European legal framework for “digital labour platforms”.
Date: 2018-10-19
Institutions: Joint Research Centre
Subjects: European undertaking, carriage of passengers, digital technology, information technology, job vacancy, labour law, labour market, organisation of work, outsourcing, report, social legislation

European legal framework  
for  
“digital labour platforms” 

De Stefano, V. 

Al  oisi, A. 

2018  

 
 
 
 
 
 
This publication is a report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s science and 
knowledge service. It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking process. 
The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission. Neither the 
European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use that might 
be made of this publication. 

Contact information  
Name: Valerio de Stefano 
Email: valerio.destefano@kuleuven.be 

JRC Science Hub 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc 

JRC112243 

PDF 

ISBN 978-92-79-94131-3 

doi:10.2760/78590 

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018 

© European Union, 2018 

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How to cite this report: De Stefano V. and Aloisi A., European Legal framework for digital labour platforms, 
European Commission, Luxembourg, 2018, ISBN 978-92-79-94131-3, doi:10.2760/78590, JRC112243. 

Contents 

Foreword .............................................................................................................. 2

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................ 3

Abstract ............................................................................................................... 4

Executive summary ............................................................................................... 5
1  A taxonomy of digital labour platforms. ................................................................ 7
1.1  Crowdsourcing and work on-demand via platform. ......................................... 11
2  Understanding the platforms’ business models. ................................................... 14
2.1  An in-depth analysis on working conditions in three sub-sectors: a multi-stage 
analysis. ......................................................................................................... 16
2.1.1  Access to the platform and registration. ................................................ 17
2.1.2  Selection process and hiring. ............................................................... 18
2.1.3  Command power and performance execution. ....................................... 19
2.1.4  Monitoring and rating (and deactivation). ............................................. 20
2.1.5  Payment rewards for completed tasks. ................................................. 22
3  Overview of the legal frameworks applying to labour platforms. ............................ 25
3.1  (European and) national requirements to comply with. ................................... 26
3.1.1  Legal frameworks for casual work: on-call work, voucher-based, and zero-
hours contracts. .......................................................................................... 32
3.1.2  Sectorial analysis. Passenger transport service. ..................................... 35
3.1.3  Sectorial analysis. Online crowdsourcing. .............................................. 38
3.1.3.1  Platforms as temporary work agencies, an “indirect” approach. ......... 39

3.1.4  Sectorial analysis. Work on demand via platform (at the household’s 
premises). .................................................................................................. 40
4  Issues at stake and potential outcomes from key litigation cases. .......................... 41
4.1  Classification of workers: a gateway to protections. ....................................... 44
5  Final remarks and policy recommendations. ........................................................ 53

References ......................................................................................................... 55

List of boxes ....................................................................................................... 64

List of figures ...................................................................................................... 65

List of tables ....................................................................................................... 66

i 

Foreword 

The  European  labour  market  is  experiencing  radical  changes,  fuelled  by  digitalisation, 
flexibilisation,  restructuring,  and  demographic  dynamics.  Moreover,  the  digital  economy 
is changing societies and altering socio-economic interactions. Understandably, all these 
trends  have  a  strong  impact  on  the  organisation  of  work  and,  above  all,  on  the 
relationships between employers and employees (or between workers and clients). More 
recently,  a  spotlight  has  been  shone  on  the  phenomenon  of  working  in  the  so-called 
“collaborative economy”, described as the most visible portion of a broader trend towards 
de-standardisation of employment relationships and de-mutualisation of risk.  

In  a  nutshell,  labour  platforms  allow  individuals,  families  or  companies  in  need  of  a 
service  to  hire  a  worker  who  is  willing  to  offer  the  relevant  activity,  whether  manual  or 
creative,  under  the  guise  of  enhanced  flexibility.  By  taking  into  account  this  significant 
heterogeneity, which may entail intense juridical implications, a common business model 
could  be  traced  consisting  in  the  “instant”  matching  of  demand  and  supply  of  labour, 
facilitated by digital tools (mostly apps on smartphones and online platforms) that make 
it easy to manage a large and “low-cost” workforce, lowering transaction costs, barriers 
to entry and information asymmetries. 

While  it  is  correct  to  maintain  that,  at  least  in  theory,  digital  labour  platforms  may 
expand  competitiveness,  increase  choice  and  create  growth  opportunities,  a  series  of 
concerns has been raised on the potential erosion of rights, and the non-compliance with 
employment  law  standards.  Moreover,  digitally  mediated  working  templates  blur 
boundaries between traditional classifications such as work and rest periods, amateurism 
and professionalism, subordination and autonomy. This model touches on the foundation 
of traditional social protection and social security systems. 

From a regulatory perspective, platform labour represents a “moving target”. Building on 
the  results  of  the  wide-ranging  investigation  into  concrete  working  conditions  in  three 
selected  subsectors,  namely  passenger  transport  services,  professional  crowdsourcing, 
on-demand  work  at  the  client’s  premises,  the  crucial  question  that  needs  answering  is 
whether  the  existing  legal  frameworks  provide  adequate  responses  to  the  current 
(digital)  challenges.  To  gain  a  better  understanding,  standard  methods  of  social  science 
research  and  legal  analysis  will  be  combined  to  outline  regulatory  and  contractual 
templates, which can easily accommodate modern organisational patterns. 

Accordingly,  the  aim  of  this  study  is  to  contribute  to  the  comprehensive  research  on 
digital labour platforms by investigating the existing legal frameworks and understanding 
related  challenges  for  policy  makers.  Ambitious  expectations  are  being  pinned  new 
technologies making work and lives considerably innovative and cannot be let down. Still 
employment rights must not be sacrificed on the altar of flexibility. The goal, indeed, is to 
develop  sustainable  digital  ecosystems  and  social  institutions  where  high-quality 
employment and competitiveness mutually reinforce. 

2 

 
Acknowledgements 

Our  appreciation  to  Professor  Stefano  Liebman,  Dean  of  the  School  of  Law  at  Bocconi 
University, Milano, Professor Miriam A. Cherry, Co-Director of the William C. Wefel Center 
for  Employment  Law  at  Saint  Louis  University  School  of  Law,  and  Janine  Berg  of  the 
International  Labour  Office,  who  have  been  extremely  helpful  with  this  report.  Many 
thanks  also  to  Mathias  Wouters,  Institute  for  Labour  Law,  KU  Leuven.  The  usual 
disclaimer applies. 

Authors 

Valerio De Stefano, Antonio Aloisi. 

3 

Abstract 

including  (i) 

This  report  maps  a  kaleidoscopic  array  of  platform-mediated  working  arrangements,  by 
clustering  the  findings  into  three  main  subsets  (passenger  transport  services, 
professional  crowdsourcing,  on-demand  work  at  the  client’s  premises).  Many  initiatives 
taken  by  the  European  institutions  and  aimed  at  promoting  decent  work  in  the 
collaborative  economy  are  analysed 
the  European  Commission’s 
Communication  356/2016,  (ii)  the  principles  enshrined  in  the  European  Pillar  of  Social 
Rights, and (iii) the ruling by the European Court of Justice on the nature of the service 
provided  by  Uber.  After  exploring  the  existing  legal  framework  in  several  European 
countries,  this  study  goes  into  the  issue  of  the  legal  status  of  platform–based  or  –
mediated  workers  by  analysing  what  is  at  stake  in  pending  litigations  on  the  proper 
classification. In the end, this report is meant to contrast the sense that new realities of 
work  have  outgrown  legal  concepts.  The  application  of  existing  regulation  must  be 
reinforced, in order to avoid the risk that platform workers are considered by default as 
falling  in  a  normative  vacuum.  In  the  end,  creating  a  level  playing  field  between  the 
traditional and the digitally-enabled companies is the only way to reap full benefits of the 
on-going digital transformation. 

4 

 
 
Executive summary 

This research focuses on emerging digital platforms which enable the matching of labour 
demand  and  supply,  through  highly  efficient infrastructure  connecting  a  vast  number  of 
workers, employers and clients instantaneously. Such far-reaching vicissitudes hold great 
perils,  but  also  huge  potential.  The  report  intends  to  “normalise”  the  discourses 
surrounding  the  digital  transformation  of  work  and  the  rise  of  non-standard  forms  of 
employment,  by  contrasting  the  sense  that  new  realities  of  work  have  outgrown  legal 
concepts. 

Policy context 

Only  few  European  States  have  adopted  specific  regulations  to  address  the  numerous 
issues  stemming  from  the  advent  of  the  platform  economy:  the  model  is  mercurial  in 
nature  and  a  hefty  intervention  may  provoke  its  premature  asphyxiation.  Accordingly, 
before proposing one-size-fits-all or horizontal regulatory schemes, it would be useful to 
validate the appropriateness of existing labour law categories, by delving into labour law 
fitness  to  these  new  realities  without  ignoring  the  sheer  heterogeneity  of  this 
phenomenon.  While  specific  legislative  and  regulatory  responses  to  these  issues  lag 
behind,  the  research  reviews  legislation  as  well  as  national  practices  with  regard  to 
platform-facilitated  arrangements  and  new  forms  of  (web–based  or  –mediated)  work. 
Against  this  background,  European  initiatives  aimed  at  promoting  decent  work  in  the 
collaborative  economy  receiving  a  high  level  of  research  attention  include:  (i)  the 
European  Commission’s  Communication  356/2016,  (ii)  the  principles  enshrined  in  the 
European  Pillar of Social Rights, and (iii) the ruling by the European  Court  of Justice on 
the nature of the service provided by the ride-hailing company Uber. Moreover, existing 
regulatory schemes, ranging from European Directives on atypical employment to casual 
work templates such as zero-hours or voucher-based contracts, are investigated. 

Key conclusions 

Labour  platforms  are  quickly  and  partly  redesigning  the  way  work  and  firms  are 
organised, by developing at the fringes of regulation. Contrary to what is often said, it is 
argued that the employment relationship and, more in general, current legal formats are 
not  undergoing  an  irreparable  crisis.  In  brief,  it  is  demonstrated  how  it  is  feasible  to 
temper the impulse to digital distinctiveness with actions to safeguard workers’ rights. 

In addition to this, it cannot be underestimated that the lack of compliance with labour-
related,  fiscal  and  social  security  duties  constitutes  platforms’  main  competitive 
advantage vis-à-vis their competitors. This regulatory arbitrage results in an aggravation 
of  existing  conceptual  tension  and,  what  is  worse,  in  an  exacerbation  of  social 
precariousness as platform workers have very limited access to labour protection. 

Before proposing one-size-fits-all or horizontal regulatory schemes, it would be useful to 
validate the appropriateness of existing labour law categories, by delving into labour law 
fitness  to  these  new  realities  without  ignoring  the  sheer  heterogeneity  of  this 
phenomenon. Indeed, several tools could already be used to regulate platform–based or 
–mediated working patterns. 

Main findings 

The (new) world of work is characterised by an increased tendency towards relationships 
that  are  not  based  on  direct  employment  contracts.  Although  the  description  of  specific 
circumstances does not allow for generalisations, a multi-stage scrutiny might provide a 
complete picture of the question. To fully appreciate the variety of services that fall under 
the  notion  of  platform-mediated  labour,  this  report  maps  a  kaleidoscopic  array  of  app-
distributed employment arrangements, by clustering the findings into three main subsets 
(passenger  transport  services,  professional  crowdsourcing,  on-demand  work  at  the 
client’s premises).  

5 

 
Scrutinising  the  concrete  operation  of  the  on-demand  platforms  could  help  scholars, 
practitioners and policymakers in addressing more complex issues concerning the scope 
of employment law and, broadly, the state of play of the social compact. The operation of 
a set  of European as  well as global platforms  will be described throughout five different 
dimensions.  In  doing  so,  the  relation  between  a  worker  and  the  platform  is  considered 
along  five  main  key  phases:  (i)  access  to  the  platform  and  registration,  (ii)  selection 
process  and  hiring,  (iii)  performance  execution  and  command  power,  (iv)  rating  and 
ranking, monitoring power (and deactivation), (v) payment rewards for completed tasks. 

This  report  goes  into  the  issue  of  the  legal  status  of  platform-coordinated  workers  by 
analysing  what  is  at  stake  in  pending  litigation  on  the  proper  classification.  Recent  and 
potential  outcomes  are  sketched.  Although  firms  engage  with  “providers”,  arguably  and 
invariably  classified  as  self-employed,  on  a  hyper-volatile  basis,  many  of  them  exert 
some  degree  of  managerial  powers,  albeit  in  a  more  sophisticated  form,  over  the 
transacted activity, while avoiding the obligations of direct employment. 

Available  research  reveals  pervasive  directives,  reinforced  surveillance,  constant 
assessment,  arbitrary  disciplinary  action  and  very little  or  no  margin in  deciding  how  to 
complete  a  task.  The  model  does  not  contain  any  entitlement  such  as  overtime,  paid 
holiday  leave,  maternity  leave,  sickness  payments  and  statutory  minimum  wages. 
Furthermore, workers are excluded from fundamental principles and rights at work such 
as  freedom  of  association,  collective  bargaining  or  protection  against  discrimination  or 
unfair dismissal. 

Therefore, this apparently new pattern has to be on the radar for several reasons. Firstly, 
the  “platformisation”  of  labour  relations  may  reshape  and  revive  traditional  outsourcing 
practices. Secondly, it could contribute to a formalisation of informal economy. Thirdly, it 
might  speed  up  the  erosion  process  of  both  traditional  categories  and  protections  – 
allowing  companies  to  gain  a  competitive  advantage  over  traditional  competitors  that 
comply with labour law provisions. Thus, such hybrid arrangements call into question the 
suitability and effectiveness of the current employment legislation. 

The  modalities  in  which  digitally  enabled  work  is  performed  differ  much  from  one 
another.  While  focusing  on  the  “distribution  channel”  (i.e.  platforms)  is  convenient  for 
academic purposes (even though it is not a legal criterion for distinction), regulating app-
mediated work as an entirely unique category deserving new notions, new concepts, new 
regulations should be avoided: the design of specific legislation only targeting platforms 
makes little sense, at least in the area of labour law and social security. 

Therefore, reaffirming the major binary divide between workers genuinely self-employed 
and  those  in  an  employment  relationship  would  be  helpful  in  the  attempt  to  reduce 
labour  market  segmentation  and  rising  inequalities.  It  can  be  argued  that  platform-
mediated  arrangements  are  particularly  keen  sites  for  investigating  how  classical  legal 
notions and formats can adapt to new dynamics. Understandably, another answer might 
be  closing  legal  loopholes  that  incentivise  exploitative  conducts  by  a  marginal  group  of 
deceitful companies. 

Some  old  issues  gain  new  attention  in  the  age  of  digital  transformation  of  work. 
“Surgical”  regulatory  interventions  shall  help  the  collaborative  economy  companies  to 
improve  their  business  model,  building  a  new  phase  of  “shared  social  responsibility”.  In 
this  sense,  the  current  European  attitude  is  perceived  as  a  fair  balance  between 
supporting  entrepreneurs’  confidence  and  implementing  workers’  protections,  but 
considerable efforts need to be done in order to ensure a stable and sustainable future. 

6 

 
1  A taxonomy of digital labour platforms. 

The European labour market has experienced radical changes in the last years, fuelled by 
digitalisation,  flexibilisation,  restructuring,  and  demographic  dynamics.  Understandably, 
all these trends have a strong impact on the organisation of work and, above all, on the 
relationships between employers and employees (or between workers and clients). Whilst 
creating  potentially  new  opportunities  for  workers,  such  as  a  better-quality  work-life 
balance, casual arrangements might determine shortcomings, such as unstable or rapidly 
changing  schedules.  Moreover,  digitally  mediated  working  templates  blur  boundaries 
between  traditional  classifications  such  as  work  and  rest  periods,  amateurism  and 
professionalism, subordination and autonomy. More recently, a spotlight has been shone 
on the phenomenon of working in the so-called “collaborative economy”, described as the 
most  visible  portion  of  a  broader  trend  towards  de-standardisation  of  employment 
relationships and de-mutualisation of risk (1). While it is correct to maintain that, at least 
in  theory,  digital  labour  platforms  may  expand  competitiveness  (but  also  competition), 
increase choice and create growth opportunities, a series of concerns has been raised on 
the potential erosion of rights, protections and social security. Though, researches have 
mostly provided anecdotal evidence and knowledge is based  on interviews and personal 
first-hand experiences.  

To begin with, navigating definitions is an intricate assignment when it comes to describe 
digitally enabled forms  of work in the so-called “platform economy”, known in everyday 
parlance  also  as  the  “gig-economy”  (2).  At  first  glance,  the  list  of  labels  grows  day  by 
day,  together  with  the  number  of  businesses  and  people  involved  in  this  sector.  In  this 
report,  notwithstanding  the  nuances  of  meanings,  “platform  economy”  (3),  “on-demand 
economy”,  and  “collaborative  economy”  will  be  used  interchangeably  (4).  Whilst 
representing  seducing  buzzwords,  these  formulas  have  reached  a  large  consensus  and 
they  are  therefore  well  suited  to  indicate  a  rather  specific  economic  segment.  At  the 
same time, it has to be acknowledged that these labels cover various kinds of economic 
actors that might have widely different normative and social implications, while sharing a 
significant  number  of  features.  Therefore,  referring  to  them  as  a  monolithic  category 
causes many commentators and practitioners to be confused about what exactly is being 
described or studied. 

Due  to  difficulties  in  measuring  the  relevant  ecosystem,  there  is  still  little  statistics  and 
scant  knowledge  about  its  dimensions  (5):  different  methodologies  may  result  in 
divergent  assessment  (6).  Nevertheless,  many  analyses  seem  to  point  out  unanimously 
that  the  collaborative  economy  is  constantly  on  the  rise.  This  economic  segment  seems 
to be growing by 25% a year. According to more generous estimates, its value in Europe 
exceeds  €20  billion  (7).  A  very  detailed  document  (8)  finds  that  the  platform  economy 

(1)   Defined  as  the  trend  of  “passing  some  of  the  risks  of  the  enterprise  onto  the  worker”.  See  FREDMAN  S. 
(2006),  Precarious  Norms  for  Precarious  Workers  in  FUDGE  J.  and  OWENS  R.  (Eds.),  Precarious  Work, 
Women and the New Economy, Oxford, p. 187. 

(2)   The term “gig” evokes artists jumping from a concert to another. 
(3)   See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions,  A  European  Agenda  for  the  Collaborative 
Economy, COM/2016/0356 final (hereinafter “the Communication”). 

(4) Although the plethora of online platforms sees itself as a part of this trend, the label of “sharing economy” is 
now disgraced  for  misrepresenting  the  reality,  after  a preliminary  moment of excitement.  For  a  complete 
overview of definitions, see SELLONI D. (2017), New Forms of Economies: Sharing Economy, Collaborative 
Consumption, Peer-to-Peer Economy in EAD., CoDesign for Public-Interest Services, Cham, p. 15. 

(5) Suffice here to highlight here the distinction between active and non-active accounts or the use of multiple 

identities to register on different platforms. 

(6)  Consistent  estimates  are  hard  to  come  by.  The  value  of  the  collaborative  economy  in  the  EU  varies  from 
survey to survey, from report to report. For a review of many intrinsic problems, see HARDIE M. (2016), The 
feasibility  of  measuring  the  sharing  economy,  UK  Office  for  National  Statistics  (describing  “a  number  of 
challenges  faced  when  attempting  to  measure  [this  phenomenon],  including  classifying  activit[ies], 
capturing sharing activity between individuals and measuring non-monetary transactions”). 

(7) Reports have revealed how online platforms are not generating sufficient income. Moreover, it has to be said 
that  “[v]ery  few  of  the  digital  platform  companies  currently  make  profits,  but  the  very  high  market 
capitalisation  of  these  companies  obviously  means  that  the  stock  market  believes  that  they  will  do  so 
sometime  in  the  future”.  See  EUROFOUND  (2017),  Non-standard  forms  of  employment:  Recent  trends  and 

7 

 
                                           
amounts to nearly €4 billion in revenues and has intermediated €28 billion of transactions 
(85%  of  this  value  being  gained  by  the  providers/workers).  According  to  a  recent 
Eurobarometer  survey,  52%  of  all  EU  citizens  are  aware  of  the  services  offered  by  the 
sharing  economy  (9).  In  addition  to  that,  it  should  be  said  that  participation  in  the 
collaborative  economy  is  “relatively  small  –  but  growing”:  between  5%  and  9%  of 
European  citizens  have  already  participated  in  this  framework,  making  no  more  than 
€1000  (the  median  of  earning  stands  at  around  €300)  (10).  According  to  a  report 
commissioned by the European Commission (11), there would be approximately 100,000 
active  workers  in  the  European  platform  economy,  representing  0.05%  of  the  total 
workforce. Before venturing on the task of scrutinising platforms more in depth, it should 
be  borne  in  mind  that  their  potential  has  not  been all  unleashed  yet.  More  importantly, 
workers  do  not  address  platforms  only  for  amateur  purposes;  on  the  contrary,  a 
significant  proportion  relies  on  these  intermediaries  for  their  principal source  of  income, 
according to a survey carried out by ILO on crowd-workers (12).  

In  considering  the  background,  scholars  have  identified  three  main  reasons  explaining 
the  rise  of  the  platform-  or  app-based  workforce:  (i)  the  need  to  cope  with  short-run 
fluctuations on the demand side, (ii) the desire to reduce labour costs, (iii) the urgency 
to  meet  market  pressures  on  short-term  results  and  efficiency  (13).  In  order  to  grapple 
with  the  constant  evolution,  this  contribution  will  look  into  the  atypical  forms  of  work 
which  are  channelled  via  digital  infrastructures  (14).  Classifying  models  in  this  field  has 
attracted  a  lot  of  consideration,  as  recent  studies  on  this  topic  have  classified  several 
typologies of platforms as well as of digitally enabled work arrangements. Legal scholars 
tend to “focus separately […] on online and offline workers, because their places of work 
(remote  versus  face-to-face)  and  relationships  with  clients  (telemediated  versus  direct) 
create  very  different  patterns  of  work,  exposing  them  to  different  risks”  (15).  Setting  a 
detailed  categorisation  could  help  in  selecting  the  most  salient  realities  to  be  assessed 
from a legal standpoint.  

future prospects, Background paper for Estonian Presidency Conference ‘Future of Work: Making It e-Easy‘, 
13-14 September 2017, p. 22. 

