Towards a successful transport sector in the EU : challenges to be addressed.
Date: 2019-02-22
Institutions: European Court of Auditors
Subjects: air transport, audit, inland waterway, intra-EU transport, long-term financing, maritime transport, rail transport, road transport, transport infrastructure, transport planning, transport policy

EN

Landscape 
Review

Towards a successful  

transport sector in the EU:  

challenges to be addressed

2018

Contents 

Executive summary 

Aim and approach of this landscape review 

Part I: Overview of the transport sector in the EU 

Key facts about the transport sector in the European Union 

Key EU policy objectives for the transport sector 

Main stakeholders in the EU transport sector 

Infrastructure investment needs and availability of funds 

Part  II: State of play in key areas  of the EU transport 
sector 

Current trends in transport use 

Transport volumes have been steadily rising and are expected to continue 
doing so 

Road transport is preferred for passengers and goods 

Intelligent transport management systems: an intrinsic part of the future of 
transport 

Emerging trends in transport  

Infrastructure development 

Despite progress in the development of transport infrastructure in the EU, 
challenges remain 

TEN-T requires significant funding – Member State’s levels of indebtedness 
could be a hindrance 

Internal market 

Decarbonisation of transport 

Part III: Key challenges to be addressed 

Match objectives with resources 

Enforcement by EU of a closer alignment of national 
infrastructure decisions with EU policy priorities  

2 

Paragraph 

I - XII 

01-05 

06-25 

06-07 

08-12 

13-16 

17-25 

26-63 

26-39 

26-27 

28-33 

34-35 

36-39 

40-51 

40-46 

47-51 

52-55 

56-63 

64-91 

66 

67-70 

 
 
Enhance the added value of EU funding 

Improve project management 

3 

71-72 

73-86 

Plan better by performing a thorough upfront analysis of costs and benefits 

74-78 

Simplify rules for implementing infrastructure projects 

Enhance project monitoring  

Pay more attention to the maintenance and renewal of existing 
infrastructure 

More effort to shift goods off roads to other transport 

79-82 

83-86 

87-89 

90-91 

Annexes 

Annex I — ECA transport reports since 2010 

Annex II — The EU’s ten goals for a competitive and resource-
efficient transport system 

Annex III — Main stakeholders at EU level 

Abbreviations 

Landscape  review team 

 
 
 
 
4 

Executive summary 

I Landscape reviews provide a broad description and analysis of policy areas, largely 
based on publicly available information.  This landscape review describes and analyses 
what the EU does in the field of transport.  We focus on infrastructure investments 
funded from the EU budget and present cross-cutting themes that we identified in 
recent audits in the five main modes of transport:  road, rail, air, inland waterways and 
maritime. Drawing from our observations and recommendations,  we present a 
horizontal  review of the key challenges faced by the development  and financing of 
transport  in the EU. In addition to our own reports, this review takes account of 
reports by other  supreme audit institutions (SAI), as well as key EU policy documents, 
studies, evaluations and data and the views of other EU and international institutions. 

II Transport is a strategic sector of the EU economy which directly affects the 
everyday lives of all EU citizens and transport services provide approximately 
11 million jobs. It is a cornerstone  of European integration as fully interconnected  and 
sustainable transport networks are a necessary condition for the completion  and 
correct functioning of the European single market. 

III EU passenger and freight transport volumes have grown  in recent decades and are 
expected to continue doing so, albeit at a slower pace. Road transport  accounts for the 
bulk of passenger and freight journeys by volume and, at present, the market does not 
sufficiently incentivise users to shift to other modes of transport, which in general 
remain economically less competitive. 

IV Transport is an area of EU shared competence,  meaning that Member  States can 
exercise their own competence  unless the EU has formulated  common  transport 
policies and strategies. The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) establishes the 
basis for the Trans-European Transport Network  (TEN-T), an integrated multimodal 
network  allowing people and goods to move quickly and easily across the EU. The 
network  comprises two layers. The “core” network,  to be completed by 2030, consists 
of the strategically most important  links and nodes across the EU. The 
“comprehensive” network,  to be completed  by 2050, has the broader  goal of ensuring 
accessibility and connectivity for all EU regions. 

V Responsibility for developing, financing and building transport infrastructure  lies 
mainly with the Member  States. EU funding, which must deliver EU added value, can 
only act as a catalyst and cover a fraction of total needs. A range of EU funding 

 
 
5 

instruments, worth  a total of about €193 billion for the 2007-2020 period, provide 
support for transport  policy. 

VI Developing the EU’s transport  infrastructure requires a considerable financial 
outlay. The Commission estimates that the total investment needs in this area are 
about €130 billion per year, with further  significant investment needed for 
maintenance. The TEN-T core network  alone will cost an estimated €500 billion for the 
period from 2021 to 2030; including the comprehensive  network  and other transport 
investments increases this amount  to about €1.5 trillion. 

VII However, since the 2008 economic crisis, reduced investment in transport 
infrastructure  has held back the modernisation of the EU’s transport network,  with 
average investment levels well below what is needed. There is a need for significant 
financial resources to meet the TEN-T objectives on schedule. Given the limited 
availability of public funds, increased private-sector investment in strategic transport 
infrastructure  is considered essential. 

VIII The rate of infrastructure development  varies across the EU, with the quality 
and availability of infrastructure  still lagging behind, particularly in eastern regions. 
While the TEN-T core networks are already complete or close to completion  in some 
Member  States, others still have a lot to do. 

IX The Commission has recognised that the successful coordinated deployment  of 
intelligent transport  management systems, which is currently ongoing, is vital to the 
achievement of a pan-European,  co-modal and truly integrated transport  system. 
Moreover,  automation, digitalisation and shared mobility are rapidly expanding trends 
that have the potential to make transport  systems more efficient. However, new 
technologies and mobility patterns also bring challenges relating to the suitability of 
the legislative framework, privacy protection,  safety, liability and data security. 

X The Commission has been active in supporting the opening and liberalisation of the 
internal transport  market. Here too, though,  some challenges remain, particularly in 
rail and air traffic management. 

XI Transport accounts for approximately  a quarter  of all greenhouse gases (GHG) 
emissions in the EU. As transport  emissions started increasing again since 2014, the 
sector is becoming one of the main challenges to the EU’s overall decarbonisation 
goals. 

 
 
6 

XII While progress has been made in infrastructure development  and the opening of 
the internal transport market,  and there are proposed measures to accelerate the 
decarbonisation of transport, the EU still faces challenges to: 

o  match relevant and achievable transport  objectives and priorities with available 

resources; 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

establish effective enforcement  tools at EU level to ensure Member  States’ 
infrastructure  decisions are aligned with EU priorities more  closely, paying 
particular attention  to cross-border sections; 

focus EU funding on priorities with the highest EU added value; 

improve  the planning, implementation  and monitoring  of EU-funded projects; 

ensure that infrastructure is adequately maintained and sustainable; 

enhance efforts to shift more goods off roads. 

 
 
 
 
 
7 

Aim and approach of this landscape 
review 

01 This landscape review describes and analyses what the EU does in the area of 
transport  policy. We focus on infrastructure  investments funded from  the EU budget 
and present cross-cutting themes that we identified in recent audits in the five main 
modes of transport:  road, rail, air, inland waterways and maritime1. The ECA has 
published 13 special reports in this area over the past eight years (see Annex I). 
Drawing from our observations and recommendations,  we present a horizontal  review 
of the key challenges faced by the development  and financing of transport in the EU. 
The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU is likely to impact upon the 
planning and implementation  of EU transport policies. However, given the negotiations 
were still ongoing at the time of publication of this document,  and concrete 
implications are uncertain, we decided not to include this aspect in the current 
landscape review. 

02 The ECA’s landscape reviews provide a broad  description and analysis of EU policy 
areas, largely based on our previous work  and publicly available information. A 
landscape review is not an audit: it does not use new audit work or present new audit 
findings or recommendations.  However, it may present conclusions and 
recommendations  from previously published reports. The Commission’s replies to our 
findings and recommendations  in the reports quoted in this document  were published 
with those reports and are available on our website. 

03 In addition to our own reports, in this review we refer to reports by other 
supreme audit institutions (SAIs) and key EU transport  policy documents, studies, 
evaluations and data. We also interviewed representatives from  the European 
Commission, the European  Parliament, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation  and Development (OECD). We maintained 
regular dialogue with the Commission during the review process and, as far as 
possible, have taken into account their comments  on the contents of this landscape 
review. 

1  Other relevant aspects of transport such as passenger rights were not included in this 

review, but have been assessed in our recently published Special Report No 30/2018  “EU 
Passenger rights are comprehensive but passengers still need to fight for their protection” 
(http://eca.europa.eu). 

 
 
                                                 
8 

04 By providing clear and accessible information to stakeholders and interested 
parties, this landscape review aims to encourage stakeholders to improve  actions 
and/or co-ordinate  them better  in order to add value to the EU’s efforts to meet its 
transport  policy objectives. 

05 The review is structured  as follows: 

(a)  Part I provides an overview  of the EU’s main policy objectives for the transport 

sector, the underlying governance framework  and the scale and availability of the 
necessary funding; 

(b)  Part II describes the state of play in key areas of the EU transport  sector; 

(c)  Part III presents cross-cutting issues and key challenges which we consider to be 

of continuing importance.  

 
 
 
 
9 

Part I: Overview of the transport sector 
in the EU 

Key facts about  the transport  sector  in the European  Union 

06 Transport is a strategic sector of the EU economy, with transport  services 
accounting for about 5 % of the EU’s gross value added2 and 5.2 % (or around 
11 million persons) of all jobs in 2016. It directly affects the everyday lives of all EU 
citizens and ensures the flow of goods to consumers from more than 11 million EU 
producers and manufacturers 3. This makes good transport  systems a cornerstone  of 
European integration. Well thought-out,  sustainable and fully interconnected  transport 
networks are a necessary condition for the completion  and correct functioning of the 
European single market. 

07 Efficient transport  services and infrastructure  are necessary to exploit the 
economic strengths of all EU regions, to support the internal market and growth  and to 
promote  economic, territorial  and social cohesion. Given its central role, transport  also 
has close ties to policy areas such as the environment,  jobs and growth,  competition, 
social policies and digitalisation. 

Key EU policy objectives  for the transport  sector 

08 EU transport policy is set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) 4. 
It was one of the first areas in which the EU stated its intention to create a common 
market, in other words the opening-up  of transport networks  and establishment of the 
freedom  to provide transport  services. 

09 The key documents for defining the objectives of EU transport  policy are the 
white papers which the Commission publishes approximately every ten years 5. The 

2  The value of goods and services produced in an area, industry or sector of an economy. 

3  European Commission, “Delivering TEN-T Facts & figures”, September 2017, p. 5. 

4  Article 4(2)(g) and Title VI. 

5  COM(1992) 494  final of 2.12.1992;  COM(2001) 370  of 12.9.2001;  and COM(2011) 144  of 
28.3.2011, Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area - Towards a competitive and 
resource efficient transport system. 

 
 
                                                 
10 

most recent white paper, that of 2011, sets a roadmap with ten key goals (see 
Annex II) for the establishment of a single European transport  area with a competitive 
and resource-efficient transport  system. 

10 A number  of strategic papers 6 and policy documents  complement  and build on 
the 2011 white paper priorities, both for individual transport  modes and from a 
cross-cutting perspective. 

11 In order  to develop an integrated multimodal  network  allowing people and goods 
to move quickly and easily across the EU, the TFEU (see Title XVI) also laid the basis for 
the Trans-European Transport Network  (TEN-T). The Commission published the TEN-T 
guidelines in 1996 as the basis for developing TEN-T policy. They have been frequently 
amended, followed by a regulation in 20137. The regulation set completion deadlines 
for the network’s ‘core’ (2030) and ‘comprehensive’  (2050) layers (see Table 1) and, 
importantly,  moved  from an approach based on individual priority  projects to that of a 
multimodal  EU-wide corridor  network.  Projects are now planned within the framework 
of corridor  plans embracing all transport modes under  12 European coordinators 
appointed by the Commission to facilitate and supervise the coordinated  development 
of the TEN-T core network  corridors. 

6  For example: Europe 2020 - A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, 

COM(2010) 2020  final; A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-
Looking Climate Change Policy, COM(2015) 80 final, European Strategy for Low Emission 
Mobility, COM(2016) 501 final (2016); An aviation strategy for Europe, COM(2015) 598 
final; Aviation: Open and Connected Europe, COM(2017) 286 final; European Strategy on 
Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems, COM(2016) 0766  final; Strategic goals and 
recommendations for the EU’s maritime transport policy until 2018, COM(2009) 0008  final; 
Europe on the move packages-An agenda for a socially fair transition towards clean, 
competitive and connected mobility for all Europe, COM(2017) 0283  final. 

