Opinion of the European Central Bank of 31 May 2019 on reform of the banking and financial market supervisory regime (CON/2019/21)
Date: 2019-05-31
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: Austria, banking supervision, central bank, competence of the institution, financial stability, national law, statistics

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 31 May 2019 

on reform of the banking and financial market supervisory regime 

(CON/2019/21) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On  15  April  2019  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  received  a  request  from  the  Austrian  Ministry  of 

Finance  (MoF)  for  an  opinion  on  a  draft  law  reforming  the  banking  supervisory  regime  (hereinafter  the 
‘draft law’)1. 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU)  and  on  the  third,  fourth  and  sixth  indents  of  Article  2(1)  of 

Council Decision 98/415/EC

2
, as the draft law relates to the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB), the 

collection,  compilation  and  distribution  of  monetary,  financial  and  banking  statistics,  and  the  rules 

applicable  to financial  institutions insofar as they materially influence the stability  of financial  institutions 

and markets, as well as the specific tasks conferred upon the ECB pursuant to Article 127(6) of the TFEU 

concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. In accordance with the first 

sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council 

has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft law 

1.1  The  draft  law  proposes  a  reform  of  the  structure  of  the  banking  and  financial  market  supervisory 

regime  in  Austria.  According  to  the  explanatory  memorandum,  the  draft  law  aims  to  make  the 

national  system  of  financial  market  supervision  more  efficient,  accelerate  and  simplify  decision-

making  processes,  establish  clear  contacts  for  market  participants  and  EU  institutions,  and 

increase the focus on service. It is intended to  end  the current split  of competences between the 

Austrian  Financial  Market  Authority  (FMA)  and  the  OeNB,  and  to  concentrate  the  full  extent  of 

microprudential supervision in the FMA. The reform is proposed to take effect from 1 January 2020. 

The  draft  law  does  not  purport  to  affect  the  OeNB’s  current  tasks  in  relation  to  macroprudential 

1 

2 

Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Alternative Investmentfonds Manager-Gesetz, das Bankwesengesetz, das Betriebliche 
Mitarbeiter-  und  Selbständigenvorsorgegesetz,  das  Bundesgesetz  zur  Schaffung  einer  Abbaueinheit,  das  E-
Geldgesetz 2010, das Einlagensicherungs- und Anlegerentschädigungsgesetz, das Finanzkonglomerategesetz, das 
Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehördengesetz, das Investmentfondsgesetz 2011, das Nationalbankgesetz 1984, das Sanie-
rungs-  und  Abwicklungsgesetz,  das  Sparkassengesetz,  STS-Verbriefungsvollzugsgesetz,  das  Versicherungsauf-
sichtsgesetz 2016, das Wertpapieraufsichtsgesetz 2018, das Zahlungsdienstegesetz 2018, das Zentrale Gegenpar-
teien-Vollzugsgesetz sowie das Zentralverwahrer-Vollzugsgesetz geändert werden. 
Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authori-
ties regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
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supervision, the oversight of financial market stability and payment systems, and the collection of 

statistics. 

1.2  The  draft  law  transfers  the  OeNB’s  current  competences  in  relation  to  microprudential  banking 

supervision, in particular the conduct of on-site inspections and off-site analysis of individual banks, 

to  the  FMA.  The  same  transfer  of  competences  is  envisaged  with  regard  to  the  supervision  of 

deposit guarantee schemes and the recovery and resolution of credit institutions. Furthermore, the 

task  of  providing  expert  opinions  to  the  FMA,  for  example  before  granting  a  banking  licence  or 

approving a merger or demerger of credit institutions, is removed from the OeNB. Only the OeNB’s 

competence to implement supervisory reporting will remain unchanged. 

