Opinion of the European Central Bank of 28 February 2019 on the establishment of a macroprudential board (CON/2019/10)
Date: 2019-02-28
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: Spain, financial stability, financial supervision, national law, supervisory body

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 28 February 2019  

on the establishment of a macroprudential board 

 (CON/2019/10) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 18 February 2019 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Banco de España, 

on behalf of the State Secretary for Economic Affairs and Support for Business, for an opinion on a draft 

royal  decree  on  the  creation  of  a  macroprudential  authority  financial  stability  board,  and  on  the 

development  and  notification  of  the  macroprudential  tools  which  may  be  adopted  by  the  Banco  de 

España,  the  National  Securities  Market  Commission  and  the  Directorate  General  for  Insurance  and 

Pension Funds (hereinafter the ‘draft royal decree’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning  of  the  European  Union  and  the  third  and  sixth  indents  of  Article 2(1)  of  Council  Decision 
98/415/EC1,  as  the  draft  royal  decree  relates  to  the  Banco  de  España  and  rules  applicable  to  financial 

institutions  insofar  as  they  materially  influence  the  stability  of  financial  institutions  and  markets.  In 

accordance  with  the  first  sentence  of  Article 17.5  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  European  Central 

Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft decree law 

1.1  The  draft  royal  decree  creates  Autoridad  Macroprudencial  Consejo  de  Estabilidad  Financiera 

(AMCESFI, the Macroprudential Authority Financial Stability Board) and (among other things) lists 

the macroprudential tools that may be used by the competent macroprudential authorities. 

1.2  The objective of AMCESFI is to contribute to the stability of the financial system as a whole through 

the  identification,  prevention  and  mitigation  of  circumstances  or  actions  which  could  cause 

systemic  risk  in  the  financial  sector.  AMCESFI  is  to  pursue  this  objective  in  cooperation  with  the 

Banco  de  España,  the  National  Securities  Market  Commission  and  the  Directorate  General  for 

Insurance  and  Pension  Funds  (hereinafter  collectively  referred  to  as  ‘the  sectoral  authorities’). 

However, each of the sectoral authorities retains its supervisory competences, including the power 

to adopt macroprudential tools. 

1.3  The tasks of AMCESFI include the identification, prevention and mitigation of the circumstances or 

actions which may give rise to systemic risk in the financial sector. For these purposes AMCESFI is 

to monitor and analyse the factors that could affect systemic risk. Based on the results of this work, 

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Council  Decision  98/415/EC  of  29 June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
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AMCESFI may issue opinions, warnings and recommendations, specifying, wherever possible, the 

systemic risk factor it means to address and the level of severity of that risk factor. After it receives 

notification from any of the sectoral authorities of their intention to activate, recalibrate or deactivate 

any  of  their  macroprudential  tools,  AMCESFI  will  issue  its  opinion  thereon.  AMCESFI  may  direct 

communications to the financial system as a whole, or to a particular financial authority or a group 

or subgroup of financial sector participants, warning about activities or issues that could constitute 

systemic risk factors. AMCESFI may also  recommend that the sectoral authorities take measures 

to prevent or mitigate systemic risk factors.  

1.4  AMCESFI will take into account the European Union and European Economic Area objectives on 

financial  stability  and  cooperate  with  the  macroprudential  authorities  in  other  Member  States  and 

with  the  competent  European  authorities.  AMCESFI  will  inform  the  Secretariat  of  the  European 

Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) of any recommendations issued, and will also inform the ECB where 

the recommendation issued affects institutions under the ECB’s direct supervision. AMCESFI may 

adopt  recommendations  of  the  ESRB  at  the  national  level  in  cases  where  it  is  the  competent 

authority  for  these  purposes,  or  provide  a  justification  for  lack  of  action,  as  applicable,  under  the 
provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1092/20102.      

