REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL On Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism
Date: 2018-11-13
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Bulgaria, corruption, criminal law, independence of the judiciary, judicial reform, organised crime, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Strasbourg, 13.11.2018  COM(2018) 850 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL On Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism {SWD(2018) 550 final}  
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

In  January  2017  the  Commission  undertook  a  comprehensive  assessment  of  the  progress 
made  by  Bulgaria  over  the  ten  years  since  the  establishment  of  the  Cooperation  and 
Verification  Mechanism  (CVM)  in  2007.1  On  the  basis  of  the  longer  term  perspective  and 
significant progress made, the Commission outlined 17 key recommendations that, if followed 
up,  would  end  the  CVM  process,  in  line  with  the  objective  set  by  President  Juncker  to 
conclude  the  CVM  process  under  this  Commission's  mandate.  The  January  2017 
recommendations  are  therefore  considered  as  sufficient  to  close  the  CVM  –  except  if 
developments were to clearly reverse the course of progress. It was also highlighted that the 
speed  of  the  process  would  depend  on  how  quickly  Bulgaria  will  be  able  to  fulfil  the 
recommendations  in  an  irreversible  way.  In  particular,  the  recommendations  focused  on  the 
responsibility  and  accountability  required  from  the  Bulgarian  authorities  and  on  building 
internal  safeguards  to  ensure  the  irreversibility  of  results  –  to  demonstrate  that  ongoing 
projects would be continued, even without the CVM. As underlined by the Council, the CVM 
will end when all six benchmarks applying to Bulgaria are satisfactorily met.  
In  the  November  2017  report,2  the  Commission  noted  that  "significant  progress  has  been 
achieved  on  the  recommendations  set  out  in  the  January  2017  report,  in  particular 
recommendations 1, where it will now be up to the new composition of the Supreme Judicial 
Council (SJC) to demonstrate results, and 16 and 17, where the progressive trend should be 
maintained.  Important  progress  has  also  been  made  on  recommendation  4,  although  more 
remains to be done. While the Commission cannot yet conclude that any of the benchmarks 
are  at  this  stage  satisfactorily  fulfilled,  it  remains  of  the  opinion  that,  with  a  continued 
political steer and a determination to advance the reform, Bulgaria should be able to fulfil the 
remaining outstanding CVM recommendations in the near future". The Council welcomed the 
significant positive steps made, while noting that much still needed to be done.3  

This  report  presents  further  progress  made  since  November  2017  in  following  up  the 
recommendations set out in the January 2017 report. As in previous years, it is the result of a 
careful process of analysis by the Commission, drawing on close cooperation with Bulgarian 
institutions,  as  well  as  the  input  of  civil  society  and  other  stakeholders,  including  other 
Member States.  

2.   GENERAL SITUATION 

The January 2017 report noted that despite the progress made on the CVM benchmarks, this 
had  been  held  back  by  unfavourable  conditions  in  terms  of  governmental  instability, 
unpredictability  in  the  legislative  process,  and  a  media  environment  that  has  not  been 
conducive to  reform.4 While these issues went  beyond the specific scope  of the CVM, such 
factors have nevertheless had an impact on the progress of reform.  

The year since November 2017 has been a period of governmental stability in Bulgaria, which 
has helped the reform process. The most significant single step was the adoption of the reform 
of the general anti-corruption framework in January 2018. Work has also continued in other 

1   COM(2017)  43.  Following  the  conclusions  of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  17  October  2006  (13339/06),  the 

Mechanism had been established by a Commission Decision of 13 December 2006 (C(2006) 6570). 

2
   COM(2017) 750. 
3   Council conclusions on the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, 12 December 2017. 
4   COM(2017) 43. 

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areas, including in the implementation of previously adopted reforms. In a few areas, reforms 
are  still  ongoing,  or  discussions  continue  on  the  right  course  of  action.  Still,  legislative 
developments  have  continued  to  raise  controversy  in  some  instances.  In  some  cases  the 
legislative  process  has  been  able  to  react  and  adapt,5  whereas  in  others,  controversy  has 
continued to follow adoption of the legislation.6 Overall, however, the legislative system has 
delivered reforms more predictably and less controversially than in the past.  

