Illicit trade in cultural goods in Europe : characteristics, criminal justice responses and an analysis of the applicability of technologies in the combat against the trade : final report.
Date: 2019-07-12
Institutions: Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture
Subjects: art trade, blockchain, criminal law, criminal proceedings, cross-border cooperation, cultural heritage, cultural object, exchange of information, fight against crime, heritage protection, illicit trade, international cooperation, new technology, organised crime, regional cooperation

Illicit  trade  in  cultural 
goods in Europe 

criminal 

Characteristics, 
justice 
responses  and  an  analysis  of  the 
applicability  of  technologies  in  the 
combat against the trade 

 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture 
Directorate D – Culture and Creativity  
Unit D.1 – Cultural Policy 

Contact: Anna Kedziorek 

E-mail:  anna.kedziorek@ec.europa.eu 

European Commission 
B-1049 Brussels 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Illicit trade in cultural goods in 
Europe 

Characteristics, criminal justice responses and an 
analysis of the applicability of technologies in the 
combat against the trade 

Final report 

Authors: 

Trafficking Culture  

Dr. Neil Brodie 

Dr. Donna Yates 

Ecorys 

Dr. Brigitte Slot 

Dr. Olga Batura 

Niels van Wanrooij 

Gabriëlle op ’t Hoog  

2019 
2019 

EN 
EN 

Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture 
Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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For any use or reproduction of photos or other material that is not under the EU copyright, permission 
must be sought directly from the copyright holders. 
Image(s) © Images cover page. Source: Shutterstock, Neil Brodie, Donna Yates 
Image © Images Operation Budweiser, 2016. Source: Romanian Police 
Image © Images Operation SÁRDICA, 2018. Source: Guardia Civil 
Image © Images Dacian Bracelets, n.d. Source: Romanian Police 

PDF 

ISBN 978-92-79-99359-6  

doi:10.2766/183649 

NC-02-19-066-EN-N  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 

Table of Contents 
Abstract 
Résumé 
Abstract 
Executive summary 
Résumé analytique 
Kurzfassung 
List of abbreviations 
1. 

5 
9 
11 
13 
14 
22 
31 
41 
44 
Background of this study, objectives and research questions ..................... 44 
Context ......................................................................................... 44 

Introduction to this study 

1.1.1 

1.1 

1.1.2 

Study objectives and research questions ........................................... 46 

2. 

1.2 
1.3 
1.4 

Terminological note .............................................................................. 47 
Scope of the study ............................................................................... 48 
Structure of this report ......................................................................... 49 
52 
2.1  Data collection ..................................................................................... 52 
Analysis .............................................................................................. 55 
2.2 
Analysis of survey .......................................................................... 55 

Methodology 

2.2.1 

2.2.2 

2.2.3 

2.2.4 

Analysis of interviews ..................................................................... 55 

Snapshot analysis .......................................................................... 55 

Analysis of technologies .................................................................. 58 

2.3 

Benefits and shortcomings of the methodology ........................................ 59 
Benefits of the methodology ............................................................ 59 

2.3.1 

2.3.2 

Shortcomings, limitations, mitigation measures ................................. 60 

2.4 

Robustness of the research.................................................................... 65 
Impact of the methodological shortcomings on the findings ................. 65 

2.4.1 

2.4.2 

How we ensure the validity of the results .......................................... 65 

3. 

Dimensions of trafficking in cultural goods 

68 
3.1 
Context and actors ............................................................................... 68 
3.2  Object types and values ........................................................................ 73 
Volume of trade ................................................................................... 78 
3.3 
Measuring illicit trade: impossible at worst, difficult at best ................. 78 

3.3.1 

3.3.2 

3.3.3 

3.3.4 

Obstacles facing reliable measurements ............................................ 79 

On the numbers that do exist .......................................................... 83 

How a (tentative) estimate can be compiled ...................................... 87 

3.4 

Trafficking routes ................................................................................. 97 
Challenges in mapping trafficking routes ........................................... 97 

3.4.1 

3.4.2  What we do know about the trafficking routes ................................. 101 

3.5  Operation modes ................................................................................ 106 
Shift to online trade and its ramifications ........................................ 106 

3.5.1 

3.5.2 

3.5.3 

Relation to organised crime ........................................................... 108 

Relation to terrorism and terrorism financing ................................... 112 

3.6 

Case studies ...................................................................................... 116 

5 

 
 
 
 
3.6.1 

3.6.2 

3.6.3 

3.6.4 

Dacian bracelets .......................................................................... 116 

Sicilian trafficking ring .................................................................. 120 

Jaume Bagot case ........................................................................ 123 

Kanakaria Mosaics ........................................................................ 126 

3.6.5  What does this tell us ................................................................... 128 

4. 
faced by the authorities 

Criminal justice responses to trafficking in cultural goods and the challenges 

130 
National level responses ...................................................................... 130 
Monitoring the market .................................................................. 131 

4.1 

4.1.1 

4.1.2 

4.1.3 

4.1.4 

Law enforcement expertise ............................................................ 132 

National data collection ................................................................. 136 

National cooperation ..................................................................... 137 

4.2 

Cross-border criminal justice responses ................................................ 142 
International inter-agency cooperation............................................ 142 

4.2.1 

4.2.2 

International access to information ................................................. 153 

4.3 

Challenges faced by the authorities ...................................................... 158 
Universal lack of awareness about illicit trade in cultural goods .......... 158 

4.3.1 

4.3.2 

4.3.3 

4.3.4 

4.3.5 

4.3.6 

Illicit trade in cultural goods is a low political priority ........................ 159 

Lack of resources for fighting illicit trade in cultural goods ................. 160 

Lack of expertise on illicit trade in cultural goods.............................. 162 

Legal constraints .......................................................................... 163 

Lack of information sharing between agencies ................................. 165 

4.4 

Best practices .................................................................................... 167 
Awareness raising ........................................................................ 167 

4.4.1 

4.4.2 

4.4.3 

4.4.4 

4.4.5 

4.4.6 

4.4.7 

4.4.8 

4.4.9 

Political support—and associated funding ........................................ 168 

National specialised unit ................................................................ 169 

Leadership .................................................................................. 169 

Access to data and information exchange ........................................ 170 

Monitoring of online trade ............................................................. 171 

Training ...................................................................................... 171 

Cooperation with archaeologists, NGOs and private investigators ....... 173 

International cooperation .............................................................. 173 

Assessment of new technologies used for identifying potentially illicit cultural 

5. 
goods and for sharing information on them 

176 
5.1  Main technical tools for identifying illicit cultural goods and sharing information 
and new innovative tools .............................................................................. 176 
5.1.1 
Main  technological  tools  currently  in  use  by  relevant  European  agencies 
and organisations ..................................................................................... 176 

5.1.2 
Technological tools assumed to be in  use by relevant European agencies 
and organisations ..................................................................................... 179 

5.1.3 
Potentially-innovative products on the market that are not being used, or 
in limited capacity, by relevant European agencies and organisations .............. 181 

5.2 

Impact, effectiveness and added value of technological tools ................... 185 

6 

 
 
5.2.1 

5.2.2 

Currently used technical tools ........................................................ 185 

Potentially innovative technical tools............................................... 187 

6. 

5.3 
Vulnerabilities and policy needs ............................................................ 189 
5.4  Overall assessment ............................................................................ 191 
196 
6.1  Main findings ..................................................................................... 196 
Characteristics of the illicit trade in cultural goods ............................ 196 

Conclusions and recommendations 

6.1.1 

6.1.2 

Criminal justice responses to combat the illicit trade in cultural goods  197 

6.2 

Recommendations .............................................................................. 200 
Recommendation 1. .................................................................................. 201 

Recommendation 2. .................................................................................. 203 

Recommendation 3. .................................................................................. 204 

Recommendation 4. .................................................................................. 205 

Recommendation 5. .................................................................................. 206 

Recommendation 6. .................................................................................. 207 

Recommendation 7. .................................................................................. 209 

Recommendation 8. .................................................................................. 210 

Recommendation 9. .................................................................................. 212 

Recommendation 10. ................................................................................ 213 

Annex 1 

Bibliography 

Annex 2

Interviews 

Annex 3

215 

231 

A3.1 
A3.2 
A3.3 

Overview of the survey results 

233 
Participants .................................................................................... 233 
Structure ....................................................................................... 233 
Responses by stakeholder category ................................................... 234 
A3.3.1  Criminal organisation and operation of the trade .............................. 234 

A3.3.2  Material parameters of the trade including volume, value, typology .... 237 

A3.3.3  Established criminal justice responses to the trade ........................... 242 

A3.3.4  Known obstacles to and shortcomings of criminal justice responses .... 245 

A3.4  

Responses by role in illicit trade chain ................................................ 249 
A3.4.1  Criminal organisation and operation of the illicit trade ....................... 249 

A3.4.2  Material parameters of the trade including volume, value, typology .... 251 

A3.4.3  Established criminal justice responses to the trade ........................... 254 

A3.4.4  Known obstacles to and shortcomings of criminal justice responses .... 256 

Annex 4

Overview of analysed technologies 

264 
Blockchain technology...................................................................... 264 
Crowdsourcing ................................................................................ 268 
Metadata Analysis ........................................................................... 271 
Satellite Imagery Analysis, Drone Photography ................................... 273 
"K-9 Artifact Finders" or Antiquities Sniffing Dogs ................................ 275 

A4.1 
A4.2 
A4.3 
A4.4 
A4.5 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  

This  study  contributes  to  a  better  understanding  of  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  in 
Europe by providing insights into its various aspects, such as source, transit and destination 
of illicitly traded goods; trafficking routes; trends and patterns of trafficking and illicit trade 
operations and actors involved. It also discusses approaches to measuring the volume of 
the  illicit  trade,  and  explores  national  and  international  criminal  justice  responses  to 
trafficking in cultural goods to identify challenges faced by the relevant law enforcement 
authorities  in implementing  effective  responses.  In  this  context,  this  study  analyses  the 
possible benefits and shortcomings of existing and new technologies that are used or can 
be  used  by  competent  authorities  for  identifying  illicitly  traded  goods,  for  improving 
information sharing and for other forms of inter-agency cooperation. Based on the analysis 
of  data  and  information  collected  through  interviews  with  experts  and  practitioners, 
stakeholder  surveys  and  desk-based  research,  this  study  formulates  a  range  of 
recommendations and concrete steps that the EU and Member States should undertake in 
order  to  intensify  and  render  more  effective  their  efforts  in  combatting  illicit  trade  in 
cultural goods. 

9 

 
 
 
 
Résumé  

Cette étude permet de mieux comprendre le commerce illicite de biens culturels en Europe 
grâce aux renseignements fournis sur ses divers aspects, tels que la source, le transit et 
la  destination  des  biens  commercialisés  illicitement,  les  itinéraires,  les  tendances  et  les 
caractéristiques  du  trafic  ainsi  que  les  opérations  commerciales  illicites  et  les  acteurs 
impliqués.  Elle  aborde  également  des  méthodes  permettant  de  mesurer  le  volume  du 
commerce  illicite,  et  examine  les  mesures  prises  par  la  justice  pénale  nationale  et 
internationale  concernant  le  trafic  de  biens  culturels  afin  d'identifier  les  difficultés  de  la 
mise  en  œuvre  de  mesures  efficaces  rencontrées  par  les  autorités  répressives 
compétentes.  Dans  ce  contexte,  cette  étude  analyse  les  éventuels  avantages  et 
inconvénients des technologies existantes et nouvelles qui sont utilisées ou auxquelles les 
autorités  compétentes  peuvent  avoir  recours  afin  d’identifier  les  biens  commercialisés 
illicitement, d’améliorer le partage des informations et pour d’autres formes de coopération 
interinstitutions.  Basée  sur  l'analyse  des  données  et  des  informations  recueillies  lors 
d'entretiens  avec  des  experts  et  des  praticiens,  d’enquêtes  auprès  d’intervenants  et  de 
recherches  documentaires,  cette  étude  formule  une  série  de  recommandations  et  de 
mesures  concrètes  que  l'UE  et  les  États  membres  doivent  suivre  et  entreprendre  afin 
d'intensifier  et  de  rendre  plus  efficace  leurs  actions  menées  dans  la  lutte  contre  le 
commerce illicite de biens culturels. 

11 

 
 
 
 
Abstract 

zur 

Identifizierung 

Diese  Studie  dient  dem  besseren  Verständnis  des  illegalen  Handels  mit  Kulturgütern  in 
Europa  anhand  von  Erkenntnissen  über  verschiedene  Aspekte  wie  Quelle,  Transit  und 
Bestimmungsort der illegal gehandelten Güter, Handelsrouten, -trends und -muster sowie 
Schwarzhandelsoperationen und beteiligte Akteure. Sie behandelt außerdem verschiedene 
Ansätze zur Erfassung des Ausmaßes von illegalem Handel und untersucht das nationale 
und  internationale  strafrechtliche  Instrumentarium  für  den  illegalen  Handel  mit 
relevanten 
von 
Kulturgütern 
Strafverfolgungsbehörden  bei  der  Umsetzung  effektiver  Maßnahmen.  In  diesem 
Zusammenhang analysiert diese Studie die möglichen Vor- und Nachteile vorhandener und 
neuer Technologien, die von zuständigen Behörden zur Identifizierung illegal gehandelter 
Güter  eingesetzt  werden  bzw.  eingesetzt  werden  können,  um  den  Austausch  von 
Informationen und verschiedene Formen der behördenübergreifenden Zusammenarbeit zu 
verbessern. Im Hinblick auf die Analyse von Daten und Informationen, die durch Interviews 
mit Experten und Praktikern, Umfragen mit Interessenvertretern sowie Sekundärforschung 
gesammelt  wurden,  führt  diese  Studie  eine  Reihe  von  Empfehlungen  und  konkreten 
Maßnahmen an, die sowohl die EU als auch ihre Mitgliedstaaten ergreifen sollten, um ihre 
Bemühungen zur Bekämpfung des illegalen Handels mit Kulturgütern zu intensivieren und 
effektiver zu gestalten. 

Problemen 

die 

für 

13 

 
 
 
 
Executive summary  

Context for this study 

The illicit trade in cultural goods affects cultural heritage worldwide and its proceeds fund 
organised crime, corruption and armed violence. International actors, including the United 
Nations and its specialised agency UNESCO, the World Customs Organisation, the Council 
of  Europe  and  the  European  Union  (EU)  have  condemned  the  damaging  practices 
associated with the illicit trade and have adopted a plethora of legal instruments, political 
declarations and resolutions aimed at strengthening the protection of cultural property and 
cultural  heritage.  However,  the  lack  of  reliable  data  on  the  cross-border  nature  of 
trafficking in cultural objects reduces the effectiveness of measures intended to curb the 
illicit trade in cultural goods. This study was commissioned to respond to the need for a 
stronger evidence base and better insights into the phenomenon. 

This  study  builds  on  and  complements  previous  research,  in  particular  the  study  on 
Preventing  and  Fighting  Illicit  Trafficking  in  Cultural  Goods  published  by  the  European 
Commission  Directorate-General  Home  Affairs  in  20111.  Whereas  the  previous  study 
focused  on  examining  legal,  administrative,  and  technical  responses  to  the  trade,  the 
current study aims to provide a better understanding of the characteristics, organisation 
and operation of the illicit trade in cultural goods, describe challenges to criminal justice 
responses  and  offer  an  overview  of  existing  and  new  technologies  that  can  be  used  to 
combat this crime. 

Based  on  the  objectives  of  the  study,  three  research  questions  have  guided  the 
research and analysis:  
1.  How can illicit trade in cultural goods in the EU be described in terms of object types; 
volumes;  trafficking  routes  into,  out  of,  and  through  the  EU;  and  operational  modes 
(means of transport, actors and agencies, methods of transaction)? 

2.  What are the criminal justice responses to trafficking in cultural goods and what are the 

challenges faced by the relevant authorities in implementing effective responses? 

3.  What  new  technologies  can  be  used  for  identifying  illicitly  traded  objects  and  for 
improving  information  sharing  and  other  forms  of  inter-agency  cooperation  and 
collaboration?  

In  this  Executive  Summary,  we  limit  ourselves  to  presenting  the  main  findings  and 
recommendations. Our  overall findings regarding the illicit trade in cultural goods and a 
concrete list of action points for the EU and Member States are set out in Chapter 6 of this 
report. 

Main activities conducted 

To meet the study’s objectives, the following activities have been conducted: 

  Desk-based research and review of the relevant literature; 

1 CECOJI-CNRS (2011) Study on preventing and fighting illicit trafficking in cultural goods in the European Union. 
Available 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/ca56cfac-ad6b-45ab-b940-
at: 
e1a7fa4458db . 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
  Scoping interviews and in-depth interviews with a wide range of stakeholders (36 

interviews in total, see Annex 2); 

  Surveys among various stakeholders and experts (see Annex 3); 
  Snapshot analyses of online marketplaces; 
  Case studies to illustrate various aspects of illicit trade in cultural goods. 

This  study  has  encountered  severe  challenges  in  the  data  collection  necessary  to 
analyse  the  dimensions  of  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods.  These  challenges  follow  from 
several  structural  issues:  data  about  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  is  not  collected 
systematically in all (EU) countries; the information that is available is not readily shared 
between concerned stakeholders; police investigations are classified and the information 
about them that is (made) available can be of low quality and difficult to interpret. Research 
on this topic suffers severely from this inadequate availability of (good quality) data, which 
is perpetuated in a vicious circle simultaneously caused by and resulting from low political 
prioritisation of the issue: without a good understanding of the size of the problem, it is 
difficult  to  muster  adequate  resources  to  fight  it.  At  the  same  time,  without  adequate 
dedicated resources the nature and scale of the problem cannot be properly understood. 
The  structural  issues  encountered  by  this  study—and  what  this  says  about  the  state  of 
knowledge about this phenomenon—merit inclusion as a fundamental conclusion in their 
own right. 

Main findings on the illicit trade in cultural goods 

Characteristics of the illicit trade 

Measuring or estimating the size of the illicit trade in cultural goods proves to be a 
challenging task as no reliable statistics exist that can be used to provide a comprehensive 
picture. The little data that is being recorded is patchy as recording approaches differ from 
country to country and between the police and customs (i.e. they use of different reporting 
codes). The factors that impact the quality of and the lack of data are manifold and include: 
different definitions of cultural goods; low political priority of the issue; lack of awareness, 
knowledge and expertise among the law enforcement; lack of central data collection point; 
lack  of  transparency  of  the  art  market;  the  large  amount  of  fakes  in  the  market;  and 
warehousing of cultural objects (see Section 3.2). 

In  the  view  of  these  problems,  this  study  has  produced  an  estimate  of  the  volume  and 
value  of  the  trade  in  cultural  goods  based  on  snapshot  analyses  of  the  online  sales  in 
antiquities and ancient and medieval coins. It was impossible to distinguish licit from illicit 
transactions  in  this  exercise  as  there  was  no  access  to  the  sold  objects  and  no  way  of 
establishing  their  authenticity  or  trading  histories.  Based  on  the  snapshot  analysis, 
European vendors sell in the region of 140.000 to 700.000 antiquities from Europe, North 
Africa and West Asia annually, with a total monetary value of €64 million to €318 million. 
European vendors also sell a minimum of 298.379 ancient and medieval coins annually, 
valued at more than €56 million. 

A significant part of the illicit trade in cultural goods has shifted online, which has 
profound  implications  for  supply  and  demand  as  well  as  operation  modes.  Online 

15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
marketplaces,  including  popular  social  networks,  provide  easier  access  to  a  larger  pool 
cultural goods for a much larger audience of potential buyers than do traditional dealership 
storefronts. The need for personal contact between buyers and sellers, trust building and 
expert appraisal of items has been reduced. This has made the trade more profitable for 
sellers because they bear less risk and can offer large amounts of lower-value items that 
were previously not in demand. The anonymity of online transactions is also beneficial for 
illicit transactions and it has facilitated the infiltration of fake items in the market. There is 
limited motivation for illicit cultural goods to  move to the dark web  when it is relatively 
easy to sell them privately or on the visible web with impunity. 

This study concludes that the shift to online trade has led to an increase in the amount of 
items sold, and lower-value small items (e.g. coins) are especially at risk. Smaller items 
can be smuggled or sent by post more easily than high-profile (and often more expensive) 
pieces like large statues.  

By  definition,  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  happens  clandestinely  and  the  trafficking 
routes involved are largely unknown to anyone except for the traffickers themselves. An 
up-to-date  map  of  such  routes  cannot  be  created  as  trafficking  routes  are  dynamic, 
responding  both  to  legal,  policy  and  law  enforcement  actions.  It  is  difficult  to  draw 
conclusions  on  specific  routes  because,  overall,  the  data  is  scarce,  seizure  samples  are 
small  and  observed  routes  vary  according  to  local/national  perspectives.  We  present 
several examples of trafficking routes in our case studies. Globally, traffickers of cultural 
goods may use the same routes as those being used for other types of illicit goods. Certain 
logistical hubs are likely to be used for trafficking in cultural goods more or less consistently 
if they are natural gateways into the  EU market (e.g. airports,  seaports,  free ports). As 
traffickers  of  cultural  goods  are  interested  in  obscuring  the  origin  of  their  goods  and  in 
creating  false  provenances,  often  these  items  are  sent  on  circuitous  routes  with  many 
destinations in between the country of origin (i.e. where it was looted) and destination (i.e. 
final buyer). 

Links with organised crime and terrorism financing 

While the art and antiquities market, for the most part, denies that illicit trade in cultural 
goods  is  a  wide-spread  phenomenon,  law  enforcement  stakeholders  overwhelmingly 
recognise the problem and indicate that organised crime is involved at all stages: directing 
looting, moving objects from dig sites to local markets, international transport, and, to a 
degree, interfacing with the licit market. Trafficking in cultural goods is a “low risk—high 
profit” crime because many items are easy to conceal, punishments are relatively low, the 
burden of proof for law enforcement is high and there are a number of legal loopholes (e.g. 
differences in national legislation, statutes of limitations, free ports) that can be exploited. 
Also, it is often a white-collar crime involving respectable and powerful members of society, 
which makes prosecution difficult. 

The desk research conducted showed that there is clear evidence of intentional and regular 
destruction of archaeological sites and cultural property by various terrorist groups. The 
scale of looting, trafficking, and the amount of money generated from these activities as 
well as exact nature of involvement of terrorist groups in the illicit trade in cultural goods 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
remain unclear. The interviews conducted for this study did not produce any new evidence 
to  substantiate  the  connection  between  terrorist  groups  and  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural 
goods. At the time of the study, only one relevant case connecting the trade to terrorist 
financing  has  been  brought  to  a  European  court,  in  this  case  by  Spanish  police. 
Interviewees reported only a small number of cases or no cases involving cultural goods 
from conflict zones, which may mean that the “hot” items are being warehoused, are not 
being recognised as coming from conflict zones, are not being effectively detected, or do 
not make up a significant portion of the market. Connecting the trafficking in cultural goods 
to terrorism financing may have been beneficial in that it has raised  public and political 
awareness  of  the  issue.  However,  looting  and  trafficking is  an  organised  crime  first  and 
foremost. The over-emphasis of connections to terrorism in current anti-trafficking policy 
could potentially result in criminal justice and other  responses that fail to address  other 
significant aspects of the greater illicit trade in cultural goods. 

Main findings on criminal justice responses 

Good practices 

This research has identified a number of practices, methods and tools that are deemed to 
be successful in the fight against illicit trade in cultural goods. 

  One  of  the  key  examples  of  best  practice  is  the  creation of  a specialised unit 
within law enforcement (both within the police and customs). Such units allow 
for  a  single  contact  point  to  be  established  which,  in  turn,  helps  to  speed  up 
communication processes at both the national and international level. In addition, 
a  specialised  unit  can  help  with  the  accumulation  of  knowledge,  expertise  and 
intelligence by developing a network of experts, colleagues and informants. While 
support of the law enforcement by trained archaeologists and art experts is crucial 
for  detection  and  investigation  of  illicitly  traded  goods,  it  is  also  necessary  that 
officers acquire special training (e.g. through expert workshops). 

  The  establishment  of  regular  meetings  between  law  enforcement  bodies 
(police,  customs,  public  prosecutors)  and  Ministries  of  Culture  or  other 
relevant  bodies  also  enhances  the  effectiveness  of  criminal  justice  responses. 
Regular  meetings  raise  mutual  awareness  of  the  relevant  work  conducted  by 
different law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders and increase effective 
inter-agency  cooperation.  Regular  meetings  can  also  aid  in  the  accumulation  of 
knowledge  and  improve  the  collective  expertise  of  the  participating  agencies. 
Various  forms  of  interaction  (workshops,  seminars,  discussions,  meetings)  with 
academics, researchers and museums are also of great value for law enforcement, 
in particular with regards to the exchange of specific expertise, acquiring valuable 
skills and sharing information.  

  Given the large number of stakeholders involved in combatting the illicit trade in 
cultural goods, establishing or appointing one institution to actively drive and 
facilitate  all  efforts  at  the  national level  would increase  effectiveness.  Such  an 
institution does not necessarily have to be part of a law enforcement authority but 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
should have an overall mandate and be committed to organise, focus, coordinate 
and support all efforts by other actors. At the EU level, a single coordination and 
facilitation point for various national efforts is particularly desirable due to the cross-
border nature of both the illicit trafficking of and the market for cultural good. This 
role could be played by a permanent specialised unit within Europol supported by 
the CULTNET network.  

  On  an  international  level,  informal  or  personal  cross-border  contacts  are  of 
great value to law enforcement efforts as they help speed up official procedures or 
fill the gap where no official channels exist. International fora (such as INTERPOL 
and Europol) are perceived as effective cooperation and coordination mechanisms. 
Law enforcement officers use them to establish new contacts, exchange information 
and  to  conduct  joint  operations.  The  interviewees  indicated  that  they  would 
welcome the creation of a permanent international forum specialised in illicit 
trade in cultural goods, as it would provide a qualitative step-change to cross-
border police efforts. 

  Finally,  an  important  factor  that  was  identified  in  a  number  of  countries  is  the 
energy and input that a strong and dedicated leader can bring. The domain of 
illicit trade in cultural goods is complex and, therefore, when a determined individual 
becomes interested in the topic, they serve as the driving force within a department, 
agency  or  country;  this  is  beneficial  for  the  fight  against  the  illicit  trade.  A 
passionate  leader  who  applies  the  laws  carefully  can  spark  interest  and  raise 
awareness elsewhere. 

Shortcomings 

Although numerous best practices were identified, this study also concludes that there are 
a substantial number of shortcomings and room for improvement in the current criminal 
justice responses. 

  First and foremost, current practices for collecting and sharing relevant data 
are  incomplete  and  insufficient.  On  the  one  hand,  data  is  not  collected 
systematically  and,  when  collected,  the  data  is  not  comparable  across  national 
agencies and Member States. On the other hand, there is sometimes simply no data 
to  be  shared  as  it  is  not  recorded.  Understanding  and  agreement  are  lacking  on 
which data can be shared and how shared data should or can be used.  

  Another  weak  aspect  of  the  current  approach  toward  the  fight  against  the  illicit 
trade  in  cultural  goods  is  the  obscurity  of  transactions  in  and  the  lack  of 
regulation of the art and antiquities market. The art market largely denies the 
existence of the illicit trade in cultural goods, while insufficient due diligence, lack 
of  registration  of  transactions  and  a  culture  of  confidentiality  create  favourable 
conditions for illicit practices. At the same time, these factors account for the lack 
of understanding and insight in the art and antiquities market on the part of those 
who seek to monitor the trade and insufficient cooperation with the law enforcement 
on the part of industry stakeholders. 

18 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Differences  in  national  laws  also  impact  the  effectiveness  of  cross-border 
criminal  justice  responses.  These  result  from  different  legal  traditions  and 
approaches  across  (European)  countries,  inconsistent  implementation of  EU-level 
directives, and different transposition or the lack of ratification or transposition of 
the major international legal instruments: in particular the UNESCO, UNIDROIT, the 
2017 Council of Europe conventions on Offences relating to Cultural Property and 
the relevant UNSC resolutions. This hampers mutual legal assistance, complicates 
cross-border  cooperation  and  leaves  loopholes  and  gaps  that  can  be  used  by 
criminals to their advantage. 

  Finally,  the  application  of  existing  or  novel  technological  tools  should  not  be 
perceived  of  a  panacea  in  the  fight  of  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods. 
Existing and some new technologies can help with identification of cultural goods 
that are known to be stolen, but most do not help in tagging and tracking of looted 
items and undocumented items. Some  of the  technologies could help with better 
detection of suspicious cultural goods, particularly those for sale online. However, 
to  use  these  technologies  effectively,  law  enforcement  officers  need  to  be  both 
trained in technology and in archaeology/art. The study concludes that, due to the 
amount of items traded as well as the speed and nature of trade, special expertise 
and skills are necessary to effectively use most available technology tools — most 
likely  on  a  much  larger  scale  than  the  current  capacities  of  the  interviewed  law 
enforcement agencies allow. 

While the art market players deny the existence of the problem, the relevant authorities 
do indicate that illicit trade in cultural goods is sometimes linked to  organised crime.  In 
some  instances  for  example  the  police  and  prosecutors  come  across  this  illegal  activity 
while investigating other forms of crime. In general, it appears that the conditions in which 
the  art  market  currently  operates  may  facilitate  criminal  behaviour  in  the  case  of 
unscrupulous traders. 

Recommendations 

Based  on the analysis of best practices and shortcomings of the current criminal justice 
responses to the illicit trade in cultural good, we have developed a number of  high-level 
recommendations that could enhance the effectiveness of the efforts. For concrete steps 
that can be taken by the EU and Member States see Section 6.2. 

  Raising  the  profile  of  the  problem  politically  is  central  to  enhancing  efforts 
towards combatting the illicit trade in cultural goods. The problem could be elevated 
at an EU-level issue by establishing a specialised unit to coordinate national efforts 
(at Europol or as a separate agency). This/such unit could have an impact on the 
political profile at the national level by drawing attention to frontrunner countries 
and calling out those whose protection measures and criminal justice responses fall 
behind (e.g. with regard to ratification and implementation - if necessary - of the 
relevant conventions and UNSC resolutions).  

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Raising  of  the  political  profile  of  this  issue  goes  hand  in  hand  with  awareness 
raising. Awareness raising campaigns should be conducted at the national and EU 
levels and should target individual groups of stakeholders with purposeful, selective 
messages, taking into account the specific needs of each group and their preferred 
communication channels. It is essential to open a dialogue with the target audience 
about what its interest in combatting illicit trade in cultural goods is and how they 
can contribute. EU-and national-level campaigns should reinforce each other. It is 
crucial that the communicated information is correct and free from exaggerations 
and scandalous or premature conclusions.  Journalists, social media influencers in 
the heritage field, and bloggers — being important intermediaries and influencers 
of public opinion — should be specially targeted. 

  One of the findings of this study is how many gaps in our understanding and 
moot points related to the illicit trade in cultural goods still exist. There is a 
strong need for further research aimed at improving the evidence base that, in turn, 
helps  refine  research  methods  and  analysis  and  provides  better  insights  into 
understanding  the  illicit  traffic  in  cultural  goods,  as  well  as  into  the  art  and 
antiquities market. Targeted investments into the creation of the right conditions 
for  such  research  (namely  systematic  and  consistent  data  collection  by  national 
authorities)  should  be made  at  the  national  and  EU  level.  Researchers  should  be 
encouraged  to  pick  up  the  relevant  topics  (e.g.  by  announcing  research  grants 
through  the  Horizon  Europe  programme  and  supporting  the  creation  of  on-going 
research  centres  and  chairs).  “Cultural  goods”  is  a  broad  category,  and  targeted 
research into the trade of distinct categories such as ancient coins, religious objects, 
historical manuscripts etc should enable more nuanced and effective responses. The 
criminal  and  financial  aspects  of  the  trade  are  also  in  urgent  need  of  further 
research.  

  Transparency  in  the  art  and  antiquities  market  should  be  increased, 
including  by  introducing  scrutiny  and  transparency  obligations  where  necessary. 
These should apply to offline and online sales. The EU and Member States should 
explore how to ensure the traceability of the traded cultural objects (e.g. through 
creation  of  national  inventories,  introducing  registering  obligations  and  due 
diligence)  and  what  role  online  marketplaces  could  play  in  it.  Ensuring  market 
transparency and best practices regarding due diligence should be used to improve 
the  relationship  between  the  authorities  and  art  dealers  and  collectors,  while 
allowing the market to improve its reputation.  

  Consideration needs to be given to how regulation and monitoring of online 
sales can be improved. As an increasingly large portion of illicit trade in cultural 
goods has moved online, the need for regulating and monitoring online sales has 
increased accordingly. In line with the previous recommendation, the goal should 
be to increase transparency and reduce the scope for illicit sales of cultural goods. 

  Data  and  information  exchange  should  be  fostered  and  enabled  through 
different  channels,  among  different  stakeholders  and  at  different  levels. 
Cooperation and data sharing across law enforcement agencies at the national level 
should be a national priority. In addition, countries should consider and implement 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
 
different  access  regimes  for  different  database  users.  At  the  EU  level, 
interoperability of national databases should be ensured, as should their linking with 
the INTERPOL database. 

  To  further  improve  the  relevant  data  pool,  integration  and  interlinking  of 
national  inventories  of  cultural  heritage,  museum  databases  and  law 
enforcement databases should be aspired to. The police and customs databases 
should be able to grab, extract and export all necessary information from national 
inventories  when  an  object  has  been  seized  or  found.  Different  technological 
solutions could be employed, for example, artificial intelligence or the creation of 
one access portal for all inventories.  

  With regards to the application of (novel) technologies, it is essential to strive to 
achieve  an  equal  level  of  technical  endowment  across  Europe.  When 
elevating the level of technological advancement in Member States, investment in 
the technical expertise of police officers in specialised units is required, for example, 
for using web crawlers and image recognition software to collect and analyse data. 
The EU could support such training of national police officers (e.g. through CULTNET 
or  Europol).  It  is  recommended  that  artificial  intelligence  (particularly  machine 
learning)  applications  and  mobile  applications  are  developed,  perhaps  in 
partnership with academia or industry. Relevant projects can be funded by pooling 
resources  of  several  Member  States,  public  procurement  at  the  EU  level  and/or 
project calls under Horizon Europe. 

 

 

It  is  essential  to  acknowledge  the  strengths  of  different  approaches  to 
combatting  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  across  Member  States  and  allow  for 
flexibility in  their  application.  It  should  be  recognised  that not  every  country  has 
the  same  needs  and  resources.  Better-positioned  countries  with  a  wealth  of 
experience on these topics should have room to experiment; they can take on the 
role of pioneers and serve as an example to the others. The EU should support such 
national efforts, encourage joint initiatives and enable sharing and mutual learning 
(for example, within the CULTNET framework). 

In the case of the illicit trade in cultural goods, efforts have already been made to 
mitigate some of the causes of illegal excavations (i.e. through capacity building, 
technical assistance, etc) in conflict zones or to harmonise relevant national laws, 
provide  the  basis  for  mutual  legal  assistance  and  to  eliminate  legal  loopholes. 
However, there is still room for improvement. Member States could provide special 
training for military, police and diplomatic staff deployed to third countries. 
Countries should also ratify and effectively transpose in the national law UNESCO 
Convention,  UNIDROIT  Convention  and  Council  of  Europe  Convention.  The 
requirements provided in the relevant UNSC resolutions should be complied with.  

  The EU can also include cultural heritage protection in larger development 
projects funded by development aid, and encourage Member States to do the 
same, particularly in cases where sustainable local income streams beyond looting 
and illicit trafficking are supported. 

21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Résumé analytique  

Contexte pour cette étude 

Le commerce illicite de biens culturels a une incidence sur le patrimoine culturel dans le 
monde  entier,  et  ses  recettes  financent  le  crime  organisé,  la  corruption  et  la  violence 
armée.  Les  acteurs  internationaux,  y  compris  les  Nations  Unies  et  son  institution 
spécialisée  l'UNESCO,  l'Organisation  mondiale  des  douanes,  le  Conseil  de  l'Europe  et 
l'Union européenne (UE) ont condamné les pratiques dommageables liées au commerce 
illicite et ont adopté une pléthore d'instruments juridiques, de déclarations et de résolutions 
politiques visant à renforcer la protection des biens et du patrimoine culturels. Toutefois, 
le  manque  de  données  fiables  sur  la  nature  transfrontalière  du  trafic  d'objets  culturels 
réduit l'efficacité des mesures destinées à freiner le commerce illicite de biens culturels. 
Cette  étude  a  été  réalisée  pour  répondre  à  la  nécessité  de  disposer  d'éléments  plus 
probants et pour mieux comprendre le phénomène. 

Par  ailleurs,  elle  s'appuie  sur  des  recherches  antérieures  et  les  complète,  notamment 
l'étude sur la Prévention et la lutte contre le trafic illicite de biens culturels publiée en 2011 
par la Direction générale des affaires intérieures de la Commission européenne. Alors que 
l'étude  précédente  portait  sur  l'examen  des  mesures  juridiques,  administratives  et 
techniques  en  matière  de  commerce,  la  présente  étude  vise  à  mieux  comprendre  les 
caractéristiques, l'organisation et le fonctionnement du commerce illicite de biens culturels, 
à décrire les difficultés quant aux mesures prises par la justice pénale et à offrir un aperçu 
des technologies existantes et nouvelles pouvant être utilisées pour lutter contre ce crime. 

En  fonction  des  objectifs  de  l'étude,  trois  questions  de  recherche  ont  guidé  les 
recherches et l'analyse:  
1. Comment le commerce illicite de biens culturels dans l'Union européenne peut-il être 
décrit en termes de types d'objet, de volumes et d’itinéraires en provenance et au sein 
de l'UE ainsi que de modes opératoires (moyens de transport, acteurs et organismes, 
méthodes de transaction) ? 

2. Quelles sont les mesures prises par la justice pénale pour lutter contre le trafic de biens 
culturels et quelles sont les difficultés rencontrées par les autorités compétentes dans 
la mise en œuvre de mesures efficaces ? 

3. Quelles nouvelles technologies peuvent être utilisées pour identifier des objets issus du 
commerce illicite et pour améliorer le partage des informations et d'autres formes de 
coopération et de collaboration interinstitutions ?  

Dans  ce  Résumé  analytique,  nous  nous  limitons  à  la  présentation  des  principales 
conclusions  et  recommandations.  Nos  conclusions  générales  en  matière  de  commerce 
illicite de biens culturels et une liste concrète des mesures destinées à l'UE et aux États 
membres sont énoncées au chapitre 6 du présent rapport. 

Principales activités menées 

Pour répondre aux objectifs de l'étude, les actions suivantes ont été menées : 

• Une recherche documentaire et un examen de la documentation pertinente ; 

22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•  Des  entrevues  encadrées  et  poussées  avec  un  large  éventail  d'intervenants  (36 

entretiens au total, voir l’annexe 2) ; 

•  Des  enquêtes  réalisées  auprès  de  parties  prenantes  et  d'experts  divers  (voir 

l’annexe 3) ; 

  Des analyses rapides des marchés en ligne ; 
•  Des  études  de  cas  pour  illustrer  divers  aspects  du  commerce  illicite  de  biens 

culturels. 

Cette étude a été confrontée à d’importantes difficultés en matière de collecte des 
données nécessaires à l’analyse des aspects du commerce illicite de biens culturels. Ces 
défis découlent de plusieurs problèmes structurels : les données sur le commerce illicite 
de biens culturels ne sont pas recueillies systématiquement dans tous les pays de l’(UE) ; 
les renseignements disponibles ne sont pas facilement partagés entre les parties prenantes 
concernées ; les enquêtes de police sont classées et les informations à leur sujet qui sont 
(rendues)  disponibles  peuvent  être  de  mauvaise  qualité  et  difficiles  à  interpréter.  La 
recherche  sur  ce  thème  pâtit  de  cette  absence  de  disponibilité  de  données  de  (bonne 
qualité),  qui  se  perpétue  dans  un  cercle  vicieux,  causée  par  la  même  occasion  par  et 
résultant d'une faible priorité mise par les politiques pour résoudre le problème. Sans une 
bonne compréhension de l'ampleur du problème, il est difficile de mobiliser les ressources 
adéquates pour y faire face. En même temps, sans les ressources dédiées, il est impossible 
de bien saisir la nature et l'envergure du problème. Les problèmes structurels rencontrés 
par  cette  étude,  et  ce  que  cela indique  sur  l'état  des  connaissances  sur  ce  phénomène, 
valent la peine d’être intégrés comme une conclusion fondamentale en soi. 

Principales conclusions sur le commerce illicite de biens culturels 

Caractéristiques du commerce illicite 

Mesurer ou estimer l'ampleur du commerce illicite de biens culturels s'avère être une 
tâche difficile du fait qu’aucune statistique fiable pouvant être utilisée n’existe pour offrir 
une vue d’ensemble. Le peu de données qui a  été rapporté  est inégal, les méthodes de 
notification variant d'un pays à l’autre et entre la police et les douanes (en d’autres termes, 
ils utilisent des codes de déclaration différents). Les facteurs qui jouent sur la qualité et 
l'absence de données sont multiples et comprennent : des définitions différentes des biens 
culturels, une faible priorité du problème par les politiques, le manque de sensibilisation, 
de connaissances et d'expertise des services répressifs, l'absence de serveur de données 
centralisé,  le  manque  de  transparence  du  marché  de  l'art,  la  quantité  importante  de 
contrefaçons sur le marché et l'entreposage des objets culturels (voir l’article 3.2). 

Considérant ces problèmes, cette étude a produit une estimation du volume et de la valeur 
du commerce de biens culturels fondée sur des analyses rapides des ventes en ligne de 
pièces  de  monnaie  médiévales  et  anciennes.  Il  était  impossible  de  distinguer  les 
transactions illicites des transactions licites dans cet exercice puisqu'il n'y avait pas d'accès 
aux  objets  vendus  et  aucun  moyen  d'établir  leur  authenticité  ou  de  connaître  leur 
historique commercial. D’après l'analyse rapide, les marchands européens vendent chaque 
année dans la région entre 140 000 et 700 000 antiquités provenant d'Europe, d'Afrique 
du Nord et d’Asie de l'Ouest, s’élevant à un montant total oscillant entre 64 et 318 millions 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d'euros.  Ils  vendent  également  au  moins  298  379  pièces  de  monnaie  anciennes  et 
médiévales, dont la valeur s’élève à plus de 56 millions d'euros. 

Une  partie  importante  du  commerce  illicite  de  biens  culturels  se  faisant 
désormais en ligne, les répercussions sur l'offre et la demande ainsi que sur les modes 
opératoires sont donc considérables. Les marchés en ligne, y compris les réseaux sociaux 
populaires, facilitent l'accès à un ensemble plus important de biens culturels pour un public 
d'acheteurs potentiels beaucoup plus large que les vitrines classiques des marchands. La 
nécessité  d'un  interlocuteur  privilégié  entre  les  acheteurs  et  les  vendeurs,  l’instauration 
d’une confiance et l’estimation des biens par un expert ont été réduites. Le commerce est 
devenu plus lucratif pour les vendeurs du fait qu’ils supportent moins de risques et qu’ils 
peuvent offrir un volume important de produits de faible valeur qui n'étaient auparavant 
pas demandés. Également bénéfique aux transactions illicites, l'anonymat des transactions 
en  ligne  a  facilité  l'infiltration  des  contrefaçons  sur  le  marché.  La  motivation  est  limitée 
pour  ce  qui  est  de  passer  par  l’Internet  sombre  pour  le  trafic  illicite  de  biens  culturels 
lorsqu'il  est  relativement  facile  de  les  vendre  en  privé  ou  sur  la  Toile  visible  en  toute 
impunité. 

Cette étude conclut que le passage au commerce en ligne a entraîné une augmentation de 
la quantité d'objets vendus. Par ailleurs, de petits articles de faible valeur (p. ex. les pièces) 
présentent notamment des risques. Les petits objets peuvent être passés en contrebande 
ou  envoyés  par  la  poste  plus  facilement  que  les  articles  imposants  (et  souvent  plus 
coûteux) comme de grandes statues.  

Par définition, le commerce illicite de biens culturels se fait de manière clandestine et les 
voies  du  trafic  empruntées  sont  généralement  méconnues  de  tous,  sauf  par  les 
trafiquants  eux-mêmes.  Il  est  impossible  d’établir  une  carte  mise  à  jour  indiquant  ces 
itinéraires,  les  voies  du  trafic  changeant,  pour  pouvoir  prendre  des  mesures  à  la  fois 
juridiques, politiques et répressives. Tirer des conclusions sur des itinéraires en particulier 
s’avère  difficile,  car,  globalement,  les  données  sont  rares,  la  saisie  des  échantillons  est 
petite  et  les  circuits  observés  varient  en  fonction  du  contexte  local/national.  Nous 
présentons plusieurs exemples d’itinéraires de  trafic dans nos  études  de cas. À l’échelle 
planétaire, les trafiquants de biens culturels sont susceptibles d’emprunter les mêmes voies 
que  celles  utilisées  par  d'autres  types  de  marchandises  illicites.  Certaines  plateformes 
logistiques seraient plus ou moins régulièrement utilisées pour le trafic de biens culturels 
si elles sont des portes d'entrée physiques pour pénétrer le marché de l'UE (par exemple, 
les  aéroports,  les  ports  maritimes,  les  ports  francs).  Les  trafiquants  de  biens  culturels 
cherchant à masquer l'origine de leurs marchandises et à créer de fausses provenances, 
ces  articles  sont  souvent  envoyés  sur  des  chemins  détournés  avec  de  nombreuses 
destinations entre le pays d'origine (en d’autres termes, où ils ont été pillés) et le pays de 
destination (à savoir, l'acheteur final). 

Liens avec le crime organisé et le financement du terrorisme 

Bien que le marché de l'art et des antiquités, en grande partie, nie que le commerce illicite 
de biens culturels est un phénomène répandu, la très grande majorité des représentants 
des services  répressifs  reconnaissent le problème et signalent que le crime organisé est 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
présent à tous les niveaux : la mise en scène de pillage, le déplacement d’objets depuis 
des sites de fouilles aux marchés locaux, le transport international, et, dans une certaine 
mesure,  l'interface  avec  le  marché  licite.  Le  trafic  de  biens  culturels  est  un  crime  au  « 
risque  faible  et  au  bénéfice  élevé  »,  en  raison  du  nombre  important  d’objets  faciles  à 
cacher, des sanctions relativement faibles, de la charge de la preuve élevée en matière de 
répression et d’un certain nombre de lacunes juridiques (p. ex. les différences entre les 
législations nationales, les délais de prescription, les ports francs) susceptibles d’être mises 
à profit. De plus, il s'agit d'une criminalité en col blanc impliquant le respect et le pouvoir 
de membres de la société, rendant les poursuites difficiles. 

Le  bureau  menant  les  recherches  a  montré  que,  de  toute  évidence,  divers  groupes 
terroristes  détruisent  volontairement  et  en  permanence  des  sites  archéologiques  et  des 
biens  culturels.  L'ampleur  du  pillage,  le  trafic  et  les  sommes  d'argent  provenant  de  ces 
activités ainsi que la nature exacte de l'implication de groupes terroristes dans le commerce 
illicite  de  biens  culturels  demeurent  obscurs.  Les  entretiens  pour  cette  étude  n'a  pas 
apporté  de  nouvelles  preuves  pour  établir  le  lien  entre  les  groupes  terroristes  et  le 
commerce illicite de biens culturels. Au moment de l'étude, un seul cas pertinent reliant le 
commerce  au  financement  des  activités  terroristes  a  été  porté  devant  une  Cour 
européenne,  en  l'occurrence,  par  la  police  espagnole.  Les  personnes  interrogées  ont 
signalé que seuls un petit nombre de cas ou aucun cas impliquant des biens culturels de 
zones de conflit, ce qui pourrait signifier que les objets « de valeur » sont entreposés, n’ont 
pas été imputés à des zones de conflit, n’ont effectivement pas été décelés ou représentent 
une  part  mineure  du  marché.  Établir  un  lien  entre  le  trafic  de  biens  culturels  et  le 
financement du terrorisme peut être bénéfique dans le sens où cela sensibilise davantage 
les politiques et les citoyens au problème. Cependant, le pillage et le trafic sont d'abord et 
avant tout un crime organisé. L’accent trop important mis sur les liens avec le terrorisme 
dans les politiques actuelles de lutte contre ce trafic pourrait faire que la justice pénale et 
d'autres  mesures  ne  tiennent  pas  compte  des  autres  aspects  non  négligeables  de 
l’immense commerce illicite de biens culturels. 

Principales conclusions sur les mesures de la justice pénale 

Bonnes pratiques 

Cette  étude  a  identifié  un  certain  nombre  de  pratiques,  de  méthodes  et  d’outils  jugés 
probants dans la lutte contre le commerce illicite de biens culturels. 

•  L'un des principaux exemples de meilleures pratiques est la création d'une unité 
spécialisée au sein des forces de l'ordre (à la fois au sein de la police et de la 
douane). Ces unités permettent la mise en place d’un interlocuteur unique qui, à 
son  tour,  contribue  à  l’accélération  des  processus  de  communication  à  l'échelle 
nationale  et  internationale.  En  outre,  une  unité  spécialisée  peut  faciliter 
l'accumulation de connaissances, d'expertise et d’informations par la création d’un 
réseau de spécialistes, de collègues et d’informateurs. Bien que l'appui des services 
répressifs par des archéologues qualifiés et des experts en art soit essentiel afin de 
localiser et d’enquêter sur des biens commercialisés de manière illicite, les agents 

25 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
doivent  également  suivre  une  formation  spéciale  (p.  ex.  par  le  biais  d'ateliers 
d’experts). 

•  La mise en place de réunions régulières entre les services de répression (la 
police,  la  douane,  le  procureur  général)  et  les  ministères  de  la  Culture  ou 
d'autres  organes  pertinents  renforce  également  l'efficacité  des  mesures  de  la 
justice  pénale.  Des  réunions  régulières  permettent  de  sensibiliser  davantage  la 
compréhension  mutuelle  du  travail  effectué  dans  ce  domaine  par  les  différents 
services  de  répression  et  les  autres  parties  prenantes,  ainsi  que  d’intensifier  la 
coopération effective interinstitutions. Des réunions régulières peuvent également 
participer à l'accumulation des connaissances et à parfaire l'expertise collective des 
organismes  participants.  Les  diverses  formes  d'interaction  (ateliers,  séminaires, 
discussions,  réunions)  avec  les  universitaires,  les  chercheurs  et  les  musées  sont 
également extrêmement précieuses pour les services de répression, notamment en 
ce  qui  concerne  l'échange  d'un  certain  savoir-faire,  l'acquisition  de  compétences 
utiles et le partage d'informations.  

•  En raison du grand nombre d'acteurs impliqués dans la lutte contre le commerce 
illicite  de  biens  culturels,  créer  ou  nommer  une  institution  pour  mener  et 
faciliter  activement  les  actions  au  niveau  national  permettrait  d'accroître 
l'efficacité.  Une  telle  institution  ne  doit  pas  nécessairement  faire  partie  d'une 
autorité  chargée  de  l’application  des  lois,  mais  elle  doit  disposer  d’un  mandat 
général et s’engager à organiser, à se concentrer, à coordonner et à soutenir tous 
les efforts déployés par les autres acteurs. À l’échelle européenne, un seul point de 
coordination et de facilitation pour les diverses actions menées sur le plan national 
est  particulièrement  souhaitable  en  raison  de  la  nature  transfrontalière  du  trafic 
illicite et du marché de biens culturels. Une unité spécialisée et permanente au sein 
d'Europol bénéficiant de l’appui du réseau CULTNET pourrait remplir ce rôle.  

•  Sur le plan international, les contacts informels et transfrontaliers sont d’une 
importance cruciale pour une action répressive, car ils contribuent à accélérer les 
procédures  officielles  ou  à  combler  les  lacunes  là  où  aucune  voie  hiérarchique 
n’existe.  Les  instances  internationales  (telles  qu'INTERPOL  et  Europol)  sont 
considérées  comme  étant  des  mécanismes  de  coopération  et  de  coordination 
efficaces. Les agents de police font appel à ces instances pour établir de nouveaux 
contacts,  échanger  des  informations  et  mener  des  opérations  communes.  Les 
personnes interrogées ont indiqué qu'elles seraient favorables à la création d'un 
forum  international  permanent  spécialisé  dans  le  commerce  illicite  de 
biens  culturels,  dans  la  mesure  où  cela  assurerait  un  changement  progressif 
qualitatif quant aux actions menées par la police transfrontalière. 

•  Enfin,  un  élément  important  identifié  dans  un  certain  nombre  de  pays  est  le 
dynamisme et la contribution apportés par un  dirigeant engagé et  dévoué. Le 
domaine du commerce illicite de biens culturels est complexe et, par conséquent, 
lorsqu'un  individu  s'intéresse  à  la  question,  cela  sert  de  moteur  au  sein  d'un 
ministère, d’un organisme ou d’un pays, ce qui est bénéfique pour lutter contre le 

26 

 
 
 
 
 
 
commerce illicite. Un dirigeant fervent qui applique les lois peut susciter de l'intérêt 
et alerter l’opinion publique dans les autres pays. 

Lacunes 

En dépit de l’évocation de nombreuses meilleures pratiques, cette étude conclut également 
qu'il  existe  un  nombre  important  de  lacunes  et  des  possibilités  d’améliorer  les  mesures 
prises actuellement par la justice pénale. 

•  Tout d'abord et avant tout, les pratiques actuelles de collecte et de partage 
de  données  pertinentes  sont  incomplètes  et  insuffisantes.  D'une  part,  les 
informations ne sont pas recueillies de façon systématique et, lors de leur collecte, 
elles  ne  sont  pas  comparées  entre  les  agences  nationales  et  les  États  membres. 
D'autre part, parfois il n’existe tout simplement pas de données à partager comme 
elles ne sont pas rapportées. Il n’existe pas d’accords d’après lesquels les données 
peuvent  être  partagées  ou  sur  la  manière  dont  elles  doivent  et  peuvent  être 
utilisées.  

•  Un autre point faible de l'approche actuelle en matière de lutte contre le commerce 
illicite de biens culturels  est  l'obscurité  des transactions ainsi  que l'absence 
de réglementations du marché de l'art et des antiquités. Le marché de l'art 
nie en grande partie l'existence du commerce illicite de biens culturels, tandis que 
l'insuffisance de diligence raisonnable, l'absence d'enregistrement des transactions 
et une culture de la confidentialité créent des conditions favorables aux pratiques 
illicites. En même temps, ces facteurs représentent le manque de  compréhension 
et de connaissances du marché de l'art et des antiquités de ceux qui cherchent à 
contrôler le commerce, ainsi que le manque de coopération avec les forces de l'ordre 
de la part des intervenants de l'industrie. 

•  Les  différences  dans  les  législations  nationales  ont  aussi  des  répercussions 
sur l'efficacité des mesures transfrontalières de la justice pénale. Elles proviennent 
des traditions et des approches juridiques distinctes entre les pays (européens), de 
l’application contradictoire des directives au niveau de l'UE  et d’une transposition 
différente  ou  de  l'absence  de  ratification  ou  de  transposition  des  principaux 
instruments  juridiques  internationaux  :  notamment  la  Convention  de  1970 
concernant  les  mesures  à  prendre  pour  interdire  et  empêcher  l'importation, 
l’exportation et le transfert de propriété illicites des biens culturels, la Convention 
d'UNIDROIT de 1995 sur les biens culturels volés ou illicitement exportés, la 2017 
Convention du Conseil de l’Europe sur les infractions visant des biens culturels et 
les résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies. Cela constitue 
une  entrave  à 
la  coopération 
transfrontalière  et  laisse  des  lacunes  et  des  échappatoires  dont  des  criminels 
peuvent tirer profit. 

juridique  mutuelle,  complique 

l'assistance 

•  Enfin, l'utilisation d’outils technologiques nouveaux ou existants ne doit pas 
être considérée comme la panacée dans la lutte contre le commerce illicite 
de biens culturels. Certains d’entre eux peuvent contribuer à l’identification des 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
biens culturels qui sont connus pour être volés, mais la plupart ne permettent pas 
de  procéder  à  un  marquage  et  de  suivre  des  objets  pillés  et  dépourvus  de 
documents.  Certaines  de  ces  technologies  pourraient  permettre  de  détecter  plus 
facilement  des  biens  culturels  suspects,  notamment  ceux  en  vente  sur  Internet. 
Cependant, pour les utiliser de façon efficace, les agents de police doivent être à la 
fois formés en technologie et en archéologie/art. L'étude conclut qu’en raison de la 
quantité d'articles échangés ainsi que de la vitesse et de la nature du commerce 
international,  des  compétences  particulières  sont  requises  afin  d’utiliser 
efficacement la plupart des outils technologiques existants, probablement sur une 
échelle beaucoup plus vaste que les ressources actuelles des agents des services 
de répression interrogés le permettent. 

Recommandations 

D’après  l'analyse  des  meilleures  pratiques  et  l’insuffisance  des  mesures  actuelles  de  la 
justice pénale en matière de commerce illicite de biens culturels, nous avons mis au point 
un certain nombre de recommandations de haut niveau qui pourraient améliorer l'efficacité 
des  actions.  Pour  en  savoir  davantage  sur  les  mesures  concrètes  que  l'UE  et  les  États 
membres peuvent prendre, veuillez-vous reporter à l’article 6.2. 

•  Faire connaître le problème auprès de la classe politique est essentiel afin de 
renforcer les actions en vue de combattre le commerce illicite de biens culturels. Le 
problème  peut  être  porté  au  niveau  européen  par  la  mise  en  place  d'une  unité 
spécialisée  pour  coordonner  les  actions  nationales  (au  sein  d'Europol  ou  d'un 
organisme distinct). Cette unité pourrait avoir un impact sur l’enjeu politique sur le 
plan national en attirant l'attention des pays pionniers et en appelant ceux dont les 
mesures de protection et de la justice pénale prennent du retard (par exemple, en 
ce qui concerne la ratification et la mise en œuvre, le cas échéant, des conventions 
et des résolutions pertinentes du CSNU).  

•  Insister  sur  l’enjeu  politique  de  ce  problème  va  de  pair  avec  le  travail  de 
sensibilisation. Des campagnes de sensibilisation doivent être menées à l’échelle 
nationale  et  européenne,  et  viser  certains  groupes  d'intervenants  avec  leurs 
messages sélectifs et ciblés, en tenant compte des besoins spécifiques de chaque 
groupe et de leur moyen de communication préféré. Il est essentiel de mener un 
débat  ouvert  avec  le  public  cible  pour  connaître  son  intérêt  en  matière  de  lutte 
contre  le  commerce  illicite  de  biens  culturels  et  sa  manière  d’y  contribuer.  Les 
campagnes  nationales  et  européennes  doivent  être  complémentaires.  Il  est 
primordial que les informations communiquées soient correctes, sans exagérations 
et  dépourvues  de  conclusions  prématurées  ou  scandaleuses.  Les  journalistes,  les 
influenceurs  des  réseaux  sociaux  dans  le  domaine  du  patrimoine  ainsi  que  les 
blogueurs,  qui  sont  d'importants  intermédiaires  et  influenceurs  de  l'opinion 
publique, doivent être tout particulièrement ciblés. 

•  L'une  des  conclusions  de  cette  étude  est  de  savoir  comment  il  est  possible  qu’il 
existe toujours de nombreuses lacunes dans notre compréhension et des 
points  discutables  quant  au  commerce  illicite  de  biens  culturels.  Il  est 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
impératif de poursuivre les recherches visant à améliorer les données de base qui, 
à  leur  tour,  contribuent  à  peaufiner  les  méthodes  de  recherche  et  d'analyse,  et 
permettent  de  mieux  comprendre  le  trafic  illicite  de  biens  culturels  ainsi  que  le 
marché de l'art et des antiquités. Des investissements visant le développement de 
conditions  appropriées  à  de  telles  recherches  (à  savoir  la  collecte  de  données 
systématique et  cohérente par les autorités nationales) doivent être  effectués au 
niveau national et  européen. Les  chercheurs doivent être invités à considérer les 
sujets pertinents (p. ex. par l'annonce de subventions pour la recherche par le biais 
du programme Horizon Europe et par leur soutien à la création actuelle de centres 
et  de  chaires  de  recherche).  Les  «  Biens  culturels  »  représentent  une  catégorie 
vaste, et la recherche visant le commerce des différentes catégories, telles que les 
pièces  de  monnaie,  les  objets  religieux,  les  manuscrits  historiques,  etc.  doit 
permettre des mesures plus efficaces  et plus nuancées.  Les aspects financiers  et 
criminels  du  commerce  international  nécessitent  également  de  poursuivre  les 
recherches.  

•  Il  faut  davantage  de transparence sur le marché de  l'art  et  des antiquités, 
notamment par l'introduction d'obligations de  contrôle  et de transparence, le cas 
échéant. Ces obligations doivent s'appliquer aux ventes en ligne et hors ligne. L'UE 
et les États membres doivent étudier les moyens d’assurer la traçabilité des objets 
culturels commercialisés (p.  ex., grâce à la création de  répertoires nationaux, en 
intégrant  des  obligations  d’enregistrement  et  une  diligence  appropriée)  et  le  rôle 
que pourraient jouer les marchés en ligne à ce sujet. Garantir la transparence du 
marché et les meilleures pratiques en ce qui concerne la diligence raisonnable doit 
servir  à  améliorer  les  relations  entre  les  autorités  et  les  marchands  d'art  et  les 
collectionneurs, tout en permettant au marché d'améliorer sa réputation. 

  Il  importe  d’examiner  les  moyens  d’améliorer  la  réglementation  et  la 
surveillance des ventes en ligne. Alors qu’une part de plus en plus importante 
du commerce illicite de biens culturels se fait désormais en ligne, la nécessité de 
réguler et de surveiller les ventes en ligne s'est de même accrue. Conformément à 
la recommandation précédente, l'objectif devrait être d'accroître la transparence et 
de réduire les possibilités de vente illicite de biens culturels. 

•  L’échange  de  données  et  d'informations  doit  être  privilégié  et  autorisé  à 
travers les différents canaux, entre les différentes parties prenantes et à 
des niveaux distincts. La coopération et le partage de données entre les services 
répressifs nationaux doivent être une priorité nationale. En outre, les pays doivent 
envisager et mettre en œuvre des régimes d'accès différents pour les utilisateurs 
de bases de données distinctes. Au niveau européen, l'interopérabilité des bases de 
données  nationales  doit  être  assurée,  de  même  que  leurs  liens  avec  la  base  de 
données d'INTERPOL. 

•  Pour  améliorer  davantage  la  pertinence  des  bases  de  données,  l'intégration  et 
l'interconnexion  entre  les  répertoires  nationaux  du  patrimoine  culturel 
ainsi  que  les  bases  de  données  des  musées  et  de  la  police  doivent  y 
prétendre. Les bases de données de la police et des douanes doivent être en mesure 

29 

 
 
 
 
 
 
de saisir, d’extraire  et  d’exporter toutes les informations nécessaires  à partir des 
répertoires  nationaux  lorsqu'un  objet  a  été  saisi  ou  trouvé.  Différentes  solutions 
technologiques  peuvent  être  utilisées,  par  exemple,  l'intelligence  artificielle  ou  la 
création d'un portail pour accéder à l’ensemble des répertoires.  

•  En  ce  qui  concerne  l'utilisation  de  (nouvelles)  technologies,  il  est  primordial  de 
s'efforcer  à  obtenir  un  niveau  égal  de  fonds  en  matière  de  ressources 
techniques au sein de l'Europe. Si le niveau de progrès technologique s’accroît 
parmi les États membres, il est alors nécessaire d’investir dans l'expertise technique 
des  agents  de  police  des  unités  spécialisées,  par  exemple,  d'utiliser  des 
métamoteurs  de  recherche  et  des  logiciels  de  reconnaissance  d'images  pour 
recueillir et analyser des données. L'UE peut financer une telle formation destinée 
aux fonctionnaires de la police nationale (par exemple, par le biais de CULTNET ou 
d’Europol).  Le  développement  d’applications  d’intelligence  artificielle  (notamment 
l'apprentissage  automatique)  et  d’applications  mobiles,  peut-être  en  partenariat 
avec les universités ou l'industrie, est recommandé. Les projets importants peuvent 
être  financés  par  le  regroupement  des  ressources  provenant  de  plusieurs  États 
membres et des marchés publics à l’échelle européenne et/ou par le biais d’un appel 
à projets dans le cadre du programme Horizon Europe. 

•  Il est essentiel de reconnaître les points forts des différentes approches en 
matière  de  lutte  contre  le  commerce  illicite  de  biens  culturels  parmi  les  États 
membres  et  de  permettre  de  la  souplesse  au  niveau  de  leur  application.  Il  faut 
reconnaître que tous les pays ne disposent pas des mêmes besoins et ressources. 
Les  pays  les  mieux  placés  maîtrisant  ces  sujets  doivent  laisser  la  place  aux 
expériences ; ils peuvent jouer le rôle de pionniers et servir d'exemple aux autres. 
L'UE  doit  soutenir  ces  actions  nationales,  encourager  les  initiatives  conjointes  et 
permettre  le  partage  et  l'apprentissage  mutuel  (par  exemple,  dans  le  cadre  du 
réseau CULTNET). 

  Dans le cas du commerce illicite de biens culturels, des actions ont déjà été menées 
pour  atténuer  certaines  des  raisons  de  fouilles  illégales  (par  exemple,  en 
développant des compétences, par le biais de l'assistance technique, etc.) dans des 
zones  de  conflit  ou  afin  d'harmoniser  les  lois  nationales  pertinentes,  de  servir  de 
base à l'entraide judiciaire et de réduire à zéro les lacunes juridiques. Cependant, il 
existe encore une marge de progression. Les États membres peuvent prévoir une 
formation  spéciale  pour  l'armée,  la  police  et  le  personnel  diplomatique 
déployés dans les pays tiers. Les pays doivent également ratifier et transposer 
efficacement dans leur droit national les Conventions de l'UNESCO, d'UNIDROIT et 
du Conseil de l'Europe. Les exigences prévues dans les résolutions pertinentes du 
Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies doivent être respectées.  

•  L'UE  peut  également  inclure  la  protection  du  patrimoine  culturel  dans  les 
grands projets de développement financés par l'aide au développement, et 
inviter les États membres à faire de même, notamment en cas de prise en charge 
des revenus durables locaux, outre le pillage et le trafic illicite. 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kurzfassung  

Kontext dieser Studie 

Der illegale Handel mit Kulturgütern betrifft das kulturelle Erbe weltweit. Seine Einnahmen 
finanzieren die organisierte Kriminalität, Korruption und bewaffnete Gewalt. Internationale 
Akteure,  darunter  die  Vereinten  Nationen  und  ihre  Sonderorganisation  UNESCO,  die 
Weltzollorganisation,  der  Europarat  und  die  Europäische  Union  (EU),  verurteilen  die  mit 
dem  illegalen  Handel  verbundenen  schädlichen  Praktiken  und  haben  verschiedene 
Rechtsinstrumente eingeführt, politische Erklärungen abgegeben und Beschlüsse gefasst, 
die  darauf  abzielen,  den  Schutz  des  kulturellen  Eigentums  und  des  kulturellen  Erbes  zu 
verstärken. Das Fehlen zuverlässiger Daten über den grenzüberschreitenden Charakter des 
illegalen Handels mit Kulturgütern beeinträchtigt jedoch die Wirksamkeit von Maßnahmen 
zu  seiner  Eindämmung.  Diese  Studie  wurde  in  Auftrag  gegeben,  um  der  Notwendigkeit 
einer stärkeren Evidenzbasis und besserer Erkenntnisse über das Phänomen Rechnung zu 
tragen. 

Diese Studie baut auf früheren Forschungsarbeiten auf und ergänzt sie, insbesondere die 
von der  Generaldirektion  Innere Angelegenheiten der  Europäischen Kommission im Jahr 
2011  veröffentlichte  Studie  zur  Verhütung  und  Bekämpfung  des  illegalen  Handels  mit 
Kulturgütern.  Während  sich  die  vorangegangene  Studie  auf  die  Untersuchung  der 
rechtlichen,  administrativen  und  technischen  Reaktionen  auf  den  Handel  konzentrierte, 
zielt  die  vorliegende  Studie  darauf  ab,  ein  besseres  Verständnis  der  Merkmale,  der 
Organisation  und  der  Verfahren  des  illegalen  Handels  mit  Kulturgütern  zu  vermitteln, 
Herausforderungen  für  strafrechtliche  Maßnahmen  zu  beschreiben  und  einen  Überblick 
über bestehende und neue Technologien zu geben, die zur Bekämpfung dieses Verbrechens 
eingesetzt werden können. 

Mit Blick auf die Ziele der Studie lagen der Forschung und Analyse drei Forschungsfragen 
zugrunde:  
1. Wie  kann  der  illegale  Handel  mit  Kulturgütern  in  der  EU  anhand  von  Objekttypen, 
Volumen,  Handelsrouten  in  die,  aus  der  und  durch  die  EU  und  Verfahrensmodi 
(Verkehrsmittel, Akteure und Agenturen, Transaktionsmethoden) beschrieben werden? 
2. Welche strafrechtlichen Maßnahmen gibt es gegen den Schwarzhandel mit Kulturgütern 
und  vor  welchen  Herausforderungen  stehen  die  zuständigen  Behörden  bei  der 
Umsetzung wirksamer Maßnahmen? 

3. Welche neuen Technologien können zur Identifizierung illegal gehandelter Objekte sowie 
Informationsaustauschs  und  anderer  Formen  der 

zur  Verbesserung  des 
Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Behörden eingesetzt werden?  

In  dieser  Kurzfassung  beschränken  wir  uns  auf  die  Präsentation  der  wichtigsten 
Erkenntnisse  und  Empfehlungen.  Unsere  allgemeinen  Erkenntnisse  zum  illegalen  Handel 
mit  Kulturgütern  und  eine  konkrete  Liste  von  Aktionspunkten  für  die  EU  und  ihre 
Mitgliedstaaten werden in Kapitel 6 dieses Berichts aufgeführt. 

31 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Die wichtigsten ergriffenen Maßnahmen 

Um die Studienziele zu erreichen, wurden folgende Maßnahmen durchgeführt: 

•  Sekundärforschung und Prüfung der relevanten Literatur, 
•  umfangreiche  und  Tiefeninterviews  mit  einem  breiten  Spektrum  an 

Interessengruppen (insgesamt 36 Interviews, siehe Anhang 2), 

•  Umfragen bei verschiedenen Interessengruppen und Experten (siehe Anhang 3), 
•  Schnappschussanalysen von Online-Marktplätzen, 
• 

Fallstudien zur Veranschaulichung verschiedener Aspekte des illegalen Handels mit 
Kulturgütern. 

