COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Turkey 2019 Report Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2019 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy
Date: 2019-05-29
Institutions: Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission
Subjects: Türkiye, accession criteria, accession negotiations, pre-accession strategy

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 29.5.2019  SWD(2019) 220 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Turkey 2019 Report Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2019 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy {COM(2019) 260 final}  
 
 
1. 

1.1. 

1.2 

2. 

Table of Contents 

INTRODUCTION 

Context 

Summary of the report 

FUNDAMENTALS FIRST: POLITICAL CRITERIA AND RULE OF LAW 
CHAPTERS 

2.1. 

Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform 

2.1.1.  Democracy 

2.1.2.  Public administration reform 

2.2. 

Rule of law and fundamental rights 

2.2.1.  Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights 

2.2.2.  Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security 

FUNDAMENTALS FIRST: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
COMPETITIVENESS 

The existence of a functioning market economy 

3 

3 

3 

9 

10 

10 

19 

21 

21 

40 

51 

52 

The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union  57 

GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION 

ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP 

Chapter 1: Free movement of goods 

Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers 

Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services 

Chapter 4: Free movement of capital 

Chapter 5: Public procurement 

Chapter 6: Company law 

Chapter 7: Intellectual property law 

Chapter 8: Competition policy 

Chapter 9: Financial services 

Chapter 10: Information society and media 

Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development 

Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy 

Chapter 13: Fisheries 

Chapter 14: Transport policy 

Chapter 15: Energy 

Chapter 16: Taxation 

Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy 

Chapter 18: Statistics 

1 

60 

62 

62 

64 

64 

65 

66 

68 

69 

70 

71 

72 

74 

75 

76 

77 

78 

81 

82 

83 

3. 

3.1. 

3.2. 

4. 

5. 

5.1. 

5.2. 

5.3. 

5.4. 

5.5. 

5.6. 

5.7. 

5.8. 

5.9. 

5.10. 

5.11. 

5.12. 

5.13. 

5.14. 

5.15. 

5.16. 

5.17. 

5.18. 

 
 
5.19. 

5.20. 

5.21. 

5.22. 

5.25 

5.26 

5.27 

5.28 

5.29. 

5.30. 

5.31. 

5.32. 

5.33. 

Chapter 19: Social policy and employment 

Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy 

Chapter 21: Trans-European networks 

Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments 

Chapter 25: Science and research 

Chapter 26: Education and culture 

Chapter 27: Environment and climate change 

Chapter 28: Health and consumer protection 

Chapter 29: Customs union 

Chapter 30: External relations 

Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy 

Chapter 32: Financial control 

Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions 

ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND TURKEY 

ANNEX II – STATISTICAL ANNEX 

84 

87 

88 

89 

90 

91 

93 

94 

97 

97 

98 

101 

104 

105 

107 

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1. 

INTRODUCTION  

1.1. 

Context 

Turkey remains a key partner for the European Union. Turkey has been linked to the EU by 
an  Association  Agreement  since  1964  and  a  Customs  Union  was  established  in  1995.  The 
European Council granted the status of candidate country to Turkey in December 1999 and 
accession  negotiations  were  opened  in  October  2005.  Within  the  framework  of  accession 
negotiations, 16 chapters have been opened so far and one of these was provisionally closed. 
The  General  Affairs  Council  conclusions  of  June  2018  stated  that  under  the  currently 
prevailing  circumstances,  Turkey’s  accession  negotiations  have  effectively  come  to  a 
standstill, no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing and no further work 
towards  the  modernisation  of  the  Customs  Union  can  be  currently  foreseen1.  The  Turkish 
government’s repeated commitment to the objective of EU accession has not been matched 
by  corresponding  measures  and  reforms  since  then,  and  the  EU’s  serious  concerns  on 
continued  negative  developments  in  rule  of  law,  fundamental  rights  and  the  Judiciary  have 
not been addressed. The EU-Turkey Association Council held its 54th meeting on 15 March 
2019  in  Brussels.  After  a  hiatus  of  three  years,  the  inter-ministerial  Reform  Action  Group 
resumed  its  work,  holding  meetings  in  August  and  December  2018,  as  well  as  on  9  May 
2019. 

The  EU  and  Turkey  continued  their  dialogue  and  cooperation  in  the  areas  of  joint  interest 
including a leaders' meeting between Presidents Juncker and Tusk and President Erdoğan in 
Bulgaria  in  March  2018  and  a  High  Level  Political  Dialogue  in  November  2018.  Dialogue 
was pursued on foreign and security policy, notably on Syria, Libya and Iraq and, following a 
counter-terrorism  dialogue  in  November  2017,  there  is  slow  movement  towards  concrete 
implementation  of  jointly  agreed  actions.  Turkey  and  the  EU  further  developed  their 
cooperation  in  the  areas  of  energy,  transport,  economy  and  trade.  There  was  a  High  Level 
Transport Dialogue in January 2019 and a High Level Economic Dialogue in February 2019. 
Technical discussions started for the mutual recognition of a few Geographical Indications of 
agricultural  products.  The  March  2016  EU-Turkey  Statement  continues  to  deliver  results, 
with both parties committed to its effective implementation. Turkey sustained its outstanding 
efforts  to  host  more  than  3.6  million  registered  refugees  from  Syria  and  around  registered 
370,000 refugees from other countries, which is the largest refugee community in the world. 
Turkey and the EU further built on the fruitful cooperation under the Facility for Refugees in 
Turkey. By May 2019, out of EUR 6 billion mobilised by the EU, more than 80 projects had 
been launched and more than EUR 2.2 billion has been disbursed. 

1.2 

Summary of the report2 

The state of emergency  introduced on 15 July 2016 in  the aftermath  of the attempted  coup 
ended on 18 July 2018, when its last extension expired, but was immediately followed by the 
adoption by the Turkish  parliament  of a law that retained many  elements  of the emergency 
rule  for  further  three  years.  The  law  limits  certain  fundamental  freedoms,  allowing  in 
particular to dismiss public servants (including judges) and to prolong detentions, to restrict 
freedom of movement and public assembly, and extending powers for Government-appointed 
provincial governors.  

1 The European Council conclusions of December 2006 remain in force. 
2  This  report  covers  the  period  from  1  March  2018  to  1  March  2019.  It  is  based  on  input  from  a  variety  of 
sources, including contributions from the government of Turkey, the EU Member States, European Parliament 
reports and information from various international and non-governmental organisations.  

3 

 
 
                                                           
The EU,  which immediately  and strongly condemned the attempted  coup, reiterated its full 
support for the country’s democratic institutions and recognised Turkey’s legitimate need to 
take swift and proportionate action in the face of such a serious threat.  However, the broad 
scale  and  collective  nature  of  measures  taken  since  the  attempted  coup  under  the  state  of 
emergency,  such  as  widespread  dismissals,  arrests  and  detentions,  continued  to  raise  very 
serious concerns. 

During the state of emergency, 36 decrees were issued constraining certain civil and political 
rights,  as  well  as  defence  rights,  expanding  police  powers  and  those  of  prosecutors  for 
investigations and prosecutions as well as foreseeing the dismissal of more than 152 000 civil 
servants, including academics, teachers and public officials.  

The Constitutional Court has ruled that it does not have a mandate to review the legality of 
decrees using legal powers issued during the state of emergency. Parliament has reviewed 32 
of  them.  In  May  2017,  the  Turkish  authorities  established  an  Inquiry  Commission  on  the 
State of Emergency Measures tasked to review all complaints individually.  

As of May 2019, 126 600 applications had been made. Of these, the Inquiry Commission has 
reviewed 70 406 and only 5 250 have led to a reinstatement, while 65 156 complaints have 
been rejected. There are 55 714 applications pending. The rate of processing of applications 
raises  concerns  at  whether  each  case  is  being  examined  individually.  Since  there  are  no 
hearings,  there  is  a  general  lack  of  procedural  guarantees  for  applicants  and  decisions  are 
taken on the basis of the written files related to the original dismissal, all of which calls into 
question the extent to which the Inquiry Commission is an effective judicial remedy.  

With  the  ending  of  the  state  of  emergency,  Turkey  has  withdrawn  its  derogations  from  the 
European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  and  from  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and 
Political  Rights  (ICCPR).  However,  the  full  monitoring  procedure  that  the  Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe reopened in April 2017 remains in place.  

Beyond the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures, the capacity of Turkey 
to ensure an effective domestic legal remedy in the sense of the European Court of Human 
Rights  has  been  further  undermined.  Several  court  rulings  favourable  to  prominent 
defendants,  including  human  rights  defenders,  were  swiftly  reversed  by  another  or  even  by 
the same court, in some instances following comments from the executive.  

Many human rights defenders, civil society activists, media, academics, politicians, doctors, 
lawyers, judges and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people, are still 
detained – sometimes without indictment, and are facing smear campaigns by the media and 
senior  politicians.  The  space  for  civil  society  organisations  working  on  fundamental  rights 
and  freedoms  has  further  shrunk,  notably  exemplified  by  the  introduction  of  further 
administrative  obstacles.  The  rights-based  organisations  closed  down  under  the  state  of 
emergency have not been offered any legal remedy in respect to confiscations. Since October 
2018,  following  the  amendment  of  the  Parliament's  rules  of  procedure,  civil  society 
organisations  are  excluded  from  the  legislative  consultation  process  at  parliamentary 
committees. Inclusive mechanisms for consulting across society as widely as possible are not 
present.    

Key  recommendations  of  the  Council  of  Europe  and  its  bodies  are  yet  to  be  addressed  by 
Turkey. Allegations of wrongdoing need to be established by transparent procedures and on 
an individual basis. Individual criminal liability can only be established with full respect for 
the  separation  of  powers,  the  full  independence  of  the  judiciary  and  the  right  of  every 
individual to a fair trial.  

4 

 
 
The  new  presidential  system  has  centralised  power  in  the  hands  of  the  executive  and 
significantly  curtailed  Parliament's  legislative  and  oversight  functions.  Since  July  2018, 
Parliament has adopted 17 pieces of legislation, including controversial changes to its rules of 
procedure.  Ministers  no  longer  appear  before  Members  of  Parliament,  who  can  ask  only 
written questions.  

Growing  political  polarisation,  especially  in  the  run-up  to  the  March  2019  municipal 
elections  continues  to  prevent  constructive  parliamentary  dialogue.  The  marginalisation  of 
the  opposition,  notably  the  People's  Democratic  Party  (HDP)  continues,  and  many  HDP 
lawmakers  are  detained.  The  long-standing  shortcomings  of  the  system  of  parliamentary 
immunity have not been addressed.  

The  June  2018  presidential  and  parliamentary  elections  and  the  March  2019  municipal 
elections  were  marked  by  strong  turnouts.  Voters  had  a  genuine  choice  despite  the  lack  of 
conditions for contestants to compete on an equal basis. The ruling party enjoyed a notable 
advantage, also  reflected in  excessive  coverage by  government-affiliated  public and private 
media.  After  the  municipal  elections,  the  Supreme  Election  Council  declared  four  elected 
mayors  and  members  of  municipal  councils  ineligible  to  assume  office  in  the  south-east  of 
Turkey,  even  though  their  candidacies  had  been  validated  before  the  elections.  It  also 
annulled the metropolitan mayoral elections in  Istanbul and scheduled a re-run for 23 June. 
The decisions by the Supreme Election Council to re-run elections in  Istanbul as well as to 
grant the mayorship of individual municipalities in the south-east to second-placed candidates 
are  a  source  of  serious  concern  regarding  the  respect  of  the  legality  and  integrity  of  the 
electoral process and the institution’s independence from political pressure. They go against 
the core aim of a democratic electoral process – that is to ensure that the will of the people 
prevails.    The  annulment  of  the  metropolitan  mayoral  election  in  Istanbul  and  its  re-
scheduling were strongly contested by opposition parties. 

The  full  entry  into  force  of  the  presidential  system  has  remodelled  the  executive  and  state 
administration.  The  presidential  system,  including  the  abolition  of  the  position  of  Prime 
Minister  and  other  functions  such  as  Under  Secretaries  in  Ministries  has  led  to  greater 
politicisation of the public administration. The President now has the power to nominate the 
heads of the vast majority of public regulatory authorities.  

Before  the  March  2019  municipal  elections,  continuing  arrests  and  dismissals  of  local 
politicians and appointment of trustees as well as the arbitrary nature of these appointments 
deprived voters of political representation at local level, and seriously risked damaging local 
democracy.  

The  government  has  overhauled  the  legal  framework  governing  the  civil-military  relations 
and  increased  the  powers  of  the  executive  over  the  military  significantly,  thereby 
strengthening  civilian  oversight.  As  part  of  the  constitutional  amendments,  high  military 
courts were effectively abolished, but the military and intelligence services continue to lack 
sufficient accountability to Parliament and security personnel continue to have wide-ranging 
legal  protection.  The  parliamentary  law  enforcement  oversight  commission  remained 
ineffective.  The  legal  framework  for  overseeing  military  expenditure  has  not  yet  been 
improved.  

The situation in the south-east has continued to be challenging, despite an improved security 
environment.  The  Government  continued  security  operations  against  a  background  of  the 
recurrent violent acts by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which remains on the EU list 
of  persons,  groups  and  entities  involved  in  acts  of  terrorism.  While  the  Government  has  a 
legitimate right to fight terrorism, it is also responsible for ensuring this is done in accordance 

5 

 
 
with the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Anti-terror measures need to 
be  proportionate.  Despite  some  reconstruction,  only  few  internally  displaced  persons  have 
received compensation. There were no visible developments on the resumption of a credible 
political process to achieve a peaceful and sustainable solution.  

Turkey is  moderately prepared in  the  area of  public administration reform, and there has 
been  serious  backsliding  in  the  area  of  public  service  and  human  resources  management, 
which has also affected policy developments and accountability. Changes to the civil service 
system  have  further  increased  the  politicisation  of  the  administration.  Merit-based, 
competitive  appointments  for  senior  managerial  positions  remain  the  exception.  Serious 
procedural  shortcomings  call  into  question  the  extent  to  which  the  Inquiry  Commission  on 
the State of Emergency Measures can be considered an effective remedy for dismissed public 
officials.  

Turkey’s judicial system is at  an early stage of preparation. There has  been  further serious 
backsliding  and  the  recommendations  in  the  previous  reports  were  not  accepted  or 
implemented. Political pressure on judges and prosecutors and transfers of a large number of 
judges and prosecutors against their will continued. This continues to have a negative impact 
on  the  independence  and  overall  quality  and  efficiency  of  the  judiciary.  The  large  scale 
recruitments of new judges and prosecutors under the current system are concerning because 
no  measures  were  taken  to  address  the  lack  of  objective,  merit-based,  uniform  and 
pre-established criteria for their recruitment and promotion. The Justice Academy of Turkey 
was re-established by Presidential Decree, after it had previously been closed under the state 
of  emergency.  The  chilling  effect  of  the  dismissal  and  forced  transfers  of  judges  and 
prosecutors is still observed, and risk engendering widespread self-censorship. No measures 
were taken to  restore legal  guarantees to  ensure the independence of the judiciary from  the 
executive or to strengthen the independence of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (CJP). 
A judicial reform strategy for 2019-2023 was announced in August 2018 but has not yet been 
adopted. Turkey consulted the Council of Europe and the Commission on the draft strategy. 

The country is at an early stage in the fight against corruption. There was backsliding since 
dismantled preventive bodies have not been replaced by an independent body, in line with the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption to which Turkey is a party. Both the legal and 
institutional  frameworks  continued  to  allow  undue  influence  from  the  executive  in  the 
investigation  and  prosecution  of  high-profile  corruption  cases.  The  legislative  amendments 
envisaged  in  previous  anti-corruption  strategies  have  not  been  implemented.  Public 
procurement  legislation  remained  incompatible  with  the  EU  acquis  and  the  scope  of  the 
derogations  to  the  public  procurement  law  was  increased  further.  The  absence  of  a  robust 
anti-corruption strategy and action plan is a sign of lack of political  will to fight decisively 
against  corruption.  No  permanent,  functionally  independent  anti-corruption  body  exists  and 
there is no specialised prosecution service to lead anti-corruption investigations and only few 
specialised courts. Overall, corruption is widespread and remains an issue of concern. 

Turkey has  some level  of preparation in the  fight against organised  crime  but  progress  is 
limited  overall.  The  country  needs  to  improve  its  legislation  on  cybercrime,  assets 
confiscation and witness protections. Turkish data protection is still not in line with European 
standards and will have to be revised in order to ensure the implementation of the operational 
agreement with Europol currently being negotiated. Turkey should develop and implement a 
more  comprehensive  and  coherent  legal  framework  for  the  confiscation  of  the  proceeds  of 
crime and improve its capacity to manage frozen assets.  

Turkey  made  good  progress  in  the  area  of  migration  and  asylum  policy  and  remained 
committed  to  the  effective  implementation  of  the  March  2016  EU-Turkey  statement.  The 

6 

 
 
declining trend in irregular crossings from Turkey to the Aegean islands since the entry into 
force  of  the  Statement  was  supported  by  intensified  efforts  by  Turkey's  law  enforcement 
agencies.  Turkey  sustained  its  outstanding  efforts  to  provide  massive  and  unprecedented 
humanitarian  aid  and  support  to  more  than  3.6  million  registered  refugees  from  Syria  and 
around  370  000  registered  refugees  from  other  countries,  thus  hosting  the  largest  refugee 
community in the world. Turkey has set up seven working groups to carry out technical work 
on the outstanding benchmarks of the visa liberalisation dialogue. However, no progress has 
been made in the harmonisation of the Turkish visa policy with the EU common visa policy.  

Serious  backsliding  remains  in  terms  of  human  and  fundamental  rights.  While  the  legal 
framework includes general  guarantees of respect for human and fundamental rights, it still 
needs to be brought in line with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the 
case  law  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (ECtHR).  There  has  been  serious 
backsliding  in  the  areas  of  freedom  of  expression,  assembly,  and  association  and  in 
procedural  and  property  rights.  No  changes  were  made  to  the  legislation  introduced 
immediately  after  the  lifting  of  the  state  of  emergency,  which  removed  crucial  safeguards 
protecting  civil  society  activists,  human  rights  defenders,  journalists,  academics  and  others 
from  abuses.  The  enforcement  of  rights  is  hindered  by  the  fragmentation  and  limited 
independence  of  public  institutions  responsible  for  protecting  those  rights  and  freedoms  as 
well  as  by  the  lack  of  an  independent  judiciary.    Trade  union  rights  continue  to  be  under 
severe  pressure.  No  steps  were  taken  to  investigate,  prosecute  or  punish  those  involved  in 
profound  human  rights  violations  during  the  state  of  emergency.  There  was  a  climate  of 
intimidation  across  society  as  the  state  of  emergency  was  used  to  narrow  the  space  for 
dissenting or alternative views. As of December 2018, the total number of people in prison 
without indictment or pending trial is 57 000, more than 20% of the prison population. There 
is  overcrowding  and  conditions  are  deteriorating.  Severe  restrictions  on  freedom  of 
expression  continued  and  the  trend  for  prosecution  of  writers,  social  media  users  and  other 
members of the public, even children, for insulting the President has dramatically increased. 
The lack of transparency as to media ownership continues to cast doubt on the independence 
of editorial comment. Roma3 continue to live in very poor housing, often lacking basic public 
services  and  relying  on  social  benefits.  The  urban  renewal  projects  continue  to  affect 
primarily their settlements, forcing the displacement of entire families. The rights of the most 
vulnerable  groups  and  of  persons  belonging  to  minorities  need  better  protection.  Gender-
based  violence,  discrimination,  hate  speech  against  minorities,  hate  crime  and  violations  of 
human rights of LGBTI persons are still a matter of serious concern.  

Turkey  welcomed  the  UN’s  renewed  efforts  to  consult  stakeholders  as  to  a  possible 
resumption of negotiations regarding Cyprus. Tensions in the region around the prospect of 
hydrocarbon  exploration  off  the  coast  of  Cyprus  increased,  due  to  Turkey’s  actions  and 
statements challenging the right of the Republic of Cyprus to exploit hydrocarbon resources 
in  the  Cyprus  Exclusive  Economic  Zone.  In  May  2019,  Turkey  sent  a  drilling  platform 
accompanied  by  military  vessels  to  the  Republic  of  Cyprus’  Exclusive  Economic  Zone, 
escalating  tensions  further.  The  Commission  recalls  the  European  Council  statement  of 
March  2018  strongly  condemning  Turkey's  continued  illegal  actions  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean  and  the  Aegean  Sea.  It  also  recalled  Turkey's  obligation  to  respect 
international  law  and  good  neighbourly  relations  and  called  on  Turkey  to  respect  the 
sovereign rights of Cyprus to explore and exploit its natural resources in accordance with EU 
and  International  Law.  In  March  2019,  the  EU  called  on  Turkey  to  refrain  from  any  such 
illegal acts, to which it would respond appropriately and in full solidarity with Cyprus. 

3  In  line  with  the  terminology  of  European  institutions,  the  umbrella  term  ‘Roma’  is  used  here  to  refer  to  a 
number of different groups, without denying the specificities of these groups. 

7 

 
 
                                                           
The  EU  has  repeatedly  stressed  the  sovereign  rights  of  EU  Member  States,  which  include 
entering  into  bilateral  agreements  and  exploring  and  exploiting  their  natural  resources  in 
accordance  with  the  EU  acquis  and  international  law,  including  the  UN  Convention  on  the 
Law  of  the  Sea.  Turkey  has  still  not  fulfilled  its  obligation  to  ensure  full  and 
non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the EU-Turkey Association 
Agreement and has not removed all the obstacles to the free movement of goods, including 
restrictions  on  direct  transport  links  with  Cyprus.  There  was  no  progress  on  normalising 
bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus. 

Operational  cooperation  with  Greece  on  migration  further  continued.  However,  tensions  in 
the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean were not conducive to good neighbourly relations 
and undermined regional stability and security. Bilateral relations with several individual EU 
Member  States  in  particular  with  Austria,  Germany  and  the  Netherlands  improved.  The 
Netherlands and Turkey  normalised relations. There were repeated and increased violations 
of  the  territorial  waters  and  airspaces  of  Greece  and  Cyprus  by  Turkey.  Another  source  of 
serious concern was the six-month detention of two Greek soldiers who had been patrolling 
the  land  border  but  relations  improved  significantly  on  their  release  in  August  2018  and 
following the Greek Prime Minister’s visit to Turkey in February.  

In this context, the EU has expressed once again serious concern and urged Turkey to avoid 
any  kind  of  threat  or  action  directed  against  a  Member  State,  or  any  source  of  friction  or 
actions  that  would  damage  good  neighbourly  relations  and  the  peaceful  settlement  of 
disputes.  

Regarding  the  economic  criteria,  serious  backsliding  continued  in  the  Turkish  economy, 
leading to deeper concerns over the functioning of the country’s market economy. In 2018, a 
sharp deterioration in the external financing conditions exposed vulnerabilities built up over 
years. In response, the Turkish authorities took a range of policy actions that have negatively 
influenced the functioning of markets, more importantly, by interfering with price formation 
and  introducing  constraints  on  the  free  use  of  foreign  exchange.  Concerns  regarding  the 
independence  of  key  economic  institutions  have  deepened.  The  current  account  deficit 
reached  a  peak  in  the  first  half  of  2018  before  a  strong  correction  set  in  as  a  result  of  the 
weakening  economy  and  the  fall  in  the  lira.  The  inflation  rate  jumped  far  above  the  upper 
band of the target range following the currency crisis and years of high credit growth, high 
money  growth  and  low  real  interest  rates.  There  was  no  progress  in  improving  the 
transparency of state aid. 

Turkey has made some progress and has a good level of preparation to cope with competitive 
pressures and market forces within the EU. Turkey is well-integrated with the EU market in 
terms of both trade and investment. Improvements were made in the energy sector, as well as 
some  advances  in  spending  on  research  and  development,  education  and  physical  capital. 
However, there are persistent problems with the quality of education and gender equality.  

Regarding  its  ability  to  assume  the  obligations  of  membership,  Turkey  has  continued  to 
align with the acquis, albeit at a limited pace. There have been more instances of backsliding 
regarding  a  number  of  key  aspects  in  the  areas  of  free  movement  of  capital,  public 
procurement, competition, information society, economic and monetary policy, and external 
relations. Turkey is well advanced in the areas of company law, trans-European networks and 
science  and  research  and  it  has  achieved  a  good  level  of  preparation  in  the  areas  of  free 
movement  of  goods,  intellectual  property  law,  financial  services,  enterprise  and  industrial 
policy,  consumer  and  health  protection,  customs  union  and  financial  control.  Turkey  is 
moderately  prepared  on  public  procurement  as  important  gaps  remain  in  its  alignment. 
Turkey is also moderately prepared in the area of free movement of capital, statistics, energy, 

8 

 
 
taxation,  economic  and  monetary  union,  regional  policy,  education  and  culture,  CFSP  and 
transport  policy  where  further  significant  efforts  are  needed  across  the  board.  Turkey  has 
reached  some  level  of  preparation  on  competition,  agriculture,  food  safety,  veterinary  and 
phytosanitary policy, social policy and employment, environment and climate change where 
more ambitious and better coordinated policies still need to be established and implemented. 
In all areas, more attention needs to be given to enforce legislation whilst many areas require 
further  significant  progress  to  achieve  legislative  alignment  with  the  EU  acquis,  strengthen 
the independence of regulatory authorities and build the administrative capacities. 

2. 

FUNDAMENTALS  FIRST:  POLITICAL  CRITERIA  AND  RULE  OF  LAW 
CHAPTERS 

Measures under the state of emergency and follow-up 

The EU, which immediately and strongly condemned the attempted coup, reiterated its full 
support for the country’s democratic institutions and recognised Turkey’s legitimate need to 
take  swift  and  proportionate  action  in  the  face  of  such  a  serious  threat.  The  state  of 
emergency, introduced on 15 July 2016 in the aftermath of the attempted coup, ended on 19 
July 2018 when its last extension expired.  Its  primary objective had been to  dismantle the 
Gülen  movement  that  the  Turkish  authorities  designated  a  terrorist  organisation  in  May 
2016  and  held  responsible  for  the  15  July  2016  coup  attempt.  More  generally,  it  was 
designed  to  support  the  fight  against  terrorism,  but  the  extraordinary  powers  it  sanctioned 
were  disproportionately  applied.  Some  decrees  issued  under  the  state  of  emergency 
amended key pieces of legislation, particularly in relation to property rights, local authorities 
and public administration, and audiovisual policy.  

During  the  state  of  emergency,  36  decrees  were  issued  constraining  certain  civil  and 
political rights. The decrees expanded the powers of the police and investigating prosecutors 
and  sanctioned  large-scale  dismissals  of  public  officials  and  closures  of  entities  and  the 
liquidation of their assets by the state. To date, Parliament has reviewed 32 of the decrees. 
The Constitutional Court has ruled that it does not have a mandate to review the legality of 
decrees using legal  powers issued during the state of emergency. More than 152 000 civil 
servants,  including  academics,  teachers,  police  officers,  health  workers,  judges  and 
prosecutors, have been dismissed using emergency decrees. More than 150 000 people were 
taken  into  custody  during  the  state  of  emergency  and  more  than  78 000  were  arrested  on 
terrorism-related  charges,  50 000  of  whom  are  still  in  jail.  The  decisions  of  the  Inquiry 
Commission on the State of Emergency Measures, established in May 2017 to individually 
review all complaints, are open to judicial review before a designated administrative court in 
Ankara, and then before the Constitutional Court. The majority of the Inquiry Commission’s 
board members are  appointed by the President of the Republic. Some 220 staff, including 
judges, prosecutors, inspectors, experts and civil servants, have been seconded to the Inquiry 
Commission,  whose  tenure  was  extended  by  a  presidential  decree  for  another  year  on  23 
January  2019.  In  August  2017,  the  Constitutional  Court  ruled  that  some  70 000  of  the 
individual  applications  it  had  received  were  inadmissible  since  they  had  not  exhausted  all 
earlier  domestic  remedies,  directing  applicants  to  the  Inquiry  Commission  and/or  to 
administrative courts. The European Court of Human Rights  also  re-directed some 28 000 
applications  it  had  received  to  the  Inquiry  Commission.  The  Inquiry  Commission  started 
considering  applications  in  December  2017.  There  are  questions  as  to  how  thoroughly 
individual evidence is being considered. Since there are no hearings, there is a general lack 
of procedural guarantees for applicants, and decisions are taken on the basis of the written 
files related  to  the original dismissal.  There are also  concerns  around the  establishment of 

9 

 
 
clear  criteria  for  the  prioritisation  of  cases,  the  possibility  for  applicants  to  seek  interim 
measures, and whether those who are reinstated can seek additional redress before ordinary 
courts. It is important that applicants who challenge a decision of the Inquiry Commission 
before the administrative courts have access to their own files. Similarly, it is important that 
the Inquiry Commission’s decisions are properly reasoned, and that the complainants have 
access to that reasoning and may contest it in court. Applicants to the Inquiry Commission 
complain that finding legal representation is often difficult. 

As  of  May  2019,  a  total  of  126  000  applications  relating  to  dismissal  from  public  service 
had been made to the Inquiry Commission. Of these, the Inquiry Commission has reviewed 
70 406  and  only  5  250  have  led  to  reinstatement,  while  65 156  complaints  have  been 
rejected. There are 55 714 applications pending. The rate of processing of applications raises 
concerns at whether each case is being examined individually. 

Immediately following the expiry of the state of emergency, the Turkish Parliament adopted 
a  law  that  retained  many  elements  of  emergency  rule  for  a  further  three  years,  curtailing 
certain fundamental freedoms, notably allowing the dismissal of public servants (including 
judges) and the extension of detention periods, restricting freedom of movement and public 
assembly, and extending powers for government-appointed provincial governors. 

With the ending of the state of emergency, Turkey has withdrawn its derogations from the 
European  Convention  on  Human  Rights.  However,  the  full  monitoring  procedure  that  the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe reopened in April 2017 remains in place 
until  its  serious  concerns  about  the  respect  for  human  rights,  democracy  and  rule  of  law 
have  been  addressed.  This  entails  regular  visits  by  rapporteurs  to  hold  dialogues  with  the 
authorities, and plenary debates to review progress. 

After a hiatus of three years, the inter-ministerial Reform Action Group resumed its work, 
holding meetings in August and December 2018, as well as on 9 May 2019. 

2.1. 

Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform 

2.1.1.  Democracy 

Despite the  welcome lifting of the state of emergency, Turkey has introduced many  of its 
more restrictive elements into legislation. The new presidential system has removed many of 
the checks and balances that existed previously, and has weakened the role of Parliament. It 
has  led  to  more  politicisation  of  the  public  administration  and  the  judiciary  and  given  the 
president  the  power  to  nominate  the  heads  of  the  vast  majority  of  the  public  regulatory 
authorities. The continuous deterioration in the situation relating to human rights, rule of law 
or independence of the judiciary continued during the reporting period.  

Elections 

Turkey held  early presidential  and parliamentary elections on 24 June 2018 under state of 
emergency  conditions.  Amendments to  the  electoral  Law, which substantially changed the 
rules for the elections and campaign process,  were adopted by Parliament only one month 
prior  to  calling  the  early  elections.  Turkey  also  held  local  elections  on  31  March  2019. 
While  both  polls  enjoyed  high  turnouts,  international  observers  stressed  on  these  two 
occasions  that  even  though  voters  had  genuine  choice,  candidates  did  not  compete  on  an 
equal  basis,  notably  in  terms  of  the  absence  of  equal  access  to  the  media  for  all  parties 
running in elections, something which was reflected in excessive coverage by government-
affiliated public and private media. The decisions by the Supreme Election Council (YSK) 
to re-run the metropolitan mayoral election in Istanbul as well as to grant the mayorship of 
individual  municipalities  in  the  south-east  to  second-placed  candidates  are  a  source  of 

10 

 
 
serious concern regarding the respect of the legality and integrity of the electoral process, as 
well as about the institution’s independence from political pressure.  

One of the new amendments to the electoral law allowed political parties to form electoral 
alliances,  giving  rise  to  the  People’s  Alliance  comprised  of  the  Justice  and  Development 
Party (AKP) and Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and the Nation’s Alliance, which united 
the  Republican  People’s  Party  (CHP),  Good  Party  (İYİ)  and  Felicity  Party.  Three  other 
parties contested the election: the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), Free Cause Party and 
Vatan Party, and there were six presidential candidates. 

The Election Observation Mission conducted by the Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human  Rights  (ODIHR)  of  the  Organisation  for  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe 
(OSCE) concluded that the elections offered voters a genuine choice. However, the parties 
could  not  compete  on  an  equal  basis  due  to  the  restrictive  legal  framework  and  powers 
granted under the state of emergency, and limited freedom of assembly and expression. The 
incumbent president and his party enjoyed a notable advantage, which was also reflected in 
excessive  coverage  by  public  and  private  media  close  to  the  government.  Turkey  has  not 
formally invited the ODHIR to present its findings since 2014. 

On  a  turnout  of  86.22%,  President  Erdoğan  won  the  presidential  race  in  the  first  round, 
securing  52.5%  of  the  vote.  In  the  parliamentary  elections,  none  of  the  parties  secured  an 
overall  majority,  although  all  major  political  parties  won  seats.  Women  remain 
underrepresented  in  political  life.  Overall,  20.5%  of  party-nominated  parliamentary 
candidates  were  female,  but  since  few  were  placed  in  eligible  positions  on  the  party  lists 
only 17.3% of Members of Parliament are women. This is nevertheless an improvement on 
the 14.7% in the outgoing legislature.  

The  June  elections  marked  the  full  entry  into  force  of  the  presidential  system  that  was 
agreed  by  a  narrow  majority  in  a  referendum  in  April  2017  (for  details  on  constitutional 
changes, see Governance section). 

Both electoral alliances were maintained for the local elections held on 31 March 2019. The 
HDP  presented  candidates  in  the  south-east,  while  not  fielding  any  candidate  in  the  large 
cities  including  Istanbul  and  Ankara.  Turnout  remained  high  at  84%.  Overall,  the  People’s 
Alliance secured 51.67% of the votes, while the Nation’s Alliance got 37.53% of votes. The 
number of women among the candidates fielded by most political parties was very low. 

The Nation’s Alliance’s candidates won in the three largest provinces as well as in other key 
municipalities including Ankara, Adana, Antalya, Mersin and Hatay. According to  the final 
count, it also won in Istanbul where the CHP elected mayor eventually received his election 
certificate after several appeals for recount of the votes in some districts were accepted. After 
a  long  appeal  process,  the  YSK  eventually  annulled  the  metropolitan  mayoral  elections  in 
Istanbul and scheduled a re-run for 23 June, based on alleged irregularities in the composition 
of the ballot box committees. It also annulled the mandate of the CHP mayor-elect, who was 
replaced  by  a  trustee,  appointed  by  the  government.  The  YSK  did  not  annul  the  other 
elections such as the elections for district mayors, council members and mukhtars while the 
same contested ballot box committees were in charge of these elections as well. Opposition 
parties strongly protested against it.  

The YSK rejected the HDP's extraordinary appeals in relation to the YSK’s decision not to 
confirm four HDP elected-mayors and several members of municipal councils in the south-
east. Even though their candidacies had been initially validated by the YSK, they have been 
denied the right to take up office on the ground that they had been previously dismissed from 
public  service  with  decree-laws  under  the  state  of  emergency.  At  the  same  time,  the  YSK 

11 

 
 
gave the mayoral mandates to the candidates who got the second highest number of votes, all 
from  the  ruling  AKP,  thereby  in  effect  reversing  the  result  of  the  election  in  these 
constituencies.  This  is  a source  of  serious  concern  regarding  the  respect  of  the  legality  and 
integrity  of  the  electoral  process,  as  well  as  about  the  institution’s  independence  from 
political pressure. 

A delegation from the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, 
comprising  22  observers,  carried  out  an  election  observation  mission  to  Turkey  from  27 
March  to  1  April  2019  to  assess  the  local  elections.  In  its  preliminary  conclusions,  the 
delegation  noted  that  the  elections  were  conducted  in  an  orderly  way.  However,  it  also 
stressed that while voters had a broad choice of political parties, it was not fully convinced 
that  Turkey  currently  has  the  free  and  fair  electoral  environment  which  is  necessary  for 
genuinely  democratic  elections  in  line  with  European  values  and  principles.  The 
Commission stressed that it expected the Turkish authorities to invite the Council of Europe 
to observe the re-run elections in Istanbul. 

Parliament 

The  new  presidential  system  has  significantly  curtailed  Parliament’s  legislative  and 
oversight functions. Since July 2018, Parliament has adopted 17 pieces of legislation, but for 
much  of  that  time  has  been  in  recess.  Among  the  pieces  of  legislation  were  controversial 
changes  to  its  rules  of  procedure.  Presidential  decrees  are  also  a  means  of  shortening 
legislative  procedure:  17  have  been  issued  since  November  2018.  Political  polarisation, 
especially  in  the  run-up  to  the  31  March  2019  municipal  elections,  continues  to  prevent 
constructive parliamentary dialogue. The marginalisation of the opposition, particularly the 
People's Democratic Party (HDP), continues, and many HDP members of parliament are in 
detention.  The  long-standing  shortcomings  of  the  system  of  parliamentary  immunity  have 
not been addressed. 

Following  the  entry  into  force  of  the  new  presidential  system,  one  Vice-President  and 
sixteen  ministers  were  appointed  on  10  July  2018  directly  by  the  President  without  any 
parliamentary  approval,  proposal  or  hearing.  The  number  of  members  of  parliament  was 
increased  from  550  to  600  in  line  with  the  revised  constitutional  provision.  Growing 
political  polarisation  and  strong  partisan  competition  continue  to  prevent  constructive 
parliamentary  dialogue  between  parties.  The  second  largest  opposition  party,  the  People's 
Democratic  Party  (HDP),  whose  two  former  co-chairs  Selahattin  Demirtaş  and  Figen 
Yüksekdağ,  nine  former  deputies  and  other  party  executives  remain  under  arrest  on 
terrorism-related  charges,  continues  to  be  particularly  marginalised.  The  parliamentary 
immunity  regime  in  Turkey  needs  to  be  strengthened  in  order  to  ensure  elected 
representatives’ freedom of expression. 

The  constitutional  overhaul  has  also  changed  the  legislative  process.  Responsibility  for 
producing draft legislative proposals lies now with members of parliament, rather than with 
the government. Since June 2018, Parliament has adopted only 17 pieces of legislation out 
of  the  1  479  bills  tabled  by  members  of  parliament.  Several  opposition  members  have 
repeatedly  reported 
ignored  many  proposed 
the  ruling  majority  consistently 
amendments  (including  on  important  legislation  such  as  the  law  replacing  the  state  of 
emergency). Moreover, under the new system, the drafting of complex legislation, originally 
done by line ministries, is now the responsibility of Parliament, which does not yet have the 
necessary resources or expertise to do this, which has a severe impact on necessary reforms.  

that 

In  the  new  system,  constitutional  provisions  enshrine  the  principle  of  the  primacy  of  law 
over  presidential  decree  but  without  control  of  the  Parliament.  They  also  define  the 

12 

 
 
legislative areas that remain the prerogative of Parliament. However, this principle has not 
always  been  respected.  Indeed,  since  November  2018,  the  president  has  issued  17 
presidential decrees covering a wide range of social and economic policy issues, including 
restructuring  the  public  administration,  making  key  public  appointments  and  introducing 
major economic policies.  

During  the  state  of  emergency,  Parliament’s  legislative  powers  could  be  by-passed  by 
executive decrees. This was used to regulate policy areas beyond those strictly covered by 
the state of emergency legislation itself.  

Parliamentary oversight of the  executive has been weakened still further under the new 
presidential  system.  Presidential  decrees  remain  exempt  from  parliamentary  control. 
Parliamentary  scrutiny  of  the  decrees  issued  under  the  state  of  emergency  is  not  fully 
effective. Under the new presidential system, Parliament is largely unable to exercise its role 
of holding the executive to account. The right to put oral questions has been abolished, and 
written  questions,  which  can  only  be  addressed  to  the  Vice-President  and  ministers,  are 
seldom answered in due time. There has been no improvement in follow-up by the executive 
on issues raised as a result of the ordinary mechanisms of parliamentary oversight, such as 
committee work or parliamentary inquiry committees. 

Parliamentary oversight of public spending needs to be improved. The audit reports from the 
Turkish  Court  of  Accounts  are  only  considered  in  the  planning  and  budget  committees  in 
connection with the approval of the final accounts and the draft government budget for the 
following year, but there is no formal parliamentary discussion of these audit reports before 
a specialised parliamentary committee. 

Limited  steps  have  been  taken  to  align  the  legal  framework  on  elections  and  political 
parties with European standards, including to partly mitigate the very high. 10% electoral 
threshold.  Turkey  needs  to  align  with  the  outstanding  ODIHR  and  Venice  Commission 
recommendations on addressing gaps in the electoral legal framework. 

Governance 

The President’s executive and legislative powers substantially increased in the constitutional 
architecture of the new presidential system. The President has remodelled the executive and 
the  state  administration  by  means  of  presidential  decrees.  The  new  Presidential  system, 
including the abolition of the position of Prime Minister and other functions such as under-
secretaries  in  ministries,  has  led  to  more  politicisation  of  the  public  administration.  The 
President  now  has  the  power  to  nominate  the  heads  of  the  vast  majority  of  the  public 
regulatory  authorities.  Ahead  of  the  March  2019  municipal  elections,  the  appointment  of 
trustees  to  replace  municipal  executives  and  elected  representatives  continued  to  have  a 
negative  impact  on  local  democracy.  A  presidential  decree  adopted  in  August  brings  the 
budgets  of  local  authorities,  professional  organisations,  foundations  and  social  security 
institutions under the control of a single account managed by the Ministry of Treasury and 
Finance that answers directly to the President.  

The  June  elections  marked  the  full  entry  into  force  of  the  presidential  system  that  was 
agreed by a narrow majority in a referendum in April 2017. The Council of Europe was not 
consulted  on  the  constitutional  amendments  in  advance  of  the  vote,  and  the  Council’s 
Venice  Commission,  in  its  March  2017  opinion,  concluded  that  they  represented  a 
dangerous  step  backwards  in  Turkey’s  constitutional  democratic  tradition.  The  Venice 
Commission noted that the state of emergency did not provide a proper democratic setting 
for  a  constitutional  referendum.  It  raised  procedural  concerns  such  as  the  detention  of  a 
significant number of opposition deputies and the fact that the vote was cast without a secret 

13 

 
 
ballot.  The  opinion  concluded  that  although  every  state  has  the  right  to  choose  its  own 
political system, this right is not unconditional. It said that the principles of the separation of 
powers and independence of the judiciary as part of the rule of law must be respected and 
built  into  the  political  system.  The  Venice  Commission  did  not  find  this  to  be  the  case  in 
Turkey. It underlined that the system was characterised by a lack of the checks and balances 
required to safeguard against an excessive concentration of power in one single office and to 
ensure  the  independence  of  the  judiciary.  Under  the  presidential  system,  the  president’s 
political  accountability  is  limited  mainly  to  elections,  and  several  provisions  curtail  the 
independence of the judiciary from the executive and run counter to European standards.  

Under  the  new  presidential  system,  the  office  of  Prime  Minister  was  abolished,  and  the 
Vice-President and ministers are now appointed directly by the President, with no role for 
Parliament. The President has the power to: 

  appoint and dismiss senior government officials; 

  set national security policies and take the necessary implementation measures; 

  declare a state of emergency; 

  issue presidential decrees on executive matters outside the scope of the law; 

  indirectly  dissolve  Parliament  by  calling  for  new  parliamentary  and  presidential 

elections; 

  draw up the government budget; 

  veto laws; and 

  appoint four of the 13 members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors and 12 of the 

15 judges of the Constitutional Court. 

Traditional  instruments  of  scrutiny  of  the  executive  by  Parliament,  such  as  a  vote  of 
confidence and the possibility of oral questions to the executive, are no longer possible; only 
written  questions  can  be  addressed  to  vice-presidents  and  ministers.  If  three-fifths  of  its 
members  agree,  Parliament  is  able  to  launch  a  parliamentary  investigation  into  alleged 
criminal  actions  by  the  President,  Vice-President  and  ministers  related  to  their  functions. 
The  principle  of  precedence  of  laws  over  presidential  decrees  is  enshrined  in  the  new 
system, and the President may not issue decrees in areas reserved to the legislature by the 
Constitution. The President has the power to veto any law, although Parliament can override 
this veto if an absolute majority agrees, while Parliament can only apply to the constitutional 
court to annul presidential decrees.  

A number of presidential decrees have created new agencies and offices, merging ministries 
and other institutions. Several key institutions, such as the General Staff, National Intelligence 
Agency,  National  Security  Council  and  Sovereign  Wealth  Fund  have  now  been  attached  to 
the presidency. As part of this overhaul, nine policy councils, with advisory and coordinating 
functions,  have  been  established  under  the  auspices  of  the  presidency.  The  relationship 
between presidency councils, which prepare policymaking recommendations for the President 
(and where ministers are not represented), and implementing line ministries, is not yet clear. 
The civil service has undergone a wholesale reform that is still not fully complete.  

Women’s  participation  in  public  service,  as  well  as  the  percentage  of  women  in  senior 
managerial positions, needs to be improved (38.41% in 2018). The percentage of women in 
senior managerial positions is 9.05%.  

14 

 
 
As regards local government, arrests of elected local politicians on terrorism-related charges 
continued,  and  some  still  remain  under  arrest.  Before  the  March  2019  municipal  elections 
several municipalities were being run by centrally appointed trustees, mainly on the  grounds 
that their elected mayors had  alleged links  to  terrorist organisations.  It  is  crucial that  voters 
are permitted to choose local elected representatives in accordance with Turkish law and with 
the  European  Charter  of  Local  Self-Government,  to  which  Turkey  is  a  party.  Arrests  and 
dismissals  of local  politicians  and  appointment  of  trustees  as  well  as  the YSK’s  decision  to 
deny mayorship to HDP candidates in four municipalities in the south-east deprive voters of 
political representation at local level, and seriously risk damaging local democracy.  

A  presidential  decree  published  in  August  2018  effectively  connects  all  local  authority 
budgets  to  the  Minister  of  Treasury  and  Finance.  Professional  organisations  established  by 
law or under the Constitution, foundations and social security institutions are all covered by 
the  decree.  Though  the  establishment  of  the  Single  Treasury  Institutional  Account  has  the 
advantage of ensuring a more balanced budget between public institutions, since any budget 
surplus  will  be  shared,  it  risks  increasing  the  dependence  of  local  administrations  and  state 
economic enterprises on centralised management, further undermining local democracy.  

The Ombudsman has a steady caseload and has been active in raising awareness of its role. 
However, the Institution still lacks ex officio powers to initiate investigations and to intervene 
in cases with legal remedies, and such limitations curtail effectiveness. 