International  observers  have  noted  a  significant  deterioration  in  the  Bulgarian  media 
environment over recent years, with a Bulgarian media sector characterised by intransparent 
ownership and weak enforcement of journalistic standards. Such a situation affects the quality 
of  public  debate  and  therefore  risks  restricting  the  access  of  the  public  to  information,  with 
only  a  limited  number  of  independent  sources.7  The  media  environment  has  a  specific 
significance  for  judicial  independence,  with  targeted  attacks  on  judges  in  some  media 
connected  to  intransparent  interests,  and  with  difficulties  in  finding  effective  redress.  The 
Supreme Judicial Council has a key role to play in defending the judiciary and the principle of 
judicial independence against such attacks.8  

More  widely,  the  ability  of  the  media,  as  well  as  of  civil  society,  to  hold  those  exercising 
power to account in  a pluralistic environment  free from pressure is an important foundation 
stone  to  pursue  the  reforms  covered  by  the  CVM,  as  well  as  for  better  governance  more 
generally. 

3.  ASSESSMENT  OF  PROGRESS  ON  THE  FULFILMENT  OF  THE  CVM 
BENCHMARKS ON THE BASIS OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS SET OUT IN 
THE JANUARY 2017 CVM REPORT  

3.1   Benchmark One: Judicial Independence 

Recommendation 1: Ensure a transparent election for the future Supreme Judicial Council, 
with  a  public  hearing  in  the  National  Assembly  before  the  election  of  the  members  of  the 
parliamentary  quota,  and  giving  civil  society  the  possibility  to  make  observations  on  the 
candidates. 

Recommendation 2: Establish a track record of transparent and merit-based appointments to 
high–level  judicial  posts,  including  the  upcoming  appointment  of  a  new  President  of  the 
Supreme Administrative Court. 

5   Amendments to the criminal code to address private sector corruption were met with widespread opposition 
from  business  associations  and  judicial  experts,  leading  the  Legal  Affairs  Committee  of  the  National 
Assembly to initiate an additional round of consultations on the draft. 

6   For  example,  amendments  to  the  Administrative  Procedure  Code  adopted  in  the  summer  of  2018,  against 
objections of civil society organisations focussing on concerns over access to justice, had to be adopted by 
overruling  a  Presidential  veto  and  have  now  been  referred  to  the  Constitutional  Court  for  review  of  their 
compliance with the Constitution.  

7   The  Reporters  Without  Borders’  World  Press  Freedom  Index  ranks  Bulgaria  111  out  of  180  countries 
worldwide in 2018, the worst score of any current EU Member State, indicating a significant deterioration of 
the situation in recent years. In 2013 the country ranked 87. See https://rsf.org/en/ranking. See also the 2016 
Media Pluralism Monitor: http://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/mpm-2016-results/bulgaria/. 

8   It has reportedly been difficult in some recent cases to find the necessary consensus within the Council on an 
appropriate  response.  Members  of  the  Council  have  argued  that  a  balance  needs  to  be  found  between  the 
legitimate  interest  of  the  media  to  report  on  judicial  affairs  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  interests  of  judicial 
independence  on  the  other.  Acknowledging  the  need  for  a  consistent  line  on  such  issues,  however,  the 
Council has drawn up a set of agreed standards to guide it in future instances.  

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Recommendation 3: To improve the practical functioning of the Judicial Inspection and the 
follow-up  by  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  to  the  inspectorate's  findings,  in  particular  on 
integrity  issues,  consider  soliciting  external  assistance,  for  example  from  the  Structural 
Reform Support Service and/or Council of Europe. 

The  last  report  highlighted  the  election  of  the  new  Supreme  Judicial  Council  as  a  key 
development  in  2017.  The  election  took  place  under  a  new  improved  constitutional  and 
legislative framework, providing for direct elections to the judicial quota and election of the 
parliamentary  quota with a two-thirds majority in the National  Assembly. The new Council 
took office in October last year and has a key role to play in both the day-to-day management 
of the judiciary as well as in its continued reform.  

Overall  the  new  Council  appears  to  have  settled  into  its  managerial  role  in  a  spirit  of 
professionalism and good cooperation, avoiding the strongly polarised atmosphere that often 
characterised the previous Council. In the past, decisions on appointments to high-level posts 
in  the  judiciary  have  constituted  an  area  of  concern,  due  to  lack  of  transparency  and 
allegations of undue influence of political or economic interests, and the January 2017 report 
therefore noted the need for the new Supreme Judicial Council to establish a track record of 
transparent and merit-based decision-making.  