Diese  Studie  ist  bei  der  Datenerhebung,  die  zur  Analyse  des  Ausmaßes  des  illegalen 
Handels  mit  Kulturgütern  erforderlich  ist,  auf  große  Herausforderungen  gestoßen. 
Diese Herausforderungen ergeben sich aus vielen strukturellen Problemen: Daten über den 
illegalen  Handel  mit  Kulturgütern  werden  nicht  in  allen  (EU-)Ländern  systematisch 
erhoben,  die  verfügbaren  Informationen  werden  nicht  automatisch  zwischen  den 
betroffenen  Interessengruppen  ausgetauscht,  polizeiliche  Ermittlungen  sind  geheim  und 
die  verfügbaren  bzw.  verfügbar  gemachten  Informationen  darüber  können  von  geringer 
Qualität und schwer zu interpretieren sein. Die Forschung zu diesem Thema leidet stark 
unter  dieser  unzureichenden  Verfügbarkeit  von  (qualitativ  hochwertigen)  Daten,  die  in 
einem Teufelskreis festhängen, der gleichzeitig durch und infolge einer geringen politischen 
Priorisierung des Themas verursacht wird: Ohne ein gutes Verständnis des Umfangs des 
Problems ist es schwierig, ausreichende Ressourcen für seine Bekämpfung aufzubringen. 
Gleichzeitig können die Art und das Ausmaß des Problems ohne ausreichende Ressourcen 
nicht  richtig  verstanden  werden.  Die  strukturellen  Probleme,  mit  denen  diese  Studie 
konfrontiert ist – und was das über den Wissensstand zu diesem Phänomen sagt  –, sind 
eine grundlegende Schlussfolgerung für sich. 

Die wichtigsten Erkenntnisse über den illegalen Handel mit Kulturgütern 

Merkmale des illegalen Handels 

Die  Messung  oder  Schätzung  des  Ausmaßes  des 
illegalen  Handels  mit 
Kulturgütern  stellt  eine  anspruchsvolle  Aufgabe  dar,  da  es  keine  zuverlässigen 
Statistiken  gibt,  die  ein  umfassendes  Bild  vermitteln  können.  Die  wenigen  Daten,  die 
erfasst  werden,  sind  lückenhaft,  da  die  Erfassungsansätze  je  nach  Land  sowie  zwischen 
Polizei  und  Zoll  unterschiedlich  sind  (d. h.  sie  verwenden  unterschiedliche  Meldecodes). 
Die Faktoren, die sich auf die Qualität und den Mangel an Daten auswirken, sind vielfältig 
und umfassen unter anderem: unterschiedliche Definitionen des Begriffs Kulturgut, geringe 
politische Priorität des Themas, mangelndes Bewusstsein, Wissen und Fachwissen bei der 
Strafverfolgung,  fehlende  zentrale  Datenerfassungsstelle,  mangelnde  Transparenz  des 
Kunstmarktes, eine große Anzahl an Fälschungen auf dem Markt sowie die Lagerung von 
Kulturgütern (siehe Abschnitt 3.2). 

Angesichts dieser Probleme hat diese Studie eine Schätzung des Volumens und des Wertes 
des Handels mit Kulturgütern auf der Grundlage von Schnappschussanalysen des Online-
Verkaufs  von  Antiquitäten  sowie  antiken  und  mittelalterlichen  Münzen  erhoben.  Es  war 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
unmöglich,  bei  dieser  Aufgabe  zwischen  legalen  und  illegalen  Transaktionen  zu 
unterscheiden,  da  es  keinen  Zugang  zu  den  verkauften  Objekten  und  keine  Möglichkeit 
gab,  deren  Echtheit  oder  Handelsgeschichte  zu  ermitteln.  Basierend  auf  der 
Schnappschussanalyse  verkaufen  europäische  Anbieter  jährlich  zwischen  140.000  bis 
700.000 Antiquitäten aus Europa, Nordafrika und Westasien mit einem Gesamtwert von 
64  bis  318  Millionen  Euro.  Europäische  Anbieter  verkaufen  zudem  jährlich  mindestens 
298.379 antike und mittelalterliche Münzen im Wert von mehr als 56 Millionen Euro. 

Ein  erheblicher  Teil  des  illegalen  Handels  mit  Kulturgütern  hat  sich  online 
verschoben,  was  tiefgreifende  Auswirkungen  auf  Angebot  und  Nachfrage  sowie  die 
Verfahrensmodi hat. Online-Marktplätze, einschließlich beliebter sozialer Netzwerke, bieten 
einem  deutlich  größeren  potenziellen  Käufer-Pool  einen  leichteren  Zugang  zu  einem 
größeren  Pool  an  Kulturgütern  als  traditionelle  Händlergeschäfte.  Der  Bedarf  an 
persönlichem  Kontakt  zwischen  Käufern  und  Verkäufern,  Vertrauensaufbau  und 
Expertenbewertungen  wurde  reduziert.  Dies  hat  den  Handel  für  Verkäufer  profitabler 
gemacht,  da  sie  weniger  Risiko  tragen  und  große  Mengen  an  preiswerteren  Artikeln 
anbieten können, die bisher nicht gefragt waren. Die Anonymität von Online-Transaktionen 
ist  auch  für  illegale  Transaktionen  von  Vorteil  und  hat  das  Eindringen  in  den  Markt  mit 
Fälschungen  erleichtert.  Die  Motivation  für  den  Wechsel  von  illegalen  Kulturgütern  ins 
dunkle Netz hält sich in Grenzen, da  es  relativ einfach ist,  sie ungestraft privat  oder im 
sichtbaren Netz zu verkaufen. 

Diese Studie kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die Verlagerung auf den Online-Handel zu einer 
Zunahme der verkauften Artikel geführt hat, wobei vor allem preiswertere Kleinteile (z. B. 
Münzen)  gefährdet  sind.  Kleinere  Artikel  können  leichter  geschmuggelt  oder  per  Post 
verschickt werden als hochkarätige (und oft teurere) Stücke wie große Statuen.  

Der  illegale  Handel  mit  Kulturgütern  erfolgt  naturgemäß  heimlich  und  die  damit 
verbundenen  Handelswege  sind  mit  Ausnahme  der  Schwarzhändler  selbst  weitgehend 
unbekannt.  Eine  aktuelle  Karte  derartiger  Routen  kann  nicht  erstellt  werden,  da  sie 
dynamisch sind und unentwegt auf  rechtliche, politische und strafrechtliche Maßnahmen 
reagieren. Es ist schwierig, Rückschlüsse auf bestimmte Routen zu ziehen, da die Daten 
insgesamt  knapp  und  die  Stichproben  klein  sind  und  die  beobachteten  Routen  je  nach 
lokaler/nationaler  Perspektive  variieren.  In  unseren  Fallstudien  stellen  wir  mehrere 
Beispiele  für  Handelsrouten  vor.  Weltweit  können  Schwarzhändler  von  Kulturgütern  die 
gleichen Wege nutzen wie jene, die für andere Arten von illegalen Gütern genutzt werden. 
Solange  gewisse  logistische  Knotenpunkte  natürliche  Zugänge  zum  EU-Markt  darstellen 
(z. B. Flughäfen, Seehäfen, Freihäfen) werden sie für den illegalen Handel mit Kulturgütern 
wahrscheinlich  mehr  oder  weniger  konsequent  genutzt.  Da  es  Schwarzhändlern  von 
Kulturgütern wichtig ist, den Ursprung ihrer Waren zu verbergen und falsche Provenienzen 
zu  schaffen,  werden  diese  Güter  oft  auf  Umwegen  mit  vielen  Zwischenstopps  zwischen 
Herkunftsland  (d. h.  dort,  wo  sie  geplündert  wurden)  und  Bestimmungsort  (d. h. 
Endabnehmer) verschickt. 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Verbindungen zur organisierten Kriminalität und Terrorismusfinanzierung 

ist, 

erkennen 

Phänomen 

ein  weit 

verbreitetes 

Kulturgütern 

Während der Kunst- und Antiquitätenmarkt größtenteils leugnet, dass der illegale Handel 
mit 
die 
Strafverfolgungsbehörden das Problem mit überwältigender Mehrheit an und weisen darauf 
hin,  dass  die  organisierte  Kriminalität  in  allen  Phasen  beteiligt  ist:  Organisation  von 
Plünderungen,  Bewegung  von  Objekten  von  Ausgrabungsstätten  zu  lokalen  Märkten, 
internationaler  Transport  und  bis  zu  einem  gewissen  Grad  auch  die  Anbindung  an  den 
legalen  Markt.  Der  Schwarzhandel  mit  Kulturgütern 
ist  eine  risikoarme  und 
gewinnbringende Form von Kriminalität, da viele Dinge leicht zu verbergen und die Strafen 
relativ gering sind. Die Beweislast für die Strafverfolgung ist hoch und es gibt eine Reihe 
von  Gesetzeslücken  (z. B.  Unterschiede  in  der  nationalen  Gesetzgebung,  Verjährung, 
Freihäfen), die Schwarzhändler sich zunutze machen können. Darüber hinaus handelt es 
sich dabei um Wirtschaftsverbrechen mit Beteiligung seriöser und mächtiger Mitglieder der 
Gesellschaft, was die Strafverfolgung erschwert. 

Die  durchgeführte  Sekundärforschung  hat  ergeben,  dass  es  eindeutige  Beweise  für  die 
vorsätzliche  und  regelmäßige  Zerstörung  archäologischer  Stätten  und  Kulturgüter  durch 
verschiedene terroristische Gruppen gibt. Das tatsächliche Ausmaß der Plünderungen, des 
Schwarzhandels  und  der  damit  verbundenen  Geldbeträge  sowie  die  genaue  Art  der 
Beteiligung terroristischer Gruppen am illegalen Handel mit Kulturgütern sind nach wie vor 
unklar. Die für diese Studie durchgeführten Interviews lieferten keine neuen Erkenntnisse, 
um den Zusammenhang zwischen terroristischen Gruppen und dem illegalen Handel mit 
Kulturgütern zu untermauern. Zum Zeitpunkt der Studie wurde nur ein relevanter Fall, der 
den Handel mit Terrorismusfinanzierung in Verbindung bringt, vor ein europäisches Gericht 
gebracht, in diesem Fall von der spanischen Polizei. Die Befragten berichteten von einer 
geringen  Anzahl  an  oder  gar  keinen  Fällen,  die  Kulturgüter  aus  Konfliktzonen  betreffen, 
was bedeuten kann, dass „heiße“ Gegenstände eingelagert oder nicht als aus Konfliktzonen 
stammend  anerkannt  werden  bzw.  nicht  wirksam  entdeckt  werden  oder  keinen 
wesentlichen Teil des Marktes ausmachen. Die Verbindung zwischen dem illegalen Handel 
mit  Kulturgütern  und  der  Terrorismusfinanzierung  kann  insofern  als  Vorteil  betrachtet 
werden, als sie das öffentliche und politische Bewusstsein für dieses Thema geschärft hat. 
Plünderung und illegaler Handel sind in erster  Linie jedoch eine Form  von organisiertem 
Verbrechen.  Die  übermäßige  Betonung  der  Verbindungen  zum  Terrorismus  in  der 
derzeitigen  Politik  zur  Bekämpfung  des  illegalen  Handels  könnte  möglicherweise  zu 
strafrechtlichen und anderen Maßnahmen führen, die andere wichtige Aspekte des illegalen 
Handels mit Kulturgütern im größeren Rahmen nicht berücksichtigen. 

Wichtige Erkenntnisse zu strafrechtlichen Maßnahmen 

Gute Praktiken 

Diese Studie hat eine Reihe von Praktiken, Methoden und Instrumenten identifiziert, die 
bei der Bekämpfung des illegalen Handels mit Kulturgütern als erfolgreich gelten. 

  Eines  der  wichtigsten  Beispiele  für  bewährte  Verfahren  ist  die  Schaffung  einer 
Spezialeinheit  innerhalb  der  Strafverfolgungsbehörden  (sowohl  bei  der 

34 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Polizei  als  auch  beim  Zoll).  Diese  Einheiten  ermöglichen  die  Einrichtung  einer 
einzigen  Anlaufstelle,  was  wiederum  dazu  beiträgt,  die  Kommunikationsprozesse 
auf  nationaler  und  internationaler  Ebene  zu  beschleunigen.  Darüber  hinaus  kann 
eine  Spezialeinheit  bei  der  Anhäufung  von  Wissen,  Fachwissen  und  Intelligenz 
helfen, indem sie ein Netzwerk aus Experten, Kollegen und Informanten aufbaut. 
Während  die  Unterstützung  der  Strafverfolgung  durch  ausgebildete  Archäologen 
und Kunstexperten für die Aufdeckung und Untersuchung illegal gehandelter Güter 
von entscheidender Bedeutung ist, ist es auch notwendig, dass die Beamten eine 
spezielle Ausbildung erhalten (z. B. durch Expertenworkshops). 

  Die 

Treffen 

zwischen 

regelmäßiger 

den 
Einrichtung 
Strafverfolgungsbehörden 
(Polizei,  Zoll,  Staatsanwaltschaft)  und  den 
Kultusministerien  oder  anderen  zuständigen  Stellen  erhöht  ebenfalls  die 
Wirksamkeit  der  strafrechtlichen  Maßnahmen.  Regelmäßige  Treffen  schärfen  das 
gegenseitige  Bewusstsein  für  die  einschlägigen  Arbeiten  der  verschiedenen 
Strafverfolgungsbehörden und anderer Interessengruppen und fördern die effektive 
Zusammenarbeit der Behörden untereinander. Regelmäßige Treffen können zudem 
dazu beitragen, Wissen anzuhäufen und das kollektive Fachwissen der beteiligten 
Behörden zu verbessern. Verschiedene Formen der Zusammenarbeit (Workshops, 
Seminare, Gesprächsrunden, Treffen) mit Wissenschaftlern, Forschern und Museen 
sind  auch  für  die  Strafverfolgungsbehörden  von  großem  Wert,  insbesondere  in 
Bezug auf den Austausch von spezifischem Fachwissen und Informationen und den 
Erwerb wertvoller Fertigkeiten.  

  Angesichts der großen Anzahl an Interessengruppen, die sich für die Bekämpfung 
des  illegalen  Handels  mit  Kulturgütern  einsetzen,  würde  die  Einrichtung  oder 
Ernennung  einer  Stelle,  die  alle  Bemühungen  auf  nationaler  Ebene  aktiv 
vorantreibt  und  erleichtert,  die  Wirksamkeit  erhöhen.  Eine  solche  Einrichtung 
muss  nicht  unbedingt  Teil  einer  Strafverfolgungsbehörde  sein,  sondern  sollte  ein 
Gesamtmandat haben und sich verpflichten, alle Bemühungen anderer Akteure zu 
organisieren,  zu  bündeln,  zu  koordinieren  und  zu  unterstützen.  Auf  EU-Ebene  ist 
eine  einzige  Koordinierungs-  und  Förderstelle 
für  verschiedene  nationale 
Bemühungen  besonders  wünschenswert,  da  sowohl  der  illegale  Handel  mit 
Kulturgütern als auch der Markt für Kulturgüter grenzüberschreitend ist. Diese Rolle 
könnte eine permanente Spezialeinheit innerhalb von Europol übernehmen, die vom 
CULTNET-Netzwerk unterstützt wird.  

  Auf 

sind 

oder 

Ebene 

informelle 

internationaler 

persönliche 
grenzüberschreitende Kontakte von großem Wert für die Strafverfolgung, da sie 
dazu  beitragen,  die  offiziellen  Verfahren  zu  beschleunigen  oder  die  Lücke  zu 
schließen,  in  der  es  keine  offiziellen  Kanäle  gibt.  Internationale  Foren  (wie 
und 
INTERPOL 
Koordinierungsmechanismen wahrgenommen. Strafverfolgungsbeamte nutzen sie, 
um  neue  Kontakte  zu  knüpfen,  Informationen  auszutauschen  und  gemeinsame 
Aktionen  durchzuführen.  Die  Befragten  gaben  an,  dass  sie  die  Einrichtung  eines 
dauerhaften internationalen Forums mit Spezialisierung auf den illegalen 

als  wirksame  Kooperations- 

Europol)  werden 

und 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
Handel mit Kulturgütern  begrüßen  würden,  da  dies  einen  wertvollen  Schritt in 
Richtung grenzüberschreitender Polizeiarbeit darstellen würde. 

  Mehrere Länder haben die Energie und den Input, den eine starke und engagierte 
Führungskraft  bereitstellen  kann,  als  wichtigen  Faktor  identifiziert.  Der  illegale 
Handel  mit  Kulturgütern  ist  ein  komplexer  Bereich.  Doch  wenn  sich  eine 
entschlossene  Einzelperson  für  das  Thema  interessiert,  fungiert  sie  als  treibende 
Kraft innerhalb einer Abteilung, Agentur oder eines Landes. Für den Kampf gegen 
den  illegalen  Handel  ist  dies  von  Vorteil.  Eine  engagierte  Führungskraft,  die  die 
Gesetze sorgfältig anwendet, kann Interesse wecken und das Bewusstsein fördern. 

Mängel 

Obwohl zahlreiche bewährte Verfahren identifiziert wurden, kommt diese Studie auch zu 
dem 
und 
an  Mängeln 
Verbesserungsmöglichkeiten bei den derzeitigen strafrechtlichen Maßnahmen gibt. 

beträchtliche 

Schluss, 

Anzahl 

dass 

eine 

es 

  In  erster  Linie  sind  die  derzeitigen  Verfahren  zur  Erhebung  und  Weitergabe 
relevanter  Daten  unvollständig  und  unzureichend.  Einerseits  werden  die 
Daten  nicht  systematisch  erhoben,  und  wenn  sie  erhoben  werden,  sind  sie  nicht 
zwischen  den  nationalen  Behörden  und  den  Mitgliedstaaten  vergleichbar. 
Andererseits  gibt  es  manchmal  einfach  keine  Daten,  die  weitergegeben  werden 
können,  weil  sie  nicht  erfasst  werden.  Es  mangelt  an  Verständnis  und 
Einverständnis  darüber,  welche  Daten  weitergegeben  werden  können  und  wie 
gemeinsame Daten verwendet werden sollen oder können. 

unzureichende  Sorgfaltspflicht,  mangelnde  Registrierung 

  Ein  weiterer  schwacher  Aspekt  des  derzeitigen  Ansatzes  zur  Bekämpfung  des 
illegalen  Kulturgüterhandels  ist  die  Geheimhaltung  der  Transaktionen  im 
Kunst-  und  Antiquitätenmarkt  sowie  dessen  mangelnde  Regulierung.  Der 
Kunstmarkt leugnet weitgehend die Existenz des illegalen Handels mit Kulturgütern, 
von 
während 
Transaktionen  und  eine  Kultur  der  Verschwiegenheit  günstige  Bedingungen  für 
illegale  Praktiken  schaffen.  Gleichzeitig  erklären  diese  Faktoren  das  mangelnde 
Verständnis  und  die  mangelnde  Einsicht  in  den  Kunst-  und  Antiquitätenmarkt 
seitens derer, die den Handel zu überwachen versuchen, sowie die unzureichende 
Zusammenarbeit 
den 
Strafverfolgungsbehörden. 

Interessengruppen 

Branche  mit 

der 

der 

  Unterschiede in den nationalen Rechtsvorschriften wirken sich auch auf die 
Wirksamkeit  grenzüberschreitender  strafrechtlicher  Maßnahmen  aus.  Sie 
resultieren  aus  unterschiedlichen  Rechtstraditionen  und  -ansätzen 
in  den 
(europäischen)  Ländern,  einer  inkonsistenten  Umsetzung  von  Richtlinien  auf  EU-
Ebene und einer unterschiedlichen Umsetzung oder mangelnden Ratifizierung oder 
Umsetzung  der  wichtigsten  internationalen  Rechtsinstrumente:  insbesondere  des 
Übereinkommens von 1970 über das Verbot und die Verhütung der illegalen Einfuhr, 
Ausfuhr und Übertragung von Kulturgut, des UNIDROIT-Übereinkommens von 1995 
illegal  ausgeführte  Kulturgüter  sowie  der  2017 
über  gestohlene  oder 

36 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Übereinkommen des Europarates über Straftaten im Zusammenhang mit Kulturgut 
und  der  einschlägigen  Resolutionen  des  Sicherheitsrates.  Dies  behindert  die 
gegenseitige Rechtshilfe, erschwert die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit und 
hinterlässt Lücken, die von Kriminellen zu ihrem Vorteil genutzt werden können. 

  Die  Anwendung  bestehender  oder  neuer  technologischer  Instrumente  sollte 
nicht  als  Allheilmittel  bei  der  Bekämpfung  des  illegalen  Handels  mit 
Kulturgütern  wahrgenommen  werden.  Vorhandene  und  einige  neue 
Technologien  können  bei  der  Identifizierung  von  Kulturgütern  helfen,  die 
bekanntermaßen  gestohlen  wurden.  Die  meisten  helfen  jedoch  nicht  bei  der 
Kennzeichnung  und  Verfolgung  von  geraubten  und  nicht  dokumentierten 
Gegenständen.  Einige  Technologien  könnten  dazu  beitragen,  verdächtige 
Kulturgüter  –  insbesondere  solche,  die  online  verkauft  werden  –  besser  zu 
erkennen.  Um  diese  Technologien  jedoch  effektiv  nutzen  zu  können,  müssen  die 
Strafverfolgungsbehörden  sowohl  in  Technologie  als  auch  in  Archäologie/Kunst 
ausgebildet sein. Die Studie kommt zu dem Schluss, dass aufgrund der Menge an 
gehandelten  Gegenständen  sowie  der  Geschwindigkeit  und  Art  des  Handels 
besondere  Fachkenntnisse  und  Fertigkeiten  erforderlich  sind,  um  die  meisten 
verfügbaren  Technologiewerkzeuge  effektiv  zu  nutzen  –  höchstwahrscheinlich  in 
einem  viel  größeren  Umfang,  als  es  die  derzeitigen  Kapazitäten  der  befragten 
Strafverfolgungsbehörden zulassen. 

Empfehlungen 

Auf Grundlage der Analyse bewährter Praktiken und Mängel der derzeitigen strafrechtlichen 
Maßnahmen für den illegalen Handel mit Kulturgütern haben wir verschiedene hochwertige 
Empfehlungen  erarbeitet,  die  die  Wirksamkeit  der  Bemühungen  verbessern  können.  Für 
konkrete Schritte, die von der EU und ihren Mitgliedstaaten unternommen werden können, 
siehe Abschnitt 6.2. 

  Die  politische  Profilierung  des  Problems  ist  von  zentraler  Bedeutung  für  die 
Verstärkung  der  Bemühungen  zur  Bekämpfung  des  illegalen  Handels  mit 
Kulturgütern.  Das  Problem  könnte  auf  EU-Ebene  durch  die  Einrichtung  einer 
Spezialeinheit zur Koordinierung der nationalen Bemühungen (bei Europol oder als 
separate Stelle) angegangen werden. Diese/eine derartige Einheit könnte sich auf 
nationaler Ebene auf das politische Profil auswirken, indem sie auf die Spitzenländer 
aufmerksam  macht  und  diejenigen  hervorhebt,  deren  Schutz-  und  strafrechtliche 
Maßnahmen  rückständig  sind  (z. B.  im  Hinblick  auf  Ratifizierung  und,  falls 
erforderlich,  Umsetzung  der  einschlägigen  Übereinkommen  und  Resolutionen  des 
VN-Sicherheitsrates).  

  Die  Anhebung  des  politischen  Profils  dieses  Themas  verläuft  parallel  zur 
Sensibilisierung.  Sensibilisierungskampagnen  sollten  auf  nationaler  und  EU-
Ebene  durchgeführt  werden  und  einzelne  Gruppen  von  Interessenvertretern  mit 
zielgerichteten,  selektiven  Botschaften  ansprechen,  wobei  die  spezifischen 
Bedürfnisse 
ihre  bevorzugten  Kommunikationskanäle 
berücksichtigt werden sollten. Es ist unerlässlich, mit der Zielgruppe einen Dialog 

jeder  Gruppe  und 

37 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
darüber  zu  eröffnen,  was  ihr  Interesse  an  der  Bekämpfung  des  illegalen  Handels 
mit Kulturgütern ist und wie sie dazu beitragen können. Kampagnen auf EU- und 
nationaler  Ebene  sollten  sich  gegenseitig  stärken.  Es  ist  von  entscheidender 
Bedeutung,  dass  die  übermittelten  Informationen  korrekt  und 
frei  von 
Übertreibungen  und  skandalösen  oder  vorzeitigen  Schlussfolgerungen  sind. 
Journalisten, Social-Media-Influencer im Bereich des Kulturerbes und Blogger – also 
wichtige Vermittler und Einflussnehmer auf die öffentliche Meinung – sollten gezielt 
angesprochen werden. 

  Eines  der  Ergebnisse  dieser  Studie  lautet,  wie  viele  Lücken  in  unserem 
Verständnis und Streitpunkte im Zusammenhang mit dem illegalen Handel 
mit  Kulturgütern  noch  immer  bestehen.  Es  besteht  ein  großer  Bedarf  an 
weiterer Forschung zur Verbesserung der Evidenzbasis, die wiederum dazu beiträgt, 
Forschungsmethoden  und  -analysen  zu  verfeinern  und  bessere  Einblicke  in  das 
Verständnis  des  illegalen  Handels  mit  Kulturgütern  sowie  in  den  Kunst-  und 
Antiquitätenmarkt  zu  gewinnen.  Gezielte  Investitionen  in  die  Schaffung  der 
richtigen  Bedingungen  für  diese  Forschung  (insbesondere  systematische  und 
konsistente  Datenerhebung  durch  nationale  Behörden)  sollten  auf  nationaler  und 
EU-Ebene  erfolgen.  Forscher  sollten  ermutigt  werden,  relevante  Themen 
aufzugreifen  (z. B.  durch  die  Ankündigung  von  Forschungsstipendien  im  Rahmen 
des „Horizon Europe“-Programms und die Unterstützung der Einrichtung laufender 
Forschungszentren und Lehrstühle). „Kulturgüter“ umfassen  eine breit gefächerte 
Kategorie und eine gezielte Erforschung des Handels mit verschiedenen Kategorien 
wie  antiken  Münzen,  religiösen  Objekten,  historischen  Manuskripten  usw.  sollte 
differenziertere und wirksamere Maßnahmen ermöglichen. Auch die strafrechtlichen 
und finanziellen Aspekte des Handels bedürfen dringend weiterer Forschung.  

  Die  Transparenz  auf  dem  Kunst-  und  Antiquitätenmarkt  sollte  auch  durch 
Einführung von Kontroll- und Transparenzverpflichtungen erhöht werden, sofern 
erforderlich. Diese sollten sowohl für Offline- als auch Online-Verkäufe gelten. Die 
EU  und  ihre  Mitgliedstaaten  sollten  prüfen,  wie  die  Rückverfolgbarkeit  der 
gehandelten  Kulturgüter  gewährleistet  werden  kann  (z. B.  durch  Erstellung 
nationaler Verzeichnisse, Einführung von Registerpflichten und Sorgfaltspflicht) und 
welche  Rolle  Online-Marktplätze  dabei  spielen  können.  Die  Gewährleistung  von 
im  Zusammenhang  mit  der 
Markttransparenz  und  bewährten  Praktiken 
Sorgfaltspflicht sollte genutzt werden, um die Beziehungen zwischen den Behörden 
und  Kunsthändlern  und  Sammlern  zu  verbessern  und  gleichzeitig  dem  Markt  zu 
ermöglichen, seinen Ruf zu verbessern.  

  Beachtung  muss  der  Frage  geschenkt  werden,  wie  die  Regulierung  und 
Überwachung von Onlineverkäufen verbessert werden kann. Da ein immer 
größerer Teil des illegalen Handels mit Kulturgütern online abgewickelt wird, ist der 
Bedarf  an  Regulierung  und  Überwachung  des  Onlineverkaufs  entsprechend 
gestiegen. In Übereinstimmung mit der vorhergehenden Empfehlung sollte das Ziel 
darin  bestehen,  die  Transparenz  zu  erhöhen  und  den  Spielraum  für  den  illegalen 
Verkauf von Kulturgütern zu verringern. 

38 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  Der  Daten-  und  Informationsaustausch  sollte  über  verschiedene  Kanäle, 
zwischen  verschiedenen  Interessengruppen  und  auf  verschiedenen 
Ebenen  gefördert  und  ermöglicht  werden.  Die  Zusammenarbeit  und  der 
Datenaustausch zwischen den Strafverfolgungsbehörden auf nationaler Ebene sollte 
eine  nationale  Priorität  sein.  Darüber  hinaus  sollten  Länder  unterschiedliche 
Zugangsregelungen  für  verschiedene  Datenbanknutzer  in  Betracht  ziehen  und 
umsetzen.  Auf  EU-Ebene  sollte  die  Interoperabilität  der  nationalen  Datenbanken 
sowie deren Verknüpfung mit der INTERPOL-Datenbank gewährleistet sein. 

  Um  den  einschlägigen  Datenpool  weiter  zu  verbessern,  sollte  die 
Integration und Vernetzung der nationalen Verzeichnisse des Kulturerbes, 
der  Museumsdatenbanken  und  der  Strafverfolgungsdatenbanken 
angestrebt werden. Die Polizei- und Zolldatenbanken sollten in der Lage sein, alle 
notwendigen  Informationen  aus  den  nationalen  Verzeichnissen  zu  erfassen,  zu 
extrahieren  und  zu  exportieren,  wenn  ein  Objekt  beschlagnahmt  oder  gefunden 
wird.  Unterschiedliche  technologische  Lösungen  können  eingesetzt  werden,  z. B. 
für  alle 
künstliche  Intelligenz  oder  die  Einrichtung  eines  Zugangsportals 
Verzeichnisse. 

in  das 

technische  Fachwissen  von  Polizeibeamten 

  Im Hinblick auf die Anwendung von (neuen) Technologien ist es unerlässlich,  ein 
gleiches Maß an technischer Ausstattung in ganz Europa anzustreben. Bei 
der Erhöhung des Niveaus des technologischen Fortschritts in den Mitgliedstaaten 
sind  Investitionen 
in 
Spezialeinheiten erforderlich, beispielsweise für den Einsatz von Webcrawlern und 
Bilderkennungssoftware  zur  Datenerhebung  und  -analyse.  Die  EU  könnte  eine 
solche Ausbildung nationaler Polizeibeamter unterstützen (z. B. über CULTNET oder 
Europol).  Es  wird  empfohlen,  Anwendungen  der  künstlichen 
Intelligenz 
(insbesondere des maschinellen Lernens) und mobile Anwendungen zu entwickeln, 
vielleicht  in  Zusammenarbeit  mit  Hochschulen  oder  der  Industrie.  Relevante 
Projekte  können  durch  die  Bündelung  von  Ressourcen  mehrerer  Mitgliedstaaten, 
öffentliches Auftragswesen auf EU-Ebene und/oder Projektaufrufe im Rahmen von 
Horizon Europe finanziert werden. 

  Es ist wichtig, die Stärken der verschiedenen Ansätze zur Bekämpfung des 
illegalen  Handels  mit  Kulturgütern  in  den  Mitgliedstaaten  anzuerkennen 
und Flexibilität bei ihrer Anwendung einzuräumen. Es sollte anerkannt werden, dass 
nicht  jedes  Land  über  die  gleichen  Bedürfnisse  und  Ressourcen  verfügt.  Besser 
positionierte Länder mit einem reichen Erfahrungsschatz zu diesen Themen sollten 
Raum zum Experimentieren haben. Sie können die Rolle von Pionieren übernehmen 
und als Vorbild für andere dienen. Die EU sollte derartige nationalen Bemühungen 
unterstützen,  gemeinsame  Initiativen  fördern  und  den  Austausch  und  das 
gegenseitige Lernen ermöglichen (z. B. im Rahmen von CULTNET). 

  Im  Falle  des  illegalen  Handels  mit  Kulturgütern  wurden  bereits  Anstrengungen 
unternommen,  um  einige  der  Ursachen 
in 
Konfliktgebieten  zu  mildern  (d. h.  durch  Kapazitätsaufbau,  technische  Hilfe  usw.) 
und die einschlägigen nationalen Gesetze zu harmonisieren sowie eine Grundlage 
für gegenseitige Rechtshilfe zu schaffen und Gesetzeslücken zu schließen. Doch es 

illegale  Ausgrabungen 

für 

39 

 
 
 
 
 
 
besteht  weiteres  Verbesserungspotenzial.  Mitgliedstaaten  könnten  eine  spezielle 
Ausbildung  für  militärisches,  polizeiliches  und  diplomatisches  Personal 
anbieten, das in Drittländer entsandt wird. Länder sollten auch das UNESCO-
Übereinkommen,  das  UNIDROIT-Übereinkommen  und  das  Übereinkommen  des 
Europarates  ratifizieren  und  wirksam  in  nationales  Recht  umsetzen.  Die  in  den 
einschlägigen  Resolutionen  des  VN-Sicherheitsrates  enthaltenen  Anforderungen 
sollten eingehalten werden.  

  Die  EU  kann  den  Schutz  des  Kulturerbes  auch 

in  größere,  durch 
finanzierte  Entwicklungsprojekte  einbeziehen  und 
Entwicklungshilfe 
Mitgliedstaaten ermutigen, dies ebenfalls zu tun, insbesondere in Fällen, in denen 
nachhaltige  lokale  Einkommensströme  über  Plünderungen  und  illegalen  Handel 
hinaus unterstützt werden. 

40 

 
 
 
 
List of abbreviations 

ADA  

Antiquities Dealers Association 

ALR  

Art Loss Register 

AML  

Anti-Money Laundering 

CEN  

Customs Enforcement Network 

CIS   

Commonwealth of Independent States 

CoE  

Council of Europe 

CULTNET 

Informal Network of Law Enforcement Authorities and Expertise, competent 
in the field of Cultural Goods 

EEA  

European Economic Area 

EMPACT   

European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats 

EU   

European Union 

Eurojust  

European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation 

Europol   

European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation 

FATF 

Financial Action Task Force 

FTE  

Full-time equivalent 

HS   

Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System/ Harmonized System 

IADAA    

International Association of Dealers in Ancient Art 

ICOM 

International Council of Museums 

IMI   

Internal Market Information system 

INTERPOL 

International Criminal Police Organisation 

IS 

Islamic State 

ITR   

Illicit Trade Report (by the WCO) 

JCO  

Joint customs operation 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MENA 

Middle East and North Africa 

PSYCHE   

Protection System for Cultural Heritage 

PSEUD 

Artworks portal evidence system (Portál systému evidence uměleckých děl) 

RFID 

Radio-frequency identification 

SELEC 

Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre 

SIENA 

Secure Information Exchange Network Application 

SPK  

Stiftung Preuβischer Kulturbesitz 

UK   

United Kingdom 

UNESCO  

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 

UNIDROIT 

International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 

UNODC   

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 

UNSC 

United Nations Security Council 

USA  

United Stated of America 

WCO 

  World Customs Organisation 

42 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 

43 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 

Introduction to this study 

1.1  Background of this study, objectives and research questions 

This chapter outlines the topical relevance of the study at hand and outlines the specific 
objectives and research questions of this study. 

1.1.1  Context 

The  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  damages  cultural  heritage  worldwide.  In  addition,  the 
proceeds of the illicit trade fund organised crime, corruption, and armed violence, including 
terrorism.  The  threats  to  cultural  property  and  the  damaging  consequences  of  its  illicit 
trade were first recognised in connection with armed conflicts, as enshrined in  the 1954 
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 
together with its First Protocol of 1954 and Second Protocol of 1999.2 The 1970 Convention 
on  the  Means  of  Prohibiting  and  Preventing  the  Illicit  Import,  Export  and  Transfer  of 
Ownership of Cultural Property3 recognised that the phenomenon of illicit trade in cultural 
goods  was  not  limited  to  times  of  armed  conflicts,  and  established  a  general  regime  of 
protection of cultural property from illicit activities.  

A  large  number  of  international  instruments  have  been  adopted  since  in  different 
international fora, targeting various aspects of illicit activities and aimed at strengthening 
the protection of cultural property and cultural heritage. The most relevant of them are the 
1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects4, the 2000 UN 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime5, and the 2001 UNESCO Convention on 
the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage6. The newly adopted Council of Europe 
Convention  on  Offences  relating  to  Cultural  Property7  (so-called  Nicosia  Convention) 
focuses  on  the  criminalisation  of  the  illicit  trafficking  in  cultural  goods  and  intentional 
destruction  of  cultural  property,  extending  the  similar  provisions  contained  in  other 
conventions. 

The UN General Assembly has been involved in preservation and further development of 
cultural values since 1972 and has adopted more than 25 resolutions8 on the protection 
and return of cultural property. Since early 2000s, the UN Security Council has issued a 

2 The official convention text with the protocols can be found at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13637&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html .  
3 The official convention text can be found at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13039&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html . 
4 The official text can be found at: https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/cultural-property/1995-convention . 
5 The official text can be found at: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro/UNTOC.html . 
6 The official web page of the convention is http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/underwater-cultural-
heritage/2001-convention/ . 
7 The so-called Nicosia Convention was adopted on 3 May 2017. See the respective press release and the text 
of the convention under: http://www.coe.int/en/web/culture-and-heritage/convention-on-offences-relating-to-
cultural-property. As of writing, it has been signed by 11 countries and ratified by two. See 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/221/signatures?p_auth=1Lwi23Yn . 
8 See the list of the UN General Assembly Resolutions at: 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/restitution-of-cultural-property/resolutions-adopted-by-the-
united-nations-general-assembly-about-return-and-restitution-of-cultural-property/ . 

44 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
series of Resolutions expressing grave concerns about and introducing concrete measures 
for  protection  of  cultural  property  and  cultural  heritage  from  destruction  and  illicit 
trafficking  as  a  result  of  armed  conflicts  and  terrorist  activities.9  UN  Security  Council 
Resolution 234710 is dedicated entirely to the protection of cultural heritage including from 
illicit  trafficking.  UNESCO  encouraged  states  to  extend  measures  from  the  UNSC 
Resolutions to protect Yemeni and Libyan artefacts from destruction and illicit trade.11  

Within the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 116/2009 of 18 December 2008 
on  the  export  of  cultural  goods12  imposes  uniform  export  controls  at  the  EU’s  external 
borders. Council Directive 2014/60/EU of 15 May 2014 on the return  of cultural objects 
unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State13 provides mechanisms for the 
return  of  objects  that  have  been  illicitly  traded  within  the  EU.  Following  on  UN  Security 
Council Resolution 2199, trade controls have also been placed on Syrian and Iraqi cultural 
goods  by  (most  recently)  Council  Regulation  (EU)  No  85/2013  of  31  January  2013 
amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  1210/2003  concerning  certain  specific  restrictions  on 
economic and financial relations with Iraq,14 and Council Regulation (EU) No 1332/2013 of 
13 December 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures 
in  view  of  the  situation  in  Syria.15  In  2019,  a  new  Regulation  on  the  import  of  cultural 
goods has been adopted to strengthen controls on the entry of illicitly-traded cultural goods 
into the European Union.16 

In 2011 the European Commission Directorate-General Home Affairs published a Study on 
Preventing  and  Fighting  Illicit  Trafficking  in  Cultural  Goods  in  the  European  Union17,  a 
report  into  controlling  the  illicit  trade  prepared  by  CECOJI-CNRS  (further  –  EC  2011 
Report). This report clarified relevant concepts and terminology, which we intend to follow 
here. Its main thrust was to examine legal, administrative and technical responses to the 
trade, and it made a series of recommendations. The findings of the EC 2011 Report have 
served as a foundation for the  study at hand,  however,  our  approach  has focused upon 
obtaining  evidence  about  the  constitution,  organisation  and  operation  of  the  illicit  trade 
and the problems facing criminal justice response.  

9 See the following UN Security Council Resolutions (in chronological order): UNSC Res 1483 (22 May 2003), 
UN Doc S/RES/1483; UNSC Res 1546 (8 June 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1546; UNSC Res 2139 (22 February 2014) 
UN Doc S/RES/2139; UNSC Res 2199 (12 February 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2199; UNSC Res 2253 (17 December 
2015) UN Doc S/RES/2253; UNSC Res 2322 (12 December 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2322; UNSC Res 2462 (28 
March 2019) UN Doc S/RES/2462. 
10 UN Res 2347 (24 March 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2347. 
11 See the letter from the UNESCO Director-General, dated 18 May 2016, regarding the implementation of 199 
(February 2015) and 2253 (December 2015) on sanctions for terrorist activities. Available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002448/244857e.pdf . 
12 OJ L 39 of 10.2.2009. 
13 Recast Directive, published in OJ L 159 of 28.5.2014. 
14 OJ L 32 of 1.2.2013. 
15 OJ L 335 of 14.12.2013. 
16 See the relevant documents on the EU’s legislative train website: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-
train/theme-a-balanced-and-progressive-trade-policy-to-harness-globalisation/file-import-of-cultural-goods. EU 
actions against illicit trade are summarised here: https://ec.europa.eu/culture/policy/culture-
policies/trafficking_en.  
17 Study available at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/ca56cfac-ad6b-45ab-
b940-e1a7fa4458db. 

45 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
1.1.2  Study objectives and research questions 

The  general  objective  of  this  study  has  been  to  contribute  to  the  understanding  of  the 
nature  of  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods,  particularly  its  criminal  organisation  and 
operation, and to provide an overview of existing new technology tools that can be used 
to  combat  this  crime,  in  order  to  support  policy  makers  and  enforcement  authorities  in 
developing  and  implementing  effective  countermeasures.  The  findings  of  the  study  will 
help policy makers and stakeholders identify and anticipate risks and threats in order to 
make informed decisions and develop more focused control and prevention measures.  

Based  on  this,  the  specific  objective  of  the  study  has  been  to  gather,  analyse  and 
disseminate information, as well as cross-reference data, on key characteristics of the illicit 
trade in cultural goods into, from and within the EU. These characteristics are: 
  source, transit and destination of illicitly traded goods; 
  trafficking routes; 
  dimensions, trends and patterns of trafficking; 
 

illicit trade operations and actors involved (especially involvement of organised criminal 
groups). 

In line with these objectives, three main research questions have been formulated to guide 
this study: 
1.  How can illicit trade in cultural goods in the EU be described in terms of: 

a.  Trafficking routes into, out of and through the EU; 
b.  Volumes; 
c.  Object types; and 
d.  Operational  modes  (means  of  transport,  actors  and  agencies,  methods  of 

transaction)? 

2.  What  are  the  criminal  justice  responses  to  trafficking  in  cultural  goods  and  what  are 

challenges faced by the relevant authorities in implementing effective responses? 

3.  What  new  technologies  can  be  used  for  identifying  illicitly-traded  objects  and  for 
improving  information  sharing  and  other  forms  of  inter-agency  cooperation  and 
collaboration?  

While  answering  these  research  questions,  the  study  will  also  develop  policy 
recommendations for future EU action. 

46 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2  Terminological note 

The topic of this study, countering the illicit trade in cultural goods, suffers from a lack of 
terminological  clarity  as  several  terms  can  be  used  interchangeably  to  mean  the  same 
thing. Terms such as cultural objects, cultural goods, cultural property, cultural patrimony, 
art objects, artefacts, artworks, antiquities, among other terms, all may denote the objects 
in  question  depending  on  the  context  and  language  used.  This  study  has,  therefore, 
followed the EU legislation and the previously conducted studies and uses the term “cultural 
goods” as it was defined and used there.18 ‘Cultural goods’ is a broad concept and, in the 
framework  of  this  study,  refers  to  any  object  which  is  of  importance  for  archaeology, 
prehistory,  history,  literature,  art  or  science,  which  belongs  to  the  categories  listed  in 
Annex 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 116/2009 and that also meets the minimum age 
threshold  specified  for  each  type  of  good.  The  EC  2011  Report  introduced  the  idea  of 
‘endangered heritage’, noting that archaeological, religious and some privately held objects 
are particularly vulnerable to theft and illicit trade, particularly in conflict situations. Thus, 
following the EC 2011 Report, this study has considered the full range of cultural goods, 
but  by  force  of  circumstance  has  primarily  been  concerned  with  endangered  heritage 
objects. 

Another central term for this study that requires a definition is illicit trade. This term is 
notoriously difficult to define, and it is often used interchangeably with other terms, such 
as illegal trade or illicit trafficking. The difficulties linked to the definition of illicit trade have 
been examined in depth by the World Trade Organisation, which can be considered “home 
of  international  trade  system”,  during  its  preparation  of  a  Memorandum  on  illicit  trade 
(Díaz-Cediel,  Pak  and  Prasetyo,  2017).  Having  analysed  various  international  legal 
instruments  relevant  to  dealing  with  illicit  trade,  the  WTO  found  that  there  is  no 
internationally accepted, universal definition of the term. At the same time, they developed 
a  general  broad  definition  based  on  the  identified  common  elements  in  sectoral 
conventions:  “illicit  trade  means  any  commercial  practice  or  transaction  related  to  the 
production, acquisition, sale, purchase, shipment, movement, transfer, receipt, possession 
or distribution of (i) any illicit product defined as such by international law; or (ii) any licit 
product for non-licit purposes as defined by international law. Illicit trade also covers any 
conduct intended to facilitate such activities.” For the purposes of this study, we have been 
using  this  definition  adjusted  to  the  context  of  cultural  goods.  This  means  we  took  into 
consideration  relevant  national  and  EU  legal  rules  determining  the  illicit  nature  of 
production, acquisition, sale, purchase, shipment, movement, transfer, receipt, possession 
or distribution of cultural goods. The term “trafficking” (e.g. trafficking routes) is used 
interchangeably with “illicit trade” in the study.19  

As indicated in the list of objectives, this study aims to support enforcement authorities 
in  their  activities,  which  target  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods.  Such  authorities 
encompass, in the first instance, those law enforcement bodies who have a direct mandate 

18 COM(2017) 375 of 13.07.2017. 
19 Whereas the terms “illicit trade” and “trafficking” are interchangeable, “illegal trade” has a different meaning. 
A trade transaction is illegal when it is forbidden by law, whereas illicit trade could refer to both a transaction 
forbidden by law or a transaction that is legal but transgresses a moral code. As cultural goods can be traded 
legally, the terms “trafficking” and “illicit trade” are used throughout this report to emphasise that what is under 
scrutiny concerns the exchange of goods in an illicit way.  

47 

 
 
 
 
 
                                           
to  investigate  and  prosecute  relevant  behaviour  and  practices,  namely  national  police 
forces,  customs  authorities  and  public  prosecutors.  The  relevant  criminal  justice 
responses  explored  in  this  study  can  be  described  as  the  national  capacity  to  detect, 
investigate  and  prosecute  relevant  crimes.  We  limit  the  research  into  criminal  justice 
responses and challenges to practical and operational issues across different EU Member 
States. The study neither analyses nor compares the underlying national policy and legal 
rules  as  this  topic  was  extensively  covered  in  the  2017  study  for  DG  TAXUD  (Deloitte, 
2017)20, which examined ratification and implementation issues of both international and 
EU legal instruments in EU Member States.   

What constitutes a protected cultural good and what constitutes illicit trade, both depend 
on the historic and cultural context and relevant legal frameworks (Interpol, 2014)21. In 
the context of this study, we acknowledge that different EU Member States have different 
approaches to the protection of cultural goods and different scopes of protection. This has 
further implications for criminal justice responses: criminalisation of acts involving cultural 
goods  vary,  so  that  actions  that  are  legal  in  one  country  (e.g.  using  metal  detectors  to 
search for ancient coins) are considered a crime in another. It is out of the scope of this 
study to suggest one authoritative definition or solution for any of the discussed notions. 
Nevertheless, the difference in national approaches is a crucial point with a bearing on this 
study, and we will return to this while discussing the dimensions of trafficking (Chapter 3) 
and take it into account when making recommendations. 

Finally, there is no internationally agreed-upon definition of ‘acceptable provenance’, a 
key concept for this study. In general terms, provenance is documentation of ownership 
history,  which  allows  buyers  and  sellers  to  trace  objects  back  in  time  and  to  determine 
their origin and legal status. It is often not clear, when the term is used in a trade context, 
whether ‘acceptable provenance’ refers to only the origin of a piece, or only the transaction 
history  for  a  set  period  of  time  (20,  30,  50,  100  years),  or  a  combination  of  such 
considerations.  There  are  also  differing  views  within  the  art,  heritage,  academic,  law 
enforcement, and legal communities on what actually constitutes proof of provenance. 

1.3  Scope of the study  

The scope of this study is based on the previously discussed terminology regarding cultural 
goods, illicit trade and criminal justice responses. Furthermore, in terms of  geographic 
coverage, this study covers the EU-28, the European Economic Area (EEA) countries and 
countries of the Western Balkans, as required by the tender specifications. Following the 
requirements  of  the  tender  specifications  and  based  on  the  initial  desk  research  and 
scoping  interviews  with  experts  and  stakeholders,  we  also  surveyed  Egypt,  Lebanon, 
Turkey and Russia due to their importance as sources of or destinations for illicit cultural 
goods.  The  information  gathered  has  been  placed  within  a  global  context  through 
comparative  analysis  with  other  information  previously  gathered  by  research  team 
members  in  regions  further  afield  during  their  work  as  the  Trafficking  Culture  Research 

20https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/annex_08_dg_taxud_study_fighting_illicit_trafficki
ng_in_cultural_goods_en.pdf 

48 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
 
consortium  (since  2011)  and  Cambridge  University's  Illicit  Antiquities  Research  Centre 
(1996–2007). 

The temporal scope of the study covers the period from 2000 to the time of publication. 
In  consultation  with  experts  in  the  scoping interviews,  the  year  2000  was  selected  as  a 
cut-off point as this would allow the team to tap into the larger pool of data collected in 
recent years, but also to ensure that the results of the analysis are relevant in the present. 
The period of 18 years can be considered sufficient to identify short and long term trends 
that  provide  insight  into  the  current  situation.  Moreover,  the  early  to  mid-noughties 
witnessed the dramatic technological changes from older “analogue” technologies to the 
global  rise  of  the  internet,  mobile  technologies,  social  media,  etc.  Starting  the  data 
collection from 2000 onwards has allowed us to better show the impact of new technologies 
by contrasting them with old ones.  

1.4  Structure of this report 

The  report  will  first  elaborate  on  the  methodological  approach  applied  to  this  research 
(Chapter 2). The different methods for data collection will be presented as will the main 
benefits  and  drawbacks  of  the  applied  methodology.  In  the  chapters  that  follow,  the 
findings and the corresponding analysis are presented.  These  are structured around the 
three  different  objectives  of  the  study:  an  analysis  of  the  dimensions  of  trafficking  in 
cultural  property  (Chapter  3),  criminal  justice  responses  (Chapter  4)  and  a  detailed 
overview and assessment of new technologies (Chapter 5). Finally, the overall conclusions 
and policy recommendations are presented in Chapter 6.  

The report is complemented by three annexes. Annex 1 contains the full bibliography of 
sources  that  were  used  for  and  are  referenced  in  this  report.  Annex  2  contains  a  list  of 
stakeholders interviewed during the study. Annex 3 presents the results of the conducted 
survey. 

49 

 
 
 
 
 
 
2 

51 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  Methodology 

In  order  to  answer  the  research  questions  presented,  we  collected  data  on  various 
elements of illicit trade in cultural goods and on criminal justice responses to illicit trade. 
Information was sought on the material parameters of illicit trade, including object types, 
volume, trafficking routes and operation modes of those participating. This was obtained 
from a range of sources and stakeholders. In addition, data collection focused on how law 
enforcement  agencies  seek  to  address  this  phenomenon,  what  obstacles  they  face 
(especially in relation to the trade’s cross-border nature) and what could be of assistance 
in improving their capabilities to effectively tackle it. 

The  analysis  presented  in  this  report  is  based  on  a  variety  of  data  sources  and  data 
collection methods. A mix of data collection methods was used as explained below in order 
to cover the required geographic scope and range of issues, to reach out to knowledgeable 
experts and stakeholders, to obtain first-hand data and information and in an attempt to 
address the existing knowledge gaps.  

2.1  Data collection  

Throughout the study,  data was collected via  4 principal avenues as  shown in Figure 1. 
Each activity sought to build on the previous one. 

Figure 1 

Data collection approach 

52 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In  total,  36  interviews  were  conducted  with  a  wide  range  of  stakeholders  including  law 
enforcement, customs, public prosecutors, governments, researchers, auction houses, art 
dealers,  and  art  dealers’  associations.  An  overview  of  all  interviewees  can  be  found  in 
Annex  2.  The  interviews  were  conducted  in  two  rounds;  during  the  first  round  (thirteen 
interviews) the focus was on improving the understanding of the nature of the illicit trade 
in cultural goods in Europe, on scoping the research but also on gathering the initial data. 
The second round of interviews (23 interviews, of which 5 were in writing) investigated the 
key issues and challenges identified through the scoping interviews, the survey and desk 
research in more depth and gathered additional data to close the remaining information 
gaps.  

All  interviews  were  semi-structured  allowing  the  interviewer  to  ask  follow-up  questions 
based on the answers provided by the interviewee. This enabled the interviewer to clarify 
answers that were unclear before and to investigate further (parts of) answers that were 
specifically relevant or interesting for the study at hand. In preparation for the interviews, 
interview guides were developed, and an indicative list of topics and questions was shared 
with the interviewees. Tailored topic sheets were created for different types of stakeholders 
(i.e.  customs,  law  enforcement  public  prosecutors,  researchers)  which  allowed  the 
interviewer to ask questions that specifically related to the knowledge and experience of 
the  interviewee.  Given  the  semi-structured  nature  of  the  interviews,  the  set  of  topics 
discussed varied slightly per interview. Notes were taken during interviews. Some of the 
interviewees requested the interview notes and validated them.  

An online survey was conducted among various stakeholder groups (from government and 
academics, to auction houses and traders) using an online tool. The survey allowed us to 
reach out to a greater number of stakeholders who could not be interviewed, and collect 
their views on the main issues of the study in a structured uniform fashion. We approached 
139 potential respondents via a direct email invitation, and, in addition, we disseminated 
the  link  to  the  online  survey  via  social  media  (i.e.  Twitter  and  LinkedIn),  through  our 
professional network and by asking respondents to share the survey with their respective 
networks.  In  total,  124  respondents  completed  the  survey  between  23  May  and  6  July 
2018 (6,5 weeks). The respondents represented 39 countries (both EU and third countries 
including Albania, Australia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Georgia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Serbia, 
Turkey, USA and Venezuela). An anonymised overview of the stakeholders and the survey 
results can be found in Annex 3.  

To validate the overall findings of the study and, in particular, the results of the stakeholder 
survey, the team  conducted a validation survey among the participants of the  CULTNET 
meeting  in  April  2019. This  meeting  was  attended  by  a  large  group  of  law  enforcement 
representatives from 20 EU Member States. In total, 13 country representatives filled out 
this survey. The anonymised details of the survey respondents as well as their responses 
can be found in Annex 3.  

Desk  research  was  conducted  to  identify  and  extract  relevant  data  from  a  variety  of 
sources,  such  as  newspaper  and  other  media  articles,  academic  papers,  NGO  and  IGO 
reports  and  press  releases,  police  and  customs  press  releases,  court  documents,  and 
company  and  project  web  pages.  The  study  looked  at  publications  in  a  number  of 

53 

 
 
 
 
 
 
languages: English, German, French, Italian, Spanish, Greek, Polish, and Dutch. Sources 
since 2000 have been included in the analysis, as 2000 was determined as being the cut-
off point for the study.  

54 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2  Analysis 

A number of approaches have been applied to analyse the findings from the various types 
of data sources. These approaches are discussed below.  

2.2.1  Analysis of survey 

In order to capture possible differences in perceptions and opinions, the responses to the 
survey  were  analysed  by  stakeholder  category  (e.g.  law  enforcement,  government, 
dealers) as well as by country’s role in the trafficking of cultural goods (i.e. source, transit 
and  destination  countries).  The  full  analysis  of  the  survey  is  presented  in  Annex  3.  The 
insights gained from the analysis per stakeholder group and country were used to answer 
the research questions and are not presented separately in this report.  

The  responses  to  the  validation  survey  were  analysed  in  a  similar  manner  and  are 
presented in Annex 3.  

2.2.2  Analysis of interviews 

The software ATLAS.ti was used to assist the analysis of the interviews. The notes for each 
interview were inserted into the tool and the team applied open coding to deconstruct the 
interview  notes.  As  a  similar  list  of  questions  was  used  for  every  interview,  each 
conversation  covered  a  similar  set  of  topics.  Therefore,  the  team  was  able  to  identify 
‘concepts’ which serve as umbrella codes covering a range of related topics (e.g. statistics). 
In addition, categories were identified which belong to a concept but are more specific (e.g. 
statistics  –  lack  of  statistics,  statistics  –  clean  statistics).  By  applying  open  coding,  the 
team was able to create additional codes (concepts and categories) as the interviews were 
being analysed. This resulted in very specific codes that accurately reflect the perspectives 
of the interviewees.  

2.2.3  Snapshot analysis 

To complement our research and assist in estimating volume, value, and types of objects 
in the trade, various ‘snapshots’ were taken of online marketplaces where cultural goods 
are  sold.  Such  snapshots  (also  known  as  ‘cross-sectional  analyses’)  cover  the  entire 
catalogue offered on a website in a specified short period of time, and provide insights into 
the market prices for particular goods, what types of objects are on offer, and how many 
are being offered at any particular time.  

It is important to note that the objective of this cross-sectional analysis was to estimate 
the  market  for  cultural  goods,  and  as  such  we  do  not  allege  or  assume  that  any  or  all 
objects  sold  have  been  involved  in  illicit  trade,  nor  should  the  analysis  be  taken  as  a 
suggestion that any of the websites surveyed or their sellers/buyers have been involved in 
illicit trade. 

55 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For this report, a sampling strategy was used to produce some quantitative estimates of 
the material volume and monetary value of the trade inside Europe of certain categories 
of cultural objects. Two categories of material were analysed. The first has been termed 
“antiquities”, comprising objects from ancient and early medieval (up to about 1066 AD) 
Europe, North Africa and West Asia (excluding Islamic) of a type normally sold in auction 
house  antiquities  sales.  The  second  category  comprised  ancient  and  medieval  coins, 
including Islamic coins (up to about 1453 AD). Selected European vendors were monitored 
for a period of time, often a short period, and sales results extrapolated to suggest annual 
returns.  Non-European  vendors selling inside Europe  on the  Internet  were not included. 
This  sampling  methodology  provided  a  realistic  strategy  to  systematically  assess 
parameters of the market within the scope of the study.  

Snapshots have been taken of the ancient coin market on the Sixbid aggregator site, the 
VCoins aggregator site, eBay UK, eBay Fr, eBay De, which we understood to be the largest 
online marketplaces for coins. Furthermore, snapshots have been taken of the antiquities 
market on the Trocadero aggregator site, Invaluable aggregator site and Catawiki auction 
site. Through a sampling strategy, some estimates of the material volume and monetary 
value  of  the  respective  markets  are  provided,  which  are  presented  throughout  the  next 
chapter.  

These snapshots tended to record quantities, types and prices of objects offered for sale, 
and not all of them record the prices for which items were actually sold. This is a known 
limitation of this type of research and can only be overcome by a longer-term monitoring 
project.  

Information about prices realised for various objects is not always readily available, and 
the  information  that  is  available  is  of  variable  quality.  Good  quality  sales  information  is 
made  publicly  available  only  by  major  auction  houses,  and  so  estimates  of  market  size 
have  tended  to  rely  upon  these  data.  Increasingly,  market  size  estimates  can  be 
augmented by information made available on various Internet sites. Nevertheless, there 
are many private or “invisible” sales which are not made public, and it has been known for 
a long time that these sales can involve extremely high-value objects (Nørskov 2002: 291-
292),  so  that  their  monetary  contribution  cannot  be  dismissed  as  unimportant  (see  box 
text). 

Invisible market and private sales 
“Invisible market” is a term introduced by Vinnie Nørskov in 2002, which she used 
to describe private sales involving cultural goods outside the public auction market. 
Objects bought through private sales on the invisible market are usually not publicly 
advertised and it is virtually impossible to ascertain their price or to establish their 
provenance.  Nevertheless,  research  suggests  that  many  museum  objects  are 
acquired  through  private  sales  and  that  the  prices  agreed  are  often  higher  than 
those  achieved  at  public  auction.  For  example,  Nørskov  showed  that  the  first 
million-dollar  museum  acquisition  of  an  antiquity  took  place  in  1972  when  the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art bought the Attic “Euphronios” krater from the dealer 
Robert Hecht. It was not until 1988 that an antiquity broke the million-dollar barrier 
at a public auction (a Cycladic figurine in New York).  

56 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Often,  information  about  private  sales  is  only  made  public  retrospectively, 
sometimes when an object is placed on public display and triggers a recovery claim. 
In June 2004, for example, the Cleveland Museum of Art announced it had bought 
a previously unknown bronze statue of the Greek god Apollo Sauroktonos for a price 
rumoured to be in the region of $5 million. Cleveland had bought the statue from 
the Geneva branch of Phoenix Ancient Art, and had been provided with provenance 
documents stating that the statue had been on a formerly East German estate since 
the 1930s and sold to a Dutch dealer in 1994 for $1250, before purchase by Phoenix 
Ancient Art. In 2006, Greece claimed the statue had been discovered in the 1990s 
under  the  sea  between  Greece  and  Italy  (Litt  2008).  In  July  2017,  New  York’s 
Metropolitan Museum of Art bought a gilded ancient Egyptian coffin for 3,5 million 
Euros from Parisian dealer Christophe Kunicki. It was accompanied by provenance 
documents stretching back to a legal export from Egypt in 1971 (Moynihan 2019). 
The museum returned the coffin to Egypt in February 2019 after being presented 
with  evidence  that  it  had  been  looted  in  2011.  The  provenance  documents  were 
shown to be fake (Metropolitan Museum 2019). 

Buyers wishing to maintain secrecy at auction might use proxies for bidding or leave 
absentee bids. In the early 2000s, for example, Sheikh Saud al Thani was active in 
Europe buying a wide range of cultural goods on behalf of Qatar’s National Council 
for  Culture,  Arts  and  Heritage.  Al  Thani  bought  privately  from  dealers,  but  also 
deployed proxies at auction (Adam 2005a). In one 2005 auction sale in London, he 
was  reported  as  having  employed  “several  agents”  to  bid  for  him  (Adam  2005b: 
48). Thanks to Al Thani, it was estimated that between 2003 and 2005 exports of 
cultural goods from the United Kingdom to Qatar were valued at about £50 million 
each year (Bailey 2005a). Christian Levett has been buying cultural goods, mainly 
antiquities, privately and at auction since 2003. In 2011, he opened the Musée d’Art 
Classique de Mougins in France to house and exhibit his collection (Fabrikant 2014). 
He never attends an auction in person, preferring to leave an absentee bid for what 
he thinks is an appropriate price (Wrathall 2013).  

Although not within the scope of this study, this world of ‘invisible’ transactions and 
private sales applies to all cultural goods: not only archaeological objects but also 
works of art (such as paintings). 

Cultural goods recirculate on the market, meaning that an object that is offered for sale 
often is re-sold several years later. Thus, in this type of study, there is a danger that the 
same object may be counted twice. An object bought at public auction, for example, may 
be sold subsequently at another auction or, more likely, on the Internet. Recirculation is 
not  a  problem  for  monetary  estimates  of  market  size,  but  could  in  theory  cause  over-
estimation of material volumes. The presence of fakes and forgeries in the market has the 
same effect. 

The  snapshot  analysis  faces  problems  of  definitional  clarity.  For  figures  quoted  in  the 
media, the terminology used by these sources to describe the material being traded and 
thus to quantify its volume and value is often vague and open to different interpretations. 
The  term  “antiquity”,  for  example,  can  be  considered  as  shorthand  for  “an  object 

57 

 
 
 
 
 
 
manufactured  by  humans  in  ancient  times”,  though  that  simply  shifts  the  problem  of 
definition  onto  “ancient  times”.  Some  members  of  the  trade  suggest  that  the  term 
“antiquities”  should  be  applied  only  to  ancient  objects  from  the  area  of  the  ancient 
Mediterranean, Europe and the Middle East, though it does not take long to find vendors 
offering  Pre-Columbian  antiquities  for  sale.  Market  categories  such  as  “Asian  Art”, 
“Primitive Art”, or “Islamic Art” also comprise antiquities to a greater or lesser extent. 

Still, the snapshot analysis is of added value to understand the type of objects and value 
of these being put on sale, based on which inferences can be made regarding the volume 
of  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods.  Interpreting  snapshot  analyses  involves  making  the 
assumption that a certain link (in a certain way or form) can be made between the activities 
on these platforms and the illicit trade. The exact nature of this link is not known. At the 
same  time,  using  snapshot  analyses  is  justifiable,  as  it  is  one  of  the  few  ways  actual 
research can be undertaken on this topic.  

2.2.4  Analysis of technologies  

Different  technologies  either  in  use  now  or  possibly  relevant  in  the  future  for  criminal 
justice responses to the illicit trade in cultural goods were identified via the survey, desk 
research and interviews and analysed as part of the study. To answer the relevant research 
questions in a structured way, a template for the analysis of technologies was developed 
for this purpose (shown in Table 1 below).  

Table 1 

Template for analysis of technologies 

Technologies: Template for Analysis 

Technology Name: 

Description: 

Applications: 

Perceived Strengths: 

Perceived Weaknesses: 

Related Technologies: 

References and Resources: 

The completed templates provide an analysis of each technology. The templates functioned 
as the ‘raw data’ for the meta-analysis which is presented in Chapter 5 below. 

58 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3  Benefits and shortcomings of the methodology 

2.3.1  Benefits of the methodology  

One  of  the  strengths  of  the  methodological  approach  applied  in  this  research  is  that  it 
allows for a comprehensive data collection. Through the variety of data collection methods 
(i.e. interviews, surveys, desk research and snapshot analyses) a rich sample of data on 
issues relevant to the research questions was gathered. Whereas the interviews provided 
detailed  and  nuanced  information  on  relevant  issues  and  the  interviewee’s  perspectives 
and  opinions,  the  survey  aimed  for  more  quantitative  data  from  a  wide  range  of 
stakeholders.  Desk  research  provided  historical  data,  assessments  and  analyses  and 
informed on various theoretical and practical approaches that were used to tackle similar 
research questions. The snapshot analyses have functioned as case studies that focus on 
a specific marketplace and point in time. Moreover, the different types of data collection 
methods  have  yielded  responses  from  different  types  of  stakeholders  and  sources.  By 
comparing and cumulating these data, this study provides a nuanced picture of the illicit 
trade in cultural goods in Europe that is as comprehensive as possible.  

A further benefit of the comprehensive approach to the data collection is that it provides 
insights  that  are  applicable  to  the  whole  of  Europe  based  on  evidence,  collected  from 
trusted sources, and not on extrapolation. Herewith, this study contributes considerably to 
the  existing academic  studies that are usually limited in scope and focus  on  one or two 
instances  of  illicit  trade.  The  instances  of  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  are  examined  in 
depth  in  such  academic  studies,  but  they  do  not  allow  the  drawing  of  meaningful 
conclusions with respect to how common the particular instance is, whether it represents 
a trend and what the bigger picture looks like.  

Much effort has been spent on gathering first-hand information and data on the illicit trade 
in cultural goods from law enforcement operatives and experts, and we have done so on 
an  EU-wide  scale,  covering  28  EU  Member  States.  Therefore,  the  study’s  results  and 
recommendations  are  evidence-based  and  take 
into  account  different  national 
circumstances, and the perceptions and opinions of renowned and experienced specialists. 
This approach yielded practical insights and anecdotes grounded in reality. We refrain from 
making  extrapolations  and  inferences  and  include  only  findings,  conclusions  and 
recommendations that are supported by the interview and survey data. 

Both  the  comprehensiveness  of  the  study  and  the  fact  that  it  took  a  practical  approach 
have enhanced its overall added value. The findings inform policy makers on what exactly 
the pertinent issues (problems) of the illicit trade in cultural goods are and their relative 
severity. This may help the reassessment of fundamental aspects upon which current policy 
was built and inform policy makers so they make more focused and effective choices in the 
future.  

59 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.2  Shortcomings, limitations, mitigation measures 

Despite  its  comprehensiveness,  the  applied  methodology  also  has  certain  shortcomings 
and limitations. At a fundamental level, the study deals with a ‘dark figure’ problem: illicit 
trade  in  cultural  goods  is  a  crime,  and  such  phenomena  often  are  characterised  by 
difficulties in obtaining hard numbers. Simply put, traffickers do not willingly report to the 
statistical office that they have successfully performed an illegal transaction. This limitation 
is  acknowledged  and  mitigated  to  the  extent  possible  by  approaching  the  issue  from 
different  sides:  via  the  trade  (snapshot  analysis),  interviews  with  operatives  from  law 
enforcement and customs as well as practitioners and renowned experts in the (licit) trade 
in cultural goods, and by drawing on the academic and specialist literature available. Even 
if the methodology employed does not lead to exact figures, it does provide insights into 
the complexities of the phenomenon, the markets, and the criminal justice responses. 

As a consequence, the general lack of reliable statistics on the topic of illicit trade in cultural 
goods posed a challenge to the research team. This was anticipated from the beginning of 
the study. To deal with this, the approach of the study was adjusted by shifting the focus 
from examining the available statistics, which have complications to the point of being of 
limited use, towards understanding why this lack of statistics exists in the first place. The 
study takes a step back to evaluate the fundamentals, aiming to understand the causes 
for the lack of statistics.  

An  operational  issue  is  the  relatively  low  response  rate  to  the  survey  (124  completed 
responses).  Despite  leveraging  the  professional/  expert  networks  of  the  study  team, 
support of the client and some of the key stakeholders, sending individual invitations to 
the survey to a large number of stakeholders (139) and repeated individual reminders as 
well as invitation for the target audience via thematic accounts in social media (through 
which 631 persons arrived at the survey starting page), not many respondents participated 
in  the  survey.  The  overview  below  provides  in  an  indication  of  the  response  rates  per 
stakeholder category.  

Table 2 

Response rates per stakeholder category 

Type of stakeholder 

Art consultant 

Art dealers 

Attorney 

Auction house 

Collector 

Gallery 

Government representative 

Other 

N0 

7 

25 

1 

8 

33 

2 

5 

2 

Type of stakeholder 

N0 

Inter-Governmental Organisation (IGO) 

Investigative analyst / prosecutor 

Journalist 

Legal practitioner 

7 

1 

2 

1 

Museum 

19 

Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) 

Police 

6 

9 

University / Research facility 

27 

Total = 15522 

22 A total of 155 responses were recorded, nevertheless only 124 respondents reached the end of the survey. 

60 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
For some categories of stakeholders (e.g. customs) the response rate was too low to draw 
any  reliable  conclusions.  The  issue  was  anticipated  as  previous  research  in  this  domain 
also suffered from the lack of responses. Nevertheless, the low response rates of customs 
and  other  stakeholder  categories  impacted  the  generalisability  of  the  survey’s  findings. 
Analysing the responses to the survey provided by the different stakeholders as a whole 
would pollute the conclusions as the perceptions of heavily represented groups would weigh 
more than those with a low response rate. The study team analysed the survey responses 
per stakeholder category, but as the number of responses of a specific group was often 
too low, no significant conclusions could be drawn from most of these analyses. To mitigate 
this drawback, the team decided to use the survey findings to direct the data  collection 
methods  in  the  second  part  of  the  research.  Additional  efforts  were  made  to  schedule 
interviews  with  the  stakeholder  groups  that  were  underrepresented  in  the  survey;  as  a 
result,  few  validation  interviews  could  be  conducted  with  customs  officials  and  public 
prosecutors. All in all, the team found that the willingness of some types of stakeholders 
to inform the study was low. This can be seen as a conclusion in itself: customs and public 
prosecutors do not have trafficking in cultural goods high on their ‘priority list’ and/ or are 
reluctant or unable to provide the necessary information.  

The number of respondents that indicated they do not have any knowledge of illicit trade 
in cultural goods is of particular interest, as is their distribution per stakeholder category 
(see Table 3). The survey was programmed in such a way that those who indicated they 
did not have any knowledge of illicit trade in cultural goods were redirected towards the 
end of the survey.  