The  legal  framework  does  not  protect  independent  regulatory  authorities  from  undue 
political interference. Under the new presidential system, many regulatory authorities (such as 
the  Competition  Authority  (see  Chapter  8  –  Competition  policy),  the  Information  and 
Communication  Technologies  Board,  the  Cyber  Security  Council,  the  Radio  and  Television 
Supreme Council (see Chapter 10 – Information Society and Media), the Directorate-General 
for Rail Regulation (see Chapter 14 – Transport policy), the Regulatory Body of the Atomic 
Industry  (see  Chapter  15  -  Energy)  and  the  central  bank  (see  Chapter  17  –  Economic  and 
Monetary Policy) are now directly linked to the Presidency.  

Civil society 

There has been serious backsliding regarding civil society as it has come under continuous 
pressure, notably in the face of a large number of arrests of activists, including human rights 
defenders. There is also public stigmatisation of independent civil society organisations and 
a recurrent use of bans of demonstrations and other types of gatherings. The space for civil 
society organisations  working on fundamental  rights  and freedoms has  further shrunk. The 
rights-based  organisations  closed  under  the  state  of  emergency  have  not  been  offered  any 
legal  remedy  in  relation  to  confiscations.  However,  civil  society  has  remained  active  and 
involved in public life as far as possible. Pro-government organisations continued to gain a 
more visible role and opportunities for representation. Administrative difficulties for national 
and international  non-governmental organisations  (NGOs)  continue to  hamper civil  society 
activities. Since October, following the amendment of Parliament’s rules of procedure, civil 
society  organisations  are  excluded  from  legislative  consultation  processes  at  parliamentary 
committees.  Systematic  and  inclusive  mechanisms  for  consulting  a  wide  spectrum  of  civil 
society, notably on new legislation and policies, need to be in place and used regularly. 

An empowered and diverse civil society is a crucial component of any democratic system and 
should  be  recognised  and  treated  as  such  by  the  state  institutions.  Turkish  civil  society 
organisations  (CSOs)  continued  to  make  crucial  contributions  on  key  challenges  facing  the 
country, notably in the areas of education, female workforce participation, awareness-raising 

15 

 
 
regarding ethnic and social tolerance, and support for refugees. There are a limited number of 
CSOs operating in the field of human rights. 

However, civil society continued to face increasing pressure, in particular following the high 
number of detentions and arrests of activists and human rights defenders. The indictment of 
Osman  Kavala,  a  prominent  human  rights  defender  who  was  held  for  more  than  a  year 
without  charge,  together  with  15  other  human  rights  activists,  is  deeply  worrying,  and  is 
emblematic of the shrinking public space and uncertainty in which civil society organisations 
are trying to operate. Smear campaigns in some media outlets against some of these activists, 
including for accepting funds from international donors, are a recurrent feature and a matter of 
serious  concern.  Furthermore,  leaks  continued  of  confidential  dossiers  on  human  rights 
defenders  in  prison,  while  their  legal  procedures  were  still  ongoing,  by  media  groups  with 
close ties to the authorities. Defamatory public rhetoric cast serious doubt on Turkey’s respect 
for due process and the presumption of innocence. International NGOs also faced difficulties 
in their work in Turkey, including those providing humanitarian aid to refugees. No effective 
domestic remedy has yet been made available for the confiscation of assets from civil society 
organisations closed by emergency decrees.  

The Directorate-General for Relations with Civil Society was established within the Ministry 
of Interior, replacing the Department of Associations. The mandate and priorities of this unit, 
including the drafting of an overarching strategy for civil society or the improvement of the 
legal  framework, remain unclear. A regulation  issued in  October 2018 makes it compulsory 
for  all  associations  to  register  all  their  members  (not  only  their  board  members)  in  the 
information system of the Ministry of Interior. This is not in line with the OSCE/Council of 
Europe guidelines on freedom of association. 

Other barriers to civil society and freedom of association remain. Cumbersome administrative 
procedures  imposed  on  NGOs  by  the  authorities  are  still  in  place.  Provisions  restricting 
registration,  procedures  for  obtaining  required  permits  and  the  functioning  of  associations 
need  to  be  revised,  including  facilitating  the  work  of  international  NGOs  working  with 
refugees in Turkey.  

The Law on Collection of Aid imposes burdensome requirements that discourage fundraising 
activities by civil society organisations. These include prior authorisation for each fundraising 
activity and long authorisation processes based on non-objective criteria. Public funds are not 
distributed in a transparent way and the process does not allow the full involvement of civil 
society organisations and other stakeholders at every stage. The existing tax system makes it 
difficult  for  foundations  and  associations  to  function  and  develop.  ‘Public  benefit’  (for 
associations) or ‘tax exemption’ (for foundations) status is vaguely defined, and the decision-
making  process  is  not  transparent.  The  environment  for  foreign  donors,  which  provide 
financial  support  to  the  Turkish  civil  society  under  the  current  Turkish  legislation,  is 
increasingly  shrinking  notably  because  of  unfounded  public  allegations,  for  example  in  the 
Gezi case.  

There  is  no  comprehensive  government  strategy  in  place  for  cooperation  with  civil  society. 
There  is  still  no  coordination  body  for  monitoring,  no  transparent  mechanism  for  public 
funding and no fiscal incentives for civil society organisations. Independent rights-based civil 
society organisations are mostly excluded from the consultations that are part of law-making 
and  policymaking  processes  and  monitoring.  Overall,  the  legal,  financial  and  administrative 
environment needs to be more conducive to developing civil society. 

Civilian oversight of the security and intelligence sector  

Presidential  decrees  resulted  in  the  overhaul  of  the  legal  and  institutional  framework 

16 

 
 
governing  the  security  sector.  Amendments  to  the  legal  framework  accorded  broad  powers 
over  the  security  forces  to  the  executive  branch.  Dismissals  and  arrests  in  relation  to  the 
attempted coup of July  2016 have continued. By  December 2018, a total  of 15 242 military 
officers  were  dismissed  from  the  service  due  to  their  alleged  links  to  the  Gülen  movement 
while  5 783  former  military  personnel  were  also  arrested  on  grounds  of  their  alleged 
involvement in the averted coup. Security and intelligence services continue to lack sufficient 
transparency and accountability before Parliament. 

A Presidential decree of July 2018 overhauled the organisational structure and accountability 
lines  of  the  Turkish  armed  forces.  The  General  Staff  and  all  force  commands  have  been 
subordinated to the Ministry of National Defence. All military hierarchy is now accountable 
to  the  President,  who  is  legally  entitled  to  give  orders  directly  to  the  chief  of  general  staff, 
force commanders and their subordinates. The Supreme Military Council was restructured to 
strengthen  civilian  presence,  with  the  designation  of  the  Vice-President  and  Treasury  and 
Finance  and  Education  Ministers  as  members.  High  military  courts  were  abolished,  and 
civilian higher courts have reviewed the appeals against the decisions of military courts. 

Despite  these  recognised  improvements,  some  issues  remain.  The  military,  police  and 
intelligence services continue to lack sufficient transparency and accountability to Parliament. 
Security personnel continue to have wide-ranging legal protection. Despite credible reporting 
of serious allegations of human rights violations and of the disproportionate use of force by 
security forces in the south-east, the track record of judicial and administrative examination of 
such  allegations  remains  poor.  The  parliamentary  law  enforcement  oversight  commission 
remained  ineffective.  The  legal  framework  for  overseeing  military  expenditure  has  not  yet 
been improved. 

Situation in the east and south-east 

The situation in the south-east has continued to be challenging despite an improved security 
environment.  The  Government  continued  security  operations  against  the  background  of  the 
recurrent violent acts by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and PKK-affiliated groups. The 
PKK  remains  on  the  EU  list  of  persons,  groups  and  entities  involved  in  acts  of  terrorism. 
While  the  Government  has  a  legitimate  right  to  fight  terrorism,  it  is  also  responsible  for 
ensuring that this is done in accordance with the rule of law, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Anti-terror measures need to be proportionate. The Government’s investment plan 
for reconstruction of damaged areas in the south-east,  announced in September 2016, led to 
the  ongoing  construction  of  many  dwellings.  The  compensation  process  and  distribution 
criteria of housing for internally displaced persons are not transparent. There were no visible 
developments  on  the  resumption  of  a  credible  political  process  to  achieve  a  peaceful  and 
sustainable solution. 

The  PKK  or  its  affiliated  groups  continued  to  commit  violent  terrorist  attacks  during  the 
reporting  period.  Terrorist  attacks  by  the  PKK  targeted  cities  in  the  south-east  and  east  of 
Turkey,  which  resulted  in  deaths  and  injuries.  The  EU  unambiguously  condemned  these 
attacks  and  expressed  solidarity  with  the  families  of  the  victims.  Subsequent  to  Abdullah 
Öcalan’s lawyers’ visit of their client on 2 May 2019 and the CPT visit from 6 to 16 May, the 
Turkish Minister of Justice stated on 16 May that the ban on these visits was lifted. 

Province governorates reacted by declaring intermittent curfews and security zones in mostly 
rural settlements. The Venice Commission’s recommendations in its June 2016 opinion on the 
legal framework governing curfews are yet to be implemented. Investigations into the deaths 
of civilians in 2015 during security operations under curfews in towns such as Cizre have not 
progressed.  In  November  2018,  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (ECtHR)  held  an 

17 

 
 
admissibility hearing in  34 ongoing applications  in  relation  to  curfews during which people 
lost their lives  in Cizre, in  the province of  Şırnak  and in  the Sur  district of Diyarbakir. The 
Council  of  Europe’s  Human  Rights  Commissioner  is  a  third  party  to  this  case.  In  February 
2019,  the  ECtHR  rejected  a  number  of  related  complaints  as  inadmissible  due  to  non-
exhaustion of domestic remedies.  

Human rights organisations and opposition parties reported serious violations of human rights 
by  security  forces,  including  alleged  instances  of  torture,  ill-treatment,  arbitrary  arrests  and 
breaches  of  procedural  rights.  The  report  by  the  Office  of  the  UN  High  Commissioner  for 
Human  Rights  of  February  2017  still  needs  follow  up;  it  stated  that there  is  no  evidence  of 
effective  and  independent  investigations  into  the  reported  killings  or  the  numerous  other 
serious human rights violations allegedly committed between July 2015 and December 2016 
during  security  operations.  As  also  reported  by  the  UN  Commissioner,  human  rights 
defenders still face major difficulties in accessing areas affected by ongoing violence, which 
impedes  their  work  on  the  forced  disappearances  that  occurred  in  the  1990s.  A  very  broad 
interpretation of the fight against terrorism, growing restrictions  put in place during and after 
the  state  of  emergency  on  the  rights  of  journalists,  the  Bar  Associations  and  Human  rights 
defenders  (HRDs)  working  on  the  Kurdish  issue  are  among  issues  raising  concern.  Other 
associations  and  Kurdish-language  media  outlets  and  cultural  rights  institutions  remained 
closed. 

There  were  numerous  new  detentions  and  arrests  of  elected  representatives  and  municipal 
executives  in  the  east  and  south-east  under  terrorism-related  charges,  and  serious  concerns 
regarding the YSK’s decision not to let elected mayors take office and to recognise second-
placed candidates as mayors (See section above — Governance). 

The  South-Eastern  Anatolia  Project  (GAP)  continues  to  operate  with  the  objective  of 
improving socioeconomic development in the region. The Government’s investment plan for 
post-conflict  reconstructing  of  damaged  areas  in  the  south-east,  announced  in  September 
2016, has led to the ongoing construction of thousands of dwellings. Some initial work was 
done by the Government to restore the cultural, historical and religious heritage sites damaged 
in  2015  and  2016.  Beyond  the  restoration  carried  out  by  the  Government  of  the  Armenian 
Catholic Church, restoration works have started in 2019 on the Surp Giragos Church and the 
Mar Petyun Chaldean Church. Civil society has continued to be critical of projects such as the 
Ilısu Dam which risks damaging natural habitats, agricultural land and historical heritage sites 
such as Hasankeyf.  

There  is  still  no  comprehensive,  consistent  approach  in  relation  to  missing  persons,  to  the 
exhumation  of  mass  graves  and  to  the  independent  investigation  of  all  alleged  cases  of 
extrajudicial killing by security and law enforcement officers. The February 2017 Council of 
Europe  report  on  missing  persons  and  victims  of  enforced  disappearance  highlighted  the 
excessive  length  of  trials.  Most  of  the  investigations  into  cases  of  enforced  disappearances 
from  the  1990s  are,  or  will  soon  be,  facing  the  20-year  statute  of  limitations.  However,  the 
UN  Working  Group  on  Enforced  or  Involuntary  Disappearances  (WGEID)  assessed  that 
enforced  disappearances  are  not  subject  to  statutes  of  limitation,  thereby  providing  a 
guarantee against impunity. 

The 2015 recommendations by the UN Special Rapporteur to tackle the lack of prosecutions 
over  extrajudicial,  summary  or  arbitrary  executions  remain  unaddressed.  The  village  guard 
system  is  still  in  place,  despite  criticism.  There  were  reported  incidents  of  human  rights 
violations.  More  than  600  village  guards  were  removed  from  duty  due  to  involvement  in 
criminal activities. 

18 

 
 
Refugees and internally displaced persons 

Turkey hosts the largest  number of refugees worldwide; in February 2019, it was  sheltering 
and meeting the needs of approximately 3.6 million Syrians and 370 000 other nationalities. 
temporary 
Some  142 000  Syrian  nationals  under 
accommodation  centres  run  by  the  Directorate-General  for  Migration  Management.  Turkey 
has made sustained significant efforts to provide support for refugees and ensure wider access 
to healthcare and schooling, with 65% of Syrian children now in school. Many cities provide 
municipal services to refugees. Of one million Syrians of school age in Turkey, about 635 000 
now  have  access  to  primary  and  secondary  education,  up  from  605 000  last  year.  In  May 
2018,  the  number  of  Syrians  under  temporary  protection  who  held  work  permits  stood  at 
43 000 (see Chapter 24 – Justice, freedom and security). 

temporary  protection 

in  13 

live 

Civil society reports highlight some problems, such as high rates of child labour and truancy 
rates  among  refugees  and  asylum  seekers,  particularly  non-Syrians.  Many  refugees  and 
asylum  seekers  are  exploited  in  the  informal  economy  and  their  poverty  inhibits  access  to 
protection. 

There  has  been  limited  progress  on  the  situation  of  internally  displaced  persons  (IDPs) 
resulting  from  the  violence  in  the  south-east,  and  a  small  percentage  of  IDPs  have  been 
offered  new  housing.  This  process  is  not  based  on  a  comprehensive  and  transparent 
mechanism (see section above – Situation in the east and south-east). 

2.1.2.  Public administration reform 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  public  administration  reform.  There  has  been  serious 
backsliding in the area of public service and human resources management, which has also 
affected  policy  development  and  accountability.  A  major  re-structuring  of  the  public 
administration  and  civil  service  system  took  place  through  presidential  decrees.  Changes  to 
the  civil  service  system  have  further  increased  the  politicisation  of  the  administration.  An 
effective  remedy  still  needs  to  be  provided  for  the  large-scale  dismissals  that  took  place 
during  the  state  of  emergency.  In  the  absence  of  a  comprehensive  public  administration 
reform  strategy,  there  is  no  systematic  approach  to  reform.  The  low  level  of  female 
representation  in  the  higher  echelons  of  bureaucracy  remains  a  concern.  The  Commission’s 
recommendations from 2018 have not yet been implemented, and therefore remain valid. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ ensure that the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures provides for an 
effective  remedy,  which  safeguards  the  right  of  every  individual  to  a  fair  administrative 
process; 

→  prepare  changes  to  its  legislation  to  introduce  a  merit-based,  competitive  appointment 
system for senior managerial positions in the civil service; 

→  review  the  policy-making  process  with  a  view  to  ensuring  inclusive  and  evidence-based 
preparation of policy planning documents and legislative proposals. 

Strategic framework for public administration reform 

Turkey  still  lacks  an  overarching  public  administration  reform  strategic  framework, 
including  on  public  financial  management.  There  are  various  planning  documents  and 
sectoral policy documents on different aspects of public administration reform, but the lack of 
political support hinders comprehensive reform efforts. An administrative unit with a legal 
mandate to coordinate, design, implement and monitor public administration reform has not 
yet  been  established.  Such  a  unit  would  need  to  coordinate  closely  with  the  Ministry  of 

19 

 
 
Finance  and  Treasury,  to  ensure  coherence  of  strategic  and  fiscal  planning  and  efficiently 
address  managerial  accountability  (see  Chapter  32).  The  financial  sustainability  of  the 
overall  public  administration  reform  is  not  guaranteed,  as  key  planning  documents  do  not 
specify the expected costs of reform measures. 

Policy development and coordination 

The  extensive  restructuring  of  the  executive  branch,  which  took  place  without  any  public 
consultation,  resulted  in  further  centralisation  of  the  policy-making  system.  Policy 
coordination  among  central  government  institutions  has  remained  strong,  but  planning, 
monitoring  and  reporting  of  whole-of-government  performance  continue  to  be  inadequate. 
There  are  no  regulations  that  describe  rules  of  procedure  and  processes  within  the  overall 
decision-making process of the government, risking potential policy and legislative overlaps. 
The policy-planning process within government departments needs to be improved to ensure 
greater  participation  and  accountability.  Nine  Presidential  Policy  Councils,  which  have 
advisory and coordination functions over sectoral policies, were established, but their relation 
to the work of individual government departments is not yet clear. This is particularly evident 
in  economic  planning,  where  policy  programmes  do  not  have  a  systematic  link  with  fiscal 
planning.  

Legislative  development  and  policy  formulation  have  not  pursued  an  inclusive  and 
evidence-based approach. This has worsened with the transition to the presidential system, as 
responsibility for producing draft legislative proposals lies now with Members of Parliament, 
rather than with the Government. Public consultation is extremely rare, and inter-ministerial 
coordination  is  complicated  by  the  administrative  overhaul  that  accompanied  the  new 
presidential system. 

Public financial management 

There  has  been  little  progress  in  public  financial  management,  notably  because  of  the 
increased  number  of  exceptions  to  the  public  procurement  law,  late  adoption  of  the  budget 
and frequent and unannounced changes to tax policy. An independent fiscal council aiming to 
ensure fiscal discipline is yet to be established. In the absence of adequate ex post monitoring 
and reporting, major public investment programmes lack transparency. Budget transparency 
needs to be further improved, with the participation of civil society  (see Chapters 5, 16, 17 
and 32).  

Public service and human resources management 

to  managerial  posts.  Senior  managerial  posts, 

The  amendments  to  the  civil  service  system  have  endangered  merit-based  recruitment, 
i.e. 
promotion  and  appointment 
undersecretary  and  deputy  undersecretary  posts,  have  been  abolished,  and  their  duties  have 
been taken over by politically appointed deputy ministers, resulting in further politicisation of 
the civil service. The large-scale dismissals of public servants during the state of emergency 
have remained a matter of concern. While the legal framework provides uniform criteria for 
demotion,  dismissals  and  disciplinary  measures  and  ensures  a  possibility  for  appeal, 
large-scale dismissals during the state of emergency did not identify evidence relating to each 
individual  dismissal  case  and  lacked  minimum  procedural  safeguards  for  those  who  were 
dismissed.  

The  State  Personnel  Administration  was  closed  in  July  2018  and  replaced  by  the  Human 
Resources office under the President of the Republic. However, given its current limited size, 
it is unclear to what  extent it can cover the functions of the State Personnel Administration 
and ensure central coordination of human resources management in the public sector. 

20 

 
 
The  civil  service  remuneration  system  is  not  standardised  across  institutions  and  lacks 
transparency. Although central institutions offer some training and are responsible for some 
aspects  of  training  policy,  the  administration  lacks  sufficient  tools  to  support  the 
professional development of civil servants. While integrity in public service is boosted by 
ethics committees and an ethics board, no integrity plans have been issued since 2014. 

Accountability of the administration 

In  the  new  presidential  system,  the  organisation  of  state  administration  follows  extremely 
centralised lines of accountability to the Presidency. Most executive institutions are formally 
embedded  in  ministries,  although  they  retain  autonomy  over  day-to-day  operational 
management.  The  roles  and  responsibilities  of  different  institutions  are  not  yet  fully  clear, 
which  risks  reducing  transparency  and  accountability.  Accountability  of  agencies  is  weak, 
and internal control and audit do not function optimally (see Chapter 32).  

Internal  and  external  oversight  arrangements 
to  ensure  citizens’  right  to  good 
administration need to be better implemented. The role of oversight institutions such as the 
Ombudsman  needs  to  be  further  improved,  in  the  absence  of  ex  officio  powers  (see 
Governance).  Citizens’  right  to  access  public  information  is  regulated  by  the  law  on  the 
right to information, which does not require proactive disclosure of information and provides 
for broad exemptions on grounds of protecting state secrets, commercial secrets and personal 
data.  A  simplified  online  access  system  received  millions  of  applications  for  access  to 
information  in  2018.  The  Board  of  Review  of  Access  to  Information  is  responsible  for 
considering appeals filed against a refusal to provide access to public information. Citizens’ 
rights  to  administrative  justice  and  their  right  to  seek  compensation  have  remained 
problematic and the backlog of cases has increased as a result of the measures taken under the 
state of emergency. 

Service delivery to citizens and businesses 

Strong  commitment  to  a  user-oriented  administration  has  continued.  E-government 
services  have  continued  to  expand.  The  number  of  registered  users  grew  to  40  million  in 
2018, a significant increase from 25.2 million in 2015. Public services  are to a large extent 
accessible  through  e-government  tools.  One-stop-shops  and  points  of  single  contact  for 
citizens, particularly at local level, need to be further extended. A monitoring system needs to 
be set up to reduce barriers to accessing services for people with disabilities. 

Simplifying administrative procedures and cutting red tape is hindered by the absence of a 
law  on  general  administrative  procedures,  which  is  necessary  to  provide  citizens  and 
businesses with greater legal certainty. 

2.2. 

Rule of law and fundamental rights 

2.2.1.  Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights 

Turkey  is  at  an  early  stage  of  applying  the  acquis  and  European  standards  in  this  area. 
Backsliding continued, and the recommendations in the previous reports were not accepted 
or implemented. Political pressure on judges and prosecutors and transfers of a large number 
of  judges  and  prosecutors  against  their  will  continued.  This  continued  to  have  a  significant 
negative  effect  on  the  independence  and  overall  quality  and  efficiency  of  the  judiciary. 
Despite  their  acquittal,  a  large  number  of  judges  or  prosecutors  who  had  been  subject  to 
criminal charges were not returned to the profession. 

Overall,  corruption  is  widespread  and  remains  an  issue  of  concern.  There  has  been  no 
revision of the anti-corruption framework to address the gaps. 

21 

 
 
Fundamental  rights  have  been  considerably  curtailed  under  the  state  of  emergency  and 
pursuant  to  the  decrees  and  legislation  adopted  during  and  after  it.  This  has  led  to  very 
limited  progress  on  the  outstanding  issues  identified  in  previous  reports,  namely  the 
termination of the state of emergency. Nevertheless, further backsliding continued in all areas 
of human rights, most notably on freedom of expression including freedom of press, freedom 
of  assembly  and  association,  protection  of  human  rights  defenders,  property  rights  and 
procedural rights. No legal improvements have taken place concerning the removal of crucial 
safeguards protecting detainees from abuse, or prosecuting civilians who committed crimes 
while resisting the 2016 attempted coup, as well as any acts in the aftermath of the attempted 
coup.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  revise the legislation so that it is compatible with the ECHR and the ECtHR case law; 

  reinstate the necessary conditions to ensure the independence, impartiality, accountability, 

quality, efficiency and professionalism of the judiciary; 

  ensure that its international obligations are respected in relation to fundamental rights and 
freedoms,  and  effectively  address  serious  human  rights  violations,  including  respecting 
the right to a fair trial and effectively investigating allegations of violations of the ECHR 
and other international Conventions to which it is a party. 

Functioning of the judiciary 

Turkey  is  at  an  early  stage  in  this  area.  Serious  backsliding  continued.  Concerns  on  the 
independence  of  the  Turkish  judiciary  following,  among  other  issues,  the  dismissal  and 
forced removal of 30% of judges and prosecutors following the 2016 attempted coup remain. 
The  recruitment  of  new  judges  and  prosecutors  under  the  current  system  added  to  the 
concerns,  as  no measures  were taken to  address  the lack of objective, merit-based, uniform 
and  pre-established  criteria  for  their  recruitment  and  promotion.  The  chilling  effect  of  the 
dismissals  and  forced  transfers  on  the  judiciary  is  still  observed,  and  risks  engendering 
widespread self-censorship among judges and prosecutors. This may weaken the judiciary as 
a whole, its independence and the separation of powers. No measures were taken to restore 
legal  guarantees  to  ensure  the  independence  of  the  judiciary  from  the  executive  or  to 
strengthen  the  independence  of  the  Council  of  Judges  and  Prosecutors  (CJP).  No  changes 
were  made  to  the  institution  of  criminal  judges  of  peace,  which  risks  becoming  a  parallel 
system. The recommendations from earlier reports therefore remain valid.  

In the coming year, Turkey should: 

  create  a  political  and  legal  environment  that  allows  the  judiciary  to  perform  its  duties 
independently  and  impartially,  respecting  European  standards;  strengthen  judicial 
responsibilities,  with  the  executive  and  legislature  fully  respecting  the  separation  of 
powers; and  ensure that  judgments  by the Constitutional  Court, whose decisions should 
follow ECtHR jurisprudence delivered in a timely manner, are respected by lower courts; 

  implement Venice Commission (VC) recommendations, also on criminal judges of peace, 

to ensure that decisions on detentions take effect only if approved by a trial court; 

  limit the role and influence of the executive within the Council of Judges and Prosecutors 

(CJP) and provide effective guarantees against transfers of judges against their will; 

  introduce  further  safeguards  against  any  interference  by  the  Council  of  Judges  and 

Prosecutors in judicial proceedings; 

22 

 
 
  guarantee the principle of administrative and financial autonomy of the Justice Academy 
in  accordance  with  European  standards,  since  the  independence  and  composition  of  the 
authority responsible for training and its content is a corollary of the general principle of 
judicial independence. Increase its capacity to train candidates fully and to prepare them 
to effectively manage their future tasks; 

  limit  any  suspension  of  judges,  as  a  major  infringement  of  guaranteed  judicial 
independence under the Constitution, to cases where there are well-founded suspicions of 
serious misbehaviour; ensure that the system of disciplinary proceedings and promotions 
for judges  and prosecutors is  guided by objective criteria without undue influence  from 
the executive; 

  in  relation  to  the  administrative  and  judicial  measures  taken  against  individuals,  ensure 
that any allegation of wrongdoing or crime is subject to due process, based on evidence, 
in line with fully transparent procedures under the authority of an independent judiciary 
respecting  the  fair  trial  criteria  of  the  ECtHR.  These  procedures  must  fully  respect 
fundamental  rights,  including  procedural  rights,  in  particular  the  presumption  of 
innocence,  individual  criminal  responsibility,  legal  certainty,  the  right  to  a  defence,  the 
right to a fair trial, equality of arms and right to an effective appeal. 

Strategic documents 

A judicial reform strategy for 2019-2023 was announced in August 2018 but the strategy has 
not  yet been adopted. Consultations on the draft strategy have taken place, including of the 
Council  of  Europe  and  the  Commission,  which  asked  the  Turkish  authorities  to  take  its 
comments into consideration when reviewing the draft. 

Management bodies 

Since  May  2017,  the  CJP  continued  to  function  based  on  the  structure  adopted  by  the 
constitutional  amendments  with  13  members  (four  members  appointed  by  the  President, 
seven  members  appointed  by  the  Parliament,  in  addition  to  the  Minister  of  Justice  and  the 
Deputy  Minister).  The  procedure  governing  the  appointment  of  CJP  members  continues  to 
raise serious concerns in relation to its independence from the executive. A budget of TRY 65 
million was allocated to the CJP under the 2018 budget for central administration and TRY 
77 million in 2019. Improved transparency, full independence from the executive and strict 
adherence to  procedures in  line with  European standards are urgently  needed to  restore not 
only the CJP’s credibility, but also public trust in the entire judiciary. 

Independence and impartiality 

The Justice Academy of Turkey (JAT) was re-established by Presidential Decree on 1 May 
2019. It replaced the previous Justice Academy that was closed under the state of emergency. 
Its duties at that time were taken over by the Judges and Prosecutors Training Centre in the 
Ministry of Justice. According to the decree, the JAT will be responsible for all pre-service 
training of candidate judges and prosecutors as well as the in-service training. It is affiliated 
to the Ministry of Justice but has scientific, administrative and financial autonomy. The JAT 
will  have  a  president  and  a  maximum  of  four  heads  of  department.  It  will  also  have  a 
Consultative Committee, tasked to make proposals.  

Detentions and court cases against judges and prosecutors, and transfers, continued. No legal 
and constitutional guarantees were introduced to prevent judges and prosecutors from being 
transferred  against  their  will.  Concerns  remained  as  regards  the  perceived  influence  of  the 
executive  over  the  decisions  of  the  criminal  judges  of  peace  and  their  jurisdiction  and 
practice. These particularly relate to their extensive powers and to the fact that objections to 

23 

 
 
their  decisions  are  not  reviewed  by  a  higher  judicial  body  but  by  another  single-judge 
institution.  Their  rulings  increasingly  diverge  from  ECtHR  case  law  and  rarely  provide 
sufficiently individualised reasoning. Defence lawyers’ access to their clients’ court files for 
a specific catalogue of crimes are restricted until the indictment has been issued. Sometimes 
this takes more than a year. 

The closure of associations critical of the Government has had negative effects on pluralism 
in  judges  associations,  and  has  led  to  a  growing  hesitation  to  become  members  of  such 
associations. 

Ceremonies for new judges and prosecutors and the opening of the judicial year are held in 
the Presidential Palace. Such events contribute to the perception of an increased politicisation 
and influence of the executive over the judiciary. Public comments especially incriminating 
ones, on ongoing judicial  cases by representatives of the executive and  legislative  branches 
disregard the presumption of innocence of the suspects, and cast serious doubt on respect for 
due process. They have a serious chilling effect on the judges and prosecutors who deal with 
these  cases.  Long  detention  and  pre-trial  periods  have  become  the  norm  rather  than  the 
exception. 

Accountability 

In  2018,  nearly  all  judges  had  declared  their  assets  as  required  by  law.  The  disciplinary 
procedures  system  for  both  judges  and  prosecutors  has  been  perceived  as  undermining 
important guarantees that safeguard the independence of the judiciary. Mechanisms to detect 
breaches of the integrity rules and to enforce disciplinary penalties are in place but need to be 
made effective and free from political interference. The Office of Judicial Ethics was founded 
in February 2016. The CJP adopted the Code of Judicial Ethics in March 2019. 

Professionalism and competence 

As of February 2019, 10,000 candidate judges and prosecutors had been integrated into the 
judicial and administrative jurisdictions since the attempted coup, following an  accelerated 
and  non-transparent  selection  process.  Concerns  remain  over  the  lack  of  objective, 
merit-based,  uniform  and  pre-established  criteria  for  recruiting  and  promoting  judges  and 
prosecutors. The CJP is not sufficiently independent from the executive, and the Ministry of 
Justice  supervises  the  selection  boards  for  new  judges  and  prosecutors,  and  manages  their 
yearly appraisal. The CJP itself plays no role in the selection boards, even though it takes the 
final  decision  on  recruitment.  2  new  regional  Courts  of  Appeals  were  opened.  116  new 
members were appointed to the Court of Cassation and the Council of State in July with the 
declared objective of decreasing the workload in these institutions.  

Quality of justice 

The large increase in the number of inexperienced judges and prosecutors in recent years and 
the  drastic  reduction  of  the  duration  of  in-service  training  have  seriously  impacted  on  the 
skills  of  the  future  judges  and  prosecutors  needed  to  effectively  manage  the  case  law  and 
tackle the workload.  

The Justice Academy should be allocated sufficient resources to tackle the increased need for 
pre-service and in-service training for newly recruited judges and prosecutors. 

Frequent transfers of judges and prosecutors have negatively affected the quality of justice. 
Overall, there are serious concerns regarding the quality of judicial decisions, particularly in 
terrorism-related  cases,  in  terms  of  their  legal  reasoning  and  the  factual  evidence  on  which 
they  are  based.  Indictments  often  reflect  allegations,  and  are  not  supported  by  credible 
evidence. These indictments, which are sometimes based on statements by people who have 

24 

 
 
been  accused  in  other  cases  or  by  secret  witnesses,  raise  serious  concerns.  In  some  cases, 
evidence and arguments presented by the defence are not reflected in the Court’s assessment. 
During court hearings, suspects and witnesses are generally not brought to the courthouse and 
are heard through an audiovisual information system. This hampers the communication of the 
defence and the accused, and should be limited to the necessary cases. 

Lawyers  who  provide  legal  assistance  to  human  rights  defenders  and  civil  and  political 
activists  also  face  obstacles  in  performing  their  work  and,  in  some  cases,  are  subjected  to 
arrest, detention and prosecution. This should be prevented at all costs. There are around 500 
lawyers under arrest and awaiting trial. 

2 new departments for mediation and for alternative dispute resolution were created in the 
Ministry of Justice. Efforts  continued to increase and promote alternative dispute resolution 
methods  to  help  reduce  the  burden  on  the  courts.  In  July  2018,  a  regulation  on  the 
implementation of the Mediation Law on Civil Disputes entered into force.  

Efficiency 

There  is  no  human  resources  strategy  for  the  judiciary,  which  struggles  to  effectively 
perform  its  tasks  in  the  wake  of  the  strong  reduction  of  experienced  personnel.  The 
recruitment  of  a  large  number  of  inexperienced  judges  and  prosecutors  using  fast-track 
procedures  without  adequate  in-service  and  pre-service  training  failed  to  remedy  the 
concerns. 

Regarding the backlog of cases, the numbers of pending cases in the high courts in December 
2018 were 40 636 for the Constitutional Court and 174 632 for the Council of State. In 2018, 
the Court of Cassation received a total of 1 017 969 cases (352 285 new cases and 665 684 
cases transferred from 2017), and dealt with 511 508 cases, resulting in a reduced backlog of 
506 461 cases by the end of 2018. These regional courts of appeal continued to operate, but 
for  both  civil  and  criminal  cases,  their  clearance  rate  remained  below  100%,  which  is 
leading to a growing backlog.  

As  regards  first  instance  courts,  the  clearance  rate  for  criminal  courts  in  2018  was  53.3% 
compared  to  55%  in  2016.  The  total  number  of  cases  finalised  in  2018  was  1 518 024 
compared to  1 324 153 in  2016. As regards the total  length  of proceedings it went  up  from 
274 days to 294 days.  

Systemic solutions are still needed, therefore, to further address the emerging backlog and the 
excessive length of some trials. As of early 2018, there are 13.9 judges and 5.9 prosecutors 
per 100 000 inhabitants (16 104 judges and prosecutors in total). According to the European 
Commission  for  the  Efficiency  of  Justice  (CEPEJ),  the  European  average  is  21  judges/11 
prosecutors per 100 000 inhabitants.  

Fight against corruption 

Turkey  is  at  an  early  stage  in  the  fight  against  corruption.  There  was  backsliding,  since 
dismantled preventive bodies have not been replaced by an independent body, in line with the 
United  Nations  Convention  against  Corruption  to  which  Turkey  is  party.  No  progress  was 
made on closing a variety of legislative gaps. Both the legal framework and the institutional 
setup  continued  to  allow  undue  executive  influence  in  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of 
high-profile  corruption  cases,  and  need  to  be  improved  in  line  with  international  standards. 
Limited  accountability  and  transparency  of  public  institutions  have  remained  a  matter  of 
concern. The absence of a robust anti-corruption strategy and action plan is a sign of lack of 
political will to fight decisively against corruption. The Council of Europe’s Group of States 
against  Corruption  (GRECO)  recommendations  have  not  yet  been  implemented.  Overall, 

25 

 
 
corruption is widespread and remains an issue of concern. There is a need for strong political 
will to effectively address corruption issues, as well as a robust criminal justice response to 
high-level corruption. In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  effectively  implement  its  international  obligations  in  relation  to  the  fight  against 
corruption, including the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the Council 
of Europe Conventions; 

  ensure effective follow-up to  the recommendations issued by the GRECO, including by 

adopting the necessary legislation; 

  establish  a  track  record  of  successful  prosecution  of,  and  convictions  for,  high-level 

corruption; 

  adopt an anti-corruption strategy, reflecting a clear political will and vision to effectively 

address corruption, underpinned by a credible and realistic action plan. 

Track record 

The  existing  legal  framework  and  institutional  architecture  enables  the  executive  branch  to 
exert  undue  political  influence  on  judges  and  prosecutors,  law  enforcement  officers  and 
inspectors. Therefore, Turkey’s track record of investigation, prosecution and conviction in 
corruption  cases  has  remained  poor,  particularly  in  relation  to  high-level  corruption  cases 
implicating  politicians  and  public  officials.  Sentences  do  not  have  a  deterrent  effect,  and 
convicts  can  benefit  from  deferred  sentences  for  some  offences.  The  track  record  of 
cooperation  by  audit  and  inspection  units  with  prosecutions  remained  poor.  Local 
administrations, land administration and management, public procurement processes, and the 
construction  and  transportation  industries,  including  when  implemented  via  public-private 
partnerships, remained particularly prone to corruption. 

Some of the GRECO recommendations calling for the adoption of new laws and practices on 
political contributions and expenditure, as well as public disclosure, have yet to be addressed. 
Turkish authorities publish no data on corruption cases. 

Institutional framework 

Prevention measures 

independent  anti-corruption  body  exists.  The 

level  of 
No  permanent,  functionally 
coordination  between  various  preventive  bodies  remained  inadequate.  The  Prime  Ministry 
Inspection  Board,  which  used  to  coordinate  preventive  anti-corruption  measures,  ceased  to 
exist  with  the  transition  to  the  presidential  system.  The  State  Supervisory  Council,  which 
assumed  some  of  the  duties  and  powers  of  the  Prime  Ministry  Inspection  Board,  lacks 
independence.  The  legal  framework  of  anti-corruption  also  remains  weak  in  the  private 
sector.  There  have  been  no  regular  awareness-raising  campaigns  on  transparency  and  the 
fight against corruption. 

Law enforcement 

No specialised prosecution service to lead anti-corruption investigations has been established. 
There  are  also  few  specialised  courts.  The  executive  has  retained  undue  political  influence 
over  officers  acting  as  judicial  police,  thereby  preventing  them  from  carrying  out  effective 
investigations. Inter-agency cooperation and information-sharing between law enforcement 
and the financial intelligence unit need to be further developed. Financial investigations are 
not  systematically  started  in  corruption  and  organised  crime  cases.  Financial  control  of 
political parties remained ineffective. 

26 

 
 
Legal framework 

Turkey is party to all international anti-corruption conventions, including the United Nations 
Convention Against corruption, which Turkey still needs to implement fully. 

The legislative amendments envisaged in previous anti-corruption strategies, i.e. the Law on 
General Administrative Procedure, the Law on Public Procurement, the Code of Ethics 
for  Members  of  Parliament  and  the  Law  on  Whistle-blower  Protection,  have  not  been 
implemented.  The  legal  framework  on  whistle-blower  protection  still  needs  to  be  aligned 
with  the  new  EU  acquis  on  this  issue.  The  anti-corruption  action  plan  (2016)  has  not  been 
followed  up  and  lacks  political  ownership.  Turkey  has  not  aligned  with  GRECO 
recommendations  on  judicial  independence  or  transparency  of  the  legislative  process  and 
the  seventeen 
political  financing.  Turkey  has 
recommendations contained in GRECO's Third Round Evaluation Report. 

implemented  satisfactorily  seven  of 

Shortcomings remain unaddressed in the corruption-related provisions of the Criminal Code, 
which do not meet the standards put in place by the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. 
The definition of active bribery, though covered in Article 252 of the Turkish Criminal Code, 
is still not in line with international conventions. The shortcomings concern, in particular, the 
provisions on bribery in the private sector.  

Public  procurement  legislation  is  not  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  vast  and  increasing 
number of exemptions inserted into the framework law on public procurement has become a 
matter  of  growing  concern.  In  particular,  tenders  at  municipal  level  and  for  public-private 
partnerships  for  large  infrastructure  investments  remained  prone  to  corruption.  The  legal 
privileges  of  public  officials,  such  as  the  requirement  for  prior  authorisation  from  their 
hierarchy before starting an investigation of alleged wrongdoing, continued to provide legal 
protection  for  public  officials  in  anti-corruption  criminal  and  administrative  investigations. 
The legal framework on preventing, prosecuting and issuing penalties for conflicts of interest 
as well as on declaring, verifying and disclosing assets remained inadequate. Turkey has no 
legislation governing lobbying. 

Strategic framework 

The  2010-2014  anti-corruption  strategy  and  action  plan  failed  to  meet  most  of  their  initial 
objectives.  Measures  envisaged  in  the  transparency  and  anti-corruption  action  plan 
announced  in  2016  have  not  yet  been  followed  up.  Turkey  needs  to  strengthen  its  overall 
capacity  to  coordinate,  implement  and  monitor  all  anti-corruption  actions  among  the  many 
relevant preventive institutions and law enforcement agencies. 

Fundamental rights 

After  two  years  of  rapid  deterioration  of  the  human  rights  situation,  Turkey’s  state  of 
emergency finally ended on 18 July 2018. However, this was not accompanied by concrete 
steps to improve the human rights in the country. Instead, many of the measures introduced 
during  the  state  of  emergency  remain  in  force  today,  and  continue  to  have  a  profound  and 
devastating impact on Turkish citizens.  

The  legal  framework  includes  general  guarantees  of  respect  for  human  and  fundamental 
rights but still needs to be brought into line with ECHR and ECtHR case law on guarantees of 
respect  for  human  and  fundamental  rights.  Serious  backsliding  in  the  areas  of  freedom  of 
expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and procedural and property rights 
continued.  Restrictions  imposed  on  the  activities  of  journalists,  academics,  human  rights 
defenders and critical voices on a broad scale have a negative effect on the exercise of these 
freedoms, and lead to self-censorship. Legislation introduced immediately after the lifting of 

27 

 
 
the state of emergency removed crucial safeguards protecting detainees from abuse, thereby 
augmenting the risk of impunity for the perpetrators of such abuse. The enforcement of rights 
is hindered by the fragmentation and limited independence of public institutions responsible 
for  protecting  human  rights  and  freedoms,  and  the  lack  of  an  independent  judiciary.  The 
Council of Europe continued its monitoring of Turkey’s respect for fundamental freedoms. 

The lack of institutional independence, lengthy review procedures, the absence of sufficiently 
individualised criteria, and the absence of a proper means of defence resulted in the failure by 
the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures to provide an effective recourse 
against dismissals so far.  

Turkey should in particular:  

  effectively ensure full respect for fundamental rights and freedoms;  

  align  Turkish  criminal  and  anti-terror  legislation  and  their  interpretation  with  European 

standards and ECtHR case-law and Venice Commission recommendations; 

  ensure  that  all  public-sector  employees  arbitrarily  dismissed  during  the  state  of 

emergency are appropriately compensated for any harm, including loss of earnings; 

  ensure  that  any  allegation  of  wrongdoing  or  crime  is  subject  to  due  process,  based  on 
evidence and fully transparent procedures under the authority of an independent judiciary, 
and  fully  respecting  relevant  procedural  rights,  in  particular  the  presumption  of 
innocence,  individual  criminal  responsibility,  legal  certainty,  the  right  to  defence,  the 
right to a fair trial, equality of arms and the right to an effective appeal; 

  ensure the effectiveness of the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures 

as a domestic remedy. 

Turkey is party to most international human rights instruments. The Optional Protocol to 
the  International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights,  and  the  International 
Convention  for  the  Protection  of  all  Persons  from  Enforced  Disappearance,  have  yet  to  be 
ratified.  The  Turkish  Parliament  ratified  the  Optional  Protocol  to  the  Convention  on  the 
Rights of the Child in 2017; it entered into force in March 2018.  

Following  the  lifting  of  the  state  of  emergency,  Turkey  revoked  its  derogations  to  the 
European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  and  to  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) in August 2018. 

In 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found violations of the ECHR in 
142  cases  (out  of  146)  relating  mainly  to  the  right  to  fair  trial  (41),  freedom  of  expression 
(40),  the  right  to  liberty  and  security  (29),  freedom  of  assembly  and  association  (11), 
inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  (11),  and  prohibition  of  torture  (10).  During  the  reporting 
period,  6 717  new  applications  were  registered  by  the  ECtHR.  In  January  2019,  the  total 
number of Turkish applications pending before the Court was 7 107. There are currently 410 
cases against Turkey in the enhanced monitoring procedure. 

In November 2018, the ECtHR announced its judgement in the case of Selahattin Demirtaş v. 
Turkey (no. 2), which found several violations of the ECHR, and ordered the termination of 
the  applicant’s  pre-trial  detention.  In  February  2019,  the  ECtHR  declared  applications 
concerning  events  during  curfews  imposed  in  the  city  of  Cizre  inadmissible.  In  the  case  of 
Kavala  v.  Turkey,  the  Council  of  Europe  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  informed  the 
Court  in  November  2018  of  her  decision  to  intervene  in  the  case.  In  January  2019,  she 
submitted an observation in which she evaluates ‘the arrest, initial and continued detention of 

28 

 
 
the  applicant  as  forming  part  of  a  broader  pattern  of  escalating  reprisals  in  Turkey  against 
civil society activists and human rights defenders for their legitimate work’. 

The implementation of the Cyprus v. Turkey case regarding missing persons and restrictions 
on the property rights of Greek Cypriots displaced or living permanently in the northern part 
of Cyprus is still pending, as is the question of ‘just satisfaction’ (compensation). Regarding 
the  implementation  of  the  Demopoulos  v.  Turkey  decision  of  5  March  2010,  6 538 
applications  from  Greek  Cypriot  owners  have  to  date  been  lodged  with  the  Immovable 
Property Commission (IPC), 105 of them during the reporting period. As of March 2019, 964 
applications  had  been  concluded  through  amicable  settlements  and  33  through  formal 
hearings.  Altogether,  the  IPC  has  so  far  paid  out  the  equivalent  of  EUR  349  million  in 
compensation.  In  December  2018,  the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe 
reviewed  Cyprus  v.  Turkey  as  well  as  Varnava  and  others  and  Xenides-Arestis  group  v. 
Turkey. No progress was made on any of those cases. 

In its judgement on the Güzelyurtlu and others v. Cyprus and Turkey case of January 2019, 
the ECtHR has found, for the first time, a violation of Article 2 ECHR on the sole basis of a 
Turkey’s failure to cooperate with the Republic of Cyprus on criminal matters. 

