REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the implementation of the EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change
Date: 2018-11-12
Institutions: Directorate-General for Climate Action, European Commission
Subjects: EU financing, EU strategy, adaptation to climate change, climate change, common agricultural policy, common fisheries policy, environmental cooperation, investment, migration policy, natural disaster

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 12.11.2018 COM(2018) 738 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the implementation of the EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change {SEC(2018) 472 final} - {SWD(2018) 460 final} - {SWD(2018) 461 final}  
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Three  out  of  four  European  citizens  consider  climate  change  to  be  a  very  serious 
problem. The changes observed in climate are already having wide-ranging impacts 
on ecosystems, economic sectors, human health and well-being in Europe. The total 
reported economic losses caused by weather and other  climate-related  extremes in 
Europe  in  1980–2016  amounted  to  over  EUR  436  billion  and  were  distributed 
between EU Member States the following way1: 

Total losses 

Losses per capita 

Germany
Italy
France
United Kingdom
Spain
Poland
Austria
Romania
Czech Republic
Denmark
Netherlands
Greece
Portugal
Hungary
Sweden
Belgium
Ireland
Croatia
Bulgaria
Finland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Cyprus
Latvia
Estonia
Malta

Losses per km² 
Germany
Italy
France
United Kingdom
Spain
Poland
Austria
Romania
Czech Republic
Denmark
Netherlands
Greece
Portugal
Hungary
Sweden
Belgium
Ireland
Croatia
Bulgaria
Finland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Cyprus
Latvia
Estonia
Malta

100

50

0

0

1000

2000

0

100

200

300

Billion euro (2016 prices) 

Euro per capita (2016 prices) 

'000 euro per km² (2016 prices) 

Due  to  climate  change  alone,  annual  damage  to  Europe’s  critical  infrastructure  could 
increase ten-fold by the  end of the  century  under business-as-usual  scenarios (from the 

1   EEA Report No 15/2017, “Climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction in Europe” (2017), 
updated in 2018 as part of the EEA indicator on 'Impacts of extreme weather and climate related 
events in the EEA member countries'. Differences in damages between countries are partially a result 
of differing levels of reporting among the countries surveyed. It must be noted that over 70% of the 
damages are caused by only 3% of all reported events. 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
current  EUR 3.4 billion  to  EUR 34 billion)2.  Losses would be  highest  for the industry, 
transport and energy sectors. 

Expected annual damage to critical infrastructure in European regions, due to 
climate change, by the end of the century (million EUR)3 

EAD 
[€ million] 

These maps on damage to critical infrastructure reflect a pattern: in general, climate 
impacts  will  be  unequally  distributed  across  Europe,  both  in  terms  of  when  and 
where they occur. For instance:4 

  The  Mediterranean  area  will  suffer  more  from  the  effects  of  heat-related 
human mortality, water restrictions, habitat loss, energy demand for cooling 
and forest fires.  

  Coastal regions, under a high-emissions scenario (between 3.2 ºC and 5.4 °C 
global temperature increase in 2 081–2 100)5, may suffer economic losses of 
around EUR 39 billion per year by 2050 and up to EUR 960 billion per year 
towards the end of the century6. 

  Preliminary  evidence  points  to  a  substantial  contraction  of  Alpine  tundra 
ecosystems in Europe, even if global warming stays within the 2ºC limit of 
the Paris Agreement. Apart from having a key role in water regulation and 
freshwater for human consumption, Alpine tundra sustains tourism and rural 
communities and it is also home to endemic species only found in Europe. 

The fires in Sweden last summer show that, beyond modelling and projections, no 
European country is protected from the consequences of climate change. 

2   Forzieri et al. (2018), 'Escalating impacts of climate extremes on critical infrastructures in Europe' 
Global Environmental Change 48 97–107. Study from the European Commission’s Joint Research 
Centre. 

3   Forzieri et al. (2018), 'Escalating impacts of climate extremes on critical infrastructures in Europe' 

Global Environmental Change 48 97–107. 

4   The following are results from the work of the European Commission’s PESETA project, 

https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/peseta  

5   Combination of IPCC scenarios RCP8.5 – SSP5. 
6   Vousdoukas et al. (2018), "Climatic and socioeconomic controls of future coastal flood risk in 

Europe", Nature Climate Change 8: 776–780. 

2 

 
 
                                                 
Evidence  is  growing  that  Europe  is  also  vulnerable  to  climate  change  impacts 
beyond  its  borders  through,  for  example,  trade,  international  financial  flows, 
migration7  and  security.  Climate  risk  operates  across  boundaries,  because  of  the 
myriad  of  complex  and  global  interconnections  between  people,  ecosystems  and 
economies.  Approaching  adaptation  as  a  global  public  good  to  tackle  cross-border 
risks may reveal opportunities to strengthen international cooperation on resilience8. 
By helping others adapt, donor countries are also helping themselves. 

The  Commission  has  gathered  some  initial  evidence  on  how  climate  impacts  in 
other parts of the world may affect Europe through international trade (imports and 
exports).  The  map  below  provides  an  assessment  of  losses  of  annual  EU  GDP 
(billion Euros) due to climate impacts in the rest of the world, through international 
trade. The figures inserted in the different regions reflect losses in a high-emissions 
scenario  (in  red)  and  a  2ºC  world  (in  blue)  by  the  end  of  the  century.  Only  four 
sectors are included in the assessment: labour productivity, agriculture, energy and 
river floods.  

Impacts on annual EU GDP (billion Euros) due to climate impacts in the rest of 
the world, via international trade (imports and exports)9  

2°C 

High 

0.1bn 

0.3bn 

1.0bn 

3.0bn 

5.0bn 

The magnitude of these cross-border trade effects depends on two factors:  

1.  the severity of climate impacts in the rest of the world's regions; and  
2.  the volume of trade between those regions and the EU10.  

The map shows that the EU would be most affected by impacts in the Americas and 
south  Asia.  Among  the  four  assessed  sectors,  the  one  that  channels  most  of  the 
cross-border effects is agriculture, followed by labour productivity.  For instance, if 
climate change reduces yields from an EU agricultural trading partner, that partner’s 
GDP  will  decrease,  which  means  (among  other  consequences)  that  it  will  import 

7  

“Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe 2016, EEA Report No 1/2017”, European 
Environment Agency, 2017. 

8   See, for instance, Benzie et al (2018), “Meeting the global challenge of adaptation by addressing 

transboundary climate risk: A joint collaboration between SEI, IDDRI, and ODI. Discussion Brief”. 
Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm. 

9   Source: European Commission, 2018 – JRC PESETA project. 
10   Public  adaptation  is  not  modelled  and  may  reduce  the  negative  impact  of  climate  change  in  third 

countries.  