Table 3 

Knowledge of illicit trade in cultural goods per stakeholder category 

Stakeholder group 

Number of 

respondents 

Percentage 

Number of 

respondents 

indicating ‘no 

knowledge of illicit 

trade’ 

Government 

Law Enforcement* 

IGOs 

Legal practitioners 

Museums 

Researchers 

NGOs 

Collectors 

Art Consultants 

Dealers 

5 

10 

7 

2 

19 

29 

6 

33 

6 

27 

1 

0 

2 

0 

9 

9 

0 

27 

4 

20 

20% 

0% 

28.6% 

0% 

47.4% 

31% 

0% 

81.8% 

66.7% 

74.1% 

* For the survey, the category “Law enforcement” covers only police representatives because no customs 

representatives responded to the survey. 

This  overview  shows  that,  in  some  stakeholder  categories,  a  substantial  part  of  the 
respondents  indicated  they  do  not  have  any  knowledge  of  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods. 
Thus, even though these respondents did participate to the study, they did not provide any 

61 

 
 
 
 
 
insights  in  the  nature,  volume  and  value  of  the  trade.  The  fact  that  over  half  the 
respondents that indicated they were dealers, art consultants or collectors indicated they 
have no knowledge of the trade whatsoever is an interesting finding in itself.  

In  the  preparation  phase  of  the  study,  the  study  team  prepared  for  the  potential 
consequences of a low response rate to the survey by integrating triangulation of findings 
from different types of sources in a later stage of the study. By triangulating the findings 
from the survey with the results from the interviews and desk research, the team was able 
to address deficiencies in understanding. Nevertheless, during the study, it became clear 
that the collected data was not compatible. Based on availability and accessibility, different 
types of information have been gathered from different sources. As mentioned above, this 
research suffers from the general lack of knowledge on the topic; data obtained from one 
type of source could often not be verified by another type of source. This has impacted the 
study team’s ability to properly apply triangulation of sources. Throughout the course of 
the study it became evident that the topic of illicit trade in cultural goods is much like a 
kaleidoscope; it is built up of many different pieces of different shapes and sizes which are 
not compatible with one another and which leave gaps. The team realises that it has only 
been  able  to  reveal  a  part  of  the  kaleidoscopic  picture  and  that  numerous  uncertainties 
remain.  Therefore,  the  triangulation  that  was  initially  foreseen  has  not  been  applied  as 
envisaged. Despite the fact that triangulation was impossible in the study at hand, it does 
illustrate  the  complexity  of  the  topic  and,  moreover,  the  dispersion  of  the  available 
information.  

A specific feature of the data collection is an uneven distribution of scoping and in-depth 
interviews  per  stakeholder  category.  While  14  interviews  were  conducted  with  police 
representatives,  one  was  conducted  with  customs,  two  with  industry  (art  dealers, 
collectors, auction houses), nil with public prosecutors and one with academic researchers. 
All in all, those on the law enforcement side were more engaged in interviews. However, 
this does not translate into a biased dataset for the following reasons. Among the survey 
respondents,  law  enforcement  represents  a  smaller  sample  in  comparison  to  industry 
stakeholders  and  academics.  By  means  of  desk  research  we  could  collect  views  of 
academics  and  industry,  the  latter  having  published  their  own  research  on  the  topic. 
Furthermore,  law  enforcement  is  the  stakeholder  group  most  directly  involved  in 
combatting  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  and  most  knowledgeable  about  criminal  justice 
responses,  which  was  the  focus  of  the  study.  First-hand  data  and  information  received 
from them is reliable and relevant. Throughout, we have sought to obtain a representative 
geographical coverage of the EU as much as possible, to take into account differing national 
circumstances and challenges. 

Some stakeholder categories (e.g. customs, public prosecutors) were harder to involve in 
interviews, and we had to rely more on desk research (specifically—on official publications 
of  competent  organisations)  in  attempt  to  remedy  this  information  gap.  Involvement  of 
customs  representatives  was  sought  through  targeted  approaches  (where  possible, 
referred  by  a  colleague  of  the  relevant  country’s  police  department)  and  through  DG 
TAXUD, which maintains regular contact with all EU Member State customs agencies. With 
a few exceptions, these efforts did not yield responses. In the end, the study has not been 
able to involve customs representatives to the  extent intended. As  customs  officials are 

62 

 
 
 
 
 
responsible for controlling goods crossing the borders, they are a crucial stakeholder group 
interfacing with illicit trade. Insufficient involvement of customs therefore has implications 
for  the  results  shown  in  this  study:  an important  part  of  the  overall big  picture  may  be 
missing. Cooperation with, and the work of, customs has been explicitly discussed in the 
interviews  with  police  officials,  however  this  only  partly  mitigates  the  limitation  as  the 
police could not provide much information about the relevant work of customs. In many 
cases,  we  observed  there  was  insufficient  coordination  between  police  and  customs, 
seemingly  reinforcing  our  own  experience  of  the  difficulties  with  involving  the  relevant 
customs officials in discussions about the issues of illicit trade in cultural goods. 

As  a  result  of  the  lack  of  statistics,  the  conclusions  of  this  study  are  predominantly 
supported by qualitative data.  The analysis is  based on the inputs received through the 
interviews, survey and desk analyses. Due to the low response to the survey, a major part 
of  the  analysis  is  developed  based  on  the  information  gathered  through  interviews  and 
desk  analyses.  As  indicated  earlier,  the  study  team  has  attempted  to  triangulate  the 
findings from the qualitative data collection methods with the survey. However, this posed 
a challenge, as information on the topic of illicit trade in cultural goods is widely dispersed 
and  often  incompatible.  Moreover,  the  information  is  not  centrally  gathered,  and  the 
amount and type of knowledge differs per type of source. As a result of the limited amount 
of available information, the study team has relied more heavily on data gathered through 
qualitative  methods.  The  team  realises  the  weaknesses  of  this  approach;  verifying  the 
information  gathered  through  interviews  is  a  challenge  and  was  not  always  possible.  In 
addition, the interviewees’ subjective perspective might have impacted the ways in which 
information was presented. Where possible, the study team tried to mitigate this risk by 
crosschecking  information  across  various  interviewees,  however,  the  team  realises  its 
significant reliance on qualitative data is a weakness. Nevertheless, given the general lack 
of data on the topic at hand, the information provided by interviewees can be understood 
as the most accurate data available. Given the absence  of compatible statistics and the 
general under-prioritisation of the issue, qualitative data is likely the most useful type of 
information available to work with.  

The  issue  of  legality  poses  an  analytical  problem.  Typically,  policy-makers  and  other 
stakeholders are interested to know the nature and scale of illicit trade. But the trade does 
not flow through clearly demarcated licit and illicit channels. Most cultural goods appearing 
for sale have either no provenance or incomplete provenance, so that often it is not possible 
for the exact legal status of any one object to be evaluated, or to ascertain without further 
investigation  whether  its  owner  has  good  title.  These  objects  are  often  called 
unprovenanced objects or orphan objects. Another possibility is to describe them as grey 
objects—objects of uncertain legality.  

A  related  problem  is  deciding  at  what  point  in  time  a  looted  or  stolen  object  enters 
legitimate  commerce,  which  for  any  one  particular  object  will  depend  upon  its  unique 
trading history. There are objects in circulation on the market that arrived there unlawfully, 
but they might have been in circulation for decades or even centuries and are now available 
for lawful transaction. It is not inherently contradictory to propose that the market (also) 
comprises objects of unlawful origin in lawful circulation.  

63 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Unlawful origin, lawful circulation? 

Cycladic  figurines  provide  a  good  example  of  a  body  of  material  that  might  be 
simultaneously  looted  and  in  seeming  lawful  circulation.  Small,  marble  Cycladic 
figurines were made on what are today the Greek Cycladic islands during the early 
bronze age. The overwhelming majority have been discovered within the borders 
of  present-day  Greece  (Marthari  et  al.  2016).  Greek  laws  expressing  public 
ownership of antiquities have existed since 1834, hardening in 1899 (Pantos 2000). 
Most Cycladic figurines in collections outside Greece have provenances dating back 
to the mid-twentieth century at the earliest, and were almost certainly taken out of 
Greece  illegally  after  1899.  Many  must  have  been  obtained  during  the  well-
documented wave of looting that swept through the Cycladic islands in the 1960s 
and 70s, which is estimated to have destroyed 12,000 early bronze age graves (Gill 
and Chippindale 1993: 625). In July 1990, Sotheby’s offered for sale a large number 
of  Cycladic  figurines  from  the  collection  of  Hans  and  Marie-Louise  Erlenmeyer 
(Sotheby’s 1990). Included in their number were 110 figurine fragments believed 
to have been discovered on the island of Keros in the 1950s or 60s and acquired 
soon after by the Erlenmeyers. They were part of a larger assemblage now dubbed 
the “Keros Hoard” (Sotirakopoulou 2005: 38-44), which was widely believed by the 
collecting and dealing communities at the time to have been looted (Getz-Gentle 
2008). The Greek government failed in its attempt through the British High Court 
to halt the Sotheby’s sale, with the judge recommending that Greece should buy 
back  the  material  at  auction  (Cassidy  1990).  Greece  subsequently  withdrew  its 
claim, and wealthy Greek citizens intervened to purchase 81 of the fragments for 
donation to the Museum of Cycladic Art, where they are now housed. Study of this 
material  has  confirmed  it  was  found  on  Keros  (Sotirakopoulou  2005).  No  one 
disputes that the Keros Hoard and indeed most Cycladic figurines circulating outside 
Greece  were  looted,  while  at  the  same  time  they  are  traded  openly  and  with 
impunity because through cross-jurisdictional trade and expired limitation periods 
they are now lawfully on the market. 

The snapshot statistics that can be produced describing the size of the market can therefore 
only  describe  the  market  in  its  entirety,  including  grey  objects  alongside  demonstrably 
legal objects. 

64 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4  Robustness of the research 

2.4.1  Impact of the methodological shortcomings on the findings 

As mentioned above, the methodological shortcomings in this study  were anticipated or 
recognised early in the study and, therefore, mitigation measures were put in place. When 
preparing the research, it was foreseen that triangulation of data from the different sources 
would be one of the mitigation strategies; in other words, comparing the results of different 
data collection methodologies as a way to strengthen the confidence in the veracity of data 
and data analysis. While collecting data, it became apparent that the type of information 
that could be retrieved through the various data collection activities differed substantially 
and was often not comparable because it referred to different aspects and elements of the 
subject-matter.  The  information  obtained  through  the  different  data  collection  methods 
presented bits and pieces in a kaleidoscope, complementing each other and providing ever 
fuller picture. However, it was rarely possible to verify the data obtained from one source 
with the data from another one. As a result, data triangulation could not be applied to our 
findings. The kaleidoscopic nature of the available information showed how little coherence 
exists in the recording of data and statistics on the topic of illicit trade in cultural goods. 
This can be understood as an important conclusion in itself.  

The task of obtaining a complete picture of the illicit trade in cultural goods proved equally 
challenging. Due to low response rates from some stakeholder groups and due to a lack of 
coherent and comprehensive record-keeping and statistics, information gaps persist, and 
the puzzle of illicit trade cannot be neatly pieced together. Some research questions can 
be still answered only in hypotheticals, and, instead of providing a straight answer to them, 
we advise on methods that can be employed and on steps that need to be taken to enable 
such answers to be given in the future. Where generalisations are not possible, we indicate 
whose opinions and information are the source of findings and conclusions. Furthermore, 
we adjusted the study’s focus to understand the reasons for the persistent lack of statistics 
and, thus, to address the more fundamental issues, which allowed us to formulate more 
relevant, accurate and effective policy recommendations.  

2.4.2  How we ensure the validity of the results 

Measuring the size and volume of an illicit market poses a significant challenge to validity, 
because, as discussed previously, there is often a lack of available statistics. In an effort 
to overcome this challenge, this research focused on gaining information and insights from 
the  stakeholders  that  are  involved  in  combatting  the  trade  (e.g.  law  enforcement  and 
customs).  

Given the nature of illicit markets, those involved in illicit activities are often reluctant to 
share information. Moreover, individuals who  are strongly involved in an illicit trade are 
often difficult to trace, let alone to approach  for an interview. On the  other hand, those 
engaged in the combating of the trade are more willing to discuss the developments and 
the progress made in their field. However, the difficulty in assessing the qualitative data 
gathered  by  talking  to  those  fighting  the  illicit  trade  is  that  it  is  disputable  whether  the 

65 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
numbers of confiscations, arrests, and cases of crimes related to cultural goods provide an 
indication of the size and volume of the trade or that they, instead, give insight into the 
effectiveness of the involved bodies. This is a well-known issue for crime research. Even if 
we were to use the statistics as a proxy for law enforcement effectiveness, their validity 
could be disputed as one is measuring outputs rather than outcomes.  

The  implication  of  this  observation  is  that  this  study  has  not  been  able  to  measure  the 
parameters of the illicit trade directly, but has had to use proxies.  

All in all, the obstacles encountered in collecting data from various resources (from non-
existence of data to unwillingness to share data, and limited quality of available data) add 
up to a severe challenge to reliably and comprehensively analysing the parameters of illicit 
trade  in  cultural  goods.  This  research  works  with  the  information  that  was  (made) 
available,  but  the  structural  issues  encountered—and  what  this  says  about  the  state  of 
knowledge about this phenomenon—merit inclusion as a fundamental conclusion in their 
own right.  

66 

 
 
 
 
 
3 

67 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  Dimensions of trafficking in cultural goods 

In  this  chapter,  several  important  parameters  of  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  are 
investigated. We start with a brief description of the context in which illicit cultural objects 
are traded, and elaborate on the object types most commonly found circulating in the illicit 
trade in cultural goods (Section 3.1). We then proceed with a discussion on the volume of 
the  trade  (Section  3.2),  which  includes  a  discussion  of  why  this  is  hard  to  measure,  a 
review of the numbers that have been obtained over the course of the study through desk 
research and interviews, and concludes with a suggestion for an approach that may assist 
in  obtaining  a  tentative  estimate  of  the  size  of  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods. 
Subsequently, an analysis of trafficking routes is presented in Section 3.3, with a discussion 
of operation modes of those involved in the illicit trade in cultural goods covered in Section 
3.4.  

3.1  Context and actors 

First, in the following paragraphs a brief discussion is presented of how the illicit market 
for  antiquities operates. It describes the main actors for  various parts of the illicit trade 
chain:  source,  transit  and  destination.  It  is  an  excerpt  from  Chapter  1  of  the  book 
‘Trafficking Culture: New Directions in Researching the Global Market in Illicit Antiquities’ 
by Simon Mackenzie, Neil Brodie, and Donna Yates (Routledge, 2019). 

The  social  construction  of  the  illicit  antiquities  trade  has  grown  around  the  basic 
concepts of supply and demand. Demand for antiquities, mostly but not exclusively, 
comes from more economically and politically secure states, inspiring a supply of 
antiquities to be sourced from less secure states, in violation of the law in one or 
both  locations.  Buyers  of  antiquities,  then,  are  willing  to  pay  a  price  that  is  high 
enough for looters and sellers of antiquities to risk a violation of the law. This fair 
but  simplistic  construction  masks  an  intricate  network  of  social,  political,  and 
economic  mechanisms  that  maintain  the  antiquities  market  (including  its  illicit 
component)  in  its  current  form;  govern  how  various  actors  negotiate  their 
involvement  in  the  trade;  and,  underlie  the  specific  decisions  made  in  heritage 
policy formulation at all levels. 

Generally  speaking,  antiquities  ‘source  countries’  tend  to  be  comparatively  lower 
income than antiquities market countries, and many of the most famous seats of 
ancient  culture  are  among  the  states  with  the  lowest  levels  of  infrastructure  and 
development. Even within wealthier ‘source countries’, major archaeological sites, 
at least those that are most often exploited, tend to be concentrated in economically 
poorer regions. 

At  the  source  end  of  the  antiquities  trade  there  are  three  main  types  of  actors: 
looters, local brokers, and facilitators. Looters, as discussed previously, are people 
who  physically  extract  antiquities  from  their  context  within  archaeological  sites. 
While  still  in  the  source  country,  looters  may  sell  their  antiquities  on  to  local, 
regional,  or  national  brokers.  These  are  early  stage  intermediaries  who  serve  to 

68 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
move the antiquities physically away from their site of looting, consolidating them 
for  further  sale.  These  brokers  may  ‘run’  in  regions,  passing  through  to  collect 
antiquities  that  locals  have  collected  for  sale.  Others  might  operate  antiquities-
related  or  other  shop  fronts  in local  markets  and  are  known  by  locals  as  reliable 
buyers. Brokers may also coordinate the targeted looting of sites. Brokers also form 
a key link in the movement of antiquities abroad, at times organising transport of 
antiquities  to  borders  and  ports,  planning  the  initial  or  complete  route  that  the 
object will take to its final market, bribing or otherwise interacting with facilitators, 
and  preparing  the  potentially  false  documents  that  the  antiquity  requires  for 
movement. Finally, facilitators often play an instrumental role at the source-end of 
the antiquities market. Here we conceive of these facilitators as actors who neither 
extract nor physically move looted antiquities, but who, through their actions, allow 
looters  and  brokers  to  operate.  This  usually  takes  the  form  of  corruption  or 
negligence on the part of individuals in a place of public trust: archaeological site 
guards,  police,  civil  servants,  elected  officials,  customs  agents,  inspectors, 
regulators, or even at times archaeologists or museum staff. 

Between  initial  extraction  from  the  ground  and  final  sale,  looted  antiquities  pass 
through a transit phase where they are moved through physical space away from 
the act of looting and towards an elite and often open market. Actors operating in 
the transport phase of the trafficking chain are able to identify the different features 
of state export and import regimes and route illicit commodities through locations 
with weaker regulation, poor staff training, or corruptible officials. These attractive 
points of through-movement for antiquities have been referred to in the literature 
as ‘transit ports’  or more  evocatively ‘portals’. Through these portals, illicit items 
mingle with licit items and often gain paperwork, a false back story [also known 
as a false provenance], and a degree of legitimacy which will allow the item to 
be moved to a location with a stricter import/export regime where they gain more 
paperwork  and  more  legitimacy.  Generally  speaking,  transit  phase  actors  can  be 
divided  into  three  groups:  brokers,  transporters,  and  facilitators.  These  perform 
related, but usually more complicated and transnational, functions as brokers and 
facilitators at source level. In the transit phase, brokers play a key role in moving 
antiquities through transit countries and in providing the pieces with the types of 
documentation required to sell it on the market [i.e. creation of false provenance 
documentation].  They  also  act  to  obscure  the  origins  of  the  piece,  creating  a 
situation where later stage sellers can plausibly deny knowledge of the illicit origins 
of the antiquities they buy. While some brokers transport antiquities themselves or 
arrange for the objects to move unaccompanied via shipping or the post, in some 
situations we see transporters who serve the functional role of moving antiquities 
from  one  location  to  another  with  particular  focus  on  moving  the  objects  across 
international  borders  and  navigating  any  checks  related  to  import  and  export. 
Facilitators during the transit phase mirror and at times include facilitators at the 
source  stage.  They,  too,  can  be  characterised  as  individuals  who  in  their  official 
capacity are able to smooth the journey of illicit antiquities from source to market 
by way of wilful negligence or corruption. 

69 

 
 
 
 
The  primary  destination  market  actors  for  the  sale  of  antiquities  are  private  and 
largely specialised antiquities dealers who sell directly to public customers and to 
each other. Many will acquire antiquities that they suspect may have been recently 
looted and trafficked, and some will knowingly and directly source looted antiquities 
from looters, traffickers, and intermediaries. As well as dealerships, antiquities are 
also bought and sold through auction houses, both via large multinational auction 
corporations  and  the  smaller  national  or  regional  houses  that  may  specialise  in 
certain types of art objects including antiquities. They style themselves as a form 
of intermediary, connecting sellers to buyers via a professional platform, with the 
understanding that they are not the owners of the antiquities they sell, rather they 
are  working  as  agents  for  their  consignors.  This  styling  can  be  misleading:  for 
example,  in  some  circumstances  auction  houses  assume  ownership  of  some 
antiquities, e.g. due to prior agreement to buy the pieces from their owner should 
they fail to sell, and eventually resell the objects via their own platform. That said, 
most  antiquities  offered  by  major  auction  houses  have  been  consigned  either  by 
private  sellers  (see  below),  or  other  antiquities  dealers.  Antiquities  are  regularly 
sold  via  major  auction  houses  accompanied  by  no  ownership  history,  and  little 
indication of current owner beyond clichés such as ‘property of an anonymous Swiss 
collector’. This makes external audit of the legitimacy and legality of the antiquities 
offered nearly impossible, and means that the auction houses themselves are able 
to  make  decisions  about  the  antiquities  consignments  they  accept  with  only 
superficial public scrutiny. 

It  would  be  misleading  to  paint  private  antiquities  collectors  with  anything  but  a 
broad brush.  They can  range  from  one-off purchasers who, for whatever reason, 
decide  to  buy  one  antiquity  and  never  engage  with  the  market  again,  to  serious 
collectors who spend a lifetime amassing what amounts to a private museum; from 
a child who spends their saved allowance on a common Roman coin to a billionaire 
who spends millions on a rare Greek bronze statue. They may be motivated by the 
enchanting  form  of  an  antiquity,  experiencing  it  as  an  art  object.  They  may  be 
drawn to buying due to an interest in the ancient past. They may buy some ancient 
objects  out  of  a  sense  of  nationalism  or  spirituality.  They  may  consider  an 
antiquities  purchase  to  be  a  business  investment.  They  may  simply  think  that  a 
particular  antiquity  might  suit  the  interior  design  of  their  home.  Yet  nearly  all  of 
these  buyers  share  the  desire  to  privately  possess  ancient  objects:  to  personally 
own them. Like dealers, private antiquities collectors are often willing to engage in 
what  can  be  characterised  as  a  grey  market  with  significant  risk  of  engaging  in 
illegality, either by choice or because of a lack of awareness of the illicit nature of 
the origins of many antiquities on the market. 

For a more complete discussion of the structure of the illicit antiquities trade, see 
Mackenzie, Brodie, and Yates 2019. 

70 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Results from the study 

The survey results demonstrate that the industry for the most part denies that there is 
illicit trade in cultural goods at all (see Table 4). In the interviews, it is often explained 
that there are individual incidents of illegal transactions, conducted by mistake or by ‘bad 
apples’ that are present in every human activity or that only low-end dealers are involved 
in them. They indicate that the art and antiquities trade is very much built on trust and is 
small,  implying  that  the  market  is  sufficiently  transparent,  and  fishy  sellers  of  cultural 
goods would have a hard time getting access to the licit market.  

Table 4 

Knowledge of illicit trade in cultural goods, various stakeholders surveyed 

Respondents were asked they had knowledge of illicit trade in cultural goods in their country. Out of 144 

respondents, 81 (56%) indicated ‘no’. The distribution between stakeholder categories is unequal. 

Stakeholder 

Participation  No indicating ‘no knowledge of illicit 

Percentage 

group 

Law Enforcement 

Legal Practitioners 

NGOs 

Government  

Researchers 

IGOs 

Museums 

Art Consultants* 

Dealers 

Collectors 

trade’ 

10 

2 

6 

5 

29 

7 

19 

6 

27 

33 

0 

0 

0 

1 

9 

2 

9 

4 

20 

27 

0% 

0% 

0% 

20% 

31% 

28.6% 

47.4% 

66.7% 

74.1% 

81.8% 

* This category was added post-hoc to the stakeholder categories, as several respondents identified themselves 

as art consultants 

Police and customs officials and public prosecutors surveyed and interviewed for this study 
overwhelmingly not only recognise illicit trade in cultural goods as a phenomenon, but also 
indicate that organised  crime is involved in its various  stages: directing looting, moving 
objects  from  dig  sites  to  local  markets,  international  transport,  and—to  a  degree—
interfacing  with the  licit  market.  Looting  can  often  even  take  the  form  of  forced  labour, 
especially  in  war  zones.  One  argument  stated  to  support  this  view  is  that  the  logistical 
challenge  of  moving  antiquities  from  source  to  market  is  far  too  great  for  unorganised 
groups to overcome. Most of the interviewees also indicate that the organised crime groups 
that are involved in the transporting of cultural goods are also active in the narcotics and/or 
arms trade. 

Many of the actors in the international art and antiquities trade are wealthy individuals, 
with considerable social capital. Often dealing firms are  family businesses, passed down 
from  one  generation  to  the  next  as  high  status  professions,  sometimes  with  high-end 
premises in desirable city locations. Many dealers are respected, well-connected individuals 
and,  as  a  whole,  the  art  dealing  community  makes  for  a  relatively  influential  lobbying 
group. .  

71 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However,  there  is  a  serious  level  of  inscrutability  about  the  antiquities  trade. 
Clients’  identities  are  fiercely  protected,  and  facts  and  figures  on  the  activities  and 
earnings of dealerships are not normally made available. So as with other types of hard-
to-investigate white-collar crime, it is extremely challenging even for the police to find out 
what is going on behind closed doors in this field. As well as hard-to-investigate, the trade 
is also hard-to-prosecute, with strategies of plausible deniability being within easy reach if 
a case should ever proceed to the  stage  of prosecution. As such, it is only in the rarest 
cases  that  matters  will  proceed  to  a  trial:  these  are  the  cases  where  there  is 
incontrovertible evidence of wrongdoing and a strong chance of getting a conviction. Most 
other cases never get past the initial investigation stage, and those that do are often settled 
by repatriations, returns, and other types of voluntary surrender of suspicious object before 
the issue comes to full-blown litigation.  

Recommendation: To break the culture of secrecy and anonymity, the regulation of 
the  art  market  should  be  brought  more  closely  in  line  with  AML  obligations,  which 
emphasise  transparency.  The  art  market  should  thus  be  subjected  to  similar 
transparency obligations as other high-value markets, such as real estate and cars. Art 
and  antiquities  dealers  should  be  obliged  to  register  details  of  all  transactions  (e.g. 
description of the object, value, seller and buyer identities). 

Unscrupulous traders also have developed various routines of cover-up in order to protect 
members against allegations of wrongdoing. Most of these are quite unsophisticated, but 
it is a marker of this area that, unlike for example tax evasion, schemes to disguise illicit 
activity in the art market do not have to be complex, so poor is the level of scrutiny of the 
trade and the low likelihood of any legal action ensuing. So, for example, objects are placed 
and  then  bought  back  through  auctions  by  the  same  dealers  to  give  them  an  apparent 
provenance. Because of the client confidentiality routines in the market even this sort of 
basic  scheme  can  be  hard  for  onlookers  to  discern.  Buyers  may  also  ask  sellers  to  sign 
documents  ‘guaranteeing’  they  have  good  title  to  an  object,  and  these  quasi-legal 
agreements  can  give  dealers  who  buy  looted  objects  an  excuse  when  subsequently 
questioned  about  what  due  diligence  they  undertook,  and  how  much  if  anything  they 
suspected at the time. These, again, are mundane schemes which can be used to thwart 
the grip that the law may otherwise have on the issue. In general, the burden of proof of 
wrongdoing is, as ever, with the police and prosecution, and in cases of white-collar crime 
this burden can be much more difficult to discharge than in  routine ‘street’ crime cases, 
simply because of the lack of transparency that surrounds antiquities dealers and deals.  

Recommendation:  To  address  cover-ups  of  illicit  transactions,  a  legal  definition  of 
acceptable  provenance  should  be  developed,  preferably  at  the  EU  level  to  ensure 
cohesion. Cultural goods should show (and/or be checked for) the proof of acceptable 
provenance. 

72 

 
 
 
 
3.2  Object types and values 

In recent years, collection of art and antiquities has become available to all layers of society 
and is no longer only a ‘hobby for the rich’. Based on anecdotal evidence, the 2016 Illicit 
Trade Report mentions that illicit trade in smaller antiquities may be on the rise and that 
larger quantities of contraband are moved in fewer shipments. Our research shows that 
particularly ancient and medieval coins (which qualify as such smaller antiquities) are often 
seized  by  law  enforcement.  Specifically,  the  snapshot  analysis  covered  in  Section  3.2 
demonstrates in a preliminary way the widespread use of online auction sites for selling 
coins  and  what  are  likely  metal  detector  finds.  The  nature  and  scale  of  the  problem 
deserves further investigation. 

Image 1 

Objects recovered by Czech and Romanian police during Operation Budweiser, 2016 

Source: Romanian Police  

As with the general trade, a large diversity of object types is present in the illicit trade in 
cultural  goods  as  illustrated  by  data  obtained  through  seizures.  Nevertheless,  many 
interviewees (e.g. stakeholders from Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland) indicate 
as a general observation that the bulk of the trade is made up by goods that are small and 
easy to smuggle, such as jewellery and coins. Coins especially make up a disproportionate 
share of items seized. This corresponds to findings from desk research: 

The World Customs Organisation (WCO) reports that, in 2015, the most often seized 
cultural goods are antiquities (such as inscriptions, coins, small seals and the like), 
followed by archives of sound, film and photographs; household items (e.g. carpets, 
samovars); archaeological items23 (WCO 2016). While coins and seals dominate the 
figures,  these  were  seized  only  in  16  of  the  25  countries  for  which  figures  are 
reported.  Some  countries  reported  seizures  only  in  one  category  of  items:  e.g. 
Latvia and Hungary—weapons; Jordan, Iran, Egypt and Syria—coins and seals. 

23 The WCO distinguishes antiquities from archaeological finds, the latter solely refer to objects that have been 
dug up. 

73 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
In  2016,  69%  of  seized  items  were  smaller  objects,  like  antiquities  (inscriptions, 
coins,  seals  and  the  like)  and  historical  items  (armour,  arms)  (WCO,  2017).  An 
additional 21% consisted of various drawings, statues, engravings, lithographs and 
similar  types  of  objects.  The  rest  were  books  and  manuscripts,  archaeological 
findings, furniture and other object types. 

In 2015, 44.235 items were seized and of those, 43.340 objects (or ~98 percent) 
were  coins  (WCO,  2016).  42.000  of  these  coins  were  seized  in  one  operation  by 
Bulgarian  customs.  Turkish  customs  also  seized  403  unspecified  antiquities,  and 
French customs seized 118 lithographs.  

These numbers from the WCO corroborate the findings from the interviews that 
small antiquities and especially coins make up the bulk of the trade. The WCO adds 
the disclaimer that the sample is extremely small and that validity of any generalisation is 
limited, while observed trends and patterns do not represent a comprehensive picture. In 
addition, it should be noted that this assessment is based on the analysis of the goods that 
interface  with  law  enforcement  (i.e.  through  seizures  and  confiscations).  There  is  an 
unknown amount of different (types of) goods in circulation that are not on the authorities’ 
radar, and this selection bias skews the perceptions regarding the presence and the share 
of  different  types  of  cultural  goods  illicitly  trading  on  the  market.  Nevertheless,  these 
findings can be substantiated by the snapshot analysis reported in Section 3.3.4 and by 
ethnographic research in Syria (Brodie and Sabrine 2018). 

Image 2 

Coins recovered by Czech and Romanian police during Operation Budweiser, 2016 

Source: Romanian Police  

A distinction can be made between the international trade—where items are sourced from 
their origin to be sold further afield—and (intra)regional markets, where items related to 
local and regional cultural heritage circulate without being moved out of the region.  

As may be expected, there is regional variation regarding the object types traded, 
depending  on  whether  a  country  is  a  source  and/or  transit  and/or  destination 
country.  For  source  countries,  the  specific  cultural  history  determines  what  types  of 
objects may be trafficked. In Scandinavia and the Baltic countries (e.g. Sweden, Norway) 
interviewees indicate, objects from the Viking era, such as knives, pottery and ceramics, 
are in high demand, while in Italy, it is mostly church objects that are at high risk of being 
stolen  (and  potentially  trafficked).  In  a  number  of  Eastern  European  countries  (e.g. 
Estonia, Latvia), illicitly excavated items from World War II are commonly seized by law 

74 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
enforcement,  as  well  as  church  objects.  Stakeholders  from  Slovenia  and  Estonia  also 
specifically mention religious objects being at risk of being stolen and potentially trafficked. 
How  reliable  these  observations  are  and  how  they  should  be  interpreted  is  difficult  to 
assess. In Italy, for example, the Italian Carabinieri claim that church objects are most at 
risk of theft and trafficking, while paradoxically official data show that in 2016 the highest 
proportion of recovered cultural objects comprised antiquities (Carabinieri 2016). Multiple 
explanations are possible for this contradiction. On the one hand, it is possible that more 
church objects are stolen, but that they also are harder to recover. On the other hand, it 
could also be that antiquities used to be more popular to steal, so that there is a ‘backlog’ 
of  stolen  specimens  that  could  be  and  are  being  recovered.  Yet  another  possible 
explanation is that thefts of cultural items from churches and monasteries are more likely 
to be reported to the police because churches would have a record of them (in a written 
form or at the very least the memory of the clergy and parishioners). This is not possible 
for illicitly dug up, and therefore unknown and undocumented, antiquities.  

It  is  important  that  more  information  be  made  available  about  the  types  of 
cultural  objects  illicitly  traded,  and  cultural  goods  most  at  risk,  in  different 
countries. 

Recommendation:  Each  country  should  establish  a  national  database  of  stolen  and 
lost cultural goods and link it to the INTERPOL’s database through regular reporting. In 
the future, interoperability of national and INTERPOL databases should be established. 
In addition, each country should formulate ‘red lists’ of national cultural goods at risk 
of looting and/or illicit trade. All national authorities that come across (illicit trade in) 
cultural goods should contribute to and consult the aforementioned database, and be 
trained in using the aforementioned red lists. 

Valuing these objects is difficult, if only because many of them have values that 
cannot  be  expressed  in  monetary  terms:  their  cultural  and  historical  significance, 
which  often  depends  on  the  (archaeological  or  architectural)  context  in  which  they  are 
found. When one does try to put a monetary value on an object, the question arises as to 
what  price  to  consider.  These  objects  often  follow  several  intermediary  steps  from  their 
origin  to  their  sale  at  the  market,  and  with  each  step  closer  to  the  market  their  price 
increases. Specifically, the price paid to the person who first comes across an object tends 
to be on the low end, the price at which it is sold on the illicit market may show a substantial 
mark-up, and the object could fetch an even higher price at an auction on the legal market. 
Furthermore, the price of an illicit transaction is usually unknown. Estimating what it would 
have been valued at if it was legally traded then needs to rest on an assumption.  

Keeping these difficulties concerning valuation in mind, at the most general level we can 
observe that as an example, coins tend to be on the cheaper end of the spectrum in terms 
of monetary value. This may also be a consequence of their relative ubiquity. On the other 
side of the spectrum, Section 3.6.1 provides a case study on Dacian bracelets that shows 
that (illicitly traded) ancient jewellery may fetch very high market prices of over €400.000. 

75 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Many of the stakeholders (e.g. Bulgaria, Europol, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, UK, 
WCO) consulted over the course of the study have reported that there is an increasing 
amount of fakes circulating on the market. Some experts interviewed for this study 
have put the number of fakes at 30% of the total objects in circulation, although no hard 
evidence was provided to support this speculation.24 These fakes are often of a very good 
quality and hard to distinguish from original artefacts. In some cases, fakes are created 
using real archaeological material from the same era, such as ancient bronze objects being 
melted  to  create  fake  ancient  coins.  The  presence  of  sophisticated  fakes  makes  it  more 
difficult to estimate the size of the market. It also complicates the work of law enforcement 
who might not have the required expertise and tools to identify fakes. Additionally, selling 
fakes  is  not  always  a  crime.  When,  after  much  time  and  effort  is  spent  on  a  long  law 
enforcement  investigation,  analysis  reveals  that  only  fakes  were  seized  during  an 
operation, it may be more difficult to obtain a warrant—as well as internal support—for a 
similar  operation  the  next  time.  It  also  negatively  impacts  the  cost-benefit  calculation 
regarding  the  deployment  of  time  and  funds  towards  investigations  into  illicit  cultural 
goods.  

Image 3 

Process of falsification of coins, dismantled by Guardia Civil and Bulgarian Police in 
Operation SÁRDICA 

Source: Guardia Civil 

24 Other experts give similar or even higher estimates. For example, art lawyer Jean-Jacques Neuer in the 
interview to Art Info, 18 January 2019, confirms the 30% estimate: 
https://www.blouinartinfo.com/news/story/3451654/fake-and-forged-works-a-conversation-with-art-lawyer-
jean . Dr Maamoun Abdulkarim, then general director of antiquities and museums in Damascus, in the interview 
to The Independent, 6 September 2016, claims that up to 80% of antiquities smuggled from Syria into Lebanon 
are fakes. The same article reports that in 2014, according to the Lebanese authorities, the estimate was 30%: 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-isis-civil-war-antiquities-fakes-palmyra-
a7228336.html . 

76 

 
 
 
                                           
Fake cultural objects 
The anonymity of the Internet market (see Section 3.4.1), or at least the distancing 
it  creates  between  sellers  and  buyers,  has  diminished  the  importance  of 
interpersonal  relationships  for  arranging  transactions  and  maintaining  long-term 
trading partnerships. This attenuated social fabric has made it easier to insert fakes 
into the market for cultural goods, and many online traders are suspected of selling 
mainly fakes, though such accusations are difficult to prove. In October 2018, for 
example,  in  the  joint  operation  Sardica,  Spanish  and  Bulgarian  police  working 
together broke up a criminal operation smuggling looted objects from Bulgaria to 
Spain by means of a shipping company, where they were sold on the Internet by 
gang members using fake user profiles (Europol 2018; Eurojust 2018). Altogether, 
there  were  17  raids  on  properties  and  13  suspects  were  arrested.  About  30,000 
objects  were  seized,  together  with  metal  detectors  and  machine  dies  and  other 
equipment used to manufacture fake coins. Operation Sardica epitomised how the 
illicit  trade  operates  in  the  2010s—an  international  group  was  both  looting  and 
faking objects for anonymous sale online (see further Section 3.4.2). 

More knowledge about the object types in circulation was also sought through running a 
survey among the different stakeholders. The sixty-three respondents that indicated they 
had knowledge of illicit trade in cultural goods in their country were asked what types of 
cultural goods are most at risk of being trafficked (multiple answers were possible). The 
results can be found in the table below. 

Table 5 

Types of objects most at risk of being trafficked, N = 63 

Type of object 

Archaeological objects 

Liturgical objects 

Objects of art 

Objects of ethnographic interest 

Incunabula and manuscripts* 

Other 

Respondents 

% of total respondents 

56 

27 

22 

15 

9 

7 

88 

42 

34 

23 

14 

11 

* An incunable or incanubulum is an early printed book, especially one printed before 1501. 

While archaeological objects are not further specified, these findings are not at odds with 
the findings from the other data collection activities.  

To  deepen  our  understanding,  the  survey  responses  were  analysed  by  stakeholder 
category. In Annex 3, we provide an overview and analysis of the responses provided. In 
short, it was found that the majority of the respondents indicated that the types of objects 
being trafficked have changed since 2000. The responses gathered during the validation 
meeting show that this group generally believes that the types of goods being traded has 
stayed the same.  

77 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3  Volume of trade 

3.3.1  Measuring illicit trade: impossible at worst, difficult at best 

Reliable  statistical  descriptions  of  the  material  volume  and  monetary  value  of  the  illicit 
trade in antiquities and other cultural goods do not exist.  

In the absence of reliable statistics, it is  sometimes reported in the media that the illicit 
trade  is  worth  billions  of  dollars  a  year  and  these  figures  are  then  repeated  by  policy-
makers and other stakeholders.  

Unfortunately,  such  figures  cannot  be  confirmed  by  reliable  data.  The  World  Customs 
Organisation (WCO) states on its website (emphasis added):  

“Estimates  of  the  size  and  profitability  of  black  markets  in  looted,  stolen  or 
smuggled works of art are notoriously unreliable, but specialists agree that this is 
one of the world’s biggest illegal enterprises, worth billions of US dollars, which has 
naturally attracted interest of organised crime” (WCO n.d.). 

Although it should be noted that many specialists interviewed for this study disagree that 
the illicit trade in cultural goods represents billions of US dollars, this is beside the point. 
As a large portion of the interviewees underscored, approaching the illicit trade in cultural 
goods from a purely economic perspective is wrong. Black markets should be addressed 
not  only  because  of  the  revenue  they  generate  but  predominantly  to  counter  the 
destructive effect they have on humankind’s shared cultural heritage.  

The origins of the outlandish billion dollar figures are now obscure, but are usually traced 
back to Interpol. In 1998, for example, a US government official writing about the illicit 
trade in cultural goods stated that “according to Interpol, it now ranks with drugs and arms 
as  one  of  the  three  most  serious  illicit  international  trading  activities,  valued  at 
approximately  $4.5  billion  annually”  (Kouroupas  1998).  The  figures'  origins  have  been 
traced back even further, to an unnamed “European official” claiming at a conference in 
the  1980s  that  the  trade  in  looted  antiquities  was  a  $6  billion  business  (Adam  2016). 
Interpol  has  taken  pains  to  distance  itself  from  these  figures  by  stating  on  its 
website: 

“We do not possess any figures which would enable us to claim that trafficking in 
cultural property is the third or fourth most common form of trafficking, although 
this is frequently mentioned at international conferences and in the media. 

In  fact,  it  is  very  difficult  to  gain  an  exact  idea  of  how  many  items  of  cultural 
property are stolen throughout the world and it is unlikely that there will ever be 
any accurate statistics. National statistics are often based on the circumstances of 
the theft (petty theft, theft by breaking and entering or armed robbery), rather than 
the type of object stolen. 

78 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An  enhanced  information  exchange  could  assist  INTERPOL  in  determining  the 
importance  as  well  as  the  trends  and  patterns  of  this  type  of  crime”.  (INTERPOL 
2019) 

This statement has been on the Interpol website since at least 2005 (Fitz Gibbon 2005: 
179) but has been widely ignored. 

Trade  organisations  have  produced  their  own  statistics.  In  2005,  for  example,  after 
consultation with Sotheby’s, Christie’s and 20 private dealers in New York, London, Paris, 
Geneva,  Montreal,  Jerusalem  and  Frankfurt,  one  study  concluded  that  worldwide  the 
annual value of antiquities sales amounted to $200 million (Kozloff 2005: 187). In 2013, 
the International Association of Dealers in Ancient Art (IADAA) suggested the annual value 
of the licit global trade in antiquities, excluding Internet sales, to be €200 million at most 
(IADAA 2013). If those statistics were correct, they are not open to independent 
appraisal  because  the  underlying  data  have  not  been  published.  They  might  be 
undervaluing  the  market,  which  has  the  consequence  of  diminishing  problematic 
externalities. In turn, as it is seemingly a small problem, external regulation or other policy 
constraints become less likely. 

3.3.2  Obstacles facing reliable measurements 

Reliable  and  comparable  statistics  are  in  some  sense  a  prerequisite  to  organising  an 
effective response to illicit trade in cultural goods. Without an overview of what is found 
where,  it  is  hard  to  tailor  law  enforcement  responses  to  the  local  needs.  Unfortunately, 
there are obstacles to creating reliable statistics at several different levels. A vicious circle 
can be discerned, simultaneously caused by and resulting from a low prioritisation of the 
issue: without a good understanding  of the size of the problem, it  is difficult to 
muster  adequate  resources  to  fight  it.  At  the  same  time,  without  adequate 
dedicated  resources  the  nature  and  scale  of  the  problem  cannot  be  properly 
understood. (A further elaboration of this vicious circle can be found in Section 4.3. In 
addition,  this  has  the  effect  of  reducing  technology  innovation  and  uptake,  as  will  be 
presented in Chapter 5.) 

Differences in definitions 
On the most fundamental level, different national legislation regarding what constitutes 
cultural  goods,  how  these  are  protected  and  what  is  allowed  and  prohibited  reflect  a 
diverging  conception  of  what  is  in  need  of  protection.  Whereas  some  countries  allow 
amateurs to use a metal detector to locate and then keep cultural objects (e.g. UK), in 
others  this  is  considered  a  crime  (e.g.  Belgium).  While  some  allow  for  free  trade  of 
cultural  goods  that  have  been  legally  acquired  (e.g.  Germany),  others  bar  what  is 
recognised  as  their  national  heritage  from  leaving  their  territory  (e.g.  Cyprus,  Italy, 
Spain). This divergence means that cultural crimes recorded in country A might well be 
fully legal in country B, which stands in the way of creating fully comparable statistics at 
the  European  level,  although  it  would  allow  for  a  country  by  country  analysis  to  an 
extent. 

79 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Export of cultural property from Spain 

To illustrate the argument above, consider the following case from Spain. The law 
on Spanish Historical Heritage is one of the more restrictive in the EU. Items that 
are classified as cultural property under this law, even if in private possession, move 
into the public domain. This means that individual ownership of the cultural property 
may continue, but the Spanish state will protect its artistic, historical, spiritual value 
which may indirectly affect the right of ownership. The cultural property becomes 
inseparable  from  its  surroundings  and  is  non-exportable.  To  move  abroad  items 
that  are  more  than  100  years  old  or  included  in  the  National  Heritage  General 
Inventory a special export permit is required that is rarely granted. 

Mr. Jaime Botín, a Spanish billionaire founder of Santander bank, wished to export 
Picasso’s  painting  ‘Head  of  a  Young  Woman’  to  Switzerland  for  some  years.  He 
acquired it in 1977 at a London auction and in 2012 sought permission to export it 
to London (to sell it again). His request was denied. In August 2015, the painting 
was seized by French customs while on board of one of his yachts, moored off the 
harbour of the French island of Corsica. Mr. Botín was charged with smuggling of 
cultural goods, with prosecutors demanding a four-year prison sentence and a €100 
million fine. In most other European countries, Botín's export of the painting would 
be  considered  legal.  This  presents  a  problem  for  discussions  about  a  coherent 
European  approach  to  addressing  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  (Financial  Times 
2015; Artnet 2017). 

Recommendation: A  common definition  of (illicit trade in) cultural goods  should be 
introduced in the EU and, ideally, by all countries around the world. The ratification and 
transposition of the Nicosia Convention (see Section 4.2.1) would be a step in the right 
direction. 

Politically, and related to the point previously made about definitions and legislation, this 
issue is not prioritised equally in all EU Member States. Those Member States that 
see the combatting of illicit trade in cultural goods as a more salient issue tend to make 
more funding towards its investigation available for law enforcement units. The lack of a 
requirement for Member States to report cases in this crime area to the European 
Commission in this sense presents a missed opportunity.25 At the moment,  cases 
and statistics are only shared on an informal basis with Europol. 

On  a  practical  level,  the  nature  of  cultural  property  crimes  means  that  in  the 
majority of cases there seem to be no victims (i.e. that this is a victimless crime): 

25 In the field of culture, the EU has strictly a supporting competence; within the Internal Market it has a shared 
competence with the Member States; and regarding customs and trade it has exclusive competence. Illicit trade 
in  cultural  goods  falls  somewhere  in  between  these  categories.  For  other  cross-border  crimes  involving  illicit 
exports-imports (e.g. firearms, drugs), such data is gathered by the European Commission’s DG HOME and DG 
TAXUD, and Member States are required to report. This is not the case for cultural goods, however. The European 
Commission has tasked Europol with conducting analysis of cross-border crimes in the EU under the EU Policy 
Cycle for serious and organised international crime. See https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact, even if Europol 
does not have competence to impose reporting obligations.  

80 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
objects  that  have  been  looted  from  licensed  archaeological  or  illegal  dig  sites  have  no 
‘owner’ who will make a declaration to the police, who will be directly affected and who 
may drive the investigation. Oftentimes, the object’s existence was unknown before being 
dug up and entering illicit market pathways. There are therefore fewer leads for police to 
work  with.  Such  leads  would  normally  trigger  investigations  that  in  turn  ensure  more 
information becomes available for statistical purposes as well. 

Illicit trade in cultural goods as a ‘victimless crime’ 

This study has encountered various incarnations of the conception of the antiquities 
trade as a victimless crime. However, the opposite is true. The long-term economic 
costs of the trade are well documented (Brodie 2010), but less well-known is the 
tragic cost in human life. Between 2012 and 2017, for example, at least 25 people 
were reported to have died in Egypt while engaged in illegal digging, often under 
their own homes (AFP 2012; Ahram Online 2016; Ahram Online 2017a; Al-Masry 
Al-Youm 2015). One was an eleven-year-old boy (Ahram Online 2017b). On top of 
this, in 2016, two site guards were killed by unknown assailants during an attack 
on the archaeological site of Dayr al-Barsha in al-Minya governorate (Sutton 2016). 

Operationally, in some cases statistics on the illicit trade in cultural goods are not 
compiled  simply  because  it  is  not  required  that  officials  do  so.  Statistics  are 
generally  a  by-product  of  investigations.  In  an  environment  with  constrained  resources, 
when a crime area is not prioritised politically, law enforcement will focus on investigating 
crimes  for  which  they  have  more  (substantial)  leads.  In  addition,  in  some  cases  law 
enforcement IT systems may be outdated and do not allow for an easy retrieval of relevant 
cases overviews, so that compiling the relevant statistics becomes an arduous task.26 This 
is compounded by the lack  of a dedicated reporting category (see the note  on statistics 
below). 

Recommendation: An agreed-upon definition of illicit trade in cultural goods  should 
be translated into a standardized data collection template for use by relevant national 
authorities.  Systematic  data  collection  according  to  this  template  should  be  made 
mandatory.  

Lack of awareness and expertise on the topic among local law enforcement officials 
(including  border  police,  customs,  and  local  police)  can  lead  to  a  failure  in  detecting 
trafficking  cases,  which  means  the  scope  of  the  problem  is  underestimated.  Another 
consequence is misreporting or mislabelling of cases in police databases, for example when 
a case of trafficking does not get the additional label ‘cultural goods’.27 As databases are 
generally not regularly revisited for recoding, such ‘pollution’ of the databases stands in 
the way of reliable statistics.  

In addition, it is widely believed (and indicated by multiple interviewees, for example, 
from Europol, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain) that looted archaeological objects and 

26 As mentioned by an interviewee from Romania. 
27 As mentioned by interviewees from Estonia, Germany and Norway, among others. 

81 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
works  of  art  from  conflict  zones  are  ‘put  on  ice’  for  a  period:  that  they  are 
warehoused for several years and then brought to the market only when these conflicts 
are no longer on the general public’s mind (see also the box text in Section 3.4.2). For 
example, and as a consequence, several police interviewees have indicated they suspect 
Iraqi and Syrian objects looted in recent conflict will only appear on the market after a few 
years have passed. There is no evidence to support this opinion, however, and it 
should be treated with caution. However, the snapshot analysis of German-language 
websites conducted for this study can be considered as an anecdotal evidence confirming 
the opinion of the interviewees. 

Compounding these difficulties, the trade is generally believed to be badly infiltrated 
by fakes, and it is usually not possible to ascertain the authenticity of an object from its 
catalogue or website description or image.28 Thus, statistics describing the size of the illicit 
trade might overestimate its real material volume and monetary value. This might not be 
a problem if the point of the  statistics is to act as a proxy measure of criminal activity, 
including fraud alongside theft and related offences. 

In many cases there is no separate police or customs code for recording crimes 
related  to  cultural  goods  in  crime  statistics  databases.29  In  such  situations  police 
cannot record trafficking cultural goods  other than under categories such as ‘fencing’  or 
‘property crime’, and customs cannot specifically record seizures of looted cultural goods 
at the border as such in their database. In theory, national trade statistics reported using 
the WCO Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, or Harmonized System 
(HS)  could  be  used  to  estimate  the  value  and  volume  of  the  trade.  Unfortunately,  in 
addition  to  a lack  of  reporting  on  the  issue  by  many  countries,  the  reporting  categories 
themselves  are  too  broad  as  to  be  analytically  useful.  The  relevant  Chapter  9705,  for 
example, gathers information relating to “Collections and collectors' pieces of zoological, 
botanical,  mineralogical,  anatomical,  historical,  archaeological,  palaeontological, 
ethnographic or numismatic interest”, thus lumping cultural goods together with objects 
of natural origin.  

Improving statistical reporting 

In 2018, the United States amended its Harmonized Tariff Schedule Chapter 9705 
to include 9705.00.0075, “Archaeological pieces” of cultural significance that are at 
least 250 years old and of a kind normally discovered through scientific excavation, 
clandestine  or  accidental  digging  or  exploration  on  land  or  under  water,  and 
9705.00.0080, “Ethnographic or Ethnological pieces” that are the product of a tribal 
or nonindustrial society and important to the cultural heritage of a people because 
of  their  distinctive  characteristics,  comparative  rarity  or  their  contribution  to  the 
knowledge of the origins, development or history of that people. These amendments 
were introduced specifically to improve statistical analysis of trade data (USA 2018). 

28 As mentioned by stakeholders from Germany and WCO, among others. 
29 Mentioned by stakeholders from five countries, including Norway, Slovenia, Austria, Czech Republic, the US. 

82 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
Recommendation:  Specific  codes  for  registering  offences  concerning  illicit  trade  in 
cultural goods in the systems of customs and police should be created. 

Cases  that  are  picked  up  by  law  enforcement  for  further  investigation  and  potential 
prosecution may be approached from a money laundering angle.30 Trafficking in cultural 
goods  often  occurs  alongside  money  laundering  and  money  laundering  has  a  burden  of 
proof that is easier to satisfy and has higher sanctions. In such cases, the criminal case is 
likely to be recorded as a money laundering case and not as a case concerning the illicit 
trade in cultural goods, which also impacts the statistics. 

Many countries also lack a central body where all relevant cases of cultural goods trafficking 
are  gathered,  from  local,  regional  and  national  police  as  well  as  border  police  and 
customs.31  Without  a  central  point  having  a  complete  overview  of  all  relevant  cases  is 
challenging, and statistics are partial at best. In addition, the administrative and reporting 
structure of relevant agencies and stakeholders that could collect statistics varies across 
countries,  which  complicates  information  sharing.32  The  lack  of  such  a  central  point 
also bars the compilation of reliable statistics at EU level. 

Recommendation: The EU should investigate ways to promote central collection of all 
relevant statistics. Europol could play a supporting role to national law enforcement in 
this field.  

3.3.3  On the numbers that do exist 

Desk  research  shows  that  figures  related  to  the  illicit  trafficking  of  cultural  goods  are 
being  reported  at  the  international  and  European  level.  The  WCO  compiles  annual  Illicit 
Trade  Reports  (ITR),  which  has  included  a  dedicated  chapter  on  cultural  heritage  since 
2015  (WCO  n.d.).  The  numbers  mentioned  in  these  sections  are  based  on  voluntary 
reporting by countries to the WCO through the Customs Enforcement Network (CEN). The 
WCO  itself  indicates  and  stresses  that  these  numbers  should  not  be  taken  as 
representative, comprehensive or fully reliable because they represent only a small 
sample. As one of the few publications actually reporting numbers, the ITR figures are still 
relevant and the table below summarises some key indicators from these reports. 

30 Mentioned by Romanian, Belgian and UK stakeholders among others. 
31 Mentioned by Romanian, Belgian, Swedish, Slovakian stakeholders amongst others. 
32 Mentioned by a Belgian stakeholder. 

83 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
Table 6 

WCO Illicit Trade Reports, key findings 

Year 

2015 

2016** 

2017 

# countries  # cases 

# border seizures  # objects seized 

13 

13 

25 

Unknown 

47 

44.235  

(during Operation Odysseus)* 

138 

140 

146 

167 

8.343 

14.753 

* 43.340 of these objects were coins, of which 42.000 seized in a single operation 

** The 2017 report shows different numbers for 2016 than mentioned in the 2016 report, for example stating 

that 15 countries reported rather than the 13 mentioned in the 2016 ITR. 

The  WCO  reports  showcase  some  of  the  challenges  experienced  when  estimating  the 
volume  of  illicit  trade.  The  rate  of  reporting  is  very  low:  only  a  small  percentage  of  the 
WCO membership actually submits figures on relevant cases each year. Because reporting 
is voluntary, the completeness of the statistics is questionable, with questions remaining 
as to whether countries report all cases and seizures or only some of them. Reporting is 
also sporadic across years: while some countries submit figures every year, many do so 
inconsistently. This makes for statistics that are not comparable over time. It can also be 
observed  that  statistics  are  easily  skewed by  the  type  of  cultural  good  being  seized,  for 
example one-off seizures of coin hoards balloon the totals.  

At  the  European  level,  data  have  also  emerged  through  joint  operations  of  different 
Member  States,  with  Europol  facilitation  and  coordination.  Prominent  among  these  are 
Operations PANDORA I and II (2016 and 2017), Operation Demetra (2018) and Operation 
Sardica (2018). These are summarised in Table 7 below. 

Table 7 

European law enforcement operations, illicit trade in cultural goods 

Operation 

Lead  and  participating 

Objects seized 

Arrests 

Investiga

countries 

tions 

Colosseum33 

IT, MT, EL, CY (lead); AT, 

34Nov 2011 

BE, BG, CZ, EE, DE, HU, 

LU, RO, NL, SK, ES; non-

EU: RU, CH, TR, UA, USA 

Odysseus 

IT, MT, EL, CY (lead); BE, 

Jan – Jun 2014 

BG, CZ, DE, ES, LU, HU, 

NL, AT, RO, SK; non-EU: 

RU, CH, TR, UA, USA 

Pandora I35 

CY and ES (lead); AT, BE, 

17 – 23 Nov 

BG, HR, DE, EL, IT, MT, 

2017 

NL, PL, PT, RO, UK; non-

EU: BA, RS, CH 

459 objects, 32 seizures 

Not known  Not known 

 Not known 

Not known  Not known 

3.561 works of art and cultural 

goods; 500 archaeological objects 

75 

92 

(400 coins) 

33 UNESCO (27 April 2013) Prevention and fight against illicit trafficking of Libyan cultural property. Introductory 
workshop, Tripoli, 27-30 April 2013 - Libya Museum. FINAL REPORT.  
34 News and Society (n.d.) Joint Customs Operation Colosseum. 
35 Europol (23 January 2017) ‘Press Release: 3561 artefacts seized in Operation Pandora’ [Operation Pandora I]. 

84 

 
 
 
 
 
                                           
Operation 

Lead  and  participating 

Objects seized 

Arrests 

Investiga

countries 

ES (lead for Europe); 80 

other countries 

Pandora II36 

20  –  30  Nov 

2017 

Demetra38 

4 July 2018 

More than 20.00037 (41.000 

worldwide in operation ATHENA, 

53* 

200* 

tions 

led by Interpol and WCO) 

25.000 archaeological goods 

valued at 40 mEUR during action 

IT (lead); DE, UK, ES 

day;  

Sardica39 

23 Oct 2018 

ES, BG (lead); also 

support from Eurojust 

3.000 archaeological goods (+ 

1.000 fakes) valued at 40 mEUR. 

30.000 artefacts (genuine or 

forged); 

180.000 EUR cash 

23 

13 

1 

1 

*  Notably,  UNESCO  indicates  the  operation  resulted  in  300  investigations  and  100  arrests,  See 

https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-and-european-union-join-forces-lawyers-police-and-customs-officers-curb-

illicit. 

Source: UNESCO, 2013; News and Society (n.d.); Europol, 2017; 2018a; 2018b; UNESCO, 2018.  

During  interviews,  law  enforcement  officials  involved  in  these  operations  stressed  that 
these  figures  cannot  be  extrapolated  to  produce  a  representative  European 
picture. The results from any one operation only represent a snapshot of the illicit trade 
in cultural goods. The results of the operations are also hard to interpret. Some countries 
had  large  seizures,  and  some  had  none  or  only  small  cases.  Seizures  represent  objects 
that  are  suspected  of  being  looted  or  stolen,  but  cannot  be  assumed  as  such  without 
knowing the outcomes of the related investigations, which may take years. And what does 
the lack of seizures/confiscations mean? It may mean that there is limited illicit trafficking 
in  cultural  goods  through  a  specific  country.  But  it  could  also  mean  that  there  was  no 
trafficking at the time of the operation. Or it could mean that cultural goods are trafficked 
through that country via a means, mechanism, or route that was not under investigation 
in  this  operation.  Yet  another  possibility  is  that  law  enforcement  officers  did  not  search 
properly and/or failed to recognise relevant cultural objects due to lack of training or skills. 
One more possibility is that not enough resources were dedicated to the operation. Another 
often-heard  analysis  in  cases  of  large  seizures  or  in  which  a  number  of  arrests  and/or 
confiscations took place is that illicit trade in cultural goods flourishes in a specific country. 
However, such conclusions are yet another way to interpret the information.  

One thing that is clear is that only limited information is made available about these 
operations. For example, the report on JCO Odysseus which was due to be published in 
March 2015, has not yet been placed into the public domain. 

36 Europol (21 February 2018) ‘Press Release: Over 41 000 artefacts seized in global operation targeting the illicit 
trafficking of cultural goods’ [Operation Pandora II]. 
37  UNESCO  (May  2018),  Sixth  Session  of  the  Subsidiary  Committee  of  the  Meeting  of  States  Parties  to  the 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of 
Cultural Property. 
38  Europol  (4  July  2018)  ‘Press  Release:  Hard  blow  against  illegal  trafficking  of  cultural  goods’  [Operation 
Demetra].  
39 Europol (5 November 2018) ‘Press Release: Spanish and Bulgarian police recover more than 30 000 stolen and 
forged archaeological goods’. 

85 

 
 
 
 
                                           
Recommendation: The EU and the Member States should publish as much information 
about actions of European law enforcement efforts and their results, as long as this does 
not harm operative work. Such publications would contribute to raising awareness about 
this topic and improve the general information level.  

From  the  interviews  and  survey  conducted  during  this  study,  it  became  clear  that 
statistics related to the illicit traffic in cultural goods are not or are inconsistently 
tallied  in  most  European  countries.  The  data  that  was  made  available  (through  the 
interviews and survey) is summarised in Table 8 below. As can be seen, the data do not 
cover all EU Member States and do not cover the same elements for those that have shared 
numbers. Crucially, numbers for four of the most important players, Italy, Spain, France 
and  the  UK,  are  missing.  The  overview  presented  below  confirms  the  observation  that 
statistics on this topic are not kept in a consistent and comprehensive manner throughout 
Europe.  Although  some  interviewees  keep  personal  (statistical)  notes,  many  of  the 
interviewees  indicate  that  they  do  not  keep  statistics,  and  when  asked  for  available 
numbers they present approximations (what they remember) or average numbers for the 
last few years. Some interviewees said that statistics were once kept but are not kept any 
more  or  that  they  have  started  to  keep  statistics  only  in  the  past  1–2  years.  Reasons 
given why statistics are not kept include that it is not the legal competence of the 
agency or not required by the organisation or any law. 

Table 8 

Assorted numbers, 2017 

Country 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Czech 
Republic 
Estonia 

Germany 

  2 police cases 

  30 customs cases 

  Customs cases were linked to money laundering 

  In addition, there have been some 40 international requests 

  36.000 objects seized (2018 data) 

  10 objects seized 

  Number  of confiscated  objects  is stable. In 2015  and  2016,  one  item whereas  in  2017  and 

2018 none. 

  20 (BW)* police cases 

  3 (Bav)** police cases 

  25 – 35 customs cases 

  137 (BW) objects seized (100 coins, 30 terracotta artefacts, 7 Ancient Egyptian artefacts)  

  7.000 (Bav) objects seized (6.500 coins: some experts say 80 are fakes, others say 70% are 

Latvia  

authentic) 

  7 police cases 

  1.000 objects seized 

  982 (2018 data) 

  10 criminal proceedings (2016 data.) 

  There have been 25 criminal proceedings each year before 2016 

  Latvia was a boom in illegal activities in 2014-2015 

86 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 

Norway 

Romania 

  20 police cases 

  10 police cases 

  6.043 objects seized (about 12.000 in 2016; before that 4.000 annually)  

  30 arrests (since 2000) 

Slovenia 

  50 police cases 

  The number of police cases is more or less steady throughout the years 

  Since 2014, there have virtually been no cases for Customs. Before 2014 it was 3 to 5 a year 

  Pre-2012 data was erased when customs merged with tax administration 

Sweden  

  1 customs case 

  8 objects seized 

  From 2010-2014, 5 cases of museum thefts and 5 cases of church thefts 

  Since 2016 only one court case, which was dismissed due to insufficient evidence 

*BW is short for Baden-Württemberg 

** Bay is short for Bayern 

The  table  above  illustrates  the  incompatibility  of  the  (type  of)  statistics  that  are 
being recorded. It shows that in some countries police do record (formally or informally) 
the amount of cases they deal with on an annual basis, whereas customs do not (or vice 
versa).  In  addition,  the  numbers  on  the  amount  of  seized  objects  differ  greatly, 
predominantly as a result of the individual recording of confiscated coins (i.e. some record 
a  hoard  of  coins  as  one  confiscated  item  whereas  others  record  each  coin  individually). 
Finally,  the  table  provides  an  indication  of  the  human  resources  that  are  tasked  with 
working on the topic of illicit trade in cultural goods in the various countries; often fewer 
personnel  affected  the  quality  of  the  statistics  being  recorded.  To  illustrate,  in  some 
countries  there  is  only  one  person  working  in  this  field  within  law  enforcement;  these 
individuals often stopped recording statistics and simply depend on their memory of how 
many cases they worked in the past.  

Recommendation: Compiling statistical data on the offences related to illicit trade in 
cultural goods should be made mandatory in all EU Member States and encouraged in 
non-EU  countries.  All  relevant  national  authorities  should  contribute  to  such  data 
collection  efforts (police, border police, customs, and others as  relevant according to 
national circumstances). Common criteria for gathering statistical information on illicit 
trade in cultural goods should be developed and agreed at the EU level.  

3.3.4  How a (tentative) estimate can be compiled 

In this section, we report the outcomes of the snapshot analyses, covering antiquities from 
Europe,  North  Africa  and  West  Asia,  and  ancient  and  medieval  coins  respectively  on  a 
number  of  important,  open  market  fora.  It  is  important  to  note  that  these  statistics 
summarise the open European market in cultural goods, not the illicit market. 

87 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Antiquities snapshot analysis 

Table 9 provides sales statistics for a one-year period (mid-2017 to mid-2018) of physical 
sales at major European auction houses. Price data for auction houses operating through 
Drouot in Paris are not freely available; Table 10 therefore provides statistics for two major 
Parisian auction houses, listing mean median-estimate values in place of average prices. 
Table 10 also lists calculated totals for the two Parisian auction houses, assuming from the 
Bonhams and Gorny & Mosch figures that 67 per  cent of all offered lots sold for a mean 
price in line with the mean median-estimate value. This means that two-thirds of the lots 
are assumed to have the average value of the known lots. Sotheby’s is the clear market 
leader in terms of monetary value, but sells fewer lots than its competitors. These statistics 
describe only major antiquities sales, and there are many other smaller sales at auction 
houses throughout Europe. 

Table 9 

Annual sales statistics (mid-2017 to mid-2018) for major auction houses 

Country  Company  Number 

Total 

Total 

Percentage 

Average 

Total 

revenue 

of sales 

number 

number 

lots sold 

price  per 

(EUR) 

of 

lots 

of 

lots 

lot (EUR) 

offered 

sold 

London, 

UK 

London, 

UK 

London, 

UK 

Sotheby’s 

Christie’s 

Bonhams 

Munich, 

Gorny & 

Germany 

Mosch 

2 

2 

2 

191 

155 

81 

68.202 

10.571.291 

Not 

known 

181 

26.069 

4.718.456 

393 

260 

66 

7.689 

1.391.709 

2 

1321 

913 

69 

2.444 

2.231.372 

Table 10 

Annual statistics (mid-2017 to mid-2018) for major Parisian auction houses 

Country 

Company 

Number  of 

Total 

Calculated 

Mean 

Calculated 

sales 

number  of 

number  of 

median-

total 

lots offered 

lots sold 

estimate 

revenue 

per 

lot 

(Euros) 

(Euros) 

Paris, France  Millon 

Paris, France 

Pierre Bergé  

2 

2 

560 

592 

375 

397 

2.373 

7.437 

889.875 

2.952.489 

Invaluable  is  an  online  aggregator  site  or  marketplace  hosting  single  seller  electronic 
auctions of art and other cultural objects. Table 11 lists the number of European auctions 
listed  on  Invaluable  containing  antiquities  over  a  six-month  period  (1  March  2018  to  1 
September 2018). The 13 auctions offered 4.184 lots, of which 2.789 lots (67 per cent) 
were sold. Table 12 lists sales statistics for seven of those auctions (statistics of the other 
6 auctions were not available).  

88 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11   Number of electronic auctions completed on Invaluable containing antiquities over a 

six-month period (1 March 2018 to 1 September 2018) 

Country 

Belgium 

France 

Spain 

Switzerland 

UK 

Total 

Number of companies 

Number of auctions 

1 

2 

2 

3 

4 

12 

1 

2 

2 

4 

4 

13 

Table 12 

Sales statistics for seven electronic auctions completed on Invaluable containing 

antiquities over a six-month period (1 March 2018 to 1 September 2018) 

Country 

of 

Number  of 

lots 

Number  of 

lots 

Percentage 

lots 

Average price per 

company 

offered 

sold 

sold 

lot (Euros) 

Belgium 

France 

Spain 

Switzerland 

UK 

UK 

UK 

48 

96 

80 

181 

197 

144 

47 

56 

8 

162 

100 

41 

2.849 

1.950 

98 

58 

10 

89 

51 

28 

68 

2.282 

15.344 

1.450 

1.097 

2.536 

1.081 

584 

Total - 3.595 

Total - 2.364 

Mean - 66 

Mean - 1.097 

Extrapolation. Assuming from Table 12 an average price per lot of €1.097, then over the 
six-month  period  the  sale  of  2.789  lots  in  the  total  of  13  auctions  would  have  realised 
€3,05 million. Extrapolating over a one-year period, the sale of 5.578 lots would realise a 
total revenue of €6,1 million. 

Catawiki  is  an  online  site  hosting  auctions  of  cultural  objects  and  other  collectibles 
consigned for sale by sellers. Some auctions are single vendor sales. Others are multiple 
vendor sales. Table 13 lists the number of sellers consigning material to auctions listed on 
Catawiki over a three-week period (two weeks in September 2018 and one week in January 
2019). 

Table 13 

Number of sellers consigning material for sale on Catawiki over a three-week period 

(September 2018 and January 2019)  

Number of sellers 

Country 

Austria 

Belgium 

France 

Germany 

Italy 

Netherlands 

Poland 

4 

1 

17 

14 

9 

21 

1 

89 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 

Portugal 

Spain 

Switzerland 

UK 

Number of sellers 

Total 

1 

8 

3 

7 

86 

Over the three weeks, 444 lots were offered in five auctions of ‘Ancient Jewellery’. In one 
of the auctions, 46 out of 72 offered lots sold (64 per cent) with an average price of €96.  

Extrapolation. Assuming 64 per cent of the 444 offered lots sold (284 lots), with an average 
price of €96, the total revenue realised over the three-week period would be €27.264. Over 
a  one-year  period,  the  projected  sale  of  4.923  lots  would  realise  a  total  revenue  of 
€472.576. 

Over  the  three  weeks,  762  lots  were  offered  in  eight  ‘Archaeology’  auctions.  The  sales 
statistics were recorded for four sales. In total, for the four sales, 160 out of 389 offered 
lots sold (41 per cent) with an average price of €278.  

Extrapolation. Assuming 41 per cent of the 762 offered lots sold (312 lots), with an average 
price of €278, the total revenue realised over the three-week period would be €260.208. 
Over a one-year period, the sale of 5.408 lots sold would realise a total revenue of €4,51 
million. 

