The cost of non-Schengen : civil liberties, justice and home affairs aspects : cost of non-Europe report.
Date: 2019-06-14
Institutions: Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services
Subjects: Europe, Schengen Agreement, border control, civil rights, costing, economic consequence, external border of the EU, frontier region, industrial policy, internal border of the EU, report, right to justice, road transport, single market

The Cost of  
Non-Schengen: 
Civil Liberties, 
Justice and 
Home Affairs 
aspects 

Cost of Non-Europe 
Report  

 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs aspects 

Study 

At  their  meeting  of  2  February  2016  the  coordinators  of  the  European  Parliament’s 
Committee  on  Civil  Liberties,  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  (LIBE)  requested  the  Policy 
Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs to conduct 'An analysis of the 
Schengen area in the wake of the recent developments'.1  

In  addition,  the  European  Parliamentary  Research  Service  (EPRS)  was  requested  to 
provide  a  specific  analysis  of  the  potential  costs  of  re-introducing  internal  border 
controls  -  or  of  the  'Cost  of  non-Schengen'  on  the  areas  of  Civil  Liberties,  Justice  and 
Home Affairs - in coordination with the Policy Department.  

In response to that request, this Cost of Non-Europe Report has been drawn up by the 
European Added Value Unit of the Directorate for Impact Assessment and European 
Added  Value  within  DG  EPRS.  The  aim  of  this  study  is  to  identify  the  costs  of  the 
(temporary) re-introduction of border controls between the Schengen Member States in 
economic, social and political terms and the potential benefits of more concerted action 
at European level, compared to the lack of such action or action by Member States alone, 
focusing on civil liberties, justice and home affairs. 

This  assessment  builds  on  expert  research  commissioned  specifically  for  the  purpose 
from RAND Europe in the form of a Research Paper entitled ‘The Cost of Non-Schengen: 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Aspects’. This Research Paper is found in the 
Annex to this report. 

1 Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), ‘An Analysis of the Schengen Area in the wake of 
recent  developments’,  Research  paper  for    Policy  Department  C:  Citizens’  Rights  and 
Constitutional Affairs, Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, DG IPOL, European Parliament, 
2016, PE 571356  

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Cost of Non-Europe Report 

Abstract 

The  Schengen  Area  is  one  of  the  major  achievements  of  European  integration  as  it 
facilitates  the  free  movement  of  persons,  goods  and  services  which  has  brought 
significant benefits to the European economy and citizens. Yet, the recent unprecedented 
influx  of  refugees  and  migrants  to  Europe  has  exposed  serious  deficiencies  in  the 
common  asylum,  migration  and  external  border  control  policies.  These  deficiencies, 
together with concerns related to internal security, have led several Schengen States to 
reintroduce internal border controls. 

This  study  identifies  the  costs,  of  the  (temporary)  reintroduction  of  border  controls 
between the Schengen Member States, with a special focus on civil liberties, justice, and 
home affairs aspects.   

Given  the  restricted  data  availability  and  methodological  limitations,  the  economic, 
social and political costs of reintroducing border controls within the Schengen Area are 
hard to measure. Within this context, it is difficult to estimate with a sufficient degree of 
certainty an overall cost in this policy field. Based on the expert research, however, this 
study estimates that - depending on their scope and length - the costs linked with the 
reintroduction of border controls could range between €0.05 billion and €20 billion in 
one-off  costs  and  between  €2  billion  and  €4  billion  in  annual  operating  costs.  This 
amounts to around 0.02%-0.03 % of the Schengen area GDP.  

As  regards  the  offences  investigated,  the  abolition  of  border  controls  in  the  light  of 
Schengen  has  not  led  to  higher  crime  rates,  nor  has  the  2007  Schengen  enlargement 
increased the perception of insecurity among EU citizens. On the contrary, citizens’ trust 
in each other and towards public institutions seems to have increased. It is important to 
note that the abolition of border controls has been accompanied by measures to facilitate 
cross- border police and judicial cooperation, for instance adding to the number of illicit 
drug seizures. The societal benefits of this cooperation could be undone by a return to 
permanent border controls. Public trust in the EU seems to have been undermined, not 
by the existence of the Schengen Area, but rather by the failure of the European Union 
to effectively address the deficiencies exposed by the refugee crises. 

This study recommends more concerted action at EU level with a view to returning to a 
fully functioning Schengen Area. Regaining inter-Member State and citizens’ trust in the 
EU’s  ability  to  tackle  the  deficiencies  exposed  by  the  refugee  crisis  should  be  an 
immediate priority. More concerted action at EU level is necessary to foster solidarity 
and  cooperation  between  Member  State  authorities.  Their  work  should  also  be 
supported  through  EU  agencies,  such  as  the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard, 
Europol, Eurojust and the European Asylum Support Office. The need for changes to the 
current  Schengen  governance  framework  should  be  further  considered  based  on 
compliance with the conditions allowing five Member States to maintain their internal 
border controls until November 2016. 

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The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

AUTHOR 
Wouter  van  Ballegooij, European  Added  Value Unit.  The  author would  like  to  thank 
Pierre Goudin, Alexandra Gatto and Maria Christina Stavridou for their contributions. 
To contact the Unit, please email: EPRS-EuropeanAddedValue@ep.europa.eu  

ABOUT THE PUBLISHER 
This paper has been drawn up by the European Added Value Unit of the Directorate 
for Impact Assessment and European Added Value, within the Directorate–General for 
Parliamentary Research Services of the European Parliament.  

LANGUAGE VERSIONS 
Original: EN 
Translations: DE, FR  

This document is available on the internet at: www.europarl.eu/thinktank 

DISCLAIMER 
The content of this document is the sole responsibility of the author and any opinions 
expressed  therein  do  not  necessarily  represent  the  official  position  of  the  European 
Parliament. It is addressed to the Members and staff of the EP for their parliamentary 
work.  Reproduction  and  translation  for  non-commercial  purposes  are  authorised, 
provided the source is acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice 
and sent a copy. 

Manuscript completed in September 2016. Brussels © European Union, 2016. 

PE 581.387 

ISBN: 978-92-823-9958-3 

doi:10.2861/58070  

QA-01-16-770-EN-N

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Cost of Non-Europe Report 

Note on methodology 

The notion of the 'Cost of non-Europe' was introduced by Michel Albert and James Ball 
in a 1983 report commissioned by the European Parliament. It was also a central element 
in a 1988 study carried out for the European Commission by the Italian economist Paolo 
Cecchini on the cost of non-Europe in the single market. 

Cost  of  Non-Europe  (CoNE)  reports  are  designed  to  study  the  possibilities  for  gains 
and/or the realisation of a 'public good' through common action at EU level in specific 
policy areas and sectors. They attempt to identify areas that are expected to benefit most 
from deeper EU integration, where the EU’s added value is potentially significant. 

The specific aim of this Cost of Non-Europe report is to identify the root cause of gaps 
and  barriers  that  have  led  to  the  reintroduction  of  internal  border  controls  in  the 
Schengen Area (without prejudice to the question as to whether these deficiencies justify 
the reintroduction of internal border controls). The costs of the reintroduction of those 
border controls were estimated in economic, social and political terms, focusing on civil 
liberties, justice and home affairs aspects. Where it was not possible to quantify all the 
costs and effects, a qualitative, complementary approach was used.  

The economic impact of the reintroduction of border controls was estimated based on 
research that followed a bottom-up cost modelling approach comprising (i) the one-off 
fixed costs of setting up or reconstructing border crossing points and (ii) the operating, 
patrolling, administrative and maintenance costs of the day-to-day border controls. This 
approach was then applied to three potential scenarios affecting the scope and length of 
internal  border  controls.  Estimates  were  based  on  extrapolating  data  from  Finland, 
Switzerland  and  Latvia;  however,  this  data  covered  the  overall  expenses  related  to 
border protection only, thus preventing a more detailed analysis.  

The social impact of the (temporary) reintroduction of border controls  was measured 
based on research looking at the impact of border controls on crime and security.  There 
are,  however,  limitations  to  measuring  this  impact  due  to  the  lack  of  clear  criminal 
definitions  with  comparable  data  among  the  Schengen  States.  Therefore  a  number  of 
similarly-defined crimes were selected (acquisitive crimes, homicides, (hard) drugs). It 
is  also  important  to  bear  in  mind  that  this  data  only  concerns  reported  crimes.  As 
reporting  of  crimes  differs  between  Schengen  States,  this  report  also  draws  on  crime 
victimisation survey data.  

The political impact was estimated based on research looking at changes in the public’s 
trust in others, in politicians, in national parliaments and the European Parliament, in 
the  police,  or  in  the  legal  system, both in  original  Schengen  countries,  and  those  that 
acceded in 2008. A comparison was also made between border and non-border regions. 
Finally, this report recommends different EU policy options that could help overcome 
the identified gaps and barriers.  

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The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

Table of Contents 

Note on methodology ................................................................................................................ 5 

Executive summary .................................................................................................................... 7 

1. 

Introduction: background and current state of play ............................................ 10 

1.1.  Background ................................................................................................................ 10 

1.2.  Current State of play................................................................................................. 13 

2. 

Gaps and barriers in the area of justice and home affairs having led to the 

reintroduction of border controls ........................................................................................... 17 

3. 

Economic, social and political impact of the reintroduction of border controls 

between the Schengen States .................................................................................................. 20 

3.1.  Economic impact ....................................................................................................... 20 

3.2.  Social impact: Crime and security .......................................................................... 23 

3.2.1.  Cross country trends in acquisitive crime rates (vehicle theft, robberies, 

and burglaries) and homicide (2003-2013) ........................................................... 25 

3.2.2.  Cross-regional trends in acquisitive crime and homicide rates ― border 

vs. non-border regions ............................................................................................ 28 

3.2.3. 

The fight against drugs trafficking before and after entering Schengen .. 29 

3.3.  Political impact: Trust .............................................................................................. 31 

4. 

Possible options for action at EU level ................................................................... 32 

Recommendation...................................................................................................................... 35 

Annex 

Research Paper by RAND Europe on the Cost of non-Schengen from a Civil Liberties 
and Home Affairs Perspective  

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Cost of Non-Europe Report 

List of Diagrams 

Diagram 1:  Trends in acquisitive crime and homicide rates in existing Schengen states 

before and after 2007 Schengen enlargement ....................................................................... 25 

Diagram 2 : Trends in acquisitive crime and homicide rates in newly acceding Schengen 

and non-Schengen states before and after 2007 Schengen enlargement .......................... 27 

Diagram 3 : Regional trend in acquisitive  crime (burglary, car theft and robbery) and 

homicide rates between border and non-border NUTS 3 regions .................................... 29 

List of Figures 

Figure 1: Administrative cost estimation diagram .............................................................. 20 

Figure 2: Trend in trust in national governments and parliaments, and in the European 

Union .......................................................................................................................................... 32 

List of Tables 

Table 1 : Summary table trends in crime rates in existing Schengen states before and after 

2007 ............................................................................................................................................. 26 

Table  2  :  Summary  table  trends  in  crime  rates  in  newly  acceding  Schengen  and  non-

Schengen states before and after 2007 ................................................................................... 28 

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The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

Executive summary 

The Schengen Agreements are a central tool in enabling the free movement of people 
throughout  the  European  continent,  allowing  them  to  move  freely  across  borders  of 
participating states. As such, the borderless Schengen Area gives a tangible reality to the 
four  freedoms  of  the  Single  Market  (free  movement  of  people,  goods,  services  and 
capital).  

Schengen is clearly one of the major achievements of European integration. It is now a 
crucial  part  of  the wider  aim  of  the  European  Union  to  become  an  Area  of  Freedom, 
Security and Justice in which the free movement of persons is ensured in  conjunction 
with  appropriate  measures  with  respect  to  external  border  controls,  asylum, 
immigration and the prevention and combating of crime. 

The  recent  unprecedented  influx  of  refugees  and  migrants  to  Europe  has,  however, 
exposed serious deficiencies in the practical operation of the common asylum, migration 
and  external  border  control  policies,  notably  at  the  Greek  (and  hence  EU)  external 
border. As discussed in section 1 of this report, these deficiencies, together with related 
concerns as regards serious threats to internal security and public policy, notably posed 
by ‘secondary movement of irregular migrants’, have led a number of Schengen States 
to reintroduce internal border controls. They sought to justify this action in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of the Schengen Borders Code (SBC).2   

Given the persistence of serious deficiencies in the management of the Greek external 
border,  the  Council  adopted  an  implementing  decision  on  12  May  2016,  based  on  a 
recommendation of the Commission, allowing five Schengen States (Austria, Denmark, 
Germany, Norway and Sweden) to maintain controls  at certain parts of their internal 
borders for a further six months (until November 2016).3  

As  discussed  in  section  2  of  this  report,  the  Schengen  State  notifications  point  to  a 
political  climate  in  which  there  is  a  loss  of  trust  in  the  ability  of  (other)  States  to 
effectively  guard  the  external  borders,  process  asylum  applications  and  cooperate 
together in the fight against terrorism and other serious crimes. Initiatives to regain that 
trust were outlined by the Commission in the ‘Back to Schengen Roadmap’4, the aim of 
which  was to ensure the return to the normal functioning of the Schengen Area and to 
lift all internal border controls related to the migratory crisis by the end of 2016 at the 

2  Regulation  (EC)  562/2006  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  establishing  a 
Community  Code  on  the  rules  governing  the  movement  of  persons  across  borders  (Schengen 
Borders Code), as of 6 June 2016; Member States’ notifications of the temporary reintroduction  of 
border controls at internal borders.  
3 Council Implementing Decision setting out a Recommendation for temporary internal border 
control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk. 
4 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and 
the Council, Back to Schengen- A Roadmap, COM (2016) 120 of 4 March 2016. 

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Cost of Non-Europe Report 

latest. The Roadmap is based on the reinforcement of external border control, notably 
through the European Border and Coast Guard, a full application of EU asylum law by 
Greece, stepping up the implementation of the emergency relocation scheme5 and the 
EU Turkey Joint Action Plan.6 In calling for interoperability of data collection, exchange 
and analysis, the Commission also refers to evidence of terrorists having used routes of 
irregular migration. 7 

Against this background, section 3.1. of this report identifies the costs of the (temporary) 
reintroduction of border controls between the Schengen States, in economic, social and 
political terms, with a special focus on:  

(i) the one-off fixed costs of setting up or reconstructing border crossing points, 
and the operating, patrolling, administrative and maintenance costs of the day-
to-day border controls,  

(ii) the impact of border controls on crime and security,  

(iii) changes in trust amongst the public : trust in others, in politicians, in national 
parliaments and in the European Parliament, in the police, or in the legal system. 

As regards the economic impact, this report identifies three different scenarios: 

1.  A  two-year  ‘suspension’  of  the  Schengen  area  in  the  five  countries  that  have 

currently reintroduced border controls related to irregular migration 

2.  A  two-year  ‘suspension’  of  the  Schengen  Area  and  reintroduction  of  border 

controls in all Schengen countries at all internal borders 

3.  Indefinite suspension of the Schengen Agreement in all countries. 

In  Scenario  1 it  is  unlikely  that  border  outposts  would  be  reinstalled in full.  Member 
States would also probably manage by reallocating human resources internally. They 
would have to purchase equipment to reflect the increasing number of travellers to be 
checked. The costs are estimated to be an amount of anything up to €211.5 million.  

Scenario 2 is similar except for the fact that now all internal borders would be checked 
by all Schengen countries. The costs are estimated between €4.39 and €7.4 billion. The 
highest  costs  would  be  borne  by  Germany,  whereas  Greece,  Iceland,  Malta  and 
Liechtenstein would be the least affected.  

5 European Commission Press release, Relocation and Resettlement: EU Member States urgently 
need to deliver, Strasbourg, 12 April 2016 
6European Commission Fact Sheet, EU-Turkey joint action plan, Brussels, 15 October 2015 
7 COM(2016) 205 final 

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The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

Scenario 3 assumes a permanent reintroduction of border controls. In this cased fixed 
costs  related  to  the  rebuilding  and  refurbishment  of  outposts  are  considered  in  full. 
Those costs would be less for those States which joined the Schengen area in 2007 or later 
as  they  often  still  have  the  basic  infrastructure  in  place.  The  estimated  costs  of 
reintroducing  border  controls  could  be  around  €20  billion  in  one-off  fixed  costs  and 
around €2 to €4 billion in annual operating costs. This corresponds to around 0.02%-0.03 
% of GDP of the Schengen area. 

Based  on  the  research  conducted,  it  may  be  concluded  that  the  abolition  of  border 
controls within the  Schengen Area, and the 2007 Schengen enlargement in particular, 
has not, for the offences investigated, led to higher crime rates. As discussed in section 
3.2., acquisitive crime (burglary, robbery and car theft) rates have dropped both in the 
original  and newly acceding Schengen States. The downward trend seems to be even 
stronger in border regions. At the same time, drugs seizures have increased in countries 
which entered Schengen after 2000. It is important to note that the abolition of border 
controls has been accompanied by measures to facilitate cross-border police and judicial 
cooperation,  the  success  of  which  we  might  see  reflected  in  these  figures.  Further 
research  will  be needed to  confirm  these  trends for  other  offences  as well  as  the  link 
between (the absence of) border controls and crime rates. Also, as discussed in section 
3.3., Schengen enlargement as such has not been found to have increased the perception 
of  insecurity  among  EU  citizens.  On  the  contrary,  citizens’  trust  in  each  other  and  in 
public institutions seems to have increased. Public trust in the EU, however, does appear 
to have been undermined, due to its failure to effectively address the refugee crises. 

The  study  recommends  more  concerted  action  at  EU  level  so  as  to  ensure  that  the 
Schengen area can return to being fully operational.  Regaining inter-Member State and 
EU citizens’ trust in the EU’s ability to tackle the deficiencies exposed by the refugee 
crisis should be an immediate priority. More concerted action at EU level is necessary to 
foster solidarity and cooperation between Member State authorities. Their work should 
also be supported through EU agencies, such as the European Border and Coast Guard, 
Europol, Eurojust and the European Asylum Support Office. The need for changes to the 
current  Schengen  governance  framework  should  be  further  considered,  based  on  the 
compliance with the conditions allowing five Member States to maintain their internal 
border controls until November 2016. 

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Cost of Non-Europe Report 

1.  Introduction: background and current state of play 

1.1. Background 

The development of the Schengen Area dates back to 1985 when a group of five Member 
States  (Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands)  signed  the 
Schengen Agreement on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders.   Five 
years later, these five Member States signed a Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement. This Convention included measures regarding:  

 

removal of checks on persons at the internal borders; 

  a common set of rules applying to people crossing the external borders of the EU 

Member States; 

  harmonisation of the conditions of entry and the rules on visas for shorts stays; 

  enhanced police cooperation (including rights of cross-border surveillance and 

hot pursuit); 

 

 

stronger 
enforcement of criminal judgments; and 

judicial  cooperation  through  a  faster  extradition  system  and 

the  establishment  and  development  of  the  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS) 
enabling national authorities to share and access information on people as well 
as on goods.8 

Yet,  the  actual  removal of  border  controls  in  the  Schengen  Area  started only  in  1995, 
when the Convention entered into force. In 1999, following the signing of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam,  this  intergovernmental  agreement  was  incorporated  into  the  EU 
framework.9 Since then, the EU offers its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice 
without  internal  frontiers,  in  which  the  free  movement  of  persons  is  ensured  in 
conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, 
immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.’10 Today, the Schengen Area is 
composed of 26 countries, of which 22 are EU Member States.  

8  The  Schengen  acquis  -  Convention  implementing  the  Schengen  Agreement  of  14  June  1985 
between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders   
O. J. L 239, 22/09/2000 P. 0019 - 0062. 
9 TFEU, Protocol (No. 19) on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European 
Union. 
10 Article 3 (2) TEU; Article 67-89 TFEU. 

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The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

Map: Schengen Area as of 1 July 2013 

Source: European Commission, DG Migration and Home Affairs11 

The Schengen Agreements are a central tool in enabling the free movement of people in 
Europe, across borders of participating states. As such, the borderless Schengen Area is 
key  in  delivering  what  is  consistently  regarded  in  opinion  polls  as  one  of  the  most 
positive results of the European Union in the eyes of Europeans.12   

11http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-
visas/schengen/index_en.htm#resp_map  
12 For instance, according to the last two Eurobarometer surveys: ‘the “free movement of people, 
goods and services within the EU” (57%, +2 percentage points) and “peace among the Member 
States  of  the  EU”  (55%,  -1)  remain  by  far  the  most  positive  results  of  the  EU  in  the  eyes  of 
Europeans. Generally speaking, although the top two items – peace and free movement – have 
switched  positions  since  autumn  2014,  this  hierarchy  has  remained  very  stable.’:  Standard 
Eurobarometer #83, spring 2015; ‘‘The “free movement of people, goods and services within the 
EU”  (57%,  +2  percentage  points)  and  “peace  among  the  Member  States  of  the  EU”  (55%,  -1) 
remain by far the most positive results of the EU in the eyes of Europeans. Generally speaking, 
although the top two items – peace and free movement – have switched positions since autumn 
2014,  this  hierarchy  has  remained  very  stable.’,  Standard  Eurobarometer  #84,  autumn  2015; 
European  Parliament  resolution  of  10  September  2015  on  migration  and  refugees  in  Europe, 
P8_TA-PROV(2015)0317,  paragraph  5:    Reiterates  its  commitment  to  open  borders  within  the 

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Cost of Non-Europe Report 

The  2006  Schengen  Borders  Code13  codified  most  of  the  relevant  Schengen  rules 
concerning controls at external borders, removal of controls at internal Schengen borders 
-  and  their  temporary  reintroduction,  and  police  cooperation  in  the  zone  behind  the 
internal borders. In the aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’  of 2011, the concerns about its 
impact upon the Schengen system, and the ability of Member States to control their share 
of external borders, as well as controversies concerning some Member States’ plans to 
reintroduce ‘quasi-border’ controls within their territory, led a number of Member States 
―  in  particular  France  and  Italy  ―  to  demand  greater  freedom  to  reintroduce  border 
controls  at  internal  borders.14  This  led  to  the  reform  of  the  Schengen  governance 
framework in 2013, which included amendments to the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) 
to  provide  for  common  rules  on  the  temporary  reintroduction  of  border  controls  at 
internal borders, and a new Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism to assess 
to what extent Member States apply the Schengen acquis.15  

Specifically, Article 25 of the SBC sets out the general framework for the reintroduction 
by  a  Schengen  Member  State  of  border  controls  at  internal  borders  where  there  is  a 
‘serious  threat  to  public  policy  or  internal  security’.  In  such  a  case,  the  country  may 
decide to reintroduce controls for up to six months, provided that the border controls 
represent a ‘last resort’ option and are temporary in nature.  

Article  26  of  the  SBC  specifies  the  criteria  for  the  reintroduction  of  internal  border 
controls. Notably, when a country takes the decision to reintroduce border controls it 
should consider the likely impact of ‘any threats to its public policy or internal security’ 
and the likely impact of the measure on the free movement of persons within the area 
without internal border controls. Article 27 of the SBC further describes the procedure 
for the reintroduction of temporary border controls and sets out the relevant notification 
requirements that the Schengen Member States should follow, including giving ― other 
than in exceptional circumstances ― at least four weeks’ notice period so that all relevant 
stakeholders16  are  informed.  Article  28  of  the  SBC  relates  to  situations  that  require 

Schengen area, while ensuring effective management of external borders; stresses that the free 
movement  of  people  within  the  Schengen  area  has  been  one  of  the  biggest  achievements  of 
European integration.’; European Parliament resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the 
Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration, P8_TA-PROV(2016)0102, 
para 75. 
13  Regulation  (EC)  562/2006  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  establishing  a 
Community  Code  on  the  rules  governing  the  movement  of  persons  across  borders  (Schengen 
Borders Code).  
14  Peers,  Steve.  ‘The  future  of  the  Schengen  System’,  Swedish  Institute  for  European  Policy 
Studies, Report No. 6, November 2013.  
15  Regulation  (EU)  No  1051/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  amending 
Regulation  (EC)  No  562/2006  in  order  to  provide  for  common  rules  on  the  temporary 
reintroduction of border control at internal borders in exceptional circumstances.   
16  e.g.  other  Schengen  countries,  the  European  Commission,  the  European  Parliament,  the 
European Council. 

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immediate action and provides for short-term (up to ten days, with possible extensions) 
introduction of internal border controls.  

In addition, Article 2917 includes a provision for situations where ‘the overall functioning 
of the area without internal border control is put at risk as a result of persistent serious 
deficiencies relating to external border control’ and allows the reintroduction of border 
controls for a period of up to two years (an initial six-month period, followed  by six-
month extensions up to three times). Importantly, unlike measures taken under Articles 
25 or 28, reintroduction of border controls under Article 29 can take place based only on 
a  recommendation  from  the  Council  of  the  EU,  which  itself  should  be  based  on  a 
proposal from the Commission.  

Finally, Article 30 lays down the criteria to be taken into consideration with respect to 
any border controls that have been reintroduced under Article 29. 

The reform also changed the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism from a 
completely intergovernmental system to one that is fully integrated in EU law and run 
primarily  by  the  European  Commission.  Because  the  SBC  had  been  substantially 
amended several times, a new consolidated version came into force in March 2016.18  

1.2. Current state of play  

The unprecedented influx of refugees and migrants to Europe, exceeding one million in 
2015,19 exposed the limits of European migration, border and asylum policies. The sheer 

17 Following the agreement reached in a trialogue meeting regarding the Commission’s 
proposal on the establishment of a European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Article 29 of the 
SBC will be slightly amended. The proposed amendment provides for a coordinated re-
introduction of internal controls if the functioning of the Schengen Area is at risk due to the fact 
that a Member State  does not ensure proper follow-up of a vulnerability assessment conducted 
by the agency or does not request sufficient support from the agency to respond to a specific 
and disproportionate pressure at its external borders - see position of the European Parliament 
at first reading on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the European Border and Coast Guard,  Article 78a; Amendment to Regulation (EU) 
2016/399, article 29 (1); A. Gatto, European Border and Coast Guard System, Briefing EU 
legislation in progress, EPRS, August 30, 2016.  
18 Regulation (EU) No 399/2016 of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Union Code 
on  the  rules  governing  the  movement  of  persons  across  borders  (Schengen  Borders  Code) 
(codification);  G. Malmersjo and M.Remáč, Schengen and the management of the EU’s external 
borders, Implementation appraisal, EPRS, European Parliament, April 2016  
19 The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimates that the number of arrivals into 
Europe in 2015 exceeded 1 million people ― compared to 276 000 in 2014. As regards 2016, the 
number of arrivals in the period from 1 January to 31 May (205 509) is much larger than that over 
the same period in 2015 (91 860). IOM, ‘Irregular Migrant, Refugee Arrivals in Europe Top One 
Million  in  2015’;  IOM,  ‘Mediterranean  Migrant  Arrivals  in  2016:  205 509;  Deaths:  2 443:  New 
Tragedy Reported Off Crete Today’. 

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numbers proved too much for the authorities, notably in Greece, to deal with in terms of 
managing its (and the EU’s) external borders, providing adequate reception conditions, 
registering individuals in EURODAC and assessing their asylum claims.20 This caused a 
de facto collapse of the Dublin system which requires that asylum seekers should stay in 
the  first  Member  State  through  which  they  enter  the  EU  and  seek  asylum  there.  An 
asylum seeker who travels on to another Member State should be returned to the first 
Member State of entry.21 The European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice 
of  the  EU  have  ruled,  however,  that  such  transfers  are  not  allowed  if  the  reception 
conditions  in  the  Member  State  of  first  entry  amount  to  inhuman  or  degrading 
treatment.22  

As  a  result,  secondary  movements  of  refugees  and  migrants  occurred  through  the 
Western  Balkans,  Austria,  Germany  and  other  northern  European  countries.  These 
mixed flows have prompted a series of Schengen Member States to invoke the relevant 
provisions  of  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  (Articles  25-30,  discussed  above)  and 
reintroduce checks at their internal borders for a defined period of time. 

Since September 2015, a total of eight countries of the Schengen area – namely, Austria, 
Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Hungary,  Norway,  Slovenia  and  Sweden  -    have 
reintroduced border controls in parts of their internal borders in view of a serious threat 
to  internal  security  and  public  policy  related  to  ‘secondary  movements  of  irregular 
migrants’.23  While Hungary and Slovenia ─ in response to the decline of the identified 

20 Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), ‘An Analysis of the Schengen Area in the wake of 
recent  developments’,  Research  paper  for  Policy  Department  C:  Citizens’  Rights  and 
Constitutional Affairs, Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, DG IPOL, European Parliament, 
2016,  section 1.1. 
21 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
establishing  the  criteria  and  mechanisms  for  determining  the  Member  State  responsible  for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the  Member States by a 
third-country national or a stateless person, OJ L 180, 29 June 2013, p. 31–59.  
22 ECtHR of 21 January 2011, Application no. 30696/09, MSS v Belgium and Greece; CJEU in Joined 
Cases NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Case C-411/10 and M.E. and Others v Refugee 
Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice and Law Reform, C-493/10 [2011] ECR 13905; ECtHR 
of 4 November 2014, Application no. 29217/12, Tarakhel v Switzerland. 
23 In the same period, France and Malta also reintroduced internal border controls but for reasons 
not related to irregular migration. Specifically, France reintroduced internal border controls in 
November 2015 first in the context of the COP21 Conference and then  as a consequence of the 
state of emergency following the Paris terrorist attacks of 13 November 2015. The internal border 
controls in France are currently still on-going. As regards Malta, internal border controls were 
reintroduced on 9 November 2015 in the context of the Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting and the Valletta Conference on Migration, and were subsequently prolonged for reasons 
of a global terrorist threat  and with the  aim  of dismantling a  smuggling ring.  Malta lifted the 
internal  border  controls  on  31  December  2015.  European  Commission,  COM  (2016)  120  final, 
‘Back to Schengen ─ A roadmap’, Communication of 4 March 2016 to the European Parliament, 
the European Council and the Council.  

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threats ─ did not prolong border controls after ten and thirty days respectively, the other 
countries have prolonged the controls on several occasions in accordance with the SBC.24 

Crucially, on 2 February 2016, the Commission adopted a Schengen Evaluation Report 
on Greece, which found ‘serious deficiencies’ regarding Greece’s ability to manage its 
external borders, and on 12 February 2016, the Council issued 50 recommendations to 
Greece  to  remedy  those  deficiencies  within  three  months.25  Then,  as  part  of  its 
Communication  on  a  Roadmap  for  restoring  a  fully  functioning  Schengen  system, 
published on 4 March 2016, the Commission outlined steps to be taken, revolving mostly 
around improvements in Greece’s external border management, provision of assistance 
to  Greece,  full  resumption  of  the  Dublin  system,  and  a  coordinated  approach  to 
temporary border controls.  

Two months later, on 4 May 2016, the Commission concluded that, despite the  huge 
efforts of the Greek authorities and real progress on the ground, serious deficiencies in 
border  management  still  persisted.  It  therefore  proposed  a  prolongation  of 
proportionate  controls  at  certain  internal  Schengen  borders  in  Austria,  Denmark, 
Germany, Norway and Sweden for a maximum period of six months.26 Following the 
Commission’s recommendation, the Council adopted an implementing decision on 12 
May  2016  setting  out  a  recommendation  allowing  for  the  continuation  of  temporary 
internal border control in exceptional circumstances for a further period of six months.27 
Specifically, following the Council’s recommendation, the five countries gave notice of 
the following internal border controls:28 

  Austria:  at  the  Austrian-Hungarian  land  border  and  Austrian-Slovenian  land 

border (16 May – 12 November 2016); 

  Denmark:  in  the  Danish  ports  with  ferry  connections  to  Germany  and  at  the 

Danish-German land border (1 June – 12 November 2016); 

  Germany: at the German-Austrian land border (12 May – 12 November 2016); 

24 Currently, five of the aforementioned countries have temporary border controls at their internal 
borders in place (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Norway and Sweden). Belgium did not prolong 
the temporary border controls after 22 April 2016.  
25 Council of the European Union, Interinstitutional File 0035/2016 NLE, ‘Council Implementing 
Decision setting out a Recommendation on addressing the serious deficiencies identified in the 
2015  evaluation  of  the  application  of  the  Schengen  acquis  in  the  field  of  management  of  the 
external borders by Greece’.  
26 European Commission, Press Release of 4 May 2016, ‘Back to Schengen: Commission takes next 
steps towards lifting of temporary internal border controls’; proposal for a Council implementing 
decision  setting  out  a  recommendation  for  temporary  internal  border  control  in  exceptional 
circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk, COM(2016) 275 final. 
27 Council of the European Union, Interinstitutional File 0140/2016 NLE, ‘Council Implementing 
Decision  setting  out  a  Recommendation  for  temporary  internal  border  control  in  exceptional 
circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk’. 
28 European Commission, ‘Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control’.  

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  Norway: in the Norwegian ports with ferry connections to Denmark, Germany 

and Sweden (10 June-11 November 2016);29 

  Sweden: in the Swedish harbours in the Police Region South and West and at the 

Öresund Bridge (8 June – 11 November 2016). 

29https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/extension-of-internal-schengen-border-control-in-
norway/id2503865/ 

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2.  Gaps and barriers in the area of Justice and Home Affairs 

having led to the reintroduction of border controls  

To  justify  the  reintroduction  of  border  controls,  Member  States  have  referred  to  the 
‘serious threat to public policy or internal security’ in accordance with Article 25 of the 
Schengen Borders Code. In accordance with Article 27 of the Schengen Borders Code, 
Schengen  States  must  provide  exact  details  of  the  nature  of  the  threat  and  its  impact 
which is so substantial and immediate that it justifies the use of the exceptional border 
control measures. The consequences for EU citizens and their rights to free movement 
must be taken into account. This is necessary for the Commission and the Member States 
to assess the proportionality of the measure against the threat which the Member State 
has specified and justified under Article 26.30 

It should be pointed out that ‘migration and the crossing of external borders by a large 
number of third-country nationals should not, per se, be considered a threat to public or 
internal  security’.31  The  Asylum  Procedures  Directive32  requires  Member  States  to 
process applications made at the borders. It has been argued that a reform of the Dublin 
system (rather than Schengen) and the reinforcement of the Common European Asylum 
System would provide more appropriate responses to the refugee crisis.33  

Analysis of the notifications by Member States show that the reintroduction of border 
controls seems to be motivated by a lack of trust in the ability of the Italian and Greek 
authorities to manage their (and the Union’s) external borders. They also point to a lack 
of  preparedness  among  national  authorities  to  deal  with  the  influx  of  refugees  and 
migrants. Some notifications are based on perceived future threats, including security 
threats.34  

30 Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), An Analysis of the Schengen Area in the wake of 
recent  developments,  Research  paper  for  Policy  Department  C:  Citizens’  Rights  and 
Constitutional Affairs, Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, DG IPOL, European Parliament, 
2016, section 4.1. 
31 Schengen Borders Code, recital 26. 
32  Directive  2013/32/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26  June  2013  on 
common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, 
p. 60–95, article 6. 
33 A. Gatto, P. Goudin, R. Nieminen, ‘Schengen area: Update and state of play’, Briefing, EPRS, 
European Parliament, March 2016; p. 3. 
34 Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), An Analysis of the Schengen Area in the wake of 
recent  developments,  Research  paper  for  Policy  Department  C:  Citizens’  Rights  and 
Constitutional Affairs, Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, DG IPOL, European Parliament, 
2016, section 4.2. 

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Initiatives to regain that trust were outlined by the Commission in the ‘Back to Schengen 
Roadmap’.35  It aims to return to the normal functioning of the Schengen Area and to lift 
all internal border controls related to the migratory crisis by the end of 2016 at the latest. 
In  the  Commission  proposal  for  a  Council  recommendation  allowing  for  the 
continuation of temporary internal border control, it is stated that: 

‘Border control should only take place during the time necessary to remedy all 
the  serious  deficiencies  in  the  management  of  the  Union’s  external  border. 
Several  legislative initiatives  and  actions  undertaken  by  the  Union in  order  to 
reinforces its external border management (European Coast and Border Guard, 
return to a full application of EU asylum law provisions by the Hellenic Republic, 
stepping up of the implementation of the emergency relocation scheme, the EU 
Turkey Statement) should also be in place and fully operational without delay 
and thus further contribute to a substantial reduction in secondary movements 
of irregular migrants.’.36 

Security  concerns  were  also  addressed  by  the  Commission  in  its  Communication  on 
‘Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security’ in which it refers 
to ‘evidence that terrorists have used routes of irregular migration to enter the EU and 
then  moved  within  the  Schengen  area  undetected’.37  There  is  clearly  room  for 
improvement between Schengen Member States in this area. In a recent study on the 
Cost  of  Non-Europe  in  the  areas  of  Organised  Crime  and  Corruption,  a  number  of 
shortcomings  in  the  area  of  police  and  judicial  cooperation  were  identified.38  These 
include a lack in efficiency and quality of justice, as well as insufficient knowledge of 
European  laws  and  co-operation  procedures  among  law  enforcement  practitioners. 
These shortcomings also hamper the effective investigation and prosecution of terrorism 
within the European Union and the belief in a common security area.39 

35 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and 
the Council, Back to Schengen- A Roadmap, COM (2016) 120 of 4.3.2016. 
36  Proposal  for  a  Council  implementing  decision  setting  out  a  recommendation  for  temporary 
internal  border  control  in  exceptional  circumstances  putting  the  overall  functioning  of  the 
Schengen area at risk, COM(2016) 275 final. 
37 COM(2016) 205 final 
38 W. van Ballegooij, T. Zandstra, Organised crime and Corruption, Cost of non-Europe Report, 
European  Parliamentary  Research  Service,  PE  558.779;  Annex  I,  Centre  for  European  Policy 
Studies  (CEPS),  The  Cost  of  Non-Europe  in  the  Area  of  Organised  Crime;  Annex  II,  RAND 
Europe, The Cost of Non-Europe in the Area of Corruption; Annex III, F. Varese, Briefing paper 
providing an overall assessment of organised crime and corruption.    
39 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and 
the Council, ‘Delivering on the European Agenda on Security to fight against terrorism and pave 
the  way  towards  an  effective  and  genuine  Security  Union’,  COM(2016)  230;  Cf.  Centre  for 
European  Policy  Studies  (CEPS),  ‘An  Analysis  of  the  Schengen  Area  in  the  wake  of  recent 
developments’,  Research  paper  for  Policy  Department  C:  Citizens’  Rights  and  Constitutional 
Affairs, Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, DG IPOL, European Parliament, 2016, section 

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3.  Economic, social and political impact of the reintroduction 

of border controls between the Schengen States  

As mentioned in section 1, the Schengen Agreement plays a central role in underpinning 
the four freedoms of the European Single Market – free movement of goods, persons, 
services  and  capital  -  consistently  considered  among  European  citizens  as  one  of  the 
most positive effect of the European Union. Hence, a suspension of the agreement and a 
re-establishment  of  internal  border  controls  are  expected  to  have  not  only  a  negative 
economic  impact  on  the  EU  and  its  Member  States,  but  also  a  social  impact  on  EU 
citizens,  and  most  likely  also  a  political  impact  on  the  EU  project  as  a  whole.  It  is 
therefore worth analysing both the potential direct budgetary costs and also the social 
and political costs of these effects. 