1.3  As  a  consequence  of  concentrating  prudential  supervisory  tasks  in  the  FMA,  the  OeNB’s 

employees  whose  work  relates  to  prudential  banking  supervision  will,  where  possible,  be 

transferred to the FMA. It  is envisaged that employees of the OeNB recruited after 30  April 1998 

will  become  employees  of  the  FMA  from  1  January  2020  and  all  of  their  existing  rights  and 

obligations  will  continue.  OeNB  internal  staff  rules  applicable  to  such  employees  will  continue  to 

apply, while the right of the OeNB’s General Council to amend those rules will be transferred to the 

FMA’s Executive Board. Under Austrian labour law, employees may be transferred either by way of 

secondment  or  by  assumption  of  their  contracts  by  operation  of  law.  Employees  who  joined  the 

OeNB before 1 May  1998 are to be seconded to the  FMA because assumption  of their contracts 

would,  according  to  the  explanatory  memorandum,  represent  a  particular  intrusion  into  the 

employment  relationship.  Although  such  seconded  employees  are  to  remain  employees  of  the 

OeNB,  they  will  be  integrated  into  the  FMA’s  operational  services.  Pursuant  to  the  draft  law,  the 

FMA will reimburse the OeNB for the payroll costs of seconded staff. 

1.4  The explanatory memorandum accompanying the  draft law states that the OeNB’s role regarding 

macroprudential supervision and financial market stability is to remain unchanged. The OeNB will 

remain competent to oversee financial market stability. It is intended that the OeNB will continue to 

monitor and analyse all circumstances that are relevant to financial market stability and inform the 

MoF  and  FMA  thereof.  In  addition  to  this  current  competence,  the  OeNB  shall  in  the  future  also 

focus on the development potential of the domestic financial market. The draft law provides for an 

increase in the number of OeNB’s representatives on the Financial Market Stability Board (FMSB) 

from one to two. Pursuant to the draft law, the OeNB will submit to each of the MoF, the FMA, the 

National Council of the Austrian Parliament, the FMSB and the new FMA Advisory Board an annual 

report on the fundamental  findings of its monitoring of developments in the financial markets and 

the  potential  impact  of  those  findings  on  the  national  financial  market.  The  OeNB  will  set  up  an 

internal organisational unit for the monitoring of developments in the financial markets. The OeNB 

will,  however,  no  longer  have  its  current  competence  to  carry  out  on-site  inspections  for 

macroeconomic reasons, and will only have the ability to instruct the FMA to conduct such on-site 

inspections  for  reasons  of  financial  market  stability,  for  macroeconomic  reasons,  or  in  a  crisis 

situation. The OeNB must state the reasons for the inspection and specify its intended scope. The 

FMA  may  either  comply  with  the  inspection  instruction,  or  refuse  it  and  state  the  reasons  for  the 

refusal. The FMA may only refuse to conduct an audit if it would compromise the audits included in 

the  FMA’s  inspection  programme  or  other  FMA  inspections,  or  if  the  data  requested  in  the 

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inspection instruction are already accessible to the OeNB or can immediately be made accessible. 

If  the  OeNB  considers  that  there  is  an  imminent  risk,  the  FMA  may  not  refuse  the  inspection 

instruction and must comply with it immediately

3
. 

1.5  The  draft  law  requires  the  OeNB  and  the  FMA  to  continue  exchanging  reporting  data,  statistical 

information and all other data and information necessary to accomplish their respective tasks in a 

suitable and efficient manner. For this purpose the FMA and the OeNB are required to conclude a 

bilateral  memorandum  of  understanding  which  must  be  published  and  set  out  details  of  their 

collaboration  and  the  information  flow  between  them.  Further  memoranda  of  understanding  will 

regulate  the  conduct  of  on-site  inspections  by  the  FMA  if  instructed  by  the  OeNB,  as  well  as  the 

transfer  of  employees  from  the  OeNB  to  the  FMA  and  vice  versa.  More  extensive  information 

obligations are to be established in times of crisis in order to ensure effective collaboration. 