In total, it is estimated that in one year Catawiki will sell 10.331 lots of cultural goods with 
a revenue of about €5 million. 

eBay offers an online marketplace for sellers to auction material directly to the public. It 
maintains individual sites for most European countries. Sales statistics of sold antiquities 
on the eBay UK site were collected for one day (8 April 2018). Table 14 lists the number 
of sellers active that day, together with their listed country of residence. 

Table 14 

Number of sellers active on eBay UK on 8 April 2018. 

Country 

Austria 

Bosnia 

Cyprus 

France 

Italy 

Portugal 

Serbia 

UK 

Number of sellers  

Total 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

2 

41 

49 

Altogether, on that one day, 144 lots sold with an average price of €35 and a total revenue 
of €4.999.  

90 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extrapolation. Assuming these statistics are representative of daily sales activity, over a 
one-year period 52.560 lots would be sold realising a total revenue of €1,8 million. 

A total of 124 out of 144 of the sold lots (86 per cent) were made of metal. Most of these 
lots probably comprised metal detector finds. It was also observed though not tabulated 
that  most  lots  offered  in  Catawiki  ‘Ancient  Jewellery’  sales  and  many  in  Catawiki 
‘Archaeology’ sales were also probably metal detector finds. These figures and observations 
demonstrate  in  a  preliminary  way  the  widespread  use  of  online  auction  sites  for  selling 
metal detector finds. The nature and scale of the problem deserves further investigation. 

Trocadero is an online aggregator site or marketplace hosting single-company sales of art 
and  other  cultural  objects  direct  to  the  public.  Surprisingly  perhaps,  when  inspected  in 
September, there appeared to be only four European vendors offering antiquities. Between 
them, they were offering 1.101 lots for sale. Three of the vendors were also active on eBay 
and Catawiki. These have not been included in the further analysis, to avoid pollution of 
the numbers through double-counting. 

Analysis of the data 

Table  15  sets  out  the  actual  and  extrapolated  annual  sales  statistics  for  the  companies 
studied,  demonstrating  the  progression  from  the  ‘high-end’  high-value,  low-volume 
marketing strategy of Sotheby’s down to the ‘low-end’ low-value, high-volume marketing 
of online marketplaces. 

Table 15 

Actual and extrapolated annual sales statistics for the companies studied 

Company 

Sotheby’s 

Christie’s 

Bonhams 

Gorny & Mosch 

Invaluable 

Catawiki 

eBay UK 

Total 

Number of lots sold annually 

Total annual revenue (Euros) 

155 

181 

260 

913 

5.578 

10.331 

52.560 

69.978 

10,6 million 

4,7 million 

1,4 million 

2,2 million 

6,1 million 

5 million 

1,8 million 

31,8 million 

These statistics do not include data from dealers and other companies selling directly to 
the public from physical premises and/or their own websites. In the United Kingdom, for 
example,  the  membership  registers  of  the  Antiquities  Dealers  Association  and  the 
International Association of Dealers in Ancient Art list 19 companies not recognised during 
this  study  to  be  selling  through  Invaluable,  Catawiki  or  eBay.  The  importance  of  this 
‘private’ or ‘invisible’ market for transacting high-value objects has already been remarked 
upon.  

The high number of antiquities being sold on eBay UK stands out, and there will be more 
antiquities  on  other  national  eBay  sites.  A  certain,  and  perhaps  large,  proportion  of  the 
cultural objects available for sale on these sites are likely to be fake. Further, antiquities 

91 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
can be found for sale in limited numbers on other Internet marketplace sites such as Etsy. 
It must also be remembered that a sold ‘lot’ might contain more than one antiquity, so the 
total number of antiquities being sold will be higher than the total number of lots sold.  

The  size  of  the  invisible  market  is  difficult  to  estimate,  though  comprising  mainly  high-
value objects its contribution to overall monetary value is likely to be much larger than its 
contribution  to  material  volume.  Some  indicators  of  the  types  of  object  being  traded 
invisibly are available. In November 2013, for example, UK customs seized a Roman statue 
illegally-exported from Libya, which the British Museum valued in the region of €2 million 
(HMRC 2015). In July 2017, the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York paid a Parisian 
dealer €3,5 million for an Ancient Egyptian gilded coffin, which was subsequently shown to 
have been stolen (Small 2019). These prices are far higher than the average price per lot 
of €10.571 recorded for Sotheby’s. In fact, the highest priced lot sold by Sotheby’s during 
the period assessed for this report was €1,7 million. Thus, it would only take the sale of 
ten or twenty objects of similar price to the Libyan and Egyptian examples to double the 
€31,8 million annual sales revenue reported in Table 14. 

Estimation of the volume and monetary value 
Given these observations and reservations, it seems reasonable to propose that the true 
material  volume  and  monetary  value  of  the  antiquities  trade  in  Europe  will  be  in  the 
region  of  twice  to  ten  times  as  much  as  the  figures  totalled  in  Table  14:  a  material 
volume  of  between  140.000  to  700.000  objects  transacted  annually,  with  a  total 
monetary  value  of  between  €64  million  to  €318  million.  These  figures  are  obviously 
imprecise and hedged with uncertainty, but they have, if nothing else, a firmer evidential 
base  than  anything  else  that  has  previously  been  published.  They  are  not  altogether 
contradictory  to  the  €200  million  figure  for  global  trade  in  antiquities  (excluding  the 
Internet) proposed by the IADAA in 2013.  

Ancient and medieval coins snapshot analysis 

Sixbid is an online aggregator site or marketplace hosting single seller electronic auctions 
of coins, medals and banknotes. Table 16 lists the number of auctions containing ancient 
coins over a six-month period (14 February 2018 to 13 August 2018). Table 17 lists the 
numbers  of  lots  offered  and  sold  in  44  auctions  over  a  one-month  period  (June  2018). 
Table 18 presents the sales statistics of a sub-sample of 13 auctions drawn from the larger 
sample of 44 auctions held in June. 

Table 16 

The number of auctions on Sixbid containing ancient coins held over a six-month period 

(14 February 2018 to 13 August 2018) 

Country 

Austria 

Belgium 

Czech Republic 

France 

Germany 

Hungary 

Italy 

92 

Number of dealers 

Number of sales 

3 

3 

2 

4 

22 

1 

6 

12 

3 

7 

43 

70 

2 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 

Monaco 

Netherlands 

Norway 

Poland 

Portugal 

San Marino 

Spain 

Switzerland 

UK 

Total 

Number of dealers 

Number of sales 

1 

2 

1 

3 

1 

2 

6 

6 

9 

72 

2 

3 

1 

4 

1 

3 

26 

13 

45 

255 

Table 17 

The number of auctions containing ancient coins held over a one-month period (June 

2018), showing the total numbers of lots offered and lots sold 

Number 

vendors 

of 

Number 

of 

Number  of 

lots 

Number  of 

lots 

% lots sold 

auctions 

offered 

sold 

33 

44 

14.719 

11.512 

78 

Table 18 

Sales statistics of 13 auctions containing ancient coins held in June 2018 

Number of 

Number of 

Number of lots 

Number of lots 

Average price 

vendors 

auctions 

11 

13 

offered 

6.812 

sold 

5.232 

(Euros) 

384 

Extrapolation. Assuming from Table 18 a mean price per sold lot of €384, then over the 
one-month period June 2018 the sale of 11.512 lots as recorded in Table 17 would have 
realised €4,42 million. Extrapolating over a one-year period, the sale of 138.144 lots would 
realise a total revenue of €53 million. 

VCoins is an online aggregator site or marketplace hosting single vendor  sales  of  coins 
and related objects direct to the public. Table 19 shows the number of European vendors 
active  on  VCoins  one  day  in  September  2018,  together  with  the  number  of  lots  being 
offered  according  to  country  of  residence.  The  high  French  total  is  due  to  one  vendor 
offering 9.054 lots. Table 20 shows the sales statistics for a sample of 14 out of the total 
48 vendors. 

Table 19 

Vendors active on VCoins one day in September 2018 

Country of residence 

Number of dealers 

Number of lots offered 

Austria 

Belgium 

France 

Germany 

Hungary 

Italy 

Netherlands 

4 

2 

3 

9 

1 

2 

7 

1.025 

2.218 

9.667 

3.081 

1.032 

539 

2.496 

93 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country of residence 

Number of dealers 

Number of lots offered 

Spain 

Sweden 

Switzerland 

United Kingdom 

Total 

5 

1 

2 

12 

48 

2.078 

208 

298 

5.676 

28.318 

Table 20 

Sales statistics for 14 vendors active on VCoins one day in September 2018 

Country 

Number of lots offered  Mean  price  per 

lot 

Total  value  of  stock 

offered (Euros) 

(Euros) 

Belgium 

Germany 

Germany 

Germany 

Germany 

Netherlands 

Netherlands 

Spain 

Spain 

Spain 

United Kingdom 

United Kingdom 

United Kingdom 

United Kingdom 

Total 

266 

414 

278 

711 

158 

318 

113 

332 

644 

321 

151 

564 

225 

1.258 

5.753 

218 

164 

255 

313 

156 

124 

175 

120 

257 

116 

792 

402 

320 

197 

58.020 

67.920 

70.812 

222.535 

24.565 

39.513 

19.816 

39.904 

165.732 

37.360 

119.627 

226.486 

71.912 

247.580 

245 

1.411.782 

Extrapolation. The total stock on offer by 48 dealers comprised 28.318 lots. Assuming an 
average price per lot of €245, then the total value of stock for 48 dealers on one day was 
€6,9 million. 

It must be emphasised that these statistics describe material being offered for sale, not 
material sold. Many of the vendors active on VCoins were also selling on Sixbid or eBay. 

Sales statistics of sold ancient coins on the eBay UK, France and Germany sites were 
collected  for  one  day  (25  August  2018).  Table  21  provides  sales  statistics  for  all  sellers 
active that day across  all three sites. Many  of the sellers listed coins on more than  one 
site. Table 22 lists the number of sellers active on each eBay  site and their countries of 
residence.  Table  23  provides  sales  statistics  for  the  individual  country  sites.  The  total 
statistics  in  Table  23  are  apparently  higher  than  those  in  Table  21  because  of  duplicate 
sales. 

94 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 21 

Sales statistics for sellers active across eBay UK, France and Germany sites on one day 

(25 August 2018) 

Country of residence 

Number 

of 

Number  of  lots 

Mean 

price 

Total 

revenue 

sellers 

sold 

(EUR) 

(EUR) 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Cyprus 

France 

Germany 

Italy 

Slovakia 

Spain 

Switzerland 

United Kingdom 

Total 

2 

1 

1 

2 

17 

24 

3 

1 

5 

1 

44 

101 

6 

5 

6 

25 

43 

195 

9 

5 

22 

1 

122 

439 

11 

13 

16 

21 

15 

16 

6 

84 

9 

38 

27 

19 

63 

67 

98 

525 

663 

3.164 

50 

422 

197 

38 

3.236 

8.523 

Table 22 

Numbers of sellers active on national eBay sites on one day (25 August 2018) 

Country of sale 

Number of sellers 

Countries of residence 

eBay France 

eBay Germany 

eBay 

United 

Kingdom 

70 

25 

60 

Belgium  (1), France  (17), Germany  (10), Italy  (3), Spain 

(3), United Kingdom (36). 

Austria (2), Germany (22), Spain (1). 

Bulgaria (1), Cyprus (2), Germany (14), Spain (2), Slovakia 

(1), Switzerland (1), United Kingdom (39). 

Table 23 

 Sales statistics for individual country eBay sites on one day (25 August 2018) 

Country of sale 

Number of lots sold 

Mean price (EUR) 

Total revenue (EUR) 

eBay France 

eBay Germany 

eBay United Kingdom 

Total 

253 

145 

309 

707 

21 

20 

22 

5.377 

2.851 

6.694 

14.922 

Extrapolation. Assuming these statistics are representative of daily sales activity, over a 
one-year period 160.235 lots would be sold realising a total revenue of €3,1 million. 

Analysis of the data 

The combined statistics for Sixbid and eBay suggest that 298.379 lots of ancient coins are 
being sold annually, realising a total revenue of €56,1 million. As is the case for antiquities, 
the real totals are likely to be higher, though the existence or size of a ‘private’ or ‘invisible’ 
market for coins has not been reported and so its size or significance remains unknown. 
The  fact  that  the  basic  statistics  are  broadly  comparable  to  those  describing  antiquities 
emphasises the importance of the coin market and its potentially damaging action. 

95 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions on snapshot analysis 
European vendors are selling annually in the region of 140.000 to 700.000 antiquities 
from Europe, North Africa and West Asia, with a total monetary value in the region of 
€64 million to €318 million. European vendors are also selling annually a minimum of 
298.379 ancient and medieval coins, valued at more than €56 million.  

The data sources and methodologies used to produce these statistics are transparent and 
open to evaluation and criticism. Further refinement would be possible by the application 
of  more  intensive  methodologies.  These  annual  statistics  will  be  increased  by  the 
considerable  number  of  antiquities  and  other  cultural  objects  sold  in  cultural  categories 
such Islamic Art, Asian Art or Primitive Art, or other material categories such as books and 
manuscripts.  

Possible way forward 

The  problem  remains,  however,  that  measuring  the  size  of  the  market  is  not  the  same 
thing  as  measuring  the  volume  or  value  of  recent  or  ongoing  illicit  trade.  The  general 
absence of provenance means that it is not possible to distinguish between objects that 
entered circulation only recently and objects that have been out of their countries of origin 
for decades or more. An alternative approach is to utilise satellite or other visual imagery 
of  looted  archaeological  sites  that  have  in  the  past  been  legally  and  professionally 
excavated. The legal and professional excavation gives insights into the potential ‘yield per 
m2’ of the excavation site, while visual imagery can be used to estimate the number of m2 
that has been looted. By combining these observations, one can arrive at an estimate  of 
the total value (and volume) of the trade in looted  objects. This method becomes more 
feasible as the number of Low Earth Orbit satellites increases, as these offer the potential 
to  get  more  up-to-date  and  granular  photographs  of  specific  geographical  areas  (The 
Economist,  6  December  2018).  This  method  has  already  been  applied:  one  study  of  a 
looted Jordanian early bronze age cemetery, for example, estimated that between 9.366 
and  28.084  pots  had  been  removed  by  looting,  which  would  have  sold  in  London  for 
between £1.142.652 and £3.426.248 (Brodie and Contreras 2012).  

The  latter  method  faces  limitations  of  its  own,  most  importantly  that  its  applicability  to 
European  sites  might  be  limited  (as  there  is  less  information  on  types  of  objects  in  any 
particular  excavation  site  and  what  their  value  would  be,  compared  to  e.g.  Peruvian  or 
Egyptian necropolises) and that such an approach does not tell us what finds its way to 
the (European) market and how. 

96 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4  Trafficking routes  

3.4.1  Challenges in mapping trafficking routes  

The  description  of  trafficking  routes  for  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  is  a  challenging 
exercise because it is marked by clichés, complexities, and unknowns. By definition, illicit 
trafficking in cultural goods is clandestine and concealed, so the routes are largely unknown 
to  anyone  except  for  the  traffickers  themselves.  The  interception  of  a  cultural  good 
represents only a snapshot of where the object is at a specific moment in time. 
Even after a thorough police or customs investigation it is often impossible to establish the 
object’s (complete) trafficking route, and the country of origin of a cultural object cannot 
always be established unambiguously. In addition, some interviewees indicated that there 
is no correlation between countries of  origin and trafficking routes on the one hand and 
the type of objects on the other. They indicated different types of objects are trafficked via 
the  same  routes;  perpetrators  tend  to  use  the  same  route  regardless  of  the  objects 
trafficked. On the other hand, there are indications that certain routes, secured with higher 
bribes, tend to be used for high-value goods. Traffickers would want to avoid the risk of 
high volumes of lower value goods to compromise the route. 

At the same time, it is common knowledge that, as with any trade, the illicit trade in cultural 
goods follows the law of supply and demand. Illicit cultural goods are transported to those 
countries where there is a market for them.  Obviously,  the illicit trade in cultural goods 
must  conform  to  certain  logistical  realities  and  many  trafficking  pathways  rely  on 
established transport corridors, networks and hubs, such as through certain airports, ports, 
railways,  roads  and  border-crossing  points.  Therefore,  most  of  the  large  transport  hubs 
within  Europe  (e.g.  Frankfurt  airport,  Rotterdam  port)  also  serve  as  transit  nodes  for 
traffickers of cultural goods. 

The  main  barrier  to  mapping  the  trafficking  routes  of  cultural  goods  is  the  variety  of 
determinant  factors  that  add  complexity  to  what  would  otherwise  be  a  straightforward 
itinerary  from  country  A  to  country  B.  Illicitly  traded  cultural  goods  are  more  likely  to 
originate in countries where it is relatively easy to access such objects. Warzones are an 
obvious  example:  where  the  state  cannot  effectively  control  its  territory  and  protect  its 
cultural resources and also cannot provide for its citizens, looting of cultural goods is likely 
to start. Countries that have a lot of poorly monitored archaeological sites, museums and 
other  culturally  or  historically  significant  buildings  (e.g.  churches  and  temples)  are  also 
likely to experience illegal excavations and thefts of cultural goods, which introduce new 
illicit goods to the market.  

The trafficking pathways of illicit cultural goods have been described in terms of "source", 
"transit",  and  "destination  market",  with  certain  countries  being  associated  with  each 
trafficking phase, though individual countries can be the site of all phases of the trafficking 
of  cultural  goods.  The  term  "source  country"  refers  to  the  location  where  the  cultural 
goods originate, for example in the ground from an archaeological site or from a church. 
Local law within the source country in many circumstances determines who is the owner 
of the cultural good as well as if the cultural good can be considered "looted", "illicit", or 
"illegal". A country may at the same time occupy various positions in the trafficking chain: 

97 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
it can be a source country for certain types of antiquities or archaeological objects, while 
also being a transit and/or destination country for cultural goods from other countries. 

A transit country is the one that illicit cultural goods are trafficked through on the way 
to the final market destination. It is unclear how long illicitly traded goods may stay in such 
countries. Almost any country can be used for transit due to its advantageous geographic 
location  in  relation  to  a  particular  trafficking  route.  Even  if  a  country  is  not  well-placed 
geographically,  it  can  still  be  used  for  transit  if  its  import-export  legislation  is  lax,  the 
enforcement  of  said  legislation  is  weak  and/or  if  the  country  has  freeports.  Familiar 
language  and  culture  as  well  as  diaspora  and  familial  ties  may  also  play  a  role  in  the 
selection of countries, which traffickers use for transit of illicit cultural goods. This category 
of countries is indispensable for the traffickers as they serve to create a physical distance 
from the point of initial theft and may be used to transfer title through multiple transactions 
across jurisdictions and to construct a false provenance for the illicit cultural goods and, 
thus, legalise them. A ‘cleaned’ cultural object can then be introduced to the country  of 
final  destination  legally  and  sold  openly  on  a  legal  market.  In  attempt  to  ‘launder’  ‘hot’ 
illicit cultural goods (e.g. those coming from warzones or well-known objects), traffickers 
may move them around the globe. Illicit cultural goods are also moved to complicate or 
hinder police investigations. Such ‘hot’ cultural goods may disappear from the public eye 
for  prolonged  periods  of  time  (sometimes  years)  before  they  are  intercepted  by  law 
enforcement or resurface in private collections. Several police investigators have shared 
such examples. 

Free ports 

Free  ports  are  warehouses  located  in  free  zones.  Customs’  presence  is  not 
mandatory  in  free  zones.  Any  non-EU  goods  can  be  introduced  there  without 
presentation  and  declaration  to  customs,  free  of  import/  export  duties  and  taxes 
(Articles  158  and  245  of  the  European  Union  Customs  Code).  The  goods  in  free 
zones can be stored, moved, used, processed, consumed or exported to their final 
destination as well as become subject of economic transactions.  

In November 2017, there were 82 free zones40 in the EU, most of them in Croatia 
(11),  followed  by  Lithuania  (10),  the  Czech  Republic  (8),  Spain  and  Poland  (7), 
Romania and Bulgaria (6), Greece and Latvia (4), Estonia (3) and Finland, France, 
Germany  and  Italy  (2).  Nine  countries  –  Cyprus,  Denmark,  Hungary,  Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia and the United Kingdom – had only one free 
zone. Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Sweden had none.41 

Originally, free ports were intended for a temporary storage of goods in transit, but 
have lately become used for long-term or even permanent storage of valuables, in 

40 The list of free zones notified to the European Commission can be found at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/resources/documents/customs/procedural_aspects/i
mports/free_zones/list_freezones.pdf . 
41 It shall be noted that customs warehouses offer the same advantages as free ports (e.g. no duties or taxes 
need to be paid, secrecy and anonymity are guaranteed). Customs warehouses can be located anywhere (i.e. 
also outside of free zones) and can be private or public. For storage of goods in a private warehouse, a customs 
authorisation is required. No authorisation is necessary for public customs warehouses. In the EU, there are far 
more customs warehouses than free ports. 

98 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
particular  cultural  goods.  However,  recently  a  new  generation  of  free  ports  has 
appeared  designed  to  cater  for  the  needs  of  art  and  antiquities  trade.  Numerous 
reports  describe  free  ports  as  luxury  “über  vaults”  (Maecenas  2017),  “modernist 
museums […], with gigantic metal and concrete sculptures in the lobby, spacious 
showrooms, and fancy meeting rooms” (Jovic 2018) and “the greatest museums no 
one  can  see”  (director  of  the  Louvre  Jean-Luc  Martinez,  in  Bowley  and  Carvajal 
2016). Free ports serve as a one-stop-shop for art dealers and collectors, located 
conveniently  at  transports  nodes  and  offering  all-round  amenities  (e.g.  climate-
controlled  rooms,  showrooms,  office  space)  and  services  (e.g.  insurances,  art 
advice, restoration, conservation).42  

Free ports offer high security and discretion and allow transactions to occur without 
attracting  attention  of  authorities.  Only  the  value  of  goods  entering  a  free  port 
needs to be declared via a  self-declaration, which is usually not checked (Korver 
2018). The goods can be traded in the safety of free ports without ever having been 
taxed. The (change of) ownership of cultural goods is concealed because free ports 
are under no  obligation of identifying the ultimate beneficiary (i.e. actual owner) 
and accept aliases or nominees, like offshore firms, trusts, foundations, lawyers or 
a  combination  of  these.  The  lack  of  transparency  and  control  is  beneficial  for 
trafficking in illicit cultural goods and for accompanying crimes, such as terrorism 
financing, money laundering and tax evasion (FATF 2010; TRACFIN 2018; European 
Parliament 2019b).  

After a number of high-profile scandals (e.g. the Yves Bouvier affair43, the dispute 
over  a  Nazi-pillaged  Modigliani  painting44),  Switzerland  and  Luxembourg  came 
under an avalanche of critic and introduced changes to their free port legislation. 
In 2016, Switzerland introduced new broad anti-money laundering law that, among 
other things, increases transparency of free ports (Korver 2018; Renold 2018). Free 
port managers must receive information on the identity of the free port tenants, an 
inventory of all cultural goods held in warehouses, their value, their certificate of 
origin and the identity of the person entitled to dispose of them.  

Luxembourg  unilaterally  transposed  some  elements  of  the  Fifth  Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive45 five years ahead of time, in 2015 (the transposition for the 
Member States is due in 2020) following a national risk assessment related to its 
free port. It is the only country where free port operators are under the same anti-

42 Lawyers Wierbicki and Rottermund (2016) advise buyers and sellers of cultural goods to choose free ports and 
customs warehouses for their transactions based on five criteria: “(1) flexibility in movement; (2) privacy with 
respect to disclosure requirements; (3) the amenities and services offered; (4) security and access; and (5) the 
current location of the art and the selection of a convenient travel location to mitigate risk of loss or damage”. 
43 For the long and still ongoing so-called Yves Bouvier affair please see an overview by Boicova-Wynants, M., 
(2019)  A  brief  insight  into  the  Rybolovlev-Bouvier  “legal  thriller”:  https://artlaw.club/en/cases/a-brief-insight-
into-the-rybolovlev-bouvier-legal-thriller or read a detailed account by Bregman, A., (2019) The Bouvier Affair: 
A True Story. 
44 See the history and the account of the legal battle over the Modigliani’s “Seated Man with a Cane” in Arthive 
(2018) A new twist in a legal battle over the Modigliani’s Seated Man with a Cane: 
https://arthive.com/news/3349~A_new_twist_in_a_legal_battle_over_the_Modiglianis_Seated_Man_with_a_Ca
ne . 
45 Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive 
(EU)  2015/849  on  the prevention  of  the  use of  the  financial  system  for  the  purposes of  money  laundering  or 
terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU, OJ L 156 of 19.6.2018. 

99 

 
 
 
 
 
                                           
money laundering obligations as financial sector (Dauvergne 2018; Korver 2018). 
Free  port  operators  are  obliged  to  identify  the  beneficial  owner  of  stored  goods 
without  the  use  of  offshore  companies,  trusts,  lawyers,  or  galleries  to  shield 
ownership.  All  goods,  independently  of  their  value,  are  checked  by  the  customs 
upon entering and leaving the free ports (for a detailed analysis of the regime see 
Korver 2018).  

It shall be noted that customs warehouses (also called bonded warehouses) 
offer the same advantages as free ports (e.g. no duties or taxes need to be paid, 
secrecy  and  anonymity  are  guaranteed).  Customs  warehouses  can  be  located 
anywhere (i.e. also outside of free zones) and can be private or public. For storage 
of  goods  in  a  private  warehouse,  a  customs  authorisation  is  required.  No 
authorisation is necessary for public customs warehouses. In the EU, there are far 
more customs warehouses than free ports. 

Countries  that  are  the  end  destination  for  illicit  cultural  goods  (i.e.  where  the  end 
buyer is) are typically those with a large art and antiquities market. Legislation in some 
countries is more encouraging for imports of and the trade in cultural goods, creating the 
necessary  environment  for  both  the  legal  and  the  illegal  market.  Indeed,  within  market 
countries, the market for all cultural goods can be described as a "grey market", with legal, 
illegal, and illicit cultural goods all traded by the same dealers and platforms, bought by 
the same consumers, and presented as indistinguishable from each other on the market. 
This  situation  will  be  somewhat  rectified  within  the  EU  once  the  new  Regulation  on  the 
introduction and the import of cultural goods enters into force. 

When decisive factors change, so do the trafficking routes. For instance, Switzerland was 
known in the past as one of the main transit hubs for cultural goods in Europe. However, 
trafficking  through  Switzerland  diminished  after  2005  when  a  more  restrictive  law 
regarding  cultural  property  entered  into  force46,  which  introduced  increased  monitoring 
and more systematic controls of Swiss freeports. Trafficking routes may change drastically 
within a short period of time and/or only for a short period of time, for example, in response 
to more rigorous border controls or a police operation. 

46 Swiss Federal Act on the International Transfer of Cultural Property (Bundesgesetz über den internationalen 
Kulturgütertransfer) entered into force on 1 June 2005. The text is available at: 
https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/20001408/index.html . 

100 

 
 
 
 
 
                                           
This all makes it almost impossible to draft a map of contemporary trafficking routes for 
cultural goods. Such a map would be incomplete: in many cases we can only guess the 
exact  origin  or  destination  of  cultural  goods;  in  other  cases,  we  would  not  know  the 
trafficking itinerary; and the routes of many yet undiscovered items would not be reflected. 
Such a map would also be too complex, because trafficking routes would be different for 
different  objects and for different time periods.  In Section 3.6 we provide selected case 
studies of the trafficking as an illustration. These maps will quickly be rendered obsolete 
by  any  regulatory  or  logistical  change  at  any  point  on  the  smuggling  chain.  While 
definitive trafficking routes can—by their nature—not be established, the role of 
critical logistical hubs as gateways into Europe should be acknowledged. 

Recommendation: Considering the importance of logistical hubs, national authorities 
at the logistical hubs should be trained to raise their awareness of and knowledge how 
to  recognise  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods.  In  addition,  EU  Member  States  should 
implement the Fifth AML Directive in such way that it applies to free ports, which would 
result in increased monitoring and systematic controls of activity there. 

3.4.2  What we do know about the trafficking routes 

We  first  discuss  findings  from  desk  research.  One  indicator  for  trafficking  routes  is 
whether there have been border seizures of cultural goods in a specific country. Such an 
indicator is an imperfect proxy for the reasons elaborated above but nevertheless shows 
that  trafficking  routes  do  cross  these  countries.  The  WCO  Illicit  Trade  Reports  (ITR)  for 
2015–2017 contain some relevant data on this. 

The 2015 ITR shows that most cultural goods seized in Europe came from Ukraine, Hungary 
and Serbia, and most seized goods were destined for Russia. In 2016, most seized goods 
came from Russia, Ukraine and Hungary. Poland and Switzerland were mainly destination 
countries. Serbia was a transit country. The trafficking routes in 2016 were reported to be 
the most frequent between Eastern and Central Europe, the most notable example being 
illicit exports from Ukraine to Russia, USA, Germany, and Poland. The available data for 
2016  suggests  that  Eastern  Europe  (Poland,  Hungary),  western  Russia  (Moscow  and  St 
Petersburg) and Ukraine (Odessa) were primary hubs for illicit trade in cultural goods. The 
trade in the Middle East was mainly within the Middle Eastern region. 

In 2017 import-export patterns between countries were less pronounced and the results 
more  mixed.  Ukraine  was  mainly  a  source  country.  Poland,  Belarus,  Switzerland,  and 
Turkey  were  mainly  destination  countries.  Russia  and  Spain  were  both  source  and 
destination countries. Russia and Serbia had also cases of transit. On the level of regions, 
the most intense trafficking was between CIS and Eastern and Central Europe (almost 2/3 
of all seizure cases). Cultural goods moved from CIS to Central and Eastern Europe, and 
—in  a  slightly  smaller  quantities—in  the  opposite  direction.  From  Western  Europe  they 
moved  mainly  to  CIS.  Cultural  goods  were  also  trafficked  between  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe and Western Europe.  

101 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  data  for  2015–2017  ITRs  came  from  an  extremely  small  pool  of  sources:  only  13 
countries  (out  of  183  WCO  member  states)  reported  in  2015  and  2016  each  and  25 
countries  reported  in  2017.  Not  all  reporting  countries  were  European.  There  is  also  no 
continuity in the reporting countries between these ITRs. A large amount of reported cases 
(more  than  half  in  2015–2016)  came  from  Russia  and  Ukraine,  jointly,  which  partially 
explains the focus  on Eastern and Central Europe. However, due to the  underdeveloped 
reporting and lack of data from Western Europe no conclusion can be made whether Central 
and Eastern Europe is a hub of illicit activities. Similarly, no conclusion can be made about 
Europe as a whole and its role in the global trade/ trafficking routes of cultural goods.  If 
anything, the ITRs demonstrate the complexity, variety and changeability of the trafficking 
routes  and  strengthen  the  case  for  the  necessity  of  statistics  and  data  sharing  on  illicit 
trade in cultural goods. 

The  picture  of  trafficking  routes  emerging  from  the  interviews  with  stakeholders  is 
diverse,  and  in  most  cases  no  clear  import-export  patterns  can  be  identified.  The  main 
reasons for this are: 
1.  lack  of  statistics:  all  interview  partners  provide  information  based  on  their 
experience, which vary significantly based on how long they have been fighting illicit 
trade  in  cultural  goods,  how  many  cases  they  have  come  across  in  their  career  and 
what type of cases they were;  

2.  small size of samples: typically, the interview partners came across a relatively low 

number of cases of illicit trade; 

3.  national/  local  perspective:  most  interview  partners  represent  national  law 
enforcement, so they describe illicit trade in cultural goods as they see it happening in 
their country only; some interview partners could provide information relevant only to 
the division they work in, while there are more police divisions in the country. 

Keeping in mind these caveats, the following observations based on the interview data can 
be  made.  Most  countries  perform  mixed  ‘roles’  in  trafficking  routes,  being  both 
source  and  transit  and,  in  some  cases,  also  destination  countries.  A  particularly 
strong example for such ‘multifunctioning’ is Germany: it was mentioned by interviewees 
almost  equal  number  of  times  in  each  role  (i.e.  as  a  source,  transit  and  destination 
country). This seems to be due to Germany’s geographic location in the middle of Europe 
on the crossroads of routes between Eastern and Western, Southern and Northern Europe 
and due to its major international transport nodes (e.g. Frankfurt airport, Hamburg port). 
Munich  was  highlighted  as  an  important  ‘hub’  within  Germany,  where  a  large  Turkish 
diaspora enables connections to be made between sellers from the Middle East and buyers 
in the West. 

Italy is  by far the country most frequently mentioned  by the  interviewees as a 
source country in the EU. At the same time, the interview results indicate that Southern 
European countries (Bulgaria, Cyprus,  Italy, Greece, Romania, Spain) tend to be  source 
countries (i.e. illicitly traded goods originate from them) to the higher degrees than other 
European countries. The reasons for this are not entirely clear; however, weaker legal or 
physical  protection  or  possibility  of  protection  of  archaeological  sites,  churches  etc.  is  a 
factor, either due to the large amount of such sites and lack of resources to guard them 

102 

 
 
 
 
 
or,  in  case  of  Cyprus,  military  conflict  in  the  past.  Among  EU  neighbours,  Turkey  was 
frequently mentioned as a source country.  

Middle  Eastern  countries  (e.g.  Eqypt,  Iran,  Syria,  Turkey,  Libya,  Lebanon,  Iraq)  were 
mentioned only a few times, mainly with indication that only a few cases encountered by 
the interviewee pertained to goods that originated in these countries. Most interviewees 
could not exclude or confirm that there are cultural goods from these countries currently 
on  the  illicit  market  because  they  personally  have  not  come  across  such  cases. 
Interviewees also explained that Middle Eastern items are ‘too hot’ to be handled right now 
(in case of Iraq and Syria—due to the UNSC Resolutions and respective EU Regulations) 
and  are  probably  stored  away  and  will  resurface  in  several  years  or  decades  from  now. 
This is a pattern that was observed, for example, with Cypriot objects looted in the 1970s. 

Warehousing of ‘hot’ objects 
It  is  widely  believed  (and  indicated  by  multiple  interviewees)  that  looted  cultural 
objects from conflict zones are ‘put on ice’ for a period, being brought to the (illicit) 
market only when these conflicts are no longer on the general public’s mind. As a 
consequence, several interviewees have indicated that they suspect, for example, 
Iraqi  and  Syrian  objects  to  appear  in  a  few  decades  time.  While  this  conjecture 
might  be  true,  there  is  no  evidence  at  the  present  time  to  support  it,  and  other 
possibilities should be considered. The Hobby Lobby case in the United States, for 
example, shows that material might simply move slowly through the market, and 
remain  hidden  from  view  after  a  private  purchase.  In  2010,  the  Hobby  Lobby 
collection bought 3.450 cuneiform  objects from  Israeli and Emirati dealers in the 
United Arab Emirates, but it was not until 2017 that a US Customs investigation, 
which started in 2011, publicised the purchase (New York 2017). The 450 tablets 
included in the purchase are thought to have been looted in Iraq sometime between 
2003 and 2009 (Jarus 2018). The Spanish investigation into Jaume Bagot reported 
in  2018  revealed  he  had  bought  objects  only  a  few  months  after  they  had  been 
looted  in  Libya  (Lamarca  and  Parga  2018).  Without  the  engagement  of  law 
enforcement  agencies,  it  is  quite  possible  that  nothing  would  be  known  of  these 
purchases.  Perhaps  there  are  many  more  similar  examples  currently  under 
investigation or that have evaded investigation altogether. The trade of coins and 
other small objects on the Internet is also likely to be rapid, though not reported. 
There are multiple media reports across  Europe  of police raiding the premises  of 
people selling unlawfully-acquired material on the Internet. Claims of warehousing 
should  not  be  dismissed  outright,  but  should be  treated  with  a  certain  degree  of 
caution. 

Belgium, Netherlands and the UK are clear destination countries. These countries 
have large art and antiquities markets (especially the UK), often well organised within a 
trade association, and less restrictive legislation on trade in cultural goods. Lax legislation 
allows for cultural goods to be sold without proper provenance quite easily. Also, none of 
the countries has ratified the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported 
Cultural Objects47, and the UK ratified the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural 

47 See the list of the State Parties to the Convention: https://www.unidroit.org/status-cp . 

103 

 
 
 
 
 
                                           
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with two Protocols only in 201748. Belgium ratified 
the 1970 UNESCO Convention in 2009, but has not yet adopted any law of transposition 
(Cornu 2017). Among third countries, the USA (cited by almost by every interviewee) and 
the United Arab Emirates were mentioned most frequently as popular destinations for illicit 
cultural goods. 

Most interviewees also stated that the trafficking routes of illicit cultural goods are 
not  special:  traffickers  of  cultural  goods  use  the  same  routes  as  traffickers  of 
other illicit goods (e.g. firearms, drugs).  

Only some interviewees could discuss the developments in trafficking routes since 2000 
due to their length of involvement with the topic. Most of them indicated that there have 
been  no  significant  changes.  A  few  interviewees  mentioned  that  Russia  and  China  have 
emerged as new markets. Slovenia had very few illicit trafficking cases in the past, and it 
reports to have no illicit import cases in cultural goods since Croatia has joined the EU (in 
2013), meaning that it no longer patrols the EU external border.49   

The questions of trafficking routes for illicit trade in cultural goods were also covered in the 
survey. Survey respondents were asked how they view the developments in the origins 
of illicit traded cultural goods since 2000. The responses to this question can be found in 
Annex  3.  Generally,  the  majority  of  the  respondents  to  the  survey  indicated  that  they 
believe  the  origins  of  illicitly  traded  objects  have  changed  since  2000,  in  particular, 
researchers seem to be certain of this change.  

Survey respondents were also asked from which countries illicitly traded cultural goods are 
most likely to originate. Multiple answers were possible. As can be seen in Table 24 below, 
survey respondents see Iraq, Afghanistan, Italy, Turkey, Greece, Lebanon, and Cyprus as 
the most important countries of origin. 

Table 24 

Country of origin, N = 63 

Country of origin 

Respondents 

Country of origin 

Respondents 

Iraq 

Afghanistan 

Italy 

Turkey 

Greece 

Lebanon 

Cyprus 

Romania 

Bulgaria 

Syria 

29 

24 

24 

23 

20 

20 

18 

13 

12 

12 

Slovenia 

Cambodia 

Estonia 

Iran 

Ireland 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Malta 

Peru 

Poland 

3 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

48 See the lists of the State Parties to the Convention: 
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13637&language=E , to the first Protocol: 
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=15391&language=E and to the second Protocol: 
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=15207&language=E . 
49 We acknowledge that there may be different reasons for this. We do not have any information from Croatia (or 
other Balkan countries) to investigate whether they experienced a change in illicit trafficking cases. 

104 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
Country of origin 

Respondents 

Country of origin 

Respondents 

Israel 

Croatia 

France 

Serbia 

Spain 

Egypt  

Libya 

Albania 

Belgium 

(Sub-Saharan) Africa 

Czech Republic 

Georgia 

Germany 

Hungary 

Montenegro 

Slovakia 

11 

United Kingdom 

8 

8 

8 

8 

6 

5 

4 

4 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

Yemen 

Algeria 

Bosnia and Herzegovina 

China 

Colombia 

Finland 

India 

Kosovo* 

Laos 

Mexico 

Netherlands 

Norway 

Portugal 

Russia 

Thailand 

2 

2 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ 

Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence. 

105 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5  Operation modes 

3.5.1  Shift to online trade and its ramifications 

Until the end of the twentieth century, the trade was conducted largely through personal 
interaction  in  physical  settings  such  as  the  auction  room,  dealer  gallery  or  exclusive 
reception. The development and widespread adoption of the Internet through the 1990s 
allowed  the  development  of  a  large  online  market  from  the  early  2000s  onwards;  then, 
during  the  late  2000s  and  2010s,  the  invention  of  smart  phones  and  associated  social 
media  and  communication  apps  such  as  Facebook  and  WhatsApp  provided  further 
electronic  means  of  trade.  Academic  research  clearly  shows  that,  from  the  late  1990s 
onward, much of the illicit trade for antiquities in Europe and throughout the rest 
of the world moved online (Brodie, 2015).  

Online trading has greatly expanded the market’s customer base by allowing people 
to buy objects from the comfort of their own homes wherever in the world they might be. 
The modes of transportation also changed: instead of couriers or dealers physically moving 
illicit cultural goods across the border in person, a lot of items are sent by regular post. 
Items  are  also  sent  ‘on  consignment’,  allowing  the  receiver  of  the  goods  to  deny  all 
knowledge of the contents and, therefore, avoid criminal responsibility. The ITRs for 2016 
and 2017 show that mail was by far the most popular mode of transportation and was used 
almost exclusively for smaller cultural goods (WCO, 2016; 2017).  

This expanding customer base together with the broad reach of online trading has created 
and progressively strengthened the demand for small, inexpensive objects of a type 
that previously would not have been profitable to trade.  

Case study: cylinder seals 
The  targeted  theft  of  5.144  cylinder  seals  and  5.542  pins,  glass  bottles,  beads, 
amulets, and  other pieces of jewellery  from basement storage rooms  of the  Iraq 
National Museum in 2003 announced the arrival this new market (Bogdanos 2005: 
511–515).  The  sales  at  Sotheby’s,  Christie’s  and  Bonhams  summarised  for  this 
report (see section 3.2.4) did not contain a single cylinder seal between them, but 
seals were easier to find in more downmarket online sales. Among the 13 auctions 
hosted  by  Invaluable  from  1  March  to  1  September  2018,  for  example,  one  UK 
company  alone  in  one  sale  sold  64  cylinder  seals  with  only  vague  indications  of 
provenance,  while  a  Swiss  company  in  another  sale  sold  99  seals  with  no 
provenance  information  whatsoever.  With  mean  prices  of  €585  and  €806 
respectively,  these  seals  would  not  have  comprised  an  attractive  financial 
proposition for the auction houses, unless bundled together in large lots. 

Thus the development of the Internet and associated social media have greatly altered the 
nature  of  commerce,  causing  the  development  of  a  high-volume,  low-value  trade, 
with  many  more  objects  being  sold  by  a  higher  number  of  dealers  than  was 
previously the case, some little more than private individuals operating from their own 
homes. Small, low-value objects pose problems for law enforcement as they are easy to 
conceal and transport, and their low value diminishes the apparent seriousness of crimes. 

106 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Large objects are broken into pieces by looters or smugglers precisely to facilitate transport 
and multiply sales. The character of looting has also changed. Since small objects that 
in the past would have been of little commercial interest are now saleable, they are looted 
when  before  they  might  have  been  ignored.  There  is  a  burgeoning  market  in  metallic 
objects, particularly coins, as metal detector finds have become progressively easier 
to sell online and the use of metal detectors seems to be spreading (as corroborated 
by many interviewees, see Section 3.5.2 below).  

Legality of metal detecting 
The legal situation as regards metal detecting is different in each European country, 
with some countries maintaining an outright ban on private metal detecting, while 
others  attempt  to  control  their  use  by  stronger  or  weaker  systems  of  permits, 
licences and protection or reporting orders. One problem caused by these different 
legal  regimes  is  that  crime  reporting  across  countries  is  not  comparable.  Metal 
detecting  that  might  be  a  crime  in  one  country  might  not  be  a  crime  in  another 
country. More seriously, these different legal regimes will obstruct any attempt to 
introduce pan-European legislation to control trafficking that would require changes 
to existing domestic legislation controlling or permitting metal detecting. This study 
was not directly concerned with metal detecting and the cross-border  movement 
and  sale  of  metal-detecting  finds,  but  it  is  a  subject  in  urgent  need  of  further 
investigation.  

For  sellers  of  cultural  goods,  the  shift  to  online  marketplaces  allowed  them  to  transfer 
much  of  the  financial  and  legal  risk  involved  in  the  trade  in  potentially  illicit 
cultural goods to the buyer. Through the medium of online sales, illicit cultural goods 
can be kept in their countries of origin or in intermediary countries, put up for sale, and 
only shipped to buyers when they are sold. This limits the antiquities that are ultimately 
trafficked  to  those  which  have  already  been  paid  for  and  reduces  the  need  for 
intermediaries  to  transport  and  launder  illicit  cultural  goods  as  looters  and  early-stage 
brokers can access buyers directly. The cultural goods are then sent directly to the buyer 
via the post, or buyers are required to personally pick up the item purchased in its country 
of origin, again shifting the risks associated with trafficking away from the seller.  

Recommendation: National authorities should invest in their relationship with postal 
services and online platforms through raising awareness and  providing training about 
the illicit trade in cultural goods.  This training should explain the abuse  of  the postal 
services and online marketplaces for illicit transactions, the need for cooperation, and 
possible  ways  of  dealing  with  the  issue.  A  good  example  to  build  on  is  Latvia,  which 
already implements such an approach for its postal services (see Section 4.4.1).  

As sellers do not need to spend resources on moving the items across the border, they can 
invest more in creating false documentation (and also provenance), which improves 
the chances of illicit cultural goods to cross the border, reach the buyer and, subsequently, 
enter  the  licit  market.  Online  trading  has  also  made  it  easier  for  dealers  caught  selling 
fakes  or  looted  material  to  rebrand  and  continue  trading  under  a  new  name.  The  old 

107 

 
 
 
 
 
 
constraints on business malpractice for what are often family businesses operating out of 
physical premises with a reputation to protect no longer apply.  

The shift to online trading has also made it easier to insert fakes into the market. 
The relative anonymity of online trading and greater difficulties in ascertaining authenticity 
without physical access to an object are important drivers. Because many of the concerned 
items  are  ‘low  value’,  buyers  will  not  have  a  relatively  expensive  authenticity  analysis 
conducted.  These  considerations  seem  to  explain  why  the  amount  of  forged  items  has 
increased in the past years.  

Both law enforcement and industry representatives interviewed for this study as well as 
survey respondents agree with the assessment that the illicit trade has moved online. Many 
law enforcement representatives said that online markets are one of their main foci where 
illicit trade in cultural goods is detected.  Interviewees also agree that  there is  relatively 
little (possibility to exercise) oversight of such marketplaces, which was corroborated by 
the survey results. 

In the context of online trade in illicit cultural goods, the so-called “dark web”, which forms 
a  part  of  the  so-called  “deep  web”  of  non-indexable  websites,  is  brought  up  by  some 
scholars  and  international  organisations  as  a  place  where  illicit  cultural  goods  are 
potentially being traded (e.g. Paul 2018; UNESCO 2018). Our interviewees expressed the 
opinion that few, if any, antiquities have been found for sale on the dark web, even during 
focused efforts to find them. Our research into the academic and other literature available 
supports  this  evaluation;  discussion  of  illicit  cultural  goods  for  sale  on  the  dark  web  in 
recent  years  has  not  included  any  evidence  that  it  is  happening  (van  Ham  et  al.  2011; 
Brodie 2018). As several interviewees pointed out, there is limited motivation for the 
marketplace for illicit cultural goods to move to the dark web when it is relatively 
easy to sell on the visible web without being caught. In addition, it can be argued 
that selling illicit cultural objects on the open Internet maintains an illusion of legality of 
the trade, whereas the dark web is notorious for being a place of criminally traded goods.  

Recommendation: The EU and its Member States should explore how the online sales 
of  cultural  goods  can  be  regulated  and  monitored.  An  obligation  to  register  the 
transaction  details  should  be  introduced  for  all  sellers  of  cultural  goods,  offline  and 
online. Special self-regulation or regulation could be introduced for online marketplaces: 
for  example,  running  automatic  image  checks  for  cultural  goods  on  sale  with  the 
available  databases  of  stolen  cultural  property;  alerting  bidders  and  potential  buyers 
about the risk of buying illicit items (e.g. in the form of a banner on the pages selling 
cultural goods or as a warning before the bid for an antiquity); automatically flagging 
suspicious items and transactions to a dedicated contact point at the national police.  

3.5.2  Relation to organised crime 

While the art market players deny the existence of the problem of illicit trade in cultural 
goods,  relevant  authorities  do  indicate  that  the  trade  is  sometimes  linked  to  organised 

108 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
crime. In some instances, the police and prosecutors come across this illegal activity while 
investigating other forms of crime, for example. In general, it appears that the conditions 
in which the art market currently operates may facilitate criminal behaviour in the case of 
unscrupulous  traders.  It  is  believed  that  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  sometimes 
operates  as  a  mafia-style  hierarchical  organised  criminal  network,  but  other  times  as 
flexible  networks  of  individuals  and  groups  acting  together  opportunistically,  many  of 
whom trade illicit cultural objects in the public and seemingly-legitimate sphere (Campbell, 
2013; see also the case study in Section 3.6). As mentioned in section 3.1, the opinions of 
stakeholders on the extent to which the illicit trade is organised differ significantly.  

Dealers  in  illicit  cultural  goods  face  less  risk  of  apprehension  and  punishment  than 
dealers of illicit narcotics or arms. In general, it is a low risk/high profit business. This is 
due to several factors. Transactions in cultural objects tend to remain below the radar of 
the  enforcement  authorities  because  they  are  easy  to  conceal  and  difficult  to  spot  for 
officers who have not received a special training. For instance, ancient coins can be mixed 
in  the  wallet  with  regular  coins.  Ancient  rings,  earrings,  bracelets  and  necklaces  can  be 
worn by the trafficker as regular jewellery. In fact, the ITRs for 2015 and 2016 indicate 
that more than half of the cultural goods seized by customs were not concealed at all, and 
another sizeable portion was concealed in personal luggage (WCO, 2015; 2016). Thorough 
checks  of suspicious cultural goods take up much time, which is particularly challenging 
for understaffed customs authorities.  

Big  cultural  objects  can  be  broken  in  small  parts  which  cannot  be  recognized  by  non-
experts.  The  fact  that  many  of  the  objects,  for  example  coming  from  illicit  excavations, 
have  never  been  recorded  anywhere,  decreases  the  possibility  of  discovery,  further 
increasing  the impression  of  impunity.  Unlike  other  illicit  objects,  cultural  goods  are  not 
per se illegal and, hence, it is difficult for non-experts to spot an object with an illicit or 
fake provenance or with fake export documentation, which is also linked to the evidential 
problems of proving criminal action. In addition, all phases of the illicit trade are facilitated 
by corruption that often involves public officials, police, diplomatic and military staff, and 
customs agents. 

Facilitators 
The  smooth-running  of  the  trade  depends  upon  the  involvement  of  a  range  of 
professional experts. This is particularly true of the higher-end trade. These experts 
include archaeologists, art historians and museum curators who identify, describe 
and  authenticate  material  for  sale,  restorers,  conservators  and  other  scientific 
experts  who  prepare  material  for  sale  and  also  authenticate  it,  and  specialist 
shipping  and  storage  companies.  These  professional  experts  or  facilitators  are 
relatively  few  in  number  compared  to  collectors  and  dealers,  and  many  are  not 
dependent upon the trade as a primary source of income. Thus they might comprise 
a  vulnerable  point  for  the  application  of  moral  persuasion  or  punitive  deterrence 
through police action. The actions of conservators and restorers are particularly well 
documented. They clean and restore objects so as to improve their appearance and 
saleability, but in so doing might destroy previous evidence of theft or illicit trade.  
In  2010,  for  example,  Swiss  customs  seized  a  decorated  Roman  sarcophagus, 
coming from the UK, as a result of control at a freeport. In 2017 it was returned to 

109 

 
 
 
 
 
Turkey where it was believed to have been looted sometime between the late 1970s 
and  1990.  A  Swiss  dealership  had  sent  the  sarcophagus  to  the  UK  in  2003  for 
restoration (Vuille et al. 2017). Sometimes conservators in Europe work on material 
that  is  destined  for  sale  outside  Europe.  US  court  documents  record  New  York 
dealers  in  Asian  antiquities  passing  material  through  the  UK  for  cleaning  and 
restoration (New York 2016).  

These professional experts might also be a covert source of human intelligence for 
police and other investigations. 

In addition, in the context of the involvement of organised crime, the link between illicit 
trade in cultural goods and money laundering has been discussed repeatedly.  

Money laundering and tax fraud 
The  connection  of  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  with  other  criminal  conducts, 
especially with money laundering, has been often discussed in media, official reports 
and  by  researchers.  While  verifiable  money  laundering is  rarely  linked  directly  to 
trafficking of cultural goods50, the risk of such criminal practices is non-negligible 
due to certain features of art market.  

The Swiss report on the national evaluation of the risks of money laundering and 
terrorist financing (CGMF 2015) highlighted the following characteristics that make 
illicit and licit trade in cultural goods susceptible to money laundering: 

  Growing prices of art works and antiquities; 
  Market in cultural goods is difficult to control due to its culture of discretion 
and  lack  of  transparency;  transactions  can  be  done  in  secret  or 
anonymously; 

  The identification of the works of art and antiquities is complicated; 
  The value of cultural objects is subjective and difficult to determine. 

The  said  report  also  notes  that  “tax  fraud  is  common”  in  the  art  and  antiquities 
market, which is a contributing factor to money laundering. The EU Supranational 
Risk Assessment Report  (European Commission  2017) assesses that vulnerability 
of  the  trafficking  in  cultural  goods  to  money  laundering  is  “significant/very 
significant”. The main reason for this is the low risk exposure: the trafficking occurs 
via informal channels with no security or monitoring of transactions. Payments in 
cash  (also  high  amounts)  are  common  such  that  it  is  impossible  to  identify  the 
buyer. 

Free  ports  and  customs  warehouses  (see  Section  3.3.1)  have  been  extensively 
criticised for being used for tax evasion purposes and money laundering (European 
Commission  2017;  Korver  2018;  European  Parliament  2019b).  High  degrees  of 
secrecy and the deferral of import duties and indirect taxes (e.g. VAT, user tax) are 
the main reason why free ports are used by buyers and sellers of cultural goods. 

50 See the discussion at the symposium “The Art Market and Money Laundering” in the USA on 12 October 2018: 
https://law.case.edu/Lectures-Events/EventId/386/e/the-art-market-and-money-laundering-a-symposium-12-
oct-2018 . The report on the symposium can be found in Small (2018): https://hyperallergic.com/465736/does-
the-art-world-have-a-money-laundering-problem/ . 

110 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
It seems to be a moot point among researchers and practitioners how often money 
laundering  and  other  financial  crimes  occur  on  the  market.  There  are  indications 
that modern and contemporary art sales are most at risk of being abused for money 
laundering  (Mödlinger  2018;  CGMF  2015).  With  regard  to  the  antique  art  and 
antiquities  sales,  Andrew  Adams,  Assistant  US  Attorney  and  deputy  chief  of  the 
Southern District of New York’s money laundering and forfeiture unit, explained at 
the symposium “The Art Market and Money Laundering” that such items sell slowly 
and  are  not  liquid.51  Therefore,  they  are  not  practical  for  money  laundering 
purposes. By contrast, Mödlinger (2018) argues that high-end valuable antiquities 
are desirable investments for criminals. There is no evidence to support either of 
the opinions, and further targeted  research into the art and antiquities market is 
necessary. 

Tax  fraud  related  to  illicit  cultural  goods  usually  takes  the  form  of  donations  to 
museums to obtain tax benefit. While no hard evidence could be found, research 
suggests that “antiquities with dubious and possibly illegal origins” (i.e. potentially 
illicit cultural goods) were donated to museums (Yates 2016a). What makes such 
questionable operations possible is the donation system that lacks regulation and 
scrutiny and favours the privacy and anonymity of the donor. 

Besides  trafficking  in  illicit  goods  (firearms,  narcotics),  criminal  organisations  can  be 
involved in other criminal activities that are more closely and directly related to trade in 
cultural  goods.  Usage  of  metal  detectors  (which  is  illegal  in  some  countries)  to  illegally 
excavate cultural goods and manufacturing of fake antiquities (which is fraud if fakes are 
sold  as  originals)  are  lucrative  enough,  especially  if  conducted  on  a  large  scale.  Many 
interviewees  indicated  that  metal  detectorists  pose  a  problem  (e.g.  in  Bulgaria,  Cyprus, 
Germany,  Norway,  Romania,  Slovenia),  also  because  they  damage  archaeological  sites. 
There have now been several successful operations in different European countries against 
gangs searching with metal detectors and selling their finds online, and numerous police 
raids have recovered metal detectors alongside looted objects. In France, for example, an 
investigation of the Facebook group Archéo 21 from March 2014 to March 2015 uncovered 
a  group  of  metal  detectorists  discussing  and  selling illegal  finds,  which  included  the  so-
called Trésor de Laignes, comprising 2000 Gallic coins. The police arrested six people in 
five different departments, seizing metal detectors and other illegal finds (Dupont 2015; 
Brenot 2016). Original research conducted for this project showed how Russian Internet 
discussion forums are used to value and sell metal-detecting finds, mainly coins, militaria 
and religious objects.  

Snapshot of Russian forums 
This  snapshot  focused  on  Russian  language  metal  detecting  forums  providing 
platform to share first-hand finds, often freshly found. Due to the amount of posts 
and  sections  available  on  the  forums,  the  snapshot  was  limited  to  items  posted 
between 1st and 3rd of July 2018; that way it was possible to portray more varied 
picture of the finds. The focus was on historic items that looked like they could have 
been found by metal detecting. 

51 Ibid. 

111 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
The overwhelming number of items were coins. Coins after WW2 were not included 
in this snapshot, as these were usually treated separately on every forum and often 
were from very recent decades. Two posts described finding coin hoards with a large 
number of coins (600 and 7199), but what happened to them afterwards was not 
described. The find spots of coins were not usually named. For religious objects, the 
region where they were found was frequently named, presumably because it helped 
with the identification of the object. There were also a significant number of militaria 
objects,  most  notably  remains  of  weapons  such  as  bayonet  knives,  bullets,  and 
cases. The usage of metal detectors was not always named explicitly, but could be 
assumed when users said that they found an item in the forest or the like.  

It  seems  that  a  significant  number  of  items  are  first  being  put  up  on  forums  for 
identification and/ or for valuation. After they are assessed by the forum users, they 
are  sometimes  moved  on  to  an  auction  section  of  the  forum  or  possibly  sold 
privately.  With  particular  sections  such  as  Numismatics  or  Metalloplastic  (literal 
translation; section includes icons, crosses), there seem to be prominent users who 
often offer their valuation.  

The value of the objects is usually not high on the metal detecting forums. A large 
proportion of these were valued at few hundred rubles, followed by some items in 
the range of few thousand. Only three items seemed to be very expensive—the hilt 
of a flail (asking price 108 000 rubles); a 5 ruble coin from 1874 valued to be worth 
up to 30 000 rubles; and a 3 1/2 Gulden coin from 1854 evaluated to be worth at 
least 300 dollars. However, although the value might not be high, the  number of 
items  available  is  impressive.  For  example,  the  Numismatics  section  on 
reviewdetector.ru has 3987 pages, and there are between 19 to 30 posts per page. 
The  first  post  dates  to  July  2006.  These  posts  mostly  deal  with  valuations  or 
identifications of objects. The military archaeology section on the same forum has 
727  pages,  and  the  earliest  entry  dates  back  to  October  2006.  On  the  forum 
reviewdetector.ru posts can be accessed without creating a user account, while on 
others such as ww2.ru to view photos you need to be a registered user. 

3.5.3  Relation to terrorism and terrorism financing 

In  recent  years,  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  has  repeatedly  been  connected  to 
terrorism financing. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2199 (2015), for example, 
noted with concern “that ISIL, ANF and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities 
associated with Al-Qaida, are generating income from engaging directly or indirectly in the 
looting  and  smuggling  of  cultural  heritage  items  from  archaeological  sites,  museums, 
libraries, archives, and other sites in Iraq and Syria, which is being used to support their 
recruitment efforts and strengthen their operational capability to organize and carry out 
terrorist attacks”. The conducted desk research shows that, while there is clear evidence 
of various terrorist and other violent non-state actors profiting from illicit trade, including 
the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in the 1980s and the Taliban and others in Afghanistan in 
the 1990s, reliable empirical evidence for the nature and importance of the relationship is 
rarely forthcoming. Two questions in particular remain unresolved. First, to what extent do 

112 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
terrorist  and  other  armed  groups  exert  “command  and  control”  over  looting  and  illicit 
trade? Second, to what extent do such groups actually profit from the trade? 

Some armed groups have been actively involved in looting and trafficking, while 
others have  been more  concerned  to  exert  control  over  trade  in  their  occupied 
territories. Early on in the Syria conflict, for example, Free Syrian Army members were 
digging and selling cultural objects  for money  to fund weapons’ purchases (Luck 2013). 
Daesh, in contrast, controlled looting and trafficking through a permit system, imposing a 
20 per cent “khums tax” on any proceeds (Al-Azm et al 2014), and allowing safe passage 
for non-affiliated dealers or smugglers (RT 2016). 

It is an open question as to whether terrorists and other armed groups are directly involved 
in  looting  and  trafficking  cultural  objects,  or  whether  instead  the  disturbed  conditions 
caused by armed conflict present lucrative opportunities for pre-existing organised criminal 
groups. In Yemen, for example, there has been a longstanding problem with looting and 
trafficking.  Between  2006  and  2012,  predating  the  Houthi  occupation  of  2015,  around 
1.500 cultural objects were seized at Sana’a International Airport alone (Al-Yarisi 2013). 
In  February  2016,  Houthi  shelling  destroyed  the  Taiz  Museum  along  with  much  of  its 
collection  (Al-Sakkaf  2016).  A  Yemeni  government  report  subsequently  stated  that  the 
museum  ‘has  become  easy  prey  for  unscrupulous  individuals  and  traders  of  antiquities. 
Such  people  started  laying  their  hands  on  the  museums’  holdings  and  looting  them’ 
(Antiquities  Coalition  2018:  87).  Thus,  looting  and  trafficking  in  areas  of  terrorist  or 
insurgent  control  should  not  be  viewed  automatically  as  evidence  of  their  direct 
involvement or even profiting, though that is likely to be the case. An important European 
example for the link between terrorist financing and trafficking of cultural goods has been 
provided by the recent Jaume Bagot case (see Section 3.6.3). The case is currently being 
prosecuted.  

The  amounts  of  money  the  looting  and  trafficking  provides  terrorist  groups 
remain unclear and many quoted figures seem inflated or exaggerated (van Lit, 2016; 
Brodie 2018). Most claims that Daesh, for example, was making millions of dollars from 
trading  in  cultural  goods  can  be  traced  back  to  an  ambiguously-worded  statement 
attributed to an unnamed Iraqi “intelligence official” reported in the Guardian newspaper, 
which claimed that in Syria Daesh “had taken $36m from al-Nabuk alone [an area in the 
Qalamoun mountains west of Damascus]. The antiquities there are up to 8.000 years old” 
(Chulov 2014). This figure has never been verified or corroborated, and is at variance with 
what is known of the pricing structure of the trade, where most profits are  made on the 
destination market, not at source. The financial structure has been explained in the report 
‘Cultural Property, War Crimes and Islamic State’ prepared for the War Crimes Unit of the 
Dutch National Police: 

The amount one would (illegally) pay in the Netherlands, London, Munich or New 
York for an item is not the amount IS earns with this trade. IS only earns money 
with their permit-system and what they sell themselves on illegal local auctions, if 
they would do so, for example. Buying illegal items on, for example, the Dutch art 
market  does  not  finance  IS  or  their  terrorist  activities  directly.  It  does  however 

113 

 
 
 
 
 
 
contribute  to  the  existence  of  an  illegal  market  that  triggers  IS  members  (and 
others) to get involved in the illegal trade in cultural property. (van Lit, 2016) 

Nevertheless, it is a fundamental reality of the trade that some of the money paid in Europe 
for  objects  excavated  in  or  traded  through  territory  controlled  by  terrorist  organisations 
must ‘trickle down’ to the organisations involved. 

There  is  no  evidence  to  support  claims  that  Daesh  might  have  been  making  millions  or 
even billions of Euros annually from the trade, or that the trade might have been a major 
source  of  revenue.  Nevertheless,  there  is  evidence  that  terrorist  and  other  armed 
insurgency groups do profit from the trade. On 16 May 2015, US Special Forces raided the 
Syrian compound of Abu Sayyaf, head of the Daesh Diwan al Rikaz (so-called Ministry of 
Natural  Resources  and  Minerals,  including  its  Antiquities  Division),  where  they  seized  a 
book  of  receipts,  dated  to  between  6  December  2014  and  26  March  2015  recording 
$265.000  tax  revenue  made  from  antiquities  sales.  Extrapolating, it  would  suggest  that 
Daesh would have made $795.000 in a year (Brodie 2018). Thus, the available evidence 
suggests that illicit trafficking in cultural goods is not the main source of  terrorist group 
funding by far (Howard et al., 2016). Some research states that it is a ‘marginal source’ 
(CAT, 2015); other research explains that, while the money made of trafficking in cultural 
goods is not significant, it may be still important in relative terms or as diversification of 
the  revenue  portfolio  for  the  budget  of  terrorist  groups  (Altaweel,  2016;  Howard  et  al., 
2016). 

Most  existing  research  suggests  that  the  involvement  of  terrorist  organisations  in 
trafficking  cultural  goods—and  making  money  thereof—is  limited  to  territory  that  they 
control (van Lit, 2016; FATF, 2015; Brodie 2018). There is no evidence that terrorist groups 
organise illicit trade activities outside their subject territories, where it is more likely that 
transnational  organized  criminal  groups  are  involved—the  so-called  crime-terror  nexus 
(Makarenko  2012).  Nevertheless,  a  disturbing  though  under-reported  and  under-
researched possibility is the voluntary or involuntary involvement of expatriate or diaspora 
traders in funding terrorism or other armed violence in their home countries. Such traders 
may be vulnerable to extortion demands with threats directed at friends or family members 
still resident at home, or to appeals for personal or family loyalty to more broad ranging 
political  or  religious  groupings.  In  2009,  for  example,  a  Taliban-affiliated  Haqqani 
commander was quoted as saying the Haqqanis received financial support from expatriate 
“businessmen who smuggle precious stones, sculptures and other historic artefacts [who] 
pay  dues  to  the  Taliban  to  avoid  trouble  on  the  road”  (Peters  2010:  36-37).  Other 
unsupported  allegations  have  also  accused  expatriate  dealers  in  Europe  or  the  United 
States of channelling money back to terrorist or insurgency groups in their home countries. 
Investigating the possibility of such money transfers is a matter of some urgency as the 
sums of money involved would be much larger than those generated through looting and 
trafficking in source countries. 

The interviews conducted for this study did not bring any new evidence to substantiate the 
connection  between  terrorist  groups  and  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods.  Most  law 
enforcement officials that were interviewed for this study stated that, to their knowledge, 
no cases exist in their respective countries where a link between trafficked antiquities and 

114 

 
 
 
 
 
 
a terrorist group was established. At the same time, however, interviewees also reported 
only a very small number of cases or even no cases at all involving cultural goods from 
conflict zone countries in the Middle East and North Africa. An opinion was repeated that 
such objects are too ‘hot’ at the moment and are being stored away, to resurface (much) 
later when the issue has disappeared from public view. Alternative explanations are that 
the material is being traded on the so-called invisible market, as exemplified by the Bagot 
case, or that small, inexpensive objects are being sold openly on the Internet or at other 
venues but are not being recognized as recently looted. 

Interviewed  law  enforcement  officers  also  noted  the  shift  in  framing  since  2000  of  how 
trafficking in cultural goods sourced to the Middle East or North Africa is discussed publicly. 
One interviewee stated that the link to terrorism financing has caused illicit trade to become 
a political issue, which was not previously the case. Another interviewee, confirming the 
above,  also  emphasised  that  looting  and  trafficking  does  not  end  when  terrorist 
groups are defeated. Illicit trade  in cultural goods in an organised crime in the 
first line, and the profits simply flow through ordinary criminal channels instead.  

Nevertheless, the interviewees agree that, all in all, the connection between the issue of 
trafficking in  cultural  goods  and  terrorism  financing  may  have  been  exaggerated,  but  is 
beneficial.  Illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  is  now  viewed  as  an  issue  of  national  and 
international  security,  which  means  it  has  moved  up  the  ladder  of  political  priorities  of 
many countries where policy-makers and the general public are now (more) aware of the 
problem. The obvious danger with this securitisation process is that as public perceptions 
of the terrorist threat shift, as has been the case over the past five years from Syria to 
Yemen (and before that from Iraq to Syria), policies and actions aimed at suppressing illicit 
trade will shift along with them.  

Recommendation: It needs to be generally accepted that trafficking routinely funds 
organised crime and, when an opportunity presents itself, terrorism. To stop this from 
happening, Member States are encouraged to implement the relevant UNSC resolutions.  

While the art market players deny the existence of the problem, the relevant authorities 
do indicate that illicit trade in cultural goods is sometimes linked to  organised crime.  In 
some  instances  for  example  the  police  and  prosecutors  come  across  this  illegal  activity 
while investigating other forms of crime. In general, it appears that the conditions in which 
the  art  market  currently  operates  may  facilitate  criminal  behaviour  in  the  case  of 
unscrupulous traders. 

While the art market players deny the existence of the problem, the relevant authorities 
do indicate that illicit trade in cultural goods is sometimes linked to  organised crime.  In 
some  instances  for  example  the  police  and  prosecutors  come  across  this  illegal  activity 
while investigating other forms of crime. In general, it appears that the conditions in which 
the  art  market  currently  operates  may  facilitate  criminal  behaviour  in  the  case  of 
unscrupulous traders. 

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3.6  Case studies  

In  this  section  we  provide  brief  case  studies  of  investigations  that  have  been  widely 
published in the media, to showcase (the complexity of) trafficking routes and associations 
with organised crime and—in one case—terrorism financing. These case studies should not 
be considered as comprehensive or representative of the whole spectrum of illicit trade in 
cultural goods, but serve as an illustration of what the route of a particular object may look 
like and underline the findings from the analysis in the preceding sections of this chapter. 
The case studies also highlight the difficulty of developing an accurate description of the 
trafficking route of an object based on open source data.  

3.6.1  Dacian bracelets 

During the 1990s52, the area of Sarmizegetusa Regi, Romania, the ancient capital of the 
Dacian  Kingdom,  was  looted  by  organised  criminal  group  with  international  connections 
(Oberländer-Târnoveanu,  n.d.).  In  the  course  of  looting,  several  hoards  of  solid  gold 
bracelets and coins were removed from the archaeological site, which was included in the 
UNESCO World Heritage list in 1999. The looters used metal detectors, which had become 
available in the country after the fall of communism. All in all, it is believed that 24 gold 
bracelets were illegally excavated. 

Image 4.   Dacian Bracelets 

Source: Romanian Police 

It can be assumed that for quite some time the looting went unnoticed by the authorities, 
perhaps because no significant Dacian treasures (especially in gold) had previously been 
found;  only  rumours  circulated  about  gold  finds.  The  first  specific  indication  that  the 
rumours  might  have  some  basis  in  fact  was  in  1996  when  several  Romanian  museums 
were  offered  a  large  amount  of  gold  Dacian  coins,  namely  400  Koson,  which  was  much 
more than all museums of the world contained at that time (May 2012). In the subsequent 
years  the  suspicions  grew  more  concrete.  For  instance,  the  world  learned  about  the 
existence of gold bracelets in December 1999 when one of them was offered for sale at 

52 Some sources give different timespans of looting, between 10 and 17 years. See: 
http://www.adz.ro/artikel/artikel/den-dakern-und-ihrem-gold-auf-der-spur/ and https://www.romania-
insider.com/traffickers-dacian-artifacts-trial/. 