3 

 
 
                                                 
fewer products from (among others) the EU. This in turn will also lower the EU’s 
GDP.11  It  is  clear  however  that  impacts  could  also  come  from  supply  chain 
disruptions  in  EU  imports,  from  damages  to  other  sectors,  and  from  further 
structural changes not assessed in this research. 

On climate and migration, recent scenarios confirm a relationship between climate 
change12 and fluctuations in asylum applications in the EU. Even under a moderate 
emissions scenario13, asylum applications are projected to increase by 28 % due to 
climate impacts by the end of the century (an average of 98 000 additional asylum 
applications per year). 

Adaptation is about solutions and preparedness for these domestic and international 
challenges.  It  means  anticipating  the  above-mentioned  adverse  effects  of  climate 
change  and  taking  appropriate  action  to  prevent  or  minimise  the  damage  they  can 
cause, or taking advantage of opportunities that may arise.  

In 2005, the Commission began to consider the need to adapt to changes in Europe’s 
climate.  As  a  result,  a  White  Paper14  was  adopted  in  2009,  and  an  EU  adaptation 
strategy ('the strategy') in 201315.  

At  the  time  the  strategy  was  developed,  the  economic,  environmental  and  social 
costs of inaction for the EU, for a number of sectors of the economy, were estimated 
at EUR 100 billion a year in 2020 and at EUR 250 billion a year in 205016. Current 
estimates seem to indicate that the cost of inaction could increase exponentially by 
the  2080s17.  The  current  economic  models  of  the  aggregate  global  impacts  of 
climate  change  may  be  inadequate  in  their  treatment  of  sectors,  integration  of 
impacts  on  the  physical  environment,  ecosystems,  biodiversity  and  their  services, 
uncertainty and tipping-points. Models may well underestimate future risks18.  

The strategy includes eight actions working towards three specific objectives: 

1.  To increase the resilience of EU countries, regions and cities. 

2.  To better inform decision-making on adaptation. 

11   The  methodology  of  the  JRC  PESETA  III  study  (multi-sector,  multi-region  general  equilibrium) 
accounts also for other economic and trade-related effects, such as higher EU agriculture exports and 
production (which would raise EU GDP) due to increasing agriculture prices in the rest of the world, 
and substitution of more expensive imports from one trading partner to another (trade diversion). The 
estimated net effect is a reduction in EU GDP. 

12   Missirian et al. (2017), 'Asylum applications respond to temperature fluctuations', Science 358, 1610–

1614,. 

13   IPCC scenario RCP 4.5. 
14   Adapting to climate change: Towards a European framework for action. COM (2009) 147 final: 

https://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_threats/climate/docs/com_2009_147_en.pdf    

15    An EU strategy on adaptation to climate change. COM (2013) 0216 final:  
       https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/adaptation/what_en#tab-0-1  
16    'Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe 2012, EEA Report No 12/2012', European 

Environment Agency, 2012. 

17   COACCH (CO-designing the Assessment of Climate CHange costs): http://www.coacch.eu/  
18   Stoerk T, Wagner G, Ward R E T (2018); Recommendations for Improving the Treatment of Risk and 
Uncertainty in Economic Estimates of Climate Impacts in the Sixth Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change Assessment Report, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 12: 371-376, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/rey005 

4 

 
                                                 
3.  To increase the resilience of key vulnerable sectors and EU policies. 

From 2013, the Commission has pursued those three goals across a broad range of 
its activities. They continue to guide the Commission’s work today. 

The  report  examines  the  process  and  the  results  of  the  evaluation  of  the  strategy, 
including the lessons-learned from its implementation so far. 

2.  PROCESS 

The  strategy  stated  that,  in  2017,  the  Commission  should  report  to  the  European 
Parliament and the Council on the state of implementation and propose a review, if 
needed. This is the context of this report, along with its accompanying staff working 
document (SWD) detailing the results of the evaluation. 

In  line  with  the  Commission’s  better  regulation  guidelines,  the  evaluation  was 
carried out according to five criteria: (i) effectiveness, (ii) efficiency, (iii) relevance, 
(iv) coherence and (v) EU added value. A thorough assessment according to these 
criteria can be found in the accompanying staff working document. 

Evidence  was  gathered  mainly  through  contractors,  who  performed  a  literature 
review, a targeted survey, a public survey, interviews, workshops and case studies.  

In addition, the Commission based its analysis on several sources, either consulted 
directly  or  integrated  by  means  of  the  contractor’s  report,  e.g.  other  evaluations 
linked  to  actions  under  the  strategy19,  national  strategies  from  Member  States, 
information  provided  by  Member  States  under  the  Monitoring  Mechanism 
Regulation20,  reports  for  programmes  funded  by  the  European  Structural  and 
Investment  Funds  (ESIF)21  since  2014  and  results  of  research  and  innovation 
projects financed by the EU framework programmes.  

3.  RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION 

Overall, the strategy has delivered on its objectives, with progress recorded against 
each of its eight individual actions, which are:  

1.  Encourage all Member States to adopt comprehensive adaptation strategies. 
2.  Provide LIFE22 programme funding to support capacity building and step up 

adaptation action in Europe. 

3.  Introduce adaptation in the Covenant of Mayors23. 

19   E.g. evaluations of LIFE (SWD (2017) 355, https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/mid-term-

evaluation-life-programme_en) and Climate-ADAPT (EEA Report No 3/2018, 
https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/sharing-adaptation-information-across-europe/). 

20   Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on a 

mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and for reporting other information 
at national and Union level relevant to climate change and repealing Decision No 280/2004/EC  
21   For  the  2014-2020  period,  this  includes  the  three  cohesion  policy  funds,  i.e.  the  European  Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF), the Cohesion Fund (CF) and the European Social Fund (ESF), as well as 
the  European  Agricultural  Fund  for  Rural  Development  (EAFRD)  and  the  European  Maritime  and 
Fisheries Fund (EMFF). 

22   http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/ 

5 

 
                                                 
4.  Bridge the knowledge gap. 
5.  Further  develop  Climate-ADAPT24  as  the  one-stop  shop  for  adaptation 

information in Europe. 

6.  Enable the climate proofing of the common agricultural policy, the cohesion 

policy and the common fisheries policy. 

7.  Ensure more resilient infrastructure. 
8.  Promote insurance and other financial products for resilient investment and 

business decisions. 

