JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Action Plan against Disinformation
Date: 2018-12-05
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Internet, action programme, digital literacy, disinformation, dissemination of information, election, freedom of expression, information, information user, press

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Brussels, 5.12.2018  JOIN(2018) 36 final  JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Action Plan against Disinformation  
 
 
1.  

INTRODUCTION 

Freedom of expression is a core value of the European Union enshrined in the European 
Union  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  and in  the  constitutions  of  Member  States. Our 
open  democratic  societies  depend  on  the  ability  of  citizens  to  access  a  variety  of  verifiable 
information so that they can form a view on different political issues. In this way, citizens can 
participate in an informed way in public debates and express their will through free and fair 
political  processes.  These  democratic  processes  are  increasingly  challenged  by  deliberate, 
large-scale, and systematic spreading of disinformation.  

Disinformation  is  understood  as  verifiably  false  or  misleading  information  that  is 
created,  presented  and  disseminated  for  economic  gain  or  to  intentionally  deceive  the 
public, and may cause public harm1. Public harm includes threats to democratic processes 
as  well  as  to  public  goods  such  as  Union  citizens'  health,  environment  or  security. 
Disinformation  does  not  include  inadvertent  errors,  satire  and  parody,  or  clearly  identified 
partisan  news  and  commentary.  The  actions  contained  in  this  Action  Plan  only  target 
disinformation content that is legal under Union or national law. They are without prejudice 
to  the  laws  of  the  Union  or  of  any  of  the  Member  States  that  may  be  applicable,  including 
rules on illegal content2. 

Following the Salisbury chemical attack and the  related European Council conclusions3, the 
Commission  and  the  High  Representative  presented  a  Joint  Communication  on  bolstering 
resilience against hybrid threats4 that highlighted strategic communication as a  priority field 
for  further  work.  The  European  Council,  then,  invited  the  "High  Representative  and  the 
Commission  to  present,  in  cooperation  with  the  Member  States  and  in  line  with  the  March 
2015  European  Council  conclusions,  an  action  plan  by  December  2018  with  specific 
proposals  for  a  coordinated  response  to  the  challenge  of  disinformation,  including 
appropriate  mandates  and  sufficient  resources 
the  relevant  EEAS  Strategic 
Communications teams"5.  

for 

This Action Plan answers the European Council’s call for measures to “protect the Union’s 
democratic  systems  and  combat  disinformation,  including  in  the  context  of  the  upcoming 
European elections”6.  It  builds on existing Commission initiatives and the work of the East 
Strategic  Communication  Task  Force  of  the  European  External  Action  Service.  It  sets  out 
actions to be taken by the Commission and the High Representative, with the assistance of the 
European  External  Action  Service,  in  cooperation  with  Member  States  and  the  European 
Parliament. This Plan includes input received from Member States, including via discussions 
at  Council 7 ,  in  Permanent  Representatives  Committees  I  and  II,  the  Political  Security 
Committee,  relevant  Council  working  parties  and  meetings  of  strategic  communication  and 
political directors of Ministries of Foreign Affairs. It also takes into account the cooperation 

1   Communication on tackling on-line disinformation, COM(2018) 236. 
2   The Commission proposed targeted measures to address the spread of illegal content on-line, including the 
Recommendation on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online (C(2018) 1177). See also proposal 
for a Regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online COM(2018) 640 as well as the 
revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive agreed on 6 November 2018. 

3   European Council conclusions, 22 March 2018. 
4   JOIN(2018) 16. 
5   European Council conclusions, 28 June 2018. 
6   European Council conclusions, 18 October 2018. 
7   See  policy  debate  on  “Tackling  the  spread  of  disinformation  online:  Challenges  for  the  media  ecosystem” 

and Council conclusions of 27 November 2018. 

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with  the  Union's  key  partners,  including  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  and  the 
Group of 7 (G7)8. 

The  Communication  on  tackling  online  disinformation  (the  April  Communication) 
emphasised  the  key  role  played  by  civil  society  and  the  private  sector  (notably  social 
media  platforms)  in  tackling  the  problem  of  disinformation.  As  a  follow-up,  online 
platforms  and  the  advertising  industry  agreed  on  a  Code  of  Practice  in  September  2018  to 
increase online transparency and protect citizens, especially with a view to the 2019 European 
Parliament elections, but also in a more long-term perspective.  It is now essential that these 
actors  deliver  on  the  objectives  the  Commission  set  out  in  April  and  fully  comply  with  the 
Code of Practice9. In addition, an independent network of fact-checkers is being developed to 
increase the ability to detect and expose disinformation, and sustained efforts are being made 
at Union and national level to support media literacy.  

This  Action  Plan  is  accompanied  by  a  progress  report  on  the  April  Communication10.  This 
report  sets  out  the  progress  achieved  on  the  various  actions,  notably  regarding  the  Code  of 
Practice, fostering a secure, trust-worthy and accountable on-line ecosystem, activities linked 
to awareness raising and media literacy as well as support to independent media and quality 
journalism. 

