COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS The 2019 EU Justice Scoreboard
Date: 2019-04-26
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, EU statistics, access to the courts, application of EU law, area of freedom, security and justice, independence of the judiciary, judge, judicial proceedings, judicial reform

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 26.4.2019  COM(2019) 198 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS The 2019 EU Justice Scoreboard  
 
 
‘The European Union is a community of law. Respecting the rule of law and abiding by Court 
decisions are not optional’  
President of the Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, 2018 State of the Union Address(1) 

‘Respect for the rule of law is not only a prerequisite for the protection of all the fundamental 
values listed in Article 2. It is also a pre-requisite for upholding all rights and obligations 
deriving from the Treaties and for establishing mutual trust of citizens, businesses and national 
authorities in the legal systems of all other Member States’ (2)  

First Vice-President, Frans Timmermans, EP Plenary Debate, 28 February 2018 

‘We are working on increasing the trust in justice. Providing sufficient financial resources to the 
justice system is not a cost, [it] is an investment. […] The country with a well functioning 
judiciary is more likely attracting investors.’  (3) 

Commissioner Jourová, Vienna, 30 November 2018 

1  

2  

3  

2018  State  of  the  Union  Address  delivered  before  the  European  Parliament  on  12  September  2018: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-speech_en_0.pdf  
Commission  Statement  by  First  Vice-President  Timmermans,  European  Parliament  Plenary  debate  of 
28 February 2018 on the Commission decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland. 
Speech delivered in Vienna on 30 November 2018, at the Conference on the Effectiveness of Justice Systems. 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

The independence, quality and efficiency, as the essential elements of effective justice systems, 
are crucial for upholding the rule of law and the values upon which the EU is founded. Effective 
justice systems are essential for the implementation of EU law. National courts act as EU courts 
when  applying  EU  law.  It  is  national  courts  in  the  first  place  that  ensure  that  the  rights  and 
obligations provided under EU law are enforced effectively (4). As noted by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union, the very existence of effective judicial protection by independent courts 
is the essence of the rule of law (5).  

The Communication on Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union – State of play 
and possible next steps, adopted on 3 April 2019, identifies the EU Justice Scoreboard as part of 
the EU’s toolbox to strengthen the rule of law by contributing in promoting judicial reform and 
standards on the rule of law (6). Respect for the rule of law, including the independence of justice 
systems, has a significant impact on investment  decisions and on attracting businesses. For this 
reason,  improving  the  effectiveness  of  national  justice  systems  is  a  priority  of  the  European 
Semester — the EU’s annual cycle of economic policy coordination. The Annual Growth Survey 
2019, which identifies the economic and social priorities for the EU and its Member States for the 
year  ahead,  reiterates  the  link  between,  on  the  one  side,  the  rule  of  law  and  effective  justice 
systems and, on the other side, a business-friendly environment and economic growth (7).  

For  monitoring  justice  reforms  and  their  impact  in  Member  States,  since  2013,  the  EU  Justice 
Scoreboard  (‘the Scoreboard’) presents  an annual  overview of indicators  with  relevance for the 
independence,  quality  and  efficiency  of  justice,  essential  parameters  of  an  effective  justice 
system. The 2019 edition  further develops  the indicators on all three elements  and, for the first 
time, presents indicators on: 

- 
- 
- 

- 
- 

the detailed spending of financial resources in each justice system; 
the standards applied to improve the quality of judgments in highest courts; 
the  management  powers  over  the  national  prosecution  services,  and  the  appointment  and 
dismissal of national prosecutors; 
the authorities involved in disciplinary proceedings regarding judges;  
the standards and practices on managing caseloads and backlogs in courts. 

4  
5  

Article 19 of Treaty on European Union (TEU). 
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v 
Tribunal de Contas, C-64/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117. 

6          COM (2019) 163 
7  

Communication from the Commission — Annual Growth Survey 2019, 21.11.2018, COM(2018) 770 final, p. 
12. 

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What is the EU Justice Scoreboard? 

The  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  is  a  comparative  information  tool  that  aims  to  assist  the  EU  and  Member 
States  on  an  annual  basis  to  improve  the  effectiveness  of  their  national  justice  systems  by  providing 
objective,  reliable  and  comparable  data  on  a  number  of  indicators  relevant  for  the  assessment  of  the 
quality,  independence  and  efficiency  of  justice  systems  in  all  Member  States.  The  Scoreboard  does  not 
present  an  overall  single  ranking  but  an  overview  of  how  all  the  justice  systems  function,  based  on 
indicators that are of common interest for all Member States. 
The Scoreboard does not promote any particular type of justice system and treats all Member States on an 
equal footing.  
Independence, quality and efficiency are essential parameters of an effective justice system, whatever the 
model of the national justice system or the legal tradition in which it is anchored. Figures on these three 
parameters should be read together, as all three elements are necessary for the effectiveness of a justice 
system and are often interlinked (initiatives aimed at improving one of them may have an influence on the 
other).  
The Scoreboard mainly focuses on litigious civil and commercial cases as well as administrative cases in 
order  to  assist  Member  States in  their  efforts to  create  a  more  investment,  business  and  citizen-friendly 
environment. The Scoreboard is a comparative tool which evolves in dialogue with Member States and the 
European Parliament (8). Its objective is to identify the essential parameters of an effective justice system 
and to provide relevant data on an annual basis. 

What is the methodology of the EU Justice Scoreboard? 

The Scoreboard uses a range of sources of information. Large parts of the quantitative data are provided 
by the Council of Europe Commission for the Evaluation of the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) with which 
the Commission has concluded a contract to carry out a specific annual study. These data cover the period 
from 2010 to 2017, and have been provided by Member States according to CEPEJ’s methodology. The 
study  also  provides  detailed  comments  and  country-specific  factsheets  that  give  more  context.  They 
should be read together with the figures (9). 
Data on the length of proceedings collected by CEPEJ show the ‘disposition time’ which is a calculated 
length  of  court  proceedings  (based  on  a  ratio  between  pending  and  resolved  cases).  Data  on  courts’ 
efficiency  in  applying  EU  law  in  specific  areas  show  the  average  length  of  proceedings  derived  from 
actual length of court cases. It should be noted that the length of court proceedings may vary substantially 
geographically within a Member State, particularly in urban centres where commercial activities may lead 
to a higher caseload. 
Other  sources  of  data  are:  the  group  of  contact  persons  on  national  justice  systems  (10),  the  European 
Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) (11), the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial 
Courts  of  the  EU  (NPSJC)  (12),  Association  of  the  Councils  of  State  and  Supreme  Administrative 
Jurisdictions  of  the  EU  (ACA-Europe)  (13),  the  European  Competition  Network  (ECN)  (14),  the 

8  

9 
10  

11 

The  European  Parliament  adopted  the  resolution  of  29  May  2018  on  the  2017  EU  Justice  Scoreboard 
(P8_TA(2018)0216)  which  has  informed  the  preparation  of  this  edition  and  will  inform  the  preparation  of 
future editions of the EU Justice Scoreboard.  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/eu-justice-scoreboard_en 
In view of the preparation of the EU Justice Scoreboard and to promote the exchange of best practices on the 
effectiveness of justice systems, the Commission asked Member States to designate two contact persons, one 
from the judiciary and one  from the  ministry of justice.  Regular  meetings of this informal group are taking 
place. 
ENCJ  unites  the  national  institutions  in  the  Member  States  that  are  independent  of  the  executive  and 
legislature, and who are responsible for the support of the judiciaries in the independent delivery of justice: 
https://www.encj.eu/ 

12    NPSJC provides a forum through which European institutions are given an opportunity to request the opinions 
of  Supreme  Courts  and  to  bring  them  closer  by  encouraging  discussion  and  the  exchange  of  ideas: 
http://network-presidents.eu/ 
ACA-Europe  is  composed  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  EU  and  the  Councils  of  State  or  the  Supreme 
administrative jurisdictions of each EU Member State: http://www.juradmin.eu/index.php/en/ 

13 

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Communications  Committee  (COCOM)  (15),  the  European  Observatory  on  infringements  of  intellectual 
property  rights  (16),  the  Expert  Group  on  Money  Laundering  and  Terrorist  Financing  (EGMLTF)  (17), 
Eurostat (18), the European Judicial Training Network (EJTN) (19), and the World Economic Forum (WEF) 
(20). 
The methodology for the Scoreboard has been further developed in close cooperation with the group of 
contact  persons  on  national  justice  systems,  particularly  through  a  questionnaire  and  collecting  data  on 
certain aspects of the functioning of justice systems. 
The  availability  of  data,  in  particular  for  indicators  on  the  efficiency  of  justice  systems,  continues  to 
improve as many Member States have invested in their capacity to produce better judicial statistics. Where 
difficulties  in  gathering  or  providing  data  continue  to  exist,  this  is  either  due  to  insufficient  statistical 
capacity or to the fact that the national categories for which data are collected do not exactly correspond to 
the ones used for the Scoreboard. Only in very few cases, the data gap is due to the lack of willingness of 
certain  national  authorities  to  contribute.  The  Commission  continues  to  encourage  Member  States  to 
further reduce this data gap and to actively engage in the exchange of best practices. 

How does the EU Justice Scoreboard feed into the European Semester? 

The  Scoreboard  provides  elements  for  assessing  the  quality,  independence  and  efficiency  of  national 
justice systems and thereby aims at helping Member States to improve the effectiveness of their national 
justice  systems.  This  makes  it  easier  to  identify  shortcomings  and  best  practices  and  to  keep  track  of 
challenges and progress. In the context of the European Semester, country-specific assessments are carried 
out through bilateral dialogue with the national authorities and stakeholders concerned. This assessment is 
reflected in the annual country reports within the Semester and combines the insight from the scoreboard 
with  qualitative  analysis,  taking  into  account  the  characteristics  of  the  legal  systems  and  the  broader 
context of the Member States concerned. The analysis under the Semester may  lead to the Commission 
proposing  to  the  Council  to  adopt  country-specific  recommendations  on  the  improvement  of  national 
justice systems in individual Member States. 

Why are effective justice systems important for an investment friendly environment? 

Effective justice systems which uphold the rule of law have since a long time been identified as having a 
positive economic impact. Where judicial systems guarantee the enforcement of rights, creditors are more 
likely  to  lend,  businesses  are  dissuaded from  opportunistic behaviour,  transaction  costs  are  reduced  and 
innovative businesses are more likely to invest. The beneficial impact of well-functioning national justice 

14 

15 

16 

17  

18 
19 

20 

The ECN has been established as a forum for discussion and cooperation of European competition authorities 
in cases where Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU are applied. The ECN is the 
framework  for  the  close  cooperation  mechanisms  of  Council  Regulation  1/2003.  Through  the  ECN,  the 
Commission  and  the  national  competition  authorities  in  all  EU  Member  States  cooperate  with  each  other: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html 
COCOM is composed of representatives of EU Member States. Its main role is to provide an opinion on the 
draft  measures  that  the  Commission  intends  to  adopt  on  Digital  Market  issues:  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
single-market/en/communications-committee 
The  European  Observatory  on  Infringements  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights  is  a  network  of  experts  and 
specialist stakeholders. It is composed of public- and private-sector representatives, who collaborate in active 
working groups. https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/web/observatory/home  
EGMLTF meets regularly to share views and help the Commission define policy and draft new legislation on 
Anti-Money 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/financial-
crime/index_en.htm 
Eurostat is the statistical office of the EU: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/about/overview 
EJTN  is  the  principal  platform  and  promoter  for  the  training  and  exchange  of  knowledge  of  the  European 
judiciary.  It  develops  training  standards  and  curricula,  coordinates  judicial  training  exchanges  and 
programmes,  disseminates  training  expertise  and  promotes  cooperation  between  EU  judicial  training 
institutions.  EJTN  has  some  34  members  representing  EU  states  as  well  as  EU  transnational  bodies. 
http://www.ejtn.eu/ 
WEF  is  an  International  Organisation  for  Public-Private  Cooperation,  whose  members  are  companies: 
https://www.weforum.org/ 

Laundering 

Financing: 

Terrorist 

and 

5 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
systems for the economy is supported by a wide range of studies and academic literature, including from 
the International Monetary Fund (21) the European Central Bank (22), the OECD (23), the World Economic 
Forum (24), and the World Bank (25). 
A  recent  study  has  found  that  reducing  the  length  of  court  proceedings  by  1%(measured  in  disposition 
time  (26))  may  increase  growth  of  firms  (27)  and  that  a  higher  percentage  of  companies  perceiving  the 
justice system as independent by 1% tends to be associated with higher turnover and productivity growth 
(28).  Another  study  has  indicated  a  positive  correlation  between  perceived  judicial  independence  and 
Foreign Direct Investment flows in Central and Eastern Europe (29).  
In  addition,  several  surveys  have  highlighted  the  importance  of  the  effectiveness  of  national  justice 
systems  for  companies.  For  example,  in  one  survey,  93%  of  large  enterprises  replied  that  they 
systematically review the rule of law conditions (including court independence) on a continuing basis in 
the  countries  they  invest  in  (30)  and,  in  another,  more  than  half  of  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises 
replied that cost and excessive length of judicial proceedings, respectively, were among the main reasons 
for not starting court proceedings over infringement of intellectual property rights (IPR) (31). 

21  

22 

23 

24 

25 

26  

27  

28  
29  

30  

31  

2018: 

Forum, 

2018’,  October 

‘The  Global  Competitiveness  Report 

IMF, Regional Economic Outlook, November 2017,  Europe: Europe Hitting its Stride, pp. xviii, pp. 40, 70: 
https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/REO/EUR/2017/November/eur-booked-print.ashx?la=en  
ECB, ‘Structural policies in the euro area’, June 2018, ECB Occasional Paper Series No 210: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecb.op210.en.pdf?3db9355b1d1599799aa0e475e5624651  
See e.g. ‘What makes civil justice effective?’, OECD Economics Department Policy Notes, No. 18 June 2013 
and ‘The Economics of Civil Justice: New Cross-Country Data and Empirics’, OECD Economics Department 
Working Papers, No. 1060. 
World  Economic 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitveness-report-2018  
World Bank, ‘World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law, Chapter 3: The role of law’, pp. 
83, 140: http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017  
‘Disposition Time’ indicator is the number of unresolved cases divided by the number of resolved cases at the 
end  of  a  year  multiplied  by  365  (days).  It  is  a  standard  indicator  defined  by  Council  of  Europe's  CEPEJ: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default_en.asp 
Vincenzo Bove and Leandro Elia; The judicial system and economic development across EU Member States, 
JRC  Technical  Report,  EUR 28440  EN,  Publications  Office  of 
the  EU,  Luxembourg,  2017: 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC104594/jrc104594__2017_the_judicial_system_a
nd_economic_development_across_eu_member_states.pdf 
Idem. 
Effect  of  judicial  independence  to  FDI  into  Eastern  Europe  and  South  Asia;  Bülent  Dogru;  2012,  MPRA 
Munich  Personal  RePEc  Archive:  https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40471/1/MPRA_paper_40322.pdf  .  EU 
MS included in the study were: BG, HR, CZ, EE, HU, LV, LT, RO, SK and SI. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit: "Risk and Return – Foreign Direct Investment and the Rule of Law", 2015  
http://www.biicl.org/documents/625_d4_fdi_main_report.pdf, p.22 
EU 
https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-
web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/documents/sme_scoreboard_study_2016/Executive-
summary_en.pdf 

(IP)  SME  Scoreboard  2016: 

Intellectual  Property  Office 

Intellectual  Property 

(EUIPO), 

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2. 

CONTEXT: KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN JUSTICE REFORMS IN 2018 

2.1. Mapping of justice reforms 

In  2018,  a  large  number  of  Member  States  continued  their  efforts  to  further  improve  the 
effectiveness  of  their  justice  systems.  Figure  1  presents  an  overview  of  adopted  and  envisaged 
measures across the different functional areas of the justice systems of Member States.  

 Figure  1:  Legislative  and  regulatory  activity  concerning  justice  systems  in  2018  (adopted 
measures/initiatives under negotiation per Member State) (source: European Commission (32)) 

In 2018, procedural law continued to be an area of particular focus in many Member States and a 
significant amount of legislative activity was either ongoing or planned for the near future. The 
status  of  judges,  reforms  in  the  area  of  legal  professionals,  ICT  development,  legal  aid  and 
measures to  optimize judicial  maps also  saw elevated activity.  A comparison  with  the previous 
Scoreboard  shows  that  the  level  of  activity  gathered  further  momentum  in  certain  areas  as 
Member  States  followed-up  on  earlier  announced  reform  plans  while  in  some  areas,  further 
reforms  are  to  be  expected  in  the  near  future.  This  also  confirms  the  observation  that  justice 
reforms take time  sometimes several years from their initial announcement until the adoption of 
legislative and regulatory measures and their actual implementation. 

32 

The  information  has  been  collected  in  cooperation  with  the  group  of  contact  persons  on  national  justice 
systems for 26 Member States. The UK did not submit information. DE explained that a number of reforms 
are under way as regards judiciary, where the scope and scale of the reform process can vary within the 16 
federal states. 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
2.2. Monitoring of justice reforms 

In 2018, the Commission continued to monitor reform efforts undertaken by Member States. 

 Results of the 2018 European Semester – 

Improving  the  independence,  quality  and  efficiency  of  justice  systems  is  a  well-established 
priority  of  the  structural  reforms  encouraged  through  the  European  Semester.  The  European 
Semester cycle starts every year in November when the Commission presents its priorities for the 
next year (Communication on the Annual Growth Survey). In February, the Commission services 
present country specific assessments in the Country Reports covering all matters dealt with by the 
Semester.  In  May/June,  the  Commission  presents  its  proposals  for  the  country-specific 
recommendations  that  are  addressed  to  Member  States.  These  recommendations  are  adopted  in 
July by the Council after having been endorsed by the European Council. 

In  the  2018  European  Semester,  based  on  a  proposal  from  the  Commission,  the  Council 
addressed  country-specific  recommendations  to  five  Member  States  relating  to  their  justice 
system (33). In addition to those Member States that received country specific recommendations, 
a  further  11  Member  States  are  facing  specific  challenges  as  regards  their  justice  systems, 
including  the  rule  of  law  and  the  independence  of  justice,  which  are  being  monitored  by  the 
Commission through the European Semester (34). 

 2018 Reports under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism – 

The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) was set up at the accession of Bulgaria and 
Romania to the European Union in 2007 (35) to address shortcomings in judicial reform and the 
fight  against  corruption  and,  as  regards  Bulgaria,  also  the  fight  against  organised  crime.  Since 
then,  CVM  reports  have  sought  to  help  focus  the  efforts  of  the  Bulgarian  and  Romanian 
authorities through specific recommendations, and have charted the progress made (36).  

