Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank — Connecting Europe and Asia — Building blocks for an EU Strategy’(JOIN(2018) 31 final)
Date: 2019-03-20
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: Asia, EU strategy, civil society, digital single market, digital technology, economic development, information technology, international cooperation, sustainable development, transmission network








C_2019228EN.01009501.xml










5.7.2019   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


C 228/95






Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank — Connecting Europe and Asia — Building blocks for an EU Strategy’

(JOIN(2018) 31 final)

(2019/C 228/14)
Rapporteur: Jonathan PEEL







Referral


European Commission, 14.12.2018




Legal basis


Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union




Section responsible


External Relations




Adopted in section


26.2.2019




Adopted at plenary


20.3.2019




Plenary session No


542 




Outcome of vote
(for/against/abstentions)


133/2/1




1.   Conclusions and recommendations









1.1.


The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) welcomes the publication of the Joint Communication ‘Connecting Europe and Asia — Building blocks for an EU Strategy’ (1), issued by the Commission together with the EU High Representative on 19 September 2018.












1.1.1.


This initiative is most timely. The world order is changing at its fastest rate for nearly thirty years, the post-war international trading order is under significant challenge, the balance of global economic power is moving eastwards and Asian global purchasing power is growing exponentially.












1.2.


The EESC however considers the Communication to be a seriously missed opportunity. The Committee notes with deep concern the number of significant strategic gaps. Key economic and geopolitical realities have not been reflected. There appears to be limited ambition and little fresh forward thinking. The opportunity has not been taken to give any real depth of vision to the future development of the EU’s relationship and connectivity with Asia, with little overt recognition of its broad diversity or complexity.












1.2.1.


There is no roadmap nor any firm indication of the EU’s strategic objectives, whether these be complementary or competitive.












1.2.2.


The EESC questions why so little, if any, reference is made to many recent, critically important developments affecting both the EU and Asia. There is, for example:






—


No attempt to identify or examine any of the major strategic challenges facing Europe in its future relationships with Asia,










—


No encouragement or examination of Asian-led connectivity or investment issues in turn pointed in the main or in part towards Europe,










—


No reference to the major trade or economic partnership agreements between the EU and leading Asian countries, either already in force or those still in progress: the omission of any reference to the recent EU-Japan EPA, the most significant such agreement (and now in operation), we find astounding,










—


No reference under ‘people-to-people connectivity’ to any of the existing civil society dialogues between EU and Asia, especially the flagship civil society monitoring bodies set up under these trade agreements,










—


No attempt to evaluate the potential role for civil society, despite this active monitoring role, especially given there is little such tradition across Asia,










—


No attempt to examine social issues, despite these often being a key topic for such bodies — including implementation of core ILO conventions, promotion of gender equality (Sustainable Development Goal 5), or even human rights,










—


No mention whatsoever of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — despite the fact that the BRI is not only directed towards Europe but affects every other Asian country as well, and in spite of it proposing actual trade, infrastructure and financial support,










—


No consideration of the potential of the BRI to incur large debts without creating many new jobs, nor any examination of its potential strategic opportunities or challenges for Europe,










—


No attempt, other than in passing, to look at the EU’s Central Asia Strategy, nor how this is being affected by the strategic power play in the area involving China, the Russian Federation and many others, including Turkey, Iran and India,










—


No reference to or evaluation of the Eurasian Economic Union, set up by Russia and which includes both European and Central Asian countries, and with ambitions for further expansion,










—


No reference to managing the demand for energy and the competing interests for the vast hydrocarbon resources found within Central Asia — apart from its reference to ‘supporting energy connectivity both between and with partners in Asia’,










—


No reference to current connectivity initiatives regarding transport or energy, such as the Intergovernmental Commission for the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) (2),










—


No attempt to link transport and the need for infrastructure in the region with, for example Sustainable Development Goal 9, which covers infrastructure,










—


Likewise little reference to the challenges facing both the EU and Asia in meeting the targets arising out of the Paris Climate Agreement, notably over environmental pollution,










—


No reference to the growing danger of armed conflict, including the use of space and digital technology, or to the need for dialogue with Asian countries here,










—


No reference to how best to work with Asian countries to bolster international organisations, notably the WTO,










—


There is only a passing mention of India, despite its size and potential strength — and just one of Iran, increasingly a key player in the wider region.
















