Afghanistan security situation : country of origin information report : June 2019.
Date: 2019-09-08
Institutions: European Asylum Support Office
Subjects: Afghanistan, child, civil defence, establishment of peace, refugee, regional disparity, regional security, report, return migration, socioeconomic conditions

European Asylum Support Office 

Afghanistan  
Security situation 

Country of Origin Information Report 

June 2019 

SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION

 
European Asylum Support Office 

Afghanistan 
Security situation 

Country of Origin Information Report 

June 2019 

 
 
 
 
 
More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). 

ISBN:  978-92-9476-992-3 

doi: 10.2847/585139 

© European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2019 

Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated. 

For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights 
statements of the respective third parties. 

Cover photo: © US Air Force, 9 February 2018, undisclosed location Afghanistan, 180209-O-
ZZ999-0001, url 

A  83rd  Expeditionary  Rescue  Squadron  Airman  observes  a  U.S.  Army  CH-47  Chinook  at  an 
undisclosed location in Afghanistan. The 83rd ERQS is the Air Force Central Command’s first 
dedicated joint personnel recovery team, utilizing Air Force Guardian Angel teams and Army 
CH-47 Chinook crews. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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Acknowledgements 

EASO would like to acknowledge the following national asylum and migration departments as the co-
drafters of this report: 

Austria,  Federal  Office  for  Immigration  and  Asylum,  Country  of  Origin  Information 
Department 

Belgium,  Office  of  the  Commissioner  General  for  Refugees  and  Stateless  Persons,  Cedoca 
(Centre for Documentation and Research) 

France,  Office  for  the  Protection  of  Refugees  and  Stateless  persons  (OFPRA),  Information, 
Documentation and Research Division (DIDR) 

The following national asylum and migration departments reviewed this report: 

Norway, Landinfo, Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre 

Slovakia, Migration Office, Department of Documentation and Foreign Cooperation 

The following external organisations reviewed parts of this report: 

ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation 

ARC Foundation – Asylum Research Centre Foundation 

It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations 
contributes  to  the  overall  quality  of  the  report,  but  does  not  necessarily  imply  their  formal 
endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

Contents 

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. 3

Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 4

Disclaimer.............................................................................................................................................. 10

Glossary and Abbreviations .................................................................................................................. 11

Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 15

Methodology .................................................................................................................................... 15

Sources ............................................................................................................................................. 16

Structure and use of the report ........................................................................................................ 17

Map ....................................................................................................................................................... 19

1. General description of the security situation in Afghanistan ........................................................... 20

1.1 Conflict background .................................................................................................................... 20

1.1.1 Overview of recent conflicts in Afghanistan ....................................................................... 20

1.1.2 Political landscape ............................................................................................................... 21

1.1.3 Peace talks ........................................................................................................................... 23

1.1.4 International context ........................................................................................................... 24

1.2 Actors in the conflict ................................................................................................................... 25

1.2.1 Pro-government forces ........................................................................................................ 25

1.2.2 Anti-Government Elements (AGEs) ..................................................................................... 31

1.3 Recent security trends and armed confrontations ..................................................................... 40

1.3.1 Armed clashes and assaults ................................................................................................ 41

1.3.2 Improvised Explosive Devices ............................................................................................. 43

1.3.3 High-profile attacks ............................................................................................................. 44

1.3.4 Targeted killings and conflict-related abduction ................................................................ 45

1.3.5 Aerial attacks and bombings ............................................................................................... 45

1.3.6 Search operations ............................................................................................................... 46

1.4 Impact of the violence on the civilian population ...................................................................... 47

1.4.1 Civilian casualties ................................................................................................................ 47

1.4.2 State ability to secure law and order .................................................................................. 48

1.4.3 Socio-economic conditions ................................................................................................. 49

1.4.4 Refugees, IDPs, returnees ................................................................................................... 50

1.4.5 Children ............................................................................................................................... 53

1.5 Geographical Overview .............................................................................................................. 54

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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1.5.1 Urban-rural divide ............................................................................................................... 54

1.5.2 Regional differences ............................................................................................................ 57

1.5.3 Government versus Taliban control .................................................................................... 60

1.6 Mobility ....................................................................................................................................... 64

2. Regional description of the security situation in Afghanistan .......................................................... 67

2.1 Kabul city .................................................................................................................................... 67

2.1.1 General description of the city ............................................................................................ 67

2.1.2 Conflict background and actors in Kabul city ...................................................................... 69

2.1.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ........................................... 69

2.2 Badakhshan ................................................................................................................................ 75

2.2.1 General description of the province ................................................................................... 75

2.2.2 Conflict background and actors in Badakhshan .................................................................. 76

2.2.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ........................................... 79

2.3 Badghis........................................................................................................................................ 82

2.3.1 General description of the province ................................................................................... 82

2.3.2 Conflict background and actors in Badghis ......................................................................... 83

2.3.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ........................................... 85

2.4 Baghlan ....................................................................................................................................... 89

2.4.1 General description of the province ................................................................................... 89

2.4.2 Conflict background and actors in Baghlan ......................................................................... 90

2.4.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ........................................... 92

2.5 Balkh ........................................................................................................................................... 96

2.5.1 General description of the province ................................................................................... 96

2.5.2 Conflict background and actors in Balkh ............................................................................. 97

2.5.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ........................................... 99

2.6 Bamyan ..................................................................................................................................... 102

2.6.1 General description of the province ................................................................................. 102

2.6.2 Conflict background and actors in Bamyan ....................................................................... 103

2.6.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 105

2.7 Daykundi .................................................................................................................................... 107

2.7.1 General description of the province ................................................................................. 107

2.7.2 Conflict background and actors in Daykundi ..................................................................... 108

2.7.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 110

2.8 Farah ......................................................................................................................................... 112

2.8.1 General description of the province ................................................................................. 112

2.8.2 Conflict background and actors in Farah........................................................................... 113

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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2.8.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 115

2.9 Faryab ....................................................................................................................................... 119

2.9.1 General description of the province ................................................................................. 119

2.9.2 Conflict background and actors in Faryab ......................................................................... 121

2.9.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 124

2.10 Ghazni ..................................................................................................................................... 127

2.10.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 127

2.10.2 Conflict background and actors in Ghazni....................................................................... 128

2.10.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 131

2.11 Ghor ........................................................................................................................................ 135

2.11.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 135

2.11.2 Conflict background and actors in Ghor.......................................................................... 136

2.11.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 138

2.12 Helmand ................................................................................................................................. 141

2.12.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 141

2.12.2 Conflict background and actors in Helmand ................................................................... 143

2.12.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 146

2.13 Herat ....................................................................................................................................... 149

2.13.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 149

2.13.2 Conflict background and actors in Herat......................................................................... 150

2.13.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 153

2.14 Jawzjan .................................................................................................................................... 156

2.14.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 156

2.14.2 Conflict background and actors in Jawzjan ..................................................................... 157

2.14.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 160

2.15 Kabul Province ........................................................................................................................ 162

2.15.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 162

2.15.2 Conflict background and actors in Kabul province.......................................................... 163

2.15.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 165

2.16 Kandahar ................................................................................................................................. 168

2.16.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 168

2.16.2 Conflict background and actors in Kandahar .................................................................. 170

2.16.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 172

2.17 Kapisa ...................................................................................................................................... 175

2.17.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 175

2.17.2 Conflict background and actors in Kapisa ....................................................................... 176

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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2.17.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 177

2.18 Khost ....................................................................................................................................... 180

2.18.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 180

2.18.2 Conflict background and actors in Khost ........................................................................ 181

2.18.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 184

2.19 Kunar ....................................................................................................................................... 186

2.19.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 186

2.19.2 Conflict background and actors in Kunar ........................................................................ 187

2.19.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 189

2.20 Kunduz .................................................................................................................................... 193

2.20.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 193

2.20.2 Conflict background and actors in Kunduz ...................................................................... 194

2.20.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 196

2.21 Laghman ................................................................................................................................. 201

2.21.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 201

2.21.2 Conflict background and actors in Laghman ................................................................... 202

2.21.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 203

2.22 Logar ....................................................................................................................................... 206

2.22.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 206

2.22.2 Conflict background and actors in Logar ......................................................................... 207

2.22.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 208

2.23 Nangarhar ............................................................................................................................... 211

2.23.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 211

2.23.2 Conflict background and actors in Nangarhar ................................................................ 212

2.23.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 215

2.24 Nimroz .................................................................................................................................... 219

2.24.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 219

2.24.2 Conflict background and actors in Nimroz ...................................................................... 221

2.24.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 222

2.25 Nuristan .................................................................................................................................. 225

2.25.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 225

2.25.2 Conflict background and actors in Nuristan .................................................................... 226

2.25.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 228

2.26 Paktika .................................................................................................................................... 231

2.26.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 231

2.26.2 Conflict background and actors in Paktika ...................................................................... 232

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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2.26.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 235

2.27 Paktya ..................................................................................................................................... 238

2.27.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 238

2.27.2 Conflict background and actors in Paktya ....................................................................... 239

2.27.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 241

2.28 Panjsher .................................................................................................................................. 244

2.28.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 244

2.28.2 Conflict background and actors in Panjsher .................................................................... 245

2.28.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 246

2.29 Parwan .................................................................................................................................... 248

2.29.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 248

2.29.2 Conflict background and actors in Parwan ..................................................................... 249

2.29.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 250

2.30 Samangan ............................................................................................................................... 253

2.30.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 253

2.30.2 Conflict background and actors in Samangan ................................................................. 254

2.30.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 255

2.31 Sar-e Pul .................................................................................................................................. 257

2.31.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 257

2.31.2 Conflict background and actors in Sar-e Pul ................................................................... 258

2.31.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 260

2.32 Takhar ..................................................................................................................................... 263

2.32.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 263

2.32.2 Conflict background and actors in Takhar ....................................................................... 264

2.32.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 267

2.33 Uruzgan ................................................................................................................................... 270

2.33.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 270

2.33.2 Conflict background and actors in Uruzgan .................................................................... 271

2.33.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 272

2.34 Wardak ................................................................................................................................... 275

2.34.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 275

2.34.2 Conflict background and actors in Wardak ..................................................................... 276

2.34.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 277

2.35 Zabul ....................................................................................................................................... 281

2.35.1 General description of the province ............................................................................... 281

2.35.2 Conflict background and actors in Zabul ......................................................................... 282

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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2.35.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 284

Annex 1: Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 286

Annex 2: Terms of Reference .............................................................................................................. 387

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

Disclaimer 

This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2012).1 The report is based 
on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced. To the extent possible 
and unless otherwise stated, all information presented, except for undisputed or obvious facts, has 
been cross-checked. 

The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost 
care.  However,  this  document  does  not  claim  to  be  exhaustive.  If  a  particular  event,  person  or 
organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or 
that the person or organisation does not exist. 

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular claim to 
refugee status or asylum. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal 
position. 

‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as a generic terminology and not as legally defined 
in the EU Asylum Acquis and the Geneva Convention. 

Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be 
made of the information contained in this report. 

The  target  users  are  asylum  caseworkers,  COI  researchers,  policymakers,  and  decision-making 
authorities. 

The drafting process (including reviewing) for this report was finalised on 30 May 2019. Any event 
taking place after this period is not included in this report. More information on the reference period 
for this report can be found in the Methodology section of the introduction. 

1 The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI), 
2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: url 

                                                           
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Glossary and Abbreviations 

AAN 

ACC 

AGEs 

Afghanistan Analyst Network 

Afghan Citizen Card 

Anti-Government Elements are individuals and armed groups involved 
in armed conflict with, or armed opposition against, the Government 
of Afghanistan and/or international military forces. Examples of such 
groups include the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, Islamic Movement 
Jaysh 
of  Uzbekistan, 
Islamic 
Muhammed  and  groups 
State/‘Daesh’.2 

Jihad  Union,  Lashkari  Tayyiba, 

themselves  as 

identifying 

Islamic 

ALCS 

ANASOC 

ANSF/ANDSF 

Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 

Afghan National Army Special Operations Command 

Afghan  National  Security  Forces/Afghan  National  Defense  And 
Security Forces, an umbrella term which includes:3 

ABF (Afghan Border Force); 

ALP (Afghan Local Police); 

ANA (Afghan National Army); 

AAF (Afghan Air Force); 

ANP (Afghan National Police); 

ANCOF (Afghan National Civil Order Force); 

ASF (Afghan Special Forces); 

ANA TF (Afghan National Army Territorial Force); 

NDS (National Directorate of Security) 

Al Qaeda 

Attrition  is  unplanned  and  planned  total  losses,  including  Dropped 
from  Rolls,  Killed 
losses 
[disappearance/captured, disability, death (not in action), retirement, 
exempted  (i.e.  AWOL  or  permanent  medical),  or  transfer  to  the 
ANA/ANP]4 

in  Action,  Separation,  and  Other 

Absent Without Leave5 

UNAMA refers to international law for a definition of ‘civilians’: 

persons  who  are  not  members  of  military/paramilitary  forces  or 
members of organised armed groups with continuous combat function 

AQ 

Attrition  

AWOL 

Civilian 

2 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, pp. 59, 61 
3 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 61 
4 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 42 
5 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 43 

 
                                                           
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CTC 

DFR 

Eid ul-Fitr 

ETIM 

FATA 

GIRoA 

and are protected against direct attacks unless and for such time as 
they directly participate in hostilities.6 

US Combating Terrorism Center 

Dropped from Rolls personnel are those soldiers and police who leave 
the  organisation  prior  to  the  end  of  their  contract  for  reasons  that 
include desertion or being absent without leave for over a month.7 

‘Festival of breaking the fast’ that marks the end of the fasting month 
of Ramadan 

East Turkestan Islamic Movement 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas 

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 

Ground engagements  Ground  engagements  include  kinetic  ground  operations,  stand-off 
attacks, crossfire and armed clashes between parties to the conflict. 
Ground  engagements  include  attacks  or  operations  in  which  small 
arms, heavy weapons and/or area weapons systems, i.e. mortars and 
rockets are fired.8 

HIG 

IEC 

IED 

Hezb-e Islami/Gulbuddin Hekmatyar 

Independent Election Commission 

Improvised  Explosive  Device.  A  bomb  constructed  and  deployed  in 
ways other than in conventional military action. IEDs can broadly be 
divided into four categories:  

Command-Operated IEDs – Radio or remote controlled IEDs operated 
from a distance that can  enable  operators to detonate a pre-placed 
device  at  the  precise  time  a  target  moves  into  the  target  area. 
Magnetic-IEDs are IEDs attached by a magnetic or other device and are 
a sub-category of command-operated IEDs. 

Victim-Operated  IEDs  –  These  detonate  when  a  person  or  vehicle 
triggers the initiator or switch which could be a pressure plate (PP-IED) 
or pressure release mechanism, trip wire or another device, resulting 
in an explosion.  

Other IEDs – This category includes command-wired IEDs and timed-
IEDs and IEDs where the trigger/switch type for detonation could not 
be determined.  

Suicide  IEDs  –  Separately  from  data  on  IEDs,  UNAMA  documents 
civilian casualties resulting from complex and suicide attacks. Suicide 
IEDs are generally either Body-Borne IEDs (BB-IEDs) or Suicide Vehicle-
Borne  IEDs  (SVB-IEDs).  Body-Borne  IEDs  refer  to  situations  where  a 
suicide bomber wears an explosive vest or belt while Suicide Vehicle-
Borne  IEDs  is  defined  as  the  detonation  of  a  vehicle  rigged  with 
explosives  by  a  driver  or  passenger  inside  the  vehicle,  or  the 

6 UNAMA Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 62 
7 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 43 
8 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 63 

                                                           
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IEHCA 

IMF 

IMU 

IS, ISKP 

detonation of a BB-IED by the driver or a passenger while inside the 
vehicle.9 

Islamic Emirate High Council of Afghanistan 

International Military Forces 

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 

Islamic State, also called ISIS, ISIL or Daesh. Islamic State in Afghanistan 
is referred to as Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). 

Khost Protection Force  A ‘campaign force’ that was established after 2001 under international 
(CIA/US  special  forces)  control.  There  are  longstanding  allegations 
against  the  Khost  Protection  Force  of  extrajudicial  killings,  torture, 
beating and unlawful detentions.10 

KIA 

LeJ 

LeT 

Killed in Action11 

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi 

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba 

Loya Paktia 

‘Greater  Paktya’,  an  area  encompassing  the  provinces  of  Paktya, 
Paktika and Khost 

MoD 

MoI 

NGO 

NUG 

ODI 

OFS 

PGF 

Ministry of Defense 

Ministry of Interior 

Non-Governmental Organisation 

National Unity Government 

Overseas Development Institute 

Operation Freedom’s Sentinel 

Pro-Government  Forces.  Afghan  National  Security  Forces  and  other 
forces  and  groups  that  act  in  military  or  paramilitary  counter-
insurgency operations and are directly or indirectly under the control 
of the Government of Afghanistan12 

PRT 

Provincial Reconstruction Team 

Red Unit/Red Brigade 

In 2015, the Taliban established a ‘special forces’ unit named Red Unit 
or Red Brigade (‘sra qet’a’ in Pashto). They are better equipped and 
trained and are generally used as a ‘rapid reaction force’.13 

RFE/RL 

RS 

SIGAR 

TAAC 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 

Resolute Support 

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 

Train, Advise, and Assist Command 

9 UNAMA, Afghanistan, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Special Report - Increasing Harm to Afghan Civilians from 
the Deliberate and Indiscriminate Use of Improvised Explosive Devices, October 2018, url, p. 10 
10 Clark, K., Khost Protection Force Accused of Fresh Killings: Six men shot dead in Zurmat, AAN, 21 January 2019, url  
11 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 32 
12 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of civilians in armed conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 64 
13 Times (The), Helmand teeters after Taliban storm in with British tactics, 21 August 2016, url  

 
                                                           
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TTP 

UNAMA 

USDOD 

USDoS 

Ushr 

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan 

United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 

United States Department of Defense  

United States Department of State 

An  Islamic  tax  (normally  10%)  on  certain  products,  for  example 
agricultural products. 

USIP 

United States Institute of Peace 

 
 
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Introduction 

This report was co-drafted by EASO and Country of Origin Information (COI) specialists from the COI 
units and asylum offices listed in the Acknowledgements section.  

The report aims to provide information on the security situation in Afghanistan, which is relevant for 
international  protection  status  determination  (PSD;  refugee  status  and  subsidiary  protection).  The 
terms of reference can be found in Annex 2. 

Methodology  

This  report  is  an  update  of  the  EASO  COI  report  Afghanistan  Security  Situation  first  published  in 
January 2015, and updated in January 2016, November 2016, December 2017 and May 2018.14  

For the assessment of the need for international protection, especially taking into account article 15(c) 
of the Qualification Directive (QD), the following are key elements : 

•  a real risk of serious harm;  
•  an internal or international armed conflict;  
• 
• 
•  a serious and individual threat to life or person. 

indiscriminate violence;  
the term ‘civilian’; and  

Based on various sources consulted by EASO,15 these key elements can be broken down into topics 
and/or indicators. Examples include: parties to the conflict; intensity level of the violence; nature of 
the violence; regional spreading of the violence; targets of the violence; risk of collateral damage; use 
of arms and tactics; possibility to reach areas – security of transport (roads and airports); and indirect 
effects of the violence/conflict. 

Based upon a study of all the mentioned sources, a list of elements and indicators was drafted, which 
served  as  a  basis  for  the  terms  of  reference  (see  Annex  2).  In  order  to  make  a  well-informed 
assessment of the fear of persecution or risk of serious harm, information is needed on these security-
related elements and indicators on a regional, provincial or even district level in the country of origin. 

Members of the EASO COI Specialist Network on Afghanistan and UNHCR gave input on the terms of 
reference that were finalised by the co-drafters in September 2014 taking all the inputs into account. 
In March 2015, EASO held a practical cooperation meeting on Afghanistan in Brussels, in which the 
participating  EU+  countries16  gave  feedback  on  the  first  EASO  COI  Report  -  Afghanistan  Security 
Situation of January 2015. 

The terms of reference were further consulted with EU+ countries and UNHCR during the process for 
developing and updating country guidance notes on Afghanistan (2016-2019), for which this report is 
produced. 

14 EASO COI reports are available via EASO’s website: url  
15 The elements, topics and indicators were identified by various sources that have a different position in the legal hierarchy 
and provide different levels of detail: The Qualification Directive (Recitals and articles); Case law from the Court of Justice of 
the  EU  in  Luxembourg;  National  State  Practice  (National  legislation;  National  case  law;  National policy  and  first  instance 
decision practice); Case law from the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg; Opinions of experts, academics and 
specialised organisations; See the following EASO publications: EASO, Article 15(c) Qualification Directive (2011/95/EU) A 
judicial analysis, December 2014, url; The Implementation of Article 15(c) QD in EU Member States, July 2015, url 
16 EU+ countries are the EU Member States plus the associated countries Norway and Switzerland. 

 
 
 
                                                           
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The reference period for describing events was from January 2018 until February 2019. A number of 
specialised paper-based and electronic sources were consulted.  

In order to ensure that the drafters respected the EASO COI Report Methodology, a review was carried 
in  the 
out  by  COI  specialists  from  the  countries  and  organisations 
Acknowledgements section. This quality process led to the inclusion of some additional information, 
in  response  to  feedback  received  during  the  respective  reviews,  until 30  May 2019.  All  comments 
made by the reviewers were taken into consideration and most of them were implemented in the 
final draft of this report. 

listed  as  reviewers 

Sources 

As a co-drafter of the report, the Austrian Country of Origin Information Department (Bundesamt für 
Fremdwesen  und  Asyl  [BFA]  Staatendokumentation)  provided  a  map  of  airports  with  scheduled 
passenger service as of 25 March 2019 and another map of security incidents from 1 January 2018 to 
28 February 2019 along with data on incidents using the following sources: 

Administrative units (districts and provinces of Afghanistan): 

•  AIMS (Afghanistan Information Management System), n.d., AIMS Political Divisions Map (398 
Districts),  https://esoc.princeton.edu/subfiles/aims-political-divisions-map,  accessed  25 
March 2019 

International borders (neighbouring states): 

•  GADM (Database of Global Administrative Areas), n.d., Global Administrative Areas version 

2.8, http://gadm.org/version2, accessed 25 March 2019 

Roads, airports, railway lines, cities: 

•  Geofabrik, 

OpenStreetMap 

Data 

Afghanistan, 

n.d., 

https://download.geofabrik.de/asia/afghanistan.html, accessed 25 March 2019 

•  OurAirports.com,  Airports  near  Afghanistan,  http://ourairports.com/search?q=Afghanistan, 

n.d., accessed 25 March 2019 

• 

Flightradar24.com,  Flight  Tracker,  https://www.flightradar24.com/34.01,67.19/7,  n.d., 
accessed 25 March 2019 

•  Ariana Afghan Airlines, Ariana Afghan Airlines, https://www.flyariana.com/, n.d., accessed 25 

March 2019 

•  Kam Air, Kam Air, https://www.kamair.com/, n.d., accessed 25 March 2019 

Security-related incidents: 

Global  Incident  Map  (n.d.):  Global  Incident  Map  displaying  Terrorist  Acts,  Suspicious  Activity,  and 
General Terrorism News, www.globalincidentmap.com, accessed 1 March 2019 

Relying on internet-based global news media reports, Global Incident Map collects security-related 
incidents connected to terrorism worldwide and provides a geo-referenced display of such incidents, 
broken down by types, on an online map, accessible upon payment. Any such incident listed always 
comes with a  citation. The  original  classification by incident type was retained, except for the two 
categories  ‘Other  suspicious  activity’  and  ‘General  terrorism  news’,  which  was  clustered  into  the 
broader category ‘other, undefined’, as they did not fit into any of the more specific categories.  

Incidents  listed  in  this  database  were  qualified  as  security-relevant. Double  entries  were  removed 
manually. The information provided includes the coordinates (latitude, longitude) of the village or the 
nearest town or city, not the actual location of the incident. 

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  17  

Further sources were used for cross-checking: 

•  ACLED 

Event  Data 
http://www.acleddata.com/data/, n.d., accessed 1 March 2019 

(Armed  Conflict 

Location 

and 

Project),  ACLED  Data, 

• 

INSO 
https://www.ngosafety.org/country/afghanistan, n.d., accessed 1 March 2019 

Organization), 

International 

Safety 

NGO 

(The 

Afghanistan, 

As a rule, set by Global Incident Map, security-related incidents do not include criminal incidents, but 
incidents  which  it  ascribes  to  or  associates  with  insurgents,  including  bomb  attacks  (successful  or 
attempted), targeted assassinations or assassination attempts, abductions, arson attacks, attacks with 
firearms and gunfights. Activities performed by state actors are subsumed under the category ‘arrests, 
captures, kills’. 

Furthermore, this report relies extensively on data provided by UNAMA in their reports on Protection 
of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Afghanistan. UNAMA uses a robust methodology to verify reported 
incidents  by  corroborating  and  cross  checking  incidents,  conducting  on-site  investigations,  and 
consulting a broad range of credible and reliable sources. For verification of each incident involving a 
civilian  casualty,  UNAMA  requires  at  least  three  different  and  independent  sources.  Unverified 
incidents are not included in its reporting.17 According to analysts, this stringent verification standard 
also means ‘there may be many more casualties than UNAMA is able to confirm’.18 

Structure and use of the report 

This report is not meant to be read as a whole. In the first part a general description is given on the 
security situation in Afghanistan including a geographical overview, which is then explained in greater 
detail in the second part, holding a regional description of geographic subdivisions (Kabul City and 34 
provinces). 

Provinces and districts 

The provincial chapters in this report are organised alphabethically and have the following structure: 
a  general  description  of  the  province  contains  information  on  the  geography  and  population;  the 
conflict  background  takes  a  longer  term  look  at  the  security  situation  in  a  province,  including  the 
armed actors active in the province. A section on recent trends in the security situation describes the 
nature of the violence, targets, locations, and casualties within the timeframe from 1 January 2018 
until 28 February 2019. Finally, conflict-induced displacements are described in a separate section. 

Both  the  general  and  regional  sections  provide  information  from  various  sources  on  the  relevant 
elements and indicators. Information on an indicator as such should never be taken as conclusive but 
as  indicative  for  protection  assessment  and  is  to  be  read  together  with  all  other  indicators  and 
information on the region (or province, district). 

There are a number of provinces and districts for which the administrative boundaries are unclear. 
For example, it is unclear whether the district of Gizab belongs to Uruzgan or Daykundi province.19 
Nor is it clear whether the district of Gormach belongs to Badghis or Faryab province.20 

17 UNAMA’s full description of their methodology can be found at: UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, pp. i-ii 
18 Bjelica, J. and Ruttig, T., UNAMA Mid-Year Report 2017: Number of civilian casualties still at “record level”, 18 July 2017, 
url 
19 Norway, Landinfo, Respons. Afghanistan: Gizab-distriktet, 11 December 2014, url  
20 Bjelica, J., How Neglect and Remoteness Bred Insurgency and a Poppy Boom: The story of Badghis, 22 February 2017, url 

 
                                                           
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

The Managing Director at Alcis, a company providing geographic information services with many years 
of  experience  in  Afghanistan,  contacted  by  OFPRA’s  Information,  Documentation  and  Research 
Division, stated in an e-mail in August 2017 that 

‘[t]here  is  not  one  unified  agreed  district  and  province  boundary  dataset  currently  in 
use.  There are various ‘official’ versions. […] The boundaries within these different datasets 
have  changed  over  time.  Some  districts  have  been  passed  across  to  other  Provinces  for 
administrative purposes. Some new districts have been created over time. Some areas within 
Afghanistan are still referred to as districts by locals of the area, even though they have never 
had boundaries created for them and never been treated as a district’.21 

In absence of an official list of districts, EASO chooses in principal to follow the administrative divisions 
of  the  provinces  used  by  UNOCHA,  as  they  produce  very  clear  maps  and  use  the  same  division 
systematically in all their publications.22  

21 Brittan, R., Managing Director Alcis, e-mail, 16 August 2017. 
22 All their relevant maps can be found at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/infographics   

 
 
                                                           
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  19  

Map  

Map 1: Afghanistan - administrative divisions©UNOCHA 

 
 
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

1.  General  description  of  the  security 
situation in Afghanistan 

1.1 Conflict background 

1.1.1 Overview of recent conflicts in Afghanistan 

The so-called Saur Revolution on 27 April 1978 brought the Afghan communists to power.23 In 1979, 
the government of the former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to support the communist Afghan 
government  headed  by  Babrak  Karmal.  The  invasion  was  followed  by  a  decade  of  armed  conflict 
between the Afghan government, supported by Soviet troops, and armed opposition groups, often 
referred to as the ‘mujahideen’. These groups were divided into several different factions, but they all 
participated in a nation-wide armed uprising that lasted until the government finally collapsed in 1992, 
following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.24 

After this collapse, a period generally referred to as ‘Civil War’ saw different mujahideen groups who 
had formed new alliances and fronts fighting for control of Afghanistan.25 War between the competing 
mujahideen factions and militias was characterised by severe human rights breaches.26 This led to the 
emergence in 1994 of a group called the Taliban, who brought stability in areas under their control, 
which won them support from segments of the population.27 They gradually gained more control and 
conquered Kabul in 1996. By 2001, the Taliban controlled most of the Afghan territory. But by the end 
of the year, as a consequence of the 11 September attacks in the US, they were ousted by a US-led 
military operation.28 The US gave its support to the mujahideen front opposing the Taliban, at that 
time known as Northern Alliance or Northern coalition.29 

On 22 December 2001, based on the Bonn Agreement, an Afghan interim government was formed, 
led by Hamid Karzai,30 a Pashtun, who also won the first presidential elections in October 2004.31 The 
Taliban had reorganised and increased their presence substantially by 2006 in Wardak, Logar, Zabul 
and Uruzgan provinces and began expanding along the western edge of Kabul province.32 Other anti-
government elements (AGEs) operating in Afghanistan included Hezb-e Islami/Gulbuddin Hekmatyar 
(HIG),  the  Haqqani  network33  and  Al  Qaeda  affiliates,  including  Tehrik-e  Taliban  Pakistan  (TTP), 
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).34 This 

23 Clark, K., An April Day that Changed Afghanistan 2: Afghans remember the ‘Saur Revolution’, AAN, 27 April 2018, url  
24 Barfield, T., A Cultural and Political History, 2010, p. 234; BBC News, Afghanistan profile – Timeline, updated on: 31 January 
2018,  url;  Ipsos/ICRC,  Our  world.  Views  from  the  field.  Summary  report:  Afghanistan,  Colombia,  Democratic  Republic  of 
Congo, Georgia, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia and the Philippines. Opinion Survey, June 2009, url, p. 10; Oxfam International, The 
Cost of War, Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978-2009, November 2009, url, pp. 7-9. 
25 BBC News, Afghanistan profile – Timeline, updated on: 31 January 2018, url; HRW, Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity, July 
2001, url, pp. 13-17; International Crisis Group, The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland, 17 June 2011, url, p. 3 
26 Oxfam International, The Cost of War, Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978-2009, November 2009, url, p. 10 
27 Giustozzi, A. and Ibrahimi, N., Thirty Years of Conflict: Drivers of anti-Government Mobilisation in Afghanistan, 1978-2011, 
January 2012, url, p. 22. 
28 CFR, The Taliban in Afghanistan, 4 July 2014, url  
29 International Crisis Group, The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland, 17 June 2011, url, p. 5 
30 Oxfam International, The Cost of War, Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978-2009, November 2009, url, p. 13; UNAMA, 
Eighth Anniversary Today of 2001 Afghan Interim Authority, 22 December 2009, url   
31 Guardian (The), The Afghan interim government: who's who, 6 December 2001, url; New York Times (The), Election of 
Karzai Is Declared Official, 4 November 2004, url 
32 International Crisis Group, The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland, 17 June 2011, url, p. 7 
33 International Crisis Group, The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland, 17 June 2011, url, pp. 14-15 
34 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 18 June 2014, 
url, p. 6. 

                                                           
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  21  

insurgency was characterised by mainly asymmetric warfare: AGEs used roadside and suicide bombs 
and complex35 attacks, intimidation of civilians and targeted killings to destabilise the country. This 
was  countered  by  searches,  clearance  operations  and  bombings  by  the  Afghan  National  Security 
Forces (ANSF) and international military forces.36  

According to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), the security situation 
deteriorated after 2005. The conflict deepened throughout 2007 and 2008, directly affecting around 
a third of the country.37 

From 2010 onwards, the Taliban-led insurgency spread into all regions of Afghanistan.38 By the end of 
2014, a transition of security responsibility from international troops to the ANSF was completed. The 
support for the further development of the ANSF continued ‘under a new, smaller non-combat NATO-
led mission (“Resolute Support”)’.39  

After  the  2014  international  military  withdrawal,  the  Taliban  have  fastly  expanded  their  presence 
countrywide.40  The  report  of  the  UN  Secretary  General in August 2017 noted that the Taliban  had 
been able to control larger parts of the country and the emergence of Islamic State in Iraq and the 
Levant - Khorasan Province (ISKP) added ‘a new, dangerous dimension’ to the situation.41 

According to UNAMA, in 2018 fighting intensified particularly in the east, southeast and in some areas 
within the south. The Taliban ‘made territorial gains in sparsely populated areas, and advanced their 
positions in areas that had not seen fighting in years’.42 Human Rights Watch noted that although the 
Taliban claimed to target government and foreign military facilities only, their indiscriminate use of 
force killed and injured hundreds of civilians.43  

1.1.2 Political landscape 

The  disputed  2014  presidential  election  resulted  in  a  political  compromise  which  led  to  the 
establishment of the National Unity Government (NUG), under the Presidency of Ashraf Ghani and 
Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah. Divisions within the government, particularly between Ghani and 
Abdullah and their camps, severely compromised the NUG’s effectiveness.44 According to the Kabul-
based Afghanistan Analyst Network (AAN) in January 2017, ‘its complex power-sharing arrangements 
[have] paralysed governance in Afghanistan’.45  

A series of violent events in Kabul in May-June 2017 caused a political crisis, resulting in a ‘significant 
shift  in  the  political  climate’  marked  by  a  rift  between  President  Ghani  and  key  members  of  the 
Jamiaat-e Islami party.46 The crisis also resulted in the consolidation of power within the NUG47 and 

35 See Glossary. 
36 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of civilians in armed conflict Midyear Report 2014, July 2014, url, pp. 5, 9, 21 
37 UNAMA, Afghanistan, Annual Report On Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2008, url, p. 1 
38 UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Afghanistan, 15 May 2015, url,  
p. 2. 
39 NATO, Inteqal: Transition to Afghan lead, updated on: 7 January 2015, url 
40 International Crisis Group, Afghanistan: Growing Challenges, 30 April 2017, url 
41 UN Secretary-General, Special report on the strategic review of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 10 
August 2017, url, p. 3. 
42 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 8 
43 HRW, World Report 2019 - Afghanistan, 17 January 2019, url  
44 Foreign Policy, NUG One Year On: Struggling to Govern, 29 September 2015, url 
45 AAN, What to Watch? Key issues to follow in Afghanistan in 2017, 27 January 2017, url 
46 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 15 September 
2017, url, p. 2 
47 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 15 September 
2017, url, p. 2 

 
                                                           
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in the first eight months of 2017, the government made progress on high-level appointments, which 
had previously been a source of tension.48  

The Independent Election Commission (IEC) set a date for the next parliamentary and district council 
elections in July 2018. In September 2017, the UN Secretary General called this timeline ‘ambitious’ 
but ‘achievable’.49 However, as a result of security challenges and voter registration reforms the long-
delayed parliamentary elections were rescheduled again to October 2018.50 Parliamentary elections 
were held in 32 provinces on 20-21 October 2018.51 Voting in Kandahar was delayed by a week after 
the assassination of the provincial police chief in a Taliban-claimed attack two days before the original 
date  of  the  elections.52  Voting  in  Ghazni  was  postponed  indefinitely  due  to  security  issues  and 
disagreements around constituencies and will be held at the same time as the presidential election.53  

Although  voter  turnout  in  Kabul  and  other  urban  centres  was  reportedly  high,  technical  and 
organisational problems occurred at some of the 4 900 polling stations across the country. In some 
polling stations machines registering fingerprints and portrait photos aiming to prevent double voting 
did not function properly while in others election staff had difficulties handling them.54  

From the beginning of the voter registration period until the day before the elections UNAMA verified 
152 election-related security incidents that resulted in 496 civilian casualties (156 deaths, 340 injured). 
Similar to the trends observed during the presidential election of 2014, in the 2018 election ‘UNAMA 
verified reports of the Taliban warning citizens not to register to vote in the elections, fining citizens 
and/or confiscating the national identity cards (tazkiras) of those who did register and threatening to 
punish election-related staff if they continued their work, including with death’.55 

In December 2018 the IEC announced a three-month delay for the presidential election which was 
originally  scheduled  for  20 April 2019.  Provincial  and  district  council  elections  were  planned  for 
20 July 2019, along with the previously postponed parliamentary vote in Ghazni province. Reasons for 
the postponement included winter weather conditions across much of the country in April and also 
the expense of holding four elections separately.56 In March 2019 the elections have been postponed 
again,  this  time  to  28 September 2019  in  an  attempt  to  ‘to  iron  out  problems  with  the  voting 
process’.57 IEC has published the preliminary list of presidential candidates that includes incumbent 
Ashraf Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, former national security adviser, Muhammad Hanif 
Atmar and also Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.58 Interior Minister Amrullah Saleh, once a devoted critic of the 
president stepped down from  his  position to join Ghani's team as a candidate for the post of vice 
president.59 Appointing Saleh was an effort from the ethnic Pashtun Ghani to neutralize a political 
opponent and to get the support of the Tajiks, among whom Saleh has a strong backing.60 

48 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 15 June 2017, 
url, p. 2; UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 15 
September 2017, url, p. 2 
49 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 15 September 
2017, url, p. 13 
50 Al Jazeera, Afghanistan's elections: All you need to know, 19 October 2018, url  
51 Tolo News, Ghazni Elections Could Be Held With Presidential Elections, 27 October 2018, url  
52 CNN, Kandahar goes to the polls in Afghan parliamentary vote delayed by violence, 27 October 2018, url  
53 Tolo News, Ghazni Elections Could Be Held With Presidential Elections, 27 October 2018, url 
54 Diplomat (The), Afghan Parliamentary Elections Marred by Technical Troubles and Insecurity, 21 October 2018, url  
55 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Special Report: 2018 Elections Violence, November 2018, 
url, p. 3  
56 France24, Afghan presidential election delayed until July 20, 30 December 2018, url  
57 Reuters, Afghanistan presidential election postponed to September, 20 March 2019, url 
58 Adili, A.Y., Afghanistan’s 2019 elections (2): Who is running to become the next president?, AAN, 11 February 2019, url 
59 New York Times (The), Afghan Presidential Race Takes Shape as Ghani’s Challengers Emerge, 18 January 2019, url 
60 Reuters, Afghanistan's Ghani launches bid for second presidential term, 20 January 2019, url 

                                                           
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—  23  

1.1.3 Peace talks 

After the collapse of the Doha peace talks in June 2013, talks did not resume before the new president, 
Ashraf  Ghani,  was  inaugurated  in  September  2014.61  In  January  2015,  the  Taliban  stated  that  its 
preconditions for entering peace talks were the end of foreign military presence, the establishment 
of an Islamic government and the implementation of sharia.62 After the death of Mullah Omar was 
revealed in July 2015, a power struggle broke out within the Taliban which, at least in part, prevented 
further progress in the peace talks.63 

In January 2016, the US, Afghanistan, Pakistan and China formed a Quadrilateral Coordination Group 
to  take  forward  the  peace  talks.  However,  the  Taliban  refused  to  engage  with  this  process.64  In 
September 2016, the government signed a peace deal with Hezb-e Islami/Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HIG). 
Describing HIG as a ‘fading insurgent group’, Borhan Osman explained in 2016 the likely effect of this 
deal on the battlefield as ‘unlikely to significantly lower the current levels of violence’.65 

In 2017, President Ghani offered the Taliban a ’last chance’ for reconciliation at the ‘Kabul-process’, 
‘an  international  conference  aiming  to  set  the  stage  for  peace  talks  and  restore  security  in 
Afghanistan’.66  However, according  to  a  September 2017  report of the UN Secretary-General ‘[n]o 
discernible  progress  has  been  made  in  fostering  negotiations  between  the  Government  and  the 
Taliban’.67 

In February 2018 the Afghan government presented very ‘concrete proposals for peace talks with the 
Taliban’  which,  according  to  AAN,  was  ‘the  most  complete  peace  offer  that  has  been  publicly 
announced  since  2001’.  Although  President  Ghani’s  peace  plan  was  offered  ‘without  any 
preconditions’, it was made clear that issues as women’s rights or the basic values of the constitution 
were not up for negotiation. While the proposal included  the prospect of establishing a Taliban office 
in Kabul, the possibility of a ceasefire and also lifting the sanctions on those Taliban leaders who would 
join the negotiation, the Taliban accused Ghani of ‘missing the point’ namely their key demand on the 
withdrawal of foreign troops.68 

In June 2018 ‘President Ghani called a unilateral halt to all offensive government actions’ over the 
Muslim  holiday  of  Eid  ul-Fitr  which  the  Taliban  also  joined.69  However,  the  Taliban  rejected  the 
President’s  idea  of  extending  the  ceasefire  and  continued  to  refuse  official  negotiations  with  the 
Afghan government.70  

International  diplomatic  efforts  intensified  towards  peace  with  the  appointment  of  Zalmay 
Khalilzad as the US Special Representative for  Afghanistan Reconciliation in September 201871 and 
with  Russia  hosting  a  meeting  in  November  2018  on  the  peace  process  that  was  attended  by  11 
countries and the Taliban as well.72  

Both tracks of negotiations continued in 2019. The Moscow meeting in the beginning of February 2019 
brought together the Taliban delegation led by chief negotiator, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai 

61 Farrell, T. and Semple, M., Ready for Peace? The Afghan Taliban after a decade of War, January 2017, url, p. 3 
62 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 27 February 
2015, url, p. 3  
63 Farrell, T. and Semple, M., Ready for Peace? The Afghan Taliban after a decade of War, January 2017, url, p. 4 
64 Farrell, T. and Semple, M., Ready for Peace? The Afghan Taliban after a decade of War, January 2017, url, p. 3 
65 Osman, B., Peace With Hekmatyar: What does it mean for battlefield and politics?, AAN, 29 September 2016, url 
66 DW, Ashraf Ghani offers Taliban 'last chance' for peace, 6 June 2017, url 
67 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 15 September 
2017, url, p. 4 
68 Ruttig, T. and Bjelica, J., Who shall cease the fire first? Afghanistan’s peace offer to the Taleban, AAN, 1 March 2018, url  
69 Clark, K., The Eid Ceasefire: Allowing Afghans to imagine their country at peace, AAN, 19 June 2018, url  
70 Ruttig, T., Getting to the Steering Wheel: President Ghani’s new set of peace proposals, AAN, 4 December 2018, url  
71 USDOS, Zalmay Khalilzad - Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, n.d., url 
72 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 9 

 
                                                           
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

and senior Afghan politicians led by former President Hamid Karzai. The talks were scheduled just a 
week after the US and the Taliban finished six days of negotiations in Qatar.73 According to AAN co-
director and senior analyst Thomas Ruttig, while in Doha progress was being made in the form of an 
agreed draft framework, the negotiations so far did not involve the Afghan government, one of the 
main three parties to the conflict, since their inclusion is blocked by the Taliban.74 The next round of 
talks, the highest level negotiations yet, began on 25 February 2019 between the insurgent group and 
the US involving Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban’s deputy leader.75 Although his presence 
could improve the chances of making progress, it is not clear how a deal could be reached given the 
absence of discussion between the Taliban and the Afghan government.76 

A  consultative  Loya  Jirga  was  initially  planned  in  Kabul  in  March  2019  with  the  goal  of  creating  a 
framework  for  the  Afghan  government  to  engage  in  peace  negotiations  with  the  Taliban.  The 
gathering  of  Afghan  politicians  and  tribal,  ethnic  and  religious  leaders  was  supposed  to  discuss 
negotiations  with  the  Taliban  along  with  the  government’s  ‘values  and  red  lines’,  however  it  was 
postponed.77 

1.1.4 International context 
In 2017, the US decided to slow down its troop withdrawal and, in August, President Donald Trump 
promised to deploy more American troops to Afghanistan to continue to train Afghan forces.78 

However, in late December 2018 media reported that President Trump decided to withdraw around 
7 000 troops from Afghanistan, about half of the remaining US force there.79 As of December 2018, 
there were  an estimated 14 000 US troops in Afghanistan.80 Around 8 500 of them are part  of the 
Resolute Support Mission, a 17 000-strong international NATO force that is training and advising the 
Afghan military.81 The timing and extent of the potential withdrawal of US troops remained uncertain 
as of February 2019, although US acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan stated that any potential 
withdrawal from Afghanistan would be ‘coordinated’ with other NATO members.82 

In  2016-2017  Afghanistan’s  relations  with  Pakistan  were  tense83  and  remained  tenuous  in  2018.84 
Both countries have been blaming each other for sheltering terrorists85 and escalating border tensions 
resulted in Pakistan building a fence on the border to prevent the movement of militants.86 USDoD 
noted  that  even  though  Pakistani military operations  disrupted  some  militant  safe  havens,  certain 
groups, such as the Taliban and the Haqqani Network enjoyed freedom of movement in Pakistan.87 
Following Imran Khan’s inauguration as Prime Minister of Pakistan in August 2018, the two countries 
continued efforts to improve their relations.88 As part of a ‘confidence-building measure’ and showing 

73 New York Times (The), In Moscow, Afghan Peace Talks Without the Afghan Government, 4 February 2019, url  
74 Ruttig, T., “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”: First steps in Afghan peace negotiations, AAN, 4 February 2019, 
url 
75 New York Times (The), U.S. and Taliban Begin Highest-Level Talks Yet on Ending Afghan War, 25 February 2019, url 
76 BBC News, Afghan peace talks: Taliban co-founder meets top White House envoy, 25 February 2019, url  
77 RFE/RL, Afghan Loya Jirga Aimed At Discussing Peace Talks Delayed, 3 March 2019, url 
78 New York Times (The), Trump Outlines New Afghanistan War Strategy with Few Details, 21 August 2017, url; New York 
Times (The), U.S. Says It Has 11,000 Troops in Afghanistan, More Than Formerly Disclosed, 30 August 2017, url 
79 RFE/RL, What Would A U.S. Troop Reduction In Afghanistan Mean?, 21 December 2018, url  
80 CNN, US military ordered to begin planning to withdraw about half the troops in Afghanistan, 21 December 2018, url  
81 NATO, Resolute Support Mission RSM: Key Facts and Figures, February 2019, url, p. 2 
82 RFE/RL, U.S. Vows ‘No Unilateral’ Troop Reduction In Afghanistan, 14 February 2019, url  
83 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 3 March 2017 
url, p. 4 
84 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 23 
85 Daily Pakistan, Pakistan desires peace, stability in Afghanistan: Khawaja Asif, 2 September 2017, url 
86 Dawn, Pakistan holds 'keys to war', says Afghan president, 31 January 2019, url  
87 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 24 
88 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 7 December 
2018, url, p. 7 

                                                           
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that Pakistan opted for a constructive role in the Afghan peace talks, Islamabad released Mullah Abdul 
Ghani Baradar who had been imprisoned since 2010. Mullah Baradar was appointed as a new leader 
for the Taliban's political office in Qatar, effectively making him the chief negotiator on behalf of the 
insurgent  group  for  the  peace  talks  with  the  US.89  However,  in  January  2019  President  Ghani 
suggested that Pakistan was a safe haven for militants and their cross-border activities by saying that 
the ‘keys to war are in Islamabad, Quetta, [and] Rawalpindi’.90 

In 2017, there were several accounts of Russia and Iran actively supporting the Taliban.91 According 
to  USDOD,  Iran  is  trying  to  grow  ties  with  the  Afghan  government  through  trade  and  economic 
investments  while  providing  support  to  the  Taliban  without  alienating  Kabul.92  Tehran  viewed  the 
Taliban as a useful tool to resist US influence on its border. Providing military equipment to them puts 
enough pressure on the United States without the risk of military retaliation.93 

Although Russia denied organising talks between Taliban representatives and an Afghan delegation 
led by Hamid Karzai, Moscow hosted meetings on the peace process in November 2018 and February 
2019 and according to RFE/RL it is ‘highly unlikely such a high-profile event would be allowed to take 
place in Moscow without the Kremlin's blessing’.94  

1.2 Actors in the conflict 

1.2.1 Pro-government forces 
The Pro-Government Forces (PGF) include the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) other forces and 
groups acting in military or paramilitary counter-insurgency operations directly or indirectly under the 
control  of  the  Government  of  Afghanistan  and  also  include  International  Military  Forces  (IMF)  and 
other foreign intelligence and security forces.95 

In 2018, UNAMA attributed 24 % of civilian casualties to Pro-Government Forces documenting 2 612 
civilian casualties (1 185 deaths and 1 427 injured) that PGF were responsible for. Compared to 2017, 
this  shows  a  24 %  increase  in  civilian  casualties  attributed  to  PGF  that  was  mainly  driven  by  a 
considerable increase in civilian casualties from aerial operations by IMF and from search operations 
by ANSF and pro-Government armed groups.96 

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 

The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) or Afghan National Defense And Security Forces (ANDSF) 
is an a ‘umbrella’ term that includes the Afghan Border Force, Afghan Local Police, Afghan National 
Army,  Afghan  Air  Force,  Afghan  National  Police,  Afghan  National  Civil  Order  Force,  Afghan  Special 
Forces, Afghan Territorial Army, and the National Directorate of Security.97 

89 RFE/RL, 'Hopeful Moment': How An 'Afghan-Led, Afghan-Owned' Peace Process Might Look, 29 January 2019, url  
90 Dawn, Pakistan holds 'keys to war', says Afghan president, 31 January 2019, url  
91 Business Insider, Russia appears to now be helping out the Taliban, 27 January 2017 url; Washington Post (The), Russia is 
sending weapons to Taliban, top U.S. general confirms, 24 April 2017 url; Wall Street Journal (The), Iran Backs Taliban With 
Cash and Arms, 11 June 2015 url; VoA, Afghan Lawmakers to Investigate Growing Ties Between Taliban, Russia and Iran, 5 
December 2016 url; RFE/RL, Afghan Governor Accuses Iran Of Supporting Taliban, 31 July 2017 url; Giustozzi, A., Afghanistan: 
Taliban’s  organization  and  structure,  23  August  2017  url,  p.  9.  Some  observers  are  more  sceptical  about  Russia’s  direct 
involvement. See: Atlantic (The), Is Russia Really Arming the Taliban?, 25 August 2017, url 
92 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 27 
93 USIP, Iran and Afghanistan’s Long, Complicated History, 14 June 2018,  url  
94 RFE/RL, 'Intra-Afghan' Talks Under Way In Moscow Amid Continuing Violence, 5 February 2019, url; Al Jazeera, Taliban: 
Russia meeting 'not about direct talks' with Kabul, 9 November 2018, url  
95 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, pp. 59, 65 
96 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, pp. 4-5 
97 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 62 

 
                                                           
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According  to  USDOD  the  ANDSF’s  total  authorised  force  level  remained  352 000  personnel  as  of 
December 2018. This includes 227 374 ANA and 124 626 ANP personnel, but excludes 30 000 Afghan 
Local Police (ALP), who are under the command of the Ministry of Interior (MoI).98 However, according 
to  the  US  military’s  Special  Inspector  General  for  Afghanistan  Reconstruction  (SIGAR),  the  actual 
personnel strength of the ANDSF as of 31 October 2018 was 308 693 personnel which is considered 
the lowest since the Resolute Support (RS) mission started in January 2015.99 

Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Washington's top priority was to build up new security forces but 
low  morale,  corruption  and  desertion  are  plaguing  this  process.100  USDOD  noted  that  attrition 
remained a problem for both the ANA and the ANP.101 Reasons for attrition included fatalities, soldiers 
going AWOL102  or  declining to  re-enlist.103 In  January 2019, President  Ghani  stated that more  than 
45 000  members  of  the  Afghan  security  forces  have  been  killed  since  he  took  office  in  2014.104 
According to SIGAR, ‘green-on-green’ insider attacks (ANDSF personnel being attacked from within 
their own ranks, sometimes by an insurgent infiltrator) remain a significant problem for the ANDSF. 105 

In December 2018, USDOD attributed the greatest portion of ANA and ANP attrition106 rates to the 
number of personnel ‘dropped from the rolls’ (DFR)107 but also noted that DFR rates for both the ANA 
and  the  ANP  are  at  the  lowest  they  have  been  during  Resolute  Support  Mission. DFRs occur  for a 
number  of  reasons,  including  low  pay,  delays  in  pay,  harsh  living  conditions,  denial  of  leave, 
intimidation by insurgents and seasonality. USDOD found poor leadership to be the single greatest 
contributor to DFRs with soldiers and police growing ‘disillusioned with leaders who fail to take care 
of them with leave, promotion, and pay in accordance with standing policies’. Although both the ANA 
and the ANP  have policies to prevent personnel from  being absent  without  leave, enforcement of 
these policies and accountability remained inconsistent.108 

In  2017,  the  Afghan  government  started  implementing  a  four-year  ‘Road  Map’  to  streamline  and 
bolster the ANSF. The aim of the plan is to ensure the government’s control over population centres 
by tackling leadership issues, resource management and rampant corruption, and by doubling the size 
and combat power of the Special  Forces, strengthening the air component, and moving the police 
away from a combat missions to civil policing.109 

According  to  USDOD,  the  ANDSF’s  2018  Annual  Campaign  Plan  ‘marked  the  transition  from  a 
defensive, reactive posture to a deliberate offensive posture’. Although the ANDSF is making efforts 
to become more offensive,  ANDSF intelligence failed to detect preparation prior  to the attacks on 
provincial  centres  in  Farah  (May 2018)  and  Ghazni  (August 2018),  which  suggests  intelligence 
capabilities require significant improvement.110 

UNAMA attributed 1 535 civilian casualties (606 deaths and 929 injured) to ANSF in 2018.111 

98 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 41 
99 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, 30 January 2019, url, p. 79 
100 DW, Afghanistan security forces suffer steep decline in numbers, says SIGAR, 1 May 2018, url  
101 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 42 
102 See Glossary. 
103 Al Jazeera, 'Will never rejoin': Record casualties take toll on Afghan forces, 23 November 2018, url  
104 BBC News, Afghanistan's Ghani says 45,000 security personnel killed since 2014, 25 January 2019, url  
105 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, 30 January 2019, url, p. 80 
106 See Glossary.  
107 See Glossary.  
108 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, pp. 42-43 
109  SIGAR,  Quarterly  Report  to  the  US  Congress,  30  July  2017,  url,  p.  94;  USDOD;  Enhancing  Security  and  Stability  in 
Afghanistan, June 2017, url, pp. 2-3;  Marty, F. J., Expanding Afghanistan’s Special Operations Forces: Doubling their success 
or further diluting their mission?, AAN, 2 October 2017, url  
110 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 36 
111 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 34 

                                                           
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Afghan National Army (ANA) 

The ANA reports to the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and is part of the armed forces of Afghanistan.112   

The  ANA  General  Staff  controls  all  of  Afghanistan’s  ground  and  air  forces,  including  the  ANA 
conventional forces, the Afghan Air Force (AAF), the Special Mission Wing (SMW), the Afghan National 
Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC), the Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF) and the 
Afghan Border Force (ABF).113 

According  to  USDOD,  the  authorised  strength  of  ANA  was  227 374  as  of  December  2018,114  while 
SIGAR reported that the actual strength of ANA and AAF as of October 2018 was 190 753 personnel 
(not  including  civilians).  This  represents  a  24 415-person  increase  from  the  same  period  in  2017, 
although the figures are skewed due to the transfer of 30 689 personnel from two MoI force elements 
(ANCOP and Afghan Border Police) to MoD. The ANA’s 190 753 personnel consisted of 83 534 soldiers, 
72 456 non-commissioned officers and 34 763 officers. The majority of attrition was experienced by 
ANA’s soldier ranks (1 827), followed by non-commissioned officers (908), and officers (529).115 

The ANA is organised into one division and six regional corps, as well as Special Forces units and the 
Air  Force.  Each  corps  typically  comprises  three  to  four  infantry  brigades  and  various  specialty 
battalions.116  The 201st Corps, 203rd Corps, 205th Corps, 207th Corps, 209th Corps, and 215th Corps are 
responsible for different  geographic  regions, while the  111th Capital Division is  independent and is 
responsible for security in Kabul.117 

As part of the government’s ‘Road Map’ the Afghan Border Police and Afghan National Civil Order 
Police  were  transferred  to  the  ANA.118  The  Afghan  Border  Force,  previously  known  as  the  Afghan 
Border Police transferred from the MoI to the MoD in December 2017 with the aim of creating seven 
ABF  Brigades  under  the  operational  control  of  ANA  corps  commanders.  The  ABF’s  mission  is  to 
maintain security in border zones and support ANA operations.119 

The reorganization of the Afghan National Civil Order Police was completed in March 2018 with the 
transfer  of  the  majority  of  the  13 000  personnel  to  the  MoD.120  Despite  the  reorganization  the 
renamed  Afghan  National  Civil  Order  Force’s  (ANCOF) mission  did  not  change:  they  deal  with  civil 
unrest,  react  to  insurgent  activities  in  remote  and  high-threat  areas,  conduct  civil  order  presence 
patrols, and provide crisis response to public unrest and terrorist attacks in urban and metropolitan 
areas.121 

President Ghani announced the establishment of the Afghan National Army Territorial Force (ANA TF) 
in  April  2018.122  The  goal  was  to  create  a  local  security  force  that  is  more  effective,  professional, 
sustainable and led by MoD. Contrary to the ALP, the MoD will command and control locally recruited, 
but nationally trained ANA TF personnel.123 Each company (tolai) recruits soldiers from a particular 
district but is led by officers from outside that district, already serving in the regular ANA or being in 
the  ANA  reserves.  The  aim  is  for  the  ANA  TF  is  to  be  36 000  strong.124  The  first  three  companies 

112 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2017, url, p. 41. 
113 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 69 
114 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 69 
115 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, 30 January 2019, url, p. 83 
116 USIP, Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces, May 2016, url, p. 14. 
117 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 70 
118 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, 30 July 2017, url, pp. 94, 106-107; USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability 
in Afghanistan, June 2017, url, pp. 2-3 
119 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, pp. 70-71 
120 NATO, Ministry of Defense takes command of police unit, 27 March 2018, url  
121 GlobalSecurity, Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF), n.d., url  
122 Clark, K., The Afghan Territorial Force: Learning from the lessons of the past?, AAN, 15 January 2019, url  
123 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 39 
124 Clark, K., The Afghan Territorial Force: Learning from the lessons of the past?, AAN, 15 January 2019, url 

 
                                                           
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completed training in September 2018 and are functioning in their home districts under the leadership 
of ANA.125 

The Afghan Air Force (AAF) is ‘the primary air enabler for the ANA ground forces by providing aerial 
fires and lift support to ground forces across Afghanistan’ with their headquarters in Kabul. As USDOD 
noted, human capital limitations are one of the largest challenges that AAF has to face with only a 
limited number of Afghans meeting the needed qualifications.126 

UNAMA  documented  a  steady  increase  in  civilian  casualties  caused  by  aerial  operations  of  PGF  in 
2018. 1 015 civilian casualties (536 deaths and 479 injured) were recorded from 173 aerial operations 
conducted by Pro-Government Forces, marking a 61 % increase in civilian casualties caused by this 
tactic compared to 2017. While in 2016 and 2017 the AAF was responsible for most of the civilian 
casualties  caused  by  aerial  operations,  in  2018  with  the  majority  of  casualties  were  attributed  to 
international military forces.127 

Afghan National Police (ANP) 

According  to  USDOD,  the  ANP’s  mission  is  ‘to  maintain  civil  order;  reduce  corruption;  prevent the 
cultivation,  production,  and  smuggling  of  illegal  narcotics;  provide  security  for  individuals  and  the 
community; and safeguard legal rights and freedoms’.128 The ANP’s total authorised strength as of 
December 2018 was at 124 626.129 The actual strength of the ANP, as of October 2018, was 117 940 
personnel. This figure represents a 28 398-person decrease since October 2017, which was mostly due 
to the transfer of 30 689 ANCOP and ABP personnel to MoD.130  

While the ANP focuses on working alongside the ANA to fight the insurgency, the long-term goal of 
the ANDSF Road map is to transition the ANP to a more traditional community police force.131  

The  Afghan  National  Police’s  geographical  zones  approximately  match  those  of  the  ANA  Corps 
boundaries, but not entirely.132 

Afghan Local Police (ALP) 

In August 2010, the Afghan Local Police (ALP) was created as a security initiative led by the Ministry 
of Interior and funded by the US government.133 Officially, the ALP reports to the MoI at national level 
but, in practice, since June 2015, it has been subordinated to the Afghan Uniform Police,134 however 
it is not counted as part of the ANSF’s authorised end strength.135 The ALP provide security within 
villages and rural areas to protect the population and the facilities from insurgent attacks. Members 
of ALP are recruited in agreement with local elders and employed within villages.136 

According to SIGAR, ALP district leaders and checkpoint leaders coordinate the ALP’s daily activities. 
The ‘guardians’, the lowest rank, make up the overwhelming majority of ALP personnel.137   

125 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 26 
126 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 72 
127 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 38 
128 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 98 
129 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 99 
130 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, 30 January 2019, url, pp. 96-97 
131 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 99 
132 SIGAR, Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons From the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, 
September 2017, url, p. 121.  
133 LA Times, Afghanistan tries to clean up its militias, 31 October 2016, url 
134 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, 30 April 2016, url, p. 107 
135 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, 30 July 2017, url, p. 104; Clark, K., Update on the Afghan Local Police, AAN, 
5 July 2017, url  
136 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, pp. 100-101 
137 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, 30 April 2016, url, p. 107; SIGAR, A Critical Rural Security Initiative Lacks 
Adequate Logistics Support, Oversight, and Direction, October 2015, url, p. 2 

                                                           
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As of November 2018, the ALP had around 28 000 guardians, of whom 23 000 were fully trained. 138 
Their  training  is  a  four-week  course  that  includes  ‘instruction  in  the  use  of  weapons,  checkpoint 
defence, human rights, avoiding civilian casualties, dealing with detainees and hygiene’.139 

According to LA Times ‘ALP members often supply their own weapons and are paid salaries of about 
100 USD or more per month’, a much smaller amount than the salaries of soldiers and police. Some 
are not paid on time and according to allegations, some ALP units supplement incomes through illegal 
means.  ALP  members  have  sustained  disproportionately  heavy  casualties  because  they  are  often 
deployed in remote areas.140 They are particularly targeted by the Taliban which, according to to the 
co-director of the Afghanistan Analyst Network, Kate Clark, ‘suggests that in some places at least, they 
are a difficult enemy for the insurgents to deal with’141 since they have ‘intimate knowledge of the 
enemy’ and are prepared to stand and defend territory.142  

The goal of the US initiative to create ALP was to mobilise local communities to substitute government 
forces that had been failing according to US military. However, with the expansion of the programme, 
ALP  units  were  increasingly  captured  by  local  powerbrokers  and/or  local  ethnic,  tribal  or  factional 
interests  and  were  abusive  against  the  local  population.  In  Ghazni  province’s  Andar  district  for 
example, uprising forces and ALP managed to drive out the Taliban of much of the district, but later 
lost the community support due to their abusive behaviour.143 According to SIGAR, as of September 
2018,  70  ALP  personnel  were  determined  to  be  under  the  influence  of  power brokers  across  nine 
provinces.  This  marks  a  significant  decrease  from  219  personnel  in  July  2018  across  12  provinces. 
Furthermore, 63 % of ALP personnel determined to be under the influence of power brokers were in 
Nangarhar, Takhar and Kunar.144 

Based  on  an  overview  of  different  studies  on  the  ALP,  some  ALP-groups  are  considered  to  have 
brought stability and security and have been welcomed by communities. Other ALP units, especially 
those who are imposed on communities, have been more problematic. This is especially the case in 
the northern provinces of Badakhshan, Takhar, Faryab, Baghlan and Kunduz and in certain districts in 
Uruzgan,  Ghazni  and  Wardak.145  AAN  gave  the  example  of  Yahyakhel  district  of  Paktika  province, 
where the ALP operates in an inclusive, accountable way. Here the ALP stays under the control of the 
tribes who work together, in a partnership instead of having the force monopolised by only one ethnic 
or tribal group.146 

UNAMA attributed a total of 38 civilian casualties (14 deaths and 24 injured) to the Afghan Local Police 
in 2018, adding that recruitment and use of children remained a problem in the force.147 

Pro-Government Militias 

UNAMA defines a pro-government armed group as: 

‘an  organized  armed  non-State  actor  engaged  in  conflict  and  distinct  from  Government 
Forces, rebels and criminal groups. Pro-Government armed groups do not include the Afghan 
Local  Police,  which  fall  under  the  command  and  control  of  the  Ministry  of  Interior.  These 

138 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, 30 January 2019, url, p. 100 
139 Clark, K., Update on the Afghan Local Police: Making sure they are armed, trained, paid and exist, AAN, 5 July 2017, url 
140 LA Times, Afghanistan tries to clean up its militias, 31 October 2016, url 
141 Clark, K., Update on the Afghan Local Police: Making sure they are armed, trained, paid and exist, AAN, 5 July 2017, url 
142 Osman, B. and Clark, K., Enemy Number One: How the Taleban deal with the ALP and uprising groups, AAN, 19 July 2018,  
url  
143 Muzhary, F. and Clark, K., How to Set up a ‘Good ALP’: The experience of Yahyakhel district, Paktika and how it became 
more peaceful, AAN, 11 December 2018, url  
144 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, 30 January 2019, url, p. 101 
145 Clark, K., Update on the Afghan Local Police, AAN, 5 July 2017, url 
146 Muzhary, F. and Clark, K., How to Set up a ‘Good ALP’: The experience of Yahyakhel district, Paktika and how it became 
more peaceful, AAN, 11 December 2018, url 
147 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, pp. 34, 14 

 
                                                           
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armed  groups  have  no  legal  basis  under  the  laws  of  Afghanistan.  Armed  groups  have  the 
capacity to employ arms in the use of force to achieve political, ideological or other objectives; 
are not within the formal military structures of States, State-alliances or intergovernmental 
organizations; and are not under the control of the State(s) in which they operate. In some 
cases, armed groups receive direct/indirect support of the host Government or other States. 
This  definition  includes,  but  is  not  limited  to,  the  following  groups:  “national  uprising 
movements”, local militias (ethnically, clan or otherwise based), and civil defence forces and 
paramilitary groups (when such groups are clearly not under State control)’.148 

A specific local security structure that has existed in Afghan society for hundreds of years is the arbaki, 
community or tribal armies.149 From the beginning of the insurgency, different paramilitary initiatives 
have been developed and formalised to support the Afghan government and assist the formal armed 
forces of Afghanistan. The government and international military forces have also relied on militias 
that are not part of any formal government entity, for conducting searches, night raids or executions. 
The formalised paramilitary initiatives have all ceased except for the ALP (see section on ALP), now 
operating within the official security structures.150  

In  2015,  the  government  developed  a  ‘National  Uprising  Support  Strategy’  to  cover  areas  in 
Afghanistan where ANSF presence was limited. The NDS reportedly hired village or tribal elders to 
‘propose  “national  uprising”  group  members,  who  NDS  subsequently  vets’.  The  strength  of  these 
armed groups varied from 22 to 500 fighters, commanded by NDS or ANP.151 The Afghan government, 
NDS and CIA are known to arm strongmen to fight the Taliban and other militants but some militia 
leaders use their new power to fight local turf wars. According to the LA Times, various militias and 
personal armed groups also battle amongst themselves over political influence.152  

In 2017, UNAMA documented abuses by pro-Government armed groups especially in Faryab, but also 
in Jawzjan, Samangan, Daikundi, Khost, Kunduz, Paktya, Helmand and Balkh provinces.153 Because of 
the links these local militia often have to local or national powerbrokers, their human rights abuses 
often occur in an atmosphere of impunity.154 

Pro-Government  armed  groups  caused  180  civilian  casualties  (99  deaths  and  81  injured)  in  53 
incidents, and were responsible for 12 conflict-related abductions throughout 2018. This represents a 
94 %  increase  in  civilian  casualties  caused  by  pro-Government  armed  groups  compared  to  2017. 
Civilian  casualties  caused  by  Pro-Government  armed  groups  mainly  occurred  during  ground 
engagements  (43 %)  and  search  operations  (28 %),  with  the  latter  becoming  a  main  concern.  The 
majority of these casualties were caused by the Khost Protection Force in Khost, Paktya, and Paktika 
provinces, while the remaining civilian casualties mainly occurred in Faryab and Takhar provinces.155 

Kate Clark described the Khost Protection Force as a ‘campaign force’ that was established after 2001 
under international (CIA/US special forces) control. Similar militias include the Kandahar Strike Force 
and Paktika’s Afghan Security Guards. There are longstanding allegations against the Khost Protection 
Force  of  extrajudicial  killings,  torture,  beating  and  unlawful  detentions.156  UNAMA  added  that  the 

148 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 65 
149 Seraj, A., Opinion: The Arbaki can secure Afghanistan better than the US, 5 November 2014, url; HRW, Just Don’t Call It a 
Militia, September 2011, url, pp. 13-14. 
150 HRW, Just Don’t Call It a Militia, September 2011, url, pp. 1-2; Habib, E., The Morphing of the Andar Uprising: transition 
to Afghan Local Police, AAN, 2 April 2013, url 
151 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2015, February 2016, url, pp. 65-66 
152 LA Times, Afghanistan tries to clean up its militias, 31 October 2016, url 
153 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2017, February 2018, url, p. 52 
154 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2016, February 2017, url, p. 94; UNAMA, 
Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Midyear Report 2017, July 2017, url, pp. 60-61 
155 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, pp. 35-36 
156 Clark, K., Khost Protection Force Accused of Fresh Killings: Six men shot dead in Zurmat, AAN, 21 January 2019, url  

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—  31  

Khost Protection Force functions outside of the regular military command and control structures and 
its operations are often not coordinated with the local authorities.157 

In 2018, UNAMA verified 22 incidents involving 107 civilian casualties (70 deaths and 37 injured) as a 
result of operations by the Khost Protection Force. This shows a significant increase compared to 2017, 
when UNAMA attributed five civilian casualties (three deaths and two injured) to the Khost Protection 
Force.158 

The majority of civilian deaths attributed to the Khost Protection Force were caused by intentional 
shooting, mostly during search operations.159 

International Military Forces   

UNAMA explains the scope of the term ‘International Military Forces’ as follows: 

‘“international military forces” include all foreign troops forming part of the NATO-led 
Resolute  Support  Mission  as  well  as  US  Forces-Afghanistan  who,  in  addition  to 
participating  in  the  Resolute  Support  Mission,  are  also  engaged  in  counterterrorism 
operations as part of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. The term also encompasses Special 
Operations Forces and other foreign intelligence and security forces’.160 

From 2010 on, the process of gradual transition of security responsibilities from international forces 
to  ANSF  was  implemented,  to  be  completed  by  the  end  of  2014.161  On  31 December 2014,  ISAF’s 
mandate expired and on 1 January 2015, this led to the transition from NATO’s ISAF combat mission 
to  a  new  non-combat  mission,  Resolute  Support,  with  a  focus  on  training,  advising  and  assisting 
ANSF.162 

According to NATO, the total Resolute Support Mission strength was around 17 000 in February 2019, 
with the goal to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces.163 In total, 39 countries contribute 
to RS with the US, Germany and the UK as the largest contributors.164 As of December 2018, nearly 
14 000  US  military  personnel  were  serving  in  Afghanistan  as  part  of  the  US  Operation  Freedom’s 
Sentinel (OFS) mission. Around 8 500 of them are assigned to the NATO RS mission, while remaining 
US military personnel ‘serve the OFS mission in support roles or in conducting air operations, training 
the Afghan special forces, and conducting counterterror operations’.165 

In  2018,  UNAMA  attributed  674  civilian  casualties  (406  deaths  and  268  injured)  to  international 
military forces with 94 % of those casualties resulting from aerial operations.166 

1.2.2 Anti-Government Elements (AGEs) 

UNAMA defines ‘Anti-Government Elements’ (also referred to as ‘insurgents’) as follows: 

‘”Anti-Government Elements” encompass all individuals and armed groups involved in armed 
conflict with or armed opposition against the Government of Afghanistan and/or international 
military forces. They include those who identify as “Taliban” as well as individuals and non-
State organised armed groups taking a direct part in hostilities and assuming a variety of labels 

157 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 36 
158 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 36 
159 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 37 
160 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 65 
161 NATO, Inteqal: Transition to Afghan lead, updated on: 7 January 2015, url 
162 NATO, Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, updated on: 27 February 2015, url; UN Secretary-General, Report of the 
Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Afghanistan, 15 May 2015, url,  p. 2. 
163 NATO, Resolute Support Mission RSM: Key Facts and Figures, February 2019, url, p. 2 
164 NATO, Resolute Support Mission RSM: Key Facts and Figures, February 2019, url, p. 2 
165 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, 30 January 2019, url, p. 77 
166 UNAMA, Afghanistan, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, February 2019, url, p. 35 

 
                                                           
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including the Haqqani Network, Hezb-e-Islami, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad 
Union, Lashkari Tayyiba, Jaysh Muhammed, groups identifying themselves as “Daesh”, Islamic 
State and other militia and armed groups pursuing political, ideological or economic objectives 
including  armed  criminal  groups  directly  engaged  in  hostile  acts  on  behalf  a  party  to  the 
conflict.’167 

Besides the main AGE forces (Taliban, including the Haqqani network), several smaller groups have 
(re)appeared which are sometimes even more radical than the Taliban. Examples of such groups are: 
the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP),168 the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU),169 East 
Turkestan  Islamic  Movement  (ETIM);170  Jundullah,171  Lashkar-e-Islam,172  Lashkar-e-Tayyiba  (mainly 
based in India, but according to USDOS also active in Afghanistan)173 and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP).174 USDOD noted in December 2018 that ‘collectively, terrorist and insurgent groups continue to 
present a formidable challenge to Afghan, U.S., and coalition forces. The presence of more than 20 
terrorist  organisations  in  the  region  creates  the  largest  concentration  of  terrorist  and  extremist 
organisations in the world.’175 

According to an article by the International Business Times (IBT), ISKP and the Taliban share the goal 
of overthrowing the Afghan government, though ‘the former views itself as part of a global movement, 
while the latter confines its operations to Afghanistan’.176 

Hezb-e Islami, a group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, made an agreement with the Afghan government 
in 2016.177 Hezb-e Islami, which is sometimes referred to as Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), had been 
called  the  ‘second-largest  insurgent  group  in  Afghanistan’  in  the  past.178  According  to  the  United 
States  Institute  of  Peace  (USIP),  ‘in  return  for  Hezb’s  renunciation  of  violence,  the  government 
promised to free Hezb prisoners, incorporate former insurgents into the security services, and resettle 
thousands of Afghan refugees living in Hezb-affiliated camps inside Pakistan.’179 Moreover, Hekmatyar 
was allowed to return to Kabul after two decades in exile. USIP found no evidence that Hezb-e Islami 
commanders joined other insurgent groups such as the Taliban or ISKP after the agreement. Instead, 
commanders opposed to it reportedly stayed in Pakistan.180  

In its 2018 annual report on civilian casualties, UNAMA states that  

167 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Special Report, October 2018, url, p. 10  
168 UN Secretary General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implication for international peace and security, 28 February 
2019, url, p. 7; Jadoon, A., Allied & Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan´s Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, CTC Sentinel 3 December 2018, url, p. IV-VI; AAN, Thematic Dossier XV: Daesh in Afghanistan, 1 August 2017, url 
169 Middle East Institute, Uzbekistan ups its involvement in Afghanistan, 31 January 2018, url; USDOD, Enhancing Security 
and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 23 
170 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 23 
AAN experts however doubt a significant ETIM presence in Badakhshan. Callahan, T. and Marty, F.J., Tilting at Windmills: 
Dubious US claims of targeting Chinese Uyghur militants in Badakhshan, AAN, 19 March 2018, url 
171 Ali, O., Precarious Consolidation: Qari Hekmat’s IS-affiliated ‘island’ survives another Taleban onslaught, AAN, 4 March 
2018, url; Ali, O., The 2016 Insurgency in the North: Raising the Daesh flag (although not for long), AAN, 15 July 2016, url  
172  USDOS,  Rewards  for  Justice  -  Reward  Offer  for  Information  on  Tehrik-e-Taliban  Pakistan  and  Factions  Key  Leaders,  8 
March 2018, url 
173 USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2018, September 2018, url, p. 315; USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in 
Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 23 
174 Washington Post (The), Pakistani Taliban leader Mullah Fazlullah killed in U.S. airstrike in Afghanistan, 15 June 2018, url; 
USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p.23; USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 
2018, September 2018, url, p. 336 
175 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 29 
176 IBT, Isis letter reveals tribal rifts in Afghanistan faction amid war with Taliban and US, 7 June 2017, url 
177 USIP, The Political Deal with Hezb-e Islami, 6 July 2018, url 
178 Diplomat (The), What Gulbuddin Hekmatyar´s Return Means for Afghanistan, 3 May 2017, url 
179 USIP, The Political Deal with Hezb-e Islami, 6 July 2018, url 
180 USIP, The Political Deal with Hezb-e Islami, 6 July 2018, url 

                                                           
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—  33  

‘In 2018, UNAMA attributed 6,980 civilian casualties (2,243 deaths and 4,737 injured) to Anti-
Government Elements, a three per cent increase compared with 2017. […] UNAMA attributed 
the majority of civilian casualties – 63 per cent – to Anti-Government Elements, with 37 per 
cent attributed to Taliban, 20 per cent to Daesh/ISKP, and six per cent to undetermined and 
other Anti-Government Elements.’181 

Most of the insurgent groups have their roots in prior phases of Afghanistan’s conflict history, some 
even  dating  back  to  the  first  mujahideen  period  in  the  1970s,182  others  to  the  1990s.183  A  more 
detailed account of their respective backgrounds remains, however, beyond the scope of this report. 

Taliban 

Thomas Ruttig, co-founder and director of AAN, stated in August 2017 that the Taliban remain ‘[...] 
the strongest component among the insurgents by far.’184 The Taliban leadership ruled Afghanistan 
between  1996  and  2001  and  regrouped  after  its  removal  from  power.185  According  to  Antonio 
Giustozzi, scholar and author of several books on the Taliban, the Taliban ‘[…] does not have a unified 
shadow government.’186 The Taliban have several commissions, among them a military commission187 
and a command structure with, at the lowest level, field commanders overseeing individual groups of 
fighters.188 The governing structure and military command is defined in the Taliban’s Layha or Code of 
Conduct.189 The Taliban issued their first Layha in 2006; the most recent one was published in 2010.190 

The present leader of the movement is former Taliban chief justice Haibatullah Akhundzada.191 He is 
reportedly a member of the Noorzai tribe from Kandahar. Serajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Mohammad 
Yaqub, son of Mullah Omar, have been announced as deputies.192 The Taliban refer to themselves as 
the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.193 

After the announcement of the death of Taliban leader Mullah Omar in 2015, a group of Taliban led 
by Mullah Mohammad Rasoul split away from the mainstream Taliban.194 This faction, known as the 
Islamic  Emirate  High  Council  of  Afghanistan  (IEHCA),  is  reportedly  active  in  western  Afghanistan. 
Mullah Rasool was arrested by Pakistani authorities in 2016.195 His group clashed several times with 
the Akhundzada-led Taliban in the last years, e.g. in the province of Herat in 2018.196 In June 2018, the 
Rasool Taliban reportedly agreed to a truce with government forces. According to the US military news 
website  Stars  and  Stripes,  ‘in  announcing  its  cease-fire,  it  acknowledged  it  was  reciprocating  the 

181 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 4 
182 Gopal, A. and Strick van Linschoten, A., Ideology in the Afghan Taliban, AAN, 29 June 2017, url; Ruttig, T., How It All Began, 
AAN, 2013, url 
183 CSIS, From the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan, March 2010, url, p. 5-7 
184 Ruttig, T., Conflict Portrait: Afghanistan, 1 November 2017, url  
185 Giustozzi, A. and Ibrahimi, N., Thirty Years of Conflict: Drivers of Anti-Government Mobilisation in Afghanistan, 1978-2011, 
AREU, January 2012, url 
186 Giustozzi, A., Afghanistan: Taliban’s organization and structure, Landinfo, 23 August 2017, url, pp. 14 
187 UN Security Council, Letter dated 18 August 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant 
to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 26 August 2015, url, pp. 19-21;  BBC News, Who 
are the Taliban?, 26 May 2016, url; Reuters, Afghan Taliban's new chief replaces 24 'shadow' officials, 27 January 2017, url 
188 UN Security Council, Letter dated 18 August 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant 
to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 26 August 2015, url, pp. 19-21 
189 Clark, K., The Layha: Calling the Taleban to Account, AAN, 4 July 2011, url 
190 Bjelica, J., and Clark, K., One Land, Two Rules (1): Service delivery in insurgent-affected areas, an introduction, AAN, 6 
December 2018, url 
191 Foreign Affairs, Why the Taliban Isn't Winning in Afghanistan, 3 January 2018, url 
192 DuPée, M., Red on Red: Analyzing Afghanistan’s Intra-Insurgent  Violence, CTC Sentinel, January  2018, url, p. 27; Tolo 
News, Haibatullah Named Taliban´s New Leader, 26 May 2016, url   
193 See the Taliban’s website: http://www.alemarah-english.org/  
194 Osman, B., Toward Fragmentation? Mapping the post-Omar Taleban, AAN, 24 November 2015, url 
195 DuPée, M., Red on Red: Analyzing Afghanistan’s Intra-Insurgent Violence, CTC Sentinel, January 2018, url, pp. 29-30   
196 Stars and Stripes, Taliban vs. Taliban clash in Afghanistan’s west leaves 40 dead, 2 November 2018, url; Ariana News, 
Infighting Leaves 45 Taliban Militants Killed or Wounded in Herat, 30 November 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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government’s eight-day truce, unlike the main Taliban group, which had earlier announced a three-
day cease-fire during the Eid holiday without mention of Kabul’s peaceful gesture..197 According to the 
Pakistani newspaper Daily Times, IEHCA might disintegrate as two of its key figures left the group to 
join the main faction of the Taliban in late 2018.198    

In  a  report  on  recruitment  to  the  Taliban,  Landinfo,  the  Norwegian  Country  of  Origin  Information 
Centre, categorised Taliban fighters into two types: full time professional fighters, often recruited in 
the madrassas, and part-time local fighters, loyal to a local commander and embedded in the local 
society.199 Giustozzi estimated the total manpower of the Taliban to exceed 200 000 in 2017, of which 
150 000 were reportedly fighters. Approximately 60 000 of these were members of full-time mobile 
units, while the remaining were part of local militias. Giustozzi however estimated that the number of 
full-time  fighters  active  at  one  and  the  same  time  within  Afghanistan  rarely  exceeds  40 000.200  In 
January 2018, an unnamed US defence official cited in the media estimated the total Taliban strength 
in Afghanistan to be 60 000, though the same article cites the Long War Journal (LWJ) stating this was 
a ‘low-end estimate’.201 According to Giustozzi, fighting is mostly carried out by full-time fighters of 
the mobile units.202  

In 2015, the Taliban established a ‘special forces’ unit named Red Unit or Red Brigade (‘sra qet’a’ in 
Pashto). The fighters of the Red Unit are better equipped and trained. They are generally used as a 
‘rapid  reaction  force’203  for  quick  interventions  and  special  operations.204  At  the  end  of  2017,  the 
strength of the Red Unit was approximately about 7 500 fighters.205  

The large majority of the Taliban are still Pashtuns, ‘although there is a growing minority of Tajiks, 
Uzbeks, Baloch, and even several hundred Hazara members (including Shias).’206 In some northern 
areas, the Taliban are reportedly already predominantly non-Pashtun, as they draw recruits from the 
local population.207  

For  further  information  on  the  structure,  leadership,  force  strength,  aims  and  objectives  of  the 
Taliban,  please  refer  to  the  EASO  Country  of  Origin  Information  Report:  Afghanistan  -  Individuals 
targeted  by  armed  actors  in  the  conflict.  For  more  information  on  the  local  Taliban  fronts  and 
recruitment practices, please refer to Landinfo’s Report titled Afghanistan: Recruitment to Taliban, 
dated 29 June 2017. 

The 2018 spring offensive of the Taliban was named ‘al-Khandaq’, referring to a seventh century battle 
in which the forces of the Prophet Mohammed prevailed over a month-long siege of Medina by Arab 
and Jewish tribes. Prior to the start of the Taliban's spring offensive, the government forces conducted 
a  pre-emptive  strike  against  various  insurgent  groups  throughout  Afghanistan  termed  Nasrat 
(meaning victory in Arabic). In the wake of the ‘al-Khandaq’ operation, the Taliban launched attacks 

197 Stars and Stripes, Taliban splinter group declares open-ended truce with Kabul, 10 June 2018, url 
198 Daily Times, Taliban splinter group fights for survival after two leaders quit, 26 November 2018, url 
199 Norway, Landinfo, Afghanistan: Recruitment to Taliban, 29 June 2017, url, pp. 8-9 
200 Giustozzi, A., Afghanistan: Taliban’s organization and structure, Landinfo, 23 August 2017, url, pp. 12-13  
201 NBC News, The Taliban is gaining strength and territory in Afghanistan, 30 January 2018, url 
202 Giustozzi, A., Afghanistan: Taliban’s organization and structure, Landinfo, 23 August 2017, url, pp. 12-13  
203 Times (The), Helmand teeters after Taliban storm in with British tactics, 21 August 2016, url  
204 Times (The), Helmand teeters after Taliban storm in with British tactics, 21 August 2016, url; Amiri, R., Helmand (2): The 
chain  of  chiefdoms  unravels,  AAN,  11  March  2016,  url;  LWJ,  Taliban  touts  “Special  Forces  Unit”,  6  November  2017,  url; 
National Interest (The), How the Taliban Would Take Over Afghanistan, 10 February 2019, url 
205 Observe Asia, The Red Brigade: the Taliban’s special forces play growing role in conflict, 5 December 2017, url 
206 Giustozzi, A., Afghanistan: Taliban’s organization and structure, Landinfo, 23 August 2017, url, p. 13 
207 Giustozzi, A., Afghanistan: Taliban’s organization and structure, Landinfo, 23 August 2017, url, p. 13; Ali, O., The Non-
Pashtun Taleban of the North (1): A case study from Badakhshan, AAN, 3 January 2017, url; Ali, O., Non-Pashtun Taleban of 
the North (2): Case studies of Uzbek Taleban in Faryab and Sar-e Pul, AAN, 17 March 2017, url; Ali, O., The Non-Pashtun 
Taleban of the North (3): The Takhar case study, AAN, 29 July 2017, url; Ali, O., Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (4): A case 
study from Jawzjan, AAN, 18 September 2017, url 

                                                           
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  35  

in  the  provinces  of  Badakhshan,  Ghazni,  Kunduz,  Paktika  and  Zabul,  as  well  as  in  Badghis,  Farah, 
Faryab, Helmand, Kandahar, and Logar.208  

According  to  UNAMA,  between  January  and  September  2018,  civilian  casualties  from  ground 
engagements reached their lowest level since 2013. Among other reasons, this might be attributed to 
a  shift  of  strategy  by  the  insurgents  towards  an  increased  usage  of  suicide  Improvised  Explosive 
Devices  (IEDs).  UNAMA  however  noted  that  the  decreasing  number  of  civilian  casualties  ‘[...]  also 
suggests that parties undertook measures to protect civilians from harm during ground operations.’209  

In  August  2018,  the  Taliban  launched  a  major  attack  against  Ghazni  city.  While  the  insurgents 
purportedly  mainly  targeted  government  forces'  security  checkposts  and  government  offices,  the 
fighting caused over 200 civilian casualties (69 deaths and 141 injured), as well as intentional damage 
on  civilian  property,  according  to  UNAMA.210  In  the  wake  of  the  2018  parliamentary  election,  the 
Taliban warned the population throughout Afghanistan not to get involved in the election process, as 
it  would  potentially  target  all  polling  stations.  UNAMA  verified  388  civilian  casualties  in  total  (52 
deaths and 336 injured) on election day, of which all but 59 casualties (14 deaths, 45 injured) can be 
attributed to AGEs, according to UNAMA.211 

For further information on the peace process please see 1.1.3 Peace talks. 

Haqqani network 

The  Haqqani  network  is  an  insurgent  network  with  origins  in  the  1970s  mujahideen  groups.212  Its 
founder,  Jalaluddin  Haqqani,213  has  been  attacking  Afghan  government  officials  since  the  early 
1970s.214 In September 2018, Jalaluddin Haqqani reportedly died aged 71. His son Serajuddin Haqqani 
had already taken over the leadership of the group at an earlier point of time.215 Although the network 
has maintained an autonomous position it is considered part of the Taliban.216 Serajuddin Haqqani 
was appointed deputy leader of the Taliban in July 2015.217 Regarding the Haqqani network’s strength, 
the USDOS stated that it ‘[...] is believed to have several hundred core members, but it is estimated 
that  the  organization  is  able  to  draw  upon  a  pool  of  upwards  of  10 000  fighters.’218  According  to 
USDOS, the Haqqani network ‘[...] is active along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and across much of 
south-eastern  Afghanistan,  particularly  in  Loya  Paktia,  and  has  repeatedly  targeted  Kabul  in  its 
attacks.’219 The group’s leadership has historically maintained a power base around Pakistan’s tribal 
areas.220 

208 Jamestown Foundation (The), Taliban Demonstrates Resilience With Afghan Spring Offensive, 2 June 2018, url 
209 UNAMA, Quarterly Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January to 30 September 2018, 10 October 
2018, url, p. 5 
210 UNAMA, Quarterly Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January to 30 September 2018, 10 October 
2018, url, p. 7 
211 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Special Report: 2018 Elections Violence, November 2018, 
url, p. 4 
212 Ruttig, T., Talking Haqqani, AAN, 1 July 2010, url 
213 Ruttig, T., Talking Haqqani, AAN, 1 July 2010, url; USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2018, September 2018, url, pp. 
294-295 
214 Ruttig, T., Talking Haqqani, AAN, 1 July 2010, url 
215 AP, Death of Afghan group’s founder unlikely to weaken militants, 4 September 2018, url 
216 Giustozzi, A., Afghanistan: Taliban’s organization and structure, 23 August 2017, url, pp. 8-9  
217 DuPée, M., Red on Red: Analyzing Afghanistan’s Intra-Insurgent Violence, CTC Sentinel, January 2018, url, p. 27   
218 USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2018, September 2018, url, p. 294 
219 USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2018, September 2018, url, p. 294 
220 VoA, What Is the Haqqani Network?, 1 June 2017, url; Economic Times (The), US asks Pakistan to act against Haqqani 
network, other terror groups, 27 February 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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Al Qaeda and affiliated groups 

In June 2014, the UN Secretary-General reported incidents linked to Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups, 
mainly  operating  from  Pakistan  in  the  east  of  Afghanistan.221  Al  Qaeda-affiliated  groups  were 
reportedly not organised under a coordinated leadership, but they contributed to security problems 
in border regions with Pakistan.222 In August 2015, the leader of Al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, pledged 
allegiance to the Taliban.223 Al Qaeda was the main target of US drone strikes until 2016. By 2018, Al 
Qaeda reportedly ‘[...] has shrunk to relative obscurity […] supplanted by newer threats such as a local 
branch of the Islamic State.’224 USDOS however stated in 2018 that  

‘although al-Qa’ida (AQ) in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been seriously degraded, remnants 
of AQ’s global leadership, as well as its regional affiliate al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent 
(AQIS), continued to operate from remote locations in the region that historically have been 
exploited as safe havens. Afghan and Pakistani forces continued to contest AQ’s presence in 
the region [...]’225   

During peace talks with US officials, the Taliban reportedly agreed in January 2019 to bar international 
terror groups such as Al Qaeda from Afghanistan.226  

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)/Jundullah 

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is an insurgent network consisting of Uzbek adherents to 
a  Salafist-jihadist  ideology  operating  in  Afghanistan  since  the  1990s.  IMU  allied  with  the  Taliban 
against the Northern Alliance and later the coalition forces in Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2001, 
some  IMU  fighters  followed  the  defeated  Taliban  into  exile  in  Pakistan.227  After  publicly  admitting 
Mullah  Omar’s  death,  IMU  purportedly  switched  allegiance  to  the  Islamic  State  in  2015.228 
Subsequently, violent  clashes between IMU and the Taliban took place in the province of Zabul in 
2015.229 In October 2015, the Taliban reportedly established a special unit to fight against IMU/ISKP 
and by December 2015, it had ‘[…] killed hundreds of IMU fighters in Zabul, including its emir, Uthman 
Ghazi.’230 In 2016, a faction of IMU loyal to the Taliban split away from the IS-affiliated part of IMU, 
according  to  USDOS.231  In  November  2015,  Radio  Free  Europe/Radio  Liberty  (RFE/RL)  reported 
fractures in the ranks of IMU.232 Alliances and motives of different dispersed IMU groups became hard 
to assess233 and some of its fighters have been active in Syria and Iraq.234  

A northern group called Jundullah separated from IMU in 2009. The group consists of non-Pashtun 
Afghans and was said to operate under the umbrella of the Taliban in the north-east of Afghanistan in 
2016,  even  though  it  had  independent  command  structures.  According  to  AAN,  some  Jundullah 

221 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 18 June 2014, 
url, p. 6 
222 UN Security Council, Letter dated 18 August 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant 
to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 26 August 2015, url, pp. 10-11 
223 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 1 September 
2015, url, p. 2 
224 Politico, Whatever happened to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan?, 15 August 2018, url 
225 USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2018, September 2018, url, p. 165 
226 Telegraph (The), Taliban agree Isil and Al-Qaeda will be barred from Afghanistan in major concession during talks with US, 
24 January 2019, url 
227 CSIS, From the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan, March 2010, url, pp. 5-8  
228 Osman, B., Toward Fragmentation? Mapping the post-Omar Taleban, AAN, 24 November 2015, url 
229 Osman, B., Toward Fragmentation? Mapping the post-Omar Taleban, AAN, 24 November 2015, url 
230 ICT, Central Asian Jihadists in the Front Line, 4 September 2017, url 
231 USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2018, September 2018, url, p. 302 
232 RFE/RL, The Islamic Movement Of Uzbekistan Comes Unraveled, 28 November 2015, url 
233 Jadoon, A., Allied & Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan's Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
December 2018, url, p. 38; RFE/RL, The Islamic Movement Of Uzbekistan Comes Unraveled, 28 November 2015, url 
234 RFE/RL, The Islamic Movement Of Uzbekistan Comes Unraveled, 28 November 2015, url 

                                                           
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—  37  

fighters pledged  allegiance  to  the  Islamic State (IS) in 2015.235 This led to armed resistance  by  the 
Taliban, causing several Jundullah fighters to flee Kunduz and Takhar.236  

According  to  AAN’s  Obaid  Ali,  the  Pashtun  Taliban  found  it  ‘a  challenge  to  bring  the  non-Taliban 
militant  groups  (IMU  and  Jundullah)  under  their  banner  [in  northern  Afghanistan].  When  they 
managed  to,  temporarily,  both  groups  continued  to  run  autonomous  fronts  and  kept  separate 
command structures.’237 

USDOS  estimated  IMU’s  strength  at  200-300  members.238  Jundullah  and  IMU  are  mainly  active  in 
Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz, Balkh, Baghlan, Sar-e Pul, as well as Faryab and Jawzjan.239 

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) 

The first reports about a branch of IS (also called ISIS, ISIL or Daesh) in Afghanistan date back to the 
summer  of  2014.240  Initially,  the  recruited  commanders  often  included  discontented  Afghan  and 
Pakistani Taliban.241 According to AAN, they have been ‘quickly decimated in five of the six provinces 
where they emerged and most of their leaders were killed – mainly by the Taliban who tried to prevent 
a  home-grown  rival  insurgency  group  from  gaining  a  foothold  on  what  they  considered  their  own 
battleground.’242 

Eventually, the group based in Nangarhar won recognition as the head of IS’ ‘provincial’ chapter for 
Khorasan  in  Afghanistan.243  The  Nangarhar  group  envisages  global  expansion  of  the  caliphate  and 
designates the region of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and the Central Asian republics as the Wilayat 
Khorasan (ISKP – Islamic State Khorasan Province).244 

ISKP has its stronghold in certain southern districts of Nangarhar,245 where they are fighting with the 
Taliban for control.246 At its peak in 2015, ISKP was the dominant insurgent group in eight districts of 
Nangarhar. However, according to AAN,  

‘ISKP territory had shrunk to four districts by the end of 2015, with territory mainly re-taken 
by the Taleban. ISKP then dug in through 2016 in all its remaining districts, that is, Achin, Kot 
and Nazyan in the south-eastern districts (Bati Kot had returned to Taleban control), as well 
as Deh Bala in the south-west. ISKP’s hold over these districts looked firm until mid-March, or 
the beginning of the Afghan spring 2017, when US and Afghan special forces stepped up their 
attacks against it. […] What has added to the pressure on ISKP’s Mamand stronghold is not 
only the penetration of US and Afghan forces into Pekha to the east, but also the group’s loss 
of Kot district to the west.’247  

235 Ali, O., The 2016 Insurgency in the North: Raising the Daesh flag (although not for long), AAN, 15 July 2016, url 
236 Ali, O., Precarious Consolidation: Qari Hekmat’s IS-affiliated ‘island’ survives another Taleban onslaught, AAN, 4 March 
2018, url 
237 Ali, O., The Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (3): The Takhar case study, AAN, 29 July 2017, url 
238 USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2018, September 2018, url, p. 302 
239 BBC Monitoring South Asia, Afghan MP says Uzbek rebel group recruiting fighters in Afghan north, 10 April 2017, url 
240 Osman, B., Messages in Chalk: ‘Islamic State’ haunting Afghanistan?, AAN, 17 November 2014, url; LWJ, Mapping the 
emergence of the Islamic State in Afghanistan, 5 March 2015, url 
241 AAN, Thematic Dossier XV: Daesh in Afghanistan, 1 August 2017, url; LWJ, Taliban touts defection of Islamic State ‘deputy’, 
4 December 2017, url 
242 AAN, Thematic Dossier XV: Daesh in Afghanistan, 1 August 2017, url 
243 Osman, B., The Islamic State in ‘Khorasan’: How it began and where it stands now in Nangarhar, AAN, 27 July 2016, url; 
AAN, Thematic Dossier XV: Daesh in Afghanistan, 1 August 2017, url  
244 Jamestown Foundation, Islamic State in Afghanistan Ready to Capitalize on Mullah Omar’s Death, 3 September 2015, url 
245 Osman, B., Descent into chaos: Why did Nangarhar turn into an IS hub?, AAN, 27 September 2016, url; Reuters, Islamic 
State beheads 15 of its own fighters: Afghan official, 23 November 2017, url; Clark, K., and Osman, B., More Militias? Part 2: 
The proposed Afghan Territorial Army in the fight against ISKP, AAN, 23 September 2017, url  
246  RFE/RL,  Taliban,  IS  Face  Off  In  Afghanistan,  30  October  2017,  url;  Quilty,  A.  “Faint  lights  twinkling  against  the  dark”: 
Reportage from the fight against ISKP in Nangarhar, AAN, 19 February 2019, url 
247 Osman, B., The Battle for Mamand: ISKP under strain, but not yet defeated, 23 May 2017, url 

 
                                                           
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ISKP  presence  reportedly  spread  to  the  neighbouring  provinces  of  Kunar248  and,  according  to 
government sources, Laghman.249 In July 2018, the UN reported that ISKP attempted to expand its 
territory  and  was  at  the  time  mainly  present  in  Nangarhar,  Nuristan,  and  Kunar.  Furthermore,  UN 
mentioned activities of (self-proclaimed) IS fighters in Jawzjan, Faryab, Sar-e Pul and Badakhshan.250 
Another source stated that ISKP is present in Kunar, Paktika, Paktya, Logar, and Khost in eastern and 
north-eastern Afghanistan, while it has also been active in the provinces of Jawzjan, Faryab, Sar-e Pul, 
Samangan, Badghis, Baghlan, Kunduz, and Badakhshan.251 

According to an analysis published by the US Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, ISKP 
‘[...] has been successful in reinforcing its organizational capacity in both Afghanistan and Pakistan by 
fostering  partnerships  with  regional  militant  groups.’252  Since  2014,  several  groups  have  pledged 
allegiance to IS or ISKP in Afghanistan, e.g. TTP factions or IMU,253 while others cooperated with ISKP 
without a formal  pledge  of  allegiance, e.g. the Jundullah faction of TTP or Lashkar-e Islam.254 AAN 
noted in 2017 that a pledge to ISKP offered an alternative to disgruntled Taliban leaders, though it 
remained unclear how deep the cooperation between the ‘official’ Nangarhar-based ISKP branch and 
self-proclaimed IS groups (e.g. in Jawzjan, Ghor and Herat) has been.255 Thomas Ruttig labelled these 
former  Taliban  factions  in  northern  Afghanistan  ‘opportunistic  pro-IS  groups.’256  Casualty  numbers 
attributed to ISKP might vary depending on whether ISKP activities are counted separately from ‘self-
proclaimed  IS  group’  activities.  Without  further  elaborating  on  definitions,  UNAMA  differentiates 
between casualties  from ISKP  and  ‘self-proclaimed ISKP’.257 Accounts on  self-proclaimed IS or ISKP 
presence might however also be inflated, as warnings about ISKP or self-proclaimed IS are ‘a useful 
fund-raising tool’: according to Ruttig, ISKP ‘[...] presence is hyped up by the Afghan government in 
order to keep Afghanistan in the minds of the West before all foreign aid dries up.’258         

ISKP and self-proclaimed IS groups have been under attack from the Taliban, as well as government 
and international forces.259 According to the magazine Politico, ISKP insurgents became a main target 
of US drone strikes in 2016.260  

ISKP-internal  sources  claimed  the  strength  of  ISKP  between  2015  and  2017  at  4 500  to  20 000 
members. While Giustozzi stated that the numbers varying between 4 500 and 9 500 correspond with 

248 LWJ, US military kills Islamic State Khorasan province leader in Kunar, 13 August 2017, url; UN Secretary-General, The 
situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 7 December 2018, url, pp. 6-7 
249 1TV News, Five killed in Taliban-Daesh clash in Laghman, 23 June 2018, url 
250  UN  Secretary-General,  Twenty-second  report  of  the  Analytical  Support  and  Sanctions  Monitoring  Team  submitted 
pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, 27 July 2018, 
url, p. 16 
251 IPP Review, The Islamic State of Khorasan Expands in Afghanistan, 3 January 2019, url  
252 Jadoon, A., Allied & Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan's Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
December 2018, url, p. IV  
253 Jadoon, A., Allied & Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan's Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
December 2018, url, p. 34 
254 Jadoon, A., Allied & Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan's Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
December 2018, url, pp. 39-42 
255  Ali,  O.,  Non-Pashtun  Taleban  of  the  North  (4):  A  case  study  from  Jawzjan,  AAN,  18  September  2017,  url;  Osman,  B., 
Carnage in Ghor: Was Islamic State the perpetrator or was it falsely accused?, AAN, 23 November 2016, url; Giustozzi, A., 
The Islamic State in Khorasan, 2018, p. 142 
256 Ruttig, T., Conflict Portrait: Afghanistan, 1 November 2017, url 
257 UNAMA, Quarterly Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January to 30 September 2018, 10 October 
2018, url, p. 2 
258 National (The), Did ISIL, the Taliban or the Haqqani Network carry out the Kandahar attack?, 12 January 2017, url 
259 Giustozzi, A., The Islamic State in Khorasan, 2018, pp. 175-182; UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and 
its implications for international peace and security, 7 December 2018, url, pp. 6-7; Guardian (The), US 'mother of all bombs' 
killed 92 Isis militants, say Afghan officials, 15 April 2017, url; Ali, O., Still under the IS’s Black Flag: Qari Hekmat’s ISKP island 
in Jawzjan after his death by drone, AAN, 15 May 2018, url; Ali, O., Qari Hekmat’s Island Overrun: Taleban defeat ‘ISKP’ in 
Jawzjan, AAN, 4 August 2018, url 
260 Politico, Whatever happened to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan?, 15 August 2018, url 

                                                           
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intelligence information, he stated that ‘[...] the claim of 20 000 members [...] appears to be quite 
propagandistic  and  out  of  line  with  previous  IS-K  claims.’261  USDOS  estimated  the  ISKP  strength  in 
2017 at 1 500 to 3 000 fighters,262 while another source stated that ISKP had approximately 4 000 to 
6 000 members in 2018.263 Anatol Lieven, a regional expert at Georgetown University's Qatar campus, 
claimed in June 2017 that Central Asian fighters form ‘a key pillar of support’ for the ISKP.264 

ISKP claimed several deadly attacks in Kabul265 and to a lesser extent Herat266 aimed at Shias267 and 
the Hazara minority, 268 as well as other targets in 2016-2018.269 AAN noted in August 2017 that ISKP's 
relative lack of success in gaining ground might have fostered a change in strategy: ISKP ‘[...] which 
has recently suffered significant loss of territory and the killing of three consecutive amirs in coalition 
air strikes, and has failed to profit from the Taleban split in 2015, appears to increasingly use urban 
terrorism as a means to show its continued presence’.270 The majority of ISKP attacks on religious sites 
reportedly  targeted  Shia  communities.271  Please  refer  to  the  EASO  Country  of  Origin  Information 
Report Afghanistan: Individuals targeted by armed actors in the conflict for more information on the 
targeting of Hazara and other Shia by ISKP in Afghanistan. 