In  the  November  2018  CVM  reports,  the  Commission  took  stock  of  progress  against  the 
recommendations that were contained in the previous reports. The report on Romania noted that 

33  

34 

35  

36  

HR,  IT,  CY,  PT,  SK.  See  Council  Recommendation  of  13 July  2018  on  the  2018   National  Reform 
Programme  of  Croatia  and  delivering  a  Council  opinion  on  the  2018  Convergence  Programme  of  Croatia 
(2018/C 320/10); Council Recommendation of 13 July 2018 on the 2018 National Reform Programme of Italy 
and  delivering  a  Council  opinion  on  the  2018 Stability  Programme  of  Italy,  (2018/C  320/11);  Council 
Recommendation  of  13 July  2018  on  the  2018 National  Reform  Programme  of  Cyprus  and  delivering  a 
Council opinion on the 2018 Stability Programme of Cyprus, (2018/C 320/12); Council Recommendation of 
13 July 2018 on the 2018 National Reform Programme of Portugal and delivering a  Council opinion on the 
2018 Stability  Programme  of  Portugal,  (2018/C  320/21);  Council  Recommendation  of  13 July  2018  on  the 
2018 National  Reform  Programme  of  Slovakia  and  delivering  a  Council  opinion  on  the  2018 Stability 
Programme of Slovakia, (2018/C 320/24). 
BE, BG, IE, EL, ES, LV, HU, MT, PL, RO, SI.  These challenges have been reflected in the recitals of the 
Country-Specific Recommendations and the country reports relating to these Member States. The most recent 
at: 
2019, 
2019 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2019-european-semester-country-reports_en 
Conclusions of the Council of Ministers, 17 October 2006 (13339/06); Commission Decision of 13 December 
2006  establishing  a  mechanism  for  cooperation  and  verification  of  progress  in  Bulgaria  to  address  specific 
benchmarks  in  the  areas  of  judicial  reform  and  the  fight  against  corruption  and  organised  crime  (notified 
under document number C(2006) 6570). 
Conclusions of the Council of Ministers, 17 October 2006 (13339/06); Commission Decision of 13 December 
2006  establishing  a  mechanism  for  cooperation  and  verification  of  progress  in  Romania  to  address  specific 
benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption (notified under document number 
C (2006) 6569). 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/rule-law/assistance-
bulgaria-and-romania-under-cvm/reports-progress-bulgaria-and-romania_en  

published 

available 

February 

country 

reports, 

are 

27 

on 

8 

 
 
                                                           
while  Romania  had  taken  some  steps  to  implement  the  final  recommendations,  recent 
developments  reversed  the  course  of  progress  and  called  into  question  the  positive  assessment 
made  back  in  January  2017.  For  Bulgaria,  the  report  came  to  the  conclusion  that  several 
recommendations  had  already  been  implemented  and  a  number  of  others  were  close  to 
implementation. The Commission has given appropriate follow-up to both these reports. 

2.3. Supporting justice reforms  

 European Structural and Investment Funds  

The Commission financially supports certain justice reforms through the European Structural and 
Investment  Funds  (ESI  Funds).  Since  2007,  16  Member  States  have  used  both  the  European 
Social  Fund  (ESF)  and  the  European  Regional  Development  Fund  (ERDF)  to  improve  the 
effectiveness of their justice systems (37). Between 2007 and 2020, more than EUR 900 million 
will have been committed to increasing the efficiency and improve the quality of justice systems 
in these Member States (38). Funded activities include:  

  Developing and upgrading business processes in courts and introducing case management 

systems or developing or upgrading human resources management processes; 

  Digitalisation  of  court  services  and  purchase  of  information  and  communication 

technology (ICT) systems; 

  Providing training to judges, prosecutors, court staff, bailiffs, public notaries, lawyers and 

raising citizens’ awareness of their rights. 

The  Commission  pays  particular  attention  to  ensure  that  EU  funds  are  adequately  used  for  the 
appropriate  reforms  in  line  with  rule  of  law.  The  Commission  emphasises  the  importance  of 
taking  a  result-oriented  approach  when  implementing  the  funding  priorities  and  calls  upon 
Member States to evaluate the impact of ESI Funds support. 

 Technical support  

Member  States  are  also  drawing  on  the  Commission’s  technical  support  available  through  the 
Structural Reform Support Service (SRSS) under the Structural Reform Support Programme (39) 
which  has  a  total  budget  of  EUR  222.8  million  over  the  period  2017-2020.  Since  2017,  16 
Member States (40) have already been  receiving or have requested technical  support for a wide 
range of areas. This includes for example technical support to improve the efficiency of the court 
system, for reforming the judicial map, on court organisation, on the design or implementation of 
e-justice  programmes  and  cyber  justice,  on  case-management  systems,  on  the  selection  and 
promotion  process  for  judges,  for  the  training  of  judges  and  for  the  out-of-court  resolution  of 
consumer  disputes.  In  May  2018,  the  Commission  also  presented  its  proposals  for  the  next 
multiannual financing period 2021-2027 and in particular for a new Reform Support Programme 
with an overall budget of EUR 25 billion to provide financial and technical support to all Member 

37  
38  

39 

40  

BG, CZ, EE, EL, ES, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, PL, PT, RO, SI, and SK. 
The  information  presented  is  based  on  data  collected  in  autumn  2017  and  updated  in  June  2018.  Since  the 
current  programming  period  2014  –  2020  is  ongoing,  the  total  amounts  dedicated  to  justice  systems  may 
increase  and the allocations to the various types of activities  may change until the end  of the programming 
period in 2023. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes/overview-funding-
programmes/structural-reform-support-programme-srsp_en 
BE, BG, CZ, EE, EL, ES, HR, IT, CY, LV, HU, MT, PL, PT, SI and SK. 

9 

 
 
                                                           
States in order to pursue and implement reforms aimed at modernising their economies, notably 
reform priorities identified in the context of the European Semester (41). 

2.4. Guaranteeing judicial independence  

There  are  various  instruments  the  EU  is  using  with  a  view  to  enforce  the  respect  of  judicial 
independence in Member States in order to protect the functioning of the Union. 

 Infringement proceedings and rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union – 

The  Commission  is  committed  to  pursuing  cases  where  national  law  prevents  national  judicial 
systems from ensuring that EU law is applied effectively in line with the requirements of the rule 
of law and Article 47 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the EU (42). 

In  September  2018,  the  Commission  decided  to  refer  Poland  to  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the 
European  Union  for  violation  of  judicial  irremovability  and  independence  by  the  Law  on  the 
Supreme Court (43). The Commission’s concerns relate to  the abrupt  lowering of the retirement 
age of Supreme Court judges and the discretionary power given to the President of the Republic 
to prolong the active service of these judges without any clear criteria and no judicial review of 
the  final  decision  taken  in  this  respect,  which  the  Commission  considers  a  violation  of  Article 
19(1)  TEU  read  in  connection  with  Article  47  of  the  Charter  (44).  On  17  December  2018,  the 
Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  issued  interim  measures,  as  requested  by  the 
Commission, ordering Poland to restore the Supreme Court to its situation before 3 April 2018, 
when the contested law entered into force, until the final judgment is rendered in the case (45). On 
1 January 2019, a law adopted by the Polish Parliament to implement the Court’s order entered 
into  force.  On  11  April  2019,  the  Advocate  General  at  the  Court  of  Justice  considered  that  the 
Court  should  rule  that  the  provisions  of  Polish  legislation  relating  to  the  lowering  of  the 
retirement age for Supreme Court judges are contrary to EU law as they violate the principles of 
irremovability of judges and of judicial independence (46). 

On  3  April  2019,  the  Commission  launched  an  infringement  procedure  by  sending  a  Letter  of 
Formal Notice to Poland regarding the new disciplinary regime for ordinary court judges, on the 
grounds  that  it  undermines  their  judicial  independence  by  not  offering  necessary  guarantees  to 
protect them from political control (47). 

The importance for Member States to ensure the independence of national courts, as a matter of 
EU  law,  has  been  highlighted  by  the  recent  case  law  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European 
Union  (48).  In  particular,  the  Court  clarified  that  the  requirement  of  judicial  independence  also 

41  

42 

43  

44  
45  
46  

47  

48  

See  press  release  IP/18/3972,  31  May  2018,  available  at:  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-
3972_en.htm  
Communication  from  the  Commission  —  EU  law:  Better  results  through  better  application  (2017/C  18/02) 
(OJ C 18, 19.1.2017, p. 10–20). 
In  December  2017,  the  Commission  decided  to  refer  the  Polish  Government  to  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the 
European  Union  for  breach  of  EU  law  by  the  Law  on  the  Ordinary  Courts  Organisation.  The  Commission 
considers that the law in question violates Article 19(1) TEU in combination with Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. For more details, see: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5367_en.pdf  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-5830_en.htm  
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-12/cp180204en.pdf  
See Opinion of Advocate General E. Tanchev of 11 April 2019, European Commission v Republic of Poland, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:325. 
See  press  release  IP/19/1957,  3  April  2019,  available  at:  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-
1957_en.pdf  
See in particular the judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos 
Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas, C-64/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, available at: https://goo.gl/utc5GR. 

10 

 
 
                                                           
 
means that the disciplinary regime governing those who have the task of adjudicating in a dispute 
must display the necessary guarantees in order to prevent any risk of it being used as a system of 
political control of the content of judicial decisions (49).  

In 2018, a number of national courts seized the Court of Justice of the European Union within the 
preliminary  reference  mechanism  (Article  267  TFEU),  seeking  clarifications  on  the  EU  law 
requirements of judicial independence. In particular, the Polish Supreme Court referred six such 
cases (50), the Polish Supreme Administrative Court one (51), and ordinary courts three (52) (53). 

 Article 7 TEU proceedings and the rule of law framework  

Article 7(1) TEU provides for a preventive mechanism that can be activated in case of a "clear 
risk of a serious breach" of the values set out in Article 2 TEU and Article 7(2) TEU provides for 
a sanctioning mechanism only in case of a "serious and persistent breach by a Member State" of 
these values. The Rule of Law Framework was set out by the Commission in 2014 (54), and its 
role  has  been  acknowledged  by  the  Court  (55).  It  provides  a  staged  process  of  dialogue  with  a 
Member State, structured with opinions and recommendations from the Commission. The goal is 
to prevent the emergence of a systemic threat to the rule of law, at which point an Article 7 TEU 
procedure would be required. The first – and so far only – time the Rule of Law Framework has 
been used came with the start of a dialogue with Poland in January 2016 (56). While the dialogue 
helped identifying problems and framing the discussion, it did not solve the detected rule of law 
deficiencies  and  the  Commission  triggered  the  Article  7(1)  TEU  procedure  in  December  2017 
(57).  On  26  June,  18  September,  and  11  December  2018,  the  Council  held  three  hearings  on 
Poland in the framework of Article 7(1) TEU. 

On  12  September  2018,  the  European  Parliament  submitted  a  reasoned  proposal  in  accordance 
with Article 7(1) TEU for the Council to determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by 
Hungary of the fundamental values of the EU (58). 

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 25 July 2018, LM, C-216/18 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, 
available at: https://goo.gl/ty1fnk. 
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 25 July 2018, LM, C-216/18 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, para. 
67, available at: https://goo.gl/ty1fnk. 
Cases C-522/18; C-537/18; C-585/18; C-624/18; C-625/18; C-668/18. 
Case C-824/18. 
Cases C-558/18; C-563/18; C-623/18. 
These requests for preliminary rulings concern, i.a., the compliance of the new disciplinary regime for judges, 
of  the  composition  of  the  National  Council  for  the  Judiciary,  and  of  the  newly  established  disciplinary 
chamber of the Supreme Court, with EU requirements on judicial independence. 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 11 March 2014, ‘A new 
EU  Framework  to  Strengthen  the  Rule  of  Law’,  COM(2014)  158  final/2.  See  also  press  release  IP-14-237, 
11 March 2014, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-237_en.htm 
See case C-619/18 R, Commission v Poland, order of 17 December 2018. 
The dialogue took place from January 2016 to December 2017. The Commission adopted one opinion on 1 
June 2016 and four recommendations on 27 July 2016, 21 December 2016, 26 July 2017 and 20 December 
2017. On 20 December 2017, the Commission concluded that there is a clear risk of a serious breach of the 
rule of law in Poland and therefore proposed to the Council to adopt a decision under Article 7(1) TEU. 
COM(2017) 835 final. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20180906IPR12104/rule-of-law-in-hungary-parliament-
calls-on-the-eu-to-act   

49  

50  
51  
52  
53  

54  

55  
56  

57  
58  

11 

 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
3. 

KEY FINDINGS OF THE 2019 EU JUSTICE SCOREBOARD 

Efficiency, quality and independence are the main parameters of an effective justice system, and 
the Scoreboard presents indicators on all three. 

3.1. Efficiency of justice systems 

The Scoreboard presents indicators for the efficiency of proceedings in the broad areas of civil, 
commercial  and  administrative  cases  and  in  specific  areas  where  administrative  authorities  and 
courts apply EU law (59). 

3.1.1. Developments in caseload 

The  caseload  of  Member  States’  justice  systems  is  high  and  remains  stable,  even  if  it  varies 
considerably between Member States (Figure 2). This shows the importance of continuing efforts 
to ensure the effectiveness of justice system. 

Figure  2:  Number  of  incoming  civil,  commercial,  administrative  and  other  cases  (*)  (1st 
instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study (60)) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, 
non-litigious  land  and  business  registry  cases,  other  registry  cases,  other  non-litigious  cases,  administrative  law 
cases and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in SK. 

59  

60  

The  enforcement  of  court  decisions  is  also  important  for  the  efficiency  of  a  justice  system.  However, 
comparable data are not available in most Member States. 
2019 Study  on  the  functioning  of  judicial  systems  in  the  EU  Member  States,  carried  out  by  the  CEPEJ 
Secretariat  for  the  Commission:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-
justice/eu-justice-scoreboard_en 

12 

 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 3: Number of incoming  civil and commercial litigious cases (*) (1st instance/per 100 
inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, litigious civil/commercial cases concern disputes between parties, e.g. disputes 
regarding  contracts.  Non-litigious  civil/commercial  cases  concern  uncontested  proceedings,  e.g.  uncontested 
payment orders. Methodology changes in EL and SK. Data for NL include non-litigious cases. 

Figure  4:  Number  of  incoming  administrative  cases  (*)  (1st  instance/per  100  inhabitants) 
(source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, administrative law cases concern disputes between citizens and local, regional 
or  national  authorities.  Methodology  changes  in  EL  and  SK.  DK  and  IE  do  not  record  administrative  cases 
separately. 

13 

 
 
 
 
3.1.2. General data on efficiency 

The  indicators  on  the  efficiency  of  proceedings  in  the  broad  areas  of  civil,  commercial  and 
administrative cases are: length of proceedings (disposition time); clearance rate; and number of 
pending cases. 

 Length of proceedings – 

The length of proceedings indicates the estimated time (in days) needed to resolve a case in court, 
meaning the time taken by the court to reach a decision at first instance. The ‘disposition time’ 
indicator is the number of unresolved cases divided by the number of resolved cases at the end of 
a year multiplied by 365 (days) (61). Figures mostly concern proceedings at first instance courts 
and  compare,  where  available,  data  for  2010,  2015,  2016  and  2017  (62).  Two  figures  show  the 
disposition  time in  2017 in  civil  and commercial litigious  cases,  and administrative cases  at  all 
court instances. 

Figure  5:  Time  needed  to  resolve  civil,  commercial,  administrative  and  other  cases  (*) 
(1st instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, 
non-litigious  land  and  business  registry  cases,  other  registry  cases,  other  non-litigious  cases,  administrative  law 
cases  and  other  non-criminal  cases.  Methodology  changes  in  SK.  Pending  cases  include  all  instances  in  CZ  and, 
until 2016, in SK. 

61 

62 

Length of proceedings, clearance rate and number of pending cases are standard indicators defined by CEPEJ: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default_en.asp 
The years were chosen to keep the seven-year perspective with 2010 as a baseline, while at the same time not 
overcrowding the figures. Data for 2012, 2013 and 2014 are available in the CEPEJ report. 

14 

 
 
                                                           
Figure  6:  Time  needed 
to  resolve 
(1st instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

litigious  civil  and  commercial  cases 

(*)  

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, litigious civil/commercial cases concern disputes between parties, e.g. disputes 
regarding  contracts.  Non-litigious  civil/commercial  cases  concern  uncontested  proceedings,  e.g.  uncontested 
payment orders. Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include all instances in CZ and, until 2016, in 
SK. Data for NL include non-litigious cases. 

Figure  7:  Time  needed  to  resolve  litigious  civil  and  commercial  cases  (*)  at  all  court 
instances in 2017 (1st, 2nd and 3rd instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*)  The  order  is  determined  by  the  court  instance  with  the  longest  proceedings  in  each  Member  State.  No  data 
available for first and second instance courts in BE, BG and IE, for second and third instance courts in NL and AT, 
for third instance courts in HR. No third instance court in MT. Access to third instance court may be limited in some 
Member States. 

15 

 
 
 
Figure  8:  Time  needed  to  resolve  administrative  cases  (*)  (1st  instance/in  days)  (source: 
CEPEJ study 

(*) Administrative law cases concern disputes between citizens and local, regional or national authorities, under the 
CEPEJ  methodology.  Methodology  changes  in  EL  and  SK.  Pending  cases  include  all  court  instances  in  CZ  and, 
until 2016, in SK. DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately. 

Figure  9:  Time  needed  to  resolve  administrative  cases  (*)  at  all  court  instances  in  2017  
(1st and, where applicable, 2nd and 3rd instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*)  The  order  is  determined  by  the  court  instance  with  the  longest  proceedings  in  each  Member  State.  No  data 
available: for first instance court in LU, for second instance courts in MT and RO, and for third instance court in 
NL.  The  supreme  or  another  highest  court  is  the  only  appeal  instance  in  CZ,  IT,  CY,  AT,  SI  and  FI.  No  third 
instance court for these types of cases in HR, LT, LU, and MT. The highest Administrative Court is the first and only 
instance for certain cases in BE. Access to third instance court may be limited in some Member States.  DK and IE 
do not record administrative cases separately. 

 Clearance rate – 

The  clearance  rate  is  the  ratio  of  the  number  of  resolved  cases  over  the  number  of  incoming 
cases. It measures whether a court is keeping up with its incoming caseload. When the clearance 
rate is about 100 % or higher, it means the judicial system is able to resolve at least as many cases 
as that come in. When the clearance rate is below 100 %, it means that the courts are resolving 
fewer cases than the number of incoming cases. 

16 

 
 
 
 
Figure  10:  Rate  of  resolving  civil,  commercial,  administrative  and  other  cases  (*)  
(1st instance/in % — values higher than 100 % indicate that more cases are resolved than come 
in,  while  values  below  100 %  indicate  that  fewer  cases  are  resolved  than  come  in)  (source: 
CEPEJ study) 

(*)  Methodology  changes  in  SK.  IE:  the  number  of  resolved  cases  is  expected  to  be  underreported  due  to  the 
methodology. 

Figure  11:  Rate  of  resolving  litigious  civil  and  commercial  cases  (*)  (1st  instance/in  %) 
(source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Methodology changes in EL and SK. IE: the number of resolved cases is expected to be underreported due to the 
methodology. Data for NL include non-litigious cases. 

17 

 
 
 
Figure 12: Rate of resolving administrative cases (*) (1st instance/in %) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Past values for some  Member States have been reduced for presentation purposes (MT in 2015=411 %; IT in 
2010=316 %); Methodology changes in EL and SK. DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately. 

 Pending cases – 

The number of pending cases expresses the number of cases that remains to be dealt with at the 
end of the year in question. It also influences the disposition time. 

Figure  13:  Number  of  pending  civil,  commercial  and  administrative  and  other  cases  (*)  
(1st instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Methodology changes in SK. Pending cases include all instances in CZ and, until 2016, in SK. 

18 

 
 
Figure  14: Number of pending litigious  civil  and commercial cases  (*) (1st instance/per 100 
inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include all instances in CZ and, until 2016, in SK. Data for 
NL include non-litigious cases. 

Figure  15:  Number  of  pending  administrative  cases  (*)  (1st  instance/per  100  inhabitants) 
(source: CEPEJ study) 

(*)  Past  values  for  some  Member  States  have  been  reduced  for  presentation  purposes  (EL  in  2010=3.7). 
Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include all instances in CZ and, until 2016, in SK. DK and IE 
do not record administrative cases separately. 