Over the past year, a number of heads of judicial bodies have been appointed, which generally 
appear  not  to  have  given  rise  to  major  controversies.9  In  March,  a  procedure  for  the 
appointment of a new chair at the Sofia City Court failed to produce a result due to a divided 
vote within the judges’ chamber of the Council. The Sofia City Court was the subject of major 
scandals in 2014 and 2015 and has since then been through a general overhaul under a new 
management.  However,  since  the  chair  resigned  for  personal  reasons  in  summer  2017,  the 
Court has been without permanent management. It will be important for the council to ensure 
that this appointment is conducted in an open and transparent procedure, so that a new chair 
will be able to command the confidence of both the general public and the judges working at 
the court.10 A procedure is also currently ongoing for the appointment of a new chair of the 
Specialised  Court  for  Organised  Crime.11    More  generally,  competitions  are  reportedly  in 
preparation for appointments in the courts, starting with the Supreme Court of Cassation and 
cascading downwards so as to ultimately reach all levels of the judiciary. Such competitions 
represent  an  important  element  of  transparency  and  it  will  be  important  for  the  Supreme 
Judicial Council to ensure their effectiveness in filling vacant posts in a regular manner.12   

Another  area  which  has  given  rise  to  controversy  in  the  past  concerns  disciplinary 
proceedings.  In  this  area  the  Council  shares  responsibility  with  the  independent  judicial 
inspectorate,  which  in  January  2017  obtained  additional  powers  to  check  the  integrity  of 
magistrates,  including  through  the  verification  of  personal  asset  declarations,  and  a  more 
central  role  in  the  initiation  of  disciplinary  proceedings.  Following  the  Commission's  
recommendation to draw on external expertise, a project was recently launched and should be 

9   The  appointment  of  the  new  chair  of  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court  was  finalised  in  2017  and  was 

already covered in the November 2017 report. 

10  A second procedure is ongoing, featuring two candidates for the post.  
11   The  specialsed court plays a  key role in the  Bulgarian judicial system, due to its responsibility for hearing 

cases related to organised crime and – since last November – high-level corruption.  

12   In  the  past,  long-term  secondments  have  been  widely  used  as  an  alternative  route  to  promotion  of  judges, 
raising  concerns  about  possible  risks  to  independence.  Stakeholders  have  pointed  to  the  risk  that  such 
practices could reemerge following legislative changes in 2017, which repealed provisions introduced in the 
context of the 2016 reform to regulate the length of secondments.  

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finalised in 2019, with the assistance of the Commission’s Structural Reform Support Service 
and the Council of Europe.   

On the basis of the analysis of Benchmark One, Bulgaria has implemented recommendation 1 
and  recommendations  2  and  3  are  close  to  implementation.  As  some  developments  are 
ongoing, continued attention to concrete results under recommendations 2 and 3 is required 
to confirm this assessment but Benchmark One can be considered provisionally closed. 

3.2   Benchmark Two: Legal Framework 

Recommendation  4:  Adopt  amendments  to  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  and  the  Criminal 
Code to improve the legal framework for the prosecution of high-level corruption and serious 
organised crime. 

The  January  2017  report  identified  as  a  key  remaining  challenge  the  need  to  address 
shortcomings in the Bulgarian criminal code and procedures, in particular with the objective 
of improving the capacity of the criminal justice system in Bulgaria to respond to high-level 
corruption and organised crime in an effective manner.  

Bulgaria has taken a number of concrete legislative measures over the years to address such 
concerns  and  followed  up  in  2017  with  additional  amendments  to  the  criminal  procedure 
code.  The  key  changes  included  a  transfer  of  high-level  corruption  cases  to  the  Specialised 
Court for Organised Crime and stricter rules on the ability of courts to refer cases back to the 
prosecution on formal grounds. Such referrals based on formal and procedural errors can now 
only  take  place  in  the  context  of  a  preliminary  hearing  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  trial 
proceedings.13  

These amendments are now in force. The specialised prosecution has also received additional 
resources  to  deal  with  the  extra  workload  and  procedures  are  ongoing  to  provide  additional 
resources to the specialised court.14 The impact of the amendments in terms of the expediency 
of  court  proceedings  has  been  a  larger  number  of  referrals  at  the  early  stage  of  the 
proceedings.  This  is  perhaps  natural  during  a  transitional  phase,  partly  reflecting  a  cautious 
approach of judges in the context of the new rules. It should be counterbalanced over time by 
faster progress once the preliminary stage is completed.15  

In  addition  to  the  legislative  amendments  already  made  to  the  criminal  procedure  code  in 
2017,  discussions  have  also  been  ongoing  over  the  past  year  on  ways  to  address  the  very 
complex  and  formalistic  procedural  framework  for  criminal  proceedings  in  Bulgaria.  This 
follows up on a number of analyses carried out in recent  years, by the Bulgarian authorities 
themselves as well as by external experts, both in the context of the continued judicial reform 
strategy and more specifically to improve the framework for the investigation and prosecution 
of corruption cases.16  

These discussions have been carried out in working groups under the Ministry of Justice, with 
the  participation  of  judicial  representatives  and  academic  experts.  In  the  course  of  2018 

13   See COM(2017) 750, p. 4, and SWD(2017)700, p. 6-7.  
14   Concerns have been raised by stakeholders about the delay in appointing additional judges to the specialised 

court, but the process has reportedly been initiated.   