3.1. Economic impact 

Several  recent  studies40  have  sought  to  identify  the  impact  that  the  abolition  of  the 
Schengen Agreement  would have on the European economy. However, these studies 
either did not take into account the running costs of border re-establishment, or included 
only a brief analysis based on an extrapolation of previous estimates which were often 
difficult to compare.  

A  recent  European  Commission  report41  estimates  the  costs  of  Smart  Borders 
implemented at the external borders of the EU; however, the report considers only the 
existing borders and estimates changes to their running costs, rather than looking at the 
internal borders as well.  

Finally,  in  its  latest  Economic  Forecast,  the  European  Commission  estimated  the 
additional  administrative  and  fiscal  costs  associated  with  a  hypothetical  scenario  of 
generalised border controls within the Schengen area to range between €0.6 billion and 
€5.8 billion annually. However, these estimates are based on 1993 data related to custom 
administration  costs  in  the  range  of  0.1%-0.2%  of  the  total  value  of  intra-community 
trade and the EU standard cost model for the reduction of regulatory burden from 2004.42 

4.3.’How well do borders work as a response to terrorism’ calling for more evidence to support 
the need for the reintroduction of border controls in the fight against terrorism.  
40 See, for example, ,  ‘Cost of Non-Schengen: Impact of border controls within Schengen on the 
Single  Market’,  Study,  EPRS,  April  2016;    ‘The  Economic  Costs  of  Non-Schengen:  What  the 
numbers tell us’, Policy Paper 162, Jacques Delors Institute, April 2016; and, ‘The economic cost of 
rolling back Schengen’, France Stratégie, February 2016.  
41  ‘Annexes  to  the  Impact  Assessment  report  on  the  introduction  of  an  Entry  Exit  System’, 
SWD(2016) 115 final, Part 3/3, European Commission, 2016.  
42  ‘European  Economic  Forecast  –  Spring  2016:  Box  1.3:  Estimating  a  hypothetical  scenario  of 
generalised  border  controls  in  the  Schengen  Area’,  European  Commission,  2016as  of  12  June 
2016.; Better Regulation Tool #53 ‘The standard cost model for estimating administrative costs’.  

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Our  study  builds  on  research  by  RAND  that  follows  a  bottom-up  cost  modelling 
approach (see figure below), whereby the total expected costs are first broken down by 
type  of  expense  (i.e.  (i)  the  one-off  fixed  costs  of  setting  up  or  reconstructing  border 
crossing points and (ii) the operating, patrolling, administrative and maintenance costs 
of  the  day-to-day  border  controls).  A  value  is  then  attached  to  each  of  the 
aforementioned  type  of  expenses  and  each  country;  finally,  these  are  summed  up  to 
provide the total cost estimate. One-off fixed costs are mainly related to the number of 
border crossing points that each country has, their geographical location (i.e., land, air, 
or sea), type (i.e. internal or external) and size (i.e. small, medium or large).  Operating 
costs, on the other hand, depend more on the number of border force employees and 
border crossings, or length and structure of land borders. 

Figure 1: Administrative cost estimation diagram 

Total 
costs 

Fixed costs of 
re-establishing 
outposts 

Border 
crossing 
points 

Size 

Type 

Cost of re-
establish-  
ment 

Outposts 

Infrastructure 

Country 

Extent 

Operating and 
maintenance costs 

Border 
crossing 
statistics 

Amount of 
passengers 

Type of 
transport 

Extent of 
border checks 

Other costs 

Unit cost 

Administration 

Patrolling 

Legal 
enforcement 

h
c
a
o
r
p
p
a
p
u
-
m
o
t
t
o
B

Source: RAND Europe 

Each cost estimate is calculated using either country specific parameters or appropriately 
modified parameters from other countries with available data (i.e., by extrapolation). For 
example, as regards estimating the operating costs of the border crossing points, only 
one (Finland) out of the 12 Schengen countries with external land borders provides a 

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The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

publicly available detailed breakdown of border maintenance costs.43 Yet, Finland is an 
exceptional  case,  as  the  Finnish-Russian  border  goes  through  mostly  uninhabited 
territory with a high degree of natural vegetation and low number of permanent border 
crossing points. Thus, it was deemed inappropriate to use the Finnish data as a basis for 
cost  extrapolation  to  other  countries  other  than  Sweden  and  Norway,  which  have 
borders  very  similar  to  the  Finnish-Russian  ones.  To  circumvent  the  issue,  data  from 
Switzerland and Latvia were used. However, both these countries provide data for the 
overall expenses related to border protection only, thus preventing a detailed analysis. 
The data were used as a basis for extrapolation to other countries by using the number 
of border crossing points as the common denominator.44  
The direct budgetary costs are estimated under three different scenarios:  

1.  A two-year ‘suspension’ of the Schengen Area in the five countries that have 
currently reintroduced border controls in relation to irregular migration. 

This scenario corresponds to the legal time limit for reinstating temporary border 
controls  in  the  context  of  the  current  Schengen  Agreement  and  in  accordance 
with  Article  29  of  the  SBC;  it  considers  the  countries  of  Austria,  Denmark, 
Germany,  Norway  and  Sweden,  and  only  at  places  where  they  have 
reintroduced them.  

Since country officials may believe that the border controls are only temporary, 
it is unlikely that land border outposts are reinstalled in full. Moreover, based on 
the situation so far and the fact that border controls have been reintroduced at 
only  a  subset  of  the  total  borders,  it  is  assumed  that  personnel  and  other 
equipment, as well as human resources, would be relocated within countries and 
thus  no,  or  insignificant,  funds  would  be  spent  on  new  equipment  or  hiring 
additional staff. Additional equipment would nevertheless have to be purchased 
to  effectively  reflect  the  increased  number  of  passengers  to  be  checked;  a 
conservative estimate is made of an additional €20 000-€40 000 on average to be 
spent per land border crossing point for all equipment. 

Based  on  these  estimates,  and  taking  one-off,  fixed  costs  into  account,  it  is 
calculated that an amount of anything up to  €211.5 million will be spent over the 
two-year period at the selected borders. 

43 Available from the Finnish open data service website, http://budjetti.vm.fi/ (only available in 
Finnish and Swedish). 
44 The number of border crossing points was used as common denominator for all countries other 
than  Greece,  Iceland  and  Malta,  which  do  not  have  any  land  borders  with  other  Schengen 
countries. For these three countries the volume of passenger flows crossing the country borders 
– together with passenger cost estimates from the UK – was used as common denominator in the 
extrapolation process.  

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2.  A two-year  ‘suspension’  of  the  Schengen Area and  reintroduction  of  border 

controls in all Schengen countries at all internal borders. 

Although  on  a  larger  scale  when  compared  to  scenario  1,  this  temporary 
reintroduction  of  border  controls  is  assumed  not  to  trigger  the  hiring  of 
additional  staff  or  the  full  reinstallation  of  border  outposts.  Thus,  under  this 
scenario too, a conservative estimate is made of an additional €20 000-€40 000 to 
be spent on average per land border crossing point for all equipment. 

Based  on  these  assumptions,  the  estimated  operating  cost  under  this  scenario 
ranges  between  €2.19  and  €3.65  billion  annually  in  all  Schengen  countries,  in 
addition to €58.6 to €108.6 million one-off fixed costs. Thus, the total budgetary 
cost for all countries over the two years would range from €4.39 billion to €7.4 
billion. The highest costs would be borne by Germany, whereas Greece, Iceland, 
Malta and Lichtenstein would be the least affected. 

3.  Indefinite suspension of the Schengen Agreement in all countries. 

This scenario considers a return to permanent reintroduction of border controls 
at all internal Schengen borders. Most elements are unchanged from Scenario 2, 
but under this scenario, fixed costs related to the rebuilding and refurbishment 
of  outposts  are  considered  in  full.  Indeed,  without  alternative  regional 
arrangements  in  place  –  such  as  the  free  traffic  zone  between  Sweden  and 
Norway  –  which  are  not  considered  in  this  scenario,  countries  would  need  to 
fully  re-establish  all  land  border  crossing  points  rather  than  temporarily 
substitute the outposts with mobile border force units. Consequently, the one-off 
fixed  costs  under  this  scenario  is  expected  to  be  much  higher  compared  to 
Scenario  2.  Since  a  distinction  between  small,  medium  and  large  outposts  is 
made, the fixed costs vary accordingly. Moreover, it is assumed that countries 
which joined the Schengen Area in 2007 or later would face reduced fixed costs, 
since these countries would only need to refurbish the existing, albeit no longer 
used, checkpoints. 

Based  on  these  assumptions,  the  estimated  operating  cost  under  this  scenario 
ranges between €2.19 and €3.65 billion annually in all Schengen countries with 
an additional €7.41 to €19.76 billion one-off fixed costs. Thus, the total budgetary 
cost for all countries over, for example, a 10-year period is estimated  to range 
between €29.31 billion and €56.26 billion.  

Finally,  following  the  scenario  outlined  in  a  recent  EPRS  report,45  which 
considers the indefinite suspension of the five countries from the Schengen Area 
that have recently reintroduced border controls, it is calculated that they would 

45 Cost of Non-Schengen: Impact of border controls within Schengen on the Single Market’, Study, 
EPRS, April 2016 

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face one-off fixed costs of €3.17 to €7.70 billion and annual operating costs of €0.92 
to €1.54 billion. Thus, the total budgetary cost for these five countries over, for 
example, a 10-year period is estimated to range between €12.37 and €23.1 billion.  

The abovementioned costs do not take into consideration potentially higher costs of visa 
proceedings  as  a  result  of  third-country  nationals  having  to  apply  for  multiple  visas 
when visiting more than one Schengen country – as opposed to the current framework 
of a single Schengen visa; the additional possibility for some cross-border roads to be 
closed  or  given  local  border  traffic  status  rather  than  guarded,  thus  reducing  the 
potential total costs, is not considered in the model either. Moreover, costs are calculated 
using a single cost estimate for a large variety of countries – thus inherently introducing 
room for error in the analysis – and are based on the assumption that the traffic flows 
across Europe would remain constant at their current levels (the number could be higher 
due  to  the  continuing  growing  trend  or could  be  lower  as a  result  of border  controls 
reintroduction). 

3.2. Social impact: Crime and security 

The  Schengen  Area  is  not  just  about  the  abolition  of  internal  border  controls;  such 
measures  are  accompanied  by  measures  aimed  at  enhancing  internal  security.  In 
particular,  the  sharing  of  data46  and  increased  cross-border  police  cooperation  are 
instrumental in improving the fight against cross-border crime. 

This raises questions as to whether:  

1.  the  lifting  of  internal border  controls  has  had  an  impact  on  crime  levels/  the  fight 
against crime, notably in border regions, 

2.  the  increased  cross-border  cooperation  has  created  synergies  in  the  individual 
Member States’ fight against crime. 

This section builds on research by RAND which investigated cross-country crime trends 
between different groups of Schengen and non-Schengen countries before and after the 
2007 Schengen enlargement. In particular, the focus was placed on the differences in the 
trends  between  the  then  existing  Schengen  States  and  the  newly  acceding  Schengen 
States  (Czech  Republic,  Poland,  Hungary,  Slovakia,  Slovenia,  Estonia,  Latvia  and 
Lithuania).  

The ‘big’ Schengen enlargement to new Member States that had joined the EU in 2004 
took place in December 2007. Emphasis was therefore placed on the trends before and 
after 2008, the year in which one would expect changes in crime statistics if the opening 

46 A. Orav and A. D'Alfonso, , Smart Borders: EU Entry/Exit System, EU Legislation in progress, 
EPRS, European Parliament, 11 July 2016 

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Cost of Non-Europe Report 

of  borders  is  related  to  crime  trends.  To  counter  the  deficiency  of  comprehensive 
quantitative data on actual cross-border crimes, three different data sources were used, 
namely: (a) UNODC crime statistics (2003-2014), (b) European Social Survey (2002-2014), 
(c)  Eurostat  regional  crime  data  (2008-2010).  Based  on  these,  using  econometrics,  the 
researchers investigated how crime rates evolved:  

1.  in  the  existing  Schengen  States  -  namely,  how  crime  rates  evolved  between 
countries which used to have a land border with the Schengen countries which 
acceded  in  2007  (i.e.  Austria,  Germany,  Italy,  Finland  and  Sweden)  and  those 
which did not have such a border, and 

2.  in the newly acceding Schengen States (i.e., Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and their neighbouring non-
Schengen States (i.e. Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Moldova and Ukraine). 

At this point, several issues which occur when analysing crime trends across countries 
should  be  considered.  Firstly,  police  reported  crimes  may  underestimate  the  true 
number of committed crimes. For instance, there is good reason to assume that people 
may not report minor crimes to the police because they feel ashamed of being a victim, 
or because the lost monetary value is too little to justify the effort to report the crime, or 
the person has a lack of trust in the ability of the police to find a criminal.47 Nevertheless, 
criminological literature48 suggests that reported crime data is appropriate to study the 
evolution  and  trends  in  crime  across  countries  under  the  assumption  that  recording 
procedures do not change substantially over time. Secondly, when using reported crimes 
for cross-country analysis, one has to be cautious due to heterogeneity of reporting rates 
across  time  and  countries.  For  instance,  reporting  rates  differ  across  countries,  and 
hence,  it  is  suggested  to  compare  reported  crimes  further  with  crime  victimisation 
survey  data.49  Thirdly,  another  problem  when  analysing  crime  statistics  is  that  the 
classification of crime may differ across countries. 

In order to circumvent, to some extent, the differences in crime classification between 
countries  and to minimise  the effect of the aforementioned  issues in the analysis that 
follows,  two  different  categories  of  crime  were  examined:  homicides  and  ‘acquisitive 
crime’ – including burglary, theft, car theft, and robbery. 

Moreover,  in  addition  to  police  reported  crimes,  crime  victimisation  data  from  the 
European  Social  Survey  were  also  used  and  standard  econometric  techniques  were 
applied.  

47 P. Buonanno, F. Drago and R. Galbiati, (2014): ’How much should we trust crime statistics? A 
comparison between the EU and the US’, LIEPP Working Paper no 19. 
48 M. Aebi, and A. Linde (2010) ’Is there a Crime Drop in Western Europe?’ European Journal of 
Criminal Policy and Research, 16, pp 251-277. 
49  J.  Van  Dijk,  J.  Van  Kesteren,  and  P.  Smith  (2007)  ’Criminal  Victimisation  in  International 
Perspective: Key Findings from the 2004-2005 ICVS and EU ICS. The Hague, Ministry of Justice. 

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3.2.1.  Cross country trends in acquisitive crime rates (vehicle theft, 
robberies, and burglaries) and homicide (2003-2013)  

(i) in the existing Schengen States 

Interestingly, as  depicted  in  Diagram  1 below,  a  downward  trend has  been  observed 
after 2008 for acquisitive crime in the existing Schengen Member States. Moreover, the 
decreasing trend is somewhat stronger for those states that had direct borders with the 
newly  acceding  Schengen  States  after  2007.  Looking  at  homicide  rates,  we  cannot 
observe a clear upward or downward trend for either of the two groups, thus implying 
that a clear association could not be made – while from 2008 to 2010 there is some slight 
increase in homicide rates in the existing Schengen states without direct borders  with 
the new ones the trend is falling.  

Diagram 1:  Trends in acquisitive crime and homicide rates in existing Schengen states before and after 
2007 Schengen enlargement 

Source: RAND Europe (2016) 

In order to take into account the effect of other factors, for example a country’s GDP per 
capita, an econometric model has been used; the summarised results are depicted in the 
table below. The findings should be read as follows: in column (1) data from the UNODC 

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-.1-.050.05.1ln acquisitive crime rate (residual)200320052007200920112013yearborder statesnon-border statesacquisitive crime rate-.3-.2-.10.1.2ln homicide rate (residual)200320052007200920112013yearborder statesnon-border stateshomicide rate 
 
 
 
Cost of Non-Europe Report 

are used regarding the police reported acquisitive crime rate in the existing Schengen 
countries that had direct borders with the new ones (i.e. Austria, Germany, Italy, Sweden 
and  Finland).  It  emerges  that  the  level  in  those  crimes  reduced  by  28.03%  after  the 
Schengen  enlargement.  At  the  same  time,  the  respective  acquisitive  crime  rate  in  the 
other existing Schengen States without direct borders with the newly added Schengen 
States only reduced by 7.87%. Thus it may be observed that there is a difference of 20.16% 
between  the  two  different  groups  of  countries.  This  might  imply  that  the  Schengen 
enlargement and the subsequent abolition of border controls did not lead to an increase 
in the police reported acquisitive crime rate in the existing Schengen countries that had 
a direct border with the newly added ones. In fact, the empirical findings may suggest 
quite  the  opposite,  namely  that  Schengen  enlargement  may  be  associated  with  lower 
levels of police reported acquisitive crime rates.  

Table 1 : Summary table trends in crime rates in existing Schengen states before and after 2007 

Existing Schengen states 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

police reported 
acquisitive 
crime 

police 
reported 
homicide 

self-reported 
acquisitive 
crime 

self-reported 
feeling secure 

Data source: 

UNODC 

ESS 

(1) No direct border 

-7.87% 

-13.86% 

-1.10% 

0.12% 

(2) Direct border 

-28.03% 

-10.17% 

-5.83% 

4.40% 

∆ before 
2008 - 
after 2008 

(2) -(1) 

-20.16% 

3.69% 

-4.73% 

4.28% 

Notes: based on parameter estimates reported in table AC.1 in Appendix C.  

In sum, in the existing Schengen States, crime rates are generally falling; but as the data 
suggests,  that  fall  is  even  more  pronounced  in  those  Schengen  States  with  direct 
(internal) borders with the countries that joined Schengen in 2007. This applies for police 
reported crime - column (1) - as well as self-reported crime victimisation rates - column 
(3).  In  addition,  individuals  are  more  likely  to  report  that  they  feel  secure  in  their 
neighbourhood at night in states with direct borders - column (4). 

 (ii) in the newly acceding Schengen Member States and non-Schengen States 

The figure below depicts trends in acquisitive crime and homicide rates for the newly 
acceding  Schengen  States  (i.e.  Czech  Republic,  Poland,  Hungary,  Slovakia,  Slovenia, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and their neighbouring non-Schengen states (i.e. Bulgaria, 
Romania, Croatia, Moldova and Ukraine). The rate of acquisitive crime is falling in the 
pre-2007  period  for  the  newly  acceding  Schengen  States  and  continues  with  even  a 
slightly stronger downward trend thereafter. As regards the homicide rate in the new 
Schengen States, there is a relatively strong fluctuation in the post-2007 period and hence 
a clear trend cannot be determined. 

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Diagram  2  :  Trends  in  acquisitive  crime  and  homicide  rates  in  newly  acceding  Schengen  and  Non-
Schengen states before and after 2007 Schengen enlargement 

Notes:  based  on  UNODC  crime  statistics.  Entries  depict  the  residual  crime  rates  for  different  groups  of 
countries over time after taking into account country- and time-specific effects based on a linear regression. 

As  in  section  (i)  above,  in  order  to  take  into  account  the  effect  of  other  factors  -  for 
example, a country’s per capita GDP - an econometric model has been developed and its 
results are depicted in the table below. This table reveals that, according to UNODC data, 
after  their  inclusion  in  the  Schengen  Area  in  2007,  the  newly  added  Schengen  States 
report  14.05%  lower  acquisitive  rates  of  crime  than  their  non-Schengen  neighbours  - 
column (1). In addition, individuals in the newly added Schengen States feel relatively 
more  secure  after  the  abolition  of  the  border  controls  than  their  non-Schengen 
counterparts - column (4). 

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-.2-.10.1.2ln acquisitive crime rate(residual)200320052007200920112013yearSchengen statesnon-Schengen statesacquisitive crime rate-.4-.20.2ln homicide rate (residual)200320052007200920112013yearSchengen statesnon-Schengen stateshomicide rate 
 
Cost of Non-Europe Report 

Table 2 :  Summary  table  trends  in  crime  rates  in  newly acceding Schengen and  Non-Schengen  states 
before and after 2007 

Newly acceding Schengen and Non-Schengen states 

(1) 
police 
reported 
acquisitive 
crime 

(2) 

police 
reported 
homicide 

(3) 
self-
reported 
acquisitive 
crime 

(4) 
self-
reported 
feeling 
secure 

Data source: 

UNODC 

ESS 

(1) No direct border 

-15.69% 

-19.29% 

-6.48% 

-18.32% 

(2) Direct border 

-29.74% 

-43.20% 

-27.21% 

24.62% 

∆ before 2008 - 
after 2008 

(2) -(1) 

-14.05% 

-23.91% 

-20.73% 

42.94% 

Notes: based on parameter estimates reported in table AC.2 in Appendix C.  

The abovementioned empirical findings suggest that the 2007 Schengen enlargement is 
associated with lower acquisitive crime rates in both the newly acceding Schengen States 
and  the  existing  Schengen  States  that  had  a  direct  border  with  them.  At  first,  these 
findings may seem counterintuitive; yet, this reduction may be due to the fact that the 
improved cross-border police cooperation and law enforcement mechanism in light of 
Schengen  could  have  made  the  fight  against  acquisitive  crime  more  efficient.  Hence, 
resources  that  were  once  used  to  guard  border controls  could now  be  redirected  and 
focus on other activities such as combating cross-border acquisitive crime. Nonetheless, 
it  is  important  to  note  that  these  findings  should  be  interpreted  as  associations  and 
cannot be read as causal effects of Schengen reducing crime levels. Moreover, due to lack 
of quantitative data, the effect of Schengen on other types of organised crime, such as 
human trafficking, was not empirically investigated.  Consequently, the findings should 
be interpreted with caution. 

3.2.2.  Cross-regional trends in acquisitive crime and homicide rates ― border vs. 

non-border regions 

This section builds on research that investigated how trends in crime rates evolve within 
a  group  of  countries  by  comparing  border  to  non-border  regions.  Regional  police 
reported crime level data (acquisitive crime data, namely burglary, robbery and car theft, 
as well as homicide data) for Eurostat’s Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics 
level 3 (NUTS 3) regions were used as a proxy for acquisitive crime. However, due to 
data limitations ― the abovementioned regional data were only available for 2008, 2009 
and 2010 ― it was only possible to compare the evolution of trends in crime rates for 
border  versus  non  border  NUTS  3  regions  after  the  2007  enlargement. Moreover,  the 
analysis considered only NUTS 3 regions of countries with direct land borders with the 
newly acceding Schengen Member States as well as with maritime links to them.  

Diagram 3 below depicts the trends for NUTS 3 regions with borders that were abolished 
as a result of a Schengen area enlargement in 2007 compared to NUTS 3 regions without 
such borders within the same country (i.e. Austria, Germany, Italy Sweden and Finland), 

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after  adjustment  of  some  parameters.50 The  findings  suggest  that  the  examined  crime 
rates tend to decrease faster for border regions than for non-border regions. While it is 
important to note that criminal activity spans to more categories than those taken into 
account in the analysis, and that the analysis cannot identify any causal effect that the 
Schengen enlargement may have had on crime rates in border countries and their border 
regions, the results do not encourage the hypothesis that the abolition of internal borders 
led to an increase in crime or that border regions would be particularly affected by this 
phenomenon. 

Diagram  3  :  Regional  trend  in  acquisitive  crime  (burglary,  car  theft  and  robbery)  and  homicide  rates 
between border and non-border NUTS 3 regions 

3.2.3.  The fight against drugs trafficking before and after entering Schengen 

Theoretical  arguments  about  the  impact  of  open  borders  on  the  fight  against  drug 
trafficking are conflicting. On the one side, some may argue that there is a clear ‘border 
effect’  and  that  the  lack  of  border  controls  makes  combating  drug  trafficking  more 
difficult; indeed, it can be stated that once the drug has passed the external borders, no 

50 Adjustment include regional GDP per capita, regional type (metropolitan or mountainous), net 
migration and total population of the region. 

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6.76.86.977.1ln acquisitive crime rate200820092010yearborder NUTS3 regionnon-border NUTS3 regionacquisitive crime rate.2.4.6.81ln homicide rate200820092010yearborder NUTS3 regionnon-border NUTS3 regionhomicide rate 
 
 
 
                                                           
Cost of Non-Europe Report 

further  controls  should  be  expected.51  On  the  other  side,  one  could  argue  that  the 
improved cross-border police cooperation and law enforcement mechanism in light of 
Schengen could have made the fight against drug trafficking more efficient. Following 
this assumption, it can be considered that resources that were once used to guard the 
border controls could now be redirected and focus on other activities such as combating 
cross-border  crime.  This  section  builds  on  research  which  examined  whether  the 
abolition of border controls in light of Schengen alters the ability of countries to tackle 
cross-border drug trafficking. To deal with problems related to (i) imperfect information 
between  buyers  and  sellers;  and  (ii)  the  role  of  enforcement  which  affects  drug 
production and distribution routes, the study is focused only on drugs with virtually no 
production within Europe, namely cocaine 
 and heroin.  

Since the data on prices and purity are only available for the period since 1995, and since 
some observations before the country in question entered the Schengen area are needed 
to do a pre- and post-Schengen comparison, the sample included all European countries 
from  the  2000  Schengen  enlargement  round  to  the  2007  enlargement52,  as  well  as 
countries which have never been part of the Schengen area (Ireland and UK) and non-
EU countries, such as Turkey, as comparison groups.  

The findings suggest that the abolition of border controls is positively associated with 
cocaine and heroin seizures. On average, it is estimated that the countries which entered 
the Schengen area after 2000 have increased the quantity of seized cocaine and heroin by 
around  50%  and  67%  respectively.  For  example,  a  pre-Schengen  annual  average  of 
around  50kg  of  seized  cocaine  would  increase  to  around  75kg  after  Schengen  and 
similarly  a  pre-Schengen  annual  average  of  60kg  of  seized  heroin  would  increase  to 
100kg after Schengen. 

The fact that abolishing border controls may increase the amount of drug seizures might 
be explained by better cross-border police cooperation in light of Schengen which could, 
in turn, have led to better or more frequent information exchange. In addition, resources 
that  were  used  pre-Schengen  to  guard  border  controls  could  be  redirected  post-
Schengen and focus on other activities such as combating cross-border drug trafficking. 

Further research will be needed to confirm these trends for other offences as well as the 
link between (the absence of) border controls and crime rates. 

51  McCabe,  Ryan,  2015,  ‘Measuring  the  border  effect:  How  Schengen  Impedes  Heroin 
confiscation’, as of 13 June 2016 available at http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2015/mccabe_ryan.pdf.  
52 Switzerland is excluded from the analysis, because, despite being a Schengen Member, it still 
has running border crossing points to check the flow of goods. 

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3.3. Political impact: Trust  

As mentioned in section 2, Member State justification for the reintroduction of internal 
border controls points to a political climate characterised by  a loss of trust in the (other) 
Member  States’  ability  to  effectively  guard  the  external  borders,  process  asylum 
applications  and  cooperate  together  in  the  fight  against  terrorism  and  other  serious 
crimes. The trust between Member States has not been measured in academic research.53 
Trust among the public, however, has been measured in the European Social Survey, 
notably  as  regards  trust  in  others,  trust  in  politicians,  national  parliaments  and  the 
European Parliament, the police, or the legal system. Using these data, one can compare 
the change in trust levels after 2008 between two different groups of countries, namely, 
the difference (1) between existing Schengen countries that had direct borders with the 
new  ones,  and  (2)  between  the  newly  acceding  Schengen  States  and  non-Schengen 
countries.54  

Overall, for the newly acceding Schengen Member States an increase in public trust is 
found across the board after the inclusion in the Schengen Area, whereas over the same 
time  period  public  trust  decreased  in  their  neighbouring,  non-Schengen  countries.  In 
addition, overall trust in the existing Schengen Member States is increasing across the 
board  but  tends  to  be  more  pronounced  in  the  existing  Schengen  states  with  direct 
borders with the new states entering the area in 2007.55  

When similar analysis is applied on a regional level, comparing border and non-border 
regions within countries in light of the Schengen enlargement, it is found that the trends 
across different measures of trust are generally very similar for border and non-border 
regions for the sample of both the newly acceding Schengen states and , as well for the 
existing Schengen states.56 

Therefore, one can conclude that the abolition of border controls in light of Schengen has 
not increased the perception of insecurity among EU citizens. Trust among the public in 
the EU seems to have been undermined though, but rather due to the European Union’s 
failure to effectively address the refugee crises,57 as illustrated by the figure taken from 
the Autumn 2015 Eurobarometer survey below. 

53 RAND (2016), p. 45. 
54 See section 3.2, for a more detailed list of countries compared.  
55 RAND (2016), p. 47 
56 RAND (2016), p. 48 
57 See ‘Debating Europe, Has the refugee crisis damaged trust in the European project?’  

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Cost of Non-Europe Report 

Figure 2: Trend of the trust in national governments and parliaments, and in the European Union 

Source:  Standard Eurobarometer 84 (Autumn 2015)58 

Nevertheless, the European Citizen’s Action Service, which runs ‘Your Europe Advice’ 
providing legal advice for EU citizens, has experienced a 9.4% increase in enquiries in 
2015  compared  to  2014,  which  might  be  indicative  of  an  increasing  sentiment  of 
uncertainty  by  citizens  about  the  practical  implementation  of  the  freedom  of 
movement.59 

4.  Possible options for action at EU level 

Based  on  the  expert  research,  this  study  estimates  that  the  costs  linked  with  the 
reintroduction of border controls could range between €0.05 billion and €20 billion in 
one-off costs and €2 billion and €4 billion in annual operating costs - the exact figure 
depending on their scope and length. These amounts correspond to around 0.02%-0.03% 
of GDP of the Schengen area.  

As  regards  the  offences  investigated,  the  abolition  of  border  controls  in  the  light  of 
Schengen  has  not  led  to  higher  crime  rates,  nor  has  the  2007  Schengen  enlargement 
increased  the  perception  of insecurity among  EU  citizens.60    On  the  contrary  citizens’ 
trust in each other and in public institutions seems to have increased. It is important to 

58http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail
/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2098  
59 CEPS (2016), Annex IV; http://europa.eu/youreurope/advice/about_en.htm  
60 These findings should nevertheless be interpreted as associations only and cannot be read as 
causal effects. They also need to be confirmed by research into other offences. See RAND Europe, 
A  Research  Paper  on  The  Cost  of  Non-Schengen:  Civil  Liberties,  Justice  and  Home  Affairs 
Aspects, p. 66. 

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note that the abolition of border controls has been accompanied by measures to facilitate 
cross-border police and judicial cooperation, for instance adding to the number of illicit 
drug seizures. The societal benefits of this cooperation could be undone by a return to 
permanent border controls. 

Though the migration and refugee crisis was not caused by deficiencies in the Schengen 
governance framework, the integrity of the Schengen Area has been affected by it. 61 The 
need  for  changes  to  the  current  Schengen  governance  framework  should  be  further 
considered  based  on  the  compliance  with  the  implementing  decision  of  12  May  2016 
allowing  five  Schengen  Member  States  (Austria,  Denmark,  Germany,  Norway  and 
Sweden)  to  maintain  controls  at  certain  parts  of  their  internal  border  for  another  six 
months (until November 2016).62   

The Schengen Member State notifications seeking to justify the reintroduction of internal 
border controls point to a political climate in which there is a loss of trust in the ability 
of  (other)  Member  States  to  effectively  guard  the  external  borders,  process  asylum 
applications  and  cooperate  together  in  the  fight  against  terrorism  and  other  serious 
crimes. Trust among the public in the EU also seems to have been undermined by the 
failure of the Union to effectively address the deficiencies exposed by the refugee crises. 
Regaining  inter-Member  State  and  EU  citizen’s  trust  in  the  EU’s  ability  to  tackle  the 
deficiencies exposed by the refugee crisis should therefore be the immediate priority. 

The deficiencies exposed by the refugee crisis and the resulting loss of trust could be 
addressed  by   more  concerted  action at  EU  level  fostering solidarity  and  cooperation 
between  the  Member  States.  Such  initiatives  should  also  take  better  advantage  of  EU 
agencies. In that context, a comprehensive assessment of the Cost of non-Europe in the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice could help to shed more light on the untapped 
potential of European integration in this field.63 
This  notwithstanding,  as  regards  the  scope  of  the  current  study,  measures  in  the 
following areas should be considered: 

1. External border control 
2. Police and judicial cooperation 
3. Asylum and Migration. 

61 RAND Europe, A Research Paper on The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs Aspects, p. 67: ‘With respect to the Schengen governance framework, our analysis 
found  that  current  arrangements  are  largely  fit  for  purpose.’;  CEPS  (2016),  p.  74:  ‘The  2013 
Schengen  Governance  Package  is  fit  for  purpose  and  recent  developments  do  not  justify  new 
legislative amendments or reforms to the Schengen Borders Code.’ 
62 Council of the European Union, Interinstitutional File 0140/2016 NLE, ‘Council Implementing 
Decision  setting  out  a  Recommendation  for  temporary  internal  border  control  in  exceptional 
circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk’. 
63 Cf. European Criminal Law Association's Forum (EUCRIM) special edition on the Cost of 
Non-Europe in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice. 

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1. External border control   
Action  in  this  area  needs  to  go  beyond  the  current  crisis-response  measures.  A  more 
sustainable solution should be based around the recent creation of a European Border 
and Coast Guard. The EBCG should be able to monitor the situation at external borders 
and intervene in situations where insufficient external border controls put the overall 
functioning of the Schengen area at risk. 64 Other relevant measures would concern the 
introduction  of  enhanced  border  checks  against  relevant  databases65  as  well  as  of  an 
entry-exit  system66  aimed  at  improving  the  identification  of  visa  over-stayers  and 
irregular migrants; moreover, criteria for the detection of terrorist travellers should be 
developed.67 

2. Police and judicial cooperation  
Action  in  this  area  should  revolve  around  the  coherence  and  interoperability  of  data 
collection, exchange and analysis, including by expanding the use and functionality of 
the Schengen Information System.68 The lack of efficiency and quality of justice, as well 
as the insufficient knowledge of European laws and co-operation procedures, notably 
co-operation  in  the  framework  of  Europol  and  Eurojust,  among  law-enforcement 
practitioners, needs to be addressed through budgetary and training measures. 69 

3. Asylum and migration  
Action in this area should aim to ensure a proper implementation of the asylum acquis 
and to adopt the proposed reforms of the European Asylum System70, in particular of 
the  Dublin  regulation71,  including  as  regards  the  relocation  of  asylum  seekers  and 

64  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard:  Parliament  and  Council  strike  provisional  deal,  press 
release, European Parliament, June 2016; A. Gatto, European Border and Coast Guard System, 
Briefing EU legislation in progress, EPRS, August 30, 2016. 
65 Schengen Borders Code: reinforcement of checks against relevant databases at external borders, 
2015/0307(COD) 
66 Entry/Exit System (EES), 2016/0106(COD) 
67 Commission recommendation of 15 June 2015 amending the Recommendation establishing a 
common ‘Practical Handbook for Border Guards (Schengen Handbook)’ to be used by Member 
States' competent authorities when carrying out the border control of persons (C (2006) 5186 final) 
C(2015) 3894 final. 
68 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Stronger 
and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security, COM(2016) 205 final 
69 W. van Ballegooij, T. Zandstra, Organised Crime and Corruption, Cost of non-Europe Report, 
EPRS, PE 558.779; Annex I, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), The Cost of Non-Europe 
in the Area of Organised Crime; Annex II, RAND Europe, The Cost of Non-Europe in the Area 
of Corruption; Annex III, F. Varese, Briefing paper providing an overall assessment of organised 
crime and corruption.    
70 D.Ivanov, Towards a reform of the Common European Asylum System, Plenary At a Glance, 
EPRS, 4 May 2016  
71 D. Ivanov, Reform of the Dublin System, Briefing, EU legislation in progress, EPRS,  September 
2016; F. Maiani, The Reform of the Dublin III Regulation, Policy Department, EP, June 2016. 

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The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

support  to  national  authorities  in  charge  of  deciding  on  asylum  applications,  and 
cooperation with countries of origin and transit.72  

The adoption and implementation of these measures and actions should put an end to 
the current situation in which there is a ‘reliance on a small number of Member States to 
provide an EU-wide public good’.73 The public good at stake here is a genuine area of 
freedom,  security  and  justice  in  which  the  free  movement  of  persons  is  ensured  in 
conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, 
immigration and the prevention and combating of crime. 

All measures mentioned above should be considered on their individual merits, based 
on a proper impact assessment including as regards their compliance with the relevant 
fundamental  rights  and  free  movement  standards  in  accordance  with  primary  and 
secondary EU law.  Once adopted, the transposition and application of the measures on 
the ground should be monitored to ensure their practical effectiveness. 

Recommendation 

More concerted action at EU level is needed so as to allow the Schengen area to return 
to  its  full  functioning.  The  need  for  changes  to  the  current  Schengen  governance 
framework  should  be  further  considered  based  on  the  compliance  with  the 
implementing  decision  of  12  May  2016  allowing  five  Schengen  Member  States  to 
maintain controls at certain parts of their internal border for another  six months until 
November 2016. Regaining inter-Member State and EU citizens’ trust should, however, 
be an immediate priority, notably through the organisation of solidarity and cooperation 
between Member State authorities, supported in their work by EU agencies. 

72 Recast Dublin Regulation COM(2016) 270; Recast EURODAC COM (2016) 272; proposal for a 
European Agency for Asylum COM(2016) 271; EU list of safe countries of origin COM(2015) 
452; Permanent relocation scheme COM(2015) 450; European travel document for the return of 
illegally staying third-country nationals COM(2015)668 final; European Resettlement Scheme 
C(2015) 3560 final; EU Turkey Joint Action Plan, Council EU-Turkey statement  
73 RAND Europe, A Research Paper on The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs Aspects, p. 67. 

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The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

Annex 

A Research Paper on the Costs of Non-Schengen 

from a Civil Liberties and Home Affairs 
Perspective 

by RAND Europe 

Abstract 
This  paper  examines  the  costs  of  non-Schengen  from  a  civil  liberties  and  home 
affairs perspective, building on recent evidence describing the potential economic 
and social costs that would accrue if the Schengen agreement were to be abolished 
and border controls re-introduced. The paper estimates the cost of re-introducing 
internal border controls in the Schengen Area at around €0.1–19bn in one-off costs 
and  around  €2–4bn in annual operating costs, corresponding to around  0.02–0.03 
per cent of Schengen Area GDP. Empirical findings of the analysis conducted in this 
paper also suggest that the abolishment of border controls as a result of Schengen is 
not associated with higher crime rates either in border or in non-border regions. In 
addition, the lack of border controls has not hampered the ability of Schengen states 
to combat the illicit drug trade. 

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The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

AUTHOR 
This  study  was  written  by  Marco  Hafner,  Jirka  Taylor,  Martin  Stepanek,  Sarah  Grand-
Clement, Martin Sacher, Elma Dujso, Matteo Barberi and Stijn Hoorens at the request of 
the European Added Value Unit of the Directorate for Impact Assessment and European 
Added  Value,  within  the  Directorate  General  for  Parliamentary  Research  Service  (DG 
EPRS) of the General Secretariat of the European Parliament.  

