Shaping the future : thoughts on the future of society and governance.
Date: 2019-08-29
Institutions: European Political Strategy Centre
Subjects: EU strategy, governance, innovation, social change, technological change

Shaping  
the Future

Thoughts on the Future of
Society and Governance

November 2016

Paper: ES-06-16-210-EN-C  •  ISBN: 978-92-79-63219-8  •  DOI: 10.2872/795551
PDF: ES-06-16-210-EN-N  •  ISBN: 978-92-79-63220-4  •  DOI: 10.2872/230622
HTML: ES-06-16-210-EN-Q  •  ISBN: 978-92-79-63221-1  •  DOI: 10.2872/349803

November 2016 

Disclaimer 
The views expressed in this publication represent only the views of the authors. This publication does not bind, nor may be 
attributed to, any of the European Union institutions and bodies participating in the inter- institutional European Strategy and 
Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), namely the European Commission, the European Parliament (EP), the General Secretariat of 
the Council of the EU (GSC) and the European External Action Service (EEAS), as well as the Committee of the Regions and the 
European Economic and Social Committee.

Foreword

Ann Mettler 
Head, European Political Strategy Centre,  
Chair, European Strategy and Policy Analysis System

On behalf of the European Strategy and Policy Analysis 
System (ESPAS), it is a great pleasure to welcome you 
to the 2016 Annual Conference, which convenes under 
the timely theme of ‘Global Trends to 2030: Society and 
Governance’. As last year, the two-day event is hosted 
by the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC) and the 
European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS).

Drawing on the insights of the 2015 ESPAS report on 
‘Global Trends to 2030: Can the EU meet the challenges 
ahead?’, we look forward to hosting experts and 
practitioners from around the world to discuss what 
divides and unites us in the digital age and to gain 
insights on the impact of new technologies on issues of 
democracy, security and trust. 

This year’s event will also focus on the role of connectivity 
for ensuring sustainable growth and inclusive prosperity, 
with a particular focus on cities and public governance. 
Furthermore, the discussions will examine the role that 
universities and think tanks have in bringing evidence 
into policymaking, as well as the critical importance of 
managing by anticipation.

With such a wide array of pertinent issues, we have set out 
to capture some of the valuable insights of our guests. It is 
with immense pleasure that we present you with this rich 
collection of forward-looking, anticipatory essays from our 
participating experts on the critical trends that are defining 
the future of our societies and governance systems.

Our aim is simple: we want to ensure that our speakers’ 
contributions are able to reach beyond the conference’s 
immediate audience. We want to stimulate strategic 
thinking by raising awareness of the innovations and 
opportunities – as well as the potential discontinuities 

and complexities – affecting the world of work and 
welfare, public services and governance. 

The ESPAS process is committed to identifying global 
long-term trends facing the European Union and 
its decision-makers. In addition, it is intended as a 
framework for engaging with international strategic 
allies, counterparts and experts from around the world in 
order to reflect on common global trends and challenges.

This publication represents an important step in this 
direction and we are tremendously grateful that amidst 
their heavy professional, academic and personal 
commitments, our speakers generously responded to 
our request for contributions. The result is a unique 
collection of over 40 original short essays addressing 
the different themes of this year’s Annual Meeting. The 
diversity of perspectives, we hope, will stimulate our 
readers’ thinking about the ways in which mega-trends, 
game-changers and our policy and political choices 
intersect and what this may mean for the future. 

Along with the ESPAS leadership, including the ESPAS 
Honorary President, James Elles, I sincerely hope that 
you will enjoy this collection of think-pieces and that 
they may trigger further dialogue and reflection on the 
future of our societies and governance systems.  

Sincerely, 

Ann Mettler

1

Acknowledgments

Many people meaningfully contributed, both intellectually 
and practically, to the organisation of the 2016 
annual ESPAS conference and to the making of this 
accompanying publication, and I would like to take this 
opportunity to express my heartfelt gratitude to them.

First and foremost, I would like to warmly thank 
our speakers and contributors. I would also like to 
take this opportunity to thank the members of the 
ESPAS Steering Group and their collaborators for a 
collaboration that has been growing ever stronger: 
Klaus Welle, Anthony Teasdale and Frank Debié from 
the European Parliament, Jim Cloos and Leo Schulte 
Nordholt from the General Secretariat of the Council 
of the EU; Christian Leffler and Alfredo Conte from the 
European External Action Service (EEAS); Jiří Buriánek 
and Béatrice Taulègne from the Committee of the 
Regions; Luis Planas and Pierluigi Brombo from the 
European and Social Affairs Committee (EESC) and, of 
course, James Elles, ESPAS’ Honorary President. 

Even more so, I wish to genuinely acknowledge the 
contributions of all the members of the ESPAS teams 
across all participating institutions who worked untiringly 
for this year’s conference and this publication: Danièle 
Réchard, Freya Windle-Wehrle and Eamonn Noonan have 
been the pillars of the EPRS. Julia Clerck-Sachsse, Carlo 
Marzocchi and Francesco Fusaro from the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), the General Secretariat 
of the Council of the EU and the European and Social 
Affairs Committee (EESC) respectively.

At the EPSC, I would particularly like to express my 
gratitude to Ruby Gropas, Ricardo Borges de Castro, 
Leonardo Quattrucci and Natacha Faullimmel, who 
have steadily carried through the entire process over 
this past year; Paweł Świeboda, who has always had 
purposeful and insightful suggestions; Agnieszka 
Skuratowicz, Mihaela Moldovan and Tina Gunda, who 
oversaw the full organisation of this event and ensured 
that this all came together; Jonáš Jančařík, who set 
up our website and orchestrated our online presence; 
Annick Hilbert, who created this year’s ESPAS design 
and beautifully laid out this publication; Rachel Smit for 
her sharp editing; and of course Carmen Tresguerres, 
who has worked closely with all to ensure that we 
always strive for more and better.

2

Table of Contents

Foreword

Acknowledgments

The Future of  Society

Game Changers  
for Inclusive Innovation
Carlos Moedas

What Will Make a Prosperous  
Society in the 21st Century?
Geoff Mulgan

What Divides and What  
Unites in the Digital Age
Heather Grabbe, Stefano Scarpetta,  
Bruce Stokes

Trust, Power and the  
Future of Society
Jeremy Heimans

Connectivity for Prosperity
Alan James, Pascal Lamy,  
Simon Schäfer, Mark Spelman

Strategic Dialogue on 
The Future of European Security
Anja Kaspersen, Shiraz Maher,  
Peter Neumann, Sir Julian King

Planning and Deciding  
in Uncertain Times
Nik Gowing, Michael Ignatieff, Mehmet Kinaci, 
Hans Peter Lankes, Aaron Maniam,  
Angela Wilkinson, Enrico Giovannini

01

02

05

06

08

11

16

18

23

28

37

38

40

42

45

48

50

53

61

The Future of  Governance

The Future of Think Tanks
Cinzia Alcidi, Matt Dann, Paweł Świeboda

Will Universities and  
Evidence-Based Research Matter?
Joseph H. H. Weiler

Rebooting Democracy
Mairead McGuinness, Pierre Calame,  
Edgar Grande, Jeanette Hofmann, Brigid Laffan

Inequality and Governance
Luis Planas, Stijn Hoorens,  
Mary Kaldor, Ibon Zugasti

Cities in the 21st Century
Karl-Heinz Lambertz, Benjamin Barber,  
Jiří Buriánek, Eric Swyngedouw

Foresight and Governance
Pierre Bollinger, Marius Oosthuizen,  
Angela Wilkinson

Europe Towards 2030
EPSC, EPRS, Council Secretariat, EEAS, CoR, EESC

Biographies of  Contributors 
to ESPAS 2016

3

 
The Future
of  Society

5

The Future of Society

GAME CHANGERS  
FOR INCLUSIVE INNOVATION

6

Carlos Moedas, Commissioner for Research,  
Science and Innovation, European Commission
Game Changers for 
Inclusive Innovation

The digital revolution has democratised innovation. 

On the one hand, users are much closer to producers 
and influence the way a product develops; they try out, 
evaluate and give feed-back. Also, the digital economy 
allows new – and smaller – players to enter the market 
and scale-up. In addition, the digital economy has 
created new markets, or new economic prospects.  
Think about bridging the gap between idle resources 
and potential users or customers. Uber or Airbnb are 
classic examples.

In the digital-physical world in which we live, we 
increasingly need open innovation, that is, involving 
more actors in the innovative process – scientists, 
entrepreneurs, users, governments and civil society. 

I see three major challenges ahead for Europe in  
this regard: 

•  the lack of disruptive market-creating innovation; 

•  the scarcity of venture capital, and the difficulty of 
scaling-up start-ups to global competitiveness; 

•  and a risk culture that accepts that failure is an 

inherent component of entrepreneurship. 

7

The Future of Society

WHAT WILL MAKE A PROSPEROUS 
SOCIETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY?

8

Geoff  Mulgan, Chief  Executive of  NESTA

21st Century Dialectics: 
Or How We Can Achieve 
Prosperity in New Times

It’s not hard to say what prosperity is: high levels of 
well-being and income, wealth and health, as well 
as confidence that you’ll thrive in the future. Nor is it 
hard to see what drives prosperity: the combination 
of stability and freedom, the rule of law and plenty of 
investment, human capital and healthcare, imaginative 
science and the absence of war.

By all of these measures, the last two generations have 
seen unprecedented advances in prosperity: dramatic 
rises in life expectancy (40 years in a century) and the 
presence of democracy; falls in poverty (to less than 
10% of the world population) and deaths from warfare; 
and today, tides of new scientific knowledge and 
technology promise further dramatic improvements 
to health, mobility and daily life, the integration of 
humans and machines, and leaps to new forms of 
collective intelligence.

So what’s the problem? The problem is partly optical – 
a rise of politicians proclaiming a story of decline – and 
partly real, in that many of the foundations of progress 
in prosperity are in doubt. 

For two generations it was plausible that more 
openness, and more flow (of capital, people, goods or 
information) contributed to the public good. It became 
an article of faith that globalisation and more open 
trade led to general benefits, stridently asserted by 
leaders and gurus of all kinds. Now, large minorities 

have seen their income stagnate, and fear that their 
children will be worse off than them, and probably 
jobless, thanks to the combination of migration and 
automation. Technological change continues to be 
‘capital-biased’, meaning a declining share of income 
for labour, and new job and wealth creation continues 
to concentrate in areas with high levels of graduates. 
The promise of shared prosperity which underpinned 
so much economic policy over the last 70 years is now 
called into question.

For two generations it seemed obvious that 
democracy was the only plausible governing model for 
advanced societies, and that its competitors (fascism, 
communism, dictatorship…) had been defeated for 
good. Now that confidence has been shaken. In the 
old democracies, where the forms of democracy have 
changed little since the 19th century, large minorities 
have lost faith not just in politicians and political 
institutions, but even in democracy itself.

For two generations optimists could point to the 
inexorable spread of science, facts and evidence. Now 
social media act as echo chambers of lies as well 
as truth and popular politicians take pride in their 
contempt for consistency and accuracy.

For two generations it seemed obvious that the world 
was becoming ever healthier. Now we see a growing 
risk of epidemics and pandemics and the threat of 

9

The Future of Society

between free flow and barriers and buffers (in everything 
from cybersecurity to migration); mobilise the full energy 
of entrepreneurship and innovation, but channel it more 
to social needs and opportunity for all; accelerate the 
next generation of technologies in ways that enhance 
humanity rather than replacing it; and reinvigorate 
democracy and politics in ways that respect peoples’ 
need for belonging, and for a share in power.

The future requires 
Europe to think 
dialectically, achieving 
a balance between 
conflicting ideas.

None of this is easy. But this 
is the serious work that must 
start if we are to prosper in 
the future. It requires Europe 
to think dialectically, achieving 
a balance between conflicting 
ideas, rather than taking them 
to their logical conclusions (the consistent mistake of 
the more extreme partisans of globalisation).

And, because the future is unknowable, it requires 
vigorous experiment in each of these fields to flesh out 
a synthesis that works in practice and not just in theory. 
Only then can we escape from fatalism and from the 
dictatorship of no alternatives.

rising antimicrobial resistance which could threaten 
tens of millions of lives by mid-century.

After a period when large parts of the world thought 
that war was a thing of the past, confrontation 
between heavily armed, technologically advanced 
countries is once again a serious prospect, with Russia 
a belligerent aggressor around Europe, and China 
flexing its muscles.

These changes are both cause and effect of a shift 
in political climate, a rising tide of nationalism in the 
US (Trump), Russia (Putin) and parts of Europe (from 
Marine Le Pen to Alternative für Deutschland), echoed in 
China under Xi, India under Modi and Japan under Abe.

How to respond? If optimistic openness was the thesis, 
we now see a dark anti-thesis. Simply to assert the old 
thesis ever more stridently doesn’t work. Instead we 
need to design new syntheses. They must avoid both 
nostalgia, and the tendency to fetishize globalisation 
and technological advance as ends in themselves, 
rather than as means. This is what I mean by dialectical 
thinking, and it’s what we badly need now. 

The syntheses will need to: maintain the momentum 
of the vanguard firms, industries and places, but focus 
much more on access, spread and adoption elsewhere 
in society and the economy; reshape education better 
to fit the future, but also offer new routes to security 
in welfare and employment; strike a better balance 

10

WHAT DIVIDES AND WHAT  
UNITES IN THE DIGITAL AGE

Mindmap from the 2015 Annual ESPAS Conference

Source: @ graphicrecorder

11

The Future of Society

Heather Grabbe, Director,  
Open Society European Policy Institute
Between Governance of the Past 
and Technology of the Future 

In the online world, people are used to instant, accessible 
and personalised services. But the infrastructure for 
politics is still based on technology developed in the 18th 
and 19th centuries. In many parts of everyday life, voters 
are used to a consumer experience where they get 
instant feedback and personal participation; but party 
membership, ballot boxes and stump speeches do not 
offer the same speed, control or personal engagement. 
The institutions of representative democracy at national 
and EU level – political parties, elected members, law-
making – do not offer the same quality of experience for 
their ultimate consumers.

How can politics 
meet people’s new 
expectations about 
decision-making?

This matters because it is 
causing voters to switch off. 
Broad participation by most of 
the population in the practice of 
democracy is vital for societies to 

remain open because it ensures pluralism and prevents 
takeover of power by narrow interests. But in some 
countries and some elections, turnout is regularly below 
a third of registered voters, especially in European 
Parliament elections.

The internet is driving the major trends that create this 
disconnection and disruption. Here are four vital areas 
in which politics should adapt, including at EU level: 

•  Expectation. Voters have a growing sense that 

political parties and law-making are out of touch, but 

not that politics is irrelevant. This is understandable 
given how we interact with other parts of our lives 
digitally. Online life is instant, transparent, easy and 
connected – while politics is often slow, laborious 
and secretive. How can politics meet people’s new 
expectations about decision-making?

•  Affiliation. The model of mass membership political 
parties is losing support, at least in its current form. 
Across Europe, formal party membership is dwindling 
in most countries. But people are interested in new 
forms of affiliation, especially through social media 
and alternative networks. And online affiliation with 
political groups is growing as people find new ways 
to engage. How to channel this desire for affiliation 
into political institutions?

•  Location. Digital technology allows people to find 
myriad new ways to express their political views 
publicly, outside of formal political spaces. Every day 
there are millions of conversations about political 
issues in new digital spaces: on Twitter timelines, 
Facebook newsfeeds, comment threads, blogs 
and videos. This new 'digital commons' reflects 
the hopes, views and beliefs of citizens – but it is 
not easy to connect these new debates to formal 
political engagement at the moment. Political 
institutions still expect voters to come to them, but 
their websites are not where the action is. How to 
take political issues to the places where there is hot 
debate nowadays?

12

•  Information. The internet has made vast amounts 
of data and a huge range of information sources 
across an enormous spectrum of issues available 
to every human with an internet connection. How is 
this information overload affecting engagement with 
politics? Web sources are also dramatically changing 
the nature of political reporting and journalism, 
making it far more dynamic and pluralistic. At the 

same time, competition from web-based sources 
and social media is forcing traditional mainstream 
media outlets to change their business models. How 
to keep political reporting accurate and pluralistic 
so that voters get reliable information on which 
to make their political choices? How to ensure 
voters, representatives and institutions are not 
overwhelmed with data and switch off?