19 

 
 
 
 
3.1.3. Efficiency in specific areas of EU law 

This section complements the general data on the efficiency of justice systems and presents the 
average  length  of  proceedings  (63)  in  specific  areas  when  EU  law  is  involved.  The  2019 
Scoreboard builds on previous data in the areas of competition, electronic communications, EU 
trademark, and anti-money laundering. The areas are selected because of their relevance for the 
single market and the business environment. In general, long delays in judicial proceedings may 
have negative consequences on rights stemming from EU law, e.g. when appropriate remedies are 
no longer available or serious financial damages become irrecoverable. 

– Competition – 

Effective  enforcement  of  competition  law  ensures  a  level  playing  field  for  businesses  and  is 
therefore essential for an attractive business environment. Figure 16 below presents the average 
length  of  cases  against  decisions  of  national  competition  authorities  applying  Articles  101  and 
102 TFEU (64). 

Figure 16: Competition: Average length of judicial review (*) (1st instance/in days) (source: 
European Commission with the European Competition Network) 

(*)  EE: no cases.  IE and AT: scenario is not applicable as the authorities do not have  powers to take  respective 
decisions.  AT: data includes cases decided by the Cartel Court involving an infringement of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU, but not based on appeals against the national competition authority. An estimation of length was used in BG, 
IT. An empty column can indicate that the Member State reported no cases for the year. The number of cases is low 
(below 5 per year) in many Member States, which can make the annual data dependent on one exceptionally long or 
short  case.  A  number  of  the  longest  cases  in  the  dataset  included  the  time  needed  for  a reference  to  the  Court  of 
Justice  of  the  European  Union  (e.g.  LT), a  constitutional  review  (e.g.  SK)  or  specific  procedural delays  (e.g.  CZ, 
EL, HU). 

63  

64  

The  length  of  proceedings  in  specific  areas  is  calculated  in  calendar  days,  counting  from  the  day  when  an 
action or appeal was lodged before the court (or the indictment became final) and the day on which the court 
adopted its decision (Figures 18-21, 23 and 24). Values are ranked based on a weighted average of data for 
2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 for Figures 18-21, data for 2015 and 2016 for Figure 23, and data for 2014, 2015 
and 2016 for Figures 22 and 24. Where data was not available for all years, the average reflects the available 
data, calculated based on all cases, a sample of cases or estimations. 
See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN. 

20 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
– Electronic communications – 

The objective of EU electronic communications legislation is to raise competition, to contribute 
to the development of the single market and to generate investment, innovation and growth. The 
positive effects for consumers can be achieved through effective enforcement of this legislation 
which can lead to lower end-user prices and better quality services. Figure 17 below presents the 
average  length  of  judicial  review  cases  against  decisions  of  national  regulatory  authorities 
applying EU law on electronic communications (65). It covers a broad spectrum of cases, ranging 
from more complex ‘market analysis’ reviews to consumer-focused issues. 

Figure  17:  Electronic  communications:  Average  length  of  judicial  review  cases  (*)  
(1st instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the Communications Committee) 

(*)  The  number  of  cases  varies  by  Member  State.  An  empty  column  indicates  that  the  Member  State  reported  no 
cases for the year (except PT for 2017: no data). In some court instances, the limited number of relevant cases (LV, 
LT, MT, SK, SE) can make the annual data dependent on one exceptionally long or short case and result in large 
variations from one year to the other.  DK: quasi-judicial body in charge of 1st instance appeals. ES, AT, and PL: 
different  courts  in  charge  depending  on  the  subject  matter.  MT:  an  exceptionally  long  case  of  2  500  days  was 
reported in 2016, which related to a complex issue whereby a local authority, together with several residents, filed 
proceedings in relation to alleged harmful emissions from base mobile radiocommunications stations. 

– EU trademark – 

Effective  enforcement  of  intellectual  property  rights  is  essential  to  stimulate  investment  into 
innovation.  EU legislation on EU trademarks (66) gives a significant  role to  the national  courts, 
which  act  as  EU  courts  and  take  decisions  affecting  the  single  market.  Figure  18  below  shows 
average length of EU trademark infringement cases in litigation among private parties. 

65  

66  

The  calculation  has  been  made  based  on  the  length  of  cases  of  appeal  against  national  regulatory  authority 
decisions applying national laws  that implement the Regulatory Framework  for Electronic Communications 
(Directives  2002/19/EC  (Access  Directive),  Directive  2002/20/EC  (Authorisation  Directive),  Directive 
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service Directive), and other relevant 
EU  law  such  as  the  Radio  Spectrum  Policy  Programme,  Commission  Spectrum  Decisions,  excluding 
Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy and electronic communications. 
Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European 
Union trade mark (OJ L 154, 16.62017, p. 1-99). 

21 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  18:  EU  trademark:  Average  length  of  EU  trademark  infringement  cases  (*)  
(1st  instance/in  days)  (source:  European  Commission  with  the  European  Observatory  on 
infringements of intellectual property rights) 

(*) FR, IT, LT, LU: a sample of cases used for data of certain years. BG: estimation by courts used for 2016. PL: 
estimation by courts used for 2015. Particularly long cases affecting the average reported in  EE, IE, LV and SE. 
EL: data based on weighted average length from two courts. ES: cases concerning other EU IP titles are included in 
the calculation of average length. DK: data from all trademark cases - not only EU - in Commercial and Maritime 
High Courts.  

– Money Laundering – 

In addition to contributing to the fight against crime, the effectiveness of the fight against money 
laundering  is  crucial  for  the  soundness,  integrity  and  stability  of  the  financial  sector,  the 
confidence in the financial system and fair competition in the single market (67). As underlined by 
the  International  Monetary  Fund,  money  laundering  can  discourage  foreign  investment,  distort 
international  capital  flows  and  have  negative  consequences  for  a  country’s  macroeconomic 
performance,  resulting  in  welfare  losses,  draining  resources  from  more  productive  economic 
activities  (68).  The  Anti-Money  Laundering  Directive  requires  Member  States  to  maintain 
statistics on the effectiveness of their systems to combat money laundering or terrorist financing 
(69). In cooperation with Member States, an updated questionnaire collected data on the judicial 
phases of the national anti-money laundering regimes. Figure 19 shows the average length of first 
instance court cases dealing with money laundering criminal offences. 

67 

68  

69  

Recital 2 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing. 
IMF Factsheet, 6 October 2016: http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/31/Fight-
Against-Money-Laundering-the-Financing-of-Terrorism 
Article 44(1)  of  the  Directive  (EU)  2015/849.  See  also  the  revised  article  44  in  Directive  (EU)  2018/843, 
which entered into force in June 2018 and has to be implemented by Member States by January 2020, at the 
latest.  

22 

 
 
                                                           
Figure 19: Money laundering: Average length of court cases (*) (1st instance/in days) (source: 
European  Commission  with  the  Expert  Group  on  Money  Laundering  and  Financing  of 
Terrorism) 

(*) No data for 2017: LU, AT, CY, PL and FR. ES: estimated length. LV: Due to a relatively low number of cases in 
2016, there are various factors possibly impacting the length of proceeding, e.g. a stay in a single case for objective 
reasons. PL: Calculation of length for 2016 based on a randomly selected sample of cases. SE: calculation in 2017 
based  on  a  sample  of  resolved  cases.  IT:  data  refer  to  the  responding  courts,  covering    about  91%  of  the  total 
proceedings in 2015, and about 99% in 2016 and 2017; data refer to both trial and  preliminary court hearing. 

3.1.4. Summary on the efficiency of justice systems 

An efficient justice system manages its caseload and backlog of cases, and delivers its decisions 
without  undue  delay.  The  main  indicators  used  by  the  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  to  monitor  the 
efficiency of justice systems are therefore the length of proceedings (estimated or average time in 
days needed to resolve a case), the clearance rate (the ratio of the number of resolved cases over 
the number of incoming cases) and the number of pending cases (that remains to be dealt with at 
the end of the year). 

General data on efficiency 

The 2019 EU Justice Scoreboard contains data on efficiency spanning eight  years (2010-2017). 
This time-span allows to identify certain trends and to take into account that justice reforms often 
take time to show their impact. 

Looking at the available data since 2010 in civil, commercial and administrative cases, efficiency 
has improved or remained stable in eleven Member States, while it decreased, albeit often only 
marginally, in ten Member States. 

Positive developments can be observed in most of the Member States which have been identified 
in the context of the European Semester as facing specific challenges (70): 

70  

See  Section  2  [HR,  IT,  CY,  PT,  SK,  which  received  2018  European  Semester  Country-Specific 
Recommendations,  and  BE,  BG,  IE,  EL,  ES,  LV,  HU,  MT, PL,  RO,  and  SI  for  which  the  challenges  have 
been  reflected  in  the  recitals  of  the  2018  Country-Specific  Recommendations  and  the  2019  European 
Semester Country Reports relating to those Member States].  
Variance  in  the  results  over  the  eight  years  analysed  may  be  explained  by  contextual  factors  (variations  of 
more  than  10 %  of  incoming  cases  are  not  unusual)  or  systemic  deficiencies  (lack  of  flexibility  and 
responsiveness or inconsistencies in the process of reform). 

23 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
  Since  2010,  in  nearly  all  of  those  Member  States,  the  length  of  first  instance  court 
proceedings  in  the  broad  ‘all  cases’  category  (Figure  5)  and  the  litigious  civil  and 
commercial  cases  (Figure  6)  has  decreased  or  remained  stable.  In  administrative  cases 
(Figure  8),  the  length  of  proceedings  since  2010  decreased  or  remained  stable  in  most  of 
these Member States. However, a few Member States facing the most substantial challenges 
showed an increase in the length of proceedings in 2017. 

  The  Scoreboard  presents  data  on  the  length  of  proceedings  in  all  court  instances  for  the 
litigious civil and commercial (Figure 7) and administrative cases (Figure 9). Data show that 
in a number of Member States identified as facing challenges with the length of proceedings 
in  first  instance  courts,  higher  instance  courts  perform  in  a  more  efficient  manner.  On  the 
contrary, for some other Member States facing challenges, the average length of proceedings 
in higher instance courts is even longer than in first instance courts. 

 

In the broad ‘all cases’, and the litigious civil and commercial cases  categories (Figures 10 
and 11), the overall number of Member States where the  clearance rate is less than 100 % 
has  decreased  since  2010.  In  2017,  nearly  all  Member  States,  including  those  facing 
challenges,  reported  a  high  clearance  rate  (more  than  97 %),  which  means  that  courts  are 
generally  able  to  deal  with  the  incoming  cases  in  these  categories.  In  administrative  cases 
(Figure 12), a larger variation of the clearance rate can be observed from one year to another 
and  while  it  overall  remains  lower  than  in  other  categories  of  cases,  some  Member  States 
have made good progress. 

  Since 2010, progress  is  continuing in  almost  all Member States  facing the most substantial 
challenges with their backlog, regardless of the category of cases. Often substantial progress 
in  reducing  pending  cases  has  been  made  for  both  litigious  civil  and  commercial  cases 
(Figure  14)  and  administrative  cases  (Figure  15).  Despite  these  improvements,  significant 
differences between Member States with comparatively few pending cases and those with a 
high number of pending cases remain. 

Efficiency in specific areas of EU law 

Data on the average length of proceedings in specific areas of EU law (Figures 16-19) provide an 
insight into the functioning of justice systems in these types of business-related disputes.  

Data  on  efficiency  in  specific  areas  of  law  are  collected  on  the  basis  of  narrowly  defined 
scenarios  and  the  number  of  relevant  cases  may  appear  low.  However,  as  compared  to  the 
calculated length of proceedings presented in the general data on efficiency, these figures provide 
for an actual average length of all relevant cases in specific areas in a year. It is therefore worth 
noting  that  several  Member  States  which  do  not  appear  as  facing  challenges  on  the  basis  of 
general data on efficiency report significantly longer average length of cases in specific areas of 
EU  law.  At  the  same  time,  the  length  of  proceedings  in  different  specific  areas  may  also  vary 
considerably in the same Member State. 

The figures in specific areas of  EU law show the following trends : 

  For  competition  cases  (Figure  16),  the  overall  caseload  faced  by  courts  across  Member 
States decreased significantly, resulting in reduced length of judicial review in seven Member 
States,  while  it  remained  stable  or  increased  in  seven  other  Member  States.  As  a  sign  of 
improvement, in 2017, only three Member States reported an average length exceeding 1000 
days compared to eight Member States one year earlier. 

 

In the area of electronic communications (Figure 17), despite marked increase in case-loads 
faced  by  courts,  a  positive  trend,  sometimes  significantly,  in  terms  of  reduced  length  of 
proceedings can be observed across the EU and only very few Member States did not manage 
to reduce or at least maintain previous average lengths of proceedings. 

24 

 
 
  As regards EU trademark infringement cases (Figure 18), in 2017 courts in some Member 
States managed to  cope  better with  caseload  and reduced the time needed to  resolve  cases, 
while in others, the average length increased quite significantly. 

  The  effective  fight  against  money  laundering  is  crucial  in  protecting  the  financial  system, 
fair  competition  and  preventing  negative  economic  consequences.    Challenges  in  length  of 
court proceedings when dealing with money laundering offences, may influence the effective 
fight  against  money  laundering.  The  2019  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  presents  updated  data  on 
the length of judicial proceedings dealing with money laundering offences (Figure 19), which 
show that while in about half of Member States the first instance court proceedings take up to 
a  year  on  average,  these  proceedings  take  around  two  years  on  average  in  several  Member 
States facing challenges (71).  

3.2. Quality of justice systems 

There  is  no  single  way  of  measuring  the  quality  of  justice  systems.  The  2019  EU  Justice 
Scoreboard  continues  examining  factors  that  are  generally  accepted  as  relevant  to  improve  the 
quality of justice. As in the previous years, they are grouped into four categories: 

1) accessibility of justice for citizens and businesses; 

2) adequate material and human resources; 

3) putting in place assessment tools; and 

4) using quality standards. 

3.2.1. Accessibility 

Accessibility  is  required  throughout  the  whole  justice  chain  to  enable  obtaining  relevant 
information — about the justice system, how to initiate a claim and the related financial aspects, 
the state of play of proceedings up until their end — so that the judgment can be swiftly accessed 
online (72). 

– Giving information about the justice system – 

Citizen-friendly justice requires that information about the judicial system is provided in a way 
that  is  not  only  easily  accessible  but  also  presents  the  information  in  a  tailor-made  form  for 
specific  groups  of  society  who  would  otherwise  have  difficulties  in  accessing  the  information. 
Figure  20  shows  the  availability  of  online  information  about  specific  aspects  of  the  judicial 
system and for specific groups of society. 

71  

72  

Directive (EU) 2018/1673 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on combating 
money laundering by criminal law  will eliminate  legal obstacles that  may delay prosecution, such as that a 
prosecution  for  money laundering can only start  when the  proceedings  for the  underlying predicate offence 
have been concluded. Member States have to transpose the Directive before 8 December 2020. 
To be noted that the Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative jurisdictions (ACA) has 
published  a  transversal  study  on  ‘Access  to  administrative  supreme  courts  and  to  their  decisions’: 
http://www.juradmin.eu/images/media_kit/aca_surveys/Transversal-Analysis---Annex-1.pdf 

25 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  20:  Availability  of  online  information  about  the  judicial  system  for  the  general 
public(*) (source: European Commission (73)) 

(*) DE: Each federal state and the federal level decide which information to provide online. 

– Legal aid and court fees – 
Access to legal aid is a fundamental right enshrined in the Charter (74). Most Member States grant 
legal aid on the basis of the applicant’s income (75).  

Figure  21  shows  the  availability  of  full  or  partial  legal  aid  in  the  scenario  of  a  claim  of 
EUR 6 000 in the context of each Member State’s income and living conditions (76). It compares 
the  income  thresholds  for  granting  legal  aid,  expressed  as  percentage  of  the  Eurostat  poverty 
threshold in  each Member State. For example, if the threshold for legal  aid  appears at  20 %, it 
means that an applicant with an income 20 % higher than the Eurostat poverty threshold in his or 
her Member State will be still eligible for legal aid. On the contrary, if the threshold for legal aid 
appears at below 0 it means that a person with income below the poverty threshold may not be 
eligible for legal aid.  

Some  Member  States  operate  a  legal  aid  system  that  provides  for  100 %  coverage  of  the  costs 
linked to litigation (full legal aid), complemented by a system covering partial costs (partial legal 
aid), the latter applying eligibility criteria different from that of the former. Other Member States 
operate either only a full or only a partial legal aid system.  

2018 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 
Article 47(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 

73 
74  
75   Member  States  use  different  methods  to  establish  the  eligibility  threshold,  e.g.  different  reference  periods 
(monthly/annual  income).  About  half  of  the  Member  States  also  have  a  threshold  related  to  the  personal 
capital of the applicant. This is not taken into account for this figure. In BE, IE, ES, FR, HR, HU, LT, LV, LU 
and NL certain categories of persons (e.g. individuals who receive certain benefits) are automatically entitled 
to receive legal aid in civil/commercial disputes. Additional criteria that Member States may use such as the 
merit of the case are not reflected in this figure. Although not directly related to the figure, it should be noted 
that in several Member States (AT, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FR, IT, NL, PL, PT, SI, UK(EW)) legal aid is not 
limited to natural persons. 
In  order  to  collect  comparable  data,  each  Member  State’s  respective  Eurostat  poverty  threshold  has  been 
converted to monthly income. The at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) threshold is set at 60 % of the national median 
equivalised disposable household income. European Survey on Income and Living Conditions, Eurostat table 
ilc_li01, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-living-conditions/data/database. 

76  

26 

 
 
                                                           
Figure  21: Income threshold for legal aid in a specific consumer case  (*)  (differences in  % 
from Eurostat poverty threshold) (source: European Commission with the CCBE(77)) 

(*) LV: income thresholds are not comparable with previous year due to adaptation of methodology for calculation. 
EE: decision to grant legal aid is not based on the level of financial resources of the applicant. IE: income threshold 
for full legal aid is not comparable with the previous year due to adaptation of methodology for calculation; partial 
legal aid has to take into account also the disposable assets of the applicant.  

Most  Member  States  require  parties  to  pay  a  court  fee  when  starting  judicial  proceedings. 
Recipients of legal aid are often exempt from paying court fees. Only EE, IE, NL and SI require a 
recipient of legal aid to pay a court fee. In CZ the court decides on an individual basis to exempt 
a legal aid recipient from paying court fees. Figure 22 compares for two scenarios the level of the 
court fee presented as a share of the value of the claim. If, for example, in the figure below the 
court fee appears at 10 % of a EUR 6 000 claim, the consumer will have to pay a EUR 600 court 
fee to start a judicial proceeding. The low value claim is based on the Eurostat poverty threshold 
for each Member State. 

77  

2018  data  collected  through  replies  by  CCBE  members  to  a  questionnaire  based  on  the  following  specific 
scenario:  a  dispute  of  a  consumer  with  a  company  (two  different  values  of  the  claim  have  been  indicated: 
€6 000 and the Eurostat poverty threshold in each Member State). Given that conditions for legal aid depend 
on the applicant’s situation, the following scenario was used: a single 35-year-old employed applicant without 
any dependant and legal expenses insurance, with a regular income and a rented apartment. 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 22: Court fee to start a judicial proceeding in a specific consumer case  (*) (level of 
court fee as a share of the value of the claim) (source: European Commission with the CCBE(78)) 

(*) ‘Low value claim’ is a claim corresponding to the Eurostat poverty threshold for a single person in each Member 
State, converted to monthly income (e.g. in 2018, this value ranged between €110 in RO and €1 716 in LU). BE and 
RO: no information on court fees for a low value claim was provided. LU: Litigants have to pay bailiff fees to start 
proceedings as a plaintiff unless they benefit from legal aid. NL: Court fees for income <€2 242/month.  