(8) VAUGHAN R. and DAVEIO R. (2016), Assessing the size and presence of the collaborative economy in Europe, 
PwC UK, Impulse paper for the European Commission. The report identifies five key sectors (peer-to-peer 
accommodation,  peer-to-peer  transportation,  on-demand  households  service,  on-demand  professional 
services, collaborative finance). The study indicates that there are 275 collaborative economy platforms in 
9 states (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands, and UK).  

(9)  EUROPEAN  COMMISSION  (2016),  The  use  of  collaborative  platforms,  Flash  Eurobarometer,  No.  438.  Survey 
Industry, 

requested  by 
Entrepreneurship and SMEs and co-ordinated by the Directorate-General for Communication. 

the  European  Commission,  Directorate-General 

Internal  Market, 

for 

(10)  A  preliminary  survey  implemented  in  the  UK,  Sweden,  Germany,  Austria  and  the  Netherlands  in  the  first 

two quarters of 2016 will be expanded in November 2017. 

(11)  DE  GROEN  W.  P.  and  MASELLI  I.  (2015),  The  Impact  of  the  Collaborative  Economy  on  the  Labour  Market, 
CEPS Special Report No. 138. The empirical strategy based on the frequency of Google searches for words 
related to online platforms is the same carried out in HARRIS S. D. and KRUEGER A. B. (2015), A Proposal for 
Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: The “Independent Worker”, The Hamilton Project. 
It is worth noting, however, that the estimate is “significantly less than the 0.4% to 1% of employees that 
is assumed to be participating in the US”. Simply put, the platforms appeared later in the EU and “[took] 
more  time  to develop  due  to  fragmented  markets  and regulation,  as  well  as  the  fact  that  labour  is  more 
protected  and  sector  concerns  may  be  more  regulated”,  see  DE  GROEN  W.  P.,  LENAERTS  K.,  BOSC  R.  and 
PAQUIER  F.  (2017),  Impact  of  Digitalisation  and  the  On-Demand  Economy  on  Labour  Markets  and  the 
Consequences  for  Employment  and  Industrial  Relations,  Study  prepared  for  the  European  Economic  and 
Social Committee, Brussels, p. 9, n. 4. 

(12)  See  BERG  J.  (2016),  Income  Security  in  the  On-Demand  Economy:  Findings  and  Policy  Lessons  from  a 
Survey of Crowdworkers in Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J., 37(3) (reporting the main results of a survey which 
shows that almost 40% of respondents – out of a sample of crowdworkers on the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
and on Crowdflower – rely on platforms as their principal source of sustenance). 

(13)  DOKKA  J.,  MUNFORF  M.  &  SCHANZENBACH  D.  W.  (2015),  Workers  and  the  Online  Gig  Economy,  The  Hamilton 

Project. 

(14) GILLESPIE A., RICHARDSON R., VALENDUC G. et al. (1999), Technology Induced Atypical Work-Forms. Report for 

the Office of technology assessment of the European Parliament (STOA), Brussels. 

(15) HUWS U., SPENCER N. H. and JOYCE S. (2016), Crowd Work in Europe. Preliminary Results from a Survey in 
the  UK,  Sweden,  Germany,  Austria  and  The  Netherlands,  Foundation  for  European  Progressive  Studies. 
Nonetheless, outlining an inflexible dichotomy between these two forms of work is not convincing. See DE 
STEFANO V. (2016), Introduction: Crowdsourcing, the Gig-Economy, and the Law in Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J., 
37(3), p. 461. 

8 

 
                                                                                                                                    
Admittedly,  many  commentators  agree  on  dividing  this  broad  array  into  two  main 
models:  (a)  crowd-sourcing,  and  (b)  work  on-demand  via  platform  or  app  (16).  In  an 
attempt  to  resolve  this  definitional  dilemma,  a  preliminary  distinction  between 
crowdsourcing  and  work  on-demand  can  be  drawn  by  taking  into  account  the  place  of 
performance  of  work  and  considering  the  mechanisms through  which  work  is  requested 
or  obtained.  At  the  same  time,  different  approaches  in  emphasizing  the  major 
characteristics  of  these  schemes  may  lead  to  alternative  categorisation.  Without  going 
too  far  on  this  point,  platforms  may  be  classified  taking  into  account  several 
characteristics:  (i)  the  dimension  of  the  platforms,  distinguishing  between  a  global  or 
local  presence,  (ii)  the  site  of  the  execution,  differentiating  between  online  tasks  and 
“real world” tasks, (iii) the content of the “gigs”, distinguishing between creative, routine 
or  manual  jobs,  (v)  the  service  offered,  distinguishing  between  “task  specific”  and 
“generalist” platforms, (vi) the nature of the performances, distinguishing between “low-
skill”  and  “high-skill”  activities  (17),  (vii)  the  way  of  adjudication  (contest  vs. 
procurement), (viii) the system of payment (free bid versus fixed rate). Besides, looking 
at  the  location,  work  on-demand  can  be  split  into  transport  services  and  household 
services. 

In  particular,  this  report  will  concentrate  its  attention  on  three  main  subgroups  of 
concrete  working  performances  in  the  platform  economy:  (i)  passenger  transport 
services, (ii) professional tasks completed online (18), (iii) manual services carried out on 
the household’s premises, whether domestic or commercial (See Figure 1 for a complete 
picture). The research will review national practices and legal cases as well as legislations 
introduced  with  regard  to  labour  platforms  and  new  forms  of  (web-based  or  -
intermediated)  work.  In  doing  so,  attention  will  be  drawn  to  eight  European  states, 
namely  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Ireland,  Spain,  Sweden  and  United  Kingdom, 
selected  for  language  reasons  and  availability  of  data  as  well  as  knowledge  about 
legislative,  judicial  and  entrepreneurial  or  collective  initiatives.  In  the  name  of 
completeness,  the  very  first  distinction  is  between  labour  platforms  and  platforms  that 
facilitate  access  to  goods,  property  and  capital  (19).  Among  the  latters,  one  can  list 
capital  platforms  (such  as  the  British  Funding  Circle  (20)),  pure  rental  services  (such  as 
AirBnB,  HomeAway  (21)  or  Turo  (22)),  peer-to-peer  car  sharing  services  (such  as  the 
French BlaBlaCar (23)) and peer-to-peer marketplace for exchanging goods (such as the 
Spanish  Grownies  (24)).  Understandably,  this  analysis  will  not  address  this  type  of 
platforms. 

(16)  BERG  J.  and  DE  STEFANO  V.  (2015,  July  10),  Regulating  work  in  the  ‘gig  economy’,  retrieved  from 

https://goo.gl/cs3tXp. 

(17)  ZITTRAIN  J.  (2009,  July  12),  The  Internet  creates  a  new  kind  of  sweatshop,  retrieved  from 
https://goo.gl/UBUfjs  (describing  “a  pyramid  of  sorts,  with  services  designed  to  tap  serious  (and  rare) 
smarts at the top, and others to enlist anyone with a brain wave at the bottom”). 

(18) See HUWS U. (2009) The making of a cybertariat? Virtual work in a real world in Socialist Register, 37, p. 2 
(claiming  that  the  formula  “non-manual  work”  would  have  denied  “the  physical  reality  of  pounding  a 
keyboard all day”). 

(19)  DRAHOKOUPIL  J.  and  FABO  B.  (2016),  The  platform  economy  and  the  disruption  of  the  employment 
relationship, ETUI Policy Brief, No. 5., p. 2. See also FARRELL D. and GREIG F. (2016), Paychecks, Paydays, 
and  the  Online  Platform  Economy:  Big  Data  on  Income  Volatility,  JP  Morgan  Chase  Institute.  Also  in  this 
pattern,  “there  is  some  work  to  be  done,  such  as  driving  the  vehicle  by  the  car  owner  or  the  guest’s 
accommodation by flat owners”. A different dividing line could be mere sharing of costs vs. profit-seeking 
motive. See also BOCK A.-K., BONTOUX L., FIGUEIREDO DO NASCIMENTO S., SZCZEPANIKOVA A. (2016), The future 
of  the  EU  collaborative  economy  –  Using  scenarios  to  explore  future  implications  for  employment,  JRC 
Science for Policy Report. 

(20) Funding Circle is a platform connecting small and medium enterprises with lenders and investors.  
(21) AirBnB is probably the most known hospitality service. It matches hosts and guests enabling the lease or 

rent of short-term lodging. It was founded in the U.S.A. HomeAway is a vacation rental platform. 

(22)  Turo,  formerly  RelayRides,  is  a  company  that  operates  a  peer-to-peer  car-sharing  marketplace.  It  allows 

private car owners to rent out their vehicles via an online platform. 

(23)  BlaBlaCar  is  a  platform  connecting  drivers  with  idle  seats  with  travellers  or  passengers  paying  a 
contribution  to  the  costs  for  long-distance  or  city-to-city  routes.  Founded  in  France.  See  AURIEMMA  S. 
(2017),  Impresa,  lavoro  e  subordinazione  digitale  al  vaglio  della  giurisprudenza  in  RGL,  I,  p.  281 
(explaining how its business model can be distinguished from other services in the same sector by virtue of 
the cost-sharing mechanism). 

(24) Grownies is a peer-to-peer marketplace for goods and clothes for young children. Founded in Spain. 

9 

 
                                           
Figure 1. Typologies of (labour) platforms. 

Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 

In order to get a better understanding of the “new” employment trends emerging across 
Europe, a preliminary remark is needed. It is nearly impossible to enclose a very complex 
phenomenon  into  rigid  schemes,  at  least  in  the  embryonic  stages  of  platform 
development. Each platform is organised in such a peculiar way that studying, and even 
regulating, this issue with a “one-size-fits-all” approach results unfeasible. By taking into 
account  this  significant  heterogeneity,  which  may  entail  intense  juridical  implications,  a 
common business model could be traced consisting in the “instant” matching of demand 
and  supply  of  labour,  facilitated  by  digital  systems  (mostly  apps  on  smartphones  and 
online  platforms)  that  make  it  easy  to  manage  a  large  and  “low-cost”  workforce.  In  a 
nutshell, platforms allow individuals, families or companies in need of a service to hire a 
worker who is willing to offer the relevant activity, under the guise of enhanced flexibility 
(“Be Your Own Boss” was one of Uber’s mottos). Dissimilarities among companies, as will 
be demonstrated in the following paragraphs, go much beyond.  

The  aim  of  this  study  is  to  contribute  to  the  comprehensive  research  on  digital  labour 
platforms  understanding  legal  frameworks  and  related  challenges  for  policy  makers.  In 
particular,  after  defining  the  main  categories  of  platforms,  this  report  will  provide  an 
overview  of  regulatory  frames  applying  to  them.  The  operation  of  a  set  of  European  as 
well as global platforms will be described throughout five different phases. Furthermore, 
labour  law  issues  arisen  from  these  “atypical”  or  “casual”  work  arrangements  will  be 
analysed.  To  this  end,  the  attention  will  be  devoted  to  potential  or  on-going  legal 
controversies  regarding  classification  of  workers  which  in  turn  impacts  on  working 
conditions, fair treatment, and collective rights in these legal regimes (25). After looking 
at those requirements that platform companies have to comply with, measures taken by 
different  Member  States  will be  discussed.  This  paper  concludes  by  illustrating  potential 
outcomes  from  litigation  cases  impacting  on  the  employment  status  issue  and,  briefly, 
policy implications at stake. 

(25)  See  also  Commission  Staff  Working  Document,  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – 
a European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy. 

10 

 
 
                                           
1.1  Crowdsourcing and work on-demand via platform. 

Clearing  up  any  misunderstanding  on  this  issue,  it  is  essential  to  acknowledge  the 
professional  nature  of  the  performances  rendered  through  labour  platforms  (26).  There 
has been a sustained attempt to present “gig work” as something related to generosity, 
altruism or  rather volunteerism, thus  excluded from the  field of labour law. Irrespective 
of  the  reason  behind  the  decision  to  engage  with  these  economic  activities,  the 
accomplishment  of  contingent  tasks  shall  not  be  considered  merely  as  an  act  of  good 
neighbourly  relations  or  a  spare-time  activity.  Clearly,  this  “understatement”  cannot 
apply  to  duties  such  as  driving  car,  cleaning  flats,  translating  documents,  drawing  up  a 
budget  and  completing  secretarial  work  (27),  just  because  they  are  “intermediated” 
through the Internet. To this extent, a clean-up exercise is due. Using euphemisms such 
as “Runners”, “Riders”, “Taskers”, “Clickers”, “Authors”, “Hourlies” or even “Friends” is a 
clear attempt to hide the fact that human labour is at stake. The aim of this “newspeak” 
is  to  counterfeit  the  reality  or,  at  least,  to  gather  arguments  to  be  sustained  in  a 
potential lawsuit. 

After an introductory comment, it has to be pointed out that professional crowdwork (or 
“crowdsourcing”  (28))  includes  services  completed  solely  on  computer  and  delivered 
remotely, encompassing a wide variety of activities, clerical or repetitive (so-called “click 
work”) as well as creative and intellectual ones, such as conceiving marketing campaigns 
or  proofreading  academic  contributions  (29).  The  list  of  dominant  performances,  also 
labelled as “human intelligence tasks” (HITs on Amazon Mechanical Turk), is rather long, 
ranging  “from  data  entry  and  admin  work  over  graphic  design  and  coding  to  legal  and 
business  consulting”  (30).  The  pattern  involves  routine  performances  (ClickWorker  is  an 
example) executed from the provider’s house – or from any place equipped with Wi-Fi – 
and  delivered  electronically  to  a  “crowdsourcer”  (31).  These  activities  can  be  simply 
performed  by  humans,  but  are  still  too  complicated  to  be  accomplished  by  computer 
algorithms. Platforms can decomponetise work into a broad range of tiny jobs that can be 
disseminated, claimed and performed (32).  

Online tasks call for special mention. At the moment, consumers as well as policy makers 
end up in overlooking the fact that a large portion of online activities is run by humans. 
To  this  extent,  Clickworker’s  presentation is  disarming:  “As  much  as modern  computing 
power  has  increased,  there  are  still  many  things  only  humans  can  do.  (…)  Clickworker 
gets  tasks  done  that  computers  can’t  process,  won’t  process,  (because  the  cost  of 
programming  or  equipment  is  too  high)  or  those  you  can’t  do  because  you  don’t  have 
enough human resources to complete the project on time and on budget” (33). As it may 
be clear, humans are behind the digital curtain. Artificial intelligence has been described, 

(26)  A  detailed  taxonomy  of  the  online  labour  market  is  developed  in  CODAGNONE  C.,  ABADIE  F.  and  BIAGI  F. 
(2016),  The  Passions  and  the  Interests:  Unpacking  the  ‘Sharing  Economy’,  JRC  Science  Policy  Report, 
Luxembourg. 

(27)  LIEBMAN  W.  B.  and  LYUBARSKY  A.  (2016), Crowdwork,  the  Law,  and  the Future of  Work,  in  Perspectives on 

Work. 

(28) The journalist Jeff Howe coined the term “crowdsourcing” in 2006. See HOWE J. (2006, June), The Rise of 
Crowdsourcing,  retrieved  from  https://www.wired.com/2006/06/crowds/  (describing  “the  act  of  taking  a 
job  traditionally  performed  by  a  designated  agent  (usually  an  employee)  and  outsourcing  it  to  an 
undefined, generally large group of people in the form of an open call”). 

(29)  The  most  common  activities  on  Amazon  Mechanical  Turk  include,  but  are  not  limited  to:  building  and 
cleaning databases, testing software, validating search results, labelling items, transcribing audio clips and 
recordings,  harvesting  email,  editing  documents,  conducting  surveys,  recognising  irony,  placing  ad  on 
videos, and detecting obscene images. 

(30)  OECD  (2016),  New  forms  of  work  in  the  digital  economy,  Digital  Economy  Papers,  No.  260,  available  at: 

https://goo.gl/0b3c4t, p. 17. 

(31)  See  EUROFOUND  and  INTERNATIONAL  LABOUR  OFFICE  (2017),  Working  anytime,  anywhere:  The  effects  on  the 

world of work, Luxembourg – Geneva. 

(32) MILLAND K. (2017), Slave to the keyboard: the broken promises of the gig economy in Transfer, 23(2), p. 
229. See also CEFKIN M., ANYA O. and MOORE R. (2014), A perfect storm? Reimagining work in the era of the 
end of the job in Ethnographic Praxis in Industry Conference Proceedings, 1, p. 4. 

(33) Clickworker’s presentation. 

11 

 
                                           
in a way, as anything but “artificial” (34), since it is powered by human labour which can 
be employed beyond the capabilities of current technology. According to the World Bank, 
“microwork”  is  becoming  a  significant  part  of  digital  work,  allowing  “broader  access  to 
specialized  skills,  more  flexible  and  faster  hiring  processes,  and  24-hour  productivity” 
(35).  It  consists  in  executing  a  variety  of  tasks  including  recommendations  for  e-
commerce  website,  detecting  inappropriate  materials  online  (from  hate  speech  to 
pornography),  providing  customer  assistance  via  chats  and  forums.  Moderation  of  user-
generated  content  on  websites  is  another  widespread  application.  In  this  case,  legal 
implications could be even more serious (i.e. child labour hidden behind avatars, the risk 
of forced labour and “gold farming” in developing countries’ sweatshops (36)), in addition 
to concerns regarding health and safety measures. Hence, crowdsourcing is supposed to 
have two different upshots: on one hand, it provides the possibility to perform jobs that 
were  not  previously  accessible  locally  or  to  specific  groups  of  workers.  On  the  other,  it 
leads to a global mobility of existing jobs. Whether these dynamics may have an impact 
on  job  creation  or  rather  destruction  is  still  not  evident,  further  research  is  needed  on 
this specific point. 

Coming now to the second model, the expression “on-demand work via platform or app” 
refers to services executed locally (mostly on the customer’s premises), such as delivery 
(Foodora),  maintenance  (Etece.es),  handyman  (TaskRunner),  cleaning  services 
(Helpling),  and  baby-sitting,  to  mention  only  the  most  important  (37).  Transportation 
services,  although  not  precisely  delivered  at  the  customer’s  premises,  belong  to  this 
category38. Anyway, literature has focused mostly on the ride-hailing sector, as this one 
represents the most blatant manifestation of risk and opportunities, and exemplifies the 
dominant double narrative concerning platform-based economy. Needless to say, Uber – 
a  very  metonym  for  the  sector  (39)  –  has  inveigled  its  way  into  popular  culture  with 
shocking speed, giving the birth even to a new verb (40). 

It  would  be  fair  to  say  that  most  of  these  workers  are  excluded  by  some,  or  even  the 
entirety,  of  the  essential  protections  due  to  employees  (subordinate  workers),  such  as 
sick  or  holiday  leave,  full  insurance,  pension,  superannuation  or  similar  scheme,  or 
minimum  rates  of  pay  and  working  time.  In  addition  to  this,  costs  associated  with 
equipment,  maintenance, 
the  provider’s  own  charge:  no 
reimbursements  for  these  expenses  are  due.  More  often  than  not,  the  “participation 

reparations  are  at 

(34) PRASSL J. (forthcoming), Humans as a service, Oxford. In an open acknowledgment in 2013, former Waymo 
and  Uber  engineer  Anthony  Levandowski,  with  such  complete  disregard  for  human  dignity,  presented  a 
Google team in India made up of what he called “human robots”, who were cataloguing images from Street 
View  application.  See  BRADSHAW  T.  (2017,  July  9),  Self-driving  cars  prove  to  be  labour-intensive  for 
humans, retrieved from https://on.ft.com/2uHBiJq.  

(35)  See  KUEK  S.  C.,  PARADI-GUILFORD  C.,  FAYOMI  T.,  IMAIZUMI  S.,  IPEIROTIS  P.,  PINA  P.  and  SINGH  M.  (2015),  The 
global opportunity in online outsourcing, Washington, DC, p. 3 (explaining how “[i]ndustry experts suggest 
that  these  firms  currently  have  combined  annual  global  gross  services  revenue  of  about  $120  million; 
together they form about 80 per cent of the microwork market”). 

(36)  CHERRY  M.  (2016),  Virtual  work  and  invisible  labor  in  CRAIN  M.,  POSTER  W.  and  CHERRY  M.  (Eds.)  (2016), 
Invisible Labor: Hidden Work in the Contemporary World, Oakland, CA, p. 83 (arguing that “ensuring non-
coerced or non-child sources of labor are just as salient here as they are in other forms of labor”). See also 
CASILLI A. (2016), Is There a Global Digital Labor Culture? Marginalization of Work, Global Inequalities, and 
Coloniality,  Paper  presented  at  the  2nd  symposium  of  the  Project  for  Advanced  Research  in  Global 
Communication (PARGC), Philadelphia. 

(37)  The  distinction  is  not  clear-cut,  as  other  platforms,  such  as  Freelancer,  allow  selecting  workers  for  both 
virtual and real world services. From coding and design to “help with my garden maintenance” and “clean 
my house or business”. See https://www.freelancer.com/freelancers/.  

(38) ADAM D., BREMERMANN M., DURAN J., FONTANAROSA F., KRAEMER B., WESTPHAL H., KUNERT A. and TÖNNES LÖNNROOS 
L. (2016), Digitalisation and working life: lessons from the Uber cases around Europe, EurWORK, European 
Observatory of Working Life. 

(39) Uber’s impressive success further inspires other platform-based companies. It very often happens to come 
across  passionate  entrepreneurs  launching  the  “Uber  but  for  X”.  It  is  indeed  useful  as  an  expository 
example, due to the “replicability” of its business model. Nevertheless, caution has to be exercised towards 
the ride-hailing company 

(40) In France the word Ubérisation has become a synonym of casualisation. It was said, and quite rightly too, 
that “[f]ew companies offer something so popular that their name becomes a verb”, see Uberworld (2016, 
September  3),  retrieved  from  https://econ.st/2bKeQVA.  Indeed,  the  company  has  become  a  dominant 
metonym for the decline of labour-intensive industries, and hence for “reinventing” jobs. 

12 

 
                                           
agreement” (i.e. non-negotiable contract) specifies that the worker performs his duty as 
an independent contractor (self-employed worker). A very popular clause points out that 
providers  use  the  platform  at  their  own  risk.  Undervaluing  the  fact  that  most  of  labour 
related,  fiscal  and  social  security  costs  are  not  paid  is  detrimental,  all  the  more  so 
because  digital  platforms  sometimes  exert  strong  prerogatives  involving  persistent 
monitoring  power,  unilateral  arrangement  of  terms  and  condition  and  deactivation 
privilege, as explained in the following section. 