1.5  The two main bodies of AMCESFI are the Board, which is AMCESFI’s decision-making body, and 

the  Technical  Committee,  which  prepares  the  matters  to  be  decided  by  the  Board.  The  Board  is 

composed  of  seven  members,  including  the  Minister  for  Economy  and  Enterprise  (as  Chair),  the 

Governor of the Banco de España (as Vice-Chair), the Deputy Governor of the Banco de España, 

the  President  and  Vice-President  of  the  National  Securities  Market  Commission,  the  State 

Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs  and  Support  for  Business,  and  the  Director  General  for  Insurance 

and Pension Funds. The Technical Committee is composed of nine members, including the Deputy 

Governor  of  the  Banco  de  España  (as  Chair),  the  Secretary-General  of  the  Treasury  and 

International  Finance  (as  Vice-Chair),  the  Director  General  of  Financial  Stability,  Regulation  and 

Resolution of the Banco de España (as Secretary), the Director General of Banking Supervision of 

the Banco de España and five other high-level officials of the Treasury and the sectoral authorities.  

1.6  AMCESFI  will  be  a  collegiate  body,  formally  established  within  the  Ministry  of  Economy  and 

Enterprise. Each of the bodies that form part of AMCESFI will contribute its own members of staff 

and  the  material  resources  needed  for  the  operation  of  AMCESFI.  AMCESFI  will  not  have  a 

specific budget. 

1.7  The draft royal decree  also lists the macroprudential tools  which may be adopted by the sectoral 

authorities for the purpose of preventing systemic risks and seeking a sustainable contribution from 

the  financial  system  towards  economic  growth.  These  include  the  tools  –  such  as  capital  buffer 

requirements,  limits  on  sectoral  concentrations,  conditions  on  loan  provisions  and  other 

transactions, higher risk weightings for real estate exposures, and any of the measures set out in 

2     Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European 
Union  macro-prudential  oversight  of  the  financial  system and  establishing  a  European  Systemic  Risk  Board  (OJ  L 
331, 15.12.2010, p. 1). 

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Article  458  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  575/20133  –  that  may  be  adopted  by  the  Banco  de  España  in 

respect  of  credit  institutions.  The  Banco  de  España  is  also  explicitly  designated  under  the  draft 

royal decree as the competent authority for the implementation of Article 458 of Regulation (EU) No 
575/20134. 

1.8  The  draft  royal  decree  also  authorises  the  Banco  de  España  to  use  macroprudential  tools 

concerning  capital  buffer  requirements  in  relation  to  exposures  to  specific  sectors  or  categories, 

and  to  establish  limits  on  sectoral  concentrations  and  conditions  on  loan  provisions  and  other 

transactions. Where these  tools  and limits are  only  required in relation to exposures to  a specific 

sector or category, as envisaged by Law 10/2014 on the organisation, supervision and solvency of 
credit institutions5, the draft royal decree provides that the following points, amongst others, may be 

taken  into  account:  (1)  the  quantitative  importance  of  the  different  categories  or  sectors  to  which 

credit institutions have exposures (in order to determine the potential limits on sectoral or category 

concentration and the potential countercyclical buffer to be established); (2) the relevant factors for 

setting  the  limits  and  conditions  on  lending  and  the  acquisition  of  fixed-income  securities  and 

derivatives by credit institutions, for transactions with agents  in the private sector based in Spain, 

including but not limited to (i) the relationship between the volume of credit provided to borrowers 

and  their  disposable  income  or  the  guarantees  provided  by  them;  (ii)  the  financial  burden 

occasioned  by  repayment;  (iii)  the  duration  of  these  agreements;  (iv)  the  fixed,  variable  or  mixed 

nature  of  the  agreed  interest  rate;  and  (v)  the  currency  of  the  credit  transactions;  (3)  the  credit 

dynamics in each category/ sector of credit exposure; and (4) the criteria established in this regard 

by  European  and  international  authorities  relating  to  macroprudential  objectives,  instruments  and 

indicators.  The  draft  royal  decree  provides  that  the  sectoral  authorities,  including  the  Banco  de 

España,  will  establish  internal  procedures  for  using  macroprudential  tools.  Any  potential  use, 

recalibration  or  deactivation  of  a  macroprudential  tool,  including  those  tools  applicable  to  credit 

institutions adopted by the Banco de España, must be notified to AMCESFI at least seven working 

days in advance of the planned date of adoption of the measures. 

