COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT BULGARIA : Technical Report Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification mechanism
Date: 2018-11-13
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Bulgaria, corruption, criminal law, independence of the judiciary, judicial reform, organised crime, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Strasbourg, 13.11.2018  SWD(2018) 550 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT BULGARIA : Technical Report Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification mechanism {COM(2018) 850 final}  
 
 
Benchmarks  to  be  addressed  by  Bulgaria  pursuant  to  Commission  Decision  of  13/XII/2006 
establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Bulgaria to address specific 
benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organised crime1: 

Benchmark  1:  Adopt  Constitutional  amendments  removing  any  ambiguity  regarding  the 
independence and accountability of the judicial system 

Benchmark  2:  Ensure  a  more  transparent  and  efficient  judicial  process  by  adopting  and 
implementing  a  new  judicial  system  act  and  the  new  civil  procedure  code.  Report  on  the 
impact of these new laws and of the criminal and administrative procedure codes, notably on 
the pre-trial phase 

Benchmark  3:  Continue  the  reform  of  the  judiciary  in  order  to  enhance  professionalism, 
accountability  and  efficiency.  Evaluate  the  impact  of  this  reform  and  publish  the  results 
annually 

Benchmark 4: Conduct and report on professional, non-partisan investigations into allegations 
of  high-level  corruption.  Report  on  internal  inspections  of  public  institutions  and  on  the 
publication of assets of high-level officials 

Benchmark  5:  Take  further  measures  to  prevent  and  fight  corruption,  in  particular  at  the 
borders and within local government 

Benchmark  6:  Implement  a  strategy  to  fight  organised  crime,  focussing  on  serious  crime, 
money laundering as well as on the systematic confiscation of assets of criminals.  Report on 
new and ongoing investigations, indictments and convictions in these areas 

List of acronyms:  

BORKOR: Centre for the Prevention and Counteraction of Corruption and Organised Crime 

CIAF: Commission on Illegal Asset Forfeiture 

CPACI: Commission for the Prevention and Ascertainment of Conflicts of Interest 

CVM: Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 

ECtHR: European Court on Human Rights 

ISJC: Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Council 

NAO: National Audit Office  

PACE: Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe  

SANS: State Agency for National Security 

SJC: Supreme Judicial Council 

SRSS: Structural Reform Support Service 

1   Previous  CVM  reports  can  be  consulted  at  https://ec.europa.eu/info/effective-justice/rule-law/assistance-

bulgaria-and-romania-under-cvm/reports-progress-bulgaria-and-romania_en 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
1.  

INTRODUCTION 

This technical report summarises the information which the Commission has used as the basis for its 
assessment of Bulgaria's progress under the  Co-operation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) since 
the last CVM report of November 2017.  

This information has been collected from a variety of sources. The Commission has had the benefit of 
working  closely  with  the  relevant  authorities  in  Bulgaria,  providing  information  on  progress  in 
detailed  reports,  as  well  as  in  face-to-face  meetings.2  Commission  contacts  with  the  Bulgarian 
administration  and  society  across  the  full  range  of  EU  policies,  including  through  the  European 
Semester for economic governance, help to inform the CVM reports. In addition to official contacts 
with Bulgarian authorities, the Commission meets with non-governmental organisations active in the 
area  of  judicial  reform  and  anti-corruption  work,  with  professional  associations  of  judges  and 
prosecutors,  and  with  representatives  of  other  EU  Member  States  in  Bulgaria.  More  generally,  the 
Commission draws on the various studies and reports that are available from international institutions 
and other independent observers in the field of judicial reform and the fight against corruption.  

Since  the  time  when  the  CVM  benchmarks  were  adopted,  there  have  been  major  developments  in 
Court  of  Justice  and  ECHR  case-law,  international  standards  and  best  practices,  and  comparative 
information  on  national  justice  systems  in  the  EU,3  which  also  help  to  give  an  objective  and 
comparable  measure  of  the  development  of  the  Bulgarian  judicial  system  and  the  fight  against 
corruption and organised crime.  

Over the years, Bulgaria has benefited from EU funds as well as bilateral support from EU Member 
States. In the current programming period, the Operational Programme "Good Governance" under the 
European  Social  Fund  has  dedicated  approximately  EUR  30  million  to  a  separate  priority  axis  for 
judicial  reform  in  Bulgaria.4  Support  from  the  European  Structural  Reform  Support  Service  (SRSS) 
also continues to be available for reforms in Bulgaria, including in the justice sector.5 For example, in 
2016  several  Member  States  provided  experts  for  a  project  led  by  the  SRSS  to  carry  out  an 
independent analysis of the Public Prosecutor's Office of Bulgaria.  
The Commission Decision of 2006 defined six benchmarks for Bulgaria.6 The six benchmarks were 
conceived in the circumstances of the day and their concrete wording reflects this, but the underlying 
themes have remained relevant.  

On 25 January 2017, the Commission adopted a comprehensive assessment of ten years’ progress in 
Bulgaria on judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organised crime. This report used a 
long-term perspective to identify the key remaining steps to reach the goals of the CVM. This process 
resulted in seventeen final recommendations set out in the January 2017 CVM report. Most of them 
focus on the responsibility and accountability required by the Bulgarian authorities and on the internal 
safeguards needed to ensure that progress achieved is irreversible. When these steps set out under each 
benchmark are taken, the respective benchmark will be considered provisionally completed. When this 
applies to all benchmarks, the CVM will be closed. Complying with the seventeen recommendations 
can  therefore  be  considered  as  sufficient  to  meet  the  CVM  goals  –  except  if  developments  were  to 
clearly reverse the course of progress underlying the baseline assessment of January 2017. 

On  15  November  2017,  the  Commission  made  its  first  assessment  of  progress  on  the  seventeen 
recommendations,  concluding  that:  “During  the  nine-month  period  since  the  January  2017  report, 

2    Commission services carried out fact-finding missions in Bulgaria in March, June and September 2018. 
3     Including the EU Justice Scoreboard: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/scoreboard/ 
4   Currently, contracts  for approximately 44 per cent of this amount  have been  signed,  while 10 per cent has 

been paid to beneficiaries.  
5  
In addition, funding for the Ministry of Interior is available through the Internal Security Fund – Police.   
6   Commission  Decision  of  13  December  2006  establishing  a  mechanism  for  cooperation  and  verification  of 
progress  in  Bulgaria  to  address  specific  benchmarks  in  the  areas  of  judicial  reform  and  the  fight  against 
corruption and organised crime (notified under document number C(2006) 6570). 

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setting out the key recommendations to fulfil all CVM benchmarks, further positive developments have 
taken place. While political uncertainty led to some delays in the implementation of reforms early in 
the year, since May the reform process has again taken on momentum, even if final outcomes are still 
to be seen, notably in areas requiring legislative reform and government action, such as in the fight 
against corruption. In the judiciary, important developments have also taken place this year, notably 
with the election of a new SJC, the impact of which should begin to show in the coming year.   

This report notes that significant progress has been achieved on the recommendations set out in the 
January  2017  report,  in  particular  recommendations  1,  where  it  will  now  be  up  to  the  new 
composition of the SJC to demonstrate results, and 16 and 17, where the progressive trend should be 
maintained. Important progress has also been made on recommendation 4, although more remains to 
be  done.  While  the  Commission  cannot  yet  conclude  that  any  of  the  benchmarks  are  at  this  stage 
satisfactorily  fulfilled,  it  remains  of  the  opinion  that,  with  a  continued  political  steer  and  a 
determination to advance the reform, Bulgaria should be able to fulfil the remaining outstanding CVM 
recommendations in the near future.”7 

2. 

PROGRESS ON KEY REMAINING STEPS 

On the basis of the key remaining steps identified in the January 2017 CVM report, this section will 
describe the actions taken by the Bulgarian authorities to fulfil the recommendations since November 
2017.  

Benchmark  1:  Adopt  Constitutional  amendments  removing  any  ambiguity  regarding  the 
independence and accountability of the judicial system  

Recommendation  1:  Ensure  a  transparent  election  for  the  future  SJC,  with  a  public  hearing  in  the 
National  Assembly  before  the  election  of  the  members  of  the  parliamentary  quota,  and  giving  civil 
society the possibility to make observations on the candidates. 

The Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) is the main governing body of the Bulgarian judiciary. Important 
changes were made in 2016 to its organisation as well as to the rules for the election of its members, 
following  constitutional  amendments  in  December  2015.  Among  the  more  notable  improvements 
brought about by these changes was the introduction of direct elections to the professional quota on a 
“one  magistrate-one  vote”  basis  and  a  two-thirds  majority  requirement  for  the  election  of  the 
parliamentary quota by the National Assembly.8 In 2017, a new SJC was elected in accordance with 
the new rules. The November 2017 report described the process, and, while noting that some aspects 
of the process had given rise to criticism9, it concluded that overall the elections to the new SJC had 
shown the merits of the new legislative framework put in place in 2016. The report further noted that it 
was now up to the newly elected Council to show its independence through a track record of impartial 
and professional decision-making in key areas.10  

The new SJC took up its duties in October 2017 and has now been in operation for a little more than a 
year.  In  comparison  with  the  previous  Council,  there  appears  to  have  been  a  positive  shift  in 

7   COM(2017) 750 final. 
8   The  SJC  is  composed  of  11  members  elected  by  their  peers  and  11  members  elected  by  the  National 
Assembly in addition to three ex officio members (the Prosecutor General and the Presidents of the Supreme 
Court  of  Cassation  and  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court).  It  brings  together  in  one  body  the  overall 
responsibility for the management of both the courts and the prosecution service, although with the reforms 
of  2015  and  2016  two  separate  chambers  were  created  with  competence  in  key  personnel  decisions 
respectively for judges on one hand and for prosecutors and investigating magistrates on the other.  

9   The criticism concerned the election of the politically appointed quota by the National Assembly, which was 
seen by some observers as reflecting behind the scenes arrangements between the main political parties rather 
than the relative merits of the candidates. The proportion of the Council elected by the National Assembly, 
rather than by the magistracy, has also continued to give rise to concerns (see SWD(2017) 700, p. 4).  

10   COM(2017) 750, p. 3.  

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atmosphere, less polarised and marked to a lesser extent by overt controversies.11 In a number of areas 
it has started to chart a direction for its work.12 An important responsibility of the Council, given the 
challenging  media environment  in  Bulgaria13,  is to  defend the judiciary  and the  principle of judicial 
independence, including in the context of media attacks against individual judges.14  

Recommendation 2: Establish a track record of transparent and merit-based appointments to high–
level  judicial  posts,  including  the  upcoming  appointment  of  a  new  President  of  the  Supreme 
Administrative Court. 