Therefore, this apparently new pattern has to be on the radar for several reasons. Firstly, 
the  “platformisation”  of  labour  relations  may  reshape  and  revive  traditional  outsourcing 
practices.  Secondly,  it  should  contribute  to  a  formalisation  of  informal  economy,  by 
“replacing  word-of-mouth  methods  of  finding  work,  and  unrecorded  cash-in-hand 
payments  by  traceable  online  payments”  (41).  Thirdly,  it  might  speed  up  the  erosion 
process  of  both  traditional  categories  and  protections  –  allowing  companies  to  gain  a 
regulatory arbitrage over traditional competitors that comply with labour law provisions. 

(41) HUWS U. (2016, June 1), Logged In, retrieved from https://goo.gl/ik6BWL. 

13 

 
 
 
                                           
2  Understanding the platforms’ business models. 

Having set the perimeter of this phenomenon, the platform’s business model will be now 
scrutinised thoroughly. In this regard, in 2016 the European Community took the stance 
defining  the  scope  of  the  notion  of  collaborative  economy  as  “business  models  where 
activities  are  facilitated  by  collaborative  platforms  that  create  an  open  marketplace  for 
temporary usage of goods or services often provided by private individuals” (42). In most 
cases, this model consists in chopping up a multipart work into its smallest components 
and  submitting  each  of  them  to  always  available  and  geographically dispersed  “legions” 
of workers. Many platforms for clerical services are operating globally as they can profit 
from  the  almost  universal  knowledge  of  the  English  language;  others  instead  are 
mediating casual work locally, sometimes contributing to reduce undeclared employment 
(incredibly  widespread  in  certain  sectors  such  as  janitorial  services).  Understanding  the 
platforms’ business model might help ascertaining whether workers are employed or self-
employed, as explained in section 4. 

As  already  flagged  above,  looking  at  labour  platforms  as  a  unified  whole  could  be 
inappropriate as well as misleading. Despite the common features, such as the enabling 
role played by ICT tools, much dissimilarity can be traced. In this paragraph, an attempt 
will  be  made  to  highlight  shared  hallmarks  of  this  autonomous  but  heterogeneous 
archetype.  As  far  as  the  business  model  is  concerned,  the  “digital  matching  firms”  at 
hand can be characterised focusing on a list of principal factors. First and foremost, the 
massive use of advanced information technology, typically the combination of widespread 
broadband, user-friendly digital application and increasingly effective features to facilitate 
transactions  and  keep  the  organisation  lean;  then  the  reliance  on  customer-based 
feedback  systems  for  quality  check  as  well  as  the  reliance  on  workers  using  their  own 
equipment  (be  they  personal  computer,  bicycles  or  cars,  whether  leased  or  owned)  to 
provide  a  service  (43).  As  mentioned,  the  interrelationships  between  actors  could  be 
described  as  triangular,  being  the  platform  (which  controls  intellectual  property  rights 
and  governance)  a  connecting  system  between  buyers  (“requesters”,  according  to  the 
internal jargon) and workers (“sellers” or “providers”). 

At  least  in  theory,  the  activities  carried  out  by  platforms  may  be  classified  as 
intermediation  between  the  aforementioned  contracting  parties.  In  addition  to  the  main 
service, ancillary activities may be supplied such as facilitation of payments, assistance in 
the  course  of  the  relevant  performance,  internal  dispute  resolution  mechanisms  or 
arbitration panels.  It is tantamount to acknowledge that the fundamental feature at the 
basis  of  the  platform  business  model  is  the  involvement  of  individual  providers  offering 
services  personally  and  mostly  for  the  same  platform  (but  not  for  the  same  client), 
although being classified as autonomous workers. An arrangement as such has the merit 
of  lowering  transaction  costs  (costs  of  finding  the  appropriate  profile,  negotiating  an 
agreement  and  enforce  it),  barriers  to  entry  and  information  asymmetries  –  at  least  on 
one  side.  Moreover,  thanks  to  the  reduction  in  agency  costs,  an  “assetless  company” 
might arrange production inputs without incurring in the costs of formal property rights, 
excluding  those  related  to  software,  patents,  and  other  intangible  assets.  That  is  why 
tech companies are often able to scale very rapidly, thanks to a shift from asset control 
to  resource  orchestration.  In  particular,  such  a  way  of  arranging  a  digital  infrastructure 
results  in  the  “pulverisation”  of  the  stable  employment  relationship.  Undeniably,  it  is 
more  convenient  for  clients  and  employer  to  engage  workers  on  a  task-by-task  basis 
rather than hiring them as employees. Many reports confirm that much of the advantage 
of new platform- and app-based players derives from their failure to comply with labour 
or  social  security  regulations  (44).  On  a  closer  inspection,  this  peculiar  model  allows  the 

(42) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social  Committee  and  the Committee  of  the Regions,  A  European  Agenda  for  the  Collaborative  Economy, 
COM/2016/0356 final (hereinafter “the Communication”). 

(43)  See  TELLES  R.  Jr.  (2016),  Digital  Matching  Firms:  A  New  Definition  in  the  “Sharing  Economy”  Space, 

Economics and Statistics Administration Issue Brief, 1, available at: https://goo.gl/ZP9KgD. 

(44) In order to be effective, this system implies the presence of a fungible and constantly available workforce. 
See  EUROFOUND  and  INTERNATIONAL  LABOUR  OFFICE  (2017),  Working  anytime,  anywhere:  The  effects  on  the 

14 

 
                                           
management  of  a  contingent  workforce  mobilised  on  a  ‘just  in  time’  basis,  thus 
responding  to  demand  peaks  and  shifting  the  impact  of  fluctuations  on  the  worker’s 
shoulders. 

At first glance, platforms constitute a promising example of a two (or multi)-sided market 
where  participants  are  rapidly  connected  via  desktop  and/or  mobile  Internet.  This 
organisation  has  reversed  the  traditional  ‘pipe’-based  business  model  –  even  though  it 
would be better to compare this new scheme to the network enterprise (45). On a closer 
inspection,  this  model  has  existed  for  decades.  What  is  new  is  the  penetration  of 
(immaterial) infrastructures which determine frictionless transactions, not to mention the 
“quantitative  leap  and  exponential  growth”  in  data  and  metrics  that,  collected,  refined 
and  analysed,  can  “train”  the  internal  algorithm  thus  resulting  in  an  even  more  prompt 
and  successful  matching  function  (46).  The  basic  structure  is  the  same  in  completely 
different  sectors,  it  replicates  the  original  model  of  a  virtual  “bulletin  board”  such  as 
Craiglist  or  eBay,  which  are  essentially  advanced  database  (47).  While  a  traditional  firm 
organises labour and other physical or immaterial resources minimising transaction costs 
internally  (according  to  the  “make”  vs.  “buy”  option,  as  theorised  by  Coase  (48)), 
platforms  generate  value  by  simplifying  and  supporting  the  interplay  between  providers 
and users/consumers. Each successful interaction guarantees a 10 up to 20% transaction 
fee  to  the  benefit  of  the  platform.  At  the  same  time,  platforms  have  the  possibility  to 
save fixed costs as well as to shed variable costs of production. Platforms do not incur in 
high fixed costs, which results in large economies of scale. Accordingly, the only activities 
that  are  “internalised”  are  middle  management,  sales  and  marketing  functions.  This  is 
how economies of scope can be combined with economies of scale and specialisation (49), 
leading  to  a  high-performing  model  of  hierarchical  outsourcing  (50).  Indeed,  as  argued, 
“firms  are  able  to  make  use  of  outsourcing  without  renouncing  to  hierarchy  in  the 
management of the relevant business relationships by means of extra-legal mechanisms” 
(51). 

Contrary  to  what  usually  happens  in  value  chain  models,  platforms  make  profits  thanks 
to the expansion of the ecosystem in a “circular and iterative” progression. Hence, a shift 
occurs  from  mass  production  to  large-scale  networks,  thanks  to  the  involvement  of 
individual  providers.  As  is  well  known,  network  effects  increase  proportionally  with  the 
growing  number  of  participants  on  the  same  side  of  the  market  (direct  effects)  or  the 
opposite side (indirect effects). There appear to be different pricing strategies for supply 

world of work, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, and the International Labour Office, 
Geneva. 

(45) On the contrary, classical “pipeline businesses” operate by controlling a linear series of activities from the 
inputs to the outputs (the value-chain model) and the process of production. Therefore, the main activity 
consists in transforming inputs at one end of the chain  into the finished product. See VAN  ALSTYNE  M.  W., 
PARKER  G.  G.  and  CHOUDARY  S.  P.  (2016),  Pipelines,  Platforms,  and  the  New  Rules  of  Strategy  in  Harvard 
Business Review, 94(4), pp. 54-62. 

(46)  VALENDUC  G.  and  VENDRAMIN  P.  (2017),  Digitalisation,  between  disruption  and  evolution  in  Transfer: 

European Review of Labour and Research, 23(2), p. 121-134. 

(47)  Early  studies  analysing  the  role  of  the  Internet  in  enabling  labour  performances  date  back  to  2001,  see 
AUTOR  D.  H.  (2001),  Wiring  the  labor  market  in  The  Journal  of  Economic  Perspectives,  15(1),  p.  25 
(demonstrating how the employer-employee matches would have been carried out on virtual venues rather 
than on-site, making one’s location irrelevant on the global scale). See also TODOLÍ-SIGNES A. (2017), The 
‘gig  economy’:  employee,  self-employed  or  the  need  for  a  special  employment  regulation?  in  Transfer: 
European Review of Labour and Research, 23(2), p. 205 (describing platforms as “a new type of company 
which claims to be a database”). 

(48) COASE R. H. (1937), The nature of the firm in Economica, 4(16), pp. 386-405. 
(49) GOLZIO L. (2005), L’evoluzione dei modelli organizzativi d’impresa in Dir. rel. ind., 2, p. 313. See also PIORE 

M. and SABEL C. (1984), The second industrial divide, New York. 

(50)  As  regard  platform-specific  investments,  drivers  must  own  a  vehicle  to  be  eligible  to  drive.  For  instance, 
Uber  usually  assists  its  drivers  in  the  relationship  with  an  affiliated  leasing  company  and  sometimes 
intervenes directly if the driver becomes delinquent in his payments. More recently, the company has also 
designed  a pilot  insurance plan  launched  in  partnership with  Aon  PLC  to  help  cover on-the-job  accidents. 
See  GEE  K.  (2017,  August  8),  In  a  Job  Market  This  Good,  Who  Needs  to  Work  in  the  Gig  Economy?, 
retrieved from http://on.wsj.com/2uBSChM. 

(51)  For  a  description  of  this  phenomenon,  admittedly  in  a  different  context,  see  DE  STEFANO  V.  (2009), 
Smuggling-in  flexibility:  temporary  work  contracts  and  the  “implicit  threat”  mechanism,  ILO  Working 
Document, 4, p. 1. 

15 

 
                                                                                                                                    
and  demand  and  asymmetric  or  surge  pricing  (52),  not  to  mention  the  promotional 
stratagems offering discounts and bonus for the launch of services (53). Conversely, the 
end  service  (or,  in  the European  Commission’s  words,  the  underlying service  –  which is 
the very service sold by the platform) is externalised to individual service providers. As a 
consequence, also marginal costs of online platforms are low.  

Yet, it could be said that “[n]o form of economic or social structure is ever entirely new” 
(54).  Therefore,  “Uberisation”  does  not  redefine  the  notion  of  the  firm.  Rather  this 
phenomenon  marks  the  shift  from  a  bureaucratic  control  to  a  more  sophisticated, 
technocratic  and  invasive  one.  Hybrid  forms  adopted  in  the  platform  economy  can  be 
situated formally halfway between those in market system (i.e. relationships driving “the 
hardest  possible  bargain  in  the  immediate  exchange”)  and  those  in  network  system 
(characterised  by  “indebtedness  and  reliance  over  the  long  haul”)  (55).  On  a  closer 
inspection, these relations may also be strongly shaped within the bureaucratic structure 
of  authority,  in  line  with  the  hierarchical  model  (56).  At  the  end  of  this  scrutiny,  it  has 
become clear that, while orthodox economic models of the firm, based on micro-analytic 
transactional  equilibria,  are  well  placed  to  identify  a  general  framework,  they  fail  to 
adequately  describe  the  quite  confusing  and  entangled  reality  of  platform  firms  (57). 
Accordingly, a fourth “breed” can be used to conceptualise the Uber-like firms’ prevalent 
business  model:  a  system  combining  complementary  features  belonging  to  dissimilar 
prototypes but in different configurations. 

2.1  An  in-depth  analysis  on  working  conditions  in  three  sub-

sectors: a multi-stage analysis. 

Understanding the way the performance is carried out is pivotal, as – in the light of the 
principle  of  the  “primacy  of  facts”  explicitly  enshrined  in  many  national  legal  systems  – 
substance has to be preferred over form (58). To explore working conditions on platforms, 
secondary data  from academic sources, non-structured interviews  and reports has been 
combined  with  publicly  available  information  (“terms  of  service”  as  well  as  independent 
investigations).  By  mapping  information  exchanged  on  closed-membership  groups  and 
dedicated  online  forums,  scrutinising  workers’  conditions  is  one  of  the  most  effective 
ways  to  collect  information  on  legal  regimes.  The  aim  is  to  generate  insights  into  a 
representative portion of the growing multitudes of platform-facilitated arrangements by 
accumulating disaggregated information about a range of different variables that help to 
differentiate  these  working  formats  along  various  dimensions.  In  order  to  describe  the 
concrete  operation  of  digital  labour  platforms,  five  key  elements  embedded  in  the 
research  question  have  been  considered,  focusing  on  their  crucial  legal  implications  in 
terms of employment status classification: (i) access to the platform and registration, (ii) 
selection  process  and  hiring,  (iii)  command  power  and  performance  execution,  (iv) 
monitoring  and  rating  (and  deactivation),  (v)  payment  rewards  for  completed  tasks.  A 

(52) It seems that platform will be soon able to discriminate on the basis of the individual’s willingness to pay. 
See EZRACHI A. and STUCKE M. E. (2015), Online Platforms and the EU Digital Single Market, University of 
Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 283, p. 9. 

(53)  This  model  turns  customers  into  “ambassador”  who  are  offered  credits  if  they  are  able  to  successfully 
convince friends to join the platform on both sides. See SRNICEK N. (2016), Platform capitalism, New York, 
p. 46 (arguing that “[p]latforms often use cross-subsidisation: one arm of the firm reduces the price of a 
service  or  good  (even  providing  it  for  free),  but  another  arm  raises prices  in  order  to make  up  for  these 
losses”). 

(54) As noted by COHEN J. E. (forthcoming), Law for the Platform Economy in U.C. Davis Law Review, p. 2.  
(55)  See  POWELL  W.  W.  (1990),  Neither  market  nor  hierarchy:  network  form  of  organization  in  Research  in 

Organizational Behavior, 12, p. 302. 

(56) For a complete analysis of these arrangements, see Part 3. 
(57)  GRIMSHAW  D.,  MARCHINGTON  M.,  RUBERY  J.  and  WILLMOTT  H.  (2005),  Introduction:  Fragmenting  Work  Across 
Organizational Boundaries in MARCHINGTON M., GRIMSHAW D., RUBERY J. and WILMOTT H. (Eds.), Fragmenting 
work:  Blurring  organizational  boundaries  and  disordering  hierarchies,  Oxford,  p.  17  (arguing  that  “it  is 
more  plausible  to  regard  ‘market’,  ‘hierarchy’,  and  ‘network’  as  concepts  that  have  proven  valuable  in 
differentiating  elements  or  dimensions  of  organising  practices  within  and  between  organisations,  rather 
than as alternative designs of economic organisation”). 

(58) See, for the Italian context, Cass. No. 13375 September 11, 2003, FI, 2003, I, 3321; Cass. No 4533 April 

10, 2000, FI, 2000, I, 2196. 

16 

 
                                           
sort of chronological order will be followed in unfolding this multi-stage process, starting 
with the registration and ending with the payment.  

2.1.1   Access to the platform and registration. 

To  gain  access  to  the  “fleet”  providing  services  through  the  platform,  a  worker  needs  a 
smartphone  equipped  with  high-speed  connection.  When  registering,  a  prospective 
worker  has  to  provide  biographical  data  (including  age,  location,  highest  degree,  title, 
grade, language skills, hobbies and know-how (59)) and a bank account where the money 
will  be  conveyed.  The  weaker  contracting  party  has  only  two  options  or,  even  better,  a 
“take-it-or-leave-it offer”: he or she may (i) adhere to the terms as drafted en bloc or (ii) 
reject  the  clauses  entirely.  The  worker  cannot  negotiate  terms  and  conditions,  as 
electronic standard contracting forms – a kind of adhesion-styled agreement (60) – allows 
only  to  click  on  “I  Agree”.  These  long  and  complex  forms  contain  a  variety  of  clauses 
encompassing  several  aspects  of  the  relevant  relationship,  from  forum  selection  to 
dispute resolution, from worker  classification to limitations of liability. Amidst such form 
that  many  users  might  have  not  even  read,  workers  can  make  inquiries  and  usually 
receive  template  responses.  These  difficulties are likely  to  be  worsened  by  the  fact  that 
workers  may  lack  direct  channels  of  communication  and  are  deprived  of  a  collective 
voice,  thus  leading  to  the  impossibility  to  have  an  impact  on  the  decision-making  that 
shapes labour processes. 

One can identify a certain uniformity between platforms (61), and the unilateral standard-
setting  activity  may  prove  to  be  an  effective  way  for  platforms  to  auto-regulate  the 
relationship.  Noticeably,  the  wording  seems  to  be  conceived  in  order  to  remain 
ambiguous  and  prevent  a  negative  outcome  in  case  of  lawsuit.  In  the  European  legal 
system, this private standard-setting may also affect the assessment of the employment 
status  of  workers.  For  instance,  food  delivery  platforms  usually  require:  being  18  or 
older, an iPhone 4s or a superior version with a tariff scheme including a data connection, 
willingness to work on the weekend, work permit, “sense of responsibility” (sic!) (62). In 
addition  to  this,  Uber  demands  documents  to  verify  the  eligibility  (63).  After  logging  in, 
the  worker  is  faced  with  a  dashboard  containing  several  elements  (i.e.  jobs  completed, 
assessment, profile or account, invoices). Speaking of requirements, in the peer-to-peer 
transport  sector,  in  most  Member  States  the  business  model  adopted  by  ridesharing 
platforms  is  based  on  licenced  drivers  (64).  In  most  of  the  cases,  workers  are  defined 
“partners” or customers, as they rely on the company’s service to be matched with final 
customers.  Moreover,  workers  renounce  the  possibility  of  challenging  their  status  and 
covenant  to  indemnify  the  platform  in  case  of  litigation  (such  clauses  are  far  from 
enforceable).  Indeed,  many  companies  now  include  arbitration  agreements  containing 
waivers  in  their  terms  of  service,  thus  narrowing  the  opportunity  for  employee 
classification  lawsuits  (65).  This  results  in the  fact  that  crucial  question issues  related  to 

(59)  Taking  the  German  Clickworker  as  an  example,  worker  can  also  upload  and  display  “work  samples”, 
including of the sort of information that would have been considered outside the purview of the traditional 
employer. 

(60) Moreover, there are realistic reasons for arguing that both worker and costumers do not authentically agree 
on anything when pushing the “I Agree” button, provided that these kinds of contracts require no explicit 
manifestation of assent. See DAVIS N. J. (2007), Presumed assent: The judicial acceptance of clickwrap in 
Berkeley Tech. L. J., 22(1), pp. 577-598. 

(61) IPEIROTIS P. G. and HORTON J. J. (2011), The need for standardization in crowdsourcing in Proceedings of the 

workshop on crowdsourcing and human computation at CHI, p. 1. 

(62) See https://rider.foodora.it/. 
(63) Considering for-hire license, the list shall include documents relating to vehicle registration, certification of 

commercial automobile liability, insurance policy. 

(64) Some commentators have suggested that ridesharing services are flourishing in the UK due to the fact that 
licensing  requirements  are  typically  minimal.  Some  member  states  (Ireland,  France,  and  Spain)  explicitly 
impose  that  profits  beyond  the  sharing  of  the  expenses  of  a  ride  can  only  be  made  by  licenced  taxi  or 
private hire car drivers. For instance, when the application UberPop, which allows non-licensed drivers (i.e. 
private  citizens)  to  offer  riders,  was  banned  in  Brussels,  Uber  restricted  it  offer  to  UberX  and  UberBlack, 
only rely on licensed drivers, though this particular type of license is extremely easy to obtain. 

(65)  The  issue  pertaining  potential  conflicts  of  laws,  particularly  when  transnational  contractual  parties  are 
operating in different jurisdictions, will be not addressed in this work. Broadly speaking, Rome I Regulation 

17 

 
                                           
legal  classification  are  “decided  secretly  and  lack  precedential  value”  (66).  After  logging 
in,  the  worker  is  faced  with  a  dashboard  containing  several  elements  (i.e.  jobs 
completed, assessment, profile or account, invoices). 

2.1.2   Selection process and hiring. 

Work  is  allocated  through  open-calls  rather  than  by  direct  assignment  or  sharp  job  role 
requirements.  The  selection  mechanism  varies  from  platform  to  platform.  Al  least  three 
principal models can be described. The “hiring procedure” may be organised (i) as a bid 
in  response  to  a  public  auction  (67)  –  each  worker  must  specify  how  fast  and  for  what 
price  he  or  she  could  do  the  job  (this  often  occurs  mostly  when  the  task  is  a  creative 
one), (ii) as an automatic matching operated by the internal algorithm on the basis of the 
specification  of  the  service  required  and  the  worker’s  profiles,  or  (iii)  in  a  different 
approach,  the  worker  may  spontaneously  apply  for  the  fulfilment  of  the  task.  Some 
“cognitive work” or “high-skill” platforms assist clients in launching a competition for the 
services  required. While many proposals may be submitted, only the “winner(s)” will be 
paid when clients select the solution they prefer. More commonly, the client indicates the 
project, workers submit their proposals and, if the solution is selected, they can arrange 
the  details,  in  few  cases  negotiating  privately.  A  sense  of  freedom  and  flexibility  is  put 
forth by assertions like the following: “[as] a Contributor, you and only you decide which 
and how many tasks to complete, and when and where you complete them. You are free 
to  spend  as  much  or  as  little  time  completing  tasks  as  you  choose.  At  no  time  are  you 
under any obligation to complete a task” (68). 