Between 2013  and 2018, the number of Member States with  a national  adaptation 
strategy  went  from  15  to  25.  The  EU  has  been  promoting  and  monitoring  action 
through  LIFE  projects  and  the  Covenant  of  Mayors  for  Climate  and  Energy  ('the 
Covenant  of  Mayors').  The  strategy  has  contributed  to  improve  adaptation 
knowledge  and  to  share  it  to  inform  decision-making.  Through  the  strategy, 
adaptation has permeated and guided a wide range of the EU’s own key policies and 
funding programmes, and reinforced links with disaster risk reduction, infrastructure 
resilience and the financial sector. 

3.1.  Relevance 

Since the adoption of the strategy, evidence has continued to increase that weather 
and  other  climate-related  extremes  are  becoming  more  frequent  and  intense  in 
Europe.  Current  emission  reduction  commitments  under  the  Paris  Agreement25 
would  result  in  global  warming  beyond  3  °C  over  pre-industrial  times.  Therefore, 
building  up  the  EU’s  resilience  against  climate  shocks  is  imperative,  in  order  to 
limit short, medium and long-term economic, social and environmental costs. 

The  consequences  of  climate  change  will  significantly  affect  a  wide  range  of  the 
EU’s  population.  Both  public  authorities  and  private  stakeholders  (households, 
companies, investors) will need to consider preventive actions. Therefore, the initial 
objectives  of  the  strategy  to  better  inform  decision-making  and  increase  resilience 
across Europe remain relevant and should continue to be pursued. 

Since  2013,  international  policy  developments  such  as  the  Paris  Agreement,  the 
Sustainable  Development  Goals  and  the  Sendai  Framework  on  Disaster  Risk 
Reduction26  have  substantially  reinforced  the  political  momentum  for  supporting 
climate change adaptation across the globe. Climate commitments and Sustainable 
Development  Goals  must  be  advanced  jointly  to  effectively  tackle  the  urgent 
challenges  posed  by  ecosystem  degradation,  climate  impacts,  inequality  rise  and 
political  instability27.  As  the  strategy’s  scope  was  to  focus  on  the  climate  change 
impacts  on  the  EU’s  territory,  it  did  not  address  the  potential  interrelations  with 
climate  change  adaptation  outside  the  EU.  Due  to  lack  of  evidence,  it  also  only 
partially  took  into  account  the  possible  impacts  of  climate  change  outside  Europe 
and their consequences for the EU. 

23   https://www.covenantofmayors.eu/ 
24   https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/ 
25   Nationally  Determined  Contributions  (NDCs).  See  also  UNEP’s  Emissions  Gap  Reports  at: 

https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report 

26   https://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/sendai-framework 
27   See: World Resources Institute: 'Connecting the Dots: Elements for a Joined-Up Implementation of the 

2030 Agenda and Paris Agreement', 2018. 

6 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nevertheless,  today  growing  evidence  points  at  the  need  for  the  EU  to  consider 
climate-security  links  and  cross-boundary  effects  of  adaptation,  or  lack  of 
adaptation, in non-EU countries.  

3.2.  Effectiveness 

The  wide-ranging  objectives  of  the  strategy  have  not  been  completely  fulfilled  in 
five  years,  but  progress  has  been  made.  In  general,  political  attention  has  shifted 
towards adaptation issues and the need to prepare for inevitable impacts. 

At  national  level,  25  Member  States  now  have  an  adaptation  strategy  in  place, 
compared  to  15  in  2013.  LIFE,  since  2014,  has  funded  60  adaptation-related 
projects with EUR 184 million, which after their completion are estimated to impact 
through replication and transfer an area of 1.8 million km2, equivalent to one fourth 
of the EU territory. Through dedicated projects, LIFE is also helping to implement 
national  and  regional  adaptation  strategies  in  Greece  and  Cyprus.  In  addition,  the 
uptake  of  adaptation  strategies  was  accelerated  by  the  European  Structural  and 
Investment Funds (ESIF), which introduced risk assessments, taking climate change 
adaptation  into  account,  as  a  precondition  to  ensure  effective  and  efficient 
spending.28 

For  the  regional  and  local  level,  the  Commission  has  introduced  adaptation  in  the 
Covenant  of  Mayors  and  has  been  raising  awareness,  mobilising  and  supporting 
cities  in  adopting  local  adaptation  strategies.  By  April  2018,  1  076  Covenant 
signatories from 25 EU Member States, covering around 60 million inhabitants, had 
committed to conduct vulnerability and risk assessments, and to develop, implement 
and report on adaptation plans. Across the EU, around 40 % of cities with more than 
150  000  inhabitants  are  estimated  to  have  adopted  adaptation  plans  to  protect 
Europeans from climate impacts29.  

The  evaluation  also  confirms  a  substantial  increase  of  adaptation  knowledge  as  a 
result  of  the  Commission’s  efforts,  notably  through  EU’s  research  and  innovation 
Framework  Programmes  and  also  through  the  European  Climate  Adaptation 
Platform  (Climate-ADAPT).  However,  none  of  the  priority  knowledge  gaps  have 
been closed and new gaps have emerged. Firstly, knowledge gaps were formulated 
in an open-ended way in 2013 (rather than sector-specific questions), which makes 
it  difficult  to  measure  progress.  Secondly,  as  is  often  the  case  for  gaps  in  other 
scientific  fields,  knowledge  may  never  be  complete  and  certain.  Uncertainty, 
however, can be integrated in modelling, transparent and open decision-making: it is 
no excuse for inaction. 

Progress  is  also  clear  on  mainstreaming  in  current  EU  policies  and  programmes. 
There  might  still  be  margin  for  improvements  in  the  integration  of  adaptation  in 
some  EU  common  policies,  such  as  trade  and  fisheries.  For  trade,  there  is  a 
knowledge  gap  on  spill-over  effects  from  third  countries,  the  understanding  of 
which would allow for an effective mainstreaming of adaptation into the EU’s trade 

28   SWD(2017)  127  The  Value  Added  of  Ex  ante  Conditionalities  in  the  European  Structural  and 

Investment Funds 

29   Reckien et al. (2018), 'How are cities planning to respond to climate change? Assessment of local 
climate plans from 885 cities in the EU-28', Journal of Cleaner Production, 26 March 2018. The 
coordinator of the study extracted this figure from the study's database, which included a 
representative sample of the 497 EU cities with more than 150 000 inhabitants. 

7 

 
                                                 
policy. For fisheries, the reasons are largely due to insufficient attention to climate 
adaptation in the related EU fund. 

