Resilience in the western Balkans.
Date: 2018-11-22
Institutions: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Subjects: European neighbourhood policy, Western Balkans, geopolitics, political situation, regional security

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REPORT Nº 36 — August 2017

Resilience in 
the Western 
Balkans

EDITED BY
Sabina Lange, Zoran Nechev and Florian 
Trauner

Reports

European
Union
Institute for
Security Studies

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
EU Institute for Security Studies

100, avenue de Suffren

75015 Paris

http://www.iss.europa.eu

Director: Antonio Missiroli

© EU Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 

Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, save where otherwise stated. 

Print ISBN 978-92-9198-626-2   ISSN 1830-9747  doi:10.2815/211038   QN-AF-17-006-EN-C

PDF  ISBN 978-92-9198-627-9  ISSN 2363-264X  doi:10.2815/97860   QN-AF-17-006-EN-N

Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Luxembourg by Imprimerie Centrale. 

Cover image: Lorenzetti, Ambrogio (1285-c. 1348), ‘Effects of Good Government in the Country - detail (hunters)’.

Cover image credit: Siena, Palazzo Pubblico.  © 2017. Photo Scala, Florence

CONTENTS

Foreword 

Antonio Missiroli

Introduction 

Sabina Lange, Zoran Nechev and Florian Trauner

Section 1  External drivers

I. Democratisation via EU integration: fragile resilience and resilient fragility 

Corina Stratulat

II. Enlargement: what role for resilience? 

Rosa Balfour

III. The Berlin Process: resilience in the EU waiting room 

Tobias Flessenkemper

IV. The impact of NATO 
Sandro Knezović

V. The impact of the United States 

Ivan Vejvoda

VI. The impact of Russia 

Dušan Reljić

VII. The impact of Turkey and the Gulf States 

Filip Ejdus

VIII. The impact of China 

Anastas Vangeli

Section 2 

Internal drivers

IX. Too much resilience? Getting used to crises 

Florian Bieber

X. No open society - no resilience 

Srdjan Cvijić

3

5

11

17

23

31

37

43

51

57

65

71

XI. Principled pragmatism and resilience 

Ana E. Juncos

XII. Balkan strongmen and fragile institutions 

Igor Bandović and Nikola Dimitrov

XIII. Integrated societies as a vector of resilience 

Alessandro Rotta

XIV. Violent extremism: beyond foreign fighters and behind numbers 

Predrag Petrović and Florian Qehaja

XV. Managing the Balkan route: the 2015/16 refugee crisis 

Julija Sardelić

75

81

87

93

99

Conclusion: The EU and the Western Balkans as a single security space 

105

Thanos Dokos

Annexes

Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘A strategic approach  
to resilience in the EU’s external action’, 7.6.2017 

Abbreviations 

Notes on the contributors 

113

137

139

Resilience in the Western Balkans 
FOREWORD

The  cover  image  of  this  EUISS  Report  is  taken  from  a  famous  fresco  painted  by 
Ambrogio  Lorenzetti  in  Siena’s  Palazzo  Pubblico  (town  hall).  Called  Allegory  and 
Effects of Good and Bad Government, the large mural encapsulates all the civic virtues 
of European polities of the time (1338 A.D.): hard work, carried out by both towns-
people and peasants, but also learning and leisure, communal solidity and solidar-
ity, stern but fair justice and osmosis between the urban and the rural landscape – 
all under the aegis of Securitas, embodied by a reassuring winged figure, allegedly 
inspired  by  a  classical  statue  attributed  to  Lysippos.  On  the  opposite  wall  of  the 
council chamber, the inverse image of malgoverno is depicted to illustrate what hap-
pens when the right path is not taken. 

While the stark opposition of good and evil is a typical feature of medieval culture, 
the ideal of buongoverno has since become a universal point of reference and inspi-
ration  –  in  political  philosophy  as  well  as  practical  policy.  The  EU  even  elevated 
the  promotion  of  ‘good  governance’  as  a  guiding  principle  of  its  2003  European 
Security Strategy (ESS), starting ‘at home’ and spreading to the adjacent regions of 
the enlarging Union – and beyond. 

That  overarching  goal  still  holds,  of  course,  and  with  the  2016  Global  Strategy 
(EUGS) the EU has added an extra layer, trying to cover the nebulous space which lies 
between good and bad governance, and highlighting the many shades of grey that 
characterise it. The EUGS acknowledges the need to devise policies and undertake 
actions capable of tackling fragility and fostering resilience all across Europe – at its 
core as well as on the periphery. More recently, a dedicated Joint Communication by 
the EEAS and the European Commission articulated in more detail how to promote 
such ‘resilience’ in different contexts while still adhering to the broader ambition of 
pursuing better governance. 

The  Institute  has  accompanied  and  supported  the  implementation  phase  of  the 
EUGS, and in particular the follow-up work on resilience, with a number of dedi-
cated activities and publications.1 This volume is exclusively devoted to the Western 
Balkans and the challenges currently confronting the region, and aims at identify-
ing potential ways to implement the new policy guidelines successfully in that spe-
cific context. Experts from both the Union and the region itself have offered their 
insights (and sometimes critical views) on the drivers of fragility and resilience in 
southeastern Europe as well as the role of external players and domestic factors. 

Most of the contributions published in this Report were drafted before the Joint 
Communication was released last June and, therefore, deserve to be read and ap-
preciated  also  as  a  complement  to  the  institutional  perspective,  in  the  hope  that 

1.  See  Florence  Gaub  and  Nicu  Popescu  (eds.),  After  the  EU  Global  Strategy:  Building  Resilience  (Paris:  EUISS,  May 

2017), which is mainly focused on the neighbouring countries. 

3 

Resilience in the Western Balkansthey will feed into the policies that the Union will devise next vis-à-vis the region to 
achieve the shared goal of buongoverno. 

This Report is the first major outcome of the close cooperation between the EUISS 
and the Belgrade-based European Fund for the Balkans (EFB). It is thanks to a gen-
erous grant from the EFB that it has been possible for the Institute to host three 
Research  Fellows from the region,2 to organise a series of events and activities to 
prepare this Report, and then to publish and disseminate it. While helping with the 
Report, the young EFB Fellows were involved in all the Institute’s activities through-
out their stay. 

This mutually beneficial partnership with the EFB is planned to continue next year, 
with a special focus on ‘Balkan futures’. The Institute is proud to see that its work 
on these issues has also anticipated the broader EU reengagement with the Western 
Balkans – which has already strongly influenced political developments in Skopje 
over the past few months and is set to materialise further in the months to come. 

Antonio Missiroli
Paris, August 2017

2.  Jelena Beslin, Zoran Nechev and Marija Ignjatijevic were hosted at the EUISS Paris HQ between October 2016 

and June 2017.

4 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36INTRODUCTION

Sabina Lange, Zoran Nechev and Florian Trauner

Upon  her  return  from  a  visit  to  the  region,  on  6  March  2017,  HR/VP  Federica 
Mogherini stated that ‘the Balkans can easily become one of the chessboards where 
the big power game can be played’. Three days later the European Council held a dis-
cussion on the region and the European Council President’s conclusions of 9 March 
2017 acknowledged the ‘fragile situation in the Western Balkans’ and the ‘internal 
and external challenges that the region is facing’. The conclusions then reaffirmed 
the EU’s unequivocal support for the European perspective of the Western Balkans 
and expressed the Union’s commitment and engagement to support the region in 
conducting EU-related reforms.

This  EUISS  Report  is  firmly  anchored  in  the  HR/VP’s  analysis  and  the  conclu-
sions of European leaders. After several years of neglect, the Western Balkans have 
returned to the spotlight of the EU’s attention once again as a geopolitical arena 
where  ‘big  power  games’  may  threaten  Europe’s  stability  as  a  whole  and  come  to 
represent a test for the EU’s capacity to act on the world stage. However, much has 
changed since the beginnings of World War I, the Cominform period and also since 
the civil wars that followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, to name just 
a few occasions when the Balkans constituted a risk for Europe or a test for the EU. 
The current fragility of the region is unlikely to lead to an open military conflict, 
neither between the countries on the peninsula nor among the big powers referred 
to  by  HR/VP  Mogherini.  More  likely  the  region  may  become  a  geopolitical  play-
ground where rival powers vie for influence and different socio-economic and politi-
cal systems as well as models of international order are tested, compared and played 
off against each other. 

In this context, the fragility that currently characterises the region exposes a com-
plex interplay of external and internal challenges – in particular, the bleak econom-
ic  and  social  situation  as  well  as  the  weak  state  of  the  region’s  democracies  have 
opened  up  space  for  external  influences  that  are  not  always  compatible  with  the 
EU’s vision for the future trajectory of the region. These challenges have exposed 
shortcomings in what has long been understood as the EU’s most effective foreign 
and security policy instrument – namely enlargement. When President Juncker an-
nounced, in the summer of 2014, that there would be no further enlargement of 
the EU in the five-year term of his Commission, he was merely acknowledging the 
state of (un)readiness of the applicant countries and the lack of progress in the ac-
cession process (including the lack of political interest on both sides to push sub-
stantially ahead). 

5 

Resilience in the Western BalkansThe negative developments in the Western Balkans have exposed the difficulties of 
enlargement as a policy in the region, and once again raised doubts about the EU’s 
capacity to act decisively at a time when mounting challenges to the security of EU 
citizens have raised expectations and led to calls for the Union to play a stronger 
global role. The influx of refugees and migrants along the Balkan route in 2015, as 
well as large-scale migration to the EU from the region; the worrying numbers of 
foreign fighters from the Western Balkans joining Daesh or Al-Nusra in Syria and 
Iraq  or  either  side  (pro-Russian  rebels  or  forces  loyal  to  the  government  in  Kiev) 
in the conflict in Ukraine; investigations revealing that weapons used in terrorist 
attacks in Western Europe originated in the region and reports of the local rise of 
(home-grown as well as imported) Islamic fundamentalism  – all attest to the extent 
to  which  the  Western  Balkans  are  embedded  in  the  Euro-Atlantic  security  space, 
but  also  highlight  the  region’s  vulnerability  to  external  drivers  of  instability  and 
insecurity.

In order to effectively support the region on the path to EU membership, mecha-
nisms and instruments beyond those of enlargement policy proper are needed in 
order  to  address  this  complex  interplay  of  external  and  internal  challenges.   The 
EU’s enlargement framework is implemented through a conditionality approach. 
According  to  the  2016  EU  Global  Strategy  (EUGS),  a  credible  accession  process 
grounded  in  strict  and  fair  conditionality  is  essential  to  foster  resilience  in  these 
countries. By nurturing state and societal resilience in the Western Balkans, the EU 
is  not  only  directly  addressing  the  region’s  capacity  to  cope  with  those  multiple 
challenges, but it is also making a long-term investment in the interest of its own 
citizens. By seeking mechanisms to enhance the impact of the EU’s external action 
and sustain progress, the Joint Resilience Communication released by the European 
External  Action  Service  (EEAS)  and  the  Commission  in  June  2017  acknowledges 
and acts upon the recognised need for a more preventive approach whereby crises 
are anticipated and dealt with proactively. 

Applying this additional layer of resilience-building mechanisms to the existing en-
largement policy tools and processes, however, raises a number of questions. How 
do  internal  and  external  factors  influence  the  region’s  societies  and  their  politics 
in relation to their progress towards accession? What makes Balkan societies sus-
ceptible to particular influences? What can help make them resilient against those 
influences? What is the correlation between societal and state resilience? How can 
policy approaches, mechanisms and instruments that have hitherto been applied be 
adapted to address and counter those internal and external factors that threaten the 
EU accession perspective? How should the EU respond to the altered geopolitical 
circumstances in order to maintain and revive its transformative power? 

This dedicated EUISS Report seeks to answer all these questions. The Report analy-
ses the drivers of fragility and resilience in the context of the internal and external 
challenges facing the region. It puts forward a series of recommendations that the 
EU and local actors may consider with a view to building up more resilient states 

6 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36and societies. The Report is divided in two sections: the first one is devoted to the ex-
ternal drivers of fragility and resilience, while the second explores the internal ones. 

In the opening chapter in Section 1, Corina Stratulat examines the role of the EU 
as a key external actor in the region. Although the EU has traditionally considered 
itself to be the main source of stability in the Western Balkans, in recent years it 
has come to be regarded by some as a potential destabilising factor for the region. 
The ongoing repercussions of the economic and financial crisis of 2008-2009, with 
which the EU and the eurozone in particular continues to struggle, as well as the 
migration crisis of 2015 have significantly contributed to this negative perception. 
This is also due to the region’s deep integration into the EU political environment 
and its high degree of economic dependency on the Union. 

The chapter by Rosa Balfour studies the impact that the convergence (or non-con-
vergence)  of  EU  and  Western  Balkan  foreign  policies  have  on  the  region,  also  in 
relation to other major players. Tobias Flessenkemper explores the role of the EU 
as  such  as  well  as  some  of  its  member  states  within  the  framework  of  the  mini-
intergovernmental ‘Berlin Process’ and its annual Western Balkan Summits. Besides 
the EU, the Report also looks into the behaviour of other external actors present 
in the region such as the United States, China, Turkey and the Gulf States, as well 
as  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organisation  (NATO).  The  chapter  by  Ivan  Vejvoda 
analyses  Washington’s  attitude  under  Obama  –  and  more  recently  the  Trump 
Administration  –  vis-à-vis  the  region.  It  assesses  how  the  US  can  engage  with  the 
Western Balkans and improve existing capacities in order to cope with any external 
or internal threats, especially in light of the growing challenge to the internal liberal 
order. The role of Russia as an external actor is explored in the chapter by Dušan 
Reljić,  which  compares  different  attitudes  towards  Russia  in  the  EU  and  in  the 
Western Balkan countries. It analyses the Russian role as that of a ‘spoiler’ (a driver 
of fragility) or alternatively a ‘promoter’ of the region (a driver of resilience). Finally, 
the author outlines options for the EU to move forward in building resilience strat-
egies, while working on improving cooperation with Russia in the interest of the 
whole region. Filip Ejdus goes further and investigates the impact of Turkey and 
the Gulf States, and whether their investments and policies should be regarded as 
drivers of fragility and/or resilience. He outlines options for the EU to engage with 
these external actors and cooperate in fostering the region’s existing capacities in 
order to  counter external or internal threats. NATO expansion in the region is also 
analysed through the prism of advancing state resilience. Sandro Knezović reflects 
on how the Russian government has responded to NATO expansion to the Western 
Balkans. In the final chapter in this section, Anastas Vangeli examines China’s at-
titude vis-à-vis the region’s objective to become part of the EU.

The second section of the Report identifies and explores the main internal drivers of 
fragility that need to be tackled in order to strengthen resilience in the region. The 
authors primarily focus on the pattern of semi-authoritarian political rule domi-
nant in the Western Balkans and the issue of state capture of key institutions and 

7 

Resilience in the Western Balkanseconomic assets as its most visible manifestation. Elites across the region continu-
ally bypass institutions and laws and govern through informal rules. Power is exer-
cised through party dominance. Not only are state institutions captured, but the 
media are muzzled as well. 

Citizens and the wider civil society in the Western Balkans are identified as potential 
partners for the EU in pushing for the implementation of reforms. Florian Bieber, 
Nikola Dimitrov and Igor Bandović all explore the relationship between state and 
societal resilience, and provide a better understanding of whether these notions are 
complementary or opposing and mutually exclusive in this part of Europe. Srdjan 
Cvijić focuses on the continuous repression, intimidation and smear campaigns to 
which civil society actors have been subjected in his chapter: he analyses the poten-
tial of civil society to drive resilience in the Western Balkans especially with regard to 
the implementation of EU-related reforms. Ana Juncos elaborates in depth on the 
notion of ‘principled pragmatism’ – as enshrined in the EU Global Strategy – and 
its usefulness in fostering resilience in the Western Balkans at state and/or societal 
level. Alessandro Rotta highlights the necessity of building diverse and integrated 
societies as a prerequisite for achieving sustainable political and social development. 
In their co-authored chapter, Predrag Petrović and Florian Qehaja explore the nexus 
between  internal  and  external  drivers  of  fragility  as  exemplified  by  the  emerging 
issue of Islamic radicalisation and violent extremism, which is exacerbated by an al-
ienated and radicalised youth, returnees from Syria and/or resident foreign fighters. 
Finally, Julija Sardelić’s chapter is devoted specifically to how the Western Balkan 
countries  coped  with  the  migration  crisis  and  the  stream  of  migrants  transiting 
through the so-called ‘Balkan route’ in 2015/2016.

Last but not least, Thanos Dokos focuses on the EU and the Western Balkans as a 
single  security  space  from  the  perspective  of  fostering  resilience  and  overcoming 
common challenges. In doing so, he proposes models for how the accession process 
with the Western Balkan countries could be expedited by using the concept of dif-
ferentiated integration.

Finally, this Report reproduces also the Joint Communication released by the EEAS 
and the European Commission on 7 June 2017. As most of the contributions print-
ed  here  were  prepared  during  the  drafting  of  the  Communication  and  before  its 
release, it may prove interesting to compare the specific views presented by the au-
thors on the Western Balkan region in specific with the general approach suggested 
by the EU. 

8 

ISSReportNo.36Section 1

EXTERNAL DRIVERS

Resilience in the Western BalkansI. DEMOCRATISATION VIA EU INTEGRATION: 
FRAGILE RESILIENCE AND RESILIENT FRAGILITY

Corina Stratulat

Introduction

Reflecting on the experience of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) after the 1989 
revolutions, Ivan Krastev1 remarked that one of the capital sins committed both by 
the European Union and the region was to ‘oversell’ democracy as the best form of 
government. Not as a choice arrived at by the respective regimes after due considera-
tion but as the default option to secure peace, deliver prosperity and achieve good 
governance – all in one package. The fall of the Berlin Wall was hailed by many as 
a  vindication  of  Western  Europe’s  ‘beacon  of  democracy’:  Western  Europe  could 
now transform its Eastern vicinity in its image and convince the post-communist 
countries  to  imitate  the  democratic  institutions  and  practices  of  their  successful 
neighbours  in  the  West.  Less  than  a  decade  later,  the  challenge  of  spreading  the 
EU’s democratic model elsewhere became obvious in the uneven political and socio-
economic development of the CEE. Yet, by 2007, no fewer than ten formerly com-
munist countries had become member states, emboldening confidence in the logic 
of democracy promotion as the sole remedy for the problems experienced by poli-
ties. This idea was articulated even more assertively in the Union’s external strategy 
and in the commitment given at the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit with regard to the 
European integration of the war-torn Western Balkans. And, once again, the EU fell 
into the same trap: obsessed with the misleading notion of democracy as a ‘silver 
bullet’ and at the same time confronted with an ubiquitous crisis of representative 
institutions, the EU enabled the resilience of a failed status quo and sustained the 
fragility of the mechanisms of change and reform in the region.

The democratisation of the Balkans: a driver of resilience?

It may well be that problems of the kind that plague the Western Balkans, like cor-
ruption, state failure and the integration of minorities, can be better dealt with in a 
democratic environment, but the argument that the introduction of elections and 
the adoption of liberal constitutions will necessarily address such difficulties does 
not hold water. While the decade-long efforts to democratise the Western Balkans 
have seen peace take hold in the region, they have failed to resolve the consequences 

1.  Ivan Krastev, ‘Democracy as self-correction’, Transatlantic Academy Paper Studies no. 1, 2012, pp. 7-8, 11-12. 

11 

Resilience in the Western Balkansof  the  breakup  of  Yugoslavia.  In  spite  of  the  democratic  agenda  for  the  Western 
Balkans and in the absence of a pan-Balkan reconciliation process, enduring lega-
cies  such  as  open  disputes  over  statehood  (Serbia-Kosovo)  or  borders  (Kosovo-
Montenegro)  and  ethnic,  social  and  religious  conflicts  (Bosnia  and  Herzegovina, 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), continue to cast a cloud over the pros-
pects of stability in the region and obstruct these countries’ ability to draw nearer 
to the Union.

Likewise,  despite  the  firm  and  by  now  long-standing  emphasis  on  the  Western 
Balkan countries complying with strict democratic criteria in order to fulfil the EU’s 
membership conditionality, public sector corruption remains endemic throughout 
the region. Although corruption is not a Balkan peculiarity – EU member states are 
also confronted with the phenomenon – it is more the norm rather than the excep-
tion  in  the  region  and  this  denies  citizens  in  the  Western  Balkan  countries  what 
others would consider normal treatment in democracies, where everyone is expected 
to be equal before the law. It also means that Western Balkan political parties – oth-
erwise key markers of modern democratic government – are the least trusted insti-
tutions across the board.

In addition, the justification of the democratic model’s superiority in terms of pro-
ducing economic growth or prosperity is also backfiring. Since 2008, the economic 
woes  of  the  Western  Balkan  countries  have  been  compounded  by  the  cold  winds 
blowing from the Union – the region’s main trading and investment partner: as the 
EU’s business and banking activity in the Western Balkans contracted, the region saw 
a steep rise in (youth) unemployment and state debt.2 Unable to generate growth on 
their own and faced with a rapidly ageing population, the Western Balkan countries 
have been helplessly gazing into a future of relentless socio-economic deprivation.

Little surprise, then, that the majority of the region’s better-educated young people 
emigrate to affluent countries in north-west Europe, while Western Balkan govern-
ments invite new business opportunities (accompanied by possibly unwanted po-
litical influence) from the likes of Russia, China, Turkey and the Gulf States. The 
fact that Western Balkan elites look eastward might be motivated by pragmatism 
rather than a search for alternatives to the EU but their wandering eye is a powerful 
reminder that the ‘job is not done’ in the Western Balkans. Meanwhile external ac-
tors will brazenly take advantage of the Union’s wavering commitment towards the 
region in order to score points in the overall tug of war with the West.

Overall, the Western Balkans have indeed become more resilient in the face of dis-
ruptive  events  or  violence.  But  political  and  economic  problems  have  turned  out 
to be equally resilient, and the ability of the EU’s democratic agenda for the region 
to fulfil dreams of prosperity, security or responsible government has revealed its 
limits. If anything, the utopian assumption that democracy is a panacea that will 

2.  See, for example, www.tradingeconomics.com and Dušan Reljić, ‘Western Balkans’ EU path: political and eco-

nomic deadlocks’, European Western Balkans, 16 February 2016. 

12 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36solve all political, economic and social ills has inflated the public’s expectations and 
is now breeding frustration with national governments and the EU integration pro-
cess throughout the Western Balkans. For that reason, the legitimacy of democracy 
should be seen to derive not from its capacity to offer citizens instant gratification 
of their desires but rather from its ability to grant voters the satisfaction of having 
the right to do something about their discontent; for example, throw governments 
out of office, change the course of policies, and rectify mistakes. It is this self-correc-
tive quality, above all, that gives democracy the upper hand.

Or a fragile strategy?

But here is the catch: the advantage that democracy has over other forms of govern-
ment by being capable of adjusting to the demands of dissatisfied citizens has also 
become increasingly disputed in practice, across Europe and beyond. Thus, the dif-
ficulty that the EU encounters in the Western Balkans, challenging both its power 
of attraction and ability to transform societies, is not only the conceptual fallacy 
regarding the real advantage of democracy but, more alarmingly, the widening gap 
between  the  democratic  ideal  and  praxis.  In  this  sense,  the  drivers  of  fragility  in 
the Western Balkan democracies have as much to do with the cynical ploys of local 
political elites (which rule unchallenged) as with the failure of the European model 
of representative democracy (which stems from a lack of meaningful policy choice). 

No political alternative

If Western Balkan politicians seem to be ‘faking’ democracy in their countries it is 
because they can do so with impunity. To some extent, this was made possible by the 
context of state-building and conflict, which allowed politicians in the region to rely 
on nationalist mobilisation and war economies to establish themselves institution-
ally and financially: concentrating rather than sharing power, fusing economic and 
political clout in the process of privatisation, and adapting Yugoslav-era traditions 
of clientelism and clan politics to the new reality. Neither the adoption of demo-
cratic constitutions, nor the EU’s democratic conditionality, managed to avoid the 
perpetuation of informal power structures, state capture and patronage that con-
tinue to thwart the region’s democratic consolidation.

In fact, the rise of strong Balkan rulers, such as Nikola Gruevski (the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia), Milorad Dodik (Republika Srpska, Bosnia-Herzegovina), 
Milo Đukanović (Montenegro), and Aleksandar Vučić (Serbia), and of their party 
machines, happened under the EU’s watch and often with its support and tacit con-
sent. These autocratically-minded leaders – all, obviously, self-proclaimed pro-Euro-
pean democrats – have been able to stay unrivalled in their domestic political arena 
because there is no democratic acquis to bring to bear on power monopolies, party 
organisation  and  competition  or  informal  practices.  Moreover,  the  EU  has  been 

13 

Resilience in the Western Balkanswilling to tolerate or turn a blind eye to Balkan politicians who inter alia shy away 
from the EU reform agenda, control the media or rig elections so long as they deliver 
on issues that have high priority for the member states, like closing borders to refu-
gees, radicalisation and terrorism or regional stability. By now, there is too much at 
stake for these politicians in terms of office spoils on the one hand or legal charges 
on the other to expect that they will loosen their grip on power. Yet, without de facto 
alternation of competing political parties in government and/or in the absence of 
viable opposition forces (as has already been seen with the rise of Viktor Orbán in 
Hungary), the worrisome degree of personal rule evident in these countries casts the 
value of elections into doubt and amounts to a key driver of democratic fragility in 
the Western Balkans. 

No alternative policy

At the same time, the strong dose of technocratic thinking that underpins the EU’s 
democracy promotion through integration in the Western Balkans is a second main 
factor of fragility. Law-making in the region continues to sidestep policy delibera-
tion and translates into the mere adoption and implementation of EU-compatible 
standards. Decision-making is conducted outside electoral politics and tied to EU 
demands and conditions, while popular opinion is ignored. As such, the Western 
Balkan polities become democracies without choices,3 in which elites cite external 
pressure (like the EU, courts or media) to evade their campaign promises and gov-
erning responsibility. This discredits representative institutions and the separation 
of state powers in the eyes of the people, which can paradoxically feed the public 
perception that in order to hold someone accountable, voters must first give that 
person full control. In part, this could provide a justification for the popularity of 
the region’s strong leaders. The fact that political parties’ capacity to offer meaning-
ful policy alternatives has been severely curtailed by the EU accession process can 
therefore go some way towards explaining the regional appeal of identity politics.

The situation is of course little different in other EU democracies, where the win-
ter of public discontent with the de-nationalisation of decision-making is cooling 
popular engagement with conventional politics and threatening to follow up with 
a patriotic spring in which the illiberal buds of, say, Trump or Le Pen today, could 
blossom in the future.

The way ahead

It is clear that such daunting regional and country-specific challenges in the Balkans, 
coupled with anxieties related to the EU’s own internal economic, political and in-
stitutional crises, have gradually shifted the concern of European capitals from how 

3.  Ivan Krastev, ‘The Balkans: democracy without choices’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 39-53.

14 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36the Western Balkan countries could be ‘transformed’ into member states to how the 
region itself might change (i.e. negatively impact on) the EU. From this new angle, 
the member states’ appetite for expansion towards the Balkans has begun to wane. 
But this broader trend of looking at interdependence as a source of insecurity could 
spell disaster for the European project, which is undoubtedly predicated on the no-
tion of benevolent cooperation. The best response to the fact that in strategic, po-
litical and economic terms the EU and the Balkans face common sources of fragility 
and share an interest in building resilience is not retreat but further engagement 
and joint action.

Current geopolitical complexities call on the EU to consolidate its political space, 
which comprises the Balkans. The recent migration/refugee crisis underscores this 
point. To this end, sustained efforts on the part of the EU to empower the Balkan 
societies  through  smart,  inclusive  and  probably  expensive  policies  are  required. 
Current proposals recommend the opening of European Structural Funds to the 
Balkan countries (such as to support infrastructural projects); extending the use of 
the EU’s financial stability mechanisms to the region or enabling circular migration 
and access to the EU labour market as a preventive measure against irregular migra-
tion; and deepening integration in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) for more effec-
tive joint action in relation to migration, the fight against corruption or organised 
crime. Others suggest that a more fundamental rethink of the model of representa-
tive democracy that the EU operates at home and exports abroad is also necessary.4 
Thus, there is no shortage of ideas for the way forward. What is lacking is vision and 
political courage. The worst that can happen now is to pretend that the EU can af-
ford to go on keeping the Balkans at arm’s length indefinitely.

4.  See Corina Stratulat, ‘The enemy within: are modern European democracies afraid of introspection?’, EPC Policy 
Brief, European Policy Centre, Brussels, October 2016.  See also Peter Mair, ‘Polity-scepticism, party failings, and 
the challenge to European democracy’, Uhlenbeck Lecture 24, Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the 
Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS), Wassenaar, 9 June 2006.

15 

Resilience in the Western BalkansResilience in the Western BalkansII. ENLARGEMENT: WHAT ROLE FOR RESILIENCE?

Rosa Balfour

Introduction

The Western Balkans has shown considerable resilience over the past two decades. 
Societies,  while  grappling  with  the  unfinished  business  of  state  dissolution  and 
conflict,  have  also  lived  through  a  massive  economic  and  financial  crisis  and  are 
currently enduring the consequences of the dwindling interest in their integration 
into the European Union. Western Balkan elites have also been resilient. Many of 
the leaders today in power have managed to morph from warmongers and/or their 
henchmen into accepted elites, playing two-level games with Brussels while pursu-
ing authoritarian policies at home to consolidate their hold on power. Clearly what  
needs to be seen is more transformation to ensure the resilience of democratic val-
ues and institutions in the Balkans.

The  EU  is  a  driver  of  both  fragility  and  resilience  in  the  Western  Balkans,  where 
one is the obverse of the other. This contribution will ask whether and how the no-
tion of ‘resilience’ as it is emerging in the context of the implementation of the EU 
Global Strategy can be of use to the region. The main argument is that the key fac-
tor ensuring the resilience of the Western Balkans is the EU accession process, with 
its emphasis on the democratic transformation of the region’s states and societies, 
providing that transformation is not superficial. 

Addressing  the  ‘resilience’  of  the  Western  Balkans,  in  other  words,  would  require 
reviewing the politics and credibility of the current accession process in consolidat-
ing the strategic aims of enlargement in the field. Deviating from that track would 
be in itself a driver of fragility.

The  concept  of  ‘resilience’  appears  to  be  of  limited  relevance  to  existing  policies 
towards the Western Balkans. It can be useful in the context of conflict resolution, 
peacebuilding or reconciliation initiatives, such as to manage the details of the im-
plementation  of  the  Belgrade-Pristina  agreement  or  to  construct  an  approach  to 
stabilise  and  democratise  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia  (fYROM). 
Drawing on peace-building methodologies, ‘resilience’ can be factored in to ensure 
the sustainability and ownership of efforts made to promote democracy and good 
governance in the Western Balkans. 

17 

Resilience in the Western BalkansConversely,  introducing  the  notion  of  ‘resilience’  to  a  region  which  in  2003  was 
promised  a  prospect  of  accession  could  have  significant  political  costs  if  it  sends 
yet more ambiguous messages about the EU’s commitment towards enlargement. 

Drivers of fragility

Recent events, from the ‘train episode’ in January (when troops were deployed to 
block a train painted in Serbia’s national colours and bearing nationalist slogans 
from entering Kosovo) to the storming of the parliament in Skopje in April 2017, 
suggest that without that political commitment from the international communi-
ty, the fragile stability achieved since the end of the 1990s conflicts is being eroded. 
Fragility is thus driven by external factors as much as resilience is. The EU’s lacklus-
tre engagement is a key driver of fragility; conversely, other external actors (Russia, 
Turkey, the Gulf States) have stepped up their involvement in the region, contribut-
ing to its destabilisation.

Europe has exercised its power by stealth, distracted by its own internal problems, 
and with its democratic credibility seriously undermined by its own internal fail-
ings, conspicuously in some of the countries that have most recently joined the EU. 
Even if the accession process has kept chugging along, and EU aid has actually in-
creased somewhat, political commitment has been waning since the Commission 
President’s infamous and unnecessary statement (of the obvious) that enlargement 
would not take place during the legislature of 2014-2019. 

But trying to keep the Balkans interested in the EU without a strong political back-
ing  has  undermined  the  strength  of  the  accession  pull:  the  correlation  between 
moving  forward  on  negotiation  talks  and  democratic  reform  at  home  has  not 
been forthcoming. Several countries, Serbia in particular, have regressed from the 
Copenhagen democratic criteria for accession while progressing in negotiations.1

Other external actors too are contributing to fragility. The new Administration in 
the US has so far shown no interest in the Balkans, and its position on Europe has 
oscillated from contempt for the EU to an assertive demand that it contribute more 
decisively to regional security – which implicitly can be interpreted as a loss of com-
mitment towards the Western Balkans. 

Other actors are increasingly visible in the region – primarily Russia, Turkey and 
the Gulf States – seemingly exploiting the vacuum created by the absenteeism of 
European political heavyweights to sow the seeds of disorder, with Russia in par-
ticular reviving Balkan ethnic tensions to pursue its goal of undermining the EU 
and its power of attraction. The EU has failed not only to beef up the strength of its 

1.  Beata Huszka, ‘Human Rights on the losing end of EU enlargement: the case of Serbia’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, forthcoming 2017; Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, ‘The Crisis of Democracy in the Western 
Balkans. Authoritarianism and EU Stabilitocracy’, BiEPAG Policy Paper, March 2017.

18 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36own pull and model; it has also avoided responding to the propaganda and public 
diplomacy  that  Russia  has  been  able  to  mobilise  in  the  region  with  considerable 
success. The new strategic communications department of the European External 
Action  Service  (EEAS)  does  not  have  the  mandate  to  design  counter-propaganda 
initiatives in the Balkans, for instance, and general communication about the EU’s 
activities abroad remains notoriously poor (although there are now moves to enable 
EU Delegations abroad to remedy this situation).

Even if the Kremlin has so far failed to make societies there attracted to the Russian 
model, the growing evidence of disruptive interference in Montenegro, Serbia and 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia finally put the Western Balkans on the 
map of EU diplomacy, as attested by the March European Council conclusions is-
sued after a trip around the region by HR/VP Federica Mogherini. The decline of 
Europe’s standing in the region is evinced by the failure of the brief diplomatic visits 
of Spring 2017 to solve any of the outstanding issues – the political crisis in Skopje, 
Serbia’s Russian drift, and the steady decline of democratic standards. Balkan poli-
ticians continue to use Russia as a playing card in their relations with Brussels to 
extort support and concessions and/or raise the spectres of Greater Albania or inter-
ethnic conflict to get international attention.

This is reflected in the growing divergence between the EU and the Western Balkans 
on aligning to EU foreign policy preferences, including adapting to the EU Global 
Strategy,  as  set  out  in  accession  chapters  30  on  External  Relations  and  31  on 
Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy,  which  includes  legally  binding  initiatives 
such as sanctions. Serbia in particular has avoided following the EU line on issues 
of  relevance  to  Russia,  but  also  China,  Bosnia-Herzegovina  and  other  countries.2 
Beyond convergence on foreign policy, the regional cooperation advocated by the 
EU through its Stabilisation and Association Process has been jeopardised by the 
souring of bilateral disputes and politicians walking away from commitments made 
towards reconciliation. 

The ease with which external actors have managed to interfere in Balkan politics is 
striking when looking at their material relationships with the region. In real eco-
nomic terms, Russia in particular is punching well above its weight. Even if it may 
be  pursuing  strategic  investments  in  the  media  to  push  through  its  propaganda 
machine, foreign direct investment (FDI)  from Russia to the region represents only 
6.6% of total FDI, while Turkey accounts for only 2.9%. The lion’s share of invest-
ments to the Western Balkans is from the EU. Similarly, three quarters of the re-
gion’s share of exports is with the EU.3 The EU is not matching its investment and 

2.  ‘Serbia’s alignment with EU foreign policy declarations continues to decrease’, European Western Balkans, 9 Feb-
ruary  2017.  Available  at:  https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/02/09/serbias-alignment-with-eu-for-
eign-policy-declarations-continues-to-decrease/. Strictly speaking, so far only Montenegro has opened chapters 
30 and 31.