Before getting a request, samples of work (together with a relevant portfolio, if any) can 
be  offered  and  assessed  by  experts.  This  preliminary  stage  is  necessary  to  obtain  the 
possibility  to  participate  in  activities  on  many  crowdsourcing  platforms  (on  Upwork  or 
Clickworker  (69),  to  name  but  a  few).  Similarly,  workers  aiming  to  use  the  German 
platform Clickworker have to submit samples of their work or to undergo a test. They are 
rated  and  subsequently  offered  tasks  that  match  their  score.  This  platform  prevents 
“unqualified  clickworker”  from  accessing  a  set  of  task  in  the  case  they  have  “not  yet 
taken  the  respective  assessments”  or  because  the  score  falls  below  the  threshold  to  be 
reached.  Reasons  for  exclusion  include  language  requirements  or  skill-specific  needs. 
From  a  different  point  of  view,  it  may  prove  to  be  hard  to  engage  with  a  reliable  client 
due to the lack of information It should also be recalled that workers on challenge-based 
platforms  like  Zooppa  as  well  as  those  like  Amazon  Mechanical  Turk  (70)  suffer  the  key 

(Reg.  593/2008)  set  as  a  general  rule  the  freedom  of  the  parties  to  choose  the  applicable  law  (Art.  3). 
However, it explicitly restricts this freedom through provisions laid down by Article 8 introducing the notion 
of “objectively applicable labour law”. That is, the law that best suits to the relationship would be applicable 
if  no  choice  exists.  The  objectively  applicable  labour  law  has  priority  against  the  chosen  law  but  only 
regarding “provisions that cannot be derogated”, namely the hard part of labour law (ius cogens) and not 
its flexible provisions that could be legally avoided by the parties (ius dispositivum). The Regulation offers a 
set  of  criteria  aimed  at  determining  the  objectively  applicable  law.  These  criteria  are  hierarchical  and  the 
foremost criterion is the habitual place of work (lex loci laboris – Art. 8(2)). The level of protection cannot 
fall below that which would be provided in the absence of choice. Additional criteria are the place of work 
engagement (Art. 8(3)) and, ultimately, the place where work is more closely connected (rule of Art. 8(4)). 
As it has been rightly pointed out, the legal construction of the “objectively applicable labour law” concept 
is the element that should be kept and applied at a platform-mediate labour regulation at an international 
level.  See  BREGIANNIS  F.,  BRUURMIJN  W.  J.,  CALON  E.  and  ORTEGA  M.  A.  D.  (2017),  Workers  in  the  Gig 
Economy, Identification of Practical Problems and Possible Solutions, Tilburg University Working Paper. 
(66) BISOM-RAPP S. and COIQUAUD U. (2017), The Role of the State towards the Grey Zone of Employment: Eyes 
on Canada and the United States in Revue Interventions économiques in Papers in Political Economy, (58), 
p. 11. 

(67) Some platforms (such as Boblr) charge a publishing fee for the launch of each competition. 
(68) Crowdflower. 
(69)  In  this  case,  worker  must  submit  mock-up  of  their  work  or  pass  a  test.  The  appraisal  attributes  a  score 

according to which a worker will be provided with certain types of tasks.  

(70)  According  to Casilli,  AMT  is  “the  most  prominent  and  high-profile example of  a  platform  for  micro-tasks”. 
The  first  “Mechanical  Turk”  was  designed  and  implemented  by  the  Hungarian  nobleman  Wolfgang  von 
Kempelen  in  the  late  1760s.  The  platform’s  name  pays  homage  to  the  eighteenth  century  mechanical 
wooden  cabinet  containing  a  chessboard,  life-sized,  adorned  with  a  turbaned  mannequin  that  could 
compete against human players at the game of chess. A small-bodied chess player was hidden and moved 

18 

 
                                                                                                                                    
risk  of  investing  time,  coupled  with  the  unlikelihood  of  winning  and  the  harshness  of 
jumping from a task to another, sometimes even with little or no effectiveness (71). It is 
worth  noting  that  Uber  does  not  disclose  the  customer’s  destination  until  the  request  is 
accepted. This “blind” mechanism prevents drivers from competing with one another for 
passengers. At the same time, platforms such as AMT do not provide “any metrics on the 
hourly rate of the work posted” (72), therefore workers have one choice only, to complete 
some  and  calculate  the  rate  in  order  to  understand  whether  the  task  is  worth  doing  or 
not. 

2.1.3   Command power and performance execution. 

As  already  explained,  the  managerial  powers  potentially  or  concretely  exerted  by  a 
platform  may  vary  according  to  the  type  of  the  performance.  In  general,  the  overriding 
evidence  confirms  that  peer-to-peer  transport  services  and  delivery  platforms  exercise 
remarkable  supervision,  direction,  and  control  over  how  the  ride  is  completed.  For 
example,  cycle  couriers  –  who  accomplish  their  duty  personally  (73)  –  are  strongly 
recommended  to  wear  a  commercial  uniform,  use  their  own  vehicle  (74),  show  up  in  a 
defined hotspot, then log in the app from their smartphone and wait for the first order. 
While  delivering  fresh  meals  from  restaurant  to  the  customer’s  address,  they  have  to 
follow  the  “suggested  route”,  in  order  to  carry  out  their  duty  as  quickly  as  possible. 
Anyway,  they  are  required  to  interact  with  the  company’s  middle  management  through 
internal  channels  of  communication  (chat  or  apps  such  as  “Staffomatic”)  (75).  Workers 
have  to  pay  for  all  running  expenses  (petrol,  insurance,  taxes)  and  assumes  all 
responsibility should an accident occur.  

To this extent, both the (human or algorithmic) management and the final costumer are 
responsible  for  ensuring  and  assessing  the  adherence  to  the  instructions  given.  In  the 
“on-demand  household  services”  subsector,  instead,  performances  such  as  cleaning, 
home  repair,  furniture  assembling,  gardening,  painting,  handyman-like  tasks  can  be 
commonly  executed  with  a  certain  degree  of  autonomy,  although  workers  have  to 
conform  to  guidelines  and  instructions.  In  this  case,  the  dependence  experienced  by 
workers  is  both  economic  and  organisational.  Conversely,  it  is  undeniable  that  workers 
using  platforms  such  as  GoPillar  or  the  globally  widespread  InnoCentive  (76)  enjoy  a 
higher degree of autonomy. On the contrary, platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk 
and Crowdflower deliver a highly standardised service. 

pawns  from  inside  –  so  no  technology  at  all,  aside  from  mock  cogs  and  clockwork  machinery.  The 
allegorical name represents a telling metaphor for a hoax, i.e. a piece of technology that relies on human 
energies and intelligence in the “black box”. See SCHWARTZ O. (2016, February 29), Humans pretending to 
be  computers  pretending  to  be  humans,  retrieved  from  https://goo.gl/MCbNFE.  See  also  MARVIT  M.  Z. 
(2014,  February  5),  How  Crowdworkers  Became  the  Ghosts  in  the  Digital  Machine,  retrieved  from 
https://goo.gl/rJRXmA. 

(71)  According  to  an ILO  survey,  workers  may spend  up  to 18  minutes  of  unpaid  work for  every  hour  worked 
and paid. BERG J. (2016), Income Security in the On-Demand Economy: Findings and Policy Lessons from a 
Survey of Crowdworkers in Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J., 37(3), p. 557. 

(72) MILLAND K. (2017), Slave to the keyboard: the broken promises of the gig economy in Transfer, European 
Review  of  Labour  and  Research,  23(2),  p.  230  (explaining  how  “even  poorly  paying  work  gets  done  just 
through this process”). 

(73) More recently, a new contract has been introduced allowing riders in specific areas to provide the service 
through  a  third  party.  In  the  light  of  a  “substitution  clause”,  couriers  may  appoint  a  third  person  to 
complete the task in their behalf. Nevertheless, in day-to-day practice, it truly is very difficult to select a 
replacement, thus representing a barrier to the recognition of the employment status. In fact, in a potential 
lawsuit, the burden of prove that those rights did not exist or were not exercised would be on the worker. 

(74) As for TaskRabbit, “some clients provide tools and closely supervise the work, whereas others will expect 
taskers to bring their own cleaning products or use their vehicles for transport-related tasks”, see PRASSL J. 
and RISAK M. (2016), Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co.: Platforms as Employers – Rethinking the Legal Analysis of 
Crowdwork in Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J., 37(3), p. 645 (using the platform to show “how different employer 
functions are exercised by more than one entity”). 

(75) INVERSI C., DUNDON T. and BUCKLEY L.-A. (2017), ‘I Don’t Work For, I Work With...’ Disposable workers and 
working time regulation in the gig-economy, Paper prepared for presentation at the “5th Conference of the 
Regulating  for  Decent  Work  Network”  at  the  International  Labour  Office,  Geneva,  Switzerland,  3-5  July 
2017. 

(76)  It  enables  research  labs  “broadcast  scientific  problems”  with  contests  for  prizes  for  solutions  in  several 

fields.  

19 

 
                                                                                                                                    
This  “faceless”,  and  sometimes  “nameless”,  employer  may  sanction  behaviours  that  are 
not  considered  compliant  with  standards  or,  even  worse,  are  merely  valued  as  lagging 
behind customer expectations. In some cases, a training phase may be carried out either 
before starting to work or should the rating fall below the critical threshold. Video-tutorial 
are  commonly  used  to  promote  certain  best  practices.  As  far  as  Uber  is  concerned,  the 
driver’s  booklet  (also  referred  to  as  “Community  Guidelines”)  invites  to  wear  formal 
attire,  suggests  to  keep  low  the  volume  of  the  radio  or  to  play  classy  music  and 
recommends  offering  chewing  gums  or  beverages  (77).  Interestingly  enough,  some 
platforms  prevent  crowdworkers  from  subcontracting  the  relevant  task  (or  a  fraction  of 
it)  to  other  workers.  This  factor  may  be  used  to  prove  the  lack  of  autonomy  of  the 
contractual  relationship.  The  irony  is  that Amazon  Mechanical  Turk,  the  biggest  “human 
cloud”  platform,  imposes  not  to  “use  robots,  scripts  or  other  automated  methods  to 
complete the Services”. Similarly, Crowdflower does not allow to employ “Internet bots, 
web  robots,  bots,  scripts,  or  any  other  form  of  artificial  intelligence”  (78)  while 
Clickworker  prohibits  outsourcing  (“Clickworkers  are  expressly  prohibited 
from 
subcontracting or outsourcing projects to third parties unless this is expressly permitted 
by the terms of a project description”) (79). 

Some  platforms  are  organising  their  workforce  in  shifts  in  a  way  contradicting  the 
message  about  the  extreme  schedule  flexibility.  Worse  still,  schedules  are  stable  from 
week to week (80) thus hampering workers’ elasticity and ignoring their needs in terms of 
work-life balance. The narrative on the freedom of arranging one’s own timetable has to 
be  firmly  demystified  for  two  main  reasons.  Firstly,  while  it  is  correct  to  argue  that 
workers  are  free  to  be  online  whenever  they  want,  the  number  of  hours  they  spend 
online is decisive when it comes to compensation. Moreover, the rates of rides accepted 
and  rides  cancelled  contribute  to  define  the  personal  ranking.  Lastly,  when  a  system  of 
rotation  is  applied,  the  unpredictability  of  working  hours  is  very  problematic  and 
frustrating  as  it  determines  long  periods  of  inactivity,  sometimes  due  to  miscalculations 
of  the  potential  demand  and  to  arbitrary,  dysfunctional  day-to-day  scheduling  practices 
(81). Despite the differences in the intensity of “temporal sovereignty” (i.e. autonomy), it 
is  evident  that,  in  each  of  the  reviewed  sectors,  workers  must  deliver  a  standardised 
service. Perhaps most important, this reality contradicts the claim according to which gig-
workers  should  be  considered  entrepreneurs,  enjoying  the  “freedom  from  formal 
constraints such as mandatory working hours” (82). Moreover, ample evidence of the far-
reaching  negative  impact  of  the  “permanent  reachability”  definitely  holds  true  for 
crowdworkers. Their constant “stand-by modus” is boosted by platforms using incentives 
to compel then to be “logged-in” when needed, regardless their actual availability. 

2.1.4  Monitoring and rating (and deactivation). 

Traceability  of  data  (83)  is  of  utmost  importance  when  it  comes  to  vetting  workers  and 
profiling  customers  (their  needs,  their  locations  and  –  more  importantly  –  their 

(77) O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No C-13-3826 EMC, 2015. Moreover it imposes “not to shout, swear 

or slam the car door”. 

(78) See https://www.crowdflower.com/legal/. 
(79) See https://workplace.clickworker.com/en/agreements/10123. 
(80)  Riders  argue  that  their  flexibility  declined dramatically since  the  company  has  adopted  a  model based  on 
weekly  shifts.  A  leaflet  containing  Deliveroo  workers’  complaints  and  claims  can  be  found  at 
https://goo.gl/Y1jPJt (in Italian). 

(81) To make things worse, the “open availability” pattern makes it almost impossible to take on second jobs or 
enrolling  in  training  programs,  and  thereby  contradicts  the  idea  that  these  schemes  may  be  used  to 
supplement income as a second job. The result may be a “trap”. 

(82)  LEHDONVIRTA  V.  (forthcoming),  Work  alerts  and personal  bests:  Managing  time  in  the  online  gig  economy, 

New Technology, Work & Employment. 

(83) It is worth emphasising that the European Parliament resolution of 15 June 2017 on a European Agenda for 
the collaborative economy (2017/2003(INI)) “[u]nderlines the importance of collaborative platform workers 
being able to benefit from the portability of ratings and reviews, which constitute their digital market value, 
and  the  importance  of  facilitating  the  transferability  and  accumulation  of  ratings  and  reviews  across 
different  platforms  while  respecting  rules  on  data  protection  and  the  privacy  of  all  parties  involved”.  In 
addition  to  this,  the  International  Transport  Forum,  an  intergovernmental  organisation  at  the  OECD,  has 
proposed  that  data  collected  from  ridesharing  platforms  on  the  service  performance  of  individual  drivers 

20 

 
                                           
willingness  to  pay)  (84).  This  issue  has  nevertheless  been  particularly  salient  in  the 
preliminary stage of on-demand economy’s development: platforms had been greeted as 
an enhanced system allowing trust between strangers. Trust, in turn, is based on a sort 
of  “digital  market  value”,  whose  very  building  block  is  the  rating  assigned  to  workers. 
Therefore,  it  can  be  said  that  customers  trust  the  fact  that  the  worker’s  career  (or 
professionalism) has been regularly traced and he or she can be considered accountable. 
Several are the tools used to supervise the worker: GPS features on smartphones allow 
delivery companies to constantly monitor the performance of their couriers, the five-star 
system  guarantees  a  constant  appraisal  of  driver’s conducts,  the  internal  software  used 
to  complete  click  task  is  inherently  meant  to  track  actions.  Platforms  have  essentially 
deputized  their  customers  to  administer  the  workforce  and  make  meticulous  reports  on 
how  service  is  rendered  (85).  Any  provider’s  act  is  therefore  “transparent”  to  the  eye  of 
the  platform,  not  to  mention  the  possibility  of  privacy  violation,  since  the  workers  are 
information  without  a  guarantee  of 
obliged  “by  design”  to  disclose  personal 
confidentiality. The same can be said for the client: sensitive information can be shared 
with  no  clarity  on  their  use.  To  put  it  bluntly,  it  can  be  concluded  that  technology-
mediated channels allow penetrating quality control, sometimes more effective than the 
one exercised by a traditional employer. 

As far as on-demand professional services are conceived, providers may take screenshots 
of the provider’s monitor or track their keyboard strokes thanks to software specialized in 
real-time  surveillance,  also  assigning  “control”  tasks  to  double-check  the  quality  of  the 
service (86). Even the amount of time a crowdworker has to complete a task can be set 
and monitored: “[a] countdown timer displays the “Remaining Time” on each work page. 
You  must  complete  the  job  before  the  time  runs  out,  i.e.  reaches  zero.  If  this  happens 
the  job  will  be  cancelled  and  will  be  lost  for  you[;]  skipping  a  job  ensures  that  you  will 
not  be  offered  this  individual  job  again,  at  least  not  within  the  next  few  minutes.  As  a 
result,  if  few  jobs  only  are  available  for  you,  you  might  not  be  offered  any  other  jobs”. 
Ride-hailing app, for instance, relay rides to another driver, if it is not accepted within 15 
seconds.  Platforms  exchanging  high-skill  activities  have  developed  a  two-stage  control 
system.  Before  submitting  the  job  to  the  client,  a  corrector  checks,  amends  and 
evaluates  the  proposal.  In  this  case,  the  “current  rating  is  an  average  of  the  last  25 
evaluations [the worker] received for the jobs you submitted. When the corrector decides 
whether the job goes back to [the worker] for reworking he has to include this evaluation 
and  a  comment  listing  the  improvements  that  need  to  be  made”  (87).  Changes  in  the 
rating  based  on  the  comments  can  be  followed  in  the  “work  history”.  However,  such 
situation  is  temporary.  A  short  time  later,  positive  evaluations  can  increase  your  rating 
while negative evaluations can decrease it. 

On  top  of  that,  electronic  ratings  and  reviews  (defining  the  individual  position  in  the 
internal  ranking)  can  grow  up  or  fall  down  on  the  basis  of  the  capricious  customer 
satisfaction systems, affecting the likelihood to be selected and hired in the future or to 
be  assigned  the  best  paid  tasks.  Furthermore,  the  worker’s  account  can  be  deactivated 
determining, in the most serious cases, the exclusion from the platform, which seriously 
impairs his “career”. Unofficial sources refer that Uber driver’s account can be suspended 
when  his  or  her  rating  falls  below  4,6  out  of  5,  though  this  condition  can  vary  by  city. 

might be used by regulators, possibly as a partial substitute for licensing. See DARBÉRA R. (2015), Principles 
for the regulation of for-hire road passenger transportation services, OECD International Transport Forum. 

(84) Data consists of two parts: firstly, data owned by the platform (e.g. the route determined through digital 
maps)  and,  secondly,  “data  processed  in  the  form  of  inferred  information”  (e.g.  the  locations  of  their 
passengers’ work places and homes can be extracted from historical data). Data are being collected from 
drivers and not from passengers and therefore can be mined even without the consent of passengers. See 
YARAGHI N. and RAVI S. (2017), The Current and Future State of the Sharing Economy, Brookings Impact 
Series, No. 03.  

(85)  ROSENBLAT  A.  and  STARK  L.  (2016),  Uber’s  Drivers:  Information  Asymmetries  and  Control  in  International 

Journal Of Communication, 10(27), pp. 3758-3784. 

(86)  Software  such  as  Worksnaps,  Worksmart  or  Interguard  sends  regular  screenshots  from  contractors’ 
computers  so  that  clients  can  check  and  monitor  the  workflow  or  measure  the  time  taken  to  complete  a 
task. 

(87) See https://www.clickworker.com/faq/. 

21 

 
                                                                                                                                    
Ratings  are  averaged  to  mirror  their  last  500  trips.  In  particular,  the  platform  places 
drivers  on  notice  of  the  kinds  of  conducts  that  may  result  in  a  negative  consequence, 
namely  low  ratings,  high  cancellations  rates,  low  acceptance  rates  (below  90%).  Al 
already  mentioned,  the  exclusion  from  the  platform  can  be  brutal  or  improvement 
courses  can  be  offered.  In  this  case,  a  worker  has  to  “provide  proofs  of  the  steps  [he 
has] taken to improve”. Understandably, rating system may determine an indirect lock-in 
effect.  As  this  portfolio  cannot  be  transferred  to  another  platform,  a  crowdworker  is  de 
facto tied to a specific platform. Switching to a rival company is costly as it would mean 
losing “the advantage of having good ratings” (88), thus entailing further concerns on the 
ownership of this amount of data. 

In addition to this, crowd-workers are faced with the volatility of customers’ preferences. 
Currently,  many  online  crowdworking  operators’  terms  of  service  allow  unsatisfied 
customers to retain a product without compensating the worker, with no explanation (89). 
This could potentially lead to opportunistic or biased behaviours (90) or to an even more 
condescending  approach  by  workers,  justified  by  the  fact  that  they  need  to  keep  their 
evaluation  above  the  threshold  (91).  At  the  same  time,  should  amendments  be  needed, 
the worker must edit the work within a certain deadline, past which he or she loses the 
right  to  be  paid.  The  uncertainty  is  therefore  exacerbated.  Albeit  incomplete  about 
consequences, the AMT clause is more than revealing: “If a Requester is not reasonably 
satisfied  with  the  Services,  the  Requester  may  reject  the  Services”  (92).  Ratings  from 
clients, as previously clarified, impact on the personal career and can determine whether 
or not the worker receives further tasks. There is no appeal. Workers are rarely allowed 
to challenge rejections they believe are groundless, unfair, or fraudulent. While it is true 
that the evaluation is made after the execution of the performance, thus conflicting with 
the idea of the constant provision of managerial power, it could be said that the implicit 
threat of receiving a bad rating compresses the autonomy of the worker and governs his 
conduct.  

2.1.5  Payment rewards for completed tasks. 

It  can  be  said  that  the  jobs  created  are  insecure  and  extremely  low-paid,  for  most 
workers it is part of a piecemeal existence. In many cases, fares constantly fluctuate or 
are altered without workers having any say or control, making the overall remuneration 
hardly  predictable  (93).  Special  attention  merits  the  severe  income  instability,  as  “the 
system  of  remuneration  and  charging  commissions  often  lacks  clarity”  (94).  Low  and 
erratic incomes are justified by the fact that there is a pronounced oversupply of labour, 
leading some workers to cut their rates below what they consider reasonable. 

Two  are  the  main  models  when  it  comes  to  put  a  price  on  a  web-enabled  work 
performance:  either  the  platform  or  the  worker  can  set  the  payment  rate,  while  –  in 
almost  all  cases  –  the  platform  handles  the  payments.  Moreover,  it  could  be  said  that 

(88) WAAS B. (2017), Crowdwork in Germany in WAAS B., LIEBMAN W. B., LYUBARSKY A. and KEZUKA K., Crowdwork 

– A Comparative Law Perspective, Frankfurt, p. 154. 