7  Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013  of 11 December 2013 on Union guidelines for the 

development of the trans-European transport network (OJ L 348, 20.12.2013,  p. 1). 

 
 
                                                 
11 

Table 1 – Scale of the TEN-T 

TEN-T 

Core (km) 

Comprehensive (km) 

Railway lines 

Roads 

Inland waterways 

50 762 

34 401 

12 880 

138  072 

136  706 

23 506 

Source:  Commission ex-post evaluation of Cohesion policy programmes for 2007-2013, work package 5. 

12 The comprehensive network  is designed to ensure accessibility and connectivity 
for all EU regions. The core network  consists of the strategically most important  links 
and nodes in the comprehensive  network,  organised into nine corridors (see Figure 1) 
and three horizontal  priorities (European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS), 
Motorways  of the Sea, and Road Safety). 

 
 
Figure 1 – TEN-T core network corridors 

12 

Atlantic,  Baltic-Adriatic,  Mediterranean,  North Sea-Baltic,  North Sea-Mediterranean,  Orient-East 
Mediterranean, Rhine-Alpine,  Rhine-Danube,  Scandinavian  Mediterranean 

Source:  European Commission. 

Main  stakeholders  in the EU transport  sector 

13 Transport is an area in which the EU and the Member  States have shared 
competence8. This means that the EU and the Member  States may each legislate and 
adopt legally binding acts. Member  States can pass laws and make rules unless the EU 
has formulated  common  transport  policies and strategies. 

14 The main stakeholders at EU level are the Commission, the European Parliament 
and the Council (see Annex III). As in all EU policy areas, the Commission proposes 
legislation and implements policy, while the Parliament and the Council enact 
legislation, generally based on the Commission’s proposals. 

15 The main stakeholders in Member  States are the national, regional and local 
authorities responsible for transport and investment policy, as well as freight and 
passenger carriers. 

8  Article 4(2)(g) and (h) TFEU. 

 
 
 
                                                 
13 

16 Most importantly,  millions of citizens and businesses benefit from transport 
networks and services. 

Infrastructure  investment  needs and availability  of funds 

17 Responsibility for developing, financing and building transport infrastructure  lies 
mainly with the Member  States. EU funding, which must deliver EU added value, can 
only act as a catalyst and cover a fraction of total needs. 

18 Developing the EU’s transport  infrastructure requires a considerable financial 
outlay. The Commission estimates the total investment needs in this area (both TEN-T 
and urban infrastructure)  to be about €130 billion per year. Further  significant 
investment is needed for maintenance9. It is estimated that the investment needs to 
develop the core network  amount to €500 billion for the period 2021 until 2030. 
Including the comprehensive  network10  and other transport  investments increases the 
figure to about €1.5 trillion11. 

19 Since the 2008 economic crisis, however, reduced investment in transport 
infrastructure  has held back the modernisation of the EU’s transport network12. 
According to the Commission’s latest TEN-T progress report13,  average investment 
levels in the EU have been well below €100 billion per year since the beginning of the 
crisis. 

20 A range of EU funding instruments, worth  a total of €193 billion for the 
2007-2020 period,  provide support for transport  policy (see Table 2). This support is 
implemented  in both direct and shared management  modes 14.The two main 

9  European Commission, Europe on the Move: An agenda for a socially fair transition towards 
clean, competitive and connected mobility for all, COM(2017) 283 final of 31.5.2017, p. 7. 

10  The 2013  TEN-T regulation set 2050 as a completion deadline for the comprehensive 

network.  

11  European Commission, “Delivering TEN-T: Facts & figures”, September 2017. 

12  European Commission, Transport in the European Union Current Trends and Issues – 2018, 

p. 12. 

13  Progress report on the implementation of the TEN-T network in 2014-2015,  COM(2017) 327 

final, 19.6.2017, p. 3. 

14  Under direct management (e.g. CEF, Horizon) the Commission selects contractors, awards 
grants, transfers funds and monitors co-funded activities. Under shared management (e.g. 

 
 
                                                 
14 

instruments are the Connecting Europe  Facility (CEF) 15 and the European Structural 
and Investment  Funds (ESIFs). The first (directly managed by the Commission) 
prioritises the TEN-T core network,  cross-border connections, bottleneck  removal and 
interoperability  projects, while the second (implemented  under shared management) 
expands these priorities to include enhancing regional mobility and connecting 
secondary and tertiary  nodes to TEN-T infrastructure16.   

Table 2 – EU transport budget allocations for the 2007-2020 period 
(€ billion) 

Instrument 

2007-2013 

2014-2020 

Total 

ERDF and Cohesion Fund/ESIFs 

TEN-T 

Marco Polo 

CEF-Transport 

FP71-Transport 

Horizon 2020-Transport 

Total 

81.8 

8.0 

0.5 

n.a. 

4.2 

n.a. 

94.5 

68.5 

150.3 

n.a. 

n.a. 

8.0 

0.5 

24.12 

24.1 

n.a. 

6.3 

4.2 

6.3 

98.9 

193.4 

1 
2 
Source:  ECA based on publicly available data. 

Seventh  Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development. 
Including €11.3 billion transferred from the Cohesion fund. 

21 Most EU funding (78 %) for transport during the two programming  periods from 
2007 to 2020 falls under shared management. However, the share of funding managed 
directly by the Commission is increasing, from 13 % for 2007-2013 to 31 % for 
2014-2020. 

ESIFs), the Commission delegates implementation of part of the budget to the Member 
States while retaining final responsibility. 

15  See Regulation (EU) No 1316/2013  of 11 December 2013 establishing the Connecting 

Europe Facility. 

16  Around 47 % of Cohesion Fund spending in the 2007-2013  period was channelled to TEN-T 
projects. See European Commission, Transport - Final Report - Work Package 5 - Ex post 
evaluation of Cohesion Policy programmes for 2007-2013, focusing on the ERDF and the 
Cohesion Fund, 2016, p. 97. 

 
 
                                                 
15 

22 Transport has been the biggest spending area for the ERDF and the Cohesion 
Fund in both programming  periods (24 % of the total allocation for 2007-2013 and 
20 % for 2014-2020). Nearly half of ERDF and Cohesion Fund expenditure  on transport 
for 2007-2020 has been allocated to roads (see Table 3). 

Table 3 – ERDF and Cohesion Fund budget allocations by transport sector 
for 2007-2020 (€ billion) 

Sector

Road
Rail
Urban transport
Ports
Multimodal transport
Intelligent transport 
systems (ITS)
Inland waterways
Air
Total transport

2007-2013

42,6 |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
23,1 ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
8,2 |||||||||||||||||||||
3,1 ||||||||
1,8 |||||

% of 
total
52 %
28 %
10 %
4 %
2 %

2014-2020

30,0 |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
18,6 |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
12,5 |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2,0 |||||
2,2 ||||||

1,0 |||

0,4 |
1,6 ||||
81,8

2,1 |||||

1 %
1 %
2 %
100 % 68,5

0,7 ||
0,4 |

% of 
total
44 %
27 %
18 %
3 %
3 %

3 %
1 %
1 %
100 %

Source:  ECA,  based on data provided by the Commission. 

23 The CEF (2014-2020 period  only) had granted €22.3 billion (about 93 % of the 
total CEF-Transport budget) to projects as of December 2017 (see Table 4). Most of the 
funded projects are on the core network  corridors  (79 %) and concern sustainable 
modes of transport  such as railways and inland waterways. 

Table 4 – Funds granted under CEF 

Sector

Total granted to projects 
(December 2017, € billion)

Rail
Inland waterways
Road
Air
Maritime
Multimodal

Total

16,4 |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
1,7 ||||||
1,7 ||||||
1,3 ||||
0,9 |||
0,3 |

22,3

100 %

% of 
total

74 %
8 %
8 %
6 %
4 %
1 %

Source:  ECA based on data provided by the Commission. 

24 At the time of drafting, the budget allocations for the 2021-2027 multiannual 
financial framework  (MFF) had not yet been adopted. The Commission’s proposal for a 

 
 
 
 
16 

CEF regulation17 would earmark €30.6  billion for transport, including a €11.3 billion 
contribution  from the Cohesion Fund. The Commission’s proposal for a 2021-2027 
regulation setting out common  provisions for seven shared management funds 18 
envisages a total of €242 billion for the ERDF and Cohesion Fund, but gives no 
allocations by sector, at this stage. 

25 The OECD has pointed out to the importance  of increased private sector 
investment in strategic transport infrastructure  to meet the shortfall in the availability 
of public funds 19. The EU uses financial instruments such as loans and guarantees (see 
below) to attract private investment in transport. 

(a)  The CEF debt instrument,  which uses the EU budget to provide guarantees mainly 
for EIB-financing, has supported 10 transport projects mobilising investment 
worth  more than €13 billion. 

(b)  The EIB Group  and the Commission jointly launched the European Fund for 

Strategic Investments (EFSI) in 2015 to help overcome  the current  investment gap 
in the EU. So far, it has provided financing of €5.6 billion to 45 projects 
contributing  to the transport  objectives 20. 

(c) 

In addition, the EIB has provided  approximately €140 billion in loans for transport 
projects in the period 2007-201821. 

17  Proposal for a regulation establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing 

Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013  and (EU) No 283/2014,  COM(2018) 438 final, 6.6.2018. 

18  Proposal for a regulation laying down common provisions on the European Regional 

Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, and the European 
Maritime and Fisheries Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum and Migration 
Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Border Management and Visa Instrument, 
COM(2018) 375  final, 29.5.2018. 

19  OECD, Strategic Transport Infrastructure Needs to 2030:  Main Findings, OECD Publications, 

Paris, 2011,  p. 6. 

20  EFSI project list as of October 2018 - signed projects (http://www.eib.org/en/efsi/efsi-

projects/index.htm). 

21  EIB financed projects as of October 2018 (http://www.eib.org/en/projects/loan/list/index). 

 
 
 
                                                 
17 

Part II: State of play in key areas of the 
EU transport sector 

Current  trends  in transport  use 

Transport volumes have been steadily rising and are expected to 
continue doing so 

26 Passenger and freight transport volumes in the EU have been steadily rising in 
recent decades 22, from 5 335 billion passenger-kilometres in 1995 to 6 802 billion in 
2016 for passenger transport and from 2 846 billion tonne-kilometres  in 1995 to 
3 661 billion in 2016 for freight. The Commission estimates that they will continue to 
grow, albeit at a slower pace than in the past. It projects an increase of 42 % for 
passenger transport activity and 60 % for inland freight between  2010 and 205023. The 
projected rise, for international maritime transport  is still greater, at 71 % over the 
same period.  

27 The increase in transport  volumes may lead to capacity challenges in the EU for 
some transport  modes. Congestion is already a major environmental  and economic 
concern which currently  costs the EU an estimated €140 billion each year24. 
Congestion costs are estimated to increase by more than 40 % by 2050, relative to 
201025. 

22  EC (2018), EU Transport in Figures – statistical pocketbook 2018, 

https://ec.europa.eu/transport/facts-fundings/statistics/pocketbook-2018_en. 

23  Europe on the Move: An agenda for a socially fair transition towards clean, competitive and 

connected mobility for all COM(2017) 283 final, p. 4. 

24  https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/connect-to-compete-

people_2016_en.pdf. 

25  Impact assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Directive 1999/62/EC on the charging of heavy goods vehicles 
for the use of certain infrastructures, SWD(2017) 180  final of 31.5.2017,  Annex 4, p. 38. 

 
 
                                                 
18 

Road transport is preferred for passengers and goods 

28 Road transport  accounts for the bulk of passenger and freight journeys by 
volume26. Car travel is the dominant  passenger mode, with around  71 % of all 
transport  activity in passenger-kilometres, followed by air, bus/coach and rail 
transport  with about 10 %, 8 % and 7 % respectively. The roads also take 49 % of EU 
freight transport  activity, followed by maritime transport  and rail 27 with about 32 % 
and 11 % respectively. 

29 The predominance  of road transport is even more striking when we look only at 
inland (excluding maritime and air) passenger and freight transport. Figure 2 shows 
that the majority of passenger kilometres are travelled in cars.  

Figure 2 – Percentage of passenger-km travelled in cars, buses and trains 
in the EU 28 

7.4
9.4

7.7
9.5

7.8
9.8

7.8
9.6

7.8
9.5

7.7
9.4

83.2

82.9

82.4

82.6

82.7

82.9

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Passenger cars

Buses and coaches

Trains

Source:  Eurostat statistical data (as of June 2018). Figures may not add up to 100 % due to rounding. 