116 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
the Christie’s auction house in New York.53 The police opened first investigations in 2001 
(May 2012).  

What happened to the looted treasure, and bracelets specifically, once they were removed 
from  the  archaeological  site  is  difficult  to  retrace  based  on  the  information  from  open 
sources. It is believed that at least some of the bracelets passed through the hands of the 
trafficking  group  known  as  the  “Serbian  cartel”  operating  out  of  Zurich  (The  hunt  for 
Transylvanian  Gold  2017).  They  most  likely  first  transported  the  bracelets  to  Belgrade, 
which was known as a major hub for stolen art (The hunt for Transylvanian Gold 2017). 
From Belgrade, the artefacts in small packages were transported by busses overnight to 
Vienna, Munich and possibly Zurich and Geneva. Hereafter, the artefacts were distributed 
to London, Paris and New York. For a long time, the whereabouts of the bracelets remained 
unknown,  until  they  were  re-discovered  and  then  recovered  by  Romania  from  different 
European countries and the USA.  

In winter 2007, after the investigations by the Romanian authorities in collaboration with 
Interpol, four spiral-shaped gold bracelets were returned from France and the USA. The 
same year, thanks to cooperation between the Romanian and French police, the fifth gold 
bracelet  was  recovered.  In  summer  2007,  the  sixth  bracelet  was  discovered  by  the 
Romanian Border Police from a member of a criminal gang, as a result of an undercover 
operation.  That  same  year  three  more  bracelets  were  repatriated  from  collectors  in 
Switzerland  and  the  USA,  and  in  2008  two  more  were  brought  back  from  the  USA  to 
Romania  (Constantinescu  et  al.  2009).  In  2009  and  in  2011,  two  more  bracelets  were 
repatriated,  bringing  the  total  number  of  recovered  bracelets  to  13  (Oberländer-
Târnoveanu, n.d.). The whereabouts of the eleven remaining bracelets are unknown.  

The value of the looted Dacian bracelets is difficult to assess. These unique artefacts are 
made of solid gold and are of different sizes and weights. One indication of market value 
is  the  auction  estimate  of  one  bracelet  at  the  Christie’s  in  1999,  which  was  $100.000, 
though the bidding stalled at $65.000 (Curry 2015). One has to point out, though, that at 
this time there were serious doubts about the  authenticity of the bracelets (because no 
archaeologically excavated Dacian gold jewellery was known at the time). After thorough 
investigation by experts however, including chemical tests showing they were made from 
local gold panned from the rivers around Sarmizegetusa, the authenticity of the bracelets 
was confirmed (Constantinescu et al. 2009).  

Another  indication  of  value  is  the  estimation  by  the  courts  of  the  damage  inflicted  to 
Romania. At the trial of ten individuals, acting as criminal group and involved in trafficking 
of  the  gold  bracelets,  the  Romanian  Ministry  of  Culture  and  Religious  Affairs  initially 
requested  damages  of  €6,6  million  (Guţă  2018).  But  in  2015,  the  Deva  Court  ruled  the 
payment of damages of only about €1,5 million (Marica 2018).  

One more indication is provided by the actual sums of money for which the bracelets were 
sold,  according  to  the  investigators  (Guţă  2018).  Specifically,  in  the  case  of  one  of  the 

53 The sale of the bracelet was called off, and it and its owner disappeared and have not yet been found. See 
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/03/150320-romanian-dacian-sarmizegetusa-gold-looted-
recovered/. 

117 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
accused  the  investigators  established  that  he  sold  six  Dacian  bracelets  for  the  following 
prices: 

Table 5 

Dacian bracelets, weight and value (EUR) 

Bracelet weight 

Price  

982.20 gr. 

1.076,72 gr. 

1.115,31 gr. 

927,98 gr. 

1.200,00 gr. 

1.139,00 gr. 

€392.400 

€430.400 

€446.000 

€370.800 

€478.400 

€454.400 

Smaller  bracelets  were  sold  at  lower  prices.  In  the  case  of  another  accused,  the 
investigation established that he sold one 765 gram gold Dacian bracelet for €305.600 and 
another bracelet of 683 gram for €272.800. From the  open sources, it is unclear when, 
where and to whom these sales were made. 

One  final  indication  of  market  value  could  be  the  price  Romania  was  forced  to  pay  in 
compensation to private  collectors  who had bought Dacian bracelets  in good faith when 
the bracelets were repatriated. Unfortunately, there is little open source information about 
this. Some sources indicate that Romania paid  €430.000–500.000 to Swiss and German 
collectors. 

In any case, the archaeological and historical value of the artefacts is hard to overestimate, 
and, due to the looting, much of it has been lost and cannot be recovered. 

On the whole, it has been difficult to retrieve information about the routes of the Dacian 
bracelets.  Despite  this  case  being  relatively  well-known  and  widely  publicised,  little 
information is available regarding the transportation routes and methods. This illustrates 
and underscores the difficulty of developing an overview of the routes that an object has 
passed. 

118 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Visualisation of the routes of the Dacian bracelets  

Source: Ecorys 

119 

 
 
 
The above visual is based on desk research conducted by the project team and serves as 
an indication of the routes. Whereas evidence exists that the bracelets have travelled these 
routes, we do not claim that the illustration depicts the entire route that the objects have 
taken. Due to lacking and difficult access to information, the above presented visual might 
be incomplete or inaccurate.  

3.6.2  Sicilian trafficking ring  

On 4 July 2018, following a four-year investigation code-named “Demetra”, a coordinated 
action by the police of Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK searched 40 houses, identified 
41  suspects,  and  arrested  23  of  them  in  connection  with  trafficking  cultural  goods 
(Carabinieri  2018;  Agrigento  Notizie  2018).  Over  25.000  archaeological  items  with  an 
estimated market value of over 40 million euros were seized, alongside some 1.500 tools 
and metal detectors that could be used for illegal digging. Most of the investigative work 
was carried out by the TPC Carabinieri as the operation covered both northern and southern 
Italy,  namely  the  provinces  of  Agrigento,  Caltanissetta,  Catania,  Crotone,  Enna,  Lecce, 
Naples,  Novara,  Taranto,  Turin,  Ragusa,  Syracuse  and  Palermo.  The  cross-border 
cooperation was coordinated by Europol and Eurojust, and three European Arrest Warrants 
were executed in Stanmore (London, UK), Ehingen (Baden-Württemberg, Germany) and 
Barcelona (Spain). The massive operation involved more than 250 police officers, including 
the support of the 9th Helicopter Palermo and the "Cacciatori Sicilia" Eliportato Squadron–
the Carabinieri divisions dealing with mafia. 

Demetra  started  as  local  police  investigation  into  illegal  digging  in  Riesi  (commune  in 
Province  of  Caltanissetta  in  Sicily)  (Carabinieri  2018),  but  took  international  dimensions 
and focused on trafficking in cultural goods once the Carabinieri established that Gaetano 
Patermo,  one  of  the  suspects,  had  contacts  to  members  of  another  organisation  that 
operated  between  London,  Munich  and  Barcelona  (Caltanisetta  Live  2018).  Incidentally, 
Patermo was arrested for and accused of organised looting and trafficking in archaeological 
goods  in  2007,  but  was  acquitted  in  2013  both  because  of  an  amnesty  agreement  and 
because the crime was not proven in the trial.54 

The investigation alleges that, for years, there was organised illegal excavation activity in 
the Italian provinces of Caltanissetta and Agrigento (Sicily). These provinces are renowned 
for their rich archaeological sites from the Greek and Roman times, including the UNESCO 
World Heritage site and Italian national monument “Valley of the Temples”, which was also 
targeted by the criminals. Besides looting, it is alleged that the criminal organisation forged 
coins and other archaeological items in special workshops, located in Catania and equipped 
with teams of counterfeiters (The Telegraph 2018). The looting and counterfeiting activities 
were allegedly run by Francesco Lucerna, himself a former tombarolo (grave-robber) from 
the Riesi area (Agrigento Notijze 2018). 

The  illegally  excavated  and  forged  items  were  then  transported  to  northern  Italy,  in 
particular  to  Piedmont,  and  then  southern  Germany  by  a  network  of  couriers.  Various 
means  of  transport  were  utilised,  including  lorries  with  false  doors  and  even  personal 

54  At  the  same  time,  8  other  persons  were  convicted  in  that  trial,  including  the  mastermind  of  the  criminal 
organisation (Parisi 2013; Cocks 2018). 

120 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
luggage  and  wallets.  Some  of  the  items  were  sold  to  collectors  in  northern  Italy,  who 
allegedly knew about their illicit origins (The Telegraph 2018).  

It  is  believed  that  in  Germany  the  couriers  made  direct  contact  with  the  members  of 
another  organisation  that  was  responsible  for  legalising,  selling  of  smuggled  items  and 
distributing of the proceeds (Ministerio Beni Cultuali Italia n.d.). Also in Germany, another 
accomplice  created  fake  provenances  for  the  smuggled  items,  usually  “From  a  Lower 
Bavarian private collection”. After that the items were sold via two Munich auction houses, 
which are currently under investigation, and directly to collectors in Turin (Christie 2018; 
Cocks 2018). 

The alleged head of the activities for legalising and selling of smuggled goods, a London 
art dealer William Thomas Veres, collected the proceeds and then redistributed them via 
Barcelona  back  to  the  Italian  organisation  to  further  fund  the  illegal  excavations.  The 
money  was  brought  back  by  a  network  of  cash  couriers  (Caltanisetta  Live  2018).  It  is 
alleged  that  Veres  and  his  accomplice  Andrea  Palma,  acting  from  Barcelona,  were  key 
facilitators  of  the  trafficking  who  coordinated  the  supply  chain  and  provided  technical 
support (The Telegraph 2018). 

The court proceedings in this case are ongoing (ARCA 2018), and it remains to be seen 
what new information will come to light about trafficking routes and organisation of illicit 
trade during the trial. 

The routes described above are visualised in the figure below. The visual is based on desk 
research conducted by the project team and serves as an indication of the routes. Whereas 
reports exist that the items have travelled these routes, we do not claim that the illustration 
depicts the entire route that the objects have taken. Due to lacking and difficult access to 
information, the above presented visual might be incomplete or inaccurate.  

121 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3  

Visualisation of the Sicilian trafficking ring routes 

Source: Ecorys

122 

 
 
 
3.6.3  Jaume Bagot case 

In March 2018, as the culmination of an investigation started in 2015, two Spaniards by 
the  name  of  Jaume  Bagot  and  Oriol  Carreras  Palomar  were  arrested  and  charged  by 
Spanish authorities for their alleged role in the sale of Greek and Roman antiquities that 
were trafficked from Libya (a conflict zone) and Egypt into the European Union and  that 
were purportedly laundered and sold on the European art market (CNN 29 March 2018). 
The Libyan objects were sourced to territory controlled by militias associated with terrorist 
groups. Formal charges include terrorism financing, membership of a criminal organisation, 
dealing  in  stolen  goods,  concealment  of  contraband  and  document  fraud/  forgery  (to 
facilitate the sale of illicit items) (ABC España, 1 April 2018).  

Jaume  Bagot,  owner  of  J.BAGOT  Arqueología  –  Ancient  Art  in  Barcelona,  is  (or  perhaps 
was) an internationally respected dealer of high-end cultural goods. He is a member of the 
art  trade  association  CINOA  (Confederation  Internationale  des  Négociants  en  Oeuvres 
d’Art)  and  the  Spanish  Federation  of  Antiquarians,  and  the  Vice-President  of  the 
Professional Group of Antiquarians of the (Barcelona) Royal Shipyard.  Police statements 
indicate  he  appeared  at  several  academic  conferences  to  discuss  the  destruction  of 
historical sites by Daesh.  

Police allege that six objects comprising the of heads and torsos of statues were bought by 
the arrested dealers. These objects had been looted from the sites of Balagrae, Apollonia 
and Cyrene in northern Libya between 2014 and 2015, when the sites were subject to the 
territorial control of Daesh affiliates Ansar Al Sharia Benghazi and Ansar Al Sharia Derna 
(Muñoz and Morcillo 2018).55 Pieces of sculpture from Cyrenaica sell on the open market 
for anything between $4000 and $400.000 (Sykes 2016).  In March 2015, a 1,2 m high 
marble statue of a goddess looted from Cyrene and seized at London Heathrow in 2011 
was  valued  at  between  £1,5  to  £2  million  (Ward  2015).  Both  Jaume  Bagot  and  Oriol 
Carreras  Palomar  deny  buying  from  terrorist  groups  or  knowingly  buying  illicitly  traded 
cultural goods.  

Police discovered that the Libyan pieces had been transported from Libya to Spain between 
2013 and 2015 by two routes (Muñoz and Morcillo 2018; Lamarca and Parga 2018). The 
first was across Egypt to Jordan and then on to Spain. A variation of the first route was to 
send  items  from  Egypt  to  Jordan,  then  to  loop  through  Saudi  Arabia  and  United  Arab 
Emirates back to Jordan again, and only then to transport items to Spain. The second route 
was through Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Thailand and on to several European 
countries such as Russia, Germany, France or the United Kingdom. Police established from 
e-mails that Bagot was working with Hussam Zurqieh, a Jordanian dealer based in Dubai, 
and Hassan Fazeli, an Iranian dealer based in Dubai and Thailand. (The statue seized at 
Heathrow in 2011 had also been dispatched from Dubai by Fazeli). Most purchase invoices 
stated incorrectly that the pieces had been bought in Turkey or Egypt. Other members of 
the network were identified in Belgium, the United Kingdom and Germany. 

55 In 2015, the International Council of Museums has published an Emergency Red List of Libyan Cultural Objects 
at Risk, and a number of Libyan UNESCO heritage sites have been put on the UNESCO ‘World Heritage in Danger’ 
list. 

123 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
The  court  proceedings  in  this  case  are  ongoing,  and  it  remains  to  be  seen  what  new 
information will come to light about modus operandi and precise trafficking routes during 
the trial. The routes described above are visualised in the figure below.  

The  visual  is  based  on  desk  research  conducted  by  the  project  team  and  serves  as  an 
indication of the routes. Whereas reports exist that the items have travelled these routes, 
we do not claim that the illustration depicts the entire route that the objects have taken. 
Due  to  lacking  and  difficult  access  to  information,  the  above  presented  visual  might  be 
incomplete or inaccurate.  

124 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 

Visualisation of routes mentioned in Jaume Bagot case 

Source: Ecorys

125 

 
 
 
 
 
 
3.6.4  Kanakaria Mosaics  

In the aftermath of the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974, the Church of Panagia Kanakaria 
in Northern  Cyprus was raided (around 1976).  The  church,  a Byzantine Monastery from 
the 6th century AD, was famous for its Early Christian mosaic art which had been stripped 
off its walls (The History Blog 2018). In total, 4 mosaics were removed. The mosaics were 
broken down, and the individual pieces found their way into the international art market. 
For  almost  a  decade,  no  news  on  the  mosaics  surfaced  until  a  London-based  art  dealer 
became suspicious when a Germany-based Turkish dealer offered him two pieces of the 
mosaics.  He  got  in  touch  with  the  Cypriot  authorities  and,  ultimately,  two  icons  were 
returned to the Republic of Cyprus (Bourloyannis and Morris 1992).  

A few years later, in 1988, a US art dealer Goldberg bought four pieces of the mosaics for 
over $1 million. She bought the items from the Turkish smuggler and art dealer Dikmen 
who had also offered items to the London-based dealer in 1983 as mentioned above. This 
time  Dikmen  collaborated  with  another  American  art  dealer,  a  Dutch  dealer  and  an 
American attorney (University of  Geneva, n.d.). The pieces  were transported to  Indiana 
(USA) via the Freeport of Geneva. Once the pieces were in Goldberg’s hands, she tried to 
sell them to the Getty Museum in Malibu, USA. In the meantime, the Autocephalous Greek 
Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus had learned of the four pieces were 
bought by Goldberg. After a long lawsuit, all four pieces returned to Cyprus in 1991. 

Dikmen remained  at large until 1997, when the  German police and  INTERPOL identified 
and  seized  from  his  apartment  in  Munich  260  icons,  frescoes,  mosaics  and  manuscripts 
from Cyprus (The Cyprus Mail 2018). Sixteen years later, 173 ecclesiastical artefacts from 
50 different churches were repatriated to Cyprus, amongst which were four pieces of the 
Kanakaria mosaics. A full account of the operation and of her own role in it is provided by 
Tasoula Hadjitofi in her book “The Icon Hunter” (2017). In 2014, another piece was located 
by a London-based Cypriot art historian who was asked to prepare a historical report on 
the piece. After negotiations, the piece was returned to the Republic of Cyprus early 2018 
(The  National  Harald  2018).  In  that  same  year,  art  detective  Arthur  Brand  was  able  to 
return  the  latest  major  missing  piece  of  the  Kanakaria  mosaics  (Brand  2018).  After 
receiving a tip, he was able to locate the piece in Monaco where a British family turned out 
to be the current owner of the piece (Archaeology News Network 2018). The family had 
bought the piece in good faith and returned the fragment to Cyprus in November 2018.  

Twelve pieces  of the Kanakaria mosaic—the major  ones—have been returned  so  far but 
some are still missing (The Cyprus Mail 2018). 

The  figure  below  visualises  the  routes  described  above.  The  visual  is  based  on  desk 
research conducted by the project team and serves as an indication of the routes. Whereas 
reports exist that the items have travelled these routes, we do not claim that the illustration 
depicts the entire route that the objects have taken. Due to lacking and difficult access to 
information, the above presented visual might be incomplete or inaccurate.  

126 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5    Visualisation of the routes of Kanakaria Mosaics

Source: Ecorys

127 

 
 
 
 
 
 
3.6.5  What does this tell us 

The case studies above illustrate how difficult it is to draw a full picture of trafficking routes 
of illicitly traded cultural goods. Often, the exact routes that an object has travelled are 
not known or are not presented in open source data. In most cases, only the geographic 
point where the items were intercepted by the police or customs is known with certainty. 
Furthermore, the route of  one single object is neither  representative  of the  entire trade 
nor can the data on one case study be extrapolated to illicit trade in cultural goods as a 
whole. The case studies also demonstrate that particular cultural goods may be trafficked 
for  a  long  period  of  time,  during  which  their  whereabouts  are  unknown.  This  requires  a 
high level of sophistication and planning, and—as also shown by the case studies—criminal 
organisations  of  different  types  may  provide  the  necessary  networks,  logistics  and 
expertise. A thorough analysis of the routes of different objects would require substantial 
resources and time and fall out of the scope of this study. 

128 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 

129 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  Criminal  justice  responses  to  trafficking  in  cultural 
goods and the challenges faced by the authorities 

Given  the  cross-border  nature  of  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods,  this  chapter  analyses 
criminal justice responses focusing on the relevant practical matters on the national and 
international level. Based on the data and information collected through interviews, desk 
research  and  a  survey,  this  chapter  discusses  challenges  faced  by  law  enforcement 
authorities  as  well  as  the  best  practices  that  have  proven  to  be  effective  in  combatting 
illicit trade in cultural goods.  

This chapter looks first at the national level activities of law enforcement agencies (Section 
4.1) and turns then to the cross-border level (Section 4.2). Challenges faced by authorities 
are discussed in detail in Section 4.3. A selection of best practices —corresponding to the 
identified challenges—is presented in the final Section 4.4.  

4.1  National level responses 

The actual organisation and division of competences and responsibilities between different 
law enforcement agencies are outside the scope of this study, as they are predetermined 
by the more general national systems of law enforcement. In all countries, customs is the 
agency that controls goods and people crossing external borders and is, therefore, at the 
front  line  of  detecting  illicit  goods  of  any  kind  entering  the  country.  Often,  customs  is 
supported  by  the  border  police  who  are  in  charge  of  physically  checking  those  external 
borders. In some countries, customs is also tasked with investigation of illicit trafficking, 
in other countries customs hand over the investigations to the police (Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Czech  Republic,  France,  Italy,  Netherlands,  Romania,  Slovenia,  Spain,  Sweden).  Yet  in 
other countries, customs handles initial investigation and then hands over the case to the 
police  (e.g.  Germany).  If  a  country  has  a  federal  structure,  federal  and  regional  police 
would have different competences in investigating illicit trade in cultural goods, based on 
the type of the crime and where it has occurred. In addition to the police and customs, 
some countries have a special body charged with the protection of cultural heritage (e.g. 
Estonia,  Netherlands,  Slovenia,  Sweden).  Such  bodies  are  commonly  established  within 
the Ministry of Culture and may have a supervisory function in relation to law enforcement 
in  the  field  of  all  crimes  against  cultural  property  (e.g.  destruction,  damaging,  looting, 
theft). While the various organisational arrangements may present difficulties or benefits 
in combatting illicit trade in cultural goods in individual countries, they are not pertinent to 
this type of crime only. In this section, we look at the practical issues of law enforcement, 
including customs, specifically relevant for trafficking in cultural goods.  

130 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.1  Monitoring the market  

While  in  some  instances  investigations  into  trafficking  of  cultural  goods  are  opened 
following  reports  from  witnesses  or  victims  or  confidential  information  given  to  law 
enforcement, monitoring the market online and offline is a large part of the police 
work.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  is  often  (seemingly)  a 
‘victimless  crime’  (see  text  box  in  Section  3.3.2),  and illegal  excavations  and  trafficking 
often happen without complaint or without witnesses. 

Many interview partners mentioned monitoring of the market as an important element of 
detecting illicit trade in cultural goods (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, France, 
Italy,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Romania,  Slovenia,  Spain,  Sweden).  An  exemplary  and 
comprehensive  approach  to  the  market  monitoring  is  taken  by  the  Command  for  the 
Protection  of  Cultural  Heritage  (Comando  dei  Carabinieri  per  la  Tutela  del  Patrimonio 
Culturale, TPC, further referred as Italian Carabinieri). Due to the large number of officers 
they  have  dedicated  to  this  topic,  the  Italian  Carabinieri  have  a  specialised  IT  unit  for 
searching the web staffed by several officers who check internet markets full-time with the 
help of a specially developed tool. In addition, Carabinieri officers visit physical dealerships 
and markets (even flea markets). 

Most  other  national  police  forces  cannot  afford  such  extensive  and  comprehensive 
checks due to the lack of resources (money and staff,  see in more detail in Section 
4.3), even though they consider them necessary. In most cases, web crawlers are not in 
use, and police officers check the relevant websites manually on a daily basis (Germany, 
Italy), which limits the number of websites that can be checked. Some of them still manage 
to check the dark web (Estonia, Germany, Latvia). A few interview partners said that they 
do not have the capacity for systematic monitoring of Internet antiquities sales and only 
check  relevant  online  marketplaces  when  they  receive  information  that  indicates  illicit 
goods are being offered online (Belgium, Cyprus, Norway). Some interviewees explained 
that there is no use in intensifying the web monitoring because they do not have the human 
capacity to process the information and follow up on it (Belgium, Spain). 

Police checks of offline stores and markets in some countries is only possible upon a prior 
notice. Competence does not always lie with a trained police officer, but, for example, can 
be the exclusive competence of a legal officer of the ministry of culture. This may lower 
the effectiveness of such on-site visits. 

Recommendation:  More  resources  should  be  invested  to  further  study  and 
understand the phenomenon of illicit trade in cultural goods. Many aspects that remain 
contested  need  to  be  further  investigated.  More  solid  evidence  should  be  produced, 
also through convictions in court. 

131 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2  Law enforcement expertise 

In the following, we elaborate on the different items that were raised by law enforcement 
stakeholders. 

Specialised units in police and customs, specialised prosecutors 

Not  all  national  law  enforcement  agencies  have  a  dedicated  or  specialised  unit 
dealing with cultural property crimes (including illicit trade in cultural goods). While many 
national  police  forces  currently  have  one,  customs  rarely  have  such  unit,  and  public 
prosecutors specialised in cultural crimes are even more rare. 

Among  the  surveyed  countries,  four  groups  can  be  distinguished  with  regard  to  the 
presence of a specialised unit within the police forces: 
1.  Countries with a long-term established specialised police unit, (more or less) stable in 

size (e.g. Italy, Romania); 

2.  Countries that have a specialised unit, but its size has been  reducing in  recent  years 

(e.g. Belgium); 

3.  Countries that had a specialised unit in the past, but it has been (recently) dismantled 

or discontinued after officers retired (e.g. Switzerland); 

4.  Countries  that  have  a  recently  established  specialised  unit  within  the  police  (e.g. 

Sweden). 

Table 6 provides an overview of the way in which countries organised their efforts in the 
combat against illicit trade in cultural goods. (Not all countries provided information.) 

Table 6 

Specialised units combatting illicit trade in cultural goods  

PO = Police, CU = Customs 

Police 

Customs 

Austria 

Belgium 

  The special unit decreased from 7 FTE in 2001 

Bulgaria 

Czech Republic 

Estonia  

Germany 

Italy 

Latvia  

Norway 

  Police FTE only refer to Baden Württemberg. The customs 

Yes 

3 

unit has no specialised officials, it is mainstreamed 

Special 

FTE 

Special 

FTE 

unit 

unit 

Yes 

3 full, 1PT 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

1 

20 

16 

Yes 

300+ 

3 

1 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

10 

  Both the specialised police and customs units also focus 

Yes 

on other illicit domains (i.e. wildlife trafficking) 

Romania 

132 

Yes 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PO = Police, CU = Customs 

Police 

Customs 

Slovenia 

Spain 

Sweden  

  Seven cover both wildlife and cultural heritage 

PT = part-time 

Special 

FTE 

Special 

FTE 

unit 

unit 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

1 (8PT) 

1PT 

20 

10 

Whether a country has a specialised unit seems to be linked to how high illicit trade 
in cultural goods is on the political priority list (see Section 3.3.2). Countries with a 
long-term,  established,  specialised  police  unit  also  have  a  strong  commitment  to  the 
protection  of  their  cultural  property  and  often  are  source  countries  (i.e.  countries 
wherefrom many illicitly traded goods originate). In countries where a specialised unit was 
dismantled  or  reduced  in  size,  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  and  other  cultural  property 
crimes are not among the top priorities, and the relevant staff were relocated to organised 
crime or counter-terrorism. This leads to the loss of expertise, databases, contacts and the 
creation of gaps in international law enforcement networks (see more details in  Sections 
4.1.3 and 4.3 below). 

The specialised units may be organised in different ways depending on the administrative 
division of a country. Some countries have regional specialised units (e.g. Germany), some 
combine these with a central unit (e.g. Italy, Romania). Most have one central unit (e.g. 
Austria, Belgium, Norway, Spain, Slovenia). Some of the specialised units work exclusively 
on  cultural  property  crimes  (e.g.  Austria,  Belgium,  Germany,  Italy,  Spain),  while  others 
deal with any type of illicit goods (i.e. narcotics, firearms, for example, in Norway) or with 
organised crime (Bulgaria). This seems to depend not only on political priorities, but also 
on the size of the country (i.e. smaller countries are more likely to ‘bundle’ competences) 
and, possibly, on the perceived frequency of this type of crime. This means that in some 
units only a few or one officers work full time on cultural property crime or a few officers 
may  work  part-time  on  this  type  of  crime,  depending  on  workload.  Where  there  are 
specialised units at national customs, they are often in charge of other crimes as well and 
the officers work part-time on illicit exports-imports of cultural goods. Table 26 provides 
an overview of police and customs officers working full or part-time in specialised units in 
different countries. 

Law enforcement officers working in specialised units  have not always been educated in 
archaeology, art history or other relevant subjects. Many interviewees pointed out that this 
special education is not necessary as they can rely on external expertise (e.g. Italy, Spain, 
Switzerland; see further below). It is important to be a good investigator and have a certain 
sensitivity and interest in the topic. One acquires operational experience and learns on the 
job;  increasingly  various  training  opportunities  are  provided  by  national  Ministries  of 
Culture and/or by international organisations and networks (see Sections 4.2 and 4.4.7). 
At the same time, a few interviewees who are trained archaeologists/historians pointed out 
that it is important to have a dedicated team of experts on this issue because it requires 
an  expert’s  eye  to  assess  cases  of  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  (e.g.  Bulgaria,  Estonia, 
Germany, Romania, Sweden). Regular police officers have a different approach, and their 

133 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
lack  of  knowledge  on  this  specific  issue  causes  ineffectiveness  and  inefficiency.  One 
interviewee went on to complete a degree in art history after joining the specialised police 
unit (Norway). 

Many interviewees emphasised the importance of a specialised unit at all stages of 
law  enforcement,  from  investigators  to  public  prosecutors  and  even  criminal 
judges. The applicable law is complex, and, if involved law enforcement officers are not 
adequately trained, investigation, prosecution and court proceedings take a lot of time and 
effort because everyone needs to ‘learn the ropes’. The public prosecutor as a link between 
the police and judge plays an extremely important role, and their expertise could make or 
break  the  case.  Several  interviewees  explained  that  even  though  there  are  no  officially 
designated public prosecutors in their countries, there are prosecutors who have acquired 
expertise on the job, and they have become preferred persons to approach with cases of 
illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods.  Also,  in  some  locations,  such  specialised  prosecutors  have 
appeared  in  recent  years  (e.g.  Munich  in  Germany,  Cyprus),  which  reflects  a  growing 
number of cases in the respective countries.  

Recommendation:  Countries  should  invest  in  developing  the  expertise  of  law 
enforcement  officers  at  all  stages  of  criminal  justice  responses,  from  customs  and 
investigators to judges. This should be done by setting up a specialised unit (following 
INTERPOL’s  calls  for  all  Member  States,  INTERPOL  2016)  and  by  providing  regular 
special training to the staff.  

Rotation of staff and retention of expertise 

Several  interview  partners  (e.g.  Netherlands,  Switzerland)  mentioned  the  importance  of 
having  a  long-term  specialised  unit  in  law  enforcement  to  accumulate  and  retain 
knowledge, intelligence and expertise in cultural property crimes (including illicit 
trade), to create own networks and to build up and maintain trust with informants 
and colleagues in other law enforcement agencies, especially from other countries. 
This usually requires years, especially in case of confidential informants. In some countries, 
police officers have to rotate on a regular basis; in other countries, retired specialists are 
not  replaced,  and  units  are  dismantled.  This  leads  to  irreversible  loss  of  knowledge, 
intelligence  and  expertise  within  the  police  and  a  gap  in  the  national  and  international 
networks of law enforcement. 

Recommendation:  In  recognition  of  the  complex  nature  of  illicit  trade  in  cultural 
goods, which requires special expertise to deal with provenance and authenticity issues, 
rotation of experts should be discouraged, and longer-term posts encouraged. 

134 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attraction of external expertise from museums and researchers 

When special expertise in identifying and authenticating cultural goods is necessary, most 
interviewees  (e.g.  Czech  Republic,  Latvia,  Spain,  Romania)  report  good  collaboration 
and reliable support from museums, universities and researchers. Academics work 
both  with  the  police  and  customs  to  identify  cultural  goods  correctly,  to  attribute 
them  or  check  their  provenance,  establish  their  value  and  origin  and  also  to 
provide training. Academics may be involved in the inspections of goods and premises 
or only consulted for desk-based research (e.g. on the basis of photographs). However, a 
few interviewees stated that sometimes researchers are reluctant to get involved in these 
cases because it might be dangerous for them if they act as a witness in a court case. 

The  cooperation  with  academics  is  organised  differently  across  countries.  In  some 
countries, law enforcement can approach academic institutions and museums and request 
their  expertise  directly  and  on  an  ad  hoc  basis  whenever  they  come  across  anything 
suspicious  and  need  help  (e.g.  Germany,  Norway,  Slovenia).  In  other  countries,  such 
requests have to go via the national Ministry of Culture (e.g. Romania, Switzerland), which 
has been flagged as problematic. The requests via the Ministry take more time than direct 
requests, and sometimes less appropriate experts may be assigned to work on the case 
because the ministry staff is not well trained to recognise the needs of the investigation. 
In a few countries, there are academic experts working at the specialised police units on a 
part-time basis (e.g. Czech Republic). Academic and museum experts are more likely to 
be called upon to identify, authenticate and value seized material than they are to monitor 
the market or help investigate trading networks. 

Recommendation:  Collaboration  with  outside  (academic)  experts  should  be 
encouraged,  especially  archaeologists.  Funds  should  be  made  available  to  facilitate 
contributions from outside experts. This could take the form of a part-time position. 

135 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.3  National data collection  

Not every country surveyed systematically collects data on illicit trade in cultural goods, of 
which a national database of stolen/ lost cultural property is one form. The accessibility of 
such databases may differ across countries. An overview  of different databases used by 
Member States is presented in Table 27 below.  

Table 7 

Databases and accessibility 

Country 

Type of 

database 

Accessibility 

Lost/stolen 

Goods that 

Confiscations 

Open to 

Open only 

Open only 

goods 

are prone to 

and attempts 

public 

to law 

to national 

illicit 

to illegal 

enforcement 

law 

trafficking 

sales 

(illustrative) 

Yes 

Yes 

n.d. 

n.d. 

Yes 

Yes** 

Yes 

Yes** 

enforcement 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes** 

Yes 

Yes* 

Partly 

Yes 

Partly*** 

Yes 

Partly 

Yes 

Yes*** 

Yes 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Czechia 

Cyprus 

France 

Germany 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

n.d. 

Baden 

Yes 

Württemberg 

Norway 

Italy 

Latvia 

Romania 

Slovenia 

Spain 

Sweden 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

* Database is only accessible to police stations with specialised unit 

*** Database is only accessible by police, but part of it is available on the police website. Customs can get access 

upon request. 

** Full database is available to national police. Restricted database can also be accessed by relevant Ministries, 

the  National  Heritage  Institute,  National  Galleries,  customs  (also  from  surrounding  countries  Austria  and 

Germany). The public can see information about an object online, without any criminal information. 

The challenges of compiling national statistics were discussed in  Section 3.3.1, but here 
more practical difficulties and obstacles should be mentioned. One of the most obvious is 
that the law enforcement agency does not have competences (i.e. this is not within their 
tasks  or  mandate)  to  compile  statistics,  especially if  there  is  also  no  specialised  unit. 
Insufficient  resourcing  (i.e.  funding  and  staffing)  is  another  problem:  where  the 
specialised unit consists of only one officer, this officer does not have time to create and 
maintain  a  database.  One  more  reason  is  the  disappearance  of  specialised  units  or 

136 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reduction of their size: in such cases, the maintenance of databases is often discontinued. 
Some interviewees related that, even though their units are understaffed, or they are not 
tasked with creation and maintenance of a database, they do so in addition to their duties 
in order to have some data available (e.g. Belgium). Such efforts, commendable as they 
are, result in fragmentary data collection on cases of illicit trade, and data are not reported 
to INTERPOL/Europol.  

The  database  by  the  Italian  Carabinieri,  ‘Leonardo’,  was  mentioned  repeatedly  by  the 
interviewed police officers as a good example of how a database should function. A part of 
the database (20.000 objects) is online and is accessible to the public; a much larger part 
is  not  publicly  available  (in  total,  the  database  records  over  6,2  million  items).  The 
database  is  only  available  in  Italian,  while  requests  for  searches  can  also  be  made  in 
English. The Italian Carabinieri are less selective of the items they include in their database 
and collect any type of information: not only photos, but also descriptions without photos, 
partial descriptions etc. This is because they get information not only from museums that 
document their items well, but also from small churches, private persons, etc. that do not 
have inventories. In line with this approach, the Carabinieri also work differently with the 
collected information: the database is used as a starting point of an investigation, rather 
than a checkpoint to determine whether a cultural good was stolen or not.  

Recommendation: in addition to recommendations on data collection and databases in 
Section  3.2,  customs  and  law  enforcement  should  be  tasked  with  systematic  data 
collection and creation and maintenance of a database. They should be granted sufficient 
resources for these tasks. 

4.1.4  National cooperation 

Inter-agency cooperation  

Investigation  and  prosecution  of  cases  of  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  often  requires 
cooperation  of  different  national  agencies.  Indications  of  trafficking  may  be  found  by 
customs which may or may not conduct an initial investigation, which is then handed over 
to the police for in-depth investigation. Later, a public prosecutor may get involved to bring 
the  case  to  the  court.  At  various  stages  of  investigation,  data  and  information  sharing 
between the relevant agencies is critical, as well as transfer of expert knowledge, common 
strategical and operational planning and supporting criminal justice responses by executing 
or responding to requests. 

Not all countries can report a good cooperation between different national law enforcement 
agencies  when  it  comes  to  combatting  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods.  In  some  Member 
States, communication flows are ineffective, also due to the lack of a single point 
of contact or of a specialised unit, and information exchange is irregular. In some 
countries, police agencies and customs work in silos, rarely coordinating or meeting with 
each other. This hinders the effective understanding of the phenomenon of illicit trade in 

137 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cultural goods nationally and internationally. Often,  the police do not have access to 
databases  compiled  by  the  customs  and  vice  versa.  In  countries  with  a  federal 
structure,  regional  police  without  a  specialised  unit  may  not  have  access  to  central 
databases of lost and stolen cultural goods. As a result, different law enforcement agencies 
are  not  aware  of  activities  undertaken  by  their  sister  organisations.  A  few  interviewees 
stated  that  international  (inter-agency)  cooperation  was  better  than  with  the  national 
customs or police. Another interviewee illustrates:  

“In  [our  country],  there  is  a  huge  problem  in  cooperation  with  customs.  There’s 
good cooperation with the border police, but [cooperating with] customs is difficult, 
[as the] sharing of information is not very good. Customs activities and seizures are 
not shared with the police. Customs and police do not have access to each other’s 
databases.”  

The  study  team  shares  this  observation  as  we  found  it  very  difficult  to  involve  customs 
representatives in this study and obtain relevant information from them: we experienced 
a low response rate to the survey and have been able to carry out only a few interviews. 

The lack of specialised units within law enforcement agencies poses a special problem 
for such cooperation. For instance, several interviewees have indicated it is difficult to 
cooperate  with  public  prosecutors  because  the  topic  is  too  specialised,  and 
prosecutors  in  their  country  handle  all  types  of  cases  and  are  not  able  to  grasp  the 
importance and complexity of trafficking in cultural goods cases when one is brought to 
them or when advice on an investigation is needed.  

In  some  countries,  national  cooperation  across  various  law  enforcement  agencies  is 
effective  and  regular,  facilitated  by  (semi)formal  structures  that  ensure  that  different 
authorities can easily keep in touch. In Spain, there are customs officers attached to some 
of the police units (they may even have an office in the police department), which ensures 
a  direct  communication  line  between  the  two  agencies.  A  Norwegian  officer  explains: 
“Cooperation  with  customs  is  smooth.  [Police]  and  customs  have  weekly  meetings,  and 
information is shared by both parties”. Although the Norwegian police, prosecutor office 
and customs do not share an information system, they have established a strong network 
which allows them to exchange information easily. A similar informal cooperation platform 
was mentioned by a Belgian law enforcement representative who indicated how useful and 
important the discussions on trafficking trends, ongoing investigations and legal framework 
within this professional environment are.  

Some Member States have established national cooperation fora, which include not only 
law  enforcement,  but  other  relevant  stakeholders  as  well.  For  instance,  Cyprus  has 
established  a  national  committee,  meeting  every  few  months,  that  consists  of  the 
Department of Antiquities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Culture, customs, 
police,  church  representatives,  and  legal  services  (public  prosecutor).  The  public 
prosecutor attending the committee, although not a specialised unit at the beginning, has 
developed the necessary expertise and has become a de facto specialised prosecutor. The 
Dutch Cultural Heritage Inspectorate works closely with the Dutch Customs and signed a 
framework agreement with them delineating each other’s role, tasks and responsibilities. 

138 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Inspectorate provides training and education to customs officers on an ongoing basis. 
Together,  they  have  created  a  risk  analysis  template  to  recognise  illegal  imports  and 
exports of cultural goods. In some countries, meetings between the various stakeholders 
take place regularly (Austria, Cyprus, Norway, Sweden) or on an ad-hoc basis (Slovenia). 
Generally, the information exchange across stakeholders on the national level is perceived 
to  be  an  effective  way  to  strengthen  and  maintain  the  network  and  helps  to  coordinate 
activities.  

Relationships with the industry 

In the absolute majority of the countries surveyed for this study, there is no dialogue or 

Recommendation: Each country should set up a process in which all relevant national 
authorities can meet on a regular basis (frequency depending on the number of illicit 
transactions, e.g. from once a month to twice a year). 

cooperation fora that involve industry stakeholders, like art and antiquities dealers, auction 
houses,  collectors  etc.  A  few  law  enforcement  representatives  explained  that  auction 
houses are not willing to cooperate with the police.  

Some countries do engage with the industry on illicit trade questions. The Cultural Heritage 
Inspectorate  of  the  Dutch  Ministry  of  Culture  organises  regular  meetings  with  industry 
associations to discuss relevant issues (for example, how to handle provenance issues). 
The  Inspectorate  states  that  it  is  crucial  that  different  stakeholders  (from  government, 
museums,  traders)  and  different  countries  are  aligned  in  their  approaches  to  fight 
trafficking in cultural goods. Regular consultations help achieve this goal at the national 
level. Belgian police indicate they have a similar approach, hosting an informal information 
exchange with Ministries, museums, archaeologists and other experts. In the Netherlands, 
police  have  a  good  working  relationship  with  the  association  of  dealers  in  ancient  art 
(Vereeniging  van  Handelaren  in  Oude  Kunst  in  Nederland,  VHOK).  The  Dutch  police 
regularly  makes  use  of  the  expertise  of  members  of  the  VHOK  in  order  to  establish  the 
authenticity, origin and value of items. Members of the association have also provided their 
expert opinion during the Cyber Patrol action as part of Operation Pandora III. 

Transparency of the art and antiquities market 
Due  to  the  lack  of  transparency56,  culture  of  discretion  and  the  resulting  lack  of 
insight and understanding in what is going on in it, the art and antiquities market 
is  a  difficult  subject  for  monitoring,  policing  and  regulation  (Yates  2016b). 
Improving  relationships  between  the  market  and  the  law  enforcement  through 
outreach  and  cooperation  (Gladstone  and  van  der  Meulen  2018)  is  one  possible 
measure, whose effectiveness will differ across countries and may be relatively low 
overall. One of the reasons for this is the art and antiquities market is amorphous: 
because art and antiquity dealership is not a registered trade, anyone can be one. 
While high-end dealers  and auction houses are known to everyone, they are just 

56 One researcher referred to it as “historical lack of transparency” (Dempster 2014). 

139 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
the  tip  of  the  iceberg.  The  exact  numbers  of  dealers  active  on  the  market—the 
target audience to get engaged—are unknown. To improve this starting point, some 
researchers  (Gladstone  and  van  der  Meulen  2018)  suggest  that  (stricter) 
registration obligations should be introduced for art and antiquities dealers as well 
as regular checks of their books. 

Another measure to enhance transparency is to improve due diligence by art and 
antiquities  dealers.  Due  diligence  describes  the  process  of  search  and  discovery 
undertaken  by  a  prospective  buyer  before  agreeing  to  a  purchase  (Prott  1997). 
Some  trade  organisations  offer  due  diligence  guidelines  for  their  members,  but 
some  of  the  guidelines  simply  restate  recommendations  about  what  should 
constitute  ethical  business  practice,  rather  than  providing  a  thorough  account  of 
necessary procedure and evidential standards. Until recently, none of the guidelines 
contained  a  requirement  to  establish  a  full  documentary  account  of  legitimate 
provenance  from  the  time  of  an  object’s  modern  discovery,  thereby  ensuring  an 
object was not stolen or trafficked. 

Throughout the 2000s, due to the abuse of cultural goods for insider trading, tax 
evasion and money laundering and the link to terrorist funding, public confidence 
in  the  propriety  of  the  market  was  undermined  and  questions  were  being  asked 
about  the  need  for  regulation  to  improve  market  transparency  (Reyburn  2015; 
Macquisten  2016).  With  these  concerns  in  mind,  the  Responsible  Art  Market 
Initiative  (RAM)  was  formed  in  Geneva  in  2015  as  a  trade  initiative  with  the 
support of academic legal specialists57. It has developed a systematic due diligence 
‘toolkit’  and  a  set  of  guidelines  to  guard  against  money  laundering  and  terrorist 
financing. For a prospective transaction, the due diligence toolkit describes checks 
that should be made into the client, the object, and the transaction itself, with an 
emphasis  throughout  on  producing  a  documentary  record.  While  such  guidelines 
point  towards  the  increasing  salience  of  due  diligence  for  market  actors,  their 
effectiveness is limited as they are not mandatory and they do not require to make 
information available to external actors. 

Building  upon  Article  10(a)  of  the  1970  UNESCO  Convention,  another  potential 
measure  to  increase  market  transparency  is  the  creation  of  a  database  of 
information  regarding  transactions  and  provenances  as  recommended  by  the 
European  Parliament  (2018)  in  the  context  of  fighting  the  terrorism  financing 
through the illicit trade in cultural goods. Another European Parliament’s report on 
cross-border restitution claims of works of art and cultural goods looted in armed 
conflicts  and  wars  (2019a)  went  further  when  it  recommended  a  number  of 
measures,  including  the  clarification  of  the  notion  “due  diligence”  at  the  EU  level 
and the creation of a “meta-database” that will record all available information on 
the  cultural  item  obtained  from  all  available  sources.  Practical  realisation  and 
implications of such suggestions need to be considered carefully, especially in the 
light of past experiences. An attempt to establish a meta-database in the UK had to 
be  abandoned  over  the  large  cost,  concerns  about  long-term  sustainability  and 
disagreement about the purposes of the database (i.e. closed database for crime 

57 For the documents of the initiative see http://responsibleartmarket.org/art-market-guidelines/ . 

140 

 
 
 
 
 
                                           
investigation v open database for due diligence) (Bailey 2003; 2005b). Currently, 
the  enormous  amounts  of  information  due  to  the  large  numbers  of  objects  sold 
online and the speed of transactions will present an additional challenge. 

At the same time, some of the interviewed representatives of art trade associations are 
strongly  in  favour  of  intensifying  the  dialogue  between  the  trade  and  the  authorities. 
Industry  representatives  perceive  a  strong  confrontation  both  from  the  side  of  the 
authorities and academics when it comes to the  existence and the  exact nature of illicit 
trade  in  cultural  goods.58  A  representative  from  ADA  refers  to  the  United  Kingdom  as  a 
good  example  of  effective  cooperation  between  law  enforcement  and  the  art  trade 
(although this is disputed by other interviewees):  

“We have always had good contacts with the Metropolitan Police’s Art and Antiques 
Squad.  A  few  years  ago,  after  news  articles  appeared  in  the  press  saying  that 
shipments  of  illicit  antiquities  from  Syria  were  appearing  in  the  UK,  [we]  set  up 
regular  exchanges  with  law  enforcement  so  we  could  find  out  what  was  actually 
going  on  rather  than  reading  stories  in  the  press  that  turned  out  not  to  be  true. 
Close communication and cooperation with law enforcement has been useful. The 
UK trade consist of a network of people who are familiar with each other and are 
keen  to  signal  things  that  can  be  addressed  internally  without  drastic  measures 
being  taken.  Information  sharing  and  a  good  relationship  with  law  enforcement 
benefits both the trade and the police.” 

Recommendation:  To  facilitate  a  better  interaction  with  the  industry,  transparency 
obligations  should  be 
in  cultural  goods  (see  relevant 
recommendations  in  Section  3.4.2.),  which  are  also  likely  to  improve  the  industry’s 
reputation. 

imposed  on  dealers 

58  A  representative  from  IADAA  indicates:  “The  relationship  between  the  art  market  and  archaeologists  and 
museums is rotten, there is a lot of antagonisation and politicisation of the positions. This was not the case 30 
years ago: in the past art dealers would bring items they have to museums for advice, museums would welcome 
[them being] the 1st choice of the item for sale. Now archaeologists are looked down at if they work with or for 
private clients and, in some countries, they may lose their jobs [as it is argued this shows a] lack of integrity. For 
example, in Germany members of archaeological associations are not allowed to consult private clients.” 

141 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
4.2  Cross-border criminal justice responses 

4.2.1  International inter-agency cooperation 

4.2.1.1.  International level 

At  the  international  level,  cross-border  cooperation  in  combatting  illicit  trade  in  cultural 
goods is encouraged, facilitated and coordinated by INTERPOL, WCO and UNESCO.  

For criminal law enforcement, internationally, INTERPOL is probably the most important 
platform  for  cooperation.  Its  three  relevant  functions  are:  (1)  liaison  point,  (2) 
communications support and (3) database assistance. Through INTERPOL, police officers 
obtain  contact  details  of  a  foreign  counterpart,  which  speeds  up  the  work  processes.  It 
opens direct communication channels avoiding the need to go via embassies and ministries 
in order to reach the competent authority. INTERPOL maintains a specialised database in 
which  lost  and  stolen  cultural  goods  are  recorded  following  respective  reports  from 
INTERPOL member states; an improved database ID-ART focusing on Europe will soon be 
launched (for more details see Section 4.2.2). It issues alerts of most wanted cultural items 
on  a  regular  basis.  INTERPOL  also  provides  operational  support  (communication  and 
coordination) for joint operations planned by several countries, also in collaboration with 
other international organisations.  

Interviewees for this study generally perceive INTERPOL to be highly effective. 
INTERPOL has been involved in combatting illicit trade in cultural goods for a long time (for 
instance, its database was established almost 25 years ago), and it has a team of people 
working on this topic with rich expertise. The interviewees emphasise the global outreach 
that INTERPOL’s network provides, which is crucial for fighting cross-border crime and 
international organised crime. Furthermore, the data shared by INTERPOL are perceived 
to be relevant. However, they are only as good as the data that are reported to INTERPOL 
by  its  member  states,  as  accurately  pointed  out  by  one  interviewee.  Most  interviewees 
stated that, when investigating a cultural property crime, they prefer to work directly with 
the specialised unit or responsible officer in the foreign country, and the INTERPOL network 
allows them to identify the competent person quite effectively. It is especially useful 
in the case of a first-time contact with a foreign country (in the EU’s context: a non-Member 
State). 

At  the  same  time,  a  few  interviewees  mentioned  that  INTERPOL’s  system  is  not  always 
effective:  “It  happens  [that]  answers  to  questions  asked  [are]  delayed  for  months, 
sometimes they do not come at all, and in other cases one and the same information is 
sent several times.” Another problem mentioned is that classified information cannot be 
exchanged. 

Whereas criminal police agencies are supported by INTERPOL, customs authorities across 
the globe are supported by the WCO. Since 2015, the WCO has become more engaged in 
combatting illicit trafficking of cultural objects. The increased efforts were spurred by the 
destruction and pillaging of cultural heritage in West and Central Africa and in the MENA 
region.  The  WCO  provides  a  specialised  platform  (ARCHEO)  through  which  customs 

142 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
agencies  can  securely  communicate,  which  is  considered  to  be  useful  by  the  customs 
officials interviewed for this study. The WCO also develops and  organises  trainings for 
customs officials  on  how  to  deal  with  (potentially  illicit)  cultural  goods59  and  supports 
customs officials with analysis and operational assistance during joint action days.  

As the international organisation advancing cooperation in the cultural domain, UNESCO 
is a pioneer  of the fight against the illicit trade in cultural goods. UNESCO  prepared the 
1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property and requested UNIDROIT to develop the 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects.   

1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the 
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 

The 1970 Convention is the first international legal instrument for the protection of 
cultural property during peacetime. It addresses three issues (Schneider 2016): (1) 
prevention  of  trafficking  in  cultural  goods  at  the  national  level;  (2)  restitution  of 
trafficked cultural goods; and (3) cooperation among states. 

Article  1  of  the  Convention  defines  “cultural  property”  as  comprising  objects 
important for archaeology, prehistory, history,  literature, art or science. Article 5 
introduces  preventive  measures  including  the  drafting  of  laws  and  regulations 
designed  to  prevent  illicit  import,  export  and  transfer  of  ownership  of  important 
cultural  property  (Article  5(a))  and  the  establishment  of  a  national  inventory  of 
protected  cultural  property  (Article  5(b)).  States  Party  can  introduce  mandatory 
export certificates (Article 6), monitor trade in cultural goods, impose penalties or 
administrative sanctions (Article 8), promulgate rules of ethics for those who deal 
in  cultural  goods  (Article  5(e)),  and  organise  educational  measures  to  raise 
awareness (Article 5(f)). States Party can also oblige dealers to maintain a register 
recording the origin, description and price of cultural goods, names and addresses 
of suppliers, and to inform purchasers of the cultural goods of the applicable export 
prohibitions (Article 10 (a)). 

The Convention is not retroactive. Article 7 (b)(ii) makes provision for the return of 
cultural  objects  stolen  from  an  inventoried  collection  of  a  museum  or  similar 
institution,  but  only  if  those  objects  were  imported  into  a  State  Party  after  the 
Convention entered into force in both State Parties involved. The recovering State 
Party must pay just compensation to a dispossessed person who had valid title to 
an object acquired through good faith purchase. 

Article 9 allows a State Party whose cultural heritage is being actively plundered to 
call  for  the  help  of  other  State  Parties  in  controlling  the  trafficking  of  plundered 
objects.  

59  See  the  recently  developed  Training  Handbook  on  the  Prevention  of  Illicit  Trafficking  of  Cultural  Heritage 
(PITCH). 

143 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
The 1970 Convention is considered a standard setting instrument as it has enabled 
the  alignment  of  relevant  national  legislation  in  many  countries  and  guided  the 
development of further legal and normative mechanisms to tackle the problem of 
illicit trade (Prott 2012). At the same time, there are several shortcomings of the 
1970 Convention that limit its effectiveness. It lends its primary protection only to 
already  discovered  and  inventoried  objects,  not  to  those  that  are  undiscovered, 
unexcavated or unregistered (Veres 2014; Prott 2012). It imposes a time constraint 
on  restitution  claims  (i.e.  only  for  objects  imported  after  the  Convention  entered 
into force), and only a few states have implemented the 1970 Convention in such a 
way as to allow for retroactivity (e.g. Australia; Prott 2012). It does not harmonise 
national rules on limitation periods or for the protection of a good faith purchaser 
(Schneider  2016;  Prott  2012).  It  restricts  acquisitions  only  for  museums,  not  for 
private  individuals  (UNODC  2009).  Most  importantly,  however,  is  the  absence  of 
any  mechanism  to  ensure  full  implementation  of  the  1970  Convention  by  an 
acceding  state.  Implementations  have  exercised  considerable  discretion,  which is 
permitted by the convention (see overview by Gerstenblith 2017), and varied from 
countries such as Switzerland, which adopted comprehensive domestic legislation, 
to others such as the United Kingdom, where no new law was thought necessary. 
Accession  to  the  1970  Convention  has  been  very  slow,  with  some  of  the  large 
market states ratifying and transposing it fairly recently60.  

UNESCO is continuously working on improving the international legal framework and its 
effective  and  consistent  implementation  in  participating  States.  UNESCO  hosts  two 
committees to this end: the Subsidiary Committee of the Meeting of States Parties to the 
Convention  on  the  Means  of  Prohibiting  and  Preventing  the  Illicit  Import,  Export  and 
Transfer  of  Ownership  of  Cultural  Property61  and  the  Intergovernmental  Committee  for 
Promoting  the  Return  of  Cultural  Property  to  its  Countries  of  Origin  or  its  Restitution  in 
case  of  Illicit  Appropriation62.  The  Subsidiary  Committee  was  established  in  2012  and 
reviews  national  reports  on  the  implementation  of  the  1970  Convention,  shares  good 
practices and recommendations for the implementation of the 1970 Convention, identifies 
challenges related to the implementation and informs the State Parties of implementation 
activities. The Subsidiary Committee prepared a set of operational guidelines which were 
adopted  by  UNESCO  in  201563.  The  guidelines  enlarge  upon  and  should  be  read  in 
conjunction  with  the  text  of  the  1970  Convention.  The  Subsidiary  Committee  also 
coordinates  measures  for  capacity-building  with  the  Intergovernmental  Committee  on 
Return and Restitution. The latter committee facilitates bilateral negotiations and promotes 
multilateral and bilateral cooperation related to return and restitution of cultural property, 
encourages  thematic  research  and  public  information  campaigns,  and  guides  UNESCO’s 
activities with regard to the restitution or return of cultural property. 

60 For example, Belgium and the Netherlands ratified the 1970 Convention only in 2009, and Germany – in 2007. 
61 For more information see: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-
property/subsidiary-committee/ . 
62 For more information see: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/restitution-of-cultural-
property/#c163842 . 
63 For more information see: 
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/pdf/OPERATIONAL_GUIDELINES_EN_FINAL_FINAL
.pdf . 

144 

 
 
 
 
                                           
UNESCO also provides training to various stakeholders—often in cooperation with the EU—
including  law  enforcement  and  industry,  develops  emergency  measures  for  cultural 
property in crisis, and creates initiatives to raise awareness on the topic of illicit trade in 
cultural goods. 

1995  UNIDROIT  Convention  on  Stolen  or  Illegally  Exported  Cultural 
Objects 

The  1995  UNIDROIT  Convention  is  intended  to  complement  and  improve  on  the 
1970  UNESCO  Convention,  establishing  an  effective  framework  for  returning 
cultural property to its rightful owners and reducing the profitability of illicit trade 
(Love  Levine  2011).  By  contrast  to  the  1970  Convention,  the  1995  Convention 
allows only a few reservations, as expressly stated in the convention’s text: upon 
ratification, State Parties are obliged to implement all provisions (Article 18). As a 
result,  uniform  national  laws  can  be  created  based  on  the  1995  Convention, 
reducing inconsistencies and conflicts of law (Love Levine 2011). To this end, the 
convention  focuses  on  issues  of  civil  law,  and  is  intended  to  remedy  perceived 
deficiencies of the 1970 UNESCO Convention concerning limitation periods and the 
rights of good faith possessors. 

The  1995  Convention  applies  to  all  cultural  objects,  including  undiscovered, 
unexcavated  and  unregistered,  and  does  not  differentiate  between  designated 
important items and other items (Article 1).  

Article 3(1) of the Convention states simply but forcefully that ‘The possessor of a 
cultural object which has been stolen shall return it’, thus overcoming the potential 
claim  to  good  title  of  a  good  faith  possessor.  Article  3(2)  makes  clear  that  for 
purposes  of  the  Convention  the  term  ‘stolen’  applies  to  objects  that  have  been 
illegally excavated or “lawfully excavated but unlawfully retained”. Article 5 makes 
provision for the return of illegally exported cultural objects, provided their removal 
has  significantly impaired  the  material integrity  of  an  object  or  its  context,  or  its 
use by a tribal or indigenous community.  

By contrast to the 1970 Convention, the 1995 Convention allows both States Party 
and  private  parties  to  bring  restitution  claims.  States  Party  can  bring  claims 
regarding  stolen  and  illegally  exported  cultural  goods,  and  private  parties  (i.e. 
dispossessed owners) can bring an action before competent foreign courts only in 
respect of stolen goods (Schneider 2016; Love Levine 2011). 

Articles 3(3), 3(4) and 3(5) establish limitation periods of three years for specific 
claims and an absolute time limit of 75 years.  

A good faith possessor may be ordered to return an illegally exported cultural good, 
but may enter into an agreement with the requesting state to retain ownership or 
to transfer ownership to a person residing in the requesting state (Article 6(3)). A 
good faith possessor is someone who “neither knew nor ought reasonably to have 
known” that the object was stolen (Article 4(1)) or illegally exported (Article 6(1)). 

145 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Such a possessor is entitled to a “fair and reasonable” compensation from the lawful 
owner of a returned cultural good, but only if he/she can prove that they exercised 
due  diligence  when  acquiring  the  object  (Articles  4(1)  and  6(1)).  The  1995 
Convention  explains  what  constitutes  due  diligence  by  listing  its  elements  in  an 
illustrative  manner:  all  “circumstances  of  the  acquisition”  need  to  be  considered 
(see Article 4(4) and 6(2) for the list of elements).  

By making the compensation of a good faith possessor dependent upon adequate 
due diligence, it has been claimed that the UNIDROIT Convention could incentivise 
improvements in the business practices of the market in cultural goods and increase 
personal responsibility of dealers (Schneider 2016). However, the Convention fails 
to  define  what  constitutes  “fair  and  reasonable”  compensation  for  a  good  faith 
possessor, and the need to pay compensation might deter claims for recovery and 
thus limit the Convention’s effectiveness (Prott 1997).  

The  1995  UNIDROIT  Convention  is  intended  to  complement  the  1970  UNESCO 
Convention. Yet while it rectifies many of the shortcomings of the 1970 Convention 
and has the clear potential to create an effective international legal framework for 
combatting illicit trade in cultural goods, it has not been very successful. To date, 
only 46 countries (of which 15 are EU Member States) have  ratified it. The main 
obstacle  to  ratification  seems  to  be  its  “all  or  nothing”  approach,  meaning  the 
requirement  to  implement  all  of  its  provisions with no  possibility  for  reservations 
(Love  Levine  2011).  Ironically,  this  approach  is  one  of  the  main  strengths  of  the 
convention which ensures the creation of a uniform legal framework across States 
Parties. Another reason why few countries have ratified the 1995 Convention might 
be commercial opposition in the large market states (most current States Party can 
be considered sources countries; see Cottrell 2009). 

International  organisations  coordinate  and  support  global  joint  efforts  by  police  and 
customs  agencies  in  the  form  of  joint  action  days  or  operations.  A  recent  example  is 
Operation  Athena  during  which  INTERPOL,  UNESCO  and  the  WCO  worked  together  with 
more than 80 countries to combat trafficking of cultural goods. In addition to being a direct 
effort  to  counter  trafficking  and  to  take  illicit  objects  off  the  markets,  joint  operations 
promote  structured  cooperation  between  police  and  customs  authorities.  As  one 
interviewee indicated:  

“This  cooperation  is  crucial  to  ensure  that  the  seizure  of  an  object  at  the  border 
eventually  results  in  a  conviction.  Whereas  the  seizure  is  the  task  of  customs, 
bringing the case to court is the in most countries, the responsibility of the police 
and,  therefore,  cooperation  between  the  two  is  crucial.  If  cooperation  is  lacking, 
criminals get away.”  

2017 Council of Europe (CoE) Convention on Offences relating to Cultural 
Property (Nicosia Convention) 

The  2017  Nicosia  Convention  intends  to  complement  the  international  system  of 
protection of cultural property by focusing on the illicit trade in cultural goods and 

146 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by bringing national criminal law responses of States Party to the same standard. 
Its  development  and  adoption  were  driven  by  the  growing  connections  between 
organised  crime  and  terrorism  to  the  trafficking  in  cultural  goods  and  by  the 
increasing  role  of  modern  technologies  in  the  illicit  trade  (CoE  2017).  It  aims  to 
close the existing loopholes that have allowed various actors in the illicit trade to 
remain undetected and unregulated.   

The  objective  of  the  2017  Convention  was  to  protect  the  most  precious  cultural 
property, namely items that have been granted a certain status by the States Party 
to this convention or to the 1970 Convention (Article 1; CoE 2017; Fincham 2019; 
Brown  2017).  Therefore,  states  need  to  classify,  define  or  specifically  designate 
items of movable or immovable cultural property that enjoy protection. (Immovable 
property is a specially designated building, archaeological site or other structures.)  

The 2017 Convention’s protection and effect extend beyond its States Party: States 
Party  will  have  to  enforce  their  criminal  laws  in  relation  to  their  “own”  and  to 
“foreign” cultural goods, if the latter were designated as important cultural property 
in accordance with the 1970 Convention (Bieczyński 2017).  

States Party to the 2017 Convention need to criminalise certain frequent, concrete 
behaviours  and  practices  that  are  characteristic  of  illicit  trade  and  trafficking 
(Articles  3–11).  These  include  theft  and  other  forms  of  unlawful  appropriation; 
conducting archaeological excavations without authorisation and unlawful removal 
of finds; illegal imports and exports; dealing in and placing on the market of cultural 
goods  with  illicit  history;  falsification  of  documents  and  permits  to  create  licit 
provenance;  destruction  or  damage  of  cultural  property.  These  criminal  offences 
must be committed intentionally, which includes the cases when an offender failed 
to establish a proper degree of due diligence (Fincham 2019). The 2017 Convention 
introduces  criminal  liability  of  legal  persons  (e.g.  auction  houses,  museums)  for 
criminal offences committed for their benefit by anyone who is in a leading position 
of that legal person (Article 13). 

National  authorities  of  States  Party  shall  be  able  to  initiate  criminal  proceedings 
without requiring a complaint from a victim of an offence (Article 17). They are also 
encouraged to provide training for law enforcement officers for dealing with cultural 
property crimes (Article 18), to engage in cross-border cooperation and to facilitate 
mutual legal assistance (Article 19). 

States  Party  are  also  invited  to  introduce  preventive  domestic  measures  (Article 
20),  such  as  publicly  accessible  inventories  and  databases,  import  and  export 
certificates, due diligence provisions for art and antiquities traders and obligations 
to keep records of transactions, monitoring of suspicious transactions online. These 
domestic measures should be flanked by international efforts necessary to combat 
cross-border crime (Article 21), namely consultation and exchange of information, 
sharing  or  interconnecting  national  inventories  and  databases  and  engaging  in 
cooperation to preserve and protect cultural property in conflict.  

147 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 2017 Convention is a significant element of the international legal framework 
for combatting illicit trade in cultural goods as it complements and strengthens the 
existing system by addressing the problem of differences in national criminal laws 
(Bieczyński 2017). It takes a holistic approach to the problem treating illicit trade 
as a transnational phenomenon with illicit elements (Fincham 2019) and lends its 
protection to cultural property everywhere (Bieczyński 2017). While being a regional 
document  of  the  Council  of  Europe,  the  2017  Convention  can  be  opened  to  non-
Members of the CoE. After it has entered into force, the State Parties may decide 
to invite other country or countries to join the convention (Article 28). 

Recommendation: To combat the cross-border crime of illicit trade in cultural goods, 
genuine international cooperation is of paramount importance. An essential element of 
it—for all countries—is the ratification and effective national implementation of the 1970 
UNESCO  Convention,  the  1995  UNIDROIT  Convention  and,  especially  relevant  in  the 
context of criminal justice responses, the Nicosia Convention. 

4.2.1.2.  EU level 

This  section  discusses  institutional  arrangements  at  the  European  level  that  support 
various  law  enforcement  authorities  in  their  efforts  of  combatting  illicit  trade  in  cultural 
goods.  

EU Expert groups 

There are a number of initiatives at the EU level to support customs authorities in detection 
of  (potentially  illicit)  cultural  goods  and  gathering  and  exchange  of  information.  The 
European  Commission  has  set  up  EU  Expert  Groups  to  facilitate  coordination  among 
customs agencies: namely the Expert Group on the return of cultural objects (DG GROW) 
and the Expert Group on customs issues related to cultural goods (DG TAXUD). Through 
these  working  groups,  relevant  national  authorities  are  informed  of  trends  and 
developments in other countries and at the EU level.  

The  expert  group  on  the  return  of  cultural  objects  exchanges  best  practices  and 
experiences  on  the  implementation  of  Directive  2014/60/EU  on  the  return  of  cultural 
objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State64, while the expert group 
on  customs  issues  related  to  cultural  goods  does  the  same  in  relation  to  the  Council 
Regulation  No  116/2009  on  the  export  of  cultural  goods65.  In  the  future  it  will  also  be 
dealing with the Regulation on the introduction and the import of cultural goods. The expert 
groups  also  serve  as  networks  facilitating  access  to  competent  counterparts  in  other 
Member States.66 They can also be a forum for developing expertise and sharing experience 

64 OJ L 159 of 28.5.2014. 
65 OJ L 39 of 10.2.2009. 
66 For example, a Belgian customs official explained that through his participation to this group, he has become 
familiar with colleagues across different Member States which has helped him in the international cases he deals 
with. 

148 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
on  a  particular  matter,  for  example  provenance  research,  when  more  focused  working 
groups are created within.  

A supporting communication tool in this field is the Internal Market Information system 
(IMI)—an  IT-based  platform  for  secure  and  fast  information  exchange  between  EU 
customs authorities of all levels. In relation to trafficking of cultural goods, IMI is used for 
sending  various  types  of  requests  and  tracking  their  execution,  from  requests  for 
information and alerts to requests related to restitution of stolen cultural goods.  

Europol 

The  long-term  cooperation  forum  for  criminal  police  Europol  also  supports  law 
enforcement  in  fighting  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods.  Europol’s  central  tasks  are  (1) 
provision of expertise, (2) acting as information hub, including data gathering and analysis 
and  communication  assistance,  and  (3)  providing  operational  support  for  cross-border 
investigations  and  operations.  In  contrast  to  INTERPOL,  Europol  first  engaged  with  this 
topic only a few years ago. Currently, it has only dedicated limited capacity specifically to 
working on the topic and it does not have its own database. While INTERPOL seems to be 
a  more  preferable  point  of  contact  for  many  interviewees  and  serves  as  an  important 
source  of  intelligence  and  communication,  they  see  a  good  potential  for  Europol  to 
become  an  effective  cooperation  platform  in  the  fight  against  trafficking in  cultural 
goods specifically within Europe. The advantages of Europol are that it can be used to plan 
and  conduct  joint  investigations  and  joint  operations,  and  it  has  developed  and 
maintained  processes  and  tools  to  support  such  activities  (specifically,  SIENA  and 
EMPACT), including tools for exchange of classified information. 

The  Secure  Information  Exchange  Network  Application  (SIENA)  is  a  state-of-the-art 
platform hosted by Europol that allows for the exchange of operational and strategic 
crime-related  information  among  Member  States,  Europol  liaison  officers  and  third 
parties (subject to respective cooperation agreements). Before a  specialised database of 
lost  and  stolen  art  objects  was  launched  (see  below),  Europol  worked  exclusively  with 
SIENA  to  store  and  exchange  information  about  stolen  goods,  and  goods  to  be  seized, 
frozen or confiscated in EU countries. SIENA is particularly useful because it is used for all 
types  of  crime  within  Europol’s  competence.  This  means  organised  crime  and  various 
trafficking crimes that may be relevant to trafficking in cultural goods as well are included 
and possible overlaps become visible. One of the limitations on the effectiveness of SIENA 
identified in the interviews lies in its different implementations in Member States, which 
are determined by national law enforcement structures. In some countries, only one officer 
in the national (central) department has access to SIENA. If a police officer from a local 
department encounters an illicit trade case and wants to reach his/her EU colleagues, this 
officer cannot do so directly and would have to go through the national contact point. This 

Recommendation: When exchanging information related to cases on a bilateral basis, 
law enforcement officers should be obliged to  use SIENA and to  copy in the relevant 
Europol  unit.  This  ensures  a  EU-wide  overview  and  relevant  cross-linkages  between 
cases can be effectively made. 

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means  at  least  one  additional  administrative  layer  and  slower  exchange  of  information, 
which may discourage operatives from using the platform and prevent valuable information 
to be recorded in the system.  

Another  Europol  tool  used  by  interviewees  is  the  European  Multidisciplinary  Platform 
Against  Criminal  Threats  (EMPACT).  EMPACT  serves  as  an  ad-hoc  management 
environment  that  fosters  cooperation  between  law  enforcement  agencies,  European 
agencies, European institutions and other relevant third parties. It is used  for planning 
and coordination  of various activities and  operations:  for  example,  Operation Pandora 
(see Section 4.4.4) was coordinated through EMPACT. A German interviewee explains:  

“The  platform  brings  different  police  departments  of  different  countries  together, 
which  works  very  good  for  [our]  department.  EMPACT  serves  as  a  mediator  and 
facilitates  meetings  when  specific  cases  arise.  Especially  during  cross-border 
investigations it is useful to organise an EMPACT meeting. Joint investigation teams 
([which  can  be  supported]  by  EMPACT)  are  the  best  way  to  work  with  other 
countries”.  

