Case T-542/19: Action brought on 5 August 2019 — FV v Council
Date: 2019-08-05
Institutions: General Court
Subjects: assistant, damages, indemnification, principle of legal certainty, principle of proportionality, professional career, right to justice, special leave, staff regulations (EU)








C_2019337EN.01001101.xml










7.10.2019   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


C 337/11






Action brought on 5 August 2019 — FV v Council
(Case T-542/19)
(2019/C 337/12)
Language of the case: French

Parties


Applicant: FV (represented by: É. Boigelot, lawyer)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:






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declare the action admissible and well founded, and consequently;










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annul the decision of 3 May 2019, notified to the applicant on 6 May 2019 by Mr [X], Senior Legal Counsellor at the Council, and taken by Mr [Y] in his capacity as appointing authority and under which ‘1. the applicant, born on 25 March 1956 [confidential], (1) official in Grade AST 7, is placed on leave in the interests of the service pursuant to Article 42c of the Staff Regulations and is entitled to the pecuniary benefits provided for therein. 2. This decision shall take effect on 31 December 2015.’;










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order the Council to pay, by way of compensation for material harm and damage to the applicant’s career, subject to an increase or reduction in that amount in the course of the proceedings, EUR 151 101,72’;










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order the Council to pay, by way of compensation for non-material harm and damage to the applicant’s reputation, subject to an increase or reduction in that amount in the course of the proceedings, EUR 70 000;










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in any event, order the defendant to pay all the costs, in accordance with Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court of the European Union.





Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.






1.


First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 266 TFEU and of fundamental and general principles of EU law, including, inter alia, protection of legitimate expectations, the principles of sound administration, good faith, legal certainty and observance of the principle of proportionality.
In that regard, the applicant considers that the appointing authority has clearly not correctly applied and interpreted the abovementioned provisions and principles by not taking the necessary measures to give effect to the judgment given in proceedings for annulment by the General Court of the European Union on 14 December 2018, FV v Council (T-750/16, EU:T:2018:972). She also considers that the appointing authority infringed the principle which requires the administration to adopt a decision which is not disproportionate, that is to say, which is necessary in order to attain the objectives pursued, which entails that the content and form of the decision is in line with those objectives. Lastly, the applicant submits that there has been a breach of her legitimate expectation that the appointing authority gives correct and expeditious effect to the abovementioned judgment, T-750/16, not only through the correct application of Article 266 TFEU but also without retroactive effect.










2.


Second plea in law, alleging, first, that the contested decision infringed the conditions of Article 42c of the Staff Regulations and Staff Note 71/15 of 23 October 2015, in breach of the principle requiring the administration to adopt a decision solely on the basis of legally admissible grounds, that is to say, grounds which are relevant and not vitiated by manifest error of assessment, fact or law, and, secondly, abuse of process.
In that regard, the applicant considers that in adopting the contested decision in those circumstances, the appointing authority clearly did not correctly apply and interpret the abovementioned statutory provisions and Staff Note, basing its decision on reasoning that is incorrect both in fact and in law. She submits that the Council has not established that the decision was in the interests of the service, which it intended to further by applying Article 42c to the applicant, and has not identified genuine organisational needs which required the alleged acquisition of new skills which the applicant was not in a position to acquire, in addition, the appointing authority clearly used Article 42c in place of disciplinary proceedings.










3.


Third plea in law, alleging, infringement of the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff. In that regard, the applicant considers that in adopting the contested decision in those circumstances, the appointing authority did not respect the balance of rights and obligations which requires the institution to take into consideration all the factors which may affect its decision and to take account both the interest of the service and the interest of the official concerned.






(1)  Confidential information omitted.