JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on the implementation of the Action Plan Against Disinformation
Date: 2019-06-14
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: European election, Internet, action programme, disinformation, dissemination of information, freedom of expression, information, information user, parliamentary election, press

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Brussels, 14.6.2019  JOIN(2019) 12 final  JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on the implementation of the Action Plan Against Disinformation  
 
 
REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACTION PLAN AGAINST DISINFORMATION 

A.  Introduction 

Protecting our democratic processes and institutions from disinformation1 is a major challenge for our 
societies. In order to tackle this challenge, the EU has put in place a robust framework for coordinated 
action which is fully in line with our European values and fundamental rights. 

European  democracy  is  only  as  strong  as  the  active  participation  of  its  citizens.  The  record  high 
turnout  in  the  recent  European  Parliament  elections  shows  how  engaged  Europeans  want  to  be  in 
shaping the future of their Union. 

While  it  is  too  early  to  draw  final  conclusions  about  the  level  and  the  impact  of  disinformation  on 
these  elections,  it  is  clear  that  the  measures  taken  as  part  of  the  Joint  Action  Plan  against 
Disinformation2  and  the  dedicated  Elections  Package3  contributed  to  deter  attacks  and  expose 
disinformation. Encouraged by these actions, numerous journalists, fact checkers, platforms, national 
authorities,  researchers  and  civil  society  contributed  to  raising  awareness  about  how  to  counter  the 
threat. Increased public awareness made it harder for malicious actors to manipulate the public debate. 

However, there is no room for complacency and the fight against disinformation must continue. It is a 
long-term challenge that concerns all parts of our societies and requires continuous commitment and 
efforts.  More  needs  to  be  done  to  protect  our  Union’s  democratic  processes  and  institutions  from 
manipulation and disinformation.  

Today’s  report  by  the  Commission  and  the  High  Representative  provides  a  first  assessment  of  the 
progress achieved so far and sets out the main lessons for the future. It explains in more detail how the 
Action Plan and the Elections Package helped to fight disinformation in the context of the European 
elections. It is also the contribution of the Commission and the High Representative to the European 
Council meeting on 20-21 June 2019. 

B.  Towards a coordinated approach to tackle disinformation 

With  the  adoption  of  the  Action  Plan  against  Disinformation,  the  Commission  and  the  High 
Representative  put  in  place  a  strong  framework  to  counter threats inside and  outside  of the  EU.  All 
relevant  actors,  including  EU  institutions,  Member  States,  industry  and  civil  society  played  their 
respective role along four strands of action: 

1   The  Commission  defines  disinformation  as  ‘verifiably  false  or  misleading  information  that  is  created, 
presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public, and may cause public 
harm. Disinformation does not include reporting errors, satire and parody, or clearly identified partisan news 
and  commentary’(COM(2018)236).  The  aim  of  disinformation  is  to  distract  and  divide,  to  plant  seeds  of 
doubt by distorting and falsifying facts, thus confusing people and weakening their faith in institutions and 
established political processes. 

2   JOIN(2018)36. 
3   The  Election  Package  includes  Commission  Communication  on  securing  free  and  fair  European  elections, 
COM  (2018),  637;  Commission  Recommendation  on  election  cooperation  networks,  online  transparency, 
protection against cybersecurity incidents and fighting disinformation campaigns in the context of elections 
to  the  European  Parliament,  COM  (2018)  5949;  Commission  Guidance  on  the  application  of  Union  data 
protection  law  in  the  electoral  context,  COM  (2018)  638;  Regulation  (EU,  Euratom)  No  2019/493  of  the 
European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  25  March  2019  amending  Regulation  (EU,  Euratom)  No 
1141/2014 as regards a verification procedure related to infringements of rules on the protection of personal 
data in the context of elections to the European Parliament, OJ L 85I , 27.3.2019, p. 7–10. 