3.  FDI data is from the European Bank for Development and Reconstruction, 2014; trade data is from the Euro-

pean Commission, 2016.

19 

Resilience in the Western Balkanspower by stealth with political action, proactive presence, commitment, public di-
plomacy, and strategic communication to counter anti-Europe propaganda. 

Drivers of resilience

It is beyond doubt that large-scale international involvement has underpinned the 
stabilisation of the Western Balkans since the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. 
Most local and regional efforts towards stabilisation, improved relations between 
countries and internal political reform have been incentivised by the prospect of in-
tegration into the EU and, for some countries, into NATO. Recent setbacks should 
not cast a shadow over the path towards pacification and democratic change em-
barked upon close to a decade ago: it was bearing some fruit, even if results were still 
unsatisfactory  and/or  in  need  of  consolidation.  Despite  growing  disillusionment 
and  misplaced  expectations  especially  in  the  countries  furthest  away  from  acces-
sion, only 20% of Balkan citizens think EU membership is a bad thing.4

The overwhelming influence of the EU over the region can be counter-intuitively 
inferred  from  the  willingness  displayed  by  the  countries  in  the  region  to  line  up 
towards supporting efforts in managing the refugee influx through the Balkans in 
2015-16, when governments demonstrated the ability to converge and respond to 
the requests of EU member states. Yet, in doing so, the governments in the region 
learned a lesson about the current political situation in the EU: good relations may 
be conditional on the delivery of key EU needs, perhaps more so than on meeting 
the transformation requirements that accession entails. 

The  external  factor  thus  continues  to  play  a  central  role  in  the  resilience  of  the 
Western Balkans, for good and for bad: it has prevented a descent into deeper desta-
bilisation but it has led to the support – directly or implicitly – of governing elites 
which are prone to undermine democratic change in favour of bolstering their own 
resilience. Hence, even if it is clearly in the interest of local actors to work towards 
the self-sustainability of the region, responsibility for its resilience still falls squarely 
on the engagement of external actors, first and foremost the EU. Failing that, there 
is a real danger that local politics will quickly revert to old habits of mutual provoca-
tion, reopening old wounds and polarising communities – all for the sake of prop-
ping up the power base and bargaining capacity of political entrepreneurs. 

The way ahead

Can the concept of resilience address this malaise? There could be a powerful argu-
ment in favour of devising policies which aim to make the region less exposed to 
external drivers of fragility. There also could be a strong argument in favour of being 

4.  Regional Cooperation Council Secretariat, ‘Balkan Barometer; Public Opinion Survey, ‘Analytical Report, Sara-
jevo’, September 2016. On the flip side, only 38% of Western Balkan citizens think the EU is a ‘good thing’.

20 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36realistic about the prospect that the EU, in its present state, will be opening its doors 
to new members any time soon: building state and societal resilience could be the 
way to make the countries of the region more philosophical about their chances of 
eventually getting in – that is if the EU after Brexit and the resurgence of nationalist 
politics remains the organisation known so far. 

But it is questionable whether the region and its governments, after over a decade of 
focus on EU accession, encircled by the EU, and without any palatable alternative to 
improving their own economic predicament, will embrace such realism and adapt 
to the new conditions. Indeed, resorting to the old opportunistic tactics of causing 
trouble to get international attention seems likely to be far more successful a strat-
egy than building a resilience which has few chances of yielding concrete benefits to 
the region.

Even if the ultimate goal were to improve regional resilience to withstand the crises 
and uncertainties currently besetting the EU, this needs to be framed within the ex-
isting strategy of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and practices regardless 
of what institutional architecture may emerge in the future. 

In parallel to making this process more credible and better tailored to addressing 
evolving politics in the region, it is beyond doubt that the EU’s overall engagement 
needs to be far more dynamic, bottom-up and, generally, sustained. In the field of 
the  still  elusive  goals  of  reconciliation  and  peace-building,  the  diplomatic  actors 
can  use  the  concept  of  ‘resilience’  to  improve  the  implementation  of  agreements 
(whether  already  reached  or  yet  to  be  reached)  to  ensure  local  sustainability  and 
ownership of conflict management efforts. 

But the cornerstone of EU policy towards the Western Balkans is ‘integration’, which 
means it cannot just apply a traditional foreign policy approach in its dealings with 
the region. This focus on integration ought to lead to the expansion of the range 
of actors engaged in EU-Balkan activities: not just institutional representatives, but 
also  European  civil  society  organisations,  political  parties,  local,  national  and  re-
gional institutions, and also political heavyweights in the member states, including 
those who have lost interest in the region, could be mobilised for the purpose of 
establishing links between present and future EU members. If this can be framed as 
a strategy for promoting resilience, so be it; providing the overall political message 
remains tied to honouring commitments made.

21 

Resilience in the Western BalkansResilience in the Western BalkansIII. THE BERLIN PROCESS: RESILIENCE 
IN THE EU WAITING ROOM

Tobias Flessenkemper

In light of the internal and external challenges that the region is facing, the European Council 
discussed the fragile situation in the Western Balkans’1 

Introduction

The Balkans and the development of European Union foreign and security policy 
are  deeply  interlinked.  Confronted  with  the  imminent  collapse  of  Yugoslavia  in 
June 1991, Luxembourg’s then foreign minister and EU Council President, Jacques 
Poos, declared: ‘This is the hour of Europe. It is not the hour of the Americans’. Ever 
since, the EU has oscillated between phases of common, even integrated, resolve to 
find answers to the challenges posed by the region, and intergovernmental, member 
state-driven  approaches  to  address  the  Balkans.  The  ‘Berlin  Process’  is  the  latest 
incarnation of  such a member state-driven, intergovernmental approach, whereby 
Germany, in contrast to the 1990s, has come to openly play a pivotal leadership role. 

The conflicts in the region during the 1990s and the failure of the EU member states 
to prevent war, mass expulsion and genocide, as well as the fallout of handling the 
post-conflict  reconstruction,  have  for  long  shaped  the  European  foreign  policy 
discourse  and  action.  The  combination  of  the  use  of  instruments  laid  out  in  the 
European Security Strategy (ESS) presented by Javier Solana in 2003, and operation-
al policies such as the Security Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004) based 
on  the  Thessaloniki  agenda  for  the  eventual  integration  of  the  Western  Balkans 
into the Union, attested to the EU’s common resolve to overcome the difficulties 
of the past. The key options were: to adapt the methodology of the 2004 enlarge-
ment round, with a focus on post-conflict stabilisation and regional cooperation 
and including a central role for the European Commission, and on the other hand 
the mobilisation of member states’ resources and engagement through CFSP and 
CSDP instruments. Yet, and despite the often declared importance of the region, 
the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki on 21 June 2003 was – a fact prob-
ably noticed by few outside the region – the last meeting of its kind. 

Since then several high-level member state initiatives have steadily evolved alongside 
European external action in the Western Balkans. This creeping ‘nationalisation’ of 

1.  Conclusions by the President of the European Council, 9 March 2017, point 13.

23 

Resilience in the Western Balkansthe enlargement process weakened the role of the European Commission.2 The last 
example of the EU Presidency taking an active role in the Western Balkans dates back 
to the year 2009. The Swedish Council Presidency, led by Foreign Minister Carl Bildt 
and Enlargement Commissioner Oliver Rehn, with the support of the US, tried to 
negotiate a new constitutional settlement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite the 
Lisbon Treaty coming into force in 2010 and the creation of the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) the trend towards member states driving the Western Balkans 
policy agenda did not stop but notably gained further momentum. The push for the 
Kosovo-Serbia ‘normalisation process’ came from member states, not from the new-
ly-established  EEAS.  Although  then  High  Representative  for  Foreign  Affairs  and 
Security Policy and Commission Vice-President Catherine Ashton assumed her role 
and advanced the normalisation agenda, she did not strive to keep the Commission 
as a central player involved in the region. Her mediation reached a peak with the 
April 2013 agreement between Kosovo and Serbia in the wake of Croatia’s EU acces-
sion on 1 July 2013. 

The Berlin Process

The tenth anniversary of the Thessaloniki Declaration coincided with Croatia’s ac-
cession  to  EU  membership.  However  the  success  of  the  Thessaloniki  agenda  was 
only  timidly  celebrated  against  the  background  of  the  exploding  Greek  debt  cri-
sis. Coinciding with the end of the institutional cycle and the outbreak of war in 
Ukraine in summer 2014, member state activism came to play a dominant role in 
the relations with the six remaining non-EU Western Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Serbia). With Germany in the lead, supported by Austria, France and Italy, and EU 
regional newcomers Slovenia and Croatia, the Berlin Process became the most vis-
ible tool for interaction with the Western Balkans. In the wake of the 100th anniver-
sary of the outbreak of the First World War and the events in Sarajevo in 1914, the 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel initiated intergovernmental meetings with the 
aim to improve regional cooperation. The conference series was originally envisaged 
to end in 2018 on the occasion of the centenary of the end of the First World War. 
A period of four years –  almost exactly the duration of the cataclysmic European 
war a hundred years earlier – was  the timeframe indicated by the Chancellor ‘during 
which we will further our endeavours to make additional real progress in the reform 
process, in resolving outstanding bilateral and internal issues, and in achieving rec-
onciliation within and between the societies in the region.’3

With its annual summits the process has established itself as a new framework to 
advance regional cooperation, connectivity, and address questions not covered by 

2.  See Christophe Hillion, ‘The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy’, Swedish Institute for Euro-

pean Policy Studies, Report no. 6, Stockholm, 2010. 

3.  See Final Declaration by the Chair of the Conference on the Western Balkans, Berlin, 28 August 2014. Available 
at: https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2014/2014-08-28-balkan.html. 

24 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36EU accession directly, such as youth cooperation, ‘reconciliation’ and bilateral dis-
putes. The method is entirely intergovernmental. So far, four summits have been 
held in Berlin (2014), Vienna (2015), Paris (2016) and Trieste (2017). The summits 
are  held at the level of heads of state  or  government, while foreign affairs minis-
ters and ministers responsible for the economy hold parallel meetings. No Berlin 
Process secretariat or permanent structure has been established. While the initiative 
remains intergovernmental, other actors such as civil society and business groups 
have come to play a limited role. The input of the EU High Representative Federica 
Mogherini and Commissioner Johannes Hahn is also noteworthy, but the European 
Commission only provides support to the process in the area related to trans-Euro-
pean networks – the so-called connectivity agenda. Overall the process relies on the 
benevolent commitment of Chancellor Merkel as initiator, the cooperation of the 
six Western Balkan countries and the willingness of the EU member state hosting 
the annual meetings. 

However the drivers of fragility in the region which formed the basis and background 
of the first meeting in Berlin in August 2014 remain unaddressed so far: the region 
suffers from widespread economic stagnation; social and market-oriented reforms 
are minimalist at best; convergence with central Europe has become elusive and EU 
accession seems more like an uncertain option than an assured prospect. The (re-)
emergence of alternative narratives to EU integration, particularly when pushed by 
Russia and Turkey, risks exacerbating these drivers of fragility. Small wonder that in 
such an adverse environment, the Berlin Process itself is regarded as one of the rare 
contributors to resilience.

Drivers of fragility

In 2014, the building blocks of a decade of EU-Western Balkan policy were no long-
er  solid  enough  to  drive  the  enlargement  process  forward.  Croatia’s  accession  in 
2013 did not result in a fresh push and resolve to move ahead with the remaining 
six countries who remained entangled in structural difficulties which had been ex-
acerbated  by  the  economic  crisis.  The  previously  powerful  instruments  of  CFSP, 
such as the EU Special Representatives, lacked authority and support and the CSDP 
missions were either in the process of being wound down or downsizing. Neither 
the outgoing Commission headed by Manuel Barroso nor the High Representative 
Catherine Ashton were preparing any new initiative.4 The expectations were set for 
a  continuation  of  the  agreed  formulas,  even  if  these  were  becoming  less  and  less 
convincing. The outbreak of protests against the governing ethno-national elites in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 2014, amidst public fury over unemployment and 
rampant corruption, showed that the EU would face increasing internal fragility in 

4.  The initiative led by Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Füle to prioritise the work on chapters 23 and 24 of the 
acquis can be considered as a Community-led drive to strengthen resilience. See European Commission, ‘Com-
munication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Enlargement strategy and main 
challenges 2010-2011’, COM(2010) 660, Brussels, 9 November 2010.

25 

Resilience in the Western Balkansthe region if it pursued a policy of ‘more of the same’. The protests in spring 2014 
raised awareness about the difficulties of a socio-economic integration model that 
on the one hand helped to shore up the dominance of political elites, while on the 
other  hand  failing  to  lift  the  majority  of  the  population  out  of  poverty,  with  no 
tangible  prospect  of  a  ‘highly  competitive  social  market  economy,  aiming  at  full 
employment and social progress’ (article 3.3 TEU) in sight.

The  outbreak  of  the  war  in  Ukraine,  and  in  particular  the  illegal  annexation  of 
Crimea by the Russian Federation on 18 March 2014, further heightened interna-
tional  awareness  of  the  violent  tensions  in  the  region  and  the  threat  these  posed 
to  regional  stability.  Political  and  social  fragility  and  externally-driven  instability 
in the Western Balkans became a key concern in many capitals. At the same time 
as tensions in the Western Balkans attracted more attention, the politicisation of 
enlargement within the EU also gained momentum. In his European People´s Party 
(EPP) ‘Spitzenkandidat’ manifesto Jean-Claude Juncker announced that ‘no further 
enlargement will take place over the next five years.’5 After the European elections 
and his own nomination by the European Council, Juncker reconfirmed his position 
during his investiture speech in the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 15 July 
2014. The uncertainty of the enlargement process became policy in the European 
institutions, while on the very same date German Chancellor Angela Merkel partici-
pated in the Brdo summit in Dubrovnik (Croatia) where she announced the meet-
ing in Berlin that would launch the Berlin Process. 

The  protests  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  in  2014  exposed  in  a  single  country  key 
drivers of fragility which are prevalent to various degrees in all six Western Balkan 
countries and can be grouped in three interlinking categories: (i) inconclusive state-
building, in particular in Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, compounded all over the region by (ii) incomplete 
and  increasingly  uncertain  democratic  and  socio-economic  transition  processes, 
with growing marginalisation of large parts of the population, in particular young 
people and women and (iii) in lieu of a fully predictable EU perspective, a strained 
atmosphere and ‘enlargement fatigue’ in Europe where the ‘global and European 
security environment has changed dramatically in recent years’ (May 2015 Council 
conclusions  on  CSDP).  Responses  to  those  drivers  of  fragility  are  framed  in  the 
Berlin  Process  in  terms  of:  addressing  bilateral  issues;  promoting  economic  con-
nectivity and cross-border cooperation; and thirdly through the high-level meetings 
which represent an opportunity to demonstrate EU leaders’ peer recognition of the 
Western  Balkan  politicians,  including  through  the  symbolism  of  ‘family  photos’ 
taken at these events, to manifest the collective drive for integration of the region 
into the EU mainstream.

Additionally, the EU has been struggling to cope with critical internal developments 
and pressures since 2014, principally the migration and border crisis in 2015/16, 

5.  Jean-Claude Juncker, ‘My priorities – A pause for enlargement’. Available at: http://juncker.epp.eu/my-priorities 

26 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36and Britain’s decision to leave the Union following its referendum on EU member-
ship on 23 June 2016. At the same time the EU and eurozone countries are only 
slowly managing to overcome the effects of the financial crisis that erupted in 2007-
2008 and hence, preoccupied with their own economic difficulties, could not sup-
port recovery in the Western Balkans. Yet, probably an even greater risk stems from 
the perception that the EU`s core of normative values is eroding. Western Balkan 
populations  and  political  elites  have  closely  observed  the  weakening  of  democra-
cy, rule of law, human and fundamental rights inside EU member states and the 
lack  of  resolve  in  addressing  the  dramatic  rollback  of  democracy  in  Turkey  after 
the attempted coup of July 2016. Moreover, the conduct of the US administration 
of Donald Trump has dented the credibility of the shared ‘liberal Western model’, 
on  which  US  support  for  the  EU  perspective  of  the  region  was  based.  Those  un-
checked drivers of ‘normative fragility’ necessarily undercut the very basis on which 
resilience needs to grow, according to the EEAS/Commission Joint Communication 
on Resilience of June 2017. In recent debates, concern has been expressed that the 
countries in the region are turning into ‘stabilitocracies’, i.e. semi-authoritarian re-
gimes managing and orchestrating internal fragility and external instability to se-
cure their rule as guarantors of stability vis-à-vis the EU.6 These questions, however, 
are beyond the limited agenda of the Berlin Process. 

Drivers of resilience

The Berlin Process is based on three main pillars: (i) regional political cooperation 
and consolidation, including bilateral dispute resolution; (ii) improved economic 
cooperation,  with  a  particular  emphasis  on  connectivity  in  the  energy,  transport 
and digital domains; (iii) people-to-people relations with a focus on young people 
and cooperation with civil society. So far, the process, despite its limitations, has 
managed to keep the key member states focused on the region and fostered their 
cooperation  against  the  backdrop  of  politically  weakened  European  institutions. 
To a certain degree the new ‘minilateral’ intergovernmentalism has managed not 
to deviate too much from the main thrust of European policy. Member state initia-
tives  helped  to  build  bridges  when  the  European  conditionality  instruments  had 
proved  to  be  ineffective.  In  late  2014,  for  instance,  framed  by  the  Berlin  Process 
cooperation,  a  British-German  initiative  deferred    the  political  conditionality  for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), thus allowing the BiH to enter into a contractual 
relationship  with  the  EU  and  unblocking  the  Bosnian-EU  integration  stalemate. 
The work on addressing bilateral issues between the Western Balkan countries re-
sulted in a declaration of governments which agreed ‘that they will not block, or en-
courage others to block, the progress of neighbours on their respective EU paths.’7 

6.  Marko Kmezić and Florian Bieber (eds.), ‘The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans. An Anatomy of Sta-

bilitocracy and the Limits of EU Democracy Promotion’, BiEPAG Policy Study, March 2017. 

7.  Final Declaration by the Chair of the Vienna Western Balkans Summit, 27 August 2015, Addendum, Annex 3, 
Regional Cooperation and the Solution of BIlateral Disputes, 27 August 2015. Available at: https://www.bmeia.
gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Addendum_Western_Balkans_Summit.pdf.  

27 

Resilience in the Western BalkansAlso  in  Vienna  in  2015,  the  focus  on  civil  society  managed  to  re-instill  a  certain 
degree of confidence in the European project against the backdrop of wide-reaching 
scepticism. A particular achievement of the Berlin Process had been the signing of 
the statute of the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO) in Paris in July 2016. 
This intergovernmental format is not however unanimously perceived in the EU as 
an entirely positive development. The approach is in some ways reminiscent of the 
‘Contact  Group’,  the  coordination  forum  on  the  Balkans  led  by  leading  Western 
powers  during  the  1990s,  albeit  fully  Europeanised.  The  Berlin  Process  excludes 
other EU member states with a keen interest and track record of engagement in the 
Western Balkans, such as the immediate neighbours Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria 
and Greece, but also others such as for example the Netherlands and Sweden, both 
of which countries  have a history of long-standing engagement in the region. As 
a process taking place outside the EU framework it is hardly possible for them to 
join in, thereby creating an ‘insiders and outsiders’ situation. A handful of member 
states, and among them particularly Germany, is now likely to exert a key influence 
on how EU institutions deploy their efforts within the accession process. The dif-
ficulties of this approach become even more palpable as the UK will host the next 
summit of the Berlin Process in 2018 at a time when Brexit negotiations will prob-
ably have entered a critical phase. 

Furthermore,  although  an  economic  recovery  is  taking  place  across  the  region, 
growth rates appear to have no significant impact on creating employment. Hence 
the Berlin Process agenda of providing incentives to governments in the region to 
accelerate infrastructure projects in the area of connectivity. It is hoped that such 
initiatives will lead to job creation and brighter personal and economic prospects. 
However, the speed  and efficiency with which these initiatives are put in place will 
inevitably be measured against Beijing’s commitment to its Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) with some €10 billion worth of investments in sixteen countries of Central, 
Eastern and Southern Europe (16+1). Clearly therefore, the single most important 
driver of resilience remains a credible EU perspective for the countries of the region. 
In this the Berlin Process has to be considered in itself as a driver of resilience: it has 
become a unique forum in which to keep the EU perspective for the region alive for 
the participating actors. 

The way ahead

The German hosts of the first meeting in August 2014 stated that the new series 
of Western Balkans conferences will lead to ‘additional real progress’ in preparing 
the countries for eventual EU membership. The extra push of the Berlin Process to 
strengthen resilience in the region is necessarily dependent of the unambiguous pull 
of a tangible EU accession perspective. This pull seems in 2017 even more elusive 
than when the Berlin Process was launched. The Commission White Paper on the 
Future of Europe of March 2017 limits expectations: ‘While no further accession to 
the EU is expected in the short term, the prospect itself is a powerful tool to project 

28 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36stability and security along our borders.’ Whether the positive effects of the acces-
sion perspective can be maintained indefinitely though is open to doubt, not least as 
the Berlin Process is politically losing clout. The original pre-Brexit idea of conclud-
ing the conference series in London in 2018 has been maintained, against the wishes 
of many of the participants and representatives of the EU institutions.  The choice 
of the Brexiting UK as a host sends an ambiguous message in itself. Is the process 
still geared towards EU membership? Has the Berlin Process become a substitute 
mechanism for European powers to engage through mini-lateralism in Balkan af-
fairs? What will be the consequences if the process is continued beyond 2018?  

While  these  questions  remain  open,  the  more  immediate  challenge  for  the  resil-
ience agenda of the European Union is to integrate the work initiated by the Berlin 
Process into the EU framework. The next institutional cycle starting in 2019 and the 
coming Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) can become key enabling drivers 
for the EU to foster sustainable resilience. However, failure to avail of this oppor-
tunity would only exacerbate already existing fragilities in the Western Balkans. So 
far, the Berlin Process has played a constructive role as an intergovernmental initia-
tive contributing to resilience by promoting regional cooperation, and bridging a 
phase of internal consolidation of the EU. During this period of uncertainty, the 
process has allowed key member states to engage and help to prepare the Western 
Balkan countries for membership in a changing Union.8 But the period up to 2025 
also risks becoming a time of continued fragility for the region if the EU accession 
process as the decisive driver of resilience stalls completely. The question is whether 
the EU institutions and member states are able to stand by the commitment made 
at the Thessaloniki European Council in 2003 and enable the Western Balkans to 
overcome fragility by acceding to resilient EU membership.  

8.  See Matteo Bonomi, ‘The Western Balkans in the European Union: Perspectives of a Region in Europe’, Istituto 
Affari Internazionali (IAI), Working Paper no. 13/2107, July 2017. Available at: http://www.iai.it/sites/default/
files/iai1713.pdf.

29 

Resilience in the Western BalkansResilience in the Western BalkansIV. THE IMPACT OF NATO

Sandro Knezović

Introduction

The conflicts that engulfed the Western Balkans in the early 1990s put the region 
in the spotlight of international attention and led to the direct involvement of the 
transatlantic  community  in  particular.  After  many  unsuccessful  attempts  at  en-
gagement by different external actors, NATO took over responsibility for ending the 
military  conflict  and  undertaking  the  peacekeeping  and  peace-building  activities 
that followed. The Alliance has conducted numerous demilitarisation programmes 
in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(fYROM)  and  Kosovo  and  deployed  military  missions  to  all  the  aforementioned 
countries, with the exception of Albania. Offering fully-fledged NATO membership 
to all countries in the region, using the conditionality mechanism during their ac-
cession processes to foster democratic transition, and providing different forms of 
assistance to this endeavour significantly contributed to the process of long-term 
consolidation  in  the  Western  Balkans.  In  other  words,  building  on  achievements 
made by peacekeeping missions by incorporating higher standards of democratic 
governance  in  the  framework  of  the  conditionality  mechanism  significantly  con-
tributed to the overall resilience of countries in the region.

NATO’s  Open  Door  Policy  resulted  in  Slovenia  joining  the  Alliance  in  2004,  fol-
lowed by Albania and Croatia in 2009 and Montenegro in 2017. The enlargement 
of the Euro-Atlantic security community to the region undoubtedly brought sta-
bility and resilience, but on the other hand also highlighted substantial loopholes 
in Western policies. Their inconsistency and inadaptability to a changing geostra-
tegic environment, as well as the lack of political determination demonstrated by 
Western countries in their approach to remaining ‘problematic’ candidates in the 
region, have opened possibilities for the (re)emergence of other geostrategic players 
(namely Russia, Turkey, the Gulf States and China) and democratic backsliding on 
the  part  of  local  political  elites.  Furthermore,  the  modest  strategic  policymaking 
capacity of the region’s aspiring EU membership candidates makes further enlarge-
ment highly unlikely in the coming decade, which will in the long term surely open 
additional space for other interested parties to exert influence.

31 

Resilience in the Western BalkansDrivers of fragility

Unlike  the  heady  days  of  the  early  2000s  when  there  were  high  levels  of  enthusi-
asm for the enlargement of the transatlantic community, there is now a visible in-
ward-looking trend at both national and international level, with states and Euro-
Atlantic institutions concentrating mostly on internal problems and challenges in 
the European vicinity. This is of course affecting NATO’s Open Door Policy in par-
ticular. The issue of enlargement is barely even mentioned in election campaigns in 
different member states, and whenever it is alluded to it is rarely evoked in a positive 
light. Political leaders are focused more on growing challenges at the national level 
while they struggle to find compromises at the intergovernmental level on appro-
priate ways of tackling threats emanating especially from the eastern and southern 
European neighbourhood. 

Unfortunately, the negative consequences are visible in the region with regard to the 
constraints on and limits of foreseeable NATO enlargement which creates a certain 
power vacuum between NATO and other emerging players. This is complicating the 
regional geostrategic landscape as well as bringing a fair amount of competition to 
the Alliance itself. 

First, Serbia is attempting to pursue a so-called ‘non-aligned security policy’, hav-
ing no intention of joining NATO in the forthcoming period and hence remaining 
open to the influences of other emerging actors. It has signed a Strategic Partnership 
Agreement and Defence Co-Operation Agreement with Russia and is continuous-
ly receiving extensive support in terms of military hardware and know-how from 
Moscow. It is also benefiting from Chinese and Gulf States’ investments in strategic 
transport infrastructure.  

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s complicated political structure has impeded NATO ac-
cession not only because of an inability to agree on reforms in order to meet criteria 
for membership, but also due to firm opposition to the idea of joining NATO by 
the ruling political elites in one of its two entities. Lack of capacity to compromise 
on strategic issues like NATO membership will continue to represent a burden for 
the  country  and  an  opportunity  for  other  rival  players  to  consolidate  their  posi-
tion. The role played by Russia in the Peace Implementation Council of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is highly illustrative in this regard. Moreover, while the growing influ-
ence of Turkey in the country is increasingly visible and has clear political ramifica-
tions, there is widespread concern about the role of the Gulf States and their contri-
bution to the spread of Salafism at the borders of the EU and NATO. 

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia met all the criteria for NATO mem-
bership  almost  a  decade  ago,  but  then  had  its  membership  bid  blocked  due  to  a 
bilateral dispute with one of the Alliance’s member states. The country has been on 
a downward democratic spiral ever since and has become increasingly open to the 
influences of other external actors in the region over the course of the last few years, 

32 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36with negative repercussions for NATO’s leverage. In the case of Kosovo, the long-
lasting status quo in the wider regional political context raises a number of concerns 
and offers limited viable options for the period to come. 

In addition to opening up space for other external actors’ influence and thus chang-
ing the geostrategic configuration of the region, the waning NATO accession per-
spective (coupled with the prolonged accession process to the EU) is also creating op-
portunities for populist elites that are once again on the rise in the Western Balkans.

At the local level, the difficulties accompanying the interminable transition process, 
coupled with deteriorating living standards and poor economic growth, have con-
tributed to the rise of populist political elites. Furthermore, a lot of current chal-
lenges  such  as  terrorism  and  the  phenomenon  of  foreign  fighters,  uncontrolled 
migration and organised crime that are threatening the wider region are actually 
leading to a backlash against the democratic reform agenda, with calls for ‘stability 
and predictability’ and growing tolerance towards less democratic and transparent 
methods of governance, thus further consolidating populist ideology and authori-
tarian politics. Additionally, unresolved national issues in countries like Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are reinvigorating the 
nationalist rhetoric of the 1990s. Clearly this is not helping the process of long-term 
consolidation that started with the EU accession process and which now appears to 
be indefinitely stalled. 

Drivers of resilience

Basic  normative  values  and  principles  of  Western  democracies  transposed  to  the 
region via the activities of deployed NATO missions were successfully incorporated 
in the conditionality mechanism for candidate states in their pre-accession phase. 
NATO’s  paramount  role  in  resilience  building  hence  continued,  being  enriched 
with different mechanisms and tools which are relevant also today.

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) has represented the cornerstone of NATO’s resil-
ience efforts for almost two decades, contributing to the long-term consolidation 
of the region. It is a programme of bilateral cooperation between individual coun-
tries from the wider Euro-Atlantic area and the Alliance, which is tailor-made for 
each partner, allowing it to select priority areas for co-operation. While it has been 
extensively used to help prepare candidate states for membership, it is important 
to emphasise that even those countries who do not intend to accede to NATO have 
benefited significantly from participating in the programme. 

Activities on offer under the PfP programme touch on virtually every field of NATO 
activity, including defence-related work, defence reform, defence policy and plan-
ning, civil-military relations, education and training, military-to-military coopera-
tion and exercises, civil emergency planning and disaster response, and cooperation 

33 

Resilience in the Western Balkanson science and environmental issues.1 In particular, participation in various NATO-
led missions substantially contributes to the interoperability of the partner states’ 
armed forces and consequently fosters the resilience of the respective states’ security 
sector in an increasingly interconnected international arena. This is actually a good 
illustration of the wide spectrum of activities NATO is undertaking in its efforts to 
foster resilience in the region and beyond. 

Taking a changing geostrategic environment which is increasingly challenging to 
NATO into account, it has to be acknowledged that the activities undertaken un-
der  the  PfP  have  nevertheless  proved  effective  and  worthwhile.  Given  broad  par-
ticipation, including of countries with no aspiration to become NATO members, 
the PfP activities have contributed to bolstering the legitimacy of the Alliance even 
in a period of geostrategic competition in the region, enhancing NATO’s profile 
as the most important long-term contributor to resilience in the Western Balkans 
and beyond.

However, while NATO conditionality represented an invaluable resilience tool for 
more  than  a  decade,  it  gradually  lost  relevance  and  has  been  replaced  by  divisive 
forces related to the ongoing geostrategic power struggle in the region. The growing 
influence of other actors in the Western Balkans is forcing the Alliance to continue 
to go through the motions of pursuing the enlargement agenda and pretend that it 
is ‘business as usual’: this is its only viable response to the assertive actions of rival 
players in this geopolitical arena. 

This  is  reflected  in  the  geostrategic  arguments  put  forward  in  support  of 
Montenegrin NATO membership, the inclusion of various additional steps in the 
accession process as well as upgraded forms of cooperation with countries that are 
still waiting for an invitation to join NATO, in particular in the case of the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. While this is obvi-
ously  not  bad  news  for  aspirant  countries  in  the  region,  it  is  obviously  an  ad hoc 
geostrategic defensive measure rather than part of a thoroughly analysed and merit-
based approach grounded on a realistic enlargement strategy for remaining difficult 
candidates in the Western Balkans. 

This clearly leads to the conclusion that it is vital for the transatlantic community 
to reengage in the region. Such reengagement should, first and foremost, be based 
on a realistic assessment of the political will for further enlargement processes on 
both sides (within NATO and within the Western Balkan region) and accordingly 
of the relevance of its main tool – the conditionality mechanism. That is of existen-
tial relevance for the legitimacy of the ‘normative power of the West’ in the region, 
which is already facing severe challenges in the altered geostrategic environment. 

1.  See: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm.

34 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36The Alliance’s commitment to the accession process of the countries in the region 
is of paramount importance not only due to the fact that it helps preserve NATO’s 
role as a normative power in the Western Balkans, but it also – along with the EU 
accession  process  –  keeps  alive  the  drivers  of  reform  processes  which  represent  a 
cornerstone of resilience in that part of Europe. 

The way ahead

The  transatlantic  community  and  the  Western  Balkans  undoubtedly  represent  a 
single  security  space,  which  is  currently  facing  serious  challenges  to  its  stability. 
Therefore,  it  seems  clear  that  the  measures  undertaken  to  build  resilience  in  the 
former will have an immediate impact on the latter and vice versa. Hence, the reaf-
firmation of the indivisibility of security in the process of formulating a new policy 
for the Western Balkans should help keep any ideas about ‘regional containment’ or 
a status quo strategy at bay.  

Resilience cannot be built, especially in a region like the Western Balkans, without 
the involvement of all relevant stakeholders in society. Not only does the institu-
tional set-up of the state need to be strengthened in order to be able to meet con-
temporary challenges, but non-state actors like civil society groups should be given 
an important role in this process. 

NATO  obviously  needs  leadership  for  this  endeavour.  A  key  role  in  the  process 
should  be  played  by  the  most  influential  member  states  and  their  institutions  in 
situations when overarching compromise on specific issues is not palpable at the in-
tergovernmental level. NATO does of course have many tools at its disposal, but this 
obviously requires strategic vision and the capacity to reach political compromise 
about the future of the Western Balkans.

Unpredictability seems to be the only predictable scenario in the period to come. 
Growing tensions at the international level and the resurgence of geopolitics and 
rival spheres of interest represent a looming challenge for the transatlantic com-
munity and NATO in particular. New assertive global players with increased de-
fence budgets – unlike the majority of EU and NATO member states – are open-
ly  challenging  the  resilience  and  functionality  of  the  entire  ‘Western  concept  of 
governance’. 

The  stability  of  neighbouring  regions  like  the  Western  Balkans,  which  requires  a 
comprehensive,  robust  and  coherent  strategy  that  combines  the  use  of  hard  and 
soft power tools, is therefore of the utmost importance.  In this context, the role 
of NATO as the strongest military alliance with a particular interest in this part of 
Europe cannot be overestimated. The fact that the transatlantic community and the 
Western Balkans actually represent the same security space raises the question of 
realistic future scenarios for difficult accession candidates and their lack of capacity 

35 

Resilience in the Western Balkansto  meet  demanding  criteria  for  membership.  It  is  essential  to  develop  alternative 
feasible options based on a clear assessment of the security implications and geo-
strategic consequences of the deficiencies and shortfalls currently affecting the en-
largement process in the Western Balkans.

36 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36V. THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES

Ivan Vejvoda

Introduction 

In terms of grand strategy, continuity has been the hallmark of US policy towards 
the Western Balkans since 1989. The White House has consistently sought to foster 
the Euro-Atlantic integration of the countries of the region – to complete the ‘un-
finished business’ (in Washington DC parlance) of ‘making Europe whole and free’ 
as President George H.W. Bush put it in a speech delivered in Mainz, West Germany, 
in May 1989. 

For  the  United  States,  the  Western  Balkans  constitute  a  part  of  core  Europe  and 
thus from Washington’s perspective a European Union and Euro-Atlantic alliance 
without them is incomplete.

As  the  crisis  that  followed  the  dissolution  of  the  former  Yugoslavia  unfolded  in 
the early 1990s and the EU and the international community became increasingly 
involved,  the  United  States  eventually  came  to  play  a  crucial  role  in  the  Western 
Balkans, culminating in a first phase with the Dayton Agreement that ended the 
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later with the NATO bombing campaign in the 
spring of 1999 that led to the Kumanovo agreement of June 1999. 