The European Council first recognised the threat of online disinformation campaigns in 
2015  when  it  asked  the  High  Representative  to  address  the  disinformation  campaigns  by 
Russia. The East Strategic  Communication Task Force has  been set up  to address  and  raise 
awareness of this issue. In addition, the Joint Communication on Countering Hybrid Threats11 
set up the Hybrid Fusion Cell within the European External Action Service to act as a single 
focus for the analysis of hybrid threats. It also led to the setting up of the European Centre of 
Excellence  for  Countering  Hybrid  Threats,  which  shares  best  practices  and  supports  the 
activities of the Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in this field. 

In  view  of  the  2019  European  Parliament  elections  and  more  than  50  presidential, 
national or local/regional elections being held in Member States by 2020, it is urgent to 
step up efforts to secure free and fair democratic processes. Threats affecting democracy 
in any Member State can harm the Union as a whole. Moreover, disinformation often targets 
European institutions and their representatives and aims at undermining the European project 
itself in general.  On 12 September 2018, the Commission adopted measures12 to secure free 
and  fair  European  elections  and  recommended  the  use  of  sanctions  where  appropriate, 

8   In the Charlevoix  Commitment on Defending  Democracy  from  Foreign Threats, G7 Leaders committed to 
take  concerted  action  to  respond  to  foreign  actors  who  seek  to  undermine  our  democratic  societies  and 
institutions, our electoral processes, our sovereignty and our security. 

9   See also Council conclusions of 27 November 2018. 
10   COM(2018) 794. 
11   While definitions of hybrid threats vary and need to remain flexible to respond to their evolving nature, the 
concept captures the mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods 
(i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or 
non-state  actors  to  achieve  specific  objectives  while  remaining  below  the  threshold  of  formally  declared 
warfare.  There  is  usually  an  emphasis  on  exploiting  the  vulnerabilities  of  the  target  and  on  generating 
ambiguity  to  hinder  decision-making  processes.  Massive  disinformation  campaigns,  using  social  media  to 
control  the  political  narrative  or  to  radicalise,  recruit  and  direct  proxy  actors  can  be  vehicles  for  hybrid 
threats. See JOIN(2016) 18. 

12   For  a  full  overview  of  measures,  see  the  Communication  on  Securing  free  and  fair  European  elections, 

COM(2018) 637 final. 

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including  for  the  illegal  use  of  personal  data  to  influence  the  outcome  of  the  elections13.  In 
addition, it is urgent that Member States take the steps needed to preserve the integrity of their 
electoral systems and infrastructure and test them ahead of the European elections.  

Disinformation  campaigns,  in  particular  by  third  countries,  are  often  part  of  hybrid 
warfare 14 ,  involving  cyber-attacks  and  hacking  of  networks 15 .  Evidence  shows  that 
foreign state actors are increasingly deploying disinformation strategies to influence societal 
debates, create divisions and interfere in democratic decision-making. These strategies target 
not only Member States but also partner countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood as well as in 
the Southern Neighbourhood, Middle East and Africa.  

Disinformation produced and/or spread by Russian sources has been reported in the context of 
several elections  and referenda in the EU16. Disinformation  campaigns related  to  the war in 
Syria17,  to  the  downing  of  the  MH-17  aircraft  in  the  East  of  Ukraine18 and  to  the  use  of 
chemical weapons in Salisbury attack19 have been well documented. 

2.  

DISINFORMATION: 
STRENGTHENING THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE 

UNDERSTANDING 

THE 

THREATS 

AND 

Disinformation  is  an  evolving  threat  which  requires  continuous  efforts  to  address  the 
relevant  actors,  vectors,  tools,  methods,  prioritised  targets  and  impact.  Some  forms, 
especially  state-driven  disinformation,  are  analysed  by  the  EU  Hybrid  Fusion  Cell,  in 
cooperation with the Strategic Communication Task Forces of the European External Action 
Service and with the support of Member States' services.  

The  actors  behind  disinformation  may  be  internal,  within  Member  States,  or  external, 
including state (or government sponsored) and non-state actors. According to reports20, more 
than  30  countries  are  using  disinformation  and  influencing  activities  in  different  forms, 
including in their own countries. The use of disinformation by actors within Member States is 
an increasing source of concern across the Union. Cases of disinformation driven by non-state 
actors have also been reported in the Union, for example related to vaccination21. As regards 

13   These sanctions are in addition to the ones provided by the General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation 

2016/679). 

14   Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats: a European Union response, JOIN(2016) 18 final. 
15   These cyberattacks may include targeted intrusions to collect sensitive information as a precursor to leaks or 
tainted  leaks,  take-over  of  social  media  accounts,  social  media  accounts  driven  by  bots,  and  disruption  of 
information technology systems of, for instance, broadcasting companies or electoral commissions.  

16   See for example the report by  the Policy Planning Staff and the Institute for Strategic Research  of France: 

https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/information_manipulation_rvb_cle838736.pdf. 