1.6  The draft law provides for a number of changes to the FMA’s governance structure. Among other 

things, the FMA will establish a Financial Market Advisory Board, whose role will be to advise the 

FMA on financial market matters, monitor and analyse international trends on the financial markets, 

and propose supervisory priorities. The Financial Market Advisory Board will have powers to adopt 

and publish opinions and recommendations. Its members will be appointed by the MoF for a five-

year  term  and  will  perform  their  duties  in  an  honorary  capacity.  Members  will  be  nominated  by 

various  ministries,  the  Austrian  Chamber  of  Commerce,  the  Vienna  Stock  Exchange,  the  OeNB 

and  the  Oesterreichische  Kontrollbank.  The  business  of  the  Financial  Market  Advisory  Board  will 

be administered by the FMA, and its rules of procedure will be established by the MoF. 

1.7  The  draft  law  proposes  an  increase  in  the  amount  of  profits  to  be  distributed  by  the  OeNB  to  its 

sole shareholder, the Austrian Federation, from 90 to 95 per cent. The explanatory memorandum 

explains  that  the  increase  is  due  to  the  transfer  of  competence  for  on-site  inspections  and 

microprudential  analysis  to  the  FMA.  Currently,  the  OeNB’s  costs  of  carrying  out  prudential 

supervisory tasks are partly refunded to it by the FMA, up to a statutory maximum annually of EUR 

11 million, and the balance is borne by the OeNB (in 2018, for example, the balance amounted to 

EUR 42.6 million). The impact assessment of the draft law calculates that from 2020 annual costs 

previously incurred by the OeNB in carrying out prudential supervisory tasks in the amount of EUR 

39.6 million will no longer be incurred once the competences are transferred – taking into account 

synergy  effects  and  increased  savings  potential.  Accordingly,  the  MoF  concludes  that  these  cost 

savings would become available for annual distribution to the Austrian Federation, in addition to the 

share  of  the  profit  that  is  currently  distributed.  According  to  the  impact  assessment,  the  MoF 

expects an increase in profit distribution of EUR 38.5 million per year from 2020 until 2023. 

1.8  As the Austrian authorities do not intend to increase the supervisory fees to be paid by supervised 

entities, the increased costs incurred by the FMA due to the transfer of prudential supervisory tasks 

from  the  OeNB  to  the  FMA  will  need  to  be  funded  by  the  Austrian  Federation.  According  to  the 

MoF’s  calculations,  these  costs  will  amount  to  EUR  33  million  annually.  Moreover,  due  to  an 

3 

See the proposed amendment to Section 70 paragraph 1c of the Law on banking (Bankwesengesetz), contained in 
the draft law. 

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extended  regulatory  role  of  the  FMA,  it  is  expected  that  the  annual  costs  of  the  MoF  itself  will 

increase by EUR 4.5 million. 

1.9  The draft law clarifies the significant contribution of the OeNB to financial education and literacy. In 

particular, it provides that the OeNB will send the MoF an annual report on fundamental findings on 

the status of financial education in Austria. 

1.10  Lastly,  the  explanatory  memorandum  to  the  draft  law  envisages  a  stronger  separation  between 

regulation  and  supervision  than  currently  exists,  thereby  strengthening  the  role  of  the  MoF  in  the 

field of regulation. For this purpose, three new departments with 30 new staff will be established in 

the division of the MoF that deals with financial markets.  

2. 

Observations 

2.1  Distribution of the OeNB’s profits 

2.1.1  In  order  to  ensure  financial  independence,  the  national  central  banks  (NCBs)  must  always  have 

sufficient  resources  to  carry  out  their  tasks  related  to  the  European  System  of  Central  Banks 

(ESCB), as well as their national tasks

4
. Member States may not put their NCBs in a position where 

they  have  insufficient  financial  resources  and  inadequate  net  equity  to  carry  out  their  tasks

5
.  An 

NCB’s  overall  independence  would  be  jeopardised  if  it  could  not  autonomously  avail  itself  of 

sufficient financial resources to fulfil its mandate. 