1.3.


The EESC does however welcome the emphasis in the Communication on sustainable, comprehensive and rules-based connectivity. It rightly stresses the importance of promoting ‘a circular economy, low greenhouse gas emissions, and a climate resilient future in order to attain the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the targets set out in the Paris Climate Agreement’.












1.4.


The EESC believes that it is imperative that the EU makes a formal response to the BRI.












1.4.1.


Many had been expecting this Communication to form a key part of the EU response to the BRI, but it is not mentioned. Originally the BRI was called the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ — the ‘Silk Road’ being the historic EU-Asia connectivity route. The EU already has a Strategic Partnership with China. The BRI looks to build actual links between Asia and Europe: the Communication is far more nebulous.












1.4.2.


The EESC draws attention to the specific linkage made by the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (3) between the BRI and the ‘16 + 1’‘format’ between China and 16 Central and Eastern European countries (including 11 Member States). This report feared that the Chinese pledge to invest USD 3 billion in infrastructure in these countries could create ‘large debts’ for relevant European governments ‘to Chinese state-owned banks […] and create few jobs in Europe’. The Communication places great emphasis on fiscal viability and innovative financing, but ignores this concern.












1.4.3.


The Committee considers that it is essential that a formal connection between the BRI and the SDGs be established. The Communication emphasises the SDGs. The EU-China Round Table, which involves both the EESC and the China Economic and Social Council (CESC), has twice endorsed this linkage at recent meetings.












1.4.4.


The BRI has to work both ways. The EESC agrees with the EU Chamber of Commerce in China (EUCCC) that its future depends on trade and investment flowing equally in both directions. This will require China to open its markets. EU business has also expressed concern, calling for greater information and transparency before it can get involved with BRI based projects. These concerns are equally relevant in a pan-Asia context.












1.5.


The EESC strongly recommends that much greater resources be put towards the EU’s relations with Asia, ‘home’, as the EEAS points out, ‘to two thirds of the world’s poor’. In comparison with the far bigger proportion of the EU development budget that goes to Africa and Latin America, the resources earmarked for many poorer Asian countries are inadequate.












1.6.


The Committee believes that the European Commission should extend the economic foreign policy instruments, supporting European businesses and particularly consortia, already in place for Africa under the auspices of InvestEU, to cover Asia and other parts of the world. Such support shall be equally carried out respecting workers’ rights in procurement procedures also in third countries receiving foreign investments.












1.7.


The section on energy is very short. The Committee urges that the EU’s considerable expertise in enhancing cooperation to improve energy efficiency and deploy renewable energy sources be fully deployed. We note too that there is no reference either to the varying competing interests for the vast hydrocarbon resources found within Central Asia, and regret that there is no reference to water, another hugely important, potentially dangerous and vital strategic commodity.












1.8.


The EESC welcomes the Communication’s comments on digital connectivity, especially its call for ‘a peaceful, secure and open ICT environment, while addressing cybersecurity threats and protecting human rights and freedoms online, including personal data protection’. Yet it is most disappointing that nothing is said about how to deal with European or Asian countries that take very different approaches to these issues.












1.9.


The EESC was surprised to read only that the EU ‘should work towards connecting the well-developed Trans-European Network for Transport (TEN-T) framework with networks in Asia’: we repeat our recommendation (4) first made in 2011 that China’s and the EU’s proposed transport corridors become fully aligned, especially rail infrastructure where possible.












1.9.1.


The EESC also repeats its 2015 recommendation that the EU should put greater effort into getting results from TRACECA ‘to speed up the development of a sustainable infrastructure chain, ensuring multi-modal transport (notably rail and road infrastructure) through linking the corridor with the Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-Ts)’.




2.   Background: the importance of Asia to the EU









2.1.