On  EU  funds,  there  were  variable  degrees  of  mainstreaming  under  the  European 
Structural and Investment Funds: a system for tracking climate-related expenditure 
was  introduced,  but  assessing  to  what  extent  investments  produced  adaptation 
benefits  on  the  ground  was  challenging  at  times.  A  complete  separation  of 
mitigation and adaptation spending is not always possible, due to synergies between 
policies, especially in the agriculture sector. However, under the European Regional 
Development  Fund  (ERDF)  and  Cohesion  Fund  (CF),  a  substantial  amount  of 
funding  can  be  directly  tracked  to  adaptation-related  investments.  In  addition,  the 
current  common  agriculture  policy,  adopted  a  few  months  after  the  adaptation 
strategy,  includes  a  number  of  measures  relevant  for  adaptation  as  well  as  for 
mitigation  (including  certain  cross-compliance  and  greening  requirements)  spread 
across  several  priorities.  Allocations  to  adaptation  in  the  different  funding 
programmes are shown in the table below. 

EU Structural and Investment Funds 2014-2020 - climate related allocations (in € 
billion and % of total) 

EU 
support 

Climate-
related 

Of which 

ERDF and ETC30 

196.7 

37.9 

Direct 
mitigation 
30.8 

Direct 
adaptation 
3.4 

Supportive 
measures for both 
3.6 

[19.3%] 

[15.7%] 

[1.7%] 

[1.8%] 

CF 

63.4 

17.6 

13.4 

3.0 

1.3 

[27.8%] 

[21.1%] 

[4.7%] 

[2.0%] 

ESF31 and Youth 
Employment Initiative 

88.9 

1.2 

1.2 

[1.3%] 

[1.3%] 

EMFF32 

5.7 

1.0 

1.0 

- 

- 

- 

EAFRD33 

99.0 

56.5 

5.4 

7.5 

[18.2%] 

[18.2%] 

Total 

453.7 

114.2 

51.9 

13.9 

[57.1%] 

[5.5%] 

[7.6%] 

- 

- 

- 

43.6 

[44%] 

48.5 

[25.4%] 

[11.4%] 

[3.1%] 

[10.8%] 

30   European Territorial Cooperation: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/cooperation/european-

territorial/ 

31   European Social Fund: http://ec.europa.eu/esf/home.jsp 
32   European Maritime and Fisheries Fund: https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/emff_en The values relate to 

the portion of the EMFF under shared management. 

33   European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development: https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rural-

development-2014-2020_en 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Furthermore, all major projects34 funded by European Regional Development Fund 
and Cohesion Fund are subject to climate proofing in the period 2014-2020, which 
addresses climate resilience through vulnerability and risk assessments followed by 
the identification, assessment and carrying out relevant adaptation actions. 

The  European  Social  Fund  and  European  Maritime  and  Fisheries  Fund  did  not 
specifically  address  TO5  (“Promoting  climate  change  adaptation,  risk  prevention 
and  management”)  in  spite  of  impacts  on  vulnerable  population,  employment  and 
fish  stocks.  The  European  Agricultural  Guarantee  Fund  (EAGF),  which  funds  the 
CAP’s direct payments, is not part of ESIF, but around 20% of direct payments can 
be considered climate relevant.   

3.3.  Efficiency 

Administrative  costs  directly  resulting  from  the  strategy  were  low  and  mostly 
limited to the Commission, with the exception of funding programmes where other 
(e.g. national) organisations complement EU funding35. Costs for other stakeholders 
were voluntary in most cases and mainly linked to accessing EU funds.  

The benefits linked to the strategy were achieved at low cost thanks to the multiplier 
effects  of  its  actions  on  guidance,  coordination,  dissemination,  demonstration  and 
mainstreaming into other policies and funding programmes. 

Overall,  the  EU  strategy  provides  value  for  money,  as  the  eight  actions  of  the 
strategy  can  be  considered  as  highly  cost-efficient.  For  example,  LIFE  projects, 
including  adaptation  ones,  are  estimated  to  have  produced  benefits  in  society  of 
around EUR 1.7 billion in 2014, four times the overall LIFE budget for that year36.  

3.4.  Coherence 

Climate  impacts  will  be  widespread  in  Europe’s  future.  Adaptation  is  required  to 
make  action  at  all  governance  levels  transformative  enough  to  cope  with  systemic 
changes in our climate, environment and society. 

The strategy is broadly coherent with other EU, national, regional and local policies 
and  adaptation  action.  The  Commission’s  guidance  produced  under  the  strategy 
helped coordinate national sectors and policies, and helped tackle some cross-border 
climate  issues  between  Member  States.  The  EU’s  macro-regional  strategies37  and 

34   This  refers  to  major  projects  in  the  meaning  of  Article  100  of  the  Common  Provision  Regulation 
(Regulation  (EU)  No  1303/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  17  December 
2013), which undergo a specific appraisal procedure. Examples of good climate proofing:  Collection 
of  waste  water  and  waste  water  treatment  on  the  island  of  Krk,  Croatia,  CCI:  2017HR16CFMP005 
and Construction of the S2 expressway, section: junction Puławska – junction Lubelska, Poland, CCI: 
2017PL16CFMP014  

35   For example, through the Member States’ programming, implementation, monitoring and evaluation 
of adaptation action and climate proofing in the context of EU funded programmes such as the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). 

36   Mid-term evaluation of LIFE (SWD(2017) 355, available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/mid-

term-evaluation-life-programme_en) 

37   http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/cooperation/macro-regional-strategies/ 

9 

 
 
                                                 
the  Covenant  of  Mayors  also  reinforced  similar  approaches  across  EU  Member 
States sharing similar climate risks. 

The  picture  is  more  nuanced  for  coherence  with  international  policies  and 
initiatives. At the time the strategy was developed, the Commission decided to focus 
on addressing climate change impacts on the EU territory, with some analysis of the 
links  between  migration  and  climate  change38  and  potential  repercussions  for  the 
EU.  

In spite of that, carrying out the Strategy has contributed to strengthening the EU's 
external action on climate resilience by improving the knowledge base, and offering 
a  test-base  for  adaptation  options  and  responses  that  could  be  relevant  outside  the 
EU39.   

Looking  ahead,  there  is  margin  for  reframing  the  strategy  to  better  align  to 
international  policy  developments  since  2013,  as  well  as  to  better  assess  the 
implications  for  the  EU  of  cross-border  effects  of  climate  impacts  in  non-EU 
countries via e.g. migratory flows, trade and financial flows.  

The  EU,  as  a  party  to  the  UNFCCC40,  must  report  on  progress  and  actions  on 
adaptation and possibly redefine its adaptation ambition by reviewing its strategies 
and policies. The strategy  should support this process  by joining  up European and 
global efforts to adapt.   