2.1.2  In  accordance  with  the  current  national  law,  certain  amounts must  be  deducted  from  the  OeNB’s 

operating  profit  prior  to  profit  appropriation:  namely,  earnings  from  assets  in  which  the  pension 

reserve has been invested; interest credited to the temporary reserve account for loans extended 

by  the  OeNB  under  the  European  Recovery  Programme;  and  earnings  from  assets  in  which  the 

Fund  for  the  Promotion  of  Scientific  Research  and  Teaching  set  up  by  the  OeNB  has  invested. 

Furthermore,  before  making  any  profit  appropriation,  up  to  10  per  cent  of  the  annual  profit  that 

remains  after  deducting  the  amounts  referred  to  above  must  be  transferred,  if  necessary,  to  the 

OeNB’s pension reserve until it reaches the  level at  which  it  is adequately funded – according to 

actuarial calculations – in order to meet the current pension claims of the beneficiaries. If, however, 

the pension reserve is significantly overfunded, the excess must be released and accounted for in 

the profit and loss account. After accounting for the deductions from the operating profit as referred 

to  above,  the  OeNB  is  obliged  under  the  current  national  law  to  distribute  90  per  cent  of  the 

balance of the profit to the Austrian Federation. Further, after such distribution, a dividend of up to 

10  per  cent  of  the  share  capital  of  the  Austrian  Federation  in  the  OeNB  must  be  paid  out  to  the 

Austrian Federation, by decision of a general meeting of the OeNB. The profit then remaining (the 

‘remaining profit’) is required to be appropriated in accordance with a decision of a general meeting 

of the OeNB. The ECB understands that the draft law provides for an increase, from 90 to 95 per 

cent, of the proportion of the OeNB’s profit – after the deductions from operating profit as referred 

4 

5 

See,  e.g.,  paragraph  3.5  of  Opinion  CON/2016/45.  All  ECB  opinions  are  published  on  the  ECB’s  website  at 
www.ecb.europa.eu. 

See, e.g., paragraph 3.1.1 of Opinion CON/2016/4 (with specific reference to Austria). 

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to  above,  and  before  payment  of  the  dividend  –  that  is  to  be  distributed  in  future  to  the  Austrian 

Federation. 

2.1.3  An NCB’s statute may prescribe how  its profits are to be allocated

6
. Profits may be distributed to 

the State budget only after any accumulated losses from previous years have been covered

7
 and 

after financial provisions deemed necessary to safeguard the real  value of the  NCB’s capital  and 

assets  have  been  created

8.

  Member  States  may  not  hamper  NCBs  in  building  up  their  reserve 

capital to a level which is necessary for a member of the ESCB to fulfil its tasks

9
. The ECB stresses 

the importance of the OeNB’s ability to independently create and adequately build up reserves and 

provisions.  Under  Austrian  law

10

,  the  OeNB  is  obliged  to  prepare  its  balance  sheet  and  its  profit 

and  loss  account  in  conformity  with  the  rules  established  by  the  Governing  Council  of  the  ECB 

under  Article  26.4  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB  and  of  the  ECB.  Consequently,  the  OeNB  has 

adopted the ESCB’s accounting rules

11

 and applies them in their entirety to its financial statements. 

However,  the  remaining  profit  is  the  only  means  by  which  the  OeNB  can  increase  its  reserve 

serving as a general risk provision. Hence the proposed increase of the proportion of the OeNB’s 

profit  to  be  distributed  to  the  Austrian  Federation  limits  the  OeNB’s  ability  to  adequately  build  up 

this reserve. 

2.1.4  In any event, any amendment to the profit distribution rules of an NCB should only be initiated and 

decided  in  close  cooperation  with  that  NCB,  since  the  NCB  is  in  the  best  position  to  assess  its 

required  level  of  reserve  capital

12

.  With  a  view  to  ensuring  financial  independence,  the  ECB 

requests  that  a  decision  by  the  consulting  authority  on  the  intended  amendment  to  the  profit 

distribution rules of the OeNB be taken only in cooperation with the OeNB.  