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1.  The EU has strengthened its capabilities to identify and counter disinformation, via the Strategic 
Communication  Task  Forces  and  the  EU  Hybrid  Fusion  Cell  in  the  European  External  Action 
Service.  It  has  also  improved  the  coordinated  response  by  setting  up  a  Rapid  Alert  System  to 
facilitate the exchange of information between Member States and the EU institutions.  

2.  The  EU  worked  with  online  platforms  and  industry  through  a  voluntary  Code  of  Practice  on 
disinformation to increase transparency of political communications and prevent the manipulative 
use of their services. This allows users to know why  they see specific political content and ads, 
and see where they come from and who is behind them. 

3.  The  Commission  and  the  High  Representative,  in  cooperation  with  the  European  Parliament, 
helped increase awareness and resilience to disinformation within society, notably through more 
fact based messaging and renewed efforts to promote media literacy. 

4.  The  Commission  has  supported  Member  States’  efforts  to  secure  the  integrity  of  elections  and 
strengthen  the  resilience  of  the  Union’s  democratic  systems,  by  facilitating  collaboration, 
providing guidance and support, and through legislative measures. 

Overview of EU joint and coordinated action against disinformation 

Launch of the EEAS 
East StratCom Task 
Force 

Communication on tackling 
online disinformation: a 
European approach 

Code of practice 
against 
disinformation 

03/2015 

04/2016 

Spring 2018 

09/2018 

09/2018 

11/2018 

Joint Framework on the 
countering hybrid threats 

Package of measures securing 
free and fair European elections 

Launch of the Observatory for 
Disinformation and Social Media Analysis 

Action Plan against 
disinformation 

Reporting by 
online platforms 

Set up of the Rapid 
Alert System 

12/2018 

01/2019 

January-May 2019 

03/2019 

03/2019 

05/2019 

Inaugural meeting of the European 
cooperation network for elections 

European Media 
Literacy Week 

European Commission’s Contribution to the 
informal EU27 leaders’ meeting in Sibiu 

1.  Improving capabilities and strengthening coordinated responses  

The Commission and the High Representative strengthened the Union’s capabilities to detect, analyse 
and expose disinformation, as well as to ensure a coordinated response, in particular through the Rapid 
Alert System. This was notably done by reinforcing related work strands in the Directorate General for 
Communication  and  by  stepping  up  the  financial  and  human  resources  of  the  Strategic 
Communication  Task  Forces  of  the  European  External  Action  Service.  For  instance,  the  increased 

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budget helped the East Strategic Communications Task Force to expand the scope of their activities 
and further develop professional monitoring. 

The Rapid Alert System facilitated daily exchanges and sharing of information on a number of cases 
and trends related to disinformation between EU authorities and Member States.  

At  this  point  in  time,  available  evidence  has  not  allowed  to  identify  a  distinct  cross-border 
disinformation  campaign  from  external  sources  specifically  targeting  the  European  elections. 
However,  the  evidence  collected  revealed  a  continued  and  sustained  disinformation  activity  by 
Russian sources4 aiming to suppress turnout and influence voter preferences. These covered a broad 
range  of  topics,  ranging  from  challenging  the  Union’s  democratic  legitimacy  to  exploiting  divisive 
public debates on issues such as of migration and sovereignty. This confirms that the disinformation 
campaigns deployed by state and non-state actors5 pose a hybrid threat to the EU. 

There was a consistent trend of malicious actors using disinformation to promote extreme views and 
polarise local debates, including through unfounded attacks on the EU. Domestic political actors often 
adopted  the  tactics  and  narratives  used  by  Russian  sources  to  attack  the  EU  and  its  values6.  Other 
external actors were also involved. 

Malicious actors have used the fire in the Notre Dame Cathedral to illustrate 
the alleged decline of Western and Christian values in the EU. They have also 
been quick to attribute the political crisis and the subsequent collapse of the 
government  in  Austria  to  the  ‘European  deep  state’,  ‘German  and  Spanish 
Security  Services’  and  individuals.  The  spreading  of  stories  about  the 
irrelevance  of  European  Parliament's  legislative  powers  and  its  control  by 
lobbyists aimed to suppress the vote7.  