There  are  opportunities  for  links  between  the  EU  future  adaptation  policy  and 
reaching  the  Sustainable  Development  Goals,  the  Convention  on  Biological 
Diversity41  and  the  Sendai  Framework  on  Disaster  Risk  Reduction.  For  example, 
many  of  the  indicators  developed  to  monitor  the  progress  on  these  global 
frameworks  are  highly  relevant  to  adaptation.  In  addition,  modelling  tools  that 
integrate  sustainability  and  climate  scenarios  and  challenges  (for  adaptation  and 
mitigation) are being developed42. 

On  internal  coherence  (i.e.  its  contents),  the  strategy  was  found  to  be  highly 
coherent  and  several  actions  complemented  each  other.  For  example,  there  was  a 
rich flow of adaptation knowledge between those generating or compiling it at EU 
level43, Climate-ADAPT44 and local  authorities drawing the necessary information 
to  engage  with  the  Covenant  of  Mayors.  However,  a  more  comprehensive 

38   One of the component staff working documents of the 2013 strategy (SWD(2013) 138 final) dealt with 

environmental degradation and migration.  

39   For instance,  the 2017 EU Submission to the  UNFCCC on adaptation presents  how the strategy  has 
promoted  the  use  of  ecosystem  based  adaptation  in  Europe,  which  can  provide  relevant  information 
and  examples  to  non-EU  countries  with  similar  challenges  or  ecosystems,  in  particular  the  most 
vulnerable. 

40   United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
41   The Convention on Biological Diversity’s Aichi Target 15 states: 'By 2020, ecosystem resilience and 
the contribution of biodiversity to carbon stocks has been enhanced, through conservation and 
restoration, including restoration of at least 15 per cent of degraded ecosystems, thereby contributing 
to climate change mitigation and adaptation and to combating desertification'. 

42   See: World Resources Institute: 'Connecting the Dots: Elements for a Joined-Up Implementation of the 

2030 Agenda and Paris Agreement', 2018. 

43   E.g. through research framework programmes, the Commission and the European Environment 

Agency. 

44   EU portal on adaptation: https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/ 

10 

 
                                                 
exploration  and  use  of  links  between  actions  could  have  improved  internal 
coherence even further45. 

3.5.  EU added value 

The  strategy  generates  added  value  for  Europe,  particularly  because  it  enables  the 
integration of adaptation in key sectors, governance levels and EU policies. 

Stakeholders  appreciated  the  benefits  of  adaptation  research  at  EU  level  and  the 
spreading of knowledge through initiatives like Climate-ADAPT.  

Decision-makers at  national,  regional  and local  level  may have been compelled to 
consider adaptation without the EU Strategy. However, stakeholders confirmed that, 
in the absence of an EU adaptation steer, there would have been less progress and 
less  encouragement  to  strengthen  adaptive  capacity,  particularly  across  borders  in 
EU  macro-regions  sharing  common  climate  risks46,  e.g.  river  basins  and  Alpine 
areas. Also, without the Covenant of Mayors, EU cities would be more vulnerable 
and local and regional actors would have less available science to support long-term 
planning. 

In  addition,  stakeholders  rated  highly  the  catalytic  role  of  the  LIFE  programme. 
LIFE  has  enhanced  bottom-up  climate  adaptation  action  and  learning,  optimising 
putting into place EU environmental and climate change policies in general. 

The  strategy’s  action  on  insurance  and  the  financial  sector  may  not  have  been 
sufficient to overcome hurdles for public-private cooperation so far. Although it has 
helped better understand how insurance markets function as a crucial adaptation tool 
in Member States, specifically on the role of insurance in climate risk management, 
EU  action  has  yet  to  bring  clear  results.  Here,  EU  added  value  lies  in  enabling 
cooperation  between  governments  and  insurers,  raising  awareness  about  the 
coverage  gap  and  about  the  need  for  governments  to  integrate  insurance  in  the 
management of all climate risks. 

Although  the  strategy  included  the  promotion  of  financial  products  for  resilient 
investment  in  its  Action  8,  the  impact  of  the  2018  Commission  action  plan  on 
financing sustainable growth47 does not form part of the evaluation due to its timing. 
However,  it  is  likely  that  it  will  prove  useful  for  ensuring  the  stability  of  the  EU 
financial  system  by  including  climate  risks  in  the  risk  management  processes  of 
companies  and  financial  institutions.  The  action  plan  also  intends  to  foster  the 

45    For example, since 2007, nine LIFE projects under Action 2 have supported the development of 

climate adaptation strategies or plans under Action 1 (total budget: EUR 16 million). The Commission 
has proposed that LIFE should continue to have a sub-programme for climate change mitigation and 
adaptation under the next multiannual financial framework. The new LIFE should focus on strategic 
integrated projects, which will support Member States in implementing key climate action plans and 
strategies, including adaptation ones. 

46     There are four macro-regional strategies, all of which integrate adaptation: Adriatic and Ionian Region,       

Alpine Region, Baltic Sea Region and Danube Region. A 'Macro-regional strategy' is an integrated 
framework endorsed by the European Council, which may be supported by the European Structural 
and Investment Funds among others, to address common challenges faced by a defined geographical 
area involving Member States and non-EU countries. More information: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/cooperation/macro-regional-strategies/   

47    COM(2018) 097. See also: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/180308-action-plan-sustainable-

growth_en. 

11 

 
                                                 
transparency  and  sustainability  of  investment  decisions  on  both  adaptation  needs 
and emission reduction opportunities. 

4.  LESSONS-LEARNED 

The outcomes and examples mentioned above illustrate that an EU level adaptation 
strategy  is  still  highly  relevant  and  adds  value  to  national,  regional  and  local 
adaptation efforts while remaining cost-effective. The strategy, a policy instrument 
with  little  administrative  implications  for  most  stakeholders,  has  succeeded  in 
focusing decision-makers on the need to  prepare for  climate hazards. The strategy 
has acted as a reference point, i.e. focusing and catalysing action at other levels of 
governance. In addition, it has successfully channelled efforts to continue to ensure 
that EU level policies and budgets integrate climate change considerations. 

Over  the  evaluation  process,  the  Commission  has  gained  valuable  insights  on  the 
first five years of putting the strategy into practice: 

  Knowledge gaps on adaptation may never be entirely closed, but the added value 
of EU research and innovation actions since 2013 has been strongly appreciated 
by stakeholders. It may be time now to switch focus from generating knowledge 
to  applying  it  for  decision-making  under  uncertainty,  particularly  in  economic 
sectors or regions that are potentially more vulnerable, such as agriculture in the 
Mediterranean regions or the European outermost regions. For these purposes, the 
Commission  could  envisage  exchanges  of  information  on  successful  adaptation 
measures between stakeholders and with the scientific community. To an extent, 
bottom-up,  co-designed  adaptation  can  spur  action  and  learning  in  spite  of 
incomplete  evidence,  in  line  with  the  precautionary  principle48.  Structured 
science-policy  dialogues  could  be  held  regularly,  for  example,  in  the  context  of 
the  biennial  European  Climate  Change  Adaptation  (ECCA)  conference49.  In 
addition,  an  adaptation  analysis  and  modelling  forum  could  be  established,  to 
improve  the  use  of  climate  change  impact  and  adaptation  models  for  policy-
making.  The  forum  could  harness  the  collective  capabilities  of  a  variety  of 
models,  work  on  the  strength  and  limitations  of  competing  approaches  to 
adaptation research and provide ongoing guidance for further efforts. 