2.1.5  Furthermore, the ECB understands that the increased profit distribution to be made by the OeNB is 

intended to compensate the Austrian Federation for the increased supervisory costs that the latter 

will incur, both within the MoF and at the FMA. However, as 90 per cent of the remaining profits are 

already distributed to the Austrian Federation under the current regime, the cost savings envisaged 

at  the  level  of  the  OeNB  would,  in  any  event,  lead  to  an  increase  in  profit  and  in  the  corporate 

income tax charge. Thus, the proposed increase in the profit distribution percentage would not be 

necessary to achieve an increased profit distribution by the OeNB. 

2.2  The OeNB’s role regarding financial market stability and macroprudential supervision 

2.2.1  Consistently  with Article 127(5) of the TFEU, the ECB has repeatedly  noted  the important role  of 

6 

7 
8 
9 
10 
11 

12 

See ECB Convergence Report 2018, p. 27. In the absence of such provisions, decisions on the allocation of profits 
should be taken by the NCB’s decision-making bodies on professional grounds, and should not be subject to the dis-
cretion of third parties, unless there is an express safeguard clause stating that this is without prejudice to the finan-
cial means necessary for carrying out the NCB’s ESCB-related tasks as well as national tasks (see, e.g., paragraph 
2.3 of Opinion CON/2017/17). 

See paragraph 4.3 of Opinion CON 2009/85 and paragraph 3.2.5 of Opinion CON/2017/17. 
See ECB Convergence Report 2018, p. 27. 
See paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2009/26 and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2012/69. 

See section 67 paragraph 2 of the Law on the National Bank. 
Guideline (EU) 2016/2249 of the European Central Bank of 3 November 2016 on the legal framework for accounting 
and financial reporting in the European System of Central Banks (ECB/2016/34) (OJ L 347, 20.12.2016).  
See ECB Convergence Report 2018, p. 27, paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2009/53 and paragraph 3.6. of Opinion 
CON/2009/83. 

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NCBs in prudential supervision to allow the Eurosystem to contribute adequately to monitoring the 

risks to financial stability in the euro area

13

. At the same time, the draft law does not seek to affect 

the  OeNB’s  existing  role  regarding  macroprudential  supervision,  the  oversight  of  financial  market 

stability and payment systems, supervisory reporting, and the collection of statistics. While the draft 

law  withdraws  the  OeNB’s  current  competence  to  carry  out  on-site  inspections,  it  authorises  the 

OeNB to instruct the FMA to conduct on-site inspections for reasons of financial market stability, or 

macroeconomic  reasons,  or  in  a  crisis  situation,  and  the  FMA  must  comply  with  the  OeNB’s 

inspection instruction immediately if the OeNB considers that there is an imminent risk. It is for the 

Austrian  authorities  to  assess  whether  the  withdrawal  of  the  OeNB’s  current  competence  for 

carrying  out  on-site  inspections  for  macroeconomic  reasons  complies  with  Austrian  constitutional 

principles.  Underlining  the  OeNB’s  role  regarding  oversight  of  financial  market  stability,  the  draft 

law increases the number of the OeNB’s representatives in the FMSB from one to two. In addition, 

the OeNB is to nominate two of the six members of the FMA’s Supervisory Board and one member 

of the FMA’s Financial Market Advisory Board. All of these mechanisms should help to ensure that 

the  transfer  of  prudential  supervisory  tasks  from  the  OeNB  to  the  FMA  does  not  jeopardise  the 

OeNB’s  ability  to  safeguard  financial  stability  and  prevent  or  mitigate  systemic  risks.  In  order  to 

safeguard the OeNB’s remaining tasks and functions, in particular macroprudential supervision and 

oversight of financial market stability, the ECB additionally recommends that the OeNB is provided 

with access to all relevant information necessary for its ongoing tasks

14

. 