The EESC welcomes being a named recipient of the Joint Communication ‘Connecting Europe and Asia — Building blocks for an EU Strategy’, issued shortly before the 12th ASEM (5) summit in Brussels in October 2018.












2.2.


This initiative to determine a Euro-Asian Connectivity strategy is most timely. The world is undergoing fundamental, structural change. The increasing economic strength and purchasing power of the East is gathering pace; the global trading order is under its strongest challenge yet due to the imposition by the US Administration of unilateral import tariffs and by its challenge to the WTO; the EU is under unprecedented internal challenge, whilst many countries are also undergoing serious internal change (e.g. the UK and Turkey), or are, like Russia or Iran, reasserting themselves.












2.2.1.


EU-Asia connectivity has existed for millennia. Before the discovery of the sea route in 1 497, this was primarily through what is now known as the Silk Roads. This covered far more than trade; it included all movement involving goods, ideas and peoples, ranging from cultural, medicinal and religious interplay through to access to key resources and technological innovation. From Asia, routes west also involved access to Africa, again witnessed today in the Chinese BRI.












2.3.


Four major Asian countries are amongst the EU’s top ten trading partners, namely China, Japan, the Republic of Korea and India. A further seven Asian countries appear within the top thirty. Of these, the EU has already negotiated major Free Trade Agreements (FTA) or Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with the Republic of Korea (no8), which came into force in 2011, with Japan (no6), now in force, and with Singapore (no14) and Vietnam (no19), where EP consent has yet to be sought. Negotiations for EU FTAs with Indonesia (no29), Malaysia (no21) and Thailand (no24) and other ASEAN countries are either ongoing or currently stalled.












2.3.1.


Each of the signed FTAs or EPAs includes a strong Trade and Sustainable Development chapter which involves an active civil society monitoring role and where the EESC in turn is heavily involved (extensively covered in other recent EESC opinions (6)). Separate Investment Protection Agreements (IPAs) have also been signed with both Singapore and Vietnam, but not yet reached with Japan.












2.3.2.


In turn, negotiations with China (no2) for a comprehensive, stand-alone Investment Agreement began in 2013 but are proceeding slowly: the 20th round of negotiations is under way. Negotiations for an FTA with India (no9), launched in 2007, however have been stalled since 2013.












2.3.3.


The EESC notes with considerable surprise that the Communication does not make any reference to any of these agreements or negotiations.












2.4.


Asia accounts for some 60 % of the world population, for some 35 % of EU exports, and 45 % of its imports. As well as high-income industrialised partners and dynamic emerging economies, it ‘is also home to two thirds of the world’s poor’, as the EEAS website (7) points out. This states that ‘development cooperation therefore remains high on the EU’s agenda’ with Asia, with more than EUR 5 billion allocated, adding that ‘policies are being put in place jointly to address common challenges, such as climate change, sustainable development, security and stability, governance and human rights, as well as the prevention of, and response to natural and human disasters’. Yet the amounts allocated for Africa and Latin America are relatively much larger.












2.5.


Asia covers a huge diversity of peoples and cultures: no one size can fit all. It can never mirror the EU. Human rights and the approach to social issues vary enormously across Asia. Apart from the economic powerhouses of East Asia and India (where economic development has yet to fulfil expectations), countries differ widely from each other. Even the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) membership ranges from Singapore to the three least developed countries of Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia.












2.6.


The Committee in turn has recently produced several Asia-oriented opinions, especially with regard to EU trade and investment negotiations, as well as two opinions on Central Asia (8), the second in 2015 at the request of the then Latvian EU presidency.




3.   General comments: building blocks?









3.1.


The Communication’s emphasis on sustainable, comprehensive and rules-based connectivity is welcome, if somewhat general. This includes environmental protection, safety and security as well as social and individual rights, together with the need for fair and transparent competition. It stresses too the importance of promoting ‘a circular economy, low greenhouse gas emissions, and a climate resilient future in order to attain the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the targets set out in the Paris Climate Agreement’.












3.2.