According to a report published by CTC, ISKP attacks grew considerably in their lethality between 2015 
and 2018: while the average number of killed persons per ISKP attack in Afghanistan was 3.9 in 2015, 
it increased to 13.4 in 2018.272 UNAMA stated in 2018 that  

‘Daesh/ISKP increased the frequency and intensity of its attacks throughout 2018, particularly 
in the eastern region. From 1 January to 31 December 2018, UNAMA attributed 138 incidents 
countrywide  resulting  in  2,181  civilian  casualties  (681  deaths  and  1,500  injured)  to 
Daesh/ISKP, which represents a 118 per cent increase from 2017. The vast majority of these 
incidents  –  102  –  occurred  across  numerous  districts  in  Nangarhar  province,  causing  991 
civilian casualties, while 20 incidents took place in Kabul province (all in Kabul city) resulting 
in 1,027 civilian casualties, and reflecting a high level of civilian harm caused by each attack in 
the densely populated city.’273 

AAN co-director Kate Clark already commented in 2017 that the number of casualties caused by ‘[...] 
ISKP is huge, considering their limited territorial footprint, but is a consequence of their willingness to 

261 Giustozzi, A., The Islamic State in Khorasan, 2018, pp. 141-142 
262 USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2018, September 2018, url, p. 305 
263 IPP Review, The Islamic State of Khorasan Expands in Afghanistan, 3 January 2019, url 
264 IBT, Isis letter reveals tribal rifts in Afghanistan faction amid war with Taliban and US, 7 June 2017, url 
265 Jadoon, A., Allied & Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan's Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
December 2018, url, p. 11; UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace 
and security, 7 December 2018, url, p. 6 
266 taz, 29 Tote nach Anschlag auf Moschee in Herat [29 Dead After Attack on Mosque in Herat], 3 August 2017, url; Reuters, 
At least one dead in blast near mosque in Afghan city of Herat, 25 March 2018, url; Jadoon, A., Allied & Lethal: Islamic State 
Khorasan's  Network  and  Organizational  Capacity  in  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan,  December  2018,  url,  p.  11;  UN  Secretary-
General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 7 December 2018, url, pp. 6 
267 taz, 29 Tote nach Anschlag auf Moschee in Herat [29 Dead After Attack on Mosque in Herat], 3 August 2017, url; Reuters, 
At least one dead in blast near mosque in Afghan city of Herat, 25 March 2018, url 
268 Reuters, At least one dead in blast near mosque in Afghan city of Herat, 25 March 2018, url 
269 taz, 29 Tote nach Anschlag auf Moschee in Herat [29 Dead After Attack on Mosque in Herat], 3 August 2017, url; Reuters, 
At least one dead in blast near mosque in Afghan city of Herat, 25 March 2018, url; UN Secretary-General, The situation in 
Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 7 December 2018, url, pp. 6 
270 AAN, Thematic Dossier XV: Daesh in Afghanistan, 1 August 2017, url 
271 Jadoon, A., Allied & Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan's Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
December 2018, url, p. V; UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Special Report: Increasing Harm to 
Afghan Civilians from the Deliberate and Indiscriminate Use of Improvised Explosive Devices, October 2018, url, p. 6 
272 Jadoon, A., Allied & Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan's Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
December 2018, url, p. 22 
273 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, pp. 20-21 

 
                                                           
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attack  unprotected  gatherings  of  civilians  for  sectarian  reasons’.274  In  early  2019,  she  stated  that 
‘meanwhile, ISKP’s transformation into a sectarian, terrorist outfit bent on carrying out large-scale, 
deliberate attacks on civilians in cities has meant calamitous casualties in horrific single attacks.’275   

1.3 Recent security trends and armed confrontations 

Several sources consider the situation in Afghanistan to be a non-international armed conflict.276  

The UN noted in December 2018 that  

‘The security situation remained volatile, with incidents continuing at consistently high 
levels. While the number of security incidents in some categories decreased slightly, the 
overall number of casualties rose owing to an increase in the severity of certain attacks. 
[…] The southern region saw the highest number of incidents followed by the eastern 
and south-eastern regions.’277 

According to the US Department of Defense, writing in December 2018, 

‘[t]he Afghan government maintained control of Kabul, main population centers, most 
key transit routes, provincial capitals, and a majority of district centers. In this reporting 
period,  the  Taliban  capitalized  on  the  freedom  of  manoeuvre  they  maintain  in  rural 
areas to mass combat power against poorly defended district centers and checkpoints. 
Despite  the  Taliban’s  proclaimed  intent  to  adopt  a  more  asymmetric  approach,  the 
group  continued  to  mass  and  conduct  raids  on  checkpoints,  district  centers,  and 
threaten  population  centers.  These  types  of  attacks  did  not  result  in  significant 
expansion of Taliban-controlled territory; however, it did test the ability of the ANDSF 
to respond, resulting in over-extension of the ANA in certain areas.’278  

On 7 June 2018, ‘President Ghani called a unilateral halt to all offensive government actions’ over the 
Muslim  holiday  of  Eid  ul-Fitr  which  the  Taliban  also  joined,  even  if  they  did  not  refer  to  the 
government’s announcement.279 This three-day ceasefire from 15 to 17 June 2018 marked ‘the first 
real cessation of hostilities’ in the last 17 years and allowed Afghans to go into areas that they had not 
been able to reach due to the Taliban’s control for years.280 According to UNAMA, only one pressure-
plate IED incident attributed to the Taliban was documented during the ceasefire and the device was 
believed  to  have  been  planted  before.  While  no  civilian  casualties  attributed  to  Pro-Government 
Forces were registered during the ceasefire, two major attacks were conducted by ISKP in Nangarhar 
against  Taliban  and  civilian  gatherings  that  resulted  in  181  civilian  casualties  (48  deaths  and  133 
injured).281 

Strategic posts along main roads were temporarily captured by the Taliban in several regions, like in 
Daymirdad  and  Sayyidabad  districts  in  Wardak  Province,  allowing  them  to  successfully  restrict 
movement  between  provinces.  In  the  northern  region,  on  the  Mazar-Shirbingham  and  Maimana-

274 Clark, K., UNAMA Documents Slight Decrease in Civilian Casualties: Indications of new trends in the Afghan war, AAN, 12 
October 2017, url 
275  Clark,  K.,  Record  Numbers  of  Civilian  Casualties  Overall,  from  Suicide  Attacks  and  Air  Strikes:  UNAMA  reports  on  the 
conflict in 2018, AAN, 24 February 2019, url 
276 Gross, R., ICRC, Expert Meeting: The Use of Force in Armed Conflicts, 15 November 2013, url, p. 85; Geiß, R. and Siegrist, 
M.,  Has  the  armed  conflict  in  Afghanistan  affected  the  rules  on  the  conduct  of  hostilities?,  March  2011,  url,  pp.  13-16; 
UNAMA, Afghanistan Midyear Report 2017, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, July 2017, url, p. 62; UNHCR, Eligibility 
Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan, 19 April 2016, url, p. 10 
277 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 7 December 
2018, url, p. 5  
278 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, pp. 24-25 
279 Clark, K., The Eid Ceasefire: Allowing Afghans to imagine their country at peace, AAN, 19 June 2018, url  
280 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 50 
281 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 9 

                                                           
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Andkhoy main roads and in the west, along the Herat-Qala-e Naw road, the Taliban also carried out 
frequent  attacks  that  resulted  in  complicating  government  access  and  limited  the  movement  of 
residents.282  

Following  the  takeover  of  Kunduz  in  2015  and 2016,  the  Taliban  conducted  two major  assaults  on 
provincial centres in 2018: a one-day attack against Farah City and a five-day assault on Ghazni City.283  

The  Taliban  indicated  their  intention  to  disrupt  the  parliamentary  elections  scheduled  for  October 
2018 through public statements issued in the weeks before election day. Similar to the trend seen 
during  the  2014  presidential  poll,  UNAMA  verified  reports  of  the  Taliban  warning  Afghans  not  to 
register  to  vote,  imposing  fines  and/or  confiscating  the  national  identity  cards  of  those  who  did 
register and threatening election-related staff if they continued to work, including with death.284 On 
18 October 2018  Kandahar  police  chief  General  Abdul  Raziq  was  killed  along  with  the  province’s 
intelligence  chief,  when  a  bodyguard  opened  fire  after  a  meeting.  The  Taliban-claimed  attack  was 
major setback for the Afghan government ahead of the elections.285  

From the start of voter registration on 14 April 2018 through the end of the year, UNAMA verified 
1 007 election related civilian casualties (226 deaths and 781 injured) along with 310 election-related 
abductions.  The majority of  election-related incidents  and more  than half of the civilian casualties 
were attributed to Taliban, while ISKP was responsible for seven election-related incidents of suicide 
and non-suicide IED attacks causing 338 civilian casualties (94 deaths and 244 injured).286  

The  ISKP  presence  remained  significant  in  the  eastern  part  of  the  country  with  reports  of  clashes 
between the group and Taliban fighters in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces.287 The group increased the 
frequency and intensity of its attacks in 2018, particularly in the eastern region. UNAMA found that 
the  substantial  increase  in  civilian  casualties  attributed  to  ISKP  was  mostly  due  to  the  increase  in 
suicide and complex attacks, which were mostly carried out against civilians or in civilian-populated 
areas.288 

According  to  UNAMA,  in  direct  violation  of  international  humanitarian  law,  Anti-Government 
Elements relied more on suicide and complex attacks and shifted their intended targets more and 
more towards the civilian population in 2018.289 

1.3.1 Armed clashes and assaults 

Since  the  start  of  the  withdrawal  of  foreign  troops  (2012),  closure  of  IMF  bases  and  transition  of 
security responsibilities into the hands of the ANSF (2013), the dynamics in the conflict have changed. 
AGEs  have  increasingly  attacked  and  challenged  ANSF,  operating  in  larger  units  (up  to  several 
hundreds of fighters, using small arms fire, rockets, mortars and grenades). They increasingly took 
control over  larger  territories  outside  the  urban centres  and  became more successful  in capturing 
district administrative centres. Mostly, the ANSF has been able to regain control quickly but certain 
district centres fell under the sustained control of Taliban forces.290 These developments triggered a 

282 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 7 December 
2018, url, p. 6 
283 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 19 
284 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Special Report: 2018 Elections Violence, url, p. 3 
285 Al Jazeera, Top Afghan General Abdul Raziq killed in Kandahar attack, 18 October 2018, url  
286 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 27 
287 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 7 December 
2018, url, pp. 6-7 
288 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, pp. 20-21 
289 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 22 
290 Münch, P. and Ruttig, T., Between Negotiations and Ongoing Resistance. The Situation of the Afghan Insurgency, 2014 
url, p. 28; LWJ, Taliban controls or contests scores of districts in Afghanistan, 5 October 2015, url; RFE/RL, Taliban Captures 
District Center In Afghan Opium Heartland, 26 August 2015, url; Ruttig, T., The Second Fall of Musa Qala: How the Taleban 
are expanding territorial control, AAN, 3 September 2015, url; ISW, Militant Attack and Support Zones in Afghanistan: April 

 
                                                           
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number of ANSF counter-offensives and clearance operations in several provinces.291 According to the 
UN Secretary General, more than half of the recorded security incidents in 2016 and 2017 were armed 
clashes.292  

UNAMA  found  that  ground  engagements,  mostly  between  PGF  and  AGEs,  ‘remained  the  second 
leading cause of civilian casualties’ in 2018, accounting for 31 % (3 382 civilian casualties: 814 deaths 
and 2 568 injured). UNAMA documented a significant reduction in this cause of civilian casualties in 
2017  which  seemed  to  continue  in  2018  with  a  3 %  decrease.  The  continuous  drop  in  ground 
engagement  casualties  was  driven  by  reductions  in  civilian  casualties  caused  by  Pro-Government 
Forces,  while  casualties  attributed  to  AGEs  remained  on  par  with  2017.293  Most  of  the  civilian 
casualties from ground engagements in 2018 (1 394 civilian casualties: 291 deaths and 1 103 injured) 
were attributed to AGEs, accounting for 41 % of civilian casualties from ground fighting throughout 
the year.294  

According to UNAMA,  

‘factors for sustained reductions in civilian casualties appeared to include relative decreases 
in attacks by Anti-Government Elements on densely-populated civilian areas, […] warnings by 
parties prior to fighting and displacement of civilians from areas regularly impacted by heavy 
conflict, and actions taken by Afghan national security forces related to the implementation 
of the National Policy on Civilian Casualty Mitigation and Prevention’.295 

However,  Taliban  fighters  attacked  Farah  City  in  May  2018,  overran  several  checkpoints  and  took 
control  of  the  main  square  before  Afghan  special  forces  backed  by  US  airpower  could  drive  them 
out.296  

Ghazni  City  was  attacked  on  10  August  2018  by  Taliban  fighters,  closing  in  on  the  city  from  their 
positions in nearby districts, villages and the city’s suburb ‘that they had systematically occupied in 
the previous months’. The insurgents disabled the telecommunication network and blocked the main 
highway in Maidan Wardak and Zabul provinces, and also the main easterly road in Andar district, 
leading  east  to  Paktika  province.  As  a  result,  neither  the  Afghan  government  nor  the  public  could 
follow what was happening in the city and the road closure prevented the government from sending 
in  reinforcements.297  According  to  UNAMA,  the  fighting  caused  significant  harm  to  the  civilian 
population not only in terms of casualties (262 civilian casualties verified: 79 deaths, 183 injured) but 
also  because  of  the  infrastructural  damage.298  After  the  attack  concerns  remained  about  the 
possibility of another large-scale assault in the south-east, including against Ghazni City. Although that 

- September 2015, 18 September 2015; Pajhwok Afghan News, MPs fear Kunduz-style attacks in other provinces, 5 October 
2015, url; International Crisis Group, Afghanistan’s Insurgency after the Transition, 12 May 2014, url, pp. I, 11-13, 19-21, 27-
28, 36-37; UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afganistan and its implication for international peace and security, 7 March 
2016, url, pp. 4-5; UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2015, February 2016, url, p. 
7. 
291 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 1 September 
2015, url, p. 5; RFE/RL, Kabul Says 88 Militants Killed Across Afghanistan, 9 October 2015, url; UN Security Council, Letter 
dated 18 August 2015 from the  Chair of the  Security Council Committee established  pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, 26 August 2015, url, p. 5; Ruttig, T., The Second Fall of Musa Qala: How 
the  Taleban  are  expanding  territorial  control,  AAN,  3  September  2015,  url;  Tolonews,  57  Taliban  insurgents  killed  in 
nationwide ANSF operations, 2 May 2015, url; Tolonews, 34 Taliban insurgents killed in ANSF operations, 11 May 2015, url; 
Tolonews, 19 insurgents killed in afghan forces operations, 3 February 2015, url 
292 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 15 September 
2017, url, p. 4. 
293 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 2 
294 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 46 
295 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 46 
296 Al Jazeera, Farah 'getting back to normal' but scars of heavy fighting remain, 20 May 2018, url  
297 Muzhary, F., Unheeded Warnings (1): Looking back at the Taleban attack on Ghazni, AAN, 16 December 2018,  url  
298 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 20 

                                                           
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did  not  occur,  the  Taliban  continued  to  pressure  Government  forces  in  the  outskirts  of  the  city, 
surrounding  districts  and  along  the  main  Highway  1,  and  eventually  captured  Andar  district on  14 
October 2018.299  

UNAMA found that the level of ‘civilian casualties from ground engagements varied by region and 
province’. In 2018 Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan ‘continued to drive the decrease in overall civilian 
casualties  from  ground  engagements,’  while  UNAMA  registered  a  significant  increase  in  civilian 
casualties resulting from ground engagements in Ghazni province, mostly due to the attack in August 
2018, and in Baghlan, Balkh, Kunar and Paktya provinces as well.300 

1.3.2 Improvised Explosive Devices 

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are unconventional explosive weapons that can take any form and 
can be activated in different ways, targeting soldiers and civilians alike.301 IEDs can be operated by the 
victim (Victim Operated IEDs) or by the attacker (Command-Operated IEDs). Command-Operated IEDs 
are radio or remote controlled allowing operators to detonate a pre-placed device at a specific time. 
Victim-Operated IEDs on the other hand detonate when a person or vehicle triggers the initiator or 
switch (pressure plate or pressure release mechanism, trip wire or another device). Another category 
is Suicide IEDs where either the attacker wears an explosive vest or belt or a vehicle is rigged with 
explosives by a driver or passenger inside.302 

Although pressure plate IEDs are typically used by AGEs to target security forces, they are planted on 
public  roads  routinely  used  by  civilians.  Accordingly,  their  use  is  inherently  indiscriminate  as  the 
‘effects cannot be directed against a specific target’.303 In 2018, Anti-Government Elements’ use of 
IEDs ‘remained the leading cause of civilian casualties’, accounting for 42 per cent of the total. Suicide 
and complex attacks resulted in 2 809 civilian casualties (886 deaths and 1 923 injured) in 2018, which 
is not only a 22 % increase compared to 2017 but also ‘the highest number of civilian casualties from 
such attacks in a single year’ since 2009 when UNAMA began the systematic documentation.304 

AAN noted that this increase was largely driven by ISKP which was responsible for 87 % of the civilian 
casualties caused by these types of incidents.305 Out of 65 suicide and complex attacks carried out by 
AGEs in 2018, UNAMA attributed 21 attacks to the Taliban (642 civilian casualties: 216 deaths, 426 
injured) and 36 attacks to ISKP (1 892 civilian casualties: 557 deaths, 1 335 injured).306 Despite being 
a significantly smaller fighting force than the Taliban and operating from a much smaller territorial 
base in Nangarhar province than before, ISKP was responsible for one fifth of all civilian casualties in 
the Afghan conflict.307 According to UNAMA, the number of suicide and complex attacks and the harm 
they caused radically increased in Nangarhar province due to the heightened activities of ISKP.308 

Out of 65 suicide and complex attacks carried out by AGEs in 2018, 28 occurred in Kabul city resulting 
in 1 686 civilian casualties (554 deaths, 1 132 injuries) and marking a 5 % increase in the number of 
casualties compared to 2017. According to UNAMA, the attacks in Kabul mostly targeted civilians: the 

299 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 7 December 
2018, url, p. 6 
300 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, pp. 46-47 
301 NATO, Improvised explosive devices, 12 December 2018, url  
302 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Special Report - Increasing Harm to Afghan Civilians from 
the Deliberate and Indiscriminate Use of Improvised Explosive Devices, October 2018, url, p. 10 
303 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Special Report - Increasing Harm to Afghan Civilians from 
the Deliberate and Indiscriminate Use of Improvised Explosive Devices, October 2018, url, p. 8 
304 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, pp. 21-22 
305  Clark,  K.,  Record  Numbers  of  Civilian  Casualties  Overall,  from  Suicide  Attacks  and  Air  Strikes:  UNAMA  reports  on  the 
conflict in 2018, AAN, 24 February 2019, url 
306 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 22 
307  Clark,  K.,  Record  Numbers  of  Civilian  Casualties  Overall,  from  Suicide  Attacks  and  Air  Strikes:  UNAMA  reports  on  the 
conflict in 2018, AAN, 24 February 2019, url 
308 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 24 

 
                                                           
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civilian Government administration, places of worship, education facilities, election-related sites and 
other ‘soft’ targets.309  

UNAMA documented 1 818 civilian casualties (475 deaths and 1 343 injured) caused by non-suicide 
IED devices in 2018, accounting for 17 % of overall civilian casualties. Of those, 72 % of these attacks 
were attributed to the Taliban, 10 % to ISKP and 18 % to undetermined AGEs. Civilian casualties caused 
by victim-activated pressure-plate IEDs decreased by 26 % in 2018 (753 civilian casualties: 269 deaths, 
484 injured), with half of them recorded in the Southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan 
and Zabul.310 

1.3.3 High-profile attacks  

According to the USDOD, the Taliban along with other militant groups continued to carry out high-
profile attacks, mostly in the capital region, to attract media attention, undermine the legitimacy of 
the Afghan government and to create the perception of widespread insecurity. From 1 June 2018 to 
30  November  2018,  there  were  59  high-profile  attacks  in  Kabul,  compared  to  73  during  the  same 
period in 2017.311 

UNAMA found that out of 65 suicide and complex attacks across the country in 2018, 28 occurred in 
Kabul  city  resulting  in  1 686  civilian  casualties  (554  deaths  and  1 132  injuries),  representing  a  5  % 
increase  in  compared  to  2017.  The  attacks  in  Kabul  mostly  targeted  civilians,  including  the  civilian 
Government administration, places of worship, education facilities, election-related sites and other 
‘soft’ targets.312 

In January 2018, attackers drove an explosive-laden ambulance into a crowded street in Kabul during 
‘one  of  the  most  violent  stretches  of  the  war’,313  killing  114  people  and  injuring  229.  The  Taliban 
claimed responsibility for the attack.314  

Other high-profile attacks during the reporting period include: 

•  Taliban militants attacked the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul City in January 2018, killing 24 

and injuring 15 civilians. There were 15 foreign nationals among the victims.315 

• 

ISKP claimed responsibility for a bombing in Kabul in March 2018, close to a shrine where Shia 
Muslims gathered to celebrate Nowruz. The attack killed 35 and injured 65 civilians.316 

•  A suicide bomber detonated a body-borne IED outside a voter registration centre in a Shia 
populated  neighbourhood  of  Kabul,  killing  60  and  injuring  138  civilians.  ISKP  claimed 
responsibility for the incident.317 

•  Another  ISKP-claimed  attack  occurred  in  August  2018,  in  Kabul’s  Shia-dominated  Dasht-i-
Barchi area where a suicide bomber detonated explosives inside a classroom of an educational 
centre, killing 40 and injuring 67 civilians.318 

309 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 23 
310 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 24 
311 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 25 
312 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 23 
313 New York Times (The), ‘It’s a Massacre’: Blast in Kabul Deepens Toll of a Long War, 27 January 2018, url 
314 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 26 
315 New York Times (The), Americans Were Among 22 Killed in Kabul Hotel Attack, U.S. Says, 23 January 2018, url;  UNAMA, 
Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 27 
316 BBC News, Kabul Sakhi shrine: 'Dozens dead' in New Year attack, 21 March 2018, url;  UNAMA, Afghanistan, Protection 
of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 29 
317 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 29; France24, 
Suicide blast at voter registration centre kills more than 50 in Kabul, 22 April 2018, url  
318 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 29; RFE/RL, 
UN Raises Death Toll From Kabul Suicide Attack To 40, 18 August 2018, url 

                                                           
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—  45  

• 

• 

In  September  2018,  a  double  suicide  attack  killed  at  least  20  people  and  injured  70  at  a 
wrestling club in Kabul. After the suicide bomber detonated the device in the club, a second 
bomber attacked first responders in a car.319 

In October 2018 a member of the Kandahar Provincial Governor’s security team opened fire 
during  a  meeting  between  Afghan  representatives  and  US  personnel  in  Kandahar  at  the 
governor's compound. General Raziq, Kandahar Chief of Police was killed and several others 
were injured.320 

1.3.4 Targeted killings and conflict-related abduction 

Besides suicide attacks and using non-suicide IEDs to deliberately target civilians or civilian objects, 
AGEs also carried out ‘targeted killings’ of civilians, mostly by shooting. UNAMA documented 295 such 
incidents in 2018  that  caused  589  civilian casualties (395 deaths and 194 injured), showing a 17 % 
decrease compared to 2017.321 However, this decrease in civilian casualties resulting from targeted 
killings by AGEs was offset by the considerable rise in casualties from suicide IED attacks, particularly 
those attributed to ISKP, which more than doubled.322 

According to UNAMA, the targeted civilians ‘were individuals perceived as supporting or otherwise 
connected to the Government or pro-Government armed groups, whether through current or former 
employment or family ties’. Although the number of attacks against tribal elders decreased from 59 
in 2017 to 30 in 2018, there was only a minor decrease in the number of civilians killed (34) and injured 
(31). UNAMA also documented 13 incidents of targeting religious scholars and leaders, resulting in 15 
deaths and 20 injured. 323 

When Ghazni was attacked in August 2018 by the Taliban, UNAMA found that the insurgents allegedly 
had a list of names and addresses of government employees and ANSF members to target along with 
their  families.  An  Afghan  National  Police  commander’s  brother,  a  district  prosecutor  and  a 
parliamentary candidate had been victims of targeted killings.324 

In 2018, UNAMA recorded 271 incidents of conflict-related abductions  affecting  1 857 civilians. 53 
incidents  resulted  in  death  and  33  in  injuries.  AGEs  were  responsible  for  all  incidents,  except  one 
involving a Pro-Government Armed Group and three abductions by the ALP. Although the number of 
civilian casualties from conflict-related abductions remained at similar levels to 2017, the number of 
abducted  civilians  increased  by  85 %  which  was  mostly  driven  by  incidents  related  to  the  election 
process.325 

For more information on the rationale and modus operandi of the Taliban targeting campaign, please 
refer to the EASO Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan: Individuals targeted by armed 
actors in the conflict.  

1.3.5 Aerial attacks and bombings 

In 2015, the number of civilian casualties caused by airstrikes rose by 85 % reversing to the previous 
years’  2012-2014  declining  trend.326  In  September  2018,  UNAMA  voiced  its  concern  about  the 
increasing number of civilian casualties from airstrikes adding that in the first 6 months of 2018 353 

319 BBC News, Afghanistan conflict: Bombers kill 20 at Kabul sports club, 5 September 2018, url  
320 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 25 
321 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 26 
322 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 18 
323 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 26 
324 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 20 
325 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 30 
326 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2015, 24 February 2016, url, pp. 59-60 

 
                                                           
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civilian casualties  (149  deaths  and  204 injured) were documented which, showing a 52 % increase 
compared to the same period in 2017.327 

From 1 January to 31 December 2018 UNAMA documented 1 015 civilian casualties (536 deaths and 
479  injured)  from  173  aerial  operations  conducted  by  PGF,  showing  a  61 %  increase  in  civilian 
casualties  from  this  tactic  compared  to  2017.  The  fact  civilian  deaths  caused  by  aerial  operations 
increased by 82 % from the previous year is of particular concern according to UNAMA.328 AAN co-
director Kate Clark noted that the US military realised the harm that civilian casualties were doing to 
its military mission and introduced new tactical measures in late 2011 on the use of air power in order 
to  reduce  civilian  casualties.329  However,  the  rules  of  engagement  for  airstrikes  by  US  Forces  in 
Afghanistan were relaxed at the end of 2017.330 Instead of allowing US forces to strike the Taliban if 
they are threatening American or Afghan forces, US aircraft could seek out and attack militants based 
simply on their affiliation to the group.331 

In 2018, aerial operations accounted for 9 % of all civilian casualties in Afghanistan, compared to 6 % 
in  2017.  Contrary  to  the  trends  in  2016-2017  when  the  Afghan  Air  Force  was  responsible  for  the 
majority of civilian casualties, victims in 2018 were mostly attributed to IMF.332 

1.3.6 Search operations 

In  2018,  UNAMA  documented  a  considerable  rise  in  civilian  casualties  caused  by  Afghan  National 
Security  Forces  and  pro-Government  armed  groups,  particularly  by  the  National  Directorate  of 
Security (NDS) Special Forces and the Khost Protection Force. The same source reports that there were 
353 civilian casualties  (284 deaths and 69 injured) were recorded from search operations, most of 
them  caused  by  NDS  Special  Forces  and  the  Khost  Protection  Force.  UNAMA  recorded  64  search 
operations  by  ANSF,  causing  a  total  of  273  civilian  casualties  (222  deaths  and  51  injured).  This 
represents a sharp increase compared to 2017 when UNAMA verified 92 civilian casualties (63 deaths 
and 29 injured) resulting from 26 search operations by ANSF.333  

The majority of casualties (240 civilian casualties: 203 deaths, 37 injured) were caused by the NDS 
Special  Forces,  either  acting  alone  or  in  joint  operations  with  IMF,  mostly  in  central,  eastern  and 
southern regions.334 AAN co-director Kate Clark added that while Afghan army special forces also carry 
out search operations, they do that reportedly without causing any civilian harm. Afghan army special 
forces are generally supported by US Special Forces while the NDS and the Khost Protection Force gets 
support from the CIA.335  

UNAMA attributed 51 civilian casualties (41 deaths, 10 injured) during 13 search operations to the 
Khost Protection Force which it considers as a Pro-Government Armed Group. UNAMA expressed its 
concern about the significant increase in harm to civilians caused by search operations, particularly by 
NDS Special Forces and the Khost Protection Force, adding that the high number of fatalities compared 
to the number of injured suggests the indiscriminate use of force.336 

327 UNAMA, Concern About Rising Number Of Civilian Casualties From Airstrikes, 25 September 2018,  url  
328 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 38 
329  Clark,  K.,  Record  Numbers  of  Civilian  Casualties  Overall,  from  Suicide  Attacks  and  Air  Strikes:  UNAMA  reports  on  the 
conflict in 2018, AAN, 24 February 2019, url 
330 UNAMA, Afghanistan, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 38 
331 New York Times (The), Mattis Discloses Part of Afghanistan Battle Plan, but It Hasn’t Yet Been Carried Out, 6 October 
2017, url  
332 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 38 
333 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, pp. 41 
334 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 42 
335  Clark,  K.,  Record  Numbers  of  Civilian  Casualties  Overall,  from  Suicide  Attacks  and  Air  Strikes:  UNAMA  reports  on  the 
conflict in 2018, AAN, 24 February 2019, url 
336 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 42 

                                                           
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1.4 Impact of the violence on the civilian population  

1.4.1 Civilian casualties 

In  2018  the  number  of  civilian  deaths  has  reached  a  record  high  level  since  UNAMA  started  to 
document conflict related civilian casualties in 2009:337 

Year 

2018 

2017 

2016 

2015 

2014 

2013 

2012 

2011 

2010 

2009 

Civilians 
killed 

Civilians 
injured 

Total civilian 
casualties 

3 804 

3 440 

3 527 

3 565 

3 701 

2 969 

2 769 

3 133 

2 794 

2 412 

7 189 

7 019 

7 925 

7 470 

6 834 

5 669 

4 821 

4 709 

4 368 

3 557 

10 993 

10 459 

11 452 

11 035 

10 535 

8 638 

7 590 

7 842 

7 162 

5 969 

UNAMA  recorded  10 993  civilian  casualties  (3 804  deaths,  7 189  injured)  as  a  result  of  the  armed 
conflict in 2018. This represents a 5 % increase in overall civilian casualties and also an 11 % increase 
in civilian deaths compared to the previous year.338 

Anti-Government Elements, including the Taliban and the ISKP were responsible for 63 % of civilian 
casualties.339 IEDs used by AGEs in both suicide and non-suicide attacks remained the leading cause 
of civilian casualties in 2018 at 42 %.340 UNAMA recorded a considerable rise in civilian casualties from 
aerial operations by Pro-Government Forces with a 61 % increase compared to 2017 and the majority 
attributed to international military forces.341 

The  appearance  of  ISKP  in  Afghanistan  after  2014  presented  a  new  threat  to  civilians.342  As  AAN 
highlighted, despite representing a smaller fighting force than the Taliban, ISKP was responsible for 
one  fifth  of  all  civilian  casualties.  The  number  of  its  civilian  casualties  more  than  doubled  in  2018 
compared to the previous year (from 843 to 1 871). According to AAN, on the pro-government side 
the  rise  in  civilian  casualties  from  aerial  operations,  especially  by  international  forces  and  civilian 
casualties  caused  by  the  NDS  Special  Forces  and  the  Khost  Protection  Force  were  of  particular 
concern.343  

337 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 1 
338 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 1 
339 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 4 
340 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 1 
341 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 3 
342 New York Times (The), Amid Afghan Peace Talks, U.N. Reports Record Civilian Deaths in 2018, 24 February 2019,  url  
343  Clark,  K.,  Record  Numbers  of  Civilian  Casualties  Overall,  from  Suicide  Attacks  and  Air  Strikes:  UNAMA  reports  on  the 
conflict in 2018, AAN, 24 February 2019, url  

 
 
                                                           
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1.4.2 State ability to secure law and order 

The Afghan Central Statistics Organization (CSO) noted an annual rise in crime statistics from 6 768 in 
2008  to 28 026  in  2015-2016,344  although  the  United  Nations  Office on Drugs and  Crime  (UNODC) 
stated  in  2012  that  there  are  no  reliable  crime  statistics  in  Afghanistan.345  According  to  the  Asia 
Foundation’s 2018 survey, 18.6 % of respondents reported having suffered from an act of violence or 
criminality.346  Similar  to  previous  year’s  findings,  the  most  reported  violent  or  criminal  acts  were 
beatings and physical attacks (41.3 %).347 

Kidnapping, robberies and drug-related crimes were reported in several provinces including Farah, 348 
Kabul,349 Kunduz350 and Balkh.351 Law enforcers are themselves often the victim of attacks.352  

According to UNODC, ‘Afghanistan faces tremendous drugs and crime challenges […]. While around 
80 % of the world's opiates comes from Afghanistan, only around 2 % is seized in country’.353 

The US Department of State noted in its report by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security that criminal 
activity is widespread in Afghanistan with transnational organised crime (related to the drug trade) 
remaining a serious concern. The report added that ‘local law enforcement authorities are generally 
ineffective  in  deterring  crime  and  responding  to  distress  calls  and  alarms’  and  response  time  is 
considerably longer than Western norms. Bribery is present at all levels of local law enforcement and 
in  some  cases  officers  commit  crimes  themselves  which  lead  to  a  lack  of  confidence  in  local  law 
enforcement by the civilian population.354 According to the Asia Foundation, the confidence amongst 
Afghans in reporting crimes to the ANA or the ANP decreased in 2018. 45.7 % of respondents reported 
crimes to ANP marking a 5 percentage point decline and reporting crimes to ANA also decreased by 
1.5 percentage point to 16.5 %.355 

In its Eligibility Guidelines published in August 2018 UNHCR stated the following on the Afghan state’s 
ability to protect civilians: 

‘Even  where  the  legal  framework  provides  for  the  protection  of  human  rights,  the 
implementation of Afghanistan’s commitments under national and international law to 
promote  and  protect  these  rights  in  practice  frequently  remains  a  challenge.  Afghan 
governance and the adherence to the rule of law are perceived as particularly weak.  

The capability of the Government to protect human rights is undermined in many districts 
by insecurity and the high number of attacks by AGEs. Rural and unstable areas reportedly 
suffer from a generally weak formal justice system that is unable to effectively and reliably 
adjudicate civil and criminal disputes. Government-appointed judges and prosecutors are 
reportedly frequently unable to remain in such communities, due to insecurity. […]  

344 Afghanistan, CSO, Crimes, Public Libraries, Radios and TV Broadcast, 2008 -2015-2016, n.d., url 
345 UNODC and Afghanistan, UNODC Country Programme for Afghanistan 2012-2014, 28 May 2012, url, pp. 16-17. 
346 Asia Foundation (The), A Survey of the Afghan People 2018, December 2018, url, p. 52  
347 Asia Foundation (The), A Survey of the Afghan People 2018, December 2018, url, p. 53 
348 Pajhwok Afghan News, Crimes on the increase in Farah, say residents, 3 March 2018, url  
349 Pajhwok Afghan News, Rise in drug-related crimes worries ‘Powder Street’ dwellers, 18 November 2018, url  
350 Pajhwok Afghan News, Increasing kidnap incidents worry Kunduzis, 15 March 2018, url  
351 Pajhwok Afghan News, 33 crime suspects detained in Balkh raids, url  
352 BBC News, Top Afghan commander Raziq killed in Kandahar gun attack, 19 October 2018, url; Al Jazeera, Taliban attacks 
kill police in northern Afghanistan, 1 January 2019, url; RFE/RL,  At Least 11 Afghan Police Officers Killed In Taliban Attacks, 
3 January 2019, url  
353 UNODC, Law Enforcement, n.d., url 
354 USDOS, OSAC, Afghanistan 2018 Crime & Safety Report, 16 February 2018, url  
355 Asia Foundation (The), A Survey of the Afghan People 2018, December 2018, url, pp. 53-54 

                                                           
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—  49  

High levels of corruption, challenges to effective governance and a climate of impunity 
are all reported by observers as factors that weaken the rule of law and undermine the 
ability of the State to provide protection from human rights violations.’356 

In the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index 2019, Afghanistan ranked 123 on a list of 126 countries 
in the world on overall rule-of-law scores.357 

For more information on the different segments of the Afghan security apparatus and their ability to 
act as an actor of protection, please refer to the April 2019 EASO Country of Origin Information Report 
Afghanistan: Key socio-economic indicators. Focus on Kabul City, Mazar-e Sharif and Herat City. For 
more information on the Afghan state as a possible actor of persecution, please refer to the EASO 
Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan: Individuals targeted by armed actors in the conflict.  

1.4.3 Socio-economic conditions 

The Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey (ALCS) 2016-17 found that ‘the overall macro-economic and 
security context in the country since 2007 can be broken into two distinct phases, before and after 
the 2014 security transition’. While the phase before the transition showed ‘higher economic growth 
and  a  relatively  stable  security  situation’,  after  2014  the  growth  rate  slowed  and  the  security 
deteriorated.358 Although after 2015 the economy started to show signs of stabilization with a 2.3 % 
growth in 2016, followed by 2.7 % in 2017,359 the World Bank considered the recovery ‘increasingly 
vulnerable’.360 Possible disruptions during the presidential and provincial council elections scheduled 
for 2019 could have negative impact on confidence, investment and growth.361 

According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), 54 % of the Afghan population is of legal 
working age (15-64 years), while 44 % is below the age of 15.362 The World Bank stated that nearly 
three-quarters  of  the  population  are  younger  than  30  years  and  around  25 %  is  between  15-30 
years.363  As  a  result,  young  Afghans  enter  the  labour  market  in  large  numbers  every  year,  but 
employment  opportunities  cannot  keep  up  with  the  population  growth  because  of  inadequate 
development resources and poor security.364  

According to ALCS 2016-17, 2 million Afghans – 23.9 % of the total labour force – can be classified as 
unemployed,  meaning  they  do  not  work  or  seek  employment  or  work  less  than  eight  hours  per 
week.365  Access  to  productive  or  remunerative  employment  is  limited,  80  %  of  employment  is 
considered vulnerable and insecure in the form of self- or own-account employment, day labour or 
unpaid work.366 Poor job quality and insecure employment are widespread and the World Bank noted 
that ‘neither education nor employment are a guarantee out of poverty’.367 

As a reflection to the slowing growth, poverty increased considerably: 38.3 % of the population was 
living  below  the  national  poverty  line  in  2012-2013  and  this  increased  to  54.5 %  in  2016-2017.368 
Afghanistan faced a sharp increase in poverty since 2011-12 with a rise in both urban and rural poverty 

356 UNHCR, Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan, 30 
August 2018, url,  pp. 29-30 
357 World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2019, url, p. 6  
358 Afghanistan, CSO, Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016-17, 23 September 2018, url, p. 2 
359 World Bank (The), Afghanistan Development Update, August 2018, url, p. 2 
360 World Bank (The), Afghanistan - Overview, 28 October 2018, url  
361 World Bank (The), Afghanistan Development Update, August 2018, url, pp. 1, 15 
362 ILO, Afghanistan - Employment and Environmental Sustainability Fact Sheets 2017, 2 April 2018, url, p. 1 
363 World Bank (The), Afghanistan - Overview, 28 October 2018, url 
364 World Bank (The), Afghanistan Development Update, August 2018, url, p. 29 
365 Afghanistan, CSO, Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016-17, 23 September 2018, url, p. 59 
366 World Bank (The), Afghanistan Overview, 28 October 2018, url 
367 World Bank (The), Afghanistan Development Update, August 2018, url, p. 30 
368 Afghanistan, CSO, Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016-17, 23 September 2018, url, p. 100 

 
                                                           
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rates.  Even  though  the  decline  in  welfare  was  widespread,  urban  poverty  rates  were  lower  than 
rural.369  

Various education indicators such as attendance and literacy rates, school-life expectancy and gender-
equity indicators, showed great progress in Afghanistan in the first decade after the fall of the Taliban 
but the improvements slowed down and even ‘come to a complete halt’ according to ALCS 2016-17.370 

In a 2018 report the World Bank concluded that over 2004-2010 healthcare services showed major 
improvements in Afghanistan, while in the period of 2011-2016 improvements continued at a slower 
pace.371 Despite these improvements, Afghanistan’s public health care system, neglected during the 
years  of  conflict,  continues  to  face  challenges,  such  as  damaged  infrastructure,  a  lack  of  trained 
healthcare providers and under-resourced healthcare facilities. The situation is ‘further complicated 
by a lack of security  and  pervasive  poverty’.372 According to ALCS 2016-17, 93 % of the  population 
lived within a range of two hours from a public clinic, 82.4 % lived less than two hours from a district 
or provincial hospital and 94.8 % were less than two hours away from a pharmacy.373 Many people in 
Afghanistan lack access to health care due to the conflict, and trauma-care is regarded as one of the 
most critical gaps remaining in Afghanistan’s public health care.374 

According to ALCS data from 2007-08 until 2016-17, access to clean water and adequate sanitation 
and hygiene has improved significantly.375 However, sanitation still continues to be poor compared to 
other  countries  in  the  region,376  and  access  to  drinking  water  still  remains  a  problem  for  many 
Afghans.377 

For  a  more  extensive  assessment  of  key  socio-economic  issues  at  stake  in  Afghanistan,  such  as 
economic  growth,  employment,  poverty  and  food  security,  please  refer  to  the  April  2019  EASO 
Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan: Key socio-economic indicators. Focus on Kabul City, 
Mazar-e Sharif and Herat City. 

1.4.4 Refugees, IDPs, returnees 

Asia  Foundation’s  2018  survey  found  mobility  was  a  coping  mechanism  for  Afghan  households 
responding to ‘insecurity, uncertainty, and external shocks’.378 

Afghanistan  has  a  long  history  of  protracted  international  displacement.  Reportedly  a  third  of  the 
population were displaced in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of 1979. Of the millions that fled to 
Iran and Pakistan, some returned to Afghanistan in the early 1990s. Afghanistan’s civil war and the 
advent of the Taliban reignited a new exodus to neighbouring countries.379 The toppling of the Taliban 
regime in 2001 marked the  beginning of a massive wave of returning Afghans. Between 2001 and 
2015,  UNHCR  assisted  the  return  of  4.8  million  Afghans,  and  many  more  returned  without official 
assistance.380  

Afghanistan is the source country of the second largest group of refugees in the world, around 2.6 
million, the vast majority of whom are hosted by neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. In addition to the 

369 World Bank (The), Afghanistan, Poverty in Afghanistan, Results based on ALCS 2016-17,  July 2018, url, p. 8 
370 Afghanistan, CSO, Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016-17, 23 September 2018, url, p. 139 
371 World Bank (The), Progress in the face of insecurity: Improving health outcomes in Afghanistan, 6 March 2018, url, p. 18 
372 WHO, From Trauma to Recovery: Addressing Emergency Care in Afghanistan, April 2018, url 
373 Afghanistan, CSO, Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016-17, 23 September 2018, url, p. 169 
374  WHO, From Trauma to Recovery: Addressing Emergency Care in Afghanistan, April 2018, url 
375 Afghanistan, CSO, Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016-17, 23 September 2018, url, p. 207 
376 Afghanistan, CSO, Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016-17, 23 September 2018, url, p. 207 
377 Asia Foundation (The), A Survey of the Afghan People 2017, November 2017, url, p. 29 
378 Asia Foundation (The), A Survey of the Afghan people 2018, December 2018, url, p. 201 
379 Middle East Research and Information Project, Afghanistan's Refugee Crisis, 24 September 2001, url 
380 World Bank (The), Fragility and population movement in Afghanistan, 3 October 2016, url, p. 1. 

                                                           
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registered  Afghan  refugees,  there  were  1.5-2  million  undocumented  Afghans  in  Iran  and  350 000-
550 000 in Pakistan.381 

Globally, Afghan nationals filed the highest number of asylum claims in 2017 (124 900 claims in 80 
different countries), although there was a considerable decrease compared to 2016 (237 800) or 2015 
(271 100).382 In 2016, more than 190 250 Afghans applied for asylum in EU+ states, while 2017 showed 
a significant decrease with only 49 135 applications.383 In 2018 45 300 asylum applications were in 
lodged in the EU+ by Afghan nationals.384 

According  to  UNHCR,  over  six  million  Afghans  returned  since  2002,  including  over  5.2  million 
registered  refugees  assisted  by  UNHCR.  In  2016,  over  600 000  Afghans  returned  from  the 
neighbouring Pakistan and Iran, including more than 370 000 refugees, marking a ‘renewed surge in 
repatriation’. In 2017, Afghan refugee returns decreased to nearly 60 000 and in 2018 the number of 
refugees returning to Afghanistan dropped below 16 000.385 Throughout 2018, IOM responded to the 
return of 805 850 undocumented Afghans from Iran and Pakistan.386 

Internal displacements 

According to UNHCR, Afghanistan has seen significant internal displacement caused by conflict and 
natural disasters. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) 
reported over 600 000 new conflict induced IDPs in 2017 and more than 200 000 Afghans have been 
displaced  by  drought,  mainly  in  the  western  part  of  the  country  in  2018. Based  on  estimations  by 
UNHCR  there  were  two  million  conflict  induced  and  drought  affected  IDPs  across  Afghanistan  in 
2018.387  In  2018,  343 341  individuals  have  been  newly  displaced  by  the  conflict  and  profiled  by 
UNOCHA as IDPs in need of protection and assistance.388 

UNOCHA found that greater levels of violence did not necessarily mean greater levels of displacement 
in 2018. With insurgents mostly engaging in a ‘war of attrition’ and focusing more on surprise assaults 
instead of efforts to seize and hold population centres, displacement was ‘confined to relatively small-
scale and temporal movement in 2018’. With the exception of the assaults against Farah and Ghazni, 
displacement was limited in duration and less likely reported. In 2017 Nangarhar, Kunduz and Badghis 
recorded the highest rates of conflict-related displacement, while in 2018 Ghazni, Faryab and Kunduz 
documented the highest numbers.389 

Afghanistan  experienced  an  extended  period  of  dryness  in  the  winter  planting  season  during 
December 2017 – February 2018. There was a precipitation deficit of more than 70 % in most parts of 
the country, which had a devastating impact on crops and livestock with the winter wet season being 
considered critical for successful agricultural production.390  

UNOCHA noted in October 2018 that the drought displaced more than 260 000 people in Badghis, 
Daykundi,  Herat  and  Ghor  provinces  in  the  previous  six  months.  Most  displaced  families  stayed  in 
displacement sites either in Herat City, Herat or in displacement sites in and around Qala-e-Naw, the 
provincial capital of Badghis.391 

381 UNHCR, Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees 2018-2019, October 2018, url, p. 4 
382 UNHCR, Global Trends, Forced displacement in 2017, 19 June 2018, url, p. 42 
383 EASO, Annual report on the situation of asylum in the EU 2017, 18 June 2018, url, p. 37 
384 EASO, EU+ Asylum Trends, 2018 Overview, 13 February 2019, url, p. 5 
385 UNHCR, Afghanistan Multi-Year Protection and Solutions Strategy 2019-2021, 31 January 2019, url, p. 3 
386 IOM, Return of undocumented Afghans, Weekly Situation Report, Jan-Dec 2018/1-5 Jan 2019, url, p. 1  
387 UNHCR, Afghanistan Multi-Year Protection and Solutions Strategy 2019-2021, 31 January 2019, url, p. 4 
388 UNHCR, Afghanistan – Operational Fact Sheet, 31 December 2018, url, p. 1  
389 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 9  
390 FAO, Afghanistan – Drought response, 23 November 2018, url, p. 2 
391 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin – Afghanistan, Issue 78 (1 July – 30 September 2018), 20 October 2018, url, p. 1  

 
                                                           
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For  more  information  on  the  socio-economic  status  of  IDPs  and  returnees  in  Afghanistan’s  major 
cities,  please  refer  to  the  April  2019  EASO  Country  of  Origin  Information  Report  Afghanistan:  Key 
socio-economic indicators. Focus on Kabul City, Mazar-e Sharif and Herat City. 

Deportations and voluntary returns  

Pakistan hosted around 1.4 million registered Afghan refugees392 and remained the world’s second 
largest  refugee  hosting  country  after  Turkey.393  The  majority  of  these  refugees  live  in  Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (58 %) and Balochistan (23 %) provinces bordering Afghanistan. Furthermore, 68 % of 
Afghan  refugees  live  in  urban  or  rural  areas,  while  32 %  reside  in  54  refugee  villages  across  the 
country.394  

Proof of Registration (PoR) cards are issued by the Government of Pakistan for the registered Afghan 
refugees, providing temporary legal stay and freedom of movement for them.395 According to AAN, 
the  extension  policy  for  PoR  cards  became  ‘more  ad-hoc  and  erratic  in  2016’  when  the  Pakistani 
government began to extend the cards for shorter periods of time.396 In October 2018 the PoR cards 
have been extended by the government until 30 June 2019.397  

Between August 2017 and February 2018, the Pakistani government, in close collaboration with the 
Government  of  Afghanistan  and  with  the  support  of  IOM  and  UNHCR,  carried  out  a  country-wide 
exercise  to  identify  undocumented  Afghans.  Some  880 000  previously  undocumented  Afghan 
nationals were identified during the exercise and 380 000 of them have already received their Afghan 
Citizen  Cards  (ACCs).398  The  goal  of  the  documentation  exercise  was  to  provide  undocumented 
Afghans with identification credentials that will allow legalise and regularise their stay in Pakistan for 
a limited period of time.399 

In response to several deadly security incidents and deteriorating political relations between Pakistan 
and  Afghanistan,  Human  Rights  Watch  stated  that  the  Pakistani  authorities  mounted  a  concerted 
campaign in 2016 to drive Afghans out of the country.400 In the second half of 2016, a combination of 
deportation  threats  and  police  abuses,  including  detention,  forced  evictions,  police  raids  and 
harassment401 pushed out nearly 365 000 of the country’s 1.5 million registered Afghan refugees, as 
well as just over 200 000 undocumented Afghans.402 In total, in 2016, 620 000 Afghans had returned 
from Pakistan.403 

Throughout 2018 a total of 15 699 Afghan refugees returned to Afghanistan with the assistance of 
UNHCR. There were 13 584 returns from Pakistan followed by 1 964 from Iran. Due to the improved 
protection environment for Afghan refugees and also to the deteriorating security in Afghanistan, the 
return trend from Pakistan significantly decreased.404 

According  to  IOM,  a  total  of  805 850  returns  were  registered  from  Iran  and  Pakistan  between 
1 January  and  31 December 2018,  while  the  total  number  of  returns  from  Iran  was  773 125.  IOM 

392 UNHCR, Registered Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, 4 February 2019, url 
393 UNHCR, Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees 2018-2019, October 2018, url, p. 6 
394 UNHCR, Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees 2018-2019, October 2018, url, p. 6 
395 UNHCR, Pakistan: Afghan Refugees Registration Update, 31 October 2018, url 
396 Bjelica, J. and Sabawoon, M.A., Still Caught in Regional Tensions? The uncertain destiny of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, 
AAN, 31 January 2018, url  
397 UNHCR, UNHCR welcomes Pakistan’s decision to extend stay of Afghan refugees, 5 October 2018, url 
398 UNHCR, Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees 2018-2019, October 2018, url, p. 13 
399 IOM, UN Migration Agency Supports Pakistan’s Documented of Undocumented Afghans, 24 May 2018, url  
400 HRW, Pakistan Coercion, UN Complicity 13 February 2017. url, p. 1. 
401 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Flash Appeal: One Million People on the Move (Covering Sep-Dec 2016), 7 September 2016, url, p. 
3  
402 HRW, Pakistan Coercion, UN Complicity 13 February 2017, url, pp. 1-3.  
403 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Dashboard (as of 31 Dec 2016), 22 March 2017, url 
404 UNHCR, Afghanistan, Voluntary Repatriation Update, January 2019, url, p. 2  

                                                           
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reported in January 2019 that compared to 2017, there has been a massive increase of returns from 
Iran that is mostly driven by the recent political and economic issues of the country.405 In May 2018 
President Donald Trump decided to withdraw from the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and world 
powers  and  to  reimpose  sanctions  on  Tehran.  As  a  result,  Iran’s  currency  is  weakened  and 
unemployment rose.406 Since Afghans mostly work in Iran’s informal economy, the demand for their 
work declined drastically.407  

1.4.5 Children 

With 48 % of its population being younger than 15 years, Afghanistan is one of the four countries in 
the world with the highest proportion of persons under the age of 15.408 

In  February  2019,  Save  The  Children  listed  Afghanistan  as  one  of  the  ten  worst  conflict-affected 
countries to be a child.409  

The armed conflict in Afghanistan has had a serious impact on children who accounted for 28 % of all 
civilian casualties in 2018. UNAMA documented 3 062 child casualties in 2018 (927 deaths and 2 135 
injured), representing a slight decrease compared to 2017.410 Although AGEs were responsible for the 
majority of child casualties in 2018 (44 % of all child casualties, 3 % decrease compared to 2017), child 
casualties  attributed  to  Pro-Government  Forces  showed  an  increase  as  well  (34 %  of  all  child 
casualties,  15 %  increase  compared  to  2017).411  UNAMA  identified  ground  engagements  between 
AGEs and PGF as the leading cause for child casualties which resulted in 1 192 child casualties in 2018, 
representing a 17 % decrease compared to 2017.412  

Nevertheless, the increase in  child casualties caused by aerial operations and suicide and  complex 
attacks was particularly concerning. Aerial operations by Pro-Government Forces were responsible for 
492  child  casualties  showing  a  85 %  increase  compared  to  2017.413  UNAMA  verified  275  child 
casualties  (67  deaths  and  208  injured)  from  suicide  and  complex  attacks  throughout  2018.  This 
represents a 33 % increase compared  to 2017 and  a 116 % surge in the number of children killed. 
UNAMA attributed 152 such child casualties (40 deaths and 112 injured) to ISKP, marking a 158 % 
increase compared to the previous year. The Taliban were responsible for 83 such casualties (24 killed 
and 59 injured), a decline of 35 % compared to 2017.414 

According to the UN Secretary General’s report covering the period January-December 2017, children 
were recruited to assist in intelligence gathering, to plant IEDs, carry out suicide attacks or were used 
for combat.415 In 2018, the recruitment and use of 38 children (37 boys and one girl) was documented, 
the majority in the eastern region. UNAMA attributed the recruitment and use of 17 children to Tehrik-
e Taliban Pakistan, five to the Taliban, two to ISKP, one to undetermined AGEs, five to ANSF (four to 
ALP and one to ANP) and eight to pro-Government armed groups.416 

According to the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA), Afghanistan was one of 
the  countries  ‘heavily  affected’  by  attacks  on  education  and  military  use  of  schools  from  2013  to 

405 IOM, Return of Undocumented Afghans, Weekly Situation Report, Jan-Dec 2018/1-5 Jan 2019, url, p. 1  
406 RFE/RL, Things Are So Bad In Iran That Afghan Migrants Are Going Home, 1 August 2018, url  
407 IOM, Return of Undocumented Afghans, Weekly Situation Report, Jan-Dec 2018/1-5 Jan 2019, url, p. 1 
408 Afghanistan, CSO, Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016-2017: Highlights Report, 2018, url, p. 4 
409 Save The Children, Stop the War on Children: Protecting Children in 21st Century Conflict, 14 February 2019, url, p. 10  
410 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 11  
411 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 12 
412 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 12 
413 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 12 
414 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 12 
415 UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict, 16 May 2018, url, p. 5  
416 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 13 

 
                                                           
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2017.417  GCPEA’s  November  2018  briefing  paper  on  Afghanistan  added  that  attacks  on  education 
accelerated again in 2018.418 

Throughout 2018 UNAMA recorded 191 incidents, almost three times the number of incidents in 2017, 
affecting education, including attacks against schools; the killing, injury and abduction of education 
personnel; and threats against education facilities and personnel. The increase is attributed mostly to 
attacks by AGEs on schools that had been used as voter registration centres and polling centres for 
the parliamentary elections in October 2018.419 

Approximately 50 % of the 5 000 polling centres, which also served as voter-registration sites, were 
located in schools. During the voter registration period, AGEs targeted schools and IEC staff registering 
voters  through  IED  and  suicide  attacks,  with  one  incident  where  the  Taliban  set  fire  to  a  school 
building. These attacks, combined with threats against teachers, resulted in the closure of schools in 
some areas. Even the open schools experienced attendance rates decreasing due to the heightened 
risk of attack.420 

For more information on the Taliban’s attitude towards education and in particular girls’ education, 
please refer to the EASO Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan: Individuals targeted by 
armed actors in the conflict.  

According to USDOS, there were reports about members of the security forces sexually abusing and 
exploiting children along with multiple reports of ‘bacha bazi’.421 

In 2018, UNAMA recorded four incidents of sexual violence against children, three by the ANP and 
one  by  the  ALP.  UNAMA  added  that  since  these  cases  are  considered  extremely  sensitive  and  are 
widely underreported, these figures do not reflect the problem in its entirety. Although in February 
2018  the  revised  Penal  Code,  which  explicitly  criminalises  the  practice  of  bacha  bazi,  entered  into 
force, accountability for these crimes remains a challenge.422 

For more child specific issues in the context of the conflict of Afghanistan, such as the harmful practice 
of Bacha Bazi and the recruitment of children by the armed actors in the conflict, please refer to the 
EASO Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan: Individuals targeted under societal and legal 
norms and the EASO Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan: Recruitment by armed groups 
from September 2016. 

1.5 Geographical Overview 

1.5.1 Urban-rural divide 

Afghanistan’s history is characterised by a structural urban-rural divide. Urban centres have been hubs 
for administration, market-driven methods of production, taxation, education, judiciary and reforms. 
This led to resentment among the rural population, which did not benefit from these developments. 423  

On the other hand, AAN’s expert Thomas Ruttig stated in 2011 that the rural-urban divide was not ‘so 
hermetic’ anymore due to a wave of reforms which date back to the beginning of the 20th century. 
Moreover,  migration  from  the  provinces  towards  bigger  cities,  the  constant  exchange  between 
villages and towns and the distribution of modern means of communications around the country have 

417 GCPEA, Education under Attack 2018, May 2018, url, pp. 32-33 
418 GCPEA, Attacks on Education in Afghanistan, Briefing Paper, November 2018, url, p. 3  
419 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 15 
420 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Special Report: 2018 Elections Violence, November 2018, 
url, p. 6 
421 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 - Afghanistan, 13 March 2019, url  
422 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 14 
423 Giustozzi, A. and Ibrahimi, N., Thirty Years of Conflict: drivers of anti-Government Mobilisation in Afghanistan, 1978-2011, 
January 2012, url, pp. 7-8  

                                                           
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contributed to the mitigation of this still existing gap.424 According to the Asia Foundation’s Survey of 
2018, rural respondents cited foreign intervention almost twice as often as urban respondents as a 
reason for pessimism. Insecurity in general was mentioned as a reason for pessimism by 76 % of the 
urban  interviewees  and  by  71 %  of  the  rural  population.425  Furthermore,  urban  respondents  were 
more likely to  fear  for their  personal  safety than interviewees living in rural areas.426 Respondents 
from rural areas, on the other hand, more frequently mentioned ‘some groups’ as being responsible 
for  posing  security  threats:427  74.2 %  of  rural  respondents  named  the  Taliban  as  a  security  threat, 
while 39.5 % of urban respondents worried more about criminals and thieves.428  

In 2015 the Taliban set as an objective to ‘capture and hold towns and provincial capitals’.429 Following 
attempts  of  capturing  provincial  centres  like  Kunduz  city,  Lashkar-Gah  in  Helmand,  Pul-i-Khumri  in 
Baghlan, Farah city, Tarinkot in Uruzgan and Maimana in Faryab in 2015, 2016 and 2017,430 in August 
2018 Taliban insurgents carried out a large-scale attack on Ghazni city, spreading concerns about the 
possibility  of  another  major  attack  in  the  south-east.431  According  to  the  Afghan  news-agency 
Tolonews in late August 2018, residents of Gardez in Paktya, Kunduz city, Ghazni city, Farah city and 
Maimana expressed their concerns over the possible collapse of these areas due to Taliban threat.432 
Moreover, in November 2018 security deteriorated in Hazara dominated areas of western Ghazni and 
eastern  Uruzgan  provinces,  causing  the  displacement  of  Hazara  families.433  Still,  according  to  US 
military sources quoted by SIGAR, the provincial centres of all of Afghanistan’s provinces were under 
Afghan government control or influence, as of December 2018.434 As reported by the UN Secretary-
General  in  his  February  2019  report,  ‘[t]he  Taliban  succeeded  in  temporarily  capturing  21  district 
administrative centres throughout the year, the second highest level since the security transition to 
the Afghan forces at the end of 2014’.435 

According to the UN Secretary-General’s report of February 2019, suicide attacks decreased by 61 % 
between  mid-November  2018  and  early  February  2019  compared  with  the  same  period  in  2017, 
probably because of effective interdiction efforts in Kabul city and Jalalabad.436 On the other hand 
‘[a]nti-Government Elements increased their reliance on suicide and complex attacks and shifted their 
intended targets more and more towards the civilian population [throughout 2018]’, and ‘suicide and 
complex  attacks  remained  the  leading  cause  of  civilian  casualties  attributed  to  Anti-Government 
Elements’.437 Between mid-November 2018 and February 2019 the city of Kabul witnessed several 
high-profile attacks despite ‘an overall lower tempo of suicide and complex attacks nationwide’.438 
Further, in Kabul province suicide and complex attacks caused 95 % of all civilian casualties, with more 

424 Ruttig, T., Afghanistan‘s not so-hermetic rural-urban divide, AAN, 26 May 2011, url 
425 Asia Foundation (The), A Survey of the Afghan People 2018, 4 December 2018, url, p. 26 
426 Asia Foundation (The), A Survey of the Afghan People 2018, 4 December 2018, url, p. 3 
427 Asia Foundation (The), A Survey of the Afghan People 2018, 4 December 2018, url, p. 4 
428 Asia Foundation (The), A Survey of the Afghan People 2018, 4 December 2018, url, p. 5 
429 BBC News, Why are the Taliban resurgent in Afghanistan?, 5 January 2016, url 
430 Ali, O., The Taleban Assault on Kunduz city: Déjà vu, but why?, AAN, 12 October 2016, url; LWJ, Taliban threatens another 
provincial  capital  in  the  Afghan  north,  21  October  2016,  url;  LWJ,  Taliban  Assaults  Provincial  Capital  in  southeastern 
Afghanistan, 22 May 2017, url 
431 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 7 December 
2018, url, p. 6 
432 Tolonews, Residents Of Numerous Cities Concerned About Security, 30 August 2018, url 
433 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 7 December 
2018, url, p. 6 
434 SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, url, p. 71 
435 UN Secretary General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 28 February 
2019, url, p. 6 
436 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 28 February 
2019, url, p. 6 
437 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 22 
438 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 28 February 
2019, url, p. 6 

 
                                                           
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than half of them caused by incidents claimed by ISKP. According to the Landinfo [informal translation] 
in  September  2018,  a  significant  amount  of  reported  incidents  in  Kabul  city  related  to  the  use  of 
IEDs.439 During parliamentary elections in October 2018, the cities of Kunduz and Kabul recorded the 
highest numbers  of  incidents,  claimed by Taliban insurgents and ISKP. Moreover, even though the 
Taliban prevented voters from participating in the election process in regions under their influence or 
control, the election could not be significantly disrupted in urban areas - despite the high number of 
security incidents.440 

Displacement patterns due to conflict shifted in 2018: whilst in 2017 the provinces with the highest 
displacement  rates  were  Nangarhar,  Kunduz  and  Badghis,  in  2018  Ghazni,  Faryab  and  Kunduz 
witnessed the  highest  numbers.441  In  2018  around  550 000 Afghans left their homes either  due to 
conflict  or  drought  and  moved  into  district  centres,  seeking  for  better  basic  services  and  income-
generating opportunities.442 As of September 2018, more than 250 000 people were displaced due to 
drought in the western region443, alone between June and August 2018 263 000 people were displace 
within  Badghis  and  Herat.444  Qala-e-Naw  in  Badghis,  for  instance,  hosted  around  120 000  newly 
displaced IDPs, as of mid-September 2018.445 Furthermore, in 2018 Afghanistan witnessed the return 
of more than 800 000 undocumented Afghans from Iran and Pakistan. While returns from Pakistan 
decreased by 70 % compared to 2017, the number of returnees from Iran rose from 462 000 in 2017 
to 760 000 in 2018. Returnees from Iran entered Afghanistan through the border crossings of Milak in 
Nimroz and Islam Qala in Herat provinces; whereas Afghans returning from Pakistan passed through 
Torkham in Nangarhar and Spin Boldak in Kandahar provinces.446 Moreover, in Farah province, one 
out of four residents was either a returnee or an IDP as of September 2018.447  

Included below is the conflict severity map produced by UNOCHA. The conflict severity is derived from 
three indicators: armed clashes and airstrikes; civilian casualties, and conflict induced displacement. 
The shading on the map is based on an average ranking of all districts on these indicators.448 

439  Norway,  Landinfo,  Respons,  Afghanistan:  Sikkerhetssituasjonen  i  den  sentrale  regionen  og  i  det  sentrale  høylandet-
oppdatering, 5 September 2018, url, p. 4  
440 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 7 December 
2018, url, p. 6 
441 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 9 
442 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 5, 13; UN Secretary General, The 
situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 7 December 2018, url, p. 12 
443 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Drought Response, Situation Report No. 2 (as of 16 September2018), 16 September 2018, url, p. 
1 
444 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 9; UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Drought 
Response, Situation Report No. 2 (as of 16 September 2018), 16 September 2018, url; BBC News, Afghan drought  ‘displacing 
more  people  than  Taliban  conflict‘,  17  October  2018,  url;  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan:  Humanitarian  Needs  Overview  2019,  6 
December 2018, url, p. 9 
445 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Drought Response, Situation Report No. 2 (as of 16 September2018), 16 September 2018, url 
446 IOM, Return of Undocumented Afghans, Weekly Situation Report, 27 Jan – 02 Feb 2019, 2 February 2019, url, pp. 1-2 
447 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 12 
448 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2  

 
                                                           
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Map 2: Conflict severity, Afghanistan449 

1.5.2 Regional differences 

According  to  the  February  2019  report  by  the  UN  Secretary  General,  the  southern  region  saw  the 
highest number of incidents between November 2018 and February 2019, followed by the eastern 
and northern regions, which accounted for 67 % of all incidents. Even if the amount of suicide attacks 
decreased, the number of airstrikes by the Afghan Air Force and international military forces increased 
by 51 % compared to 2017.450 Security concerns increased in Kandahar after the provincial police chief 
and the provincial head NDS were killed in Kandahar city in October 2018.451 Moreover, as reported 
by US military sources, most of the security incidents initiated by anti-government groups recorded in 
the first ten months of 2018, occurred in the provinces of Badghis, Farah, Faryab, Ghazni, Helmand, 
Kandahar, Uruzgan and Herat; Herat and Badghis witnessed the greatest increase in these types of 
attacks since August 2018. From October to December 2018 however, the province with the highest 
rate of AGE offensives was Farah, followed by Helmand and Faryab.452 According to a dataset from 
August 2018 quoted by UNOCHA, 70 % of men did not feel safe when travelling to work, the mosque, 
health and education facilities or the market, with this figures reaching a peak of 95 % in Uruzgan and 
92 %  in  Helmand  provinces.453  As  reported  by  a  military  analyst  specialised  on  issues  relating  to 

449 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2  
450 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 28 February 
2019, url, p. 6 
451 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 7 December 
2018, url, p. 6 
452 SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, url, pp. 73-74 
453 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 9 

 
 
                                                           
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Afghanistan, throughout 2018 battles took also place in provinces that were previously considered 
relatively calm.454  

ISKP remained present in the eastern region, notably in Nangarhar province, where its fighters claimed 
responsibility for suicide and complex attacks throughout 2018. Also, ISKP claimed attacks in Kabul 
city, ‘reflecting a high level of civilian harm caused by each attack in the densely populated city’.455 
Furthermore,  clashes  between  ISKP  and  the  Taliban  were  reported  in  Nangarhar  and  in  Kunar 
provinces.456  

According  to  a  military  analyst  specialized  on  issues  relating  to  Afghanistan,  there  are  differences 
between the strategies of ISKP and the Taliban: whilst the latter focus their attacks mostly against 
security  forces  or  Afghan  government  employees,  trying  to  avoid  ‘collateral  damage’  among  the 
civilian population, ISKP also targets Shias as well as non-cooperating civilians, aiming to reach high 
numbers of civilian casualties. It thus allows for a high number of ‘collateral damage’.457 

Map 3 was created by the Austrian COI Department and provides an overview of the security incidents 
from 1 January 2018 to 28 February 2019 per province based on Global Incident Map (GIM) data. In 
total, 5 232 security incidents were found in open media sources by the GIM website.458 

454 Military analyst, confidential communication, 14 January 2019 
455 UNAMA, Afghanistan, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, February 2019, url, p. 21 
456 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 28 February 
2019, url, p. 7 
457 Military analyst, confidential communication, 14 January 2019 
458 Austria, BFA-Staatendokumentation, Afghanistan - Security Incidents [Map], 25 March 2019 

                                                           
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—  59  

Map 3: Overview of security incidents per province (1 January 2018 to 28 February 2019)459 

459 Global Incident Map collects data on security-related incidents connected to terrorism worldwide on the basis of global 
online news media reports and provides a geo-referenced display of such incidents, broken down by types, in an online map. 
See Methodology. 

 
 
                                                           
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1.5.3 Government versus Taliban control 

As  stated  by  AAN’s  co-director  Kate  Clark  in  May  2017,  many  assessments  of  territorial  control  in 
Afghanistan have been made in recent years. There have been debates over figures and also over the 
definition of the word ‘control’; moreover, assertions have been made about the meaning of ‘loss of 
government  control’,  partly  linked  to  deliberate  withdrawals  to  areas  deemed  to  be  of  more 
strategical importance.460 

This security report provides information from territorial assessments by both the US military and the 
Taliban. As both subjects are actors in the conflict, a certain degree of propaganda and ‘information 
operations’ must be taken into account.461 Therefore, assessments by the US war and terrorism blog 
Long War Journal (LWJ) and a military analyst specialized on issues relating to Afghanistan were also 
included. Furthermore, according to AAN’s expert Thomas Ruttig, there are differing counts of the 
number of districts, ranging from 379 to 407;462 this has to be considered when analysing assessments 
by different sources.  

According  to  US  military  sources  quoted  by  SIGAR,  in  October  2018  control  over  Afghanistan’s 
districts, population, and territory became more contested, Afghan government control or influence 
continued  to  decline,  and  insurgent  control  or  influence  increased  slightly  since  July  2018.463  The 
Afghan government’s control or influence over its districts decreased by nearly two percentage points 
since July to 53.8 % and the number of contested districts rose to 33.9 %.464 The percentage of the 
population living in  districts  under  Afghan government control or influence, which from May 2017 
until July 2018 was largely stagnant at around 65 %, decreased to 63.5 % in October.465 The number 
of  inhabitants  of  contested  areas  increased  to  8.5  million  people  (25.6 %  of  the  population),  an 
increase by nearly two percentage-points compared to the same period in 2017.466 Sources quoted by 
SIGAR identified the provinces with the most insurgent-controlled or influenced districts as Kunduz, 
Uruzgan, and Helmand.467  

SIGAR  receives  its  data  over  territorial  control  from  Resolute  Support,  the  NATO-led  mission  in 
Afghanistan, which has the tasks of training, advising and assisting Afghan security forces.468 Whilst 
the  indicators  used  by  RS  to  assess  territorial  control  are  ‘government  control’,  ‘government 
influence’,  ‘insurgent  activity’  and  ‘contested’,  the  Long  War  Journal  does  not  assess  ‘government 
influence’, as they consider it no more than a measure of ‘control’.469 

460 Clark, K.,  Looking at the ‚Nicholson plan‘: A bid to tilt the Afghan war in the government‘s favour, AAN, 24 May 2017, url 
461 Munoz, A. and Dick, E., Information Operations: The Imperative of Doctrine Harmonization and Measures of Effectiveness, 
RAND Corporation, 2015, url 
462 Ruttig, T., The Afghanistan Election Conundrum (12): Good news and bad news about district numbers, AAN, 16 August 
2018, url 
463 SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, url, p. 68 
464 SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, url, p. 69 
465 SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, url, p. 65 
466 SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, url, p. 69 
467 SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, url, p. 71 
468 SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, url, p. 76 
469 LWJ, Analysis: US military downplays district control as Taliban gains ground in Afghanistan, 31 January 2019, url 

                                                           
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Map 4: Stability level of Afghanistan’s 407 districts as of 22 October 2018470 

The  Taliban’s  2018  reporting  claims  that    about  61  of  Afghanistan’s  districts  along  with  their 
administrative  centres  were  under  complete  control  of  insurgents.  In  the  remaining  districts, 
government control is purportedly limited to district administrative centres and a few are under the 
complete control of Afghan government.471 

470 SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, url, p. 71 
471 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of Jihad, End of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 
31 December 2018, url 

 
 
 
                                                           
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As of 31 December 2018, the Taliban published the following territorial control map: 

Map 5: Taliban territorial control map; source: Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan472 - Note: The acronym IEA in the legend means 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan [The Taliban]. 

LWJ reported in late January 2019 that the Afghan government controlled 35.1 % of Afghanistan’s 407 
districts, and the Taliban ruled over another 13 % in 2018. The remaining 49.6 % were contested, while 
seven districts (or 1.7 %) could not be accurately assessed.473 The methodology of LWJ is described as 
follows: 

‘The primary data and research behind this are based on open-source information, such as 
press  reports  and  information  provided  by  government  agencies  and  the  Taliban.  This  is  a 
living map that LWJ frequently updates as verifiable research is conducted to support control 
changes. Any “Unconfirmed” district colored orange has some level of claim-of-control made 
by the Taliban, but either has not yet been—or can not be— independently verified by LWJ 
research.  A  “Contested”  district  may  mean  that  the  government  may  be  in  control  of  the 
district center, but little else, and the Taliban controls large areas or all of the areas outside of 
the  district  center.  A  “Controlled”  district  may  mean  the  Taliban  is  openly  administering  a 
district, providing services and security, and also running the local courts.’474 

472 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of Jihad, End of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 
31 December 2018, url 
473 LWJ, Analysis: US military downplays district control as Taliban gains ground in Afghanistan, 31 January 2019, url 
474 LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, as of 23 April 2019, url 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
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—  63  

Map 6: Taliban control in Afghanistan475 

A  military  analyst  specialized  in  Afghanistan  issues  reported  in  January  2019  that  around  39 %  of 
Afghan districts were under control of the Afghan government and 37 % were controlled by Taliban; 
these areas were relatively calm and clashes were reported occasionally. Around 20 % were highly 
contested and ISKP controlled around 4 % of the districts.476 

AAN expert Kate Clark stated in May 2017 that ‘[r]egardless of all this [the various assessments of 
territorial control], the trend is clear – and not good: the government has been steadily losing territory 
since the end of 2014’.477 

475 LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, as of 23 April 2019, url 
476 Military analyst, confidential communication, 14 January 2019 
477 Clark, K., Looking at the ‘Nicholson plan‘: A bid to tilt the Afghan war in the government‘s favour, AAN, 24 May 2017, url 

 
 
 
                                                           
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1.6 Mobility 

Afghanistan's most important road is Highway 1, often referred to as the ‘Ring Road’. Encircling the 
central parts of the country, Highway 1 connects Afghanistan's main urban centres Kabul, Mazar-e-
Sharif,  Herat  and  Kandahar.478  While  President  Ashraf  Ghani  reportedly  pledged  to  complete  the 
missing  sections of  the  Ring  Road  within nine months  in 2015,479 some parts allegedly still remain 
unpaved,  e.g.  about  200  kilometres  between  Badghis  and  Faryab.480  Additionally,  the  notoriously 
overcrowded and desolate Salang Tunnel at the Salang Pass between Parwan and Baghlan remains a 
bottleneck between Kabul and the northern parts of the country.481 

Besides  bad  road  conditions,  which  reportedly  did  not  improve  substantially  despite  considerable 
funding  of  construction  projects  by  foreign  donors  from  2001  onwards,482  the  volatile  security 
situation impedes safe passage in many parts of the country. Clashes between government forces and 
insurgents,483  as  well  as  checkpoints  established  by  insurgents,484  improvised  explosive  devices 
(IEDs),485 kidnappings486  and  armed  robberies by various groups487 reportedly caused casualties  on 
many roads in Afghanistan in 2018 and early 2019. 

Most notably, the Taliban were threatening strategic parts of the Ring Road in Ghazni, Baghlan, and 
on the highway linking Herat to Kandahar in the western province of Faryab in 2018.488 Already in 
2013 AAN reported an upsurge in insurgent attacks on Highway 1 in Ghazni. This part of the Ring Road 
is  pivotal  for  civilian  and  military  transport,  as  it  connects  Kabul  to  Kandahar  in  southern 
Afghanistan.489 In August 2018, a major Taliban attack on Ghazni City destroyed parts of the road and 
contaminated it with IEDs.490 While the highway was cleared subsequently, UNOCHA warned that ‘[…] 
travel  from  Kabul  to  Ghazni  via  Highway  1  is  possible  but  remains  risky,  notably  due  to  sporadic 
fighting between Saidabad, Wardak, and Ghazni.’491 In December 2018, AAN reported that the Taliban 
continued to put pressure on the Kabul-Kandahar highway in Ghazni.492 Similarly, the Taliban began 
to make strategic inroads into Baghlan in 2014. A pivotal section of the Ring Road runs through this 
province,  as  it  connects  Kabul  with  the  north  of  the  country.  According  to  AAN,  the  Taliban 
strategically  blocked  parts  of  the  Baghlan-Balkh  highway  during  large-scale  attacks  on  Kunduz  in 

478 Diplomat (The), Kabul's Plan to Realize Afghanistan’s Geographic Dividend, 5 December 2017, url; AAN, Going in Circles: 
The never-ending story of Afghanistan’s unfinished Ring Road, 16 January 2015, url  
479 Suroush, Q., Going in Circles: The never-ending story of Afghanistan’s unfinished Ring Road, AAN, 16 January 2015, url  
480 SIGAR, Afghanistan´s Ring Road from Qeysar to Laman: After more than 12 years and over $249 million spent, the project 
is only 15 percent complete, June 2018, url, p. 4 
481 Pajhwok Afghan News, Current Salang tunnel insufficient, says President Ghani, 15 October 2018, url; Diplomat (The), 
Fixing the Salang Pass Tunnel, 21 October 2015, url  
482 SIGAR, Afghanistan´s Ring Road from Qeysar to Laman: After more than 12 years and over $249 million spent, the project 
is  only  15  percent  complete,  June  2018,  url,  p.  4;  Suroush,  Q.,  Going  in  Circles:  The  never-ending  story  of  Afghanistan’s 
unfinished Ring Road, AAN, 16 January 2015, url 
483 Pajhwok Afghan News, Commuters say insecurity worsens on Balkh-Jawzjan road, 18 November 2018, url 
484 Salaam Times, Afghan forces move to secure highways against Taliban's 'customs tax' extortion, 14 December 2018, url 
485  Tolonews,  Seven  Police  Killed  In  Kabul-Kandahar  Highway  Attack,  15  August  2018,  url;  Khaama  Press,  Explosion  on 
Kandahar-Zabul highway leaves 3 civilians dead, 7 July 2018, url; Ali, O., The 2018 Election Observed (3) in Kunduz: A Very 
Violent E-Day, AAN, 7 November 2018, url  
486 CBS News, Taliban kidnaps more than 100 bus passengers in northern Afghanistan, 20 August 2018, url; Khaama Press, 
Taliban militants kidnap 170 passengers from Kunduz-Takhar highway, 20 August 2018, url; Bakhtar News, Taliban Abduct 
Commuters of Three Buses in Kunduz-Takhar Highway, 20 August 2018, url 
487 Pajhwok Afghan News, Herat truck drivers say intimidated for extortion by police, 5 January 2019, url 
488 Muzhary, F., Unheeded Warnings (2): Ghazni city as vulnerable to Taleban as before, AAN, 30 December 2018, url; Ali, O. 
and Ruttig, T., Battle for  Faryab: Fighting Intensifies on one of Afghanistan’s Major  Frontlines,  AAN, 12 March 2018, url; 
Pajhwok Afghan News, 14 ANA soldiers killed in Kunduz attack, 26 April 2018, url 
489 Osman, B., The Road to Ghazni: Bombs, battles and blockades, AAN, 13 July 2013, url 
490 UNO, ‘No safe way’ into battle-scarred Afghan city of Ghazni to deliver aid as traumatized children search for parents, 17 
August 2018, url 
491 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Ghazni Conflict Update No. 4, 20 August 2018, url 
492 Muzhary, F., Unheeded Warnings (2): Ghazni city as vulnerable to Taleban as before, AAN, 30 December 2018, url 

                                                           
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Afghanistan's north in 2015 and 2018 in order to disrupt troop movements by the government forces. 
AAN links the success of the Taliban in holding Kunduz for two weeks in 2015 to this strategy.493 

According to the magazine Foreign Affairs, the Taliban set up checkposts at strategic points on the 
Ring Road, in order to conduct identity checks and arrest or execute persons. According to Foreign 
Affairs this is a strategy that is much less costly and more sustainable for them than capturing urban 
centres.494 AAN  noted  in  2016  that  this  is a viable method to ‘[…] undermine the Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF), both psychologically and physically,’ as it renders travelling for government-
affiliated persons very dangerous and blocks troop movements.495 Furthermore, collecting ‘customs 
duties’ along main roads is a source of revenue for the Taliban.496 

Afghanistan's major population centres can be reached either by road or by plane. According to the 
airport  map  produced  by  the  Austrian  Country  of  Origin  Information  unit,  scheduled  passenger 
services to domestic and international destinations exist from Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, and Mazar-e 
Sharif.497 Hamid Karzai International Airport (KBL) is located at a distance of 16 kilometres from Kabul's 
city centre.498 In July 2018, at least 14 persons reportedly died in a suicide attack near the airport’s 
main  entrance.499  Herat  International  Airport  (HEA)  is  situated  at  the  Kandahar-Herat  highway, 
approximately 20 kilometres south of the city centre of Herat.500 Mazar-e-Sharif International Airport 
(MZR)  is  located  to  the  east  of  Mazar-e-Sharif's  city  centre,  next  to  the  German  army  base  Camp 
Marmal.501 

Domestic airports with scheduled passenger services also exist in the provinces of Farah, Helmand, 
Nimroz, and Uruzgan,502 while scheduled flights to the provincial capitals of Badakhshan, Bamyan, and 
Ghor have been suspended since January 2018 after a considerable number of Kam Air staff members 
died in an attack in Kabul. This allegedly poses a problem to the local population as road travel to the 
provinces  is  reportedly  unsafe  due  to  insurgent  activity,  a  lack  of  law  enforcement  and  bad  road 
conditions.503 

493 Hewad, G., The 2015 insurgency in the North (4): Surrounding the cities in Baghlan, AAN, 21 October 2015 url; Ali, O., 
Taleban in the North: Gaining ground along the Ring Road in Baghlan, AAN, 15 August 2016, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 14 
ANA soldiers killed in Kunduz attack, 26 April 2018, url 
494 Foreign Affairs, The Taliban’s Battle Plan, 28 November 2018, url 
495 Ali, O., Taleban in the North: Gaining ground along the Ring Road in Baghlan, AAN, 15 August 2016, url 
496 Salaam Times, Afghan forces move to secure highways against Taliban's 'customs tax' extortion, 14 December 2018, url 
497 Austria, BFA-Staatendokumentation, Afghanistan - Airports [Map], 25 March 2019 
498 Hamid Karzai International Airport, Hamid Karzai International Airport, n.d. url 
499 Al Jazeera, Several dead in Kabul suicide blast as exiled VP Dostum returns, 23 July 2018, url 
500 Afghanistan, Civil Aviation Authority, Aeronautical Information Publication, 3 January 2019, url, p. 98 
501 Afghanistan, Civil Aviation Authority, Aeronautical Information Publication, 3 January 2019, url, p. 238; Airportia, Mazar-
I-Sharif International Airport MZR, n.d., url 
502 Austria, BFA-Staatendokumentation, Afghanistan - Airports [Map], 25 March 2019 
503 Pajhwok Afghan News, Ghor residents fume over suspension of flights, 19 March 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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Map 7: Afghanistan – Airports 504 

504 Austria, BFA-Staatendokumentation, Afghanistan - Airports [Map], 25 March 2019 

 
                                                           
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2.  Regional  description  of  the  security 
situation in Afghanistan 

In the following sections, security trends are explained in greater detail, per geographic subdivision 
(Kabul City and 34 provinces). In each provincial section a general description of the province contains 
information on the geography and population, on the conflict background, including the actors in the 
conflict and the Taliban presence in the province. A second part describes recent trends in the security 
situation,  including  the  nature  of  the  violence,  frequency,  targets,  locations,  and  victims  within  a 
timeframe  from  1 January 2018  until  28 February 2019.  Finally,  a  separate  part  is  dedicated  to 
displacements.  Under  the  sub-sections  several  incidents  are  described.  These  should  be  read  as 
illustrations of trends in the security situation and not as an exhaustive list of incidents. 

2.1 Kabul city  

2.1.1 General description of the city 

Kabul is the capital of Afghanistan, and also a district in Kabul province. It is the most populous city in 
Afghanistan,  with  an  estimated  population  of  4 117 414  inhabitants  for  2018/19.505  However,  the 
population  figure  is  disputed,  with  some  sources  claiming  that  it  amounts  to  almost  6  million. 506 
According to a 2017 report by AAN expert Fabrizio Foschini for the United States Institute of Peace 
(USIP), the city, which before 2001 counted 12 wards (also referred to as Police Districts,  507 PDs, or 
nahia508),  expanded  to  22  PDs  as  a  result  of  its  significant  demographic  growth  and  horizontal 
expansion.509  Kabul  city  hosts  an  airport,  which  is  served  by  international  and  domestic  passenger 
flights as of March 2019.510  

505 Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 5 
506 Foschini, F., Kabul Unpacked, A geographical guide to a metropolis in the making, AAN, 19 March 2019, url, p. 1  
507 Foschini, F., Kabul and the challenge of dwindling foreign aid, USIP, April 2017, url, pp. 7-8 
508 Foschini, F., Kabul Unpacked, A geographical guide to a metropolis in the making, AAN, 19 March 2019, url, p. 4 
509 Foschini, F., Kabul and the challenge of dwindling foreign aid, USIP, April 2017, url, pp. 7-8 
510 Austria, BFA-Staatendokumentation, Afghanistan - Airports [Map], 25 March 2019 

 
                                                           
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Map 8: Kabul Police Districts, source: BFA-Staatendokumentation511 

The city is composed of three concentric rings: the first one includes Shahr-e Kohna, the old city, Shahr-
e Naw, the new city, as well as Shash Darak and Wazir Akbar Khan, where many foreign embassies, 
foreign organisations and offices are located. The second ring consists of neighbourhoods developed 
in the 1950s-1980s to host the growing urban population like Taimani, Qala-e Fatullah, Karte Se, Karte 
Chahar, Karte Naw and the microraions (Soviet-style residential districts). Finally, the third ring, which 
sprouted  after  2001,  is  mainly  populated  by  ‘recent  immigrants’512  (Afghan  immigrants  from  the 
provinces),513 except for some high-profile residential compounds for VIPs.514  

As for the ethnic distribution of the city’s population, Kabul is a melting pot for various ethnic, linguistic 
and religious groups, and each one of them settled in specific places, according to the geographical 
position of their home provinces: this applies to the ancient city, as well as to neighbourhoods further 
out, and it  becomes more prominent  in the unplanned areas.515 In the most recently settled  areas 
residents  depend  mostly  on  qawmi  (a  social  unit  based  on  kinship,  residence  and  occupation) 
networks in order to find shelter, jobs and collectively advance their settlement conditions.516 On the 
other hand, in the central areas of the city, the movement of residents and their change of residence 
are more common. This ‘has a disruptive effect on social networks, exemplified by the often-heard 
complaint “one does not know one’s neighbours anymore”’.517 

Some  examples  of  the  ethnic  distribution  of  the  Kabul  population  are  the  following:  Hazaras  have 
settled mainly in the western neighbourhood of Chandawal in downtown Kabul and in Dasht-e-Barchi, 
as well as Karte Se in the outskirts; Tajiks populate Payan Chawk, Bala Chawk and Ali Mordan in the 
old  city,  and  northern  parts  of  the  periphery  like  Khairkhana;  Pashtuns  are  mostly  present  in  the 
eastern part of down-town Kabul, Bala Hisar, and, further, east and south of the periphery like in Karte 
Naw and Binihisar,518 but also in the western neighbourhoods of Kota-e-Sangi and Bazaar-e-Company 

511 Austria, BFA-Staatendokumentation, Kabul Police Districts [Map], 13 February 2019 
512 Foschini, F., Kabul and the challenge of dwindling foreign aid, USIP, April 2017, url, p. 6 
513 Foschini, F., Kabul Unpacked, A geographical guide to a metropolis in the making, AAN, 19 March 2019, url, p. 3 
514 Foschini, F., Kabul and the challenge of dwindling foreign aid, USIP, April 2017, url, p. 6 
515 Noori, W., A., Challenges of Traffic Development in Kabul City, University of Giessen, 2010, url, pp. 35-36 
516 Foschini, F., Kabul and the challenge of dwindling foreign aid, USIP, April 2017, url, pp. 6-8 
517 Foschini, F., Kabul Unpacked, A geographical guide to a metropolis in the making, AAN, 19 March 2019, url, p. 3 
518 Noori, W., A., Challenges of Traffic Development in Kabul City, University of Giessen, 2010, url, pp. 35-36; Foschini, F., 
Kabul and the challenge of dwindling foreign aid, USIP, April 2017, url, p. 6 

 
                                                           
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(also Company);519 Hindus and Sikhs settled in the heart of the city in Hindu Gozar Street.520 In the 
neighbourhoods  which  are  densely  populated  by  recent  immigrants  sharing  the  same  regional  or 
ethnic background, a sort of ‘village society’ has emerged; whose dwellers know each other and have 
more  direct  connections  with  their  province  of  origin  than  with  central  Kabul.521  Moreover, 
transportation in each area was monopolised by the ethnic group which had the majority there, as of 
2009.522 

Because  of  frequent  high-profile  attacks  on  the  city  throughout  2017,  the  Afghan  government 
announced in August 2017 the development of a new security plan for Kabul, called ‘the Green Belt’ 
(also Zarghun Belt, in Pashtu), aimed at the implementation of new or improved security measures 
within  the  city,  like  setting  up  more  checkpoints,  installing  vehicle  barriers  and  metal  gates, 
establishing scanners at the four gates to Kabul city in Pul-e Charkhi, Company, Tank-e Logar and Sar-e 
Kotal, deploying K9 units detecting explosives and illegal materials, and other measures. The plan was 
supposed to first cover the ‘diplomatic area’, also referred to as the Green Zone, and then be expanded 
to  the  north  of  Wazir  Akbar  Khan,  Sherpur  and  an  area  along  the  road  leading  to  the  airport.523 
Moreover, a special unit within the Afghan police called the Crisis Response Unit was created, in order 
to prevent and respond to attacks, as reported by Landinfo [informal translation].524  

2.1.2 Conflict background and actors in Kabul city 

As reported by Landinfo [informal translation] in September 2018, there is reason to believe that a 
significant proportion of recorded incidents involving the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
have taken place in Kabul city. At the same time, IEDs are also frequently used in attacks on the road 
network in the province as a whole. In Kabul, there is rarely direct fighting, and even when exchanges 
of fire take place between conflict parties, they are not fighting over territorial control. The picture of 
conflict in Kabul city is characterised by asymmetric tactical warfare with suicide bombers and IEDs as 
weapons of attack.525 
The ISKP plays a relevant role in Kabul city, where it has perpetrated a significant amount of attacks.526 
Moreover, according to AAN’s expert Thomas Ruttig, the capital city offers infrastructure, logistics and 
possible  personnel  that  could  be  used  by  the  Haqqani  network,  Taliban  groups,  splinter  groups 
claiming its affiliation to the IS and Pakistani anti-Shia groups.527 

2.1.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population  

2.1.3.1 General  

In 2018 UNAMA documented 1 686 civilian casualties (554 deaths and 1 132 injured) in Kabul city from 
suicide and complex attacks. ‘Out of 65 suicide and complex attacks across the country in 2018, 28 
incidents  occurred  in  Kabul  city’.  This  represents  an  increase  of  5 %  compared  to  2017.  UNAMA 

519 Noori, W., A., Challenges of Traffic Development in Kabul City, University of Giessen, 2010, url, pp. 38-39 
520 Noori, W., A., Challenges of Traffic Development in Kabul City, University of Giessen, 2010, url, pp. 35-36; Foschini, F., 
Kabul and the challenge of dwindling foreign aid, USIP, April 2017, url, p. 6 
521 Foschini, F., Kabul and the challenge of dwindling foreign aid, USIP, April 2017, url, p. 7 
522 Noori, W., A., Challenges of Traffic Development in Kabul City, University of Giessen, 2010, url, p. 39 
523 Bjelica, J., and Clark, K., The New Kabul ‚Green Belt‘ Security Plan: More Security for Whom?, AAN, 25 September 2017, 
url 
524  Norway,  Landinfo,  Respons,  Afghanistan:  Sikkerhetssituasjonen  i  den  sentrale  regionen  og  i  det  sentrale  høylandet-
oppdatering, 5 September 2018, url, p. 4  
525  Norway,  Landinfo,  Respons,  Afghanistan:  Sikkerhetssituasjonen  i  den  sentrale  regionen  og  i  det  sentrale  høylandet-
oppdatering, 5 September 2018, url, p. 4  
526  Norway,  Landinfo,  Respons,  Afghanistan:  Sikkerhetssituasjonen  i  den  sentrale  regionen  og  i  det  sentrale  høylandet-
oppdatering, 5 September 2018, url, p. 4  
527 Ruttig, T., Five Questions to Make Sense of the New Peak in Urban Attacks and a Violent Week in Kabul, AAN, 5 February 
2018, url 

 
                                                           
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reported  that  ‘[t]he  attacks  perpetrated  in  Kabul  mainly  targeted  civilians,  including  the  civilian 
Government administration, places of worship, education facilities, election-related sites and other 
“soft”  targets.’528  Though,  between  16 November 2018  and  7 February 2019,  suicide  attacks 
decreased by 61 %, compared with the same period the year before: ‘[…] possibly reflecting successful 
interdiction efforts by Afghan National Defence and Security Forces in the cities of Kabul and Jalalabad 
[…]’.529 

In  the  period  from  1 January  2018  to  28 February 2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 288 incidents related to insurgents in Kabul city.530 

Throughout 2018, attacks targeting government offices,531 Afghan security forces,532 journalists,533 a 
ceremony in front of the airport,534 Muslim clerics,535 Shia worshippers,536 an educational centre,537 
protesters,538 a sports’ club539 and a voter registration centre540 were claimed by541 or attributed to 
ISKP.542 Many of these attacks significantly affected the Hazara population, as the participants of the 
protest were mainly Hazara and the educational centre, the sports clubs as well as the registration 
centre  are  all  located  in  the  Hazara  dominated  Dasht-e-Barchi  neighbourhood  (located  in  Police 
District, PD, 6).543 For instance, in April 2018, a suicide bomber attacked a voter registration centre in 
Dasht-e-Barchi, killing 57 people and injuring an additional 119.544 Moreover, in early March 2019 a 
mortar attack killed at least eleven people and injured 95 near a gathering in Dasht-e-Barchi to mark 
the  anniversary  of  the  death  of  Abdul  Ali  Mazari,  a  prominent  former  leader  of  the  Hazara 
community.545 

Further attacks affecting the Shia community occurred during Nowruz celebrations in another area of 
Kabul city: in March 2018, at least 31 people were killed and 65 were wounded in a suicide attack near 
the Karte Sakhi shrine, where hundreds – many of them Shia - had gathered to celebrate the start of 

528 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 23 
529 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 28 February 
2019, url 
530 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
531 Al Jazeera, Afghanistan: At least twelve killed in Kabul suicide blast, 11 June 2018, url; CNN, ISIS claims attack on Afghan 
Interior Ministry, 30 May 2018, url 
532 Pajhwok Afghan News, Police among 4 dead as blasts, clashes rock Kabul, 9 May 2018, url 
533 Die Zeit, Mindestens 25 Tote nach Doppelanschlag in Kabul, 30 April 2018, url 
534 DW, Afghanistan: Deadly suicide attack at Kabul airport as exiled VP Dostum returns, 22 July 2018, url 
535 Reuters, Afghan president backs suicide bomb fatwa after 14 killed, 5 June 2018, url 
536 BBC News, Kabul Sakhi shrine: ‚Dozens dead‘ in New Year attack, 21 March 2018, url 
537 Al Jazeera, Afghanistan: ISIL Suicide bomber targets school in Kabul, 16 August 2018, url  
538 Die Zeit, Mehrere Tote bei Anschlag nahe Anti-Taliban-Demo, 12 November 2018, url 
539 Al Jazeera, Afghanistan: Two journalists among 20 killed in Kabul blasts, 6 September 2018, url; BBC News, Afghanistan 
conflict: Bombers kill 20 at Kabul sports club, 5 September 2018, url 
540 UNAMA, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Election-Related Attacks and Abuses during the Initial Voter Registration 
Period, 10 May 2018, url, pp. 2-3  
541 CNN, ISIS claims attack on Afghan Interior Ministry, 30 May 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Police among 4 dead as 
blasts, clashes rock Kabul, 9 May 2018, url; Die Zeit, Mindestens 25 Tote nach Doppelanschlag in Kabul, 30 April 2018, url; 
DW,  Afghanistan:  Deadly  suicide  attack  at  Kabul  airport  as  exiled  VP  Dostum  returns,  22  July  2018,  url;  Reuters,  Afghan 
president  backs  suicide  bomb  fatwa  after  14  killed,  5  June  2018,  url;  UNAMA,  Protection  of  civilians  in  armed  conflict: 
Election-Related Attacks and Abuses during the Initial Voter Registration Period, 10 May 2018, url, pp. 2-3 
542 Al Jazeera, Afghanistan: Two journalists among 20 killed in Kabul blasts, 6 September 2018, url; BBC News, Afghanistan 
conflict: Bombers kill 20 at Kabul sports club, 5 September 2018, url 
543  Die  Zeit,  Mehrere  Tote  bei  Anschlag  nahe  Anti-Taliban-Demo,  12  November  2018,  url;  Al  Jazeera,  Afghanistan:  Two 
journalists among 20 killed in Kabul blasts, 6 September 2018, url; BBC News, Afghanistan conflict: Bombers kill 20 at Kabul 
sports club, 5 September 2018, url; UNAMA, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Election-Related Attacks and Abuses 
during the Initial Voter Registration Period, 10 May 2018, url; Al Jazeera, Afghanistan: ISIL Suicide bomber targets school in 
Kabul, 16 August 2018, url   
544 BBC News, Afghanistan: Kabul voter centre suicide attack kills 57, 22 April 2018, url 
545 Al Jazeera, Death toll rises to 11 in attack on Shia gathering in Kabul, 8 March 2019, url 

                                                           
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Nowruz, the New Year festivity. The attack was claimed by ISKP.546 The same group carried out an 
attack through remote-controlled bombs during Nowruz celebrations in March 2019, killing at least 
six persons; this attack too, like the one of 2018, targeted an area close to the Karte Sakhi shrine.547  

Moreover,  further  representative  ISKP-related  security  incidents  were  recorded  in  Kabul  city 
throughout  2018:  at  least  13  people  were  killed  and  31  wounded  in  a  suicide  bombing  at  the 
Department of Rural Rehabilitation and Development in June 2018.548 Dual suicide bombings occurred 
in Kabul in the Shash Darak area in April 2018, close to NATO headquarters, several embassies, foreign 
offices and the Afghan intelligence service. The attack killed 25 and wounded 45 people.549 

The deadliest attack during parliamentary elections in October 2018 was carried out by ISKP outside 
a polling station in Kabul city killing 13 persons and injuring 40. IEC staff members and Afghan National 
Police officers performing civilian functions were among the fatalities 550  

The Taliban also claimed attacks throughout 2018: The most prominent security incident occurred in 
late  January,  when  a  ‘van  painted  to  look  like  an  ambulance’  exploded  outside  of  a  government 
compound in  Kabul  city,  killing  114  and wounding 229 civilians.551 In early January, Taliban fighters 
stormed  the  Intercontinental  Hotel  (PD  4),  killing  at  least  24  civilians  and  injuring  15.552  Moreover, 
Taliban  members  carried  out  an  attack  against  a  foreign  security  contractors’  compound  in  Pul-e-
Charkhi (PD 9) in November, killing and wounding employees and other civilians.553 Furthermore, the 
insurgents claimed responsibility for a car bomb in mid January 2019 in front of the ’heavily fortified’ 
Green Village compound554 (PD 9), that killed security guards and wounded more than 100 people. 555 
The  Taliban  publicly  announced  its  opposition  to  parliamentary  elections,556  and  they  threatened 
voters and volunteers, attacked polling centres, fired mortar shells and detonated bombs all over the 
country.557 Although security in Kabul city was tight,558 more than a dozen explosions were reported.559 

In January 2018, AAN expert Thomas Ruttig described the difficulties of attributing security incidents 
to different anti-government groups. ISKP often claims attacks not carried out by its fighters, whereas 
the Taliban often deny their involvement in assaults causing high numbers of civilian casualties.560 For 
instance, when a suicide attack targeting a gathering of clerics at the Uranus wedding hall caused the 

546 BBC News, Kabul Sakhi shrine: ‘Dozens dead’ in New Year attack, 21 March 2018, url 
547 BBC News, Kabul bombings: Nowruz celebrations hit by deadly blasts, 21 March 2019, url 
548 BBC News, Kabul blast: At least 13 killed in Afghan ministry attack, 11 June 2018, url   
549 RFE/RL, RFE/RL Journalists Among 25 Killed In Kabul Suicide Bombings, 30 April 2018, url   
550 UNAMA, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Special Report: 2018 elections violence, November 2018, url, p. 4 
551 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 26  
552 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 27  
553 Tolonews, Truck Bomb Attack In Kabul Leaves 10 Dead, 29 November 2018, url; Guardian (The), Taliban carry out deadly 
attack on G4S compound in Kabul, 28 November 2018, url 
554 Reuters, Afghan Taliban claim lethal car bomb attack in Kabul, 15 January 2019, url 
555 Reuters, Afghan Taliban claim lethal car bomb attack in Kabul, 15 January 2019, url; Afghanistan Times, Truck bombing 
against Green Village camp killed 4, injured 113 in east of Kabul city, 14 January 2019, url  
556 VoA, Taliban Vows to Attack and Disrupt Afghan Elections, 8 October 2018, url; UNAMA, Protection of civilians in armed 
conflict: Special Report: 2018 elections violence, November 2018, url, p. 3 
557 UNAMA, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Special Report: 2018 elections violence, November 2018, url, pp. 1-2; 
New York Times (The), Afghanistan Votes for Parliament Under Shadow of Taliban Violence, 20 October 2018, url 
558 News, Afghan election day plunges into chaos with multiple Taliban attacks on polling stations, 21 October 2018, url 
559 New York Times (The), Afghanistan Votes for Parliament Under Shadow of Taliban Violence, 20 October 2018, url 
560 Ruttig, T., Five Questions to Make Sense of the New Peak in Urban Attacks and Violent Week in Kabul, AAN, 5 February 
2018, url 

 
                                                           
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death of at least 50 people in November 2018,561 the Taliban denied their involvement in the incident 
and condemned it.562 Furthermore, there was no claim of responsibility by ISKP.563 

2.1.3.2 Displacement 

As many  as two-thirds  of all Afghans  displaced outside their province are moving towards the five 
regional capitals,564 and Kabul’s growth has been particularly significant.565 The total number of IDPs 
in Kabul is not known. Movement to and within the city is fluid and many return regularly to their area 
of origin during more peaceful periods.566 In September 2018, the Afghan Minister of Refugees and 
Repatriation  estimated  the  total  number  of  IDPs  in  Kabul  to  be  from  70 000  to  80 000  people.567 
Research carried out by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) on displacement in Kabul found 
that there are different categories of IDPs in the city: (1) those fleeing armed conflict and insecurity, 
(2) returnees who could not return to their area of origin and live in secondary displacement, (3) those 
displaced  from  rural  areas  because  of  natural  disasters,  localised  conflicts  or  a  shortage  of  work, 
essential services and food and (4) migratory groups/nomads such as Kuchis and Jogis residing in the 
city  because  conflict  disrupted  their  migration  patterns  and  livelihood  or  because  of  increasing 
impoverishment.568  

IDPs in Kabul often settle in areas at the outskirts of the capital, such as Bagrami and PDs 8, 12, 13, 16 
and 21.569 They do not necessarily live separated from the other urban dwellers and often mingle with 
other  vulnerable  groups  such  as  the  urban  poor,  returnees  and  economic  migrants.  The  lack  of 
adequate land and affordable housing in the urban area forces most new and protracted IDPs in Kabul 
to reside in one of the sixty to seventy informal and illegal settlements around the city. These are 
often referred to as ‘(Kabul) Informal Settlements’, ISETs or KIS (most of them not in accordance with 
the Kabul City Master Plan) and include some of the poorest and most vulnerable households in the 
city.570 

In  December  2017,  the  Afghanistan  Protection  Cluster  reported  on  worrying  indications  of  rising 
poverty  in  Kabul’s  KIS-sites,  contributing  to  street  begging,  over-crowded  accommodation,  and 
heightened risks of gender-based violence.571 A study  by the NGO IMPACT Initiatives, published in 
December 2017, indicated a low percentage of exchange between people residing within and outside 
ISET’s,  revealing  two  distinct  sub-communities  within  the  broader  community  and  a  perceived 
isolation of the IDP families from surrounding host communities.572 The IDPs arriving and residing in 
Kabul add pressure on the community, basic services and social infrastructure, strongly affecting the 

561 BBC News, Kabul suicide bomber kills dozens at gathering of clerics, 20 November 2018, url 
562 Defense Post (The), Afghanistan: Dozens killed in explosion at religious gathering in Kabul, 20 November 2018, url; Al 
Jazeera, ‘Brutal and barbaric’: Victims recount horror of Kabul attack, 21 November 2018, url 
563  BBC  News,  Kabul  suicide  bomber  kills  dozens  at  gathering  of  clerics,  20  November  2018,  url;  Defense  Post  (The), 
Afghanistan: Dozens killed in explosion at religious gathering in Kabul, 20 November 2018, url 
564 NRC, Displaced: If You’re a Thirteen Year Old Living in Afghanistan, 30 January 2019, url 
565 Metcalfe, V. et al., Sanctuary in the City? Urban Displacement and Vulnerability in Kabul, June 2012, url, p. 7; Foschini, F., 
Kabul Unpacked - A Geographical Guide to a Metropolis in the Making, AAN, 19 March 2019, url, p. 17  
566 Metcalfe, V. et al., Sanctuary in the City? Urban Displacement and Vulnerability in Kabul, June 2012, url, p. 8; Foschini, F., 
Kabul Unpacked - A Geographical Guide to a Metropolis in the Making, AAN, 19 March 2019, url, p. 3 8 
567 Tolonews, Insecurity, Drought Displace 300,000 Afghans, 21 September 2018, url 
568 Metcalfe, V. et al., Sanctuary in the City? Urban Displacement and Vulnerability in Kabul, June 2012, url, p. 7 
569 Afghanistan Protection Cluster, Central Region Update, May 2017, 17 June 2017, url, p. 1; ERM, Household Assessment 
Report, 25 February 2019, url, p. 3 
570 Metcalfe, V. et al., Sanctuary in the City? Urban Displacement and Vulnerability in Kabul, June 2012, url, pp. 7-8; Bjelica, 
J., Afghanistan’s Returning Refugees: Why Are So Many Still Landless?, AAN, 29 March 2016, url; NRC et al., Escaping War: 
Where to Next? A Research Study on the Challenges of IDP Protection in Afghanistan, January 2018, url, pp. 25, 53; Guardian 
(The), Pressure Builds in ‘Powderkeg’ Kabul as Refugees Return Home, 15 March 2018, url; UNHCR, Eligibility Guidelines for 
Assessing the International Protection Needs for Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan, 30 August 2018, url, p. 35; Action Against 
Hunger, No Afghans Left Behind. Calling for a Collective People Centered Approach to Hunger, November 2018, url, p. 12    
571 Afghanistan Protection Cluster, Central Region Update, November 2017, December 2017, url 
572 IMPACT Initiatives, Area Based Community Profile: Kabul Afghanistan, December 2017, url, pp. 4-5 

                                                           
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absorption  capacity  of  the  city.573  More  than  80 %  of  the  Kabul  IDP  respondents  of  a  Norwegian 
Refugee Council (NRC) study published in January 2018 listed access to food and water as a major 
challenge in their daily lives.574 Afghanistan’s capital is facing a severe water shortage for some years 
now, seriously affecting already vulnerable groups like displaced people.575 

With  limited  job  opportunities,  few  or  no  social  protection  nets,  poor  shelter/housing  conditions, 
impeded access to education and healthcare and the continuous fear of eviction displaced families in 
the  KIS-sites  face  increased  protection  risks  in  their  daily  life  and  are  often  forced  into  secondary 
displacement and negative coping strategies like child labour, early marriage and reducing quantity 
and quality of food.576 Child labour appears particularly prevalent among the urban displaced in Kabul, 
due to the greater economic vulnerability of IDPs in the capital and the fact that the city’s relatively 
vibrant economy creates more demand for child labour.577 IDPs in Kabul are more likely than their 
counterparts in the general population to be underemployed. Their lack of marketable skills for urban 
markets restricts them to unstable work. They mostly work as unskilled day labourers, competing for 
low paid and precarious jobs in the construction sector and to a lesser extent in agriculture.578  

Apart  from  internal  displacement  due  to  the  conflict  in  Afghanistan,  Kabul  city  sees  large  flows  of 
Afghan refugees returning from neighboring countries (Pakistan and Iran), putting further strain on 
the city’s services and its capacity to reintegrate these displaced people.579 A study by Oxfam among 
returnee populations in Kabul city found that most returnees depend on relatives for accommodation 
and other in-kind support. Those who have been in Kabul for several years reported a deterioration 
of the situation for returnees in the city. According to Oxfam the same general situation applies to 
both forced and voluntary returnees in Kabul: ‘few tensions but increased pressure on local resources, 
jobs, services, and facilities that feeds fears among both returnees and host communities’.580 

According to the World Bank around 80 % of Kabul’s population, a mix of recent and long term IDPs, 
returnees, economic migrants and original inhabitants, lives in informal settlements. Not only newly 
displaced people or returnees, but also some older-generation IDPs and returnees still find it hard to 
integrate in the city and find stable employment, while they are often cut off from humanitarian help 
destined for recent arrivals. Within this context of massive and prolonged population movements, 
analyst Nassim Majidi, co-director of the research organisation Samuel Hall, quoted by the Guardian, 

573  UNHCR,  UNHCR’s  Support  Towards  the  Implementation  of  the  Solutions  Strategy  for  Afghan  Refugees:  Enhancing 
Resilience and Co-Existence Through Greater Responsibility Sharing 2018-2019, October 2018, url, pp. 5, 21-22; UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 15 
574 NRC et al., Escaping War: Where to Next? A Research Study on the Challenges of IDP Protection in Afghanistan, January 
2018, url, pp. 27-28  
575 AI, ‘My Children Will Die This Winter’ - Afghanistan’s Broken Promise to the Displaced, 2016, url, pp. 33-34; IOM, Baseline 
Mobility Assessment: Summary Results June 2017, June 2017, url, pp. 25-26; Guardian (The), Pressure Builds in ‘Powderkeg’ 
Kabul as Refugees Return Home, 15 March 2018, url; Kazemi, S. R., Blue Gold: The Quest for Household Water in Kabul City, 
AAN, 30 August 2018, url; DW, Can Religious Leaders Help Keep Kabul’s Water Flowing?, 23 October 2018, url; Washington 
Post (The), To Survive in Kabul Boys Scavenge for Treasure in the City’s Trash, 11 February 2019, url  
576 Afghanistan Protection Cluster, Central Region Update, November 2017, December 2017, url; NRC et al., Going Home to 
Displacement:  Afghanistan’s  Returnee-IDPs,  December  2017,  url,  pp.  6-7;  Afghanistan  Protection  Cluster,  Fact  Sheet 
Afghanistan  May  2018,  14  June  2018,  url,  p.  2;  Haymon  B.  S.,  The  Cycle  of  Struggle:  A  Human  Security  Perspective  on 
Afghanistan’s IDP Women, October 2018, url, pp. 27-28 
577 NRC et al., Going Home to Displacement: Afghanistan’s Returnee-IDPs, December 2017, url, pp. 6-7; NRC et al., Escaping 
War: Where to Next? A Research Study on the Challenges of IDP Protection in Afghanistan, January 2018, url, pp. 32-33 
578 NRC et al., Escaping War: Where to Next? A Research Study on the Challenges of IDP Protection in Afghanistan, January 
2018, url, pp. 27-28 
579 ACAPS,  Anticipatory Briefing Note - Afghanistan: Forced returnees: Nangarhar, Kandahar, Kabul, 17 January 2018, url, p. 
1; Afghanistan Protection Cluster, Central Region Update, 17 June 2017, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs 
Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 15 
580 Oxfam, Returning to Fragility. Exploring the Link Between Conflict and Returnees in Afghanistan, January 2018, url, pp. 
23-24  

 
                                                           
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refers to the humanitarian situation in Kabul as a ‘powder keg, with poverty, greater risks of natural 
disasters, disease and social instability’.581 

581 Guardian (The), Pressure Builds in ‘Powderkeg’ Kabul as Refugees Return Home, 15 March 2018, url 

                                                           
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2.2 Badakhshan 

2.2.1 General description of the province  

The  province  of  Badakhshan  is  located  in  the  north-eastern  region  of  Afghanistan  and  shares 
international borders with Tajikistan, China, and Pakistan. Within Afghanistan, Badakhshan borders the 
provinces  of  Takhar,  Panjshir,  and  Nuristan.582  Badakhshan  is  divided  into  the  following  districts: 
Arghanjkhwah,  Argo,  Baharak,  Darayem,  Darwaz  (Marmay),  Darwaz-e-Balla  (Nesay),  Eshkshmesh, 
Fayzabad,  Jorm,  Keshem,  Khash,  Khwahan,  Kofab,  Kohestan,  Koran  wa  Munjan,  Raghestan,  Shar-e-
Buzorg, Shignan, Shaki, Shuhada, Tagab, Teshkan, Wakhan, Warduj, Yaftal-e-Sufla, Yamgan (Girwan), 
Yawan, and Zebak.583 Most of the province is mountainous. The provincial capital of Badakhshan is 
Fayzabad.584 

According to estimates by the Afghan CSO, the population of Badakhshan is 1 017 499 in 2018/19.585 
The province is composed of Tajiks, Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Hazara, Baloch and Kyrgyz.586 

Scheduled passenger service to Badakhshan's regional airport was reportedly suspended in January 
2018  after the  death of several  Kam  Air staff members in a suicide attack.587 As of February  2019, 
scheduled passenger services between Fayzabad and Kabul are provided.588 A new road connecting 

582 UNOCHA, Reference Map Badakhshan Province, 19 February 2014, url  
583 Afghanistan, IEC, 2018 Wolesi Jirga Elections – Results by Polling Stations: Province Badakhshan, 2018, url; Afghanistan, 
CSO, ۱۳۹۷ رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 22 
584 Pajhwok Afghan News, Background profile of Badakhshan province, n.d., url 
585 Afghanistan, CSO , ۱۳۹۷ رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 3 
586 Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial Profile Badakhshan, 1 February 2017, url 
587 Pajhwok Afghan News, Ghor residents fume over suspension of flights, 19 March 2018, url 
588 Sweden, Lifos, Inrikesflyg i Afghanistan, 7 February 2019, url 

 
 
                                                           
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Badakhshan with neighbouring Takhar province is under construction; its extension to the Tajik-Afghan 
border in the east of the province is planned.589 

According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, Badakhshan is a region for poppy cultivation in northern 
Afghanistan.590 The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) reported in 2014 stated that it is 
also a transit zone for drug trafficking.591 The province is rich in mineral resources.592 Badakhshan's 
mines are allegedly exploited illegally by armed men and insurgents.593 Contracts to legally extract gold 
and copper in the province have reportedly been signed in October 2018.594  

2.2.2 Conflict background and actors in Badakhshan  

Between  1996  and  2001,  Badakhshan  was  among  the  few  areas  in  Afghanistan  remaining  beyond 
Taliban control. Nevertheless, sources in 2017 and 2018 reported that Taliban presence is on the rise 
in  several  districts  of  the  province.595  According  to  an  article  published  by  the  Afghan  news  portal 
Khaama  Press  in  December  2018,  Badakhshan  is  one  of  the  relatively  volatile  provinces  in  north-
eastern Afghanistan.596  

An AAN report published in 2017 highlights that the Taliban have become increasingly successful in 
Badakhshan  since 2015,  partly  because of a changed recruitment policy which is  – contrary to the 
Taliban  strategy  of  the  1990s  –  more  affirmative  towards  local  non-Pashtuns,  in  particular  Tajiks. 
Another reason for the insurgents' recent successes in Badakhshan are political dynamics which have 
long been dominated by struggles between local powerbrokers.597 

Besides local Taliban insurgents, Tajik, Uzbek, Uyghur, 598  and to a lesser extent Russian and Turkmen 
nationals are reportedly fighting in several districts of the province.599 According to a working paper 
of by the NGO The Liaison Office and the Bonn International Center for Conversion, published in June 
2017, foreign fighters and their families settled in Badakhshan as a result of a Pakistan Army operation 
in  North  Waziristan,  Pakistan,  in  2014.600  Reportedly,  they  are  likely  to  belong  to  smaller  insurgent 
groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Al Qaeda. Furthermore, foreign fighters such 
as  the  above  mentioned  Uyghurs  are  embedded  within  local  Taliban  structures,  fighting  alongside 
Afghan  insurgents.601  The  same  source  indicates  that  the  Badakhshan  Taliban  are  a  comparatively 
heterogeneous movement, facilitating ‘[…] a hybridization of the local insurgency in the name of the 
Taliban.‘602  Afghanistan  Analysts  Network  however  also  stated  that  ‘[…]  reliably  identifying  and 
tracking foreign fighters is virtually impossible […].‘ And ‘determining those fighters’ actual origins is 
equally difficult.‘603 

589 Diplomat (The), Kabul's Plan to Realize Afghanistan’s Geographic Dividend, 5 December 2017, url 
590 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 19 
591 AREU, Evolving Terrain: Opium Poppy Cultivation in Balkh and Badakhshan Provinces in 2013, February 2014, url, p. 24 
592 Samuel Hall, Review of Country Strategy Badakhshan and Takhar, October 2010, url, p. 6 
593 Pajhwok Afghan News, Illegal extraction of Badakhshan mines goes on, 7 January 2018, url 
594 Pajhwok Afghan News, Badakhshan gold, copper mines contracts signed, 6 October 2018, url 
595 Gandhara, Taliban Increasing Presence In Remote Afghan Region Bordering China, 12 February 2018, url; Ali, O., The Non-
Pashtun Taleban of the North (1): A case study from Badakhshan, AAN, 3 January 2017, url 
596 Khaama Press, Militants suffer casualties in Badakhshan airstrike, 1 December 2018, url   
597 Ali, O., The Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (1): A case study from Badakhshan, AAN, 3 January 2017, url  
598 Gandhara, Taliban Increasing Presence In Remote Afghan Region Bordering China, 12 February 2018, url; Mielke, K. and 
Miszak, N., Making sense of Daesh in Afghanistan: A social movement perspective, June 2017, url, p. 27  
599 Mielke, K. and Miszak, N., Making sense of Daesh in Afghanistan: A social movement perspective, June 2017, url, p. 27  
600 Mielke, K. and Miszak, N., Making sense of Daesh in Afghanistan: A social movement perspective,  June 2017, url, p. 27  
601 Callahan, T. and Marty F.J., Tilting at Windmills: Dubious US claims of targeting Chinese Uyghur militants in Badakhshan, 
AAN, 19 March 2018, url; Mielke, K. and Miszak, N., Making sense of Daesh in Afghanistan: A social movement perspective, 
June 2017, url, p. 27  
602 Mielke, K. and Miszak, N., Making sense of Daesh in Afghanistan: A social movement perspective, June 2017, url, p. 27  
603 Callahan, T. and Marty F.J., Tilting at Windmills: Dubious US claims of targeting Chinese Uyghur militants in Badakhshan, 
AAN, 19 March 2018, url 

                                                           
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According to Afghan intelligence documents, IS is present in Badakhshan province.604 Afghan officials 
however  dismissed  Russian  claims  in  2018  about  unknown  helicopters  landing  in  Afghanistan's 
northern provinces – Badakhshan among them – in order to support IS fighters on the ground.605 A 
2017  analysis  of  IS  in  Afghanistan  indicates  that  IS  presence  is  less  intense  in  Badakhshan  than  in 
nearby Kunduz and Takhar provinces.606 

In terms of the presence of government security forces, Badakhshan is under the responsibility of the 
209th ANA Shaheen Corp.607 

The following table provides an overview of control of the districts in Badakhshan province based on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.608 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region, to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote. 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of 
October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last 
accessed:609 
April 2019) 

Taliban 

(assessment as of 
December 2018) 

BADAKHSHAN 

BBC 

(reporting period: 
August-November 
2017) 

Arghanjkwha 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Argo 

Gov control 

Baharak 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Darayem 

Gov control 

Darwaz 

Gov control 

Darwaz-e-
Balla 

Gov control 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Contested 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Contested 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

remote - not under 
anyone's control 

TB control: 90%; Gov 
control: 10% 

Gov control: 50%; TB 
control: 50% 

Gov control: 50%; TB 
control: 50% 

Gov control: 60%; TB 
control: 40% 

remote - not under 
anyone's control 

remote - not under 
anyone's control 

Eshkmesh 

Gov control 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Fayzabad 
(capital) 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 50%; TB 
control: 50% 

Jorm 

Gov control 

INS activity 

INS activity 

Contested 

TB control: 95%; Gov 
control: 5% 

604 Press TV, Daesh leader in Afghanistan killed in airstrikes in Nangarhar: Government, 26 August 2018, url   
605 Afghanistan Times, Afghanistan dismisses Russia’s claims over unknown helicopters landing, 21 February 2018, url 
606 Mielke, K. and Miszak, N., Making sense of Daesh in Afghanistan: A social movement perspective, June 2017, url, p. 26  
607 Afghanistan, MoD, 209 Shaheen Corps, n.d., url 
608 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, End of year report 
(2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
609 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 

 
                                                           
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Keshem 

Gov control 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Khash 

Gov control 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Gov control: 60%; TB 
control: 40% 

remote - not under 
anyone's control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

remote - not under 
anyone's control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 70%; TB 
control: 30% 

Contested 

Gov control 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Khwahan 

Gov control 

Kofab 

Gov control 

Kohestan 

Koran Wa 
Monjan 

Raghestan 

Shahr-e-
Buzorg 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Gov control 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 68%; TB 
control: 32% 

Shaki 

Gov control 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Shighnan 

Gov control 

Shuhada 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Tagab 

Gov control 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control: 85%; Gov 
control: 15% 

remote - not under 
anyone's control 

TB control: 90%; Gov 
control: 10% 

remote - not under 
anyone's control 

remote - not under 
anyone's control 

Gov control: 70%; TB 
control: 30% 

TB control: 80%; Gov 
control: 20% 

Gov control: 50%; TB 
control: 50% 

Teshkan 

Gov control 

Wakhan 

Gov control 

Warduj 

Taliban control 

Yaftal-e-Sufla 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Yawan 

Gov control 

Yamgan 

Taliban control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

High INS 
activity 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

High INS 
activity 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

High INS 
activity 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

High INS 
activity 

Contested 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

remote - not under 
anyone's control 

Taliban 
control 

TB control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 60%; TB 
control: 40% 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

remote - not under 
anyone's control 

Taliban 
control 

TB control 

Zebak 

Gov control 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Nasai610 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

Gov control: 70%; TB 
control: 30% 

Gov control: 70%; TB 
control: 30% 

610 According to Pajhwok Afghan News’ division of Badakhshan in administrative divisions Nasai is an area/mini district within 
the district of Darwaz. (Pajhwok Afghan News, Elections 2018 - Badakhshan Administrative Units, n.d., url)  

 
                                                           
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2.2.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.2.3.1 General  

In 2018, UNAMA documented 63 civilian casualties (18 deaths and 45 injured) in Badakhshan. This 
represents  a  decrease  of  3 %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were  ground 
engagements, followed by kidnapping/abduction and targeted killings.611  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA  places  the  district  of  Jorm  in  the 
second highest category and Kohistan, Raghestan, Teshkan and Warduj districts in the category below. 
Baharak, Tagab and Yamgan are in the fourth highest category and the remaining districts are in the 
two lowest categories.612  

In  the  period  from  1 January 2018  to  28 February 2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 89 incidents related to insurgents in Badakhshan province.613 

Fighting  between  government  forces  and  insurgents  took  place  in  several  districts  in  2018  (i.e.  in 
Arghanjkhwa,614 Jorm,615 Kohestan,616 Koran wa Monjan,617 Darwaz-e-Balla,618 and Zebak districts619).  