30 Despite the 2011 white paper objective of shifting 30 % of road freight over 
300 km to other modes, such as rail or waterborne  transport,  by 2030, and more  than 
50 % by 2050, and despite the EU’s increased emphasis on environmentally  friendly 

26  EC (2018), EU Transport in Figures – statistical pocketbook 2018 

https://ec.europa.eu/transport/facts-fundings/statistics/pocketbook-2018_en. 

27  Rail freight performs differently in other parts of the world, where it is often the 

predominant mode of transport, reaching market shares of 40 % and more (e.g. in the 
United States, Australia, China, India, and South Africa). See our Special Report No 8/2016 
“Rail freight transport in the EU: still not on the right track” (http://eca.europa.eu). 

 
 
 
                                                 
19 

transport  modes, the share of road use for inland freight transport  has actually 
increased - from 75.1 % in 2011 - to 76.4 % in 2016 (see Figure 3). 

Figure 3 – Percentage of freight tonne-km transported by road, inland 
waterways and rail in the EU-28 

18.7

6.3

18.5

6.8

18.2

6.9

18.4

6.7

18.3

6.5

17.4

6.2

75.1

74.7

74.9

74.9

75.3

76.4

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Road

Inland waterways

Rail

Source:  Eurostat statistical data (as of June 2018). Figures may not add up to 100 % due to rounding. 

31 Road transport  is the preferred  way of sending goods within the EU, as it has the 
advantages of flexibility, reliability, price, time and door-to-door  delivery. In 2016, the 
ECA published a special report on rail freight transport  in the EU. We compared the 
challenges faced by freight transporters using rail to those faced when using road. At 
present, the market does not sufficiently incentivise users to shift from  road to other 
modes of transport,  which remain economically less competitive. Figure 4 shows some 
of the main reasons rail compares unfavourably  with road for freight. 

 
 
 
Figure 4 – The challenges facing rail compared to road for freight 

20 

Source:  ECA Special Report No 8/2016“Rail freight transport in the EU:  still not on the right track”. 

32 Transport generates negative externalities such as accidents, GHG emissions, air 
pollution and noise that involve a social and economic  cost. Before factoring in 
congestion, these negative external effects of transport were estimated to cost around 
4 % of EU GDP in 2011. As also indicated in our recent report  on high-speed rail 
(HSR) 28, there is ongoing debate in the EU about charging systems (particularly road 
charging) that look at both user-pays and polluter-pays principles across the various 
transport  modes, demonstrating  awareness of the need for a thorough  analysis of the 
potential drawbacks and benefits of internalising external costs. The internalisation of 
external costs means that users bear the costs they create and thus have an incentive 
to change their behaviour  in order to reduce those costs. Internalisation would have 
significant implications for transport  networks, the cost to final consumers and the use 
of transport  infrastructure. The Commission is currently carrying out a study on the 
internalisation of external costs (“Sustainable transport infrastructure  charging and 
internalisation of transport externalities"), with a view both to assessing the extent to 
which the user-pays and polluter-pays principles are already applied to different 

28  Special Report No 19/2018  “A European high-speed rail network: not a reality but an 

ineffective patchwork” (http://eca.europa.eu) 

 
 
 
                                                 
21 

modes in the Member  States, and to shaping a contribution  to the debate. The results 
of the study should be available by mid-2019. 

33 Increasing the use of multimodal  transport,  which has been one of the EU’s main 
transport  policy objectives for many years, can play a part in the modal shift away from 
road-only transport  operations.  Multimodality  refers to the use of different means of 
transport  during the same journey.  Despite some progress in recent years, multimodal 
transport  is still not widespread in Europe 29. The main EU legal instrument that directly 
supports multimodal transport  is the combined transport  directive of 199230, which 
was being amended at the time of writing. Multimodal projects are mainly supported 
through  the ERDF and Cohesion Fund,  with an allocated amount  of around €4 billion 
during the period from 2007 to 2020. The Commission announced 2018 as the ‘Year of 
Multimodality’  - a year during which it intended to raise the importance  of 
multimodality  for the EU transport  system. 

Intelligent transport management systems: an intrinsic part of the future 
of transport 
34 Intelligent transport management  systems refer to a range of digital traffic 
management and information  systems covering several modes of transport (see 
Box 1). The Commission has recognised that the successful coordinated deployment  of 
such systems is vital to the achievement of a pan-European,  co-modal and truly 
integrated transport system and forms an intrinsic part of the future of transport31. 
Deployment  is ongoing with approximately €3.1 billion allocated from the ERDF and 

29  According to the Commission’s SWD(2017) 362  final Impact Assessment accompanying the 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
92/106/EEC  on the establishment of common rules for certain types of combined transport 
of goods between Member States, intermodal transport accounted in 2015 for 18 % of 
freight transport within the EU (excluding air and pipeline transport and maritime transport 
with non-EU countries), having grown annually by an average of 3.5 % in the five preceding 
years. 

30  Council Directive 92/106/EEC of 7 December 1992 on the establishment of common rules 

for certain types of combined transport of goods between Member States (OJ L 368, 
17.12.1992,  p. 38). 

31  European Commission, The implementation of the 2011  White Paper on Transport 

"Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – towards a competitive and resource-
efficient transport system" five years after its publication: achievements and challenges, 
SWD(2016) 226 final of 1.7.2016, pp. 24 - 25. 

 
 
                                                 
22 

Cohesion Fund for 2007-2020 and an additional €3 billion granted under the CEF as of 
the end of 2017. 

Box 1 

Intelligent transport management systems 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

Intelligent transport systems (ITS) apply information  and communication 
technologies in the field of road transport,  including infrastructure, vehicles and 
users, as well as traffic and mobility management, and interfaces with other 
modes of transport. 

The European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) project aims to replace 
Europe’s many national train control  and command  systems with a single set-
up. 

The Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) project aims to improve  air 
traffic management  (ATM) performance  by modernising and harmonising ATM 
systems through  the definition, development,  validation and deployment  of 
innovative technological and operational ATM solutions. 

The River Information  Services (RIS) was set up to enable swift electronic data 
transfer between water and shore through  the exchange of predictive and real-
time information. 

The primary purpose of the Vessel Traffic Management Information  System 
(VTMIS) is to enhance safety and minimise the environmental  impact of 
shipping accidents. 

35 Furthermore,  the European  Global Navigation Satellite System (Galileo) aims to 
provide improved  positioning and timing information, which should have significant 
positive implications for transport services and users. As transport  has been 
increasingly reliant on the availability of satellite signals for precise localisation, the 
2011 white paper named deployment  of Galileo as one of its objectives. Galileo was 
launched as the EU equivalent of the American GPS and Russian GLONASS so that the 
EU could be autonomous  in this strategic sector. The system has an estimated total 
cost of around  €10.5 billion and consists of 30 satellites and the associated ground 
infrastructure.  The deployment  of Galileo is ongoing; the Commission expects it to 
conclude by the end of 2020. 

 
 
23 

Emerging trends in transport  

36 Automation,  digitalisation and shared mobility are rapidly expanding trends (see 
Box 2) that have the potential to make transport  systems more efficient, thus 
improving road safety32, reducing environmental  impacts and easing congestion. 

Box 2 

Emerging trends in transport 

o 

Automation:  at least some vehicle functions are performed  automatically 
without  any input from the driver/operator. 

o  Digitalisation: data exchange between different actors in the transport  system 
so that supply and demand can be matched in real time, leading to a more 
efficient use of resources. Digitalisation could help create a truly multimodal 
transport  system by combining all modes of transport  in a single, smoothly 
functioning mobility service for people and goods.  

o 

Shared mobility: shared use of vehicles, such as bike or car-sharing. 

37 Fully automated  vehicles are now being tested, and it is conceivable that 
technological developments  will ultimately make them a common  sight on the roads. 
Fully automated  driving will require advanced telecommunications  and satellite 
infrastructure  and services for positioning and communication  between vehicles. Once 
Galileo is successfully deployed it will provide  the necessary services to meet those 
needs. 

38 However, new technologies and mobility patterns also bring challenges relating 
to the suitability of the legislative framework, privacy protection,  safety, liability and 
data security33. The 2018 EU strategy for mobility of the future34 contains Commission 
proposals to address these major sources of concern. 

32  While significant progress in recent decades (fatalities slashed from almost 55 000  in 2001 
to 25 650  in 2016)  has made the EU the world’s safest road transport region, the pace of 
improvement has stalled for the past four years. Further efforts will be needed to achieve 
the white paper objective of ‘zero fatalities’ by 2050. 

33  SWD(2016) 226 final, p. 38. 

34  European Commission, On the road to automated mobility: An EU strategy for mobility of 

the future, COM(2018) 283  final of 17.5.2018. 

 
 
                                                 
24 

39 The adaptation of infrastructure  to new mobility patterns and the deployment  of 
new infrastructure  for clean, alternative fuels pose additional challenges that require 
fresh investment and a revised approach to the design of networks  and business 
models. Charging infrastructure  is essential to facilitate the development  of electro- 
mobility, in particular the uptake of electric vehicles 35. In 2013, the EU launched its 
clean fuels strategy36, which is intended to ensure a network  of alternative fuel 
stations (including electric charging points) with standardised design and use. 

Infrastructure  development 

Despite progress in the development of transport infrastructure in the 
EU, challenges remain 

40 Seamless door-to-door  mobility for people and goods in the EU depends on an 
advanced and well-functioning transport infrastructure.  The key building block in the 
development  of the European transport  system is the completion  of the TEN-T. Other 
layers of the transport  system, such as urban transport, are also important,  as this is 
where many of the sector’s negative externalities (e.g. accidents, pollution and noise) 
are most directly felt. 

41 The EU’s expansion from 15 to 28 Member  States brought changes to logistics 
chains and geographical patterns of trade, and raised the structural challenge of 
rapidly developing the EU’s transport  infrastructure, particularly in the new Member 
States. 

42 Being the most flexible mode of transport, road has adapted most easily to the 
new reality, while rail, for example, requires more  effort to modernise and develop its 
networks and links. Figure 5 and Figure 6 illustrate the growth  in the length (both in 
absolute value and in percentage) of EU motorways  and railways in the decade to 
2016. 

35  “When compared to the total stock of passenger cars, the total share of Plug-in Electric 

Vehicles (PEVs) was only around 0.3 % in 2017  in the EU”, European Parliament, Research 
for TRAN Committee - Charging infrastructure for electric road vehicles, p. 13. 

36  Clean Power for Transport: A European alternative fuels strategy, COM(2013) 17  final of 

24.1.2013. 

 
 
                                                 
Figure 5 – Motorway lengths 2005-2016 in the EU 28 (in km) 

25 

18 000

16 000

14 000

12 000

10 000

8 000

6 000

4 000

2 000

0

Ireland: 271 %
Romania: 228 %
Poland: 197 %
Hungary: 124 %
Bulgaria: 124 %
Czech Republic: 117 %
Greece: 101 %
Estonia: 46 %
Slovakia: 41 %
Slovenia: 36 %
Spain: 35 %
Portugal: 31 %

% Increase

Croatia: 29 %
Finland: 28 %
Sweden: 25 %
Denmark: 22 %
Luxembourg: 10 %
France: 8 %
Italy: 6 %
Netherlands: 6 %
Germany: 5 %
United Kingdom: 4 %
Austria: 4 %
Belgium: 1 %

Source:  ECA,  based on European Commission (2018), EU Transport in Figures - statistical  pocketbook 
2018. No data for Malta and Latvia. 

2005

2016

Figure 6 – Railway lengths 2005-2016 in the EU 28 (in km) 

45 000

40 000

35 000

30 000

25 000

20 000

15 000

10 000

5 000

0

e
c
n
a
r
F

d
n
a
o
P

l

y
l
a
t
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e
G

n

i

a
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S

n
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e
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R

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e
z
C

i

m
o
d
g
n
K
d
e
t
i
n
U

% increase

Germany: 14 %

Netherlands: 9 %

Lithuania: 8 %

Spain: 6 %

Italy: 3 %

Finland: 3 %

Belgium: 2 %

d
n
a
n
F

i

l

a

i
r
t
s
u
A

a

i
r
a
g
u
B

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a
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v
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S

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i

l

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s
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a

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e
h
t
e
N

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i
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r
C

l

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u
t
r
o
P

k
r
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m
n
e
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e
c
e
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r
G

i

a
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u
h
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d
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a

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I

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v
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S

l

i

a
n
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t
s
E

g
r
u
o
b
m
e
x
u
L

Source:  ECA,  based on European Commission (2018), EU Transport in Figures - statistical  pocketbook 
2018. Cyprus and Malta have no rail network. 