(89)  FELSTINER  A.  (2011),  Working  the  Crowd:  Employment  and  Labor  Law  in  the  Crowdsourcing  Industry  in 

Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L., 32, p. 153. 

(90)  See  SILBERMAN  M.  S.  and  IRANI  L.  (2016),  Operating  an  Employer  Reputation  System:  Lessons  from 

Turkopticon, 2008-2015 in Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J., 37(3), p. 505. 

(91)  The  problem  lies  in  the  fact  that  algorithms  might  end  up  perpetuating  human  biases.  See  CHERRY  M.  A. 
(2016),  People  Analytics  and  Invisible  Labor  in  St.  Louis  U.  L.  J.,  61,  p.  12  (explaining  how  “if  customer 
ratings are as vulnerable to bias as research suggests, it is likely that minority drivers will be more likely 
than  white  drivers  to  be  deactivated,  but  the  deactivation  itself  looks  like  an  automatic  event,  divorced 
from  a  person  with  bias”).  For  a  comprehensive  review  on  “workforce  analytics”,  see  KIM  P.  T.  (2017), 
Data-driven discrimination at work in Wm. & Mary L. Rev., 58, pp. 857-936. 

(92) See 3.A and 3.B. 
(93) One of the latest examples is an application introduced by UberEats, which has cut the “trip reward” from 
initially £5 to £4 for weekday lunch and weekend dinner times, and to £3 for weekday dinner and weekend 
lunchtimes.  See  O’CONNOR  S.  (2016,  September  8),  When  your  boss  is  an  algorithm,  retrieved  from 
https://on.ft.com/2cJHEUA. 

(94)  DE  GROEN  W.  P.  and  MASELLI  I.  (2016),  The  Impact  of  the  Collaborative  Economy  on  the  Labour  Market, 

Centre for European Policy Studies, p. 10. 

22 

 
                                           
compensation  on  a  piece-rate  basis  is  the  norm  (by  the  job  or  even  by  the  task,  from 
cent  amounts  to  two-digit  euro  sums)  (95).  More  rarely,  performances  are  remunerated 
on an hourly basis, rarely with a “minimum rate” (96). When work is charged by the hour, 
the  monitoring  activity  is  even  more  invasive.  Accordingly,  a  relationship  can  be 
established between the qualitative nature of the work and the payment scheme.  When 
prices are set by the platform, routine tasks have a fixed or variable fee and the fare is 
calculated  on  current  market  factors.  The  platform  can  sometimes  use  specific 
estimators.  Contrariwise,  creative  activities  are  organised  as  a  contest  or  a  “lottery” 
where  “even  those  who  don’t  become  ‘winners’  have  to  transfer  all  their  intellectual 
property  rights  to  the  platform”  (97).  In  very  few  cases,  rates  of  pay  are  negotiated 
between  the  individual  worker  and  the  client  or  workers  can  freely  set  and  advertise  a 
charge for specific activities. 

With  regard  to  food-delivery  apps,  two  different  payment  structures  can  be  found:  a 
piece-based  remuneration  or  an  hourly  based  one.  In  the  first  case,  understandably, 
workers are pushed to complete as many deliveries as possible within an hour, in a way 
increasing  competition  and  diminishing  the  sense  of  solidarity  among  colleagues.  In  the 
second  case,  on  top  of  a  fixed  hourly  compensation,  bonuses  related  to  the  number  of 
completed deliveries can be assigned. Moreover, platforms such as Uber, which pays on a 
per  trip  basis,  cuts  their  transaction  fee  after  passing  a  certain  number  of  rides.  This 
incentive-based  promotional  system  is  aimed  at  encouraging  drivers  to  stay  online  and 
available.  Worse  still,  platform-coordinated  workers  are  usually  not  allowed  to  solicit  or 
accept  tips:  acceptance  of  gratuities  cultural  practices  is  inflexibly  discouraged  (98).  In 
order  to  circumvent  such  obstacles,  workers  and  customers  have  started  gaming  the 
platforms:  after  a  preliminary  contact,  they  tend  to  interact  directly,  bypassing  the 
intermediary.  

Interestingly  enough,  Amazon  Mechanical  Turk  pays  out  cash  only  to  American  and 
Indian  bank  accounts,  being  these  the  two  main national  communities  of  workers  using 
such  platform.  More  than  ten  years  after  it  was  started,  if  workers  are  based  in  a 
different state, they get paid in the form of credits or Amazon.com gift cards to be used 
on  the  e-commerce  section  of  the  same  website.  As  a  consequence,  workers  may  only 
buy  physical  item  and  have  to  pay  delivery  charges  –  a  win-win  situation  for  the 
platform. On Clickworker, instead, when a certain amount is reached, money goes to the 
bank  or  to  a  personal  Paypal  account.  Most  workers  work  from  10  to  20  hours  a  week, 
earning  about  $  80  a  month.  Some  workers  who  use  the  platform  “full  time”  can  reach 
20-40  hours  a  week,  amounting  to  a  salary  of  $  200-750  a  month.  The  average  hourly 
pay  is  2  euros.  “Highly  ranked”  workers  can  get  up  to  6-8  euros  per  hour.  As  a  result, 
stress and unpaid waiting time are the norm.  

(95) In general, the per-delivery rate is understood as a dramatic pay drop. Certain reports indicate that many 
crowdworkers  are  economically  dependent  on  one  or  few  platform  companies  they  are  simultaneously 
active on. For example, for approximately 40% of crowdworkers their work on Amazon Mechanical Turk is a 
full-time  occupation.  See  MILLAND  K.  (2016),  Crowd  Work:  the  Fury  and  the  Fear  in  FOUNDATION  FOR 
EUROPEAN  PROGRESSIVE  STUDIES  (FEPS),  The  Digital  Economy  and  the  Single  Market,  Brussels,  Belgium,  p. 
84.  See  also  EUROFOUND  (2015),  New  forms  of  employment,  Luxembourg,  p.  115  (describing  poor 
conditions of crowd workers: “research has, for example, shown that 25% of the tasks offered at Amazon 
Mechanical  Turk  are  valued  at  €0.007,  70%  offer  €0.04  or  less,  and  90%  pay  less  than  €0.07.  This  is 
equals an hourly rate of around €1.44”). 

(96)  In  a  most  unusual  way,  the  global  free-lancing  platform  Upwork  imposed  a  sort  of  “minimum  rate”  of  3 
dollars per hour for all jobs, irrespective of the location of the performance. Adtriboo, a Spanish platform, 
applies a minimum or even fixed price for specific tasks on the basis of market prices and assumed number 
of  hours  spent  for  completing  such  a  task.  See  FINCK  M.  (2017),  Digital  Regulation:  Designing  a 
Supranational  Legal  Framework  for  the  Platform  Economy,  LSE  Legal  Studies  Working  Paper  No.  15 
(exhibiting a set of examples of self-regulation). 

(97) DÄUBLER W. (2017), Challenges to Labour Law in PERULLI A. (Ed.), L’idea di diritto del lavoro, oggi: In ricordo 
di  Giorgio  Ghezzi,  Padova,  p.  485.  In  a  different  work,  the  author  uses  the  expression  “greyhound”,  see 
DÄUBLER W. and KLEBE, T. (2016), Crowdwork: datore di lavoro in fuga? in Giorn. dir. lav. rel. ind., 3, p. 479 
ff.  (arguing  that  crowdwork  represents  the  dawn  of  an  unprecendent  form  of  compensating  subordinate 
work: contest with prizes). 

(98)  See  WEINBERGER  M.  (2017,  June  20),  Uber  will  finally  let  its  drivers  accept  tips,  retrieved  from 

https://read.bi/2rRAaQU. 

23 

 
                                           
Notwithstanding the above considerations, the levels of remuneration for virtual unskilled 
tasks  appear  particularly  low  when  converted  into  hourly  rates  and  compared  with 
national  averages  for  standard  employment  involving  similar  tasks.  They  also  appear 
insufficient to serve as a primary source of income. The scale of employment associated 
with  this  type  of  work  is  currently  limited.  Apart  from  the  risk  of  rejection,  one  of  the 
main  causes  of  complaint  is  delays  in  receiving  payments.  Other  grievances  underlying 
dissatisfaction  mention  the  fact  that  payments  are  often  lower  than  expected.  Although 
the final fee is calculated according to the estimated average processing time as well as 
to the level of difficulty, or – for creative tasks – to the special skills required to fulfil the 
job,  hidden  extras  may  cause  an  significant  reduction  in  the  amount  due.  So,  just  in 
conclusion,  several  negative  aspects  need  to  be  stressed:  firstly,  the  total  lack  of 
transparency  of  criteria  applied  to  payments,  secondly,  the  absence  of  the  minimum 
levels of payment (either hourly or per task) and, thirdly, the worrisome unpredictability 
of how much a worker may earn using a given platform.  

24 

 
 
3  Overview of the legal frameworks applying to labour 

platforms. 

From  a  regulatory  perspective,  platform  labour  represents  a  “moving  target”  (99). 
Building on the results of the wide-ranging investigation into concrete working conditions 
in  three  selected  subsectors  (passenger  transport  services,  professional  crowdsourcing, 
on-demand work at the client’s premises), the crucial question that now needs answering 
is  whether  the  existing  legal  frameworks  provide  adequate  responses  to  the  current 
(digital)  challenges.  This  dilemma  encapsulates  very  well  tensions  underlying  any 
discussion  on  working  in  the  platform  economy:  is  it  sufficient  that  common  statutory 
rules and standards are correctly applied or is there a need for new legislation? On this 
matter,  boosters  and  naysayers  have  re-ignited  a  heated  debate  on  the  relationship 
between  law  and  technological  progress  or,  even  better,  on  the  ability  of  regulations  to 
keep  pace  with  various  forms  of  innovation.  Yet  until  very  recently  “little  systematic 
effort  has  been  made  to  establish  how  existing  regulations  should  apply”  (100).  Without 
taking  position  on  the  unnecessary  dispute,  the  following  paragraphs  will  map  and 
highlight national requirements to comply with. One thing is sure: the claim that existing 
laws should be disapplied and new ones adopted to better support digital matching firms 
interests is weak (101). 

To  begin  with,  in  the  fragmented  European  landscape,  several  indicators  help  to  define 
the  dimension  of  work  associated  with  the  platform  economy.  The  stable  proportion  of 
self-employment in the EU (14.9% in 2015 (102)) may serve as a proxy to determine the 
potential  size  of  a  contingent  of  workers  ready  to  engage  in  this  economic  segment  (a 
possible  “‘surplus  population’  of  workers”).  At  the  same  time,  both  temporary  contracts 
and  self-employment  grew,  quite  strongly  in  some  Member  States,  between  the  mid-
1990s  and  2007.  There  is  more.  Despite  the  relatively  tiny  proportion  of  this  class  of 
workers, there was an increase in the share of self-employed people without employees 
(solo  self-employed  workers)  between  2002  and  2015,  while  the  composition  of  this 
group  is  changing  –  service  sectors  account  for  the  largest  portion  of  self-employed 
labour  force  (103).  Moreover,  the  percentage  of  workers  taking  up  second  jobs  has 
augmented  gradually  thus  expanding  the  same  pool  of  workers:  the  majority  of 
freelancers  in  OECD  countries  are  “slashers”  (workers  with  a  portfolio  of  multiple 
activities to earn a living), as their contract work supplements another part-time or full-
time  position  (104).  In  spite  of  the  differences  among  States,  all  these  trends  appear  to 
pre-date slightly the advent of the collaborative economy; it is indeed a well-known fact 
that most digitally enabled companies were founded only in the last five to ten years. 

(99) GARBEN S. (2017), Protecting Workers in the Online Platform Economy: An overview of regulatory and policy 

developments in the EU, European Risk Observatory Discussion paper, p. 14. 

(100) HUWS U. and JOYCE S. (2016), The economic and social situation of crowd workers and their legal status in 

Europe, op. cit., p. 4. 

(101) DEAKIN S. and MARKOU C. (2017, September 25), London Uber ban: regulators are finally catching up with 

technology, retrieved from https://goo.gl/fpgTMM. 

(102) Defined as “the employment of employers, workers who work for themselves, members of producers’ co-
operatives, and unpaid family workers. Employed people are those aged 15 or over who report that they 
have worked in gainful employment for at least one hour in the previous week or who had a job but were 
absent 
from  work  during  the  reference  week”.  See  https://data.oecd.org/emp/self-employment-
rate.htm#indicator-chart.  According  to  Eurostat,  in  2016,  30.6  million  people  aged  between  15  and  64 
were  self-employed  in  the  EU.  They  accounted  for  14%  of  total  employment,  see  https://goo.gl/yc7jCK. 
See  also  EUROFOUND  (2017),  Exploring  self-employment  in  the  European  Union,  Publications  Office  of  the 
European  Union,  Luxembourg  (warning  that  the  figure  may  seem  “to  be  in  contrast  with  the  current 
discourse on the rise of non-standard employment and selfemployment”). 

(103)  Own-account  workers  (self-employed  people  without  employees)  amount  to  10%  of  all  employed,  while 
employers (self-employed persons with at least one employee) take a share of 4.5% of total employment 
in Europe. Among the self-employed, one out of five could be classified as “dependent” in the light of their 
self-perceived  and  objective  economic  situation.  For  a  complete  picture,  see  EUROFOUND  (2017),  Non-
standard forms of employment: Recent trends and future prospects, Dublin, p. 1.  

(104)  HUSSENOT  A.  (2017,  August  21),  Why  the  future  of  work  could  lie  in  freelancing,  retrieved  from 
http://wef.ch/2vWWHPR.  In  addition  to  this,  it  is  important  to  note  that  most  of  these  self-employed 
workers have no employees. 

25 

 
                                           
To  put  it  bluntly,  the  very  questions  to  be  answered  are:  does  an  authentic  loophole 
exist?  How  can  this  space  of  uncertainty  be  reduced  to  the  benefit  of  the  parties 
involved?  Solving  this  dilemma  is  no  minor  matter.  More  recently,  the  European 
Parliament has called on the Commission “to publish guidelines on how Union law applies 
to  the  various  types  of  platform  business  models  in  order,  where  necessary,  to  fill 
regulatory gaps in the area  of  employment and social security”. At first glance, it might 
seem that policymakers seem to have adopted a “wait–and–see” attitude so far, at least 
from a labour law perspective: this approach is to be welcomed as a  wise choice, given 
the embryonic phase of this sector. Nevertheless, a number of episodic initiatives may be 
traced mostly concerning work on demand and transport services (105). Conversely, much 
more  has  been  said  (and  done)  in  the  field  of  competition,  tax  and  administrative  law, 
particularly as regarding ride-haling services such as Uber or, more in general, occasional 
services exchanged directly or through various intermediaries, including digital platforms 
(106).  

The  truth  is  that  some  old issues  gain  new  attention  and  conceivably importance  in  the 
age  of  digital  transformation  of  work.  It  can  be  said  that,  from  a  legal  point  of  view, 
“digital  platform  work”  does  not  even  exist.  First  of  all,  as  explained  in  the  previous 
sections,  the  modalities  in  which  digitally  enabled  work  is  performed  differ  much  from 
one  another.  While  focusing  on  the  “distribution  channel”  is  convenient  for  academic 
purposes (even though it is not a legal criterion for distinction), regulating app-mediated 
work  as  an  entirely  unique  category  deserving  “new  notions,  new  concepts,  new 
regulations” should be avoided: the design of specific legislation only targeting platforms 
makes little sense, at least in the area of labour law. Before going into the content of the 
third section of the report, it is important to clarify that there has been a little number of 
court cases around Europe providing insights on different topics yet. Thus this section will 
highlight  national  requirements  and  legal  frameworks  that  may  be  adapted,  using  the 
already  defined  tripartite  scheme  to  present  collaborative  economy  services  (peer-to-
peer  transport  services,  crowdsourcing,  manual  on-demand  work  via  platform). 
Afterwards,  the  second  paragraph  will  investigate  the  issues  at  hand  in  pending  and 
potential lawsuits and their possible outcomes, largely looking into the vexed question of 
worker classification. 

3.1  (European and) national requirements to comply with. 

It should be made clear that, from a purely legal point of view, “digital platform-enabled 
labour” does not even exist, in the sense that it is not “a sort of watertight dimension of 
the  economy  and  the  labour  market”  (107).  First  of  all,  as  explained  in  the  previous 
sections, digitally enabled work patterns differ much from one another. What is more, the 
fact is that this intrinsic heterogeneity makes generalisation hazardous. While the wide-
ranging  description  of  working  conditions  in  the  “app  economy”  is  becoming  consistent 
and  unambiguous  –  at  least  in  academic  research,  there  is  no  consensus  on  the  legal 

(105) LENAERTS K., BEBLAVÝ M. and KILHOFFER Z. (2017), Government Responses to the Platform Economy: Where 
do we  stand?,  CEPS  Policy  Insights  No.  30, p.  5  (claiming that  “[i]n  Europe,  the most  common  approach 
taken  by  governments  involves  applying  the  legal,  regulatory  and  policy  frameworks  that  are  already  in 
place to the platform economy. In none of the countries studied is there a specific framework or guidelines 
covering the platform economy as such”). 

(106) Some countries such as Finland have published guidance on the application of the national tax regime to 
the collaborative economy. Moreover, the Italian “Sharing Economy (Tax) Act” – which was simply brushed 
aside  when  it  came  to  the  actual  discussion  –  introduced  a  “discounted”  tax  rate,  with  lower  or  no  tax 
charged on income up to €10,000. See VAUGHAN R. and DAVERIO R. (2016), Assessing the size and presence 
of the collaborative economy in Europe. PwC UK, impulse paper for the European Commission. Two other 
significant  experiences  can  be  mentioned.  For  instance,  in  Belgium  an  act  adds  a  new  type  of  income 
related  labour  activities  delivered  via  “registered  platforms”  (i.e.  recognised  by  the  Belgian  federal 
government) below € 5,000 of annual income. A beneficial fiscal regime of 10% applies. Below this cut-off, 
no VAT or social contributions are charged. For income gained through accommodation, there are different 
rules (and then generally municipal taxes apply). In France, instead, in its 2014 annual digital report, the 
Conseil  d’Etat  proposed  the  creation  of  a  platform-specific  status  requiring  the  renegotiation  of  Directive 
2000/31/EC. 

(107)  DE  STEFANO  V.  (2016),  The  rise  of  the  “just-in-time  workforce”:  On-demand  work,  crowdwork,  and  labor 

protection in the “gig economy” in Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J., 37(3), p. 472. 

26 

 
                                           
recipe  for  dealing  with  these  issues.  Scholars,  commentators  and  lawmakers  have 
conflicting  views  on  the  applicability  of  existing  legal  frameworks  to  digitally  enabled 
platforms  (108).  On  the  one  hand,  those  who  think  that  new  realities  of  work  have 
outgrown  old-fashioned  legal  concepts,  on  the  other,  those  who  insist  in  making  clear 
that  the  newness  of  platforms  does  not  deserve  or  justify  a  special  treatment.  Boosters 
and  naysayers  have  re-ignited  a  heated  debate  on  the  relationship  between  law  and 
technological  progress  or,  even  better,  on  the  ability  of  regulations  to  keep  pace  with 
transformational new realities. In the meantime, platforms have grown pretending not to 
be covered by already  existing regulations (109), “their preferred tactic being that of the 
fait accompli” (110). 

Only  few  European  States  have  adopted  explicit  regulations  to  address  the  numerous 
issues stemming from the advent of the collaborative economy: the model is mercurial in 
nature  and  a  hefty  intervention  may  provoke  its  premature  asphyxiation.  Accordingly, 
before proposing universal or rather horizontal regulatory schemes, it would be useful to 
validate  the  appropriateness  of  existing  labour  legislations.  According  to  the  European 
Parliament, in fact, “certain parts of the collaborative economy are covered by regulation 
at  local  and  national  level”  (111),  therefore  member  States  are  encouraged  to  “step  up 
enforcement of existing legislation” by recurring to all available tools (112). In the view of 
many scholars, “[m]ethods need to be found of applying existing European directives and 
national  legislation  to  work  of  this  kind”  (113).  Taking  note  of  the  current  state  of  play, 
which kind of rule could be applied to digital labour platforms? As already mentioned, it 
might  be  acknowledged  that  these  arrangements  often  fall  within  the  “extended  family” 
of “non-standard forms of employment” which are even more frequently used to “enable 
a  firm  to  adjust  to  fluctuations  in  demand”  as  well  as  for  cost-saving  reasons  (114). 
Typically,  these  forms  imply  a  discontinuous  and  multilateral  nature  of  the  relationship 
and  the  concrete  risk  of  work  intensification.  Conceived  as  a  balanced  instrument 
combining  flexibility  and  security,  they  have  largely  been  employed  for  unintended 
purposes, thus resulting in an escalation of precariousness leading to a detrimental race 
to the bottom. 

If, for instance, platform-based labour is understood as a peculiar form of vulnerable (yet 
subordinate) work, then the feasibility of the application of the three directives regulating 
“atypical  employment”  to  platform  workers  (namely,  Part-Time  Work  (115),  Fixed-Term 

(108)  SUNDARARAJAN  A.  (2017),  The  Collaborative  Economy:  Socioeconomic,  Regulatory  and  Policy  Issues, 
Directorate  General  for  Internal  Policies  Policy  Department,  Economic  And  Scientific  Policy,  p.  7  (arguing 
that “it is important to think beyond simply trying to retrofit old regulatory regimes onto the new models”). 
(109) A Uber manager once admitted that the company, today in the seventh year of operation, didn't “have the 
time  to  marinate  on  some  of  the  basics  as  the  focus  has  been  on  launching  in  more  cities”.  See  Uber 
drivers  confront  challenges  working 
from 
https://goo.gl/WUFjK4.  

‘faceless  boss’  (2017,  June  9), 

retrieved 

for  a 

(110) DEGRYSE C. (2016), Digitalisation of the economy and its impact on labour markets, WP ETUI, No 2, pp. 15 
and  35  (claiming  that  “these […]  strategies  are  likely  to  have  a  major  impact  on  the  traditional  payment 
and  regulation  models  directly  affecting  workers”).  See  also  GRAHAM  M.,  HJORTH  I.  and  LEHDONVIRTA  V. 
(2017), Digital labour and development: impacts of global digital labour platforms and the gig economy on 
worker livelihoods in Transfer, European Review of Labour and Research, 23(2), p. 153 (arguing that “work 
tends  to  be  performed  outside  of  the  purview  of  national  governments:  minimum  wages,  worker 
protections, and even taxes, seem to be optional rather than required for both the platforms and the clients 
that source work through them”). 