Stefano Scarpetta, Director, Directorate for Employment, 
Labour and Social Affairs, OECD
The Future of Work

The world of work is changing rapidly. Several ongoing 
mega-trends – including globalisation, digitalisation 
and demographic changes – coupled with rapid change 
in values and preferences regarding work, have the 
potential of significantly affecting the quantity and 
types of jobs in our economies, as well as how and by 
whom they will be carried out.

Driven by these trends, the future of work will offer 
unparalleled opportunities. New technologies and 
new markets will generate new and more productive 
and rewarding jobs. The ability to de-bundle jobs into 
smaller tasks will allow work to be carried out more 
efficiently on a truly global, digital assembly line. In the 
future, workers are likely to have more to say about 
who they work for, how much they work, as well as 
where and when they work. Such increased flexibility 
will provide greater opportunities for under-represented 
groups, such as women, senior workers and those with 
disabilities, to participate in the labour market.

The future of  work 
will offer unparalleled 
opportunities

However, there are also significant 
challenges associated with the new 
world of work. While fears of mass 
unemployment caused by automation 
and globalisation are exaggerated, 
significant upheaval is nevertheless likely as jobs are 
destroyed in some areas, while others emerge elsewhere. 
Adjustment costs may be significant and are more likely 
to fall on the least skilled and the most disadvantaged.

At the same time, many of the existing jobs will involve 
new tasks and require new competencies and skills. While 
building the right skills is more than ever essential to 
prepare young people to this dynamic labour market, a 
parallel major agenda is also that of adapting and up-
grading the skills and competences of those already in 
the labour market. Failure to make significant progress in 
this area may well lead to further increases in inequality 
if not mass technological unemployment. Moreover, some 
of the new forms of work that are emerging raise serious 
concerns about the quality of jobs that are created and 
the degree of protection the workers involved have given 
the existing institutions and polices. 

13

The Future of Society

There are many uncertainties on how the world of work 
will look like in the next 10-15 years and thus detailed 
planning for the potential changes that might occur 
will most likely be ineffective. It is important, however,  
to strengthen the resilience and adaptability of labour 
markets, so that workers and countries can manage 
the transitions with the least possible disruption, while 
grasping the new opportunities. 

Modernising education and life-long learning 
programmes, re-thinking labour market regulation and 
overhauling social protection are only three of the most 
important policy initiatives that will be necessary to 
ensure that changes in the world of work result in fair 
and efficient labour markets, rather than becoming yet 
another reason for social cleavage.

Bruce Stokes, Director of  Global Economic 
 Attitudes, Pew Research Center
Populism: From Backlash 
to Framing the Future

The rise of populism on both sides of the Atlantic 
is one of the defining social, political and economic 
phenomena of the current era. 

The growing gap between the rich and the poor and the 
widespread economic turmoil in the wake of the 2007-
2008 global financial crisis has helped fuel populist 
sentiment. But populism is not solely a byproduct of 
economic inequality and hard times. Populist backlash 
has its roots in broadly shared anxiety about the loss 
of traditional ways of life, unease with rising racial 
and ethnic diversity and the erosion of public faith in 
existing institutions of democratic society. All of these 
concerns would, arguably, be more manageable in 
an era of rapid and broadly shared economic growth. 
But the prospect of slower growth thanks to aging 
populations and anemic productivity in both Europe 
and the United States suggests that improved living 
standards are unlikely to serve as a brake on populist 
political movements any time soon. 

In 2007, even before the economic downturn, a median 
of 75% of Europeans in eight EU nations believed that 
their traditional way of life was getting lost, according 
to a Pew Research Center survey. In the United States, 
public regret about what had been lost thanks to the 
rapid pace of change stood at 73%. 

Once the financial crisis hit European and American 
confidence, the economy tanked. In 2009, a median 
of just 16% of the public in seven EU nations thought 
the economy was doing well. Today, that median 
stands at 37% – an improvement, but hardly a ringing 
endorsement of economic fortunes. Importantly, the 
aggregate figure masks wide disparities: 75% of 
Germans are pleased with their economic conditions, 
but only 12% of the French and 13% of the Spanish 
agree. Economic confidence in the US has followed a 
similar trajectory: in 2009, 17% said the economy was 
doing well, in 2016 44% hold this view. 

14

Populism may prove to 
be a powerful political 
force in both Europe 
and the United States 
for some time to come.

Finally, people on both sides 
of the Atlantic have lost faith 
in democratic leadership and 
societal institutions. Only 42% 
of Americans trust their political 
leaders, down from 64% in 
2000, according to a recent 
Gallup survey. Only 20% have confidence in Congress. 
In 2007, in the six EU countries with the largest 
population, a median of 73% expressed a favourable 
view of the European Union in a Pew Research 
Center survey. In 2016 that median is 49%. In 2014 
favourability of the EU parliament was just 40%.

Populism on both sides of the Atlantic has its roots in 
the economic crisis, but also in public concern about 
diversity and refugees. Moreover, there is a shared 
decline in public faith in some of the key institutions 
of democratic society and in those who are elected to 
lead it. With multiple factors feeding the rise of public 
anger, fear and frustration, populism may prove to be 
a powerful political force in both Europe and the United 
States for some time to come. 

Along with general economic worries, there is 
widespread concern about inequality. A median of 60% 
in seven EU nations surveyed in 2014 said the gap 
between the rich and the poor was a very big problem. 
And 46% of Americans agreed. 

Populist sentiment has also been stoked by frequent 
outcries over the influx of immigrants and refugees. 
About a third (a median of 34%) of Europeans in 10 EU 
nations surveyed in 2016 believe that the increasing 
number of people of many different races, ethnic 
groups and nationalities in their country makes their 
nation a worse place to live. In many EU nations this 
sentiment is more prominent from those on the right 
of the ideological spectrum than on the left. Moreover, 
a median of 50% believes that refugees are a burden, 
taking jobs and social benefits. And a median of 43% 
of Europeans hold an unfavourable view of Muslims in 
their country. In general this view is also much more 
likely to be expressed by those on the right ideologically 
than those on the left.

In the United States, 8% of the registered voters say 
increasing racial and ethnic diversity is bad for the 
country. That share about doubles when looking at 
supporters of Republican presidential nominee Donald 
Trump (17%). Only 3% of supporters of Democratic 
presidential nominee Hillary Clinton agree. Registered 
voters are also polarised on the question of whether 
immigrants are a burden on the US. Less than one-
in-five of Clinton supporters (17%) think so, but the 
share quadruples among Trump supporters 69% of 
supporters of Republican presidential candidate Donald 
Trump say immigrants are a burden on society and 
57% believe Muslims living in the US should be subject 
to more scrutiny. 

15

The Future of Society

TRUST AND THE  
FUTURE OF SOCIETY

Mindmap from the 2015 Annual ESPAS Conference

Source: @ graphicrecorder

16

Jeremy Heimans, Co-founder and CEO of  Purpose.com 
The Rise and Implications 
of 'New Power'

People are waking up to their own power, coming 
together at a scale and speed unimaginable just a few 
years ago. New crowd-based and participatory models 
and values are transforming politics, business and 
other sectors of society. 

How can we better understand the changing nature of 
power and move beyond the usual banal discussion 
about the role of technology and social media to a 
more structural discussion about the new models, 
values and forms of participatory power that are 
emerging? What do these shifts mean for existing 
institutions, and what ought we expect from emerging 
'new power' players? Will platforms like Uber, Airbnb 
and Facebook actually further concentrate power, even 
as they offer new kinds of agency to people? 

How should governments and other actors respond to 
forces like ISIS that are using sophisticated new power 
techniques to propagate their ideology of violence? How 
do we reconcile the growing popularity of old power 
'strongmen' leaders with the increase in political protest 
and spontaneous social movements around the world? 
Will movements like Black Lives Matter in the US or 
Occupy globally 'consolidate' their role and institutionalise 
in their next phases, or will they stay diffuse?

What can governments and the public sector learn from 
new power – and what can they do to adapt?

17

The Future of Society

CONNECTIVITY  
FOR PROSPERITY

Mindmap from the 2015 Annual ESPAS Conference

Source: @ graphicrecorder

18

Alan James, VP Worldwide Business  
Development, Hyperloop One
The Future of Transportation

minute travel times between 
many city pairs, and tightly 
integrating of smart mobility 
solutions for on-demand 
‘final mile’ feeder/distributor 
services, Europe could connect 
in a new ecumenopolis.

Transportation is humanity’s 
greatest lever for economic 
growth. More than any 
other technology, transport is 
the catalyst for big leaps in 
culture and ideas.

With Hyperloop, urban planners can alleviate housing 
shortages by locating new, green developments 80 to 
300 kilometers away, yet accessible to central business 
districts within minutes. Inefficient use of scarce airport 
capacity by disproportionately polluting short haul flights 
can be replaced by faster ground transport. Congestion and 
emissions at ports can be slashed, with Hyperloop shuttling 
containers quietly and around the clock to inland terminals.

Ever since the advent of fast steamships, new transportation 
paradigms have arrived at regular intervals, roughly every 
80-100 years. Shipping, rail, automobile, air travel. The time 
for a new mode of transportation that delivers superior 
performance at a competitive price without damaging the 
environment is here. Welcome to the Age of Hyperloop.

Transportation is humanity’s greatest lever for 
economic growth. More than any other technology, 
transport is the catalyst for big leaps in culture and 
ideas. And transport has itself been the engine for 
growth on a global scale. The Great Acceleration of the 
Rail Age enabled the transport of produce and people 
in volume, which in turn enabled urbanisation and the 
development of the mass market. Powered by coal, 
constructed of iron and steel, and financed on new 
capital markets, the railways themselves became a 
primary driver of the Industrial Revolution.

That was then, this is now. The great question facing 
global leaders is whether our current transportation 
options can meet the inexorable and conflicting demands 
of growth and environmental stewardship. At current 
2.7% annual rates of growth, mobility demand in the 
developed world will double in 25 years and rise sixteen-
fold in a century. Existing modes have served us well, 
but offer only incremental improvements when a step-
change in performance and energy efficiency is required.

Hyperloop One’s mission is to deliver that step-change and 
to bring fast, cheap, clean and reliable mass transportation 
to the billions who can’t afford more than a bus, whilst 
offering city to city travel times faster than a private jet.

Our aim is to do for people and cargo what global 
fibre networks did for the internet – create on demand, 
point to point transportation that’s at once banal and 
miraculous: imagine attending a morning meeting in 
Paris, being in Brussels for lunch and then in Frankfurt 
for your daughter’s soccer match by 17:00. With 
Hyperloop operating on demand, offering 10 to 20 

19

The Future of Society

Pascal Lamy, President Emeritus Jacques Delors Institute. 
Time for Sustainable Connectivity

Increasing connectivity is and will remain one of the 
main engines of globalisation as it keeps slashing 
the cost of distance. Hence a growing international 
integration of production systems and a constant 
Ricardo-Schumpeterian pressure for efficiencies. 

This is fine as long as these efficiency gains are, or 
perceived to be, fairly distributed. But, as we have seen 
in recent times, opening may turn to protectionist or 
isolationist discourse if gains are not equitably distributed.

This is also fine as long as economic development 
remains compatible with ecological sustainability, which 
is not the case anymore. 

Conclusion: whereas less connectivity would be absurd, 
more connectivity does not work for sustainable 
prosperity under any conditions and these conditions 
need more attention than in the past. They have to do 
with social and cultural security, different structures 
of relative prices (capital / labour, environmental 
externalities), new forms of accountability and 
democratic choices, approximating global ethics, etc. 

A new version of what I called the 'Geneva consensus' 
as opposed to the old Washington consensus.

Simon Schäfer, CEO & Founder, Factory
Why Tech Innovators are  
Poised to Save the World

When trying to understand the societal impact of tech 
entrepreneurs on modern society, we need to look 
back, back to hippie culture and the San Francisco 
music revolution of the sixties, the birthplace of tech 
entrepreneurship in its current form. The common 

and strikingly new belief at that time was that we 
are responsible for the future of our planet, that an 
inclusive and networked society is more balanced 
and likely to be more sustainable; that race, gender 
and sexual orientation do not matter and need to be 

20

tolerated in whichever form. That misfits and outlaws 
are admirable, if not role models.

Today’s tech entrepreneurs have the DNA of this exact 
cultural expression incorporated in their commercial 
endeavours. Many go as far as saying they only make 
money to build things, not to have money. They need 
money to change the world from within.

The result is very benchmarkable: The effort made to 
achieve a diversified corporate culture, to create an 
environment in which young people are inspired to 
create regardless of their origin is at the core of many 
successful companies today. 

Fast growing, lean in structure, highly diversified and 
ultimately creating wealth and prosperity through 
employee stock option programmes, whilst taking their 
people on a global journey to discover new things. 
Founders and their teams benchmark against the best, 
truly believe in meritocracy and - even if they fail as a 
business - learn on an internationally superior level how to 
implement innovation. Startups drive our society forward.

The many founders I know who have created significant 
wealth did not settle in Cayman Islands and buy a 
yacht, but reinvest in their peers - maintaining a fragile 
ecosystem that is ultimately aspiring to be self sustaining.

So how could society and government not embrace this 
changing-the-world-to-the-better trend in capitalism, which 
ultimately relies on a connected and inclusive society?

Mark Spelman Co Head Future of  the Digital Economy 
and Society Initiative, World Economic Forum
Future of Digital 
Economy and Society

The exponential growth in digitisation and internet 
connectivity is creating significant new opportunities 
for business and society. What makes the changes so 
significant is the combination and leverage of multiple 
technologies: algorithms, sensors, data, cloud, artificial 
intelligence, machine learning and virtual reality 
working together that is new. These digital technologies 
can also combine with other technologies such as 3D 
printing, robotics, advanced materials, and energy 
storage, to have a multiplier effect on the way we live 
and work. The result is that digitisation is transforming 
what we do - from smart factories, to smart homes, 
to smart health - from the means of production to our 
personal well-being.

Much of the focus on the digital economy has been on 
the growth of digital industries relative to the rest of 
the economy, technology investment, internet usage, 
digital jobs and digital skills. Governments have been 
busy creating the enabling conditions for the digital 
economy from new computing curriculum, digital 
skills strategies, to new eGovernment services. These 
initiatives are important in that they enhance efficiency, 
reduce costs and encourage innovation.

Where there has been less focus is on the opportunity 
to realise specific societal benefits through the 
application of these new digital technologies. For 
example, cars are evolving into sophisticated, 

21

The Future of Society

connected data platforms which allow for new features 
from assisted vehicles to semi autonomous and 
ultimately fully driverless vehicles and robo-taxis. The 
societal benefit is that assisted driving features will 
improve overall vehicle and road safety as well as 
reducing fuel consumption. 

In the UK, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety 
has estimated there is a 7% reduction in crashes for 
vehicles with a basic forward-collision warning system 
and a 14% reduction for those with automatic braking. 
Assisted driving has the potential for value creation, 
through value addition for the industry, value impact 
for customers, and value impact for society and the 
environment. Assisted driving can deliver a number 
of societal benefits: less people killed or injured 
on the roads; reduced CO2 emissions, and savings 
for customers who opt for usage based insurance 
premiums through the adoption of ADAS ‘advanced 
driver assistance systems’ in cars. 

The full benefits of digitisation will not be realised 
without a sharper societal lens; digital benefits require 
multiple players to come together; for cars it will 
involve the car manufacturers, driver groups, highways 
agencies, insurance sector with Government playing a 
catalysing role.

Connected cars are only the start of a wide range of 
potential societal benefits; there are opportunities for 
new mobility solutions that connect road, rail, ferry, 
public and private transport with walking and cycling. 
Multiple solutions will require platforms to work 
together to recognise the traveller and allow for new 
ways of integrating transport. The societal benefits 
through time saved and reduced emissions could be 
significant in many cities. Add to transport solutions the 

The full benefits of  
digitisation will not be 
realised without a sharper 
societal lens; digital benefits 
require multiple players to 
come together

possibility of more efficient 
use of available logistics 
capacity, which would 
offer better rates, more 
convenience and real time 
tracking of goods. Logistics 
has low utilisation rates, 
particularly in trucking fleets, due to empty backhauls 
faced by most truckers. The EU trucking industry is very 
fragmented; well over 90% of the players operate a 
fleet of less than 20 trucks. The creation of a logistics 
platform to match demand with empty backhaul 
capacity opens the door to improved utilisation; which 
in turn offers the potential for less empty trucks, lower 
emissions and lower delivery costs.