2005

2016

 
 
 
 
 
 
26 

43 The rate of infrastructure development  varies across the EU, with the quality and 
availability of infrastructure  still lagging behind particularly in eastern regions 37 (fewer 
motorways  and high-speed rail lines, conventional rail in need of upgrading and 
affected by longer travel times than in Western Europe).  Moreover,  missing links and 
bottlenecks still feature along the EU transport network,  where they present serious 
obstacles to traffic flows. Border crossings are particularly affected in this regard. For 
example, 149 (41 %) of the 365 cross-border rail connections identified by the 
Commission are non-operational  today38. 

44 While some Member  States have already completed, or are close to completing, 
their sections of the TEN-T core network,  others still have a lot to do39. In 2017, in 
addition to the regularly updated  corridor  work plans 40, the Commission issued a 
progress report41 on the implementation  of the TEN-T in 2014 and 2015. The report 
concluded that there has been progress achieved, but overall, it can be assumed that 
in most cases significant improvements are still required and significant investment 
needed to reach the TEN-T objectives. 

45 Significant EU investment42 has helped to improve  connectivity and accessibility. 
For example, during the 2007-2013 period  cohesion funding supported  the 
construction  of 3 875 km of new roads (47 % of them TEN-T) and the relaying of over 
23 000 km, a total length equal to about 10 % of the main road network  in the 
15 eligible Member States 43. The result was improved  road access for millions of 

37  European Commission, Transport in the European Union Current Trends and Issues – 2018, 

p. 13. 

38  Most missing links are not situated along a TEN-T corridor or in the comprehensive 

network. See the Commission’s 2018 Comprehensive analysis of the existing cross-border 
rail transport connections and missing links on the internal EU borders, p. 13. 

39  See DG MOVE Transport scoreboard for the latest available data (as of year-end 2015) 

(https://ec.europa.eu/transport/facts-fundings/scoreboard_en). 

40  https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/downloads_en. 

41  https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/com20170327-progress-report-tent-

2014-2015.pdf. 

42  Investment in transport accounted for over 40 % of total government capital expenditure 

on transport over the 2007-2013  period in the EU-12; see the Commission’s Seventh report 
on economic, social and territorial cohesion, 2017,  p. 198. 

43  Member States eligible for Cohesion funding are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and 
Slovakia. 

 
 
                                                 
27 

people and reduced travel times 44. Cohesion funding was also used to build and relay 
3 405 km of railway lines (49 % TEN-T), or just over 2 % of the entire railway network45. 

46 To continue closing the gap between Member  States, significant EU expenditure 
has also been planned during the 2014-2020 period46: 

(a)  Around  €70 billion is planned in EU co-funding from  the ESIFs: €34 billion for 
TEN-T infrastructure  and €36 billion for transport  investment projects which 
connect to or complement  TEN-T projects. This investment would cover 977 km of 
inland waterways, the building of 3 414 km and the relaying of 9 742 km of roads, 
the construction  of 1 136 km and the upgrading of 9 680 km of railway lines, and 
748 km of new or improved  tram and metro  lines. 

(b) 

In addition, the €24.1 billion CEF-Transport budget (which includes €11.3 billion 
for Member  States eligible for Cohesion funding) focuses mainly on rail projects in 
the TEN-T core network.  The expected results of these projects include, among 
other things, the removal by 2020 of 243 rail, road and inland-waterways 
bottlenecks, 3 088 new alternative fuel supply points for road transport,  1 790 km 
of rail adapted to nominal gauge, 5 788 km equipped with ERTMS, 1 753 km 
electrified, 2 804 km of freight lines improved  and 3 862 km of inland waterways 
upgraded. 

TEN-T requires significant funding – Member State’s levels of 
indebtedness could be a hindrance 

47 Despite already significant levels of national and EU investment, which have 
contributed  to better connectivity and accessibility, much more  is still needed to 
achieve the TEN-T objectives (see paragraph  17). 

48 Responsibility for developing, financing and building transport infrastructure  lies 
mainly with the Member  States. At the same time, the EU has agreed that Member 

44  European Parliament, Report on the implementation of cohesion policy and the thematic 
objective of ‘promoting sustainable transport and removing bottlenecks in key network 
infrastructures’ - Article 9(7) of the Common Provisions Regulation (2017/2285(INI), 
4.4.2018. 

45  European Commission, Transport – Final Report – Work Package 5 - Ex post evaluation of 
Cohesion Policy programmes 2007-2013, focusing on the ERDF and the Cohesion Fund, 
2016,  pp. 3-4, 42, 46. 

46  European Commission, Delivering TEN-T - Fact and Figures, September, 2017. 

 
 
                                                 
28 

States’ annual general government  deficit should not exceed 3 % and that the 
government  debt-to-GDP  ratio should not exceed 60 % (the Maastricht criteria 47). 
Consequently, although the objectives for completion of the TEN-T appear in a 
regulation, in some cases national levels of indebtedness may place additional 
constraints on Member  States’ investment capacity. In other  words, reducing public 
debt and spending more on public investment, including for transport, can be 
competing objectives. 

49 The OECD recognised this challenge and the need for improved  funding and 
financing arrangements in many countries given the current high levels of deficit and 
debt and other demands on national budgets 48. 

50 The European Parliament also noted that Member  States in economic and 
budgetary difficulties were unable to co-finance freight projects and took the view that 
projects carried out as part of the CEF should not be taken into account in the Stability 
and Growth  Pact49 (SGP) calculations of public debt50. 

51 The Commission issued a communication51 to clarify the use of a certain flexibility 
embedded  in the SGP regarding eligible investments that may under  certain conditions 

47  The euro convergence criteria – also known as the ‘Maastricht criteria’ – are based on 
Article 140 TFEU. Member States are required to meet these criteria to enter the third 
stage of the Economic and Monetary Union and adopt the euro as their currency.  

48  OECD, Strategic Transport Infrastructure Needs to 2030:  Main Findings, OECD Publications, 

Paris, 2011,  p. 4. 

49  An agreement binding on all the EU Member States since 1997  (reformed in 2005 and 2011) 

concerning implementation of the Maastricht Treaty provisions addressing the 
sustainability of Member State fiscal policies, essentially by maintaining public deficit and 
debt at acceptable levels. 

50  European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2017 on logistics in the EU and multimodal 

transport in the new TEN-T corridors (2015/2348(INI)), point 13. 

51  Commission, Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the stability 
and growth pact, COM(2015) 12  final, 13.1.2015. Under the ‘investment clause’, eligible 
investments are national expenditure on projects co-funded under the Structural and 
Cohesion policy, Trans-European Networks, the Connecting Europe facility, and the 
European Fund of Strategic Investments. The conditions to justify a temporary deviation 
are: GDP growth in the concerned Member States must be negative or well below its 
potential; the deviation does not lead to an excess over the 3 % deficit reference value and 
an appropriate safety margin is preserved; investment levels are effectively increased as a 

 
 
                                                 
29 

justify a temporary  deviation from the existing rules. The application and effectiveness 
of this investment flexibility is being examined as part of a wider review of the 
flexibility arrangements 52. 

Internal  market 

52 In order  to achieve a functioning single transport market, the Commission has 
sought to create fair conditions for competition  both within and between modes of 
transport.  The Commission has been active in supporting the opening and 
liberalisation of the internal transport  market;  however, some challenges remain, 
particularly in the rail sector and air traffic management. 

53 As regards railways, freight has been open to competition  since 2007 and 
international passenger transport was liberalised in 2010. However, the market 
liberalisation of railways has been uneven across the Member  States. Only a handful of 
Member  States have liberalised their domestic rail passenger markets. New entrants 
still face discrimination in obtaining access to rail infrastructure  and essential service 

result; the deviation is compensated within the timeframe of the Member State’s Stability 
or Convergence programme. 

52  In its Special Report No 18/2018 “Is the main objective of the preventive arm of the 

Stability and Growth Pact delivered?” (http://eca.europa.eu), the Court concluded that the 
investment clause does not ensure an increase in the public investment-to-GDP ratio and 
allows non-investment-related spending to continue in the years ahead and recommended 
to the Commission to discontinue the use of the investment clause in its current form. The 
Commission did not accept this recommendation and noted that the investment clause is 
being reviewed as part of the wider review of the SGP flexibility arrangements.  

Moreover, in May 2018,  the Commission published a review of the flexibility under the SGP 
(COM(2018) 335 final and SWD (2018) 270  final). The review found that for the Member 
States that were granted flexibility in the period 2015-2018, the objectives of the structural 
reform and investment clauses have been reached to some extent. Regarding the 
investment clause, the review confirmed that the projects eligible for the investment clause 
were co-funded by the EU. However, the analysis was more mixed as to whether the 
investment clause led to new investments. The Commission noted that the positive impact 
of the reforms/investments on fiscal sustainability is meant to unfold over a longer time 
span than covered by the review and that the impact on public investment volumes is 
complex to assess with precision. 

 
 
                                                 
30 

facilities, which are often owned and operated  by incumbents 53. In 2016 the EU 
adopted the  “fourth railway package” 54 which aims to further liberalise the passenger 
market and lift barriers to interoperability,  with a calendar for enforcement  starting 
June 2019. 

54 The EU liberalised air travel in 1992, resulting in more competition,  a wider 
choice of travel opportunities  and substantially increased traffic. The number  of daily 
flights in the EU rose from 10 000 to 29 000 between  1992 and 2017 and annual air 
passenger numbers grew from  360 million to more than one billion between 1993 and 
2017. Today, European  aviation represents 26 % of the world market, contributing 
€510 billion annually to Europe's GDP, and supporting 9.3 million jobs in Europe. 

55 Although inherently international, air traffic has traditionally been managed 
nationally and in a fragmented and monopolistic environment.  These features have 
contributed  to higher air traffic management costs, which are borne by airspace users. 
The Commission’s response was to launch the Single European Sky (SES), an initiative 
intended to improve the overall performance  of air traffic management by shifting a 
number  of duties from the intergovernmental  domain to the EU. However, European 
airspace management remains fragmented55. In 2013, the Commission proposed 
improvements  to the SES framework  (the “SES2+” legislative package56). However, at 
the time of drafting, the package was still awaiting legislative approval by the 
European Parliament and the Council, thus hindering the introduction  of a coherent 
up-to-date framework  at EU level. 

53  See European Commission, Transport in the European Union Current Trends and Issues - 
2018,  p. 7 and ECA Special Report No 8/2016“Rail freight transport in the EU: still not on 
the right track”. 

54  The fourth railway package is a set of six legislative texts designed to complete the single 
market for rail services. Its overarching goal is to revitalise the rail sector and help it to 
compete with other modes of transport.  

55  European Commission, Transport in the European Union Current Trends and Issues - 2018, 

p. 9. 

56  European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 

Council on the implementation of the Single European Sky (recast), COM(2013) 410 final of 
11.6.2013. 

 
 
                                                 
31 

Decarbonisation  of transport 

56 In October 2014, the EU leaders adopted the 2030 climate and energy 
framework,  including a target of at least a 40 % reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions by 2030 (relative to 1990). In 2015, the EU and all 28 Member  States signed  
the Paris Agreement57.  Under this agreement, they were requested to submit 
long-term plans by 2020 showing the efforts by each country to reduce national 
emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change. In March 2018, the European 
Council invited the Commission to present a proposal, by the first quarter  of 2019, for 
a long-term  EU strategy to reduce GHG emissions in accordance with the Paris 
Agreement, taking the national plans into account. 

57 Figure 7 shows that in 2016 transport accounted for approximately one quarter 
of all GHG emissions in the EU (compared  to 15 % in 1990), making it the second 
largest producer  of emissions after the energy supply sector. The 2011 white paper set 
a target of reducing GHG emissions from transport  (excluding international maritime 
transport)  by at least 60 %, compared  with 1990 levels, by 2050, and an interim target 
of around 20 %, compared  with 2008 levels, by 2030. 

Figure 7 – GHG emissions by source in thousand tonnes, EU 28, 1990 and 
2016 

1990

Waste 
management
235 988
4%

Agriculture
541 874
10%

2016

Waste 
management
138 496
3%

Agriculture
430 002
10%

Industrial 
processes and 
product  use
517 454
9%

Transport 
(including 
international 
aviation)
856 284
15%

Fuel 
combustion 
and  fugitive 
emissions from 
fuels  (without 
transport)
3 563 690
62%

Industrial 
processes and 
product  use
374 483
8%

Transport 
(including 
international 
aviation)
1 079 529
24%

Source:  European Environment Agency,  data as of 5 June 2018. 