Successive White House Administrations since 1989, through the two Obama presi-
dencies from 2009 to 2017, have favoured a concerted and unified transatlantic ap-
proach  to  the  Western  Balkans.  Over  time  the  European  Union  has  assumed  the 
lead mediating role with the full backing of the United States.

There has been no serious expectation that this policy and approach would change 
under the Trump Administration in spite of much speculation in the initial days 
of  the  new administration  that a possible  deal with President Putin might entail 
a reversal of this policy. The recent visit in August of Vice-President Mike Pence to 
Montenegro, the latest member of the NATO alliance, and his reassurance that ‘the 
future of the Western Balkans is in the West’ clearly demonstrated that US policy 
towards the region has not changed. 

37 

Resilience in the Western BalkansContinuous engagement 

With the ‘return to Europe’ of post-communist countries after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall it was clear that along with the other Balkan countries (Romania and Bulgaria, 
and Greece  prior to that) the remaining  countries of the Western Balkans would 
follow the path of Euro-Atlantic integration.

With  the  implementation  of  peace  accords  and  the  gradual  stabilisation  of  the 
region the US progressively passed on the baton of engagement to the European 
Union, while remaining involved in a number of security, foreign policy and devel-
opment aid issues. Particular emphasis has been placed on the essential role played 
by NATO in the context of the engagement of the US and EU in the region.

There have of course been periods when the US has been less actively engaged in the 
region due to other geopolitical priorities. As the region progressively stabilised, the 
engagement of the US State Department under the Obama Administration inevi-
tably decreased, as illustrated by the lower-level visits of Assistant Secretary of State 
and of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (DAS).

The UN General Assembly resolution on Kosovo of 9 September 2010, adopted with 
the backing of the US, opened the way for the EU to take the lead in mediation ef-
forts between Belgrade and Pristina. This was a landmark moment and signalled 
that the EU now had a leading role to play in the Western Balkans, overseeing the 
resolution of the most violent conflict to have taken place on European soil since 
the Second World War, with the US in a fully supporting role. 

The talks between Belgrade and Pristina that began in Brussels in March 2011, me-
diated by Catherine Ashton, the then High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, led two years later to the signing of the Brussels Agreement in April 
2013. The Obama Administration gave its full support to this process, and through-
out Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, along with the US State Department’s DAS 
Philip Reeker, were actively involved in reaching out to all actors and facilitating the 
negotiation of the compromise. 

It is noteworthy that immediately upon signing the two sides and HR/VP Catherine 
Ashton went to NATO headquarters where NATO pledged its support to guaran-
tees for keeping stability and peace under the new agreement. 

In  a  show  of  transatlantic  unity,  in  October  2012  Hillary  Clinton  and  Catherine 
Ashton  travelled  to  Belgrade,  Pristina  and  Sarajevo  together  to  meet  with  all  the 
relevant parties and emphasise concerted support for Euro-Atlantic integration.

NATO has played a crucial role in underpinning the US’s security and foreign policy 
in the region and has been a key element in the Euro-Atlantic integration process, 
and thus in the post-war stabilisation of the region. 

38 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36The US initially instigated the creation of the Adriatic Charter in May 2003 as a re-
gional security grouping of aspiring NATO member states, modelled on the Vilnius 
Ten (May 2000). It was initially founded by Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia,1 and subsequently joined in 2008 by Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Montenegro, and by Serbia as an observer member. 

After a long wait it was at the NATO Riga Summit in November 2006 that Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had signed up to in 1995.

It  was  during  Obama’s  first  term  that  Albania  and  Croatia  became  members  of 
NATO  in  2009,  and  under  his  second  Administration  that  the  whole  process  of 
Montenegro’s accession to NATO was completed. The US Senate’s ratification of 
Montenegro’s  membership  and  the  official  accession  ceremony  at  the  US  State 
Department in early June have taken place under President Trump’s watch.

It should be noted that while maintaining intense security and military cooperation 
with NATO, with which it has an individual Partnership Action Plan since January 
2015, Serbia is the only country of the region not seeking full membership of the 
Alliance. 

In spite of Donald Trump’s declaration while on the election campaign trail that 
NATO was ‘obsolete’, NATO appears now to have regained his full backing and sup-
port, and thus endorsement for its continuing role in the Western Balkans.

One of NATO’s most important operations is the KFOR mission which has been 
deployed  in  Kosovo  since  1999.  Today  this  mission  has  4,600  soldiers  of  which 
about  600  are  from  the  US.  Like  the  preceding  Administration,  the  new  Trump 
Administration also attaches great importance to resolving one of the most impor-
tant post-war issues in the Balkans. On the occasion of the visit by Serbian Prime 
Minister Aleksandar Vučić to Washington in July, the Vice-President expressed US 
support for Serbia’s efforts to join the EU and emphasised the need for continued 
progress in normalising the relationship with Kosovo.

Promoting resilience

Even though the EU and its member states have provided the bulk of support in 
terms  of  investment  and  development  aid,  the  level  of  US  support  to  the  region 
is  also  significant.  USAID  has  been  supporting  a  variety  of  rule  of  law  projects 
and  institution  building,  along  with  support  to  civil  society.  Private  foundations 
such at the Open Society Foundations, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, the 

1.  The author of this chapter originally used the form ‘Macedonia’ in the text. The EUISS uses the name ‘the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ in accordance with the guidelines concerning the official nomenclature of this 
country issued by the EU Office of Publications. 

39 

Resilience in the Western BalkansRockefeller  Brothers  Fund,  and  the  German  Marshall  Fund  have  supported  civil 
society organisations for a number of years. 

Some  of  these  have  recently  come  under  attack,  most  notably  the  Open  Society 
Foundations, in a number of Western Balkan countries where the political climate 
has become increasingly authoritarian. 

How the Trump Administration reacts to this criticism against certain US private 
foundations, and whether it adapts its development aid policies accordingly, remains 
to be seen. One early indicator is the support that has been given by US officials to 
the Budapest-based Central European University which has come under attack in 
Hungary. This comes in addition to the support given by the EU to the head of the 
Open Society Foundations, the philanthropist George Soros, to continue funding 
projects and initiatives related to building open societies in the Western Balkans. 

Three other issues have been essential to US interests in the region: (i) foreign fight-
ers; (ii) the fight against organised crime and corruption; and (iii) energy. It will be 
interesting to observe how the new Trump Administration continues engagement 
on these fronts based on direct US security interests.

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the mid-1990s, the situation in the Middle East 
and  the  appearance  of  the  so-called  Islamic  State/Daesch  has  led  to  numerous 
Balkan nationals travelling to the Middle East to join the ranks of fighters, to then 
return  as  potential  terrorists  prepared  to  carry  out  attacks  on  European  soil  and 
indeed elsewhere. Cooperation between the intelligence agencies of the US, Europe 
and the Western Balkans region has been significant and fruitful in this regard and 
will continue to remain so.

Previous  and  continuing  intelligence  cooperation  between  the  US  and  European 
agencies, in particular the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and British 
Serious  Organised  Crime  Agency  (SOCA)  and  others  in  the  2000s  led  to  a  crack-
down on a number of regional criminal networks that were globally organised and 
shipping drugs from Latin America to Europe and the region.

Energy has also been an issue of central importance in relations with the region. 
After the abandonment of the South-Stream Gas pipeline project spearheaded by 
Russia’s Gazprom – a project that had raised many hopes of the region profiting 
from transit tariffs – there has been renewed discussion about ways of diversifying 
energy  supplies,  gas  in  particular,  to  the  region,  progressively  weaning  it  off  full 
dependence on the Russian gas market. Talks with the EU on interconnectors, and 
with the US on Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) are part of mid to long-term strategies in 
which the EU again has the lead role but where the US has an important supportive 
role to play.

40 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36In this respect the presence of the then US Vice-President Joseph Biden at the Zagreb 
Bled-Brijuni Western Balkans Summit of southeast European leaders in November 
2015, along with European Council President Donald Tusk, sent another clear sig-
nal that the United States is paying attention and supporting the region’s continu-
ing trajectory towards Euro-Atlantic integration. 

Biden  declared  that  the  United  States  has  ‘had  an  overwhelming  interest  in  this 
region for the last 25 years’. The former Vice-President is certainly the US politician 
who  has  been  most  systematically  interested  and  engaged  in  this  region  over  the 
past quarter century, and his trip confirmed the US’s commitment to the Western 
Balkans,  supporting  both  the  European  Union  accession  process  and  NATO  in 
the region. Secretary of State John Kerry’s attendance at the OSCE Ministerial in 
Belgrade  in  December  2015  where  he  met  with  all  regional  leaders  was  a  further 
clear sign of support.

It is Russia’s new assertiveness, coupled with the refugee crisis and concern about 
global terrorist threats, that have given all these visits a heightened relevance. Russia 
is deploying various tactics and stratagems to try to derail the process of integra-
tion, and to expose the weakness of the EU and the West. Against this backdrop it is 
all the more important for the EU and the US to support the region in its continued 
efforts towards democratic reform and thus integration. 

Most  recently,  in  April  of  this  year  Senator  John  McCain  made  a  visit  to  the  re-
gion and delivered strong messages to local political leaders but also to the Trump 
Administration.  In  an  opinion  piece  in  the  Washington  Post  on  27  April  McCain 
writes as if addressing the new White House Administration directly: ‘the United 
States needs to maintain its support to the nations of southeastern Europe in their 
pursuit of integration into the Euro-Atlantic community through institutions such 
as  NATO  and  the  European  Union  …  the  United  States  should  maintain  robust 
support for US programs that help to strengthen the rule of law and to fight corrup-
tion, essential steps on the path to Euro-Atlantic integration’.

The visit of Wisconsin Republican Senator Ron Johnson to Belgrade in September 
underscored these points.

Conclusion

In this geopolitical context, the statement of the March EU Council reiterating its 
full support to the enlargement process to the Western Balkans is significant. The 
growing presence and role of ‘third parties’, namely Russia and Turkey, has led the 
EU and the US to renew their focus on the region. The international community is 
aware that the stability of this as yet unintegrated part of Europe is vitally important. 
Surrounded as it is by fully-fledged EU and NATO member states, it is in a sense the 
inner courtyard of Europe and NATO and therefore a reinvigorated enlargement 

41 

Resilience in the Western Balkansapproach is of the essence. Clearly it is imperative that the aspiring Western Balkan 
countries accelerate their democratic reform processes. In this context the support 
of the new White House Administration has already yielded tangible results. The 
engagement of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, 
Hoyt Yee, in support of the EU’s efforts, was instrumental in resolving the political 
crisis following the storming of the parliament in Skopje in April and the political 
stalemate in Albania before the parliamentary elections were held in June.   

The ‘Berlin Process’ initiated by Chancellor Merkel in 2014 to give a new impetus to 
enlargement clearly needs to be further reinforced, not only because it is important 
to build upon the momentum generated at the latest summit held in July in Trieste 
but  because  the  credibility  of  the  European  project  and  of  the  Western  Alliance 
is at stake.

This region is crucial for Europe’s stability. It is therefore in the best self-interest 
of  the  EU  and  its  member  states  to  continue  fostering  the  enlargement  process. 
The  US  along  with  the  EU  and  NATO  all  have  a  key  role  to  play  in  strengthen-
ing peace and security in the region. Continuity has been  a defining feature of US 
policy towards the region of the Western Balkans since the dissolution of the former 
Yugoslavia, and this has not changed despite the recent transition of power at the 
White House. The present US Administration under President Trump is committed 
to promoting the Euro-Atlantic integration of these countries and assist the EU in 
achieving the dream of a United Europe. 

42 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36VI. THE IMPACT OF RUSSIA

Dušan Reljić1

Introduction

There are so many ‘spinners of fairy tales’ in the West who present ‘Yugoslavia as 
the  poor,  helpless  Little  Red  Riding  Hood,  about  to  be  torn  apart  and  devoured 
by  the  bloodthirsty  wolf,  the  Soviet  Union’  –  thus  spoke  Leonid  Brezhnev,  with 
mock indignation, while on a state visit in Belgrade in November 1976. Josip Broz 
Tito, then socialist Yugoslavia’s celebrated leader, was 84 years old and the country 
was facing the twilight of his long rule. Western pundits had for long speculated 
about Moscow’s evil intent to incorporate non-aligned Yugoslavia into its sphere 
of influence once Tito was gone. Eventually, the ‘spinners of fairy tales’ were proven 
wrong and everything turned out completely differently: most of what used to be 
Yugoslavia soon became part of the ‘Euro-Atlantic system’.

Currently,  many  Balkan  experts  and  observers  have  reason  to  ruminate  over 
Brezhnev’s ironic remarks in Belgrade when confronted daily with alarmist warnings 
about an imminent ‘Russian threat’ in southeast Europe. Moscow is often depicted 
as a major driver of fragility in the Western Balkans, an external actor that aims at 
undermining  the  region’s  already  weak  resilience  against  political  and  economic 
disturbances. Russia’s attempts to gain influence are consequently seen as a poten-
tial source of a major confrontation between the West and Moscow. ‘The Balkans 
will be America and Russia’s next (virtual) battlefield’, prophesied, for instance, one 
author in the spring of 2017.2 Much in the same vein as four decades ago, there is 
abundant delusionary thinking, and even more ‘loose punditry’ (a phrase coined, in 
this context, by the veteran southeast Europe analyst Ivan Vejvoda). What is much 
less on offer is evidence-based analysis which reliably measures Russia’s capability 
to act as a driver of fragility and saboteur of resilience in the region. 

1.  The opinions expressed in this chapter are the author’s own.

2.   James Jay Carafano, ‘The Balkans will be America’s and Russia’s next (virtual) battlefield’, The National Interest, 9 

April 2017.

43 

Resilience in the Western BalkansDrivers of resilience: between  
the Baltics and the Black Sea 

In fact, Brezhnev was telling the truth – 
the  Soviet  Union  at  the  time  was  not 
economically  or  militarily  capable  of 
‘devouring’  Yugoslavia  and  therefore 
had  no  intention  of  launching  an  in-
tervention  in  the  country.  Scores  of 
Warsaw  Pact  tank  divisions  would 
have had to be deployed in the face of 
a  hostile  population,  thereby  provok-
ing a major political and perhaps even 
military confrontation with the West. 
Vladimir  Putin’s  Russia  today  is  even 
less  in  a  position  to  extend  its  influ-
ence all the way to the Eastern Adriatic. 
Figure  1  illustrates  this:  since  2009,  a 
chain  of  NATO  states  has  separated 
Russia  from  the  Western  Balkans. 
There are currently no indications that 
this modern limes stretching from the 
Baltics to the Black Sea will in the fore-
seeable future become in any way more 
permeable  and  that  Russia’s  strategic 
displacement from central and south-
east  Europe  could  be  reversed.  This 
fact  is  the  basis  of  the  region’s  resil-
ience against Russia’s ambitions to es-
tablish a zone of influence anywhere to 
the west of the ‘NATO frontier’ should 
such  designs  ever  take  the  shape  of 
concrete political and military actions.

Figure 1: Alliances 
Alliances
NATO, Warsaw Pact, non-aligned and neutral states, 
1990 and 2017
NATO, Warsaw Pact, non-aligned and neutral states

1990

non-aligned/
neutral

Warsaw Pact

NATO

2017

Source: SWP, 2017

However, the map also shows several ‘blank spots’ in the Western Balkans surround-
ed by NATO and/or EU member states: Serbia with Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.3 Priština (because of Kosovo’s un-
resolved international status),4 Belgrade (because of NATO’s war against Serbia in 
1999), Sarajevo (because most Serbs in this country see the West as the protector of 
their Croat and Muslim compatriots and contenders) and Skopje (because of the 

3. The author of this chapter originally used the form ‘the Republic of Macedonia’ in the text. The EUISS uses the 
name  ‘the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia’  in  accordance  with  the  guidelines  concerning  the  official 
nomenclature of this country issued by the EU Office of Publications. 

4.  Spain, Slovakia, Romania, Greece and Cyprus (all EU and/or NATO member states) do not recognise the seces-

sion of Kosovo Albanians from Belgrade in 2008.

44 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36‘name dispute’ with Athens) are not going to join the Western military alliance at 
any time in the foreseeable future. Similarly challenging is their bid to enter the EU 
not only because of the many political and economic deficiencies with which these 
applicants are still burdened, but also because of the ongoing internal crises that the 
EU is experiencing. 

The Kremlin has often criticised any further NATO expansion, not only in its neigh-
bourhood  but  also  in  southeast  Europe,  as  a  threat  to  Russian  security.  Moscow 
however appears to be less perturbed about the Western Balkan countries’ ambition 
to join the EU: in one of his first comments on the subject, in Zagreb in 2007, Putin 
alluded  to  the  Western  Balkan  countries’  EU  membership  plans  primarily  in  the 
context of Russia’s energy strategy in southeast Europe. Moscow has shifted from 
this rather indifferent attitude to observing the EU’s quandary on how to deal with 
problematic  Western  Balkan  applicants  with  a  certain  amount  of  schadenfreude: 
Russia had no objections to their bids for membership, they are only creating an-
other  headache  for  the  EU,  commented  Russia’s  Ambassador  to  the  Union  in 
early 2017. 

Basically,  as  long  as  the  Euro-Atlantic 
integration  of  the  Western  Balkans  is 
stalled, Russia has a window of oppor-
tunity to act as a ‘spoiler’ in the region 
and an additional driver of the region’s 
overall  fragility,  mostly  through  po-
litical manoeuvring, public diplomacy 
and propaganda – as well as, according 
to Western allegations, through under-
cover subversion.

Accordingly,  Moscow  habitually  sides 
with  rulers  in  the  region,  no  matter 
how  authoritarian  and  corrupt  they 
might be, if they have open issues with 
the  West.  Russia  has,  for  instance, 
given  diplomatic  support  to  the  for-
mer right-wing political leaders in the 
Republic  of  Macedonia  since  2015 
whenever  they  attempted  to  suppress 
demands  for  democracy  and  the  rule 
of law. According to standard Kremlin 
interpretation, such protests are exter-
nally  orchestrated  attempts  to  stage 
‘coloured  revolutions’  such  as  those 

SEE6 trade in goods
Figure 2: SEE6 trade in goods
in % of total imports/exports, 2015 
in % of total imports/exports, 2015

other | 7.1

USA | 1.1

Switzerland | 1.2
Turkey | 4.5

Russia | 6.0
China | 6.6

€23.9 bn
imports

EU-28 | 73.5

other | 6.5

Switzerland | 1.2
China | 1.5
Turkey | 2.9
USA | 3.1
Russia | 4.2

EU-28 | 80.6

€15.3 bn
exports

45 

Resilience in the Western Balkans 
that took place in Ukraine in 2014 or in 2000 in Serbia, when the despotic ruler 
Slobodan Milošević was ousted. 

Similarly, Moscow insists that it is in fact NATO that is undermining the Western 
Balkans while pretending to offer stability to the region and accusing Russia of pos-
ing a threat to regional security while continually nurturing anti-Russian hysteria. 
A typical occasion for such charges popped up in April 2017 when Albanian leaders 
in  Tirana  and  Priština  threatened  that  a  union  between  Albania  (a  member  of 
NATO) and Kosovo cannot be ruled out if EU membership prospects for the Western 
Balkans fade. Moscow went to great lengths to highlight these statements as proof 
of the genuine intentions of the Western promoters of ‘a greater Albania’.

However,  it  is  at  the  level  of  such  dip-
lomatic  and  propagandistic  rhetoric 
against  ‘foreign  interference’  and  the 
West’s ‘double standards’ that Moscow’s 
leverage also ends: in southeast Europe, 
Russia simply does not have the means 
or resources to substitute the West and 
in particular the EU as a pole of attrac-
tion for economic, far less political, in-
tegration. Statistics on trade and invest-
ments show this clearly.

0

-1

Figure 3: Serbian net foreign direct investment
in € billion

2010

2012

China

2014

2016

Switzerland

Russia

Gulf Arab States

EU-28

-2

-3

In  the  Western  Balkans,  Russia‘s  clout 
is  minimal  compared  with  the  region’s 
existing  level  of  economic  integration 
with the EU (see Figures 2 and 3). The 
SEE65 import twelve times more goods 
from  the  EU  than  from  Russia.  They 
export twenty times more goods to the 
EU than to Russia. Also, in terms of for-
eign  direct  investment  (FDI)  and  port-
folio  investments,  Russia’s  spending  is 
dwarfed by capital flows from the EU to the region. Gazprom’s purchase of 56 % 
of  the  Serbian  state-owned  oil  company  NIS  in  2008,  allegedly  for  €400  million, 
with some subsequent payments, was a notable exception in this regard. Other sig-
nificant direct investments from Russia have not been recorded since, as shown in 
Figure 4. 

Source: Central Bank of Serbia, 2017

Total

In fact, it is to Croatia, an EU country, that most Russian cash in the region has 
gone. Moscow’s state-controlled banks Sberbank and VTB were in 2017 among the 
chief creditors (with borrowings amounting to €1 million and €1.3 billion for both 

5.  The  regional  EU  applicants:  Serbia,  Kosovo,  Albania,  Montenegro,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  the  former 

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

46 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36banks together) of the bankrupt food and retail company Agrokor, the region’s big-
gest business. However, as the Financial Times has reported,6 so far Agrokor’s Russian 
creditor banks have not sought to use the situation to increase Moscow’s influence 
in Croatia and its neighbours. In essence, Russian ownership of banking assets in 
the region is very low compared to banks from EU countries. 

Ownership of banking assets per country
Figure 4: Ownership of banking assets per country
in %, end of 2014
in %, end of 2014 

Albania

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Kosovo

the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Montenegro

Serbia
Slovenia

Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development/Bancscope (end of 2014) 

Last but not least, in the media industry, Russia is not known to possess any as-
sets worth mentioning whereas Springer, Bertelsmann and other mostly German, 
Swiss,  Austrian  and  US  companies  are  significant  media  owners  in  the  region.  A 
Moscow-based  company  owns  a  minority  stake  in  the  Belgrade  broadsheet  daily 

6.  ‘Crisis at Croatia’s Agrokor poses threat beyond creditors’, Financial Times, 12 April 2017.

47 

Resilience in the Western BalkansAustriaDomesticFranceGermanyGreeceSloveniaTurkeyotherAustriaDomesticFranceGermanyGreeceItalyotherAustriaDomesticFranceItalySloveniaotherAustriaDomesticGermanySloveniaTurkeyAustriaDomesticGermanyItalyRussiaSloveniaTurkeyotherAustriaDomesticFranceGermanyGreeceItalyTurkeyotherPolitika; however, this Russian firm serves only as a front for a Serbian entrepreneur 
acting as a proxy for political factions in his country. Russia external broadcaster 
‘Sputnik’ and its internet operations are present in the region, but only represent a 
marginal source of information compared with the domestic media outlets or even 
the US-funded Radio Free Europe. 

Three drivers of Russia’s influence in the region 

Alongside its strategic and economic displacement from southeast Europe, Russian 
leverage in the region is also less and less effective. The first instrument of Russian 
influence was always more imagined than real: although Serbs, Montenegrins and 
Slavic Macedonians share Slavic roots and the Orthodox religion with Russia, and 
while  memories  of  historic  alliances  with  Russia  continue  to  play  an  important 
role  in the construction of their identities,  the region’s numerous ethnic minori-
ties, such as the Hungarians and Albanians, are indifferent to tales of historic and 
religious  ties  with  Russia.  On  the  contrary,  overstated  closeness  to  Russia  breeds 
ethnic tensions that no government in the region can afford in light of the overall 
determination to join the EU. Also, many Orthodox Slavs in the region eye Russia 
sceptically as a great power whose actions, as demonstrated by a number of episodes 
that occurred in past centuries, were not always supportive of their goals. 

Surveys attest that even in a country such as Serbia, where a majority of the popula-
tion favours alliances with Russia and overwhelmingly rejects NATO membership, 
support for joining the EU hovers at around 50 percent. In fact, public attitudes 
towards  the  EU  in  the  whole  region  are  contradictory  and  shifting.  Support  for 
membership shot up after the completion of successive steps in the EU accession 
process,  such  as  the  lifting  of  visa  requirements  in  2010,  only  to  fall  again  when 
bad news came from Brussels – whether in connection with the euro crisis, the flow 
of migrants through the Balkans, the difficulties in the EU-brokered talks between 
Belgrade and Priština, or most recently the Brexit referendum. The foreign policy 
leanings of the Serbs and other Western Balkan nations considering EU accession 
are plainly shaped more by political perceptions of current events than by suppos-
edly deep-seated historical preferences and animosities.

Moscow’s second instrument of influence – stemming from southeast Europe’s 
dependency on Russian energy supplies and especially natural gas – is also dimin-
ishing. In 2015, Russia abandoned the planned construction of the South Stream 
gas  pipeline  partly  on  account  of  the  EU’s  strict  conditions,  alongside  high  con-
struction costs and uncertain price trends for fossil fuels. The Western Balkan coun-
tries are members of the EU’s Energy Community and have agreed to adopt its ac-
quis. This has prevented Russia’s Gazprom from using South Stream to expand its 
predominance in southeastern Europe. 

48 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36Moscow’s  third  instrument  of  influence  in  the  region  relates  to  Serbia  and  is 
the threat to use its Security Council veto if the West attempts to make Kosovo a 
member of the United Nations. This is the only critical tie between the two states. 
Moscow is keen to draw Serbia further from the West because no politician who 
wants to succeed in Serbian politics can risk losing Russia’s support over the Kosovo 
conundrum. A sign of Moscow’s success in this respect would be for Serbia to raise 
its military and security cooperation with Russia to the same level that it has with 
the US and NATO.  According to Russian figures, 22 Serbian military exercises were 
conducted jointly with NATO in 2015, and only two with Russia. Consequently, it 
would be counterproductive for Brussels and the leading EU member states to pres-
surise Belgrade to distance itself from Russia. Serbia’s accession to the EU is not im-
minent in any case. Excessive Western pressure would only reinforce the perception 
in Serbia that Russia is the country’s sole ally. 

Eliminating the drivers of fragility 

The EU can achieve all the leverage it wants in the Western Balkans if it decides to 
engage in regional ‘geo-economics’. The starting point is to consider itself and the 
Western Balkans to be a single security – and stability – space. The EU’s own stabil-
ity rests to a great extent on the ability of the welfare state to curb social inequality 
which is the main source of grievance and instability. In southeast Europe, exactly 
the same premise applies.

Since opening up their economies and forging closer ties with the EU after the regime 
change at the turn of the century, there has been a steep increase in social inequality 
as well as public and private indebtedness in the Western Balkans. Unemployment 
has  increased  and  living  standards  have  deteriorated.  In  fact,  between  2006  and 
2016, the SEE6 have accumulated a trade deficit with the EU of almost €97 billion, 
mostly  with  Germany  and  Italy,  their  chief  trading  partners.  Loans  from  abroad 
keep the states in the region afloat, leaving it to the coming generations (and there 
is a sharp demographic decline in most of the countries) to settle the debts. 

As long as political, legal and economic conditions in southeast Europe show no 
signs of converging with the rest of the continent, the region will remain unsta-
ble with little resilience to domestic or externally induced calamities. To trigger 
convergence,  the  EU  should  enable  applicant  countries  to  access  the  European 
Structural Funds before formal membership. Including them into the portfolio 
of the new European Fund for Strategic Investment, and the EU’s financial sta-
bility  mechanisms  should  also  be  on  the  accession  agenda  in  Brussels.  The  EU 
labour  market  should  be  opened  up  to  citizens  of  the  SEE6  to  enable  circular 
migration. 

The crucial task is to raise living standards in the region and open up improved em-
ployment and life prospects, especially for the younger generation. That is the only 

49 

Resilience in the Western Balkansway to preserve the attraction of the EU’s model of democracy in southeast Europe 
and curtail the disruptive influence of other external actors like Russia, Turkey and 
the Gulf Arab states as well as an erratic US under Donald Trump.

50 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36VII. THE IMPACT OF TURKEY AND THE GULF STATES

Filip Ejdus

Introduction

The implosion of Yugoslavia in the 1990s created favourable conditions for both 
Turkey  and  the  Gulf  States  to  increase  their  presence  in  the  Western  Balkans. 
Turkey directly supported Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians through its en-
gagement in NATO interventions, thereby allowing Ankara to show its relevance for 
the Alliance in the post-Cold War period. While the Gulf States formally stayed out 
of the conflict, they mobilised on behalf of their fellow Balkan Muslims through the 
provision of humanitarian aid, but also with clandestine arms transfers and thou-
sands of volunteers. After the wars, and particularly after the arrival of the Justice 
and  Development  Party  (AKP) to power  in 2002, Turkey intensified its economic 
and diplomatic activities, which were particularly geared towards Muslim commu-
nities in the region. The Gulf States also stepped up their humanitarian assistance, 
focusing on building mosques and schools and steadily increasing their foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) flows to the region.

The EU is still the most important trading partner of the Western Balkans (it ac-
counts for over 76% of the region’s trade), the biggest donor and in most countries 
the most important source of FDI. However, the slowdown of the EU enlargement 
process in recent years has emboldened both Turkey and the Gulf States to further 
intensify their presence in the Western Balkans. Ankara has sought to compensate 
the lack of progress in the EU accession talks by launching diplomatic initiatives, 
stepping up trade and investment, facilitated by free trade agreements, and engag-
ing more strongly with all Balkan countries. The Gulf States, on the other hand, see 
their Balkan investment as an opportunity to diversify their economies in the face 
of plummeting oil prices.

In its recent Global Strategy, the EU declared resilience in the neighbourhood to 
be one of its key foreign policy interests. If the EU is to achieve its objective of pro-
moting resilience in the Western Balkans, it is of the utmost importance to under-
stand  the  effect  of  this  increased  involvement  of  Turkey  and  the  Gulf  States  on 
the resilience of states in the region or their ability to adapt to external shocks and 
‘bounce back’.

51 

Resilience in the Western BalkansTurkey and the Gulf States as drivers of fragility

The  Western  Balkans  is  a  fragile  post-conflict  region  composed  of  economically 
challenged,  weak  democracies  with  a  set  of  unresolved  ethnic  and  territorial  dis-
putes. While the key drivers of fragility, such as state weakness, ethno-national dis-
putes and poor economic performance are all internal to the region, the rising influ-
ence of Turkey and the Gulf States has amplified their impact in several ways.

While  Turkey  officially  still  supports  the  Euro-Atlantic  integration  of  the  region, 
the stalemate in EU accession talks has increased Ankara’s assertiveness on this is-
sue in recent years. Its attempts to act as a mediator in intra-regional conflicts have 
had limited success and at times have even deepened the existing tensions in the re-
gion. For instance, during his visit to Prizren in October 2013, Turkey’s then Prime 
Minister  Recep  Tayyip  Erdoğan  stated  that  ‘Turkey  is  Kosovo,  Kosovo  is  Turkey’. 
This infuriated Belgrade, which temporarily pulled out of Ankara-sponsored trilat-
eral talks (with Bosnia). Although Turkey still shares the EU’s stance towards the 
key issues in the region, including the recent crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, a further deterioration of Ankara’s relations with the EU might turn 
Turkey against the European integration of the Western Balkans. In spring 2017, for 
example, pro-Erdoğan anti-EU protests were held in Sarajevo. Although still small 
in size, these protests indicate Ankara’s capacity to derail the European project in 
the Western Balkans.

Turkey’s  internal  tensions  and  democratic  regression  have  also  started  to  slowly 
spill over into the Western Balkans. For years, Turkey facilitated the spread of the 
Hizmet movement in the region through a network of civil society organisations, 
schools  and  religious  centres.  After  the  leader  of  the  movement  Fethullah  Gülen 
and Erdoğan fell out, Turkey started applying pressure on the Western Balkan states 
to crack down on schools and individuals related to the Hizmet movement which 
is now labelled by Ankara as a terrorist organisation.1 Another potential driver of 
fragility  is  the  potential  of  Erdoğan’s  authoritarian  governing  style  –  based  on  a 
personality cult, tight media control and majority rule – to become a role model for 
the Western Balkan leaders. Just like Erdoğan, for example, Aleksandar Vučić was 
elected president of Serbia during his tenure as a Prime Minister in April 2017 while 
demoracy has been gradually backsliding since his Serbia Progressive Party (SNS) 
came to power in 2012.

The increased presence of the Gulf States has also contributed to regional fragil-
ity.  To  begin  with,  it  has  led  to  the  spread  of  the  ultra-conservative  doctrine  of 
Wahhabism in the region. This has been facilitated by hundreds of Saudi-funded 
mosques  and  schools  that  have  mushroomed  across  the  Balkans  in  the  past  two 
decades. It is very difficult to estimate the exact number of people in the region who 
have fallen under the spell of fundamentalist imams preaching in those mosques, 

1.  So far, the pressure has only worked in Serbia where the local government in the city of Novi Pazar announced 

that it will not provide any support to Gülen’s ‘terrorist organisation’.

52 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36some  of  whom  had  also  received  scholarships  to  study  Islam  in  Saudi  Arabia. 
However, opinion polls suggest that the percentage is still among the lowest in the 
Muslim world. Although still in a minority, this increasingly vocal cohort of funda-
mentalists undermines the fragile cohesion among the Balkan Muslims and threat-
ens inter-ethnic relations. The extent of their influence is reflected in the fact that 
Albania,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  Kosovo  are  the  European  countries  which 
have produced the highest number of foreign fighters per capita who joined armed 
groups in Iraq and Syria. Upon their return, these Balkan jihadists can be expected 
to further disseminate radical ideas and exacerbate fragility in the region.

The economic presence of the Gulf States in the Western Balkans has also not been 
entirely uncontroversial. The €3.5 billion worth Belgrade Waterfront project signed 
in 2015, for example, has created a huge controversy which peaked when a group of 
unidentified masked men demolished several legally disputed buildings. Although 
the  culprits  have  never  been  identified,  the  aim  of  the  demolition  seems  to  have 
been to clear the ground for the real estate development in order to meet a dead-
line that had been previously promised to Arab investors. This sparked a series of 
public protests in Belgrade, gradually growing into a social movement against the 
Belgrade Waterfront project in its entirety. Non-transparent investments have also 
raised concerns about their sustainability. In 2015, for instance, a Dubai-based in-
vestor announced plans to invest €4.3 billion in building a luxury tourist resort near 
Sarajevo, which promised to be one of the biggest investments of its kind in Europe. 
Two years later, the project has still not taken off the ground and doubts have been 
raised about the credibility of the investor.

Finally,  the  lucrative  arms  deals  with  the  Gulf  States  have,  albeit  indirectly,  also 
driven fragility in the region. The Gulf States have taken advantage of lax export 
controls in the Western Balkans to purchase large quantities of weapons, re-export-
ing some of this weaponry to various armed groups in the Middle East. By feeding 
the wars not just in Syria, but also in Iraq, Yemen and Libya with the weapons, the 
Gulf  States  have  contributed  to  the  escalation  and  perpetuation  of  military  con-
flicts in the region. This, in turn, led to the increasing number of refugees transiting 
through the Balkan route on their way to the EU (almost a million of them in 2015 
alone). However important these negative influences have been, they also arguably 
have a positive flipside which is explored in the next section.

Turkey and the Gulf States as drivers of resilience

The influence of Turkey and the Gulf States has also several positive effects on the 
region. To begin with, their investments have been an important substitute for the 
reduction of FDI from the EU, which halved in the period between 2010 and 2013.2 
Since the early 2000s, Turkey’s investments have provided an important boost for 

2.  Nazif Mandaci, ‘Western Balkans and the Gulf: Interregionalism in the making’, Mediterranean Politics, 6 March 

2017, p.9.