LINGUISTIC VERSIONS 
Original: EN 

DISCLAIMER 
The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do 
not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. 

Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the 
source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy. 

Manuscript completed in June 2016. 
Brussels © European Union, 2016. 

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Cost of Non-Europe Report 

Contents 

Chapter 1 – Introduction .......................................................................................... 46 

I – Motivation ..................................................................................................... 46 
II – Background and context ............................................................................ 46 
1. Current challenges to the Schengen system ............................................. 48 
2. Links between Schengen and other policy areas ..................................... 50 
3. Role of trust and democratic legitimacy in the current challenge to 

Schengen .................................................................................................... 52 

4. Gaps in intra-EU solidarity as a factor contributing to trust 

breakdowns ............................................................................................... 53 

5. Economic, social and political costs resulting from imperfect 

functioning of the Schengen Area .......................................................... 54 
III – Objectives and scope of this paper .......................................................... 57 
IV – Research approach and limitations ........................................................ 58 
1. Conceptual limitation: what is ‘non-Schengen’? ...................................... 58 
2. Methodological limitations ......................................................................... 59 
3. Limitations of policy assessments .............................................................. 59 
V – Structure of the paper ................................................................................ 59 

Chapter 2 – Quantifying the costs of non-Schengen in economic, social and 

political terms: a home affairs and civil liberties perspective ............................. 61 

I – Analytical approach ..................................................................................... 61 
II – Economic costs: direct budgetary impact of re-introducing internal 

border controls ........................................................................................... 61 
1. A cost-estimation approach ........................................................................ 61 
2. Border crossing points ................................................................................. 63 
3. Costs of (re-)establishing and running border crossing points .............. 67 
4. Estimating the budgetary costs of non-Schengen .................................... 73 
III – Social costs: crime and security ............................................................... 80 
1. Acquisitive and violent crime ..................................................................... 81 
2. Illicit drug trade ............................................................................................ 88 
IV – Political cost: associations between Schengen and trust ...................... 92 
Chapter 3 – Options for concerted action at EU level .......................................... 98 

I – Schengen governance framework .............................................................. 99 
1. Enforcement of existing rules ..................................................................... 99 
2. SBC rules on the re-introduction of internal controls ........................... 100 
3. Schengen Information System .................................................................. 101 
4. Schengen evaluation and monitoring system ........................................ 102 
5. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 104 
II – External border control ............................................................................ 105 

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The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

1. Increase in institutional capacity .............................................................. 105 
2. Strengthening of border checks ................................................................ 107 
3. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 109 
III – Police and judicial cooperation.............................................................. 110 
1. Closing information gaps .......................................................................... 110 
2. Improving interoperability ....................................................................... 111 
3. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 112 
IV - Asylum and migration ............................................................................ 113 
1. Dublin reform ............................................................................................. 114 
2. Related policy areas ................................................................................... 115 
3. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 117 
Chapter 4 – Report summary and conclusions ................................................... 118 

I – The costs of non-Schengen ........................................................................ 118 
II – Are there potential benefits of more concerted action at EU level 

within the current Schengen governance framework or by external 
factors?....................................................................................................... 119 
III – Implications .............................................................................................. 120 
Chapter 5 – References ........................................................................................... 121 

Appendix A – Overview of existing information exchange systems .............. 131 

Appendix B – Budget costs estimation methodology ........................................ 134 

1. Distribution of land border crossing points ........................................... 134 
2. Number of border crossing points ........................................................... 137 
3. Cost of border protection .......................................................................... 138 
4. Alternative cost modelling using passenger flows ................................ 140 
5. Fixed costs of extending air and maritime border control ................... 140 
Appendix C – Social costs: crime and security ................................................... 141 

Appendix D – Political costs: trust ........................................................................ 144 

Appendix E – Overview of components of the EU Action Plan on Return .... 146 

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The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

List of Tables 

Table 1.1: Overview of SBC provisions dealing with the temporary re-introduction of 
internal border controls ............................................................................................................... 49 
Table 1.2: Overview of selected temporary re-introductions of internal border controls in 
Schengen countries since September 2015 ................................................................................ 51 
Table 1.3: Overview of selected studies estimating the costs of non-Schengen .................. 56 
Table 2.1: Operating costs estimates .......................................................................................... 70 
Table 2.2: Total (entry and exit) air and maritime passenger transport between Schengen 
countries ........................................................................................................................................ 71 
Table 2.3: Re-establishment costs of land border crossing points ......................................... 73 
Table 2.4: Parameters used ......................................................................................................... 74 
Table 2.5: Scenario 2 – estimated costs ...................................................................................... 77 
Table 2.6: Scenario 3 – estimated costs ...................................................................................... 79 
Table 2.7: Cost estimates in Scenarios 2 and 3 ......................................................................... 80 
Table 2.8: Summary table trends in crime rates in existing Schengen states before and 
after 2007 ....................................................................................................................................... 85 
Table 2.9: Summary table trends in crime rates in newly acceding Schengen and non-
Schengen states before and after 2007 ....................................................................................... 86 
Table 2.10: Schengen and indicators of supply-reduction measures. ................................... 92 
Table 2.11: Measures of trust included in the ESS, 2002–2014. .............................................. 94 
Table 2.12: Change in trust before and after 2008 for newly acceding Schengen and non-
Schengen countries in the same region ..................................................................................... 94 
Table 2.13: Change in trust before and after 2008 for existing Schengen states with direct 
or no direct borders to newly acceding states entering the area in 2007 .............................. 95 
Table AB.1: Size of Austrian border crossing points ............................................................. 136 
Table AB.2: Dataset of borders, their length (in km) and number of known border 
crossing points ............................................................................................................................ 137 
Table AB.3: Dataset of borders, their length (in km) and number of known border 
crossing points ............................................................................................................................ 138 
Table AB.4: Air and maritime border equipment costs ........................................................ 140 
Table AC.1: Cross-country trends in acquisitive crime and homicide rates 2003–2014 – 
Western Schengen states ........................................................................................................... 142 
Table AC.2: Cross-country trends in acquisitive crime and homicide rates 2003–2014 – 
Eastern European Schengen and non-Schengen states ......................................................... 143 
Table AD.1: Cross-country trends in different measures of trust 2002–2014 – Eastern 
European Schengen and non-Schengen states ....................................................................... 144 
Table AD.2: Cross-country trends in different measures of trust 2002–2014 – Western 
Schengen states with direct and no direct internal borders to Eastern European Schengen 
states ............................................................................................................................................ 145 
Table AE.1. Overlap between the Action Plan on Return with respect to EU return system 
and other policy areas ............................................................................................................... 146 

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The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

List of Figures 

Figure 2.1: Cost-estimation diagram ......................................................................................... 63 
Figure 2.2: Trends in acquisitive crime and homicide rates in existing Schengen states 
before and after 2007 Schengen enlargement ........................................................................... 83 
Figure 2.3: trends in acquisitive crime and homicide rates in newly acceding Schengen 
and non-Schengen states before and after 2007 Schengen enlargement .............................. 84 
Figure 2.4: Regional trends in acquisitive crime (burglary, car theft and robbery) and 
homicide rates between border and non-border NUTS 3 regions ........................................ 88 
Figure 2.5: Trends for border and non-border regions in different measures of trust for 
newly acceding states that entered Schengen Area in 2007. .................................................. 96 
Figure 2.6: Trends for border and non-border regions in different measures of trust for 
existing Schengen states with direct borders to newly acceding states that entered 
Schengen Area in 2007. ............................................................................................................... 97 
Figure AB.1: Large border crossing point on highway A1/8 (Austria/Germany) .......... 135 
Figure AB.2: Medium border crossing point between Braunau am Inn and Simbach am 
Inn (Austria/Germany) ............................................................................................................ 135 
Figure AB.3: Small border crossing point between Hörschlag and Český Heršlák 
(Austria/Czech Republic) ......................................................................................................... 136 

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Cost of Non-Europe Report 

Abbreviations 
AFIS 
AFSJ 
CJEU  
CRI 
EASO 
EBCG 
EC 
ECA 
EEAS 
EES 
EMCDDA 
EMLOs 
EP  
EPRIS 
ESS 
ETA 
eTA 
ETIAS 
EU 
eu-LISA 

FRA 
GDP 
JHA 
LIBE 
MSF 
NGO 
NUTS 
OECD  
PNR 
PPP 
RABIT 
SBC 
SCH-EVAL 
SIRENE   
SIS 
TFEU 
UN 
UNHCR   
UNODC   
VIS 
WDI 

Automatic Fingerprint Identification System 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
Court of Justice for the European Union 
Common risk indicator 
European Asylum Support Office 
European Border and Coast Guard 
European Commission 
European Court of Auditors 
European External Action Service 
Entry–Exit System 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
European Migration Liaison Officers 
European Parliament 
European Police Records Index System 
European Social Survey 
Electronic Travel Authority (Australia) 
Electronic Travel Authorization (Canada) 
EU Travel Information and Authorisation System 
European Union  
European Agency for the operational management of Large-Scale 
IT Systems 
Fundamental Rights Agency 
Gross domestic product  
Justice and Home Affairs  
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs  
Médecins Sans Frontières 
Nongovernmental organisation 
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
Passenger Name Record 
Purchasing power parity 
Rapid Border Intervention Team 
Schengen Borders Code 
Schengen Evaluation Working Party 
Supplementary Information Request at the National Entry 
Schengen Information System 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
United Nations  
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
Visa Information System 
World Development Indicators 

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The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

Acknowledgements 

The  authors  wish  to  thank  a  number  of  people  for  their  suggestions  and  comments  on 
earlier versions of this document. First of all, we are grateful to Mr Wouter van Ballegooij 
from the Parliamentary Research Service of the European Parliament for his guidance and 
suggestions.  

In  addition,  we  express  our  gratitude  to  all  the  interviewees  who  kindly  agreed  to 
participate in this study and offer their time and insights.  

We  are  also  grateful  to  a  number  of  experts  and  RAND  colleagues  who  reviewed  and 
commented on the modelling approach in this study. We further thank Professor Francesco 
Maiani for helpful comments and suggestions. 

Finally, we would like to thank Dr Christian Van Stolk (Rand Europe) and Professor Alex 
Armand, who peer-reviewed this document as part of RAND’s quality-assurance process 
and provided useful comments and feedback on its earlier versions. 

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Cost of Non-Europe Report 

Executive summary 

Amid  the  recent  and  unprecedented  influx  of  migrants  into  the  European  Union,  the 
functioning of Schengen has been placed under considerable strain, with several member 
states re-introducing temporary controls on parts of their internal borders. Recent evidence 
suggests that suspensions of Schengen are associated with economic costs related to trade 
barriers and traffic delays at border crossing points, among others things.  
Against this background, the European Parliament has commissioned RAND Europe to 
investigate  the  economic,  social  and  political  costs  of  non-Schengen,  with  a  particular 
emphasis on civil liberties and home affairs. This study aims to contribute to discussions 
about Schengen’s sustainability in the light of the migration crisis by identifying the costs 
of re-introducing border controls between Schengen member states, and by identifying the 
potential benefits of more concerted action at EU level compared to the lack of such action, 
or to action by member states on their own.  

The  remit  of  this  study  includes  both  economic  costs  (such  as  re-introducing  internal 
border controls) along with wider social and political costs (such as crime, and measures 
of security and trust). The focus on the latter types of cost reflects the fact that, as well as 
its economic benefits, Schengen has also been a building block of the EU’s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, and as such has an importance beyond the purely economic. 

Using a bottom-up cost-estimation approach, we estimated the fixed and operating costs 
of  re-establishing  internal  border  controls  within  the  Schengen  Area.  Under  three 
scenarios,  which  differ  in  the  assumption  made  about  the  length  and  scope  of  the  re-
establishment of border controls, we conclude that reversing Schengen could cost current 
Schengen states anywhere between €0.1bn and €19bn in fixed one-off costs, depending on 
the extent of border crossing point reconstruction, and around €2–4bn in annual operating 
costs. The former corresponds to around 0.01–0.16 per cent and the latter to around 0.02–
0.03 per cent of the current Schengen Area GDP.  

We  also  investigated  the  associations  between  Schengen  and  the  abolishment  of  border 
controls with crime, security and trust of citizens in national and European institutions. 
Our findings suggest that, contrary to the predictions of basic economic and criminological 
theory,  rates  in  acquisitive  crime  (burglary,  car  theft,  theft  and  robberies)  have  not 
increased following the abolition of internal border controls. On the contrary, we found a 
more pronounced downward trend after the 2007 Schengen enlargement in levels of crime 
in  existing  Schengen  states  with  direct  borders  to  the  newly  acceding  Schengen  states 
compared  to  existing  Schengen  states  lacking  a  direct  border  with  new  members.  This 
finding  also  held  when  we  looked  into  border  and  non-border  regions  within  these 
countries.  We  also  found  positive  associations  between  the  abolition  of  internal  border 
controls  as  a  result  of  Schengen  and  the  volume  of  seized  drugs  (cocaine  and  heroin), 
perhaps as a result of improved cross-border police cooperation and information exchange. 
In addition, our findings suggest an upward trend in European citizens’ general trust in 
national and European institutions following the Schengen enlargement of 2007. This is an 
important finding as trust is seen as a major enabling factor in the working of the Schengen 
Area.  

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The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

In  light  of  this  identification  and,  where  possible,  quantification  of  the  costs  of  non-
Schengen, this study discusses a series of possible steps which could be taken to help return 
to a fully functioning Schengen Area and thus mitigate the potential costs outlined above.  

With respect to the Schengen governance framework, our analysis found that the current 
arrangements are largely fit for purpose. There are areas where further steps can be made 
(and are underway), such continuing to improve member states’ use of and participation 
in the Schengen evaluation mechanism and the Schengen Information System. However, 
given the current political context, with its breakdown in trust and lack of solidarity among 
member states, action in this area alone is unlikely to address the fundamental needs and 
concerns which have led member states to re-introduce internal border controls. To achieve 
this goal, other steps may need to be considered in the  areas of external border control, 
police and judicial cooperation, and asylum and migration acquis. 

Regarding external border controls, institutional capacity may be increased following the 
establishment  of  the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  (EBCG)  Agency,  although  the 
creation of the EBCG would not address challenges stemming from reliance on  member 
states’ resources. Greater effectiveness of border checks can be achieved through initiatives 
such as systematic checks on EU nationals, the Entry–Exit System, and the use of common 
risk indicators. 

Existing  police  and 
judicial  cooperation  arrangements  would  also  benefit  from 
improvements in information collection and sharing between agencies and member states. 
In  this  regard,  closing  existing  data  gaps  and  increasing  the  interoperability  of  existing 
(and any new) information systems are two areas for improvement. However, action in 
these two areas may have only limited impact on the immediate needs of member  states 
that have led to the reintroduction of internal border controls. 

Lastly,  action  in  the  area  of  migration,  asylum  and  external  relations  may  also  result  in 
benefits  for  the  Schengen  system  by  addressing  underlying  member  states’  concerns, 
namely the arrival and subsequent unmanaged secondary movements of migrants. This 
appears  to  be  the  case  with  the  currently  pursued  policy  of  reducing  the  number  of 
irregular  arrivals,  to  which  a  series  of  recent  policy  proposals  may  provide  a  more 
developed legal basis. However, this approach leaves a series of major fundamental right 
concerns unaddressed. In addition, as with the EBCG proposal, it does not appear to have 
large potential to address questions around solidarity and the reliance on a small number 
of member states to provide an EU-wide public good. 

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Cost of Non-Europe Report 

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION  

I - Motivation 
Border-free movement within the Schengen Area is among the most visible achievements 
of the  European Union (EU) and is considered one  of its most cherished benefits  (Peter 
2015). This free movement of people across borders represents a key pillar of the EU treaty 
and is seen as one of the most valued achievements of the European integration process, 
with  the  Schengen  mechanism  at  its  centre.  As  data  from  recent  Eurobarometer  polls 
highlights,  almost  a  quarter  of  European  citizens  mention  freedom  of  movement  when 
asked what the EU means to them personally, while freedom of movement is mentioned 
as the second most positive result of EU integration, just after the creation of a secure peace 
(EC 2015h).  

The  unprecedented  influx  of  asylum-seekers  into  the  EU  in  2015  has  placed  Schengen 
under considerable strain, with several member states re-introducing controls on parts of 
their  internal  borders,  thereby  suspending  the  functioning  of  the  Schengen  Agreement. 
Subsequent studies (auf dem Brinke 2016; Aussilloux & Le Hir 2016) have demonstrated 
that suspensions of Schengen are associated with considerable economic costs stemming 
from  factors  such  as  traffic  delays  and  barriers  to  trade.  In  addition,  these  costs  may 
represent  only  a  subset  of  possible  losses  linked  to  an  imperfect  functioning  of  the 
Schengen  Area,  given  that  re-introducing  border  controls  may  have  further  social  and 
political costs. 

The European Parliament has commissioned RAND Europe to examine whether there are 
other types of cost associated with non-Schengen, with a special emphasis on civil liberties 
and  home  affairs.  This  study  aims  to  contribute  to  discussions  about  Schengen’s 
sustainability in the light of the migration crisis by identifying the costs of re-introducing 
border controls between Schengen member states in economic, social and political terms, 
and the potential benefits of more concerted action at EU level, compared to the lack of 
such action or action by member states on their own. The remit of this study includes both 
economic costs (such as the burden of re-introducing internal border controls) along with 
wider social and political costs (such as crime, and measures of security and trust). The 
focus  on  the  latter  types  of  cost  reflects  the  fact  that,  as  well  as  its  economic  benefits, 
Schengen has also been a building block of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(Guild et al. 2010), and as such has an importance beyond the purely economic.  

II - Background and context 
The development of the Schengen Area dates back to 1985 when five EU member states 
(Belgium,  Germany,  France,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands)  signed  an  agreement 
allowing for the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders. Five years later, the 
five countries signed a treaty implementing the Schengen Agreement which laid out the 
basis  for  the  agreement’s  implementation  (the  Schengen  acquis).  The  actual  removal  of 
border  controls  in  the  Schengen  Area  took  place  in  1995,  almost  ten  years  after  the 
signature of the original agreement. 

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The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

In the 1990s, the Schengen Area expanded to include every EU member state except the 
United  Kingdom  and  Ireland,  who  maintain  opt-ins.74  Similarly,  all  the  member  states 
which  joined  as  part  of  the  2004  accession  wave  (with  the  exception  of  Cyprus)  have 
become  members  of  the  Schengen  Area,  although  the  newest  member  states  (Bulgaria, 
Romania and Croatia) have not yet joined the system. Non-EU countries can also become 
members, with four (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) having joined so far. 
Thus, the total current Schengen Area includes 26 countries, of which 22 are EU member 
states (EC, n.d.). 

Initially, cooperation between the Schengen countries took the form of intergovernmental 
agreements  outside the  EU legal framework. Following the  adoption  of the  Amsterdam 
Treaty, Schengen cooperation was incorporated into the EU acquis. Schengen governance 
arrangements were incorporated into the activities of the Council of the EU (Council of the 
EU  1991).  The  council  subsequently  determined  which  legal  provisions  constituting  the 
Schengen acquis  were  to be  incorporated into the  EU legal framework,75 and published 
these in 2000 (Council of the EU 2000b). Since then, the Schengen acquis has been further 
developed  by  subsequent  legislative  acts  such  as  the  Schengen  Borders  Code  (SBC), 
adopted in 2006. The EU undertook a reform of the Schengen governance system in 2013. 
During  this  process,  the  Schengen  Borders  Code’s  provisions  for  temporary  re-
introduction  of  border  controls  at  internal  borders  were  amended  (EU  2013)76  and  an 
evaluation and monitoring mechanism set up, charged with assessing the application of 
the Schengen acquis by member states (Council of the EU 2013a). 

Importantly,  the  removal  of  internal  border  controls  in  the  Schengen  Area  has  been 
accompanied by a harmonisation of rules concerning the area’s common external border.77 
This harmonisation includes common rules for conditions of entry (EU 2006) and short-
stay visas (EU 2009b). In addition, in an attempt to balance considerations of freedom and 
security,  a  series  of  ‘compensatory’  (EU  2009a)  measures  were  adopted  by  Schengen 
countries  to  strengthen  police  and  judicial  cooperation  among  participating  countries. 78 
The Schengen Information System (SIS) was established, followed by the introduction of 
its  second  generation  version  in  2013,  enabling  countries  to  share  information  about 

74  The  new  Schengen  countries  were  (year  of  signing  the  agreement  in  brackets):  Italy 
(1990),  Portugal  (1991),  Spain  (1991),  Greece  (1992),  Austria  (1995),  Denmark  (1996), 
Finland (1996) and Sweden (1996). 
75 As Huybreghts (2015) points out, this step was triggered by the need to determine the 
legal basis for  each part  of the  Schengen acquis in the  new pillar  system created by the 
Amsterdam Treaty. In addition, the council needed to identify Schengen provisions which 
had already been superseded by EU developments in the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
area and were thus no longer relevant.  
76 The SBC was codified in March 2016 in the EU (2016a). 
77 These rules are codified in the aforementioned Schengen Borders Code. In addition, in 
2006, the Commission published a Practical Handbook for Border Guards (Schengen Handbook), 
intended as a tool for  national authorities to help ensure  a uniform execution of border 
control tasks (Council of the EU 2006). 
78  While  not  part  of  the  Schengen  Area,  the  United  Kingdom  and  Ireland  opted  into 
Schengen’s cooperation mechanisms (Council of the EU 2000a; Council of the EU 2002). 

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individuals  and  goods  between  relevant  border, 
authorities.79 

law-enforcement  and 

judicial 

1. Current challenges to the Schengen system 

The  recent  influx  of  irregular  migrants  and  refugees  to  Europe80  has  put  the  Schengen 
system under considerable strain and has led to several Schengen countries re-introducing 
border checks on a temporary basis. 

The possibility of re-introducing controls at internal Schengen borders is foreseen in the 
Schengen  Borders  Code,  whose  Article  2581  lays  out  a  general  framework  for  the  re-
introduction of controls where there is a ‘serious threat to public policy or internal security’ 
in a given country. In such a case, the country may decide to re-introduce controls for up 
to  six  months,  provided  that  the  border  controls  represent  a  ‘last  resort’  option  and  are 
temporary in nature (Guild et al. 2015). Article 26 of the SBC specifies the criteria for any 
member state’s re-introduction of internal border controls, namely ‘any threats to [member 
state’s] public policy or internal security’ and the likely impact of the re-introduction itself. 
Article  27  of  the  SBC  further  specifies  the  procedure  for  the  re-introduction  of  border 
controls and lays out the pertinent notification requirements (giving at least four weeks’ 
notice) in order to inform all relevant stakeholders including other Schengen countries, the 
European Commission, European Parliament and the Council of the EU.  

For situations that necessitate immediate action, Article 28 of the SBC allows for short-term 
(up to ten days, with possible extensions) emergency action. In addition, Article 29 includes 
a provision for situations where ‘the overall functioning of the area without internal border 
control is put at risk as a result of persistent serious deficiencies relating to external border 
control’ and allows the re-introduction of border controls for a period of up to two years 
(an initial six-months period, followed by up to three six-month extensions). Importantly, 
unlike measures taken under Articles 25 or  28,  re-introduction of border controls under 
Article 29 can take place based on a recommendation from the Council of the EU, which 
itself should be based on a proposal from the European Commission. Article 30 lays out 
the  criteria  to  be  taken  into  consideration  with  respect  to  any  border  control  re-
introductions made in accordance with Article 29. 

79 For a more detailed description of Schengen’s compensatory measures, see for instance 
Delivet (2015). 
80 The International Organisation for Migration estimated that the number of arrivals in 
Europe during 2015 exceeded one million people, and that the number of arrivals in the 
first two  months of 2016 was much larger  than that over  the  same  period in 2015  (IOM 
2015; IOM 2016). 
81 The numbering of SBC Articles in this report is done in accordance using the codified 
version from March 2016, which may result in discrepancies with older texts referencing 
the SBC. 

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Table 1.1: Overview of SBC provisions dealing with the temporary re-introduction of internal 

border controls 

SBC 
Article 

Article 25 

Provision 

Provides for temporary re-introduction of controls in response to a ‘serious threat 
to public policy or internal security’ (up to six months) 

Article 26  Criteria for temporary re-introduction of controls under Articles 25 and 28 

Article 27 

Procedure for re-introduction of controls under Article 25 

Article 28 

Provides for temporary re-introduction of controls in cases requiring immediate 
action (up to two months) 

Article 29 

Provides for temporary re-introduction of controls in cases where the overall 
functioning of the Schengen Area is at risk (up to two years) 

Article 30  Criteria for temporary re-introduction of controls under Article 29 

In September 2015, Germany was the first country to resort to temporary measures under 
Article 28 and re-introduced controls at its border with Austria (Council of the EU 2015j). 
In November 2015, facing a deadline after which Article 28 border controls could not be 
sustained, Germany announced that it would keep controls in place under the provision 
of Article 25, thereby availing itself of an additional six months in order to maintain border 
checks.  Austria  followed  suit  shortly  after  the  original  German  announcement  and  re-
introduced Article  28 controls at its borders with Hungary, Italy, Slovakia and Slovenia 
(Council of the EU 2015i). As with the German case, Austrian controls were reclassified as 
Article 25 measures in November 2015. One day after Austria, Slovenia also announced 
the re-introduction of temporary controls at its border with Hungary (Council of the EU 
2015k). However, unlike Germany and Austria, Slovenia terminated its temporary controls 
in October 2015 (Council of the EU 2015l).  

Since  the  initial  announcements  in  September  2015,  several  other  Schengen  countries 
(Belgium,  Denmark,  France,82  Germany,  Hungary,  Norway  and  Sweden)  have  taken 
similar measures. 

The  temporary  re-introduction  of  border  controls  in  accordance  with  the  provisions 
discussed above by Schengen countries is not necessarily an unusual development. In fact, 
countries  have  routinely  made  use  of  these,  for  instance  in  the  context  of  high-profile 
events  taking  place  in  a  given  country  or  in  response  to  serious  public  health  risks.83 
However,  the  recent  succession  of  individual  countries  invoking  the  relevant  SBC 

82  France  initially  introduced  temporary  border  controls  in  connection  with  a  climate 
change  conference  in  Paris  held  in  November  and  December  2015.  Following  the 
November terrorist attacks in Paris and the subsequent declaration of a state of emergency, 
the already established controls were retained (Council of the EU 2015h).  
83 See, for instance, Carrera et al. (2011) and Groenendijk (2004). 

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provisions and continued ’serious deficiencies’ with respect to external border controls in 
Greece (EC 2016b) has given rise to questions about the system’s future.84  

Various  European  Union  bodies  have  clearly  stated  their  commitment  to  preserving 
internal  border-free  movement  (EP  2015b),  notably  in  a  Council  Recommendation  of  12 
February 2016 describing steps to address deficiencies in external borders (Council of the 
EU 2016d) and in the EC’s March 2016 communication on a roadmap for restoring a fully 
functioning Schengen system (EC 2016a). This roadmap outlined steps to be taken, mostly 
concerning improvements in Greece’s ability to manage its part of the Schengen external 
border, resumption of Dublin transfers to Greece, and provision of assistance to Greece. 
The  roadmap  established  a  progress-monitoring  schedule  to  help  the  EC  determine 
whether the situation had improved sufficiently to avoid the invocation of SBC Article 29. 
In  early  May  2016,85  based  on  reporting  from  Greece  and  its  own  assessment,  the  EC 
concluded  that  while  substantial  progress  had  been  made  by  Greece,  not  all  previously 
identified  serious  deficiencies  in  external  border  management  had  been  sufficiently 
addressed (EC 2016n). As a result, the EC recommended that the Council of the EU issue a 
decision allowing member  states to maintain internal border controls, albeit only with a 
limited  scope  and  for  a  period  of  up  to  six  months.  The  council  adopted  these 
recommendations in a 12 May 2016 Decision (Council of the EU 2016b). 

2. Links between Schengen and other policy areas 

From  the  perspective  of  the  member  states  that  have  re-introduced  temporary  border 
controls since September 2015, the  main challenge to  border-free  movement stems from 
factors  external  to  the  Schengen  governance  framework.  This  is  well  documented  in 
justifications for the re-introduction of internal border controls submitted to the Council of 
the EU in line with the relevant SBC provisions outlined above. As summarised in Table 
1.2, the most frequently cited reason is the uncontrolled influx of undocumented migrants 
and security threats. The aim of this paper is not to examine the legality or appropriateness 
of these justifications86 but simply to note them as an expression of the political context in 
which member states have taken the decision to re-introduce internal border controls, and 
as a statement of member states’ needs which must be addressed if there is to be a return 
to  the  normal  functioning  of  Schengen.  Therefore,  a  consideration  of  policy  options  to 
improve  the  functioning  of  the  Schengen  Area  needs  to  take  into  account  the  Schengen 
framework as well as other policy areas, which is reflected in the scope of this study.  

84 In this context, it is worth recalling a short-lived discussion to establish a mini-Schengen 
(limited to Benelux, Austria and Germany) floated by Dutch representatives in December 
2015 (Guild et al. 2015). 
85 The timing of this assessment is set so that its results are known before the lapse of any 
border controls introduced by member states under Article 25 of the SBC. 
86  This  aspect  will  be  examined  as  part  of  a  parallel  paper  completed  by  the  Centre  for 
European Policy Studies. 

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Table 1.2: Overview of selected temporary re-introductions of internal border controls in 

Schengen countries since September 2015 

Country 

Date of notification 

Stated reason 

Germany 

September 2015 

Uncontrolled influx of third-country 
nationals 

Document ref. 

11986/15 

Austria 

September 2015 

Influx of third-country nationals 

12110/15 

Slovenia 

September 2015 

Uncontrollable migration flow 

12111/15 

Sweden 

Norway 

France 

November 2015 

Unprecedented migratory pressure 

14047/15 

November 2015 

Unpredictable migratory pressure 

14633/15 

December 2015 

State of emergency following 
November 2015 terrorist attacks 

15181/15 

Denmark 

January 2016 

Unprecedented migration pressure 

5021/16 

In  addition  to  member-state  notifications,  this  interconnectedness  of  policy  areas  is 
acknowledged both in official EU documentation and the academic literature. To illustrate, 
the  latest  EC  report  on  the  functioning  of  Schengen  noted  that  ‘although  the  asylum 
legislation  is  not  part  of  the  Schengen  acquis,  it  is  obvious  that  the  refugee  crisis  has 
significant  consequences  for  the  situation  at  the  EU’s  external  borders  and  within  the 
Schengen area’ (EC 2015b, 3). Similarly, the EC report ‘State of Play of Implementation of 
the  Priority  Actions  under  the  European  Agenda  on  Migration’  notes  that  ‘the  Union’s 
ability to maintain an area free from internal border control is contingent on having secure 
external borders’ (EC 2016e, 13). Also, acknowledging the linkage between Schengen and 
police  and  judicial  cooperation,  the  European  Agenda  on  Security  (EC  2015f)  hails  the 
Schengen  Information  System  as  one  of  the  most  important  tools  for  law  enforcement 
cooperation in the EU. 

Put slightly differently, the current challenges to the Schengen system do not necessarily 
stem from inadequacies in the Schengen governance framework itself. For instance, Steve 
Peers  (2015a)  suggested  that  the  current  issues  observed  in  Greece  and  the  resulting 
Schengen suspensions are a product of deficiencies in the EU’s asylum system rather than 
Greek border management per se. Similarly, Bertoncini and Vitorino (2016) argued that the 
Schengen  Area,  rather  than  contributing  to  the  asylum-seeker  crisis,  was  its  ‘collateral 
victim’. The need to address external factors in the interest of the Schengen Area is also 
acknowledged in the latest European Commission report on the functioning of Schengen, 
which noted that:  

addressing the two major challenges faced in the Schengen area — the refugee crisis and 
the terrorist threat — requires full and correct implementation of the measures already 
contained in the two sets of documents tabled by the Commission in spring [2015]: the 
European Agenda on Migration and the European Agenda on Security (EC 2015b) 

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3. Role  of  trust  and  democratic  legitimacy  in  the  current  challenge  to 

Schengen  

Given  the  importance  of  the  political  context  in  the  re-introduction  of  internal  border 
controls,  the  role  of  trust  (or,  more  precisely,  a  breakdown  thereof)  needs  to  be 
acknowledged.  This  is  applicable  at  two  distinct  levels:  (1)  trust  between  individual 
member states, and (2) trust between the public and national and EU institutions. The first 
dimension, trust among member states, represents the ‘basis of Schengen cooperation’ given 
that individual member states need to have confidence that their partners’ policies and controls 
are adequate and similar enough to warrant the removal of internal borders (Pascouau 2012). 
However,  as  pointed  out  by  Sinkkonen  (2016),  this  type  of  trust  has  diminished,  as 
demonstrated  by  ‘blame  games’  over  which  member  state  has  failed  to  uphold  their 
obligations. This is echoed by Bertoncini and Vitorino (2016), who argue that the ‘tension 
undermining the Schengen area is a result first and foremost of a crisis in trust among the 
member states’. 

Public  trust  in  institutions  is  the  second  dimension  of  the  underlying  issue.  Trust  in 
institutions across the EU had been decreasing with the continuation of the migrant crisis 
(Atwater 2015), which may reflect a general trend regarding confidence in governments’ 
ability to address public concerns.87 This trend is particularly relevant for EU institutions 
since, as numerous observers (Majone 1998; Scharpf 1999) have argued, there appears to 
be a link between effectiveness and legitimacy with respect to EU policymaking.88 Pedersen 
(2015) argued that this may be particularly the case with respect to security policies. Using 
the example of the Schengen Information System (SIS) and Eurodac, he suggested that if 
the  problem-solving  capacity  of  these  tools  is  encumbered,  ‘the  legitimacy  of  the 
instruments  and  ultimately  the  Schengen  agreements  in  their  present  form  could  be 
seriously endangered’.  

Therefore, the breakdown of inter-member state trust and the lack of public trust in the 
EU’s  ability  to  uphold  security  and  common  migration  and  asylum  policy  need  to  be 
understood as a direct contributing factor to the political context that has led member states 
to re-introduce temporary internal border controls. This observation further underscores 
the  point  made  above  that  policy  initiatives  aimed  at  reinstating  Schengen  to  its  full 
functionality need to extend beyond the Schengen governance framework.  

87 The re-introduction of temporary border controls  needs to be  seen in this context.  As 
Pastore  and  Henry  (2016)  noted,  the  very  first  re-introduction  of  border  controls,  by 
Germany  in  September  2015,  represented  a  notable  turnaround  in  German  policy, 
prompted  by  a  sudden  spike  in  migrant  arrivals  in  Bavaria  not  long  after  the  German 
government’s very welcoming initial stance. 
88  More  recently,  in  a  reference  to  the  refugee  crisis,  Emmott  (2015)  observed  that  the 
purpose of the EU has come under question in relation to its inability to find a solution. 

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4. Gaps in intra-EU solidarity as a factor contributing to trust breakdowns 

Inseparable from the issue of trust is the notion of solidarity among member states, both in 
terms  of  respecting  obligations  to  uphold  common  rules  and  in  implementing  financial 
and operational assistance schemes (Pascouau 2012). While member states have not always 
complied with their obligations under the existing Schengen migration and asylum acquis, 
it remains a matter of debate as to what extent these obligations were realistic to start with, 
particularly  in  light  of  recent  migration  volumes.  A  range  of  solidarity  and  assistance 
mechanisms has been proposed and, to a varying degree of success, implemented, in line 
with  Article  80  of  the  TFEU  (Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union)  on 
solidarity and the fair sharing of obligations, including areas of border control, migration 
and  asylum  (EP  2015d).  However,  no  information  exists  on  how  these  assistance 
mechanisms compare to the overall needs of border countries and  what resources these 
countries  would  need  to  fully  meet  their  obligations  under  the  current  circumstances. 
Solidarity  mechanisms  require  a  small  number  of  member  states  to  provide  at  a 
disproportionate cost a service to the entire EU/Schengen Area, and the degree to which 
existing assistance mechanisms fall short of these countries’ current needs remains an open 
question.89 

To  illustrate,  the  European  Court  of  Auditors  (ECA)  conducted  a  review  (ECA 2014)  of 
spending under the External Borders Fund, which focuses on management of the external 
Schengen border. The review concluded that while the fund had contributed to financial 
solidarity among member states, it was impossible to determine its results and impact due 
to deficiencies in the relevant authorities’ monitoring and ex-post evaluations. In response, 
the  ECA  recommended  that  member  states  develop  measurable  targets,  coupled  with 
progress indicators in terms of the fund’s outputs, outcomes and impacts. 
Similarly, in 2016 the ECA published the results (ECA 2016) of an audit of EU spending 
related to migration in Southern Mediterranean and Eastern Neighbourhood countries. As 
with the 2014 report, this audit concluded that it was difficult to provide a measurement 
of the outcome of EU spending in this area and called for the implementation of a set of 
‘clear and measurable objectives’. 

In addition to their design, at least some  existing solidarity mechanisms appear to have 
been hampered by the lack of member states’ participation and cooperation. One example 
is the current scheme for the relocation of asylum seekers. In September 2015, the Council 
of the EU issued two decisions introducing (Council of the EU 2015b) and subsequently 
amending  (Council  of  the  EU  2015c)  a  mechanism  whereby  asylum  seekers  would  be 
redistributed to other Schengen countries.90 However, shortly after the adoption of these 

89 It is worth stressing that the issue of solidarity and burden-sharing is not a new question 
but one that has been posed many times before. See, for instance,  EP (2010); Thielemann 
(2006), Thielemann (2008) and Eiko and Armstrong (2012). 
90 As Carrera and Guild (2015) point out, in addition to introducing a measure of solidarity, 
a related reason for the proposed relocation mechanisms was the failure of some member 
states to comply with their obligations under the Receptions Conditions Directive 2013/33 

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decisions,  the  possibility  of  forcing  uncooperative  member  states  into  compliance  came 
into question.91 
Subsequent  developments  have  largely  confirmed  these  concerns.  The  relocation 
mechanism  continues  to  attract  strong  opposition,  particularly  from  new  EU  member 
states,92 and in December 2015, Slovakia challenged the decision before the Court of Justice 
for  the  European  Union  (CJEU)  (Vikarska  2015).  Other  countries,  while  not  in  principle 
opposed  to  the  decision,  have  largely  not  come  anywhere  near  fulfilling  their  share  of 
relocations.  Therefore,  the  numbers  of  actually  relocated  asylum  seekers  has  lagged  far 
behind  the  original  plans  and  remains  extremely  low  (EC  2016r).93  In  addition,  in  some 
instances  relocated  asylum  seekers  failed  to  stay  in  the  country  allocated  to  them  and 
attempted  to  move  to  a  different  country  (Lazarová,  2016).  In  light  of  these  events,  the 
scheme was considered a failure by various commentators as early as January 2016 (de la 
Baume 2016; Peers 2016a; Maiani 2016). Notably, the relocation mechanism is not the only 
scheme  where  member-state  participation  has  fallen  short  of  projected  needs.  Other 
examples  include  hotspots  in  Greece  and  Italy,  which  have  been  affected  by  a  lack  of 
seconded staff from member states (EC 2016e; Kaca 2016).  

