Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 January 2019 on remuneration for executives and senior management in Narodowy Bank Polski (CON/2019/3)
Date: 2019-01-30
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: Poland, access to information, central bank, national law, remuneration of work, senior management

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 30 January 2019  

on remuneration for executives and senior management in Narodowy Bank Polski 

(CON/2019/3) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On  28  January  2019  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  received  a  request  from  the  Polish  Sejm 

(Parliament)  for  an  opinion  on  three  draft  laws  amending  various  laws  on  remuneration  policies  at 

Narodowy  Bank  Polski  (NBP).  Each  of  the  three  draft  laws  has  been  introduced  by  members  of  the 

Parliament drawn from different political parties in the Parliament. 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC 1, as 

the  draft  laws  relate  to  NBP.  In  accordance  with  the  first  sentence  of  Article 17.5  of  the  Rules  of 

Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft laws 

1.1 

Law amending the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski and the Law on restricting business activities for 

public officials (hereinafter the ‘first draft law’) 

1.1.1  The first draft law, proposed by members of Parliament from the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and 

Justice  party),  introduces,  inter  alia,  a  provision  that  requires  the  NBP  management  board  to  set 

the  remuneration  for  individual  categories  of  senior  management  positions  at  NBP,  provided  that 

the  maximum  remuneration  for  a  position  must  not  exceed  60%  of  the  NBP  Governor’s  total 

remuneration  (including  any  applicable  awards,  bonuses  and  other  benefits).  Under  the  current 
version  of  the  Law  on  Narodowy  Bank  Polski2,  the  NBP  management  board  takes  into  account 

salary  levels  in  the  banking  sector  when  establishing  the  amount  of  funds  available  for 

remuneration of NBP staff members. 

1.1.2  Additionally,  the  first  draft  law  proposes  to  make  public  the  remuneration  of  persons  occupying 

senior managerial positions at NBP and of NBP management board members, as well as the NBP 

management  board’s  resolution  on  the  rules  of  remuneration  of  NBP  staff  members.  The 

publication would include the specific position and its remuneration for each month, including any 

applicable  awards,  bonuses  and  other  benefits  paid  in  the  calendar  year  preceding  the  year  in 

which the information is published. 

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2  

Council  Decision  98/415/EC  of  29 June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 
Ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 r. o Narodowym Banku Polskim (Dz.U. z 2017 r., poz. 1373). 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
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1.1.3  The first draft law also proposes publishing certain historical  data. In particular,  within  30  days of 

the entry into force of the draft law, the NBP Governor would be required to publish, on the NBP’s 

website,  the  NBP  management  board’s  resolutions  on  the  rules  of  remuneration  of  NBP  staff 

members  and  levels  of  remuneration  of  NBP  management  board  members  and  other  senior 

management from 1995 to 2018. 

1.1.4.  Finally,  the  first  draft  law  proposes  to  amend  the  Law  on  restricting  business  activities  for  public 
officials3  by  requiring  NBP  management  board  members  and  other  senior  management  to  make 

declarations  of  their  financial  interests.  This  requirement  is  similar  to  requirements  for  the  NBP 

Governor  and  certain  other  public  administration  officials  in  Poland.  The  draft  law  also  has  a 

provision that puts restrictions on the type of business activities in which NBP management board 

members and other senior management are able to participate.  

1.2 

Law amending the Law on restricting business activities for public officials (hereinafter the ‘second 

draft law’) 

Similarly to the first draft law, the second draft law, proposed by members of Parliament from the 

Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform party), aims to impose a requirement on NBP management 

board  members  and  other  senior  management  to  make  declarations  of  their  financial  status. 

Additionally,  in  this  case,  much  of  the  information  disclosed  in  these  declarations  of  financial 

interests  would  be  public,  including  the  name  of  the  individuals  submitting  the  declaration. 

Addresses, information on the location of real estate property and information that would allow the 

identification  of  personal  property  owned  by  the  person  submitting  the  declaration  would  not  be 

made public. 

1.3 

Law amending the Law on Narodowy Bank Polski (hereinafter the ‘third draft law’) 

The third draft law, proposed by members of Parliament from the Kukiz‘15 movement, introduces a 

new  mechanism  under  which  the  Marshall  of  the  Sejm,  acting  upon  the  proposal  of  the  NBP 

Governor,  is  to  issue  an  ordinance  specifying  the  qualification  requirements,  remuneration  rules 

and  position  bands  applicable  to  NBP  staff  members.  This  ordinance  is  to  be  made  public. 

Accordingly, under the third draft law the rules for NBP staff remuneration would no longer be laid 

down  by  the  NBP  management  board  and  salary  levels  in  the  banking  sector  will  no  longer  be 

taken into account when establishing the amount of funds available for remuneration of NBP staff 

members. 

2. 