At the time the interviews for this study were conducted, Europol had not yet installed a 
fulltime expert dedicated to the topic of cultural heritage crime. Hence, many interviewees 
indicated that Europol’s involvement in the fight against illicit trade in cultural goods was 
limited. Since early 2019, Europol has installed a full-time officer to ensure continuity in 
combatting illicit trade in cultural goods and to establish a single liaison point for Member 
States. The position is a temporary one. The positive effect of this measure has become 
apparent already after only three months of its introduction: in this short time, the newly 
appointed officer received as many requests for investigations as Europol had received in 
the  entire  year  of  2018.  In  the  light  of  these  results,  making  this  post  permanent  and 
improving  its  resourcing  is  likely  to  increase  the  effectiveness  of  the  Europe-wide  fight 
against illicit trade in cultural goods.  

Recommendation: The dedicated unit at  Europol  should be  funded  on a permanent 
basis and expanded to serve as a central supporting node to European law enforcement 
efforts in combatting illicit trade in cultural goods. 

It is important that Europol does not duplicate, but rather complement INTERPOL, 
and it should specifically invest in creating a European network of law enforcement officers 
specialised  in  cultural  property  crimes,  encourage  direct  connections  and  greater 
information sharing between them. This all may be achieved if the informal network of law 
enforcement authorities and expertise competent in the field of cultural goods (CULTNET) 
is formalised, as Europol could provide a secretariat or liaison officer for it. 

CULTNET 

CULTNET was set up in 2012 at the initiative of Cyprus for the purpose of preventing and 
combating cultural property crime. It shall be institutionalised with a permanent secretariat 

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in the (near) future.67 Up until now, the network has been meeting (almost) every year, 
and  its  participants  have  found  it  very  useful  as  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  is  such  a 
complex, yet niche domain. As a Romanian expert summarises:  

“In general, CULTNET can be perceived as a best practice. It is very helpful to be in 
direct contact with the law enforcement colleagues in different countries. It helps 
to have a direct contact point as this reduces  the need for official papers  for the 
cooperation to take place. Formalising CULTNET [with a permanent secretariat] as 
part of Europol will be very helpful”. 

The interviewees identified several avenues for improvement of CULTNET, some of which 
may become irrelevant once the network is formalised. Being an informal network, as it 
stands CULTNET does not have its own funding or budget. A combination of the lack of 
funding and low prioritisation of illicit trade in cultural goods results in some countries not 
sending their representatives to attend CULTNET meetings. Member States have to bear 
the  costs  of  participation  for  their  policy  officers  attending  CULTNET  meetings;  as 
combatting  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  is  not  a  priority  in  most  countries,  they  do  not 
reserve money for this. The lack of funding also means that the network is not able to work 
in  a  sustainable  way  (for  instance,  by  developing  joint  objectives,  strategic  and  action 
points, follow up on them) and cannot produce tangible outcomes. Interested police officers 
have to work on the relevant issues in their spare time because they have no capacity to 
do so during their work time. This all reduces the effectiveness of the network. Currently 
the Dutch police provides funds for one police officer to develop a lasting working agenda 
for CULTNET.  

The  activity  in  CULTNET  has  been  up  to  now  very  much  driven  by  the  countries 
presiding  over  the  informal  network,  which  is  linked  to  the  EU  Presidency  and 
rotates  every  6  months.  Because  of  this,  the  network’s  activity  depends  on  how 
high  of  a  priority  cultural  property  crime  is  for  the  presiding  country,  and  the 
issues change often depending on what the presiding country considers top priority (e.g. 
trafficking or forgery). Because of the lack of interest of some countries, the network was 
dormant for almost two years, but became reactivated two years ago. Some countries do 
not participate in CULTNET at all.  

Recently, the network has been gathering the momentum: countries are interested in 
a  more  permanent  and  structured  entity.  CULTNET  meeting  attendance  has  been 
increasing, and the latest meeting in Romania in April 2019 saw representation from 20  
Member States, the highest to date. 

67 As per the initiative of the Bulgarian Council Presidency the 2017 Council of Europe conventions on Offences 
relating to Cultural Property. 

151 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
Recommendation: Investigate the possibilities for establishing an EU Agency to deal 
with illicit trade in cultural goods. Such an agency would absorb CULTNET and focus on 
strategic  issues.  It  should  have  its  own  budget  and,  potentially,  fund  an  office  at 
Europol. 

If no Agency can be established, CULTNET should be formalised as a permanent network 
for addressing strategic issues related to illicit trade in cultural goods. Building on the 
efforts of recent years, the aim should be to encourage participation by all EU Member 
States  and  interested  third  countries  (e.g.  Switzerland,  Norway)  through  their 
specialised units. 

Eurojust 

Eurojust serves as a platform for cooperation for public prosecutors across the European 
Union.  Eurojust  also  aims  to  improve  cooperation  between  authorities  by  facilitating 
(judicial)  assistance,  including  Joint  Investigation  Teams.  For  ongoing  investigations, 
Eurojust  organises  coordination  meetings  between  law  enforcement  officers  and  public 
prosecutors  of  different  Member  States,  assists  in  detection  of  persons  relevant  for  the 
investigation  and  in  gathering  of  evidence  abroad.  A  representative  from  the  Eurojust 
Italian  desk  indicates  that  cooperation  between  Member  States  works  well;  for  his 
colleagues, cultural goods constitute a serious topic and are treated as such. Several police 
investigators also confirmed that support and contacts provided by Eurojust are useful in 
their cross-border investigations. 

Regional cooperation 

As direct contacts and good bilateral relations are important, it is no surprise that various 
law  enforcement  stakeholders  also  collaborate  with  neighbouring  states  in  regional 
cooperation structures.  Here, representatives  from the government, law enforcement 
authorities,  customs  and  researchers  from  one  country  collaborate  with  a  similar  group 
from another nearby country (for example, cooperation by Nordic countries). Tight regional 
cooperation may be of benefit due to common history (e.g. the Balkan countries), a defined 
and  separate  geographic  location  (e.g.  Scandinavian  countries)  or  shared  challenges 
related  to  illicit  trade  (e.g.  it  was  indicated  that  countries  of  Southern  Europe  are  often 
source countries for illicitly traded goods, see Section 3.3).  

One example of such cooperation is the Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre 
(SELEC).  Eleven  countries68  participate  in  SELEC  with  the  aim  to  provide  support  and 
enhance  coordination  in  the  fight  against  (organised)  crime  in  the  region,  in  particular 
regarding  trans-border  activities.  SELEC  is  supported  by  the  US  Federal  Bureau  of 
Investigation (FBI). A Bulgarian interviewee said that the Centre is very useful and was 
especially  pleased  with  the  information  exchange  and  operational  support  provided  by 
SELEC,  which  is  organised  via  a  system  of  liaison  officers.  A  less  formalised  regional 

68  Albania,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Bulgaria,  the  Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia,  Greece,  Hungary, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Turkey. 

152 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
 
cooperation is the regular meeting of the Scandinavian countries on the topic of illicit 
trade  in  cultural  goods.  A  Swedish  interviewee  indicated  that  these  meetings  are  very 
interesting  and  useful,  partly  because  the  Nordic  countries  share  similar  challenges 
regarding the types of goods that are being looted and traded (i.e. Viking objects).  

Bilateral cooperation 

Several interviewees highlighted the importance of having special bilateral agreements 
with non-EU countries for international cooperation on cultural property crimes. 
Without such agreements no cooperation is possible with certain third countries. Some of 
the European states conclude agreements with countries of origin or destination of cultural 
goods.  For  example,  Switzerland  has  bilateral  agreements  regarding  the  import  and 
repatriation of cultural property with Cyprus, Italy, Greece, Egypt, China, Colombia, Mexico 
and  Peru.  Such  agreements  allow  for  mutual  legal  assistance  and  make  the 
restitution  of  stolen cultural goods easier, but  also facilitate  legal trade.  One of 
the interviewees explains in what cases bilateral agreements are especially useful: 

“It  seems  that  this  is  the  only  effective  option  for  cooperation  between  certain 
countries  where  there  is  a  drastic  discrepancy  in  domestic  law  with  respect  to 
demand  and  trade  in  cultural  goods,  [and  in  the]  absence  of  not  only  double 
punishment but even of an administrative regime in one of the countries - usually 
the one that lacks rich cultural heritage.” 

Another interviewee pointed out the difficulty of negotiating relevant agreements for 
an  individual  EU  Member  State  and  suggested  that,  because  a  united  Europe  stands 
stronger, the EU as a whole should negotiate them. An example is the EU-US Agreement 
on the procession and transfer of financial messaging data from the EU to the US for the 
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program. 

4.2.2  International access to information 

Access to and exchange of data and information is a crucial element of a successful and 
effective  cross-border  cooperation  in  fighting  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods.  Cross-border 
information exchange can happen in several ways. First, law enforcement from different 
countries could report to a central agency that would create and maintain a database of 
information.  Different  countries  can  then  access  this  central  database  and  retrieve  the 
necessary  information  either  directly  or  with  the  assistance  of  the  database  curator  or 
owner. Second, a database could be created by a central agency through their own data 
collection. The database owner can then grant access to any interested parties, including 
to  law  enforcement.  Third,  law  enforcement  agencies  could  provide  access  to  their  own 
databases to their fellow law enforcement agencies from other countries (for example, on 
a mutual basis). Fourth, information could be provided via direct requests from one agency 
to another across the border. These requests may be of different kinds: they may refer to 
information  that is  contained in  the  database,  but  they  may  also  refer  to  operative  and 
other information. They may also be information requests in the absence of a database. 

153 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Databases range from police/agency-run to those run by a non-governmental organisation; 
from national to international; from closed databases to those that allow the general public 
to conduct searches. A closed database limits access to the members of the agency that is 
running  it  (e.g.  police),  so  that  other  national  authorities  (e.g.  customs)  and  foreign 
authorities would need to file an official request for information to access it. Among those 
open to the public, some databases can be accessed by citizens and traders directly and 
free of charge; other databases require a subscription or registration and, in some cases, 
a  fee;  yet  other  databases  can  only  be  accessed  indirectly  by  sending  a  request  for 
information to the agency running the database. 

Access to international databases 

Different international agencies and private and public actors have created and maintain 
databases in order to bring together information about illicit trade in cultural goods. The 
merits of databases as a technology in the fight against illicit trade in cultural goods are 
discussed in Section 5.1.1. In this section we will focus on the ease of use (i.e. the ease of 
entering the relevant data, the availability of access to data and information and the ease 
of access and search) based on the desk research and stakeholder interviews.  

INTERPOL’s  ‘Stolen  works  of  art’  database  was  launched  in  1995  in  an  effort  to 
centralise  the  available  information  on  stolen  items  and  to  ensure  this  information  was 
circulated more widely. It contains a record of thousands stolen goods  (51.000 as per 1 
March 2018). It is fully dependent on the information provided by national law enforcement 
agencies for its completeness: entries in the database are made by INTERPOL based on 
notifications  from  Member  States.  Not all Member States report  all cases of stolen 
cultural goods to this database. One of the reasons they do not that was mentioned by 
several interviewees is that too many details are required to fill in the entry form. 
One national law enforcement representative explains that the bar for the inclusion of an 
object into the database is set too high: 

“Interpol includes in its database only those  objects that are  reported stolen and 
only upon demand from police forces from different countries. And only with good 
pictures, if there are no photos, they do not put it there. If they are not sure about 
the information provided, they do not put it in the database. They do not have a 
possibility to do investigations or to verify information.” 

Another  national  law  enforcement  representative  adds  that  the  database  is  useful  only 
“when a cultural good is stolen from a public or private collection, for which there are good 
digital  images,  full  description  and  dimensions,  and  a  description  of  how  the  theft  has 
occurred. For illegally excavated and exported archaeological objects and coins, the needed 
information  cannot  be  submitted.”  The  same  is  true  for  objects  stolen  from  churches, 
smaller  museums  and  other  heritage  sites  if  they  do  not  have  good  inventories  and 
photographs.  

This leads to the INTERPOL database being of very high quality, but it is incomplete 
and much smaller than the  sum of national databases. One interviewee  remarked 

154 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
that at this point the database mainly consists of Western European contributions, implying 
that the global coverage of the database is limited.  

Another  drawback  is  the  lack  of  interoperability  with  other  (national)  databases, 
such that it is impossible to transfer information from a national database to INTERPOL’s 
database. While this is a general problem of all existing databases, several interviewees 
noted  specifically  that  the  INTERPOL  database  would  benefit  from  more  enhanced 
integration with other national databases.  

Access to the database is granted only upon registration (i.e. application to INTERPOL for 
a  username  and  password).  Free  use  of  the  system  is  provided  to  law  enforcement 
authorities; and academics traders and companies legally dealing with cultural goods can 
have a subscription against a fixed fee. Interviewees indicated that the search function is 
useful and based on non-technical search terms. However, the INTERPOL database does 
not  have  an  image-based  search  function  and  does  not  allow  search  parameters  to  be 
excluded. 

The desire to improve functionalities of the INTERPOL database and to gear it more towards 
the  needs  of  the  European  law  enforcement  has  resulted  in  the  development  of  the 
Protection SYstem for Cultural Heritage (PSYCHE) and its follow-up ID-ART. This 
joint effort by Interpol and the Italian Carabinieri (supported by the European Union), is 
ongoing but the first results are already operational.  

PSYCHE  allows  law  enforcement  officials  to  insert,  modify  and  delete  information  in  the 
INTERPOL  database  via  a  specifically  designed  web  messaging  tool.  Entries  will  be 
submitted via their national INTERPOL Bureaus.  In addition, much of the content  of the 
Carabinieri’s  Leonardo  database  shall  be  included  in  PSYCHE/  ID-ART.  An  innovative 
feature is the  image recognition tool  which allows users to  automatically compare an 
uploaded image of a suspect object to those in the database to see if a match can be made. 
When  PSYCHE  and  ID-ART  are  completed,  the  maintenance  of  the  database  will  be  the 
responsibility of INTERPOL.  

Several  interviewees  have  already  started  to  use  PSYCHE  and  were  generally  satisfied, 
especially  by  the  new  features.  However,  one  of  them  indicated  that  the  image-based 
search  still  needs  improvement  and  suggested  that  the  user-friendliness  of  the  tool  be 
enhanced as she had experienced difficulties with editing and deleting entries.  

An important question is what data standards will be adopted for entries through ID-ART. 
From the viewpoint of supporting law enforcement activities, a flexible approach that can 
accommodate  a  range  of  formats  currently  in  use  in  various  Member  States  would  be 
preferable.  This  would  be  in  line  with  the  working  model  for  the  Carabinieri’s  database 
LEONARDO. Adhering to the stricter demands of INTERPOL’s existing database would limit 
its added value considerably. 

Recommendation: Interoperability of all national databases with INTERPOL’s ID-ART 
should be ensured. 

155 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The added value of ID-ART will also depend on who will be authorised to access it, provide 
entries  and  perform  searches  (e.g.  only  a  central  unit  or  local  police  units  as  well). 
Currently, this is not entirely clear, but it seems that customs agencies will not have (direct) 
access to ID-ART, which limits its reach. 

The Art Loss Register (ALR) is a private database that registers both valuable cultural 
goods and lost and stolen art and antiquities. The registration of valuables is intended as 
a preventive measure, discouraging crime. Furthermore, the ALR also registers items that 
are subject to security claims (e.g. insurance, banking) and to civil disputes (e.g. in divorce 
procedures) as well as fakes and forgeries if reported by police  or experts. The scope of 
the items on record is larger than of any other database and leaves out basically only items 
looted from the ground where no previous record of them exists.  
Entries  in  the  database  can  refer  to  any  object  that  is  uniquely  identifiable  with  a 
description (including insurance details) and evidence. From private persons  reporting a 
theft, the ALR asks for proof of ownership and a police report showing the object has been 
lost or stolen, but is flexible about what is considered evidence. Entries into the database 
are  made  only  by  the  ALR  staff  who  are  all  trained  professionals.  The  entries  are  made 
upon request by title-holders, police and by the staff ex officio (based on media and police 
reports).  

Only ALR staff has access to the database, so law enforcement officers wanting to check 
need  to  send  them  a  search  request  to  obtain  the  information  indirectly.  Search  and 
registration of cultural objects for law enforcement is for free, whereas dealers, collectors, 
insurers etc. need to pay a fee. If a concerned citizen enquires about a suspicious item, a 
search can be run for free, and if it brings up a match, police are alerted. A drawback of 
the database is that, contrary to the previously discussed examples, it cannot be searched 
by law enforcement officials directly. Officials need to request ALR staff to perform a search 
for  them.  This  could  be  considered  to  limit  the  potential  law  enforcement  uses  of  this 
database,  however  within  the  market  more  generally,  the  closed  nature  of  the  ALR 
database  may  allow  for  a  degree  of  market  oversight  which  may  help  law  enforcement 
investigations. Because the INTERPOL database is open for dealers and buyers of cultural 
goods to search, those that find themselves to be in possession of a looted object in the 
database may choose to hide that object from public view. In such a situation, authorities 
will not have been alerted to the search. In contrast, if a search contracted by a dealer or 
buyer through the ALR turns up an object that is documented as stolen, the ALR is then 
able to notify the proper authorities. 

At the same time, the ALR as a private company has a contractual leverage on some actors 
(e.g. insurers, auction houses) and can use it to help recover stolen items. The ALR staff 
can also accompany law enforcement on a raid to help identify items.  

The  ICOM  Red  Lists69  are  not  databases,  but  nevertheless  are  an  important  source  of 
information for law enforcement. They are accessible to both officials and  to the general 
public. The ICOM Red Lists present an overview of the types of goods that are prone to 
illicit trafficking from a particular country or region, and thereby help to create awareness 
among  the  public  and  experts.  They  contain  valuable  information  for  law  enforcement, 

69 See https://icom.museum/en/activities/heritage-protection/red-lists/.  

156 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
namely:  information  about  relevant  national  laws,  identifying  features  such  as  sample 
museum numbers, typical features of artefacts (e.g. patterns, types of writing, materials). 
Although the ICOM Red Lists do not document  specific missing objects, various Member 
State  representatives  indicate  that  they  make  use  of  this  overview  when  checking  the 
origin of cultural goods.  

Cross-border access to national information 

Law  enforcement agencies in many countries have developed national databases of lost 
and  stolen  cultural  goods.  Most  of  these  databases  are  created  and  maintained  by  the 
police  for  their  own  purposes  and  are  open  only  to  a  limited  number  of  users  from  the 
same  country.  The  authorised  users  are  granted  account  credentials.  Typically,  the 
authorised users would include the national ministry of culture and/or other government 
bodies  charged  with  protection  of  cultural  heritage,  the  customs  agency  and  the  public 
prosecutor’s office.  

There are a few notable exceptions to this rule. For example, the database of the Italian 
Carabinieri is partially open to any interested party free of charge. In addition, there are 
15 units throughout Italy working on the database, and they can be contacted by email 
with a request to search the portion of the database that is not publicly available. These 
officers can accept vague requests (i.e. descriptions without photographs). 

The  Czech  Police  maintain  a  database  called  Artworks  Portal  Evidence  System  (PSEUD) 
that  is  available  in  four  languages  and  is  open  to  the  police  of  neighbouring  countries. 
Foreign police can access both public and police information in the database. 

Where the police database is a closed one or there is no database at all, direct requests 
for  information  are  the  only  possibility.  The  overwhelming  majority  of  interviewees 
expressed their satisfaction with the speed and quality of the execution of their requests 
by foreign colleagues, but also indicated that it works well due to the possibility of a direct 
and informal contact. Many of the interviewees simply call on the phone or write an email 
if they need information from a foreign database. Some explained that official requests, 
when  they  have  to  be  made  for  legal  reasons,  usually  take  a  lot  of  time.  Also,  some 
countries are faster in answering than others. According to one interviewee, although some 
non-EU  countries  are  especially  slow  in  their  responses,  the  response  always  comes 
eventually. 

Recommendation: Investigate if and how mutual access to national databases could 
be  improved  for  competent  national  authorities  (i.e.  customs  and  police  databases). 
The Czech PSEUD database (see Section 4.4.5) can be used as an example of how this 
can be done. 

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4.3  Challenges faced by the authorities 

Law enforcement authorities continue to experience a variety of challenges that—at times 
significantly—complicate  the  performance  of  their  tasks  and  reduce  their  effectiveness. 
While the intensity and severity of these challenges can differ per Member State and even 
per  authority  within  a  Member  State,  they  are  interrelated  and  reinforce  each  other, 
exacerbating  their  effect.  At  the  same  time,  some  of  the  challenges  can  be  considered 
fundamental  and  formative  for  other  challenges  and  difficulties  (see  Figure  4.1);  these 
challenges (Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2) are discussed below. 

Figure 6 

Challenges faced by the authorities 

4.3.1  Universal lack of awareness about illicit trade in cultural goods 

The general lack of awareness about illicit trade in cultural goods, its exact nature and its 
size is an important challenge that underlies and causes many other problems encountered 
by  law  enforcement.  The  lack  of  awareness  is  almost  universal,  as  both  survey  and 
interviews suggest. The general public lacks adequate information about what illicit 
trade in cultural goods entails, with media paying disproportionate attention to Syrian 
and  Iraqi  antiquities  and  ‘crowding  out’  trafficking  in  other  cultural  goods.  The  lack  of 
knowledge  within  the  industry  about  illicit  cultural  goods  (see  Section  3.4.2) 
impacts the trade's ability to develop and implement effective due diligence, to improve its 
reputation  by  rewarding  compliant  dealers  and  strengthening  the  legal  trade  and  to 
increase transparency. It may lead to reputational damage of the licit art market and to 

158 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
people refraining from buying certain items. It may also hinder the building-up of trustful 
and effective cooperation between the industry and law enforcement.  
Some interviewees indicated that there is lack of awareness about illicit trade in cultural 
goods even among their law enforcement colleagues. This may lead to the lack of detection 
and  underreporting  of  cultural  property  crime,  for  instance,  while  investigating  other 
offences.  It  may  also  have  an  impact  on  international  cooperation  as  requests  of 
information or assistance in execution of procedural actions are misunderstood and are not 
prioritised. 

Ultimately, the lack of awareness among the general public, industry and specialists leads 
to the lack of awareness among politicians, which results in placing low priority 
of the issue on the political agenda.  

Recommendation: In a broader sense, countries should invest in awareness raising 
efforts,  targeting  various  types  of  actors  in  tailored  manner.  For  example,  law 
enforcement  training  can  focus  on  recognising  objects,  art  dealers  should  be 
encouraged to improve due diligence and transparency, and the general public should 
be made aware of the importance of cultural heritage for our shared understanding of 
history and identity. 

4.3.2  Illicit trade in cultural goods is a low political priority 

As a result of the lack of awareness about illicit trade in cultural goods, fighting illicit trade 
in cultural goods is a low political priority in most European countries (with a few notable 
exceptions,  like  Cyprus  or  Italy).  Art  crime  is  usually  a  ‘victimless  crime’  in  which  only 
goods are directly subjected to the crime (see Section 3.2.2 where this notion is put into 
perspective).  Illicit  trade  in  firearms,  narcotics  or  human  trafficking  are  perceived  to  be 
more serious crimes, posing a bigger threat to society, and, therefore, receive more public 
and political attention—and, as a result, more  funding and increased  criminal responses 
opportunities. Low political priority was the factor most cited as facilitating illicit trade in 
the  survey:  all  12  public  officials  (consisting  of  representatives  of  law  enforcement, 
government and international organisations) that answered the related question indicated 
that under-prioritisation facilitates illicit trade in their country, 10 of them (83%) stating 
this was ‘very’ or ‘extremely’ the case.  

Low prioritisation of the problem perpetuates a vicious circle in the fight against illicit trade 
in cultural goods. Due to low prioritisation, few resources are committed to investigating 
and  prosecuting  this  crime.  This  hampers  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  law 
enforcement performance in these complex cases. Usually, only few cases are detected; 
in  only  a  small  percentage  of  them  sufficient  evidence  is  forthcoming  to  investigate 
perpetrators; only a small proportion of those cases is brought to trial; and only a fraction 
are  tried  successfully.  As  investigations  are  typically  kept  secret  and  only  trials  are 
publicised,  this  creates  an  impression  that  trafficking  in  cultural  goods  is  a  rare 
phenomenon and does not need more resources. In other words: politicians require 
high numbers of convictions, recoveries and restitutions to act, but as long as the 

159 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
topic of illicit trade in cultural goods is not prioritised more than it currently is, 
no better numbers can be produced. 

A  few  examples  from  stakeholder  interviews  illustrate  the  prevailing  attitudes.  One 
interviewee  explains  why  only  few  cases  of  cultural  property  crime  are  reported  by  law 
enforcement and customs: “...the reason there was only one case reported during the last 
few  years  is  because  police  officers  on  the  border  are  focused  on  other  issues,  such  as 
immigrants. They do not pay sufficient attention to this type of crime”. A second interview 
captures the working of the vicious circle: “The problem is kept small through it being not 
a priority and not dedicating a lot of resources. The less police are deployed, the less crime 
is uncovered, the less crime is reported. No one wants to create additional problems for 
themselves. This loop causes resources dedicated to the illicit trade to remain minimal.” 

The low political  priority of the  problem, at the same time,  reinforces the lack  of 
awareness, as fewer resources are dedicated to providing education on the topic at law 
enforcement trainings, to organise media campaigns for the general public and to include 
the topic in school curricula. 

Recommendation:  Combatting  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  needs  to  become  a 
political priority. The EU could play a more active role by, for example, presenting best 
practices  more  prominently  in  order  to  exert  ‘peer  pressure’  on  countries.  Going  one 
step further would be to call out those Member States that do not take sufficient action 
to combat illicit trade in cultural goods (naming and shaming). 

4.3.3  Lack of resources for fighting illicit trade in cultural goods 

Because the fight against illicit trade is not prioritised, law enforcement does not get the 
resources that it needs to effectively address the issue. The lack of resources manifests 
itself in a number of ways, affecting the organisation of law enforcement, staffing, skills 
and expertise of the officers, and endowment and equipment of law enforcement. Ten out 
of 12 public officials (83%) answering the related survey question indicated that the lack 
of resources is a facilitating factor for illicit trade in their country, 6 of them indicating this 
is  ‘very’  or  ‘extremely’  the  case.  The  law  enforcement  respondents  to  the  survey  also 
indicated  that  their  organisation  needs—in  order  of  priority—human  resources,  financial 
resources  and  better  equipment  as  well  as  training  to  carry  out  more  effective  action 
against the illicit trade. 

Many  law  enforcement  officers  stated  that  their  teams  are  too  small,  lacking  enough 
human  capacity  to  perform  all  tasks  or  perform  them  efficiently.  An  interviewed 
prosecutor confirmed that, while the cooperation with the police and customs was good, 
they did not have many members of staff available to work on the cultural property cases 
(which  was,  however,  typical  for  other  topics  as  well).  As  already  indicated,  regular 
monitoring  and  research  of  the  (online)  market  is  impossible  for  many  national  law 
enforcement agencies. One police officer said that, while they receive many notifications 
of suspect goods from academics, civil society and internet users, they do not have enough 

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resources  to  follow  up  on  all  these  notifications.  Many  law  enforcement  authorities  lack 
specialised  capacity,  namely  experts  in  systematic  data  gathering,  data  analysis  and 
creation of statistics. Even the arrival of automated tools, for example for monitoring the 
internet, would still require human expertise to interpret the results and would thus not 
(fully) address this limitation (see Section 5.4). 

Lack of funding also negatively affects the potential for professional development 
of law enforcement officers, as mentioned by a large number of interviewees. As many of 
them do not have a specialised background in archaeology or other relevant subjects, the 
possibility  to  participate  in  training  sessions  (e.g.  those  organised  by  UNESCO)  and  to 
attend meetings with colleagues from other countries where best practices and knowledge 
can be exchanged (e.g. via CULTNET) is of utmost importance. However, the participants 
of such events usually have to bear their own travel and accommodation costs, for which 
they may not be granted funds. If they are unable to attend such events, law enforcement 
officers  also  miss  the  opportunity  to  establish  the  necessary  (cross-border)  connections 
that may allow them to improve their policing work. 

Lack of funding impacts the ability of law enforcement to consult or use external 
experts. For instance, there are archaeologists who assist police and customs pro bono 
and in their free time. However, this is an unsustainable model for their involvement as 
they may not be able to afford to work for free and most experts cannot work pro bono in 
addition to their regular job. Such work is unlikely to attract any professional credit within 
their "day job", and there is no real incentive to participate. It might even be viewed as 
detrimental to career progression. 

Several interviewees also bemoaned the lack of necessary equipment. This includes not 
only specialised technology (for  example, bespoke state-of-the-art electronic databases, 
image  recognition  software  or  special  web  crawlers),  but  also  good  (high-resolution) 
cameras, drones or cars. One interviewee wishes: “It would be good for the service to have 
off-road vehicles, since much of the treasure hunt takes place in remote, high-mountain 
areas”. 

The lack of funding further fuels the vicious circle described above. As explained, lack of 
resources for fighting illicit trade in cultural goods means that law enforcement is less 
effective  and  produces  fewer  results  that  matter  (like  recoveries,  convictions)  and 
cannot  generate  statistics.  Therefore,  the  true  size  of  the  problem  remains  further 
concealed, and a perceived small problem can only obtain limited funding. 

Recommendation: Law enforcement should be better resourced in order to be able to 
establish a specialised  unit with sufficient staff, to develop  skills and expertise of the 
staff,  to  engage  external  experts,  where  necessary,  and  to  acquire  the  necessary 
equipment.  

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4.3.4  Lack of expertise on illicit trade in cultural goods 

Lack  of  expertise  on  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  is  a  direct  consequence  of  the  lack  of 
funding for and low political priority of this issue. We choose to discuss this separately to 
emphasise the important aspects of this challenge.  
Illicit trade in cultural goods is under-researched as a phenomenon and is poorly 
understood.  To  study  the  phenomenon  in  depth,  long-term  comprehensive  studies  are 
necessary that would either create statistics or would rely on national statistics once those 
are  collected.  The  three-year  ILLICID  project  aimed  at  developing  and  applying 
methodologies  for  measuring  the  illicit  trade  of  cultural  objects  inside  Germany  is 
supported by €1,2 million funding from the Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung 
(SPK, 2015). This is the first study of a realistic scale for measuring the size of the market 
in one country alone. Currently, however, no coherent statistics or data are available (as 
explained in Section 3.2), and academic research focuses on individual cases or countries, 
so that no holistic picture for the whole of Europe exists.  

Another issue is lack of expertise in the law enforcement: there are not enough specialised 
units in police and customs and very few specialised prosecutors. Such specialised police 
(or  customs)  units  are  considered  to  be  extremely  effective:  10  out  of  12  (83%)  public 
officials’ survey responses indicated that such a unit had helped fight illicit trade in their 
country, 7 of them stating this was ‘very’ or ‘extremely’ the case.70  

As noted by several interviewees, the lack of expertise at the ground level and insufficient 
training  for  customs  and  police  can  result  in  failures  to  detect  (potentially)  illicit 
cultural  goods,  in  low  quality  of  entries  in  databases  and  in  poor  investigation 
and evidence collection. For example, 10 out of 12 public officials (83%) answering the 
related question indicated that lack of scientific knowledge to detect forgeries is a factor 
facilitating  illicit  trade  in  their  country,  with  6  indicating  this  is  ‘very’  or  ‘extremely’  the 
case.  The  lack  of  specialised  prosecutors  is  “harmful  as  well”,  in  the  words  of  one 
interviewee: “Some cases [do not] get the attention or treatment they deserve because 
the public prosecutor is not sufficiently specialised. It is necessary to provide trainings to 
recognize illicit trade or ancient goods, which the police department [and public prosecutor] 
cannot  [do]  at  the  moment”.  The  lack  of  specialised  training  seems  to  be  a  missed 
opportunity: 10 out of 12 public officials (83%) answering the related question indicated 
that specialised training had been effective to combat illicit trade in their country, with 7 
of them indicating this was ‘very’ or ‘extremely’ the case. The two remaining respondents 
indicated they do not know, most likely because they have not received such training. 

Recommendation:  More  resources  should  be  dedicated  to  understanding  the  illicit 
trade in cultural goods, by procuring dedicated large-scale longer-term studies (e.g. via 
Horizon  Europe) and by adequately resourcing law enforcement to collect, share and 
analyse  relevant  data.  Countries  should  invest  in  the  development  of  expertise  at  all 
stages of the criminal justice system (see Section 4.1.2). 

70 One respondent indicated it had not at all been effective, the 12th respondent indicated (s)he did not know, 
most likely because there is no specialised unit in that official’s country. 

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4.3.5  Legal constraints 

National  legal  frameworks  may  also  have  implications  on  the  effectiveness  of  criminal 
justice responses, both nationally and across borders. The interviewees raised a number 
of different issues, some of which may be peculiar only to one jurisdiction while others are 
more widespread. 

An important, overarching problem is the  lack of harmonisation  among EU Member 
States  (or,  more  broadly,  European  countries)  of  some  central  concepts,  like  ‘cultural 
goods’, ‘antiquities’, ‘archaeological objects’ as well as of different approaches to legality 
and prosecution of certain actions. While there are a number of international conventions 
and  EU  legal  instruments  that  aim  to  solve  this  problem,  in  the  opinion  of  many 
interviewees the goal has not yet been  effectively achieved. The main reason  for this is 
that international and EU legal instruments were transposed and implemented differently 
in  the  national  law  of  each  Member  State,  such  that  only  a  very  low  degree  of 
harmonisation  has  been  achieved.  The  interviewees  did  not  specify  the  individual  legal 
provisions  that  need  further  harmonisation  or  where  implementation  has  been  too 
fragmented,  but  gave  several  anecdotal  examples  of  the  difficulties  that  encountered  in 
their own practice of cross-border crime fighting:  

“Different  legislations  between  EU  Member  States  is  one  of  the  major  problems. 
Example: An Amsterdam art dealer bought something in good faith. Much later it 
appeared  that  it  was  stolen  from  a  museum  in  Germany.  The  dealer  however 
exercised  due  diligence  and,  did  everything  in  accordance  with  Dutch  law  and 
therefore was legal owner of the item. The German authorities asked for assistance 
in interviewing him as a suspect and seize the item. But according to Dutch law he 
wasn’t a suspect in the matter at all. The dealer wanted to be compensated for the 
sale,  the  Germans  could  not  recompense  him  because  it  is  illegal  to  buy  stolen 
items.  In  the  end  the  [German]  museum  compensated  him  for  the  lost  money 
(dealer  did  not  make  a  profit).  In  German  law  the  museum  then  committed  a 
criminal act, i.e. according to German law de facto they bought a stolen item.” 

While almost all EU Member States have ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention71, only 15 
have ratified the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. As for the Nicosia Convention, only Cyprus 
has ratified it so far72. 

Recommendation:  Ratification  and  effective  transposition  into  national  law  of 
international legal instruments will increase the level of harmonisation across countries, 
provide  a  solid  foundation  for  cross-border  mutual  legal  assistance  and  reduce  the 
number  of  loopholes  that  can  be  abused  by  criminals.  The  Nicosia  Convention  in 
particular is designed to enhance criminal justice responses. 

71 Ireland and Malta are the only EU Member States that have not done so to date. 
72 The Nicosia Convention requires 5 ratifications to enter into force. Currently, there are 11 signatories and 2 
ratifications; Mexico and Cyprus. 

163 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
Different approaches of national legislation to the implementation of international and EU 
legal  instruments  are  conditioned  by  different  legal  traditions.  These  legal  traditions 
determine the regime of private property (i.e. what can be considered private property and 
what  rights  and  obligations  that  rightful  owner  has),  the  existence  and  type  of  markets 
and the extent of government intervention into both. For example, in Bulgaria, Cyprus and 
some other countries, all archaeological finds belong to the state. The Cypriot interviewee 
explained their approach: 

“This strict regulation was mainly the result of the heavy looting that occurred in 
Cyprus  through  the  ages,  as  well  as  the  mass  export  of  Cypriot  cultural  objects 
during the period of Ottoman and British rule. As a result, these cultural objects are 
now spread across the world. Therefore, Cyprus decided (with the 1935 Antiquities 
Law) that cultural goods belong to the state. As such, Cyprus does not have a legal 
antiquities' trade. There are private collections of antiquities but these need to be 
registered and licensed, and possessors are not allowed to trade in antiquities (they 
can be donated or inherited).”  

This is not the case in some other countries  such as, for example, the UK.73 In England 
and Wales, all archaeological finds are normally the property of the landowner, on whose 
land they were found; the exception are the so-called treasure finds as defined by Treasure 
Act  1996  and  Treasure  (Designation)  Order  2002.  To  sell  a  non-treasure  find,  its  finder 
needs to have the permission of the respective landowner. There is a legal obligation to 
report all treasure finds, but even such finds can be sold legally by the finder after they 
are disclaimed on behalf of the Crown. 

The  interviewed  law  enforcement  officers  from  Southern  Europe  perceive  the  Northern 
countries as more liberal, and the difference in legal approaches complicates cooperation:  

“The work with countries from northern Europe is challenging because their cultural 
goods’  and  historical  values’  trade  regime  is  rather  liberal.  They  do  not  have  as 
strict requirements for establishing artefacts’ origin as Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and 
Spain do.” 

Commonly to all countries, the legal characteristics of the crime are problematic. All 
interviewed police officers and prosecutors explain that the burden of  proof is very high 
due  to  the  nature  of  the  crime  (i.e.  it is  very  difficult  to  get  evidence  that  an  item  that 
nobody knew was there in the first place was illegally excavated from a specific site), which 
means  that  efforts  required  to  conduct  an  investigation  are  significant.  One  interviewee 
explains:  

“Typically, in my experience, the investigation focuses especially on recovery of the 
goods detected after years abroad in an art gallery or auction house, the offence 
usually is fencing. It is difficult to detect the person/ group originally responsible. 

73 The process described in this paragraph may change slightly if and when the relevant law is amended. The 
public consultation on the amendments was launched by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
on 1 February 2019. See Revising the definition of treasure in the Treasure Act 1996 and revising the related 
codes of practice at: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/revising-the-definition-of-treasure-in-the-
treasure-act-1996-and-revising-the-related-codes-of-practice . 

164 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
It  is  difficult  to  obtain  a  sentence  against  someone,  as  it  is  very  hard  to 
demonstrate, have evidence that the last person detected (the owner of the piece) 
was aware, at the time of buying, that the good was illegal. You can try to do this 
via the amount paid: if it is low for a masterpiece, then this is a hint. But usually 
the owner has all the legal papers.” 

It is not always possible to return a recovered object to its country of its origin: a 
few interviewees indicated that sometimes no country claims recovered objects or is able 
to prove that the objects were looted from its territory. The recovered cultural goods then 
are simply stored by the police for an undefined amount of time, and the case cannot be 
closed.  For  various  reasons,  investigation  and  recovery  do  not  necessarily  lead  to 
prosecution  of  the  criminals.  One  interviewee  states:  “All  this  throws  off  the  balance 
between  effort  and  reward  for  law  enforcement”.  It  is  relatively  expensive  for  law 
enforcement  authorities  in  terms  of  time  and  resources  to  combat  illicit  trade,  while 
rewards and results are low.  

Perpetrators seem to be aware of this imbalance: getting involved in cultural property 
crime pays off. There is a low chance of being caught, and if one gets caught, the chance 
of getting convicted is minimal. In some countries, loopholes in law allow perpetrators to 
walk  free.  For  example,  in  Bulgaria  all  archaeological  finds  need  to  be  turned  over  to  a 
museum  within  seven  days.  A  Bulgarian  interviewee  explains  that  traffickers  and  mid-
range dealers use this legal provision as a defence from seizure/ confiscation of items. In 
other  cases,  statutes  of  limitations  may  be  applicable.  For  example,  in  Germany,  the 
statute of limitation of 30 years applies even to a bad faith purchaser, in which case he/she 
cannot  be  forced  to  return  an  illegally  obtained  cultural  good.  On  top  of  that,  the 
punishments  for  cultural  property  crimes  are  low  in  all  European  countries.  Law 
enforcement representatives (e.g. from Belgium, Norway, Sweden, UK) are aware of the 
favourable nature that this creates for criminals. 

4.3.6  Lack of information sharing between agencies 

One  of  the  important  problems  that  inhibits  adequate  and  effective  criminal  justice 
responses and that was mentioned by many interviewees is the lack of information sharing 
between  different  agencies  involved,  both  in  the  national  and  cross-border  context.  In 
Sections  4.1.4  and  4.2.2,  we  touched  upon  arrangements  for  data  and  information 
exchange when describing national cooperation and access to information. However, the 
deficits of information sharing are a separate issue that warrants special attention. 

All interviewees pointed out various shortcomings in information and data exchange. One 
of  the  most  fundamental  shortcomings  is  that  data  is  not  (properly)  collected,  for 
instance, in some countries there are no databases and no statistics; therefore, nothing 
can be shared in a regular and systematic manner.  

In most countries, however, some data and information are collected, mainly in the form 
of records of lost and stolen cultural goods. Yet, law enforcement agencies are reluctant 
to share them even within their own jurisdiction. Many interviewed police officers did 
not know  whether their colleagues at customs  had a relevant database, and vice versa. 

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Some police databases are closed to customs (i.e. are for internal use by the police only) 
who can only access them via informal contact. In some cases, information is shared in 
form of regular reports, however the interviewee could not specify the frequency of such 
reports  or  what  type  of  information  was  included.  It  has  been  mentioned  by  some 
interviewees that official channels and protocols for inter-agencies requests for information 
can be slow and inefficient.  

The information is commonly shared in an ad hoc manner, mainly when there is a suspicion 
of a criminal activity (i.e. upon request or by law when customs has to hand over the case 
to the police). This type of information and data sharing is necessary for a specific criminal 
response (e.g. investigation), but is not helpful or effective for crime prevention, detection 
and  analysis  of  developments  in  crime  and  criminal  responses.  Without  regular  and 
systematic sharing of data and information, customs cannot develop specialised and more 
up-to-date  risk  assessments,  and  the  police  cannot  assess  and  improve  its  own 
performance. Due to the lack of data and information sharing, the awareness about cultural 
property crime remains low. 

Cross-border  information  sharing  between  different  customs  authorities  and 
between  different  police  authorities  seems  to  work  well  (according  to  the 
interviewees). This is because there are specialised formal and informal networks where 
these law enforcement agencies regularly meet and remain among themselves. But there 
are  still  difficulties  where  inter-agency  exchange  of  information  is  necessary  and 
there are no informal direct contacts. One of the interviewees explains why national inter-
agency exchange of information is important for successful international cooperation:  

“It is important that information exchange takes place on the national level because 
[my specialised] unit is not the only unit that can come across cases of trafficking. 
Furthermore, if questions are asked from abroad, [the interviewee] is usually the 
one  who  has  to  answer  them  and,  therefore,  she  needs  to  be  aware  of  ‘the  full 
picture’. If customs don’t share all information, it is difficult for her to answer all 
questions.“ 

Recommendation: Law enforcement agencies should be encouraged to systematically 
collect data, create databases and share data and information on a regular basis with 
other agencies, for example, through granting each other access to their databases and 
through  regular  meetings  (see  other  recommendations  in  Sections  3.2,  4.1.3  and 
4.1.4). 

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4.4  Best practices 

In this section we present a number of best practices in various areas of criminal justice 
responses  that  were  identified  by  interviewees  and  through  desk  research.  While  the 
implementation of these practices would definitely aid in the fight against the cultural goods 
trafficking, we need to keep in mind that the EU’s measures to combat illicit trade in cultural 
goods can only be as strong as its weakest link. 

At  the  outset,  with  regard  to  the  listed  best  practices  we  have  two  important 
recommendations: 
1)  The  strengths  of  the  different  approaches  of  the  Member  States  should  be 
acknowledged and built upon, as there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution in this field and 
different countries have found innovative ways to deal with specific problems. 
2) Some countries are pioneers in a certain aspect of combatting the illicit trade. Other 
countries should be encouraged to learn from these experiences, and the ‘pioneers’ can 
play a leading role in further developing and sharing their practices across the EU. 

4.4.1  Awareness raising 

Catalogue of Endangered Latvian Cultural Archaeological Artefacts 

In Latvia, the Latvian Academy of Culture, National History Museum of Latvia, and State 
Inspection  for  Heritage  Protection  jointly  developed  a  public  “Catalogue  of  Endangered 
Latvian Cultural Archaeological Artefacts”. The project received advisory support from the 
State Revenue Service, State Police, State Border  Guard, Latvian Postal Office and Riga 
International Airport. The catalogue shows various types of archaeological objects that are 
“more  frequently  acquired  illegally,  illegally  traded  and  exported  outside  the  territory  of 
Latvia”.74  

The goal of the catalogue in general is to raise awareness about the illicit trade in (Latvian) 
cultural  goods.  It  aims  to  educate  the  general  public  as  well  as  (foreign  and  Latvian) 
traders,  museums  and  other  organisations  in  the  cultural  sector  on  how  to  recognise 
potentially illicit objects. It is also used directly by law enforcement to help them recognise 
potentially illicit objects. In this sense, it is somewhat similar to the ICOM Red Lists. The 
catalogue was included in the INTERPOL database and was disseminated globally (through 
INTERPOL) to relevant police agencies.  

The  Latvian  catalogue  is  an  example  of  good  practice  in  raising  awareness  about  the 
phenomenon of illicit trade in cultural goods among a broad audience: the general public 
and  the  trade,  the  cultural  goods  sector  and  (international)  law  enforcement  officials. 
Moreover,  it  seems  to  have  had  an  effect:  Latvian  law  enforcement  indicated  that  the 
catalogue helped intensify targeted law enforcement activities. As a result, the number of 

74 More information and the catalogue itself can be found here: http://lnvm.lv/en/?p=1523.  

167 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
potentially  illicit  objects  traded  per  day  on  one  prominent  marketplace  platform  was 
brought down from 2.000 to 80 objects (a factor of 25). 

The project itself can also be considered as an example of ‘good practice’ for engagement 
and  cooperation  of  many  different  stakeholders  to  develop  an  initiative  aimed  at 
combatting illicit trade in cultural goods. 

Italian Carabinieri app ‘iTPC’ 
The  Italian  Carabinieri  has  developed  an  app  that  provides  information  about  cultural 
heritage and allows citizens to assist the Carabinieri by reporting thefts or finds of cultural 
goods  such  as  ancient  paintings  or  statues.  The  app  has  multiple  functions.  One  is  to 
provide access to past news and bulletins on cultural heritage that have been prepared by 
the TPC from the 1980s to the present. Another function is a ‘visual search’, which allows 
users to compare photos they take of suspect objects against the Carabinieri database of 
stolen cultural goods. A third function allows users to create an ‘Object ID’ for objects they 
own,  with  an  accurate  photo  and  brief  description.  The  Object  ID  can  be  used  in  an 
investigation in case the object is stolen. Fourth, users are able to request advice from the 
Task Force Unite4Heritage, which includes experts from UNESCO and the Carabinieri and 
is knowledgeable about objects from crisis zones. Finally, the app assists users in locating 
the closest TPC office.  

All in all, the iTPC app is an example of good practice in raising awareness among a broad 
public by giving them tools to work on the protection of cultural heritage themselves. Such 
an app could potentially be beneficial in other countries and at a European level as well. 

4.4.2  Political support—and associated funding 

Italy’s comprehensive approach 

The Italian government made the protection of its cultural heritage an important political 
priority long ago and ensured that its law enforcement units are properly equipped to deal 
with the challenge. The Ministry of Culture, Customs and Carabinieri work closely together, 
and  the  Carabinieri’s  unit  for  protection  of  cultural  heritage  is  well-funded,  staffed  and 
trained. The political support is further expressed in the strong diplomatic support for the 
retrieval  of  illicitly  traded  Italian  cultural  goods  from  abroad.  Embassies  have  a  cultural 
attaché  who  puts  cultural  heritage  on  the  agenda  and  exerts  pressure  to  assist  the 
restitution  procedures.  This  can  result  in  pragmatic  but  creative  deals:  for  example 
recovered stolen artefacts are returned to an Italian museum by a third country, and in 
return  the  museum  may  make  these  objects  or  a  collection  available  for  a  (temporary) 
museum exhibition in that third country. 

The Italian government approach constitutes an example of good practice that combines 
various 
training,  and 
complementing the law enforcement and legal tracks with diplomatic actions.  

important  elements:  political  prioritisation, 

funding  and 

168 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bulgaria’s embassy liaisons 

Bulgaria has a network of law enforcement officials that work at embassies abroad. They 
are  authorised  to,  upon  instruction  from  the  ‘home  base’,  organise  meetings  with  their 
counterparts in the host country, coordinate on cases and contribute to joint operations or 
preventive actions. Through them, information can be quickly shared and a good (bilateral) 
network of  contacts  can be maintained. This constitutes an  example  of good practice in 
facilitating a cross-border response to the illicit trade in cultural goods.  

4.4.3  National specialised unit 

Comando dei Carabinieri per la Tutela del Patrimonio Culturale 

The  Italian  Carabinieri  constitutes  an  example  of  good  practice  of  a  national  specialised 
unit.  It  is  well-funded,  has  a  large  staff  and  state-of-the-art  equipment,  and  is  active 
nationally and internationally to combat illicit trade in cultural goods and to raise awareness 
among  a  large  audience  (see  above).  It  is  a  well-known  and  internationally  renowned 
specialised police unit. 

USA: New York District Attorney’s Antiquities Trafficking Unit 

Several  interviewees  have  highlighted  the  work  of  Matthew  Bogdanos,  a  US  Assistant 
District Attorney, and his Antiquities Trafficking Unit as a good practice. Within this unit, full-
time antiquities trafficking analysists coordinate with experts, the police, the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) and prosecutors under the guidance of a public prosecutor (in 
this case the assistant district attorney) (Artnet 18 December 2017). The reach of this unit 
only extends to crimes committed New York County (thus, to New York City's Manhattan), 
however as a market centre, this represents a sizeable share of the global antiquities trade. 
Through combining the legal competences of the district attorney, DHS and police, the unit 
has at its disposal the required tools to enable confiscation of suspected looted objects. It 
has already undertaken several investigations and actions that resulted in the recovery of 
artefacts  collectively  worth  over  $150  million  and  repatriating  many  of  these  to  their 
countries of origin (Manhattan DA, 4 September 2018).  

4.4.4  Leadership 

Institutionalisation of CULTNET 

During  Bulgaria’s  Presidency  of  the  Council  of  the  European  Union  in  2018,  steps  were 
taken to formalise the (currently informal) CULTNET network. This was made possible by 
the Dutch government’s readiness to provide a Permanent Secretariat for this institution 
(Bulgarian Presidency of the European Council, 8 May 2018) and efforts by Bulgaria and 
Romania  to  put  this  topic  on  the  agenda  during  their  respective  presidencies  of  the 
network.  In  addition,  much  work  has  been  done  by  the  leadership  of  the  Dutch  Police’s 
Antiquities and Art Trade unit to put this topic on the agenda domestically, and the unit 
succeeded  in  persuading  the  Dutch  government  to  make  staff  and  funds  available  to 
support this permanent secretariat. 

169 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reinforcing a European approach: Spain’s unit driving collaboration 

The leadership of the Spanish Heritage Team in the Central Operational Unit of the Guardia 
Civil  has  played  a  crucial  role  in  advancing  collaboration  between  European  law 
enforcement stakeholders on countering illicit trade in cultural goods. It has initiated and 
led  a  number  of  EMPACT-joint  action  days  (Europol,  n.d.),  and  strongly  advocates 
cooperation  via  Europol  and  CULTNET,  which  further  strengthens  a  joint  European 
approach. The team has been specifically active in the driving the Pandora actions (I, II 
and III) 

Operation Pandora I, II, III  
All three iterations of Operation Pandora have been geared towards dismantling 
criminal networks involved in cultural theft and exploitation (and identifying possible 
links with organised crime). Thus far, three operations have taken place:  

  Operation Pandora I – October/November 2016; 
  Operation Pandora II – October/December 2017; 
  Operation Pandora III – October 2018. 

During the operations, numerous items have been confiscated, individuals have been 
arrested and investigations were initiated (see Table 6 for exact numbers). In all three 
operations, the Spanish Guardia Civil has played a crucial role in coordinating and/or 
leading the efforts of the various participating agencies and Member States. 

Effectively enforcing existing laws: New York District Attorney’s Antiquities 
Trafficking Unit 

The Antiquities Unit led by Matthew Bogdanos introduced above shows that forceful action 
can  be  taken  within  existing  legal  frameworks.  With  funding  and  specialised  staff 
commitment, combating illicit trade in cultural goods can be made into a priority, and as 
his unit’s successes in recovering and repatriating objects shows, it is not always necessary 
for law enforcement to obtain additional competences or to create new legal instruments 
to be effective in combating this illicit trade in  cultural goods. A consistent and effective 
enforcement of the existing legal framework is the priority. 

4.4.5  Access to data and information exchange 

Carabinieri LEONARDO database 

The Carabinieri’s LEONARDO database constitutes an example of good practice, but as it 
is  well-known  and  covered  in  various  other  sections  in  the  report,  we  refrain  from 
expanding further here. 

Czech Republic: PSEUD database 

Since 1992, the Czech Republic has maintained a database called Portál systému evidence 
uměleckých děl or PSEUD within which stolen and recovered cultural objects are registered 
by  the  Criminal  Police  and  Investigation  Service.  When  an  artefact  is  stolen,  it  is  first 

170 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
entered  into  the  police  information  system.  If  the  artefact  meets  the  necessary 
requirements, it is included in the PSEUD search database. A restricted version has been 
online  and  accessible  to  the  public  since  2001.  The  full,  non-restricted  database  is 
accessible  to  officials  from  police,  the  Ministry  of  Culture  and  the  customs  agency,  the 
National Heritage Institute, and the National Gallery. What sets this database apart is that 
officials from neighbouring countries Austria and Germany have direct access as well. This 
constitutes  a  good  practice  in  information  sharing  domestically  between  different 
stakeholder categories (including other government departments and museums), as well 
as cross-border information sharing with the police from other countries. 

4.4.6  Monitoring of online trade 

As the sale of cultural goods has largely moved online, it is important for law enforcement 
authorities  (and  other  relevant  actors)  to  monitor  these  online  sales  regularly.  Some 
countries indicated they are able to conduct such checks in a consistent manner. The Italian 
Carabinieri has a team working full-time on managing the unit’s database and monitoring 
the Internet sales. Similarly, in Germany's Baden-Württemberg, one FTE is dedicated to 
updating  the  unit’s  database  and  to  checking  the  online  trade.  In  Bulgaria,  there  is  no 
dedicated  team  or  officer  who  is  tasked  with  the  regular  checks  of  online  sales  but  the 
team  jointly  makes  sure  that  the  four  biggest  websites  (for  Bulgaria)  are  checked  on  a 
daily basis. Other Member State representatives (Belgium, Spain) indicated that they do 
not have sufficient resources to monitor the online trade themselves; instead they rely on 
leads they receive from inter alia the public and academics. 

The efforts of the national law enforcement authorities have been supported by the latest 
Pandora operation (III) where significant focus was put on investigating the online trade. 
This operation included a cyber patrol action where suspicious advertisements of cultural 
artefacts on the Internet were checked and investigated.  

4.4.7  Training 

UNESCO and EU training sessions 

UNESCO regularly hosts training sessions for various stakeholders that (may) encounter 
illicit trade in cultural goods. Sometimes these are organised together with the European 
Union, as happened for example in 2018—European Year of Cultural Heritage. These may 
be focused on art dealers specifically or on government representatives. Interviewees who 
attended  such  meetings  recently  indicated  that  they  were  helpful,  as  these  training 
sessions  bring  together  public  prosecutors,  police  and  customs  officials  as  well  as 
representatives from cultural ministries. Not only do the training sessions raise awareness 
and improve exchange of information, they also facilitate direct contacts that are important 
when cross-border cooperation needs to take place. 

UNESCO creates and distributes various (online) training materials for different audiences: 
law enforcement, customs, judiciary, art market, and researchers. In 2018, UNESCO and 
the EU developed a training manual "Fighting the Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Property: A 
Toolkit for European Judiciary and Law Enforcement". The manual contains basic reference 

171 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
documents along with examples of their use and exercises to complement the theoretical 
information. It aims to provide comprehensive information for practical use by the police, 
gendarmerie, customs, prosecutors and judges. 

WCO regional training 

Together  with UNESCO, the WCO has developed specific training for customs  officials in 
countries of origin where cultural heritage is especially at risk (see for example WCO 19 
December 2018). These training sessions raise awareness among the customs officials who 
are at the frontline of the fight against illicit trade in cultural goods and provide them with 
relevant operational tools.  

NGO training 

Some NGOs also provide training. For example, since 2017 the Lebanese NGO Biladi has, 
with the support of the Norwegian Embassy in Beirut, organised training sessions bringing 
together  Iraqi,  Syrian  and  Lebanese  cultural  heritage  professionals  with  international 
experts  in  law  and  enforcement,  and  used  the  training  as  a  platform  through  which  to 
establish  an  international  network  dedicated  to  the  recovery  of  looted  objects  form  the 
countries involved. 

Comprehensive approach to trainings in Latvia 

In Latvia, various public institutions and government agencies have joined forces to combat 
cultural heritage crime. Following the idea of the Latvian School of Public Administration 
and with support of the National Heritage Protection Board, the State Police, Customs, the 
Latvian  Ministry  of  Culture,  the  Latvian  Ministry  of  Justice,  the  Latvian  National  History 
Museum and the artlaw.club platform, regular training sessions have been developed and 
organised since 2014. These training sessions attempt to raise awareness across various 
bodies  of  the  government  including  law  enforcement  authorities,  judiciary  bodies, 
controlling institutions (inter alia Latvian Post Office, Riga International Airport personnel) 
and  cultural  institutions.  The  raining  covers  the  current  Latvian  context,  legal  aspects, 
approaches  to  international  cooperation  and  practical  know-how  on  the  identification  of 
artefacts. Training modules are tailored to the respective audience.  

The  results  of  this  approach,  presented  at  the  CULTNET  meeting  in  April  2019,  are 
impressive.  Whereas,  in  its  peak  year  2014,  36  cases  of  destruction  of  Latvian  cultural 
heritage sites were reported, this number dropped to 3 in 2018. Similarly, the number of 
archaeological items of Latvian origin for sale on eBay decreased significantly. In November 
2016 eBay offered 2007 of such items (when accessed from US browser; 30 when accessed 
from Latvian browser) while in March 2019, only 57 items were offered (14 when eBay was 
accessed from a Latvian browser). 

172 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.8  Cooperation with archaeologists, NGOs and private investigators 

In  the  Netherlands,  the  specialised  police  unit  occasionally  works  with  private  art 
investigators.  These  private  investigators  may  have  privileged  access  to  information,  as 
they are able to make connections and investigate people operating in the ‘grey area’ more 
easily than the police can. Such art investigators have proven to be of help in recovering 
stolen art on several occasions, such as the recovery of five Dutch Golden Age paintings 
stolen  from  the  Dutch  Westfries  Museum  (New  York  Times,  7  October  2016).  Such  an 
approach would not work in every country. For example, in the UK authorities are sceptical 
of  working  with private  art  investigators  even  when  some  of  these  private  investigators 
are  former  police  officers.  Cooperation  with  archaeologists  is  appreciated  by  all  law 
enforcement. 

4.4.9  International cooperation 

Throughout the study, several examples of good practice for international cooperation were 
encountered. As indicated in Section 4.2.1, INTERPOL is an important agency facilitating 
international  cooperation  and  has  received  praise  from  many  of  the  interviewees  and 
survey respondents.  

EU and regional cooperation 

Other fora such as SELEC and the more informal Scandinavian regional cooperation 
were highlighted as avenues to coordinate effective actions. CULTNET was mentioned by 
several interviewees as helpful in establishing and maintaining a relevant network in the 
EU, and its planned formalisation will increase its added value. 

When  a  cross-border  investigation  reaches  the  prosecution  stage,  Eurojust  plays  an 
important  role  in  streamlining  collaboration  between  different  countries.  The  supporting 
work  of  its  national  desk  liaisons  constitute  an  example  of  good  practice  in  making 
investigations  more  effective.  Their  role  in  this  area  may  grow  as  the  European 
Investigation  Order  (EIO)  becomes  more  frequently  used.  Through  the  EIO,  judicial 
authorities can request evidence and direct other Member States to start an investigation. 
Such requests cannot easily be refused. This tool has only been fully operational since 15 
September  2018  but  is  already  considered  to  be  a  valuable  tool  (Eurojust,  29  January 
2019).75  

Finally, Europol’s role in the field could (potentially) constitute an example of best practice 
in international cooperation. At the moment, they are able to facilitate cooperation between 
EU Member States, with third countries, and with private parties (such as Facebook and 
eBay)  through  the  EMPACT  platform.  It  has  a  budget  with  which  it  organises  meetings 
before and after joint action days and can support the participation of third countries of 
interest (such as Balkans countries). Through its coordination and support for joint action 
days  hosted  as  part  of  EMPACT,  it  also  promotes  ‘institutional  learning’:  each  joint 

75 See also the Eurojust EIO infographic available here 
http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/doclibrary/corporate/Infographics/European%20Investigation%20Order/2018-
European-Investigation-Order.pdf.  

173 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
operation raises the learning curve for involved police and customs agencies. In the future, 
it will facilitate cooperation through hosting the Secretariat of a formalised CULTNET. At 
the same time, maximising Europol's potential added value would require an increase in 
its dedicated budget and staff for the illicit trade in cultural goods. 

174 

 
 
 
5 

175 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.  Assessment of new technologies used for identifying 
potentially  illicit  cultural  goods  and  for  sharing 
information on them 

This  chapter  will  discuss  the  technical  tools  that  (a)  are  currently  used  by  relevant 
European  agencies  and  organisations  for  identifying  potentially  illicit  cultural  goods  or 
sharing information as informed by the previously-discussed interviews and surveys; (b) 
are presumed to be currently in use by relevant European agencies based on open source 
data analysis, but were not directly addressed by interviewees or survey respondents; and 
(c) are not thought to be currently in use but that may represent innovative products in 
this field.  

The  inventory  of  technologies  is  followed  by  their  analysis  based  on  their  impact, 
effectiveness, and added value, particularly with respect to cross-border cooperation and 
with addressing an illicit trade that is increasingly digital in itself. The analysis draws upon 
interview data, survey responses, and the results of surveys of open source data related 
to technology use and possibilities towards combatting the illicit trade in cultural goods in 
Europe.  This  chapter  is  supplemented  by  specific  assessments  of  selected  individual 
technologies presented at the end of this Chapter in Annex 4. 

5.1  Main technical tools for identifying illicit cultural goods and sharing 

information and new innovative tools 

5.1.1  Main  technological  tools  currently  in  use  by  relevant  European  agencies 

and organisations  

X-Ray scanners 

Perhaps the most ubiquitous technology currently used to identify potentially illicit cultural 
goods within Europe are X-Ray scanners. Employed at ports, airports, borders, and notably 
within national postal systems, the use of X-Ray to detect illicit goods within luggage and 
parcels, and on persons is standard practice throughout the world. The key advantage of 
using  X-Ray  scanning  technology  is  the  widespread  presence  of  scanners:  no 
further  investment  in  technology  is  needed.  However,  the  success  of  X-Ray  scanning 
technology  in  detecting  illicit  cultural  goods  depends  on  the  operator  having  had 
relevant  training.  While  many  types  of  illicit  cultural  objects  present  as  distinct  and 
identifiable  forms  within  X-Ray  images,  operators  must  be  familiar  with  those  forms. 
Following detection in an X-Ray scan, agents and operators must conduct a visual search 
of  the  object  in  question  and  thus  must  be  trained  in  the  physical  identification  of 
potentially  illicit  cultural  goods. Further,  replicas  of  ancient  objects  are  sold  as  common 
tourist  souvenirs  or  shipped  as  exports  from  various  countries,  meaning  that  the  false 
positive rate for detection of illicit cultural goods via X-Ray scanners is high and 
leads to  an increase  in physical inspections.  Agents  using  X-Ray  scanners  must  be 
tasked  with  or  provided  with  a  mandate  to  conduct  searches  of  suspected  illicit  cultural 
goods  as  such  actions  require  increased  delays  to  passengers  and  shipments  which,  in 
turn, carries an increased staffing cost to minimise such delays.  

176 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Databases 

One  of  the  primary  technological  tool  types  mentioned  by  informants  and  survey 
respondents was databases of cultural goods that are known to have been stolen. These 
range from police/agency-run (e.g. INTERPOL’s PSYCHE database) to those run by a non-
governmental organisation (e.g. the commercial Art Loss Register's database, but also the 
database  of stolen items maintained by the Church  of Sweden); from  national (e.g. the 
Carabinieri's LEONARDO database) to international; from closed databases to those that 
allow  the  general  public  to  conduct  searches.  A  closed  database  limits  access  to  the 
members of the agency that is running it (e.g. police), so that other national authorities 
(e.g. customs) and foreign authorities would need to file an official request for information 
to access it.76 Among those open to public, some databases can be accessed by citizens 
and traders directly and free of charge; other databases require subscription or registration 
and, in some cases, a fee; yet other databases can only be accessed indirectly by sending 
a  request  for  information  to  the  agency  running  the  database  (i.e.  the  archive  of  lost 
cultural goods of the Cypriot Department of Antiquities). 

An advantage of the use of databases for both recording and researching crimes related to 
cultural goods is that they are a familiar technology, with simple searching usually 
considered to require little in the way of additional training. However, databases 
are difficult to set up, costly to maintain, and are only as useful as the quality and 
completeness of the data they contain. Respondents report that most of the applicable 
databases  in  Europe  are  not  set  up  for  information  sharing  or  cross  searching  and  that 
limited funding prevents development, expansion, and modernisation. Further, databases 
of stolen items are only useful when investigating the theft and trafficking of previously 
known  and  documented  cultural  goods,  such  as  those  stolen  from  a  museum.  The 
databases are, however, less useful where cultural goods in them are poorly documented, 
and  officers  have  to  rely  on  low-quality  images  or  even  solely  on  (sketchy)  verbal 
descriptions.  Previously  undocumented  cultural  goods  that  have  been  illicitly  excavated 
from the ground cannot be recorded in databases, meaning they are of limited utility in 
most antiquities trafficking cases.  

Importantly,  in  their  current  form,  checking  existing  databases  of  illicit  cultural 
objects is not possible in most front-line situations. Border agents, for example, who 
must make a decision about detention, further investigation, or seizure in a matter of only 
a few minutes are unlikely to be able to search the plethora of databases available; even 
if  they  had  the  time  to  do  so,  they  are  unlikely  to  have  the  vocabulary  to  describe  the 
object  in  question  in  such  a  way  that  would  turn  up  database  results.  As  such,  the 
databases are only useful further down the investigative line when an object has already 
been seized or in market situations where more time for research is available. 

Web crawling and scraping applications 

A  number  of  informants  and  survey  respondents  reported  either  the  current  use  or  the 
desire  to  use  web-crawling  and  scraping  applications  to  investigate  the  sale  of  cultural 
goods  online.  There  was  a  relative  consensus  among  stakeholders  that  the  internet 

76 In practice, informal requests are frequently made in order to speed up the information exchange. However, a 
proper procedure needs to be followed for evidence gathering. 

177 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
represents  the  primary  marketplace  for  most  illicit  cultural  goods  in  Europe  and  that 
technical investigative tools that focused on the internet marketplace were both 
appropriate and useful.  

Web crawling refers to the use of internet software to systematically index a website or set 
of  websites,  and  web  scraping  refers  to  the  automated  harvesting  of  data  from  these 
indexed  sites.  Users  have  the  ability  to  target  specific  sites  and  types  of  data  (e.g.  by 
keywords, images, etc.) based on their needs. Such tools allow agencies to quickly gather 
relevant information concerning sales of antiquities from large auction and sales sites, as 
well as the wider web. However, processing that data requires human eyes, training, 
and expertise. The need for adequately trained staff to work on these online data is not 
necessarily reduced, but crawlers and scrapers allow that staff to save time, cover larger 
ground and process more data. Interviewees who noted that they did not use automated 
tools to search the web mentioned limited staffing as the primary reason for lack of 
uptake. 

Machine Learning, Artificial Intelligence, and Image Recognition 

Machine learning is a blanket term for statistical techniques employing neural networks to 
accomplish tasks. These can be collectively referred to as Artificial Intelligence (AI) because 
they  aim  to  perform  tasks  that  humans  accomplish  with  ease.  Machine  learning 
distinguishes  itself  from  other  approaches  to  AI  in  that  the  algorithms  employed  by  the 
neural networks are statistically deduced rather than hand-tuned by a human designer.  

Machine Learning is being applied to the art world in a number of experimental ways, for 
example,  in  the  detection  of  forged  paintings  (see  Elgammal  et  al,  2017).  That  said, 
respondents and interviewees reported only one application of Machine Learning/AI in use 
among relevant agencies responding to the illicit trade in cultural goods: image recognition. 

Early  approaches  to  image  recognition  were  based  around  hand-designed  algorithms. 
However, in the last few decades, machine learning-based techniques have matured, and 
statistically  deduced  algorithms  are  commonly  used  for  image  recognition.  Such  image 
recognition applications can take many forms. In the context of this study, interviewees 
referred to applications that, when used in tandem with web crawlers and web scrapers, 
can  identify  patterns  in  digital  images  that  are  likely  to  indicate  that  the  image  is  of  a 
specific subject. In this case, image recognition is used to identify images of cultural goods 
which  have  been  scraped  from  auction  sites,  social  media,  and  other  websites.  Few 
respondents  reported  having  direct  experience  with  such  applications,  but  more  were 
familiar with agencies in Europe who are using image recognition in their work to detect 
illicit sales of cultural goods. Such applications produce high false positive rates, with 
detection  thresholds  usually  set  to  reduce  false  negatives,  and  a  trained  user  who  is 
able to identify illicit cultural goods and other items of interest is needed to process 
all data collected. Thus, like more basic crawlers and scrapers, staffing requirements are 
not significantly reduced by the use of image recognition software, but rather trained staff 
are able to process more data more quickly. 

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Communication platforms  

Policing  and  related  agencies  are  known  to  be  using  various  types  of  bespoke 
communications platforms to share information about, among other things, cases involving 
the illicit trafficking of cultural goods. Few of these platforms are thought to be specific to 
cultural property cases, but are rather the normal communications platforms used for 
all  types  of  agency  and  cross-agency  information  sharing  (e.g.  EMPACT,  IMI  – 
Internal  Market  Information  system,  WCO’s  ARCHEO  platform).  These  have  not  been 
specifically  profiled  here  and  were  not  further  discussed  by  informants  or  respondents. 
While  communication  platforms  specific  to  sharing  knowledge  about  the  illicit  trade  in 
cultural goods across agencies and across jurisdictions might be considered, it is likely that 
there would be limited uptake. These platforms would represent an additional service for 
agents and stakeholders to monitor, potentially increasing their workload, and it is unclear 
what added value that specific focus on cultural goods would offer. 