The EESC would be deeply concerned if the Communication had not spelt all this out, not least as these core themes have been emphasised and developed ever since the Commission’s 2006 Trade Communication, ‘Global Europe’. That set out to ensure that the benefits of trade liberalisation and European values ‘are passed on to citizens. As we pursue social justice and cohesion at home we should also seek to promote our values, including social and environmental standards and cultural diversity around the world’ (9). These themes were developed by the 2015 ‘Trade for all’ Communication (10).












3.3.


We therefore strongly support the underlying premise of the Joint Communication, which is exhortative in tone. Despite that, there seems to be a major disconnect with many recent developments within Asia, especially those that may in time present strategic challenges to Europe itself. Such developments range from the BRI, to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to the increased interconnectivity between Russia, China, Central Asia, Turkey, Iran and even India, notably over energy and transport.












3.3.1.


It is very disappointing that the opportunity has not been taken to give any real depth of vision with regard to the future development of the EU’s relationship and connectivity with Asia. There is no examination of what Asian countries may want in turn from the EU: investment? Markets? Help with capacity building? The document reads more like a list of ‘building blocks’ that are already in place, rather than setting out any range of ambition as to what the EU would wish to build, positively, for the future. There appears little fresh forward thinking, especially ‘outside the box’.
Perhaps never the aim of the Joint Communication, but we consider that a large number of key opportunities have been missed. These have already been spelt out in detail above.




4.   Connectivity









4.1.


The core theme of the Communication is connectivity. This follows the definition set out by the ASEM Ministerial meeting in November 2017. Despite it being aimed in turn for the 2018 summit, ASEM is not looked at. Connectivity here covers a very broad range of issues, separated into six specific areas. These include rail, road, air and sea infrastructure, energy (electricity, gas) infrastructure, ICT, AI, and smart grids, and trade and investment relations, as well as the key people-to-people dimension.












4.2.


To ‘sustainable connectivity’ the Communication adds ‘fiscal viability’, expanded in a later section as ‘international partnerships in finance’ and covered in depth. Whilst this includes a reference to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), unloved by the US, there is no reference to the concerns raised by the EP (11) about the Chinese ‘16 + 1 Initiative’ creating large debts and few jobs in Europe, not that these effects would or do stop at EU borders. That followed the Chinese pledge made at the 2017 Summit to invest USD 3 billion in infrastructure in these 16 European countries, the EP stressing such projects ‘must not be awarded in a non-transparent tender’.












4.2.1.


The EP called on Member States to work far more closely to ensure ‘no compromising of national and European interests for short term financial support’. This overall concern finds an echo in the EU proposal concerning screening of inward Foreign Direct Investment (12).












4.2.2.


The Committee notes that, whereas for Africa there are EU support instruments for European businesses and consortia, these do not exist for Asia-Europe connections. Not least as this puts such businesses at a disadvantage compared with Chinese companies that are supported by the BRI, we believe that the Commission now needs to extend this policy in place for Africa, and that InvestEU be extended to cover investment risks both in Asia as well as in other parts of the world. Such support shall be equally carried out respecting workers’ rights in procurement procedures also in third countries receiving foreign investments.












4.3.


‘Comprehensive connectivity’ in turn includes transport, digital and energy connectivity. With regard to digital connectivity, section 3.2 of the Communication refers to high capacity network links, universal and affordable access to the internet, and ‘a peaceful, secure and open ICT environment, while addressing cybersecurity threats and protecting human rights and freedoms online, including personal data protection’. Yet nothing is said about how to deal with those countries that take very different approaches to these issues.












4.4.


On transport the Communication points out that 70 % of trade goes by sea and 25 % by air, inevitable given the distances involved. We note however that, in dealing with customs formalities, no account has apparently been taken of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, which entered into force in February 2017.












4.4.1.


It recognises that the potential for growth in transport is substantial, pointing out that ‘rail remains relatively marginal’. Sea transport is far more appropriate for many Asian countries and a ship can take up to 200 times as many containers than a train. But sea transport is a global, not an Asian, issue. It adds that ‘road transport usually makes sense over medium distances … and as a secondary transport network’. But why is there no mention of the IGC TRACECA (13)?