53 

Resilience in the Western Balkansthe economies of the region especially in Kosovo (€340 million) and Albania (€1.5 
billion) where Turkey tops the list of partners and foreign investors. Major Turkish 
banks  such  as  Turkish  Economy  Bank,  Halk  Bank,  Ziraat  Bank  and  İşbank  have 
opened up branches and made acquisitions in the region. Turkey also made signifi-
cant investments in the construction sector (e.g. the Vermice-Pristina-Merdare high-
way), airports (e.g. Pristina, Skopje, Ohrid) and the textile industry among others.3

More  recently,  the  Gulf  States  have  also  started  investing  in  the  region  to  diver-
sify their oil-based economies, a move which has been wholeheartedly endorsed by 
Western Balkan countries seeking to expand economic partners beyond the crisis-
stricken EU. In the past few years, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has stepped up 
investments not only in Albania (e.g. the Tirana-Elbasan road, Sheik Zayed Airport 
in  Kukes)  but  also  in  Montenegro,  Serbia  and  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of 
Macedonia. In anticipation of Montenegro’s NATO and EU membership, the UAE 
has  made  several  investments  in  the  real  estate  sector  including  the  takeover  of 
Porto Montenegro in the Bay of Kotor in 2016. This is of strategic importance for 
a future NATO member state where Russia accounts for nearly a third of foreign 
investments.

In Serbia, the UAE has invested in aviation, urban construction, military technol-
ogy and agriculture for the sake of its own food security. In 2013, it acquired 49% 
of the Serbian national carrier JAT.4 In April 2015, the government of Serbia struck 
a €3.5 billion worth deal to develop Belgrade’s rundown riverfront. In recent years, 
Belgrade secured two low-interest $1 billion loans from the UAE, first to avoid bank-
ruptcy in 2013 and then to plug its public deficit in 2016. In the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, the UAE is the second largest non-EU donor. Qatar has also 
stepped up its investments in the real estate, health, media and transport sectors 
across  the  region  while  Kuwait and Saudi  Arabia have announced further invest-
ments  in  the  real  estate,  banking  and  defence  sectors.  Finally,  the  lucrative  arms 
deals between the Gulf and the Western Balkan create new jobs and contribute to 
boost  sluggish  economic  growth  across  the  region.  Virtually  non-existent  before 
2012, arms exports from the Western Balkans into the Gulf region increased to €561 
million by 2016. 

In addition to clear economic benefits, a case could be made that the influence of 
Turkey and the Gulf States on the political resilience of the region has not been en-
tirely negative either. In the years following the Balkan wars, Turkey’s political and 
military involvement in the Western Balkans was part of broader efforts to integrate 
the region into the EU and NATO. More recently, states in the Western Balkans have 
welcomed the increased political presence of the non-EU actors as a way of widening 
their foreign policy options. Increasingly weary about the uncertain prospect of the 

3.  Alida Vračić, ‘Turkey’s Role in the Western Balkans’, SWP Research Paper 11, December 2016. 

4.  Will Bartlett, James Ker-Lindsay, Kristian Alexander and Tena Prelec, ‘The United Arab Emirates as an emerging 
actor in the Western Balkans: the case of strategic investment in Serbia’, Journal of Arabian Studies, vol. 7, no. 1,  
2017, pp. 94-112. 

54 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36European project more broadly, states in the region have sought to diversify their 
partnerships to hedge their bets. This, however, could also act as a driver of fragility 
as it could further weaken domestic incentives to reform and sharpen geopolitical 
competition.

Finally, through its cultural influence in the region, Turkey has sought to strength-
en the resilience of local Islamic communities against the fundamentalist forms 
of Islam propagated by Saudi-trained clerics and local indoctrinated recruits.5 A 
clear majority of the Balkan Muslims follow the moderate Hanafi School of Islam 
that was dominant in the Ottoman Empire. It is certainly more compatible with 
secularism,  democracy,  and  the  European  integration  aspirations  of  the  region 
and acts as a bulwark against Wahhabism spreading from the Gulf. Turkey’s ef-
forts to restore the Ottoman cultural heritage and connect with the Muslim com-
munities in the region has therefore acted as a driver of resilience although in the 
future much will depend on the nature of the relationship between Ankara and 
Brussels. 

The way ahead 

The rising influence of Turkey and the Gulf States has had a mixed impact on the 
Western Balkans. However, neither their positive nor their negative impact on the re-
gion should be overstated. The region is not a strategic priority for them while their 
economic and political clout is still much less significant than the EU’s. Moreover, 
in contrast to Russia, which openly undermines the EU’s influence in the Western 
Balkans, both Turkey and the Gulf States still treat the region as a bridge to the EU.

In  the  next  decade,  the  impact  of  Turkey  and  the  Gulf  States  on  the  Western 
Balkans will depend on four interlinked factors. The first one relates to how the 
EU faces up to current challenges. If the EU weakens internally and/or its enlarge-
ment  policy  towards  the  Western  Balkans  halts,  other  external  actors  including 
the  Gulf  States  and  Turkey  will  seek  to  fill  the  vacuum  and  not  necessarily  for 
the benefit of the region. The second factor is the wider geopolitical environment 
in the Middle East. As political, economic and security interdependence between 
these  regions  increases,  the  Western  Balkans  will  be  increasingly  susceptible  to 
import  both  their  positive  and  negative  influences.  The  third  factor  is  how  the 
EU’s  relationships  with  Turkey  and  the  Gulf  States  will  evolve.  Their  deteriora-
tion would deepen tensions in the Western Balkans while a wider geopolitical con-
vergence would boost regional resilience. For example, a proposed formal end of 
accession  talks  following  Turkey’s  controversial  constitutional  referendum  and 
the announced retaliatory withdrawal of Ankara from the migrant deal with the 
EU might have a devastating effect on all states along the Balkan route. Finally, 
if  the  democratic  backsliding  in  the  Western  Balkans  continues  and  a  solution 

5.   Kerem Öktem, ‘New Islamic actors after the Wahhabi intermezzo: Turkey’s return to the Muslim Balkans’, Euro-

pean Studies Centre, University of Oxford, December 2010.

55 

Resilience in the Western Balkansto the political stalemate in Bosnia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
and Serbia/Kosovo is not found, external players will be increasingly tempted to 
exploit  divisions  in  the  region,  thus  seriously  jeopardising  its  development  and 
prosperity.

56 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36VIII. THE IMPACT OF CHINA

Anastas Vangeli

Introduction

In 2012 China announced a new comprehensive initiative for cooperation with six-
teen countries in Central, East and Southeast Europe (CESEE), including the five 
countries of the Western Balkans that are not (yet) EU members: Albania, Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina,  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia,1  Montenegro  and 
Serbia – but not Kosovo which China does not recognise.  Analysts in the region, 
but also in the broader China-watching community, did not pay much attention 
to what at the time was regarded as an obscure diplomatic undertaking. Five years 
later,  in  addition  to  the  increased  economic  cooperation  which  it  has  driven,  the 
‘16+1’ initiative has evolved into a complex networking platform consisting of a web 
of  transgovernmental  institutions:  diplomatic  exchanges  between  China  and  the 
respective countries have intensified, while countries from the region have gained 
a prominent role in China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The cumula-
tive  result  is  that  today  the  Beijing-based  16+1  is  the  largest  and  most  elaborate 
multilateral  framework  directly  engaging  with  the  CESEE,  and  as  such,  the  larg-
est non-Euro-Atlantic initiative that involves the Western Balkan countries – even 
though the volume of economic cooperation between China and the sixteen is still 
minuscule compared to the level of cooperation that China enjoys with the rest of 
the EU and the continent, in particular Western Europe. 

As China’s role in the world becomes ever more significant, especially at a time of 
diminishing American global leadership, its engagement in the Western Balkans is 
of particular importance for both the trajectories of economic and political devel-
opment of the countries themselves, and the EU as a stakeholder in the region. The 
Chinese vision of the Balkans means that the EU has to reflect not only on its China 
policy, but also on the way it perceives and handles intra-EU, and moreover intra-
European, issues of diversity and developmental discrepancies. It will also have to be 
proactive in fostering synergies between the Chinese approach and its own strategy.

With  the  16+1  subregional  cooperation  format,  China  has  managed  to  establish 
a  novel  platform  for  intensifying  and  expanding  cooperation  with  the  Western 
Balkan  states  while  circumventing  traditional  stakeholders  in  the  region  such  as 
the EU and the US – but also Russia and Turkey. The rapid development of the new 

1.  The author of this chapter originally used the form ‘Macedonia’ in the text. The EUISS uses the name ‘the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ in accordance with the guidelines concerning the official nomenclature of this 
country issued by the EU Office of Publications.

57 

Resilience in the Western Balkansplatform – but also the Western Balkan states’ and traditional stakeholders’ relative 
unfamiliarity with China – has polarised opinion on the initiative: some see China 
as a threat, some see it as an opportunity, with little nuance in between.

In  reality,  however,  China  is  a  complex,  multifaceted  and  often  enigmatic  actor 
whose  geopolitical  strategy  is  quite  different  to  that  of  other  stakeholders  in  the 
region. It has championed an incremental and experimental foreign policy which 
both  perpetuates  and  challenges  the  status quo.  The  outcomes  of  the  relationship 
with China are greatly dependent on the partner countries themselves. The Chinese 
approach to cooperation is inclusive: while an overall framework exists, there is am-
ple space for the details to be incrementally developed, and for the voice of the part-
ner countries to be heard in the process.

Drivers of fragility

China and the EU are strategic partners engaged in a relationship of ‘coevolution’ 
as both sides try to avoid and minimise conflicts, and boost their cooperation where 
possible, while adhering to their own domestic imperatives. It is a partnership not 
necessarily  driven  by  high  politics,  but  rather  by  intense  two-way  economic  ex-
change, cooperation on climate change, and people-to-people contacts. 

Yet, dealing with China is one of the most challenging external issues for both the 
EU, and for its member states. In the last decade, as the EU has undergone multiple 
crises that have limited its capacity to act as a global power, China has gradually 
become  a  more  resolute  and  influential  global  actor  thanks  to  its  economic  rise. 
At the same time, the major problem for the EU vis-à-vis China is not China itself, 
but  the  difficulty  of  speaking  with  one  voice.  Prioritising  bilateral    economic  co-
operation (framed as national interest) with China, individual European member 
states have often overlooked Brussels, accommodated Chinese interests, and thus 
contributed to fragmenting the EU’s China policy. The incoherence on China also 
extends to how the EU handles the growing presence of China in its neighbourhood 
and the enlargement area – while the EU may seek to promote normative principles 
and values, member (and candidate) states prioritise lucrative interests, and some-
times even compete with each other. Eventually, the different perspectives on China 
will have to be reconciled so as to maximise the benefits and reduce the costs for 
Europeans.

Today, China as a global actor is concerned not only with immediate economic in-
terests, but also with questions that directly concern policy frameworks and govern-
ance issues. While not explicitly promoting any normative blueprints, China’s size, 
clout and resources have rendered its relationships with most of the countries in the 
world – including the countries in the Western Balkans – highly asymmetrical. The 
multiple asymmetries have enabled Beijing to create an environment conducive to 

58 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36the advancement of its own development agenda and to engage other countries on 
its own terms through the creation of new, China-centered institutions.

The fact that China-Western Balkans cooperation takes place almost exclusively on 
Chinese terms could be challenging for the regional governments. To counter any 
potential  sources  of  fragility  stemming  from  the  asymmetry  between  China  and 
the Western Balkans, both the national governments in the region, and the EU as a 
stakeholder, need to take China seriously, develop their own China strategies and 
pro-actively approach the new opportunities for cooperation, thus contributing to 
the shaping of the agenda.

Chinese policymakers have capitalised on what they perceive as a certain ‘flexibility’ 
enjoyed by the subgroup of the five Western Balkan countries by virtue of their be-
ing outside of the EU. In practice this means that China can avoid EU regulations 
governing large-scale projects with which it otherwise has to contend in its bilateral 
dealings with EU member states. In other words, what China cannot do in the EU 
due to regulation issues, it can often do in the Western Balkans.

To  a  certain  extent  this  represents  a  ‘competitive  edge’  enjoyed  by  the  Western 
Balkan countries compared to other countries in Europe. For instance, most of the 
infrastructure projects launched under 16+1 are in Western Balkan countries. The 
major infrastructure projects have been implemented not through public bidding, 
but by special legislation which  diverges from EU norms. While this may often be 
a result of specific sets of circumstances and not necessarily illicit, in order to avoid 
all  suspicion  and  maintain  transparency,  national  governments  in  the  Western 
Balkans should find a way to foster a model of holding competitive public tenders. 

This can also serve to minimise risk. A major controversy has surrounded the con-
struction of two highways in Macedonia via a Chinese loan, by a Chinese contrac-
tor, leading to one of the most high-profile corruption scandals that have shaken 
the VMRO-DPMNE government under Gruevski. Moreover, the projects have been 
accompanied  by  major  errors  that  resulted  in  the  construction  being  postponed 
as well as increased costs. It is however worth noting that infrastructure projects 
carried out by European companies in deals arranged by the Gruevski government 
shared the same fate. Corruption-free governance, including transparent and com-
petitive public bidding, is at the core of the reform processes required by the EU, 
and is therefore one area where further monitoring is needed. However, rather than 
slowing down or compromising the current level of cooperation, anti-corruption 
should be framed as another area where there can be convergence with China – es-
pecially at a time when China is undergoing one of the most thorough anti-corrup-
tion campaigns in its history.

59 

Resilience in the Western BalkansDrivers of resilience

China  has  unequivocally  supported  the  process  of  European  integration  and  the 
Western Balkan countries’ accession to the Union. Chinese officials have gone to 
great lengths to assure their European counterparts and in particular EU officials 
that  16+1  is  complementary  to  the  overall  Sino-European  relationship.  While 
the notion of the strategic partnership between China and the EU is absent from 
Beijing’s discourse in the Western Balkans, common interests and potential conver-
gences do exist.

The Chinese interest in the economic renewal of the Balkans is very much welcome 
for  both  local  governments  and  the  EU.  The  main  focus  of  Beijing’s  cooperation 
with the region – the infrastructure and connectivity projects – are crucial for the 
development of this part of Europe, as also recognised by the EU which launched  
the Berlin Process to address these issues specifically. In the Chinese view, the payoff 
from having developed infrastructure comes in a non-monetary form, as the flow of 
people and ideas between the areas that have been newly connected or reconnected 
as a result of the new railway and motorways is expected to catalyse economic activi-
ties along these routes. Another significant pillar of the cooperation – production 
capacity cooperation – can be instrumental in reviving some of the lost industrial 
capacities of the Western Balkan states, and creating new ones.

Politically, China refrains from commenting on the internal affairs of the Western 
Balkan countries – pursuing cooperation with whoever is in power (while nurtur-
ing  relations  with  opposition  parties  too).  Nevertheless,  there  are  signs  that  as  it 
becomes more involved in the region, it is also increasingly concerned about the reli-
ability and professionalism of its partners. While adhering to the core principle of a 
state-led economy, Chinese experts have often pointed out the necessity of reform. 
At the same time, the exponentially increasing pace of 16+1 cooperation is driving 
the Western Balkan countries to acquire more China expertise and to strengthen 
their capacity as actors in international affairs. In some areas – such as local govern-
ance or e-commerce – there is indeed an opportunity for the Western Balkan coun-
tries to learn much from China.

Through  16+1  and  the  BRI,  China  has  promoted  regional  economic  integration, 
transcending  national  borders,  and  uniting  around  projects  that  pass  through 
countries that have historically been divided by bitter national disputes. Pragmatic 
cooperation with China can bring the governments in the region to work closer to-
gether, thereby transcending the ‘zero-sum’ logic that tends to prevail in the region 
– in order for them to benefit from the BRI, for instance, they will need to develop 
a regional strategy towards China. Consequently, China has argued that despite all 
the setbacks, the future for the region is bright, which is one of the rare messages of 
optimism in the Western Balkan these days. China has also implicitly recognised the 
Western Balkan countries as being as equally European as other EU member states, 
in view of their structural and geographic proximity, by giving them all a seat at the 

60 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36table of the 16+1. Somewhat paradoxically, this makes the Chinese approach rela-
tively successful in the eyes of local stakeholders, at a time when the predominant 
narratives coming from the West are not only rather pessimistic, but also convey  
the idea that the region is not fully European. 

The way ahead

Through the 16+1 subregional cooperation format China has also become an un-
likely  but  important  voice  in  the  debate  on  the  future  trajectory  of  the  Western 
Balkans. In essence, instead of perpetuating the pessimistic discourse on the Balkans 
so often heard in the West, China has presented its ambitious new paradigm and 
grand narrative, best expressed through the BRI and the idea of pooling together 
resources and investing in a common  future without interference in each other’s 
internal political affairs. China has portrayed the Western Balkans as a region with 
untapped  economic  potential  which  can  be  a  landbridge  connecting  Europe,  the 
Mediterranean and Asia, contrary to the common perception of the Balkans as a pe-
ripheral region plagued by political crises, ethno-nationalist conflicts, and compet-
ing geopolitical influences. While China acknowledges the existence of some of the 
problems Western Balkan countries are facing, questions that commonly arise in 
discussions on the Balkans in the West are notably absent from the Chinese agenda.

In the coming years, it is to be expected that unless a major security crisis (involving 
large-scale violence) erupts in the region, China’s interest and engagement in the 
Western Balkans will increase. While many in Brussels may see this as a challenge, 
some elements of the discourse deployed by China can potentially have an empow-
ering effect on the region. China in this sense provides them with the incentive and 
the opportunity to raise their profile as actors in international affairs and rethink 
their role in a more global context. 

However, there is also a potential for unintended consequences, the issue of regula-
tion and compliance with EU standards being only one of them. Populists in the 
region rashly portray China as a potential alternative in case of a deterioration in 
relations with the EU – but at the same time, others also portray China as an anti-
European and anti-Western force. In reality, China has neither the interest nor the 
resources  to  overturn  the  current  status  quo,  and  prioritises  a  stable  international 
environment.  In  the  coming  years,  the  EU  will  have  to  first  and  foremost  ensure 
that  it  does  not  let  populists  hijack  the  China  agenda,  and  concentrate  on  pro-
moting its Strategic Partnership with Beijing.  At the same time, while striving to 
‘Europeanise’  the China policy of the Western Balkan countries, it must also allow 
enough space for these countries to develop their own discourse on and approach 
to China, and pay heed to their needs and demands for economic rewards. Equally, 
Western Balkan leaders and citizens must be careful not to oversimplify the issue of 
cooperation with China  while also finding a way to ensure that in their cooperation 
with Beijing, they also comply with their own EU accession agenda.

61 

Resilience in the Western BalkansIn order to play a constructive role in this process, the EU will need to better co-
ordinate  its  strategic  external  relations  with  its  enlargement  and  neighbourhood 
policy (and personnel). Such improved coordination is likely to have a positive long-
term outcome in fostering resilience in the Western Balkan region, both in terms 
of boosting development and connectivity, but also in the overall capacity of the 
Western Balkan states to act more independently and gain more autonomy and lev-
erage on the international stage. Finally, the EU should further explore ways to find 
complementarities between China’s ambitions and its own goals. Just as Brussels 
and Beijing have figured out a way for China to contribute to the Juncker Plan un-
der  the  BRI  scheme,  they  can  also  explore  ways  in  which  China  can  support  the 
Berlin Process, to the benefit of everyone involved. After all, close cooperation with 
China  during  its period of reform and  opening up has greatly benefited the core 
EU economies. China’s 16+1 platform is also a way for the post-socialist countries 
of Europe, including those from the Western Balkans, to have the opportunity to 
catch up with the countries of ‘core Europe’ in their cooperation with China.

62 

ISSReportNo.36Section 2

INTERNAL DRIVERS

Resilience in the Western BalkansIX. TOO MUCH RESILIENCE? GETTING USED TO CRISES

Florian Bieber

Introduction

The Western Balkans have been shaped by recurrent crises over the past generation. 
Since the 1980s the region has experienced only a few years of ‘normality’, under-
stood as periods of economic growth, moderate or declining unemployment and 
political stability. The 1980s were marked by economic crisis and political confron-
tation. The 1990s were a decade of war, authoritarianism and nationalist mobilisa-
tion. The early years of the new millennium saw a brief interlude of stabilisation, 
expressed in a move towards democratisation, the end of violent conflict and eco-
nomic reform and EU integration. This process gradually came to an end as a conse-
quence of the global economic crisis of 2008-2009. Thus, familiarity with crisis has 
been a hallmark of the Western Balkans over the past 25 years, and this has led to a 
fusion of fragility and resilience.

After  a  gradual  improvement  in  democratic  governance  in  the  2000s,  stagnation 
and decline in standards of governance have marked the region since.1 The Western 
Balkan states have not managed to establish consolidated democracies, and many 
observers are currently worried about an overall trend of ‘democratic backsliding’. 
Today, the political space is dominated by parties representing powerful clientelis-
tic networks.

The political stasis and democratic regression are mirrored by economic stagnation. 
Unemployment rates among the general population averaged between 15 and 30 
percent between 2012 and 2016, even if gradually declining, and between 30 and 60 
percent among young people. These numbers, reaching a regional average of 47.7 
percent in 2015, are staggeringly high.2

However,  economic  woes  and  a  drift  towards  more  authoritarianism  have,  ironi-
cally, not produced a large-scale regional political crisis. There have been, however, 
a number of national crises across the region, including the protracted stalemate in 

1.  ‘The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans: Authoritarianism and EU Stabilitocracy’, BiEPAG Policy Paper, 
March 2017. Available at: http://www.biepag.eu/publications/the-crisis-of-democracy-in-the-western-balkans-
authoritarianism-and-eu-stabilitocracy/

2.  World Bank and Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW), Western Balkans Labor Market Trends 
2017,  April  2017.  Available  at:  http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/336041491297229505/170403-Regional-
Report-Western-Balkan-Labor-Market-Trends-2017-FINAL.pdf

65 

Resilience in the Western Balkansthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia3 between 2015 and May 2017 over the 
widespread abuse of power by the ruling VMRO-DPMNE party. 

The  region  has  recently  attracted  international  media  attention,  focusing  on  its 
potential to relapse into violent conflict, in a context where the prospect of EU ac-
cession  has  become  more  distant  and  joint  transatlantic  support  for  democratic 
reform has become less tangible.

The main challenge facing the region concerns its ability to absorb and withstand 
crises. The continuous crises in the region have made citizens resilient to upheaval; 
however, this resilience can be best understood as an ability to endure crises, rather 
than  the  ability  to  overcome  and  become  less  vulnerable  to  future  crises.  Indeed, 
the region’s motto could be encapsulated by ‘trpi i šuti›, the title of a song by the 
Bosnian hip-hop and reggae band Dubioza kolektiv – meaning ‘suffer and shut up’.4

Drivers of fragility

The region is characterised by various structural causes of fragility, which are in turn 
exploited and reinforced by various political actors. First, structural economic un-
derdevelopment has deep historical roots related to the location of the region on 
Europe’s economic periphery. Modernisation efforts undertaken during the social-
ist period were only of limited success. The economic transition after 1990 and the 
global financial crisis that erupted in 2008-2009 have accentuated the region’s pe-
ripheral economic position and thwarted progress towards economic convergence. 
Periods of high growth during the early 2000s were linked largely to a second wave 
of privatisations – following earlier privatisations during the 1990s that mostly fa-
voured government cronies – and foreign direct investment (FDI), mostly in service 
sectors (banking, financial services and retail), but this has failed to create long-term 
economic growth and employment. 

This precarious economic situation has a number of consequences. First, it leads to 
large-scale emigration, both of well-educated and less educated citizens. This trend 
is a historic phenomenon and has been a central feature of the region’s economic 
and social structure for two centuries. However, the loss of well-educated, talented 
young people due to emigration can create considerable shortfalls in the economy 
and  society.  Furthermore,  the  emigration  ‘safety  valve’  can  reduce  social  pressure 
for  change.  Second,  the  structural  economic  weaknesses  reinforce  the  centrality 
of  the  state.  The  significance  of  the  state  as  a  provider  of  employment  and  eco-
nomic resources is again historically embedded, and not a consequence of socialism 
alone, at least in the post-Yugoslav region. The centrality of the state magnifies the 

3. The author of this chapter originally used the form ‘Macedonia’ in the text. The EUISS uses the name ‘the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ in accordance with the guidelines concerning the official nomenclature of this 
country issued by the EU Office of Publications. 

4.  See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gAd0fQZs5UQ.

66 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36importance of political elites who jostle for control of power and resources, leading 
to a polarisation of  the political space. More immediately, the overriding central au-
thority enjoyed by the state has provided it with far-reaching means of controlling 
society and the political system.

Third, another important structural feature of fragility is the role of informal net-
works  and  practices.  The  historically  central  role  of  the  state,  and  the  repercus-
sions of the political, economic and social transformation after 1989, have resulted 
in  a  system  where  formal  institutions  are  bypassed  through  informal  networks. 
These both reinforce power structures (i.e. through the use of employment to se-
cure loyalty to the state and the ruling party), and subvert them (by using family 
and other personal connections to secure favours). The key issue here is the absence 
of equal and fair access to social and economic opportunities. Instead, alternative, 
non-transparent mechanisms of access to services (bottom-up) and control over so-
ciety (top-down) are in place that are enduring and deeply entrenched. These can 
absorb societal change and institutional and legal transformation, but remain fun-
damentally unequal and usually reinforce hierarchical dependencies. 

Fourth,  the  state  system  and  borders  are  not  based  on  near  universal  consent. 
While in most of the EU existing states and borders are widely accepted (with no-
table  exceptions  in  Spain,  Belgium  and  the  UK),  in  the  Western  Balkans  the  cur-
rent state system does not reflect broad agreement. A significant share of citizens 
in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Serbia,  Kosovo  and  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of 
Macedonia would prefer to live in a different state arrangement, either integrating 
territories of neighbouring states, populated by ethnic kin, or seceding to join them.

This does not mean that most citizens would actively like to change the status quo 
or see this as an important issue – election results would suggest that this is not the 
case, as parties advocating radical change receive mostly modest levels of support. 
However, the latent discontent with the state system can be exacerbated by the re-
gion’s structural economic weaknesses. If states are unable to deliver on economic 
improvement, their legitimacy will suffer and the discontent of citizens can be chan-
nelled towards demanding a change of the status quo. 

Fifth, the legacies of the wars of the 1990s continue to constitute a source of con-
tention and division. The dominant narratives of self-victimisation and apportion-
ing blame to the other side, as shaped during the wars, have persisted and are repro-
duced in school textbooks and the media. The impact of international efforts, such 
as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or domestic 
civil society initiatives, such as REKOM, have been modest. While some war crimes, 
such as the Srebrenica massacre, are now widely acknowledged, these narratives are 
still pervasive throughout the former Yugoslavia and can easily be instrumentalised 
to mobilise nationalist sentiment and poison intercommunity relations. 

67 

Resilience in the Western BalkansThese five structural features of fragility in the region have not been addressed in re-
cent years and as a result have generally become more entrenched. They provide the 
backdrop for more immediate sources of fragility in the countries of the Western 
Balkans.  The  deteriorating  international  environment,  as  noted  earlier,  can  be 
viewed as a negative intervening factor: this presents an array of challenges includ-
ing the overall crisis of liberal democracy, as well as the institutional and identity 
crisis of the EU, and the erosion of transatlantic ties. More recently this also includes 
the rise in geopolitical tensions in the Balkans resulting from the migration flows 
through the region, and the stronger presence of external actors such as Russia and 
Turkey. Economic stagnation is both a result of the adverse international environ-
ment since 2008 and internal structural factors.

Regional elites have been incorporating these considerations into their system of 
rule. Few of them appear to be committed democrats and political competition re-
mains highly polarised and based on a zero-sum game. Consequently, the system 
of  rule  has  moved  towards  greater  authoritarianism  and  democratic  institutions, 
where they exist, have been undermined and instrumentalised. 

Political elites promise stability and continuation of the status quo, based on modest 
overtures towards the EU and paying lip service to democratic practices and reform.  
Their  rule  is  not  based  on  consensus  seeking  and  institution  building.  Thus,  the 
inherent polarisation of the political landscape has a high potential for conflict and 
in combination with the abuse of institutions renders an orderly transfer of power 
through elections increasingly more difficult. This encourages the proliferation of 
extra-institutional  politics  (boycotts,  protests,  violence),  which  reinforces  fragil-
ity.  Furthermore,  non-democratic  regimes  thrive  on  crisis  and  use  crisis  to  shore 
up their power and divert attention from their undemocratic system of rule. Thus, 
elites take advantage of or even manufacture crisis to secure control.

Taken together, there are multiple levels of fragility that are interlocking and cur-
rently  mutually  reinforcing.  In  discussing  and  confronting  the  more  immediate 
challenge posed by elites and their autocratic system of rule, there is a need to bear 
in mind that, unless comprehensively addressed, the structural causes of fragility 
will persist no matter what government is in power. 

Drivers of resilience 

Populations across the region have been resilient and resourceful in surviving the 
multiple  crises  with  which  they  have  been  confronted  over  the  past  few  decades. 
Persistently high unemployment and poverty rates pose an ongoing challenge, giv-
ing rise to widespread emigration. Local economies are as a result heavily depend-
ent on remittances. The region is one of the world’s key remittance-receiving areas, 
together with Central America (which receives high volumes of remittances from 
the US) and Central Asia (from Russia). Most remittances in the Western Balkans 

68 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36originate  from  the  EU  and  Switzerland  and  the  phenomenon  is  particularly  sig-
nificant in Albania and Kosovo. The region depends heavily on the export of labour 
(both legal and illegal) and there is a strong reliance on informal networks and fami-
lies in local economies.

While authoritarian and nationalist views are common, as evidenced in the results 
of surveys, these are counterbalanced by high levels of scepticism and distrust to-
wards political elites, traumatic memories of the wars of the 1990s and re-emerging 
informal cross-national cooperation.

On a larger scale, the relatively small size of the countries in the Western Balkans, 
plus their far-reaching integration into the economies and social and political struc-
tures of the EU, result in links and dependencies that prevent them from seeking 
alternatives to EU integration. Attempts to build close ties to countries outside the 
EU can at best supplement, but not replace, ties to the EU. This orientation towards 
Central and Western Europe is historically embedded and unlikely to weaken.

The way ahead

The current status quo in the Western Balkans is exacerbating democratic, economic 
and social stagnation and regression, resulting in an increased potential for crisis 
and conflict. The region has clearly become more fragile in recent years. This trend 
is largely the result of developments outside the region, combined with structural 
factors that compound the challenges, as outlined above. 

The  close,  enduring  ties  between  the  Western  Balkans  and  Central  and  Western 
Europe will persist and are unlikely to be permanently disrupted. The key question 
is whether the offer of integration, as embodied by EU membership, will become 
more plausible again and entail the possibility of equality and convergence as its 
central promises, rather than a permanent centre-periphery relationship.

The Brexit crisis and fraught transatlantic relationship mean that, in the mid-term 
at least, the EU is not going to be a transformative actor in the region in the way that 
it was a decade ago. Whether it will regain this dynamic will depend on factors ex-
ternal to the Western Balkans. However, the question remains whether the current 
approach can bridge the crisis of enlargement and transformation. This appears un-
likely. The EU and its member states have been insufficiently critical of the decline 
of democracy in the region and offer few solutions to the structural weaknesses and 
sources of fragility that have been outlined in this chapter. This would require a new 
approach that reasserts the role of the EU as a normative and transformative actor. 
In addition, the current crisis highlights the difficulty of achieving enduring change 
through external conditionality alone. Thus, overcoming fragility in the region will 
require more influential domestic actors willing to initiate change who are commit-
ted to the normative framework of the EU.

69 

Resilience in the Western BalkansToday the region has few political actors who openly oppose EU integration: but 
most only pay lip service to democratic reform. Clearly, much of this commitment 
is insincere and risks undermining the content of the EU accession agenda itself. 
Citizens, especially those active in social movements, and other pro-reform civil so-
ciety actors note that declaratory commitment to EU principles and reform by local 
political elites appears to suffice to receive external support. The danger is that the 
pro-reform movement might become increasingly anti-EU, as they see EU support 
for governing elites as ultimately an obstacle to reform. Such a trajectory could in-
flict  lasting  damage  to  the  EU  integration  project  in  the  Western  Balkans  that  it 
would take years to overcome.

70 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36X. NO OPEN SOCIETY - NO RESILIENCE

Srdjan Cvijić

Introduction

There is a paradox at the heart of the story of EU enlargement in the Western Balkans. 

On  the  one  hand,  Montenegro  and  Serbia  started  the  EU  accession  negotiations 
process; Albania, a candidate country, is expected to open the first negotiating chap-
ters  before  the  end  of  2017  or  at  the  beginning  of  2018.  In  the  former  Yugoslav 
Republic  of  Macedonia,1  essentially  blocked  on  its  path  to  EU  membership,  or 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, still waiting for a meaningful process of 
European integration to start, a semblance of normality is maintained both by the 
local governments and the EU. 

On  the  other  hand,  democracy  in  the  region  is  backsliding.  Numerous  electoral 
observation reports by the OSCE/ODIHR cast doubt on the freedom and fairness 
of  elections.  The  2016  World  Press  Freedom  Index  concludes  that  the  Western 
Balkans experienced the steepest decline in media freedom worldwide since 2012. 
Corruption, in some cases amounting to state capture by ruling parties, and unre-
formed security services restrict freedom and rule of law across the region. In the 
case  of  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia,  even  a  traditionally  tactful 
European Commission Country Report for 2016, explicitly uses the term ‘state cap-
ture’ to describe the situation on the ground.2 Recent developments in the coun-
try, such as the storming of the parliament on 27 April by Macedonian nationalist 
hooligans and violence against elected officials, allegedly facilitated by the passivity 
of the police force, demonstrate that the government-inspired clampdown on civil 
society should be considered as a warning sign of a deterioration of the security situ-
ation in the country.

Particularly worrying is the rapidly closing space for civil society organisations and 
independent and critical media. Last December, Skopje came close to passing leg-
islation reminiscent of Russia’s foreign agent and undesirable organisations laws, 
following  months  of  government-orchestrated  attacks  against  the  Foundation 
Open  Society–Macedonia,  and  other  civil  society  organisations  in  the  run-up 

1.  The author of this chapter originally used the form ‘the Republic of Macedonia’ in the text. The EUISS uses the 
name  ‘the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia’  in  accordance  with  the  guidelines  concerning  the  official 
nomenclature of this country issued by the EU Office of Publications. 

2.    For  a  comprehensive  account  on  the  crisis  of  democracy  in  the  Western  Balkans  see:  Florian  Bieber  et  al, 
‘The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans: Authoritarianism and EU Stabilitocracy’, BiEPAG Policy Paper, 
March 2017.

71 

Resilience in the Western Balkansto  parliamentary  elections.  This  would  have  been  unimaginable  only  a  couple  of 
years ago. 

The situation is similar in the rest of the region. While the first decade of the twenty-
first century brought an expansion of freedoms in the Western Balkans, since 2010 
this is in sharp decline. The region is now back to where it started in the early 2000s.

Drivers of fragility: Pax Junckeriana 

In 2015, for a brief moment, the refugee crisis put the Western Balkans back on the 
political map of Europe, highlighting the region’s strategic importance for Europe’s 
security and stability. But hopes that this heightened attention would translate into 
greater political commitment towards EU membership were quickly shattered as it 
became clear that Europe’s attention was limited to ensuring the effective closure of 
the Western Balkans migration route.3 

Not just in the context of the migration crisis, but more generally, the EU is ready to 
trade democracy for stability. The 2003 Thessaloniki European Council promise of 
future EU membership to the countries of the region seems to be fading into obliv-
ion. The European Commission’s ‘White Paper on the Future of Europe’ published 
on 1 March 2017 does not mention EU enlargement once. Instead, the EU turns a 
blind eye to local leaders’ authoritarian tendencies and at times actively supports 
local strongmen regardless of democratic backsliding in their countries and the in-
timidation of civil society.4 This is not an isolated example but a consistent policy.