On  the  promotion  and  enforcement  of  human  rights,  the  National  Human  Rights  and 
Equality  Institution  (NHREI)  and  the  Ombudsman,  as  the  main  human  rights  institutions, 
continued  to  receive  complaints.  The  major  difference  in  the  scope  of  intervention  of  both 
institutions lies with the individual application procedure. The Ombudsman Institution deals 
only with  complaints against the actions of the public administration. The NHREI does not 
accept applications that are within the remit of the Ombudsman; therefore, the efficiency and 
capacity  of  the  Ombudsman  to  deal  with  such  applications  also  need  to  be  stepped  up. 
Following the appointment of members of the NHREI in March 2017, the institution became 
operational in 2018, after its implementing legislation was adopted.  

The NHREI has concluded two decisions out of 401 received applications; it has conducted 
27 visits and published reports of five visits to some detention centres, prisons and an elderly 
home.  The  speed  and  effectiveness  of  the  institution  in  dealing  with  applications  causes 
particular  concern  in  light  of  the  high  number  of  alleged  violations  in  the  aftermath  of  the 
attempted coup. 

Neither of these institutions is operationally, structurally or financially independent, and their 
members are not  appointed in  compliance with  the Paris Principles. So far, the NHREI has 
not applied for accreditation with the relevant International Coordinating Committee (ICC) of 
National  Institutions  for  the  Promotion  and  Protection  of  Human  Rights.  Turkey  should 
urgently ensure that any and all cases of alleged human rights violations are effectively dealt 
with  and  processed,  and  that  these  bodies  fully  comply  with  the  Paris  Principles  and  the 
European  Commission  Recommendation  on  Standards  for  Equality  Bodies,  adopted  on  22 
June 2018. 

There  was  limited  implementation  of  the  2014  action  plan  on  preventing  violations  of  the 
ECHR. The implementation reports are not made public, thus limiting the accountability of 
institutions  responsible  for  implementation.  Turkey  needs  to  update  its  action  plan  on  the 
prevention of the ECtHR violations, since the previous one has expired. Legislative changes, 
introduced  during  and  after  the  state  of  emergency,  which  are  not  in  line  with  European 
standards,  continue  to  hamper  in  particular  the  right  to  freedom  of  expression,  freedom  of 
assembly and the right to a fair trial, to an effective remedy and to protection of property. 

Parliament’s  Human  Rights  Inquiry  Committee  is  authorised  to  visit  and  observe  prisons, 
including military prisons, without advance permission; during the reporting period, it visited 

29 

 
 
three  prisons  and  published  two  reports.  In  2018,  2,229  applications  claiming  violations  of 
human rights were referred to the Committee. 1,305 of these applications were lodged during 
the previous legislative period, the rest after the June 2018 elections.  

Human rights defenders continue to be subject to intimidation, judicial prosecution, violent 
attacks, threats,  surveillance, prolonged arbitrary  detention  and ill-treatment.  The frequency 
and  number  of  detentions  and  arrests  of  civil  society  representatives,  journalists,  lawyers, 
academics and others has increasingly led to  a shrinking space for civil  society. During the 
reporting  period,  there  was  a  climate  of  intimidation  across  society  as  the  Government 
continued  to  use  the  state  of  emergency  to  narrow  the  space  for  dissenting  or  alternative 
views.  

A  law  adopted  in  July  2018  after  the  lifting  of  the  state  of  emergency  grants  provincial 
governors wide powers to prevent people from entering or leaving certain locations in their 
provinces for up to 15 days, and to prevent all movement or assemblies at particular locations 
or  times  on  security  grounds.  The  trials  against  the  group  of  10  human  rights  defenders  in 
Büyükada  Island,  and  against  the  former  director  of  Amnesty  International  Turkey,  on 
charges  of  links  to  a  terrorist  organisation  continued  during  the  reporting  period.  Osman 
Kavala, the chairperson of Anadolu Kültür, remained in detention without indictment for over 
a  year. An indictment against him and 15 other members of civil society organisations was 
filed  with  a  court  in  March  2019.  The  confidentiality  order  in  his  file  has  prevented  his 
lawyers from accessing details of the case. 

Lawyers  who  provide  legal  assistance  to  human  rights  defenders  and  civil  and  political 
activists face huge obstacles in performing their work and are at risk of arrest, detention and 
prosecution. 

Concerning  the  right  to  life,  although  Turkey  is  a  party  to  Protocol  13  of  the  ECHR, 
statements on the possibility of  reinstating the death  penalty have  continued to  be made by 
public officials, including by the President. In the south-east, there is a lack of credible and 
effective investigations into reported killings by the security authorities, as noted by the UN 
High  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights.  Furthermore,  alleged  cases  of  abductions  and 
enforced  disappearances  by  security  or  intelligence  services  in  several  provinces  have  not 
been  adequately  investigated.  Impunity  remains  for  such  abuses.  Legislation  adopted  in 
June  2016  grants  judicial  privileges  to  the  security  forces,  which  increase  the  risk  of 
impunity. 

Allegations of torture and ill treatment remain a serious concern. The repeated extensions 
of the state of emergency led to profound human rights violations, and the Government failed 
to take steps to investigate, prosecute, and punish members of the security forces and other 
officials  accused  of  human  rights  abuses.  The  removal  of  crucial  safeguards  by  means  of 
emergency decrees has increased the risk of impunity for perpetrators of such crimes, and has 
led to allegations of an increase in the number of cases of torture and ill-treatment in custody. 
Changes to the anti-terror legislation introduced a maximum pre-trial detention period of up 
to 12 days, in contravention of the relevant ECtHR case law (maximum of up to four days). 
There  are  concerns  that  changes  in  legislation  allowing  suspects  to  be  brought  back  from 
prisons  to  police  stations  after  being  arrested  have  led  to  more  cases  of  ill-treatment  or 
torture. The recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture following his 2016 
visit to the country need to be implemented. In addition, Turkey still needs to implement the 
recommendations of the 2016 fourth periodic review by the UN Committee against Torture. 
The authorities should also authorise the publication of all pending reports of the Council of 
Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture. 

30 

 
 
The handling of complaints of torture and ill-treatment is also reported to be ineffective, and 
allegedly  entails  a  risk  of  reprisal.  Complaints,  reports  and  any  indications  of    torture  or 
ill-treatment need to be investigated swiftly, effectively and impartially; perpetrators must be 
prosecuted  and  convicted  in  accordance  with  the  gravity  of  their  acts  in  line  with  the 
country’s  international  obligations,  in  particular  with  the  ECHR  and  the  UN  Convention 
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UN CAT). 

The NHREI, which should act as the national preventive mechanism, does not meet the key 
requirements  under  the  Optional  Protocol  to  the  UN  CAT  and  is  not  yet  effectively 
processing cases referred to it. In line with its stated zero tolerance policy for torture, greater 
efforts  are  necessary  to  ensure  that  this  institution  effectively  fulfils  its  mandate,  with  a 
dedicated structure and appropriate resources.  

Overcrowding and deteriorating prison conditions continue to be a source of deep concern. 
The prison  population  rate reached 318 per 100,000 inhabitants and, as of December 2018, 
the  prison  population  stands  at  260,000.  At  present,  743  children  are  staying  with  their 
detained mothers. As of December 2018, the total number of detainees in prison without an 
indictment or pending trial is 57,000.Over 20% of the total prison population are in prison for 
terrorism-related  charges.  These  include  journalists,  political  activists,  lawyers  and  human 
rights  defenders.  There  have  been  many  allegations  of  human  rights  violations  in  prisons, 
including arbitrary restrictions on the rights of detainees, denial of access to medical care and 
the use of torture, mistreatment, prevention of open visits, and solitary confinement.  In late 
autumn  2018,  hunger  strikes  were  initiated  to  protest  the  alleged  isolations  in  the  prison 
island Imralı; these have continued, and involve around 300 inmates in 60 prisons. In 2018, 
the Directorate-General  for Prisons  and Detention  Houses received 877 complaints alleging 
torture and ill-treatment in prisons and detention centres. Legal and administrative action had 
been taken against 543 personnel by December 2018. Prison monitoring boards, which were 
dissolved following the attempted coup, were re-established with similar structures, and they 
remain  largely  ineffective.  There  are  also  concerns  related  to  the  lack  of  access  by  civil 
society organisations to prisons, despite the allegations of human rights violations. Given that 
the national preventive mechanism is not fully operational, there is no oversight over human 
rights abuses in prisons.  

On  the  protection  of  personal  data,  the  Personal  Data  Protection  Authority  (DPA)  has 
become operational and its Board has been appointed, but no legislative changes have taken 
place to ensure that the law is harmonised with the EU acquis, in particular the EU General 
Data  Protection  Regulation  2016/679  and  Law  Enforcement  Directive  2016/680,  which 
entered into force in May 2018. This concerns inter alia the application of data protection in 
law enforcement and the powers of the Data Protection Authority. Turkey has not signed or 
ratified  that  2018  Protocol  amending  the  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Individuals  with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Council of Europe, CETS No 223). 

On  freedom  of  thought,  conscience  and  religion,  freedom  of  worship  continued  to  be 
generally  respected.  The  Venice  Commission  recommendations  on  the  status  of  religious 
communities in Turkey are yet to be implemented. This concerns in particular the right of the 
Orthodox Patriarch to use the title ‘ecumenical’. Requests by different Christian communities 
to  open  places  of  worship  and  curricula  for  clergy  are  still  pending.  Hate  speech  and  hate 
crimes  against  Christians  and  Jews  continued  to  be  reported  (see  below  -  Minorities).  The 
controversial use for marking religious celebrations of the Hagia Sophia, which is a museum 
situated  within  a  listed  UNESCO  world  heritage  site,  continued  to  trigger  reactions.  One 
Islamist  foundation,  which  opposes  the  Government,  was  closed  down,  and  its  assets  and 
media  outlets  transferred  to  the  Treasury.  A  comprehensive  legal  framework  in  line  with 

31 

 
 
European  standards  needs  to  be  put  in  place,  and  appropriate  attention  must  be  paid  to 
implementing the ECtHR judgments on compulsory religion and ethics classes, indication of 
religious  affiliation  on  identity  cards  and  Alevi  worship  places.  For  example,  in  one  Court 
case,  the  mention  of  Zoroastrianism  in  the  religion  section  of  the  defendant’s  identity  card 
was  seen  as  evidence  of  membership  of  an  illegal  organisation.  Alevis  held  several 
demonstrations  and  made  a  number  of  press  statements  concerning  the  lifting  of  the 
compulsory  religion  course,  and  for  an  end  to  discriminatory  attitude  against  Alevis  in 
education, employment and social life. The Turkish Government did not implement the action 
plan, submitted in 2016 to the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, relating to ECtHR 
decisions on Cem Houses and on compulsory religion classes. School textbooks still need to 
be  revised  in  order  to  remove  all  discriminatory  elements  against  all  religions  and  faith 
groups. No steps were taken to open the Halki (Heybeliada) Greek Orthodox Seminary. There 
are  concerns  over  the  protocols  signed  between  the  Ministry  of  National  Education  and 
religion-affiliated  organisations  over  the  delivery  of  educational  tasks  of  the  Ministry. 
Through  government  policies,  the  work  of  the  Religious  Affairs  Presidency  (Diyanet) 
increased in all spheres of public life. 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

Freedom of expression 

Turkey is at an early stage in this area and the serious backsliding continued. The restrictive 
measures  adopted  during  and  after  the  state  of  emergency  were  disproportionate  in  their 
implementation  and  have  negatively  affected  many  opposition  voices  in  the  media,  civil 
society  and  academia.  Exercise  of  the  freedom  of  expression  has  been  considerably 
hampered.  Legislation,  especially  provisions  on  national  security  and  the  fight  against 
terrorism, and its implementation, are diverging from the case law of the European Court of 
Human  Rights.  Criminal  cases  against  journalists,  human  rights  defenders,  lawyers,  writers 
and  social  media  users  continued.  A  decree  law  of  July  2018  amending  the  duties  and 
authorities  of  the  Directorate-General  of  Press  and  Information,  which  was  originally 
affiliated with  the Prime Ministry, handed over  authorisation  to  issue  yellow press  cards to 
the  Directorate  of  Communication  linked  to  the  Presidency  of  the  Republic.  Many  EU 
journalists faced delays in the renewal of their press accreditation. 

No  measures  have  been  taken  to  address  the  damage  incurred  as  a  result  of  the  closure  of 
numerous  media  outlets  or  the  appointment  by  the  Government  of  trustees  to  administer 
them. The high number of arrests of journalists - over 160 journalists remain in prison - is of 
very serious concern. The blocking and erasing of online content without a court order on an 
inappropriately  wide  range  of  grounds,  based  on  the  Internet  Law  and  the  general  legal 
framework,  continued.  Judicial  control  of  requests  relating  to  content  takedowns  or  the 
blocking  of  content  based  on  individual  decisions  by  criminal  judges  of  peace  led  to 
concerns,  due  to  the  structure  of  these  courts.    An  estimated  170 000  sites  are  reportedly 
banned.  A  large  number  of  media  workers  (journalists,  engineers,  sound  and  image 
technicians, etc.) were laid off in 2016 (2 708), 2017 (166) and 2018 (175). 

The Commission’s 2016 and 2018 recommendations were not followed up, and are therefore 
restated in this report. In the coming year, Turkey should: 

  release journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers, writers and academics being held in 
pre-trial detention; refrain from, and end, the practice exercised in various forms by both 
state  and  non-state  agents  of  intimidating,  interfering  with  and  putting  pressure  on  the 
media, ensuring a safe, plural and enabling environment for the media to carry out their 
work independently and without fear of reprisals; 

32 

 
 
  refrain  from  undue  restrictions  on  freedom  of  expression,  including  in  relation  to  anti-
terrorism  operations,  in  line  with  the  Guidelines  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the 
Council of Europe on protecting freedom of expression and information in times of crisis; 

  ensure that existing legislation, in particular the Anti-Terror Law, the Criminal Code and 
the Internet Law, is revised to comply with European standards and is implemented in a 
manner  which  does  not  curtail  freedom  of  expression  and  ensures  proportionality  and 
equality before the law; 

  ensure that criminal law provisions, in particular articles on defamation and other similar 
offences, are not used as a means of putting pressure on critical voices, by ensuring that 
courts apply European Court of Human Rights case-law and are able to act independently. 

Intimidation of journalists 

Heavy  pressure  on  the  media  continued  as  in  previous  years,  with  arrests,  detentions, 
prosecutions and dismissals of media staff. Censorship and self-censorship continued among 
media  workers.  There  were  an  estimated  160  journalists  in  prison  in  February  2019.  Civil 
society has documented threats and physical attacks on journalists and media organisations. 
There is government interference in editorial independence, and pressure on media outlets to 
fire  journalists  critical  of  the  Government.  The  state  has  undertaken  direct  and  indirect 
takeover of, or the closure of, private media companies. There are restrictions on access to the 
airwaves,  and  there  have  been  fines  and  closures  of  TV  and  radio  channels  critical  of  the 
Government. 

The criminal justice system allowed journalists to be prosecuted and imprisoned on extensive 
charges  of  terrorism,  insulting  public  officials,  and/or  committing  crimes  against  the  state. 
The right to a fair trial and the respect of the principle of the presumption of innocence were 
not  always  ensured  in  political  cases  (see  above  -  Judiciary).  Indictments  did  not  usually 
establish a link with the alleged offence and, in some high-profile cases, the defence provided 
by  the  defendants  was  not  taken  into  consideration  by  the  court.  In  many  cases,  the  use  of 
confidential  decisions  impaired  the  access  to  justice  and  the  right  of  defence,  because  the 
charges  against  the  suspects  were  communicated  to  them  and  their  lawyers  only  when  the 
indictment was issued. In some cases, the indictment took more than a year to be issued. On 
the  other  hand,  details  of  prosecution  files  of  journalists  or  members  of  civil  society 
organisations  appeared in the mainstream  media, which  amplified smear  campaigns against 
them and violated the principle of the presumption of innocence. 

Judicial cases against critical newspapers and their affiliated journalists continued. Eighteen 
journalists  from  the  Cumhuriyet  newspaper  were  convicted  in  February  2018.  A  limited 
number  of  other  writers  and  journalists  have  belatedly  been  released  pending  trial.  Several 
court cases were subject to comments from the executive. 

Legislative environment 

No improvements took place concerning the legal framework and its implementation, which 
guarantee  the  exercise  of  freedom  of  expression  in  the  media  and  internet.  Legislation  on 
anti-terrorism,  on  the  internet  and  on  intelligence  services,  and  the  Criminal  Code,  impede 
freedom  of  expression  and  run  counter  to  European  standards.  Criminal  legislation  still 
allows  prison  sentences  for  insulting  the  President  and  senior  politicians,  and  for  insults  to 
religion.  In  addition  to  prison  terms,  high  fines  also  have  a  deterrent  effect  on  media 
reporting, especially for grassroots media. Legislation on hate speech that is not in line with 
ECtHR case law needs to be improved. 

33 

 
 
The  Internet  Law  and  the  general  legal  framework  enable  the  executive  to  block  online 
content  without  a  court  order  on  an  inappropriately  wide  range  of  grounds.  Following  a 
March  2018  amendment,  the  regulation  of  broadcasting  performed  by  the  Radio  and 
Television Supreme Council is applicable to any online media service providers and platform 
operators, including those operating from abroad. The amendments also gave the Council the 
power to impose bans on internet broadcasting. 

A  decree  law  also  closed  down  the  Prime  Ministry  Directorate-General  of  Press  and 
Information, which was authorised to issue press cards. This power has now been transferred 
to  the  presidency.  In  December  2018,  the  new  Press  Cards  Regulation  was  published.  It 
changed accreditation criteria, making state press cards harder to obtain and making it easier 
to  cancel  them.  In  December  2018,  official  sources  stated  that  the  press  cards  of  1 954 
journalists  had  been  cancelled  over  the  last  three  years.  Many  EU  journalists  faced  long 
delays  for  the  renewal  of  their  press  cards.  Some  of  them  have  seen  their  accreditation 
refused without proper justification. 

Implementation/institutions 

Severe  restriction  of  the  freedoms  of  expression  and  media  continued,  including  the 
imprisonment  of  scores  of  journalists,  the  closure  of  media  outlets,  the  criminalisation  of 
criticism of government policies or officials, and the blocking of websites and  content. The 
trend  of  prosecutions  of  journalists,  writers,  social  media  users  and  other  members  of  the 
public, even children, for insulting the President, has dramatically increased. Such cases often 
end with prison sentences, suspended sentences or punitive fines. Similarly, a journalist has 
been sentenced to jail for ‘defamation and insult’ because of her investigation  into offshore 
tax  havens  which  revealed  details  of  the  business  activities  of  the  country’s  former  Prime 
Minister and his sons. Criminal convictions based on press statements made by human rights 
defenders continued. 

Reporters  without  Borders,  in  its  2018  World  Press  Freedom  Index,  ranked  Turkey  157  of 
180 countries, down from 155 in last year’s index. 

The  Zaman  case  of  journalists/writers  concluded  in  July  2018,  and  all  defendants  were 
acquitted  of  coup  charges.  Appeals  in  the  case  are  pending.  In  October,  Istanbul’s  Appeal 
Court upheld aggravated life sentences for six suspects, including the well-known writers and 
intellectuals Nazlı Ilıcak, Ahmet Altan and Mehmet Altan, over links to the Gülen movement. 
In  late  June  2018,  Mehmet  Altan  was  released  under  judicial  control.  It  is  worrying  that 
regional courts keep ignoring the judgments of the Constitutional Court and the ECtHR. 
Indeed,  in  January  2018,  the  Constitutional  Court  had  ruled  that  the  rights  to  liberty  and 
freedom  of  expression  of  two  of  the  above  journalists  had  been  violated,  and  that  their 
detention could not be considered a necessary and proportionate measure. The lower courts 
rejected  the  release  of  the  accused,  claiming  that  the  judgment  of  the  Constitutional  Court 
was an ‘usurpation of authority’ and therefore could not be accepted. 

In August 2018, the  Istanbul Chief Prosecutor’s Office opened an investigation into actions 
threatening  ‘economic  security’,  while  Turkey’s  financial  watchdog  launched  a  separate 
probe into what it described as ‘fake news’ aimed at manipulating the economy, thus creating 
a chilling effect on disseminating news on the deteriorating economic situation. There was an 
increase in investigations due to social media posts. The Offices of the Ankara and Istanbul 
Chief  Public  Prosecutors  launched  investigations  into  ‘news  items,  printed  and  visual 
publication, social media accounts that serve in economic attacks’ in August. The pressures 
on  Kurdish  media  and  those  reporting  Kurdish  issues  continued  through  court  cases, 
detentions and arrests of journalists. 

34 

 
 
Court  cases  continued  against  ‘Academics  for  Peace’,  who  signed  a  declaration  in  January 
2016 condemning the security operations in the south-east and calling for resumption of the 
peace  talks.  Some  of  the  cases  ended  in  convictions  on  charges  of  ‘terrorist  organisation 
propaganda’, and the sentences were postponed, apart from  two cases where the  academics 
refused postponement of sentences, one of them has been imprisoned in May. Cases against 
university  students  on  various  freedom  of  expression-related  charges  also  continued,  with 
concerns regarding the respect of ECtHR case law standards. 

The  increased  use  of  harsh  rhetoric  against  any  form  of  critical  voice  by  public  officials, 
including at the highest level, continued.  

Regarding  the  internet,  Twitter  Transparency  reported  that  over  1 464  tweets  and  425 
accounts were blocked, and 13 843 specific accounts were reported by the Turkish authorities 
in the first half of 2018. Access to Wikipedia in Turkey, blocked since April 2017, has still 
not  been lifted.  According to  unofficial  sources, some 244 000 websites  have been banned, 
only 2% of which were on the basis of a court decision.  

Public service broadcasters 

A  Presidential  decree  restructured  the  public  service  broadcaster,  TRT,  and  changes  to  the 
monitoring  rules  were  interpreted  as  taking  away  the  right  of  the  Radio  and  TV  Supreme 
Council  (RTÜK)  to  monitor  TRT  broadcasts.  Following  the  changeover  to  the  executive 
presidency, a presidential decree published on 24 July 2018 affiliated the Turkish Radio and 
Television Corporation (TRT) with the Presidential Communication Authority and the RTÜK 
with  the  Ministry  of  Culture  and  Tourism.  The  editorial  policy  of  the  public  service 
broadcaster TRT continued to display a significant pro-government line. 

The  Internet  Law,  and  the  draft  provisions  that  further  expand  the  powers  of  the  RTÜK  in 
allocating licenses for online broadcasting, should be also revised in line with EU standards. 
A  state  of  emergency  decree  amended  several  articles  of  the  TRT,  and  ruled  that  all 
purchases,  sales,  services,  consultancy  fees,  productions  and  transportation  fees  will  be 
exempt from the public procurement law. RTÜK’s independence and neutrality is subject to 
criticism, as members continue to be elected by Parliament without input from civil society or 
professional organisations. However, the current  composition of the RTÜK  does not reflect 
Parliament,  since  the  HDP  is  excluded  (see  Chapter  10  –  Information  Society  and  Media). 
Under the state of emergency, RTÜK continued to take a number of channels off the air as 
well  as  suspending  and  fining  channels  for  broadcasting  content  that  is  ‘contrary  to  the 
national and moral values of society, general morality and the principle of family protection’. 
In  September  2018,  RTÜK  approved  a  regulation  which  grants  further  authority  to  impose 
extensive supervision and censorship on radio and television broadcasts made on the Internet. 

During  the  electoral  campaigns,  the  İYİ  and  CHP  presidential  candidates  and  all  CHP 
parliamentary candidates boycotted the TRT due to its alleged lack of impartiality.  

Economic factors 

The lack of transparency of media ownership continues to cast doubt on the independence of 
editorial  policies.  Concentration  in  the  media  market  increased  sharply  with  the  sale  of  the 
Doğan holding to Demirören holding. The takeover of media outlets and the appointment of 
trustees  to  control  media  groups  have  had  a  negative  economic  impact,  with  the  loss  of 
hundreds of jobs. Emergency decrees led to the closure of a large number of media outlets. In 
addition, according to journalists’ associations, the increase in paper prices led some media 
outlets  to  stop  publishing  and  some  other  local  outlets  to  either  decrease  the  number  of 
publications  or  close  their  supplements.  As  a  result,  unemployment  among  journalists 
increased. The journalists’ organisations called for the Press Advertising Authority to review 

35 

 
 
is  not  fairly  and 
its  advertisement  distribution  policy.  State-sponsored  advertising 
transparently distributed. This further distorts the market, and adds to the economic pressure 
on  some  media  outlets  from  major  customers,  including  the  state.  Independent  and 
sustainable financing of the public service broadcaster is not ensured. Broadcasting law does 
not ensure fair competition, as it does not prevent monopolisation.  

Professional organisations and working conditions 

The representation of journalists continues to be divided between the professional journalists’ 
associations  and  the  pro-government  union.  Journalism  in  Turkey  is  an  increasingly 
precarious profession, with low wages,  a high risk of judicial harassment  and  a lack of job 
security.  Working  conditions,  insufficient  trade  union  rights  and  application  of  labour 
legislation,  difficulty  in  obtaining  a  press  card  and  arbitrary  accreditation  decisions  remain 
major concerns. 

(See also Chapter 10 - Information society and media) 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

There  was  further  backsliding  in  the  area  of  freedom  of  assembly  and  association,  where 
the  legislation  and  its  implementation  are  not  in  line  with  European  standards  and  do  not 
abide by the Turkish Constitution. The applicable ECtHR case law on freedom of assembly 
needs  to  be  implemented  without  delay,  and  relevant  national  laws  need  to  be  revised 
accordingly.  The  implementation  of  legislation  resulting  from  the  state  of  emergency 
expanded  the  administration’s  powers  to  limit  the  right  to  peaceful  assembly.  The  ECtHR 
decided in favour of the applicant in the Güler v. Turkey case where the applicant was given 
an official warning for being absent from his job after attending the May Day celebrations in 
2008. Another ECtHR judgment on İmret v. Turkey (no.2) is related to the Kurdish issue, and 
calls for legal amendments to vague provisions defining a terrorism-related criminal activity, 
in this case participation in public demonstrations, based on Articles 220 (7) and 314 of the 
Criminal Code. 

A  regulation  adopted  in  October  2018  which  obliges  associations  to  disclose  all  their 
members to authorities is problematic, and is a violation of constitutional guarantees such as 
freedom  of  association  and  the  right  to  privacy.  The  budgets  of  the  Turkish  Union  of  Bar 
Associations,  the  Turkish  Medical  Association  and  other  such  professional  organisations 
were included in the general ‘Single Treasury Institutional Account’ managed by the Ministry 
of Treasury and Finance, which answers directly to the Presidency. This raises doubts about 
how  effectively  these  organisations  can  continue  to  function  if  their  financial  resources  are 
controlled  by  the  executive.  While  a  number  of  commemoration  ceremonies  and  meetings 
were allowed, many events and demonstrations relating to the Kurdish issue or organised by 
the opposition groups were prohibited on security grounds. The unauthorised holding of such 
demonstrations at times resulted in forceful dispersal by the police forces. Initiatives to mark 
the ‘Armenian Genocide Commemoration Day’ suffered a setback for the first time in years, 
as the request of Istanbul Governorship  regarding the removal of the word ‘genocide’ from 
the statements was rejected by the organisers, resulting in harsh police intervention. While a 
large  World  Peace  Day  demonstration  in  Diyarbakır  was  allowed  on  1  September,  several 
others were banned around Turkey. In August, after many  years, the peaceful gatherings by 
‘Saturday  Mothers’  to  protest  the  unidentified  killings  and  missing  persons  dating  back  to 
1990s were banned by the Ministry of Interior. In September 2018, 500 workers who stopped 
working  in  the  construction  of  the  third  airport  in  İstanbul  on  the  grounds  of  bad  working 
conditions  and  over  30  fatal  accidents  were  temporarily  arrested,  and  are  awaiting  trial, 
following police intervention using pepper gas. Trials for 62 workers are ongoing. Governors 

36 

 
 
in  several  provinces  have  used  wide-ranging  state  of  emergency  powers  to  ban  events  and 
assemblies.  The  Ankara  Governorate  ban  on  all  LGBTI  activities  imposed  in  November 
2017,  which  has  undermined  the  visibility  of  LGBTI  communities  and  their  ability  to 
exercise  the  right  to  peaceful  assembly,  ended  in  April  2019.  An  administrative  court  in 
Ankara  decided  to  lift  the  ban  while  an  appeal  had  previously  been  rejected  in  November 
2018.  An  increased  number  of  penalties  for  participants  in  unauthorised  events  acted  as 
another constraint on the right to freedom of assembly and association. 

Issues of  labour and trade union rights  are further covered in  Chapter 19  - Social policy 
and employment. 

On  property  rights,  the  confiscations  of  the  property  of  many  institutions,  companies  or 
private individuals under the state of emergency and beyond remain of serious concern. There 
continues  to  be  a  lack  of  effective  domestic  remedy  for  confiscations,  since  the  Inquiry 
Commission  on  the  State  of  Emergency  Measures  is  slow  to  issue  decisions  and  lacks 
transparency. In the south-east, the authorities have started repairing damage in a number of 
cities  and  towns.  Regarding  the  implementation  of  the  Law  on  Foundations,  most  of  the 
appeals  regarding  rejected  claims  for  the  restitution  of  property  are  pending  either  before  a 
local court or at the ECtHR. Some earlier favourable decisions, which have been challenged 
by the Treasury, are also awaiting final judgment. Some judicial decisions on property rights 
were  reversed,  to  the  detriment  of  minority  foundations,  such  as  the  returning  of  the 
Sanasaryan  Inn  back  to  the  state.  The  case  in  relation  to  the  ownership  of  the  land  of  the 
Syriac  Orthodox  Mor  Gabriel  Monastery 
is  ongoing.  The  Council  of  Europe’s 
recommendations  on  protecting  property  rights  and  education  rights  still  need  to  be  fully 
implemented.  Council  of  Europe  Resolution  1625  (2008)  regarding  property  rights  on  the 
islands  of  Gökçeada  (Imbros)  and  Bozcaada  (Tenedos)  needs  to  be  fully  implemented. 
Relevant legislation on the issue of property rights of non-Muslim minorities and legislation 
covering all issues of property rights still need to be revised. 

The principle of non-discrimination is not sufficiently protected by law or enforced fully in 
practice. The NHREI, which is in charge of applying anti-discrimination legislation, had only 
finalised two decisions by March 2019. Hate crime legislation is not in line with international 
standards, and does not cover hate offences based on sexual orientation. The introduction of 
revised  school  textbooks  in  the  2017-18  academic  year  has  raised  questions  about  some 
content  with  regard  to  secularism/religion  and  gender  inequality.  In  April  2016,  Turkey 
signed  the  Additional  Protocol  to  the  Convention  on  Cybercrime,  concerning  the 
criminalisation  of  acts  of  a  racist  and  xenophobic  nature  committed  through  computer 
systems,  but  ratification  is  still  pending.  Turkey  should  urgently  adopt  a  law  on  combating 
discrimination  in  line  with  the  ECHR,  including  sexual  orientation  and  identity.  Turkey 
should also ratify Protocol 12 of the Convention, which provides for the general prohibition 
of discrimination, and implement the recommendations of the Council of Europe’s European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance. 

Equality between women and men is in place in the legislative and institutional framework. 
However, due to weak implementation of legislation and the low quality of support services 
available,  gender  disparity  still  exists  in  areas  such  as  decision-making,  employment, 
education  and  health.  The  Government  has  taken  some  positive  steps  to  improve  gender 
equality,  as  stated  in  action  plans  on  education,  employment  and  violence.  However,  these 
action plans have not been fully implemented, and lack systematic monitoring. There is a lack 
of  strong  political  commitment  to  gender  equality:  stereotyped  views  of  gender  roles, 
including in the school textbooks and in the media, continue to pervade Turkish society and 
foster the persistent low social status of women and violence against women. Further efforts 

37 

 
 
to  educate  women  and  men  are  necessary  to  prevent  domestic  violence.  Gender-based 
violence  led  to  the  death  of  440  women,  and  only  317  women  reported  sexual  violence  in 
2018. There are serious concerns that relate to early and forced marriages and discretionary 
mitigation in court cases of violence against women, possibly mirroring sexist prejudice and 
victim  blaming.  Closure  of  women’s  associations  and  some  centres  after  the  state  of 
emergency caused additional challenges for women victims who lost support services. 

There was little progress on the rights of the child. Challenges of child poverty, child labour, 
and child marriage remain, as do gaps in access to quality inclusive education and protection 
from  violence  and abuse, particularly for the most  vulnerable  groups, including Roma. The 
2013-2017 national  children’s rights strategy and action plan has not been renewed, and its 
implementation  is  not  being  closely  monitored.  A  national  strategy  to  prevent  violence 
against  children  was  in  place  until  2018,  but  has  yet  to  be  updated  or  renewed.  Despite 
reports  of  increased  sexual  abuse  and  ill-treatment  of  children,  systematic  monitoring  and 
research  on  these  issues  remain  inadequate.  All  allegations  of  child  abuse  need  to  be 
investigated  swiftly,  effectively  and  impartially.  Juvenile  courts  are  still  not  in  place  in  all 
provinces,  despite  the  clear  wording  of  the  law.  The  quality  of  legal  aid  for  juveniles,  and 
rehabilitation  activities  in  prisons  are  a  matter  of  concern.  Closure  by  the  authorities  of 
several civil society organisations dealing with juvenile rights after the state of emergency led 
to a decrease in civil society support to victims.  

On  the  rights  of  persons  with  disabilities,  Turkey  continued  capacity-building  efforts  to 
promote  inclusive  education  services.  However,  the  lack  of  qualified  teaching  staff  for 
inclusive  education  is  a  major  obstacle.  There  is  a  particularly  low  rate  of  participation  in 
early  childhood  education.  Affordable  occupational  therapy  and  vocational  rehabilitation 
services need to be expanded to promote the employability of persons with disabilities. The 
Government continued its financial support scheme for home-based care provision for people 
with  disabilities  in  need.  However,  people  with  disabilities  have  limited  access  to  the 
personal and social support needed for independent living. Awareness on the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (CPRD) among public service providers 
is reportedly low, and no systematic efforts are made to promote or implement the principles 
of  the  Convention.  The  National  Monitoring  and  Evaluation  Committee  on  the  Rights  of 
Persons with Disabilities needs to be activated, and its work should be conducted in line with 
the  CRPD.  The  NHREI  needs  to  step  up  efforts  to  address  discrimination  on  the  basis  of 
disability.  According  to  the  Criminal  Code,  the  exclusion  of  a  disabled  person  from  public 
service  is  not  considered  a  crime,  unless  it  is  a  hate  crime.  Legal  sanctions  against 
discrimination  in  education  and  employment  remain  unidentified  in  Turkish  Disability  Act. 
Accessibility  Monitoring  and  Audit  Commissions  established  at  provincial  level  have  not 
been  effective  in  promoting  accessibility.  Turkey  has  no  mental  health  legislation  and  no 
independent  body  to  monitor  mental  health  institutions.  Turkey  suffers  from  a  lack  of 
reliable, up-to-date data on the situation of persons with disabilities. 

There  are  serious  concerns  on  the  protection  of  the  fundamental  rights  of  lesbian,  gay, 
bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons. No changes have been introduced to 
the  military  disciplinary  system  or  to  medical  regulations  which  define  homosexuality  as  a 
‘psychosexual disorder/illness’. A new law of January 2018 on disciplinary provisions for the 
security  forces  stated  that  ‘abnormal/pervert’  actions  were  grounds  for  dismissal  for  all 
security  personnel.  Activists  have  been  sued  for  ‘participating  in  an  unauthorised 
demonstration’. LGBTI activities and Pride parades have been banned or stopped by police in 
several  provinces,  among  them  Ankara,  Adana  and  Istanbul.  LGBTI  activities  can  only  be 
carried  out  informally  in  closed  spaces.  In  2018,  the  Court  of  Cassation  changed  its  2015 
positive  jurisprudence  on  hate  speech  by  stating  that  calling  LGBTI  persons  ‘perverts’  is 

38 

 
 
freedom  of  expression.  Hate  speech  by  government  officials  and  media  against  the  LGBTI 
community  continued  during  the  reporting  period.  Intimidation  and  violence  against  the 
LGBTI community continues to be a major problem, and hate speech against LGBTI persons 
is  not  effectively  prosecuted,  as  it  is  mostly  considered  to  fall  within  the  boundaries  of 
freedom of speech. There is no specific legislation to address  these crimes. There is limited 
protection of  LGBTI organisations which have received threats. Discrimination towards the 
LGBTI community is still widespread. 

No  steps  were  taken  to  further  align  legislation  with  European  standards  on  procedural 
rights,  some  aspects  of  which  are  guaranteed  by  law,  including  legal  aid  and  the  right  to 
translation and interpretation in criminal matters. Turkey has been repeatedly criticised by the 
ECtHR  for  violating  the  right  to  a  fair  trial,  notably  due  to  its  failure  to  respect  procedural 
rules.  Some  prohibitions  introduced  by  state  of  emergency  decrees  were  lifted,  but  the 
legislative  amendments  adopted  in  July  amending  several  articles  related  to  fundamental 
freedoms  was  criticised  for  retaining  many  of  the  repressive  powers  of  the  state  of 
emergency. Accordingly, changes to anti-terror legislation allow maximum detention periods 
before the detainee is brought before a judge (for release or formal arrest) of up to 12 days. 
The ECHR standard is a maximum of 4 days. The ban on access to defence during the first 24 
hours of police custody is still present in the Anti-Terror Law. Legal professionals are being 
targeted with allegations of supporting a terrorist organisation. Twelve of 17 lawyers from a 
Lawyers Association and a Law Bureau, who were released from prison in September 2018, 
were  re-arrested  after  the  prosecutor’s  objection  in  the  same  court,  in  the  absence  of  new 
evidence or developments. The evidence indicates that these allegations are a strategy to stop 
the legitimate exercise of their professional duties, including human rights-related work. As 
of January 2019, it is estimated that 1,546 lawyers have been prosecuted, including 274 who 
have  been  convicted  in  first-instance  courts  of  membership  of  a  terrorist  organisation.  Law 
officials  (judges,  prosecutors  and  other  civil  servants)  suspended  from  the  civil  service  by 
state of emergency decrees are barred from acting as lawyers, since the Ministry of Justice's 
appeals  against their licences have so far always  been accepted by the judiciary. Criticisms 
persist  of  the  complex  and  problematic  structure  of  the  legal  aid  system,  as  well  as  of  the 
quality of the services offered. However, a strategy plan accompanied by an action plan for 
2018-2021 has been developed, with the aim of restructuring the system.  

Hate speech and threats directed against minorities remain a serious problem. This includes 
hate speech in the media targeting national, ethnic and religious groups. There has also been 
increased  anti-Semitic  rhetoric  in  the  media  and  by  public  officials  due  to  the  conflict  in 
Palestine.  Furthermore,  school  textbooks  need  to  be  revised  to  delete  remnants  of 
discriminatory references. Attacks or acts of vandalism on minority worship places continued 
and  need  to  be  investigated.  State  subsidies  for  minority  schools  have  also  fallen 
considerably.  However,  discussions  between  the  Government  and  representatives  of 
minorities  have  continued.  For  example,  President  Erdoğan  hosted  the  Ecumenical  Greek 
Orthodox  Patriarch  and  discussed  the  Patriarch’s  request  for  support  for  the  protection  and 
restoration  of  the  Greek  orphanage  on  Istanbul’s  Prinkipo  (Büyükada)  Island.  On  minority 
foundations,  no  new  regulation  on  the  election  procedures  for  non-Muslim  foundations  has 
been  published  since  2013.  In  the  absence  of  a  regulation,  these  foundations  are  unable  to 
hold elections for their board members. The Armenian Patriarchal election procedures were 
halted  by  the  Istanbul  Governorate.  Regarding  minorities,  full  respect  for  and  protection  of 
language,  religion,  culture  and  fundamental  rights  in  accordance  with  European  standards 
have yet to be fully achieved. The issue of property rights of non-Muslim minorities and the 
need for a revision of legislation covering all issues regarding property rights is pending. As 
the Venice Commission underlined in 2010, Turkey should continue the reform process and 

39 

 
 
introduce  legislation  which  makes  it  possible  for  all  non-Muslim  religious  communities  as 
such to acquire legal personality. 

Implementation of the national strategy (2016-2021) for Roma citizens needs to be stepped 
up,  with  sufficient  budget  allocation,  especially  after  the  end  of  the  SIROMA  IPA  project. 
There is still a lack of solid data allowing for evidence-based policy, measureable indicators 
and  time-bound  targets.  Adoption  and  implementation  of  a  new  action  plan  is  urgently 
required following the end of the previous one covering 2016-2018. Local authorities need to 
be  properly  involved  for  effective  implementation  of  the  strategy,  and  adopt  local 
strategies/action plans when relevant. The monitoring committee of the strategy needs to be 
strengthened  and  have  more  regular  meetings.  A  broader  group  of  Roma  NGOs  should  be 
included  in  the  Committee.  Following  the  June  parliamentary  election,  there  are  now  two 
Roma  MPs.  Roma  in  general  live  in  very  poor  housing  conditions,  often  lack  basic  public 
services and are reliant on benefits. Urban renewal projects continue to primarily affect Roma 
settlements, forcibly displacing families. In the field of education, Roma children experience 
additional  challenges  in  accessing  quality  education,  and  schools  in  Roma  neighbourhoods 
are  often  poorly  resourced.  Inadequate  access  to  education  and  high  drop-out  rates  persist, 
especially  at  lower  and  upper  secondary  levels.  Participation  in  pre-primary  education 
remains very low. It is difficult for Roma citizens to find long-term formal employment. The 
employment  rate  of  Roma  citizens  is  around  31  percent.  A  coordinated  and  rights-based 
public  service  delivery  approach  at  district  level,  as  piloted  by  the  IPA  funded  SIROMA 
project,  needs  to  be  disseminated.  The  first  EU-Turkey  Joint  Roma  Seminar  did  not  take 
place in 2018 as initially planned.  

On  cultural  rights,  the  Government  has  not  legalised  the  provision  of  public  services  in 
languages other than Turkish. Legal restrictions on mother-tongue education in primary and 
secondary schools remain. Optional courses in Kurdish continue in public state schools, as do 
university  programmes  in  Kurdish,  Arabic,  Syriac  and  Zaza.  Particular  restrictions  exist  on 
Kurdish language and literature: there are reports about the dismissal of Kurdish academics 
and lecturers, partly facing terrorism-related investigations, the closure of Kurdish language 
NGOs and institutions, pressure on Kurdish media, and bans on Kurdish books (see Chapter 
10 – Information society and media). In the south-east, several commemorative and literary 
monuments marking Kurdish personalities, as well as events and bilingual street signs, were 
removed by appointed trustees and authorities. The State Theatres, Opera and Ballet were re-
established  by  presidential  decree  in  July  2018.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  new 
presidential  board  for  cultural  and  artistic  policies  will  allow  autonomy  to  cultural 
institutions. 

2.2.2.  Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security 

The  EU  has  common  rules  for  border  control,  visas,  external  migration  and  asylum. 
Schengen  cooperation  entails  the  lifting  of  border  controls  inside  the  EU.  There  is  also 
cooperation  in  the  fight  against  organised  crime  and  terrorism,  and  judicial,  police  and 
customs cooperation.   

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  justice,  freedom  and  security.  There  has  been  some 
progress in the past year, in particular in migration and asylum policy. Turkey continued to 
make significant efforts in hosting and addressing the needs of almost four million refugees, 
and  in  preventing  illegal  crossings  towards  the  EU.  Turkey  remained  committed  to 
implementing  the  March  2016  EU-Turkey  Statement  and  played  a  key  role  in  ensuring 
effective management of migratory flows along the Eastern Mediterranean route. There has 
been  limited  progress  in  the  implementation  of  the  recommendations  of  last  year’s  report. 
Turkey is not yet implementing the provisions relating to third-country nationals in the EU-

40 

 
 
Turkey readmission agreement, despite these entering into force in October 2017. Turkey still 
needs to  align its legislation on data protection to allow for police and judicial  cooperation 
with  Europol  and  Eurojust,  as  well  as  on  border  management  and  on  the  fight  against 
terrorism. Most of the recommendations can be repeated, therefore. 

For the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  continue  implementing  the  EU-Turkey  Statement  of  March  2016  and  implement  all  the 
provisions of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement towards all EU Member States; 

  align legislation on personal data protection with European standards, and implement the 
necessary requirements for the negotiation of an international agreement allowing for the 
exchange of personal data with Europol and Eurojust; 

  revise its legislation and practices on terrorism in line with the European Convention on 
Human  Rights,  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  case  law  and  the  EU  acquis  and 
practices. The proportionality principle must be observed in practice. 

Fight against organised crime 

Turkey has some level of preparation in the fight against organised crime. There has been 
limited progress overall, and no progress in meeting last year’s recommendations, which can 
be largely repeated. Turkey should continue to take measures to improve its track record on 
dismantling criminal networks and confiscating criminal assets. Turkey also needs to improve 
its  legislation  on  cybercrime,  asset  confiscation  and  witness  protection.  Two  rounds  of 
negotiations  took  place  on  an  international  agreement  on  the  exchange  of  personal  data 
between Europol and the Turkish authorities. However, the Turkish data protection law is not 
yet in line with the European standards. 

For the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  establish an Asset Recovery Office in line with the EU acquis; 

  collect  and  use  appropriate  aggregate  statistics  to  facilitate  threat  assessment,  policy 

development and implementation; 

  enhance cooperation with Europol; 

  adopt  the  2019-2021  action  plan  for  the  implementation  of  the  strategy  for  combatting 

organised crime; 

  develop  a strategic approach towards financial investigations, including  by adopting the 
Financial Action Task  Force concept  of financial investigations; implementing financial 
investigations  as  a  standard  when  dealing  with  organised  crime,  terrorism  and  serious 
corruption  cases;  launching  financial  investigations  from  the  very  start  of  a  criminal 
investigation;  applying  a  multidisciplinary  cooperation  and  a  pro-active  approach  with 
regard to financial investigations; and developing a legal framework for the confiscation 
of proceeds of crime. 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

Pursuant to the main law on enforcement institutions relevant in the fight against organised 
crime,  i.e.  the  Gendarmerie  and  the  Turkish  National  Police  under  the  Ministry  of  Interior, 
the  number  of  specialised  departments  dealing  with  specific  forms  of  organised  crime  (e.g. 
drugs,  irregular  migration,  human  trafficking,  cybercrime,  witness  protection)  has  further 
increased. 

41 

 
 
Turkey  has  not  yet  established  or  designated  an  Asset  Recovery  Office  in  charge  of  the 
identification and tracing of criminal assets.  

The Cyber Security Council was abolished and the President of the Republic was authorised 
to designate a board or an authority to fulfil the duties of the Council. The repercussions of 
this recent change remain to be seen. 

Turkey’s  legal  framework  for  the  fight  against  organised  crime  and  police  cooperation  is 
partially aligned with the EU acquis. The scope of witness protection needs to be expanded to 
include  all  types  of  serious  crime,  while  its  procedural  rules  also  need  improvement. 
Extended confiscation, third-party confiscation, and precautionary freezing of assets need to 
be aligned with the acquis. 