In  January  and  February  2018,  US620  and  Afghan  forces621  launched  airstrikes  targeted  insurgents’ 
infrastructure in Badakhshan in order to curb terrorist activities near Chinese and Tajik borders. The 
air campaign reportedly targeted the Taliban stronghold Warduj for the first time in two years.622 In 
May 2018, the US air-force conducted an airstrike in the regional capital, which, according to residents, 
failed  to  hit  militants.623  Further  airstrikes  were  carried  out  by  Afghan  and  US  air  forces  in  April, 
October, and November 2018.624  

While  airstrikes  have  been  conducted  in  Badakhshan  province  before,  AAN  experts  termed  the 
intensity of the February 2018 airstrikes unusual and ‘[…] USFOR-A touted them as a demonstration 
of  the  stepped-up  US  air  campaign  in  Afghanistan  and  its  expansion  to  the  northern  parts  of  the 
country.‘625  The  airstrikes  purportedly  targeted  Taliban  camps  providing  support  to  militant  Turkic 
Muslim Uyghurs of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) seeking independence from China. 
Experts cited by AAN doubted that a large Uyghur extremist presence in Badakhshan, or that ETIM or 
other militant Uyghur groups  such  as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) pose a credible cross-border 

611 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
612 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2  
613 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
614 Pajhwok Afghan News, Conflict displaces around 300 Badakhshan families, 27 August 2018, url 
615 Pasbanan, Taliban insurgents were heavily defeated in Jurm district of Badakhshan, 11 May 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan 
News, 18 ANA soldiers killed in attack on Badakhshan post, 13 June 2018, url     
616 Afghanistan Times, Commandos battle to regain Kohistan district, 4 May 2018, url; Gandhara, Suicide Bombers Attack 
Home Of Kandahar Police Chief, 6 May 2018, url  
617 Xinhua News Agency, Over 2 dozen killed in 24 hours in Afghanistan, 25 October 2018, url   
618 Tolonews, Badakhshan’s Nusay District Cleared Of Taliban, 5 September 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, ‘Badakhshan´s 
Nusay district on the verge of collapse´, 29 August 2018, url  
619 Pajhwok Afghan News, Badakhshan: 8 security personnel among 23 killed, 16 July 2018, url  
620 Afghanistan Times, New US forces air campaign expands to the north of Afghanistan, 6 February 2018, url   
621 Pajhwok Afghan News, 17 foreign rebels killed in Badakhshan airstrike, 16 January 2018, url  
622 Xinhua News Agency, Afghan airstrikes against Taliban kill 8 in Badakhshan province, 4 February 2018, url   
623 Tolonews, Foreign forces conduct airstrike in Faizabad city, 25 May 2018, url 
624 Khaama Press, 8 militants killed in AAF airstrike in Badakhshan province: Gen. Radmanish, 8 April 2018, url; Khaama Press, 
Militants  suffer  casualties  in  separate  clashes,  airstrikes  in  Balkh  and  Badakhshan,  26  October  2018,  url;  Khaama  Press, 
Militants suffer casualties in Badakhshan airstrike, 1 December 2018, url    
625 Callahan, T. and Marty F.J., Tilting at Windmills: Dubious US claims of targeting Chinese Uyghur militants in Badakhshan, 
AAN, 19 March 2018, url   

 
                                                           
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threat.626  However,  a  government  official  of  Badakhshan  claimed  that  Uyghur  extremists  plan  to 
increase  their  force  in  Badakhshan  in  order  to  move  into  China  through  the  Wakhan  Corridor.627 
According to  a  statement by the  Afghan National Army, ETIM’s deputy  leader was killed  by  Afghan 
security forces in April 2018 in Jorm district.628 Rumours about the establishment of a Chinese military 
base in Badakhshan have been refuted by the Afghan government, as well as by Chinese officials in 
February 2018.629  

2.2.3.2 Displacement  

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018, reporting 16 940 persons 
displaced  from  Badakhshan  province,  mainly  finding  refuge  within  the  province  itself  or  in 
neighbouring provinces of Panjsher and Nuristan, and in Kabul province.630 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019, reporting 1 330 persons 
displaced from Badakhshan province, all moving to Fayzabad district within the province itself.631 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018, reporting 16 856 persons 
displaced to Badakhshan province, all displaced from within the province itself.632 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019, reporting 1 330 persons 
displaced to Badakhshan province, all displaced from within the province itself.633 

District 

Arghanjkhwa 

Argo 

Darayem 

Eshkmesh 

Jorm 

Kohestan 

Koran Wa Monjan 

Raghestan 

Tagab 

Teshkan 

Warduj 

Yamgan 

Zebak 

Baharak 

Displaced from 
(2018) 

Displaced to 
(2018) 

Displaced from 
(2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

987 

462 

1 386 

35 

3 843 

2 261 

14 

581 

42 

5 943 

1 050 

287 

49 

/ 

/ 

/ 

2 618 

308 

3 213 

105 

/ 

581 

/ 

3 269 

/ 

/ 

49 

1 764 

714 

616 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

626 Callahan, T. and Marty F.J., Tilting at Windmills: Dubious US claims of targeting Chinese Uyghur militants in Badakhshan, 
AAN, 19 March 2018, url   
627 Gandhara, Taliban Increasing Presence In Remote Afghan Region Bordering China, 12 February 2018, url 
628 1TV News, Afghan forces kill No. 2 of anti-China militant group, 1 April 2018, url 
629  Afghanistan  Times,  Afghanistan  denies  China  is  building  military  base  in  Badakhshan,  17  February  2018,  url;  Pajhwok 
Afghan News, No deliberation on Chinese military base: NSC, 17 February 2018, url  
630 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url   
631 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 24 March 2019, url  
632 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url  
633 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 24 March 2019, url 

                                                           
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Fayzabad 

Keshem 

Shighnan 

/ 

/ 

/ 

2 765 

1 484 

700 

/ 

/ 

/ 

1 330 

/ 

/ 

In  January  2018,  UNOCHA  registered  3 200  people  displaced  due  to  conflict  from  four  districts  in 
Badakhshan to the provincial capital Fayzabad City.634 

A military operation at the end of March 2018 reportedly displaced 4 200 people in Baharak and Jorm 
districts.635  Due  to  continued  military  operations  in  the  area  UNOCHA  registered  another  2 800 
displaced  people  in  April  2018  from  remote  villages  of  Jorm  district  to  the  district  centre  and  to 
Fayzabad City.636 An offensive by an armed group in Baharak district in April 2018 reportedly displaced 
1 400 people to the district centre.637 

At end of April and in May 2018, UNOCHA reported 4 000 people displaced from Teshkan district to 
the  center  of  the  district,  to  Fayzabad  city  and  to  Darayem  and  Keshem  districts,  due  to  military 
operations and conflict.638 

Due to ongoing conflict, armed clashes and a Taliban invasion in several villages in the Shiva area of 
Arghanjkhwa  district  and  in  Argo  district,  from  January  to  September  2018,  300  -  600  families 
(numbering more than 1 600 people) were reportedly displaced to Shighnan and Baharak districts and 
to Fayzabad city.639 

In the Humanitarian Response Plan for 2018 - 2021 and the Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2019 
UNOCHA  classifies  Badakhshan  as  one  of  the  eight/nine  main  provinces  of  both  origin  and 
displacement  of  conflict-affected  communities.640  The  Afghanistan  Protection  Cluster  mentioned 
Badakhshan as one of the six top hosting provinces for IDPs in May, June and August 2018.641 

634 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 22 - 28 January, 28 January 2018, url, p. 1  
635 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 26 March - 1 April, 9 April 2018, url, p. 1 
636 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 2 - 8 April 2018, 8 April 2018, url, p. 1 
637 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 23 - 29 April 2018, 30 April 2018, url, p. 1 
638 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 7 - 13 May 2018, 14 May 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Operational Coordination 
Team (OCT) - Badakhshan Province - Meeting Summary, 21 May 2018, url, p. 2; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 
2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url  
639 Xinhua News Agency, Taliban Outfit Forces 600 Families to Leave Their Houses in N. Afghanistan, 26 August 2018, url; 
Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Conflict  Displaces  Around  300  Badakhshan  Families,  27  August  2018,  url;  UNOCHA,  Operational 
Coordination Team (OCT) - Badakhshan Province - Meeting Summary, 18 September 2018, url, p. 2; UNOCHA, Afghanistan 
Weekly Field Report, 17 - 23 September 2018, 23 September 2018, url, p. 1 
640  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan:  Humanitarian  Needs  Overview  2019,  6  December  2018,  url,  p.  42;  UNOCHA,  Humanitarian 
Response Plan Afghanistan - January 2018 - December 2021, December 2018, url, p. 51 
641 Afghanistan Protection Cluster, Fact Sheet Afghanistan May 2018, 14 June 2018, url, p. 1; Afghanistan Protection Cluster, 
Fact Sheet Afghanistan June 2018, 23 July 2018, url, p. 1; Afghanistan Protection Cluster, Fact Sheet Afghanistan August 2018, 
3 October 2018, url, p. 1 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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2.3 Badghis 

2.3.1 General description of the province  

The province of Badghis  is situated in western Afghanistan.642 The provincial capital is  Qala-e-Naw. 
Badghis  borders  the  provinces  of  Herat  to  the  west,  Faryab  to  the  east,  and  Ghor  to  the  south. 
Furthermore, it shares an international border with Turkmenistan to the north. Badghis comprises the 
following districts: Ab Kamari, Bala Murghab, Ghormach, Jawand, Muqur, Qadis, and Qala-i-Naw.643 
The district of Ghormach reportedly became part of Faryab in 2017.644 In August 2018, the Peshawar-
based daily newspaper, the Frontier Post reported that Ghormach’s administrative affairs would be 
shifted back to Badghis due to security reasons.645 The administrative status of the district seems to 
be  disputed.  AAN  cited  sources  claiming  that  the  central  government  had  already  transferred 
Ghormach to Faryab in 2007, while the governor of Faryab did not consider Ghormach to be part of 
Faryab in 2010.646 

The Afghan CSO estimated the population of Badghis for 2018/19 at 530 574.647 According to the Office 
of  the  President  of  Afghanistan,  Badghis  is  inhabited  mainly  by  Tajiks,  Pashtuns,  Uzbeks,  and 
Turkmens.648 

642 Pajhwok Afghan News, Badghis administrative units, n.d., url 
643 Afghanistan, IEC, 2018 Wolesi Jirga Elections – Results by Polling Stations: Province Badghis, 2018, url; Afghanistan, CSO, 
۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 37 
644 Ali, O. and Ruttig, T., Battle for Faryab: Fighting intensifies on one of Afghanistan’s major frontlines, AAN, 12 March 2018, 
url; UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 15 
645 Frontier Post (The), Ghormach falls to Taliban as ANA troops move to Maimana, 28 August 2018, url 
646 Bjelica, J., How Neglect and Remoteness Bred Insurgency and a Poppy Boom: The story of Badghis, AAN, 22 February 
2017, url 
647 Afghanistan CSO , ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 3 
648 Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial Profile Badghis, 1 February 2017, url 

 
                                                           
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The  UNODC  Opium  Survey  of  2018  identified  Badghis  as  one of  the  main  opium-poppy-cultivating 
provinces of Afghanistan.649 In 2018, opium poppy cultivation in Badghis Province decreased by more 
than two thirds compared to 2017, mainly driven by drought,650 but also because UNODC counted the 
district Ghormach, which is a major poppy cultivating district, as part of Faryab in 2018.651 

Badghis is reportedly rich in natural resources.652 Extraction is however impeded by a lack of security. 
According to  the  Institute for  War  and Peace Reporting (IWPR), precious and  semi-precious stones 
such as lapis lazuli are mined illegally in some districts of Badghis Province. Furthermore, Badghis has 
Afghanistan’s highest concentration of pistachio forests.653 While this used to be a source of income 
for all in former times, the spread of pistachio forests has been significantly reduced during the past 
four decades  and  residents  now  claim  that insurgents increasingly profit from  the sale of pistachio 
nuts.654 

The roads of Badghis have been reported to be of poor quality and mostly unsafe because of insurgent 
and criminal activity.655 According to a report by AAN, parts of the paved highway between Badghis 
and Faryab have been under Taliban control.656 An assessment by SIGAR found that only 15 % of a 
projected 233-kilometre section of the Afghan Ring Road between the district of Qeysar in Faryab and 
the site of Laman in Badghis have been built as of September 2017 despite considerable funding since 
2005.657 SIGAR linked the project’s failure mainly to security issues and estimated that the prospects 
for a timely completion are bleak due to increasing insecurity in the region.658  

2.3.2 Conflict background and actors in Badghis  

According to the provincial profile of Bagdhis by the Naval Postgraduate School, Badghis was the first 
province of northern Afghanistan to be seized by the Taliban in late 1996.659 After the fall of the Taliban, 
several influential warlords ruled Badghis, among them Abdul Malik, Rashid Dostum, Juma Khan, and 
Ismail Khan.660  

Khaama Press stated in April 2018 that Badghis is one of the relatively calm provinces in north-western 
Afghanistan, noting however that anti-government forces are active in several of its districts and ‘often 
carry  out  insurgency  activities’.661  According  to  the  US  Congress-financed  Radio  Free  Europe/Radio 
Liberty,  ‘Badghis  Province  has  been  a  hotbed  of  fighting  by  Taliban  and  Islamic  Movement  of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) militants since 2014, and Afghan security forces have launched several offensives 
since then in an attempt to drive militants out of the province.‘662 According to the website Strategy 
Page, different Taliban factions (i.e. Taliban led by Mullah Mansour and Taliban led by Mullah Rasool) 
have also been fighting against each other in the western provinces of Afghanistan (i.e. in Badghis, 

649 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 17 
650 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 16 
651 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 17 
652 IWPR, Riches Lie Below the Surface in Afghan Province, 12 February 2018, url  
653 IWPR, Insurgents Profit from Afghan Pistachio, 26 March 2018, url  
654 IWPR, Insurgents Profit from Afghan Pistachio, 26 March 2018, url; Salaam Times, Taliban's control of pistachio trade in 
western Afghanistan 'alarming', 6 September 2018, url 
655 AREU, The Political Economy of Education and Health Service Delivery in Afghanistan, January 2016, url, p. 44-46; Bjelica, 
J., How Neglect and Remoteness Bred Insurgency and a Poppy Boom: The story of Badghis, AAN, 22 February 2017, url 
656 Bjelica, J., How Neglect and Remoteness Bred Insurgency and a Poppy Boom: The story of Badghis, AAN, 22 February 
2017, url 
657 SIGAR, Afghanistan´s Ring Road from Qeysar to Laman: After more than 12 years and over $249 million spent, the project 
is only 15 percent complete, June 2018, url, p. 4 
658 SIGAR, Afghanistan´s Ring Road from Qeysar to Laman: After more than 12 years and over $249 million spent, the project 
is only 15 percent complete, June 2018, url, p. 23  
659 Bjelica, J., How Neglect and Remoteness Bred Insurgency and a Poppy Boom: The story of Badghis, AAN, 22 February 
2017, url 
660 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Badghis Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
661 Khaama Press, 16 army and police soldiers martyred in Badghis attacks: official, 23 April 2018, url  
662 RFE/RL, Afghanistan's New Northern Flash Points, n.d., url 

 
                                                           
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Farah, and Herat)  since 2016,  leaving  hundreds of Taliban fighters dead and providing  government 
forces with an opportunity to gain influence in formerly Taliban-controlled districts.663 An EU-funded 
Emergency Response Mechanism (ERM) household assessment report of November 2018 indicated 
that the security situation has worsened in Badghis in 2018 due to fighting between insurgents and 
government forces in Jawand and Qadis.664 

In autumn 2017, the Taliban leadership in western Afghanistan reportedly called on its commanders 
to fight against IS and eliminate its supporters. According to the same source, the Taliban announced 
that any collaboration, compromise or interaction between Taliban and IS insurgents will be punished 
severely  –  among  other  provinces  especially  in  Badghis.665  Referring  to  NATO  sources,  the  Spanish 
newspaper  El  Mundo  stated  in  August  2017  that  a  small  group  of  IS  fighters  emerged  in  Murghab 
district in Badghis666 and an International Public Policy (IPP) Review stated in January 2019, that ‘[...] 
the  Islamic  State  of  Khorasan  has  cultivated  its  presence  […]‘  among  other  provinces  of  northern 
Afghanistan  also  in  Badghis.667  However,  there  were  reportedly  no  IS-related  attacks  in  Badghis 
between 2014 and 2018.668  

The 207 Zafar Corps is in charge of the Afghan National Army operations in the province of Badghis. 669 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Badghis  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.670 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong,  as a region,  to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.  

BADGHIS 

Qala-e-Naw 
(capital) 

Ab Kamari 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: August- 
November 
2017) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment 
as of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last 
accessed:671 

April 2019) 

Taliban 

(assessment as of 
December 2018) 

Gov control 

GIRoA control  GIRoA control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

TB control: 70%; 
Gov control: 30% 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Bala Murghab 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5% 

TB control: 97%; 
Gov control: 3% 

663 Strategy Page, Afghanistan: Perpetual Pressure On Pakistan, 13 March 2018, url 
664 ERM, Household Assessment Report, 1 November 2018, url, p. 1  
665 IFP, Taliban Calls ISIS “Crusader”, Affiliate of United States, 8 October 2017, url  
666 El Mundo, Guerra civil talibán en la 'provincia española' de Afganistán, 29 August 2017, url  
667 IPP Review, The Islamic State of Khorasan Expands in Afghanistan, 3 January 2019, url 
668 Jadoon, A., Allied and Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan´s Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
CTC Sentinel, 3 December 2018, url, p. 11 
669 Afghanistan, MoD, 207 Zafar Corps, n.d., url 
670 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, 23 April 2019, url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of 
Jihad, End of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
671 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 

                                                           
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Jawand 

Muqur 

Qadis 

Ghormach 

Tagab Alam 

Sang Atesh 672 

Daraboom 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

TB control: 96%; 
Gov control: 4% 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

/ 

/ 

/ 

Contested 

Contested 

Taliban 
control 

TB control: 94 %; 
Gov control: 8 % 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control: 94 %; 
Gov control: 8 % 

INS activity 

High INS 
activity 

Taliban 
control 

TB control  

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

TB control  

TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5% 

TB control  

2.3.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.3.3.1 General  

In  2018,  UNAMA  documented  79  civilian  casualties  (21  deaths  and  58  injured)  in  Badghis.  This 
represents  a  decrease  of  40 %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were  ground 
engagements, followed by unexploded ordnance (UXO)/landmines and (non-suicide) IEDs.673  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA  places  the  districts  Bala Murghab, 
Muqur, Ab Kamari and Qadis in the second highest category and Qala-e-Naw and Jawand districts in 
the third highest category. Ghormach district is placed in the highest category.674  

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 119 incidents related to insurgents in Badghis province.675 

672 ACCORD added during the review that Sang Atesh is the capital of Ab Kamari district. ACCORD, email, 15 March 2019 
673 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
674 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url 
675 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 

 
 
                                                           
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The Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) conducted several clearing operations in 2018, e.g. in March,676 
April,677 June,678 July,679 September,680 and December.681 Taliban attacks on pro-government forces 
took  place  throughout  the  year,  e.g.  in  the  districts  of  Qadis,682  Maqur,683  Ab-i-Kamari,  684  Qala-i-
Naw,685 including an attack on a check-post in the provincial capital, which left 16 members of the 
government  forces  dead.686  In  May  2018,  the  Taliban  overran  an  area  in  Maqur  district  after  the 
security forces retreated from the area.687 Regarding the scope of casualties, the climax was reached 
on 20  June 2018  (a day after the end of the Eid ceasefire), when 20 to 30 ANA soldiers died after 
militants ambushed a check-point in Bala Murghab district.688 Afghan newsportal Tolonews reports 
that 24 Taliban fighters died in a clash with security forces in Ab Kamari district on the same day.689 In 
September 2018, the Maqur district police chief was killed in a roadside bombing.690 

In March 2018, 5 civilians were kidnapped when the Taliban stopped a passenger vehicle traveling 
from Herat to Badghis in Qala-i-Naw.691  

A bomb blast in Qala-i-Naw injured eleven people, including two children in July 2018. According to 
the governor’s spokesman, the explosives were attached to a motorcycle.692  

2.3.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 11 967 persons 
displaced from Badghis province, most of whom (9 667) were displaced within the province, mainly 
in the provincial capital district, Qala-e Naw.693 

676 Pajhwok Afghan News, Nearly 100 militants killed in past 24 hours: MoD, 9 March 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 45 
rebels  killed  in  fresh  operation:  MoD,  16  March  2018,  url;  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  71  militants  killed  in  round-the-clock 
operations: MoD, 23 March 2018, url 
677 Pajhwok Afghan News, 25 rebels killed, 20 injured in fresh operations: MoD, 6 April 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 
Above 100 rebels slain in past 24 hours, says MoD, 13 April 2018, url  
678 Khaama Press, Heavy airstrikes target militant compounds in Badghis after last week´s major attack, 24 June 2018, url; 
Tolonews,  Taliban  Suffers  Heavy  Losses  In  Afghan  Air  Strike,  30  June  2018,  url;  Tolonews,  63  Insurgents  Killed  In  ANSF 
Operations:  MoD,  1  July  2018,  url;  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  72  Taliban  killed  in  round-the-clock  raids,  6  July  2018,  url; 
Tolonews, 67 Insurgents Killed In ANDSF, AAF Operations, 14 September 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 62 insurgents 
killed, 17 injured in fresh raids: MoD, 20 September 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Scores of rebels, security personnel 
killed in clashes, 14 December 2018, url  
679 Tolonews, 63 Insurgents Killed In ANSF Operations: MoD, 1 July 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 72 Taliban killed in 
round-the-clock raids, 6 July 2018, url; Tolonews, 67 Insurgents Killed In ANDSF, AAF Operations, 14 September 2018, url; 
Pajhwok Afghan News, 62 insurgents killed, 17 injured in fresh raids: MoD, 20 September 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 
Scores of rebels, security personnel killed in clashes, 14 December 2018, url  
680 Tolonews, 67 Insurgents Killed In ANDSF, AAF Operations, 14 September 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 62 insurgents 
killed, 17 injured in fresh raids: MoD, 20 September 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Scores of rebels, security personnel 
killed in clashes, 14 December 2018, url  
681 Pajhwok Afghan News, Scores of rebels, security personnel killed in clashes, 14 December 2018, url  
682 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban capture Badghis areas; police in denial, 24 April 2018, url;News Services Division, Afghan 
official: Taliban target police checkpoint, killing 5, 17 November 2018, url        
683 Pajhwok Afghan News, 13 dead, many wounded in Farah, Badghis clashes, 10 July 2018, url        
684 Pajhwok Afghan News, 15 members of uprising force killed in Taliban attacks, 22 June 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 
Taliban's Red Unit commander among 12 killed in Badghis, 9 September 2018, url        
685 Pajhwok Afghan News, 5 policemen, as many militants killed in Badghis clash, 4 September 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan 
News, 6 policemen, 8 militants killed in Badghis clash, 17 September 2018, url        
686 Khaama Press, 16 army and police soldiers martyred in Badghis attacks: official, 23 April 2018, url 
687 Pajhwok Afghan News, Badghis: Taliban capture Maqur´s village, 16 May 2018, url 
688 El Mundo, Mueren 30 soldados afganos en el peor ataque talibán desde el fin de la tregua, 20 June 2018, url; Pajhwok 
Afghan News, 20 ANA soldiers, 5 rebels killed in Badghis clashes, 20 June 2018, url  
689 Tolonews, 24 Taliban Killed In Badghis Clash, 20 June 2018, url 
690 Pajhwok Afghan News, District police chief killed in Badghis roadside bombing, 5 September 2018, url  
691 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban kidnap 5 passengers in Badghis, 30 March 2018, url  
692 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban kidnap 5 passengers in Badghis, 14 July 2018, url  
693 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url  

                                                           
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—  87  

UNOCHA  collected  data  for  the  period  1 January 2019  –  28 February 2019,  reporting  1 921  persons 
displaced from Badghis province, more than the half of them displaced into Herat province and the rest 
were displaced within Badghis province itself.694 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 9 918 persons 
displaced to Badghis province.695 

UNOCHA collected  data  for  the  period  1  January 2019 - 28  February 2019,  reporting 651  persons 
displaced to Badghis province, all coming from Badghis province’s districts.696  

Districts 

Abkamari 

Balamurghab 

Ghormach 

Jawand 

Muqur 

Qadis 

Qala-e Naw 

Displaced from 
(2018) 

Displaced to 
(2018) 

Displaced from 
(2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

2 902  

1 817 

176 

1 738 

1 498  

3 333  

503 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

207 

1 002  

8 709  

1 329 

38 

/ 

60 

/ 

298 

196 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

651 

In 2018, Badghis was considered as one of ‘the main provinces of both origin and displacement of 
conflict-affected communities’.697 UNOCHA reported in February,698 May,699 June,700 July 2018701 and 
January 2019702 displacements within or from Abkamari district to the provincial capital Qala-e naw 
or Herat province because of the conflict and the fightings. These have also caused displacements 
from Balamurghab, Jawand, Muqur, Qadis districts to the provincial capital in February 2018703 and 
from Jawand district in October 2018.704  

The  drought  is  another  important  cause  of  displacements  within  Abkamari  district  to  the  district 
centre and from other districts to distant provinces like Kandahar705 or to the provincial capital.706 In 
June,  July  and  August  2018,  263  000  people  were  displaced  within  Badghis  and  Herat  provinces 
because of the drought.707 

Another natural cause of displacements are flash floods which affected 2 667 families in Muqur district 
and 496 families in Abkamari district in May 2018.708 

694 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 
695 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 20 January 2019, url 
696 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 
697 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 42 
698 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 26 February – 4 March 2018, 5 March 2018, url 
699 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 7 – 13 May 2018, 14 May 2018, url 
700 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Badghis Province - Meeting Summary, 27 June 2018, url  
701 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 9 – 15 July 2018, 16 July 2018, url  
702 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 8 - 14 January 2019, 15 January 2019, url  
703 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 26 February – 4 March 2018, 5 March 2018, url 
704 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 26 February – 4 March 2018, 5 March 2018, url 
705 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 27 August – 2 September 2018, 4 September 2018, url  
706 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Badghis Province - Meeting Summary, 1 August 2018, url  
707 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url  
708 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Badghis Province - Meeting Summary, 30 May 2018, url  

 
 
 
                                                           
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In  July  2018,  UNOCHA  mentioned  displacements  within  Muqur  district  because  of  ‘inter-tribal 
disputes over agricultural land’.709 

709 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 16 – 22 July 2018, 23 July 2018, url  

 
                                                           
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2.4 Baghlan 

2.4.1 General description of the province  

Baghlan, which is located in north-eastern Afghanistan, borders the provinces of Bamyan, Samangan, 
Kunduz, Takhar, Panjshir, Parwan,710 and Balkh.711 Baghlan is divided into the following 15 districts: 
Andarab,  Baghlan-e-Jadid  (also  known  as  Baghlan-e  Markazi),  Burka,  Dahana-e-Ghuri,  Deh  Salah, 
Doshi, Fereng wa Gharu, Guzargah-e-Nur, Khenjan, Khost wa Fereng, Khwajahejran (Jalga), Nahrin, Pul-
e-Hesar, Pul-e-Khumri, and Tala wa Barfak. The capital of the province is Pul-e-Khumri.712  

The  Afghan  CSO  estimates  the  population  of  Baghlan  at  977 297  in  2018/19.713  According  to  the 
provincial  profile  published  by  the  US  Naval  Postgraduate  School,  a  slight  majority  of  Baghlan's 
residents  are  Tajiks,  followed  by  Pashtuns  and  Hazaras  as  second  and  third  largest  ethnic  groups 
respectively. Furthermore, ethnic Uzbeks and Tatars live in Baghlan.714  

Baghlan  is  known  to  be  an  economic  hub  connected  to  eight  other  provinces  by  the  Kabul-North 
highway.715  This  is  the  only  trans-Hindukush  highway  in  Afghanistan  and  the  main  transit  route 
between  Kabul  and  the  north  of  the  country.716  At  the  border  between  Baghlan  and  Parwan,  the 
highway leads through the notoriously overcrowded and desolate Salang Tunnel.717 Besides the Kabul-

710 UNOCHA , Afghanistan: North Eastern Region – District Atlas, April 2014, url 
711 AIMS, AIMS Political Divisions Map, n.d., url 
712 Afghanistan, IEC, 2018 Wolesi Jirga Elections – Results by Polling Stations: Province Baghlan, 2018, url; Afghanistan, CSO, 
۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 14 
713 Afghanistan, CSO , ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 14 
714 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Baghlan Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
715 Pajhwok Afghan News, Baghlan administrative units, n.d., url 
716 Hewad, G., The 2015 insurgency in the North (4): Surrounding the cities in Baghlan, AAN, 21 October 2015, url 
717 Pajhwok Afghan News, Current Salang tunnel insufficient, says President Ghani, 15 October 2018, url; Diplomat (The), 
Fixing the Salang Pass Tunnel, 21 October 2015, url  

 
 
                                                           
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North highway Baghlan should be connected to Bamyan by 2022 via the so-called Baghlan to Bamyan 
(B2B) road, according to plans by the World Bank.718 

According to AAN, the Kabul-North highway is pivotal for military success of government forces, as 
insurgents are able to hinder the movement of ammunition and troops by blocking the highway. AAN 
links the Taliban’s success in conquering and holding Kunduz city for two weeks in 2015 to the fact that 
they were able to stop Kunduz-bound military convoys in Baghlan for days with a combination of road 
blocks and ambushes.719 In 2018 the Taliban again attacked checkposts on the highway connecting 
Baghlan with Kunduz before launching an attack in Kunduz.720 Furthermore, the Kabul-North highway 
has also been blocked repeatedly by protesters in 2018.721 

The security along the highway is pivotal for Kabul’s energy supply, as electricity transmission lines 
originating  in  Tajikistan  and  Uzbekistan  run  along  the  highway.  In  2018,  the  Taliban  caused  several 
blackouts in the capital by cutting the energy supply to Kabul in the provinces of Kunduz and Baghlan 
in order to blackmail the government.722 

Insurgents  reportedly  draw  revenue  from  Baghlan's  coal  mines  by  extorting  money  from  trucks 
carrying coal.723 According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, Baghlan does not belong to the ten main 
opium-poppy-cultivating provinces of Afghanistan.724 Opium poppy cultivation in Baghlan remained 
approximately the same in 2018 compared to 2017.725  

2.4.2 Conflict background and actors in Baghlan  

According to Khaama Press, writing in September 2018, ‘Baghlan has been among the relatively calm 
provinces in northern parts of the country but the security situation of the province has deteriorated 
during  the  recent  years.‘726  The  security  situation  reportedly  worsened  in  2016  after  the  Taliban 
launched concerted actions against key districts near the provincial centre of Pul-e-Khumri.727 In spring 
2018, the Afghan Ministry of Defence (MoD) admitted that the provincial capital Pul-e-Khumri was 
threatened by the Taliban,728 and by December 2018 the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) stated that 
Baghlan  was  among  the  provinces  with  a  high  Taliban  presence  and  that  Afghan  forces  have  been 
engaged in deadly battles in parts of the province.729 

The transport routes leading through Baghlan are decisive for the security situation of the province. 
According to AAN, the Taliban started intimidating people travelling along the Baghlan-Balkh highway 
in  late  2015.730  Having  understood  the  strategic  importance  of  the  main  transport  routes  in  the 
province, the Taliban established mobile checkpoints on the Baghlan-Balkh highway in order to search 
for ANSF members of the  and attempted to establish a permanent presence in the area. In response, 

718 World Bank (The), Trans-Hindukush Road Connectivity Project, n.d., url  
719 Hewad, G., The 2015 insurgency in the North (4): Surrounding the cities in Baghlan, AAN, 21 October 2015, url 
720 Pajhwok Afghan News, 14 ANA soldiers killed in Kunduz attack, 26 April 2018, url 
721 Pajhwok Afghan News, Protestors block road over civilian casualties, 17 April 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Salang 
highway’s bad condition triggers protest, 11 July 2018, url; Tolonews, Supporters of Disqualified Candidate Block Kabul-Balkh 
Highway, 14 August 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Protesting Baghlan candidates conditionally reopen north highway, 26 
November 2018, url 
722 Khaama Press, Taliban sets condition to reconnect Kabul electricity, 19 March 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban 
threaten  to  cut  off  power  supply  to  Kabul,  24  March  2018,  url;  Tolonews,  Major  Power  Outage  Hits  Kabul  After  Pylon 
Destroyed, 26 March 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Kabul in darkness as Taliban blow up power pylon, 26 March 2018, 
url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban again blow up power pylon in Baghlan, 14 April 2018, url 
723 Diplomat (The), Why the Americans Shouldn't Dig for Coal in Afghanistan, 28 February 2018, url 
724 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 17 
725 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 15 
726 Khaama Press, Local Taliban leaders, militants suffer heavy casualties in Baghlan, 13 September 2018, url 
727 Khaama Press, Taliban's deputy military chief surrenders in Baghlan province, 12 August 2017, url 
728 Tolonews, 7 Provincial Centers Face ‘Serious Security Threats', 16 May 2018, url 
729 Tolonews, Afghan Forces To Focus On Insecure Regions In Winter, 26 December 2018, url 
730 Ali, O., Taleban in the North: Gaining ground along the Ring Road in Baghlan, AAN, 15 August 2016, url 

                                                           
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—  91  

to  AAN,  were 
ANSF  have  conducted  several  clearance  operations,  which,  according 
‘inconsequential‘ and hence unsuccessful in creating a coherent government presence in the area.731 

Besides  Taliban  insurgents,  local  pro-government  militias  supported  by  the  National  Directorate  of 
Security used to be active in the province, e.g. in the Surkh Kotal area eight kilometres north-west of 
Pul-e-Khumri.732 

According  to  an  AAN  report  from  July  2016,  Afghan  ethnic  Uzbeks  have  set  up  an  insurgent  group 
called Jundullah in 2009 by splitting away from IMU.733 While Jundullah has been affiliated with the 
Taliban in the past, it established itself as an independent, IS-allied group by taking advantage of the 
turmoil created  by  the  Taliban  conquest of Kunduz in September 2015. Unsympathetic towards IS-
groups, the Taliban have contained Jundullah’s activities in Baghlan by 2016. According to the same 
report, as of July 2016, ‘[...] the threat of Daesh in the north-east – through Jundullah affiliating itself 
to IS – is neither widespread, nor immediate.’734 A December 2018 report by the US Counter-Terrorism 
Center (CTC) on IS-groups in Afghanistan, counted one ISKP attack in Baghlan between 2014 and 2018. 
The attack took place in 2017 causing the deaths of nine persons.735   

In terms of government security force presence, Baghlan is under the responsibility of the 209th ANA 
Shaheen Corp.736 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Baghlan  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal (LWJ) and 
the  Taliban.737  When  a  source  does  not  provide  information  on  a  district,  the  field  is  left  blank. 
Sometimes  a  district  is  only  mentioned  by  one source  (the Taliban).  These  districts  are  not  always 
recognized  by  the  government  or  sometimes  belong,  as  a  region,  to  another  district.  If  found, 
clarification is made in a seperate footnote.  

BAGHLAN 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: August- 
November 
2017) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment 
as of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last accessed: 738 
April 2019) 

Taliban 

(assessment as 
of December 
2018) 

Andarab 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control 

Baghlan-e-Jadid 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

/ 

Burka 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control: 90%; 
Gov control: 
10% 

731 Ali, O., Taleban in the North: Gaining ground along the Ring Road in Baghlan, AAN, 15 August 2016, url 
732 Ali, O., Taleban in the North: Gaining ground along the Ring Road in Baghlan, AAN, 15 August 2016, url 
733 Ali, O., The 2016 Insurgency in the North: Raising the Daesh flag (although not for long), AAN, 15 July 2016, url  
734 Ali, O., The 2016 Insurgency in the North: Raising the Daesh flag (although not for long), AAN, 15 July 2016, url  
735 Jadoon, A., Allied and Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan´s Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
CTC Sentinel, 3 December 2018, url, p. 11-15 
736 Afghanistan, MoD , 209 Shaheen Corps,  n.d., url 
737 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, 23 April 2019, url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of 
Jihad, End of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
738 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 

 
                                                           
TB control: 50%; 
Gov control: 
50% 

Gov control: 
85%; TB control: 
15% 

Gov control: 
70%; TB control: 
30% 

Gov control: 
80%; TB control: 
20% 

Gov control: 
90%; TB control: 
10%/ 

TB control: 50%; 
Gov control: 
50% 

92 — 

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Dahana-e-Ghori 

Taliban control 

High INS 
activity 

High INS 
activity 

Taliban control 

TB control  

Dehsalah 

Gov control 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

/ 

Doshi 

Fereng Wa 
Gharu 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Gov control 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Guzargah-e-Nur 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Khenjan 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Khost Wa 
Fereng 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Khwajahejran 
(Jalga) 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Gov control 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Nahrin 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Pul-e-Hesar 

Gov control 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Gov control 

Pul-e-Khumri 
(capital) 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Tala Wa Barfak 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5% 

TB control: 50%; 
Gov control: 
50% 

Banu 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

Gov control 

2.4.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.4.3.1 General  

In  2018  UNAMA  documented  261  civilian  casualties  (68  deaths  and  193  injured)  in  Baghlan.  This 
represents  an  increase  of  17  %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were  ground 
engagements, followed by (non-suicide) IEDs and targeted killings.739  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian casualties, and conflict-induced displacements, UNOCHA places the district of Pul-e-Khumri in 
the highest category. Baghlan-e-Jadid and Burka districts are placed in the second highest category, 
and Tala wa Barfak and Doshi in the third highest category. The remaining districts are in the two lowest 
categories.740 

739 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
740 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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—  93  

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 131 incidents related to insurgents in Baghlan province.741 

As of reporting from March 2018, the district of Dahana-e-Ghori has reportedly been under Taliban 
control  over  the  past  two  years.742  In  May  2018,  the  Taliban  reportedly  sent  letters  asking  for  the 
payment of taxes in contested Baghlan-e-Markazi district.743 In the past, the Taliban reportedly used 
to collect zakat and ushr taxes from Baghlan residents in districts under their control.744  

Throughout 2018 and early 2019, the Taliban attacked army and police check-points or patrols.745 In 
May 2018, key district Tala wa Barfak, bordering Bamyan and Parwan provinces, reportedly fell to the 
Taliban for more than a week.746 Additionally, the insurgents also conducted kidnappings and targeted 
killings.747  Ahead  of  the  2018  parliamentary  elections,  Taliban  militants  caused  casualties  at  voter 
registration centres, leaving six persons dead in an explosion in Pul-e-Khumri in April,748 and killing one 
police officer in Baghlan-e-Markazi district in June.749 On election day, eight people were killed and 45 
injured in election-related incidents, including twin blasts in the provincial capital Pul-e-Khumri.750 

In  2018,  ANSF  conducted  several  clearing  operations  in  the  province.751  Because  of  the  ongoing 
insurgent  activity  in  Baghlan,  reinforcement  troops  have  been  sent  to  Dahana-e-Ghori  district  in 
November  2018.752  According  to  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  at  the  end  of  2018  security  personnel 
stationed in insecure areas of the province had been left without pay for three months.753 

The fighting also caused fatalities among civilians, as well as damage of civilian property. In February 
2018, residents of Pul-e-Khumri protested and sought compensation over homes destroyed by Afghan 
Air Force (AAF) airstrikes.754 In August 2018, a person was killed and six of her family members injured 

741 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
742 Pajhwok Afghan News, 5 ALP men killed, 3 wounded in Baghlan attack, 14 March 2018, url 
743 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban ask Baghlan traders to pay them taxes, 14 May 2018, url 
744 Hewad, G., The 2015 insurgency in the North (4): Surrounding the cities in Baghlan, AAN, 21 October 2015, url; Ali, O., 
Taleban in the North: Gaining ground along the Ring Road in Baghlan, AAN, 15 August 2016, url 
745 Pajhwok Afghan News, 5 ALP men killed, 3 wounded in Baghlan attack, 14 March 2018, url; Tolonews, Security Forces, 
Taliban Locked In Heavy Clash In Baghlan, 14 April 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 14 ANA soldiers killed in Kunduz attack, 
26 April 2018, url; Tolonews, 18 Taliban Insurgents Killed in Baghlan Clashes, 29 April 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 20 
Taliban, 8 Daesh killed in Ghazni, Baghlan, 23 July 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban kill 3 ANA soldiers, seize Humvee 
in Baghlan capital, 4 August 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 36 ANA soldiers, 8 ALP personnel killed in Baghlan battle, 15 
August  2018,  url;  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  7  Afghan  Local  Police  personnel  killed  in  Baghlan  assault,  18  August  2018,  url; 
Tolonews, Afghan Forces Killed in Taliban Attack in Baghlan, 9 September 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 11 civilians freed 
from Taliban jail in Helmand raid, 8 December 2018, url; Khaama Press, Security forces and Taliban suffer heavy casualties 
in Pul-e-Khumri city clash, 3 January 2019, url; Al Jazeera, Taliban launch deadly attacks as they attend Afghan peace talks, 5 
February 2019, url 
746  Tolonews,  Key  District  In  Baghlan  Reportedly  Falls  To  Taliban,  8  May  2018,  url;  Khaama,  Afghan  armed  forces  retake 
control of Tala Barfak in Baghlan, 18 May 2018, url 
747  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  2  Taliban  killed,  3  wounded  in  Baghlan  clash,  5  February  2018,  url;  Pajhwok  Afghan  News, 
Lawmaker Qudratullah Zaki survives Taliban’s attack in Baghlan, 16 April 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban kidnap 6 
Indian engineers in Baghlan, 6 May 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, ALP commander killed by Taliban in Baghlan attack, 20 
December 2018, url 
748 Tolonews, Six Killed In Baghlan Explosion At Voter Registration Center, 22 April 2018, url 
749 Tolonews, One Dead In Baghlan Voter Registration Center Explosion, 23 June 2018, url 
750 Pajhwok Afghan News, 8 killed, 45 wounded in Baghlan election related incidents, 20 October 2018, url 
751 Pajhwok Afghan News, Operations underway to ensure polls security: MoD, 10 September 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan 
News,  30  Taliban  killed,  16  wounded  in  Baghlan  airstrikes,  11  September  2018,  url;  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Anti-Taliban 
operation launched in Baghlan’s Dand-i-Ghori, 5 November 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban leader’s son, friends 
detained in Baghlan, 13 March 2018, url 
752 Tolonews, MoD Sends In Extra Troops As Violence Grips Baghlan, Ghazni, 8 November 2018, url 
753 Pajhwok Afghan News, Troops in Baghlan without salaries for 3 months, 2 December 2018, url 
754 Pajhwok Afghan News, Dand-i-Shahabuddin residents seek compensation for destroyed homes, 3 February 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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in a government mortar shell attack on a civilian house in the provincial capital carried out by security 
forces.755 

In  January  2019,  four  Taliban  fighters  and  one  civilian  reportedly  died  in  an  explosion  during  a 
volleyball match in a Taliban-controlled area of Tala wa Barfak.756  

2.4.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018, reporting 13 421 persons 
displaced from Baghlan province, mainly within the province itself, in neighbouring provinces Parwan, 
Balkh, Panjsher and Bamyan, or in other provinces in the area such as Kabul, Kapisa and Khost.757 

UNOCHA  collected  data  for  the  period  1  January  2019  -  28  February  2019,  reporting  70  persons 
displaced from Baghlan province, all coming from Doshi district and displaced to Kabul district of Kabul 
province.758  

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018, reporting 11 928 persons 
displaced to Baghlan province, all coming from within the province itself.759 

No  conflict-induced  internal  displacement  to  Baghlan  province  was  reported  by  UNOCHA  for  the 
period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019.760 

District 

Baghlan-e-Jadid 

Dahana-e-Ghori 

Doshi 

Pul-e-Khumri 

Tala Wa Barfak 

Displaced from 
(2018) 
6 769 

Displaced to 
(2018) 
4 571 

Displaced from 
(2019) 
/ 

Displaced to 
(2019) 
/ 

210 

287 

5 474 

681 

/ 

/ 

7 357 

/ 

/ 

70 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

From  January  to  March  2018  more  than  300  IDP  families  were  registered  in  Pul-e-Khumri  city, 
displaced from Dand-e-Dhahabuddin area due to armed conflict.761 

In  May  2018,  UNOCHA  recorded  4 000  people  displaced  to  Kabul,  Bamyan  and  Kunduz  provinces 
coming from Tala Wa Barfak and Doshi districts of Baghlan, after heavy fighting erupted in Tala Wa 
Barfak on 9 May.762 On 19 June 2018, humanitarian partners reported to UNOCHA that 1 200 of the 
IDPs that had fled Tala Wa Barfak in early May had already returned to their homes.763 Additionally 
2 000 people were reportedly displaced from Khalazai area of Pul-e-Khumri city to the center in May 
2018.764 

755 Pajhwok Afghan News, Girl killed, 6 family members injured in mortar shell attack, 11 August 2018, url 
756 Tolonews, Five Killed In Baghlan Explosion, 26 January 2019, url 
757 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url  
758 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 24 March 2019, url  
759 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url 
760 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 24 March 2019, url  
761 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Baghlan Province - Meeting Summary, 14 March 2018, url, p. 1  
762  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan  Weekly  Field  Report,  14  -  20  May  2018,  22  May  2018,  url,  p.  1;  Tolonews,  UN  Chef  Urges 
Governments to Protect Civilians from Violence, 23 May 2018, url 
763 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 11 - 17 June, 19 June 2018, url, p. 1 
764 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 7 - 13 May 2018, 14 May 2018, url, p. 1  

 
                                                           
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In August 2018, Afghan NGO Bakhtar Development Network (BDN) reported on military operations in 
Mangalha Khogyani area of Baghlan-e-Jadid district, which led to temporary displacements within the 
district itself and to Pul-e-Khumri city.765  

In September and October 2018, UNOCHA recorded thousands of IDPs within Baghlan-e-Jadid district 
and  from  Dand-e-Ghori,  Cheshma-e-Sher  and  Omarkhil  villages  of  Pul-e-Khumri  district  to  Pul-e-
Khumri city.766 

In December 2018 UNOCHA classified Baghlan as one of the 12 provinces with large concentrations of 
IDPs and returnees who are most affected by the ongoing conflict and drought.767 According to IOM’s 
Afghanistan’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Baseline Mobility Assessment, in 2018 one in six 
people  is  either  a  returnee  or  an  IDP  in  Baghlan  province.768  IOM  ranked  Baghlan-e-Jadid  on  the 
twelfth (January - March 2018) and fifteenth place (April - June 2018) of the top 20 districts hosting 
the  most  returnees  and  IDPs769  and  on  the  nineteenth  place  of  the  top  25  districts  hosting  most 
returnees and IDPs from October to December 2018.770 

765 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Baghlan Province - Meeting Summary, 29 August 2018, url, p. 1 
766  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan  Weekly  Field  Report,  24  -  30  September,  30  September  2018,  url,  p.  1;  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan 
Weekly Field Report, 10 - 16 September 2018, 17 September 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 8 - 
14 October 2018, 14 October 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 
2019, url  
767 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: 2019 Update to the 2018-2010 Humanitarian Response Plan, 21 December 2018, url, p. 33 
768 IOM, Displacement Survey Shows 3.5 Million Internally Displaced, Returnees from Abroad in 15 Afghan Provinces, 8 May 
2018, url 
769  IOM,  Baseline  Mobility  Assessment:  Summary  Results  January  -  March  2018,  31  March  2018,  url,  p.  5; IOM,  Baseline 
Mobility Assessment: Summary Results April - June 2018, 25 September 2018, url, p. 5 
770 IOM, Baseline Mobility Assessment: Summary Results October - December 2018, 15 March 2019, url, p. 5  

 
 
 
                                                           
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2.5 Balkh 

2.5.1 General description of the province 

Balkh is situated in the northern part of Afghanistan, bordering Uzbekistan to the north, Tajikistan to 
the north-east, Kunduz and Baghlan to the east, Samangan to the south-east, Sar-e Pul to the south-
west, Jawzjan to the  west and Turkmenistan to the north-west.771 The provincial capital is Mazar-e 
Sharif.  The  province  consists  of  the  following  districts:  Balkh,  Charbulak,  Charkent,  Chemtal, 
Dawlatabad, Dehdadi, Kaldar, Keshendeh, Khulm, Marmul, Mazar-e Sharif, Nahr-e Shahi, Sholgareh, 
Shortepa and Zari.772 

According to a CSO estimation, the population of Balkh Province was 1 442 847 in 2018/19,773 with 
454 457 living in the provincial capital Mazar-e Sharif.774 Balkh is an ethnically diverse province. It is 
inhabited by Pashtun, Uzbek, Hazara, Tajik, Turkmen, Aimaq, Baloch, Arab, and Sunni Hazara (Kawshi) 
communities.775 

Balkh is an important crop growing area, as favourable climatic conditions allow for two harvests a 
year.776  Dubbed  a  ‘Silk  Route  crossroad’,777  Balkh  –  and  more  specifically  Mazar-e  Sharif  –  is  an 

771 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Northern region District Atlas, 13 April 2014, url; GADM, Afghanistan [Map], 2018, url 
772 Afghanistan, IEC, 2018 Wolesi Jirga Elections – Results by Polling Stations: Province Balkh, 2018, url; Afghanistan, CSO, 
۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 27 
773 Afghanistan, CSO, ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 3 
774 Afghanistan, CSO, ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 27 
775 Pajhwok Afghan News, Background Profile of Balkh, n.d., url; US, Naval Postgraduate School, Balkh Provincial Review, 
n.d., url 
776 Samuel Hall, Economic Assessment and Labour Market Survey of Mazar-i Sharif, Pul-i Khumri, Kandahar City and Kunduz 
City, 16 January 2017, url, p. 43 
777 Afghanistan, MRRD, Balkh provincial profile, n.d., url 

 
                                                           
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—  97  

import/export hub as well as a regional trading centre.778 The highway leading to the Uzbek border 
crossing point Hairatan-Termiz branches off the Ring Road approximately 40 km east of Mazar-e Sharif. 
Furthermore, a highway facilitating transport from Balkh to Bamyan in the centre of Afghanistan is 
reportedly  under  construction.779  An  airport  with  scheduled  passenger  services  to  national  and 
international  destinations  exists  in  Mazar-e  Sharif.780  In  January  2019,  an  air  corridor  connecting 
Mazar-e Sharif and Europe via Turkey was opened for cargo flights.781 

According to the UNODC Opium Survey of 2018, Balkh ranks 7th among the ten main opium-poppy-
cultivating provinces of Afghanistan.782 Because of a drought, poppy cultivation decreased by 30 % in 
the province in 2018 compared to 2017.783 

2.5.2 Conflict background and actors in Balkh 

According to RFE/RL, Balkh used to be one of the relatively calm provinces of northern Afghanistan, 
largely due to a monopoly on power by the former warlord Atta Mohammed Noor, who later became 
governor of Balkh.784 In December 2017, Noor resigned after a stand-off with President Ashraf Ghani, 
sparking fears  that this  would  impair  the security situation in the province.785 According to Afghan 
news-portals Tolonews and Pajhwok Afghan News, the tensions between the president and Noorwere 
followed  by  an  increased  presence  of  armed  men  in  Mazar-e  Sharif,  which  allegedly  had  links  to 
political  parties  and  members  of  parliament.786  Subsequently,  criminal  activities  such  as  armed 
robberies, murder, clashes, and kidnapping increased in Balkh´s capital.787  

While Balkh is reportedly ‘one of Afghanistan´s most stable provinces‘,788 anti-government elements 
are active in the province and several security incidents have been reported in 2018 and early 2019. 
Taliban fighters attacked Afghan Local Police (ALP) personnel, members of pro-government militias, 
and  security  posts  in  the  districts  of  Sholgareh,789  Chahrbulak,790  Chemtal,791  and  Dawlatabad792 
throughout  2018  and  early  2019.  The  Afghan  National  Security  Forces  (ANSF)  conducted  several 

778 Samuel Hall, Economic Assessment and Labour Market Survey of Mazar-i Sharif, Pul-i Khumri, Kandahar City and Kunduz 
City, 16 January 2017, url, p. 43 
779 Diplomat (The), Kabul's Plan to Realize Afghanistan’s Geographic Dividend, 5 December 2017, url 
780 Austria, BFA-Staatendokumentation, Afghanistan - Airports [Map], 25 March 2019 
781 Pajhwok Afghan News, Mazar-i-Sharif-Turkey-Europe air corridor formally opens, 9 January 2019, url 
782 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 17 
783 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 6 
784 RFE/RL, Afghanistan's New Northern Flash Points, n.d., url; RFE/RL, Powerful Afghan Governor Resigns, Ending Standoff 
With Ghani, 23 March 2018, url 
785 RFE/RL, Afghan Governor's Dismissal Highlights Rift In Party, Risks To Unity Government, 19 December 2017, url; RFE/RL, 
Powerful Afghan Governor Resigns, Ending Standoff With Ghani, 23 March 2018, url 
786 Tolonews, Illegal Armed Men ‘A Big Challenge For Balkh Residents’, 12 January 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 2 injured 
as gunmen loyal to MPs clash in Balkh, 28 January 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Illegal armed men threaten Mazar-i-
Sharif security, 22 May 2018, url  
787 Tolonews, Illegal Armed Men ‘A Big Challenge For Balkh Residents’, 12 January 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Illegal 
gunmen seen behind insecurity in Mazar-i-Sharif, 25 January 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 2 injured as gunmen loyal to 
MPs  clash  in  Balkh,  28  January  2018,  url;  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Mazar-i-Sharif  garrison  failing  to  bar  illegal  gunmen: 
Residents, 7 March 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Illegal armed men threaten Mazar-i-Sharif security, 22 May 2018, url; 
Tolonews, Mazar Man Killed For His Motorcycle, 22 July 2018, url 
788 RFE/RL, Powerful Afghan Governor Resigns, Ending Standoff With Ghani, 23 March 2018, url 
789 Tolonews, 17 Members Of Public Uprising Force Killed In Balkh, 21 January 2018, url 
790 Tolonews, Chahar Bolak Police Chief Dies After Taliban Attack, 22 April 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban capture 
2 checkpoints in Balkh’s Chahar Bolak district, 15 September 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 9 ALP personnel killed in attack 
on Balkh post, 18 September 2018, url; Tolonews, Six Security Force Members Killed In Balkh Clash, 9 January 2019, url; 
Tolonews, Key Taliban Commander Killed In Balkh, 10 January 2019, url 
791 Tolonews, Main District In Balkh Under Security Threat, 6 July 2018, url; Tolonews, Sources Claim Balkh Outposts Fallen 
To Taliban, 11 September 2018, url 
792 Pajhwok Afghan News, Part of Balkh’s Dawlatabad district falls to Taliban, 3 September 2018, url; RFE/RL, Afghan Security 
Forces Retake Northern District From Taliban, 4 September 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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clearing  operations  in  Balkh.793  Furthermore,  the  US  air-force  carried  out  an  airstrike  in  Charbulak 
district in April 2018.794 

The headquarters of the 209th ANA Shaheen corps, which is responsible for ensuring security in the 
provinces of Balkh, Jawzjan, Faryab, Sar-e-Pul, Samangan, Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan, and Baghlan, 
are stationed in Dehdadi district of Balkh.795 German Federal Army soldiers are based in Camp Marmal 
in Mazar-e Sharif.796 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Balkh  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal (LWJ) and 
the  Taliban.797  When  a  source  does  not  provide  information  on  a  district,  the  field  is  left  blank. 
Sometimes a  district  is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not  always 
recognised  by  the  government  or  sometimes  belong,  as  a  region,  to  another  district.  If  found, 
clarification is made in a separate footnote.    

BALKH 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: August-
November 
2017) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment 
as of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last 
accessed:798 
April 2019) 

Taliban 

(assessment as of 
December 2018) 

Balkh 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control  GIRoA Control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

/ 

Charbulak 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5% 

Charkent 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control  GIRoA Control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 70%; 
TB control: 30% 

Chemtal 

Dawlatabad 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
presence - Low 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5% 

GIRoA Control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Taliban 
control 

Gov control: 60%; 
TB control: 40% 

Dehdadi 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control  GIRoA Control 

Kaldar 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control  GIRoA Control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 70%; 
TB control: 30% 

793  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Taliban  suffered  heavy  losses  in  joint  operations:  NATO,  6  March  2018,  url;  Tolonews,  25 
Insurgents Killed In Afghan Operations, 4 April 2018, url; RFE/RL, Afghan Army: Dozens Of Militants Killed In Operations, 21 
April 2018, url; Tolonews, Taliban Commanders Killed In Afghan Forces Airstrikes, 5 May 2018, url; Tolonews, Taliban Suffers 
Heavy  Casualty  Toll  in  Balkh  Operation,  8  July  2018,  url;  RFE/RL,  Afghan  Security  Forces  Retake  Northern  District  From 
Taliban, 4 September 2018, url; Tolonews, 67 Insurgents Killed In ANDSF, AAF Operations, 14 September 2018, url; Pajhwok 
Afghan News, Scores of rebels, security personnel killed in clashes, 14 December 2018, url 
794 Tolonews, 35 Taliban Killed In US Airstrikes In Balkh, 28 April 2018, url 
795 Tolonews, 209 Shaheen Corps: The Base The Taliban Attacked, 22 April 2018, url 
796 Tagesspiegel, Afghanische Ex-Mitarbeiter der Bundeswehr demonstrieren vor Camp, 22 September 2018, url 
797 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, 23 April 2019, url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of 
Jihad, End of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
798 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 

                                                           
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—  99  

Keshendeh 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control  GIRoA Control 

Khulm 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control  GIRoA Control 

Marmul 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control  GIRoA Control 

Mazar-e-Sharif 
(capital) 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control  GIRoA Control 

Nahr-e-Shahi 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control  GIRoA Control 

Shahrak-e 
Hayratan 

Sholgareh 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control  GIRoA Control 

Open Taliban 
presence - Low 

GIRoA Control  GIRoA Control 

Shortepa 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control  GIRoA Control 

Zari 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control  GIRoA Control 

Alburz799 

Chahi 

Khas Balk 

Ragh 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 80%; 
TB control: 20% 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

/ 

/ 

Gov control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 75%; 
TB control: 25% 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

/ 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 65%; 
TB control: 35% 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 50%; 
TB control: 50% 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

TB control  

TB control  

Gov control: 50%; 
TB control: 50% 

Gov control: 90%; 
TB control: 10% 

2.5.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.5.3.1 General 

In  2018,  UNAMA  documented  227  civilian  casualties  (85  deaths  and  142  injured)  in  Balkh.  This 
represents  an  increase  of  76  %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were  ground 
engagements,  followed  by  (non-suicide)  IEDs  and  targeted  killings.800  UNAMA  recorded  99  civilian 
casualties caused by ground engagement in Balkh province which is a 296 % increase compared to 
2017.801 

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA  places  the  districts  of  Chemtal, 
Charbulak,  Balkh  and  Mazar-e-Sharif  in  the  second  highest  category  and  the  districts  Dawlatabad, 
Shortepa and Keshendeh in the fourth highest category. The remaining districts are in the two lowest 
categories.802 

799 According to UNHCR Alburz is an area in Chemtal district. (UNHCR, National Profile of Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) in 
Afghanistan, August 2008, url, p. 49) 
800 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
801 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 47 
802 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2 

 
 
                                                           
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In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 131 incidents related to insurgents in Balkh province.803 

In August 2018, eight civilians died in a roadside bomb blast in Sholgareh district, which was attributed 
to the Taliban by a local official.804 In October 2018, four polling observers were abducted and killed in 
a  Taliban-controlled  area  of  the  district  Nahr-e  Shahi.  A  Taliban  spokesman  denied  any  Taliban 
involvement in the incident.805 In Keshendeh, Taliban insurgents reportedly kidnapped 25 passengers 
travelling from Sar-e-Pul to Mazar-e Sharif in November 2018.806 Taliban militants torched a fuel tanker 
and seized another on the Mazar-Shebrghan highway in November 2018, injuring four civilians during 
a clash with ANA forces.807 

In September 2018, security guards for two high ranking officials clashed at Hairatan port, killing one 
person and wounding two others.808 In December 2018, four persons died and nine were injured in an 
attack  by  unidentified  gunmen  allegedly  targeting  a  pro-government  commander  at  a  funeral  in 
Balkh.809    

2.5.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 1 218 persons 
who were displaced from Balkh province and all of them were displaced within the province itself, in 
the districts of Nahr-e-Shahi and Keshendeh.810 

No  conflict-induced  internal  displacement  from  Balkh  province  was  reported  by  UNOCHA  for  the 
period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019.811 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 15 313 persons 
displaced to Balkh province, including 1 218 from the province itself, 10 749 from Faryab and 1 610 
from Sar-e-Pul.812 

UNOCHA collected data, for the period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019, on 2 226 persons displaced 
to Mazar-e-Sharif in Balkh province, from Faryab. 813 

District 

Charbulak 

Keshendeh 

Nahr-e-Shahi 

Mazar-e-Sharif 

Displaced from 
(2018) 

Displaced to (2018) 

Displaced from 
(2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

553 

665 

/ 

/ 

/ 

665 

13 766 

882 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

2 226 

803 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
804  Tolonews,  Eight  Civilians  Killed  in  Balkh  Roadside  Mine  Blast,  8  August  2018,  url;  RFE/RL,  Roadside  Bomb  Kills  Eight 
Civilians In Afghanistan, Says Local Official, 8 August 2018, url    
805 Pajhwok Afghan News, 4 polling observers killed after being kidnapped in Balkh, 21 October 2018, url 
806 Tolonews, Taliban Kidnaps 25 Passengers In Balkh, 27 November 2018, url  
807 Pajhwok Afghan News, 4 civilians wounded in clash on Mazar-Shebrghan highway, 13 November 2018, url  
808 Pajhwok Afghan News, Security guards of top officials clash at Hairatan port, 17 September 2018, url 
809 Pajhwok Afghan News, 4 killed, 9 injured in attack on funeral prayers in Balkh, 14 December 2018, url 
810 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 20 January 2019, url 
811 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 
812 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 
813 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 

 
                                                           
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According to IOM, one in six people is a returnee or an IDP in Balkh province. 814 

814 IOM, Displacement Survey Shows 3.5 Million Internally Displaced, Returnees from Abroad in 15 Afghan Provinces, 8 May 
2018, url  

 
 
                                                           
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2.6 Bamyan 

2.6.1 General description of the province 

The province of Bamyan borders Samangan to the north, Baghlan, Parwan and Wardak to the east, 
Ghazni  and  Daykundi  to  the  south,  and  Sar-e  Pul  and  Ghor  to  the  west.815  It  is  divided  into  seven 
districts: Bamyan, Kahmard, Panjab, Sayghan, Shibar, Waras and Yakawlang. The provincial capital is 
Bamyan  City.816  Bamyan  is  situated  south  of  Hindu  Kush  and  north  of  Baba  (Koh-i-Baba)  mountain 
range.817  

The  estimated  population  of  Bamyan  is  478 424,818  with  most  of  the  people  living  in  the  main 
valleys.819 The main ethnic groups of Bamyan, which is dubbed the 'unofficial Hazara capital'820 and 
part of the Hazarajat,821 are the  Hazara, followed by Tajiks and Pashtuns.822 Additionally, people of the 
Sayed/Sadat group live in Bamyan.823 Sayeds, claiming to be descendants of Prophet Mohammed, do 
not constitute a distinct ethnic group. According to various resources quoted in a query response of 
ACCORD, Bamyan Sayeds are mostly Hazaras, though they distinguish themselves from other Hazaras, 

815 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Bamyan Province District Atlas, April 2014, url  
816 Afghanistan, IEC, 2018 Wolesi Jirga Elections – Results by Polling Stations: Province Bamyan, 2018, url; Afghanistan, CSO, 
۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 15 
817 Pajhwok Afghan News, Background Profile of Bamyan Province, n.d., url 
818 Afghanistan, CSO, ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 2 
819 Bamyan Tourism, The Land, n.d., url 
820 Al Jazeera, Afghanistan: Who are the Hazaras?, 27 June 2016, url 
821 Australia, DFAT, Hazaras in Afghanistan, 18 September 2017, url, p. 3 
822 Pajhwok Afghan News, Background Profile of Bamyan Province, n.d., url 
ACCORD, Anfragebeantwortung zu Afghanistan: Informationen zur Volksgruppe der Sadat (Sayed, Sayyed, Sadaat, Sayyid, 
Sayid, Sayeed) [Query response on Afghanistan: Information on the ethnic group of the Sadat (Sayed, Sayyed, Sadaat, Sayyid, 
Sayid, Sayeed)], 25 October 2017, url; US, Naval Postgraduate School, Bamyan Provincial Overview, n.d., url   

 
                                                           
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—  103  

and are traditionally part of the religious and political elite of the Hazara.824 Approximately 90 % of 
Bamyan’s residents are Shias.825 

Scheduled passenger service to and from Bamyan's airport was suspended in January 2018 after the 
only airline flying this route lost several staff members in an attack on a hotel in Kabul.826 As of February 
2019, service seemingly has been resumed.827 Bamyan can be reached from Kabul either by the Kabul-
Bamyan highway, via the province of Wardak, or via Parwan.828 Bamyan is supposed to be connected 
to neighbouring  Baghlan by  the so-called Baghlan to Bamyan (B2B) road  in 2022;829 and a Chinese 
company has signed a contract to build a road connecting Bamyan’s Yakawlang district with Dare-e-
Sof district in Samangan in 2017.830 This is part of the National North-South Corridor project, which 
should  eventually  connect  Mazar-e  Sharif  in  Balkh  with  Kandahar  in  the  south.  In  November 2018 
livestock owners and traders travelling on the Kabul-Bamyan highway claimed that Taliban insurgents 
collected ushr taxes from them in neighbouring Maidan Wardak.831 

Bamyan is reportedly  one of  Afghanistan’s poorest provinces, ‘[...]  often lacking basic facilities  and 
electricity.’832 Tourism is a source of revenue in the province,833 which has however been impeded by 
insecurity in neighbouring provinces, as ‘[…] key highways leading to its centre are no longer secure,’ 
according to the Afghan newsportal Tolonews.834 

According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, Bamyan remained the only opium-free province in the 
Northern region of Afghanistan in 2018.835 

2.6.2 Conflict background and actors in Bamyan 

Tolonews called Bamyan ‘the safe haven of the country’ in 2017.836 According to RFE/RL, the Taliban 
had  no  influence  in  Bamyan  in  November  2018.837  An  Afghan  military  expert  traced  the  relative 
stability of Bamyan to the social cohesion among its inhabitants, as most of them belong to the same 
ethnic group.838 According to UNAMA, Bamyan's relative peacefulness can also be attributed to the 
involvement of religious leaders in peace processes in the province.839 

BBC research on the Taliban presence, which was conducted between August and November 2017, 
concluded that the Taliban had a ‘low’ active presence in two of Bamyan's seven districts, i.e. Sayghan 
and  Shibar,  the  latter  bordering  Baghlan,  Parwan  and  Wardak  provinces,  both  of  which  were  each 
attacked once in three months.840 After Tala wa Barfak district in neighbouring Baghlan province was 
captured  by  the  Taliban  in  May  2018,  local  officials  warned  that  Bamyan’s  Kahmard  and  Sayghan 
districts might also collapse.841 In July 2018, Taliban insurgents indeed attacked several police check 

824 ACCORD, Anfragebeantwortung zu Afghanistan: Informationen zur Volksgruppe der Sadat (Sayed, Sayyed, Sadaat, Sayyid, 
Sayid, Sayeed) [Query response on Afghanistan: Information on the ethnic group of the Sadat (Sayed, Sayyed, Sadaat, Sayyid, 
Sayid, Sayeed)], 25 October 2017, url   
825 Pajhwok Afghan News, Background Profile of Bamyan Province, n.d., url 
826 Pajhwok Afghan News, Ghor residents fume over suspension of flights, 19 March 2018, url 
827 Sweden, Lifos, Inrikesflyg i Afghanistan, 7 February 2019, url, p. 11 
828 Pajhwok Afghan News, Hajigak Pass reopens for traffic, 26 April 2015, url 
829 World Bank (The), Trans-Hindukush Road Connectivity Project, n.d., url 
830 Xinhua News Agency, Chinese firm signs contract to build road in Afghanistan, 9 January 2017, url 
831 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban gunmen take taxes on Kabul-Bamyan highway, 5 November 2018, url 
832 Al Jazeera, Afghanistan: Who are the Hazaras?, 27 June 2016, url 
833  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  More  than  200,000  tourists  visit  Bamyan  this  year,    3  September  2017,  url;  Wiener  Zeitung, 
Skifahren bei den Buddhas, 4 January 2018, url 
834 Tolonews, Bamiyan Tourism Takes A Knock Due To Security Threats On Roads, 28 June 2017, url 
835 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 15 
836 Tolonews, Bamiyan Tourism Takes A Knock Due To Security Threats On Roads, 28 June 2017, url 
837 RFE/RL, Afghan Taliban Wants What It Hasn't Been Able To Hold: Hazara Regions, 13 November 2018, url 
838 Pajhwok Afghan News, 2017 causalities: nearly 25,000 people killed, wounded in Afghanistan, 14 January 2018, url 
839 UNAMA, Bamyan religious scholars gather to discuss peace-building in Afghanistan, 20 November 2017, url 
840 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url 
841 Pajhwok Afghan News, After Tala wa Barfak, Taliban eying Bamyan’s Kahmard, 12 May 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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points in Kahmard district, killing one tribal elder and abducting four persons according to Tolonews. 
Three of the four abducted persons were later released and the Taliban fled into Tala wa Barfak.842 

In November 2018, Afghan president Ashraf Ghani announced the formation of a new security unit 
consisting of at least 443 security personnel in the province.843 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Bamyan  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.844 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region, to another district. If found, clarification is made in 
a separate footnote.    

BBC 

 (reporting 
period: 
August-
November 
2017) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment as 
of October 
2018) 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control 

GIRoA Control 

BAMYAN 

Bamyan 
(capital) 

Kahmard 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control 

GIRoA Control 

Panjab 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control 

GIRoA Control 

Sayghan 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA Control 

GIRoA Control 

Shibar 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA Control 

GIRoA Control 

Waras 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control 

GIRoA Control 

Yakawlang 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control 

GIRoA Control 

LWJ 

Taliban 

(last 
accessed:845 
April 2019) 

(assessment as 
of December  
2018) 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control 

Gov control: 
95%; TB control: 
5% 

Gov control 

Gov control: 
95%; TB control: 
5% 

Gov control: 
95%; TB control: 
5% 

Gov control 

Gov control 

842 Tolonews, Taliban Attack Police Check Posts in Bamiyan, 30 July 2018, url 
843 Khaama Press, Ghani orders formation of the new 443-strong security unit in Bamyan province, 10 November 2018, url 
844 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, End of year report 
(2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
845 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 

 
                                                           
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2.6.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.6.3.1 General 

In 2018 UNAMA documented 7 civilian casualties (1 death and 6 injured) in Bamyan. This represents 
an  increase  of  75  %  compared  to  2016.  Leading  causes  of casualties  were  unexploded  ordnance 
(UXO)/landmines, followed by ground engagements and threat/intimidation/harassment.846  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA places  the  districts  of  Yakawlang, 
Panjab, Kharmand and Sayghan in the lowest category. The districts Waras, Shibar and Bamyan are in 
the second lowest category.847 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 4 incidents related to insurgents in Bamyan province.848 

In  late  November  2018,  Afghan  authorities  arrested  Hazara  militia  leader  Alipoor  (also  known  as 
Commander  Shamsheer)  on  charges  of  attacking  security  forces,849 as  well  as  of  extortion  of 
passengers  by  his  gunmen  on  the  highways  in  Bamyan,  Ghor,  and  Wardak  provinces.850 The  arrest 
caused protests in Kabul, Bamyan, and Mazar-e-Sharif; in Kabul the protests turned violent.851 Alipoor’s 
supporters claimed that Alipoor had not been fighting government forces, but rather the Taliban in 
parts  of  Wardak,  Ghor,  and Daykundi.852  Alipoor’s  militia  is  based  in  the  province  of  Wardak,  but 
also  operates  in  other  parts  of  Afghanistan,  claiming  to  help  Hazara  communities  facing  security 
threats.853 

2.6.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA  collected  data  for  the  period  1  January  2018  –  31  December  2018,  reporting  8  persons 
displaced  from  Bamyan  province  within  the  province  itself.  They  were  all  displaced  from  the 
district of Waras to the district of Bamyan,854 in April 2018.855 

No conflict-induced internal displacement to or from Bamyan province was reported by UNOCHA for 
the period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019.856 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 3 091 
persons displaced to Bamyan mainly from other provinces. 
Displaced from 
Displaced to (2018) 
(2018) 

Displaced from 
(2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

District 

Waras 

Bamyan 

Kahmard 

8 

/ 

/ 

/ 

2 634 

368 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

846 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
847 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2 
848 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
849 Tolonews, Alipoor Says He Is 'Ready To Hand Over All Weapons', 27 November 2018, url 
850 RFE/RL, Afghan Authorities Release Militia Leader After Violent Demonstrations, 26 November 2018, url; Tolonews, NDS 
Chief Says Claims Against Alipoor Will Be Investigated, 27 November 2018, url  
851 Tolonews, Alipoor Says He Is 'Ready To Hand Over All Weapons', 27 November 2018, url; RFE/RL, Afghan Authorities 
Release Militia Leader After Violent Demonstrations, 26 November 2018, url 
852 Tolonews, Alipoor Supporters Protest For The Second Day In Kabul, 26 November 2018, url 
853 RFE/RL, Afghan Authorities Release Militia Leader After Violent Demonstrations, 26 November 2018, url 
854 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 20 January 2019, url 
855 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Internal Displacement due to Conflict, 24 February 2019, url  
856 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 

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Sayghan 

/ 

89 

/ 

/ 

 
 
 
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2.7 Daykundi 

2.7.1 General description of the province 

Located  in  the  Central  Region  of  Hazarajat,  Daykundi  is  surrounded  by  Ghor  to  the  north  and 
west,  Bamyan  to  the  east,  Ghazni  to  the  south-east,  Uruzgan  to  the  south  and  Helmand  to  the 
southwest.857  According  to  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Daykundi  used  to  be  part  of  Uruzgan  and 
became  a  separate  province  in  2003,858  while  the  United  Nations  Development  Programme 
(UNDP)  stated  that  the  province of Daykundi was established in 2014.859 

Besides  the  provincial  capital  Nili,  Daykundi  consists  of  the  following  districts:  Ashtarlay,  Pato, 
Kajran,  Khadir,  Kiti,  Miramor,  Sang-e-Takht,  and  Shahrestan.860  Gizab/Pato  district  changed  hands 
between  Uruzgan and Daykundi in the past.861 In May 2018, Pajhwok Afghan News reported that Pato 
– formerly part of Gizab district in Uruzgan – had been declared an independent district and would 
soon  become  part  of  Daykundi.862  The  Afghan  CSO  counted  Pato  as  a  'temporary'  district  of 
Daykundi  in  2018.  863 According  to  AAN,  'temporary'  districts  '[…]  have  been  approved  after  entry 
into  force  of  the  2004  constitution  by  the  president  due  to  security  or  other  considerations,  but 
have not yet been approved by parliament.'864 

857 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Daykundi Province District Atlas, April 2014, url 
858 Pajhwok Afghan News, Mineral resources of Daikundi province, 1 February 2014, url 
859 UNDP, The Secret Behind Nili Market’s Success in Daikundi, 5 February 2017, url 
860 Afghanistan, IEC, 2018 Wolesi Jirga Elections – Results by Polling Stations: Province Daykundi, 2018, url; Afghanistan, CSO, 
۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 30 
861 Van Bijlert, M., Trouble in Gizab; the fight everyone chose to ignore, AAN, 31 October 2011, url 
862 Pajhwok Afghan News, Daikundi: 80pc of Pato residents without Tazkira, 6 May 2018, url  
863 Afghanistan, CSO, ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 30 
864 Ruttig, T., The Afghanistan Election Conundrum (12): Good news and bad news about district numbers, AAN, 16 August 
2018, url 

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According to estimations by the Afghan CSO, 498 840 people live in Daykundi as of 2018/19.865 Part of 
the  Hazarajat,866  most  of  Daykundi´s  residents  are  Hazara,  with  a  minority  of  Pashtuns,  Balochs, 
and Sayeds/Sadats.867  

Most  of  Daykundi´s  territory  is  mountainous,  with  heavy  snowfall  in  winter  blocking  many  roads 
for  months.868  An  assessment  by  the  Afghanistan  Food  Security  Cluster  (FSC)  described  the 
condition  of  Daykundi´s  roads  as  ‘very  bad’, with  sparse  infrastructure.869  According  to  Tolonews, 
only  one  paved  road  exists  in  the  province.870 The  same  source  reports  that  there  is  an  airport  in 
Daykundi,  which  is  ‘not  standard’ according  to  the  governor  of  the  province,  as  only  small  planes 
can land.871 According to the airport map produced by the Austrian COI unit, Daykundi is not served 
by scheduled passenger flights.872 

Daykundi residents largely depend on agriculture.873 According to FSC, remittances sent from 
migrants are an important source of income for the population of Daykundi.874   

According  to  the  2018  Opium  Survey  of  UNODC,  Daykundi  was  not  among  Afghanistan's  ten 
main  opium-poppy-cultivation  provinces  in  2018875  –  cultivation  amounted  to  less  than  1000 
hectares  in  2018.876  Compared  to  2017,  poppy  cultivation  decreased  by  50  %  in  2018,877  placing 
Daykundi among the provinces with a ‘strong decrease’ according to UNODC.878 

2.7.2 Conflict background and actors in Daykundi 

Tolonews termed Daykundi a secure province, with the lack of infrastructure being a major problem 
to  the population.879  An Afghan military expert traced the relative stability of Daykundi, as well as 
Bamyan and  Panjshir,  to  the  social  cohesion  among  its  inhabitants,  as  most  of  them  belong  to  the 
same tribal group.880 

In  2015,  armed  groups  of  rival  parties  caused  insecurity  in  the  districts  of  Ashtarlay,  Khadir,  and 
Sang-e-Takht,  according  to  residents.881  As  Daykundi  borders  on  the  unstable  provinces  of 
Helmand  and  Uruzgan,  Pajhwok  Afghan  News  reported  in  March  2015  and  June  2018  that 
residents  repeatedly  voiced  fears  of  Taliban  attacks.882  Throughout  2018,  the  Taliban  launched 
attacks  against  security 

865 Afghanistan, CSO, ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 3 
866 ACCORD, Anfragebeantwortung zu Afghanistan: Informationen zur Volksgruppe der Sadat (Sayed, Sayyed, Sadaat, Sayyid, 
Sayid, Sayeed [Query response on Afghanistan: Information on the ethnic group of the Sadat (Sayed, Sayyed, Sadaat, Sayyid, 
Sayid, Sayeed)], 25 October 2017, url 
867 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Dai Kundi Provincial Overview, n.d., url   
868 Pajhwok Afghan News, Daikundi province background profile, n.d., url 
869 FSC, Daykundi Province Fact Findings (Qualitative Assessment) Report, 18 April 2018, url, p. 3  
870 Tolonews, Daikundi Secure But Lacks Development: Residents, 6 April 2018, url 
871 Tolonews, Daikundi Secure But Lacks Development: Residents, 6 April 2018, url 
872 Austria, BFA-Staatendokumentation, Afghanistan - Airports [Map], 25 March 2019 
873  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Daikundi  province  background  profile,  n.d.,  url;  Tolonews,  Daikundi  Secure  But  Lacks 
Development: Residents, 6 April 2018, url 
874 FSC, Daykundi Province Fact Findings (Qualitative Assessment) Report, 18 April 2018, url, p. 6-7  
875 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p.17 
876 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 19 
877 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 10, p. 19 
878 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 10, p.11 
879 Tolonews, Daikundi Secure But Lacks Development: Residents, 6 April 2018, url; Tolonews, Daikundi Relatively Secure But 
Undeveloped: Residents, 15 November 2016, url 
880 Pajhwok Afghan News, 2017 causalities: nearly 25,000 people killed, wounded in Afghanistan, 14 January 2018, url  
881 Pajhwok Afghan News, Illegal armed men’s influence growing in Daikundi: PC member, 30 August 2015, url; Tolonews, 
Daykundi Resident's Protest over Irresponsible Armed Men, 8 April 2015, url 
882 Pajhwok Afghan News, Daikundi residents concerned about Daesh in neighborhood, 3 June 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan 
News, Kajran district may fall to Taliban, residents warn, 25 March 2015, url 

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checkpoints  in  several  of  Daykundi´s  districts.883In  November  2018,  President  Ashraf  Ghani 
reportedly acknowledged  the  promotion  of  Daykundi  to  a  second  grade  province  in  order  to 
increase  the  allocation  of  funds  to  the  province.  According  to  a  publication  of  2004,  the  ‘[…] 
the  grade  is  determined  largely  by  population,  but  there  are  additional  political  factors  that 
play  into  the  assignation. […] The grade of a province or district will affect the size of governor’s 
office and district office, as well as the position grades of the staff.’884 Furthermore, Ghani ordered 
the Army Chief to create a military battalion in Daykundi.885 

Daykundi is under the responsibility of the 205th ANA Corps.886 

The following table provides an overview of control of the districts in Daykundi province based on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.887 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region, to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.  

DAYKUNDI 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: 
August-
November 
2017 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment as 
of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last 
accessed:888 
April 2019) 

Taliban 

(assessment as of 
December 2018) 

Ashtarlay 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control 

GIRoA Control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 90%; 
TB control: 10% 

Kajran 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control 

GIRoA Control 

Unconfirmed 

Gov control: 80%; 
TB control: 20% 

Khadir 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control 

GIRoA Control 

Kiti 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control 

GIRoA Control 

Miramor 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control 

GIRoA Control 

Nili (capital) 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control 

GIRoA Control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 90%; 
TB control: 10% 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 90%; 
TB control: 10% 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 90%; 
TB control: 10% 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 90%; 
TB control: 10% 

883 Pajhwok Afghan  News, 7  pro-govt fighters, 2 policemen killed in Daikundi clash, 23 July 2018,  url; RFE/RL, Dozens Of 
Afghan Police Officers Killed In Taliban Attacks, 16 October 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban capture security posts 
near Daikundi’s capital, 16 December 2018, url  
884 IBRD/AREU, A Guide to Government in Afghanistan, 2004, url, p. 95 
885 MENA FN, Afghanistan - President acknowledges promotion of Daikundi to 2nd grade province, 10 November 2018, url 
886 Global Security, Afghan National Army (ANA) - Order of Battle, n.d., url, page last modified 6 September 2018 
887 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, 23 April 2019, url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of 
Jihad, End of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
888 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 

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Sang-e-Takht 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control 

GIRoA Control 

Shahrestan 

Gov control 

GIRoA Control 

GIRoA Control 

(capital Nili under 
Gov control) 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 90%; 
TB control: 10% 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 90%; 
TB control: 10% 

Gizab (Patoo) 

Open 
Taliban 
presence – 
low 

GIRoA Control 

GIRoA Control 

Contested 

TB control: 80%; 
Gov control: 20% 

Ajrestan889 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

TB control 

2.7.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.7.3.1 General 

In  2018  UNAMA  documented  41  civilian  casualties  (19  deaths  and  22  injured)  in  Daykundi. 
This  represents  a  decrease  of  5 %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were 
ground  engagements, followed by kidnapping/abduction and (non-suicide) IEDs.890  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA  places  the  district  of  Pato in  the 
second highest category, the district of Kajran in the fourth highest category and the remaining districts 
in the two lowest categories.891 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019, open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 21 incidents related to insurgents in Daykundi province.892 

In July 2018, at least nine members of a pro-government militia, as well as two policemen were killed 
in  a  Taliban  attack  on  the  district  centre  of  Pato.893 In  October  2018,  hundreds  of  Taliban  fighters 
equipped with heavy weapons reportedly attacked checkpoints in Kajran district, killing eight Afghan 
soldiers and five policemen. While the attacks had no direct link to the parliamentary elections which 
took place a few days after, RFE/RL pointed out that they highlighted the strength of the Taliban in 
large parts of Afghanistan.894 One day after the attacks, an IED explosion killed one woman and injured 
three  persons.  AAN  cited  officials  who  interpreted  the  Taliban  attacks  and  IED  explosion  in  mid-
October  2018  as  an  attempt  to  dissuade  residents  from  voting.  According  to  them,  larger  attacks 
probably failed to materialise after these incidents because the Taliban had also suffered considerable 
casualties in Kajran.895  

889 According to UNOCHA and Pajhwok Afghan News Ajrestan district is located in Ghazni province. (UNOCHA Afghanistan 
Daykundi Province - District Atlas, April 2014, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 33 Security Personnel Flee Ajristan, Get Shelter in 
Daikundi, 14 August 2018, url)  
890 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
891 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2 
892 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
893 Pajhwok Afghan News, 7 pro-govt fighters, 2 policemen killed in Daikundi clash, 23 July 2018, url  
894 RFE/RL, Dozens Of Afghan Police Officers Killed In Taliban Attacks, 16 October 2018, url 
895 Qaane, E., The 2018 Election Observed (7) in Daikundi: The outstanding role of women, AAN, 27 January 2019, url 

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—  111

In December 2018, Taliban insurgents captured security checkposts in Pato, only a few kilometres 
away from the district border of Daykundi´s capital Nili.896  

Afghan security forces responded with clearing operations in the end of December 2018, killing at least 
30 Taliban insurgents in Pato and reopening the Nili-Pato highway.897 Another offensive of the Afghan 
security forces took place in the beginning of January 2019.898   

2.7.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 558 persons 
displaced from Daykundi province mainly within the province itself.899 

No conflict-induced internal displacement from Daykundi province was reported by UNOCHA for the 
period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019.900 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 2 756 persons 
displaced to Daykundi province, including 2 229 individuals from Ghazni.901 

No  conflict-induced  internal  displacement  to  Daykundi  province  was  reported  by  UNOCHA  for  the 
period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019.902 

District 

Gizab / Patoo 

Kajran 

Kiti 

Nili 

Miramor 

Displaced from 
(2018) 

Displaced to (2018) 

Displaced from 
(2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

335 

10 

213 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

527 

2 229 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

and IED explosion lled one woman and injured  and thetanding role of women, ors that play into the assignation,.g to the 
same et896 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban capture security posts near Daikundi’s capital, 16 December 2018, url 
897 Pajhwok Afghan News, 30 militants eliminated in Daikundi operation, 27 December 2018, url 
898 Pajhwok Afghan News, 46 militants killed, 33 injured in past 24 hours: MoD, 4 January 2019, url 
899 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 20 January 2019, url 
900 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 
901 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 
902 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 

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2.8 Farah 

2.8.1 General description of the province 

The province of Farah is located in the western part of Afghanistan and borders Herat to the north, 
Ghor  to  the  northeast,  Helmand  to  the  southeast  and  Nimroz  to  the  south,  as  well  as  Iran  to  the 
west.903 The province is divided into eleven districts: Anar Dara, Bakwa, Bala Buluk, Farah, Gulistan, 
Khak-e-Safed, Lash-e-Juwayn, Pur Chaman, Pushtrud, Qala-e-Kah (formerly Pusht-Koh) and Shib Koh. 
The provincial capital of Farah is Farah.904  

According to estimates by the Afghan CSO, the population of Farah was 543 237 in 2018/19.905 The 
majority  of  Farah's  inhabitants  are  Pashtuns,  with  Tajik  and  smaller  Hazara  communities  residing 
mainly in the countryside.906 Aylat, Mugal, Sadat, Bomodi, Aymaq, Barahawi and Baloch tribes live in 
Farah, according to Pajhwok Afghan News.907 

According to the airport map produced by the Austrian COI department, Farah has an airport with 
scheduled passenger services to regional destinations.908 Part of the Ring Road leads through Farah, 
connecting the province with the regional centre of Herat in the north and the provinces of Nimroz 
and Helmand in the south and southeast, respectively.909 Cross-border transport and trade with Iran 

903 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Farah Province District Atlas, April 2014, url 
904 Afghanistan, IEC, 2018 Wolesi Jirga Elections – Results by Polling Stations: Province Farah, 2018, url; Afghanistan, CSO, 
۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 39; UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Farah 
Province District Atlas, April 2014, url; Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial Profile of Farah, 1 February 2017, url 
905 Afghanistan, CSO, ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 3 
906 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Farah Provincial Overview, n.d., url   
907 Pajhwok Afghan News, Background Profile of Farah, n.d., url 
908 Austria, BFA-Staatendokumentation, Afghanistan - Airports [Map], 25 March 2019 
909 Diplomat (The), Kabul's Plan to Realize Afghanistan’s Geographic Dividend, 5 December 2017, url 

 
                                                           
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—  113  

is  reportedly  possible  at  Abu  Nasr  Farahi  port.910  In  September  2018,  Tolonews  reported  security 
problems near the border crossing, as the route towards the border leads through militant-controlled 
areas.911 

According  to  the  2018  UNODC  Opium  Survey,  Farah  is  one  of  the  main  opium-poppy-cultivating 
provinces in western Afghanistan.912 Regarding the size of poppy cultivation in hectares, Farah ranked 
5th among all Afghan provinces in 2018, with a decrease of poppy acreage by 15% compared to 2017,913 
after opium-poppy cultivation had increased by 41% in 2017 compared to 2016.914 

2.8.2 Conflict background and actors in Farah 

In June 2018, AAN in June 2018 called the Taliban ‘[...] a persistent and growing force in Farah since 
2001,  rebuilding  their  strength  quietly  after  the  U.S.  invasion  and  then  seizing  territory  in  remote 
districts.’915 Accordingly, the Taliban were never fully defeated after 2001 and kept a strong presence 
in  the  province  –  especially  in  Bala  Buluk.916  In  February  2018,  the  Washington  Post  stated  that 
approximately 60 % of Farah was controlled by insurgents, while the government controlled only the 
provincial capital and 10 district centres, some of which are allegedly too dangerous for district officials 
to visit.917 

AAN noted that there might be an ethnic dimension favouring the maintenance of a strong Taliban 
organisation in some parts of the province. Taliban stronghold Shiwan village in Bala Buluk district for 
instance, is mostly inhabited by so-called naqelin, i.e. Pashtuns, who have been resettled from their 
original areas in Helmand by the Afghan monarch about 100 years ago. Shiwan's naqelin reportedly 
still maintain close links to the Taliban strongholds in Helmand. Additionally, AAN assumed that the 
Baloch minority in Farah helped to establish links to Baloch smugglers in neighbouring Nimroz, who 
are reportedly able to draw on ‘[...] century-old connections with Iran and Pakistan.’918 

According to AAN, Farah is of strategic interest to insurgents and pro-government strongmen because 
of  its  transport  routes  into  bordering  Iran.919  Reportedly,  the  Taliban  levy  ‘taxes’  on  cross-border 
traffic,920  as  well  as  along  the  highway  connecting  Farah  to  Nimroz.921  Opium-poppy  cultivation  is 
especially strong in the districts under Taliban control.922 Drug production and smuggling is however 
not confined to Taliban insurgents, according to AAN; there is allegedly an increasing convergence of 
interests between the drug trade, Taliban networks and the local administration of Farah.923 

Rivalries among local pro-government strongmen reportedly have had negative consequences on the 
security  situation  in  the  province,  as  ‘[…]  Farah’s  government  officials  competed  over  the  seven 
unofficial border crossing points to Iran, at which they collected customs – and apparently pocketed 
most of it,’ – a practice, which allegedly continues according to AAN.924 

910 Tolonews, Import Ban Affects Business In Farah Port, 21 September 2018, url; IRNA, Afghanistan opens Farah border to 
Iranian goods, 4 November 2018, url 
911 Tolonews, Import Ban Affects Business In Farah Port, 21 September 2018, url  
912 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p.16 
913 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p.17 
914 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017, November 2017, url, p.16 
915 Ruttig, T., Why Farah? A short history of the local insurgency (II), AAN, 7 June 2018, url 
916 Ruttig, T., Why Farah? A short history of the local insurgency (II), AAN, 7 June 2018, url 
917  Washington  Post  (The),  Outgunned  in  urban  centers,  Taliban  wages  fierce  fight  in  remote  western  Afghanistan,  26 
February 2018, url 
918 Ruttig, T., Why Farah? A short history of the local insurgency (II), AAN, 7 June 2018, url 
919 Ruttig, T., Why Farah? A short history of the local insurgency (II), AAN, 7 June 2018, url 
920 Ruttig, T., Why Farah? A short history of the local insurgency (II), AAN, 7 June 2018, url; Washington Post (The), Outgunned 
in urban centers, Taliban wages fierce fight in remote western Afghanistan, 26 February 2018, url 
921 Ruttig, T., Why Farah? A short history of the local insurgency (II), AAN, 7 June 2018, url 
922 Ruttig, T., Why Farah? A short history of the local insurgency (II), AAN, 7 June 2018, url 
923 Ruttig, T., Why Farah? A short history of the local insurgency (II), AAN, 7 June 2018, url  
924 Ruttig, T., Why Farah? A short history of the local insurgency (II), AAN, 7 June 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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IS has been reportedly present in some parts of Farah in 2015.925 According to Iranian sources, Taliban 
fighters succeeded in dislodging IS militants.926 

According to Washington Post, around 6 000 members of the security forces were employed in the 
province of Farah in early 2018 – approximately half as much as in neighbouring Helmand Province 
with a similar size. The Washington Post cited local officials stating that the strength of government 
forces in the province is insufficient, as a majority of police are ‘ghost officers’, i.e. policemen on the 
payrolls, which exist only on paper.927  

In February 2018, 50 Italian soldiers were stationed near the airport of Farah City in order to support 
the Afghan forces  in  clearing  operations.928 In August 2018, the Afghan  Ministry of Defense (MoD) 
confirmed the deployment of US Special Forces to assist in the training of the Afghan armed forces in 
Farah.929  

Farah is under the responsibility of the 207th ANA Zafar Corps.930 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Farah  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.931 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region,  to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.  

BBC 

(reporting 
period: August-
November 
2017) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment 
as of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last 
accessed:932 
April 2019) 

Taliban 

(assessment as of 
December 2018) 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

/ 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control  

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Taliban 
control 

Taliban 
control 

TB control  

TB control  

FARAH 

Anar Dara 

Bakwa 

Bala Buluk 

Gulistan 

925 Osman, B., The Shadows of ‘Islamic State’ in Afghanistan: What threat does it hold?, AAN, 12 February 2015, url; Mielke, 
K. and Miszak, N., Making sense of Daesh in Afghanistan: A social movement perspective, June 2017, url, p. 27; VoA, Taliban 
Captures IS Bases in Afghanistan, 5 January 2016, url   
926 Middle East Institute, Afghans see Iran´s hand in Taliban´s latest gains in western Afghanistan, 14 March 2018, url  
927  Washington  Post  (The),  Outgunned  in  urban  centers,  Taliban  wages  fierce  fight  in  remote  western  Afghanistan,  26 
February 2018, url 
928 Pajhwok Afghan News, 50 Italian troops in Farah to support Afghan forces, 7 February 2018, url 
929 Khaama Press, MoD confirms deployment of US Special Forces in Farah province, 5 August 2018, url 
930 Global Security, Afghan National Army (ANA) - Order of Battle, n.d., url, last modified 6 September 2018; Afghanistan, 
MoD, 207 Zafar Corps, n.d., url 
931 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of Jihad, End 
of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
932 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated.  

                                                           
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  115  

Khaki Safed 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

Contested 

Contested 

Taliban 
control 

TB control  

Lash Wa Juwayn 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Control 

GIRoA Control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

TB control: 70%; 
Gov control: 30% 

Pur Chaman 

Pusht Rod 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Qala Kah (formerly 
called Pusht Koh) 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Shib Koh 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

GIRoA 
Control 

GIRoA Control 

Contested 

Taliban 
control 

TB control: 80%; 
Gov control: 20% 

TB control: 80%; 
Gov control: 20% 

TB control: 80%; 
Gov control: 20% 

TB control  

Farah (capital) 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Gov control: 50%; 
TB control: 50% 

Farah Rod 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

TB control: 98%; 
Gov control: 2% 

2.8.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.8.3.1 General 

In 2018, UNAMA documented 275 civilian casualties (122 deaths and 153 injured) in the province of 
Farah. This represents a decrease of 19 % compared to 2017. Leading causes of casualties were ground 
engagements, followed by (non-suicide) IEDs and targeted killings.933  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA  places  the  districts  of  Farah,  Bala 
Baluk and Pushtrod in the highest category. The districts of Anar Dara, Qala-e-Kah and Khak-e-Safed 
are in the third highest category, the districts of Shibkoh, Bakwa and Gulistan in the category below, 
and the district of Lash-e-Juwayn and Pur Chaman in the second lowest category.934 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 215 incidents related to insurgents in Farah.935 

933 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
934 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2 
935 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 

 
                                                           
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Throughout 2018, the Taliban attacked military posts and security checkpoints, mainly in the district 
of Bala Buluk,936 but also in the district of Pushtrud,937 as well as in the outskirts of Farah City938, and 
within the provincial capital itself.939 The district centre of Anar Dara was reportedly briefly captured 
by the Taliban in March 2018.940  

In May 2018, the insurgents succeeded in overrunning parts of Farah City for the first time in three 
years.941 The Taliban had already closed in on Farah City in October 2016;942 and in 2017, the British 
newspaper  Guardian  reported  three  failed  attempts  to  capture  the  provincial  capital.943  In  the 
beginning of 2018, Afghan officials warned that Taliban insurgents were no longer only on the outskirts 
of Farah, but had actually entered the city.944 According to AAN, the Taliban employed a strategy of 
consolidating control over rural areas and infiltrating the provincial centre´s outskirts before eventually 
attacking the centre itself.945  

According to Tolonews, altogether approximately 2000 Taliban fighters originating from the provinces 
of Helmand, Herat, Ghor, and Zabul have been involved in the large-scale attack on Farah City in May 
2018.946 Afghanistan Analysts Network however stated that this number cannot be confirmed.  947 As 
the Taliban were  comparatively  well-equipped – using for instance night-vision goggles and helmet 
cameras  –,  Afghan  officials  accused  Russia  of  arming  the  Taliban.  Russian  authorities  rejected  this, 
pointing out that the Taliban, with abundant income from opium production and trade, might have 
acquired Russian night-vision gear on the black market in Pakistan, or in former Soviet countries.948   

With the aid of US and Afghan airstrikes, government forces reportedly repelled the Taliban from Farah 
City after hours of fighting.949 Afghan and US forces conducted several airstrikes in Farah in 2018, for 

936 Pajhwok Afghan News, 20 killed as police, Taliban clash in Farah, 17 February 2018, url; LWJ, As security in Farah worsens, 
Taliban  stage  deadly  attack,  24  February  2018,  url;  RFE/RL,  Dozens  Dead  After  Taliban  Ambush  On  Afghan  Government 
Forces,  10  March  2018,  url;  RFE/RL,  Taliban  Attacks  Kill  Nine  Afghan  Soldiers,  Police,  24  April  2018,  url;  RFE/RL,  Afghan 
Soldiers Reported Killed In Militant Attack, 14 July 2018, url; Khaama Press, 51 militants killed, wounded in Bala Bolok clashes, 
claims Farah officials, 7 August 2018, url; Khaama Press, Taliban launch deadly attacks on security posts in Farah province, 
17 September 2018, url 
937  Washington  Post  (The),  Outgunned  in  urban  centers,  Taliban  wages  fierce  fight  in  remote  western  Afghanistan,  26 
February 2018, url; Khaama Press, Taliban launch deadly attacks on security posts in Farah province, 17 September 2018, 
url; RFE/RL, At Least 17 Afghan Soldiers Killed In Taliban Attacks, 14 October 2018, url 
938 RFE/RL, At Least 10 Afghan Security Forces Killed In Two Separate Attacks, 14 March 2018, url 
939  Washington  Post  (The),  Outgunned  in  urban  centers,  Taliban  wages  fierce  fight  in  remote  western  Afghanistan,  26 
February 2018, url; Washington Post (The), Taliban overruns parts of Afghan city of Farah in major offensive, 15 Mai 2018, 
url; RFE/RL, At Least 17 Afghans Killed In Taliban Attacks As U.S. Peace Envoy Heads To Region, 9 November 2018, url 
940 Khaama Press, Farah’s Anar Dara has reportedly fallen into Taliban hands, 12 March 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 
Farah: Taliban overrun Anar Dara district, 12 March 2018, url; Al Jazeera, Afghan troops push back Taliban fighters in Farah 
province, 13 March 2018, url 
941 Washington Post (The), Taliban overruns parts of Afghan city of Farah in major offensive, 15 Mai 2018, url; RFE/RL, UN 
Says More Than 100,000 Afghans Displaced In 2018, 23 May 2018, url 
942 Ruttig, T., Why Farah? A short history of the local insurgency (II), AAN, 7 June 2018, url 
943 Guardian (The), Russia accused of supplying Taliban as power shifts create strange bedfellows, 22 October 2017, url 
944 LWJ, As security in Farah worsens, Taliban stage deadly attack, 24 February 2018, url 
945 Ruttig, T. et al., Surrounding the Cities: The meaning of the latest battle for Farah (I), AAN, 6 June 2018, url 
946 Tolonews, 7 Provincial Centers Face ‘Serious Security Threats', 16 May 2018, url 
947 Ruttig, T. et al., Surrounding the Cities: The meaning of the latest battle for Farah (I), AAN, 6 June 2018, url 
948 New York Times (The), Using Night-Vision Goggles, Taliban Stage Lethal Attack, 20 February 2018, url; Guardian (The), 
Russia accused of supplying Taliban as power shifts create strange bedfellows, 22 October 2017, url 
949 Washington Post (The), Taliban overruns parts of Afghan city of Farah in major offensive, 15 May 2018, url; Khaama Press, 
NDS Special Forces foil Taliban´s bid to carry out coordinated attack in Farah, 26 May 2018, url  

                                                           
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instance in April,950 May,951 July,952 September,953 November,954 and December,955 as well as in January 
2019.956  According  to  a  UN  Secretary-General’s  report  of  February  2019,  Farah  was  among  the  six 
provinces  with  the  largest  number  of  airstrikes  in  Afghanistan  in  the  period  of  December  2018  to 
February 2019.957 

In June 2018, a former district chief of Pur Chaman was arrested with several of his employees on 
charges  of  involvement  in  terrorist  related  activities.958 In  July,  11  civilians  travelling  from  Herat  to 
Kabul  died  and  about  40  were  injured  when  their  bus  hit  a  roadside  bomb  in  the  district  of  Bala 
Buluk.959 In December 2018, MoI officials arrested a police officer allegedly affiliated to the Taliban 
and accused of facilitating a Taliban attack on police forces in November 2018 which resulted in the 
deaths  of  22  policemen.960  In  January  2019,  Taliban  insurgents  kidnapped  several  persons,  among 
them a local journalist, who was later killed by the Taliban.961  

2.8.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 24 674 persons 
displaced from Farah province, most of whom (23 662) were displaced within the province and the 
others went to Badghis, Helmand, Herat, Kandahar and Nimroz provinces.962 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019, reporting 2 135 persons 
displaced from Farah province, a large part of them (2 051) were displaced within the province and the 
rest of them were displaced to Herat province.963  

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 23 662 persons 
displaced to Farah province all coming from within the province itself.964 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019, reporting 2 051 persons 
displaced to Farah province, all coming from the province itself. 965 

District 

Anar Dara 

Bakwa 

Displaced from 
(2018) 

Displaced to 
(2018) 

Displaced from 
(2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

197 

102  

/ 

/ 

115 

57 

/ 

/ 

950 Khaama Press, Joint airstrikes leave 37 militants dead, 7 wounded in Farah, 16 April 2018, url 
951 Khaama Press, Video: Deadly airstrikes target Taliban after Farah city attack, 16 May 2018, url; Khaama Press, Taliban 
leader Mullah Din Mohammad and comrades killed in Farah airstrike, 21 May 2018, url; Khaama Press, NDS Special Forces 
foil Taliban’s bid to carry out coordinated attack in Farah, 26 May 2018, url 
952 Khaama Press, AAF targets Humvee vehicle captured by Taliban leaving 4 militants dead, 4 July 2018, url; Khaama Press, 
Badar-16 operations kick off against Taliban in Farah province, 18 July 2018, url 
953 Khaama Press, 46 militants killed, 38 thousand kgs of explosives in Farah airstrikes, 24 September 2018, url 
954 Khaama Press, Humvee APC destroyed, 9 militants killed in AAF airstrike in Farah province, 23 November 2018, url  
955 Khaama Press, 54 militants killed during the joint operations in  past 24 hours: MoD, 22 December 2018, url; Khaama 
Press, Drone strike target militants in Farah province, 23 December 2018, url; Khaama Press, Taliban commander among 7 
killed in Farah airstrikes, 24 December 2018, url 
956 Khaama Press, 29 Taliban militants killed in coalition airstrike in Kandahar, 6 January 2019, url 
957 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implication for international peace and security, 28 February 
2019, url, p. 6  
958 Khaama Press, Afghan Special Forces arrest ex-district chief in Farah over terror charges, 27 June 2018, url 
959 RFE/RL, Bomb Kills At Least 11 In Western Afghanistan, 31 July 2018, url 
960 Khaama Press, MoI arrest police officer affiliated with Taliban in Farah province, 22 December 2018, url 
961  RFE/RL,  Afghan  Forces  Free  Hostages  As  Taliban  Kidnap  Government  Employees,  5  January  2019,  url;  Khaama  Press, 
Reporters Without Borders reacts to the killing of a journalist by Taliban, 9 January 2019, url 
962 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url  
963 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url  
964 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 
965 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url  

 
                                                           
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Bala Buluk 

Farah 

Gulistan 

Khaki Safed 

Lash Wa Juwayn 

Purchaman 

Pusht Rod 

QalaKah 

Shib Koh 

5 062  

4 983 

408 

744 

8  

259  

12 631 

157  

46  

109 

23 553  

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

154 

914 

21 

165 

/ 

112 

557 

35 

5 

/ 

2 051 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

In 2018, 25 % of Farah’s population was either a returnee or an IDP.966 According to UNOCHA, fighting 
and clashes between ANDSF and armed groups were the main reasons of displacements967 even in 
the provincial capital where fighting has ‘displaced more than 10,000 people to neighbouring villages, 
before  returning  to  their  homes  after  security  forces  had  regained  control  of  the  area.  Some  500 
people reportedly also displaced from Farah City into Herat’.968  

966 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 12 
967 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 12 – 18 March 2018, 19 March 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 2 – 8 April 2018, 9 April 2018, url 
968 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 14 – 20 May 2018, 21 May 2018, url 

 
 
 
                                                           
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—  119  

2.9 Faryab 

2.9.1 General description of the province 

Bordering Turkmenistan to the west and north, Jawzjan and Sar-e Pul to the east, Ghor to the south 
and  Badghis  in  the  south-west,  the  province  of  Faryab  is  situated  in  the  north-western  region  of 
Afghanistan. The provincial capital is Maymana. The province comprises the following districts: Almar, 

 
 
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Andkhoy,  Bilcheragh,  Dawlatabad,  Garziwan,  Khan-e-Char  Bagh,  Khwajasabzposh,  Kohestan, 
Maymana, Pashtunkot, Qaramqol, Qaysar, Qorghan, Shirintagab.969 According to UNODC, the district 
of Ghormach became part of Faryab in 2017.970 In August 2018, the Peshawar-based daily newspaper, 
Frontier Post noted that Ghormach’s administrative affairs would be shifted back to Badghis due to 
security  reasons.971  The  administrative  belonging  of  Ghormach  seems  to  be  disputed.  Afghanistan 
Analysts Network reported in 2017 that the central government had already transferred Ghormach to 
Faryab  in  2007,  while  the  governor  of  Faryab  did  not  consider  Ghormach  to  be  part  of  Faryab  in 
2010.972 In 2018, AAN stated that Ghormach had been ‘temporarily transferred’ to Faryab according 
to  a  list  of  Afghanistan´s  district  numbers  which  was  jointly  published  by  the  Central  Statistics 
Organization and the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG).973 The 2018/19 population 
estimation of the Afghan CSO, as well as the publication of the 2018 parliamentary election results by 
the Independent Election Commission again listed Ghormach as part of Badghis.974   

Estimates  by  the  Afghanistan  CSO  report  the  population  of  Faryab  to  be  1 069 540  in  2018/19.975 
Together with Sar-e Pul, Faryab is one of the two provinces with an Uzbek majority in Afghanistan. 
Additionally,  Tajiks/Aimaqs,  Pashtuns,  Hazara,  Moghol  and  other  smaller  ethnicities  live  in  the 
province.976 

A part of the Ring Road leads through Faryab, connecting the province with neighbouring Jawzjan and 
the regional centre Mazar-e Sharif in Balkh Province.977 Another stretch of the Ring Road, planned to 
connect the district of Qaysar in Faryab with the site of Laman in Badghis south-west of Faryab, is 
under construction. According to an assessment by SIGAR, only 15 % of this projected 233-kilometre 
section of the Ring Road between Qaysar and Laman has been built as of September 2017 despite 
considerable funding since 2005.978 SIGAR linked the project’s failure mostly to security issues and 
estimates  the  prospects  for  a  timely  completion  to  be  bleak,  due  to  increasing  insecurity  in  the 
region.979 According to AAN, parts of the paved highway between Badghis and Faryab have been under 
Taliban control in the past,980 and in March 2018, the Taliban were threatening parts of the Ring Road, 
as well as important provincial roads.981     

According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, Faryab was among the ten main opium-poppy-cultivating 
provinces of Afghanistan in 2018 – though it ranked within the lowest third of those ten provinces. 
Compared to 2017, the size of poppy-cultivating acreage in Faryab decreased by 64% in 2018, even 

969 Afghanistan, IEC, 2018 Wolesi Jirga Elections – Results by Polling Stations: Province Faryab, 2018, url; Afghanistan, CSO, 
۱۳۹۷  روﺷﮐ  سوﻔﻧ  دروآرﺑ  [Estimated  population  of  the  country  2018-2019],  June  2018,  url,  p.  35;  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan: 
Northern Region District Atlas, April 2014, url 
970 Ali, O. and Ruttig, T., Battle for Faryab: Fighting intensifies on one of Afghanistan’s major frontlines, AAN, 12 March 2018, 
url; UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 15 
971 Frontier Post (The), Ghormach falls to Taliban as ANA troops move to Maimana, 28 August 2018, url 
972 Bjelica, J., How Neglect and Remoteness Bred Insurgency and a Poppy Boom: The story of Badghis, AAN, 22 February 
2017, url 
973 Ruttig, T., The Afghanistan Election Conundrum (12): Good news and bad news about district numbers, AAN, 16 August 
2018, url 
974 Afghanistan, IEC, 2018 Wolesi Jirga Elections – Results by Polling Stations: Province Faryab, 2018, url; Afghanistan, CSO, 
۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 35-37 
975 Afghanistan, CSO, ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 3 
976 Ali., O., Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (2): Case studies of Uzbek Taleban in Faryab and Sar-e Pul, AAN, 17 March 
2017, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Background profile Faryab province, n.d., url 
977 Diplomat (The), Kabul's Plan to Realize Afghanistan’s Geographic Dividend, 5 December 2017, url 
978 SIGAR, Afghanistan´s Ring Road from Qeysar to Laman: After more than 12 years and over $249 million spent, the project 
is only 15 percent complete, June 2018, url, p. 4 
979 SIGAR, Afghanistan´s Ring Road from Qeysar to Laman: After more than 12 years and over $249 million spent, the project 
is only 15 percent complete, June 2018, url, p. 23  
980 Bjelica, J., How Neglect and Remoteness Bred Insurgency and a Poppy Boom: The story of Badghis, AAN, 22 February 
2017, url 
981 Ali, O. and Ruttig, T., Battle for Faryab: Fighting intensifies on one of Afghanistan’s major frontlines, AAN, 12 March 2018, 
url 

                                                           
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—  121  

though  UNODC  counted  Ghormach  –  a  district  with  sizeable  opium-poppy  cultivation  –  as  part  of 
Faryab for the first time in 2018.982 UNODC links the decrease mainly to this year's weather conditions, 
as Faryab was affected by a drought.983  

2.9.2 Conflict background and actors in Faryab 

According to AAN, ‘[...] Faryab is strategically important as it connects the western parts of the country 
with the north – it was through Faryab that the Taleban moved to capture Mazar-e Sharif in 1997 and 
1998  and  from  where  anti-Taleban  forces  came  to  re-capture  the  city  in  2001.’984  Khaama  Press 
reported in January 2019 that ‘Faryab is among the relatively volatile provinces in North of Afghanistan 
where Taliban militants are actively operating in some of its districts and often attempt to carry out 
attacks against the government and security institutions.‘985  

AAN links the Taliban's success in Faryab from 2007 onwards to ‘[...] local Jamiati-Jombesh rivalries, 
poppy-cultivation interests and radical propaganda by religious preachers, coupled with the absolute 
inconsistence  of  government  outreach  [...],’986  as  well  as  the  exploitation  of  local  land  and  water 
conflicts and the rearmament of local commanders.987 According to AAN, fighting broke out between 
local  pro-government  militias  in  early  2018,  which  further  weakened  the  resistance  against  anti-
government insurgents.988  

According to AAN, the Taliban became increasingly successful in the province after drawing on local 
fighters – which is a change in strategy compared to the Taliban's approach before 2001. Since 2008, 
Faryab’s Taliban shadow governors mostly have been Uzbeks and also a majority of the Taliban district 
officers are Uzbeks in districts with an Uzbek majority, along with a few Tajiks. Pashtuns serve on mid-
level posts in the districts of Qaysar, Dawlatabad, and Shirintagab where Pashtuns form a considerable 
share of the population.989 However, AAN reported that the strategy of endorsement towards non-
Pashtun  ethnic  groups  among  Faryab’s  Taliban  limits  the  group’s  organisational  capacity  as  some 
Pashtun  Taliban  commanders  ignore  instructions  of  Uzbek  shadow  governors.  In  order  to  avoid 
tensions, the current shadow governor allegedly deploys a strategy of individual smaller operations by 
each group in their own areas instead of joint operations with larger numbers of fighters.990 

General Abdul Rashid Dostum, Jombesh party leader and self-proclaimed sole representative of the 
Uzbek minority in Afghanistan, allegedly perceived the Taliban outreach to Uzbek communities as a 
threat. Subsequently, Dostum put considerable effort in combatting the Taliban influence on Uzbek 
communities  in  Faryab  and  led  several  counteroffensives  of  pro-government  (Jombesh)  militias 
together with the ANSF throughout 2015 and 2016. According to AAN, there were ‘[...] some initial 
successes, but no significant  long-term results’: Dostum was reportedly able to clear most parts of 
Qaysar,  Dawlatabad,  and  Shirintagab  (as  well  as  Ghormach)  of  Taliban  militants.  Local  government 
forces  and  pro-government  militias  have  however  not  been  able  to  hold  most  of  the  areas  after 

982 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 17 
983 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 25 
984 Ali., O., Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (2): Case studies of Uzbek Taleban in Faryab and Sar-e Pul, AAN, 17 March 
2017, url 
985 Khaama Press, Afghan Air Force bomb Taliban gathering in Faryab province, 14 January 2019, url 
986 Ali, O. and Ruttig, T., Classics of Conflict (1): Reviewing some of Afghanistan’s most notorious hotspots, AAN, 3 July 2015, 
url 
987 Ali, O. and Ruttig, T., Battle for Faryab: Fighting intensifies on one of Afghanistan’s major frontlines, AAN, 12 March 2018, 
url 
988 Ali, O. and Ruttig, T., Battle for Faryab: Fighting intensifies on one of Afghanistan’s major frontlines, AAN, 12 March 2018, 
url 
989 Ali, O. and Ruttig, T., Classics of Conflict (1): Reviewing some of Afghanistan’s most notorious hotspots, AAN, 3 July 2015, 
url; Ali., O., Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (2): Case studies of Uzbek Taleban in Faryab and Sar-e Pul, AAN, 17 March 
2017, url 
990 Ali, O. and Ruttig, T., Battle for Faryab: Fighting intensifies on one of Afghanistan’s major frontlines, AAN, 12 March 2018, 
url 

 
                                                           
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Dostum moved out of Faryab.991 According to the analyst Deedee Derksen, the rearmament of local 
militias by Dostum might have strengthened the Taliban in the long run, as large numbers of militiamen 
formerly affiliated to Dostum might have defected to the Taliban after their funding by Dostum dried 
up.992  

Besides  local  Taliban  insurgents,  a  small  Taliban-affiliated  group  of  the  Islamic  Jihad  Union  (IJU) 
reportedly fights in Faryab.993 In April 2018, Qari Hekmat, the leader of the self-proclaimed ISKP, which 
operated in Jawzjan, was killed in a US airstrike in Bilcheragh close to Jawzjan’s borders. The fact that 
Hekmat  has  been  killed  in  Faryab  should  be  attributed  to  the  village’s  proximity  to  Hekmat's 
stronghold in Jawzjan, according to AAN. AAN stated that Hekmat had shown no signs of planning to 
expand towards Faryab994 and in the beginning of August 2018, the group was defeated by the Taliban 
in Jawzjan.995  

In terms of the presence government security forces, Faryab is under the responsibility of the 209th 
ANA Shaheen Corp.996 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Faryab  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.997 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region,  to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.    