The appointment of magistrates is one of the key responsibilities of the SJC, and one which has often 
in the past been marked by considerable controversy. With the exception of the offices of Prosecutor 
General  and  of  Presidents  of  the  two  Supreme  Courts15,  this  task  falls  within  the  remits  of  the  two 
separate chambers for judges and prosecutors within the SJC. Over the past year, new heads have been 
appointed to a number of courts and prosecution offices by the new SJC. The great majority of these 
appointments do not appear to have given rise to serious controversy, even if some criticism has been 
aired in concrete cases. Each appointment is preceded by a public hearing phase, which provides an 
opportunity  for  a  wide  range  of  interests  to  give  their  opinion  on  the  candidates  and  requires 
candidates  to  submit  a  concept  paper  detailing  the  objectives  that  they  would  pursue in  the  post,  as 
well  as  a  declaration  of  private  property  and  interests.  This  level  of  transparency  is  designed  to 
facilitate public scrutiny of candidates. It also allows for a more open and systematic comparison of 
merits, where several candidates have applied for a post.16  

Following the reform of 2015/2016, voting records are now public, which also enhances transparency 
around  appointment  decisions.  On  the  other  hand,  some  stakeholders  have  pointed  to  the  fact  that 
decisions of the SJC often are not clearly reasoned, as they result from a simple vote, and members 
have  not  always  clearly  explained  the  motivations  based  on  which  they  have  cast  their  votes.17  The 
presentation  of  clear  reasoning  behind  appointment  decisions,  including  any  dissenting  opinions  is 
generally beneficial for the development of public trust that such decisions are being made on the basis 
of merit. It is also one way to communicate the SJC’s broader vision for development of the judiciary. 
Notwithstanding these concerns expressed by some stakeholders over transparency, it seems clear that 
recent  reforms,  in  particular  the  public  voting  record,  have  contributed  to  an  improvement  in  the 
public’s  ability  to  follow  decision-making  within  the  Council.  The  approach  towards  appointments 
also  reflects  a  general  environment  within  the  current  Council  seen  as  more  consensual  and 
professional.  

11   Previous reports have noted that controversies and infighting among  members of the Council had given rise 

to concerns and affected public confidence in the judiciary, see COM(2017) 43, p. 4 and 8.  

12   This  is  the  case  notably  in  areas  such  as  workload  and  reform  of  the  judicial  map.  In  some  respects  the 
approach taken by the new council on these issues has put into question work done by the previous council. 
In  others,  it  has  given  new  impetus  to  necessary  decisions.  See  also  recommendation  2  and  benchmark  3 
below.  

13   Observers  have  noted  a  significant  deterioration  in  the  general  media  environment  in  recent  years,  see 

https://rsf.org/en/ranking  and http://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/   

14   In some recent cases, the Council has found it difficult to reach a consensus on an appropriate response, with 
members divided on the balance to be found between the legitimate interest of the media to report on judicial 
affairs and the need to defend the judiciary against the risk of intimidating press coverage exerting pressure 
on  individual  judges.  As  a  way  forward,  the  council  recently  decided  to  prepare  internal  guidance  on  the 
matter. 

15   These are appointed by the President of the Republic on a motion of the plenary of the SJC.  
16   In a large number of cases, however, there was only a single candidate.  
17   Some  stakeholders  have  expressed  concern  that  an  impression  of  decisions  being  determined  behind  the 
scenes could reflect a possible reappearance of intransparent practices which marred the previous SJC. Such 
concerns often focussed on the significant share of political appointees in the SJC, an issue which was not 
addressed by the 2015 constitutional amendments. See also footnote 9 above.   

4 

 
                                                           
One  high-profile  appointment  which  presented  a  particular  challenge  for  the  SJC  over  the  past  year 
was the appointment of a new President of the Sofia City Court.18  As one of the  main courts of the 
country, dealing with major commercial as well as important criminal cases, the Sofia City Court has a 
prominent position within the overall judicial system in Bulgaria. It was embroiled in a high-profile 
scandal at the end of 2014 concerning the handling of random allocation of cases, with alleged links to 
corrupt  practices  within  the  court.  Under  a  new  management  since  spring  2015,  the  Court  has 
undergone  important  changes  in  an  effort  to  address  the  issues  identified.  However,  judges  have 
continued to raise concerns over working conditions. Together with the other Sofia courts, the Sofia 
City  Court  is  known  to  have  a  disproportionately  heavy  workload  compared  to  other  courts  in  the 
country.  Given  this  background, the  appointment  of a  new  President  of  the  Sofia  City  Court can be 
seen  as  a  particularly  sensitive  test  case  for  the  SJC.  In  March  2018  a  first  attempt  at  filling  the 
vacancy failed, as neither of the two candidates obtained the required majority in the judges’ chamber 
of the SJC,19 despite the benefits of a competition between two candidates and the fact that at least one 
of the candidates appeared to have wide support among judges at the Court.20 A second procedure was 
subsequently launched with two candidates applying within the deadline in June 2018. The vote in the 
SJC  should  now  be  imminent.  The  delays  experienced  have  caused  uncertainty  and  tensions  in  the 
Court.21  On  the  other  hand,  the  SJC  has  pointed  to  the  fact  that  these  are  important  appointments 
which should not be rushed.  

As regards appointments more generally within the judiciary, a number of competitions have already 
taken place under the new SJC, although these have primarily concerned the promotion of prosecutors. 
Competitions for the promotion of judges, on the other hand, are generally only in preparation or still 
ongoing.22  In  this  context,  concerns  have  been  raised  that  long  timelags,  in  combination  with 
legislative  amendments  made  in  autumn  2017  to  deregulate  secondments,  risk  leading  to  the 
reappearance  of  practices,  widespread  before  the  legislative  reform  of  2016,  to  use  long-term 
secondments of judges as an alternative to, or circumvention of, official promotions within courts.23  

The January 2017 recommendation pays particular attention to the appointment of a new President of 
the Supreme Administrative Court, which took place in the autumn of 2017, and was covered in the 
report  of  November  2017.24  The  next  appointment  for  one  of  the  ‘top  three’  positions  within  the 
judiciary is expected to be the appointment of a new Prosecutor General in the autumn of 2019.25 The 
very  high  profile  of  the  Prosecutor  General’s  office  in  the  Bulgarian  system  further  accentuates  the 

18   The previous President of the Court since 2015 resigned for personal reasons in summer 2017.  
19   An appointment requires an absolute majority of 8 out of the 14 members of the chamber, which is composed 
of  6 judges  from  the  professional  quota  and  6 jurists  elected  by  the  National  Assembly  as  well  as  the  two 
Presidents of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court,  who are members  ex 
officio. 

20   Under  legislation  adopted  in  2016,  the  assembly  of  judges  at  the  individual  court  is  competent  to  hear  all 
candidates  and  give  its  opinion.  In  this  case  the  assembly  of  judges  at  the  Sofia  City  Court  had  explicitly 
recommended  one  of  the  two  candidates.  Such  a  recommendation  is  however  only  advisory,  and  the  final 
decision is made by the SJC, following its own hearing of the candidates. 

21   Another  ongoing  procedure  for  a  prominent  position  concerns  the  presidency  of  the  specialised  court  for 
organised crime, which is currently under additional stress due to the assignment to it of new competences 
regarding high-level corruption cases.  

22   A  competition  for  seven  appointments  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  and  59  positions  in  the  regional 
courts were launched in December 2017 but were still ongoing as of October 2018. Other competitions are in 
preparation, including for the appellate courts.  

23   Such practices were partly a response to a shortage of official competitions for the promotion of judges, as 
these were seen as a complex and lengthy way of filling judicial posts, but were also criticised in the past as a 
means of circumventing merit-based promotion policies, and possibly creating risks to judicial independence, 
due  to  the  temporary  nature  of  secondments  and  the  resulting  dependence  of  the  judges  concerned  on  the 
goodwill of the judicial hierarchy. 

24   COM(2017) 750, p. 4. 
25   The prosecutor General is appointed for a non-renewable term of 7 years. The incumbent was appointed in 

November 2012. 

5 

 
                                                           
need  for  a  transparent  and  merit-based  process.  The  nomination  process  will  attract  a  significant 
amount  of  attention,  also  at  political  level,  and  is  hence  likely  to represent an important test for the 
new SJC in the coming year.  

Recommendation  3:  To  improve  the  practical  functioning  of  the  ISJC  and  the  follow-up  by  the 
Supreme  Judicial  Council  to  the  inspectorate's  findings,  in  particular  on  integrity  issues,  consider 
soliciting external assistance, for example from the SRSS and/or Council of Europe. 

In  response  to  this  recommendation,  the  Bulgarian  authorities  have  requested  the  assistance  of  the 
Commission’s structural reform support service (SRSS) for a project which will be led by the Council 
of  Europe  and  will  help  the  inspectorate  further  develop  its  capacity  to  deal  with  integrity  issues 
among magistrates, while drawing on lessons from other Member States.26 The project is planned to be 
launched by the end of 2018 and to be completed in autumn 2019.  

The Inspectorate to the SJC plays an important role in promoting good management practices in the 
judiciary  through  regular  inspections  of  judicial  bodies.  Following  the  constitutional  and  legislative 
reforms  of  2015  and  2016,  the  inspectorate  was  furthermore  given  a  more  central  role  in  regard  to 
integrity  issues,  including  the  checking  of  asset  and  interest  declarations  of  magistrates  and  the 
verification of concrete circumstances raising concerns over judicial integrity, for example based on 
information received through alerts from the public. The inspectorate is also competent to propose the 
initiation of disciplinary proceedings, although any decisions on disciplinary matters of magistrates are 
made  by  the  SJC,  subject  to  judicial  review  at  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court.  The  handling  of 
integrity  and  disciplinary  issues  has  been  a  concern  in  the  past,  which  is  the  background  for  the 
recommendation in the January 2017 report to draw on outside expert assistance in order to develop 
the capacity and review the functioning of the Inspectorate in this area.  