The Ministry of Interior continues to coordinate implementation of the 2016-21 strategy for 
combating organised crime. An action plan for the implementation of this strategy covering 
2019-21  is  under  preparation.  Turkey  is  implementing  a  number  of  sectoral  strategies  and 
action plans, such as a national cybersecurity strategy and action plan for 2016-19.  

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

In the fight against organised crime, 1 118 persons were arrested in 417 operations in 2018 
compared  with  685  persons  arrested  in  274  operations  in  2017.  In  2018,  in  972  cases  of 
organised crime, 1 774 persons were convicted.  

In the fight against smuggling (fuel, cigarettes, historical works, commodities etc.), in 2018, 
569 suspects were arrested out of 20 187 persons in 13,047 incidents. In 2017, 558 suspects 
were  arrested  out  of  20 033  persons  in  14 009  incidents,  and  in  2016,  434  suspects  were 
arrested out of 15 933 persons in 10,157 incidents. 

The measures taken after the attempted coup of July 2016 continued to affect the operational 
capacity  of  the  forces  of  public  order.  In  2018,  192  personnel  (officers,  non-commissioned 
officers,  civil  servants)  from  the  Coast  Guard  Command  were  dismissed  (128  in  2017).  In 
2018,  689  personnel  (officers,  non-commissioned  officers)  from  the  Turkish  Jandarma 
(gendarmerie) were dismissed (1 533 in 2017). 2 204 new personnel were recruited in 2017 
and  2018.  The  capacity  of  the  training  academy  has  been  stretched  to  meet  the  increasing 
number of training courses required. 

As regards international cooperation, the first round of negotiations took place in November 
2018 for an international agreement on the exchange of personal data between Europol and 
the Turkish authorities competent in fighting serious crime and terrorism. The second round 
took  place  in  April  2019.  The  Turkish  data  protection  law  is  not  yet  in  line  with  European 
standards,  something  which  is  a  central  requirement  for  concluding  the  agreement.  A 
strategic agreement with Europol has been in force since 2004, while a Turkish liaison officer 
has  been  seconded  to  Europol  since  2016.  Closer  cooperation  between  Turkish  law 
enforcement  and  Europol  can  be  achieved  by  making  better  use  of  the  existing  strategic 
cooperation agreement and liaison agreement.  

Turkey  continues  to  cooperate  with  22  Member  States,  with  47  signed  cooperation 
agreements to fight against terrorism and crime via information sharing and joint operations. 
Overall, Turkey has 172 security cooperation agreements with 103 countries. 

The number of suspicious transaction reports submitted to the Financial Crimes Investigation 
Board  in  2018  grew  to  222 743,  compared  to  176 411  in  2017  and  132 750  in  2016.  The 
number  of  files  analysed  and  evaluated  by  the  Financial  Crimes  Investigation  Board  is 
showing an upward trend, increasing from 23 893 during the reporting period, compared with 
10 554 in 2017.  

42 

 
 
As  regards  domestic  operational  capacity,  the  courts’  need  of  expertise  in  organised  crime 
cases continues. Cooperation between law enforcement bodies on organised crime should be 
improved, in particular that between the police and the gendarmerie. In terms of equipment, 
law  enforcement  bodies  have  appropriate  modern  vehicles,  radio  communication  systems, 
software, hardware and premises. Most of the required databases are in place, though they are 
not  always  interconnected.  Cooperation  between  the  Police  Academy  of  Turkey  and  the 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) has continued. 

In line with  EU  acquis, the confiscation  of criminal  assets should be a priority in  the fight 
against  organised  crime,  terrorism  and  corruption  in  Turkey.  Turkey  should  develop  and 
implement  a more  comprehensive  and  coherent  legal  framework for the  confiscation of the 
proceeds of crime. In addition, it is crucial that financial investigations into a person’s assets 
are allowed to continue (for years if needed) after a criminal conviction in order to fully and 
effectively implement a previously issued confiscation order. Finally, Turkey should urgently 
improve its capacity to manage frozen or confiscated assets so that they do not lose economic 
value (asset management). 

The  number  of  people  convicted  for  money  laundering  was  9  in  2018,  unchanged  from 
2017.  During  the  reporting  period,  the  Turkish  Coast  Guard  Command  was  involved  in  13 
drug-related  incidents  in  2018,  ten  of  which  were  carried  out  with  other  law  enforcement 
agencies;  they  led  to  39  suspects  being  taken  into  custody.  Turkish  law  enforcement 
authorities detained 24 809 suspects in connection with drug-related crimes, which resulted in 
8 237 convictions.  

Turkey  is  a  destination  and  a  transit  country,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  a  source  country,  for 
women, men  and children subjected to  trafficking in human beings for  sexual  and labour 
exploitation.  Authorities  reported  134  victims  of  trafficking  in  human  beings  until  31 
December 2018, compared with 303 in 2017. The main shortcomings identified are the lack 
of shelters (there are currently only two with a total hosting capacity for 42 victims), access 
to shelters for men (labour exploitation), victim identification, legal assistance to victims, and 
a referral system that involves civil society organisations. 

Turkey has strong standards preventing the sale of blank-firing, gas and alarm weapons that 
can  be  converted  into  live-firing  guns.  However,  these  standards  do  not  apply  to  the 
manufacture of such weapons for export. Consequently, Turkey is a major exporter to the EU 
of blank-firing, gas and alarm weapons, which do not comply with EU standards and are one 
of the main current sources of firearms trafficking. 

Pro-actively fighting organised crime and corruption remains fundamental to countering the 
illicit influence of criminal groups on the political, legal and economic systems. 

Cooperation in the field of drugs 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

Drug policies are the responsibility of the High Council for the Fight against Drugs, which is 
responsible for inter-institutional coordination and monitoring in this area. The High Council 
includes  ministers  from  all  of  the  ministries  involved  in  delivering  the  objectives  of  this 
strategy. The Board for the Fight against Drugs supports the work of the High Council, and 
the  Ministry  of  Health  carries  out  the  secretariat  functions.  There  is  a  research  committee 
conducting  research  on  drug  addiction  and  new  types  of  addiction,  which  aims  to  identify 
reasons for addiction and measures to be taken to address the issue. There is also a scientific 
committee, composed of academics, which is tasked with making scientific recommendations 
for studies and carrying out training on drug abuse. This committee is established within the 

43 

 
 
Turkish  Monitoring  Centre  for  Drugs  and  Drug  Addiction.  The  National  Early  Warning 
System for control procedures is managed by the same centre of the Turkish National Police. 

A  national  anti-drug  strategy  for  2018-2023  was  adopted  in  May  2018.  In  July  2017,  the 
Ministry of  Interior had adopted its own institutional plan to implement  specific projects in 
this  field.  The  implementation  policy  on  the  fight  against  drugs  (2017-2018)  was  updated 
during the reporting period. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Turkey remains a transit route for drugs between Asia and Europe. Turkish law-enforcement 
bodies  conducted  successful  operations  during  the  reporting  period  which  resulted  in  the 
seizure  of  175 714  kg  of  cannabis,  1 476  kg  of  cocaine,  17 752  kg  of  heroin,  8 605 662 
ecstasy  tablets  and  26 271 790  captagon  tablets.  Joint  controlled  delivery  operations  and 
judicial cooperation also continued involving the Germany, the Netherlands, the UAE, Italy, 
Bulgaria, Austria, the UK, Iran, Spain and the USA.  

Since 2008, a total of 718 new psychoactive substances have been included in the scope of 
the  legislation  as  a  result  of  the  activities  of  the  National  Early  Warning  System  for  the 
control procedures of the Turkish National Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
working group. The number of sniffer dogs used by the Turkish National Police has increased 
to 431 from 391 over the past year. 

Narcotics teams specialised in fighting against drugs operate now in all 81 provinces, to focus 
especially on high-risk locations such as schools. This is the result of a constant increase in 
number of provinces covered: 11 in 2015, 29 in 2016, and 50 in 2017.  

Turkey continues to report annually to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction (EMCDDA). The quality and quantity of data Turkey provides has been improving 
in  recent  years.  Rehabilitation  and  treatment  capacity  in  the  country  needs  to  be  further 
increased, despite the increase in the number of treatment centres. Turkey’s capacity for data 
collection and analysis is being strengthened through projects funded under IPA. 

Fight against terrorism 

Turkish  efforts  to  tackle  terrorism  resulted  in  improvement  of  the  security  climate  in  the 
country. Turkey is still facing threats from terrorist groups. The EU has condemned all acts of 
terrorist  violence.  Measures  taken  in  the  fight  against  terrorism  need  to  be  proportionate. 
While  the  Government  has  a  legitimate  right  and  responsibility  to  fight  terrorism,  it  is  also 
responsible for ensuring that these efforts are done in accordance with the rule of law, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. Amending the anti-terror law and practices in line with EU 
standards is key. This is also a remaining benchmark in the visa-liberalisation dialogue. 

In its efforts to fight terrorism, Turkish threat perception has prioritised the fight against the 
PKK  and  the  dismantling  of  the  Gülen  movement,  nationally  designated  as  a  terror 
organisation in May 2016, and to which Turkey attributes the organisation and execution of 
the attempted coup of July 2016. The PKK remains on the EU’s list of persons, groups and 
entities  involved  in  acts  of  terrorism.  Turkey  continued  its  efforts  to  fight  against  both 
home-grown and foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) cells. Following the jointly agreed actions at 
the  counter-terrorism  dialogue  in  November  2017,  cooperation  between  Turkey  and  EU 
Member States on the issue of foreign terrorist fighters has improved; there is a strong need 
to continue to implement the actions that were agreed. 

44 

 
 
Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

There  is  a  Police  tactical  unit  responsible  for  counter-terror  in  the  Branch  of  the  General 
Directorate of Security. 

Turkey has not made any progress in reforming its legislative framework on anti-terrorism 
in  the  reporting  period.  While  maintaining  the  effectiveness  of  its  fight  against  terrorist 
threats, Turkey needs to bring its legislation on terrorism and corresponding implementation 
into line with the standards enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights, the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights and the EU acquis and practices.  

The country is party to the Council of Europe’s Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure 
and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism. The country 
currently  lacks  a  comprehensive  strategy  and  action  plan  on  anti-money  laundering  and 
terrorism  financing.  However,  the  Financial  Crimes  Investigation  Board  (MASAK),  in 
coordination  with  other  relevant  institutions,  has  been  preparing  a  comprehensive  national 
risk assessment document ahead of the upcoming Financial Action Task Force assessment in 
2019. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Turkey’s  counter-terrorism  dialogue  with  the  EU  continued,  and  is  among  the  key  areas  of 
joint interest. Turkey developed its cooperation with EU Member States on detecting foreign 
terrorist  fighters  (FTF)  who  seek  to  cross  Turkey  to  reach  -  or  return  from  -  Syria  or  Iraq. 
Closer cooperation with Europol on FTF would be desirable. By 2018, Turkey issued entry 
bans for more than 70,000 suspected FTF (14% of whom are EU citizens) and deported about 
6 969 FTF  (917 EU nationals). However, police  and judicial  cooperation  with  EU Member 
States  and  EU  agencies  in  combating  terrorism  remained  limited  due  to  the  absence  of  a 
personal  data  protection  law  in  line  with  European  standards,  and  differences  over  the 
definition  of,  and  penalties  for,  terrorist  offences.  Turkey  should  continue  its  efforts  to 
effectively prevent and counter radicalisation. 

Legal and irregular migration 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

As regards the institutional framework, the Security and Foreign Policies Council is one of 
the  nine  new  Presidential  Councils  established  by  presidential  decree  in  July  2018.  The 
Migration Board, established by presidential decree in September 2018, is responsible for the 
determination,  coordination  and  implementation  of  Turkey’s  migration  strategy  and  is 
convened by the Minister of the Interior. 

A  decree  of  July  2018  resulted  in  the  abolition  of  the  following  institutions:  the  Migration 
Policy  Board,  previously  established  under  the  Law  on  Foreigners  and  International 
Protection  (LFIP),  the  Migration  Advisory  Board,  which  organised  participation  by  civil 
society  and  academia,  and  the  Coordination  Board  on  Combatting  Irregular  Migration.  A 
presidential decree which came into force in July 2018 established a new department under 
the  Directorate-General  for  Migration  Management  (DGMM), 
the  Department  for 
Combatting Irregular Migration. 

The DGMM remains a key player in managing migration and continued to increase its staff 
capacity, and employs a total of 3 098 staff centrally and in the Turkish provinces. While no 
DGMM  structure  abroad  has  yet  been  set  up,  the  DGMM  has  appointed  contact  points  to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the main countries of origin of irregular migration to Turkey. 

The legislation in this area is partially aligned with the EU acquis.  

45 

 
 
Turkey  did  not  sign  any  additional  bilateral  readmission  agreements  in  2018.  The 
readmission agreement with Nigeria was ratified. 

The  DGMM  follows  a  strategic  plan  for  2017-21,  which  contains  objectives  for  regular 
migration, irregular migration, international protection, the fight against trafficking in human 
beings, improved integration and communication, and increased institutional capacity.  

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

The EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 after three years of implementation continued to 
deliver results, with both parties committed to its effective implementation. According to the 
International Organisation for Migration, the number of lives lost in the Aegean Sea during 
irregular crossing attempts stood at 156 in 2018, compared with 62 in 2017 and 434 in 2016. 
The daily average of irregular crossings from Turkey to the Aegean islands was 85 from the 
activation of the Statement until the end of 2018, compared with 1 794 before the activation 
of  the  Statement.  This  sharp  downward  trend  was  supported  by  intensified  efforts  by 
Turkey’s  law  enforcement  agencies  to  prevent  irregular  departures  from  coastal  areas,  by 
Turkish  Coast  Guard  rescue  operations  in  the  Aegean  Sea,  by  the  restriction  of  the  free 
movement  of  persons  seeking  international  protection  and  by  a  measure  relocating  persons 
under  temporary  protection  who  tried  to  cross  irregularly  to  Europe  to  temporary 
accommodation  centres  in  eastern  provinces  of  Turkey.  Technical  cooperation  between 
Greece  and  Turkey  on  returns  under  the  Statement  has  been  facilitated  by  regular  trilateral 
meetings also  involving  the EU. At the same time, migratory pressure on Turkey increased 
significantly.  According  to  the  Turkish  authorities,  222 290  persons  who  had  crossed  into 
Turkey  illegally  were  apprehended  in  2018,  compared  with  175 752  in  2017.  Irregular 
migrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria were the three most frequently apprehended 
nationalities. The number of irregular migrants intercepted by the coast guard reached 23 185 
in  the  reporting  period,  up  from  21 937  in  2017.  The  number  of  people  smugglers 
apprehended  increased  slightly  from  4 641  in  2017  to  4 913  in  2018.  No  data  is  available 
concerning their prosecution by the Turkish judicial system. 

Turkey continued to implement the ‘One-for-One’ resettlement scheme under the EU-Turkey 
Statement, in cooperation with the EU Member States and relevant UN agencies in Turkey. 
Between April 2016 and December 2018, 18 640 Syrians were resettled from Turkey to the 
EU,  of  whom  nearly  7 000  in  2018.  Respecting  its  commitments  under  the  EU-Turkey 
Statement since April 2016, in 2018 Turkey accepted 1 762 returnees from the Greek islands, 
including 278 Syrians. The number of returns is low and needs to be increased. 

Turkey  has  18  removal  centres  with  a  total  capacity  of  8 276  persons.  An  additional 
temporary facility  for 4 000 persons was  opened in  2018. The DGMM plans to  increase its 
hosting  capacity  by  opening  another  16  removal  centres  for  up  to  7 200  persons  by  2020. 
Turkey  needs  to  further  align  its  practice  with  European  standards  in  removal  centres,  in 
particular with regard to access to legal counselling and interpreters. 

49 523  irregular  migrants  were  returned  from  Turkey  to  their  countries  of  origin  in  2018. 
Through an IPA-financed project implemented with IOM, 1 737 irregular migrants received 
voluntary  return  assistance.  Turkey  is  working  on  developing  a  national  mechanism  for 
Assisted Voluntary Return. 

Implementation  of  the  EU-Turkey  readmission  agreement  remained  unsatisfactory. 
Provisions of the agreement that apply to Turkish nationals are not implemented consistently 
by all Turkish diplomatic missions in the EU. In relation to third-country nationals, Turkey 
maintained its position that it would not implement the provisions that entered into force in 
October 2017 until the visa requirement for Turkish citizens travelling to the Schengen zone 

46 

 
 
for a short stay has been lifted. Turkey has suspended and therefore is not implementing the 
bilateral  protocol  on  readmission  with  Greece  (at  the  end  of  2018  there  were  over  3 500 
unanswered requests). Turkey does not readmit third-country nationals from Bulgaria under 
either the bilateral border agreement or the EU-Turkey readmission agreement. 

Asylum 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

The  DGMM  is  the  main  institution  responsible  for  all  refugee-related  issues.  The  dual 
asylum registration and refugee status determination system established by the DGMM and 
the  UNHCR  was  abolished  in  September  2018.  Since  then,  registration  and  refugee  status 
determination  for  non-Syrians  in  Turkey  has  been  exclusively  managed  by  the  DGMM.  In 
March  2018,  the  DGMM  opened  a  pilot  Refugee  Status  Determination  (RSD)  centre  in 
Ankara.  Another  one  is  scheduled  to  start  operations  in  Istanbul  in  2019.  The  basic  aim  of 
this initiative is to further harmonise RSD procedures in Turkey. The DGMM now issues ID 
cards for applicants with an immediate validity of six months once their registration has been 
completed.  An  ID  card  legalises  an  applicant’s  stay  in  Turkey  and  provides  access  to  the 
national health insurance scheme, public schools, free interpretation services and other social 
assistance.  In  some  Provincial  Directorates  for  Migration  Management  (PDMM),  there  are 
backlogs  and  long  waiting  times  for  registering  for  international  protection  status. 
International  Protection  applicants  face  serious  difficulties  in  accessing  registration  and 
obtaining IDs.   

Applicants  for  international  protection,  conditional  refugee  status  holders  and  people  under 
temporary  protection  (Syrians)  can  apply  for  work  permits.  According  to  the  Turkish 
authorities,  the  number  of  work  permits  issued  to  Syrians  under  temporary  protection  was 
38 289 at the end of 2018, compared with 15 700 in 2017. This increase is attributed to the 
information activities carried out by the Government to encourage legal employment, and to a 
reduction  in  the  administrative  fees  for  work  permits.  Throughout  2018,  the  DGMM 
continued  the  verification  of  data  of  Syrians  under  temporary  protection,  updating  and 
completing the information taken during their original registration. As of 31 December 2018, 
the data of 2.6 million Syrians had been verified. 

Legislation  in  this  area  is  partially  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  Turkish  Law  on 
Foreigners  and  International  Protection  (LFIP)  maintains  the  reservation  (geographical 
limitation) expressed in the New York Protocol of the 1951 Geneva Convention, according to 
which  the  vast  majority  of  persons  seeking  international  protection  in  Turkey  cannot  apply 
for fully-fledged refugee status but for ‘conditional refugee’ status and subsidiary protection 
only. Conditional refugee status limits the stay in the country ‘until the moment a recognised 
conditional refugee is resettled to a third country’. Syrian refugees are collectively granted a 
specific refugee status under the Temporary Protection Regulation.  

The  DGMM  drafted  a  strategy  and  action  plan  on  ‘harmonisation’  (the  term  used  by  the 
Turkish  authorities  to  define  activities  related  to  the  integration  of  migrants  and  refugees) 
covering  2019-2023,  which  contains  objectives  for  employment,  health,  education,  social 
policies,  orientation/information,  and  social  aid.  The  plan  was  endorsed  by  the  former 
Migration Policies Board in February 2018, but has not yet been made public.  

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Turkey has continued to provide generous assistance to refugees, hosting the largest refugee 
community  in  the  world,  with  3.6  million  Syrians  under  Temporary  Protection  and  around 
370,000 registered non-Syrian refugees. The number of asylum seekers continued to increase 
over  the  reporting  period.  In  2018,  Turkey  had  granted  international  protection  (refugee 

47 

 
 
status,  conditional  refugee  status  or  subsidiary  protection)  to  72 056  applicants.  The 
authorities rejected 13 139 applications. The UNHCR indicates that at the end of December 
2018, 370 932 asylum seekers and refugees from countries other than Syria were registered in 
Turkey; of these, 46% were Afghanis and 39% were Iraqis.  

There  are  currently  62  ‘satellite  cities’  in  Turkey  where  asylum  seekers  and  recognised 
conditional  refugees  are  required  to  reside.  Syrians  may  register  in  any  of  Turkey’s  81 
provinces,  but  must  then  stay  in  that  province.  Registration  was  temporarily  suspended  in 
some provinces during 2018. 

Around 155 000 of 3.6 million Syrian refugees live in 13 camps located in the south-east of 
the  country,  close  to  the  Syrian  border.  The  number  of  camps  is  steadily  decreasing  as 
refugees are resettled to urban areas or return to their home countries. In 2018, the DGMM 
took over the management of the camps from Turkey's Disaster and Emergency Management 
Agency. Throughout 2018, significant steps were taken to provide wider access to schooling 
and healthcare to  Syrians  under temporary protection, including with  EU support under the 
Facility for Refugees in Turkey.  

The  Facility  is  implemented  as  humanitarian  and  development  assistance.  Under  the  first 
tranche  of  humanitarian  assistance,  45  projects  were  contracted  with  19  partners,  covering 
basic  needs,  protection,  education  and  health.  The  EU  addressed  the  needs  of  particularly 
vulnerable refugees via the Emergency Social Safety Net, benefitting more than 1.6 million 
of  the  most  vulnerable  refugees.  The  Conditional  Cash  Transfer  for  Education  programme 
was launched in 2017 and is the largest ever Education in Emergencies programme financed 
by  the  EU,  facilitating  access  for  refugee  populations  to  formal  education  systems.  As  of 
April  2019,  over  494 000  children  attended  school  and  their  families  received  financial 
support through this programme.  

In  education,  a  grant  of  EUR  300  million,  implemented  in  cooperation  with  the  Turkish 
Ministry  of  National  Education,  has  supported  the  integration  of  Syrian  children  into  the 
Turkish education system, thus providing access to education to over 600 000 children. This 
support continues under the second tranche, and a new project with the Ministry of National 
Education  was  signed,  worth  EUR  400  million.  In  addition,  in  health,  the  Facility  is 
delivering EUR 300 million in aid to ensure that refugees can access healthcare services, with 
over 4 million primary health care consultations carried out and over 500 000 Syrian refugee 
children vaccinated so far. Furthermore, 143 migrant health centres are now operational, with 
over 2 000 staff employed.  

Throughout 2018, the DGMM continued the verification of data of Syrians under temporary 
protection, updating and completing the information taken during their original registration. 
By December 2018, the data of 2.6 million Syrians had been verified using Facility funding. 
This will provide updated data to design evidence-based programmes for targeted assistance, 
and should be made available to policymakers across relevant government bodies. Reports in 
the press of alleged expulsions, returns and deportations of Syrian nationals, in violation of 
the  principle  of  non-refoulement,  continued  in  2018.  The  EU  monitors  the  situation  of 
refugees  and  migrants  in  Turkey  through  regular  meetings  and  information  exchange  with 
Turkish  authorities,  as  well  as  national  and  international  organisations,  including  these 
focusing on refugee and migrant rights, and through field visits in crucial geographical areas. 
However,  the  EU  does  not  have  access  to  the  Turkish-Syrian  border  and  is  not  monitoring 
returns to Syria. The EU provides significant funding for capacity building of DGMM. 

In  June  2018,  the  Turkish  Constitutional  Court  issued  a  pilot  judgement  concerning  the 
prohibition of refoulement in light of the amendments introduced to the LFIP by way of an 

48 

 
 
emergency  decree  in  October  2016.  The  exception  introduced  to  the  principle  of 
non-refoulement  provides  that  a  deportation  decision  ‘may  be  taken  at  any  time  during  the 
international  protection  proceedings’  against  a  person  for  reasons  of  (i)  leadership, 
membership of or support of a terrorist organisation, or a benefit-oriented criminal group; (ii) 
a threat to public order or public health; or (iii) in relation to terrorist organisations defined by 
international  institutions  and  organisations.  This  exception  has  been  subjected  to  frequent 
criticism  by  civil  society  organisations,  since  it  allows  for  deportation  while  the  asylum 
procedure is still pending. The Constitutional Court has granted interim measures, deciding to 
suspend deportation decisions in 784 out of 866 applications. 

At  the  end  of  2018,  out  of  a  total  of  526 846  persons  registered  as  eligible  to  apply  for 
international  protection  in  Turkey  (not  including  nationals  eligible  for  the  Temporary 
protection  status),  the  Turkish  authorities  had  issued  72 961  positive  decisions  and  13 942 
negative decisions, and still had to process a backlog of 317 062 applications.    

The  pilot  centre  for  refugee  status  determination  established  in  March  2018  in  Ankara  to 
accelerate  asylum  processing  is  staffed  with  a  number  of  caseworkers  and  designed  as  a 
long-term support mechanism. Provincial Directorates for Migration Management may refer 
asylum applicants to the centre in the event of a sudden increase in the number of applicants. 
Decisions issued by the RSD centre are not final, and the final decision on granting status still 
belongs  to  the  governorate  where  the  application  is  lodged.  Interpretation  is  available,  also 
partly  through  EU  support;  however,  it  is  not  sufficient  and  needs  to  be  further  expanded. 
GöçNet is the government database containing data on applicants for international protection, 
including biometric data in the form of photos and fingerprints. Access to GöçNet by all law 
enforcement  agencies  dealing  with  foreigners  has  not  yet  been  ensured,  although  border 
guards have access to it. There are only two reception and accommodation centres for asylum 
seekers, set up in Yozgat and Tekird, with a total reception capacity of 150 people.  

The DGMM continued to cooperate with the European Asylum Support Office in 2018.  

Visa policy 

The  EU-Turkey  visa  liberalisation  dialogue  continued.  Turkey  established  seven  working 
groups to carry out  technical work on the outstanding benchmarks of the visa liberalisation 
dialogue,  namely  the  fight  against  corruption,  judicial  cooperation  in  criminal  matters, 
cooperation  with  Europol,  data  protection  legislation,  anti-terrorism  legislation,  the 
EU-Turkey  readmission  agreement  and  biometric  passports.  Significant  progress  was  made 
regarding biometric passports, as the Directorate-General for Civil Registry and Citizenship 
started  issuing  second-generation  biometric  passports  for  Turkish  citizens  in  April  2018. 
These biometric passports are now compatible with EU standards. In November, the EU and 
Turkey  launched  negotiations  on  an  agreement  on  the  exchange  of  personal  data  between 
Europol  and  the  Turkish  authorities  but  Turkey  has  yet  to  revise  its  data  protection 
legislation.  

No progress has been made in the harmonisation of the Turkish visa policy with the EU visa 
policy.  Turkey  should  take  further  steps  to  ensure  full  alignment  with  the  EU  visa  policy. 
Turkey continues to apply a discriminatory visa regime towards 11 Member States. 

Schengen and external borders 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

Legislation  to  create  a  single  civil  agency  in  charge  of  border  security  was  put  on  hold, 
mainly due to security concerns in several border regions. Cooperation between the different 
the 
agencies 

in  border  management  matters 

is  formally  coordinated  by 

involved 

49 

 
 
Directorate-General  for  Provincial  Administration  under  the  Ministry  of  Interior.  However, 
coordination  remains  weak,  not  least  since  the  number  of  civil  executive  bodies  and  law 
enforcement  agencies  dealing  with  border  management  issues  is  relatively  high,  and  is 
organised  in  a  decentralised  manner  (in  border  regions  in  particular).  A  National 
Coordination  and  Joint  Risk  Analysis  Centre  was  established  in  2016  with  the  aim  of 
providing  a platform  for collecting,  exchanging  and processing data on  border security  and 
carrying out joint risk analysis among the different border authorities. The centre has not yet 
become fully operational. 

While  Turkey’s  legislation  on  external  borders  and  Schengen  is  inspired  by  the  EU  acquis 
and  practices,  its  legislative  and  administrative  frameworks  are  not  fully  aligned  with  EU 
standards. In order to bring the country’s border management system more into line with the 
EU acquis, Turkey should adopt a law on integrated border management (IBM) and intensify 
its efforts to set up a civilian and professional border security agency which is specialised in 
border checks of persons at border crossing points and in border surveillance at land and sea 
borders. During the course of 2018, no new legislation on border management was adopted. 

Since  2012,  Turkey  has  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  with  the  European  Border  and 
Coast Guard Agency. During the reporting period, Turkey participated in joint operations as 
an observer. 

The  entire  Syrian  border  is  protected  by  a  wall  or  barbed  wire  fence.  Several  border 
checkpoints  remain  open  for  regular  trade  and  border  crossings.  These  construction  works 
also aim to facilitate the removal of anti-personnel landmines laid 60 to 70 years ago. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

The Government continued to build up its mobile border surveillance capacity at land and sea 
borders during the reporting period. New technologies were rolled out and the infrastructure 
modernised.  The  greater  influx  of  migrants  and  increased  numbers  of  operations  by  the 
different border services during 2018 have resulted in an increased number of apprehensions 
of irregular migrants and organisers of people smuggling in 2018 (see figures in the section 
Legal  and  Irregular Migration above).  Demining  activities with  the financial support of the 
EU were carried out during the reporting period in the province of Ağrı (near Doğubeyazıt) at 
Turkey’s  border  with  Iran.  Turkey  continued  its  border  cooperation  with  neighbouring 
Greece  and  Bulgaria  through  the  trilateral  Police  and  Customs  Co-operation  Centre  by 
dispatching liaison officers who are permanently based at the Bulgarian border crossing point 
Kapitan Andreevo. 

Judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters 

Judicial  cooperation  in  civil  and  criminal  matters  is  regulated  by  the  Law  on  International 
Civil Law and Procedural Law, circulars and international conventions. Turkey is a party to 
most of these.  

Turkey still needs to accede to relevant international conventions in the area of civil justice, 
many  of  which  were  drawn  up  by  the  Hague  Conference  on  Private  International  Law, 
including  in  particular  the  Hague  Convention  of  30  June  2005  on  Choice  of  Court 
Agreements.  Turkey  has  not  yet  ratified  the  European  Convention  on  the  Compensation  of 
Victims. Turkey should take effective measures to ensure an acceptable reduction in delays to 
proceedings resulting from the 1980 Hague Convention on civil aspects of international child 
abduction and to foster the use of international mediation in such cases. 

Turkey now has in place the main legislation governing the judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters and has acceded to most of the international conventions. In 2018, Turkey signed a 

50 

 
 
Protocol Amending the Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced 
Persons.  The  implementation  of  the  newly  introduced  mechanisms  aim  to  speed  up  the 
cooperation under the Law on international judicial cooperation in criminal matters of 2016. 
It has started to  yield positive results. However, the independence and accountability of the 
justice system has to be substantially strengthened for a smooth application of the principle of 
mutual recognition of judgements and court decisions in criminal matters. 

In 2018, EU Member States accepted 7  extradition requests  from  Turkey while Turkey did 
not accept any of the 5 requests from EU Member States. EU Member States did not accept 
any  transfer  of  convicts  to  Turkey  and  neither  did  Turkey.  Turkey  still  does  not  cooperate 
with all EU Member States in these matters. 

In 2018, Eurojust dealt with 12 cases involving Turkey. 

All aspects of customs cooperation are now covered under Chapter 29 – Customs Union. 

3. 

FUNDAMENTALS FIRST: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND COMPETITIVENESS 

Source: Eurostat and national sources 

In  line  with  the  conclusions  of  the  European  Council  in  Copenhagen  in  June  1993,  EU 
accession requires the existence of  a functioning market  economy and the capacity to  cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. 

Economic  governance  has  become  even  more  central  in  the  accession  process  in  recent 
years.  The  Commission's  monitoring  takes  place  in  two  processes:  the  Economic  Reform 
Programme  exercise  and  the  assessment  of  compliance  with  the  economic  criteria  for 
accession.  Each  enlargement  country  prepares  an  annual  Economic  Reform  Programme 
(ERP), which sets out a medium-term macro-fiscal policy framework and a structural reform 
agenda aimed at ensuring competitiveness and inclusive growth. The ERPs are the basis for 
country-specific  policy  guidance  jointly  adopted  by  the  EU  and  the  Western  Balkans  and 
Turkey at ministerial level in May each year. 

51 

 
 
 
3.1. 

The existence of a functioning market economy 

The Turkish economy is well advanced, but serious backsliding continued, leading to deeper 
concerns  over  the  functioning  of  the  country’s  market  economy.  A  sharp  deterioration  in 
external financing conditions exposed vulnerabilities which have built up over the  years.  In 
response, the Turkish  authorities took  a range of policy  actions that negatively affected the 
functioning of the markets, particularly interference with price formation and the introduction 
of  constraints  on  the  free  use  of  foreign  currency.  Existing  concerns  regarding  the 
independence  of  key  economic  institutions,  including  the  independence  of  their  staff,  have 
deepened,  in  particular  after  the  transition  to  the  presidential  system  in  which  checks  and 
balances were eroded.  

The current account deficit reached a peak in the first half of 2018 before a strong correction 
set in as a result of the weakening economy and the fall in the Turkish lira (TL). The inflation 
rate  jumped  to  levels  far  above  the  upper  band  of  the  target  range  following  the  currency 
crisis and years of high credit growth, high money growth and low real interest rates. 

Fiscal,  quasi-fiscal  and  regulatory  measures  stimulated  the  economy  when  it  was  in  an 
upswing,  combined  with  relatively  easy  monetary  conditions.  In  the  ensuing  disorderly 
unwinding of imbalances, measures taken by the authorities have eroded the functioning of 
the market economy.  

In order to improve the functioning of the market economy Turkey should in particular: 

  increase  fiscal  transparency  and  credibility,  promote  domestic  savings  and  reduce 

incentives for greater indebtedness of companies;  

  improve  the  business  environment,  including  by  strengthening  the  rule  of  law  and 

reducing the number of businesses remaining under trusteeship; 

  unwind  the  measures  that  inhibit  the  free  flow  of  foreign  capital  and  reduce  state 

influence in price setting;  

  reduce informality in the labour market and develop more incentives for the participation 

of women in the labour market. 

Economic governance 

Turkey  faced  a  sharp  deterioration  in  its  external  financing  conditions  in  the  second 
half  of  2018,  which  led  to  strong  policy  responses,  some  of  which  are  hampering  the 
functioning  of  the  market  economy.  The  long-running  depreciation  of  the  TL  accelerated 
markedly in April 2018 and even more sharply in August 2018. Turkey’s high dependence on 
foreign  financing  exposed  it  to  changes  in  investor  sentiment.  In  response,  the  Turkish 
authorities, in addition to a series of mainstream policy measures such as an interest rate hike 
and  the  adoption  of  a  fiscal  consolidation  plan,  also  undertook  a  range  of  actions  that 
undermine  the  proper  functioning  of  the  markets.  These  include  restrictions  on  the  use  of 
derivatives,  requesting  banks  to  charge  below-market  interest  rates  for  mortgages,  banning 
the use of foreign currencies in high-value transactions (car leases and real estate), blocking 
price  hikes  for  specific  consumer  goods  products,  forced  transfers  of  foreign  currency 
proceeds  into  domestic  currency,  and  a  temporary  change  in  the  withholding  tax  for  bank 
also 
deposits.  The  Government 
by 
setting 
price 
influenced 
price 
'voluntary 
a 
coordinating 
reduction'  while 
the 
intensifying 
sanctioning  of  price  rises  deemed 

52 

-6-4-202468101214201320142015201620172018Turkey: Real GDP growth and contributions Priv. cons.Gov. cons.GFCFStocksNet exportsreal GDP growthSource: Macrobond, own calculations% y-o-y 
 
excessive.  At  an  aggregate  level,  the  emergency  measures  have  had  limited  impact  on 
lowering inflationary expectations and reducing inflationary pressure. Concerns regarding the 
independence of economic institutions such as the financial supervisor (loosening of macro-
prudential standards to stimulate growth), the national accounts office (dismissal of a senior 
staff member), and the central bank (missing the upper band inflation target by a wide margin 
for  several  years,  switching  between  policy  rate  channels  in  the  absence  of  economic 
rationale)  have  deepened.  These  concerns  deepened  further  with  the  transition  to  the 
presidential  system,  in  which  checks  and  balances  have  been  eroded.  The  policy  guidance 
jointly  agreed  at  the  May  2018  Economic  and  Financial  Dialogue  between  the  EU  and  the 
Western Balkans and Turkey has been implemented to a limited extent. 

Macroeconomic stability 

The  Turkish  economy  slowed  markedly  in  2018  after  strong  growth  in  the  preceding 
years as financial conditions sharply deteriorated in August. In 2013-2017, GDP grew by 
an  average  of  5.5%  a  year,  and  GDP  per  capita,  calculated  in  Purchasing  Power  Standards 
(PPS)  EUR,  by  4.9%.  Due  to  this  high  growth,  per  capita  income  converged  significantly 
with EU levels, from 52% in 2010 to 65% in 2017. Loose financial conditions fuelled growth, 
in  particular  in  the  construction  sector.  However,  this  came  at  the  cost  of  increasing 
macroeconomic imbalances, setting the scene for sharp depreciation of the TL and a strong 
deterioration  in  financial  conditions  and  credit  supply.  While  growth  was  still  robust  at  the 
beginning of 2018 (7.1% year-on-year in the first quarter), the deceleration of the economy 
that started in the second quarter worsened in the third. An increase in net exports only partly 
offset a sharp contraction in domestic demand. 

The  current  account  deficit  reached  a  high  in  the  first  half  of  2018  of  8.0%  of  GDP 
before reversing to a surplus in the second half. The ratio of the current account deficit to 
GDP was 7.0% of GDP in 2013 and 5.6% in 2017, averaging 5.0% of GDP over this period. 
After  reaching  a  high  in  the  first  half  of  2018,  the  current  account  corrected  following  the 
sharp  depreciation  of  the  TL  as  imports  contracted  and  exports  increased.  The  services 
balance increased to 3.3% of GDP over the full year 2018, above the 2015 high of 2.9% of 
GDP. A current account deficit of 3.6% of GDP was recorded over the full year 2018. The 
services balance improved, with a recovery of tourism in Turkey, although individual tourists 
spent on average 15.5% less in 2017 than in 2013 (-18.5% Q1-Q3 2018 vs. Q1-Q2 2013).  

Capital flows to Turkey have been volatile, with  large shifts within categories.  Foreign 
direct  investment  flows  (FDI)  have  been  the  most  stable,  but  continue  to  play  a  relatively 
limited role, registering a net inflow of 1.0% of GDP in the first three quarters of 2018. Net 
portfolio flows into Turkey surged in 2017 to 2.8% of GDP, but reversed and registered an 
outflow  of  0.7%  of  GDP  in  the  first  three  quarters  of  2018.  Turkish  companies  also 
increasingly financed themselves through trade credit, receiving more trade credit than they 
extended. Trade credit flows reversed in the third quarter however (-0.7% of GDP vs. +0.4% 
in 2017). The ratio of official reserve assets to short-term debt declined from 108% (7 months 
of imports) in 2016 to 97% (5 months of imports) in 2017, and further to 83% (5 months of 
imports)  in  2018.  Turkey’s  gross  international  debt  grew  from  40.1%  of  GDP  in  2013  to  a 
high of 52.9% in the first three quarters of 2018. 

Inflation increased markedly from the low double figures in 2017 to over 20% following 
the sharp depreciation of the TL in August. Inflation increased to a high of 25.2% year-on-
year  in  September,  before  falling  to  19.7%  in  February  2019.  The  Central  Bank  of  the 
Republic of Turkey (CBRT) has used different policy instruments to influence interest rates. 
The economic rationale for switching between these interest rate channels is not obvious, and 
the  use  of  the  late  liquidity  window  (LLW)  emergency  facility  increased  the  risks  of 

53 

 
 
inappropriate funding levels and moral hazard. By the end of 2017, the LLW had become the 
only financing channel. In May-September 2018, the central bank rapidly alternated between 
different instruments, announcing first a central repo rate, switching to overnight lending and 
then  reverting  to  repo  until  it  increased  its  main  policy  rate  to  24%,  well  above  market 
expectations. 

Fiscal  and  quasi-fiscal  policy  have  worked  pro-cyclically  and  increased  government 
liabilities. The Government has financed large infrastructure projects through Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs), increasing government contingent liabilities. It has also stimulated credit 
growth  through  government  credit  guarantees,  and  state-owned  banks  have  been  at  the 
forefront of increased lending. The primary budget balance fell from 1.7% in 2013 to 0.2% of 
GDP in  2017. A benchmark fiscal  rule was  considered but  never implemented. There is  no 
independent fiscal council, and medium-term projections, which have been targets rather than 
conservative estimates, now fall directly under the responsibility of the President.  

The budget deficit grew due to pre-
central 
spending.  The 
election 
government  budget  deficit  outcome 
was  2.4%  of  GDP.  Both  primary 
expenditures and revenues increased, 
but expenditures increased at a higher 
pace. General government debt stood 
at 32.6% of GDP in the third quarter 
of  2018,  up  from  28.3%  of  GDP  in 
2017.  Foreign  currency  denominated 
debt  was  stable  at  39%  of  all  debt 
from the first quarter. With the transition to the presidential system, important changes have 
been made to Turkey’s budgetary framework, which raises concerns about accountability and 
the  transparency  of  public  finances.  Budget  preparation,  implementation  and  audit  are 
centralised  under  the  President,  as  are  off-balance-sheet  items  such  as  the  Turkish  Wealth 
Fund.  

The macroeconomic policy mix led to an unsustainable credit-fuelled economic boom in 
2017  and  early  2018  that  ultimately  led  to  a  further  increase  in  vulnerabilities.  The 
institutional  setting  weakened  with  the  transition  to  the  presidential  system  and,  despite  a 
large increase in the nominal policy interest rates, the real interest rate remained close to zero 
throughout 2018. However, in a reaction to the crisis, the Government announced an austere 
fiscal agenda which, together with reduced political tensions with Turkey’s major allies and 
strongly  positive  real  interest  rates,  worked  to  restore  market  confidence.  Measures  to 
stabilise  the  financial  sector  by  focusing  on  recapitalising  banks  and  improving  their  asset 
quality were announced in April 2019.  

Functioning of product markets 

Business environment 

Starting  a business  has become easier.  The  Government  has made  good progress,  having 
legislated  to  improve  the  investment  environment,  especially  by  reducing  and  facilitating 
bureaucratic procedures and lowering costs for starting a business and obtaining construction 
permits.  The  average  cost  of  starting  a  business  fell  from  12.6%  to  10.6%  of  per  capita 
income in 2018. The number of newly created businesses grew by 17% year-on-year between 
2017  and  2018.  Market  exit  has  remained  costly  and  time-consuming.  While  some  aspects 
have  been  simplified,  insolvency  procedures  still  last  an  average  of  five  years  and  the 

54 

010203040-4-2024201320142015201620172018*Turkey: Fiscal developmentsPrimary balance (lhs)Interest (lhs)GG balance (lhs)Public Debt (rhs)Source: Nationalsources% ofGDP* forecast 
 
recovery  rate  fell  slightly  further  between  2017  and  2018,  from  an  average  of  15.3%  to 
14.7%. The number of company bankruptcies decreased by 7.1% between 2017 and 2018. 

The management of numerous companies has been transferred to the trusteeship of the 
Savings  Deposit  Insurance  Fund  (TMSF).    As  of  13  November  2018,  1,008  companies 
based  in  42  provinces  across  Turkey  with  a  total  asset  value  of  ₺55.9  billion  (EUR 
8.8 billion) and a total of 45,364 employees had been seized or had a trustee appointed since 
the coup attempt. In the new presidential system, the TMSF has been tied to the presidency. 
Furthermore, the President now also has the authority to appoint the Head of the TMSF and 
its members. Turkey does not score well in international business environment rankings, and 
its position in the judiciary components of these rankings is deteriorating. 

The  informal  sector  remains  large,  even  if  it  is  being  reduced.  Turkey  has  reported  a 
decline in the informal economy's share of GDP from 32% in 2002 to 27% in 2017. Informal 
employment has declined from 45.4% of total employment in 2007 to 34% in 2017. Turkey 
put a lot of effort into receiving and addressing the needs of almost four million refugees, but 
the  high  number  of  refugees  has  exacerbated  the  problem  of  informal  employment.  From 
January 2016, refugees fulfilling certain eligibility criteria could apply for work permits. The 
uptake  was  relatively  limited  in  the  first  year,  in  part  because  of  stringent  requirements. 
Turkey  has  also  allowed  the  creation  of  many  new  businesses  headed  by  Syrians  under 
temporary  protection.  Turkey’s  performance  as  concerns  corruption  has  been  deteriorating 
over the past five years [see Chapter 23].  

State influence on product markets 

The Government has stepped up its interventions in the price-setting mechanism in key 
sectors. Around 30% of the consumer price inflation basket in Turkey is composed of goods 
whose prices are set or heavily influenced by public authorities, either directly or indirectly 
(price  limits,  tax  rate  adjustments).  This  represents  an  increase  from  the  25%  reported  last 
year. In October 2018, the government launched a full-scale programme to fight inflation by 
inviting companies to cut prices on consumer goods by at least 10% until the end of the year. 
In  August  2018,  amid  growing  concerns  over  the  risks  of  pricing  behaviours  (especially 
significant  price  hikes  and  stockpiling),  the  Ministry  of  Trade  introduced  an  amendment  to 
the Regulation on commercial advertising and unfair commercial practices. According to this 
new  legislative  framework,  price  hikes  not  justified  by  a  rise  in  input  costs  or  by  the 
exchange  rate  are  considered  unfair  commercial  practices.  Measures  to  boost  competition, 
however, would be more appropriate than direct government interference in price setting. The 
Food and Agricultural Product Markets Monitoring and Evaluation Committee is seeking to 
contain the rise in food prices by improving supply conditions for unprocessed food products. 

There  has  been  backsliding  in  improving  the  transparency  of  State  aid.  Legislation  to 
implement the State Aid Law, originally scheduled to be passed by September 2011, has still 
not been adopted. The State Aid Authority has still not formally set up a comprehensive State 
aid  inventory  or  adopted  an  action  plan  to  align  all  State  aid  schemes  with  the  acquis. 
Additionally, Turkey has abolished the administrative structure responsible for implementing 
State aid legislation, and fully transferred its mandate to the Economic Policies Council and 
to the President, who is  also the appointing authority for this Council's members. Thus, the 
organisational  structure  established  for  the  purposes  of  implementing  the  Law  has  been 
dismantled, and the current structure is not considered to be operationally independent.  