 

In  the  case  of  long-term  infrastructure  investments,  climate  resilience  is 
essential:  it  requires,  among  others  specific  adaptation  standards50,  earth 
observation  data,  other  space  data  and  space-based  services,  citizen  science  and 
guidelines that are accessible to both experts and decision-makers. There is room 
to  further  expand  the  integration  of  adaptation  in  infrastructure,  e.g.  by 

48   Although the principle is enshrined in Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, it is not defined there. The Commission issued a Communication on the precautionary principle 
in 2000: COM(2000)0001 

49   The next ECCA will take place in Lisbon. See: https://www.ecca2019.eu/ 
50   The  Commission  has  requested  the  European  Standardisation  Organisations  to  update  standards  for 
climate-resilient infrastructure in the transport, energy and building sectors. See Commission Decision 
(C(2014)3451). 

12 

 
                                                 
prescribing  climate  proofing  for  any  infrastructure  funded  by  the  EU51,  and 
particularly when the infrastructure is vital for emission reduction efforts.  

  The strategy’s actions could be better integrated with each other. Links between 
actions did occur spontaneously, but could be better identified and exploited. For 
example,  Climate-ADAPT  could  provide  a  better  overview  of  current  research 
projects funded by the EU or operational activities such as the various Copernicus 
services. In addition, there should be a more frequent exchange of methodologies 
and findings targeting practitioners and relevant  national and EU platforms, e.g. 
through more interactive tools or webinars. 

  Equally,  the  strategy  should  better  integrate  the  international  dimension  of 
adaptation  to  synchronise  with  global  collective  policy  and  actions  on 
sustainable development, biodiversity and disaster risk reduction, to name just a 
few. So, the Commission aims to join up its mainstreaming efforts and processes 
to  achieve  SDGs  and  climate  commitments,  both  inside  the  EU  and  through  its 
support to and cooperation with developing countries. 

  The strategy promoted adaptation plans at all levels, but was less effective on the 
carrying  out  and  monitoring  of  those  plans  in  Member  States.  A  more 
streamlined  process  to  follow  progress  in  national  adaptation  actions,    and  to 
facilitate  peer  learning,  could  help  to  further  accelerate  adaptation  action. 
Adaptation  is  included  in  the  Regulation  on  the  Governance  of  the  Energy 
Union52,  which  will  enable  a  more  systematic  regular  reporting  from  Member 
States on a range of adaptation goals and progress. This will also help to carry out 
the  Paris  Agreement.  This  should  lead  to  an  enhanced  EU-wide  monitoring 
framework of national and/or regional and/or local strategies, which in turn could 
more  effectively  flag  areas  for  enhanced  action  and  cooperation,  common 
challenges or shared uncertainties. 

  On  the  number  of  local  adaptation  strategies,  progress  has  been  slower  than 
envisaged in 2013, and differs between Member States. This is probably linked to 
national contexts, i.e. whether or not there is binding national legislation requiring 
local  adaptation  plans  from  local  authorities53.  In  order  to  promote  the 
development and carrying out local adaptation strategies, the Commission should: 

(1)  Encourage  Member  States  to  consider  frameworks  to  enhance  local  action  

actively and constantly; and  

51    Current Commission proposals for the 2021-2027 EU budget foresee that a wider range of EU-funded 
infrastructure  investments  be  climate-proof.  See:  COM(2018)  375  for  the  proposal  on  a  Common 
Provisions  Regulation  and  COM/2018/372  final  for  ERDF  and  CF  in  particular.  All  legal  texts  and 
factsheets  are  available  at:  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/regional-development-and-
cohesion_en. See also, for COM(2018) 439 for the InvestEU programme, and COM(2018) 438 for the 
Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). 

52   COM(2016) 759: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Governance of the Energy Union, amending Directive 94/22/EC, Directive 98/70/EC, Directive 
2009/31/EC, Regulation (EC) No 663/2009, Regulation (EC) No 715/2009, Directive 2009/73/EC, 
Council Directive 2009/119/EC, Directive 2010/31/EU, Directive 2012/27/EU, Directive 2013/30/EU 
and Council Directive (EU) 2015/652 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 

53   Denmark, France and the United Kingdom have binding national legislation in place requiring local 

adaptation plans from local authorities. 

13 

 
                                                 
(2)  increase  awareness-raising  and  technical  and  financial  assistance  to  local 
authorities,  e.g.  through  the  Covenant  of  Mayors  or  other  initiatives,  notably  in 
Member  States  where  the  proportion  of  local  adaptation  strategies  is  lower  (i.e. 
Southern and eastern Europe)54. 

  The five years since the strategy was adopted are too short a period to analyse the 
distributional  effects  of  adaptation  (or  lack  of  adaptation).  Projected  impacts 
vary  qualitatively  and  quantitatively  between  EU  regions.  The  EU’s  solidarity 
instruments and its economic and social cohesion may be tested: there might be 
winners  and  losers  both  regionally,  socially  and  among  economic  actors. 
Appropriate  performance  indicators  aggregated  at  EU  level  would  be  needed  to 
measure  specific  impacts  on  countries,  regions,  population  groups  or  sectors. 
After the projects  funded under the 2014-2020  multiannual  financial framework 
end, it may be possible to aggregate relevant and innovative societal indicators to 
map more precisely the socioeconomic impacts of climate change and adaptation 
policies.  This  could  possibly  lead  to  improved  approaches  to  the  Commission’s 
cohesion policy for the post-2027 programming period. 