Fuel 
combustion  and 
fugitive 
emissions from 
fuels  (without 
transport)
2 416 775
55%

57  21st session of the Conference of the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change. The parties to the Paris Agreement committed to restricting GHG 
emissions to the levels needed to limit the rise in average global temperature to well below 
2°C above pre-industrial levels - and to pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 
1.5°C (aspirational goal). 

 
 
 
                                                 
32 

58 According to the European  Environment  Agency, transport  emissions rose 
between 1990 and 2007 and then fell until 2014. In 2015 and 2016 they rose again 58. 
This means that the sector has become one of the main challenges to the EU’s overall 
decarbonisation goals. Under current  policies, account being taken of the expected 
growth in freight and passenger transport,  by 2050 GHG emissions from transport  are 
projected to  decrease by 15 % relative to 2005. However,  emissions would still be 10 % 
higher in 2050 than in 1990, owing to the fast rise in transport emissions during the 
1990s 59. 

59 In 2017, we published a landscape review on energy and climate change60 which 
contributes to the discussion on decarbonisation. It included, among other  aspects, a 
comprehensive overview  of relevant transport  audits of EU SAIs concerned  with the 
reduction  of greenhouse gas emissions in the transport sector directly, or dealt with 
low-carbon transport  modes, or a shift to such transport modes (see paragraph 90). 

60 Achievement of the emissions reduction targets will require a fundamental shift 
towards using less energy, and cleaner energy, as well as the more efficient use of 
transport  infrastructure. The EU has adopted initiatives and legislative measures to 
accelerate the decarbonisation of transport.  The 2015 Energy Union Strategy61 
identified the transition to an energy-efficient, decarbonised transport  sector as an 
area of critical importance.  In 2016, this was followed by a low-emissions mobility 
strategy62. The CEF programme  also contributes towards the reduction  of GHG 
emissions, as the majority of transport  projects selected for funding relate to non-road 
transport  modes. 

61 Many efforts to reduce emissions, at both EU and Member  State level, have 
focused on roads, the sector responsible for the largest share (72 %) of transport 

58  See Trends and projections in Europe 2017,  Report No 17/2017,  7.11.2017,  p. 25. 

59  Impact assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Directive 1999/62/EC on the charging of heavy goods vehicles 
for the use of certain infrastructures, SWD(2017) 180  final of 31.5.2017,  Annex 4, pp. 34-35. 

60  See our Landscape review: “EU action on energy and climate change” 2017 

(http://eca.europa.eu). 

61  A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change 

Policy, COM(2015) 080  final. 

62  European Commission, A European Strategy for Low-Emission Mobility, COM(2016) 501 

final of 20.7.2016. 

 
 
                                                 
33 

emissions 63 in 2016. Since road transport  emissions are concentrated  in densely 
populated areas and are among the main causes of air pollution  in cities, the 
decarbonisation of road transport  is also crucial for improving air quality and human 
health. In our 2018 report  on air pollution, we noted  that air pollution tends to affect 
city dwellers more  than inhabitants of rural areas because the density of people living 
in cities means that air pollutants are released on a larger scale (for example, from 
road transport) and because dispersion is more difficult in cities than in the 
countryside64. In 2017 and 2018, the Commission’s three ‘mobility packages’65 
contained proposals that included reviewing the EU’s clean vehicles, Eurovignette and 
combined transport  directives, an action plan to boost investment in alternative fuel 
infrastructure,  the first ever CO2 emissions standards for heavy-duty  vehicles, new CO2 
emissions standards for cars and vans post-2020, improved  fuel-efficiency labelling of 
tyres and an action plan on batteries. 

62 In the area of air transport,  the main focus has been in international aviation, 
building on the EU Emissions Trading System. The EU is committed  to meeting at least 
the global target set for international aviation by the International  Civil Aviation 
Organisation in October 2016, namely to maintain global net CO2 emissions at 2020 
levels through carbon-neutral  growth. 

63 For the maritime sector, the EU is in line with the International Maritime 
Organisation’s global approach. In April 2018, the IMO adopted an initial strategy of 
reducing of GHG emissions from ships by at least 50 % by 2050 compared  to 2008, 
whilst pursuing efforts towards decarbonising the sector as soon as possible in this 
century. To this end, the strategy is accompanied by a comprehensive list of possible 
emission reduction  measures, including short-term  measures 66. 

63  EC (2018), EU Transport in Figures – statistical pocketbook 2018, 

https://ec.europa.eu/transport/facts-fundings/statistics/pocketbook-2018_en. 

64  See our Special Report No 23/2018 “Air pollution: Our health still insufficiently protected” 

(http://eca.europa.eu).  

65  Europe on the move packages-An agenda for a socially fair transition towards clean, 

competitive and connected mobility for all Europe, COM(2017) 0283  final. 

66  http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/ 

GHG-Emissions.aspx. 

 
 
                                                 
34 

Part III: Key challenges to be addressed 

64 Since 2010, the ECA has published 13 special reports on transport  in the EU, 
mainly focusing on infrastructure investment and internal market development.  Our 
observations led us to draw conclusions and make recommendations  to help the 
Commission and the Member  States to improve  how they manage EU spending on 
transport,  raise the quality of that spending, and to inform  the public about how their 
money is being used (see Annex I for a full list of reports with a summary of their main 
conclusions and recommendations).   

65 In paragraphs  66 to 91, we present six cross-cutting issues which we examined in 
our audits of different parts of the transport  field, and which we consider to be of 
continuing importance. We also present a horizontal review of the key challenges 
faced by the development  and financing of transport  in the EU, as well as points raised 
by SAls of EU Member  States, and made in other publically available information. 

Match  objectives  with resources 

66 The EU has set a number  of very ambitious objectives for all transport modes: in 
particular the completion of the TEN-T core network  by 2030. Given the considerable 
financial outlay and the time it takes to complete large transport  infrastructure 
projects 67, thorough  planning is necessary to achieve these objectives, supported  by a 
robust and credible analysis of the estimated costs, for which there should be 
sufficient financial resources. Our past audit work has highlighted a number  of issues 
that may cause objectives to be missed. Examples follow: 

(a)  ERTMS audit68: although revising the European deployment  plan in 2017 was a 

step towards more  realistic deployment, major challenges remained. Firstly, as in 
the past, the deployment  plan did not include an overall EU cost assessment. 
Secondly, there was no dedicated funding nor was the source of such funding 
defined. In addition, there was still no legally binding deadline for 
decommissioning national systems and making ERTMS the only signalling system 
used in Member  States. The low level of ERTMS deployment  (8 % of the core 

67  For example, as stated in our Special Report No 19/2018  “A European high-speed rail 

network: not a reality but an ineffective patchwork” (http://eca.europa.eu), it takes around 
16 years on average from the start of works for new high-speed lines to reach operability. 

68  Special Report No 13/2017 “A single European rail traffic management system: will the 

political choice ever become reality?” (http://eca.europa.eu). 

 
 
                                                 
35 

network  corridor  sections at the time of the audit) put the achievement of the 
targets set for 2030 at risk. 

(b) 

Inland waterways audit69: we found that EU strategies for transport along inland 
waterways lacked a comprehensive and robust analytical basis, and the cost of 
eliminating bottlenecks in Europe (around €16 billion) greatly exceeded the 
available funding from the EU budget for inland waterway infrastructure. 
Therefore, to address this gap there is a need for additional financing from 
national and/or private sources. 

(c)  Maritime transport  audit70: we found that the long-term port strategies put  in 

place by Member  States and the Commission did not provide  an adequate basis 
with which to plan port capacity or assess the need for EU and national public 
infrastructure  funding. 

Challenge  to be addressed:  Match  relevant  and achievable 
transport  objectives  and priorities  with available  resources 

Setting ambitious policy objectives and priorities without  ensuring the availability of 
resources reduces the likelihood of achieving them on time and thus affects the 
credibility of the entire policy. While progress has been made (see paragraph  72), 
further  work is needed. 

o 

The long-term plan for building the remaining infrastructure, in particular for the 
TEN-T core network,  needs to be reinforced, with precise milestones that are 
regularly monitored,  reliable overall cost estimates matched by available financial 
resources, and a particular focus on cross-border sections. This would increase 
the likelihood of achieving the transport  policy objectives on time and within 
budget. 

69  Special Report No 1/2015 “Inland Waterway Transport in Europe: No significant 

improvements in modal share and navigability conditions since 2001” 
(http://eca.europa.eu). In September 2013, the Commission adopted the Naiades II 
programme (COM(2013) 623  final), which sets out the programme for policy action in the 
field of inland waterway transport for the period 2014-2020. The Court has not assessed 
the effectiveness of this programme. 

70  Special Report No 23/2016 “Maritime transport in the EU: in troubled waters - much 
ineffective and unsustainable investment” (http://eca.europa.eu). In April 2018, the 
designated European Coordinator published a Detailed Implementation Plan for the 
Motorways of the Sea. The Court has not assessed the effectiveness of this plan. 

 
 
                                                 
36 

Enforcement  by EU of a closer alignment  of national 
infrastructure  decisions  with EU policy priorities   

67 Although the TEN-T Regulation establishes the corridors along which 
infrastructure  is to be built and the European coordinators  seek to coordinate work 
plans accordingly, Member  States provide  most of the required funding and remain 
primarily responsible for the planning and delivery of transport networks.  They alone 
can decide if and when to build infrastructure71. Thus there is a risk that the EU 
transport  network  will develop as a set of individual networks  rather than as an 
integrated system that will best meet the needs of the EU as a whole. 

68 We and other SAIs have noted in recent audits that Member  States do not always 
share the EU’s ambitions: Member  States have no incentive to implement  EU policies 
with little national interest, particularly cross-border  links 72. 

(a)  HSR audit73: Member  States did not build high-speed lines if they were not 

considered a national priority, even if situated on a transnational corridor  and 
part of the core network.  Moreover,  the Commission had limited enforcement 
tools or powers with which to hold Member  States to their commitments  to build 
the high-speed lines that were needed to complete the core network. 

(b)  ERTMS audit: the planned deployment  set out in the revised European 

deployment  plan was affected by a lack of time alignment between Member 
States on cross-border sections. This showed that Member  States essentially plan 
deployment  according to their national needs, regardless of any commitments  to 
EU priorities. 

71  Special Report No 19/2018  “A European high-speed rail network: not a reality but an 

ineffective patchwork”. 

72  The CEF mid-term evaluation (pp. 6 and 13) also found that national budgets do not 
sufficiently prioritise multi-country cross-border investments. The evaluation mainly 
attributed this to asymmetry in the apportioning of costs and benefits in multi-country 
projects, since costs are incurred nationally/locally but benefits are realised on a European 
scale. 

73  Special Report No 19/2018  “A European high-speed rail network: not a reality but an 

ineffective patchwork”. 

 
 
                                                 
37 

(c)  The Swedish SAI74 found that national authorities had not given priority  to the EU 

perspective in their domestic transport  infrastructure planning. 

(d)  The French SAI75 found that France was lagging behind with the investment 

needed to achieve the technological pillar of the Single European Sky and had 
submitted a performance  plan that did not comply with the performance 
objectives set at EU level. 

69 In its 2017 resolution76, the European Parliament also expressed regret that 
Member  States’ national infrastructure plans are too often decided without reference 
to the TEN-T objectives. It urged the Commission and Member  States to increase 
coordination  between the two levels of planning and to prioritise projects that are in 
line with the TEN-T objectives and likely to deliver greater European added value. 

70 As transport  systems in the EU have historically been  developed to meet national 
needs, administrative barriers and technical, operational and procedural differences 
between Member  States pose an important  obstacle to the objective of EU-wide 
interoperability.  For example, national railways apply over 11 000 different rules, 
which the European Union Agency for Railways has been entrusted  to “clean up” 77. We 
note that a timely implementation  of the fourth  railway package (see paragraph 53) 
could help removing  the administrative and regulatory  barriers to interoperability. 

Challenge  to be addressed:  Establish  effective enforcement 
tools  at EU level to ensure  Member States’  infrastructure 
decisions  are aligned  with EU priorities  more closely,  paying 
particular  attention  to cross-border  sections 

Misalignment between EU and Member  State priorities is an obstacle to completion  of 
the single transport market. 

74  See Road and rail investments in Sweden: lacking an EU perspective? RIR 2017:  27, 

Riksrevisionen, Sweden, November 2017 (https://www.riksrevisionen.se/). 

75  See L’ État et la compétitivité du transport aérien: un rôle complexe, une stratégie à 

élaborer, Cour des Comptes, September 2016 (https://www.ccomptes.fr/fr). 

76  European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2017 on logistics in the EU and multimodal 

transport in the new TEN-T corridors (2015/2348(INI)), point 12. 