2.3  The FMA’s tasks within the Single Supervisory Mechanism 

2.3.1  Pursuant  to  Article  127(6)  of  the  TFEU  and  Articles  4  and  6  of  Council  Regulation  (EU)  No 
1024/201315, the ECB  is responsible for the  effective and consistent functioning of the SSM,  and 

the ECB and the NCAs are each subject to a duty of cooperation, and an obligation to exchange 

information. Where appropriate, and without prejudice to the responsibility and accountability of the 

ECB for the tasks conferred on it by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, the NCAs are responsible for 

providing  assistance  to  the  ECB,  on  the  terms  set  out  in  Regulation  (EU)  No  468/2014  of  the 

,  with  the  preparation  and  implementation  of  any  acts 
European  Central  Bank  (ECB/2014/17)
relating  to  the  tasks  conferred  on  the  ECB  under  Article  4  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  1024/201317 
related to all credit institutions, including assistance in verification activities 18. 

16

13 
14  

15 

16  

See paragraph 2 of Opinion CON/2013/56. 

See paragraphs II.b) to e) of the OeNB’s opinion on the draft law, dated 7 May 2019, which is published on the Aus-
trian Parliament’s website at www.parlament.gv.at.. 

Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 

Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the  framework for coop-
eration within the  Single Supervisory Mechanism between the  European Central Bank  and national competent  au-
thorities and with national designated authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) (OJ L 141, 14.5.2014, p. 1). 
See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2018/6 and paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2016/43. 

17 
18   Without prejudice to certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, NCAs shall carry out and be responsible 
for certain tasks and adopting all relevant supervisory decisions with regard to certain less significant credit institu-
tions or financial holding companies. Wherever the ECB is assisted by NCAs for the purpose of exercising the tasks 
conferred on it by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, the ECB and the NCAs shall comply with the provisions set out in 
the relevant Union acts in relation to the allocation of responsibilities and cooperation between competent authorities 
from different Member States. 

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2.3.2  Taking  into  account  the  responsibilities  of  the  FMA  within  the  framework  of  the  SSM,  the  ECB 
19 

notes  that  Article  4(4)  of  Directive  2013/36/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council

requires  Member  States  to  ensure  that  the  competent  authorities  have  the  expertise,  resources, 

operational  capacity,  powers  and  independence  necessary  to  carry  out  the  functions  relating  to 

prudential supervision, investigations and penalties set out in that Directive and in Regulation (EU) 

No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council

20

. According to the recommendation of 

Basel  Core  Principles  for  Effective  Banking  Supervision  the  supervisor  is  to  have  adequate 

resources for the conduct of effective supervision and oversight

21

. 

2.3.3  The ECB recommends that the Austrian authorities clarify in the draft law that the Financial Market 

Advisory Board, which includes industry representatives and representatives of supervised entities 

in  matters  of  banking  supervision,  will  not  obtain  any  confidential  information,  and  that  any  such 

information  shared  in  the  SSM  will  not  be  provided  to  the  Financial  Market  Advisory  Board. 

Regarding  the  operational  independence  of  the  FMA,  the  ECB  highlights  Article  19  of  Council 

Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, which provides that the members of the ECB’s Supervisory Board 

must  act  independently  and  objectively  in  the  interest  of  the  Union  as  a  whole  and  must  neither 

seek  nor  take  instructions  from  the  institutions  or  bodies  of  the  Union,  from  any  government  of  a 

Member State or from any other public or private body.  