2. 

General observations 

2.1  The  ECB  welcomes  the  fact  that  the  draft  royal  decree  establishes  a  national  macroprudential 

board  which  ensures  that  all  the  relevant  authorities  and  institutions  involved  in  macroprudential 

policy are represented on the board, and defines the board’s objectives, mission and powers in line 
with  the  guiding  principles  expressed  in  Recommendation  ESRB/2011/36  and  Recommendation 
ESRB/2013/17. 

3     Regulation  (EU)  No  575/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26  June  2013  on  prudential 
requirements  for  credit  institutions  and  investment  firms  and  amending  Regulation  (EU)  No  648/2012  (OJ  L  176, 
27.6.2013, p. 1). 

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This provision is intended to confer on the Banco de España an authority that had been previously only granted on a 
transitional basis. 

Law  10/2014,  of  16  June,  on  the  organisation,  supervision  and  solvency  of  credit  institutions,  BOE  no.  156, 
27.06.2014, p. 49412.  

6     Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on the macro-prudential mandate of 

national authorities (ESRB/2011/3) (OJ C 41, 14.2.2012, p.1). 

7     Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 4 April 2013 on intermediate objectives  and instruments 

of macro-prudential policy (ESRB/2013/1) (OJ C 170, 15.6.2013, p. 1). 

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2.2  The ECB also welcomes the fact that the draft royal decree lists the macroprudential tools that the 

sectoral authorities, including the Banco de España, may use, and in particular gives the Banco de 

España  the  authority  to  use  macroprudential  tools  concerning  capital  buffer  requirements  for 

exposures to specific sectors or categories,  and to establish limits on sectoral concentrations and 

conditions  on  loan  provisions  and  other  transactions,  as  envisaged  by  Law  10/2014  on  the 

organisation,  supervision  and  solvency  of  credit  institutions.  The  draft  royal  decree  also  refers  to 

the  possibility  of  applying  a  countercyclical  capital  buffer  for  exposures  to  a  specific  sector  or 

category, which was also envisaged by Law 10/2014 on the organisation, supervision and solvency 

of  credit  institutions.  The  ECB  has  previously  stated  its  views  with  respect  to  this  specific 
application  of  the  sectoral  buffer  in  its  opinion8  on  Royal  Decree–law  22/2018  on  the  creation  of 
macroprudential  tools9,  which  amended  Law  10/2014  on  the  organisation,  supervision  and 

solvency of credit institutions. 

3. 

Role of Banco de España as macroprudential authority  

3.1  The  ECB  considers  that  central  banks  should  play  a  leading  role  in  macroprudential  oversight, 
given  their  expertise  and  existing  responsibilities  in  the  area  of  financial  stability10.  This  is 

particularly  so  in  the  case  of  the  Banco  de  España,  which  retains  the  powers  to  use 

macroprudential tools as provided in Law 10/2014 on the organisation, supervision and solvency of 

credit  institutions,  holds  the  position  of  Vice-Chair  on  the  Board  and  of  Chair  on  the  Technical 

Committee,  and  will  act  as  the  secretariat  of  the  Technical  Committee.  The  ECB  therefore 

welcomes the role envisaged for the Banco de España as set out in the draft royal decree.  

3.2  The  ECB  understands  that  the  Banco  de  España  shall  continue  to  be  the  concerned  authority  in 

Spain  for  the  purposes  of  notification  to  the  ECB  by  the  national  competent  or  designated 

authorities  of  requirements  for  capital  buffers  to  be  held  by  credit  institutions  in  addition  to  own 

funds  requirements  and  any  other  measures  aimed  at  addressing  systemic  or  macroprudential 
risks under Article 5 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/201311. 