4.4.2.


A key recommendation of the EESC’s 2015 opinion on Central Asia (14) was that the EU should put greater effort into getting results from TRACECA ‘to speed up the development of a sustainable infrastructure chain, ensuring multi-modal transport (notably rail and road infrastructure) through linking the corridor with the Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-Ts)’.












4.4.3.


The EESC pointed out that ‘for the EU, TRACECA remains an important initiative. It is an international programme to strengthen economic relations, trade and transport communication from the Black Sea basin to the South Caucasus and Central Asia based on existing transport systems, through the political will and common aspirations of its 13 Member States’. If there are issues of corruption here, these need to be tackled directly.












4.4.4.


The EESC is also surprised to see merely a proposal that the EU ‘should work towards connecting the well-developed (TEN-T) framework with networks in Asia’. Our 2015 opinion repeated our ‘2011 recommendation that China’s and the EU’s proposed transport corridors need to become fully aligned, not least where possible in rail infrastructure’. The EESC repeats this again in 2019.












4.4.5.


That opinion also noted that ‘building a modern and interoperable road and strategic railway infrastructure along the Silk Road route is a key interest for China, the EU and Russia as well. The successful integration of this region through modern and reliable infrastructure should offer a major opportunity not just for greater regional economic integration but also to promote the mobility of people and multicultural exchange, in turn producing a better environment for advancing the rule of law and democracy’. In view of SDG 9 (Build resilient infrastructure, promote sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation), this becomes even more urgent.












4.4.6.


We regret too that nothing is said about extending road and rail connections towards India and SE Asia, despite the considerable recent road building in both Central Asia and Iran. The US abandonment of the JCPOA Agreement (15) may be a key factor here.












4.5.


The section on energy connectivity (3.3) is notably short. The EESC previously recommended ‘that the viability of EU links with Central Asia’s considerable potential energy reserves must be based on practical and economic considerations. The EU is right to participate in the development of the energy sector in these countries, not least because their reserves offer Europe additional and complementary (as opposed to alternative) sources of energy, albeit complicated by issues of transit and transport. However, it will be important to avoid any potential misunderstanding with China in the context of our mutual interest to increase energy supplies from Central Asia’.












4.5.1.


Again the EESC repeats its recommendation ‘that the EU’s considerable expertise in enhancing cooperation to improve energy efficiency and deploy renewable energy sources be deployed, as there is significant untapped potential in the region’.












4.5.2.


The EESC notes with surprise that water is not mentioned despite being a vital commodity for much of Asia, with a real potential for conflict. Management of water, like environmental sustainability, is critically important, notably water efficiency and water wastage.












4.5.3.


Climate change will exacerbate water shortages. There is already the potential for conflict within Central Asia between those countries that have water but no serious hydrocarbon resources and those with oil and gas — but no water. Potential damming of major rivers, such as the Mekong, remains an outstanding concern, whereas the melting of the ‘third pole’, the Himalayan ice cap, can also be expected to pose a particular challenge.




5.   Belt and Road Initiative and wider EU-Asia considerations









5.1.


The EESC will not be alone in its surprise that the Communication did not mention the BRI: many were expecting this to form a key part of Europe’s response.












5.1.1.


When first launched in Astana in 2013 by President Xi the BRI was called the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’: the ‘Silk Roads’ are the historic EU-Asia connectivity route.












5.1.2.


The BRI was initially backed by a fund of USD 16,3 billion, by now far higher: it offered actual money. Not only aimed at building closer links with Europe, it was part of a broader vision to expand regional cooperation between China and other Asian countries, as well as Africa, to enhance regional connectivity, deepen trade and economic relations and expand people-to-people ties. It now aims to build trade and infrastructure involving over seventy countries by land and sea, adding investment, development, financial and people-to-people connectivity — a strong signal of China’s desire to play a greater role globally, despite many (including India and Japan) having concerns about the political and financial strings attached.












5.1.3.