5. Economic, social and political costs resulting from imperfect functioning 

of the Schengen Area 

The political context in which member states have re-introduced internal border controls 
also  provides  a  good  indication  of  what  can  be  conceptualized  as  costs  associated  with 
gaps  in  the  functioning  of  Schengen.  Economic  costs  of  various  forms  (e.g.  direct 
administrative  costs  associated  with  the  management  of  re-introduced  borders,  macro-
economic costs stemming from disruptions to trade and travel, and so on) are an obvious 
category and have been discussed in existing literature. 

Multiple studies have estimated the economic costs of the removal of Schengen border-free 
movement (also dubbed ‘the costs of non-Schengen’) with regard to trade, waiting times 
and impact on financial markets – see for example reports by the EPRS (EP 2016b), Jacques 
Delors Institute (auf dem Brinke 2016), EC (2016a) and France Stratégie (Aussilloux & Le 

to provide acceptable conditions for asylum seekers. For a discussion of the  situation in 
Greece, see for instance HRW (2011). 
91 See, for instance, Peers (2015b). One of the underlying considerations being that while 
the EC could initiate infringement proceedings, this is a very lengthy process and at its end 
member  states  may  prefer  simply  to  pay  the  financial  penalty.  Interestingly,  financial 
penalties were explicitly built into the new version of the relocation mechanism proposed 
by the EC in May 2016. 
92 The Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia voted against the Council of the 
EU Decision of 22 September 2015. The decision was passed using the qualified majority 
voting procedure. 
93 While engagement of member states (or lack thereof) seems to be one of the key factors, 
other underlying factors also need to be acknowledged. These include, among others, the 
administrative compexity of the scheme and its lack of attractiveness to asylum seekers. 
See, for instance, EC (2016v). 

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Hir  2016).  These  reports  demonstrated  that  an  abolishment  of  the  Schengen  agreement 
could  have  a  detrimental  impact  on  the  European  economy  and  its  member  states. 
However,  these  studies  either  did  not  consider  the  running  costs  of  border  re-
establishment or included only a brief analysis of such costs based on an extrapolation of 
previous, often hardly comparable, estimates.  

A more thorough analysis of a related topic can be found in another report published by 
the EC (2016c), which estimates the costs of ‘smart borders’ (modern self-service gates and 
kiosks) implemented at the external borders of the EU. Unfortunately, the report considers 
only changes to the running costs of existing external borders instead of looking at internal 
borders  as  well.  Finally,  yet  another  EC  report  (2016j)  looks  directly  at  the  additional 
administrative and fiscal costs, suggesting that they  would  range  from €0.6bn to €5.8bn 
annually based on a 1993 estimate of public administrative costs in the range of 0.1–0.2 per 
cent of the total value of intra-community trade, and on the EU standard-cost model for 
the reduction of regulatory burden from 2004 (EC 2004). Table 1.3 provides a summary of 
the various economic cost estimates. 

In addition to economic costs, re-introducing intra-EU borders may have wider social and 
political  costs.  For  example,  Schengen  is  an  integral  part  of  the  EU’s  Area  of  Freedom, 
Safety and Justice (Guild et al. 2010) while the abolition of internal borders routinely ranks 
among the most popular EU achievements among general public (Peter 2015). It is noted 
that to ensure security within the border-free area, Schengen states have increased police 
cooperation  to  tackle  organised  cross-border  crime  and  terrorism.  Cross-border 
surveillance,  hot  pursuits,94  the  establishment  of  joint  police  centres  and  the  SIS  are 
particular examples of intra-Schengen cooperation.  

Hence,  the  costs  of  non-Schengen  may  also  be  conceptualised  by  considering  what 
Schengen  was  supposed  to  deliver.  In  addition  to  creating  a  border-free  travel  area, 
Schengen  (and  in  particular  its  compensatory  measures)  was  intended  to  result95  –  and 
according to some authors (Vitorino & Bertoncini 2015) may actually have resulted – in a 
more secure area. Therefore, it is possible that there are safety and security costs associated 
with  non-Schengen  which  merit  greater  examination  (Gros  2015).  However,  in  light  of 
recent migration waves and terrorist attacks some argue that border controls are essential 
to  safeguard  national  internal  security  (Vasilopoulou  2013).  The  underlying  reasoning 
behind this argument is that the lack of internal border controls may allow criminals and 
terrorists  to  operate  in  one  country  and  hide  in  another,  making  legal  prosecution  and 
enforcement more difficult.  

The majority of evidence is anecdotal, however, and there is only sparse empirical evidence 
– Pána (2011), for instance, highlighted that after the Czech Schengen accession in 2007 no 

94  ‘Hot  pursuits’  allow  the  police  force  from  one  Schengen  state  catching  criminals  in  the  act  of 
committing  serious  offences  to  pursue  them  across  borders  and  detain  them  on  the  territory  of 
another Schengen state.  
95 Bertoncini and Vitorino (2016) argued that the original security dimension of Schengen 
has  been  played  down  in  the  recent  debate  surrounding  the  re-introduction  of  internal 
border controls. 

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overall significant increase in crime was observed. In Austrian and German border regions 
no increase in crime was reported; on the contrary, in some of the border regions overall 
crime  levels  even  decreased.  Pána  (2011)  also  mentioned  that  one  other  change  in  the 
border  areas  was  a  decrease  of  prostitution  due  to  the  end  of  large  queues  at  border 
crossings,  which  previously  represented  an  opportunity  for  prostitutes  to  find  clients. 
Ademmer  et  al.  (2015)  came  to  a  similar  conclusion  by  looking  at  German  regions 
bordering  the  Czech  Republic  and  Poland.  This  study  looked  at  four  German  states 
(Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,  Brandenburg,  Saxony  and  Bavaria)  bordering  these  two 
countries  and  examined  how  criminal  activity  had  evolved  in  them  after  Schengen 
compared  to  non-border  states.  The  idea  was  that  these  four  states  would  have  been 
adversely affected compared to non-border states, although the study findings suggested 
that  while  crime  rates  have  generally  decreased  across  Germany,  criminal  activity  in 
German states bordering Poland and the Czech Republic in fact decreased relatively more 
over the period between 2006 (the last full year border checks were in place) and 2014. A 
similar pattern was observed when looking only at property crime, and while the results 
are  merely  descriptive  (and  the  authors  acknowledge  that  more  in-depth  analysis  is 
required to shed light on causal effects), the findings at least suggest that the abolition of 
border  controls  may  have  led  to  a  decrease  in  criminal  activity  in  German  states  not 
bordering new member states.  

In contrast to the studies above, McCabe (2015) looked at a different type of crime pursued 
by organised crime groups across Europe: drug trafficking. This study found a negative 
association  between  joining  Schengen  and  a  country’s  volume  of  heroin  seizures, 
suggesting that Schengen states intercept less heroin than they would as a non-Schengen 
state. The study examines cross-country differences and long-term trends in the quantities 
of heroin seized by comparing Schengen with non-Schengen countries. However, it does 
not compare the total volume of heroin seized by countries after joining Schengen to their 
pre-Schengen levels, which would have shed more light on the potential causality of this 
association. We investigate this point in more detail below. 
Looking at political costs, the discontinuation of Schengen, particularly if seen as connected 
to the EU’s inability to uphold its migration and asylum policies, may contribute to losses 
in  public  trust  in  the  European  project  or  other  areas  of  trust  relating  to  national  and 
international institutions (Heinrich Böll Stiftung 2016). 

Table 1.3: Overview of selected studies estimating the costs of non-Schengen  

Study 

Methodology 

Findings 

Cecchini (1988). The European 
Challenge. Commission of the 
European Communities 

European Currency Unit 
(ECU) 902m in six countries 
(Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, UK). 

Multinational survey of 
budgetary costs to public 
authorities in terms of 
material and human resources 
employed to carry out 
customs inspections, 
deducting cost associated 
with non-custom tasks. 

European Commission 
(2016a), Communication from 
the Commission to the 

EU standard-cost model for 
the reduction of regulatory 
burden assuming €18.5 labour 

Between €0.6bn and €5.8bn of 
administrative costs would 
have to be paid by 

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The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

European Parliament, the 
European Council and the 
Council: Back to Schengen – A 
Roadmap 

EP (2016b), The Cost of Non-
Schengen: Impact of border 
controls within Schengen on 
the Single Market 

costs per hour and one billion 
passenger trips annually; 
Cecchini (1988) report 
findings – assuming public 
administrative costs of 0.1–0.2 
per cent of the total value of 
intra-community trade 

Costs of border-crossing 
points enhancement in seven 
countries financed by the 
‘Schengen Facility’ fund, 
extrapolated to all Schengen 
countries using population 
ratios. 

governments for increased 
staff for border controls. 

One-off costs of re-
establishing all land border 
crossing points in all 
Schengen countries of €7.1bn. 

auf dem Brinke (2016), The 
Economic Costs of Non-
Schengen: What the numbers 
tell us. (Jacques Delors 
Institut) 

Extrapolation of the costs to 
protect the US–Canadian 
border using border length 
ratio. 

Operating costs (personnel 
and maintenance of border 
infrastructure) €1.6–2.7bn per 
year. 

III - Objectives and scope of this paper 

Against this background, the current paper focuses on the ‘costs of non-Schengen’ from a 
civil  liberties,  justice  and  home  affairs  perspective.  As  outlined  above,  although  recent 
literature has provided a good evidence base relating to the macro-economic cost of non-
Schengen, there remains a gap in the evidence base concerning potential budgetary costs 
along with wider social and political costs. This paper aims to bridge that gap.  

While social and political costs can take many different forms, we focus on those related to 
justice and home affairs, including crime, safety and security, and trust.  

Additionally,  given  the  likelihood  of  substantial  costs  associated  with  an  imperfect 
functioning of the Schengen Area, this study seeks to identify the potential benefits of more 
concerted  action  at  EU  level  which  could  enable  Schengen  to  return  to  full  functioning, 
with resulting benefits. In its analysis of policy options and areas requiring more concerted 
action at the EU level, the paper notes the political context in which internal borders were 
re-introduced and of the needs of the member states responsible. Therefore, in addition to 
the Schengen governance framework, the following external domains are also examined: 
external border control, migration and asylum acquis, and police and judicial cooperation. 

In essence, this paper seeks to address two main research questions which can be divided 
into further sub-questions as follows:  

1)  What  are  the  economic,  social  and  political  costs  of  the  re-introduction  of  border 

controls in the area of justice and home affairs?  
a.  What  are  the  budgetary  costs  of  re-allocating  public  sources  towards  border 

control? 

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b.  What are the empirical associations between Schengen, crime and security? 
c.  What is the empirical association between Schengen and various modalities and 

levels of trust? 

2)  Would potential benefits result from more concerted action at the EU level within the 

current Schengen governance framework, or by external factors? 

It is important to acknowledge the limited timeframe of this study, resulting in constraints 
on the paper’s scope and level of detail. We could also have looked further into other areas 
of crime (such as human trafficking) related to border controls or the lack thereof, but due 
to the absence of existing quantitative data have not pursued that area of research.  

IV - Research approach and limitations 

A  number  of  different  research  activities  have  been  undertaken  to  produce  this  paper. 
Overall, we applied a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods including desk research 
and  literature  review,  semi-structured  interviews  with  different  stakeholders,  cost-
modelling and econometric-modelling techniques. Our approach is as comprehensive as 
has been possible within the timeframe of this study, although a few limitations need to be 
highlighted. 

i. 

Conceptual limitation: what is ‘non-Schengen’? 

An underlying conceptual challenge to this study is a lack of clarity concerning the most 
accurate description of ‘non-Schengen’. A somewhat crude approach would be to imagine 
Schengen as a binary choice, i.e. either the Schengen Area and its provisions are in place 
for a given country, or they are not. This is the approach this paper takes for a subset of 
analyses owing to methodological and data considerations. 

In  reality,  however,  the  spectrum  of  options  is  more  complex,  and  the  forms  in  which 
Schengen may function are more varied. For instance, based on the Council  of the EU’s 
decision of 12 May 2016 (Council of the EU 2016b), internal border controls are maintained 
by five countries. In each of these countries controls are carried out only at a subset of their 
respective borders and checks are intended to be targeted and limited in scope. However, 
future  re-introductions  of  internal  borders  may  be  of  a  completely  different  scope. 
Furthermore,  the  duration  of  temporary  controls  can  be  subject  to  change,  adding 
complexity  to  efforts  at  estimating  their  impact.  The  temporary  nature  of  re-introduced 
border  controls  may  make  countries  reluctant  to  make  investments  in  longer-term 
solutions  and  arrangements,  thereby  relying  on  measures  of  a  more  stopgap  nature.  In 
estimating economic costs, this paper attempts to address this uncertainty and variation 
by introducing a series of sensitivity analyses. 

In  addition,  even  in  the  event  of  a  discontinuation  of  the  internal  border-free  area,  it  is 
conceivable that some Schengen compensatory measures and other related features would 
be retained. This applies particularly to the  Schengen Information System, described by 
one  interviewee  as  ‘by  far  the  largest  cooperation  system  on  the  planet’.  This  poses  a 
challenge for estimations based on comparisons with status quo ante, i.e. the situation before 
the  establishment  of  Schengen  or  before  a  given  country’s  accession  to  the  area.  Put 

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differently, one way of thinking about the costs of non-Europe is that they represent the 
opposite of EU added value. Viewed from this perspective, even in the event of a complete 
re-introduction of  internal  border controls in the  Schengen Area, some EU added value 
stemming from the Schengen governance framework is likely to be retained, such as in the 
form of improved law-enforcement cooperation. It is therefore unlikely that the costs of 
complete non-Schengen would equal the totality of Schengen’s EU added value. 

1. Methodological limitations 

The study was undertaken in a constrained time-span which determined the extent of the 
analysis.  For  instance,  the  cost-modelling  approach  applied  in  this  paper  is  based  on 
relatively scarce data and assumptions had to be made throughout the modelling process 
to extrapolate and/or aggregate missing input data for a wider set of countries. With more 
time available  more data points could have potentially been collected. Nevertheless, we 
have clearly highlighted all assumptions made and, in line with good practice, provide a 
range of cost estimates based on sensitivity analyses. 
In addition, the report uses data on criminal activities. Such data comes with caveats and 
is not always available at all geographic levels of analysis (e.g. country or regional level) 
over a longer period of time. This has to some extent determined the empirical analyses 
conducted in this paper. It is also important to note that all empirical estimates in this paper 
should be interpreted as associations rather than causal effects. The specific limitations of 
the empirical approach taken in this paper are discussed in the relevant sections of chapter 
2.  

2. Limitations of policy assessments 

EU  institutions  have  been  very  active  in  the  past  two  years  as  far  as  policymaking  in 
Schengen-related  areas  is  concerned.  Relevant  examples  range  from  the  adoption  of 
documents setting out broad policy direction (such as the European Agenda on Migration 
and  its  security  counterpart)  to  concrete  legislative  proposals  (such  as  the  proposal  to 
establish the European Border and Coast Guard) along with the development of tools to 
complement existing policies (such as common risk indicators). These recent undertakings 
are currently in various stages of their policy life – some are still under consideration while 
some are in the early stage of implementation. This poses several challenges for an analysis 
of their impacts. In the case of recently implemented initiatives, there may not be enough 
evidence available. For initiatives that are currently under consideration, their final form – 
which itself may vary substantially from the initial proposal – may not have been agreed 
on.  In  addition,  while  some  policy  proposals  have  been  accompanied  by  an  impact 
assessment,  as  Malmersjo  and  Remáč  (2016)  noted,  this  is  by  no  means  a  universal 
occurrence. 

V - Structure of the paper 

This research paper is structured as follows:  

-  Chapter 2 aims to quantify the economic, social and political cost of non-

Schengen from a home affairs and civil liberties perspective; 

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-  Chapter 3 examines different options where action at EU level could lead to 

beneficial outcomes compared to the current state of play; 

-  Chapter 4 provides a report summary and conclusions.  

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CHAPTER 2 – QUANTIFYING THE COSTS OF NON-
SCHENGEN IN ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
TERMS: A HOME AFFAIRS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES PERSPECTIVE 

I -Analytical approach 

As outlined in chapter 1, the goal of this paper is to add to the existing evidence base on 
the potential economic, social and political costs of ‘non-Schengen’  – or, in other words, 
what  Europe  could  lose  by  reversing  the  current  internal  border-free  zone  within  the 
Schengen Area.  

With  regard  to  economic  costs,  this  study  focuses  on  the  potential  costs  of  physically 
rebuilding borders between Schengen states. In principle, these costs can be divided into 
direct and indirect (opportunity) costs, which can in turn be further differentiated by the 
type  of  affected  subject.  To  that  end  we  apply  a  cost-modelling  approach  taking  into 
account information from a variety of sources. 

Concerning  social  and  political  costs,  we  use  econometric-modelling  techniques  to 
investigate  the  association  between  Schengen  and  different  types  of  crime,  including 
acquisitive and violent crime, as well as the illicit drug trade. We also explore associations 
between Schengen and different measures of trust, including interpersonal trust and trust 
in  national  and  transnational  institutions.  For  potential  social  and  political  costs  we 
examine both cross-country and within-country trends and changes by comparing border 
and non-border regions. Specific analyses are outlined in more detail below.  

II - Economic costs: direct budgetary impact of re-introducing internal 
border controls 

1. A cost-estimation approach 

In order to calculate the potential budgetary costs of re-establishing border controls we use 
a bottom-up cost-modelling approach, breaking the total expected costs down by type of 
expense (one-off fixed costs and operating costs), attaching a value to each category and 
country, and summing those up to provide  a total estimate. Each individual estimate  is 
calculated using either country-specific parameters or appropriately modified parameters 
from other countries. Although more complicated and demanding than the alternative (i.e. 
a top-down cost estimation based on dividing total expenditure by total units of activity), 
a bottom-up approach is more transparent and versatile, and facilitates use of the analysis 
in different scenarios (Cabinet Office, n.d.). Moreover, a top-down approach is infeasible 
in  our  study  to  start  with  due  to  lack  of  data  on  the  total  costs  of  border  protection  at 
country level.  

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In essence, the direct budgetary costs of re-introducing border controls can in principle be 
divided into two categories depending on their re-occurrence and dependency on other 
factors (see Figure 2.1): 
1.  Fixed  costs  of  setting  up  or  reconstructing  border  crossing  points,  including 
building  new  checkpoints,  refurbishing  older  unused  outposts,  purchasing 
computers,  scanners,  and  other  IT  equipment,  developing  supporting  IT 
infrastructure,  purchasing  personal  equipment  for  border  force  officers,  patrol 
vehicles,  related  infrastructure,  and  project  management  and  training  for  new 
border-force  employees.  We  assume  that  fixed  costs  are  a  function  of  country, 
border-outpost  size,  type  (air/land/maritime)  and  total  number,  as  depicted  in 
Figure  2.1.  That  is,  establishing  a  border  outpost  will:  (1)  generally  be  more 
expensive in richer countries, particularly due to higher prices and also possibly 
more  expensive  equipment  used;  (2)  will  depend  on  outpost  size  and  intended 
traffic capacity; and (3) will be more expensive for land border outposts that need 
to  be  completely  refurbished  or  wholly  rebuilt  compared  to  air  and  maritime 
borders (see below). Total costs will be the sum of expenses required to re-establish 
each individual border outpost. 

2.  Operating,  patrolling,  administrative  and  maintenance  costs  of  day-to-day 
border  controls,  consisting  principally  of  border-force  salaries,  equipment 
maintenance, fuel, law-enforcement activities and administrative expenses such as 
visa  checks.  As  with  fixed  costs,  operating  costs  will  mainly  depend  on  the 
number, type and size of border crossing points, as well as on the length and type 
of  the  border  itself.  Every  border  outpost  requires  border  agency  officers  and 
infrastructure maintenance, but borders with a lower density of border outposts 
are  more  expensive  to  patrol.  There  are  also  substantial  costs  related  to  law 
enforcement  and  administration.  Again,  richer  countries  are  more  likely  to  see 
higher expenses per border outpost or 100 km of border length. 

In the following we do not consider potential increases in the costs of processing visas as 
it is difficult to estimate the number of additional applications, while countries may have 
existing capacity to cover any increases in demand. In addition, there are no national data 
on the extent to which processing costs can be recovered through user fees and it is possible 
that all costs would be covered this way. 

In principle, one-off fixed costs are related mainly to the number of border crossing points 
and their location, type and size, whereas operating costs depend more on the number of 
border-force  employees  and  border  crossings,  or  on  the  length  and  structure  of  land 
borders (Figure 2.1). Unfortunately, the theoretical model cannot be fully reflected in the 
calculation due to data limitation, particularly the lack of a detailed cost breakdown. In the 
following,  we  first  introduce  variables  relevant  for  both  cost  categories,  discuss  their 
calibration  at  the  national  level,  and  subsequently  calculate  estimated  direct  budgetary 
costs in two proposed scenarios. 

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Figure 2.1: Cost-estimation diagram 

Total 
costs 

Fixed costs of 
re-establishing 
outposts 

Border 
crossing 
points 

Size 

Type 

Cost of re-
establishment 

Outposts 

Infrastructure 

Country 

Extent 

h
c
a
o
r
p
p
a
p
u
-
m
o
t
t
o
B

Operating and 
maintenance costs 

Internal 
Schengen 
borders 

Costs of 
protecting 
border 

Length 

Border checks 

Typology 

Patrolling 

Density of 
crossing 
points 

Administration 

Legal 
enforcement 

It  is  important  to  stress  that  estimating  the  budgetary  costs  of  reversing  the  Schengen 
Agreement is difficult due to the shortage of detailed data (e.g. the lack of a land border 
crossing  points  register  as  a  result  of  absent  internal  border  controls),  the  diversity  of 
possible  scenarios,  and  methodological  limitations.  To  that  end,  any  predictions  are  by 
definition uncertain. In order to diminish the degree of uncertainty we provide a range of 
estimates for a set of different scenarios complemented by sensitivity analysis. That is to 
say, scenarios serve to identify the main possible paths of future development (for example 
either the  permanent  re-introduction of borders or  just a time-limited alternative) while 
sensitivity analysis works with the  underlying parameters and induces variation within 
each scenario to provide information on the effect of a change in parameter estimates on 
the resulting costs.96  

Below we discuss how we calculate the different cost elements as outlined in Figure 2.1 to 
obtain the total costs of re-establishing borders in the Schengen Area.  

2. Border crossing points 

In  order  to  assess  the  costs  of  re-establishing  borders  it  is  important  to  discuss  first  the 
different types of borders. 

96 This may be illustrated by looking at the time required to perform a passport check. A 
European  Commission  (2016j)  report  suggests  that  checking  travel  documents  takes 
between 1.5 and six minutes per passenger for all modes of transport, while for each lorry 
between  four  and  16  minutes  is  needed  to  perform  the  document  check  and  a  cargo 
inspection. Depending on the value chosen, the upper bound on the estimate can therefore 
be up to four times higher than the lower bound. 

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The internal borders within the Schengen Area, i.e. borders between two countries that are 
both parties to the Schengen Agreement, are open and unguarded. There are in principle 
no officers present even at border crossing points (i.e. official locations of entry into another 
country), even though this may vary by country size/importance of the particular crossing 
point.  Either  way,  border-force  officers  do  not  carry  out  border  checks  regardless  of 
travellers’ country of  origin. Schengen  states are required to remove all  obstacles to the 
fluid movement of road traffic, and while police and security checks may still be carried 
out, they must be on the basis of police information about possible threats to public security 
or  suspected  cross-border  crime,  or  only  to  verify  a  person’s  identity,  respectively  (EU 
2006). (Norway, Switzerland and Iceland are in the Schengen Area but not in the EU, and 
therefore have customs controls in effect for all arriving travellers, regardless of point of 
origin.) 

In the event of reversing the Schengen Agreement, some/all internal borders would need 
to be patrolled again, depending on the particular agreements among European countries, 
and a vast network of border posts would need to be re-established around the continent 
to check identity and the travel entitlements of people wishing to move from one country 
to another. Importantly, since most border posts along internal borders have been closed 
(and  some  completely  removed),  this  would  come  at  a  significant  cost  to  the  countries 
concerned. 

By contrast, the external borders of the Schengen Area, i.e. borders between Schengen and 
non-Schengen countries, are guarded and the participating countries are required to apply 
standardised  strict  checks  on  travellers  entering  and  exiting  the  Schengen  Area.  The 
checking procedures are outlined in Regulation (EU) 2016/399; we use these procedures 
as  an  average  standard  in  our  forward-looking  analysis.  That  is  to  say,  should  border 
checks be reinstated we assume that they would be procedurally similar to those currently 
taking place at external Schengen borders in terms of their scale and scope. In other words, 
all travellers would be subject to at least a minimum check of their identity and the expiry 
date  and  authenticity  of  their  travel  documents.97  Additionally,  border  officers  might 
investigate  signs  of  document  falsification  or  counterfeiting  as  well  as  consulting 
(inter)national  databases  to  ensure  that  the  traveller  does  not  represent  a  threat  to  the 
country. Depending on whether they were entering or exiting the country, third-country 
nationals might also need to show an appropriate visa/residence permit if required, inform 
the  officer of  the  purpose  of  their stay,  point of departure  and destination,  and  provide 
proof of sufficient funds to cover their stay. Given the variation in the procedures required, 
average processing times might differ substantially.  

Another way of differentiating between borders is according to their geographical location, 
where we distinguish between land borders (including natural sweet-water borders such 
as  rivers  or  lakes),  air  borders,  and  sea  borders.  Only  land  borders  can  be  considered 

97  Border-check  procedures  governed  by  national  law  rather  than  Schengen-wide 
directives may be less strict in their requirements to check all travellers, resulting in the 
practice  adopted  by  many  European  countries  before  border  controls  were  stopped 
whereby border agency officials allowed barrier-free transport for some individuals based 
on their professional judgement.  

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internal or external as air and maritime borders are open to any  plane/ship in a virtual 
sense, regardless of their country of origin. Hence, air and maritime borders in all Schengen 
countries  are  continuously  guarded98  and  while  there  are  separate  areas  to  process 
individuals  travelling  within  the  Schengen  Area,  these  borders  would  not  need  to  be 
substantially transformed if the Schengen Area was abolished. 

Finally, we  may distinguish border crossing points on the  basis of the  volume  of traffic 
passing through them. According to an EC report (EC 2016c), approximately seven per cent 
of the total 1,800 border crossing points in selected EU member states is defined as a ‘large’ 
border crossing: 40 sea border crossings, 27 air border crossings, 40 land border crossings, 
and 20 railway connections linking Schengen countries. Moreover, 70 per cent of travellers 
are estimated to use these large border crossing points. In our study, we further distinguish 
‘medium’  and  ‘small’  land  border  crossing  points.  The  three  categories  would  roughly 
correspond to, for example, French–Belgian border crossing points between Roubaix and 
Kortrijk (large), Bercu and Crinquet (medium), and at Oost-Cappel (small).  

In order to estimate the overall costs of re-introducing borders within the Schengen Area, 
a list of border crossing points in operation before Schengen was established (or potential 
outposts should it be abolished) would be needed. To the best of our knowledge, there is 
no  such  official  and  complete  list  of  historic  and/or  potential  border  crossing  points 
publicly available. We therefore used a European Parliament regulation99 to establish a list 
of  internal  border  crossing  points  for  the  Schengen  countries.  This  document  contains 
detailed lists of border crossing points for all countries that joined the Schengen Area in 
2007 or later (note that Liechtenstein is only reported as a part of Switzerland100) as well as 
the air and maritime border crossing points of all other Schengen countries as reported by 
national  officials.  As  of  May  2016,  there  were  an  additional  45  updates  to  the  original 
document from 2006, mostly relating to the addition/removal of air or maritime crossing 
points. 

Unfortunately,  it  seems  that  while  some  countries  reported  a  full  list  of  official  routes, 
others arguably reported only those above a certain level, neglecting local border traffic 
and  tourist  crossing  points.  What  is  more,  neighbouring  countries  sometimes  provide 
different lists of crossing points; for instance the Czech Republic lists 100 crossing points 
on its border with Poland, whereas Poland lists 109. To deal with these inconsistencies we 
apply the principle of prudence, taking the lower  of the two numbers to obtain a lower 
bound for the overall cost estimate. In addition, in order to make a clear distinction in the 
analysis we assume  that unless a subset of the listed border crossing points is  explicitly 
labelled as official local or tourist points (e.g. using a note next to the crossing’s name), only 

98 For simplicity, we assume that all airports, airfields, and aerodromes listed in the official 
documentation  (see  below)  as  air  borders  are  open  to  planes  coming  from  within  and 
outside the Schengen Area. Even though there may be some small airports open to internal 
Schengen flights only – and thus not necessarily guarded – these would not significantly 
affect the results of our analysis. 
99 List of border crossing points referred to in Article 2(8) of the EP Regulation (EU, 2006). 
100 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Switzerland. 

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‘standard’ crossing points are reported. To reflect this in the analysis, all explicitly defined 
local border traffic crossings and tourist crossing points are excluded from the calculations 
to establish consistency across countries.101  
To test the appropriateness of our approach, we picked an example and manually analysed 
the Austrian border (see Appendix for details). Our findings shed additional light on the 
issue; in the European Parliament regulation, Austria lists 16, 19, 3 and 16 border crossing 
points  with  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Slovakia,  and  Switzerland  (including 
Liechtenstein) respectively. Those numbers are much lower than our findings of 69, 33, 10 
and 22. However, when we looked at Slovenia, the 21 regular border crossing points and 
31 local border crossing points reported in the official document (EU, 2006) exactly match 
the 52 crossing points determined during our map investigation, suggesting that the other 
numbers of Austrian border crossing points (which do not explicitly mention local border 
traffic and tourist crossing points) exclude crossing points below a certain threshold, which 
is also the approach taken in our analysis.102 

In addition, we use the recent border closures by Austria and France and the related reports 
(Council of the EU 2015f & 2015g) listing all newly introduced border controls to see how 
they match those listed in the 2006 European Parliament documentation and to provide us 
with new information on, for example, border crossing points between France and Belgium 
which was not available in the other documents. Arguably, the recently established border 
crossing points are the  same  as those that  would be re-established should the  Schengen 
Agreement  be  abolished.  Indeed,  recently  opened  borders  (such  as  the  one  between 
Austria and Hungary) would likely have more or less the same number of crossing points 
as before 2007, even though their distribution as regards to size is slightly different in the 
2006  and  2015  documents,  possibly  due  to  various  road  extensions.  However,  looking 
closely at the data we can see that, for example, the French–Belgian border has substantially 
fewer actual crossing points than one may have expected.103 It is possible that the French 
authorities deliberately reduced the number of crossing points in order to cut the costs of 
protecting the border and to integrate border controls into as few nodes as possible, but 
this may eventually be the case in all countries. Either way, the lower number of border 

101 Local border traffic crossing points can only be used by residents of the border area and 
are  generally  in  remote  places  not  accessed  by  other  travellers.  Similarly,  only  minimal 
volume  of  traffic  leads  through  tourist  crossing  points.  We  therefore  argue  that  such 
crossing points may not be guarded at all or would only require negligible investment in 
comparison with total costs. In line with the principle of prudence, we leave them out  of 
the calculations, giving us a lower bound on the total costs estimated. 
102  In  addition,  the  recently  published  list  of  border  crossing  points  re-established  in 
reponse  to  the  ongoing  migrant  crisis  (see  below)  distinguishes  four  levels  of  border 
crossing points. Although there are some discrepancies (arguably due to reconstruction of 
individual communications), only level 1–3 border crossing points seem to be included in 
the older documentation, again suggesting that the smallest border crossing points were 
previously excluded. 
103 Indeed, small roads cross the 620km-long border every few kilometres but there are only 
18 officially accessible border crossing points listed in the documentation, i.e. 2.9 crossing 
point per 100 km – far lower than the average 5.96 across all countries with known crossing 
points (excluding local border traffic and tourist-only border crossing points). 

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crossing points is in line with our principle of prudence and where double records exist 
(e.g. the French–Swiss border) we use the newest data only. 

The next step in our analysis employs statistical methods in order to estimate the number 
of land crossing points between countries that joined the Schengen Area prior to 2007 and 
for  which  we  therefore  do  not  have  any  official  data.  Specifically,  we  created  a  dataset 
consisting  of  all  known  land  border  posts  (countries  that  joined  Schengen  in  2007,  plus 
Austria and France), border lengths, type of terrain (lowlands, highlands, mountains) and 
controls  for  natural  borders  (particularly  rivers  which  decrease  the  number  of  crossing 
points per 100 km), and determined what the number of crossing points between any two 
Schengen  countries  would  be  based  on  existing  observations,  given  the  length  of  their 
mutual border, its specifications, and the average number of crossing points per 100 km 
for such a type of border (see the Appendix for technical details).  

Finally, border post re-establishment costs depend on the extent of work to be done and 
whether there are substantial cross-country differences in the status of land border crossing 
points that need to be taken into account. A substantial randomized online search based 
on checking satellite pictures of border crossing locations showed that there are essentially 
no longer any posts on borders between countries that joined the Schengen Area prior to 
2007. For instance, looking at the French–Belgian border, not only there are no functioning 
posts,  but  there  are  not  even  buildings  that  would  somewhat  resemble  them,  either  on 
large  or  small  roads.  By  contrast,  in  other  parts  of  Schengen,  traces  of  former  border 
infrastructure survive. The Haparanda–Tornio border crossing (one of the few Swedish–
Finnish crossing points on the Torne River), for example, has an old customs building on 
the  Finnish  side  but  no  infrastructure  for  regular  checks  of  individuals  and  vehicles. 
Similarly,  looking  at  the  Czech–German,  Polish–Slovakian  and  Latvian–Lithuanian 
borders  we  discovered  that  car  gates  and  border-force  officer  booths  have  often  been 
demolished,  although  some  of  the  infrastructure  –  roads  and  buildings  –  remain.104  A 
European Commission report (2010) supports our findings, stating that obstacles to fluid 
traffic flow (such as buildings, control booths, roofs over the road and mobile equipment) 
would be dismantled gradually following their country’s entrance into the Schengen Area, 
but that the process might take a long time due to various property-rights constraints, plans 
for future refitting and so on, noting that countries which had joined the Schengen Area in 
2007 or later have had difficulties adjusting their borders accordingly. 

3. Costs of (re-)establishing and running border crossing points 

Lack of reliable data presents a major difficulty in analysing both fixed and operating costs. 
Again, very few countries in the Schengen Area have working land borders which might 
serve as a basis for calculations, there are no international statistics available on the subject, 
and national authorities rarely publish any data, resulting in very little information being 
available.  Even  where  data  exist,  border  agency  budgets  are  not  broken  down  into 
sufficiently detailed categories or locations and the staff responsible are unable to provide 

104 For instance, looking at the Latvian–Lithuanian border crossing point near Kurpalaukis 
and Grenctāle, we can clearly see the whole outpost next to the highway.  

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additional  data.  For  instance,  we  obtained  the  projected  2016  Latvian  border  agency 
expenditure but were unable  to distinguish between  the  costs of protecting the external 
land  border  with  Belarus  and  Russia  and  the  maritime  border,  as  the  Latvian  officers 
responsible  informed  us  that  they  did  not  have  the  information  themselves.  In  what 
follows we discuss our approach in dealing with this lack of data. 

3.1 Operating costs 

There is no reason to believe that processing and maintenance costs would substantially 
and systematically differ from  one  outpost to another within  the  same  country.  Border-
force  officers  are  state  employees  and  as  such  are  likely  paid  a  similar  wage,  possibly 
adjusted for local discrepancies in price levels; similarly, the cost of new equipment and 
servicing is more or less equal within individual countries. The opposite is true for inter-
country comparison where various other factors, particularly average salary, income tax 
rates  and  employment  levels  come  into  play.  This  is  reflected,  for  example,  in  the 
Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD)  comparative  price 
levels,105 a purchasing power parity (PPP) index which shows that to buy the same bundle 
of goods, people in Switzerland, the most expensive country in the dataset, must pay 29 
per  cent  more  than  in  the  UK  and  142  per  cent  more  than  in  Slovakia.  Consequently, 
assuming  that  re-establishment  and  operating  costs  would  be  equal  in  all  countries, 
adjusting only for currency exchange rates, would lead either to understating costs in rich 
countries,  overstating  costs  in  poorer  countries,  or  both.  We  therefore  use  OECD 
comparative price levels to obtain national cost estimates. 

Overall,  only  one  (Finland)  out  of  a  potential  12  Schengen  countries  with  external  land 
borders provides a publicly available detailed breakdown of border maintenance costs. 106 
These  confirmed  2013  data  show  that  Finland  spent  €103m  on  border  controls  alone, 
employing 1,119 officers and performing 17.8 million border checks across all external air, 
maritime  and  land  borders.  These  numbers  correspond  to  the  official  data  on  external 
border  crossing  statistics,107  which  depict  an  increase  in  external  border  traffic  (and  a 
decrease in internal border traffic) up to the same number of approximately 17.8 million 
external border crossings in 2013, out of which approximately 10.6 million were passengers 
with  visa  requirements.  In  addition,  1,232  border  force  officers  patrolled  the  external 
borders,  costing  €113m.  The  figure  also  includes  staff  salaries,  capital  expenditure, 
technical supervision and assistance services.108 Unfortunately, Finland is an exceptional 

105  Available  at  http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CPL.  The  monthly 
comparison reflects amount of money  that must be spent in each country to purchase a 
comparable  bundle  of  goods  consumed  regularly  by  households,  such  as  products  for 
everyday needs (food, clothing, cars, rents, personal services), products provided by the 
government, and payments to the government for licences and permits. 
106 Available from the Finnish open data service website, http://budjetti.vm.fi. 
107 Available at http://www.findikaattori.fi/en/105. 
108 Inflation in Finland, as measured by the consumer price index, was 0.8 per cent during 
2013–2016; applying this to the estimates we obtain €105.5m and €115.7m for border check 
and patrolling costs respectively, as the actual 2016 price adjusted estimates used in our 
analysis. 

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example in several ways. In particular, the Finnish–Russian border goes through mostly 
uninhabited  territory  with  a  high  degree  of  natural  vegetation  and  a  low  number  of 
permanent border crossing points. It would therefore be inappropriate to use the Finnish 
data as a basis for cost extrapolation to other countries, and in the following we apply the 
Finnish data only to Sweden and Norway, which have borders very similar to the Finnish–
Russian one.  

To  circumvent  the  issue,  we  further  use  data  from  Switzerland109  and  Latvia.110  Both 
countries report overall expenses related to border protection only, preventing a detailed 
analysis.  Nevertheless,  based  on  their  description  of  respective  border  agency 
responsibilities  they  include  essentially  the  same  items  (such  as  maintaining  border 
outposts, controlling passengers, border surveillance, capital expenditure, patrolling costs 
and administrative and maintenance costs), and can thus be compared and used as a basis 
for extrapolation to other countries using a common denominator. 