– Submitting and following a claim online – 

The  ability  to  complete  specific  steps  in  the  judicial  procedure  by  electronic  means  is  an 
important part of the quality of justice systems because the electronic submission of claims, the 
possibility  to  monitor  and  advance  a  proceeding  online  can  ease  access  to  justice  and  reduce 
delays and costs. ICT systems in courts also play an increasing role in cross-border cooperation 
between judicial authorities and also facilitate the implementation of EU legislation, for example, 
on small claims procedures.  

78  

The data refer to income thresholds valid in 2018 and have been collected through replies by CCBE members 
to  a  questionnaire  based  on  the  following  specific  scenario:  a  dispute  of  a  consumer  with  a  company  (two 
different values of the claim have been indicated: €6 000 and the Eurostat poverty threshold in each Member 
State). 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 23: Availability of electronic means  (*) (0 = available in 0 % of courts, 4 = available 
in 100 % of courts (79)) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) DK and RO: cases may be submitted to courts by email. 

– Information to parties – 

Figure  24  presents  standards  on  the  way  parties  are  informed  and  the  type  of  information  they 
receive  about  the  progress  of  their  case,  with  particular  focus  on  the  use  of  electronic  or 
automatic methods. Certain Member States have an automated e-mail or SMS notification system 
providing  information  about  delays,  timetables  or  general  case  progress.  Others  give  online 
access to the information during the case, while some leave it at the discretion of the courts. 

Figure  24:  Standards  on  information  about  case  progress  (source:  European  Commission 
(80)) 

(*)  Maximum  possible:  16  points.  Member  States  were  awarded  points  depending  on  the  method  used  to  provide 
each type of information. 1.5 points for automatic notification by e-mail or SMS, 1 point for online access to the case 
during the case proceedings, 0.5 points for each information upon request by parties, court discretion or any other 
method used.  LU: communications done by email are not legally binding (still on implementation phase).  SI:  The 

79  

80 

Data concern 2017. Equipment rate  from 100 % (device  completely deployed) to 0 % (device  non-existing) 
indicates  the  functional  presence  in  courts  of  the  device  covered  by  the  graph,  according  to  the  following 
scale: (100 % = 4 points if applicable to all matters / 1.33 points per specific matter; 50-99 % =  3 points if 
applicable to all matters / 1 point per specific  matter; 10-49 % =  2 points if applicable to all  matters / 0.66 
point per specific matter; 1-9 % = 1 point if applicable to all matters / 0.33 points per specific matter. Matter 
relates to the type of litigation handled (civil/commercial, criminal, administrative or other). 
2018 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

29 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
new  Court  Rules  provide  the  obligation  for  courts  to  enable  an  on-line  view  of  data  recorded  in  case  register 
systems. It is still to be implemented.  

– Accessing judgments – 

Ensuring access to judgments online increases the transparency of justice systems, helps citizens 
and  businesses  understand  their  rights  and  can  contribute  to  consistency  in  case-law.  The 
arrangements for online  publication of judgments are essential  for creating user-friendly search 
facilities (81), that make case-law more  accessible  to  legal  professionals  and the general  public. 
The  online  publication  of  court  decisions  requires  balancing  a  variety  of  interests,  within  the 
boundaries  set  by  legal  and  policy  frameworks  (82).  The  European  Commission  supports  open 
data initiatives from the public sector, including the judicial system (83). 

Figure  25:  Online  accessibility  to  published  judgments  to  the  general  public  (*) 
(civil/commercial,  administrative  and  criminal  cases,  all 
instances)  (source:  European 
Commission (84)) 

(*)  Maximum  possible:  9  points.  For  each  court  instance,  one  point  was  given  if  all  judgments  are  available  for 
civil/commercial and administrative and criminal cases respectively (0.5 when some judgments are available). For 
Member  States  with  only  two  court  instances,  points  have  been  given  for  three  court  instances  by  mirroring  the 
respective higher instance court of the non-existing instance. For those  Member States  that do not distinguish the 
two areas of law (civil/commercial and administrative), the same number of points have been given for both areas. 
BG: Court of Cassation criminal decision are all published except those containing classified information.  LU and 
SE:  courts  do  not  publish  judgments  regularly  online  (only  landmark  cases).  LV:  for  judgment  adopted  in  non-
public  hearing, only  the  publicly  announced  parts  are  published  online.  DE:  each  federal  state  decides  on  online 
availability  of  1st  instance  judgments.  IE:  for  criminal  cases,  summary  cases  are  not  generally  the  subject  of  a 
written judgment. CY: for administrative and criminal cases judges decide on which judgments to be published. NL: 
courts decide on publication according to published criteria. PL: for administrative cases, the chief of unit in every 
court  decides  on  the  publication.  PT:  for  civil  and  criminal  cases,  a  commission  within  the  court  decides  on  the 
publication.  

81  

82  

83  
84 

See  Best  practice  guide  for  managing  Supreme  Courts,  under  the  project  Supreme  Courts  as  guarantee  for 
effectiveness of judicial systems, p. 29. 
Conclusions of the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within 
the Council on Best Practices regarding the Online Publication of Court Decisions (OJ C 362, 8.10.2018, p. 
2).  
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/open-data  
2018 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  26:  Arrangements  for  online  publication  of  judgments  in  all  instances  (*) 
instances)  (source:  European 
(civil/commercial,  administrative  and  criminal  cases,  all 
Commission (85)) 

(*)  Maximum  possible:  45  points.  For  each  of  the  three  instances,  three  points  can  be  given  if  civil/commercial, 
administrative and criminal cases are covered. If e.g. only one of the three categories of cases is covered only one 
point  per  instance  is  given.  Where  a  Member  State  has  only  two  instances,  points  have  been  accorded  for  three 
instances by mirroring the respective higher instance of the non-existing instance. For those Member States which 
do not distinguish between administrative and civil/commercial cases, the same points have been allocated for both 
areas  of  law.  CZ:  some  of  the  2nd  instance  judgments  in  civil/commercial  cases  are  assigned  ECLI.  IE: 
Administrative cases are in effect subsumed within the category civil and commercial cases in the Irish legal order. 
NL: no keywords, but a table of contents is added to every published judgment.  

– Accessing alternative dispute resolution methods – 

Figure  27  shows  Member  States’  efforts  in  promoting  the  voluntary  use  of  alternative  dispute 
resolution  methods  through  specific  incentives,  which  may  vary  depending  on  the  area  of  law 
(86).  

85 
86  

2018 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 
The methods to promote and incentivise the use of ADR do not cover compulsory requirements to use ADR 
before  going  to  court,  as  such  requirements  raise  concerns  about  their  compatibility  with  the  right  to  an 
effective remedy before a tribunal enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 

31 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  27:  Promotion  of  and  incentives  for  using  ADR  methods  (*)  (source:  European 
Commission (87)) 

(*)  Maximum  possible:  48  points.  Aggregated  data  based  on  the  following  indicators:  1)  website  providing 
information on ADR, 2) publicity campaigns in media, 3) brochures to the general public, 4) court provides specific 
information sessions on ADR upon request, 5) ADR/mediation coordinator at courts, 6) publication of evaluations 
on  the  use  of  ADR,  7)  publication  of  statistics  on  the  use  of  ADR,  8)  legal  aid  covers  costs  (in  part  or  in  full) 
incurred with ADR, 9) full or partial refund of court fees (including stamp duties, if ADR is successful, 10) no lawyer 
for  ADR  procedure  required,  11)  judge  can  act  as  mediator  and  12)  agreement  reached  by  the  parties  becomes 
enforceable in court. For each of these 12 indicators, one point was given for each area of law. DK: each court has 
an ambassador responsible for promoting the use of mediation. Administrative courts have the possibility to propose 
to the parties to turn to mediation. IE: administrative cases are subsumed within the category civil and commercial 
cases.  EL:  ADR  exists  in  the  area  of  public  procurement  procedure  before  Administrative  Courts  of  appeal.  ES: 
ADR  is  mandatory  in  labour  law  cases.  LT:  a  secretary  at  the  National  Courts  Administration  coordinates  the 
judicial  mediation  processes  in  courts.  PT:  for  civil/commercial  disputes,  court  fees  are  refunded  only  in  case  of 
justices  for  peace.  SK:  the  Slovak  legal  order  does  not  support  the  use  of  ADR  for  administrative  purposes.  SE: 
judges have procedural discretion on ADR. Indeed, seeking friendly settlements is a mandatory task for the  judge 
unless it is inappropriate. 

3.2.2. Resources 

including 

Sufficient  resources, 
technical 
infrastructure, and well-qualified, trained and adequately remunerated personnel of all categories, 
are necessary for the good functioning of the justice system. Without adequate facilities, tools or 
personnel with the required qualifications, skills and access to continuous training, the quality of 
proceedings and decisions is put at stake. 

into  physical  and 

the  necessary 

investments 

– Financial resources – 

The  figures  below  show  the  actual  government  expenditure  on  operation  of  the  justice  system 
(excluding  prisons),  both  per  inhabitant  (Figure  28)  and  as  a  share  of  gross  domestic  product 
(GDP) (Figure 29), the criteria for determining the financial resources (Figure 30), and, finally, 
the main categories of expenditure on law courts (Figure 31) (88). 

2018 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

87 
88    General government total (actual) expenditure on the administration, operation or support of administrative, 
civil  and  criminal  law  courts  and  the  judicial  system,  including  enforcement  of  fines  and  legal  settlements 
imposed by the courts and operation of parole probation systems, and legal aid as well as legal representation 
and  advice  on  behalf  of  government  or  on  behalf  of  others  provided  by  government  in  cash  or  in  services, 
excluding  prison  administrations  (National  Accounts  Data,  Classification  of  the  Functions  of  Government 
(COFOG), group 03.3), Eurostat table gov_10a_exp, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. 

32 

 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 28: General government total expenditure on law courts (*) (in EUR per inhabitant) 
(source: Eurostat) 

(*) Member States are ordered according to the expenditure in 2017 (from highest to lowest). 2017 data for ES, FR, 
HR, NL and SK are provisional.  

Figure 29: General government total expenditure on law courts (*) (as a percentage of GDP) 
(source: Eurostat) 

(*) Member States are ordered according to the expenditure in 2017 (from highest to lowest). 2017 data for ES, FR, 
HR, NL and SK are provisional.  

33 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  30  shows  which  state  power  (judiciary,  legislature  or  executive)  sets  the  criteria  on 
determining financial resources for the judiciary, and the type of criteria used. 

Figure 30: Criteria for determining financial resources for the judiciary (*) (89) 

(*) DK: number of incoming and resolved cases at courts of 1st instance courts are taken into account. DE: only for 
the Supreme Federal Court’s budget — as regards courts of 1st and 2nd instance. Judicial systems vary between the 
federal states. EE: number of incoming and resolved cases for courts of 1st and 2nd instance courts. FR: number of 
incoming and resolved cases for courts of all instances. The number of resolved cases based on an evaluation of the 
costs for courts is taken into account. IT: the Ministry of Justice defines criteria for civil and criminal courts, while 
the Council for the Judiciary (CPGA) defines criteria for administrative courts.  HU: law states that the salaries of 
judges must be determined in the act on the central budget in such a way that the amount must not be lower than it 
had been in the previous year.  NL: the number of resolved cases based on an evaluation of the costs for courts is 
taken into account. FI: The  number of resolved cases based on an evaluation of the  costs  for courts is taken into 
account. 

Figure  31  shows,  for  the  first  time,  the  main  economic  categories  comprising  government 
expenditure  on  law  courts:  1)  wages  and  salaries  of  judges  and  court  staff,  including  social 
contributions  (‘compensation  of  employees’  (90)),  2)  operating  costs  for  goods  and  services 
consumed  by  the  law  courts  such  as  building  rentals,  office  consumables,  energy  and  legal  aid 
(‘intermediate  consumption’  (91)),  3)  investment  in  fixed  assets,  such  as  court  buildings  and 
software (‘gross fixed capital formation’ (92)), and 4) other expenditure. 

89 

90  

91  

92  

imputed  social  contributions 

Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association  with the 
ENCJ. Responses from Member States without Councils for the Judiciary were obtained through cooperation 
with the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU. 
Compensation of employees  consists of  wages and salaries in cash or in kind (D.11) and employer's actual 
and 
(D.121  and  D.122).  See:  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Compensation_of_employees. 
Intermediate consumption is a national accounts concept which measures the value of the goods and services 
consumed  as  inputs  by  a  process  of  production.  It  excludes  fixed  assets  whose  consumption  is  recorded  as 
consumption of fixed capital. The goods and services may be either transformed or used up by the production 
process.  
See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Intermediate_consumption. 
Gross  fixed  capital  formation,  abbreviated  as  GFCF,  consists  of  resident  producers’  investments,  deducting 
disposals, in fixed assets during a given period. It also includes certain additions to the value of non-produced 
assets realized by producers  or institutional units. Fixed assets are tangible or intangible assets produced as 
outputs  from  production  processes  that  are  used  repeatedly,  or  continuously,  for  more  than  one  year.  See 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Gross_fixed_capital_formation_(GFCF). 

34 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 31: General government total expenditure on law courts (in 2017, as a percentage of 
expenditure) (source: Eurostat) 

– Human resources – 

Adequate  human  resources  are  essential  for  the  quality  of  a  justice  system.  Diversity  among 
judges,  including  gender  balance,  adds  complementary  knowledge,  skills  and  experience  and 
reflects the reality of society. 

Figure 32: Number of judges (*) (per 100 000 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*)  This  category  consists  of  judges  working  full-time,  under  the  CEPEJ  methodology.  It  does  not  include  the 
Rechtspfleger/court  clerks  that  exist  in  some  Member  States.  AT:  Data  on  administrative  justice  is  introduced  for 
2016 cycle for the first time. EL: the total number of professional judges includes different categories over the years 
shown above, which partly explains their variation. Since 2016, data on number of professional judges includes all 
the ranks for criminal and political justice as well as administrative judges. IT: The regional administrative courts, 
regional  audit  commissions,  local  tax  commissions  and  military  courts  are  not  taken  into  consideration.  UK: 
weighted average of the three jurisdictions. Data for 2010 contains 2012 data for UK (NI). LU: numbers have been 
revised following an improved methodology. 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  33:  Proportion  of  female  professional  judges  at  1st  and  2nd  instance  courts  in  2017 
(source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) EL: data for 2016. 

Figure 34: Proportion of female professional judges at Supreme Courts in 2017 and 2018 (*) 
(source: European Commission (93)) 

(*) The Member States are in the same order as in Figure 33. 

93  

2018  data.  European 
http://eige.europa.eu/lt/gender-statistics/dgs/indicator/wmidm_jud_natcrt__wmid_natcrt_supcrt . 

for  Gender  Equality,  Gender  Statistics  Database,  available  at: 

Institute 

36 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 35: Number of lawyers (*) (per 100 000 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under CEPEJ methodology a lawyer is a person qualified and authorised according to national law to plead and 
act  on  behalf  of  his  or  her  clients,  to  engage  in  the  practice  of  law,  to  appear  before  the  courts  or  advise  and 
represent  his  or  her  clients  in  legal  matters  (Recommendation  Rec  (2000)21  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the 
Council  of  Europe  on  the  freedom  of  exercise  of  the  profession  of  lawyer).  DE:  no  distinction  is  made  between 
different  groups  of  lawyers  in  Germany,  such  as  between  solicitors  and  barristers.  FI:  since  2015,  the number  of 
lawyers  provided  includes  both  the  number  of  lawyers  working  in  the  private  sector  and  the  number  of  lawyers 
working in the public sector. UK: data for 2010 and 2014. 

– Training – 

Judicial  training  is  important  in  contributing  to  the  quality  of  judicial  decisions  and  the  justice 
service delivered to  citizens. The data set  out  below cover judicial training in  a broad range of 
areas, including communication with parties and the press and on judicial skills.  

Figure 36: Judges participating in continuous training activities in EU law or in the law of 
another  Member  State  (*)  (as  a  percentage  of  total  number  of  judges)  (source:  European 
Commission (94)) 

(*) Values for some Member States have been reduced for presentation purposes (SI=257%). In several Member States the ratio 
of  participants  exceeds  100 %,  meaning  that  some  participants  attended  more  than  one  training  activity.  DK:  including  court 
staff. IT: The regional administrative courts, regional audit commissions, local tax commissions and military courts are not taken 
into consideration. AT: including prosecutors. UK: Data are for 2016.  

94 

2017 data collected in cooperation with the European Judicial Training Network and CEPEJ. 

37 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  37:  Share  of  continuous  training  of  judges  on  various  types  of  skills  (*)  (as  a 
percentage  of  total  number  of  judges  receiving  these  types  of  training)  (source:  European 
Commission (95)) 

(*) The table shows the distribution of judges participating in continuous training activities (i.e. those taking place after the initial 
training period to become a judge) in each of the four identified areas as a percentage of the total number of judges trained in 
these types of training. Legal training activities are not taken into account. Judicial training authorities in EL, CY, LU and MT 
did not provide specific training activities on the selected skills. DK: including court staff. AT: including prosecutors. UK 
data are for England and Wales.  

Figure  38:  Availability  of  training  for  judges  on  communication  (*)  (source:  European 
Commission (96)) 

(*)  Maximum  possible:  12  points.  Member  States  were  given  1  point  if  they  have  initial  training  and  1  point  if  they  have 
continuous training (maximum of 2 points for each type of training). DK: no training is offered on communicating with people 
who are visually or hearing impaired because the state offers a visually or hearing impaired people support in form of tools or an 
assistant in the courtroom, e.g. a deaf interpreter.  

3.2.3. Assessment tools 

Monitoring and evaluation of court activities help to detect shortcomings and needs, and therefore 
help the justice system increase its quality. Regular evaluation could improve the justice system’s 
responsiveness to current and future challenges. Adequate ICT tools could provide real-time case 

95 

96 

2017  data  collected  in  cooperation  with  the  European  Judicial  Training  Network  and  CEPEJ.  ‘Judgecraft’ 
includes activities such as conducting hearings, writing decisions or rhetoric. 
2018 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

38 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
management  systems  and  could  help  to  provide  nationwide  standardised  court  statistics.  In 
addition,  they  could  be  used  for  the  management  of  backlogs  and  automated  early-warning 
systems. Surveys are essential to assess how justice systems operate from the perspective of legal 
professionals and court users. An adequate follow-up of surveys is a prerequisite to improve the 
quality of justice systems.  

Figure 39: Availability of monitoring and evaluation of court activities  (*) (source: CEPEJ 
study (97)) 

(*)  The  evaluation  system  refers  to  the  performance  of  court  systems,  using  indicators  and  targets.  In  2018,  all 
Member States reported having a system that  allows them to monitor the number of incoming cases and delivered 
decisions, as well as the length of proceedings making these categories superfluous for the above figure. Similarly, 
the  more  in-depth  work  on  quality  standards  has  superseded  their  use  as  an  evaluation  category.  Data  on  ‘other 
elements’  include  e.g.  clearance  rate  (AT,  FR),  number  of  appealed  cases  and  enforcement  procedures  (ES), 
number of cases according to types of disputes (SK), outcome of the case, e.g. full or partial satisfaction (SK), final 
convictions and suspended cases (RO) and number of court sessions (PL). 