15   The  Bulgarian  authorities  have  indicated  that  they  expect  clear  positive  results  in  terms  of  the  overall 

expediency of trial procedures to become evident over the coming months.  

16   See also section 3.3 and 3.4 below.  

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conclusions were reached on a number of points,  which it has been decided did  not  merit a 
legislative  follow-up.17  Where  it  has  been  decided  not  to  legislate,  it  will  be  important  that 
possible  non-legislative  measures  are  considered  in  order  to  address  the  underlying 
challenges.  

A few of the points raised by the analyses are still under consideration for possible legislative 
follow-up.  One  example,  which  goes  to  the  heart  of  the  challenges  raised,  relates  to  the 
question  of  how  to  define  the  threshold  for  initiating  pre-trial  proceedings  and  the  related 
issue  of  use  of  “preliminary  enquiries”,  which  are  not  regulated  in  the  criminal  procedure 
code and for which the gathered information cannot be used as evidence in court. There are 
efficiency arguments for and against the use of preliminary enquiries, which is also linked to 
sensitive  issues  around  the  mechanisms  for  judicial  review  of  prosecutorial  decisions.18 
Another sensitive point on which deliberations have not yet reached a conclusion concerns the 
procedures in place to hold accountable the most senior positions in the magistracy, including 
a  serving  Prosecutor-General,  in  the  event  of  serious  allegations  of  wrongdoing  or  criminal 
acts.19  

Finally,  with  regard  to  the  criminal  code,  the  government  prepared  targeted  amendments 
seeking to facilitate the prosecution of corruption offences in the public sector and to extend 
the application of criminal law to corruption in the private sector. These amendments proved 
controversial and deliberations are still ongoing in the Bulgarian legislature.  

Careful  consideration  and  consultation  of  stakeholders  are  important  when  deciding  on  the 
way forward on these remaining questions, in particular given the potential consequences for 
the  overall  system  of  criminal  investigation  and  the  balance  between  key  institutions. 
Moreover,  while  Benchmark  Two  focuses  on  possible  legislative  solutions,  the  underlying 
challenges  are  closely  linked  to  questions  raised  in  the  context  of  the  wider  judicial  reform 
strategy and corruption investigations, which are the subject of Benchmarks Three and Four 
below. 

On the basis  of  the analysis of  Benchmark Two, Bulgaria has made significant  progress on 
recommendation  4  and  took  concrete  action  to  improve  the  relevant  legal  framework.  A 
number of issues, also relevant in the context of Benchmarks Three and Four, are still under 
consideration by the Bulgarian authorities. Benchmark Two can be considered provisionally 
closed, pending continued monitoring of the follow-up to legislative changes.  

3.3   Benchmark Three: Continued Judicial Reform 

Recommendation  5:  Publish  a  report  for  public  consultation  detailing  the  progress  made 
implementing the national judicial reform strategy and setting out the remaining steps to be 

17   An example of where it has been decided to progress through means other than legislation is  the content and 
format  of  indictments,  where  the  Prosecutor  General  has  asked  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  for  an 
interpretative ruling in order to clarify the legal basis. Another point which the Bulgarian authorities decided 
not to follow up was the recommendations on stronger involvement of management in decisions on concrete 
cases  within  the  prosecutor’s  office,  which  were  considered  by  the  Bulgarian  authorities  as  possibly 
problematic in a Bulgarian context.  

18   SWD(2018) 550, p. 9. 
19  The lack of effective mechanisms for the investigation of a serving Prosecutor General was identified by the 
European Court of Human Rights as one of the key shortcomings of the Bulgarian criminal justice system in 
a landmark case from 2009, the follow-up to which is still under monitoring by the Council of Europe.  See 
Kolevi vs Bulgaria, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["001-95607"]}). 

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taken.  Establish  a  mechanism  for  continued  public  reporting  of  progress  for  the  remaining 
duration of the strategy's implementation. 

Recommendation 6:  Address  the workload situation in  the busiest  courts  based on the new 
workload standards, and agree a roadmap for the reform of the judicial map in parallel with 
the development of e-justice. 

Recommendation 7: Establish a roadmap for the implementation of the recommendations of 
the Structural Reform Support Service report concerning the reform of the Prosecutor's Office 
and  its  interactions  with  other  institutions,  including  a  mechanism  for  the  reporting  of 
progress to the wider public. 