With  the  entry  into  force  of  the  new  rules  in  January  2017,  the  inspectorate  has  started  gaining 
concrete experience in the application of its new powers, which can serve as an important basis for the 
review.27 The system for the checking of asset and interest declarations for around 4,000 magistrates is 
now up and running.28 Due to the technical challenge of setting up the new system, deadlines for the 
processing of the declarations were extended to six months, but the checks for 2017 were finalised on 
time by early 2018. As regards the effectiveness of the checks, the Inspectorate has drawn attention to 
the limitations on its access to bank account data. As a result, the law has been amended to facilitate 
the  checks  by  allowing  magistrates  to  voluntarily  agree  to  the  lifting  of  banking  secrecy  for  the 
purposes of the checks.29  

More significant challenges have been identified in regard to the response to alerts received from the 
public as well as to the specific inspection of circumstances which have been deemed to raise potential 
integrity  issues.  The  inspectorate  cannot  act  on  anonymous  alerts  or  alerts  which  do  not  provide 
sufficiently concrete information. It is possible for the inspectorate to prompt the person making the 
alert  to  provide  additional  information,  but  this  is  not  necessarily  sufficient,  as  the  person  may  not 
always  have  access  to  all  the  facts  or  possess  the  necessary  legal  knowledge.  In  terms  of  its  own 
follow-up,  while  the  inspectorate  can  invite  the  magistrate  concerned  for  an  interview,  it  has  no 

26   Bilateral contacts have already taken place with the judicial inspectorate of France to learn from the French 

experience and there is also an interest to learn from the Spanish system.  

27   In addition, as noted in the November 2017 report, the Venice Commission has raised a number of issues in 
its opinion of October 2017 on the 2016 reform of Bulgaria’s judicial systems act,  which could also provide 
useful input. COM(2017) 750, p. 4.  

28   The  submission  of  declarations  reportedly  passed  without  major  incident,  with  only  a  small  number  of 
magistrates failing to declare within the set deadlines. Failure to declare is publicised on the website and may 
result in financial penalties. Significant discrepancies in the information declared compared with data in other 
public registers results in referral of the case to relevant authorities such as the National Revenue Agency, if 
not corrected within the deadline. The inspectorate reports that in 2018 a substantial number of declarations 
contained discrepancies, the majority of which were however clarified within the deadline.  
29   The Inspectorate has already been given access to the relevant public registers for cross checks.  

6 

 
                                                           
powers to require him or her to appear, and, more generally, it has limited investigatory powers. As a 
result,  while  the  inspectorate  does  receive  a  significant  number  of  alerts  and  can  also  act  on  media 
publications30, only a minority of alerts provide a basis for the opening of an inspection, and very few 
result in the identification of irregularities. Even fewer have resulted in a disciplinary follow-up.31 The 
inspectorate  may  also  refer  cases  to  the  Prosecutor’s  Office  in  case  there  is  evidence  of  a  potential 
crime, but the information included in the alerts has generally not provided sufficient basis for such a 
reference.32  

In 2017 and 2018 the inspectorate has continued to refer cases for disciplinary follow-up at the SJC, 
which have generally been followed up by the SJC.33 While, as already mentioned, referrals related to 
integrity issues are few in number, a large number of disciplinary proceedings appear to concern the 
failure of judges to respect procedural deadlines, an issue which in some cases could be partly related 
to problems with workload, therefore reflecting broader management challenges in the judiciary.34  

Benchmark  2:  Ensure  a  more  transparent  and  efficient  judicial  process  by  adopting  and 
implementing a new Judicial System Act and the new Civil Procedure Code. Report on the 
Impact of these new laws and of the Criminal and Administrative Procedure Codes, notably 
on the pre-trial phase 

Recommendation  4:  Adopt  amendments to the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  and the  Criminal  Code  to 
improve the legal framework for the prosecution of high-level corruption and serious organised crime. 

The January 2017 report highlighted the complex legal framework and formalistic criminal procedures 
as  a  key  challenge  affecting  the  ability  of  the  Bulgarian  law  enforcement  to  fight  corruption  and 
organised crime. As already noted in the November 2017 report, Bulgaria enacted amendments to its 
criminal procedural code in the summer 2017 which came into effect on 5 November 2017. The main 
objectives of the amendments were to speed up court procedures in criminal cases and to strengthen 
the institutional framework for the investigation and adjudication of corruption cases involving high-
level officials. 35   

In  concrete  terms  this  involved,  in  the  first  case,  the  introduction  of  a  preliminary  hearing  stage  in 
court  proceedings,  during  which  formal  shortcomings  affecting  the  pre-trial  investigation  and  the 
indictment had to be addressed. The idea behind this innovation was that such formal issues should no 
longer  provide  a  basis  for  referring  cases  back  to  the  prosecution  in  late  stages  of  the  trial.  Such 
referrals have been identified as a major cause for delays in court proceedings, with prosecutors often 
criticising what is sometimes seen as an overly zealous attitude in the courts over minor formal errors, 

30   In the case of media publications the inspectorate may act ex officio.  
31   The decision on a referral of an inspection report for disciplinary follow-up at the SJC is not automatic but is 
taken  on  a  case  by  case  basis  by  the  college  of  inspectors.  In  this  sense,  the  inspectorate  operates  as  an 
independent authority within the judiciary, with a certain gatekeeper role in regard to the disciplinary system, 
although  court  presidents  and  the  Minister  of  Justice  can  also  propose  the  initiation  of  disciplinary 
proceedings. Inspectors are elected by the National Assembly by two-thirds majority.  

32   The challenges outlined above have reportedly resulted in deliberations over whether it could be appropriate 
for  the  inspectorate  to  be  able  to  draw  on  investigatory  agencies  via  the  intervention  of  the  Prosecutor’s 
Office in order to clarify the facts in relation to alerts that it receives. In considering such an option, account 
has  to  be  taken  of  the  differentiation  between  administrative  verifications,  disciplinary  proceedings,  and 
criminal  investigations,  which  are  fundamentally  different  types  of  procedures  requiring  very  different 
procedural  safeguards,  thus  making  the  issue  inherently  sensitive.  Reportedly,  draft  amendments  were 
discussed in the Legal Affairs committee of the National Assembly but ultimately rejected. 

33   Reportedly, a rare exception was a case which was rejected becasue the limitation period for the initiation of 
disciplinary proceedings expired while the case was pending, which could possibly point to a need to review 
procedures to ensure all cases within the SJC are dealt with on time. Reportedly there has been at least one 
other case, this one not initiated by the Inspectorate, which was also rejected based on expiry of the limitation 
period. 

34   In addition, a large number of disciplinary proceedings are referred to the SJC by heads of judicial bodies.  
35   SWD(2017) 700, p. 7. 

7 

 
                                                           
and judges tending to underline quality failings in the work of the prosecution. The logic of the new 
procedural step was to impose a higher level of discipline on both prosecution and defence, so as to 
ensure that formal errors were cleared up early on in the procedure so that the later stages of the trial 
could  focus  on  issues  of  substance.  The  other  major  element  of  the  reform  was  the  transfer  of 
jurisdiction  for  corruption  cases  involving  high-level  officials  to  the  specialised  court  for  organised 
crime. A consequence of this was also to give the specialised prosecutor’s office for organised crime 
the lead in the supervision of investigations and in the prosecution of such crimes.  

Initially  these  reforms  received  a  mixed  reception  among  a  number  of  stakeholders  within  the 
judiciary, with critics highlighting possible legal issues as well as arguing that there had been a lack of 
consultation and debate.36   

The amendments have now been in force for one year and while it may still be too early to make a 
comprehensive assessment, it is possible to draw some preliminary lessons from the experience so far. 
As  far  as  the  preliminary  hearing  is  concerned,  initial  experience  reportedly  indicated  that  a  high 
proportion of cases were being referred back to the prosecution during the preliminary hearing. This 
could be seen as confirmation of a more effective process, identifying problems early on. It could also 
reflect  a  more  cautious  attitude  among  some  judges,  given  the  expressed  concerns  over  a  possible 
negative  impact  on  defendants’  rights  of  the  new  system.  On  balance,  however,  the  Bulgarian 
authorities have indicated that they expect the additional delays at the early stage of proceedings to be 
compensated later on by a more expedient progress of cases through the trial phase.  

As for the transfer of high-level corruption cases to the specialised court, the November 2017 report 
referred to the need for proper preparation and planning in terms of resource needs and organisation. 
These  concerns  seem  at  least  partly  to  have  been  addressed.  In  particular,  there  was  a  significant 
increase in staff resources allocated to the specialised prosecutor’s office and the attached department 
of investigating magistrates in early 2018. The specialised prosecution works closely with the general 
directorate for organised crime in the Ministry of Interior, which is also increasingly involved in the 
investigation of corruption crimes, as well as with the special anti-corruption unit under the Sofia City 
Prosecutor’s Office, which used to be in charge of corruption cases involving high-level officials, in 
order  to  ensure  a  smooth  transition.  A  similar  increase  in  resources  for  the  specialised  court  was 
initially not made, which led  to concerns over the expected increase in workload and the risk that a 
shortage of courtrooms and staff could mean cases unnecessarily delayed.37   

Apart from these amendments already enacted and implemented, the last CVM report also noted that 
deliberations were under way on wider procedural and legal reforms to address formalism in criminal 
procedures and complexity in the legal framework. These efforts are based on several analyses carried 
out  in  recent  years  by  independent  experts  and  the  Bulgarian  authorities,  which  have  highlighted  a 
number  of  challenges  affecting  the  effectiveness  of  investigations  and  the  prosecution  of  corruption 
and  organised  crime  in  Bulgaria.38  A  number  of  working  groups  were  set  up  under  the  Ministry  of 
Justice  in  2017, involving  stakeholders from  the judiciary.  The  discussions  concern  a  wide  range  of 
issues, such as the format and content of indictments, the role of the preliminary enquiry stage prior to 
the  formal  pre-trial  investigation,  the  role  of  the  State  Agency  for  National  Security  in  criminal 

36   Elements of the reform were brought before the Constitutional Court in order to verify their coherence with 
constitutional  principles,  such  as  the  protection  of  defendants’  rights  and  the  prohibition  against  special 
tribunals.  In  the  course  of  2018  the  Constitutional  Court  has  decided  on  these  cases  and  found  that  the 
reforms were in conformity with the Constitution on these points. 

37   The SJC has now decided, in the context of a wider reallocation, to reassign three vacant posts for judges to 
the specialised court as well as to explore possibilities for additional judges to be assigned through voluntary 
transfers.  Discussions  are  also  ongoing  to  address  the  issue  of  suitable  physical  premises  through  a 
combination of short and long term measures, ultimately involving the refurbishment of a new building for 
the Court.  