Figure  40:  Availability  of  ICT  for  case  management  and  court  activity  statistics  
(0 = available in 0 % of courts, 4 = available in 100 % of courts (98)) (source: CEPEJ study) 

97  
98  

2017 data. 
2017 data. Equipment rate from 100 % (device completely deployed) to 0 % (device non-existing) indicates 
the functional presence in courts of the device covered by the graph, according to the following scale: 100 % 
= 4 points if applicable to all matters / 1.33 points per specific matter; 50-99 % = 3 points if applicable to all 
matters / 1 point per specific matter; 10-49 % = 2 points if applicable to all matters / 0.66 point per specific 
matter; 1-9 % = 1 point if applicable to all matters / 0.33 points per specific matter. Matter relates to the type 
of litigation handled (civil/commercial, criminal, administrative or other). 

39 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 41: Topics of surveys conducted among court users or legal professionals (*) (source: 
European Commission (99)) 

(*) Member States were given one point per survey topic indicated regardless of whether the survey was conducted 
at national, regional or court level. ‘Other topics’ include: physical accessibility (MT); usability of the online portal 
with  court  information  (DK);  access  to  court  ingformation  (PT),  and  availibility  of  readibility  of  forms  and 
instructions  to  complete  them  (PL).  This  category  also  covers  surveys  among  court  staff,  e.g.  integrity  of  judges 
(HU), level of knowledge and personal culture of court service employees (PL) and property profile of the judiciary 
(AT), and qualitative aspects, such as satisfaction (AT), quality of sentencing (MT), loyalty towards the courts (PT) 
and conception of appropriate punishment (FI).  

Figure 42: Follow-up of surveys conducted among court users or legal professionals (*) 
(source: European Commission (100)) 

(*)  Member  States  were  given  one  point  per  type  of  follow-up.  The  category  ‘other  specific  follow-up’  included: 
guideline and framework for new online portal (DK), guideline for policy and operational direction, (MT), improve 
general perceptions about justice system (PT), and publication of informative tools for general public. IE: data refer 
to the probate survey conducted in 2016. 

99 
100 

2017 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 
2017 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

40 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
3.2.4. Standards 

Standards can drive up the quality of justice systems. For the first time, based on data gathered by 
the  Association  of  the  Councils  of  State  and  Supreme  Administrative  Jurisdictions  of  the  EU 
(ACA-Europe)  and  the  Network  of  the  Presidents  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Courts  of  the  EU 
(NPSJC),  the  2019  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  presents  an  overview  of  the  practices  used  at  the 
highest and lower courts that contribute to the quality of judgments (Figure 43).  

Following  the  examination  of  standard  measures  on  timing  and  information  to  parties  in  the 
previous edition, the 2019 EU Justice Scoreboard focuses on timing, backlogs and timeframes as 
a management tool in the judiciary (101). Figure 44 presents an overview of which Member States 
use  standard  measures  on  time  limits,  timeframes  and  backlogs.  Time  limits  are  quantitative 
deadlines, e.g. maximum number of days between the registration of a case until the first hearing. 
Backlogs  are  cases  older  than  an  identified  period  of  time.  Timeframes  are  measurable 
targets/practices e.g. specifying a pre-defined share of cases to be completed within a certain time 
period.  Figure  45  presents  which  bodies  set,  monitor  and  follow-up  on  backlog  standards,  and 
Figure 46 shows in more detail certain aspects related to timeframes.  

– Quality of judgments – 

High quality judicial decisions are generally perceived as those that are clearly drafted, structured 
and  that  strike  a  proper  balance  between  clear  reasoning  and  conciseness,  thus  being  easily 
understood  and  enforceable.  The  wording  and  structure  of  judicial  decisions  may  also  have  an 
impact  on  how  well  they  can  be  processed  by  software  programmes,  in  particular  Natural 
Language  Processing  (NLP)  applications.  This  end  result  can  only  be  achieved  through  the 
combination of a complex and multifaceted set of elements, such as the high quality professional 
training  of  judges,  the  adoption  of  good  pratices  regarding  drafting  and  the  monitoring  of  the 
quality of the decisions,  in the respect of the independence of the judiciary. The Association of 
the  Councils  of  State  and  Supreme  Administrative  Jurisdictions  of  the  EU  (ACA-Europe) 
developed a questionnaire that was replied to by the Supreme Administrative Courts, and by the 
Supreme Courts (members of the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the 
EU  (NPSJC).  Without  entering  into  the  merits  of  individual  decisions,  Figure  43  presents  the 
standards adopted by the Member States regarding selected indicators considered to contribute to 
the overall quality of judgments.  

101  

In  the  EU  Justice  Scoreboard,  the  standards  on  time  limits  and  timeframes  go  beyond  the  requirements 
stemming  from  the  right  to  a  hearing  within  a  reasonable  time  as  enshrined  in  Article 47  of  the  Charter  of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU and in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 

41 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  43:  Standards  applied  to  improve  the  quality  of  judgments  in  highest  courts  (*) 
(source: European Commission with ACA-Europe and NPSJC) 

(*)  For  each  Member  State,  left  column  presents  the  practices  in  Supreme  Courts,  right  column  presents  the 
practices  in  Supreme  Administrative  Courts  (column  marked  with  letter  “A”).  The  Member  States  appear  in  the 
alphabetical order of their geographical  names in the original language. Member States were given one point per 
indicator  of  the  quality  of  judgments.  Training  includes  the  legal  training  of  judges  on  the  structure  of  written 
decisions (0.25 points), legal training of Supreme Courts’ judges on the style of reasoning of written judgments, legal 
training  of  lower  courts’  judges  on  the  style  of  reasoning  of  written  decisions  (0.25  points)  and  training  on  the 
drafting of judgments (university, judges’ school or on the job) (0.25 points). An obligation to use clear and simple 
language is considered to exist whether required by law, regulation or professional practice (1 point). The obligation 
of  conciseness  is  considered  to  be  applicable  whether  based  on  law,  court  regulations  or  practices  (1  point).  The 
assessment of the quality of judgments refers to the existence of an internal mechanism at the level of the Supreme 
Court  to  assess  the  global  quality  of  its  own  decisions  (1  point).  IT,  Corte  Suprema  di  Cassazione:  although  a 
procedural tool for clarification of judgments does not exist, in some situations, certain aspects of the case may still 
be  clarified  at  the  stage  of  the  execution  of  the  decision  before  a  competent  judge.  DK  and  RO:  no  data. 
Participating courts: BE: Cour de Cassation (Supreme Court) and Conseil d’Etat (Council of State) BG: Върховен 
касационен  съд  (Supreme  Court)  and  Върховен  административен  съд  (Supreme  Administrative  Court).  CZ: 
Nejvyšší 
(Supreme  Administrative  Court)  DE: 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative  Court).  EE: Riikohus (Supreme Court).  IE: Chúirt Uachtarach 
(Supreme Court). EL: Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας (Council of State).  ES: Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court). FR: 
Cour de Cassation (Supreme Court) and Conseil d’Etat (Council of State). HR: Vrhovni sud (Supreme Court) and 
Visoki upravni (Supreme Administrative Court).  IT: Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Supreme Court) and Consiglio 
de  Stato  (Council  of  State).  CY:  Ανώτατο  Δικαστήριο  (Supreme  Court).  LV:  Augstākā  tiesa  (Supreme  Court).  LT: 
Vyriausiasis  Administracinis  Teismas  (Supreme  Administrative  Court).  LU:  Cour  de  Cassation  (Supreme  Court). 
HU: Kúria (Supreme Court). MT: Court of Appeal. NL: Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) and Raad van State (Council 
of State). AT: Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) and Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Supreme Administrative Court). 
PL:  Sąd  Najwyższy  (Supreme  Court)  and  Naczelny  Sąd  Administracyjny  (Supreme  Administrative  Court).  PT: 
Supremo  Tribunal  Administrativo  (Supreme  Administrative  Court).  SI:  Vrhovno  sodišče  (Supreme  Court).  SK: 
Najvyšší súd (Supreme Court). FI: Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Court). SE: Högsta domstolen 
(Supreme Court) and Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen (Supreme Administrative Court). UK: Supreme Court. 

(Supreme  Court)  and  Nejvyšší 

správní 

soud 

soud 

42 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 44: Standards on timing (*) (source: European Commission (102)) 

(*)  Member  States  were  given  1  point  if  standards  are  defined,  regardless  of  the  area  (civil/commercial, 
administrative, or other). 

Figure  45  focuses  on  standards  on  backlogs,  which  consist  of  delay  reducing  measures  to 
improve  the  pace  of  definition  in  litigation.  The  figure  shows  the  competences  of  the  different 
powers  of  the  Member  States  to  set,  monitor  and  follow-up  standards  on  backlogs.  Figure  46 
focuses on timeframes, which can be an effective management tool in the judiciary since they can 
help  to  detect  potential  issues  on  efficiency  and  assist  in  identifying  solutions  (e.g.  additional 
human or financial resources, reorganisation of court management process, temporary assistance 
to a court).  

Figure 45: Setting and monitoring of standards on backlogs (*) (source: European 
Commission (103)) 

(*) The ‘executive’ encompasses institutions under direct or indirect control by the government. ‘Other’ refers to the 
National Office for the Judiciary in HU, headed by its president elected by qualified majority of the Parliament from 
among judges for a period of nine years. The ‘judiciary’ includes bodies such as court presidents, Councils for the 
Judiciary, judges’ bodies. HU: The National Office for the Judiciary is involved in setting, monitoring and follow-up 
of standards on backlogs. 

102 
103 

2018 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 
2018 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

43 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  46:  Timeframes:  definition,  automatic  monitoring  and  follow-up  (*)  (source: 
European Commission (104)) 

3.2.5. Summary on the quality of justice systems 

Easy  access,  sufficient  resources,  effective  assessment  tools  and  appropriate  standards  and 
practices are the factors that contribute to a high quality of justice systems. Citizens and business 
expect  high-quality  decisions  from  an  effective  justice  system  (105).  The  2019 EU  Justice 
Scoreboard develops its comparative examination of these factors. 

Accessibility 

This edition looks at elements contributing to a citizen-friendly justice system: 
  Almost  all  Member  States  provide  access  to  some  online  information  about  their  judicial 
system, including a centralised web portal with online forms and interactive education on legal 
rights  (Figure  20).  Differences  appear  on  the  content  of  the  information  and  how  adequate 
these are with people’s needs. For example, as to the possibility to calculate legal aid through 
online  simulation,  an  improved  number  of  Member  States  (13)  enable  people  to  find  out 
whether they are eligible for legal aid. While information for non-native speakers is available 
in  the  majority  of  Member  States,  this  is  not  always  the  case  with  targeted  information  for 
children and visually or hearing impaired people. 

  The  availability  of  legal  aid  and  the  level  of  court  fees  have  a  major  impact  on  access  to 
justice,  in  particular  for  people  in  poverty.  Figure  21  shows  that  in  some  Member  States, 
consumers whose income is below the Eurostat poverty threshold would not receive legal aid. 
Compared  to  last  year,  though,  two  of  such  Member  States  have  made  legal  aid  more 
reachable.  At  the  same  time,  over  the  years,  legal  aid  has  become  less  accessible  in  some 
Member  States.  The  level  of  court  fees  (Figure  22)  has  remained  largely  stable  since  2016 
although  in  several  Member  States,  the  court  fees  have  raised  as  a  proportion  of  the  claim, 

2018 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

104 
105        The  use  of  Artificial  Intelligence  in  justice  systems  has  become  a  topical  issue.  In  April  2018,  the 
Commission  adopted  a  Communication  on  Artificial  Intelligence  for  Europe  (COM(2018)237  final);  it 
highlighted  the  importance  of  investments  in  key  application  areas  such  as  public  administration,  including 
justice. In the coming years the EU Justice Scoreboard could give an overview of the situation in the Member 
States. Figures 26 and 43 (arrangements for online publication of judgments, and practices for the quality of 
judgments) already present data related to factors that are crucial for the development of a robust “Legal tech” 
industry in Europe. 

44 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
especially for low value claims, imputable to the increase of the minimum court fee applicable. 
The difficulty in benefiting from legal aid in combination with partly significant levels of court 
fees  in  some  Member  States  could  have  a  dissuasive  effect  for  people  in  poverty  to  access 
justice. 

  The availability of electronic means during the judicial procedure contributes to easier access 
to justice and the reduction of delays and costs. Figure 23 shows that in more than half of the 
Member States, electronic submission of claims is not in place or is possible only to a limited 
extent and that not all Member States allow following the progress of court proceedings online. 

  Most  Member  States  have  standards  on  how  to  inform  the  parties  about  the  progress  of 
their case, the court timetable or potential delays (Figure 24). Compared to previous years, a 
few  Member  States  have  considerably  improved  these  standards.  The  differences  between 
Member States relate mainly to the methods used. While some Member States have a system 
with automated e-Mail or SMS notification providing information about delays, timetables or 
general case progress, others simply give online access to the information about the case, and 
some also leave it at the discretion of the courts.  

  Compared  to  previous  years,  online  access  to  court  judgments  (Figure  25)  has  improved 
especially as to the publication of judgments of the highest instance: 19 Member States publish 
all  civil/commercial  and  administrative  judgments.  For  the  first  time,  the  EU  Justice 
Scoreboard  presents  the  publication  of  criminal  judgments.  They  indicate  that  19  Member 
States publish all criminal judgments of the highest instance. The positive developments invite 
all Member States to further improve as decisions at the highest instance play an important role 
for  the  consistency  of  case  law.  As  various  arrangements  for  online  publication  (Figure  26) 
could  facilitate searches  for relevant  case-law, tagging judgments with  keywords and  greater 
use of the European Case Law identifier (ECLI) could be further developed.  

  The number of Member States promoting the voluntary use of alternative dispute resolution 
methods  (ADR)  (Figure  27)  for  private  disputes  continues  to  grow  compared  to  previous 
years.  This  is  mainly  achieved  by  introducing  more  incentives  for  the  use  of  ADR  across 
different areas of law. Administrative disputes have also been taken into consideration and less 
than half of the Member States allow ADR in the field. 

Resources 

High  quality  justice  systems  in  Member  States  require  sufficient  levels  of  financial  and  human 
resources,  including  the  necessary  investments  into  physical  and  technical  infrastructure, 
appropriate  initial  and  continuous  training,  as  well  as  diversity  among  judges,  including  gender 
balance. The 2019 EU Justice Scoreboard shows the following: 

 

In  terms  of  financial  resources,  data  show  that,  overall,  in  2017,  general  government  total 
expenditure  on  law  courts  remained  mostly  stable  in  Member  States,  with  significant 
differences in actual amounts, both in EUR per inhabitant and as a percentage of GDP between 
Member States persisting (Figures 28 and 29). However, fewer Member States increased their 
expenditure in 2017 compared to 2016. Member States mostly use historical or actual cost for 
determining  financial  resources  for  the  judiciary,  while  few  rely  on  the  actual  workload  or 
court requests (Figure 30). 

  For the first time, based on data gathered by the Eurostat, the 2019 EU Justice Scoreboard also 
presents  the  breakdown  of  total  expenditure  into  different  categories.  Figure  31  reveals 
significant differences in spending patterns among Member States. On the one hand, while the 
wages  and  salaries  of  judges  and  court  staff  (including  social  contributions)  represent  the 
biggest share in most Member States, investment into fixed assets such as court buildings and 
software is very low, and even absent in some cases. The expenditure on operating costs (e.g. 
building rentals, legal aid and other consumables), on the other hand, is considerably higher in 
some Member States (Figure 31).  

45 

 
 
  Women  represent  a  large  majority  among  judges.  In  first  and  second  instance  courts  they 
prevail  in  the  majority  of  Member  States  (Figure  33).  This  is  then  reversed,  though,  in 
Supreme  Courts  where  women  represent  less  than  fifty  percent  of  judges  in  most  Member 
States  (Figure  34).  However,  the  proportion  of  female  judges  at  Supreme  Courts  has  grown 
since 2010 in most Member States. 

  On the training of judges, while most Member States provide continuos training in EU law, 
the  law  of  another  Member  State  and  on  judgecraft  fewer  offer  training  on  IT  skills,  court 
management  and  judicial  ethics  (Figure  37).  On  the  training  on  communicating  with 
vulnerable group of parties, there appear to be improvements at the benefit of children, persons 
visually  or  hearing  impaired  and  victims  of  gender  based  violence  (Figure  38),  less  so  with 
respect  to  asylum  seekers.  Less  than  half  of  Member  States  provide  trainings  on  awareness 
raising and ability to deal with fake news and social media issues. 

Assessment tools 

  Monitoring  and  evaluation  of  court  activities  (Figure  39)  exists  in  all  Member  States.  It 
generally includes different performance and quality indicators and regular reporting. Almost 
all Member States monitor the number and length of court cases and have regular evaluation 
systems.  Compared  to  previous  years,  several  Member  States  have  extended  monitoring  to 
more specific elements and some involved more specialised court staff for quality. 

  Many  Member  States  have  yet  to  implement  ICT  case  management  systems  to  their  full 
potential, and no improvements have been achieved compared to previous years (Figure 40). 
These  systems  serve  various  purposes,  including  generating  statistics,  and  are  to  be 
implemented  consistently  across  the  whole  justice  system.  Some  Member  States  have  early-
warning  systems  to  detect  malfunctions  or  non-compliance  with  case  processing  standards, 
which enables the finding of timely solutions. In some Member States, it is still not possible to 
ensure nationwide data collection across all justice areas. 

  The use of surveys among court users and legal professionals (Figure 41) has decreased, with 
a rising number of Member States opting not to conduct any surveys. Accessibility, customer 
service, court hearing and judgment, as well as general trust in the justice system remained key 
survey  topics,  but  only  a  few  Member  States  inquired  about  the  satisfaction  of  groups  with 
special  needs  and  the  awarness  of  rights.  Almost  all  Member  States  who  used  surveys  also 
ensured  follow-up  (Figure  42),  while  the  extent  of  the  follow  up  continued  to  vary  greatly. 
Results generally were made public and fed into reports, while in most of the Member States 
the survey results allowed to identify the need to amend legislation. 

Standards 
Standards can drive up the quality of justice systems. This  edition continues to examine in more 
detail certain standards aiming to improve the timing of proceedings and the information provided 
to  the  parties.  For  the  first  time,  the  2019  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  also  includes  data  on  the 
standards regarding the quality of judgments. 

  Based  on  data  gathered  by  ACA-Europe  and  NPSJC,  Figure  43  shows  that  the  standards 
regarding the quality of judgments differ considerably among Member States, and, in some 
Member  States,  even  between  the  courts  considered.  However,  most  Member  states  provide 
some kind of professional training for judges on the structure, style of reasoning and drafting 
of judgments. 

In  most  Member  States,  the  structure  and  reasoning  of  decisions  include  predetermined 
elements. In addition, in some Member States, court users have access to mechanisms to obtain 
clarifications  regarding  court  decisions,  an  interesting  practice  to  improve  citizen-friendly 
justice systems.  

46 

 
 
Supreme Courts that deploy instruments of self-assessment of the quality of their decisions 
are  a  minority,  although  such  practice,  while  respecting  the  independence  of  the  judiciary, 
could allow improvements. 

  Most  Member  States  use  standards  on  timing.  However,  certain  Member  States  facing 
particular  challenges  on  efficiency  are  currently  not  using  such  standards.  Standards  on 
backlogs  are  still  not  as  widespread  as  those  fixing  time  limits  (e.g.  fixed  time  from  the 
registration  of  a  case  until  the  first  hearing)  and  time  frames  (e.g.  specifying  a  pre-defined 
share of cases to be completed within a certain time) (Figure 44). 