Digital opportunities come in many forms. A Europe that 
has always believed in a balanced socio-economic model 
needs to look at digital in the same way. The digital 
economy is growing faster than the rest of the economy; 
but this growth undervalues the additional societal 
benefits that can be achieved through time savings, 
reduced emissions, and better utilisation of assets. To 
achieve these societal benefits will require forward 
looking policy makers and collaboration across sectors.

One thing we know is that digital is blurring industry 
boundaries and enabling new cross industry 
partnerships to be formed; realising societal benefits 
through digital begins will the identification of 
opportunities in sectors such as transport and energy 
and then requires strong cross sector collaboration to 
agree on the policies, incentives, standards and pilots 
to unlock societal value for all our citizens.

22

THE FUTURE  
OF SECURITY

Mindmap from the 2015 Annual ESPAS Conference

Source: @ graphicrecorder

23

The Future of Society

Sir Julian King, Commissioner for Security Union,  
European Commission
The Future of Security  
and Preparing for It:  
Why the Security Union is Needed

•  we need to tackle the root causes of terrorism 

including radicalisation – through prevention and 
de-radicalisation work. This work is best done at the 
local level – led by grassroots and civil society - but 
the EU can help with funding and by facilitating 
networks allowing for best practice to be shared. 
Radicalisation also happens in the internet. We can 
work at EU level to ensure illegal content promoting 
Daesh for example is taken down by internet 
companies.

•  finally, we need to build our resilience – critical 

infrastructure  of course  – IT, airports, ports and so 
on, 'soft targets' – such as public spaces but also 
society's resilience at large.

Terrorism and organised crime threatens our values 
and our way of life. Neither respects national borders. 
Indeed their business models thrive on the lack of 
coordination between states.  The only way to defeat 
the terrorists and criminals is by working together 
effectively. In today’s world, security of one Member 
State is the security of all. National security remains the 
sole responsibility of Member States, but they cannot 
effectively address alone threats which are transnational.

So what can we do at EU level to support Member 
States in fighting terrorism and enhancing security?

•  we need to squeeze the space that terrorists, cyber 
and serious criminals operate in – with relevant EU 
wide legislation where useful, setting standards by 
focussing on implementation: doing what we have 
agreed to do, helping Member states with delivery 
on the ground, as well as being ready to enforce 
the rules. And ensuring that the relevant agencies 
– Europol and Eurojust for example - work together 
and with Member States.

24

Rajan Basra, Research Fellow, International Centre for the Study of  Radicalisation. 

 & Peter R. Neumann, Professor of  Security Studies and Director of  the International 
Centre for the Study of  Radicalisation (ICSR), both at King’s College London. 
How Crime and Terror Have Merged: 
European Jihadists and the New 
Crime-Terror Nexus

The conventional wisdom used to be that terrorists are 
middle-class and educated. In October 2016, the World 
Bank published a study according to which the majority 
of Islamic State fighters were better educated than 
their peers. But the picture among European jihadists 
is strikingly different. Far from being middle-class, they 
are at home in the ghettos of big cities like Paris and 
Brussels, and many of them have criminal pasts.

Khalid el-Bakraoui, who blew himself up in a Brussels 
metro station in March 2016, was previously involved 
in bank robberies and carjackings. Brahim Abdeslam, 
one of the suicide attackers during the November 
2015 attacks in Paris, had a history of drug trafficking 
and robbery. And the three jihadists involved in the 
Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015 were robbers, 
fraudsters, and counterfeiters.

This is no mere coincidence. As we demonstrate in a 
recently published report, throughout Europe, criminals 
have been drawn to jihadism. Two-thirds of German 
foreign fighters had criminal records. According to 
Belgium’s Federal Prosecutor, half of his country’s 
jihadists had criminal records prior to leaving for Syria. 
And officials from Norway and the Netherlands have 
told us that ‘at least 60 percent’ of their jihadists 
have been involved in crime. No wonder, then, that the 
Islamic State has been labelled ‘a sort of super-gang’.

What is it that they find so appealing in extremism? 
In our examination of 79 European jihadists with 
criminal backgrounds, we saw that they often searched 
for ‘redemption’ from their past sins. Jihadism offers 
them the chance to wipe the slate clean. This typically 
followed on from a shocking event or personal crisis 
– what Quintan Wiktorowicz has termed a ‘cognitive 
opening’ – which prompted them to reassess their life, 
and become open to new ideas and beliefs. 

Our examination reveals another worrying trend: 
that jihadism licenses the use of crime. From senior 
leaders within the jihadist scene, down to street-level 
supporters, there is the idea that anything taken from 
the disbelievers is simply ghanima, or the ‘spoils of 
war’. Anwar al-Awlaki, the al-Qaeda leader who was 
killed in a US drone attack in 2011, infamously justified 
this in his 'Ruling on dispossessing the disbelievers’ 
wealth in Dar al-Harb (the lands of war)'. Islamic State 
has even issued instructions in its magazines advising 
would-be jihadists to commit white-collar crime, by 
forging payslips and taking out credit from banks. It 
seems that jihadists, therefore, are actively encouraged 
to commit crimes.

One of most effective examples of this was Khalid 
Zerkani, who became an influential figure in the 
Molenbeek jihadist scene prior to his 2014 arrest for 

25

The Future of Society

terrorist-related offences. He encouraged a gang of 
young men to rob tourists in Brussels, and would then 
distribute the proceeds amongst the group, earning him 
the nickname Papa Noël (Father Christmas). Speaking 
at his trial, one witness said that Zerkani told the young 
men that ‘to steal from the infidels is permitted by Allah’.

This religious veneer, combined with Zerkani’s charisma, 
was massively influential: he was responsible for upwards 
of 70 men mobilising to Syria. Amongst his recruits 
was Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who helped coordinate the 
attacks in Paris. This phenomenon is worrying, as it 
offers criminals an opportunity for ‘redemption’ without 
requiring any change in their behaviour. It simply 
repurposes crime, under a religious sanction.

There are a number of steps that can be taken to 
counteract this nexus of crime and terrorism. Above 
all, we need to re-think radicalisation, as the behaviour 
of those who adopt extremist ideas does not always 
match up to long-held notions about displays of 
religion. Being ‘pious’ is no guarantee that criminal 
behaviour has stopped, while acting like a ‘gangster’ 
does not preclude involvement in terrorism. Countering 
terrorist financing should also target all streams 
of financing, including small-scale, petty crime, and 
illicit trade such as counterfeiting. As the Mayor of 
Molenbeek, Francoise Schepmans, has recently said, 
radicalisation thrives on other forms of criminality, and 
it may be wise to first target lower offences.

Anja Kaspersen, former Head of  International Security, 
World Economic Forum
The Darker Side of New 
Technologies: How A New Global 
Security Order Has Arrived

Understanding the impact of new technologies on 
global security has never been more urgent – but 
responses are falling behind and there is no framework 
on the table to get back on track. 

After decades of relative stability, international political 
and security systems are now coming undone at the 
seams. Strong states are becoming more stand offish. 
Growing asymmetries in norms and interests are 
compromising international law. 

Geo-strategic balances are shifting as large armies 
are growing less important than access to data, 
technological prowess and digital literacy. As warfare 
is becoming robotised and artificial intelligence 
militarised, we face a new arms race with potentially 
destabilising consequences. 

Rapid technological advances are making it cheaper and 
easier to develop new ways of causing harm at scale. 
The 'democratisation of destruction' is exemplified by 
cyber attacks on critical network systems, which are 
likely to become more commonplace.

26

  
Decentralising threats create an incentive for states 
to collaborate on designing effective responses to 
their shared challenges – but political systems still 
assume a zero-sum approach to security, and trust 
is eroding. Fear-mongering populist politicians are 
filling the vacuum in global leadership as electorates 
feel helpless and fatigued by the sense that problems 
outside their immediate environment are unsolvable 
and elected leaders cannot be trusted to have their 
best interests at heart. 

The 'democratisation of  
destruction' is exemplified 
by cyber attacks on critical 
network systems, which 
are likely to become more 
commonplace. 

The social contract 
is breaking down, as 
connectivity is enabling 
people’s sense of 
identity and loyalty to 
shift from the state of 
which they are citizens, 

to more fragmented groups and/or transnational 
movements based on shared beliefs. We have not yet 
developed 'a cyber social contract' to protect ourselves, 
the structures we rely on, and the internet itself. Data 
security, accountability and transparency in design and 
policy remain more of an after-fix than a priority. 

We have not yet developed  
'a cyber social contract' to protect 
ourselves, the structures we rely 
on, and the internet itself.

Political leaders 
are not technology 
literate. Innovators 
and entrepreneurs 
lack understanding of 
the security implications of their work. And we lack 
mechanisms to bring the two together. 

Together, these intersections add up to a critical inflection 
point that will increasingly transform our lives in ways we 
struggle to understand, let alone control. It is all too easy 
to concoct a frightening vision of the future. How do we 
minimise the prospects of sleepwalking into dystopia?
There are no easy answers, but the first step is to 
acknowledge the risks and make a greater effort to 
include all stakeholders, disciplines and generations 
in an honest and informed conversation. To genuinely 
commit to stability and responsible innovation we need 
to rebuild trust – which requires a demonstration of 
positive change and transparent leadership. 

As the Nobel-winning physicist and tech optimist 
Dennis Gabor once put it, 'The future cannot be 
predicted, but futures can be invented'. 

27

The Future of Society

PLANNING AND DECIDING  
IN UNCERTAIN TIMES

Mindmap from the 2015 Annual ESPAS Conference

Source: @ graphicrecorder

28

Nik Gowing, Visiting Professor, School of  Social Science 
and Public Policy, Kings College, London 

& Chris Langdon, Co-author, Thinking the Unthinkable
The New Uncertain Normal for Leadership 
in Politics, Public Service and Corporates. 
The Need to Think the Unthinkable.

In 2016, the vulnerabilities at top levels of leadership 
are greater than at any time in recent history. The 
implications are deeply troubling. A proliferation of 
‘unthinkable’ events since the Russian seizure of 
Crimea in early 2014 has revealed a new fragility at 
the highest levels of the corporate, public policy and 
investment worlds. The ability to spot, identify and 
handle unexpected, non-normative events at critical 
moments has proved not just to be wanting but 
perilously inadequate.

 The ability to spot, identify 
and handle unexpected, non-
normative events at critical 
moments has proved not just 
to be wanting but perilously 
inadequate.

Examples of the ‘new 
normal’ keep stacking up. 
Most recently, they include: 
Brexit, Europe’s migration 
crisis, the sudden 60% 
reduction in oil prices, and 
the new frailty of political stability. Traditional parties 
and structures are being challenged by the new, radical, 
disruptive scale of digital empowerment and public 
disillusionment. Who a few months ago seriously raised 
the prospect of US President Donald Trump? Even the 
sudden possibility in recent weeks confirmed two dark 
new realities: the destabilising impact of the ‘new 
normal’ of ‘unthinkables’, plus the narrowness and 
inadequacy of risk assessments.

These challenges raise major questions about the 
appropriateness and configuration of the human capacity 
of those at the highest levels to cope with and respond 
effectively to the fast growing proliferation of ‘unthinkables’.

New research confirms how pressures resulting from 
an ever-more compressed time scale often overwhelm 
decision-makers’ capacity to act effectively. New 
solutions and answers need to be found rapidly, 
especially in the areas of behaviour, culture, mindsets 
and systems. 

The ongoing research project ‘Thinking the Unthinkable’ 
led by Nik Gowing and Chris Langdon explores the 
inability to handle the ‘new normal’. It is based on 
scores of confidential high level interviews and 
conversations. They are captured in 2,000 pages of 
transcripts. The interim findings are available at  
www.thinkunthinkable.org. 

Two dark new realities are 
confirmed: the destabilising 
impact of  the ‘new normal’ 
of  ‘unthinkables’, plus the 
narrowness and inadequacy of  
risk assessments.

29

The Future of Society

Mehmet Kinaci, Strategic Analyst, Strategic Plans and 
Policy Directorate, NATO
'It’s not the big fish that 
eat the small…It’s the 
fast that eat the slow.'1

In the past two decades, the world has been 
experiencing a period of unprecedented transition 
in political, social, economic and environmental 
areas mainly driven by an exponential change in 
technology. The rate of change in many aspects of 
human society is expected to continue creating both 
opportunities and perils. A recently introduced phrase 
- 'a black elephant.' 2 3 - is used to describe existing 
and foreseeable problems of great magnitude and 
complexity. There are many black elephants: failed 
and failing states, global warming, water scarcity, 
mass immigration, income inequality, and rising global 
powers challenging the international order. Additionally, 
the growing role of non-state actors and super-
empowered individuals in domestic and international 
affairs has increased the complexity of addressing 
these black elephants in the strategic environment. 

1.  Jennings, Jason and Haughton, Laurence, 'It’s not the big fish eat the small…
It’s the fast that eat the slow.', 2000 This quote is also attributed to Klaus 
1.  Jennings, Jason and Haughton, Laurence, 'It’s not the big fish eat the small…
Schwab, Founder and Executive Chairman of the World Economic Forum
It’s the fast that eat the slow.', 2000 This quote is also attributed to Klaus 
Schwab, Founder and Executive Chairman of the World Economic Forum
2.  Friedman, Thomas L., The New York Times, 'Stampeding Black Elephants,' 
22 Nov 2014, 'Black elephant' is a combination of two existing well-known 
2.  Friedman, Thomas L., The New York Times, 'Stampeding Black Elephants,' 
phrases: 'a black swan' and the 'elephant in the room.'
22 Nov 2014, 'Black elephant' is a combination of two existing well-known 
phrases: 'a black swan' and the 'elephant in the room.'
Postnormal Times,' in 'The Future of Internet' Springer 2015 J. Winter, R. 
Ono (eds.)
Postnormal Times,' in 'The Future of Internet' Springer 2015 J. Winter, R. Ono 
(eds.)
You Think,' 2012
You Think,' 2012
Artificial Intelligence,' 19 Aug 2015
Artificial Intelligence,' 19 Aug 2015

4.  Diamandis, Peter and Kotler, Steven, 'Abundance: The Future Is Better Than 
4.  Diamandis, Peter and Kotler, Steven, 'Abundance: The Future Is Better Than 
5.  Sainato, Michael, 'Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, and Bill Gates Warn About 
5.  Sainato, Michael, 'Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, and Bill Gates Warn About 

3.  Sweeney, John A., 'Infectious Connectivity: Affect and the Internet in 
3.  Sweeney, John A., 'Infectious Connectivity: Affect and the Internet in 

Strategic foresight helps decision-
makers understand the present, 
but also describe the future so that 
the right decisions made today will 
help shape a better tomorrow.

It has been argued 
that the exponential 
growth in technology, 
the introduction of 
artificial intelligence 
(AI), deep learning 
and human-machine interface will help humanity to 
create abundance and will solve our problems.4 Others 
suggest that AI and robotics will create disruption5 
resulting in high unemployment and, raising ethical 
concerns and wider instability. 

Our social, economic regulations and our political 
systems have yet to adapt to these conditions. 
Compounded by the complexity, these changes will 
create uncertainty that will present further challenges 
to decision-makers. In an increasingly complex and 
uncertain environment, where changes are taking 
place more rapidly than ever. Strategic foresight helps 
decision-makers understand the present, but also 
describe the future so that the right decisions made 
today will help shape a better tomorrow. 

30

Hans Peter Lankes, Managing Director,  
Corporate Strategy, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Tackling Uncertainty 
Head-on

By creating a series of  ‘different 
futures’, based on the most 
significant but uncertain forces 
shaping our environment, 
decision makers are encouraged 
to re-examine their own 
assumptions about the future.

When planning for 
any organisation’s 
future, decision makers 
are faced with an 
increasingly complex 
and dynamic external 
environment. For 
some elements of 

this environment, such as demographics, it is possible 
to identify broad trends; while others, such as the 
turbulent geopolitics, are more challenging to predict. In 
considering an uncertain future and how best to position 
the organisation, scenario planning is a useful tool. By 
creating a series of ‘different futures’, based on the most 
significant but uncertain forces shaping our environment, 
decision makers are encouraged to re-examine their 
own assumptions about the future. The process results 
in individuals stepping away from the so often reactive, 
incremental strategic planning – a natural response 
to uncertainty – in favour of a more forward looking, 
proactive approach.

of technology; the ageing world population; and climate 
change and environmental degradation. Other elements 
of the world in 2030 were deemed more uncertain and 
research identified more tentative trajectories, for example 
considering the future of energy or financial services as 
well as more speculative questions surrounding conflict 
and social cohesion. This research, and the fundamental 
questions behind it, led to the creation of four ‘different 
futures’ for us to consider in our exercise. 