2.3.4  Furthermore, the OeNB’s Governor, acting in his or her personal capacity, participates in decisions 

adopted by the ECB’s Governing Council on supervisory matters relating to the SSM, mainly based 

on  complete  draft  decisions  proposed  by  the  ECB’s  Supervisory  Board  pursuant  to  the  non-

objection procedure specified under Article 26(8) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. As for 

all his or her tasks, concerning SSM matters, the Governor needs to have the necessary resources 

as well as access to relevant information and data. In this respect, attention should be paid to the 

OeNB’s ability to employ and retain qualified staff necessary in view of its autonomy in staff matters 

deriving from its financial independence

22

. 

2.4  The OeNB’s role regarding financial education 

2.4.1  Regarding the prohibition on monetary financing under Article 123 of the TFEU, as supplemented 

by Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93, the ECB notes that, inter alia, any financing by a central 

bank  of  the  public  sector’s  obligations  vis-à-vis  third  parties  is  prohibited.  Accordingly,  national 

legislation may not require an NCB to finance either the performance of functions by other public 

sector bodies, or the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties. This prohibition applies in the 

19  

20  

21 

22 

Directive  2013/36/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26  June  2013  on  access  to  the  activity  of 
credit  institutions  and  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions  and  investment  firms,  amending  Directive 
2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338). 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential require-
ments for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, 
p. 1). 
According to the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, the head of a supervisory authority is also 
to be appointed for a minimum term and removed from office during that term only for reasons specified in law, or if 
not physically or mentally capable of carrying out the role, or if found guilty of misconduct. See Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (September 2012), Principle 2, Effective Cri-
teria 2 and 6, available on the website of the Bank for International Settlements at www.bis.org. 

See ECB Convergence Report May 2018, p. 28. 

7 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

case  of  conferral  of  new  tasks  upon  NCBs

23

.  However,  the  ECB  understands  that  the  OeNB 

already provides financial education to the Austrian population, promotes a general understanding 

of economic interrelationships, and organises a wide range of educational opportunities

24

. Hence, 

the draft law only serves to clarify the OeNB’s role in connection with financial literacy, by explicitly 

providing that it will also contribute to the development of financial training in Austria, including by 

submitting to the MoF an annual report on fundamental findings on the status of financial education 

in Austria

25

. On that basis, the ECB considers that the draft law does not confer a new task on the 

OeNB in the context of providing financial education. 

2.4.2  As previously noted by the ECB, financial education is not among central banking tasks listed in the 

Treaties

26

. Nevertheless, the tasks carried out by the OeNB in the area of financial education could 

be  considered  as  complementary  to  the  macroprudential-  and  financial  market  stability-related 

tasks  that  it  currently  performs.  Furthermore,  they  do  not  appear  to  be  atypical  for  NCBs  of  the 

ESCB

27

.  However,  ensuring  the  provision  of  general  financial  education  forms  part  of  the 

educational policies of the State. In this respect, these tasks will be administered, at least in part, 

on behalf of and in the interest of the government. 

2.4.3  Regarding  financial  independence,  the  ECB  reiterates  that  an  NCB  needs  to  have  available  to  it 

sufficient  financial  resources  to  fulfil  its  mandate,  i.e.  to  perform  its  ESCB-related  tasks  and  its 

national  tasks.  The  consulting  authority  must  take  into  consideration  that  the  OeNB  should  have 

sufficient resources available for the performance of its tasks. The ECB understands that the OeNB 

will be in a position to carry out these tasks without a negative impact on its core central banking 

tasks. 

This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 31 May 2019. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Mario DRAGHI 

23 
24 

25 

26  
27  

See ECB Convergence Report 2018, p. 30. 
For  example,  the  OeNB  provides  tailor-made  offers  regarding  financial  education  on  its  financial  education  online 
platform. According to its website, the OeNB is constantly striving to expand and improve these opportunities. 
See the proposed amendment to section 44b paragraph 5 of the Law on the National Bank (Nationalbankgesetz), as 
included in the draft law. 
See paragraph 3.4 of Opinion CON/2017/43 and paragraph 4.2 of Opinion CON/2018/2. 
See paragraph 3.2 of Opinion CON/2017/43. 

8