(111)  European  Parliament  resolution  of  15  June  2017  on  a  European  Agenda  for  the  collaborative  economy 
(2017/2003(INI)).  Para.  14. Yet,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that,  in  the  section  “Impact  on  labour  market 
and workers’ right”, the Parliament demands, “in a proactive way”, the modernisation of existing legislation 
and the reduction in regulatory gaps. 

(112)European  Parliament  resolution  of  15  June  2017  on  a  European  Agenda  for  the  collaborative  economy 

(2017/2003(INI)). Para. 15. 

(113) VALENDUC G. and VENDRAMIN P. (2016), Work in the digital economy: sorting the old from the new, WP ETUI, 

No. 3, p. 42. 

(114)  INTERNATIONAL  LABOUR  OFFICE  –  ILO  (2016),  Non-standard  employment  around  the  world:  Understanding 

challenges, shaping prospects, Geneva, p. 159. 

(115) Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on Part-time work 
concluded  by  UNICE,  CEEP  and  the  ETUC,  OJ  [1999]  L14/9  (pursuing  quality  alongside  the  non-
discrimination  aims,  the  directive  imposes  comparable  working  conditions  for  full-time  and  part-time 
workers  unless  there  is  an  objective  justification  for  dissimilar  treatment).  For  a  comprehensive 

27 

 
                                           
Contract (116), Temporary Agency Work (117)) should be assessed (118). Broadly speaking, 
“each Directive reflects  a trade-off between flexibility for  employers to have recourse to 
these forms of contract, coupled with standards on the treatment of such workers” (119). 
They  were  underpinned  by  the  assumption  workers  engaged 
in  non-standard 
employment  should  not  see  their  working  conditions  limited  by  barriers  erected  on  the 
basis  of  the  form  of  employment.  Interestingly  enough,  the  aforementioned  directives 
impose  a  prohibition  of  discrimination  but  also  contain  limits  and  provisions  aimed  at 
preventing  the  abuse  of  such  forms  (120).  Furthermore,  one  could  claim  the  significance 
of standards regarding Undeclared Work (121), Equal Pay (122) and Equal Treatment (123). 
It  can  be  said  that  the  rationales  behind  these  guidelines  are  now  challenged  by  the 
increasing  prevalence  of  ITC-enabled  arrangements,  thus  needing  to  be  updated  and 
reviewed.  

Another  question  to  be  addressed  is  whether,  and  to  what  extent,  the  Directive  on 
Working  Time  (124)  –  offering  a  lot  of  flexibility  in  exchange  for  certain  limits  –  may  be 
used  as  regards  the  workers  concerned.  However,  it  has  to  be  noted  that  workers  who 
can  determine  the  organisation  of  their  own  working  time  are  not  necessarily  excluded 
from being in an employed relationship. Against this background, it has to be pointed out 
that the notion of working time is defined as an interval “during which the person gives 

assessment, see BELL M. (2011), Achieving the Objectives of the Part-Time Work Directive? Revisiting the 
PartTime Workers Regulations in Industrial Law Journal, 40(3), pp. 254-279. 

(116) Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the Framework Agreement on Fixed-term work 
concluded  by  ETUC,  UNICE  and  CEEP,  OJ  [1999]  L175/43  (the  directive  establishes  a  framework  for  the 
prevention of both abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term contracts and discrimination against 
those working under fixed-term contracts). For a comparative analysis of the origins and evolution of legal 
regulations  on  fixed-term  employment  contract,  see  LUDERA-RUSZEL  A.  (2015),  Typical  or  Atypical: 
Reflections on the Atypical Forms of Employment Illustrated with the Example of a Fixed-Term Employment 
Contract-A  Comparative  Study  of  Selected  European  Countries  in  Comp.  Lab.  L.  &  Pol’y  J.,  37,  pp.  407-
445. 

(117)  Directive  2008/14/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  of  19  November  2008  on  temporary 
agency  work  OJ  [2008]  L327/9  (allowing  workers  to  fall  under  the  scope  of  domestic  definitions  of 
“employees”  or  “workers”  and  qualify  for  stronger  employment  rights).  See  also  EUROPEAN  COMMISSION 
(2014), Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  on  the  application  of  directive  2008/104/EC  on 
temporary agency work. COM(2014) 176 final, p. 19 (stating that the use of derogations to the principle of 
equal treatment could, in specific cases, “have led to a situation where the application of the Directive has 
no real effects upon the improvement of the protection of temporary agency workers”). 

(118)  The  resolution  of  European  Parliament  urges  the  Commission  to  reinforce  the  implementation  of  already 
existing directives devoted to precarious employment in order to “the spread of socio-economic uncertainty 
and the deterioration of working conditions for many workers”. 

(119)  BELL  M.  (2012),  Between  flexicurity  and  fundamental  social  rights:  the  EU  directives  on  atypical  work  in 
European Law Review, 37, p. 36 (wondering whether there is a fundamental social right to equal treatment 
for  atypical  workers).  The  principle  of  equal  treatment  contained  in  directive  on  Part-Time  Work,  Fixed-
Term Contract, and Temporary Agency Work. 

(120) See Paragraph 5 of the Framework Agreement on Fixed-Term Work; art. 4(1) of Directive 2008/104/EC. 
(121) A type of undeclared work is “own account” or “self-employed work”, where self-employed persons provide 

services either to a formal enterprise or to other clients, such as households. 

(122) Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 

relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women. 

(123) Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment 

in employment and occupation. 

(124)See RISAK M. (2017), The scope of working time directive: perspective and challenges, A Thematic Working 
Paper  for  The  Annual  Conference  of  the  European  Centre  of  Expertise  (ECE)  in  the  field  of  labour  law, 
employment  and  labour  market  policies:  The  Personal  Scope  of  Labour  Law  in  Times  of  Atypical 
Employment  and  Digitalisation  (arguing  that  “[those  persons  active  in  the  virtual  realms  of  the  gig 
economy] are formally free to work what and when they choose – but this freedom may often be no more 
than  formal  due  to  an  economic  situation  which  does  not  leave  them  a  lot  of  alternatives  to  selling  their 
labour  in  a  certain  way  to  certain  contractual  partners”).  It  has  been  claimed  that  the  WTD  has  been 
written  “from  the  perspective  of  a  standard  worker  is  expected  to  work  excessively  long  hours”.  For  a 
comprehensive analysis, see DAVIES A. (2013), Regulating Atypical Work: Beyond Equality in COUNTOURIS N. 
and  FREEDLAND  M.  (Eds.),  Resocialising  Europe  in  a  Time  of  Crisis,  Cambridge,  UK,  pp.  230–249. 
Interestingly  enough,  AMT  warns  its  providers  to  “comply  with  all  applicable  laws  and  registration 
requirements,  including  those  applicable  to  independent  contractors  and  maximum  working  hours 
regulations”. 

28 

 
                                                                                                                                    
up autonomy and is not free to determine its  behaviour” (125), a concept that somehow 
diverges  from  the  basic  structure  of  some  of  these  alternative  arrangements.  At  the 
same time,  one could argue that, in most  of the cases, the substantial conduct and the 
concrete situation of this group of workers approximates the one of employees, therefore 
the provisions of the directive shall apply by analogy. Nevertheless, the extension of the 
scope of the abovementioned regulation may be considered questionable, since “working 
time  restrictions  in  the  sense  to  forbid  [workers]  to  work  beyond  a  certain  number  of 
hours” (126) may prove be to the detriment of this group, infringing the possibility to earn 
a decent wage, stay above the ranking thresholds, then be paid enough or be appointed 
in  the  future.  Indeed,  tracking  all  activities  in  order  to  enforce  a  regulation  as  such 
“would  lead  to  a  complete  supervision  of  the  individual  and  it  would  be  incomplete 
because  the  time  spent,  e.g.,  in  preparing  work  with  electronic  media,  will  be  not 
included”  (127).  As  shown  above,  an  extensive  interpretation  of  the  Directive  may  cause 
difficulties.  In  nearly  all  scenarios,  its  application  is  not  entirely  satisfactory,  unless 
prompt action is taken to ensure scrupulous revision and reasonable enforcement. 

Box 1. The Communication on the European agenda for the collaborative 
economy 

Rebutting  the  charge  of  ill-adapting  pre-existing  or  out-dated  legal  arsenal  and  national 
regulations  to  this  new  mode  of  doing  business  (128),  starting  from  2015,  the  European 
institutions  have  developed  a  framework  for  (collaborative)  online  platforms.  This 
journey’s  milestones  are  several:  after  the  adoption  of  the  Single  Market  Strategy  in 
October 2015, the Commission focused its attention on carrying out a public consultation, 
with  the  aim  to  gather  the  observations  of  various  stakeholders  including  public 
authorities,  scholars,  entrepreneurs  and  individuals,  and  a  valuable  Eurobarometer 
survey  (129).  Finally,  two  Communications  on  Online  Platforms  and  on  the  Collaborative 
Economy  were  released  between  May  and  June  2016.  Since  the  first  is  rather  wide-
ranging (it contains principles such as a level playing field for comparable digital services, 
transparency,  openness  and  non-
responsible  behaviour  of  online  platforms, 
discrimination)  (130),  a  hands-on  analysis  of  the  Agenda  for  the  Collaborative  Economy 
will be provided (131). 

(125) VERHULP E. (2017), The Notion of ‘Employee’ in EU-Law and National Laws, A Thematic Working Paper for 
The Annual Conference of the European Centre of Expertise (ECE) in the field of labour law, employment 
and  labour  market  policies:  The  Personal  Scope  of  Labour  Law  in  Times  of  Atypical  Employment  and 
Digitalisation. 

(126) RISAK, ibidem.  
(127) DÄUBLER W., Challenges To Labour Law in PERULLI A. (Ed.), L’idea di diritto del lavoro, oggi: In ricordo di 

Giorgio Ghezzi, Padova, p. 497. 

(128)  HATZOPOULOS  V.  and  ROMA  S.  (2017),  Caring  for  Sharing?  The  Collaborative  Economy  under  EU  Law  in 

(129) 

Common Market Law Review, 54(1), p. 26. 
The 

438: 
https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S2112_438_ENG  

Eurobarometer 

Flash 

use 

of 

collaborative 

platforms, 

retrieved 

from 

(130) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions,  “A  Digital  Single  Market  Strategy  for  Europe” 
{SWD(2015)  100  final}.  Brussels,  6.5.2015.  COM(2015)  192  final.  See  BUSCH  C.,  SCHULTE-NÖLKE  H., 
WIEWIÓROWSKA-DOMAGALSKA A. and ZOLL F. (2016), The Rise of the Platform Economy: A New Challenge for 
EU Consumer Law? in Journal of European Consumer and Market Law, 1(6), p. 4 (soliciting the drafting of a 
Platform Directive since “EU consumer law does not adequately cover the growing number of three-party 
situations”). 

(131) This paragraph draws from ALOISI A. (forthcoming), The role of European institutions in promoting decent 
work  in  the  collaborative  economy  in  BRUGLIERI  M.  (Ed.),  Multi-disciplinary  design  of  sharing  services, 
Milano. 

29 

 
                                           
A  cornerstone  of  the  Communication  resides  in  the  classification  of  activities.  If  the 
distinction  between  true  and  commercial  sharing  can  easily  be  rooted  in  the  switch 
between  “compensation  costs  vs.  remuneration”,  regulators  are  constantly  asked  to 
distinguish between professionals and individuals who turn to the collaborative economy 
platforms  on  an  occasional  basis,  when  services  are  provided  for  free  or  at  a  price  that 
barely  covers  costs.  Experts  suggest  establishing  a  narrow  set  of  criteria  such  as  the 
frequency with which a service is rendered, the provider’s profit-seeking motive and the 
relevant  payment  (132).  Yet,  the  issue  is  far  from  being  unravelled.  Lines  between 
categories  are  now  increasingly  tangled,  and  sometimes  this  uncertainty  seems  to  be 
sought deliberately in order to avoid due legal compliance. 

In the Communication, the supply of the “underlying service” is considered the criterion 
to establish which regulatory corpus should be applied to a given platform. In particular, 
this paragraph focuses on the multilayer analysis designed by the Commission and aimed 
at establishing whether a platform is operating in a “real world” sector, rather than as an 
ICT  matchmaker.  According  to  the  document,  if  the  platform  provides  the  “underlying” 
service,  in  addition  to  the  information  society  service  one  (133),  it  should  be  subject  to 
“relevant  sector-specific  regulation,  including  business  authorization  and  licensing 
requirements generally applied to service providers”. To this extent, the provision of the 
“underlying service” has to be assessed in concrete by considering three key concurring 
elements: (i) the price-fixing activity; (ii) the setting of other contractual terms; (iii) the 
ownership  of  assets  used  to  supply  the  service  itself.  Other  criteria  may  be  taken  into 
account:  for  example,  the  fact  that  the  platform  incurs  in  the  cost  and  assumes  all  the 
risk related to the service or whether an employment relationship exists with the worker. 
The  conditions  are  not  extremely  stringent  as,  for  instance,  merely  assisting  the 
“ultimate” provider of the underlying service or arranging a ranking mechanism does not 
“constitute  proof  of  influence  and  control”.  When  most  criteria  are  met,  there  are 
vigorous indicators that the collaborative platform exercises a notable influence or control 
over the ultimate provider. As a consequence, the platform cannot be merely considered 
as  the  facilitator  of  the  mere  “intermediation  service”  (134),  absolved  of  its  sectorial 
responsibilities. In Smorto’s words, as a first rule of thumb, when platforms exert a high 
level  of  control  and  influence  over  workers,  “they  should  be  regarded  as  service 
providers; conversely, when platforms limit their activity to the matching of demand and 
supply,  enabling  peers  to  deliver  the  underlying  services,  they  should  be  deemed  as 
intermediaries” (135). 

(132) PETROPOULOS G. (2017), An economic review of the collaborative economy, Bruegel Policy Contribution, No 

5. 

(133) See Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34/EC as amended by Directive 98/48/EC. 
(134) Moreover, if the platform does not just act as a broker (even as a “notice board” or a “virtual display”), but 
offers ancillary services, this cannot be read as a decisive index of influence or control over the underlying 
service. 

(135) SMORTO G. (forthcoming), Regulating (and self-regulating) the sharing economy in Europe: an overview in 

BRUGLIERI M. (Ed.), Multi-disciplinary design of sharing services, Milano. 

30 

 
                                           
To move on to a different subject, it is crucial to scrutinise the analysis developed by the 
Commission  and  aimed  at  establishing  whether  a  worker  is  employed  by  the  platform. 
Equally  noteworthy,  the  Communication  refers  to  the  notion  of  worker  settled  by  the 
Court of Justice (“…a person [who] for a certain period of time performs services for and 
under  the  direction  of  another  person  in  return  for  which  he  receives  remuneration”). 
Three  criteria  need  to  be  met  in  order  to  detect  the  existence  of  an  employment 
relationship: (i) the existence of the subordination link; (ii) the performance of effective 
duties; (iii) the presence of remuneration. The clarification of the Commission is relevant 
to the extent of this analysis: the link of subordination can be described as the provision 
of the directive power by the platform, which determines the content of the activity (i.e. 
the scope of work), how the performance has to be accomplished and the form and level 
of  the  remuneration.  It  has  to  be  underlined  that  management  and  control  on  a 
continuous  basis  is  not  decisive,  as  well  as  limited  working  hours  or  low  rate  of 
productivity  are  not  enough  to  exclude  the  existence  of  an  employment  relationship. 
What  is  relevant  is  that  an  employment  relationship  can  be  identified,  according  to  the 
OECD’s  assessment  (136),  when  platform  workers  have  no  choice  but  to  follow  detailed 
instructions given by the operator, or when the latter utilises customer ratings to control 
or  even  “dismiss”  providers.  Taking  a  closer  look,  it  is  possible  to  connect  this 
examination with the previous one  on the provision of the underlying service.  If  so, the 
existence  of  an  employment  relationship  would  be  sufficient  to  label  the  platform  as  a 
provider of the off-line equivalent service, thus enforcing compliance with sector specific 
requirements, in a circular way. 

As for the nature of work and the presence of remuneration, the debate on how to set a 
threshold  for  distinguishing  between  peers  (or  amateur/occasional  providers)  and 
professional services providers is still intense. The European Commission support analysis 
(137)  mentions  different  elements:  annual  turnover  for  transport  services,  the  frequency 
of  the  activity  (i.e.  the  services  are  offered  regularly  or  marginally).  The  Parliamentary 
resolution  corroborates  this  view  invoking  “further  guidelines  on  laying  down  effective 
criteria  for  distinguishing  between  peers  and  professionals”  (138).  Taking  a  step 
backwards,  in  France,  for  instance,  an  act  was  passed  defining  a  “social  liability”  of 
platforms towards (professional) self-employed workers. Due to this regulation, platforms 
are  obliged  to  pay  insurance  against  industrial  accidents  at  the  workplace  and 
contributions to vocational training. In particular, a worker working for a certain amount 
of  time  acquires  rights  in  the  field  of  lifelong  training  and  the  platform  must  pay  the 
contributions  provided  for  by  the  legislation.  Moreover,  prior  experience  has  to  be 
validated  in  order  to  be  portable.  Since  August  2016,  unprecedented  provisions  have 
been  introduced  by  the  new  Labour  Code  regarding  “workers  obtaining  work  through 
digital platforms”. The Code extends to this group of freelancers individual and collective 
rights, including to strike and form or join a union. In Ireland, last year, a bill was passed 
allowing for self-employed people to collectively bargain (139). 

The Communication concludes by advocating an intervention of Member States aimed at 
“assessing the adequacy of national employment legislation” in relation “to the different 
needs  of  workers  and  self-employed  individuals  in  the  digital  world  as  the  innovative 
nature  of  collaborative  business  model”  and  to  “provide  guidance  on  the  applicability  of 
their  national  employment  rules  in  light  of  labor  patterns  in  the  collaborative  economy” 
(140). 

(136) Other arguments rely on the “economic dependence” criterion, applicable to some providers.  
(137)  Commission  Staff  Working Document,  Communication  from  the Commission  to  the  European  Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – a European 
Agenda for the Collaborative Economy. 

(138) Paragraph 18. Paragraph 19, instead, demands “appropriate dividing lines”. 
(139)  O’REGAN  M.  (2016,  November  10),  Seanad  passes  Bill  providing  collective  pay  bargaining  for  self-

employed, retrieved from https://goo.gl/whJaHP. 

(140)  CAUFFMAN  C.  and  SMITS  J.  (2016),  The  sharing  economy  and  the  law:  food  for  European  lawyers  in 

Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 23(6), pp. 903-907. 

31 

 
                                           
3.1.1  Legal  frameworks  for  casual  work:  on-call  work,  voucher-based, 

and zero-hours contracts. 

Platform-based  working  templates  can  be  labelled  under  the  umbrella  definition  of  app-
driven casual arrangements, a subgroup of non-standard forms of work (141), rather than 
under  the  self-employment  category.  In  such  arrangements  “the  relationships  is  not 
stable  and  continuous,  and  the  employer  is  not  obliged  to  regularly  provide  the  worker 
with  work,  but  has  the  flexibility  of  calling  them  in  on  demand”,  in  the  words  of 
Eurofound  (142).  It  has  to  be  noted  that  the  concrete  performances  rendered  in  the 
context  of  crowdsourcing  and  work  on  demand  via  platform  are  collocated  in  a 
problematic  area  of  business  where  informality  (implying  recruitment  by  word  of  mouth 
and cash payments), low wages and abuses are becoming increasingly frequent. 

The  “precarity”  that  originates  from  these  arrangements  is  manifold. First,  the  very  low 
guaranteed  hours  mean  that  the  worker  can  hardly  earn  sufficient  income  under  the 
contract. Second, while the intermittent (and unpredictable) nature of the hours provides 
a  flexible  tool  to  the  employer/client  (143),  the  worker  suffers  from  insecurity  and 
instability. Since the employer only agrees to pay for work completed, not to make work 
available, the workers  may have to  wait for the next  work  order to  materialise (what is 
called “spot labour market”), and are therefore prevented from organising their schedule 
ahead.  Third,  the  fact  that  the  employer  can  “adjust”  the  hours  to  the  contractual 
minimum,  according  to  her  needs,  without  any  constrain,  closely  resembles  “a  situation 
where  the  worker  can  be  dismissed  without  notice”  (144).  The  combination  of  these 
vulnerabilities makes it “exceedingly difficult for workers to enforce the few rights that do 
apply  to  them,  as  any  challenge  or  inconvenience  to  the  employer  may  lead  to  ad  hoc 
termination” (145). 

Non-standard working arrangements could be seen as part of the broader trend of “over-
flexibilisation” of the labour market to the disadvantage of workers. This brief paragraph 
will try to present work on demand as a  species of the genus  of casual work  which has 
been regulated in different ways throughout Europe. The common feature is the fact that 
in  this  arrangement  employer  can  determine  “location  and  allocation  of  working  time” 
and the scope of the work to be done. In many cases, the performance is characterised 
by  “continuous  employment  relationship  without  continuous  work”  (146).  Another  shared 
characteristic is that employers, who are supposed to bear the economic risk, end up in 
shifting business risk on the workers. Despite the widespread factual complexity, work in 
the  on-demand  economy  can  be  characterised  as  a  set  of  digitally  intermediated 
voucher-based  contracts  (147).  Far  from  being  monolithic,  this  tool  represents  rather  an 
“organising principle of precarious work”, kind of a wide and various arrangement where 

(141) There is no universally accepted definition of NSFE. Note that Eurofound’s list contains only “new forms of 
work” which is a narrower definition. EUROFOUND (2015), New forms of employment, Publications Office of 
the  European  Union,  Luxembourg  (conducting  a  “mapping  exercise”  resulting  in  the  identification  of  nine 
distinct  forms  of  employment  as  new  –  or  of  increasing  importance  –  since  2000).  See  also  EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION  (2015),  Employment  and  Social  Developments  in  Europe  2014,  Luxembourg;  INTERNATIONAL 
LABOUR  OFFICE  (2016),  Non-standard  employment  around  the  world:  Understanding  challenges,  shaping 
prospects, p. 2; OECD (2016), New forms of work in the digital economy, Digital Economy Papers No. 260, 
p. 17. 