Privatisation and restructuring 

The pace of privatisation has slowed considerably, accelerating the downward trend of 
previous  years.  The  total  volume  of  completed  privatisations  fell  from  $1.3 billion  (about 

55 

 
 
EUR 1.2 billion) in 2016 to $224 million (about EUR 188 million) in 2017. The privatisation 
of sugar factories represented by far the largest portion of privatisation revenues in 2018. The 
share of the energy sector (hydropower plants) in privatisation tenders remains high. Network 
sectors have been liberalised, with the exception of postal services and railways. Government 
assets  within  the  scope  of  the  Turkish  Sovereign  Wealth  Fund  (TWF)  appear  to  be  ring-
fenced from privatisation. Under the presidential system, the Fund has been affiliated to the 
Presidency  and  the  mandate  of  the  Prime  Minister  on  the  TWF  has  been  transferred  to  the 
President.  As  a  result,  the  strategic  investment  plan  of  the  TWF  requires  the  President’s 
approval. Furthermore, the President is authorised to transfer public assets to the Fund and to 
nominate the auditors for it. The President has become the chairman of the Executive Board 
of the TWF and has appointed the Minister of the Treasury and Finance as the Fund's vice- 
chairman.  Concerns  over  auditing  of  the  TWF  have  not  been  addressed.  Borrowing  by  the 
TWF  would  increase  government  debt.  Government  revenues  as  a  share  of  GDP  stood  at 
31.4% in 2017. 

Functioning of the financial market 

Financial stability 

The  financial  sector  performed  generally  well  and  demonstrated  resilience  during  a 
period of high volatility in capital flows and the TL exchange rate. Credit growth started 
to  accelerate  at  the  end  of  2016,  and  continued  to  do  so  in  the  first  half  of  2017  when  the 
Turkish non-monetary authorities provided policy stimulus through a relaxation of the macro-
prudential regulation and an expansion of government credit guarantees. As inflation started 
to  pick  up  during  2017,  the  policy  rate  did  not  keep  up  and  the  realised  real  interest  rate 
declined while inflation expectations increased. This likely added to the policy stimulus and 
the resurge in credit growth. From the end of 2017, credit growth lost momentum and rapidly 
declined  throughout  2018.  The  banking  sector’s  loans-to-deposits  ratio  stood  at  117.6%  in 
December 2018. The sector’s capital adequacy ratio increased from 15.6% to 16.8% between 
2016 and 2017 and further to 17.3% by December 2018. The proportion of non-performing 
loans  (NPL)  of  total  banking  sector  loans  remained  relatively  low,  at  3.9%  in  December 
2018.  These  financial  soundness  indicators,  however,  benefited  from  changes  in  risk 
classification.  A  stress-test  performed  by  the  financial  supervisor  at  the  end  of  December 
2018 received criticism for lack of transparency.  

Access to finance 

Banks  have  continued  to  dominate  the  financial  sector.  Over  the  past  five  years,  banks' 
credit extension to the private sector increased from 51.2% of GDP in 2013 to 63.6% in the 
first three quarters of 2018. Their rapid credit expansion continued in 2017 (+21% year-on-
year) and in the first half of 2018 (+21%). In the second half of 2018, loan growth stalled in 
nominal  terms  and  declined  strongly  in  real  terms.  Compared  to  the  EU,  banks  offer  more 
loans  to  the  non-financial  corporate  sector.  The  number  of  banks  active  in  Turkey  has 
remained relatively stable, at around fifty. Interest rate spreads between commercial loans in 
foreign currency and deposits have been relatively stable over the past five years, at around 
2 percentage points, and increased somewhat towards the end of 2018. The Government has 
continued to  use the Credit Guarantee  Fund to  support SMEs and to  provide a boost to  the 
economy,  for  instance  by  agreeing  in  May  2018  to  introduce  a  loan  guarantee  package  for 
businesses worth ₺35 billion. In May 2018, the Government introduced stricter regulation of 
the  use  of  foreign  currency  borrowing  by  the  corporate  sector,  which  should  help  limit  its 
exposure  to  exchange  rate  fluctuations.  While  this  will  benefit  the  non-financial  corporate 
sector,  part  of  the  losses  on  existing  foreign  currency  loans  will  be  borne  by  the  banking 

56 

 
 
sector. Access to foreign finance for smaller companies is now via the banking sector, and is 
dependent on the sector’s access to international capital flows and its financial stability. 

Functioning of the labour market 

in  the 

Unemployment  remained  stubbornly 
high  during  the  past  few  years  of 
strong  economic  growth,  and  has 
started to rise with the turning of the 
economic cycle, pointing to continued 
challenges 
labour  market. 
Although  the  unemployment  rate  for 
15-64 year-olds remained broadly at the 
same level in 2017 and 2018, this hides 
a  sizable  fluctuation  within  these  two 
years.  The  unemployment  rate  fell  by 
3 percentage  points  in  2017  and  grew 
by 3 percentage points in 2018. The unemployment rate for women (14.2% in 2017) remains 
significantly  higher  than  for  men  (9.7%  in  2017).  Female  unemployment  rates  have 
than  male  ones.  The 
fluctuated  more 
unemployment  rate  for  people  with  a  higher  level  of  education  reached  12.4%  in  August 
2018. Turkey also suffers from a high level of youth unemployment (15-24 years). This stood 
at  20.3% in  2018, representing a decrease of 0.5  percentage points compared with  2017. A 
quarter of young people are not in employment, education or training (NEET).  

throughout  recent  economic  developments 

The labour force participation rate is increasing, however, but the gender employment 
gap persists. Driven by a growing working-age population, the labour force participation rate 
continued to increase from 58.0% in 2017 to 58.5% in 2018. The overall employment rate for 
15-64  year-olds  increased  from  51.5%  in  2017  to  52.0%  in  2018,  with  a  large  difference 
between men (70.9%) and women (32.9%). Undeclared work remains widespread, with one 
third of the workforce still in informal employment. The minimum wage has risen over the 
years  in  real  terms,  despite  increasing  inflation.  This  complicates  the  reduction  of  the 
informal sector. 

3.2. 

The  capacity  to  cope  with  competitive  pressure  and  market  forces  within  the 
Union 

Turkey  has  made  some  progress  and  has  a  good  level  of  preparation  in  achieving  the 
capacity  to  cope  with  the  competitive  pressure  and  market  forces  within  the  EU,  with 
improvements  in  energy  sector  and  some  advances  in  spending  on  R&D,  education  and 
physical capital. Turkey is well integrated with the EU market in terms of both trade and 
investment. However, significant weaknesses exist as regards the quality of education and 
gender  equality  in  education,  as  well  as  the  level  of  innovation,  the  energy  sector  and 
infrastructure. There was no progress on last year’s policy recommendations. 

In  order  to  improve  competitiveness  and  support  long-term  growth,  Turkey  should  in 
particular: 

  increase enrolment in education and improving the quality of secondary education; 

  remove  trade  barriers  or  equivalent  that  are  not  in  conformity  with  the  EU-Turkey 
Customs  Union,  including  in  public  procurement,  forced  localisation  schemes  for 
investment and additional duties on imports from non-EU countries. 

57 

 
 
Education and innovation 

Significant problems remain in education in terms of both quality and access, which is 
more difficult for girls. The Global Competitiveness sub-indices for the quality of education 
ranks Turkey 101 out of 133 countries, and 131 out of 144 countries for the gender gap. Total 
expenditure in 2017 was ₺176.5 billion, representing an increase of 9.8% compared to 2016. 
Expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP was 4.7% in 2016 and 4.2% in 2017 (EU 
average 5.0%, with different demography). The net enrolment rate for pre-school education 
for the age group 5 increased from 58.8% in 2017 to 66.9% in 2018. The net enrolment rates 
in primary school (first 4 years) increased from 91.2% in 2017 to 91.5% in 2018, but fell for 
lower secondary school (second 4 years) from 95.68% to 94.47%. Parents have two choices: 
they  can send their children to  either pre-school  or primary school  at  the age of five. Most 
parents  choose  pre-schools  instead  of  primary  schools.  In  secondary  education  (final  four 
years), the net enrolment rate increased from 82.5% in 2017 to 83.6% in 2018. A mismatch 
continues  between  the  requirements  of  the  labour  market  and  the  skills  produced  by  the 
education  system.  PISA  scores  (Programme  for  International  Student  Assessment)  are 
relatively  low  in  Turkey  (science  literacy  score  of  425  in  2015)  in  comparison  with  the 
OECD average (493) and the EU. 

Research  and  development  (R&D)  expenditure  increased  from  0.86%  of  GDP  in  2014  to 
0.96% in  2017, but  remained well below the Government’s current  target  of 1.8% by  2018 
(which was defined using the old national accounting methodology). This is also well below 
the EU average. About half of this investment came from the private sector. Despite recent 
initiatives, cooperation between research institutions and the private sector is still limited. 

Physical capital and quality of infrastructure 

Improvements  in  the  country’s  physical  capital  have  been  modest.  Total  investment 
increased from 29.3% in 2016 to 30.0% of GDP in 2017 (28.5% of GDP in 2013). The share 
of  gross  fixed  capital  formation  by  the  government  GDP  increased  from  5.2%  in  2016  to 
6.6%  in  2017  (4.4%  in  2013),  while  private-sector  investment  decreased  by  0.7%  of  GDP 
between 2016 and 2017. In order to control public spending, the Government has announced 
the suspension of investment projects for which the tender process has not yet been launched 
or has started but not yet been finalised. 

Some  progress  was  made  in  the 
energy  sector,  particularly  in  the 
gas  market.  A  positive  development 
is  the  launch  of  Turkey's  natural  gas 
spot trading platform, operated by the 
Energy  Exchange  EXIST.  Further 
progress  is  needed,  however,  to  open 
the  natural  gas  market  and  create 
state-owned 
competition 
enterprise  BOTAŞ.  Since  2016,  the 
Transmission 
Turkish 
Company (TEiAŞ) has  been an observer  at  the European  Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) which allows market players to freely import and export 
electricity between the EU and Turkey, thus improving security of supply. 

Electricity 

the 

for 

In  telecommunications,  the  number  of  broadband  internet  subscribers  reached  71.8  million. 
Mobile  broadband  penetration  significantly  increased  to  73.1%,  though  it  is  still  below  the 
OECD average of 102.4%. The share of households with access to the internet at home grew 

58 

02004006008001000TR, 2006EU, 2006TR, 2016EU, 201604812Turkey: Selected indicators relative to populationElectricity production, GWh per 1000 inhabitantsRoad length, km per 1000 inhabitantsRail passenger-km per inhabitant, lhsSource: Eurostat 
 
from  80.7%  to  83.8%  between  April  2017  and  April  2018.  Over  the  same  period,  internet 
usage  by  individuals  aged  16-74  increased  from  66.8%  to  72.9%.  Within  2  years  of 
implementation, the number of 4.5G subscribers reached 68 million. No further progress has 
been made on aligning telecommunications legislation with the EU framework. As a source 
of  concern,  Turkey  still  needs  to  amend  the  Internet  Law  in  line  with  UN  and  Council  of 
Europe recommendations. 

Sectoral and enterprise structure 

The  sectoral  breakdown  of  employment  growth  shows  a  continued  shift  towards  the 
services sector, which accounted for 53.7% of total employment and 61.6% of GDP in 2017. 
Industry accounted for 19.1% of employment and 20.7% of GDP, while agriculture employed 
19.4%  of  the  workforce  and  produced  6.1%  of  GDP.  This  confirms  the  higher  share  of 
industry  in  value  added  recorded  over  the  past  five  years.  Services  contributed  by  far  the 
largest part of value added over the same period, with a stable share of 61-62% of total value 
added.  

SMEs  employ  around  three  quarters  of  Turkey’s  workforce  and  generate  more  than 
half of the economy’s total value added. Turkey continued to implement various corporate 
schemes,  mostly  targeting  SMEs.  The  scope  of  schemes  concerning  the  organisation  of 
sectoral  national  fairs  and  participation  in  international  fairs,  market  research  and  market 
entry, investment support for centres of attraction, industry areas, organised industrial zones, 
technology  development  zones,  support  for  tourism  operators  and  Treasury  support  for 
venture  capital  funds  was  further  extended  to  cover  a  wider  range  of  beneficiaries  and 
activities. Financial institutions do not offer as much long-term funding to SMEs as they do 
to large corporations. A large proportion of SMEs will no longer be able to borrow in foreign 
currency. According to a protocol signed in January 2018, further Treasury support of about 
EUR  9  billion  was  made  available  for  SMEs  through  the  Credit  Guarantee  Fund.  This  has 
further stimulated the growth in lending to SMEs. 

Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness  

Turkey's trade integration with the EU is high and increased further in 2017 and 2018. 
Turkey is  the EU's  fifth  largest  trading partner, and the EU remains by  far Turkey's  largest 
trading  partner.  The  share  of  Turkish  exports  going  to  the  EU  grew  from  47.1%  to  50%, 
while the share of Turkish imports coming from the EU declined marginally from 36.4% to 
36.2%  between  2017  and  2018.  The  EU  also  remains  the  largest  source  of  foreign  direct 
investment (FDI) in Turkey, with a 71% share of stocks in 2017, although this is lower than 
2013 (77%). About half of trade related to global value chains (GVCs) is with the EU. The 
so-called backward participation in GVCs with low value added and low technology content 
is particularly important in trade with Asia, whereas the integration with EU GVCs is more 
balanced  between  backward  and  forward  participation  thus  contributing  to  value  added. 
Irrespective  of  the  obligations  under  the  Customs  Union  with  the  EU,  Turkey  has  put  up 

59 

 
 
 
several  trade  barriers  within  the  Customs  Union,  including  in  public  procurement,  forced 
localisation schemes for investment and additional duties on imports from non-EU countries. 

Turkish openness, measured as exports  and imports over GDP, stood at 54% in 2017. 
This  is  a  relatively  high  figure  compared  to  the  past  two  decades.  Price  competitiveness 
benefited from the continuous depreciation of the TL in 2017; nominal effective depreciation 
(NEER) of 18% and  real  effective  appreciation  (REER) of 15% on the basis of unit labour 
costs,  which accelerated in 2018 (NEER -24%, REER -15%). 

4. 

GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION 

Cyprus 

Turkey  welcomed  the  UN’s  renewed  efforts  to  consult  stakeholders  as  to  a  possible 
resumption  of  negotiations.  Tensions  in  the  region  around  the  prospect  of  hydrocarbon 
exploration  off  the  coast  of  Cyprus  increased,  due  to  Turkey’s  actions  and  statements 
challenging  the  right  of  the  Republic  of  Cyprus  to  exploit  hydrocarbon  resources  in  the 
Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone. Turkey has still not fulfilled its obligation to ensure full 
and  non-discriminatory  implementation  of  the  Additional  Protocol  to  the  EU-Turkey 
Association Agreement and has not removed all the obstacles to the free movement of goods, 
including  restrictions  on  direct  transport  links  with  Cyprus.  There  was  no  progress  on 
normalising bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus. 

Turkey’s actions and statements continued to challenge the right of the Republic of Cyprus to 
exploit  hydrocarbon  resources  in  the  Cyprus  Exclusive  Economic  Zone.  In  February  2018, 
Turkey undertook repeated manoeuvres by naval vessels to block the drilling operations of a 
vessel contracted by an Italian company and commissioned by Cyprus, which resulted in the 
abortion  of  the  planned  drilling  activities.  In  May  2019,  Turkey  sent  a  drilling  platform 
accompanied  by  military  vessels  to  the  Republic  of  Cyprus’  Exclusive  Economic  Zone, 
escalating  tensions  further.  The  EU  called  on  Turkey  to  respect  the  sovereign  rights  of 
Cyprus  to  explore  and  exploit  its  natural  resources  in  accordance  with  the  EU  acquis  and 
international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.  In March 2019, the 
EU  called  on  Turkey  to  refrain  from  any  such  illegal  acts,  to  which  it  would  respond 
appropriately and in full solidarity with Cyprus. The EU has also stressed the need to respect 
the sovereignty of Member States over their territorial sea and airspace. In March 2018, the 
European  Council  strongly  condemned  Turkey's  continued  illegal  actions  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea, and recalled Turkey’s obligation to respect international 
law and good neighbourly relations and to normalise relations with all EU Member States. 

As emphasised in the Negotiating Framework and Council declarations, Turkey is expected 
to  actively  support  the  negotiations  on  a  fair,  comprehensive  and  viable  settlement  of  the 
Cyprus issue within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council 
resolutions  and  in  line  with  the  principles  on  which  the  EU  is  founded.  It  is  important  to 
preserve the progress  made so far  and to  pursue preparations for a fair,  comprehensive  and 
viable settlement, including in its external aspects. Turkey’s commitment and contribution in 
concrete terms to this comprehensive settlement remains crucial. The process of granting the 
Committee on Missing Persons full access to all relevant archives and military areas has seen 
welcome  developments,  but  needs  to  be  further  expedited.  Despite  repeated  calls  by  the 
Council and the Commission, Turkey has still not complied with its obligations as outlined in 
the  Declaration  of  the  European  Community  and  its  Member  States  of  21  September  2005 
and in Council Conclusions, including those of December 2006 and December 2015. Turkey 
has  not  fulfilled  its  obligation  to  ensure  full  and  non-discriminatory  implementation  of  the 
Additional  Protocol  to  the Association  Agreement  and has not  removed  all  obstacles to  the 

60 

 
 
free movement of goods, including restrictions on direct transport links with the Republic of 
Cyprus.  There  was  no  progress  on  normalising  bilateral  relations  with  the  Republic  of 
Cyprus. 

Turkey continued to veto applications by the Republic of Cyprus to join several international 
organisations,  including  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development 
(OECD). 

Peaceful settlement of border disputes 

Bilateral exploratory talks are being held between Greece and Turkey to find common ground 
for the start of negotiations on the delimitation of the continental shelf. Greece continued to 
object to Turkey’s launch of a tender for offshore oil and gas exploration, including part of 
the continental shelf off the Greek island of Castellorizo. 

The threat of casus belli in relation to the possible extension of Greek territorial waters, as set 
out  in  a  1995  Turkish  Grand  National  Assembly  resolution,  still  stands.  The  agreement  to 
ease  increasing  tensions  in  the  Aegean  Sea  reached  during  the  December  2017  visit  of  the 
Turkish  President  to  Greece  has  not  been  followed  up  in  practice.  Greece  and  Cyprus 
continue  to  complain  about  repeated  and  increased  violations  of  their  territorial  waters  and 
airspace  by  Turkey,  including  flights  over  the  Greek  islands.  Another  source  of  serious 
concern  was  the  six-month  detention  of  two  Greek  soldiers  who  were  patrolling  the  land 
border  between  Greece  and  Turkey.  During  this  six-month  period  no  bilateral  visits  took 
place.  The  Turkish  President  and  the  Greek  Prime  Minister  had  a tête-à-tête  meeting  at  the 
margins  of  the  NATO  Summit  in  Brussels  in  July  2018.  The  two  Greek  soldiers  were 
released in  August  2018. The  Greek Prime Minister visited Turkey in  February 2019.   The 
Greek  Foreign  Minister  visited  Izmir  and  met  with  his  Turkish  counterpart  during  the 
inauguration of the renovated building of the Greek Consulate in  Izmir in September  2018, 
and  on  two  subsequent  occasions.  In  line  with  the  Negotiating  Framework  and  previous 
European Council and Council conclusions, the Council reiterated in June 2018 that Turkey 
needs to commit itself unequivocally to good neighbourly relations, international agreements 
and the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter, having 
recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice. In this context, the EU has again 
expressed  serious  concern,  and  urged  Turkey  to  avoid  any  kind  of  threat  or  action  directed 
against  a  Member  State,  or  any  source  of  friction  or  action  that  would  damage  good 
neighbourly relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes. 

Regional cooperation 

Good neighbourly relations form an essential part of Turkey’s process of moving towards the 
EU. Bilateral relations with other enlargement countries and neighbouring EU Member States 
were  generally  good.  Operational  cooperation  with  Greece  on  migration  further 
continued.  However,  tensions  in  the  Aegean  Sea  and  Eastern  Mediterranean  were  not 
conducive to good neighbourly relations and undermined regional stability and security. 

Turkey has continued its policy of engagement in the Western Balkans, in economic, trade, 
cultural  and  political  terms,  maintaining  strong  ties  with  the  countries  of  the  region  and 
supporting their respective efforts to join NATO and the EU. Turkey and Albania agreed on 
the  terms  of  a  strategic  partnership,  which  could  be  signed  in  the  course  of  2019.  Contacts 
with  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  developed  positively,  Turkey  providing  constant  financial 
support  to  the  Office  of  the  High  Representative  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  Turkey 
continued  in  particular  to  engage  with  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  through  its  trilateral 
mechanism dialogues with Serbia on the one hand and Croatia on the other.  

61 

 
 
Turkey maintained good relations with Kosovo and expressed constant support for Kosovo’s 
integration  into  regional  organisations.  Reciprocal  high-level  visits  continue  to  take  place. 
The  arrest  and  deportation  to  Turkey  in  March  2018,  at  the  request  of  the  Turkish 
government, of six Turkish nationals legally residing in Kosovo raised serious concerns about 
the respect of due process.  

Turkey further developed cooperation with Montenegro, following two bilateral agreements 
which were agreed in 2016 and 2017.  

Relations with North Macedonia developed. Relations deepened with Serbia, following the 
agreement in 2017 to launch a bilateral High Level Cooperation Council, focusing mainly on 
economic relations, trade and infrastructure. Turkey continued to support the stability of the 
region through the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP). 

Bilateral  relations  with  several  individual  EU  Member  States  not  adjoining  Turkey  (in 
particular with Austria, Germany and the Netherlands) improved, followed by Ministerial and 
on occasion Presidential visits. The Netherlands and Turkey normalised relations. However, 
there  continued  to  be  reports  of  tensions  among  members  of  the  Turkish  diaspora  living  in 
EU Member States, and pressure on them to report on other members of these communities 
who allegedly belong to the Gülen movement.  

5. 

ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP  

5.1. 

Chapter 1: Free movement of goods 

The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU 
based on common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national rules, the 
principle of the free movement of goods prevents these from creating unjustified barriers to 
trade. 

Turkey is  at  a  good level  of preparation for the free movement  of goods.  It  made  limited 
progress, mainly in  aligning with the ‘New and Global Approach’ and the ‘Old Approach’ 
acquis. Some technical barriers to trade continue to prevent the free movement of goods and 
some  localisation  schemes  and  domestic  requirements  discriminate  against  EU  products, 
violating Turkey’s obligations under the Customs Union. 

In the coming period, Turkey should in particular: 

  eliminate obstacles to the free movement of goods that are in breach of Customs Union 
obligations,  such  as  export  restrictions  and  various  requirements  related  to  registration, 
prior approval, licensing and surveillance, and among others non-acceptance of EU good 
manufacturing practices certificates for pharmaceutical products as well as discrimination 
of EU agricultural and forestry tractors 

  re-consider  its  localisation  schemes,  so  as  to  set  up  a  more  conducive  investment 

environment, particularly in the area of pharmaceuticals; 

  continue  to  ensure  prompt  alignment  with  the  EU  acquis  for  this  chapter,  complete  the 
overall revision of the outdated Framework Law on Technical Legislation of Products and 
increase the efficiency of the market surveillance system. 

General principles 

 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ 
Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence. 

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With regard to general principles, the framework for the free movement of goods is largely 
in  place  in  Turkey.  However,  issues  related  to  implementation  remain.  Problems  regarding 
excessive  requests  for  documentation  have  been  reported  when  implementing  of  the 
risk-based  electronic  import  control  system  TAREKS  for  goods  coming  from  the  EU,  and 
technical barriers to the free movement of goods persist. In addition, localisation schemes in  
for  pharmaceuticals  and  agricultural  and  forestry  tractors,  as  well  as  local  content 
requirements  for  renewable  electricity  generation  create  de  facto  market  access  barriers  for 
EU products. 

Non-harmonised area 

A regulation on mutual recognition in the non-harmonised area has been in force since July 
2013. The mutual  recognition  principle has been introduced to  certain  areas where national 
rules  apply.  There  has  been  an  increasing  number  of  notifications  from  Turkey  in  the  last 
three  years,  mostly  consisting  of  mandatory  technical  specifications.  The  number  of 
notifications is, however, insufficient in light of Turkey’s legislative activity. 

Harmonised area: quality infrastructure 

 A legal basis and an administrative structure are in place for technical regulations, standards, 
conformity assessment, accreditation, metrology, and market surveillance. The revision of the 
Framework Law on Technical Legislation of Products is still pending and the absence of an 
overarching  legal  text  leads  to  a  piecemeal  alignment  of  the  EU's  New  Legislative 
Framework. The Turkish Standards Institute is independent, able to implement European and 
international standards and has adequate staff resources and financing. By November 2018, it 
had adopted a total of 19 880 national standards aligned with European standards. The rate of 
harmonisation of European Committee for Standardisation standards (CEN) stands at around 
97%  and  at  94%  for  European  Committee  for  Electrotechnical  Standardisation  standards 
(CENELEC).  The  Turkish  Standards  Institute  has  been  a  full  member  of  CEN  and 
CENELEC since 2012. Eight Turkish economic operators are full members of the European 
Telecommunications  Standards  Institute,  ETSI,  while  the  Information  and  Communications 
Technologies Authority is an observer. A national standardisation strategy for 2017-2020 is 
in place. 

There were 47 notified  bodies  and two technical approval bodies in  Turkey  as  of  February 
2019.  The  Turkish  Accreditation  Agency,  TÜRKAK,  is  a  signatory  of  multilateral 
agreements as part of the European cooperation for Accreditation association. The National 
Metrology Institute, TÜBÍTAK-UME is a member of the European Association of National 
Metrology Institutes (EURAMET) and the Ministry of Industry and Technology participates 
at the European Legal Metrology Organisation (WELMEC). A three- year national metrology 
strategy was in place by the end of 2018. 

Turkey carries out a regular market surveillance programme in line with the EU legislation 
and submits  its  annual  programme to  the European Commission. An electronic information 
system  enables  the  nine  different  public  entities  to  report  their  observations  and  an  annual 
report on the results is published. According to the 2018 report, the overall budget allocated 
to market surveillance activities fell by 1% and the number of market surveillance inspectors 
grew  by  4.1%  in  2017.  There  has  been  a  fall  of  24%  in  the  number  of  products  subject  to 
market surveillance checks. A total of 232 704 batches were inspected in 2017, of which 168 
704  were  produced  in  Turkey.  About  54  917  batches  were  found  to  be  non-compliant  or 
unsafe.  During inspections carried out by Member State authorities on products originating 
in Turkey, 105 750 batches were found to be non-compliant or unsafe. The number of non-
compliant  or  unsafe  products  detected  decreased  by  47%  in  2017,  mainly  due  to  lower 

63 

 
 
number  of  inspections  whereas  the  number  of  products  sent  for  further  tests  increased.  An 
approach that gives priority to particularly risky products is needed. The measures imposed 
on  non-compliant  and  unsafe  products  have  been  reduced.  Market  surveillance  on  products 
marketed through e-commerce is very limited. 

Harmonised area: sectoral legislation 

On the ‘New and Global Approach’ product legislation, Turkey adopted legislation to align 
with the acquis on cableway installations, gas appliances, pressure equipment and eco-design 
requirements for heaters. Implementing legislation was issued for construction products, lifts, 
measuring instruments, recreational crafts and personal watercrafts and energy efficiency of 
new hot boilers. 

On  ‘Old  Approach’  product  legislation,  Turkey  adopted  new  and  amending  legislation  on 
detergents, veterinary medicinal products, and market surveillance of automotive products. In 
the  area  of  pharmaceuticals,  contrary  to  Customs  Union  rules,  Turkey  does  not  accept  EU 
good manufacturing practices certificates. Turkey has been a member of the Pharmaceuticals 
Inspection Convention since of 1 January 2018 and an observer member of the International 
Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals 
for Human Use in June 2018. Turkey adopted a regulation in June 2017 aiming to improve 
alignment  with  e  REACH  (Registration,  Evaluation,  Authorisation,  and  Restriction  of 
Chemicals) legislation, but full alignment is still pending. The national registration system for 
chemicals  is  expected  to  be  operational  by  2023.  Turkey’s  localisation  schemes  for 
pharmaceuticals  and  agricultural  and  forestry  tractors  create  market  access  barriers  for  EU 
products. In addition, Turkey systematically delays for some years the application for motor 
vehicles of new emission limits, which increases pollution and represents a trade barrier. 

On  procedural  measures,  there  is  a  specific  licensing  and  regulation  system  for  economic 
operators  dealing  with  drug  precursors,  with  a  strict  follow-up  and  monitoring  system  in 
cooperation  with  the  police  and  customs  authorities.  National  legislation  is  in  place  setting 
out  licensing  procedures  for  firearms  (Directive  2009/43).  There  was  no  progress  on 
alignment to the acquis on cultural goods. 

5.2. 

Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers 

Citizens of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must be 
given the same working and social conditions as other workers. 

Preparations for freedom of movement for workers are at an early stage and there has been 
no progress during the reporting period. 

There  has  been  no  progress  on  access  to  the  labour  market,  future  participation  in  the 
EURES  (European  Employment  Services)  network  or  coordination  of  social  security 
systems.  So  far,  Turkey  has  concluded  16  bilateral  social  security  agreements  with  EU 
Member  States,  but  no  new  bilateral  social  security  agreements  were  signed  during  the 
reporting period.  

5.3. 

Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services 

EU natural and legal persons have the right to establish themselves in any Member State and 
to provide cross-border services. For certain regulated professions, there are rules on mutual 
recognition of qualifications. Postal services are gradually being opened up to competition. 

Preparations for right of establishment and freedom to provide services are at an early stage. 
No  progress  has  been  made  in  the  reporting  period.  Substantial  efforts  are  still  needed  to 
align with the acquis.  

64 

 
 
In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  align  with  the  Services  Directive  on  the  provision  of  cross-border  services  and  set  up 

a single point of contact. 

No  progress  has  been  observed  on  the  right  of  establishment,  an  area  where  many 
requirements remain in place and continue to restrict this right. 

Regarding  the  freedom  to  provide  cross-border  services,  requirements  for  registration, 
licensing and authorisation remain in place for service providers registered in the EU. There 
is no Point of Single Contact but work is ongoing on transforming the information system in 
the retail sector (PERBIS) into a sector-specific point of single contact. 

No  progress  has  been  made  in  the  area  of  postal  services.  The  mandate  to  restructure  the 
scope of the universal postal services and the components of the reserved area are now with 
the President as they have been transferred from the Council of Ministers with the transition 
to the presidential system. A reserved area still exists in the standard letter-post service area 
and  the  universal  service  provider  still  maintains  its  exclusivity  rights  in  this  area.  Turkey 
should continue aligning its national legislation with the acquis in the area of postal services. 

On  the  mutual  recognition  of  professional  qualifications,  the  vocational  qualifications 
authority has continued to issue occupational  standards. Some regulated  professions remain 
subject  to  reciprocal  recognition  requirements.  Restrictions  to  mobility  of  professions,  such 
as nationality and language requirements remain. Turkey should continue aligning its national 
legislation with the acquis in the area of mutual recognition of professional qualifications. 

5.4. 

Chapter 4: Free movement of capital 

In  the  EU,  capital  and  investments  must  be  able  to  move  without  restriction  and  there  are 
common rules for cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain 
rules to support the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  for  free  movement  of  capital.  Overall,  there  has  been 
backsliding in this area. Confronted with large capital outflows linked to the currency crisis 
of  August  2018,  the  authorities  imposed  restrictions  on  capital  outflows  and  foreign 
exchange-denominated transactions. Legislation on real estate acquisition is not aligned with 
the  acquis.  There  has  been  some  progress  during  the  reporting  period  in  the  fight  against 
money laundering and the financing of terrorism.  

In  addition  to  addressing  the  shortcomings  set  out  below,  Turkey  should  pay  particular 
attention in the coming year to: 

  drafting  and  adopting  an  action  plan  on  real  estate  acquisition  by  foreigners  to  lift 

restrictions and increase transparency; 

  further  aligning  with  the  acquis  by  strengthening  measures  to  prevent  the  misuse  of  its 
financial system for the purposes of money laundering and the financing of terrorism. 

On  capital  movements  and  payments,  Turkey’s  legislation  on  real  estate  acquisition  by 
foreigners  remains  opaque  and  does  not  apply  to  all  EU  nationals  in  a  non-discriminatory 
way. Turkey needs to adopt and implement an action plan to further liberalise the purchase of 
real  estate  by  foreigners,  bringing  its  laws  in  line  with  the  acquis.  Turkey  has  eased  the 
conditions for granting Turkish citizenship to foreign investors, who are investing in capital 
or  buying  a  real  estate,  by  lowering  the  quantitative  criteria  (see  further  down  below). 
Restrictions  on  foreign  ownership  remain  in  place  in  sectors  such  as  radio  and  TV 
broadcasting, transport, education and the electricity market. In the wake of the August 2018 

65 

 
 
currency  crisis,  the  authorities  imposed  numerous  restrictions  on  capital  movements  for 
residents and non banking corporations in particular for transactions denominated in foreign 
currencies (such as banning the use of foreign currencies in high value transactions (car lease 
and real estate) and forcing transfers of foreign currency proceeds into domestic currency). 

Turkey has reached a good standard in  payment systems. The central bank and the banking 
regulatory and supervision agency are the two authorities that can grant licences for payment 
system operators. 

Turkey  has  made  progress  in  the  fight  against  money  laundering  and  the  financing  of 
terrorism. The country is party to the Council of Europe’s Convention on Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism. In 
2016,  the  Turkish  Financial  Intelligence  Unit  -  the  Financial  Crimes  Investigation  Board 
(MASAK)  -  was  granted  authority  to  freeze  suspicious  funds  upon  the  decision  of  the 
Ministry of Treasury and Finance. Turkey needs to continue its alignment of the legislative 
framework and administrative set up with a view to complying with the fourth round of the 
Financial  Action  Task  Force’s  mutual  evaluations.  The  country  currently  lacks  a 
comprehensive  strategy  and  action  plan  to  fight  money  laundering  and  terrorist  financing. 
However,  MASAK,  in  coordination  with  other  relevant  institutions,  has  been  preparing  a 
comprehensive  national  risk  assessment  document  in  view  on  the  upcoming  FATF 
assessment. 

MASAK has strengthened its administrative and enforcement capacity, and has improved its 
cooperation  with  law  enforcement  agencies  and  judicial  authorities.  The  number  of 
suspicious transaction reports submitted to the MASAK has increased from 10 522 in 2017 to 
23 893 in 2018. In 2018, the number of people convicted for money laundering amounted to 
nine.  Confiscations  and  the  level  of  seizure  of  assets  remain  limited  in  relation  to  money 
laundering and terrorism financing as stand-alone crimes.  

Turkey operates an investor citizenship scheme, allowing foreign investors to acquire Turkish 
citizenship  on  the  basis  of  investment.  The  Commission’s  Report  of  23  January  2019  on 
Investor Citizenship and Residence Schemes underlines that such schemes pose risks for the 
EU. Turkey should put in place robust monitoring systems linked to this scheme, in particular 
to  counter  possible  security  risks  such  as  money  laundering,  terrorist  financing  and 
infiltration of organised crime. In addition, as provided for by new EU anti-money laundering 
rules,  Turkey  should  devote  particular  attention  to  enhanced  customer  due  diligence  in  the 
context of the investors’ citizenship programme. 

5.5. 

Chapter 5: Public procurement 

EU  rules  ensure  that  the  public  procurement  of  goods,  services  and  works  in  any  Member 
State  is  transparent  and  open  to  all  EU  companies  on  the  basis  of  non-discrimination  and 
equal treatment. 

Turkey is moderately prepared for public procurement. Turkey has been backsliding in the 
past  year  due  to  the  introduction  of  ever  more  exemptions  for  purchases  that  are  subject  to 
general  public  procurement  rules.  Large  gaps  remain  in  its  alignment  with  the  acquis.  The 
Commission’s recommendations from last year have not been implemented, and remain valid. 

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out below, in the coming year Turkey should in 
particular: 

  revise its public procurement legislation to further align it with the 2014 EU Directives on 
public procurement including concessions and public-private partnerships, to provide for 
remedies in line with EU public procurement directives and to increase transparency; 

66 

 
 
  eliminate  the  discriminatory  domestic  price  advantages  and  offset  practices  and  repeal 

exemptions; 

  establish an independent procurement body and divide the functions allocated within the 
public  procurement  authority  between  a  fully  independent  review  body  and  the  central 
procurement institution.  

General principles 

Concerning  the  legal  framework,  Turkey’s  national  public  procurement  legislation  broadly 
reflects  the  principles  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union.  However, 
compulsory  domestic  price  advantages  and  offsets,  which  allow  authorities  to  demand 
compensating measures  if goods are not produced domestically, are discriminatory and thus 
contradicts  the  EU  acquis.  Turkey  also  cancelled  the  lower  limit  of  $10  million  that  was  a 
prerequisite for the offset practice.  

The Public Procurement Law (PPL) is partly aligned with the 2004 EU Public Procurement 
Directives, but major gaps in compliance remain. The legislation, which is consistent with and 
supported  by  budget  and  expenditure  regulations,  allows  public  contracts  to  be  prepared, 
awarded,  and  managed  in  line  with  sound  project  management  principles.  However,  the 
legislation  has  a  number  of  inconsistencies  with  the  acquis.  The  coverage  of  public 
procurement  rules  is  significantly  reduced  by  a  long  and  increasing  list  of  exclusions  of 
varying importance and scope. A range of sector-specific laws limits transparency. 

Turkey aims to  develop  local  manufacturing capacity  by means of public procurement. The 
scope  of  the  compulsory  domestic  price  advantage  of  up  to  15%  for  ‘medium  and  high-
technology industrial products’, which was established for such purpose, has been expanded 
to the delivery of software. For works contracts, the legislation also stipulates the compulsory 
use  of  certain  material,  machinery  and  equipment  to  be  listed  by  the  relevant  ministries 
without any limit in the form of a certain proportion. In 2018, the number of tenders open to 
international  competition  with  domestic  price  advantage  was  43.75  %,  up  from  37.46%  in 
2017, while in terms of the contract value it was 44.00%, essentially unchanged from 44.12% 
in 2017. The legislation has not yet been aligned with the 2014 EU Directives. 

The  Public  Procurement  Authority  (PPA)  is  responsible  for  implementing  the  Public 
Procurement  Law and monitoring the public procurement system.  The Ministry of Treasury 
and Finance (MoTF) is in charge of coordinating policy formulation and implementation. The 
PPA  is  affiliated  to  the  MoTF  but  is  nominally  autonomous.  However,  the  operational 
independence  of  the  Public  Procurement  Board  is  impaired,  since  the  President  of  the 
Republic is authorised to directly appoint the President and members of the Board, while the 
specific  qualification  requirements  in  terms  of  education  and  sector  experience  have  been 
removed. 

Award of public contracts 

Turkey’s 2018 public procurement market amounted to 5.7% of GDP, which is a drop from 
7.5%  in  2017.  Procedures  continued  to  generally  respect  transparency  and  efficiency 
principles.  

Operational  responsibility  for  preparing  and  carrying  out  public-private  partnerships 
projects  lies with  the line ministry or other relevant  authorities concerned. Since July 2018, 
the power of the High Planning Council to approve the public-private partnerships has been 
transferred to the President, while early-stage review of the projects, which had been carried 
out  by  the  former  Ministry  of  Development,  will  be  carried  out  by  the  strategy  and  budget 
directorate  affiliated  to  the  Presidency.  However,  the  directorate  has  not  yet  established  a 

67 

 
 
sufficient  operational  capacity.  Turkey  still  lacks  a  functioning  single  framework  for 
coordinating, supervising and monitoring public-private partnership operations.  

Monitoring  of  the  contract  awards  and  implementation  is  satisfactory.  The  PPA  issues 
statistics  every  six-months,  which  provides  a  basis  for  measuring  performance  and  making 
improvements to the public procurement system. 

The capacity of contracting authorities to manage public procurement processes  continues 
to  improve.  Turkey  keeps  promoting  the  effective  use  of  e-procurement.  Mechanisms  to 
identify and address corrupt and fraudulent practices are in place, including rules on integrity 
and conflict of interest. However, Turkey has not yet developed a risk indicator system that 
signals  potential  integrity  problems  in  the  procurement  process.  Turkey  should  fill  the 
substantial  number  of  vacant  posts  in  the  PPA  in  order  to  strengthen  its  administrative  and 
coordination capacity. 

Remedies 

The  right  to  legal  remedy  is  secured  in  the  Constitution  and  the  PPL  lays  down  the 
institutional  set  up  and  mechanism  for  handling  complaints.  Complainants  are  entitled  to 
appeal  before  the  Public  Procurement  Board,  which  is  part  of  the  PPA.  The  review  and 
remedies  system  provides  for  speedy,  effective  and  competent  handling  and  resolution  of 
complaints  and  sanctions.  However,  further  alignment  of  the  legislation  with  the  EU 
Remedies Directive is needed. 

In  2018,  the  Public  Procurement  Board  received  2  017  complaints  in  2018  (2.41%  of 
contracts),  compared  with  3  526  (3.59%  of  the  contracts)  in  2017.  The  Board’s  position  as 
part  of  the  PPA  has  remained  a  concern;  indeed,  a  fully  independent  Public  Procurement 
Board  would  avoid  possible  conflicts  of  interest  and  ensure  transparency.  With  the 
introduction of the Presidential system in July 2018, the President of the Republic (instead of 
the Council of Ministers) is now responsible for the appointment of the Board’s president and 
members. 

5.6. 

Chapter 6: Company law 

The  EU  has  common  rules  on  the  formation,  registration  and  disclosure requirements  of  a 
company,  with  complementary  rules  for  accounting  and  financial  reporting,  and  statutory 
audit. 

Turkey  is  well  advanced  in    company  law.  Some  progress  was  achieved  on  the  2018 
recommendation on statutory audit. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  finalise technical alignment with the acquis in the company law area;  

  adopt  the financial reporting standard  for small and micro companies to  achieve further 

acquis alignment. 

On  company  law,  a  few  alignment  issues  remain,  for  example  concerning  cross-border 
mergers,  domestic  mergers,  divisions  and  takeovers.  The  central  registration  recording 
system (MERSIS) maintains company registration data electronically, and makes it available 
to  the  public.  Setting  up  of,  in  particular,  limited  liability  and  public  companies  has  been 
simplified by the amendments to the Turkish Commercial Code. Work continues to enhance 
the  corporate  governance  reporting  standards.  Disclosure  of  and  public  access  to  company 
financial documents in the business register (as required by EU company law and accounting 
rules) has still to be put in place.  

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Concerning corporate accounting and auditing, Turkey is currently preparing the financial 
reporting standard for small and micro companies to comply with Directive 2013/34/EU and 
the related acquis. Alignment concerning non-financial information or reports on payments to 
governments  is  unclear.  Efforts  to  extend  the  scope  of  statutory  auditing  continued  and 
thresholds have been increased based on a decision published in 2018. Public-interest entities 
(PIEs) of any size are obliged to appoint a statutory auditor and there are additional specific 
requirements in place for the statutory audit of PIEs. A system of investigations and sanctions 
is in place. National standards on auditing and a code of ethics for auditors have been issued 
in  accordance  with  the  International  Standards  on  Auditing  and  the  International  Ethics 
Standards  Board  for  Accountants  Ethics  Code.  Further  work  is  required  to  align  with  the 
acquis on accounting and the statutory audit. 

5.7. 

Chapter 7: Intellectual property law 

The  EU  has  harmonised  rules  for  the  legal  protection  of  intellectual  property  rights  (IPR) 
and of copyright and related rights. Rules for the legal protection of IPRs cover, for instance, 
patents and trademarks, designs, biotechnological inventions and pharmaceuticals. Rules for 
the  legal  protection  of  copyright  and  related  rights  cover,  for  instance,  books,  films, 
computer programmes and broadcasting. 

Turkey has a good level of preparation in this area. There has been limited progress during 
the reporting period. Recommendations from last year’s report have been only partially met 
and remain valid: 

  adopt copyright legislation in line with the acquis; 

  improve  enforcement  measures 

intellectual  property 
infringements,  including  further  specialisation  in    Intellectual  Property  Rights  (IPR) 
courts and facilitated procedures to obtain search and seizure warrants; 

industrial  and 

to  combat 

  sustain  a  constructive  dialogue  with  IPR  owners  and  enhance  awareness  raising  on 
concerns  related  to  counterfeiting  and  piracy,  focusing  on  the  benefits  of  a  strong  IPR 
protection system for economic growth. 

With regard to copyright and related rights, the draft copyright law is under consultation. 
Longstanding  systemic  problems  to  be  addressed  by  the  new  copyright  law  remain,  in 
particular: the treatment of foreign producers, public performance rights, reproduction rights, 
collective rights management, distribution of copyright levies to right owners, exceptions, the 
compensation method, interpreters' rights, and performers' rights.  

Concerning  industrial  property  rights,  the  Turkish  Patent  and  Trademark  Office  (TPTO) 
has organised various trainings on different industrial property rights and the code of conduct 
of patent and trademark agents. Since the new Industrial Property Law was adopted in early 
2017,  implementation  and  enforcement  has  been  slow.  There  is  a  lack  of  common  legal 
understanding in particular on new enforcement procedures such as accelerated destruction. 
Regulatory  data  protection  is  not  aligned  with  the  Customs  Union  Agreement.  Generic 
producers are able to apply for market authorisation before the patent rights have expired. 

Concerning  judicial  enforcement,  enforcement  in  the  area  of  accelerated  destruction 
procedure  is  weak.  Warehousing  and  storing  of  counterfeit  goods  seized  in  the  operations 
remain  a  longstanding  problem.    Courts  take  expert  witness  statements  even  where  is 
unnecessary. Supervision of expert witnesses, trademark and patent agents for their conduct 
is  weak  and  conflict  of  interest  issues  related  to  them  have  not  been  resolved.  The  most 
common complaint from different industries is the problems they encountered in finding out 
about  search  and  seizure  warrants  against  counterfeit  goods.  There  is  a  lack  of  specialised 

69 

 
 
knowledge  and  experience  in  the  lower  courts  on  IPR  issues.  The  Turkish  National  Police 
conducted  successful  operations  against  traders  of  fake  spirits  and  tobacco  products  in 
December 2018.  

Turkey  is  a  producer  of  counterfeit  leather  goods,  shoes,  textile  products,  foodstuffs  and 
cosmetics.  Counterfeit  and  fake  products  are  sold  both  online  and  in  open  bazaars  and  in 
international fairs in touristic areas of Turkey. They pose important risks to consumer health 
and safety. Unauthorised use of software is very widespread. 

In 2017, the number of e-applications by IPR right owners via   Customs Administration’s IT 
system increased by 14.4% compared with  2016.  In 2017, the number of counterfeit  goods 
seized by the Customs in the border controls increased by 18.3% compared to 2016, due to 
ongoing training of customs officers. Customs Administration has improved coordination of 
the  customs  enforcement  through  information  exchange  with  other  units  of  the  Customs 
Administration.  IPR  indicators  related  to  confiscated  counterfeit  goods  are  now  more 
frequently and structurally used in risk analysis system. In the second half of 2018, a number 
of  trainings  on  counterfeiting  for  the  customs  officers  were  launched  in  cooperation  with 
around 65 trademark owners. 