77  Special Report No 19/2018  “A European high-speed rail network: not a reality but an 

ineffective patchwork”. 

 
 
                                                 
38 

o 

Appropriate  enforcement  tools are needed so that the obligations imposed by the 
TEN-T Regulation can be met more swiftly, allowing the completion  of key 
strategic infrastructure and providing for remedial action if priority  projects do 
not begin on schedule or are subsequently delayed, or if coordination  problems 
on cross-border  sections seem likely to prevent infrastructure  from entering into 
service as planned. 

o 

All administrative and regulatory barriers to interoperability should be removed 
as a matter of priority. 

Enhance  the added  value of EU funding 

71 EU funds can cover only a small fraction of overall investment needs (see 
paragraphs  17 to 25). To maximise their impact, these limited resources should focus 
on the highest priorities and EU added value. Our recent audits have shown that EU 
funds require better targeting. 

(a)  ERTMS audit: although, according to EU policy, ERTMS investments should focus 
on the core network  corridors,  there were some EU-funded investments (using 
Cohesion policy support in particular) in single lines off the core network  and with 
no connection  to it or to a cross-border section. In addition, only limited EU 
support was allocated for cross-border trackside sections. 

(b)  Maritime transport  audit: the bulk of EU funding targeted designated “core 

ports”. However,  we found that there are too many of these (104 in total), which 
might prevent  funding from  targeting the most important  ports. 

(c) 

Inland waterways audit: no difference was made between the core and 
comprehensive networks,  which did not help with the prioritisation of waterways. 
The EU strategies did not prioritise the elimination of bottlenecks nor did they 
prioritise rivers on which to invest the limited available resources. 

72 The 2014-2020 ESIFs introduced  a new precondition  for access to transport 
funding: Member  States now have to demonstrate  that the proposed  projects will be 
implemented  as part of a comprehensive  long-term national or regional transport  plan 
that contributes  to the single European transport  area and the TEN-T. This is a positive 
step towards the more coordinated  and strategic identification of projects. 

 
 
39 

Challenge  to be addressed:  Focus EU funding  on priorities  with 
the highest  EU added  value 

Since the scale of EU’s funding is limited compared  to the overall needs, it is necessary 
to focus on priorities with the highest EU added value. 

o 

o 

Better coordinating and targeting EU funding, in both shared and direct 
management, to reflect the EU’s transport policy priorities could help to maximise 
the effectiveness of investments and ensure a more  coherent and strategic 
approach to developing the transport  network. 

EU support should be prioritised for projects that are run in response to clearly 
established and properly  assessed needs, are based on careful planning and offer 
demonstrable  EU added value for the network  (e.g. resolving major bottlenecks 
and missing links and establishing cross-border connections). 

Improve project  management 

73 Project management entails appraising 78, implementing and monitoring  the 
necessary resources and effort to deliver the project goals and objectives. Good 
project management is essential for objectives to be achieved efficiently and 
effectively. 

Plan better by performing a thorough upfront analysis of costs and 
benefits 

74 As transport  infrastructure requires significant financial resources, it is crucial to 
analyse all major costs and benefits correctly in advance. When used appropriately, 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) makes it possible to assess a project’s return on investment 
and its social desirability and usefulness before any decisions are taken. 

75 Our audits revealed that there is a tendency for project sponsors and appraisers 
to use CBA merely as a compulsory administrative step rather than as a tool for better 
decision-making. Furthermore,  CBA is often affected by optimism bias: project 
sponsors tend to be too optimistic about key project parameters, including capital and 

78  Appraisal is the process of assessing the costs and benefits of meeting objectives and the 

associated risks. It helps decision-makers to understand the probable effects, trade-offs and 
overall impact of different options by providing an objective evidence base for 
decision-making. 

 
 
                                                 
40 

operating costs, project duration  and expected benefits. Making unrealistic estimates 
can result in undeliverable targets, over-sized and/or  under-used projects, cost 
increases and delays - in other  words, less value for money. 

76 We found examples in several audits of decision-making on the back of an 
unreliable analysis, which led to undesirable impacts: 

(a)  HSR audit: decisions to build high-speed lines were often politically based and 

made little use of cost-benefit analysis to ensure cost-efficient decision-making. 
Assessments of Member  States’ real needs were in some cases of poor quality, 
and too little consideration was given to the alternative solution of upgrading 
existing conventional lines, despite the significant potential. As a result, high-
speed lines with limited chance of viability from the social cost-benefit 
perspective were being built. 

(b)  Airports audit79: In many cases the EU funded infrastructures were over-sized, 

due to significantly over-optimistic assumptions included in the investment plans. 
More than half of the EU funds supporting the audited airports went into 
infrastructures (newly built or upgrade) which were unnecessarily large and not 
fully used when completed. 

(c)  Maritime transport  audit: the funding of similar port infrastructure  at 

neighbouring ports, with no sound business case or up-front  cost-benefit analysis, 
has meant ineffective investments resulting in cases of unused or under-used 
facilities. 

77 Acknowledging these weaknesses, since the 2015 round  of CEF calls for proposals 
the Commission (INEA) also introduced  a specific assessment of costs and benefits by 
external CBA experts before agreeing to provide CEF support,  which may help to 
improve  the quality of up-front  decision-making. 

79  Special Report No 21/2014  “EU-funded airport infrastructures: poor value for money” 

(http://eca.europa.eu). 

 
 
                                                 
41 

78 The Court notes that while the CEF and ESIF regulations for the 2014-2020 
programming  period included explicit references 80 to cost-benefit analysis, this is no 
longer the case in the proposals for regulations 81 for the 2021-2027 period. 

Simplify rules for implementing infrastructure projects 

79 The Court and national SAIs have observed in recent audits that projects whose 
preparation  was less thorough and detailed faced a higher risk of cost escalations and 
delays. 

(a)  HSR audit: In the case of one station, construction costs had soared from 
€4.5 billion estimated in 2003 to €8.2 billion in January 2018 because of 
unrealistic initial cost estimates for tunnelling in a densely populated  city centre, 
and insufficient assessments of geological, environmental and local community 
cultural heritage aspects. 

(b)  PPP audit82: an additional amount  of almost 1.5 billion euro in public funds was 

necessary to complete the five motorways  we audited, around  30 % of which was 
provided  by the EU. In particular, the public authority  in a public-private 
partnership to build and operate three motorways  had to pay an additional 
€705 million to the private partners also due to  the fact that projects were poorly 
prepared  and PPP contracts had been signed before relevant issues were resolved 
such as clearing archaeological findings; obtaining the required  environmental 
permits, and finalising the necessary land expropriations. 

(c)  Several EU SAIs 83 have also reported  on weaknesses in project 
planning/preparation  leading to delays and cost overruns. 

80  Article 10 (6) of the CEF regulation 1316/2013  stipulated that the amount of financial 

assistance to be granted to the actions selected shall be modulated on the basis of a cost- 
benefit analysis of each project. Article 101 (e) of the ESIF common provisions regulation 
(1303/2013)  stipulated that for the approval of major projects, the managing authority shall 
ensure that a cost-benefit analysis is available. 

81  COM(2018) 438  final, 6.6.2018 and COM(2018) 375 final, 29.5.2018. 

82  Special Report No 9/2018  “Public Private Partnerships in the EU: Widespread shortcomings 

and limited benefits” (http://eca.europa.eu). 

83  Austria, Federal Report 2017/4:  Railroad Project: Brenner Base Tunnel, Rechnungshof, 2017 
(https://www.rechnungshof.gv.at/home.html); Belgium, Mise en oeuvre et financement du 
Réseau régional express (RER), Cour des Comptes, 2017 (https://www.ccrek.be/); UK, 

 
 
                                                 
42 

80 Delays and cost overruns were also caused by inefficient regulatory and 
administrative procedures.  For example, our maritime transport  audit revealed 
significant delays in the implementation  of projects because of administrative 
complexity (in one case 33 authorisations were needed to build and operate a marina, 
and in another it took 22 years to obtain the necessary authorisations to start port 
constructions). This is indicative of structural problems related to the issuing of permits 
and authorisations at national level. 

81 The situation is amplified in cross-border projects, where procurement  is a major 
issue. We highlighted in our HSR audit that there was no common  legal framework  for 
cross-border projects, and tendering documents,  contracts and accounting systems 
differed from  one Member  State to the other.  No simplified procedures  (such as the 
“one-stop shops”) were in place to facilitate and accelerate implementation.  In 
addition, the Commission lacked the necessary instruments to intervene effectively if 
delays on one side of a border  hampered  the timely use of high-speed rail 
infrastructure  built on the other side of the border.  European coordinators  were well 
placed to monitor  what is, or is not, working along a corridor,  but they also lacked the 
legal power to intervene. All these inefficiencies adversely affected the speed and 
success of project implementation. 

82 Having acknowledged this recurrent  issue, in 2018 the Commission presented a 
legislative initiative84 to the European Parliament and the Council with a view to 
streamlining TEN-T implementation,  especially in the case of complex cross-border 
projects (introduction  of one-stop shops, a 3-year timeframe for authorisations, 
strengthened role of the European Coordinators  in monitoring  the permit granting 
procedures, and simplified procurement  procedures along borders). At the time of 
writing, the proposal for a regulation has still not been adopted by the European 
Parliament and the Council. 

Modernising the Great Western railway - assessment of the Department management of 
the program, National Audit Office, 2016 (https://www.nao.org.uk/). 

84  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on streamlining 

measures for advancing the realisation of the trans-European transport network, 
COM(2018) 277  final of 17.5.2018. 

 
 
                                                 
43 

Enhance project monitoring  

83 Monitoring,  both during and after project implementation,  is another crucial 
aspect of project management. 

84 Regular monitoring  of costs and benefits during implementation  is necessary for 
reasons of management, control  and transparent accountability. Large infrastructure 
projects with an implementation  timespan of many years should feature a mechanism 
for regularly monitoring  and, where necessary, updating original projections. This is 
vital to manage the delivery of social value through the realisation of targets and cost 
controls, and it can be beneficial for current  and future decision-making. 

85 In our audits, we found that regular cost-efficiency checks were not one of the 
guiding principles in implementing  transport projects. However, we also observed 
examples of good practice where projects were reassessed before each new 
programming  phase to verify that they still addressed current  needs 85. 

86 Monitoring  and evaluation of a project  after implementation  involves assessing 
outcomes of the intervention  and provides a summary  of the lessons learned during 
design and delivery. We have argued in several reports 86that  project monitoring  is 
mainly output-oriented  and fails to assess results and impacts. Thus, no one body has 
clear information  as to whether  EU co-funded projects, taken individually and/or  in the 
context of the core network  corridors, have achieved any result-based objectives and 
impact on economic development  (new jobs, , tourism, etc.). 

Challenge  to be addressed:  Improve the planning, 
implementation  and monitoring  of EU-funded  projects 

Addressing recurrent  issues in the planning, implementation  and monitoring  of EU-
funded projects could help to improve  the effectiveness of EU support. 

85  For instance, the HSR report highlighted a project review which concluded that configuring 
a line differently could save €5.7 billion euro but add just 10 minutes to the trip, i.e. a 
saving of €570 million for each additional minute of travel time. This example demonstrates 
how design choices lead to substantial savings with limited impact on performance. 

86  Special report No 21/2018 “Selection and monitoring for ERDF and ESF projects in the 

2014–2020  period are still mainly outputs-oriented” (http://eca.europa.eu); Special Report 
No 19/2018; Special Report No 23/2016 

 
 
                                                 
44 

o 

o 

o 

Planning could be enhanced by conducting a thorough  needs analysis and using 
realistic traffic forecasts and reliable parameters to assess project costs and 
benefits. 

Rules for implementing infrastructure  projects, particularly cross-border, should 
be simplified as a matter of priority  so as to remove  all administrative and 
regulatory barriers. Doing so could help to reduce inefficiencies, shorten delays 
and keep cost increases under control. 

Regular monitoring  of costs and benefits during project implementation  is key to 
ensuring cost-efficient investments. Monitoring  focused on results and impacts as 
well as outputs could provide a clearer picture of the extent to which EU-funded 
projects are delivering sustainable results and impacts and contributing  to the 
EU’s transport  objectives. 

Pay more attention  to the maintenance  and renewal of existing 
infrastructure 

87 High-quality infrastructure is essential for the efficient and sustainable 
functioning of the EU internal market. However, on a number  of occasions we and 
other SAIs 87 have reported  on the inadequate maintenance of existing road, rail and 
river infrastructure  in different countries of the EU, with implications for quality, 
safety, efficiency and sustainability88. 