FARYAB 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: August-
November 
2017) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment 
as of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last 
accessed:998 
April 2019) 

Taliban 

(assessment as of 
December 2018) 

Almar 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

INS activity 

INS activity 

Contested 

TB control: 98%; 
Gov control: 2% 

Andkhoy 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 60%; 
TB control: 40% 

Bilcheragh 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Contested 

High INS 
activity 

Taliban 
control 

TB control  

991 Ali., O., Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (2): Case studies of Uzbek Taleban in Faryab and Sar-e Pul, AAN, 17 March 
2017, url 
992 War on the Rocks, In Afghanistan, Today’s Pro-Government Militias Could Be Tomorrow’s Insurgents, 11 December 2017, 
url 
993 Ali, O. and Ruttig, T., Battle for Faryab: Fighting intensifies on one of Afghanistan’s major frontlines, AAN, 12 March 2018, 
url 
994 Ali, O. and Ruttig, T., Battle for Faryab: Fighting intensifies on one of Afghanistan’s major frontlines, AAN, 12 March 2018, 
url 
995 Ali, O., Qari Hekmat´s Island Overrun: Taleban defeat ‘ISKP’ in Jawzjan, AAN, 4 August 2018, url 
996 Global Security, Afghan National Army (ANA) - Order of Battle, n.d., url, last modified 6 September 2018; Afghanistan, 
MoD , 209 Shaheen Corps, n.d., url 
997 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, 23 April 2019, url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of 
Jihad, End of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
998 LWJ is living map that is frequently updated. 

                                                           
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—  123  

Dawlatabad 

Garziwan 

Khan-e-Char 
Bagh 

Khwajasabzposh 

Kohestan 

Maymana 
(capital) 

Pashtunkot 

Qaramqol 

Qaysar 

Qorghan 

Shirintagab 

Khwaja Musa999 

Khaibar 

Lolash 

Juma Bazar1000 

Chilgazi1001 

Bandar1002 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Gov control 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Gov control 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

INS activity 

INS activity 

Contested 

TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5% 

TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5% 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 50%; 
TB control: 50% 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

INS activity 

INS activity 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

INS activity 

Taliban 
control 

Contested 

/ 

/ 

TB control: 60%; 
Gov control: 40% 

Taliban 
control 

TB control: 90%; 
Gov control: 10% 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

TB control: 90%; 
Gov control: 10% 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

INS activity 

INS activity 

Contested 

TB control: 90%; 
Gov control: 10% 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

TB control: 80%; 
Gov control: 20% 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Contested 

INS activity 

Taliban 
control 

TB control: 97%; 
Gov control: 3% 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

TB control  

TB control  

TB control: 97%; 
Gov control: 3% 

TB control: 98%; 
Gov control: 2% 

TB control  

TB control  

999 According to Pajhwok Afghan News Khwaja Musa is an area located in Pashtunkot district. (Pajhwok Afghan News, Faryab 
Governor Denies Khwaja Musa Fell to Taliban, 2 March 2016, url)   
1000  According  to  Pajhwok  Afghan  News  Juma  Bazar  is  the  capital  of  Khwajasabzposh  district.  (Pajhwok  Afghan  News, 
Elections 2018 - Faryab Adminstrative Units, n.d., url)  
1001 According to Anadolou Agency (AA) Chilgazi is an area in Ghormach district. (Anadolou Agency (AA), Taliban Overrun 
Military Base in Afghanistan, 14 August 2018, url)  
1002 According to Afghanistan Times Bandar is an area in Kohestan district. (Afghanistan Times, Taliban Martyred Six of a 
Family in Faryab, 1 January 2018, url)   

 
 
                                                           
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2.9.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.9.3.1 General 

In 2018, UNAMA documented 646 civilian casualties (230 deaths and 416 injured) in the province of 
Faryab. This represents an increase of 1 % compared to 2017. Leading causes of casualties were ground 
engagements, followed by UXO/landmines.1003  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian casualties, and conflict-induced displacements, UNOCHA places the districts of Dawlatabad, 
Shirintagab, Khwajasabzposh, Pashtunkot, Qaysar and Almar in the highest category and the district of 
Kohestan in the second highest category. Qaramqol, Garziwan, and Bilcheragh districts are in the third 
highest category, Maymana in the category below, and Qurghan, Andkhoy and Khan-e-Char Bagh in 
the lowest categories.1004  

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 259 incidents related to insurgents in Faryab province.1005 

In  March  2018,  AAN  stated  that  ‘[...]  Faryab  has  become  one  of  the  most  active  fronts  in  the 
countrywide war between the Taleban and the government and its allies’ over the past two years.1006 
Most of the districts of Faryab have been under Taliban control in the beginning of 2018 according to 
the  same  report,  with  the  government  controlling  only  the  district  centres  and  a  few  surrounding 
villages  in  the  districts  of  Shirintagab,  Khwajasabzposh,  Dawlatabad,  Pashtunkot,  Almar,  Qaysar, 
Bilcheragh, Kohestan and Garziwan.1007 The district of Ghormach – now again part of Badghis – was 
fully captured by the Taliban in August 2017 and again in August 2018, after it had changed hands 
several times during recent years.1008 Additionally, the Taliban also increased their presence along the 
Ring Road by establishing mobile checkpoints and searching vehicles for government employees and 
security force members along a crucial part of the highway connecting major trading centre Mazar-e 
Sharif in the north-east with Herat in the west of the country.1009 

According to AAN’s report published in the beginning of October 2018, almost two thirds of Faryab´s 
voters were prevented from registering for the 2018 parliamentary elections due to insecurity.1010  

As the Taliban gained control over a majority of Faryab’s districts in 2017, taking the provincial capital 
Maymana ‘practically under siege’, the Afghan government and – for the first time since 2014 – also 
NATO forces shifted troops towards the province.1011 AAN analysts Obaid Ali and Thomas Ruttig took 
this  as  a  sign  of  worry  by  the  government  forces,  anticipating  that  Maymana  might  eventually  be 
captured  by  the  Taliban.  According  to  the  same  report,  the  AAF  had  intensified  airstrikes  in  the 
province  at  least  since  January  2018,  while  airstrikes  had  already  caused  considerable  casualties 
among civilians in 2017.1012 AAF airstrikes, as well as clashes between Taliban and government forces, 

1003 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
1004 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2 
1005 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
1006 Ali, O. and Ruttig, T., Battle for Faryab: Fighting intensifies on one of Afghanistan’s major frontlines, AAN, 12 March 2018, 
url 
1007 Ali, O. and Ruttig, T., Battle for Faryab: Fighting intensifies on one of Afghanistan’s major frontlines, AAN, 12 March 2018, 
url 
1008 Frontier Post (The), Ghormach falls to Taliban as ANA troops move to Maimana, 28 August 2018, url 
1009 Ali, O. and Ruttig, T., Battle for Faryab: Fighting intensifies on one of Afghanistan’s major frontlines, AAN, 12 March 2018, 
url 
1010 Adili, A.Y., Afghanistan Elections Conundrum (17): Voters disenfranchised in Faryab, AAN, 12 October 2018, url 
1011 Ali, O. and Ruttig, T., Battle for Faryab: Fighting intensifies on one of Afghanistan’s major frontlines, AAN, 12 March 2018, 
url 
1012 Ali, O. and Ruttig, T., Battle for Faryab: Fighting intensifies on one of Afghanistan’s major frontlines, AAN, 12 March 2018, 
url 

                                                           
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—  125  

continued in early 2019.1013 According to a UN Secretary General report of February 2019, Faryab was 
among the six provinces with the largest number of airstrikes in Afghanistan in the period of December 
2018 to February 2019.1014 

2.9.3.1 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 68 267 persons 
displaced from Faryab province mainly within the province itself, but also to Jawzjan, Balkh, Herat, 
Ghor and Kandahar.1015 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019, reporting 7 336 persons 
displaced from Faryab province, mainly within the province itself but also to Balkh province (2 226). 
1016 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 51 126 persons 
displaced to Faryab province. All of them were originating from the province itself.1017 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019, reporting 4 613 persons 
displaced to Faryab province, all of them originating from the province itself. 1018 

District 

Almar 

Andkhoy 

Bilcheragh 

Dawlatabad 

Garziwan 

Khwajasabzposh 

Kohestan 

Pashtunkot 

Qaysar 

Qaramqol 

Qorghan 

Shirintagab 

Maymana 

n/a 

Displaced from 
(2018) 

Displaced to (2018) 

Displaced from 
(2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

8 769 

1 736 

1 345 

10 911 

525 

5 415 

1 323 

16 415 

3 110 

4 627 

1 393 

10 640 

/ 

2 058 

1 526 

12 740 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

5 922 

336 

441 

/ 

1 078 

29 083 

/ 

336 

/ 

161 

728 

329 

686 

245 

3 493 

875 

/ 

/ 

378 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

763 

/ 

/ 

/ 

3 850 

/ 

1013 Frontier Post (The), Operations against rebels to continue: Defence Minister, 9 January 2019, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 
Iranians among 29 insurgents killed in Faryab clashes, 2 January 2019, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Nearly a dozen insurgents 
killed, 7 wounded in Faryab, 3 January 2019, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban’s deputy district chief killed in airstrike, 6 
January 2019, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 34 Taliban killed, 20 wounded in Faryab raids, 7 January 2019, url; Khaama Press, 
Afghan Air Force bomb Taliban gathering in Faryab province, 14 January 2019, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 3 children rescued 
from Taliban jail, 19 January 2019, url 
1014 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implication for international peace and security, 28 February 
2019, url, p. 6  
1015 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 20 January 2019, url 
1016 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 
1017 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 
1018 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 

 
                                                           
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According to UNOCHA, quoted by AAN, 30 282 Fariyabis left their places of origin, between January 
and September 2018, due to fightings and drought.1019 

In  May  2018,  many  IDPs  went  from  Dawlatabad  and  two  other  districts  to  Maymuna  city  due  to 
conflict.1020 In September 2018, 2 100 individuals came to Maymana due to an attack on their village 
in Pashtunkot district,1021 and 400 families were displaced in Maymana City due to military operations 
in Shirintagab district in January 2019.1022 

1019  Adili, A.Y., Afghanistan Elections Conundrum (17): Voters disenfranchised in Faryab, AAN, 12 October 2018, url  
1020 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report 21-27 May 2018, 28 May 2018, url  
1021 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report 10-16 September 2018, 17 September 2018, url  
1022 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report 01-07 January 2019, 10 January 2019, url 

 
 
 
                                                           
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2.10 Ghazni 

2.10.1 General description of the province 

The province of Ghazni is located in the southeast of Afghanistan, bordering the provinces of Bamyan 
and Wardak to the north, Logar, Paktya and Paktika to the east, Zabul to the south and Uruzgan and 
Daykundi  to  the  west.  Ghazni  does  not  share  an  international  border.  The  province  has  19 

 
 
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administrative units: Ghazni district with the provincial capital of Ghazni City, as well as the districts of 
Abband, Ajrestan, Andar, Dehyak, Gelan, Giro, Jaghatu, Jaghuri, Khwajaumari, Malestan, Muqur, Nawa, 
Nawur,  Qarabagh,  Rashidan,  Waghaz,  Walimuhammad-e  Shahid  (Khugyani),  and  Zanakhan.1023  The 
district of Andar is also known as Shelgar.1024  

According  estimates  by  the  Afghanistan CSO, the population of Ghazni  is 1 315 041 in 2018/19.1025 
Pajhwok  Afghan  News  states  that  Ghazni  is  inhabited  by  Pashtuns,  Tajiks  and  Hazara,  as  well  as  of 
several  smaller  groups  such  as  Bayats,  Sadats  and  Sikhs.1026  Nearly  half  of  Ghazni's  population  are 
reportedly Pashtuns, with a bit less than a half being Hazaras, and about 5 % Tajiks.1027 

A US military expert called Ghazni City a ‘key intersection’, as it is situated on the Ring Road (or Highway 
1), connecting the capital Kabul with major population centre Kandahar in the south. Additionally, the 
road to Paktika's capital Sharan branches off the Ring Road in Ghazni City, while the road to Paktya's 
capital Gardez forks a bit north of Ghazni City. Hence, control over Ghazni is of strategic importance. 1028  

According  to  UNOCHA,  Highway  1  was  partially  destroyed  and  contaminated  with  IEDs  in  August 
2018.1029 At the end of August 2018, this stretch of the Ring Road near Ghazni City had reportedly been 
cleared of IEDs and reopened for civilian traffic. Accordingly, UNOCHA stated in August 2018 that ‘[...] 
travel from Kabul to Ghazni via Highway 1 is possible but remains risky, notably due to sporadic fighting 
between  Saydabad,  Wardak,  and  Ghazni.’1030  Afghanistan  Analysts  Network  reported  in  December 
2018  that  the  Ghazni-Paktika  highway  was  under  Taliban  control  and  closed  for  civilian  and 
government  vehicles,  with  the  insurgents  continuing  to  put  pressure  on  the  Kabul-Kandahar 
highway.1031 

Zarkashan mine, reportedly one of the biggest gold mines in Afghanistan, lies in the district of Muqur. 
In  February  2018,  according  to  AAN,  Muqur's  residents  complained  that  Taliban  insurgents  were 
mining in Zarkashan with the help of Pakistani engineers.1032 

According  to  the  2018  UNODC  Opium  Survey,  Ghazni  was  not  one  of  the  ten  main  opium-poppy-
cultivating  provinces  of  Afghanistan  in  2018.1033  While  Ghazni  was  reportedly  poppy-free  between 
2013 and 2016, approximately 1 000 hectares of opium-poppy have been cultivated in 2017. In 2018, 
the size of the acreage decreased by 64 %.1034 Most of Ghazni's opium-poppy has been cultivated in 
the insecure district of Ajrestan in 2018.1035 

2.10.2 Conflict background and actors in Ghazni 

Voice of America (VoA) termed Ghazni a ‘restive’ province in the beginning of 2018.1036 According to 
AAN, the Taliban have ‘long-established significant influence’ in the province and dominated militarily 
‘[...] all but one of the 18 district centres and some larger areas in three districts’ in July 2018,1037 with 

1023 Afghanistan, CSO, ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 16; UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan: South Eastern Region - District Atlas, April 2014, url  
1024 Muzhary, F. and Clark, K., Uprising, ALP and Taleban in Andar: The arc of government failure, AAN, 22 May 2018, url 
1025 Afghanistan, CSO, ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 2 
1026 Pajhwok Afghan News, Background Profile of Ghazni, n.d., url 
1027 Naval Postgraduate School, Ghazni Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1028 Clearance Jobs, Taliban Seizure of Ghazni City Returns Terror Organization to its Roots, 13 August 2018, url  
1029 UN News, ‘No safe way’ into battle-scarred Afghan city of Ghazni to deliver aid as traumatized children search for parents, 
17 August 2018, url 
1030 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Ghazni Conflict Update No. 4, 20 August 2018, url 
1031 Muzhary, F., Unheeded Warnings (2): Ghazni city as vulnerable to Taleban as before, AAN, 30 December 2018, url 
1032 Qaane, E., The Insecure Spring of Ghazni: Results of third-grade treatment by the centre?, AAN, 25 July 2018, url 
1033 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 17 
1034 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 19 
1035 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 21 
1036 VoA, IS Leaflets Threaten Residents in Restive Afghan Province, 10 January 2018, url  
1037 Qaane, E., The Insecure Spring of Ghazni: Results of third-grade treatment by the centre?, AAN, 25 July 2018, url 

                                                           
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—  129  

the  provincial  capital  remaining  an  exception  until  August  2018,  when  the  Taliban  overran  Ghazni 
City.1038  

According  to  various  sources  reporting  on  Taliban  attacks,  the  Afghan  security  forces  were 
understaffed in Ghazni in 2018 (for more information see section 2.10.3.1).1039 Supplementing the ANP, 
ALP, and NDS paramilitary forces, a newly established ANA Territorial Force (ANA TF) is being piloted 
in the district of Jaghori as part of a pilot project. According to AAN, the establishment of this new 
local defence force has been authorised in February 2018 by presidential decree in order to create a 
force protecting local people and holding territory without being co-opted by strongmen or factional 
interests. While the decision to choose Jaghori as one of the pilot regions for the deployment of ANA 
TF was reportedly made before the Taliban attacks on Jaghori and Malestan in November 2018, AAN 
assumed that the attacks might have accelerated the formation of the Jaghori ANA TF companies.1040  

During the attack on Ghazni City in August 2018, the government forces were aided by US air strikes 
and US Army Special Forces on the ground.1041 In November 2018, three US special operations soldiers 
were killed in an IED explosion in Andar district at the outskirts of Ghazni City, a fourth soldier wounded 
in the attack died in December.1042   

Ghazni is under the responsibility of the 203rd ANA Corps.1043 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Ghazni  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal (LWJ) and 
the  Taliban.1044  When  a  source  does  not  provide  information  on  a  district,  the  field  is  left  blank. 
Sometimes  a  district  is  only  mentioned  by  one  source  (the  Taliban).  These  districts  are  not  always 
recognised  by  the  government  or  sometimes  belong,  as  a  region,  to  another  district.  If  found, 
clarification is made in a separate footnote.  

1038 New York Times (The), Taliban Kill More Than 200 Afghan Defenders on 4 Fronts: ‘A Catastrophe’, 12 August 2018, url; 
Der Spiegel, Taliban-Offensive in Afghanistan Der Albtraum von Ghazni [Taliban Offensive in Afghanistan: The Nightmare of 
Ghazni], 15 August 2018, url; Muzhary, F., Unheeded Warnings (1): Looking back at the Taleban attack on Ghazni, AAN, 16 
December 2018, url; Muzhary, F., Unheeded Warnings (2): Ghazni city as vulnerable to Taleban as before, AAN, 30 December 
2018, url  
1039 Pajhwok Afghan News, Fierce clash ongoing for control of Ajiristan district HQ, 20 May 2018, url; Qaane, E., The Insecure 
Spring of Ghazni: Results of third-grade treatment by the centre?, AAN, 25 July 2018, url; New York Times (The), Taliban Kill 
More  Than  200  Afghan  Defenders  on  4  Fronts:  ‘A  Catastrophe’,  12  August  2018,  url;  Tolonews,  Dozens  Of  Commandos 
‘Missing’ In Ghazni’s Ajristan District, 13 August 2018, url; Der Spiegel, Taliban-Offensive in Afghanistan: Der Albtraum von 
Ghazni [Taliban Offensive in Afghanistan: The Nightmare of Ghazni], 15 August 2018, url; RFE/RL, Afghan Taliban Wants What 
It Hasn't Been Able To Hold: Hazara Regions, 13 November 2018, url; Adili, A. Y. and van Bijlert, M., Taleban Attacks on Khas 
Uruzgan, Jaghori and Malestan (II): A new and violent push into Hazara areas, AAN, 29 November 2018, url; Muzhary, F., 
Unheeded Warnings (1): Looking back at the Taleban attack on Ghazni, AAN, 16 December 2018, url; Muzhary, F., Unheeded 
Warnings (2): Ghazni city as vulnerable to Taleban as before, AAN, 30 December 2018, url  
1040 Clark, K., The Afghan Territorial Force: Learning from the lessons of the past?, AAN, 15 January 2019, url 
1041 Time, Exclusive: Inside the U.S. Fight to Save Ghazni From the Taliban, 23 August 2018, url  
1042 Army Times, Fourth soldier dies from large IED blast in Afghanistan, 3 December 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 12 US 
Army personnel killed in Afghanistan last year, url 
1043 Global Security, Afghan National Army (ANA) - Order of Battle, n.d., url, last modified 6 September 2018 
1044 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, 23 April 2019, url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of 
Jihad, End of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

GHAZNI 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: 
August-
November 
2017) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

 (assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment 
as of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last accessed: 1045 
April 2019) 

Taliban 

(assessment 
as of 
December 
2018) 

Jaghuri 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Contested 

Malestan 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Nawur 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Taliban control 

Gov 
control: 
80%; TB 
control: 
20% 

Gov 
control: 
80%; TB 
control: 
20% 

Gov 
control: 
80%; TB 
control: 
20% 

Open Taliban 
presence – 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
Presence – 
high 

Open Taliban 
presence – 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
presence – 
Medium 

Ajrestan 1046 

Andar (Shilgar) 

Qarabagh 

Giro 

Muqur 

Waghaz 

Gelan 

Contested 

Contested 

Taliban control 

TB control  

Contested 

Contested 

Taliban control 

TB control/ 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Taliban control 

TB control : 
95%; Gov 
control: 5% 

TB control : 
99%; Gov 
control: 1% 

TB control : 
95%; Gov 
control: 5% 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Contested 

Open Taliban 
presence – 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
presence – 
Medium 

Contested 

Contested 

Taliban control 

TB control  

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control : 
94%; Gov 
control: 6% 

1045 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 
1046 According to the Taliban Ajrestan district is located in Daykundi province. (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of Jihad, 
End of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url) 

                                                           
 
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—  131  

Abband 

Nawa 

Dehyak 

Rashidan 

Zanakhan 

Khwajaumari 

Jaghatu (Bahram-
e-Shahid) 

Walimuhammad-e-
Shahid (Khogyani) 

Ghazni (capital) 

Open Taliban 
presence – 
Medium 

Taliban 
control 

Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 

Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 

Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 

Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 

Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

TB control : 
93%; Gov 
control: 7% 

INS activity 

INS activity 

Taliban control 

TB control  

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Taliban control 

TB control  

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Taliban control 

TB control  

Contested 

Contested 

Taliban control 

TB control 

Contested 

Contested 

Taliban control 

TB control  

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Taliban control 

TB control  

Taliban control 

TB control  

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control: 
90%; Gov 
control: 
10% 

2.10.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.10.3.1 General 

In  2018,  UNAMA  documented  653  civilian  casualties  (253  deaths  and  400  injured)  in  Ghazni.  This 
represents  an  increase  of  84 %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were  ground 
engagements, followed by aerial attacks and targeted or deliberate killings.1047  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA  places  the  district  of  Andar  in  the 
highest category  and the districts of  Ajrestan, Qarabagh, Dehyak and Ghazni  in the second highest 
category. Gelan, Jaghatu, Muqur, Waghaz and Zanakhan districts are in the third highest category and 
the districts of Khwajaumari, Abband and Giro in the fourth category. The remaining districts are in 
the two lowest categories.1048 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 476 incidents related to insurgents in Ghazni province.1049 

1047 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
1048 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2 
1049 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 

 
 
                                                           
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Throughout  2018  and  early  2019,  Ghazni  continued  to  be  a  major  battlefield  between  Taliban 
insurgents and the Afghan government – backed by US forces since the second half of 2018.1050 Starting 
in spring 2018, the Taliban increasingly expanded their control in the province. They slowly approached 
the  outskirts  of  Ghazni  City,  established  road  checkpoints,  extorted  money  and  killed  government 
employees as well as politicians.1051 In the middle of August 2018, the Taliban captured large parts of 
Ghazni City, leading  to  fierce  clashes  between the insurgents and government forces.1052 After five 
days, the government regained control over the provincial capital – though, according to AAN, it is 
disputed,  whether  this  was  because  of  the  security  forces'  counterattack  backed  by  airstrikes,  or 
because of a strategic retreat by the Taliban.1053  

Airstrikes carried out in August 2018 led to civilian casualties and destroyed civilian homes.1054 UNAMA 
recorded 262 civilian casualties (79 deaths, 183 injured) related to the Taliban attacks in August 2018. 
According to UNAMA, most of the civilian casualties were caused by indirect weapons; mainly rockets 
and mortars, as well as small arms fire during ground engagement. UNAMA reported seven airstrikes 
carried out by  the  pro-government  forces, causing the  death of 32 persons and injuring 49 others. 
Furthermore, the Taliban ‘[...] burned down large parts of the bazaar area, causing many people to 
lose their livelihoods, and intentionally damaged two media corporations.’1055 

The parliamentary election, which should have taken place in October 2018, was first postponed to 
April 2019 in Ghazni due to the volatile security situation.1056 In late December 2018, the Independent 
Election Commission announced that the parliamentary election in Ghazni, as well as the presidential 
election in all of Afghanistan will be held with a three-month delay in July 2019.1057 In March 2019 the 
elections have been postponed again, this time to 28 September 2019.1058 

Simultaneously with the attack on Ghazni City, the Taliban captured the district of Ajrestan west of the 
provincial capital, as well as an ANA base in Faryab, and a base in Baghlan Province. The New York 
Times  took  this  as  an  indicator  for  Taliban  military  capacity,1059  while  the  security  forces  allegedly 
showed a lack of coordination in Ghazni.1060 An entire ANA commando of approximately 100 soldiers 
reportedly disappeared during the attack in Ajrestan.1061 After fleeing into mountainous areas, about 

1050 Pajhwok Afghan News, Fierce clash ongoing for control of Ajiristan district HQ, 20 May 2018, url; Qaane, E., The Insecure 
Spring of Ghazni: Results of third-grade treatment by the centre?, AAN, 25 July 2018, url; New York Times (The), Taliban Kill 
More  Than  200  Afghan  Defenders  on  4  Fronts:  ‘A  Catastrophe’,  12  August  2018,  url;  Tolonews,  Dozens  Of  Commandos 
‘Missing’ In Ghazni’s Ajristan District, 13 August 2018, url; Der Spiegel, Taliban-Offensive in Afghanistan: Der Albtraum von 
Ghazni [Taliban Offensive in Afghanistan: The Nightmare of Ghazni], 15 August 2018, url; RFE/RL, Afghan Taliban Wants What 
It Hasn't Been Able To Hold: Hazara Regions, 13 November 2018, url; Adili, A. Y. and van Bijlert, M., Taleban Attacks on Khas 
Uruzgan, Jaghori and Malestan (II): A new and violent push into Hazara areas, AAN, 29 November 2018, url; Muzhary, F., 
Unheeded Warnings (1): Looking back at the Taleban attack on Ghazni, AAN, 16 December 2018, url; Muzhary, F., Unheeded 
Warnings (2): Ghazni city as vulnerable to Taleban as before, AAN, 30 December 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 3 Ghazni 
police killed, 5 injured in Taliban attack, 1 January 2019, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Over 70 militants killed, scores injured 
in  nation-wide  operations:  MoD,  4  January  2019,  url;  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  15  Taliban  killed  in  Ghazni  clash,  blast,  17 
January 2019, url  
1051 Der Spiegel, Taliban-Offensive in Afghanistan Der Albtraum von Ghazni [Taliban Offensive in Afghanistan: The Nightmare 
of Ghazni], 15 August 2018, url  
1052 Der Spiegel, Taliban-Offensive in Afghanistan Der Albtraum von Ghazni, 15 August 2018 [Taliban Offensive in Afghanistan: 
The Nightmare of Ghazni], url 
1053 Muzhary, F., Unheeded Warnings (1): Looking back at the Taleban attack on Ghazni, AAN, 16 December 2018, url 
1054  Muzhary,  F.,  Unheeded  Warnings  (1):  Looking  back  at  the  Taleban  attack  on  Ghazni,  AAN,  16  December  2018,  url; 
UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians on Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 20 
1055 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians on Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 20 
1056 Muzhary, F., Unheeded Warnings (1): Looking back at the Taleban attack on Ghazni, AAN, 16 December 2018, url 
1057 France 24, Afghan presidential election delayed until July 20, 30 December 2018, url 
1058 Reuters, Afghanistan presidential election postponed to September, 20 March 2019, url 
1059 New York Times (The), Taliban Kill More Than 200 Afghan Defenders on 4 Fronts: ‘A Catastrophe’, 12 August 2018, url 
1060 Muzhary, F., Unheeded Warnings (1): Looking back at the Taleban attack on Ghazni, AAN, 16 December 2018, url 
1061 Tolonews, Dozens Of Commandos ‘Missing’ In Ghazni’s Ajristan District, 13 August 2018, url 

                                                           
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20  survivors  reached  neighbouring  Miramor  district  in  Daykundi  two  days  later,  recounting 
that  approximately 40 soldiers had been killed by Taliban ambushes during their flight.1062   

In November 2018, the Taliban launched a major offensive against the Hazara-dominated, formerly 
peaceful districts of Jaghori and Malestan, after the insurgents had already attacked neighbouring Khas 
Uruzgan in Uruzgan Province in the end of October.1063 According to AAN, the attacks have been '[…] 
unprecedented in their reach and led to massive displacement.'1064 RFE/RL and AAN interpreted the 
attacks as an attempt to gain a foothold among Hazara communities, after the traditionally Pashtun-
dominated  Taliban  have  succeeded  in  governing  ethnic  Tajik  and  Uzbek  areas  in  the  north  of 
Afghanistan. However, according to RFE/RL, the integration of Hazara fighters into Taliban ranks might 
be much harder to achieve due to the history of ‘past atrocities’ against of Hazaras by the Taliban.1065  

In 2018, sources reported that the security force's response to the Taliban attacks has been perceived 
as too slow – fuelling concerns of an anti-Hazara bias of the government, as well as ethnic targeting by 
the Taliban – leading Hazara representatives to start to mobilise forces in order to defend Jaghori and 
Malestan.1066 Furthermore, Hazara activists protested against the government in Kabul in 2018, urging 
for  more  effective  measures  to  restore  security  in  the  districts  under  threat.1067 By  the  end  of 
November 2018, the Taliban had been pushed out of Jaghori and Malestan. The threat of renewed 
attacks however still exists, according to AAN.1068   

AAN reports that the takeover of Andar in October 2018 '[…] actually normalised public services.'1069 
A school, as well as a hospital, which had left the district centre because of fighting, were allowed to 
move back in October 2018. In this regard AAN found that ‘full control by one side has proved a better 
situation for civilians than their district being contested.’1070   

2.10.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 46 311 persons 
displaced from Ghazni, most of whom (37 611) went to Ghazni district and the others were displaced 
to Bamyan province (2 617 ), Kabul district (2 562), Daykundi province (2 229) and in less important 
numbers in Helmand, Herat, Kandahar, Khost, Nimroz, Paktya and Zabul provinces.1071 

UNOCHA  collected  data  for  the  period  1  January  2019  -  28  February  2019,  reporting  83  persons 
displaced from Ghazni. 1072 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 37 779 persons 
displaced to Ghazni province, all displaced to Ghazni district.1073 

1062 New York Times (The), Taliban Kill More Than 200 Afghan Defenders on 4 Fronts: ‘A Catastrophe’, 12 August 2018, url 
1063 RFE/RL, Afghan Taliban Wants What It Hasn't Been Able To Hold: Hazara Regions, 13 November 2018, url; Adili, A. Y. and 
van Bijlert, M., Taleban Attacks on Khas Uruzgan, Jaghori and Malestan (II): A new and violent push into Hazara areas, AAN, 
29 November 2018, url 
1064 Adili, A. Y. and van Bijlert, M., Taleban Attacks on Khas Uruzgan, Jaghori and Malestan (II): A new and violent push into 
Hazara areas, AAN, 29 November 2018, url 
1065 RFE/RL, Afghan Taliban Wants What It Hasn't Been Able To Hold: Hazara Regions, 13 November 2018, url 
1066 Adili, A. Y. and van Bijlert, M., Taleban Attacks on Khas Uruzgan, Jaghori and Malestan (II): A new and violent push into 
Hazara areas, AAN, 29 November 2018, url; Reporterly, Awakened Community: How an Unexpected Protest Lit Up at the 
Heart of Kabul, 12 November 2018, url 
1067 Adili, A. Y. and van Bijlert, M., Taleban Attacks on Khas Uruzgan, Jaghori and Malestan (II): A new and violent push into 
Hazara areas, AAN, 29 November 2018, url; Reporterly, Awakened Community: How an Unexpected Protest Lit Up at the 
Heart of Kabul, 12 November 2018, url 
1068 Adili, A. Y. and van Bijlert, M., Taleban Attacks on Khas Uruzgan, Jaghori and Malestan (II): A new and violent push into 
Hazara areas, AAN, 29 November 2018, url 
1069 Muzhary, F., Unheeded Warnings (2): Ghazni city as vulnerable to Taleban as before, AAN, 30 December 2018, url 
1070 Muzhary, F., Unheeded Warnings (2): Ghazni city as vulnerable to Taleban as before, AAN, 30 December 2018, url 
1071 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url  
1072 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 
1073 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 

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No conflict-induced internal displacement to Ghazni province was reported by UNOCHA for the period 
1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019.1074 

District 

Ajrestan 

Andar 

Dehyak 

Ghazni 

Giro 

Jaghuri 

Malestan 

Muqur 

Qarabagh 

Waghaz 

Displaced from 
(2018) 

Displaced to 
(2018) 

Displaced from 
(2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

219 

763 

81  

38 038 

/ 

3 038 

3 753  

139 

189  

91 

/ 

/ 

/ 

37 779 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

35 

48 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

In  2018,  Ghazni  was  considered  by  UNOCHA  as  one  of  ‘the  main  provinces  of  both  origin  and 
displacement of conflict-affected communities’.1075 

During the week of 29 January to 4 February 2018, 3 400 people came to the provincial capital because 
of  military  operations,  intimidations  and  forced  taxations  by  non-state  armed  groups;  however 
districts of origin were not mentioned in the UNOCHA weekly report of 5 February 2018.1076 In May 
2018, 4 district centres were attacked by insurgents causing the forced displacement of 10 000 people 
within their districts or to the provincial capital.1077 The assault on Ghazni city by the Taliban on 10 
August 2018 caused the displacement of more than 21 000 people.1078 

In  November  2018,  heavy  fighting  in  Malistan  and  Jaghuri  districts  have  resulted  in  displacements 
within  the  province  or  further1079    and  the  displacement  levels  have  intensified  on  10  November 
because of ground operations and airstrikes.1080 In these two affected districts, families had to move 
repeatedly.1081 On 15 November 2018, 760 families from Malestan and Jaghuri districts were displaced 
to Bamyan province.1082 

1074 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 
1075 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 42 
1076 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 29 January- 4 February, 5 February 2018, url 
1077 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 14 – 21 May 2018, 22 May 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Ghazni Armed 
Clashes Flash Update No.1, 14 November 2018, url 
1078  Tolonews,  21,000  Displaced  After  Ghazni  Crisis:  OCHA,  27  August  2018,  url;  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan:  Ghazni  Conflict 
Update No. 5 (as of 26 August 2018), 26 August 2018, url 
1079 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 05 – 11 November 2018, 12 November 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan: 
Ghazni Armed Clashes Flash Update No.2, 17 November 2018, url 
1080 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Ghazni Armed Clashes Flash Update No.1, 14 November 2018, url 
1081 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Ghazni Armed Clashes Flash Update No.1, 14 November 2018, url  
1082 ERM, Household Assessment Report, 18 November 2018, url 

 
 
                                                           
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2.11 Ghor 

2.11.1 General description of the province 

The  province  of  Ghor  is  located  in  central-northwestern  Afghanistan  and  does  not  share  an 
international border. It is surrounded by the provinces of Herat and Badghis to the west, Faryab and 
Sar-e Pul to the north, Bamyan and Daykundi to the east, and Helmand and Farah to the south. Ghor 
is divided into ten districts: Chaghcharan (Feroz Koh), Charsadra, Dawlatyar, Du Layna, Lal Wa Sarjangal, 
Pasaband, Saghar, Shahrak, Taywara, and Tulak.1083 The provincial capital of Ghor is called Feroz Koh or 
Chaghcharan.  While  Radio  Television  Afghanistan  (RTA),  the  national  broadcasting  corporation  of 
Afghanistan, stated that Chaghcharan was renamed to Feroz Koh in 2014, the Independent Election 
Commission and the Afghan Central Statistics Organization refer to Chaghcharan as Ghor's provincial 
capital in 2018 publications.1084 

The  Afghan  CSO  estimated  the  population  of  Ghor  to  be  738 224  in  2018/19.1085  According  to  the 
provincial profile published by the US Naval Postgraduate School, the largest ethnic group in Ghor are 
Tajiks, followed by Hazaras and a small number of Pashtuns and Uzbeks;1086 RFE/RL stated that Aimaqs 

1083 Afghanistan, IEC, 2018 Wolesi Jirga Elections – Results by Polling Stations: Province Ghor, 2018, url; Afghanistan, CSO, 
۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 29; UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Ghor 
Province - District Atlas, April 2014, url; Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial Profile Ghor, 1 February 2017, url  
1084 RTA, Ghor Province, 11 July 2018, url; Afghan Islamic Press, Name of Chaghcharan city being changed to Feroz Koh, 21 
April  2014,  url;  Afghanistan,  IEC,  2018  Wolesi  Jirga  Elections  –  Results  by  Polling  Stations:  Province  Ghor,  2018,  url; 
Afghanistan, CSO, ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 29  
1085 Afghanistan, CSO, ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 3 
1086 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Ghor Provincial Overview, n.d., url 

 
 
                                                           
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constitute the majority of Ghor.1087 The Aimaqs are  '[…] closely related to the Hazara, and to some 
degree the Tajiks […]' according to the US Naval Postgraduate School.1088  

Afghan airline Kam Air, which used to operate in Ghor, suspended flights to Chaghcharan after several 
Kam Air staff members were killed in an attack in Kabul in January 2018.1089 This reportedly posed a 
problem to Ghor's residents as the highways to Herat and Kabul are insecure and in bad condition. 1090 
According to the airport map produced by the Austrian COI department, scheduled passenger service 
to Chaghcharan was again available in March 2019.1091  

Taliban  insurgents  and  unidentified  gunmen  posed  a  security  threat  on  several  roads  in  Ghor  in 
2018.1092  Furthermore,  Pajhwok  Afghan  News  reported  that  a  bridge,  which  had  remained  under 
construction for eight years, caused problems on the highway to Kabul, as crossing the river Harirod is 
nearly impossible in the district of Lal Wa Sarjangal in rainy seasons.1093   

According  to  the  2018  UNODC  Opium  Survey,  Ghor  was  not  among  the  ten  main  opium-poppy-
cultivating  provinces  of  Afghanistan  in  2018.1094  Compared  to  2017,  opium-poppy  cultivation 
reportedly  decreased  by  15 %  in  2018.  The  main  opium-poppy  cultivating  districts  have  been 
Chaghcharan, Pasaband, and Taywara.1095  

2.11.2 Conflict background and actors in Ghor 

According to AAN, ‘Ghor is known for its particularly confusing pattern of conflicts, involving insurgent 
groups and ‘freelancing’ militias, the dividing line between which is all but hermetic [...].’1096 Besides 
Taliban insurgents, armed groups partially affiliated to political parties in the central government are 
present  in  the  province.  According  to  AAN,  the  ‘insurgent’  activities  of  some  groups  can  be  hardly 
distinguished from crime and allegiances have been shifting several times in the past.1097 The absence 
of rule of law and government is allegedly a particular pressing problem in Ghor.1098 

AAN reported in November 2016 of a network of militants active in the district of Chaghcharan, which 
maintained  close  links  to  the  political  party  and  former  militia,  Jamiat-e  Islami,  but  also  with 
established links to the Taliban after 2010. It was said to sympathise with ISKP after 2015 – even though 
AAN stated that claims of an IS-affiliation of the group proved wrong. While the network’s criminal 
activities led to protests and resistance of local residents, the government forces’ weak presence in 
Ghor, as well as the network’s affiliation with Jamiat reportedly prevented its disarmament. On the 
contrary,  after  fighting  between  the  group  and  the  Taliban  erupted,  provincial  officials  treated  the 
group as a ‘popular uprising‘ force and the ANSF provided logistical support for the fight against the 
Taliban.  However,  when  ANSF  launched  a  clearing  operation  against  the  network  in  the  wake  of 
protests caused by the killing of more than 30 civilians by the network in 2016, the Taliban allegedly 

1087 RFE/RL, Female Afghan Governor Won't Back Down Amid Threats, Controversy, 19 October 2015, url 
1088 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Ghor Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1089 Pajhwok Afghan News, Ghor residents fume over suspension of flights, 19 March 2018, url 
1090 Pajhwok Afghan News, Ghor residents fume over suspension of flights, 19 March 2018, url 
1091 Austria, BFA-Staatendokumentation, Afghanistan - Airports [Map], 25 March 2019 
1092 Pajhwok Afghan News, Ghor residents fume over suspension of flights, 19 March 2018, url; Frontier Post (The), Gunmen 
seized 5 WFP wheat trucks in Ghor, 6 February 2018, url; Tolonews, Armed Men Gun Down Three Travelers On Herat-Ghor 
Highway, 17 April 2018, url; RFE/RL, Six Afghan Civilians Said Killed In Attack In Western Province, 17 April 2018, url; 1TV 
News, Gunmen kill three passengers in Ghor, 19 November 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban plant bombs on all 
routes to Ghor’s Pasaband, 2 December 2018, url 
1093 Pajhwok Afghan News, 8 years on, Harirod bridge still incomplete in Ghor, 27 November 2018, url 
1094 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 17 
1095 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 33 
1096 Ruttig, T., The ‘Humvee Bomb’ Series: The October wave of Taleban attacks in 2017 context, AAN, 7 November 2017, url 
1097 Osman, B., Carnage in Ghor: Was Islamic State the perpetrator or was it falsely accused?, AAN, 23 November 2016, url 
1098 New York Times (The), Seesaw Conflict With Taliban Takes Toll in Fallen Afghan District, 7 August 2017, url; New York 
Times (The), No Justice, ‘No Value’ for Women in a Lawless Afghan Province, 7 July 2017, url; IWPR, Afghanistan: Women 
Abused in Lawless Ghor, 24 July 2018, url  

                                                           
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fought against ANSF, as they perceived the presence of government forces as a threat against their 
strongholds in neighbouring Charsada district.1099  

Furthermore, according to an AAN report of 2017, an MP from Ghor province stated that affiliates of 
Hezb-i-Islami,  a  rival  party  to  Jamiat-e  Islami,  distributed  a  large  quantity  of  weapons  to  their 
supporters  in  Ghor.1100  According  to  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  two  sons  of  a  former  Hezb-i-Islami 
commander died in a clash with Taliban insurgents in January 2018. The fighting reportedly erupted 
over the collection of ushr taxes, respectively a leadership dispute between the former Hezb-i-Islami 
commander and Taliban insurgents.1101 

The ANSF conducted operations in Ghor in 2018.1102 According to a report of January 2019, the newly 
established ANA TF will be stationed ‘soon’ in several districts of Ghor.1103 

The 207th Zafar Corps is in charge of ANA operations in the province of Ghor.1104 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Ghor  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.1105 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region, to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.  

GHOR 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: August-
November 
2017) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of: July 
2018) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of 
October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last 
accessed:1106 
April 2019) 

Taliban 

(assessment as of 
December 2018) 

Chaghcharan (Firoz 
Koh) (capital) 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

TB control: 70%; 
Gov control: 30% 

Lal Wa Sarjangal 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
Control 

GIRoA 
control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Dawlatyar 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Charsadra 

Gov control 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Gov control: 
90%; TB control: 
10% 

Gov control: 
80%; TB control: 
20% 

TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5% 

1099 Osman, B., Carnage in Ghor: Was Islamic State the perpetrator or was it falsely accused?, AAN, 23 November 2016, url 
1100 Ruttig, T., A Matter of Registration: Factional tensions in Hezb-e Islami, AAN, 25 November 2017, url 
1101 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban kill HIA commander’s sons in Ghor clash, 13 January 2018, url 
1102 Tolonews, Casualties Rise Amid Heavy Clashes In 10 Provinces, 13 May 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Scores of rebels, 
security personnel killed in clashes, 14 December 2018, url 
1103 Tolonews, Territorial Army To Begin Mission In West, 14 January 2019, url 
1104 Afghanistan, MoD, 207 Zafar Corps, n.d., url 
1105 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, 23 April 2019, url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of 
Jihad, End of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
1106 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 

 
                                                           
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Du Layna 

Shahrak 

Taywara 

Pasaband 

Saghar 

Tulak 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5% 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

TB control: 75%; 
Gov control: 25% 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

TB control: 60%; 
Gov control: 40% 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

TB control: 97%; 
Gov control: 3% 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Control 

GIRoA 
control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

TB control: 93%; 
Gov control: 7% 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

TB control: 92%; 
Gov control: 8% 

Murghab 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

TB control  

2.11.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.11.3.1 General 

In 2018, UNAMA documented 64 civilian casualties (28 deaths and 36 injured) in Ghor. This represents 
an  increase  of  94 %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were  targeted  or  deliberate 
killings, followed by ground engagements and (non-suicide) IEDs.1107  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian casualties, and conflict-induced displacements, UNOCHA places the districts of Taywara and 
Feroz Koh (Chagcharan) in the second highest category and the districts of Du Laina, Pasaband and 
Shahrak  in  the  third  highest  category.  Dawlatyar  and  Charsadra  districts  are  in  the  fourth  highest 
category and the remaining districts in the two lowest categories.1108 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 56 incidents related to insurgents in Ghor province.1109 

The Taliban reportedly gained significant strength in Ghor around 2010.1110 Areas of Shahrak district 
have been under Taliban control for years now, according to Pajhwok Afghan News.1111 Throughout 
2018,  the  Taliban  conducted  several  operations  in  Ghor,  abducting  and  assassinating  persons,1112 
attacking  voter  registration  centres  in  the  city  of  Chaghcharan  twice  in  the  wake  of  the  2018 

1107 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
1108 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2 
1109 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
1110 Osman, B., Carnage in Ghor: Was Islamic State the perpetrator or was it falsely accused?, AAN, 23 November 2016, url 
1111 Pajhwok Afghan News, Ghor: Taliban lash 18-year-old girl on elopement charges, 28 June 2018, url 
1112 Pajhwok Afghan News, 5 health workers kidnapped in Ghor, 2 January 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Abducted health 
workers released in Ghor, 11 March 2018, url; TRT World, Roadside bomb kills district chief in Afghanistan's western Ghor 
province, 7 July 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Ghor: Taliban kidnap 6 including 3 girl students, 23 July 2018, url 
Bakhtar News, Taliban Assassinate Director of Population Register in Ghor, 27 October 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 
Taliban shot dead population registration official in Ghor, 27 October 2018, url;  

 
                                                           
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—  139

parliamentary  election,1113  and  planting  mines  on  roads.1114  In  November  2018,  Taliban  insurgents 
reportedly burnt the TV sets of residents in remote villages of Dawlatyar district.1115 

According to Pajhwok Afghan News, residents of Shahrak and Du Layna voiced fear over a growing 
Taliban presence and an increasing number of terrorist attacks in July 2018.1116 Heavy clashes between 
Taliban and security forces, as well as local militias in May 2018 reportedly caused the death of 46 
combatants in Shahrak.1117 In November 2018, the Afghan Ministry of Interior acknowledged that the 
Taliban had sought to expand their attacks in Ghor in 2018.1118 In December 2018, the Taliban shadow 
governor of Ghor was reportedly killed by a drone strike in the bordering province of Helmand.1119 

Taliban  insurgents  have  been  allegedly  stopping  passengers  on  the  Ghor-Herat  highway,  issuing 
documents  under  the  title  ‘Islamic  Emirate  of  Afghanistan  and  Taliban’s  Economic  Commission’, 
extorting  people and  taking  government  employees  hostage. 1120 According  to  Frontier  Post,  in 
February 2018,  gunmen  seized  five  lorries carrying wheat provided by the World Food Programme 
(WFP) on the way from Herat to Chaghcharan in Shahrak district. Officials blamed Taliban insurgents 
for the hijacking, while the Taliban did not claim responsibility.1121  

In April and November 2018, news sources reported killings of passengers travelling from Daykundi 
to  Herat  by  unknown  gunmen  at  the  outskirts  of  the  provincial  capital.1122  In  December  2018, 
Taliban insurgents reportedly planted bombs on all routes leading to the district of Pasaband in the 
south of Ghor, blocking the transport of goods to the province.1123  

Pajhwok Afghan News and Khaama Press reported the arrest of one of the leaders of the network 
which was mentioned in section 2.11.2, as well as the seizure of a large quantity of arms and explosives 
during  an  NDS  operation  in  Lal  Wa  Sarjangal  district  in  February  2018.1124 The  captive  was  called 
a ’senior ISIS’ leader by the news sources1125 – a label rejected by AAN in 2016 as a one-sided pledge 
of allegiance by the captive at the most.1126   

The lack of law enforcement by the government reportedly has particularly negative consequences on 
women in Ghor; Ghor was described by the New  York Times in 2017 as ‘[…] may be the country’s 
capital of gender-based violence and abuse.’1127 Newspapers reported cases of Taliban or other non-
government forces’ extra-judicial rulings in 2017 and 2018 that led to the stoning, forced marriage, 
lashing or murder of women allegedly for breaking sharia law in 2017 and 2018.1128 According to the 

1113 Pajhwok Afghan News, 1 rebel killed in attack on Ghor voter registration centre, 26 April 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 
4 Taliban who stormed Ghor voter center killed, 10 May 2018, url 
1114 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban plant bombs on all routes to Ghor’s Pasaband, 2 December 2018, url 
1115 Salaam Times, Taliban burn residents' TVs in Ghor to hide group's crimes, 17 December 2018, url 
1116 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban growing presence worries Ghor residents, 2 July 2018, url 
1117 Pajhwok Afghan News, Battle for Ghor’s Awshan area takes 46 lives: Official, 13 May 2018, url  
1118 Tolonews, Interior Ministry Confirms Spike in Casualty Toll This Year, 12 November 2018, url 
1119 Khaama Press, Taliban’s shadow governor for Ghor has reportedly been killed, 4 December 2018, url 
1120 Pajhwok Afghan News, Ghor residents fume over suspension of flights, 19 March 2018, url 
1121 Frontier Post (The), Gunmen seized 5 WFP wheat trucks in Ghor, 6 February 2018, url 
1122 Tolonews, Armed Men Gun Down Three Travelers On Herat-Ghor Highway, 17 April 2018, url; RFE/RL, Six Afghan Civilians 
Said Killed In Attack In Western Province, 17 April 2018, url; 1TV News, Gunmen kill three passengers in Ghor, 19 November 
2018, url  
1123 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban plant bombs on all routes to Ghor’s Pasaband, 2 December 2018, url 
1124 Pajhwok Afghan News, Weapons seized, senior Daesh held in Ghor, 11 February 2018, url; Khaama Press, Senior ISIS 
leader arrested by Afghan forces in Ghor province, 12 February 2018, url 
1125 Khaama Press, Senior ISIS leader arrested by Afghan forces in Ghor province, 12 February 2018, url 
1126 Osman, B., Carnage in Ghor: Was Islamic State the perpetrator or was it falsely accused?, AAN, 23 November 2016, url 
1127 New York Times (The), No Justice, ‘No Value’ for Women in a Lawless Afghan Province, 7 July 2017, url 
1128 Pajhwok Afghan News, Ghor: Taliban lash 18-year-old girl on elopement charges, 28 June 2018, url; New York Times 
(The), No Justice, ‘No Value’ for Women in a Lawless Afghan Province, 7 July 2017, url; IWPR, Afghanistan: Women Abused 
in Lawless Ghor, 24 July 2018, url  

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Afghan news website Tolonews, the number of so-called ‘Kangaroo Courts’ – extra-judicial courts run 
by anti-government forces – increased in 2017 and early 2018 in the province.1129    

Two radio stations were reportedly burned down by unidentified men in Ghor in late 2017 and early 
2018.1130 

2.11.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 13 142 persons 
displaced from Ghor, most of whom (10 305) were displaced within the province; 2 755 went to Herat 
province and the rest went to Nimroz and Kandahar provinces.1131 

UNOCHA collected  data  for  the  period  1  January 2019 - 28  February 2019,  reporting 294  persons 
displaced from Ghor. 1132 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 11 755 persons 
displaced to Ghor province, with 1 210 of them originating from Badghis province.1133 

UNOCHA collected  data  for  the  period  1  January 2019 - 28  February 2019,  reporting 246  persons 
displaced to Ghor province; all of them were displaced within the province. 1134 

District 

Chaghcharan 

Charsadra 

Dawlatyar 

Du Layna 

Pasaband 

Saghar 

Shahrak 

Taywara 

Tulak 

Displaced from 
(2018) 

Displaced to 
(2018) 

Displaced from 
(2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

1 076 

1 260 

392  

4 187 

480  

686  

3 972 

243  

846  

10 097  

/ 

62 

532  

/ 

/ 

1 064  

/ 

/ 

/ 

150 

/ 

/ 

90 

/ 

48 

/ 

6 

246  

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

Fighting  was  the  main  cause  of  displacement:  in  May  2018,  5 000  people  were  displaced  within 
Shahrak district and to neighbouring districts such as Dolayna and Chaghcharan.1135 In October 2018, 
operations of ANSF  against a  militia commander has resulted in displacements in Lal Wa Sarjangal 
district.1136 Ghor province was also affected by drought in 2018 which caused internal displacements 
in August 2018.1137 

1129 Tolonews, Kangaroo Courts Increased in Afghanistan in 1396, 20 March 2018, url  
1130 TKG, Local Radio Station Burned in Ghor, 24 December 2017, url; Afghanistan Times, Unknown Gunmen Torch Radio 
Station in Ghor, 22 January 2018, url 
1131 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url  
1132 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 
1133 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 
1134 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 
1135 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 7 – 13 May 2018, 14 May 2018, url 
1136 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 8-14 October 2018, 14 October 2018, url  
1137 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 27 August – 2 September 2018, 4 September 2018, url  

 
 
                                                           
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—  141

2.12 Helmand 

2.12.1 General description of the province 

The province of Helmand is situated in southern Afghanistan, bordering the provinces of Nimroz, and 
Farah to the west, Ghor, and Daykundi to the north, and Uruzgan, as well as Kandahar to the east. 
In 

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the south, Helmand shares a 162-kilometre-border with Pakistan along the Durand line.1138 Helmand 
is the largest province of Afghanistan.1139 It is divided into the districts of Baghran, Deh-e-Shu, Garmser, 
Kajaki, Lashkargah, Musaqala, Nad-e Ali, Marja (formerly part of Nad-e-Ali1140), Nahr-e-Saraj (Gereshk), 
Nawa-e-Barikzayi  (Nawa),  Nawamish,  Nawzad,  Reg-e-Khan  Nishin  (Reg),  Sangin,  and  Washer.  The 
provincial capital of Helmand is Lashkargah.1141 According to the Afghan Central Statistics Organization, 
Marja and Nawamish are so-called ‘temporary’ districts,  1142 as they ‘[...] have been approved after 
entry into force of the 2004 constitution by the president due to security or other considerations, but 
have  not  yet  been  approved  by  parliament.’1143 Hazara- dominated  Nawamish  was  reportedly  split 
from the Pashtun-majority district of Baghran by a presidential order in March 2016. In June 2017, 
its administrative  affairs  were  temporarily  transferred  to  neighbouring  Daykundi  Province.1144  The 
2018  parliamentary  elections  in  Nawamish  were  however  administered  from  Lashkargah,  causing 
protests in the district.1145  

According to CSO estimates, the population of Helmand is 1 395 514 in 2018/19.1146 The majority of 
Helmand's residents are reportedly Pashtuns, with a Baloch minority in the south at the border to the 
Pakistani  province  Balochistan1147 and  Hazaras  in  Nawamish  in  the  north. 1148 While  Helmand's 
northern districts – Baghran, Kajaki and Musa Qala – are mainly populated by members of the Alizai 
tribe,  the  districts  of  Marja  and  Nad-e-Ali  are  more  heterogeneous,  inhabited  by  Nurzai,  Ishaqzai, 
Alizai, Alekozai, and several smaller tribes.1149 The Ishaqzai are allegedly ‘[...] one of the most religiously 
conservative  tribes  across  Afghanistan,’1150 with  the  late  Taliban  leader  Mullah  Akhtar  Muhammad 
Mansur belonging to this tribe.1151    

According to AAN, the more heterogeneous composition of the districts in the south of Helmand was 
the result of a large-scale irrigation and agriculture project mainly funded by USAID until 1970, which 
created  new  arable  land  to  be  cultivated  by  so-called naqileen  –  i.e.  Pashtuns  from  other  parts  of 
Afghanistan.1152 Author Carter Malkesian noted that this allegedly led to a rift in Helmand's society 
and the naqileen predominantly allied with the Taliban against the older landed tribes, particularly in 
the district of Garmser in southern Helmand.1153    

The province has a ‘significant geo-strategic importance’ according to Pajhwok Afghan News,1154 as a 
section of the Ring Road runs through the districts of Nahr-e-Saraj, Sangin and Washer,1155  connecting 
major  population  centre  Herat  in  the  west  with  Kandahar  in  the  east  and  eventually  the  capital 

1138 Pajhwok Afghan News, Recognition of southern Helmand province, n.d., url  
1139 Diplomat (The), 5 Reasons Why Helmand Matters to the Taliban, 31 May 2016, url 
1140 Amiri, R., Helmand (1): A crisis a long time coming, AAN, 10 March 2016, url 
1141 Afghanistan, IEC, 2018 Wolesi Jirga Elections – Results by Polling Stations: Province Hilmand, 2018, url; Afghanistan, CSO, 
۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 36 
1142 Afghanistan, CSO, ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 36 
1143 Ruttig, T., The Afghanistan Election Conundrum (12): Good news and bad news about district numbers, AAN, 16 August 
2018, url 
1144 Ruttig, T., The Afghanistan Election Conundrum (12): Good news and bad news about district numbers, AAN, 16 August 
2018, url  
1145 Ruttig, T., The Afghanistan Election Conundrum (12): Good news and bad news about district numbers, AAN, 16 August 
2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Polls in Nawamesh being administered from Helmand, 29 July 2018, url 
1146 Afghanistan, CSO, ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 3 
1147 Naval Postgraduate School, Helmand Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1148 Ruttig, T., The Afghanistan Election Conundrum (12): Good news and bad news about district numbers, AAN, 16 August 
2018, url 
1149 Amiri, R., Helmand (1): A crisis a long time coming, AAN, 10 March 2016, url  
1150 Amiri, R., Helmand (1): A crisis a long time coming, AAN, 10 March 2016, url  
1151 Amiri, R., Helmand (1): A crisis a long time coming, AAN, 10 March 2016, url; Guardian (The), Why capturing Helmand is 
top of the Taleban’s strategic goals, 26 December 2015, url  
1152 Amiri, R., Helmand (1): A crisis a long time coming, AAN, 10 March 2016, url 
1153 Malkasian, C., War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier, 2013, p. 266 
1154 Pajhwok Afghan News, Recognition of southern Helmand province, n.d., url  
1155 Amiri, R., Helmand (1): A crisis a long time coming, AAN, 10 March 2016, url 

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—  143  

Kabul.1156 A domestic airport with scheduled passenger service reportedly exists in Helmand's capital 
Lashkargah.1157  

Helmand  is  one  of  Afghanistan's  most  fertile  regions,  with  a  climate  favouring  the  cultivation  of  a 
variety of crops – including opium –, and Helmand river providing the necessary irrigation through a 
‘relatively organized’ canal system.1158 

According  to  the  2018  UNODC  Opium  Survey,  Helmand  remained  by  far  the  largest  opium-poppy 
cultivating  province  in  2018  and  accounted  for  52 %  of  the  total  opium  poppy  cultivation  in 
Afghanistan. Compared to 2017, Helmand's opium-poppy cultivation decreased by 5 % in 2018.1159 The 
province's pivotal role for opium-poppy cultivation allegedly contributes considerably to its strategic 
importance  for  the  Taliban:  whoever  controls  Helmand  is  rewarded  with  large-scale  revenues, 
according to several accounts.1160    

2.12.2 Conflict background and actors in Helmand 

Helmand  is  reportedly  ‘[...]  one  of  Afghanistan’s  most  volatile  provinces  and  the  deadliest  for 
international  forces  in  16  years  of  hostilities.’1161  The  Taliban  are  reportedly  able  to  draw  on  large 
numbers of supporters among Helmand's population.1162   

According to AAN, local strongmen returned to rule in Helmand after the fall of the Taliban regime in 
2001  and  were  rewarded  with  local  government  posts  by  then  newly  appointed  President  Hamid 
Karzai. These strongmen could then secure control over patronage networks and resources, such as 
revenues from opium-poppy cultivation. Much of the violence of Helmand has been – and still is – 
driven by the drug economy. As stated by AAN, ‘allegations of abuses by these strongmen were legion 
and included illegal arrests and torture, all aggravated by the marginalization of “out” tribes who saw 
their  poppy  crops  selectively  eradicated  and  government  ranks  packed  out  by  their  rivals.’  This 
contributed allegedly much to the Taliban's appeal in the eyes of the local population.1163 

As a precondition for their deployment in the region, British officials demanded the clearing of local 
government posts from strongmen in 2006 – a demand, which President Karzai reluctantly fulfilled. 
However,  according  to  AAN,  removing  the  strongmen  ‘[...]  eliminated  the  source  of  much  of  the 
resentment, which was driving the province towards insurgency, but also the means of containing it,’ 
as security in the province was mostly based on agreements between the strongmen in government 
positions and local militias.1164  

After  the  local  militias  withdrew  and  the  British  troops  were  unable  to  fill  the  gaps,  the  Taliban 
enhanced their operations in the province. In order to counter this development, US forces have been 
deployed in large numbers in Helmand from 2008 onwards. While the Taliban were pushed back from 
some areas, such as Marja, ISAF ‘[...] repeatedly squandered the chance to build a durable political 
settlement  [...]’  in  Sangin,  according  to  AAN.1165  After  the  international  troops  largely  withdrew  in 

1156 Diplomat (The), 5 Reasons Why Helmand Matters to the Taliban, 31 May 2016, url; Amiri, R., Helmand (1): A crisis a long 
time coming, AAN, 10 March 2016, url 
1157 Austria, BFA-Staatendokumentation, Afghanistan - Airports [Map], 25 March 2019 
1158 Diplomat (The), 5 Reasons Why Helmand Matters to the Taliban, 31 May 2016, url 
1159 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 17 
1160 N-TV, Taliban auf dem Vormarsch: In Helmand geht es um Afghanistans Zukunft [Taliban on the rise: Afghanistan's future 
at the stake in Helmand], 23 December 2015, url; Guardian (The), Why capturing Helmand is top of the Taleban’s strategic 
goals, 26 December 2015, url; Amiri, R., Helmand (1): A crisis a long time coming, AAN, 10 March 2016, url 
1161 LA Times, The Marines Returned To Helmand Province. Is Their Mission A Blueprint For Trump’s Afghanistan Strategy?, 
15 November 2017, url 
1162 Diplomat (The), 5 Reasons Why Helmand Matters to the Taliban, 31 May 2016, url  
1163 Amiri, R., Helmand (1): A crisis a long time coming, AAN, 10 March 2016, url 
1164 Amiri, R., Helmand (1): A crisis a long time coming, AAN, 10 March 2016, url 
1165 Amiri, R., Helmand (1): A crisis a long time coming, AAN, 10 March 2016, url 

 
                                                           
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2014, the Taliban overran several ‘chiefdoms’ in Helmand, which had been under control of ANP, ALP 
and pro-government militia commanders.1166  

According  to  AAN,  the  government  forces'  lack  of  success  can  be  partially  traced  to  their  lack  of 
strength,  as  up  to  40 %  of  officially  enrolled  troops  have  been  alleged  to  be  ‘ghost  soldiers’  –  i.e. 
soldiers existing only on  paper.  Furthermore, AAN mentions a lack of communication between the 
different branches of the security forces, as well as a new combat strategy by the Taliban as further 
reasons for the government forces' weak performance. In 2015 and early 2016, the Taliban were able 
to expand their control in various districts, according to AAN.1167  

In 2017, US Marines returned to Helmand, reportedly in order to advise Afghan government forces 
from inside military bases and in order to increase airstrikes without conducting ground operations on 
their  own.1168  Another  report  indicated  that  the  Marines  have  been  in  combat  in  Helmand,  even 
though fighting was mainly done by Afghan troops, while the US forces stayed behind.1169 According 
to the US newspaper LA Times, the outspoken aim of the Marine's deployment in Helmand has been 
to secure the provincial capital Lashkargah from falling to the Taliban.1170 

Throughout 2017, the US-backed government forces launched several operations, pushing the Taliban 
away from major towns and highways, reportedly eliminating the threat to Lashkargah.1171 However, 
in February 2018, the Taliban allegedly still controlled approximately half of the province.1172 Aided by 
airstrikes, government forces reportedly took back Nawa district as their biggest success in Helmand 
in 2017.1173 According to the LA Times, the Afghan security forces remain dependent on US support in 
order to stay on the offensive.1174 

Besides  the  Taliban,  Al  Qaeda  is  allegedly  present  in  Helmand.  According  to  LWJ,  Al  Qaeda  closely 
collaborates with the Taliban – even though the Pentagon reportedly stated that the two groups do 
not maintain strategic relationships.1175 In August 2018, Afghan security forces reportedly killed seven 
Al Qaeda members in Helmand.1176 

According  to  the  news  magazine  The  Diplomat,  as  of  September  2018,  there  has  been  no  known 
presence of Islamic State (IS) fighters in Helmand.1177 

On the government side, along with Afghan security forces such as the ANP, ALP, ANA, pro-government 
‘uprising groups’ as well as the US forces, a special division called the Sangorian is reportedly active in 
Helmand.  1178 The Sangorian was established in January 2016 by the operational commander of the 

1166  Amiri,  R.,  Helmand  (1):  A  crisis  a  long  time  coming,  AAN,  10  March  2016,  url;  Amiri,  R.,  Helmand  (2):  The  chain  of 
chiefdoms unravels, AAN, 11 March 2016, url 
1167 Amiri, R., Helmand (2): The chain of chiefdoms unravels, AAN, 11 March 2016, url 
1168 LA Times, The Marines Returned To Helmand Province. Is Their Mission A Blueprint For Trump’s Afghanistan Strategy?, 
15 November 2017, url 
1169 AP News, Marines see Afghan forces improve in Helmand battles, 1 February 2018, url  
1170 LA Times, The Marines Returned To Helmand Province. Is Their Mission A Blueprint For Trump’s Afghanistan Strategy?, 
15 November 2017, url 
1171 LA Times, The Marines Returned To Helmand Province. Is Their Mission A Blueprint For Trump’s Afghanistan Strategy?, 
15 November 2017, url 
1172 AP News, Marines see Afghan forces improve in Helmand battles, 1 February 2018, url  
1173 Military Times, Helmand again the focus of US strategy in Afghanistan, 11 December 2017, url; AP News, Marines see 
Afghan forces improve in Helmand battles, 1 February 2018, url 
1174 LA Times, The Marines Returned To Helmand Province. Is Their Mission A Blueprint For Trump’s Afghanistan Strategy?, 
15 November 2017, url 
1175 LWJ, Afghan forces target al Qaeda commanders in Helmand and Nangarhar, 7 August 2018, url  
1176 LWJ, Afghan forces target al Qaeda commanders in Helmand and Nangarhar, 7 August 2018, url; Afghanistan Times, Top 
Al-Qaeda Loyalist Killed in Helmand, 7 August 2018, url 
1177 Diplomat (The), The Last 2 Sikhs in the Taliban’s Heartland, 26 September 2018, url  
1178 Jamestown Foundation (The), The Sangorian: Weakening the Taliban from Within, 11 January 2019, url; RFE/RL, Secret 
Afghan Force Mimics, Infiltrates Taliban, 15 February 2018, url 

                                                           
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—  145  

Afghan forces in Helmand as a covert anti-Taliban militia with the aim of infiltrating and weakening the 
Taliban from within. Its fighters are locals, Taliban dissidents and former Taliban insurgents.1179      

Helmand is under the responsibility of the 215th ANA Corps.1180 

The following  table  provides  an overview of control of the districts in  Helmand province based on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.1181 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region,  to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.  

HELMAND 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: August-
November 
2017) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment 
as of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last 
accessed:1182 
April 2019) 

Taliban 

(assessment as of 
December 2018) 

Baghran 

Taliban control 

Deh-e-Shu 

Taliban control 

High INS 
activity 

High INS 
activity 

High INS 
activity 

High INS 
activity 

Taliban 
control 

Taliban 
control 

TB control  

TB control  

Garmser 

Kajaki 

Lashkargah 
(capital) 

Taliban control 
(East)/Open 
Taliban 
presence – 
Medium (West) 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
Presence - 
medium/low 

INS activity 

INS activity 

Contested 

INS activity 

INS activity 

Contested 

TB control: 97%; 
Gov control: 3% 

TB control: 99%; 
Gov control: 1% 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Gov control: 60%; 
TB control: 40% 

Musaqala 

Taliban control 

High INS 
activity 

High INS 
activity 

Taliban 
control 

TB control  

Nad-e-Ali (Marja) 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

Nad-e-Ali: 
contested; 
Marja: INS 
activity 

Nad-e-Ali: 
GIRoA 
Influence and 
Marja: INS 
activity 

Contested 

Nahr-e-Saraj 
(Gereshk) 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Nad-e-Ali: Gov 
control: 50%; TB 
control: 50% and 
Marja: TB control: 
97%; Gov control: 
3% 

TB control: 85%; 
Gov control: 15% 

1179 Jamestown Foundation (The), The Sangorian: Weakening the Taliban from Within, 11 January 2019, url  
1180 Global Security, Afghan National Army (ANA) - Order of Battle, n.d., url 
1181 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of Jihad, End 
of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
1182 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated.  

 
                                                           
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Nawa-e-Barakzaiy 
(Nawa) 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Nawzad 

Taliban control 

Reg (Khaneshin) 

Taliban control 

High INS 
activity 

High INS 
activity 

High INS 
activity 

High INS 
activity 

Sangin 

Taliban control 

INS activity 

INS activity 

Taliban 
control 

Taliban 
control 

Taliban 
control 

Gov control: 55 
%; TB control: 45 
% 

TB control  

TB control  

TB control (except 
for Gov presence: 
2 %) 

TB control: 98%; 
Gov control: 2% 

Washer 

Baghni 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

TB control  

2.12.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.12.3.1 General 

In 2018, UNAMA documented 880 civilian casualties (281 deaths and 599 injured) in Helmand. This 
represents  a  decrease  of  11 %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were  ground 
engagements, followed by (non-suicide) IEDs and suicide or complex attacks.1183 

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA  places  the  districts  of  Lashkargah, 
Nad-e  Ali,  Nawa-e-Barakzaiy,  Sangin  and  Nahr-e  Saraj  in  the  highest  category  and  the  district  of 
Garmser  in  the  second  highest  category.  Kajaki  districts  are  in  the  third  highest  category  and  the 
districts of Musa Qala, Nawzad, and Washer in the category below. The remaining districts are placed 
in the lowest categories.1184 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 313 incidents related to insurgents in Helmand province.1185 

Throughout  2018  and  early  2019,  US  and  Afghan  forces  continued  operations  in  the  province,1186  
including airstrikes reportedly inflicting considerable damage among civilians.1187 The UN Secretary-
General  reported  in  the  end  of  February  2019  that  approximately  one  third  of  all  airstrikes  in 
Afghanistan were carried out in the province of Helmand in the period of November 2018 to February 
2019. This is the largest share of airstrikes carried out in a single province.1188 

1183 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
1184 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2 
1185 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
1186 RFE/RL, Ten Suspected Insurgents Killed In Afghanistan's Helmand, 10 March 2018, url; RFE/RL, Afghan Army: Dozens Of 
Militants Killed In Operations, 21 April 2018, url; RFE/RL, 'At Least 30 Afghan Civilians' Killed In Air Strike, 28 November 2018, 
url;  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Over  70  militants  killed,  scores  injured  in  nation-wide  operations:  MoD,  4  January  2019,  url; 
RFE/RL, Air Strike In Afghanistan Kills 16 From Same Family, 25 January 2019, url 
1187 RFE/RL, 'At Least 30 Afghan Civilians' Killed In Air Strike, 28 November 2018, url; RFE/RL, Air Strike In Afghanistan Kills 16 
From Same Family, 25 January 2019, url 
1188 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 28 February 
2019, url 

 
                                                           
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—  147  

In  December  2018,  the  Taliban  shadow  governor  of  Helmand  allegedly  died  in  a  US  airstrike.1189 
Newspapers  reported  on  several  occasions  about  the  liberation  of  captives  of  the  Taliban  by 
government  forces.1190  The  Taliban,  on  the  other  hand,  repeatedly  attacked  security  checkposts  or 
security forces.1191 Several suicide attacks took place in Helmand in 2018, some of them attributed to 
the  Taliban,  while  those  responsible  for  others  remained  unclear.1192  UNAMA  counted  five  Taliban 
suicide attacks causing 121 civilian casualties (28 deaths, 93 injuries) in 2018.1193 

Besides  suicide  attacks,  insurgents  might  have  targeted  civilians  in  Helmand  by  group  poisoning  in 
2018,  as  more  than  50  schoolgirls  were  hospitalised  in  Lashkargah  in  April  2018  after  showing 
symptoms of poisoning.1194 Preceding the 2018 parliamentary election, a bomb attack reportedly killed 
eight people at an election rally in Lashkargah. According to RFE/RL, no one claimed responsibility for 
the attack.1195 

A car bomb blast killing 16 persons near a sports stadium in Lashkargah in March 2018 sparked peace 
protests, including the formation of a peace camp and eventually a peace march from Helmand to 
Kabul, which led to widespread media coverage and support of residents from other provinces. 1196 
Notably,  according  to  RFE/RL,  women  also  participated  in  the  sit-ins,  which  is  unusual  in  the 
conservative Pashtun-dominated region.1197   

2.12.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 8 269 persons 
displaced from Helmand province. They were mainly displaced within the province itself (6 615) and 
Kandahar (1 551).1198 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019, reporting 259 persons 
displaced from Helmand province, mainly within the province itself. 1199 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 6 615 persons 
displaced to Helmand province. They were all originating from the province itself.1200 

UNOCHA collected  data  for  the  period 1  January  2019 - 28  February 2019,  reporting 237  persons 
displaced to Lashkargah district in Helmand province, they were all originating from Nad-e-Ali/Marja 
district in the province itself. 1201 

1189 LWJ, Taliban shadow governor for Helmand killed in US airstrike, 2 December 2018, url 
1190 RFE/RL, 'Dozens Of People Freed' From Taliban Custody In Afghanistan, 31 May 2018, url; RFE/RL, Afghan Special Forces 
Free 61 From Taliban Captivity,  3 August 2018, url; RFE/RL, Afghan Forces Free Hostages As Taliban Kidnap Government 
Employees, 5 January 2019, url  
1191 RFE/RL, Sixteen Afghan Pro-Government Fighters Killed In Taliban Attack, 12 February 2018, url; RFE/RL, At Least Two 
Afghan Soldiers Killed In Taliban Attack, 27 May 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Nad Ali district administrative chief survives 
Taliban attack, 13 January 2019, url; RFE/RL, Afghan Soldiers Reported Killed In Militant Attack, 14 July 2018, url 
1192 Al Jazeera, Afghanistan: Deadly car bombing near Helmand stadium, 23 March 2018, url; RFE/RL, Suicide Car Bomber 
Kills 13 At Afghan Wrestling Match, 23 March 2018, url; RFE/RL, Suicide Bomber Kills Six In Afghanistan, 28 April 2018, url  
1193 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians on Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 24 
1194 RFE/RL, More Than 50 Afghan Schoolgirls Hospitalized For Suspected Poisoning, 2 April 2018, url 
1195 RFE/RL, At Least Eight Killed In Afghan Election Rally Blast, 9 October 2018, url 
1196 RFE/RL, 'Stop This War': Afghan Women Challenge Taliban, Rally For Peace, 29 March 2018, url; Sabawoon, A.M., Going 
Nationwide: The Helmand peace march initiative, AAN, 23 April 2018, url; Sabawoon, A.M., and Ruttig, T., “The Eid ceasefire 
helped our efforts well”: Helmand peace marchers keep up the pressure, AAN, 2 August 2018, url   
1197 RFE/RL, 'Stop This War': Afghan Women Challenge Taliban, Rally For Peace, 29 March 2018, url 
1198 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 20 January 2019, url 
1199 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 
1200 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 
1201 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 

 
 
                                                           
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District 

Displaced from 
(2018) 

Displaced to (2018) 

Displaced from 
(2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

Baghran 

Deh-e-Shu 

Garmser 

Kajaki 

Lashkargah 

Musaqalah 

Nad-e-Ali/Marja 

Nahr-e-Saraj 

Nawa-e-Barakzaiy 

Nawzad 

Sangin 

/ 

14 

80 

682 

329 

44 

3 816 

2 481 

280 

21 

522 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

2 624 

/ 

1 737 

2 422 

/ 

/ 

/ 

22 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

237 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

237 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

According to UNOCHA, about 1 400 individuals were displaced from Khanshin to Lashkhargah due to 
drought and lack of water as of December 2018. About 600 IDPs came to Lashkargah from Ghazni and 
Farah provinces due to insecurity.1202 According to the report for the period 20 – 26 November 2018, 
around 229 IDP families went from Nad-e Ali district to Lashkargah because of fighting.1203 

1202 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report 26 November – 3 December 2018,  5 December 2018, url 
1203 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report 20 - 26 November 2018,  27 November 2018, url  

 
 
 
 
                                                           
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—  149  

2.13 Herat 

2.13.1 General description of the province 

The province of Herat is located in the west of Afghanistan, sharing an international border with Iran 
to the west and Turkmenistan to the north, as well as with the provinces of Badghis to the northeast, 
Ghor to the east, and Farah to the south.1204 Herat is divided into 16 districts: Adraskan, Chisti Sharif, 
Farsi, Ghoryan, Gulran, Guzara (Nizam-e Shahid), Herat, Injil, Karukh, Kohsan, Kushk (Rubat-e Sangi), 
Kushki Kohna, Obe, Pashtun Zarghun, Shindand, Zinda Jan. Additionally, there are four  ‘temporary’ 
districts – Poshtko, Koh-e Zore (Koh-e Zawar), Zawol, and Zer Koh –,1205 which have been carved out of 
Shindand  district  for  a  better  allocation  of  funds.1206  The  provincial  capital  of  Herat  is  the  city  of 
Herat.1207 According to Pajhwok Afghan News, Herat is one of the largest provinces of Afghanistan. 1208 

The Afghan CSO estimated the population of the province at 1 967 180 in 2018/19, with 506 896 of its 
residents  living  in  the  provincial  capital.1209  According  to  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Pashtuns,  Tajiks, 
Hazara,  Turkmen,  Uzbeks  and  Aimaqs  are  the  main  ethnic  groups  in  the  province,  with  Pashtuns 
representing the majority in 11 border districts.1210 A 2015 USIP report stated that ‘historically, Herat 
city has been a Tajik-dominated enclave in a Pashtun-majority province that includes sizeable Hazara 

1204 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Hirat  Province - District Atlas, April 2014, url 
1205 Afghanistan, IEC, 2018 Wolesi Jirga Elections – Results by Polling Stations: Province Hirat, 2018, url; Afghanistan, CSO, 
۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 38-39  
1206 Ali, O. and Ruttig, T., Classics of Conflict (1): Reviewing some of Afghanistan’s most notorious hotspots, AAN, 3 July 2015, 
url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Govt won´t talk peace from a weak position: Ghani, 1 June 2015, url 
1207 Afghanistan, CSO, ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 38 
1208 Pajhwok Afghan News, Background profile of Herat province, n.d., url 
1209 Afghanistan, CSO, ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 38 
1210 Pajhwok Afghan News, Background profile of Herat province, n.d., url 

 
 
                                                           
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and  Aimaq minorities.’1211  Large-scale  migration  reportedly  changed  the  ethnic  composition  of  the 
city. According to AAN, the share of Shia Hazaras has been particularly increasing since 2001 due to 
repatriation from Iran and displacement from provinces of central Afghanistan.1212 USIP noted that the 
‘[...] degree of ethnic segregation in Herat today is pronounced.’1213  

The province is connected to other major cities by the Ring Road.1214 A primary road leads from Herat 
eastwards to Ghor and Bamyan and on to Kabul.  1215 Other highways connect the provincial capital 
with  the  Afghan-Turkmen  border  crossing  at  Torghundi,  as  well  as  with  the  Afghan-Iranian  border 
crossing at Islam Qala.1216 According to the Afghan newspaper Salaam Times, the Taliban have been 
extorting money from traders and other citizens on the highway between Kabul and Herat, as well as 
Herat and Farah, while local officials claimed in December 2018 that the roads leading to the border 
ports at Torghundi and Islam Qala were secure due to an enhanced presence of the security forces in 
the area.1217 The UN Secretary-General noted in his report covering events from 10 September to 7 
December 2018 that ‘the Taliban also carried out frequent attacks […] along the Herat-Qala-e-Naw 
road in the west, complicating Government [sic] access and limiting the movements of residents.’1218  

According to the airport map produced by the Austrian COI department, an airport with scheduled 
passenger services to national and international destinations exists in the vicinity of Herat City.1219 

While agriculture is an important source of income for many dwellers in rural parts of Herat, ‘[...] urban 
commercial  and  industrial  ventures  dominate  Herat  City's  economy’  and  the  proximity  of  Iran  is  a 
determining factor for the city.1220  

According  to  the  2018  UNODC  Opium  Survey,  Herat  was  not  one  of  the  ten  main  opium-poppy 
cultivating provinces of Afghanistan in 2018.1221 Compared to 2017, Herat's opium-poppy cultivation 
decreased by 46 % in 2018. The main opium-poppy cultivating provinces in 2018 have been Kushk and 
Shindand.1222  

2.13.2 Conflict background and actors in Herat 

According  to  Khaama  Press,  ‘Herat  has  been  among  the  relatively  calm  provinces  in  West  of 
Afghanistan but the Taliban militants are active in some of its remote districts and often attempt to 
carry out terrorist related activities.’1223 

AAN  described  the  district  and  provincial  administration  in  Herat  in  January  2017  as  ‘generally 
dysfunct’,  with  political  power  ‘[...]  scattered  among many  actors  [...]’.1224  According  to  a  report  of 
January 2017, the security situation has been deteriorating, as violent clashes between government 
forces and insurgents – reportedly mostly the Taliban – as well as between different Taliban factions 
increased.  AAN  linked  the  upsurge  of  fighting  to  the  weak  position  of  key  district  and  provincial 

1211 USIP, Political and Economic Dynamics of Herat, 2015, url, p.8 
1212 Kazemi, R.S., Speculation Abounding: Trying to make sense of the attacks against Shias in Herat city, AAN, 3 February 
2019, url 
1213 USIP, Political and Economic Dynamics of Herat, 2015, url, p.8 
1214 Diplomat (The), Kabul's Plan to Realize Afghanistan’s Geographic Dividend, 5 December 2017, url 
1215 iMMAP, Afghanistan Administrative Map, 19 September 2017, url 
1216 iMMAP, Afghanistan Administrative Map, 19 September 2017, url 
1217 Salaam Times, Afghan forces move to secure highways against Taliban's 'customs tax' extortion, 14 December 2018, url 
1218 UN Secretary-General, The Situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 7 December 
2018, url, p. 6 
1219 Austria, BFA-Staatendokumentation, Afghanistan - Airports [Map], 25 March 2019 
1220 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Herat Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1221 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 17 
1222 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 33 
1223 Khaama Press, Prominent Taliban leader killed in Herat drone strike, 17 December 2018, url 
1224  Kazemi,  R.S.,  The  Battle  between  Law  and  Force:  Scattered  political  power  and  deteriorating  security  test  Herat’s 
dynamism, AAN, 11 January 2017, url 

                                                           
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—  151  

officials, who have been mostly assigned as interim candidates lacking a full mandate after President 
Ashraf Ghani summarily dismissed their predecessors in 2014.1225  

Within  the  Taliban,  conflicts  emerged  after  the  announcement  of  the  death  of  the  Taliban  leader 
Mullah Omar in 2015.1226 Mullah Rasool, following a more conciliatory stance towards the government 
in Kabul, split away from the mainstream Taliban together with approximately 1 000 fighters. While 
the government  forces  in Herat  reportedly do not fight against the Rasool group,  which  advocated 
peace talks and pledged to protect a large government pipeline project in the region, at least 60 clashes 
between the group and the mainstream Taliban reportedly took place between 2015 and 2017, leaving 
hundreds of Taliban fighters dead according to the US military newsportal Stars and Stripes.1227 

The district of  Nizam-e  Shahid  near  Herat City,  as well  as Herat City itself, reportedly witnessed an 
upsurge of criminality in recent years. AAN attributed this to the alleged practice of local strongmen 
to  settle  disputes  by  contract  killings,  while  ‘[…]  there  are  reports  that  locals  whose  fortunes  have 
worsened in the wake of the international military drawdown are resorting to abductions and thefts 
as  a  quick  way  to  make  lots  of  money.’1228  These  developments  have  been  allegedly  facilitated  by 
corruption within the police.1229 Besides criminal acts, the Taliban are allegedly also active in the city, 
causing casualties among security force members as well as civilians.1230 

Between 2017 and 2018, ISKP reportedly conducted three suicide attacks in Herat City.1231 

The 207th Zafar Corps is in charge of the ANA operations in the province of Herat.1232 Italian forces are 
stationed in the province of Herat as part of the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission.1233 

In October 2018, AAN reported that ‘large swathes of territory in the province, particularly areas far 
from the provincial and district centres, are either contested or partially or completely controlled by 
the Taleban’.1234 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Herat  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.1235 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region, to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.    

1225  Kazemi,  R.S.,  The  Battle  between  Law  and  Force:  Scattered  political  power  and  deteriorating  security  test  Herat’s 
dynamism, AAN, 11 January 2017, url 
1226  Kazemi,  R.S.,  The  Battle  between  Law  and  Force:  Scattered  political  power  and  deteriorating  security  test  Herat’s 
dynamism, AAN, 11 January 2017, url; Giustozzi, A./Mangal, S., An Interview with Mullah Rasool on Reconciliation between 
the Taliban and the Afghan Government, 16 March 2016, url; Stars and Stripes, Taliban vs. Taliban clash in Afghanistan’s 
west leaves 40 dead, 2 November 2018, url 
1227 Stars and Stripes, Taliban vs. Taliban clash in Afghanistan’s west leaves 40 dead, 2 November 2018, url 
1228  Kazemi,  R.S.,  The  Battle  between  Law  and  Force:  Scattered  political  power  and  deteriorating  security  test  Herat’s 
dynamism, AAN, 11 January 2017, url  
1229  Kazemi,  R.S.,  The  Battle  between  Law  and  Force:  Scattered  political  power  and  deteriorating  security  test  Herat’s 
dynamism, AAN, 11 January 2017, url 
1230 Khaama Press, Gunmen attack Police District Center Herat city, casualties feared, 12 January 2019, url; Gulf Times, Taliban 
attack on Afghan police station kills five, 13 January 2019, url 
1231 taz, 29 Tote nach Anschlag auf Moschee in Herat [29 Dead After Attack on Mosque in Herat], 3 August 2017, url; Reuters, 
At least one dead in blast near mosque in Afghan city of Herat, 25 March 2018, url   
1232 Afghanistan, MoD, 207 Zafar Corps, n.d., url 
1233 Khaama Press, President Ghani met with Italy’s defense minister Elisabetta Trenta, 16 December 2018, url 
1234  Kazemi,  R.S.,  The  2018  Election  Observed  (6)  in  Herat:  Insecurity,  organisational  shambles,  alleged  rigging,  AAN,  20 
December 2018, url 
1235 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, 23 April 2019, url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of 
Jihad, End of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

HERAT 

Adraskan 

Chishti Sharif 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: August-
November 
2017) 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Farsi 

Gov control 

Ghoryan 

Gulran 

Guzara 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Herat (capital) 

Gov control 

Injil 

Gov control 

Karukh 

Gov control 

Kohsan 

Gov control 

Kushk 

Kushki Kohna 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Obe 

Gov control 

Pashtun Zarghun 

Gov control 

Shindand 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of 
October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last 
accessed:1236 
April 2019) 

Taliban 

(assessment as of 
December 2018) 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

TB control: 98%; 
Gov control: 2% 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 80%; 
TB control: 20% 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

/ 

Contested 

TB control: 50%; 
Gov control: 50% 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5% 

GIRoA 
control 

GIRoA 
control 

GIRoA 
control 

GIRoA 
control 

GIRoA 
control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
control 

GIRoA 
control 

GIRoA 
control 

GIRoA 
control 

GIRoA 
control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 60%; 
TB control: 40% 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 60%; 
TB control: 40% 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

TB control: 70%; 
Gov control: 30% 

Contested 

/ 

Contested 

Contested 

Gov control: 60%; 
TB control: 40% 

TB control: 90%; 
Gov control: 10% 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

TB control: 60%; 
Gov control: 40% 

INS Activity 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control: 98%; 
Gov control: 2% 

Zinda Jan 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
control 

GIRoA 
control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

TB control: 70%; 
Gov control: 30% 

Rabat-e-Sangi 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

TB control: 80%; 
Gov control: 20% 

1236 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 

                                                           
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  153  

2.13.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.13.3.1 General 

In 2018, UNAMA documented 259 civilian casualties (95 deaths and 164 injured) in the province of 
Herat. This represents a decrease of 48 % compared to 2017. Leading causes of casualties were (non-
suicide) IEDs, followed by ground engagements and targeted killings.1237  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA  places  the  district  of  Shindand 
(together with the ‘temporary’ districts formerly part of Shindand) in the highest category, and the 
district of Herat in the second highest category. Adraskan and Obe districts are in the category below 
and  Guzara,  Pashtun  Zarghun,  Kushk,  Kushk-e-Kuhna  and  Chist-e  Sharif  districts  are  in  the  fourth 
category. The remaining districts are in the two lowest categories.1238 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 175 incidents related to insurgents in Herat province.1239 

Shindand  is  allegedly  the  most  volatile  district  of  Herat,  witnessing  violent  clashes  between  rival 
Taliban  factions,  as  well  as  between  the  mainstream  Taliban  and  pro-government  forces.1240 
Government forces conducted operations in Shindand in December 20181241 and January 2019.1242 In 
December 2018 AAN noted that the continued infighting in Shindand had the ‘surprising’ effect of the 
2018 parliamentary elections actually taking place in the districts under ‘influence or control’ of the 
Rasool Taliban faction.1243 The same source however also noted that ‘the insecure district of Shindand, 
which borders Farah province and has been divided into five smaller districts, also witnessed a patchy, 
insecure and, in some places, non-existent election’.1244  

According to Tolonews, besides Shindand, Obe is the other insecure district in Herat.1245 AAN stated in 
December 2018 that ‘at present, the exercise of control over Obe district is not static. It changes daily.’ 
AAN  described  the  situation  in  the  districtas  a  ‘mutually-hurting  stalemate.’  Reportedly,  with  the 
exception of healthcare, the Taliban interfere directly with public services provided in the district.1246 
In October 2018, Khaama Press reported the death of the Taliban deputy shadow governor of Herat in 
the  district  of  Obe,  allegedly,  due  to  wounds  inflicted  during  government  operations  a  few  days 
earlier.1247   

1237 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
1238 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2 
1239 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
1240 VoA, 11 Afghan Forces Killed in Taliban Attack on Herat Province, 13 Apil 2018, url; Khaama Press, Clash among Afghan 
forces and Taliban leaves 15 dead, wounded in Herat, 28 April 2018, url; Al Jazeera, Afghan soldiers killed in 'coordinated 
Taliban attack' in Herat, 7 December 2018, url; Ariana News, Infighting Leaves 45 Taliban Militants Killed or Wounded in 
Herat, 30 November 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Herat intelligence officer killed in Taliban ambush, 30 November 2018, 
url 
1241 Khaama Press, Prominent Taliban leaders killed in U.S. drone strikes in West of Afghanistan, 27 December 2018, url 
1242 Khaama Press, Afghan and Coalition Forces kill 6 militants in separate operations, airstrike, 26 January 2019, url 
1243  Kazemi,  R.S.,  The  2018  Election  Observed  (6)  in  Herat:  Insecurity,  organisational  shambles,  alleged  rigging,  AAN,  20 
December 2018, url 
1244  Kazemi,  R.S.,  The  2018  Election  Observed  (6)  in  Herat:  Insecurity,  organisational  shambles,  alleged  rigging,  AAN,  20 
December 2018, url 
1245 Tolonews, Concerns Rise Over Possible Taliban Attacks On Herat Districts, 8 September 2018, url 
1246 Kazemi, R.S., One Land, Two Rules (2): Delivering public services in insurgency-affected Obeh district of Herat province, 
AAN, 9 December 2018, url 
1247 Khaama Press, Taliban’s deputy shadow governor dies of critical wounds in Herat, 14 October 2018, url 

 
 
                                                           
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The mainstream Taliban faction and government forces also clashed in the districts of Zawal1248 and 
Guzra.1249 According to Khaama Press, in December 2018 Taliban leaders were killed in two separate 
drone strikes in the districts of Farsi and Zawal.1250   

In  March 2018,  IS  reportedly  conducted  an  attack,  killing  at  least  one  person  and  wounding  seven 
others,  in  front  of  a  Shia  mosque  in  the  city.1251  In  April  2018,  at  least  six  civilians,  including  four 
children, were killed by a bomb attack near a mosque and a bazaar.1252 In June 2018, a publicly known 
local  Shia  cleric  was  killed  in  Herat  City,  in  September  2018,  police  and mosque  guards  reportedly 
prevented a suicide attack on a Shia mosque in the district of Injil.1253 AAN claimed that attacks on Shia 
religious  figures  and  sites  have  increased  in  Herat  since  2016,  citing  demographic  changes, 
radicalisation among some religious figures, strategic considerations by the Nangarhar-based ISKP, and 
the proximity to Iran as possible reasons for the increase in attacks. AAN, however, has pointed out 
that widespread sectarian conflict between Herat's Shia and Sunni population was unlikely ‘at least in 
the foreseeable future’ due to the prevailing ‘Shia-Sunni solidarity’ among Heratis.1254 

In February 2018, the newsportal Arab News reported that all of Herat's districts have been cleared 
of landmines in a 10-year-long effort, except for Shindand and Gulran. The volatile security situation 
has so far prevented the clearance of these two remaining districts.1255 Yet, in December 2018 RFE/RL 
reported that three civilians were killed after their vehicle struck a roadside bomb in Guzra district. 1256 

Further,  12  civilians  were  killed  in  January  2018  when  a  roadside  bomb  hit  a  vehicle  in  Gulran 
district.1257  A  bomb  blast  in  the  Tang-i-Til  locality  of  Shindand  district  killed  least  six  people  and 
wounded  seven  others  in  April  2018.1258  Pajhwok  Afghan  News  reported  at  least  four  road 
construction workers being killed by unidentified armed men in Shindand district in May 2018.1259 

2.13.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 609 persons 
displaced from Herat province, most of which (570) were displaced within the province.1260 

UNOCHA  collected  data  for  the  period  1  January  2019  -  28  February  2019,  reporting  60  persons 
displaced from Herat province.1261 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 5 482 persons 
displaced to Herat province: most of whom (2 755) were from Ghor province; other IDPs were from 
Badghis, Daykundi,  Farah, Faryab, Ghazni, Helmand, Kunar and Paktya provinces.1262 

1248 Khaama Press, 17 Afghan army soldiers martyred in Herat attack: officials, 9 June 2018, url 
1249 The New Arab, 'Taliban roadside bomb; in Afghanistan's Herat province kills civilians, 8 December 2018, url 
1250 Khaama Press, Prominent Taliban leader killed in Herat drone strike, 17 December 2018, url; Khaama Press, Top Taliban 
leader killed in Herat drone strike, 25 December 2018, url 
1251 Reuters, At least one dead in blast near mosque in Afghan city of Herat, 25 March 2018, url  
1252 RFE/RL, Bomb Attack Kills At Least Six In Western Afghanistan, 9 April 2018, url 
1253 Kazemi, R.S., Speculation Abounding: Trying to make sense of the attacks against Shias in Herat city, AAN, 3 February 
2019, url 
1254 Kazemi, R.S., Speculation Abounding: Trying to make sense of the attacks against Shias in Herat city, AAN, 3 February 
2019, url 
1255 Arab News, Thousands of lives saved as Herat cleared of landmines, 18 February 2018, url 
1256 RFE/RL, Three Civilians Killed In Afghan Roadside Bombing, 8 December 2018, url 
1257 Pajhwok Afghan News, 12 civilians dead in Herat landmine explosion, 21 January 2018, url 
1258 Pajhwok Afghan News, 6 killed, 7 wounded in Shindand rickshaw blast, 9 April 2018, url 
1259 Pajhwok Afghan News, 4 road construction workers killed in Herat, 26 March 2018, url 
1260 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url  
1261 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 
1262 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 

                                                           
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  155  

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019, reporting 1 558 persons 
displaced to Herat province most of whom (1 270) were displaced from Badghis province.1263 

District 

Karukh 

Kushk 

Obe 

Shindand 

Guzara 

Herat 

Injil 

Displaced from 

Displaced to 

Displaced from 

Displaced to 

(2018)1264 

(2018) 

(2019) 

/ 

75 

6 

521  

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

10  

5 125 

347  

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

(2019) 

1 020 

/ 

/ 

60 

/ 

538 

/ 

In 2018, Herat province hosted the ‘the highest number of IDPs and returnees nationwide – more than 
200 000’.1265 In August 2018, 12 000 displaced families were displaced in Herat city, mainly in the west 
of the provincial capital.1266 In November 2018, 147 600 people out of 223 100 people displaced by 
drought in Western Afghanistan were displaced in Herat province.1267 

1263 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 
1264 The district of origin of 7 persons displaced is not mentioned in UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 
2018, 28 January 2019, url  
1265 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 12 
1266 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Regional Team (HRT) - Western Region Afghanistan - Meeting Summary, 14 August 2018, url 
1267 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 29 October – 4 November 2018, 5 November 2018, url 

 
 
 
                                                           
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2.14 Jawzjan 

2.14.1 General description of the province 

 
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  157  

Jawzjan is situated in the north of Afghanistan, bordering Turkmenistan to the north, Balkh to the east, 
Sar-e Pul to the south, and Faryab to the west.1268 The province is divided into the following districts: 
Aqcha,  Darzab,  Fayzabad,  Khamyab,  Khanaqa,  Khwajadukoh,  Mardyan,  Mingajik,  Qarqin,  and 
Qushtepa,  as  well  as  the  provincial  capital  Shiberghan.1269  According  to  AAN,  Darzab  has  been 
transferred from Faryab to Jawzjan because of security reasons. Later, the district of Qushtepa was 
carved out of Darzab.1270  

The  Afghan  CSO  estimates  the  population  of  Jawzjan  to  be  579 833  in  2018/19.1271  According  to  a 
provincial profile of 2008, the two largest ethnic groups in the province are Uzbek and Turkmen, with 
smaller groups of Pashtuns and so-called Arabs – i.e. descendants of migrants who left the Arabian 
peninsula  in  the  14th  century  –,  as  well  as  some  Tajiks  and  Kuchi  nomads,  whose  numbers  vary 
depending on the season.1272   

The Ring Road connects the provincial capital of Jawzjan with the major population centre Mazar-e 
Sharif in Balkh, as well as Faryab to the west. Another main road connects neighbouring Sar-e Pul to 
the  Ring  Road  in  Shiberghan.1273  Pajhwok  Afghan  News  reported  a  growing  number  of  security 
incidents  on  the  highway  between  Sheberghan  and  Mazar-e  Sharif  in  November  2018.  Travellers 
reportedly  have  been  caught  in  crossfire  as  security  forces  and  Taliban  insurgents  clashed  on  the 
highway  in  the  districts  of  Aqcha  in  Jawzjan  and  Chahar  Boluk  in  Balkh.1274  Furthermore,  armed 
robberies  reportedly  took  place  on  the  highway  in  the  above  mentioned  districts,  as  well  as  in 
Mingajik.1275  According  to  the  airport  map  produced  by  the  Austrian  COI  department,  Shiberghan 
airport  does  not  have  scheduled  passenger  services  as  of  March  2019.1276  Pajhwok  Afghan  News 
termed  Jawzjan  ‘[...]  one  of  the  strategic  provinces  of  the  country’, with  ‘[...]  immense  natural  gas 
reserves [...]’.1277 

According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, Jawzjan lost its poppy-free status in 2016. While opium-
poppy cultivation reached a peak in 2017 – with a nearly eightfold increase compared to 2016 –, the 
size of the opium-poppy cultivating area in Jawzjan decreased by 90 % in 2018 compared to 2017.1278 
UNODC links the decrease in acreage to 2018's severe draught in northern Afghanistan.1279 Jawzjan 
was not among the ten main opium-poppy cultivating provinces of Afghanistan in 2018.1280 

2.14.2 Conflict background and actors in Jawzjan 

Despite  being  home  to  the  former  powerful  Uzbek  militia  leader  Abdul  Rashid  Dostum  and  the 
presence of his ‘former militia fighters’, insurgent activity reportedly increased in Jawzjan after NATO-
led forces handed over control to Afghan security forces in 2012.1281 A 2017 study on Islamic State (IS) 
presence in Afghanistan found that ‘there are enormous numbers of armed forces in [...] Jawzjan [...], 
among which the irregular (arbakee, private paramilitary units of commanders) and anti-government 

1268 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Northern Region - District Atlas, April 2014, url 
1269 Afghanistan, IEC, 2018 Wolesi Jirga Elections – Results by Polling Stations: Province Jawzjan, 2018, url; Afghanistan, CSO, 
۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 34 
1270 Ruttig, T., The Afghanistan Election Conundrum (12): Good news and bad news about district numbers, AAN, 16 August 
2018, url 
1271 Afghanistan, CSO, ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 3 
1272 Larsson, K., A Provincial Survey of Balkh, Jowzjan, Samangan and Saripul, November 2008, url 
1273  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan:  Northern  Region  -  District  Atlas,  April  2014,  url;  iMMAP,  Afghanistan  Administrative  Map,  19 
September 2017, url; Diplomat (The), Kabul's Plan to Realize Afghanistan’s Geographic Dividend, 5 December 2017, url 
1274 Pajhwok Afghan News, Commuters say insecurity worsens on Balkh-Jawzjan road, 18 November 2018, url 
1275 Pajhwok Afghan News, Commuters say insecurity worsens on Balkh-Jawzjan road, 18 November 2018, url 
1276 Austria, BFA-Staatendokumentation, Afghanistan - Airports [Map], 25 March 2019 
1277 Pajhwok Afghan News, Jawzjan background profile, n.d., url 
1278 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 19 
1279 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 26 
1280 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 17 
1281 RFE/RL, Afghanistan's New Northern Flash Points, n.d., url  

 
                                                           
158 — 

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forces  (mostly  various  local  Taliban  groups)  clearly  outnumber  the  ANSF  (ANA,  ANP  and  ALP)  and 
National Uprising units.’1282 

AAN  reported  in  2017  that  the  Taliban  became  increasingly  successful  in  Jawzjan,  setting  up 
administrative  and  military  institutions,  after  opening  their  ranks  to  non-Pashtun  fighters.  The 
recruitment of Uzbeks allegedly proved particularly successful in the province.1283 Subsequently, the 
Taliban  were  able  to  expand  their  control  in  Jawzjan  as  well  as  in  other  provinces  of  northern 
Afghanistan.1284 Within Jawzjan, they have been reportedly pushing into the province's northern and 
eastern parts, as well as the strategic areas around the provincial centre.1285 

AAN reported that conflict emerged between local Taliban commanders and the Taliban leadership in 
2014 after the latter tried to enhance the accountability of the commanders in operations. According 
to AAN, the appearance of IMU in Qushtepa subsequently favoured the formation of an ‘Islamic State 
(IS)’ faction in the district.1286 

IMU,  which  had  infiltrated  Jawzjan  in  early  2015  from  neighbouring  Faryab  Province  according  to 
RFE/RL,1287 has been a former ally of the Taliban, but shifted allegiance towards IS after the disclosure 
of Taliban leader Mullah Omar's death in 2015.1288 The presence of IMU in Jawzjan reportedly provided 
Qari Hekmat and his followers with an opportunity to pledge allegiance to IS. Subsequently, Hekmat 
succeeded in shaping his former Taliban unit into an independent IS-associated group.1289  AAN stated 
that it had found no reliable evidence of a connection between Hekmat's IS group and Nangarhar's 
Islamic State Khorasan Province, which is allegedly recognised by the ‘Daesh central’ in Syria and Iraq 
(i.e. the main franchise) as an IS branch.1290 A study on IS presence in Afghanistan published in 2017 
supports this finding.1291  

According to AAN, Hekmat's shift to ‘IS’ was rather driven by ‘[...] power-saving opportunism [...]’ than 
by ideological motives.1292 The self-proclaimed IS group managed to hold control over the districts of 
Qushtepa and Darzab for three years, fighting the Taliban1293 – though not expanding its territory due 
to  the  widespread  Taliban  presence  in  the  province1294  –,  and  initially  outlasting  the  death  of  its 
founder  by  a  US  drone  strike  in  April  2018.1295  In  August  2018,  the  Taliban  overran  the  group's 
strongholds, prompting a faction of Hekmat's former unit to surrender to the government forces in 
fear of retaliation by the Taliban, while others (reportedly mainly Central Asian fighters) surrendered 
to  the  Taliban.  According  to  AAN,  the  Taliban  took  over  Qushtepa  and  Darzab  after  the  group's 
defeat.1296  

1282 Mielke, K. and Miszak, N., Making sense of Daesh in Afghanistan: A social movement perspective, June 2017, url, p. 28-
29 
1283 Ali, O., Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (4): A case study from Jawzjan, AAN, 18 September 2017, url 
1284 RFE/RL, Afghanistan's New Northern Flash Points, n.d., url; Ali, O., Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (4): A case study 
from Jawzjan, AAN, 18 September 2017, url 
1285 Ali, O., Qari Hekmat’s Island Overrun: Taleban defeat ‘ISKP’ in Jawzjan, AAN, 4 August 2018, url 
1286 Ali, O., Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (4): A case study from Jawzjan, AAN, 18 September 2017, url 
1287 RFE/RL, Afghanistan's New Northern Flash Points, n.d., url  
1288 Ali, O., Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (4): A case study from Jawzjan, AAN, 18 September 2017, url; AAN, Toward 
Fragmentation? Mapping the post-Omar Taleban, 24 November 2015, url 
1289 Ali, O., Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (4): A case study from Jawzjan, AAN, 18 September 2017, url 
1290 Ali, O., Qari Hekmat’s Island Overrun: Taleban defeat ‘ISKP’ in Jawzjan, AAN, 4 August 2018, url 
1291 Mielke, K. and Miszak, N., Making sense of Daesh in Afghanistan: A social movement perspective, June 2017, url, pp. 28-
29 
1292 Ali, O., Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (4): A case study from Jawzjan, AAN, 18 September 2017, url 
1293 Ali, O., Qari Hekmat’s Island: A Daesh enclave in Jawzjan?, AAN, 11 November 2018, url; Ali, O., Precarious Consolidation: 
Qari Hekmat’s IS-affiliated ‘island’ survives another Taleban onslaught, AAN, 4 March 2018, url; Der Spiegel, Afghanistan 120 
Tote bei Kämpfen zwischen Taliban und IS [Afghanistan: 120 Dead in Clashes Between Taliban and IS], 19 July 2018, url 
1294 Ali, O., Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (4): A case study from Jawzjan, AAN, 18 September 2017, url 
1295 Ali, O., Still under the IS’s Black Flag: Qari Hekmat’s ISKP island in Jawzjan after his death by drone, AAN, 15 May 2018, 
url 
1296 Ali, O., Qari Hekmat’s Island Overrun: Taleban defeat ‘ISKP’ in Jawzjan, AAN, 4 August 2018, url 

                                                           
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  159  

Regarding the government forces, the province of Jawzjan is under the responsibility of the 209th ANA 
Shaheen Corp.1297 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Jawzjan  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.1298 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region, to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.       

JAWZJAN 

Aqcha 

Darzab 

Fayzabad 

Khamyab 

Khanaqa 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Khwajadukoh 

Gov control 

Mardyan 

Mingajik 

Qarqin 

Qushtepa 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: August-
November 
2017) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment 
as of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

Taliban 

(last 
accessed:1299 
April 2019) 

(assessment as 
of December 
2018) 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control: 94%; 
Gov control: 6% 

INS Activity 

INS Activity 

Taliban 
control 

TB control: 94%; 
Gov control: 6% 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

INS Activity 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Taliban 
control 

Contested 

Contested 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

TB control: 94%; 
Gov control: 6% 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

TB control: 93%; 
Gov control: 7% 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control: 93%; 
Gov control: 7% 

TB control  

TB control: 94%; 
Gov control: 6% 

TB control: 70%; 
Gov control: 
30% 

TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5% 

TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5% 

TB control: 50%; 
Gov control: 
50% 

INS Activity 

INS Activity 

Contested 

Shiberghan 
(capital) 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

1297 Afghanistan, MoD, 209 Shaheen Corps, n.d., url 
1298 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, 23 April 2019, url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of 
Jihad, End of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
1299 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated.  