5.8. 

Chapter 8: Competition policy 

EU rules protect free competition. They include antitrust rules against restrictive agreements 
between companies and abuse of dominant position and also include rules on concentrations 
between  companies,  which  would  significantly  impede  competition.  EU rules  also  set  out  a 
system  of  State  aid  control.  Governments  are  only  allowed  to  grant  State  aid  if  restrictive 
conditions are met, with a view to prevent distortion of competition. 

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  competition  policy.  There  has  been 
backsliding particularly concerning the independence of the state aid authority and State aid 
legislation. Legislation on anti-trust and mergers is largely aligned with the acquis. 

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out below, in the coming year Turkey should 
in particular: 

  step  up  the  enforcement  of  the  State  aid  law  by  adopting  secondary  legislation  without 

further delay and give access to an updated inventory of aid schemes; 

  establish an operationally independent State aid authority; 

  revise its competition legislation to increase the alignment level with the EU acquis in the 

area of anti-trust and mergers). 

Anti-trust and mergers 

The legislative framework is broadly aligned with the acquis. The Law on the Protection of 
Competition  reflects  Article 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. Implementing legislation in this field is largely in place. Turkey needs to harmonise 
the  legislation  with  the  acquis  by  introducing  de  minimis,  commitments  and  settlement 
procedures and amendments in mergers control. 

Regarding  the  institutional  framework,  the  Competition  Authority  is  responsible  for 
implementing the Law on the Protection of Competition. Its mandate is very similar to that of 
the European Commission.  Operationally, it is  a largely independent  competition  authority. 
However,  the  direct  appointment  of  the  president  and  the  members  of  the  competition 
authority  by  the  President  of  the  Republic  without  involvement  of  the  relevant  public 

70 

 
 
institutions and the lack of specific requirements for professional qualifications on education 
and sector experience for board members impair the independence of the Board. 

The  Competition  Authority’s  enforcement  capacity  is  adequate.  Overall  implementation  is 
effective,  but  there  has  been  a  fall  in  the  number  of  decisions,  in  particular  on  anti-trust 
(down  from  191  in  2013  to  88  in  2018),  and  in  the  fines  imposed  (down  from  EUR  195 
million in 2013 to 57.9 million in 2018). The number of ex officio investigations remains low 
(from  17  in  2012,  to  8  in  2018).  The  Competition  Authority  conducted  an  average  of  85 
down-raids annually between 2016 and 2018 (76 in 2018). In 2018, out of the 95 judgements 
concluded as a result of the appeals against the Competition Authority decision, 86% of them 
were upheld by national courts. 

State aid 

The  legislative  framework  is  partially  in  line  with  the  acquis.  State  aid  regulations  do  not 
cover  agriculture,  fisheries  and  services  sectors,  which  are  not  part  of  the  EU-Turkey 
Customs Union. Turkey’s Law on the Monitoring and Supervision of State Aid is broadly in 
line  with  Articles  107  and  108  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union. 
However,  concerning  secondary  legislation  Turkey  repealed  a  set  of  deadlines  previously 
defined  in  the  law  and  empowered  the  former  Council  of  Ministers  (since  July  2018  the 
President)  to  delay  the  enforcement  of  implementing  legislation  for  an  unlimited  period. 
Therefore,  the  implementing  legislation  required  to  enforce  the  State  aid  control  is  not  in 
place and Turkey has yet to adopt an action plan for alignment with the acquis. 

Concerning the  institutional  framework, during the reporting period the former Directorate 
General  for  State  Aids,  administratively  assisting  and  undertaking  the  management  of  the 
State  Aid  Monitoring  and  Supervision  Board,  was  abolished.  The  mandate  of  the  Board 
which was responsible for implementing the law has been fully transferred to the Economic 
Policies Council and to the President, who is also the appointing authority of this Council's 
members.  Thus,  the  organisational  structure  previously  established  for  the  purposes  of 
implementing the State aid law has been repealed and the current structure is not considered 
as completely operationally independent. 

No  assessment  of  Turkey's  enforcement  capacity  can  be  made  as  there  is  no  functional 
organisational structure or no implementing legislation in force. A State aid inventory has yet 
to be set up and made accessible. 

Liberalisation 

Competition and State aid rules apply to state-owned enterprises. However, the competences 
of  the  Prime  Minister,  the  Council  of  Ministers  and  the  High  Planning  Council  concerning 
the  privatisation  process  have  been  transferred  to  the  President,  who  has  assumed  a  power 
over the privatisation decisions and procedures. 

5.9. 

Chapter 9: Financial services 

EU rules aim at ensuring fair competition between and the stability of financial institutions, 
namely  banking,  insurance,  supplementary  pensions,  investment  services  and  securities 
markets. They include rules on authorisation, operation and supervision of these institutions. 

Turkey has a good level of preparation in the area of financial services. There has been no 
progress during the reporting period. 

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out below, in the coming year Turkey should 
in particular: 

  further  strengthen  bank  governance  and  supervision,  crisis  management  and  the 

71 

 
 
resolution framework; 

  continue  to  support  the  development  of  Turkish  capital  markets  and  their  proper 

supervision. 

For  banks  and  financial  conglomerates,  the  Banking  Regulatory  and  Supervisory  Agency 
has  determined  the  requirements  to  be  met  for  the  inclusion  of  debt  in  the  calculation  of 
banks’ equity. It has also amended the regulation on bank transactions regarding establishing 
companies and acquiring shares. According to this amendment, under certain conditions, the 
agency’s  approval  is  no  longer  required  for  banks  when  establishing  new  companies  or 
acquiring  shares  in  existing  companies  established  by  more  than  one  bank  or  financial 
institution. The agency has introduced new procedures for the rescheduling of loans granted 
to debtors. Under the new presidential system, the president and the members of the agency 
and of the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund will be directly appointed by the President of the 
Republic for a period of 4 years. 

Regarding  insurance  and  occupational  pensions,  in  December  2018  the  Ministry  of 
Treasury  and  Finance  introduced  an  amendment  to  rules  on  automatic  enrolment  of 
employees into the pension scheme by their employers. With the new legislative framework, 
employees who have used their right of withdrawal from the auto-enrolment pension system 
will be automatically re-enrolled in the system within three years. 

There has been some progress on financial market infrastructure, notably with regard to the 
supervision and investment services, but no progress on securities markets and investment 
services.  The  independence  of  the  Capital  Market’s  Board  has  been  reduced,  since  the 
President of the Republic has been granted the power to directly appoint its president and the 
members for a period of four years. 

5.10.  Chapter 10: Information society and media 

The  EU  supports 
for  electronic 
communications,  electronic  commerce  and  audio-visual  media  services.  The  rules  protect 
consumers and support universal availability of modern services. 

internal  market 

functioning  of 

the  smooth 

the 

Turkey has some level of preparation in the area of information society  and media. There 
has  been  backsliding  in  this  sector.  Lack  of  transparency  of  media  funding,  the  growing 
influence of political interests on editorial policies, the concentration of media ownership, the 
shrinking  space  for  pluralism  and  restrictions  on  freedom  of  expression,  the  lack  of 
independence of regulatory authorities remain of concern. There is inadequate competition in 
fixed  voice  and  broadband  markets  and  excessive  taxation  and  costs  for  operators  and 
consumers of information and communications technologies. 

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out below, in the coming year Turkey should 
in particular: 

 improve the independence of the regulatory authorities for telecommunications and media 
and  their  board  members  and  amend  the  Internet  Law  in  line  with  the  Venice 
Commission’s recommendations; 

 align the universal service, authorisation arrangements, market access and rights of way in 

electronic communications with the EU acquis; 

 complete the release of 700 MHz from broadcasting services of mobile broadband; 

→  take  steps  to  strengthen  the  public  broadcaster  and  to  finalise  the  digital  switchover 

process. 

72 

 
 
On  electronic  communications  and information  and  communications  technologies  (ICT), 
there  has  been  no  progress  in  aligning  legislation  with  the  acquis  on  market  access  and 
universal  service.  Turkey  has  modified  the  appointment  regime  for  the  Information  and 
communication  technologies  Board  by  authorising  the  President  of  the  Republic  to  directly 
appoint  its  members.  Specific  requirements  concerning  education  and  sector  experience  as 
qualifications  for such appointments have also been  removed. Additionally, the mandate of 
the  Cyber  Security  Council  composed  of  representatives  from  the  line  ministries  has  been 
fully  transferred  to  the  President.  The  independence  of  the  related  Board  and  the  Council, 
which has been impaired by these changes, remains a concern. Competition in the fixed voice 
and broadband market is not effective. Fees charged by municipalities for rights of way and 
for base  stations installation  further increase costs. Mobile broadband penetration increased 
significantly  to  73.1%  in  the  second  quarter  of  2018,  though  it  is  still  below  the  OECD 
average of 102.4%. The fixed broadband penetration rate is  15.7%  compared to the OECD 
average of 30.4%. Within 2 years of implementation, the number of 4.5G subscribers reached 
68 million. As a source of concern, Turkey still has not amended the Internet Law in line with 
UN and Council of Europe recommendations (see Chapter 23 — Judiciary and fundamental 
rights). 

Concerning  information society services, the national strategy  covering 2015-2018 remains 
in  place  and  there  is  a  need  to  update  it.  The  proportion  of  people  using  e-government 
increased from 42% to 45.6%.  

In the area of audio-visual policy, there has been no progress in alignment with the acquis. A 
State of Emergency decree published on 12 January 2018 shut down two more media outlets 
on grounds of alleged links with terror organisations, transferring their assets and properties 
to the control of the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund. With this, the number of radio and TV 
stations closed following the coup attempt of 15 July 2016 reached 63. The sale of Turkey's 
largest media group in March 2018 led to a further concentration of media in the hands of a 
few groups close to the Government. The media landscape is now dominated by outlets either 
close to the Government or dependent on public contracts, which further reduces pluralism in 
the Turkish media. The lack of transparency of funding and links with political and business 
spheres  also  affect  the  private  media  sector,  displaying  a  strong  influence  on  editorial 
policies.  

In  the  run  up  to  the  presidential  and  parliamentary  elections  of  June  2018,  the  incumbent 
President  and  his  party  enjoyed  a  notable  advantage,  which  was  also  reflected  in 
proportionally excessive coverage by government-affiliated public and private media. During 
the  elections,  compliance  with  media  regulations  is  overseen  by  the  Radio  and  Television 
Supreme Council (RTÜK). The decision of the Supreme Board of Elections (SBE) listing the 
channels to be monitored during the election campaign was adopted as late as 28 May 2018, 
less than a month before the elections. RTÜK's reports to the SBE are not public. Moreover, a 
decree  repealed  the  SBE’s  powers  to  sanction  radio  and  TV  broadcasters,  which  fail  to  be 
impartial  and  politically  neutral.  The  public  broadcaster  TRT's  channels,  which  are  90% 
dependent on state funding, were virtually inaccessible for the opposition, in particular during 
the election campaign. Taken together,  all these factors left  the media campaign practically 
without effective supervision according to the Council of Europe/PACE report. (See Political 
criteria) 

In  March  2018,  the  Parliament  approved  a  bill,  granting  RTÜK  the  authority  to  regulate 
online content, a form of media increasingly used by critical voices in Turkey. In September 
2018,  following  the  approval  of  its  Supreme  Council,  RTÜK  published  a  draft  internet 
regulation  on  its  website.  The  draft  contains  controversial  provisions  with  regard  to 

73 

 
 
jurisdiction,  licencing  and  restricting  access  to  content.  In  January  2019,  the  Supporting, 
Evaluation  and  Classification  of  Cinema  Films  Law  was  published  in  the  Official  Gazette. 
According to the Law, cinema films that are locally produced or imported will be evaluated 
and classified before they are made available for commercial circulation and screening.  

Following the changeover to the executive presidency, a presidential decree published in July 
2018,  affiliated  the  Turkish  Radio  and  Television  Corporation  (TRT)  with  the  Presidential 
Communication Authority and RTÜK with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Its effects 
on the functioning of RTÜK remain to be seen. 

As  for  the  media  regulator,  public  consultations  with  media  service  providers  continued. 
RTÜK's decisions are available online. However, membership of RTÜK's Supreme Council 
does not reflect the current composition of the Parliament, as required by law. 

The completion of the digital switchover remains uncertain, as the re-tendering procedure has 
not yet started. 

5.11.  Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development 

The  common  agricultural  policy  supports  farmers  and  rural  development.  This  requires 
strong management and control systems. There are also common EU rules for quality policy 
and organic farming. 

There is some level of preparation in the area of agriculture and rural development.  Some 
progress has been made in the past year, especially continuing to improve implementation of 
the  EU-Turkey  trade  agreement  for  agricultural  products.  However,  the  Commission’s 
recommendations from last year have been only partly taken up. There is still no strategy for 
producing agricultural statistics. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ adopt a strategy for producing agricultural statistics; 

→ develop a strategy to align its agricultural support policy. 

On  horizontal  issues,  the  development  of  an  integrated  administration  and  control  system 
(IACS) has continued. The Farm Accountancy Data Network covers all 81 provinces and has 
now been integrated into the agricultural production and registration system. The agricultural 
census is not yet complete and the strategy for agricultural statistics has not yet been adopted. 
Further alignment with EU policies requires the decoupling of payments from production and 
linking area-based payments to cross-compliance standards.  

On common market organisation, no progress was made in legislative alignment. 

The  EU  and  Turkey  have  amended  Protocol  2  to  Decision  No  1/98  of  the  EC-Turkey 
Association Council on the trade regime for agricultural products and agreed to broaden the 
scope of the tariff quota for meat products exported from the EU to Turkey to include fresh 
and  chilled  bovine  meat.  This  will  be  an  important  step  forward  to  ensure  proper  and 
transparent  management  of  the  import  quota  is  ensured  in  line  with  the  new  rules  on  the 
management of tariff quotas. 

In the EU pre-accession programme for rural development (IPARD II), 12 746 applications 
were received and 3  446 projects  given contracts, with  the EU contributing  a total  of EUR 
245.4  million  by  the  end  of  2018  to  investments  in  agricultural  holdings  and  in  processing 
and  marketing,  and  farm  diversification  (measures  1,  3  and  7).  Accreditation  for  budget 
implementation  tasks  was  granted  to  the  Links  between  Actions  of  Rural  Development 
(LEADER)  measure  in  February  2019.  There  was  a  series  of  events  and  studies  on 

74 

 
 
establishing  and  improving  of  the  National  Rural  Network  (NRN)  in  several  provinces. 
Twenty-five  local  action  groups  established  under  LEADER  have  started  developing  local 
action  strategies.  Through  LEADER  and  the  NRN  measures,  the  successful  IPARD 
Programme implementation also involved civil society.  

In  quality  policy,  further  implementing  regulations  were  adopted  following  the  2017 
Intellectual  Property  Law  that  increased  the  level  of  alignment  with  the  EU  Geographical 
Indications  legislation.  The  EU-Turkey  reinforced  cooperation  on  mutual  registration  of 
Geographical  Indications  (GIs)  has  been  relaunched,  aiming  at  facilitating  the  mutual 
registration and adequate protection of GIs through information and knowledge exchange.    

Alignment with the EU acquis of the regulation on principles and implementation of organic 
farming  is  well  advanced.  The  Turkish  Accreditation  Agency  accredits  organic  agriculture 
control bodies. 

5.12.  Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy 

EU hygiene rules for foodstuff production ensure a high level of food safety. Animal health 
and welfare and the safety of food of animal origin are safeguarded together with quality of 
seeds, plant protection material, protection against harmful organisms and animal nutrition. 

There is some level of preparation in the area of food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary 
policy. There has been some progress in the past year concerning enforcement capacity for 
animal welfare, food, feed and animal by-products and food safety legislation. However, the 
Commission’s recommendations from last year have only been taken up in part. Turkey has 
ratified the European  Convention for the Protection of Animals kept  for Farming Purposes, 
but food establishments still need to be upgraded to meet EU standards. Full implementation 
of the acquis in this area will require significant further work.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  upgrade  food  establishments  to  meet  EU  standards,  including  submitting  a  national 

programme and a monitoring plan; 

  make progress on addressing zoonoses. 

There  has  been  limited  progress  in  aligning  and  implementing  the  acquis  on  general  food 
safety.  Turkey  has  not  yet  fully  aligned  its  veterinary  policy  with  the  EU  acquis.  The 
identification and registration of bovines and small ruminants has continued. The regulation 
concerning  the  identification  and  monitoring  of  equidae,  and  the  one  concerning  cats,  dogs 
and ferrets, were adopted.  Electronic identification of cattle began in 2018. Border inspection 
posts at land and sea borders and at the Sabiha Gökçen Airport in Istanbul are still not fully 
operational. 

Turkey  has  continued  its  fight  against  animal  diseases.  Foot  and  mouth  disease  outbreaks 
have decreased as a result of mass vaccination. The disease-free zone ensured by vaccination 
in  the area of western Turkey bordering Bulgaria and Greece has been  maintained by strict 
movement  controls.  Vaccination  against lumpy skin  disease has continued. A regulation  on 
disease-free  compartmentalisation  and  another  on  protection  against  and  combating 
bluetongue have entered into force. Significant efforts are still needed to fully align with the 
acquis on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies and surveillance systems, including full 
compliance with  the February 1998 Decision of the EC-Turkey Association Council on the 
trade regime for agricultural products. Further structural and administrative work is necessary 
to fully implement the acquis on animal welfare. A regulation has been adopted on minimum 
rules for protection of chickens kept  for meat  production. Turkey has ratified the European 

75 

 
 
Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Animals  kept  for  Farming  Purposes.  There  has  been  no 
progress on zoonoses. 

Turkey has continued to implement training, inspection and monitoring programmes for the 
placing  on  the  market  of  food,  feed  and  animal  by-products  on  the  market,  and 
administrative capacity for official controls has been improved. No progress has been made 
on developing the national  plan for upgrading agri-food establishments.  Significant  work is 
still  needed  to  apply  the  new  rules  on  registering  and  approving  food  establishments. 
Substantial  work on  animal by-products  is  still required. Provisions for funding inspections 
have still not been aligned with the EU system. 

Alignment  of  food  safety  rules  with  the  acquis  has  advanced  on  issues  such  as  labelling, 
additives  and  purity  criteria,  flavourings,  food  supplements  and  enzymes.  Relevant 
regulations  have  been  adopted,  among  others  for  labelling  and  specifications  for  food 
additives. 

Progress  on  specific  rules  for  feed  remains  limited.  There  has  been  no  progress  on 
phytosanitary policy. Alignment is  yet to  be completed for new  foods and for  genetically 
modified organisms. 

5.13.  Chapter 13: Fisheries 

The  common  fisheries  policy  lays  down  rules  on  fisheries  management,  protects  living 
resources  of  the  sea  and  limits  the  environmental  impact  of  fisheries.  This  includes  setting 
catch  quotas,  managing  fleet  capacity,  rules  on  markets  and  aquaculture  and  support  for 
fisheries and coastal communities.  

Preparations  in  fisheries  remain  at  an  early  stage.  Some  progress  was  made  on  resources 
and fleet management, inspection and control, and on international agreements. However, no 
progress was made on addressing last year’s recommendation on adopting a fisheries law.  

Therefore, in the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ adopt a fisheries and aquaculture law which is aligned with the EU acquis. 

Institutional capacity has been further improved. There has been some progress in resources 
and  fleet  management.  The  total  of  1264  fishing  vessels  over  10  meters  long  has  been 
scrapped from the fleet since 2013. Nearly 1500 vessels were monitored via the new vessel 
monitoring  system.  The  system  monitors  sea  fishing  activities  as  well  as  the  registry, 
location,  time,  speed  and  destination  of  the  vessels,  and  of  the  fishery  catch  data.  The 
implementation of electronic logbooks has also started with the new system. A new support 
scheme  has  been  introduced  to  improve  data  quality,  particularly  socio-economic  data  on 
marine and inland artisanal fishing vessels, and to ensure sustainable management. 

On  inspection  and  control,  some  progress  was  made  in  legislative  alignment  and  on 
implementation  of  the  International  Commission  for  the  Conservation  of  Atlantic  Tuna 
(ICCAT) recommendations on Bluefin tuna. No progress was made on market policy.  

Regarding international agreements, cooperation between Turkey and the EU has continued 
in  ICCAT and the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean. Turkey has signed 
the Sofia Ministerial  Declaration on Black Sea Fisheries and Aquaculture and the Regional 
Plan  of  Action  for  Small-Scale  Fisheries  in  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Black  Sea.  The 
cooperation agreements with Somalia, Gambia and Mauritania have been ratified. Turkey has 
also  ratified  the  FAO  Agreement  on  Port  State  Measures  to  prevent,  deter  and  eliminate 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Because the EU acquis implements the provisions 
of  the  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea,  including  through  the  common 

76 

 
 
fisheries policy, Turkey’s ratification of the Convention is necessary to improve cooperation 
with the EU on fisheries and maritime policy. 

5.14.  Chapter 14: Transport policy 

The EU has common rules for technical and safety standards, security, social standards, and 
market  liberalisation  in  road  transport,  railways,  inland  waterways,  combined  transport, 
aviation and maritime transport. 

institutional  set  up  of 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  transport  policy.  Some  progress  has  been  made  in  the 
reporting  period.  The 
the  Ministry  undergone  significant 
re-organisation.  Some  further  liberalisation  was  implemented  in  the  railway  market.  In  the 
maritime  sector,  the  institutional  and  technical  capacity  to  implement  international 
conventions  remains  limited.  Negotiations  for  a  comprehensive  agreement  in  the  aviation 
sector  as  well  as  the  working  arrangement  with  the  European  Aviation  Safety  Agency 
(EASA) are two significant issues which will take Turkey a step further. In the coming year, 
Turkey should in particular:  

  finalise  its  new  Road  Safety  Strategy  for  2021-2030  in  line  with  the  EU's  safe  system 

approach;  

  create a competitive level playing field for all railways operators;  

  take  steps  towards  alignment  with  the  EU  acquis  particularly  in  the  areas  of  aviation, 

intelligent transport systems and EU passenger rights in all modes of transport.  

As regards the general transport acquis, Turkey is preparing a new comprehensive study to 
assess  the  level  of  alignment  in  the  transport  sector  and  identify  gaps  and  actions  to  close 
them.  The  now  finished  logistics  master  plan  has  broadly  identified  the  locations  of  the 
logistics  centres  in  the  regions.  Turkey  has  also  finalised  and  published  its  intelligent 
transport systems strategy and action plan. Turkey is not yet aligned with the Clean Power for 
Transport package.  

On  road  transport,  the  legal  framework  is  well  aligned  with  the  acquis.  Turkey  has 
continued  to  carry  out  robust  roadside  inspections.  Cargo  securing  remains  an  issue  in 
updating  the  relevant  Turkish  road  transport  legislation.  Turkey’s  Directorate-General  for 
Highways of the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure has published a regulation on road 
infrastructure safety assessment. Road safety is suffering from the lack of a lead agency and 
Turkey  needs  to  take  significant  steps  to  ensure  better  coordination  among  the  relevant 
stakeholders with a concrete road safety strategy for the safe system approach. The Turkish 
national  police joined the European Traffic Police Network (TISPOL) in  July 2018.  There 
has been no progress in the negotiations to implement the smart tachograph in the European 
Agreement  concerning  the  Work  of  Crews  of  Vehicles  engaged  in  International  Road 
Transport  (AETR),  which  covers  Turkey.  Because  the  smart  tachograph  will  be  mandatory 
under  EU  law  on  15  June  2019  for  vehicles  registered  in  the  EU,  delays  in  the  AETR 
agreement not only prevent Turkey from fully aligning with EU standards on road safety but 
will also pose a challenge for vehicles manufacturers established in Turkey, since they will 
have to find a way to install smart tachographs on their vehicles intended for the EU before 
they are put on the market. 

The institutional set up in the railways sector is not fully aligned with EU requirements. The 
Directorate-General for Rail Regulation is not sufficiently independent from the Ministry of 
Transport.  Its  human  resources  and  technical  capacity  have  not  reached  the  level  of  its 
European  peers.  The  state-owned  railway  operator  (TCDD  Transport)  is  financially 
dependent  on  the  funds  channelled  from  the  state-owned  Infrastructure  Manager  (TCDD 

77 

 
 
Infrastructure) in breach of the principle of separation of essential functions. A regulation on 
railway  interoperability  is  in  its  final  stage  of  preparation  pending  consultation  with  the 
European Commission. TCDD Infrastructure has issued a network statement, which defines 
the  terms  under  which  competing  railway  companies  can  access  the  railway  infrastructure 
including  access  pricing  methodology.  Two  passenger  and  three  freight  train  operation 
certificates have been issued to private sector operators. All railway vehicles in the country 
have  been  registered  in  the  rolling  stock  registry.  However,  implementing  legislation 
provides  that  only  domestically  produced  freight  and  passenger  rolling  stock  may  be 
registered until 1 January 2020, establishing an entry barrier for imports. The DG for Railway 
Regulation has issued safety certificates for all railway operators. It has certified the training 
centre  in  Eskisehir  for  training  of  train  drivers  and  safety  critical  positions.  It  is  also 
establishing a statistical portal to aggregate all railway-related services and productivity data. 

In maritime transport, emergency response centres in Tekirdağ and Antalya have been fully 
operational  since  early  2018.  Turkey  has  become  a  party  to  two  International  Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) conventions on the control of harmful anti-fouling systems on ships, and 
on  the  safe  and  environmentally  sound  recycling  of  ships.  Turkey  needs  to  develop  the 
institutional  and  technical  capacity  required  to  fulfil  its  responsibilities  under  IMO 
conventions.  Turkey  has  still  not  signed  the  Paris  Memorandum  of  Understanding,  despite 
being on its white list. Turkey has adopted all the necessary legislation to ensure alignment 
with the acquis on a Community vessel traffic monitoring and information System (VTMS). 

Turkey  has  to  align  with  the  relevant  EU  legislation  on  inland  waterway.  Turkey  has  not 
signed the main international agreements on inland waterways. 

In  aviation,  Turkey  is  aiming  to  become  fully  integrated  into  the  EU  aviation  system, 
including  becoming  a  member  of  the  European  Aviation  Safety  Agency  (EASA).  Several 
instructions  have  been  issued  based  on  EASA  Operations.  The  new  Istanbul  Airport  was 
inaugurated  in  October  2018.  Negotiations  on  the  comprehensive  EU-Turkey  aviation 
agreement continued, albeit at a slow pace. They will define the future of aviation relations 
between the EU and Turkey and the level of Turkey's integration into the EU single aviation 
market. There has been no progress on the renewal of the working arrangement between the 
Turkish Directorate-General for Civil Aviation and the EASA. Given the insufficient human 
resources  in  the  aviation  sector,  Turkey  needs  to  fully  operationalise  the  aviation  training 
academy. The lack of adequate communication between air traffic control centres in Turkey 
and  Cyprus  continues  to  compromise  air  safety  in  the  Nicosia  flight  information  region, 
requiring  an  operational  solution.  In  other  areas  of  the  aviation  acquis,  Turkey  is  making 
progress in aligning its regulations with the acquis but further efforts are needed, particularly 
in air traffic management.  

There has  been some progress  on  combined transport. Turkey prepared a four step multi-
modal national transport master plan in March 2018 and transport information management 
systems in June 2018.  

As long as restrictions remain in place on vessels and aircraft registered in Cyprus, related to 
Cyprus,  or  whose  last  port  of  call  was  Cyprus,  Turkey  will  not  be  in  a  position  to  fully 
implement the acquis relating to this chapter. 

5.15.  Chapter 15: Energy 

EU  energy  policy  covers  security  of  supply,  the  internal  energy  market,  hydrocarbons, 
renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear energy, nuclear safety and radiation protection. 

78 

 
 
Turkey is moderately prepared in this chapter. Good progress has been made on security 
of supply, renewable energy and energy efficiency.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  adopt  legislation  in  line  with  the  Euratom  acquis,  clarifying  structural,  staffing  and 
coordination  issues  in  nuclear  energy  regulation  and  guarantee  the  independence  of  the 
newly established nuclear energy regulator; 

  deepen  gas  market  reform  by  setting  up  a  legally  binding  plan  and  a  timetable  for  the 
and 

cost-reflective 

establishing 

transparent, 

of 

unbundling 
non-discriminatory pricing in the gas sector; 

activities 

and 

  roll  out  the  implementation  of  the  national  energy  efficiency  action  plan  (NEEAP)  in 

particular the envisaged national energy efficiency financing mechanism. 

Very  good  progress  has  been  made  on  security  of  supply.  The  first  phase  of  the  Trans-
Anatolian Pipeline project (TANAP) was completed in June 2018. The second phase, aiming 
to connect TANAP to Europe via the Trans-Adriatic pipeline project (TAP) is expected to be 
finalised  according  to  plan  by  June  2019.  The  offshore  section  of  the  TurkStream  pipeline 
project, run by Turkey and Russia, was completed in November 2018.  

In  addition  to  the  two  floating  storage  regasification  unit  (FSRU)  terminals  operated  by 
Turkey's Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAŞ), the construction of a third FSRU on the 
Aegean  coast  started  in  2018.  In  addition,  Turkey  started  the  expansion  of  its  second 
underground  gas  storage  facility  (Salt  Lake)  to  increase  its  capacity  to  5.4  billion  cubic 
meters of gas and a daily production capacity of 80 million cubic meters of gas until 2020. 
This expansion is considered very important for Turkey's security of supply.  Turkey is at an 
advanced  stage  of  implementation  of  the  acquis  on  mandatory  oil  stocks  and  has  already 
constituted the necessary volume of these stocks. Relevant legal provisions became effective 
in January 2018. 

As  regards  electricity  networks,  Turkey  has  progressed  in  aligning  with  the  EU  network 
codes,  fostering  network  integration  and  greater  capacity  of  interconnections  to  increase 
efficiency  and  security  of  electricity  supply.  In  October  2018,  the  Turkish  electricity 
transmission  system  operator  (TEIAŞ)  applied  to  continue  as  an  observer  member  of  the 
European  Network  of  Transmission  System  Operators  for  Electricity  (ENTSO-E).  The 
modernising and upgrading of the Turkish electricity network in line with ENTSO-E should 
continue,  including  on  the  harmonisation  of  Turkish  electricity  codes  with  relevant  EU 
network codes and on further acquis alignment.  

In the internal energy market, some progress has been made on pending improvements in 
transparent,  cost-reflective  and  non-discriminatory  pricing  mechanisms  for  electricity  and 
gas.  The  capacity  of  Turkey's  Energy  Market  Regulatory  Authority  (EMRA)  to  implement 
transparency  and  competition  law  on  the  Turkish  natural  gas  market  in  line  with  the  EU 
Regulation on Wholesale Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT) needs to be improved. 
Legislation on natural gas market transactions also needs to be improved.  

A  positive  development  was  the  launch  in  September  2018  of  Turkey's  natural  gas  spot 
trading platform, operated by the EXIST Energy Exchange. The platform enables spot market 
transactions  in  natural  gas,  balancing  transactions  and  reconciling  of  imbalances.  However, 
the  viability  of  the  exchange  is  impacted  by  BOTAŞ's  dominant  market  position.  BOTAŞ 
remains vertically integrated and has yet to unbundle its trading and grid operator functions. 
Insufficient  progress  was  reported  on  establishing  a  transparent,  cost-reflective  and  non-
discriminatory gas transit regime. 

79 

 
 
The  Turkish  Treasury  has  issued  a  guarantee  for  the  external  debt  financing  of  four  major 
BOTAŞ  projects,  namely:  the  Salt  Lake  Natural  Gas  Underground  Storage  Facility,  the 
Trans-Anatolian  Natural  Gas  Pipeline  (TANAP),  the  North  Marmara  Natural  Gas  Storage 
Plant and the Floating LNG Storage and Gasification Unit. EMRA has lifted tariffs for LNG 
and FSRU terminals to promote LNG and FSRUs investments in Turkey. 

The state-owned electricity generation company (EÜAŞ), responsible for more than a third of 
Turkey's power generation capacity, took over the Turkish electricity trading and contracting 
Company  (TETAŞ)  in  July  2018.  This  has  made  EÜAŞ  responsible  for  signing  energy 
purchase and sales agreements as well as importing and exporting electricity.  

On  hydrocarbons,  Turkey  is  at  an  advanced  stage  of  alignment  with  EU  legislation  but 
needs  to  further  align  with  Directive  2013/30/EU  on  the  safety  of  offshore  oil  and  gas 
operations,  also  as  regards  transit  of  hydrocarbons.  At  the  end  of  2018,  Turkey  started 
exploration activities for oil and gas in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey undertook seismic 
research activities in the Cyprus' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and threatened to conduct 
its own drilling activities for hydrocarbon exploration in the Cyprus EEZ. 

Turkey's  progress  in  the  renewable  energy  sector  has  been  good.  Three  large  tenders  in 
photovoltaics (PV) and onshore and offshore wind energy generation were launched based on 
a model applying a fixed feed-in tariff and guaranteed investment in domestic manufacturing 
and R&D for a fixed period of time. These tenders failed to attract sufficient investor interest, 
however, and are expected to be extended or relaunched in 2019. Concerns have been voiced 
regarding special incentives and local-content requirements, which affect access by EU and 
other international companies' to tenders in the renewable energy sector.  

The  Ministry  of  Energy  and  Natural  Resources  is  one  of  the  few  that  kept  its  name  and 
political  mandate,  with  some  structural  changes  in  renewable  energy  and  energy  efficiency 
under the Presidential executive system introduced in Turkey in 2018. 

Progress on energy efficiency has been good in terms of adopted legislation, and moderate in 
terms  of  actual  implementation.  The  long-awaited  national  energy  efficiency  action  plan 
(NEEAP)  was  finally  adopted  in  2018.  Although  the  plan  is  broadly  aligned  with  the  EU 
Energy  Efficiency  Directive  2012/27/EU,  the  2007  Energy  Efficiency  Law  needs  to  be 
revised in order to avoid overlaps and account for institutional changes. Turkey needs to align 
with  the  2010  Energy  Performance  of  Buildings  Directive.  The  development  of  a  national 
energy  efficiency  financing  mechanism,  envisaged  under  the  NEEAP,  has  to  be  prioritised. 
Better coordination by involving and regularly consulting relevant stakeholders in the design, 
monitoring and evaluation of energy efficiency policies and measures will help ensure their 
feasibility and increase the rate of compliance. 

Moderate  progress  has  been  made  on  nuclear  energy,  nuclear  safety  and  radiation 
protection.  A  new  atomic  industry  regulatory  body  was  created  in  2018  by  presidential 
decree. The decree has left gaps on structural, staffing and coordination issues and needs to 
be followed up by additional legislation, consistent with the Euratom acquis, to bridge those 
gaps.  Given  Turkey’s  plan  to  have  a  first  nuclear  power  reactor  commissioned  and 
operational  by  2023,  the  legal  and  institutional  framework  should  be  improved  rapidly  to 
align  with  the  EU's  nuclear  legislation  and  ensure  nuclear  safety  in  line  with  the  Euratom 
Treaty. 

Turkey  has  declared  its  intention  to  issue  a  national  report  on  the  stress  tests  at  its  first 
nuclear power plant (NPP) at Akkuyu to allow for the preparation of a pending peer review. 
During the 2018 EU-Turkey technical energy dialogue, the EU invited Turkey to participate 
in  similar  peer  reviews.  Turkey  has  been  invited  to  attend  the  European  Nuclear  Safety 

80 

 
 
Regulators Group (ENSREG) as an observer, in preparation for stress tests and to facilitate 
common approaches on nuclear safety and waste management, but has not yet confirmed its 
participation.  There  is  a  need  of  additional  legal  and  technical  assurance  that  the  Turkish 
nuclear power plants will be constructed, commissioned, and operated safely and in line with 
the Euratom Treaty and EU secondary legislation. Additionally, Turkey has not yet acceded 
to  the  Joint  Convention  on  the  Safety  of  Spent  Fuel  Management  and  on  the  Safety  of 
Radioactive  Waste  Management,  and  is  not  yet  a  member  of  the  European  Community 
Urgent Radiological Information Exchange system.  

5.16.  Chapter 16: Taxation 

EU rules on taxation cover value added tax and excise duties as well as aspects of corporate 
taxation.  They  also  deal  with  cooperation  between  tax  administrations,  including  the 
exchange of information to prevent tax evasion. 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  taxation.  Some  progress  was  made  in  this 
area  notably  through  the  removal  of  the  regional  headquarters  regime,  amendments  to  the 
technology development zones regime and progress with the 2009 action plan on excise duty 
of alcoholic beverages. Turkey has also ratified the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters 
and  has  signed  the  Multilateral  Competent  Authority  Agreement  –  in  the  context  of  the 
OECD Automatic Exchange of Information standard. Not all of last year’s recommendations 
were sufficiently addressed, however, and so in addition to addressing the shortcomings set 
out below, in the coming year Turkey should: 

  align the range of excisable energy products with the acquis; 

  tackle the deficiencies identified by the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 

Information. 

Indirect taxation 

As regards indirect taxation, a wide the range of products is subject to a 1% value added tax, 
deviating from the acquis (a 15% minimum rate is standard although member states can apply 
reduced  rates  of  VAT  to  certain  goods  and  services).  Legislation  on  structure,  exemptions, 
special schemes and the scope of reduced rates need to be further aligned with the acquis. 

On excise duties, the specific duty on imported and blended tobacco, which was imposed at 
$150  per  tonne  and  used  to  finance  the  Tobacco  Fund,  has  been  removed,  in  line  with  the 
2009 action plan. Turkey’s cigarette excise duties legislation contradicts the acquis in terms 
of the specific and ad valorem elements of the tax, but the overall level of excise duties on 
cigarettes  is  close  to  EU  levels.  Regarding  alcoholic  beverages,  Turkey  has  removed  the 
taxation  differentials  in  absolute  terms  between  raki  (mainly  domestically  produced)  and 
certain other alcoholic beverages (mainly imported) in compliance with the 2009 action plan. 
Excise  duties  on  energy  products  are  generally  well  above  the  EU  minimum  rates,  but 
kerosene,  coal  and  electricity  are  not  subject  to  excise  duties,  contrary  to  the  acquis.  The 
regular  practice  of  introducing  temporary  tax  cuts  and  restructuring  public  debts  is 
detrimental to voluntary tax compliance in Turkey. 

Direct Taxation 

In direct taxation, the Council of the European Union Code of Conduct Group has evaluated 
Turkey’s  preferential  tax  regimes  and  has  assessed  the  technology  development  zone  and 
regional  headquarters  regimes  as  being  potentially  harmful.  In  the  context  of  the 
commitments made by Turkey to respond to the December 2017 Council Conclusions on the 

81 

 
 
list  of  non-cooperative  jurisdictions  for  tax  purposes,  Turkey  has  repealed  the  regional 
headquarters  regime  from  2019  and  has  set  an  end-of-2021  deadline  for  the  vested  rights. 
Turkey has also amended the technology development zone regime. 

Administrative cooperation and mutual assistance 

The  Convention  on  Mutual  Administrative  Assistance  in  Tax  Matters  (MAC)  entered  into 
force in July 2018. The MAC requires the parties’ competent authorities to mutually agree on 
the scope of the automatic exchange of information and the procedures to be complied with. 
Turkey  is  also  committed  to  the  OECD  Automatic  Exchange  of  Information  standard,  and 
signed  the  Multilateral  Competent  Authority  Agreement  in  2017.  In  the  context  of  the 
December 2017 EU Council conclusions  on the list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax 
purposes,  Turkey  also  committed  to  implementing  the  automatic  exchange  of  information 
with all EU Member States by the end of 2019. 

Operational capacity and computerisation 

Regarding operational capacity and computerisation, the Revenue Administration remained 
affiliated to the Ministry of Treasury and Finance within the scope of the presidential system 
and  maintained  its  mandate.  The  e-invoice  system  was  used  by  72  000  taxpayers  in  2017. 
Efforts to establish an integrated public finance management information system are ongoing. 

5.17.  Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy 

EU rules require the independence of central banks and prohibit them from directly financing 
the public sector. Member States coordinate their economic policies and are subject to fiscal, 
economic and financial surveillance. 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  economic  and  monetary  policy.  There  has 
been backsliding during the reporting period, because of increased political pressure on the 
central bank, undermining its independence and credibility. Deadlines for the submission of 
fiscal  notifications  are  not  always  respected.  There  was  no  implementation  of  the  2018 
report's recommendations. 

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out below, in the coming year Turkey should: 

→ avoid any political interference undermining the independence of the central bank. 

On monetary policy, significant further progress is needed to ensure the independence of the 
central  bank.  The  inflation  target  is  determined  jointly  by  the  central  bank  and  the 
government. There has been increasing political pressure on the central bank (e.g. the public 
comments  of  the  President  of  the  Republic  to  lower  borrowing  costs  and  to  fight  inflation 
through lower interest rates), thus undermining its operational and institutional independence. 
As  regards  personal  independence,  under  the  new  presidential  system,  the  Governor  and 
Vice-Governors  are  now  directly  appointed  by  the  President  of  the  Republic,  while  the 
members of the Board of the Monetary Policy Committee are subject to his approval. On the 
other  hand,  Turkey  made  some  progress  in  terms  of  simplifying  its  monetary  policy  by 
setting  back  the  one-week  repo  rate  as  the  main  policy  rate,  but  switched  to  providing  all 
funding through other channels at two instances. Further work should be done to ensure full 
alignment  with  the  acquis  in  relation  to  privileged  access  to  financial  institutions  by  the 
public sector. 

On  economic  policy,  significant  further  alignment  with  the  Directive  on  Requirements  for 
Budgetary  Frameworks  is  needed.  Turkey  revised  its  national  account  system  to  better 
comply  with  the  European  System  of  National  and  Regional  Accounts  (ESA-2010). 
However, further efforts would be required to  align  fiscal  reporting  and  notifications under 

82 

 
 
the  excessive  deficit  procedure  with  ESA  2010.  Further  improvements  are  also  needed  to 
ensure  the  credibility  of  macroeconomic  forecasts.  Turkey  does  not  have  numerical  fiscal 
rules  or  a  fiscal  council  that  monitors  fiscal  policy  independently,  as  is  required  by  the 
Directive. Turkey continues to submit fiscal notifications twice per year, although not always 
by the set deadlines. 

The 2019-2021 Economic Reform Programme (ERP) was formally submitted on 26 February 
2019, with almost a one month delay. Following the transition to the new presidential system, 
the central coordination of the ERP was given this year to the newly established Presidency’s 
Strategy and Budget Directorate. The structural reform priority measures are better specified 
than  last  year,  although  the  quality  of  these  measures  in  terms  of  description,  timeline, 
estimated impact and risks could be improved. 

5.18.  Chapter 18: Statistics 

EU  rules  require  that  Member  States  are  able  to  produce  statistics  based  on  professional 
independence, impartiality, reliability, transparency, and confidentiality. Common rules are 
provided for the methodology, production and dissemination of statistical information. 

Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of statistics. Turkey has continued to make good 
progress  in  terms  of  integrating  the  administrative  records  of  public  institutions  into  the 
national accounting system. Some progress has also been achieved in the area of agricultural 
and  migration  statistics.  However,  further  efforts  are  needed  to  align  macroeconomic 
statistics with the EU acquis. 

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out below, in the coming  year Turkey should 
continue to: 

  improve compliance with the European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA 

2010); 

  improve  coordination  between  TurkStat  and  other  data  providers,  while  improving  the 

quality and use of administrative records; 

  improve statistics on agriculture and migration.  

As  regards  statistical  infrastructure,  the  statistics  legislation  is  based  on  the  principles  of 
the European Statistics Code of Practice, and it ensures the professional independence of the 
Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat). However, a presidential decree adopted in July 2018 
shortened the mandate of the President of TurkStat and changed the appointment procedures 
of  senior  officials.  The  President  of  TurkStat  is  appointed  directly  by  the  President  of  the 
Republic,  while  the  appointment  of  the  vice-presidents  and  heads  of  departments  is  also 
subject to his approval. There are certain concerns regarding the transparency of appointment 
and  dismissal  processes  within  TurkStat.  Important  efforts  have  been  made  to  integrate  the 
administrative  records  of  public  institutions  into  statistical  production.  Closer  cooperation 
between  TurkStat  and  some  of  the  main  data  providers  will  help  to  improve  the  quality  of 
registers and increase the use of administrative data. 

For macroeconomic statistics, the GDP data were revised to ensure greater compliance with 
the  European  System  of  National  and  Regional  Accounts  (ESA  2010)  at  the  end  of  2016. 
Turkey continues its efforts to integrate the administrative records of public institutions into 
the national accounting system. The GNI inventory submitted to Eurostat in 2017 represents a 
substantial improvement compared to the earlier version, but needs to be further aligned with 
Eurostat’s GNI Inventory Guide. Turkey produces highly compliant statistics on international 
trade  in  goods.  In  November  2018,  Turkey  submitted  to  Eurostat  tables  for  the  excessive 

83 

 
 
deficit  procedure  for  2014-2017.  The  harmonised  index  of  consumer  prices  is  highly 
compliant with the EU acquis. 

On  business  statistics,  implementation  of  the  regulation  on  structural  business  statistics  is 
still ongoing. TurkStat has started to use administrative records to produce indicators related 
to short-term and structural business statistics. Short-term statistics are largely aligned, with 
the exception of services. Innovation, ICT and full data sets for R&D statistics are produced 
and sent to Eurostat. Rail, maritime and regional transport statistics are compliant and work is 
ongoing for road freight and passenger mobility data. Tourism statistics are also available.  

As for  social statistics,  data from  the income  and living conditions  survey  is  available and 
labour  market  statistics  are  fully  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  methodology  for 
employment  data  follows  EU  practice.  Data  are  available  for  education  and  vocational 
training. There is good compliance in public health statistics for data related to health surveys 
and causes of death, while further progress is needed for data on health expenditure and non-
monetary  healthcare.  Social  protection  statistics  are  highly  compliant.  Crime  statistics  are 
produced,  but  they  have  not  yet  been  transmitted  to  Eurostat.  There  was  progress  on 
migration  statistics.  Statistics  on  immigration  and  emigration  were  published  using 
administrative registers for the first time in September 2018, and sent to  Eurostat. The data 
cannot be published by Eurostat because of definitional problems. 

As  regards  agricultural  statistics,  no  agricultural  census  has  been  carried  out  since  2001. 
Crop,  animal  production,  milk  and  dairy  statistics  are  available.  Supply  balance  sheets  are 
available for almost all basic crop products and for wine. Work is ongoing for the economic 
accounts  for  agriculture  and  the  agricultural  input  price  index.  Turkey  carried  out  a  farm 
structure survey in 2016 to determine the physical sizes of the agricultural holdings. Turkstat 
published the results of the survey in April 2018, but the microdata and the methodological 
report have not been sent to Eurostat. 