38   COM(2017) 750, p. 5. See also recommendations 7, 8 and 11 below.  

8 

 
                                                           
investigations,  procedures  for  the  application  of  special  investigatory  means,  and  the  status  and 
follow-up to intelligence reports from the financial intelligence directorate.39  

These  deliberations  have  not  yet  led  to  further  proposals  for  legislative  amendments,  and  reports 
suggest  that  on  most  issues  the  conclusion  is  that  legislative  change  is  not  the  appropriate  way  to 
address  the  issues  raised.  This  is  the  case,  for  example,  concerning  the  follow-up  to  intelligence 
reports on suspicious transactions, the role of the national security agency in criminal investigations, 
procedures for special investigatory means, and the content and format of indictments.40  

The status of the preliminary enquiry is one of the issues where discussions appear still to be ongoing. 
Preliminary enquiries are widely used as a step prior to the opening of a formal pre-trial investigation, 
as they allow for greater procedural flexibility than the formal investigation. However, these pre-trial 
investigations  are  not  regulated  by  the  criminal  procedure  code,  and  any  evidence  or  testimony 
gathered has no status in court, resulting in lengthy and cumbersome double work if they need to be 
followed up by a formal investigation. Furthermore, precisely because of their less formal nature, the 
institution  of  the  preliminary  enquiry  is  often  regarded  with  suspicion,  as  a  possible  avenue  for  the 
investigatory and prosecuting authorities to circumvent the constraints and guarantees implied by the 
formal pre-trial procedure.41 Investigatory and prosecuting authorities have cited the very high number 
of preliminary enquiries to argue that abolishing this procedural step would risk a dramatic increase in 
the number of formal investigations, with serious consequences for the efficiency of the system. On 
the other hand, critics of the procedure argue that given the discretion left to the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office and the fact that the threshold for opening a formal investigation remains relatively high, the 
current system carries a risk of restricting access to justice for victims of crime. 

The issue of the preliminary enquiry is closely related to the issue of judicial review of prosecutorial 
decisions. Bulgarian law affords the victim the right to judicial review of the prosecutorial decision to 
close a formal pre-trial investigation without trial. However, no judicial review exists on the decision 
not to open a pre-trial investigation in the first place.42 Critics of the current system have linked this to 
the  availability  of  the  preliminary  enquiry  as  an  initial  step,  arguing  that  this  gives  the  prosecutor 
considerable discretion over the decision to open a formal investigation.43  

Another  issue  which  is  still  subject  to  discussion  concerns  the  challenges  involved  in  ensuring  an 
independent  and  impartial  investigation  into  any  allegations  of  criminal  conduct  by  the  most  senior 
officials  of  the  magistracy  while  in  post  –  the  Presidents  of  the  High  Court  of  Cassation  and  the 
Supreme  Administrative  Court,  and  the  Prosecutor  General.  This  issue  was  raised  specifically  in 
regard  to  the  particular  role  of  Prosecutor  General  within  the  Bulgarian  system  in  a  ruling  of  the 
European Court of Human Rights from 2009, where the follow-up by the Bulgarian authorities is still 
being monitored by the Council of Europe.44  

39   The  financial  intelligence  directorate  of  the  State  Agency  for  National  Security  plays  a  key  role  in  the 
prevention and detection of  money laundering and terrorist  financing and other financial crimes, preparing 
intelligence reports to law enforcement based on alerts from financial institutions about potentially suspicious 
financial transactions.  

40   On  the  format  and  content  of  indictments,  the  Prosecutor  General  instead  asked  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Cassation for an interpretative ruling in order to clarify the legal basis (set out in Article 246 of the criminal 
procedure code). In its response, however, the court limits itself to referring to a previous interpretative ruling 
from 2002, considering that no further guidance is necessary.  

41   A positive recent step in this regard was a new rule to limit the duration of the preliminary enquiry to three 

weeks. Previously, such enquiries have been reported to continue for very long periods in some cases.  

42   The victim may only appeal to a higher ranking Prosecutor’s Office. Ultimately the Prosecutor General may 

also decide on the opening of an investigation in exceptional circumstances.   

43   See also recommendation 8 below. 
44   Kolevi  vs  Bulgaria,  https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["001-95607"]}).  This  issue  is  also  relevant  in 
relation to recommendations  7 and 8 below.  Although the  issue  was identified specifically in regard to the 

9 

 
                                                           
 
The  difficulties  encountered  in  identifying  and  agreeing  on  legislative  solutions  to  address  highly 
formalistic  procedures  in  Bulgaria  highlights  the  complexity  and  sensitivity  of  the  issues  at  stake. 
These  issues  are  deeply  entangled  in  legal  tradition  and  institutional  convention,  and  may  therefore 
require a broader change in culture for greater trust to develop in the relations between different parts 
of the judiciary.45  

A  similar  challenge  affects  the  efforts  to  modernise  outdated  provisions  of  the  Bulgarian  criminal 
code. As described in previous reports46, attempts at comprehensive reform of the code have not been 
successful in the past and the Bulgarian authorities have therefore directed their efforts rather towards 
more targeted amendments to facilitate the prosecution of corruption crimes. However, even this more 
limited  approach  ran  into  problems  in  spring  2018,  when  a  set  of  amendments  concerning  private 
sector corruption was met with broad opposition from stakeholders across society, prompting the legal 
affairs committee of the National Assembly to postpone their adoption in order to carry out additional 
consultations with stakeholders.47   

Benchmark  3:  Continue  the  reform  of  the  judiciary  in  order  to  enhance  professionalism, 
accountability  and  efficiency.  Evaluate  the  impact  of  this  reform  and  publish  the  results 
annually 

Recommendation  5:  Publish  a  report  for  public  consultation  detailing  the  progress  made 
implementing  the  national  judicial  reform  strategy  and  setting  out  the  remaining  steps  to  be  taken. 
Establish a mechanism for continued public reporting of progress for the remaining duration of the 
strategy's implementation. 

This recommendation envisages a mechanism for involving stakeholders and the wider public in the 
setting  of  priorities  for  further  work  under  the  2014  judicial  reform  strategy.48  In  response,  the 
government has established a cycle of half-yearly reporting and consultations with stakeholders on the 
implementation of the judicial reform strategy. The government has also maintained the consultative 
Judicial Reform Council, which bring together stakeholders to discuss ongoing reform initiatives.49  

These  mechanisms  constitute  useful  complements  to  formal  stakeholder  consultations  on  new 
legislative  initiatives  and  could  promote  a  wider  debate  among  stakeholders,  including  the  judicial 
professions, on the direction of judicial reform in the coming years. Such wider debate is necessary in 
areas where reforms require coordination between the different branches of government and could be 
used to involve the wider public in decisions on issues such as updating of the court map, introducing 
e-justice solutions, and enhancing public accountability and transparency in the judiciary.50  

prosecution, the Bulgarian authorities have decided to broaden the scope of their deliberations to all the three 
top figures within the judiciary. 

45   Some observers have pointed out that the formalism affecting Bulgarian criminal court procedures is at least 
partly the result of a low level of trust within the judges profession in the professionalism and impartiality of 
the investigating and prosecuting authorities. 

46   COM(2017) 43, p. 5. 
47   The debate once again raised the issue of trust in institutions, as opposition was at least in part a reflection of 
concerns  over  the  extension  of  investigatory  and  prosecutorial  authority  in  the  realm  of  private  sector 
economic relations.  

48   An English version of the strategy can be found via this link: www.strategy.bg/FileHandler.ashx?fileId=5570  
49   Over  the  past  year,  the  council  held  regular  meetings  in  December,  March  and  July  as  well  as  an 
extraordinary meeting in November 2017. Topics covered have included draft amendments to the judiciary 
system  act  and  the  penal  code,  follow-up  to  the  CVM  report  of  November  2017,  and  the  report  on  the 
implementation of the judicial reform strategy. Some stakeholders have expressed concern that the meeting 
on the last topic did not leave sufficient room for debate, possibly indicating a need for further consultations.  
50   Some observers have indicated that judicial reform has not had a high profile on the public agenda over the 

past year, as other issues have tended to take priority.  

10 

 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Recommendation 6: Address the workload situation in the busiest courts based on the new workload 
standards, and agree a roadmap for the reform of the judicial map in parallel with the development of 
e-justice. 

While the engagement in broader debate on judicial reform strategy remains important, a number of 
more concrete challenges have been left over from the previous Council and now figure prominently 
on  the  agenda  of  the  SJC.  This  concerns  in  particular  the  issues  of  how  to  address  the  unbalanced 
workload situation across the various jurisdictions. As described in previous reports, there remains a 
large discrepancy in workload among the different courts, which affects in particular the larger courts 
in the capital and larger cities. The efforts of the previous SJC were mainly focussed on developing 
common standards for the assessment of the issue, as a basis for agreeing on remedies.  

Some  incremental  reallocation  of  posts  among  courts  has  also  taken  place  over  the  years  in  the 
direction of the more busy courts. It has been argued that this approach has its limits, as some of the 
courts concerned are already very large and a further increase in staff would run into limits in terms of 
suitable  premises  and  result  in  the  number  of  judges  at  certain  courts  becoming  too  high  for  an 
effective staff management to be possible.51 Nevetheless, discussions are under way exploring how to 
further strengthen the Sofia City and Regional courts with additional posts.52 

The new SJC has also engaged in a dialogue with the government and legislature to explore possible 
ways of addressing the workload issue through legislative changes, by redistributing the competence 
for certain types of cases among courts. For various reasons, many civil law cases are concentrated in 
the Sofia courts, whereas the citizens concerned are spread out throughout the country.53 A number of 
potential  legislative  options  have  been  under  consideration,  and  amendments  concerning  certain 
consumer and insurance claim cases were promulgated in August 2018.54 Further changes are expected 
to be developed with assistance from the Commission’s Structural Reform Support Service.55  

In  the  longer  term,  the  Bulgarian  authorities  envisage  that  such  legislative  solutions  could  be 
combined with adjustments in the geographic structure of jurisdictions, that is, a reform in the judicial 
map. As already noted in the November 2017 report56, this process is furthest advanced with regard to 
the  prosecution  service,  where  already  in  spring  2017  the  previous  SJC  discussed  in  principle  an 
approach  to  the  consolidation  of  local  offices  throughout  the  country.  Further  steps  towards 
implementation  have  been  held  back  by  uncertainty  over  the  future  plans  with  regard  to  the  local 
courts.57 In the meantime, the prosecution is currently pursuing an incremental approach, in which a 

51   A concern often raised by judges at the Sofia courts is the access to suitable physical premises. A dialogue is 
ongoing  with  the  Ministry  of  Justice  on  ways  to  rationalise  the  management  of  court  premises  in  order  to 
seek partial solutions to this issue.  