The tactics used by these actors are evolving as quickly as the measures adopted by states and online 
platforms. Instead of conducting large-scale operations on digital platforms, these actors, in particular 
linked to Russian sources, now appeared to be opting for smaller-scale, localised operations that are 
harder to detect and expose. 

Given  the  increasingly  sophisticated  nature  of  disinformation  activities,  and  the  difficulties  of 
independent  researchers  to  access  relevant  data  from  the  platforms,  a  conclusive  assessment  of  the 
scope and impact of disinformation campaigns will take time and require a concerted effort by civil 
society, academia, public actors and online platforms. 

The  Rapid  Alert  System  has  demonstrated  its  value  by  fostering  closer  coordination  among  EU 
institutions and national authorities. The number of interactions between authorities has been growing 
steadily  and  the  tool  has  become  a  reference  point  for  the  fight  against  disinformation.  It  has  also 
strengthened  cooperation  with  online  platforms,  although  the  platforms  still  need  to  become  more 
responsive to external reports of inauthentic behaviour and malign content. The Rapid Alert System 

4   The  number  of  disinformation  cases  attributed  to  Russian  sources  and  documented  by  the  East  Strategic 
Communication Task Force since January 2019 (998) doubled as compared to the same period in 2018 (434). 
5   See in particular Facebook announcements on the removal of pages, groups and accounts in other countries 

https://newsroom.fb.com/news/. 

6   https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/interim-briefing-propaganda-and-digital-campaigning-in-the-eu-

elections/. 
7   For  more 

the 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/disinformation-cases/. 

disinformation 

on 

cases 

on 

these 

issues, 

see  EUvsDisinfo 

portal: 

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also facilitated cooperation with international partners, such as the G7 and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, and this will be further strengthened in the future.  

2.  Implementation of the Code of Practice on Disinformation 

Online  platforms  have  become  powerful  gateways  to  information  for  many  EU  citizens.  They 
therefore can play a key role in the spread of disinformation. This is why the Commission has urged 
platforms to step up their efforts in the fight against disinformation.  As a result, the main platforms, 
including  Facebook,  Google,  Twitter,  along  with  software  companies  and  bodies  representing  the 
advertising industry adopted in October 2018 a self-regulatory Code of Practice on disinformation8. In 
doing so, they voluntarily committed to improve the transparency, accountability and trustworthiness 
of their services.  

In  view  of  the  2019  European  elections,  the  Commission  and  the  European  Regulators  Group  for 
Audiovisual  Media  Services  (ERGA)9  carried  out  a  targeted  monitoring  of  the  actions  taken  by 
Facebook,  Google  and  Twitter  on  the  basis  of  monthly  reports  submitted  by  these  platforms  from 
January to May 201910. This monitoring identified the following achievements: 

  The online platforms improved their scrutiny of ad placements to limit malicious click-baiting 
practices and reduce advertising revenues for those posting disinformation. Their monthly reports 
provided detailed figures, by Member State, on the number of ads taken down and ad accounts 
closed due to deceptive or misleading behaviour11.  

  All three online platforms stepped up their efforts to improve transparency for political ads, in 

particular by labelling them and making them publicly available via searchable ad libraries.  

  The  platforms  reported  to  have  taken  actions  to  support  the  integrity  of  their  services.  They 
reported  to  focus  on  manipulative  behaviour  to  make  content  more  visible  through  coordinated 
operations, as well as the abusive use of bots and fake accounts.  

From  January  to  May,  online  platforms  have  taken  action  against 
inauthentic  behaviour  to  limit  the  scope  of  spam  and  disinformation 
globally. Google reported to have globally removed more than 3.39 million 
Youtube  channels  and  8,600  channels  for  violations  against  its  spam  and 
impersonation policies. Facebook disabled 2.19 billion fake accounts in the 
first quarter of 2019 and acted specifically against 1,574 non-EU-based and 
168 EU-based pages, groups and accounts engaged in inauthentic behaviour 
targeting  EU  Member  States.  Twitter  challenged  almost  77  million  spam-
like or fake accounts globally. 