As we reflected on possible future worlds in which the 
EBRD might operate, we identified two uncertainties 
which could have a profound impact on the Bank’s 
operating environment. The first, will ‘our’ world be 
characterised by top down or bottom up power and 
processes? And the second, is economic development 
leading to more or less inclusion, especially with 
regards to employment and opportunity? We saw these 
as the ‘drivers behind the drivers’ of the economic, 
social and political systems of the future, providing a 
skeleton framework to structure our strategic thinking. 

At the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, we undertook a scenario planning exercise 
in 2016 for just this purpose. Involving several levels of 
Bank staff, this exercise focused on the central question 
of 'In what kind of world will the Bank be operating in 
2030?' As mentioned, we have a better grip on some 
elements of the future than on others – our team 
explored four megatrends: the rise of emerging markets 
and urbanisation; the accelerating scope, scale and impact 

Based on this analysis, we at the EBRD have derived 
areas where early positioning would make sense 
irrespective of which ‘future’ materialises, and others 
where it is better to wait until there is greater visibility. 
We are now helping sector and country teams adopt 
the same methodology in their planning, with the aim 
of shifting the culture throughout the organisation 
away from incrementalism, and towards tackling 
uncertainty head-on.

31

The Future of Society

Angela Wilkinson former Head of  Strategic Foresight, 
OECD, author of  ‘Strategic reframing’
The Future of Leadership in Europe

Leadership matters: hundreds of books are published 
every month with the word leadership in the title. Yet 
there no universal theory of leadership or agreement 
on how good, bad, better or great leadership can be 
evaluated or measured.

One the one hand, societies everywhere are searching 
for leaders and leadership systems that can deliver 
realistic hope. One the other hand, advances in 
education, the spread of democracy, prosperity gains 
and social media have contributed to a diffusion of 
power and authority within societies and across the 
world. The turnover of political and business leaders 
in democratic societies seems to be occurring at an 
accelerating pace – shaped by and contributing to 
structural short-termism. 

Thinking about the future leadership of Europe in terms of 
all good vs. all bad futures e.g. integrated vs. fragmented, 
is not useful. Instead it is helpful to reflect on why 
different stories of leadership co-exist. Leadership stories 
reflect five different myths of progress – see table.

In the classical Hero myth, a leader was an individual 
who tried against the odds to achieve the impossible. 
Success was not guaranteed. It was the competition 
itself that was important, as it still is in the Olympics - 
to bring out the best and reward the best, so everyone 
tries to win. But the loser, too, has honour.

In the Democratic/Scientific Myth, a leader is a wise 
and honest broker of the truth. In the Economic myth, 
a leader is always one step ahead of the competition: 
winning is everything. A leader who fails, is blamed.

In the Ecological myth, leadership is a whole system 
capability. Entrepreneurial and generous individuals 
play their part in enabling new and shared value. The 
health of the whole system is contingent on the quality 
of cooperation and self-awareness of the whole system 
and its wider context. 

Which of these stories of leadership are being/should 
be used to hold leaders accountable for the stories they 
are telling about the future of Europe?

Mythology

Hero

Religious

Democratic/ 
Scientific

Economic

Ecological

Ideal

Excellence

Goodness

Truth

Growth

Behaviour

Competition

Obedience

Reason

Actors

Heroes

Communication

Stories

Saints
Prophets

Scripture
Prayer

Philosophers
Scientists

Mathematics
Logical
arguments

32

Maximising
advantage

Consumers
Business

Images
Numbers
Data

Health
(Wholeness)

Communication

Creators

Self-
expression

Michael Ignatieff, President and Rector Central European University

Knowledge and Democracy1

Our societies have never 
deluged with so much 
information and never been in 
greater need of knowledge. 

Our democracies have a 
common life – but there is 
much disorder in it – the 
cultivation of suspicion 
towards foreigners, the 

manipulation of fear and the knowing disregard for truth. If 
our democracies were in healthier shape, we could face the 
challenge of resurgent authoritarianism with confidence, but 
there are few democracies, whether in the Central European 
region or elsewhere, that are in good shape. There is so 
much inequality and injustice; so much corruption and self-
dealing, so many unanswered attacks on the independence 
of institutions, from the courts to the press.

There are moments when it becomes easy to believe 
we will never bring order to our common matters. There 
are moments too when the work that universities do 
seems beside the point, and our research seems too 
obscure to be of any use.

We need to rededicate ourselves to what universities 
uniquely do; this is even more so the case for the 
Central European University.

The one thing we must teach all our students, if our societies 
are to remain free, is to know what knowledge truly is. For 
without knowledge, without respect for research, science and 
reason, democracies cannot bring order to our common life. 

Our societies have never deluged with so much 
information and never been in greater need of knowledge. 
From our smart phones and computers, a torrent of data 
deluges us every day. We are more confused than ever 

1.  This contribution is adapted from Professor Ignatieff’s inaugural address as 
1.  This contribution is adapted from Professor Ignatieff’s inaugural address as 
Rector of the Central European University. It was delivered on 21 October 
Rector of the Central European University. It was delivered on 21 October 
2016 in Budapest.
2016 in Budapest.

because we have wandered from the continent of truth. 
A university is the guardian of that continent of truth. We 
need to teach that some things are true. Some are false. 
Some ideas take us forward toward deeper understanding 
of reality, while others take us back into darkness and 
confusion. Some ideas have survived the test of falsification 
while others have been rightly discarded.Of course, we 
must not set ourselves up as a knowledge elite. We need to 
be humble guardians, aware of how often universities have 
abused their authority and proclaimed truths that turned 
out, upon examination, to be false.

Even a humble guardian, however, must keep faith with 
the history of our sciences. We must believe that over 
time, after inconceivable effort, and many backward steps, 
we have made progress. The continent of certainty grows 
slowly larger. Expanding its boundaries and defending the 
core of what we know to be true are the essential work of 
universities in bringing order to our common life.

Democracies cannot solve their problems if demagogues 
and populists are allowed to despise the hard-won 
knowledge of experts, if the facts of climate change, 
migration, racial discrimination, inequality can be conjured 
away by the dark technologies of political illusion.

A university dedicated to a free and open society has 
one function, to graduate men and women who are 
citizens, citizens who know that our common life has no 
order without knowledge. However much we may dispute 
the content and meaning of knowledge, democracies 
cannot dispute that it exists, and that once established 
as such, knowledge must be the lodestar that guides us 
to accept the legitimacy of what we decide together – on 
the basis of what we know together.

33

The Future of Society

Enrico Giovannini, Professor of  Statistics,  
University of  Rome 'Tor Vergata'
Minimising Vulnerability and 
Fostering Resilience: An Investment 
for the Future of Europe 

The ESPAS Report Global Trends to 2030 noted 
that 'The world is becoming steadily more complex, 
more challenging and also more insecure'. Since 
the publication of the Report in 2015, the sense of 
uncertainty has become even stronger in Europe 
and elsewhere. The referendum on Brexit, the 2016 
US elections, as well as the political conditions in 
several European countries have demonstrated the 
risks that even well-established institutional systems 
can face due to a growing sense of uncertainty and 
dissatisfaction among citizens with current policies. 

In the 2016 ‘State of Union’ address, President Juncker 
rightly recognised the risks of dissolution that Europe 
is facing underlining that the 'the next 12 months are 
decisive if we want to reunite our Union'. A stronger 
Europe must be built over the key principles contained 
in Art. 3 of the Treaty, particularly with regards 
to 'social justice and protection, equality between 
women and men, solidarity between generations, and 
protection of the rights of the child'. 

To do that in the age of uncertainty is a huge challenge, 
but it is not impossible, as the experience of some 
European countries show. This is why two key concepts 
should drive European policies: 'an investment in people 
is an investment in future' and 'none left behind'.

The first principle requires a change in the current 
mindset and in accounting rules: today, if a company 
buys a computer, this is an investment, often subsidised 
by tax benefits; if it offers training to its employees, this 
is a cost. The same applies to public administrations. 
In a knowledge-driven economy this is a nonsense. 
Human (and social) capital, the most important driver 
of economic growth and societal well-being, has been 
largely reduced over the last decade and we are not 
doing enough to rebuild it.

The second principle is at the centre of the United 
Nations ‘Agenda 2030’ for sustainable development, 
to which all European countries have subscribed. 
It requires a serious fight against all inequalities, 
as already stated in Art. 3 of the Treaty, especially 
inequalities of opportunities. This is where Europe lacks 
a common vision, as if this would be a ‘social’ problem 
to be dealt by individual countries. On the contrary, 
existing inequalities put at risk our economic future, as 
well our common political perspectives.

34

For these reasons, reducing people’s vulnerability to 
current and future shocks and building resilience of our 
economies and societies should be the first priority for 
the Union. Tangibly, this could involve the following:

1.  EU-wide programmes for people at risk of poverty 

and social exclusion (who are today more than 120 
million across the 28 member states) based on 
minimum income, intensive re-training and active 
labour market policies; 

2.  a EU five-year plan, similar to the EFSI, to rebuild 
human (and social) capital and prepare people for 
the new industrial revolution that is ongoing; and 

3.  change in fiscal rules, so that expenditures in human 

capital are treated as an investment, and not as a cost.

Reducing people’s vulnerability 
to current and future shocks 
and building resilience of  our 
economies and societies should be 
the first priority for the Union.

As proposed in the 
abovementioned 
ESPAS Report 'The 
world of the future, 
combining volatility, 
unpredictability and 
complexity, will require interdisciplinary approaches 
that enable anticipation, facilitate reaction and forge 
resilience. Above all, it requires the prioritisation of 
long-term objectives and strategies'. This means 
overcoming the usual distinction between economic 
and social policies, and stimulating in any possible way 
economic and social investments. 

If the future of the European Union relies on the future 
of its citizens, investing on them is the only way to 
have a future.

35

36

The Future
of  Governance

3737

The Future of Society

THE FUTURE  
OF THINK TANKS

38

Paweł Świeboda, Deputy Head, European Political Strategy Centre, 
European Commission
The Role of Think Tanks

Think tanks play a fundamental role in shaping policy 
agendas. They mobilise expertise and put forward 
evidence. They push for innovative change and they 
build networks and communities through which they 
nurture and spread ideas and catalyse action.

The current environment of fast-paced transformations 
and increasingly complex and intertwined challenges 
at local, national and global levels would seem to 
create a perfect backdrop for think tanks to engage in 
dynamically, offering creative, pragmatic and actionable 
policy solutions on tangible issues. 

And yet, the current conjuncture is also a particularly 
testing time for think tanks as we enter a ‘post-truth’ 
society, in which facts and expertise are increasingly 
challenged as the basis for policy and decision-making, 
in favour of more media-inviting catchphrases.1 This 
shift not only generates uncertainty and ambiguity 
around policymaking; it also leads to disinterest, disdain 
and even rejection of knowledge and evidence. 

So, how should think tanks respond to this changing reality?

First, they must commit to taking on the much-needed 
function of repeatedly, constructively and boldly putting 
forward evidence-based assessments, in spite of the 
current apparent contempt for facts2 feeding into more 
effective and efficient policies.

Second, they have a critical role to play in confronting 
the trap of ‘automatic thinking,’ groupthink and 
confirmation bias. A 2015 World Development Report 
on Mind, Society and Behavior3 highlights the patterns 
in which policymakers prefer to avoid being exposed 
to opposing or differing views by selecting and filtering 
evidence in a way that confirms their views. The role of 
think tanks is to challenge these patterns by providing 
a platform to introduce new ideas, expanding the scope 
of the debate and of the participants.

Finally, on the way to 2030, in an increasingly 
networked society, think tanks must provide a 
space4 between governments, research and academia, 
and, increasingly, civil society and media, within which 
ideas can be tested, strategies can be debated, and 
action for the future can be designed. 

1.  William Davies, ‘The Age of Post-Truth Politics,’ New York Times,  
1.  William Davies, ‘The Age of Post-Truth Politics,’ New York Times,  
2.  John de Boer, What are Think Tanks Good For?, United Nations University 
2.  John de Boer, What are Think Tanks Good For?, United Nations University 

24 August 2016
24 August 2016
Centre for Policy Research, http://cpr.unu.edu/what-are-think-tanks-good-for.
html, 2015
Centre for Policy Research, http://cpr.unu.edu/what-are-think-tanks-good-for.
html, 2015
3.  World Bank, World Development Report on Mind, Society and Behaviour, 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Publications/WDR/WDR%20
3.  World Bank, World Development Report on Mind, Society and Behaviour, 
2015/Chapter-1.pdf, 2015
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Publications/WDR/
WDR%202015/Chapter-1.pdf, 2015
4.  Ben Rogers, Rethinking the Role of Think Tanks, The Guardian, https://www.
theguardian.com/global/2010/jul/05/role-thinktanks-political-theory-left, 2010
4.  Ben Rogers, Rethinking the Role of Think Tanks, The Guardian, https://www.
theguardian.com/global/2010/jul/05/role-thinktanks-political-theory-left, 2010

39

The Future of Society

WILL UNIVERSITIES  
AND EVIDENCE-BASED  
RESEARCH MATTER?

40

European Parliament Research Service
The Future of Universities and 
Evidence-Based Research

Among the European Union’s best assets are its highly-
educated population, its universities, and its research 
capacity. Europe’s universities have, through the course 
of their rich history contributed hugely to modern 
thought and to modern science. They have helped 
shape the world that we know today.

Past glories will not sustain us forever. Universities 
need to change in order to serve the needs of 
tomorrow’s economy and society. This is not in debate. 
There is a need for more skills - and more research 
- in science and technology, for example. Universities 
will continue to have a central role in the drive for 
technological innovation.

We face a future in which machine capacity - and 
machine intelligence, albeit with certain constraints 
- will far outstrip human capacity. Technology holds 
immense promise - but this promise is accompanied 
by threats, and even existential threats. It follows that 
the need to improve our knowledge of the human and 
social sciences does not diminish - it increases. 

Change should not mean throwing the baby out with 
the bathwater. Cutting-edge education and research on 
the human dimension will remains fundamental. 

It may be that the longstanding division between 
natural sciences on one side, and social sciences on the 
other, has become outdated. There is certainly room 
for a conversation not just about becoming inter-
disciplinary or cross-disciplinary, but about rethinking 
inherited concepts of disciplines and their boundaries.  

Most of all, universities must play their part in 
developing the values and norms that are needed to 
guide and direct our path into a future that will look 
very different from the present, and that will offer a 
completely different set of opportunities and risks.

41

The Future of Society

REBOOTING  
DEMOCRACY

42

Pierre Calame, Honorary President of  the Charles Léopold Mayer 
Fondation and author of  'Sauvons la démocratie!'
A European Citizens’ 
Foundational Assembly

Democracy is in tatters. In a period of rapid change, in 
particular of the scale and width of interdependencies 
among societies and with biosphere, institutions and 
methods of governance, including representative 
democracy, have shown great inertia, both conceptually 
and institutionally. This means that we attempt to 
manage present and coming societal challenges with 
a conceptual and institutional framework created 
centuries ago. Talking about governance means 
adopting a much broader historical perspective, looking 
for general principles which should guide our badly 
needed quest for a governance and a democracy 
appropriate to our needs.

The most urgent issue for the EU is the conscience 
of being one community. The way forward lies in the 
organisation of a citizens’ foundational assembly

In a very unusual call to political leaders, the French 
Catholic bishops recently stated: 'the republican social 
contract to live together on the national territory is not 
self-evident anymore'. Since the French Revolution and 
its deification of the Nation, the 'republic was one and 
indivisible' and the existence of an eternal national 
community was unquestioned. The bishops’ call 
reminds us what governance 
is really about: to found the 
community - and not only, as 
we seem to think, to manage 
an existing community. 

Governance is 
about founding a 
community, - and not 
only managing it

This is the deep meaning of the EU crisis. It will not be 
addressed by national referendums or by controversies 
among experts on the balance of powers between 
European institutions or between member states  
and Europe.

Taking stock of a breakthrough in deliberative 
democracy, we can reconcile citizens with the EU 
through the organisation of a foundational assembly in 
two stages, first local and then European, and we can 
set out concrete steps to this goal.