 
                                                           
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2.14.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.14.3.1 General 

In  2018,  UNAMA  documented  183  civilian  casualties  (61  deaths  and  122  injured)  in  Jawzjan.  This 
represents  an  increase  of  55 %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were  ground 
engagements, followed by aerial attacks and (non-suicide) IEDs.1300  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian casualties  and  conflict-induced  displacements, UNOCHA places the district  of Darzab in the 
highest  category  and  the  district  of  Qushtepa  in  the  second  highest  category.  Aqchah,  Fayzabad, 
Khanaqa,  and  Sheberghan  districts  are  in  the  category  below  and  Mardyan  in  the  fourth  highest 
category. The remaining districts are placed in the two lowest categories.1301 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 111 incidents related to insurgents in Jawzjan province.1302 

Fighting  between  government  forces  and  insurgents  caused  casualties  among  fighters  throughout 
2018  and  early  2019,  e.g.  in  the  districts  of  Aqcha,1303  Darzab,1304  Fayzabad,1305  Khamab, 1306 
Qushtepa,1307 and Sheberghan.1308  According to UNAMA, ‘foreshadowing trends seen throughout the 
year, 2018 began with a spike in civilian harm caused by a series of airstrikes by international military 
forces in early January in Nangarhar and Jawzjan provinces […].’1309 The government forces conducted 
several ground operations and airstrikes in the province in 2018.1310  

Due to security reasons, the 2018 parliamentary elections did not take place in the districts of Darzab, 
Khamyab and Mardyan.1311 In another district, two children were injured in a rocket attack on a polling 
station.1312 

In June 2018, Pajhwok Afghan News reported about an increase in the number of rapes and sexual 
violence against women, as well as killings of male relatives by self-proclaimed IS fighters in the district 

1300 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
1301 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2 
1302 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
1303 Pajhwok Afghan News, 6 Taliban killed in clash with Jawzjan uprising force, 2 September 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 
Policeman among 3 killed in Jawzjan clash, 8 November 2018, url;  Pajhwok Afghan News, Jawzjan clash leaves 37 dead and 
wounded, 13 January 2019, url 
1304 Pajhwok Afghan News, 9 Daesh, 3 Taliban killed in Jawzjan, Farah incidents, 27 March 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 
10 Daesh killed, 6 police wounded in Jawzjan clash, 1 April 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 12 Daesh, 3 local police killed in 
Jawzjan firefight, 20 April 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Policemen among 15 rebels killed in Jawzjan clash, 8 June 2018, 
url  
1305 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban militants recapture 7 Jawzjan villages, 13 July 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 6 Taliban 
killed in clash with Jawzjan uprising force, 2 September 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 4 pro-government fighters killed in 
Jawzjan attack, 10 January 2019, url 
1306 Khaama Press, Taliban militants overrun Khamab district in Jawzjan province, 10 September 2018, url  
1307 Pajhwok Afghan News, 38 Taliban killed in Jawzjan, Faryab clashes, 8 October 2018, url  
1308 Pajhwok Afghan News, Uprising group commander among 7 soldiers killed in Jawzjan, 15 December 2018, url  
1309 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 8 
1310 Pajhwok Afghan News, 10 civilians, 26 Daesh militants killed in Jawzjan airstrikes, 2 January 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan 
News, Air Strikes on Daesh, Jawzjan, 7 February 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Over 60 rebels killed in military offensives 
countrywide, 9 February 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 13 Daesh insurgents killed in Jawzjan airstrike, 4 March 2018, url; 
Pajhwok Afghan News, 60 Daesh rebels killed and wounded in Jawzjan offensive, 17 March 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 
71 militants killed in round-the-clock operations: MoD, 23 March 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 25 rebels killed, 20 injured 
in fresh operations: MoD, 6 April 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Frenchman among 8 rebels killed in Jawzjan, 11 April 
2018, url  
1311 Pajhwok Afghan News, No elections in 3 high security risk districts of Jawzjan, 17 October 2018, url 
1312 Pajhwok Afghan News, 46 killed, 240 injured in nationwide poll violence, 20 October 2018, url 

                                                           
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—  161  

of Darzab.1313 In the same district, the self-proclaimed IS fighters reportedly beheaded a twelve-year 
old boy on charges of supplying food to the police,1314 as well as an adult accused of spying for the 
government forces.1315 The Taliban allegedly punished two women for having phone contact with men 
in October 2018 in Darzab.1316 UNAMA reported that Anti-Government Elements hindered health care 
personnel in Jawzjan from conducting vaccination campaigns (including for Polio) on two occasions in 
2018.1317  

2.14.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 2 261 persons 
who were displaced from Jawzjan province within the province itself and also to the district of Nahr-
e-Shah in Balkh province. According to the same data, IDPs from outside of Jawzjan province, mainly 
came from Faryab province.1318  

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019, reporting 329 persons 
displaced from Qushtepa district to Shiberghan district in Jawzjan province. 1319 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting  7 981 persons 
displaced to Jawzjan province, including 1 638 from the province itself and 6 077 from  Faryab.1320 

UNOCHA collected data  for the period 1  January 2019 – 28  February 2019, reporting 868 persons 
displaced  to  Shiberghan  district,  mostly  from  Qushtepa  district  within  the  province,  and  from 
Faryab.1321 

District 

Darzab 

Fayzabad 

Mardyan 

Qushtepa 

Shiberghan 

Displaced from 
(2018) 

Displaced to (2018) 

Displaced from 
(2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

630 

84 

539 

1 008 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

7 981 

/ 

/ 

/ 

329 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

868 

According  to  UNOCHA  data  in  2018,  IDPs  came  to  Shiberghan  mainly  from  Faryab  province  and 
Jawzjan province itself due to conflicts.1322 

According  to  UNHCR,  Jawzjan  province  is  one  of  the  five  provinces  with  the  lowest  rates  of  IDP 
enrolment for male children (37 %) and female children (30 %).1323 

1313 Pajhwok Afghan News, ‘Daesh atrocities growing in Jawzjan’s Darzab district’, 20 June 2018, url 
1314 Pajhwok Afghan News, Jawzjan: Daesh militants behead 12-year-old child, 17 April 2018, url 
1315 Pajhwok Afghan News, Daesh behead alleged govt spy in Jawzjan, 21 June 2018, url 
1316 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban whip 2 women over phone contact with men, 28 October 2018, url 
1317 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 16 
1318 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 20 January 2019, url 
1319 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 
1320 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 
1321 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 
1322 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 20 January 2019, url 
1323 UNHCR, Returnee and Internally Displaced Persons Monitoring Report - Final Report, May 2018, url, p. 17 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
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2.15 Kabul Province 

2.15.1 General description of the province  

Kabul  province  is  located  in  central  Afghanistan.1324  It  borders  Parwan  and  Kapisa  to  the  north, 
Laghman to the east, Nangarhar to the south-east, Logar to the south, and Wardak to the west.1325 
Kabul city being the provincial capital,1326 the province is divided into the following districts: Bagrami, 
Chahrasyab,  Dehsabz,  Estalef,  Farza,  Guldara,  Kabul,  Kalakan,  Khak-e-Jabbar,  Mirbachakot,  Musayi, 
Paghman, Qarabagh, Shakardara and Surobi.1327 According to the Afghanistan CSO, the population of 
Kabul province is estimated at 4 860 880 for 2018/19,1328 comprising Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks, 
Turkmen, Baloch, Sikhs and Hindus.1329 The majority of the  population of  Kabul province are Sunni 
Muslims, but there are also Shias, Sikhs and Hindus.1330  

Major roads depart from Kabul city and connect the Afghan capital with the rest of the country. The 
main highway to Mazar-e Sharif passes through the districts of Shakardara, Mirbachakot, Kalakan and 
Qarabagh.  Another  primary  road  connects  Kabul  city  with  Bagram  in  Parwan  province  and  passes 
through Dehsabz and Qarabagh district. The Kabul-Jalalabad highway leads to Nangarhar through the 
districts of Bagrami, Khak-e-Jabbar and Surobi. The Kabul-Kandahar highway connects Kabul to Wardak 

1324 Pajhwok Afghan News, Kabul province background profile, n.d., url 
1325 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Kabul Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1326 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Kabul Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1327 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Kabul Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated 
population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 4 
1328 Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 2 
1329 Pajhwok Afghan News, Kabul province background profile, n.d., url; Naval Postraduate School, Kabul Provincial Overview, 
n.d., url 
1330  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Kabul  province  background  profile,  n.d.,  url;  Australian  Institute  of  International  Affairs,  A 
Precarious State: the Sikh Community in Afghanistan, 11 July 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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—  163  

province through Paghman district in the south-west of the province. Another primary road passes 
through Bagrami and Chahrasyab in the south and connects Kabul city with Logar province.1331 Kabul 
city hosts an airport which was served by international and domestic scheduled passenger flights as 
of March 2019.1332 

As reported by Landinfo in September 2018 [informal translation], many of the incidents outside of 
the  capital  took  place  along  the  main  highways,  with  insurgents  usually  attacking  Afghan  security 
forces’ outposts and civilians often being caught in the cross-fire. Furthermore, IEDs were often used 
on  the  road  network  in  Kabul  province.  The  Afghan  security  authorities  have  been  investing many 
resources in trying to secure the metropolitan area and the capital. Road network control is important, 
among other things, to prevent insurgents from transporting explosives into Kabul city and thus being 
able to carry out suicide or complex attacks.1333 For instance, the Kabul-Jalalabad highway, which in 
2015 was considered one of the ‘world’s most dangerous roads’ and ‘one of the most important trade 
routes  in  Afghanistan’,  passes  through  areas  where  Taliban  were  active,  like  Surobi  district.1334  The 
highly secured Green Village compound lies along this highway.1335 The road was closed for hours after 
a terrorist attack on the compound in January 2019.1336  

Moreover, Landinfo [informal translation] reported on security incidents taking place along the road 
network in Paghman district and occasional incidents along the highways through Qarabagh, Dehsabz 
districts.1337  

According  to  the  2018  UNODC  survey  Kabul  province  saw  an  increase  in  cultivation  area  by  11  % 
compared to 2017. Poppy-cultivation was limited to the Uzbin valley of Surobi district, where security 
was ‘extremely poor’.1338  

2.15.2 Conflict background and actors in Kabul province 

As reported by AAN in  July 2015, the  government’s control over Uzbin valley in  Surobi  district had 
decreased in the recent past and members of Hezb-e Islami, which has historically been the stronger 
group in the area, as well as  the  Taliban, were present in the district at  that time.1339 Surobi has a 
significant  strategic  relevance  because  of  its  proximity  to  Kabul  city  and  the  Salang  highway. 1340 
Furthermore, the Uzbin valley of Surobi district served as a relatively easily traversable connection to 
the insecure districts of Tagab in Kapisa and Badpash in Laghman.1341  

According to UNAMA, reporting in November 2018, Surobi ‘has in recent years suffered from several 
community conflicts. Earlier this year, for example, a mediation process […] helped two tribes resolve 
a  longstanding  land  dispute  that  had  turned  violent.  According  to  Surobi  local  council  head 
Rahmatullah, the major causes of conflict in the district are underdevelopment and poverty’.1342  

1331 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Kabul Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url 
1332 Austria, BFA-Staatendokumentation, Afghanistan - Airports [Map], 25 March 2019 
1333  Norway,  Landinfo,  Respons,  Afghanistan:  Sikkerhetssituasjonen  i  den  sentrale  regionen  og  i  det  sentrale  høylandet-
oppdatering, 5 September 2018 url, p. 4  
1334 Diplomat (The), Next Stop Jalalabad: Traveling on One of the World‘s Most Dangerous Roads, 13 December 2015, url; 
Stars and Stripes, Afghans often unintended victims of Taliban attacks on Jalalabad Road, 31 January 2015, url 
1335 Der Spiegel, Autobomben-Anschlag vor Ausländerhotel, 14 January 2019, url 
1336 Al Jazeera, Fatal blast rocks Afghan capital Kabul, 15 January 2019, url 
1337  Norway,  Landinfo,  Respons,  Afghanistan:  Sikkerhetssituasjonen  i  den  sentrale  regionen  og  i  det  sentrale  høylandet-
oppdatering, 5 September 2018 url, p. 4  
1338 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 21 
1339 Foschini, F., Classics of Conflict (2): Reviewing some of Afghanistan‘s most notorious hotspots, AAN, 9 July 2015, url 
1340 War on the Rocks, Remembering the French war in Afghanistan, 10 September 2018, url 
1341 Foschini, F.,  Classics of Conflict (2): Reviewing some of Afghanistan‘s most notorious hotspots, AAN, 9 July 2015, url 
1342 UNAMA, Kabul elders call for participation of all Afghans in peacefully resolving community conflict, 15 November 2018, 
url 

 
                                                           
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In  its  September  2018  update  on  the  security  situation  in  the  central  highlands  of  Afghanistan, 
Landinfo  stated  [informal  translation]  that  it  was  not  aware  of  ISKP  activities  outside  Kabul  city.  In 
Kabul city, the group has carried out numerous attacks; however,  not in the surrounding districts of 
Kabul province. In Kabul province, the major insurgent actor was the Taliban.1343 

In terms of the presence of government security forces, the main part of Kabul province is under the 
responsibility  of  the  Train,  Advise,  and  Assist  Command  -  Capital  (TAAC-C).  Turkish  forces  and 
contingents from other nations lead the TAAC. The district Surobi falls under the responsibility of the 
201st ANA Corps.1344  

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Kabul  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.1345 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region, to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.   

KABUL 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: August-
November 
2017) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment as 
of July 2018) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment as 
of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last 
accessed:1346 
April 2019) 

Taliban 

(assessment 
as of: 
December 
2018) 

Bagrami 

Gov control 

GIRoA control 

GIRoA control 

Chaharasyab 

Gov control 

Dehsabz 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

Estalef 

Gov control 

GIRoA control 

GIRoA control 

Farza 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA control 

GIRoA control 

Guldara 

Gov control 

GIRoA control 

GIRoA control 

Kabul (capital) 

Gov control 

GIRoA control 

GIRoA control 

Kalakan 

Gov control 

GIRoA control 

GIRoA control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control 

Gov control 

Gov control 

Gov control 

Gov control 

Gov control 

Gov control 

Gov control 

1343  Norway,  Landinfo,  Respons,  Afghanistan:  Sikkerhetssituasjonen  i  den  sentrale  regionen  og  i  det  sentrale  høylandet-
oppdatering, 5 September 2018 url, p. 4  
1344 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2018, url, p. 15 
1345 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, End of year report 
(2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
1346 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 

 
                                                           
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—  165  

Khak-e-Jabbar 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Mirbachakot 

Gov control 

GIRoA control 

GIRoA control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Musayi 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Paghman 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Qarabagh 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Shakardara 

Gov control 

GIRoA control 

GIRoA control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Surobi 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 
50%; TB 
control: 
50% 

Gov control 

Gov control 

Gov control: 
80%; TB 
control: 
20% 

Gov control 

Gov control 

TB control: 
80%; Gov 
control: 
20% 

2.15.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.15.3.1 General  

In  2018,  UNAMA  documented  1  866  civilian  casualties  (596  deaths  and  1  270  injured)  in  Kabul 
province.  This  represents  an  increase  of  2 %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were 
suicide/complex attacks, followed by (non-suicide) IEDs and targeted killings.1347  

According  to  Landinfo’s  September  2018  update  on  the  security  situation  in  the  central  highlands 
[informal translation], most of the civilian casualties in the province were recorded in Kabul city, as 
well as in Surobi district.1348  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA  places  the  district  of  Kabul  in  the 
highest  category  and  the  district  of  Surobi  in  the  third  highest  category.  Paghman  and  Qara  Bagh 
districts are in the fourth highest category and remaining districts fall in the two lowest categories.1349 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map  website  reported  324  incidents related to insurgents in Kabul province, of which 36 
were located outside of Kabul city according to the source’s geotagging.1350 

Airstrikes  were  carried  out  by  Afghan  security  forces  in  Surobi  district  in  October  2018,  killing  and 
wounding Taliban insurgents.1351 Moreover, military ground operations were carried out in the same 

1347 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
1348  Norway,  Landinfo,  Respons,  Afghanistan:  Sikkerhetssituasjonen  i  den  sentrale  regionen  og  i  det  sentrale  høylandet-
oppdatering, 5 September 2018, url, p. 4  
1349 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2  
1350 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
1351 Tolonews, 42 Taliban Insurgents Killed In ANSF Operations, 23 October 2018, url; Khaama Press, Taliban militants critically 
wounded in an airstrike in Kabul, 23 October 2018, url 

 
 
                                                           
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district in July 2018.1352 The National Directorate of Security (NDS) purportedly arrested members of 
the Haqqani Network in Bagrami and Paghman districts, as well as in Kabul city in September 2018.1353 

As  reported  by  Landinfo  in  September  2018  [informal  translation],  suicide  attacks,  which  were  the 
most  frequent  method  of  attack  used  in  Kabul  city,  were  also  reported  in  other  parts  of  the 
province.1354 Taliban militants carried out attacks on Afghan security forces’ outposts in Surobi district 
in July 2018, killing and wounding soldiers.1355 Roadside bombs exploded in Paghman district in August 
2018, killing security forces1356 and in March 2018, killing civilians.1357 Moreover, in December 2018 an 
explosion purportedly targeting a security forces’ convoy took place in Paghman district, killing and 
wounding security personnel.1358  

2.15.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA  collected  data  for  the  period  1  January  2018  -  31  December  2018,  reporting  35  persons 
displaced  from  Surobi  district  in  Kabul  province,  all  displaced  to  Pul-e-Alam  district  of  Logar 
province.1359 

No  conflict-induced  internal  displacement  from  Kabul  province  was  reported  by  UNOCHA  for  the 
period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019.1360 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018, reporting 9 422 persons 
displaced  to  Kabul  province  (mainly  to  Kabul  district),  coming  from  Nangarhar,  Ghazni,  Wardak, 
Kapisa,  Baghlan,  Logar,  Kunduz,  Paktya,  Badghis,  Samangan,  Laghman,  Uruzgan  and  Badakhshan 
provinces.1361 UNOCHA registered  a peak of 476  IDPs coming from the provincial capital of Ghazni 
province in mid-August 2018, due to the three-day assault of the Taliban on Ghazni city1362 and a peak 
of 1 400 IDPs coming from Jaghuri district of Ghazni province mid-November 2018.1363 

1352 Khaama Press, Operations underway in Kabul‘s Surobi after last week‘s attack by militants, 9 July 2018, url 
1353 Tolonews, 11 Haqqani Members Arrested In Kabul, 5 September 2018, url 
1354  Norway,  Landinfo,  Respons,  Afghanistan:  Sikkerhetssituasjonen  i  den  sentrale  regionen  og  i  det  sentrale  høylandet-
oppdatering, 5 September 2018, url, p. 4  
1355 Khaama Press, Afghan army helicopter crashes in Kabul, leaving one wounded, 2 August 2018, url 
1356 Khaama Press, Army soldiers suffer casualties in an explosion in Kabul, 6 August 2018, url 
1357 Siasat Daily (The), 2 killed in roadside blast in Afghanistan, 19 March 2018, url 
1358 Khaama Press, 6 killed, 6 wounded in Kabul explosion, 11 December 2018, url 
1359 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url   
1360 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 24 March 2019, url  
1361 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 1 - 7 January 2018, 8 January 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict 
Displacement  2018,  last  updated:  28  January  2019,  url;  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan  Weekly  Field  Report,  15  -  21  January,  22 
January 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 5 - 11 February, 12 February 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 4 - 11 March 2018, 11 March 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 
26 March - 1 April, 9 April 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 23 - 29 April 2018, 30 April 2018, url, 
p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 30 April - 6 May 2018, 7 May 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly 
Field  Report,  14  -  21  May  2018,  22  May  2018,  url,  p.  1;  UNOCHA,  Humanitarian  Regional  Team  (HRT)  -  Central  Region 
Afghanistan, 28 May 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 28 May - 3 June 2018, 4 June 2018, url, p. 1; 
UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 18 - 24 June 2018, 25 June 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 9 - 15 July 2018, 16 July 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 30 July - 5 August 2018, 6 August 
2018,  url,  p.  1;  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan  Weekly  Field  Report,  13  -  19  August  2018,  20  August  2018,  url,  p.  1;  UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 6 - 12 August 2018, 14 August 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 
3 - 9 September, 10 September, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 10 - 16 September 2018, 17 September 
2018,  url,  p.  1;  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan  Weekly  Field  Report,  24  -  30  September,  30  September  2018,  url,  p.  1;  UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 8 - 14 October 2018, 14 October 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 
5 - 11 November 2018, 12 November 2018, url, p. 1    
1362  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan:  Ghazni  Conflict,  Update  No.  2,  15  August  2018,  url;  UNOCHA,  Humanitarian  Needs  Overview 
Afghanistan 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 11; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 
2019, url 
1363 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Ghazni 
Armed Clashes, Flash Update No. 1, 14 November 2018, url; UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Kabul Province 
-  Meeting  Summary,  15  November  2018,  url,  p.  1;  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan:  Ghazni  Armed  Clashes  Flash  Update  No.  2,  17 

                                                           
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—  167  

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019, reporting 1 176 persons 
displaced to Kabul province, all to Kabul district. These IDPs are mainly coming from Tagab and Nejrab 
districts in Kapisa province (889 IDPs) and from neighbouring Logar, Ghazni and Baghlan provinces. 1364 

District 

Surobi 

Kabul 

Bagrami 

Dehsabz 

Displaced from 
(2018) 

Displaced to (2018) 

Displaced from 
(2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

35 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

9 254 

98 

70 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

1 176 

/ 

/ 

UNOCHA’s Humanitarian Response Plan of December 2018 classified Kabul as one of the 12 provinces 
with large concentrations of IDPs and returnees who are most affected by the ongoing conflict and 
drought.1365 IOM ranked Kabul district third out of the top 20 districts hosting the most returnees and 
IDPs from January to June 20181366 and seventh out of the top 25 districts hosting most returnees and 
IDPs from October to December 2018.1367 

According to UNHCR, Kabul and Nangarhar provinces are the main areas of return since 2002 and into 
2018.1368  Kabul  province  remains  a  particularly  attractive  return  destination  and  is  described  by 
UNHCR as one of the four provinces with the highest percentage of returnees who did not originate 
there.1369 

November  2018,  url,  p.  1;  UNOCHA,  Operational  Coordination  Team  (OCT)  -  Kabul  Province  -  Meeting  Summary,  18 
November 2018, url, p. 1; Tolonews, Taliban Attack Jaghori Following ANSF Operation, 20 November 2018, url; Tolonews, 
Poor Living Conditions Plague Ghanzi, Uruzgan IDP’s, 30 November 2018, url 
1364 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 24 March 2019, url 
1365 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: 2019 Update to the 2018-2010 Humanitarian Response Plan, 21 December 2018, url, p. 33 
1366 IOM, Baseline Mobility Assessment: Summary Results January - March 2018, 31 March 2018, url, p. 5; IOM, Baseline 
Mobility Assessment: Summary Results April - June 2018, 25 September 2018, url, p. 5 
1367 IOM, Baseline Mobility Assessment: Summary Results October - December 2018, 15 March 2019, url, p. 5  
1368 UNHCR, Fact Sheet Afghanistan, April 2018, url, p. 2; UNHCR, Fact Sheet Afghanistan, May 2018, url, p. 2; UNHCR, Fact 
Sheet Afghanistan, June 2018, url, p. 2; UNHCR, Fact Sheet Afghanistan, 30 September 2018, url, p. 2; UNHCR, Afghanistan 
Voluntary Repatriation Update, October 2018, url, p. 4 
1369 UNHCR, Returnee and Internally Displaced Persons Monitoring Report - Final Report, May 2018, url, p. 19 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
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2.16 Kandahar 

2.16.1 General description of the province 

 
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—  169  

The province of Kandahar is situated in the south of Afghanistan, bordering on Uruzgan and Zabul to 
the north, Helmand to the west, and Pakistan to the south and east.1370 Kandahar is divided into the 
following districts: Arghandab, Arghestan, Daman, Ghorak, the provincial capital Kandahar, Khakrez, 
Maruf, Maywand, Miyanishin,  Nesh,  Panjwayi, Reg (Shiga), Shahwalikot, Shorabak,  Spinboldak, and 
Zheray,  as  well  as  the  ‘temporary’  districts  of  Dand  and  Takhtapul.1371  Temporary  districts  are 
administrative units that ‘[…] have been approved after entry into force of the 2004 constitution by 
the  president  due  to  security  or  other  considerations,  but  have  not  yet  been  approved  by 
parliament.’1372 

According to  Afghanistan CSO  estimates, the population of Kandahar  is 1 337 183 in 2018/19, with 
596 423  of  its  residents  living  in  the  provincial  capital.1373  The  majority  of  Kandahar's  population 
belongs to Pashtun tribes, with smaller groups of Baloch, Hazara and Tajiks, as well as other ethnicities, 
which are usually referred to as Farsiwan, i.e. Farsi/Dari speakers.1374  

The Ring Road connects the provincial capital of Kandahar with the major population centres of Herat 
and Kabul. In March 2018, the Afghan news portal Tolonews described the highway as being ‘[...] in 
extremely bad condition due to heavy road usage, a lack of maintenance and continued attacks by 
insurgents.’1375 A northbound road towards Uruzgan forks in Kandahar City. Heading southwards, a 
road  connects  the  city  of  Kandahar  with  the  Afghan-Pakistani  border  crossing  at  Spin  Boldak-
Chaman.1376 In October 2018, the border crossing reportedly has been closed due to clashes between 
Afghan and Pakistani security forces.1377 According to the airport map of the Austrian COI department, 
an  airport  with  scheduled  passenger  services  to  domestic  and  international  destinations  exists  in 
Kandahar City.1378 

In 2016, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline project, aiming at transporting 
gas  from  Turkmenistan  to  India,  was  inaugurated.1379  The  pipeline  is  projected  to  lead  through 
Afghanistan alongside the Ring Road from Herat to Kandahar1380 and would therefore intersect Taliban-
controlled areas. The Taliban reportedly agreed to the project and vowed not to attack construction 
workers.1381 However, in May 2018, Arab News reported that five workers had been killed and one was 
abducted by unidentified gunmen in Kandahar.1382 

According  to  the  2018  UNODC  Opium  Survey,  after  neighbouring  Helmand,  Kandahar  hosted  the 
second largest opium-poppy cultivating area in Afghanistan in 2018. Compared to 2017, the size of 
Kandahar's opium-poppy acreage decreased by 16 % in 2018.1383 The main opium-poppy cultivating 
areas have been reportedly the districts of Maywand, Zheray, Nesh, Spinboldak, and Panjwayi.1384  

1370 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Kandahar Province - District Atlas, April 2014, url 
1371 Afghanistan, IEC, 2018 Wolesi Jirga Elections – Results by Polling Stations: Province Kandahar, 2018, url; Afghanistan, 
CSO, ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 33 
1372 Ruttig, T., The Afghanistan Election Conundrum (12): Good news and bad news about district numbers, AAN, 16 August 
2018, url 
1373 Afghanistan, CSO, ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 33 
1374 Naval Postgraduate School, Kandahar Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1375 Tolonews, Seven Die In Kandahar-Herat Highway Accident, 14 March 2018, url; Tolonews, Govt Asked To Reconstruct 
Kabul-Kandahar Highway, 1 June 2018, url  
1376 iMMAP, Afghanistan Administrative Map, 19 September 2017, url; Diplomat (The), Kabul's Plan to Realize Afghanistan’s 
Geographic Dividend, 5 December 2017, url 
1377 Pajhwok Afghan News, Afghan, Pakistani forces clash over border fence, 14 October 2018, url; National (The), Pakistan 
and Afghan forces clash at border crossing, 16 October 2018, url 
1378 Austria, BFA-Staatendokumentation, Afghanistan - Airports [Map], 25 March 2019 
1379 Tolonews, All You Need To Know About TAPI Project, 24 February 2018, url 
1380 Tolonews, All You Need To Know About TAPI Project, 24 February 2018, url 
1381 Arab News, Five working to clear way for gas pipeline killed in Afghanistan, 21 May 2018, url 
1382 Arab News, Five working to clear way for gas pipeline killed in Afghanistan, 21 May 2018, url 
1383 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 17 
1384 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 30 

 
                                                           
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2.16.2 Conflict background and actors in Kandahar 

Kandahar is reportedly the ‘birthplace’ of the Taliban and therefore has symbolic importance for the 
group.1385 Additionally, its location bordering the Pakistani province of Balochistan, which ‘[...] serves 
as  the  group's  safe  haven  as  well  as  a  prime  recruitment  center,’  and  the  role  of  opium-poppy 
cultivation  in  the  province,  add  strategic  importance  to  Kandahar.1386  While  Xinhua  News  Agency 
stated that the security situation has been improving in the province1387 and Reuters described the 
province as ‘relatively secure’ in May 2018,1388 Khaama Press and LWJ reported an increase in Taliban 
attacks  throughout  late  2017  to  early  2019.1389  According  to  the  Afghan  news  portal  Ariana  News, 
Kandahar ‘[...] witnessed a sharp increase in deadly attacks by the militants in recent months where 
Afghan  security  forces  and  their  international  allies  have  also  doubled  counter-attacks  [...].’ 1390 
Kandahar has  been one of  the  four  provinces with the highest casualty rates in 2018, according to 
Pajhwok Afghan News.1391 

Listing several murders of women with public profiles an article about such murders in Afghanistan 
published  in  the  London  Review  of  Books  indicated  that  the  situation  of  women  deteriorated 
significantly in Kandahar after foreign donors, who had been fostering women's rights, largely left the 
province. Citing an NGO representative of Kandahar, she stated that ‘[...] the Western presence had 
produced a generation of educated women society [in Kandahar] had no use for.’1392  

AAN credited the years of relative stability in the province to the presence of the powerful strongman 
and police chief General Abdul  Razeq. The US allegedly backed Razeq because of his strong stance 
against  the  Taliban.1393  Human  Rights  Watch  reported  on  several  war  crimes  by  Razeq  and  his 
followers, which the US and Afghan governments reportedly largely ignored for the sake of security in 
Kandahar.1394  According  to  AAN,  ‘Razeq’s  rule  drove  the  insurgency,  but  also  contained  it’:  Razeq 
removed the Taliban from Kandahar City and its surrounding districts, while the Taliban control over 
more  distant  areas  reportedly  remained  ‘significant  but  static.’1395  In  October  2018,  Razeq  was 
assassinated, allegedly by the Taliban.1396 AAN assumed that power struggles are a likely going to be 
the result of Razeq’s death, as Razeq’s former post as provincial  police chief is a lucrative position 
thanks to the opium-poppy industry in neighbouring Helmand.1397 

1385 ISW, Regional Command South, n.d., url 
1386 LWJ, Taliban overruns Afghan army camp in Kandahar, 19 October 2017, url; Reuters, Heavy casualties as blast rocks 
Afghan city of Kandahar, 22 May 2018, url 
1387 Xinhua News Agency, Two civilians injured in S. Afghan shoot out, 11 March, url 
1388 Reuters, Heavy casualties as blast rocks Afghan city of Kandahar, 22 May 2018, url  
1389 Khaama Press, Afghan forces suffer casualties in Kandahar VBIED suicide attack, 28 September 2017, url; LWJ, Taliban 
overruns Afghan army camp in Kandahar, 19 October 2017, url; Khaama Press, Explosion targets military convoy in Kandahar 
province, 11 March 2018, url; Khaama Press, 3 terrorist networks busted in Kandahar province, 22 January 2019, url  
1390 Ariana News, 11 Children Killed as Car Bomb Targets Foreign Forces Convoy in Kandahar, 30 April 2018, url 
1391 Pajhwok Afghan News, 2018 casualties indicate 7 percent surge, 3 January 2019, url 
1392 Jeong, M., Diary: Femicide in Kandahar, 31 August 2017, url. May Jeong is a visiting scholar at the New York University 
Journalism Institute. 
1393 Ruttig, T., The Killing of Razeq: Removing the Taleban’s strongest foe in Kandahar, an indirect hit at elections, AAN, 19 
October 2018, url 
1394 HRW, “Today We Shall All Die”: Afghanistan’s Strongmen and the Legacy of Impunity, 3 March 2015, url; Ruttig, T., The 
Killing of Razeq: Removing the Taleban’s strongest foe in Kandahar, an indirect hit at elections, AAN, 19 October 2018, url 
1395 Ruttig, T., The Killing of Razeq: Removing the Taleban’s strongest foe in Kandahar, an indirect hit at elections, AAN, 19 
October 2018, url 
1396 Ruttig, T., The Killing of Razeq: Removing the Taleban’s strongest foe in Kandahar, an indirect hit at elections, AAN, 19 
October 2018, url 
1397 Ruttig, T., The Killing of Razeq: Removing the Taleban’s strongest foe in Kandahar, an indirect hit at elections, AAN, 19 
October 2018, url 

                                                           
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The Afghan forces, aided by foreign forces, carried out several operations in Kandahar in 2018 and 
early 2019.1398  LWJ  claimed  in  May  2018 that  ‘[...] Afghan security forces appear  to be focusing on 
Taliban forces in the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar [...].’1399  

Kandahar is under the responsibility of the 205th ANA Corps.1400 

The following table provides an overview of control of the districts in Kandahar province based on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.1401 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region,  to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.     

KANDAHAR 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: August-
November 
2017) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of 
October 
2018) 

LWJ 

Taliban 

(last 
accessed:1402 
April 2019) 

(assessment as 
of December 
2018) 

Kandahar (Dand) 
(capital) 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
control 

GIRoA 
control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control 

Zheray 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence/ 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 
60%; TB control: 
40% 

Daman 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
control 

GIRoA 
control 

GIRoA 
control 

GIRoA 
control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control 

Contested 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
control 

GIRoA 
control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

INS Activity 

INS Activity 

Contested 

Gov control: 
60%; TB control: 
40% 

TB control: 90%; 
Gov control: 
10% 

Gov control: 
60%; TB control: 
40% 

TB control: 98%; 
Gov control: 2% 

Arghandab 

Arghestan 

Panjwayi 

Maruf 

1398  RFE/RL,  'Dozens'  Of  Taliban  Militants  Killed  In  Southern  Afghanistan,  2  February  2018,  url;  Khaama  Press,  Explosion 
targets military convoy in Kandahar province, 11 March 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Over 70 militants killed, scores 
injured in nation-wide operations: MoD, 4 January 2019, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Militants, civilians suffered casualties in 
Kandahar raid, 19 January 2019, url; Khaama Press, 3 terrorist networks busted in Kandahar province, 22 January 2019, url; 
Khaama Press, Deadly airstrikes target Taliban training camp in Kandahar province, 28 January 2019, url 
1399 LWJ, Taliban’s 2018 offensive encompasses all regions of Afghanistan, 17 May 2018, url 
1400 NATO, Resolute Support Afghanistan, Afghan 205th Corps Increases Capabilities with Eagle Strike Company, 16 July 2018, 
url 
1401 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, 23 April 2019, url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of 
Jihad, End of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
1402 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 

 
                                                           
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Spinboldak 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
control 

GIRoA 
control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 
65%; TB control: 
35% 

TB control: 90%; 
Gov control: 
10% 

TB control: 90%; 
Gov control: 
10% 

TB control: 90%; 
Gov control: 
10% 

TB control: 97%; 
Gov control: 3% 

Maywand 

Shahwalikot 

Khakrez 

Nesh 

Ghorak 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

INS Activity 

INS Activity 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

INS Activity 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

INS Activity 

INS Activity 

Contested 

TB control  

Reg 

Taliban control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

TB control  

Miyanshin 

Shorabak 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

INS activity 

INS Activity 

Taliban control 

TB control) 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

TB control  

Takhta Pul 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

Gov control: 
65%; TB control: 
35% 

2.16.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.16.3.1 General 

In 2018, UNAMA documented 537 civilian casualties (204 deaths and 333 injured) in the province of 
Kandahar. This represents a decrease of 25 % compared to 2017. Leading causes of casualties were 
(non-suicide) IEDs, followed by ground engagements and search operations.1403 Between 1 January 
and 30 September 2018, UNAMA reported that ‘pressure-plate IEDs left over from fighting in recent 
years continue to be of particular concern in many parts of Kandahar, where pressure-plate and other 
non-suicide IEDs caused most of the civilian casualties attributed to Anti-Government Element use of 
IEDs  in  the  province.  Anti-Government  Elements  also  continue  to  impact  civilians  with  remote-
controlled  IEDs  targeting  Pro-Government  Forces  in  civilian  populated  areas,  particularly  in 
Kandahar’.1404 

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA  places  the  districts  of  Kandahar, 

1403 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
1404 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Special Report, Increasing Harm to Afghan Civilians from 
the Deliberate and Indiscriminate Use of Improvised Explosive Devices, October 2018, url, pp. 7-8 

 
                                                           
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—  173  

Maiwand and Shah Wali Kot in the highest category and the districts of Khakrez, Maruf, Miyanshin and 
Nesh  in  the  second  highest  category.  The  districts  of  Arghestan,  Daman,  Ghorak,  Spin  Boldak,  and 
Zheray  are  placed  in  the  category  below  while  Arghandab  and  Panjwayi  fall  in  the  fourth  highest 
category. The remaining districts are in lower categories.1405 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 243 incidents related to insurgents in Kandahar province.1406 

The Taliban conducted several attacks on security checkpoints in the province throughout 2018 and 
early 2019, resulting in casualties.1407 Furthermore, IED blasts caused casualties among civilians,1408 
killing for instance eleven children in a car bomb blast targeted at a convoy of foreign forces in April 
2018.1409 

RFE/RL reported in October 2018 that four civilians were accidentally killed in an airstrike by the Afghan 
Air Force in the district of Maruf. AAF allegedly targeted Taliban insurgents, who mixed with a wedding 
procession after they had launched an attack.1410 In February 2018 Afghan special forces reportedly 
‘summarily  executed  civilians  in  Kandahar  province  during  military  operations  from  January  31  to 
February 1, 2018’ according to Human Rights Watch.1411 

The 2018 parliamentary election was postponed for a week in Kandahar due to the assassination of 
General Abdul Razeq shortly before.1412 In late September 2018, an election candidate from the Kuchi 
community, a nomadic Pashtun group, was shot dead in the province.1413 

2.16.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 789 persons 
displaced from Kandahar province. They were mainly displaced within the province itself.1414 

No conflict-induced internal displacement from Kandahar province was reported by UNOCHA for the 
period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019.1415 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting  3 439  persons 
displaced to Kandahar province, including 1 551 from Helmand.1416 

No  conflict-induced  internal  displacement  to  Kandahar  province  was  reported  by  UNOCHA  for  the 
period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019.1417 

District 

Ghorak 

Displaced from 
(2018) 

Displaced to (2018) 

Displaced from 
(2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

127 

/ 

/ 

/ 

1405 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2 
1406 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accesed 1 March 
2019 
1407  RFE/RL,  Dozen  Afghan  Security  Personnel  Killed  In  Taliban  Attacks  ,  18  May  2018,  url;  Arab  News,  Daesh  fighters  in 
Afghanistan kill at least 15 Taliban, 17 July 2018, url; Ariana News, Taliban Suffer Heavy Casualties in Kandahar, 10 May 2018, 
url; Ariana News, Taliban Blow Up Afghan Army Outpost in Kandahar, 2 January 2019, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 5 ANA 
soldiers killed, 6 wounded in Taliban assault, 2 January 2019, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Border police among 23 killed in 
Kandahar firefight, 5 January 2019, url 
1408 Reuters, Heavy casualties as blast rocks Afghan city of Kandahar, 22 May 2018, url 
1409 Ariana News, 11 Children Killed as Car Bomb Targets Foreign Forces Convoy in Kandahar, 30 April 2018, url 
1410 RFE/RL, Air Strike Kills Four Civilians In Southern Afghanistan, 5 October 2018, url 
1411 HRW, Afghanistan: Alleged Summary Executions by Special Forces, 21 February 2018, url 
1412 Van Bijlert, M.,, Before Election Day Three: Looking at Kandahar’s upcoming vote, AAN, 26 October 2018, url 
1413 RFE/RL, Afghan Candidates Killed On The Campaign Trail, 19 October 2018, url 
1414 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 20 January 2019, url 
1415 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 
1416 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 
1417 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 

 
                                                           
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Khakrez 

Maruf 

Maywand 

Nesh 

Reg 

Shahwalikot 

Kandahar / Dand 

305 

6 

47 

163 

10 

131 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

3 439 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

 
 
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—  175  

2.17 Kapisa 

2.17.1 General description of the province 

The  province  of  Kapisa  is  situated  in  central-eastern  Afghanistan,  surrounded  by  the  provinces  of 
Panjshir to the north, Laghman to the east, Kabul to the south, and Parwan to the west.1418 Kapisa is 
divided  into  the  following  districts:  Alasay,  Hisa-e  Awal-e-Kohestan,  Hissa-e-Duwum-e-Kohestan, 
Kohband, Mahmud-e-Raqi, Nejrab, and Tagab. Mahmud-e-Raqi is the provincial capital of Kapisa.1419 

The Afghan CSO estimated the population of Kapisa at 471 574 in 2018/19.1420 The major ethnic groups 
of Kapisa are Tajik, Pashtun, and Nuristani,1421 with the Tajiks, which are the largest single group, living 
mainly in the northern part of the province.1422   

A primary road connects the capital of Kapisa to Kabul City.1423 

According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, Kapisa was not among Afghanistan's ten main opium-
poppy cultivating provinces in 2018.1424 The size of the opium-poppy acreage reportedly decreased by 
60 %  in  2018  compared  to  2017.  Opium-poppy  was  mainly  cultivated  in  the  districts  of  Tagab  and 
Alasay.1425  

1418 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Kapisa Province - District Atlas, April 2014, url 
1419 Afghanistan, IEC, 2018 Wolesi Jirga Elections – Results by Polling Stations: Province Kapisa, 2018, url; Afghanistan, CSO, 
۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 6 
1420 Afghanistan, CSO, ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 2 
1421 Foreign Policy, Are Ethnic Politics Afghanistan’s Great Hope?, 11 November 2014, url; US, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Kapisa Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1422 Ali, O., Fire in the Pashai Hills: A two-district case study from Kapisa, AAN, 6 April 2015, url 
1423 iMMAP, Afghanistan Administrative Map, 19 September 2017, url 
1424 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 17 
1425 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 23 

 
 
                                                           
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2.17.2 Conflict background and actors in Kapisa 

According to AAN, Kapisa has strategic importance, as ‘[...] it is a small province in the middle of almost 
everything:  it  is  easy  for  insurgents  to  try  and  reach  Kapisa’s  capital  and  the  neighbouring 
provinces.’1426 

A  2014  report  by  the  New  York  Times  stated  that  the  battle  between  Taliban  insurgents  and 
government forces intensified after the French ISAF forces left the province in 2012. The New York 
Times  traced  the  Taliban's  success  partially  to  a  lack  of  capacity  or  ‘unwillingness’  by  the  Afghan 
security  forces  to  overtake  Taliban-controlled  areas  in  Kapisa,  leading  to  US  forces'  allegations  of 
infiltration  of  the  ANA  by  the  insurgents  or  close  cooperation  between  the  Afghan  Army  and  the 
insurgents The Taliban, on the other hand, reportedly were a ‘disciplined’ force in Kapisa, ‘[...] able to 
operate freely.’1427 

AAN  surmised  in  2012  that  Kapisa  might  be  ‘sociologically  divided’  into  southern  districts  more 
sympathetic  towards  the  insurgents,  and  the  north,  ‘where  allegiance  to  Jamiat-e  Islami  makes 
community support for the Taliban less likely’.1428 In 2015, the southern districts of Alasay, Nijrab, and 
Tagab  were  reported  to  be  the  most  insecure  districts  of  Kapisa.  According  to  AAN,  the  political 
landscape  in  Kapisa  was  characterized  by  a  ‘[...]  never-ending  story  of  local  warlords  and  Taleban 
competing  with  each  other  [...]’,  and  the  poor  economic  situation  of  many  residents  which 
‘[contributed] to the high rates of militancy and private feuds [...]’ in some districts of the province. 1429 

Kapisa is under the responsibility of the 201st ANA Corps.1430 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Kapisa  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.1431 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region,  to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.    

KAPISA 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: August-
November 
2017) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment as 
of July 2018) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment as 
of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last 
accessed:1432 
April 2019) 

Tagab 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Taliban 

(assessment 
as of 
December 
2018) 

TB control: 
70%; Gov 
control: 
30% 

1426 Foschini, F., In Kabul’s Shadow: the attacks in the provinces on 15-16 April, AAN, 24 April 2012, url 
1427 New York Times (The), Hour’s Drive Outside Kabul, Taliban Reign, 22 November 2014, url 
1428 Foschini, F., In Kabul’s Shadow: the attacks in the provinces on 15-16 April, AAN, 24 April 2012, url 
1429 Ali, O., Fire in the Pashai Hills: A two-district case study from Kapisa, AAN, 6 April 2015, url 
1430 Global Security, Afghan National Army (ANA) - Order of Battle, n.d., url, last modified 6 September 2018 
1431 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, 23 April 2019, url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of 
Jihad, End of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
1432 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated.  

                                                           
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—  177  

Nejrab 

Alasay 

Mahmud-e-Raqi 
(capital) 

Hisa-e-Awal-e-
Kohestan 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Gov control 

Gov control 

Hisa-e-Duwum-e-
Kohestan 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 
50%; TB 
control: 
50% 

TB control: 
95%; Gov 
control: 5% 

Gov control 

Gov control 

Gov control 

Gov control: 
70%; TB 
control: 
30% 

Kohband 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA control 

GIRoA control 

2.17.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.17.3.1 General 

In  2018,  UNAMA  documented  139  civilian  casualties  (39  deaths  and  100  injured)  in  Kapisa.  This 
represents  an  increase  of  38 %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were  ground 
engagements, followed by aerial attacks and (non-suicide) IEDs.1433 

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA  places  the  district  of  Tagab  in  the 
highest  category,  the  district  of  Nijrab  in  the  second  highest  category,  the  district  of  Alasay  in  the 
category below and the remaining districts in the two lowest categories.1434 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 81 incidents related to insurgents in Kapisa province.1435 

In  February  2018,  Pajhwok  Afghan  News  reported  that  the  Taliban,  as  well  as  the  ALP,  have  been 
collecting ushr taxes from Tagab's residents for years now.1436 In 2018 and 2019, government forces 
reportedly carried out several operations in Kapisa, with US support, mainly in the districts of Tagab 
and Nijrab in 2018 and early 2019,1437 retaking several villages in Tagab from the Taliban in January 
2019.1438 

1433 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
1434 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2 
1435 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
1436 Pajhwok Afghan News, Both Taliban, ALP take ushr from Tagab residents, 20 February 2018, url 
1437 Khaama Press, ISIS militants among 7 killed in Nangarhar and Kapisa drone strikes, 1 March 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan 
News, Taliban suffered heavy losses in joint operations: NATO, 6 March 2018, url; AA, Afghan government says 171 terrorists 
killed, 11 March 2018, url; RFE/RL, Afghan Army: Dozens Of Militants Killed In Operations, 21 April 2018, url; New York Times 
(The), Airstrikes Are Killing More Civilians in  Afghanistan, U.N. Warns, 26  September 2018,  url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 8 
Taliban, 2 children killed in Laghman, Kapisa airstrikes, 26 November 2018, url; Xinhua News Agency, Airstrike kills 10 Taliban 
militants in Afghanistan's Kapisa province, 1 December 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 50 rebels killed, 80pc of Tagab area 
cleared, 6 December 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 14 Taliban killed in ongoing Kapisa operation, 2 January 2019, url 
1438 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban judge reconciles with govt in Kapisa, 18 January 2019, url 

 
 
                                                           
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In September 2018, an airstrike killed nine civilians in the district of Tagab.1439 In late November 2018, 
two children reportedly were killed by an airstrike in Tagab district.1440 

According to the website of the US Central Command, the Taliban shadow governor of Kapisa, as well 
as the district shadow governor of Tagab, were killed in a US airstrike in July 2018.1441 

2.17.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018, reporting 7 560 persons 
displaced from Kapisa province, mainly within the province itself or in neighbouring provinces Kabul 
and Parwan.1442 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019, reporting 1 330 persons 
displaced from Nejrab and Tagab districts in Kapisa province, mainly to Kabul district of Kabul province 
and within the province itself in Mahmud-e-Raqi district.1443 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018, reporting 5 789 persons 
displaced  to  Kapisa  province,  mainly  coming  from  within  the  province  itself  (5 600  IDPs)  or  from 
neighbouring provinces Parwan, Laghman, Nuristan, Baghlan, Samangan and Kunar.1444 

UNOCHA  collected  data  for  the  period  1  January  2019  -  28  February  2019,  reporting  350  persons 
displaced to Mahmud-e-Raqi district in Kapisa province, all coming from within the province itself from 
Nejrab district.1445 

District 

Tagab 

Alasay 

Nejrab 

Mahmud-e-Raqi 

Hisa-e-Duwum-e-
Kohestan 

Hisa-e-Awal-e-
Kohestan 

Displaced from 
(2018) 

Displaced to (2018) 

Displaced from 
(2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

5 019 

693 

1 848 

/ 

/ 

/ 

3 402 

/ 

1 351 

854 

14 

168 

245 

/ 

1 085 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

350 

/ 

/ 

Throughout  2018,  UNOCHA  continuously  reported  conflict  induced  displacement  in  and  from  the 
insecure  districts  of  Tagab,  Alasay  and  Nejrab.  According  to  UNOCHA,  the  main  reasons  for  these 
displacements  are  military  (clearing)  operations,  insecurity  and  ongoing  armed  conflict, threats  by 
non-state armed groups, economic problems and frequent intimidation. The IDP families mainly found 
refuge in the Tamir area (district center) of Tagab, the district center of Nejrab and in the districts of 
Mahmud-e-Raqi, Hisa-e-Duwum-e-Kohestan and Hisa-e-Awal-e-Kohestan.1446 

1439 UNAMA, Concerns About Rising Number of Civilian Casualties from Airstrikes, 25 September 2018, url 
1440 Pajhwok Afghan News, 8 Taliban, 2 children killed in Laghman, Kapisa airstrikes, 26 November 2018, url 
1441 US, Central Command, Taliban’s Two Top Leaders in Kapisa Province Killed, 27 July 2018, url 
1442 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url 
1443 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 24 March 2019, url  
1444 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url 
1445 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 24 March 2019, url  
1446 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Kapisa Province - Meeting Summary, 3 January 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 1 - 7 January 2018, 8 January 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team 
(OCT) - Kapisa Province - Meeting Summary, 18 January 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 15 - 21 
January, 22 January 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Kapisa Province - Meeting Summary, 

 
                                                           
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In April 2018, UNOCHA reported a peak of 1 000 displaced families (7 000 individuals) due to an ANSF 
military operation (by the name of Sailab) in the insecure areas of Afghania, Ghain and Pacha Ghan of 
Nejrab district, launched to ‘clear’ the region from opposition groups.1447 The IDP families settled in 
Maghdud Khil, Koramai, China, Tarinan, and Chokambaz villages of Nejrab district or were displaced 
to ‘secure districts’ of Kapisa (like the provincial capital Mahmud-e-Raqi) and to Kabul.1448  

In January 2019, the provincial governor of Kapisa informed UNOCHA of the launch of ANSF military 
clearing operations in Nejrab district, leading to a ‘big number of the population’ being displaced from 
their places of origin such as Afghania, Ghain, Shpee and Pacha Ghan areas of Nejrab district to the 
center  of  the  district,  Hisa-e-Awal-e-Kohestan,  Hisa-e-Duwum-e-Kohestan  and  Mahmud-e-Raqi 
districts of Kapisa province.1449 According to the governor, cited in a UNOCHA meeting report from 
January 2019, at that time, ANSF military operations were still ongoing in insecure areas of Kapisa 
province and several villages of Nejrab and Tagab districts became safe, which caused some of the 
displaced families to return home.1450 

Throughout  2018,  UNOCHA  reported  regularly  on  IDPs  arriving  in  Kapisa  province  coming  from 
insecure areas  in  neighbouring provinces such as Baghlan,  Samangan, Laghman, Nuristan, Parwan, 
Shigal Wa Sheltan district of Kunar province and Surobi district of Kabul province. These IDPs mainly 
went to the provincial capital of Mahmud-e-Raqi and in Hisa-e-Awal-e-Kohestan district.1451 

According to UNHCR Kapisa is one of the four provinces with the highest percentage of returnees who 
originate there but choose to live somewhere else once they return.1452  

14 March 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Kapisa Province - Meeting Summary, 8 May 2018, 
url, pp. 1-2; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 21 - 27 May 2018, 28 May 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Operational 
Coordination Team (OCT) - Kapisa Province - Meeting Summary, 31 May 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 28 May - 3 June 2018, 4 June 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Kapisa Province - 
Meeting Summary, 30 July 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 30 July - 5 August 2018, 6 August 2018, 
url,  p.  1;  UNOCHA,  Operational  Coordination  Team  (OCT)  -  Kapisa  Province  -  Meeting  Summary,  31  May  2018,  url,  p.  1; 
UNOCHA,  Operational  Coordination  Team  (OCT)  -  Kapisa  Province  -  Meeting  Summary,  26  September  2018,  url,  p.  1; 
UNOCHA,  Afghanistan  Weekly  Field  Report,  24  -  30  September,  30  September  2018,  url,  p.  1;  UNOCHA,  Operational 
Coordination Team (OCT) - Kapisa Province - Meeting Summary, 7 November 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly 
Field Report, 5 - 11 November 2018, 12 November 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 4 - 9 December 
2018, 9 December 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Kapisa Province - Meeting Summary, 11 
December 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Kapisa Province - Meeting Summary, 6 January 
2019, url, p. 1 
 1447 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Kapisa Province - Meeting Summary, 18 April 2018, url, p. 1 
 1448 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Kapisa Province - Meeting Summary, 18 April 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 16 - 22 April 2018, 23 April 2018, url, p. 1 
1449 UNOCHA, Provincial Disaster Management Committee (PDMC) - Kapisa Province - Meeting Summary, 29 January 2019, 
url, p. 1 
1450 UNOCHA, Provincial Disaster Management Committee (PDMC) - Kapisa Province - Meeting Summary, 29 January 2019, 
url, p. 1 
1451 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Kapisa Province - Meeting Summary, 3 January 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 1 - 7 January 2018, 8 January 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team 
(OCT) - Kapisa Province - Meeting Summary, 18 January 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 12 - 18 
March 2018, 19 March 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Kapisa Province - Meeting Summary, 
31 May 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 28 May - 3 June 2018, 4 June 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 30 July - 5 August 2018, 6 August 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 
1-7 October 2018, 8 October 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Kapisa Province - Meeting 
Summary, 7 November 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 5 - 11 November 2018, 12 November 
2018, url, p. 1 
1452 UNHCR, Returnee and Internally Displaced Persons Monitoring Report - Final Report, May 2018, url, p. 19  

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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2.18 Khost 

2.18.1 General description of the province 

The province of Khost is situated in the eastern part of Afghanistan, bordering Pakistan to the east, 
Paktika to the southwest, and Paktya to the west and northwest.1453 Khost is divided into the following 
districts:  Ali  Sher  (Terezayi),  Bak,  Gurbuz,  Jajimaydan,  Khost  (Matun),  Mandozayi  (Esmayel  Khel), 
Muzakhel, Nadirshahkot, Qalandar, Sabari (Yaqubi), Shamal, Spera, and Tani.1454 The provincial capital 
of  Khost  is  the  city  of  Khost.1455  Khost  is  part  of  Loya  Paktya  (i.e.  ‘Greater  Paktya’),  an  area 
encompassing the provinces of Paktya, Paktika and Khost.1456 

The  Afghan  CSO  estimated  the  population  of  Khost  at  614 584  in  2018/19.1457  According  to  AAN 
founder Thomas Ruttig, Khost is part of one of the three major Pashtun regions of Afghanistan.1458 The 
province  is  primarily  inhabited  by  Pashtuns,  with  approximately  1 %  Tajik  and  various  other 
minorities1459 living mostly in the city of Khost.1460 According to the US-based Tribal Analysis Center 
(TAC),1461  the  province  is  inhabited  by  a  large  number  of  tribes,  among  them  the  Zadran  tribe, 

1453 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: South Eastern Region - District Atlas, April 2014, url 
1454 Afghanistan, IEC, 2018 Wolesi Jirga Elections – Results by Polling Stations: Province Khost, 2018, url; Afghanistan, CSO, 
۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 19 
1455 Afghanistan, IEC, 2018 Wolesi Jirga Elections – Results by Polling Stations: Province Khost, 2018, url; Afghanistan, CSO, 
۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 19 
1456 Ruttig, T., Loya Paktia‘s Insurgency: The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity, London, 2009, p. 57 
1457 Afghanistan, CSO, ۱۳۹۷ روﺷﮐ سوﻔﻧ دروآرﺑ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 2 
1458 Ruttig, T., Loya Paktia‘s Insurgency: The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity, London, 2009, p. 57 
1459 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Khost Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1460 TAC, Khost Province District Studies, 20 May 2013, url, p. 8 
1461 TAC is a website that provides pro-bono commentary and analysis on tribal issues; it does not carry out direct fieldwork 
but summarises information from a wide variety of sources. The Board of Editors consists of several scholars and former 
government analysts who worked on tribal issues.    

 
                                                           
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—  181  

namesake  of  the  so-called  ‘Zadran  Arc’,  which  includes  stretches  of  Western  Khost,  Paktya  and 
Paktika.1462 Historically a strong tribe, TAC described the Zadran in 2013 as a ‘loose tribe’, characterized 
by infighting and multiple political affiliations.1463 Furthermore, Kuchi and Musalyan nomads live in 
Khost seasonally.1464 

In  2013,  TAC  described  Khost  as  a  ‘[...]  major  transit  hub  for  trade  from  Pakistan  [...].’1465  Khost 
reportedly has three border crossings with Pakistan (Ghulam Khan, Babrak Tanai and Zazai Maidan). 1466 
According to Pajhwok Afghan News, the key border crossing of Ghulam Khan was closed in 2014 due 
to  military  operations  in  Pakistan's  North  Waziristan  but  reopened  in  March  2018.1467  The  border 
crossing of Zazai Maidan has also been temporarily closed in the past.1468 In 2018, border disputes 
between Afghan and Pakistani security forces caused casualties among the fighting parties, as well as 
among  civilians.1469  RFE/RL  stated  that  the  border  fencing,  and  continued  border  fortifications  by 
Pakistan,  ‘have threatened to disrupt the daily lives of people living in communities that straddle the 
border’.1470  

The  so-called  Khost-Gardez  Pass  connects  Khost  with  neighbouring  Paktya,  Logar  and  ultimately 
Kabul.1471 According to a report by the US-based news site ThinkProgress, the Khost-Logar road leads 
through areas with a strong Taliban presence and hence potential Taliban checkpoints in the provinces 
of Paktya and Logar.1472 According to the airport map produced by the Austrian COI department, an 
airport with scheduled passenger services does not exist in Khost.1473 

The 2018 UNODC Opium Survey reported that Khost has been poppy-free at least since 2013.1474 

2.18.2 Conflict background and actors in Khost 

In  2009,  Thomas  Ruttig  noted  that  Loya  Paktya  –  encompassing  Khost  –  has  never  been  a  Taliban 
stronghold.1475 AAN stated in August 2018 that Khost ‘[...] features an active insurgency, but it remains 
somewhat curtailed by strong tribal affiliations and cohesive local communities.’1476 AAN noted that 
due  to  the  geographical  terrain  of  mountainous  Khost,  insurgents  are  largely  dependent  on  the 
collaboration of locals, as ‘the sworn hostility of even a minor community can be a logistical nightmare 
for insurgents, as they have to rely on mountain routes or secrecy for the security of their movements 

1462 TAC, Khost Province District Studies, 20 May 2013, url, p. 8 
1463 TAC, Khost Province District Studies, 20 May 2013, url, p. 8 
1464 TAC, Khost Province District Studies, 20 May 2013, url, p. 9 
1465 TAC, Khost Province District Studies, 20 May 2013, url, p. 9 
1466 Pajhwok Afghan News, Khost market unaffected by closure of Pakistan border, 8 July 2016, url 
1467 Pakistan Today, Tribesmen, business communities welcome Pak-Afghan Ghulam Khan border opening, 1 May 2018, url; 
Pajhwok Afghan News, Af-Pak trade via Ghulam Khan route set to resume, 5 March 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Khost 
market unaffected by closure of Pakistan border, 8 July 2016, url; Dawn, Ghulam Khan route to open on 7th, 5 March 2018, 
url 
1468 Pajhwok Afghan News, Khost market unaffected by closure of Pakistan border, 8 July 2016, url 
1469 RFE/RL, Afghanistan Returns Captured, Dead Pakistani  Soldiers  After Cross-Border Clash, 16 April 2018, url; Pajhwok 
Afghan News, Zazai Maidan residents clash with Pakistani forces, 15 July 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 5 Pakistani soldiers 
killed in border clash, 16 April 2018, url 
1470 RFE/RL, Afghanistan Returns Captured, Dead Pakistani Soldiers After Cross-Border Clash, 16 April 2018, url 
1471  iMMAP,  Afghanistan  Administrative  Map,  19  September  2017,  url;  New  York  Times  (The),  Costly  Afghanistan  Road 
Project Is Marred by Unsavory Alliances, 1 May 2011, url  
1472 ThinkProgress, Afghans fearful as CIA-backed militias patrol the ground and U.S. drones haunt the skies, 13 December 
2017, url 
1473 Austria, BFA-Staatendokumentation, Afghanistan - Airports [Map], 25 March 2019 
1474 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 19 
1475 Ruttig, T., Loya Paktia‘s Insurgency: The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity, London, 2009, p. 58 
1476 Foschini, F., Hitting Gardez: A vicious attack on Paktia’s Shias, AAN, 18 August 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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and  the  success  of  their  operations.’1477  AAN  assumed  that  ‘this  discourages  acts  that  would 
antagonise whole communities.’1478   

The Haqqani  network reportedly  has  been most active in the ‘Zadran Arc’,1479 with its late founder 
Jalaluddin Haqqani being a member of the Zadran tribe.1480 The group is affiliated with the Taliban, 
though it declared itself independent from the Quetta Shura from 2007 to 2015.1481 Declassified US 
cables quoted by Associated Press (AP) stated that the Haqqani network, contrary to other Taliban 
factions,  ‘[…] functions more in the military area, and is not a force in setting Taliban political or social 
issues’,1482 a perception seemingly shared by Ruttig.1483 

The Haqqani network reportedly maintains close ties to the Pakistani secret service ISI, as well as other 
Pakistani militant groups and Al Qaeda.1484 In 2017, the UN Security Council reported the presence of 
individuals affiliated to Al Qaeda in Khost.1485 Jalaluddin Haqqani reportedly died aged 71 in September 
2018.  According  to  the  Associated  Press  (AP),  it  is  unlikely  that  Haqqani's  death  will  weaken  the 
organization founded by him as Haqqani had already handed over control to his son Serajuddin at an 
earlier point of time.1486 

On the government side, a ‘campaign force’ named Khost Protection Force (KPF) reportedly has been 
the most influential security actor in the province.1487 According to several sources, KPF is supported 
by the CIA and unaccountable to the provincial government. KPF has been accused of human rights 
violations such as extrajudicial killings, torture, and arbitrary arrests, most recently in January 2019 in 
the province of Paktya, as well as in Khost in December 2018.1488 

In 2018 and early 2019, regular Afghan security forces conducted ground operations and airstrikes in 
the province.1489 Khost is under the responsibility of the 203rd ANA Corps.1490 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Khost  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.1491 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region, to another district. If found, clarification is made in 
a separate footnote.     

1477 Foschini, F., Hitting Gardez: A vicious attack on Paktia’s Shias, AAN, 18 August 2018, url 
1478 Foschini, F., Hitting Gardez: A vicious attack on Paktia’s Shias, AAN, 18 August 2018, url 
1479 Ruttig, T., Loya Paktia‘s Insurgency: The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity, London, 2009, p. 62 
1480 AP, Death of Afghan group’s founder unlikely to weaken militants, 4 September 2018, url 
1481 Giustozzi, A., Afghanistan: Taliban’s organization and structure, 23 August 2017, url, p. 9  
1482 AP, Death of Afghan group’s founder unlikely to weaken militants, 4 September 2018, url 
1483 Ruttig, T., Loya Paktia‘s Insurgency: The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity, London, 2009, p. 73 
1484  AP,  Death  of  Afghan  group’s  founder  unlikely  to  weaken  militants,  4  September  2018,  url;  Ruttig,  T.,  Loya  Paktia‘s 
Insurgency:  The  Haqqani  Network  as  an  Autonomous  Entity,  London,  2009,  pp.  75-76;    New  York  Times  (The),  Costly 
Afghanistan Road Project Is Marred by Unsavory Alliances, 1 May 2011, url 
1485 UN Security Council, Twentieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to 
resolution 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, 7 August 2017, url, p. 15 
1486 AP, Death of Afghan group’s founder unlikely to weaken militants, 4 September 2018, url 
1487 Washington Post (The), CIA runs shadow war with Afghan militia implicated in civilian killings, 3 December 2015, url 
1488 Clark, K., Khost Protection Force Accused of Fresh Killings: Six men shot dead in Zurmat, AAN, 21 January 2019, url; New 
York Times (The), C.I.A.’s Afghan Forces Leave a Trail of Abuse and Anger, 31 December 2018, url; Washington Post (The), 
CIA runs shadow war with Afghan militia implicated in civilian killings, 3 December 2015, url 
1489  Xinhua  News  Agency,  Airstrike  kills  4  Haqqani  militants  in  Afghanistan,  26  July  2018,  url;  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  62 
insurgents killed, 17 injured in fresh raids: MoD, 20 September 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 10 Afghan soldiers killed in 
Khost gunbattle, 10 December 2018, url 
1490 Global Security, Afghan National Army (ANA) - Order of Battle, n.d., url 
1491 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, 23 April 2019, url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of 
Jihad, End of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 

                                                           
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—  183  

KHOST 

Bak 

Gurbuz 

Jajimaydan 

Khost (Matun) 
(capital) 

Mandozayi 

Musakhel 

Nadirshahkot 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: August-
November 
2017) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment 
as of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last 
accessed:1492 
April 2019) 

Taliban 

(assessment as of 
December 2018) 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Gov control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control 

/ 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Gov control: 70%; 
TB control: 30% 

Gov control: 65%; 
TB control: 35% 

Qalandar 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

TB control  

Sabari 

Shamal 

Spera 

Tani 

Terazayi 

Alisher 

Ismail Khel 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Gov control: 50%; 
TB control: 50% 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

/ 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control: 40%; 
Gov control: 
40%1493 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

Gov control: 90%; 
TB control: 10% 

Gov control 

1492 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 
1493 The percentages referred to by the Taliban on their website sometimes don’t add up to 100 %. 

 
 
                                                           
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2.18.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.18.3.1 General 

In  2018,  UNAMA  documented  175  civilian  casualties  (84  deaths  and  91  injured)  in  Khost.  This 
represents a decrease of 3 % compared to 2017. Leading causes of casualties were (non-suicide) IEDs, 
followed by targeted killings and search operations.1494 With regard to all of Afghanistan, the same 
source further found that ‘search operations caused 353 civilian casualties (284 deaths and 69 injured) 
with the majority caused by NDS Special Forces and the Khost Protection Force, both of whom are 
supported by international military forces.’ 1495 

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian casualties, and conflict-induced displacements, UNOCHA places the district of Khost (Matun) 
in the second highest category. Musakhel, Sabari, Terezayi and Jaji Maydan are in the third highest 
category, the districts of Mandozayi, Nadir Shah Kot and Bak in the fourth highest category and the 
remaining districts in the two lowest categories.1496 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 67 incidents related to insurgents in Khost province.1497 

According to Khaama Press and Pajhwok Afghan News, all districts of Khost are comparatively calm.1498 
However, insurgent activity,  as  well  as operations  by Afghan security forces and the KPF  ‘campaign 
forces’ caused civilian casualties in Khost in 2018 and early 2019. In February 2018, reportedly seven 
members of a family reportedly died in an operation of the security forces in the district of Terezayi, 1499 
while  an  operation  in  Sabari  district  caused  ten  casualties  (four  deaths,  six  injuries).  According  to 
Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  it  was  not  clear  whether  the  persons  wounded  or  killed  in  Sabari  were 
civilians.1500 In July 2018, five members of a family were reportedly killed in an operation of the Afghan 
Special Forces in Bak district.1501 A clash between security forces and insurgents claimed the lives of 
four civilians in Nadirshahkot district in March 2018, according to Xinhua News Agency.1502 Residents 
later brought the coffins of the killed civilians to Khost City in order to protest, demanding prosecution 
for the deaths.1503 Furthermore, the Kabul-Khost highway was blocked for several hours by protestors 
asking for a stop to ‘campaign forces`’ operations.1504 A KPF raid in December 2018 allegedly left four 
civilians dead, including a toddler.1505  

In April 2018, a journalist was reportedly shot dead in Khost.1506 In May 2018, an explosion in a mosque 
serving  as  a  voter  registration  centre  for  the  upcoming  parliamentary  elections  killed  at  least  17 
persons.1507 In June 2018, two people were shot dead and three others were injured in a Mosque in 

1494 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
1495 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 6 
1496 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2 
1497 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
1498 Khaama Press, Afghan forces thwart deadly VBIED attack in Khost province, 6 March 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 
Judges, attorneys not available in 3 Khost districts, 31 December 2018, url 
1499 Pajhwok Afghan News, 7 members of a family killed in Khost operation, 8 February 2018, url 
1500 Pajhwok Afghan News, 10 people suffer casualties in Khost operation, 21 February 2018, url 
1501 Pajhwok Afghan News, 5 of a family killed in Khost raid by Afghan special forces, 8 July 2018, url 
1502 Xinhua News Agency, Afghan gun battle claims 4 lives of civilians, 4 March 2018, url 
1503 Xinhua News Agency, Afghan gun battle claims 4 lives of civilians, 4 March 2018, url 
1504 Ariana News, Residents Protest against Operations of ‘Campaign Forces’ in Khost, 4 March 2018, url 
1505 New York Times (The), C.I.A.’s Afghan Forces Leave a Trail of Abuse and Anger, 31 December 2018, url 
1506 BBC News, BBC reporter Ahmad Shah killed in Afghanistan attack, 30 April 2018, url 
1507 BBC News, Afghanistan: At least 17 killed in Khost mosque blast, 6 May 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 17 killed in blast 
at voter registration centre in Khost, 6 May 2018, url 

                                                           
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Mandozayi district.1508 In January 2019, two people died and 20 persons were injured in the provincial 
capital in an explosion, for which nobody claimed responsibility.1509 

In November 2018, a bomb blast in the mosque of an army base reportedly killed 26 members of the 
Afghan security forces.1510  

2.18.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 4 676 persons 
displaced from Khost province, of whom almost all (4 669) were displaced to the capital district, Khost 
(Matun).1511 

No  conflict-induced  internal  displacement  from  Khost  province  was  reported  by  UNOCHA  for  the 
period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019.1512 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 6 139 persons 
displaced to Khost province from Baghlan, Ghazni, Logar, Nangarhar, Paktika and Paktya provinces.1513 

No conflict-induced internal displacement to Khost province was reported by UNOCHA for the period 
1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019.1514 

District 

Bak 

Gurbuz 

Jajimaydan 

Musakhel 

Sabari 

Spera 

Terezayi 

Khost (Matun) 

Displaced from 

Displaced to 

Displaced from 

Displaced to 

(2018)1515 
28 

(2018) 
/ 

(2019) 
/ 

(2019) 
/ 

210  

2 100  

49 

2 212 

28 

49 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

6 139  

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

Causes  of  displacements  are  linked  to  the  conflict  according  to  UNOCHA:  military  operations  in 
January 20181516 and cross border shelling in Jajimaydan district in April 2018 drove 1 000 people living 
near the border to leave this area.1517 

1508 Pajhwok Afghan News, 2 killed, 3 injured in gun attack on Khost mosque, 7 June 2018, url  
1509 Pajhwok Afghan News, 2 killed, 3 injured in gun attack on Khost mosque, 7 June 2018, url; Khaama Press, 2 killed, over 
20 wounded in an explosion in Khost province, 8 January 2019, url 
1510 NBC News, Suicide blast kills dozens at mosque in Afghanistan's Khost province, 23 November 2018, url 
1511 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url  
1512 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url 
1513 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 
1514 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url 
1515 The district of origin of 7 persons displaced is not mentioned in UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 
2018, 28 January 2019, url  
1516 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 22 - 29 January, 29 January 2018, url 
1517 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 16 – 22 April 2018, 23 April 2018, url  

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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2.19 Kunar 

2.19.1 General description of the province  

Kunar is located in eastern  Afghanistan, on the Afghan-Pakistani border; it borders  Nuristan  to the 
north, Pakistan to the east, Nangarhar to the south, and Laghman to the west.1518 The provincial capital 
is Asadabad;1519 the province is divided into the following districts: Asadabad, Barkunar (also Asmar), 
Chapadara,  Chawkay  (also  Sawkay),  Dangam,  Dara-e-Pech  (also  Manogi),  Ghaziabad,  Khashkunar, 
Marawara, Narang, Nari, Nurgal, Sarkani, Shigal,1520 Watapur and Sheltan.1521 The latter is defined as a 
‘temporary district’, meaning that it is considered to belong to Kunar province, but its status as such 
has  not  been  approved  by  the  Afghan  parliament  yet.1522  According  to  the  Afghanistan  CSO,  the 
population  of  Kunar  is  estimated  at  482 115  for  2018/19.1523  It  is  composed  mainly  of  Pashtuns, 
followed by Pashai and Nuristani.1524 The province, which is rich in forests, has been affected by high 

1518 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Kunar Provincial Overview, n.d., url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Kunar Province – District 
Atlas, April 2014, url 
1519  US,  Naval  Postgraduate  School,  Kunar  Provincial  Overview,  n.d.,  url;  Afghanistan,  Office  of  the  President,  Provincial 
Profile Kunar, 1 February 2017, url 
1520 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Kunar Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; US, Naval Postgraduate School, Kunar Provincial 
Overview, n.d., url 
1521 Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 20; US, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Kunar Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1522 Ruttig, T., The Afghanistan Election Conundrum (12): Good news and bad news about district numbers, AAN, 16 August 
2018, url 
1523 Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 2 
1524  US,  Naval  Postgraduate  School,  Kunar  Provincial  Overview,  n.d.,  url,  Afghanistan,  Office  of  the  President,  Provincial 
Profile Kunar, 1 February 2017, url 

 
                                                           
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—  187  

rates  of  illegal  logging,  mining  and  smuggling  by  insurgents,  mafia  groups  and,  allegedly,  some 
government officials.1525  

A national highway from Jalalabad passes through the districts of Nurgal, Chawkay, Narang, Asadabad, 
Shigal and leads to Asmar.1526 From Asmar the highway leads to Nuristan province through Ghaziabad 
and Nari districts.  In  2017, insurgents  built a stone wall on the road in order to limit the transit of 
government officials. The Afghan security forces reopened the road in August 2018 after a series of 
operations.1527 The province shares a 175 kilometre-long border with Pakistan; through the Korengal 
valley, which  lies  west  of  the  provincial  capital,  the  insurgents  have  been  entering  and  leaving  the 
province during the years.1528 Pakistani militants and Al Qaeda fighters used to access Afghanistan from 
the former tribal areas or urban centres in Pakistan and passed through insurgent controlled areas in 
Nangarhar, Kunar, Nuristan and Badakhshan.1529  

According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, opium-poppy cultivation levels in Kunar (1 723 hectares) 
remained similar to 2017 (1 634 hectares) representing a 6% increase in poppy cultivation.1530  

2.19.2 Conflict background and actors in Kunar 

According  to  a  government  source  quoted  by  Tolonews  in  March  2017,  at  least  15  terrorist 
organisations, among them ISKP, Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e Taiba, were active in the province.1531 

Sources from 2018-2019 reported that Pakistan’s Tehrik-e Taliban members run a military base, called 
Ghazi Camp, in Kunar province; they  shifted it to Kunar after clearing operations by  the military in 
Pakistan.1532 

ISKP is active in the province. According to the New York Times, ISKP fighters pushed back the Taliban 
from Korengal valley and expanded their control over it, as of January 2019. Before the takeover of the 
valley, ISKP expansion in the country ‘had been contained’ through military operations, but the seizure 
of  the  valley  by  the  armed  group  again  raised  concerns  over  its  expansion  in  the  region.  The 
consolidation of ISKP in the valley could ‘threaten several neighboring districts’, as well as the main 
road connecting Kunar with Nuristan province, speculated the New York Times in January 2019.1533 
According to the Kunar police chief quoted by Pajhwok Afghan News in 2017, there were hundreds of 
ISKP militants in the province. They had started their activities in Chapadara and maintained training 
centres in Nari. Moreover, ISKP fighters have also appeared in areas of Nurgal, Watapur and Dara-e-
Pech districts.1534  

As  of  February  2019,  the  UN  Secretary-General  described  Kunar  as  one  of  the  IS  ‘strongholds’  in 
Afghanistan.1535  UNAMA’s  2018  annual  report  noted  that  ‘Daesh/ISKP  is  present  in  the  east  of 
Afghanistan,  with  an  estimated  3,000  fighters  currently  active,  primarily  in  Nangarhar  and  Kunar 

1525 IWPR, Illegal Logging Destroying Afghan Forests, 23 January 2018, url 
1526 Afghanistan, MOPW, Application of Road Numbering System National Highways, 16 October 2015, url, p.5; UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan: Kunar Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url 
1527 Salaam Times, Afghan forces reopen key Kunar highway blocked by Taliban, 9 August 2018, url 
1528 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Kunar Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1529 Osman, B., Descent into chaos: Why did Nangarhar turn into an IS hub?, AAN, 27 September 2016, url 
1530 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 23 
1531 Tolonews, Daesh, Al-Qaeda Among 15 Terror Groups in Kunar, 14 March 2017, url 
1532 Dawn, Son of TTP chief killed in drone attack in Afghanistan, 8 March 2018, url; RCD, Taliban Promotes Training Camp 
for ‘Commando Mujahidin‘, 23 January 2019, url 
1533 New York Times (The), Violence Grows in Northern Afghanistan, but Neither Side Is Gaining Much Ground, 10 January 
2019, url 
1534 Pajhwok Afghan News, Hundreds of Daesh rebels emerge in Kunar: police chief, 5 July 2017, url 
1535 UN Secretary-General, Eighth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace 
and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, 1 February 2019, 
url, p. 7 

 
                                                           
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provinces’.1536 The same source further noted that with regards to Al Qaeda: ‘Al-Qaeda is believed to 
maintain a limited presence in eastern Afghanistan, especially Kunar and Nuristan provinces, and to 
continue  to  have  links  to  anti-Government  groups  operating  throughout  Afghanistan.  Most  recent 
reporting  in  mid-2018  suggested  that  Al-Qaeda  operatives  have  recently  increased  from  100-120 
individuals, based on mid-2017 estimates, to an estimated 250-400’.1537 

According to news magazine, the Diplomat reporting in 2017, a group of Hezb-e Islami militants have 
been based in Shigal district.1538 Although as of 2017 they were communicating with other insurgent 
groups, they have neither joined the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, nor ISKP.1539 

According to local sources quoted by the IWPR, insurgents operating in areas not controlled by the 
government, like Chapadara and Dara-e-Pech, funded themselves through profits from deforestation 
and mining.1540  

In terms of presence of government security forces, Kunar province is under the responsibility of the 
201st ANA Corps, which falls under the Train, Advise, and Assist Command – East (TAAC-E), led by US 
and Polish forces.1541 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Kunar  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal (LWJ) and 
the  Taliban.1542  When  a  source  does  not  provide  information  on  a  district,  the  field  is  left  blank. 
Sometimes a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always 
recognised  by  the  government  or  sometimes  belong,  as  a  region,  to  another  district.  If  found, 
clarification is made in a separate footnote.    

KUNAR 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: 
August-
November 
2017) 

Asadabad (capital) 

Gov control 

Barkunar 

Chapadara 

Chawkay 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

GIRoA 
Control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of 
October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last 
accessed:1543 
April 2019) 

Taliban 

(assessment as of 
December 2018) 

GIRoA Control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

TB control: 60%; 
Gov control: 40% 

Contested 

Contested 

/ 

Contested 

Contested 

Taliban 
control 

TB control: 80%; 
Gov control: 20% 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Gov control 

1536 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of civilians in armed conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 60 
1537 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of civilians in armed conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 61 
1538 Diplomat (The), Afghan Jihad Frozen in Time?, 25 April 2017, url 
1539 USIP, The Political Deal with Hezb-e Islami, 6 July 2018, url 
1540 IWPR, Illegal Logging Destroying Afghan Forests, 23 January 2018, url 
1541 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2018, url, p. 15 
1542 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, 23 April 2019, url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of 
Jihad, End of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
1543 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 

                                                           
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—  189  

Dangam 

Dara-e-Pech 

Ghaziabad 

Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 

Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control: 60%; 
Gov control: 40% 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

/ 

/ 

Khaskunar 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Marawara 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Narang 

Gov control 

Nari 

Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 

Nurgal 

Gov control 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Sarkani 

Shigal Wa Sheltan 

Watapur 

Asmar 

Manogi 

Gov control: 70%; 
individual control 
(Abdul Wali): 30% 

TB control: 70%; 
Gov control: 30% 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Gov control: 65%; 
TB control: 35% 

Contested 

TB control: 65%; 
Gov control: 35% 

Contested 

/ 

Contested 

TB control: 50%; 
Gov control: 50% 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

Gov control: 75%; 
TB control: 25% 

TB control: 80%; 
Gov control: 20% 

TB control: 60%; 
Gov control: 40% 

TB control: 60%; 
Gov control: 40% 

2.19.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.19.3.1 General  

In 2018, UNAMA documented 397 civilian casualties (128 deaths and 269 injured) in Kunar province. 
This  represents  an  increase  of  77  %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were  ground 
engagements, followed by aerial attacks and (non-suicide) IEDs.1544  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA  places  the  districts  of  Ghaziabad, 

1544 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 

 
 
                                                           
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Watapur, and Sarkani in the highest category and Chapadara, Dara-e-Pech, Marawara, Nari, Dangam, 
Shigal and Chawkay in the second highest category. Bar Kunar is placed in the third highest category 
and Nurgal, Asad Abad and Khas Kunar are in the fourth highest category. The remaining district falls 
in the lower category.1545 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 174 incidents related to insurgents in Kunar province.1546 

With  regards  to  targeted  killings,  in  2018  UNAMA  documented  ‘nine  incidents  […]  in  which  Anti-
Government Elements threatened health care personnel to stop vaccination campaigns, including for 
polio. Six of these incidents took place in the eastern region (Kunar and Nangarhar provinces)’1547 and 
‘on 28 July [2018],  in  Dara-i-Pech  district, Kunar province, Daesh/ISKP killed four men for allegedly 
spying  for  pro-Government  forces.  The  victims  had  been  abducted  and  held  in  captivity  for  two 
months. Daesh/ISKP claimed responsibility for the execution of the men and published photos on the 
Amaq [IS-run] news website’.1548  

Airstrikes  were  carried  out  by  Afghan  and  US  security  forces  in  Shigal  District  in  December  2018 
wounding Taliban fighters and causing ‘31 civilian casualties (13 deaths and 18 injured), including 28 
women and children’,1549 in Narang in late October 2018, killing three children;1550 in Barkunar early 
October  2018,  killing  Taliban  commanders;1551  in  Marawara  in  June  2018,  killing  the  chief  of  the 
Pakistani Taliban, Mullah Fazlullah;1552 and in March 2018, targeting Ghazi Camp, killing Fazlullah’s son 
and other members of TTP.1553 Moreover, military ground operations by Afghan security forces were 
carried  out  in  Dara-e-Pech  in  late  January  2019,1554  in  Shigal  District  in  December  2018,1555  and  in 
Watapur in September 2018, killing IS militants.1556  

Clashes  between  ISKP  militants  and  Afghan  security  forces  took  place  in  Marawara  and  Watapur 
districts in December 2018, resulting in casualties among ISKP fighters.1557 Suicide attacks took place 
in  Sawkay  district  in  late  June  2018,  killing  and  injuring  policemen  and  civilians  at  a  police 
checkpoint1558 and in Watapur in March 2018, killing a Kunar provincial council member and a religious 
scholar.1559  

Clashes  between  the  Taliban  and  ISKP  militants  took  place  in  October  2018,  killing  and  wounding 
fighters of both sides and also children.1560 

1545 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2  
1546 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
1547 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 16 
1548 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 31 
1549 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 43 
1550 New York Times Magazine (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: Oct. 19-25, 26 October 2018, url 
1551 Khaama Press, Drone strike target Taliban‘s Red Unit commanders in Kunar province, 2 October 2018, url 
1552 Al Jazeera, Pakistan Taliban chief Mullah Fazlullah ‘killed in drone attack‘, 15 June 2018, url; RFE/RL, Suicide Bomber Kills 
Eight Policemen In Afghanistan‘s Kunar Province, 26 June 2018, url 
1553 Dawn, Son of TTP chief killed in dron attack in Afghanistan, 8 March 2018, url 
1554 Tolonews, Daesh Commander Killed In Kunar, 30 January 2019, url; Khaama Press, Nearly 20 Taliban, ISIS-K militants 
killed during the operations of Afghan, Coalition Forces, 30 January 2019, url 
1555 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 43 
1556 Xinhua News Agency, Afghan forces launches operations against IS outfit, 24 September 2018, url 
1557 Khaama Press, Afghan forces repulse ISIS attacks in two districts of Kunar province, 11 December 2018, url 
1558  RFE/RL,  Suicide  Bomber  Kills  Eight  Policemen  In  Afghanistan‘s  Kunar  Province,  26  June  2018,  url;  Tolonews,  Suicide 
Bombing Claims Eight Lives In Kunar, 25 June 2018, url 
1559 Tolonews, Kunar Provincial Council Member Killed In Suicide Attack, 30 March 2018, url 
1560 Tribune Express (The), Several dead after Afghan Taliban, IS clash in Kunar, 6 October 2018, url; UN Secretary-General, 
The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 7 December 2018, url, p. 7 

                                                           
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—  191  

In  late  January  2019  IS  fighters  were  killed  after  the  detonation  of  their  own  improvised  explosive 
devices (IEDs) in Dara-e-Pech district.1561 In late January 2019 Taliban were killed in the detonation of 
an IED allegedly installed by ISKP militants.1562  

Three civilians were killed and another 16 wounded in Shigal district in August 2018 when their vehicle 
struck a roadside bomb.1563  

2.19.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 15 207 persons 
displaced from Kunar, most of them (14 022) being displaced within the province.1564 

UNOCHA  collected  data  for  the  period  1  January  2019  -  28  February  2019,  reporting  104  persons 
displaced from Kunar province with all of them displaced within the province.1565 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 14 047 persons 
displaced to Kunar province.1566  

UNOCHA  collected  data  for  the  period  1  January  2019  -  28  February  2019,  reporting  104  persons 
displaced  to  Kunar  province  coming  from  Ghaziabad,  Barkunar, Narang,  Dara-e-Pech,  Barkunar and 
Chapadara districts within the province.1567 

Displaced from 
(2018) 

Displaced to 
(2018) 

Displaced from 
(2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

District 

Asadabad 

Barkunar 

Chapadara 

Chawkay 

Dangam 

Dara-e-Pech 

Ghaziabad 

Khaskunar 

Marawara 

Narang 

Nari 

Nurgal 

Sarkani 

Shigal Wa Sheltan 

/ 

842 

759  

3 758 

5 268  

187 

180 

/ 

70  

/ 

63 

873 

192  

511 

Watapur 

2 504  

1 962  

1 129 

531  

3 507 

4 564 

151  

/ 

234 

52 

46 

491 

243 

292 

845 

/ 

47 

11 

/ 

/ 

8 

19 

/ 

/ 

19 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

34 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

11 

/ 

27 

/ 

32 

/ 

/ 

/ 

1561 Khaama Press, ISIS-K militants blown up by IED in Kunar province, 28 January 2019, url 
1562 Khaama Press, ISIS-K bomb kill Taliban local commander in Kunar province, 19 January 2019, url 
1563 Pajhwok Afghan News, 3 civilians dead, 16 wounded in Kunar roadside blast, 28 August 2018, url   
1564 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url  
1565 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url 
1566 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 
1567 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url 

 
 
 
                                                           
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During the first four months of 2018, and in July and December 2018, UNOCHA reported that people 
have been displaced because ‘threats and intimidation by Non State Armed Groups (NSAG)’1568 and 
also due to clashes between these groups and ANSF, especially in Chawkay and Khaskunar districts in 
January 2018.1569 

Moreover, clashes between armed groups have resulted in the following displacements mainly within 
the province:  

in July 2018, 3 500 people were displaced in Chapadara district,1571 

•  600 persons displaced within Nurgal district in May 2018,1570  
• 
•  1 000 persons have been displaced within Watapur district in October 2018,1572 
• 

in August 2018, an armed group was targeted by ANSF operations in Asmar district causing 
the displacement of 2 700 people within the district and to other districts of Kunar.1573 

Cross-border  shelling,  especially  in  Dangam  district,  is  another  cause  of  displacements.1574  For 
example in March 2018, 3 000 people went to Dangam district center as a result of these cross-border 
shelling.1575 

1568 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 1 – 7 January 2018, 8 January 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 5 - 11 February 2018, 12 February 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 26 February – 4 March 2018, 
5  March  2018,  url;  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan  Weekly  Field  Report,  4  June  –  10  June  2018,  11  June  2018,  url;  UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 2 – 8 April 2018, 9 April 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 10 December 
– 16 December 2018, 17 December 2018, url 
1569 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 8 – 14 January 2018, 16 January 2018, url  
1570 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 7 – 13 May 2018, 14 May 2018, url  
1571 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 2 – 8 July 2018, 9 July 2018, url 
1572 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 1-7 October 2018, 8 October 2018, url  
1573 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 30 July – 5 August 2018, 6 August 2018, url  
1574 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 19 – 25 March 2018, 25 March 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 2 – 8 April 2018, 9 April 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 23 – 29 July 2018, 30 July 2018, url 
1575 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 19 – 25 March 2018, 25 March 2018, url 

 
 
                                                           
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2.20 Kunduz 

2.20.1 General description of the province  

Kunduz is located in northern Afghanistan; it borders Tajikistan to the north, Takhar province to the 
east, Baghlan province to the south, and Balkh province to the west.1576 The provincial capital is Kunduz 
city1577  and  the  province  is  divided  into  the  following  districts:  Aliabad,  Chardarah,  Dasht-e-Archi, 
Emamsaheb, Khanabad, Kunduz and Qala-e-Zal.1578 The districts of Gulbad, Gultepa and Aqtash are 
newly  established  districts.1579  According  to  the  Afghanistan  CSO,  the  population  of  Kunduz  is 
estimated  at  1 091 116  for  2018/191580  and  is  composed  mainly  of  Pashtuns,  followed  by  Uzbeks, 
Tajiks, Turkmen, Hazara, Aymaq and Pashai.1581  

A section of Asian Highway AH7 from Kabul passes through the provinces of Parwan and Baghlan and 
connects the national capital with Kunduz province and the border crossing to Tajikistan at the port of 
Sher Khan (also Sher Khan Bandar).1582 In the past, the Taliban have set up check-points on the highway 
section  connecting  Kunduz  to  Baghlan.1583  Moreover,  the  Kunduz-Takhar  highway  runs  east  from 

1576 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Kunduz Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url 
1577 Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial Profile Kunduz, 1 February 2017, url 
1578 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Kunduz Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; US, Naval Postgraduate School, Kunduz Provincial 
Overview, n.d., url 
1579 Ali, O., The 2018 Election Observed (3) in Kunduz: A Very Violent E-Day, AAN, 7 November 2018, url 
1580 Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 3 
1581 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Kunduz Provincial Overview, n.d., url; Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial 
Profile Kunduz, 1 February 2017, url  
1582  Afghanistan,  MOPW,  Application  of  Road  Numbering  System  National  Highways,  16  October  2015,  url,  p.5;  RFE/RL, 
Tajikistan/Afghanistan: Road Bridge Opens With Aim Of Strengthening Trade, 26 August 2007, url  
1583 Ali, O., New Taleban Attacks in Kunduz: Less coordination, still well placed to threaten the city, AAN, 9 July 2017, url; Ali, 
O., The Taleban Assault on Kunduz city: Déjà vu, but why?, AAN, 12 October 2016, url 

 
 
                                                           
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Kunduz city, passing through the district of Khanabad and connecting the province with Takhar and 
Badakhshan.1584  

In  August  2018,  Taliban  militants  kidnapped  170  passengers  who  were  travelling  to  Kabul  through 
Takhar, near Khanabad district, with the aim to identify members of the Afghan security forces.1585 
Moreover, the highway has occasionally been closed in the past because of fights between the Taliban 
and  Afghan  security  forces,1586  limiting  mobility  between  Kunduz,  Takhar,  and  Badakhshan  and 
affecting  the  whole  north-eastern  region.1587  Furthermore,  Taliban  mined  the  road  during 
parliamentary elections in October 2018, ruining parts of it, and destroying police check-points, as well 
as  military vehicles.1588  Another  national  highway  connects  Kunduz  city  with  Balkh  province  to the 
west.1589 The province has always been a strategic crossing-point. Being close to Tajikistan, it hosted 
the Tajikistan Islamic opposition during the Tajik civil war in the 1990s and it provided access to the 
main smuggling routes to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Moreover, located near a main road to Kabul, it 
connects the rest of Afghanistan with its northern region.1590 

According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, Kunduz maintained its poppy-free status, which it has 
held since 2007. Even though the cultivation rate has risen ‘in recent years’, it still remained under 100 
hectares in 2018, which is the UNODC threshold for obtaining ‘poppy-free status’.1591  

2.20.2 Conflict background and actors in Kunduz 

The security situation of the province has purportedly been deteriorating over recent years.1592 The 
security situation in and around Kunduz city has also been reported to be getting worse, with ‘fears 
the city could again fall into the hands of the Taliban as it did briefly on two occasions in recent years 
- in September 2015 and in October 2016‘.1593  

Kunduz was the last Taliban stronghold before the Taliban’s fall in 2001, when it was freed by U.S. led 
security forces.1594 Kunduz city temporary fell to the Taliban in September 2015,1595 and they almost 
recaptured it in October 2016 by encircling the city and cutting off the main supply and reinforcement 
routes.  After  these  attempts  by  Taliban  to  capture  Kunduz  city,  the  Afghan  security  forces  tried  to 
regain  control  over  the  districts  of  Dasht-e-Archi,  Qala-e-Zal,  Emamsaheb  and  parts  of  Khanabad, 
which served as strategic strongholds for the Taliban offensive. The operations took long and control 
over the districts changed hands a few times, purportedly contributing to instability in the province. 1596 
In  2017,  renewed  attempts  by  the  Taliban  to  get  closer  to  the  provincial  capital  through  attacking 
nearby Dasht-e-Archi took place, but these were repelled by Afghan security forces.1597 According to a 

1584 Afghanistan, MOPW, Application of Road Numbering System National Highways, 16 October 2015, url, p.5; UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan: Kunduz Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; Ali, O., The Taleban Assault on Kunduz city: Déjà vu, but why?, 
AAN, 12 October 2016, url 
1585 CBS News, Taliban kidnaps more than 100 bus passengers in northern Afghanistan, 20 August 2018, url; Khaama Press, 
Taliban militants kidnap 170 passengers from Kunduz-Takhar highway, 20 August 2018, url; Bakhtar News, Taliban Abduct 
Commuters of Three Buses in Kunduz-Takhar Highway, 20 August 2018, url 
1586 Tolonews, ‚Heavy Clashes‘ Close Kunduz-Takhar Highway To Traffic, 5 May 2017, url; Middle East Press, Kunduz – Takhar 
Highway Blocked For Traffic, 17 August 2016, url 
1587 Ali, O., The Taleban Assault on Kunduz city: Déjà vu, but why?, AAN, 12 October 2016, url 
1588 Ali, O., The 2018 Election Observed (3) in Kunduz: A Very Violent E-Day, AAN, 7 November 2018, url 
1589 MOPW, Application of Road Numbering System National Highways, 16 October 2015, url, p.6 
1590 DW, Kunduz violence could destabilize neighbors, 30 September 2015, url 
1591 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 21 
1592 Ali, O., The 2018 Election Observed (3) in Kunduz: A Very Violent E-Day, AAN, 7 November 2018, url; Al Jazeera, Taliban 
launch deadly attacks as they attend Afghan peace talks, 5 February 2019, url  
1593 Al Jazeera, Taliban launch deadly attacks as they attend Afghan peace talks, 5 February 2019, url 
1594 RFE/RL, Afghanistan‘s New Northern Flash Points, n.d., url 
1595 RFE/RL, Afghanistan‘s New Northern Flash Points, n.d., url 
1596 Ali, O., The Taleban Assault on Kunduz city: Déjà vu, but why?, AAN, 12 October 2016, url 
1597 Ali, O., New Taleban Attacks in Kunduz: Less coordination, still well placed to threaten the city, AAN, 9 July 2017, url; 
 Tolonews, Dozens of Afghan Forces Killed In North, 10 September 2018, url 

                                                           
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—  195  

report  by  AAN  in  2017,  insurgents  had  been  weakened  by  night-raids  and  airstrikes  carried  out  by 
coalition forces, which killed key figures of the Taliban movement, like the Taliban shadow governor of 
the province, Mullah Salam. The appointment of his successor created tensions among the Taliban in 
Chardarah and Dasht-e-Archi, which weakened the coordination of the movement in the province. 1598  

According to AAN, in 2018, the Taliban were active in Dasht-e-Archi and Chardarah districts, where 
government  control  was  limited  to  small  parts  of  the  district  centres  and  some  neighbouring 
villages.1599  Moreover,  according  to  sources  quoted  by  AAN,  as  of  February  2019,  the  Taliban  had 
established a parallel shadow government in Dasht-e-Archi which ‘includes “a district governor, head 
of education, judicial, health, public outreach, military and the finance committees”’. 1600 These posts 
are held by ‘young Pashtuns and Uzbeks from the district’.1601 In Aliabad, Emamsaheb and Khanabad 
the  government’s  presence  reached  almost  half  of  the  districts,  whilst  the  remaining  parts  were 
contested. Aqtash, Gulbad and Gultepa were largely or entirely under Taliban control.1602 

According to an April 2018 report by the Jamestown Foundation, a US-based institute for research and 
analysis,  the  Islamic  State  (IS)  set  up  bases  in  the  northern  provinces  of  Afghanistan,  including  in 
Kunduz.1603  In  the  past,  the  province  had  been  hosting  foreign  fighters  from  Central  Asia,  such  as 
members  of  the  Islamic  Jihad  Union  (IJU)  and  the  Islamic  Movement  of  Uzbekistan,  which  were 
purportedly  active  along  the  ‘porous’  Afghan-Tajik  border.1604  Besides  Uzbek  and  Tajik  militants, 
fighters coming from Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and Chechnya were also reported to have been active in the 
province.1605  Moreover,  an  insurgent  group  called  Jabha-ye  Qariha  (‘the  front  of  those  who  have 
memorised  the  Quran  by  heart’,  the  qaris),  which  is  known  as  the  military  wing  of  Jundullah,  is 
purportedly active in Dasht-e-Archi district. Although Jundullah is an independent group, it is allied 
with  the  Taliban.  Still,  the  two  insurgent  groups  have  different  beliefs:  Jundullah  follows  a  radical 
ideology  and  almost  completely  ignores  local  culture,  whereas  the  Taliban,  who  are  mainly  locals, 
respect and rely on elders and their system of traditional mediation.1606  

In terms of the presence of government security forces, Kunduz province is under the responsibility of 
the 209th ANA Corps, which falls under the Train, Advise, and Assist Command – North (TAAC-N), led 
by German forces.1607 

The following table provides an overview of control of the districts in KunduzKunduz province based 
on information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.1608 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region, to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.    

1598 Ali, O., New Taleban Attacks in Kunduz: Less coordination, still well placed to threaten the city, AAN, 9 July 2017, url 
1599 Ali, O., The 2018 Election Observed (3) in Kunduz: A Very Violent E-Day, AAN, 7 November 2018, url 
1600  Ali,  O.,  One  Land,  Two  Rules  (3):  Delivering  public  services  in  insurgency-affected  Dasht-e  Archi  district  in  Kunduz 
province, AAN, 26 February 2019, url 
1601  Ali,  O.,  One  Land,  Two  Rules  (3):  Delivering  public  services  in  insurgency-affected  Dasht-e  Archi  district  in  Kunduz 
province, AAN, 26 February 2019, url 
1602 Ali, O., The 2018 Election Observed (3) in Kunduz: A Very Violent E-Day, AAN, 7 November 2018, url 
1603 Jamestown Foundation (The), Islamic State a Deadly Force in Kabul, 6 April 2018, url 
1604 DW, Kunduz violence could destabilize neighbors, 30 September 2015, url 
1605 RFE/RL, Afghanistan‘s New Northern Flash Points, n.d., url 
1606  Ali,  O.,  One  Land,  Two  Rules  (3):  Delivering  public  services  in  insurgency-affected  Dasht-e  Archi  district  in  Kunduz 
province, AAN, 26 February 2019, url 
1607 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2018, url, p. 16 
1608 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, 23 April 2019, url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of 
Jihad, End of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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KUNDUZ 

BBC 

(reporting period: 
August-November 
2017) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment as 
of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last 
accessed:1609 
April 2019) 

Aliabad 

Open Taliban 
presence – low 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Chardarah 

Open Taliban 
Presence – high 

INS activity 

INS activity 

Contested 

Dasht-e-Archi 

Open Taliban 
Presence – high 

INS activity 

INS activity 

Contested 

Emamsaheb 

Khanabad 

Open Taliban 
presence – 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
presence – 
Medium 

INS activity 

INS activity 

Contested 

INS activity 

INS activity 

Contested 

Kunduz 
(capital) 

Open Taliban 
presence – low 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Qala-e-Zal 

Aqtash1610 

Kalbad 1611 

Gul Tapa1612 

Open Taliban 
presence – low 

INS activity 

INS activity 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

Taliban 
control 

Taliban 
control 

Taliban 
control 

Taliban 
control 

Taliban 

(assessment 
as of 
December 
2018) 

TB control: 
80%; Gov 
control: 20% 

TB control: 
95%; Gov 
control: 5% 

TB control: 
95%; Gov 
control: 5% 

TB control: 
75%; Gov 
control: 25% 

TB control: 
80%; Gov 
control: 20% 

TB control: 
80%; Gov 
control: 20% 

TB control: 
95%; Gov 
control: 5% 

TB control  

TB control  

TB control  

2.20.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.20.3.1 General  

In 2018, UNAMA documented 337 civilian casualties (105 deaths and 232 injured) in Kunduz province. 
This  represents  a  decrease  of  11 %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were  ground 

1609 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 
1610 The Taliban mention Aqtash as a district they newly created. (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of Jihad, End of year 
report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url) 
1611 The Taliban mention Kalbad as a district they newly created. (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of Jihad, End of year 
report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url) 
1612 The Taliban mention Gul Tapa as a district they newly created. (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of Jihad, End of 
year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url) 

 
                                                           
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—  197  

engagements, followed by aerial attacks and (non-suicide) IEDs.1613 The same source ‘also documented 
continued reductions in civilian casualties from ground engagements in Kunduz province and Laghman 
province,  which  joined  the  top  five  provinces  that  had  a  reduction  of  civilian  casualties  from  such 
operations  in  2018’.1614  For  Kunduz  province,  it  recorded  109  civilian  casualties  caused  by  ground 
engagements, which is a 31 % decrease compared to 2017.1615 

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian casualties, and conflict-induced displacements, UNOCHA places the districts of Emamsaheb, 
Dasht-e-Archi, Chardarah, and Kunduz in the highest category and Qala-e-Zal and Khanabad districts 
in the second highest category while Aliabad district falls into the category below.1616  

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 167 incidents related to insurgents in Kunduz province.1617 

An  aerial  operation  carried  out  by  international  military  forces  in  March  2019  in  Telawka 
neighbourhood  near  Kunduz  city  ‘killed  13  civilians  and  injured  three  more’;  10  of  the  recorded 
fatalities were children. The attack was intended to support pro-Government forces on the ground.1618 

Military  operations  by  Afghan  security  forces  took  place  in  Khanabad  district  in  late  January  2019, 
killing insurgents.1619 Airstrikes were carried out by Afghan security forces in Chardarah in July 2018, 
killing civilians,1620 and in April 2018, in Dasht-e-Archi, killing civilians, most of them being children. 1621 
The latter airstrike targeted a religious ceremony next to a madrassa, where ‘senior Taliban leaders 
present in the area, including members of the Quetta Shura, as well as members of a Taliban “Red 
Unit”’  had  allegedly  gathered  ‘to  launch  an  operation  against  Kunduz  city’,  according  to  the 
government. The Afghan Air Force released ‘multiple rockets`and fired ‘heavy machineguns’, which 
caused  107  casualties  (36  killed  and  71  injured),  of  which  81  were  children  (30  killed  and  51 
injured).1622 

In  September  2018,  Taliban  militants  tried  to  storm  the  district  centre  of  Dasht-e-Archi  again  and 
engaged in battles with Afghan security forces leading to casualties reported on both sides; reportedly 
more than 30 security forces members and nearly 30 Taliban fighters were killed and wounded.1623 In 
October 2018 and in February 2019, sources reported fears that Taliban could overrun Kunduz city 
again.1624  

Kunduz was among the provinces with the highest level of Taliban violence during 2018 parliamentary 
elections: in Dasht-e-Archi and Qala-e-Zal districts ‘Taleban’s shadow district governors appeared in 

1613 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
1614 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 47 
1615 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 47 
1616 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p.2  
1617 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
1618 UNAMA, Kunduz airstrike kills 13 civilians, mostly children – UN initial findings, 25 March 2019, url 
1619 Tolonews, Taliban Commanders Killed In NDS Operation in Kunduz, 31 January 2019, url; Xinhua News Agency, Afghan 
forces storm Taliban bastion in northern Kunduz province, killing 4 militants, 27 January 2019, url; Fars News, 21 Afghan 
Security Forces Killed in Taliban Attack, 10 September 2018, url  
1620 Indian Express (The), Afghanistan: Air strike near Kunduz kills 14 civilians, 20 July 2018, url; Stars and Stripes, US says 
Kunduz airstrike did not kill civilians, 10 August 2018, url; Tolonews, MoD Confirms Civilian Deaths in Kunduz Operation, 19 
July 2018, url 
1621 Tolonews, Ghani Visits Dasht-e-Archi Victims in Kabul Hospital, 7 April 2018, url; UNAMA, Human Rights and Protection 
of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Special Report Airstrikes in Dasht-e-Archi district, Kunduz Province, 2 April 2018, May 2018, 
url, p. 2 
1622 UNAMA, Human Rights and Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Special Report Airstrikes in Dasht-e-Archi district, 
Kunduz Province, 2 April 2018, May 2018, url, p. 2 
1623 Tolonews, Dozens of Afghan Forces Killed In North, 10 September 2018, url 
1624  Al  Jazeera,  Taliban  launch  deadly  attacks  as  they  attend  Afghan  peace  talks,  5  February  2019,  url;  Ali,  O.,  The  2018 
Election Observed (3) in Kunduz: A Very Violent E-Day, AAN 7 November 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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mosques during Friday prayers and announced the Taleban leadership’s position on the elections’. 1625  
In other Taliban-controlled areas of the province ‘their fighters individually talked with local elders and 
mosque preachers, asking them to prevent people from taking part in the elections’.1626 Shelling at 
polling centres was reported in most parts of the province, even inside the city, killing and injuring 
Independent Election Commission volunteers and voters.1627 Voting did not take place in Qala-e-Zal, 
Gultepa  and  Gulbad,  due  to  high  security  risks.1628  Intense  Taliban  attacks  were  registered  also  in 
Khanabad and Emamsaheb districts, limiting voting.1629 In April 2018, 400 schools that had been closed 
by  the  Taliban  for  one  month  in  some  areas  of  Kunduz  province  reopened  thanks  to  tribal  elders’ 
mediation.1630 

2.20.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018, reporting 46 312 persons 
displaced  from  Kunduz  province,  mainly  within  the  province  itself,  and  to  neighbouring  provinces 
Balkh and Takhar, in Kabul province and in other provinces like Kunar and Kandahar.1631  

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019, reporting 2 429 persons 
displaced  from  Khanabad  district  in  Kunduz  province,  all  within  the  province  itself  in  Kunduz 
district.1632 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018, reporting 43 638 persons 
displaced to Kunduz province (mainly to Kunduz district), all coming from within the province itself.1633 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019, reporting 2 429 persons 
displaced to Kunduz district in Kunduz province, all coming from Khanabad district within the province 
itself.1634 

District 

Chardarah 

Dasht-e-Archi 

Emamsaheb 

Khanabad 

Qala-e-Zal 

Kunduz 

Aliabad 

Displaced from 
(2018) 

Displaced to 
(2018) 

Displaced 
from (2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

20 321 

2 555 

12 152 

4 032 

7 252 

/ 

/ 

1 085 

/ 

4 942 

2 373 

2 674 

32 515 

49 

/ 

/ 

/ 

2 429 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

2 429 

/ 

Ongoing military operations led by the International Military Forces and ANSF in Kunduz province have 
displaced thousands of people throughout 2018.1635 According to humanitarian actors in Afghan civil 

1625 Ali, O., The 2018 Election Observed (3) in Kunduz: A Very Violent E-Day, AAN, 7 November 2018, url 
1626 Ali, O., The 2018 Election Observed (3) in Kunduz: A Very Violent E-Day, AAN, 7 November 2018, url 
1627 Ali, O., The 2018 Election Observed (3) in Kunduz: A Very Violent E-Day, AAN, 7 November 2018, url 
1628 Pajhwok Afghan News, Fearing violence, 80pc Kunduz voters stayed home, 27 October 2018, url; Ali, O., The 2018 Election 
Observed (3) in Kunduz: A Very Violent E-Day, AAN, 7 November 2018, url 
1629 Ali, O., The 2018 Election Observed (3) in Kunduz: A Very Violent E-Day, AAN, 7 November 2018, url 
1630 Asia Plus, After a month closure, elders help reopen 400 schools in Kunduz, 24 April 2018, url 
1631 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url   
1632 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 24 March 2019, url  
1633 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url 
1634 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url  
1635 ACBAR, Putting Protection at the Heart of the Peace Process, 29 October 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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—  199  

society,  the  scale  of  damage  to  civilian  infrastructure  and  homes  caused  by  airstrikes  and  the 
subsequent land mining of these areas by non-state armed groups prevents the possible return of 
displaced families, even after the airstrikes have ended.1636  

UNOCHA continuously reported conflict-induced displacement in and from Chardarah district, due to 
military  clearing/search  operations  and  airstrikes.1637  A  displacement  peak  was  registered  in  mid-
January 2018 when almost 7 000 people were displaced due to an operation codenamed ‘Pamir 17’ 
in  10  villages  of  the  district.1638  The  IDPs  mainly  went  to  the  provincial  capital  Kunduz  city,  others 
stayed  within  the  district  itself.1639  According  to UNOCHA,  the  majority  of  these  displaced  families 
returned back to their places of origin or neighbouring villages inside Chardarah district in February 
2018,  however  a  large  number  of  them  stayed  in  Kunduz  city.1640  Another  peak  was  registered  by 
UNOCHA in the summer of 2018, with more than 7 000 people from Chardarah district being displaced 
to Kunduz city in July,1641 more than 2 400 IDPs arriving in Kunduz city in August due to four concurrent 
military operations in Chardarah1642 and almost 5 000 people displaced to Kunduz city in September 
due to a military operation in Nahri Sofi and Dobandi villages of Chardarah.1643 

A military operation in Emamsaheb district in January 2018 reportedly displaced some 2 000 families 
to  other  areas,  including  the  provincial  capital  Kunduz  City.1644  In  the  summer  of  2018  UNOCHA 
registered thousands of IDPs from Emamsaheb reaching the district centre.1645 

In January 2018 UNOCHA registered more than 2 600 IDPs within Qala-e-Zal district.1646 Fighting at the 
military frontline between ANSF and AGEs in Bazar Aqtepa of Qala-e-Zal district at the end of April - 
beginning of May 2018 caused thousands of people to be displaced to Kunduz city and a desert area 
close to the district center of Qala-e-Zal.1647 

Military operations (in Ehsan Toop village) and drought led to the displacement of more than 1 400 
people from Khanabad district to Kunduz city in April 2018.1648 In May 2018, UNOCHA registered more 
than 2 300 conflict-induced IDPs within the district of Khanabad itself.1649 In January 2019, UNOCHA 

1636 ACBAR, Putting Protection at the Heart of the Peace Process, 29 October 2018, url 
1637 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url 
1638 Pajhwok Afghan News, 2,000 Families Flee Homes as Kunduz Raids Continue, 20 January 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan 
Weekly Field Report, 15 - 21 January, 22 January 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 22 - 28 January, 
28 January 2018, url, p. 1; Pajhwok Afghan News, Kandahar Trader Assists Chahar Darah War-Hit Families, 30 January 2018, 
url; UNOCHA, Humanitarian Regional Team (HRT) - North and Northeastern Afghanistan, 11 February 2018, url, pp. 1, 3 
1639 Pajhwok Afghan News, 2,000 Families Flee Homes as Kunduz Raids Continue, 20 January 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan 
Weekly Field Report, 15 - 21 January, 22 January 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 22 - 28 January, 
28 January 2018, url, p. 1; Pajhwok Afghan News, Kandahar Trader Assists Chahar Darah War-Hit Families, 30 January 2018, 
url; UNOCHA, Humanitarian Regional Team (HRT) - North and Northeastern Afghanistan, 11 February 2018, url, pp. 1, 3 
1640 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Kunduz Province - Meeting Summary, 6 February 2018, url, p. 1 
1641 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 2 - 8 July, 9 July 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team 
(OCT) - Kunduz Province - Meeting Summary, 25 July 2018, url, pp. 1-2 
1642  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan  Weekly  Field  Report,  30  July  -  5  August  2018,  6  August  2018,  url,  p.  1;  UNOCHA,  Operational 
Coordination Team (OCT) - Kunduz Province - Meeting Summary, 12 August 2018, url, p. 1 
1643 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Kunduz Province - Meeting Summary, 25 September 2018, url, pp. 1-
2; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 24 - 30 September, 30 September 2018, url, p. 1 
1644  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  12  Villages  Cut  Off  as  Taliban  Dynamite  Kunduz  Bridge,  23  January  2018,  url;  UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url  
1645 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 25 June - 1 July 2018, 1 July 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict 
Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url   
1646 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url  
1647 Pajhwok Afghan News, Kunduz Clashes Displace Hundreds of Families, 2 May 2018, url; Tolonews, Conflicts Displace 
Almost 1,000 Kunduz Families, 5 May 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 30 April - 6 May 2018, 7 May 
2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Kunduz Province - Meeting Summary, 7 May 2018, url  
1648  UNOCHA,  Operational  Coordination  Team  (OCT)  -  Kunduz  Province  -  Meeting  Summary,  8  April  2018,  url;  UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 23 - 29 April 2018, 30 April 2018, url, p. 1 
1649 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url   

 
                                                           
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reported more than 2 400 people displaced from remote villages in Khanabad district to the district 
centre and Kunduz city.1650  

In  November  2018,  AGEs  coordinated  attacks  on  ANSF  bases  in  Qarluq,  Tepa  Haji  Mohibullah  and 
Hazarbagh areas of Dasht-e-Archi district which led to the displacement of 400 families to Khwajaghar 
district of neighbouring Takhar province in November 2018.1651 

According to a research study from the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) on the challenges of IDP 
protection  in  Afghanistan,  Kunduz  province  has  become  increasingly  significant  as  both  a  point  of 
departure  and  destination.1652  The  research  data  published  in  January  2018  reported  63 %  of  IDP 
movements  are  within  the  province  itself,  18 %  are  to  Kabul  province  and  15 %  are  to  Nangarhar 
province.1653 Furthermore, 97 % of NRC’s IDP respondents from Kunduz reported fleeing areas under 
Taliban control.1654 UNOCHA noted in November 2018 that Kunduz was one of the three provinces 
that experienced the highest numbers of conflict-related displacement.1655 

In June 2018, the UN Secretary-General reported particularly high levels of displacement in Kunduz 
province, with many displaced families having been moved multiple times and having no immediate 
prospect of returning to their areas of origin.1656 UNOCHA’s Humanitarian Response Plan of December 
2018 classified Kunduz as one of the 12 provinces with large concentrations of IDPs and returnees 
who  are  most  affected  by  the  ongoing  conflict  and  drought.1657  Furthermore,  the  Afghanistan 
Protection Cluster mentioned Kunduz as one of the six top hosting provinces for IDPs in May, June and 
August 2018.1658  

IOM rated Chardarah district 20th out of the top 20 districts hosting the most returnees and IDP’s in 
April - June 20181659 and Kunduz district as 24th out of the top 25 districts hosting most returnees and 
IDPs from October to December 2018.1660 Several sources described Kunduz as one of the main areas 
for returning registered refugees in 2018.1661 A January 2018 study by Oxfam stated that the fear that 
the arrival of large groups of returnees in Kunduz will increase competition and upset the ethnic and 
power configurations in the province.1662  

1650 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 8 - 14 January 2019, 15 January 2019, url, pp. 1-2 
1651 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Kunduz Province - Meeting Summary, 13 November 2018, url, pp. 1-2; 
UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Takhar Province - Meeting Summary, 19 November 2018, url, pp. 1-2 
1652 NRC et al., Escaping War: Where to Next? A Research Study on the Challenges of IDP Protection in Afghanistan, January 
2018, url, p. 19  
1653 NRC et al., Escaping War: Where to Next? A Research Study on the Challenges of IDP Protection in Afghanistan, January 
2018, url, p. 19 
1654 NRC et al., Escaping War: Where to Next? A Research Study on the Challenges of IDP Protection in Afghanistan, January 
2018, url, p. 10 
1655 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 9 
1656 UN Secretary-General, The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security, 6 June 2018, 
url, p. 11 
1657 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: 2019 Update to the 2018-2010 Humanitarian Response Plan, 21 December 2018, url, p. 33 
1658 Afghanistan Protection Cluster, Fact Sheet Afghanistan May 2018, 14 June 2018, url, p. 1;  Afghanistan Protection Cluster, 
Fact Sheet Afghanistan June 2018, 23 July 2018, url, p. 1; Afghanistan Protection Cluster, Fact Sheet Afghanistan, August 
2018, url, p. 1  
1659 IOM, Baseline Mobility Assessment: Summary Results January - March 2018, 31 March 2018, url, p. 5; IOM, Baseline 
Mobility Assessment: Summary Results April - June 2018, 25 September 2018, url, p. 5 
1660 IOM, Baseline Mobility Assessment: Summary Results October - December 2018, 15 March 2019, url, p. 5  
1661 UNHCR, Fact Sheet Afghanistan, 30 June 2018, url, p. 2; UNHCR, Fact Sheet Afghanistan, 30 September 2018, url, p. 2; 
Ahmad A., Refugees Return to Poverty, Unemployment and Despair: Afghanistan’s Labor Market and the Status of Women, 
VIDC, November 2018, url, p. 19 
1662 Oxfam, Returning to Fragility: Exploring the Link Between Conflict and Returnees in Afghanistan, January 2018, url, p. 25 

 
 
                                                           
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2.21 Laghman 

2.21.1 General description of the province  

 
 
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Laghman is located in eastern Afghanistan and it borders on the provinces of Panjshir and Nuristan to 
the  north,  Kunar  to  the  east,  Nangarhar  to  the  south,  and  Kabul  and  Kapisa  to  the  west.1663  The 
provincial  capital  of  Laghman  is  Mehtarlam.1664  The  province  is  divided  into  the  following  districts: 
Alingar,  Alishang,  Dawlatshah,  Mehtarlam,  Qarghayi,1665  and  Bad  Pash  (also  Bad  Pakh);  the  latter 
became a district of its own in 2011.1666 According to the Afghanistan CSO, the population of Laghman 
is estimated at 476 537 for 2018/191667 and is composed mainly of Pashtuns, followed by Tajik and 
Pashai tribes.1668 The province is mostly mountainous, a fact that has favoured the insurgents in the 
past, who used to ‘flee into remote mountain ranges’, according to a report from 2014.1669 

The  Kabul-Jalalabad  section  of  Asian  Highway  AH-1  passes  through  Qarghayi  district,1670  where  a 
secondary  road  branches  off  to  connect  to  Nurgeram  in  Nuristan  via  the  provincial  capital 
Mehtarlam.1671 Bad Pash district has been a strategic crossing-point for Afghan and foreign insurgents 
coming from the border area and moving deeper into Afghanistan, especially to Kabul and Kapisa.1672 

According  to  the  2018  UNODC  Opium  Survey,  opium-poppy  cultivation  levels  in  Laghman  (2  092 
hectares) remained similar to 2017 (2 257 hectares) with insignificant changes at district level.1673  

2.21.2 Conflict background and actors in Laghman 

According to Khaama Press reporting in October 2018, Laghman, which was described as one of the 
‘relatively calm’ provinces of Afghanistan, has seen a rise in activities by Taliban and ISKP militants in 
some remote districts of the province.1674  

Purportedly,  Alingar  district,  which  was  mainly  under  the  influence  of  the  Taliban  in  the  past, 
reportedly saw an increased presence of IS fighters, as reported in February 2018.1675 As of February 
2019, the UN Secretary-General described Laghman as one of the IS ‘strongholds’ in Afghanistan.1676 

In terms of the presence of government security forces, Laghman province is under the responsibility 
of the 201st ANA Corps, which falls under Train, Advise, and Assist Command - East (TAAC-E), led by US 
and Polish forces.1677 

The following table  provides an overview of control of the districts in Laghman province based on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.1678 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 

1663 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Laghman Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1664  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan:  Laghman  Province  –  District  Atlas,  April  2014,  url;  US,  Naval  Postgraduate  School,  Laghman 
Provincial Overview, n.d., url; Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial Profile Laghman, 1 February 2017, url 
1665 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Laghman Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url 
1666 Foschini, F., The Enteqal Seven (2): Around Mehtarlam, an ‚insurgency corridor‘ in the making, AAN, 10 May 2011, url 
1667 Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 2 
1668  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Background  profile  of  Laghman  province,  n.d.,  url;  US,  Naval  Postgraduate  School,  Laghman 
Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1669 Stars and Stripes, Insurgents in Afghanistan‘s Laghman province may win by not losing, 15 November 2014, url 
1670 Afghanistan, MOPW, Application of Road Numbering System National Highways, 16 October 2015, url, p.5; UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan: Laghman Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url 
1671 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Laghman Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url 
1672 Foschini, F., Classics of Conflict (2): Reviewing some of Afghanistan‘s most notorious hotspots, AAN, 9 July 2015, url; 
Foschini, F., The Enteqal Seven (2): Around Mehtarlam, an ‘insurgency corridor‘ in the making, AAN, 10 May 2011, url 
1673 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 23 
1674 Khaama Press, Four key Taliban group leaders ambushed in Laghman province, 1 October 2018, url 
1675 Salaam Times, Security forces launch operation in Laghman amid Taliban-ISIS clashes, 27 February 2018, url; National 
(The), ISIS targets Taliban in fight for Afghanistan, 15 July 2018, url 
1676 UN Secretary-General, Eighth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace 
and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, 1 February 2019, 
url, p. 7 
1677 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2018, url, p. 15 
1678 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 

                                                           
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a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region, to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.      