Even before the global financial and economic crisis, when EU integration still en-
joyed momentum, the 2007 Berlin Declaration issued on the occasion of the 50th 
anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome referred to ‘the unnatural di-
vision  of  Europe  [as  something]  consigned  to  the  past.’  The  Declaration  did  not 
mention EU enlargement a single time. In 2009, the EU enlargement portfolio was 
merged  with  the  European  Neighborhood  Policy  under  the  mandate  of  a  single 
Commissioner  and  single  Directorate  General.  Grouping  together  enlargement 
countries with the countries of the neighbourhood under the same portfolio – os-
tensibly an organisational matter – was yet another manifestation of a policy an-
nounced in July 2014 with the statement of the then nominee for the presidency of 
the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker that ‘there will be no new enlarge-
ment in the next five years.’ 

3.   For a comprehensive account on the effects of the EU’s response to the migration crisis in the Balkans on the 
state of democracy in the region see Srdjan Cvijic, Nikola Dimitrov and Natasha Wunsch, ’The migrant crisis: a 
catalyst for EU enlargement?’, Policy Paper, BiEPAG, June 2016.

4.   An illustrative example is the participation at the pre-electoral rally of the former Yugoslave Republic of Mac-
edonia’s VMRO-DPMNE party and explicit backing of a contender in the election by Austria’s Foreign Minister 
Sebastian Kurz. Such actions of unwarranted support gave local strongmen a sense of impunity, thus creating 
a political environment where the abovementioned May 2017 electoral violence could occur.  See http://www.
balkaninsight.com/en/article/critics-slam-kurz-s-support-for-macedonia-s-ruling-party-11-28-2016

72 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36Juncker’s 2014 ‘moratorium’ on EU enlargement announced grim times for the civil 
society of the region. The absence of a political momentum in EU enlargement had 
two  consequences:  it  showed  that  the  EU’s  membership  carrot  is  illusory;  and  it 
simultaneously weakened the stick that could be used to enforce reforms, thus leav-
ing the region’s civil society vulnerable to increasingly intolerant ruling elites. This 
is how the Western Balkans ended up in a vicious circle, a perennial status quo of Pax 
Junckeriana. 

Drivers of resilience: a citizen-centred approach to resilience

The EU’s transformative power in the region is in free fall and this issue urgently 
needs to be addressed. Slowly, the EU’s leadership is waking up from its winter sleep. 
During her visit to the region in the first week of March 2017, Federica Mogherini, 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of 
the European Commission, delivered words of hope: ‘this is not an “enlargement” 
of our Union but a reunification because the Balkans are part of Europe’. The 9-10 
March 2017 European Council conclusions echoed her words: ‘the European Union 
remains faithful to the promise of Thessaloniki and fully committed to the stabil-
ity and prosperity of the region’. Faced with growing tensions and divisions in the 
Western  Balkans,  as  well  as  the  ’unhealthy’  influence  of  other  geopolitical  actors 
(such as Russia and Turkey), the EU is finally contemplating a more active engage-
ment in the region. An acknowledgment by Brussels, Berlin and other EU capitals 
that the EU’s insufficient engagement has allowed other powers to gain ground in 
the region, is still counterbalanced by a fear that the populations in the EU mem-
ber states are hostile to further enlargement of the Union. The Rome Declaration 
issued on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of 
Rome on 25 March 2017 is a good illustration of this. In it the EU Heads of State 
and Government pledge ‘keeping the door open to those who want to join’, but then 
add a politically and semantically unnecessary qualification – ‘later’.

Regardless of the shortcomings, this is an important change of tone, but strategic 
communication is not enough. In order to keep the Western Balkans on a reform 
path  towards  membership,  the  EU  needs  to  adopt  a  citizen-centred  approach  to 
resilience. 

Presently, EU accession negotiations are almost exclusively a dialogue between the 
EU  and  governments  of  the  region.  Parliaments  and  civil  society  remain  largely 
sidelined. Even in Montenegro, which formally adopted a more inclusive approach 
to civil society participation in the negotiations, until recently civil society organi-
sations  (CSOs)  did  not  have  access  to  reports  prepared  by  different  Directorates 
General  and  agencies  of  the  European  Commission,  as  well  as  expert  missions 
to  Montenegro.  Parliaments  of  the  region  do  not  have  full  access  to  such  docu-
ments either. 

73 

Resilience in the Western BalkansDespite  the  attempts  of  civil  society  organisations  to  gain  access  to  them,  the 
European Commission is reluctant to disclose the reports claiming ownership of 
the documents and thus a right to decide who receives them. Hence the negotia-
tions process remains opaque and undemocratic. 

Due to vaguely defined goals in the Action Plans within the framework of the ne-
gotiating chapters, governments are able to manipulate perceptions of achieved re-
sults and communicate them in a way that fosters unrealistic expectations to other 
stakeholders and to the general public. Oversight of the reports by NGOs and the 
general public would make potential manipulations much more difficult. But it is 
not just the Western Balkans that need more transparency from Brussels. It is the 
EU’s own credibility in the region that is at stake. 

The way ahead: a new partnership with the citizens of the region

Inviting civil society to provide input to the annual country reports of the European 
Commission is not enough.

An empowered civil society is a precondition for a successful EU enlargement pro-
cess and a more resilient Western Balkans region. In a situation where parliaments 
are severely marginalised by, and the judiciary subservient to, the executive power, 
civil society is the only hope for a functioning system of checks and balances. The 
EU accession negotiations process carries in itself a bias toward the executive power 
preventing true parliamentary debate. By exacerbating the democratic deficit in this 
way, the EU is copying the strongmen politics it seeks to combat.

The task of creating independent parliaments, courts and other institutions cannot 
be achieved overnight. But empowering civil society requires relatively little effort 
in comparison. All the EU has to do is publicly stand in its defence and increase the 
transparency of the EU enlargement process. 

Transparency and meaningful participation of civil society in the EU enlargement 
process is vital also to counter the propaganda of other geopolitical actors whose 
influence in the region is growing. The EU’s approach of deal-making with politi-
cal elites (i.e. encouraging so-called ‘Stabilitocracy’) achieves the opposite: it breeds 
instability  by fuelling discontent,  delegitimising and thus weakening support for 
the  EU  in  the  region,  and  allowing  other  geopolitical  actors  to  gain  traction  and 
influence.

74 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36XI. PRINCIPLED PRAGMATISM AND RESILIENCE

Ana E. Juncos

Introduction

The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) adopted in 2016 proposes ‘principled pragmatism’ 
as a new operating principle in the EU’s foreign policy. According to the EUGS: ‘We 
will be guided by clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic assessment 
of the current strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a 
better world.’1 In this way, principled pragmatism seeks to reconcile interests and 
values, which according to the EUGS go ‘hand in hand’. The EU appears to embrace 
a more assertive and self-interested strategy: fostering resilience abroad can enhance 
the security of the Union by promoting more stable and prosperous states in the 
neighbourhood. At the same time, this new approach appears to be in line with the 
EU’s  liberal  narrative  and  its  normative  and  soft  power  ambitions  regarding  the 
promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights.

The  notion  of  principled  pragmatism  is  also  in  step  with  the  rise  of  resilience  in 
EU  foreign  and  security  policy,  as  reflected  in  its  emphasis  on  a  more  pragmatic 
approach.2 This pragmatist orientation could serve as a new catalyst for EU foreign 
policy in the Western Balkans and provide an opportunity to move beyond previ-
ous policies towards a more ‘bottom-up’ approach to building peace. Accordingly, 
a stronger focus should be placed on local practices and the practical consequences 
of the EU’s actions, thereby embracing and further enhancing the already existing 
internal capacities of the Western Balkan countries. In doing so, the EU will need 
to carefully manage several challenges (drivers of fragility) and draw on existing ca-
pabilities  (drivers  of  resilience)  in  order  to  develop  a  renewed  and  more  effective 
approach to the region.

Drivers of fragility

Principled  pragmatism  entails  a  careful  balancing  act  between  the  promotion  of 
interests and values, as well as some compromises and trade-offs in practice. The 
EU will need to take into consideration the ‘reality’ of power and interests by rec-
ognising  that  norms  can  only  be  advanced  when  they  are  sustained  by  the  right 

1.  European External Action Service, ‘Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the 

European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, June 2016. 

2.  Ana E. Juncos, ‘Resilience as the new EU foreign policy paradigm: a pragmatic turn?’, European Security, vol. 26, 

no. 1, 2017, pp. 1-18.

75 

Resilience in the Western Balkansconfiguration of power and interests. Moreover, the EU should consider the conse-
quences of norm-driven actions and the fact that pragmatic tactics will sometimes 
need to be employed to avoid undesired social outcomes, but with the view of pro-
moting moral principles down the line.

An approach that seeks to reconcile values and interests is of course nothing new in 
the EU’s foreign policy towards the Western Balkans. While the promotion of EU 
principles has been at the core of the EU’s enlargement policy, security considera-
tions have always played a role in this part of the world, including regarding the 
offer  of  EU  membership  at  Thessaloniki  in  2003.  The  notion  of  principled  prag-
matism seeks to bridge these two elements by ensuring that the long-term goal of 
EU membership for the Balkans can be achieved in the short and medium term by 
a more adaptable and flexible policy informed by a ‘realistic assessment’ of the local 
politics, security considerations and geopolitical context. For instance, according to 
the EUGS, geostrategic considerations will play a key role in determining where the 
EU should be more active, with the EU focusing on the neighbourhood (broadly un-
derstood), and only engaging elsewhere on a case-by-case basis. This suggests that 
the  EU  will  continue  to  be  heavily  involved  in  the  Western  Balkans,  where  it  can 
make a difference through the offer of EU membership, and where the geopolitical 
context has become more complex and competitive in recent years with the increas-
ing involvement of Russia, Turkey and other international powers.

While a more pragmatist stance offers new opportunities for the EU’s policy in the 
Western Balkans, there are still a number of challenges associated with it. The EU 
will continue to face criticisms that it lacks consistency in its foreign policy, espe-
cially where normative considerations might be seen as the price to be paid to main-
tain security and stability. The apparent tension between stability and democracy 
promotion  remains  particularly  pertinent  in  the  Western  Balkans,  where  the  rise 
of autocratic leaders and semi-authoritarian governments challenges key principles 
such as democratic oversight and freedom of the press. Yet, to what extent is it prag-
matic to accept authoritarianism as a way to maintain stability? Will the EU hide 
behind the convenient label of ‘pragmatism’ to do less or, even worse, nothing in 
the face of human rights violations? While in the short term, some might see the 
promotion of stability as the best strategy, repressive regimes will no doubt result in 
more instability further down the line as they fuel more popular discontent. Hence 
the EU should avoid the dangers of a ‘resilience as stability’ paradigm.

This discussion also highlights the tensions between state and societal resilience in-
sofar as a strong and resilient state might not always be in harmony with a resilient 
society. For instance, the region continues to suffer from a lack of capacity at the 
institutional/state level, with many Western Balkan countries characterised by weak 
rule of law, state capture, organised crime and corruption. To address these drivers 
of fragility, the EU will need to continue to invest in building state resilience. Yet, 
building the capacity of the security forces in the Western Balkans could result in 
more assertive policing (e.g. crowd control) undermining democratic accountability 

76 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36or  the  respect  for  human  rights,  and  aggravating  the  tensions  between  state  and 
societal resilience. In sum, principled pragmatism might leave the EU open to the 
same criticisms about inconsistencies and double standards in its external action, 
especially if the EU follows a ‘resilience as stability’ paradigm.

Drivers of resilience

While there remain important challenges, there are also some assets and expertise 
the EU can draw on to implement a policy driven by ‘principled pragmatism’ and 
contribute to fostering resilience in the Western Balkans. Firstly, the EU will be able 
to draw on the accumulated experience of the enlargement policy and, particularly, 
the emphasis on nationally-owned processes. Having said that, there is certainly a 
need for a more people-centred and inclusive approach, by seeking to embed owner-
ship not just at the governmental level, but also at the societal level. Yet, even if the 
EU is able to achieve a more pragmatic bottom-up approach, a tension between con-
ditionality and local ownership will remain as the extent of local ownership that can 
be exercised in the context of enlargement is limited by the fact that the objectives 
are already externally determined by the acquis communautaire. On the positive side, 
the  notion  of  resilience  and  the  pragmatist  approach  associated  with  it  provides 
room  for  a  more  flexible,  responsive  and  adaptable  approach,  which  might  ease 
some of the rigidities related to the application of EU conditionality in the region.

The enlargement process has also the advantage of being a multi-stakeholder pro-
cess, involving a plurality of actors (both within and outside the EU), which should 
increase the opportunities for accountability and the transparency of the process. 
From  an  EU  perspective,  the  involvement  of  the  European  Commission  and  the 
European  Parliament  could  prove  particularly  important  by  acting  as  a  brake  on 
any potential moves towards a ‘resilience as stability’ paradigm – which some mem-
ber states might be more inclined to adopt. The European Parliament, for instance, 
has been particularly vocal in this regard and largely unwilling to close its eyes to 
violations of human rights and the rule of law in the past. More generally, in a post-
Brexit and post-Trump EU, there also seems to be a growing internal awareness of 
the  dangers  of  neglecting  the  rise  of  illiberal  democracies  within  the  EU  and  the 
need to intervene early on (as suggested by the cases of Hungary and Poland). This 
might also influence the EU’s policy towards the Western Balkans and other neigh-
bouring countries.

Last but not least, the EU will also be able to draw on its previous capacity-building 
activities, both in the context of the enlargement process and its Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations. These include twinning pro-
grammes, training activities and the monitoring, mentoring and advising mandates 
which have so far targeted civil servants, security officials, and a range of organisa-
tions and institutions across the Western Balkans. It is imperative however that the 
EU  learns  from  both  the  successes  and  failures  of  these  past  activities  to  ensure 

77 

Resilience in the Western Balkansthat capacity-building programmes target the right institutions and individuals. In 
particular, a stronger focus should be placed on fostering and further enhancing 
the already existing internal capacities of the Western Balkan countries, rather than 
starting from scratch with each iteration of a capacity-building programme.

The way ahead

What does the notion of principled pragmatism mean for the EU and resilience in 
the Western Balkans? This new approach implies a mix of realism and idealism by 
(a) making a realistic assessment of the geopolitical context; (b) moving forward to-
wards the formulation of a political vision through credible and concrete steps; (c) 
communicating this vision to the Western Balkan governments and populations; 
and (d) strengthening local ownership and supporting capacity building.

Implementing  the  notion  of  principled  pragmatism  in  the  Western  Balkans  sug-
gests  that  the  EU  will  need  to  carefully  manage  expectations  and  local  realities. 
First, a more pragmatic approach should be based on a ‘realistic assessment’ of in-
ternational politics. In other words, the EU must take into account both the need 
for  cooperation,  but  also  the  fierce  competition  it  faces  from  other  international 
powers  vying  for  influence  in  the  Western  Balkans.  Again,  such  a  realistic  assess-
ment should not serve as an excuse to do less, or nothing, in the face of growing 
authoritarian trends in the region. Realism will need to be carefully balanced with 
respect for European values if what the EU seeks to promote is resilient states and 
societies.

Second, the EU needs to set out a clear vision for the future of the region. Lack of 
commitment and hesitant policies have led in the past to a rise in euroscepticism 
among Balkan elites and populations. The result has been a preservation of the sta-
tus quo whereby Balkan political leaders pretend to reform, while EU policymakers 
pretend they support the enlargement process. This also requires visible and con-
crete steps that positively contribute to the welfare of Balkan societies in the short 
and medium term – as was the case with the visa liberalisation process. The citizens 
of the Western Balkans need to experience the benefits of closer integration into the 
EU in their daily lives. This should also contribute to fostering societal resilience in 
the medium term.

Third,  the  EU’s  vision  toward  the  Western  Balkans  needs  to  be  better  communi-
cated to a number of different audiences. Internally, the EU needs to better explain 
this vision to its own populations as a way to ensure the legitimacy and credibility of 
the enlargement process. The EU should also seek to engage partners in the Western 
Balkans, involving them in the design and implementation of specific programmes. 
The  EU  and  the  local  governments  also  need  to  engage  in  a  better  public  diplo-
macy exercise vis-à-vis local populations in the Balkans. This might not only increase 

78 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36support for EU accession across the region, but also decrease support for other al-
ternative narratives offered by competing powers.

Fourth and finally, the EU needs to deliver on its promise of stronger local own-
ership,  with  the  proviso  noted  earlier  that  there  will  always  be  a  tension  between 
conditionality and local ownership. While local ownership entails a commitment 
to  work  with  a  variety  of  local  actors  (national  governments,  municipalities  and 
civil society), given current authoritarian trends, the EU would be well advised to 
strengthen  its  support  for  civil  society  in  the  region.  Capacity-building  interven-
tions should be designed in a way that promote not just effective delivery of ser-
vices by state institutions, but also respect for European principles, such as human 
rights, democratic oversight and accountability. A stronger focus should be placed 
on existing local practices and capabilities with a view to further enhancing already 
existing internal capacities.

79 

Resilience in the Western BalkansResilience in the Western BalkansXII. BALKAN STRONGMEN AND 
FRAGILE INSTITUTIONS1

Igor Bandović and Nikola Dimitrov

Introduction: the European promise

Following the violent conflicts that accompanied the dissolution of the Yugoslav 
Federation in the 1990s, the Western Balkans was promised a European future. At 
the  Thessaloniki  summit  in  June  2003,  the  European  Council  declared  that  ‘the 
future of the Balkans is within the European Union’.2 But, after two decades of en-
gagement and 14 years after the promise of Thessaloniki, it appears that the EU has 
lost its power of attraction in the region. 

The EU accession process – the best bet for the Western Balkans countries to trans-
form into stable and prosperous democracies governed by the rule of law – has run 
out of steam. Worse, for those who hope to join the EU, the accession path often 
seems like a road to nowhere. Many of the accession candidates have come to believe 
that the EU treats them unfairly. Sceptical EU member states, on the other hand, 
are increasingly unconvinced that the transformative power of enlargement actually 
delivers real results. They feel that the accession process is not strict enough. Faced 
with this mood of waning enthusiasm for the project, politicians avoid debates on 
further enlargement. Besides, in the past few years the EU has been too busy ‘fire-
fighting’  a  series  of  internal  crises  and  coping  with  bigger  and  more  pressing  ex-
ternal  challenges  to  worry  about  the  Western  Balkans.  At  least  for  as  long  as  the 
region remains peaceful. The refugee crisis of 2015-2016 highlighted the strategic 
importance of the region, but did little to foster more long-term strategic thinking 
about its future. 

This has created an unhealthy symbiotic relationship between the Balkan strong-
men on one hand, and European political elites under pressure from the far-right 
and an increasingly Eurosceptic public opinion on the other hand, which ultimately 
plays in favour of maintaining the status quo. The ruling Balkan elites pay lip-service 
to  reforms  and  tighten  their  grip  on  feeble  institutions,  while  feeding  their  pop-
ular base a rhetoric of victimhood and stoking anti-EU sentiment. For European 
leaders,  growing  authoritarianism,  corruption  and  impunity  keep  the  region  off 

1.  This text was written in April 2017 and therefore only takes account of events and developments in the region up 

until the end of that month.

2.  European Council, Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans Summit, PRES/03/163, Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003.

81 

Resilience in the Western Balkansthe unpopular enlargement agenda in their national parliaments.3 The European 
Commission is caught in the crossfire, trying to keep the process alive and make 
it more credible, but it faces a Herculean task. On paper, there is some progress in 
terms of climbing up the ladder, at least with some countries, such as Montenegro 
and Serbia, albeit at a very slow pace.

Drivers of fragility: the rise of authoritarianism

In  reality  however,  the  Western  Balkans  are  clearly  moving  backward.  Laws  are 
adopted, usually without much prior debate in parliaments, but not implemented. 
Corruption remains pervasive, justice selective and freedom of the press is declining. 
Authoritarianism is on the rise, as is citizens’ growing apathy and disillusionment 
with  political  elites  in  the  face  of  rampant  unemployment,  widening  inequality 
and a political system characterised by entrenched cronyism. The recent Nations in 
Transit Report released by Freedom House paints an alarming picture of the region 
where ‘nationalists are in a race to the bottom’.4 The deterioration in the quality of 
democracy has been most marked in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.5 
Once a hopeful frontrunner in the accession process, its score is now nearing the 
low point of 2001, when violent ethnic conflict erupted in the country. Despite its 
formal progress in EU accession negotiations, Serbia’s democracy score has reached 
its lowest point since 2003, showing that the process of legislative approximation 
with the EU acquis does not necessarily translate into progress in democratisation. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index in 2016 places Albania between 
Guatemala and Ecuador, and Bosnia and Herzegovina just before Lebanon.6

A ‘winner takes all’ mentality seems to be prevalent in the region. Political leaders 
often interpret their election victory as a licence to dictate their will, rather than as 
a mandate to navigate their respective countries through the complex democratic 
process of debates, cooperation, coalition-building and compromise. Once in office, 
their prime concern is to shore up their power and destroy the political opposition, 
along  with  the  nascent  systems  of  checks  and  balances,  thereby  endangering  the 
fragile democratic scaffolding of the Western Balkan societies.

One  of  the  biggest  challenges  and  a  major  driver  of  fragility  in  the  region  is  the 
rise  of  authoritarianism.  Reforms  undertaken  over  the  last  decade  in  three  key 
areas  –  the  creation  of  an  efficient  public  administration,  the  development  of  an 

3.  Florian Bieber and Marko Kmezic, ‘EU enlargement in the Western Balkans in a time of uncertainty’, BiEPAG Pol-
icy Brief, September 2016. Available at http://www.biepag.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/EU-Enlargement-
in-the-Western-Balkans-in-a-Time-of-Uncertainty.pdf. 

4.  Freedom House, ‘Nations in Transit 2017: The False Promise of Populism’, 2017. Available at https://freedom-

house.org/sites/default/files/NIT2017_booklet_FINAL_0.pdf. 

5.  The authors of this chapter originally used the form ‘Macedonia’ in the text. The EUISS uses the name ‘the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ in accordance with the guidelines concerning the official nomenclature of this 
country issued by the EU Office of Publications.

6.  The Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Democracy Index 2016: Revenge of the “Deplorables”’, The Economist, 2016.

82 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36independent judiciary and the fight against corruption – have failed to pass the test 
of sustainability and irreversibility. The rule of strongmen goes hand-in-hand with 
political  interference  in  the  judiciary,  control  and  manipulation  of  state  institu-
tions, patronage, and impunity. The rule of law presupposes an independent judici-
ary, strong institutions, and accountability. In Serbia, two-thirds of the population 
see corruption and crime, and the venal behaviour of politicians, as the main in-
ternal threats to democratic governance.7 The European Commission Enlargement 
Strategy  Report  released  in  November  2016  stressed  that  ‘strengthening  the  rule 
of law remains a key challenge’, adding that ‘corruption remains widespread in all 
countries, with continued impunity, especially for high-level corruption’.

In addition, according to the Report ‘freedom of expression and media remains a 
particular concern’ in the region. There is widespread interference in editorial poli-
cies,  a  clampdown  on  critical  and  investigative  reporting,  clientelist  ties  between 
political elites and media owners, threats against journalists, censorship, and wide-
spread abuse of public advertising for electoral purposes. This undermines the con-
cept of an ‘informed citizen’ as the backbone of any functional democracy.

Although Balkan strongmen like to be seen as guarantors of stability, as has par-
ticularly been the case in the context of the refugee crisis, their governance erodes 
structural stability and institutional resilience. To divert attention from authoritar-
ian practices and avoid accountability, they often actively exploit and even instigate 
ethnic tensions, using a specific brand of ‘Balkan populism’ combining ethnic iden-
tity,  issues  of  statehood,  a  narrative  of  victimhood  and  witch  hunting  of  domes-
tic ‘traitors’ and foreign ‘enemies’. Caught red-handed in the wiretapping scandal, 
Nikola  Gruevski’s  ruling  VMRO-DPMNE  party  in  Skopje  has  resisted  a  peaceful 
transition of power and striven to avoid political accountability, stirring up ethnic 
tensions as a diversionary tactic.

Drivers of resilience: the democratic constituency

To borrow a saying attributed to an Austrian officer in the final days of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, ‘the situation is serious, but not hopeless’. The widespread pro-
tests  that  took  place  in  Skopje  in  April  2016  and  in  Sarajevo  in  2014,  and  more 
recently in Belgrade, show that people’s understandable disillusionment with the 
political elites is increasingly matched by a growing sense of empowerment among 
civil society and whole swathes of the population at large, and a determination to 
hold authorities to account and challenge the status quo. 

In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, to take but one example, President 
Ivanov’s response to the problem of impunity and lack of accountability exposed 

7.  Belgrade Centre for Secuity Policy, ‘Public Opinion on the Security of Serbia and Dialogue with Pristina’, Febru-
ary 2017 Available at http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/public_opinion_on_the_security_of_ser-
bia_and_dialo.pdf. 

83 

Resilience in the Western Balkansby the wiretapping scandal, was to issue blanket pardons to senior government fig-
ures, thereby putting the political elite above the law. He was enabled to do so by a 
highly controversial decision of the Constitutional Court, annulling the legislative 
limitations upon his abolition powers. It was the citizens who took to the streets 
and forced the President to reverse his decision. In this instance, the societal drivers 
of resilience (the citizens) stepped in once the state institutions (the President and 
the  Constitutional  Court)  failed  and  revealed  themselves  instead  to  be  drivers  of 
fragility. Similarly, the failure of the Serbian police to react in the Savamala case in 
Belgrade, when a group of masked men used bulldozers to demolish buildings in 
a historic area of the city earmarked by the government as the site of a major rede-
velopment project, brought the drivers of resilience to light: the Commissioner for 
Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection, the Ombudsman 
and the citizens. The silence of the European Commission 2016 Serbia Report on 
the Savamala incident undermines the EU’s credibility and is a bitter disappoint-
ment to its core constituency in the region.

In both cases, the mainstream national media remained largely silent. None of the 
biggest TV channels in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia dared to broad-
cast the intercepted communications, exposing apparent direct involvement of sen-
ior government and party officials in corruption, abuse of office, electoral fraud and 
political interference in the judiciary. Access to accurate and reliable information 
is mainly possible due to the work of alternative news outlets, regional media net-
works and courageous investigative journalists. Investigative reporting plays a cru-
cial and indispensable role in the fight against impunity and corruption.

Independent  institutions  with  a  proven  track  record  of  integrity  are  subject  to 
smear campaigns. The Special Public Prosecutor’s office in Skopje, an institution 
that commands high levels of public trust in the country and that is tasked with 
investigating and prosecuting crimes arising from the wiretapping affair, has been 
subject to a continuous negative campaign by the ruling party and the pro-govern-
ment media.8

The way ahead: democracy and rule of law are not negotiable 

The EU should establish clear red lines in the key areas of media freedom, rule of 
law and democratic governance and never hesitate to cry foul when they are crossed. 
State drivers of fragility in the form of captured institutions must be denounced 
and  state  drivers  of  resilience  praised  and  supported.  Delivering  clear  and  public 
messages backed by strict conditionality when it comes to the state of democracy 
and  the  rule  of  law  in  the  Western  Balkan  countries  will  keep  both  governments 
and broader societal constituencies focused on the core purpose of the accession 

8.  International  Republican  Institute  (IRI),  ‘Macedonia:  political  instability  escalates  while  confidence  in  demo-
cratic institutions declines’, June 2016 Available at http://www.iri.org/resource/macedonia-political-instability-
escalates-while-confidence-democratic-institutions-declines. 

84 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36process: democratic tranformation. European party families must never tolerate or 
turn a blind eye to major democratic shortcomings of their associative members in 
the region. The current refusal of Skopje’s ruling VMRO-DPMNE party to transfer 
power peacefully, culminating with the storming of the parliament in April, during 
which MPS were violently attacked by a mob, must trigger a decisive response by the 
European People’s Party (EPP). 

In its communication with the Western Balkans, the EU should never focus exclu-
sively on the state actors and governments but always strive to include civil society. 
The  citizens  are  the  core  constituency  supporting  European  integration  and  EU 
representatives  should  directly  engage  with  the  public  in  the  region  on  a  regular 
basis. The EU should boost free media and civil society by supporting civil society 
organisations with a proven track record of mobilising citizens around critical is-
sues of justice and democracy, as well as credible independent journalistic networks 
at national and regional level to ensure the sustainability of impartial and investiga-
tive journalism as a key precondition for accountable governance.

With the right support focused on the fundamentals – media freedom, the rule of 
law and democratic governance – this wider civil society constituency could provide 
the internal impetus to revitalise the accession process and demonstrate to scepti-
cal EU member states that real change is within reach in the Western Balkans. And 
remind the EU that its enlargement policy is still a powerful instrument for enhanc-
ing resilience in the region.

85 

Resilience in the Western BalkansResilience in the Western BalkansXIII. INTEGRATED SOCIETIES AS A 
VECTOR OF RESILIENCE

Alessandro Rotta

Introduction

Upholding multi-ethnic polities, reinforcing the protection of minorities and fos-
tering  intercommunal  tolerance  was  one  of  the  international  community’s  chief 
aims in the Balkans after the wars that accompanied the dissolution of the former 
Yugoslavia. This strategy was based on the idea that the inability to manage rela-
tions between different ethnic groups was among the main causes of the conflicts 
that ravaged the region in the 1990s. Over twenty years after Dayton, however, in 
most countries and entities in the Western Balkans, the objective of building inte-
grated and cohesive societies in which diversity is considered an asset and a strength  
is far from being achieved. Constitutional, legal and policy mechanisms aimed at 
protecting minorities and enhancing their participation in public and political life 
are largely in place and often modelled on very high standards. However, their im-
plementation  and  effect  on  actual  societal  integration  is  limited,  if  not  counter-
productive.  Even  where  they  actually  work,  power-sharing  agreements,  territorial 
and non-territorial autonomy regimes and other forms of minority protection tend 
to segment society into parallel, non-communicating spheres, accentuating deeper 
faultlines and producing the paradoxical effect of estranging communities further. 
Moreover,  resort  by  political  leaders  to  exclusionist  rhetoric  targeting  ethnic  and 
other minorities as a means of galvanising support is an unfortunate and growing 
trend throughout Europe. This trend is aggravated in the Western Balkans by elites’ 
use of ethno-politics and revamped nationalism to appease discontented publics, 
divert attention from social and economic grievances, and consolidate their hold 
on power. 

The international community, with the EU in the lead, needs to continue fostering 
and strengthening the region’s domestic capacities to respond to governance chal-
lenges, ensuring that growing political turbulence does not transform into organ-
ised violence. In this context, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities 
(HCNM) has a key role to play: the Commissioner’s mandate is to detect tensions 
related to ethnic relations that could potentially lead to conflict, and alert the wider 
OSCE, as well as to work on removing the causes. Based on their engagement in 
the Western Balkans, as well as elsewhere in the OSCE region, successive HCNMs 
have gathered significant expertise on how policies aimed at managing diversity can 
help defuse such tensions and prevent them from escalating into conflict, distilling 

87 

Resilience in the Western Balkansthis knowledge in a series of thematic Recommendations and Guidelines.1 In the 
Balkans, besides surveying tensions and warning about conflict signals, the HCNM 
has provided legislative and policy support to improve and strengthen the lot of na-
tional minorities, as well as promoting the overall cohesion of societies. Measuring 
and analysing the gap between the current situation and a desirable degree of so-
cietal integration is a way to map fragility in the Western Balkans, and HCNM ex-
pertise  on  shaping  integration  processes  can  provide  relevant  insight  on  how  to 
build, strengthen and move beyond resilience in the region, towards security and 
prosperity. 

Drivers of fragility 

Factors weakening the social fabric in the Western Balkans, while magnifying the 
gap between different communities within each country and entity, are many and 
interrelated. The exploitation of identity politics and nationalism by political elites 
to  divert  attention  from  governance  deficiencies,  deteriorating  democratic  stand-
ards, the co-optation of institutions by political parties, segregative education poli-
cies and economic difficulties can widen the distance and deepen divisions between 
ethnic groups, and are, in the HCNM institution’s view, main sources of fragility.

1.  Numerous observers and various indicators have recorded the deterio-
rating quality of democracy across the region, and the risks of a slide 
towards authoritarian rule. The captivating notion of ‘stabilitocrats’ de-
scribes  local  elites  who  while  outwardly  assuming  a  constructive  role 
in  guaranteeing  regional  stability  and  protecting  purported  EU  inter-
ests, including by filtering waves of migration from and across the re-
gion,  in  reality  disregard  democratic  standards  and  rely  on  informal 
networks and control of the media to consolidate their power.2 The re-
sulting poor governance, along with shrinking democratic spaces and 
practices, fosters exclusion. This affects society as a whole, but possibly 
has  particularly  undesirable  effects  on  specific  ethnic  groups  or  com-
munities. Attacking neighbouring countries or different ethnic groups 
within one country is part of the ordinary political arsenal of many local 
stabilitocrats. 

2.  Nationalist rhetoric is often a cover for political parties’ patronage and 
clientelistic  policies  at  the  local  and  central  level,  assigning  employ-
ment  and  directing  economic  investment  based  on  party  allegiance, 

1.  The  seven  individual  thematic  Recommendations  and  Guidelines  address  recurrent  issues  that  the  successive 
High Commissioners have faced in their work. Intended for policymakers and States’ representatives, they of-
fer guidance on developing policies that may help ease inter-ethnic tensions. See: http://www.osce.org/hcnm/
thematic-recommendations-and-guidelines.

2.  On this see, for example, ‘The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans. Authoritarianism and EU Stabilitoc-
racy’,  BiEPAG  Policy  Paper,  March  2017.  Available  at:  http://www.biepag.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/
BIEPAG-The-Crisis-of-Democracy-in-the-Western-Balkans.-Authoritarianism-and-EU-Stabilitocracy-web.pdf.

88 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36rather  than  on  merit,  economic  needs  or  policy.  This  creates  an  addi-
tional  faultline,  alongside  ethnic  segregation,  between  those  who  are 
included in the spoils system, and profit from it, and those who are not. 
It  contributes  to  a  sense  of  exclusion  and  disenfranchisement  among 
citizens, irrespective of the ethnic group to which they belong, and can 
further aggravate community divisions. Party control over institutions 
also reduces their responsiveness, efficiency and accountability. 

3.  Ethnically  segregated  education,  which  is  the  norm  in  several  mul-
ti-ethnic  Balkan  countries  and  entities,  can  cement  divisions  between 
communities,  rather  than  mending  them,  exacerbating  distances  and 
making  the  prospects  of  social  cohesion  across  ethnic  lines  more  dis-
tant. Mono-ethnic schools favour the teaching of monolithic and eth-
no-centric historical narratives, to the further detriment of mutual un-
derstanding among communities. 

4.  The slowdown of the EU’s economy in the past years has affected the 
Balkans  due  to  their  strong  interdependence  with  the  EU  in  terms  of 
trade,  investments  and  remittances.  While  Western  Balkan  countries 
grew  faster  in  2016  than  in  2015,  economic  growth  does  not  seem  to 
address  striking  inequalities,  including  between  different  ethnic  com-
munities, and is insufficient to reduce high unemployment rates.3 

Political, social and economic factors may explain the high propensity of the popu-
lation in the region to leave their countries and entities. According to opinion polls, 
almost  half  of  the  population  of  the  Balkans  would  live  elsewhere  if  they  could, 
which in itself is a clear indicator of limited trust in the capacity of domestic insti-
tutions and signals a form of disengagement from efforts towards political change 
and building a better society.4   

While the factors listed above relate to internal drivers of fragility, the role of ex-
ternal actors should not be neglected. The EU’s massive political and financial in-
vestment in the region supports continued reform efforts alongside other actors, 
including the OSCE. However, the EU’s ability to sort out local political crises, in-
cluding between different groups, is limited, including because accession prospects 
are too distant and do not provide sufficient incentives. This has allowed competing 
narratives from neighbouring powers to take hold in the region. When it comes to 
managing diversity and societal cohesion, negative examples stemming from within 
EU  member  states  may  have  diminished  the  EU’s  ability  to  project  its  normative 
power, or lead by example, again leaving room for alternative governance models, 

3.  World  Bank  Group,  Faster  Growth,  More  Jobs,  Western  Balkans  Regular  Economic  Report  no.11,  Spring  2017. 