8   In May 2019 Microsoft became a signatory to the Code. 
9   A full report will be adopted by ERGA at the meeting of 20/21 June 2019. 
10   The Commission published these reports together with its assessment of the progress in the  implementation 

of the Code of Practice. 

11   Such behaviour includes impersonation, spamming, misrepresentation of identity, links to ‘ad-farms’ and/or 
impostor websites. During the five-month period, Google took action against 131,621 EU-based ads accounts 
for  violating  its  misrepresentation  policies,  and  against  26,824  EU-based  ads  accounts  for  violating  its 
policies on insufficient original content; also, it took action against 1,188 EU-based publisher accounts for 
violating its policies on valuable inventory. Facebook reported on some 1.2 million ads actioned in the EU 
for violating its policies on low quality or disruptive content, misleading or false content, or circumvention of 
its systems. Twitter reported rejecting 6,018 ads targeted at the EU for violation of its unacceptable business 
practices ads policy as well as 9,508 EU-targeted ads for violations of its quality ads policy. 

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In  the  days  preceding  the  elections,  online  platforms  identified  and  took  down  additional  accounts 
spreading  disinformation  and  hate  speech  following  alerts  from  independent  investigators  and 
journalists12. More than 600 groups and Facebook pages operating across France, Germany, Italy, the 
United Kingdom, Poland and Spain were reported to have spread disinformation and hate speech or 
have used false profiles to artificially boost the content of parties or sites they supported. These pages 
generated  763  million  user  views.  Reports  from  researchers,  fact-checkers  and  civil  society  also 
identified  additional  instances  of large-scale  attempts  to  manipulate  voting  behaviour  across  at  least 
nine Member States13. 

Notwithstanding  these  efforts,  more  needs  to  be  done  by  the  platforms  to  effectively  tackle 
disinformation.  Although  Facebook  extended  its  transparency  to  issue-based  ads14  and  Google  and 
Twitter  did  not,  questions  remain  about  the  effectiveness  of  the  transparency  measures  taken  by  all 
signatories. Furthermore, the platforms did not make sufficient progress in increasing the transparency 
of websites hosting ads, partly due to the lack of engagement from the advertising industry.  

All platforms should also ensure an active and working cooperation with fact checkers in all Member 
States  and  empower  users  to  better  detect  disinformation.  This  can  be  done,  for  instance,  by 
developing trustworthiness indicators for information sources in cooperation with media organisations.  

Platforms should also give meaningful access to data to the research community, in line with personal 
data protection rules. The cooperation with researchers will enable a better detection and analysis of 
disinformation  campaigns,  a  sound  monitoring  of  the  Code’s  implementation  and  independent 
oversight of the functioning of algorithms. The Commission will continue to promote a wide take-up 
of the Code amongst all relevant stakeholders. 

Before  the  end  of  the  year,  the  Commission  will  assess  the  effectiveness  of  the  Code  following  its 
initial 12-months implementation period. Should the results of this assessment not be satisfactory, the 
Commission may propose further initiatives, including of a regulatory nature. 

3.  Awareness raising and improving societal resilience  

There is a need to join forces to counter disinformation and foster societal resilience. This can be done 
by empowering citizens and civil society and ensuring fact-based communication on the EU. Ahead of 
the European elections, the EU institutions have worked closely in the following areas:  

  Raising awareness of disinformation: EU institutions launched a number of initiatives to raise 
public  awareness  of  disinformation  across  EU  Member  States,  including  seminars,  conferences 
and  media  briefings.  Overall,  hundreds  of  journalists  participated,  leading  to  an  increased 
understanding  and  coverage  of  disinformation  threats.  Information  sessions  for  visitors  groups 
including  during  the  European  Youth  Week  in  Brussels,  hosted  approximately  200  participants 
from civil society, universities and youth organisations.  

12   https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/22/far-right-facebook-groups-spreading-hate-to-millions-in-

europe. 