52   This  discussion  follows  consultations  with  the  management  of  a  number  of  courts  around  the  country  and 
would entail the reallocation of vacant positions as well as the possible voluntary transfer of judges towards 
the Sofia courts. It was also decided to allocate three posts to the Specialised criminal court, and explore the 
possibility of further voluntary transfers, in  light of the additional responsibilities  for high-level corruption 
cases assumed by that court in November 2017.  

53   One reason is the location of many company headquarters in Sofia.  
54   In consumer or insurance cases the concentration of trials in Sofia has created challenges not only in terms of 
workload,  but  also  with  regard  to  access  to  justice  for  citizens  who  are  forced  to  travel  or  take  legal 
representation in the capital. A reallocation of such cases closer to the citizens affected is therefore expected 
to serve a double purpose, alleviating the burden on the Sofia courts while at the same time improving the 
ease of access to justice.  

55   This  concerns  the  development  of  a  system  for  digital  handling  of  payment  order  proceedings,  where  a 

project proposal was submitted by the Bulgarian authorities in the summer 2018.   

56   COM(2017) 750, p. 6. 
57   Bulgaria  has  113  local  courts  and  prosecutors’  offices  for  a  population  of  little  over  7  million  inhabitants. 
While there is broad consensus on the need for a rationalisation of the prosecutor’s offices into fewer entities, 
the  closing  of  local  courts  has  proven  to  be  more  contentious  on  the  local  level.  Nevertheless,  a  rational 
approach to the closing of prosecutors’ offices would naturally take into account where the remaining local 
courts will eventually be situated, hence raising the need for a coordinated approach.  

11 

 
                                                           
limited number of local offices will be consolidated during a pilot phase58, to be followed by further 
steps in the context of a broader plan for the reform of the local courts.59 

It  is  still  to  be  seen  when  the  blueprint  for  a  broader  reform  will  be  ready.  The  previous  SJC  had 
launched  a  package  of  large  projects  with  funding  from  the  European  Social  Fund60  for  the 
development  of  a  concept  for  the  reform  of  the  judicial  map  and  the  development  of  e-justice.  The 
package  covers  not  only  the  development  of  a  concept  for  the  reform  of  the  court  map  but  also 
elements  for  the  future  Bulgarian  e-justice  system.61  However,  these  projects  have  seen  significant 
delays  under  the  previous  SJC.  In  light  of  the  limited  progress  made,  the  new  SJC  has  since 
relaunched the process and agreed an extension of the relevant deadlines.62  

Recommendation 7: Establish a roadmap for the implementation of the recommendations of the SRSS 
report  concerning  the  reform  of  the  Prosecutor's  Office  and  its  interactions  with  other  institutions, 
including a mechanism for the reporting of progress to the wider public. 

The Bulgarian Prosecutor’s Office forms part of the magistracy and retains a pivotal role in Bulgarian 
society, with the Prosecutor General’s office counting among the key institutions of the State.63  The 
independent and powerful role of the Prosecutor’s Office has over the years given rise to controversy, 
with  concerns  expressed  about  a  perceived  lack  of  accountability  for  prosecutorial  decisions  and 
possible risks to judicial independence. Due to its central position within the overall criminal justice 
system, the prosecution has also been a natural focal point for criticism of limited progress in the fight 
against  corruption  and  organised  crime  in  Bulgaria.  The  result  was  calls  for  reform  to  enhance 
transparency  and  accountability  in  the  prosecution  and  to  ensure  effective  and  independent 
investigations.  A  number  of  legislative  and  organisational  reforms  have  sought  to  reflect  such 
concerns over the years64, and in 2016 a project was organised by the Commission's Structural Reform 
Support Service to carry out an independent and comprehensive analysis of the Prosecutor’s Office, to 
provide suggestions for ways to improve the system.65  

The  independent  expert  analysis  was  welcomed  by  the  Bulgarian  authorities  and  was  followed  up 
through  a  number  of  initiatives  set  out  in  a  roadmap  in  summer  2017.  The  November  2017  CVM 
report  noted  that  while  many  measures  were  already  being  implemented,  some  initiatives  were  still 

58   The decision to close 11 local offices (out of 113)  was taken in July and is expected to enter into  force in 
January 2019. Public protests in some of the  localities concerned prompted the Prosecutor’s Office  to take 
additional measures to inform local communities and alleviate concerns about the possible implications of the 
plans, highlighting the sensitivies involved.  

59   On  the  side  of  the  courts,  the  option  of  addressing  workload  through  limited  changes  to  the  territorial 
jurisdiction  of  the  Sofia  courts,  pending  a  decision  on  possible  broader  changes  to  the  judicial  map,  is 
reportedly also being considered.  

60   Under the Operational Programme for Good Governance (OPGG) the European Social Fund has earmarked 
up  to  30  million  euro  for  the  2014-2020  programming  period  for  projects  in  the  area  of  judicial  reform  in 
Bulgaria.  

61   A  more  streamlined  use  of  ICT  across  the  courts  would  contribute  to  enhancing  the  efficiency  and 

transparency of court proceedings and could also contribute to a more effective use of staff resources.  

62   Different elements are now expected to be finalised in stages towards the end of 2020. 
63   This  is  often  characterised  as  a  legacy  of  communist  times,  and  this  model  exists  in  a  number  of  former 

communist countries. 

64   For  example,  legislative  changes  in  2016  aimed  to  clarify  the  legal  framework  for  exercising  hierarchical 
authority  over  the  decisions  of  individual  prosecutors  and  lower  level  prosecutors’  offices,  notably  by 
requiring  instructions  to  be  reasoned,  made  in  writing  and  respecting  the  independence  of  the  responsible 
prosecutor on the case, and by restricting the formal power of instruction of the Prosecutor General vis-à-vis 
individual prosecutors, giving a stronger role to the different steps in the organisational hierarchy.  

65   The project was carried out by an independent expert team of prosecutors from Germany, France, Spain and 
the  Netherlands,  under  the  aegis  of  the  Commission’s  Structural  Reform  Support  Service.  An  executive 
summary of the final report can be found at the website of the Ministry of Justice: 
http://www.mjs.bg/Files/Executive%20Summary%20Final%20Report%20BG%2015122016.pdf  

12 

 
                                                           
 
ongoing  or  needed  to  be  translated  into  a  clear  plan  of  action  in  key  areas.66  The  latter  referred  in 
particular  to  initiatives  envisaging  possible  legislative  amendments,  which  were  to  be  discussed  in 
working  groups  under  the  Ministry  of  Justice  with  involvement  of  the  relevant  stakeholders.  As 
mentioned  under  recommendation  4  above,  these  discussions  still  continue  in  some  areas,  notably 
regarding the role of the preliminary enquiry and the procedure to ensure an independent investigation 
in  the  event  of  serious  allegations  relating  to  a  Prosecutor  General  while  in  office.  In  other  areas, 
however, discussions have led to the conclusion that the issues concerned cannot adequately be dealt 
with  through  legislative  amendments,  the  implication  being  that  focus  should  rather  be  on  practical 
and organisational measures to address the issues raised in the analysis.  

The  Prosecutor’s  Office  has  reported  that  the  wide  range  of  organisational  measures  which  were 
within  its  own  remit  of  authority67  have  largely  been  implemented  or  are  being  implemented  on  an 
ongoing  basis.  Additional  organisational  measures  may  also  be  appropriate  for  some  issues  initially 
referred  for  legislative  follow-up  where  it  was  eventually  concluded  that  legislation  was  not  the 
solution.68 

Two  key  aspects  that  were  highlighted  in  the  analysis  and  which  appear  to  have  been  particularly 
sensitive in the Bulgarian context were how to deal with hierarchy and accountability. An important 
conclusion was that while the system needs to ensure the necessary space for prosecutors to do their 
job in an autonomous fashion, this does not necessarily imply the total absence of supervision by the 
management. Experts pointed to the fact that in many systems it would be normal, especially in high-
profile cases, that the management takes responsibility for key decisions, depending on the sensitivity 
of  the  issue. This turned  out  to  be  one  of  the  more  controversial recommendations  in the  Bulgarian 
context,  reflecting  strong  sensitivities  surrounding  the  exercise  of  hierarchic  authority  within  the 
prosecution.69  Given  that  the  organisation  of  the  Bulgarian  Prosecutor’s  Office  retains  strong 
hierarchic  features,  the  balance  struck  in  terms  of  managerial  responsibility  will  remain  an  issue  of 
legitimate debate.  

The second aspect mentioned concerns external accountability. The prosecution should be independent 
in its day to day functioning. At the same time, the management should also be accountable towards 
wider society. A recommendation made in this regard was for a stronger parliamentary oversight role 
by the National Assembly. In response to this, the National Assembly in 2017 initiated a practice of 
calling on the Prosecutor General to appear before the Legal Affairs Committee every three months, to 
provide  information  on  current  developments  involving  the  prosecution.70  Members  of  the  Legal 
Affairs Committee reported satisfaction with the frequency and depth of these meetings. Other aspects 
of  accountability  that  are  relevant  in  this  context,  such  as  communication  with  the  public,  judicial 
oversight of prosecutorial decisions, disciplinary procedures, and appointments to prosecutorial office, 
are also covered in other recommendations.71  

66   See COM(2017) 750, p. 6-7; SWD(2017) 700, p. 9-12. 
67   SWD(2017) 700 , p. 11. 
68   See recommendation 4 above. 
69   The recommendation was seen as going against the direction taken in recent reforms, which have aimed at 
protecting  the  independence  of  individual  prosecutors  by  restricting  the  possibilities  of  management  to 
intervene in decisions. While in reality it is unlikely that any prosecutor would be able to work effectively on 
a major case without the support of his or her management – tacit moral support at the very minimum – the 
suggestion that  managers should be  regularly involved in important decisions on cases,  beyond the limited 
possibilities already provided for in the law, was met with strong resistance.  

70   In  addition,  the  Prosecutor  General  regularly  appears  before  various  other  committees  whenever  relevant 
topics  are  discussed.  There  is  also  an  annual  debate  in  the  National  Assembly  of  the  annual  reports  of  the 
judicial institutions.  

71   Appointments and disciplinary proceedings are within the responsibilities of the prosecutors’ chamber within 
the SJC, which is chaired by the Prosecutor General and brings together an additional five members elected 
by prosecutors and investigating magistrates as well as five members elected by the National Assembly.  