(142) The pattern is the same as for so-called “zero-hours contracts” that imply no minimum number of working 
hours. It has to be admitted that the same report classifies a portion of digital labour platforms under the 
label  of  ICT-enabled  work.  See  EUROFOUND  (2015),  New  forms  of  employment,  Publications  Office  of  the 
European Union, Luxembourg, p. 46. 

(143) EICHHORST W. and MARX P. (2015). Introduction: an occupational perspective on non-standard employment 
in  ID.  (Eds.),  Non-standard  employment  in  post-industrial  labour  markets:  an  occupational  perspective, 
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, p. 5. 

(144) GARBEN S., KILPATRICK C. and MUIR E. (2017), Towards a European Pillar of Social Rights: upgrading the EU 

social acquis, College of Europe Policy Brief, 1, pp. 4-5. 

(145) Ibid. 
(146) As explained in VALENDUC  G. and VENDRAMIN  P.  (2016), Work in the digital economy: sorting the old from 

the new, WP ETUI, No. 3, p. 34. 

(147)  FREEDLAND  M.  R.  and  PRASSL  J.  (2017),  Employees,  Workers,  and  the  ‘Sharing  Economy’:  Changing 
Practices and Changing Concepts in the United Kingdom, University of Oxford, Legal Research Paper Series, 
No 19. 

32 

 
                                           
workers are not guaranteed a fixed (or even any) number of hours in a given period and 
where, at least in theory, they are not obliged to accept any offers of work made by their 
employer/principal/client  (148).  This  controversial  area  needs  to  be  addressed  by 
European authorities in order to improve the situation of these workers. 

Member states have inconsistent regulations for casual work, the Dutch model (149) and 
the British scheme (150), being on two opposite ends of a spectrum. This legal format can 
be used to regulate arrangement in the work on demand via platform (at the household’s 
premises) segment, but it may fail to regulate different activities. In The Netherlands, no 
minimum  hours  are  assigned  and  voucher-based  workers  are  paid  only  if  actually 
worked.  A  minimum  wage  is  guaranteed  for  on(cid:1)call  workers  employed  for  less  than  15 
hours  per  week.  Nevertheless,  after  three  months,  the  worker  (who  has  worked  for  a 
certain  amount  of  time)  must  be  guaranteed  a  minimum  working  hours  on  the  basis  of 
the  average  hours  worked  in  the  previous  quarter;  social  partners  may  adapt,  and  in 
some cases alter, certain modules for a specific sector in a collective agreement. The aim 
of the law was to discourage the use of the on(cid:1)call contract as a sham for what should be 
a SER. According to commentators, the Dutch experiment was successful. 

Conversely, in the UK,  zero-hours contract (ZHC) workers are not  entitled to any pay if 
the  employer  cannot  provide  them  with  work.  In  this  system,  workers  are  not  paid  for 
their  inactive  time  away  from  the  workplace,  while  they  receive  remuneration  for  the 
time spent working or waiting at the employer’s premises. In the UK, ZHC are considered 
as  employment  contracts  only  when:  (i)  an  obligation  to  provide  work  personally  is 
applied;  (ii)  employer  and  employee  share  a  “mutuality  of  obligation”;  (iii)  the  worker 
agrees to be under the “sufficient” control of the employer, either expressly or implicitly 
(151). Nevertheless, it is very difficult “for an individual to acquire sufficient continuity of 
employment  to  qualify  for  significant  employment  rights,  including  unfair  dismissal  and 
redundancy  protection  which  require  two  years  of  service”  (152).Dissimilarly,  the  Irish 
model can guarantee a certain degree of protection to workers, but such approach is not 
very widespread (153). If a worker is not called at all in a given week, she is entitled to a 
compensation  for  the  availability  to  be  engaged  amounting  to  a  fraction  of  the  contract 
hours  (25%  of  the  available  hours,  with  a  cap).  Just  like  the  platform  labour 
arrangements, ZHCs have no specific legal status. 

In France, a voucher-based scheme (the so-called “chèque emploi service universel”) has 
existed since 1994, then modified in 2006 as for domestic work childcare. A very similar 
instrument  was  available  in  Italy  until  the  beginning  of  2017  (154):  each  “voucher”  – 
easily  purchasable  –  had  a  nominal  value  of  10  euros  (7.50  for  the  worker  and  the 
remaining  part  allocated  to  the  national  system  of  social  security  and  for  health  and 

(148)  ADAMS  A.,  FREEDLAND  M.  R.  and  PRASSL  J.  (2015),  The  ‘Zero-Hours  Contract’:  Regulating  Casual  Work,  or 

Legitimating Precarity?, in Giornale di diritto del lavoro e di relazioni industriali, 147, p. 529 

(149) Introduced by the Flexibility and Security Act (FSA) in 1999. 
(150)  ADAMS  Z.  and  DEAKIN  S.  (2014),  Re-regulating  zero  hours  contracts.  Institute  for  Employment  Rights, 

Liverpool. 

(151) For a complete review of various tests, see BURCHELL B., DEAKIN S. and HONEY S. (1999), The employment 
status of individuals in non-standard employment, Department of Trade and Industry, London, p. 5 ff. and 
also p. 11 for other factors taken into account by courts. 

(152)  DEAKIN  S.  (2016),  New  forms  of  employment:  Implications  for  EU‐law  –  The  law  as  it  stands  in  WAAS  B. 
(Ed.)  New  forms  of  employment  in  Europe,  Bulletin  of  comparative  labour  relations,  94,  Alphen  aan  den 
Rijn, The Netherlands, p. 49. 

(153)  For  a  complete  overview,  see  O’SULLIVAN  M.,  TURNER  T.,  LAVELLE  J.,  MACMAHON  J.,  MURPHY  C.,  RYAN  L., 
GUNNIGLE P. and O’BRIEN M. (2017), The role of the state in shaping zero hours work in an atypical liberal 
market  economy  in  Economic  and  Industrial  Democracy,  pp.  6-7  (arguing  that  “zero  hours  work  is 
operationalised through an alternative type of contract – an ‘If and When’ contract”). 

(154) Moreover, according to Decreto Legislativo, 15 June 2015, no. 81, Arts. 13-18, two types of contratto di 
lavoro intermittente exist. Under the first type, the worker is not bound to accept calls, and the employer, 
to  offer  a  minimum  amount  of  work.  In  the  second  type, the  worker  undertakes  to  accept  the  calls.  The 
employer  still  does  not  guarantee  a  minimum  amount  of  hours  but  has  to  pay  a  monthly  ‘availability 
indemnity’  for  periods  in  which  the  worker  is  not  called  in.  In  case  of  a  call,  a  minimum  notice  of  one 
working  day  is  required.  See  DE  STEFANO  V.  (2016),  Casual  Work  beyond  Casual  Work  in  the  EU:  The 
Underground  Casualisation  of  the  European  Workforce–And  What  to  Do  about  it  in  European  Labour  Law 
Journal, 7(3), p. 439. 

33 

 
                                           
safety  and  administrative  purposes).  The  government  had  firstly  liberalised  their  use  in 
2012  but,  due  to  a  worrisome  increase  in  their  usage,  it  had  to  set  up  limitations  (400 
working  days  for  each  employee  over  three  years)  and  the  duty  to  notify  the  local 
directorates of the Ministry of Labour via text message the precise time period of usage. 
Under  the  concrete  threat  of  a  referendum  promoted  by  the  central  union  organisation 
CGIL,  the  legislator  repealed  that  provision.  A  new  form  of  occasional  jobs  (155)  has 
recently  been  introduced  limiting  the  scope  of  application  to  certain  clients  and  sectors. 
The  Swedish  homologous  contract  can  be  permanent  or  fixed  term,  with  no  guaranteed 
income.  Similarly  to  the  other  national  experiences,  the  employer  is  not  obliged  to  pay 
for  the  inactive  periods.  Access  to  training  and  other  benefits  are  regulated  by  each 
individual contract.  

In  Belgium,  a  similar  template  can  be  found  under  the  label  of  “intermittent  work”  (so-
called  “travail  occasionel”).  Designed  in  2007  and  revitalised  in  2013,  such  short-term 
contracts of two consecutive days can be signed in order to deal with peak periods – with 
a cap of 50 days per year per single worker. An employer may take flexible measures for 
up  to  100  days  per  year,  contributing  with  a  lump  sum  of  €7.50  per  hour  in  social 
security (up to €45 per day) (156). The workers enjoy full social security rights as well as 
benefits  afforded  to  standard  employees  in  the  same  sector,  and  so  have  the  same 
working conditions (157). A new scheme devoted to domestic services (titre-services) has 
been  launched  at  the  beginning  of  2004.  At  the  same  time,  the  Belgian  legislator  has 
somehow  merged  voucher-based  work  and  temporary-work  agency  into  a  hybrid 
triangular  formula  tying  a  worker,  an  employer  and  a  final  user.  Service  voucher 
organisations need to be recognised by the Ministry of Labour in order to employ workers 
on a permanent or fixed-term, full-time or part-time basis. At least a quota of 13 hours 
with a unit price of 9 euros per week has to be mandatorily offered after the three initial 
months,  and  the  contract  has  to  be  converted  into  a  permanent  one.  The  voucher 
organisation  (public  institutions,  commercial  businesses,  temporary  work  agencies, 
private non-profit organisation) employs voucher workers for a maximum 500 hours per 
calendar year per client. 

In Germany, “on-call worker” regulations curb the incidence of ZHC-style arrangements. 
Yet the so-called “mini-jobs” serve the same purpose, by “provid[ing] work incentives for 
individuals  with  supposedly  low  earning  potential”  (158).  Introduced  as  a  form  aimed  at 
supporting  marginal  employment  and  formalising  undeclared  work,  they  are  part-time 
forms of employment mainly used for domestic household workers whose monthly salary 
cannot exceed €450. Although employers belonging to all German industries are allowed 
to  offer  these  contracts,  the  form  is  typical  in  fields  such  as  catering  and  retail.  “Mini-
jobbers”  are  entitled  to  sick  pay  and  annual  leave  and  exempted  from  income  tax 
payments,  while  employers’  social  insurance  contributions  are  considerably  below  those 
for  equivalent  regular  jobs  (the  rate  is  around  14%).  The  number  of  daily  and  weekly 
working hours has to be specified. If not agreed otherwise, at least ten working hours per 
week or three hours per shift must be paid, regardless the number of hours worked (159). 
Their  classification  is  alternative  to  the  employer-employee  relationship,  as  long  as  the 
service  provision  does  not  exceed  four  working  days  per  week  –  in  most  cases,  falling 
within the scope  of marginal part-time employment. A minimum wage is set, as well as 
benefits such as holiday allowances and paid sick leave are granted. 

(155) Act 24 April 2017, n. 50, transformed into Act 21 June 2017, n. 96.  
(156)  EUROFOUND  (2017),  Non-standard  forms  of  employment:  Recent  trends  and  future  prospects,  op.  cit.,  p. 

49. 

(157)  See  also  EUROFOUND  (2017),  Non-standard  forms  of  employment:  Recent  trends  and  future  prospects, 
Dublin,  p.  30  (explaining  how  this  contractual  form  has  been  subsidised by  the  government  and  benefits 
from the standard labour regulations for the sector). 

(158)  On  this  point,  see  DEAKIN  S.  (2016),  New  forms  of  employment:  Implications  for  EU‐law  –  The  law  as  it 
stands in WAAS B. (Ed.) New forms of employment in Europe, Bulletin of comparative labour relations, 94, 
Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands, p. 52. 

(159)  Moreover,  in  the  Netherlands,  where  zero  hours  clauses  can  only  be  concluded  for  the  first  6  months of 
employment  with  the  same  employer,  a  special  status  for  workers  in  the  housework  service  sector  has 
been introduced. See Dienstverlening aan huis; Service provision at home. 

34 

 
                                           
3.1.2  Sectorial analysis. Passenger transport service. 

At first glance, this sector seems to have been caught up in the eye of the storm raging 
on the platform economy. Although outside of the scope of this report, issues related to 
competition  law  will  be  analysed  briefly.  There  are  substantially  three  reasons  for  such 
interest. First and foremost, peer to peer transport service companies – especially Uber – 
are considered the flagships of the whole “at-the-touch-of-a-button economy”, therefore 
regulations  and  decisions  regarding  this  segment  attract  more  attention  and  gain  a 
bigger  media  impact.  Secondly,  this  economic  sector  is  (“heavily”)  regulated  at  the 
national level  –  basically  through  a  system  of  prior  authorisations  and  licenses  (160).  All 
complaints by incumbents aside, when Uber enters a (national) market, it is confronted 
by a broad array of requirements to be met. Thirdly, the only case ruled by the European 
Court  of  Justice  (ECJ)  concerns  the  legal  regime  applicable  to  the  much-reviled  ride-
hailing service (161). On Wednesday 20 December 2017, the Court took the view that the 
service provided by UberPop (the peer-to-peer service) is more than a matching activity 
connecting, by means of a digital app, a nonprofessional driver with riders. Rather it is a 
genuine  transport  service.  Such  a  service  must  be  excluded  from  the  scope  of  the 
freedom to provide services in general as well as the directive on services in the internal 
market and the directive  on electronic commerce (162). As  a consequence, the company 
must  comply  with  rules  governing  traditional  taxi  services  at  the  national  level.  It  is 
important to review such regulations, imposing a prior authorisation (163). 

Looking  at  the  requirements,  it  has  to  be  highlighted  that  the  current  regulations  for 
passenger transport services are rather restrictive. Barriers to market entry prevent new 
players  from  entering in  several  countries.  For  instance,  in  France,  following  the  reform 
of the Transport Code, only taxicabs can inform users about the availability and location 
of  cars  in  real  time  (164),  thus  excluding  platforms  from  exercising  any  organisational 
prerogative.  In  Spain,  the  Transport  Code  distinguishes  between  remunerated  transport 
services  and  non-profit  transport  services  (165).  In  order  not  to  be  subject  to 
authorisations, private transport must (i) be carried out for personal or domestic needs of 
the  car  owner  and  his  or  her  relatives  and  (ii)  not  result  in  direct  or  indirect  monetary 
remuneration.  Likewise,  in  Germany,  passenger  transportation  for  commercial  purposes 
is  regulated  but,  in  the  event  that  the  “payment  only  covers  the  running  costs  of 
operating the vehicle”, the law does not apply, as specified in the general provisions. Also 
in Denmark all of transportation services of persons for remuneration which goes beyond 

(160) The ILO Tripartite Sectorial Meeting on Safety and Health in the Road Transport Sector, held in Geneva in 
October 2015, adopted a resolution on transport network companies. The Resolution stressed “the need for 
a level playing field which ensures that all transport network companies are covered by the same legal and 
regulatory framework  as  established  for  transport  companies,  in  order  to  avoid  a  negative  impact  on  job 
security,  working  conditions  and  road  safety  and  to  avoid  an  informalisation  of  the  formal  economy”  and 
“the importance of decisions taken by competent authorities or judiciary in relation to self-proclaimed ‘ride-
sharing’ for-reward transport platforms, to be fully implemented and enforced”. 
(161) Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi v. Uber Systems Spain, S.L. (Case C-434/15). 
(162) Questions 3 and 4 refer to the services provided by Uber Systems Spain, even though UberPop is provided 
by Uber BV, while Uber Systems Spain’s activities being limited to marketing and support. Nevertheless, it 
is clear that the court refers to Uber BV (based in the Netherlands) rather than Uber Systems Spain. Uber 
failed in claiming that its UberPop service could be classified as a mere ICT service. It is worth noting that 
the ruling focused on the so-called peer-to-peer operations. 

(163)  In  the  ECJ’s  words,  “as  EU  law  currently  stands,  it  is  for  the  Member  States  to  regulate  the  conditions 
under  which  intermediation  services  such  as  that  at  issue  in  the  main  proceedings  are  to  be  provided  in 
conformity with  the  general  rules  of  the  FEU  Treaty”  (§47).  In  a  statement,  the  company  claimed  that  it 
already operated under the transportation law of most Member States, and that the ruling might have little 
impact.  At  the  same  time,  Member  States  might  use  this  window  of  opportunity  to  update  (sometimes 
obsolete) rules on urban public transport. 

(164) Uber’s top management was accused of “deceptive commercial practices” and complicity in promoting an 
illegal taxi service. In 2016 the company had to pay a 1.2m fine on the grounds of unfair trade practices. 
(165)  In  addition,  a  definition  for  ridesharing  (“co-voiturage”)  has  been  introduced  referring  to  the  use  of  a 
vehicle  by  a  driver  and  one  or  several  passengers,  for  non-profit  (“à  titre  non  onéreux”)  except  for  cost 
compensation, in the context of a ride that the driver performs for its own account. The same article states 
that  the  matching  of  drivers  and  passengers  (and  thus  intermediation  services  for  ridesharing)  may  be 
done “à titre onéreux” (for remuneration) without the intermediary falling under the transport professions 
laid down in Article L. 1411-1 of the French Transport Code. 

35 

 
                                           
the  direct  cost  coverage  is  to  be  considered  a  commercial  activity  (166).  As  a 
consequence, many platforms would be subject to prior authorisation. It is fundamental 
to  acknowledge  that  national  courts  in  France,  Belgium,  Italy  (167)  and  Germany  have 
banned  Uber  peer-to-peer  passenger  transport  services.  In  particular,  several  German 
courts  stated  that  the  technological  platform  (i.e.  the  software  application)  had  to  be 
considered “as an integral part of an overall service which involves a transport service”. 
Therefore,  Uber  has  been  considered  as  an  illegal  provider  of  transport  service  directly 
affecting competition in that sector. Similarly, the Commercial Court of Brussels outlawed 
UberPop,  which  allowed  non-licensed  rivers  to  offer  rides.  Shortly  after,  Uber  restricted 
its  offer  to  the  other  versions,  only  relying  on  professional  drivers,  though  this  kind  of 
license is very easy to obtain in the Belgian capital. 

All the issues dealing with competition law implications will be not included in this report 
due  to  space  constraints.  Rather,  what  matters  is  the  preliminary  ruling  that  the  CJEU 
issued in response to a request submitted by Commercial Court No 3 of Barcelona (168). 
The decision by the Luxembourg court defined the nature of the services provided by the 
UberPop  application  and,  consequently,  the  applicable  regulation.  In  brief,  since  Uber 
organises  the  service,  sets  rules  for  drivers,  checks  prices  and  fixes  cars’  quality 
standards,  UberPop  is  not  an  information  society  service,  but  rather  a  transport  service 
(169).  In  May  2017  the  Advocate  General  Szupunar  released  a  non-binding  opinion  (170) 
stating that the service offered by Uber is a “composite” one since it comprises two main 
components:  the  one  provided  by  electronic  means  and  the  other  part  essentially 
consisting  in  urban  transport.  The  ECJ  closely  followed  AG  Szpunar’s  opinion.  Two 
requirements are to be met for a composite service to be  classified as falling within the 
concept of “information and society service”, thus benefiting from liberalisation.  

Firstly, the “material” activity has to be economically independent of the service rendered 
by  electronic  means  and  independently  of  the  physical  services  (such  as  platforms  for 

(166)  Suffice  here  to  observe  that  in  Belgium,  France,  and  Italy,  UberPop  –  the  service  that  allow  private 
individuals  without  any  requirements  to  become  “drivers  partners”  –  has  been  banned  and  therefore 
blocked.  In  these  countries  Uber  can  provide  its  UberX  or  UberBlack  versions,  by  meeting  a  set  of 
obligations including registration, insurance policies, training or a clean criminal background. London: PwC 
UK. In Spain, Uber was banned nationally in December 2014. VAUGHAN R. and DAVERIO R. (2016), Assessing 
the  size  and  presence  of  the  collaborative  economy  in  Europe.  PwC  UK,  impulse  paper  for  the  European 
Commission. 

(167)  Tribunale  di  Milano  banned  the  UberPop  app  across  Italy  for  unfair  competition  practices  in  May  2015. 
According to the court the service was a direct competitor of traditional taxi cooperatives. Although Uber is 
a private transport service, it has the same features as a taxi service. The service should not be treated as 
a  mere  car-sharing  or  car-pooling  (since  car  owners  do  not  share  the  costs  of  the  drive  to  reach  their 
personal destination). The app was therefore deemed comparable with an old-fashioned call centre while its 
pricing system is not subject to the rules governing the public taxi service, “Uber fares are lower because 
its drivers do not have to bear the expenses incurred by the holders of a transport licence (such as the cost 
of installing meters, insurance and maintenance checks)”, the lack of authorisation and the non-regulated 
behaviour of UberPop drivers give them an unfair competitive advantage. A second decision by the Court of 
Milan stated that UberBlack service (licenced drivers) may also constitute “unfair competition” against PHV 
drivers who have to return to a garage in between rides. See DONINI A. (2016), Regole della concorrenza e 
attività  di  lavoro  nella  on  demand  economy:  brevi riflessioni  sulla  vicenda  Uber,  nota a  Trib.  Milano,  sez. 
spec. impresa, ord. 9 luglio 2015 in RIDL, II, p. 46. Similar observations were made in Tribunale di Torino, 
Sez.  spec.  impresa,  sentenza  24/3/2017,  n.  1553  and  Tribunale  di  Roma,  S.  spec.  impresa,  ordinanza 
7/4/2017 (then reversed). For a complete review, including a focus on Uber’s liability towards passengers 
and third parties, see DI AMATO A. (2016), Uber and the Sharing Economy in Italian L.J., 2, p. 177. 

(168) Case C 434/15 Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi v. Uber Systems Spain SL (Request for a preliminary ruling 
from  the  Juzgado  de  lo  Mercantil  No  3  de  Barcelona  (Commercial  Court  No  3  of  Barcelona,  Spain)). 
Questions 3 and 4 refer to the services provided by Uber Systems Spain, even though UberPop is provided 
by Uber BV, while Uber Systems Spain’s activities being limited to marketing and support. Nevertheless, it 
is  clear  that  the  court  refers  to  Uber  BV  (based  in  the  Netherlands)  rather  than  Uber  Systems  Spain. 
Accordingly, the question arising is “whether restrictions in one Member State [pertaining] the freedom to 
provide electronic intermediary service from another Member State”. 