13   Avaaz (2019): Far Right Networks of Deception; Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2019): 2019 EU Elections 
Information  Operations  Analysis: Interim Briefing Paper; Avaaz  & Institute for  Strategic Dialogue (2019): 
Disrupted: Evidence of Widespread Digital Disruption of the 2019 European Parliament Elections. 

14   E.g.  immigration,  political  values,  civil  and  social  rights,  security  and  foreign  policy,  and  environmental 

politics. 

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Due  to  the  new  EU  data  protection  rules,  a  myth  circulated  in  Germany  that 
children  would  not  be  able  to  attach  their  letters  to  Santa  Claus  (known  as 
Wunschzettel) to their town’s Christmas tree, as is customary. Although the EU 
data protection  rules  were designed to  protect  one’s personal  data  being  used 
without their permission, nowhere does it say that children can’t publicly share 
what they want for Christmas, provided their parents agree. 

  Better  communication  on  EU  policies:  To  increase  awareness  and  better  understanding  of  the 
impact  of  the  EU  on  their  daily  life,  EU  institutions  provided  proactive  and  multilingual 
communication  to  millions  of  EU  citizens  through  social  media15  and  through  communication 
campaigns16.  The  European  Parliament  launched  an  awareness  campaign  called  “This  Time  I'm 
Voting”17 and several national authorities took similar actions. The Commission and the European 
External Action Service significantly expanded their positive communications through dedicated 
campaigns, reaching millions of citizens.  

  Boosting  the  EU  capacity  to  react  to  disinformation:  The  Commission  worked  together  with 
the European External Action Service and the European Parliament to produce and distribute myth 
busting  and  awareness-raising  materials,  drawing  on  both  academic  and  institutional  expertise. 
The internal Commission Network against Disinformation operated regularly, in cooperation with 
other  EU  institutions,  combining  policy  expertise  and  communication  know-how.  Several 
Commission Representations created pages on their websites rebutting longstanding myths about 
the  EU  and  developed  partnerships  with  fact  checkers,  editorial  teams  and  other  civil  society 
initiatives to debunk disinformation. 

15   The Commission regularly communicates via its social media accounts on the topic of disinformation: there 
were 57 posts from January 2018 to April 2019, across Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and LinkedIn, which 
generated 54 781 engagements and had an impact of 3 256 476 impressions (Twitter and Facebook only) and 
385 655 reach (Facebook and Instagram only). 

16   A  Europe  that  delivers  (InvestEU,  running  in  16  Member  states  and  reaching  over  240  million  potential 
contacts in 2017-2018), a Europe that empowers (EUandME, targeting around 100 million 18-35 year-olds in 
the EU, and reaching over 60 million potential contacts in 2018-2019) and a Europe that protects (targeting 
35-55 year-olds – and reaching almost 60 million potential contacts in 2018-2019.) 

17   This  campaign  involved  300  000  supporters  engaged  in  debating  Europe  in  their  local  communities  and 
social groups - both on and off-line. Over 340 three hundred pan-European organisations partnered up with 
Parliament to promote the elections. 

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EU institutions 

Researchers 

Member  
States 

The fight against 
disinformation is a shared 
responsibility of all 
relevant actors 

Civil society 

Private sector /  
online platforms 

Fact checkers 

  Strengthening societal resilience through media literacy: A high level of media literacy is key 
in enabling citizens to make informed decisions in the digital age. It is a pre-requisite for a vibrant, 
modern  democracy.  To  scale  up  media  literacy  initiatives  across  the  EU  and  highlight  best 
practices, in particular at regional and national level, the Commission organised the first European 
Media Literacy Week with more than 320 events  in the EU18.  In line with the new audio-visual 
media  services  directive19,  Member  States  will  have  to  bolster  media  literacy  measures  in  their 
national frameworks, in close cooperation with regulators and other stakeholders. 