See Opinion CON/2018/58. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 

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9     Royal  Decree-law  22/2018,  of  14  December,  on  the  establishment  of  macroprudential  tools,  BOE  no.  304, 

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18.12.2018, p. 124062.  
This  is  in  line  with  recital  24  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  1092/2010.  This  is  also  reflected,  for  example,  in  the  fact  that 
under  Article  6(1)  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  1092/2010  the  members  of  the  General  Board  of  the  ESRB  with  voting 
rights include the President  and the Vice-President of the ECB  and the Governors of the national central banks of 
the  ESCB.  As  previously  noted  by  the  ECB,  given  their  central  role  in  macro-prudential  policy,  the  General  Board 
should  include  representatives  from  all  ESCB  central  banks.  See  paragraph  2.1  of  ECB  Opinion  CON/2015/4. 
Recommendation  ESRB/2011/3  envisages  that  the  national  macroprudential  authority  can  be  either  a  single 
institution  or  a  board  of  authorities,  but  also  recommends  to  Member  States  to  ensure  that  central  banks  play  a 
leading role in the macroprudential policy. See ESRB Recommendation on the macro-prudential mandate of national 
authorities  (ESRB/2011/3):  Follow-up  Report  –  Overall  assessment  published  on  the  ESRB  website  at 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu;  see  also  paragraph  5.2  of  Opinion  CON/2014/46  and  paragraph  2.3  of  Opinion 
CON/2014/21. 
See  Regulation  (EU)  No  1024/2013  of  the  Council  of  15  October  2013  conferring  specific  tasks  on  the  European 
Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 
63). 

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4. 

Procedure for activation of macroprudential tools 

4.1  The draft royal decree provides that the sectoral authorities have an obligation to notify AMCESFI 

at  least  seven  days  in  advance  of  the  activation,  recalibration  or  deactivation  of  macroprudential 

tools.  This  notification  period  may  be  shortened  where  advisable  under  market  circumstances  or 

where the measure must be used immediately. In view of the short time frame in which AMCESFI 

is to issue its opinion, the ECB understands that the issuance of such an opinion, or the lack of it, 

does  not  preclude  the  adoption  of  the  macroprudential  tool  by  the  relevant  sectoral  authority  in 

order to safeguard the independence of that sectoral authority’s actions.  

4.2  The draft royal decree stipulates that AMCESFI must inform the ESRB of recommendations issued 

by AMCESFI to the sectoral authorities. In order to ensure that AMCESFI’s actions complement the 

ESRB’s  actions  taken  at  Union  level,  it  is  suggested  that  the  requirement  to  inform  contained  in 

Article  18(2)  of  the  draft  royal  decree  be  amended  to  also  include  warnings  addressed  to  the 

financial  system  or  financial  authorities,  in  particular  if  significant  cross-border  effects  are  to  be 

expected. 

5.  Warnings addressed to a group or sub-group of financial sector stakeholders 

The draft royal decree envisages that AMCESFI may issue warnings addressed to a group or sub-

group of financial sector stakeholders about activities or issues that could constitute systemic risk 

factors.  The  issue  of  such  warnings  allows  AMCESFI  to  directly  address  stakeholders  from 

different sub-sectors within the financial sector. However, directly addressing warnings to groups of 

financial sector stakeholders could interfere with the macroprudential supervision conducted by the 

sectoral authorities. Furthermore, it is more consistent with the coordinating role of AMCESFI that 

those  warnings are  issued  through the relevant sectoral authorities.  It  is therefore suggested that 

Article  12  of  the  draft  royal  decree  be  amended  so  that  warnings  to  groups  of  financial  sector 

stakeholders are channelled through the relevant sectoral authorities.  

This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 28 February 2019. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Mario DRAGHI 

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