Recommendation 8: Establish a roadmap for the implementation of the recommendations of 
the study on ECtHR rulings, including a mechanism for the reporting of progress to the wider 
public. 

The work on judicial reform continues under the various strands set out in the 2014 judicial 
reform  strategy.  In  this  context,  the  government  has  continued  its  consultations  with 
stakeholders  in  the  consultative  Judicial  Reform  Council  and  has  established  a  practice  of 
publishing regular updates on progress and further priorities in the reform process. With the 
current  reform  strategy  coming  to  a  close  in  2020,  these  mechanisms  could  be  used  as  a 
springboard  for  a  broader  debate  in  society  on  the  future  of  the  Bulgarian  judiciary  and 
priorities  for  possible  reform  initiatives  also  pointing  beyond  2020.  This  debate  would  also 
usefully  involve  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council,  which  holds  extensive  independent  powers 
with regard to the management of the judiciary in Bulgaria.  

A key issue in this regard concerns the management of workload in the courts and the related 
issue of a possible future reform of the judicial map. The prosecution is now moving forward 
with a pilot project to consolidate a small number of local prosecution offices, as a first step 
towards a wider reform. On the side of the courts, the Supreme Judicial Council has taken a 
cautious approach, awaiting the outcome of an ongoing project, and a general reform of the 
court map now appears increasingly unlikely in the near term.  Instead, initiatives have been 
taken  to  reallocate  jurisdiction  in  civil  law  cases  through  legislative  change  in  order  to 
redistribute the workload of the busiest courts, typically located in Sofia, to other courts. This 
approach  has  the  government’s  support,  and  has  already  resulted  in  concrete  amendments 
recently  adopted  in  the  National  Assembly.20  Alongside  these  legislative  initiatives,  the 
Supreme  Judicial  Council  has  also  recently  launched  several  procedures  for  the  transfer  of 
judicial  posts  to  the  major  courts  in  Sofia.  These  legislative  and  managerial  efforts  will  be 
important in order to alleviate pressures on these courts in the short term. In the longer term, 
reforms of a more structural nature will be needed in order to ensure an effective and efficient 
judiciary.21  

Another  key  strand  of  work  under  the  judicial  reform  strategy  aims  at  improving  the 
framework for the judicial follow-up to cases concerning corruption and organised crime. In 

20  Amendments  to  the  civil  procedure  code  have  been  adopted  to  reallocate  jurisdiction  for  certain  types  of 
consumer  and  insurance  claim  cases.  Further  changes  are  being  considered,  possibly  drawing  on  technical 
assistance from the Commission’s Structural Reform Support Service. 

21  An important aspect of such reforms will be the development of e-justice solutions in the context of a broader 
reconsideration of the judicial map. This is an area where  efforts have been relaunched under the Supreme 
Judicial  Council.  The  previous  Council  initiated  several  projects  with  support  from  EU  funds,  which  have 
however been subjet to significant delays.  

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2016,  a  team  of  experienced  prosecutors  from  several  Member  States,  supported  by  the 
Commission’s  Structural  Reform  Support  Service,  produced  a  report  on  the  Bulgarian 
prosecution  service  and  set  out  a  number  of  recommendations  to  the  Bulgarian  authorities. 
The  recommendations  contained  in  the  report  from  December  2016  formed  the  basis  of  a 
roadmap issued by the Bulgarian authorities in 2017, and many have by now been followed 
up  with  concrete  actions,  such  as  the  strengthening  of  the  Specialised  Prosecution  for 
Organised  Crime,  now  also  responsible  for  high-level  corruption.  Some  recommendations 
have not received the support of the authorities. In particular, recommendations for a stronger 
involvement  of  the  managerial  hierarchy  within  the  prosecution  service  on  concrete  cases 
were  considered  problematic  by  the  Bulgarian  authorities,  on  the  grounds  that  such  formal 
recognition of a role for the hierarchy in regard to individual cases would appear to be moving 
back  towards  a  system  which  was  seen  as  problematic  in  the  past.22  A  number  of 
recommendations  did  result  in  concrete  action  by  the  Bulgarian  authorities,  including 
consideration  of  possible  legislative  amendments,  some  of  which  are  still  ongoing23,  and 
various organisational measures, primarily within the prosecution service. This work will take 
time  to  have  an  impact  and  will  require  a  persistent  and  continued  focus  on  the  part  of  the 
management within the prosecution to ensure their success over time.  