17   Joint  statement  by  17  member  countries  of  the  Organisation  for  the  Prohibition  of  Chemical  Weapons 

(OPCW) on chemical attacks in Douma, Syria: 
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/manipulation-of-information/article/syria-chemical-
attacks-in-douma-7-april-joint-statement-by-france-and-16-other. 

18   On  the  disinformation  campaign  on  MH-17,  see  the  East  Strategic  Communication  Task  Force: 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/mh17-time-is-running-out-for-disinformation/  and  https://euvsdisinfo.eu/flight-mh-17-
three-years-on-getting-the-truth-out-of-eastern-ukraine/ as well as the statement from the Joint Investigation 
Team: https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-crash/@104053/reaction-jit-to/. 

19   https://euvsdisinfo.eu/timeline-how-russia-built-two-major-disinformation-campaigns/  
operation 

On 
targeting 
https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2018/10/04/netherlands-defence-intelligence-and-security-service-
disrupts-russian-cyber-operation-targeting-opcw. 

the  OPCW 

the  Hague, 

Russian 

cyber 

the 

in 

see: 

20   See https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2017.  
21   See COM(2018) 245 and COM(2018) 244. 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
external actors, the evidence is strong in the case of the Russian Federation. However, other 
third countries also deploy disinformation strategies, quickly learning from the methods of the 
Russian Federation. 

According  to  the  EU  Hybrid  Fusion  Cell,  disinformation  by  the  Russian  Federation22 poses 
the greatest threat to the EU. It is systematic, well-resourced, and on a different scale to other 
countries.  In  terms  of  coordination,  levels  of  targeting  and  strategic  implications,  Russia's 
disinformation constitutes part of a wider hybrid threat that uses a number of tools, levers, and 
also non-state actors. 

Constant targeted disinformation campaigns against the Union, its institutions and policies are 
likely  to  increase  in  the  run  up  to  the  2019  European  Parliament  elections.  This  calls  for 
urgent and immediate action to protect the Union, its institutions and its citizens against 
disinformation. 

Social media  have become  important means of  spreading  disinformation, including in some 
cases, like Cambridge Analytica,  to  target the delivery  of disinformation  content to specific 
users,  who  are  identified  by  the  unauthorised  access  and  use  of  personal  data,  with  the 
ultimate  goal  of  influencing  the  election  results.  Recent  evidence  shows  that  private 
messaging  services  are  increasingly  used  to  spread  disinformation 23.  Techniques  include 
video  manipulation  (deep-fakes)  and  falsification  of  official  documents;  the  use  of  internet 
automated software (bots) to spread and amplify divisive content and debates on social media; 
troll attacks on social media profiles and information theft. At the same time, more traditional 
methods  such  as  television,  newspapers,  websites  and  chain  emails  continue  to  play  an 
important  role  in  many  regions.  The  tools  and  techniques  used  are  changing  fast  -  the 
response needs to evolve just as rapidly.  

In  addition  to  taking  action  within  Member  states  and  Union-wide,  the  Union  has  a 
significant  interest  in  working  with  partners  in  three  priority  regions  –  the  Union’s 
Eastern  and  Southern  Neighbourhood  and 
in  the  Western  Balkans.  Exposing 
disinformation in countries neighbouring the Union is complementary to tackling the problem 
within the Union.  

The European External Action Service has set up specific strategic communication task 
forces consisting of experts with relevant language and knowledge skills, to address the issue 
and  develop  response  strategies.  They  are  working  closely  with  Commission  services  to 
ensure a coordinated and consistent communication approach in the regions. 

Based  on  the  Action  Plan  on  Strategic  Communication,  adopted  on  22  June  2015,  the 
mandate of the East Strategic Communication Task Force comprises three strands of action: 
(i)  Effective  communication  and  promotion  of  Union  policies  towards  the  Eastern 
the  Eastern 
Neighbourhood;  (ii)  Strengthening 
Neighbourhood  and 
including  support  for  media  freedom  and 
strengthening independent media and (iii) Improved Union capacity to forecast, address and 
respond  to  disinformation  activities  by  the  Russian  Federation.  In  response  to  the  Council 
conclusions in December 2015 and June 2017, the European External Action Service set up 

the  overall  media  environment 

in  Member  States, 

in 

22   Russian  military  doctrine  explicitly 
https://www.rusemb.org.uk/press/2029. 

recognises 

information  warfare  as  one  of 

its  domains: 

23   According  to  Oxford  University,  direct  messaging  platforms  have  hosted  disinformation  campaigns  in  at 

least 10 countries this year. 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
two additional task forces: the Western Balkans Task Force24 for the corresponding region and 
the Task Force South25 for the countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa and the Gulf 
region. 