The  EPRS  report  (EP  2016b),  one  of  a  very  few  comparable  studies  that  endeavours  to 
estimate  the  budgetary  costs  of  re-establishing  borders,  applied  population  size  as  the 
common denominator used to extrapolate country-level costs. We argue that this approach 
is subject to substantial limitations, particularly due to the weak link between population 
size and border length, typology, number of border crossing points and their size, which 
constitute the main factors in determining the overall expense of maintaining land borders. 
Alternatively, the report by the Jacques Delors Institut (auf dem Brinke 2016) uses border 
length to extrapolate the estimated costs of protecting the US–Canadian border with the 
Schengen Area. However, this approach does not take into account the fact that there are 
only 119 open land border crossing points (including Alaska) at the US–Canadian border, 
many of which are in sparsely populated areas completely different geographically from 
the  European  landscape.  By  contrast,  we  estimate  that  the  internal  Schengen  border, 
although only a little less than twice as long, would have over 1,500 border crossing points, 
i.e. over 12 times more than the US–Canadian border. 

A possible alternative common denominator is the volume of passenger crossing country 
borders, although needless to say, abolition of border checks has significantly complicated 
monitoring border-crossing statistics, particularly at land borders. Frontier countries such 
as Finland, Poland or Hungary have up-to-date statistics on external border crossings that 
are further reported to the European authorities, and the number of passengers using rail, 
air and water transport can be deduced either from data provided by transport companies 
or  from  various  other  security  checks  required  prior  to  boarding  train/aircraft/vessel. 
However, the lack of any border controls at roads, combined with the popularity of car and 
coach transport, creates a substantial gap in the data. Moreover, European countries did 
not  have  the  obligation  to  publish  any  data  on  border  crossings  prior  to  joining  the 
Schengen Area, resulting in extremely sparse historical data. Hence, we refrain from using 
passenger flows as the common denominator, although we use them – together with per-
passenger cost estimates from the UK – to provide cost estimates for Greece, Iceland, and 
Malta, which do not have any land borders with other Schengen countries (see Appendix 

109 Swiss Federal Finance Administration, www.efv.admin.ch. 
110 Latvian State Border Guard, www.rs.gov.lv. 

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for a description of the methodology). We also use a weighted average of both estimates 
(using land border crossing points and passenger flows) to determine cost estimates for 
Denmark  and  Estonia.  These  counties  are  unique  in  having  a  high  share  of  passengers 
travelling by maritime transport; the expenses stemming from additional passenger checks 
would thus be significantly under-represented using only the main methodology based on 
the number of land border crossing points. 

In what follows we take the approach that the number of border crossing points is the most 
appropriate  common denominator, and therefore use it in our cost  modelling.  Not only 
does  this  approach  explicitly  link  costs  to  actual  border  outposts  and  their  size  (and 
therefore  indirectly  to  passenger  flows)  but  also  implicitly  connects  to  border  length 
through our estimation of border post counts using border length and typology. In other 
words,  a  cost  estimate  per  border  crossing  point  contains  information  on  salary  and 
outpost maintenance expenses as well as border surveillance, making it the most reliable 
basis for extrapolation.  

Using  this  approach  the  estimated  costs  of  protecting  land  borders  are  €1,283,752  per 
border  crossing  in  Switzerland,  €1,786,187  in  Latvia,  and  €11,045,924  in  Finland  (PPP 
adjusted, see Table 2.1 and further details on the calculation in the Appendix). As expected, 
the Finnish estimate is higher due to the lower density of crossing points along the Finnish–
Russian border. We then combine the Swiss and Latvian estimates into an average estimate 
of €1,534,970 to be applied for all but the Scandinavian countries. To account for a possibly 
large margin of error due to inter-country heterogeneity, we complement the estimates by 
sensitivity  analysis  in  range  of  ±25  per  cent  around  the  point  estimate.  The  resulting 
estimates are shown in Table 2.1. 

Table 2.1: Operating costs estimates 

Base country 
Finland 
Switzerland and Latvia  

Cost per border crossing point  To be applied in 

€11,045,924 
€1,534,970 

Scandinavia 
Other Schengen countries 

3.2 Fixed costs of border re-establishment 

As described earlier, we assume that only land borders would require substantial capital 
investment, as these would need to be refurbished or  completely rebuilt, unlike  air  and 
maritime borders, which are already operating and would mainly require additional staff 
and equipment. According to responses in a note from the Council of the EU (2009b), the 
average passenger processing time at the external Schengen border was 0.5–2.5 minutes 
for  passengers  without  visa  requirements  and  1–5  minutes  for  passengers  with  visa 
requirements, with Italy and Norway having the fastest and slowest controls, respectively 
(with slight variation between entry and exit checks). 

Unlike  road  transport,  air  and  maritime  transport  is  well  documented  in  the  official 
statistics.  Eurostat111  data  show  that  216.9  million  passengers  travelled  by  air  and  49.8 

111 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat 

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million by sea between Schengen countries in 2014. The detailed distribution is shown in 
Table 2.2. 

Table 2.2: Total (entry and exit) air and maritime passenger transport between Schengen 

countries 

 Country 

Austria 

Belgium 

Czech Republic 

Denmark 

Estonia 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Greece 

Hungary 

Iceland 

Italy 

Latvia 

Liechtenstein 

Lithuania 

Malta 

Luxembourg 

Netherlands 

Norway 

Poland 

Portugal 

Slovakia 

Slovenia 

Spain 

Sweden 

Switzerland 

Total 

Air transport 

Maritime transport 

     14,693,529  

     17,620,675  

       6,208,805  

     15,457,168  

       1,341,592  

       9,337,784  

     45,354,871  

     79,226,099  

     17,997,894  

       5,356,101  

           528,961  

     51,984,923  

       2,665,568  

 -  

       1,992,406  

       2,475,556  

       1,595,481  

     26,241,334  

       8,305,820  

     11,926,824  

     16,358,715  

           653,175  

           600,758  

     72,062,493  

     15,671,085  

       8,037,939  

   433,695,557  

                    -    

3,000    

                    -    

   21,769,000  

     9,247,000  

   17,052,000  

           25,000  

   11,348,000  

     1,570,000  

                    -    

                    1,000    

     3,502,000  

         677,000  

                    -    

         279,000  

             305,000    

                    -    

             2,000  

     5,930,000  

     1,657,000  

                    -    

                    -    

                 14,000  

         362,000  

   25,924,000  

                    -    

   99,344,000  

Source: Eurostat (avia_paincc and mar_pa_qm databases). 

Assuming  opening  hours  from  6am  to  12pm  every  day  of  the  year  and  533  million 
entries/exits by passengers travelling by air and water transport in 2015 (i.e.  267 million 
passenger  trips  per  year  or  731,500  passenger  trips  per  day),  nearly  41,000  passengers 
would need to be processed every hour. Using detailed calculations based on the number 
of  existing  air  and  maritime  border  crossing  points  and  national  statistics  on  passenger 
traffic, 12–35 additional officers would  need to be present at  major airports and  4–10 at 

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major ports to process passengers travelling within the former Schengen Area.112 Finally, 
following  the  European  Commission  report  (EC  2016c),  we  assume  that  other  ‘small’ 
crossing points would require two officers at any time. 

For  simplicity,  and  in  line  with  the  EC  report,  we  assume  that  each  officer  requires  a 
personal computer, passport scanner, fingerprint reader and equipment for taking facial 
images. An overview of the assumed costs is shown in Table AB.4 in the Appendix. Given 
all  the  facts,  we  assume  fixed  costs  at  large  air  and  maritime  borders,  excluding  any 
reconstruction of Schengen Area lanes, project management, additional IT infrastructure, 
officer  training  and  peak-time  backups  to  be  in  range  of  €92,000–294,000  and  €53,900–
154,000 for airports and ports, respectively. Because the resulting costs are negligible in the 
summary, we use these estimates to show the magnitude of any such changes rather than 
to provide an exhaustive list of all possible related expenses. 

In addition to the updating costs of land and maritime borders we attempt to estimate the 
costs  of  re-establishing  land  borders.  Following  on  from  the  discussion  in  the  previous 
section, we assume that all land borders opened as a result of the 2007 and later Schengen 
enlargements later would not need to have their border posts completely rebuilt but rather 
refurbished  and  re-equipped.  Since  it  is  difficult  to  estimate  the  extent  of  such 
reconstruction, we assume that the costs of refurbishment would be 40–60 per cent lower 
than the cost of building a new outpost of the same size. 

Given the lack of any appropriate European data, we use available information on the costs 
of similar  US projects instead. In particular, we collected data on three  US–Mexico land 
border crossing points in Calexico, CA, Columbus, NM, and Laredo, TX. Although two of 
these (Calexico and Laredo) are mainly reconfiguration and expansion projects,  budgets 
range from $68m to $370m, i.e. in line with unofficial statistics from Europe.113 Using more 
conservative figures, we believe that costs would be in range of €80–200m per large border 
crossing. 

112 Specifically, there are 810 ports and 617 airports in the reporting countries (Liechtenstein 
does not have any airports), out of which we assume that 15 per cent are major crossing 
points  (based  on  the  distribution  of  regular  airports  and  aerodromes  in  our  dataset) 
processing 70 per cent of all passengers as per the European Commission (2016c) report 
quoted earlier, giving us an average  of 3,152,631/8,637 passengers to be processed each 
year/day at major airports and 1,351,227/3,475 at all major ports. Note that there is large 
variance in the data across individual crossing points and countries. As a sanity check, we 
consider the Czech Republic with 18 listed airports, i.e. approx. 3 major airports according 
to our assumptions. The largest airport, Václav Havel Airport in Prague, clears more than 
11 million passengers for departure each year, while the second largest airport, in Brno, 
clears less than 500 thousand passengers per year, with both figures including flights to all 
destinations. Overall, the numbers are therefore in line with our results. 
113  The  German–Czech  border  crossing  at  Waidhaus–Rozvadov  cost  over  CZK  1.1bn  in 
1997, i.e. approx. US $35m in 1997 prices and US $52.9m in 2016 prices. Data taken from 
iHned.cz (1997). 

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To approximate the costs required to build a medium-size outpost, we use public tender 
on the construction of border crossing point in Bijaca, Bosnia and Herzegovina (EC 2014), 
valued at €4.932m, and a report published by the Estonian Ministry of the Interior on the 
reconstruction  of  the  Ivangorod–Narva  border  crossing  points  on  the  Estonian-Russian 
border (EstLatRus, n.d.), costing €8.221m. Accounting for lower purchasing parity levels 
in these countries, we therefore assume a medium-size outpost to cost on average between 
€5m and €10m to build. 

Finally, small outposts are the most difficult to measure due to their heterogeneity and lack 
of data. To partially reduce the heterogeneity, we exclude local traffic and tourist crossing 
points from our analysis, providing a conservative estimate of the total costs. Based on the 
medium-size estimate and our expert opinion, we consider the costs to build a small border 
outpost  to  be  between  €100,000 and  €400,000,  which  is  likely  to  be  far  below  the  actual 
figures and therefore in line with our principle of prudence. The summary of fixed costs 
related to land borders can be found in Table 2.3. 

Table 2.3: Re-establishment costs of land border crossing points  

Size of border crossing point 

Estimated unit cost 

Large 

Medium 

Small 

€80–200m 

€5–10m 

€100,000–400,000 

%reduction for post-2007 Schengen countries 

40–80% 

4. Estimating the budgetary costs of non-Schengen 

Having  prepared  all  the  underlying  data,  we  now  determine  possible  scenarios  of 
development. For simplicity, we assume three scenarios:114 

1.  a two-year suspension of the Schengen Area in the five countries that have recently 
re-introduced border controls (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Norway and Sweden) 
and only at places where they have been re-introduced; 

2.  a two-year suspension of the Schengen Area and re-introduction of border controls 

in all Schengen countries at all internal borders; 
indefinite suspension of the Schengen Agreement in all countries. 

3. 

For Scenarios 1 and 2 we provide cost estimates for the two years of temporary border re-
introduction. For Scenario  3 we provide an annual cost estimate and the total estimated 
costs for the first ten years after border re-introduction. 

Note that the calculations refer only to additional costs related to the new borders and do 
not represent the total expenditure on border controls (particularly the cost of protecting 
maritime and air borders). For example, the estimates for Germany only reflect additional 

114 Due to linearity and the independence property of our cost modelling, costs associated 
with  any  subset  of  countries/borders  is  directly  proportional  to  their  share  of  border 
crossing points out of the total. Similarly, operating costs are assumed to be constant across 
years and annual costs can thus be multiplied to obtain estimates for multiple years. 

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costs of re-establishing land borders and processing additional passengers at airports and 
ports  but  do  not  include  existing  costs  of  maintaining  air  and  sea  borders  that  occur 
regardless of the Schengen Agreement. Furthermore, we do not consider additional visa 
processing  costs  in  Scenario  3  as  a  result  of  third-country  nationals  having  to  apply  for 
multiple  visas  when  visiting  more  than  one  Schengen  country  rather  than  just  a  single 
Schengen visa, as in the current arrangement. This is due to high degree of uncertainty in 
terms of passenger flows should the Schengen Area be abolished and lack of reliable data 
on  visa-processing  expenses.  Again,  our  estimates  are  thus  conservative  and  the  actual 
figures may be higher. 

There are also several caveats to be mentioned. Firstly, we assume that the border crossing 
points  identified  in  the  European  Parliament  regulation115  would  all  be  re-established. 
However, it is possible that actual numbers may be either lower and higher given that some 
cross-border roads may be closed or given local border traffic status rather than guarded, 
reducing the potential total costs, or on the contrary some newly built roads not recorded 
in  the  2006  documentation  may  serve  as  new  crossing  points.  We  try  to  minimise  such 
occasions  by  excluding  former  local  border  traffic  and  tourist  crossing  points  from  our 
analysis.  

Secondly,  using  a  single  cost  estimate  for  such  a  wide  variety  of  countries  inherently 
introduces error in the analysis. Consider, for example, patrolling costs in the light of the 
current migration crisis in Europe. Arguably, countries on the main migrant route such as 
Austria  and  Germany  are  likely  to  aim  for  a  higher  degree  of  internal  Schengen  border 
surveillance than for example Poland or Estonia, thus possibly overstating patrolling costs 
for the latter two countries  and understating them for the former. We try to reduce this 
error  by  using  both  Swiss/Latvian  and  Finnish  estimate  to  account  for  differences  in 
geography across Europe and by introducing a range around the point estimate to give a 
better idea of the potential costs. Finally, the analysis does not take into account possible 
bilateral agreements allowing barrier-free movement of people such as the former Nordic 
Passport Union; these would partially open borders again and thus lower potential costs. 
The main parameters used in the calculation are summarised in Table 2.4. All figures are 
in 2016 prices, i.e. using present value of money. 

Table 2.4: Parameters used in the cost estimation 

Parameter 

Lower 
bound 

Upper 
bound 

Source 

Border outpost re-establishment – 
large 

€80m 

€200m 

Border outpost re-establishment – 
medium 

€5m 

€10m 

Calexico, CA, Columbus, NM, 
and Laredo, TX (all USA) 

Ivangorod–Narva, Estonia; 
Bijaca, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 

115 List of border crossing points referred to in Article 2(8) of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of the EU of 15 March 2006 establishing a 
Community  Code  on  the  rules  governing  the  movement  of  persons  across  borders 
(Schengen Borders Code). 

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Border outpost re-establishment – 
small 

Reduction in re-establishment costs 
for new Schengen countries 

€100,000 

€400,000 

Expert opinion 

40% 

80% 

Expert opinion 

Operating costs per border crossing 
point – Europe 

1,559,657 

Latvian State Border Guard, 
Swiss Federal Finance 
Administration 

Operating costs per border crossing 
point – Scandinavia 

Passenger processing time (without 
visa) 

Passenger processing time (visa 
requirement) 

11,045,924 

Finnish open data service 

0.5 minutes 

2.5 minutes 

1 minute 

5 minutes 

Council of the European 
Union note116 

Additional officers per large border – 
air borders 

12 

Additional officers per large border - 
maritime borders 

Additional officers per small border 

4 

2 

35 

10 

2 

Authors’ calculations 

European Commission 
(2016b) 

4.1 Scenario 1: two-year border introduction in five countries at specific locations 

The  two-year  suspension  corresponds  to  the  legal  time  limit  for  reinstating  temporary 
border controls in the context of the current Schengen Agreement as per Article 29 of the 
SBC. The five countries with effective internal border controls as of June 2016 are:117  

•  Austria: at the Austrian–Hungarian land border and Austrian–Slovenian land 

border; 

•  Denmark: in the Danish ports with ferry connections to Germany and at the 

Danish–German land border; 

•  Germany: at the German–Austrian land border; 

•  Norway: in the Norwegian ports with ferry connections to Denmark, Germany and 

Sweden; 

•  Sweden: in the Swedish harbours in the Police Region South and West and at the 

Öresund bridge. 

Unfortunately, there are currently no data available on the actual costs of the recently re-
introduced border controls. Should country officials believe that any border controls are 
only  temporary,  it  is  unlikely  that  land  border  outposts  would  be  reinstalled  in  full.118 
Moreover, contrary to Scenario 2 we assume that personal and other equipment as well as 
human resources would be relocated within countries and that either no or insignificant 

Council 

European 

117 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/05/12-internal-
border-controls/. 
118 This assumption is in line with testimonies offered by interviewed officials. 

available 

release 

press 

at 

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funds would be spent on new equipment and hiring additional staff. This assumption is in 
line with information obtained during our interviews and based on the fact that controls 
were re-introduced at only a small proportion of land borders in Austria, Denmark and 
Germany, and in ports that had such equipment prior to re-introduction of the additional 
controls to check passengers coming from outside the Schengen Area. 

The bottom line is that there would be little to no additional fixed and operating costs as a 
result of relocating resources within countries. However, to give an indication of maximum 
potential costs should all equipment be purchased and new staff hired, we use the same 
methodology as in Scenarios 2 and 3 with a proportionally reduced number of assumed 
operating border crossing points. In particular, we assume that all types of border crossing 
point  would  require  the  same  additional  equipment  (personal  computers,  passport 
readers, face-recognition machines and fingerprint scanners) but that land border crossing 
points would also need equipment for newly hired border-force officers (particularly fully 
equipped  cars),  backed  up  by  sufficient  infrastructure.  Without  any  data  available,  we 
suggest  as  a  conservative  estimate  that  an  additional  €20,000–40,000  would  need  to  be 
spent per land border crossing point on average for all equipment. For air and maritime 
borders, we follow the methodology introduced in the previous section. 

Using these estimates, the upper bound on costs of border protection over the two years at 
the selected borders, including one-off fixed costs, would be €211.5m. The assumed costs 
of border protection in addition to what would otherwise be spent on human and capital 
resources that are likely to be relocated within countries would be in range of €0–211.5m.119 

4.2 Scenario 2: two-year border introduction in all Schengen countries 

As in Scenario 1, it is unlikely that a temporary re-introduction of border controls, although 
this time on a larger scale, would prompt countries to hire a substantial number of new 
border-force officers or even rebuild permanent border crossing points. Notwithstanding 
that,  additional  equipment  would  have  to  be  purchased  to  reflect  the  increase  in  the 
number of passengers to be checked. We assume that these costs would be the same as in 
Scenario  1,  i.e.  €20,000–40,000  per  land  border  crossing  point  and  as  per  the  detailed 
breakdown shown in Table 2.4 for air and maritime border crossing points. 

Note that the purpose of calculating fixed costs in this scenario is essentially to show the 
vast difference between these and both the operating costs and fixed costs in Scenario 3. 
Starting with operating costs, our total estimate is €2.19–3.65bn to be spent annually in all 
Schengen  countries.  Unsurprisingly,  the  highest  costs  would  be  on  the  German  side, 
whereas  Greece,  Iceland,  Malta  and  the  Eastern  European  countries  would  be  least 
affected.  Greece,  Malta  and  Iceland  do  not  have  any  land  borders  with  other  Schengen 
countries  and  the  added  costs  would  only  be  related  to  additional  checks  on  air  and 
maritime transport passengers. Fixed costs have a similar distribution although we can see 
that they are much lower than operating costs, in range of €58.6–108.6m. Detailed data are 
shown in Table 2.5. 

119 In other words, the estimate does not include e.g. salaries of police officers who would 
otherwise have different duties within the state service. 

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Table 2.5: Scenario 2 – estimated costs 

Fixed costs 

Operating costs 

Land border 
length 

Lower 
bound 

Upper 
bound 

Point 
estimate 

Lower 
bound 

Lower 
bound 

2,562 

1,385 

1,881 

68 

339 

1,350 

2,828 

3,621 

- 

1,145 

- 

1,890 

1,323 

76 

544 

- 

359 

1,027 

2,355 

1,649 

1,214 

1,427 

664 

1,837 

2,233 

1,880 

4.1 

1.5 

2.8 

2.6 

1.1 

1.7 

5.4 

10.2 

1.7 

1.4 

0.6 

5.1 

1.2 

0.1 

0.9 

0.1 

0.4 

1.6 

2.5 

2.7 

1.9 

1.6 

1.1 

3.6 

2.4 

- 

8.3 

2.9 

5.7 

4.2 

1.8 

3.0 

10.4 

19.1 

2.8 

2.8 

1.0 

8.9 

2.3 

0.2 

1.7 

0.1 

0.8 

3.0 

4.2 

5.3 

3.6 

3.1 

2.2 

6.9 

4.2 

- 

199.6 

93.6 

182.5 

77.7 

46.5 

121.5 

201.2 

369.6 

23.2 

81.1 

2.0 

127.9 

67.1 

9.4 

54.6 

4.8 

31.2 

90.5 

265.1 

145.0 

104.5 

107.6 

82.7 

151.3 

276.1 

- 

149.7 

70.2 

136.9 

58.3 

34.9 

91.1 

150.9 

277.2 

17.4 

60.8 

1.5 

95.9 

50.3 

7.0 

40.9 

3.6 

23.4 

67.8 

198.8 

108.8 

78.4 

80.7 

62.0 

113.5 

207.1 

- 

249.5 

117.0 

228.1 

97.1 

58.1 

151.9 

251.5 

462.0 

29.0 

101.4 

2.5 

159.9 

83.8 

11.7 

68.2 

6.0 

39.0 

113.1 

331.4 

181.3 

130.6 

134.5 

103.3 

189.1 

345.2 

- 

Country 

Austria 

Belgium 

Czech Republic 

Denmarkc 

Estonia 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Greecea 

Hungary 

Icelanda 

Italy 

Latvia 

Liechtenstein 

Lithuania 

Maltaa 

Luxembourg 

Netherlands 

Norway 

Poland 

Portugal 

Slovakia 

Slovenia 

Spain 

Sweden 

Switzerlandb 

Total 

33,657 

58.6 

108.6 

2,916.2 

2,187.2 

3,645.3 

Note: in € millions per year, 2016 prices, PPP adjusted 
a Operating costs calculated using passenger flows methodology (see Appendix for details). 
b No additional costs assumed as border controls and surveillance are functioning at the moment. 
c Operating costs calculated from estimates obtained using the two methodologies. 

4.3 Scenario 3: Permanent suspension of the Schengen Agreement in all countries 

In the third scenario we consider border controls to be permanently re-introduced on all 
internal Schengen borders. Most of the elements are unchanged from Scenario 2, but now 
we  also  consider  fixed  costs  related  to  outpost  rebuilding  and  refurbishment.  Indeed, 
without  alternative  regional  arrangements  in  place  such  as  a  free-traffic  zone  between 

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Sweden and Norway (which are not considered in this scenario), countries would need to 
fully  re-establish  all  land  border  crossing  points  rather  than  temporarily  substitute  the 
posts with mobile border force units. As discussed in the methodology section we between 
distinguish  large,  medium,  and  small  outposts  and  their  related  building  costs,  with 
reduced costs for countries that joined Schengen Area in 2007 and later, as these countries 
would need only to refurbish existing, albeit no longer used, checkpoints.  

Based  on  these  assumptions,  the  total  annual  costs  in  Scenario  3  would  again  be  in  the 
range of €2.19–3.65bn, with an additional €7.41–19.76bn to be spent on the re-establishment 
of land borders. The total budgetary costs over a ten-year period would thus be €29.31.1–
56.26bn for all countries in the Schengen Area. 

Finally, in line with the recent European Parliamentary Research Service report (EP 2016b) 
we also present estimated costs only for the five countries that have recently re-introduced 
border  controls.  Assuming  these  countries  would  leave  the  Schengen  Area  indefinitely, 
they would face €3.17–7.70bn in one-off fixed costs and €0.92–1.54bn in annual operating 
costs. 

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Table 2.6: Scenario 3 – estimated costs 

Fixed costs 

Operating costs 

Land border 
length 

 2,562  

 1,385  

Lower 
bound 

 868.4  

 408.3  

Upper bound 

Point 
estimate 

Lower 
bound 

 2,102.6  

 199.6  

 149.7  

 986.3  

 93.6  

 70.2  

Upper 
bound 

 249.5  

 117.0  

 1,881  

 94.6  

 684.7  

 182.5  

 136.9  

 228.1  

 68  

 339  

 1,350  

 2,828  

 3,621  

 -  

 1,145  

 -  

 1,890  

 1,323  

 76  

 544  

 -  

 359  

 1,027  

 2,355  

 1,649  

 1,214  

 1,427  

 664  

 1,837  

 2,233  

 1,880  

 110.0  

 13.9  

 107.8  

 883.5  

 1,556.5  

 1.7  

 40.5  

 0.6  

 552.6  

 202.9  

 257.5  

 39.2  

 0.1  

 116.9  

 399.3  

 237.7  

 66.7  

 367.7  

 60.5  

 57.5  

 568.7  

 401.1  

- 

 270.1  

 96.3  

 261.0  

 2,136.1  

 3,766.5  

 2.8  

 292.6  

 1.0  

 77.7  

 46.5  

 121.5  

 201.2  

 369.6  

 23.2  

 81.1  

 2.0  

 1,337.4  

 127.9  

 491.3  

 633.3  

 285.6  

 0.1  

 280.7  

 966.3  

 576.9  

 481.0  

 891.9  

 439.0  

 418.1  

 1,377.3  

 983.9  

- 

 67.1  

 9.4  

 54.6  

 4.8  

 31.2  

 90.5  

 265.1  

 145.0  

 104.5  

 107.6  

 82.7  

 151.3  

 276.1  

- 

 58.3  

 34.9  

 91.1  

 150.9  

 277.2  

 17.4  

 60.8  

 1.5  

 95.9  

 50.3  

 7.0  

 40.9  

 3.6  

 23.4  

 67.8  

 198.8  

 108.8  

 78.4  

 80.7  

 62.0  

 113.5  

 207.1  

- 

 97.1  

 58.1  

 151.9  

 251.5  

 462.0  

 29.0  

 101.4  

 2.5  

 159.9  

 83.8  

 11.7  

 68.2  

 6.0  

 39.0  

 113.1  

 331.4  

 181.3  

 130.6  

 134.5  

 103.3  

 189.1  

 345.2  

- 

Country 

Austria 

Belgium 

Czech 
Republicd 

Denmarkc 

Estoniad 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Greecea 

Hungaryd 

Icelanda 

Italy 

Latviad 

Liechtenstein 

Lithuaniad 

Maltaa 

Luxembourg 

Netherlands 

Norway 

Polandd 

Portugal 

Slovakiad 

Sloveniad 

Spain 

Sweden 

Switzerlandb 

Total 

 33,657  

 7,414.5  

19,762.9 

 2,916.2  

 2,187.2  

 3,645.3  

Note: in € millions per year, 2016 prices, PPP adjusted 
a Operating costs calculated using passenger flows methodology (see Appendix for details). 
b No additional costs assumed as border controls and surveillance are functioning at the moment. 
c Operating costs calculated from estimates obtained using the two methodologies. 
d Countries with existing border outposts in need of refurbishment. 

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Finally, Table 2.7 contains an overview of annual costs and fixed costs in all three 
scenarios. As we can see, the total annual costs would be at least 0.02–0.03 per cent of 
Schengen Area GDP. Note that these conservative estimates are based on a multitude of 
assumptions and are considerably lower than the alternative estimates using per-
passenger costs shown in the Appendix. They should therefore be taken with caution as 
it is possible that actual costs would be higher. 

Table 2.7: Cost estimates in Scenarios 2 and 3 

Fixed costs 

Operating costs 

In € million 

As % of Schengen 
Area GDP 

In € million 

As % of Schengen 
Area GDP 

58.6–108.6 

Less than 0.01% 

2,187.2–3,645.3 

0.02–0.03% 

7,414.5–19,762.9 

0.06–0.16% 

2,187.2–3,645.3 

0.02–0.03% 

Scenario 
2 

Scenario 
3 

III - Social costs: crime and security 

As in the United States, reports have highlighted the fact that Europe has experienced a 
general downward trend in crime rates since the mid-1990s (Tonry 2014), although others 
have  suggested  that  this  applies  only  to  specific  crimes  such  as  property  crimes  and 
homicides,  whereas  other  violent  crimes  (including  assault  and  sexual  crimes)  are 
increasing  in  parts  of  Europe  (Aebi  &  Linde  2010).  Overall,  analysing  crime  trends  and 
their  determinants  is  a  complex  endeavour  and  no  consensus  has  been  reached  in  the 
academic  literature  on  the  factors  driving  the  aforementioned  trends.  Some  argue  that 
increased alcohol consumption, especially among youth, may have led to  higher rates of 
violent crime over the last decades (Aebi & Linde 2010), whereas Tonry (2014), for instance, 
argues that the rise in reported non-lethal violent crimes such as assaults, sex and family-
violence  has  been  observed  because  of  a  shift  in  the  cultural  threshold  of  tolerance  in 
reporting such crimes, suggesting that this increasing trend might be driven by changes in 
reporting patterns rather than by the underlying frequency with which these types of crime 
are committed.  

Furthermore,  some  have  argued  that  demographic  change  leads  to  decreasing  youth 
cohorts,  which  may  subsequently  have  led  to  lower  crime  rates  (Baumer  2008).  The 
explanation behind this (well documented in the literature) is that youth, especially young 
men, are over-represented as perpetrators of crime compared to any other demographic 
group. Another set of research focuses on the influence of economic variables in explaining 
trends  in  crime.  Emphasising  property  crimes,  some  argue  that  national  differences  in 
economic  factors  such  as  inflation,  unemployment  and  economic  growth  are  relevant 
determinants of crime (Buonanno et al. 2014).  

In this regard, in many European member states, especially those that joined the EU from 
2004  onwards,  the  socio-economic  situation  has  improved  over  the  last  decade,  with 
increasing standards of living, output and employment leading to lower rates of property 

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crime. In addition, Aebi and Linde (2010) argue that the reinforcement of police measures 
at external EU borders in the light of Schengen has played a major role in reducing crime 
by making it more difficult for criminals to transport illegal goods.  

In summary, the analysis of crime is complex and many theories exist in the literature as 
to  why  certain  crime  trends  observed  over  the  last  decades  have  occurred,  but  no 
conclusive explanation has emerged. Building on work by Ademmer et al. (2015), which 
analyses regional crime  trends between existing and  newly acceding Schengen  states in 
light of the 2007 Schengen enlargement, the analysis that follows does not aim to provide 
an explanation of the causal effects of the crime trends described above but to provide an 
illustrative overview on how trends in certain types of crime evolved before and after the 
2007 Schengen enlargement for different groups of countries and regions. 

1. Acquisitive and violent crime 

In order to assess the associations between abolishing border controls and crime rates, we 
investigate in more detail the 2007 Schengen enlargement during which all new member 
states except Cyprus entered the Schengen Area. In particular, we focus in more detail on 
the  existing  Schengen  states  and  the  newly  acceding  Schengen  states  (Czech  Republic, 
Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). 

In essence, the purpose of this analysis is to investigate whether we can observe different 
trends in crime rates for existing Schengen states before and after the 2007 enlargement, 
with a particular attempt to test the hypothesis that those states with direct borders to the 
newly  acceding  Schengen  states  (Germany,  Italy,  Austria,  Sweden  and  Finland)120  were 
affected by substantial changes in crime rates. We also examine whether there has been a 
change in crime rates in the new Schengen states compared to non-Schengen states in the 
same  region. Note  that the 2007 Schengen enlargement happened de  facto  in  December 
2007.  Hence,  in  what  follows,  we  look  at  time  trends  before  and  after  2008,  the  year  in 
which we would expect changes in crime statistics if the opening of borders is related to 
crime trends. 

Unfortunately,  no  comprehensive  quantitative  data  on  cross-border  crimes  exist.  To 
counter  this deficiency, we use three  different data sources, (1) UNODC  crime  statistics 
(2003–2014), (2) European Social Survey (2002–2014), and (3) Eurostat regional crime data 
(2008–2010) and investigate how crime rates evolve in the existing western Schengen states 
and in the new Schengen states and their neighbouring non-Schengen states.  

When  analysing  crime  trends  across  countries  several  well-known  issues  have  to  be 
considered.  Firstly,  police-reported  crimes  may  underestimate  the  true  number  of 
committed crimes. For instance, there is good reason to assume that people may not report 

120  Note  that  Sweden  and  Finland  do  not  have  substantial  direct  land  borders  to  new 
Schengen  states  from  the  2007  Schengen  enlargment.  Nevertheless,  Finland  has  close 
maritime  borders  and  active  ferry  traffic  with  Estonia,  and  Sweden  has  close  maritime 
borders with the Baltic states and Poland. 

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minor  crimes  to  the  police  because  they  feel  ashamed  of  being  a  victim,  because  the 
monetary  value  lost  is  too  little  to  make  the  effort  of  reporting  the  crime  worthwhile 
(Buonanno et al. 2014) or because the person has a lack of trust in the ability of the police 
to find a criminal. Nevertheless, criminological literature (e.g. Aebi & Linde 2010) suggests 
that reported crime data is appropriate when studying the evolution and trends in crime 
across  countries  under  the  assumption  that  recording  procedures  do  not  change 
substantially over time. Secondly, when using reported crimes for cross-country analysis, 
one has to be cautious due to the heterogeneity of reporting rates across time and countries. 
For instance, reporting rates differ across countries and hence it has been suggested that it 
is also useful to compare reported crimes with crime victimisation survey data (Van Dijk, 
Van Kesteren, & Smith, 2007). Thirdly, another problem when analysing crime statistics is 
that the classification of crimes may differ across countries.  

1.1 Cross-country trends in acquisitive crime and homicide rates (2003-2013) 

In order to tackle the aforementioned issues in analysing cross-country and cross-regional 
trends  in  crime  rates  we  follow  Buonanno  et  al.  (2014)  and  look  separately  at  homicide 
rates and an aggregate measure of several other crimes called ‘acquisitive crime’ (including 
burglary,  theft,  car  theft  and  robbery)  to  circumvent  to  some  extent  different  crime 
classifications between countries. In addition, we not only look at police-reported crimes 
but  also  use  crime  victimisation  survey  data  from  the  ESS.  Lastly,  we  use  the  natural 
logarithm of crime rates and apply country/region and time-fixed effects to alleviate the 
potential under-reporting issue and to negate the influence of measurement error that is 
constant over time or space.  

Figure  2.2  depicts  trends  in  acquisitive  crime  and  homicide  rates  for  Western  Schengen 
states  before  and  after  the  2007  Schengen  enlargement.  Note  that  the  time  series  are 
adjusted  for  country-specific  and  time-specific  effects.121  Interestingly,  although  for 
acquisitive  crimes  we  observe  a  downward  trend  after  2008,  the  decreasing  trend  is 
somewhat stronger in states with direct borders to the new Schengen members after 2007. 
Looking  at  homicide  rates,  we  cannot  observe  a  clear  upward  or  downward  trend  for 
Western  Schengen  states  either  with  or  without  direct  borders  to  the  Eastern  Schengen 
states that entered the area in 2007. While there is some slight increase in homicide rates in 
Western states without direct borders from 2008 to 2010, the trend falls afterwards.  

121 E.g. depicted are the residuals from a linear regression model using OLS employing the 
crime rate as outcome variable and controlling for country and year fixed effects. 

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Figure 2.2: Trends in acquisitive crime and homicide rates in existing Schengen states before and 

after 2007 Schengen enlargement 

Notes: based on UNODC crime statistics. Entries depict the residual crime rates for different groups of countries 
over time after taking into account country- and time-specific effects based on a linear regression. 

Furthermore,  figure  2.3  depicts  trends  in  acquisitive  crime  and  homicide  rates  for  the 
newly  acceding  Schengen  states  entering  the  area  in  2007  compared  to  non-Schengen 
countries in the same region (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Moldova and Ukraine). The rate 
of acquisitive crimes falls in the period before 2007 for the newly acceding Schengen states 
and continues with a downward trend thereafter. The figures even reveal a slightly more 
downward sloping trend after 2007. The same applies to homicide rates, although the rate 
fluctuates  relatively  strongly  in  the  post-2007  period,  and  a  clear  trend  cannot  be 
determined. 

While the time-series in figures 2.2 and 2.3 are adjusted for time-invariant country effects 
and general time-effects, other time-varying variables such as a country’s GDP per capita 
as  a  measure  of  wealth  might  also  influence  overall  differences  in  crime  rates  across 
countries. In order to test whether the different trends across groups of countries depicted 
in figures 2.2 and 2.3 are robust to the inclusion of further control variables and are indeed 
statistically significant, we estimate the following linear regression model using OLS: 

𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡 +   𝛽3(𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑐 + γ𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1) 

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-.1-.050.05.1ln acquisitive crime rate (residual)200320052007200920112013yearborder statesnon-border statesacquisitive crime rate-.3-.2-.10.1.2ln homicide rate (residual)200320052007200920112013yearborder statesnon-border stateshomicide rate 
 
 
 
Cost of Non-Europe Report 

Where  𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  in  equation  (1)  represents  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  number  of  police 
reported crimes per 100,000 inhabitants (burglaries, vehicle theft, theft and robbery) and 
the number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in country i in year t. We use both police 
reported  crimes  from  the  UNODC  (United  Nations  Office  on  Drugs  and  Crime)  crime 
database  and  crime  victimisation  survey  data  from  the  ESS.122 𝐶𝑖𝑡  represents  a  vector  of 
control  variables  including  the  GDP  per  capita  (from  World  Development  Indicators 
[WDI]),  total  population  (Eurostat),  net  migration  (Eurostat),  total  number  of  people 
working for police and in prisons, the share of young males among the total population 
(Eurostat), and unemployment rate (WDI). It is noted in the criminological literature that 
controlling for  the  age structure  is very important as young males are statistically more 
likely to be criminal offenders than any other demographic group (Levitt & Lochner 2001). 
In addition, different levels of unemployment may determine  levels of crime. Economic 
theory would predict that, all else being equal, an increase in unemployment may induce 
rises in crime levels as the opportunity costs (e.g. earning a market wage) decrease. Note 
that 𝜃𝑐 represents country-fixed effects, and γ𝑡 (group-specific) time effects.  

Figure 2.3: trends in acquisitive crime and homicide rates in newly acceding Schengen and non-

Schengen states before and after 2007 Schengen enlargement 

122  In  each  round,  the  ESS  asks  people  whether  a  member  of  the  household  has  been  a 
victim of robbery or burglary within the last five years. 