88 Infrastructure  maintenance is the responsibility of national and local authorities. 
The Commission has raised the issue that road and rail infrastructure across the EU has 

87  Special Report No 19/2018,  Special Report No 8/2016, Special Report No 1/2015;  Sweden, 

The Swedish Transport Administration’s road maintenance, RiR 2017:8, Riksrevisionen, 2017 
(https://www.riksrevisionen.se/); Netherlands, Maintaining the main road network, 
Algemene Rekenkamer, 2014 (https://www.rekenkamer.nl/); France, Le rapport public 
annuel 2016,  Tome II, 7 - Les transports ferroviaires en Île-de-France depuis 2010 : des 
progrès sensibles, des insuffisances persistantes, Cour des comptes, 2016 
(https://www.ccomptes.fr/fr) ; Poland, Functioning of the inland waterways, Najwyższa Izba 
Kontroli, 2014 (https://www.nik.gov.pl/). 

88  The Commission ex-post evaluation of Cohesion policy programmes for 2007-2013 also noted 
uncertainty about the financial sustainability of some projects due to a lack of evidence that 
maintenance costs would be properly met. See, p. 70. 

 
 
                                                 
45 

been degrading because of too little maintenance89. It has noted that maintenance 
budgets are often insufficient and have not kept up with the increasing scale of 
infrastructure  and the ageing of crucial links, resulting in significant maintenance 
backlogs 90. Both the European  Parliament91 and the Council 92 have also underlined the 
importance  of paying due consideration to transport infrastructure  maintenance 
needs. 

89 In this respect, the Commission’s proposal for the new common  provisions 
regulation for the 2021-2027 programming  period (not yet adopted at the time of 
writing) includes an enabling condition  “Comprehensive transport planning at the 
appropriate  level”, which would require the provision of information  about the 
availability of budgetary and financial resources to fund planned investments and 
cover the operating and maintenance costs of existing and planned infrastructure.  This 
enabling condition  needs to be fulfilled and applied throughout  the programming 
period by the Member  States; otherwise, expenditure  related to the specific objective 
concerned cannot be included in the payment  applications. 

Challenge  to be addressed:  Ensure  that  infrastructure  is 
adequately  maintained  and sustainable 

Adequate infrastructure  maintenance is a key prerequisite for the development  of a 
sustainable EU transport  network. 

o 

Stakeholders should pay attention not only to investments in new infrastructure, 
but also to ensuring the maintenance and renewal of existing infrastructure, 
which are currently  unsatisfactory. 

89  European Commission, Transport in the European Union Current Trends and Issues - 2018, 

p. 12. 

90  Impact assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Directive 1999/62/EC on the charging of heavy goods vehicles 
for the use of certain infrastructures, SWD(2017) 180  final of 31.5.2017,  pp. 6-20. 

91  European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2017 on logistics in the EU and multimodal 

transport in the new TEN-T corridors (2015/2348(INI)), point 15. 

92  Council conclusions on the progress of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) 

implementation and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) for transport of 
5 December 2017, point 25. 

 
 
                                                 
46 

More effort to shift goods  off roads  to other  transport 

90 As mentioned  in paragraph  58, transport emissions are one of the main 
challenges to the EU’s overall decarbonisation goals. Our 2017 landscape review on 
energy and climate change included, among other aspects, relevant transport  audits of 
EU SAIs concerned  with the reduction  of greenhouse gas emissions in the transport 
sector directly, or dealt with low-carbon transport  modes, or a shift to such transport 
modes. In particular, we noted that there were issues with the design and 
effectiveness of biofuels policy and that the shift in transport  of goods from  road to rail 
and maritime/inland  waterways was not taking place to a sufficient degree. Both 
inland waterway transport  and rail failed to compete  with road transport. 

91 In our rail freight audit, we noted that externalities produced  by rail and road 
transport93 (environmental  impacts and pollution, congestion, accidents, etc.) are not 
taken into account in a comprehensive  manner when setting the price to be paid by 
users for access to infrastructure. 

Challenge  to be addressed:  Enhance  efforts to shift more goods 
off roads 

Shifting goods from roads to other  more environmentally  friendly transport modes 
could help reduce transport  emissions, which are mainly concentrated  in the road 
sector. 

o 

Stakeholders should pursue the shift of freight from  roads to other  transport 
modes by strengthening intermodal  competition  and by setting out principles 
requiring the external costs of all transport modes to be adequately considered, 
and advocating their implementation. 

93  As part of its mobility packages, the Commission has proposed a review of Directive 

1999/62/EC  on the charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures. 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 

This Landscape Review was adopted  by Chamber II, headed by Mrs Iliana Ivanova, 
Member  of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg  at its meeting of 24 October 2018. 

For the Court of Auditors 

Klaus-Heiner Lehne 
President 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 

Annexes 

Annex I — ECA transport  reports  since 2010 

Title 

Description/conclusions 

Key recommendations 

Special Report No 19/2018 
“A European high-speed rail 
network:  not a reality but 
an ineffective patchwork” 

Special Report No 9/2018 
“Public Private Partnerships 
in the EU:  Widespread 
shortcomings and limited 
benefits” 

The EU’s current long-term 
plan for high-speed rail is 
unlikely to be achieved and 
there is no solid EU-wide 
strategic approach. The 
European high-speed rail 
network is only a patchwork of 
national lines without proper 
coordination across borders, 
planned and built by Member 
States in isolation, resulting in 
poor connections. The 
European Commission has no 
legal tools and no powers in the 
decision making to ensure that 
Member  States make rapid 
progress towards completing 
the core network. 

EU co-financed Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) cannot be 
regarded as an economically 
viable option for delivering 
public infrastructure. The PPPs 
audited suffered from 
widespread shortcomings and 
limited benefits, resulting in 
€1.5 billion of inefficient and 
ineffective spending. In 
addition, value for money  and 
transparency were widely 
undermined in particular by 
unclear policy and strategy, 
inadequate analysis, off-
balance-sheet recording of 
PPPs and unbalanced risk-
sharing arrangements. 

The European Commission should: 
carry out realistic long-term planning; 
agree with Member  States which key 
strategic stretches to implement  first, 
with an assessment of the need  for 
very high speed lines, close monitoring 
and enforceable powers to ensure 
that commitments  to complete  the 
core EU high-speed rail network are 
respected; link EU co-funding to 
earmarked strategic priority projects, 
effective on-track competition and 
achievement of results; simplify cross-
border tendering procedures, use 
“one-stop-shops” for the various 
formalities, and lift all remaining 
administrative and regulatory barriers 
to interoperability; improve seamless 
high-speed rail operations for 
passengers, by, for example, e-
ticketing and simplification of track 
access charges. 

The Commission and the Member 
States, in particular, should: not 
promote  more intensive and 
widespread use of PPPs until the 
issues identified have been addressed; 
mitigate the financial impact of delays 
and re-negotiations on the cost of 
PPPs borne by the public partner; base 
PPP selection on sound comparative 
analyses of the best procurement 
option; ensure the  necessary 
administrative capability and establish 
clear PPP policies and strategies to 
implement successful EU-supported 
PPPs; improve the EU framework for 
better  PPP project effectiveness, so 
that the choice of the PPP option is 
justified by value-for-money 
considerations. 

 
 
Special Report No 18/2017 
“Single European Sky: a 
changed culture but not a 
single sky” 

Special Report No 13/2017 
“A single European rail 
traffic management  system: 
will the political choice ever 
become  reality?” 

Special Report No 23/2016 
“Maritime transport in the 
EU:  in troubled waters — 
much ineffective and 
unsustainable investment” 

The Single European Sky (SES) 
initiative to improve air traffic 
management  across the EU 
addressed a clear need and has 
led to a greater culture of 
efficiency. However,  European 
airspace management remains 
fragmented  and the SES as a 
concept has not yet been 
realised. EU funding for the 
technological elements of SES 
has so far reached €730 million 
and is due to grow to 
€3.8 billion by 2020. 

The deployment  of an EU-wide 
railway signalling system is at a 
low level so far and represents 
a patchwork. This is despite the 
fact that the concept is not 
generally questioned by the rail 
sector. The auditors found that 
many infrastructure managers 
and railway undertakings are 
reluctant to invest in the 
system due to the  expense 
entailed and the lack of an 
individual business case. 

A third of EU spending on 
facilities such as quays, docks 
and breakwaters at EU seaports 
between  2000 and 2013 was 
ineffective and unsustainable. 
One euro in three spent on the 
projects examined 
(€194 million) went on projects 
which duplicated existing 
facilities nearby. €97 million 
was invested in infrastructure 
which was either unused or 
heavily underused for more 
than three years after 
completion. 

49 

The European Commission should: 
review the SES high-level goals; 
analyse other options for reducing 
fragmentation and prioritise R&D 
solutions that address the problem; 
ensure that national supervisory 
authorities are fully independent; 
streamline the performance scheme 
and review some of its key indicators; 
review the EU support structure for 
R&D in the light of the SES objectives; 
reinforce the  accountability of the 
SESAR  Joint Undertaking. 

The auditors made a number of 
recommendations to the European 
Commission, the Member  States and 
the European Union Agency for 
Railways concerning the assessment of 
deployment  costs; decommissioning 
of national signalling systems; 
individual business cases for 
infrastructure managers and railway 
undertakings; compatibility and 
stability of the system; the role and 
resources of the European Union 
Agency for Railways; alignment of 
national deployment plans, 
monitoring and enforcement; 
improved take-up of EU funds for rail 
signalling projects; and better 
targeting of EU funding. 

The Commission shoud: revise the 
current number of 104 core ports and 
set out an EU-wide  port development 
plan; consider the exclusion of EU 
funding for port infrastructure for 
container transhipment and storage as 
well as for superstructure which is not 
within the public remit; ensure that all 
essential loan information on 
proposed EIB loans is shared between 
the EIB and the Commission; prioritise 
core ports and key waterways with EU 
support for investment only where EU 
added value is clear and there is 
sufficient private investment; Issue 
port-specific state aid guidelines and 
monitor and follow up earlier state aid 
decisions; reduce administrative 
burden and delays by promoting 
national “one stop-shops” for issuing 
permits and authorisations; improve 
the competitive position of maritime 
transport compared to other transport 

 
 
Special Report No 8/2016 
“Rail freight transport in the 
EU:  still not on the right 
track” 

Despite the European 
Commission’s objective of 
shifting freight from road to 
rail, rail’s share of EU freight 
has actually declined slightly 
since 2011. Rail is more 
environmentally friendly and 
uses less imported oil, but it is 
failing to respond to the 
competition from road. 

Special Report No 1/2015 
“Inland Waterway 
Transport in Europe: No 
significant improvements in 
modal share and 
navigability conditions since 
2001” 

EU-funded  efforts to shift 
freight traffic in Europe from 
roads to inland waterway 
transport have made slow 
progress in the last 15 years. 
Projects co-funded by the EU  as 
part of a strategy to increase 
the use of inland waterways 
have not been implemented 
effectively. Inland waterway 
transport has made no gains as 
an alternative to road transport 
and navigability has not 
improved. 

50 

modes by further simplifying maritime 
transport and customs formalities. 

The Commission and the Member 
States should address the weaknesses 
observed in rail freight market 
liberalisation, traffic management 
procedures, administrative and 
technical constraints, monitoring and 
transparency of the performance of 
the rail freight sector and fair 
competition between  different types 
of transport. To make better  use of EU 
funds, the Commission and the 
Member  States should match policy 
objectives more consistently to 
funding allocations and the selection, 
planning and management of projects 
and network  maintenance. 

To improve the effectiveness of EU 
funding of inland waterway transport:  
Member  States should prioritise 
inland waterway projects with the 
greatest and most immediate benefits; 
the Commission should focus its 
funding on projects with advanced 
plans to eliminate bottlenecks. 
To improve coordination between 
Member  States, the Commission 
should: rigorously analyse the 
potential market and benefits of 
inland navigation on different river 
segments and coordinate across 
Member  States the implementation of 
core TEN-T  network;  agree specific 
and achievable objectives with 
Member  States to eliminate 
bottlenecks; strengthen the legal base 
in order to broaden the reporting 
requirements in relation to the 
navigation status of the waterways 
and to require Member  States to 
elaborate national inland waterway 
maintenance plans in a coordinated 
way. 

 
 
Special Report No 21/2014 
“EU-funded  airport 
infrastructures: poor value 
for money” 

EU-funded  investments in 
airports have not generated  the 
expected  results and have 
produced poor value for 
money.  Due to a lack of 
adequate planning and 
forecasting, some of the 
funded airports were situated 
too close to one another, while 
some of the construction 
projects were too big for the 
numbers of planes and 
passengers involved. 