Since  it  was  established,  the  East  Strategic  Communication  Task  Force  has  effectively 
communicated  on  the  policies  of  the  Union  in  the  Union’s  Eastern  neighbourhood  mainly 
through a campaigns-led approach. In addition, the East Strategic Communication Task Force 
has catalogued, analysed and put the spotlight on over 4,500 examples of disinformation by 
the Russian Federation, uncovering numerous disinformation narratives, raising awareness of 
and exposing the tools, techniques and intentions of disinformation campaigns. Its focus is on 
the  Eastern  Partnership  countries  and  on  Russian  domestic  and  international  media  and  its 
approach is to expose, on the basis of the evidence collected, the trends, narratives, methods 
and channels used and raise awareness of them.  

The  mandate  of  the  East  Strategic  Communication  Task  Force  should  therefore  be 
maintained  and  the  mandate  of  the  other  two  Strategic  Communications  Task  Forces 
(Western  Balkan  and  South)  should  be  reviewed  in  the  light  of  the  growing  scale  and 
importance of disinformation activities in those regions and the need to raise awareness of the 
adverse impact of disinformation.  

ACTIONS 

3.  
DISINFORMATION 

FOR  A  COORDINATED  UNION  RESPONSE 

TO 

Addressing  disinformation  requires  political  determination  and  unified  action, 
mobilising  all  parts  of  governments  (including  counter-hybrid,  cybersecurity,  intelligence 
and  strategic  communication  communities,  data  protection,  electoral,  law  enforcement  and 
media authorities). This should be done in close cooperation with like-minded partners across 
the  globe.  It  requires  close  cooperation  between  Union  institutions,  Member  States,  civil 
society and the private sector, especially online platforms.  

The  coordinated  response  to  disinformation  presented  in  this  Action  Plan  is  based  on  four 
pillars:  
(i) 

improving  the  capabilities  of  Union  institutions  to  detect,  analyse  and  expose 
disinformation;  
strengthening coordinated and joint responses to disinformation;  

(ii) 
(iii)  mobilising private sector to tackle disinformation;  
(iv) 

raising awareness and improving societal resilience.  

PILLAR 1:   IMPROVING  THE  CAPABILITIES  OF  UNION  INSTITUTIONS  TO 
DETECT, ANALYSE AND EXPOSE DISINFORMATION  

To  address  effectively  the  threat  of  disinformation,  it  is  necessary  to  reinforce  the 
Strategic  Communication  Task  Forces  of  the  European  External  Action  Service,  the 
Union  Delegations  and  the  EU  Hybrid  Fusion  Cell  by  providing  them  with  additional 
specialised  staff,  such  as  experts  in  data  mining  and  analysis  to  process  the  relevant 
data.  It  is  also  important  to  contract  additional  media  monitoring  services  to  cover  a  wider 
range of sources and languages and additional research and studies on the reach and impact of 

24   The Council conclusions on Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process of 15 December 2015. 
25   The Council conclusions on Counter-Terrorism adopted on 19 June 2017. 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
disinformation.  In  addition,  there  is  a  need  to  invest  in  analytical  tools  such  as  dedicated 
software to mine, organise and aggregate vast amounts of digital data.  

The  reinforcement  of  the  strategic  communication  teams  of  the  European  External  Action 
Service will be done in two steps. 

In the short term, the budget for strategic communication is expected to more than double26 in 
2019 and this will be  accompanied  by  a  reinforcement  of at  least  11 positions ahead of the 
European elections. In the medium term27, additional positions of permanent officials will be 
requested  in  the  strategic  communication  teams  and  the  EU  Hybrid  Fusion  Cell  in  the 
headquarters,  as  well  as  new  posts  in  delegations  in  the  neighbourhood,  to  reach  a  total 
increase of 50-55 staff members over the next two years.  

Further  synergies  will  take  place  between  the  Commission’s  services  and  the  European 
External  Action  Service,  for  example  on  sharing  tools  or  designing  communication 
campaigns. 

Threat  analyses  and 
intelligence  assessments  are  the  basis  for  the  work  on 
disinformation. The expertise of the Intelligence and Situation Centre should be fully utilised 
to analyse the evolving nature of disinformation campaigns. 

The  Strategic  Communication  Task  Forces  will  work  closely  with  the  relevant  Union 
delegations  and  the  Commission  to  tackle  disinformation.  In  particular,  they  will 
cooperate  with  the  internal  Network  against  Disinformation  of  the  Commission,  set  up 
following the April Communication28. 

Member  States  should  complement  and  support  the  actions  of  the  Union  institutions  by 
increasing  their  national  capabilities  and  by  supporting  the  necessary  increases  in  resources 
for the Union institutions. 

Action 1: With a view to the 2019 European Parliament elections in particular, but also with a 
longer-term perspective, the High Representative, in cooperation with the Member States, will 
strengthen  the  Strategic  Communication  Task  Forces  and  Union  Delegations  through 
additional  staff  and  new  tools  which  are  necessary  to  detect,  analyse  and  expose 
disinformation  activities.  Member  States  should,  where  appropriate,  also  upgrade  their 
national capacity in this area, and support the necessary increase in resources for the Strategic 
Communication Task Forces and Union delegations. 

the  Strategic 
Action  2:  The  High  Representative  will  review 
Communications  Task  Forces  for  Western  Balkans  and  South  to  enable  them  to  address 
disinformation effectively in these regions. 

the  mandates  of 

PILLAR 2:  STRENGTHENING  COORDINATED  AND  JOINT  RESPONSES  TO 

DISINFORMATION 

26   Current  discussions  on  the  2019  budget  foresee  an  increase  from  EUR  1.9  million  in  2018  to 5  million  in 

2019. 