43

The Future of Governance

Jeanette Hoffmann, Professor and Head of  the Internet 
Policy Field, Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society
The Internet as Subject of 
Democratic Engagement

The protest against Facebook is by no means an 
isolated incidence. With the growing pervasiveness of 
social networks and new forms of algorithmic decision-
making, we can observe an increasing politicisation 
of their underlying rationalities. People do not only 
question the 'curation' of content; they also ask for 
greater algorithmic accountability and transparency. 
Interestingly, these new areas of democratic 
engagement unfold on an international level. Moreover, 
they include issues traditionally considered private such 
as trade secrets (i.e. algorithms) or freedom of contract 
(i.e. terms of service). Thus, the Internet enables 
democratic action but simultaneously may itself 
become subject of democratic engagement. 

We risk overlooking how 
digital technologies and 
democratic practices mutually 
influence each other and 
thereby create something new. 

Nearly all democratic theories characterise democracy 
as an open-ended, necessarily incomplete and dynamic 
project. Its concrete form varies over time and across 
regions; and the scope of self-determination may 
shrink or expand even if its legal framework may 
remain unaltered. However, when we think of the 
relationship between democracy and the Internet, we 
often focus on rather traditional forms of democratic 
engagement and control. This may concern, for 
example, new opportunities for participation or more 
transparency and accountability in political decision-
making. Yet, if we regard the Internet as a mere tool 
for political action, we risk overlooking that and how 
digital technologies and democratic practices mutually 
influence each other and thereby create something new. 

A practical example concerns the recent international 
debate about Facebook’s content policies. A Norwegian 
journalist had uploaded a Pulitzer Prize winning picture 
by Nick Ut from 1972 showing a group of terrified 
Vietnamese children running away from Napalm 
bombing. At its centre is a naked nine year old girl who 
had torn off her burning clothes. Because Facebook’s 
rules ban nudity, the social network took down the 
famous picture and all subsequently uploaded copies 
in protest of this policy, including who Norwegian Prime 
Minister Erna Solberg accused Facebook of editing 'our 
common history'. 

44

INEQUALITY  
AND GOVERNANCE

Mindmap from the 2015 Annual ESPAS Conference

Source: @ graphicrecorder

45

The Future of Governance

Stijn Hoorens, Associate Director, Head of  Office, 
RAND Brussels
The Elephant in the Room: 
the Many Dimensions of 
Inequality in Europe

The gap between rich and poor has widened. Austerity 
programmes enacted by a series of EU governments 
since 2009, with the aim of reducing budget deficits, 
have had a disproportionate effect on those with lower 
incomes and exacerbated income differences. 1 in 4 
Europeans are estimated to be at risk of poverty and 
social exclusion in the EU. Recent publications (e.g. 
Branko Milanovic’s Elephant chart) suggest that lower 
middle classes in rich countries have been one of the 
most prominent losers of globalisation in the past 
couple of decades. And they fuel expectations that 
inequality will further increase in years to come.

If  there is one challenge 
governments should single out 
for attention, it is breaking this 
vicious cycle affecting the most 
vulnerable groups in our society.

Not only does this 
represent a reversal 
of progress for the EU 
– income inequality 
had declined in most 
member states in 

recent decades – but it also is at odds with one of the 
foundational purposes of the Union: inclusive growth.

Inequality can be measured across several dimensions. 
Young people (between 15 and 24) for instance, are 
the only age group whose income has not grown in 

real terms over the past half century. Moreover, they 
have been disproportionally hit by the crisis. One in 
five workers in this age group is unemployed. In some 
countries, such as Spain and Greece, it is one in two. 
These conditions could leave lasting scars. Historic 
evidence suggests that unemployment early in careers, 
or even graduating from school in times of economic 
crisis, can have lasting, harmful effects on young 
people’s lifetime careers and salaries.

The interaction of all these dimensions – the income 
gap, a skills gap, an age gap, a gender gap, the digital 
divide, and the vulnerability of particular household 
compositions – could feed a vicious cycle for vulnerable 
groups, including young people, the older poor, low-
skilled workers, migrants and their children, and single 
parents and their children. These groups are at risk of 
becoming trapped in poverty and social exclusion. If 
there is one challenge governments should single out 
for attention, it is breaking this vicious cycle affecting 
the most vulnerable groups in our society.

46

 
Ibon Zugasti, Futurist, Chairman of  the Millenium Project Node in 
Spain, Vice-President of  the Foresight Europe Network
The Future of Work, 
Technology, Income Gaps and 
the Role of Governments

•  According to the World Bank, a billion people will enter 
the job market over the next ten years, while one 
projection expects 2 billion jobs to be lost by 2030.

And, what is the role of Governments? 

Government long-term and 
large-scale strategies are needed 
to address the potential scope 
and spectrum of  unemployment 
and income gaps in the 
foreseeable future due to the 
acceleration, globalisation, and 
integration of  technological 
capacities and population 
growth.

The Millennium 
Project is currently 
conducting a global 
study to help 
Governments create 
a set of long-range 
phased strategies 
to address future 
technology-work 
dynamics and income 
gaps. The results 
have been used to create three Future Work/Technology 
Global 2050 Scenarios, as input to national planning 
workshops organized by Millennium Project Node 
chairs around the world (www.millennium-project.org/
millennium/AI-Work.html).

The future of work and technology and increasing income 
gaps are among the most discussed topics of long-term 
prospects at the moment. However, systemic perspectives 
and global as well as local strategies to improve the 
long-term outlook are often lacking. Government long-
term and large-scale strategies are needed to address 
the potential scope and spectrum of unemployment 
and income gaps in the foreseeable future due to 
the acceleration, globalisation, and integration of 
technological capacities and population growth.

Some key facts:

•  The World Bank has shown that the rate and level of 
poverty is falling worldwide; however, income gaps 
are growing. Oxfam found that the richest 1% of the 
population owns about 46% of global wealth, while 
the bottom 50% of the population barely owns some 
0.7% of the world’s wealth, about the same as the 
world’s 85 richest people.

•  The OECD estimates that technology is likely to 
account for some 80% of the drop in the labour 
share among its members.

•  Since the rate of return for investments into high tech 
and financial instruments is so much greater than 
investment into labour, the income gaps are likely to 
increase, making the world increasingly unstable.

47

The Future of Society

CITIES IN THE  
21ST CENTURY

48

Erik Swyngedouw, Professor, University of  Manchester;  
author of  'The Post-Political city?' and 'The Globalized City'
Cities of Flows and the Spectre 
of the Sustainable City

It is vitally important to recognise that planetary 
urbanisation is one of the main drivers of the ecological 
predicament the world is in. Indeed, the ‘sustainability’ 
of contemporary urban life – understood as the 
expanded reproduction of its socio-physical form and 
functioning – accounts for 80% of the world’s resource 
use, of global ecological degradation, and of the world’s 
waste. What I wish to foreground in this contribution 
is that these urban roots that structure global socio-
ecological flows and the feeble techno-managerial 
attempts to produce more ‘sustainable’ forms of 
urban living actually are customarily ignored by both 
researchers and policy-makers, while it is precisely 
these socio-metabolic flows that continue to sharpen 
the combined and uneven socio-ecological patterning 
that marks contemporary urbanisation dynamics. 

I see urbanisation as a socio-ecological metabolic 
process whose functioning is predicated upon 
increasingly longer, often globally structured, metabolic 
flows that fuse together materials, natures, and peoples 
in socially, ecologically and technologically articulated, 
but uneven, manners. I am concerned, therefore, with 
the question of the urbanisation OF nature, that is 
the process through which all manner of natures, 
from a wide range of localised ecologies, are socially 
mobilised, economically incorporated, bio-chemically 
metabolised and technologically transformed in order 
to support the global urbanisation process.

Consider, for example, how the everyday functioning of 
urban IT-networks, social media, smart infrastructural 
networks and eco-architecture, informatics, and the 
like are predicated upon mobilising minerals like Coltan 
from some of the socio-ecologically most vulnerable 
places on earth, upon global production chains that 
are shaped by deepening uneven socio-ecological 
conditions, and upon a ‘re-cycling’ process that 
returns much of the e-waste to the socio-ecologically 
dystopian geographies of Mumbai’s or Dhaka’s 
suburban informal wastelands.

The ‘sustainability’ of  
contemporary urban life – 
understood as the expanded 
reproduction of  its socio-
physical form and functioning 
– accounts for 80% of  the 
world’s resource use, of  global 
ecological degradation, and of  
the world’s waste.

Therefore, there is 
an urgent research 
and policy agenda 
opening up that should 
focus on exploring 
and considering 
the geographically 
uneven constellations 
associated with 
globally constituted 
smart technological 
networks, connectivities, 
and transformations through which the metabolic 
circulations of matter, people and natures are 
organised, and to recognise the pivotal role of 
urbanisation therein. 

49

The Future of Society

FORESIGHT  
AND GOVERNANCE

Mindmap from the 2015 Annual ESPAS Conference

Source: @ graphicrecorder

50

Angela Wilkinson former Head of  Strategic Foresight, 
OECD, author of  ‘Strategic reframing’
The Future of Foresight in Europe.  
Beyond Evidence-Based  
Pessimism to Realistic Hope

A focus on the short term often overemphasises 
negative, trends of doom and gloom. Developing and 
using foresight enables realistic hope. It pushes beyond 
sugar-coated ideology about what the future should be 
and the evidence-based pessimism that is driving fear 
of the future. 

If you could immerse yourself in this future – 
experience it somehow – and then look back to the 
present day, what would you notice? How would your 
priorities and options for action differ from what you 
are doing today? Would today’s key trends still be 
significant? The power of foresight is in refreshing and 
reframing the present. 

Foresight is a disciplined approach to futures thinking 
that enables societies to thrive under disruptive 
changes and to collaborate to create new and better 
future possibilities for all. It is not about wishful 
thinking. The aim is not to predict, but to be better 
prepared. To develop a more explicit, testable, 
contestable and useful sense of the future that is 
already emerging in the here-and-now.

What will 2030 or 2050 look like, sound like, and feel 
like? The unexpected can happen faster than anyone 
anticipates in 2016. Imagine it is good news. We have 
access to boundless clean energy. Trust is distributed 
across networks. Gender parity has been achieved. 
Peace and prosperity are working hand in hand. 

The power of  foresight 
is in refreshing and 
reframing the present.

Looking forward from 2016, 
we are in danger of becoming 
overwhelmed by evidence-
based pessimism. The distant 
future has become a source of fear. Probabilistic trend 
analysis, business-as-usual scenarios and conditional 
projections are necessary but insufficient. They fail to 
incentivise action until crisis. 

There is no appetite for dystopian visions or overly 
optimistic utopias which lack insight, innovation and 
frustrate progress. Rather, we can use foresight to 
generate new insights about the present day - to 
inspire innovation, identify new solution spaces and 
populate these with new seeds of change.

51

The Future of Governance

Marius Oosthuizen, Faculty in Strategic Foresight,  
Gordon Institute of  Business Science, University of  Pretoria
Strategic Foresight: 
a Mechanism for 
Stakeholder Mutuality

Under such conditions, mutuality, which is the 
recognised interdependence of stakeholders, serves as 
an enabling social lubricant for collaboration. 

We thus propose that an approach to policy-making 
that employs strategic foresight methods such as 
scenario planning in an integrated manner with 
dialogue and diplomacy as social learning processes 
for the development of mutuality, is crucial and 
complimentary to the technocratic planning tools 
already in use. Such approaches enable broad 
participation by cross-sectoral stakeholders in the 
policy-making process, amounting to a mechanism 
for contending perspectives to be articulated and 
compared and for common ground to be sought. 

For global interdependence to be sustained into the 
future, higher levels of stakeholder mutuality will  
be crucial.

The last decade was marked by a fundamental 
misalignment between the global economic system 
and the societies which it is expected to serve, between 
political systems that must enable prosperity and progress 
and the rising expectations of voters. This is at the heart 
of the social upheaval, rising populism and the declining 
trust in institutions seen in many western democracies. 

Forming policy responses in this environment 
necessitates new modes of engagement, co-creation, 
and collaboration. Policy-making is about problem 
solving. Solutions however require strategic insight 
and future-orientated idealism, grounded in pragmatic 
implementation plans for the 
here-and-now. In complex 
globally interconnected 
systems such solutions are 
increasingly illusive and require 
broad coalitions of actors 
working in unison. 

For global 
interdependence to 
be sustained into the 
future, higher levels of  
stakeholder mutuality 
will be crucial.

To create these coalitions amid competing interests 
and perspectives is the goal of participative strategic 
foresight methods employed for stakeholder mutuality. 
This implies methodological complexity and ambiguity. 
It implies diversity and contestation. It is in this nexus, 
between foresight, strategic option-generation, and 
ethical concession that policy-makers must craft  
their interventions.

52

Europe
towards 2030

53

Europe towards 2030

Draw here !

Your Mindmap or Worldcloud from the 2016 Annual ESPAS Conference

If you want to share, please take picture and send to:  
EPSC-EU-STRATEGIC-FORESIGHT@ec.europa.eu

54

European Commission
Managing by Anticipation

Decision-makers have always been faced with the 
tasks of addressing crises, leading change and 
responding to the unexpected. 

Recently, however, unexpected and constant change 
has become the norm, while the interconnections 
between separate and distinct crises are more tightly 
knit than ever. Technological innovations have amplified 
these trends to an unprecedented degree in terms of 
pace, scope, complexity and impact. And, while some 
crises are already loud and visible, others are less easy 
to spot or to predict, although they may potentially be 
more toxic in the long run.

In 2015, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker 
spoke of the ‘polycrisis’ facing Europe. Indeed, decision-
makers at all levels of government, in the public and 
private sectors, in academia and in the non-profit sector, 
are engaging in ‘polycrisis management’. It has almost 
become banal to describe this as the ‘new normal’.

While polycrisis management is fundamentally 
necessary, it is just as critical to invest resources and 
reflection in preparing for the future, as this is the 
only way to recalibrate towards effective governance 
aimed at medium and long-term objectives. This is the 
only way that we can take part in shaping trends – be 
they global or local – while also building capacities 
throughout our societies, our institutions and across 
our systems of governance, to better equip them for 
change, to make them more adaptable – in short: to 
build their resilience.

To thrive in conditions of polycrisis and change, a 
strategic ability to anticipate, identify and respond to 
opportunities and risks is needed. Responding is not 
just about reacting, it is about being adaptive. 

For Europe, this means reflecting on which strategic 
investments – in infrastructure and in human capital – 
will have the most impact and be most sustainable; it 
means making the most out of the opportunity to pool 
resources together across Member States; it means 
reviewing the European method to ensure it remains 
robust, relevant and effective.

55

Europe towards 2030

European Parliament Research Service
Winners and Losers  
of Globalisation

The winners of globalisation are often said to be the 
millions in the emerging economies who have been 
lifted out of poverty in recent decades, together with 
those who were already rich and are now richer. The 
losers are said to be concentrated in the developed 
countries - the squeezed middle whose jobs, income 
and prospects have been hit. 

Concerns about jobs and prospects in the west 
have generated scepticism towards globalisation. 
One outcome is renewed questioning of the role of 
international trade. Economists have long argued that 
trade is not a zero-sum game, but that it increases 
prosperity. Accordingly, a return to a bilateral rather 
than a multilateral framework risks creating even 
greater economic difficulties. But this does not convince 
those whose economic prospects have worsened.

A consensus may be emerging in favour of stronger 
efforts to compensate the losers of globalisation.  
This would imply a reorientation of globalisation in 
practice, rather than its abandonment. 

A variety of strategies have been proposed, as Europe and 
the west seeks to manage a large-scale economic and 
social transition in the coming decades. Some prioritise 
the role of innovation as a source of new jobs and new 
prosperity. Others favour a return to redistributive policies 
and better social protection. The way forward could well 
involve a combination of measures.

On a broader level, globalisation seems to have 
damaged the social contract that characterised 
European democracies in the modern era. There are 
many signs of greater political polarisation and in cases 
political paralysis. Is it time to seek to adapt and renew 
the social contract, not just at national level, but also at 
European and international levels? 

56

General Secretariat of  the Council of  the European Union
Governance Challenges 
for the EU

Over the past few years, the EU has had to confront 
a series of crises that have put a lot of strain on its 
governance system and opened new fault-lines across 
European societies: sovereign debt issue, migration, 
Brexit, Ukraine, Russia's newfound assertiveness, 
terrorism. The outcome of the US elections will also have 
to be factored in over the coming months and years. 