13 

 
                                                           
Recommendation 8: Establish a roadmap for the implementation of the recommendations of the study 
[of European Court on Human Rights rulings], including a mechanism for the reporting of progress to 
the wider public. 

The European Court on Human Rights in 2015 identified a systemic problem concerning the effective 
investigation  of  crime  in  Bulgaria,  based  on  a  large  number  of  cases  reaching  the  court  over  the 
previous years. This led the Bulgarian authorities to carry out an in-depth analysis of the past case law 
of  the  European  Court  on  Human  Rights  with  regard  to  Bulgaria,  and  in  2017  the  government  and 
prosecution  set  out  a  number  of  measures  to  be  considered  in  order  to  address  the  shortcomings 
identified.  Many  of  the  issues  overlap  with  those  identified  under  recommendations  4  and  7  above, 
including challenges linked to formalistic procedures, and have therefore been discussed in the context 
of possible amendments to the criminal procedure code.72  

In addition to possible legislative initiatives, a number of measures of a more managerial nature have 
also been taken within the prosecution to address the issues identified.73 In June 2018, the Prosecutor’s 
Office  and  the  Ministry  of  Justice  signed  a  cooperation  agreement  setting  out  a  framework  for  the 
coordination  of  the  follow-up  to  any  future  cases  with  the  European  Court  on  Human  Rights 
concerning  alleged  shortcomings  concerning  the  effective  investigation  of  crimes  in  Bulgaria.  The 
agreement  provides  that  such  cases  will  be  followed  closely  by  the  relevant  Prosecutor’s  Office,  in 
order  to  make  sure  that  the  Ministry  of  Justice  is  provided  with  all  relevant  information  about 
measures taken in regard to the case concerned. The relevant office will be supervised by the Supreme 
Cassation  Prosecutor’s  Office,  which  will  also  identify  any  issues  of  broader  relevance  deemed  to 
require an organisational or methodological follow-up within the prosecution. Any rulings pronounced 
by the Court are to be published on the website of the Ministry of Justice, to be followed up with the 
publication of annotated comments from the Prosecutor’s Office.  

Measures for the implementation of rulings of the Court74 will be prepared by the Ministry of Justice 
with the assistance of the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor’s Office, which will also internally coordinate 
any measures to be taken within the remit of the prosecution and report back to the Ministry of Justice.   

Benchmark  4:  Conduct  and  report  on  professional,  non-partisan  investigations  into 
allegations  of  high-level  corruption.  Report  on  internal  inspections  of  public  institutions 
and on the publication of assets of high-level officials 

Recommendation  9:  Adopt  a  new  legal  framework  on  the  fight  against  corruption  in  line  with  the 
intentions  set  out  in  the  anti-corruption  strategy,  and  ensure  its  implementation.  Set  up  an  effective 
anti-corruption authority. 

In  the January  2017  report  the  fight  against  corruption  was identified as an area  where  only  limited 
progress had been achieved over the ten years under the CVM. A national anti-corruption strategy had 
been  adopted  in  2015  but  implementation  remained  in  an  early  stage.  Efforts  to  address  endemic 
corruption  and  lack  of  trust  in  institutions  had  therefore  had  few  results  over  the  years.  The 
investigative  and  judicial  follow-up  to  allegations  of  high-level  corruption  seldom  resulted  in  final 
convictions in court. Preventive mechanisms were hampered by institutional fragmentation and a lack 
of  coordination.  Key  institutions  suffered  from  a  general  lack  of  support  from  the  political 
establishment and in some cases had been affected by high profile scandals.75  

72   For example, a key issue identified in the case law concerns instances where ineffective judicial review on 
prosecutorial decisions has hampered the right of victims to an effective investigation. As discussed above, 
this is partly related to the ongoing debate on possible changes to the role of preliminary enquiries.  

73   SWD(2017) 700, p. 12.  
74   The  Council  of  Europe  monitors  the  implementation  of  rulings  of  the  European  Court  on  Human  Rights 
through regular reviews of action plans prepared by the representations of the Member States concerned. 
75   Most notably, the Commission for the Prevention and Ascertainment of Conflicts of Interest lost its chairman 
in  2013  amidst  allegations  of  abuse  of  powers  and  having  directed  the  activities  of  the  commission  for 

14 

 
                                                           
 
In this context, a key initiative of the Bulgarian government in 2015 was the presentation of a major 
legislative reform which aimed at merging a number of existing institutional structures into a unified, 
independent  anti-corruption  agency  charged  with  the  investigation  and  verification  of  conflicts  of 
interest and private assets of high level officials, as well as the general promotion of measures for the 
prevention and detection of corruption in public institutions.76   

The progress of this legislative initiative was difficult. The proposal was first rejected by the National 
Assembly in 2015 due to political opposition to allowing the new agency to act on anonymous alerts. 
A revised version of the law was presented in 2016 but parliamentary negotiations were still underway 
when a political crisis resulted in the resignation of the government towards the end of 2016, followed 
by the dissolution of Parliament and a general election in March 2017.  

In  autumn  2017  the  government  presented  a  revised  proposal  to  the  National  Assembly  which  was 
adopted in December of the same year. However, concerns were raised about some aspects of the new 
law, notably what was seen as weak provisions on whistleblower protection as well as the fact that the 
management  of  the  new  agency  was  to  be  elected  by  a  simple  majority  in  the  National  Assembly, 
raising concerns over possible politicisation.77 The political tensions over the new law came to a head 
when  the  President  of  the  Republic  issued  a  veto,  sending  the  legislation  back  to  the  National 
Assembly for a second hearing. In January the National Assembly overruled the Presidential veto and 
the law entered into force.78  

With the new legislation in force the new anti-corruption agency79 was formally established, through a 
merger of existing structures. The law ensured a seamless transition with the staff and resources of the 
pre-existing  institutions  automatically  incorporated  into  the  new  structure.  In  March  2018,  the 
National  Assembly  elected  the  chair  of  the  former  Commission  for  illegal  asset  forfeiture  as  the  
director  of  the  new  agency.80  The  deputy  director  as  well  as  remaining  three  members  of  the 

political ends. The post of chairman was never filled and remained vacant in subsequent years, as did another 
seat  on  the  five  member  board,  with  the  result  that  all  decisions  of  the  commission  required  a  unanimous 
decision of the remaining three members.   

76   Originally, the new institution  would incorporate  the  Commission  for the Prevention and Ascertainment of 
Conflicts of Interest, the centre for the prevention of corruption and organised crime (BORKOR), the anti-
corruption directorate of the State Agency for National Security and the part of the National Audit Office in 
charge of the verification of asset declarations for high level public officials. In the final version presented by 
the  current  government  in  autumn  2017,  the  Commission  for  Illicit  Asset  Forfeiture  was  also  included, 
significantly raising the profile of the new agency.  

77   As  the  agency  was  not  allowed  to  act  on  anonymous  alerts,  the  issue  of  whistleblower  protection  had 
particular  relevance.  On  the  issue  of  politicisation,  this  concern  has  notably  been  raised  by  opposition 
politicians. The main opposition party in the National Assembly had presented its own proposals under which 
the management would be appointed by the President of the Republic. Others have however pointed out that 
the  President of the Republic is also a political figure and that no procedure can be entirely without risk of 
politicisation. 

78   The President can veto legislation once but cannot oppose a law that has been reconfirmed by an additional 

vote in the National Assembly.  

79   The agency is formally named the Commission for Counteracting Corruption and Illegal Assets Forfeiture. 
80   The  procedure  was  transparent  and  featured  an  open  contest  between  two  qualified  candidates,  with  the 
successful  candidate  supported  by  the  governing  coalition  and  the  former  acting  chair  of  the  conflict  of 
interest  commission  having  the  support  of  the  main  opposition  party.  The  procedure  involved  the 
presentation  by  both  candidates  of  their  personal  concepts  for  the  work  of  the  new  agency  as  well  as  an 
opportunity  for  civil  society  to  raise  questions,  which  served  as  a  basis  for  a  public  hearing  in  the  anti-
corruption and parliamentary ethics committee of the National Assembly, followed by the vote in plenary on 
8 March. The Director is elected for a term of 6 years.   

15 

 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
management were subsequently confirmed by the National Assembly on a proposal of the director.81 
By the end of April the transition was largely complete.  

The  new  anti-corruption  agency  has  a  wide  mandate.  One  key  responsibility  is  the  verification  of 
personal  interest  and  asset  declarations  of  about  15,000  high-level  officials,  including  ministers, 
mayors  and  key  civil  servants,  as  well  as  conducting  administrative  investigations  into  alleged 
misconduct by such officials in the course of their duties. The agency has the authority to use special 
investigatory means, including covert surveillance operations.82 While it does not have the status as a 
criminal  investigatory  agency,  it  may  be  requested  by  the  Prosecutor’s  Office  to  assist  in  the 
investigation  of  corruption  cases  by  verifying  circumstances  and  collecting  information.  It  does  not 
have the power to carry out arrests or other police activities.  

Another  major  area  of  activity  for  the  new  agency  will  be  the  promotion  of  general  corruption 
prevention  throughout  the  public  administration  and  the  wider  society.  As  such,  it  will  be  working 
closely  with  the  National  Anti-corruption  Policies  Council,  which  remains  the  main  forum  for  the 
coordination and development of government policy in the area.83  

Finally, the agency takes over the responsibilities of the former asset forfeiture commission in the area 
of  the  seizure  and  confiscation  of  criminally  acquired  assets.  The  new  law  has  incorporated  all  the 
main features of the previous legislation on asset forfeiture, including the ability to confiscate assets 
through  a  civil  law  procedure  (non-conviction  based  confiscation)  as  well  as  the  relevant  staff  and 
resources. These functions are also managed under the authority of an especially assigned member of 
the management.  

The  anti-corruption  agency  has  now  been  in  operation  for  little  over  half  a  year.  The  transfer  of  a 
number  of  separate  organisational  entities  into  a  single  institution  has  reportedly  been  finalised 
without major incident or interruptions in the work. A wide range of agreements have been concluded 
with relevant counterparts in order to ensure continued cooperation with the various institutions and 
access to relevant information.  

A number of difficult challenges will have to be addressed by the new agency as it begins developing 
a track record. The success of the new agency over the longer term will depend on its ability to draw 
synergies  between  the  different  parts,  the  idea  behind  the  new  agency  being  that  bringing  together 
these  pre-existing  structures  should  result  in  improved  efficiency  and  effectiveness  while  also 
enhancing  coordination  within  the  corruption  prevention  system,  as  well  as  visibility  towards  the 
society at large.  