27   Through amendments of the 2019 budget and/or the proposal for the 2020 budget. 
28   This  network 

its 
Representations.  The  Commission  has  also  recently  set  up  a  working  group  with  the  European  External 
Action Service and the European Parliament on tackling disinformation ahead of the European elections. 

the  representatives  of  Directorates-General  of 

the  Commission  and 

includes 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The  first  hours  after  disinformation  is  released  are  critical  for  detecting,  analysing  and 
responding to it. Consequently, a  Rapid  Alert  System will  be  set  up to  provide  alerts  on 
disinformation  campaigns  in  real-time  through  a  dedicated  technological  infrastructure. 
This will facilitate sharing of data and assessment, to enable common situational awareness, 
coordinated attribution and response and ensure time and resource efficiency.  

In view of the creation of the Rapid Alert System, each Member States should designate, in 
line  with  its  institutional  setup,  a  contact  point,  ideally  positioned  within  strategic 
communications  departments.  This  contact  point  would  share  the  alerts  and  ensure 
coordination with all other relevant national authorities as well as with the Commission and 
the European External Action Service. This  is without prejudice to existing competences of 
national authorities under Union and/or national law or under other parts of this Action Plan. 
Where disinformation concerns elections or the functioning of democratic institutions in the 
Member  States,  national  contact  points  should  closely  cooperate  with  the  national  election 
networks29. In this case, the outcome of the work of the Rapid Alert System should be shared 
with  the  European  cooperation  election  network30,  in  particular  to  exchange  information  on 
threats  relevant  to  elections  and  support  the  possible  application  of  sanctions.  Online 
platforms should cooperate with the contact points underpinning the Rapid Alert System, in 
particular during election periods, to provide relevant and timely information. 

The Rapid Alert System should be closely linked to existing 24/7 capabilities such as the 
Emergency Response Coordination Centre31 and the Situation Room of the European External 
Action Service32. The EU Hybrid Fusion Cell of the Intelligence and Situation Centre as well 
as  the  relevant  Council  Working  Parties  could  also  be  used  as  channels  for  sharing 
information.  The  Commission  and  the  High  Representative  will  ensure  regular  exchange  of 
information  and  best  practices  with  key  partners,  including  within  the  G7  and  the  North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation.  

Prompt reaction via fact-based and effective communication is essential to counter and 
deter disinformation, including in cases of disinformation concerning Union matters and 
policies.  This  is  important  to  foster  an  open,  democratic  debate  free  from  manipulation, 
including  in  the  context  of  the  forthcoming  European  elections.  Union  institutions 33 and 
Member  States  need  to  improve  their  ability  to  react  and  communicate  effectively.  The 
Commission  has  already  increased  its  funding  for  better  communication  activities, 
implemented  through  its  regional  communication  programmes,  including  in  the  Union's 
neighbourhood,  and  Union  Delegations.  Union  institutions  are  all  active  in  communicating 
about  European  action  and  policies  in  the  Union,  in  particular  Commission  Representations 

29   See  Recommendation  C(2018)  5949  on  election  cooperation  networks,  online  transparency,  protection 
against  cybersecurity  incidents  and  fighting  disinformation  campaigns  in  the  context  of  elections  to  the 
European  Parliament.  These  networks  will  bring  together  national  election  authorities,  audio-visual  media 
regulators,  cybersecurity  and  data  protection  authorities  as  well  as  relevant  expert  groups,  for  example  on 
media  literacy.  They  constitute,  together  with  the  Union  institutions,  the  European  election  network.  The 
European election network will be convened for the first time in January 2019. 

30   Set up pursuant to the Recommendation issued on 12 September 2018. 
31   The  Emergency  Response  Coordination  Centre  is  set  up  under  Article  7  of  Decision  1313/2013/EU  on  a 

Union Civil Protection Mechanism. 

32   The  Situation  Room  is  a  permanent  stand-by  body  of  the  European  External  Action  Service  that  provides 
worldwide monitoring and current situation awareness. It is part of EU Intelligence and Situation Centre and 
acts as a situation information hub for all relevant stakeholders from the European institutions. 

33   In the Commission, Members of the College of Commissioners, the Spokesperson's Service and Commission 
Representations would maintain their key role of stepping in to ensure rebuttals whenever there are errors in 
media reports. 

7 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
and  European  Parliament  liaison  offices  in  the  Member  States  play  a  key  role  to  provide 
locally-tailored messaging, including specific tools to counter myths and disseminate facts34. 