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-.2-.10.1.2ln acquisitive crime rate(residual)200320052007200920112013yearSchengen statesnon-Schengen statesacquisitive crime rate-.4-.20.2ln homicide rate (residual)200320052007200920112013yearSchengen statesnon-Schengen stateshomicide rate 
 
                                                           
The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

Notes: based on UNODC crime statistics. Entries depict the residual crime rates for different groups of countries 
over time after taking into account country- and time-specific effects based on a linear regression. 

For the comparison of crime trends across countries of similar economic and institutional 
settings, we split the available country-level data into two samples: (1) one including all 
existing Schengen states before and after 2007, and (2) one including the newly acceding 
Schengen and non-Schengen states  in the  same  region  before and after 2007. In the  first 
sample, the indicator variable 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡 takes the value 1 if a country has a direct border to 
the newly acceding Schengen states (namely Austria, Germany, Italy, Finland or Sweden) 
and 0 for all other existing Schengen states without direct borders. For the second sample, 
the indicator variable takes the value 1 for all the newly acceding Schengen states (Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Poland) and 0 for all non-Schengen states. The 
parameter estimate 𝛽2 reports whether there are any initial differences in the level of crime 
rates  between  the  two  groups  of  countries.  𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡  takes  the  value  1  after  2008  and 
represents  the  period  after  the  new  Schengen  states  entered  the  area.  In  essence,  in  the 
analytical  framework  outlined  by  equation  (1)  the  parameter  estimate  𝛽1  indicates  the 
average  crime-rate  trend  for  those  countries  not  in  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡.  In  addition, 𝛽3  indicates 
whether for countries included in the group of interest (𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡) we observe a change in 
the average crime rates after 2008 compared to those countries not included in the group.123 

The fully detailed regression output table can be found in the Appendix tables AC.1 and 
AC.2, whereas tables 2.8 and 2.9 below summarise the findings more generally and confirm 
widely the trends observed in figures 2.2 and 2.3. In existing Schengen states, outlined in 
table 2.10, crime rates are generally falling but as the data suggest, this fall is even more 
pronounced  in  states  with  direct  (internal)  borders  to  countries  that  joined  Schengen  in 
2007.  This  applies  for  police-reported  crime  as  well  as  self-reported  crime  victimisation 
rates.  In  addition,  individuals  are  more  likely  to  report  that  they  feel  secure  in  their 
neighbourhood at night in states with direct borders.  

Table 2.11 reveals that the newly acceding states the Schengen area in 2007 report lower 
rates of crime for both acquisitive crimes and homicides. This also applies when examining 
self-reported crimes (column 3). In addition, individuals in Schengen states feel relatively 
more secure after the abolishment of border controls (column 4). 

Table 2.8: Summary table trends in crime rates in existing Schengen states before and after 2007 

Existing Schengen states 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

police- 
reported 
acquisitive 
crime 

police- 
reported 
homicide 

self-reported 
acquisitive 
crime 

self-
reported 
feeling 
secure 

Data source: 

UNODC 

ESS 

(1) No direct border 

–7.87% 

–13.86% 

–1.10% 

0.12% 

123 Note that the overall average change in crime rates for countries included  in 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡 is 
calculated as the sum of 𝛽1 and 𝛽3, whereas 𝛽3 represents the change for countries in the 
group net of a common time trend similar for both groups of countries. 

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∆ before 
2008 - 
after 2008 

(2) Direct border 

–28.03% 

–10.17% 

–5.83% 

4.40% 

(2)-(1) 

–20.16% 

3.69% 

–4.73% 

4.28% 

Notes: based on parameter estimates reported in table AC.1 in Appendix C.  

The crime trends presented above tell a compelling story, countering the hypothesis that 
abolishing (internal) border controls in the light of Schengen leads to increased crime and 
insecurity. If at all, we observe downward trends in acquisitive crime rates. It is important 
to note that the parameter estimates presented in the tables above represent associations 
and  not  causal  effects.  Although  we  aim  to  control  for  as  many  potential  confounding 
factors as possible, unobserved factors that may affect crimes rates after 2008 may still be 
correlated with any of the parameters of interest, hence leading to a biased estimates. What 
is more, the types of crimes investigated in this section do not paint the full picture on how 
the abolishment of border controls may affect levels of crime as other types of crime such 
as drug or human trafficking activities are also impacted by changes in the extent of border 
controls. Hence, in section 2 below we investigate the associations between Schengen and 
drug trafficking in more detail. 

While the presented findings for acquisitive and homicide rates emphasise  the between-
country aspect of crime and Schengen, it is also important to investigate whether border 
regions within countries evolve differently over time in terms of their crime rates compared 
to non-border regions. 

Table 2.9: Summary table trends in crime rates in newly acceding Schengen and non-Schengen 

states before and after 2007 

Newly acceding Schengen states 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

police-
reported 
acquisitive 
crime 

police-
reported 
homicide 

self-
reported 
acquisitive 
crime 

self-
reported 
feeling 
secure 

Data source: 

UNODC 

ESS 

(1) No direct border 

–15.69% 

–19.29% 

–6.48% 

–18.32% 

(2) Direct border 

–29.74% 

–43.20% 

–27.21% 

24.62% 

∆ before 
2008 - 
after 
2008 

(2)–(1) 

–14.05% 

–23.91% 

–20.73% 

42.94% 

Notes: based on parameter estimates reported in table AC.2 in Appendix C.  

1.2 Cross-regional  trends  in  acquisitive  crime  and  homicide  rates:  border  versus  non-
border regions 

The previous section investigated cross-country crime trends between different groups of 
Schengen  and  non-Schengen  states  before  and after  the  2007  Schengen  enlargement.  As 
mentioned above, it has been argued by some that the abolishment of border controls in 
light of Schengen may have improved economic output but at the cost of higher crime and 

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The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

insecurity (Vasilopoulou 2013). If this hypothesis holds, one could expect that such effects 
on crime might be more pronounced in border regions than in non-border regions due to 
their  closer  proximity  to  regions  in  countries  with  lower  levels  of  economic  prosperity. 
Hence, we would expect  that regions with direct borders to the Eastern Schengen states 
might be affected disproportionally. At the same time, one could argue that border regions 
may not be the most economically advanced regions due to their peripheral character and 
hence criminal activities may focus more in less peripheral and more urban centres further 
away from borders.  
In this section, and similarly to Ademmer et al. (2015), we investigate how trends in crime 
rates evolve within countries by comparing border to non-border regions. To that end we 
run  similar  regression  models  as  illustrated  in  equation  (1)  but  using  regional  police 
reported crime level data (burglary, robbery and car theft) for NUTS 3 (Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units for Statistics) regions provided by Eurostat (n.d.) as our outcome variable 
of interest.  Unfortunately these data are only publicly available  for  the  years 2008, 2009 
and 2010. Hence, we can only compare whether trends in crime rates evolve differently for 
border versus non-border NUTS 3 regions after the 2007 enlargement from 2008 for three 
years onwards. For the purposes of this analysis we look at NUTS 3 regions of countries 
with  direct  land  borders  to  the  Eastern  Schengen  states,  namely  Austria,  Germany  and 
Italy, as well as NUTS 3 regions in southern Sweden and Finland with maritime links to 
the Baltic States. 

Figure 2.4 depicts trends for NUTS 3 regions in existing Schengen states with borders that 
were abolished as a result of the Schengen Area enlargement in 2007 compared to NUTS 3 
regions  without  such  borders  within  the  same  country.124  Note  that  the  parameter 
estimates  are  adjusted  for  regional  GDP  per  capita,  regional  type  (metropolitan  or 
mountainous), net migration and total population of the region. 

124 Countries included are Austria, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Finland. 

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Figure 2.4: Regional trends in acquisitive crime (burglary, car theft and robbery) and homicide 

rates between border and non-border NUTS 3 regions 

Interestingly,  the  trend  is  similar  to  the  one  reported  in  the  previous  section  for  trends 
across countries.  Overall, crime rates tend to decrease faster for  border regions than for 
non-border regions. 

While it is important to stress that this analysis cannot identify any causal effect Schengen 
enlargement may have had on crime rates in border countries and their border regions, the 
results do not support the hypothesis that the abolition of internal borders has led to an 
increase  in  crime  or  that  border  regions  would  be  particularly  affected  by  this 
phenomenon. 

2. Illicit drug trade  

As  mentioned  above,  crime  is  a  multifaceted  phenomenon  and  any  attempt  to  try  to 
investigate its associations should consider different types of crimes. Whereas the sections 
above looked at acquisitive and violent crime, in this section we examine in more detail 
whether  abolishing  direct  border  controls  at  border  crossing  points  alters  the  ability  of 
countries to tackle cross-border drug trafficking. Some argue that there is a clear ‘border 
effect’  and  that  a  lack  of  border  controls,  as  one  important  supply-reduction  strategy, 
weakens  attempts to efficiently combat the illicit drug trade. The argument is that open 
borders  reduce  the  costs  of  trafficking  as,  once  the  drug  has  passed  external  Schengen 

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6.76.86.977.1ln acquisitive crime rate200820092010yearborder NUTS3 regionnon-border NUTS3 regionacquisitive crime rate.2.4.6.81ln homicide rate200820092010yearborder NUTS3 regionnon-border NUTS3 regionhomicide rate 
 
 
The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

borders, arguably no further controls within the whole Schengen Area should be expected 
(McCabe 2015). This is more or less in line with the argumentation of the basic economic 
framework of crime whereby a lack of direct border controls may reduce the expected ‘cost’ 
of  criminal  activity,  in  this  case,  trafficking  illicit  drugs  across  borders.  However,  at  the 
same time one could argue that supply-reduction strategies such as improved cross-border 
police  cooperation  and  other  law-enforcement  mechanisms  building  on  Schengen 
compensatory measures could have made the fight against drug trafficking more effective. 
For  instance,  police  resources  that  were  caught  up  at  border  controls  can  now  focus  on 
other  activities  such  as  combatting  cross-border  crime  (Pána  2011).  Hence,  the 
argumentation could go in both directions and the theoretical arguments are inconclusive.  

The aim of this analysis is to investigate whether the abolishment of border controls in light 
of Schengen is hampering the fight against the illicit drug trade across Europe. We compare 
how  different  proxy  indicators  of  supply-reduction  efforts  evolve  before  and  after  a 
country abolishes border controls. Attributing  before  and after trends in the  quantity  of 
seized drugs in a given country only to Schengen may be misleading as other (unobserved) 
effects might influence such indicators, including changes in demand or supply shocks in 
production countries. In order to take these factors into account we benchmark the change 
in the volume of drugs seized before and after becoming member of the Schengen Area 
with countries that have not been part of the area at a given point in time.  

Note that analysing illicit drug markets is not straightforward due to some special features 
of such illegal markets, including for instance (1) the role of imperfect information where 
sellers and buyers are uncertain about the quality and quantity of drugs in a transaction 
and  (2)  the  role  of  enforcement  in  affecting  the  price  of  drugs  and  the  way  they  are 
produced and distributed. Firstly, when buying an illegal drug one only learns its purity 
after the sale is made. Based on US data, Galenianos, Liccardo Pacula, and Persico (2009) 
found  that  five  to  ten  per  cent  of  transactions  were  faked.  These  so-called  ‘rip-off’ 
transactions  involved  no  drug  content  at  all,  although  buyers  paid  the  same  average 
amount  for  the  product  as  they  did  for  real  drugs.  Unlike  in  a  normal  goods  market, 
product quality in a drug market cannot be enforced by the buyer lawfully. Galenianos et 
al.  (2009)  argue  that  under  these  circumstances  repeated  transactions  with  a  particular 
seller  are  more  likely  –  or,  in  other  words,  regular  buyers  keep  their  sellers  honest  by 
discouraging rip-offs. That is, stronger enforcement may make repeated interactions more 
likely and increase the purity of the drug sold. For instance, higher levels of undercover 
police activity may induce a higher risk of switching suppliers as the next supplier could 
be an undercover police officer. Hence, it has to be taken into account that enforcement 
may affect simultaneously the quantity and quality sold in a given drug market.  
Secondly, when looking at the supply side with a focus on Europe, synthetic drugs  and 
marijuana  (for  instance)  are  produced  within  Europe  but  also  trafficked  into  European 
countries  over  a  variety  of  different  trafficking  routes  (EMCDDA  2015).  Stronger 
enforcement in some of the source countries could increase costs of production and hence 
induce  a  substitution  effect  to  synthetic  drugs  or  marijuana  produced  within  European 
borders. However, it is not only changes in enforcement in source countries which might 
affect production of these drugs. More efficient border controls may lead to fewer drugs 
being trafficked cross-border, with a resultant increase in domestic production to satisfy 
demand. These two factors may confound any parameter estimate in empirical analysis. 

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Therefore, to mitigate  the  confounding nature  of these challenges in analysing  the  drug 
markets described above, we focus only on drugs with virtually zero production within 
Europe: cocaine and opiates.  

Cocaine is mainly produced in South America and shipped over different routes to Europe. 
The  main  countries  through  which  cocaine  enters  Europe  are  Spain,  Portugal,  the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Italy,  with the  first two  providing the  major  share of cocaine 
seizures  (United  Nations  Office  on  Drugs  and  Crime  [UNODC]  2009).  Western  Europe, 
one the world’s largest heroin markets, sources its heroin primarily from opium grown in 
Afghanistan via a number of land routes, including the ‘northern’ route across Central Asia 
and Russia, and the ‘Balkan’ route across Eastern and Southeastern Europe (Siddharth & 
Barkell 2013). For both cocaine and opiates, European supply-side reduction strategies are 
predominantly  based  on  intelligence-led  law  enforcement,  including  exchange  of 
information across national and international agencies (Council of the EU 2008). 

As outlined in the analytical framework by Kilmer and Hoorens (2010), a host of indicators 
exist  to  assess  whether  supply-side  reduction  measures  work.  These  include,  among 
others, drug seizures and purity-adjusted prices. In essence, seizures of illicit drugs serve 
several  purposes:  (1)  as  a  potential  deterrent  to  transporting  drugs  (across  borders);  (2) 
generating  information  about  the  geographic  flow  of  drugs;  and  (3)  providing  a 
performance  measure  for  law-enforcement  agencies.  The  issue  with  drug  seizures  as  a 
supply-reduction indicator is that it is a function of the overall quantity of drugs shipped, 
the  relative  performance  of  the  enforcement  agencies,  and  the  general  ‘ability’  or 
‘productivity’ of drug traffickers. So for instance, observing an increase in the volume of 
drug  seized  between  Schengen  states  compared  to  non-Schengen  states  (e.g.  comparing 
Hungary with Serbia) after 2008 could, all else being equal, be driven simply by a larger 
volume of drug traffic through Hungary, as smugglers may find it more effective to change 
their route through states without physical border controls. Hence, in order to investigate 
in  a  more  comprehensive  manner  whether  Schengen  is  associated  with  alterations  in 
supply-reduction strategies we also look at drug prices. Note that while one might expect 
reductions  in  drug  supply  due  to  effective  enforcement  to  lead  to  higher  drug  prices, 
looking at raw  drug  prices  alone  is  misleading as  suppliers can adjust  the purity of the 
drug  in  response  to  enforcement-led  changes  in  drug  supply.  Hence  we  look  at  purity-
adjusted prices which are calculated by dividing the total price paid for a unit of a drug by 
its purity.  

For the purpose of this analysis we use data from the World Drug Report provided by the 
United Nation’s Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) online database.125 Data on seizures 
on opiates and cocaine is collected by the UNODC through Annual Questionnaire Reports 
(ARQ). For many countries the data is available virtually from the early 1980s until 2014. 
In addition we use data on purity and prices from  the  European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), which is available from 1995 onwards. The data 
on prices and purity for opiates is patchy across time and country coverage; hence we use 
only price and purity data for cocaine, which therefore also serves as the main drug we 
focus  on  in  our  analysis,  although  we  also  include  seizures  of  heroin  for  completeness. 

125 https://data.unodc.org/ 

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Since the data on prices and purity are only available since 1995 and some observations 
before  the  country  entered  the  Schengen  Area  is  needed  to  perform  a  before  and  after 
comparison, we include all European countries in our sample only from the 2000 Schengen 
enlargement  round  up  to  2007,  and  those  countries  that  have  never  been  part  of  the 
Schengen  Area  (Ireland,  the  UK  and  non-EU  countries  such  as  Turkey)  which  act  as 
comparison  groups.  We  exclude  Switzerland  from  the  analysis  because  even  though 
Switzerland entered the Schengen Area in 2008, it still has running border crossing points 
to check the flow of goods.  
In essence, we run the following econometric model using OLS: 
𝑇

𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛿𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

      (2) 

𝑡=2

Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 in equation (2) represents the natural logarithm of the volume of seized drugs 
(in  kilograms)  and  the  purity-adjusted  drug  prices  in  a  given  country  i  at  time  t,  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 
represents an indicator variable which takes the value 1 if the country is in the treatment 
group  (e.g.  country  enters  Schengen  at  some  point)  and  𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡  is  an  indicator  that 
takes the value 1 if the country has abolished its border controls as a result of entering the 
Schengen Area, 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 is a set of indicator variables that capture common year effects across 
all countries, and 𝜃𝑐  represents a country-specific time-invariant effect. To explain further, 
the common year effects aim to capture general trends in consumption of a specific drug, 
whereas the country-fixed effects should take into account time-invariant effects specific 
to  a  country,  including  for  instance  any  differences  across  countries  in  reporting  drug 
seizures.  𝐶𝑖𝑡  is  a  vector  of  country-specific  time-varying  effects,  including  proxies  for 
demand-side measures, such as total population or GDP per capita, but also the amount of 
public  money  spend  per  capita  on  policy  and  public  safety.126  We  also  include  the 
proportion of young males among the total population and the unemployment rate. 

2.1 Trends in supply-reduction indicators before and after entering Schengen 

Table 2.10 reports associations between the abolishment of internal border controls after 
entering  the  Schengen  Area  and  the  volume  of  seized  cocaine  and  heroin  and  purity-
adjusted prices of cocaine. The parameter estimates in column (1) and (2) suggest that on 
average,  countries  that  entered  Schengen  after  2000  have  increased  quantities  of  seized 
cocaine and heroin by around 50 to 67 per cent, respectively. To put that into perspective, 
this  means  that  the  pre-Schengen  average  of  around  50kg  of  seized  drugs  increased  to 
around  75kg  annually,  whereas  the  pre-Schengen  average  of  around  60kg  increased  to 
around 100kg annually in the countries under consideration.  

Looking at purity-adjusted prices for cocaine, we observe that entering the Schengen Area 
increases on average the purity-adjusted prices by around nine per cent. That is to say, the 
empirical findings suggest not only that the amount of seized drugs increased but also the 
purity-adjusted  prices.  Even  though  our  analysis  cannot  fully  control  for  demand-side 
mechanisms  (we  include  only  total  population  and  GDP  per  capita  as  demand-side 
indicators),  given  the  assumption  that  demand  for  drugs,  in  this  case  cocaine,  is  price-

126 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SNA_TABLE11 

Based 

on 

COFOG 

data: 

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inelastic, then the simultaneous increase in purity-adjusted prices may suggest a supply-
side effect driving the results.  

It  is  important  to  stress  that  the  parameter  estimates  presented  Table  2.10  represent 
associations  and  not  necessarily  causal  effects  between  entering  the  Schengen  Area  and 
indicators  for  supply-reduction  measures.  Nevertheless,  our  findings  highlight  the  fact 
that entering the Schengen Area does not hamper the ability of states to effectively combat 
the illicit drug trade. If there is an effect at all, then the associations reported suggest that 
supply-reduction efforts may become more efficient when a country enters the Schengen 
Area.  

At first glance, the fact that abolishing border controls may increase the number of drug 
seizures might seem counterintuitive. That is to say, a lack of border controls would seem 
to make it easier for drug traffickers to move drugs within the Schengen Area as they do 
not face the risk of being captured once they pass physical border controls. This argument 
is  made  in  McCabe  (2015).  One  potential  factor  which  may  explain  our  findings  is  that 
better cross-border police cooperation in light of Schengen might have led to better or more 
frequent information exchange. In addition, police resources that have been  performing 
static  border  enforcement  may  have  become  more  efficiently  used  in  combatting  drug 
trafficking.  

Table 2.10: Schengen and indicators of supply-reduction measures. 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

Dependant variable: 

In seizures of 
cocaine 

In seizures of 
heroin 

In purity-adjusted 
price of cocaine 

treat 

–11.0150 

Schengen 

(5.398)** 

0.5348 

(0.299)* 

Constant 

–142.5473 

–10.4487 

(2.912)*** 

0.6798 

(0.379)* 

–98.4652 

–1.2603 

(0.466)*** 

0.0927 

(0.055)* 

31.3854 

(58.966)** 

(27.939)*** 

(4.681)*** 

Observations 

387 

R-squared 

0.6908 

598 

0.4197 

368 

0.6778 

Notes: Clustered (country) standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  Models in columns 
1 to 3 include the total population and GDP per capita, total population, share of young males, 
unemployment rate, GINI coefficient and the per capita spend on police and prisons as control variables. 
The time span of the data includes the years 1995 to 2014. The sample includes all countries from the 2000 
Schengen enlargement onwards plus a number of non-Schengen states such as the UK, Ireland, and 
Turkey. 

IV - Political cost: associations between Schengen and trust  

As outlined in chapter 1, the role of trust is an important enabling factor  in the effective 
working of Schengen. This corresponds to trust at different levels, mainly trust between 
member states and trust between the public and national and EU institutions. To the best 

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of our knowledge no comprehensive quantitative data on inter-country trust is available.127 
To address this gap, in this section we use the European Social Survey (ESS) to investigate 
whether abolishing border controls is associated with changes in public trust. The ESS has 
asked individuals since 2002 in different regions and countries across Europe about how 
much they trust others, politicians, the national and European Parliament, the police, and 
the legal system. Since the data is only available from 2002 onwards, we focus our analysis 
on the 2007 Schengen enlargement and compare how different measures of trust in these 
countries  have  evolved  before  and  after  they  joined  the  Schengen  Area.  As  comparison 
group  we  use  other  non-Schengen  countries  in  the  same  region.  In  addition,  as  when 
analysing  the  associations  between  abolishing  border  controls  and  crime  rates,  we  also 
investigate  how  measures  of  trust  have  changed  in  existing  Schengen  states  after  2007 
compared to before 2007. To that end we run the following regression model using OLS: 
𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡 +   𝛽3(𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝)𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑐 + γ𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (3) 
Where 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑡 represents a measure of trust for individual i in country or region c at time 
t, 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 is a dummy variable taking the value 1 after 2008, the year after the 2007 Eastern 
Schengen  enlargement.  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡  takes  the  value  1  if  an  individual  lives  in  a  country 
belonging to the specific group of interest. As with our analysis of crime rates, we split the 
sample  in  two:  (1)  containing  only  Eastern  Schengen  states  and  Eastern  non-Schengen 
states and (2) containing only Western Schengen states that were in the Schengen Area in 
2007.  This  ensures  comparing 
individuals  within  similar  economic  and  social 
environments.  (𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝)𝑖𝑐𝑡  takes  the  value  1  for  the  group  of  interest  after  2007, 
representing the average change in the trend of the trust measure in relation to Schengen. 
Hence, parameter  estimate  𝛽1 reports the  change in average trust before and after 2008, 
whereas  parameter  estimate  𝛽3  reports  the  change  in  average  trust  for  individuals  in 
country  or  region  in  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡  net  of  the  change  in  average  trust  in  individuals  not  in  a 
country or region covered that group. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of individual demographic and other 
measures, including gender, age, education, domicile (e.g. urban/rural), citizenship,  and 
whether the individual belongs to an ethnic minority. 𝜃𝑐 are country specific effects and γ𝑐𝑡 
capture country-specific time trends and adjust indirectly for any country-level variables 
which change over time, including for instance economic output and levels of corruption. 

In each of its surveys the ESS asks European citizens about various different measure of 
trust.  In  our  analysis  we  include  trust  based  on  the  variables  and  questions  outlined  in 
Table 2.11, which can be observed over all surveys of the ESS between 2002 and 2014. In 
order to measure trust in the criminal justice system we combine the variables trust in police 
and  trust  in  the  legal  system.  In  order  to  create  a  measure  of  trust  in  national  political 
institutions  we  also  combine  the  variables  trust  in  national  parliament  and  trust  in 
politicians.128 The only variable measuring trust in European institutions is the variable trust 
in  the  European  Parliament.  In  the  lack  of  alternative  measures,  we  use  this  variable  as  a 
proxy measure for trust in European institutions in general.  

127 There are surveys, such as Pew’s Global Attitudes Project, that ask respondents about 
their views of a selected small number of major world countries or their policies. However, 
these questions are typically limited to a small number of countries and cannot be used for 
a systematic analysis of inter-country trust within the EU. 
128 Note that we take the average value of both variables combined. 

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Table 2.11: Measures of trust included in the ESS, 2002–2014. 

Trust measure 

General trust 

Trust in criminal justice 
system 

ESS: variables/questions 

Scale 

Most people can be 
trusted or you can’t be too 
careful 

Trust in the police 

Trust in the legal system 

0 (you can’t be too careful) to 10 
(people can be trusted) 

0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete 
trust) 

0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete 
trust) 

Trust in national political 
institutions 

Trust in national 
parliament 

0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete 
trust) 

Trust in politicians 

0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete 
trust) 

Trust in European 
institutions 

Trust in the European 
Parliament 

0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete 
trust) 

Notes: we combine trust in police and the legal system by taking the average of the two; the same applies to 
trust in national parliament and trust in politicians. 

1.1 Cross-country trends in different measures of trust (2002–2014) 

The full regression output of estimating equation (3) can be found tables AD.1 and AD.2 
in Appendix D. Tables 2.12 and 2.13 summarise the main findings regarding trends in trust 
over time for newly acceding states that entered the Schengen Area at the end of 2007 and 
for existing Schengen states before and after 2008, respectively.  

For  the  sample  containing  new Schengen states and countries that have not (yet) joined 
Schengen in the same region, we observe on average an increasing trend in trust across the 
board. This includes general trust, trust in the criminal justice system, trust in national and 
European institutions. Over the same time period, we observe that, comparing before and 
after  2008,  trust  in  non-Schengen  countries  decreased.  Similar  trends  apply  to  existing 
Schengen states when we examine the trend before and after 2008. Overall, general trust 
has  increased  but  tends  to  be  more  pronounced  in  existing  Schengen  states  with  direct 
borders to the newly acceding states entering the area in 2007. 

Table 2.12: Change in trust before and after 2008 for newly acceding Schengen and non-

Schengen countries in the same region 

Newly acceding countries 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

general 
trust 

trust in 
criminal justice 
system 

trust in 
national 
institutions 

trust in 
European 
institutions 

∆ before 
2008 - 
after 2008 

(1) Non-Schengen 

–5.28% 

–5.41% 

–8.86% 

–11.71% 

(2) Schengen 

13.62% 

6.28% 

1.38% 

3.55% 

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 (2)-(1) 

18.90% 

11.69% 

10.24% 

15.26% 

Note: based on parameter estimates reported in table AD.1 in Appendix D.  

Table 2.13: Change in trust before and after 2008 for existing Schengen states with direct or no 

direct borders to newly acceding states entering the area in 2007 

Existing Schengen states 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

general 
trust 

trust in 
criminal 
justice 
system 

trust in 
national 
institutions 

trust in 
European 
institutions 

∆ before 2008 
- after 2008 

(1) No direct border 

2.10% 

0.37% 

7.45% 

(2) Direct border 

3.93% 

2.13% 

16.43% 

(2)-(1) 

1.83% 

1.76% 

8.98% 

1.76% 

2.11% 

0.35% 

Note: based on parameter estimates reported in table AD.2 in Appendix D.  

1.2 Cross-regional trends in trust: border versus non-border regions 

In addition to cross-country trends in different measures of trust, we also examine trends 
at the regional level by comparing border and non-border regions within countries in light 
of the 2007 Schengen enlargement. In essence, using the analytical framework outlined in 
equation (3) we use the regional component from the ESS multilevel data129 that is available 
for the years 2008, 2010 and 2012. We adjust the results for demographic factors such as 
age, gender, education, citizenship and domicile and use the weights provided in the ESS 
to make the reported values representative. In addition we include regional fixed effects 
(NUTS 2 or NUTS 1 level) and regional-specific time effects which adjust for all factors that 
vary over time by region. 

In the analysis a region is defined as a ‘border region’ when its borders have been abolished 
in the 2007 enlargement, including for instance German–Czech or German–Polish regions 
with border crossing points. It is important to note that the ESS multilevel reports are not 
the same NUTS levels for the countries included. Notably, German regions are reported 
on the NUTS 1 level, whereas for instance regions of the Czech Republic are reported as 
NUTS 3 regions. This needs to be taken into account when comparing different trends, in 
that the underlying entity differs.  

Figures 2.5 and 2.6 illustrate the fact that, albeit having different levels in existing Schengen 
states, general trends across different measures of trust are very similar for border and non-
border regions for the sample of newly acceding Schengen states, as well for the existing 
Schengen states. 

129 http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/multilevel/ 

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Figure 2.5: Trends for border and non-border regions in different measures of trust for newly 

acceding states that entered Schengen Area in 2007. 

Note: entries based on ESS multilevel data. 

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11.21.41.61.8general trust200820102012yearborder regionnon-border regiongeneral11.21.41.61.8trust in EU institutions200820102012yearborder regionnon-border regionEU institutions11.21.41.61.8trust in national institutions200820102012yearborder regionnon-border regionNational institutions11.21.41.61.8trust in criminal justice system200820102012yearborder regionnon-border regioncriminal justice system 
 
The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects  

Figure 2.6: Trends for border and non-border regions in different measures of trust for existing 
Schengen states with direct borders to newly acceding states that entered Schengen 
Area in 2007. 

Note: entries based on ESS multilevel data. 

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1.851.91.9522.05general trust200820102012yearborder regionnon-border regiongeneral1.851.91.9522.05trust in EU institutions200820102012yearborder regionnon-border regionEU institutions1.851.91.9522.05trust in national institutions200820102012yearborder regionnon-border regionNational institutions1.851.91.9522.05trust in criminal justice system200820102012yearborder regionnon-border regioncriminal justice system 
Cost of Non-Europe Report 

CHAPTER 3 – OPTIONS FOR CONCERTED ACTION AT EU 
LEVEL 

As  the  analysis  presented  in  the  previous  section  and  wider  academic  literature 
demonstrates, there are positive economic, social and political outcomes associated with 
the Schengen Agreement. Therefore, it is worth examining possible areas for concerted EU 
action  that  may  help  restore  Schengen  to  its  full  functioning  and  thus  potentially  help 
reclaim  the  full  extent  of  Schengen’s  benefits.  This  is  the  objective  of  this  chapter.  We 
reiterate that the inclusion of policy options for more concerted action at the EU level stems 
from the contextual considerations presented in chapter 1 and take into account the costs 
discussed in chapter 2. Therefore, these need to be understood as a discussion of responses 
to a political situation in which trust between member states has been eroded, as has that 
of the general public in the EU’s ability to uphold common standards and policies in the 
areas of border control, migration and asylum. Therefore, in addition to examining options 
pertaining to the Schengen governance framework, we dedicate a section to options for EU 
action in the following three policy areas: 

-  External border control 
-  Police and judicial cooperation 
-  Asylum and migration law 

In each of these areas we take stock of existing initiatives and additional possible options 
along  with  their  possible  impact,  building  on  available  literature  supplemented  by 
interviewee  testimonials  where  available.  In  each  policy  area  we  also  consider  the 
acceptability and feasibility of EU action in a given area. 

Ultimately, not all options discussed in this chapter should be seen as a pre-requisite for a 
return to the normal functioning of Schengen. For instance, as laid out in the EC’s ‘Back to 
Schengen’  roadmap  (EC  2016a),  the  objective  is  to  return  to  a  normally  functioning 
Schengen Area by the end of 2016, although some of the options discussed in this chapter 
may conceivably require longer to take effect. Accordingly, some options are more likely 
to have an impact in the near future than others and may therefore be more important, at 
least from the short-term point of view. This sense of prioritisation can be seen in the EC’s 
exploratory  memorandum  to  its  May  2016  recommendation  to  prolong  current  internal 
border controls. The document calls for the following initiatives to be ‘in place and fully 
operational without delay’ (EC 2016n): (1) the European Coast and Border Guard, (2) full 
application of EU asylum law provisions, (3) improved implementation of the emergency 
relocation scheme, and (4) the EU–Turkey joint action. 

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I - Schengen governance framework 

Action in this area could address the following needs arising from the political 
context surrounding the re-introduction of internal border controls  

-  Need to improve the management and monitoring of cross-border flows 

Policy options in this area 

- 

Improve the enforcement of the existing Schengen acquis. 

-  Expand the use and functionality of SIS. 

-  Continue implementing the new Schengen evaluation system. 

Possible impact of undertaken steps 

-  The steps discussed below, particularly upgrades to SIS, are likely to contribute 
to greater exchange of information and, by extension, to addressing some of the 
current security concerns. 

-  However, overall, the existing Schengen governance framework appears to be 
broadly fit for purpose and does not require major modifications. The impact of 
any  steps  discussed  in  this  section  on  the  political  context  leading  to  the  re-
introduction of internal border controls is therefore very limited. 

This  section  discusses  areas  of  possible  action  covered  by  the  Schengen  governance 
framework. Namely, the following three topics: (1) the Schengen evaluation mechanism; 
(2) SBC provisions pertaining to the re-introduction of internal controls; and (3) Schengen 
Information System. 

1. Enforcement of existing rules 

Before embarking on introducing new initiatives, it is important to recognise  that better 
use  can  also  be  made  of  existing  legislation  and  instruments  by  ensuring  that  member 
states have implemented all relevant acquis in an appropriate way and/or are compliant 
with their provisions. With respect to the Schengen acquis, EC’s seventh bi-annual report 
on Schengen (EC 2015k) noted violations of Schengen provisions in terms of ensuring the 
absence of internal border controls. Most often these pertained to the obligation to ensure 
that  any  controls  conducted  in  border  areas  do  not  have  an  effect  equivalent  to  that  of 
formal  border  controls  (Article  23)  and  to  the  duty  to  remove  obstacles  to  traffic  flow 
(Article  24).  In  response,  the  EC’s  use  of  formal  notices,  information  exchanges, 
investigations  (with  the  possible  escalation  to  infringement  proceedings  and  their 
established system of financial sanctions [EC, 2016l]) have been and remain an important 
tool to help ensure member-state compliance with existing EU law. Improved compliance 
with  Schengen  acquis  has  beneficial  impacts  on  individuals  crossing  internal  borders. 
However, viewed from the perspective of the needs expressed by those member states that 
have re-introduced internal border controls, it is difficult to see that better compliance with 
the Schengen acquis would have any impact on the current political context which has led 
to the re-introduction of internal border controls. 

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2. SBC rules on the re-introduction of internal controls 

Several comments can be made on SBC Articles 25-30 on the basis of interviews and wider 
literature.  Overall,  every  interviewee  who  commented  on  the  topic  felt  that  the  current 
system is working well. One interviewee stressed that the provisions of Article 29 and the 
role  of  the  EU  in  their  introduction  helpfully  incorporate  the  need  for  a  multilateral 
solution,  well  suited  to  current  challenges,  which  span  the  domains  of  border  control, 
asylum, migration law and so on.130 Having said which, the interviewee added that this 
assessment is based on the assumption that current issues can be resolved within two years 
given that current rules are unable to address an event of a longer duration.  
With respect to the provisions of Article 25 and 28, two interviewees pointed out that there 
was a disconnect between  the  original aims of Article 25 and Article  28 and  the  way in 
which these have been used in the past year. The introduction of the two articles in 2013 
did not foresee the current scale of the migrant crisis; rather, the intention was to address 
member states’ needs related to temporary circumstances such as high-profile sport events. 
However, this was not the reason for which Schengen countries invoked Article 25 and 28 
in 2015. The fact that the EC agreed with those re-introductions further demonstrates what 
one  interviewee  called  a  ’shift  in  the  interpretation’  of  the  suspension  measures. 
Importantly, though, this is not a criticism of the suspension measures per se. Articles 25 
and 28 also have the advantage of giving member states the possibility  of responding to 
any developments while the EC assesses the need to trigger provisions covered by Article 
29.  

Peers (2013) assessed the changes to the SBC resulting in the introduction of Article 29. He 
argued  that  the  new  provisions  amounted  to  a  compromise  between  those  desiring  to 
increase  member  state  power  over  the  re-imposition  of  border  controls  and  those 
advocating  a  shift  towards  more  EC  control.  The  author  welcomed  the  introduction  of 
greater  measures  to  increase  member  states’  accountability  once  they  decide  to  re-
introduce border controls in the form of reporting requirements and detailed criteria to be 
applied in the decision process.131 

The report by Peers also highlighted several potentially problematic areas. First, member 
states are free to react to an EC decision related to Article 29 controls in any way they deem 
fit and it is conceivable that the consequences of any divergence in how member states re-

130 The existing provisions of Article 29 are mirrored in proposed amendment by the EC to 
the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency  proposal,  which  would  provide  for  a 
coordinated re-introduction of internal controls if the functioning of the Schengen Area is 
at  risk  due  to  the  fact  that  a  member  state  does  not  ensure  proper  follow  up  to  a 
vulnerability assessment conducted by the agency or does not request sufficient support 
from  the  agency  to  respond  to  a  specific  and  disproportionate  pressure  at  its  external 
borders. 
131 Member states’ adherence to this reporting process is well illustrated by the series of 
notifications published over the course of the last year. In addition, the EC and Council of 
the  EU  have  expressed  views  on  the  application  of  these  criteria,  although  these  by 
themselves are not legally binding. 

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impose  border  controls  may  be  somewhat  chaotic.  Second,  the  applicable  rules  do  not 
specify  what  it  actually  means  to  re-introduce  internal  controls  and,  for  instance,  how 
similar their regime should be compared to that of external Schengen borders. Ultimately, 
however, this is not to suggest that member states’ discretion in this area has resulted in 
systematic issues and there does not appear  to be any evidence of that having occurred 
since the use of Article 29 in May 2016. Instead, it is discussed here as a potential risk which 
may or may not merit addressing through greater coordination efforts. 

3. Schengen Information System 

The Schengen Information System is another of the ‘compensatory’ measures introduced 
to complement the abolition of internal borders and represents a common database of the 
Schengen Area.  In  operation  since 1995, it enables relevant national authorities  to share 
and access in real-time information on people as well as goods (Delivet 2015). In 2013, a 
second  generation  of the  system (SIS II) was launched and the  management  of  the  new 
version was transferred to a then recently created agency – the European Agency for the 
operational management of Large-Scale IT Systems (eu-LISA).132 

In 2015, eu-LISA (2015) published a report on the technical functioning of SIS II focusing 
on its central system and communication infrastructure. The report described the technical 
availability and performance of the system as ‘excellent’ and did not find any considerable 
impact  on  ongoing  operations  stemming  from  a  small  number  of  reported  incidents.  In 
addition, eu-LISA noted a steady increase in the overall use of SIS since its inception in 
2013.  The  latest  EC  reports  on  the  functioning  of  Schengen  (EC  2015c,  2015k)  also 
highlighted the  central role  played by SIS and noted several recent initiatives to further 
improve its performance, such as amendments to the SIRENE (Supplementary Information 
Request at the National Entry) Manual and new visualisation functionalities. Efforts have 
also been made to align SIS and Interpol’s firearms database. 