  The strategy may be able to deliver more in the future in certain areas, such as: 

o  Disaster risk reduction, notably on integration of adaptation perspectives 
in  methodologies  and  indicators,  knowledge  for  risk  assessment  and  a 
more  systematic  dialogue  between  practitioners  of  adaptation  and 
practitioners  of  disaster  risk  reduction.  Enhancing  citizens’  awareness 
could also be considered. 

o  Better integration of adaptation in the EU maritime and fisheries policy, 
and coastal areas in general. Even if emissions and temperatures stabilise, 
sea levels  will continue  to  rise. One in  three EU citizens  lives  within 50 
km  of  the  seashore  and  without  adaptation  measures,  millions  will  be 
affected by coastal flooding. EU policies that affect land-sea interactions 
in coastal areas, such as Maritime Spatial Planning and Integrated Coastal 
Zone  Management55,  Horizon  Europe  and  the  European  Maritime  and 
Fisheries  Fund56,  and  also  the  actions  in  the  International  Ocean 
Governance  agenda57  should  be  better  prepared  to  deal  with  this  in  the 
future. 

o  Development and use of instruments and tools for investors and insurers 
who  may  not  be  integrating  climate  change  into  their  risk  management 
practices  sufficiently58.  There  is  untapped  potential  to  improve  forecasts 

54   Reckien et al., (2018). 'How are cities planning to respond to climate change? Assessment of local 
climate plans from 885 cities in the EU-28', Journal of Cleaner Production, 26 March 2018. 

55   Directive 2014/89/EU. See also: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/iczm/practice.htm  
56   COM(2018) 390 final 
57   JOIN(2016) 
49_en.pdf 
The agenda could be also used to tackle the ongoing changes in distribution and abundance of marine 
species that poses challenges to those responsible for setting quotas. 
58   https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/05/180515081720.html 

https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/sites/maritimeaffairs/files/join-2016-

final, 

49 

14 

 
                                                 
and risk analyses through climate services and better data sharing59, where 
emerging market opportunities can boost adaptation, particularly by using 
Copernicus  climate  information60.  The  Space  Strategy  for  Europe61 
identified  climate  issues  as  one  of  the  most  important  emerging  user 
needs. 

o  Using  private  investment  in  adaptation.  Public  resources  will  not  be 
sufficient to secure a climate-resilient economy. In order to attract private 
finance  as  well,  the  action  plan  for  financing  sustainable  growth62 
envisages  to  provide  clarity  on  whether  or  not  investments  contribute  to 
climate  adaptation  through  a  taxonomy  of  environmentally  sustainable 
investments63. This action, together with the investment support provided 
under  the  InvestEU  Programme,  opens  up  avenues  to  direct  the  private 
sector  towards  climate-resilient  businesses  and  to  build  a  pipeline  of 
targeted  adaptation  projects.  Ideally,  this  would  be  accompanied  by  the 
development of tools such as technical standards on climate resilience and 
the  economic  advantages  of 
cost-benefit  analyses 
adaptation.  

that  highlight 

o  Ecosystem-based  adaptation  (e.g.  conservational  agricultural  practices, 
infrastructure,  nature  protection),  provides  multiple  benefits 
green 
including for biodiversity, ecosystems, climate change adaptation, climate 
change mitigation, air and soil quality and societal well-being. This multi-
functionality  should  be  better  embedded  in  the  assessment  of  adaptation 
options. This would allow nature-based adaptation solutions to compete in 
the  short-term  with  other,  more  conventional  or  'grey'  infrastructure 
options.  Ecosystem-based  adaptation  could  also  be  mainstreamed  in 
capital raising and investments. Lessons from LIFE (including its Natural 
Capital  Financing  Facility),  Horizon  2020  and  other  EU-funded  projects 
should  be  taken  into  account  in  order  to  implement  the  action  plan  on 
financing 
in  green 
infrastructure and nature-based solutions.   

sustainable  growth, 

investments 

triggering 

is 

important 

to  better 

integrate  adaptation 

o  Promoting  the  adoption  and  monitoring  of  local  adaptation  strategies 
into 
and  action.  It 
national/regional  legal  frameworks  (e.g.  urban,  spatial  and  coastal 
planning).  Political  commitment  from  all  the  relevant  governance  levels 
should  be  encouraged,  leading  to  better  technical  assistance  for  regional 
and  local  authorities  and  more  adaptation  funding.  On  the  basis  of  the 
permanent national multi-level climate and energy dialogues envisaged in 
the Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union, the Covenant of 
Mayors  could  help  identify  and  share  good  national  practices  to  engage 
cities. 

59   Climate services garnered increasing attention by the EU research and innovation community around 
2015: https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/news/european-research-and-innovation-
roadmap-climate-services   

60   See: https://climate.copernicus.eu/  
61   COM(2016)705 
62    COM(2018) 097. See also: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/180308-action-plan-sustainable-

growth_en 

63   COM(2018)  353,  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the 

establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment 

15 

 
                                                 
o  Better  preparation  of  geographical  areas  with  specific  environmental 
challenges,  natural  constraints  or  vulnerabilities  with  high  exposure  to 
climate change, such as the Outermost Regions. 

o  Promoting  the  assessment  and  mapping  of  social  vulnerability  to 
climate-related  events,  as  well  as  identifying  and  involving  vulnerable 
groups for the design of fair adaptation policies at all relevant governance 
levels.  For  example,  the  Commission  could  increase  the  need  to  assess, 
plan,  and  carry  out  socially  just  adaptation  in  cities  through  EU  funding 
programmes,  e.g. helping to  build capacity in  municipalities  so that they 
can  design  adaptation  policies  that  are  socially  fair.  Some  examples  in 
Finland, Slovakia and France could be a point of departure64. 

o  Reinforcing the links between  public health and adaptation, notably to 
improve  cross-sectoral  cooperation  on  risk  assessment  and  surveillance 
and to increase the awareness and capacity of the health sector, including 
at local level, to address current and emerging climate-related health risks. 
For example, the Commission could further support the development and 
sharing of best practice and new knowledge on climate-related health risks 
through  Horizon  2020  and  its  successor  programme,  as  well  as  through 
LIFE  and,  potentially,  the  health  strand  under  the  proposed  European 
Social Fund Plus65 for 2021-2027.  

o  Promoting links with mitigation policies at all governance levels. At EU 
level,  the  Commission  will  include  adaptation  in  its  forthcoming  long-
term  low-emission  development  strategy.  Adaptation  provides  economic 
and  social  stability,  not  adapting  (or 
'maladaptation')  will  deepen 
inequalities,  weaken  territorial  cohesion  and  increase  security  risks  and 
displacements.  At  national  level,  adaptation  goals  will  be  part  of  the 
National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) under the Regulation on the 
Governance  of  the  Energy  Union.  The  Commission  expects  that  these 
plans  will  reflect  the  need  to  climate-proof  sectors  that  are  crucial  to 
emission reduction (e.g. land use, agriculture, energy or transport). 

In  general,  despite  the  voluntary  and  indirect  nature  of  the  eight  actions  in  the 
strategy  (guidance,  coordination,  research,  dissemination,  integration  of  adaptation 
into  policies  and  sectors),  they  have  provided  momentum  and  support  to  national, 
regional, local and cross-border adaptation.  