LAGHMAN 

Alingar 

Alishang 

Dawlatshah 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: August-
November 
2017) 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 
Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of October 
2018) 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Mehtarlam (Bad 
Pash) (capital) 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
control 

Mehtarlam: 
GIRoA control 
and Bad Pash: 
Contested 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Qarghayi 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

LWJ 

Taliban 

(last 
accessed:1679 
April 2019) 

(assessment as 
of December 
2018)  

Contested 

Contested 

TB control: 88%; 
Gov control: 
12% 
TB control: 85%; 
Gov control: 
15% 
TB control: 90%; 
Gov control: 
10% 
Mehtarlam: Gov 
control: 75%; TB 
control: 25% 
and Bad Pash: 
TB control: 98%; 
Gov control: 2% 
TB control: 98%; 
Gov control: 2% 

2.21.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.21.3.1 General  

In 2018, UNAMA documented 271 civilian casualties (93 deaths and 178 injured) in Laghman province. 
This  represents  a  decrease  of  23  %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were  ground 
engagements,  followed  by  targeted  killings  and  UXO/landmines.1680  The  same  source  ‘also 
documented continued reductions in civilian casualties from ground engagements in Kunduz province 
and Laghman province, which joined the top five provinces that had a reduction of civilian casualties 
from such operations in 2018’. 1681 For Laghman province, it recorded 123 civilian casualties caused by 
ground engagements, which is a 53 % decrease compared to 2017.1682 

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA  places  the  districts  of  Alishang, 
Mehtarlam,  and  Alingar  in  the  highest  category  and  Dawlatshah  in  the  second  highest  category. 
Qarghayi falls in the fourth category.1683  

url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, 23 April 2019, url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice of 
Jihad, End of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
1679 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 
1680 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
1681 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 47 
1682 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 47 
1683 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 144 incidents related to insurgents in Laghman province.1684 

A  Taliban  attack  on  an  army  outpost  in  Qarghayi  was  foiled  by  Afghan  security  forces  in  January 
2019.1685  Also  in  Qarghayi  district,  IEDs,  purportedly  installed  by  anti-government  militants,  were 
defused by Afghan security forces in late December 2018.1686 Airstrikes were carried out by foreign 
security  forces  in  Alishang  in  November  2018,  killing  insurgents.1687  Military  operations  against 
insurgents,  Taliban  and  ISKP  fighters,  were  carried  out  by  Afghan  security  forces  in  Dawlatshah  in 
October and in Alingar in September and February 2018, killing militants.1688  

Clashes  between  Taliban  insurgents  and  ISKP  fighters  were  reported  in  Alingar  district  throughout 
2018.1689 Battles between the two militant groups in Alingar district in February 2018 reportedly went 
on  for  more  than  a  month  killing  as  many  as  40  militants  and  injuring  dozens,  according  to  local 
officials; Afghan special forces also conducted ground and air operations in the area. A local resident 
interviewed by the Salaam Times said that the fighting had reportedly caused the closure of schools, 
stoppages of vaccinations and the groups had been ‘committing atrocities’..1690 

In  August  2018  six  girls  were  killed  after  the  detonation  of  an  unexploded  ordnance  in  Alingar 
district.1691 Pajhwok Afghan News reported at least six civilians killed in a roadside bombing in Qarghayi 
district in February 2019.1692 

Election related violence was recorded  in Laghman province  by UNAMA, as the  detonation of  IEDs 
placed  near  a  school  serving  as  a  polling  centre  in  Mehtarlam  injured  civilians  (12  men  and  two 
children).1693 

According to local sources quoted by IWPR, the Taliban have been threatening musicians and people 
listening  to  music  for  not  conforming  to  their  interpretation  of  Islam  in  some  areas  of  Laghman 
province, including in Alishang and Mehterlam districts.1694 

2.21.3.2 Displacement   

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 9 738 persons 
displaced from Laghman province almost all of whom (9 265) were displaced within the province.1695 

1684 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
1685 Khaama Press, Afghan forces foil Taliban attack on an army outpost in Laghman province, 22 January 2019, url 
1686 Khaama Press, Afghan forces foil militants bid to detonate a bridge in Laghman, 23 December 2018, url 
1687 Pajhwok Afghan News, 8 Taliban, 2 children killed in Laghman, Kapisa airstrikes, 26 November 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan 
News, 7 Taliban killed, 3 Daesh financiers held in Laghman, Nangarhar, 3 November 2018, url 
1688  Khaama  Press,  Four  key  Taliban  group  leaders  ambushed  in  Laghman  province,  1  October  2018,  url;  Khaama  Press, 
Taliban, ISIS militants suffer heavy casualties in Laghman, Kunar provinces, 27 September 2018, url; Salaam Times, Security 
forces launch operation in Laghman amid Taliban-ISIS clashes, 27 February 2018, url 
1689 National (The), ISIS targets Taliban in fight for Afghanistan, 15 July 2018, url; 1TV News, Five killed in Taliban-Daesh clash 
in Laghman, 23 June 2018, url; Salaam Times, Security forces launch operation  in Laghman amid  Taliban-ISIS clashes, 27 
February 2018, url; Frontier Post (The), Clashes erupt between Taliban, Daesh in Laghman, 14 February 2018, url; Telegraph 
(The), Taliban claim to be preparing onslaught to drive Islamic State from Afghan stronghold, 7 August 2018, url; Huffington 
Post, Afghanistan un voto nel vuoto. E nel sangue, 20 October 2018, url  
1690 Salaam Times, Security forces launch operation in Laghman amid Taliban-ISIS clashes, 27 February 2018, url 
1691 Tolonews, Six Girls Killed In Laghman Explosion, 15 August 2018, url; Huffington Post, Una mattanza senza fine. Bandiera 
nera sul mattatoio-Afghanistan, 16 October 2018, url 
1692 Pajhwok Afghan News, Landmine kills 6 civilians in Laghman, 19 February 2019, url 
1693 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Special Report: 2018 Elections Violence, November 2018, 
url, p. 5 
1694 IWPR, Taleban Try to Silence Afghan Music Again, 20 February 2018, url 
1695 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url  

                                                           
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UNOCHA  collected  data  for  the  period  1  January  2019  –  28  February  2019,  reporting  14  persons  
displaced from Laghman province.1696 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 9 325 persons  
displaced to Laghman province.1697 

No conflict-induced internal displacement to Laghman province was reported by UNOCHA for the 
period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019.1698 

District 

Alingar 

Alishang 

Dawlatshah 

Mehtarlam/Bad Pash 

Qarghayi 

Displaced from 

Displaced to 

Displaced from 

Displaced to 

(2018) 
9 096  

177  

139  

326 

/ 

(2018) 
2 527 

3 500  

/ 

3 228 

70 

(2019) 
/ 

(2019) 
/ 

/ 

14 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

In 2018, Laghman was considered as one of ‘the main provinces of both origin and displacement of 
conflict-affected communities’.1699 Insecurity is a factor in displacements in Laghman province.1700 In 
at least seven Afghanistan Weekly Field Reports published between January 2018 and January 2019, 
UNOCHA stated that people have been displaced because of ‘threats and intimidation by Non State 
Armed  Groups  (NSAG)’.1701  Laghman  districts  affected  by  these  causes  of  displacements  are 
Alingar,1702 Alishang1703 and Mehtarlam1704 districts. 

Clashes between non-state armed groups and sporadic conflicts were also a cause mentioned more 
than one time in UNOCHA weekly reports on displacements from Alingar district to Mehtarlam city1705 
and from Alishang district.1706 

In February 2018, an ANSF operation against non-state armed groups forced 4 200 people to find a 
shelter within Alingar district or in Mehtarlam City.1707 

1696 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 
1697 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 
1698 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url  
1699 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 42 
1700 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 30 July – 5 August 2018, 6 August 2018, url 
1701 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 15 – 21 January, 22 January 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 5 - 11 February, 12 February 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 16 – 22 April 2018, 23 April 2018; 
url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 30  April-6 May 2018, 7 May 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 05 – 11 November 2018, 12 November 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 10-16 September 2018, 
17  September  2018,  url;  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan  Weekly  Field  Report,  01  January-  07  January  2019,  9  January  2019,  url; 
UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 30  April– 6 May 2018, 7 May 2018, url 
1702 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 15 – 21 January, 22 January 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report,  16  –  22  April  2018,  23  April  2018,  url;  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan  Weekly  Field  Report,  05  –  11  November  2018,  12 
November 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 01 January- 07 January 2019, 9 January 2019, url 
1703 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 16 – 22 April 2018, 23 April 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 30  April-6 May 2018, 7 May 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 01 January- 07 January 2019, 9 
January 2019, url 
1704 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 16 – 22 April 2018, 23 April 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 30  April– 6 May 2018, 7 May 2018, url 
1705 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 05 – 11 November  2018, 12 November 2018,  url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan 
Weekly Field Report, 26 March – 1 April 2018, 9 April 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 2 – 8 April 2018, 
9 April 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 1 - 7 January 2019, 9 January 2019, url 
1706 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 1 - 7 January 2019, 9 January 2019, url  
1707 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 19 - 25 February, 26 February 2018, url 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
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2.22 Logar 

2.22.1 General description of the province  

Logar  is  located  in  central  Afghanistan,  about  65  kilometres  south  of  Kabul.1708  It  borders  on  the 
provinces of Kabul to the north, Nangarhar to the north and east, Paktya to the south, and Ghazni and 
Maydan  Wardak  to  the  west.1709  The  provincial  capital  of  Logar  is  Pul-e-Alam.1710  The  province  is 
divided into the following districts: Azra, Barakibarak, Charkh, Kharwar, Khoshi, Mohammad Agha, and 
Pul-e-Alam.1711 According to the Central Statistics Organization of Afghanistan, the population of Logar 
is estimated at 419 377 for 2018/191712 and is composed mainly of Tajiks, Pashtuns, and Hazara. 1713 
The province is rich in chromite ore, with deposits extracted illegally and smuggled to Pakistan.1714 The 
presence of natural resources in the province has often caused local rivalries over revenues coming 
from mineral deposits.1715    

1708 Pajhwok Afghan News, Background Profile of Logar, n.d., url 
1709 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Logar Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1710 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Logar Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1711 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Logar Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; US, Naval Postgraduate School, Logar Provincial 
Overview, n.d., url 
1712 Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 2 
1713 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Logar Provincial Overview, n.d., url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Background Profile of Logar, 
n.d., url 
1714 Pajhwok Afghan News, Illegal extraction of Logar chromites goes on, 6 October 2015, url; VoA, Report; Militant Groups 
in Afghanistan Get Rich Off Mineral Smuggling, 1 February 2017, url 
1715 Global Security Review, Are Afghanistan‘s Mineral Deposits the Answer to the Country‘s Economic Woes?, 31 December 
2018, url 

 
                                                           
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The Kabul-Gardez-Khost highway passes through the districts of Mohammad Agha and Pul-e-Alam.1716 
According to local sources quoted by the Afghanistan Times, Taliban militants stopped buses travelling 
on  the  highway  section  in  Mohammad  Agha  and  kidnapped  government  employees  in  November 
2018. Security on the highway had purportedly been deteriorating and government officials could not 
travel on it.1717 The province served as a strategic crossing-point for Taliban fighters, not only due to 
its  proximity  to  Kabul,  but  also  because  it  provided  easy  access  to  insurgents’  fronts  in  nearby 
provinces of Nangarhar, Paktya, Paktika, Khost, Wardak, and Ghazni; as well as in Pakistan.1718  

According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, Logar has maintained poppy-free status since 2014.1719  

2.22.2 Conflict background and actors in Logar 

According to a 2014 report by AAN, the security situation in Logar province had been deteriorating 
since 2011. Taliban militants were seeking to control Azra, Khoshi, Barakibarak and Mohammadagha 
districts due to their strategic positions as bordering Nangarhar, Paktya, Maydan Wardak, and Kabul 
provinces. According to local sources quoted by AAN in December 2014, Taliban militants terrorised 
the population of Muhammad Agha by posting rules on mosque walls, sending death threats to people 
supposedly working for the government, extorting locals to spy for them and imposing curfews.1720  

According to local sources quoted by Tolonews, in April 2018, Taliban fighters and members of other 
insurgent groups have been active in parts of all of Logar’s districts, including the provincial capital. 1721  

In terms of the presence of government security forces, Logar province is under the responsibility of 
the 203th ANA Corps, which fall under Task Force Southeast (TF Southeast), led by US forces.1722 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Logar  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal (LWJ) and 
the  Taliban.1723  When  a  source  does  not  provide  information  on  a  district,  the  field  is  left  blank. 
Sometimes a district  is only mentioned by one source (the  Taliban). These districts  are  not  always 
recognised  by  the  government  or  sometimes  belong,  as  a  region,  to  another  district.  If  found, 
clarification is made in a separate footnote.    

LOGAR 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: August-
November 
2017) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment 
as of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

Taliban 

(last 
accessed:1724 
April 2019) 

(assessment as 
of December 
2018) 

1716  Ali,  O.,  The  Empty  Streets  of  Mohammad  Agha:  Logar‘s  struggle  against  the  Taleban,  AAN,  15  December  2014,  url; 
UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Logar Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; Afghanistan, MOPW, Application of Road Numbering 
System National Highways, 16 October 2015, url, p.5 
1717 Afghanistan Times, Taliban drag government servants out of buses along Kabul-Logar road, 16 November 2018, url 
1718 Ali, O., The Empty Streets of Mohammad Agha: Logar‘s struggle against the Taleban, AAN, 15 December 2014, url; Gilles 
Dorronsoro, The Taliban‘s winning strategy for international peace, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009, url, 
p. 22; Al Jazeera, Taliban attack in Afghanistan‘s Logar kills eight security forces, 20 January 2019, url 
1719 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 21 
1720 Ali, O., The Empty Streets of Mohammad Agha: Logar‘s struggle against the Taleban, AAN, 15 December 2014, url 
1721 Tolonews, Logar Still Insecure After 72 Military Operations, 27 April 2018, url 
1722 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2018, url, p. 16 
1723 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; Long War Journal, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Voice 
of Jihad, End of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
1724 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

Azra 

Barakibarak 

Charkh 

Kharwar 

Khoshi 

Open Taliban 
presence – 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
Presence – high 

Open Taliban 
Presence – high 
Open Taliban 
Presence – high 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

Taliban 
control 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Taliban 
control 
Taliban 
control 

Open Taliban 
presence – low 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Mohammadagha 

Open Taliban 
Presence – high 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Pul-e-Alam 
(capital) 

Open Taliban 
Presence – high 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Tsarkh 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

TB control: 90%; 
Gov control: 
10% 
TB control: 90%; 
Gov control: 
10% 
TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5% 
TB control: 98%; 
Gov control: 2% 
TB control: 65%; 
Gov control: 
35% 
TB control: 55%; 
Gov control: 
45% 
TB control: 70%; 
Gov control: 
30% 
TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5%  

2.22.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.22.3.1 General  

In 2018 UNAMA documented 143 civilian victims (68 deaths and 75 injured) in Logar province. This 
represents  a  decrease  of  3 %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were  ground 
engagements, followed by targeted killings and complex attacks.1725  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA  places  the  districts  of  Charkh, 
Barakibarak, Pul-e Alam, and Mohammad Agha  in the  second highest category and  Kharwar  in the 
fourth highest category. The remaining districts fall in the lower category.1726 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 151 incidents related to insurgents in Logar province.1727  

Logar is described by Khaama Press as ‘among the relatively volatile provinces’ with militants ‘actively 
operating’;  airstrikes  carried  out  by  coalition  forces  killed  8  Taliban  militants  in  Mohammad  Agha 
district in late December 2018.1728 In August 2018, Taliban militants tried to storm the district centre 
of Azra. According to local sources, Afghan policemen, who had asked for air backup, were accidentally 
killed  in  airstrikes  carried  out  by  US  forces.1729  However,  these  claims  were  denied  after  an 
examination by pro-government security forces stating that the policemen were killed after a Taliban 
attack.1730 In July 2018, an airstrike by the Afghan Air Force killed four civilians while targeting militants 
in Babos and Alowzai areas of Pul-e-Alam.1731  

1725 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
1726 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2  
1727 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
1728 Khaama Press, Drone strikes leaves [sic] 8 militants dead in Logar province, 26 December 2018, url 
1729 APA and DPA, Dutzende Tote bei Gefechten und Explosionen in Afghanistan, 8 August 2018, url 
1730 Stars and Stripes, US says airstrike did not kill Afghan forces, 8 August 2018, url 
1731 Pajhwok Afghan News, Protest as airstrike kills 4 civilians in Logar, 9 July 2018, url 

 
                                                           
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  209  

Further military operations against insurgents were carried out in the form of ground engagements: 
Iin November 2018, Taliban militants were killed and some more were detained in Padkhab Shana 
area  of Pul-e-Alam  city  during  a  night  raid  by NDS.1732 Also in November, ‘eight civilians, including 
women and children’, were killed during a night raid in Mohammad Agha district.1733  

In the first quarter of 2018, around 72 military operations against insurgents were purportedly carried 
out in the form of night raids and airstrikes, killing insurgents but also reportedly targeting civilian 
houses belonging to the civilian population in Barakibarak.1734  

In January 2019, a Taliban car bomb targeting the convoy of the Logar provincial governor exploded 
along this highway  in Mohammad  Agha district.1735 In November 2018 a district  chief  and the NDS 
director for Barakibarak district were killed in a Taliban roadside bombing in Pul-e-Alam city.1736 In late 
April 2018, Logar deputy governor Qamaruddin Shakib was killed in a Taliban attack in the district of 
Mohammad Agha.1737  

In August 2018, UNAMA verified threats by the Taliban against girls’ schools in Logar’s Barakibarak 
district  that  resulted  in  ‘the  suspension  of  classes  for  girls  above  grade  six  in  the  district  and  the 
replacement of female teachers for younger girls with male teachers’.1738 In July 2018 schools were 
purportedly closed  in Mohammad Agha  and Pul-e Alam  due to threats by Taliban insurgents.1739  A 
bomb  explosion  caused  at  least  eight  fatalities  during  a  gathering  of  peace  activists  in  late  June 
2018.1740 

2.22.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018, reporting 2 471 persons 
displaced from Logar  province,  displaced to neighbouring provinces Kabul  and Khost or within  the 
province itself.1741 

UNOCHA  collected  data  for  the  period  1  January  2019  -  28  February  2019,  reporting  182  persons 
displaced from Barakibarak district in Logar province, to Kabul district in Kabul province.1742 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018, reporting 217 persons 
displaced  to  Logar  province,  mainly  coming  from  within  the  province  itself  (168  IDPs)  or  from 
neighbouring provinces of Kabul, Paktya and Khost.1743 

No conflict-induced internal displacement to Logar province was reported by UNOCHA for the period 
1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019.1744 

District 

Displaced from 
(2018) 

Displaced to 
(2018) 

Displaced from 
(2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

1732 Pajhwok Afghan News, 7 Taliban killed, 9 suspected detained in Logar, 25 November 2018, url 
1733 Pajhwok Afghan News, 8 civilians killed in Logar night raid, 21 November 2018, url  
1734 Tolonews, Logar Still Insecure After 72 Military Operations, 27 April 2018, url 
1735 Ariana News, Attack on Logar officials‘ convoy leaves eight killed, 10 wounded, 20 January 2019, url; Al Jazeera, Taliban 
attack in Afghanistan‘s Logar kills eight security forces, 20 January 2019, url 
1736 Pajhwok Afghan News, District chief, intelligence director killed in Logar roadside bombing, 18 November 2018, url 
1737 Tolonews, Logar Still Insecure After 72 Military Operations, 27 April 2018, url 
1738 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 16 
1739 APA and DPA, Taliban bedrohen Lehrer in Afghanistan: Schulen geschlossen, 14 July 2018, url 
1740 APA and DPA, Mindestens 29 Tote bei Kämpfen und Explosionen in Afghanistan, 28 Juni 2018, url 
1741 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url 
1742 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url  
1743 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url 
1744 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url  

 
 
 
 
                                                           
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

Barakibarak 

Charkh 

Azra 

Mohammadagha 

Pul-e-Alam 

2 163 

259 

14 

35 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

28 

189 

182 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

According  to  UNOCHA,  the main  reasons for IDPs leaving the insecure districts of Barakibarak and 
Charkh in Logar province are military operations, insecurity, intimidation and economic problems.1745 
Many  of  the  reported  IDPs  settled  in  the  provincial  capital  Pul-e-Alam  and  in  Mohammadagha 
district.1746 

In April and July 2018 UNOCHA reported respectively 1 000 and 900 IDPs arriving in Logar’s provincial 
capital,  Pul-e-Alam,  coming  from  Chaparhar  district  of  Nangarhar  province.1747  According  to  the 
authorities  in  Logar  another  500  displaced  people  arrived  in  Pul-e-Alam  in  July  2018  coming  from 
different locations within the province itself and from neighbouring Paktya province.1748 

After Kabul, Logar province is mentioned by UNHCR as one of the main areas of return in the central 
region in 2018.1749 According to  IOM’s Afghanistan’s Displacement Tracking Matrix Baseline Mobility 
Assessment in 2018, 1-in-6 people is a returnee and 1-in-4 people is an IDP in Logar province.1750 IOM 
ranked provincial capital Pul-e-Alam as 9th out of the top 20 districts hosting the most returnees and 
IDPs  from  January  to  June  2018;1751  and  ranked  16th  out  of  the  top  25  districts  hosting  the  most 
returnees and IDPs from October to December 2018.1752  

1745  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan  Weekly  Field  Report,  15  -  21  January,  22  January  2018,  url,  p.  1;  UNOCHA,  Operational 
Coordination Team (OCT) - Logar Province - Meeting Summary, 24 January 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly 
Field Report, 29 January - 4 February, 5 February 2018, url, p. 1 
1746 Pajhwok Afghan News, More than 100 IDP Families Get Cash, Food in Aid, 15 January 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan 
Weekly Field Report, 15 - 21 January, 22 January 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Logar 
Province - Meeting Summary, 24 January 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 29 January - 4 February, 
5 February 2018, url, p. 1 
1747 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 23 - 29 April 2018, 30 April 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly 
Field Report, 16 - 22 July 2018, 22 July 2018, url, p. 1 
1748 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 25 June - 1 July 2018, 1 July 2018, url, p. 1 
1749 UNHCR, Fact Sheet Afghanistan, 30 September 2018, url, p. 2 
1750 IOM, Baseline Mobility Assessment: Summary Results January - March 2018, 31 March 2018, url, p. 1; IOM, Displacement 
Survey Shows 3.5 Million Internally Displaced, Returnees from Abroad in 15 Afghan Provinces, 8 May 2018, url 
1751 IOM, Baseline Mobility Assessment: Summary Results January - March 2018, 31 March 2018, url, p. 5; IOM, Baseline 
Mobility Assessment: Summary Results April - June 2018, 25 September 2018, url, p. 5 
1752 IOM, Baseline Mobility Assessment: Summary Results October - December 2018, 15 March 2019, url, p. 5  

 
 
                                                           
 
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  211  

2.23 Nangarhar 

2.23.1 General description of the province  

Nangarhar is located in eastern Afghanistan, on the Afghan-Pakistani border. It borders Laghman and 
Kunar to the north, Pakistan to the east and south, and Logar and Kabul to the west.1753 The provincial 
capital of Nangarhar is Jalalabad.1754 The province is divided into the following districts: Achin, Batikot, 
Behsud, Chaparhar, Dara-e-Nur, Dehbala, Durbaba, Goshta, Hesarak, Jalalabad, Kama, Khogyani, Kot, 
Kuzkunar, Lalpur, Muhmand  Dara, Nazyan, Pachieragam, Rodat, Sherzad, Shinwar and Surkhrod.1755 
According  to  the  Afghanistan  CSO  ,  the  population  of  Nangarhar  is  estimated  at  1 635 872  for 
2018/191756 and is composed mainly of Pashtuns, followed by Pashai, Arabs and Tajiks.1757 Members 
of the Sikh and Hindu community lived in Nangarhar province, particularly in and nearby Jalalabad. 1758 
According to the Afghan radio network Salam Watandar, many of them have been leaving Afghanistan 
due  to  insecurity  and  government’s  indifference.  In  late  September  2018  only  60  families  of  the 
community still lived in Nangarhar.1759  

1753 US, Naval Postraduate School, Nangarhar Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1754 Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial Profile Nangarhar, 1 February 2017, url 
1755 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Nangarhar Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; US, Naval Postgraduate School, Nangarhar 
Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1756 Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 2 
1757 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Nangarhar Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1758 Foschini,  F., The Other Fold of the Turban: Afghanistan‘s Hindus and  Sikhs, AAN, 23 September  2013, url; Australian 
Institute of International Affairs, A Precarious State: the Sikh Community in Afghanistan, 11 July 2018, url 
1759 Salam Watandar, Sikhs and Hindus of Nangarhar leaving Afghanistan, 23 September 2018, url 

 
 
                                                           
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Asian  Highway  AH-1  passes  through  the  districts  of  Surkhrod,  Jalalabad,  Behsud,  Rodat,  Batikot, 
Shinwar, Muhmand Dara and reaches the Afghan-Pakistani border at Torkham.1760 The province, which 
borders  the  former  Federally  Administered  Tribal  Areas  (FATA)  of  Pakistan1761  (now  merged  with 
Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province),1762 has served as an unofficial crossing-point for local and 
foreign militants.1763  

According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, Nangarhar was the leading poppy-cultivating province 
in the eastern region, even though the cultivation rate had decreased by 9 %, compared to 2017. The 
decrease applied to the districts of Khogyani, Chaparhar and Lalpur, whereas an increase was observed 
in Kot, Shinwari and Achin. Most of the national eradication procedures also took place in Nangarhar 
province.1764  

2.23.2 Conflict background and actors in Nangarhar 

Nangarhar  has  been  observing  a  deterioration  of  its  political  and  security  situation  since  2011.1765 
According to a 2016 report by the AAN, the political and military vacuum that had been affecting the 
province for years, and paved the way for the rise of the Afghan branch of the Islamic State, the Islamic 
State Khorasan Province.  

First,  the  gap  between  the  provincial  political  elites  and  Nangarhar’s  population  grew  deeper,  as 
corruption,  local  struggles  for  power  and  the  failure  to  provide  effective  services  undermined  the 
people’s  trust  in  the  Afghan  government  and  left  the  population  unprotected  against  insurgents. 
Moreover, the decrease in international combat forces in the province, starting from 2013, led to a 
considerable loss of territorial control by the Afghan government, mainly in the districts along the Spin 
Ghar mountain range in the south and the east of the province.  

Second,  the  fragmented  insurgency  in  Nangarhar,  undermined  by  internal  power  struggles, 
undisciplined commanders and fighters involved in criminal activities, could never totally consolidate 
and stabilize its power within the province. Furthermore, different militant groups, Afghan and foreign, 
as  well  as  Salafi  fighters  within  the  Taliban  ranks,  contributed  to  destabilising  Nangarhar’s  Taliban 
movement even more, ending with many of them joining the Afghan branch of IS.1766 In February 2019 
Andrew Quilty from AAN noted that ‘it has been almost four years since the Islamic State Khorasan 
Province  (ISKP)  captured  territory  in  southern  Nangrahar  province,  where  it  ruled  with  extreme 
brutality’ and that whilst the ISKP ‘has been driven back’, it ‘still holds some territory – and the “battle” 
goes on, with ISKP mainly now targeting civilians in large-scale, urban, terrorist attacks’.1767 

According to AAN, the following Afghan militant groups were operating in the province in 2016: the 
mainstream Taliban under the Quetta Shura’s (or Rahbari Shura) command; the Tora Bora Jihadi Front, 
mostly  active  in  Khogyani,  Sherzad  and    Pachieragam,  which  was  integrated  into  the  mainstream 
Taliban movement in October 2015; Hezb-e Islami, mainly operating in Chaparhar, Kot and Sherzad; 
the abovementioned Salafi groups, whose influence within the eastern provinces was significant, and 
who were mainly operating in Chaparhar, Kot and Batikot; Fedaiy Karwan, a semi-autonomous group 

1760 Afghanistan, MOPW, Application of Road Numbering System National Highways, 16 October 2015, url, p.5; UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan: Nangarhar Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url 
1761 Osman, B., Descent into chaos: Why did Nangarhar turn into an IS hub?, AAN, 27 September 2016, url 
1762 International Crisis Group, Shaping a New Peace in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas, 20 August 2018, url 
1763 Osman, B., Descent into chaos: Why did Nangarhar turn into an IS hub?, AAN, 27 September 2016, url; New Arab (The), 
In Nangarhar province, Afghanistan, violence is committed by all sides, 25 January 2018, url 
1764 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 23 
1765 Osman, B.,  Descent into chaos: Why did Nangarhar turn into an IS hub?, AAN, 27 September 2016, url; TBIJ, Nangarhar: 
Descent into chaos, 30 July 2018, url; New Arab (The), In Nangarhar province, Afghanistan, violence is committed by all sides, 
25 January 2018, url 
1766 Osman, B.,, Descent into chaos: Why did Nangarhar turn into an IS hub?, AAN, 27 September 2016, url 
1767 Quilty, A., “Faint lights twinkling against the dark”: Reportage from the fight against ISKP in Nangrahar, AAN, 19 February 
2019, url 

                                                           
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  213  

within the Taliban movement, mostly operating in Khogiani and Sherzad districts; and the Siahpushan 
(‘plural:  black-clad  and  masked’),  whose  alliance  was  not  clear  and  who  were  active  in  Khogyani, 
Pachieragam and Sherzad.1768  

Additionally,  foreign  militant  groups  were:  Al  Qaeda,  mostly  operating  around  the  former  Khyber 
Agency in Pakistan and Kunar; the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, mostly operating in southern and eastern 
districts;  Lashkar-e  Islam  operating  mainly  in  Nazyan  and  Achin  and  which  cooperated  with  the  IS; 
Jamaat ul-Ahrar, a splinter group of TTP mostly operating in Lalpur, Goshta and Muhmand Dara; Junud-
e  Khorasan,  another  splinter  group  of  TTP,  also  operating  mainly  in  the  latter  districts;  the  Salafi 
oriented group Amr bil ma’ruf Wa Nahi An Al-Munkar, active in Nazyan and Achin and the Ansar ul-
Islam, a Pakistani pro-government group sometimes present in Nazyan and Achin.1769 

As of February 2019, the UN Secretary-General described Nangarhar as one of the ISKP ‘strongholds’ 
in  Afghanistan.1770  UNAMA’s  2018  annual  report  noted  that  ‘Daesh/ISKP  is  present  in  the  east  of 
Afghanistan,  with  an  estimated  3,000  fighters  currently  active,  primarily  in  Nangarhar  and  Kunar 
provinces’.1771 

Differences in social-tribal solidarity among the Shinwari tribe, which is prevailing in many districts of 
Nangarhar,  were  another  factor  that  led  to  the  rise  of  IS  in  the  province.  Whilst  the  Shaikhan 
tribesmen, a  Shinwari sub-tribe  predominant in Durbaba, showed cohesion and were  able to  push 
back the insurgency in their district, the Shinwari tribal communities in other districts were fragmented 
and  characterised  by  power  struggles  and  was  therefore  unable  to  serve  as  an  opposition  to  the 
insurgency. As a consequence, intra-tribal fighting eroded the strength of social structures and made 
the communities vulnerable to pressure from local and foreign insurgents.1772  

Furthermore, the involvement of external actors like Pakistan, Iran, India, China, Russia and the United 
States complicated the already tense intra-provincial relations among warlords, strongmen, criminals, 
local officials, businessmen and Taliban militants.1773 

Pro-government  military  special  units,  also  referred  to  as  counter-terrorism  pursuit  teams,  are 
reportedly operating in Nangarhar and Khost provinces. These forces, which are unofficially trained 
and overseen by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and in charge of combating the insurgency, 
have also reportedly been responsible for killing and torturing civilians.1774   

In terms of the presence of government security forces, Nangarhar province is under the responsibility 
of the 201st ANA Corps, which falls under Train, Advise, and Assist Command - East (TAAC-E), led by US 
and Polish forces.1775 

The following table provides an overview of control of the districts in Nangarhar province based on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.1776 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 

1768 Osman, B., Descent into chaos: Why did Nangarhar turn into an IS hub?, AAN, 27 September 2016, url 
1769 Osman, B., Descent into chaos: Why did Nangarhar turn into an IS hub?, AAN, 27 September 2016, url; See also: EASO, 
EASO Country of Origin Information Report, Pakistan, Security Situation, October 2018, url  
1770 UN Secretary-General, Eighth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace 
and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, 1 February 2019, 
url, p. 7 
1771 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 60 
1772 Osman, B., Descent into chaos: Why did Nangarhar turn into an IS hub?, AAN, 27 September 2016, url 
1773 New Arab (The), In Nangarhar province, Afghanistan, violence is committed by all sides, 25 January 2018, url 
1774  New  York  Times  (The),  C.I.A.‘s  Afghan  Forces  Leave  a  Trail  of  Abuse  and  Anger,  31  December  2018,  url;  Die  Presse, 
Afghanistan vor dramatischer Wende, 28 January 2018, url 
1775 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2018, url, p. 15 
1776 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, End of year report 
(2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region, to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.    

NANGARHAR 

Achin 

Batikot 

Behsud 

Chaparhar 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: August-
November 
2017) 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment 
as of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

Taliban 

(last 
accessed:1777 
April 2019) 

(assessment as 
of December 
2018) 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA Control 

Contested 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Dara-e-Nur 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Dehbala (Hasqa 
Mina) 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Gov control 

Durbaba 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Goshta 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Hesarak 

Jalalabad (capital) 

Kama 

Khogyani 

Kot 

Kuzkunar 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

Open Taliban 
Presence - 
medium/low 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

INS activity 

INS activity 

Contested 

GIRoA 
Control 

GIRoA 
Control 

GIRoA Control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 
80%; TB control: 
20% 
Gov control: 
65%; TB control: 
35% 

Gov control: 
60%; TB control: 
40% 
Gov control: 
90%; TB control: 
10% 

Gov control: 
75%; TB control: 
25% 
Gov control: 
90%; TB control: 
10% 
TB control: 80%; 
Gov control: 
20% 

Gov control: 
85%; TB control: 
15% 
TB control: 65%; 
Gov control: 
35% 
Gov control: 
67%; TB control: 
33% 

/ 

1777 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  215  

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 
Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 
Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 
Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control: 77%; 
Gov control: 
23% 
TB control: 70%; 
Gov control: 
30% 
Gov control: 
85%; TB control: 
15% 
Gov control: 
70%; TB control: 
30% 
Gov control: 
87%; TB control: 
13% 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

/ 

Contested 

INS activity 

INS activity 

Contested 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

TB control: 55%; 
Gov control: 
45% 
TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5% 
TB control: 65%; 
Gov control: 
35% 
Gov control: 
80%; TB control: 
20% 
Gov control: 
65%; TB control: 
35% 

Lalpur 

Muhmand Dara 

Nazyan 

Pachieragam 

Rodat 

Shinwar 

Surkhrod 

Sherzad 

Ghani Khel 

Khewa 

Spin Ghar 

2.23.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.23.3.1 General  

In 2018, UNAMA documented 1 815 civilian casualties (681 deaths and 1 134 injured) in Nangarhar 
province. This represents an increase of 111 % compared to 2017. Leading causes of casualties were 
suicide/complex  attacks,  followed  by  (non-suicide)  IEDs  and  ground  engagements.  The  number  of 
civilian casualties due to IEDs (mostly non-suicide) ‘increased four-fold’ and ‘nearly reached the same 
levels as Kabul for the first time’.1778 

In  2018,  UNAMA  recorded  17  suicide  and  complex  attacks  in  Nangarhar  attributed  to  ISKP,  which 
caused 738 civilian casualties (222 deaths and 516 injuries).1779 

In  mid-June  2018,  ISKP  ‘conducted  two  large  attacks  in  Nangarhar  against  Taliban  and  civilian 
gatherings […], resulting in 181 civilian casualties (48 deaths and 133 injured)’.1780 

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA  places  the  districts  of  Khogyani, 
Chaparhar,  Dehbala,  Batikot  and  Rodat  in  the  highest  category  and  Jalalabad,  Hesarak,  Surkhrod, 
Pachieragam, Achin, Shinwar and Muhmand Dara districts in the second highest category. Behsud, Kot, 

1778 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
1779 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 24 
1780 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 9 

 
                                                           
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Goshta, Lalpur, Sherzad and Nazyan are in the third highest category while Kama is in the category 
below. The remaining districts fall in the two lowest categories.1781 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 754 incidents related to insurgents in Nangarhar province.1782 

Airstrikes  against  ISKP  were  carried  out  by  pro-government  forces  in  Achin  in  January  2019,1783  in 
Nazyan in November 2018,1784 and in Deh Bala in March 2018,1785 killing ISKP fighters;1786 as well as in 
Khogyani and Chaparhar districts.1787 In January 2019, airstrikes were also carried out against Taliban 
militants in Hesarak and ‘along a road in Nangarhar’, killing several insurgents.1788 Moreover, airstrikes 
killed high ranking ISKP fighters in the province throughout 2018: Qari Riaz, one of the leaders of ISKP, 
in Chaparhar district1789 and the ISKP spokesman for Afghanistan, Sultan Aziz Azam, in Pachieragam 
district in late December 20181790 as well as Saad Arhabi, another top leader of ISKP, in Khogyani in 
August  2018.1791  A  night  raid  carried  out  by  Afghan  forces  in  Chaparhar  district  in  late  May  2018 
purportedly  caused  casualties  among  the  civilian  population.1792  Clashes  between  Taliban  militants 
and ISKP were reported in Nangarhar province.1793  

Suicide attacks and other acts of aggression were carried out in Nangarhar province throughout 2018: 
in early October 2018 an ISKP suicide attack during an election-campaign rally in Kama district killed 
13 civilins and wounded 30 people.1794 Also in early October 2018, a bomb detonation took place near 
a cricket pitch in Batikot, wounding at least children.1795 In September 2018, a suicide attack targeted 
a protest in Mohmand Dara district, near the Jalalabad-Torkham highway1796 and caused casualties 
among the civilian population  (at  least 68 killed and 165 injured).1797 Moreover, also in September 
2018, bombs exploded in front of girls’ schools in Jalalabad, killing one pupil and wounding 4 others, 
and in Behsud district.1798  

In late July 2018, casualties were recorded after insurgents stormed a government building and took 
people hostage.1799 In early July 2018 a suicide bombing in Jalalabad claimed by the IS killed members 

1781 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2  
1782 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
1783 Khaama Press, Coalition forces carry out drone strikes against ISIS-K hideouts in Nangarhar, 27 January 2019, url 
1784 Pajhwok Afghan News, 17 Taliban, Daesh rebels killed in Laghman, Nangarhar airstrikes, 4 November 2018, url 
1785 Tolonews, 14 Insurgents Killed in Kunduz, Nangarhar Airstrikes, 26 March 2018, url 
1786 Khaama Press, Coalition forces carry out drone strikes against ISIS-K hideouts in Nangarhar, 27 January 2019, url; Pajhwok 
Afghan  News,  17  Taliban,  Daesh  rebels  killed  in  Laghman,  Nangarhar  airstrikes,  4  November  2018,  url;  Tolonews,  14 
Insurgents Killed in Kunduz, Nangarhar Airstrikes, 26 March 2018, url 
1787 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 7 December 
2018, url, p. 7  
1788 Khaama Press, Coalition airstrike target Taliban IED planters in Nangarhar leaving 5 dead, 18 January 2018, url 
1789 Khaama Press, Top ISIS-K leader Qari Riaz killed in coalition airstrike in Nangarhar, 31 December 2018, url 
1790 Ariana News, U.S. Airstrike kills Daesh spokesman in Afghanistan, 27 December 2018, url; VoA, Islamic State-Afghanistan 
Spokesman Killed in US Airstrike, 27 December 2018, url 
1791 National (The), ISIS leader in Afghanistan killed in strike, spy agency says, 26 August 2018, url; News International (The), 
Daesh Afghan chief killed by airstrikes in Nangarhar, 27 August 2018, url 
1792 Al Jazeera, Afghan forces night raid kills civilians in Nangarhar, 29 May 2018, url 
1793  TBIJ,  Nangarhar:  Descent  into  chaos,  30  July  2018,  url;  UN  Secretary-General,  The  situation  in  Afghanistan  and  its 
implications for international peace and security, 7 December 2018, url, p. 7  
1794 RFE/RL, At Least 13 Dead, Dozens Injured In Apparent Suicide Attack At Afghan Campaign Rally, 2 October 2018, url; 
Reuters, Carnage at Afghan election rally as suicide bomber strikes, 2 October 2018, url 
1795 Reuters, Carnage at Afghan election rally as suicide bomber strikes, 2 October 2018, url; AP, At least 14 killed in suicide 
bombing at Afghan election rally, 2 October 2018, url 
1796 Tolonews, Death Toll Rises To 32 In Nangarhar Explosion, 11 September 2018, url 
1797 RFE/RL, Death Toll In Suicide Attack In Eastern Afghanistan Soars To 68, 12 September 2018, url 
1798 AFP, Student killed in twin bomb attack near Afghan girls‘ school: officials, 11 September 2018, url 
1799 Guardian (The), Afghanistan: gunmen storm government building in eastern city, 31 July 2018, url 

                                                           
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—  217  

of the Sikh and Hindu community, among them the only Sikh candidate for parliamentary elections. 1800 
During an attack on a boys’ school in Khogyani district, ISKP militants beheaded three employees and 
set the school building on fire in late June 2018.1801 Due to threats by ISKP, more than 80 girls’ schools 
were closed in Jalalabad and its neighbouring districts in June 2018.1802 According to UNAMA in June 
‘ISKP  expressly  declared  its  intention  to  target  schools,  particularly  girls’  schools  […].  Alleging  that 
aerial operations by international and Afghan national security forces of residential areas in Deh Balah 
district […] over the previous three days had killed approximately one hundred women and children, 
the  group  warned  that  all  girls’  schools  in  Nangarhar  province  would  be  targets  for  attack 
thereafter’.1803  

In  May  2018  explosions  during  a  cricket  match  in  Jalalabad  killed  at  least  eight  spectators.1804  In 
January 2018 a suicide attack targeting the Save the Children office in Jalalabad and claimed by the IS, 
killed and injured security forces and civilians.1805 

2.23.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 12 236 persons 
displaced from Nangarhar, almost all of which (10 461) found refuge within the province itself and in 
neighbouring provinces like Kabul, Laghman, or in other provinces  more distant like Khost, Paktya and 
Wardak.1806 

UNOCHA  collected  data  for  the  period  1  January  2019  – 28  February 2019,  reporting  154  persons 
displaced from Nangarhar province, with all of them displaced within the province.1807 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 11 274 persons 
displaced to Nangarhar province.1808 

UNOCHA  collected  data  for  the  period  1  January  2019  – 28  February 2019,  reporting  154  persons 
displaced to Nangarhar province, from Hesarak district to Jalalabad.1809 

District 

Achin 

Batikot 

Behsud 

Chaparhar 

Dara-e-Nur 

Dehbala 

Hesarak 

Displaced from 
(2018) 

Displaced to 
(2018) 

Displaced from 
(2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

52 

406  

/ 

1 900  

/ 

5 221 

392 

/ 

392  

1 461 

146  

133  

3 708 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

154 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

1800 BBC News, Afghanistan blast: Sikhs among the 19 dead in Jalalabad suicide attack, 1 July 2018, url; New York Times (The), 
Sikhs and Hindus Bear Brunt of Latest Afghanistan Suicide Attack, 1 July 2018, url 
1801 New York Times (The), Sikhs and Hindus Bear Brunt of Latest Afghanistan Suicide Attack, 1 July 2018, url 
1802 Telegraph (The), Eighty Afghan girls‘ schools close over Islamic State threat, 6 June 2018, url 
1803 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 15 
1804 Al Jazeera, Afghanistan: Jalalabad cricket match bomb attack kills eight, 19 May 2018, url; New York Times (The), Rare 
Attack on Cricket Match in Afghanistan Kills at Least 8, 19 May 2018, url 
1805 BBC News, Save the Children offices attacked in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, 24 January 2018, url 
1806 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url  
1807 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url 
1808 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 
1809 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url 

 
 
                                                           
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

Jalalabad 

Kama 

Khogyani 

Kot 

Kuzkunar 

Muhmand Dara 

Nazyan 

Pachieragam 

Rodat 

Sherzad 

Shinwar 

Surkhrod 

/ 

/ 

1 749  

81  

/ 

7  

77  

1 730 

98  

460  

28 

35 

2 286 

50 

473  

/ 

111  

/ 

/ 

350 

213 

/ 

/ 

1 951  

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

154 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

In  2018,  Nangarhar  province  was  considered  as  one  of  ‘the  main  provinces  of  both  origin  and 
displacement of conflict-affected communities’.1810 

In at least seven UNOCHA Afghanistan Weekly Field Reports published between  January  2018 and 
January 2019, it is reported that people have been displaced in Nangarhar because of ‘threats and 
intimidation’  by  ‘Non  State  Armed  Groups  (NSAG)  or  Armed  Opposition  groups  (AOG)’1811  For 
example, in February 2018, 2 114 people were displaced for these reasons during one week within 
the province.1812 In June 2018, UNOCHA recorded 3 000 people1813 and in September 3 400 people 
displaced for these reasons.1814 

Armed  clashes  have  also  resulted  in  displacements:  armed  clashes  between  armed  groups  have 
resulted in the displacement of 300 people from Batikot district to Jalalabad city and other areas in 
May  2018.1815  ANSF  operations  in  June  2018  in  Dehbala  district  led  to  the  displacement  of  3 500 
people within the district.1816 

1810 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 42 
1811 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 5 - 11 February, 12 February 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 12 - 18 February, 19 February 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 19 - 25 February, 26 February 
2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 14 – 21 May 2018, 22 May 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly 
Field Report, 18 - 24 June 2018, 25 June 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 3 - 9 September 2018, 10 
September 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 10-16 September 2018, 17 September 2018, url 
1812 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 12 - 18 February, 19 February 2018, url  
1813 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 18 - 24 June 2018, 25 June 2018, url  
1814 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 3-9 September 2018, 10 September 2018, url  
1815 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 21 – 27 May 2018, 28 May 2018, url 
1816 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 4 – 10 June 2018, 11 June 2018, url  

 
 
 
 
                                                           
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—  219  

2.24 Nimroz 

2.24.1 General description of the province  

Nimroz  province  is  located  in  the  south-west  of  Afghanistan,  alongside  the  border  with  Iran  and 
Pakistan.1817 The province borders Farah to the north, Helmand to the east, Pakistan to the south and 

1817 Pajhwok Afghan News, Background profile of Nimroz, n.d., url 

 
 
                                                           
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Iran  to  the  west.  The  provincial  capital  is  Zaranj.1818  Nimroz  is  divided  into  the  following  districts: 
Chakhansur,  Charburjak,  Kang,  Khashrod  and  Zaranj.1819  Dularam,  which  became  part  of  Farah 
province in 2009, went back under Nimroz’ jurisdiction in 2013 and became a district on its own.1820 

According to the Central Statistics Organization of Afghanistan, the population of Nimroz is estimated 
at 176 898 for 2018/19,1821 and is composed mainly of Balochs, followed by Pashtuns, Tajiks1822 and 
Uzbeks.1823 The province’s topography consists of flat and mostly desert terrain.1824 In January 2019 
Pajhwok Afghan News reported about the negative impact of ‘the worst drought in living memory’ in 
Nimroz province, as many farmers lost significant amounts of livestock.1825 The Afghan government 
had plans to construct water dams on major Afghan rivers flowing towards Iran; one of the projects 
involved the Kamal Khan dam in Charburjak,1826 which was targeted by a Taliban attack in November 
2018,  that  caused  the  deaths  of  12  guards  and  one  insurgent.1827  According  to  sources  quoted  by 
Foreign  Policy  magazine,  Iran  was  trying  to  sabotage  the  dam  project  by  supporting  the  local 
Taliban.1828 

A national highway, starting from Delaram and intersecting Highway One, passes through the districts 
of Khashrod, Chakhansur and Zaranj; it leads to Zaranj city, at the Afghan-Iranian border.1829 Taliban 
militants  purportedly  set  up  check-points  along  the  Zaranj-Dularam  highway  and  charged  taxes  on 
vehicles carrying goods, as reported in January 2018.1830 The city of Zaranj hosts an airport, which was 
served by domestic scheduled passenger flights as of March 2019.1831  

The  province  is  of  strategic  position  for  smuggling  because  of  its  proximity  to  Iran,  Pakistan  and 
Helmand. Moreover, the Zaranj – Dularam road and the south-western highways have been used as 
transit routes for drugs trafficking.1832 Furthermore, the province of Nimroz was identified as a ‘key 
human trafficking route’ by a Tolo News investigation from September 2018, as many Afghan migrants 
who intend to leave the country get to Iran by passing through Nimroz.1833  

According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, poppy-cultivation in Nimroz province decreased by 21 % 
compared to 2017. The districts with the highest rate of opium-poppy-cultivation were Khashrod and 
Charburjak.1834  

According to an IWPR report from February 2018, the province was facing a significant drug problem 
due to a growing local rate of addiction. The high addiction rate was attributed to the large numbers 

1818 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Nimroz Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1819 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Nimroz Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; US, Naval Postgraduate School, Nimroz Provincial 
Overview, n.d., url  
1820 Ruttig, T., Why Farah? A short history of the local insurgency (II), AAN, 7 June 2018, url; UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, 
Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013, November 2013, url, p. 14; Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial Profile Nimroz, 
1 February 2017, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Background profile of Nimroz, n.d., url 
1821 Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 3 
1822 Pajhwok Afghan News, Background profile of Nimroz, n.d., url 
1823 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Nimroz Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1824 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Nimroz Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1825 Pajhwok Afghan News, Nimroz farmers in despair as drought kills livestock, 2 January 2019, url 
1826 Diplomat (The), Iran‘s Support for the Taliban Brings It to a Crossroads With Afghanistan, 21 May 2018, url 
1827 Pajhwok Afghan News, 12 Kamal Khan Dam guards killed in Taliban attack, 13 November 2018, url 
1828 Foreign Policy, On the Edge of Afghanistan, 12 September 2017, url 
1829 Afghanistan, MOPW, Application of Road Numbering System National Highways, url, p. 5; UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Nimroz 
Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url 
1830 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban running ‘customs check-point‘ on Nimroz road, 20 January 2018, url 
1831 Austria, BFA-Staatendokumentation, Afghanistan - Airports [Map], 25 March 2019 
1832 IWPR, Drugs Trade Thrives in Afghan Province, 19 February 2018, url 
1833 Tolonews, Nimroz Identified As Key Human Trafficking Route, 13 September 2018, url; Foreign Policy, On the Edge of 
Afghanistan, 12 September 2017, url 
1834 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN , Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 33 

                                                           
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  221  

of returnees from Iran, who started using drugs while working there.1835 According to governmental 
sources  quoted  by  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  70 %  of  Afghans  working  in  Iran  were  addicted  before 
returning  to  Afghanistan.  Furthermore, the number of drug addicts in Nimroz tripled in 2018, as a 
result  of  high  levels  of  deportations  of  Afghan  refugees  from  Iran  and  easy  access  to  drugs. 1836 
According to  Foreign  Policy  magazine,  Nimroz province, which was considered  ‘Afghanistan’s drug-
smuggling hub’, served as a ‘financial artery’ for the Taliban. Zaranj city was described as ‘Afghanistan’s 
smuggling capital’.1837  

2.24.2 Conflict background and actors in Nimroz  

Nimroz belongs to the ‘forgotten’ provinces of Afghanistan.1838 According to sources quoted by Foreign 
Policy  magazine,  the  province  has  been  among  the  most  problematic  areas  of  the  country,  partly 
because  it  has  been  marginal  and  unimportant  to  the  government.1839  It  has  maintained  this 
reputation even after the implementation of investments to strengthen state institutions in the post-
2001  years  which  is  perceived  to  have  increased  the  influence  of  local  strongmen,  criminals  and 
insurgents  due  to  corruption.1840  Moreover,  constant  disputes  with  Iran  over  water  sources  have 
characterized  relations  for  centuries.1841  During  the  last  years,  the  tensions  worsened  due  to 
supposedly surreptitious support of the Taliban movement by Iran.1842  

According to sources quoted by the French newspaper, Le Figaro, Iran has been supporting the Taliban 
financially, militarily and also by providing them with training units organised by the Qods Force, a 
branch  of  Iran’s  Revolutionary  Guards.  In  return,  Taliban  fighters  had  to  intensify  their  operations 
against ISKP and US troops.1843 Purportedly, Iran’s influence over the province was so high, that even 
Afghan governmental officials were said to be spying for Iran.1844  

Taliban  fighters  loyal  to  Mullah  Rasul,  the  leader  of  a  Taliban  splinter  group  active  in  western 
Afghanistan, have been operating in Nimroz province, perceived to be fighting against the main Taliban 
faction for control of drug-trafficking route.1845  

Even  though  Al  Qaeda  has  not  announced  its  presence  in  Nimroz,  a  US  soldier  was  killed  during  a 
firefight with the group in late November 2018. Not announcing its presence is purportedly ‘consistent 
with the [Al Qaeda’s] strategy inside Afghanistan’.1846 

In terms of the presence of government security forces, Nimroz province is under the responsibility of 
the 215th ANA Corps, which falls under Task Force Southwest (TF Southwest), led by US forces.1847 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Nimroz  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 

1835 IWPR, Drugs Trade Thrives in Afghan Province, 19 February 2018, url; Foreign Policy, On the Edge of Afghanistan, 12 
September 2017, url  
1836 Pajhwok Afghan News, Drug addicts‘ population triples in Nimroz this year, 9 July 2018, url 
1837 Foreign Policy, On the Edge of Afghanistan, 12 September 2017, url 
1838 Diplomat (The), Afghanistan‘s Forgotten Province, 1 December 2010, url 
1839 Foreign Policy, On the Edge of Afghanistan, 12 September 2017, url   
1840 Foreign Policy, On the Edge of Afghanistan, 12 September 2017, url  
1841 Foreign Policy, On the Edge of Afghanistan, 12 September 2017, url; Foschini, F., On the borders: Where do the attacks 
in Nimruz come from?, AAN, 18 August 2012, url 
1842 Foreign Policy, On the Edge of Afghanistan, 12 September 2017, url; Diplomat (The), Iran‘s Support for the Taliban Brings 
It to a Crossroads With Afghanistan, 21 May 2018, url 
1843 Le Figaro, En Afghanistan, l‘Iran accroît son aide aux talibans, 19 September 2018, url, p. 31; Foreign Policy, On the Edge 
of Afghanistan, 12 September 2017, url 
1844 Le Figaro, En Afghanistan, l‘Iran accroît son aide aux talibans, 19 September 2018, url, p. 31 
1845 RFE/RL, Taliban Infighting Leaves Dozens Of Militants Dead In Afghanistan, 30 November 2018, url 
1846 LWJ, Taliban continues to host foreign terrorist groups, despite assurances to the contrary, 7 February 2019, url; LWJ, US 
service member killed during a battle with al Qaeda in Afghanistan, 27 November 2018, url 
1847 NATO, RS Afghanistan, Task Force Southwest, n.d., url; USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 
2018, url, p. 16 

 
                                                           
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Taliban.1848  When  a  source  does  not  provide  information  on  a  district,  the  field  is  left  blank.  
Sometimes a  district  is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not  always 
recognised  by  the  government  or  sometimes  belong,  as  a  region,  to  another  district.  If  found, 
clarification is made in a separate footnote.  

NIMROZ 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: 
August-
November 
2017 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment 
as of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

Taliban 

(last 
accessed:1849 
April 2019) 

(assessment as 
of December 
2018)  

Zaranj (capital) 

Gov control 

Charburjak 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Chakhansur 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Kang 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Khashrod (Dularam) 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Gov control 

TB control: 
70%; Gov 
control: 30% 
TB control: 
70%; Gov 
control: 30% 
Gov control: 
70%; TB 
control: 30% 
TB control: 
95%; Gov 
control: 5% 

2.24.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.24.3.1 General  

In 2018, UNAMA documented 82 civilian casualties (18 deaths and 64 injured) in Nimroz province. This 
represents  a  decrease  of  17  %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were  ground 
engagements, followed by UXO/landmines and aerial attacks.1850  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA  places  Khashrod  in  the  second 
highest category and Zaranj in the fourth highest category. The remaining districts fall in the two lowest 
categories.1851  

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 65 incidents related to insurgents in Nimroz province.1852 

1848 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, End of year report 
(2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
1849 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 
1850 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
1851 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2  
1852 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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Pro-government security forces carried out military operations against Al Qaeda in Nimroz province in 
November 2018; one US soldier died.1853 Moreover in November and December 2018, airstrikes were 
carried  out  in  Khashrod  district,  killing  and  wounding  Taliban  militants.1854  In  July  2018,  insurgents 
attacked  an  Afghan  police  check-post  in  Khashrod  district,  killing  Afghan  security  personnel.1855  US 
airstrikes  targeting  Taliban  narcotic  production  factories  were  carried  out  in  April  2018.1856  Clashes 
between the Afghan security forces and the Taliban took place in Dil Aram1857 and in Charburjak, 1858 
causing fatalities among Taliban militants and Afghan security forces.1859  

In  November  2018,  Taliban  militants  shot  dead  a  supposed  ‘uprising  commander’  from  Jawzjan 
province in the district of Khashrod, after having dragged him out of a passenger vehicle travelling on 
the  Dularam-Khashrud  highway.1860  In  October  2018  a  community  elder  known  for  his  tribal  and 
Taliban mediation efforts was assassinated in Delaram.1861 Also in October 2018, an Imam was shot by 
unidenfied gunmen on his way home Chakhansor district.1862  

According to a report on elections-related violence by UNAMA, road blockades were set up in Nimroz 
by insurgents during the two days of elections in October 2018 to keep locals from voting and to delay 
the transport of electoral material.1863 

2.24.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA  collected  data  for  the  period 1 January 2018  – 31  December 2018,  reporting 74 persons 
displaced  from  Nimroz  province.  All  of  them  were  displaced  within  the  province  itself  from 
Khashrod/Dularam district to Zaranj.1864 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019,  reporting 12 persons 
displaced from Nimroz. They were displaced to Herat.1865 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 617 persons 
displaced to Nimroz province mainly from other provinces, they all settled in Zaranj district.1866 

No conflict-induced internal displacement to Nimroz province was reported by UNOCHA for the period 
1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019.1867 

District 

Displaced from 
(2018) 

Displaced to (2018) 

Displaced from 
(2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

Khashrod / Dularam 

74 

/ 

12 

/ 

1853 Guardian (The), Three members of US military killed in Afghanistan explosion, 27 November 2018, url; LWJ, US service 
member killed during battle with al Qaeda in Afghanistan, 27 November 2018, url 
1854 Pajhwok Afghan News, Airstrikes kill 15 Taliban in Farah, Nimroz, 6 December 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 4 militants 
killed in Nimroz airstrike, 23 November 2018, url 
1855 Pajhwok Afghan News, Nimroz: Taliban kill 6 policemen, snatch weapons, 14 July 2018, url 
1856 VoA, IS Leader in Afghanistan Killed; Taliban Drug Factories Targeted, 9 April 2018, url 
1857 Pajhwok Afghan News, 11 ALP personnel killed in Kunduz, Nimroz clashes, 9 November 2018, url 
1858 New York Times Magazine (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: Nov. 9-15, 15 November 2018, url 
1859 New York Times Magazine (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: Nov. 9-15, 15 November 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 
11 ALP personnel killed in Kunduz, Nimroz clashes, 9 November 2018, url 
1860 Pajhwok Afghan News, Man‘s body found with Taliban letter in Nimroz, 16 November 2018, url; Afghanistan, MOPW, 
Application of Road Numbering System National Highways, url, p. 5; UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Nimroz Province – District Atlas, 
April 2014, url 
1861 TBIJ, One day in Afghanistan, 7 October 2018, url 
1862 Pajhwok Afghan News, Unknown gunmen kill Imam in Nimroz, 19 October 2018, url 
1863 UNAMA, Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Special Report: 2018 Elections Violence, November 2018, 
url, p. 5 
1864 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 20 January 2019, url 
1865 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url 
1866 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 
1867 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url 

 
                                                           
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Zaranj 

/ 

617 

/ 

/ 

 
 
 
 
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2.25 Nuristan 

2.25.1 General description of the province  

Nuristan is located in eastern Afghanistan, on the Afghan-Pakistani border. It borders Badakhshan to 
the  north, Pakistan to the east, Kunar and  Laghman to the  south  and Panjshir to the  west.1868 The 
provincial capital of Nuristan is Parun. The province is divided into the following districts: Barg-e-Matal, 
Duab, Kamdesh, Mandol, Nurgeram, Parun, Wama and Waygal.1869 Nuristan is mostly mountainous 
and  belongs  to  ‘the  most  remote,  under-served  and  unknown  provinces’  of  Afghanistan.1870  It  is 
divided into three isolated valleys: the Alingar River valley in the west, the Pech River valley in the 
centre  and  the  Landay  Sin  River  valley  in  the  east.  Because  its  inhabitants  were  non-Muslim,  the 
province was called Kafiristan (land of the infidels) until the mid-1890s, when its population converted 
to Islam and it was renamed Nuristan (land of light).1871 

According to the Afghanistan CSO , the population of Nuristan is estimated at 158 211 for 2018/191872 
and it is composed mainly of Nuristani, followed by Pashai, Pashtuns, Gujars and Tajiks.1873 Although 
the Nuristani people are mostly considered as a single ethnic group, de facto they comprise numerous 

1868 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Nuristan Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1869 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Nuristan Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial 
Profile Nuristan, 1 February 2017, url; Ali, O., et al., The 2018 Elections Observed (5) in Nuristan: Disfranchisement and lack 
of data, AAN, 17 November 2018, url 
1870 Ali, O., et al., The 2018 Elections Observed (5) in Nuristan: Disfranchisement and lack of data, AAN, 17 November 2018, 
url 
1871 Ali, O., et al., The 2018 Elections Observed (5) in Nuristan: Disfranchisement and lack of data, AAN, 17 November 2018, 
url 
1872 Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 2 
1873 US,  Naval Postgraduate School,  Nuristan Provincial Overview, n.d., url; Pajhwok Afghan  News, Background Profile of 
Nuristan, n.d., url 

 
 
                                                           
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ethnic  and  sub-ethnic  communities  that  speak  different  Indo-European  languages,  sometimes 
subsumed under the Dardic languages branch.1874  

Most of the province’s roads used to be travelable only by pack animals. Even so, Nuristan became a 
key support route from Pakistan for mujahideen groups in the past and remains so for the numerous 
insurgents active in the area today. Moreover, it connects Kabul and the Panjshir valley in the central 
region  through  the  provinces  of  Kapisa  and  Laghman.  Given  its  strategic  position,  road  building 
projects were already carried out during mujahideen-times and continued by the US forces and the 
Afghan government after 2001 in order to fight the insurgency. However, in November 2018, in some 
areas of the province the road conditions remained poor.1875  

According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, Nuristan has maintained poppy-free status since 2013, 
with the exception of 2017, when 121 hectares were cultivated.1876  

2.25.2 Conflict background and actors in Nuristan 

Conservative  religious  groups,  such  as  Wahabis  and  Salafis,  have  been  active  in  the  province  for 
centuries.  The  Afghan-Soviet  war  saw  a  particular  consolidation  of  the  power  of  these  groups  in 
Nuristan.1877 Before the communist regime, religious leaders were respected and influenced politics. 
However, in areas of the province like the Landay Sin valley, power was shared through community 
democracy, with a body of elders and a body of policemen were appointed annually in order to define 
policies and enforce community law.1878  

The  Islamic  clergy  started  to  mobilize  in  the  province  after  1978,  when  the  pro-Soviet  People’s 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) failed to establish its rule. In this regard, the Daulat-e Inqilabi-
ye Islam-ye Nuristan (Islamic Revolutionary State of Nuristan) emerged in northern Nuristan under the 
leadership  of  the  religious  scholar  Mawlawi  Muhammad  Afzar,  who  also  supported  the  Taliban 
movement and was  therefore  given  the freedom to rule over the province. After the escalation of 
hostilities with Hezb-e Islami and Jamiat-e Islami in 1997, his control started to decline and Hezb-e 
Islami became more influential in the province. 1879  

After 2001, various counter-insurgency operations were carried out throughout the province by the 
US military and coalition forces, until the US withdrew their troops in 2009, following some defeats. 
Subsequently, the Taliban again expanded their control over large areas of the province due to the 
neglect by the Afghan government.1880 Moreover, some areas of the province, like Kamdesh’s district 
centre  and  Mandol  district,  were  under  the  rule  of  a  Hezb-e  Islami  commander  and  a  security 
commander, respectively, both appointed by the Afghan government.1881  

According  to  an  AAN  report,  in  November  2018  almost  all  the  districts  of  Nuristan  province  were 
somehow under control or influence of the Taliban. Villages were reported to be isolated from each 
other, as well as from the district centres, where governmental presence has often been defined as 

1874 Ali, O., et al., The 2018 Elections Observed (5) in Nuristan: Disfranchisement and lack of data, AAN, 17 November 2018, 
url 
1875 Ali, O., et al., The 2018 Elections Observed (5) in Nuristan: Disfranchisement and lack of data, AAN, 17 November 2018, 
url; Foschini, F., New Battles and Old Wants in Nuristan, AAN, 2 June 2012, url 
1876 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN , Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 23 
1877 Ali, O., et al., The 2018 Elections Observed (5) in Nuristan: Disfranchisement and lack of data, AAN, 17 November 2018, 
url; Middle East Institute, Social Change in Eastern Nuristan, December 2009, url 
1878 Middle East Institute, Social Change in Eastern Nuristan, December 2009, url 
1879 Ali, O., et al., The 2018 Elections Observed (5) in Nuristan: Disfranchisement and lack of data, AAN, 17 November 2018, 
url 
1880 Ali, O., The 2018 Elections Observed (5) in Nuristan: Disfranchisement and lack of data, AAN, 17 November 2018, url 
1881 Foschini, F., New Battles and Old Wants in Nuristan, AAN, 2 June 2012, url 

                                                           
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—  227  

‘token’.  The  community  elders  still  play  an  important  role,  as  they  take  most  of  the  decisions.  The 
police’s presence is limited to district centres. 1882 

ISKP has been reported to be active in Nuristan since 2016, when many of its fighters came to the 
province,  following  the  loss  of  large  parts  of  their  territory  in  neighbouring  Nangarhar.1883  Most of 
them  were  purportedly  foreign  fighters.1884  In  June  2017,  a  governmental  source  quoted  by  AAN 
reported  ISKP  presence  in  the  districts  of  Mandol,  Duab,  Nurgeram,  Waygal  and  Wama.1885  As  of 
February  2019,  the  UN  Secretary-General  described  Nuristan  as  one  of  the  ISKP  ‘strongholds’  in 
Afghanistan.1886 The relations between Taliban and ISKP militants were reportedly conflict-ridden, as 
Taliban  fighters  tried  to  clear  some  Afghan  provinces  from  IS  presence,  including  Nuristan.1887 
Moreover, whilst the Taliban movement follows the Hanafi School of Islamic law, ISKP fighters belong 
to the Salafi movement. The ISKP could therefore count on the support of Salafi enclaves in the eastern 
provinces  of  Nangarhar,  Kunar  and  Nuristan.  Furthermore,  ISKP  also  recruited  its  fighters  among 
dissident Taliban.1888  

According to Khaama Press, Al Qaeda fighters have also been active in Nuristan province and operated 
camps there.1889 

In terms of the presence of government security forces, Nuristan province is under the responsibility 
of the 201st ANA Corps, which falls under Train, Advise, and Assist Command - East (TAAC-E), led by US 
and Polish forces.1890 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Nuristan  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.1891 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong -as a region- to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.  

1882 Ali, O., The 2018 Elections Observed (5) in Nuristan: Disfranchisement and lack of data, AAN, 17 November 2018, url 
1883 Ali, O., The 2018 Elections Observed (5) in Nuristan: Disfranchisement and lack of data, AAN, 17 November 2018, url; 
Dawn, ISKP: another emerging giant?, 16 October 2017, url; LWJ, Islamic State‘s emir for its Khorasan province killed, 26 
August 2018, url; VoA, Afghans Dispute Russia‘s Islamic State Claims, 27 June 2018, url 
1884 VoA, Islamic State Seeks Foothold in Eastern Afghan Provinces, 7 August 2017, url 
1885 Ali, O., et al., The 2018 Elections Observed (5) in Nuristan: Disfranchisement and lack of data, AAN, 17 November 2018, 
url 
1886 UN Secretary-General, Eighth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace 
and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, 1 February 2019, 
url, p. 7 
1887 Telegraph (The), Taliban claim to be preparing onslaught to drive Islamic State from Afghan stronghold, 7 August 2018, 
url;  National  (The),  Taliban  prepare  ‘decisive‘  anti-ISIS  operation  in  eastern  Afghanistan,  5  August  2018,  url;  Difesa  & 
Sicurezza, Afghanistan, i talebani si preparano a cacciare Isis da Nangarhar, 8 August 2018, url 
1888 taz, „Islamischer Staat“ und Taliban, Der afghanische Terrorwettbewerb, 1 February 2018, url 
1889  Khaama  Press,  Taliban  militants  killed  in  U.S.  drone  strike  in  Nuristan  province,  24  October  2018,  url;  LWJ,  Taliban 
promotes training camp for ‘Commando Mujahidin‘, 22 January 2019, url 
1890 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2018, url, p. 15 
1891 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, End of year report 
(2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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BBC 

(reporting period: 
August-November 
2017) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment 
as of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last 
accessed:1892 
April 2019) 

Taliban 

(assessment as of 
December 2018) 

NURISTAN 

Barg-e-Matal 

Duab 

Kamdesh 

Mandol 

Nurgeram 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 
Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 
Open Taliban 
Presence - high 
Open Taliban 
presence - low 
Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Poruns (capital) 

Gov control 

Wama 

Waygal 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 
Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

TB control: 60%; 
gov control: 40% 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

GIRoA 
Influence 
GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 
GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 
Gov control or 
undetermined 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

INS activity 

INS activity 

Contested 

TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5% 

TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5% 
TB control 
(completely) 
TB control: 60%; 
gov control: 40% 
Gov control: 75%; 
TB control: 25% 

TB control: 60%; 
gov control: 40% 

TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5% 

2.25.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.25.3.1 General  

In 2018, UNAMA documented 25 civilian casualties (9 deaths and 15 injured) in Nuristan province. This 
represents  an  increase  of  41 %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were  ground 
engagements, followed by targeted/deliberate killings and aerial attacks.1893  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian casualties, and conflict-induced displacements, UNOCHA places the districts of Barg-e-Matal, 
Kamdesh  and  Waygal  in  the  third  highest  category  and  Nurgeram  and  Duab  in  the  fourth  highest 
category. The remaining districts fall into the two lowest categories.1894 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 82 incidents related to insurgents in Nuristan province.1895 

1892 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 
1893 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
1894 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p.2  
1895 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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Airstrikes  against  ISKP  were  carried  out  by  international  forces  in  January  2018  in  Waygal  killing 
fighters,1896 as well as against the Taliban in late October 2018 in Nurgeram, when six insurgents were 
killed,1897 and in late June 2018 in Waygal, killing 10, six of whom civilians.1898  

In August 2018, fighting between Taliban militants and ISKP has been reported in Nuristan province. 1899  

Four members  of  the  Afghan  security  forces were killed after the explosion of a roadside bomb in 
Nurgeram district in late October 2018.1900 

In  December  2018  unidentified  gunmen  stormed  a  local  radio  station  in  Nurgeram  district  and 
reportedly  took  one  of  the  workers  hostage.1901  During  the  October  2018  parliamentary  elections, 
Taliban mortar attacks against polling stations were reported in Wama, Barg-e-Matal, Kamdesh and 
Nurgeram districts, wounding civilians and preventing others from voting.1902 

2.25.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 628 persons 
displaced from Nuristan. A large proportion of them (561) were displaced within the province.1903 

No conflict-induced internal displacement from Nuristan province was reported by UNOCHA for the 
period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019.1904 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reported 902 persons 
displaced to Nuristan province.1905 

No  conflict-induced  internal  displacement  to  Nuristan  province  was  reported  by  UNOCHA  for  the 
period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019.1906 

District 

Barg-e-Matal 

Kamdesh 

Mandol 

Nurgeram 

Poruns 

Wama 

Waygal 

Displaced from 

Displaced to 

Displaced from 

Displaced to 

(2018) 
107 

152  

92 

61 

/ 

32 

184  

(2018) 
/ 

(2019) 
/ 

(2019) 
/ 

/ 

/ 

16  

511 

375 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

1896 Pajhwok Afghan News, Daesh fighters killed in Nuristan, Kunar airstrikes, 15 January 2018, url 
1897  Salaam  Times,  Coalition  air  strike  kills  6  Taliban  militants  in  Nuristan,  24  October  2018,  url;  Khaama  Press,  Taliban 
militants killed in U.S. drone strike in Nuristan province, 24 October 2018, url 
1898 Afghanistan Times, Six civilians, five Taliban killed in Nuristan airstrike, 26 June 2018, url 
1899 Difesa & Sicurezza, Afghanistan, i talebani si preparano a cacciare Isis da Nangarhar, 8 August 2018, url; Telegraph (The), 
Taliban claim to be preparing onslaught to drive Islamic State from Afghan stronghold, 7 August 2018, url  
1900 New York Times Magazine (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: Oct. 19-25, 26 October 2018, url 
1901 Pajhwok Afghan News, Gunmen attack, vandalize Nuristan radio station, 23 December 2018, url 
1902 Ali, O., et al., The 2018 Elections Observed (5) in Nuristan: Disfranchisement and lack of data, AAN, 17 November 2018, 
url 
1903 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url  
1904 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 
1905 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 
1906 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 

 
 
 
                                                           
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According  to  UNOCHA,  threats  and  intimidation  by  armed  groups  have  caused  displacements  in 
2018,1907  for  example,  200  people  from  four  Nuristan  districts  moved  to  Poruns  district  in  March 
2018for this reason.1908 Insecurity is also  a reason for displacement.1909  

1907 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 19 2018 – 25 March 2018, 25 March 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly 
Field Report, 21 – 27 May 2018, 28 May 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 4 – 10 June 2018, 11 June 
2018, url 
1908 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 6 March 2018 – 1 April 2018, 2 April 2018, url  
1909 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 4 – 10 June 2018, 11 June 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 30 July – 5 August 2018, 6 August 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report,6 – 12 August 2018, 14 August 
2018, url 

 
                                                           
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—  231  

2.26 Paktika 

2.26.1 General description of the province  

 
 
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Paktika  is  located  in  eastern  Afghanistan,  on  the  Afghan-Pakistani  border.  It  borders  Ghazni  to  the 
north-west, Paktya and Khost to the north, Pakistan to the south and east and Zabul to the south-
west.1910 The provincial capital of Paktika is Sharana. The province is divided into the following districts: 
Bermel, Dila (also Khushamand), Gomal, Gyan, Janikhel, Matakhan, Naka, Omna, Sarobi, Sarrawzah, 
Sharan, Turwo, Urgun, Wazakhah, Wormamay, Yahyakhel, Yosufkhel, Zarghunshahr (also Khairkot) and 
Ziruk.1911 As reported by the official website of the Office of the Afghan President, the province also 
has the following four non-official districts: Shakeen, Bak Khil, Charbaran and Shakhil Abad.1912  

The province is composed of three sub-regions: the northern-central sub-region, the south-east sub-
region along the Afghan-Pakistani border and the south-west sub-region, called Katawaz, which was 
previously  part  of  Ghazni.  Paktika  became  a  separate  province  under President  Daud’s  rule  (1973-
1978),  and  there  is  still  a  strong  sense  of  belonging  to  one  of  the  three  sub-regions  among  the 
population. Moreover, local tribal relations still play an important role in the province.1913  

According to the Afghanistan CSO, the population of Paktika is estimated at 748 910 for 2018/19.1914 
The  province  is  composed  mainly  of  Pashtuns,  with  a  Tajik  minority  in  the  cities  of  Sharana  and 
Urgun.1915  

A  national  highway  connects  the  provinces  of  Ghazni  and  Paktika  and  continues  to  the  Afghan-
Pakistani  border.1916  According  to  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  in  December  2018  the  Ghazni-Paktika 
highway had been closed for six months, following Taliban attacks in Ghazni province.1917 Moreover, 
according to governmental sources quoted by Pajhwok, two highways connecting Paktika province to 
the central region faced security problems.1918 The security situation on the  Urgun highway, which 
connects many districts of Paktika, had also purportedly deteriorated in late August 2018, with check-
points, set up in parts of Sarrawzah district, often attacked by insurgents.1919 

According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, Paktika has maintained poppy-free status since 2014.1920  

2.26.2 Conflict background and actors in Paktika 

According to an AAN analysis from December 2018, the Taliban have been predominant in many areas 
of Paktika province. Some districts were either fully under Taliban control or contested.1921 The districts 
of  Naka  and  Omna  were  fully  under  Taliban  control,  whereas  their  presence  in  the  other  districts 
varied,  particularly  in  the  Katawaz  region.  The  government’s  presence  was  strong  around  the 
provincial capital and in Matakhan, Yosufkhel, Khairkot, Urgun and Yahyakhel.1922 The latter district, 
where Taliban militants re-emerged from 2004 until 2011, was reported in 2018 to be mostly under 

1910 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Paktika Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1911 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Paktika Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; US, Naval Postgraduate School, Paktika Provincial 
Overview, n.d., url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Back ground Profile of Paktika, n.d., url; Muzhary, F., The 2018 Election Observed 
(4) in Paktika: Pre-election fraud and relatively peaceful polling, AAN, 13 November 2018, url 
1912 Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial Profile Paktika, 1 February 2018, url 
1913  Muzhary,  F.,  The  2018  Election  Observed  (4)  in  Paktika:  Pre-election  fraud  and  relatively  peaceful  polling,  AAN,  13 
November 2018, url; Muzhary, F. and Clark, K., How to Set up a ‘Good ALP‘: The experience of Yahyakhel district, Paktika and 
how it became more peaceful, AAN, 11 December 2018, url 
1914 Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 2 
1915  Muzhary,  F.,  The  2018  Election  Observed  (4)  in  Paktika:  Pre-election  fraud  and  relatively  peaceful  polling  AAN,  13 
November 2018, url 
1916  Afghanistan,  MOPW,  Application  of  Road  Numbering  System  National  Highways,  16  October  2015,  url,  p.5;  Pajhwok 
Afghan News, 6 months on, Ghazni-Paktika highway remains closed, 13 December 2018, url 
1917 Pajhwok Afghan News, 6 months on, Ghazni-Paktika highway remains closed, 13 December 2018, url 
1918 Pajhwok Afghan News, Offensive soon to drive rebels from Gardez-Paktika road, 7 June 2018, url 
1919 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban threatening to close important road in Paktiak [sic], 20 August 2018, url 
1920 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN , Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 21 
1921 Muzhary, F. and Clark, K., How to Set up a ‘Good ALP‘: The experience of Yahyakhel district, Paktika and how it became 
more peaceful, AAN, 11 December 2018, url 
1922  Muzhary,  F.,  The  2018  Election  Observed  (4)  in  Paktika:  Pre-election  fraud  and  relatively  peaceful  polling,  AAN,  13 
November 2018, url 

                                                           
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—  233  

the control of the ALP which enjoys support from the local community. Yahyakhel was described in the 
same source as being among the most peaceful districts in Paktika.1923  

According to local sources quoted by AAN, in 2018 the Taliban adopted a ‘softer’ policy towards the 
electoral  campaign  and  the  election  itself  in  Paktika  province:  whilst  in  the  past  campaigning  and 
coverage of elections was limited, the situation was more relaxed in 2018. Even though the Taliban did 
not  threaten  any  dwellers  of  Paktika  province  during  the  pre-election  period  –  according  to  local 
sources quoted by AAN – they did try to oppose voting during election day in some areas by launching 
shells. Moreover, Paktika was among the few provinces where the Independent Electoral Commission 
(IEC) did not request a second day of voting.1924  

The Haqqani network started to expand in Loya Paktya, an area composed of Khost, Paktya and Paktika, 
some years before 2011;1925 its main area of operations was the Zadran valley between Paktya, Paktika 
and Khost, which served as a corridor from Pakistan to Ghazni and Logar through the districts of Spera 
in Khost, Gyan in Paktika and Zurmat in Paktya.1926 According to an article by Long War Journal from 
September  2012  reporting  about  an  assault  on  a  base  in  Paktika’s  Charbaran  Valley,  some  foreign 
fighters linked to Al Qaeda were active in eastern Afghanistan and were known to be fighting alongside 
the Haqqani network in the region. Some of these groups were the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU), as well as its splinter group the Islamic Jihadi Union (IJU), the Caucasus Mujahedin Khorasan, 
Jund al Khilafah and the Turkistan Islamic Party.1927 According to the New York Times in October 2011, 
Charbaran had ‘become one of the main routes for Haqqani fighters to enter Afghanistan’, and they 
generally  entered  the  province  on  foot,  stayed  ‘overnight  in  safe  houses  and  tent  camps’  and 
proceeded ‘toward Kabul or other areas’ where they had been sent to fight. Also, ‘[m]id-level Haqqani 
leaders’ used to meet in the valley’s villages, ‘including near an abandoned school and the ruins of a 
government center […] that local fighters had destroyed by 2008’.1928 

In terms of the presence of government security forces, Paktika province is under the responsibility of 
the 203th ANA Corps, which falls under Task Force Southeast (TF Southeast), led by US forces.1929 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Paktika  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal (LWJ) and 
the  Taliban.1930  When  a  source  does  not  provide  information  on  a  district,  the  field  is  left  blank. 
Sometimes a district  is only mentioned by one source (the  Taliban). These districts  are  not  always 
recognised  by  the  government  or  sometimes  belong,  as  a  region,  to  another  district.  If  found, 
clarification is made in a separate footnote.  

1923 Muzhary, F. and Clark, K.,, How to Set up a ‚Good ALP‘: The experience of Yahyakhel district, Paktika and how it became 
more peaceful, AAN, 11 December 2018, url; Muzhary, F., The 2018 Election Observed (4) in Paktika: Pre-election fraud and 
relatively peaceful polling, AAN, 13 November 2018, url 
1924  Muzhary,  F.,  The  2018  Election  Observed  (4)  in  Paktika:  Pre-election  fraud  and  relatively  peaceful  polling,  AAN,  13 
November 2018, url 
1925 Clark, K., 2001 Ten Years on (3): The fall of Loya Paktia and why the US preferred warlords, AAN, 24 November 2011, url 
1926  Ruttig,  T.,  Loya  Paktia‘s  Insurgency:  The  Haqqani  Network  as  an  Autonomous  Entity,  London,  2009;  UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan: Paktika Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url  
1927 LWJ, ‚Al Mujahir Jihadi Studio‘ releases video of attack on base in Paktika, 7 September 2012, url 
1928 New York Times (The), Americans Raid Byways of Haqqani Insurgents in Afghanistan, 2 October 2011, url 
1929 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2018, url, p. 16 
1930 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, End of year report 
(2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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BBC 

(reporting 
period: 
August-
November 
2017) 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 
Taliban 
control 
Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 
Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 
Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 
Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 
Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 
Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 
Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 
Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 
Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 
Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 
Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 
Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 
Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of 
October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last 
accessed:1931 
April 2019) 

Taliban 

(assessment as of 
December 2018) 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Taliban 
control 

TB control: 70%; 
Gov control: 30% 

TB control  

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control  

Contested 

Contested 

Taliban 
control 

TB control  

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control: 70%; 
Gov control: 30% 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Gov control: 70%; 
TB control: 30% 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control  

Contested 

Contested 

Taliban 
control 

TB control  

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

TB control: 60%; 
Gov control: 40% 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 50%; 
TB control: 50% 

GIRoA 
control 

GIRoA 
control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 80%; 
TB control: 20% 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Gov control: 75%; 
TB control: 25% 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

TB control: 60%; 
Gov control: 40% 

Contested 

Contested 

Taliban 
control 

/ 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Gov control: 75%; 
TB control: 25% 

PAKTIKA 

Bermel 

Dila 

Gomal 

Gyan 

Janikhel 

Matakhan 

Naka 

Omna 

Sarobi 

Sarrawzah 

Sharan (capital) 

Turwo 

Urgun 

Wazakhah 

Wormamay 

1931 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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—  235  

Yahyakhel 

Yosufkhel 

Zarghunshahr 

Ziruk 

Chahrbaran 

Khushamand 

Khair Kot 

Shakin 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 
Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 
Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

/ 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Gov control: 60%; 
TB control: 40% 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

/ 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

TB control: 85%; 
Gov control: 15 % 
or Gov control: 
80%; TB control: 
20% 
TB control  
Gov control: 90%; 
TB control: 10% 
TB control: 60%; 
Gov control: 40% 
Gov control: 50%; 
TB control: 50% 

2.26.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.26.3.1 General  

In 2018, UNAMA documented 150 civilian casualties (67 deaths and 83 injured) in Paktika province. 
This represents a decrease of 6 % compared to 2017. Leading causes of casualties were (non-suicide) 
IEDs, followed by targeted killings and ground engagements.1932  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian casualties, and conflict-induced displacements, UNOCHA places Urgun district in the second 
highest  category  and  Gomal  in  the  category  below.  Sharan,  Mata  Khan,  Yahya  Khel,  Sar  Rawzah, 
Zarghun  Shahr,  Jani  Khel,  Surobi,  Nika,  Barmal,  Giyan  and  Wazakhah  fall  into  the  fourth  highest 
category. The remaining districts are in the two lowest categories.1933 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 92 incidents related to insurgents in Paktika province.1934 

As  reported  by  a  local  source  to  AAN  in  November  2018,  the  Taliban  had  not  been  very  active  in 
carrying out attacks against pro-government forces in Paktika. Furthermore, ‘the most recent attack 
had been on Khushamand (also known as Dela) district, a week before the election. Besides that, there 
had  not  been  any  major  attack  by  Taleban  fighters  in  the  province  since  August  2017,  when  they 
carried one out on Gomal district’.1935 During the parliamentary elections in October 2018 there were 
some security incidents in parts of Sarobi, Sarrawzah, Matakhan and Sharana, which caused ‘relatively 
few’ casualties.1936  

1932 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
1933 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2  
1934 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
1935  Muzhary,  F.,  The  2018  Election  Observed  (4)  in  Paktika:  Pre-election  fraud  and  relatively  peaceful  polling,  AAN,  13 
November 2018, url 
1936  Muzhary,  F.,  The  2018  Election  Observed  (4)  in  Paktika:  Pre-election  fraud  and  relatively  peaceful  polling,  AAN,  13 
November 2018, url 

 
 
                                                           
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In late December 2018 Afghan security forces carried out airstrikes in Bermel district, which killed the 
military commission chief of the Haqqani network. According to the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) 
quoted by Khaama Press, the senior Haqqani network leader was active in planning and coordinating 
attacks in Paktika and the provinces nearby.1937 Moreover, US security forces carried out airstrikes in 
Gomal district in December 2018, killing militants1938 and in Gyan district in November 2018, killing 
two Taliban militants and four civilians and wounding five others.1939   

In its annual 2018 report, UNAMA expressed concern over the increase in incidents of pro-Government 
armed  groups  deliberately  targeting  and  killing  civilians  during  search  operations.  Most  of  the 
casualties were caused by the Khost Protection Force in Khost, Paktya and Paktika.1940  

In May 2018, an Afghan National Police member shot and killed a 12-year-old boy who refused to carry 
water in Omna district. In retaliation, a member of the Afghan Local Police killed two members of the 
Police involved in the killing.1941 

In  early  January  2019,  at  least  5  civilians  were  killed  and  7  others  wounded,  after  an  unexploded 
ordnance  detonated  in  Janikhel  district.1942  In  October  2018  three  children  were  killed  by  an 
unexploded ordinance in Urgun district.1943  

In December 2018, clashes between security forces and armed insurgents closed at least 35 schools in 
Paktika province, most of them in Khoshamand district;1944 also in Urgun district, a middle school was 
torched.1945 In April 2018, a tribal elder and brother of a lawmaker was killed by Taliban insurgents in 
Sharan district.1946 

2.26.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 4 052 persons 
displaced from Paktika, most of them (3 737) displaced within the province; the others went to Khost 
province.1947 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019 reporting 1393 persons 
displaced from Paktika province, all within the province.1948 

No conflict-induced internal displacement was reported by UNOCHA to this province for the period 1 
January 2018 – 31 December 2018.1949 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019 reporting 1 393 persons 
displaced to Paktika, from Naka and Bermel districts to Sharan and Urgun within the province.1950 

District 

Displaced from 

Displaced to 

Displaced from 

Displaced to 

(2018) 

(2018) 

(2019) 

(2019) 

1937 Khaama Press, Senior Haqqani Network leader killed in Paktika airstrike, 25 December 2018, url; Salaam Times, Afghan 
air strike kills Haqqani Network leader in Paktika, 26 December 2018, url 
1938 Khaama Press, Drone strikes leave at least 15 militants dead in Ghazni and Paktika, 13 December 2018, url 
1939 Pajhwok Afghan News, 9 civilians killed & wounded in Paktika airstrike, 6 November 2018, url 
1940 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 35 
1941 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, pp. 43-44 
1942 Tolonews, Explosion in Paktika Leaves Six Civilians Dead, 7 January 2019, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 5 civilians killed, 7 
wounded in Paktika bomb blast, 7 January 2019, url 
1943 Pajhwok Afghan News, Leftover bomb kills 3 children in Paktika, 11 October 2018, url 
1944 Pajhwok Afghan News, 35 Paktika schools closed over insecurity: official, 16 December 2018, url 
1945 Pajhwok Afghan News, Gunmen set on fire a middle school in Paktika, 29 December 2018, url 
1946 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban gun down lawmaker’s brother in Paktika, 3 April 2018, url 
1947 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url  
1948 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement in 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url 
1949 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 
1950 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement in 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url 

                                                           
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—  237  

Bermel 

Dila 

Gyan 

Janikhel 

Naka 

Sharan 

Urgun 

/ 

539 

706 

735  

210 

/ 

1 862 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

1 735 

2 002  

770 

/ 

/ 

/ 

623 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

623 

770 

 
 
 
 
238 — 

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2.27 Paktya 

2.27.1 General description of the province  

Paktya is located in eastern Afghanistan, on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.1951 It borders Logar to 
the north, Pakistan to the east, Khost to the south-east, Paktika to the south and Ghazni to the west.1952 
The  provincial  capital  of  Paktya  is  Gardez.  The  province  is  divided  into  the  following  districts: 
Ahmadaba,  Alikhel  (or  Jaji),  Chamkani,  Dand  Wa  Patan,  Gardez,  Janikhel,  Lija  Ahmad  Khel  (or  Laja 
Mangel), Sayedkaram (or Mirzaka), Shawak, Zadran and Zurmat.1953 According to the Afghanistan CSO, 
the population of Paktya is estimated at 590 668 for 2018/191954 and is composed mainly of Pashtuns, 
followed by Tajiks.1955  

The  Kabul-Gardez  highway  connects  the  provincial  capital  to  Kabul  city  crossing  through  Logar.1956 
Another highway, called the ‘G-K’ or Gardez-Khost highway, passes through the districts of Shawak and 
Zadran as well as through Khost province, and reaches Ghulam Khan at the Afghan-Pakistani border.1957 
Taliban militants are reported to search vehicles and look for government employees on the Gardez-
Kabul highway,1958 and according to Khaama Press, they kidnapped 22 passengers on the Kabul-Gardez 

1951 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Paktya Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
1952 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Paktya Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url 
1953 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Paktya Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; US, Naval Postgraduate School, Paktya Provincial 
Overview, n.d., url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Background Profile Paktia Province, n.d., url 
1954 Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 2 
1955  US,  Naval  Postgraduate  School,  Paktya  Provincial  Overview,  n.d.,  url;  Afghanistan,  Office  of  the  President,  Provincial 
Profile Paktia, 1 February 2017, url 
1956 Pajhwok Afghan News, Insecurity growing on Kabul-Gardez highway‘, 18 July 2018, url; Foschini, F., Hitting Gardez: A 
vicious attack on Paktia‘s Shias, 18 August 2018, AAN, url 
1957 Pajhwok Afghan News, Reconstructed Gardez-Khost highway inaugurated, 15 December 2015, url; US, USAID, Gardez-
Khost National Highway, November 2016, url 
1958 Pajhwok Afghan News, ‘Insecurity growing on Kabul-Gardez highway‘, 18 July 2018, url; 

 
                                                           
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—  239  

highway  in  late  July  2018.1959  Also  in  July  2018  and  on  the  same  highway,  the  Taliban  purportedly 
attacked the convoy of Paktya’s governor and the vehicles of the provincial prosecutor.1960 Moreover, 
the Ghazni-Paktya highway was closed by Taliban militants after fights with the Afghan security forces 
in Ghazni province, in May 2018.1961  

According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, Paktya has maintained poppy-free status since 2013.1962  

2.27.2 Conflict background and actors in Paktya 

Paktya,  a  conservative  province,  mainly  inhabited  by  Pashtuns,  played  a  significant  role  during  the 
Soviet invasion in the 1980s, the civil war and Taliban rule in the 1990s, as well as during the post-2001 
years.1963  The  province  is  home  to  many  ex-mujahideen  commanders  who  were  members  of  the 
Harakat-e  Enqelab-e  Islami-e  Afghanistan  (The  Islamic  Revolutionary  Movement  of  Afghanistan),  a 
Sunni tanzim, or mujahideen-party, founded in 1979-1980 in Peshawar and operating mainly in Paktya 
and Logar provinces. Established as an umbrella organisation of the anti-Soviet movement, the Harakat 
started  to  operate  its  own  armed  resistance  after  Hezb-e  Islami  and  Jamiat-e  Islami  left  the 
organization. Harakat differed from these two mainly Muslim Brotherhood-inspired groups, as it was 
founded on a strong ulema base and had arisen as a local, rural and traditional Islamist movement. 
After  1993,  following  a  change  in  the  power  structure  of  the  mujahideen  government,  Nabi 
Muhammadi, the then leader of Harakat, dissolved the party and exhorted its members to join the 
Taliban, which many  of them  did.1964 As of December 2015,  the  Harakat party has returned to the 
political scene as a more moderate movement among different tanzims. It has thus been seen by many 
as a ‘bridge’ for peace talks with the Taliban, due to its ‘special relationship’ with them.1965 

According to AAN, even though Loya Paktya, composed of Khost, Paktya and Paktika, ‘had not been 
Taleban  heartland,  […]  the  Taliban  had  dealt  with  it  reasonably  well’.  1966  Important  senior  Taliban 
members, like Jalaluddin Haqqani, also came from Paktya Province. Even so, in the first stage after 
2001, the people from Loya Paktya overthrew the Taliban through tribal councils and supported the 
Afghan  government.  However,  this  mind-set  changed  after  the  tribal  elders  of  the  region  were 
excluded from the state-building process, which was mainly controlled by the new politicians in Kabul 
and Northern Alliance members.1967 In June 2018 Gardez city hosted a pro-peace gathering with tribal 
elders from Paktya, Paktika and Khost provinces who asked the Taliban to extend the ceasefire of Eid 
ul-Fitr. Moreover, many dwellers of Paktya province have been said to have pleaded for the creation 
of safe areas for peace talks with Taliban militants.1968  

Paktya province is witnessing an active insurgency, nevertheless, it is constrained however by robust 
tribal  affiliation  and  united  local  communities  on  which  it  has  to  rely  in  order  to  coordinate  its 
operations, according to an AAN report from August 2018.1969 The fact that the hostility of ‘even a 
minor  community’  would  be  counterproductive  for  the  insurgents  ‘discourages  acts  that  would 

1959 Khaama Press, Taliban militants kidnap 22 passengers from Kabul-Gardez highway, 31 July 2018, url 
1960 Pajhwok Afghan News, ‚Insecurity growing on Kabul-Gardez highway‘, 18 July 2018, url 
1961 LWJ, Taliban blockade of Ghazni-Paktia highway enters second month, 9 June 2018, url 
1962 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN , Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 19 
1963 Clark, K., Khost Protection Force Accused of Fresh Killings: Six men shot dead in Zurmat, AAN, 21 January 2019, url; Ruttig, 
T., A Bridge for the Taliban? Harakat, a former mujahedin party, leaps back into action, AAN, 14 December 2015, url; Clark, 
K., 2001 Ten Years on (3): The fall of Loya Paktia and why the US preferred warlords, AAN, 24 November 2011, url 
1964 Ruttig, T., A Bridge for the Taliban? Harakat, a former mujahedin party, leaps back into action, AAN, 14 December 2015, 
url; Clark, K., Khost Protection Force Accused of Fresh Killings: Six men shot dead in Zurmat, AAN, 21 January 2019, url 
1965 Ruttig, T., A Bridge for the Taliban? Harakat, a former mujahedin party, leaps back into action, AAN, 14 December 2015, 
url 
1966 Clark, K., 2001 Ten Years on (3): The fall of Loya Paktia and why the US preferred warlords, AAN, 24 November 2011, url 
1967 Clark, K., 2001 Ten Years on (3): The fall of Loya Paktia and why the US preferred warlords, AAN, 24 November 2011, url 
1968 Salaam Times, Hundreds of Taliban refuse to return to battlefield following ceasefire, 3 July 2018, url 
1969 Foschini, F., Hitting Gardez: A vicious attack on Paktia‘s Shias, AAN, 18 August 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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antagonize whole  communities’.1970  In October 2018  Thomas Ruttig  described Paktya province  as a 
‘Taliban stronghold’.1971 

The  Haqqani  network  started  to  expand  in  Loya  Paktya  some  years  before  20111972  and  has  now 
become powerful in Paktya province.1973 According to some sources quoted by AAN, the network had 
tried to expand into Zurmat district; five years ago it purportedly armed and supported Kuchi nomads 
who claimed governmental land in the district. Moreover, the Haqqanis allegedly demanded transit 
rights  through  Zurmat  valley  for  them  and  their  allies,  Al  Qaeda  foreign  fighters  coming  from  the 
former Soviet Union, in order to reach Gardez city and potentially Kabul.1974  

As reported by AAN, a small Shia community of mostly bilingual (Dari as a first language and Pashtu as 
a second) residents lives in Khwajah Hassan, in the north-east of the provincial capital. Most of the 
Dari speaking population of Paktya are Sunni Tajiks, whereas the Shia minority among them belongs 
to a separate group called Sadat (singular Sayyed). The Sadat from Khwajah Hassan are said to have 
been living in the area without conflict with the Sunni (Tajik and Pashtun) communities of the province. 
Actually, according to sources quoted by AAN, both religious communities have cooperated and fought 
alongside to defend Gardez, since the Soviet invasion. After the ISKP attack on the Shia mosque in 
Khwajah Hassan in August 2018, many members of Gardez Sunni community took part in the funerals 
of the victims and mourned for the dead.1975  

In terms of the presence of government security forces, Paktya province is under the responsibility of 
the 203th ANA Corps, which falls under Task Force Southeast (TF Southeast), led by US forces.1976 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Paktya  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.1977 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region, to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.  

PAKTYA 

Ahmadaba 

Alikhel (Jaji) 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: 
August-
November 
2017) 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 
Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment as 
of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

Taliban 

(last 
accessed:1978 
April 2019) 

(assessment as 
of December 
2018) 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA Influence 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control: 80%; 
Gov control: 
15% 
TB control: 70%; 
Gov control: 
30% 

1970 Foschini, F., Hitting Gardez: A vicious attack on Paktia‘s Shias, AAN, 18 August 2018, url 
1971 taz, Nicht nur die Taliban als Problem, 21 October 2018, url 
1972 Clark, K., 2001 Ten Years on (3): The fall of Loya Paktia and why the US preferred warlords, 24 November 2011, url 
1973 Clark, K., Khost Protection Force Accused of Fresh Killings: Six men shot dead in Zurmat, AAN, 21 January 2019, url 
1974 Clark, K., Khost Protection Force Accused of Fresh Killings: Six men shot dead in Zurmat, AAN, 21 January 2019, url 
1975 Foschini, F., Hitting Gardez: A vicious attack on Paktia‘s Shias, AAN, 18 August 2018, url 
1976 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2018, url, p. 16 
1977 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, End of year report 
(2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
1978 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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Chamkani 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA Influence 

Gov control 
or 
undetermined 

Dand Wa Patan 

Gardez (capital) 

Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 
Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA Influence 

Gov control 
or 
undetermined 

Lija Ahmad Khel 
(Laja Mangel) 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA Influence 

Contested 

TB control: 80%; 
Gov control: 
15% 
Gov control: 
70%; TB control: 
30% 
TB control: 60%; 
Gov control: 
40% 
TB control: 85%; 
Gov control: 
15% 

Janikhel 

Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 

Sayedkaram 
(Mirzaka) 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Contested 

Contested 

Sayedkaram: 
contested 
and Mirzaka: 
GIRoA 
Influence  

Sayedkaram: 
contested and 
Mirzaka: GIRoA 
Influence 

Shawak 

Zadran 

Zurmat 

Arma 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA Influence 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA Influence 

Open Taliban 
Presence - 
high 
/ 

Contested 

Contested 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

Gerda Tserhi 

/ 

Taliban 
control 

/ 

Contested 

TB control: 80%; 
Gov control: 
15% 

Gov control 
or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Taliban 
control 

/ 

/ 

/ 

TB control: 70%; 
Gov control: 
30% 
TB control: 90%; 
Gov control: 
10% 
TB control  
TB control: 80%; 
Gov control: 
15% 

2.27.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.27.3.1 General  

In 2018, UNAMA documented 428 civilian casualties (152 deaths and 276 injured) in Paktya province. 
This  represents  a  decrease  of  13 %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were 
suicide/complex attacks, followed by ground engagements and aerial attacks.1979  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian casualties, and conflict-induced displacements,  UNOCHA places Gardez district in the highest 
category and Zurmat and Jani Khel districts in the second highest category.  Sayed Karam, Jaji and Dand 
Wa Patan are in the third highest category and Ahmadaba, Zadran, Lija Ahmad Khel and Chamkani are 
in the fourth highest category. The remaining district falls into the lower category.1980  

1979 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
1980 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2  

 
 
                                                           
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In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 108 incidents related to insurgents in Paktya province.1981 

Throughout  2018,  Afghan  and  foreign  security  forces  carried  out  operations  and  airstrikes  against 
insurgents in Chamkani in September 2018, killing 3 civilians and injuring 10, including women and 
children, 1982 in July 2018, in Ahmadabad, killing Taliban militants,1983 and in Zurmat, killing at least 10 
civilians,1984  andin Sayedkaram in May 2018, killing insurgents.1985In December 2018, an airstrike that 
killed around 10 civilians and the deaths caused protests among the inhabitants of the area.1986  

UNAMA  expressed  concern  over  the  increase  in  incidents  of  pro-Government  armed  groups 
deliberately targeting and killing civilians during search operations. Most of the casualties were caused 
by  the  Khost  Protection  Force  in  Khost,  Paktya  and  Paktika.1987  In  late  December  2018,  militants 
allegedly belonging to the Khost Protection Force executed six civilians, suspected of having links with 
the  Taliban  in  Zurmat  district.1988  Similar  episodes  had  already  affected  the  province,  when  KPF 
members conducted a military operation in Zurmat, killing 12 civilians in December 2018,1989 or when 
US soldiers killed 7 members of one family, among them 2 pregnant women in October 2018.1990  

In  August  2018,  ISKP  attacked  a  Shia  mosque  in  Khwajah  Hassan,  Gardez  city,  killing  at  least  38 
worshippers and wounding around 80 others. It was the first attack directed against the Shia minority 
in the province.1991  

The  Taliban  were  reported  to  have  planted  landmines  on the  Janikhel-Samkani  highway  in  August 
2018 and forcing civilians to surrender to them in Janikhel district.1992  

In  the  districts  of  Zurmat,  Sayedkaram  and  Ahmadabad  Taliban  have  allegedly  closed  schools,  in 
protest against the poor state of school buildings.1993 According to Thomas Rutting, Taliban insurgents 
hindered  the  dwellers  of  Zurmat  district  to  cast  their  vote  during  parliamentary  elections  in  late 
October 2018.1994  

2.27.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 1 829 persons 
displaced from Paktya, most of them (1 358) displaced within the province1995 and the others went to 
Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Khost and Logar provinces. 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 1 554 persons 
displaced to Paktya province.1996 

1981 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
1982 Pajhwok Afghan News, 3 civilians killed, 10 hurt in Paktia airstrike, 20 September 2018, url 
1983 Tolonews, Over 100 Militants Killed In Paktia Operations, 13 July 2018, url 
1984 Pajhwok Afghan News, 20 civilians, 26 Taliban killed in Paktia‘s Zurmat operation, 13 July 2018, url 
1985 Tolonews, Six Taliban insurgents Killed in Paktia Airstrike, 28 May 2018, url 
1986 AP, Airstrike kills 10 civilians in eastern Afghanistan, 2 December 2018, url 
1987 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 35 
1988 Clark, K., Khost Protection Force Accused of Fresh Killings: Six men shot dead in Zurmat, AAN, 21 January 2019, url 
1989 New York Times Magazine (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: Nov. 30-Dec. 6, 7 December 2018, url 
1990 Deutschlandfunk Kultur, Razzien in Afghanistan: Wenn Soldaten die Falschen töten, 14 January 2019, url 
1991 Foschini, F., Hitting Gardez: A vicious attack on Paktia‘s Shias, AAN, 18 August 2018, url; Reuters, Islamic State says it 
carried out Afghan Shi‘ite mosque bombing, 4 August 2018, url 
1992 Pajhwok Afghan News, Paktia’s Janikhel residents concerned over ongoing unrest, 18 August 2018, url 
1993 Ariana News, Taliban closes over 20 schools in Paktia, 5 June 2018, url 
1994 taz, Nicht nur die Taliban als Problem, 21 October 2018, url 
1995 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url  
1996 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 

 
                                                           
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No conflict-induced internal displacement from Paktya province and to this province was reported by 
UNOCHA for the period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019.1997 

District 

Alikhel (Jaji) 

Dand Wa Patan 

Gardez 

Janikhel 

Lija Ahmad Khel / Laja Mangel 

Sayedkaram / Mirzaka 

Zadran 

Zurmat 

Displaced 
from (2018) 

Displaced to 
(2018) 

Displaced 
from (2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

567  

42 

/ 

364  

42 

282  

210  

322  

/ 

/ 

1 554 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

According to UNOCHA, ‘insecurity’ and ‘conflict’ are the reasons of displacements from Paktya districts 
to its provincial capital.1998 

1997 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 17 March 2019, url 
1998 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 28 May – 3 June 2018, 4 June 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 2 –8 July 2018, 9 July 2018, url  

 
 
 
 
                                                           
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2.28 Panjsher 

2.28.1 General description of the province  

Panjsher  is  located  in  central  Afghanistan  and  borders  the  provinces  of  Baghlan  and  Takhar  to  the 
north,  Badakhshan  to  the  north-east,  Nuristan  to  the  east, Laghman  and  Kapisa  to  the  south,  and 
Parwan to the west.1999 The provincial capital of Panjsher is Bazarak. The province is divided into the 
following  districts:  Bazarak,  Dara  (or  Ab  Shar  or  Hes-e-Duwumi),  Khenj  (Hes-e-Awal),  Onaba  (or 
Anawa), Paryan, Rukha and Shutul.2000 According to the Afghanistan CSO, the population of Parwan is 
estimated at 164 115 for 2018/192001 and is composed mainly of Tajiks,2002 followed by Hazara, Pashai, 
Nuristani and Ghilzai Pashtuns.2003  

Panjsher  province  is  connected  to  Kabul  through  a  local  road  which  passes  through  the  district  of 
Bagram in Parwan Province.2004 The distance between Kabul and Bazarak is 150 kilometres.2005 A deep 
and narrow gorge at the beginning of Panjsher Valley, which is said to be ‘tailor-made for obstruction 
and ambush’, has kept the province isolated and difficult to access.2006 

1999  US,  Naval  Posgtraduate  School,  Panjsher  Provincial  Overview,  n.d.,  url;  UNODC  and  Afghanistan,  MCN,  Afghanistan 
Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 21 
2000 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Panjsher Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; Pajwhok Afghan News, Panjsher background 
profile, n.d., url; US, Naval Postraduate School, Panjsher Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
2001 Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 2 
2002 New York Times (The), Recalling Past Threats, Afghans in Tranquil Valley Work to Keep It That Way, 13 January 2014, url 
2003  US,  Naval  Postgraduate  School,  Panjsher  Provincial  Overview,  n.d.,  url;  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Panjsher  background 
profile, n.d., url; Reuters, The Taliban in Afghanistan‘s once impregnable Panjshir Valley, 15 October 2011, url 
2004 Fox News, Afghanistan‘s beautiful ‚Green Zone‘ offers emeralds, peace, 23 May 2017, url 
2005 Der Tagesspiegel, Das Panjshrital in Afghanistan: Mit dem Stolz der Löwen, 4 March 2015, url 
2006 New York Times (The), Recalling Past Threats, Afghans in Tranquil Valley Work to Keep It That Way, 13 January 2014, url 

 
                                                           
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According  to  the  2018  UNODC  Opium  Survey,  Panjshir  has  maintained  poppy-free  status  since 
2013.2007  

2.28.2 Conflict background and actors in Panjsher 

Panjsher province led the resistance against the Soviets and the Taliban insurgency during the 1980s 
and the 1990s. The province is home to the Tajik Ahmad Shah Massoud, the ‘Lion of Panjshir’, who 
fought against the Soviets and headed the Northern Alliance against the Taliban.2008 His grave, which 
is located in the  province, has  attracted many visitors over the years, among  these also prominent 
politicians like Afghanistan’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Abdullah Abdullah.2009  

The  Panjshiris,  the  Tajik  dwellers  of  the  province,  are  known  for  their  historical  opposition  to  the 
Taliban  and  were  therefore  recruited  by  the  first  CIA  operatives  in  Afghanistan  after  the  2001 
attacks.2010 In 2012, about 70% of NDS personnel originated from Panjsher or was connected to the 
Northern  Alliance.2011  Furthermore,  in  2014  new  and  reinforced  Afghan  police  checkpoints,  which 
were mainly controlled by agents of the NDS, were set up across the road into Panjsher.2012  

Many  Panjshiris  have  been  members  of  the  Afghan  political  and  military  elite,  like  CEO  Abdullah 
Abdullah or former NDS chief and now vice-presidential candidate Amrullah Saleh.2013   

According to the Afghan news agency Pasbanan, ISKP was recruiting fighters in Panjsher province as of 
March 2018. Purportedly, 15 ISKP-affiliated individuals belonged to two Iraqi families, and they were 
operating under the shield of the pan-Islamic Tahrir Party. Moreover, they allegedly spoke Arabic as 
well as Persian, and they entered Panjsher province through Nangarhar and Laghman. Living in Ab Shar 
district, the families were purportedly interested in getting control over the emerald and Azure mines 
of the province.2014  

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Panjsher  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.2015 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region, to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.     