The  independent  analysis  of  the  prosecution  in  2016  was  a  particularly  comprehensive 
project, but it was accompanied by similar efforts led by the Bulgarian authorities themselves, 
in  response  to  recommendations  made  in  previous  reports  under  the  CVM.  In  particular, 
Bulgaria carried out a separate analysis of cases at the European Court of Human Rights that 
had identified shortcomings in the effective investigation of crime in Bulgaria, with the aim of 
identifying recurrent challenges that could be addressed through legislative or other measures. 
This work was followed up with a roadmap in 2017 setting out a number of strands of work, 
which  has  fed  into  the  deliberations  on  legislative  changes  referred  to  above,  in  addition  to 
various measures of a more managerial or organisational nature.24 

On the basis of the analysis of Benchmark Three, Bulgaria has made significant progress and 
recommendations 5, 6, 7, and 8 are close to implementation. Some developments are ongoing, 
and continued monitoring is required to confirm this assessment.  

3.4   Benchmark Four: High-level Corruption 

Recommendation 9: Adopt a new legal framework on the fight against corruption in line with 
the intentions set out in the anti-corruption strategy, and ensure its implementation. Set up an 
effective anti-corruption authority. 

Recommendation 10: Adopt and implement a reform of the law on public administration to 
strengthen the internal inspectorates in the public administration. 

Recommendation 11: Building on the analysis of past cases, establish a roadmap between all 
relevant  institutions  to  address  shortcomings  in  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of  high-
level  corruption  cases,  including  a  mechanism  for  the  reporting  of  progress  to  the  wider 
public. 

22  Recent reforms have rather been taking the direction of extending the formal safeguards for the independence 

of individual prosecutors. 

23   See section 3.2 above.  
24   Most recently, a framework for coordinated follow-up to such cases at the European Court of Human Rights 

has been set up between the Ministry of Justice and the Prosecutor’s office.   

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Recommendation 12: Establish  a mechanism for  public reporting on progress in  high-level 
corruption  cases  which  are  in  the  public  domain.  General  Prosecution  to  report  –  whilst 
respecting the presumption of innocence – on investigations and indictments. Supreme Court 
of  Cassation  and  Ministry  of  Justice  to  report  on  convictions  as  well  as  the  enforcement  of 
sentences. 

In January 2018, Bulgaria adopted a comprehensive reform of its anti-corruption legislation. 
The  new  law  puts  in  place  a  comprehensive  reform  of  the  legislative  framework  for  the 
prevention  of  conflicts  of  interest,  illicit  enrichment  and  corruption.  It  establishes  a  new 
unified anti-corruption agency in charge of verifying conflicts of interest and private assets of 
high  level  officials,  investigating  allegations  of  malpractice  among  such  officials,  generally 
promoting the prevention of corruption, as well as conducting procedures for the seizing and 
confiscation  of  illicit  assets.  The  new  agency  is  based  on  a  merger  of  a  number  of  already 
existing institutions and is now fully operational. It also incorporates a directorate previously 
located in the State Agency for National Security and is competent to assist the prosecution in 
investigations  of  suspected  high-level  corruption.  Although  it  does  not  have  independent 
powers  of  criminal  investigation,  which  rest  with  law  enforcement  authorities  and  the 
prosecution, it has extensive competence to carry out surveillance and intelligence measures 
within its remit. The new agency also takes over the staff, resources and powers of the former 
commission for illegal assets forfeiture and is now the main agency responsible for the seizure 
and confiscation of illicit assets in Bulgaria.  

The new law ensured a high level of continuity in terms of staff and legislative framework. In 
March,  the  former  head  of  the  commission  for  illicit  asset  forfeiture  was  elected  by  the 
National  Assembly  to  head  the  new  agency,  in  a  competitive  procedure  featuring  two 
candidates.25 The Deputy Director and the remaining three members of the management board 
were subsequently confirmed on a proposal of the newly elected Director, through a similar 
procedure. While the procedure was carried out in a transparent manner, the procedure set out 
in the law gave rise to controversy in the context of its adoption, as it provides for election of 
the management by simple majority in the National Assembly.26 It will therefore be important 
for  the  new  management  to  build  a  reputation  for  independence  and  impartiality  in  the 
management of the agency’s activities. 

A  key  challenge  for  the  new  agency  will  be  to  effectively  manage  the  broad  remit  of  its 
responsibilities,  spanning  from  prevention  to  activities  linked  to  investigation  and  asset 
forfeiture. It will be important to ensure that due attention is paid to all work strands within an 
overall strategic approach, while also maintaining a clear separation between tasks wherever 
appropriate.27 A separate challenge in this context will be the need to communicate effectively 

 The candidate was supported by a wide majority in the National Assembly. 