The strategy has become a cooperative framework of reference, capable of updating 
knowledge  and  signalling  the  need  to  transform  our  societies  as  climate  impacts 
materialise. Equivalent progress would not have been possible in the absence of it, 
particularly  for  the  production  and  sharing  of  knowledge  and  the  integration  of 

64   Some  local  authorities  (such  as  the  Helsinki  Metropolitan  Area  in  Finland,  Košice  and  Trnava  in 
Slovakia,  Vejle  in  Denmark  and  Paris  in  France)  have  already  identified  groups  that  are  socially 
vulnerable to climate change and are beginning to plan and implement socially just adaptation actions. 
Source:  Breil  M,  Downing  D,  Kazmierczak  A,  Mäkinen  K,  Romanovska  L  (2018),  'Social 
vulnerability  to  climate  change  in  European  cities  –  state  of  play  in  policy  and  practice'.  European 
Topic Centre on Climate Change impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation (ETC/CCA) Technical paper 
2018/1. https://doi.org/10.25424/CMCC/SOCVUL_EUROPCITIES. 

65   COM(2018)382 

16 

 
                                                 
adaptation  in  EU  policies.  The  Commission’s  climate  ambition  for  the  2021-2027 
budget builds on the ideas enshrined already in the 2013 Strategy.  

For instance, the Commission intends to use 25 % of the next multiannual financial 
framework  (2021-2027)66  on  climate  mitigation  and  adaptation  objectives67.  The 
proposal  envisaged  to  spend  35  %  of  the  EU  research  framework  programme  on 
climate-related  topics68.  The  European  Regional  Development  Fund  would  aim  at 
30  %  climate  spending  and  the  Cohesion  Fund  at  37  %.  For  these  two  funding 
programmes, this  represents a significant relative increase compared to the current 
period. Besides that, the Commission proposals69 envisages that:  

(1) a  wider  range  of  EU-funded  infrastructure  investments  is  climate-

resilient; and  

(2) support 

through  cohesion  policy  funds 

is,  where  applicable, 
conditional  to  disaster  risk  management  plans  consistent  with 
national  adaptation  strategies,  and  to  National  Energy  and  Climate 
Plans.  

This  will  be  supported  by  legislative  and  non-legislative  measures  under  the 
Commission’s Sustainable Finance initiative, to channel private capital into climate 
change  mitigation  and  adaptation  activities  and  enable  more  avenues  for  blended 
finance vehicles.  

In  addition,  the  Commission  has  further  consolidated  adaptation  in  its  legislative 
proposal for a future common agricultural policy70, where climate adaptation is now 
clearly identified in one of the nine specific objectives, along with specific impact 
and  result  indicators  to  track  progress.  It  is  expected  that  40  %  of  the  future  CAP 
budget  will contribute to  climate action and,  furthermore, that Member State CAP 
strategic plans develop an intervention strategy based on an assessment of needs that 
looks into relevant climate change policies and planning71. 

At this stage, the Commission considers the current strategy is fit for purpose, while 
recognising  that  adaptation  needs  have  intensified  and  diversified  since  2013.  
Before deciding on a possible revision of the strategy, a number of events and their 
outcomes will have to be factored in up to 2020, e.g.: 

  UNFCCC’s  COP2472  and  the  facilitative  (Talanoa)  dialogue  during  2018. 
Adaptation is an important aspect of the Paris Agreement work programme 

66   COM(2018) 322. All legal texts and factsheets available at: 

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/factsheets-long-term-budget-proposals_en 

67   Note that at the level of the EU budget, the reporting is done on “climate mainstreaming” without any 

differentiation between adaptation and mitigation. 

68   COM(2018) 435 and https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/research-and-innovation-including-

horizon-europe-iter-and-euratom-legal-texts-and-factsheets_en  

69   COM(2018) 375 for the proposal on a Common Provisions Regulation and COM/2018/372 final for 

ERDF and CF in particular. All legal texts and factsheets are available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/regional-development-and-cohesion_en. See also, for 
COM(2018) 439 for the InvestEU programme, and COM(2018) 438 for the Connecting Europe 
Facility (CEF). 
70    COM(2018)392 
71   As referred to in Article 96, 97 and 103, and Annex XI of the Commission’s proposal (COM(2018) 

392). 

72   The 24th Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC: http://cop24.gov.pl/  

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that  is  currently  being  negotiated.  COP24  and  the  Talanoa  Dialogue  will 
promote  a  global  and  European  reflection  on  collective  and  individual 
progress to meet the long-term objectives of the Paris Agreement. This may 
have  implications  on  adaptation  discussions,  particularly  in  light  of  the 
special report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on 
the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C and the special report of the IPCC 
on climate change and oceans and the cryosphere. 

  The  initial  implementation  of  the  Regulation  on  the  Governance  of  the 
Energy  Union.  National  Energy  and  Climate  Plans  (NECPs)  will  also 
include  adaptation  goals  where  appropriate.  The  Regulation  requires  the 
Commission  to  assess  the  draft  plans  and  empowers  it  to  provide 
recommendations on them. Member States will have to take due account of 
any recommendation, or make public the reasoning for not doing so. Long-
term  national  strategies  will  also  cover  adaptation  and  will  have  to  be 
consistent  with  the  NECPs.  Progress  on  adaptation  will  be  reported  in  a 
more  systematic  and  regular  form  by  Member  States,  and  this  process  will 
be  facilitated  via  implementing  acts  on  the  structure  and  format  of  this 
reporting. 

  The EU’s long-term greenhouse gas emission reduction strategy. Adaptation 
will  feature  in  the  long-term  strategy,  highlighting  the  need  for  EU 
companies and governments to plan for slow-onset impacts such as sea level 
rise  or  water  scarcity.  It  will  also  spur  the  combination  of  mitigation  and 
adaptation into coherent climate actions and responses. 

In  the  meantime,  EU    environment  and  maritime  policies  (e.g.  the  Soil  Thematic 
Strategy,  the  Biodiversity  Strategy),  the  Bioeconomy  Strategy,  the  ongoing 
evaluations  of  the  common  agriculture  policy,  regional  and  cohesion  policies  and 
the next 2021-2027 budget will continue to concentrate mainstreaming efforts. The 
LIFE,  cohesion  policy  funds  and  Horizon  2020  support  for  adaptation  will  be 
maintained up until 2020, the revamped Civil Protection Mechanism, if adopted, is 
expected  to  boost  the  links  between  adaptation  and  disaster  risk  reduction  and,  in 
cities, the Covenant of Mayors will forge ahead to protect European citizens against 
the impacts of climate change.  

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