2007 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 19 
2008 New York Times (The), Recalling Past Threats, Afghans in Tranquil Valley Work to Keep It That Way, 13 January 2014, url; 
Washington Post (The), ‚The Lion of Kandahar‘: Was slain commander a hero or part of the problem?, 29 November 2018, 
url 
2009 Pajhwok Afghan News, President, CEO arrive in Panjshir province,1 January 2016, url; Stars and Stripes, As Afghan war 
escalates, security fears grow in peaceful valley, 7 November 2016, url 
2010 Christian Science Monitor (The), Why Afghanistan‘s intelligence agency has a major blind spot, 23 April 2012, url 
2011 Christian Science Monitor (The), Why Afghanistan‘s intelligence agency has a major blind spot, 23 April 2012, url 
2012 New York Times (The), Recalling Past Threats, Afghans in Tranquil Valley Work to Keep It That Way, 13 January 2014, url; 
Washington Post (The), ‚The Lion of Kandahar‘: Was slain commander a hero or part of the problem?, 29 November 2018, 
url 
2013 New York Times (The), Recalling Past Threats, Afghans in Tranquil Valley Work to Keep It That Way, 13 January 2014, url; 
Reuters, Afghanistan‘s Ghani launches bid for second presidential term, 20 January 2018, url; Telegraph (The), Afghanistan‘s 
former spy chief: ‚Never trust the Taliban‘, 13 August 2011, url 
2014 Pasbanan, Panjshir, Is threatened by ISIS recruitment, 8 March 2018, url 
2015 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, End of year report 
(2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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PANJSHER 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: 
August-
November 
2017) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment 
as of October 
2018) 

Bazarak (capital) 

Gov control 

GIRoA control  GIRoA control 

Dara (Ab Shar) 

Gov control 

GIRoA control  GIRoA control 

Khenj (Hes-e-Awal) 

Gov control 

GIRoA control  GIRoA control 

Onaba (Anawa) 

Gov control 

GIRoA control  GIRoA control 

Paryan 

Gov control 

GIRoA control  GIRoA control 

Rukha 

Shutul 

Gov control 

GIRoA control  GIRoA control 

Gov control 

GIRoA control  GIRoA control 

LWJ 

(last 
accessed:2016 
April 2019) 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 
Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 
Gov control or 
undetermined 

Dara Abdulla 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

Taliban 

(assessment 
as of 
December 
2018) 

Gov control 

Gov control: 
87%; TB 
control: 13% 

Gov control 

/ 

Gov control: 
85%; TB 
control: 15% 

Gov control 

Gov control 

Gov control: 
77%; TB 
control: 23% 

2.28.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.28.3.1 General  

In 2018, UNAMA documented no civilian casualties in Panjsher province.2017  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian casualties, and conflict-induced displacements, UNOCHA places the entire province Panjshir 
into the lowest category.2018 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 2 incidents related to insurgents in Panjsher province.2019 

The  number of Taliban attacks in Panjsher has been relatively low compared to other areas of the 
country.2020  The  most  prominent  assaults  date  back  several  years  ago.  In  2015  Taliban  insurgents 
detonated suicide vests in front of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) office;2021 in 2014 a Taliban 
suicide-attack took place at a check-point and killed at least 12 Afghan security forces and civilians and 
injured  35  more;2022  in  2013  the  Islamic  Movement  of  Uzbekistan  assaulted  the  governor’s 

2016 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 
2017 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
2018 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2  
2019 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
2020 New York Times (The), Recalling Past Threats, Afghans in Tranquil Valley Work to Keep It That Way, 13 January 2014, url 
2021 SBS News, Panjshir attacks shows all Afghanistan ‚unsafe‘, 26 February 2015, url 
2022 LWJ, Taliban claim suicide assault in Panjshir Valley, 2 May 2014, url; BBC News, Taliban in deadly Afghanistan Panjshir 
suicide bombing, 1 May 2014, url 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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compound.2023 According to the US-military news website Stars and Stripes, inhabitants from Panjsher 
began to fear a growth of Taliban presence in their lands in 2016, as fighting in neighbouring Baghlan 
and nearby Kunduz provinces was ongoing.2024 

2.28.3.2 Displacement 

No conflict-induced internal displacement from Panjsher province was reported by UNOCHA for the 
period 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018.2025 

No conflict-induced internal displacement from Panjsher province was reported by UNOCHA for the 
period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019.2026 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018, reporting 189 persons 
displaced to Panjsher province, coming from neighbouring provinces Laghman, Nuristan, Badakhshan 
and  Baghlan.2027  These  189  IDPs  were  registered  in  the  first  six  months  of  2018.2028  In  July  and 
December  2018,  UNOCHA’s  Weekly  Field  Reports  respectively  reported  600  and  840  individuals 
displaced to Panjsher from the four above mentioned provinces.2029 

No  conflict-induced  internal  displacement  to  Panjsher  province  was  reported  by  UNOCHA  for  the 
period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019.2030 

District 

Bazarak 
Onaba (Anawa) 
Khenj (Hes-e-Awal) 
Rukha 

Displaced from 
(2018) 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 

Displaced to (2018) 

63 
28 
63 
35 

Displaced from 
(2019) 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 

Displaced to 
(2019) 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 

According to UNOCHA the main reasons for the displacement of IDPs arriving in Panjsher province 
were  insecurity,  threat,  military  operations,  intimidation  and  frequent  fighting  in  their  places  of 
origin.2031 

According to UNHCR, Panjsher is one of the four provinces with the highest percentage of returnees 
who originate there but ‘choose to live somewhere else once they return’.2032  

2023 LWJ, IMU, Taliban launched joint suicide assualt in Panjshir, 1 June 2013, url 
2024 Stars and Stripes, As Afghan war escalates, security fears grow in peaceful valley, 7 November 2016, url 
2025 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url 
2026 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url  
2027  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan  Conflict  Displacement  2018,  last  updated:  28  January  2019,  url;  UNOCHA,  Operational 
Coordination Team (OCT) - Panjsher Province - Meeting Summary, 3 April 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 2 - 8 April 2018, 8 April 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Panjsher Province - Meeting 
Summary,  15  July  2018,  url,  p.  1;  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan  Weekly  Field  Report,  16  -  22  July  2018,  22  July  2018,  url,  p.  1; 
UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 24 - 31 December 2018, 31 December 2018, url, p. 1 
2028 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url 
2029 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 16 - 22 July 2018, 22 July 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 24 - 31 December 2018, 31 December 2018, url, p. 1 
2030 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url  
2031 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Panjsher Province - Meeting Summary, 3 April 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, 
Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Panjsher Province - Meeting Summary, 15 July 2018, url, p. 1   
2032 UNHCR, Returnee and Internally Displaced Persons Monitoring Report - Final Report, May 2018, url, p. 19  

 
 
 
                                                           
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2.29 Parwan 

2.29.1 General description of the province 

Parwan is located in the central part of Afghanistan. It borders Baghlan in the north, Panjshir and Kapisa 
in the east, Kabul and Wardak in the south and south-east and Bamyan in the west.2033 Its provincial 
capital is Charikar. The province is divided into the following districts: Bagram, Charikar, Ghorband (or 
Siya  Gird),  Jabalussaraj,  Koh-e-Safi,  Salang,  Saydkhel,  Shekhali,  Shinwari  and  Surkh-e-Parsa.2034 
According to the Afghanistan CSO, the population of Parwan is estimated at 711 621 for 2018/192035 
and is composed mainly of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Qizilbash, Kuchi and Hazara.2036  

The Salang Pass Tunnel, which is located between Parwan and Baghlan provinces, connects Kabul to 
northern Afghanistan.2037 A highway from Kabul runs through the districts of Charikar, Jabalussaraj and 
Salang  to  Kunduz  province;  moreover,  another  highway  connecting  Parwan  and  Bamyan  provinces 
runs  through  Charikar,  Shinwari,  Ghorband,  Shekhali  and  the  Shibar  Pass.2038  The  Parwan-Bamyan 
highway has occasionally been closed due to clashes between Taliban militants and Afghan security 

2033 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Parwan Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
2034 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Parwan Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial 
Profile Parwan, 1 February 2017, url  
2035 Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 2 
2036 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Parwan Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
2037 Tolonews, Road Works Underway On Salang Pass, 1 September 2018, url; Washington Post (The), Corruption at 13,000 
feet: Afghanistan struggles to maintain a treacherous mountain trade route, 22 January 2018, url; Diplomat (The), Fixing the 
Salang Pass Tunnel, 21 October 2015, url 
2038  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan:  Parwan  Province  –  District  Atlas,  April  2014,  url;  Afghanistan,  MOPW,  Application  of  Road 
Numbering System National Highways, url, p. 5 ; Ruttig, T., Ghorband – A Valley Once Friendly, 19 July 2011, url 

 
                                                           
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—  249  

forces.2039  An  abduction  perpertrated  by  the  Taliban  took  place  along  the  Kabul-Bamyan  route  in 
Shekhali district in August 2018.2040 Parwan province hosts Bagram Air Base, the largest NATO military 
base in Afghanistan.2041  

According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, Parwan has maintained poppy-free status since 2013.2042  

2.29.2 Conflict background and actors in Parwan 

According to Khaama Press, Parwan was considered ‘relatively calm’,2043 until the security situation 
started deteriorating in some of the province’s districts.2044 In 2011, the insurgency started to expand 
its activities into Siya Gird, Shinwari, which are Pashtun majority districts, and Surkh-e-Parsa, where 
the Sunni Hazara majority sympathized with Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin forces due to the fact that it was 
‘at  odds’  with  the  Shia  Hazara  in  neighbouring  Bamyan  province.  Moreover,  the  Pashtun  areas  of 
Ghorband valley supported HIG-forces during the civil war. Some of these forces were absorbed by the 
Taliban during their subsequent rule. 2045  

In  2011,  the  Taliban  started  their  spring  offensive  and  appointed  shadow  district  governors  for 
Shinwari, Siya Gird and even Also Koh-e-Safi, which was traditionally a bastion of HIG. The province 
has also been affected by a long-established rivalry between Jamiat-e Islami and HIG, as Tajik ethnic 
groups affiliated with Jamiat were powerful strongmen and had important networks throughout the 
area. Many of them were in control of Parwan’s administration. The Taliban also appointed Tajiks into 
their ranks  to avoid limiting the insurgency exclusively to the Pashtun ethnicity.2046  

As  reported  by  LWJ  in  August  2018,  Taliban  insurgents  have  been  active  in  Koh-e-Safi,  Saydkhel, 
Shinwari, Siya Gird Ghorband and Surkh-e-Parsa, from where they planned attacks on Charikar and 
Bagram Air Base.2047 Moreover, in the past Taliban militants collaborated with Al Qaeda in order to 
attack the NATO facility in Bagram also in 2018.2048 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Parwan  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.2049 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region, to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.   

2039 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban  suffer heavy casualties in Parwan, 25 April 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Parwan-
Bamyan  highway  closed  amid  fierce  clash,  27  July  2017,  url;  Afghanistan  Times,  Violent  Clash:  Bamyan-Parwan  Highway 
Closed, 29 July 2017, url 
2040 Killid Group (The), Taliban Kidnap 9 Passengers in Parwan, 30 July 2018, url 
2041 LWJ, Taliban suicide bomber kills 3 Czech soldiers, 5 August 2018, url 
2042 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN , Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 21 
2043 Khaama Press, Taliban‘s military chief for Parwan province has been killed in an infighting, 22 December 2018, url 
2044 Khaama Press, Taliban‘s military chief for Parwan province has been killed in an infighting, 22 December 2018, url; Ruttig, 
T., Ghorband – A Valley Once Friendly, AAN, 19 July 2011, url 
2045 Ruttig, T., Ghorband – A Valley Once Friendly, AAN, 19 July 2011, url 
2046 Ruttig, T., Ghorband – A Valley Once Friendly, AAN, 19 July 2011, url 
2047 LWJ, Taliban suicide bomber kills 3 Czech soldiers, 5 August 2018, url 
2048 LWJ, Taliban suicide bomber kills 3 Czech soldiers, 5 August 2018, url 
2049 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, End of year report 
(2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

PARWAN 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: August-
November 
2017) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment 
as of: October 
2018) 

LWJ 

Taliban 

(last 
accessed:2050 
April 2019) 

(assessment as 
of December 
2018) 

Bagram 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA control  GIRoA control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Charikar (capital) 

Gov control 

Ghorband 
(Siagherd) 

Jabalussuraj 

Koh-e-Safi 

Salang 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 
Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Shekhali 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

Contested 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

GIRoA Control  GIRoA control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Shinwari 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

GIRoA 
influence 

Surkh-e-Parsa 
Saydkhel 

Gov control 
Gov control 

Contested 
Contested 

GIRoA 
influence 

Contested 
Contested 

Contested 

Contested 
Contested 

Gov control: 
90%; TB control: 
10% 
Gov control: 
90%; TB control: 
10% 
TB control: 80%; 
Gov control: 
20% 

Gov control 

TB control: 60%; 
Gov control: 
40% 

Gov control 

Gov control: 
70%; TB control: 
30% 
TB control: 80%; 
Gov control: 
20% 
Gov control 
Gov control 

2.29.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.29.3.1 General  

In 2018, UNAMA documented 41 civilian casualties (20 deaths and 21 injured) in Parwan province. 
This  represents  a  decrease  of  47 %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were  ground 
engagement, followed by suicide/complex attacks and ground engagements [sic].2051  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements  –  UNOCHA  places  Ghorband  district  in  the 
second  highest  category  and  Bagram  and  Shinwari  in  the  fourth  highest  category.  The  remaining 
districts fall into the two lowest categories.2052 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 49 incidents related to insurgents in Parwan province.2053 

2050 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 
2051 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
2052 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p.2  
2053 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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—  251  

Afghan and foreign forces carried out a night raid in Jabalussaraj district in November 2018, killing 
three civilians.2054  In September 2018 US forces carried out an airstrike targeting Taliban insurgents 
who were allegedly trying to attack Bagram airbase, killing four of them.2055  

Fighting between Taliban and Afghan security forces took place in several districts of Parwan province 
in 2018, such as Siya Gird, Shinwari and Shekhali, causing casualties mostly among the insurgents.2056 
In late December 2018, the Taliban shadow military chief for Parwan province was killed in Jabalussaraj 
district after a supposed fight among the insurgents themselves.2057 Taliban fighters were attacking 
Afghan  and  international  security  forces,  killing  NATO  soldiers  near  the  provincial  capital  in  August 
2018.2058 In early January 2019 unidentified militants kidnapped the district court chief of Shinwari 
district.2059  

In  mid-February  2019,  unidentified  gunmen  shot  dead  an  appellant  court  employee  in  Charikar 
district.2060 In January 2019, suspected militants kidnapped the court chief of Shinwari district.2061 Also 
in January 2019, the Taliban seized 45 schoolteachers in Siya Gird district.2062 Moreover, the Taliban 
abducted nine people along the Kabul-Bamyan route in Shekhali district in August 2018.2063 

A 16-year-old boy was shot and killed by an unidentified gunman in Sayedkhel in April 2018. According 
to the district administrative chief, the teenager had been threatened before on the phone by ISKP 
militants for not assisting them.2064 

A  December  2018  study  on  Charikar  municipality  found  that  around  100  businessmen,  heads  of 
government institutions, law makers and NGOs had left Parwan province due to insecurity, extortion 
and armed robberies.2065 

According to a report on elections-related violence by UNAMA, road blockades were set up in Parwan 
by insurgents during the two days of elections in October 2018 to keep locals from voting and to delay 
the transport of electoral material.2066 

2.29.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA  collected  data  for  the  period  1  January  2018  -  31  December  2018,  reporting  84  persons 
displaced from Parwan province, displaced within the province itself or to the neighbouring province 
of Kapisa.2067 

2054 RAWA News, Residents Protest Joint Military Operation In Parwan That Killed Three Civilians, 23 November 2018, url; 
Xinhua News Agency, Afghan airstrikes kill 2 militants in Parwan province, 13 October 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 3 
civilians killed, 4 injured in Parwan overnight raid, 23 November 2018, url 
2055 Khaama Press, 4 Taliban militants killed an attempt to attack Bagram airbase with rockets, 2 September 2018, url 
2056  1TV  News,  Afghan  commando  kill  12  Taliban  in  Parwan  raid,  6  November  2018,  url;  Bakhtar  News,  Taliban  Attack 
Repulsed in Parwan, 30 July 2018, url; Tolonews, Taliban Attacks Security Check Posts In Parwan, 26 April 2018, url; Pajhwok 
Afghan News, Taliban suffer heavy casualties in Parwan, 25 April 2018, url 
2057 Khaama Press, Taliban‘s military chief for Parwan province has been killed in an infighting, 22 December 2018, url 
2058 Al Jazeera, Afghanistan: Taliban suicide bomber kills NATO troops in Parwan, 5 August 2018, url 
2059 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban kidnap district‘s court chief in Parwan, 17 January 2019, url; Washington Post (The), Three 
troops under U.S. command, dozens of Afghan soldiers die in separate attacks, 5 August 2018, url 
2060 Pajhwok Afghan News, Appellant court worker gunned down in Parwan, 17 February 2019, url 
2061 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban kidnap district’s court chief in Parwan, 17 January 2019, url 
2062 Pajhwok Afghan News, Seized 2 days ago, Taliban release Parwan teachers, 31 January 2019, url 
2063 Killid Group (The), Taliban Kidnap 9 Passengers in Parwan, 30 July 2018, url 
2064 Pajhwok Afghan News, Unidentified armed man kill teenage boy in Parwan, 21 April 2018,url   
2065 Pajhwok Afghan News, Feeling unsafe, traders & well-off persons flee Parwan, 1 December 2018, url 
2066 UNAMA, Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Special Report: 2018 Elections Violence, November 2018, 
url, p. 5 
2067 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url   

 
                                                           
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No conflict-induced internal displacement from Parwan province was reported by UNOCHA for the 
period 1 January 2019 - 28 February 2019.2068 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018, reporting 1 113 persons 
displaced  to  Parwan  province,  mainly  coming  from  Kapisa,  Kunar  and  Laghman  provinces,  from 
Baghlan province and a small number from within the province itself.2069  

UNOCHA  collected  data  for  the  period  1  January  2019  -  28  February  2019  reporting  105  persons 
displaced to Parwan province coming from Kapisa and Laghman provinces.2070 

District 

Shinwari 
Ghorband 
Bagram 
Charikar 
Jabalussaraj 

Displaced from 
(2018) 
49 
35 
/ 
/ 
/ 

Displaced to 
(2018) 
/ 
/ 
364 
595 
154 

Displaced from 
(2019) 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 

Displaced to 
(2019) 
/ 
/ 
/ 
105 
/ 

According  to  UNOCHA  the  main  reasons  for  the  displacement  of  IDPs  arriving  in  Parwan  were 
insecurity, threats, military operations and armed conflict in their places of origin.2071 

In March and October 2018, UNOCHA reported on ongoing military operations by ANSF in Tagab and 
Alasay districts of Kapisa province leading to the displacement of a significant number of civilians to 
secure districts of nearby provinces, including Parwan.2072 Another group of IDPs coming from Shigal 
Wal Sheltan and Dangam districts of Kunar province arrived in Parwan in October 2018, due to being 
continuously under the attack of heavy artillery fire from ANSF.2073 

In March and July 2018 UNOCHA’s Weekly Field Reports and OCT Meeting Summaries reported on 
IDP’s from Nuristan, Samangan and Sar-e-Pul province arriving in Parwan.2074 According to the Afghan 
authorities a group of more than 900 displaced individuals arrived in Parwan province in October 2018, 
coming from insecure districts in Kabul, Kapisa and Kunar provinces.2075 

At the end of February 2019, the head of Directorate of Refugees and Repatriations reported during 
an OCT meeting in Parwan that 180 displaced families that arrived in different districts in the province 
in the past two to three months, coming from insecure areas in Laghman, Kunar, Nangarhar, Kapisa, 
Baghlan and Takhar provinces.2076 

2068 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url  
2069 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url  
2070 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url  
2071 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Parwan Province - Meeting Summary, 6 March 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 4 - 11 March 2018, 11 March 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team 
(OCT) - Parwan Province - Meeting Summary, 4 July 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Parwan 
Province - Meeting Summary, 3 October 2018, url, p. 1 
2072 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Parwan Province - Meeting Summary, 6 March 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 4 - 11 March 2018, 11 March 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team 
(OCT) - Parwan Province - Meeting Summary, 3 October 2018, url, p. 1 
2073 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Parwan Province - Meeting Summary, 3 October 2018, url, p. 1 
2074 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Parwan Province - Meeting Summary, 6 March 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 4 - 11 March 2018, 11 March 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team 
(OCT) - Parwan Province - Meeting Summary, 4 July 2018, url, p. 1 
2075 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 1 - 7 October 2018, 8 October 2018, url, p. 1 
2076 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Parwan Province - Meeting Summary, 26 February 2019, url, p. 1 

 
 
 
                                                           
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—  253  

2.30 Samangan  

2.30.1 General description of the province  

The northern province Samangan borders Balkh to the north and the north-east, Baghlan to the east, 
Bamyan to the south and Sar-e Pul to the west.2077 The provincial capital of Samangan is Aybak. The 
province is divided into the following districts: Aybak, Dara-e-Suf-e-Payin (Lower Dara-e-Suf), Dara-e-
Suf-e-Bala  (Upper  Dara-e-Suf),  Feroznakhchir,  Hazrat-e-Sultan,  Khuram  Wa  Sarbagh  and  Ruy-e-
Duab.2078 According to the Afghanistan CSO , the population of Samangan is estimated at 415 343 for 
2018/192079 and composed of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Pashtuns, Hazaras, Arabs, Tatars2080 and Aimaq.2081 

The province lies strategically, to the north of the Hindu Kush.2082 A section of Highway One from Kabul 
to Mazar-e Sharif crosses Samangan’s districts of Khuram wa Sarbagh, Aybak and Hazrat-e-Sultan and 
connects Samangan to the northern provinces until Herat.2083 Taliban militants attacked check points 
along  the  road  which  connects  Dara-e-Suf  to  Mazar-e  Sharif  in  January  20192084  and  kidnapped 

2077 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Samangan Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url 
2078 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Samangan Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial 
Profile Samangan, 1 February 2017, url 
2079 Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 3 
2080 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Samangan Provincial Review, n.d., url 
2081 Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial Profile Samangan, 1 February 2017, url 
2082 RFE/RL, Afghanistan‘s New Northern Flash Points, n.d., url 
2083  Afghanistan,  MOPW,  Application  of  Road  Numbering  System  National  Highways,  16  October  2015,  url;  UNOCHA, 
Afghanistan:  Samangan  Province  –  District  Atlas,  April  2014,  url;  Diplomat  (The),  Kabul‘s  Plan  to  Realize  Afghanistan‘s 
Geographic Dividend, 5 December 2017, url 
2084 Tolonews, Two Policemen Killed In Samangan Clash, 6 January 2019, url 

 
  
                                                           
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

passengers  travelling  on  the  road  running  through  Upper  Dara-e-Suf  district,  which  connects  the 
district’s mines with local Afghan markets in December 2018.2085  

According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, Samangan province lost its poppy-free status in 2017. 
Opium-poppy-cultivation  decreased  by  2 %  and  therefore  remained  stable  compared  to  2017.  The 
main opium-poppy-cultivating districts were Lower Dara-e-Suf and Upper Dara-e-Suf.2086  

2.30.2 Conflict background and actors in Samangan  

According to governmental sources quoted by Pajhwok Afghan News in April 2018, ‘dozens’ of illegal 
armed groups were active in Samangan,2087 as were pro-government militias.2088 

Moreover, Taliban insurgents have been operating in the province throughout 2018.2089  

As reported by the United States Institute of Peace, ISKP used to recruit militants in Samangan province 
in 2016.2090  

In terms of the presence of government security forces, Samangan province is under the responsibility 
of the 209th ANA Corps, which falls under Train Advise Assist Command-North (TAAC-N), led by German 
forces.2091 

The following table provides an overview of control of the districts in Samangan province based on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.2092 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region, to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.   

SAMANGAN 

Aybak (capital) 

Dara-e-Suf-e-Bala 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: 
August-
November 
2017) 

Open Taliban 
presence – 
low 
Open Taliban 
presence – 
low 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment 
as of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

Taliban 

(last 
accessed:2093 
April 2019) 

(assessment as 
of December 
2018) 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control: 
80%; TB 
control: 20% 
TB control: 
60%; Gov 
control: 40% 

2085 Tolonews, Taliban Abducts 40 Passengers In Samangan, 2 December 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Mineral resources 
of Samangan province, 23 July 2014, url 
2086 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 25 
2087 Pajhwok Afghan News, Dozens of illegal armed group active in Samangan, 8 April 2018, url 
2088 Al Jazeera, Taliban launch deadly attacks as they attend Afghan peace talks, 5 February 2019, url 
2089  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Taliban  closing  in  on  Dara-i-Sauf  Payeen  district,  29  November  2018,  url;  Tolonews,  Two 
Policemen Killed In Samangan Clash, 6 January 2019, url; Khaama Press, Samangan‘s Security chief, several soldiers killed in 
Taliban attack, 16 October 2018, url; AP News, Taliban attack Afghan security forces in north, killing 52, 10 September 2018, 
url  
2090 USIP, The Islamic State in Afghanistan, Assessing the Threat, 7 April 2016, url, p. 2 
2091 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2018, url, p. 16 
2092 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, End of year report 
(2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
2093 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  255  

Dara-e-Suf-e-Payin 

Open Taliban 
presence – 
low 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Feroznakhchir 

Gov control 

GIRoA control  GIRoA control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Hazrat-e-Sultan 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Khuram Wa 
Sarbagh 

Ruy-e-Duab 

Khulm 

Open Taliban 
presence – 
low 
Open Taliban 
presence – 
low 
/ 

GIRoA control  GIRoA control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control 

/ 

/ 

/ 

Gov control 

TB control: 
90%; Gov 
control: 10% 

Gov control 

Gov control: 
60%; TB 
control: 40% 

Gov control 

2.30.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.30.3.1 General  

In 2018, UNAMA documented 46 civilian casualties (19 deaths and 27 injured) in Samangan province. 
This represents an increase of 21 % compared to 2017. Leading causes of casualties were (non-suicide) 
IEDs, followed by targeted/deliberate killings and ground engagements.2094  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA  places  Aybak  district  in  the  third 
highest  category  and  Lower  Dara-e-Suf,  Upper  Dara-e-Suf  and  Khuram  Wa  Sarbagh  in  the  fourth 
highest category. The remaining districts fall into the two lowest categories.2095 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 43 incidents related to insurgents in Samangan province.2096 

The Taliban attacked a pro-government militia in Dara-e-Suf district, killing and wounding militants as 
well as civilians in February 2019. According to local sources quoted by Al Jazeera, the Taliban targeted 
local villagers, among them women and children; since Dara-e-Suf is a remote area there is no police 
presence in some villages,2097 and residents have their own local militia to enhance security.2098  

Moreover,  Taliban  insurgents  attacked  Afghan  security  force  posts  in  Lower  Dara-e-Suf  district 
throughout 2018, killing, among other soldiers, Samangan’s security chief in October;2099 the Taliban 
also suffered casualties among their own ranks.2100 

At  least  ten  civilian  casualties  were  reported  in  Lower  Dara-e-Suf  in  February  2019,  as  a  result  of 
clashes  with  the  Taliban  who  were  attempting  to  get  usher  and  zakat  (taxes)  from  them.2101  In 

2094 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
2095 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2  
2096 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
2097 Tolonews, 10 Civilians Killed In Samangan Clash, 4 February 2019, url 
2098 Al Jazeera, Taliban launch deadly attacks as they attend Afghan peace talks, 5 February 2019, url 
2099  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Taliban  closing  in  on  Dara-i-Sauf  Payeen  district,  29  November  2018,  url;  Tolonews,  Two 
Policemen Killed In Samangan Clash, 6 January 2019, url; Khaama Press, Samangan‘s Security chief, several soldiers killed in 
Taliban attack, 16 October 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Police retake 40 Samangan villages from Taliban, 15 October 
2018, url; AP News, Taliban attack Afghan security forces in north, killing 52, 10 September 2018, url  
2100 Pajhwok Afghan News, Police retake 40 Samangan villages from Taliban, 15 October 2018, url; AP News, Taliban attack 
Afghan security forces in north, killing 52, 10 September 2018, url  
2101 Tolonews, 10 Civilians Killed In Samangan Clash, 4 February 2019, url 

 
 
                                                           
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December  2018,  60  drivers  of  coal-supplying  trucks  in  Dara-i-Suf  Payan  district  were  abducted  by 
Taliban militants. The Taliban demanded tax from drivers who refused to make the payment. The truck 
conductors were also abducted, but were released soon afterwards.2102 In late April 2018, in Aybak 
district, the Taliban shot dead a mullah who was known for preaching against the Taliban, while he 
was at a wedding party, as well as another woman, and injured two more.2103 In February 2018, four 
employees of a construction firm were kidnapped by unidentified gunmen, allegedly by the Taliban in 
Aibak, the provincial capital.2104 

2.30.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 3997 persons 
displaced from Samangan province, mainly within the province itself, but also to Kabul province.2105 

No conflict-induced internal displacement from Samangan province was reported by UNOCHA for the 
period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019.2106 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 3 836 persons 
displaced to Samangan province, coming mainly from within the province itself.2107 

No conflict-induced internal displacement to Samangan province was reported by UNOCHA for the 
period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019.2108 

District 

Aybak 
Dara-e Suf-e-Bala 
Dara-e-Suf-e-Payin 
Khuram Wa Sarbagh 
Ruy-e-Duab 

Displaced from 
(2018) 
2 884 
252 
665 
140 
56 

Displaced to (2018) 

3 584 
252 
/ 
/ 
/ 

Displaced from 
(2019) 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 

Displaced to 
(2019) 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 

In  February  2019,  around  50  families  were  displaced  from  Faryab  to  Aibak  city  owing  to  conflict 
between the Taliban and security forces.2109 

2102Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban abduct 60 coal truck drivers in Samangan, 2 December 2018, url 
2103 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 29 
2104 Pajhwok Afghan News, 4 construction firm workers kidnapped in Samangan, 25 February 2018, url 
2105 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 20 January 2019, url 
2106 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url 
2107 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 
2108 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url 
2109 Pajhwok Afghan News, 50 families displaced in Samanga due to conflict, 23 February 2019, url 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
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2.31 Sar-e Pul 

2.31.1 General description of the province  

 
 
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Sar-e Pul is located in the northern part of Afghanistan. It became province of its own in 1988, when 
Jawzjan ceded it.2110 Sar-e Pul borders Jawzjan in the north, Balkh in the north-east, Samangan in the 
east, Bamyan and Ghor in the south and Faryab in the west.2111 The provincial capital is Sar-e Pul. 2112 
The province is divided into the following districts: Balkhab, Gosfandi, Kohestanat, Sancharak, Sar-e 
Pul,  Sayad  and  Sozmaqala.2113  According  to  the  Afghanistan  CSO,  the  population  of  Sar-e-Pul  is 
estimated  at  599 137  for  2018/192114  and  is  composed  mainly  of  Uzbeks2115,  followed  by  Hazaras, 
Tajiks, Pashtun, Arabs, Aimaq and Balochs.2116  

A Highway from Sheberghan, Jawzjan province, connects the provincial capital of Sar-e Pul with the 
Mazar-e  Sharif–  Herat  section  of  Highway  One.2117  Taliban  militants  purportedly  attacked  multiple 
checkpoints in the outskirts of Sar-e Pul city from Highway One in early January 2019.2118  An abduction 
of  passengers  travelling  to  Mazar-e-Sharif  perpetrated  by  Taliban  militants  in  Balkhab  district  was 
reported  in  late  November  2018.2119  In  September  2018,  the  Sar-e  Pul–Jawzjan  highway  was 
occasionally closed due to clashes between the insurgents and the Afghan security forces;2120 Taliban 
militants had set up check points along it.2121  

According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, poppy-cultivation in Sar-e Pul province decreased by 
81 % in 2018, compared to 2017. The districts with the highest rate of opium-poppy-cultivation were 
Sayad, Sancharak and the Sar-e Pul provincial centre. Moreover, the 2018 drought affected the rain-
fed agricultural area.2122  

As reported by Reuters in January 2019, oil wells near Sar-e Pul city are an important source of income 
for the province, and the Taliban try to either control or destroy them.2123 

2.31.2 Conflict background and actors in Sar-e Pul  

As reported by AAN in mid-2018, Taliban militants controlled half of the province: mostly the western 
and  southern  parts  and  some  parts  of  Sayad,  Balkhab  and  Sancharak  districts.2124  Since  2012  the 
province  has  become  a  ‘Taliban  stronghold’.  The  administration  as  well  as  military  structure  of  the 
Taliban network in Sar-e Pul has consisted mainly of non-Pashtun locals, reflecting the multi-ethnic 
character of the province. The insurgency used to get its fighters from the prevailing ethnic groups in 

2110 Pajhwok Afghan News, Background Profile of Sar-i-Pul province, n.d., url 
2111 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Sar-e-Pul Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url 
2112 Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial Profile Sar e Pul, 1 February 2017, url  
2113 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Sar-e-Pul Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial 
Profile Sar e Pul, 1 February 2017, url  
2114 Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 3 
2115 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Sar-i-Pul Provincial Review, n.d., url; Ali. O., Non-Pashtun Taleban in the North (2): Case 
studies of Uzbek Taleban in Faryab and Sar-e Pul, AAN, 17 March 2017, url 
2116 Afghanistan, Office of the President, Sar e Pul, 1 February 2017, url  
2117  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan:  Sar-e-Pul  Province  –  District  Atlas,  April  2014,  url;  Afghanistan,  MOPW,  Application  of  Road 
Numbering System National Highways, url, p. 5  
2118 Tolonews, Over 20 Soldiers Killed In Sar-e-Pul clashes, 1 January 2019, url; MENAFN, Afghanistan- Taliban attacks in Sar-
e Pul kill at least 21 security forces, 2 January 2019, url 
2119 Tolonews, Taliban Abducts 40 Passengers In Samangan, 2 December 2018, url 
2120 LWJ, Taliban threatens Sar-i-Pul City, captures district in Jawzjan, 10 September 2018, url 
2121 LWJ, Taliban threatens Sar-i-Pul City, captures district in Jawzjan, 10 September 2018, url; Tolonews, Center of Sar-e Pul 
on Verge of Collapse, Heavy Clashes Ongoing, 10 September 2018, url; Reuters, Dozens killed in heavy fighting in northern 
Afghanistan, 10 September 2018, url 
2122 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN , Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 26 
2123 Reuters, Taliban threaten oil fields in northern Afghanistan, 4 January 2019, url 
2124 Ali, O., New Confusion about ISKP: A case study from Sar-e Pul, AAN, 7 September 2018, url; Ali. O., Non-Pashtun Taleban 
in the North (2): Case studies of Uzbek Taleban in Faryab and Sar-e Pul, AAN, 17 March 2017, url 

                                                           
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the districts. For instance, in Kohestanat, the movement was mainly led by Aimaq and Tajiks, whereas 
in Sozmaqala it was mostly controlled by Uzbeks.2125  

According to AAN, Central Asian militants from the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) have been active in Sar-e 
Pul  province  and  operating  alongside  the  Taliban  since  2015.  IJU militants  are  mainly  Uzbeks  from 
Uzbekistan, who have settled in Kohestanat district. Their main activity in the province has consisted 
in offering military training to new Taliban recruits.2126 

According  to  several  sources  including  an  April  2018  Jamestown  Foundation  report,2127  Long  War 
Journal  report  of  July  2018,2128  TASS  Russian  News  Agency  reporting  in  August  20182129  and  BBC 
research between August and November 2017, fighters of the Islamic State were active in parts of the 
province.2130 Contravening  these  declarations,  AAN  found no evidence of the presence of militants 
affiliated  with  the  IS  or  the  ISKP  in  Sar-e  Pul  province,  as  of  September  2018;  noting  that  existing 
reporting and locals may have confused IS with the IJU.2131 

In terms of the presence of government security forces, Sar-e Pul province is under the responsibility 
of the 209th ANA Corps, which falls under Train Advise Assist Command-North (TAAC-N), led by German 
forces.2132 

The following  table  provides  an overview of control of the districts in Sar-e Pul province based on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.2133 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region, to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.  

SAR-E PUL 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: August-
November 
2017) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment 
as of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last 
accessed:2134 
April 2019) 

Taliban 

(assessment as of 
December 2018) 

Balkhab 

Gov control 

Gosfandi 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Kohestanat 

Taliban control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

/ 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Gov control: 80%; 
TB control: 20% 

High INS 
Activity 

High INS 
Activity 

Taliban control 

TB control  

2125 Ali, O., Non-Pashtun Taleban in the North (2): Case studies of Uzbek Taleban in Faryab and Sar-e Pul, AAN, 17 March 
2017, url 
2126  Ali, O., New Confusion about ISKP: A case study from Sar-e Pul, AAN, 7 September 2018, url 
2127 Jamestown Foundation, Islamic State a Deadly Force in Kabul, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 16 Issue: 7, 6 April 2018, url 
2128 LWJ, Taliban, Islamic State continue battle in northern Afghanistan, 18 July 2018, url 
2129 TASS Russian News Agency, Russia records unidentified helicopters delivering weapons to Taliban, IS in Afghanistan, 23 
August 2018, url 
2130 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url  
2131 Ali, O., New Confusion about ISKP: A case study from Sar-e Pul, AAN, 7 September 2018, url 
2132 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2018, url, p. 16 
2133 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, End of year report 
(2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
2134 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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Sancharak 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Sar-e-Pul (capital) 

Gov control 

Sayad 

Sozmaqala 

Al Badr 
Al Fath 

Sheram 

Sayedabad 

Andkhoi 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 
Open Taliban 
presence - low 
/ 
/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

/ 
/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 
/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 
/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

TB control: 70%; 
Gov control: 30% 
TB control: 60%; 
Gov control: 40% 

TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5% 

TB control: 75%; 
Gov control: 25% 
TB control  
TB control  

TB control  
TB control: 70%; 
Gov control: 30% 
Gov control 

2.31.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.31.3.1 General  

In 2018, UNAMA documented 101 civilian casualties (22 deaths and 79 injured) in Sar-e Pul province. 
This  represents  a  decrease  of  6  %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were  ground 
engagements,  followed  by  UXO/landmines  and  (non-suicide)  IEDs  and  targeted  or  deliberate 
killings.2135  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA  places  Sar-e  Pul,  Sayad,  and 
Sancharak  in the  second  highest  category  and  Sozmaqala  in  the  fourth  highest category, while the 
remaining districts fall into the category below.2136 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 71 incidents related to insurgents in Sar-e Pul province.2137 

In 2018, security conditions in Sar-e Pul province were considered ‘serious’2138 and the province was 
described as ‘contested’.2139 Insurgents were active in the districts of Kohestanat2140 - which fell under 
Taliban’s rule in 2015,2141 and districts of Sayad and Sozmaqala.2142 During the 2018 electoral process, 
people  did  not  register  in  Kohestanat  and  some  registration  centres  were  closed  in  Sayad  and 
Sozmaqala.2143  

The  provincial  capital  of  Sar-e  Pul  nearly  fell  to  Taliban  insurgents  in  September  20182144  and  its 
outskirts  were  attacked  in  January  2019,2145  resulting  in  casualties,  mostly  among  Afghan  security 

2135 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
2136 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, November 2018, url, p. 2  
2137 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
2138 Reporterly, The Dilemma of Voters in Sar-e-Pul: Lax Security, Ethnic issues, and Fear in the Minds, 11 October 2018, url 
2139 Ali, O., New Confusion about ISKP: A case study from Sar-e Pul, AAN, 7 September 2018, url 
2140 Reportedly, The Dilemma of Voters in Sar-e-Pul: Lax Security, Ethnic issues, and Fear in the Minds, 11 October 2018, url 
2141 Ali, O., New Confusion about ISKP: A case study from Sar-e Pul, AAN, 7 September 2018, url 
2142 Reporterly, The Dilemma of Voters in Sar-e-Pul: Lax Security, Ethnic issues, and Fear in the Minds, 11 October 2018, url 
2143 Reporterly, The Dilemma of Voters in Sar-e-Pul: Lax Security, Ethnic issues, and Fear in the Minds, 11 October 2018, url 
2144 Tolonews, Center of Sar-e Pul on Verge of Collapse, Heavy Clashes Ongoing, 10 September 2018, url; Reuters, Dozens 
killed in heavy fighting in northern Afghanistan, 10 September 2018, url 
2145 Tolonews, Over 20 Soldiers Killed In Sar-e-Pul clashes, 1 January 2019, url; MENAFN, Afghanistan- Taliban attacks in Sar-
e Pul kill at least 21 security forces, 2 January 2019, url 

 
                                                           
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forces,2146 but also among the militants themselves, according to Afghan government officials.2147 The 
attack in early January 2019 was purportedly aimed at securing an oil-rich area near the provincial 
capital.2148  

In February 2019, Taliban militants gunned down the executive director of Gosfandi district in Qalqola 
locality.2149 In December 2018 the district police chief of Sayad was killed following clashes between 
the Taliban and Afghan security forces in the area.2150  

According to Tolonews, the Taliban kidnapped 25 people travelling from Balkhab district to Mazar-e 
Sharif, Balkh province, in late November 2018.2151 In July 2018, 15 civilians and seven Taliban militants 
were killed in a suicide blast at a fateha service for a deceased in Sayyad district. No group had claimed 
the attack, however, some sources held ISKP responsible for the suicide bombing.2152 Also in July 2018, 
three members of a farmer’s family were killed and one was injured when the Taliban attacked his 
house in Sancharak district.2153     

2.31.3.2 Displacement  

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 12 033 persons 
displaced from Sar-e Pul province. Most of them were displaced within the province itself (10 207), 
while 1 610 persons were displaced to Balkh province, and 266 persons to Jawzjan.2154 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019, reporting 9 590 persons 
displaced from Sar-e Pul province. They were mainly (9 548) displaced within the province itself.2155 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 10 073 persons 
displaced to Sar-e Pul province.2156 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019, reporting 9 548 persons 
displaced to Sar-e Pul province and all of them originated from the province itself.2157 

District 

Balkhab 
Kohestanat 
Sancharak 
Sar-e-Pul 
Sayad 

Displaced from 
(2018) 
70 
231 
4 998 
2 219 
4 515 

Displaced to 
(2018) 
/ 
/ 
1 477 
8 596 
/ 

Displaced from 
(2019) 
/ 
/ 
8 890 
/ 
700 

Displaced to 
(2019) 
/ 
/ 
/ 
9 548 
/ 

2146 Tolonews, Over 20 Soldiers Killed In Sar-e-Pul clashes, 1 January 2019, url; MENAFN, Afghanistan - Taliban attacks in Sar-
e Pul kill at least 21 security forces, 2 January 2019, url; Reuters, Dozens killed in heavy fighting in northern Afghanistan, 10 
September 2018, url 
2147 Tolonews, Over 20 Soldiers Killed In Sar-e-Pul clashes, 1 January 2019, url 
2148 Reuters, Taliban threaten oil fields in northern Afghanistan, 4 January 2019, url; Tolonews, Sar-e-Pul Oil Reservoirs Under 
Taliban Threat: Officials, 3 January 2019, url; Tolonews, Over 20 Soldiers Killed In Sar-e-Pul clashes, 1 January 2019, url  
2149 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban gun down district’s executive head in Sar-i-Pul, 3 February 2019, url 
2150 Tolonews, District Police Chief Killed In Taliban Attack In Sar-e-Pul, 4 December 2018, url 
2151 Tolonews, Taliban Abducts 40 Passengers In Samangan, 2 December 2018, url 
2152 Pajhwok Afghan News, 22 dead, many injured in Sar-i-Pul suicide attack, 17 July 2018, url 
2153 Pajhwok Afghan News, Three Members Of One Family Killed In Taliban Attack In Sar-e-Pul, 7 July 2018, url 
2154 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 20 January 2019, url 
2155 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url 
2156 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 
2157 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url 

 
 
                                                           
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In November2158 and December2159 2018, around 2 000 families were displaced from Sancharak to Sar-
e Pul and Balkh province due to clashes between security forces and Taliban in their home district. 

2158 Pajhwok Afghan News, 1,500 Sar-i-Pul families flee fresh violence to Balkh, 18 November 2018, url  
2159 Pajhwok Afghan News, Hundreds flee Sar-i-Pul’s Tabar area, clash continues, 14 December 2018, url 

 
 
                                                           
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2.32 Takhar 

2.32.1 General description of the province  

 
  
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Takhar province is located in the north-east of Afghanistan. Its provincial capital is Taloqan.2160 Takhar 
borders on Tajikistan  to the  north,  Badakhshan to the east, Panjshir and Baghlan to the south  and 
south-west and Kunduz to the west.2161 The province is divided into the following districts: Baharak, 
Bangi,  Chahab,  Chal,  Darqad,  Dasht-e-Qala,  Eshkamesh,  Farkhar,  Hazar  Sumuch,  Kalafgan, 
Khwajabahawuddin  (Khwaja  Bahawuddin),  Khwajaghar  (also  Khwaja  Ghar),  Namakab,  Rostaq, 
Taloqan,  Warsaj  and  Yangi  Qala.2162  According  to  the  Afghanistan  CSO,  the  population  of  Takhar  is 
estimated at 1 053 852 for 2018/192163 and is composed mainly of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Pashtuns, Hazaras 2164 
and Arabs2165. 

The Kunduz-Takhar Highway runs through the districts of Kalafgan, Taloqan and Bangi.2166 In August 
2018, Taliban militants were reported to have abducted passengers travelling through Takhar.2167 In 
the past, the highway has been closed occasionally because of clashes between the Taliban and Afghan 
security forces.2168  

According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, Takhar was poppy-free from 2008 until 2017. In 2018 
the province  lost  its  poppy-free  status,  as 251 hectares  of opium poppy were cultivated in Rostaq, 
Kalafgan and Farkhar districts.2169 Drug smuggling routes leading into Central Asia run through some 
districts of Takhar province.2170 

2.32.2 Conflict background and actors in Takhar  

According to Tajik authorities’ estimates, the 1 360 kilometre-long border with Tajikistan includes at 
least 300 kilometres that are  not controlled by Afghan  government  forces. The number of Taliban 
militants near Tajikistan accounts to around 7 000, according to Tajik border troops.2171  

Besides  the  Taliban,  militants  from  ISKP,  the  Islamic  Movement  of  Uzbekistan  ,  drug  runners  and 
criminals  are  active  along  the  Tajik  border,2172  as  well  as  members  of  the  terrorist  movement 
Jundullah, a splinter group of IMU, mainly composed of non-Pashtun2173 Afghans.2174 Purportedly, a 
small  number  of  Islamic  Jihad  Union  fighters,  a  movement  mainly  composed  of  Uzbeks  from 
Uzbekistan, are active in parts of the province. These fighters are part of an independent front called 
Imom  Buxoriy  Katiba  (Imam  Bukhari’s  Battalion),  which  operates  in  northern  and  north-eastern 
Afghanistan.2175  

2160 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Takhar Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Background profile of 
Takhar province, n.d., url 
2161 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Takhar Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url 
2162 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Takhar Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Background profile of 
Takhar province, n.d., url 
2163 Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 3 
2164 Pajhwok Afghan News, Background profile of Takhar province, n.d., url; US, Naval Postgraduate School, Takhar Provincial 
Review, n.d., url 
2165 Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial Profile Takhar, 1 February 2017, url 
2166  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan:  Takhar  Province  –  District  Atlas,  April  2014,  url;  Diplomat  (The),  Kabul‘s  Plan  to  Realize 
Afghanistan‘s Geographic Dividend, 5 December 2017, url 
2167 Khaama Press, Taliban militants kidnap 170 passengers from Kunduz-Takhar highway, 20 August 2018, url; Bakhtar News, 
Taliban Abduct Commuters of Three Buses in Kunduz-Takhar Highway, 20 August 2018, url 
2168 Tolonews, ‘Heavy Clashes‘ Close Kunduz-Takhar Highway To Traffic, 5 May 2017, url; Middle East Press, Kunduz – Takhar 
Highway Blocked For Traffic, 17 August 2016, url 
2169 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN , Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 27 
2170 Ali, O., The Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (3): The Takhar case study, AAN, 29 July 2017, url; RFE/RL, In The Dark: 
Tajik Border Residents Live Not Knowing What Lies Beyond, 22 November 2018, url  
2171 RFE/RL, In The Dark: Tajik Border Residents Live Not Knowing What Lies Beyond, 22 November 2018, url 
2172 RFE/RL, In The Dark: Tajik Border Residents Live Not Knowing What Lies Beyond, 22 November 2018, url 
2173 Ali, O., The Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (3): The Takhar case study, AAN, 29 July 2017, url 
2174 Ali, O., Precarious Consolidation: Qari Hekmat‘s IS-affiliated ‚island‘ survives another Taleban onslaught, AAN, 4 March 
2018, url 
2175 Ali, O., New Confusion about ISKP: A case study from Sar-e Pul, AAN, 7 September 2018, url  

                                                           
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As reported by AAN in 2017, the Taliban have been unable to ‘establish a stronger foothold’ in Takhar, 
despite some territorial gains starting in 2014. This has prevented them from ‘connecting their fronts 
in […] the west and southwest on the one hand, and […] the east on the other’.2176  

Former mujahideen commanders used to have significant influence over Takhar province following 
the fall of the Taliban regime.2177 The major ethnic groups in the province are Uzbeks and Tajiks, many 
of  whom  were  connected  to  the  local  Jombesh  and  Jamiat-e  Islami  parties,  which  were  led  by 
strongmen with political ties to the Afghan government. Furthermore, the insurgents’ network was 
fight  under  Pashtun 
fragmented,  as  non-Pashtun  militants,  mainly  Uzbeks,  refused  to 
commanders.2178  

Taliban insurgents started to emerge in 2010 in Darqad, a Pashtun dominated district, and spread first 
to the provinces bordering Kunduz and Baghlan, until they also expanded their territorial control to 
other  districts.  Militants  affiliated  to  IMU,  Jundullah  and  the  Taliban  fought  alongside  each  other 
against  the  Afghan  security  forces  until  the  end  of  2014.  In  mid-2015,  the  IMU  allied  with  the  IS. 
Consequently, the already precarious relations between the Pashtun and the non-Pashtun insurgents 
worsened and the Taliban ordered the disarmament and even the killing of some Uzbek Jundullah 
fighters in order to prevent them from allying with the IS, as IMU did.2179  

Throughout the years the Taliban appointed more local Uzbek and Tajik commanders to key positions 
in order to broaden their base in the ‘largely non-Pashtun’ province and to prevent it from becoming 
an IS stronghold.2180 This policy was interrupted with the replacement of the former Uzbek shadow 
governor of the province by a Pashtun, which led to a further deterioration of the relations between 
the  two  ethnic  groups.  Although  the  situation  improved  after  an  Uzbek,  the  former  Taliban 
commander  Mawlawi  Nurullah,  was  appointed  as  the  new  shadow  governor  of  Takhar  in  2017, 
insurgents  affiliated  with  IMU  and  Jundullah  continued  to  fight  autonomously  from  the  Taliban. 
Although the three groups share the same religious views, as they all follow the Hanafi school of law, 
the IMU and Jundullah ignore local culture, such as the role of elders in conflict resolution and in other 
important issues.2181  

In 2017 Taliban militants were mostly active in a region called Mawara-ye Kokcha, which includes the 
districts Khwaja Bahawuddin, Dasht-e-Qala, Darqad, Yangi Qala, Chahab and Rostaq. As most of the 
districts, apart from Rostaq, border on Tajikistan, there were concerns about a possible infiltration of 
insurgents into Central Asia and Russia.2182 According to different sources, in 2018 Taliban militants 
have  been  active  in  Darqad,  Khwaja  Ghar,  Khwaja  Bahawuddin,  Yangi  Qala,  Eshkamesh2183  and 
Chahab2184 districts.  

In terms of the presence of government security forces, Takhar province is under the responsibility of 
the 209th ANA Corps, which falls under Train Advise Assist Command-North (TAAC-N), led by German 
forces.2185 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Takhar  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 

2176 Ali, O., The Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (3): The Takhar case study, AAN, 29 July 2017, url 
2177 Hewad, G., Ethnic Revolt or Mujahedin Solidarity? A look at the power shuffle in Takhar (amended), AAN, 17 July 2013, 
url; Ali, O., The Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (3): The Takhar case study, AAN, 29 July 2017, url 
2178 Ali, O., The Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (3): The Takhar case study, AAN, 29 July 2017, url 
2179 Ali, O., The Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (3): The Takhar case study, AAN, 29 July 2017, url 
2180 Ali, O., The Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (3): The Takhar case study, AAN, 29 July 2017, url 
2181 Ali, O., The Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (3): The Takhar case study, AAN, 29 July 2017, url 
2182 Ali, O., The Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (3): The Takhar case study, AAN, 29 July 2017, url 
2183 1TV News, Taliban closes 27 schools in Takhar, 29 May 2018, url 
2184 Ariana News, 16 policemen killed in Taliban raid in Takhar, 28 June 2018, url 
2185 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2018, url, p. 16 

 
                                                           
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Taliban.2186 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region, to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.  

TAKHAR 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: 
August-
November 
2017) 

US military 
quoted by 
SIGAR 

US military 
quoted  by 
SIGAR 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment 
as of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

Taliban 

(last 
accessed:2187 
April 2019) 

(assessment as 
of December 
2018) 

Baharak 
Bangi 

Gov control 
Gov control 

Contested 
Contested 

Contested 
Contested 

Contested 
Contested 

Chahab 

Gov control 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

/ 
/ 
Gov control: 
80%; TB control: 
20% 

Chal 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

/ 

Darqad 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
low 

INS activity 

INS activity 

Contested 

Dasht-e-Qala 

Gov control 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Eshkashem 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
low 

Farkhar 

Gov control 

Hazarsumuch 

Gov control 

INS activity 

INS activity 

Contested 

GIRoA 
Influence 
GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 
GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 
Gov control or 
undetermined 

/ 

/ 

Khwajabahawuddin 

Gov control 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Khwajaghar 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
low 

Kalafgan 

Gov control 

Namakab 

Gov control 

Rostaq 

Gov control 

Taloqan (capital) 

Gov control 

INS activity 

INS activity 

Contested 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

TB control: 90%; 
Gov control: 
10% 
TB control: 80%; 
Gov control: 
20% 

/ 

Gov control: 
60%; TB control: 
40% 

/ 

Gov control: 
95%; TB control: 
5% 

2186 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; Long War Journal, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, End of 
year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
2187 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 

TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5% 

TB control: 80%; 
Gov control: 
20% 
TB control: 50%; 
Gov control: 
50% 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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—  267  

Warsaj 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
Influence 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

/ 

Yangi Qala 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
low 

INS activity 

INS activity 

Contested 

TB control: 90%; 
Gov control: 
10% 

2.32.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.32.3.1 General  

In 2018, UNAMA documented 113 civilian casualties (26 deaths and 87 injured) in Takhar province. 
This  represents  an  increase  of  15 %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were  ground 
engagements, followed by (non-suicide) IEDs and threat/intimidation/harassment.2188  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian casualties, and conflict-induced displacements, UNOCHA places the district of Darqad in the 
second highest category and Dasht-e-Qala district in the third highest category. Eshkamesh, Khwaja 
Ghar  and  Farkhar  are  in  the  fourth  highest  category  while  the  remaining  districts  fall  into  the  two 
lowest categories.2189 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 88 incidents related to insurgents in Takhar province.2190 

In January 2019, battles between the Taliban and the Afghan security forces were ongoing in Takhar, 
in an attempt by the insurgents to gain territory.2191 For instance, eight policemen and 10 fighters were 
killed after clashes occurred in Khwaja Ghar district.2192 Taliban have attacked a security post in Khwaja 
Ghar in September 2018, killing and setting on fire eight policemen.2193 In June 2018 Taliban insurgents 
attacked a security post in Chahab district and killed at least 16 members of the border police.2194   

In late October, the Taliban fired mortars towards a polling centre located at a school in Eshkamish 
district. One mortar missed the polling centre and landed on a home, killing three girls, one boy and a 
woman, and injuring a girl and a woman.2195 In mid-October 2018 in Rostaq district, a bomb explosion 
targeted an election rally killing 22 people and injuring 36 others.2196 In June 2018 the Taliban captured 
a female potential candidate in the forthcoming elections along with her brother in Darqad district.2197 

In February 2019, two radio station employees, a presenter and a journalist, were killed in Taliqan city, 
the capital of Takhar province by unknown gunmen who entered the station and opened fire on the 
staff.2198 In February 2019, 11 people were injured and three were killed when a mortar shell hit their 
home in Dasht-e-Qala district.2199 Still in Dasht-e-Qala, 5 members of a family were killed and 5 others 
were injured when a mortar shell landed on their home in August 2018.2200 In May 2018, the Taliban 
were accused by the Afghan government of having ‘attacked civilians, burned down their houses, then 

2188 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
2189 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2  
2190 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
2191 Bloomberg, Afghan Taliban Mounts Fresh Attacks Amid Ongoing Peace Talks, 13 January 2019, url 
2192 Xinhua News Agency, Gun Battle kills 18 including 8 police in Afghan northern Takhar province, 10 January 2019, url 
2193 1TV News, Eight Afghan police killed, set on fire by Taliban in Takhar, 6 September 2018, url 
2194 Ariana News, 16 policemen killed in Taliban raid in Takhar, 28 June 2018, url 
2195 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 48 
2196 Pajhwok Afghan News, 22 dead, 36 injured in blast at Takhar election rally, 13 October 2018, url 
2197 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban capture female potential candidate in Takhar, 6 June 2016, url 
2198 Tolonews, Two Radio Station Employees Gunned Down in Takhar, 6 February 2019, url 
2199 Pajhwok Afghan News, 3 of a family killed, 11 wounded in Takhar mortar strike, 12 February 2019, url 
2200 Pajhwok Afghan News, 5 of a family killed in Takhar mortar strike, 13 August 2018, url 

 
 
                                                           
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looted their stores’ in Takhar province,2201 targeting them for cooperating with the government. The 
killing of three nurses in a clinic, which had been reported by government officials, was denied by the 
Taliban.2202   

In August 2018, Taliban militants kidnapped 170 passengers travelling to Kabul through Takhar, near 
Khan Abad district, in Kunduz.2203 Moreover, Taliban insurgents purportedly closed schools in Darqad, 
Yangi Qala, Khwaja Bahawuddin and Khwaja Ghar, as of late May 2018.2204 

2.32.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data, for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 21 532 persons 
displaced from Takhar province, all within the province itself.2205 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019, reporting 9 562 persons 
displaced from Dasht-e-Qala district in Takhar province, all within the province itself.2206 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 22 995 persons 
displaced to Takhar province. 21 532 of these IDPs came from within the province itself and mainly 
went to Taloqan city and Khwajabahawuddin and Darqad districts.2207 In November 2018, UNOCHA 
registered  1 463  IDPs  in  Khwajaghar  district,  all  coming  from  Dasht-e-Archi  district  in  Kunduz 
province.2208 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019, reporting 9 562 persons 
displaced to Takhar province, all coming from within the province itself from Dasht-e-Qala district. 2209 

District 

Baharak 

Darqad 

Dasht-e-Qala 

Eshkashem 

Farkhar 

Khwajaghar 

Khwajabahahuddin 

Rostaq 

Taloqan 

Displaced from 
(2018) 

Displaced to (2018) 

Displaced from 
(2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

2 226 

6 944 

1 974 

119 

224 

10 045 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

4 270 

903 

119 

/ 

1 463 

2 072 

588 

13 580 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

9 562 

5 586 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

1 001 

2 975 

Due  to  military  operations  in  Darqad  district  during  the  first  months  of  2018  UNOCHA  reported 
displacements  from  Darqad  and  Yangi  Qala  districts  to  the  provincial  capital  Taloqan  and  to 
Khwajabahawuddin district, with peaks of 5 200 displaced people in March 2018 and 1 100 families in 

2201 VoA, Afghan Special Forces Free Scores From Taliban Prisons, 31 May 2018, url 
2202 VoA, Afghan Special Forces Free Scores From Taliban Prisons, 31 May 2018, url 
2203 Khaama Press, Taliban militants kidnap 170 passengers from Kunduz-Takhar highway, 20 August 2018, url; Bakhtar News, 
Taliban Abduct Commuters of Three Buses in Kunduz-Takhar Highway, 20 August 2018, url 
2204 1TV News, Taliban closes 27 schools in Takhar, 29 May 2018, url 
2205 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url   
2206 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url  
2207 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url 
2208 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url 
2209 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url 

 
                                                           
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—  269  

April  2018.2210  According  to  reporting  of  the  Afghanistan  National  Disaster  Management  Authority 
(ANDMA) of Takhar province in December 2018 the Taliban forced young people in Darqad district to 
join them, which caused displacement from the district to Taloqan city and neighbouring districts.2211 

At the end of May 2018 UNOCHA reported that almost 2 000 people were displaced due to fighting 
over the control of Dasht-e-Qala district centre which was taken over by the Taliban for one day.2212 
The  IDPs  were  displaced  within  the  district  itself,  in  Rostaq  and  Khwajaghar  districts  and  in  the 
provincial capital Taloqan.2213 In September 2018, UNOCHA registered another 84 families displaced 
from Dasht-e-Qala district to Taloqan city.2214 

In August 2018, UNOCHA appointed Baharak, Dasht-e-Qala and Khwajaghar districts as conflict areas 
with a daily increase of the number of displaced families.2215 In September 2018 380 families were 
reported  displaced  from  Juda  Bulaq  village  of  Anbar  Koh  area  of  Baharak  district  to  neighbouring 
village Qush Bulaq.2216 

In November and December 2018, UNOCHA registered 572 families (4 004 individuals) displaced from 
different parts of Takhar province to the provincial capital Taloqan city.2217 

In the Humanitarian Response Plan of December 2018, UNOCHA classified Takhar as one of the 12 
provinces  with  large  concentrations  of  IDPs  and  returnees  who  are  most  affected  by  the  ongoing 
conflict and drought.2218 The Afghanistan Protection Cluster mentioned Takhar as one of the six top 
hosting provinces for IDPs in August 2018.2219 IOM ranked Khwajaghar 13th (January - March 2018) 
and 18th place (April - June 2018) of the top 20 districts hosting the most returnees and IDPs up to 
June 2018.2220 

 2210 UNOCHA Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Takhar Province - Meeting Summary, 13 February 2018, url, pp. 1-2; 
UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 12 - 18 March 2018, 19 March 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Operational Coordination 
Team (OCT) - Takhar Province - Meeting Summary, 15 April 2018, url, pp. 1-2 
2211 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Takhar Province - Meeting Summary, 17 December 2018, url, p. 4 
2212  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan  Weekly  Field  Report,  28  May  -  3  June  2018,  4  June  2018,  url,  p.  1;  UNOCHA,  Operational 
Coordination Team (OCT) - Takhar Province - Meeting Summary, 25 June 2018, url, pp. 1-2  
2213  UNOCHA,  Afghanistan  Weekly  Field  Report,  28  May  -  3  June  2018,  4  June  2018,  url,  p.  1;  UNOCHA,  Operational 
Coordination Team (OCT) - Takhar Province - Meeting Summary, 25 June 2018, url, pp. 1-2 
2214 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 24 - 31 December 2018, 31 December 2018, url, p. 1 
2215 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Takhar Province - Meeting Summary, 7 August 2018, url, pp. 1-2 
2216 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Takhar Province - Meeting Summary, 10 September 2018, url, pp. 1-2 
2217 Pajhwok Afghan News, Ongoing Clashes Displace 1,500 Families in Takhar, 4 November 2018, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan 
Weekly  Field  Report,  26  November  -  3  December  2018,  3  December  2018,  url,  p.  1;  UNOCHA, Afghanistan  Weekly  Field 
Report, 4 - 9 December 2018, 9 December 2018, url, p. 1 
 2218 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: 2019 Update to the 2018-2010 Humanitarian Response Plan, 21 December 2018, url, p. 33 
2219 Afghanistan Protection Cluster, Fact Sheet Afghanistan August 2018,
2220 IOM, Baseline Mobility Assessment: Summary Results January - March 2018, 31 March 2018, url, p. 5; IOM, Baseline 
Mobility Assessment: Summary Results April - June 2018, 25 September 2018, url, p. 5 

3 October 2018, url, p. 1 

 
 
                                                           
 
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2.33 Uruzgan 

2.33.1 General description of the province 

Uruzgan  province  is  located  in  the  central  part  of  Afghanistan  and  is  also  known  by  the  name 
‘Rozgan’ or ‘Uruzganis’.2221 Uruzgan borders on Daykundi in the north, Ghazni in the east, Zabul and 
Kandahar  in  the  south  and  Helmand  in  the  west.  The  provincial  capital  is  Tirinkot  (also  known 
as  Tarinkot).  Uruzgan  is  divided  into  the  following  districts:  Chora  (also  Chinarto),  Dehrawud, 
Khasuruzgan  (also  Khas  Uruzgan),  Shahid-e-Hassas,  and  Tirinkot.2222  The  district  of  Gizab,  which 
was  formerly  part  of  Daykundi province, now falls within the administration of Uruzgan.2223 Chinarto 
and Surab are two new districts  of  the  province;  their  status  has  not  been  officially  recognised 
yet.2224  According  to  the  Afghanistan CSO,  the  population  of  Uruzgan  is  estimated  at  420 964  for 
2018/192225 and is composed mainly of Pashtuns, as well as Hazaras and Kuchi nomads.2226  

The Kandahar-Uruzgan Highway runs through the districts of Chora and Tarinkot.2227 Taliban militants 
purportedly set up check-points along the highway and searched or abducted travellers.2228 Moreover, 

2221 Pajhwok Afghan News, Brief introduction of Uruzgan province, n.d., url 
2222 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Uruzgan Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Brief introduction of 
Uruzgan province, n.d., url 
2223 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN , Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 6 
2224 Pajhwok Afghan News, Uruzgan administrative units, n.d., url 
2225 Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 3 
2226 Pajhwok Afghan News, Brief introduction of Uruzgan province, n.d., url 
2227 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Uruzgan Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; Tolonews, Taliban Abducts 19 Bus Passengers 
and Police On Uruzgan Highway, 28 February 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Dilapidated Kandahar road gives passengers 
bumpy ride, 14 November 2018, url 
2228 Tolonews, Taliban Abducts 19 Bus Passengers and Police On Uruzgan Highway, 28 February 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan 
News, Dilapidated Kandahar road gives passengers bumpy ride,  14 November 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Lecturer 
among 5 passengers killed on Uruzgan-Kandahar highway, 25 April 2018, url 

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  271  

passengers complained about the ‘shabby condition’ of the road, which extended the travel time and 
had a negative impact on vehicles and security.2229 Military operations were ongoing in February 2019, 
in order to clear the road from Taliban insurgents.2230 The city of Tirinkot hosts an airport, which was 
served by domestic scheduled passenger flights as of March 2019.2231  

According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, poppy-cultivation in Uruzgan province decreased by 13 % 
in  2018,  compared  to  2017,2232  but  it  remains  the  country’s  third  leading  opium-cultivating 
province.2233 The districts with the highest rate of opium-poppy-cultivation were Tarinkot, Dehrawud, 
and Shahid-e-Hassas.2234 According to the Jordanian news website Al Bawaba, the illegal crop was very 
common  in  the  province  in  2017;  many  dwellers  relied  economically  on  poppy-cultivation  and  the 
number of addicts, including women and children, reached up to 15 000.2235  

2.33.2 Conflict background and actors in Uruzgan  

Uruzgan is home to Pashtuns and Hazaras and, according to the news agency Reuters, the two ethnic 
groups have had an ‘uneasy co-existence’ for a long time.2236 In some districts of the province, like Khas 
Uruzgan, Hazaras have lived in self-governed enclaves under local agreements with the Taliban, which 
so far have ensured stability.2237  

The  precarious  relations  between  the  two  ethnic  groups  date  back to  the  1980s,  when  an  intense 
conflict  arose  in  the  district.  After  one  year  of  fighting,  peace  was  negotiated  through  external 
mediation and was ensured by continuous efforts on the part of the village elders. As the communities 
took opposite sides in the post-2001 counterinsurgency campaigns, the preservation of the status quo 
became harder. The creation of counterinsurgency groups like the Afghan Security Guards (ASG), which 
were  mainly  composed  of  Hazaras,  and  the  Afghan  Local  Police,  in  which  many  former  Taliban 
commanders  participated,  fostered  the  already  existing  hostilities  between  the  ethnic  groups. 
Moreover, many Pashtuns were affiliated with Taliban insurgents through kinship and other ties, which 
caused distrust among the Hazara. On the other hand, the appointment of the ethnic Hazara Abdul 
Hakim Shujai from the ASG into the Pashtun dominated ALP in 2011 agitated the tense inter-ethnic 
relations even more.2238 During his activities as ASG member and ALP commander, Shujai was accused 
of many abuses and extrajudicial killings of Pashtuns in the area.2239  

As reported by multiple sources, the increased violence against the Shia community in Afghanistan 
risks triggering sectarian conflicts.2240 The battles that affected Uruzgan and Ghazni in October and 
November  2018  outraged  many  Hazara,  as  well  as  Afghan  citizens  from  other  ethnic  groups,  and 
caused protests in Kabul City.2241 

2229 Pajhwok Afghan News, Dilipidated Kandahar road gives passengers bumpy ride, 14 November 2018, url 
2230 Khaama Press, Militants suffer heavy casualties in ANDSF operations in Kandahar and Zabul, 7 February 2019, url 
2231 Austria, BFA-Staatendokumentation, Afghanistan - Airports [Map], 25 March 2019 
2232 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN , Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 30 
2233 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN , Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 6 
2234 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN , Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 30 
2235 Al Bawaba, In Uruzgan, Afghan Mothers Feed Their Children Opium to Make Them Sleep, 2 November 2017, url 
2236 Reuters, Afghan Shi‘ite militia battles Taliban, raising sectarian fears, 3 November 2018, url 
2237 Adili, A., Y. and van Bijlert, M., Taleban Attacks on Khas Uruzgan, Jaghori and Malestan (I): A new and violent push into 
Hazara areas, AAN, 28 November 2018, url 
2238 van Bijlert, M., Security at the Fringes: the case of Shujai in Khas Uruzgan, AAN, 6 April 2013, url 
2239 Adili, A., Y. and van Bijlert, M., Taleban Attacks on Khas Uruzgan, Jaghori and Malestan (II): A new and violent push into 
Hazara areas, AAN, 29 November 2018, url 
2240  Reuters,  Afghan  Shi‘ite  militia  battles  Taliban,  raising  sectarian  fears,  3  November  2018,  url;  Jamestown  Foundation 
(The), How Islamic State-Khurasan is Driving Afghanistan Toward Sectarian Conflict, 12 October 2018, url 
2241 Tolonews, Hundreds Protest In Kabul Over Ghazni, Uruzgan Insecurity, 12 November 2018, url; Khaama Press, Protesters 
gather near Presidential Palace in Kabul over recent wave of violence, 12 November 2018, url 

 
                                                           
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According to Pajhwok Afghan News, ISKP has been active in the province, particularly in Chora district, 
recruiting new supporters, even among women. Purportedly, ISKP fighters in the province have been 
former Taliban militants.2242 

In terms of the presence of government security forces, Uruzgan province is under the responsibility 
of  the  205th  ANA  Corps,  which  falls  under  Train  Advise  Assist  Command-South  (TAAC-S),  led  by  US 
forces.2243 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Uruzgan  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal (LWJ) and 
the  Taliban.2244  When  a  source  does  not  provide  information  on  a  district,  the  field  is  left  blank. 
Sometimes a  district  is only mentioned by one source (the  Taliban). These districts  are  not  always 
recognised  by  the  government  or  sometimes  belong,  as  a  region,  to  another  district.  If  found, 
clarification is made in a separate footnote.  

URUZGAN 

BBC 

(reporting period: 
August-November 
2017) 

Dehrawud 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of 
October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last 
accessed:2245 
April 2019) 

Taliban 

(assessment as of 
December 2018) 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Chora (Chinarto) 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

INS Activity 

INS Activity 

Taliban 
control 

Shahid-e-Hassas 

Khasuruzgan 

Tirinkot (capital) 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 
Open Taliban 
Presence - high 
Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

INS Activity 

INS Activity 

Contested 

TB control  

INS Activity 

INS Activity 

Contested 

Contested 

GIRoA 
Influence 

Contested 

Chahr Chino 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

TB control: 94%; 
Gov control: 6% 

Chora: TB control: 
95%; Gov control: 
5% and Chinarto: 
TB control: 94%; 
Gov control: 6% 

TB control: 94%; 
Gov control: 6% 

TB control: 95%; 
Gov control: 5% 

TB control: 97%; 
Gov control: 3% 

2.33.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.33.3.1 General  

In 2018, UNAMA documented 173 civilian casualties (46 deaths and 127 injured) in Uruzgan province. 
This  represents  a  decrease  of  70 %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were  ground 

2242 Pajhwok Afghan News, Uruzgan: 3 women from Chora district join Daesh, 18 April 2018, url 
2243 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2018, url, p. 15 
2244 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, End of year report 
(2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
2245 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  273  

engagements, followed by (non-suicide) IEDs and aerial attacks.2246 Further, the same source recorded 
126 civilian casualties caused by ground engagements in Uruzgan province which is a 62 % decrease 
compared to 2017.2247 

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018 combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian casualties, and conflict-induced displacements, UNOCHA places Tirinkot in the highest category 
and Dehrawud, Chora and Khas Uruzgan in the second highest category. Shahid-e-Hassas is placed in 
the fourth highest category and the remaining districts fall in the two lowest categories.2248 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 220 incidents related to insurgents in Uruzgan province.2249 

Throughout 2018, Taliban militants were active in the province.2250 They extended their operations to 
areas which until then had been spared, like the district of Khas Uruzgan, fomenting intense battles 
between  Shujai’s  militiamen  and  the  Taliban.2251  The  fighting,  accounting  for  many  casualties  and 
internally  displaced  people,  mostly  among  the  Hazara  civilian  population,  went  on  for  almost  one 
month until late November.2252 There are many theories about the reasons for the Taliban expansion 
into new areas: some point to their desire to gain more territory to improve their position in the peace 
talks, others point to their move to expand their influence among all ethnic groups and, third, some 
believe that the Taliban want to establish their own administration and collect taxes.2253  

Airstrikes were reported in Uruzgan throughout 2018, mainly causing Taliban casualties, including in 
the outskirts of Tirinkot2254 in Chinarto district2255 and in Khas Uruzgan.2256 Two children were killed, 
their father and another child were injured by a mortar shell landing on their house during a security 
operation in Tirinkot, in March 2018.2257  

Five passengers were kidnapped and later killed by gunmen in the Urdo-Balagh locality of the Uruzgan-
Kandahar  highway  in  April  2018.2258  In  the  same  locality  the  Taliban  intercepted  a  vehicle  and 
kidnapped 30 passengers, after closing the Uruzgan-Kandahar highway in February 2018.2259 

According to a report on elections-related violence by UNAMA,  the Taliban tried to discourage the 
inhabitants  of  Gizab  district  from  voting  by  transmitting  threats  through  loudspeakers  in  local 
mosques.2260 Moreover, according to a dataset from August 2018 quoted by UNOCHA, 95 percent of 

2246 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
2247 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 47 
2248 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2  
2249 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
2250 LWJ, Afghan forces withdraw from district center in Uruzgan as the Taliban attacks, 29 May 2018, url 
2251 Adili, A., Y. and van Bijlert, M., Taleban Attacks on Khas Uruzgan, Jaghori and Malestan (I): A new and violent push into 
Hazara areas, AAN, 28 November 2018, url; Adili, A. Y. and van Bijlert, M., Taleban Attacks on Khas Uruzgan, Jaghori and 
Malestan (II): A new and violent push into Hazara areas, AAN, 29 November 2018, url; Reuters, Afghan Shi‘ite militia battles 
Taliban, raising sectarian fears, 3 November 2018, url 
2252 Adili, A., Y. and van Bijlert, M., Taleban Attacks on Khas Uruzgan, Jaghori and Malestan (I): A new and violent push into 
Hazara areas, AAN, 28 November 2018, url 
2253 Adili, A., Y. and van Bijlert, M., Taleban Attacks on Khas Uruzgan, Jaghori and Malestan (II): A new and violent push into 
Hazara areas, AAN, 29 November 2018, url 
2254 Tolonews, Eight Taliban Killed In Uruzgan Airstrike, 12 December 2018, url; Tolonews, Nine Insurgents Killed In Afghan 
Airstrikes,  11  February  2019,  url;  Tolonews,  Key  Taliban  Commander  Killed  In  Uruzgan  Airstrike,  16  February  2019,  url; 
Pajhowk Afghan News, Notorious Taliban commander among 10 rebels killed in Uruzgan airstrike, 23 February 2019, url 
2255 Tolonews, 11 Taliban Fighters Killed In Uruzgan Airstrike, 4 August 2018, url 
2256 Tolonews, 42 Daesh And Taliban Fighters Killed In Afghan Airstrikes, 5 March 2018, url 
2257 Pajhwok Afghan News, Mortar shells kills 2 children in Uruzgan, 22 March 2018, url 
2258 Pajhwok Afghan News, Lecturer among 5 passengers killed on Uruzgan-Kandahar highway, 25 April 2018, url 
2259 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban kidnap 30 passengers on Uruzgan-Kandahar highway, 28 February 2018, url 
2260 UNAMA, Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Special Report: 2018 Elections Violence, November 2018, 
url, p. 5 

 
 
                                                           
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the male population  in  Uruzgan  did  not feel safe when travelling to work, the mosque,  health and 
education facilities or the market.2261 

2.33.3.2 Displacement  

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 8 459 persons 
displaced from Uruzgan province. Among these IDPs, 7 367 were displaced within the province itself. 
The major part of the rest of the IDPs was displaced to Kandahar.2262 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019, reporting 161 persons 
displaced from Uruzgan province and all of them were originating from Dehrawud district.2263 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 7 410 persons 
originating from Uruzgan and settled in Tirinkot district of the province itself.2264 

No  conflict-induced  internal  displacement  to  Uruzgan  province  was  reported  by  UNOCHA  for  the 
period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019.2265 

District 

Chora / Chinarto 
Dehrawud 
Khasuruzgan 
Shahid-e-Hassas 
Tirinkot 

Displaced from 
(2018) 
749 
368 
1 597 
72 
5 673 

Displaced to (2018) 

/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
7 410 

Displaced from 
(2019) 
/ 
161 
/ 
/ 
/ 

Displaced to 
(2019) 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 

According to UNOCHA, villagers were forced to flee their places of origin for improved safety.  As of 
April 2018, more than 1 700 IDPs arrived to Tirinkot City due to military operations in Chora/Chinarto, 
Khasuruzgan and Tirinkot district.2266 In June 2018, IDPs continued to arrive individually or in small 
groups  to  the  areas  around  of  Tirinkot  City  because  of  fighting  across  the  southern  region 
provinces.2267  Around 2 660 persons were displaced, following armed conflict in Khasuruzgan district, 
to Ghazni province, according to the November 4th 2018 UNOCHA Weekly Field Report.2268  

2261 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 9 
2262 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 20 January 2019, url 
2263 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url 
2264 UNOCHA, Afghanistan  Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, 28 January 2019, url 
2265 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url 
2266 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report (26 March – 1 April 2018), 1 April 2018, url  
2267 ERM, Household Assessment Report, 17 December 2018, url  
2268 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 29 October - 4 November 2018, 5 November 2018, url 

 
 
 
                                                           
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—  275  

2.34 Wardak  

2.34.1 General description of the province  

Wardak province, also known as Maidan Wardak, borders Parwan and Bamyan to the north, Kabul and 
Logar to the east and Ghazni to the south and west. The province is divided into the following districts: 
Chak,  Daymirdad,  Hesa-e-Awal-e-Behsud,  Jaghatu,  Jalrez,  Markaz-e-Behsud,  Maydanshahr  (also 
Maidan Shahr), Nerkh, Saydabad.2269 The capital city is Maidan Shahr, which is located approximately 
40 kilometres south-west of Kabul.2270 According to the Afghanistan CSO, the population of Wardak is 
estimated at 637 634 for 2018/192271 and is composed of Tajiks, Pashtuns and Hazaras.2272  

The Kabul-Kandahar highway crosses the province’s districts of Maidan Shahr, Narkh and Saydabad. A 
provincial road runs west from Maidan Shahr to Bamyan through the districts of Jalrez, Hesa-e-Awal-
e-Behsud, Markaz-e-Behsud and the Hajigak pass;2273 the Taliban purportedly set up check-points on 
this  road.2274  Afghanistan  National  Army  soldiers  have  also  been  reported  to  harass  and  beat  up 
locals.2275 The Taliban also collect ushr on local roads in the province.2276 Furthermore, as reported by 
the UN Secretary-General in December 2018, Taliban insurgents temporarily captured strategic posts 

2269 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Wardak Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; Naval Postgraduate School, Mayden Wardak 
Provincial Overview, n.d., url; Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial Profile Maidan Wardak, 1 February 2017, url 
2270 Washington Post (The), Taliban blocks major Afghan highway in expanding attacks, 26 October 2016, url; Afghanistan, 
Office of the President, Provincial Profile Maidan Wardak, 1 February 2017, url 
2271 Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 2 
2272 Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial Profile Maidan Wardak, 1 February 2017, url; US, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Mayden Wardak Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
2273 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Wardak Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url  
2274  Wiener  Zeitung,  Skifahren  bei  den  Buddhas,  4  January  2018,  url;  New  York  Times  (The),  Who  Is Winning  the  War  in 
Afghanistan? Depends on Which One, 18 August 2018, url 
2275 Pajhwok Afghan News, ANA soldiers accused of harassing civilians, 11 April 2018, url 
2276 Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban gunmen take taxes on Kabul-Bamyan highway, 5 November 2018, url 

 
  
                                                           
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

along  main  roads  to  Kabul  in  Saydabad  and  Daymirdad  districts,  restricting  movement  between 
provinces.2277 Following clashes between Taliban and Afghan security forces, electricity was cut off in 
the  province2278  and  the  Kabul-Kandahar  highway  has  been  closed  occasionally.2279  Moreover, 
demining operations took place in January 2018 on the southern highway through Maidan Wardak 
province.2280  

According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, Wardak province has maintained poppy-free status since 
2013.2281  

2.34.2 Conflict background and actors in Wardak  

Wardak is considered a ‘relatively volatile’ province by Khaama Press, with Taliban active in some of 
its districts.2282 The Haqqani network expanded to the province in the past and used to cooperate with 
jihadist groups operating south of Kabul. The Haqqani network has mainly provided indirect support 
in form of funds, training, and appointing local Islamist militant leaders.2283  

According to an article by the Jamestown Foundation, a US based institute for research and analysis, 
increased violence against the Shia community risks triggering sectarian conflicts. In Wardak province, 
for instance, a militia composed of 1 000 armed Hazara allied itself with Hazara groups in Ghazni and 
other  Hazara  dominated  areas  in  2016,  in  order  to  create  its  own  protection  force  for  the  central 
region.2284 

In terms of the presence of government security forces, Wardak province is under the responsibility 
of the 203th ANA Corps, which falls under the Task Force Southeast, led by US forces.2285 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Wardak  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.2286 When a source does not provide information on a district, the field is left blank. Sometimes 
a district is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not always recognised by 
the government or sometimes belong, as a region, to another district. If found, clarification is made 
in a separate footnote.   

2277 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 7 December 
2018, url, p. 6 
2278 AP, Afghan officials say highway reopened after Taliban assault, 7 October 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Ghazni in 
darkness since 5 days after power cables cut, url 
2279 Pajhwok Afghan News, 7 people killed, 37 wounded in Maidan Wardak car bombing, 27 October 2018, url; AP, Afghan 
officials say highway reopened after Taliban assault, 7 October 2018, url 
2280 Tolonews, A Night With Deminers Clearing The Maidan Wardak Highway, 23 January 2018, url 
2281 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 19 
2282 Khaama Press, NDS Special Forces storm Taliban‘s military compound in Wardak leaving 10 dead, 30 December 2018, url 
2283 Stanford University, Mapping militant organizations, Haqqani Network, 8 November 2017, url 
2284 Jamestown Foundation (The), How Islamic State-Khurasan is Driving Afghanistan Toward Sectarian Conflict, 12 October 
2018,  url;  Khabarnama,  دﻮﺴﻬﺑ  بﺎﺠﮐ رد  �دﺮﻣ  ﺢﻠﺴﻣ  یﺎﻫو ی�ﻧ  ﻞ�ﮑﺸ�  ؛ ی�ﺸﻤﺷ  ناﺪﻧﺎﻣﻮﻗ  [The  Sword  Commander:  the  formation  of 
popular armed forces in Kojab Behsud], 20 October 2016, url 
2285 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2018, url, p. 16 
2286 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, End of year report 
(2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 

                                                           
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—  277  

WARDAK 

Chak 

Daymirdad 

Hesa-e-Awal-e-
Behsud 

Jaghatu 

Jalrez 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: August-
November 
2017) 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 
Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Gov control 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

Markaz-e-Behsud 

Gov control 

Maydanshahr 
(capital) 

Nerkh 

Saydabad 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

Open Taliban 
Presence - high 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment 
as of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

Taliban 

(last 
accessed:2287 
April 2019) 

(assessment as 
of December 
2018) 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

GIRoA 
influence 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Taliban control 

TB control: 
85%; Gov 
control: 15% 
TB control: 
97%; Gov 
control: 3% 

/ 

TB control: 
98%; Gov 
control: 2% 
TB control: 
50%; Gov 
control: 50% 

/ 

TB control: 
70%; Gov 
control: 30% 
TB control: 
90%; Gov 
control: 10% 
TB control: 
80%; Gov 
control: 20% 

2.34.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.34.3.1 General  

In 2018, UNAMA documented 224 civilian casualties (88 deaths and 136 injured) in Wardak province. 
This represents an increase  of 170 % compared to 2017.  Leading  causes of casualties were ground 
engagements, followed by suicide attacks and (non-suicide) IEDs.2288  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA  places  Jalrez  and  Saydabad  in  the 
second highest category and the districts Chak and Narkh in the third highest category. Maydan Shahr 
and  Jaghatu  are  in  the  fourth  highest  category  and  the  remaining  districts  are  in  the  two  lowest 
categories.2289 

2287 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 
2288 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
2289 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p. 2  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 90 incidents related to insurgents in Wardak province.2290 

The province has seen intensive night raids and airstrikes that have caused casualties among civilians, 
the most prominent one in Jaghatu district at the end of September 2018 which killed 12 persons.2291 
Moreover, Nerkh2292and Jalrez2293 districts were also affected by air strikes and military operations 
that caused at least 11 fatalities among civilians.2294 Two civilians have been killed and nine others 
were wounded in mortar shell attacks allegedly carried out by the Taliban in the capital Maidan Shahr 
in late June 2018.2295 According to residents of Saydabad district in March 2018, four civilians were 
killed in a night raid by the Afghan security forces in the Tangi Dara area.2296  

Military  operations  conducted  by  Afghan  security  forces  took  place  in  Saydabad2297  and  Chak 2298 
districts,  also  killing  high  ranking  Taliban  members.2299  Members  of  the  Haqqani  network  were 
purportedly arrested in the province.2300 

Taliban insurgents carried out suicide attacks outside a police compound in the provincial capital in 
October 2018, as well as in January 2019, resulting in casualties among Afghan security forces, civilians 
and among the insurgents themselves.2301 The most prominent attack was a Taliban car-bomb on a 
National  Directorate  of  Security  base  near  the  provincial  capital,  which  killed  between  12  and  126 
Afghan security forces in January 2019.2302 Sources described it as ‘one of the deadliest attacks against 
the intelligence service in the 17-year war with the Taliban’.2303 Furthermore, the Taliban took Afghan 
security  force  members  hostage  after  fights  between  the  two  sides  in  June  2018,2304  they  overran 
several government check-points in Jalrez district2305 and carried out battles in Daymirdad,2306 causing 
victims among the security forces and the insurgents themselves.2307  

In September 2018 four people were killed when their vehicle struck a landmine in the Khanjan Khel 
area of Nerkh district. The Taliban in the area had warned residents against traveling on the road from 

2290 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
2291 Tolonews, Preliminary Findings Indicate Wardak Airstrike Killed 12 Civilian, 26 September, 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan 
News, 12 of a family killed in Wardak raid, claim residents, 24 September 2018, url; Afghanistan Times, Hundreds of Civilians 
Killed by Airstrikes in Past Three Months in Wardak, 9 October 2018, url 
2292 Afghanistan Times, Hundreds of Civilians Killed by Airstrikes in Past Three Months in Wardak, 9 October 2018, url 
2293 Pajhwok Afghan News, 6 civilians killed in Miadan [sic!] Wardak airstrike, 23 January 2019, url 
2294  Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  6  civilians  killed  in  Miadan  [sic!]  Wardak  airstrike,  23  January  2019,  url;  Afghanistan  Times, 
Hundreds of Civilians Killed by Airstrikes in Past Three Months in Wardak, 9 October 2018, url 
2295 Pajhwok Afghan News, 2 civilians killed, 9 hurt in Maidan Wardak mortar shells attack, 23 June 2018, url 
2296 Tolonews, Wardak Residents Claim 4 Civilians Killed In Govt Forces Raid, 30 March 2018, url 
2297 Khaama Press, NDS Special Forces storm Taliban‘s military compound in Wardak leaving 10 dead, 30 December 2018, url 
2298 Khaama Press, Taliban‘s shadow governor of Maidan Wardak killed in ANDSF operations, 20 October 2018, url 
2299 Khaama Press, NDS Special Forces storm Taliban‘s military compound in Wardak leaving 10 dead, 30 December 2018, 
url; Khaama Press, Taliban‘s shadow governor of Maidan Wardak killed in ANDSF operations, 20 October 2018, url 
2300 Xinhua News Agency, One Haqqani militant killed, 5 arrested in eastern Afghanistan, 11 March 2018, url 
2301 Tolonews, Blast Targets Afghan Forces Base in Wardak, 21 January 2019, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 7 people killed, 37 
wounded in Maidan Wardak car bombing, 27 October 2018, url; RFE/RL, Afghans Vote In Kandahar Elections Delayed By 
Violence, 27 October 2018, url 
2302 New York Times (The), After Deadly Assault on Afghan Base, Taliban Sit for Talks With U.S. Diplomats, 21 January 2019, 
url; Guardian (The), Taliban kill ‚more than 100 people‘ in attack on Afghan military base, 21 January 2019, url 
2303 New York Times (The), After Deadly Assault on Afghan Base, Taliban Sit for Talks With U.S. Diplomats, 21 January 2019, 
url; Il Messaggero, Afghanistan, sangue sul disimpegno Usa: autobomba die talebani contro scuola militare, 130 vittime, 22 
January 2019, url 
2304 DW, Taliban take Afghan security forces hostage in Maidan Wardak, 23 June 2018, url 
2305 Tolonews, 11 Security Forces Killed in Wardak Clashes, 9 September 2018, url 
2306 VoA, Dozens of Afghan Forces Killed in Taliban Attacks, 9 September 2018, url 
2307 Tolonews, 11 Security Forces Killed in Wardak Clashes, 9 September 2018, url; VoA, Dozens of Afghan Forces Killed in 
Taliban  Attacks,  9  September  2018,  url;  Khaama  Press,  Taliban‘s  shadow  governor  of  Maidan  Wardak  killed  in  ANDSF 
operations, 20 October 2018, url; Khaama Press, NDS Special Forces storm Taliban‘s military compound in Wardak leaving 
10 dead, 30 December 2018, url 

                                                           
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—  279  

8pm to 4 am.2308 In another similar incident in May 2018 four people were killed and two injured when 
their vehicle was hit by a roadside bomb in Tangi Dara area of Saydabad district.2309  

According to a report on elections-related violence by UNAMA, Wardak is one of the provinces where 
threats by the Taliban during the electoral process took place in form of ‘night letters’ to citizens, road 
blockages and indirect fire.2310  

2.34.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 3 199 persons 
displaced  from  Wardak  province,  mainly  displaced  within  the  province  itself  or  in  neighbouring 
provinces Kabul and Ghazni.2311 

No conflict-induced internal displacement from Wardak province was reported by UNOCHA for the 
period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019.2312 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 2 205 persons 
displaced to Wardak province, mainly coming from within the province itself (2 156 IDPs) and a small 
number from Chaparhar district in Nangarhar province.2313 

No  conflict-induced  internal  displacement  to  Wardak  province  was  reported  by  UNOCHA  for  the 
period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019.2314 

District 

Saydabad 
Nerkh 
Jaghatu 
Chak 
Jalrez 
Daymirdad 
Maydanshahr 
Markaz-e-Behsud 

Displaced from 
(2018) 
707 
1 092 
301 
105 
364 
630 
/ 
/ 

Displaced to (2018) 

560 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
1 561 
84 

Displaced 
from (2019) 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 

Displaced to 
(2019) 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 

In February and March 2018, UNOCHA reported on displacement out of Nerkh, Chak, Saydabad and 
Jalrez districts due to insecurity and conflict between Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin and the Taliban.2315 The 
majority of these IDP families went to the capital of Maydanshar and the Dashte Top area of Saydabad 
district.2316  In  the  same  period,  UNOCHA’s  Weekly  Field  Reports  reported  on  displacements  from 
different  districts  in  Wardak  to  the  provincial  capital  of  Maydanshar,  due  to  insecurity,  clashes 
between  members  of  non-state  armed  groups  and  a  pro-government  militia  and  armed  clashes 
between armed opposition groups.2317 

2308 Pajhwok Afghan News, 4 civilians killed in Wardak roadside bombing, 7 September 2018, url  
2309 Pajhwok Afghan News, 4 civilians killed, 2 injured in Maidan Wardak bombing, 24 May 2018, url 
2310 UNAMA, Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Special Report: 2018 Elections Violence, November 2018, 
url, p. 5, 6 
2311 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url 
2312 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url  
2313 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url 
2314 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url  
2315 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Maidan Wardak Province - Meeting Summary, 27 February 2018, url, 
p. 1  
2316 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Maidan Wardak Province - Meeting Summary, 27 February 2018, url, 
p. 1 
2317 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly  Field Report, 12-18 February 2018, 18 February 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Afghanistan 
Weekly Field Report, 26 February - 6 March, 6 March 2018, url, p. 1 

 
 
                                                           
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On the 13 August, following the Taliban attack on Ghazni City, UNOCHA reported on large numbers of 
civilians fleeing the city to neighbouring Wardak province via the embattled Highway 1, although these 
reports were not confirmed by the authorities.2318 In November 2018, heavy fighting was reported in 
Malestan and Jaghuri districts of Ghazni province. An escalation of the conflict with intensified ground 
operations and airstrikes triggered displacement into Wardak, Bamyan and Kabul provinces.2319 

In October 2018 the head of DoRR reported during an OCT meeting in Wardak that the number of 
IDPs in the province was expected to increase, as the joint ANSF military operations were going on in 
different  locations.2320  Furthermore,  1 600  displaced  people  from  insecure  districts  within  the 
province reportedly arrived in Maydanshar that same month.2321 

According to UNHCR, Wardak is one of the four provinces with the highest percentage of returnees 
who originate there, but ‘choose to live somewhere else once they return’.2322  

2318 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Ghazni Conflict, Update No. 1, 13 August 2018, url, p. 1 
2319 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Ghazni Armed Clashes, Flash Update No. 1, 14 November 2018, url, p. 1 
2320 UNOCHA, Operational Coordination Team (OCT) - Maidan Wardak Province - Meeting Summary, 8 October 2018, url, p. 
1 
2321 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 8 - 14 October 2018, 14 October 2018, url, p. 1 
2322 UNHCR, Returnee and Internally Displaced Persons Monitoring Report - Final Report, May 2018, url, p. 19  

 
                                                           
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—  281  

2.35 Zabul 

2.35.1 General description of the province  

Zabul province is located in the southern part of Afghanistan and shares an international border with 
Pakistan.  Among  the  Afghan  provinces,  Zabul  borders  Kandahar,  Uruzgan,  Ghazni  and  Paktika.  The 
provincial capital is Qalat (formerly known as Qalat-i Ghilzai);2323 Zabul is divided into the following 
districts:  the  provincial  capital  Qalat,  Arghandab,  Atghar,  Daychopan,  Kakar  (also  known  as  Khake 
Afghan),  Mizan,  Nawbahar,  Shahjoy,  Shinkay,  Shomulzay,  Tarnak  wa  Jaldak  (also  known  as  Shahr 
Safa).2324  According  to  the  Afghanistan  CSO,  the  population  of  Zabul  is  estimated  at  371 043  for 
2018/192325 and it is composed mainly of Pashtuns and Baloch.2326 The province is also known by the 
name ‘Zabalistan’ and is considered the birthplace of the Pashtun ethnic group.2327 

The Kabul-Kandahar Highway, also known by the name of ‘Highway One’,2328 runs through the districts 
of Tarnak wa Jaldak, Qalat and Shahjoy.2329 The road has a significant strategic relevance, as it connects 
the  capital  city  with  Kandahar,  a  city  that  is  considered  to  be  the  native  region  of  the  Taliban 
movement. It passes through remote areas of the province, many of which are not under government 

2323 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Zabul Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
2324 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Zabul Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Background profile of Zabul, 
n.d., url; Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial Profile Zabul, 1 February 2017, url 
2325 Afghanistan, CSO,  رﻮﺸﮐ سﻮﻔﻧ دروآﺮﺑ۱۳۹۷ [Estimated population of the country 2018-2019], June 2018, url, p. 3 
2326 Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial Profile Zabul, 1 February 2017, url; US, Naval Postgraduate School, Zabul 
Provincial Overview, n.d., url 
2327 Pajhwok Afghan News, Background profile of Zabul, n.d., url 
2328 Telegraph (The), Kabul-Kandahar highway is a symbol of what‘s gone wrong in Afghanistan, 9 September 2012, url 
2329 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Zabul Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url 

 
 
                                                           
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control.  It  is  a  key  supply  route  for  the  south.2330  Conflict-related  security  incidents  such  as  illegal 
armed  groups  attacking  police  check-posts  and  detonations  of  improvised  explosive  devices  are 
reported to have taken place along some highway sections in Zabul province.2331  

According to the 2018 UNODC Opium Survey, poppy-cultivation in Zabul province increased by 21 % 
in 2018, compared to 2017. The districts with the highest rate of opium-poppy-cultivation were Tarnak 
wa Jaldak and Mizan, where security conditions were reportedly bad.2332 The opium trade represents 
one of the main sources of income for the insurgency.2333 

2.35.2 Conflict background and actors in Zabul  

In the 1980s, during the Soviet occupation, the mujahideen movement mainly infiltrated Afghanistan 
from Pakistan through Zabul province. Located along the ‘conservative Pashtun belt’, Zabul province 
has a historical significance for the Taliban, who started their battle over the control of the country in 
the 1990s from there. Mullah Mohammad Omar, the founder of the Taliban movement, was from the 
the Hotak tribe, one of the two main tribes in the province.2334 

Nowadays considered a ‘Taliban stronghold’ in the ‘volatile south’, the province sees a weak presence 
of the Afghan government, which is limited to the capital city, while the majority of the population 
lives  across  numerous  villages  in  rural  areas.  Among  the  inhabitants  of  Zabul  the  ‘feeling  of  being 
forgotten by the government’ is reportedly one of the reasons for the considerable Taliban presence 
in the area.2335 According to the Survey of the Afghan People 2018 by the Asia Foundation, 58.5 % of 
Zabul  dwellers  sympathized  ‘a  lot’  with  the  Taliban,  the  most  of  any  province  of  Afghanistan. 2336 
Furthermore, 63 % claimed to have no fear when encountering them, while many of the respondents 
were sceptical of the performance by the ANA and ANP.2337 

Besides  local  Taliban  insurgents,  ISKP  fighters  are  purportedly  active  in  several  districts  of  the 
province.2338 According to the Saudi-Arabian newspaper Arab News, confrontations about the right to 
lead the Afghan insurgency arose within the Taliban movement in 2015, after it was disclosed that 
Mullah Omar had died in 2013. This situation fuelled the hopes of ISKP, which wished to exploit these 
divisions in order to become the dominant faction in the southern region. After clashes between the 
Taliban Red Unit and the Taliban splinter group of Mullah Mohammad Rasool in the western region of 
Afghanistan, which caused the latter’s expulsion to Pakistan, his successor, Mullah Mansour Dadullah 
declared allegiance to ISKP and moved to Khak-e Afghan district in Zabul province. The ISKP group has 
been composed of Afghans from across the country and Uzbek militants, most of them being members 
of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.2339 Thus, throughout 2015 ISKP had increased its influence in 
the province and it even targeted Highway One and abducted Hazaras and Shia Muslims. This caused 
the official Taliban movement to launch a military reaction, supported by the Red Unit, ending with 
their victory over IS in the same year.2340  

2330  Telegraph  (The),  Kabul-Kandahar  highway  is  a  symbol  of  what‘s  gone  wrong  in  Afghanistan,  9  September  2012,  url; 
RFE/RL, The Forgotten Afghan Province That Is A Key Taliban Stronghold, 16 December 2018, url; Jamestown Foundation 
(The), Islamic State a Deadly Force in Kabul, 6 April 2018, url 
2331  Tolonews,  Seven  Police  Killed  In  Kabul-Kandahar  Highway  Attack,  15  August  2018,  url;  Khaama  Press,  Explosion  on 
Kandahar-Zabul highway leaves 3 civilians dead, 7 July 2018, url  
2332 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN , Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 30 
2333 RFE/RL, The Forgotten Afghan Province That Is A Key Taliban Stronghold, 16 December 2018, url 
2334 RFE/RL, The Forgotten Afghan Province That Is A Key Taliban Stronghold, 16 December 2018, url 
2335 RFE/RL, The Forgotten Afghan Province That Is A Key Taliban Stronghold, 16 December 2018, url 
2336 Asia Foundation (The), A Survey of the Afghan People 2018, December 2018, url, p. 61 
2337 Asia Foundation (The), A Survey of the Afghan People 2018, December 2018, url, p. 47 
2338 Jamestown Foundation (The), Islamic State a Deadly Force in Kabul, 6 April 2018, url; Arab News, In Afghanistan, the 
Taliban‘s anti-Daesh squad gains a reputation for ruthlessness, 27 June 2018, url 
2339 Arab News, In Afghanistan, the Taliban‘s anti-Daesh squad gains a reputation for ruthlessness, 27 June 2018, url; AAN, 
Toward Fragmentation? Mapping the post-Omar Taleban, 24 November 2015, url 
2340 Arab News, In Afghanistan, the Taliban‘s anti-Daesh squad gains a reputation for ruthlessness, 27 June 2018, url 

                                                           
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—  283  

In terms of the presence of government security forces, Zabul province is under the responsibility of 
the 205th ANA Corps, which falls under the Train Advise Assist Command-South (TAAC-S), led by US 
forces.2341 

The  following  table  provides  an  overview  of  control  of  the  districts  in  Zabul  province  based  on 
information provided by the BBC, the US military (quoted by SIGAR), the Long War Journal and the 
Taliban.2342  When  a  source  does  not  provide  information  on  a  district,  the  field  is  left  blank.  
Sometimes a  district  is only mentioned by one source (the Taliban). These districts are not  always 
recognised  by  the  government  or  sometimes  belong,  as  a  region,  to  another  district.  If  found, 
clarification is made in a separate footnote.    

ZABUL 

Atghar 

Arghandab 

Daychopan 

Kakar (Khak-e-
Afghan) 

Mizan 

Nawbahar 

BBC 

(reporting 
period: August-
November 
2017) 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 
Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 
Open Taliban 
presence - low 

Taliban control 

Open Taliban 
presence - low 
Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

US military 
(quoted by 
SIGAR) 

US military 
(quoted  by 
SIGAR) 

(assessment 
as of July 
2018) 

(assessment 
as of October 
2018) 

LWJ 

(last 
accessed:2343 
April 2019) 

Taliban 

(assessment as of 
December 2018) 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

INS Activity 

INS Activity 

Taliban 
control 

TB control: 99%; 
Gov control: 1% 

TB control 

INS Activity 

INS Activity 

Contested 

TB control 

High INS 
activity 

High INS 
activity 

Taliban 
control 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control 

TB control: 96%; 
Gov control: 4% 

INS Activity 

INS Activity 

Contested 

TB control 

Qalat (capital) 

Gov control 

GIRoA 
control 

GIRoA control 

Gov control or 
undetermined 

TB control: 75%; 
Gov control: 25% 

Shahjoy 

Shinkay 

Shomulzay 

Tarnak Wa Jaldak 

Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 
Open Taliban 
presence - low 
Open Taliban 
presence – 
Medium 
Open Taliban 
presence - 
Medium 

INS Activity 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

TB control: 97%; 
Gov control: 3% 

TB control: 85%; 
Gov control: 15% 

TB control: 88%; 
Gov control: 12% 

Contested 

Contested 

Contested 

/ 

Seyuri 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

TB control: 98%; 
Gov control: 2% 

2341 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2018, url, p. 15 
2342 BBC News, Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds, 31 January 2018, url;  SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, 30 October 2018, url, pp. 219-229; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2019, 
url, pp. 240-250; LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, End of year report 
(2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control, 31 December 2018, url 
2343 LWJ is a living map that is frequently updated. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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Shahr-e-Safa 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

TB control: 94%; 
Gov control: 6% 

2.35.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

2.35.3.1 General  

In 2018, UNAMA documented 293 civilian casualties (57 deaths and 236 injured) in Zabul province. 
This  represents  a  decrease  of  12 %  compared  to  2017.  Leading  causes  of  casualties  were  ground 
engagements, followed by (non-suicide) IEDs and UXO/landmines.2344  

In a map depicting 'conflict severity' in 2018, combining three indicators: armed clashes and air strikes, 
civilian  casualties,  and  conflict-induced  displacements,  UNOCHA  places  Shahjoy  in  the  highest 
category and Qalat in the category below. Daychopan, Mizan and Arghandab are in the third highest 
category and Tarnak Wa Jaldak, Shinkay, Nawbahar and Shamul Zayi districts are in the fourth category. 
The remaining districts are in lower category.2345 

In  the  period  from  1  January  2018  to  28  February  2019,  open  media  sources  used  by  the  Global 
Incidents Map website reported 117 incidents related to insurgents in Zabul province.2346 

The province has seen intense fighting and military operations such as night raids and air strikes, which 
have caused casualties among civilians.2347 Taliban insurgents have been carrying out activities related 
to  terrorism  such  as  shootings  and  suicide  attacks  in  some  districts  of  Zabul  province,  resulting  in 
casualties among the Afghan security forces and the insurgents themselves.2348 Furthermore, airstrikes 
by US forces took place in June 2018 and killed Taliban leaders and commanders.2349 

Three civilians were killed in July 2018 by a blast in the Juldak area of Qalat city when their vehicle was 
hit by a bomb allegedly planted by the Taliban.2350 Still in July, two children were killed and two others 
and a woman were injured in July 2018 when their house in Shajoy district was hit by a mortar shell 
fired by the Taliban.2351 Furthermore, a woman was killed and two others were injured when their car 
hit an IED in the Kam Karez area of Sayori district in February 2018.2352 

According to a report about 2018  elections-related violence by UNAMA, citizens from some districts 
of Zabul were threatened through Taliban’s ‘night letters’ and asked to show their tazkiras on road 
blockades.2353 

2344 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 68 
2345 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 6 December 2018, url, p.2  
2346 Global Incident Map displaying Terrorist Acts, Suspicious Activity, and General Terrorism News, url, accessed 1 March 
2019 
2347 RFE/RL, The Forgotten Afghan Province That Is A Key Taliban Stronghold, 16 December 2018, url 
2348 Khaama Press, Militants suffer heavy casualties in ANDSF operations in Kandahar and Zabul, 7 February 2019, url; Khaama 
Press, Afghan forces thwart suicide attack on a governmental compound in Zabul, 22 December 2018, url; Tolonews, District 
Police Chief Killed In Taliban Attack in Zabul, 14 October 2018, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 8 Taliban, 3 ANA soldiers killed in 
Zabul battle, 19 December 2018, url; New York Times Magazine (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: Dec. 14-20, 21 December 
2018, url; New York Times Magazine (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: Dec. 28-3 Jan., 4 January 2019, url  
2349 Khaama Press, Taliban executioner killed in U.S. drone strike in Zabul province, 14 December 2018, url; Xinhua News 
Agency, Airstrikes kill 2 Taliban commanders in Southern Afghanistan, 1 January 2018, url 
2350 Pajhwok Afghan News, 3 civilians killed in Zabul bomb blast, 7 July 2018, url 
2351 Pajhwok Afghan News, 3 children killed in Nangarhar, Zabul incidents, 12 July 2018, url 
2352 Tolonews, Woman Killed in Zabul Roadside Explosion, 22 February 2018, url 
2353 UNAMA, Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Special Report: 2018 Elections Violence, November 2018, 
url, p. 5 

 
                                                           
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2.35.3.2 Displacement 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 1 897 persons 
displaced from Zabul province.2354  Among them, 1 872 persons were displaced within the province 
itself, while the 25 other persons were displaced to Kandahar.2355 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019, reporting 1 005 persons 
displaced from Zabul province within the province itself.2356 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018, reporting 2 102 persons 
displaced to Zabul  province.2357 

UNOCHA collected data for the period 1 January 2019 – 28 February 2019, reporting 1 152 persons 
displaced to  Zabul province.2358 

District 

Arghandab 

Daychopan 

Kakar 

Mizan 

Nawbahar 

Qalat 

Shahjoy 

Shinkay 

Shomulzay 

Displaced from 
(2018) 

Displaced to (2018) 

Displaced from 
(2019) 

Displaced to 
(2019) 

192 

300 

405 

202 

94 

104 

486 

108 

6 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

1 495 

607 

/ 

/ 

/ 

1 005 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

1 152 

/ 

/ 

/ 

According to UNOCHA, on 9 December 2018, 900 IDPs came to Qalat district from several districts 
because of armed conflicts in their places of origin.2359  

2354 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 20 January 2019, url 
2355 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2018, last updated: 20 January 2019, url 
2356 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url 
2357 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Induced Displacements in 2018, last updated: 28 January 2019, url 
2358 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Conflict Displacement 2019, last updated: 31 March 2019, url 
2359 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Weekly Field Report, 4-9 December 2018, 9 December 2018, url  

 
 
 
 
                                                           
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Annex 1: Bibliography 

Oral sources, including anonymous sources 

Brittan, R., Managing Director Alcis, e-mail, 16 August 2017 

Military analyst, confidential communication, 14 January 2019. The military analyst is specialized on 
issues relating to Afghanistan.  