25  
26   The law was first adopted in December 2017 but faced a veto by the President of the Republic, based on a 
number  of  concerns,  some  of  which  had  also  been  raised  by  members  of  the  opposition  and  civil  society 
organisations. Eventually, the National Assembly overruled the veto and adopted the law in January 2018. 
27   The agency is expected to play a central role in both development and communication regarding broader anti-
corruption  strategy.  At  the  same  time,  a  number  of  highly  sensitive  tasks  in  relation  to  anti-corruption 
investigations and procedures for confiscation of assets require careful management to protect confidentiality 
while also ensuring an appropriate level of transparency and accountability towards the wider society.   

8 

 
                                                           
with the public on the various roles of the agency in a transparent way in order to build public 
trust in its independence and to avoid confusion of roles.28  

To complement the new agency’s focus on high-level officials, the government has updated 
and clarified the legal framework for the internal inspectorates of the State administration, and 
this is now being implemented, including new expanded powers regarding the verification of 
interest  and  asset  declarations  for  public  employees.  Additional  staff  are  expected  to  be 
allocated to the inspectorates in the coming months. The new rules also provide for a stronger 
coordination  role  of  the  chief  inspectorate  under  the  Prime  Minister’s  office  and  for  clearer 
rules for the work and qualifications of inspectors.  

Finally,  a  key  issue  highlighted  in  successive  CVM  reports  has  been  the  lack  of  a  coherent 
track  record  in  Bulgaria  of  convictions  in  high-level  corruption  cases.  In  2016  the 
prosecutor’s office carried out a review of a samble of completed corruption cases to identify 
issues hampering a successful prosecution of such cases. This was followed up by a number 
of measures, some of which involving the consideration of possible legislative amendments, 
with  the  objective  of  improving  the  capacity  of  the  criminal  justice  system  in  Bulgaria  to 
respond to high-level corruption in an effective manner.29  

The  efforts  to  improve  the  framework  for  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of  corruption 
would need to continue in the future in order for Bulgaria to be able to show concrete results 
over  time  and  build  a  solid  track  record.  In  this  context,  transparency  around  progress  on 
cases  is  an  important  element  of  accountability  towards  the  general  public.  The  Bulgarian 
authorities  are  exploring  concrete  technical  options  in  order  to  provide  more  transparent 
information  to  the  public,  building  on  progress  already  made  and  acknowledged  in  the 
November 2017 report. 

On the basis of the analysis of Benchmark Four, Bulgaria has made significant progress on 
recommendations  9,  10,  11,  and  12.  The  Bulgarian  authorities  will  need  to  show  concrete 
results and build a track record evidenced by final decisions in high level corruption cases. 
The new anti-corruption institutional framework requires continued monitoring in view of the 
need to consolidate the progress made.  

3.5   Benchmark Five: Corruption in General including Local Level and Borders 

Recommendation  13:  Carry  out  an  external  review  of  the  ex  ante  checks  of  public 
procurement procedures and their follow-up, including ex post checks, as well as on cases of 
conflicts  of  interest  or  corruption  discovered  and  remedial  measures  taken  to  address 
identified shortcomings. 

Recommendation  14:  Put  in  place  risk-based  measures  to  address  low-level  corruption  in 
high risk sectors within the public administration, taking inspiration from what has been done 
in the Ministry of Interior. Continue the efforts in the Ministry of Interior. 

Recommendation 15: Establish  a mechanism for  public reporting  on the implementation  of 
the  national  anti-corruption  strategy  covering  the  remaining  duration  of  the  Strategy's 
implementation. 

28   This includes the need to communicate on the agency’s role in regard to law enforcement operations in a way 

which underlines its independence.  

29   There is a substantial overlap in these measures to those referred to in sections 3.2 and 3.3 above. 

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As  part  of  a  broader  reform  of  its  public  procurement  system  in  recent  years,  Bulgaria 
introduced  a  new  system  of  ex  ante  checks  of  public  procurement  procedures,  in  order  to 
make  the  checks  more  effective  and  strengthen  follow-up.  As  this  is  a  key  risk  area,  the 
January 2017 report recommended an external review of the functioning of the new system to 
verify  its  effectiveness  and  identify  possible  shortcomings.  The  review  has  now  been 
launched by the Bulgarian authorities. It is being implemented in cooperation with the World 
Bank and should be finalised by early 2019. This should provide an important step in making 
corruption through public procurement procedures more difficult.  