All this has taken place against the backdrop of an 
increasingly interconnected world where information 
and sometimes disinformation travels fast, requiring 
constant and rapid reactions from holders of public 
office; and where winners and losers of globalisation 
seem to live in increasingly different universes, with 
growing anger from those who are or feel left out. 

The latter challenges are global; but the EU is in 
a particularly difficult position, first, because of its 
institutional set up: its system is more geared towards 
carrying out long term structural reform than towards 
managing crises. Second, as a Union of States and 
peoples, the EU has to cope with multiple and sometimes 
conflicting legitimacies. Communication under those 
circumstances proves to be a particular headache, and an 
area where the EU certainly has to reinvent its functioning.

In the EU, the horizontal character, political sensitivity 
and sheer size of these challenges has triggered a 
strong increase of the guiding and steering role of the 
European Council, which gathers the Member States' 
Heads: existential questions are 'Chefsache'. This is 
inevitable but the need for crisis management has to 

some extent lowered the European Council's capacity 
for developing longer term visions. It can also at times 
cause strains across the system. Some people claim 
that this interferes with the co-decision powers of 
the legislators (European Parliament and Council of 
the Union). On the other hand, the European Council 
- whose members are certainly the most legitimate 
representatives of their peoples - is the closest you 
get to a (collective) government within the EU and is 
the indispensable institution for setting the general 
direction of where the EU is headed.  

A key challenge for the EU concerns the growing 
demands of citizens and stakeholders to have their 
say and play a direct role in governance. The internet 
and social media have provided grass-root movements 
with an entirely new speed and scale,  creating 
opportunities for people to make their voices heard.  
Over the years, the EU has developed new tools of 
information, transparency and public consultation, but 
struggles to find the right balance between openness 
and effectiveness. The EU's tradition of regulating areas 
of increasing technical complexity by externalising 
regulation to de-politicised, 'expert' agencies and 
watchdogs has also come under scrutiny.

The European institutions and the administrations 
serving them need to find new ways to respond 
to these developments while continuing to ensure 
effective policy-making. 

57

Europe towards 2030

European External Action Service
Society and Conflict in a 
Changing Global Environment

Our strategic environment is changing rapidly. We 
live in a world that is at once more connected, 
contested and complex. The fragile societies, instability 
and conflict which we meet in many parts of our 
neighbourhood and beyond also have consequences for 
our internal security and prosperity. 

To take account of the new global context, our approach 
to conflict must also change. Greater connectivity is 
both an asset as it drives communication, trade and 
mobility, but also makes us vulnerable to cross border 
crime, terrorism, global pandemics and cyber-attacks. 
The rise in human mobility compels us to rethink our 
approach to migration, sustainable development, 
security and governance. 

This increasing link between the internal and external 
policies is perhaps one of the most significant 
features of our time. As a result, the internal make-
up of societies, how they are governed, levels of 
trust, economic prosperity and deeply anchored 
shared values play an important role in domestic 
resilience as well as in international relations, driving 
or exacerbating conflicts where society is weak and 
divided, and mitigating or even preventing crises when 
a strong societal fabric exists.

This is particularly apparent in the EU’s near 
surroundings. Many countries to our East suffer from 
economic, political and energy related vulnerabilities. 
War and conflict situations in Libya, Syria and Iraq 
have enabled extremists to undermine existing societal 
structures and feed parallel criminal and terrorist 
networks. Further South, regions prone to instability and 

violence suffer from a toxic combination of poverty, weak 
governance and poor infrastructure, corruption, human 
rights abuses and conflict ridden electoral politics as well 
as the increasing impact of climate change.

Demographic trends threaten to increase the risk of 
conflict in years to come. By 2030 the global middle 
class is expected to rise to 5 billion. But inequalities are 
set to rise too, potentially triggering social discontent 
and upheaval in both the developing and the developed 
world. Disparities in wealth, education, digital 
connectivity and employment opportunities (notably for 
the young) present risks of increased social tension as 
well as conflict.

To anticipate these changes, foreign policy needs to 
increasingly focus on fostering a social fabric that is 
able to withstand tension both internal and external. The 
EU Global Strategy takes account of this growing link 
between societal resilience and conflict prevention, not 
least by pursuing follow up policies in the field of building 
resilience, adopting an integrated approach to crises and 
conflicts that puts a premium on prevention and post- 
crisis reconstruction as well as by strengthening the 
links between our internal and external policies. Building 
on this nexus, Agenda 2030 and the realisation of the 
SDGs are key elements in the EU’s strategy in promoting 
a sustainable and cohesive way of living together and 
sharing the planet and its natural resources.

In the years to come we need to focus even more 
on adopting tailor made approaches in our external 
relations that integrate the strong link between resilient 
vibrant societies and preventing conflict. 

58

Committee of  the Regions
Cities and Regions of Tomorrow:  
Drivers of a Better Future ?

Cities are catalysts for policy change and the 21st 
century will be shaped by metropolitan values: diversity, 
creativity, industriousness, entrepreneurialism. 

The challenge facing the Metropolitan generation to 
build modern cities and smart regions is monumental. 
As far as urbanisation and metropolisation are 
concerned, polycentric development is the key approach 
to encourage regions and cities to combine resource 
potential and boost flows and interactions. The process 
towards polycentric regions is particularly evident in 
Europe. This coalescing of cities into regional urbanised 
entities is linked to the transition from an industrial to 
a post-industrial era and as such, can be considered 
as the spatial manifestation of changes in economic, 
political-institutional societal and technological process, 
most notably the 'globalisation' in our society. 

Many decisions today will shape longer paths to 
achieve liveable cities and regions by 2030 and 2050; 
cities and regions that will be economically robust, 
environmentally resilient, providing quality of life 
and social inclusion. Are we perfectly aware of these 
challenges and well prepared to face them? What does 
building a long term urban vision mean?

More specifically, what meta conditions are needed 
to ensure that the respective 'Urban Pact' strategy 
initiated by the Dutch Presidency of the Council of the 
EU (2016) in close cooperation with the Committee of 
the Regions becomes a sustainable pathway towards 
this end?

59

Europe towards 2030

Economic and Social Affairs Committee (EESC)
Organised Civil Society 
and Governance:  
Trends and Challenges

Advances in technology, wealth and income 
concentration, shifting demography, migration 
flows, under employment and climate change are 
transforming our societies. The (dis)empowered citizen, 
as introduced by the World Economic Forum 2016 
Global Risks Report, describes the tensions between 
the growing cyber connectivity empowering citizens 
with more information and means of communications 
against the increasing feeling of exclusion from 
meaningful participation to decision-making among 
citizens and civil society1.

Alongside a growing proportion of people distrusting 
their government, we register also a decline of trust 
and membership in established political parties and 
organisations in Europe2. At European Union level, the 
political and economic crisis has called into question 
the very foundations of EU and fueled the distance 
between people, organisations and institutions.

For Jean Monnet, one of the founding father of the 
European Union, 'Nothing can be done without citizens 
but nothing can last without institutions'. In this context, 
the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), 
set up by the 1957 Treaties to involve civil society 
organisations, aims at complement the representative 
democracy with the participatory democracy and 
strengthening the role of civil society organisations. 
In its recent opinion, the Committee has stressed 
that Europe will be able to avoid extremism, defend 
its democratic values and establish a 'community of 
destiny' through greater transparency, ownership and 
participation by citizens and organised civil society at 
both national and European level7.

Looking forward to 2030, how can the expectations 
of the (dis)empowered citizen and the deriving 
challenges be addressed? How can civil society 
organisations adapt to the shifting external contexts 
and take the opportunity to play their crucial role in 
societal development? How can traditional institutions 
of 'organised' civil society respond to, and support, 
citizen engagement? How civil society organisations 
can thrive from the new models for citizens’ expression 
and generate increasing involvement in national and 
European governance?

1.  The Global Risks Report 2015, World Economic Forum
1.  The Global Risks Report 2015, World Economic Forum
2.  Edelman Trust Barometer 2015
2.  Edelman Trust Barometer 2015
3.  SOC/423, Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on 
3.  SOC/423, Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on 

'Principles ,procedures and action for the implementation or Article 11(1) and 
'Principles ,procedures and action for the implementation or Article 11(1) and 
11(2) of the Lisbon Treaty'
11(2) of the Lisbon Treaty'

60

 
Biographies
of  the Contributors  
to ESPAS 2016

61

Biographies of the Contributors to ESPAS 2016

His books include If Mayors Ruled The World: 
Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities, Strong Democracy 
and Jihad vs. McWorld. His book Cool Cities: Urban 
Sustainability in a Warming World will appear in 2016/17. 

Barber has been an outside adviser to President Bill 
Clinton and has consulted with national and municipal 
political and civic leaders around the world.

A founding editor of the international quarterly Political 
Theory, Barber has written for the Financial Times, 
Washington Post, and New York Times, as well as 
Suddeutsche Zeitung, Nouvel Observateur, El Pais and 
La Repubblica. He has also written extensively for 
television and theatre.

Pierre Bollinger 

Pierre Bollinger is the Head of Outreach, Partnerships 
and International Affairs of France-Stratégie (CGSP), 
a governmental think-tank under the authority of the 
French Prime Minister. 

Prior to joining it in 2011, he served as an Advisor for 
Non-Governmental Affairs at the French Embassy in 
Washington (2007-2011) and worked as an Associate 
Director at the American Center of Sciences Po. A 
political scientist by training, he holds Masters in 
Philosophy and Political Science from the Université 
Paris 1-Sorbonne and Sciences Po, and was a Visiting 
and Teaching Fellow at Harvard University’s GSAS, as 
well as a Fulbright grantee. He is also a co-founder of 
the French Political Theory Review Raisons Politiques 
(Presses de Sciences Po.).

Cinzia Alcidi

Dr. Cinzia Alcidi is Senior Fellow at the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels, where 
she leads the Economic Policy Unit, and fellow at 
LUISS - School of European Political Economy. Prior to 
joining CEPS, she worked at the International Labour 
Office in Geneva and taught International Economics 
at University of Perugia (Italy). Her research activity 
includes macroeconomics, economic policy and EU 
governance. She has experience in coordinating 
research projects and networks. She has published 
extensively on the economic policy and governance of 
the euro area and participates regularly in international 
conferences. She holds a Ph.D. degree in International 
Economics from the Graduate Institute of International 
and Development Studies, Geneva (Switzerland).

Benjamin R. Barber 

Benjamin R. Barber is Distinguished Senior Fellow at 
the Fordham School of Law’s Urban Consortium, and 
President of the GLOBAL PARLIAMENT OF MAYORS 
project, which held its inaugural convening in The Hague 
in September 2016. 

Dr. Barber is a Walt Whitman Professor of Political 
Science Emeritus, Rutgers University. 

62

Author of 'Democracy at tatters' and 'Essay 
on economy', http://www.eclm.fr, among other 
books. Motivated by the deep crisis of democracy, 
he organised citizens panels on two levels 
(regional and European) (https://books.google.fr/
books?isbn=2843771439). Lastly, in response to 
the worst crisis the EU has faced since its beginning, 
he has proposed a two stage (local then European) 
foundational assembly (blog.pierre-calame.fr).

Jim Cloos

Jim Cloos is Deputy Director-General in the General 
Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, where he 
oversees teams dealing with the preparation of European 
Council meetings, co-legislation, inter-institutional 
relations, and support to the rotating Presidency.

He started his career as a Luxembourg diplomat, 
working at the Permanent Representation of 
Luxembourg to the EU from 1987 to 1992 
and eventually becoming Deputy Permanent 
Representative. During the Luxembourg Presidency 
in the first half of 1991 he took an active part in the 
drafting of the Maastricht Treaty. After moving to the 
European Commission, he headed the Cabinet of the 
Commissioner in charge of agriculture between 1993 
and 1995 and was Head of Cabinet to the President 
between 1995 and 1999. Between 2001 and 2006, 
he was Director for relations with the US in the Council 
Secretariat and a close collaborator of the High 
Representative Javier Solana. 

Jiří Buraniek

Jiří Buriánek has been the Secretary General of the 
Committee of the Regions since June 2014. He served 
previously as Director at the Secretariat-General of 
the Council, responsible for network industries (energy, 
transport, telecommunications/information society) 
and European infrastructures (Connecting Europe 
Facility and Trans European Networks). Prior to this, 
he has also served as Enlargement Manager at the 
European Commission’s DG Joint Research Centre 
and as Secretary General of PostEurop, the European 
Restricted Union of the UN Special Agency of the 
Universal Postal Union uniting 42 European Universal 
Service Providers.

Pierre Calame

Pierre Calame, 72 years old. Former student of Ecole 
polytechnique in France. Between 1968 and 1988, he 
was senior official in the Ministère de l’Equipement; 
positions included responsibility for région de 
Valenciennes, then facing systemic economic and 
cultural crisis. 1988 to 2010, he became general 
manager and chair of an international independent 
foundation, FPH (http://www.fph.ch). Launched in 1994, 
the 'Alliance for a responsible and united world' for 
dialogue on major global issues, and organised in 2001 
the first ever World citizens assembly  
(www.alliance21.org/lille/fr/).

63

 
 
Biographies of the Contributors to ESPAS 2016

Jim Cloos read Russian and Linguistics at the 
University of Reading, UK, then obtained post-graduate 
diplomas in Soviet and Eastern European Studies at the 
Paris Institut d'Études Politiques and in International 
Trade at the university of Paris IX Dauphine. He is 
the co-author of National Leaders and the Making of 
Europe, an 'insiders history' of the European Council 
from 1975 to the present day (John Harper, 2015), 
as well as of Le traité de Maastricht: genèse, analyse, 
commentaires (Bruylant 1993). He also published 
numerous articles on institutional questions, the CFSP 
and transatlantic relations.

Matt Dann

Matt Dann oversees the management of the non-
research operations, including finances, strategy and 
managing institutional relations with stakeholders, for 
the European Economics think tank Bruegel. Matt is an 
experienced media professional who has worked in both 
television and the financial sector. He is a graduate of 
Keele University, England, and has an MBA from Solvay 
Business School of the Université Libre de Bruxelles

James Elles

James Elles was a British Conservative Member of the 
European Parliament for the South East region of the 
UK from 1984 to 2014. Since stepping down, he has 
remained active in a number of fields. Apart from being 
Chairman of the South East Conservative European 
Network (SECEN ), he is a Member of the Steering 
Committee of the European Internet Forum (EIF) (which 
he co-founded in 2000); he continues to chair the 
Transatlantic Policy Network (TPN) which he founded 
in 1992; and is Honorary President of the European 
Strategy and Policy Analysis (ESPAS) which he started 
in 2010, examining long-trends to focus on priority 
challenges facing the EU in the years ahead.

Enrico Giovannini 

Enrico Giovannini is an Italian economist and 
statistician, member of the Club of Rome. Since 2002 
he is full professor of economic statistics at the Rome 
University ‘Tor Vergata’. 

From April 2013 to February 2014 he was Minister of 
Labour and Social Policies in the Italian Government, 
and prior to that (2009- 2013) he was President of 
the Italian Statistical Institute (Istat), and Director of 
Statistics and Chief Statistician of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (2001-2009). 

64

Heather Grabbe

Heather Grabbe is Director of the Open Society 
European Policy Institute, the EU policy arm of the 
Open Society Foundations established by George Soros. 

From 2004-2009 Dr Grabbe was Senior Advisor to 
European Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn, 
responsible in his Cabinet for the Balkans and Turkey. 
Before joining the Commission, she was Deputy Director 
of the Centre for European Reform think-tank, working 
with Charles Grant on a wide range of European issues. 
Her academic experience includes research at the 
European University Institute (Florence), Chatham House 
(London), Oxford and Birmingham universities, and 
teaching at the London School of Economics.

Her publications include Can the EU Survive Populism? 
(with Stefan Lehne, 2016, Carnegie Europe) and The 
EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanisation through 
Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe  
(2006, Palgrave).

He is Senior Fellow of the LUISS School of European 
Political Economy, Vice-president of the High Level 
Group on Competitiveness and Growth of the European 
Council, Co-Chair of the ‘Independent Experts Advisory 
Board on Data Revolution for Sustainable Development’ 
established by the UN Secretary-General, member of 
the European Statistical Governance Advisory Board 
(ESGAB) responsible for supervising the functioning 
of the European Statistical System, member of the 
‘Commission économique de la Nation’ established 
by the French government, member of the Council of 
the International Statistical Institute and of boards of 
several Italian and international institutions. 

He was Visiting Fellow at the European Political 
Strategy Centre in 2015-2016. In 2014, the President 
of the Italian Republic made him ‘Cavaliere di Gran 
Croce al Merito della Repubblica’, the highest ranking 
honour of the Italian Republic.