Available at: http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/310431491458109659/WBRER-11-v6.pdf.

4.  Regional Cooperation Council, Balkan Barometer 2016. Available at: http://www.rcc.int/seeds/results/2/bal-

kan-opinion-barometer.

89 

Resilience in the Western Balkansfrom within or outside the EU, which provide a fertile breeding ground for local 
stabilocratic leaderships. 

Drivers of resilience 

Drivers  of  resilience  are  present  across  the  region,  as  a  result  of  both  domestic 
strengths as well as external support and long-standing international intervention. 
The list below juxtaposes resilience factors with the drivers of fragility enumerated 
earlier. It combines both aspects of resilience already observable as well as areas that 
the international community should further support.  

1.  As noted, recourse to nationalist rhetoric and the demonisation of other 
ethnic groups is often a tactic designed to deflect attention from issues 
of  poor  accountability  and  governance,  lack  of  respect  for  the  rule  of 
law and other undemocratic practices. Strengthening accountability 
in the political process in the region and demanding high standards of 
democratic practice and the rule of law is a way to address general gov-
ernance challenges and to unmask nationalistic politics and curb their 
pernicious effects. An inclusive political process, the participation of all 
members of society – including young people, women and minorities – 
transparent government processes and institutional responsiveness can 
all contribute to making Balkan societies more resilient. The growth of 
significant civil society movements, even if often focused on single-agen-
da issues such as urban renewal or environmental protection, is also an 
indicator of societal resilience and illustrates the presence of an audi-
ence that is receptive to a discourse different from the dominant ethno-
national one. These self-organised movements, which are quite different 
from service-providing NGOs, often need political rather than financial 
support, and for the international community to live up to its commit-
ments, rather than preaching certain values while supporting elites who 
undermine those same values.

2.  Fearmongering by domestic elites does not automatically or necessar-
ily augment the distance between ethnic groups. This can be partially 
explained  by  communities’  relatively  recent  experience  of  violent  and 
disruptive conflicts, which has made them wary of falling into patterns 
of  political  behaviour  that  might  lead  to  the  recurrence  of  large-scale 
organised violence. A case in point is represented by recent examples of 
voting across ethnic lines in some countries, despite the ruling elites’ 
use of strident nationalistic rhetoric, showing that criticism of poor gov-
ernance could even become a factor uniting different ethnic communi-
ties.  This  can  be  explained  by  the  failure  of  ethno-centric  parties  and 
agendas to bring positive change and improvements, and address press-
ing  socio-economic  challenges.  Further  support  by  the  international 

90 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36community  to  societal  integration  along  civic,  rather  than  ethnic 
lines, could help provide an anchor to communities moving beyond the 
ethnic divide.  

3.  In  the  field  of  education,  to  reverse  prevailing  trends,  major  political 
and financial investments are needed to move towards establishing in-
tegrated  and  multilingual  education  systems  at  all  levels  designed  to 
provide  equal  access,  opportunities  and  educational  outcomes  for  all 
pupils, regardless of whether they come from a majority or minority eth-
nic background, as well as to allow for multiple perspectives, ensure that 
there  is  space  for  different  ethnic  communities  to  interact  inside  and 
outside the curriculum, and to learn each other’s languages to bridge 
the divides. Particularly in parts of the region with a high young popula-
tion, such investment in education is crucial to consolidate peace and 
promote positive societal transformation. The use of the languages of 
different  communities  in  education,  access  to  public  services  and  po-
litical representation is essential to foster a sense of belonging for all 
groups  in  multi-ethnic  societies,  and  should  be  used  to  strengthen 
integration and resilience. 

4.  Economic  development,  and  the  opportunities  for  social  mobility 
that go with it, is a crucial precondition for building and strengthening 
resilience. Job security based on private, rather than public, investments 
would also help break the cycle of clientelistic patronage, whereby lo-
cal and central governments selectively provide work and welfare in ex-
change  for  political  allegiance.  Implementing  further  labour  mobility 
schemes  with  the  EU  could  also  help  release  pressure  on  local  labour 
markets and provide financial resources to domestic economies. 

The way ahead 

The factors contributing to fragility and resilience listed above are dynamic, evolv-
ing and interwoven, making their interplay very complex. External support remains 
essential  to  ensure  that  resilience  prevails  over  fragility.  Beyond  mere  resilience, 
overall security, for states and entities as well as for the communities within them, 
can only derive from a deep-seated sense of belonging and inclusion in a wider se-
curity  and  political  community.  This  depends  on  local  political  dynamics  being 
strongly  anchored  to  EU  accession  prospects  and  on  respect  for  OSCE  commit-
ments. Besides contributing to strengthening democratic standards, inclusion in a 
wider political space enhances shared values, strengthens cohesion and reduces the 
likelihood of conflicts. It also counters the ‘us versus them’ perception that often 
accompanies conditions and solutions ‘imposed’ by the international community. 
One key feature of HCNM involvement in a given context is to point to local au-
thorities’ and communities’ vested interest in adopting sound integration policies 

91 

Resilience in the Western Balkansand strategies and fostering the development of cohesive identities, which can nur-
ture  a  sense  of  belonging  among  members  of  different  communities.  As  detailed 
in the latest, most comprehensive set of HCNM Guidelines, The Ljubljana Guidelines 
on Integration of Diverse Societies, developing integration policies is part of the rights 
and responsibilities that sovereignty entails, based on good and democratic govern-
ance, non-discrimination and effective equality, recognising diversity and multiple, 
multi-layered  identities.  This  requires  the  involvement  of  all  relevant  actors  and 
stakeholders  and  all  levels  of  government,  and  should  inform  all  relevant  policy 
domains, from citizenship to participation, security and law enforcement, access to 
justice and media. The Ljubljana Guidelines are innovative, as they put the onus of 
integration on society as a whole, and they refer to the integration of societies, rather 
than making specific groups responsible for integrating into society. Challenges in 
implementing them derive from the need for states to assume the full responsibility 
that sovereignty entails, abandoning an ethno-centric narrative and moving beyond 
the majority/minority divide. Also, the creation of an inclusive and integrated soci-
ety requires the coordination of a number of complex policy fields, and cooperation 
between several layers of government. 

Arguably, the way ahead lies in a convergence of domestic and international efforts 
towards pursuing the goal of integrated societies in the Western Balkans. Integrated 
societies should be based on dialogue and interaction between different communi-
ties, and be characterised by tolerance and mutual respect. Their members should 
feel  that  they  are  represented  by  common  public  institutions  and  have  a  shared 
sense of belonging to a common state and an inclusive society, without excluding 
the possibility of distinct identities, which are evolving, multiple and context-based. 

Creating such societies is a long-term objective, which still requires major efforts 
in the Balkans, but it is also an objective that parts of the international community 
seem increasingly reluctant to uphold.  Yet this is the best recipe to achieve long-
term and sustainable security and conflict prevention. 

92 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36XIV. VIOLENT EXTREMISM: BEYOND FOREIGN 
FIGHTERS AND BEHIND NUMBERS

Predrag Petrović and Florian Qehaja

Introduction

The fact that from 2013 until 2015 almost 1,000 people from the Western Balkans 
left to fight in Syria and Iraq is a matter of ongoing concern.1 Even though the num-
ber of foreign fighters began to decrease as of 2015, it is estimated that more than 
300 have returned to their home countries. The return of foreign fighters however 
represents only the tip of the iceberg: the problem becomes much more complex 
when other individuals from the region who were not necessarily foreign fighters 
but subscribe to the ideology of Islamist extremism are factored into the equation. 
While the returned foreign fighters potentially represent an ongoing security threat, 
the major challenge derives from individuals and groups aiming at fragmenting so-
ciety and especially radical Islamist preachers and practitioners. In particular, the 
traditional  practice  of  Islam  has  been  undermined  in  recent  years  by  a  new  wave 
of  radical  clerics  who  have  sought  to  spread  the  doctrines  of  conservative  Salafi-
inspired Islam.

In  order  to  counter  the  potential  of  violent  extremism,  a  holistic  approach  is  a 
sine qua non for a successful outcome in the long term. The notions of Countering 
Violent Extremism (CVE) or Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) should be used in 
reference to the legal and policy framework of the countries in the Western Balkans. 
This  should  imply  taking  steps  which  will  not  only  reflect  a  consultative  process 
in terms of design and implementation but also emphasise the importance of fos-
tering resilience. As the findings on fragility below will show, there is a wide spec-
trum of push and pull factors driving individuals into the arms of violent extremist 
groups. These include personal, societal, economic and religious factors: all equally 
important. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the key fragilities that are common 
to all Western Balkan countries, describe how serious they are and identify measures 
for addressing them. 

1.  Predrag Petrović, ‘Islamic radicalism in the Balkans’, Alert no. 24, EUISS, 10 June 2016.

93 

Resilience in the Western BalkansDrivers of fragility

There  is  no  single  argument  explaining  the  complex  process  whereby  drivers  of 
fragility foster the spread of (violent) extremism in the Western Balkans.  Islamic 
extremism is probably the most acute of the externally-driven challenges that has 
emerged in recent years in the societies of the region which, preoccupied with in-
digenous challenges in the aftermath of the 1990s wars, are now confronted with 
this  unprecedented  phenomenon.  It  is  true  however  that  the  drivers  combine  a 
diverse  range  of  factors  that  include  individual,  societal,  political  and  economic 
dimensions. First of all, the negative legacies of communist rule, violent conflicts 
and mismanaged economic transformation have left the economies of the Western 
Balkans countries in very poor shape. The unemployment rate is very high (aver-
aging  around  25%  in  2016),  and  widespread  poverty  and  social  inequality  create 
additional challenges for the young people of the region. Today, inequality is more 
a social than an economic issue, and could lead to further discrimination against 
already disadvantaged segments of society.2 In other words, the lack of economic 
and social opportunities drives marginalised and alienated young people towards 
the radical alternatives offered by the purveyors of religious and political extrem-
ism. Certain remote areas and enclaves in the Western Balkans have become fertile 
recruiting grounds for radical imams and certain Islamic NGOs and charities using 
humanitarian aid as a cover and tool for spreading extremist ideology. 

The dire economic situation is exacerbated by endemic corruption. Political parties, 
governments and parliaments are popularly perceived as the most corrupt institu-
tions. It is not surprising then that citizens’ trust in public institutions has steadily 
declined in the Western Balkans. Lack of trust in political institutions could lead 
to refusal to comply with their decisions and even to (violently) oppose them. This 
undermines the legitimacy of these institutions and increases the likelihood of dis-
affected young citizens being attracted by the radical alternatives offered by the ji-
hadist recruiters and conservative religious preachers. 

On the other hand, local government structures are very passive and largely depend-
ent on the state budget as well as political and economic dynamics at central level. 
In particular, municipal safety councils which were established after the conflicts of 
the 1990s are barely operational and largely rely on donor support. Local communi-
ties are rarely invited for consultations on local security and safety concerns, with 
the result that their voice is disregarded.  

Poor educational standards, leading to a lack of critical and analytical skills, is a par-
ticular problem. There is a mismatch between the educational system and market 
needs resulting in a workforce trained for low-skilled occupations and lacking a sat-
isfactory level of professional or practical skills. Teaching methods and techniques 
are based on ex-cathedra lectures favouring rote learning and the memorisation of 

2.  Nemanja Džuverović, ‘Socio-economic roots of extremism in the region’, in Filip Ejdus and Predrag Jurekovic 
(eds.),  Violent Extremism in the Western Balkans, Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence and Sport, 2016, p. 30.

94 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36facts which discourages critical thinking among students. While it cannot be said 
that the deficiencies of the education system directly fuel extremism, their negative 
experience of the system may contribute to the alienation of some young people, 
thus making them more receptive to the messages of radical Islam. 

The  fragmentation  within  the  Muslim  community  and  the  challenges  facing  the 
traditional practice of Islam presents another opportunity for extremism. These fac-
tors  have  created  a  fertile  ground  for  the  spread  of  conservative  Salafist  ideology 
propagated by imams trained in certain Middle Eastern countries. While the spread 
of Salafism represents a substantial problem for traditional practitioners, especially 
due to the challenge it poses to the secular order, the main problem is with the so-
called Takfiri groups and those Salafist elements who choose to use force in order to 
attain their ideological goals. The involvement of certain Gulf States in the region is 
viewed with suspicion, while the activities of so-called humanitarian NGOs whose 
goal is the promotion of non-traditional Islam and violent extremism pose a nota-
ble risk in this regard.3 

Drivers of resilience

An increasing number of projects and programmes seek to invest in preventing vio-
lent  extremism.  Such  efforts  need  to  be  based  on  full  local  ownership  which  can 
only be ensured by the participation of national actors and in particular community 
engagement. As such, they should focus on building resilience – a process whereby 
communities can overcome or resist negative forces and influences that threaten to 
damage  or  destabilise  them.  Furthermore,  the  assistance  should  be  targeted  geo-
graphically and not necessarily be explicitly identified as having the aim of reducing 
extremism,  so  as  to  avoid  mistakes  encountered  by  previous  initiatives  that  have 
been implemented with limited to no success. 

First, community engagement is essential to the process of building resilience. In 
the Western Balkans, civil and property-related conflicts are traditionally solved by 
resorting to mediation. For example, in Albania and Kosovo village elders or other 
respected figures often performed the role of go-betweens and mediators in inter-
personal disputes, including blood feuds. Using this mode of mediation can help 
foster dialogue between Muslims in the region, secular society, and state authori-
ties by harmonising ideas, activities and approaches. Mediators often successfully 
facilitate dialogue for the purpose of reducing internal clashes within the Islamic 
associations  across  the  region,  between  so-called  ‘moderate’  imams  mainly  from 
the Hanafi school of Islam, and so-called ‘conservative’ imams advocating a radical 
Salafist interpretation of Islam. 

3.  Vlado Azinović and Muhamed Jusić, ‘The new lure of the Syrian War: the foreign fighters’ Bosnian contingent’, 

Atlantic Initiative, Sarajevo, 2016. 

95 

Resilience in the Western BalkansSecond, the experience of recent years has showed that due to lack of knowledge 
about radical Islam and an overall lack of information many parents were unaware 
of  the  danger  of  their  children  being  indoctrinated  and  lured  to  join  extremist 
militant groups. Only with targeted awareness-raising campaigns has the level of 
knowledge increased and this has led to a fall in the number of foreign fighters and 
extremist recruits in the last two years. Such awareness-raising campaigns should 
be undertaken by civil society, which needs to play a central role in this matter. A 
robust involvement of institutions may harm national efforts due to the crisis of 
legitimacy affecting political elites and institutions across the region. This endeav-
our should not rely solely on traditional seminars or workshops but rather on face-
to-face  meetings  and  community  involvement  in  order  to  disseminate  important 
information throughout society.4 

Third, indigenous safety mechanisms should be further operationalised and used 
for the purpose of mitigating the risk of violent extremism at the community level. 
These may include a diverse set of governmental and non-governmental actors at 
the local level. In this way, existing mechanisms are strengthened instead of creat-
ing new tools and mechanisms as a part of an increasing donor-driven approach to 
preventing violent extremism. 

The way ahead

While the aim is to identify and optimise the drivers of resilience in the short term, 
it is essential that other actions and investments are undertaken in the long term in 
order to counter the further spread of Islamic extremism. To this end, there need to 
be three overarching investments in the future. 

Further reform of the educational system is essential for preventing violent extremism. 
The Western Balkans continues to be plagued by an inefficient and outdated edu-
cation system that at all levels fails to address the pedagogical and skills training 
needs of its students and the economy. Despite some recent improvements, there is 
poor professional development for teachers, an inadequate and outdated curricu-
lum, and a shortage of learning materials and equipment. It is imperative to invest 
in an educational system which will be more attractive to young people and adapted 
to their needs. In this way, the trend whereby controversial imams peddling extrem-
ist propaganda exert more appeal and influence than teachers might be reversed. 

Increasing  opportunities  for  young  people  is  an  antidote  to  extremist  recruiters. 
Governments should create better opportunities and alternatives for the youth of 
the Western Balkans. As a result of feeling isolated, neglected and excluded from 
social  and  cultural  activities,  young  people  often  experience  a  strong  sense  of  al-
ienation. This leads to them becoming engaged, for example, in Islamic NGOs and 

4.  Florian Qehaja, Skender Perteshi and Mentor Vrajolli, ‘Mapping the State of Play of Institutional and Community 
Involvement in Countering Violent Extremism in Kosovo’, Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS), 2016.

96 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36so-called humanitarian organisations. The assistance should be tailored to the de-
velopment  aspects  which  may  include  investment  in  cultural  and  sport  facilities, 
including large-scale capacity building for young people. If they were able to avail 
of such enhanced opportunities they would be less receptive to the messages of ex-
tremist recruiters.  

Investing in institutional trust is essential. More trust in the state and its institutions, as 
well as more opportunities for young people, would encourage them to follow paths 
which do not impact negatively on society, avoiding extremist religious ideologies. 
This is an investment which can be successful only if a secular society which puts the 
citizens’ interests first while respecting individuals’ religious rights can be substan-
tively developed. Such an endeavour should be tailored to the ongoing efforts to 
strengthen trust in public institutions. Lack of such trust explains the current over-
all apathy among the citizens of the region, resulting in alienation which leads some 
to succumb to Islamist propaganda and join the ranks of violent extremist groups. 

97 

Resilience in the Western BalkansResilience in the Western BalkansXV. MANAGING THE BALKAN ROUTE: 
THE 2015/16 REFUGEE CRISIS

Julija Sardelić

Introduction 

In the 1990s, the region of southeast Europe faced multiple refugee crises due to 
the armed conflicts that accompanied the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Entire com-
munities who had been forcibly displaced were often a source of bitter contention 
between the newly established countries. Yet the 2015/16 refugee crisis1 re-united 
some of these countries in a common goal: two EU member states, Slovenia and 
Croatia, and two candidate countries, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia.2 During the refugee crisis between September 2015 and March 2016, 
the common goal was to coordinate and manage the Western Balkan route in order 
to enable the transit of refugees and other forced migrants mainly from Syria, Iraq 
and  Afghanistan  towards  the  EU  member  states  willing  to  accept  them  (notably 
Germany).  After  March  2016  the  objective  eventually  shifted  towards  sealing  the 
Western  Balkan  route  and  reducing  the  number  of  migrants  moving  north.  The 
management of the Western Balkan route between September 2015 and March 2016 
deserves  special  attention  because  it  did  bring  the  countries  of  southeast  Europe 
(including countries that were previously in conflict) together again in cooperation. 
The cooperation between the four former Yugoslav countries was significantly af-
fected by the development of the asylum legislation and politics of the EU and cer-
tain of its member states. Both politics and EU legislation contributed to the fragili-
ties that complicated the response to the refugee crisis in the four former Yugoslav 
countries. Yet these countries also demonstrated their resilience in achieving their 
objectives in the management of forced migration, especially by positioning them-
selves as transit rather than host countries. 

Drivers of fragility 

All the post-Yugoslav states along the Western Balkan route (both the member states 
and  the  candidate  countries  in  order  to  comply  with  the  EU  acquis)  harmonised 

1.  Despite the fact that it was used in public discourse (both by politicians and the media), the term ‘refugee crisis’ 
needs to be used with caution. According to UNHCR data, a much larger number of refugees (2.9 million in 
Turkey) are displaced within the region around Syria or internally displaced within Syria (6 million). 

2.  The author of this chapter originally used the form ‘the Republic of Macedonia’ in the text. The EUISS uses the  
name  ‘the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia’  in  accordance  with  the  guidelines  concerning  the  official 
nomenclature of this country issued by the EU Office of Publications.

99 

Resilience in the Western Balkanstheir national legislation on asylum with EU law, in particular to comply with the 
Asylum Procedure Directive and Reception Conditions Directive, which came into 
effect in July 2015. Yet in reality the EU member states as well as candidate countries 
along the Western Balkan route faced a different kind of challenge from the sum-
mer of 2015, not foreseen in the procedures laid down by these two directives. The 
circumstances that surrounded the 2015/16 refugee crisis, with a major influx of 
forced migrants and the emergence of the Western Balkan route, were the main driv-
ers of fragility as EU legislation did not offer a conclusive answer on how to tackle 
such an unprecedented situation. 

According to different available sources, in the period between September 2015 and 
March 2016 (until the EU-Turkey refugee deal was struck), more than half a mil-
lion migrants passed through the four former Yugoslav countries along the Western 
Balkan route. Similarly, 20 years ago the EU faced a large influx of displaced people 
in need of international protection because of the war on the territory of the for-
mer Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Based on that experience, the 
European  Community  designed  the  Temporary  Protection  Directive  as  a  mecha-
nism for managing an unexpected mass influx of people. The situation in 2015/16 
seemed like a textbook example of when the Directive should be invoked, but there 
was no decision by the EU Council authorising such a course of action. Thus, while 
the  legal  mechanism  for  responding  to  the  refugee  crisis  in  the  EU  was  in  place, 
there was no political decision to invoke it. This indirectly contributed to the fragil-
ity of the four former Yugoslav states on the Western Balkan route: they were left to 
cope with a situation where they had to create their own ad hoc response to the influx 
of forced migrants. In the beginning their response and the cooperation between 
the countries in question was chaotic, even signalling a possible trigger for a new 
wave of instability in the region. Having a history of conflicts and border disputes, 
neither Slovenia and Croatia nor Croatia and Serbia saw eye to eye in this coopera-
tion in the beginning. Yet the cooperation became more robust when it was clear 
that these countries shared the same approach: they were hesitant to become the 
final destination countries as they did not have the capacities to receive or to inte-
grate such a large number of migrants. However, they did respond to the situation 
by positioning themselves as transit countries, especially in response to Germany’s 
decision in September 2015 to allow refugees taking the Western Balkan route to 
cross the border towards Austria and enter Germany.

In September 2015, Germany decided to examine the asylum applications of those 
forced  migrants  whose  first  EU  country  of  entry  was  not  Germany  (as  stipulated 
in  the  Dublin  III  Regulation).  With  Berlin’s  decision  to  apply  this  discretionary 
clause in the face of a humanitarian emergency, the widespread perception was that 
Germany was opening its doors to welcome all the refugees that were not wanted in 
other states. Here the post-Yugoslav states found themselves affected by the unilat-
eral decisions taken by Germany. While the Dublin III Regulation defines the role 
of transfer countries in relation to asylum applications in the international transit 

100 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36area,  it  does  not  address  how  other  EU  member  states  should  react  when  one  of 
them applies discretionary clauses to examine more asylum applications.

Germany  had  previously  been  one  of  the  most  desirable  destinations  for  refu-
gees. The application of the discretionary clause reaffirmed its position. While the 
Western  Balkan  route  existed  prior  to  the  2015/16  refugee  crisis,  in  this  period 
it officially become one of the main routes of forced migration to Europe. When 
Hungary  in  the  autumn  of  2015  erected  a  fence  along  its  southern  border  with 
Serbia  and  then  along  its  border  with  Croatia,  Slovenia  and  Croatia  became  two 
additional transit countries along the Western Balkan route, alongside Serbia and 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. One of the main challenges for these 
countries  was  that  there  were  many  ambiguities  with  regard  to  how  to  interpret 
the  relevant  provisions  of  EU  law,  which  should  have  bound  the  member  states, 
as well as shape the responses of candidate countries aspiring to join the EU. The 
reality also was that most of the refugees and forced migrants did not want to seek 
asylum in the four post-Yugoslav countries, but wanted to continue on their path. 
The  Asylum  Procedures  Directive  as  well  as  Reception  Conditions  Directive  con-
tain clear guidelines and provisions regarding admission and reception of asylum 
seekers, but are less explicit with recommendations regarding the treatment of peo-
ple who are transiting through the territory. At the same the four former Yugoslav 
countries along the Western Balkan route preferred these migrants to pass through 
their territory rather than stay. Arguing that they did not have the capacities for the 
integration of such a large number of asylum seekers, they concentrated on assist-
ing in the passage of the migrants to another destination further north. 

Drivers of resilience

To fully comprehend the drivers of resilience in the four former Yugoslav states, it 
has to be noted that they derive from three different sources: from the states, but 
also from civil society, as well as from the migrants themselves taking the Western 
Balkan route. As stated by many different sources, most refugees taking the Western 
Balkan route remained resilient despite the obstacles and changes with which they 
were  confronted  on  their  path:  they  were  determined  to  continue  towards  coun-
tries  such  as  Germany  even  before  it  decided  to  open  its  borders  and  examine  a 
larger number of asylum applications. Therefore, most of them did not apply for 
international protection in the countries along the Balkan route. Civil society or-
ganisations in all the four former Yugoslav countries argued that they should take 
a  different  approach  towards  refugees  taking  the  Western  Balkan  route  than  for 
example Hungary, which had erected border fences to keep them out. They called 
for a humanitarian corridor towards Germany and were against denying entry to 
the refugees at the border, but advocated rather helping them to continue on their 
desired path. 

101 

Resilience in the Western BalkansAlthough it is questionable whether or not the former Yugoslav countries along the 
Western  Balkan  route  did  set  up  a  humanitarian  corridor,  the  majority  of  politi-
cal leaders favoured taking a humanitarian approach towards refugees while they 
were passing through their territory. One of the drivers of resilience in this case was 
the fact that these countries had previous experience with their own refugee crises. 
During the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s 4 million people became refugees 
or were internally displaced: a large proportion remained displaced in the territory 
of the former Yugoslav countries, which developed different approaches on how to 
integrate displaced populations into their societies. Many politicians claimed that 
these countries’ previous experience with refugees helped them develop a specific 
humanitarian approach not witnessed in the Visegrad countries, who categorically 
refused  both  the  passage  and  the  resettlement  of  refugees.  However,  the  parallel 
between the former Yugoslav refugee crises and the 2015/16 refugee crisis also has 
its limitations. In the 2015/16 refugee crisis the primary goal was not to provide 
accommodation to the refugees, but to help them travel on to other countries such 
as Germany. 

Given that EU legislation on the transit of forced migrants was too vague, the four 
former Yugoslav countries took the initiative of adopting a number of amendments 
to  their  national  legislation  in  order  to  help  refugees  continue  their  journey.  For 
example, in June 2015, the parliament in Skopje passed amendments to its Law on 
Asylum and International Protection. According to the new amendment, foreign-
ers irregularly entering the territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
could  express  their  intention  to  seek  asylum  and  were  then  granted  72  hours  in 
which  to  lodge  their  asylum  claim  with  the  authorities.  This  meant  that  within 
these 72 hours people taking the Western Balkan route were not considered to be 
in  the  country  illegally  and  could  also  use  public  transport.  These  amendments 
were also introduced because of pressure exerted by civil society and events that oc-
curred early in the year when a number of migrants were killed by a train while walk-
ing on railway tracks. In other cases, civil society opposed the introduction of new 
amendments to legislation. For example, Slovenia introduced an amendment to its 
Defence Law, according to which it granted new police-like powers to the army to 
patrol the border and manage the passage of refugees through Slovenian territory. 
Many  civil  society  groups  were  against  such  powers  being  given  to  the  army.  For 
them this represented a new form of militarisation of society, but the state repre-
sentatives claimed these measures needed to be put in place to ensure the additional 
safety of citizens. 

Cooperation  between  countries  in  the  management  of  the  Western  Balkan  route 
worked smoothly as long as all countries were pursuing the same goal and had their 
border ‘open’ for transiting refugees. However, problems occurred once one of the 
countries decided to close its border and did not allow the passage of refugees for 
a period of time. This caused tensions both between Serbia and Croatia as well as 
between Slovenia and Croatia. It was not clear how the countries should act in order 
to be compliant with EU law, but at the same time they did not want to become 

102 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36overburdened by asylum claims and felt unable to cope with such a huge influx of 
people given their limited reception capacities. Yet they demonstrated resilience in 
creating ad hoc solutions for these situations. This was indeed also seen in their firm 
position at the EU-Turkey Summit in March 2016 where the representatives of all 
four  post-Yugoslav  countries  agreed  that  leaving  the  Western  Balkan  route  as  an 
open corridor managed by states was not a sustainable solution and that it needed 
to be closed down. 

The way ahead

While the Western Balkan route is now officially closed off, the crisis exposed a num-
ber of issues that need to be re-addressed in the context of Europe’s future asylum 
policy. Currently the four former Yugoslav countries straddling the Western Balkan 
route lack policies that would enable them to be effectively prepared in the event 
that another refugee crisis were to occur. Although there is a Temporary Protection 
Directive in place, it was not triggered in response to the refugee crisis, since many 
countries in the EU as well as the candidate countries were not prepared to accept 
the refugees on a longer term basis, but only help them while they were in transit. 

Here the EU could take the initiative by developing and promoting successful refu-
gee  integration  policies  as  well  as  mobility  and  diversity  policies.  The  EU  slogan 
‘United  in  Diversity’  needs  a  fresh  boost:  the  refugee  crisis  requires  not  only  an 
emergency response, but also a long-term plan on how refugees can be successfully 
integrated within the societies in question. While the post-Yugoslav countries did 
have previous experience of responding to a refugee crisis they had not developed 
policies that could be transferable to the current context. 

Here the EU needs to take a more active role in developing and also supporting refu-
gee integration by offering relevant funding. Developing effective measures for inte-
gration would also have a positive effect on burden-sharing among the EU member 
states. While the Dublin Regulation is currently being revised, it needs to be taken 
into account that the ‘first country rule’ does not work and disproportionately af-
fects certain countries, and also creates particular challenges for candidate coun-
tries located along major migrant routes (as many observers have warned before). 

Nevertheless, effective integration policies can only be developed in an equal part-
nership between EU member states as well as candidate countries, who shouldered a 
large share of the burden during the 2015/16 refugee crisis. In addition, it needs to 
be remembered that integration is a two-way process: this cannot be a matter decided 
only by the EU host states – the perspectives of refugees themselves as well as of civil 
society actors working on asylum should be given much greater weight in these is-
sues. Engaging these diverse actors in dialogue is a precondition for the formulation 
of new policies. It is essential that such policies should be put in place before the EU 
as well as the Western Balkans are confronted with another major refugee crisis.

103 

Resilience in the Western BalkansResilience in the Western BalkansCONCLUSION: THE EU AND THE WESTERN 
BALKANS AS A SINGLE SECURITY SPACE

Thanos Dokos

Introduction

Just  over  one  hundred  years  ago  the  Balkans  were,  literally,  the  powder  keg  of 
Europe: it was here that the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo 
on 28 June 1914 triggered a chain of events that would lead to World War I. In the 
1990s, the brutal Yugoslav civil wars brought back traumatic memories of the re-
gion’s history of conflict and violence and served as a wake-up call for Europeans 
regarding the security and stability of the continent. Although it is becoming clear 
that this wake-up call has so far gone largely unheeded, at least the Balkans are now 
a relatively more quiet neighbourhood and inter-state conflict in the region appears 
on the whole rather unlikely. However, there are other security concerns, especially 
in the Western Balkans. As pointed out in another chapter of this publication, ‘over 
twenty years after Dayton … in most countries and entities in the Western Balkans, 
the objective of building integrated and cohesive societies in which diversity is con-
sidered an asset and a strength is far from being achieved.’ As almost all regional 
states are associated with the EU and/or NATO, those institutions have a key role to 
play in strengthening resilience (defined as the internal capacity of governments to 
deal with home-made or imported crises, shocks or threats) in the Western Balkans, 
and in assisting these countries in their efforts to overcome a range of challenges. 
This concluding chapter will try to offer a concise synthesis of policy recommenda-
tions offered by contributors in this volume. 

The concept of a single security space

For security purposes the Western Balkans should be considered as an integral part 
of core Europe. The area from the Atlantic (UK included) to the borders of Belarus, 
Russia,  Ukraine  and  Turkey  should  be  treated  as  a  single  and  indivisible  security 
space because of the various socio-economic networks connecting those countries 
with the EU and the high permeability of the Union’s external borders with those 
countries.  The  notion  that  Europe  could  somehow  insulate  itself  from  these  re-
gions, especially the Western Balkans, is completely unrealistic. Even if the EU were 
to choose not to include the region in its internal security arrangements, visa-free 
agreements with Western Balkan countries, in combination with the Union’s own 
internal freedom of movement arrangements (the Schengen Area), would facilitate 

105 

Resilience in the Western Balkansthe conduct of various illegal activities from and through the Western Balkans into 
EU territory. Furthermore, the region occupies an important geostrategic position 
on Europe’s energy map. 

The concept of the indivisibility of security and of a single security space and the 
treatment of countries in the Western Balkans in this context as both partners and 
as a buffer zone to prevent the spillover of security problems from this fragile region 
to the EU itself look almost like mandatory choices for the Union. The EU needs 
to invest in increasing resilience in the Western Balkans by providing both politi-
cal inspiration and more extensive, and more efficient, technical and economic as-
sistance. However, despite being located in Europe and NATO’s ‘inner courtyard’, 
and being completely surrounded by members of the EU and NATO, the political/
institutional map shows several ‘blank spots’ in the Western Balkans. 

The way ahead

An important first step would be for the EU to conduct a resilience mapping exer-
cise, identifying the factors of fragility and assessing the capacities of countries in 
the Western Balkans in an effort to target deficiencies and weaknesses and suggest 
corrective measures. Current and future security concerns, threats and challenges in 
the Western Balkans include the following: 

1.  Inconclusive state-building processes and state fragility in countries like Bosnia-
Herzegovina,  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia  (FYROM) 
and Kosovo (also due to the fact that the state system and the borders 
do  not  command  broad  legitimacy  in  the  eyes  of  the  population),  in 
combination with the burden of (both older and more recent) history, 
and the rise of autocratic leaders and semi-authoritarian governments 
which challenge key democratic principles such as rule of law, account-
ability and governance and the freedom of the press. Interestingly, there 
is  a  rather  widespread  perception  that  the  EU  and  its  member  states 
have  been  insufficiently  critical  of  the  decline  of  democracy  and  have 
offered few solutions to counter sources of fragility. The growing apa-
thy and disillusionment of citizens with political leaders in the face of 
rampant unemployment, clientelist practices, the negative role of local 
elites (‘stabilitocrats’) and increasing inequality also exacerbate fragility.

2.  Population movements, as large numbers of refugees from Syria and other 
conflict-afflicted  countries  in  Europe’s  Southern  neighbourhood,  as 
well as economic migrants, have been trying to reach Western European 
countries through Greece and the so-called Balkan route. The refugee 
crisis of 2015/2016 highlighted the strategic importance of the region, 
but  did  little  to  foster  more  long-term  strategic  thinking  about  its 

106 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36future. Europe’s attention was limited to ensuring the effective closure 
of the Western Balkan migration route.

3.  Radicalisation concerns, as more than one thousand foreign fighters from 
Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic 
of  Macedonia  travelled  to  the  Middle  East  to  fight  with  the  so-called 
Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq. While the returned foreign fighters 
potentially represent an ongoing traditional security threat, the major 
challenge derives from extremist Islamist elements seeking to fragment 
society and destroy societal cohesion. Although the phenomenon can 
be  partly  explained  by  limited  employment  opportunities  that  drive 
young people to seek alternatives offered by radical Islamists, a better 
understanding  of  the  motivations  that  lead  young  Muslims  from  the 
Western Balkans to become radicalised is certainly necessary. There is 
concern that the rise of ultra-conservative Salafist Islam is undermining 
cohesion among the Balkan Muslims, threatening inter-ethnic relations 
and that, if left unchecked, this may pose a challenge to the secular or-
der and the wider social fabric in the Western Balkans.