As for environmental statistics, waste statistics are available, but further progress is needed 
for  data  on  agricultural  and  construction  waste.  Environmental  accounts  on  greenhouse  gas 
emissions,  environmental  taxes,  material  flow,  energy  and  environmental  protection 
expenditure  are  available.  Energy  statistics  are  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis.  Good  quality 
statistics on energy prices are available and are sent regularly to Eurostat. 

5.19.  Chapter 19: Social policy and employment 

EU rules in the social field include minimum standards for labour law, equality, health and 
safety at work and non-discrimination. They also promote social dialogue at European level. 

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  social  policy  and  employment.  There 
has been no progress during the past year, especially in employment policy. In the coming 
year, Turkey should in particular: 

  remove  obstacles  which  limit  the  enjoyment  of  trade  union  rights  and  reinvigorate  the 

bilateral and tripartite social dialogue; 

  oversee the implementation of health and safety at work legislation for the benefit of the 

entire labour force; 

  promote women’s employment by stepping up appropriate work-life balance policies. 

In  labour  law,  Turkey  is  moderately  prepared.  Labour  law  is  still  not  applicable  to 
agriculture and forestry  workplaces with  fewer than 50 employees, or to  domestic workers, 
except for matters involving occupational health and safety. This, coupled with high rates of 
informality, means that a high proportion of the working population is not protected by the 

84 

 
 
labour law. The current number of the labour inspectors is well below the benchmarks set by 
the  International  Labour  Organisation,  as  critical  for  the  enforcement  of  the  labour  law. 
Mediation (mandatory before resorting to labour courts) has started functioning. The national 
programme  for  the  elimination  of  child  labour  for  2017-  2023  has  been  launched,  but  no 
official data has been released on its implementation. 

On  health  and  safety  at  work,  the  EU  framework  directive  has  been  largely  transposed, 
except  the  requirement  that  low-risk  enterprises  with  fewer  than  50  employees  utilise 
occupational health and safety professionals. This provision will enter into force in July 2020. 
Occupational accidents claimed at least 1,636 lives in 2017, up from 1,405 in 2016, with the 
construction  sector  causing  the  highest  number  of  fatalities.  The  fatal  accident  rate  per 
number  of  persons  employed  (“incident  rate”)  has  also  increased.  Migrant  children  are 
particularly vulnerable to work-related accidents. The low level of union density, high levels 
of  informality  and  extensive  subcontracting  of  work  in  the  private  sector  are  factors  that 
increase risks to employees’ safety. The high number of occupational incidents and fatalities 
at  the  new  Istanbul  airport  site,  the  largest  construction  site  in  Turkey,  attracted  public 
attention  with  mass  worker  protests  in  September  2018.  Turkey  needs  to  improve  its 
prevention,  identification  and  reporting  systems  for  occupational  fatalities  and  diseases  and 
implement a proper system of labour inspection. 

Social dialogue has backslid during the last year. The members of the Economic and Social 
Council, which has not convened since 2009, will now be appointed by the President of the 
Republic. The tripartite consultative committee, which has continued to be the main tripartite 
social dialogue forum, convened once in 2018. Trade union density among registered private-
sector employees  was  13.8% in  January 2019.  Trade union density  among the 2.47 million 
public servants is high at 67.6%, although it has been decreasing since 2016. Managers and 
members of some unions continued to face arbitrary dismissal, harassment and detention for 
various union activities of a peaceful nature. Sixty-two workers, including one union leader, 
are  on  trial  because  of  their  involvement  in  mass  worker  protests  against  poor  working 
conditions  at  the  new  Istanbul  airport  construction  site.  These  and  other  breaches  of 
fundamental  labour  rights  as  the  freedom  of  association  and  the  right  for  collective 
bargaining have raised the attention of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The list 
of public institutions whose employees are not allowed to organise in unions, already long by 
international  standards,  has  been  further  expanded.  Mass  dismissals  of  public  servants  for 
alleged links to terrorist groups, in relation to the coup attempt of 2016, have continued. The 
State of Emergency Appeal Commission, which is mandated to examine dismissals of public 
servants, still has a large backlog of unresolved cases for those affected by measures under 
the state of emergency (see section Measures under the state of emergency). 

In 2018, two strike actions in the private sector were postponed (and de-facto banned) by the 
Government. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court has ruled that a 2015 decision to postpone 
a metal sector strike, imposed by the Government on the grounds of national security, was in 
breach of the right to strike. 

In 2018, the overall employment rate was 52.0%, 32.2% for women. The unemployment rate 
was 11%. The labour force participation rate was 58.5%, with  an increase in female labour 
force participation from 37.6% in 2017 to 38.3% in 2018. Of employed women, 23% work as 
unpaid family workers in agriculture. The  youth unemployment rate was 20.3%: a decrease 
from  20.8  %  in  2017.  While  there  is  a  minor  decrease  in  the  number  of  females  not  in 
employment, education or training in the age group 15-24 from 34.0 % in 2017 to 33.6 % in 
2018, there is an increase for males from 14.6% in 2017 to 15.6% in 2018. In 2018, the rate 
of  employees/employers  not  registered  to  any  social  security  institution  reached  33.6%. 

85 

 
 
Approximately 800 000 Syrian refugees are employed largely in the informal sector. 43.4% 
of women are in undeclared jobs with this rate climbing to 90.8% for women in agriculture. 
Turkey  has  set  concrete  targets  for  the  labour  market,  demonstrating  long-term  policy 
making.  No  official  figures  for  employment  have  been  announced  following 
the 
“employment  mobilisation  programme”  launched  in  2016  to  create  two  million  jobs, 
primarily  by  covering  employers’  share  of  social  security  contributions  and  to  encourage 
registration. As was the case last year, the majority of the job placements continued to be in 
occupations not requiring any qualifications. People with disabilities face difficulties getting 
a  foothold  on  the  labour  market  and  large  gender  inequalities  exist.  A  major  part  of  the 
unemployment insurance fund was used for employment subsidy programmes to employers, 
and the impact of this is yet to be evaluated. 

Turkey has a good level of preparation for using the European Social Fund. The Ministry of 
Family,  Labour  and  Social  Services  manages  similar  sectoral  funds  under  IPA  and  IPA  II 
programmes, covering areas of employment, education, lifelong learning and social inclusion. 
(concerning  the  effectiveness  of  the  management  of  IPA  funds,  see  chapter  22  –  Regional 
Policy and Structural Instruments). 

In social inclusion and protection, Turkey has continued to provide a wide range of public 
and social services to 3.9 million registered refugees, who are predominantly Syrian nationals 
placed under ‘temporary protection’. Income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient 
remained  stable,  but  with  0.426  was  higher  than  for  all  EU  Member  States.  The  income-
quintile  ratio  (another  common  reference  for  inequality)  stands  at  8.6  (EU  5.2),  and 
substantiates  the  same  tendency.  Turkey  has  no  policy  framework  for  poverty  reduction. 
Social protection  expenditures represented 12.3% of GDP  in  2017. Participation of persons 
with disabilities in Turkey’s economy and society remains a challenge, the main issues being 
limited  enforcement  of  anti-discrimination  legislation,  inadequate  physical  infrastructure  at 
workplaces,  and  lack  of  affordable  occupational  therapy  services.  Implementation  of  the 
Strategy  on  Roma  Citizens  needs  to  be  improved,  including  the  preparation,  adoption  and 
implementation of an action plan for 2019-2021, with the involvement of all relevant actors. 
Social assistance beneficiaries are referred to the public employment service for employment 
or active labour market measures. There has been little progress in moving from institutional 
to  community-based  care for vulnerable persons. Home-based  care subsidies for vulnerable 
children  and  persons  with  disabilities  are  expanding.  Quality  standards,  monitoring, 
inspection and evaluation of all care services need to be improved. 

Turkey  has  no  strategy  or  action  plan  for  non-discrimination  in  employment  and  social 
policy.  The  human  rights  and  equality  body  has  started  processing  complaints  and  its 
capacity  needs  to  be  strengthened.  Public  awareness  needs  to  be  raised  about  rights  and 
responsibilities in this field. A survey revealed that more than 80% of young Syrian migrants 
perceive  discrimination  in  the  labour  market.  The  legislative  framework  does  not  prohibit 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual identity and orientation. (See Chapter 23 – Judiciary 
and fundamental rights). 

On equality between women and men in employment and social policy, there have been no 
legislative  developments  in  relation  to  part-time  work  for  working  parents  in  the  public 
sector.  The  legislative  and  institutional  mechanisms  needed  to  balance  family  and  working 
life  as  a  basic  component  of  all  national  policies  promoting  women’s  employment  are  still 
lacking.  The  main  source  of  inequality,  and  the  gender  gap,  is  the  low  participation  of 
Turkish women in the workforce. There is a wide gap in the employment rates (38%), labour 
force participation rates and unemployment rates of women and men, and a gender pay gap 
observed  for  all  levels  of  educational  attainment.  The  lack  of  institutions  and  services 

86 

 
 
providing  care  for  children,  the  sick  and  the  elderly  people  continues  to  hinder  women’s 
employment, due to a gender bias in caring responsibilities (See also Chapter 23). 

5.20.  Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy 

EU enterprise and industrial policy strengthens competitiveness, facilitates structural change 
and  encourages  a  business-friendly  environment  that  stimulates  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises. 

Turkey has a good level of preparation in the area of enterprise and industrial policy. There 
has been good progress on the legal framework for doing business but issues such as tackling 
the  informal  economy,  the  long-term  financing  of  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  and 
the legal framework for microfinance remain challenges. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  improve policy compliance following the results of the Small Business Act report; 

  focus on measuring the impact of policy tools. 

Enterprise and industrial policy principles 

There  has  been  significant  progress  on  the  legal  framework  covering  the  business 
environment.  An  omnibus  law  amending  other  laws  to  improve  the  business  environment, 
published in March 2018, did much to ease the administrative burden on enterprises. This law 
and  other  accompanying  measures  helped  Turkey  improve  its  ranking  in  the  2019  Doing 
Business Index by 17 places making the country one of the top 10 reformers. Following the 
transition  to  the  executive  presidency  system,  the  Ministry  of  Industry  and  Technology 
extended its mandate to cover foreign direct investments, incentive schemes for industry, and 
regional development including the development agencies set up for the purpose. 

Turkey’s  efforts  to  digitalise  government  services  have  continued  for  foreign  direct 
investments  where  an  electronic 
investment 
information  system  was  introduced.  An  e-export  strategy  and  action  plan  has  been  adopted 
for 2018-2020 to increase exports in e-commerce.  

implementation  and  foreign 

incentive 

Turkey’s focus on localisation schemes (some of which create obstacles to the free movement 
of  goods with  the EU  –  see Chapter 1) and the strategic use of public procurement  for the 
benefit of local industry  have continued during the reporting period.  Turkey maintained the 
scope of the 15% domestic price advantage in public procurement with compulsory use for 
medium and high-technology industrial products, contrary to EU rules (see also Chapter 5). 
A  presidency  decision  on  the  industry  cooperation  programme  exempted  public  contracts 
containing de-localisation and technology transfer from public procurement rules. Such steps 
and  the  existing  and  planned  schemes  for  localisation  in  sectors  such  as  pharmaceuticals, 
medical  devices,  biotechnological  products  and  agricultural  and forestry  machinery,  are not 
compatible  with  the  general  principles  of  the  EU  common  industrial  policy.  The  informal 
economy is still substantial and remains a major problem area. The innovation performance is 
the weakest in intellectual assets and the employment effect. Evaluations of impact on policy 
objectives are not systematically conducted. 

Enterprise and industrial policy instruments  

The Turkish legislation is not yet fully harmonised with the Late Payment Directive. Turkey 
has continued to implement various schemes supporting companies, mainly SMEs. The scope 
of  schemes  of  a  number  of  schemes  has  been  further  extended  to  cover  a  wider  range  of 
beneficiaries and activities. These are schemes for the organisation of sectoral national fairs 
and participation in international fairs, market research and market entry, investment supports 

87 

 
 
for centres of attraction, industry areas, organised industrial zones, technology development 
zones,  supports  for  tourism  operators  and  Treasury  supports  for  venture  capital  funds. 
According  to  a  protocol  signed  in  January  2018,  further  Treasury  support  of  about  EUR  9 
billion  has  been  made  available  for  SMEs  through  the  Credit  Guarantee  Fund.  Several 
technical  assistance  and  financing  schemes  run  by  the  SME  support  administration 
(KOSGEB)  are  also  operational.  Turkey  has  continued  to  support  technology  development 
zones. There were 81 of these zones in January 2019 (69 in 2017) with 61 being operational. 
In  2018,  1,022  patents  had  been  obtained  from  29,503  completed  projects  (compared  with 
640 patents from 28,852 projects in the previous reporting period). Turkey remains active in 
the  COSME  programme,  the  Enterprise  Europe  Network  and  in  the  Small  Business  Act 
assessment process. 

5.21.  Chapter 21: Trans-European networks 

Turkey is well advanced in the area of trans-European networks, where good progress has 
been achieved. The logistics master plan has been finalised. Turkey's role in fostering energy 
security in the region and the EU has been strengthened by the completion of the first phase 
of the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline project (TANAP), the backbone of the southern gas corridor. 

In  addition  to  addressing  the  shortcomings  set  out  below,  Turkey  should  pay  particular 
attention in the coming year to: 

  accelerating efforts to align with key parts of the acquis to facilitate alignment in TEN-T; 

  establish  a  transparent,  cost-reflective  and  non-discriminatory  gas  transit  regime  in  line 

with the acquis. 

As regards transport networks, Turkey has collected information for the last eight years on 
the  Trans-European  Transport  (TEN-T)  network,  which  is  now  collated  on  the  transport 
information management system. The data will be transferred to the TEN-Tec system. Turkey 
has provided a firm commitment with an indicative completion target to finalise the railway 
connection over the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge in İstanbul. A joint monitoring board is being 
established to oversee and steer the development  of railway projects in the Marmara region 
which indeed will provide high capacity reliable railway connections in the east-west corridor 
and  form  an  important  part  of  the  further  extension  of  the  TEN-T.  The  construction  of  the 
Halkalı  –  Kapıkule  railway  project,  which  is  co-financed  by  the  EU  using  IPA  II  funds,  is 
expected to start in the first half of 2019. The logistics master plan has been finalised. Turkey 
needs to  ensure that  its  transport network projects are implemented in  line with  the TEN-T 
regulatory framework, and upgrade its transport networks in line with the requirements of the 
TEN-T Regulation.  

As regards energy networks, significant progress has been achieved on gas networks and in 
particular  on  the  Trans-Anatolian  Pipeline  project  (TANAP),  the  backbone  of  the  southern 
gas corridor. The completed first phase will bring 6 billion cubic meters of Azeri gas per year 
through Georgia to Turkey. The second phase, aiming to deliver ten billion cubic metres of 
gas to Europe via Greece, Albania and Italy, is expected to be finalised by June 2019, with 
gas  arriving  in  Europe  via  the  Trans-Adriatic  pipeline  project  (TAP)  in  2020.  Progress  has 
been  made  on  the  TurkStream  pipeline  project  with  the  completion  of  its  first  offshore 
section. The construction of the onshore connecting line to the existing transit pipeline of the 
Turkish  Petroleum  Pipeline  Corporation's  (BOTAŞ)  is  ongoing.  The  routing  of  the  second 
export line, whose offshore section is under construction, is yet to be determined, the options 
being either Greece or Bulgaria. Insufficient progress can be reported on the establishment of 
a  transparent,  cost-reflective  and  non-discriminatory  gas  transit  regime  (See  Chapter  15  – 

88 

 
 
Energy).  There  has  been  limited  progress  on  the  interconnection  between  Turkey  and 
Bulgaria.  For  electricity  networks,  Turkey  has  made  progress  in  aligning  with  the  EU 
network  codes,  fostering  network  integration  and  greater  capacity  of  interconnections  to 
increase efficiency and security of electricity supply. 

5.22.  Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments 

Regional  policy  is  the  EU’s  main  investment  policy  for  sustainable  and inclusive  economic 
growth.  Member  States  bear  responsibility  for  its  implementation,  requiring  adequate 
administrative capacity and sound financial management of project design and execution. 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  regional  policy  and  the  coordination  of 
structural  instruments.  Overall,  there  has  been  no  progress  in  this  area,  especially  in 
absorbing  IPA  II  funds  and  in  strengthening  capacity  for  programme  implementation. 
However,  for  regional  integration  and  territorial  cooperation  there  has  been  some 
achievement  in  setting  up  management  and  control  systems  and  implementation  results 
within IPA I. In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  focus on the completion of the ongoing operations under IPA II, in particular the mature 
operations  within  the  existing  pipeline,  in  order  to  ensure  full  implementation  of  EU 
funds by the set deadlines to deliver high quality results and avoid de-commitments; 

  ensure effective strategic planning and risk management at the programme level; 

  strengthen  the  capacities  of  the  National  IPA  Coordinator  (NIPAC)  and  National 
Authorising  Officer  (NAO)  to  coordinate  Operating  Structures  (OSs),  as  well  as 
administrative  capacities  in  the  field  of  Regional  Policy  and  coordination  of  Structural 
Instruments. 

No  progress  has  been  made  in  the  legislative  framework.  Mechanisms  for  evidence-based 
policymaking, policy and program evaluations, and impact assessment are not yet in place. It 
is not clear how the 2014-2023 National Strategy for Regional Development (NSRD), which 
provides a framework for planning on regional and national level, will be enforced in the new 
presidential system introduced after the June 2018 elections.  

There  has  been  no  progress  in  the  institutional  framework.  All  four  Operating  Structures 
(OSs)  for  IPA  Multi-Annual  Operational  Programmes  (MAAPs)  have  been  entrusted  with 
budget implementation tasks for the management of MAAPs in the IPA II period (2014-20). 
However,  the  functions  and  responsibilities  of  the  structures  in  charge  of  managing  IPA  II 
assistance are still not adequately understood. In addition, Turkey’s transition to an executive 
presidential  model  resulted  in  a  restructuring  in  the  institutional  set-up,  which  has  caused 
uncertainty  for  the  upcoming  period.  The  role  of  the  NIPAC  still  remains  weak.  The 
development agencies lack the power and resources to act as engines of development. On the 
positive  side,  a  permanent  Head  of  the  Audit  Authority  responsible  for  auditing  of  the 
functionality  and  efficient  of  the  management  and  control  mechanisms  was  appointed  in 
April 2019. 

Administrative  capacities  have  backslid  during  the  year.  The  line  OSs  responsible  for 
MAAPs have experience and capacities to manage procurement procedures and contracts, but 
a  systematically  high  staff  turnover,  a  lack  of  experience  enforcement  of  contractual 
conditions  and  a  low  ownership  by  the  OSs  have  led  to  delays  in  procurement  and 
implementation.   

There is some progress in programming. Project pipelines have been established by all IPA 
structures  for  the  IPA  II  period  (2014-20).  Drafting  of  project  documentation  is  fairly 

89 

 
 
advanced  and  procurement  is  ongoing  but  at  a  limited  pace.  It  is  important  to  reduce  the 
substantial four-year delay between programming and implementation. 

On monitoring and evaluation, progress is slow regarding the effective use of the integrated 
monitoring  information  system  developed  by  the  Ministry  of  Development,  and  there  has 
been  backsliding  on  a  systematic  evaluation  policy  in  the  context  of  IPA  II  funds.  
Monitoring of sustainability and financial adjustment applicable to IPA I is not sufficient. 

Concerning financial management, control and audit, the de-commitment risk of the IPA 
II  funds  remains  high,  especially  for  IPA  2014  funds  within  MAAPs,  which  are  due  in  the 
end  of  2019.  OSs  still  suffer  from  a  lack  of  capacity  for  the  preparation  of  tender 
documentation  and  procurement.  Efficiently  prioritising  and  organising  procurement 
processes,  ant  the  follow-up  of  implementation  are  key  elements  in  speeding  up  the 
implementation and avoiding de-commitments.  

5.25  Chapter 25: Science and research 

The  EU  provides  significant  support  for  research  and  innovation.  All  Member  States  can 
benefit  from  the  EU’s  research  programmes,  especially  where  there  is  scientific  excellence 
and solid investment in research. 

Overall,  Turkey’s  preparations  in  science  and  research  are  well  advanced.  Turkey  made 
good progress notably in e-infrastructures, open data and gender mainstreaming in research. 
The  cooperation  between  Turkey  and  EU  is  good  but  there  is  room  for  improvement.  Last 
year recommendations remain valid. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  ensure promotion to research and innovation clusters; 

  develop  and/or  update  National  strategies  and  infrastructures  in  the  science,  technology 

and innovation sectors; 

  reinforce  its  efforts  towards  aligning  its  national  research  area  (TARAL)  with  the 
European Research Area (ERA) and increase participation in Horizon 2020 and maximise 
its benefits. 

On  research  and  innovation  policy,  the  share  of  R&D  expenditure  to  GDP  slightly 
increased in  2017 compared  with  2016, but  remains  below 1% (EU28 average is  2%). The 
number  of  researchers  per  million  inhabitants  (a  third  of  the  European  average)  is  still 
limiting  Turkey's  overall  research  capacity.  The  share  of  female  R&D  personnel  slightly 
increased  in  2017,  compared  to  2016  and  reached  32%  of  the  total  R&D  personnel.  The 
female  R&D  personnel  is  highest  in  higher  education  (44%),  followed  by  the  government 
sector  (28.6%)  and  financial  and  non-financial  corporations  (25.1%).  The  New  Economic 
Program  launched  in  September  2018  has  strategic  goals  in  science,  technology  and 
innovation policies and a new Policy Board on Science, Technology and Innovation has been 
established. Both measures may have a positive impact in the sector. 

On framework programmes, participation in Horizon 2020 is stagnant at a level that is too 
low. The figures show that to date, Turkey has been slightly more successful in Horizon 2020 
than  in  the  previous  FP7  programme  but  further  efforts  are  still  needed.  The  Horizon  2020 
Action  Plan  prepared  by  the  Scientific  and  Technological  Research  Council  of  Turkey 
(TUBITAK)  to  increase  and  to  broaden  Turkish  participation  in  Horizon  2020  is  welcome 
and  needs  to  be  quickly  implemented.  Turkey  needs  to  continue  its  efforts  to  align  its 
National  Research  Area  (TARAL)  with  the  European  Research  Area  (ERA).  TARAL 

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progress is satisfactory and promising to link the ERA into diverse national R&I policies and 
ecosystems, however there is still room for improvements as only in some cases a coherent 
strategy is presented. Turkey has achieved good results on ERA priorities related to  gender 
equality and it is encouraged to continue in that direction. 

On  Innovation  Union,  Turkey  remains  a  ‘moderate  innovator’  according  to  the  European 
Innovation Scoreboard for 2018. Performance has increased slightly over recent years, but is 
still below EU in most of the indicators. The number of Technology Development Zones – to 
better  serve  cooperation  between  business  and  academia  grew  to  81  in  2018.  Research  and 
innovation  clusters,  knowledge  exchange,  mentoring  for  start-ups  and  closer  cooperation 
between  academia  and 
increase 
industry-SMEs  should  be  promoted 
commercialisation of RDI products and the number of patents granted.  

in  order 

to 

5.26  Chapter 26: Education and culture 

The EU supports cooperation in education and culture through funding programmes and the 
coordination of Member State policy through the open method of coordination. The EU and 
the  Member  States  must  also  prevent  discrimination  and  ensure  quality  education  for 
children of migrant workers, including those from disadvantaged backgrounds. 

Turkey is moderately prepared on education and culture. There has been some progress on 
this  chapter,  notably  regarding  the  national  qualifications  system.  Turkey  recognises  the 
value of culture in development policies and encourages the promotion and protection of its 
cultural heritage. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  further  improve  inclusive  education,  with  a  particular  focus  on  girls  and  children  from 
disadvantaged groups and closely monitor and continue work to reduce the proportion of 
school dropouts; 

  ensure the good functioning of the Turkish Qualifications Framework; 

  take concrete steps to implement of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and 

Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. 

In the area of education, with a level of public expenditure of 4.3% of the GDP, Turkey is at 
an  advanced  stage  of  implementing  the  Bologna  process,  although  significant  quality 
differences  persist  among  Turkey's  206  universities.  Turkey  has  set  up  a  Higher  Education 
Quality Board in charge of quality assessment and assurance. A regulation was published in 
November  2018  regarding  the  principles  and  procedures  for  Turkey’s  quality  assurance  in 
higher  education system of Turkey as  well as for the management  of the Higher Education 
Quality  Council  was  published  in  November  2018.  The  Board  is  not  yet  a  member  of  the 
European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education. 

The  implementation  of  a  national  vocational  qualifications  system  by  the  Vocational 
Qualifications Authority (VQA) is ongoing. The VQA, which is the authority responsible for 
preparing  national  occupational  standards  and  national  qualifications  and  authorising  of 
certification  bodies,  is  also  in  charge  of  implementing  of  the  Turkish  qualifications 
framework (TQF). 

In  November  2018,  792  national  occupational  standards  were  published  in  the  Official 
Gazette  and  467  qualifications  approved.  The  number  of  authorised  certification  bodies 
increased from 116 in 2017 to 182 in 2018. Through the exams and skill tests carried out by 
these  certification  bodies,  431  907  individuals  have  been  issued  a  VQA  vocational 

91 

 
 
qualifications certificate. The principles and procedures on ensuring the quality assurance of 
the qualifications to be Included in TQF were published. 

Although the TQF now refers to the European qualifications framework, Turkey will have to 
ensure that principles and procedures relating to quality assurance, credit systems, inclusion 
of qualifications, and validation of non-formal and informal learning are fully in place. In the 
formal vocational education and training sector, the implementation of modular curricula and 
a credited module system, instead of the current class passing system, remains an important 
issue for the effective implementation of the TQF. 

An  amendment  to  the  Law  for  Private  Education  adopted  in  May  2018  puts  on  an  equal 
footing holders of  certificates of completed training issued by private  education institutions 
and  holders  of  certificates  following  an  exam  at  an  accredited  vocational  qualification 
institution.  This  change  undermines  efforts  made  to  establish  a  quality-assured  vocational 
qualification system in Turkey. 

There has been some progress in the net enrolment rate of children, particularly in pre-school 
education, which increased from 58.8% in 2017 to 66.9% in 2018. The net enrolment rates in 
primary school increased from 91.2% in 2017 to 91.7% in 2018, but fell in lower secondary 
school from 95.7% to 94.5% over the same period. In secondary education, the net enrolment 
rate increased from 82.5% in 2017 to 83.6% in 2018. 

Turkey  has  been  participating  in  the  EU  programmes  as  a  candidate  country  since  2004. 
Applications for the Erasmus + programme’s mobility actions further increased from 9 391 in 
2017 to 10 578 in 2018, with a budget of nearly EUR 110 million. 

For Turkey, quality and inclusiveness are amongst the main priorities as they aim at reducing 
disparities  between  urban  and  rural  areas,  increasing  the  quality  of  teachers  through 
continuous  professional  development  and  in-service  training,  reducing  gender  inequalities, 
updating  curricula  to  include  transferable  skills,  etc.  Although  these  efforts  are  welcome, 
based on the latest PISA results Turkey appears at the bottom of the ranking table, suggesting 
serious issues with the overall quality of education. 

As for  culture, following the full  entry into force of the presidential  system, a Culture and 
Arts  Council  was  established  under  the  auspices  of  the  President  of  the  Republic.  The 
Council  is  composed  of  cultural  professionals  and  oversees  the  implementation  of  cultural 
policies. Pursuant to Turkey's ratification of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection 
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions in 2017, the Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism  contributes  to  the  studies  of  the  Convention's  National  Committee,  but  measures 
have yet to be taken for its implementation. 

Turkey  withdrew  from  the  Creative  Europe  programme  in  January  2017.  Cultural  relations 
with  the  EU  continue  on  a  bilateral  basis  and  in  the  EU-Turkey  Civil  Society  Dialogue 
programmes funded under the IPA. 

Besides active participation in the youth actions of the Erasmus+ programme, there are some 
good developments in the field of youth policies, based on the National Youth and Sports 
Policy Paper which was adopted in 2013 in line with the European Union Youth Strategy 
(2010-2018). This paper includes 20 main policy fields including key topics defined in the 
European Union Work Plan for Sport (2017-2020) such as anti-doping, good governance in 
the field of sport as well as innovation and social inclusion through the promotion of physical 
activity.  

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5.27  Chapter 27: Environment and climate change 

The  EU  promotes  strong  climate  action,  sustainable  development  and  protection  of  the 
environment. EU law contains provisions addressing climate change, water and air quality, 
waste  management,  nature  protection,  industrial  pollution,  chemicals,  noise  and  civil 
protection. 

Turkey has some level of preparation in this area. There has been some progress, mainly in 
increasing  capacity  in  waste  management  and  wastewater  treatment  and  legislative 
alignment, but enforcement and implementation still remain weak. More ambitious and better 
coordinated  environment  and  climate  policies  need  to  be  established  and  implemented. 
Strategic  planning,  substantial  investment  and  stronger  administrative  capacity  are  required 
as well. In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  complete alignment with the directives on water and industrial pollution, and ensure that 

the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive is correctly implemented; 

  ensure  alignment  with  the  acquis  on  public  participation  and  the  right  to  access 

environmental information; 

  ratify the Paris Agreement on climate change, and start implementing its contribution to 

the Agreement, and complete its alignment with the EU acquis on climate action. 

Environment 

Turkey  has  achieved  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  horizontal  legislation. 
Implementation  of  the  Directive  on  infrastructure  for  spatial  information  is  still  at  an  early 
stage.  There  are  concerns  on  how  the  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  Directive  is 
implemented.  There  are  still  complaints  about  the  application  of  the  rule  of  law  in  court 
decisions  on  environmental  issues  and  about  public  participation  and  the  right  to 
environmental  information.  Turkey  is  still  not  a party  to  the  Aarhus  Convention.  The  2016 
law  that  waived  licencing  and  other  restrictions  for  strategically  important  investment 
projects  is  a  major  concern.  Procedures  for  transboundary  consultations  have  not  yet  been 
aligned  with  the  acquis.  The  Strategic  Environmental  Assessments  Directive  is  currently 
aligned in some sectors. Alignment on environmental liability remains limited. 

On air quality, national legislation aligning with the VOC Solvents Emissions Directive was 
adopted  in  2018.  National  legislation  still  needs  to  be  adopted  in  line  with  the  current 
directives on ambient air quality and national emissions ceilings. Severe air pollution in some 
cities is  reported on an annual  basis.  Local  clean air action plans are being prepared for 64 
provinces. A national  strategy for air quality monitoring is  in  place  and  7 out  of 8 planned 
regional networks are operational. Air quality monitoring data is published online. 

The legal framework on waste management is mostly aligned. Turkey has adopted a strategy 
promoting a zero waste management approach, efficient use of natural resources, landfilling 
reduction  and  increased  recycling  and  reuse.  Legislation  introducing  a  ban  on  the  free 
distribution  of  lightweight  plastic  bags  came  into  force  in  January  2019  and  attracted 
substantial public interest. Work has continued to bring waste treatment facilities up to acquis 
standards.  Alignment  and  capacity  for  sorting,  recycling  and  medical  waste  treatment  have 
increased.  Significant  efforts  are  necessary  to  implement  waste  management  plans  at  local 
and regional level. Economic instruments to promote recycling and the prevention of waste 
generation are improving, but remain limited. 

In the area of water quality, the level of alignment is advanced. Over 30% of water bodies 
were identified as sensitive areas. The preparation of management plans for four river basins 

93 

 
 
out  of  25  has  been  completed.  Transboundary  consultations  on  water  issues  are  still  at  an 
early  stage.  Wastewater  treatment  capacity  has  increased  as  a  result  of  continuous 
investments.  Alignment  with  the  Marine  Strategy  and  Bathing  Water  Directives  is  still 
pending.  

The  framework  legislation  on  nature  protection,  the  national  biodiversity  strategy  and  an 
action  plan  have  yet  to  be  adopted.  Regulations  allowing  planning  and  construction  in 
wetlands, forests and natural sites are still not in line with the acquis. The lists of habitats and 
species detected in Turkey under the Habitats and Birds Directives have been prepared. The 
institutional  framework  for  managing  future  Natura  2000  sites  needs  to  be  streamlined  and 
adequately  resourced.  Investments,  particularly  in  hydropower  and  mining,  need  to  comply 
with nature protection obligations, especially for potential Natura 2000 areas.  

In  industrial  pollution  and  risk  management,  alignment  with  most  EU  directives  and 
regulations is at an early stage. There is good alignment with the Seveso II Directive and the 
ecolabel regulation was adopted in 2018. Alignment with the Seveso III Directive, Industrial 
Emissions Directive, the eco-management and audit scheme, and the Paints Directive are still 
pending. 

On  chemicals,  legislation  on  persistent  organic  pollutants  was  adopted  in  2018.  The 
legislation  on  the  import  and  export  of  dangerous  chemicals  is  yet  to  be  adopted.  The 
adoption of a regulatory framework to implement the Directive on the protection of animals 
used for scientific purposes has advanced. 

Alignment with legislation on noise is well advanced. Preparation of noise mapping and local 
noise action plans are at an advanced stage. 

Turkey  has  still  not  established  the  Common  Emergency  Communication  and  Information 
System  (CECIS)  since  it  joined  the  Union  Civil  Protection  mechanism  in  2016.  Although 
required by the latter, Turkey has not yet submitted a summary of their national assessment.  

Climate change 

There  was  no  progress  in  this  area  over  the  previous  period.  A  national  strategy  consistent 
with  the  EU  2030  climate  and  energy  framework  has  not  yet  been  formulated,  and 
mainstreaming of climate action into other sector policies is still weak. The existing national 
strategy and action plan only partially addresses climate change mitigation and only for the 
short-term. Turkey has still not ratified the Paris Agreement on climate change. Regarding its 
commitments  under  the  UN  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change,  Turkey  submitted 
its third biennial report on greenhouse gasses in January 2018. The latest national inventory 
was submitted in April 2018. 

Turkey is not yet aligned with the Emission Trading Directive. Legislation aligning with the 
EU’s economy-wide greenhouse gas monitoring mechanism still needs to be adopted. Further 
efforts  need  to  be  made  to  fully  implement  the  legislation  aligned  with  the  Fuel  Quality 
Directive and to initiate alignment on emissions standards for new cars. Turkey also needs to 
establish an alignment plan for the Carbon Capture and Storage Directive. 

5.28  Chapter 28: Health and consumer protection 

EU rules protect consumers in relation to product safety, dangerous imitations and liability 
for  defective  products.  The  EU  also  ensures  high  common  standards  for  tobacco  control, 
blood, tissues, cells and organs, patients’ rights and communicable diseases. 

There  is  a  good  level  of  preparation  for  legislative  alignment  of  consumer  and  health 
protection. There has been some progress on legislative alignment and the establishment of 

94 

 
 
structures needed to implement the EU public health acquis. Previous recommendations have 
not been fully implemented. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  ensure effective protection of consumers by better enforcement and better coordination of 

and cooperation with consumer groups;  

  increase  its  institutional/administrative  capacity,  inter-sectoral  cooperation,  financial 
resources  and  appropriate  diagnostic  facilities  to  address  public  health  issues  at  central 
and provincial level. 

Consumer protection 

National  legislation  is  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis  on  consumer  protection  in  non-safety 
related issues, though enforcement, consumer awareness, coordination and cooperation with 
sectoral  stakeholders  remain  insufficient.  Within  the  Ministry  of  Trade,  the  Directorate 
General  for  Consumer  Protection  and  Market  Surveillance  conducted  market  surveillance 
inspections pursuant to the Law on the Protection of Consumers.  

In 2018, Turkey  re-organised the town-based  consumer arbitration committees and reduced 
them from  1 011 to  211 for cost-efficiency  reasons.  The Directorate General for Consumer 
Protection initiated a distance-learning programme for arbitration committees. Also in 2018, 
a strategy for the protection of financial consumers was adopted. 

Turkey continued to improve its product safety and market surveillance regime. However, the 
number  of  complaints  has  remained  quite  high.  Consumer  information  and  awareness, 
especially concerning investment frauds promising a high profit, remains a matter of concern. 

Turkey  has  continued  to  improve  its  online  services  and  organise  training  and  awareness 
raising  activities,  in  particular  on  product  safety.  Consumer  judges  and  some  arbitration 
committee members were also trained on EU consumer policy and EU best practices, though 
the quality of the decisions of arbitration committees in terms of common legal understanding 
and  well-justified  decisions  needs  to  be  improved.  The  time  it  takes  for  an    arbitration 
committee to  reach a decision is  very long (one year on average, contrary to  the six-month 
legal  deadline).  The  impartiality  of  expert  witnesses  in  consumer  conflicts  is  not  always 
ensured.  Inconsistency  between  the  decisions  of  different  arbitration  committees  and 
consumer courts on very similar consumer complaints remains a systemic problem. There is 
weak  participation  by  consumer  organisations  in  policymaking  and  decision-making 
mechanisms. Co-operation in the consumer protection sector involving all stakeholders needs 
to be improved. Overall, more political commitment and willingness in the area of consumer 
protection is needed.  

Public Health 

With  regard  to  public  health,  the  re-organisation  of  the  Ministry  of  Health  has  continued 
with  the  aim  of  creating  administrative  structures  to  address  public  health  issues  at  central 
and provincial levels. 

In  tobacco  control,  Turkey  has  achieved  major  legislative  advances  during  the  past  two 
decades.  Tobacco  use  has  been  reduced  considerably  and  indoor  air  quality  has  been 
improved.  However,  smoking  prevalence  is  still  high  and  increasing  (31.5%)  and  some 
violations of indoor smoking bans continue. The mean age of starting smoking is 18.1 years 
(17.2  years  for  men  and  20.2  years  for  women).  An  updated  strategy  document  and  action 
plan on tobacco control (2018-2023) is in place. The plan focuses on provisions that reduce 
demand  for  tobacco,  availability  for  children  and  young  people,  and  supply  in  general. 

95 

 
 
Turkey ratified the  Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Protocol  on  Illicit  Trade in 
April  2018.  Moreover,  a  provision  in  the  omnibus  law,  passed  in  November  2018  and 
effective  as  from  June  2019,  introduced  plain  tobacco  packaging  to  regulate  the  retail 
packaging and appearance of tobacco products. 

The  fight  against  smoking  is  considered  the  first  step  in  prevention  of  lung  cancer. 
According  to  the  Lung  Cancer  Report,  the  economic  burden  of  lung  cancer  is  estimated  at 
around  TRY  8.8  billion  and  there  are  more  than  175  000  new  cases  of  cancer  each  year. 
Cancer registry centres have been established in every province. However, Turkey is not part 
of the European Network of Cancer Registries. 

Despite  intensive  awareness  raising  campaigns  on  nutrition,  physical  activity  and  the 
reduction and prevention of alcohol-related harm in Turkey, fruit and vegetable consumption 
remains  low,  with  almost  88%  of  men  and  women  consuming  fewer  than  five  servings  of 
fruit  and  vegetables  per  day,  thus  exposing  them  to  higher  risk  of  non-communicable 
diseases. Moreover, 81.3% (70.1% of males and 92.2% of females) are not involved in any 
effective physical activity and 64.4% are overweight. The high levels of risk factors for non-
communicable  diseases  require  immediate  action,  as  they  are  responsible  for  87%  of  all 
deaths  and  18%  of  adult  premature  deaths  in  Turkey.  A  multi-sectoral  action  plan  on  non-
communicable diseases for 2017–2025 is in place. 

Regarding  blood,  tissues,  cells  and  organs  capacity  building  of  the  blood  bank  system  is 
ongoing. There are now 18 regional blood banks, which has led to a reduction in the number 
of temporary blood banks by Ministry of Health. There are 37 establishments which collect 
blood  in  Turkey.  No  progress  can  be  reported  on  alignment  of  tissues,  cells  and  organ 
legislation and the operation of the heamovigilance system. 

For communicable diseases and serious cross border threats to health, the early warning 
response and epidemiological surveillance systems demonstrated that they operate effectively 
during  the  anthrax  cases  that  Turkey  faced  in  August.  Standard  operating  procedures  for 
coordination between the health sector and other sectors are considered to have been tested 
successfully  on  a  larger  scale.  Laboratory  services  have  also  proved  to  support  the 
surveillance system efficiently. 

Turkey  has  the  highest  rate  of  antibiotic  resistance  among  OECD  countries.  The  average 
resistance proportion is about 35%, which is seven times higher than European countries with 
the  lowest  proportions.  A  new  electronic  prescription  system  is  in  place  to  monitor  and 
control the use of antibiotics. 

On  mental  health,  the  number  of  community-based  mental  health  centres  has  increased  to 
167 from 163. Although the suicide rate in Turkey is lower than in most European countries, 
it  has  started  to  become  a  significant  public  health  problem  with  a  50%  increase  in  the 
number of people who committed suicide in the last four decades. 

According to the Ministry of Interior, there has been a sharp decrease in the number of drug-
induced deaths (228 for the first 9 months of 2018, down from 1020 in 2017). This is linked 
to  the  effective  functioning  of  the  national  coordination  mechanisms  on  preventing  drug 
abuse  through  the  control  of  supply  and  demand.  Drug  addicts  are  offered  better 
rehabilitation and information through awareness campaigns.  In addition, access to drugs is 
being  reduced  by  removing  distribution  and  consumption  locations,  along  with  the  fight 
against illicit trade. 

As  concerns  health  access  inequalities,  there  is  no  data  available  on  the  level  of  healthcare 
services for people with disabilities, people living with HIV, and children and adults who use 
drugs.   

96 

 
 
5.29.  Chapter 29: Customs union 

All Member States are part of the EU customs union and follow the same customs rules and 
procedures.  This  requires  legislative  alignment,  adequate  implementing  and  enforcement 
capacity, and access to the common computerised customs systems. 

Turkey  maintains  a  good  level  of  preparation  for  the  customs  union.  Some  progress  has 
been made concerning the rules on managing tariff quotas during the reporting period. Duty 
relief,  free  zones  and  surveillance  measures  are  not  fully  in  line  with  the  acquis  or  with 
Turkey’s obligations under the Customs Union. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  further improve risk-based controls  and simplified procedures  in  line with the  acquis to 

facilitate legitimate trade, while ensuring security and safety; 

  eliminate import and export restrictions hampering the effective free movement of goods. 

There  has  been  some  progress  on  customs  legislation,  particularly  concerning  the  rules  on 
management  of  tariff  quotas.  The  level  of  alignment  remains  generally  high.  However,  the 
customs  law  is  yet  to  be  harmonised  with  the  EU  Customs  Code.  Gaps  remain  for 
improvement  of  risk-based  controls  and  simplified  procedures  in  line  with  the  acquis  to 
facilitate legitimate trade, while ensuring security and safety. 

As  for  the  rules  on  management  of  tariff  quotas,  a  new  allocation  method  was  introduced 
enabling  that  the  requests  could  be  made  in  the  customs  declaration  automatically. 
Furthermore,  the  limitations  as  regards  allocation  of  tariff  quotas  for  the  processed 
agricultural products were removed. 

Rules on surveillance, free zones and duty relief are yet to be aligned with the acquis while 
some  exemptions  were  introduced  regarding  the  surveillance  on  imports  of  a  few  products 
(electric accumulators, PVC floor coverings, malleable pipe fittings and parts for lifts) on the 
basis  of  origin.  Additional  duties  applied  on  imports  of  a  large  number  of  products 
originating  in  third  countries  were  not  removed  infringing  the  fundamental  principle  of  the 
Customs  Union  as  those  duties  apply  to  products  of  third  country  origin  even  though  they 
were in free circulation in the EU (See also Chapter 1 – Free movement of goods). Turkey 
has not wholly removed the export restrictions on certain leather products in violation of the 
Customs  Union  rules.  Designation  of  specialised  customs  offices  and  proof  of  origin 
requirements for goods in free circulation in the EU are not in line with Customs Union rules. 
Turkey's increased duty  on sweet corn is disproportionally high contrary to Customs  Union 
rules. 

On administrative and operational  capacity, efforts to  strengthen the customs  enforcement 
capacity have continued in relation to intellectual property rights. However, further alignment 
with  the  acquis  in  this  area  is  required.  Further  efforts  are  needed  to  improve  risk-based 
controls  to  enforce  safety  and  security  measures.  Unlike  the  computerised  transit  system 
which  Turkey  has  been  implementing  as  part  of  its  membership  of  the  Convention  on  a 
Common  Transit  Procedure,  tariff  IT  systems  (TARIC,  Surveillance)  remain  to  be 
operational.  A  strategy  bringing  together  IT  activities  with  business  initiatives  has  been 
prepared and adopted. 

5.30.  Chapter 30: External relations 

The  EU  has  a  common  trade  and  commercial  policy  towards  third  countries,  based  on 
multilateral and bilateral agreements and autonomous measures. There are also EU rules in 
the field of humanitarian aid and development policy. 

97 

 
 
Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of external relations. There has been backsliding 
in the reporting period. The level of alignment with the Common Customs Tariff (CCT) was 
reduced, as Turkey continued to  apply  additional customs duties  and further diverged from 
the EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences in breach of the EU-Turkey Customs Union. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  urgently re-align its customs tariff with the CCT; 

  complete  its  alignment  with  the  EU’s  Generalised  System  of  Preferences  and  dual-use 

export control regime. 

No progress has been made on the common commercial policy. Turkey has not maintained 
its  once  good  level  of  alignment  with  the  EU  common  commercial  policy  despite  the 
EU-Turkey  Customs  Union,  since  it  still  applies  additional  duties  to  a  large  number  of 
imported products (See Chapter 29 - Customs Union). Turkey’s deviation from the CCT by 
its levy of additional duties has been compounded by its deviation from the EU Generalised 
Scheme  of  Preferences  in  terms  of  both  countries  and  products.  The  intensive  use  of 
safeguard measures remains a cause of concern. Turkey continues to open new investigations 
based  on  weak  evidence  and  use  safeguards  where  more  targeted  trade  defence  measures, 
such  as  the  anti-dumping  instrument,  would  be  more  appropriate.  There  should  be  closer 
coordination between the EU and Turkey within the World Trade Organisation, in particular 
on  the  Doha  Development  Agenda,  and  in  the  OECD  and  the  G-20.  On export  controls  on 
dual-use  goods,  Turkey  has  not  aligned  with  the  EU  position  on  membership  of  certain 
multilateral  export  control  arrangements,  such  as  the  Wassenaar  Arrangement  on  Export 
Controls  for  Conventional  Arms  and  Dual-Use  Goods  and  Technologies  and  the  Missile 
Technology Control Regime. Alignment is also needed with the EU position on medium and 
long-term export credits. 

Regarding  bilateral  agreements  with  third  countries,  Turkey  is  generally  aligned  with  the 
terms of EU as regards the terms of free trade agreements it has entered with third countries. 
However, it has continued to implement its free trade agreement with Malaysia although the 
EU has not yet concluded a similar agreement with this country. 