  Standards  on  backlogs  are  a  useful  tool  that  can  contribute  to  better  case  management  and 
improved efficiency. Figure 45 shows that backlogs are mostly set solely by the judiciary or in 
cooperation  with  the  executive.  The  monitoring  and  follow-up  is  mainly  under  the 
responsibility of the judiciary, while, in some Member States, the executive also plays a role 
on the monitoring and follow-up phases. 

  While  most  Member  States  have  standards  on  timeframes  (Figure  46),  only  a  few  have 
continuous  monitoring  mechanisms  on  the  predefined  timeframes.  The  2019  EU  Justice 
Scoreboard shows that the majority of Member States deploy additional resources on follow-
up measures,  which, however, differ in  their scope. The most common follow-up measure is 
the  reorganisation  of  the  court  management  process,  while  the  possibility  of  temporary 
assistance by special judges is only foreseen by few Member States. 

47 

 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Independence 

Judicial  independence  is  a  requirement  stemming  from  the  principle  of  effective  judicial 
protection referred to in Article 19 TEU, and from the right to an effective remedy before a court 
or  tribunal  enshrined  in  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  EU  (Article 47)  (106).  It 
guarantees the fairness, predictability and certainty of the legal system, which are vital elements 
for the rule of law and for an attractive investment environment. The perceived independence of 
the  judiciary  is  a  growth-enhancing  factor,  as  a  perceived  lack  of  independence  can  deter 
investments.  In  addition  to  indicators on perceived judicial independence from  various sources, 
the Scoreboard presents  a number of indicators on how justice systems are organised to protect 
judicial  independence  in  certain  types  of  situations  where  independence  could  be  at  risk. 
Reflecting  the  input  from  the  European  Network  of  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  (ENCJ),  the 
Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU (NPSJC) and the Association 
of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the EU (ACA-Europe), the 
2019 EU Justice Scoreboard shows new or updated indicators in relation to legal safeguards  on 
the  disciplinary  proceedings  regarding  judges  and  the  appointment  of  judges-members  of  the 
Councils for the Judiciary, and on the organisation of the prosecution services.  

3.3.1. Perceived judicial independence 

Figure  47:  Perceived  independence  of  courts  and  judges  among  the  general  public  (*) 
(source: Eurobarometer (107) — light colours: 2016, 2017 and 2018, dark colours: 2019) 

(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is 
very good or fairly good (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, then they are ordered by the 
percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is fairly bad or very bad (total bad); if some 
Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who 
stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good; if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, 
total bad and of very good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts 
and judges is very bad. 

Figure 48 shows the main reasons given by respondents for the perceived lack of independence of 
courts and judges. Respondents among the general public, who rated the independence of the 

106  
107  

See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT&from=EN. 
Eurobarometer survey FL474, conducted between 9 and 11 January 2019. Replies to the question: ‘From what 
you know, how would you rate the justice system in (our country) in terms of the independence of courts and 
judges?  Would  you 
see: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/eu-justice-scoreboard_en. 

fairly  bad  or  very  bad?’, 

is  very  good, 

fairly  good, 

say 

it 

48 

 
 
 
                                                           
justice system as being ‘fairly bad’ or ‘very bad’, could choose between three reasons to explain 
their rating. The Member States are listed in the same order as in Figure 47. 

Figure 48: Main reasons among the general public for the perceived lack of independence 
(share of all respondents — higher value means more influence) (source: Eurobarometer (108)) 

Figure  49:  Perceived  independence  of  courts  and  judges  among  companies  (*)  (source: 
Eurobarometer (109) — light colours: 2016, 2017 and 2018, dark colours: 2019) 

(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good or fairly 
good (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who 
stated that the independence of courts and judges is fairly bad or very bad (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total 
good and total bad, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good; if 
some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and of very good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents 
who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very bad. 

108  

109  

Eurobarometer survey FL474, replies to the question: ‘Could you tell me to what extent each of the following 
reasons explains your rating of the independence of the justice system in (our country): very much, somewhat, 
not really, not at all?’. 
Eurobarometer  survey  FL475,  conducted  between  7  January  and  16 January  2019.  Replies  to  the  question: 
‘From what you know, how would you rate the justice system in (our country) in terms of the independence of 
courts  and  judges?  Would  you  say  it  is  very  good,  fairly  good,  fairly  bad  or  very  bad?’,  see: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/eu-justice-scoreboard_en. 

49 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 50 shows the main reasons given by respondents for the perceived lack of independence of 
courts  and  judges.  Respondents  among  companies,  who  rated  the  independence  of  the  justice 
system as being  ‘fairly  bad’ or ‘very bad’, could choose between three  reasons  to  explain their 
rating. The Member States are listed in the same order as in Figure 49. 

Figure 50: Main reasons among companies for the perceived lack of independence  (rate of 
all respondents — higher value means more influence) (source: Eurobarometer (110)) 

Figure 51: WEF: businesses’ perception of judicial independence (perception — higher value 
means better perception) (source: World Economic Forum (111)) 

110  

111 

Eurobarometer survey FL475; replies to the question: ‘Could you tell me to what extent each of the following 
reasons explains your rating of the independence of the justice system in (our country): very much, somewhat, 
not really, not at all?’. 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) bases its indicator on survey answers to the question: ‘In your country, 
how independent is the judicial system  from influences of the government,  individuals, or companies? [1 = 
not independent at all; 7 = entirely independent]’. Responses to the survey came from a representative sample 
of  businesses  representing  the  main  sectors  of  the  economy  (agriculture,  manufacturing  industry,  non-
manufacturing  industry,  and  services)  in  all  the  Member  States  concerned.  The  survey  is  administered  in  a 
variety  of  formats,  including  face-to-face  or  telephone  interviews  with  business  executives,  mailed  paper 
forms, and online surveys. See https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitveness-report-2018  

50 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
3.3.2. Structural independence  

The guarantees of structural independence require rules, particularly as regards the composition 
of  the  court  and  the  appointment,  length  of  service  and  grounds  for  abstention,  rejection  and 
dismissal of its members, in order to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to 
the imperviousness of that court to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests 
before it (112).  

European standards have been developed, particularly by the Council of Europe, for example in 
the  2010  Council  of  Europe  Recommendation  on  judges:  independence,  efficiency  and 
responsibilities (113). The Scoreboard presents a number of indicators on how justice systems are 
organised to safeguard judicial independence. 

For  the  first  time,  this  edition  of  the  Scoreboard  includes  indicators  on  bodies  and  authorities 
involved  in  disciplinary  proceedings  regarding  judges  (Figures  52  and  53),  and,  as  last  year, 
shows  an  indicator  on  the  appointment  of  judges-members  of  the  Councils  for  the  Judiciary 
(Figure  54)  (114).  The  2019  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  expands  its  overview  of  how  prosecution 
services  are  managed  and  organised  in  the  Member  States  (Figures  55,  56  and  57)  (115).  The 
figures present the national frameworks as they were in place in December 2018. 

The figures presented in the Scoreboard do not provide an assessment or present quantitative data 
on the effectiveness of the safeguards. They are not intended to reflect the complexity and details 
of the safeguards. Having more safeguards does not, in itself, ensure the effectiveness of a justice 
system. It should also be noted that implementing policies and practices to promote integrity and 
prevent  corruption  within  the  judiciary  is  also  essential  to  guarantee  judicial  independence. 
Ultimately,  the  effective  protection  of  judicial  independence  requires  a  culture  of  integrity  and 
impartiality, shared by magistrates and respected by the wider society. 

112  

113 

114  

115  

See  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgment  of  25  July  2018,  LM,  C-216/18  PPU, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:586.  para  66.  See  also  paragraphs  46  and  47  of  the  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12 
Judges: Independence, Efficiency and Responsibility (adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of  Europe  on  17  November  2010)  and  Explanatory  Memorandum,  which  provide  that  the  authority  taking 
decisions on the selection and career of judges should be independent of the executive and legislative powers. 
With a view to guaranteeing its independence, at least half of the members of the authority should be judges 
chosen by their peers. However, where the constitutional or other legal provisions prescribe that the head of 
state, the government or the legislative power take decisions concerning the selection and career of judges, an 
independent  and  competent  authority  drawn  in  substantial  part  from  the  judiciary  (without  prejudice  to  the 
rules  applicable  to  councils  for  the  judiciary  contained  in  Chapter  IV)  should  be  authorised  to  make 
recommendations or express opinions which the relevant appointing authority follows in practice.  
See Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 Judges: Independence, Efficiency and Responsibility, adopted by the 
Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe  on  17  November  2010  and  Explanatory  Memorandum 
(hereinafter: ‘the Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12’). 
The  figures  are  based  on  the  responses  to  an  updated  questionnaire  drawn  up  by  the  Commission  in  close 
association  with  the  ENCJ.  Responses  to  the  updated  questionnaire  from  Member  States  that  have  no 
Councils for the Judiciary, are not ENCJ members, or their ENCJ membership has been suspended (CZ, DE, 
EE, CY, LU, AT, PL and FI)  were obtained through cooperation  with the  Network of the Presidents of the 
Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU.  
The  figures  are  based  on  responses  to  an  updated  questionnaire  drawn  up  by  the  Commission  in  close 
cooperation with the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. 

51 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
– Safeguards on disciplinary proceedings regarding judges – 

Disciplinary proceedings regarding judges are among the most sensitive situations in relation to 
judicial independence. According to the Court of Justice of the European Union, “the requirement 
of  independence  also  means  that  the  disciplinary  regime  governing  those  who  have  the  task  of 
adjudicating in a dispute must display the necessary guarantees in order to prevent any risk of it 
being used as a system of political control of the content of judicial decisions.” (116) The set of 
guarantees identified by the Court of Justice as essential for safeguarding the independence of the 
judiciary  include  rules  which  define  both  conduct  amounting  to  disciplinary  offences  and  the 
penalties actually applicable, rules which provide for the involvement of an independent body in 
accordance with a procedure which fully safeguards the rights enshrined in Articles 47 and 48 of 
the  Charter,  in  particular  the  rights  of  the  defence,  and  rules  which  lay  down  the  possibility  of 
bringing  legal  proceedings  challenging  the  disciplinary  bodies’  decisions  (117).  The  Court  of 
Justice  held  that  “Article  267  TFEU  gives  national  courts  the  widest  discretion  in  referring 
matters  to  the  Court  (…)  at  whatever  stage  of  the  proceedings  they  consider  appropriate”  (118). 
The  Court  added  that  any  national  rule  inhibiting  this  discretion  “in  order  to  avoid  being  (…) 
exposed  to  disciplinary  penalties”  is  “detrimental  to  the  prerogatives  granted  to  national  courts 
and  tribunals  by  Article  267  TFEU  and,  consequently,  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  cooperation 
between the Court and the national court (…) established by the preliminary ruling mechanism” 
(119).  The  Court  later  stated  that  “not  being  exposed  to  disciplinary  sanctions  for  (…)  sending 
request  for  a  preliminary  ruling  to  the  Court  (…)  constitutes  a  guarantee  essential  to  judicial 
independence” (120). 

According  to  the  Council  of  Europe  standards,  disciplinary  proceedings  regarding  judges  may 
follow  where  they  fail  to  carry  out  their  duties  in  an  efficient  and  proper  manner  (121).  The 
interpretation  of  the  law,  assessment  of  facts  or  weighing  of  evidence  carried  out  by  judges  to 
determine cases should not give rise to civil or disciplinary liability, except in case of malice and 
gross  negligence  (122).  Moreover,  disciplinary  proceedings  should  be  conducted  by  an 
independent  authority  as  a  court  with  all  the  guarantees  of  a  fair  trial.  The  judge  under 
disciplinary  proceeding  should  have  the  right  to  challenge  the  decision  and  the  sanction. 
Disciplinary sanctions should be proportionate (123). 

Figure 52 presents an overview of the authorities that decide on disciplinary sanctions regarding 
ordinary judges, which can be either (a) regular independent authorities such as courts (Supreme 
Court,  Administrative  Court  or  Court  President)  or  Councils  for  the  judiciary,  or  (b)  other 
authorities whose members are specifically appointed by the Council for the Judiciary, by judges 
or by the executive to decide in disciplinary proceedings regarding judges. 

116  

117  

118  

119  

120  

121  
122  
123  

See  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgment  of  25  July  2018,  LM,  C-216/18  PPU, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, para 67. 
See Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 25 July 2018, LM, C-216/18 PPU, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, para 67. 
See  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgment  of  5  July  2016,  Ognyanov,  C-614/14, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:514, para. 17.  
See  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgment  of  5  July  2016,  Ognyanov,  C-614/14, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:514, para. 25.  
See Court of Justice of the European Union, order of 12 February 2019,  RH, C-8/19, ECLI:EU:C:2019:110, 
para. 47. 
Para 69 of the Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12. 
Para 66 of the Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12. 
Para 69 of the Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12. 

52 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 52: Authority deciding on disciplinary sanctions regarding judges (*) (124) 

(*)  BG:  Lighter  disciplinary  sanctions  may  be  imposed  by  the  Court  President.  CZ:  Disciplinary  cases  are  examined  by 
disciplinary chambers of the Supreme Administrative Court. The members are proposed by the President of the Court among a 
list of judges and they are chosen by sortition. DK: The Court of Indictment and Revision whose members are proposed by several 
actors (judiciary, law firm and public organisation) and appointed by the Ministry of Justice following the recommendation of the 
Judicial  Appointments  Council  (independent  body)  decides.  DE:  Disciplinary  measures  can  be  applied  in  formal  disciplinary 
proceedings (Section 63 German Judiciary Act) by service courts (‘Dienstgerichte der Länder’ concerning federal state judges, 
and  ‘Dienstgericht  des  Bundes’  concerning  federal  judges),  which  are  special  panels  in  regular  courts.  The  members  of  these 
panels are appointed by the judges (‘Präsidium’) of the particular court (higher regional court or regional court, or the Federal 
Court  of  Justice).  Less  severe  disciplinary  measures,  such  as  reprimand,  can  be  issued  in  a  disciplinary  ruling  (Section  64 
German  Judiciary  Act)  by  either  a  court  president  or  the  ministry  of  justice  (both  at  the  level  of  federal  states  and  at  federal 
level). EE: disciplinary cases are examined by the Disciplinary Chamber of Judges appointed by the Supreme Court and by the 
General Assembly of all Estonian judges. IE: Judges are not subject to a disciplinary body or disciplinary regime apart from the 
procedure under the Constitution under which a judge may be removed from office for stated misbehaviour or incapacity upon 
resolutions passed by both Houses of Parliament (the Oireachtas) calling for his/her removal. EL: The disciplinary authority over 
judges  is  exercised,  in  the  first  and  second  instance,  by  councils  composed  of  regular  judges  of  higher  rank  chosen  by  lot. 
Disciplinary authority over  high  ranking  judges  is  exercised  by  the  Supreme  Disciplinary  Council.  LV:  Disciplinary  cases  are 
examined  by  the  Judicial  Disciplinary  Committee  whose  members  are  appointed  by  the  general  meeting  of  judges.  ES: 
Disciplinary decisions regarding minor disciplinary offences are made by the governance chamber of the respective Court of the 
district where the disciplined judge sits (High Court of Justice, National Court and Supreme Court).  LT: At first instance, the 
Judicial Court of Honour, whose members and chairperson (judge, elected by the Council for the Judiciary) are laid out in the 
Ruling  of  the  Council  for  the  Judiciary,  decides.  It  is  composed  of  six  judges  selected  and  appointed  by  the  Council  for  the 
Judiciary, two members appointed by the President of the Republic and two members appointed by the Speaker of the Seimas. At 
second  instance,  the  Supreme  Court  decides.  HU:  Disciplinary  cases  are  examined  by  the  Service  Tribunal  appointed  by  the 
Council  for  the  Judiciary.  MT: The  Commission  for  the  Administration  of  Justice  decides.  PL:  The  Minister  of  Justice  selects 
disciplinary  judges  after  a  non-binding  consultation  with  the  National  Council  for  the  Judiciary.  SI:  The  disciplinary  court  is 
appointed  by  the  Council  for  the  Judiciary  among  members  of  the  Council  itself  and  among  judges  proposed  by  the  Supreme 
Court.  SK:  Disciplinary  panels  are  appointed  by  the  Council  for  the  Judiciary.  For  the  President  and  Vice  President  of  the 
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court is competent for disciplinary proceedings. SE: A permanent judge may be removed from 
office only if he has committed a serious crime or repeatedly neglected his duties and thereby shown himself manifestly unfit to 
hold the office. Should the decision to remove the judge from office have been made by another authority than a court (in practice 
by the National Disciplinary Offence Board), the judge concerned may call upon a court to review that decision. UK (EN&WL): 
The Lord Chief Justice has the power, with the agreement of Lord Chancellor, to give a judge formal advice, a formal warning or 
a reprimand, or to suspend them from office in certain circumstances.  UK (NI): Disciplinary cases are decided by Lord Chief 
Justice and Judicial Appointments Ombudsman. 

Figure  53  presents  an  overview  of  the  investigative  bodies,  which  carry  out  the  formal 
investigation  during  disciplinary  proceedings  regarding  judges.  It  does  not  concern  preliminary 
enquiries to decide whether or not to initiate a formal disciplinary proceeding. The investigation 
phase is a particularly sensitive step within disciplinary proceedings, which could affect judicial 
independence.  The  investigative  power  can  be  exercised  either  (a)  by  regular  independent 
authorities  such  as  Court  Presidents  or  Councils  for  the  Judiciary,  or  (b)  by  other  investigators 
who are specifically appointed -by the Council of the Judiciary, by judges or by other authorities-  
for conducting investigations in disciplinary proceedings regarding judges. 

124  

Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association  with the 
ENCJ. Responses to the updated questionnaire from Member States that have no Councils for the Judiciary, 
are  not ENCJ members, or their ENCJ membership has been suspended  were obtained through cooperation 
with the NPSC. 