Special Report No 1/2014 
“Effectiveness of EU-
supported public urban 
transport projects” 

Two thirds of urban transport 
projects co-financed by EU 
structural funds are 
underutilised. Weaknesses in 
project design and inadequate 
mobility policy were two of the 
main contributory factors 
identified. 

Special Report No 5/2013 
“Are  EU Cohesion Policy 
funds well spent on roads?” 

The ECA  audited 24 ERDF and 
Cohesion Fund road investment 
projects in Germany, Greece, 
Poland and Spain to assess 
whether  they achieved their 
objectives at a reasonable cost. 
The total value of audited 
projects exceeded  € 3 billion.  
All the road projects examined 
by the auditors delivered 
savings in travel-time and 
improved road safety. But they 
found that insufficient 
attention was paid to ensuring 

51 

The Commission should ensure during 
the 2014-2020 programme period that 
Member  States only allocate EU 
funding to airport infrastructures in 
those airports which are financially 
viable and for which investment needs 
have been properly assessed and 
demonstrated.  This should be part of 
the approval and monitoring of 
Operational Programmes carried out 
by the Commission. 
The Member  States should have 
coherent regional, national and 
supranational plans for airport 
development  to avoid overcapacity, 
duplication and uncoordinated 
investments in airport infrastructures. 
As a result of this audit, the EU 
support to airport infrastructure was 
substantially reduced in the 2014-
2020 programming period. 

The Commission should require that: 
management  tools be put in place to 
monitor the quality of the service and 
the level of user satisfaction once 
projects are operational; a minimum 
number of result indicators with 
related targets be included in the 
grant agreements and are 
subsequently measured; the 
estimation of the number of expected 
users is more rigorously analysed and 
that the choice of the mode of 
transport is supported by a quantified 
comparison of different transport 
options; urban transport projects be 
included in a sound mobility policy; 
these relevant recommendations also 
be addressed by the Member  States’ 
authorities when managing EU-funded 
urban transport projects. 

Three main recommendations: EU co-
financing of road projects should 
depend on clear objectives with 
targets for travel-time, gains in road 
safety, capacity improvements and 
economic effects; payments should be 
linked to the  use of cost effective road 
building techniques in line with best 
practice; and Member  States should 
ensure international competition on 
construction projects and focus their 
procurement systems on delivering 
the most economical offers. 

 
 
Special Report No 3/2013 
“Have the Marco Polo 
programmes been  effective 
in shifting traffic off the 
road?” 

cost-effectiveness. Most of the 
audited projects were affected 
by inaccurate traffic forecasts. 
The result was that the type of 
road chosen was often not best 
suited to the traffic it carried. 
Motorways were preferred 
where express roads could 
have solved the traffic 
problems. 14 out of 19 projects 
recorded less traffic-use than 
expected.  Compared to initial 
plans, the average cost increase 
was 23 %. Time overruns 
averaged 9 months or 41 % 
when compared to the 
deadlines agreed at the outset. 

The audit found there  were not 
enough relevant project 
proposals put forward because 
the market situation and the 
programme rules discouraged 
operators from taking 
advantage of the scheme. Half 
of the audited projects were of 
limited sustainability. One of 
the main findings of the audit 
was that there were serious 
indications of “deadweight” - 
that is projects which would 
have gone ahead even without 
EU funding. In fact, 13 of the 16 
beneficiaries audited confirmed 
that they  would have started 
and run the transport service 
even without a subsidy. In 
addition, there were no reliable 
data to assess benefits on the 
environmental impact of 
freight transport, road 
congestion or road safety.  

52 

The ECA  recommended  the Council, 
the European Parliament and the 
Commission to consider discontinuing 
EU funding for transport freight 
services following the same design as 
the Marco Polo programmes (“top-
down supply-push”) which led in 
particular to the weaknesses identified 
in this report (insufficient market 
uptake, absence of evidence of 
achieving the objectives, high 
administrative burden, poor 
sustainability and deadweight) and 
making continuation of such funding 
conditional upon an ex-ante impact 
assessment showing whether  and to 
what extent  there  is an EU added 
value. This would imply making a 
detailed market analysis of the 
potential demand and taking up the 
experience and best practices of 
Member  States similar national 
support schemes. Only in the event  of 
a positive assessment as to a 
meaningful EU action in this area, the 
Court recommends that the 
Commission take a series of actions to 
strengthen performance in future 
schemes. 

Special Report No 4/2012 
“Using Structural and 
Cohesion Funds to co-
finance transport 
infrastructures in seaports: 
an effective  investment?” 

The audit found that only 11 of 
the 27 audited transport 
infrastructures in seaports’ 
projects co-financed by the 
Structural and Cohesion Funds 
in the 2000-06 programme 
period were  effective.  In 
addition, a third of the projects 
audited had non-transport 

The Commission should remind the 
Member  States of their obligation to 
use EU funding in accordance with 
sound financial management; make 
cohesion policy aid for the coming 
period conditional upon the existence 
of a comprehensive long-term port 
development  strategy (based on an 
assessment of needs) for all the ports 

 
 
related objectives. As well as 
ineffective projects, the Court 
found that some projects were 
not in use and 4 significant 
projects with a value of 70.8 % 
of the total amount audited 
had not been completed at the 
time of the audit. Out of the 23 
completed projects, eleven had 
been completed on time but 12 
experienced an average 
construction delay of 
26 months. Furthermore,  five 
of the completed projects, 
representing almost half of the 
amounts audited, will need 
considerable further 
investment before they can be 
put into effective use. 

The Court concluded that, 
through co-financing 
the development  of rail 
infrastructure, the EU 
contributed to providing 
new possibilities for trans-
European rail transport. Some 
actions could however 
be taken in order to achieve 
greater value for EU money. 

53 

of the relevant region; increase the 
focus on the effectiveness of projects 
through the  use of result and impact 
indicators, on-the spot visits on 
effectiveness issues, and introduction 
of the principle that EU funding should 
be conditional upon results; carry-out 
ex post checks on the  use and 
performance of co-financed 
infrastructures on a risk basis; 
strengthen the  assessment of major 
projects and Cohesion Fund projects. 

The Commission should, in future 
considerations of the definition of the 
Priority Projects, work with Member 
States and railway institutions to 
identify those trans-European 
corridors for which there is significant 
actual or anticipated demand, 
strengthening the European-level 
knowledge and analytical bases where 
necessary. The Commission should 
consider placing increased emphasis 
on alleviating practical constraints for 
cross-border rail transport that are not 
per se related to infrastructure, and 
encourage and facilitate collaboration 
amongst Member  State rail 
institutions to this end. 

Special Report No 8/2010 
“Improving transport 
performance on Trans-
European rail axes: Have EU 
rail infrastructure 
investments been 
effective?” 

Note: Our reports and the Commission’s replies to our findings and recommendations 
are published on our website (http://eca.europa.eu).   

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 

Annex II — The EU’s ten goals  for a competitive  and resource-
efficient transport  system 

Developing and deploying new and sustainable fuel and propulsion systems 

—  Halve the use of ‘conventionally-fuelled’ cars in urban transport  by 2030; phase 
them out in cities by 2050; achieve essentially CO2-free city logistics in major 
urban centres by 2030; 

— 

Low-carbon sustainable fuels in aviation to reach 40 % by 2050; also by 2050 
reduce EU CO2 emissions from maritime bunker  fuels by 40 % (if feasible 50 %); 

Optimising the performance of multimodal logistic chains, including by making 
greater use of more energy-efficient modes 

—  30 % of road freight over 300 km should shift to other modes such as rail or 
waterborne  transport  by 2030, and more than 50 % by 2050, facilitated by 
efficient and green freight corridors.  To meet this goal will also require 
appropriate  infrastructure to be developed; 

—  By 2050, complete a European high-speed rail network.  Triple the length of the 

existing high-speed rail network  by 2030 and maintain a dense railway network  in 
all Member  States. By 2050 the majority of medium-distance  passenger transport 
should go by rail; 

—  A fully functional and EU-wide multimodal TEN-T ‘core network’  by 2030, with a 

high quality and capacity network  by 2050 and a corresponding set of information 
services; 

—  By 2050, connect all core network  airports to the rail network,  preferably high-

speed; ensure that all core seaports are sufficiently connected to the rail freight 
and, where possible, inland waterway system; 

Increasing the efficiency of transport and of infrastructure use with information 
systems and market-based incentives 

—  Deployment  of the modernised  air traffic management infrastructure (SESAR) in 
Europe by 2020 and completion of the European Common  Aviation Area. 
Deployment  of equivalent land and waterborne  transport  management systems 
(ERTMS, ITS, SSN and LRIT, RIS). Deployment  of the European Global Navigation 
Satellite System (Galileo); 

 
 
 
55 

—  By 2020, establish the framework  for a European  multimodal transport 

information,  management and payment  system; 

—  By 2050, move close to zero fatalities in road transport.  In line with this goal, the 
EU aims at halving road casualties by 2020. Make sure that the EU is a world 
leader in safety and security of transport in all modes of transport; 

—  Move towards full application of “user pays” and “polluter pays” principles and 
private sector engagement to eliminate distortions, including harmful subsidies, 
generate revenues and ensure financing for future  transport investments. 

Source: COM(2011) 144  final of 28.3.2011  - Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – 
Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system. 

 
 
 
 
56 

Annex III — Main  stakeholders  at EU level 

Council

Enact 
legislation

European 
Parliament

European 
Commission

Proposes  legislation 
and implements  policy

Directorate-General 
for Mobility and 
Transport
(DG MOVE)

European Commission

Directorate-General 
for Regional and 
Urban Policy 
(DG REGIO)

Innovation and 
Networks 
Executive Agency 
(INEA)

SESAR (Single 
European Sky 
ATM research) 
Joint Undertaking

European 
Maritime Safety
Agency (EMSA)

Related agencies 
and joint 
undertakings:

Shift2Rail Joint 
Undertaking

European
Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA)

European Union 
Agency for 
Railways (ERA)

 
 
 
 
 
 
57 

Abbreviations 

ATM: Air traffic management 

CEF: Connecting Europe Facility 

DG MOVE: European Commission Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport 

DG REGIO: European Commission Directorate-General for  Regional and Urban Policy 

EFSI: European Fund  for Strategic Investments 

EIB: European Investment Bank 

ERDF: European Regional Development Fund 

ERTMS: European Rail Traffic Management System 

ESIFs: European Structural  and Investment  Funds 

Eurostat: Statistical Office of the European Union (a Commission Directorate-General) 

Galileo: European Global Navigation Satellite System 

GDP: Gross Domestic Product 

GHG: Greenhouse gases 

GLONASS: Global Navigation Satellite System 

GPS: Global Positioning System 

HSR: High-speed rail 

IMO: International Maritime Organisation 

INEA: Innovation  and Networks Executive Agency 

ITS: Intelligent transport  systems 

MFF: Multiannual financial framework 

OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 

PPP: Public-private partnerships 

RIS: River information  services 

 
 
58 

SAI: Supreme  audit institution 

SES: Single European Sky 

SESAR: Single European Sky ATM Research 

SGP: Stability and Growth  Pact 

TEN-T: Trans-European Transport Network 

TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

VTMIS: Vessel Traffic Management Information  System 

 
 
 
 
 
59 

Landscape review team 

This landscape review was produced  by audit Chamber II Investment  for cohesion, 
growth and inclusion spending areas, headed by ECA Member  Iliana Ivanova. 

The review was led by ECA Member  Ladislav Balko, supported  by Branislav Urbanic, 
Head of Private Office and Zuzana Frankova, Private Office Attaché; Pietro Puricella, 
Principal Manager; Svetoslav Hristov, Head of Task; Valeria Rota, Enrico Grassi, Marjeta 
Leskovar and Annekatrin  Langer, Auditors. Thomas Everett provided  linguistic support. 

First row: Enrico Grassi, Svetoslav Hristov, Ladislav Balko, Marjeta Leskovar,  
Pietro Puricella 
Second row: Branislav Urbanic, Thomas Everett 

 
 
 
 
This landscape review describes and analyses what the EU does in the 
field of transport. We focus on infrastructure investments funded from 
the EU budget and present cross-cutting themes that we identified 
in recent audits in the five main modes of transport: road, rail, air, 
inland waterways and maritime. Drawing from our observations and 
recommendations, we present a horizontal review of the key challenges 
faced by the development and financing of transport in the EU.

By providing clear and accessible information to stakeholders and 
interested parties, this landscape review aims to encourage stakeholders 
to improve actions and/or co-ordinate them better in order to add value 
to the EU’s efforts to meet its transport policy objectives.

© European Union, 2018
For any use or reproduction of photos or other material that is not 
under the European Union copyright, permission must be sought 
directly from the copyright holders. 

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