Bespoke smartphone applications 

At  least  one  police  force  has  developed  a  public  smart  phone  application  related  to 
combatting the illicit trade in cultural goods in Europe. The Carabinieri released their iTPC 
Carabinieri  app in  February  of  2018,  and  it  represents  at  least  the  second  app  that  has 
been developed by the unit. The first is now defunct and was presumably superseded by 
the  current  app.  The  iTPC  Carabinieri  app,  which  is  only  available  in  Italian,  allows  the 
general public to read over 40 years of Carabinieri bulletins related to stolen cultural goods, 
to fill out Object ID information about a potentially stolen piece and possibly submit it to 
the Carabinieri for review, and to search their database of stolen cultural goods by taking 
and uploading a photo of a suspect artwork. This feature could not be thoroughly tested 
for the purposes of this study.  

It is unclear how useful the application is for detecting stolen cultural goods that appear in 
the Carabinieri database. However, the  creation of smartphone apps that allow the 
general  public to  record  and  share specific information about  crimes related to 
cultural  goods  with  authorities  should  be  considered,  especially  in  response  to 
specific needs. A  smartphone application that allows users to  record incidents of looting 
and  heritage  vandalism  with  a  photograph  and  GPS  coordinates,  for  example,  could  be 
useful in some locations and would represent  another form of  crowdsourcing (discussed 
below). 

5.1.2  Technological  tools  assumed  to  be  in  use  by  relevant  European  agencies 

and organisations  

Social network analysis applications 

Social network analysis refers generally to the investigation of human interactions through 
the social structures that we create. Applications used for social network analysis include 
both those that focus specifically on networking patterns that can be gleaned from social 
media,  and  those  that  can  be  used  based  on  data  gathered  from  more  varied  sources. 
Social  network  analysis  in  both  these  forms  is  known  to  be  used  by  police,  security 
analysts, and the military for various forms of crime investigation, including investigation 

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involving trafficking. It is assumed that such applications have been applied to the illicit 
trade  in  cultural  goods,  particularly  for  investigations  which  involve  social  media.  Such 
applications have the capacity to greatly expand the scope of investigations of network-
based  crimes  such  as  the  trafficking  of  cultural  goods  by  identifying  links  in  trafficking 
chains. However, privacy restrictions may restrain some agencies from conducting 
some forms of social network analysis without prior authorisation, and many online 
social media platforms endeavour to restrict the use of automated crawlers on their sites 
that gather data for network analysis purposes, meaning that some forms of data gathering 
in advance of social network analysis must be done manually by staff. 

Crowdsourcing 

The term crowdsourcing has multiple meanings. In this context, the term refers to the use 
of  various  tools  to  gain  data  or  information  about  crime  from  the  general  public.  While 
more innovative versions of crowdsourcing, such as using large groups of online volunteers 
to  process  large  amounts  of  data,  are  presented  in  Section  5.4  and  are  not  thought  to 
currently  be  in  use  among  policing  agencies  and  other  stakeholders  in  Europe,  more 
traditional crowdsourcing is the use of social media and other digital information platforms 
to publicise crimes and appeal to the public for information about the illicit trade in cultural 
goods and related crimes is standard practice. In England, for example, the twitter account 
@HeritageCrime is run by Historic England to make specific public appeals for information 
about the theft and destruction of cultural goods and cultural sites. It promotes the direct 
appeals  tweeted  by  county-level  Heritage  Crime  police  officers  and  other  police 
representatives.  Many  followers  of  this  account  (often  dedicated  researchers)  share  the 
tweets  with  their  own  networks,  so  it  has  a  multiplier  effect.  Such  basic  digital 
crowdsourcing  is  a  low-cost  way  to  publicise  a  crime  and  solicit  information  and 
evidence  from  a  wider  range  of  potential  informants  when  the  particulars  of  an 
investigation allow. 

Metadata analysis 

Metadata  analysis  refers  to  the  investigation  of  information  tags  that  accompany  digital 
files,  including  digital  documents  and  photographs.  Such  tags  can  reveal  identifying 
information about the circumstances of the file's creation and, in some cases, record the 
location of creation and the name of the creator. This is especially the case for image files, 
as  digital  cameras  and  smart  phones  often  record  a  significant  amount  of  metadata 
alongside  any  photograph  taken  unless  the  user  specifically  turns  such  features  off. 
Metadata  analysis  is  quick  and  inexpensive  and  is  standard  practice  for  seized 
digital  files.  Further,  the  available  metadata  of  files  related  to  the  illicit  trafficking  and 
sale of cultural goods gained through the process of police web scraping described above 
should  be  and  are  likely  being  investigated  as  well.  Though  metadata  analysis  was  not 
specifically mentioned by informants, many web crawling and scraping applications focus 
specifically on file metadata, making it a complementary tool. 

Metadata  analysis  in  policing  and  security  has  also  come  to  refer  to  the  analysis  of 
supplemental  information  associated  with  digital  and  traditional  communications,  for 
example the numbers and times of outgoing calls made by a suspect's mobile phone, but 

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not  the  contents  of  that  conversation.  This  type  of  metadata  analysis  has  not  been 
evaluated here. 

Messaging services 

While not directly referenced by informants or survey respondents in this study, informal 
discussions with stakeholders indicate that various types of messaging services are in use 
among agents, usually in the form of popular smartphone applications such as WhatsApp, 
Signal, and Telegram. In many cases, this constitutes unauthorised use, but the ubiquity 
of the applications and the ease with which they can be used to quickly transmit images 
and  other  information  ensures  they  are  used  at  times.  Secure  smartphone  based 
messaging  that  can  be  implemented  across  jurisdictions,  then,  is  an  area  for 
future  consideration  and  development,  not  just  for  sharing  information  related  to 
cultural goods, but for all areas of cross-border policing. 

5.1.3  Potentially-innovative products on the market that are not being used, or 
in limited capacity, by relevant European agencies and organisations 

Blockchain technology 

Blockchain technology refers to applications that are based on the idea of a “blockchain”, 
a verifiable distributed ledger  of transactions.  Within the art market,  numerous start-up 
companies  have  adopted  proprietary  tagging,  inventory  maintenance,  and  transaction 
platforms based on blockchains, promoting them as a means through which buyers  and 
sellers can more reliably investigate provenance and avoid buying fakes. In essence, these 
are  tagging  and  database  technologies,  and  thus  can  be  applied  only  to  known  and 
inventoried cultural goods; there is no application for this technology for the bulk of the 
illicit antiquities trade, which is in unknown cultural goods that have been looted from the 
ground. Indeed, most of these applications use proprietary, company-controlled blockchain 
technologies  with  limited  public  verifiability,  thereby  sacrificing  some  of  the  primary 
benefits of blockchain. These ledgers are unlikely to remain accessible in the event that 
any  of  these  start-up  companies  fail.  Further,  these  applications  have  been  developed 
specifically  for  the  market  in  fine  art,  not  for  antiquities,  and  it  is  unclear  what 
benefit blockchain-based technologies have for curbing the illicit trade in antiquities. 

Satellite imagery analysis and remote sensing and monitoring 

The prospect of using satellite imagery analysis and monitoring of heritage sites through 
use of satellite and drone technology has been shown to be potentially effective through a 
number  of  academic  studies  throughout  the  world  (Brodie  and  Contreras,  n.d.;  Casana, 
2015;  Casana  and  Laugier,  2017;  Caspari,  2018;  Contreras  and  Brodie,  2010a,  2010b; 
Parcak  et  al.,  2016).  These  remote  sensing  technologies  allow  for  changes  in 
heritage sites, such as looters’ holes or site destruction, to be detected either by trained 
professionals  or,  to  a  lesser  extent,  by  machine  learning/image  recognition  software. 
Although  these  technologies  do  not  directly  address  the  trafficking  aspects  of  the  illicit 
trade in cultural goods, they may allow for interventions at certain sites towards protection 
and could alert authorities that cultural goods from certain sites and cultures may be 
about to appear on the market. 

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Few, if any, of these studies have been focused on Europe. Most relate to types of terrains 
or social situations that are not applicable in a European context. Satellite monitoring works 
best on arid and flat landscapes, such as coastal Peru, Egypt, and Western Asia. It is also 
useful in detecting large scale site destruction in both urban and rural landscapes during 
times of extreme armed conflict. However, this does not mean that use of satellite imagery 
and other remote sensing and monitoring techniques cannot be implemented in Europe, 
especially  considering  the  rapid  technological  developments  in  the  field,  and  further 
research into the utility of such methods to meet specific operational needs in European 
contexts is warranted. 

Trained sniffer dogs and "electronic noses" 

One of the more unusual "technologies" proposed to aid in the prevention of the illicit trade 
in  cultural  goods  has  been  the  introduction  of  working  dogs  who  are  trained  to  detect 
cultural goods at airports, ports, and borders. Working in a similar way to dogs trained to 
detect  narcotics  or  prohibited  produce,  the  proposed  antiquities  sniffing  dogs  would  be 
trained  to  alert  for  smells  related  to  objects  that  have  recently  been  removed  from  the 
ground. No such dogs are currently in use, but training testing is underway in the United 
States.  On  a  related  note,  several  informants  mentioned  the  possibility  of  the  use  of 
"electronic  noses"  for  antiquities  detection,  though  all  indicated  that  such  technology  is 
very expensive and not in use. Electronic noses  work in a similar way to detection dogs 
and are able to pick up the chemical signature of specific odours, with the smells associated 
with  recently  unearthed  cultural  goods  being  a  possible  target.  It  remains  to  be  seen  if 
either proposed method works in a real-world setting. 

Tagging and tracking technologies 

Various forms of marking and tagging of cultural goods have been proposed that go beyond 
traditional marking methods such as writing inventory numbers on the objects with ink. 
These methods vary in their goals, ranging from ideas for object identification to ideas for 
object tracking. These technologies include proposed radio-frequency identification (RFID) 
tags that could be scanned and, to a lesser extent, tracked; tagging in the form of clear 
liquid  painted  on  the  object  that  is  invisible  to  traffickers  but  visible  under  certain 
circumstances to law enforcement or contains identifiable chemical signatures; and tags 
attached to objects that would, theoretically, monitor their movements in real time. 

For the most part, these tagging technologies have been proposed by private companies, 
rather  than  law  enforcement  or  other  professional  stakeholders,  and  their  utility  and 
efficacy are questionable at times. They cannot be used for cultural goods that are 
previously undocumented, and in most cases there is no obvious added value in 
using such new tagging technologies rather than the inexpensive and more familiar 
recording using traditional tags and photographs. The few informants who mentioned new 
tagging technology indicated that experts rejected them due to the potential damage some 
of  them  might  cause  to  cultural  goods  when  applied.  Further,  much  of  the  information 
recorded in such tags are likely to be housed in proprietary databases not under the control 
of authorities, leading to questions of sustainability and access. 

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Digital scanning technology 

Significant advances have been made in recent years in three-dimensional digital scanning 
technologies. A variety  of different scanners and specific types of scanning technologies 
exist  that  are  able  to  collect  information  about  a  tangible  object  and  render  it  as  a  3D 
model  in  a  digital  space  to  a  high  degree  of  accuracy.  This  model  can  be  moved, 
manipulated, and shared, and can be used via a 3D printer to produce a physical replica 
of the original object. Because this type of recording is non-invasive, 3D scanning has been 
widely adopted by the heritage preservation community for recording heritage objects and 
sites, particularly those that face various forms of threats. While there is an ongoing debate 
in this sector about issues related to intellectual property rights, appropriation, and access 
related to  such 3D scans of heritage items, digital scanning is widely seen as a positive 
development towards preservation. 

With  regard  to  combatting  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods,  digital  scanning  technology 
was mentioned by few informants. Those who did mention such technology envisioned it 
being  used  by  law  enforcement  as,  in  effect,  an  enhanced  photograph  of  a  previously 
recorded cultural object that is suspected to have been stolen. If, for example, a museum 
held  3D  scans  of  all  of  their  antiquities  and  one  of  those  antiquities  was  stolen  and 
potentially seized, the  3D scan could be transmitted to law enforcement for more  exact 
comparison  than  a  photograph  can  offer.  Such  a  scenario  would  require  a  significant 
amount of potentially expensive scanning work on the part of the museum and it is unclear 
if  there  is  significant  added  value  of  a  3D  scan  over  a  traditional  photograph  in  such  a 
scenario. The existence of a 3D scan (and, for that matter, a traditional photograph) which 
proves that a cultural good is illicit or illegal is likely to deter buyers and, potentially, 
thieves, however the existence of such records must be publicised for such an effect to 
occur.  One  way  to  do  this  is  to  be  very  public  about  digitisation  in  museum  and  other 
collections, with specific wording in the press and in museum/heritage site/storage signage 
that indicates that the cultural goods in question are scanned (or photographed) and are, 
thus, unsellable. 

Another  potential  use  for  3D  scanning  technology  lies  in  attempts  to  match 
undocumented looted antiquities to their source. In some situations, accurate digital 
scans  of  statue  pedestals,  tomb  floors,  remaining  objects,  and  the  other  damaged 
architectural and archaeological remains that are left behind by looters could be matched 
to  cut  surfaces  or  other  features  of  cultural  goods  on  the  market.  In  cases  such  as  the 
Weary Herakles looted from Turkey (Thomas, 2012) and the Khmer statues looted from 
Koh Ker, Cambodia (Ece et al., n.d.), the matching of features that remained at the sites 
to the cultural goods in question was integral to establishing indisputable provenance. In 
both cases this was accomplished with plaster casts, but 3D scans would accomplish the 
same  task  more  quickly  and  in  a  less  potentially  damaging  manner.  Such  possibilities 
should be considered by law enforcement agencies on a case-by-case basis. 

Finally, digital scanning technology and the resulting high-quality 3D-printed models of 
antiquities  has  been  put  forward  as  a  potential  way  to  satisfy  market  demand  for 
cultural  goods.  This  reasoning  posits  that  collectors  might  be  convinced  to  purchase 
copies  of  particular  pieces  of  ancient  art  instead  of  authentic  antiquities.  This  does  not 
appear to be a viable solution as it does not address the documented collector desire to 

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own the authentically ancient (Yates, 2015) and would likely not result in any reduction of 
the illicit market. 

184 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 

Impact, effectiveness and added value of technological tools  

5.2.1  Currently used technical tools 

Because this has become the common model for much of the illicit trade in cultural goods 
within  Europe,  many  of  the  technological  tools  currently  in  use  among  law  enforcement 
and  related  agencies  and  organisations  focus  on  detecting  and  deterring  crimes  online. 
However, relevant agencies find it difficult to police the internet, with multiple platforms 
for sales stretching across both the indexable/visible and the deep/ dark web.  

Naturally the visible web is perceived to be  easiest for policing agencies to monitor and 
respond  to.  A  number  of  web  crawling  and  scraping  tools  (discussed  above)  are  in  use 
among law enforcement agencies in Europe to detect possible illicit cultural goods for sale 
online,  and  they  are  considered  to  be  desirable  technology  among  respondents  and 
interviewees.  Several  of  these  stakeholders  noted  that  image  recognition  software, 
used in tandem with web crawlers and scrapers, is used by certain policing agencies 
in  Europe  and  represents  a  useful  area  for  further  expansion  with  regard  to 
monitoring sales of cultural goods online.  

Yet however promising these technologies may be, interviewees, particularly those from 
agencies  that  have  already  implemented  the  use  of  crawlers,  scrapers,  and  image 
recognition, reported that a trained and specialised human eye is needed to make 
sense  of  data  collected  by  automated  tools.  Several  policing  agencies  indicate  that 
they do not have the staffing capacity to process data produced by crawlers, scrapers or 
even manual searches of sales sites. Several of the policing agencies that do not use such 
technology and do not have the staffing capacity for manual web searching depend on tips 
from the public about potential illicit sales of cultural goods online; capacity and funding 
issues also prevent those tips from being followed up on at times. While there are many 
free  and  open  source  options  with  regards  to  crawlers  and  scrapers,  implementation  of 
those technologies requires technical skills that are often beyond the capacity of units and 
officers who are focused on detecting the illicit sale of cultural goods. Implementation and 
training, then, is often expensive and thus beyond the budgetary constraints of such units. 
While it is  clear  that  crawlers,  scrapers,  and  associated  image  recognition  packages  are 
considered  useful  and  desirable  by  those  involved  in  policing,  the  financial  and  staffing 
capacity  is  rarely  available  to  implement  them  properly.  In  other  words,  there  is  no 
issue with the availability and awareness of such technology solutions, but rather 

Recommendation:  The  EU  and  Member  States  should  support  set-up,  training  and 
ongoing  staffing  for  web  crawling  and  scraping  tools.  This  could  be  done  through 
providing  funds  through  the  Internal  Security  Fund  (and  its  successor),  with 
contributions to national efforts. In addition, at European level  (further) development 
of this capacity at Europol could be supported, through installing a dedicated official at 
Europol dealing with web crawling and scraping. Furthermore, dedicated training at an 
EU level for  CULTNET  members could be  organised (by  countries that have the most 
experience). 

185 

 
 
 
 
 
 
the primary reason they are not used in a more widespread manner is a lack of 
funding for initial setup, training, and ongoing staffing. 

Informants  noted  that  monitoring  of  illicit  transactions  on  the  dark  web  or  deep  web  is 
extremely difficult. The deep web consists of online locations that are difficult to index or 
blocked from being indexed meaning that the simpler crawling and scraping tools do not 
work.  A  primary  feature  of  the  dark  web  and  darknets  is  anonymity,  meaning  agencies 
have  limited  means  through  which  to  track  illicit  sales  to  either  a  seller  or  a  buyer. 
Considering that few, if any, antiquities have been found for sale on the dark web, even 
during focused efforts to find them (see Section 3.4.1 above), technologies meant to search 
and crawl specifically the dark web are of limited, if any, use. 

Traditional  databases  were  also  considered  by  informants  to  be  an  important  and 
valuable technology tool for combatting the illicit trade in cultural goods in Europe, with 
the potential for aiding in cross-border investigations. These databases are by no means 
new; however, there is some indication that emergent technologies might be useful 
when  paired  with  these  databases,  including  “big  data”  analysis,  network 
analysis, and the creation of bespoke smartphone applications for searching and 
submitting database entries.  

Recommendation:  The  EU  and  Member  States  should  support  the  development  of 
bespoke smartphone applications for searching and submitting database entries. These 
should allow frontline officers (e.g. border police, customs) to effectively and efficiently 
check  pictures  taken  on  the  ground  against  available  (national  and  international) 
databases. It should also be possible to seamlessly add entries into these databases. A 
call for relevant R&D projects could be announced under Horizon Europe. 

Despite  the  fact  that  existing  databases  related  to  cultural  goods  are  reported  as  being 
useful, stakeholders interviewed and surveyed were keenly aware of their shortcomings. 
It  was  noted  by  several  interviewees  and  survey  respondents  that  databases  of  stolen 
cultural  goods  were  not  useful  in  cases  where  the  goods  in  question  were  poorly 
documented  or  undocumented,  such  as  those  illicitly  looted  from  the  ground.  Such 
databases  are  only  considered  useful  in  cases  of  theft  and  trafficking  of  documented 
antiquities,  such  as  those  stolen  from  museums  or  churches.  With  regard  to  recorded 
cultural goods, databases depend on the quality and completeness of the data contained 
within  them.  Many  require  complete  and  detailed  registration  and  recording  of  cultural 
objects in their country of origin in advance of any theft. Such registration has often not 

Recommendation:  The  EU  and  Member  States  should  investigate  how  it  can  make 
funding  available  for  improvement  of  databases  and  their  usability.  Funding  for 
maintenance and expansion of existing databases could come from the Internal Security 
Fund  (or  its  successor)  or  a  similar  budget  facility.  Improving  interoperability  and 
automatic search through image recognition could be researched and designed under 
Horizon Europe. 

186 

 
 
 
 
 
been carried out. Furthermore, most searching of these databases is done manually, 
requiring  staff  time  and  specialised  staff  training  in identification  of  cultural  goods,  with 
funds for such staff time being limited. In the same vein, many existing databases are 
perceived to be underfunded, with inadequate staffing available for support, upkeep, 
and  development  of  new  functionality.  Increased  support  for  maintenance  and 
expansion of existing databases regarding cultural goods would be welcome. 

5.2.2  Potentially innovative technical tools 

Beyond  technologies  that  are  currently  in  use  or  that  were  identified by  informants  and 
respondents as of being of known utility in combatting the illicit trade in cultural goods, 
there is a plethora of new and emerging technologies that have been put forward, primarily 
in the popular press but also in academia, as being possibly applicable to this issue. While 
some informants indicated that they were aware of some of these technologies, these were 
rarely discussed in interviews and in survey responses. When they were mentioned, it was 
not without some degree of scepticism or criticism. 

Speaking  generally  most  of  these  new  and  emerging  technologies  have  not  been 
specifically developed with curbing the illicit trade in cultural goods in mind. Instead, they 
can be characterised as "technologies in search of an application": owners and developers 
of a particular application in search for a way to apply it come upon the issue of antiquities 
trafficking. Because of this, many of these technologies do not address a defined law 
enforcement need, or fill a detection or enforcement gap; instead, they address issues 
that  may  not  be  of  direct  relevance  to  real-world  organizational  needs  regarding  the 
prevention  of  crimes  related  to  cultural  goods.  Despite  much  discussion  of  these 
technologies in the popular media, they may be of limited utility. 

As discussed previously, most of these technologies, particularly those related to tagging 
and  inventory  tracking  of  cultural  goods,  can  only  be  used  on  previously  known  pieces, 
such as those kept in museums, churches, archaeological stores, etc. Informants, survey 
respondents, and additional research indicates that documentable items stolen from such 
locations do not represent a sizable portion of the illicit market in cultural goods. Further, 
these documentable items are easily incorporated into traditional registry schemes which 
are inexpensive and in widespread use. While better ways to tag and inventory such items 
are  certainly  welcome,  the  introduction  of  these  technologies  is  unlikely  to  have 
much, if any, effect on the illicit trade in cultural goods. 

Recommendation: On the whole, the EU and Member States should prioritise actions 
that are directed at making existing solutions more effective. 

All told, there was no significant divide between law-enforcement and non-law enforcement 
technological tools to combat the illicit trade in cultural goods in Europe. Policing and other 
agencies  appear  to  be  drawing  from  the  same  corpus  of  available  technologies  that  the 
private sector and academia are drawing from. The primary divide between the two with 
regard  to  implementation  appears  related  to  cost/benefit  evaluation.  The  needs  of 

187 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
academic data collection or private sector inventory tracking are different than the needs 
of  law  enforcement  agencies.  With  limited  resources,  law-enforcement  agencies 
working  in  this  area  must  restrict  their  use  of  new  technologies  to  those  that 
address specific gaps or operational needs, and can only implement technologies that 
they have the capacity and desire to adequately staff, maintain, and sustain.  

188 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3  Vulnerabilities and policy needs 

As  mentioned  previously,  many  interviewees  and  respondents  concur  that  the  primary 
vulnerability  in  this  area  does  not  rest  with  either  a  lack  of  technology  or  a  lack  of 
knowledge  about  technology  options  and  solutions.  It  is  the  lack  of  political  will  to 
address the issue of the illicit trafficking of cultural goods and the resulting lack 
of  money  to  devote  to  technology,  including  staff  capacity  and  training,  that  prevents 
uptake.  This  is  part  of  a  widespread  belief  among  stakeholders  in  Member  States  that 
countering the illicit trade in cultural goods is not a priority area for funding and capacity 
building,  with  few  resources  devoted  to  the  issue.  Money,  then,  is  the  primary  obstacle 
that  prevents  the  uptake  and  application  of  relevant  technological  tools.  See  also  the 
obstacles mentioned in Section 3.3.2.  

Because  many  technologies  cited  in  the  popular  press  as  potential  solutions  to  issues 
related  to  the  trafficking  of  cultural  goods  are  owned  and  promoted  by  "start-ups", 
emerging businesses with limited track records, the long-term sustainability of many 
of these technologies is questionable. The majority of start-ups fail which may render 
some of these technologies unsupported if they are adopted by policing agencies. This is 
of  particular  concern  when  the  technology  in  question  relies  on  a  database,  register,  or 
other vital component of functionality that is privately held and maintained by the start-
up.  If  the  start-up  fails,  sells  the  technology,  or  otherwise  leaves  the  market,  the 
technology might become non-functional and all data associated with it may be lost. 

Thus, the proprietary nature  of much  of this technology is  of  concern, and  proprietary 
applications  which  can  be  wholly  administered  and maintained  by  policing  and 
other relevant agencies should be considered above other options. This, however, 
can make such technology expensive to implement, requiring technical expertise, staffing, 
and  continued  maintenance.  Indeed,  open  source  versions  of  these  technologies,  which 
eliminate the drawbacks of the use of proprietary applications, also may require significant 
technical expertise, as well as costs related to training and maintenance. In other words, 
few of these new  and emerging technologies eliminate the  need  for  significant 
amounts  of  trained/specialised  human  intervention  or  monitoring,  and  as 
informants  report  a  lack  of  agency  investment  in  combatting  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural 
goods, they are unlikely to be implemented. 

There is also tension related to data security when evaluating and implementing the use 
of  technological  tools.  Although  the  costs  and  long-term  reliability  and  functionality  of 
certain proprietary applications are of serious concern, some informants reported that they 
were barred from using open source software packages and applications. This means that 
the technological solutions that may be the cheapest and the most sustainable in the longer 
term cannot be adopted by key agencies. Such blanket bans on open source and free 
software,  if  truly  widespread,  seem  counterproductive,  and  may  reflect  a  poor 
understanding  of  the  security  and  sustainability  advantages  of  open  source  applications 
when compared to the security and sustainability drawbacks of proprietary packages. In 
cases  where  such  prohibitions  will  not  be  lifted,  partnerships  with  academics  or 
interested  non-profit groups may allow the data from  open source  applications 

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to be collected and processed, with the results turned over to the relevant policing or 
other agencies. 

Recommendation: National authorities should critically assess their guidelines on the 
use  of  open  source  or  free  software  in  light  of  the  balance  between  cost-efficiency, 
effectiveness and sustainability. Where it is impossible for law enforcement to work with 
such software, partnerships with academics and NGOs should be sought to incorporate 
data  from  open  source  applications.  Such  cooperation  should  come  with  sufficient 
funding. 

Nominally  secure  smart  phone  communications  applications,  such  as  WhatsApp,  Signal, 
and Telegram, were not mentioned by any of our interviewees formally. However, informal 
discussions with various stakeholders in recent years indicate that they are in use among 
relevant  agents,  stakeholders,  etc.,  even  in  some  situations  where  the  use  of  such 
applications is prohibited. These applications represent a quick and easy way for agents to 
share images of and messages about suspect or seized cultural goods with other agents 
and, potentially, to share them cross-agency and even cross-border. The ubiquity of smart 
phones  and  the  ease  with  which  these  applications  informally  transcend  physical  and 
linguistic barriers makes them worthy of consideration and it is assumed that they are in 
use for policing issues other than the illicit trade in cultural goods. Their use represents a 
significant potential security risk, but for the illicit trade in cultural goods specifically, the 
visual nature of identification of the commodity in question requires the capacity to quickly 
share images in a secure way: between agents, between agencies, across borders, and, at 
times, to stakeholders and experts who are not within law enforcement (e.g. academics 
for identification, museum staff, etc), in situations where speed of communication is vital.  

The  use  of  commercial  communications  applications  may  indicate  a  need  to 
develop  a  secure  smart  phone  messaging  application  for  law  enforcement 
cooperation  across  Member  States.  That  said,  uptake  on  such  a  system  might  be 
limited. Further, a bespoke application for communications solely about cultural goods is 
unlikely  to  be  widely  adopted,  and  its  development  would  be  a  waste  of  resources.  The 
appeal  of  pre-existing  commercial  communication  applications  is  that  they  are  in 
widespread use: everyone has them already and knows how to use them. This remains an 
open issue that goes far beyond the illicit trade in cultural goods. 

Recommendation:  The  EU  and  Member  States  should  investigate  if  and  how  a 
dedicated secure smart phone messaging application could be developed for European 
law enforcement officials. This should go beyond simply sharing information regarding 
the combat against illicit trade in cultural goods, and should thus be considered as a 
broader recommendation beyond the scope of this study. 

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5.4  Overall assessment 

Overall,  no  clear  technology  gap  emerged  from  this  study.  Informants  and 
respondents rarely reported that technological tools to solve existing needs were in need 
of  development.  Evaluation  of  available  technologies  that  are  not  currently  in  use  or 
available  to  relevant  agencies  did  not  reveal  any  technology  that  would  appear  to 
unilaterally solve a significant issue or policing need related to preventing the illicit trade 
in  cultural  goods  if  adopted.  The  main  issue  related  to  uptake  and  implementation  of 
technology in relation to this area which came up time and time again among informants 
was  money.  Reports  of  lack  of  funding  for  technology  uptake,  staffing  capacity  for 
implementation, and technology training were widespread. It is clear that useful technology 
tools  exist  and  are  in  use  in  some  agencies  in  Europe  (specifically,  web  crawlers  and 
scrapers, image recognition applications, and digital databases), but that this use and their 
further development is dependent on the resources devoted to them. As the illicit traffic 
in  cultural  goods  was widely  reported  to  be  a  low  priority  area  within  relevant 
agencies, funding for these successful technologies is limited or non-existent. 

It is worth noting that representatives of Italy's Carabinieri, cited by several informants as 
consistently  employing  some  of  the  more  developed  and  widely  deployed  of  the 
technologies mentioned above, stated in interview that none of the technologies in question 
have much operational value without a trained human eye to evaluate the results. They 
benefit from significantly more staffing and resources devoted to combatting the illicit trade 
in cultural goods than most other Member States and thus are able to assign well-trained 
staff to technology implementation. No technology currently in use or identified from 
open source research eliminates the need for agents to be specially trained in the 
identification  of  cultural  objects  and  the  contexts  in  which  they  are  traded. 
Further,  the  increase  in  data  that  many  of  these  technologies  produce  may  actually 
increase  the  need  for  trained  staff  to  process  it,  exacerbating  rather  than  reducing  the 
capacity limitations of relevant agencies. 

Funding  for  the  sustained  implementation  of  existing  crawling  and  scraping 
technologies  for  detecting  illicitly  traded  cultural  goods  online  may  be  useful  as 
these  technologies  were  cited  as  among  the  most  promising  by  informants.  This  would 
especially be the case if training on the use of such technologies was delivered in the form 
of cross-border capacity sharing. The best way for  such tools to be implemented in any 
setting that they have not been used in before is from direct collaboration from an existing 
law enforcement agency that uses them elsewhere in Europe. Such capacity sharing for 
implementation  and  agent  training  has  the  added  benefits  of  some  degree  of 
harmonisation  of  tool  use  across  Member  States  and  agencies,  of  serving  as  a 

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communications  vector  for  best  practices,  and  of  fostering  on-going  cross-border 
connections and collaborations between relevant agencies. 

Recommendation: The EU and Member States should promote peer-to-peer learning 
of  how  to  use  crawling  and  scraping  technologies  for  detecting  illicit  trade  in  cultural 
goods.  Dedicated  workshops  should  be  organised,  for  example,  through  the 
(formalised)  CULTNET,  where  countries  leading  the  way  in  the  application  of  these 
technologies are invited to show and train others. Such workshops should be open to 
representatives from all relevant national authorities. 

A  common  sentiment  among  respondents  is  that  changes  in  the  ways  certain  existing 
technologies  were  used  and  maintained  could  improve  agency,  interagency,  and  cross-
jurisdictional responses to the illicit trade in cultural goods. Databases, in particular, are 
an  existing  technology  where  increased  data  sharing  might  lead  to  improved 
capacity for detecting illicit cultural goods on the market or in the process of being 
trafficked. Increases in public, professional, and academic access to these databases may 
facilitate  the  crowdsourcing  of  information  about  illicitly  trafficked  cultural  goods.  An 
increase  in  data  sharing  across  different  national  and  international  databases,  too,  may 
facilitate  cross-border  and  inter-agency  actions.  This  is  not  to  say  that  all  existing 
databases should be made available to the public and the trade, rather, the restrictions 
placed on access to existing databases should be actively evaluated with an eye 
towards facilitating information sharing with relevant bodies and partners.  

Recommendation:  To  improve  the  added  value  of  existing  (national)  databases, 
various types of access authorisations for different groups (other national authorities, 
academia, general public and the trade) should be considered and introduced.  

While it is clear that some agencies are using some open source technologies, citing them 
as  inexpensive  and  useful,  provided  they  have  the  capacity  to  implement  them, 
prohibitions against the implementation of open source technology use were cited by some 
informants due to security concerns. Such bans will effectively prevent the trial and use of 
what could be important technology, often for very little gain. It is an illusion to believe 
that  proprietary  software  packages  are  secure  and  open  source  packages  are  not. 
Especially in cases where the transmission of protected or sensitive data is not the focus 
of the technology in use, open source technology should be considered. Blanket bans on 
open source tools should be questioned at a level beyond the scope of this study.  

Funding  for  public/private  and  public/academic  partnerships  regarding  technology 
development and implementation could be useful, but such partnerships must be designed 
to meet specific operational needs or to close enforcement and detection gaps. We must 
avoid  the  "technology  looking  for  an  application"  problem,  where  developers  of 
technologies attempt to apply them to the illicit trade in cultural goods in ways that do not 

192 

 
 
 
 
 
provide  worthwhile  solutions  to  existing  issues.  Uptake  of  such  technologies  is  likely  to 
represent poor benefits for the cost. 

That  said,  public/private  and  public/academic  partnerships  towards  the 
development  of  new  technologies  specifically  to  fill  enforcement  and  detection 
gaps,  and  to  tap  into  other  sources  of  funding  beyond  what  is  directly  available  to  law 
enforcement, have the potential to mitigate some of the money and capacity issues raised 
by  interviewees.  Support  for  such  partnerships,  particularly  around  meeting  a  clear  and 
articulated need, could be fruitful. 

Recommendation:  The  EU  and  Member  States  should  make  available  funding  for 
public/private  and  public/academic  partnerships  to  develop  new  technologies.  This 
funding  should  be  tied  to  demonstrating  the  technology  meets  a  proven  law 
enforcement  or  provenance  search/due  diligence  need.  This  funding  could  be  made 
available under Horizon Europe. 

As the previous chapter makes clear, these technological tools do not operate in a vacuum, 
and this should be considered at all times. As one of the interviewees mentioned, a change 
of mind-set may be necessary in some EU Member States to increase and optimise of the 
use  of  technological  tools  to  fight  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  and  to  become  more 
cooperative:  

“Even if you have the most sophisticated technologies, you would be ineffective if 
countries  do  not  have  the  will  (mentality)  and  ability  (due  to  different  legislative 
frameworks) to cooperate. That’s the issue that needs to be solved first”. 

The quote underlines the main finding of the research that the systematic approach to 
combating illicit trade when looked at from macro-perspective is lacking: statistics 
and record keeping are very patchy and law enforcement approaches are too dependent 
on local circumstances and personality. 

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6 

195 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.  Conclusions and recommendations 

This chapter provides an overview of the main findings of this study. In addition, it provides 
recommendations  on  the  level  of  EU  criminal  justice  responses  as  well  as  in  relation  to 
technologies  that  could  potentially  be  helpful  in  combatting  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural 
goods. Finally, a concrete list of action points that can be implemented by law enforcement 
authorities (and other relevant stakeholders) is presented.  

6.1  Main findings 

The presentation of the main findings of this study is divided into two sections: first our 
findings on the dimensions of the illicit trade in cultural goods and, second, our findings 
regarding criminal justice responses.  

6.1.1  Characteristics of the illicit trade in cultural goods 

Measuring  or  estimating  the  size  of  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  is  fraught  with 
difficulties,  as  insufficient  data  are  being  collected  and  reported  from  the  ground  up.  In 
addition, the little data that are being recorded are not filed in a systematic manner, and 
data  collection  and  recording  approaches  differ  from  country  to  country  and  across 
stakeholders (i.e. the police might use different ways to record statistics on the illicit trade 
in cultural goods than customs). There are a number of factors at play that cause the lack 
of (quality of) recorded data on the trade, as elaborated upon in Section 3.2. Among these 
are  differences  in  priority  given  to  the  topic  across  countries,  lack  of  knowledge  and 
expertise among law enforcement officers, which in turn negatively affects the detection 
of cases of illicit trade, and the different definitions of cultural goods across jurisdictions. 
The reasons for the limited availability of data as presented in Section 3.2 boil down to a 
lack of awareness of and low political priority placed on the illicit trade in cultural goods.  

The illicit trade in cultural goods seems to have shifted to online markets in recent decades, 
with  profound  implications  for  supply  and  demand  as  well  as  operation  modes.  On  the 
supply  side,  it  has  become  much  easier  and  profitable  to  offer  lower-value  goods. 
Simultaneously, the demand side has grown as online marketplaces offer larger choice and 
ease when shopping for cultural goods. The shift to online markets has allowed sellers to 
shift part of the risk associated with trafficking to the buyers, as objects can be marketed 
without first having to be moved to the buyer’s destination. Online trade has diminished 
the need for building personal connections to  access sellers’ inventories  or connect with 
potential buyers. The increased anonymity has made the online illicit trade in cultural goods 
more  attractive  to  both  sellers  and  buyers.  This  relative  anonymity  has  facilitated  the 
(further)  infiltration  of  the  market  with  fakes,  as  buyers  cannot  easily  verify  the 
authenticity  of  an  object  shown  online.  The  prevalence  of  fakes,  in  turn,  thwarts  the 
development of accurate statistics on the trade.  

On  the  types  of  goods  that  are  being  traded,  this  study  concludes  that  a  substantial 
proportion of the illicit trade in cultural goods concerns  smaller items that can be  easily 

196 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
smuggled (e.g. coins) rather than the more high-profile (and often more expensive) pieces 
like large statues. The shift to online trade seems to have led to an increase in the amount 
of small items traded.  

Identifying  and  visualising  the  routes  that  are  used  to  traffic  goods  is  a  complicated 
challenge. An up-to-date map of such routes cannot be created as trafficking routes are 
dynamic,  responding  both  to  legal,  policy  and  police  enforcement  actions.  At  the  same 
time,  due  to  their  location,  certain  logistical  hubs  acting  as  gateways  to  the  European 
market are likely to be used for trafficking more or less consistently. Also, trafficking routes 
used for trafficking in cultural goods may partially overlap with those used for trafficking 
of other illegal goods (such as drugs, firearms). One caveat is that as traffickers of cultural 
goods have an interest in hiding the origin of their goods and in creating false provenances, 
often these cultural goods are sent on circuitous routes with many destinations in between 
the country of origin (i.e. where it was looted) and destination (i.e. final buyer). 

6.1.2  Criminal justice responses to combat the illicit trade in cultural goods 

The research has analysed what practices, tools and/or methods are deemed effective and 
which are less successful in contributing to combatting the illicit trade in cultural goods.  

What works well 

  Setting up a specialised unit within law enforcement focused on the illicit trade 
in cultural goods was identified as an example of good practice. Such units allow 
for  accumulation  of  knowledge,  facilitates  the  development  of  expertise  and 
intelligence and help to establish a network of (international) colleagues, experts 
and  informants.  Specialised  units  serve  as  the  main  point  of  contact  for 
law  enforcement  agencies.  As 
(international)  colleagues 
(international) cooperation often occurs under time pressure, it is beneficial to have 
a direct contact point to turn to in order to speed up the communication processes. 
It is of an added value if the officers in such units have an additional qualification 
in archaeology/ art history, although training on the job may be sufficient as well 
(this would depend on cooperation with other stakeholders, see below). The support 
of  law  enforcement  by  trained  heritage  professionals  (archaeologists,  museum 
workers,  academic  researchers),  especially  for  the  web  monitoring  but  also 
identification of fakes and provenance research, is crucial for effective detection and 
investigation of illicitly-traded cultural goods; 

from  various 

  Regular  contacts  (including 

face-to-face  meetings)  between 

law 
enforcement  agencies  (e.g.  police,  customs,  prosecutors)  on  the  topic  of  illicit 
trade are crucial for exchange information and finding solutions to common legal, 
operative  and  practical  challenges.  In  countries  where  regular  meetings  are 
organised/  institutionalised,  law  enforcement  officers  are  more  aware  and 
knowledgeable about the work of their colleagues and are satisfied with the inter-
agency cooperation. Not only do such meetings have a positive impact on national 
cooperation  between  the  various  bodies  of  law  enforcement,  they  also  serve  to 
enhance  the  collective  expertise  of  the  officers  on  the  topic.  Law  enforcement 

197 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
representatives  participating  in  such  meetings  indicated  they  improve  their 
expertise through these sessions; they may become a de facto specialised unit even 
if they are not officially designated to function as such; 

  Regular cooperation between law enforcement, academics, researchers and 
museums serves to complement and match legal and operative knowledge with 
specialist  knowledge  related  to  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods.  In  particular,  the 
operative  and  investigative  skills  and  information  of  police  is  supplemented  and 
enriched  by  specialist  knowledge  on  how  to  determine  the  origin,  nature  and 
authenticity  of  questionable  cultural  goods.  At  the  same  time,  academics, 
researchers  and  museum  workers  are  alerted  to  relevant  criminal  developments. 
This type of interaction can take form of regular meetings and discussions, training 
and seminars, potentially leading to operational cooperation; 

  Appointment of one institution that is actively driving and facilitating efforts 
of  all  stakeholders  towards  combatting  the  trafficking  in  cultural  goods  is  an 
effective method (e.g. Carabinieri in Italy, Cypriot Department of Antiquities). Such 
institution  should  have  an  overall  mandate  to  protect  cultural  heritage  and  be 
committed  to  organise,  focus,  coordinate  and  support  all  efforts  by  other  actors. 
Such an institution does not need to be part of law enforcement, but needs to have 
understanding of what law enforcement does. In addition, such an institution also 
needs  to  have  a  vision/strategy  for  protection  of  cultural  heritage.  Ideally,  these 
institutions  organise  campaigns,  round  tables,  regular  meetings  etc.  to  raise 
awareness and share knowledge on the topic of illicit trade in cultural goods; 

  International cooperation fora (such as INTERPOL and Europol) are perceived 
of as  effective in reaching their desired goal. All stakeholders are aware  of these 
fora’s existence and activities, and most participate in them personally. These fora 
generally  facilitate  the  exchange  of  information,  support  and/or  coordinate  joint 
operations  and  are  involved  in  the  development  of  new  tools  and  methods  for 
combatting  the  illicit  trade.  Law  enforcement  officers  are  aware  of  and  use  the 
cooperation  and  communication  tools  developed  by  international institutions  (i.e. 
EMPACT). Joint operations conducted with the help of these tools were considered 
effective and successful.  

  On an international level, informal or personal contacts across the border 
are of great value. Being able to contact a counterpart informally and/or directly 
helps to speed up official procedures, especially where official avenues are too slow 
and less effective than informal relationships. Information can be exchanged faster 
and more efficiently via such contacts. Moreover, since not every stakeholder can 
make use of official cooperation channels, informal contacts might sometimes offer 
the only possibility for cross-border information sharing; 

  Finally, leadership, commitment and determination are essential when working 
in this domain. This study found that many experts agree that there  are  enough 
laws  already  in  place  pertaining  to  this  issue,  but  their  proper  and  effective 
implementation and application is lacking. Some of the examples of devoted officers 
and  units  can  serve  as  an  inspiration  to  others:  the  Dutch  police  unit  that  will 

198 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
provide  the  permanent  secretariat  to  CULTNET,  the  Spanish  police  unit  that  has 
initiated  several  European  Joint  Operations  and  the  Italian  Carabinieri  that  are 
leading the development and application of technological tools; 

Identified (practical) difficulties 

  One  of  the  most  prominent  challenges  to  combatting  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural 
goods is the collection and, subsequently, sharing of relevant data. Section 
3.2  elaborates  on  the  reasons  why  the  recording  of  statistics  and  data  on  this 
subject is difficult, most importantly due to under-prioritising of the issue, lack of 
mandate  for  the  recording  of  statistics  and  the  limited  awareness  of  the  issues 
involved. Furthermore, the data are not shared because there are sometimes simply 
no data to share. Data sharing also remains a challenge because law enforcement 
agencies tend to work in silos and are reluctant to exchange data and information. 
Last but not least, understanding and agreement are lacking about what data can 
be shared and what can be done with information that is shared. For example, a 
number of police officers indicated that the relevant data about this issue cannot be 
shared  because  it  contains  sensitive  operative  information.  However,  such  data 
could  be  redacted,  and  non-sensitive  data  could  be  shared.  Such  data  could  be 
potentially valuable for the analysis of trends and threats and for crime prevention. 
Another example is that customs officers are interested in data that can help them 
identify  risks  or  improve  their  risks  assessment.  In  order  for  the  police  to  share 
such data, they would need to know exactly what information is required because 
simply opening access to police databases for customs would be ineffective. Thus, 
not only recording but also sharing of data is an area that should be considered for 
further understanding, refinement and improvement; 

  Another weak aspect of the current approach towards combatting the illicit trade in 
cultural goods is the opacity and lack of regulation of the art and antiquities 
market. The functioning of the art and antiquities market is based on trust, and 
confidentiality, or even secretiveness, with regard to transaction details (e.g. prices, 
identities of buyers and sellers) is standard. This results in insufficient or even a 
lack  of  due  diligence  in  relation  to  cultural  goods  and  a  lack  of  registration  of 
transactions, and creates favourable conditions for unscrupulous dealers; 

  Differences in relevant national laws impact the effectiveness of cross-border 
criminal  justice  responses.  National differences  exist  due  to  a  number  of  factors, 
not all of which can be easily overcome easily. They include different legal traditions 
and  approaches  across  (European)  countries,  inconsistent  implementation  of  EU-
level directives, different transposition or the lack of ratification or transposition of 
the major international and European legal instruments: the UNESCO, UNIDROIT, 
and Nicosia Conventions. This hampers mutual legal assistance, complicates cross-
border cooperation and allows criminals use the differences to their advantage; 

  The  past  decades  have  seen  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  increasingly 
move online, for all items but the most exclusive. The internet has lowered barriers 
to entry for would-be sellers. It also made (illicit) cultural goods accessible for an 

199 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
exponentially  larger  group,  resulting  in  a  larger  demand  for  especially  small 
inexpensive objects which can be easily shipped. To a large extent, the internet has 
made the need for personal connections to access all but the most high-value illicit 
cultural goods obsolete. This shift to online sales has increased difficulties for law 
enforcement, as it is easy to set up anonymous or pseudonymous accounts to buy 
and  sell  items  and  sites  where  items  are  on  offer  have  proliferated.  Law 
enforcement is at a disadvantage as regulation is still catching up to the reality of 
online sales, and there  is insufficient capacity to monitor  online sales  (as well as 
follow  up  through  investigations).  Incidentally,  the  shift  to  online  sales  and 
associated scope for (pseudo-)anonymity has also made it easier to insert fakes in 
the market, as an authenticity analysis cannot be performed on pictures alone, and 
are anyway often relatively too expensive for low value purchases; 

  While there are a number of technological tools that can support the work of law 
enforcement,  technology  alone  cannot  solve  the  problem  of  illicit  trade  in 
cultural goods. Our analysis shows that many technologies that currently exist can 
help with the investigation of crimes related to cultural goods that are known to be 
stolen (e.g. cultural goods that are inventoried/ registered). However, most illicitly 
traded  cultural  goods  are  unknown  and  undocumented  items,  which  significantly 
limits  usefulness  of  existing  technological  solutions.  While  some  existing 
technologies can help better detect suspicious cultural goods, solid expertise and 
investigative  skills  are  likely  to  remain  the  cornerstone  of  the  effective  criminal 
justice responses. Considering the complexity of the phenomenon of the illicit trade 
in cultural goods and the reported lack of resources of the competent authorities, 
more investment in law enforcement capacity is necessary. 

6.2  Recommendations 

Based  on  the  analysis  of  best  practices  and  shortcomings  of  current  criminal  justice 
responses  to  this  issue,  we  have  developed  a  number  of  recommendations  that  could 
enhance the effectiveness of the efforts made to combat the illicit trade in cultural goods.  

200 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 1. 

Raise the profile of the problem and dedicate appropriate resources 

Raising  the  profile  of  the  problem  politically  is  central  to  enhancing  efforts  towards 
combatting the illicit trade in cultural goods and goes hand in hand with raising awareness 
among  a  broad  range  of  stakeholders  (Recommendation  2).  These  efforts  need  to  be 
directed  at  the  national  level  because  Member  States  are  primarily  responsible  for 
competences, structure and resourcing of the criminal law enforcement. 

What the EU can do 

  Showcasing  best  practices  related  to  combatting  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods, 
which would act as peer pressure on countries. Such best practices could relate 
to engaging in awareness campaigns; delivering comprehensive, inclusive and 
innovative training and workshops; developing interesting cooperation set-ups 
and other. 
‘Naming and shaming’ countries that do not collect or report data on the illicit 
trade in cultural goods, that are slow to implement relevant EU directives or who 
have  not  ratified  or  ratified  but  not  (effectively)  transposed  the  UNESCO, 
UNIDROIT and Nicosia Conventions, as a form of peer pressure. 

 

  Support the creation of a specialised unit at EU level (for example at Europol, or 
an EU agency) to combat the illicit trade in cultural goods. This would elevate 
the issue symbolically and also be of an operational value for Member States. 
Such  units  should  work  closely  with  CULTNET  as  this  informal  network  has 
already established an international community regarding this issue, as well as 
with customs, public prosecutors and renowned experts in the field.  

  Support the development of the dedicated unit within Europol in order for it to 

become a permanent entity.  

  Emphasise the link between trafficking of cultural goods, organised crime and, 
when  the  opportunity  presents  itself,  terrorism.  The  EU  should  encourage  the 
implementation of the relevant UNSC resolution across Member States. 

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What Member States can do 

  Member States should establish a dedicated contact point for cultural heritage 
crime in their law enforcement bodies (police, customs, prosecutors office). This 
can  be  an  entire  team  or  a  single  individual  (who  also  has  responsibilities  in 
other areas).  

  Member  States  should  establish  an  inter-agency  cooperation  mechanism 

facilitating the contacts between the relevant authorities 

  Member  States  should  establish  a  national  database  of  stolen  and  missing 
cultural goods, and such database should be linked to the INTERPOL database 
by a regular reporting. All national authorities that come across (illicit trade in) 
cultural goods should contribute to and consult this database.  

  In addition, Member States should develop a national ‘red lists’ of their cultural 
heritage objects most at risk of illicit trafficking. The relevant national authorities 
should be trained in using these red lists.  

  Make reporting of cases concerning the illicit trade in cultural goods mandatory 
for all involved law enforcement bodies using a standardised collection template, 
and  make  a  separate  code  for  it  in  the  relevant  crime  reporting  systems,  so 
statistics can be easily extracted. 

  Be  more  vocal  about  the  actions  of  law  enforcement  efforts  and  their  results 

(without being of harm to the operative work). 

  Train staff at national logistical hubs to recognise illicit trade in cultural goods 

more effectively 

202 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 2.  

Raise awareness to trigger a virtuous circle 

Awareness raising efforts should cover various groups of stakeholders, from the general 
public to art collectors to dealers to law enforcement. Journalists, social media influencers 
in the heritage field, and bloggers should be targeted as well as they play an important 
role in conveying information and framing public debates. Cultural heritage professionals, 
art historians and archaeologists should all be alerted against the implications of illicit trade 
in cultural goods. Professionals that can facilitate the illicit trade should also be reached 
out, including postal services providers, removal companies, diplomatic and military staff, 
online marketing places, insurance companies etc. Information conveyed should be tailored 
and relevant for  each target audience.  It is essential to  open a dialogue with the target 
audience about what its interest in combatting illicit trade in cultural goods is and how they 
can contribute. It is crucial that the information communicated is correct, and one should 
steer away from exaggerations and scandalous or premature conclusions. Even though, as 
indicated by interviewees, connecting illicit trade in cultural goods with terrorist financing 
has made the issue more prominent, it has taken public and policy focus away from other 
important and persistent aspects of the phenomenon, has alienated industry stakeholders, 
and has contributed to the misdirection of resources.  

What the EU can do 

  Organise  regular  EU-wide  awareness  campaigns  targeting  various  stakeholder 
groups.  This  includes  producing  visual  information  and  communication 
materials,  and  developing  common  messages  that  can  be  used  across  the  EU 
and at EU representations abroad (including embassies of the Member States). 
  Coordinate and amplify national awareness raising campaigns, by re-translating 

national messages through EU-wide channels (e.g. Twitter accounts). 

What Member States can do 

  Task a dedicated agency (e.g. Ministry of Culture) with creating and conducting 
awareness  raising  campaigns  for  various  national  stakeholders  as  appropriate 
for the national context  

  Cooperate  with  other  countries  (regionally  or  bilaterally)  to  organise  joint 
awareness raising campaigns for specific types of stakeholders (e.g. tourists) 
  Invest  in  relationship  with  postal  services  and  online  platforms  by  providing 

training about illicit trade in cultural goods  

203 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 3. 

Improve the evidence base towards understanding the phenomenon of illicit 
trade in cultural goods 

As this study has shown, many fundamental issues related to dimensions of illicit trade in 
cultural  goods  remain  unclear,  and  are  contested  by  different  experts  and  by  different 
stakeholders. These need to be further investigated to produce more solid evidence and 
further studied to generate better analyses and knowledge. Such investments need to be 
mindful of and address the obstacles described in this report. The evidence gained through 
such  research  will  help to  establish  a  common  ground,  to  enhance  public  discussion,  to 
develop  (international)  criminal  justice  responses  and  to  engage  with  different 
stakeholders.  

What the EU can do 

  Announce  relevant  calls  for  research  grants  under  the  Horizon  Europe, 
particularly for research projects into topics related to provenance research and 
due diligence; the scope and scale of the market for small and portable cultural 
goods (e.g. coins) including evaluation of harms; the relationship that the illicit 
trade  in  cultural  goods  had  with  the  trade  in  other  illicit  commodities;  and 
extensively describing, defining, and quantifying the illicit trade within individual 
member states. 

  Procure  focused  studies  to  measure  the  size  of  the  licit  and  illicit  market  in 
cultural  goods,  to  investigate  trafficking  routes,  to  analyse  further  ways  for 
harmonising  national  laws  and  on  other  topics.  Such  studies  should  be  well 
resourced and allow for sufficient time for data collection and research. 

  Make the compiling of statistical data on the offences related to illicit trade in 
cultural goods mandatory in all EU Member States and encourage this in on-EU 
countries.  

  Agree on common criteria for gathering statistical information on illicit trade in 

cultural goods at EU level.  

  Encourage  collaboration  with  (academic)  experts  outside  law  enforcement, 
especially  archaeologists.  Funds  should  be  made  available  to  facilitate  this 
cooperation.  

What Member States can do 

  Encourage  national  research  by  offering  research  grants  covering  various 

aspects of trade in cultural goods, including criminal and financial aspects 

  Establish a dedicated chair or research centre  
  Involve all relevant national authorities in the process of data collection on illicit 

trade in cultural goods.  

  Discourage  the  rotation  of  experts  in  law  enforcement  authorities  in  order  to 

reduce the loss of knowledge in this highly specialised field.  

204 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 4. 

Enhance transparency of the art and antiquities trade 

Increased scrutiny of the art and antiquities market, including by imposing transparency 
obligations via legislative measures, can greatly contribute to decreasing illicit trafficking 
of  cultural  objects  into  the  EU.  Ideally,  every  cultural  object  on  the  market  should  be 
traceable thanks to registration obligations. This would also be beneficial for art collectors 
who would enjoy the security that robust and transparent provenance checks provide. The 
EU is encouraged to explore novel approaches to the licensing of the art market, however, 
it should be aware of previous (failed) attempts and take into account the lessons learned 
in this regard.  

Furthermore, it is also important to establish a dialogue with the art trade sector to better 
understand  its  functioning  and  structure,  which  is  fundamental  to  combatting  the  illicit 
trade. The art industry should not be perceived as homogeneous; different sectors exist 
within it that are affected by illicit trade to different degrees (or have different problems). 
The trade also is comprised of different types  of  actors (especially in the context of the 
online trade) who have different willingness, motivation, and ability to cooperate. The large 
number  of  small  marketplaces,  fora  and  websites  make  it  hard  to  establish  a  positive 
relationship  with  the  trade.  Moreover,  the  poor  relationship  between  law  enforcement 
agencies and industry hinders effective implementation of efforts to address the illicit trade 
in cultural goods. 

What the EU can do 

  Investigate what legislative measures can be adopted at the EU level to improve 

transparency of the art industry. 

  Support the development of an EU wide, comprehensive, compulsory digitised 

art register to register all transactions of art and antiquities.  

  Develop a legal definition of acceptable provenance. 
  Consider novel approaches to licencing the art market, taking into account the 
reasons why previous attempts failed and paying sufficient attention to ensuring 
oversight and control.  

What Member States can do 

  Adopt national legislation to improve traceability of cultural goods, for instance 

by establishing national registries for transactions in cultural goods 

  Implement the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive in such way that it applies 

to art dealers and free ports 

  Adopt  national  legislation  obliging  art  dealers  to  follow  clearly  defined  due 

diligence guidelines 

205 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 5. 

Investigate how regulation and monitoring of online sales can be improved 

As an increasingly large portion of illicit trade in cultural goods has moved online, the need 
for  regulating  and  monitoring  online  sales  has  increased  accordingly.  In  line  with  the 
previous  recommendation,  the  goal  should  be  to  increase  transparency  and  reduce  the 
scope  for  illicit  sales  of  cultural  goods.  Sellers  of  cultural  goods  should  be  required  to 
maintain registries with details of transactions. Online marketplaces could be subjected to 
special  (self-)regulation  involving  e.g.  automatically  checking  images  against  available 
databases  of  stolen  cultural  goods  and  ‘red  lists’  of  endangered  cultural  property; 
automatic  alerts  to  bidders  and  potential  buyers  of  the  risk  of  buying  illicit  items; 
automatically flagging suspicious items and transactions to dedicated police contact points.  

As many of the sold items – especially coins and other small items – are moved through 
regular  postal  services,  authorities  should  invest  in  their  relationship  with  these 
organisations. Tailored training and awareness raising measures should be considered so 
that illicit cultural goods can be detected and intercepted.  

What the EU can do 

  Investigate what legislative measures can be adopted at the EU level to improve 

monitoring of online sales. 

  Support the development of an EU wide, comprehensive, compulsory digitised 

art register to register all transactions of art and antiquities.  

  Support  the  development  of  European  guidelines  for  relevant  actors  such  as 
postal services and online marketplaces to combat illicit trade in cultural goods 

What Member States can do 

  Adopt  national  legislation  to  improve  traceability  of  online  sales  of  cultural 

goods, by imposing obligations on sellers to register transactions 

  Promote  self-regulation  by  online  marketplaces  in  the  field  of  cultural  goods 
sales and, if this does not materialise within a set timeframe (e.g. 1 or 2 years) 
or  is  ineffective,  adopt  national  legislation  that  imposes  obligations  for  online 
marketplaces tailored to combatting illicit trade in cultural goods 

  Make available sufficient funds and manpower for law enforcement authorities 
to monitor online markets effectively, including through the use of technological 
tools such as webcrawlers 

  Invest  in  awareness  raising  and  training  activities  with  postal  services,  to 
increase detection and interception of illicit cultural goods being transported 

206 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 6. 

Encourage cooperation and data sharing between different law enforcement 
agencies at the national level 

As data exchange is essential for crime prevention and investigation, information sharing 
should be fostered and enabled through different channels, among different stakeholders 
and at different levels. Cooperation and data sharing across law enforcement agencies at 
the national level should be a national priority.  

Inherent  to  the  success  of  data  sharing  across  countries  is  the  interoperability  of  the 
different  national  databases.  Currently,  information  cannot  always  be  exchanged  as  a 
result of the different and incompatible ways that information is recorded. To this end, it 
is  recommended  various  existing  national  databases  (i.e.  national  databases  with  the 
INTERPOL database) be interlinked in order to develop a much larger dataset that can be 
searched.  

In  addition,  the  structure  of  (some)  databases  should  be  revised.  Where  appropriate, 
databases that are currently closed could be partially opened to the general public and to 
industry. Similarly, agency databases could be made more open for use by other agencies 
(e.g.  between  police  and  customs,  between  neighbouring  countries’  law  enforcement 
agencies).  Different  modes  of  access  to  and  control  over  data  can  be  established  for 
different categories of users in order to only provide access to appropriate information so 
that available data can be used more widely while, at the same time, sensitive information 
can be safeguarded. 

What the EU can do 

  Develop a template for data recording that can be used by the police and customs 

to gather statistics on illicit trade in cultural goods in a consistent manner 

  Investigate ways to promote the central collection of all relevant statistics. Europol 
could play a supporting role to this collection process on the side of national law 
enforcement authorities. 

207 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What Member States can do 

  Set  up  regular  meetings  between  relevant  stakeholders  (e.g.  police,  customs, 
public  prosecutors,  researchers),  as  required  by  the  training,  information  and 
operative needs 

  Link national databases of stolen and lost cultural goods to international databases 
  Establish data sharing pathways between the police and customs databases 
  Make (parts of) national databases accessible to the public and industry 
  Make law enforcement and customs authorities responsible for the maintenance 

of the databases and allocate sufficient funds for these activities.  
  Make the usage of SIENA obligatory for law enforcement officers when 

exchanging information about cases on a bilateral basis. In addition, the relevant 
Europol unit should be copied in.  

208 

 
 
 
 
Recommendation 7. 

Align and link national inventories of cultural heritage, museum databases and 
law enforcement databases 

Building on Recommendation 7, the further interlinking of national inventories of cultural 
heritage, museum databases and law enforcement databases should be aspired to. With 
increased  integration,  databases  could  become  more  easily  accessible  and  widely  used. 
Restrictions on data sharing can be applied in order to safeguard certain types of sensitive 
information.  Nevertheless,  police  databases  should  be  able  to  access  and  integrate  all 
necessary  information  from  national  inventories  of  cultural  goods.  Ideally,  the  police 
database would automatically check the inventories of theirs and other countries when an 
object  has  been  seized  or  found  as  well.  Artificial  intelligence  could  be  of  help  here  as 
algorithms could cross-check different databases for images/  descriptions. Alternatively, 
one portal could be established which grants access to all relevant databases; ideally such 
a portal would be hosted with Interpol or another central agency tasked with coordinating 
research into the illicit trade in cultural goods to ensure a worldwide coverage. 

What the EU can do 

  Support  integration  and  interoperability  of  various  national  inventories  and 
databases by procuring the development of standards and rules, if necessary, 
for cross-border data sharing 

  Liaise  with  the  Member  States  and  INTERPOL  on  the  creation  of  a  database 

portal 

What Member States can do 

  Interlink various national inventories and databases with each other 
  Ensure the national inventories and databases can also exchange data with the 

INTERPOL database 

  Investigate  if/how  artificial  intelligence  could  be  applied  to  improve  cross-

database searching 

209 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 8. 

Invest in technical expertise and technical endowment of law enforcement  

With regards to the application of (novel) technologies, it is essential to strive to achieve 
an  equal  level  of  technical  endowment  across  Europe.  Currently,  some  national  police 
forces  are  still  using  relatively  old  software  and  cannot  investigate  and  cooperate  with 
others on equal footing which, in turn, hinders effective investigation.  

When elevating the level of technological advancement in a Member States, investments 
in the technical expertise of police officers in specialised units is required. The tools used 
in investigations can be complex and, therefore, staff needs to be trained adequately. In 
addition,  the  application  of  web  crawlers  and  image  recognition  software  should  be 
anticipated and staff should be trained in dealing with analysis of the resulting data.  

Moving  forward,  investments  in  the  use  of  artificial  intelligence,  particularly  in  machine 
learning, is recommended. Such investments could be done in a public-private partnership 
and/or  the  resources  of  all  or  several  Member  States  can  be  pooled  and  a  joint  tender 
announced.  Alternatively  or  additionally,  a  tender  can  be  announced  by  the  European 
Commission or it could be a project financed via Horizon Europe. 

What the EU can do 

  Monitor the development of the technological capacity across the EU  
  Support  and  encourage  the  adoption  of  innovative  technologies  by  national 
specialised  units  by  offering  the  necessary  training  (for  example,  through 
CULTNET or in cooperation with INTERPOL) 

  Investigate whether a tender or a call under Horizon Europe can be issued to 

boost the application of artificial intelligence to this issue  

  Support the training of staff for web crawling and scraping tools (through the 

Internal Security Fund and its successor) 

  Encourage  the  instalment  of  a  dedicated  official  at  Europol  dealing  with  web 

crawling and scraping. 

  Support the development of bespoke smartphone applications for searching and 
submitting database entries and, subsequently, to support the usage of those 
tools among frontline officers.  

  Promote  peer-to-peer  learning  of  on  data  scraping  and  web  crawling  for 
detecting  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods.  Workshops  could,  for  instance,  be 
organised through CULTNET. 

210 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What Member States can do 

  Invest in technological equipment of specialised units 
  Provide adequate training for staff in the application of novel technologies 
  Cooperate in the joint development of advanced technological capabilities across 

the EU 

  Encourage  partnerships  between  law  enforcements,  academics  and  NGOs  in 
working  with  open  source  data  and  free  software  (where  possible).  Sufficient 
funding should be awarded to facilitate such cooperation. 

211 

 
 
 
 
Recommendation 9. 

Acknowledge the strengths of different approaches and allow for flexibility 
across different EU Member States 

There is no “one size fits all” solution the problem of trafficking in cultural goods in each 
country. It would be valuable to acknowledge the strengths of different approaches that 
suits best to national circumstances. For example, not every country needs or can afford 
the type of specialised police unit that Italy has. Some countries may be well served by a 
small unit or a unit that combines expertise in several related crime areas. At the same 
time,  countries  with  more  expertise  and  knowledge  should  be  encouraged  to  lead  by 
example and to experiment with different technical, operative and cooperation solutions in 
order  to  inspire  others  to  innovate  as  well.  The  countries  with  more  available  resources 
and expertise are also better positioned to become pioneers for further developments in 
criminal  justice  cooperation.  They  would  need  less  resources/  investment  to  make  the 
qualitative jump.  

What the EU can do 

  Allow for flexibility across Member States 
  Support pioneering and outstanding practices, for example, by publicising them 

and/or establishing an achievement award 

  Support cooperation between Member States both to share experiences and to 

develop and try different technical, operative and cooperation solutions 

What Member States can do 

  Member  States  with  a  well-developed  approaches  towards  art  crime  can 
promote  their  strategies  and  inspire  and  support  other  Member  States  in  the 
development of their national approach 

  Member  States  that  are  in  the  process  of  developing  their  approach  towards 
cultural  heritage  crimes  need  to  be  receptive  to  best  practices  developed  by 
other Member States. 

212 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 10. 

Continue addressing the root causes of the problem 

In the case of the illicit trade in cultural goods, efforts have already been made to mitigate 
some  of  the  causes  of  illegal  excavations  (i.e.  through  capacity  building,  technical 
assistance,  etc.)  in  countries  during  times  of  armed  conflict.  To  further  intensify  these 
efforts, a key recommendation would be to establish a special unit and/or special measures 
to be implemented in conflict zones for protection of cultural heritage there. An example 
of such measure could be the Cultural Property Protection Unit established by the UK which 
will be deployed to war zones where art and archaeological sites are at risk.  

Furthermore, the root causes of the illicit trade need to be addressed within the EU as well. 
They include discrepancies and loopholes in legislation, lack of consistent implementation 
of the international legal instruments, lack of monitoring of excavation sites and related 
issues.  

What the EU can do 

  When joint military and civilian EU missions and operations to crisis zones are 
planned, recommend that the participating Member State establishes a special 
unit  for  the  protection  of  cultural  heritage  and  coordinate  their  efforts  to  this 
end 

  Study the discrepancies in national laws that encourage illicit trade in cultural 

goods and suggest legislative and other measures to eliminate them 

  Monitor  the  ratification  and  transposition  of  the  relevant  international 
conventions in national laws and ‘name and shame’ those Member States that 
do not effectively implement the conventions 

  Introduce a common definition of (illicit trade) in cultural goods (which would 

ideally be adopted globally).  

What Member States can do 

  Provide special training to diplomatic, military and police staff deployed to third 

countries 

  Study  the  root  causes  of  illicit  trafficking  specific  to  the  Member  State  and 
introduce measures to eliminate them (e.g. introduction of regular monitoring 
and controls of free ports) 

  Ratify and transpose in the national law the UNESCO Convention, the UNIDROIT 

Convention and the Nicosia convention to reduce legal loopholes 

  Apply  foreign  aid  to  the  development  of  sustainable  heritage  preservation 
practices and the creation of local income streams beyond looting and trafficking 
in regions known to be sources for the illicit trade in cultural goods 

213 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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229 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 2 Interviews 

The table below provides an overview of the interviewees with whom the research team 
has spoken.  

Table A2.1   Overview interviewees 

Name 

Organisation 

Stakeholder category 

First round of interviews (scoping interviews) 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

Cultural  Heritage 
Education, Culture and Science, the Netherlands 
nn 

Inspectorate,  Ministry  of 

Government 

Customs organisation 

nn 

nn 

Law enforcement 

Law enforcement 

Marja van Heese 

Anonymous 

Anonymous 

Anonymous 

Colonel 
Deregibus 

Alberto 

Carabinieri, Ministry of Defence, Italy 

Law enforcement 

Martin Finkelnberg 

Alberto Rodao 

Anonymous 

Anonymous 

Arthur Brand 

National Police, the Netherlands  
Coordinator CULTNET 
Guardia Civil, Spain 

Europol 

Nn 

Artiaz 

James Ratcliffe  

Art Loss Register 

Jean-Robert Gisler 

Vincent Geerling 

University  of  Freiburg, 
Cultural Heritage Unit, Federal Police Switzerland 
Head of IADAA 

formerly 

investigator 

Law enforcement 

Law enforcement 

Law enforcement 

Museums 

Art consultant 

Industry 

Researcher 

Art dealer 

Second round of interviews  

14  Barbora Kubikova 

Czech Law Enforcement 

Law Enforcement 

15  Christian Klein 

German (Munich) Law Enforcement 

Law Enforcement 

16  Anonymous 

Romanian Law Enforcement 

Law Enforcement 

17  Kenneth Didriksen 

Norwegian Law Enforcement 

Law Enforcement 

18  Anonymous 

Swedish Law Enforcement 

Law Enforcement 

19  Anonymous 

Slovenian Law Enforcement 

Law Enforcement 

20  Anonymous 

21  Anonymous 

22  Anonymous 

Nn. 

Nn.  

Nn 

23 

Joanna 
Lande 

van 

der 

Antiquities Dealers’ Association 

Law Enforcement 

Customs 

Nn 

Industry 

24  Bernd Schober 

German (Baden Württemberg) Law Enforcement 

Law Enforcement 

231 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name 

Organisation 

Stakeholder category 

25  Dietmar Möllman 

German Customs 

26  Anonymous 

27  Anonymous 

Nn. 

Nn. 

Customs 

Nn. 

Customs 

28  Anonymous 

Office of EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator 

Nn 

29  Anonymous 

Nn. 

30  Vojko Otovic 

Slovenian Customs 

Researcher 

Customs 

31  Anonymous 

Austrian Law Enforcement 

Law Enforcement 

32  Gordana Križanić 

33  Anonymous 

Representative  of  the  Croatian  Public  Prosecutor’s 
Office 
Nn. 

34  Anonymous 

Nn.  

Public Prosecution 

Nn.  

Nn.  

35  Anonymous 

Eurojust 

Public Prosecution 

36  Efthymia Alphas 

Department  of  Transport,  Communication  and 
Works, Cyprus 

Government 

232 

 
 
 
Annex 3 Overview of the survey results 

A3.1  Participants 

Out  of  144  respondents  that  were  asked  whether  they  had  knowledge  of  illicit  trade  in 
cultural goods in their country, 63 (44%) indicated ‘yes’ (see table).  