Nik Gowing 

Nik Gowing has been the main presenter on BBC World 
since February 1996. He was a founding presenter of 
Europe Direct and has been a guest anchor on both 
HARDtalk and Simpson’s World. 

Before joining the BBC, Nik was a foreign affairs 
specialist and presenter at ITN for 18 years. From 1989 
to 1996 he was diplomatic editor Channel Four News, 
from ITN in London. In 1981, he won a BAFTA for his 
exclusive coverage of the imposition of martial law in 
Poland, and won a medal at the New York Television 
Festival for his nightly coverage of the 1991 Gulf War.

65

Biographies of the Contributors to ESPAS 2016

Edgar Grande

Jeremy Heimans

Edgar Grande holds the Chair in Comparative Politics 
the University of Munich. His research interests are 
focused on problems of governance, globalisation, 
European integration and political conflict. 

He has published widely on European politics. His recent 
publications include Politicising Europe: Integration 
and Mass Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016 (co-edited with Swen Hutter and Hanspeter 
Kriesi); Restructuring Political Conflict in Western 
Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012 
(co-authored with H. Kriesi, M. Dolezal, M. Helbling, 
D. Höglinger, S. Hutter and B. Wüest); West European 
Politics in the Age of Globalization. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008 (co-authored with H. 
Kriesi, R. Lachat, M. Dolezal, S. Bornschier and T. Frey); 
and Cosmopolitan Europe. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2007 (co-authored with Ulrich Beck).

Co-founder & Chief Executive Officer of Purpose.com
Jeremy has been building movements since the age 
of 8 when, as a child activist in his native Australia, he 
ran media campaigns and lobbied leaders on issues 
like children's rights and nuclear non-proliferation. In 
2005, he co-founded GetUp, an Australian political 
organisation and internationally recognised social 
movement phenomenon that today has more members 
than all of Australia's political parties combined. In 
2007, Jeremy was a co-founder of Avaaz, the world’s 
largest online citizens’ movement, now with more than 
40 million members.

In 2011, Jeremy received the Ford Foundation's 75th 
Anniversary Visionary Award for his work as a movement 
pioneer and the World Economic Forum named him a 
Young Global Leader. He also serves as Chair of the 
Forum's Global Agenda Council on Civic Participation. 
In 2012, Fast Company named him one of the Most 
Creative People in Business. The World e-Government 
Forum has named him as one of the top ten people who 
is changing the world of politics and the internet, and 
The Guardian named him one of the ten most influential 
voices on sustainability in the US. And in 2015, Jeremy 
received the Performance Theatre's Inspired Leadership 
Award, whose previous recipients have included Richard 
Branson, Melinda Gates, and Paul Polman.

His work has been profiled in publications like The 
Economist and The New York Times, and his most 
recent thinking with Henry Timms on 'new power' was 
featured as the Big Idea in Harvard Business Review, 
as one of 2014’s top TED talks with more than 1.25m 
views, and by CNN as one of ten top ideas to change 
the world in 2015.

66

Stijn Hoorens

Stijn Hoorens is Associate Director of RAND Europe and 
Head of RAND’s office in Brussels. RAND is a not-for-profit 
research organisation that helps to improve policy and 
decisionmaking through research and analysis. Before 
joining RAND fourteen years ago, he held research positions 
at Delft University of Technology and at the Netherlands 
Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO).

Stijn has led and designed numerous policy studies 
advising various governments at national and 
international level. He has been involved in ESPAS for 
several years and led RAND’s study on Europe’s societal 
challenges. His research interests include issues around 
demography, employment, and skills. 

He received his B.Sc. and M.Sc. in systems engineering, 
policy analysis, and management from Delft University 
of Technology.

Jeremy has been a keynote speaker at venues such 
as the World Economic Forum at Davos, TED, the RSA, 
Chatham House, the United Nations, Blair House, The 
Economist Big Rethink, The Guardian Activate, and 
Social Media Week. 

Jeremy began his career with the strategy consultants 
McKinsey & Company and he has degrees from 
Harvard University and the University of Sydney. He 
lives in New York.

Jeanette Hofmann

Jeanette Hofmann, political scientist, heads the project 
group The Internet Policy Field at the Social Science 
Research Centre Berlin (WZB). She is also one of the 
founding directors of the Alexander von Humboldt 
Institute for Internet and Society (HIIG) in Berlin. Jeanette 
Hofmann is honorary professor of internet politics at 
the Central Institute of Further Education at the Berlin 
University of the Arts (UDK). 

She was a member of the Enquete Commission 
on Internet and Digital Society of the German 
Bundestag from 2010 to 2013. Jeanette Hofmann’s 
latest publications focus on conceptualising Internet 
Governance, the emergence of internet politics as a new 
policy domain in Germany, and the role of trust in the 
global regulation of the Internet.

67

 
Biographies of the Contributors to ESPAS 2016

Michael Ignatieff

Born in Canada, educated at the University of Toronto 
and Harvard, Michael Ignatieff is a university professor, 
writer and former politician.

His major publications are The Needs of Strangers 
(1984), Scar Tissue (1992), Isaiah Berlin (1998), The 
Rights Revolution (2000), Human Rights as Politics and 
Idolatry (2001), The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an 
Age of Terror (2004), and Fire and Ashes: Success and 
Failure in Politics (2013).

Between 2006 and 2011, he served as an MP in the 
Parliament of Canada and then as Leader of the Liberal 
Party of Canada and Leader of the Official Opposition. 
He is a member of the Queen’s Privy Council for 
Canada and holds eleven honorary degrees.

Alan James 

Alan James is VP Worldwide Business Development 
at Hyperloop One. Dr James has extensive experience 
in developing the strategic, economic, political and 
commercial cases for major infrastructure projects. 

Hyperloop is a new mode of transport, operating 
on-demand, which is designed to move freight and 
passengers quickly, efficiently, and with minimal impact 
to the environment. Hyperloop One networks are 
capable of speeds over 1,000 km/h (622 mph), and 
radically transform connectivity and competitiveness of 
the cities, regions and countries they serve.

Hyperloop One, based in Los Angeles, is the company 
actually building Hyperloop and is scheduled to 
demonstrate a working system in early 2017.

Between 2012 and 2015 he served as Centennial Chair 
at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International 
Affairs in New York. Between 2014 and 2016 he was 
Edward R. Murrow Professor of the Practice of the Press, 
Politics and Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School.

In parallel with developing the technology, Hyperloop One 
is also developing business cases for the first wave of 
Hyperloop networks around the world. Alan is leading the 
company’s engagement with the EU and the Governments 
of member states where Hyperloop networks are proposed.

He is currently the Rector and President of Central 
European University in Budapest.

68

Mary Kaldor

Mehmet Kinaci

Mehmet Kinaci has a B.Sc. in Civil Engineering and earned 
his M.A. in International Security Management and 
Leadership. He served at the strategic and operational 
levels at NATO and National HQs, and was involved 
in NATO operations in the Balkans, Mediterranean, 
Afghanistan and other NATO programmes such as the 
Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialogue. He 
also served at HQ ISAF where had the opportunity to 
interact with a variety of experts, including advisers to 
Afghan ministers and special advisers to international 
community representatives.

He joined Allied Command Transformation in 2010. 
His area of expertise includes Strategic Foresight 
and Energy Security. He was the team leader in the 
development of the ‘Strategic Foresight Analysis 2013 
and 2015 update Reports’ and is currently developing 
the SFA 2017 which aims to establish persistent 
foresight and future studies at Allied Command 
Transformation. SFA identifies trends that will shape the 
future strategic context and derive defence and security 
implications for the Alliance out to 2030 and beyond.

He successfully completed the NATO Executive 
Development Programme in 2011/2012 and continues 
his PhD in the International Studies programme of the 
Old Dominion University.

Mary Kaldor is Professor of Global Governance, 
Director of the Civil Society and Human Security 
Research Unit, and CEO of the DFID funded Justice and 
Security Research programme at the London School of 
Economics. She has pioneered research on new wars 
and global civil society. She is convenor of the Human 
Security Study Group that reported to Javier Solana 
when he was High Representative for Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, and now reports to his successor 
Federica Mogherini. Her books include The Baroque 
Arsenal (1982), Global Civil Society: An Answer to War 
(2003) and New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a 
Global Era (Third edition, 2012).

Anja Kaspersen

Anja Kaspersen is Head of Strategic Engagement and 
New Technologies with the International Committee  
of the Red Cross.

Anja is an international security policy entrepreneur, geo-
strategic thought-leader and practitioner. Previously with 
the World Economic Forum, spearheading the Forum’s work 
on geopolitics, international security and new technologies, 
addressing violent extremism, the future of warfare and 
humanitarian action. Professional affiliations with the 
Hastings Centre, the World Policy Institute Council, the 
IEEE and the Harvard Future Society AI-Initiative. Former 
positions include a long and varied career with the 
Norwegian Government, international organisations, 
research, academia and the private sector. Aspiring yogi. 

69

Biographies of the Contributors to ESPAS 2016

Sir Julian King

Pascal Lamy 

Julian King is Commissioner for Security Union.
Sir Julian King KCVO CMG was appointed Her Majesty’s 
Ambassador to the French Republic. Julian King was 
appointed Director-General Economic and Consular at 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in June 2014. 
Previous to this post, Julian was appointed Director 
General of the Northern Ireland Office in November 
2011 to June 2014, Julian was Ambassador to Ireland 
from 2009 to 2011. From 2008 to 2009 he worked in 
the European Commission, on secondment, heading the 
Office of the British Commissioner.

Pascal Lamy is President Emeritus of the Jacques 
Delors Institute. 

From September 2005 to August 2013, Pascal Lamy 
served for two consecutive terms as Director-General 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO). A committed 
European and member of the French Socialist Party, he 
was Head of Cabinet for the President of the European 
Commission, Jacques Delors, from 1985 to 1994. He then 
joined Credit Lyonnais as CEO until 1999, before returning 
to Brussels as European Trade Commissioner until 2004.

Mr. Lamy holds degrees from HEC School of 
Management, the Institut d’Etudes Politiques (IEP) and 
the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA).

Brigid Laffan 

Brigid Laffan is Director and Professor at the Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European 
University Institute (EUI), Florence. She was Vice-
President of UCD and Principal of the College of Human 
Sciences from 2004 to 2011. She was the founding 
director of the Dublin European Institute UCD from 1999 
and in March 2004 she was elected as a member of 
the Royal Irish Academy. In September 2014 Professor 
Laffan was awarded the UACES Lifetime Achievement 
Award. In 2012 she was awarded the THESEUS Award 
for outstanding research on European Integration. In 
2010 she was awarded the Ordre national du Mérite by 
the President of the French Republic.

70

Karl-Heinz Lambertz

Hans Peter Lankes

Hans Peter Lankes has been Managing Director, 
Corporate Strategy at EBRD since May 2011 and is a 
member of the Bank’s Executive Committee. In this 
function he has advised the President on the Bank’s 
strategy, was responsible for designing and achieving 
shareholder support for the Bank’s priorities and 
chairing the Change Management Board. 

From July 2012 until June 2013 and again in October-
December 2014 he served as Acting Vice President, 
Policy with the task of reorganising the Vice Presidency 
into the Bank’s hub for strategy and policy coordination. 
Since January 2015 he is the Bank’s Acting  
Chief Economist.

Karl-Heinz Lambertz (born 4 June 1952) studied Law 
at the catholic University Louvain-La-Neuve (UCL) and 
the University of Heidelberg. After his studies, Karl-
Heinz Lambertz became consultant at the Office of the 
Minister for Institutional Reforms and deputy manager 
of Aerotech Ltd as well as consultant for SRIW (Société 
Régionale d'Investissement de Wallonie). From 1999 
until 2014, he was Minister President of the German 
speaking Community of Belgium. He held the positions 
of Minister of Employment, Policy for the Disabled, 
Media and Sport and Minister of Local Authorities. In 
2014, Mr Lambertz became President of the Parliament 
of the German-speaking Community until becoming 
Senator of the Community in 2016. 

He has been a member of the European Committee of 
the Regions (CoR) since 1999, where he was President 
of the PES Group for 5 years, becoming First Vice-
President of the institution in 2015. Mr Lambertz is 
Member of the Commission for Social Policy, Education, 
Employment, Research and Culture (SEDEC) and the 
Commission for Environment, Climate Change and 
Energy (ENVE). He is active in the Congress of Local and 
Regional Authorities within the Council of Europe where 
he is President of the Socialist Group. From 2013 to 
2014 Mr Lambertz was President of the Euregio Maas-
Rhine (EMR) and became President of the Association of 
European Border Regions (AEBR) in 2010.

In 2008, he was one of three senior Belgian politicians 
commissioned by King Albert II to investigate ways of 
enabling constitutional reform talks in the light of the 
long-running Belgian constitutional crisis. 

71

Biographies of the Contributors to ESPAS 2016

He then spent three years as Head of Cabinet of Mrs 
Margot Wallström, Commission Vice President for 
Institutional Relations and Communication. During 
2010 Mr Leffler was Deputy Director General of the DG 
for Development and relations with African, Caribbean 
and Pacific States, as well as a senior adviser to 
EU High Representative for CFSP and European 
Commission Vice-President Catherine Ashton, assisting 
her in the preparation for the establishment of the new 
European External Action Service. 

From the beginning of 2011 to 2015 he was Managing 
Director for Americas with the European External Action 
Service. Mr Leffler took up his current position on 16 
September 2015.

Shiraz Maher

Dr. Shiraz Maher is Deputy Director of the International 
Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) and a 
member of the War Studies Department at King’s 
College London. He currently leads the Centre’s 
research on the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts and also 
researches Salafi-Jihadi soteriology. The BBC has 
described him as 'one of the world’s leading experts 
on radicalisation'. In 2016 he was shortlisted for 
the Orwell Prize in journalism for his pieces on 
radicalisation, foreign fighter mobilisation, and the 
terrorist threat to Europe. 

Christian Leffler

Deputy Secretary General for Economic and Global 
Issues at the European External Action Service (EEAS).

Born in Göteborg in 1955, Mr Leffler obtained a 
Bachelor’s degree in politics and international relations 
from the LSE. After doctoral studies at the Graduate 
Institute of International Studies in Geneva he joined the 
Swedish Foreign Service in 1980. Postings to Cairo and 
Paris were followed by the Political Affairs Department 
of the Ministry in Stockholm. After participating in the 
accession negotiations and in establishing the new 
working structures of the Representation in the first 
year of active Swedish EU membership, he became the 
first Swedish 'Antici', responsible under the Permanent 
Representative for policy coordination in the work in the 
Council of Ministers.

He joined the European Commission in 1996, where he 
took up the post of Commission 'Antici' and Head of 
the unit in the Secretariat General responsible for the 
coordination of relations with the Council of Ministers. 
In 1999, he became the Deputy Head of the Private 
Office of the Right Honourable Chris Patten, European 
Commissioner for External Relations. From 2002 until 
2007, he was Director in charge of the Middle East and 
South Mediterranean in the European Commission’s 
Directorate General for External Relations. 

72

He received his education at Somerville College, Oxford, 
where he graduated with double First Class Honours 
in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE), was a 
Coombs Scholar and held the Mary Somerville prize for 
academic excellence. He was President of the Oxford 
Economics Society in 2000. In 2002, he received a 
Master of Arts degree in International and Development 
Economics from Yale University. He received a Master 
of Public Policy (with Distinction) from Oxford’s new 
Blavatnik School of Government (BSG) in 2014, 
which he attended on a Lee Kuan Yew Postgraduate 
Scholarship from the Singapore government. 

In January 2011, Aaron was one of eight young leaders 
named an 'Outstanding Young Singaporean' by the 
Orchid Jayceettes of Singapore. In June 2012, he was 
conferred the Singapore Youth Award, the highest 
national honour for young people who exemplify 
excellence in their professional lives and community 
work, by the Prime Minister. He was identified by the 
World Economic Forum as a Young Global Leader in 
January 2013.

Aaron Maniam

Aaron Maniam is Director of Industry at Singapore’s 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, responsible for 
coordinating economic policies and regulating the 
manufacturing, services and tourism sectors, as well 
overseeing long-term economic transformation. 