Cooperation  between  Member  States  and  Union  institutions  should  be  further 
strengthened,  especially  as  regards  information-sharing,  common  learning,  awareness-
raising, pro-active messaging and research. More intelligence sharing between Member States 
and  Union  institutions  is  needed  to  improve  situational  awareness  and  their  respective 
response capacities. Pro-active and objective communication on Union values and policies is 
particularly  effective  when  carried  out  directly  by  Member  States.  To  this  end,  the 
Commission  and  the  High  Representative  call  on  Member  States  to  intensify  their 
communication  efforts  and  to  defend  the  Union  and  its  institutions  against  disinformation 
campaigns.  

Action 3: By March 2019, the Commission and the High Representative, in cooperation with 
Member States, will establish a Rapid Alert System for addressing disinformation campaigns, 
working  closely  with  existing  networks,  the  European  Parliament  as  well  as  the  North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation and G7’s Rapid Response Mechanism. 

Action 4: With a view to the upcoming European elections, the Commission, in cooperation 
with  the  European  Parliament,  will  step  up  its  communication  efforts  on  Union  values  and 
policies. Member States should significantly strengthen their own communication efforts on 
Union values and policies. 

Action 5: The Commission and the High Representative, in cooperation with Member States, 
will strengthen strategic communications in the Union’s neighbourhood. 

PILLAR 3:  MOBILISING PRIVATE SECTOR TO TACKLE DISINFORMATION 

Online  platforms,  advertisers  and  the  advertising  industry  have  a  crucial  role  to  play  in 
tackling the disinformation problem, as its scale is directly related to the platforms’ ability to 
amplify,  target  and  spread  disinformation  messages  of  malicious  actors.  Given  their  past 
failures to act appropriately to tackle this problem, the Commission urged them in April 2018 
to step up their efforts. Against this background, the Code of Practice on Disinformation was 
published  on  26  September  201835.  The  main  online  platforms  which  signed  the  Code  of 
Practice committed to specific actions to be carried out before the 2019 European Parliament 
elections. 

The  Commission  calls  upon  all  signatories  of  the  Code  of  Practice  to  implement  the 
actions and procedures identified in the Code swiftly and effectively on an EU-wide basis, 
focusing on actions that are urgent and relevant for ensuring the integrity of 2019 European 
elections.  In  particular,  large  online  platforms  should  immediately  (i)  ensure  scrutiny  of  ad 

34   Several  Commission  Representations  have  developed  locally  adapted  tools  to  debunk  disinformation,  like 
Les Décodeurs de l'Europe in France, UE Vero Falso in Italy, Euromyty.sk in Slovakia and EU myth-busting 
cartoon competition in Austria and cartoon series in Romania. 

35   https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation.  On  16  October,  the  Code's 
initial  signatories  provided  their  formal  subscriptions  to  the  Code,  identifying  the  commitments  each 
signatory  will  adhere  to  and  a  table  listing  relevant  company  best  practices  as  well  as  milestones  for  the 
overall  implementation  of  the  Code  in  the  EU.  The  initial  signatories  include  the  main  online  platforms 
(Facebook, Google, Youtube, Twitter), providers of software (Mozilla), advertisers as  well as a  number of 
trade  associations  representing  online  platforms  and  the  advertising  industry.  The  Code  of  Practice  should 
create  a  more  transparent,  trustworthy  and  accountable  online  ecosystem  and  protect  users  from 
disinformation. 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
placement and transparency of political advertising, based on effective due diligence checks 
of the identity of the sponsors, (ii) close down fake accounts active on their services and (iii) 
identify automated bots  and label them accordingly. Online platforms should also cooperate 
with the national audio-visual regulators and with independent fact-checkers and researchers 
to detect and flag disinformation campaigns in particular during election periods and to make 
fact-checked content more visible and widespread.  

The Commission will, with the help of the European Regulators Group for Audio-visual 
Media  Services  (ERGA) 36,  monitor  the  implementation  of  the  commitments  by  the 
signatories of the Code of Practice and will regularly inform on whether and to what extent 
individual platforms are meeting these commitments. To allow effective and comprehensive 
monitoring, the platforms should by the end of this year provide the Commission with up-to-
date  and  complete  information  on  the  actions  they  have  taken  to  comply  with  these 
commitments. The Commission will publish this information in January 2019. The platforms 
should  also  provide  complete  information,  including  by  replying  to  Commission's  specific 
requests,  on  how  they  are  implementing  the  commitments  on  a  regular  basis  starting  in 
January 2019 in order to enable a targeted monitoring of the compliance with the Code ahead 
of the European Parliament elections. This information will also be published. 

In addition, the Code of Practice envisages that the signatories will provide a full report after 
twelve  months.  These  reports  should  include  complete  data  and  information  to  enable  a 
thorough  assessment  by  the  Commission.  On  this  basis,  the  Commission,  assisted  by 
independent  expertise  and  with  the  help  of  the  ERGA,  will  assess  the  overall 
effectiveness of the Code of Practice. The Commission may also seek the assistance of the 
European audio-visual observatory. 