The Committee believes that it is imperative that the EU makes a formal response to the BRI. The EU-China Strategic Partnership is important. Whereas the BRI aims to provide actual infrastructure, transport and trade links, what this Communication offers is far more nebulous. Does the EU want that in future roads may lead to Beijing, rather than to Rome?












5.2.


The BRI is a key factor in EU Asia connectivity. Reference has already been made to the concerns expressed by the EP. In its turn, the EUCCC have stressed that the BRI must be a two-way vehicle, saying its future ‘depends on trade and investment flowing equally in both directions, which will require China to open its markets’.












5.2.1.


The EUCCC believes the success of the BRI ‘will largely be predicated on open markets, balanced trade, transparency and reciprocity’. It points to the need in Asia, as elsewhere, for sound infrastructure, saying ‘improved connectivity can be a major contributor to economic growth, so such an approach is in the interests of all participants in this ambitious project’. It calls for ‘transparent public procurement processes’ to be put in place ‘that will allow European and Chinese companies, and especially private companies, to compete on an even playing field with projects going to the strongest bidders. Not doing so would likely result in funds being wasted and projects failing’ (16).












5.2.2.


The Communication (section 5.3) also speaks about ‘a level playing for business’. EU business has expressed its concerns, also calling for greater transparency and deeper company involvement at an earlier stage in BRI projects, to allow due diligence, assessment of commercial viability and ensure a rules-based market economy and non-discriminatory public procurement also apply.












5.3.


The Communication emphasises the SDGs. The EESC believes it is essential to make a formal connection between the SDGs and the BRI. The 2017 Joint Statement of the EU-China Round Table (17)‘emphasises that the implementation of BRI should contribute to the realisation of the UN 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals and the implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change’.












5.3.1.


The 2018 Joint Statement (18) further stated ‘with respect to important infrastructure initiatives, that as important trade and investment partners, the EU and the PRC should continue to align the development and implementation of major initiatives, and deepen cooperation in trade, investment facilitation, e-commerce, connectivity, infrastructure, IT, energy, people-to-people contacts and other fields’. Authorities on both sides it added should ‘ensure all joint initiatives and projects are fiscally and environmentally sustainable, and thus, contribute to the achievement of the SDGs’. It pointed out that ‘both the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement highlight the outstanding needs for global infrastructure, and finds that all SDGs need to be taken into consideration in the context of the BRI and the Euro-Asian Connectivity Strategy’.












5.3.2.


The Round Table concluded ‘that, for major projects to be beneficial to both sides, they need to deliver mutual benefit and to be transparent, interoperable, reciprocal and sustainable, based on consultation, contribution and shared benefits’.












5.4.


Turning to wider considerations for EU-Asian connectivity, it is clear that many of the issues relevant to the BRI have much broader application. For example, the Communication lays emphasis on the SDGs, but this is not spelt out in depth. The most relevant SDGs, not only for the BRI, but for pan-Asian connectivity, include:






—


Goal 6 (Clean water and sanitation),










—


Goal 7 (Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all),










—


Goal 9 (Build resilient infrastructure, promote sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation),










—


Goal 8 (Promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all), and










—


Goal 14 (Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources).
















5.4.1.


Many other SDGs also need to be taken into account, notably Goal 5 (Achieve Gender Equality), Goal 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities), Goal 12 (Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns), and Goal 15 (Sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, halt and reverse land degradation, halt biodiversity loss).












5.5.


The Communication rightly lays great emphasis on ‘rules-based connectivity’. Here the WTO has a significant role, now under threat from the US Trump Administration. A key WTO task is to promote transparency in international trade, notably through its system of ‘peer-review’ whereby the trading practices of its members are kept under regular review. The WTO is the right forum where concerns, such as those raised by the US over China, including dumping and hidden subsidies, should be dealt with.












5.5.1.


For this and many other geo-political reasons, given the exponential growth in trade for a large number of Asian states, positive support for the WTO will be strong, and widespread Asian backing will be there for the EU in its championing of the WTO, its role and its key activities.












5.5.2.