  Empowering civil society: The International Fact-Checking Network created a European branch 
of  independent  fact  checkers  covering  14  Member  States  and  launched  a  website  in  11  EU 
languages. The Commission will continue to facilitate the creation of a European multidisciplinary 
community  of  independent  fact  checkers  and  academic  researchers.  Under  the  Horizon  2020 
programme, the Commission supported investments in new technologies for content verification 
and distribution through social media. In the Union’s neighbourhood, the Commission increased 
efforts to build links between EU and partner countries’ civil society. This allowed to identify and 
test community-driven solutions to fight disinformation. 

The  Commission  launched  the  Social  Observatory  for  Disinformation  and 
Social Media Analysis (SOMA) facilitating networking, knowledge exchange 
and development of best practices among independent fact checkers. A first 
group  of  14  European  fact-checking  organisations  have  access  to  SOMA, 
which 
research  on 
launching  multidisciplinary  centres 
disinformation.  The  Connecting  Europe  Facility  will  also  provide  funding 
(EUR  2.5  million)  for  a  new  digital  service  infrastructure  aimed  at 
networking fact checkers and researchers. 

is  also 

for 

18   This initiative  was carried out in cooperation with the Member States and took place from 18 to 22 March 

2019. 

19   Directive (EU) 2018/1018 of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 November 2018. 

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4.  Protecting the integrity of elections 

Since the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica case and the revelations about election interference around 
the  world,  the  Commission  has  acted  decisively  to  protect  the  integrity  of  elections  and  increase 
societal  resilience,  in  particular  with  its  Election  Package.  These  actions  helped  achieve  concrete 
results in the following areas: 

Improved coordination of election authorities: The election networks consisting of authorities 
with competence relevant to electoral context, established in cooperation with Member States, led 
to increased preparedness for possible threats and better coordination of activities at national and 
EU  level  before  the  elections.  Their  activities  included  identification  of  threats  and  gaps,  crisis 
preparedness,  awareness-raising  campaigns,  efforts  to  counter  disinformation,  monitoring  and 
enforcement  of  applicable  rules  and  analyses  of  applicable  national  laws  and  procedures.  The 
established collaboration effectively supported the preparation for elections in Member States and 
helped to address some of the differences in this complex area. 

  Better  protection  against  cyber  threats:  Practical  exercises  organised  with  the  support  of the 
European  Union  Agency  for  Network  and  Information  Security  (ENISA),  the  Commission  and 
the  Parliament  helped  strengthen  preparedness  and  resilience  towards  cyber  threats20.  The  EU 
institutions  took  steps  to  protect  the  social  media  accounts  of  the  EU  Institutions  and  of  their 
selected  key  representatives21.  With  the  adoption  of  a  new  legal  framework22,  the  EU  can  now 
also  impose  sanctions  (e.g.  asset  freeze,  travel  ban)  to  deter  and  respond  to  cyber-attacks  that 
constitute an external threat to the Union or its Member States. 

  Misuse  of  personal  data:  To  clarify  data  protection  obligations,  the  Commission  issued 
guidance23 on how to apply the General Data Protection Regulation in the electoral context. The 
European Data Protection Board also issued a statement on the use of personal data in political 
campaigns24 committing to work with other relevant authorities to safeguard trust in the security 
and integrity of the elections. In addition, new measures introducing sanctions for infringements 
of  data  protection  rules  by  European  political  parties  entered  into  force25.  The  Commission 
recommended that Member States adopt the same approach at the national level. 

20   Two exercises organised by ENISA helped prepare national authorities for incidents aiming to create doubt 
about the legitimacy of the elections and for a scenario in which  cyber-attacks were performed over critical 
infrastructures  before  and  during  European  elections.  Over  70  incident-handling  experts  from  the  EU 
Member States participated in the latest exercise in May 2019. 

21   Social Media Assurance Service (SMAS) provided by EU Computer Emergency Response Team. 
22   Council  Regulation  (EU)  2019/796  concerning  restrictive  measures  against  cyber-attacks  threatening  the 
Union or its Member States, OJ L 129I , 17.5.2019, p. 1–12; Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 concerning 
restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States, OJ L 129I , 17.5.2019, 
p. 13–19. 