As  for  development  policy  and  humanitarian  aid,  official  development  aid  granted  by 
Turkey  has  markedly  increased  to  EUR  7.2  billion  or  0.95%  of  Official  Donor 
Assistance/Gross  National  Income  (ODA/GNI)  in  2017,  exceeding  the  0.7%  recommended 
by  the  UN.  The  assistance  was  largely  directed  towards  humanitarian  support  for 
Syria-related activities on Turkey’s own territory. 

5.31.  Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy 

Member  States  must  be  able  to  conduct  political  dialogue  under  EU  foreign,  security  and 
defence policy, to align with EU statements, to take part in EU actions and to apply agreed 
sanctions and restrictive measures. 

level.  The  EU  and  Turkey  continued 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  foreign,  security  and  defence  policy.  Some 
progress  was  made  through  regular  political  dialogue  on  foreign  and  security  policy, 
their  dialogue  on 
including  at  ministerial 
counterterrorism and on the EU's common security and defence policy. Turkey joined Russia 
and Iran in the Astana process about Syria and reached the Sochi deal that prevented another 
humanitarian  catastrophe.  It  continued  to  provide  substantial  humanitarian  assistance  to 
Syrian refugees and maintained a military presence in Idlib. Turkey also continued to provide 
humanitarian  and  development  aid  in  other  regions,  including  in  Afghanistan  and  to 
Rohingya refugees.  

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In the coming year, Turkey should in particular:  

  take  decisive  steps  to  significantly  improve  its  alignment  with  EU  declarations  and 

Council decisions on common foreign and security policy. 

The  political  dialogue  between  the  EU  and  Turkey  on  foreign  and  security  policy  issues 
continued  at  all  levels.  It  benefited  from  the  results  achieved  through  the  successful  joint 
implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016. A high-level political dialogue 
took  place  in  November  2018,  where  a  number  of  foreign  policy  issues  were  discussed  in 
detail. Ministerial level contacts have been constant, especially on Syria. Political Directors’ 
meetings  took  place  in  February  and  October  2018.  Discussions  focussed  mainly  on 
developments  in  the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa  region  (Syria,  Iraq,  Iran,  Libya,  Saudi 
Arabia  and  the  Gulf,  Israel  and  Palestine  and  the  Middle-East  Peace  Process)  but  also  on 
Russia, Ukraine, South Caucasus, Central Asia, the Western Balkans and on key international 
developments (Rohingya, Jerusalem). Turkey attended a number of conferences organised or 
supported  by  the  EU  on  the  Black  Sea  region  (fisheries),  Palestine/Gaza,  Gambia,  Somalia 
and the Sahel  region,  as well as the Brussels  II  Conference on Syria at  the level  of Deputy 
Prime  Minister.  The  Foreign  Minister  represented  Turkey  in  the  EU-hosted  High  Level 
Meeting  on  Syria  in  the  margins  of  the  73rd  session  of  the  UN  General  Assembly. 
Furthermore,  a  political  dialogue  between  the  EU  and  Turkey  on  UN  issues  took  place  in 
October 2018. 

(See Political criteria — Regional issues and international obligations - for more information 
on  developments  in  bilateral  relations  with  other  enlargement  countries  and  EU  Member 
States.) 

The  institutional  framework  enabling  Turkey’s  participation  in  the  common  foreign  and 
security policy (CFSP)  and security and defence policy (CSDP) is in place. Turkey voiced 
support for the overall objectives in the Global strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and 
Security  Policy.  During  the  reporting  period  from  beginning  of  March  2018  until  end  of 
February 2019, Turkey aligned, when invited, with 16 out of 87 relevant High Representative 
declarations  on  behalf  of  the  EU  and  Council  decisions,  representing  an  alignment  rate  of 
around 18 %.Turkey has not yet signed the statute of the International Criminal Court nor the 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Turkey has held the Chairmanship of the Organisation 
of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Summit since April 2016. 

The  ‘Operation  Olive  Branch’  led  by  Turkish  forces  and  the  Free  Syrian  Army's  ended  in 
March  2018  with  the  expulsion  of  the  Democratic  Union  Party/People's  Protection  Units 
(PYD/YPG), which Turkey regards as a terrorist organisation linked to the PKK, from Afrin 
in north-western Syria. The Turkish government said it would withdraw from Syria only once 
a political solution is reached. 

Turkey aimed at advancing its interests in Syria through its participation in the Astana talks 
involving  top  political,  military  and  intelligence  officials  from  Turkey,  Russia  and  Iran.  In 
September 2018 Presidents Erdoğan and Putin agreed on the Sochi Memorandum on Idlib in 
Syria,  avoiding  a  full-scale  attack  of  the  Syrian  regime  on  Idlib  and  a  likely  humanitarian 
disaster.  In  pursuance  of  the  agreement,  Turkey  worked  to  remove  heavy  armaments  and 
radical  terrorist  groups  from  a  demilitarised  zone  in  Idlib.  Turkey  continues  to  support  the 
National  Coalition  for  Syrian  Revolutionary  and  Opposition  Forces,  based  in  Istanbul,  and 
hopes that by entrenching the opposition's presence in Idlib it can strengthen the hand of the 
opposition delegation at the UN-led Geneva talks and the planned Constitutional Committee 
agreed  at  Sochi  in  January  2018.  Turkey  continued  to  provide  extensive  humanitarian 
assistance  to  more  than  3.6  million  Syrian  refugees  on  its  soil.  Turkey  has  upgraded 

99 

 
 
infrastructure  in  the  opposition-held  areas  in  northern  Syria  and  reports  that  more  than 
360 000 Syrians have returned to these areas from Turkey and elsewhere. 

Turkey’s  relations  with  Iraq's  government  developed  in  a  context  marked  by  uncertainties 
after  the  elections  held  in  Iraq.  Turkey  pledged  to  provide  $5  billion  at  the  Kuwaiti 
International Conference for Reconstruction of Iraq held in February 2018, which would be 
allocated to  reconstruction projects  to  be defined when security  conditions  are met. Ankara 
continued  to  develop  its  relations  with  the  leaders  of  the  Kurdistan  Regional  Government 
(KRG) administration. Turkey continued to conduct air strikes against camps run by the PKK 
and its affiliates in the Qandil Mountain and expressed increased concern about other camps 
run by the PKK in Sinjar and Mahmur. Turkey succeeded to maintain a military presence in 
Iraq  with  the  camp  of  Bashiqa,  in  the  hope  of  finding  a  long-term  agreement  with  Iraqi 
authorities with a view to institutionalising it. Turkey expressed much concern about attacks 
targeting  Turkmen  living  in  northern  Iraq  and  brought  the  wounded  to  Turkey  for  medical 
treatment. 

Relations with the USA reached a new low in the summer of 2018 with the imposition of new 
trade  tariffs  and  sanctions  on  two  Turkish  Ministers  in  connection  with  the  detention  of 
Pastor Brunson, who was released in October 2018. There are still numerous serious irritants, 
including  US  support  for  the  Syrian  Democratic  Forces  in  north-eastern  Syria,  the  long 
standing request for the extradition of Fetullah Gülen, expected penalties on Halkbank for the 
alleged breach of sanctions on Iran, as well as US policy on Palestine. 

Turkey and Russia intensified dialogue and cooperation, in particular on the Syrian conflict. 
Bilateral  cooperation  developed  in  strategic  fields  such  as  energy  and  defence:  Russia 
confirmed the supply of  a S-400 air defence system to  Turkey, which the latter said  would 
not  harm  cooperation  with  NATO.  Yet,  the  US  opposed  the  deal  and  floated  possible 
sanctions  against  Turkey  in  case  the  deal  would  be  implemented.  Russian  sanctions,  which 
had been imposed following the downing of a Russian jet by the Turkish army in late 2015, 
were lifted and relations were normalised. Presidents Erdoğan and Putin met repeatedly in the 
course of the reporting period, including on the occasion of the launch of the construction of 
the  nuclear  plant  Akkuyu  –  a  project  worth  $  20  billion  –  near  Mersin  in  April  2018.  The 
construction of the Turkstream pipeline took full speed. 

Relations with Ukraine developed, including in the defence industry sector, and progress is 
being made on a possible future Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and Ukraine. While 
reiterating  its  condemnation  of  Russia’s  "illegal  annexation  of  Crimea"  and  support  to  the 
"rebels" in the Donbass region, and its concerns over the living conditions and human rights 
of Tatars in Crimea, Turkey did not align itself with relevant Council decisions, including EU 
restrictive measures relating to Russia and Ukraine. 

Turkey  reacted  strongly  to  the  murder  of  Saudi  journalist  Jamal  Khashoggi  at  the  Saudi 
Arabia  (KSA)  Consulate  in  Istanbul.  Turkey  invited  the  UN  Special  Rapporteur  on 
extrajudicial,  summary  or  arbitrary  executions  to  collect  evidence  during  a  mission  in 
Istanbul  and  Ankara  in  January/February  2019.  While  pressing  for  an  international 
investigation, it kept the dialogue open with Saudi authorities. Ankara supported EU moves 
to  safeguard the international agreement  on the  Iranian nuclear plan (Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action) and announced its intention not to abide by US sanctions on Iran even though 
it  received  a  temporary  waiver  to  continue  importing  Iranian  crude.  Turkey  continued  to 
provide  humanitarian  and  development  assistance  to  Afghanistan.  Turkey  encouraged  UN 
political and humanitarian initiatives regarding Yemen. 

100 

 
 
Turkey  continued  to  increase  its  engagement  in  Libya.  Relations  with  Egypt  did  not 
improve, despite Turkey proposing to Egypt to relaunch some form of bilateral consultations. 
Turkey and Israel withdrew their ambassadors mid-May 2018, after Turkey criticised Israel 
for the killing of Palestinians in Gaza. Turkey continued to express strong opposition to the 
US  administration’s  recognition  of  Jerusalem  as  Israel’s  capital  and  the  move  of  the  US 
Embassy to Jerusalem. Turkey criticised the withdrawal of US funding for the United Nations 
Agency  for  the  Palestinian  Refugees  (UNRWA)  and  pledged  to  increase  its  funding  at  a 
meeting held in New York in September 2018 on the margins of the UN General Assembly 
as well as to raise the international community's awareness on UNRWA's financial situation. 

Regarding  South  Caucasus  and  Central  Asia,  Turkey  continued  to  engage  closely  with 
Azerbaijan,  Georgia,  and  Turkmenistan,  through  its  trilateral  dialogue  mechanisms  on 
foreign  policy,  transport  and  energy.  Turkey  took  note  of  Armenian  President  Sargsyan's 
decision  in  March  2018  to  declare  the  two  protocols  with  Turkey  on  the  normalisation  of 
bilateral relations "null and void"; the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs said soon after that 
the two protocols would nevertheless stay on the agenda of the Grand National Assembly of 
Turkey, hoping for a future resumption of relations. Turkey worked on developing relations 
in  particular  with  Uzbekistan,  taking  advantage  of  President  Mirziyoyev's  accession  to 
power.  Turkey  continued  to  maintain  close  relations  with  the  countries  of  the  Western 
Balkans, in particular by providing financial support to the Office of the High Representative 
(OHR)  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  It  has  also  developed  its  cultural,  religious  and 
educational diplomacy in this region. 

Turkey  has  further  strengthened  its  relations  with  partners  in  Africa,  Asia  and,  to  a  lesser 
extent,  Latin  America.  Turkey  plans  to  hold  a  third  Turkey-Africa  Partnership  Summit  in 
2019 (the two first took place in 2008 and 2014). To develop relations with India was flagged 
as  a  priority  but  time  would  be  needed  to  do  so  as  Turkey  has  privileged  its  relations  with 
Pakistan  so  far,  and  more  recently  with  Bangladesh,  in  the  wake  of  the  Rohingya 
humanitarian crisis. Turkey started to implement humanitarian projects worth $ 51 million in 
Bangladesh,  in  support  to  Rohingya  refugees,  but  was  denied  access  to  beneficiaries  in 
Myanmar.  Turkey  continued  talks  with  China  on  the  Belt  and  Road  Initiative.  Turkey 
participated actively in the MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia) 
informal group of global middle power countries. 

Turkey  continued  to  participate  in  all  international  export  control  arrangements  and 
instruments  on  non-proliferation.  It  has  not  yet  aligned  itself  with  the  EU  position  on 
membership of the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Missile Technology Control Regime (see 
Chapter 30 — External relations). 

Turkey continued to  actively participate in military crisis management operations under the 
EU common security and defence policy (CSDP) notably EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Turkish participation in the Ukraine and Kosovo missions was suspended after 
Turkish  seconded  staff  was  withdrawn  following  the  attempted  coup  of  2016,  but  Turkey 
later  expressed  its  interest  in  continuing  to  contribute  to  these  missions  and  submitted 
applications.  The  issue  of  EU-NATO  cooperation,  going  beyond  the  ‘Berlin  plus’ 
arrangements, involving all EU Member States, continues to be unresolved. Turkey continued 
to lobby in favour of a reform of the UN Security Council and reiterated its dedication to the 
2030 Agenda of the Sustainable Development Goals. 

5.32.  Chapter 32: Financial control 

The  EU  promotes  the  reform  of  national  governance  systems  to  enhance  managerial 
accountability, sound financial management of income and expenditure, and external audit of 

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public funds. The financial control rules further protect the EU’s financial interests against 
fraud in the management of EU funds and the euro against counterfeiting. 

Turkey has  a  good  level of preparation on  financial control, though  backsliding  occurred 
during the reporting period because the Prime Ministry Inspection Board was abolished, and 
no  new  national  anti-fraud  coordination  service  (AFCOS)  was  assigned  to  work  with  the 
European  Commission.  Also,  the  Turkish  Sovereign  Wealth  Fund  (TWF)  has  remained 
outside  the  scope  of  the  Turkish  Court  of  Accounts,  as  the  TWF  is  audited  by  auditors 
appointed by the President of the Republic, who is now also the Chairman of the TWF. The 
impact  of  the  new  presidential  system  on  financial  control  remains  to  be  further  assessed. 
Most  of  the  Commission’s  recommendations  since  2016  have  not  been  implemented,  and 
remain valid. 

In the coming year, Turkey should: 

  update the Public Internal Financial  Control policy paper and its action plan and ensure 
that  a  formal  coordination,  monitoring  and  reporting  framework  is  put  in  place  for  the 
updated action plan; 

  ensure systematic and timely implementation of external audit recommendations; 

  nominate an AFCOS and re-establish the AFCOS network. 

Public internal financial control (PIFC) 

The  strategic  framework  is  partially  in  place,  but  the  Public  Internal  Financial  Control 
policy  paper  dates  back  to  2012.  There  is  no  mechanism  in  place  to  coordinate 
implementation  of  the  reforms  and  to  ensure  regular  monitoring  and  reporting  on 
implementation.  Also,  as  Turkey  does  not  have  a  strategic  framework  for  public 
administration  reform  in  place,  it  is  not  clear  to  what  extent  all  the  enabling  conditions  for 
managerial accountability are being addressed. (see also Public administration reform).  

The Turkish  administration has a uniform  management structure that combines elements  of 
managerial  accountability  and  delegation  with  results-oriented  performance  management 
system.  Further  efforts  are  needed  to  address  harmonisation  of  legislation,  managerial 
accountability,  including  delegation  of  decision-making  responsibilities,  and  functioning  of 
internal  control.  The Public Financial Management  and Control (PFMC)  Law applies  to all 
public institutions and sets out the relevant responsibilities of the heads of public institutions, 
including managerial duties and the delegation of authority to authorising officers. With the 
introduction  of  the  presidential  system  after  the  June  2018  elections,  the  PFMC  Law  was 
amended  to  reflect  the  changes  in  the  institutional  and  administrative  structure.  Roles  and 
responsibilities of the relevant institutions have not  yet been clearly defined, which may, in 
turn,  lead  to  less  transparency  and  weaker  accountability.  Weaknesses  remain  in 
accountability arrangements with agencies (see also Public administration reform). 

The PFMC Law regulates internal control, which functions largely in line with international 
standards.  The  application  of  risk  management  is  still  at  an  early  stage,  and  irregularity 
management and reporting are yet to be further developed. Turkey has established a treasury 
single  account,  but  the  inclusion  of  local  administrations,  state  owned  enterprises  and 
regulatory and supervisory agencies within its scope raises concerns.  

Internal audit practice  is regulated in line with  international standards in the PFMC Law. 
An internal  audit manual  and a  code of ethics  are in  place, as  are manuals  prepared by the 
central harmonisation unit. Quality review needs to be systematically implemented. There is 
generally a lack of data on internal audit planning and implementation of recommendations. 

102 

 
 
Two  central  harmonisation  units  (CHU–IA  and  CHU-FMC),  are  in  charge  of  developing 
and  disseminating  methodological  guidance,  monitoring  and 
reporting  on  PIFC 
implementation. The CHU-FMC does not perform internal control quality reviews and there 
is no systematic follow-up of the implementation of audit recommendations. 

External audit 

The constitutional and legal framework provides the independence of the Turkish Court of 
Accounts (TCA). The TCA law is in line with International Organisation of Supreme Audit 
Institutions (INTOSAI) standards. It provides for an exhaustive audit mandate and gives the 
TCA full discretion in discharging its responsibilities. Concerns exist around fiscal discipline, 
transparency  and  accountability  in  relation  to  the  Turkish  Sovereign  Wealth  Fund,  now 
directly affiliated with the President and outside the scope of the Turkish Court of Accounts 
(TCA), though it is subject to an independent audit.  

The TCA has both audit and judicial functions. There has been a minor increase of staff from 
1  414  in  2017  to  1  422  in  2018,  including  with  the  number  of  auditors  from  759  to  783. 
However, overall institutional capacity was adversely impacted by the emergency decrees, 
as  10%  of  TCA  staff  were  dismissed.  The  TCA  strategic  development  plan  for  2014-2018 
needs to be updated. Given the high number of local level budget users, the capacity of  the 
TCA  to  audit  local  administrations,  municipal  companies  and  associations  needs  to  be 
increased. 

The  TCA  has  improved  the  quality  of  audit  work  by  adopting  performance  audit  and 
regularity  audit  manuals  and  by  strengthening  its  training  centre.  Audit  reports  largely 
comply with international standards. In 2018, the TCA carried out 97 performance audits, in 
comparison  with  72  performance  audits  in  2017.  The  TCA  annually  submits  four  audit 
reports  to  parliament  (External  Audit  General  Evaluation  Report,  Accountability  General 
Evaluation Report, Financial Statistics Evaluation Report, and Report on State Enterprises), 
in addition to a statement of general conformity. 

Regarding the impact of audit work, the TCA assesses the internal control environment of 
audited entities as part of its audit work, and thus contributes to PIFC development. The TCA 
reports  are  analysed  by  the  State  Economic  Enterprise  Commission.  The  TCA  reports  are 
published online every year, with the exception of those on State Economic Enterprises. The 
TCA annual audit report is discussed in the relevant parliamentary committee, but increased 
parliamentary scrutiny and follow-up still needs to be ensured. The low number of referrals 
for  prosecution  continues  to  be  of  concern.  Many  TCA  recommendations  are  not 
systematically and timely implemented by the audited institutions. A working group between 
the  TCA  and  the  Ministry  of  Treasury  and  Finance  is  operational  and  there  is  a  need  for  a 
similar working group with the Turkish Parliament. 

Protection of the EU’s financial interests 

While  Turkey  has  reached  a  good  level  of  acquis  alignment,  it  still  needs  to  align  its 
legislation  with  the  new  EU  Directive  2017/1371  on  the  fight  against  fraud  to  the  Union’s 
financial interests by means of  criminal  law.  Following the abolition of the Prime Ministry 
Inspection  Board  in  2018,  Turkey  is  yet  to  assign  a  new  national  anti-fraud  coordination 
service (AFCOS) to work with the European Commission. An anti-fraud network, involving 
other  relevant  authorities,  also  needs  to  be  re-established.  Turkey  also  needs  to  adopt  a 
national anti-fraud strategy. Turkey should significantly strengthen its cooperation with the 
European  Commission  during  investigations,  and  continue  to  report  irregularities  and 
suspected fraud cases to the Commission. Turkey has reported 371 cases to the Commission 
via  an  online  irregularity  management  system  since  2012,  of  which  110  cases  in  2018. 

103 

 
 
Turkey needs to continue to develop a solid track record on investigations and the reporting 
of irregularities.  

Protection of the euro against counterfeiting 

Turkey  has  reached  a  high  level  of  acquis  alignment  in  this  area.  Technical  analysis  of 
counterfeit  money,  including  euro  banknotes  and  coins,  is  carried  out  by  the  central  bank. 
Credit institutions that do not withdraw counterfeits from circulation are subject to financial 
penalties. Turkey ensures cooperation with the Commission and the European Central Bank 
and takes part in the actions of the Pericles 2020 programme. 

5.33.  Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions 

This  chapter  covers  the  rules  governing  the  funding  of  the  EU  budget  (‘own  resources’). 
These  resources  mainly  consist  of:  (i)  contributions  based  on  the  gross  national  income  of 
each  Member  State;  (ii)  customs  duties;  and  (iii)  a  resource  based  on  value-added  tax. 
Member States must have the appropriate administrative capacity to adequately coordinate 
and ensure the correct calculation, collection, payment and control of own resources.  

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  financial  and  budgetary  provisions. 
Some  progress  was  made  on  aligning  statistics  with  EU  standards.  Solid  coordination 
structures,  administrative  capacity  and  implementing  rules  will  need  to  be  set  up  in  due 
course. 

 In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

  further align the GNI Inventory with Eurostat’s GNI Inventory Guide. 

Basic  principles  and  institutions  in  the  underlying  policy  areas  linked  to  the  application  of 
the own resources system are already in place (see Chapters 16 – Taxation, 18 – Statistics, 
29  –  Customs  union  and  32  –  Financial  control).  The  Customs  Union  with  the  EU  on 
processed  agricultural  goods  and  industrial  goods  (with  the  exception  of  coal  and  steel 
products)  continues  to  ensure  considerable  alignment  of  Turkey’s  customs  legislation  with 
the customs acquis while a draft customs law aligned with the Union Customs Code is yet to 
be adopted. This will facilitate preparation in traditional own resources. 

For  the  value  added  tax-based  resource,  preparation  is  needed  to  correctly  calculate  the 
statistical VAT base, the weighted average rate and the positive and negative corrections to 
offset the impact of derogations from the acquis. Sound measures are needed to combat VAT 
and customs duties fraud and to tackle the informal economy. 

Concerning the gross national income-based resource, GDP data was revised in December 
2016  to  achieve  greater  compliance  with  the  European  system  of  accounts  (ESA  2010). 
Turkey will need to continue its efforts to ensure its national accounts and GNI calculations 
are exhaustive, and take account of the informal economy. 

As  concerns  the  administrative  infrastructure,  Turkey  will  need  to  set  up  a  fully 
operational  coordination 
structure,  with  appropriate  administrative  capacity  and 
implementing rules, to ensure that it will be able to correctly calculate, forecast, account for, 
collect, pay, control and report own resources to the EU in line with the acquis. 

104 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND TURKEY 

Within  the framework of  accession negotiations, 16 chapters have been  opened so  far and 
one of these was provisionally closed. In June 2018, the General Affairs Council concluded 
that  Turkey  has  been  moving  further  away  from  the  European  Union.  Turkey's  accession 
negotiations  have  therefore  effectively  come  to  a  standstill  and  no  further  chapters  can  be 
considered for opening or closing and no further work towards the modernisation of the EU-
Turkey  Customs  Union  is  foreseen.  Reforms  and  developments  in  Turkey  continue  to  be 
monitored  by  the  bodies  set  up  under  the  Association  Agreement.  The  Association 
Committee  met  in  November  2018,  while  subcommittees  kept  being  held  throughout  the 
reporting period.  

The  Commission,  jointly  with  the  European  External  Action  Service,  has  maintained  EU-
Turkey  relations  in  all  key  areas  of  joint  interest  based  on  a  broad  strategic  engagement. 
Commissioners  continued  to  visit  Turkey  during  the  reporting  period  and  there  was  a 
Leaders' meeting between Presidents Juncker and Tusk and President Erdoğan in Bulgaria in 
March  2018.  High  Representative/Vice  President  Mogherini  and  Commissioner  Hahn  took 
part in a High Level Political Dialogue with Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu on 22 November 
2018, prepared by a political dialogue at directors' level in October 2018. Regular discussions 
on  foreign  and  security  policy  were  held  on  a  wide  range  of  topics  and  regions  including 
developments  in  the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa  region  (Syria,  Iraq,  Iran,  Libya,  Saudi 
Arabia  and  the  Gulf,  Israel  and  Palestine  and  the  Middle-East  Peace  Process)  but  also  on 
Russia, Ukraine, South Caucasus, Central Asia, the Western Balkans and on key international 
developments (Rohingya, Jerusalem).  

Turkey is the EU’s fifth largest trading partner, while the EU is Turkey’s largest. Two out of 
five  goods  traded  by  Turkey  come  from  or  go  to  the  EU  and  over  70%  of  foreign  direct 
investment in Turkey originates in the EU. A  High Level Economic Dialogue was held in 
February  2019  in  Istanbul,  where  both  parties  discussed  macroeconomic  and  investment 
developments  and engaged with  the business  community. As part of the Economic Reform 
Programme  exercise,  Turkey  participated  in  the  multilateral  economic  dialogue  with  the 
Commission and Member States held in May 2018 to prepare the country for participation in 
multilateral surveillance and economic policy coordination as part of the EU’s Economic and 
Monetary  Union.  The  EU  and  Turkey  also  continue  to  coordinate  in  the  framework  of  the 
G-20.  Turkey  and  the  EU  continued  to  improve  their  sectorial  cooperation;  a  High  Level 
Transport  Dialogue  took  place  in  January  2019.  Negotiations  on  a  comprehensive 
EU-Turkey  Air  Agreement  continued  during  the  year.  Regarding  the  Customs  Union,  the 
Commission  adopted  a  recommendation  for  opening  of  negotiations  with  Turkey  on  the 
modernisation of the Customs Union on 21 December 2016. This recommendation has been 
forwarded to the Council where it has been under consideration, without prejudice to Member 
States'  position.  In  June  2018,  the  General  Affairs  Council  concluded  that,  under  the 
prevailing  circumstances,  no  further  work  towards  the  modernisation  of  the  EU-Turkey 
Customs Union could be foreseen. The Customs Union Joint Committee met in May 2018 to 
discuss  a  significant  number  of  issues  hampering  the  smooth  functioning  of  the  Customs 
Union.  

In  the  area  of  visa,  migration  and  asylum,  the  implementation  of  the  March  2016 
EU-Turkey  Statement  has  continued  to  deliver  concrete  results  in  reducing  irregular  and 
dangerous crossings and in saving lives in the Aegean Sea. Turkey sustained its considerable 
efforts to provide massive and unprecedented humanitarian aid and support to more than 3.6 
million  registered  refugees  from  Syria  and  some  370  000  registered  refugees  from  other 
countries.  A  progress  report  on  the  implementation  of  the  European  Agenda  on  Migration 

105 

 
 
was  issued  in  March  2019.  In  the  context  of  the  EU-Turkey  visa  liberalisation  dialogue, 
Turkey has established seven working groups to carry out technical work on the outstanding 
benchmarks.  The  Directorate-General  for  Civil  Registry  and  Citizenship  started  issuing 
second-generation biometric passports for Turkish citizens in April 2018. In November, the 
EU  and  Turkey  launched  negotiations  on  an  international  agreement  on  the  exchange  of 
personal  data  between  Europol  and  the  Turkish  authorities  competent  for  fighting  serious 
crime and terrorism. 

Turkey and the EU further built on the fruitful cooperation under the Facility for Refugees in 
Turkey. The Facility manages a total of EUR 6 billion: EUR 3 billion for 2016-2017 has been 
fully contracted and more than EUR 2 billion disbursed, with the balance to be disbursed in 
the course of implementation of Facility projects through to mid-2021. The European Council 
gave  its  agreement  on  the  financing  of  the  second  tranche  of  the  Facility  in  2018,  with 
resources coming from the EU budget (EUR 2 billion) and Member States (EUR 1 billion). 
Programming for the second tranche was launched immediately afterwards; already EUR 450 
million were contracted in 2018. The funding will continues to support projects focused on 
humanitarian assistance, education, migration management, health, municipal infrastructure, 
and socio-economic support.  

Regarding  bilateral  financial  assistance,  the  Commission  adopted  the  revised  Indicative 
Strategy Paper of Turkey in August 2018, strengthening the focus of EU financial assistance 
on the fundamental pillars of the enlargement strategy. Furthermore, as a consequence of low 
absorption capacity, lack of performance and backsliding on reforms, this revision involved a 
substantial cut of the budget of the Instrument for Pre Accession Assistance, that was reduced 
by  EUR  759  million  for  the  2018-2020  period.  The  total  allocation  for  the  year  2018 
amounted  to  EUR  387  million.  This  was  composed  of  the  annual  programme  with  a  EUR 
110.8  million  EU  contribution  designed  to  support  activities  on  fundamental  rights,  co-
finance  Turkey's  participation  in  Union  programmes  and  agencies  in  order  to  continue  to 
enhance people-to-people contacts between Turkey and the EU and provide support to civil 
society  (EUR  12.4  million).  An  EU  allocation  of  EUR  145  million  was made  to  the  multi-
annual  action programmes on Environment  and climate action, Education, employment  and 
social  policies,  Competitiveness  and  innovation  and  Transport.  Finally,  EUR  131  million 
were allocated to the agricultural and rural development programme. 

Turkey  participates  in  the  following  EU  programmes:  Erasmus+,  Horizon  2020,  Customs 
2020, Fiscalis 2020, COSME (Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises)  and  EASI  (Employment  and  Social  Innovation).  Turkey  participates  in  the 
European  Environmental  Agency,  in  the  European  Monitoring  Centre  for  Drugs  and  Drug 
Addiction and since 2015 in the Civil Protection Mechanism and has agreed to participate in 
the European Solidarity Corps. 

106 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX II – STATISTICAL ANNEX 

STATISTICAL DATA (as of 29.04.2019) 

Turkey 

Basic data 

Population (thousand) 

Total area of the country (km²) 

Note 

2006 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

68 860.5 

75 627.4 

76 667.9 

77 695.9 

78 741.1 

79 814.9 

785 347 

785 347 

785 347 

783 562 

780 270 

780 270 

National accounts 

Note 

2006 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

Gross domestic product (GDP) (million national currency) 

789 228 

1 809 713  2 044 466  2 338 648  2 608 526  3 106 537 

Gross domestic product (GDP) (million euro) 

436 278 

714 313 

703 412 

772 979 

780 225 

753 904 

GDP (euro per capita) 

6 300 

9 400 

9 100 

9 900 

9 800 

9 400 

GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards (PPS)) 

11 200 

16 300 

17 700 

19 300 

19 200 

19 900 

GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU average (EU-28 = 100) 

Real GDP growth rate: change on previous year of GDP volume (%) 

Employment growth (national accounts data), relative to the previous 
year (%) 

Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP (in volume) per person 
employed, relative to the previous year (%) 

Unit labour cost growth, relative to the previous year (%) 

**3 year change (T/T-3) in the nominal unit labour cost growth index 
(2010 = 100) 

45 

7.1 

: 

: 

: 

: 

61 

8.5 

: 

: 

: 

: 

64 

5.2 

: 

: 

: 

: 

66 

6.1 

: 

: 

: 

: 

65 

3.2 

: 

: 

: 

: 

66 

7.4 

: 

: 

: 

: 

107 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Labour productivity per person employed: GDP (in PPS) per person 
employed relative to EU average (EU-28 = 100) 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

Gross value added by main sectors 

Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 

Industry (%) 

Construction (%) 

Services (%) 

Final consumption expenditure, as a share of GDP (%) 

Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP (%) 

Changes in inventories, as a share of GDP (%) 

Exports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 

Imports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 

Gross fixed capital formation by the general government sector, as a 
percentage of GDP (%) 

9.3 

22.6 

7.2 

60.9 

: 

28.7 

0.9 

21.7 

26.5 

: 

7.7 

22.4 

9.2 

60.7 

: 

28.5 

1.2 

22.3 

28.1 

: 

7.5 

22.7 

9.2 

60.6 

: 

28.9 

0.1 

23.8 

27.6 

: 

7.8 

22.4 

9.3 

60.5 

: 

29.7 

-1.4 

23.3 

26.0 

: 

7.0 

22.3 

9.7 

61.0 

: 

29.3 

: 

22.0 

24.9 

: 

6.9 

23.2 

9.7 

60.2 

: 

30.0 

: 

24.8 

29.3 

: 

Business 

Industrial production volume index (2010 = 100) 

Number of active enterprises (number) 

Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided 
by the number of enterprises active in t (%) 

Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) 
divided by the number of enterprises active in t (%) 

People employed in SMEs as a share of all persons employed (within the 
non-financial business economy) (%) 

Note 

2006 

92.7 

2013 

116.5 

2014 

120.5 

2015 

124.1 

2016 

126.3 

2017 

134.3 

: 

: 

: 

: 

2 695 131  2 677 316  2 689 910 

: 

12.4 

12.2 

12.1 

12.3 

12.4 

10.8 

: 

74.2 

73.5 

72.7 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

108 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR 
million) 

Total value added (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR 
million) 

: 

: 

97 399 

95 399 

104 876 

184 511 

178 415 

207 088 

: 

: 

: 

: 

Inflation rate and house prices 

Note 

2006 

Harmonised consumer price index (HICP), change relative to the 
previous year (%) 

**Annual change in the deflated house price index (2010 = 100) 

9.3 

: 

2013 

7.5 

2014 

8.9 

2015 

7.7 

2016 

7.7 

2017 

11.1 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

Balance of payments 

Note 

2006 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

Balance of payments: current account total (million euro) 

-24 823 

-47 920 

-32 852 

-28 940 

-29 937 

-41 918 

Balance of payments current account: trade balance (million euro) 

-32 569 

-60 174 

-47 868 

-43 378 

-36 943 

-52 186 

Balance of payments current account: net services (million euro) 

11 068 

17 783 

20 079 

21 837 

13 789 

17 649 

Balance of payments current account: net balance for primary income 
(million euro) 

Balance of payments current account: net balance for secondary income 
(million euro) 

Net balance for primary and secondary income: of which government 
transfers (million euro) 

**3 year backward moving average of the current account balance 
relative to GDP (%) 

**Five year change in share of world exports of goods and services (%) 

Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
(million euro) 

-4 767 

-6 490 

-6 202 

-8 699 

-8 294 

-9 783 

1 445 

962 

1 139 

1 300 

1 511 

2 402 

1 871 

880 

840 

979 

1 493 

2 224 

: 

: 

-7.1 

-5.6 

-5.0 

-4.1 

-4.4 

: 

: 

11.94 

10.41 

1.56 

15 340.1 

7 474.6 

4 568.3 

11 632.3 

9 211.3 

7 277.2 

Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad (million euro) 

735.9 

2 662.5 

5 020.7 

4 336.2 

2 480.8 

2 328.9 

109 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of which FDI of the reporting economy in the EU-28 countries (million 
euro) 

: 

1 372.2 

1 372.6 

2 404.2 

1 374.1 

1 037.4 

Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the reporting economy (million euro) 

16 076.0 

10 137.0 

9 589.0 

15 968.5 

11 692.1 

9 606.1 

of which FDI of the EU-28 countries in the reporting economy (million 
euro) 

**Net international investment position, relative to GDP (%) 

Year on year rate of change in gross inflow of remittances (in national 
currency) from migrant workers (%) 

: 

4 371.3 

4 495.3 

8 380.2 

4 371.7 

2 841.5 

-37.4 

39.5 

-41.8 

-4.6 

-47.6 

9.5 

-44.6 

6.2 

-42.8 

-10.8 

-54.3 

-13.3 

Public finance 

Note 

2006 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

***General government deficit / surplus, relative to GDP (%) 

***General government gross debt relative to GDP (%) 

Total  government revenues, as a percentage of GDP (%) 

Total government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP (%) 

: 

: 

: 

: 

Financial indicators 

Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to GDP (%) 

Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to total exports (%) 

Note 

2006 

38.0 

173.6 

0.2 

31.4 

33.0 

32.8 

2013 

41.4 

187.5 

0.2 

28.8 

32.3 

32.1 

2014 

43.4 

183.9 

0.6 

27.6 

32.6 

31.9 

2015 

46.7 

201.6 

-1.1 

28.3 

33.0 

34.1 

2016 

47.4 

218.2 

-2.8 

28.3 

31.4 

34.2 

2017 

53.4 

216.9 

Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, overnight deposits, million euro) 

38 616 

78 110 

91 571 

97 885 

103 717 

99 085 

Money supply: M2 (M1 plus deposits with maturity up to two years, 
million euro) 

160 193 

309 213 

360 158 

373 608 

381 256 

357 979 

Money supply: M3 (M2 plus marketable instruments, million euro) 

171 832 

323 062 

375 844 

387 048 

393 581 

370 812 

Total credit by monetary financial institutions to residents (consolidated) 
(million euro) 

1) 

100 358 

341 791 

423 556 

448 738 

447 892 

440 779 

**Annual change in financial sector liabilities (%) 

: 

22.2 

17.3 

14.5 

17.5 

19.8 

110 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
**Private credit flow, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) 

**Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) 

Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per annum (%) 

Lending interest rate (one year), per annum (%) 

Deposit interest rate (one year), per annum (%) 

Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 euro = … national currency) 

Trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2010 = 100) 

**3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-weighted effective exchange rate 
index, 42 countries (2010 = 100) 

2) 

3) 

: 

: 

15.77 

21.47 

16.99 

1.809 

87.1 

: 

17.4 

71.7 

5.62 

13.35 

9.21 

2.534 

90.4 

-9.6 

11.1 

74.6 

9.15 

14.77 

9.25 

2.906 

85.9 

-2.3 

14.2 

79.4 

10.7 

16.85 

10.72 

3.026 

85.0 

-7.2 

13.6 

84.8 

9.32 

15.79 

10.33 

3.343 

83.8 

-7.3 

13.9 

85.1 

11.58 

18.12 

13.53 

4.121 

74.9 

-12.9 

Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro) 

50 323 

98 663 

95 828 

99 624 

95 863 

95 362 

External trade in goods 

Note 

2006 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

Value of imports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 

111 096 

189 784 

182 338 

186 536 

179 468 

207 000 

Value of exports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 

68 020 

114 563 

118 654 

129 555 

128 792 

139 229 

Trade balance: all goods, all partners (million euro) 

-43 076 

-75 222 

-63 684 

-56 981 

-50 676 

-67 771 

Terms of trade (export price index / import price index * 100) (number) 

4) 

Share of exports to EU-28 countries in value of total exports (%) 

Share of imports from EU-28 countries in value of total imports (%) 

102 

56.3 

42.6 

Demography 

Crude rate of natural change of population (natural growth rate): number 
of births minus deaths (per thousand inhabitants) 

Infant mortality rate deaths of children under one year of age (per 
thousand live births) 

Note 

2006 

12.4 

98 

41.5 

36.7 

2013 

12.0 

100 

43.5 

36.7 

2014 

12.3 

107 

44.5 

38.0 

2015 

11.8 

111 

47.9 

39.0 

2016 

11.2 

105 

47.0 

36.4 

2017 

10.8 

24.5 

10.8 

11.1 

10.7 

10.0 

9.2 

111 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Life expectancy at birth: male (years) 

Life expectancy at birth: female (years) 

Labour market 

Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the 
population aged 20–64 that is economically active (%) 

*Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population 
aged 20–64 that are in employment (%) 

Male employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 

Female employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 

Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: proportion of the population 
aged 55–64 that are in employment (%) 

Employment by main sectors 

Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 

5) 

Industry (%) 

Construction (%) 

Services (%) 

People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, 
persons aged 20–64 (%) 

People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, 
persons aged 20–64 (%) 

Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that is unemployed 
(%) 

Male unemployment rate (%) 

Female unemployment rate (%) 

: 

: 

Note 

2006 

52.6 

75.4 

81.1 

2013 

58.4 

75.4 

80.9 

2014 

58.9 

75.4 

81.0 

2015 

59.9 

75.4 

81.0 

2016 

60.9 

75.7 

81.3 

2017 

61.9 

48.2 

53.4 

53.2 

53.9 

54.3 

55.3 

73.2 

24.0 

27.6 

: 

: 

: 

: 

15.1 

75.3 

31.8 

31.5 

23.6 

19.4 

7.0 

50.0 

13.5 

75.0 

31.6 

31.4 

21.1b 

20.5b 

7.4b 

51.0b 

13.1b 

75.3 

32.6 

31.9 

20.6 

20.0 

7.2 

52.2 

13.5 

75.5 

33.2 

33.4 

19.5 

19.5 

7.3 

53.7 

13.8 

76.1 

34.4 

34.4 

19.4 

19.1 

7.4 

54.1 

13.3 

84.9 

86.5 

86.9b 

86.5 

86.2 

86.7 

8.8 

9.9 

10.3 

10.9 

10.9 

8.0 

10.6 

9.1 

11.9 

9.3 

12.6 

9.6 

13.6 

9.4 

13.9 

8.8 

8.6 

9.1 

6) 

6) 

6) 

112 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force aged 15–24 
that is unemployed (%) 

Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that has 
been unemployed for 12 months or more (%) 

Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed at most 
lower secondary education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%) 

Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed tertiary 
education (ISCED levels 5-8) (%) 

6) 

6) 

6) 

6) 

3.0 

7.2 

5.9 

Social cohesion 

Note 

2006 

Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (national currency) 

Index of real wages and salaries (index of nominal wages and salaries 
divided by the inflation index) (2010 = 100) 

GINI coefficient 

Poverty gap 

*Early leavers from education and training: proportion of the population 
aged 18–24 with at most lower secondary education who are not in 
further education or training (%) 

756 

: 

45 

36.5 

48.8 

16.5 

16.9 

17.8 

18.4 

19.5 

20.5 

2.1 

7.3 

6.9 

2013 

1 509 

: 

42 

27.9 

37.6p 

2.0 

8.4b 

8.1 

2014 

1 648 

: 

41 

28.4 

38.3 

2.2 

8.9 

8.4 

2015 

1 828 

: 

42 

27.8 

36.7 

2.2 

9.1 

9.3 

2016 

2 031 

: 

43 

26.6 

34.3 

2.4 

8.9 

9.4 

2017 

2 287 

: 

43 

26.4 

32.5 

Standard of living 

Number of passenger cars relative to population size (number per 
thousand population) 

Number of mobile phone subscriptions relative to population size 
(number per thousand population) 

Mobile broadband penetration (per 100 inhabitants) 

Fixed broadband penetration (per 100 inhabitants) 

Note 

2006 

89.2 

2013 

122.8 

2014 

128.6 

2015 

136.3 

2016 

143.7 

2017 

150.8 

763.4e 

909.0b 

925.3 

935.2 

940.4 

962.7 

0 

4 

32 

11 

42 

12 

50 

12 

65 

13 

71 

15 

113 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Infrastructure 

Note 

2006 

Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²) 

7) 

Length of motorways (kilometres) 

11.3 

1 908 

Innovation and research 

Note 

2006 

Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%) 

*Gross domestic expenditure on R&D relative to GDP (%) 

Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD), as a 
percentage of GDP (%) 

Percentage of households who have internet access at home (%) 

: 

0.56 

: 

: 

2013 

12.6 

2 244 

2013 

4.4 

0.82 

0.37 

2014 

13.1 

2 278 

2014 

4.4 

0.86 

0.32 

2015 

13.2 

2 282 

2015 

4.4 

0.88 

0.32 

2016 

13.2 

2 542 

2016 

4.7 

0.94 

0.29 

2017 

13.3 

2 657 

2017 

4.2 

0.96 

0.34 

49.1 

60.2 

69.5 

76.3 

80.7 

Environment 

*Index of greenhouse gas emissions,  CO2 equivalent (1990 = 100) 

Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per 1 000 euro 
GDP at 2010 constant prices) 

Electricity generated from renewable sources relative to gross electricity 
consumption (%) 

Note 

2006 

169.3 

176.9 

2013 

208.3 

155.2 

2014 

214.4 

158.3 

2015 

223 

161.6 

2016 

235.4 

165.2 

2017 

: 

165.7 

25.5 

28.1 

20.5 

31.5 

32.3 

29.4 

Road share of inland freight transport (based on tonne-km) (%) 

94.8 

95.2 

95.1 

95.9 

95.6 

95.4 

Energy 

Note 

2006 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

Primary production of all energy products (thousand TOE) 

26 198 

29 100 

28 803 

31 463 

35 707 

36 471 

Primary production of crude oil (thousand TOE) 

2 142 

2 379 

2 606 

2 661 

2 722 

2 700 

114 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Primary production of solid fuels (thousand TOE) 

12 948 

13 542 

13 814 

12 798 

15 498 

15 682 

Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) 

745 

443 

395 

314 

302 

292 

Net imports of all energy products (thousand TOE) 

69 013 

86 533 

94 014 

103 702 

106 056 

116 709 

Gross inland energy consumption (thousand TOE) 

93 847 

113 909 

122 213 

132 326 

139 620 

150 404 

Gross electricity generation (GWh) 

176 299 

240 154 

251 963 

261 783 

274 408 

297 278 

Agriculture 

Note 

2006 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

Agricultural production volume index of goods and services (at producer 
prices) (2010 = 100) 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) 

40 493 

38 423 

38 558 

38 551 

38 328p 

38 002p 

Livestock numbers: live bovine animals (thousand heads, end of period) 

8) 

10 871 

14 415 

14 223 

13 994 

14 080 

15 944 

Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand heads, end of period) 

1 

3 

3 

2 

1 

1 

Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats (thousand heads, end of 
period) 

32 260 

38 510 

41 485 

41 924 

41 329 

44 302 

Raw milk available on farms (thousand tonnes) 

11 952 

18 224 

18 631 

18 655 

18 489 

20 700 

Harvested crop production: cereals (including rice) (thousand tonnes) 

34 643 

37 489 

32 714 

38 637 

35 281 

36 133 

Harvested crop production: sugar beet (thousand tonnes) 

14 452 

16 489 

16 743 

16 023 

19 593 

21 149 

Harvested crop production: vegetables (thousand tonnes) 

25 852 

28 448 

28 487 

29 552 

30 267 

30 826 

: = not available 
b = break in series 
e = estimate 
p = provisional 
* = Europe 2020 indicator 
** = Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator 

115 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** = The government deficit and debt data of enlargement countries are published on an "as 
is" basis and without any assurance as regards their quality and adherence to ESA rules. 

Footnotes 

1)  Data cover loans granted by MFIs to residents. Participation Banks and Investment and 

Development Banks are included. 
2)  Data cover debt securities and loans. 
3)  Average of monthly data. Overnight deposit facility. 
4)  Underlying indices are calculated with Fisher index formula. 
5)  2013: includes NACE Rev. 2 Group 98.1 (undifferentiated goods-producing activities of 

private households for own use). 

6)  Unemployment based on four weeks criterion and using only active jobs search methods. 
7)  Main lines only. 
8)  Excluding buffaloes. 

116