A specific target of SDG 17 (revitalise the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development) is to ‘promote a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system under the WTO’. As its Nairobi Ministerial Declaration (19) spelt out, ‘international trade can play a role towards achieving sustainable, robust and balanced growth for all’, whilst emphasising this would be far harder without an effective multilateral trade mechanism.




6.   Empowerment of civil society









6.1.


As mentioned, there has been a strong Trade and Sustainable Development chapter in all EU FTAs and EPAs since 2011, with an active monitoring role involving civil society.












6.1.1.


Nevertheless, the role and concept of civil society is markedly different in Asia than it is in Europe, or elsewhere. The setting up of an effective Civil Society Forum under the EU-Korea FTA has been successful if a long undertaking. The establishment of a similar mechanism between the EU and Japan is under way, built up through long-standing, in-depth and fruitful contact. For neither Singapore nor Vietnam however is there any existing mechanism to build on following ratification. Other ASEAN countries, notably Indonesia, are likely to follow. Despite it being the flagship for EU connectivity with civil society in Asia here the Communication remains silent.












6.2.


The EESC welcomes the inclusion of the concept of people-to-people connectivity in the Communication. This specifically refers to ‘connectivity and mobility amongst students, academics and researchers’ (section 3.4) as ‘key to mutual understanding and economic growth’, highlighting the Erasmus programme and the ‘Marie Sklodowska Curie actions’. Most people-to-people connectivity arises through trade, tourism or sport, although the EU has also established a wide range of dialogue initiatives with China, India and others.












6.2.1.


The involvement of youth, particularly through education and exchange programmes is particularly important. The revised, highly sought after EU Erasmus+ programme is key. This helps develop deeper educational ties, and mobility at tertiary level, which should be accompanied by visa facilitation and fee waivers for the most gifted students. However, this programme is global, and given the diversity within Asia not easy or perhaps even desirable to gain a specific Asian context.












6.2.2.


But this has to work both ways: Asia also has high-end skills to offer. Many Asian countries are more interested in mutual recognition of qualifications, greater mobility of labour and easy access to visas, as already shown by the impasse in the negotiations with India.












6.3.


However, the EU needs to do more to win hearts and minds in Asia. The Communication has disappointingly little to say about human rights (due perhaps to the diversity across Asia), the rule of law, good governance and democratisation. The EU must encourage confidence building. Asia as a whole faces difficult challenges due to the painful and widespread transition from command to more national market-oriented economies in many countries, hampered as ever by endemic periods of ethnic, environmental and economic turbulence, not to mention corruption.





Brussels, 20 March 2019.


The President


of the European Economic and Social Committee

Luca JAHIER




(1)  JOIN(2018) 31 final.

(2)  www.traceca-org.org/en/traceca/

(3)  EP 2017/2274(INI), 11 July 2018.

(4)  EESC opinions on The review of the EU-Central Asia Strategy — a civil society contribution (OJ C 242, 23.7.2015, p. 1), and The EU’s role and relationship with Central Asia and the contribution of civil society (OJ C 248, 25.8.2011, p. 49).

(5)  Asia Europe Meeting, comprising 30 European and 21 Asian countries.

(6)  Including opinions on (i) The role of Domestic Advisory Groups in monitoring the implementation of Free Trade Agreements; (ii) Trade for All — Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy (OJ C 264, 20.7.2016, p. 123); and (iii) Trade and sustainable development chapters in EU Free Trade agreements (OJ C 227, 28.6.2018, p. 27).

(7)  https://eeas.europa.eu/regions/asia/334/asia_en

(8)  See footnote 4.

(9)  COM(2006) 567 final, point 3.1.iii.

(10)  COM(2015) 497 final

(11)  See footnote 3.

(12)  COM(2017) 487 final.

(13)  See footnote 2.

(14)  See footnote 4.

(15)  The 2015 Joint and Comprehensive Plan of Action signed with Iran.

(16)  As restated 27 May 2017.

(17)  15th EU-China Round Table.

(18)  16th EU-China Round Table.

(19)  Nairobi Ministerial Declaration.