The  Commission  notes  that  the  overall  effectiveness  of  the  Code  depends  upon  the  widest 
possible participation of online platforms and the online advertising sector. It therefore calls 
upon additional relevant stakeholders to adhere to the Code. 

Action  6:  The  Commission  will  ensure  a  close  and  continuous  monitoring  of  the 
implementation  of  the  Code  of  Practice.  Where  needed  and  in  particular  in  view  of  the 
European  elections,  the  Commission  will  push  for  rapid  and  effective  compliance.  The 
Commission will carry out a comprehensive assessment at the conclusion of the Code’s initial 
12-month  period  of  application.  Should  the  implementation  and  the  impact  of  the  Code  of 
Practice prove unsatisfactory, the Commission may propose further actions, including actions 
of a regulatory nature.  

PILLAR 4:  RAISING AWARENESS AND IMPROVING SOCIETAL RESILIENCE 

Greater public awareness is essential for improving societal resilience against the threat 
that  disinformation  poses.  The  starting  point  is  a  better  understanding  of  the  sources  of 
disinformation  and of the intentions, tools and objectives behind  disinformation,  but  also  of 
our own vulnerability. A sound scientific methodology could help identify key vulnerabilities 

36   The European Regulators Group for Audio-visual Media Services comprises all the relevant regulators of all 
the  Member  States.  It  provides  technical  advice  to  the  Commission  in  a  number  of  fields  related  to  the 
application of the Directive, facilitates cooperation among the national regulatory authorities and/or bodies, 
and between the national regulatory authorities and/or bodies and the Commission. The revised Audio-visual 
Media  Service  Directive  further  strengthened  the  role  of  this  Group  in  particular  in  relation  also  to  video 
sharing platforms.  

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
across  Member  States37.  It  is  essential  to  understand  how  and  why  citizens,  and  sometimes 
entire  communities,  are  drawn  to  disinformation  narratives  and  define  a  comprehensive 
answer to this phenomenon. 

Building resilience also includes specialised trainings, public conferences and debates as well 
as other forms of common learning for the media. It also involves empowering all sectors of 
society  and,  in  particular,  improving  citizens'  media  literacy  to  understand  how  to  spot  and 
fend off disinformation. 

A  comprehensive  response  to  disinformation  requires  active  participation  by  civil  society. 
The Communication and the Recommendation38, that are part of the set of measures on 
securing  free  and  fair  European  elections  (the  Elections  Package)  called  on  Member 
States  to  engage  with  media,  online  platforms,  information  technology  providers  and 
others, in awareness raising activities to increase the transparency of elections and build trust 
in the electoral processes. Member States' active engagement and follow-up in this context is 
needed in the run-up to the European elections. 

Independent  fact-checkers  and  researchers  play  a  key  role  in  furthering  the 
understanding  of  the  structures  that  sustain  disinformation  and  the  mechanisms  that 
shape how it is disseminated online. Moreover, through their activities, they raise awareness 
of  various  types  of  disinformation  threats  and  can  contribute  to  mitigating  their  negative 
impact.  It  is  necessary  to  strengthen  their  capacity  to  identify  and  expose  disinformation 
threats and facilitate cross-border  cooperation.  Building on the actions outlined in  the April 
Communication,  it  is  necessary  to  scale  up  national  multidisciplinary  teams  of  independent 
fact-checkers  and  academic  researchers  with  specific  knowledge  about  local  information 
environments.  This  requires  the  support  and  the  cooperation  of  Member  States  in  order  to 
facilitate  the  functioning  of  the  European  network  of  fact  checkers,  in  full  respect  of  the 
independence  of  the  fact-checking  and  research  activities.  Under  the  Connecting  Europe 
Facility  programme39,  the  Commission  will  finance  a  digital  platform  which  will  network 
together the independent national multidisciplinary teams. 

To  increase  public  awareness  and  resilience,  the  Commission  will  further  step  up  its 
commitment and current activities in relation to media literacy to empower Union citizens to 
better  identify  and  deal  with  disinformation40.  Member  States  should  rapidly  implement  the 
provision of the revised Audio-visual Media Service Directive requiring them to promote and 
develop media literacy skills41.  

The Commission has proposed funding for the development of new tools to better understand 
and  combat  online  disinformation  in  its  proposal  for  Horizon  Europe  programme 42.  The 

37   This could be further explored as part of the work of the Media Pluralism Monitor, a project co-funded by the 

European Union and carried out by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom in Florence. 

38   See Commission Recommendation on election cooperation networks, online transparency, protection against 
cybersecurity  incidents  and  fighting  disinformation  campaigns  in  the  context  of  elections  to  the  European 
Parliament, C(2018) 5949.  

39   Regulation  (EU)  No  1316/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  December  2013 
establishing  the  Connecting  Europe  Facility,  amending  Regulation  (EU)  No  913/2010  and  repealing 
Regulations (EC) No 680/2007 and (EC) No 67/2010. 