53 

 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  53:  Investigator  in  charge  of  formal  disciplinary  proceedings  regarding  judges  (*) 
(125) 

(*)  BG:  The  relevant  administrative  head  of  the  court  or  the  Judge’s  College  to  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  of  Bulgaria 
investigates. CZ: The minister of justice can also conduct some preliminary enquiries in order to prepare the motion to initiate 
disciplinary proceedings, normally consulting the president of the court where the concerned judge sits. DK: The Director of the 
Public Prosecution investigates. DE: There is no formal pre-investigatory phase. In disciplinary orders, concerning less severe 
disciplinary  measures  such as  reprimand, the  court president  and  the highest  service  authority  (usually the  ministry  of  justice, 
both at the level of federal states and at federal level) assess the facts. The highest service authority decides whether to launch a 
disciplinary proceeding before the court. Then the court carries out formal investigations. EE: The President of a court or the 
Chancellor  of  Justice  (Ombudsman)  can  conduct  an  investigation.  IE:  The  judges  are  not  subject  to  a  disciplinary  body  or 
disciplinary regime apart from the procedure under the Constitution under which a judge may be removed from office for stated 
misbehaviour or incapacity upon resolutions passed by both Houses of Parliament (the Oireachtas) calling for his/her removal. 
EL: Civil and Criminal Courts: The Judicial Inspection Body which is elected from among judges by lot. Administrative courts: 
The  investigator  is  chosen  by  lot  among  the  members  of  the  Council  of  State.  ES:  The  Promoter  of  disciplinary  action  is 
appointed by the General Council for the Judiciary; the Promoter is selected from a pool of judges of the Supreme Court and 
Magistrates with more than 25 years of legal experience, but exclusively exercises the functions of Promoter during his mandate. 
IT: The Prosecutor General at the Supreme Court (who is a member of the Council for the Judiciary) is entitled to conduct the 
investigation.  CY:  The  Investigative  judge,  appointed  by  the  Supreme  Court,  investigates.  LV:  The  Judicial  Disciplinary 
Committee  investigates.  HU:  The  Disciplinary  Commissioner,  appointed  by  the  Service  Tribunal  (disciplinary  court), 
investigates. LT: The Judicial Ethics and Discipline Commission, whose members and chairperson (elected by the Council for the 
Judiciary) are laid out in the Ruling of the Council for the Judiciary, is composed of four judges appointed by the Council for the 
Judiciary,  two  members  appointed  by  the  President of  the  Republic,  and one  member  appointed by  the Speaker  of  the Seimas, 
investigates. The chairperson of the Judicial Ethics and Discipline Commission has the right to delegate the court president  in 
which  the  judge  is  working  or  the  president  of  the  higher  court  to  carry  out  the  investigation  and  present  the  results  of  the 
investigation. MT: The Commission for the Administration of Justice investigates. NL: The Prosecutor-General investigates. PL: 
The Minister of Justice appoints the Disciplinary Officer for ordinary court judges and his/her two deputies (they, in turn, can 
appoint their own deputies from among candidates proposed by judges, but under some circumstances can appoint deputies of 
their  own  choosing)  to  investigate.  The  Minister  of  Justice  can  take  over  any  ongoing  investigation  by  appointing  an  ad  hoc 
Disciplinary Officer of the Minister of Justice.  PT: The Council for the judiciary appoints the Judicial Inspection Body, which 
investigates. RO: The Judicial Inspection Body  investigates.  SI: The Judicial Council appoints a disciplinary prosecutor from 
among candidates proposed by the Supreme Court, to investigate. SK: The Disciplinary panel, appointed by the Council for the 
Judiciary,  conducts  the  investigation.  SE:  The  Parliamentary  Ombudsmen and  the  Chancellor  of  Justice  act  as  prosecutors  in 
cases of serious malpractice. UK (EN&WL): Depending on the nature of the case and what stage of the disciplinary process the 
case  is  at,  different  authorities  consider  complaints  at  different  stages  of  the  disciplinary  process:  the  Judicial  Conduct  and 
Investigations Office considers the papers in the first instance; nominated judges, selected by Lord Chief Justice, typically make 
decisions on the papers alone, but do have the discretion to interview parties; disciplinary panels, selected by Lord Chief Justice 
and Lord Chancellor, typically look at the papers and take evidence from the subject of the complaint in person; and investigating 
judges, selected by Lord Chief Justice, usually interview the subject of the complaint and might also interview other parties. It 
should be noted that not every complaint goes through all of these stages. UK (NI): Lord Chief Justice for Northern Ireland. 

– Safeguards on the nomination of judges-members of the Councils for the Judiciary – 

Councils for the judiciary are essential bodies for ensuring the independence of justice. It is for 
the  Member  States  to  organise  their  justice  systems,  including  deciding  on  whether  or  not  to 
establish a Council for the Judiciary. However, well established European standards, in particular 
the  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12,  recommend  that  ‘not  less  than  half  the  members  of 
[Councils for the Judiciary] should be judges chosen by their peers from all levels of the judiciary 

125   Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association  with the 
ENCJ. Responses to the updated questionnaire from Member States that have no Councils for the Judiciary, 
are  not ENCJ members, or their ENCJ membership has been suspended  were obtained through cooperation 
with the NPSC. 

54 

 
 
 
                                                           
and with respect for pluralism inside the judiciary’ (126). The figure below describes whether the 
judiciary is involved in the appointment of judges-members of the Councils for the Judiciary. 

Figure 54: Appointment of judges-members of the Councils for the Judiciary: involvement 
of the judiciary (*) (127) 

(*) The Member States appear in the alphabetical order of their geographical names in the original language. The 
figure  presents  the  national  frameworks  as  they  were  in  place  in  December  2017.  DK:  judges-members  of  the 
Council are selected by judges. All members are formally appointed by the Minister of Justice. EL: judges-members 
are  selected  by  lot.  ES:  judges-members  are  appointed  by  the  Parliament  —  the  Council  communicates  to  the 
Parliament the list of candidates who have received the support of a judges’ association or of 25 judges. NL: judges-
members are selected by the judiciary and are appointed on the proposal of the Council, based among others on the 
advice  of  a  selection  committee  (consisting  mainly  of  judges  and  court  staff).  All  members  of  the  Council  are 
formally appointed by a Royal Decree, an administrative  act, which does not leave any room for discretion to the 
executive.  PL:  Candidate  judges-members  are  proposed  by  groups  of  at  least  2 000  citizens  or  25  judges.  From 
among the candidates, the deputies’ clubs select up to nine candidates, from which a committee of the lower chamber 
of the Parliament (Sejm) establishes a final list of 15 candidates, who are appointed by the Sejm. RO: The campaign 
and election of judges-members are organised by the Superior Council of Magistracy. Once the final list of elected 
judges-members is confirmed, the Senate will validate it "en bloc". The Senate may refuse to validate the list only in 
case  of  infringement  of  the  law  in  the  procedure  for  the  election  of  the  members  of  the  council  and  only  if  the 
infringement  has  had  an  influence  over  the  result  of  the  election.  The  Senate  cannot  exercise  discretion  over  the 
choice of candidates UK: judges-members are selected by judges. 

– Safeguards relating to the functioning of national prosecution services in the EU – 

Public prosecution plays a major role in the criminal justice system as well as in cooperation in 
criminal  matters.  The  proper  functioning  of  the  national  prosecution  service  is  important  for 
fighting  money  laundering  and  corruption.  According  to  the  Court  of  Justice  case-law,  in  the 
context of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (128), the public prosecutor’s 
office can be considered a Member State judicial authority responsible for administering criminal 
justice whenever it can be distinguished from the executive, in accordance with the principle of 
the separation of powers which characterises the operation of the rule of law (129). 

126  

Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12,  para.  27;  see  also  2016  CoE  action  plan,  C  item  (ii);  Opinion 
no.10(2007)  of  the  Consultative  Council  of  European  Judges  (CCJE)  to  the  attention  of  the  Committee  of 
Ministers of the  Council of Europe on the  Council  for the  Judiciary at the  service of  society, para. 27; and 
ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-11, para. 2.3. 

127   Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association  with the 

ENCJ. 

128   OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1. 
129  

Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgment  of  10  November  2016,  Openbaar  Ministerie  v  Ruslanas 
Kovalkovas,  Case  C-477/16  PPU,  paras  34  and  36,  ECLI:EU:C:2016:861; judgment  of  10 November  2016,  
Openbaar Ministerie v Halil Ibrahim Özçelik, C‑ 453/16 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2016:860, paras. 32 and 34. See 
also  Opinion  No.  13(2018)  Independence,  accountability  and  ethics  of  prosecutors,  adopted  by  the 
Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE), recommendation xii. 

55 

 
 
 
                                                           
The  organisation  of  national  prosecution  services  varies  throughout  the  EU  and  there  is  no 
uniform model for all Member States. However, there is a widespread tendency to allocate for a 
more  independent  prosecutor’s  office,  rather  than  one  subordinated  or  linked  to  the  executive 
(130).  Management  powers  over  national  prosecutors,  together  with  procedures  for  appointment 
and  dismissal  of  prosecutors  may  influence  the  extent  of  the  independence  of  a  prosecution 
service.  Whatever  the  model  of  the  national  justice  system  or  the  legal  tradition  in  which  it  is 
anchored,  European  standards  require  that  Member  States  take  effective  measures  to  guarantee 
that  public  prosecutors  are  able  to  fulfil  their  professional  duties  and  responsibilities  under 
adequate  legal  and  organisational  conditions  (131)  and  without  unjustified  interference  (132).  In 
particular,  where  the  government  gives  instruction  of  a  general  nature,  for  example  on  crime 
policy,  such  instructions  must  be  in  writing  and  published  in  an  adequate  way  (133).  Where  the 
government has the power to give instructions to prosecute a specific case, such instructions must 
carry  with  them  adequate  guarantees  (134).  According  to  the  2000  Recommendation  of  the 
Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe,  instructions  not  to  prosecute  should  be 
prohibited (135). Interested parties (including victims) should be able to challenge a decision of a 
public prosecutor not to prosecute a case (136). 

Figure 55 presents an overview of the distribution of the main management powers over national 
prosecutors between different authorities. The figure shows which authority, either the Prosecutor 
General; 
the  Minister  of 
Justice/Government/President; or the Parliament, has the following management powers: 

Judiciary/Prosecutorial  Council; 

the  Council 

the 

for 

1) to issue general guidance regarding prosecution policy, 

2) to give instructions regarding prosecution in individual cases, 

3) to evaluate a prosecutor,  

4) to promote a prosecutor, 

5) to remove an individual case which was assigned to a prosecutor (transfer a case), 

6) to decide on a disciplinary measure regarding a prosecutor, and  

7) to transfer prosecutors without their consent.  

Apart  from  these  selected  main  management  powers,  the  same  or  other  authorities  may  have 
additional  powers  over  national  prosecution  services  (e.g.  the  power  to  solve  conflicts  of 
competence between Member States' public prosecution offices; to acquire data and information 
from lower prosecution offices). It should be noted that other authorities may have a role in the 
above  listed  management  powers  (e.g.  a  disciplinary  court  may  decide  on  certain  disciplinary 
measures).  

130  

131  

132  

133  
134  
135  

136  

CDL-AD(2010)040-e Report on European Standards as regards the Independence of the Judicial System: Part 
II — the Prosecution Service — Adopted by the Venice Commission — at its 85th plenary session (Venice, 
17-18 December 2010), para. 26. 
Recommendation Rec(2000)19 on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system, adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 6 October 2000 (the 2000 Recommendation), para. 4. 
The  2000  Recommendation,  paras  11  and 13.  See  also  Opinion  No.  13(2018) Independence,  accountability 
and  ethics  of  prosecutors,  adopted  by  the  Consultative  Council  of  European  Prosecutors  (CCPE), 
recommendations i and iii. 
The 2000 Recommendation, para. 13, point c). 
The 2000 Recommendation, para. 13, point d). 
The 2000 Recommendation, para. 13, point f). See also Opinion No. 13(2018) Independence, accountability 
and  ethics  of  prosecutors,  adopted  by  the  Consultative  Council  of  European  Prosecutors  (CCPE), 
recommendation iv. 
The 2000 Recommendation, para. 34. 

56 

 
 
                                                           
Figure  55  presents  only  a  factual  overview  of  certain  aspects  of  the  organisation  of  the 
prosecution services and does not assess their effective functioning, which requires a qualitative 
assessment taking into account the specific circumstances of each Member State.  

The  percentage  represents  the  distribution  of  the  seven  management  powers  referred  to  above 
among  the  four  possible  authorities,  without  any  weighting  in  terms  of  the  importance  of  each 
point. 

Figure 55: Distribution of main management powers over national prosecution services (*) 
(source: European Commission with the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing of 
Terrorism) 

(*)  The  Member  States  appear  in  the  alphabetical  order  of  their  geographical  names  in  the  original  language.  The  main 
management powers of the Prosecutor General are described in Figure 56.  BE: Council for the Judiciary: power to decide on 
promotion  of  prosecutors.  Minister  of  Justice:  power  to  issue  general  guidance  regarding  prosecution  policy  on  advice  of  the 
Board of prosecutors general and to give instructions regarding prosecution in individual cases (a right of positive injunction to 
prosecute is foreseen in art. 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and art. 151 (1) of the Constitution).  BG: Council for the 
Judiciary  (Prosecutor's  college  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council):  powers  to  decide  on  a  disciplinary  measure  regarding  a 
prosecutor,  on  individual  evaluation  and  on  promotion  of  prosecutors.  Minister  of  Justice  may  propose  the  appointment, 
promotion,  demotion,  transfer  and  release  from  office  of  judges,  prosecutors  and  investigating  magistrates.  CZ:  Minister  of 
Justice:  power  to  decide  on  the promotion of  prosecutors;  power  to  transfer  prosecutors  without  their  consent  only  in  case  of 
organisational  changes  based  on  the  law.  DK:  Minister  of  Justice:  powers  to  decide  on  disciplinary  measures  regarding 
prosecutors  and  to  decide  on  promotion  of  prosecutors.  DE:  Minister  of  Justice:  power  to  issue  general  guidance  regarding 
prosecution  policy  and  to  give  instructions  regarding  prosecution  in  individual  cases.  EE:  Disciplinary  proceedings  shall  be 
initiated at the request of an interested person or on their own initiative by the Minister of Justice against the Prosecutor General, 
chief  state  prosecutor  or  chief  prosecutor.  EL:  Supreme  Judicial  Council:  power  to  promote  and  transfer  public  prosecutors, 
effected by Presidential decree. Minister of Justice is exceptionally allowed to issue general information directives to prosecutors 
in relation to the application of the legal instruments adopted within the Council of the European Union concerning the judicial 
cooperation of the Member States in the fields of the prevention and combating of certain types of crimes.  ES: Fiscal Council 
(Prosecutorial Council) has the power to review decisions made by the Prosecutor General in cases set in law.  FR: Minister of 
Justice:  power  to  issue  general  guidance  regarding  prosecution  policy;  power  to  decide  on  disciplinary  measures  regarding 
prosecutors on the opinion of the High Council for the Judiciary (Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature) (Article 65 of the French 
Constitution and Articles 48, 58-1 and 59 of the Statutory Order). If the Minister intends to take a decision that is more serious 
than the one proposed by the High Council for the Judiciary, the Council must be consulted again (section 58 (1) of the Statutory 
Order). The President of the Republic issues a decree to promote a prosecutor on the opinion of the Council for the Judiciary. 
High Council for the Judiciary gives opinion on disciplinary measures, transfers of prosecutors without consent, and promotion 
of prosecutors. HR: State Attorneys Council: power to decide on disciplinary measures and to promote prosecutors. IT: Council 
for  the  Judiciary:  powers  to  decide  on  a  disciplinary  measure  regarding  a  prosecutor,  to  transfer  prosecutors  without  their 
consent, to decide on individual evaluation of a prosecutor, and to promote a prosecutor. CY: Council for the Judiciary dismisses 
the Prosecutor General. LV: Council of the Prosecutor General: according to the Article 29, part 2 of the Law on Prosecution 
Office, the Council as a collegiate advisory institution reviews the main issues related to the organization and operation of the 
Prosecution  Office  and  performs  other  functions  provided  in  the  law  (e.g.  develops  and  adopts  statutes  governing  selection, 
traineeship and qualification examination of applicants to the Prosecutor’s position and statutes for evaluation of prosecutors’ 
professional  performance).  LT:  Parliament  (Seimas)  sets  the  operational  priorities  of  the  Prosecution  Service  and  conducts 
parliamentary  scrutiny  of  non-procedural  actions.  LU:  Minister  of  Justice  may  instruct  prosecution  services  to  prosecute  in  a 
case (but cannot instruct not to prosecute). However, there have not been any instructions since more than 20 years. There is no 
legal requirement to consult a prosecutor or seek the opinion of the Prosecutor General on such an instruction. The Grand-Duke, 
as the Head of State, has the competence to decide on promotion of prosecutors, on the basis of a favourable opinion by the state 
prosecutor / General Prosecutor. MT: The police have the exclusive competence to institute and undertake criminal proceedings 

57 

 
 
 
and act as prosecutors before the inferior courts; the Attorney General acts as a prosecutor before the Superior Courts when the 
compilation  of  evidence  before  the  Inferior  Courts  is  concluded.  NL:  Attorney  General's  Council  (College  van  procureurs-
generaal): power to issue general guidance regarding prosecution policy. Minister of Justice: power to issue general guidance 
regarding prosecution policy and to decide on certain disciplinary measure on prosecutors; it may instruct prosecution services 
to prosecute or not to prosecute in a case, but needs to beforehand obtain a written reasoned opinion of the Attorney General's 
Council (College van procureurs-generaal) on the suggested instructions, and notification to Parliament is required. However, so 
far, there has only been one such case more than twenty years ago. The Head of the Public Prosecution Service within the district 
where the Public Prosecutor is working has the power to decide on disciplinary measures and on the evaluation of prosecutors. 
AT:  Minister  of  Justice:  power  to  issue  general  guidance  regarding  prosecution  policy  and  to  give  instructions  regarding 
prosecution in individual cases with the approval of an independent body (Weisungsrat) established at the General Prosecutors 
office. The powers of the Prosecutor General do not include direct management over the prosecution service as referred to in the 
chart.  The  other  management  powers  shown  in  the  chart  are  held  either  by  the  Superior  Prosecutor  or  by  the  Independent 
Personnel  Board  (Personalkommission),  consisting  of  four  members,  who  must  be  public  prosecutors  (see  comments  under 
Figure  56).  As  regards  the  promotion  of  a  prosecutor,  it  requires  an  application  for  a  higher  position  and  follows  the  rules 
applicable  to  an  appointment  as  a  prosecutor  (i.e.  proposal  by  the  independent  Personal  Board  (Personalkommission), 
appointment  by  the  Federal  President  delegated  to  the  Minister  of  Justice).  The  power  to  decide  on  a  disciplinary  measure 
regarding a prosecutor resides with the Disciplinary Courts, which also have the power to transfer a prosecutor as a sanction. 
PL:  Prosecutor  General  is also the  Minister of  Justice.  PT:  Council  for  Judiciary: power  to decide  on a disciplinary  measure 
regarding a prosecutor, to transfer prosecutors without their consent, to decide on individual evaluation of a prosecutor and on 
promotion  of  a  prosecutor.  Parliament  can  issue  general  guidance  regarding  prosecution  policy.  RO:  Council  for  Judiciary: 
power  to  decide  on  a  disciplinary  measure  regarding  a  prosecutor  and  to  decide  on  promotion  of  a  prosecutor  (according  to 
Article  40 par 2  letter  i)  of  the Law  no 317/2004,  the  Prosecutorial  Section  within  the Superior Council  of  Magistracy  (SCM) 
issues the promotion decision of the prosecutors, but the promotion is decided only after a competition (Article 43 of the Law no 
303/2004)). Minister of Justice, according to the recently amended article 69 of Law no. 304/2004 on judicial organisation, may 
ask the General Public Prosecutor of the Public Prosecutor's Office next to the High Court of Cassation and Justice, or, as the 
case may be, the General Public Prosecutor of the National Anti-Corruption Public Prosecutor's Office, for information on the 
activity of the Public Prosecutor's Offices and may issue written guidelines about the steps to be taken in crime prevention and 
control.  According  to Article  40 par 2  letter  h) of  the  Law  no 317/2004  on SCM,  the  Prosecutorial  Section  within  the  SCM  is 
competent to decide on complaints against the final decision of the evaluation committee (the rating). According to Article 39 par 
3  of  the  Law  no  303/2004  on  the  judges  and  prosecutors  statute,  the  individual  evaluation  of  the  prosecutors  is  performed  by 
special  committees  constituted  on  the  decision  of  the  SCM.  SI:  State  Prosecutorial  Council:  powers  to  transfer  prosecutors 
without their consent, to decide on individual evaluation of a prosecutor, to decide on promotion of a prosecutor. Moreover,  the 
State Prosecutorial Council is responsible for the appointment and dismissal of the heads of district state prosecutor’s offices, 
performance  assessment  and  promotion,  transfers,  secondments  and  participation  in  the  appointment  procedure  of  state 
prosecutors, providing opinions on the policy of prosecution, performance assessment and efficiency of functioning of the state 
prosecutor’s offices, the protection of self-dependence in the performance of state prosecutorial service and the performance of 
other matters in accordance with the State Prosecutor's Office Act.  SK: The powers of the Prosecutorial Council (Prosecutors’ 
Board) do not include direct management over the prosecution service as referred to in the chart. The Prosecutors’ Board has 
other powers (e.g. decides on the objections of a prosecutor against the content of the evaluation, which the Head of the Public 
Service  Office  has  not  complied  with,  and  expresses  its  opinion  on  the  temporary  assignment  of  a  prosecutor  to  another 
Prosecution Office). SE: Government can issue general guidance regarding prosecution policy.  