In 2017, the National Anti-corruption Policy Council launched a review of the sectorial anti-
corruption plans for the main high-risk sectors throughout the State administration. Following 
this review, the Council adopted horizontal guidance for the further development of the plans. 
This work aims to spread good practices, based in part on the experience within the Ministry 
of  Interior,  which  has  developed  a  comprehensive  programme  of  targeted  anti-corruption 
measures  since  2015.30  The  new  guidelines  provide  a  clearer  framework  for  the  preventive 
work in the various sectors of government, with clear lines of responsibility and standards for 
definition of measures, follow-up, and reporting. It is now being implemented across the State 
administration.31  

The National Anti-corruption Policy Council continues its activities in regard to the setting of 
overall  direction  in  these  efforts,  while  creating  a  useful  link  with  the  government,  civil 
society,  and  the  judiciary.  This  is  also  the  main  forum  for  the  overall  monitoring  and 
evaluation with regard to the implementation of the national anti-corruption strategy.32  

On the basis  of  the analysis of  Benchmark Five, Bulgaria has made significant progress on 
recommendations 13, 14 and 15. Generally, these issues will need continued follow-up by the 
Bulgarian authorities over the longer term in order to be able to show concrete results.  

3.6   Benchmark Six: Organised Crime 

Recommendation 16: Establish  a mechanism for  public reporting on progress in  high-level 
organised crime cases which are in the public domain. General Prosecution to report – whilst 
respecting the presumption of innocence – on investigations and indictments. Supreme Court 
of  Cassation  and  Ministry  of  Justice  to  report  on  convictions  as  well  as  the  enforcement  of 
sentences. 

Recommendation 17: Adopt the necessary amendments to the law on confiscation of criminal 
assets and ensure the Illegal Asset Forfeiture Commission continues to operate independently 
and efficiently. 

Previous reports have acknowledged the progress already made in regard to organised crime 
in Bulgaria, but pointed to some remaining issues needing to be monitored. The first issue was 
to establish a system to provide transparency on the reporting of progress in organised crime. 

30   These efforts are continuing within the Ministry of Interior, including with a view to addressing corruption at 

the borders, also involving customs.  

31  In March 2018, a first round of anti-corruption plans were adopted in line with the new guidelines. 
32   The Council brings together all the relevant government agencies and is chaired by a national anti-corruption 

coordinator, currently the deputy Prime Minister for judicial reform.  

10 

 
                                                           
Some  progress  on  this was  already  acknowledged  in  the  November  2017  report  and  further 
work is currently ongoing, also covering high-level corruption cases.33   

The  other  issue  was  for  the  legislation  on  asset  forfeiture  to  be  reviewed  in  order  to  ensure 
overall  effectiveness  of  the  system  for  seizure  and  confiscation  of  illicit  assets.  These 
amendments were made and have been carried over into the new legislative framework that 
was adopted at the beginning of 2018.  

On  the  basis  of  the  analysis  of  Benchmark  Six,  this  report  confirms  the  conclusion  from 
November  2017  that  Bulgaria  has  made  significant  progress  on  recommendation  16  and 
implemented recommendation 17.  Benchmark Six can be considered provisionally closed. 

4.  

CONCLUSION  

Over  the  twelve  months  since  November  2017,  Bulgaria  has  continued  its  efforts  to 
implement the recommendations set out in the January 2017 report.  

In  line  with  the  assessment  set  out  in  this  report,  the  Commission  considers  that  several 
recommendations  have  already  been  implemented  and  a  number  of  others  are  very  close  to 
implementation.  On  this  basis,  the  Commission  has  concluded  that  Benchmarks  One,  Two 
and Six can be considered provisionally  closed.  Given that  in  some cases  developments  are 
ongoing,  continued  monitoring  is  required  to  confirm  this  assessment.  The  Commission  is 
confident that Bulgaria will be able to fulfil all the remaining recommendations.  

With  a  determined  follow-up  to  the  remaining  recommendations,  Bulgaria  will  take  an 
important  step  towards  solving  many  of  the  challenges  that  it  faces.  Bulgaria  needs  to 
continue to develop a track record of concrete results so as to consolidate the progress made. 
This  positive  trend  will  need  to  be  maintained  under  the  CVM  and  will  need  continued 
monitoring by the Bulgarian authorities after the closure of the CVM. Transparent reporting 
by  the  Bulgarian  authorities  and  public  and  civic  scrutiny  will  play  an  important  role  in 
internalising monitoring at national level and providing the necessary safeguards to maintain 
the path of progress and reform.   

The Commission will continue to monitor and follow progress closely and will make a further 
assessment  of  the  progress  made  before  the  end  of  this  Commission’s  mandate.  The 
Commission expects that with this the CVM process for Bulgaria will be concluded. In line 
with  this  objective,  the  Commission  invites  Bulgaria  to  pursue  the  current  positive  trend 
towards implementation of all remaining recommendations. 

33  See also section 3.4 above.  

11