Specific observations 

2.1  Central bank independence 

As all of the three draft laws apply to and directly affect the NBP’s decision-making bodies and its 

employees,  they  should  be  examined  from  the  perspective  of  central  bank  independence 

requirements under Article 130 of the Treaty, in particular financial independence, as well as that of 
the personal independence of the members of the NBP’s decision-making bodies 4. 

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4  

Ustawa  z  dnia  21  sierpnia  1997  roku  o  ograniczeniu  prowadzenia  działalności  gospodarczej  przez  osoby  pełniące 
funkcje publiczne (Dz.U. z 2017 r., poz. 1393). 
See,  e.g.,  paragraph  2.2  of  Opinion  CON/2017/49.  All  ECB  opinions  are  published  on  the  ECB’s  website  at 

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2.2  Financial independence 

2.2.1  The ECB has a well-established doctrine that autonomy in staff matters is an integral aspect of the 

principle  of  financial  independence  of  national  central  banks  (NCBs)  in  the  European  System  of 

Central  Banks.  According  to  this  principle,  Member  States  may  not  impair  an  NCB’s  ability  to 

employ  and  retain  the  qualified  staff  necessary  for  the  NCB  to  perform  independently  the  tasks 

conferred on it by the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the 

European  Central  Bank  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  ‘Statute  of  the  ESCB’).  Also,  an  NCB  may 

not  be  put  into  a  position  where  it  has  limited  control  or  no  control  over  its  staff,  or  where  the 
government of a Member State can influence its policy on staff matters5. 

2.2.2  In order to protect NBP’s autonomy in staff matters, the Polish legislator is under an obligation to 

ensure that a decision on any legislative proposal is taken in close and effective cooperation with 

NBP,  taking  due  account  of  its  view,  to  ensure  the  ongoing  ability  of  the  NCB  to  independently 
carry out its tasks6.  

2.2.3  Amendments  included  in  any  legislative  proposal  that  lead  to  reductions  in  remuneration  are  not 

compatible with the principle of financial independence if NBP’s ability to employ and retain staff to 

perform  independently  the  tasks  conferred  on  it  by  the  Treaty  and  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB  is 

affected.  The  ECB  notes  that  the  explanatory  memoranda  accompanying  the  draft  laws  do  not 

analyse this issue, including the effects of a possible reduction of remuneration on NBP’s ability to 

employ  and  retain  the  necessary  staff.  In  order  to  be  compatible  with  the  principle  of  financial 

independence,  any  adopted  legislative  solution  should  provide  for  a  cooperation  mechanism  with 

NBP, to ascertain if NBP considers that an exception to a cap on remuneration is required. Such a 

deviation should be decided upon in close and effective cooperation with NBP, taking due account 
of  NBP’s  views,  to  ensure  the  ongoing  ability  of  NBP  to  independently  carry  out  its  tasks7.  Any 

amendments  that  lead  to  reductions  in  the  remuneration  for  an  NCB’s  staff  members  should  not 

interfere  with  that  NCB’s  powers  to  administer  its  own  financial  resources,  including  the  funds 
resulting from any reduction in salaries that it pays 8. 

2.2.4  Personal independence 

The ECB notes that any sanctions which are imposed by the Law on restricting business activities 

for public officials (under the first or the second  draft laws) due to the  NBP Governor’s and  other 

members  of  the  NBP  management  board’s  non-compliance  with  the  obligation  to  submit 

declarations of their financial interests should be compatible with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the 

ESCB, and should not establish new grounds for dismissal of the NBP Governor or other members 

of the NBP management board, contrary to that Article.  

2.3  Transparency 

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7  
8  

www.ecb.europa.eu. 
See  paragraph  6  of  Opinion  CON/2012/89,  paragraph  3.3  of  Opinion  CON/2008/10  and  paragraph  2.2  of  Opinion 
CON/2008/9. 
See  the  ECB’s  Convergence  Report  2018,  2.2.3  (‘Autonomy  in  staff  matters’).  See  also  paragraph  2.1  of  Opinion 
CON/2016/32. 
See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2016/32. 
See  the  ECB’s  Convergence  Report  2018,  2.2.3  (‘Autonomy  in  staff  matters’)  and  paragraph  4.2.2  of  Opinion 
CON/2014/38. 

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The  doctrine  of  autonomy  in  staff  matters  does  not  prevent  the  publication  of  information  on  the 

method by which remuneration is determined and the remuneration of NCB staff members and the 

members of the NCB’s decision-making bodies. Such disclosure principally promotes transparency 
and  good  governance  and  constitutes  best  practice  in  public  administration910.  However,  to  the 

extent that the provisions included in any of the draft laws might lead to the publication of personal 

information,  the  relevant  data  protection  legislation  and  related  case-law  would  need  to  be 

considered prior to the draft law being adopted.  

This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 30 January 2019. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Mario DRAGHI 

9  
10  

See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2008/10. 
At the ECB and in several Member States, such information is public or can be disclosed upon request. 

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