Figure 56 presents a factual overview of the main management powers of the Prosecutor General 
over  prosecutors:  1)  to  issue  general  guidance  regarding  prosecution  policy,  2)  to  give 
instructions regarding prosecution in individual cases, 3) to evaluate a prosecutor, 4) to promote a 
prosecutor, 5) to remove an individual case which was assigned to a prosecutor (transfer a case), 
6)  to  decide  on  a  disciplinary  measure  regarding  a  prosecutor,  and  7)  to  transfer  prosecutors 
without  their  consent.  In  addition  to  these  powers,  the  Prosecutor  General  may  have  other 
powers, which are not shown in the figure (137). 

137  

For  example,  the  Prosecutor  General  may  play  a  role  in  bodies  responsible  for  decisions  regarding 
prosecutors, even if not taking such decisions directly.  

58 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  56:  Management  powers  of  the  Prosecutor  General  (*)  (source:  European 
Commission with the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism) 

(*)  The  Member  States  appear  in  the  alphabetical  order  of  their  geographical  names  in  the  original  language.  BE:  As  to  the 
power to give instructions regarding prosecution in individual cases, a right of injunction to prosecute upon the Prosecutor of the 
King  is  provided by  art. 364  of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure.  Articles  150  (2)  and  138  (2)  of the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure 
provide  a  general  right  to  exercise  authority  upon  the  Prosecutor  of  the  King.  CZ:  power  to  give  instructions  regarding 
prosecution in individual cases only within the Prosecutor General Office and towards high public prosecutor offices.  EL: The 
Public  Prosecutor  of  the  Supreme  Court  (i.e.  General  Prosecutor)  has  the  right  to  address  to  all  prosecutors  of  the  country 
general  directions  and  recommendations  relating  to  the  performance  of  their  duties,  without  of  course  the  addressees  of  its 
directives and recommendations being bound by the formulation and the expression of their opinion.  ES: The Attorney General 
sets internal orders and instructions appropriate to the service and to the exercise of prosecuting functions, which may be general 
or related to specific matters. The general guidelines are essential in order to maintain the principle of unity of action and are 
fundamentally defined through circulars, instructions and consultations. As to the transfer without consent just in cases of high 
workload. IT: The Prosecutors General at the Court of Appeal have the powers to remove an individual case which was assigned 
to a territorial prosecutor, in case of inaction; in addition to this, they have the power to acquire data and information from the 
prosecution  offices  of  the  district  (or  territorial)  and  to  send  to  the  Prosecutor  General  at  the  Court  of  Cassation,  in order  to 
verify  the  correct  and  uniform  functioning  of  the  prosecution  offices  and  compliance  with  the  rules  on  due  process.  The 
Prosecutor  General  at  the  Court  of  Cassation  is  in  charge  by  Law  of  the  control  over  the  National  Anti-Mafia  Directorate; 
moreover, he is in charge of resolving the conflicts of competence between two or more territorial prosecution offices.  CY: The 
Attorney  General  has  the  power  to  decide  on  disciplinary  measures  regarding  prosecutors  in  case  of  minor  disciplinary 
violations.  In  case  of  serious  disciplinary  offences,  the  Attorney  General  does  not  propose  sanctions  but  recommends  the 
initiation  of  disciplinary  measures  by  the  Public  Service  Commission.  LT:  As  to  the  power  to  give  instructions  on  individual 
cases, the Prosecutor General cannot instruct on which decision to make; as to the power to decide on promotion of prosecutors, 
the  Prosecutor  General  decides  on  the  conclusions  of  the  Prosecutor  Selection  Commission  or  the  Chief  Prosecutor  Selection 
Commission.  LU:  The  Prosecutor  General  has  the  power  to  instruct  prosecution  services  to  prosecute  in  a  case  (but  cannot 
instruct  not  to  prosecute).  As  to  the  promotion  of  a  prosecutor,  the  state  prosecutor  /  Prosecutor  General,  with  a  favourable 
opinion, suggests the promotion to the executive and the Head of State signs the nomination.  AT: The powers of the Prosecutor 
General do not include direct management over the prosecution service as referred to in the chart. Superior Prosecutors have the 
following  powers:  to  issue  general  guidance  regarding  prosecution  policy  within  their  respective  districts,  to  give  instructions 
regarding prosecution in individual cases, to transfer prosecutors without their consent for organisational reasons (e.g. having to 
cope with excessive workload or long term sick leaves at one prosecution authority-only within his or her district and for a limited 
time). Head of the respective prosecution authority has the power to give instructions regarding prosecution in individual cases 
and  to  remove  an  individual  case,  which  was  assigned  to  a  prosecutor  (transfer  a  case).  The  Independent  Personnel  Body 
(Personalkommission), consisting of four members, who must be public prosecutors, has the power to evaluate a prosecutor. PL: 
The Prosecutor general is also the Minister of Justice. RO: The General Prosecutor has the power to transfer an individual case 
from  a  prosecution  unit  to  another  prosecution  unit  and  to  issue  general  guidance  regarding  prosecution  policies 
(recommendations), in order to guarantee a unitary approach on criminal investigations.  SI: Both the Prosecutor General and 
the  head  of  State  Prosecutor’s  Offices  have  the  powers  to  issue  general  guidance  on  prosecution  policy  and  to  remove  an 
individual case assigned to a prosecutor. 

59 

 
 
 
Figure  57  presents  an  overview  of  the  authorities  (Council  for  the  Judiciary/Prosecutorial 
Council/Court,  Ministry  of  Justice,  Prosecutor  General/prosecution  service)  dealing  with  the 
appointment and the dismissal of national  prosecutors, and does not  show the appointment  and 
dismissal  of  Prosecutors  General  or  other  assimilated  management  positions.  The  figure  shows 
the diversity of models of organisation of the prosecution service across Member States gathering 
around  the  executive  power  or  the  judiciary.  The  figure  also  shows  the  role  of  the  Prosecutor 
General  and  Councils  for  the  Judiciary/Prosecutorial  Councils  as  important  actors  both  in  the 
appointment and in the dismissal of prosecutors. 

Figure  57:  Appointment  and  dismissal  of  national  prosecutors  (*)  (source:  European 
Commission with the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism) 

(*) BE: Proposal for appointment: Council for the Judiciary. Decision on appointment: Head of State on advice of the Minister of 
Justice. Proposal for dismissal: disciplinary court. Decision on dismissal: Head of State on advice of the Minister of Justice. BG: 
Decision  on  appointment  and  dismissal:  the  Prosecutors’  Chamber  of  the  Council  for  the  Judiciary.  CZ:  Proposal  for 
appointment: Prosecutor General. Proposal for dismissal: Prosecutor General, Chief Public Prosecutors and Minister of justice. 
Decision on dismissal: Court. DK: Proposal for appointment: Prosecutor General proposes the final candidates for the position 
of prosecutor trainees (for the duration of approximately three years) to the Ministry of Justice who appoints the candidates. If a 
prosecutor trainee passes the examination and subsequently the training, the candidate will become a prosecutor. EE: Proposal 
for appointment: prosecutors' competition committee for specialised prosecutors, district prosecutors and assistant prosecutors; 
chief  prosecutors  for  senior  prosecutors.  Decision  on  appointment  and  dismissal:  Prosecutor  General.  IE:  Proposal  for 
appointment: a recruitment competition under a recruitment licence issued by the Commission on Public Service Appointments 
(CPSA) held normally by the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (or potentially by the Public Appointment Service). 
Decision on appointment: Director of Public Prosecutions. Proposal for dismissal: Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, 
in accordance with terms and conditions set by the Minister of Finance, Public Expenditure  & Reform. Decision on dismissal: 
Deputy  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  (Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  for  prosecutors  graded  as  principal  officers  and 
upwards).  ES:  Proposal  for  appointment:  National  Prosecutor  following  a  report  from  the  Fiscal  Council,  after  hearing  the 
Superior Fiscal Council of the respective Autonomous Community in the case of posts in the Public Prosecutor's Offices of its 
territorial  scope.  Decision  on  appointment:  the  Government.  Proposal  for dismissal: Attorney  General.  Decision  on dismissal: 
Minister of Justice, after a favourable report form the Fiscal Council. EL: Proposal for appointment: Ministry of Justice annually 
issues  a  ministerial  decision  concerning  the  entrance  examination  to  the  National  School  of  Judges  for  candidate  Public 
Prosecutors. The selection process -held by a five-member committee- currently consists of written and oral exercises. Once they 
enter  the  Greek  National  School  of  Judges,  the  successful  candidates,  start  a  16-month  course  of  study  in  both  theory  and 
practice. This training is followed by an examination used to rank them by order of merit. Depending on their rank, they will be 
appointed to the competent court. Decision on appointment: Candidates are appointed as Public Prosecutors by a Presidential 
decree. Proposal for dismissal: Minister of Justice. Decision on dismissal: a court judgment by Disciplinary Councils provided 
for in Article 91 § 2 of the Constitution and are composed of professionals judges.  FR: Proposal for appointment: Minister of 
Justice on non- binding advice of the Council of the Judiciary. Decision on appointment: President of the Republic. Proposal for 
dismissal:  Minister  of  Justice  on  non-binding  advice  of  the  Council  of  the  Judiciary.  Decision  on  dismissal:  President  of  the 
Republic.  IT:  Decision  on  appointment:  after  the  proposal  of  the  Council,  the  Minister  of  Justice  issues  a  ministerial  decree, 
without any discretion not to appoint or to appoint any other candidate than the proposed candidate prosecutor. CY: Proposal for 
appointment/dismissal: Attorney General. Decision on appointment/dismissal: Public Service Commission with the opinion of the 
Attorney General. LT: Proposal for appointment: Prosecution Selection Commission (composed by two prosecutors nominated by 
the Collegiate Council, two prosecutors nominated by the Prosecutor General and one member nominated by each the President 
of the Republic, the Speaker of the Seimas and the Prime Minister). Decision on appointment: Prosecutor General. Proposal for 
dismissal: Prosecutors’ Ethics (same composition as the Prosecution Selection Commission). LU: Proposal for appointment: The 
Minister of Justice, on the favourable opinion of the Prosecutor General, proposes a nomination to the Grand-Duke. Decision on 

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appointment: Head of State. Proposal for dismissal: Prosecutor General. Decision on dismissal: Court.  HU: Proposal/decision 
on appointment: Senior Prosecutor. Proposal for dismissal: Senior Prosecutor. Decision on dismissal: Prosecutor General. MT: 
The  police  have  the  exclusive  competence  to  institute  and  undertake  criminal  proceedings  and  act  as  prosecutors  before  the 
inferior courts; the Attorney General acts as a prosecutor before the Superior Courts when the compilation of evidence before the 
Inferior  Courts  is  concluded.  NL:  Proposal  for  appointment:  Minister  of  Justice.  Decision  on  appointment  is  taken  by  royal 
decree (the appointing authority has an obligation by constitutional practice to follow the proposal to appoint the candidate for 
the post of prosecutor). Proposal for dismissal: Minister of Justice on advice of the Head of the prosecution office. Decision on 
dismissal is taken by royal decree. AT: Proposal for appointment: Independent Personnel Body (Personalkommission) consisting 
of  four  members,  who  must  be  public  prosecutors.  Decision  on  appointment:  Federal  President  delegates  the  decision  to  the 
Minister  of  Justice.  Proposal  and  decision  on  dismissal:  Disciplinary  Court.  PL:  Proposal  for  and  decision  on  appointment: 
Prosecutor General - who is also the Minister of Justice - upon a motion of the National Public Prosecutor. A competent public 
prosecutor's  office’s  board  gives  an  opinion  on  a  candidate  for  the  post  of  prosecutor.  Proposal  for  dismissal:  National 
prosecutor.  Decision  on  dismissal:  Disciplinary  court;  in  very  limited  situations,  also  the  Prosecutor  General  can  dismiss  a 
prosecutor at the request of the National Prosecutor. The opinion on dismissal of a prosecutor is given by the meeting of public 
prosecutors  of  the  National  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  or  competent  Regional  Prosecutor’s  Office.  RO:  Proposal  for 
appointment: Superior Council of Magistracy. Decision on appointment: President (the appointing authority has an obligation by 
law to follow the proposal to appoint the candidate for the post of prosecutor). SI: Proposal for appointment: Minister of Justice 
on  the  opinion  of  the  Council  for  the  Prosecution  Service.  Decision  on  appointment:  Council  for  the  Prosecution  Service  (the 
appointing authority has not an obligation to follow the proposal to appoint the candidate for the post of prosecutor). Proposal 
for  dismissal:  Council  for  the  Prosecution  Service.  Decision  on  dismissal:  Government  on  the  proposal  from  the  Minister  of 
Justice. SK: Proposal for appointment: Chairman of the Selection Board of the General Prosecutor´s Office. Appointment and 
dismissal: Prosecutor General. FI: Appointment and dismissal: Prosecutor General. SE: Proposal for, decision on appointment: 
Director  of  human  resources  of  the  Swedish  prosecution  authority,  on  the  opinion  of  the  Prosecutor  General.  Proposal  for 
dismissal: Director of human resources of the Swedish prosecution authority. Decision on dismissal: Court on the opinion of the 
Prosecutor General. 

3.3.3. Summary on judicial independence 
Judicial  independence  is  a  fundamental  element  of  an  effective  justice  system.  It  is  vital  for 
upholding  the  rule  of  law,  the  fairness  of  judicial  proceedings  and  the  trust  of  citizens  and 
businesses in the legal system. For this reason,  any justice reform should uphold the rule of law 
and comply with  European standards on judicial  independence.  The Scoreboard shows trends in 
perceived  judicial  independence  among  the  general  public  and  businesses.  This  edition  also 
presents some selected indicators concerning legal safeguards in relation to the bodies involved in 
disciplinary proceedings regarding judges and of the management of the prosecution services. The 
structural  indicators  do  not  in  themselves  allow  for  conclusions  to  be  drawn  about  the 
independence of the judiciaries of the Member States, but represent possible elements which may 
be taken as a starting point for such an analysis.  
  The 2019 Scoreboard presents the developments in perceived independence from surveys of 

 

citizens (Eurobarometer) and companies (Eurobarometer and World Economic Forum): 
  All surveys generally show similar results, in particular as regards the composition of the 
two  groups  of  Member  States  that  have  the  highest  and  the  lowest  perceived  judicial 
independence. 
The World Economic Forum survey (Figure 51), presented for the seventh time, shows 
that  businesses’  perception  of  independence  has  improved  or  remained  stable  in  about 
three-fifths  of  the  Member  States  when  compared  to  2010.  Also  among  the  Member 
States  facing  specific  challenges  (138),  the  perception  of  independence  improved  or 
remained  stable  in  nearly  three-fifths  of  those  countries  looking  over  the  eight-year 
period.  However,  compared  to  2016-17,  businesses’  perception  of  independence 
decreased in about three-fifths of all Member States.   
The Eurobarometer survey among the general public (Figure 47), presented for the fourth 
time, shows that the perception of independence has improved in about two-thirds of the 
Member  States  when  compared 
to  2016.  The  general  public’s  perception  of 
independence  has  improved  in  more  than  two-thirds  among  the  Members  States  facing 
specific  challenges  looking  over  the  four-year  period.  However,  compared  to  last  year, 

 

138  

See footnote 70. 

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 

the  general  public’s  perception  of  independence  decreased  in  about  three-fifths  of  all 
Member  States  (in  more  than  two-thirds  of  Members  States  facing  specific  challenges, 
and about half of other Member States).  
The  Eurobarometer  survey  among  the  companies  (Figure  49),  presented  for  the  fourth 
time, shows that the perception of independence has improved in about two-thirds of the 
Member  States  both  compared  to  2016  and  to  the  last  year  (compared  to  last  year  this 
was the case in more than two-thirds of Members States facing specific challenges, and 
about three-fifths of other Member States). 

  Among  the  reasons  for  the  perceived  lack  of  independence  of  courts  and  judges,  the 
interference  or  pressure  from  government  and  politicians  was  the  most  stated  reason, 
followed by the pressure from economic or other specific interests. Both reasons are still 
notable for several Member States where perceived independence is very low (Figures 48 
and 50). 

  Among  the  reasons  for  good  perception  of  independence  of  courts  and  judges,  nearly 
four-fifth  of companies  and of  citizens (equivalent  to  40 % or 44 % of  all  respondents, 
respectively) named the guarantees provided by the status and position of judges. 
  The  2019  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  presents  overviews  on  the  disciplinary  authorities  dealing 
with  proceedings  regarding judges  as well  as competence of the judiciary, the  executive and 
the parliament in the selection of judges-members of the Councils for the Judiciary, and some 
managerial and organisational aspects of the prosecution services: 
  Figure  52  presents  an  overview  of  the  authorities  in  charge  of  disciplinary  proceedings 
regarding judges. In the majority of Member States, the authority deciding on disciplinary 
sanctions  is  an  independent  authority  such  as  a  court  (Supreme  Court,  Administrative 
Court or Court President) or a Council for the judiciary, while in some Member States it is 
a special court whose members are specifically selected or appointed (by the Council for 
the  Judiciary,  by  Judges  or,  in  one  Member  State,  by  the  Minister  of  Justice)  to  act  in 
disciplinary proceedings. 

  Figure  53  presents  an  overview  of  who  is  the  investigator  in  charge  of  disciplinary 
investigations  regarding judges.  In the majority  of Member States, the investigator is  a 
Court President or a Council for the Judiciary. In some Member States the investigator is 
specifically selected either by judges or by the Council of the Judiciary or, in one Member 
State, by the Minister of Justice. 

  Figure 54 shows the involvement of the judiciary in the appointment of judges-members 
of the Council for the Judiciary.  It  is  up to  the Member States to  organise their justice 
systems, including whether or not to establish a Council for the Judiciary. However, where 
a Council for the Judiciary has been established by a Member State, the independence of 
the  Council  must  be  guaranteed  in  line  with  European  standards.  In  almost  all  Member 
States, the judges-members of the Councils are proposed and elected or selected by judges. 

  Figure 55 presents an overview of the distribution, among different authorities, of the main 
management powers over national prosecutors. Figure 56 presents a factual overview of 
the  main  management  powers  of  the  Prosecutor  General  over  prosecutors.  These  figures 
show  that  in  some  Member  States  there  is  a  certain  level  of  concentration  in  one  single 
authority of the main management powers relating to  the prosecution services. Figure 57 
presents  an  overview  of  the  authorities  involved  in  the  appointment  and  dismissal 
procedures  for national  prosecutors. While the situation varies widely among Member 
States,  in  most  countries  the  Council  for  the  Judiciary/Prosecutorial  Council  or  the 
prosecution service is involved.  

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4. 

CONCLUSIONS 

This seventh edition of the EU Justice Scoreboard shows that a large number of Member States 
have  continued  their  efforts  to  further  improve  the  effectiveness  of  national  justice  systems. 
However, challenges remain to ensure full trust of citizens in the legal systems of those Member 
States  where  guarantees  of  status  and  position  of  judges  might  be  at  risk  and  so  their 
independence.  The  Commission  has  taken  the  necessary  action  and  continues  to  monitor  the 
situation in Member States. It is committed to ensure that any justice reform respects EU law and 
European standards on rule of law. 

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