He joined the Singapore government in 2004, 
serving on the North America Desk of the Foreign 
Service (2004-2006) and at Singapore’s Embassy 
in Washington DC (2006-2008), where he was the 
principal coordinator for Congressional liaison and 
issues relating to the Middle East. He was posted to 
the Strategic Policy Office (SPO) at the Public Service 
Division in 2008, where he worked on scenario 
planning and analysis of long-term trends relevant 
to Singapore. He was appointed the first Head of the 
Singapore Government’s newly-formed Centre for 
Strategic Futures (CSF) in January 2010, while retaining 
his SPO portfolio. In July 2011, Aaron was appointed 
Director of the Institute of Policy Development at the 
Civil Service College (CSC), which organises leadership 
training programmes for public sector talent (the top 
1% of the public sector workforce). In 2012, he started 
the CSC Applied Simulation Training (CAST) Laboratory, 
an experiment to apply principles of 'serious play' 
to training public officers to deal with complex 
environments. He led efforts to develop the College’s 
curriculum on complexity science, and convened the 
College’s multi-sector interest groups on Complexity 
and Governance. 

73

Biographies of the Contributors to ESPAS 2016

Mairead McGuinness

Ann Mettler

Ann METTLER is the head of the European Political 
Strategy Centre (EPSC), the in-house think tank of the 
European Commission. The EPSC provides specialised 
and forward-looking advice to President Juncker. 

Ann Mettler is also the Chair of the European Strategy 
and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS).

Prior to assuming her position in December 2014, Ann 
was for eleven years executive director of the Lisbon 
Council, a Brussels-based think tank. From 2000-2003, 
she worked at the World Economic Forum, where she 
last served as director for Europe. 

She holds Masters Degrees in political science and 
European law and economics, and graduated with 
distinction from the University of New Mexico, USA, and the 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-University in Bonn, Germany.

Mairead McGuinness MEP is Vice-President of the 
European Parliament.

As Vice-President, Mairead has responsibility for the 
Parliament's information and communications policy; she 
oversees the Parliament’s scientific research body – STOA – 
and its link with the scientific community; and plays a leading 
role in the area of children's rights as the Parliament’s 
mediator in cases of international parental child abduction. 
Mairead is a long-standing member of the Parliament’s 
Agriculture and Rural Development Committee, and the 
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety Committee.

An agricultural economist, she focuses on the future shape 
of agriculture and rural development, global development 
policy, the environment and food safety and security.

Mairead chaired the Parliament's investigation into 
the collapse of the Equitable Life assurance company 
which identified issues around weak financial regulation 
before the financial crisis of 2008.

In May 2014 Mairead was elected to the European 
Parliament for the third time. Prior to becoming an MEP she 
was a well-known journalist, broadcaster and commentator.

74

Carlos Moedas

Geoff  Mulgan

Carlos Moedas was born in Beja (Portugal) in 1970. He 
graduated in Civil Engineering from the Higher Technical 
Institute (IST) in 1993, completing the final year of 
studies at the École Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées 
in Paris (France). He worked in engineering for the Suez-
Lyonnaise des Eaux group in France until 1998.

He obtained an MBA from Harvard Business School 
(USA) in 2000, after which he returned to Europe to 
work in mergers and acquisitions at investment bank 
Goldman Sachs in London (UK).

He returned to Portugal in 2004 as Managing Director of 
Aguirre Newman and member of the Executive Board of 
Aguirre Newman in Spain. In 2008, he founded his own 
investment company, Crimson Investment Management.

In 2011, he became a Member of Parliament in 
Portugal and was appointed to the position of Secretary 
of State to the Prime Minister of Portugal, in charge of 
the Portuguese Adjustment Programme.

In 2014, he became Member of the European 
Commission, overseeing the portfolio of Research, 
Science and Innovation.

Geoff Mulgan was the first Chief Executive of the Young 
Foundation (2004-2011), which became a leading centre 
for social innovation, combining research, creation of 
new ventures and practical projects.

Between 1997 and 2004 Geoff had various roles in the 
UK government including director of the Government’s 
Strategy Unit and head of policy in the Prime Minister’s 
office. Before that he was the founder and director of 
the think-tank Demos.

He has also been Chief Adviser to Gordon Brown 
MP; a lecturer in telecommunications; an investment 
executive; and a reporter on BBC TV and radio.

He is a visiting professor at LSE, UCL, Melbourne 
University and a regular lecturer at the China Executive 
Leadership Academy. He is an adviser to many 
governments around the world, and has been a board 
member of the Work Foundation, the Health Innovation 
Council, Political Quarterly and the Design Council, and 
chair of Involve. He is also currently chair of the Studio 
Schools Trust and the Social Innovation Exchange.

Between 2015-2018 Geoff will be a senior visiting 
scholar at Harvard University, in the Ash Center at the 
Kennedy School.

His recent books include The Art of Public Strategy 
- Mobilising Power and Knowledge for the Public 
Good (OUP, 2008), Good and Bad Power: the ideals 
and betrayals of government (Penguin, 2006) 
and Connexity (Harvard Business Press and Jonathon 
Cape, 1998). His latest book The Locust and the 
Bee was published by Princeton University Press in 
March 2013. 

75

Biographies of the Contributors to ESPAS 2016

He works with business leaders, policy makers and 
civil society activists using his expertise in stakeholder 
dialogue, scenario planning, strategic foresight and 
systems thinking. He is a member of the Advisory 
Council of the Association of Professional Futurists 
and recent participant in the London-based School of 
International Futures.

Luis Planas

Luis Planas has been Secretary-General of the European 
Economic and Social Committee since March 2014.

From 1986 to 1994, he served as a member of the 
European Parliament and, from 1996 to 2004, was 
head of the private office of two successive European 
Commissioners. From 2010 to 2011, he was Spanish 
ambassador and Permanent Representative to the EU.
He was also Spanish ambassador to Morocco from 
2004 to 2009 and has occupied a number of other 
positions at national and regional level in Spain. He 
was a member of the Spanish Parliament from 1982 
to 1987 and three times served as regional minister in 
the government of Andalucía. 

He holds a law degree from the University of Valencia. 
He is a regular speaker and has written articles and 
essays on European affairs. 

He is married and has two sons. 

Peter Neumann

Peter Neumann is Professor of Security Studies at the 
War Studies Department of King’s College London, and 
serves as Director of the International Centre for the 
Study of Radicalisation.

He has authored or co-authored five books, including 
Old and New Terrorism, published by Polity Press in 
2009; and The Strategy of Terrorism (with MLR Smith), 
published by Routledge in 2008. 

He holds an MA in Political Science from the Free 
University of Berlin, and a PhD in War Studies from 
King’s College London. 

Marius Oosthuizen 

Marius Oosthuizen is a member of faculty at the 
Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of 
Pretoria, South Africa. He teaches leadership, strategy 
and ethics, and heads up the Future of Business Project 
that uses strategic foresight methods to explore the 
future of South Africa and Africa. 

Marius is a graduate of the Oxford Scenarios Programme 
at Saïd Business School, University of Oxford, UK. He 
holds a Masters in Strategic Foresight from Regent 
University, Virginia Beach, USA and an Honours Bachelor 
in Systematic Theology from the University of South 
Africa (UNISA) and is currently completing a Masters in 
Applied Social and Political Ethics.

76

Stefano Scarpetta

Stefano Scarpetta is Director for Employment, Labour 
and Social Affairs at the OECD.

Mr. Scarpetta joined the OECD in 1991 and held several 
positions in the Economics Department and in his 
current Directorate. He led several large-scale research 
projects, including: 'Implementing the OECD Jobs 
Strategy'; the 'Sources of Economic Growth in OECD 
Countries'; and contributed to others including 'The Policy 
Challenges of Population Ageing' and 'The Effects of 
Product Market Competition on Productivity and Labour 
Market Outcomes'. From 2002 to 2006 he worked at 
the World Bank, where he took over the responsibility 
of labour market advisor and lead economist. In 
this capacity, he coordinated a Bank-wide research 
programme of Employment and Development and 
contributed extensively to the Bank’s investment climate 
assessments. He returned to the Economics Department 
of the OECD in November 2006 where he became the 
head of the Country Studies Division in charge of Japan, 
Korea, China, India, Mexico, Portugal, Denmark and 
Sweden. From March 2008 to June 2010, he was the 
editor of the OECD Employment Outlook and the Head 
of the Employment Analysis and Policy Division of the 
Directorate of Employment, Labour and Social Affairs 
(DELSA). He became the Deputy Director of DELSA in 
June 2010 and in May 2013 has become Director.

He has published extensively in academic journals, 
including in the American Economic Review, 
The Economic Journal, Economic Policy and The 
International Journal of Industrial Organisation. He 
edited several books in the fields of: labour economics 
and industrial relations; economic growth; and industrial 
organisation. He is the co-director of the programme of 
work on Employment and Development at the Institute 
for the Studies of Labour (IZA, Bonn, Germany); 
Research Fellow of IZA;  Member of the expert group on 
the minimum wage in France; Member of the Executive 
Board of the CAED (Comparative Analysis of Enterprise 
Data) network and member of the Scientific Committee 
of the DARES (French Ministry of Labour).

Mr. Scarpetta holds a Ph.D. in Economics  from the Ecole des 
Hautes Etudes en Science Sociales (EHESS), Département 
et Laboratoire d’Economie Théorique Appliquée (DELTA) 
in Paris and a Master of Science in Economics from the 
London School of Economics and Political Science.

Simon Schäfer 

Simon Schäfer is CEO, Founder of Factory, a campus 
concept from Berlin, where startups can learn from 
each other and use collective knowledge to overcome 
early stage hurdles. 

Simon is also the founder of Startup Europe Summit 
(SES), Europe’s foremost tech meets policy conference. 
Since 2015, Simon is member of the Board of Directors 
at Allied for Startup and member of the Advisory Board 
at the Lisbon Council since 2014. Simon is CEO of 
totalCommerce GMbH. 

77

Biographies of the Contributors to ESPAS 2016

Mark Spelman 

Bruce Stokes

Mark Spelman is an international business leader who 
worked at Accenture for 26 years. He has significant 
experience in business and digital strategies, operating 
models and change management. His Accenture 
roles included being Global Head of Strategy, Global 
Managing Director for Thought Leadership and 
Executive Director for the Accenture Institute for  
High Performance. 

Mark’s current roles include working for the World 
Economic Forum ( WEF ) to lead their Future of the 
Internet Initiative and chairing an EU-China Expert 
group on the Future of the Digital Economy. This work 
involves engaging leading thinkers and decision makers 
from Government, Business and Civil Society on digital 
disruption, access and internet governance. 

Mark was Chairman of the American Chamber of 
Commerce Executive Council in Brussels; his current 
non executive roles include Chatham House, The Future 
Cities Catapult in the UK, a social enterprise Numbers 
For Good and Chairman of Leap a charity specialising 
in helping young people understand the causes and 
consequences of conflict. 

He has an MA in Economics from Cambridge University 
and a MBA from INSEAD, France

Bruce Stokes is the director of Global Economics Attitudes 
at the Pew Research Center. He is also a non-resident 
fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States 
and an associate fellow at Chatham House.

He is a former senior fellow at the Council on Foreign 
Relations, where he is a member. And for 23 years he was 
the international economics columnist for the National 
Journal, a Washington-based public policy magazine.

He is the author many Pew surveys, including most 
recently: Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean 
More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs; Europeans Face the World 
Divided; Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit.
Bruce is coauthor of the book America Against the World: 
How We Are Different and Why We Are Disliked (Times 
Books, 2006) and author of the 2009 GMF Transatlantic 
Trends survey. In 2012 he co-authored  
A New Era for Transatlantic Trade Leadership (European 
Centre for International Political Economy, Brussels) and The 
Case for Renewing Transatlantic Capitalism (demosEuropa, 
Warsaw). In 1996 he edited Open For Business: Creating a 
Transatlantic Marketplace (Council on Foreign Relations)

78

He recently co-edited (with Japhy Willson) The Post-
Political and its Discontents: Spectres of Radical Politics 
Today (Edinburg University Press, 2014). His new book 
with MIT-Press, Liquid Power, focuses on water and social 
power in 20th century Spain. He is also ce-editor of In the 
Nature of Cities (Routledge)  and author of Social Power 
and the Urbanization of Water (Oxford University Press).

J.H.H. Weiler

J.H.H. Weiler is University Professor at NYU Law School 
and Senior Fellow at the Center for European Studies 
at Harvard. Until recently he served as President of the 
European University Institute, Florence. Previously he 
served as Manley Hudson Professor of International 
Law at Harvard Law School. He also served for many 
years as Member of the Committee of Jurists of 
the Institutional Affairs Committee of the European 
Parliament. Prof. Weiler is Editor-in-Chief of the 
European Journal of International Law (EJIL) and the 
International Journal of Constitutional Law (ICON). He 
holds a PhD. in European Law from the EUI, Florence 
and honorary degrees from various European and 
American universities. He is the author of many works 
among them The Constitution of Europe – Do the New 
Clothes have an Emperor (translated into 8 languages).

Paweł Świeboda

Prior to joining the EPSC as Deputy Head and acting 
Leader of the institutional team, Paweł ŚWIEBODA 
was President of demosEUROPA – Centre for European 
Strategy, an EU policy think tank based in Warsaw, 
from 2006 to 2015. Earlier, he was Director of the EU 
Department at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
the years 2001-2006 and EU Advisor to the President 
of Poland from 1996 to 2000.

A graduate of the London School of Economics and the 
University of London, UK, he is a member of a number 
of advisory boards of European think tanks as well as a 
member of the Global Agenda Council on Europe of the 
World Economic Forum. In 2013/2014, he was Rapporteur 
of the Review of European Innovation Partnerships.

Erik Swyngedouw 

Erik Swyngedouw is Professor of Geography at 
Manchester University. His research interests include 
urban political-ecology, hydro-social conflict, urban 
governance, democracy and political power, and the 
politics of globalisation. 

His was previously professor of geography at Oxford 
University and held the Vincent Wright Visiting 
Professorship at Science Po, Paris, 2014. 

79

Biographies of the Contributors to ESPAS 2016

Klaus Welle

Ibon Zugasti

Ibon Zugasti is Partner/Director at PROSPEKTIKER (www.
prospektiker.es), International Projects Manager at LKS 
(www.lks.es), Chairman of the Millennium Project Node 
in Spain (www.proyectomilenio.org), Vice-President 
of Foresight Europe Network – FEN (www.feneu.org) 
and Deputy Director of the Iberoamerican Foresight 
Network – RIBER (www.riber.info).

Ibon has led several consultancy and research 
projects in fields like strategic foresight, sustainable 
development, labour and training, and energy. 

He has also been advisor for the European Commission 
and Committee of the Regions of the EU and the World 
Bank. He is coauthor of different publications such 
as Latin America 2030: Delphi Survey and Scenarios 
(Millennium Project), An initial assessment of territorial 
forward planning/foresight projects in the EU (CoR), The 
water-energy-food nexus – Foresight for R&I in the 
context of climate change (EC) and also contributes to 
the yearly publication State of the Future (Millennium 
Project). He has been teaching strategic management 
and foresight in many Universities and conferences at 
the international level.

Mr. Welle has had a long career in the European 
Parliament. To date, Mr. Welle has been Secretary 
General of the European Parliament since 2009. In this 
capacity he is the European Parliament’s most senior 
official. From 2007 until 2009 he was the head of the 
Cabinet of the President of the European Parliament. 
From 2004 until 2007, he was the Director-General 
for Internal Policies at the European Parliament. From 
1999 until 2003, he was the Secretary-General of the 
EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament. From 1994 
-1999 he was Secretary-General of the EPP Party. Mr. 
Welle holds a degree in Economics from the University 
of Witten/Herdecke, Germany. 

Angela Wilkinson 

Angela Wilkinson has over 30 years of experience in 
forward assessment, business strategy and public 
policy. An expert in developing the anticipatory 
capabilities of leaders and their organisations. Very 
experienced in directing major international initiatives 
to address pressing global challenges, she has 
conducted over 100 foresight initiatives, worked in 30 
countries and in a wide range of sectors. Angela held 
senior positions at the OECD, University of Oxford and 
in several global firms. 

Author of two books on scenario planning and 
numerous articles on uncertainty and risk. Fellow of 
the World Academy of Arts and Science, Angela holds a 
PhD in Physics.

80

INSTITUTIONAL PARTNERS

OBSERVERS

European 
Commission

European 
Parliament

Council of 
the European 
Union

European 
External Action 
Service

Committee of 
the Regions

European 
Economic and 
Social Committee

AN INTER-INSTITUTIONAL 
EU PROJECT

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