Table A3.1  

Overview survey respondents 

Stakeholder group 

Participation 

No indicating ‘no 

Percentage 

knowledge of illicit 

trade’ 

Government  

Law Enforcement 

IGOs 

Legal Practitioners 

Museums 

Researchers 

NGOs 

Collectors 

Art Consultants 

Dealers 

5 

10 

7 

2 

19 

29 

6 

33 

6 

27 

1 

0 

2 

0 

9 

9 

0 

27 

4 

20 

20% 

0% 

28.6% 

0% 

47.4% 

31% 

0% 

81.8% 

66.7% 

74.1% 

This  subgroup  was  asked  which  factors  facilitate  illicit  trade  in  their  country.  Below,  we 
present an overview of the responses per factor considered. 

When distributing the survey among the CULTNET members at their annual meeting, 13 
participants responded to the survey. Among those, there was 1 customs representative 
and 12 law enforcement representatives. All indicated that they have knowledge of illicit 
trade in cultural goods.  

A3.2  Structure 

The rest of this Annex shows the responses of the stakeholder groups ‘Law Enforcement’, 
‘Researchers’ and ‘Dealers’, as these are instructive of wider differences between groups 
and because these have a (relatively) representative N (number of responses). In addition, 
the responses provided during the validation phase (the survey distributed at the CULTNET 
meeting)  are  presented  in  separate  tables  and  figures  to  allow  for  easy  comparisons 
between the different groups.  

This breakdown is followed by an overview of the insights provided by respondents based 
on  the  role  their  respective  country  plays  in  the  illicit  trade  chain.  The  countries  are 
categorises as being source, transit or destination countries with some countries belonging 
to more than one category. The categorisation of these respondents is as follows: 

233 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3.2  

Distinction on place in chain (overlap possible) 

Source 

Australia 

Bosnia and Herzegovina 

Bulgaria 

Cyprus 

Georgia 

Iran 

Italy 

Macedonia 

Malta 

New Zealand 

Pakistan 

Poland 

Romania 

Serbia 

Spain 

Turkey 

Market 

Australia 

Austria 

Belgium 

Canada 

Denmark 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Iceland 

Ireland 

Luxembourg 

Netherlands 

New Zealand 

Norway 

Russia 

Sweden 

Switzerland 

United Kingdom 

United States 

Transit 

Albania 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bosnia and Herzegovina 

Bulgaria 

Czech Republic 

Estonia 

Georgia 

Germany 

Iran 

Italy 

Latvia 

Macedonia 

Netherlands 

Pakistan 

Poland 

Romania 

Serbia 

Slovenia 

Spain 

Switzerland 

Turkey 

United Kingdom 

United States 

A3.3  Responses by stakeholder category 

This section provides an overview of the survey responses by stakeholder category as well 
as those provided during the validation exercise at the CULTNET meeting. 

A3.3.1  Criminal organisation and operation of the trade 

Law Enforcement 

In  the  figure  below,  the  different  factors  are  shown  which  may  contribute  to  facilitating 
illicit  trade.  For  each  specific  factor  the  figure  indicates  how  many  respondents  have 
indicated it ‘very much’ or ‘extremely’ facilitates illicit trade.  

234 

 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Factors facilitating illicit trade according to LEAs, N = 7 

Lack of resources for customs and LEAs

Under-prioritisation

Technological developments

Few resources for due diligence for traders and collectors

Ineffective border and customs controls

Lack of cooperation between parties

Existence control free zones

Lack of scientific knowledge, LEAs

Ease of financial transactions

Development of demand for goods

Discrepancies in export rule application

14,3%

Corruption in government

0,0%

57,1%

57,1%

57,1%

33,3%

28,6%

85,7%

85,7%

85,7%

71,4%

71,4%

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

* Please note: N = 6 for ease of financial transactions 

Researchers 

In  the  figure  below,  the  different  factors  are  shown  which  may  contribute  to  facilitating 
illicit  trade.  For  each  specific  factor  the  figure  indicates  how  many  respondents  have 
indicated it ‘very much’ or ‘extremely’ facilitates illicit trade.  

  Factors facilitating illicit trade according to researchers, N = 15 

Lack of resources for customs and LEAs

Under-prioritisation

Development of demand for goods

Technological developments

Lack of cooperation between parties

Existence control free zones

Ineffective border and customs controls

Lack of scientific knowledge, LEAs

Discrepancies in export rule application

Ease of financial transactions

Few resources for due diligence for traders and collectors

Corruption in government

20,0%

86,7%

86,7%

80,0%

73,3%

73,3%

73,3%

73,3%

66,7%

66,7%

53,3%

53,3%

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

235 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dealers 

Four  dealers  answered  questions  regarding  factors  that  facilitated  illicit  trade  in  cultural 
goods. Their answers are shown in the table below. 

  Generally,  the  respondents  indicated  that  all  factors  were  slightly  or  not  at  all  of 

influence; 

  Furthermore,  dealers  responded  ‘don’t  know’  relatively  often  to  the  questions 

concerning factors that facilitate illicit trade.  

Table A1.2 

Factors that facilitate illicit trade, N = 4 

Extremely  Very  Moderately  Slightly  Not 

at all 

Don’t 
know 

Corruption  in  customs,  law  enforcement 
and government oversight agencies 

Development  of  demand  for  specific 
cultural goods on the market 

Lack  of  scientific  knowledge  to  detect 
falsifications on the part of LEAs 

Ease  of  financial  transactions  (real-life, 
mobile payments et cetera) 

Discrepancies in the application of export 
rules by Member States 

Few resources to implement appropriate 
due diligence for traders and collectors 

Existence of control-free zones (e.g. due 
to conflicts) 

1 

Ineffective border and customs controls 

Lack  of 
interested  parties 
NGOs, dealers) 

cooperation  between  all 
(police,  customs, 

Lack  of  resources  for  customs  and  law 
enforcement (time, people, money) 

Under-prioritisation of the issue 

Technological  developments  (internet, 
social media, metal detectors) 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

2 

1 

2 

3 

1 

3 

1 

2 

2 

1 

3 

2 

1 

1 

2 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

Validation group 

In total, 11 participants of the  CULTNET meeting answered the question on  factors that 
facilitate  illicit  trade.  The  responses  by  the  validation  group  show  that  technological 
developments, under prioritisation of the issue and the lack of resources for customs and 
LE play a significantly big role in the facilitation of the trade. On the other hand, the lack 
of cooperation between interested parties, discrepancies in the application of export rules 
and  corruption  in  customs,  ILE  and  government  oversight  agencies  is  indicated  to  not 
facilitate the trade at all.  

236 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factors facilitating illicit trade according to validation group77 

Under-prioritisation

Technological developments

Lack of resources for customs and LEAs

Ease of financial transactions

Existence control free zones

Ineffective border and customs controls

Lack of scientific knowledge, LEAs

Discrepancies in export rule application

Development of demand for goods

Lack of cooperation between parties

Few resources for due diligence for traders and collectors

Corruption in government

8,3%

84,6%

91,7%

83,3%

58,3%

77,8%

63,6%

53,8%

45,5%

50,0%

36,4%

30,0%

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

A3.3.2  Material parameters of the trade including volume, value, typology 

Figure A3.4 below, presents the perceptions vis-à-vis changes in the nature of the illicit 
trade in cultural goods since 2000.78 It shows that law enforcement respondents are divided 
in  their  opinion  on  whether  there  have  been  changes  or  not,  while  museums  and 
researchers  tend  to  agree  that  these  origins  have  changed  since  2000.79  Although  we 
should  interpret  these  results  with  caution  in  light  of  the  number  of  participants,  these 
responses seem to indicate a broad consensus among the four groups that the value of the 
trade has not decreased in the past 19 years, and that it is likely to have increased.  

77 The N of each answer option differed. From top to down, the N for each option is: 11, 11, 10, 7, 7, 7, 7, 5, 5, 
4, 3, 1 
78 This question was not part of the questionnaire distributed at the CULNET meeting. 
79 Which may be because museum and research staff have less rotation and been in post longer. 

237 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
  How has the nature of illicit trade in cultural goods developed since 2000? The origin 

of illicitly traded goods has changed/ stayed the same (N = 28) 

Law enforcement

3

3

Museums

Researchers

5

11

2

4

0%

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Changed

Stayed the same

Figure A3.5 shows that there is a general consensus with regards to the change in value 
of the illicit trade in cultural goods. The majority of all respondents, including the validation 
group, agree that the value of the illicit trade has (significantly) increased.  

  How has the value of illicit trade in cultural goods developed since 2000? (N = 27, N = 

10 for validation group) 

Law enforcement

0

5

1

0
0

Museums

2

3

Researchers

2

Validation group

1

8

7

2

4

2

0
0

0
0

0
0

0%

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Significantly increased

Increased

Stayed the same

Decreased

Significantly decreased

The  figure  below  shows  how  stakeholders  view  the  development  of  the  types  of  illicitly 
traded  goods.  Treating  this  cautiously  in  light  of  the  number  of  responses,  all  three 
stakeholder  groups  are  more  or  less  evenly  split  on  whether  the  objects  types  have 
changed or rather that they have stayed the same since 2000. The validation group is in 

238 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
stronger agreement; the general belief in this group is that the types of goods traded since 
2000 has stayed the same.  

  How has the types of illicitly traded goods developed since 2000? (N = 25, N= 11 for 

validation group) 

Law enforcement

Museums

Researchers

3

6

4

3

6

3

Validaton group

3

8

0%

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Changed

Stayed the same

Finally,  stakeholders  were  asked  how  the  characteristics  of  transactions  involving  illicit 
cultural  goods  have  developed  since  2000.  Although  the  response  rate  is  limited,  it  is 
interesting that there is consensus among the four groups—with a slight majority among 
museum  participants—that  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  has  changed,  characterised  by 
more online and faster transactions. This finding may offer an explanation for the earlier 
observation  that  the  total  value  of  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods  is  thought  to  have 
increased: all else being equal, a higher volume of transactions would result in a higher 
value of the total market. 

239 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Since 2000, the characteristics of transactions involving illicit cultural goods have 
changed/ stayed essentially the same. (N = 28, N = 11 for validation group) 

Law enforcement

5

Museums

4

0

Researchers

Validation group

11

8

1

1

3

3

0

1

2

0%

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Changed: more online and faster transactions

More secure for the involved due to greater use of technology (harder to combat)

Stayed essentially the same

The figure below shows how stakeholders view the development of the volume of illicit 
trade in cultural goods since 2000. In line with observations on the value, there seems to 
be broad agreement between stakeholders, who indicate the volume of illicit trade has 
increased. 

  How has the volume of illicit trade in cultural goods has developed since 2000? (N = 

26, N = 11 for validation group) 

Law enforcement

0

Museums

2

Researchers

2

4

6

2

2

1

0
0

0
0

4

2

1

Validation group

3

5

3

0
0

0%

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Significantly increased

Increased

Stayed the same

Decreased

Significantly decreased

The responses of dealers are recorded in tables below due to their relatively low number. 
It is hard to draw conclusions from the inputs of traders, as they seem to be split between 
the answer categories and a ‘don’t know’ response. Generally speaking, we can conclude 

240 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
that  they  are  more  conservative  regarding  the  size  of  the  problem  of  illicit  trade:  they 
believe it has more or less stayed the same since 2000 and may have decreased in volume 
and value. Nevertheless, one should note that due to the low response rate of dealers and 
other  industry  representatives,  the  conclusions  based  on  the  survey  results  are  not 
significant and cannot be generalised to the industry as whole.  

Table A1.3 

Development of nature and types of illicit trade in cultural goods since 2000, N = 4/5 

Changed 

Stayed the same 

I don’t know 

Development of nature of illicit trade in 

cultural goods since 2000 (origin) 

Development types of illicitly traded 

goods since 2000 

1 

1 

2 

2 

2 

1 

Table A1.4 

Development of volume and value of illicit trade in cultural goods since 2000, N = 4 

Significantly 

Increased  Remained 

Decreased  Significantly 

Don’t 

increased 

roughly 

the same 

decreased 

know 

Development of 

volume  

Development of 

value  

1 

1 

1 

3 

2 

Table A1.5 

Development of characteristics of illicit trade in cultural goods since 2000, N = 4 

Changed: more 

More secure for 

Stayed 

I don’t know 

online and 

involved due to 

essentially 

faster  

technology 

the same 

1 

2 

1 

Development 

characteristics of 

transactions involving illicit 

cultural goods 

241 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A3.3.3  Established criminal justice responses to the trade 

Law Enforcement 

In the figure below, it is indicated which criminal justice responses are considered to be 
very or extremely effective by law enforcement officials. 

Effectiveness of established criminal justice responses according to LEA, N = 7 

International cooperation

Creation of specialised customs and police units

Specialised training

Adoption of EU level measures

Creation of a special database

Thematic cooperation via IGOs

Ratification and transposition of international conventions
by MS

Technological measures

Introduction of code of ethics (art dealers, museums)

0,0%

71,4%

71,4%

57,1%

42,9%

42,9%

42,9%

28,6%

33,3%

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Museums 

A  total  of  4  representatives  of  museums  have  answered  questions  regarding  the 
established criminal justice responses in their respective country (low N). Their responses 
are  presented  in  the  table  below.  Generally,  there  is  no  clear-cut  interpretation  of  the 
answers. 

Table A1.6 

Measures combating illicit trade in cultural goods, N = 4 

Extremely  Very  Moderately  Slightly 

Not 

Don’t 

at all 

know 

Technological measures (digital 

imprinting, marketing etc) 

Adoption of EU-level measures 

Creation of a special database 

Specialised training 

Introduction of codes of ethics (by/for art 

dealers, museums) 

1 

2 

1 

1 

1 

1 

2 

3 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

242 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ratification and transposition of 

international conventions by Member 

1 

1 

1 

1 

Extremely  Very  Moderately  Slightly 

Not 

Don’t 

at all 

know 

States (UNESCO, UNIDROIT) 

Creation of specialised customs and 

police units by Member States 

Thematic cooperation via international 

organisations (Europol, Interpol, WCO) 

International cooperation 

1 

1 

2 

Researchers 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

In the figure below, it is indicated which criminal justice  responses are considered to be 
very or extremely effective by researchers. 

Effectiveness of established criminal justice responses according to researchers, N = 

15 

Ratification and transposition of international conventions by
MS

International cooperation

Thematic cooperation via IGOs

Creation of specialised customs and police units

Adoption of EU level measures

Creation of a special database

Specialised training

53,3%

53,3%

46,7%

33,3%

26,7%

26,7%

26,7%

Introduction of code of ethics (art dealers, museums)

Technological measures

20,0%

13,3%

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Dealers 

Four dealers answered the questions regarding the established criminal justice responses 
(low N). Their responses are presented in the table below. Generally speaking: 

  Only a code of ethics is perceived to be effective; 
  Many have indicated not knowing about effectiveness of most factors. 

243 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1.7 

Measures combating illicit trade in cultural goods, N = 4 

Extremely  Very  Moderately  Slightly  Not 

Don’t 

at all 

know 

Technological 

measures 

(digital 

imprinting, marketing et cetera) 

Adoption of EU-level measures  

Creation of a special database 

Specialised training,  

Introduction of codes of ethics (by/for art 

1 

2 

dealers, museums)  

Ratification 

and 

transposition 

of 

international  conventions  by  Member 

States (UNESCO, UNIDROIT) 

Creation of specialised customs and police 

units by Member States 

Thematic  cooperation  via  international 

organisations (Europol, Interpol, WCO) 

International cooperation 

Validation group  

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

3 

2 

1 

2 

1 

2 

3 

3 

2 

1 

1 

1 

1 

2 

During the CULTNET meeting, 13 participants shared their views on the effectiveness of 
established criminal justice responses. This shows that the creation of specialised customs 
and police units, specialised training and international cooperation are understood to be 
very effective. The implementation of technological measures and the introduction of codes 
of ethics are perceived to be less effective.  

Hereby, the answers by the validation group deviate from those provided by researchers. 
The latter indicated the introduction of a codes of  ethics as very  effective whereas they 
perceived the creation of specialised units less effective.  

244 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effectiveness of established criminal justice responses according to researchers, N = 

1380 

International cooperation

Specialised training

Creation of specialised customs and police units

Thematic cooperation via IGOs

Creation of a special database

Adoption of EU level measures

Technological measures

Introduction of code of ethics (art dealers, museums)

Ratification and transposition of international conventions
by MS

76,9%

76,9%

69,2%

53,8%

53,8%

38,5%

38,5%

30,8%

30,8%

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

A3.3.4  Known obstacles to and shortcomings of criminal justice responses 

These  questions  were  only  asked  to  law  enforcement  officials  (during  the  online  survey 
and as part of the validation survey). During the first round of the survey, five respondents 
replied to this question. In the validation phase, another eight respondents replied. The 
table below shows how frequent a specific resource was mentioned. 

Table A1.8  What does your organisation need for carrying out more effective action against illicit 

trade? (N = 5, N = 8)  

Respondents 

Validation group 

Needs 

Human Resources 

Financial resources 

Better equipment 

Training 

Expert advice 

Collaboration 

with 

national 

counterparts and institutions 

4 

3 

3 

2 

1 

1 

Cooperation 

with 

foreign 

1 

counterparts and institutions 

More competences (legislation) 

Other 

1 

1 

8 

6 

2 

3 

1 

1 

1 

3 

1 

One of the respondents of the validation group underscored that a better understanding of 
the problem is required.  

80 N = 12 for ‘creation of a specialised database’ and ‘specialised training’ 

245 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
These respondents were also asked what measures could be taken to reduce illicit trade. 
Both  law  enforcement  representatives  and  the  validation  group  indicated  that  stricter 
regulation  would  be  beneficial.  At  the  same  time,  both  groups  stressed  that  existing 
instruments  should  be  used  more  effectively.  Implementation  of  (available  or  new) 
technologies could also help, according to law enforcement representatives. The members 
of  the  validation  group  indicated  that  the  ratification  of  the  2017  Convention  would  be 
useful.  

  What new measures could be taken at national level to reduce illicit trade, according 

to LE (N = 7) 

71,4%

57,1%

57,1%

Stricter regulation of trade in cultural goods by Member
States (e.g. prohibition of exports, licensing of dealers,…

There are enough instruments in place, but they should be
used more effectively

Implementation of a technology

Ratification and implementation of the 2017 Convention on
Offences Relating to Cultural Property of Council of Europe

Legislation to control the importation of cultural goods into
the European Union

Incentivise dealers to adopt the UNESCO International
Codes of Ethics for Dealers in Cultural Property

Creation of a European inventory of stolen/looted objects

Adoption of a new international convention

14,3%

Other, please specify

28,6%

28,6%

42,9%

42,9%

42,9%

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

246 

 
 
 
 
 
  What new measures could be taken at national level to reduce illicit trade, according 

to validation group (N = 7) 

Stricter regulation of trade in cultural goods by Member
States (e.g. prohibition of exports, licensing of dealers,…

Ratification and implementation of the 2017 Convention
on Offences Relating to Cultural Property of Council of…

There are enough instruments in place, but they should
be used more effectively

Legislation to control the importation of cultural goods into
the European Union

Creation of a European inventory of stolen/looted objects

Incentivise dealers to adopt the UNESCO International
Codes of Ethics for Dealers in Cultural Property

15,4%

Implementation of a technology

Adoption of a new international convention

0,0%

0,0%

46,2%

38,5%

30,8%

23,1%

23,1%

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

In addition, LEA representatives and the validation group were asked who should be the 
prime target audience(s) for an awareness raising campaign about illicit trade in cultural 
goods.  Law  enforcement  representatives  indicated  that  the  general  public  in  the  EU, 
collectors and tourists were perceived to be the most suitable target audience (see figure 
below). The validation group indicated that law enforcement in the EU and in third countries 
form the prime target audience.  

  Who should be the prime target audience(s) for an awareness raising campaign 

about illicit trade in cultural goods, according to LEA (N = 7) 

General public in the EU

Collectors in the EU

Tourists

General public in third countries

Law enforcement (customs and police) in EU

Art dealers in the EU

71,4%

42,9%

42,9%

28,6%

28,6%

28,6%

Law enforcement (customs and police) in third countries

14,3%

Museum workers and researchers in the EU

0,0%

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

247 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Who should be the prime target audience(s) for an awareness raising campaign 

about illicit trade in cultural goods, according to the validation group ( N = 8) 

Law enforcement (customs and police) in EU

61,5%

Law enforcement (customs and police) in third countries

General public in the EU

General public in third countries

Art dealers in the EU

23,1%

23,1%

Collectors in the EU

15,4%

Tourists

7,7%

53,8%

46,2%

Museum workers and researchers in the EU

0,0%

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Finally, law enforcement authorities and the validation group were asked what actions can 
be taken to create (more reliable) statistics on the illicit trade in cultural goods. As shown 
below,  LEAs  indicated  that  common  recording  of  statistics,  sharing  of  data,  common 
standards of measurement and compulsory registering of all goods are possibly effective 
actions. The validation group confirmed these ideas.  

  What actions can be taken to create (more reliable) statistics on the illicit trade in 

cultural goods, according to LEA (N = 7) 

Common standards of recording of statistics

57,1%

Common standards of measurement (of seizures, cases,
objects) among Member States

Sharing of data between law enforcement authorities of
different countries

Compulsory registering and reporting of all traded cultural
goods

42,9%

42,9%

42,9%

Harmonised system for describing cultural goods

28,6%

Compulsory registering and reporting to a central database
of detected illicitly traded cultural goods

14,3%

0

1

2

3

4

5

248 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  What actions can be taken to create (more reliable) statistics on the illicit trade in 

cultural goods, according to validation group (N = 7 

Sharing of data between law enforcement authorities of
different countries

Compulsory registering and reporting of all traded cultural
goods

Common standards of measurement (of seizures, cases,
objects) among Member States

53,8%

46,2%

46,2%

Common standards of recording of statistics

38,5%

Harmonised system for describing cultural goods

23,1%

Compulsory registering and reporting to a central database
of detected illicitly traded cultural goods

7,7%

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

A3.4   Responses by role in illicit trade chain 

This section provides an overview of the survey responses by stakeholder role in the illicit 
trade chain.  

A3.4.1  Criminal organisation and operation of the illicit trade 

Source 
In  the  figure  below,  the  different  factors  are  shown  which  may  contribute  to  facilitating 
illicit trade according to source countries. For each specific factor the figure indicates how 
many respondents have indicated it ‘very much’ or ‘extremely’ facilitates illicit trade.  

249 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Factors facilitating illicit trade according to source countries, N = 14 

Technological developments

Lack of cooperation between parties

Lack of resources for customs and LEAs

Development of demand for goods

Ease of financial transactions

Under-prioritisation

Discrepancies in export rule application

Few resources for due diligence for traders and collectors

Existence control free zones

Ineffective border and customs controls

Lack of scientific knowledge, LEAs

Corruption in government

Transit 

85,7%

78,6%

78,6%

71,4%

71,4%

71,4%

71,4%

64,3%

64,3%

64,3%

50,0%

42,9%

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

In  the  figure  below,  the  different  factors  are  shown  which  may  contribute  to  facilitating 
illicit trade according to transit countries. For each specific factor the figure indicates how 
many respondents have indicated it ‘very much’ or ‘extremely’ facilitates illicit trade.  

  Factors facilitating illicit trade according to transit countries, N = 38 

Technological developments

Under-prioritisation

Lack of resources for customs and LEAs

Lack of cooperation between parties

Ineffective border and customs controls

Existence control free zones

Few resources for due diligence for traders and collectors

Discrepancies in export rule application

Ease of financial transactions

Lack of scientific knowledge, LEAs

Development of demand for goods

71,1%

68,4%

57,9%

52,6%

55,3%

50,0%

50,0%

50,0%

44,7%

44,7%

42,1%

Corruption in government

23,7%

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

250 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Destination 

In  the  figure  below,  the  different  factors  are  shown  which  may  contribute  to  facilitating 
illicit trade according to destination countries. For each specific factor the figure indicates 
how many respondents have indicated it ‘very much’ or ‘extremely’ facilitates illicit trade.  

  Factors facilitating illicit trade according to destination countries, N = 30 

Under-prioritisation

Technological developments

Lack of resources for customs and LEAs

Ineffective border and customs controls

Lack of cooperation between parties

Existence control free zones

Lack of scientific knowledge, LEAs

Few resources for due diligence for traders and collectors

Development of demand for goods

Discrepancies in export rule application

Ease of financial transactions

70,0%

66,7%

63,3%

60,0%

56,7%

56,7%

53,3%

53,3%

46,7%

43,3%

40,0%

Corruption in government

13,3%

0

5

10

15

20

25

A3.4.2  Material parameters of the trade including volume, value, typology 

The  Figure  below  shows  how  stakeholders  view  the  development  of  the  nature  of  illicit 
trade in cultural goods since 2000. 

  How has the nature of illicit trade in cultural goods has developed since 2000? 

Source

Transit

7

19

5

14

Destination

16

8

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Changed

Stayed the same

251 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the same vein, the figure below shows how stakeholders view the development of the 
volume of illicit trade in cultural goods since 2000. 

  How has the volume of illicit trade in cultural goods has developed since 2000? 

Source

3

Transit

Destination

6

4

7

15

3

1

0

9

1

1

9

7

2

1

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Significantly increased

Increased

Stayed the same

Decreased

Significantly decreased

The figure below shows the same for the value of illicit trade in cultural goods. 

  How has the value of illicit trade in cultural goods has developed since 2000? 

Source

3

6

2

0
0

Transit

6

Destination

4

13

11

9

7

0

1

0

1

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Significantly increased

Increased

Stayed the same

Decreased

Significantly decreased

The  figure  below  shows  how  stakeholders  view  the  development  of  the  types  of  illicitly 
traded goods. 

252 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  How has the types of illicitly traded goods developed since 2000?  

Source

4

9

Transit

19

Destination

14

19

10

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Changed

Stayed the same

Finally,  stakeholders  were  asked  how  the  characteristics  of  transactions  involving  illicit 
cultural goods have developed since 2000. 

Since 2000, the characteristics of transactions involving illicit cultural goods have… 

Source

Transit

9

26

2

1

4

4

Destination

21

2

2

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Changed: more online and faster transactions

More secure for the involved due to greater use of technology (harder to combat)

Stayed essentially the same

253 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A3.4.3  Established criminal justice responses to the trade 

Source 

In the figure below, it is indicated which criminal justice responses are considered to be 
very or extremely effective by source countries. 

Effectiveness of established criminal justice responses according to source 

countries, N = 14 

International cooperation

Creation of a special database

Creation of specialised customs and police units

Thematic cooperation via IGOs

Specialised training
Ratification and transposition of international conventions by
MS

Adoption of EU level measures

Technological measures

Introduction of code of ethics (art dealers, museums)

Transit 

71,4%

71,4%

71,4%

64,3%

64,3%

57,1%

57,1%

42,9%

28,6%

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

In the figure below, it is indicated which  criminal justice responses are considered to be 
very or extremely effective by transit countries. 

254 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effectiveness of established criminal justice responses according to source 

countries, N = 14 

International cooperation

Thematic cooperation via IGOs

Creation of specialised customs and police units

Creation of a special database

Specialised training

Ratification and transposition of international conventions
by MS

Adoption of EU level measures

Introduction of code of ethics (art dealers, museums)

64,9%

45,9%

40,5%

40,5%

40,5%

32,4%

32,4%

29,7%

Technological measures

21,6%

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Destination 

In the figure below, it is indicated which criminal justice responses are considered to be 
very or extremely effective by destination countries. 

Effectiveness of established criminal justice responses according to source 

countries, N = 28/29 

International cooperation

Thematic cooperation via IGOs

Introduction of code of ethics (art dealers, museums)
Ratification and transposition of international conventions by
MS

Creation of specialised customs and police units

Specialised training

Adoption of EU level measures

Creation of a special database

Technological measures

6,9%

53,6%

34,5%

34,5%

35,7%

26,7%

23,3%

20,7%

20,0%

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

255 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A3.4.4  Known obstacles to and shortcomings of criminal justice responses 

Source 

These  questions  were  only  asked  to  law  enforcement  officials.  Three  respondents  from 
source countries  replied to this question, the table below shows how  frequent a  specific 
resource was mentioned. 

Table A1.9  What does your organisation need for carrying out more effective action against illicit 

trade? (N = 3)  

Human Resources 

Financial resources 

Better equipment 

Training 

Expert advice 

Collaboration  with  national 

counterparts  and 

institutions 

Respondents 

3 

2 

3 

2 

1 

1 

Cooperation with foreign counterparts and institutions  1 

More competences (legislation) 

Other 

These respondents were also asked what measures could be taken to reduce illicit trade. 
Most indicate stricter regulation, while at the same time it is stressed existing instruments 
should be used more effectively. New technologies could also help (see figure). 

  What new measures could be taken at national level to reduce illicit trade, N = 14 

Stricter regulation of trade in cultural goods by Member
States (e.g. prohibition of exports, licensing of dealers,…

Legislation to control the importation of cultural goods into
the European Union

Ratification and implementation of the 2017 Convention on
Offences Relating to Cultural Property of Council of Europe

Implementation of a technology

Incentivise dealers to adopt the UNESCO International
Codes of Ethics for Dealers in Cultural Property

There are enough instruments in place, but they should be
used more effectively

Creation of a European inventory of stolen/looted objects

Adoption of a new international convention

Other, please specify

14,3%

85,7%

78,6%

71,4%

57,1%

57,1%

0,428571429

42,9%

42,9%

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

256 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, LEA representatives were asked who should be the prime target audience(s) 
for an awareness raising campaign about illicit trade in cultural goods, with up to 3 answers 
possible.  The  general  public  in  the  EU,  collectors  and  tourists  were  perceived  to  be  the 
most suitable target audience (see figure below).  

  Who should be the prime target audience(s) for an awareness raising campaign 

about illicit trade in cultural goods, N = 14 

General public in the EU

General public in third countries

Law enforcement (customs and police) in third countries

Law enforcement (customs and police) in EU

Tourists

Collectors in the EU

Art dealers in the EU

Museum workers and researchers in the EU

50,0%

50,0%

28,6%

28,6%

28,6%

21,4%

21,4%

21,4%

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Finally, LEAs from source countries were then asked what actions can be taken to create 
(more  reliable)  statistics  on  the  illicit  trade  in cultural  goods.  As  shown  below,  common 
recording  of  statistics,  sharing  of  data,  common  standards  of  measurement  and 
compulsory registering of all goods are most often seen as possibly effective actions. 

  What actions can be taken to create (more reliable) statistics on the illicit trade in 

cultural goods, N = 14 

Sharing of data between law enforcement authorities of
different countries

Compulsory registering and reporting of all traded cultural
goods

Harmonised system for describing cultural goods

Common standards of measurement (of seizures, cases,
objects) among Member States

Compulsory registering and reporting to a central database
of detected illicitly traded cultural goods

Common standards of recording of statistics

71,4%

50,0%

42,9%

42,9%

28,6%

28,6%

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

257 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The museums, dealers and art collectors were asked what they need to be able to carry 
out an effective provenance control on cultural goods that are acquired or received on loan. 
The figure below shows the responses of these groups who were located in source countries 
(N = 2). 

  What do you need to be able to carry out effective provenance control on the 

cultural goods that are acquired (before acquisition) or received on loan? N = 2 

Human resources

Financial resources

Training

Expert advise

More or different legal competences

0,0%

Changes in legal procedures

0,0%

100,0%

50,0%

50,0%

50,0%

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

Transit 

These  questions  were  only  asked  to  law  enforcement  officials.  Three  respondents  from 
transit  countries  replied  to  this  question,  the  table  below  shows  how  frequent  a  specific 
resource was mentioned. 

Table A1.10  What does your organisation need for carrying out more effective action against 

illicit trade? (N = 3)  

Human Resources 

Financial resources 

Better equipment 

Training 

Expert advice 

Respondents 

2 

1 

2 

1 

Collaboration  with  national 

counterparts  and 

1 

institutions 

Cooperation with foreign counterparts and institutions  1 

More competences (legislation) 

1 

Other 

258 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These respondents were also asked what measures could be taken to reduce illicit trade. 
Most indicate stricter regulation, while at the same time it is stressed existing instruments 
should be used more effectively. New technologies could also help (see figure). 

  What new measures could be taken at national level to reduce illicit trade, N = 36 

Stricter regulation of trade in cultural goods by Member
States (e.g. prohibition of exports, licensing of dealers,…

There are enough instruments in place, but they should be
used more effectively

Incentivise dealers to adopt the UNESCO International
Codes of Ethics for Dealers in Cultural Property

Creation of a European inventory of stolen/looted objects

Implementation of a technology

Legislation to control the importation of cultural goods into
the European Union

Ratification and implementation of the 2017 Convention on
Offences Relating to Cultural Property of Council of Europe

Adoption of a new international convention

16,7%

Other, please specify

52,8%

44,4%

44,4%

33,3%

27,8%

27,8%

25,0%

25,0%

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

In addition, LEA representatives were asked who should be the prime target audience(s) 
for an awareness raising campaign about illicit trade in cultural goods, with up to 3 answers 
possible.  The  general  public  in  the  EU,  collectors  and  tourists  were  perceived  to  be  the 
most suitable target audience (see figure below).  

  Who should be the prime target audience(s) for an awareness raising campaign 

about illicit trade in cultural goods, N = 29 

Art dealers in the EU

Collectors in the EU

62,1%

58,6%

General public in the EU

44,8%

Law enforcement (customs and police) in EU

General public in third countries

37,9%

31,0%

Law enforcement (customs and police) in third countries

Tourists

Museum workers and researchers in the EU

Other, please specify

27,6%

24,1%

20,7%

24,1%

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

259 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, LEAs from transit countries were then asked what actions can be taken to create 
(more  reliable)  statistics  on  the  illicit  trade  in cultural  goods.  As  shown  below,  common 
recording  of  statistics,  sharing  of  data,  common  standards  of  measurement  and 
compulsory registering of all goods are most often seen as possibly effective actions. 

  What actions can be taken to create (more reliable) statistics on the illicit trade in 

cultural goods, N = 14 

Sharing of data between law enforcement authorities of
different countries

Harmonised system for describing cultural goods

Common standards of measurement (of seizures, cases,
objects) among Member States

Compulsory registering and reporting to a central
database of detected illicitly traded cultural goods

63,9%

50,0%

44,4%

44,4%

Common standards of recording of statistics

38,9%

Compulsory registering and reporting of all traded cultural
goods

30,6%

Other, please specify

8,3%

0

5

10

15

20

25

The museums, dealers and art collectors were asked what they need to be able to carry 
out an effective provenance control on cultural goods that are acquired or received on loan. 
The figure below shows the responses of these groups who were located in transit countries 
(N = 5). 

  What do you need to be able to carry out effective provenance control on the 

cultural goods that are acquired (before acquisition) or received on loan? N = 5 

Human resources

Financial resources

Training

Expert advise

20,0%

20,0%

More or different legal competences

0,0%

Changes in legal procedures

0,0%

100,0%

80,0%

Other, namely:

40,0%

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

260 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Destination 

These  questions  were  only  asked  to  law  enforcement  officials.  Two  respondents  from 
destination  countries  replied  to  this  question,  so  the  findings  should  be  treated  with 
caution. The table below shows how frequent a specific resource was mentioned. 

Table A1.11  What does your organisation need for carrying out more effective action against 

illicit trade? (N = 2)  

Respondents 

Human Resources 

Financial resources 

Better equipment 

Training 

Expert advice 

Collaboration  with  national 

counterparts  and 

institutions 

Cooperation with foreign counterparts and institutions 

More competences (legislation) 

Other 

1 

1 

1 

1 

These respondents were also asked what measures could be taken to reduce illicit trade. 
Most indicate stricter regulation, while at the same time it is stressed existing instruments 
should be used more effectively. New technologies could also help (see figure). 

  What new measures could be taken at national level to reduce illicit trade, N = 28 

Incentivise dealers to adopt the UNESCO International
Codes of Ethics for Dealers in Cultural Property

There are enough instruments in place, but they should be
used more effectively

Stricter regulation of trade in cultural goods by Member
States (e.g. prohibition of exports, licensing of dealers,…

Creation of a European inventory of stolen/looted objects

Ratification and implementation of the 2017 Convention on
Offences Relating to Cultural Property of Council of Europe

Legislation to control the importation of cultural goods into
the European Union

50,0%

46,4%

42,9%

39,3%

32,1%

32,1%

Implementation of a technology

Adoption of a new international convention

14,3%

7,1%

Other, please specify

39,3%

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

261 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, LEA representatives were asked who should be the prime target audience(s) 
for an awareness raising campaign about illicit trade in cultural goods, with up to 3 answers 
possible.  The  general  public  in  the  EU,  collectors  and  tourists  were  perceived  to  be  the 
most suitable target audience (see figure below).  

  Who should be the prime target audience(s) for an awareness raising campaign 

about illicit trade in cultural goods, N = 28 

Collectors in the EU

Art dealers in the EU

57,1%

50,0%

Law enforcement (customs and police) in EU

General public in the EU

Law enforcement (customs and police) in third countries

Tourists

39,3%

32,1%

28,6%

25,0%

General public in third countries

14,3%

Museum workers and researchers in the EU

10,7%

Other, please specify

17,9%

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Finally,  LEAs  from  destination  countries  were  then  asked  what  actions  can  be  taken  to 
create  (more  reliable)  statistics  on  the  illicit  trade  in  cultural  goods.  As  shown  below, 
common recording of statistics, sharing of data, common standards of measurement and 
compulsory registering of all goods are most often seen as possibly effective actions. 

  What actions can be taken to create (more reliable) statistics on the illicit trade in 

cultural goods, N = 28 

Sharing of data between law enforcement authorities of
different countries

Common standards of measurement (of seizures, cases,
objects) among Member States

Common standards of recording of statistics

Harmonised system for describing cultural goods

Compulsory registering and reporting to a central database
of detected illicitly traded cultural goods

Compulsory registering and reporting of all traded cultural
goods

64,3%

60,7%

50,0%

46,4%

28,6%

25,0%

Other, please specify

10,7%

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

262 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The museums, dealers and art collectors were asked what they need to be able to carry 
out an effective provenance control on cultural goods that are acquired or received on loan. 
The  figure  below  shows  the  responses  of  these  groups  who  were  located  in  destination 
countries (N = 5). 

  What do you need to be able to carry out effective provenance control on the 

cultural goods that are acquired (before acquisition) or received on loan? N = 5 

Human resources

Financial resources

Training

Expert advice

40,0%

40,0%

100,0%

80,0%

Changes in legal procedures

20,0%

More or different legal competences

0,0%

Other, namely:

40,0%

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

263 

 
 
 
 
Annex 4 Overview of analysed technologies  

A4.1  Blockchain technology 

Description 

The term blockchain technology encompasses a host of technologies, which are based on 
the blockchain, a verifiable and distributed ledger that was invented by the pseudonymous 
Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008. The primary purpose of the blockchain is to serve as a record 
of transactions for which any alterations to the record are detectable. Records, referred to 
as  blocks,  contain  cryptographically  secured  information  about  the  previous  record, 
creating a chain of linked records, allowing for independent validation of veracity through 
inspection of previous blocks in the chain; an altered record will not match previous records 
in the chain, and thus will be known to have been altered. As such, blockchain technologies 
use the blockchain as a means to ensure the integrity of information, usually transactional 
information, contained in block records. 

Applications 

The most well-known blockchain-based technology is the cryptocurrency bitcoin, for which 
it  was  invented,  and  the  blockchain  is  often  closely  associated  with  cryptocurrency. 
However, other applications have been proposed for the blockchain, primarily for situations 
where a verifiable ledger of transaction records is desirable. Many of these proposals are 
either suppositional or in their early stages of development and widespread applications 
beyond  cryptocurrency  and,  increasingly,  the  banking  industry  are  limited  at  this  time. 
While  incarnations  of  blockchain  technologies  have  been  proposed  within  nearly  every 
market  and  field  imaginable,  commentators  both  within  these  fields  and  in  the 
cryptography  community  more  generally  have  warned  that  much  of  this  is  "hype".  The 
media (and funding) popularity of blockchain may be inspiring the proposing of blockchain 
technologies for markets where they are a poor, impractical, or impossible fit.  

Within the art market, blockchain technologies have been proposed as a means by which 
provenance information can be assessed preceding a transaction. The idea behind this is 
that by having an unalterable chain of transactions concerning a piece of art, ideally leading 
back to the artwork's creation, a potential buyer will be able to verify that the art is both 
authentic  and  has  not  been  subject  to  an  unauthorised  transaction  (e.g.  has  not  been 
stolen  and  resold).  Blockchain  technology  proposals  that  include  antiquities  and  for 
artworks  created  before  the  ledger  in  question  are  not  envisioned  to  have  records  that 
extend  to  the  creation  of  the  objects,  rather  block  records  are  envisioned  to  record 
transactional information from the point in which the object is first entered into the ledger. 
From there, transactions are then recorded in an unalterable way allowing buyers to ensure 
that the antiquity in question has not undergone an unauthorised sale since being entered 
into the ledger (note: a theft before entry into the ledger would not be detectable).  

Blockchain  technologies  related  to  art  provenance  and  developed  by  various  for-profit 
companies have garnered a significant amount of press in recent years. Further blockchain 

264 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
technologies in development are devoted to allowing entry into investment into fine art in 
various ways, devising new ways to pay artists, and allowing art to be transacted using 
cryptocurrencies. 

Blockchain applications for art-related market 
A number of start-up develop blockchain-based applications for the special needs 
of the art-related market. They include but are not limited to: 
  Verisart81 which uses blockchain to create a ledger of "permanent digital records 
for  a  physical  artwork",  referring  to  these  records  as  certificates.  They  state 
that  their  records  are  public  and  "anybody  can  verify  the  existence  of  a 
certificate and check provenance instantly if they have access to the certificate", 
though the details of art transactions and the identity of the parties in involved 
are not publicly shared. They claim to be "building a new global standard for 
art certification and verification"; 

  Artory82 a blockchain-based art provenance registry. Once an artwork is entered 
into the ledger,  further  records are added when that artwork is sold, valued, 
restored,  etc,  presumably  provided  that  Artory  is  notified  of  such  events  by 
what  they  call  a  "trusted  source"  (e.g.  an  auction  house,  a  gallery,  a  living 
artist). Artory promises complete anonymity to collectors while maintaining a 
publicly accessible registry of the artworks themselves. In October 2018 Artory 
collaborated  with  Christie's  auction  house  to  enter  all  the  artworks  in  a  sale 
onto the company's block chain ledger, the details of which would be passed on 
to buyers; 

  Codex  Protocol83  is  a  blockchain-based  provenance  registry  for  art  and 
collectables.  The  company  envisions  the  use  of  their  registry  for  various  art 
market "solutions". The first of these to launch, Biddable, allows users to bid 
on  art  via  the  website  LiveAuctioneers  using  cryptocurrency  (though  this 
particular feature was unavailable at the time of review), and items purchased 
are automatically entered as blocks on the Codex Protocol ledger; 

  Artlery84 is the creator of an "art-backed" cryptocurrency called CLIO. What this 
means,  precisely,  is  undiscernible  from  the  information  provided  on  their 
website at the time of writing; 

  Maecenas85  a  blockchain-based  platform  through  which  users  invest  in/take 
partial ownership of percentages of the value of a work of art so that the owner 
of the work of art can raise money. It is billed as a way for people to invest in 
art  while  avoiding  auction  and  gallery  fees  as  well  as  maintenance  and 
insurance costs of the art and a way for art collectors to raise money based on 
the value of their artworks while physically keeping the art. That said, there is 
some indication that art listed on the platform for investment will be held in a 
secure storage facility. Maecenas uses blockchain to create the ledger of these 
transactions, which art investors and owners can check; 

81 https://verisart.com/. 
82 https://www.artory.com/. 
83 https://www.codexprotocol.com/. 
84 https://artlery.com/. 
85 https://www.maecenas.co/. 

265 

 
 
 
                                           
  Fimart86,a  blockchain-based  "fractional  marketplace  of  art".  Artworks  are 
physically tagged and tag data is entered into the company's provenance tag 
database,  and  from  there  can  be  listed  in  their  "fractional  marketplace".  Via 
Fimart,  the  owner  retains  both  the  physical  artwork  and  a  51%  stake  in  the 
ownership of the piece while listing the remaining 49% for sale to investors in 
fractional  pieces.  These  transactions  are  maintained  in  a  blockchain-based 
ledger.  

None of the above-mentioned applications specifically focus on applying the blockchain to 
the antiquities trade, however it is assumed that antiquities can be registered within these 
ledgers  like  any  other  form  of  artwork.  Antiquities-specific  blockchain  applications  are 
currently  rare  and  exist  more  as  a  possibility  than  a  fully  implemented  application.  For 
example, a proposal for 3D scanning of cultural heritage assets and storage of those assets 
in a private blockchain-based ledger has been proposed in a patent filed by researchers at 
Tsinghua University, presumably to provide evidence for repatriation if  the antiquities in 
question  are  subsequently  stolen,  though  it  is  unclear  what  added  benefit  a  blockchain 
ledger serves in such circumstances.  

Assessed Strengths 

If applied in an open and distributed way, the primary benefit of blockchain technology in 
the  art  market  is  that  it  can  eliminate  dependence  on  previously  established  trust 
relationships between buyer, seller, and intermediary (e.g. dealer, auction house). A buyer 
need not place their trust in the honesty of a seller regarding an artwork's provenance and 
authenticity, they can consult a verifiable record of previous transactions. While this record 
is  only  as  good  as  the  information  contained  within  it  (see  Assessed  Weaknesses),  it 
represents  a  movement  away  from  a  complete  dependence  on  dealers  for  artwork 
information. 

Assessed Weaknesses 

Beyond  the  fact  that  previously  unknown  looted  antiquities  cannot  be  entered  into  a 
blockchain-based ledger, the primary weaknesses in the use of blockchain technologies as 
provenance registries for antiquities lies in the inherent disconnect between the physical 
objects and the digital ledger  record. Even if the information in the blockchain ledger is 
both verifiable and accurate (which it may not be, see below), there is no unbreakable link 
between the digital record and physical object. The blockchain was developed to allow the 
transactions  of  the  digital  currency  bitcoin,  and  bitcoins,  as  digital  objects,  do  not  exist 
beyond their blockchain record. Antiquities, on  the other hand, are physical objects and 
their connection to entries in a blockchain ledger is dependant, usually, on a photograph 
included  with  the  record  and/or  the  application  of  a  sticker  which  identifies  the  registry 
record associated with the antiquity. Removal of the sticker or alteration of the antiquity 
may render the piece unlinkable to its blockchain record.  

Further, a blockchain-based provenance ledger, like any database, is only as good as the 
information that it contains. The registration of inaccurate or false information about the 

86 http://www.looklateral.com/ecosystem/. 

266 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
ownership history and source of an antiquity into a ledger backed by blockchain technology 
will  create  a  largely  permanent  record  which  will  be  at  best  misleading  and  at  worst 
exploitable by those seeking to launder illicit antiquities or pass fakes into the market. As 
such, companies who run blockchain-based art registries may restrict who may place new 
entries in the ledger in hopes of maintaining data integrity. However, research has shown 
that groups which are often listed as being trusted to register artworks on these blockchain 
ledgers (e.g. auction houses, dealers, collectors) contain actors who actively produce false 
provenance to hide the illicit origins of antiquities. The problem with art provenance data 
veracity in blockchain ledgers made headlines in mid-2018 when a man named Terence 
Eden was able to place an entry into the Verisart ledger certifying himself as the owner 
and creator of Leonardo's Mona Lisa with Verisart issuing a certificate saying that Eden's 
association with the work was "irrevocably sealed and permanently verifiable". He was not 
asked to provide any proof of ownership or proof of having created the piece, and was only 
asked to provide an email address and an image of the artwork (which he had downloaded 
from Wikipedia).  

While most commercial firms operating in blockchain technologies for the art world describe 
their ledgers as public, this appears to largely be a linguistic stretch. While some limited 
transactional data is shared, nearly all companies surveyed assure the anonymity of sellers 
and  buyers,  at  least  in  the  public  versions  of  their  records.  This  limits  the  ability  of 
independent  researchers  and  law  enforcement  to  use  these  ledgers  to  research  the 
transaction  and  ownership  histories  of  suspect  antiquities  which  have  been  recorded, 
continuing an antiquities market tradition of opaque transactions and identity protection 
which can shield criminal activity. 

One  final  but  important  weakness  of  blockchain  technologies  is  that  the  inalterability  of 
ledger records may violate the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Transaction 
records,  which  may  contain  personal  data  like  names  or  email  addresses,  cannot  be 
removed from a blockchain ledger, even at the request of the individual whose personal 
data has been recorded.  

Related Technologies 

The blockchain is closely related to, and substantially based upon, a Merkle or hash tree, 
the concept for which dates back to 1979. Merkle trees demonstrate a similar structure of 
blocks,  each  containing  information  from  the  previous  blocks  to  prevent  alteration  and 
maintain verifiability. Merkle tree blocks contain information from a series of two previous 
blocks (creating a treelike formation) while blockchain blocks contain information from a 
series of single previous blocks (creating a chainlike formation). The treelike formulation 
of  Merkle  trees  means  that  blocks  will  not  contain  data  from  alternate  and  concurrent 
branches of the tree. Technologies based on Merkle trees may be just as suitable to some 
of the above-discussed art market uses as the blockchain. 

267 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A4.2  Crowdsourcing 

Description 

Crowdsourcing is a general term that refers to a number of practices that have the ultimate 
goal of obtaining money,  services, or information from a wide public. While actions and 
campaigns  that  can  be  considered  crowdsourcing  occurred  before  the  internet  era,  the 
term is most frequently used to describe online-appeals to internet users.  

Crowdsourcing platforms 
  So-called  "crowdfunding"  platforms  such  as  Kickstarter87  Go  Fund  Me88,  and 
Just Giving89 where users as the public for money to fund the development of 
products,  charities,  medical  treatment,  etc.  An  example  of  an  archaeology-
focused crowdfunding platform is Dig Ventures;90 
Information  sharing  and  data  curation  crowdsourcing  platforms  that  seek 
voluntary contributions from internet users, such as Wikipedia;91 

 

  So-called  "citizen  science"  projects  which  invite  internet  users  to  engage  in 
repetitive  tasks,  usually  related  to  identifying  certain  patterns  or  transcribe 
words within images, such as Galaxy Zoo;92 

  Paid  work  where  a  large  number  of  users  are  paid  very  small  amounts  for 
completing small tasks which require a degree of human intelligence, the most 
well-known platform for these being Amazon's Mechanical Turk.93  

On a less structured level, direct appeals to the public for information, about for example 
a crime, transmitted via social or traditional can be considered to be "crowdsourcing" that 
information. As such, crowdsourcing can be seen as a familiar tool for law enforcement to 
encourage informants to come forward which is bolstered by the reach of the internet. 

Applications 

Beyond  direct  public  appeals  from  police  for  information  regarding  particular  crimes, 
crowdsourcing  techniques  and  technologies  have  been  applied  to  the  issue  of  illicit 
trafficking  of  cultural  goods  in  a  number  of  ways,  usually  by  academic,  journalistic,  or 
private researchers, sometimes in collaboration with authorities. 

Examples of crowdsourcing applied to trafficking in cultural goods 
 

In 2017, Dr Sarah Parcak of the University of Alabama at Birmingham launched 
GlobalXplorer94  funded  by  a  TED  Prize  and  in  collaboration  with  National 
Geographic. Using a "citizen science" model, GlobalXplorer invited anyone with 
an  internet  connection  to  explore  satellite  images  of  rural  Peru  for  signs  of 
archaeological  looting  and  to  mark  where  it  was  seen  with  the  idea  that  the 

87 https://www.kickstarter.com/. 
88 https://gofundme.com. 
89 justgiving.com. 
90 https://digventures.com. 
91 wikipedia.org. 
92 galaxyzoo.org. 
93 http://www.mturk.com. 
94 https://www.globalxplorer.org. 

268 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
results of hundreds of people looking at the same satellite images will turn up 
a clear indication where looting might be occurring. Over 73.000 separate users 
have  engaged  with  the  platform.  The  information  gathered  was  then 
transmitted to the Government of Peru, a partner in the project, and it is unclear 
at this time how Peru acted on the information gathered. GlobalXplorer is in the 
process of expanding to more locations; 
In 2012, investigative reporter Jason Felch announced that he was developing 
a crowdsourcing campaign called Wikiloot95. At the heart of this was a plan to 
place  a  significant  number  of  photographs  and  other  documentary  materials 
seized  in  antiquities  trafficking-related  raids  in  Europe  online  for  researchers 
and  the  general  public  to  review  so  as  to  conduct  their  own  investigations. 
Further, Wikiloot originally sought to model themselves after the whistle blower 
site Wikileaks, providing an anonymous platform for people to leak information 
about  antiquities  trafficking.  While  the  idea  for  a  platform  gained  much 
attention  at  the  time,  funding  for  it  failed  to  materialise.  In  2014,  it  was 
announced that the project was re-branded as Antiquarium, but at the time of 
writing, this platform has not been launched; 
In 2015 researchers Matthew Vincent and Chance Coughenour working under 
the name Project Mosul96 began a crowdsourcing initiative, asking the public to 
submit their personal photographs of antiquities and heritage sites destroyed 
by  the  Islamic  State  in  Iraq.  From  these  images,  they  sought  to  use 
photogrammetry to create digital reconstructions of the lost pieces. They have 
since developed their reconstructions into a virtual tour of the Mosul museum.  

 

 

Assessed Strengths 

Crowdsourcing  information  about  specific  crimes  from  the  public  as  amplified  by  social 
media is, at least on the outset, an inexpensive way for investigators to gain information 
that  would  be  otherwise  unobtainable.  Although  there  is  time-cost  in  processing  the 
information  gained,  the  only  existing  structure  needed  to  engage  in  this  form  of 
crowdsourcing are active institutional social media accounts. 

The use of crowdsourcing platforms, either in the form of easy information reporting (e.g. 
a pathway for online auction users to quickly report a suspect antiquities sale to authorities) 
or through bespoke "citizen science" platforms  (e.g. GlobalXplorer  which seeks to share 
crowdsourced looting data from satellite images with the Government of Peru) may prove 
a useful way to harness public interest in preserving cultural goods while increasing police 
and authorities' capacity. If carefully designed to produce a useable information stream for 
authorities and if built around operational needs, agencies and authorities that use targeted 
crowd sourcing to, say, monitor physical and digital antiquities auctions, keep an eye on 
social  media,  or  assess  various  forms  of  collected  data  may  find  their  staffing  burden 
reduced.  while  simultaneously  increasing  public  awareness  about  the  issue  of  cultural 
property trafficking. 

95 see: https://www.theguardian.com/science/2012/jun/06/wikiloot-crowdsourcing-stolen-artifacts. 
96 Now Rekrei, https://projectmosul.org/. 

269 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
Finally,  while  the  construction  of  a  bespoke  crowdsourcing  platform  to  target  cultural 
property crime would likely be time consuming and expensive, there is strong potential for 
law enforcement to work with auction and sales websites as well as social media sites to 
implement  crowd  sourcing  reporting  tools  so  that  users  can  notify  the  platform  of 
potentially  illicit  sales  and  to  strengthen  pathways  towards  information  sharing  with 
authorities. This basic form of crowdsourcing as crowd reporting harnesses the good-will 
of  the  platform  and  the  interest  that  users  have  in  internally  policing  crimes  related  to 
cultural heritage. 

Assessed Weaknesses 

Crowdsourcing has the  potential to generate a  significant amount of  false or immaterial 
information  as  both  well-meaning  and  malicious  members  of  the  public  come  forward. 
Time,  effort,  and  expertise  may  be  needed  to  sort  through  the  information  gained  to 
determine if it is of use.  

Further, depending on the goals of the crowdsourcing project, technical expertise may be 
needed  to  process  the  information  collected  and  render  it  into  the  desired  form.  Also, 
existing  crowdsourcing  platforms  may  be  inadequate  for  the  goals  of  the  project  or  the 
level of security required related to sensitive investigations, meaning that project or goal-
specific  platforms  may  need  to  be  developed.  Such  development  requires  time,  money, 
and technological expertise which is unlikely to be available in most circumstances. 

Finally,  there  are  significant  questions  about  the  ownership  of  the  data  that  is  collected 
from crowdsourcing projects. Issues related to data protection and control as well as the 
safety of both targets of inquiry and the members of the public conducting the information 
gathering must be carefully and thoroughly evaluated before any crowdsourcing project is 
implemented with regard to crimes related to cultural goods. 

Related Technologies 
Crowdsourcing can be considered more  of a practice than a technology in its own right. 
Thus a number of technologies may feed into a crowdsourcing project. Those that relate 
to reducing the illicit trade in cultural goods include, but are not limited to: 
  Satellite imagery analysis and remote sensing; 
  Bespoke smartphone applications; 
  Metadata analysis; 
  Social network analysis; 
  Web crawling and scraping; 
  Image Recognition. 

In all cases, crowdsourcing projects are designed around the data available and the specific 
technology or information source being monitored will dictate how the crowdsourcing can 
be approached. 

270 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A4.3  Metadata Analysis 

Description 

The term metadata can broadly be defined as saved data that describes other stored data. 
While the term can be applied to traditional data storage methods, for example, a physical 
card  catalogue  in  the  library  stores  what  can  be  considered  metadata  about  the  data 
contents  of  books,  "metadata"  was  coined  in  relation  to  computing  and  is  most  closely 
linked with extra data that is stored about data files. 

The  American  non-profit  National  Information  Standards  Organization  describes  three 
types of metadata that can exist about a file: 
  Descriptive metadata which allows files to be discovered by users and may include 

such information at file name, keywords, author/creator, etc.; 

  Administrative metadata that helps with the organisation and sorting of the files in 

question and may include such information as time and location of creation, when the 
file was last modified, what model of device created the file, etc.; 

  Structural metadata which may contain information about how files can be put 

together to be made into some set whole. 

The first two types of metadata, descriptive and administrative, are most relevant to this 
discussion. 

Metadata is an inescapable part of our digital lives, with at least some descriptive and/or 
administrative  metadata  generated  for  every  file  that  we  create  on  computers, 
smartphones, digital cameras, and other devices. Due to the ubiquity of this information 
and insufficient focus on computer literacy beyond functional use in all levels of education, 
most users are unaware of the amount of information that is stored within the digital files 
that they generate. The metadata that is stored alongside digital photographs, which can 
include such information as when a photo was taken, who took the photo (often by name), 
and the exact location where the image was taken, has provoked particular controversy at 
various points due to an increase in image sharing on social media. The tension between 
user sharing and user privacy remains unresolved, with metadata often at the centre of 
the controversy. 

Applications 

While it is possible for the knowledgeable user to delete, alter, or never store certain file 
metadata,  many  technology  users  use  the  default  settings  for  phones,  computers,  and 
other  technology  devices  and  those  settings  usually  include  the  storage  of  extensive 
metadata. This makes metadata analysis of files of particular interest to law enforcement 
as  users  who  have  become  targets  of  official  investigations  may  not  know  how  much 
information they are sharing via photos, documents, or other files that they generate.  

Analysis of this metadata can range from using the simple metadata reading tools available 
in the user interface of all major operating systems (for example, right click+Get Info on 
MacOSX) to the use  of  applicable command-line interface commands to inspect the file, 

271 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
through to the use of bespoke applications. The results depend on how much metadata is 
present and how reliable it is. 

In an extreme example, and due to the immediate nature of social media posting, such 
metadata  can  and  has  been  used  to  pinpoint  the  exact  location  of  users  in  near  to  real 
time. A more common law enforcement use of metadata is to analyse seized or intercepted 
files  for  metadata  information  to  help  identify  or  build  a  case  against  a  suspect.  The 
metadata associated with a digital photograph depicting the committing of a crime which 
has  either  been  discovered  by  authorities  on  the  internet  or  seized  via  a  search  of  a 
suspect's devices may reveal where and when the crime took place and might also identify 
who took the photograph, allowing an investigation to be advanced. 

This  scenario  is  of  particular  importance  to  investigations  related  to  the  trafficking  of 
cultural goods. Because much of the monetary value of cultural goods rests in the aesthetic 
qualities of these pieces, the transmission of images is an inescapable aspect of antiquities 
transactions. The ubiquity of phones with camera functions ensures that even "looters" in 
very  low-income  countries,  as  well  as  everyone  on  the  antiquities  smuggling  chain,  are 
able to document finds and share them with potential buyers. Metadata analysis conducted 
when such images are intercepted by authorities can produce information beyond what is 
shown in the photograph itself.  

Assessed Strengths 

As metadata analysis of freely available and seized files has become a common practice 
among investigative agencies, it is assumed that such techniques are  already in use for 
antiquities  trafficking  investigations  throughout  Europe.  Such  analysis  is  very  low  cost, 
usually does not require special equipment or an advanced degree of technical skill, and 
takes  very  little  time.  It  has  the  potential  to  reveal  relevant  information  about  the 
trafficking of illicit cultural objects for very little investment. This is a low-risk technique 
that has the potential for high gain for investigations.  

Assessed Weaknesses 

As mentioned above, electronic metadata is alterable. Not all files will have much, if any 
metadata,  and  existing  metadata  can  be  intentionally  altered  to  be  misleading. 
Knowledgeable digital application users may opt to keep their metadata generation on files 
to a minimum. Many social media sites (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram) strip all 
original  metadata  from  images  uploaded  to  their  service,  meaning  that  images  sourced 
from those services are not suitable for metadata analysis. These weaknesses, however, 
do not negate the potential usefulness of metadata if it is present and all seized and suspect 
images should have any potential metadata analysed. 

Access to and analysis of certain types of metadata by law enforcement may be restricted. 
For the most part, these restrictions relate to communications metadata, such as the data 
generated by the act of sending a text message (i.e. identity of sender, identity of receiver, 
when the text was sent) without looking at the contents of the text message. The collection 
of such data is very different than looking at the metadata available with an image that is 

272 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
freely available on the internet or that has been seized in a lawful way. However, anyone 
conducting  such  analysis  should  be  aware  of  their  organizational  or  national  metadata 
policy. 

Related Technologies 

Use  of  web  and  social  media  scraping  applications  towards  the  detection  of  antiquities 
trafficking  may  incorporate  metadata  analysis.  Some  of  these  technologies  specifically 
focus on scraping for particular file metadata. 

A4.4  Satellite Imagery Analysis, Drone Photography 

Description 

Satellite  imagery  consists  of  various  types  of  images  of  the  earth  taken  from  orbit  by 
government or commercial satellites. Although such imagery has been collected since the 
1960s and, notability, the launch of the Landsat programme in the 1970s, public use of 
satellite imagery became widespread in the 2000s as popular applications such as Google 
Earth  which  makes  such  imagery,  much  of  it  sourced  from  Landsat,  available  for  free. 
Higher quality satellite images are collected by public and private bodies for purposes that 
range from security to scientific research, though access to this imagery may be limited. 
Satellite  imagery  of  the  Earth  in  the  visible  light  spectrum  displays  land  features  from 
above within context of the surround landscape. Imagery in the non-visible spectrum, for 
example in infrared, can be used to detect land features that are otherwise unable to be 
seen with human eye. 

Applications 

While a full discussion of the technology involved in collecting satellite imagery is outside 
the  remit  of  this  review,  the  analysis  of  satellite  imagery  has  a  number  of  potential 
applications towards combatting the illicit trade in cultural goods in some circumstances. 

When it comes to the detection of looting at heritage sites, consultation of satellite imagery 
may provide a way for researchers and authorities to track physical changes to the fabric 
of  sites  over  time,  map  looting  incidents,  and  identify  looting  "hot  spots".  In  some 
locations, satellite imagery may be used for detection purposes to identify physical border 
crossings  and  pathways  used  during  the  transnational  trafficking  phase  of  the  illicit 
movement  of  cultural  goods.  The  extent  to  which  these  applications  are  operationally 
useful, however, is context specific.  

It must be emphasised that most satellite imagery that is available for analysis does not 
represent either real time or even recent imagery, meaning that looters and traffickers are 
unlikely to be "caught in the act" by satellite imagery analysis. Thus such analysis is best 
used for quantifying damage over time and detecting past incidents of looting for recording 
and  consideration.  For  the  most  part,  this  use  of  satellite  technology  for  survey  and 
recording of past looting incidents and interventions towards future protection has been 

273 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
employed by academics and researchers (e.g. Brodie and Contreras, n.d.; Casana, 2015; 
Casana  and  Laugier,  2017;  Caspari,  2018;  Contreras  and  Brodie,  2010a,  2010b; 
Lasaponara and Masini, 2017; Lauricella et al., 2017; Parcak et al., 2016; Tapete et al., 
2016), sometimes in concert with heritage protection authorities. 

A similar technology which can be employed both for recording change over time, but also 
for  real-time  monitoring  is  the  use  of  aerial  photography  taken  from  unmanned  aerial 
vehicles, commonly called drones. Drone technology can be relatively inexpensive and can 
be  employed  at  sites  with  known  sensitivity  to  looting  to  monitor  emerging  looting 
situations. Such an approach has been taken at the site of Fifa in Jordan (Kersel and Hill, 
2015),  and  is  currently  being  employed  by  Peru's  Ministry  of  Culture  (Neuman  and 
Blumenthal 2014). 

Assessed Strengths 

The use of remote sensing images, be they from satellites, drones, or other sources, is a 
well-known, much-used tool in archaeological heritage survey and preservation. There is 
ample expertise to draw upon when considering the utility of applying such technology to 
a particular context. Many collections of satellite images are free to access and use and 
tools such as Google Earth allow everyone, including police and preservation authorities, 
to access potentially useful data towards the recording of past looting incidents with the 
only financial outlay being in staff time and training. Further, authorities may have access 
to  restricted,  higher  quality,  government-level imagery  that  the  general  public  does  not 
have,  potentially  increasing  their  capacity  to  detect  site  damage.  Drones  represent  an 
inexpensive and accessible way for authorities to gather their own aerial photography for 
analysis. 

The  use  of  both  satellite  imagery  and  drones  allows  for  relatively  quick  survey  of  large 
areas that are potentially sensitive to looting from the comfort of a desk. This may reduce 
the staffing needed for on-the-ground monitoring and, particularly in the case of drones, 
could represent a way to target-harden remote heritage sites. 

Assessed Weaknesses 

While satellite and drone imagery have clear applications towards heritage site survey and 
monitoring,  there  are  few,  if  any,  applications  of  this  technology  towards  reducing  the 
market for illicit cultural goods or detecting later stage trafficking. Further this technology 
is  only  useful  in  locations  where  archaeological  remains  are  clearly  visible  from  the  air, 
such as flat, arid or semi-arid lands with minimal tree or brush cover, and where looting 
takes the form of visible hole-making. This significantly reduces the locations within Europe 
that such technologies are immediately useful. 

The ability to detect looting in satellite and drone imagery is dependent on the clarity and 
resolution  of  the  photographs  themselves.  The  free  satellite  imagery  that  is  publicly 
available  for  many  locations  is  not  of  high  enough  quality  to  definitively  identify  looting 
incidents within it, and higher-quality imagery is either expensive or unobtainable. False 
positives and false negatives are also common when identifying looting in such images and 

274 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in many instances, recording of looting within satellite or drone images must be followed 
up with physical site survey.  

Related Technologies 

Analysis  and  processing  of  satellite  and  drone  imagery  can,  in  some  circumstances,  be 
streamlined through the use of automated and semi-automated tools to detect patterns in 
the  images.  Such  image  recognition  may  reduce  the  amount  of  time  needed  to  process 
large data sets, though false positives and, more concerning, false negatives for looting 
remain an issue.  

The  processing  of  satellite  imagery  can  also  be  paired  with  citizen  science  style 
crowdsourcing,  allowing  members  of  the  public  to  detect  looting in  photographs.  This  is 
the  model  used  by  the  GlobalXplorer  Project97  which  asks  volunteers  from  the  general 
public to record looting evidence in satellite images of Peru. 

A4.5 

"K-9 Artifact Finders" or Antiquities Sniffing Dogs 

Description 

So-called  "K-9  Artifact  Finders"  are  working  dogs  trained  to  detect  scents  related  to 
recently excavated looted and trafficked antiquities.  They are currently being developed 
and  trained  by  the  USA-based  non-profit  Red  Arch  Research  in  partnership  with  the 
University of Pennsylvania's Penn Vet Working Dog Centre and the Penn Museum. 

Applications 

At  the  time  of  writing,  "K-9  Artifact  Finders"  are  in  early  stages  of  development  and 
training. If they prove effective, they are expected to join other working dogs  employed 
by customs services at airports, border checkpoints, and other locations of cargo transit. 
Like dogs who are trained to detect drugs, biological material, and other contraband within 
luggage and cargo, the developers of "K-9 Artifact Finders" expect that the dogs will be 
able to detect recently-looted antiquities in the process of being smuggled and signal to 
their handler that certain bags, parcels, and individuals require further customs inspection. 
They also could be deployed during relevant police searches of individuals and properties. 

Assessed Strengths 

Searches of people and cargo in transit are limited and are not focused on cultural objects. 
Furthermore, customs agents and related security forces often have limited training in the 
detection of illicit cultural objects. It is especially difficult for agents to detect small objects 
like coins, which are easy for traffickers to conceal, and cultural works which are visually 
similar to modern-made tourist souvenirs and require expertise for identification. Should 
antiquities-detecting dogs prove effective at signalling the presence of recently excavated 
illicit cultural objects, they would provide agents with both an indication of who and what 

97 https://www.globalxplorer.org/. 

275 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
should  be  searched,  and  provide  them  with  the  confidence  to  hold  suspect  objects  for 
specialist inspection. 

The use of working dogs is common among customs and security forces at points of entry, 
and from a logistical and staffing perspective, the addition of a new type of dog to existing 
teams  will  likely  be  low  impact.  Furthermore,  shippers  and  travellers  are  familiar  with 
working dogs, their presence in port of entry facilities will not be disruptive. 

Assessed Weaknesses 

Antiquities-sniffing dogs are in an early stage of development and training and it is not yet 
certain that they will prove effective in detecting illicit antiquities in transit. They have not 
yet been trained, tested, or adopted at any port. 

It is assumed that the dogs in question are being trained to detect odours related to the 
presence of soil on certain types of material associated with cultural artefacts (e.g. soil on 
ceramic, soil on patinaed bronze). It is unclear how the dogs will be able to separate these 
smells from those associated with outdoor activities or the production of modern arts and 
crafts,  as  well  as  distinguish  the  smell  of  transiting  antiquities  from  residual  orders  on 
individuals and equipment associated with archaeological and other field work. A significant 
number  of  inaccurate  signals  from  antiquities-sniffing  dogs  may  greatly  increase  the 
number of unnecessary searches of individuals and cargo, costing facilities, travellers, and 
shippers time and money.  

Related Technologies 

Antiquities-sniffing dogs are a type of work dog classed as a detection dog. They are closely 
related  in  function  to  dogs  used  to  detect  narcotics  and  contraband  biological  and  food 
products at airports and other ports of entry, and used by police forces for similar purposes.  

276 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 

In person 

All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the address 

of the centre nearest you at: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 

On the phone or by email 

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Finding information about the EU 

Online 

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EU publications 

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Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe Direct or your local information 

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EU law and related documents 

For access to legal information from the EU, including all EU law since 1952 in all the official language versions, 

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Open data from the EU 

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be downloaded and reused for free, for both commercial and non-commercial purposes. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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ISBN:   978-92-79-99359-6 
DOI: 10.2766/183649