At  the  same  time,  while  the  EC’s  seventh  bi-annual  report  (EC  2015k)  on  Schengen 
welcomed increases in the use and functionality of SIS, it noted ‘significant discrepancies’ 
in the employment of SIS between member states. The eighth Schengen Report (EC 2015c) 
did not elaborate on this observation other than adding that ‘the majority’ of member states 
made good use of advances in the system’s functionality, suggesting that there were some 
member states that did not.  

Along similar lines, in its November 2015 resolution (EP 2015c), the European Parliament 
called  on  member  states  to  increase  the  use  of  available  information-exchange  tools, 
including  the  SIS  and  VIS  (Visa  Information  System).  One  interviewee  highlighted  the 
contribution of regular evaluations and noted that member states are good at following up 
on resulting recommendations. An up-to-date indication of the use of the SIS by member 
states, along with a discussion of further possible areas for improvement, can be expected 
from the upcoming results of an evaluation of SIS II, projected by the EC to be available in 

132 In addition to SIS II, the European Agency is currently managing EURODAC and the 
Visa Information System (VIS) (eu-LISA, n.d.). 

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the second quarter of 2016.133 This is in line with the roadmap for the evaluation of SIS II 
(EC 2016k).  

Several additional efforts to improve SIS are envisaged in the foreseeable future and should 
be acknowledged here. In February 2016 the EC published a report on the ability of SIS to 
use fingerprint information for identification purposes (EC 2016t). The report concluded 
that the  technology (Automatic Fingerprint Identification System  – AFIS) was  ready for 
incorporation into SIS, which paved the way for its implementation.134 According to a May 
2016  memo  from  the  EC,  the  system  will  be  ready  in  mid-2017  (EC  2016i).  In  other 
developments, the Council of the EU Presidency is preparing an action plan on SIS and 
foreign terrorist fighters and on addressing notable operational difficulties. The action plan 
is expected to be published before the presidency’s end. Later in 2016, the EC is expected 
to propose a revision of SIS. This proposal will address, among other issues, the following 
areas: (1) return of irregular migrants and entry bans, (2) biometric identification through 
facial images, and (3) alerts for wanted unknown persons (EC 2016i). 

The SIS was initially perceived as deficient in terms of data protection and fundamental 
rights  (Centre  for  the  Study  of  Global  Ethics  2010;  Parkin  2011).  However,  more  recent 
official  publications  document  existing  data-protection  safeguards  such  as  controlled 
access restricted only to information necessary for the performance of the tasks of relevant 
authorities (EC 2015a).  

The Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) is currently examining the  risks and benefits  of 
holding individuals’ personal data, particularly with regards to biometric data, in the SIS 
(and  VIS  and  Eurodac),  although  the  results  are  not  yet  available  (FRA,  n.d.a). 
Interestingly, a related survey conducted by the FRA concerning travellers’ perception of 
the  use  of  biometrics  showed  that  most  travellers  do  not  view  this  as  a  rights  violation 
(FRA 2015). 

4. Schengen evaluation and monitoring system 

The  Schengen  evaluation  system  is  among  the  compensatory  measures  adopted  to 
complement  the  abolition  of  internal  borders  in  the  Schengen  Area  (Delivet  2015), 
originally  set  up  as  a  permanent  mechanism  in  1998  at  the  intergovernmental  level.135 
Following the communitarisation of the Schengen acquis by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the 
responsibility of the Evaluation Standing Committee was taken over by the Council of the 
EU’s Schengen Evaluation Working Party (SCH-EVAL) (Council of the EU 2014). 

133 As indicated in a response to an MEP question (EP 2016a). 
134  An  interviewee  highlighted  a  current  gap  that  will  be  targeted.  There  is  no  effective 
search function associated with fingerprint information, meaning that the information is 
useful only if there is a name attached to the fingerprint that is being checked. 
135  The  standing  committee  on  the  evaluation  and  implementation  of  Schengen.  The 
committee’s tasks were (1) assessing the progress of candidate countries towards meeting 
the  conditions  for  entry,  and  (2)  monitoring  the  implementation  of  Schengen  acquis  in 
member states that were already parties to the convention (Arbidāne et al. 2016). 

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In 2013, the Council of the EU adopted a regulation to strengthen the Schengen evaluation 
mechanism,  the  first  since  its  early  version  agreed  in  the  late  1990s  (Council  of  the  EU 
2013b). According to the new mechanism, the EC is tasked with establishing a multi-annual 
and an annual work programme, whereby each member states would be evaluated every 
five years.136 The evaluations draw on several data collection exercises: (1) a questionnaire 
prepared  by  the  EC  in  consultation  with  member  states,  Frontex,  and  Europol  to  be 
completed  by  competent  national  authorities;  (2)  on-site  visits  (both  announced  and 
unannounced) conducted by experts designated by member states and EC representatives; 
and (3), if requested, risk analyses conducted by EU bodies, offices and agencies other than 
Frontex that are involved in the implementation of the Schengen acquis. 

Based on these activities, member state experts and EC representatives prepare evaluation 
reports and formulate recommendations to remedy any observed deficiencies. These are 
then submitted to the Council of the EU for consideration.137 The evaluation system also 
includes  a  follow-up  mechanism  by  which  a  member  state  found  in  neglect  of  its 
obligations is required to prepare an action plan in response to any recommendations from 
the Council of the EU. The adequacy of this action plan is subject to EC assessment and its 
implementation needs to be regularly reported on by the member state. Commenting on 
the new division of responsibilities between the  EC and member states, one interviewee 
noted that the involvement of the EC has created a more formal and actionable mechanism, 
although some member states have expressed reservations about a perceived loss of say in 
the process. 

The  EC’s  Seventh  Bi-annual  Report  on  Schengen  (EC  2015k)  commented  on  the 
implementation of the new evaluation regime, which started in November 2014. The report 
noted  that  the  rollout  of  the  new  system  was  preceded  by  an  intensive  training  and 
preparation period, based on a commonly agreed curriculum. The report found the first 
series of evaluation visits very positive, with good cooperation among all engaged parties 
including the EC, member states and Frontex. With respect to individual features of the 
new system, the report highlighted the ability to conduct unannounced visits and the fact 
that individual member-state  evaluations are supposed to cover all aspects of Schengen 
acquis in a relatively short period of time, enabling the evaluators to get a comprehensive 
snapshot  of  the  situation  in  a  given  country.  Arbidāne  et  al.  (2016)  also  argued  that 
innovations in the evaluation mechanism, such as the use of highly qualified experts and 
unannounced  visits,  contribute  to  ‘high  preparedness  standards’  for  relevant  national 
authorities. 

The most recent eighth bi-annual report on Schengen (EC 2015c) offered a somewhat more 
negative  assessment  of  the  evaluation  process.  The  report  noted  that  the  success  of  the 
evaluation  mechanism  is  to  a  considerable  degree  dependent  on  member  states’ 
cooperation  and  compliance  with  respect  to  the  Schengen  Questionnaire  distributed  to 

136 In other words, each year five to seven member states would be evaluated (Malmersjo 
& Remáč 2016). 
137 Arbidāne et al. (2016) pointed out that one of the reasons implementing powers to adopt 
recommendations rests with the Council of the EU is to strengthen mutual trust between 
member states. 

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relevant national authorities. Regrettably, the record of the member states undergoing an 
evaluation  in  2016  in  this  regard  was  rather  mixed  –  half  of  them  failed  to  return  the 
questionnaire on time  (even allowing for  extending deadlines). In addition, some  of the 
returned questionnaires either left some questions unanswered or provided information of 
poor quality and were thus of limited use to the evaluation. To improve the mechanism’s 
effectiveness and efficiency, the EC developed, with input from member states, a Schengen 
Evaluation  Guide  (Schengen  Committee  2015)  and  guidelines  on  the  conduct  of 
unannounced visits (Schengen Committee 2014). 

5. Conclusion 

In conclusion, there is little evidence that the current Schengen governance framework is 
not be fit for purpose. Improvements can be made, for instance through better enforcement 
of existing acquis or expanding the use and functionality of SIS. However, these steps bear 
little relation to the needs of member states identified in the introduction to this paper and 
are  therefore  unlikely  to  have  a  major  impact  on  the  political  context  in  which  internal 
border controls have been re-introduced. 

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II - External border control 

Action in this area could address the following needs arising from the political 
context surrounding the re-introduction of internal border controls 

-  Better management of migratory flows crossing the external border and within 

the EU. 

-  Mitigation of terrorist and other security threats. 

Policy options in this area 

- 

- 

Increase  of  the  institutional  capacity  dedicated  to  the  protection  of  external 
border  through  the  establishment  of  the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard 
Agency. 

Strengthening of border checks through conducting systematic checks against 
relevant databases, introducing the  Entry–Exit System, and utilising common 
risk indicators. 

Possible impact of steps undertaken 

-  The  proposals  to  strengthen  external  border  checks  are  expected  to  result  in 
greater  effectiveness  of  controls.  Systematic  checks  would  result  in  greater 
demands on resources; the EES could result in savings, once initial one-off costs 
are absorbed. 

-  There  appear  to  be  substantial  limitations  on  the  potential  impact  of  the 
European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) Agency. Notably, it would continue 
to be reliant on member-state resources, which has been an issue for Frontex as 
well. 

Given  the  needs  of  member  states  identified  in  the  contextual  discussion  of  this  paper, 
external border control is an area where more concerted action at the EU level may merit 
examination. This section discusses two distinct areas of possible action:  (1) increases in 
institutional capacity, and (2) strengthening of external border-check procedures. 

1. Increase in institutional capacity 

In  response  to  the  increased  migration  flows  seen  at  Schengen’s  external  border,  the 
European  Union  has  undertaken  a  series  of  steps  to  improve  the  ability  of  relevant 
authorities to manage pressures encountered. These include hotspots in Italy and Greece 
(EC 2015c), Frontex joint operations (Triton and Poseidon) and Rapid Border Intervention 
Teams (RABITs), and a naval military operation Sophia. However, as noted by numerous 
observers, there are clear limits to the effectiveness of these initiatives due to factors such 
as implementation issues138 and the scope and objectives of the intervention.139  

138  This  is  particularly  applicable  to  hotspots.  See,  for  instance,  (EC  2015b,  2016e, 2016s; 
Kaca, 2016). 
139  For  instance,  the  UK  House  of  Lords  found  opration  Sophia  unable  to  make  a 
meaningful contribution to the deterrence of the flow of migrants and smuggling networks 

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Overall,  however,  hotspots  and  other  ongoing  initiatives  intended  to  manage  migrant 
flows  need  to  be  understood  as  extraordinary  crisis-response  measures.  In  an  effort  to 
systematically increase the effectiveness of external border controls and address some of 
the  challenges  described  above,  the  EC  proposed  in  December  2015  to  establish  a  new 
European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) Agency (EC 2015i). The proposed new agency 
would replace Frontex and have additional tasks, responsibilities and powers.140 The EBCG 
proposal and its features build on the  findings of an independent evaluation of Frontex 
(Frontex 2015a), conducted in 2015, and incorporate recommendations issued by Frontex 
management  in  response  to  the  evaluation  (Frontex  2015b).  The  evaluation  noted  that 
while Frontex was operating effectively, several areas with room for improvement could 
be identified. These included a better delineation of the agency’s role vis-à-vis national and 
other  EU  agencies,  lack  of  monitoring  capacity,  challenges  with  access  to  member-state 
resources and monitoring of fundamental rights in agency’s activities (Frontex 2015a). The 
area  of  fundamental  rights  was  also  picked  up  by  the  European  Ombudsman,  which 
recommended the  establishment of a complaints  mechanism, as suggested in  the  EBCG 
proposal. 

To  help  meet  the  agency’s  objectives,  the  proposal  envisages  the  doubling  of  Frontex’s 
current staff count and the development of a reserve pool of national experts. The latter is 
supposed to address the current challenge faced by Frontex, which relies on member states’ 
cooperation in responding to its calls for  national experts (EC 2016e). However,  Carrera 
and  den  Hertog  (2016)  pointed  out  that  the  EBCG  would  still  remain  dependent  on 
member states’ resources and as such falls short of a true European system.141 

There is no impact assessment available on the EBCG proposal. However, in April 2016, 
the European Parliament published a study (Rijpma 2016) on the proposal commissioned 
by the LIBE committee which voiced several concerns. First and foremost, it suggested that 
the  agency’s  proposed  right  to  intervene  and  member  states’  obligation  to  provide 
personnel for intervention teams might be in violation of EU treaties and of member states’ 
exclusive control of their internal security. Secondly, the report felt that the dual mandate 
of coordinating member-state activities and of monitoring those very activities  might be 
problematic  to  execute.  Thirdly,  the  EP  suggested  that  the  agency’s  third-country 
cooperation  be  limited  to  parties  to  the  Geneva  Refugee  Convention  and  the  European 
Convention  on  Human  Rights.  The  EP  report  also  suggested  that  several  aspects  of  the 
proposal required further clarification. These were: (1) division of responsibilities between 

because, according to the authors, the operation is a response to the symptoms rather than 
the causes of the migrant crisis (House of Lords, 2016). 
140 These include a right to intervene (with the EC’s approval) in member states if they do 
not act on previous EBCG recommendations, increased monitoring capabilities stemming 
from a dedicated monitoring centre, and a greater role for the agency in migrant returns. 
In addition, the proposal foresees the establishment of a complaints mechanism (EC 2015i). 
141 In this context, it is worth, however, recalling that this approach is consistent with a 2014 
feasibility  study  on  European  border  guards,  which  observed  that  member  states’ 
preference  was  to  remain  in  control  of  their  own  border  guards.  In  response,  the  study 
recommended a phased approach for any shift in responsibility away from the member-
state level. 

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the agency and other border-management actors; (2) differentiation between the agency’s 
monitoring and the Schengen evaluation mechanism; (3) information to be collected from 
member  states  by  the  agency;  and  (4)  responsibility  of  the  agency’s  officers  operating 
outside their country of origin. Finally, the EP recommended that the agency’s adherence 
to the Charter of Fundamental Rights be strengthened. 

Carrera and den Hertog (2016) also produced an assessment of the EBCG proposal. The 
authors  stressed  that  the  proposed  agency  would  not  address  what  they  felt  was  the 
principal challenge to the Schengen Area, i.e. deficiencies in the EU’s asylum system and 
inadequate reception conditions. In addition, they foresaw possible challenges in the fact 
that the agency’s strengthened coordination role would lead it to work with (para)military 
organisations  in  some  member  states.  In  these  instances,  the  authors  argued,  it  was  not 
clear how the compliance of such organisations would be assured and what the reporting 
lines would be in place in the event of an incident. 

In late June 2016, the European Parliament and Council of the EU agreed on a compromise 
text  of  the  proposal,  which  addresses  some  of  the  points  raised  above  (EP  2016c).  The 
revised  version  incorporated  additional  fundamental  rights  safeguards  to  its  return 
provisions  and  increased  the  role  of  the  agency  in  return  proceedings,  though  only 
following member-state decisions. In situations where member states fail to cooperate with 
the agency or do not take appropriate steps in the event of ‘specific and disproportionate’ 
pressure  at  its  external  border,  the  proposal  suggests  this  may  be  grounds  for  the  re-
introduction of internal border controls if the functioning of the Schengen Area is at risk. 
To that end, the revised text proposes a revision of Article 29 of the SBC that would include 
the provisions of the ECBG regulation (and member-state non-compliance) as a possible 
reason for invocation of the article. 

2. Strengthening of border checks 

2.1 Systematic checks against relevant databases 

In  December  2015,  the  EC  put  forward  a  proposal  to  reinforce  checks  against  relevant 
databases  at  external  borders  with  the  aim  of  enhancing  overall  security  within  the 
Schengen  Area  (EC  2015j).  The  current  provisions  for  third-country  nationals  foresee 
systematic  checks  as  to  whether  such  nationals  are  ‘considered  to  be  a  threat  to  public 
policy, internal security or the international relations of any of the member states’ only at 
entry via external Schengen borders. At the exit of external borders, checks take place only 
‘whenever  possible’.  The  new  proposal  now  foresees  thorough  checks  also  at  the  exit, 
thereby aligning entry and exit requirements, with the consultation of relevant databases 
becoming binding (EC 2015j). Similar systematic checks are envisaged for persons enjoying 
the right of free movement under EU law. 

As for possible technical impacts, the EC expects these systematic checks to lead to ‘further 
demands on the border management capacity and resources of member states’ (EC 2016c). 
In  its  explanatory  memorandum,  the  EC  does  not  see  any  concern  with  regard  to  the 
respect of fundamental rights in relation to the proposal (EC 2015j). Related to the question 

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of possible fundamental rights issues in this area, one interviewee pointed out that these 
checks would be passive only and would not result in any retention of information such as 
travel patterns, while another noted that the FRA is currently looking to update its policing 
handbook to cover the use of search databases (FRA 2013).  

2.2 Entry–Exit System 

Alongside  the  legislative  package  described  above,  the  EC  also  published  an  updated 
proposal  on  the  establishment  of  an  Entry–Exit  System  for  the  external  borders  of  EU 
member  states  in  April  2016  as  part  of  its  proposals  on  ‘smart  borders’  (EC  2016g).  In 
addition  to  the  three  main  centralised  information  systems  for  EU  border  management 
(SIS,  VIS  and  Eurodac),  the  proposal  for  an  Entry–Exit  System  (EES)  aims  to  improve 
external  border  management  as  well  as  contributing  to  the  fight  against  terrorism. 
Furthermore,  as  there  is  no  European-wide  provision  for  the  registration  of  entries  and 
exits  of  third-country  nationals  under  the  current  rules  (EC  2016c),  the  EES  aims  to 
electronically  register  when  and  where  third-country  nationals,  who  are  admitted  for  a 
short stay, enter and exit external Schengen borders (EC 2016o).  

The objective of this registration system is to detect overstayers and identify persons who, 
while  within  the  Schengen  Area,  are  not  in  possession  of  identity  documents.  The  EES 
proposal goes further than the proposal on the reinforcement of checks at external borders 
insofar  as  the  EES  would  collect  new  data  from  third-country  nationals  which  are  not 
collected  under  current  border  provisions,  including  alphanumerical  data  as  well  as 
fingerprints  and  facial  images.  From  the  perspective  of  fundamental  rights,  one 
interviewee  stressed  that  the  current  EES  proposal  represents  an  improvement  over  its 
unfavourably received predecessor in 2013 in that it adopts a much lighter approach in line 
with recently adopted EU data-protection standards (EU 2016b). 

According to an impact assessment accompanying  the  package, expected advantages of 
the EES are a positive impact on border-crossing times at entry for travellers using the self-
service systems. In addition, the system is expected to improve identification of overstayers 
and irregular migrants. In terms of the economic cost, it is said that ‘the net present value 
of the EES becomes positive four years after start of operations and the cumulated benefits 
over ten years are more than 2.5 times the accumulated costs over the same period’ (EC 
2016d). 

The expected disadvantages of the measures are the negative impact on border-crossing 
times at entry for visa-exempt travellers at first enrolment, although this is mitigated by 
the  use of self-service kiosks. In addition, another disadvantage  of the  measures are the 
development costs of the EES, amounting to €395m over the three years that is required to 
build  the  system.  The  changes  required  to  VIS  and  SIS  have  been  estimated  at  a  €40m 
development cost, although with no additional operational cost. 

2.3 Common risk indicators 

In  light  of  the  increased  risk  of  terrorist  travel,  the  EC  developed  a  set  of  common  risk 
indicators (CRIs) in May 2015. These CRIs were set up in order to detect terrorist travel (EC 

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2016h),  particularly  in  terms  of  returning  terrorist  fighters,  and  to  help  national  border 
agencies  apprehend  suspected  individuals  who  could  be  a  threat  to  public  security.  In 
combination  with  other  tools  such  as  the  PNR  (Passenger  Name  Record),  the  CRI  is 
intended to track the movement of offenders to help ‘prevent criminals escaping detection 
by travelling through another member state’ (EC 2015g).  

CRIs are meant to be used by all member states during external border checks, screening 
all returnees systematically to assess their level of risk. Details on the content of CRIs are 
not  known,  although  the  EC  noted  that  CRIs  are  ‘based  on  travel  trends,  patterns  and 
specific  characteristics  of  those  persons’,  and  developed  in  ‘close  cooperation’  with 
member  states,  national  experts,  the  European  External  Action  Service  (EEAS),  Europol 
and Frontex (EC 2015j). According to one interviewee, CRIs are planned to be continually 
developed  and  regularly  updated  in  accordance  to  the  situation  on  Schengen’s  external 
borders. The CRIs have been rolled out to every member state, along with a handbook and 
training  and  awareness-raising  developed  by  Frontex,  which  has  been  coordinating  the 
implementation.  
The expected advantages of the CRIs is that they help support the work done by national 
border  agencies,  improve  target  checks,  and  provide  further  criteria  on  who  is  a  likely 
threat (EC 2015k & 2016i). However, criticism has been made on the basis of the  criteria 
used by the CRIs. While these are not known, the possibility of discriminatory profiling in 
relation of a traveller’s country of origin or arrival from certain third countries has been 
raised (Bigo et al. 2015; Privot 2016). There  has not been an  official release from the  EC 
specifically addressing concerns surrounding this tool. 

3. Conclusion 

In conclusion, all policy options discussed in this section are directly related to the declared 
needs  of  member  states  as  they  aim  to  contribute  to  improvements  in  external  border 
management,  resulting  in  improved  management  of  migration  and  threat  detection. 
However,  while  assessments  of  measures  intended  to  strengthen  border  checks  suggest 
possible  positive  impacts,  the  effectiveness  of  the  potential  ECBG  Agency  has  been 
questioned on numerous occasions. 

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III - Police and judicial cooperation 

Action in this area could address the following needs arising from the political 
context surrounding the re-introduction of internal border controls 

-  Better management of migratory flows crossing the external Schengen border 

and within the EU. 

-  Mitigation of terrorist and other security threats. 

Policy options in this area 

- 

Improve police and judicial cooperation through (1) closing gaps in the type of 
information  collected,  and  (2)  improving  the  interoperability  of  existing 
information collection systems. 

Possible impact of the steps undertaken 

-  Action  in  this area would likely  have a positive  impact as some  of the  issues 
encountered  in  the  past  that  contributed  to  the  current  challenges  would  be 
resolved with the proposed suite of initiatives. Some limitations may stem from 
the need to consider data protection and privacy needs. 

-  Action in this area would have a very limited impact on needs linked to the area 

of asylum, which appears to be the dominant concern. 

Given the  security-focused nature of member-state  concerns discussed in the  contextual 
section of this paper, improvements in cooperation between law-enforcement and judicial 
authorities  represents  an  area  where  member  states’  needs  may  be  addressed  through 
concerted action at the EU level. This section focuses on options surrounding information 
sharing and exchange between relevant authorities. 

There  currently  exists  a  multitude  of  information  databases  relevant  for  border 
management  and  law  enforcement  in  the  European  Union  and  Schengen  Area 
(summarised  in  Appendix  A).  While  the  databases  are  invaluable  tools,  gaps  in  their 
coverage, interoperability and utilisation, along with wider information-sharing practices 
among law-enforcement authorities, represent an area with room for improvement (de la 
Baume & Paravicini 2015).  

1. Closing information gaps 

According  to  an  EC  assessment,  current  information  systems  suffer  from  gaps  of 
information  as  well  as  from  shortcomings  in  terms  of  the  actual  functionalities  of  the 
systems (EC 2016g). Suggested remedies consist of optimising law-enforcement tools and 
improving  the  data  collected  by  the  various  systems,  with  a  view  to  minimising 
information gaps. In an effort to close some of these observed gaps in data coverage, the 
EC  suggestions  also  include  the  creation  of  additional  information  systems.  These 
comprise the Entry-Exit proposal for third-country nationals (discussed in section II.2), the 
PNR, ETIAS and EPRIS (EC 2016g). 

The  PNR,  approved  in  April  2016 (Council  of  the  EU  2016a;  EC 2016m),  is  a  system  by 
which airlines will have to share passengers’ data with national authorities for ‘all flights 

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from third countries to the EU and vice versa’. In combination with other tools such as SIS 
and  common  risk  indicators  (discussed  in  sections  II.4  and  III.2),  these  would  track  the 
movement of offenders to help ‘prevent criminals escaping detection by travelling through 
another member state’ (EC 2015g). The initial PNR proposal was rejected by the European 
Parliament Committee on  Civil Liberties, Justice  and Home  Affairs (LIBE) in April 2013 
due  to  concerns  over  its  ‘necessity,  proportionality,  and  impact  on  data  protection’  (EC 
2016g).142 In December 2015, the European Parliament and Council of the EU reached an 
agreement on a revised version  of the  text  incorporating additional data protection and 
privacy safeguards which was subsequently endorsed by the LIBE committee (EP 2015a). 
However,  the  approval  of  the  directive  was  met  with  continued  concerns  voiced  by 
organisations such as European Digitals Rights (EDRI) (Naranjo 2015) regarding areas such 
as data protection, retention and access, and discriminatory profiling. 143 

The European Police Records Index System (EPRIS) is intended to give member states’ law-
enforcement authorities a ‘quick overview of whether and possibly where relevant police 
information on a certain person can be found’, a system which would be used in the context 
of international organised crime or terrorist networks (Council of the EU 2009a). The EC 
will assess its necessity, technical feasibility and proportionality through the help of a pilot 
project held in five member states (EC 2016g).  

Another option (although not yet formally proposed) is the introduction of the EU Travel 
Information  and  Authorisation  System  (ETIAS),  which  would  register  relevant  journey 
information for visa-exempt travellers (Council of the EU 2016c). This would be similar to 
systems established by other countries, such as ETA in Australia, ESTA (Electronic System 
for Travel Authorization) in the United States and eTA in Canada. ETIAS is not intended 
to be used to monitor  actual border crossings, but to  work alongside  the  current  ‘smart 
borders’ proposal. 

In the  opinion of one  interviewee, the  development  of ETIAS would be a welcome  step 
towards basing travel authorisation and security considerations on personal history and 
individual information as opposed to on country of citizenship (currently demonstrated 
by the existence of visa waivers). 

2. Improving interoperability 

In addition to expressing the need to expand data coverage, the  EC has also highlighted 
the fact that current information systems and databases represent a fragmented system in 
terms of data management for border control and security (EC 2016g). Information is rarely 
interconnected, can be stored in an inconsistent manner across various databases and may 
be subject to diverging level of access for relevant authorities. In practical terms, it can be 
difficult to know which database should be checked in any given situation, exacerbated by 

142 See also FRA (2011). 
143 Reflecting on the fact that not all forms of profiling are illegal and discriminatory, one 
interviewee  noted  the  existence  of  FRA’s  lists  of  dos  and  don’ts  for  police  officers  as  a 
useful resource. See e.g. FRA (n.d.b & n.d.c). 

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the fact that not all member states have access to the same sources.144 In addition, there are 
varying  levels  of  implementation  of  the  information  system  across  member  states,  with 
some information systems not properly adopted by certain member states.  

This fragmentation is not necessarily an issue in itself and can be viewed as a byproduct of 
data-protection considerations in a process in which systems were developed in different 
institutional,  legal,  and  policy  contexts  (EC  2016g).145  Rather,  it  is  the  lack  of 
interoperability  that  hampers  the  effectiveness  of  existing  systems.  Indeed,  as  one 
interviewee  suggested,  EU  information  systems  may  be  used  by  some  authorities  as  a 
secondary tool at best, precisely due to the fact that they are not integrated as well as they 
might be. 
To  improve  the  interoperability  of  the  systems,  the  EC  proposes  focusing  on  four 
dimensions of interoperability:  

1.  having a single search interface that would search several of the information systems 

at once and combine the results;  

2.  data that would be registered would only have to be done so once, unlike the 

current system; 

3.  a shared biometric matching service; 
4.  a common repository of data for different information systems (visa applications, 

entry/exit records, criminal and police records, asylum applications). 

To this end, the EC will set up a senior-level Expert Group on Information Systems and 
Interoperability  which  will  involve  EU  agencies,  national  experts  and  institutional 
stakeholders (EC 2016g). The objective of this group will be to develop a strategic vision 
for the overall EU architecture of data management in the domains of border control and 
security, along with proposals for its implementation. At the time of writing, the mode of 
reporting of this expert group has not yet been determined.146 

3. Conclusion 

In conclusion, initiatives intended to improve the exchange of information between law-
enforcement  and  judicial  agencies  aim  to  address  existing  gaps  in  European  security 
infrastructure. As such, they are likely to contribute to meeting the needs of member states 
that  have  arisen  during  the  political  debate  surrounding  the  re-introduction  of  internal 
borders. At the same time, they are by themselves unlikely to have a considerable impact 
on  challenges  associated  with  recent  migratory  flows  and  related  legislation  and 
institutional capacity. 

144  This  consideration  includes  EU  countries  whose  participation  in  various  aspects  of 
Schengen is optional (Denmark, UK, Ireland) along with Schengen countries which are not 
members of the EU. 
145 This point was echoed by an interviewee who stressed that tying all systems together 
would not be desirable from a data-protection perspective. 
146  A  group  of  PPE  MEPs  raised  a  parliamentary  question  to  that  effect  on  3  May.  An 
answer is not available (EP 2016d).  

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IV - Asylum and migration 

Action in this area could address the following needs arising from the political 
context surrounding the re-introduction of internal border controls 

-  Better  management  of  migratory  flows  resulting  from  deficiencies  in  the  EU 

asylum law and its implementation. 

Policy options in this area 

-  Reform the Dublin system. 

- 

- 

Improve the EU return policy. 

Strengthen  collaboration  on  managing  irregular  migration  with  transit 
countries and countries of origins. 

Possible impact of steps undertaken  

-  Proposed and undertaken steps are likely to result in the decrease of pressure 

on the system in the form of fewer new arrivals. 

-  Concerns  persist  over  legality,  feasibility  and  the  impact  on  human  rights  of 

some policy options. 

-  Deficiencies  in  inter-member  state  solidarity  are  not  likely  to  be  addressed 

substantially. 

As shown by the mention of uncontrolled migratory flows in member states’ notifications 
re-introducing internal border controls, a reform of the EU’s asylum system may represent 
one way of addressing member states’ needs in the current crisis. This need to reform the 
EU’s asylum acquis, both as a solution to the current crisis and as a goal in its own right, 
has also been voiced by numerous commentators (see for example Bertoncini & Vitorino 
2016; Carrera & den Hertog 2016; Carrera & Guild 2015; Peers 2015a).  

Accordingly, this section discusses areas of possible action pertaining to the EU’s asylum 
and migration law. It focuses on efforts to reform the Dublin system but also takes note of 
other  related  measures.  However,  we  precede  the  discussion  of  policy  options  by 
reiterating that there are gaps in the implementation of existing acquis in the area of asylum 
and migration. The communication on the state of play in the implementation of actions 
under  the  EU  Agenda  on  Migration  (EC  2016f)  examined  the  implementation  of  the 
following six measures: 

-  Asylum Procedures Directive 2013/32/EU 
-  Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33/EU 
-  Qualifications Directive 2011/95/EU 
-  Directive 2011/51/EU (Long-term residents) 
-  EURODAC Regulation EU/603/2013 
-  Return Directive 2008/115/EC 

The  communication  noted  that  between  September  2015  and  February  2016  the 
Commission took 58 decisions to send either a letter of formal notice or a reasoned opinion 
to  a  member  state  deemed  in  possible  breach  of  its  obligations.  Only  Finland  and 

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Slovakia147 were not recipients of either type of communication, suggesting that gaps in 
the implementation of relevant EU law are widespread, although this overview does not 
provide an indication of the scope of the deficiencies in question. 

1. Dublin reform 

In April 2016, the EC proposed a reform of EU asylum law consisting of three pillars. First, 
the EC proposed the transformation of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) into 
a  new  EU  Asylum  Agency,  tasked  with  a  greater  coordinating  role  amongst  relevant 
national organisations and with assessing conditions in third countries to inform as to the 
admissibility  of  incoming  asylum  requests  (EC  2016p).  Secondly,  the  EC  proposed  a 
revision of the Eurodac Regulation, increasing the volume of data collected, the length of 
their  retention  and  their  possible  sharing  with  third  countries.  Thirdly,  the  package 
proposed  an  amendment  to  the  Dublin  Regulation  which  would  prioritise  the 
consideration of an application’s admissibility, severely limit benefits to asylum seekers in 
the event of their secondary movements, and introduce objective criteria for when asylum 
seekers should be relocated as a solidarity measure among member states (EC 2016q).  

The proposal raises a series of questions surrounding its legality, feasibility and objectives. 
Firstly, several provisions of the proposals may be in violation of the EU Charter and/or 
previous CJEU rulings (Peers 2016b).148 In addition, the proposals raise a host of concerns 
relating to data protection stemming from the envisaged increases in the volume of data 
collected and stored, in the number of people about whom data would be collected, and in 
the  number  of  parties  the  data  would  be  shared  with  (including,  under  certain 
circumstances,  non-EU  entities).  The  provisions  prioritising  considerations  about  the 
admissibility of asylum applications also appear to build on the recent controversial EU–
Turkey Joint Action Plan (see section IV.2). 

Secondly, it  is  questionable  as to what extent  some  elements of the  asylum package  are 
politically  feasible.  This  observation  pertains  particularly  to  the  proposed  corrective 
relocation mechanism which represents a new attempt at introducing some form of sharing 
among member states. However, it is not clear why those member states, which had been 
steadfastly  opposed  to  previous  relocation  proposals,  should  want  to  accept  this  latest 
version.  In  this  context,  it  is  also  worth  consider  acceptability  of  the  scheme  to  asylum 
seekers  and  recalling  critical  assessments  of  the  current  relocation  scheme  set  up  in 
September  2015  as  they  continue  to  be  applicable  to  the  debate  surrounding  this  latest 
proposal. Both Carrera & Guild (2015) and Peers (2015b) pointed out that the system paid 
little attention to the preferences of asylum seekers themselves with respect to their country 
of destination. 

147 Not counting Denmark, Ireland and the UK, for which the analysis is applicable only in 
the case of the Eurodac Directive. 
148 This applies particularly to the prioritisation of considerations of admissibility and to 
several  provisions  concerning  the  prevention  of  secondary  movements,  which  are 
problematic from the perspective of, among other areas, rights of the child, human dignity, 
right to an effective remedy, right to access an asylum procedure, and non-refoulement. 

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The  proposed  relocation  mechanism  is  intended  to  relieve  some  pressure  on  selected 
border  countries,  assuming  its  feasibility.  However,  its  impact  would  be  limited  in  that 
member states would not be allowed to relocate inadmissible cases and so the judgment of 
admissibility  would  still  rest  with  the  first  EU  country  (Peers  2016b).  Lastly,  as  one 
interviewee  pointed  out,  although  its  name  might  suggest  otherwise,  the  proposed  EU 
Asylum  Agency  would  fall  short  of  an  EU  decision-making  body.  As  such,  while  the 
responsibilities of the new agency would be increased compared to those of the EASO, the 
role  of  national  authorities  in  the  asylum-processing  system  would  remain  largely 
unchanged, along with its associated challenges. Primary among these remains the issue 
of how responsibilities and costs are distributed among member states. 

2. Related policy areas 

2.1 Return 

The  effectiveness  of  the  EU’s  asylum  policy  is  related  to  the  effectiveness  of  returns.  In 
setting  out  the  EU’s  Agenda  on  Migration,  the  EC  acknowledged  that  the  EU’s  return 
policy was working ‘imperfectly’ (EC 2015e) and subsequently published an  ‘EU Action 
Plan on return’ in September 2015. This action plan outlined measures aimed at rendering 
the EU return system more effective and was accompanied by a ‘Return Handbook’ with 
guidelines and best practices for the execution of return procedures (EC 2015d). The actual 
policy  steps  to  implement  the  action  plan  overlap  to  a  considerable  degree  with  other 
policy  areas  discussed  elsewhere  in  the  report  (see  Table  AE.1  in  Appendix  E).  One 
relevant area not previously discussed in this report is policies targeting third countries 
and their nationals. This topic is briefly discussed below. 

2.2 Initiatives targeting third countries and their nationals 

EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan 
One possible way of relieving migratory pressures faced by EU border member states is to 
better manage migratory flows and discourage them in the first place through cooperation 
mechanisms  with  third  countries  and  communication  efforts  targeting  third-country 
nationals. A landmark effort in this area is the EU–Turkey Joint Action Plan, activated in 
November 2015 (Council of the EU 2015e; EC 2016u). According to provisions agreed in 
March, irregular  migrants  travelling from Turkey to  Greece  will be returned  to  Turkey. 
Those arriving in Greece will be processed according to EU Asylum Law, for the purposes 
of which Turkey is considered a safe country. To compensate for the returns to Turkey, a 
1:1 scheme was introduced whereby for one Syrian national returned to Turkey, another 
Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU. Turkey also agreed to take steps to fight 
illegal migration from Turkey to the EU. In return, the EU agreed to provide up to €6bn for 
the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, to reopen selected chapters in the EU–Turkey accession 
process, and to liberalise the visa regime for Turkey citizens. 

The  implementation  of  the  EU–Turkey  Joint  Action  Plan  had  a  clear  short-term  impact, 
driving down the number of migrants coming into Greece (Reuters 2016). At the same time 
the agreement has been viewed as highly controversial (Barigazzi 2016), primarily because 

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it considers Turkey a ‘safe’ country, an assertion which has been challenged by numerous 
observers  (Amnesty  International  2016a  &  2016b;  Frelick  2016;  Peers  &  Roman  2016; 
Roman, Baird, & Radcliffe, 2016; Ulusoy 2016) and even in multiple instances by a Greek 
court  (EDAL  2016).  Related  to  the  implementation  of  the  deal  with  Turkey,  several 
international  organisations,  including  the  UNHCR  (Fleming  2016),  Médecins  Sans 
Frontières  (MSF  2016b)  and  Oxfam  (Oxfam  2016)  have  expressed  concerns  about 
conditions in Greek hotspots and their use as detention centres as part of a system of forced 
migrants and asylum seekers. In protest, these organisations decided to suspend some of 
their  activities  supporting  the  hotspots  (EurActiv  2016)  while  Médecins  Sans  Frontières 
announced that it would discontinue accepting EU funds in protest at the EU–Turkey deal 
(MSF 2016a).  

In addition to human rights concerns, the EU–Turkey deal faces several potential practical 
risks to its effectiveness. First, the visa-free regime for Turkey citizens is yet to be approved 
(Al-Jazeera 2016) and a failure to do so may remove a key building block of the agreement. 
Second, several authors (e.g. Barigazzi 2016; Shuster 2016) pointed out that the impact of 
the  deal  depends  to  a  considerable  degree  on  Turkey’s  ability  and,  perhaps  more 
importantly, willingness to implement its part of the agreement. 