23   COM(2018) 638. 
24   https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb-2019-03-13-statement-on-elections_en.pdf. 
25   Regulation  2019/493  amending  Regulation  1141/2014  as  regards  a  verification  procedure  related  to 
infringements  of  rules  on  the  protection  of  personal  data  in  the  context  of  elections  to  the  European 
Parliament, OJ L 85I , 27.3.2019, p. 7–10. 

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  Boosting  transparency:  Member  States,  political  parties,  foundations  and  campaigns  were 
invited to take  measures  to  enhance  the transparency  of  political communications  and  ads.  The 
objective  was  to  enable  EU  citizens  to  recognise  online  paid  political  ads  and  communications 
and identify who is behind them. For instance, this can be done by making information available 
on their websites relating to their expenditure on online activities and on targeting criteria used 
for ads.  

Based on this experience, the Commission will adopt a comprehensive report in October 2019 on the 
elections, including on the implementation of the Elections package. 

C.  Conclusions 

In  the  run-up  to  the  European  elections,  the  coordinated  EU  approach  helped  to  ensure  stronger 
preparedness and coordination in the fight against disinformation. The preliminary analysis shows that 
it contributed to expose disinformation attempts and to preserve the integrity of the elections26, while 
protecting freedom of expression. The highest turnout in the past twenty years (50.97 %) reflects the 
interest of the citizens for the Union and its importance for their lives. 

However,  there  is  no  room  for  complacency.  Disinformation  is  an  evolving  threat  that  requires 
continuous  research  to  update  our  policy  toolbox  in  line  with  new  trends  and  practices.  Malicious 
sources,  both  within  and  outside  the  EU,  are  constantly  using  new  tactics,  opting  increasingly  for 
smaller-scale local operations that are less likely to be detected and exposed. However, the objective 
remains the same: dividing our society and undermining the trust of citizens in democratic processes 
and institutions.  

Protecting  our  democratic  processes  and  institutions  from  disinformation  and  manipulation  poses  a 
long-term challenge and requires continuous efforts. This requires a joint effort of EU institutions and 
Member  States  and  includes  the  need  for  adequate  human  and  financial  resources  to  better  detect, 
analyse  and  expose  disinformation  campaigns  and  raising  preparedness  to  address  disinformation 
campaigns  at  EU  and  national  level.  The  private  sector,  in  particular  online  platforms,  have  a 
particular responsibility in tackling disinformation.  

The Commission’s contribution to the informal EU27 leaders’ meeting in  Sibiu on 9 May27 made it 
clear: the rise of targeted disinformation campaigns will remain a major challenge for the future, and 
called for joint action by EU institutions and Member States to counter the threat.  

The European External Action Service and the Commission, together with Member States, will further 
strengthen cooperation within the Rapid Alert System, including developing a common methodology 
for  analysis  and  exposure  of  disinformation  campaigns  and  stronger  partnerships  with  international 
partners, such as G7 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

Still this year, the Commission will report on the implementation of the Election Package and assess 
the effectiveness of the Code of Practice. On this basis further actions may be considered to ensure and 
improve our long-term response to the threat. 

26   This has been recognised by independent actors and media as well. A study by the Oxford Internet Institute 
found  that  less  than  4%  of  news  sources  shared  on  Twitter  ahead  of  the  European  elections  was 
disinformation  content,  while  mainstream  professional  news  outlets  received  34%  of  shares.  According  to 
FactCheckEU, there was less disinformation than expected in the run up to the European elections and it did 
not dominate the conversation as it did around the past elections in Brazil, the United Kingdom, France or the 
United States. 
27   COM(2019)218. 

9 

 
                                                           
REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACTION PLAN AGAINST DISINFORMATION 

The Commission and the High Representative are committed to continue their joint efforts to protect 
our  European  democracy  from  disinformation  and  manipulation.  It  is  our  shared  responsibility  to 
safeguard EU citizens' right to factual, objective and reliable information. 

10