Apart from the evident challenge of effectively managing an institution with such a wide remit, while 
at the same time being able to focus on key priorities, another challenge will be to establish a track 
record and a reputation for neutrality and impartiality. As an element of transparency, the law provides 
that  the  agency  is  to  be  accountable  towards  the  National  Assembly,  which  can  request  its 
management  to  appear  and  to  provide  information  on  its  activities. The  agency  will  also  publish  an 
annual  activity  report.84  As  some  stakeholders  have  voiced  concerns  over  possible  attempts  to  exert 
political  or  other  undue  influence  on  the  agency’s  work,  a  key  challenge  for  the  agency  will  be  to 

81   The deputy director and remaining three members of the commission heading the agency are nominated by 
the Director and confirmed by the National Assembly in a procedure similar to the procedure for the election 
of the Director, with a public hearing in committee followed by a plenary vote.  

82   These  are  conducted  under  the  authority  of  the  directorate  that  was  transferred  from  the  State  Agency  for 
National  Security,  which  was  also  responsible  for  carrying  out  such  investigations  under  the  previous 
institutional set-up. It works under the direction of the deputy director of the agency and its staff has a special 
status, similar to that of agents of the State Agency for National Security.  

83   It  is  chaired  by  a  national  anti-corruption  coordinator,  currently  the  deputy  Prime  Minister  for  judicial 
reform,  and  brings  together  all  the  main  institutions  involved  in  anti-corruption  work  together  with 
representatives of civil society.  

84   The first activity report is expected in spring 2019. 

16 

 
                                                           
ensure transparency and trust around its work, in full respect of the necessary confidentiality around 
sources and concrete investigations.85  

Recommendation 10: Adopt and implement a reform of the law on public administration to strengthen 
the internal inspectorates in the public administration. 

The network of internal inspectorates within national ministries play a pivotal role in preventing and 
detecting corruption within the State administration in Bulgaria. A key element envisaged in the anti-
corruption strategy adopted in 2015 was the strengthening of these structures through a clearer legal 
framework and better coordination. Legislative amendments to this effect were adopted in the autumn 
of 2017 after two years of preparation.  

The new legal framework is currently being implemented, based on a government ordinance adopted 
in  June  2018.  It  provides  for  clearer  rules  and  standards  regarding  the  number  of  inspectorates, 
minimum  requirements  for  staff,  functions  of  inspectorates,  rights  and  obligations  of  inspectors, 
reporting and planning of inspections and transparency of results towards the public.86  

Under the new rules the content of inspections is more clearly regulated, as are the requirements for 
any  follow-up  by  the  services  concerned  on  recommendations  given  on  the  basis  of  the  inspection. 
Furthermore, the chief inspectorate, reporting directly to the Prime Minister’s Office, is given a formal 
coordinating role, with the authority to provide guidance and assess the work of other inspectorates. 
The  implementation  of  these  new  rules  should  provide  a  more  coherent  and  coordinated  approach 
across the State administration. Implementation is ongoing. Notably, competitions for additional staff 
for the inspectorates are in preparation for early 2019 in order to boost the number of inspectors in line 
with the new standards.87 Additional specialised training programmes for inspectors are also being put 
in place in connection with the implementation of the new law. 

With  the  reform  of  the  general  anti-corruption  legislative  framework  adopted  at  the  beginning  of 
201888,  the  inspectorates  were  given  important  new  responsibilities  in  regard  to  the  verification  of 
interest and asset declarations as well as the assessment of concrete instances of potential conflicts of 
interest for staff at lower levels within the State administration. The new rules constitute a significant 
extension of the requirement to declare interest and assets, which now apply to all public officials.89  
The  need  to  carry  out  related  verifications  may  require  additional  staff  to  be  assigned  to  the 
inspectorates  as  well  as  appropriate  methodologies  for  their  practical  implementation.  General  rules 
were set out in a government ordinance in September 2018, which provides that verifications should 
follow  a  risk-based  approach,  in  accordance  with  a  methodology  to  be  developed  by  the  new  anti-
corruption agency.90  

85   A recent law enforcement operation where the agency was involved drew criticism for alleged violations of 
the  rights  of  individuals  concerned.  Questions  have  also  been  raised  about  the  extent  to  which  the  agency 
should be obliged to publicly explain decisions not to open an investigation on the basis of an alert from the 
public.  

86   Reportedly the practice on such issues varied widely between ministries in the past.  
87   The  ordinance  sets  minimum  standards  for  the  staff  numbers  in  inspectorates,  based  on  the  size  of  the 
administration they are covering. In some cases, such as the Ministry of Interior, these standards will require 
a significant increase in the number of inspectors. 

88   See under recommendation 9 above.  
89   The requirement for all government staff to submit such declarations is new. The anti-corruption agency is 
only responsible for the verification of declarations of the approximately 15,000 high level officials defined 
in  the  law.  Remaining  staff  will  be  covered  by  the  relevant  government  bodies  themselves.  For  the  State 
administration,  this  task  falls  to  the  inspectorates.  Concerns  have  been  raised  in  this  regard  about  the  very 
wide  scope  of  the  new  requirements,  which,  depending  on  the  method  of  verification,  may  pose  a  very 
extensive administrative burden on the public administration. 

90   This should help ensure a more effective use of the limited resources at the disposal of the inspectorates in 
regard to this new task, as the inspectorates will not have to systematically verify all declarations, as is the 
case  for  those  of  high  level  officials,  but  can  concentrate  of  high-risk  categories  of  staff.  Rules  also  differ 

17 

 
                                                           
 
Recommendation 11: Building on the analysis of past cases, establish a roadmap between all relevant 
institutions  to  address  shortcomings  in  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of  high-level  corruption 
cases, including a mechanism for the reporting of progress to the wider public. 

An  effective  anti-corruption  system  needs  to  cover  the  whole  chain  of  prevention,  detection, 
investigation, prosecution, and adjudication in the courts. The criminal justice system forms a key part 
of any successful strategy. The challenges facing Bulgaria in this area  have to a large extent already 
been mentioned under benchmarks 2 and 3 above. Nevertheless, due to the importance of corruption in 
the  Bulgarian  context,  this  recommendation  aimed  at  ensuring  a  specific  focus  on  this  particular 
challenge. The response by the Bulgarian authorities was set out in a separate roadmap in 2017 and 
included measures ranging from consideration of possible legislative changes to initiatives of a more 
managerial  nature  such  as  revamping  training  and  strengthening  the  units  dealing  with  the 
investigation and prosecution of corruption cases.91  

Implementation  of  the  envisaged  measures  are  at  various  stages  of  completion.  They  include,  as 
already  mentioned, the  strengthening  of  the  specialised  prosecutor’s  office  for  organised crime  with 
additional  prosecutorial  and  investigative  staff,  as  well  as  the  development  of  agreed  modalities  for 
close  cooperation  of  the  prosecution  with  all  the  various  relevant  agencies,  including  the  organised 
crime directorate of the Ministry of Interior, the new anti-corruption agency, the public inspectorates, 
tax and customs agencies, and the State Agency for National Security.92 In addition, a wide range of 
training initiatives have been launched for the relevant staff.  

Finally, various options for legislative follow-up have been analysed, with some proposals still under 
consideration.93  Although  legal  barriers  may  be  important  in  some  instances,  it  seems  clear  that 
legislative amendments on their own will not provide a full solution to the challenges hampering the 
effective  investigation  and  prosecution  of  corruption  in  Bulgaria.  These  challenges  will  also  require 
continued efforts by all the relevant institutions and agencies, to raise motivation and trust among staff 
and to improve the environment for effective cooperation.94  

Recommendation  12:  Establish  a  mechanism  for  public  reporting  on  progress  in  high-level 
[corruption] cases which are in the public domain. General Prosecution to report – whilst respecting 
the  presumption  of  innocence  –  on  investigations  and  indictments.  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation and 
Ministry of Justice to report on convictions as well as the enforcement of sentences. 

An important step in regard to the development of a track record of investigations into allegations of 
high-level  corruption  is  to  ensure  public  accountability  and  transparency  around  such  investigations 
and  the  related  judicial  proceedings.  This  recommendation  aims  at  facilitating  public  access  to 
information about corruption cases and court proceedings, in full respect of fundamental rights.  

The November 2017 report already noted the establishment of a public website at the Supreme Court 
of  Cassation  presenting  information  on  ongoing  court  proceedings,  based  on  reporting  from  the 
various  appellate  regions.  The  report  also  noted  the  already  existing  accounting  mechanisms  in  the 
form  of  annual  reports  and  regular  relations  with  the  media.  The  National  Anti-corruption  Policy 

from  those  applicable  to  high  level  officials  in  terms  of  penalties  and  public  access  to  the  information 
gathered.  

91   SWD(2017) 700, p. 14-15. 
92   While parts of the State Agency for National Security has been transferred to the new anti-corruption agency, 
the security agency continues to play an important role, notably in providing intelligence for financial crime 
investigations through its  financial intelligence directorate.  One of the issues  highlighted in  the analysis of 
the  Prosecutors  Office  by  independent  experts  in  2016  concerned  the  follow-up  by  law  enforcement  to 
intelligence reports from the financial intelligence directorate.  

93   The  legislative  changes  under  consideration  largely  overlap  with  those  already  discussed  above  under 
benchmark  2  and  3,  including  in  response  to  the  independent  analysis  of  the  prosecution  service  and  the 
analysis of the follow-up to cases at the European Court for Human Rights. 

94   This also concerns the relations between prosecution offices and courts.   

18 

 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Council has also published summary information gathered from prosecution and courts on its website. 
More  recently,  the  Council  has  initiated  the  development  of  more  elaborate  standards  for  the 
presentation of this information and is exploring the possibility of establishing a more comprehensive 
reporting mechanism based on automatic retrieval of information from the unified information system 
handling  criminal  cases.95  Ultimately,  the  aim  is  to  present  information  on  the  whole  chain  from 
prosecution over court procedures and to enforcement in a single place. 