Furthermore,  the  agreement  addresses  the  situation  only  in  the  Aegean  Sea.  As  one 
interviewed expert suggested, it is likely that this deal, all else being equal, will result in a 
diversion  of  main  migrant  flows  towards  the  central  Mediterranean  route,  resulting  in 
pressure on Lampedusa and southern Italy in general. Consequently, a solution similar to 
the EU–Turkey deal which would be applicable in this region would require a deal with 
North African countries such as Libya, which may be even more problematic.149 

Other mechanisms targeting third countries 
In addition to the EU–Turkey deal, the European Union has put in place or is working on 
agreements with other countries to readmit their nationals who were not allowed to stay 
in the EU. In October 2015, the Council of the EU called on the EC and the EEAS to develop 
‘tailor-made packages’ to incentivise and leverage individual third countries with a view 
to  supporting  and  encouraging  better  implementation  of  readmission  arrangements 
(Council  of  the  EU  2015a).  Concurrently,  in  November  2015,  the  Council  of  the  EU 
approved the creation of European Migration Liaison Officers (EMLOs) to be seconded to 
EU delegations in key third countries with the aim of improving the engagement of third 
countries in migration issues and of enhancing EU’s migration action in those countries 
(Council of the EU 2015d). As of March 2016, the first series of EMLO vacancies was being 
advertised  for  posting  in  Ethiopia,  Niger,  Pakistan  and  Serbia  (UK  Parliament  2016). 
Return, readmission, and reintegration with specific respect to Sub-Saharan Africa was one 
of five major areas covered by the Valetta Migration Action Plan agreed by the Council of 
the EU in November 2015 (Council of the EU 2015m). 

However, despite increasing attention, the European Agenda on Migration progress report 
noted  in  February  2016  that  readmission  rates  remained  low  (EC  2016e).  Therefore, 
continued focus on concluding readmission agreements (e.g.  with Algeria and Morocco) 

149 Peers (2016b) calls any possible deal with Libya ‘heinous’. 

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or at ensuring their effective implementation (e.g. with Pakistan and Sub-Saharan Africa) 
remains a necessity. Therefore, while in principle greater cooperation with third countries 
is likely to have a positive impact, this has not yet materialised. 

3. Conclusion 

In conclusion, the policy of reducing the number of arrivals, as exemplified  Joint Action 
Plan with Turkey, is likely to decrease pressure on the EU’s asylum system, at least in the 
short  run,  thereby  addressing  member  states’  needs  and  priorities  with  respect  to  the 
management of migratory flows in Europe. The proposed reform of the Dublin system may 
further  develop  the  legal  underpinnings  of  this  policy.  However,  the  steps  necessary  to 
achieve this goal have given rise to substantial concerns about their legality, feasibility and 
respect for human rights. In addition, the current set of proposals does not appear able to 
address  deficiencies  in  solidarity  among  member  states,  which  in  turn  raises  questions 
about the extent to which the lack of trust among member states is being addressed. 

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CHAPTER 4 – REPORT SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  

This  study  has  sought  to  quantify  the  economic,  social  and  political  costs  of  the  re-
introduction  of  border  controls  in  the  Schengen  Area  and  to  identify  areas  where  more 
concerted action at the EU level may yield benefits. 

The focus of the study was on civil liberties and home affairs aspects relevant to the LIBE 
Committee of the European Parliament. The research team employed a mix of quantitative 
(cost-estimation  and  econometric  modelling)  and  qualitative  (review  of  relevant 
documents and interviews with  seven stakeholders) methods. The findings of the study 
are summarised below. 

I - The costs of non-Schengen 

The study builds on existing evidence on the costs of non-Schengen which looked at the 
potential economic costs of re-establishing internal border controls within the  Schengen 
Area. The majority of these studies calculate the costs to the EU economy with regard to 
reductions in trade and waiting times at border crossings. 

Using a bottom-up cost-estimation approach this study estimates what it would cost the 
Schengen  states  to  rebuild  their  borders,  both  in  terms  of  physically  rebuilding  border 
crossing  points  and  in  terms  of  annual  operating  and  maintenance  costs.  Under  three 
scenarios,  which  differ  in  assumptions  made  about  the  length  and  scope  of  the  re-
establishment  of  border  controls,  our  estimates  suggest  that  reversing  Schengen  from  a 
border-free zone to one with border controls could cost the current Schengen states around 
€0.1–19bn  in  fixed  costs  and  around  €2–4bn  in  annual  operating  costs.  The  former 
corresponds to around 0.01–0.16 per cent and the latter to around 0.02–0.03 per cent of the 
GDP of the current Schengen Area. 

In addition, the findings suggest that abolishing border controls has not led to increasing 
levels of crime and decreasing levels of self-reported feelings of security among European 
citizens.  In  fact,  our  empirical  findings  suggest  that  Schengen  membership  may  be 
associated with lower levels of acquisitive crime and better supply-reduction efforts with 
regard  to  illicit  drug  trafficking.  However,  it  is  important  to  note  that  these  empirical 
findings need to be interpreted as associations only and cannot be read as causal effects of 
Schengen.  Moreover,  due  to  a  lack  of  quantitative  data  this  study  has  not  empirically 
investigated  links  between  Schengen  and  border-free  travel  zones  and  other  types  of 
organised crime such as human trafficking.  

Trust in national and European institutions and trust among member states is seen as an 
important tool in the working of the Schengen governance framework. For the former our 
study finds positive associations with Schengen. We observe increasing levels of trust in 
Eastern European member states that entered  the  Schengen Area in 2007, as well as for 
Western  Schengen  states  that  were  members  of  Schengen  before  the  2007  enlargement. 
While  it  is  difficult  to  express  increased  levels  of  trust  and  decreased  levels  of  crime  in 

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monetary terms, these costs should be considered as potential opportunity costs in light of 
the re-establishments of border controls. 

II - Are there potential benefits of more concerted action at EU level 
within  the  current  Schengen  governance  framework  or  by  external 
factors? 

In  light  of  this  identification  and,  where  possible,  quantification  of  the  costs  of  non-
Schengen,  this  study  discussed  a  series  of  possible  steps  which  could  be  taken  to  help 
return  the  Schengen  Area  to  its  full  functioning  and  thus  mitigate  the  potential  costs 
outlined above. 

With  respect  to  the  Schengen  governance  framework,  our  analysis  found  that  current 
arrangements are largely fit for purpose. There are areas where further steps can be made 
(and  are  underway),  such  as  continuing  to  improve  member  states’  utilisation  of  and 
participation  in  the  Schengen  evaluation  mechanism  and  the  Schengen  Information 
System. However, taking into account the current political context, marked by breakdowns 
in  trust  and  deficiencies  in  solidarity  among  member  states,  action  in  this  area  alone  is 
unlikely to address the fundamental needs and concerns of member states that have led 
them to re-introduce internal border controls. To achieve this goal, steps in other areas may 
need to be considered, namely in the domains of external border control, police and judicial 
cooperation, and asylum and migration acquis. 

With respect to external border control, institutional capacity may be increased with the 
establishment  of  the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency,  although  the  current 
proposal does not remove challenges stemming from reliance on member-state resources. 
Greater  effectiveness  of  border  checks  can  be  achieved  through  initiatives  such  as 
systematic  checks  on  EU  nationals,  the  Entry–Exit  System  and  the  use  of  common  risk 
indicators. 

Existing  police  and 
judicial  cooperation  arrangements  would  also  benefit  from 
improvements in information collection and sharing across agencies and  member states. 
In this regard, two areas for improvement are closing existing data gaps and bringing about 
greater interoperability of existing (and any new) information systems. However, action in 
these two areas may have only limited impact on the immediate needs of member states 
that have led to the reintroduction of internal border controls. 

Lastly,  action  in  the  area  of  migration,  asylum  and  external  relations  may  also  result  in 
benefits  for  the  Schengen  system  by  addressing  underlying  member  states’  concerns, 
namely the arrival and subsequent unmanaged secondary movements of migrants. This 
appears  to  be  the  case  with  the  currently  pursued  policy  of  reducing  the  number  of 
irregular  arrivals,  to  which  a  series  of  recent  policy  proposals  may  provide  a  more 
developed legal basis. However, this approach leaves a series of major fundamental right 
concerns unaddressed. In addition, as with the EBCG proposal, it does not appear to have 
large potential to address questions around solidarity and the reliance on a small number 
of member states to provide an EU-wide public good. 

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III - Implications 

The Schengen Agreement, long considered one of the major achievements of the European 
Union, has come under considerable pressure during the current refugee crisis in Europe. 
Several  member  states  have  felt  the  need  to  re-introduce  controls  along  their  internal 
controls,  thereby  placing  limits  on  internal  border-free  movement.  Several  studies  have 
linked suspensions of Schengen to considerable macroeconomic costs, and in this study we 
further highlight the fact that suspensions of Schengen have substantial direct budgetary 
costs for the EU and its member states. In addition, other opportunity costs associated with 
possible breakdowns of the Schengen system include crime, security and trust. Reflecting 
the fact that Schengen is one of the components of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice,  our  analyses  showed  that  Schengen  membership  is  not  associated  with  any 
increases  in  crime  and  may  even  be  associated  with  decreased  crime  trends  in  border 
regions  compared  to  non-border  regions  of  individual  member  states.  Furthermore, 
Schengen membership appears to be associated with improved outcomes in terms of illicit 
drug seizures, a finding which is further corroborated when considering purity-adjusted 
prices.  In  terms  of  other  social  costs,  Schengen  membership  appears  to  be  positively 
associated with a range of measurements of trust. 

In  light  of  these  findings,  it  seems  plausible  that,  in  addition  to  direct  budgetary  costs, 
suspensions  of  Schengen  may  result  in  a  range  of  social  and  political  costs.  This  report 
examined  a  range  of  policy  options  for  action  at  the  EU  level  which  may  help  restore 
Schengen to its full functioning and therefore mitigate the aforementioned and other costs. 
Our  analysis  found  that  the  Schengen  governance  framework  itself  is  broadly  fit  for 
purpose, although action in other areas may be necessary. This observation is in line with 
the needs and objectives of member states declared in connection with the re-introduction 
of internal border controls, which revolved around the  areas of external border control, 
police and judicial cooperation, and migration and asylum acquis. 

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APPENDIX A – OVERVIEW OF EXISTING INFORMATION EXCHANGE SYSTEMS 

Mechanism 
Type 

System 

Year 
imple-
mented 

Status 
(proposed/under 
implementation/f
ully functional 

Used by 

Participating countries 

Collects information on 

Type of information collected 

SIS II 

2013 

Fully functional 

Police; Border 
guards 

Schengen countries, 
UK/Ireland (criminal 
alerts only, not 
immigration alerts) 

Border 
Management 
and Law 
Enforcement 

Border 
Management
:  
EU 
Nationals 
and Third 
Country 
Nationals 

Advance 
Passenger 
Informatio
n (API) 

Stolen and 
Lost Travel 
Documents 
Database 
(SLTD) 

Wanted or missing persons/ 
persons under surveillance 
persons who are not nationals 
of a member state of the 
Schengen Area and who are 
banned from entry into the 
Schengen territory; 
information on stolen or 
missing vehicles and objects 
such as  

Travellers (via airplanes, rail, 
maritime) 

Identity papers; vehicle registration 
certificates; vehicle number plates, etc. 

Number and type of travel document 
used, nationality, full names, date of 
birth, border crossing point of entry into 
the territory of the member states, code 
of transport, departure and arrival time 
of the transportation, total number of 
passengers carried on that transport, 
and the initial point of embarkation. 

Lost, stolen and revoked travel 
documents – such as passports, identity 
cards, UN laissez-passer or visa stamps, 
including stolen blank travel documents 

2004 

Fully functional 

Border guards 

member states 

2002 

Fully functional 

INTERPOL 
National Central 
Bureaus and law 
enforcement 
agencies 

170 countries 

Travellers 

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Border 
Management
: Third 
Country 
Nationals 
Only 

EURODA
C 

2000 

Fully functional 
(new proposed 
Regulation by the 
EC, dating May 
2016150) 

National 
Officials from 
member state, 
and under the 
new proposal 
the new EU 
Border Guard 
and EU Asylum 
agencies. 

member states, who 
will be obliged to take 
and store the 
information collected 
under the new 
proposal. 

Asylum seekers; irregular 
border crossers over 14 years 
old. Proposed changes would 
allow information to be taken 
from children aged 6 and 
above. 

Fingerprints. The proposed change 
include facial images as well as 
fingerprints, as well as names, 
nationalities, place and date of birth, 
travel document information. 

Proposal 

Border guards 

member states 

Holders of short-stay visas 

Alphanumeric and biometric data 

Entry–Exit 
System 
(ESS) 

(expecte
d 
impleme
ntation 
2020) 

VIS 

2011 

Fully functional 

External border 
guards 

Law 
Enforcement 

PNR 

2015 

Under 
implementation 

Airlines; 
member states 

member states 

Applicants for short-stay visas, 
over 12 years old 

Travellers (via airplanes, rail, 
maritime) 

Photographs; fingerprints; etc. 

All passenger details (name, address, 
itinerary, payment information, 
baggage information) 

ECRIS 

2012 

Fully functional 

2006 

Fully functional 

Europol 
Informatio
n System 
(EIS)151 

2014 

Focal Point 
Traveller 
Database 

Central 
authorities of 
member states 

Law 
enforcement 
agencies 

Europol, 
member states 

member states 

Criminal convictions 

Criminal records 

member states 

Suspected and convicted 
persons, criminal 
structures, offences and means 
used to commit 
them 

Data relating to serious international 
crime and terrorism (persons, cars, 
identity documents, etc.) 

Information on the recruitment and 
travel of suspect persons 

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Prüm 

2008 

Under 
implementation 

Police 

member states 
(however not all have 
filled their legal 
obligations under the 
Prüm decision). 

DNA exchange 

Fingerprints: DNA; vehicle registration 

150  European  Commission.  2016f.  Proposal  for  a  REGULATION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND  OF  THE  COUNCIL  on  the 
establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria 
and  mechanisms  for  determining  the  member  state  responsible  for  examining  an  application  for  international  protection  lodged  in  one  of  the 
member states by a third-country national or a stateless person] , for identifying an illegally staying third-country national or stateless person and 
on  requests  for  the  comparison  with  Eurodac  data  by  member  states'  law  enforcement  authorities  and  Europol  for  law  enforcement  purposes 
(recast). COM(2016) 272 final. As of 19 May 2016: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-272-EN-F1-1.PDF 
151 Europol. 2013. Europol Information System: Crime reference system for EU law enforcement and cooperation partners. EU Publication Office. 

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APPENDIX B – BUDGET COSTS ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 

1. Distribution of land border crossing points 

To confirm findings of the European Commission (2016b) that approximately 7 per cent of 
internal  Schengen  border  crossing  points  are  large,  processing  about  70  per  cent  of  all 
passengers,  we  conducted  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  Austrian  border.  Austria  is 
conveniently located in the centre of Europe and has substantial lowland and mountainous 
borders, to provide a rough estimate on the distribution of different types of borders. Using 
a detailed map, we determined 289 individual Austrian border crossing points (i.e. places 
where  a  permanent  road  connected  on  both  sides  of  the  border  to  further  main 
communications  crosses  the  state  border)  and  established,  based  on  their  location 
(particularly type  of road, proximity  of large cities, or  being  on a  major  trans-European 
travel paths), into which size category they belong (small/medium/large). 

As a rule of thumb, large crossing points are located on motorways and other main roads 
in areas with substantial road traffic, medium crossing points are on secondary roads in 
high traffic zones or on main roads in less traffic-intensive areas, and small crossing points 
are mainly on local roads in sparsely populated areas. The ‘small’ category also contains 
local border traffic and tourist crossing points such as the former pedestrian-only border 
crossing points on the Czech-Polish mountainous border. 

For  instance,  the  border  crossing  point  on  highways  A1/8  (Austria/Germany)  and 
155/304  are  both  considered  large  border  crossings  as  they  lie  in  close  proximity  to 
Salzburg and are on a major east-west traffic route. Similarly, the border crossing point on 
highway  148/12  is  considered  large  as  it  is  on  the  same  route,  but  the  nearby  crossing 
between Braunau am Inn and Simbach am Inn is only considered a medium point as it is 
off the main highway, while still being on the east-west route. The same reasoning applies 
for the crossing at 1/21, which is just off the main highway. Finally, e.g. the border crossing 
point between Hörschlag and Český Heršlák is considered small as it is located on a local 
road, not near any large city or major traffic route. The aforementioned crossing points are 
shown in Figures AB.1 to AB.3. Since it is impossible to distinguish a small border crossing 
point  from  a  local  border  traffic  or  a  tourist  crossing  point,  all  of  those  were  put  in  the 
‘small’  category  and  we  further  rely  on  the  official  documentation  to  provide  detailed 
distinction used in the cost analysis. 

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Figure AB.1: Large border crossing point on highway A1/8 (Austria/Germany) 

Source: ‘Highway A1, Austria.’ Map. Google Maps. Google, 08 June 2016. Accessed 08 June 2016. 

Figure AB.2: Medium border crossing point between Braunau am Inn and Simbach am Inn 

(Austria/Germany) 

Source: ‘Braunau am Inn, Austria.’ Map. Google Maps. Google, 08 June 2016. Accessed 08 June 2016. 

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Figure AB.3: Small border crossing point between Hörschlag and Český Heršlák (Austria/Czech 

Republic) 

Source: ‘Hörschlag, Austria.’ Map. Google Maps. Google, 08 June 2016. Accessed 08 June 2016. 

Table  AB.1 shows  our findings. As  we can see, the  share of large crossing points (8 per 
cent) roughly corresponds to the European Commission’s estimate (7 per cent). 

Table AB.1: Size of Austrian border crossing points 

Neighbouring country 

Size of crossing points 

Large 

Medium 

Smalla 

Germany 

Czech Republic 

Slovakia 

Hungary 

Slovenia 

Italy 

Switzerland 

Liechtenstein 

Total 

Total (%) 

8 

1 

3 

3 

4 

2 

2 

0 

23 

8% 

25 

16 

1 

9 

17 

5 

4 

1 

78 

27% 

53 

52 

6 

21 

34 

3 

16 

3 

188 

65% 

Notes: Includes local border traffic and tourist border crossing points. 

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2. Number of border crossing points 

To obtain a full dataset of internal Schengen border crossing points, we first started with 
the European Parliament regulation152 and the recent reports from Austria and France153 to 
create a basis of all known land, air, and maritime crossing points. Unlike air and maritime 
borders which are known in full and will not change, the list of known land border crossing 
points is patchy with no information on borders between countries that joined Schengen 
before 2007 (except for Austria and France) such as Netherlands, Denmark, or the whole 
Scandinavia. A part of the dataset is shown in Table AB.2. 

Table AB.2: Dataset of borders, their length (in km) and number of known border crossing 

points 

Country 

Neighbouring 
Country 

Border 
characteristic 

Border 
length 

Standard 
land BCP 

Local b. t. BCP 
and Tourist BCP 

Austria 

Czech Republic 

Austria 

Germany 

Austria 

Hungary 

½ mount., 
½ lowlands 

⅔ mount., 
⅓ river 

Lowlands 

Austria 

Italy 

Mountainous 

Austria 

Liechtenstein 

Mountainous 

Austria 

Slovakia 

Austria 

Slovenia 

Lowlands 

⅔ mount., 
⅓ lowlands 

Austria 

Switzerland 

Mountainous 

Belgium 

France 

Belgium  Germany 

Lowlands 

Lowlands 

Belgium 

Luxembourg 

Lowlands 

Belgium  Netherlands 

Lowlands 

362 

784 

366 

430 

35 

91 

330 

164 

620 

167 

148 

450 

16 

34 

19 

9 

1 

3 

30 

16 

18 

- 

- 

- 

35 

22 

20 

0 

2 

1 

22 

12 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Subsequently, we used statistical methods to estimate the number of border crossing points 
in areas with no official information. Specifically, we complemented the information on all 
known  land  border  outposts  by  border  lengths,  type  of  terrain  (lowlands,  highlands, 
mountains)  and  controls  for  natural  borders  (particularly  rivers  which  decrease  the 
number  of  crossing  points  per  100  km),  and  determined  what  would  the  number  of 
crossing points between any two Schengen countries be based on existing observations, 

152 List of border crossing points referred to in Article 2(8) of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community 
Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders 
Code). 
153 Note  from Austrian delegation to Working Party on  Frontiers/Mixed Committee  no. 
14211/15 from 18 November 2015 and Note from French delegation to Working Party on 
Frontiers/Mixed Committee no. 15181/15 from 10 December 2015. 

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given  the  length  of  their  mutual  border,  its  specifications,  and  the  average  number  of 
crossing  points  per  100  km  for  such  type  of  border.  For  instance,  the  Belgian-Dutch  or 
Dutch-German borders are in many ways  similar  to the  French-Belgian border and it is 
therefore reasonable to expect that the number of border crossing points per 100 km would 
not be substantially different one border from another. A snapshot of the final dataset is 
shown in Table AB.3. 

Table AB.3: Dataset of borders, their length (in km) and number of known border crossing 

points 

Country 

Neighbouring 
Country 

Border 
characteristic 

Border 
length 

Standard 
BCP 

Local b. t. BCP 
and Tourist BCP 

Austria 

Czech Republic 

Austria 

Germany 

Austria 

Hungary 

½ mount., 
½ lowlands 

⅔ mount., 
⅓ river 

Lowlands 

Austria 

Italy 

Mountainous 

Austria 

Liechtenstein 

Mountainous 

Austria 

Slovakia 

Austria 

Slovenia 

Lowlands 

⅔ mount., 
⅓ lowlands 

Austria 

Switzerland 

Mountainous 

Belgium 

France 

Belgium 

Germany 

Lowlands 

Lowlands 

Belgium 

Luxembourg 

Lowlands 

Belgium 

Netherlands 

Lowlands 

a Estimated 

3. Cost of border protection 

362 

784 

366 

430 

35 

91 

330 

164 

620 

167 

148 

450 

16 

34 

19 

9 

1 

3 

30 

16 

18 

9a 

8a 

25a 

35 

22 

20 

0 

2 

1 

22 

12 

- 

- 

- 

- 

As described in chapter 2, we use Finnish,154 Latvian,155 and Swiss156 data to estimate the 
operating costs of protecting land borders in Europe, with the number of border crossing 
points serving as a common denominator  used for extrapolation to other countries. The 
Finnish  data  are  conveniently  broken  down  into  document  checks,  patrolling,  law 
enforcement,  and  search  and  rescue  emergency  operations  while  the  Latvian  and  Swiss 
data are only in a form of a bulk estimate for all border control related activities. On the 
contrary, the Swiss costs are related to existing internal Schengen borders,157 whereas the 

154 Finnish open data service website, http://budjetti.vm.fi. 
155 Latvian State Border Guard, www.rs.gov.lv 
156 Swiss Federal Finance Administration, www.efv.admin.ch 
157 Switzerland is in Schengen but not in the European Union (and its common trade area) 
therefore  continuing  border  surveillance  operations  and  maintaining  operating  border 
outposts at all its borders. In line with the Schengen principles, border force officers at the 

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Finnish  and  Latvian  figures  to  external  borders  only.  As  discussed  earlier,  there  is  no 
reason to believe that the costs per border crossing point should be substantially different 
within  one  country  and  we  can  therefore  use  the  costs  to  protect  external  borders  to 
estimate equivalent protection of internal borders. The lists of border crossing points for 
all respective borders are known from the official documentation.  

Unfortunately, the Finnish costs are not directly comparable to the Swiss and Latvian ones. 
In particular, while we were able to extract only patrolling costs related to the land border 
with Russia, the 1,340 km long border has only 10 permanent border crossing points due 
to very specific location in subarctic climate and sparsely populated land. Hence, we only 
use  the  Finnish  data  to  estimate  costs  to  protect  borders  in  Norway  and  Sweden,  i.e. 
countries essentially similar to Finland in these characteristics. Additionally, we were not 
able to extract Latvian expenses related only to the land borders with Belarus and Russia; 
the Latvian figure thus also contains costs to protect the maritime border at the Baltic sea 
and we include the 10 officially documented Baltic sea ports among border crossing points 
used in the calculation. Since the Latvian costs per border crossing point are broadly similar 
to the Swiss figures, we believe the costs are applicable for extrapolation to other countries. 
Finally, Germany lists unexpectedly high number of crossing points on their borders with 
Switzerland.158 Hence, we slightly reduced the number of border crossing points to reflect 
this  using  a  manual  analysis  of  the  border.159  Finally,  we  include  main  international 
airports as documented in the European Parliament report in the total number of border 
crossing  points  serving  as  denominator;  nevertheless,  only  land  borders  are  used  for 
extrapolation to other countries. 

Using the approach the estimated costs of maintaining border control are €1,283,752  per 
border  crossing  in  Switzerland,  €1,786,187  in  Latvia,  and  €11,045,924  in  Finland  (PPP 
adjusted). Combining the Swiss and Latvian estimates we obtain a €1,534,970 estimate to 
be applied for all but the Scandinavian countries. 

outposts  do  not  perform  document  checks  but  may  control  any  passenger  as  a  part  of 
customs duties. We argue that since document checks at land borders constitute just a small 
proportion of the total costs, the difference in processes does not have a significant impact 
on our analysis. 
158 This is particularly due to specific typology of the border and approach to cross-border 
traffic between these countries; unlike in other countries where any two cities practically 
resembling one split by a country border are divided along the border and connected only 
at  certain  points  to  allow  integrated  border  control,  cities  along  the  German-Swiss  are 
generally  connected  by  any  street  that  crosses  the  border.  For  instance,  Konstanz,  a 
university city with approximately 80,000 inhabitants and a land border of only 2.6km with 
Switzerland has 7 official border crossing points. 
159 Such reduction is in line with the recent re-introduction of border controls in France; 
although there are over one hundred roads of any type connecting France and Belgium, 
the French government only re-introduced 18 border crossing points. 

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4. Alternative cost modelling using passenger flows 

One  issue  with  cost  modelling  using  border  crossing  points  is  that  it  cannot  be  used  to 
approximate  costs  related  to  higher  passenger  flows  through  air  and  maritime  borders 
alone. In particular, Greece, Iceland, and Malta do not have any land borders and Denmark 
with  Estonia  have  far  greater  amount  of  passengers  travelling  using  maritime  than  air 
transport  so  their  increased  costs  of  processing  more  passengers  are  not  appropriately 
reflected in the main analysis.160 Hence, we calculate the costs of protecting borders using 
an alternative approach based on a cost per passenger obtained from the UK, suggesting 
that each passenger costs £2.8 (€3.61).161 This figure is excluding patrolling costs which is 
in  line  to  no  new  patrolling  costs  occurring  in  Greece,  Iceland,  and  Malta  should  the 
Schengen Agreement be abolished. To obtain country cost estimates, we simply multiply 
the  per-passenger cost (adjusted for  PPP differences)  by the  total  number  of passengers 
travelling  through  air  and  maritime  transport  within  the  Schengen  Area  obtained  from 
Eurostat as described in chapter 2. 

5. Fixed costs of extending air and maritime border control 

Table AB.4: Air and maritime border equipment costs 

Estimated cost per 
airport 

Estimated cost per port 

Equipment 

Computera 

Estimated unit cost 

Large 

Small 

Large 

Small 

€ 2,000 

€24,000- 
€70,000 

€4,000 

€14,000-
€40,000 

€4,000 

160  The  overall  expenditure  data  used  in  our  analysis  include  costs  of  document  and 
luggage  checks  at  the  air  and  maritime  borders  as  well  as  their  protection  so  the 
extrapolation  to  other  borders/countries  implicitly  contains  all  relevant  expenditure 
categories, providing reliable  estimates for  countries with the  ratio of internal Schengen 
land borders to other borders roughly corresponding to the projected increase in air and 
maritime  transport  to  be  checked.  This  is  true  for  all  countries  except  for  Denmark  and 
Estonia  because  the  number  of  airports  is  highly  correlated  with  the  length  of  country 
borders so extrapolation using border crossing points inherently includes costs of higher 
air passenger flows as well. However, countries with high amount of maritime transport 
would have their costs understated using this approach. Scandinavian countries (Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden) form a separate category in this regard as their cost estimates are 
calculated using the Finnish data. 
161 UK Border Force agency. The data were calculated using a full-cost allocation model, 
assuming total related costs of £332m and 118.4 million passengers. According to the UK 
Border Force officials, the calculation includes Home Office headquarters overheads and 
omits costs allocated to seizures and patrolling. Moreover, the UK Visas & Immigration 
spending  is  excluded  from  the  numbers.  Exclusion  of  patrolling  costs  prevents  a  direct 
comparison of the results to the main scenario since these would be underestimated but is 
necessary for the Greek, Maltian, and Icelandian data to be correct since these countries 
would  not  introduce  any  new  border  surveillance  in  case  the  internal  borders  controls 
would be re-introduced. 

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Passport scannera 

€ 1,200 

Fingerprints readerb 

€ 4,000 

Facial image scannerb 

€ 500 

€14,000-
€42,000 

€48,000-
€140,000 

€6,000-
€21,000 

€2,400 

€8,000 

€1,000 

€8,400-
€24,000 

€28,000-
€80,000 

€3,500-
€10,000 

€2,400 

€8,000 

€1,000 

a Source: Online search 
b Source: Council of the European Union (2009) 

APPENDIX C – SOCIAL COSTS: CRIME AND SECURITY 
Table AC.1 and AC.2 report the findings from estimating equation (1) using Ordinary Least 
Squares  (OLS)  regressions.  Columns  (1)  to  (3)  in  Table  AC.1  include  the  findings  for 
comparing existing Schengen states with direct borders to the new member states from the 
2007  enlargement  with  existing  Schengen  states  with  no  direct  borders.  The  parameter 
estimates confirm the trends depicted in figure 2.2 - there seems to be an overall decline in 
acquisitive crimes in both border and non-border existing Schengen states in the period 
after 2008. The parameter estimate for 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 indicates that on average acquisitive crime in 
countries  with  no  direct  borders  to  newly  acceding  Schengen  states  has  decreased  on 
average  by  around  7  per  cent  after  2008.  In  addition,  the  parameter  estimate  for  the 
interaction term (𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝)𝑖𝑡 means that on average acquisitive crime decreased by 
20  per  cent  for  existing  Schengen  with  direct  borders  to  the  newly  acceding  Schengen 
states.  Interestingly, similar trends are observable using victimisation data from the ESS 
(column  3).  The  interaction  term  parameter  estimates  measures  that  the  self-reported 
probability  of  being  a  victim  of  burglary  or  robbery  has  decreased  by  around  1.64 
percentage points. For homicides we observe a slightly stronger decline in existing non-
border  Schengen  states  than  for  border  states,  but  none  of  the  parameter  estimates  is 
statistically significantly different from zero.  

Columns (1) to (3) in Table AC.2 include the findings when comparing the newly acceding 
Schengen states from the 2007 enlargement with non-Schengen states in the same regon. 
Again, the parameter estimates mainly confirm the trends depicted in figure 2.3. However, 
none of the estimates for police reported crime is statistically significantly different from 
zero,  whereas  the  estimates  using  victimisation  data  from  the  ESS  suggest  that  self-
reported acquisitive crimes have decreased after 2008 on average, by almost 9 percentage 
points in the newly acceding Schengen states. 

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Table AC.1: Cross-country trends in acquisitive crime and homicide rates 2003–2014 – 
Existing Schengen states 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

estimation method: 

OLS 

sample: 

Existing Schengen states 

data source: 

Police reported (UNODC) 

Victimisation (ESS) 

crime: 

level: 

𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 

𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡 

(𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝)𝑖𝑡 

acquisitive 
crime 

homicide 

acquisitive crime 

feeling secure 

country 

individual 

-0.0787 

(0.091) 

-0.9845 

(0.497)** 

-0.2016 

(0.073)*** 

-0.1386 

(0.387) 

-1.6671 

(1.568) 

0.0369 

(0.259) 

-0.0031 

(0.001)** 

0.0608 

0.0006 

(0.002) 

0.1132 

(0.003)*** 

(0.003)*** 

-0.0164 

0.0235 

(0.001)*** 

(0.002)*** 

Constant 

26.5201 

39.2901 

0.2812 

0.5342 

(7.262)*** 

(24.921) 

(0.012)*** 

(0.015)*** 

Observations 

168 

R-squared 

0.9488 

168 

0.4811 

164,907 

0.1494 

165,184 

0.1112 

Clustered standard errors in parentheses (country); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Models in column (1) to 
(3) are estimated on the sample of existing Schengen States, whereas group_it is a dummy taking the value 1 
for Germany, Austria, Italy, Sweden and Finland.. Note that the victimisation data stems from the ESS and is 
weighted using design and population weights. All estimated models control for GDP per capita, the share 
of young males in the total population, the number of personnel in police and prisons. The specifications 
using the ESS are on the individual level and adjusted for demographics such as age, gender, education, 
citizenship or ethnic minority. 

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Table AC.2: Cross-country trends in acquisitive crime and homicide rates 2003–2014 – 
Newly acceding Schengen and non-Schengen states 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

estimation method:  

OLS 

sample: 

Newly acceding Schengen and non-Schengen states 

data source: 

Police reported (UNODC) 

Victimisation (ESS) 

crime: 

level: 

𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 

𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡 

(𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝)𝑖𝑡 

Constant 

acquisitive 
crime 

homicide 

acquisitive crime 

feeling secure 

country 

individual 

-0.1569 

(0.222) 

2.0901 

(0.388)*** 

-0.1405 

(0.119) 

3.0184 

(2.293) 

-0.1929 

(0.222)*** 

-0.6728 

(0.797) 

-0.2391 

(0.280) 

3.3726 

(3.338) 

224 

0.8938 

-0.0166 

(0.009)* 

0.0821 

-0.0788 

-0.059 

-0.2218 

(0.014)*** 

(0.059)*** 

-0.0953 

0.1059 

(0.010)*** 

(0.029)*** 

0.2561 

0.4301 

(0.032)*** 

(0.031)*** 

101,956 

0.1488 

102,599 

0.1488 

Observations 

228 

R-squared 

0.9369 

Clustered standard errors in parentheses (country); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Models in column (1) to 
(4) are estimated on the sample of newly acceding European Schengen and non-Schengen States, whereas 
group_it is a dummy taking the value 1 for Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Poland, Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania.. Note that the victimisation data stems from the ESS and is weighted using design and 
population weights. All estimated models control for GDP per capita, the share of young males in the total 
population, the number of personnel in police and prisons. The specifications using the ESS are on the 
individual level and adjusted for demographics. 

It  is  important  to  note  that  the  parameter  estimates  presented  in  Table  AC.1  and  AC.2 
represent associations and not causal effects. Nevertheless, after carefully filtering out as 
many  confounding  factors  as  possible,  we  do  not  observe  increasing  crime  rates  for 
acquisitive crimes in the existing Schengen states before and after the 2007 enlargement. In 
fact, the rates are decreasing and stronger for the Schengen states with direct borders. 

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APPENDIX D – POLITICAL COSTS: TRUST 

Table AD.1: Cross-country trends in different measures of trust 2002–2014 – Newly acceding 

Schengen and non-Schengen states 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

estimation method:  

OLS 

sample: 

Newly acceding Schengen and non-Schengen states 

measure of trust: 

general trust 

trust in 
criminal justice 
system 

trust in national 
institutions 

trust in European 
institutions 

𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 

𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡 

(𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝)𝑖𝑡 

-0.0528 

(0.024)** 

-0.0532 

(0.045) 

0.1890 

-0.0541 

(0.025)* 

0.0660 

(0.026)** 

0.1169 

-0.0886 

(0.033)* 

0.0260 

(0.033) 

0.1024 

-0.1171 

(0.042)*** 

-0.4108 

(0.085)*** 

0.1526 

(0.022)*** 

(0.025)*** 

(0.033)*** 

(0.043)*** 

Constant 

0.9691 

(0.034)*** 

Observations 

101,950 

R-squared 

0.0907 

-0.0215 

(0.066) 

95,295 

0.2449 

-0.1160 

(0.082) 

95,295 

0.1751 

1.0189 

(0.053)*** 

87,596 

0.0683 

Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses (country); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Models reported in 
column (4) to (6) are estimated on the sample of the newly acceding Schengen states from the 2007 enlargement 
(Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and  non-Schengen states in the same 
region. Note that the trust data stems from the ESS and is weighted using design and population weights. All 
estimated models control for individual demographics, such as age, gender, education, citizenship, belonging 
to ethnic minority, domicile (e.g. rural/urban). In addition the specifications control for country fixed and time 
effects.  They  also  include  country-specific  time  trends  that  should  capture  time-varying  variables  on  the 
country level, such as GDP per capita or different levels of corruption on the country level. 

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Table AD.2: Cross-country trends in different measures of trust 2002–2014 – Existing Schengen 

states with direct and no direct internal borders to newly acceding Schengen states 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

estimation 
method:  

sample: 

OLS 

Existing Schengen states 

measure of trust: 

general trust 

trust in criminal 
justice system 

trust in national 
institutions 

trust in 
European 
institutions 

dyear 

0.0210 

(0.002)*** 

g3 

0.0454 

0.0037 

(0.003) 

0.3063 

0.0745 

0.0176 

(0.004)*** 

(0.003)*** 

0.1931 

0.3063 

(0.004)*** 

(0.002)*** 

(0.003)*** 

(0.002)*** 

D_g3 

0.0183 

0.0176 

(0.001)*** 

(0.003)*** 

Constant 

1.0581 

0.4995 

0.0898 

(0.004)*** 

0.7832 

0.0035 

(0.003) 

0.4933 

(0.008)*** 

(0.033)*** 

(0.050)*** 

(0.033)*** 

Observations 

164,767 

R-squared 

0.0699 

158,493 

0.1079 

158,493 

0.1472 

158,493 

0.1079 

Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses (country); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Models in column 
(1) to (4) are estimated on the sample of existing Schengen States, whereas group_it is a dummy taking the 
value 1 for Germany, Austria, Italy, Sweden and Finland. Note that the trust data stems from the ESS and is 
weighted using design and population weights. All estimated models control for individual demographics, 
such as age, gender, education, citizenship, belonging to ethnic minority, domicile (e.g. rural/urban). In 
addition the specifications control for country fixed and time effects. They also include country-specific time 
trends that should capture time-varying variables on the country level, such as GDP per capita or different 
levels of corruption on the country level. 

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APPENDIX E – OVERVIEW OF COMPONENTS OF THE EU 
ACTION PLAN ON RETURN 

Table AE.1. Overlap between the Action Plan on Return with respect to EU return system and 

other policy areas 

Action Plan Area/objective 

Concrete policy option 

Stronger enforcement of EU 
rules (i.e. Return Directive) 

Implementation of existing acquis, use of 
infringement procedure as necessary 

Enhanced sharing of 
information to enforce return 

Creation of new information databases and 
improvements to the existing ones 

Reform of Eurodac Regulation 

Smart Borders package 

Strengthening the role and 
mandate of Frontex 

Proposal to establish European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency 

An integrated system of return 
management 

Enhance voluntary return 

Reform of the Dublin system 

Policies targeting third countries and their 
nationals 

Policies targeting third countries and their 
nationals 

Relevant 
section of 
chapter 3 

I.1; IV 

III 

IV.1 

II.2 

II.1 

IV.1 

IV.2 

IV.2 

PE 581.387 

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