40   Such activities will include a Union online media literacy library and learning centre as well as other media 

literacy tools. 

41   Article 33a of the revised Audiovisual Media Service Directive. 
42   COM(2018) 435. 

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Commission  will  also  support,  where  appropriate,  information  campaigns  to  raise  users' 
awareness of the most recent technologies (e.g. deep fakes). 

The work of independent media is essential for the functioning of a democratic  society. 
The  Commission43will  therefore  continue  to  support  independent  media  and  investigative 
journalists, as they contribute to the exposure of disinformation. In addition, the Commission 
will  continue  to  carry  out  specific  programmes  related  to  media  support,  including  with 
financial support, and professionalisation in its neighbourhood44.  

Action 7: With a view especially to the 2019 European elections, but also to the longer term, 
the  Commission  and  the  High  Representative,  in  cooperation  with  the  Member  States,  will 
organise targeted campaigns for the public and trainings for media and public opinion shapers 
in  the  Union  and  its  neighbourhood  to  raise  awareness  of  the  negative  effects  of 
disinformation.  Efforts  to  support  the  work  of  independent  media  and  quality  journalism  as 
well as the research into disinformation will be continued in order to provide a comprehensive 
response to this phenomenon. 

Action 8: Member States, in cooperation with the Commission, should support the creation of 
teams  of  multi-disciplinary  independent  fact-checkers  and  researchers  with  specific 
knowledge of local information environments to detect and expose disinformation campaigns 
across different social networks and digital media. 

Action  9:  As  part  of  the  Media  Literacy  Week  in  March  2019,  in  cooperation  with  the 
Member  States,  the  Commission  will  support  cross-border  cooperation  amongst  media 
literacy  practitioners  as  well  as  the  launch  of  practical  tools  for  the  promotion  of  media 
literacy  for  the  public.  Member  States  should  also  rapidly  implement  the  provisions  of  the 
Audio-visual Media Services Directive, which deal with media literacy. 

Action 10: In view of the upcoming 2019 European elections, Member States should ensure 
effective follow-up of the Elections Package, notably the Recommendation. The Commission 
will closely monitor how the Package is implemented and where appropriate, provide relevant 
support and advice. 

4. 

CONCLUSIONS  

Disinformation is a major challenge for European democracies and societies, and the Union 
needs  to  address  it  while  being  true  to  European  values  and  freedoms.  Disinformation 
undermines  the  trust  of  citizens  in  democracy  and  democratic  institutions.  Disinformation 
also contributes to the polarisation of public views and interferes in the democratic decision-
making  processes.  It  can  also  be  used  to  undermine  the  European  project.  This  can  have 

43   The Creative Europe programme, if adopted, will help reinforce Europe’s news media sector, diversity and 
pluralism of journalistic content, as well as a critical approach to media content through media literacy, COM 
(2018) 438. 

44   The Commission funds the project "openmediahub" to: (i) provide journalists in the neighbourhood with the 
necessary skills for independent and objective reporting; (ii) improve the skills of the editorial staff and (iii) 
reinforce the network of media professionals and journalists in the neighbourhood. As regards the Western 
Balkans,  the  Commission  is  providing  financial  support  for  the  setting  up  of  a  network  of  journalistic 
associations,  the  building  of  trust  in  media,  and  the  reinforcing  of  judiciary  systems  to  defend  freedom  of 
expression. In this area the Commission also supports public service media, new independent media outlets, 
and the improvement of quality and professionalism in journalism. 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
considerable  adverse  effects  on  society  across  the  Union,  in  particular  in  the  run  up  to  the 
2019 European Parliament elections.  

Strong  commitment  and  swift  actions  are  necessary  to  preserve  the  democratic  process  and 
the trust of citizens in public institutions at both national and Union level. The present Action 
Plan  sets  out  key  actions  to  tackle  disinformation  in  a  coordinated  approach  of  the  Union 
institutions  and  the  Member  States.  It  also  highlights  measures  to  be  taken  as  a  matter  of 
priority by different actors ahead of the 2019 European Parliament elections. Member States 
should step up their solidarity and defend the Union against hybrid attacks, including attacks 
using disinformation.  

At the same time, and in the long-term, the objective is for the Union and its neighbourhood 
to  become  more  resilient  against  disinformation.  This  requires  continuous  and  sustained 
efforts to support education and media literacy, journalism, fact-checkers, researchers, and the 
civil society as a whole.  

The Commission and the High Representative therefore: 

- 

- 

- 

- 

recall that joint action is required by all relevant institutional actors as well as by the 
private  sector,  in  particular  online  platforms,  and  civil  society  as  a  whole  to  tackle 
effectively all the different aspects of the disinformation threat;  

call on the European Council to endorse the present Action Plan;  

call on Member States to cooperate in carrying out the actions set out in this Action 
Plan; 

as a matter of priority, call on all relevant actors to implement those actions which are 
urgent and relevant in the run up to the upcoming European elections in May 2019. 

12