Even long-standing EU member states in the region, such as Greece, should 
also expect to be affected by radicalisation trends in the medium- to long-
term, because of their own large resident Muslim immigrant communities, 
although left- and right-wing radicalisation will also be a problem as is al-
ready the case in several European societies. Addressing the root causes of 
religious radicalisation in European societies should obviously be an im-
portant priority, along with more short-term measures intended to bolster 
state resilience and mitigate the impact of radicalisation on regional and 
European security. 

4.  Organised crime and corruption are widespread in several countries in the 
Balkans, including EU member states in the region. The nexus between 
organised  crime  (including  trafficking  of  refugees/migrants),  corrup-
tion, terrorism and radicalisation is a complex phenomenon which pre-
sents law enforcement agencies with a difficult challenge. 

5.  In recent years, the slowdown of the EU enlargement process has allowed oth-
er  powers  to  intensify  their  presence  in  the  Western  Balkans  as  states 
in the region have sought to diversify their partnerships to hedge their 
bets. The rising influence of Turkey and the Gulf States has had a mixed 
impact on the Western Balkans, giving rise to new challenges. Moreover, 
both Turkey and the Gulf States still treat the region as a bridge to the 
EU, in contrast to Russia, which is perceived as openly seeking to un-
dermine the EU’s influence in the Western Balkans, but does not have 
the  means  to  substitute  the  EU  as  a  pole  of  attraction  for  economic, 
far less political, integration. In addition to direct interference, Balkan 

107 

Resilience in the Western Balkanspoliticians use Russia as a playing card in their relations with Brussels 
to extract support and concessions. On the other hand, the EU is not 
matching its investment and projection of soft power with political ac-
tion, proactive presence, commitment, public diplomacy, and strategic 
communication to counter anti-Europe propaganda. As argued by one 
of the authors in this volume, the EU can achieve substantial leverage in 
the Western Balkans if it decides to engage in regional ‘geo-economics’.

It should also be noted that with the ‘16+1’ initiative, China has man-
aged  to  establish  an  elaborate  multilateral  platform  directly  engaging 
with  the  countries  of  the  Western  Balkans,  while  circumventing  tra-
ditional  stakeholders  in  the  region  such  as  Brussels  and  Washington. 
However,  while  China’s  increased  interest  and  presence  in  the  region 
will not necessarily lead to conflict or confrontation, the EU will have to 
work out a new modus vivendi with China in this regard.

Among drivers of resilience, democracy and the rule of law, political stability and 
a well-functioning security sector are extremely important. The role of the EU and 
NATO, although the latter’s transformative power is more effective in the hard se-
curity (military) rather than soft security (law enforcement) sphere, cannot be over-
stated. It should be mentioned, however, that as a result of the EU’s ongoing in-
stitutional and identity crisis, the broader crisis of liberal democracy and strained 
transatlantic ties, at least in the medium term the EU is not going to be as dynamic 
and transformative actor in the region as it was a decade ago. 

As the European Global Strategy (EUGS) acknowledges, ‘fragility beyond our bor-
ders  threatens  all  our  vital  interests’,  and  ‘a  credible  enlargement  policy  ground-
ed  on  strict  and  fair  conditionality  is  an  irreplaceable  tool  to  enhance  resilience 
within the countries concerned’, where the EU ‘can make a meaningful difference’. 
This criterion suggests that the EU should continue to be heavily involved in the 
Western  Balkans,  where  it  can  make  a  difference  through  the  offer  of  EU  mem-
bership. However, because of ‘enlargement fatigue’ and because the EU is currently 
faced with multiple crises, enlargement in the Western Balkans has been moving at 
a slower pace than initially anticipated. The region is not yet part of the EU but the 
delay should be perceived as only temporary as the Western Balkans are clearly part 
of Europe’s finalité; also because of their relatively small size (in terms of population 
and economy) they are relatively easy to integrate.

Depending  on  more  general  developments  inside  the  EU,  especially  in  the  light 
of  the  French  election  result  in  May  and  the  upcoming  elections  in  Germany  in 
September, the accession process of selected countries in the Western Balkans could 
be expedited, perhaps using the concept of differentiated integration, if the Union 
is not prepared to take in new full members. Upon fulfilling basic membership re-
quirements,  candidate  countries  could  be  invited  to  join  an  ‘external’  cycle,  with 
strong emphasis on security cooperation (accompanied by financial incentives). 

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Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36 
The EU and NATO invested significantly in Security Sector Reform (SSR) efforts 
over the past two decades. The effort should be continued and expanded. A change 
in focus will be necessary, however. As mentioned in the Global Security Strategy, 
‘we will … enhance our partners’ capacities to deliver security within the rule of law’. 
Whereas rule of law, democratic control and accountability should remain impor-
tant objectives (in order to avoid the usual dilemma of stability vs democracy), EU-
NATO efforts should focus on making the security sector in the Western Balkans 
(but also in the Union itself) substantially more capable of dealing with new security 
threats (especially those of a transnational nature). What the security sector-related 
agencies urgently need are new training methods that would provide them with new 
skills,  but  also  cutting-edge  technologies  and  new  organisational  structures  that 
would facilitate a change in mentality that is absolutely essential in dealing with 
complex  security  problems.  More  specifically,  training  opportunities  for  security 
sector personnel from Western Balkan countries should be substantially increased. 
Promoting interagency, bilateral and multilateral cooperation should also become 
important priorities for the EU. 

Radicalisation  is  another  area  where  more  cooperation  would  be  necessary. 
Following  a  radicalisation  mapping  exercise  in  the  Western  Balkans,  EU  member 
states  which  have  been  addressing  radicalisation  and  violent  extremism  for  quite 
some time should start sharing experiences and best practices, where available, with 
countries in the region. Cooperation at various other levels should follow. 

Border  protection  is  also  another  promising  –  and  necessary  –  area  of  increased 
cooperation in view of continuing migration and refugee flows. The EU needs to 
safeguard its external borders from all kinds of security risks. The establishment of 
a European Borderguard/Coastguard Agency is an important first step in this direc-
tion. Enlisting the cooperation of countries in the Western Balkans would facilitate 
the task. Greece in particular has much to gain from cooperation with its Balkan 
neighbours and should be among the leading EU countries to promote SSR reform 
in the Western Balkans, as well as in Bulgaria and Romania to the extent that this is 
necessary. It should be mentioned here that there is already reasonably good secu-
rity cooperation between Greece and Albania and whatever problems may exist are 
due to a lack of capabilities, not a lack of political will. 

Whereas  the  input  of  NATO  can  be  moderately  helpful,  and  possible  synergies 
should be explored, this is a task mainly for the EU. Adopting the concept of ‘func-
tional resilience’ can be quite useful. Such capacity building should ideally be com-
bined with stronger local ownership, hence the significance of civil society actors 
who  could  embrace  and  support  such  reforms,  while  championing  the  causes  of 
transparency and accountability. The following ideas have also been suggested by 
several contributors as complementary elements of an EU-promoted strategy to fos-
ter resilience in the Western Balkans: 

109 

Resilience in the Western Balkans • A deep-seated sense of belonging and inclusion in a wider security and po-

litical community should be cultivated; 

 • Any new vision of the region’s European trajectory needs to be better com-

municated, preferably in a direct dialogue with citizens;

 • There is a need for a holistic approach which would include, inter alia, com-
munity engagement in fostering inter-religious dialogue, further reform of 
the educational system and increased opportunities for young people;

 • The EU needs to establish clear red lines in the key areas of media freedom, 
rule of law and democratic governance. This is especially the case given that 
reforms undertaken in the last ten years in three key areas – the creation 
of an efficient public administration, the establishment of an independent 
judiciary and the fight against corruption – have failed to pass the test of 
sustainability and irreversibility. 

At the EU level, adopting the concept of an indivisible and common security space, 
approaching external and internal drivers of fragility as interlocking and mutually 
enforcing, bolstering European resilience, as well as promoting SSR in the Western 
Balkans on the basis of pragmatic policy recommendations, would go a long way 
towards increasing stability and resilience in both the region and the EU itself.

110 

ISSReportNo.36ANNEXES

Resilience in the Western BalkansJOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL, ‘A 
STRATEGIC APPROACH TO RESILIENCE IN 
THE EU’S EXTERNAL ACTION’, 7.6.2017

1. Introduction

The EU and its Member States have established a robust policy framework to guide 
the  Union’s  external  action,  anchored  in  Article  21  of  the  Treaty  and  the  Global 
Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy1 (“EU global strat-
egy”), and linked to commitments they have taken at global and regional level. The 
challenge now is how to sustain progress in the transformational agenda the EU has 
set itself, against a backdrop of a more connected, contested and complex global 
environment. The EU global strategy identifies strengthening state and societal re-
silience as part of the response to this challenge.

The  aim  of  this  Joint  Communication  is  to  identify  how  a  strategic  approach  to 
resilience  can  increase  the  impact  of  EU  external  action  and  sustain  progress  to-
wards EU development, humanitarian, foreign and security policy objectives, given 
the more fluid landscape of global challenges and risks that the EU global strategy 
describes. It recognises the need to move away from crisis containment to a more 
structural, long-term, non-linear approach to vulnerabilities, with an emphasis on 
anticipation, prevention and preparedness.

It argues that given the rapidly changing environment, a political approach is need-
ed,  underpinned  by  a  coherent  mobilisation  of  political  dialogue,  the  diplomatic 
resources of the Union and its Member States, EU assistance and sectoral policy dia-
logue and bilateral initiatives. And it proposes the principles and working methods 
that need to be put in place to implement it. It builds upon the experience of imple-
menting  the  2012  Commission  Communication  on  Resilience2,  which  continues 
to guide relevant EU work, as well as experience drawn from the EU’s promotion of 
resilience when addressing complex domestic policy challenges.

This Joint Communication also recognises that the EU is not insulated from the 
pressures  affecting  its  external  partners,  and  that  EU  external  policy  can  make  a 
contribution  to  strengthening  resilience  within  the  Union  itself.  In  that  spirit  it 

1.  “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and 

Security Policy”. June 2016

2.  “The EU Approach to Resilience – learning from Food Security Crises”. COM(2012) 586 final, 3 October 2012

113 

Resilience in the Western Balkansproposes that proper linkages need to be established between internal and external 
policy, particularly in relation to the European Agenda on Security.

2. A strategic approach to resilience in the EU’s external action

An  ambitious  policy  framework.  There  has  been  an  intense  effort  by  the  EU 
over the past few years to re-shape its external policy framework in response to the 
changing  global  environment.  This  new  framework  comprises  multilateral  goals 
such  as  the  2030  Agenda  for  Sustainable  Development,  the  Paris  Agreement  on 
Climate  Change  and  the  Sendai  Framework  for  Disaster  Risk  Reduction  and  the 
Commitments to Action taken at the World Humanitarian Summit, as well as the 
EU’s own major reviews of the European Neighbourhood Policy, of its relations with 
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, the European Consensus on Development, 
and the establishment of a new level of ambition for the EU’s security and defence 
policy. The Rome Declaration has reconfirmed the EU’s commitment to a stronger 
role on the global scene.

A more fluid landscape of global challenges and risks. The EU will be taking for-
ward this agenda in the context of a world where the pace of change is increasingly 
rapid  and  the  pressures  on  states,  societies,  communities  and  individuals  are  in-
creasingly disruptive. Pressures, marked by the unprecedented pace of globalisation, 
range from demographic, climate change, environmental or migratory challenges 
beyond the power of individual states to confront, to economic shocks, the erosion 
of societal cohesion due to weak institutions and poor governance, conflict, violent 
extremism, and acts of external powers to destabilise perceived adversaries. There is 
constant pressure on the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. And 
there is vast unmet humanitarian and development need.

Chronic vulnerability and fragility in Europe’s wider neighbourhood is exacerbat-
ing the impact of these pressures. It is hampering the development of entire regions 
with potential spill-over beyond their borders.

Fostering resilience to sustain progress. The 2012 Commission Communication 
on the EU approach to resilience defines resilience as “the ability of an individual, 
a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, adapt and quickly 
recover from stresses and shocks”. The EU global strategy takes the concept further. 
It  speaks  of  resilience  as  “a  broad  concept  encompassing  all  individuals  and  the 
whole  of  society”  that  features  “democracy,  trust  in  institutions  and  sustainable 
development, and the capacity to reform”. Support to resilience at all levels is also 
an integral part of the new European Consensus on Development.

The EU’s strategic approach to resilience aims at achieving and sustaining the ambi-
tious set of objectives for the EU’s external action described above, by strengthening:

114 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36 •

 •

 •

the adaptability of states, societies, communities and individuals to politi-
cal, economic, environmental, demographic or societal pressures, in order 
to sustain progress towards national development goals;

the capacity of a state - in the face of significant pressures to build, maintain 
or restore its core functions, and basic social and political cohesion, in a 
manner that ensures respect for democracy, rule of law, human and funda-
mental rights and fosters inclusive long-term security and progress;

the capacity of societies, communities and individuals to manage opportu-
nities and risks in a peaceful and stable manner, and to build, maintain or 
restore livelihoods in the face of major pressures.

The ten guiding considerations in Annex identify some of the major methodologi-
cal insights that will shape this work.

3. Implementing a strategic approach to resilience

Work will be taken forward along the following three interlinked lines:

 •

 •

 •

expanding the contribution that EU external action can make to strength-
ening resilience of partner countries and their citizens while consolidating 
and delivering on existing resilience commitments;

enriching sectoral policy dialogue with partner countries by drawing upon 
the EU’s experience in promoting resilience in its domestic policy, and its 
research base;

ensuring that EU external policy effectively contributes to resilience within 
the Union.

This work will be grounded in the EU’s commitment to democracy and human and 
fundamental rights.

3.1 Expanding the contribution that EU external 
action can make to strengthening state, societal and 
community resilience in partner countries

The EU will continue to implement the 2013-2020 Resilience Action Plan, guided 
by  the  2013  Council  Conclusions  on  an  EU  approach  to  resilience.  But  the  EU’s 
resilience approach will expand to address state, societal and community resilience, 
informed by the new European Consensus on Development. It will place a greater 
emphasis  on  addressing  protracted  crises,  the  risks  of  violent  conflict  and  other 

115 

Resilience in the Western Balkansstructural pressures including environmental degradation, climate change, migra-
tion and forced displacement.

This approach will be aligned with EU commitments in the 2030 Agenda, notably 
to “leave no one behind” and the pledge in Sustainable Development Goal 16 to 
promote “peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide ac-
cess to justice and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions”.

Resilience and inclusive and participatory societies

There is a strong body of evidence showing the link between inclusive and participa-
tory societies, with accountable, transparent and democratic institutions, and sus-
tainable development and the prevention of violent conflict. Conversely, shortcom-
ings in governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, gender equality, 
corruption or the shrinking space for public participation and civil society, pose a 
fundamental challenge to the effectiveness of any society’s development efforts. The 
quality of governance and public administration determines the performance of a 
country in all public policy domains, shaping economic prosperity, social and terri-
torial cohesion, and sustainable growth. Resilient societies are underpinned by sus-
tainable and balanced socioeconomic development that anticipates and addresses 
socioeconomic inequalities, vulnerabilities, and their root causes. This understand-
ing is at the heart of the EU’s approach to state and societal resilience.

The EU should:

 •

continue to support domestic efforts, tailored to the needs and context of each society, 
to build sustainable democratic states, accountable and transparent institutions, re-
form the security sector, strengthen the rule of law, broad-based inclusive growth and 
employment,  participatory  decision-making  and  public  access  to  information.  The 
involvement of local governments, communities and civil society stakeholders will be 
given particular attention.

Resilience in practice – building resilience in a post-conflict situation: the case of Nigeria

Addressing vulnerability and fragility in Africa is a global priority, demanding col-
lective action from all stakeholders to address the interlinked challenges of poverty, 
inequality, conflict, violent extremism and climate threats. Protracted crisis in the 
region also has significant spill-over effects for the EU.

116 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36The EU response to the crisis in Northern Nigeria is an example of a joined-up resil-
ience approach, based on joint analysis (conducted together with the World Bank 
and UN) and joint strategic planning. A substantial package of assistance will aim 
to enhance resilience of conflict-affected people and begin reconstruction in North 
Eastern Nigeria. It builds on the existing emergency response, to gradually move into 
recovery and rehabilitation, utilising both humanitarian and development funds.

Resilience in practice – resilience and support to our partners 
in the EU’s five guiding principles towards Russia

The internal resilience of the Union is an integral consideration of our external policy 
towards Russia. The five guiding principles agreed by the Foreign Affairs Council in 
March 2016 recognise the need to strengthen engagement with a neighbourhood 
that extends as far as Central Asia. They also identify the need to strengthen the re-
silience of the EU, in particular on energy security, hybrid threats and strategic com-
munication. They aim to ensure that both the Union and its neighbouring partner 
countries remain free to make their own political, diplomatic and economic choices, 
by reducing the scope for external leverage or coercion.

Economic resilience

Economic  resilience  is  a  key  factor  of  the  overall  resilience  of  a  country,  and  is 
strongly correlated to other facets of resilience. Enhancing economic resilience in-
cludes  sound  macroeconomic  policies.  It  also  requires  attention  to  other  factors 
such as ensuring adequate financing of the infrastructure necessary to provide es-
sential public services, ensuring a more diversified economy with efficient and se-
cure  energy  supply,  and  the  necessary  financial  contingency  measures,  and  meas-
ures to ensure continuity of business and the protection of vital services and key 
facilities in the face of shocks.

While macroeconomic stability is essential for social development, macro-level sta-
bilisation and adjustment policies can entail costs. Such pressures can exacerbate 
existing inequities and societal tensions, particularly when they affect the most vul-
nerable. Policies need to be designed to mitigate these consequences. The upgrading 
of statistical and forecasting capacities is a condition to improve policy making and 
monitoring.

Economic resilience also requires providing the conditions for sustainable and in-
clusive  growth,  investment  and  financing.  This  starts  with  a  diversified  economy 
that is not overly dependent on single sectors or companies, and has a supportive 
environment for new businesses and SMEs to grow. The promotion of the circu-
lar economy, which reduces resource dependency, can also contribute to this goal. 
Moreover, giving workers the necessary skills and access to training will help them 
to adapt to structural changes.

117 

Resilience in the Western BalkansInvestment by foreign companies can help countries upgrade their economies, but 
this  needs  to  be  matched  with  incentives  for  multinational  enterprises  to  ensure 
respect for human rights, including labour rights.

The EU should:

 •

support partner countries in developing economic resilience underpinned by macroe-
conomic stability, and accompanied by measures aimed at promoting inclusive growth 
and mitigating the potential negative transitional impact on some groups in society; 
particular attention should be given to skills development, creation of decent jobs, social 
protection, and economic empowerment of disadvantaged groups in this context;

 • work with the European Investment Bank, other International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs), business sector organisations and social partners to enhance investment frame-
works for economic and social resilience, underpinned by inclusive economic develop-
ment, job creation and the promotion of business and access to finance; it should make 
full use of the proposed External Investment Plan in pursuit of this agenda.

A greater emphasis on needs resulting from protracted crises

The level of humanitarian need related to displacement resulting from violent con-
flict is the highest ever recorded. Whole regions are stuck in a state of protracted 
crisis  and  fragility,  where  the  impact  of  chronic  natural  disasters,  environmental 
degradation  and  conflict  intersect  and  magnify  each  other.  Currently  22%  of  the 
world  population,  or  1.6  billion  people3,  live  in  fragile  situations,  with  the  figure 
expected  to  rise  further  by  2030.4  In  addition  to  the  rising  numbers  of  people  in 
humanitarian need, people are affected for longer periods of time. The average du-
ration of displacement is now 17 years. Two thirds of international humanitarian 
assistance now goes to long-term recipients, as a result of protracted crises or recur-
rent disasters in the same region.

The  traditional  linear  division  of  labour  between  humanitarian  aid  and  develop-
ment cooperation has been changing in the face of this new reality. Structural fragil-
ity, which has both short-term and long-term socioeconomic and political impacts, 
needs to be addressed more effectively in order to break recurring cycles of emergen-
cies. The EU’s current model of addressing crises needs to become better attuned 
to a situation where poverty, population growth, climate change, rapid urbanisa-
tion, competition for limited resources, conflict and violent extremism are creating 
whole regions of instability.

3.  OECD(2016), States of Fragility 2016: Understanding violence

4.  One Humanity: Shared Responsibility - Report of the Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, for the World Humanitar-

ian Summit, 2016

118 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36The EU should:

 •

 •

prioritise and enhance close cooperation of EU political, humanitarian and develop-
ment actors on protracted crises and protracted displacement, while respecting the dis-
tinct mandates established by the Treaties, and humanitarian principles;

encourage Governments, through political dialogue, with support from development 
partners, to take more responsibility for chronic vulnerability and strengthen local ca-
pabilities for risk management and an earlier, local response;

 • mobilise its capacity for diplomatic engagement, sectoral policy dialogue and assistance 
programming in a coherent way around an improved shared analysis of all factors – 
including socioeconomic, political and environmental risks that compound vulnerabil-
ity to existing hazards.

Resilience in practice - understanding the gender dimension, 
an example from conflict and disaster policy

Case studies show that climate change, disasters and violent conflict can affect gen-
der groups in different ways. These factors need to be properly understood and ad-
dressed in any resilience analysis.

In some cases disasters and conflicts can underscore patriarchal social norms that 
disproportionately restrict women and girls’ equal access to rights and resources, 
and they can also create a shift in gender roles and norms.

Women and girls can also play an active and important role in contributing to so-
cietal resilience that can underpin peace. Ensuring that women and girls are well 
informed and actively participate in peace building and recovery efforts not only 
ensures that their specific needs and capacities are taken into consideration, but 
can also create a window of opportunity for social change, by challenging tradi-
tional gender roles and gender-based discrimination. This is a further factor of 
societal resilience, and can ensure more suitable and sustainable outcomes for EU-
supported work.

The specific contribution of women to strengthening resilience to violent conflict 
within societies also needs to be fully recognised, as well as their role when engag-
ing communities in the prevention and resolution of conflict and countering violent 
extremism.

119 

Resilience in the Western BalkansResilience and the prevention of violent conflict

A  resilience  approach  to  the  prevention  of  violent  conflict  aims  at  improving  in-
terventions, through better understanding of the factors that lead to violent con-
flict and identifying the endogenous capacities within a society that can allow some 
communities to resist a drift towards violence. It can give traction to initiatives for 
peace, and support to local conflict- resolution mechanisms, particularly in coun-
tries where the state may have an ambiguous role as both a source of political au-
thority and as a source of violence or coercion.

Such an approach also means broadening the range of responses considered, for in-
stance by giving greater weight to contribution of employment and social policy to 
societal resilience in national recovery programmes, working to ensure social inclu-
sion in governance arrangements for access to natural resources, and strengthening 
the gender dimension (see box above).

There  is  also  scope  to  enhance  the  contribution  of  the  EU’s  Common  Security 
and  Defence  Policy  (CSDP)  partnerships  to  strengthening  resilience,  in  line  with 
the  May  2017  Council  Conclusions  on  Security  and  Defence.  This  could  include 
training and capacity building, and work under the Capacity Building in support of 
Security and Development initiative.

All of this needs to be underpinned by joined-up political and diplomatic work by 
the EU and its Member States.

The EU should:

 •

 •

 •

strengthen its work on conflict prevention and peacebuilding through introducing a 
resilience dimension that puts a stronger emphasis on a more complete, shared analysis, 
engagement at community and state level, and, where appropriate, the rolling out of 
the integrated approach to conflict and crisis set out in the EU global strategy;

give greater weight in its conflict assessment methodology to local capacities to deal with 
risks, and the positive factors of resilience within a community, alongside an analysis 
of the power relationships and external pressures that can lead to societal breakdown; 
also take greater account of the link between environmental fragility and the risk of 
violent conflict, and systematically include climate and environmental indicators in 
conflict early warning systems;

use this strengthened analysis to inform and enhance political efforts by the EU and its 
Member States to prevent conflict, through political dialogue, a collective diplomatic 
response, and engagement with partners such as the UN.

120 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36Resilience, climate change and environmental degradation

Climate  change,  natural  disasters  and  environmental  degradation  are  interlinked 
and have a far-reaching impact on the resilience of communities and the ecological 
support systems upon which life depends. They are cause or contributing factors to 
many conflicts worldwide.

The EU should:

 •

broaden its approach to these challenges and put greater emphasis on the conserva-
tion, restoration and sustainable management of natural resources and ecosystems, 
and maintenance of the services that they provide. This should be done alongside cur-
rent work on building resilience in relation to extreme events such as drought, famine 
and floods5;

 • when assessing vulnerability, look not only at the intensity of events, but also at their 
frequency  and  likelihood;  factor  long-term  environmental  pressures  into  the  assess-
ment and response, such as deforestation and increasing water demand, as well as the 
need to anticipate the consequences of natural disasters and slow-onset events, such as 
land degradation, ocean acidification, sea level rise, and melting of glaciers;

 •

require more systematically environmental, climate and disaster risk assessments, in-
tegrate them into early warning systems to identify the potential impact of catastrophic 
sudden and slow onset risks, as well as to identify and prioritise preventive and/or 
adaptive  measures  for  risk  informed  investments,  development,  territorial  and  ur-
ban planning.

The  EU  is  also  committed  to  work  with  local  authorities  to  boost  resilience  in 
rapidly-growing urban areas, where lack of planning or investment in measures to 
mitigate  climate  and  geophysical  risks  can  expose  populations  to  significant  hu-
man and economic damage when shocks and stresses occur. Addressing underlying 
risk factors through risk-informed public and private investments is proving more 
cost-effective  than  relying  on  post-disaster  response.  In  this  context,  the  EU  will 
also continue to build on established sectoral dialogue on sustainable urbanisation 
with major partners and institutions, including regional and local authorities, to 
strengthen their resilience and innovation capacity, in line with the objectives of the 
New Urban Agenda.

The EU should:

 •

promote the use of ecosystem-based approaches to disaster risk-reduction;

5.  The crucial role of well-functioning ecosystems, and the services they provide, is recognised in the EU’s Nature 

Action Plan.

121 

Resilience in the Western Balkans •

promote risk transfer through risk financing mechanisms such as insurance and con-
tingency credit;

 • work with local authorities to develop governance systems that promote resilience to 

climate change, and the sustainable management of natural resources.

This work will be accompanied by reinforced EU political outreach, notably through 
the Green Diplomacy Network, the G7 working groups on Climate and Fragility, 
the G7 InsuResilience partnership, and the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change. The EU should also work through other relevant fora, includ-
ing the UN and relevant multilateral environmental agreements to raise awareness 
among partners of the environmental contribution to stability and security.

Resilience, migration and forced displacement

The  2030  Agenda  recognises  the  positive  contribution  of  migrants  to  inclusive 
growth and sustainable development. It also takes into account the vulnerabilities 
and  needs  of  forcibly  displaced  people.  Properly  designed  migration  policies  can 
strengthen economic resilience, both in the host countries and in the communities 
of origin. Moreover, at an individual level, migration and flight can be a legitimate 
adaptation strategy to severe external stresses. But sudden, sustained or large scale 
migratory pressures, including pressures from forced displacement, often fall most 
heavily on some of the poorest parts of the world, putting further stress on fragile 
coping mechanisms. Sub-Saharan Africa is particularly affected by this. And Europe 
can also expect to remain a destination for many, which in addition for the impact 
this will have on the EU, has implications for the transit countries on its geographi-
cal periphery.

A resilience approach to migration means designing policy to reflect how migratory 
patterns  respond  to  the  complex  interaction  between  demography,  institutional 
and democratic weaknesses, economic and social imbalances, violent conflict, en-
vironmental  degradation  and  climate  change.  It  means  continuing  to  invest  in  a 
sound evidence base for policy, and making timely investments in response.

The EU should work to further develop the following key dimensions of a resilience approach to 
migration and forced displacement by:

ensuring that work on migration is fully embedded in our overall political relation-
ship with partner countries. And that it is based on the principles of ownership, shared 
responsibility and the full respect of humanitarian and refugee law, and human rights 
obligations, including the right to protection;

addressing root causes of irregular migration, some of which are deep-seated, including 
poverty, inequality, demographic growth, lack of employment, education and econom-

 •

 •

122 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36ic opportunities, instability, conflict, climate change and environmental degradation, 
and the long-term consequences of forced displacement;

fostering self-reliance and enabling the displaced to live in dignity, including as contrib-
utors to their host societies6. This requires a new people-centred development- oriented 
approach for the forcibly displaced and their host communities that supports access to 
education, housing, decent work, livelihoods and services, and aims to end dependence 
on humanitarian assistance;

countering trafficking and organised crime networks that exploit migrants and refu-
gees, and apply a gender-sensitive lens to the specific forms of violence affecting them;

supporting  host  communities.  The  EU  should  further  support  targeted  initiatives  to 
improve language and professional skills, access to services and to the labour market, 
inclusive education, foster inter-cultural exchanges and promote awareness campaigns 
targeting both host communities and migrants;

strengthen the evidence base for interventions, including through devoting specific at-
tention  to  forced  displacement,  drivers  of  migration  and  cooperation  with  non-EU 
countries in the EU framework programme for research and innovation.

 •

 •

 •

 •

Resilience in practice – understanding the drivers and the interlinkages between 
pressures. An example of migration, environment and climate change

Migration to the EU is thought to be heavily influenced by environmental and cli-
mate changes, though this driver is difficult to disentangle from economic, demo-
graphic and other drivers and often goes unreported. Many migrants from Western 
Africa or Eastern Africa have first been driven away from their homes as a result of 
desertification and soil degradation, contributing to a pattern of rural exodus in 
Africa, largely driven by environmental disruptions on agricultural systems.

The effects of natural disasters are compounded by economic and demographic 
trends and rapid urbanisation. As a result, African cities are often overwhelmed by a 
large expansion of population, and unable to meet the needs of their inhabitants for 
jobs, housing or basic services. Recent studies have shown how migrants largely con-
gregate in informal settlements in the outskirts of large African cities, as for instance 
in the case of Accra, where more than 90% of migrant households live in one severely 
deprived area with no access to running water.

6.  Commission Communication on Lives in Dignity: from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance – Forced Displacement 

and Development (COM(2016) 234 final)

123 

Resilience in the Western Balkans3.2 Strengthening resilience through policy 
dialogue and bilateral initiatives

The EU is increasingly using a resilience approach to break down silos when 
addressing complex domestic policy challenges ranging from economic policy 
to climate adaptation and security of energy supply. It has also made a signifi-
cant investment in research to ensure a sound evidence base for this approach, 
and has developed a range of analytical tools to support policy implementa-
tion. For many of these challenges the domestic and international dimensions 
of the response are closely interlinked (see box below). This allows us to enrich 
policy dialogue with partner countries by bringing to the table insights from 
the EU’s domestic policy experience. Policy dialogue is a two-way process, and 
the EU also has much to learn from its partners in this way.

The EU should:

 •

 •

 •

draw upon the EU’s technical experience of building resilience in its domestic policies to 
strengthen bilateral sectoral policy dialogue and initiatives; it should seek to expand the 
contribution of specialised EU agencies to this work;

seek to ensure that EU best practice and standards are reflected in relevant multilateral 
instruments and policy frameworks, including in the ILO, WHO and G20;

foster a shared international knowledge-base on resilience by involving non-EU coun-
tries in resilience-related research and innovation under Horizon 2020, and to share 
and operationalise the results in our international cooperation.

Resilience in practice – linking the EU’s internal and external policy work

Critical infrastructure protection - The concept of resilience has been embedded 
in the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection since 2013. This 
has resulted in the development of risk assessment methodologies and research that 
already informs cooperation with a number of non-EU countries, including Ukraine. 
The concept has been further developed in the proposed Regulation on Security of 
Gas Supply, which includes provisions relating to risks stemming from non-EU coun-
tries and including effective cross-border measures in national emergency and pre-
ventive action plans. A similar approach is taken in the electricity sector.

Energy security - EU policy on security of energy supply links the concept of a resil-
ient Energy Union to global energy security and to the EU’s climate change policy*, 
including enhancing the energy security of partner countries by accelerating the 
global energy transition towards carbon-neutral economies and societies and in-
creasing energy efficiency. EU energy and climate diplomacy aims at promoting 
this approach.

124 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36Climate adaptation - The 2013 Climate Adaptation Strategy has promoted resilience 
through comprehensive adaptation strategies at national and municipal level, ad-
dressing vulnerable sectors such as agriculture, fisheries and critical infrastructure. 
The Strategy is currently being evaluated, and the experience gained within the EU 
shared with its external partners.

Civil protection – the EU civil protection mechanism contributes to resilience by im-
proving the effectiveness of prevention, preparedness and response to natural and 
man-made disaster in the EU, neighbouring countries and beyond. It promotes the 
development of risk assessments and the financing of prevention and preparedness, 
training and exercises.

Economic resilience - the EU is contributing to ongoing work in the G20 focused on 
building the capacity to achieve sustainable growth in the face of risks and pressures 
related to structural challenges; avoiding excessive build-up of risks, imbalances and 
vulnerabilities in the face of shocks. Although this does not establish binding obli-
gations, the work has resulted in a useful conceptual framework to inform policy. 
Moreover, in line with the EU global strategy, the EU is developing a more integrated 
European Economic Diplomacy, aiming to foster growth and jobs both in non-EU 
countries and within the EU, by encouraging increased involvement and participa-
tion of the EU private sector in our partner countries.

Employment - The EU is supporting the development of a Recommendation on 
Employment and Decent Work for Peace and Resilience within the International 
Labour Conference. This will provide guidance to governments on targeted em-
ployment and social policies linking humanitarian assistance and longer term 
development.

Global health risks - The EU has recognised that major human and animal health 
threats such as Ebola, avian influenza, anti-microbial resistance and African swine 
fever pose a threat not only to the resilience of health systems, but also to societal 
and economic resilience. Drug- resistant infections could by 2050 cause global eco-
nomic damage on a par with the 2008 financial crisis**. The EU’s response has been 
to develop domestic capacities to anticipate and respond to severe and sustained 
outbreaks, while strengthening international cooperation, including with the WHO. 
It has invested in research and innovation projects to improve early detection and 
surveillance, and develop adequate medical countermeasures. Lack of access to wa-
ter and sanitation, and air pollution, are also recognised as important health threats 
that the EU is actively addressing.

125 

Resilience in the Western BalkansResearch - The EU is already working under Horizon 2020 to develop a sound 
evidence base to inform our action to strengthen resilience. It funds work on resil-
ience in relation to security, radical ideologies, the economy, social sciences, water 
and food security and the challenges of large-scale migration and forced displace-
ment. Much of this is done in collaboration with partner countries***. Specialised 
services such as the European Commission’s Knowledge Centre on Migration and 
Demography, further the evidence-base, while research-informed risk indexes such as 
the Global Conflict Risk Index and the Index for Risk Management support decisions 
about prevention, preparedness and response.

* Commission Communication on Lives in Dignity: from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance – Forced Displacement and 
Development (COM(2016) 234 final)

** World Bank figures

*** Examples include the Partnership for Research and Innovation in the Mediterranean Area 2018-2028 (PRIMA), 
which  aims  at  developing  novel  solutions  for  sustainable  water  management  and  food  production,  and  the  EU-
Africa Research and Innovation Partnership in the area of food, nutrition security and sustainable agriculture.

Resilience in practice - Fostering a strategic approach to 
resilience in the EU’s neighbouring countries

The EU global strategy places a particular focus on resilience in the EU’s neighbour-
ing countries. This reflects the special political commitments of the accession pro-
cess and the EU’s neighbourhood policy; the close integration of our economies and 
societies; the interdependencies in our broad security interests; and the exposure 
that some of our neighbouring countries have to geopolitical rivalries.