Public sources 

1TV  News,  Afghan  commando  kill  12  Taliban 
http://www.1tvnews.af/en/news/afghanistan/36338-afghan-commandos-kill-12-taliban-in-parwan-
raid, accessed 21 January 2019 

raid,  6  November  2018, 

in  Parwan 

1TV  News,  Afghan 
http://www.1tvnews.af/en/news/afghanistan/33936-afghan-forces-kill-no-2-of-anti-china-militant-
group, accessed 19 December 2018 

forces  kill  No.  2  of  anti-China  militant  group,  1  April  2018, 

1TV  News,  Eight  Afghan  police  killed,  set  on  fire  by  Taliban  in  Takhar,  6  September  2018, 
http://www.1tvnews.af/en/news/afghanistan/35685-eight-afghan-police-killed-set-on-fire-by-
taliban-in-takhar, accessed 18 January 2019  

Five 

1TV  News, 
http://www.1tvnews.af/en/news/afghanistan/34887-five-killed-in-taliban-daesh-clash-in-laghman, 
accessed 4 February 2019  

Taliban-Daesh 

Laghman, 

killed 

clash 

June 

23 

in 

in 

2018, 

Gunmen 

1TV  News, 
2018, 
passengers 
http://www.1tvnews.af/en/news/afghanistan/36491-gunmen-kill-three-passengers-in-ghor, accessed 
23 January 2019 

19  November 

three 

Ghor, 

kill 

in 

News, 

1TV 
2018, 
http://www.1tvnews.af/en/news/afghanistan/34635-taliban-closes-27-schools-in-takhar,  accessed 
18 January 2019  

29  May 

Takhar, 

schools 

Taliban 

closes 

27 

in 

(Anadolu  Agency),  Afghan  government  says  171  terrorists  killed,  11  March  2018, 

AA 
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/afghan-government-says-171-terrorists-killed/1085784, 
accessed 4 February 2019 

AAN  (Afghanistan  Analysts  Network),  Thematic  Dossier  XV:  Daesh  in  Afghanistan,  1  August  2017,  
https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/publication/aan-thematic-dossier/thematic-dossier-xv-daesh-
in-afghanistan/, accessed 11 February 2019 

AAN (Afghanistan Analysts Network), What to Watch? Key issues to follow in Afghanistan in 2017, 27 
January 
https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/what-to-watch-key-issues-to-follow-in-
afghanistan-in-2017/, accessed 17 January 2019 

2017, 

ACAPS (Assessment Capacities Project), Anticipatory Briefing Note - Afghanistan: Forced returnees: 
Nangarhar, 
2018, 
https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20180117_acaps_anticipatory_report_afgha
nistan_forced_returnees.pdf, accessed 14 January 2019 

Kandahar, 

January 

Kabul, 

17 

ACBAR  (Agency  Coordinating  Body  for  Afghan  Relief  and  Development),  Putting  Protection  at  the 
Heart  of  the  Peace  Process,  29  October  2018,  http://www.acbar.org/article/putting-protection-at-
the-heart-of-the-peace-process-, accessed 19 February 2019  

ACCORD  (Austrian  Centre  for  Country  of  Origin  and  Asylum  Research  and  Documentation), 
Anfragebeantwortung  zu  Afghanistan:  Informationen  zur  Volksgruppe  der  Sadat  (Sayed,  Sayyed, 

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  287  

Sadaat, Sayyid, Sayid, Sayeed) [Query response about Afghanistan: Informations regarding the group 
of 
(Sayed,  Sayyed,  Sadaat,  Sayyid,  Sayid,  Sayeed)],  25  October  2017, 
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1419111.html, accessed 8 January 2019 

the  Sadat 

Action Against Hunger, No Afghans Left Behind. Calling for a Collective People Centered Approach to 
Hunger, 
at: 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Case%20study%20Afghanistan%20_%20ACF
.pdf, accessed 21 February 2019  

November 

available 

2018, 

Adili, A. Y. and van Bijlert, M., Taleban Attacks on Khas Uruzgan, Jaghori and Malestan (II): A new and 
violent  push  into  Hazara  areas,  Afghanistan  Analysts  Network  (AAN),  29  November  2018, 
https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/taleban-attacks-on-khas-uruzgan-jaghori-and-malestan-ii-a-
new-and-violent-push-into-hazara-areas/, accessed 16 January 2019  

Adili,  A.Y.,  Afghanistan  Elections  Conundrum  (17):  Voters  disenfranchised  in  Faryab,  Afghanistan 
Analysts  Network  (AAN),  12  October  2018,  https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/afghanistan-
elections-conundrum-17-voters-disenfranchised-in-faryab/, accessed 4 February 2019 

Adili,  A.Y.,  Afghanistan’s  2019  elections  (2):  Who  is  running  to  become  the  next  president?, 
Afghanistan  Analysts  Network 
11 
https://www.afghanistan-
analysts.org/afghanistans-2019-elections-2-who-are-running-to-become-the-next-president/, 
accessed 25 February 2019 

February 

(AAN), 

2019, 

Afghan  Islamic  Press,  Name  of  Chaghcharan  city  being  changed  to  Feroz  Koh,  21  April  2014, 
http://www.afghanislamicpress.com/en/story.php?id=64934, accessed 29 January 2019 

June  2017, 
Afghanistan  Protection  Cluster,  Central  Region  Update,  May  2017,  17 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/20170621_cr_may_factsheet.pdf, accessed 26 February 2019  

Afghanistan  Protection  Cluster,  Central  Region  Update,  November  2017,  December  2017,  Central 
Region Update, November 2017, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/61282.pdf, 
accessed 26 February 2019  

Afghanistan  Protection  Cluster,  Fact  Sheet  Afghanistan  August  2018,  3  October  2018, 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/document_79.pdf,  accessed  18  February 
2019  

June  2018,  23 
Afghanistan  Protection  Cluster,  Fact  Sheet  Afghanistan 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/65077, accessed 18 February 2019 

July  2018, 

Afghanistan  Protection  Cluster,  Fact  Sheet  Afghanistan  May  2018,  14 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/64119.pdf, accessed 18 February 2019 

June  2018, 

Afghanistan  Times,  Afghanistan  Denies  China  is  Building  Military  Base  in  Badakhshan,  17  February 
http://www.afghanistantimes.af/afghanistan-denies-china-building-military-base-
2018, 
badakhshan/, accessed 14 December 2018 

Afghanistan  Times,  Afghanistan  Dismisses  Russia’s  Claims  Over  Unknown  Helicopters  Landing,  21 
February  2018,  http://www.afghanistantimes.af/afghanistan-dismisses-russias-claims-unknown-
helicopters-landing/, accessed 20 December 2018 

Afghanistan  Times,  Commandos  Battle 
http://www.afghanistantimes.af/commandos-battle-regain-kohistan-district/, 
December 2018 

to  Regain  Kohistan  District,  4  May  2018, 
14 

accessed 

Afghanistan  Times,  Hundreds  of  Civilians  Killed  by  Airstrikes  in  Past  Three  Months  in  Wardak,  9 
October  2018,  http://www.afghanistantimes.af/hundreds-of-civilians-killed-by-airstrikes-in-past-
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https://www.khaama.com/afghan-forces-repulse-isis-attacks-in-two-districts-of-kunar-province-
02911/, accessed 6 February 2019  

Khaama Press, Afghan forces suffer casualties in Kandahar VBIED suicide attack, 28 September 2017, 
https://www.khaama.com/afghan-forces-suffer-casualties-in-kandahar-vbied-suicide-attack-03538/, 
accessed 11 February 2019 

Khaama  Press,  Afghan  forces  thwart  deadly  VBIED  attack  in  Khost  province,  6  March  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/afghan-forces-thwart-deadly-vbied-attack-in-khost-province-04586/, 
accessed 5 February 2019 

Khaama  Press,  Afghan  forces  thwart  suicide  attack  on  a  governmental  compound  in  Zabul,  22 
December 2018, https://www.khaama.com/afghan-forces-thwart-suicide-attack-on-a-governmental-
compound-in-zabul-02977/, accessed 14 January 2019  

Khaama Press, Afghan Special Forces arrest ex-district chief in Farah over terror charges, 27 June 2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/afghan-special-forces-arrest-ex-district-chief-in-farah-over-terror-
charges-05444/, accessed 18 January 2019 

Khaama  Press,  Army  soldiers  suffer  casualties 
https://www.khaama.com/army-soldiers-suffer-casualties-in-an-explosion-in-kabul-05724/, 
accessed 7 February 2019  

in  an  explosion 

in  Kabul,  6  August  2018, 

Khaama  Press,  Badar-16  operations  kick  off  against  Taliban  in  Farah  province,  18  July  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/badar-16-operations-kick-off-against-taliban-in-farah-province-05618/, 
accessed 18 January 2019 

Khaama Press, Clash among Afghan forces and Taliban leaves 15 dead, wounded in Herat, 28 April 
2018,  https://www.khaama.com/clash-among-afghan-forces-and-taliban-leaves-15-dead-wounded-
in-herat-05010/, accessed 30 January 2019 

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—  313  

Khaama Press, Coalition airstrike target Taliban IED planters in Nangarhar leaving 5 dead, 18 January 
2018, https://www.khaama.com/coalition-airstrike-target-taliban-ied-planters-in-nangarhar-leaving-
5-dead-03139/, accessed 30 January 2019  

Khaama Press, Coalition forces carry out drone strikes against ISIS-K hideouts in Nangarhar, 27 January 
2019,  https://www.khaama.com/coalition-forces-carry-out-drone-strikes-against-isis-k-hideouts-in-
nangarhar-03188/, accessed 30 January 2019  

Khaama Press, Deadly airstrikes target Taliban training camp in Kandahar province, 28 January 2019, 
https://www.khaama.com/deadly-airstrikes-target-taliban-training-camp-in-kandahar-province-
03198/, accessed 1 February 2019 

Khaama  Press,  Drone  strike 
https://www.khaama.com/drone-strike-target-militants-in-farah-province-02981/, 
January 2019 

in  Farah  province,  23  December  2018, 
18 

target  militants 

accessed 

Khaama Press, Drone strike target Taliban‘s Red Unit commanders in Kunar province, 2 October 2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/drone-strike-talibans-red-unit-commanders-in-kunar-province-06074/, 
accessed 6 February 2019  

Khaama Press, Drone strikes leave at least 15 militants dead in Ghazni and Paktika, 13 December 2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/drone-strikes-leave-at-least-15-militants-dead-in-ghazni-and-paktika-
02921/, accessed 25 January 2019   

Khaama  Press,  Drone  strikes  leaves  [sic]  8  militants  dead  in  Logar  province,  26  December  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/drone-strikes-leaves-8-militants-dead-in-logar-province-03002/, accessed 
1 February 2019  

Khaama  Press,  Explosion  on  Kandahar-Zabul  highway  leaves  3  civilians  dead,  7  July  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/explosion-on-kandahar-zabul-highway-leaves-3-civilians-dead-05523/, 
accessed 14 January 2019  

Khaama  Press,  Explosion  targets  military  convoy 
in  Kandahar  province,  11  March  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/explosion-heard-in-kandahar-province-04618/, accessed 1 February 2019 

Khaama  Press,  Farah’s  Anar  Dara  has  reportedly  fallen  into  Taliban  hands,  12  March  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/farahs-anar-dara-has-reportedly-fallen-into-taliban-hands-04626/, 
accessed 18 January 2019 

Khaama  Press,  Four  key  Taliban  group  leaders  ambushed  in  Laghman  province,  1  October  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/four-key-taliban-group-leaders-ambushed-in-laghman-province-06069/, 
accessed 4 February 2019  

Khaama Press, Ghani Orders Formation of the New 443-Strong Security Unit in Bamyan Province, 10 
November 
https://www.khaama.com/ghani-orders-formation-of-the-new-443-strong-
security-unit-in-bamyan-province-02716/, accessed 9 January 2019 

2018, 

Khaama Press, Gunmen attack Police District Center Herat city, casualties feared, 12 January 2019, 
https://www.khaama.com/gunmen-attack-police-district-center-herat-city-casualties-feared-
03100/, accessed 30 January 2019 

Khaama Press, Heavy Airstrikes Target Militant Compounds in Badghis After Last Week´s Major Attack, 
24  June  2018,  https://www.khaama.com/heavy-airstrikes-target-militant-compounds-in-badghis-
after-last-weeks-major-attack-05423/, accessed 27 December 2018 

Khaama  Press,  Humvee  APC  destroyed,  9  militants  killed  in  AAF  airstrike  in  Farah  province,  23 
November 
https://www.khaama.com/humvee-apc-destroyed-9-militants-killed-in-aaf-
airstrike-in-farah-province-02793/, acccessed 18 January 2019 

2018, 

 
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Khaama Press, ISIS  militants  among  7  killed in Nangarhar and Kapisa drone strikes,  1 March 2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/isis-militants-among-7-killed-in-nangarhar-and-kapisa-drone-strikes-
04558/, accessed 4 February 2019 

Khaama  Press,  ISIS-K  bomb  kill  Taliban  local  commander  in  Kunar  province,  19  January  2019, 
https://www.khaama.com/isis-k-bomb-kill-taliban-local-commander-in-kunar-province-03142/, 
accessed 6 February 2019  

ISIS-K  militants  blown  up  by 

Khaama  Press, 
in  Kunar  province,  28  January  2019, 
https://www.khaama.com/isis-k-militants-blown-up-by-ied-in-kunar-province-03196/,  accessed  6 
February 2019  

IED 

Khaama  Press,  Joint  airstrikes  leave  37  militants  dead,  7  wounded  in  Farah,  16  April  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/joint-airstrikes-leave-37-militants-dead-7-wounded-in-farah-04893/, 
accessed 18 January 2019 

Khaama  Press,  Local  Taliban  Leaders,  Militants  Suffer  Heavy  Casualties  in  Baghlan,  13  September 
2018,  https://www.khaama.com/local-taliban-leaders-militants-suffer-heavy-casualties-in-baghlan-
05954/, accessed 3 January 2019 

Khaama  Press,  Militants  Suffer  Casualties 
in  Badakhshan  Airstrike,  1  December  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/militants-suffer-casualties-in-badakhshan-airstrike-02852/,  accessed  19 
December 2018.  

Khaama Press, Militants Suffer Casualties in Separate Clashes, Airstrikes in Balkh and Badakhshan, 26 
October  2018,  https://www.khaama.com/militants-suffer-casualties-in-separate-clashes-airstrikes-
in-balkh-and-badakhshan-02628/, accessed 19 December 2018 

Khaama  Press,  Militants  suffer  heavy  casualties  in  ANDSF  operations  in  Kandahar  and  Zabul,  7 
February  2019,  https://www.khaama.com/militants-suffer-heavy-casualties-in-andsf-operations-in-
kandahar-and-zabul-03256/, accessed 11 February 2019  

Khaama  Press,  MoD  confirms  deployment  of  US  Special  Forces  in  Farah  province,  5  August  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/mod-confirms-deployment-of-us-special-forces-in-farah-province-
05719/, accessed 18 January 2019 

Khaama Press, MoI arrest police officer affiliated with Taliban in Farah province, 22 December 2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/moi-arrest-police-officer-affiliated-with-taliban-in-farah-province-
02979/, accessed 18 January 2019 

Khaama Press, NDS Special Forces foil Taliban’s bid to carry out coordinated attack in Farah, 26 May 
2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/nds-special-forces-foil-talibans-bid-to-carry-out-coordinated-
attack-in-farah-05245/, accessed 18 January 2019 

Khaama Press, NDS Special Forces storm Taliban‘s military compound in Wardak leaving 10 dead, 30 
December 2018, https://www.khaama.com/nds-special-forces-storm-talibans-military-compound-in-
wardak-leaving-10-dead-03022/, accessed 15 January 2019  

Khaama  Press,  Nearly  20  Taliban,  ISIS-K  militants  killed  during  the  operations  of  Afghan,  Coalition 
Forces,  30  January  2019,  https://www.khaama.com/nearly-20-taliban-isis-k-militants-killed-during-
the-operations-of-afghan-coalition-forces-03205/, accessed 6 February 2019  

Khaama Press, Operations underway in Kabul‘s Surobi after last week‘s attack by militants, 9 July 2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/operations-underway-in-kabuls-surobi-after-last-weeks-attack-by-
militants-05538/, accessed 7 February 2019  

Khaama Press, President Ghani met with Italy’s defense minister Elisabetta Trenta, 16 December 2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/president-ghani-met-with-italys-defense-minister-elisabetta-trenta-
02932/, accessed 30 January 2019 

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—  315  

Khaama  Press,  Prominent  Taliban  leader  killed  in  Herat  drone  strike,  17  December  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/prominent-taliban-leader-killed-in-herat-drone-strike-02944/,  accessed 
30 January 2019 

Khaama  Press,  Prominent  Taliban  leaders  killed  in  U.S.  drone  strikes  in  West  of  Afghanistan,  27 
December 2018, https://www.khaama.com/prominent-taliban-leaders-killed-in-u-s-drone-strikes-in-
west-of-afghanistan-03011/, accessed 30 January 2019 

Khaama Press, Protesters gather near Presidential Palace in Kabul over recent wave of violence, 12 
November  2018,  https://www.khaama.com/protesters-gather-near-presidential-palace-in-kabul-
over-recent-wave-of-violence-
02722/?fbclid=IwAR2cNyRcLjWNmzaEoWNieBq37J1eVAKL2aT_4yCqbU9HdYKpr30O1NoXe-g, 
accessed 16 January 2019  

Khaama Press, Reporters Without Borders reacts to the killing of a journalist by Taliban, 9 January 
2019,  https://www.khaama.com/reporters-without-borders-reacts-to-the-killing-of-a-journalist-by-
taliban-03085/, accessed 18 January 2019 

Khaama Press, Samangan‘s Security chief, several soldiers killed in Taliban attack, 16 October 2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/samangans-security-chief-several-soldiers-killed-in-taliban-attack-
06163/, accessed 21 January 2019  

Khaama  Press,  Security  Forces  and  Taliban  Suffer  Heavy  Casualties  in  Pul-e-Khumri  City  Clash,  3 
January  2019,  https://www.khaama.com/security-forces-and-taliban-suffer-heavy-casualties-in-pul-
e-khumri-city-clash-03045/, accessed 3 January 2019 

Khaama  Press,  Senior  Haqqani  Network  leader  killed  in  Paktika  airstrike,  25  December  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/senior-haqqani-network-leader-killed-in-paktika-airstrike-02999/, 
accessed 25 January 2019  

Khaama  Press,  Senior  ISIS  leader  arrested  by  Afghan  forces  in  Ghor  province,  12  February  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/senior-isis-leader-arrested-by-afghan-forces-in-ghor-province-04473/, 
accessed 23 January 2019 

Khaama  Press,  Taliban  commander  among  7  killed  in  Farah  airstrikes,  24  December  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/taliban-commander-among-7-killed-in-farah-airstrikes-02993/,  accessed 
18 January 2019 

Khaama Press, Taliban executioner killed in U.S. drone strike in Zabul province, 14 December 2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/taliban-executioner-killed-in-u-s-drone-strike-in-zabul-province-02826/, 
accessed 14 January 2019 

Khaama Press, Taliban launch deadly attacks on security posts in Farah province, 17 September 2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/taliban-launch-deadly-attacks-on-security-posts-in-farah-province-
05976/, accessed 18 January 2019 

Khaama Press, Taliban leader Mullah Din Mohammad and comrades killed in Farah airstrike, 21 May 
2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/taliban-leader-mullah-din-mohammad-and-comrades-killed-in-
farah-airstrike-, accessed 7 February 2019 

Khaama  Press,  Taliban  militants  critically  wounded  in  an  airstrike  in  Kabul,  23  October  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/taliban-militants-critically-wounded-in-an-airstrike-in-kabul-06215/, 
accessed 7 February 2019  

Khaama Press, Taliban militants kidnap 170 passengers from Kunduz-Takhar highway, 20 August 2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/taliban-militants-kidnap-170-passengers-from-kunduz-takhar-highway-
05795/, accessed 18 January 2019  

 
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Khaama  Press,  Taliban  militants  kidnap  22  passengers  from  Kabul-Gardez  highway,  31  July  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/taliban-militants-kidnap-22-passengers-from-kabul-gardez-highway-
05674/, accessed 24 January 2019  

Khaama  Press,  Taliban  militants  killed  in  U.S.  drone  strike  in  Nuristan  province,  24  October  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/taliban-militants-killed-in-u-s-drone-strike-in-nuristan-province-02620/, 
accessed 25 January 2019  

Khaama  Press,  Taliban  militants  overrun  Khamab  district  in  Jawzjan  province,  10  September  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/taliban-militants-overrun-khamab-district-in-jawzjan-province-05929/, 
accessed 31 January 2019 

Khaama  Press,  Taliban  Sets  Condition  to  Reconnect  Kabul  Electricity,  19  March  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/taliban-sets-condition-to-reconnect-kabul-electricity-04679/,  accessed  4 
January 2019 

Khaama  Press,  Taliban,  ISIS  militants  suffer  heavy  casualties  in  Laghman,  Kunar  provinces,  27 
September 
https://www.khaama.com/taliban-isis-militants-suffer-heavy-casualties-in-
laghman-kunar-provinces-06041/, accessed 4 February 2019  

2018, 

Khaama  Press,  Taliban‘s  military  chief  for  Parwan  province  has  been  killed  in  an  infighting,  22 
December  2018,  https://www.khaama.com/talibans-military-chief-for-parwan-province-has-been-
killed-in-infighting-02973/, accessed 21 January 2019  

Khaama Press, Taliban‘s shadow governor of Maidan Wardak killed in ANDSF operations, 20 October 
2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/talibans-shadow-governor-for-maidan-wardak-killed-in-andsf-
operations-06193/, accessed 15 January 2019  

Khaama Press, Taliban’s deputy shadow governor dies of critical wounds in Herat, 14 October 2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/talibans-deputy-shadow-governor-dies-of-critical-wounds-in-herat-
6152/, accessed 12 February 2019 

Khaama  Press,  Taliban’s  shadow  governor  for  Ghor  has  reportedly  been  killed,  4  December  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/talibans-shadow-governor-for-ghor-has-reportedly-been-killed-02873/, 
accessed 23 January 2019 

Khaama  Press,  Taliban's  deputy  military  chief  surrenders  in  Baghlan  province,  12  August  2017, 
https://www.khaama.com/talibans-deputy-military-chief-surrenders-in-baghlan-province-03339/, 
accessed 13 February 2019 

Khaama Press, Top ISIS-K leader Qari Riaz killed in coalition airstrike in Nangarhar, 31 December 2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/top-isis-k-leader-qari-riaz-killed-in-coalition-airstrike-in-nangarhar-
03029/, accessed 30 January 2019  

Khaama  Press,  Top  Taliban 
leader  killed 
https://www.khaama.com/top-taliban-leader-killed-in-herat-drone-strike-02998/, 
January 2019 

in  Herat  drone  strike,  25  December  2018, 
30 

accessed 

Khaama  Press,  Video:  Deadly  airstrikes  target  Taliban  after  Farah  city  attack,  16  May  2018, 
https://www.khaama.com/video-deadly-airstrikes-target-taliban-after-farah-city-attack-05164/, 
accessed 18 January 2019 

  [The  Sword  Commander:  the 
دﻮﺴﻬﺑ  بﺎﺠﮐ رد  �دﺮﻣ  ﺢﻠﺴﻣ  یﺎﻫو ی�ﻧ  ﻞ�ﮑ
ﺸ�  ؛ ی�ﺸﻤﺷ  ناﺪﻧﺎﻣﻮﻗ
Khabarnama, 
formation 
2016, 
20  October 
in 
armed 
of 
http://khabarnama.net/blog/2016/10/02/new-uprising-front-emerged-in-maidan-wardak/, accessed 
15 January 2019  

Behsud], 

popular 

forces 

Kojab 

Killid  Group 
2018, 
https://tkg.af/english/2018/07/30/taliban-kidnap-9-passengers-parwan/, accessed 21 January 2019  

Passengers 

Parwan, 

Taliban 

Kidnap 

(The), 

July 

30 

in 

9 

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  317  

LA  Times  (Los  Angeles  Times),  Afghanistan  tries  to  clean  up  its  militias,  31  October  2016, 
http://www.latimes.com/world/lafg-afghanistan-militias-snap-story.html, accessed 9 January 2019 

LA  Times  (Los  Angeles  Times),  The  Marines  Returned  To  Helmand  Province.  Is  Their  Mission  A 
2017, 
Blueprint 
https://taskandpurpose.com/afghanistan-helmand-marines-trump-strategy,  accessed  25  January 
2019 

Afghanistan 

November 

Strategy?, 

Trump’s 

For 

15 

Larsson,  K.,  A  Provincial  Survey  of  Balkh,  Jowzjan,  Samangan  and  Saripul,  November  2008, 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.373.684&rep=rep1&type=pdf,  accessed 
31 January 2019 

Le Figaro, En Afghanistan, l‘Iran accroît son aide aux talibans, 19 September 2018 [In Afghanistan, Iran 
at: 
increases 
https://www.institutkurde.org/publications/bulletins/pdf/402.pdf, accessed 29 January 2019  

available 

Taliban], 

support 

the 

its 

to 

Lifos (Center för landinformation och landanalys inom migrationsområdet), Inrikesflyg I Afghanistan, 
7  February  2019,  https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1458028/1226_1550669878_190207700.pdf, 
accessed 25 March 2019 

ll  Messaggero,  Afghanistan,  sangue  sul  disimpegno  Usa:  autobomba  die  talebani  contro  scuola 
militare, 130 vittime [Afghanistan, blood on the U.S. lack of commitment: Taliban car-bomb against 
military 
2019, 
https://www.ilmessaggero.it/pay/edicola/afghanistan_autobomba_morti_talebani-4246561.html, 
accessed 22 January 2019  

victims], 

January 

school, 

130 

22 

LWJ  (Long  War  Journal),  ‚Al  Mujahir  Jihadi  Studio‘  releases  video  of  attack  on  base  in  Paktika,  7 
September 
2012, 
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/09/al_muhajir_jihadi_studio_relea.php, accessed 25 
January 2019  

LWJ (Long War Journal), Afghan forces target al Qaeda commanders in Helmand and Nangarhar, 7 
August  2018,  https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/afghan-forces-target-al-qaeda-
commanders-in-helmand-and-nangarhar.php, accessed 28 January 2019 

LWJ (Long War Journal), Afghan forces withdraw from district center in Uruzgan as the Taliban attacks, 
29  May  2018,  https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/05/afghan-withdraw-from-district-
center-in-uruzgan-as-the-taliban-attacks.php, accessed 16 January 2019  

LWJ (Long War Journal), Analysis: US military downplays district control as Taliban gains ground in 
January  2019,  https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/01/analysis-us-
Afghanistan,  31 
military-downplays-district-control-as-taliban-gains-ground-in-afghanistan.php, 
13 
February 2019  

accessed 

LWJ (Long War Journal), As security in Farah worsens, Taliban stage deadly attack, 24 February 2018, 
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/02/as-security-in-farah-worsens-taliban-stage-
deadly-attack.php, accessed 18 January 2019 

LWJ  (Long  War  Journal),  IMU,  Taliban  launched  joint  suicide  assualt  in  Panjshir,  1  June  2013, 
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/06/imu_taliban_launched.php, accessed 22 January 
2019  

LWJ  (Long  War  Journal),  Islamic  State‘s  emir  for  its  Khorasan  province  killed,  26  August  2018, 
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/islamic-states-emir-for-its-khorasan-province-
reported-killed.php, accessed 25 January 2019  

LWJ  (Long  War  Journal),  Mapping  Taliban  Control 
https://www.longwarjournal.org/mapping-taliban-control-in-afghanistan, accessed 23 April 2019 

in  Afghanistan,  as  of  23  April  2019, 

 
318 — 

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LWJ (Long War Journal), Mapping the emergence of the Islamic State in Afghanistan, 5 March 2015, 
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/03/mapping-the-emergence-of-the-islamic-state-in-
afghanistan.php, accessed 12 February 2019 

LWJ (Long War Journal), Taliban Assaults Provincial Capital in southeastern Afghanistan, 22 May 2017, 
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/05/taliban-assaults-provincial-capital-in-
southeastern-afghanistan.php, accessed 13 February 2019  

LWJ  (Long  War  Journal),  Taliban  blockade  of  Ghazni-Paktia  highway  enters  second  month,  9  June 
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/06/taliban-blockade-of-ghazni-paktia-
2018, 
highway-enters-second-month.php, accessed 24 January 2019  

LWJ  (Long  War  Journal),  Taliban  claim  suicide  assault 
in  Panjshir  Valley,  2  May  2014, 
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/05/taliban_claim_suicide_assault.php,  accessed  22 
January 2019  

LWJ (Long War Journal), Taliban continues to host foreign terrorist groups, despite assurances to the 
contrary, 7 February 2019, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/02/taliban-continues-to-
host-foreign-terrorist-groups-despite-assurances-to-the-contrary.php, accessed 12 February 2019  

LWJ (Long War Journal), Taliban controls or contests scores of districts in Afghanistan, 5 October 2015, 
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/10/taliban-controls-or-contests-scores-of-districts-
in-afghanistan.php, accessed 13 February 2019  

LWJ  (Long  War  Journal),  Taliban  overruns  Afghan  army  camp  in  Kandahar,  19  October  2017, 
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/10/taliban-overrun-afghan-army-camp-in-
kandahar.php, accessed 8 January 2019 

LWJ (Long War Journal), Taliban promotes training camp for ‚Commando Mujahidin‘, 22 January 2019, 
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/01/taliban-promotes-training-camp-for-
commando-mujahidin.php, accessed 25 January 2019  

LWJ (Long War Journal), Taliban shadow governor for Helmand killed in US airstrike, 2 December 2018, 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  3  civilians  killed,  4  injured  in  Parwan  overnight  raid,  23  November  2018, 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  3  Ghazni  police  killed,  5  injured  in  Taliban  attack,  1  January  2019, 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  30  militants  eliminated  in  Daikundi  operation,  27  December  2018, 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  33  crime  suspects  detained 
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Pajhwok Afghan News, 33 Security Personnel Flee Ajristan, Get Shelter in Daikundi, 14 August 2018, 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  35  Paktika  schools  closed  over  insecurity:  official,  16  December  2018, 
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Pajhwok Afghan News, 36 ANA Soldiers, 8 ALP Personnel Killed in Baghlan Battle, 15 August 2018, 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  38  Taliban  killed 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  4  civilians  killed  in  Wardak  roadside  bombing,  7  September  2018, 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  4  civilians  killed,  2  injured  in  Maidan  Wardak  bombing,  24  May  2018, 
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Pajhwok Afghan News, 4 civilians wounded in clash on Mazar-Shebrghan highway, 13 November 2018, 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  4  construction  firm  workers  kidnapped  in  Samangan,  25  February  2018, 
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Pajhwok Afghan News, 4 killed, 9 injured in attack on funeral prayers in Balkh, 14 December 2018, 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  4  militants  killed 
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Pajhwok Afghan News, 4 polling observers killed after being kidnapped in Balkh, 21 October 2018, 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  4  pro-government  fighters  killed  in  Jawzjan  attack,  10  January  2019, 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  4  Taliban  who  stormed  Ghor  voter  center  killed,  10  May  2018, 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  45  Rebels  Killed 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  46  killed,  240  injured  in  nationwide  poll  violence,  20  October  2018, 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  46  militants  killed,  33  injured  in  past  24  hours:  MoD,  4  January  2019, 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  5  ALP  men  killed,  3  wounded  in  Baghlan  attack,  14  March  2018, 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  5  ANA  soldiers  killed,  6  wounded  in  Taliban  assault,  2  January  2019, 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  5  civilians  killed,  7  wounded  in  Paktika  bomb  blast,  7  January  2019, 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  5  health  workers  kidnapped 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  5  of  a  family  killed  in  Khost  raid  by  Afghan  special  forces,  8  July  2018, 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  5  of  a  family  killed 
in  Takhar  mortar  strike,  13  August  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/08/13/5-family-killed-takhar-mortar-strike, accessed 17 January 
2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  5  Pakistani  soldiers  killed 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/04/16/5-pakistani-soldiers-killed-border-clash, 
February 2019 

in  border  clash,  16  April  2018, 
5 

accessed 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  5  policemen,  as  many  militants  killed  in  Badghis  clash,  4  September  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/09/04/5-policemen-many-militants-killed-badghis-clash, 
accessed 21 December 2018 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  50  Italian  troops  in  Farah  to  support  Afghan  forces,  7  February  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/02/07/50-italian-troops-farah-support-afghan-forces,  accessed 
18 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  50  rebels  killed,  80pc  of  Tagab  area  cleared,  6  December  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/12/06/50-rebels-killed-80pc-tagab-area-cleared,  accessed  4 
February 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  6  civilians  killed  in  Miadan  [sic!]  Wardak  airstrike,  23  January  2019, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2019/01/23/6-civilians-killed-miadan-wardak-airstrike,  accessed  24 
January 2019  

in  Shindand  rickshaw  blast,  9  April  2018, 
Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  6  killed,  7  wounded 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/04/09/6-killed-7-wounded-shindad-rickshaw-blast, accessed 12 
January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  6  months  on,  Ghazni-Paktika  highway  remains  closed,  13  December  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/12/13/6-months-ghazni-paktika-highway-remains-closed, 
accessed 25 January 2019  

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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  6  Policemen,  8  Militants  Killed  in  Badghis  Clash,  17  September  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/09/17/6-policemen-8-militants-killed-badghis-clash,  accessed 
21 December 2018 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  6  Taliban  killed  in  clash  with  Jawzjan  uprising  force,  2  September  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/09/02/6-taliban-killed-clash-jawzjan-uprising-force, 
accessed 
31 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  60  Daesh  rebels  killed  and  wounded  in  Jawzjan  offensive,  17  March  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/03/17/60-daesh-rebels-killed-and-wounded-jawzjan-offensive, 
accessed 31 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  62  insurgents  killed,  17  injured  in  fresh  raids:  MoD,  20  September  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/09/20/62-insurgents-killed-17-injured-fresh-raids-mod, 
accessed 5 February 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  7  Afghan  Local  Police  Personnel  Killed  in  Baghlan  Assault,  18  August  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/08/18/7-afghan-local-police-personnel-killed-baghlan-assault, 
accessed 3 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  7  members  of  a  family  killed  in  Khost  operation,  8  February  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/02/08/7-members-family-killed-khost-operation,  accessed  5 
February 2019 

Pajhwok Afghan News, 7 people killed, 37 wounded in Maidan Wardak car bombing, 27 October 2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/10/27/7-people-killed-37-wounded-maidan-wardak-car-
bombing, accessed 15 January 2019  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  7  pro-govt  fighters,  2  policemen  killed  in  Daikundi  clash,  23  July  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/07/23/7-pro-govt-fighters-2-policemen-killed-daikundi-clash, 
accessed 16 January 2019 

Pajhwok Afghan News, 7 Taliban killed, 3 Daesh financiers held in Laghman, Nangarhar, 3 November 
2018,  https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/03/7-taliban-killed-3-daesh-financiers-held-laghman-
nangarhar, accessed 4 February 2019  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  7  Taliban  killed,  9  suspected  deatained  in  Logar,  25  November  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/25/7-taliban-killed-9-suspects-detained-logar-raid, accessed 
1 February 2019  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  71  militants  killed  in  round-the-clock  operations:  MoD,  23  March  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/03/23/71-militants-killed-round-clock-operations-mod, 
accessed 31 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  72  Taliban  Killed 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/07/06/72-taliban-killed-round-clock-raids, 
December 2018 

in  Round-the-Clock  Raids,  6 

July  2018, 
21 

accessed 

raid,  21  November  2018, 
Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  8  civilians  killed 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/21/8-civilians-killed-logar-night-raid,  accessed  15  January 
2019 

in  Logar  night 

Pajhwok Afghan News, 8 killed, 45 wounded in Baghlan election related incidents, 20 October 2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/10/20/8-killed-45-wounded-baghlan-election-related-
incidents, accessed 3 January 2019 

Pajhwok Afghan News, 8 Taliban, 2 children killed in Laghman, Kapisa airstrikes, 26 November 2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/26/8-taliban-2-children-killed-laghman-kapisa-airstrikes, 
accessed 4 February 2019  

 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  8  Taliban,  3  ANA  soldiers  killed  in  Zabul  battle,  19  December  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/12/19/8-taliban-3-ana-soldiers-killed-zabul-battle,  accessed  14 
January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  8  years  on,  Harirod  bridge  still  incomplete  in  Ghor,  27  November  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/27/8-years-harirod-bridge-still-incomplete-ghor,  accessed 
23 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  9  ALP  personnel  killed  in  attack  on  Balkh  post,  18  September  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/09/18/9-alp-personnel-killed-attack-balkh-post,  accessed  15 
January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  9  civilians  killed  &  wounded  in  Paktika  airstrike,  6  November  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/06/9-civilians-killed-wounded-paktika-airstrike, accessed 25 
January 2019  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  9  Daesh,  3  Taliban  killed  in  Jawzjan,  Farah  incidents,  27  March  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/03/27/9-daesh-3-taliban-killed-jawzjan-farah-incidents, 
accessed 31 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Abducted  health  workers  released 
in  Ghor,  11  March  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/03/11/abducted-health-workers-released-ghor,  accessed  24 
January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Above  100  Rebels  Slain  in  Past  24  Hours,  Says  MoD,  13  April  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/04/13/above-100-rebels-slain-past-24-hours-says-mod, 
accessed 21 December 2018 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Afghan,  Pakistani  forces  clash  over  border  fence,  14  October  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/10/14/afghan-pakistani-forces-clash-over-border-fence, 
accessed 17 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Af-Pak  trade  via  Ghulam  Khan  route  set  to  resume,  5  March  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/03/05/af-pak-trade-ghulam-khan-route-set-resume, accessed 5 
February 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  After  Tala  wa  Barfak,  Taliban  eying  Bamyan’s  Kahmard,  12  May  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/05/12/after-tala-wa-barfak-taliban-eying-
bamyan%E2%80%99s-kahmard, accessed 8 January 2019 

Pajhwok 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/node/506202, accessed 31 January 2019 

Afghan  News, 

Daesh, 

Strikes 

Jawzjan, 

Air 

on 

7 

February 

2018, 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Airstrikes  kill  15  Taliban 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/12/06/airstrikes-kill-15-taliban-farah-nimroz, 
January 2019  

in  Farah,  Nimroz,  6  December  2018, 
29 

accessed 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  ALP  Commander  Killed  by  Taliban  in  Baghlan  Attack,  20  December  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/12/20/alp-commander-killed-taliban-baghlan-attack,  accessed 
3 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  ANA  soldiers  accused  of  harassing  civilians,  11  April  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/04/11/ana-soldiers-accused-harassing-civilians,  accessed  17 
February 2019 

Pajhwok Afghan News, Anti-Taliban operation launched in Baghlan’s Dand-i-Ghori, 5 November 2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/05/anti-taliban-operation-launched-baghlan%E2%80%99s-
dand-i-ghori, accessed 3 January 2019 

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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Appellant  court  worker  gunned  down  in  Parwan,  17  February  2019, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2019/02/17/appellant-court-worker-gunned-down-parwan, accessed 
25 February 2019 

Afghan 

n.d., 
Pajhwok 
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January 2019  

Background 

Province, 

Faryab 

Profile 

News, 

Afghan 

Pajhwok 
n.d., 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/badakhshan-administrative-units,  accessed  25  February 
2019 

Badakhshan 

Background 

province, 

profile 

News, 

of 

Pajhwok 
Background 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/background-profile-balkh, accessed 15 January 2019   

Afghan 

Profile 

News, 

Balkh, 

of 

n.d., 

Afghan 

Pajhwok 
n.d., 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/background-profile-bamyan-province, accessed 8 January 
2019 

Background 

Province, 

Bamyan 

Profile 

News, 

of 

Pajhwok 
Background 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/background-profile-farah, accessed 17 January 2019 

Afghan 

Profile 

Farah, 

News, 

of 

n.d., 

Background 
Pajhwok 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/background-profile-ghazni, accessed 22 January 2019  

Ghazni, 

Afghan 

Profile 

News, 

of 

n.d., 

Afghan 

Pajhwok 
n.d., 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/background-profile-herat-province-1, accessed 29 January 
2019 

Background 

province, 

profile 

News, 

Herat 

of 

Afghan 

Pajhwok 
Background 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/background-profile-laghman-province, 
January 2019 

Laghman 

profile 

News, 

of 

province, 

accessed 

n.d., 
25 

Pajhwok 
Background 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/background-profile-logar, accessed 1 February 2019  

Afghan 

Profile 

Logar, 

News, 

of 

n.d., 

Pajhwok 
Background 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/background-profile-nimroz, accessed 29 January 2019  

Nimroz, 

Afghan 

profile 

News, 

of 

n.d., 

Pajhwok 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/background-profile-nuristan, accessed 25 January 2019  

Background 

Nuristan, 

Afghan 

Profile 

News, 

of 

n.d., 

Pajhwok 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/back-ground-profile-paktika, accessed 25 January 2019  

Background 

Paktika, 

Afghan 

Profile 

News, 

of 

n.d., 

Afghan 

Pajhwok 
Background 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/background-profile-sar-i-pul-province, 
January 2019  

Sar-i-Pul 

Profile 

News, 

of 

province, 

accessed 

n.d., 
18 

Afghan 

n.d., 
Pajhwok 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/background-profile-takhar-province, accessed 19 January 
2019  

Background 

province, 

Takhar 

profile 

News, 

of 

Background 
Pajhwok 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/background-profile-zabul, accessed 8 January 2019  

Afghan 

profile 

News, 

Zabul, 

of 

Afghan 

Pajhwok 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/background-profile-paktia-province-0, 
January 2019 

Background 

Profile 

News, 

Paktia 

Province, 

accessed 

n.d., 

n.d., 
24 

 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Badakhshan  Gold,  Copper  Mines  Contracts  Signed,  6  October  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/10/06/badakhshan-gold-balkhab-copper-mines-contracts-
signed, accessed 13 December 2018 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Badakhshan:  8  Security  Personnel  Among  23  Killed,  16  July  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/07/16/badakhshan-8-security-personnel-among-23-killed, 
accessed 13 December 2018 

Pajhwok 
n.d., 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/badghis-administrative-units, accessed 21 December 2018 

Administrative 

Badghis 

Afghan 

News, 

Units, 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Badghis:  Taliban  Capture  Maqur´s  Village,  16  May  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/05/16/badghis-taliban-capture-maqur%E2%80%99s-village, 
accessed 27 December 2018 

Pajhwok 
Baghlan 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/baghlan-administrative-units, accessed 2 January 2019 

administrative 

Afghan 

News, 

units, 

n.d., 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Battle  for  Ghor’s  Awshan  area  takes  46  lives:  Official,  13  May  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/05/13/battle-ghor%E2%80%99s-awshan-area-takes-46-lives-
official, accessed 24 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Border  police  among  23  killed  in  Kandahar  firefight,  5  January  2019, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2019/01/05/border-police-among-23-killed-kandahar-firefight, 
accessed 1 February 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Both  Taliban,  ALP  take  ushr  from  Tagab  residents,  20  February  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/02/20/both-taliban-alp-take-ushr-tagab-residents,  accessed  4 
February 2019 

Afghan 

n.d., 
introduction 
Pajhwok 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/brief-introduction-uruzgan-province, accessed 16 January 
2019  

province, 

Uruzgan 

News, 

Brief 

of 

Pajhwok Afghan News, Commuters say insecurity worsens on Balkh-Jawzjan road, 18 November 2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/18/commuters-say-insecurity-worsens-balkh-jawzjan-road, 
accessed 31 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Conflict  Displaces  Around  300  Badakhshan  Families,  27  August  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/08/27/conflict-displaces-around-300-badakhshan-families, 
accessed 13 December 2018 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Crimes  on  the 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/03/03/crimes-increase-farah-say-residents, 
January 2019 

in  Farah,  say  residents,  3  March  2018, 
15 

accessed 

increase 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Current  Salang  tunnel  insufficient,  says  President  Ghani,  15  October  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/10/15/current-salang-tunnel-insufficient-says-president-ghani, 
accessed 15 January 2019  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Daesh  behead  alleged  govt  spy 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/06/21/daesh-behead-alleged-govt-spy-jawzjan, 
February 2019 

Jawzjan,  21 

in 

June  2018, 
accessed  1 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Daesh  fighters  killed  in  Nuristan,  Kunar  airstrikes,  15  January  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/01/15/daesh-fighters-killed-nuristan-kunar-airstrikes,  accessed 
25 January 2019  

Pajhwok 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/daikundi-province-background-profile, 16 January 2019  

background 

Daikundi 

province 

profile, 

Afghan 

News, 

n.d., 

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—  335  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Daikundi  residents  concerned  about  Daesh  in  neighborhood,  3  June  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/06/03/daikundi-residents-concerned-about-daesh-
neighborhood, accessed 8 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Daikundi:  80pc  of  Pato  residents  without  Tazkira,  6  May  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/05/06/daikundi-80pc-pato-residents-without-tazkira,  accessed 
16 January 2019 

Pajhwok Afghan News, Dand-i-Shahabuddin Residents Seek Compensation for Destroyed Homes, 3 
February  2018,  https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/02/03/dand-i-shahabuddin-residents-seek-
compensation-destroyed-homes, accessed 3 January 2019 

Pajhwok Afghan News, Dilipidated Kandahar road gives passengers bumpy ride, 14 November 2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/14/dilapidated-kandahar-road-gives-passengers-bumpy-
ride, accessed 16 January 2019  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  District  chief,  intelligence  director  killed  in  Logar  roadside  bombing,  18 
November  2018,  https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/18/district-chief-intelligence-director-
killed-logar-roadside-bombing, accessed 1 February 2019  

Pajhwok Afghan News, District Police Chief Killed in Badghis Roadside Bombing, 5 September 2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/09/05/district-police-chief-killed-badghis-roadside-bombing, 
accessed 21 December 2018 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Dozens  of  illegal  armed  group  active  in  Samangan,  8  April  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/04/08/dozens-illegal-armed-groups-active-samangan,  accessed 
21 January 2019  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Drug  addicts‘  population  triples  in  Nimroz  this  year,  9  July  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/07/09/drug-addicts%E2%80%99-population-triples-nimroz-
year, accessed 29 January 2019  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News, 
-  Badakhshan  Administrative  Units,  n.d., 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/badakhshan-administrative-units,  accessed  25  January 
2019 

Elections  2018 

Pajhwok 
2018 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/faryab-administrative-units, accessed 25 January 2019 

Adminstrative  Units, 

Afghan  News, 

Elections 

Faryab 

- 

n.d., 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Farah:  Taliban  overrun  Anar  Dara  district,  12  March  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/03/12/farah-taliban-overrun-anar-dara-district,  accessed  18 
January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Faryab  Governor  Denies  Khwaja  Musa  Fell  to  Taliban,  2  March  2016, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2016/03/02/faryab-governor-denies-khwaja-musa-fell-taliban, 
accessed 17 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Fearing  violence,  80pc  Kunduz  voters  stayed  home,  27  October  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/10/27/fearing-violence-80pc-kunduz-voters-stayed-home, 
accessed 4 February 2019  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Feeling  unsafe,  traders  &  well-off  persons  flee  Parwan,  1  December  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/12/01/feeling-unsafe-traders-well-persons-flee-parwan, 
accessed 16 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Fierce  clash  ongoing  for  control  of  Ajiristan  district  HQ,  20  May  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/05/20/fierce-clash-ongoing-control-ajiristan-district-hq, 
accessed 16 January 2019 

 
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in  Jawzjan,  11  April  2018, 
Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Frenchman  among  8  rebels  killed 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/04/11/frenchman-among-8-rebels-killed-jawzjan,  accessed  31 
January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Ghazni 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/21/ghazni-darkness-5-days-after-power-cables-cut, 
accessed 15 January 2019  

in  darkness  since  5  days  after  power  cables  cut, 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Ghor  residents  fume  over  suspension  of  flights,  19  March  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/03/19/ghor-residents-fume-over-suspension-flights, accessed 8 
January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Ghor:  Taliban  kidnap  6 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/07/23/ghor-taliban-kidnap-6-including-3-girl-students, 
accessed 24 January 2019 

including  3  girl  students,  23  July  2018, 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Ghor:  Taliban  lash  18-year-old  girl  on  elopement  charges,  28  June  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/06/28/ghor-taliban-lash-18-year-old-girl-elopement-charges, 
accessed 23 January 2019 

Pajhwok Afghan News, Girl killed, 6 family members injured in mortar shell attack, 11 August 2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/08/11/girl-killed-6-family-members-injured-mortar-shell-
attack, accessed 3 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Govt  won´t  talk  peace  from  a  weak  position:  Ghani,  1  June  2015, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/06/01/govt-won%E2%80%99t-talk-peace-weak-position-ghani, 
accessed 26 March 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Gunmen  attack,  vandalize  Nuristan  radio  station,  23  December  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/12/23/gunmen-attack-vandalize-nuristan-radio-station, 
accessed 17 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Gunmen  set  on  fire  a  middle  school  in  Paktika,  29  December  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/12/29/gunmen-set-fire-middle-school-paktika,  accessed  17 
January 2019 

Pajhwok 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/04/26/hajigak-pass-reopens-traffic, accessed 8 January 2019 

Afghan  News,  Hajigak 

Reopens 

Traffic, 

April 

Pass 

for 

26 

2015, 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Herat  intelligence  officer  killed  in  Taliban  ambush,  30  November  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/30/herat-intelligence-officer-killed-taliban-ambush, 
accessed 30 January 2019 

Pajhwok Afghan News, Herat truck drivers say intimidated for extortion by police, 5 January 2019, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2019/01/05/herat-truck-drivers-say-intimidated-extortion-police, 
accesssed 4 February 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Hundreds  flee  Sar-i-Pul’s  Tabar  area,  clash  continues,  14  December  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2017/12/14/hundreds-flee-sar-i-pul%E2%80%99s-tabar-area-clash-
continues, accessed 24 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Hundreds  of  Daesh  rebels  emerge  in  Kunar:  police  chief,  5  July  2017, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2017/07/05/hundreds-daesh-rebels-emerge-kunar-police-chief, 
accessed 6 February 2019  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Illegal  armed  men  threaten  Mazar-i-Sharif  security,  22  May  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/05/22/illegal-armed-men-threaten-mazar-i-sharif-security, 
accessed 15 January 2019 

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—  337  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Illegal  armed  men’s  influence  growing  in  Daikundi:  PC  member,  30  August 
2015, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/08/30/illegal-armed-men%E2%80%99s-influence-
growing-daikundi-pc-member, accessed 17 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Illegal  Extraction  of  Badakhshan  Mines  Goes  On,  7  January  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/01/07/illegal-extraction-badakhshan-mines-goes,  accessed  8 
January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News, 
Illegal  extraction  of  Logar  chromites  goes  on,  6  October  2015, 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/2015/10/06/illegal-extraction-logar-chromites-goes,  accessed  1 
February 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Illegal  gunmen  seen  behind  insecurity  in  Mazar-i-Sharif,  25  January  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/01/25/illegal-gunmen-seen-behind-insecurity-mazar-i-sharif, 
accessed 15 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News, 
incidents  worry  Kunduzis,  15  March  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/03/15/increasing-kidnap-incidents-worry-kunduzis, accessed 14 
January 2019 

Increasing  kidnap 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News, 
July  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/07/18/‘insecurity-growing-kabul-gardez-highway’,  accessed  24 
January 2019  

Insecurity  growing  on  Kabul-Gardez  highway‘,  18 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News, 
July  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/07/18/‘insecurity-growing-kabul-gardez-highway’,  accessed  24 
January 2019 

Insecurity  growing  on  Kabul-Gardez  highway‘,  18 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Iranians  among  29  insurgents  killed  in  Faryab  clashes,  2  January  2019, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2019/01/02/iranians-among-29-insurgents-killed-faryab-clashes, 
accessed 21 January 2019 

Pajhwok 
Jawzjan 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/jawzjan-background-profile, accessed 31 January 2019 

background 

profile, 

Afghan 

News, 

n.d., 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/04/jawzjan-clash-leaves-20-taliban-dead, 
January 2019 

leaves  20  Taliban  dead,  4  November  2018, 
31 

Jawzjan  clash 

accessed 

leaves  37  dead  and  wounded,  13  January  2019, 
Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Jawzjan  clash 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2019/01/13/jawzjan-clash-leaves-37-dead-and-wounded,  accessed 
31 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Jawzjan:  Daesh  militants  behead  12-year-old  child,  17  April  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/04/17/jawzjan-daesh-militants-behead-12-year-old-child, 
accessed 1 February 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Judges,  attorneys  not  available  in  3  Khost  districts,  31  December  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/12/31/judges-attorneys-not-available-3-khost-districts, 
accessed 5 February 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Kabul  in  darkness  as  Taliban  blow  up  power  pylon,  26  March  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/03/26/kabul-darkness-taliban-blow-power-pylon,  accessed  3 
January 2019 

Afghan 

Pajhwok 
n.d., 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/kabul-province-background-profile,  accessed  7  February 
2019  

background 

province 

profile, 

News, 

Kabul 

 
338 — 

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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Kajran  district  may  fall  to  Taliban,  residents  warn,  25  March  2015, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/03/25/kajran-district-may-fall-taliban-residents-warn, accessed 
17 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Kandahar  Trader  Assists  Chahar  Darah  War-Hit  Families,  30  January  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/01/30/kandahar-trader-assists-chahar-dara-war-hit-families, 
accessed 27 February 2019  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Khost  market  unaffected  by  closure  of  Pakistan  border,  8  July  2016, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2016/07/08/khost-market-unaffected-closure-pakistan-border, 
accessed 5 February 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Kunduz  Clashes  Displace  Hundreds  of  Families,  2  May  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/05/02/kunduz-clashes-displace-hundreds-families, accessed 27 
February 2019  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News, 
Laghman,  19  February  2019, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2019/02/19/landmine-kills-6-civilians-laghman, accessed 24 February 
2019 

Landime  kills  6 

civilians 

in 

Pajhwok Afghan News, Lawmaker Qudratullah Zaki Survives Taliban’s Attack in Baghlan, 16 April 2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/04/16/lawmaker-qudratullah-zaki-survives-
taliban%E2%80%99s-attack-baghlan, accessed 3 January 2019 

 Pajhwok Afghan News, Lecturer among 5 passengers killed on Uruzgan-Kandahar highway, 25 April 
2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/04/25/lecturer-among-5-passengers-killed-uruzgan-
kandahar-highway, accessed 12 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Leftover  bomb  kills  3  children 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/10/11/leftover-bomb-kills-3-children-paktika, 
January 2019 

in  Paktika,  11  October  2018, 
24 

accessed 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Man‘s  body  found  with  Taliban  letter  in  Nimroz,  16  November  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/16/man%E2%80%99s-body-found-taliban-letter-nimroz, 
accessed 29 January 2019  

Pajhwok Afghan News, Mazar-i-Sharif garrison failing to bar illegal gunmen: Residents, 7 March 2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/03/07/mazar-i-sharif-garrison-failing-bar-illegal-gunmen-
residents, accessed 15 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Mazar-i-Sharif-Turkey-Europe  air  corridor  formally  opens,  9  January  2019, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2019/01/09/mazar-i-sharif-turkey-europe-air-corridor-formally-
opens, accessed 15 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Militants,  civilians  suffered  casualties  in  Kandahar  raid,  19  January  2019, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2019/01/19/militants-civilians-suffered-casualties-kandahar-raid, 
accessed 1 February 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Mineral 
http://mines.pajhwok.com/news/mineral-resources-daikundi-province, accessed 16 January 2019  

resources  of  Daikundi  province,  1  February  2014, 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Mineral 
July  2014, 
http://mines.pajhwok.com/news/mineral-resources-samangan-province, accessed 21 January 2019  

resources  of  Samangan  province,  23 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  More  than  100  IDP  Families  Get  Cash,  Food  in  Aid,  15  January  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/01/15/more-100-idp-families-get-cash-food-aid,  accessed  27 
February 2019  

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—  339  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  More  than  200,000  tourists  visit  Bamyan  this  year,    3  September  2017, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2017/09/03/more-200000-tourists-visit-bamyan-year,  accessed  8 
January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Mortar  shells  kills  2  children 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/03/22/mortar-shell-kills-2-children-uruzgan, 
January 2019 

in  Uruzgan,  22  March  2018, 
15 

accessed 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  MPs  fear  Kunduz-style  attacks  in  other  provinces,  5  October  2015, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/10/05/mps-fear-kunduz-style-attacks-other-provinces, 
accessed 24 January 2019 

Pajhwok Afghan News, Nad Ali district administrative chief survives Taliban attack, 13 January 2019, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2019/01/13/nad-ali-district-administrative-chief-survives-taliban-
attack, accessed 28 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Nearly  100  Militants  Killed  in  Past  24  Hours:  MoD,  9  March  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/03/09/nearly-100-militants-killed-past-24-hours-mod, accessed 
21 December 2018 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Nearly  a  dozen  insurgents  killed,  7  wounded  in  Faryab,  3  January  2019, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2019/01/03/nearly-dozen-insurgents-killed-7-wounded-faryab, 
accessed 21 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Nimroz  farmers  in  despair  as  drought  kills  livestock,  2  January  2019, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2019/01/02/nimroz-farmers-despair-drought-kills-livestock, accessed 
29 January 2019  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Nimroz:  Taliban  kill  6  policemen,  snatch  weapons,  14  July  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/07/14/nimroz-taliban-kill-6-policemen-snatch-weapons, 
accessed 29 January 2019  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  No  Deliberation  on  Chinese  Military  Base:  NSC,  17  February  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/02/17/no-deliberation-chinese-military-base-nsc,  accessed  13 
December 2018 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  No  elections  in  3  high  security  risk  districts  of  Jawzjan,  17  October  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/10/17/no-elections-3-high-security-risk-districts-jawzjan, 
accessed 1 February 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Offensive  soon  to  drive  rebels  from  Gardez-Paktika  road,  7  June  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/06/07/offensive-soon-drive-rebels-gardez-paktika-road, 
accessed 26 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Ongoing  Clashes  Displace  1,500  Families  in  Takhar,  4  November  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/04/ongoing-clashes-displace-1500-families-takhar, accessed 
27 February 2019  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Operations  Underway  to  Ensure  Polls  Security:  MoD,  10  September  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/09/10/operations-underway-ensure-polls-security-mod, 
accessed 3 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Over  60  rebels  killed  in  military  offensives  countrywide,  9  February  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/02/09/over-60-rebels-killed-military-offensives-countrywide, 
accessed 31 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Over  70  militants  killed,  scores  injured  in  nation-wide  operations:  MoD,  4 
January  2019,  https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2019/01/04/over-70-militants-killed-scores-injured-
nation-wide-operations-mod, accessed 23 January 2019 

 
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Pajhwok Afghan News, Paktia’s Janikhel residents concerned over ongoing unrest, 18 August 2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/08/18/paktia%E2%80%99s-janikhel-residents-concerned-over-
ongoing-unrest, accessed 24 January 2019 

Panjsher 
Pajhwok 
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/panjsher-background-profile, accessed 11 January 2019 

background 

profile, 

Afghan 

News, 

n.d., 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Part  of  Balkh’s  Dawlatabad  district  falls  to  Taliban,  3  September  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/09/03/part-balkh%E2%80%99s-dawlatabad-district-falls-
taliban, accessed 15 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Parwan-Bamyan  highway  closed  amid  fierce  clash,  27  July  2017, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2017/07/27/parwan-bamyan-highway-closed-amid-fierce-clash, 
accessed 21 January 2019  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Police  among  4  dead  as  blasts,  clashes  rock  Kabul,  9  May  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/05/09/police-among-4-dead-blasts-clashes-rock-kabul, 
accessed 12 February 2019  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Police  retake  40  Samangan  villages  from  Taliban,  15  October  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/10/15/police-retake-40-samangan-villages-taliban, accessed 21 
January 2019  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Policeman  among  3  killed 
in  Jawzjan  clash,  8  November  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/08/policeman-among-3-killed-jawzjan-clash,  accessed  31 
January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Policemen  among  15  rebels  killed  in  Jawzjan  clash,  8  June  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/06/08/policemen-among-15-rebels-killed-jawzjan-clash, 
accessed 31 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Polls  in  Nawamesh  being  administered  from  Helmand,  29  July  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/07/29/polls-nawamesh-being-administered-helmand,  accessed 
28 January 2019 

in  Panjshir  province,1 
Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  President,  CEO  arrive 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2016/01/01/president-ceo-arrive-panjshir-province, 
January 2019  

January  2016, 
accessed  22 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Protest  as  airstrike  kills  4  civilians 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/07/09/protest-airstrike-kills-4-civilians-logar, 
January 2019 

in  Logar,  9 

July  2018, 
9 

accessed 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Protesting  Baghlan  Candidates  Conditionally  Reopen  North  Highway,  26 
November 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/26/protesting-baghlan-candidates-
conditionally-reopen-north-highway, accessed 3 January 2019 

2018, 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Protestors  Block  Road  Over  Civilian  Casualties,  17  April  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/04/17/protestors-block-road-over-civilian-casualties,  accessed 
3 January 2019 

Afghan 

Pajhwok 
n.d., 
of 
https://www.elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/recognition-southern-helmand-province,  accessed 
25 January 2019 

Recognition 

province, 

southern 

Helmand 

News, 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Reconstructed  Gardez-Khost  highway  inaugurated,  15  December  2015, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/12/15/reconstructed-gardez-khost-highway-inaugurated, 
accessed 24 January 2019  

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—  341  

Pajhwok Afghan News, Rise in drug-related crimes worries ‘Powder Street’ dwellers, 18 November 
2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/18/rise-drug-related-crimes-worries-
%E2%80%98powder-street%E2%80%99-dwellers, accessed 27 February 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Salang  Highway’s  Bad  Condition  Triggers  Protest,  11  July  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/07/11/salang-highway%E2%80%99s-bad-condition-triggers-
protest, accessed 3 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Scores  of  Rebels,  Security  Personnel  Killed  in  Clashes,  14  December  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/12/14/scores-rebels-security-personnel-killed-clashes, 
accessed 21 December 2018 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Security  guards  of  top  officials  clash  at  Hairatan  port,  17  September  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/09/17/security-guards-top-officials-clash-hairatan-port, 
accessed 15 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Seized  2  days  ago,  Taliban  release  Parwan  teachers,  31  January  2019, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2019/01/31/seized-2-days-ago-taliban-release-parwan-teachers, 
accessed 18 February 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Taliban  abduct  60  coal  truck  drivers  in  Samangan,  2  December  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/12/02/taliban-abduct-60-coal-truck-drivers-samangan, 
accessed 18 February 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Taliban  Again  Blow  Up  Power  Pylon 
in  Baghlan,  14  April  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/04/14/taliban-again-blow-power-pylon-baghlan,  accessed  4 
January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Taliban  Ask  Baghlan  Traders  to  Pay  Them  Taxes,  14  May  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/05/14/taliban-ask-baghlan-traders-pay-them-taxes,  accessed  3 
January 2019 

Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban capture 2 checkpoints in Balkh’s Chahar Bolak district, 15 September 
2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/09/15/taliban-capture-2-checkpoints-
balkh%E2%80%99s-chahar-bolak-district, accessed 15 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Taliban  Capture  Badghis  Areas;  Police 
in  Denial,  24  April  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/04/24/taliban-capture-badghis-areas-police-denial, accessed 27 
December 2018 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Taliban  capture  female  potential  candidate  in  Takhar,  6  June  2016, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/06/06/taliban-capture-female-potential-candidate-takhar, 
accessed 8 February 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Taliban  capture  security  posts  near  Daikundi’s  capital,  16  December  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/12/16/taliban-capture-security-posts-near-
daikundi%E2%80%99s-capital, accessed 16 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Taliban  closing  in  on  Dara-i-Sauf  Payeen  district,  29  November  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/29/taliban-closing-dara-i-sauf-payeen-district,  accessed  21 
January 2019  

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Taliban  growing  presence  worries  Ghor  residents,  2  July  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/07/02/taliban-growing-presence-worries-ghor-residents, 
accessed 23 January 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Taliban  gun  down  district’s  executive  head  in  Sar-i-Pul,  3  February  2019, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2019/02/03/taliban-gun-down-district%E2%80%99s-executive-head-
sar-i-pul, accessed 18 February 2019 

 
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Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Taliban  gun  down 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/04/03/taliban-gun-down-lawmaker%E2%80%99s-brother-
paktika, accessed 5 February 2019 

lawmaker’s  brother 

in  Paktika,  3  April  2018, 

Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban Gunmen Take Taxes on Kabul-Bamyan Highway, 5 November 2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/05/taliban-gunmen-take-taxes-kabul-bamyan-highway, 
accessed 8 January 2018 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Taliban 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2019/01/18/taliban-judge-reconciles-govt-kapisa, 
February 2019 

judge  reconciles  with  govt 

in  Kapisa,  18  January  2019, 
4 

accessed 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Taliban  kidnap  30  passengers  on  Uruzgan-Kandahar  highway,  28  February 
2018,  https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/02/28/taliban-kidnap-30-passengers-uruzgan-kandahar-
highway, accessed 18 February 2019 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Taliban  kidnap  5  passengers 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/03/30/taliban-kidnap-5-passengers-badghis, 
February 2019 

in  Badghis,  30  March  2018, 
18 

accessed 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Taliban  kidnap  6 
in  Baghlan,  6  May  2018, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/05/06/taliban-kidnap-6-indian-engineers-baghlan,  accessed  3 
January 2018 

Indian  engineers 

Pajhwok  Afghan  News,  Taliban  kidnap  district‘s  court  chief 
in  Parwan,  17  January  2019, 
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2019/01/17/taliban-kidnap-district%E2%80%99s-court-chief-parwan, 
accessed 21 January 2019  

Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban Kill 3 ANA Soldiers, Seize Humvee in Baghlan Capital, 4 August 2018, 
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Jawzjan  villages,  13 

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January 2019 

in  Nimroz,  19  October  2018, 
18 

accessed 

Imam 

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administrative 

Uruzgan 

Afghan 

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'shadow'  officials,  27 

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to  September,  20  March  2019, 

Reuters,  Afghanistan‘s  Ghani  launches  bid  for  second  presidential  term,  20  January  2018, 
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rocks  Afghan  city  of  Kandahar,  22  May  2018, 

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in  northern  Afghanistan,  4 

threaten  oil 

fields 

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2018, 

 
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2018, 

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2018, 

RFE/RL  (Radio  Free  Europe/Radio  Liberty),  Air  Strike  In  Afghanistan  Kills  16  From  Same  Family,  25 
January 
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2019, 

RFE/RL  (Radio  Free  Europe/Radio  Liberty),  Air  Strike  Kills  Four  Civilians  In  Southern  Afghanistan,  5 
October 
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2018, 

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Attacks, 
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attacks/29098084.html, accessed 18 January 2019 

March 

2018, 

14 

RFE/RL (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), At Least 11 Afghan Police Officers Killed In Taliban Attacks, 
3 
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January 

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RFE/RL (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), At Least Eight Killed In Afghan Election Rally Blast, 9 October 
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2018, 

RFE/RL (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), Bomb Attack Kills At Least Six In Western Afghanistan, 9 
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RFE/RL (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), Bomb Kills At Least 11 In Western Afghanistan, 31 July 2018, 
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RFE/RL (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), Death Toll In Suicide Attack In Eastern Afghanistan Soars 
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RFE/RL (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), Dozen Afghan Security Personnel Killed In Taliban Attacks, 
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RFE/RL (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), Dozens Dead After Taliban Ambush On Afghan Government 
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10  March 

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north/29546063.html, accessed 22 January 2019 

RFE/RL  (Radio  Free  Europe/Radio  Liberty),  'Dozens  Of  People  Freed'  From  Taliban  Custody  In 
Afghanistan,  31  May  2018,  https://www.rferl.org/a/dozens-of-people-freed-taliban-custody-
afghanistan/29261150.html, accessed 28 January 2019 

RFE/RL  (Radio  Free  Europe/Radio  Liberty),  'Dozens'  Of  Taliban  Militants  Killed  In  Southern 
Afghanistan,  2  February  2018,  https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-kandahar-dozens-taliban-
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RFE/RL (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), In The Dark: Tajik Border Residents Live Not Knowing What 
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what-lies-beyond/29615744.html, accessed 18 January 2019  

RFE/RL  (Radio  Free  Europe/Radio  Liberty),  'Intra-Afghan'  Talks  Under  Way  In  Moscow  Amid 
2019,  https://www.rferl.org/a/afghan-taliban-moscow-
Continuing  Violence, 
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February 

5 

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2015,  https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-88-militants-killed-in-24-hours/27172480.html,  accessed 
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Telegraph  (The),  Kabul-Kandahar  highway  is  a  symbol  of  what‘s  gone  wrong  in  Afghanistan,  9 
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Telegraph (The), Taliban agree Isil and Al-Qaeda will be barred from Afghanistan in major concession 
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Telegraph  (The),  Taliban  claim  to  be  preparing  onslaught  to  drive  Islamic  State  from  Afghan 
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The  New  Arab,  'Taliban  roadside  bomb;  in  Afghanistan's  Herat  province  kills  civilians,  8 December 
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ThinkProgress, Afghans  fearful as  CIA-backed militias patrol the ground and U.S. drones haunt the 
skies,  13  December  2017,  https://thinkprogress.org/cia-presence-afghanistan-a4243c90932f/, 
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Time,  Exclusive:  Inside  the  U.S.  Fight  to  Save  Ghazni  From  the  Taliban,  23  August  2018, 
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(The  Killid  Group),  Local  Radio  Station  Burned 

TKG 
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in  Ghor,  24  December  2017, 

‘Heavy  Clashes‘  Close  Kunduz-Takhar  Highway  To  Traffic,  5  May  2017, 

Tolonews, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/%E2%80%98heavy-clashes%E2%80%99-close-kunduz-
takhar-highway-traffic, accessed 18 January 2019  

10 

Tolonews, 
2019, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/10-civilians-killed-samangan-clash,  accessed  13  February 
2019 

Samangan 

February 

Civilians 

Clash, 

Killed 

In 

4 

11 

2018, 
Arrested 
Tolonews, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/11-haqqani-members-arrested-kabul,  accessed  7  February 
2019 

Haqqani  Members 

September 

Kabul, 

In 

5 

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  355  

11 

Tolonews, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/11-security-forces-killed-wardak-clashes, 
January 2019 

in  Wardak 

Clashes, 

Security 

Forces 

Killed 

9 

September 

accessed 

2018, 
15 

11 

Tolonews, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/11-taliban-fighters-killed-uruzgan-airstrike, 
February 2019 

In  Uruzgan 

Airstrike, 

Fighters 

Taliban 

Killed 

4 

August 

2018, 
5 

accessed 

Tolonews,  14 
in  Kunduz,  Nangarhar  Airstrikes,  26  March  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/14-insurgents-killed-kunduz-nangarhar-airstrikes,  accessed 
30 January 2019  

Insurgents  Killed 

Tolonews,  17  Members  Of  Public  Uprising  Force  Killed 
January  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/17-members-public-uprising-force-killed-balkh, accessed 15 
January 2019 

In  Balkh,  21 

18 

Tolonews, 
2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/18-taliban-insurgents-killed-baghlan-clashes-0,  accessed  3 
January 2019  

29  April 

Insurgents 

Clashes, 

Baghlan 

Taliban 

Killed 

in 

Tolonews,  19 
February  2015, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/19-insurgents-killed-afghan-forces-operations,  accessed  9 
January 2019 

forces  operations,  3 

insurgents 

afghan 

killed 

in 

Tolonews,  209  Shaheen  Corps:  The  Base  The  Taliban  Attacked,  22  April  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/209-shaheen-corps-base-taliban-attacked,  accessed  16 
January 2019 

21,000 

Tolonews, 
After 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/21000-displaced-after-ghazni-crisis-ocha, 
February 2019 

Displaced 

Ghazni 

OCHA, 

Crisis: 

27 

August 

accessed 

2018, 
19 

24 

Tolonews, 
2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/24-taliban-killed-badghis-clash,  accessed  27  December 
2018 

Badghis 

Taliban 

Clash, 

Killed 

June 

20 

In 

25 

Tolonews, 
4 
Killed 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/25-insurgents-killed-afghan-operations, 
February 2019 

Operations, 

Insurgents 

Afghan 

In 

April 
accessed 

2018, 
25 

34 

Tolonews, 
2015, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/34-taliban-insurgents-killed-ansf-operations,  accessed  11 
January 2019 

operations, 

in  ANSF 

insurgents 

11  May 

Taliban 

killed 

35 

Tolonews, 
2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/35-taliban-killed-us-airstrikes-balkh,  accessed  15  January 
2019 

Airstrikes 

In  US 

Taliban 

Balkh, 

Killed 

April 

28 

In 

Tolonews,  42  Daesh  And  Taliban  Fighters  Killed 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/42-daesh-and-taliban-fighters-killed-afghan-airstrikes, 
accessed 5 February 2019 

In  Afghan  Airstrikes,  5  March  2018, 

In  ANSF  Operations,  23  October  2018, 
Tolonews,  42 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/42-taliban-insurgents-killed-ansf-operations,  accessed  7 
February 2019  

Insurgents  Killed 

Taliban 

Tolonews,  57  Taliban 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/57-taliban-insurgents-killed-nationwide-ansf-operations, 
accessed 8 January 2019 

in  nationwide  ANSF  operations,  2  May  2015, 

insurgents  killed 

 
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1 
Tolonews, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/63-insurgents-killed-ansf-operations-mod, 
December 2018 

ANSF  Operations:  MoD, 

Insurgents 

Killed 

In 

July 

2018, 
accessed  27 

Tolonews,  67 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/67-insurgents-killed-andsf-aaf-operations, 
December 2018 

In  ANDSF,  AAF  Operations,  14  September  2018, 
accessed  27 

Insurgents  Killed 

Tolonews,  7  Provincial  Centers 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/7-provincial-centers-face-%E2%80%98serious-security-
threats, accessed 21 December 2018  

Threats',  16  May  2018, 

Security 

‘Serious 

Face 

Tolonews,  A  Night  With  Deminers  Clearing  The  Maidan  Wardak  Highway,  23  January  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/night-deminers-clearing-maiden-wardak-highway, accessed 
15 January 2019 

Tolonews,  Afghan  Forces  Killed 
https://www.tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan/afghan-forces-killed-taliban-attack-baghlan, 
accessed 3 January 2019 

in  Baghlan,  9  September  2018, 

in  Taliban  Attack 

Tolonews,  Afghan  Forces  to  Focus  On 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/afghan-forces-focus-insecure-regions-winter-operations, 
accessed 3 January 2019 

in  Winter,  26  December  2018, 

Insecure  Regions 

Tolonews,  Alipoor  Says  He 
https://www.tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan/alipoor-says-he-%E2%80%98ready-hand-over-
all-weapons-officially, accessed 8 January 2019 

'Ready  To  Hand  Over  All  Weapons',  27  November  2018, 

Is 

Tolonews,  Alipoor  Supporters  Protest  For  The  Second  Day  In  Kabul,  26  November  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/alipoor%C2%A0supporters%C2%A0protest-second-day-
kabul, accessed 8 January 2019 

Tolonews,  All 
2018, 
http://prod.tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan/all-you-need-know-about-tapi-project, accessed 4 
February 2019  

Know  About 

You  Need 

February 

Project, 

TAPI 

To 

24 

Tolonews,  Armed  Men  Gun  Down  Three  Travelers  On  Herat-Ghor  Highway,  17  April  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/armed-men-gun-down-three-travelers-herat-ghor-
highway, accessed 23 January 2019 

Tolonews,  Badakhshan’s  Nusay  District  Cleared  Of 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/badakhshan%E2%80%99s-nusay-district-cleared-taliban, 
accessed 18 December 2018.  

September 

Taliban, 

5 

2018, 

Tolonews,  Bamiyan  Tourism  Takes  A  Knock  Due  To  Security  Threats  On  Roads,  28  June  2017, 
https://www.tolonews.com/business/security-threats-roads-bamiyan-impacting-tourism, accessed 8 
January 2019  

Blast 

Tolonews, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/blast-targets-afghan-forces-base-wardak, 
January 2019  

Targets  Afghan 

In  Wardak, 

Forces 

Base 

21 

January 

accessed 

2019, 
21 

Tolonews,  Casualties  Rise  Amid  Heavy  Clashes 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/casualties-rise-amid-heavy-clashes-%C2%A010-provinces, 
accessed 23 January 2019 

In  10  Provinces,  13  May  2018, 

Tolonews,  Center  of  Sar-e  Pul  on  Verge  of  Collapse,  Heavy  Clashes  Ongoing,  10  September  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/center-sar-e-pul-verge-collapse-heavy-clashes-ongoing, 
accessed 18 January 2019  

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—  357  

Tolonews,  Chahar  Bolak  Police  Chief  Dies  After  Taliban  Attack,  22  April  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan/chahar-bolak-police-chief-dies-after-taliban-
attack, accessed 15 January 2019 

Tolonews,  Concerns  Rise  Over  Possible  Taliban  Attacks  On  Herat  Districts,  8  September  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/concerns-rise-over-possible-taliban-attacks-herat-districts, 
accessed 30 January 2019 

Conflicts 

Tolonews, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/conflicts-displace-almost-1000-kunduz-families, 
27 February 2019  

Families, 

Displace 

Kunduz 

Almost 

1,000 

5  May 

2018, 
accessed 

Daesh 

Tolonews, 
http://prod.tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan/daesh-commander-killed-kunar, 
February 2019  

Commander 

Kunar, 

Killed 

30 

In 

January 

2019, 
6 

accessed 

Tolonews,  Daesh  Militants  Recruiting 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/daesh-recruiting-ghor-province-officials, 
January 2019 

In  Ghor  Province:  Officials,  9 

June  2017, 
23 

accessed 

Tolonews,  Daesh,  Al-Qaeda  Among  15  Terror  Groups 
in  Kunar,  14  March  2017, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/provincial/daesh-al-qaeda-among-15-terror-groups-kunar, 
accessed 6 February 2019  

Tolonews,  Daikundi  Relatively  Secure  But  Undeveloped:  Residents,  15  November  2016,  
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/28362-daikundi-relatively-secure-but-undeveloped-
residents, accessed 17 January 2019 

Tolonews,  Daikundi 
2018,  
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/daikundi-secure-lacks-development-residents,  accessed  17 
January 2019 

Lacks  Development: 

Residents, 

6  April 

Secure 

But 

Tolonews,  Daykundi  Resident's  Protest  over 
Irresponsible  Armed  Men,  8  April  2015, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/daykundi-residents-protest-over-irresponsible-armed-men, 
accessed 17 January 2019 

Tolonews,  Death  Toll  Rises  To  32 
In  Nangarhar  Explosion,  11  September  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/suicide-bomber-targets-protest-nangarhar,  accessed  30 
January 2019  

Tolonews,  District  Police  Chief  Killed 
In  Sar-e-Pul,  4  December  2018, 
http://prod.tolonews.com/afghanistan/district-police-chief-killed-taliban-attack-sar-e-pul,  accessed 
18 January 2019  

In  Taliban  Attack 

Tolonews,  District  Police  Chief  Killed 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/district-police-chief-killed-%C2%A0taliban-
attack%C2%A0%C2%A0zabul, accessed 14 January 2019  

In  Taliban  Attack 

in  Zabul,  14  October  2018, 

September 
Tolonews,  Dozens 
https://www.tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan/afghan-forces-suffer-huge-casualty-toll-
%C2%A0north, accessed 4 February 2019  

In  North, 

Afghan 

Forces 

Killed 

10 

of 

2018, 

Tolonews,  Dozens  Of  Commandos  ‘Missing’  In  Ghazni’s  Ajristan  District,  13  August  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/dozens-commandos-%E2%80%98missing%E2%80%99-
ghazni%E2%80%99s-ajristan-district, accessed 17 January 2019 

Tolonews,  Eight  Civilians  Killed 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/eight-civilians-killed-balkh-roadside-mine-blast, 
15 January 2019 

in  Balkh  Roadside  Mine  Blast,  8  August  2018, 
accessed 

 
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Eight 

2018, 
Tolonews, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/eight-taliban-killed-uruzgan-airstrike,  accessed  5  February 
2019 

December 

Airstrike, 

Uruzgan 

Taliban 

Killed 

12 

In 

Explosion 

2019, 
Tolonews, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/explosion-paktika-leaves-six-civilians-dead,  accessed  25 
January 2019  

Civilians  Dead, 

January 

Paktika 

Leaves 

Six 

in 

7 

Tolonews, 
Baghlan 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/five-killed-baghlan-explosion, accessed 28 January 2019 

Explosion, 

January 

Killed 

Five 

26 

In 

2019, 

Foreign 

Tolonews, 
https://www.tolonews.com/i2ndex.php/afghanistan/foreign-forces-conduct-airstrike-faizabad-city, 
accessed 19 December 2018 

Conduct  Airstrike 

25  May 

Faizabad 

Forces 

City, 

in 

2018, 

Tolonews,  Ghani  Visits  Dasht-e-Archi  Victims 
in  Kabul  Hospital,  7  April  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/ghani-visits-dasht-e-archi-victims-kabul-hospital,  accessed 
4 February 2019  

Tolonews,  Ghazni  Elections  Could  Be  Held  With  Presidential  Elections,  27  October  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/elections-2018/ghazni-elections%C2%A0could%C2%A0be-held-
presidential-elections, accessed 15 February 2019 

Tolonews,  Govt  Asked 
June 
https://www.tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan/govt-asked-reconstruct-kabul-kandahar-
highway, accessed 17 January 2019 

Kabul-Kandahar  Highway, 

To  Reconstruct 

1 

Haibatullah 

Tolonews, 
https://www.tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan/haibatullah-named-talibans-new-leader, 
accessed 27 March 2019 

Taliban´s 

Leader, 

Named 

New 

May 

26 

2018, 

2016, 

Tolonews,  Hundreds  Protest  In  Kabul  Over  Ghazni,  Uruzgan  Insecurity,  12  November  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/hundreds-protest-kabul-over-ghazni-uruzgan-insecurity, 
accessed 16 January 2019  

Illegal  Armed  Men 

Tolonews, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/illegal-armed-men-%E2%80%98-big-challenge-
balkh%E2%80%99, accessed 15 January 2019 

‘A  Big  Challenge  For  Balkh  Residents’,  12  January  2018, 

Import 

2018, 
Tolonews, 
https://www.tolonews.com/business/import-ban-affects-business-farah-port,  accessed  21  January 
2019  

Ban  Affects 

September 

Business 

Farah 

Port, 

21 

In 

Insecurity,  Drought  Displace 

2018, 
Tolonews, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/insecurity-drought-displace-300000-afghans,  accessed  27 
February 2019  

September 

Afghans, 

300,000 

21 

Tolonews,  Interior  Ministry  Confirms  Spike  in  Casualty  Toll  This  Year,  12  November  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/interior-ministry-confirms-spike-casualty-toll-year, 
accessed 23 January 2019 

Tolonews,  Kangaroo  Courts 
in  1396,  20  March  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/kangaroo-courts-increased-afghanistan-1396,  accessed  23 
January 2019 

in  Afghanistan 

Increased 

Tolonews,  Key  District 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/key-district-under-siege-baghlan, accessed 3 January 2019 

In  Baghlan  Reportedly 

Taliban,  8  May  2018, 

Falls 

To 

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—  359  

Key 

2019, 
Tolonews, 
https://www.tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan/key-taliban-commander-killed-balkh,  accessed 
15 January 2019 

Commander 

January 

Taliban 

Balkh, 

Killed 

10 

In 

In  Uruzgan  Airstrike,  16  February  2019, 
Tolonews,  Key  Taliban  Commander  Killed 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/key-taliban-commander-killed-uruzgan-airstrike,  accessed 
25 February 2019 

Tolonews,  Kunar  Provincial  Council  Member  Killed 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/kunar-provincial-council-member-killed-suicide-attack, 
accessed 6 February 2019  

In  Suicide  Attack,  30  March  2018, 

Logar 

Tolonews, 
2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/logar-still-insecure-after-72-military-operations, accessed 1 
February 2019  

72  Military  Operations, 

Insecure  After 

27  April 

Still 

Tolonews,  Main 
6 
Balkh 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/main-district-balkh-under-security-threat, 
January 2019 

Security 

Threat, 

District 

Under 

In 

July 

accessed 

2018, 
15 

Tolonews,  Major  Power  Outage  Hits  Kabul  After  Pylon  Destroyed,  26  March  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/business/major%C2%A0power%C2%A0outage-hits-kabul-
after%C2%A0pylon-destroyed, accessed 3 January 2019 

Tolonews, 
2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/mazar-man-killed-his-motorcycle, accessed 15 January 2019 

Motorcycle, 

Mazar 

Killed 

Man 

July 

For 

His 

22 

Tolonews,  MoD  Confirms  Civilian  Deaths 
July  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/mod-confirms-civilian-deaths-kunduz-operation, accessed 4 
February 2019  

in  Kunduz  Operation, 

19 

Tolonews,  MoD  Sends  In  Extra  Troops  As  Violence  Grips  Baghlan,  Ghazni,  8  November  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/mod-sends-extra-troops-violence-grips-baghlan-ghazni, 
accessed 3 January 2019 

Tolonews,  NDS  Chief  Says  Claims  Against  Alipoor  Will  Be  Investigated,  27  November  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan/nds-chief%C2%A0says-claims-against-alipoor-
will-be-investigated, accessed 8 January 2019 

Identified  As  Key  Human  Trafficking  Route,  13  September  2018, 
Tolonews,  Nimroz 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/nimroz-identified-key-human-trafficking-route, accessed 29 
January 2019  

Nine 

Killed 
Tolonews, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/nine-insurgents-killed-afghan-airstrikes, 
February 2019 

Insurgents 

Airstrikes, 

Afghan 

11 

In 

February 

accessed 

2019, 
13 

Tolonews,  One  Dead 
https://www.tolonews.com/elections-2018/one-dead-baghlan-voter-registration-center-explosion, 
accessed 3 January 2019 

in  Baghlan  Voter  Registration  Center  Explosion,  23 

June  2018, 

Tolonews,  Over 
2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/over-100-militants-killed-paktia-operations,  accessed  24 
January 2019  

Paktia  Operations, 

100  Militants 

Killed 

July 

13 

In 

Tolonews,  Over 
https://www.tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan/over-20-soldiers-killed-sar-e-pul-clashes, 
accessed 18 January 2019  

Sar-e-Pul 

Soldiers 

clashes, 

January 

Killed 

20 

In 

1 

2019, 

 
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Tolonews,  Poor  Living  Conditions  Plague  Ghanzi,  Uruzgan 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/poor-living-conditions-plague-ghazni-uruzgan-idps, 
accessed 27 February 2019 

IDP’s,  30  November  2018, 

Tolonews,  Preliminary  Findings  Indicate  Wardak  Airstrike  Killed  12  Civilian,  26  September,  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/preliminary-findings-indicate-wardak-airstrike-killed-12-
civilian, accessed 15 January 2019  

Tolonews,  Residents  Of  Numerous  Cities  Concerned  About  Security,  30  August  2018, 
https://www.tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan/residents-numerous-cities-concerned-about-
security, accessed 13 February 2019  

Road  Works 

Tolonews, 
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/road-works-underway-salang-pass-road, 
January 2019  

Underway 

Salang 

Pass, 

On 

1 

September 

accessed 

2018, 
21 

Tolonews,  Sar-e-Pul  Oil  Reservoirs  Under  Taliban  Threat:  Officials,  3 
https://www.tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan/sar-e-pul-oil-reservoirs-under-taliban-threat-
officials, accessed 18 January 2019  

January  2019, 

Tolonews,  Security  Forces,  Taliban  Locked 
https://www.tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan/security-forces-taliban-locked-heavy-clash-
baghlan, accessed 3 January 2019  

in  Heavy  Clash 

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2018, 
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ghazni-armed-clash-no-2-17-november-2018, accessed 20 February 2019 

November 

Clashes 

Update 

Flash 

No. 

17 

2, 

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

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UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Afghanistan: Daykundi 
Province 
2014, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Daykundi.pdf, 
accessed 16 January 2019 

District 

Atlas, 

April 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Afghanistan Weekly 
Field 
2018, 
September 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20180910_Afghanistan%20Weekly%20Field
%20Report%203%20-%209%20September_EN.pdf, accessed 14 January 2019 

September 

Report 

2018, 

10 

3 

9 

– 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Afghanistan: Bamyan 
Province 
2014, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Bamyan.pdf, 
accessed 8 January 2019 

District 

Atlas, 

April 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Afghanistan: Drought 
Response,  Situation  Report  No.  2 
(as  of  16  September  2018),  16  September  2018, 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20180920_afghanistan_drought_sitrep_no_
2.pdf, accessed 13 February 2019  

UNOCHA  (United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Affairs),  Afghanistan:  Farah 
2014,  
Province 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Farah.pdf, 
accessed 17 January 2019  

District 

Atlas, 

April 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Afghanistan: Ghazni 
Conflict 
2018, 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20180820_OCHA_Update_Ghazni%20No%2
04.pdf, accessed 22 January 2019 

Update 

August 

No. 

20 

4, 

UNOCHA  (United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Affairs),  Afghanistan:  Ghor 
Province 
2014, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Ghor.pdf, 
accessed 23 January 2019  

District 

Atlas, 

April 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/ocha-afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-week-1-%E2%80%93-7-january-2018, accessed 15 February 2019 

January 

January 

2018, 

7 

8 

1 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/ocha-afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-week-15-21-january-2018, accessed 14 February 2019 

January 

January 

2018, 

21 

15 

22 

- 

22 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
2018, 
Report, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/20180129_afghanistan_weekly_field_report_22_-28_january_2018_en.pdf, accessed 19 February 
2019 

January 

January 

2018, 

28 

28 

- 

UNOCHA  (United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Aid),  Afghanistan: 
Humanitarian 
2018, 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/afg_2019_humanitarian_needs_overview.p
df, accessed 18 February 2019 

December 

Overview 

Needs 

2019, 

6 

UNOCHA  (United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Aid),  Afghanistan:  Ghazni 
2018, 
Conflict, 

Update 

August 

No. 

13 

1, 

 
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https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20180813_OCHA_Update_Ghazni%20No1.p
df, accessed 24 January 2019 

UNOCHA  (United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Aid),  Afghanistan:  Ghazni 
2018, 
Conflict, 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20180815_ocha_update_ghazni_no2_final.
pdf, accessed 20 February 2019  

Update 

August 

No. 

15 

2, 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
2018, 
Report, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/ocha-afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-29-january-4-february-2018, accessed 14 February 2019 

February 

February 

January 

2018, 

29 

4 

5 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
February 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-5-11-february-2018, accessed 20 February 2019 

February 

2018, 

11 

12 

5 

- 

12 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/20180219_afghanistan_weekly_field_report_12_-_18_february_2018_en_0.pdf,  accessed  24 
January 2019  

February 

February 

2018, 

18 

18 

- 

26 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
2018, 
Report, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/20180304_afghanistan_weekly_field_report_26_february_-_4_march_en.pdf, 
24 
January 2019  

accessed 

February 

March 

March 

2018, 

4 

5 

- 

4 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/20180312_afghanistan_weekly_field_report_5_-_11_march_2018_en.pdf,  accessed  24  January 
2019 

March 

March 

2018, 

11 

11 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
2018, 
March 
Report, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-12-18-march-2018, accessed 15 February 2019 

March 

2018, 

12 

19 

18 

- 

26 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
2018, 
Report, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/20180402_afghanistan_weekly_field_report_26_march_-_01_april_2018_en_final_1.pdf, 
accessed 18 February 2019  

March 

2018, 

April 

April 

1 

9 

- 

2 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/20180409_afghanistan_weekly_field_report_2_april_-_8_april_2018_en_final_0.pdf, accessed 23 
January 2019  

2018, 

April 

April 

8 

9 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
2018, 
Report, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-16-22-april-2018, accessed 14 February 2019 

2018, 

April 

April 

16 

22 

23 

- 

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UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-30-april-%E2%80%93-6-may-2018, accessed 19 February 2019 

2018, 

April 

May 

May 

30 

6 

7 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
May 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-7-13-may-2018, accessed 15 February 2019 

2018, 

May 

13 

14 

7 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-14-20-may-2018, accessed 15 February 2019 

2018, 

May 

May 

22 

20 

14 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-23-29-april-2018, accessed 14 February 2019 

2018, 

April 

April 

29 

23 

30 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
2018, 
Report, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-21-27-may-2018, accessed 15 February 2019 

2018, 

May 

May 

28 

27 

21 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-28-may-%E2%80%93-3-june-2018, accessed 15 February 2019 

2018, 

June 

June 

May 

28 

4 

3 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20180619_afghanistan_weekly_field_report
_11_-_17_june_2018_en.pdf, accessed 15 February 2019 

2018, 

June 

June 

11 

17 

19 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-18-24-june-2018, accessed 20 February 2019 

2018, 

June 

June 

18 

24 

25 

- 

25 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/20180702afghanistan_weekly_field_report_25_june_-_1_july_2018_en.pdf, 
14 
February 2019  

accessed 

2018, 

June 

July 

July 

1 

1 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/20180709_afghanistan_weekly_field_report_2_-_8_july_2018_en.pdf, accessed 19 February 2019  

2018, 

July 

July 

8 

2 

9 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-9-15-july-2018, accessed 20 February 2019 

2018, 

July 

July 

15 

16 

9 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
2018, 
Report, 

2018, 

July 

July 

16 

22 

22 

- 

 
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https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/20180723_afghanistan_weekly_field_report_16_-_22_july_2018_en.pdf,  accessed  23  January 
2019  

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-30-july-%E2%80%93-5-august-2018, accessed 15 February 2019 

August 

August 

2018, 

July 

30 

5 

6 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
August 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-6-12-august-2018, accessed 20 February 2019 

August 

2018, 

12 

14 

6 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
2018, 
Report, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/hid_contacts, 
20 
February 2019 

accessed 

August 

August 

2018, 

19 

13 

20 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-10-16-september-2018, accessed 15 February 2019 

September 

September 

2018, 

16 

10 

17 

- 

17 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
2018, 
Report, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/20180924-afghanistan_weekly_field_report_17_-_23_september_en.pdf,  accessed  18  February 
2019  

September 

September 

2018, 

23 

23 

- 

24 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/20180930-afghanistan_weekly_field_report_24_-_30_september_en.pdf,  accessed  15  February 
2019  

September 

September 

2018, 

30 

30 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
2018, 
October 
Report, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-1-%E2%80%93-7-october-2018, accessed 15 February 2019 

October 

2018, 

7 

1 

8 

- 

8 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
2018, 
Report, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/20181015_draft_afghanistan_weekly_field_report_8_-_14_october_en_final.pdf,  accessed  20 
February 2019  

October 

October 

2018, 

14 

14 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-05-november-11-november-2018, accessed 15 February 2019 

November 

November 

2018, 

11 

12 

5 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
December, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/weekly_update_-_03_december_2018.pdf, accessed 18 February 2019  

November 

December 

2018, 

26 

3 

3 

- 

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

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4 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afghanistan_weekly_field_report_-_04_december_-_09_december_2018.pdf, 
15 
February 2019 

December 

December 

accessed 

2018, 

9 

9 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afghanistan_weekly_field_report_24_31_december_2018.pdf, accessed 23 January 2019  

December 

December 

2018, 

31 

24 

31 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
2019, 
Report, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/weekly_report_08_-14_january_2019.pdf, accessed 1 March 2019  

January 

January 

2019, 

14 

15 

8 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
2018, 
Team 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afg_minutes_20180521_oct_ner_badakhshan.pdf, accessed 18 February 2019 

-  Meeting 

Badakhshan 

21  May 

Summary, 

Province 

(OCT) 

- 

(OCT) 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
September  2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afg_minutes_20180918_oct_ner_badakhshan.pdf, accessed 18 February 2019  

-  Badakhshan  Province 

Summary,  18 

-  Meeting 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afg_minutes_20180314_oct_ner_baghlan.pdf, accessed 15 February 2019  

-  Meeting 

14  March 

Summary, 

Province 

Baghlan 

(OCT) 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afg_minutes_20180829_oct_ner_baghlan.pdf, accessed 15 February 2019 

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

Baghlan 

August 

(OCT) 

29 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
2018, 
-  Meeting 
Team 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_kabul_oct_meeting_-_cr_15_nov_2018.docx, accessed 20 February 2019  

15  November 

Summary, 

Province 

(OCT) 

Kabul 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
2018, 
-  Meeting 
Team 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_of_kabul_oct_meeting_-_cr_18_nov_2018.docx, accessed 20 February 2019  

18  November 

Summary, 

Province 

(OCT) 

Kabul 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_kapisa_oct_meeting_-_cr_3_january_2017.docx, accessed 14 February 2019  

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

January 

Kapisa 

(OCT) 

3 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_kapisa_oct_meeting_-_cr_18_january_2018.docx, accessed 15 February 2019 

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

January 

Kapisa 

(OCT) 

18 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
2018, 
-  Meeting 
Team 

September 

Summary, 

Province 

Kapisa 

(OCT) 

26 

- 

 
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https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_kapisa_oct_meeting_-_cr_26_sep_2018.docx, accessed 15 February 2019 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
2018, 
Team 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_kapisa_oct_meeting_-_cr_7_november_2018.docx, accessed 15 February 2019  

7  November 

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

Kapisa 

(OCT) 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
2018, 
Team 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_kapisa_oct_meeting_-_cr_14_mar_2018.docx, accessed 15 February 2019 

-  Meeting 

14  March 

Summary, 

Province 

Kapisa 

(OCT) 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_kapisa_oct_meeting_-_cr_18_april_2018.docx, accessed 14 February 2019  

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

Kapisa 

(OCT) 

April 

18 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_kapisa_oct_meeting_-_cr_8_may_2018.docx, accessed 15 February 2019  

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

8  May 

Province 

Kapisa 

(OCT) 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_kapisa_oct_meeting_-_cr_31_may_2018.docx, accessed 15 February 2019  

-  Meeting 

31  May 

Summary, 

Province 

Kapisa 

(OCT) 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
2018, 
Team 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_kapisa_oct_meeting_-_cr_30_july_2018.docx, accessed 15 February 2019  

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

Kapisa 

(OCT) 

July 

30 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
2018, 
-  Meeting 
Team 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_kapisa_oct_meeting_-_cr_11_dec_2018.docx, accessed 15 February 2019  

December 

Summary, 

Province 

Kapisa 

(OCT) 

11 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2019, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_kapisa_oct_meeting_-_cr_6_january_2019.docx, accessed 15 February 2019  

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

January 

Kapisa 

(OCT) 

6 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afg_minutes_20180206_oct_ner_kunduz.pdf, accessed 19 February 2019  

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

February 

Province 

Kunduz 

(OCT) 

6 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afg_minutes_20180408_oct_ner_kunduz.pdf, accessed 19 February 2019 

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

Kunduz 

(OCT) 

April 

8 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
2018, 
Team 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afg_minutes_20180507_oct_ner_kunduz.pdf, accessed 19 February 2019  

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

7  May 

Province 

Kunduz 

(OCT) 

- 

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UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afg_minutes_20180725_oct_ner_kunduz.pdf, accessed 19 February 2019  

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

Kunduz 

(OCT) 

July 

25 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afg_minutes_20180812_oct_ner_kunduz.pdf, accessed 19 February 2019 

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

Kunduz 

August 

(OCT) 

12 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
-  Meeting 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/2018/11/afg_
minutes_20180925_oct_ner_kunduz.pdf, accessed 19 February 2019   

September 

Summary, 

Province 

Kunduz 

(OCT) 

25 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afg_minutes_20181113_oct_ner_kunduz.pdf, accessed 19 February 2019 

13  November 

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

Kunduz 

(OCT) 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
2018, 
Team 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_logar_oct_meeting_-_cr_24_january_2018.docx, accessed 14 February 2019 

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

January 

(OCT) 

Logar 

24 

- 

(OCT) 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
-  Meeting  Summary,  27  February  2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_wardak_oct_meeting_-_cr_27_feb_2018.docx, accessed 24 January 2019  

-  Maidan  Wardak  Province 

(OCT) 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
-  Meeting  Summary,  8  October  2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_wardak_oct_meeting_-_cr_8_oct_2018.docx, accessed 24 January 2019 

-  Maidan  Wardak  Province 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_panjsher_oct_meeting_-_cr_3_april_2018.docx, accessed 23 January 2019  

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Panjsher 

Province 

(OCT) 

April 

3 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_panjsher_oct_meeting_-_cr_15_july_2018.docx, accessed 23 January 2019  

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

Panjsher 

(OCT) 

July 

15 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
2018, 
Team 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_parwan_oct_meeting_-_cr_6_march_2018.docx, accessed 24 January 2019 

-  Meeting 

6  March 

Summary, 

Province 

Parwan 

(OCT) 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_parwan_oct_meeting_-_cr_4_july_2018.docx, accessed 24 January 2019 

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

Parwan 

(OCT) 

July 

4 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
2018, 
Team 

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

October 

Parwan 

(OCT) 

3 

- 

 
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es/minutes_parwan_oct_meeting_-_cr_3_october_2018.docx, accessed 24 January 2019 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
2019, 
Team 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_parwan_oct_meeting_-_cr_26_february_2019.docx, accessed 1 March 2019 

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

February 

Province 

Parwan 

(OCT) 

26 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
2018, 
Team 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afg_minutes_20180625_oct_ner_takhar.pdf, accessed 18 February 2019  

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

Takhar 

(OCT) 

June 

25 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afg_minutes_20180807_oct_ner_takhar.pdf, accessed 18 February 2019  

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

August 

Takhar 

(OCT) 

7 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
-  Meeting 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afg_minutes_20180910_oct_ner_takhar.pdf, accessed 18 February 2019 

September 

Summary, 

Province 

Takhar 

(OCT) 

10 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afg_minutes_20181217_oct_ner_takhar.pdf, accessed 18 February 2019  

17  December 

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

Takhar 

(OCT) 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
2018, 
-  Meeting 
Team 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afg_minutes_20181119_oct_ner_takhar.pdf, accessed 19 February 2019 

19  November 

Summary, 

Province 

Takhar 

(OCT) 

- 

UNOCHA  (United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Aid),  Provincial  Disaster 
Management  Committee  (PDMC)  -  Kapisa  Province  -  Meeting  Summary,  29  January  2019, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_kapisa_pdmc_meeting_-_cr_29_january_2019.docx, accessed 1 March 2019 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2019, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-01-january-07-january-2019, accessed 6 February 2019 

January 

January 

2019, 

1-7 

9 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-10-december-16-december-2018, accessed 6 February 2019 

December 

December 

10-16 

2018, 

17 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-29-october-04-november-2018 , accessed 25 February 2019 

November 

November 

October 

2018, 

29 

04 

5 

– 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
2018, 
Report, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-10-16-september-2018, accessed 7 February 2019 

September 

September 

10-16 

2018, 

17 

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  375  

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
September 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-27-august-%E2%80%93-2-september-2018, accessed 7 February 2019 

September 

August 

2018, 

27 

2 

4 

– 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
August 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-6-12-august-2018, accessed 7 February 2019 

August 

2018, 

12 

14 

6 

– 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-23-%E2%80%93-29-july-2018, accessed 8 February 2019 

23-29 

2018, 

July 

July 

30 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
2019https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-4-june-%E2%80%93-10-june-2018, accessed 8 February 2019 

2018, 

June 

June 

4-10 

11 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
2018, 
Report, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-21-27-may-2018, accessed 8 February 2019 

21-27 

2018, 

May 

May 

28 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-14-20-may-2018, accessed 8 February 2019 

14-21 

2018, 

May 

May 

22 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-26-march-%E2%80%93-1-april-2018, accessed 8 February 2019 

March 

2018, 

April 

April 

26 

1 

9 

– 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-19-25-february-2018, accessed 8 February 2019 

February, 

February 

25 

26 

19 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-12-18-february-2018, accessed 8 February 2019 

February, 

February 

18 

19 

12 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
2018, 
Report, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/ocha-afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-week-8-14-january-2018, accessed 8 February 2019 

January 

January 

2018, 

14 

16 

8 

– 

(HRT) 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Humanitarian Regional 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/cr_-_hrt_meeting_minutes_28_may_2018.docx, accessed 20 February 2019  

-  Central  Region  Afghanistan,  Meeting 

Summary, 

28  May 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Humanitarian Regional 
Team  (HRT)  -  North  and  Northeastern  Afghanistan,  Meeting,  Summary,  11  February  2018, 

 
376 — 

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afg_minutes20180211_hrt_nner.docx, accessed 19 February 2019  

(HRT) 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Humanitarian Regional 
-  Western  Region  Afghanistan,  Meeting  Summary,  14  August  2018, 
Team 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/western-region-
humanitarian-regional-team-hrt-meeting-14-august-2018, accessed 25 February 2018 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
2018, 
Team 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/badghis-
operational-coordination-team-oct-meeting-minutes-1-august, accessed 22 February 2019 

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

Badghis 

August 

(OCT) 

1 

- 

UNOCHA  (United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Affairs),  Afghanistan:  Hirat 
Province 
2014, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Hirat.pdf, 
accessed 29 January 2019   

District 

Atlas, 

April 

- 

UNOCHA  (United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Affairs),  Afghanistan:  Kabul 
Province 
2014, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Kabul.pdf, 
accessed 7 February 2019  

District 

Atlas, 

April 

– 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office  for  the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs),  Afghanistan: Kapisa 
Province 
2014, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Kapisa.pdf, 
accessed 4 February 2019 

District 

Atlas, 

April 

- 

UNOCHA  (United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Affairs),  Afghanistan:  Kunar 
2014, 
Province 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Kunar.pdf, 
accessed 6 February 2019  

District 

Atlas, 

April 

– 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Afghanistan: Kunduz 
2014, 
Province 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Kunduz.pdf, 
accessed 4 February 2019  

District 

Atlas, 

April 

– 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Afghanistan: Laghman 
Province 
2014, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Laghman.pdf, 
accessed 4 February 2019  

District 

Atlas, 

April 

– 

UNOCHA  (United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Affairs),  Afghanistan:  Logar 
Province 
2014, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Logar.pdf, 
accessed 1 February 2019  

District 

Atlas, 

April 

– 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Afghanistan: Nimroz 
Province 
2014, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Nimroz.pdf, 
accessed 29 January 2019  

District 

Atlas, 

April 

– 

UNOCHA  (United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Affairs),  Afghanistan:  North 
2014, 
District 
Eastern 
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1184496/1930_1415353203_afghanistan-north-eastern-region-
district-atlas.pdf, accessed 2 January 2019. 

Region 

Atlas, 

April 

– 

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  377  

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Afghanistan: Northern 
Region 
2014, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Northern.pdf, 
accessed 8 January 2019 

District 

Atlas, 

April 

– 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Afghanistan: Nuristan 
Province 
2014, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Nuristan.pdf, 
accessed 25 January 2019  

District 

Atlas, 

April 

– 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Afghanistan: Paktika 
Province 
2014, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Paktika.pdf, 
accessed 25 January 2019  

District 

Atlas, 

April 

– 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Afghanistan: Paktya 
Province 
2014, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Paktya.pdf, 
accessed 24 January 2019  

District 

Atlas, 

April 

– 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Afghanistan: Panjsher 
2014, 
Province 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Panjsher.pdf, 
accessed 22 January 2019  

District 

Atlas, 

April 

– 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Afghanistan: Parwan 
Province 
2014, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Parwan.pdf, 
accessed 21 January 2019  

District 

Atlas, 

April 

– 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Afghanistan: Samangan 
Province 
2014, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Samangan.pdf
, accessed 21 January 2019  

District 

Atlas, 

April 

– 

UNOCHA  (United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Affairs),  Afghanistan:  South 
Eastern 
2014, 
District 
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1216593/1930_1415350213_afghanistan-south-eastern-region-
district-atlas.pdf, accessed 23 November 2018 

Region 

Atlas, 

April 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Afghanistan: Takhar 
Province 
2014, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Takhar.pdf, 
accessed 18 January 2019  

District 

Atlas, 

April 

– 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Afghanistan: Wardak 
Province 
2014, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Wardak.pdf, 
accessed 15 January 2019 

District 

Atlas, 

April 

UNOCHA  (United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Affairs),  Afghanistan:  Zabul 
Province 
2014, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Zabul.pdf, 
accessed 14 January 2019 

District 

Atlas, 

April 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)p, Afghanistan: Sar-e-
2014, 
District 
Pul 

Province 

Atlas, 

April 

– 

 
378 — 

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/Sar-e-Pul_0.pdf, accessed 18 January 2019  

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
2018, 
1 
Report, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-19-25-march-2018, accessed 21 January 2019 

March 

2018, 

2018 

April 

April 

6 

2 

– 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
2018, 
Report 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/weekly_update_-_03_december_2018.pdf, 
accessed 9 January 2019 

November 

December 

December 

2018, 

26 

5 

– 

3 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2018, 
November 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20181105_afghanistan_weekly_field_report
_29_oct_-_04_nov_2018_en.pdf, accessed 24 January 2019 

November 

October 

2018, 

29 

4 

5 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report 
2018, 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/afghanistan_weekly_field_report_20_-
_26_november.pdf, accessed 21 January 2019 

November 

November 

2018, 

26 

20 

27 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
Report, 
2019, 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/afghanistan_weekly_field_report_-
_04_december_-_09_december_2018.pdf, accessed 21 January 2019 

December 

December 

2018, 

4-9 

10 

22 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
2018, 
Report, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/20180129_afghanistan_weekly_field_report_22_-28_january_2018_en.pdf,  accessed  9  January 
2019 

January, 

January 

28 

28 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_parwan_oct_meeting_-_cr_6_march_2018.docx, accessed 17 January 2019  

-  Meeting 

6  March 

Summary, 

Province 

Parwan 

(OCT) 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_parwan_oct_meeting_-_cr_3_october_2018.docx, accessed 17 January 2019 

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

October 

Parwan 

(OCT) 

3 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_parwan_oct_meeting_-_cr_6_march_2018.docx, accessed 17 January 2019 

-  Meeting 

6  March 

Summary, 

Province 

Parwan 

(OCT) 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
2018, 
Team 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/minutes_parwan_oct_meeting_-_cr_4_july_2018.docx, accessed 17 January 2019 

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

Parwan 

(OCT) 

July 

4 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Humanitarian Bulletin – 
Afghanistan, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/humanitarian-
bulletin-afghanistan-issue-78-1-july-%E2%80%93-30-september, accessed 17 December 2018  

20  October 

September 

2018), 

Issue 

July 

78 

30 

(1 

– 

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

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Afghanistan 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Humanitarian Response 
Plan 
2018, 
- 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afg_2019_humanitarian_response_plan.pdf, accessed 23 January 2019 

December 

December 

January 

2021, 

2018 

- 

UNOCHA  (United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Aid),  Afghanistan: 
Humanitarian 
2017, 
31 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/infographic/afghanistan-
humanitarian-dashboard-1-jan-31-dec-2016, accessed 12 January 2019 

Dashboard 

March 

2016), 

Dec 

(as 

22 

of 

UNOCHA  (United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Aid),  Badghis  Operational 
Coordination 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/badghis-
operational-coordination-team-oct-meeting-30-may-2018, accessed 31 January 2019  

Meeting, 

(OCT) 

Team 

May 

30 

UNOCHA  (United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Aid),  Afghanistan  Internal 
Displacement 
2019, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/idps,  accessed  25  February 
2019 

February 

Conflict, 

due 

24 

to 

the 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan: 2019 Update 
2018, 
to 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afg_2019_humanitarian_response_plan.pdf, accessed 11 January 2019  

Humanitarian 

2018-2010 

December 

Response 

Plan, 

21 

UNOCHA  (United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Aid),  Afghanistan:  Ghazni 
Conflict 
2018, 
26 
https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-ghazni-conflict-update-no-5-26-august-2018, 
accessed 13 February 2019  

Update 

August 

August 

2018), 

No. 

(as 

26 

of 

5 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), (United Nations Office for 
the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Aid),  Badghis  Operational  Coordination  Team  (OCT)  Meeting 
Minutes, 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/badghis-
operational-coordination-team-oct-meeting-27-june-2018, accessed 12 January 2019   

June 

27 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
2018, 
Team 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afg_minutes_20180213_oct_ner_takhar.pdf, accessed 12 January 2019  

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

February 

Province 

Takhar 

(OCT) 

13 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Afghanistan Weekly Field 
2018, 
March 
Report, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/document/afghanistan-
weekly-field-report-12-18-march-2018, accessed 13 February 2019  

March 

2018, 

12 

19 

18 

- 

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid), Operational Coordination 
Team 
2018, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/afg_minutes_20180415_oct_ner_takhar.pdf, accessed 27 January 2019  

-  Meeting 

Summary, 

Province 

Takhar 

(OCT) 

April 

15 

- 

UNOCHA  (United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Aid),  Afghanistan  Conflict 
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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  387  

Annex 2: Terms of Reference 

The goal of this report is to provide security-related information relevant for international protection 
status determination.  

An important goal of this report is to provide details on a regional, provincial or even district level. 

The reporting period for incidents and events illustrating the general trends of the conflict, is 1 January 
2018 until 28 February 2019. 

The content of the report should contain information on the following topics: 

•  General description of the security situation 

-  Conflict background 

  Overview of recent conflicts in Afghanistan  
  Political landscape 
  Peace talks 
 

International context 

-  Actors in the conflict 

  Pro-government forces 

•  Tasks/roles/numbers 
•  Components 
•  Civilian casualties attribution 

  Anti-government elements 

Level of organisation  

• 
•  Civilian casualties attribution 

-  Recent security trends and armed confrontations 

  Trends, nature of violence and methods primarily used 

- 

Impact of the violence on the civilian population 

  Civilian casualties 
  State ability to secure law and order 
  Socio-economic situation 
  Refugees, IDPs, returnees 
  Children 

-  Geographical overview 

  Broad regional differences 
 
Insurgent control 
  Conflict severity 

-  Mobility 

 

security aspects of travelling (roads, flights) 

•  Regional description: per province 

-  General description (districts, population, geography, economy) 
-  Conflict background (description on presence and general activity of actors, Taliban 

control/presence) 

-  Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
388 — 

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

  Civilian casualties 
  Conflict severity 
 
  Description of representative incidents 
  Displacement 

Incident numbers 

 
 
 
EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

—  389  

 
 
 
390 — 

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: AFGHANISTAN - SECURITY SITUATION 

B
Z
-
0
4
-
1
9
-
4
4
2
-
E
N
N

-

doi: 10.2847/585139