The Bulgarian authorities report that a number of large scale investigations are underway and several 
cases concerning former high-level officials have entered the trial phase. A limited number of cases 
have  led  to  final  convictions  in  court.96    Significant  cases  of  organised  corruption  that  are  being 
investigated by the authorities have recently appeared in the public domain.97 

Benchmark 5: Take further measures to prevent and fight corruption, in particular at the 
borders and within local government 

Recommendation  13:  Carry  out  an  external  review  of  the  ex  ante  checks  of  public  procurement 
procedures and their follow-up, including ex post checks, as well as on cases of conflicts of interest or 
corruption discovered and remedial measures taken to address identified shortcomings. 

In November 2017 the Bulgarian authorities launched a review of the public procurement system, with 
assistance  from  the  World  Bank.98  The  project  includes  a  component  which  will  assess  the  overall 
institutional capacity of the national Public Procurement Agency with particular attention paid to the 
agency’s  functions  related  to  ex  ante  checks  on  public  procurement  procedures.  The  project,  which 
also includes a broader assessment of the entire system, is expected to be completed in early 2019 and 
result  in  concrete  recommendations  for  follow-up  by  the  Bulgarian  authorities.  Serious  risks  of 
corruption in public procurement continue to be a concern in regard to Bulgaria.99 

Recommendation 14:  Put in place risk-based measures to address low-level corruption in high risk 
sectors within the public administration, taking inspiration from what has been done in the Ministry of 
Interior. Continue the efforts in the Ministry of Interior. 

As  noted  in  the  November  2017  report,  the  sectorial  anti-corruption  plans  were  made  subject  to  a 
general  review  in  the  autumn  of  2017  in  order  to  assess  their  effectiveness  and  identify  ways  of 
improving  the  overall  system.  Based  on  this  review,  the  National  Anti-corruption  Policy  Council 
agreed a set of comprehensive guidelines for such plans in early spring 2018. The guidelines set out an 
agreed framework for the implementation of such plans in a regular cycle involving the adoption of 
the  plan  by  the  respective  minister  at  the  beginning  of  the  year  and  regular  reporting  on  its 
implementation. The plans are drawn up and implemented within each ministry under the supervision 
of  working  groups  chaired  by  a  deputy  minister  and  composed  of  the  internal  inspectorates  and 
specialised  department  heads,  together  with  high  level  officials for  legal  affairs,  public  procurement 
and general administration.  

New sectorial anti-corruption plans were finalised by all Ministries under the new guidelines in March 
2018  and  submitted  to  the  National  Anti-corruption  Policy  Council,  which  is  in  charge  of  overall 

95   The  decision  to  move  ahead  on  this  is  still  to  be  made  pending  a  study  on  the  technical  feasibility  of 

developing such a mechanism. 

96   The  Prosecutor’s  Office  reports  a  significant  number  of  high-level  officials  being  charged  with  corruption 
offences  in  the  first  half  of  2018,  including  one  minister,  two  deputy  ministers,  and  several  mayors. 
Indictments have been rendered in court for one member of parliament, three ministers, two deputy ministers, 
and  several  mayors.  A  number  of  cases  have  also  recently  resulted  in  convictions,  including  six  cases 
involving mayors. 

97   This  includes  alleged  large  scale  organised  fraud  involving  State  officials  in  the  granting  of  Bulgarian 

citizenship to foreigners against the payment of bribes.  

98   The project is financed by the European Social Fund (Operational Programme “Good Governance”).  
99   Recent revelations by investigative journalists concerning possible massive frauds targeting procurement in 

EU funded programmes are currently being investigated by law enforcement. 

19 

 
                                                           
coordination  and  evaluation  of  progress.100  The  plans  cover  a  wide  range  of  risk  areas  such  as  the 
management of public funds, procurement, provision of administrative services, concessions, granting 
of licences and permits, registration regimes etc. and should provide for measures to address any risks 
identified in the respective areas. Concrete measures already taken have a strong emphasis on training 
of personnel, especially in management positions and potential risk areas. In addition, a wide range of 
organisational  measures  have  been  taken  in  various  sectors  such  as  rotation  of  personnel,101 
introduction  of  electronic  services,  dissemination  of  information  to  staff  and  private  interlocutors  to 
facilitate compliance, and mechanisms to gather feedback from stakeholders.102 

Particular  attention  continues  to  be  given  to  the  prevention  of  corruption  within  the  Ministry  of 
Interior and at the  borders.  Measures already  in  use  include  rotation  of  personnel in  sensitive  posts, 
video-surveillance103 and the expansion of the use of electronic services.104 A new system of integrity 
checks for Ministry of Interior personnel is planned to be implemented over the coming months.105 In 
addition, a special department is being set up to deal with interest and asset declarations and options 
for  electronic  processing  of  the  declarations  are  being  explored.106  Measures  implemented  by  the 
Ministry of Interior as well as the Customs Authorities to specifically address corruption at the borders 
also include mobile checks behind the border as well as information flyers and hotlines for the public 
to report irregularities.107  

Recommendation  15:  Establish  a  mechanism  for  public  reporting  on  the  implementation  of  the 
national anti-corruption strategy covering the remaining duration of the Strategy's implementation. 

The November 2017 report mentions the continued operation of the National Anti-corruption Policies 
Council,  which  is  responsible  for  the  overall  coordination  and  evaluation  of  progress  under  the 
national  anti-corruption  strategy.  In  2018  the  composition  of  the  council  was  expanded  to  include 
deputy  chairs  of  the  supreme  courts  as  well  as  the  deputy  of  the  new  anti-corruption  authority.  In 
addition,  the  civil  council  attached  to  it  is  expanded  from  9  to  11  members  and  allowing  for  the 
participation  of  business  associations  in  addition  to  general  civil  society  organisations.  At  the  same 
time, rules were adopted for a more transparent selection of representatives from civil society, based 
on a regular rotation of membership.  

100  In addition, under the new law adopted at the beginning of 2018, the new anti-corruption agency is expected 
to play a role in terms of analysing existing anti-corruption measures and proposing possible improvements.   
101  For  example  the  customs  agency  applies  an  extensive  system  of  random  rotation  of  personnel  in  order  to 

prevent opportunities for the development of corrupt practices at local level.  

102  The  National  Revenue  Agency  has  for  example  established  a  coordination  council  with  employers’ 
associations and other private stakeholders to discuss challenges related to tax compliance, which covers the 
issue of how to address possible corruption risks. 

103  Video cameras have been installed in traffic and security police cars and at border check points. 
104  The Ministry of Interior is delivering 37 percent of its services electronically and has an objective of reaching 

50 per cent. This covers for example the electronic administration of fines.  

105  This project drew on experience sharing by counterparts in the United Kingdom in particular.  
106  In the Ministry of Interior the requirement for all personnel to submit personal interest and asset declarations 
will cover up to 40,000 people and will require electronic processing in order for the system to be effective, 
allowing  inspectors  to  focus  on  problematic  cases.  The  Ministry  is  looking  at  experience  in  other  Member 
States to gather inspiration in this area. 

107  The  authorities acknowledge  a continued challenge in this  area but consider that  the extent of the problem 
has reduced since a peak around 2015. Multilingual teams have been put in place and there is an objective to 
react to alerts within 24 hours, also involving the Prosecutor’s Office where necessary. One challenge in this 
respect  has  apparently  been  linked  to  the  fact  that  many  irregularities  are  only  reported  once  the  victim  - 
often  transiting  through  Bulgaria  -  has  returned  to  his  or  her  country  of  residence.  This  delay  complicates 
effective follow-up.  

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The  council  continues  adopting  annual  progress  reports  on  the  implementation  of  the  national  anti-
corruption  strategy  from  2015  and  monitoring  the  implementation  of  anti-corruption  measures 
throughout the public administration.108    

Benchmark 6: Implement a  strategy to fight organised crime, focussing on serious crime, 
money laundering as well as on the systematic confiscation of assets of criminals. Report 
on new and ongoing investigations in these areas 

Recommendation  16:  Establish  a  mechanism  for  public  reporting  on  progress  in  high-level 
[organised  crime]  cases  which  are  in  the  public  domain.  General  Prosecution  to  report  –  whilst 
respecting  the  presumption  of  innocence  –  on  investigations  and  indictments.  Supreme  Court  of 
Cassation and Ministry of Justice to report on convictions as well as the enforcement of sentences. 

The measures taken by Bulgaria to develop a system for the systematic reporting of progress on high-
level corruption cases, as set out under recommendation 12 above, also cover reporting on organised 
crime cases. Implementation of this recommendation is therefore at a similar stage as described above.  

The January 2017 report acknowledged a general change in the overall crime picture over the ten years 
to  2017109  as  well  as  the  ability  of  the  specialised  court  and  prosecution  office,  set  up  in  2012,  to 
establish  the  beginning  of  a  track  record  of  final  convictions  in  serious  organised  crime  cases.  The 
authorities report that the institutions continue to consolidate their track record in this area.110  

Recommendation 17: Adopt the necessary amendments to the law on confiscation of criminal assets 
and ensure the Illegal Asset Forfeiture Commission continues to operate independently and efficiently. 

As noted in the November 2017 report, the relevant legislative amendments have been implemented. 
In  the  meantime,  a  new  comprehensive  reform  of  the  legislative  framework  for  the  fight  against 
corruption  in  Bulgaria  was  adopted  in  January  2018,  which  incorporates  the  pre-existing  law  on 
confiscation of criminal assets and integrates the former asset forfeiture commission in a new unified 
anti-corruption agency.  

As regards confiscation of criminal assets, the new law retains the main features of the previous legal 
framework111, and the administration of the former commission has been effectively incorporated into 
the new agency in a manner which appears to have ensured continuity in its functions. Data for 2018 
do  not  so  far  indicate  any  adverse  impact  on  the  relevant  proceedings  and  the  Bulgarian  authorities 
have reported no complications linked to the introduction of the new legal or institutional framework.   

108  See also recommendation 14 above. 
109  The  Bulgarian  economy  and  society  remains  vulnerable  to  infiltration  by  organised  crime  for  a  number  of 
reasons, but there has been a clear improvement compared to the situation in the mid-2000s, notably in terms 
of the level of open violence associated with organised crime gangs.  

110  In  the  first  half  of  2018,  the  Specialised  Prosecutor’s  Office  obtained  104  convictions  in  cases  involving 
organised crime and initiated 100 new pre-trial proceedings. For the entire 2017, the corresponding figures 
are 261 convictions and 162 newly initiated pre-trial proceedings. 

111  The  Commission  addressed  on  8  November  2018  a  reasoned  opinion  to  Bulgaria  for  not  having  fully 
communicated  the  national  measures  taken  to  implement  Directive  2014/42/EU.  Bulgaria  should  have 
implemented the Directive by 4 October 2016. 

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