A credible accession process grounded in strict and fair conditionality provides the 
political foundation to enhance resilience at state and societal level of countries in 
the Western Balkans and Turkey. At the core of this process is the “fundamentals 
first” approach, focusing on rule of law, human and fundamental rights, democratic 
institutions, including public administration reform, as well as economic reforms 
and competitiveness.

The 2015 Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was closely co-
ordinated with work on the EU global strategy, and its four priorities* already reflect 
much of the Strategy’s thinking on resilience. Taking forward the Review will, there-
fore, be a major part of our work on strengthening resilience in the region**.

The ENP works towards long-term social, economic and political transformation 
which requires the building up of institutional capacities, working at different levels 
of civil society and with local and regional authorities as well as central government, 
tackling the entrenched interests of authoritarian elites and sectarian narratives and 
implementing security sector reform.

126 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36Our collaboration on security policy is based on developing a shared understanding 
of interests and risks. This is particularly the case in our work on the prevention of 
violent conflict, radicalisation and extremism, and in our work to strengthen cyber-
security and resilience against hybrid threats.

An important dimension of our resilience approach is to strengthen linkages between 
our interventions in the region and those beyond. For example our work on energy, 
transport and connectivity links Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood countries, 
Iran and Central Asia; the EU Trust Fund for Africa tackles the root causes of irregu-
lar migration across the continent; the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the 
Syrian crisis supports Syrian refugees and host communities in the Neighbourhood 
and Turkey.

A number of key tools underpin our strategic approach to strengthening resilience 
in the region: engaging partners at both state and community level; increased col-
laboration with Member States, partner countries and national and international 
stakeholders to enhance ownership; greater flexibility of funding; more tailor-made 
and differentiated relationships with partners; and improved public diplomacy and 
communication. At the core of this is a political approach based around new, mutu-
ally agreed Partnership Priorities or revised Association Agendas, based on a clear 
assessment of shared, medium-term priorities, underpinned by a commitment to 
respect human and fundamental rights.

*Good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights; economic development; the security dimension; mi-
gration and mobility

** See Joint Report on the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy Review, JOIN (2017) 18 final 
of 18.5.2017

3.3 Resilience and the security of the EU

Under  the  EU  global  strategy,  peace  and  security  are  indivisible  from  sustainable 
and  inclusive  development,  the  respect  of  global  norms  and  rules-based  interna-
tional systems. Promoting this agenda remains central to the EU’s external action. 
But the Global Strategy also recognises that the EU and its Member States are sub-
ject to many of the structural pressures that test the resilience and expose vulnera-
bilities of our partner countries. That is why it identifies the protection of the EU as 
a key task ahead. Building more resilient neighbours is part of the response. But EU 
external policy, including through the CSDP, has also a role in directly contributing 
to resilience within our borders, at a time when the Union has a greater responsibil-
ity than ever before to contribute to the security of its citizens. That requires better 
detection of external pressures and threats, coupled with adequate mechanisms to 
ensure an appropriate political response.

The  EU’s  work  on  the  Security  Union  also  puts  resilience  at  the  heart  of  its  ap-
proach,  while  addressing  the  issue  of  external  non-state  actors.  Under  the  April 

127 

Resilience in the Western Balkans2015  European  Agenda  on  Security,  the  Commission  has  focused  on  two  broad 
pillars: tackling terrorism and organised crime, and strengthening the Union’s de-
fences and building resilience.

The challenge now is to knit together the internal and external security dimensions 
of EU policy in a way that mutually reinforces them, effectively raises the cost of 
coercive action by external parties, and allows the Union to anticipate and take early 
political and operational action in response to other kinds of pressures.

The EU will continue to pursue six main strands of concrete work in this regard:

 • Resilience against hybrid threats. Building on the Joint Framework on 
Countering  Hybrid  Threats,  a  central  objective  of  EU  efforts  will  be  to 
strengthen  protection  of  critical  infrastructure,  while  diversifying  energy 
sources and suppliers, and strengthening defence capabilities. Priority will 
be given to ensuring effective operational cooperation and secure commu-
nication between the Member States, and to work with actors across sec-
tors, making use of common tools. Cooperation with non- EU countries, 
particularly in the EU’s neighbourhood, will be stepped up.

 • Cyber-security.  The  malicious  use  of  Information  and  Communication 
Technologies can undermine both societal and economic resilience. Cyber 
threats have safety and security implications, and can cause major damage 
to the economy. In response both a normative agenda and an operational 
one will be pursued. Work will continue in line with UN efforts to build in-
ternational consensus around the rejection of the malicious use of ICT in or 
against any kind of essential services, regardless of its source, motive, nature 
or geographic origin. At the same time the EU is working to promote the 
resilience of essential services both internally7 and at the international level, 
and will enhance its cross-border cooperation on this agenda8.

 •

Strategic communication. The EU and some of its partner countries are 
targeted by external disinformation activities that form part of concerted 
strategies to discredit the political and social systems that are central to our 
identity, to our security and stability. In response measures to increase citi-
zens’ resilience to hostile disinformation will be further developed by rais-
ing awareness, by supporting greater media plurality and professionalism, 
and by communicating positive narratives and fact-based messages.

7.  For example, Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning 
measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union, COM(2016) 
410 final and the review of the 2013 EU Cybersecurity Strategy planned for September 2017.

8.  Including work with the EU’s main trade partners toward stronger cybersecurity for connected objects, as an-

nounced in the Digital Single Market mid-term review COM (2017) 228 final of 10.5.2017

128 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36The EU should strengthen the resources of the East Stratcom Task Force 
and  intensify  its  cooperation  with  EU  institutions,  Member  States  and 
likeminded  partners.  Longer  term  strategic  approach  and  outreach  to-
wards  Eastern  Partnership  countries  will  be  further  developed,  focusing 
on people-to-people exchanges, and on working with existing civil society 
networks that already represent a source of community-based resilience. A 
similar approach will be pursued in the Western Balkans and Turkey, with 
a reinforced team to deal with strategic communication in candidate coun-
tries and potential candidates.

The EU should also develop an outreach strategy to the Arab world that 
addresses terrorist propaganda and the use of the internet in radicalisation, 
and promotes human and fundamental rights.

 • The  work  to  strengthen  state  and  societal  resilience  described  above  is 
central to the EU’s approach to counter-terrorism and countering vio-
lent extremism. Prevention of radicalisation requires a carefully adapted 
strategy  that  responds  to  the  various  drivers  of  violence.  Improved  legal 
frameworks and effective institutions to detect, prevent and disrupt terror-
ist organisations and their sources of funding is essential. But to have the 
desired impact, such work will need to go hand in hand with ensuring the 
protection of the rights and civic space that helps create peaceful and stable 
societies less susceptible to the message of violent extremism. The EU will 
encourage partner countries in its Counter-Terrorism dialogue to address 
the issue across all relevant policies, not just as a security response. This 
includes ensuring that local practitioners can identify and address the early 
warning signs of radicalisation, including online radicalisation.

 • Enhancing  the  security  of  critical  transport  infrastructure.  Increased 
security of critical transport is an important element of co-operative, con-
nected and automated mobility that underpins a global, inter-connected 
economy. The EU should strengthen its engagement with non-EU coun-
tries to mitigate threats to transport infrastructure and services. It should 
reinforce the access to co-operation at expert level, in support of capacity 
building, awareness strategies, tools and information networks, as well as 
improving the role of police and judiciary systems.

 •

Further developing cooperation with NATO and the OSCE. The EU 
and NATO have agreed a number of measures to bolster resilience as part 
of their work on countering hybrid threats. These include intensification 
of staff contacts on resilience requirements, promoting greater coherence 
between the EU Capability Development Plan and the NATO Defence Plan-
ning Process, and working to be ready to deploy experts upon request to 
support EU Member States or NATO allies in enhancing their resilience, 
either in the pre-crisis phase or in response to a crisis.

129 

Resilience in the Western BalkansThis work has underlined the interdependencies between civil authorities, 
military and private sector in strengthening the resilience of Member States 
to hostile acts by state and non-state actors. These interdependencies range 
from the reliance of the military on civilian logistical and telecommunica-
tion capabilities, to the reliance of civil authorities on military capabilities 
for  handling  disruptive  events  affecting  large  numbers  of  citizens.  These 
interdependencies  will  be  explored  with  a  view  to  coming  forward  with 
proposals  to  the  Council  for  further  possible  future  co-ordinated  work- 
streams with NATO.

There is considerable scope to explore collaborative work on resilience with 
the OSCE, in view of the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security en-
compassing the military, the economic and environmental as well as the 
human dimensions.

4. The way forward – four building blocks to incorporating a 
strategic approach to resilience in the EU’s external action

The EU global strategy’s emphasis on resilience underlines a significant change in 
the  way  the  EU  manages  the  risk  and  impact  of  disruptive  shocks  and  pressures 
in its external policy. It recognises that these pressures and shocks are part of the 
context  in  which  the  EU  operates  and  should  be  factored  into  the  way  we  work, 
rather than being seen as an unexpected exception. This implies a progressive shift 
in emphasis from crisis containment to upstream measures founded in long-term, 
but flexible, country and regional strategies that are better risk-informed and less 
instrument-driven.  It  also  implies  a  greater  attention  to  risk  factors  affecting  EU 
interests. Ultimately the aim will be to combine political dialogue, sectoral policy 
dialogue, technical and financial assistance in an effective way upstream of a crisis.

All this requires a rethink of the EU’s problem analysis and design of programmes, 
as well as of the methods of assessment of the sustainability of EU’s interventions. 
In response, four basic building-blocks to incorporating a resilience approach in a 
systematic way into the EU’s external action are proposed:

improving and sharing analysis of risk at country and regional level so as 
better to inform strategy, political dialogue and programming of assistance;

instituting a more dynamic monitoring of external pressures, and working 
with the Council to ensure a more timely political and diplomatic response;

integrating the resilience approach in EU programming and financing of 
external action;

developing international policy and practice on resilience.

 •

 •

 •

 •

130 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.364.1 Improving analysis of risk at country and regional level

The EU has access to a formidable body of information about risks, pressures and 
vulnerabilities  to  shock  in  its  partner  countries.  This  knowledge  comes  from  the 
EU’s diplomatic and intelligence networks, its operational field presence, the secto-
ral policy expertise available in the institutions and Member States, and the moni-
toring mechanisms of the EU agencies. There is a multiplicity of overlapping risk as-
sessment processes reflecting different policy perspectives: humanitarian, conflict, 
environmental and economic. There are, nontheless, significant gaps, for instance 
in our ability to predict the impact of climate change, environmental and other fac-
tors on migratory movements. In addition, analysis often gives too little emphasis 
to local resilience capacities and the positive dynamics these can generate. And risk 
assessment processes are not always able to capture in full the possible impact on 
EU political, security and economic interests.

While respecting the different mandates, there is a need to bring the various sources 
of information together in a way that gives decision-makers a full picture of how 
different factors may interact to affect the development and stability of a country or 
region, or programme objectives.

The EU should:

 •

 •

improve conflict sensitivity, and address gaps in our understanding of risk, for instance 
by developing better mechanisms to assess the nature and impact of future flows of 
displaced people and migrants, and the relationship between climate pressures, envi-
ronmental degradation and violent conflict;

streamline current assessment processes to ensure that a single succinct country assess-
ment identifying both risk and resilience factors is available to guide policy across the 
various actors of EU external policy. This single country assessment will integrate in a 
more systematic and dynamic way information from the EU’s diplomatic network, 
humanitarian, crisis response and development actors as well as the specialised knowl-
edge  about  the  external  environment  held  by  the  EU’s  internal  policy  Directorates 
General and agencies. It would inform political dialogue and the design of assistance 
programmes. It would provide an analytical contribution in support of the established 
decision-making processes governing the development of EU country strategies, CSDP 
operations and the programming of external assistance;

 •

promote  joint  analysis  with  multilateral  partner  organisations  and  bilaterally  with 
like-minded development partners addressing the different dimensions of resilience.

131 

Resilience in the Western Balkans4.2 A more dynamic monitoring of external 
pressures to allow early action

The EU needs to be able to monitor and respond to external pressures affecting the 
resilience of its partner countries and of the EU in both a medium-term and a short-
term time frame.

The EU should:

 •

 •

further develop the EU’s Conflict Early Warning System in order to integrate appro-
priate indicators of resilience alongside the risk factors currently monitored The Early 
Warning System already picks up on many broader indicators of risk and vulnerabil-
ity, such as environmental, climate and demographic pressures9, as well as indicators 
of governance and institutional capacity to cope with such pressures. Monitoring of re-
silience indicators could help identify the tipping point at which pressures overwhelm 
coping mechanisms;

reflect the strategic importance of resilience when developing the EU’s Integrated Ap-
proach to external conflicts and crises. The Integrated Approach, as envisaged in the 
EU global strategy, expands the scope and ambition of the Comprehensive Approach, 
and should succeed it following completion of the 2016-2017 Comprehensive Approach 
Action Plan.

The Conflict Early Warning System is designed primarily to identify potential driv-
ers of violent conflict in third countries, within a four year horizon. It is now pro-
posed to complement this with mechanisms focused on identifying external pres-
sures and their consequences in a short-term horizon, with a view to informing a 
strengthened and timely EU political response.

The EU should:

 •

establish a light-touch short-term horizon-scanning system mechanism to identify the 
impact on EU interests of external pressures identified in a three to six month time 
frame. This will focus on identifying external pressures that could present a risk of de-
railing in a significant way a partner country’s development process or security, or 
that could have significant consequences for the resilience of the Union. To the extent 
that data is available it would also provide an initial measure of the consequences for 
the broader interests of the Union, such as external disruptions to the security of energy 
supply and critical supply chains, public health emergencies, the impact of crises on EU 
citizens abroad, and major migratory movements;10

9.  In identifying these indicators the EU will draw upon scientific research conducted by the European Commis-

sion’s Joint Research Centre, and that funded under Horizon 2020.

10. This could include data from the Justice and Home Affairs agencies such as the European Border Guard and 
Cost Guard Agency on migratory pressures, and the advance cargo information and customs risk management 
system that identifies certain threats to the security and integrity of international supply chains, and to critical 
infrastructure such as sea-port facilities, airports or land borders.

132 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36 •

support efforts, including at the UN, for the early detection and prevention of atrocities, 
including through the development of an atrocity-prevention tool kit.

Both systems will be designed to support effective decision-making processes up-
stream  of  a  crisis.  The  Council  and  the  Commission  both  have  central  roles  to 
play in this.

In view of this:

 •

 •

 •

the Political and Security Committee (PSC) will be invited to consider the results of 
the horizon-scanning mechanism on a regular basis in order to ensure timely political 
guidance for early action;

the Presidency will be invited to consider the relevance of the information from the ho-
rizon-scanning mechanisms to other relevant Council formations, such as the Standing 
Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI);

the EU should continue to develop mechanisms that integrate flexibility into assistance 
programmes, to allow early appropriate action when risks are identified.

4.3 Integrating the resilience approach into 
EU programming and financing

The EU will build on existing practice to make an assessment of risk and resilience 
factors a standard component of programming processes and project design across 
EU  humanitarian,  crisis  response  and  development  assistance,  including  the  EU 
Trust Funds. Key lessons from the resilience approach include the need to be able 
to work at multiple levels, including community-driven interventions, the need for 
longer  term  programming  cycles  (including  planning  of  humanitarian  aid)  com-
bined with short term flexibility, and the need for contingency financing arrange-
ments  to  address  potential  disruptive  pressures  and  shocks  that  could  otherwise 
derail the achievement of longer term strategic objectives. This should be taken into 
account in joint programming processes with Member States, which will be further 
encouraged.

The EU should:

 •

update programming guidance where necessary, drawing on EU experience and the 
methodological work of other multilateral partners on resilience. It should underline 
that  humanitarian  and  development  assistance  in  fragile  environments  should  be 
conflict-sensitive to avoid the potential of negative impact and to improve effectiveness. 
Methodologies to identify and address such risks will be further developed;

133 

Resilience in the Western Balkans •

 •

 •

take  account  in  programme  monitoring  and  evaluation  frameworks  the  fact  that 
strengthening resilience requires long-term interventions with a high degree of innova-
tion and flexibility in their design, identifying appropriate indicators and acknowledg-
ing the challenge to collect qualitative data;

take into consideration the strategic approach to resilience in its current and future fi-
nancing of EU external action;

cost-effective innovative risk financing solutions at a regional, national and local level 
should be explored (e.g. contingent credit, catastrophe funds and insurance).

4.4 Developing international policy and practice

The EU is working closely with major international partners that have developed 
their own resilience policy frameworks, including the United Nations, World Bank, 
Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development,  European  Bank  for 
Reconstruction and Development. The EU has an interest in developing a shared 
understanding  and  practice  around  resilience,  and  in  cooperating  at  operational 
level where possible.

The EU should:

 •

 •

intensify policy and practical cooperation with international partners in order to share 
research findings and methodological knowledge and, where possible align resilience 
approaches, share data sets and alert systems;

cooperate  more  closely  with  regional  and  sub-regional  organisations  on  resilience 
frameworks, by sharing and exchanging evidence and experience.

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and 
the European Commission invite the European Parliament and the Council to en-
dorse and support the approach set out in this Joint Communication.

Annex – 10 guiding considerations for a strategic approach to resilience

Based  on  the  EU’s  experience  following  the  2012  Communication,  and  the  in-
sights  gained  from  the  wide  consultation  process  in  the  preparation  of  this 
Communication, the following guiding considerations for an effective and strategic 
approach to resilience can be identified:

1.  Strengthening resilience is a means not an end. The EU’s strategic 
approach  to  resilience  is  about  building  upon  underlying  institution-
al and societal strengths in partner countries in order to achieve long 

134 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36term sustainable development or security goals. It is about securing pro-
gress towards these goals by addressing vulnerabilities and underlying 
structural risks. It recognises that development, and progress towards 
democracy,  peace  and  security,  is  not  a  linear  process,  and  that  secto-
ral approaches, on their own, are not always enough to ensure sustain-
able results.

2.  Understanding the factors of resilience in a given context can help 
us  plan  against  pressures  and  contingencies  in  a  more  effective 
manner. To do so requires a proper understanding of the linkages be-
tween  different  parts  of  the  complex  systems  that  govern  and  sustain 
states, societies and communities, as well as of how they respond when 
faced with sudden-onset shocks, recurrent or long-term stresses.

3.  Resilience  is  context-specific,  and  requires  tailor-made  approach-
es. Although there are a number of common characteristics of resilient 
systems, it will be for practitioners and local actors to develop context-
specific working definitions. The role of the EU and other external ac-
tors is to support this process and to foster societies better empowered 
to identify and solve their own problems. It requires policy makers and 
development partners to adopt a long-term approach that tolerates the 
necessary adaptability as approaches are tested and refined.

4.  Identifying and building upon existing positive sources of resilience 
is as important as tracking and responding to vulnerabilities. Such 
factors  may  take  the  form  of  institutionalised  or  informal  democratic 
and good governance or justice systems, non-state institutions and or-
ganisations, embedded cultural norms and practices or ad hoc commu-
nity-driven solutions that complement state capacities or compensate for 
their absence. Resilience has to be addressed at multiple levels – state, 
society and community. Local governments and civil society are often 
the basis on which resilience can take root and grow at community level. 
Women have a specific and essential role that needs to be recognised and 
acted upon, while addressing the structural causes of gender inequality.

5.  Resilience is about transformation not preserving the status quo. If 
resilience is about sustaining the core identity and capabilities of states, 
societies and communities in the face of disruptive pressures, it is also 
about  ensuring  their  ability  to  adapt  and  reform  to  meet  new  needs. 
Harnessing the transformative dimension of resilience is key.

6.  Resilience requires a political approach. Governments have primary 
responsibility for catering for the needs of their populations, and inter-
national  assistance  should  not  be  a  substitute  for  local  responsibility 
and  political  action.  All  countries  have  committed  to  the  Sustainable 

135 

Resilience in the Western BalkansDevelopment Goals, which include specific references to strengthening 
resilience. Thus the primary responsibility for integrating resilience into 
national and local policy frameworks lies within each country. However, 
the EU and its Member States can support the strengthening of resil-
ience  through  raising  the  issue  as  an  integral  part  of  its  political  dia-
logue, including at the highest level.

7.  Resilience  requires  risk-informed  programming.  Action  to  ad-
dress the underlying diverse causes of fragility should be accompanied 
with  risk  management  measures  to  protect  populations  from  shocks 
and  stresses,  limit  their  impact  through  early  response  and  assist  a 
quick recovery.

8.  It will not always be possible to address sustained pressures at their point 
of origin, or to escape the consequences of a sudden-onset crisis. But ad-
dressing  problems  at  the  point  of  failure  is  disproportionately  costly. 
That means building flexibility and adaptability to change into pro-
gramme design from the outset. It also means thinking about the pos-
sible stresses that strengthening or weakening one part of a system can 
place on another.

9.  Early warning needs to be linked to early action. It is not possible to 
avoid all risks, so an effective resilience approach requires decision mak-
ers to be able to identify and assess pressures in the long, medium and 
short term, and to take effective early action. This means that a com-
plete assessment has to be linked to appropriate decision- making pro-
cesses. This is not just about shocks (as in the case of natural disaster, 
inter-state conflict or economic crisis), it is also about slow-onset crises, 
recurrent pressures, or cumulative long-term pressures that can reach 
a  tipping  point  (demographic,  environmental  degradation,  climate 
change, migratory and other chronic stresses).

10.  The operational starting point is a broader analysis of strengths, vul-
nerabilities and pressures. States and societies are built around complex 
interdependencies  between  political  and  security  actors,  the  private  sec-
tor, civil society, communities and individuals. Traditional sectoral policy 
approaches may not identify all vulnerabilities, their interconnections, or 
anticipate how a system as a whole will respond when it comes under pres-
sure, including possible consequences for other States. That means that 
for any given outcome, risk – and the ability to cope – needs to be ana-
lysed at multiple levels, particularly at the points at which one factor of 
resilience, or one set of actors is dependent on the resilience of others, or 
where power relations between different levels of society play an important 
role. Typically this will mean an “all- hazard” approach, bringing together 
analysis at regional, state, organisational, community and individual level.

136 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36ABBREVIATIONS

BiH

BRI

CEE

CESEE

CFSP

CSDP

CSO

CVE

EEAS

EFB

EPP

ESS

EUGS

FDI

FYROM

HCNM

HR/VP

NATO

NGO

ODIHR

OSCE

OSF

PfP

PVE

SEE6

SOEs

SSR

TEU

UAE

UNHCR

USAID

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Belt and Road Initiative

Central and Eastern Europe

Central, East and Southeastern Europe

Common Foreign and Security Policy

Common Security and Defence Policy

Civil society organisation

Countering Violent Extremism

European External Action Service

European Fund for the Balkans

European People’s Party

European Security Strategy

EU Global Strategy

Foreign Direct Investment

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

High Commissioner on National Minorities

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/
Vice-President of the European Commission

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

Non-governmental organisation

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Open Society Foundations

Partnership for Peace

Preventing Violent Extremism

Six countries of southeast Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro 
and Serbia)

State-owned enterprises

Security Sector Reform

Treaty on European Union

United Arab Emirates

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

United States Agency for International Development

137 

Resilience in the Western BalkansResilience in the Western BalkansNOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

Rosa Balfour is a Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the US and Acting 
Director  of  its  Europe  Programme.  She  has  researched  and  published  widely  on 
issues  relating  to  European  foreign  policy  and  external  action,  relations  with  the 
Mediterranean region, Eastern Europe  and the Balkans, EU enlargement, and on 
the role of human rights and democracy in international relations. Prior to joining 
GMF, she was a Director at the European Policy Centre (EPC), where she headed 
the Europe in the World programme. She holds an MA in history from Cambridge 
University, an MSc in European Studies and PhD in International Relations both 
from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).

Igor Bandović has been working as a Senior Programme Manager for the European 
Fund  for  the  Balkans  since  2008.  He  is  in  charge  for  the  policy  research  and  ad-
vocacy  initiatives  within  the  Fund,  including  the  coordination  of  the  ‘Balkans  in 
Europe Policy Advisory Group’. Prior to joining the EFB, he worked for different in-
ternational organisations, including the International Organisation for Migration 
and United Nations Development Programme (2006-2008). From 2002 to 2006, he 
worked for the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights where his research priorities were 
human rights education, civil society and nationalism.

Florian Bieber is Professor of Southeast European History and Politics and Director 
of  the  Centre  for  Southeast  European  Studies  at  the  University  of  Graz,  Austria. 
He  is  the  coordinator  of  the  Balkans  in  Europe  Policy  Advisory  Group  (BiEPAG) 
and  provides  policy  advice  to  international  organisations,  foreign  ministries,  do-
nors  and  private  investors.  He  has  worked  for  the  European  Centre  for  Minority 
Issues and taught at Kent University (UK) and Central European University (CEU). 
His  research  interests  include  democratisation,  institutional  design  in  multi-
ethnic  states,  nationalism  and  ethnic  conflict,  as  well  as  the  political  systems  of 
Southeastern Europe. 

Srdjan Cvijić coordinates EU enlargement advocacy at the Open Society European 
Policy  Institute.  Additionally  he  is  a  member  of  the  Balkans  in  Europe  Policy 
Advisory Group. He has been engaged in EU policy work since 2005. Before joining 
the Open Society Foundation in 2015, he worked at the European Policy Centre, 
the  NATO  Parliamentary  Assembly,  the  Stability  Pact  for  South  Eastern  Europe, 
and in the diplomatic service of the Republic of Serbia. He holds a PhD from the 
Law  Department  of  the  European  University  Institute  in  Florence  and  an  MA  in 
International  Relations  and  European  studies  from  Central  European  University 
in Budapest.

Nikola  Dimitrov  is  a  Distinguished  Fellow  at  The  Hague  Institute  for  Global 
Justice. In his 18 years of public service in foreign and security policy, he has served 
as Deputy Foreign Minister (2000), National Security Adviser to the President of the 

139 

Resilience in the Western BalkansRepublic of Macedonia (2001), Macedonian Ambassador to the Netherlands (2009-
14) and to the United States (2001-06). He joined The Hague Institute in April 2014, 
where his work inter alia focuses on democratic governance, rule of law, stability and 
the Euro-Atlantic integration of Southeast Europe. He is a member of the Balkans 
in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG).

Thanos Dokos has a PhD in International Relations from Cambridge University and 
has held research posts at the Hessische Stiftung Friedens und Konfliktforschung 
(1989-90) and the Center for Science and International Affairs (CSIA) at Harvard 
University (1990-91). He has worked for the Hellenic Ministries of National Defence 
(1996-98)  and  Foreign  Affairs  (1998-1999)  and  has  taught  at  the  Universities  of 
Piraeus and Athens. He is currently the Director-General of the Hellenic Foundation 
for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). His research interests include global 
trends, international security, Greek-Turkish relations and Mediterranean security.

Filip  Ejdus  is  a  Marie  Curie  Fellow  at  the  School  of  Sociology,  Politics  and 
International  Studies  (University  of  Bristol)  and  an  Assistant  Professor  at  the 
Faculty of Political Sciences (University of Belgrade). In the broadest sense, his re-
search looks at the management of (in)security during crises and beyond borders 
while his areas of geographic expertise are the Western Balkans, Middle East and 
Horn of Africa. He is currently working on a project on the local ownership princi-
ple in EU crisis management interventions.

Tobias Flessenkemper is Senior Fellow and Balkans Project Director of the Centre 
international de formation européenne (CIFE) in Nice and a member of the Balkans 
in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG). He was a Visiting Fellow at the Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs) 
from 2012-13, and previously held senior advisory and management positions in 
the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and EUPOL Proxima. He is the 
co-founder and managing director of elbarlament.org, an advisory practice based in 
Berlin, focusing on innovation in governance and communication. 

Ana E. Juncos is a Reader in European Politics at the School of Sociology, Politics 
and International Studies, University of Bristol. Her primary research interest lies 
in  European  foreign  and  security  policy,  with  a  focus  on  the  development  of  the 
EU’s conflict prevention and crisis management capabilities and its role in conflict 
resolution. She is the Consortium Co-ordinator of the H2020 funded project EU-
CIVCAP. Her previous research project examined the EU’s intervention in  Bosnia 
since  1991  (EU  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  in  Bosnia,  Manchester  University  Press, 
2013). She is also co-editor of EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management (with Eva 
Gross, Routledge, 2011).

Sandro Knezović is a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Development 
and International Relations in Zagreb. His research focuses on IR topics, especially 
those  related  to  international  and  European  security  and  defence  (CFSP/CSDP), 

140 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36the EU and NATO enlargement and its impact on the region of Southeast Europe. 
He was the first Croatian Visiting Research Fellow at the EU Institute for Security 
Studies (April-July 2007) and has been a visiting lecturer at several universities in 
Japan. He is a member of numerous international expert teams and research net-
works, and has published extensively in the field of his expertise.

Sabina Lange is Senior Lecturer at EIPA, and Associate Professor of International 
Relations at the University of Ljubljana. She has been a Senior Associate Analyst at 
the EUISS since October 2015, working on issues related to the EU Global Strategy 
and the Western Balkans. Since 2009 she has been training member state officials in 
programmes for preparation of future rotating Council Presidencies, and has given 
regular courses on decision-making in the EU and on interinstitutional relations in 
the European Commission, the European Parliament, the General Secretariat of the 
Council and EU Agencies. She has been a consultant for the European Parliament 
and the Committee of the Regions.

Zoran Nechev specialises in EU-Western Balkans relations and the external dimen-
sions of EU justice and home affairs. Since 2014, he has been an academic guest at 
the Center for International and Comparative Studies, ETH Zürich, examining the 
effects of the EU’s conditionality policy on rule of law in the Western Balkans. He 
also heads the Center for EU Integration at the Institute for Democracy ‘Societas 
Civilis’, Skopje. He is a Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung KAS Macedonia PhD Fellow. He 
has been a Senior Associate Analyst at the EUISS since January 2017, involved in 
research activities relating to the EU Global Strategy, as well as justice and home 
affairs in the Western Balkans.

Predrag  Petrović  is  executive  director  at  the  Belgrade  Centre  for  Security  Policy 
(BCSP).    His  research  interests  include  security  sector  reform,  intelligence  gov-
ernance and the privatisation of security, as well as violent extremism. He was in-
volved in drafting a model of the referral mechanisms for preventing youth radi-
calisation,  and  accompanying  protocols  for  security  institutions.  He  contributed 
to the Handbook of European Intelligence Cultures (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016) with a 
chapter on Serbian security and intelligence services. He obtained his MPhil degree 
at  the  Faculty  of  Political  Sciences,  Belgrade  University  with  a  thesis  entitled  The 
Privatisation of Security in Weak States: The Case of Serbia.

Florian Qehaja is the Executive Director of the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies 
(KCSS).  He  serves  as  an  international  consultant  on  security  issues  cooperating 
with leading international governmental and non-governmental organisations. He 
is non-resident advisor on CVE to the Director of Peacebuilding and Human Rights 
Programme of Columbia University. He holds a post-doc from Columbia University 
(SIPA) and a PhD from the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. He re-
cently published the book International or Local Ownership? Security Sector Development 
in Post-Independent Kosovo (Westphalia Press, 2017).

141 

Resilience in the Western BalkansDušan Reljić is currently head of the Brussels office of Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik  (SWP),  the  Berlin-based  German  Institute  for  International  and  Security 
Affairs.  His  research  focuses  on  security  issues  in  the  EU  and  southeast  Europe; 
democratisation,  nationalism  and  ethnic  strife;  former  socialist  countries’  experi-
ence of transition; and the role of the news media in situations of conflict. He previ-
ously worked as senior research associate in the SWP research division ‘EU External 
Relations’  (2003-2013),    and  was  senior  researcher  and  subsequently  head  of  the 
Media and Democracy Programme at the Dusseldorf-based European Institute for 
the Media (EIM) between 1996 and 2003. 

Alessandro Rotta is Senior Advisor to the OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities since November 2015. Prior to that he worked as Senior Political Advisor 
to  the  EU  Special  Representative  in  Kosovo  (2011-2015),  as  Political  Advisor  in 
the EULEX Kosovo Mission (2008-2011) and as a Political Advisor to the Special 
Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in Brussels (2006-2008). 
Previously, he was Coordinator of studies and researcher on South Eastern Europe 
at the Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale-CeSPI, a Rome-based think tank, from 
2000 to 2006. He holds a degree in Political Science from the University of Florence.

Julija Sardelić is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the School of Law and Social Justice, 
University of Liverpool. Previously, she was a Max Weber Fellow at the European 
University Institute and CITSEE Research Fellow at the School of Law, University 
of Edinburgh. Her research focuses in particular on the legal status of marginalised 
and  vulnerable  minorities  in  Europe.  As  a  Postdoctoral  Researcher  at  the  School 
of Law and Social Justice she is currently conducting a socio-legal analysis on the 
impact of the refugee crisis on understandings of multiculturalism and diversity in 
Europe. From September 2017, she will be a Marie Curie Sklodowska Postdoctoral 
Fellow at the University of Leuven in Belgium. 

Corina  Stratulat  is  Senior  Policy  Analyst  at  the  European  Policy  Centre  (EPC) 
where  she  works  on  EU  institutional  reform  issues,  EU  enlargement  towards  the 
Balkans and democracy. Prior to joining the EPC, she received her PhD in Political 
and Social Sciences from the European University Institute in Florence, an MPhil 
in Contemporary European Studies from the University of Cambridge and a BA in 
Integrated Social Sciences from Jacobs University (Bremen, Germany). Her main re-
search interests include comparative Central and East European politics, parties and 
party systems, elections, democracy, EU institutions, integration and enlargement.

Florian  Trauner  is  a  research  professor  at  the  Vrije  Universiteit  Brussel  and  a 
Senior  Associate  Analyst  at  the  EUISS.  He  also  teaches  at  the  College  of  Europe, 
Natolin Campus. He specialises in justice and home affairs (both internal and exter-
nal dimensions) and EU-Western Balkans relations. Among his recent publications 
are Policy Change in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: How EU institutions matter 
(Routledge, 2015) and ‘The EU visa suspension mechanism’ (EUISS Alert, February 
2017). At the EUISS, he is involved in activities relating to the Global Strategy.

142 

Resilience in the Western BalkansISSReportNo.36Anastas Vangeli is a doctoral researcher at the Graduate School for Social Research 
at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw and a Claussen Simon PhD Fellow at 
the Trajectories of Change Program of the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius, 
Hamburg. He is an active member of the UACES Collaborative Research Network 
on  EU-China  Relations,  and  a  non-resident  fellow  at  the  Torino  World  Affairs 
Institute (T.wai).  He is the co-editor of China and Europe in 21st Century Global Politics: 
Partnership, Cooperation or Co-evolution? (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013) and 
has published a number of scholarly articles, research papers and book chapters on 
China, post-socialist Europe, and the relationship between them.

Ivan  Vejvoda  is  a  Permanent  Fellow  and  Director  of  the  ‘Europe  at  Risk?’  pro-
ject  at  the  Institute  for  Human  Sciences,  Vienna,  Austria.  From  2010  to  2017  he 
was  Senior  Vice  President  at  the  German  Marshall  Fund  of  the  United  States  in 
Washington D.C.  Prior to this, from 2003 to 2010 he was the Executive Director of 
the Balkan Trust for Democracy.  He served as the Senior Advisor on Foreign Policy 
and European integration to the Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić. He was ex-
ecutive director of the Belgrade-based Fund for an Open Society from 1998 to 2002. 
He was awarded the French National Order of Merit in the rank of Officer (2006) 
and the Italian Order of the Star of Solidarity in the rank of Commander (2007).

143 

Resilience in the Western Balkanss

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European Union Institute for Security Studies 
100, avenue de Suffren | 75015 Paris | France | www.iss.europa.eu