(169) GENNA I. (2017, December 20), The European court stops UberPop, not Uber. A new legislation for digital 
start-ups  is  needed,  retrieved  from  https://goo.gl/kkNZ52  (arguing  that  “[t]he  principles  stated  by  the 
court may become far restrictive for innovative digital services rendered by such non professional workers, 
since it requires them the be subject to the general legislation of the sector (if any)”). 

(170)  However,  statistics  show  that  in  80%  of  the  cases  the  court  substantially  confirms  the  legal  solution 
suggested  by  the  Advocate  General.  See  also  SCOTT  M.  (2017,  May  11),  Uber  Suffers  Bloody  Nose  in  Its 
Fight to Conquer Europe, retrieved from https://nyti.ms/2pAaM0U. 

36 

 
                                           
airline tickets or hotel reservations), secondly, the provider has to supply the service as a 
unique  entity  or  to  exert  a  significant  influence  over  the  conditions  of  the  electronic 
service  (the  prevailing  part).  The  observations  of  the  Advocate  General  seem  to  follow 
settled  case  law  on  the  intrinsic  connection  between  the  two  activities.  In  the  end,  the 
digital infrastructure  would not exist without the singular rides. Accordingly, Uber is not 
considered to be a mere matchmaking intermediary (comparable to a “broker”) between 
drivers and passengers, but rather “a genuine organiser and operator of urban transport” 
(171). 

As a direct consequence, it does not fall under the scope of the principle of the freedom 
to  provide  services  in  the  context  of  the  information  society  services,  in  the  sense  of 
Directive  on  electronic  commerce.  It  should  be  noted  that  many  scholars  suggest  a 
similar interpretation, according to which platforms like Uber “are directly involved in the 
provision  of  the  transportation  service  and  are  unlikely  to  qualify  as  mere  providers  of 
online  services”  (172)  since  their  conditions  on  cars,  facilities,  and  prices,  and  should 
thereby  considered  a  supplier  of  transportation  services.  It  is  also  undeniable  that  this 
allegation is sufficiently substantiated by the fact that Uber creates added value providing 
rides  and  exerting  significant  indirect  control  over  how  drivers  perform  their  jobs  (173). 
Uber  should  be  considered  as  a  supplier  of  transportation  services  (174).  Accordingly,  if 
the  platform  under  scrutiny  should  offer  a  tangible  service,  demonstrating  the  intense 
command  power  could  be  even  easier.  Although  the  issue  relating  to  workers’ 
classification  is  extraneous  to  the  subject  of  the  opinion,  many  of  the  arguments  used 
could  be  read  in  the  sense  of  considering  them  as  employees  rather  than  contractors 
before  a  national  court.  As  a  consequence,  such  conduct  potentially  infringes  both 
competition and employment legislations. 

Apart from this consideration, it can be said that the opinion reflects the passages used 
by the British Tribunal in 2016 (175) and by several American courts before (176). It sheds 
a light on the concrete  relationship between the eponym platform and drivers using the 
app,  or  better  the  application  programming  interfaces,  as  their  “main  professional 
activity”.  The  mechanism  is  brilliantly  presented:  “Uber  informs  drivers  of  where  and 
when they can rely on there being a high volume of trips and/or preferential fares. Thus, 
without  exerting  any  formal  constraints  over  drivers,  Uber  is  able  to  tailor  its  supply  to 
fluctuations  in  demand”.  The  Advocate  couldn’t  have  been  clearer  describing  the  rating 
system:  “Uber  therefore  exerts  control,  albeit  indirect,  over  the  quality  of  the  services 
provided by drivers”. Again, it is important to stress the fact that the opinion is not aimed 
at  investigating  working  conditions,  and  distances  himself  from  dealing  with  the 
(mis)classification issue, denying that the intrusive control is “exercised in the context of 
a traditional employer-employee relationship”. Nevertheless, the same arguments – used 

(171) “The moment we shift our analytical focus to Uber’s exercise of employer functions, on the other hand, it 
becomes clear that the platform does in fact exercise all relevant employer functions usually involved in the 
provision of transportation or logistics services”. See PRASSL J. and RISAK M. (2016), Uber, Taskrabbit, and 
Co.:  Platforms  as  Employers  –  Rethinking  the  Legal  Analysis  of  Crowdwork  in  Comp.  Lab.  L.  &  Pol’y  J., 
37(3), p. 637. 

(172)  HATZOPOULOS  V.  and  ROMA  S.  (2017),  Caring  for  Sharing?  The  Collaborative  Economy  under  EU  Law, 

Common Market Law Review, 54(1), p. 97. 

(173)  “Through  tools  such  as  dynamic,  algorithmic  pricing  and  a  number  of  other  elements  of  the  Uber 
application’s design, Uber is empowered via information and power asymmetries to effect conditions of soft 
control, affective labor, and gamified patterns of worker engagement on its drivers” according to ROSENBLAT 
A. and STARK L. (2016), Algorithmic Labor and Information Asymmetries: A Case Study of Uber’s Drivers in 
International Journal of Communication, 10(27), p. 3759. 

(174)  “Uber  exercises  decisive  influence  over  the  conditions  under  which  that  service  is  provided  by  those 

drivers”, Case C-434/15, § 39. 

(175)    Employment  Tribunal,  Mr.  Y.  Aslam,  Mr.  J.  Farrar  and  Others  v  Uber,  Case  Numbers:  2202551/2015  & 

Others, 28 October 2016. At the time of writing, the ruling is undergoing scrutiny by a higher court. 

(176)  United States District Court, Northern District of California, O’Connor et al. v. Uber Technologies, Inc., et 
al.,  Order  Denying  Cross-Motion  for  Summary  Judgement,  11  March  2015;  United  States  District  Court, 
Northern  District  of  California,  Cotter  et  al.  v.  Lyft  Inc.,  Order  Denying  Cross-Motion  for  Summary 
Judgement, 11 March 2015. As to the case, it should be noted that it was “filed in northern California – a 
jurisdiction with both an expansive legal definition of employee12 and potentially sympathetic judges and 
jurors”.  See  DUBAL  V.  B.  (2017),  Winning  the  Battle,  Losing  the  War?:  Assessing  the  Impact  of 
Misclassification Litigation on Workers in the Gig Economy in Wisconsin Law Review, (4), p. 743. 

37 

 
                                           
before a Labour Court – may prove the existence of a subordination link (“indirect control 
such  as  that  exercised  by  Uber,  based  on  financial  incentives  and  decentralised 
passenger-led ratings,  with a scale effect, makes it possible to  manage in a way that is 
just  as  –  if  not  more  –  effective  than  management  based  on  formal  orders  given  by  an 
employer to his employees and direct control over the carrying out of such orders”). This 
is why such comment is much more significant than the mere legal situation at hand. 

3.1.3  Sectorial analysis. Online crowdsourcing. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  online  piecework  and  crowdsourcing  are  overlapping  but 
distinguishable  concepts,  the  difference  being  centred  on  the  size  of  the  tasks.  To  sum 
up,  the  contractual  scheme  allows  the  engagement  of  “a  large,  distributed,  global  labor 
pool  of  remote  workers”  to  whom  tasks  can  be  commissioned  (177).  It  can  be  said  that 
online  crowdsourcing  is  the  most  elusive  segment  of  collaborative  economy.  To  date, 
perhaps  not  surprisingly,  there  are  no  tailored  regulations  governing  these  workers. 
Being  perhaps  the  most  genuinely  unprecedented  segment  of  this  phenomenon,  it  has 
not  been  captured  by  the  legislator  yet.  The  online  labour  market  for  professional 
activities  is  more  sensitive  to  the  intervention  of  the  lawmaker  –  particularly  in  those 
areas where specific restrictions and charges set by professional bodies and associations 
apply.  

More  in  general,  and  in  addition  to  those  enumerated  in  the  previous  sections,  one  can 
list  several  concerns  regarding  remotely  provided  services  including  the  need  to  safely 
use ergonomics office tools and display screens or taking a break during long shifts (178), 
in  order  to  avoid  stress  and  postural  disorders.  As  is  well  known,  prolonged  use  of 
laptops  or  smartphones  or  the  fact  that  a  worker  has  to  work  at  an  unconformable, 
overcrowded  or  dangerous  workplace,  whether  domestic  or  “shared”  in  co-working 
spaces,  may  determine  severe  consequences.  Yet,  the  European  Framework  Agreement 
on  Telework,  signed  by  the  social  partners  in  July  2002,  cannot  be  applied  to  these 
performances,  at  least  in  theory,  as  it  has  been  designed  “in  the  context  of  an 
employment contract/relationship” (Art. 2) (179). Much the same goes for the Directive on 
Health and Safety in Fixed-Term and Temporary Employment (91/383/EEC) (180). A point 
of  contention  with  respect  to  including  platform  workers  under  the  scope  of  the 
aforementioned regulations is likely to revolve around the interpretation of legal status of 
the worker, since these relationships do not qualify as either an employment contract or 
a  contract  that  creates  an  employment  relationship.  In  Spain,  the  Netherlands  and  the 
United  Kingdom  collaborative  workers  need  to  register  with  the  tax  authorities/social 
security  funds.  Also,  workers  need  to  keep  records  of  their  earnings  made  through 
platforms  and  track  their  expenses.  In  France,  the  same  registration  is  compulsory  and 
expenses are deductible. In other countries, such as Germany and Italy, workers are not 
required to register when providing services through collaborative platforms. 

(177)    According  to  Wexler,  quoted  by  Eurofound,  The  process  can  be  divided  into  different  main  stages:  the 
client  (i)  identifies  a  challenge  or  an  opportunity,  (ii)  launches  a  call  specifying  instructions,  rules  and 
expectations, (iii) collects proposals from the crowd, (iv) selects the proposal deemed most suitable for the 
intended purpose, (iv) understands “how to best to use the loyalty of those drawn to a competition once it 
is  over”.  See  WEXLER  M.  N.  (2011),  Reconfiguring  the  sociology  of  the  crowd:  Exploring  crowdsourcing  in 
International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 31(1/2), pp. 6-20. 

(178)  EC  Directive  90/270/EEC  refers,  among  others,  to  “computer  systems  on  board  a  means  of  transport”, 
“portable  systems  […]  at  a  workstation,  typewriters”.  In  this  case,  the  Directive  states  that  employers 
(emphasis added) are obliged “to perform an analysis of workstations in order to evaluate the safety and 
health conditions to which they give rise for their workers, particularly as regards possible risks to eyesight, 
physical problems and problems of mental stress”. As a consequence, they are obliged to “take appropriate 
measures to remedy the risks found”. 

(179) See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:c10131&from=EN  
(180)  The  directive  ensures  the  same  level  of  protection  to  fixed-term  and  agency  workers  as  to  other 
employees, moreover it imposes an adequate procedure of information and training as well as appropriate 
medical  surveillance  to  protect  workers’  safety  and  health.  See  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01991L0383-20070628  

38 

 
                                           
3.1.3.1  Platforms as temporary work agencies, an “indirect” approach. 

temporary  work 

The  Parliamentary  Resolution  has  recommended  “to  examine  how  far  the  Directive  on 
Temporary Agency Work (2008/104/EC1) is applicable to specific online platforms” (181). 
It is not crystal clear whether the document refers to the whole collaborative ecosystem, 
as the expression “online platform” can be interpreted in different ways. The Parliament 
explains that “many intermediating online platforms [as] structurally similar to temporary 
temporary  agency 
work  agencies  (triangular  contractual  relationship  between: 
worker/platform  worker; 
user 
agency/online 
undertaking/client)”.  Other  scholars  have  proposed  an  analogous  intervention,  mostly 
focusing  on  knowledge  based  work  exchanged  via  digital  platforms  (182).  If  it  is 
undeniable, as rightly pointed out, that the relationship between players can be described 
as tripartite – and the role of the platform can be likened to that played by a “broker” – 
the  fully-fledged  or  automatic  application  of  the  European  Directive  raises  more 
problems. As a matter of fact, it has to be noted that the power to supervise and control 
the  individuals’  performance  execution  is  sometimes  shared  between  the  final  user 
(private  citizens,  families  or  firms)  and  the  platforms  matching  professional  or  amateur 
freelancers  with  clients.  However,  it  is  recalled  that  this  arrangement  postulates  the 
existence  of  two  different  contracts:  a  commercial one  binding  the  agency  and  the  final 
user and an employment one between the agency and the worker. 

platform; 

Nevertheless,  the  concept  of  “temporary  agency  worker”  can  be  “applie[d]  not  only  to 
workers  who  have  concluded  a  contract  of  employment  with  a  temporary-work  agency, 
but also to those who have an ‘employment relationship’ with such an undertaking” (183). 
Such  employment  relationship  is  characterised  by  the  fact  that  a  person  performs 
services  for,  and  under  the  direction  of,  another  person  for  a  certain  period  of  time  in 
exchange  for  remuneration.  In  particular,  the  ECJ  has  somewhat  enlarged  the  scope  of 
the  Directive  by  establishing  that,  while  member  states  have  the  competence  to  define 
the notion of “worker” under national law (184), the same cannot be said of that concept 
for  the  purposes  of  the  Directive  that  would  be  otherwise  undermined.  Building  on  this 
interpretation,  other  scholars  have  proposed  the  application  of  the  temporary  work 
agency scheme also to platform-mediated labour, when the requester (i.e. the client) is a 

(181) OJ L 327, 5.12.2008, p. 9. 
(182)  A  Discussion  Draft  of  a  Directive  on  Online  Intermediary  Platforms  has  been  proposed  by  a  European 
network  of  scholars  and  published  in  April  2016  taking  the  triangle-relation  as  the  qualifying  element  to 
distinguish  a  platform.  See  BUSCH  C.,  DANNEMANN  G.,  SCHULTE-NÖLKE  H.,  WIEWIÓROWSKA-DOMAGALSKA  A.  and 
ZOLL  F.  (2016),  Discussion  Draft  of  a  Directive  on  Online  Intermediary  Platforms  in  Journal  of  European 
Consumer  and  Market  Law,  5,  p.  164-169.  The  text  of  the  Discussion  Draft  is  available  at: 
https://goo.gl/Tsxke9. See also KINGSLEY S. C., GRAY M. L. and SURI S. (2014), Monopsony and the crowd: 
Labor  for  lemons  in  Internet,  Politics,  &  Policy  2014  Conference,  Oxford,  UK,  pp.  18-19.  According  to 
Kezuka, the online freelancing platform Upwork represents “a prototype of a platform that competes with 
the  traditional  staffing  agency  (or  direct  employment)  model  by  matching  individuals  with  contingent  or 
freelance  projects”.  See  KEZUKA  K.  (2017),  Crowdwork  and  the  Law  in  Japan  in  WAAS  B.,  LIEBMAN  W.  B., 
LYUBARSKY  A.  and  KEZUKA  K.  (Eds.),  Crowdwork–A  Comparative  Law  Perspective,  Frankfurt.  In  order  to 
ensure the protection of crowdworkers and to improve the quality of crowdwork, Temporary Agency Work 
Directive  2008/104/  EC  and  its  transposition  have  been  used  as  a  model  for  the  creation  of  a  special 
legislative  act  dealing  with  platform  labour:  “a  core  provision  might  thus  be  –  as  in  the  case  of  artwork 
(Art.  5  of  Directive  2008/104/EC)  –  a  principle  of  equal  treatment  with  a  corporate  customers’  existing 
workforce, to ensure that jobs are not crowdsourced just for the sake of contravening minimum wage and 
other  employment  provisions.  The  basic  working  and  employment  conditions  of  crowdworkers  shall 
therefore be for the duration of working on tasks or—if the general availability is part of the business model 
like in the case of Uber in the United Kingdom—at least those that would apply if they had been recruited 
directly  by  the  crowdsourcer  to  occupy  the  same  job.  This  would  also  establish  the  equal  treatment  of 
temporary agency workers and avoid the circumvention of the laws protecting them by switching over to 
crowdsourcing. It should be noted, however, that this equal-treatment-approach very likely only works in 
cases where the crowdworker is actually working for a business that would otherwise employ an employee 
and  that  actually  crowdsourced  labor”.  See  PRASSL  J.  and  RISAK  M.  (2017),  The  Legal  Protection  of 
Crowdworkers: Four Avenues for Workers’ Rights in the Virtual Realm in MEIL P. and KIROV V. (Eds.), Policy 
Implications of Virtual Work, London, pp. 290-291. 

(183) Betriebsrat de Ruhrlandklinik gGmbH v Ruhrlandklinik gGmbH (C-216/15) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62015CJ0216&from=EN  

(184)  In  general,  European  social  policy  has  been  limited,  due  to  the  “unanimity  requirement”  for  adopting 

legislative acts. 

39 

 
                                           
commercial  business.  Although  this  working  hypothesis  does  not  reflect  current  market 
conditions,  it  should  be  taken  into  consideration  despite  its  difficult  and  controversial 
feasibility (185). 

3.1.4  Sectorial  analysis.  Work  on  demand  via  platform  (at  the 

household’s premises). 

To begin with, it is worth emphasising that the vast majority of tasks exchanged though 
platform or app has nothing “disruptive” in their concrete execution (one needs to think 
only  of,  for  example,  assembling  furniture,  cleaning  an  apartment  or  caring  for  the 
elders) (186). Such platforms represent an “outlet for pre-existing abilities” and specified 
tasks which are carried out locally, with the service purchaser and provider based in the 
same  physical  area.  Much  of  the  work  in  the  sectors  of  household  chores  (such  as 
nannies,  cleaners  and  caregivers)  has  changed  little  over  decades  (187).  Paradoxically, 
ITC-enabled  arrangements  are  suspiciously  reminiscent  of  what  the  labour  market  has 
experimented  in  bygone  times  (188).  Consequently,  on-demand  household  services  (as 
defined in the first paragraph of this research) can be simply considered as “twenty-first 
century casual work rebranded”. 

The  good  thing  is  that  platforms  have  the  potential  to  reduce  the  informal  sector  by 
offering  formal  schemes  for  low-productivity  jobs  in  sectors  particularly  prone  to 
undeclared  work  (often  been  paid  in  cash,  off  the  books)  such  as  domestic  housework 
services, personal services, private  security, industrial cleaning, agriculture and hotel or 
food  industry.  Legal  implications  of  this  model  should  not  be  treated  lightly  since  the 
combination between the displacement of work in many sectors of the economy and the 
increase in the need for home-based care and services (189) due to demographic reasons 
could  make  jobs  such  as  home  help  “the  single  largest  occupation  in  the  economy  by 
2030” (190). 

(185)  For  un  updated  comparative  analysis  of  the  regulation  of  temporary  agency  work  at  a  supranational 
European level, see COUNTOURIS N., DEAKIN S., FREEDLAND M., KOUKIADAKI A. and PRASSL J. (2016), Report on 
temporary  employment  agencies  and  temporary  agency  work:  A  comparative  analysis  of  the  law  on 
temporary  work  agencies  and  the  social  and  economic  implications  of  temporary  work  in  13  European 
countries, Geneva (clarifying how “temporary agency work can constitute a potential stepping stone for so-
called labour market entrants, as well as […] a ‘trap’ in the sense of leading to an overall downgrading of 
working conditions”). 

(186)  A  dissonance  between  narratives  and  reality  is  worth  mentioning.  And,  while  cell  phone  apps  and online 
markets  for  work  may  be  new,  the  roles  of  driver,  cleaner,  and  errand  runner  are  well-established.  The 
tasks that these workers perform are by no means new jobs, even if these jobs are enabled, enhanced, or 
made  more  efficient  by  technology.  See  CHERRY  M.  A.  (2016),  Beyond  Misclassification:  The  Digital 
Transformation of Work in Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J., 37(3), p. 587. 

(187) FARVAQUE N. (2015), Thematic review on personal and household services, EEPO, European Commission, p. 
9  (mapping  the  variety  of  employment  models).  See  also  Commission  Staff  Working  Document  on 
exploiting the employment potential of the personal and household services, SWD (2012) 95 final. 

(188) See also TOMASSETTI J. (2016), Does Uber redefine the firm? The postindustrial corporation and advanced 
information  technology  in  Hofstra  Lab.  &  Emp.  L.  J.,  34,  p.  31  (explaining  how,  “despite  their 
seductiveness,  the  self-definition  as  a  mere  tech  firm  is  correct  if  referred  to  the  “mechanics”  of  the 
operation rather than on the substance”.) 

(189) According to many commentators, “the existing evidence base suggests growth in these services has been 
exponential within and across countries”. For a comprehensive analysis of how on-demand domestic work 
platforms  operate  in  different  developing  country  contexts,  and  the  experiences of domestic  workers  and 
services purchasers who have engaged with them, see HUNT A. and MACHINGURA F. (2016), A good gig? The 
rise of on-demand domestic work, Overseas Development Institute Working Paper No. 7, p. 20 (suggesting 
that  “the  engagement  of  domestic  workers  as  independent  contractors  could  undo  progress  in  the 
formalisation of domestic work by diminishing legal rights and protections where they currently exist”). 
(190) POO A. (2017), Out from the shadows: domestic workers speak in the United States in GAROFALO GEYMONAT 
G., MARCHETTI S. and KYRITSIS P. (Eds.), Domestic workers speak a global fight for rights and recognition, p. 
21. 

40 

 
                                           
4  Issues at stake and potential outcomes from key litigation 

cases. 

The employment status issue is fundamental in order to solve the other ones. In brief, it 
has  been  claimed  that  current  labour  law  framework  is  not  aptly  suited  to  govern  new 
working patterns and should be revised, either on legislative (191) or interpretative level. 
Against  this  background,  the  vast  majority  of  labour  lawyers  have  concentrated  their 
research  on  the  issue  of  platform  workers’  classification  into  either  of  the  existing 
categories  of  employees  or  self-employed  workers  (192).  Since  the  dawn  of  the  platform 
economy,  scholars  and  lawmakers  have  been  striving  to  find  a  viable  solution  to 
numerous  complex  challenges  that  this  new  organisational  model  poses  to  the  legal 
system:  the  classification  of  platform  workers,  the  demarcation  of  the  relevant  market, 
and the nature of the service provided by online intermediaries, to name but a few. 

Accordingly,  this  section  will  investigate  the  issues  at  hand  in  pending  and  potential 
lawsuits  and  their  possible  outcomes,  largely  looking  into  the  vexed  question  of  worker 
classification. Indeed, “the status of the crowd is, perhaps, the thorniest issue of all” (193) 
affecting  individuals  but  also  employers  seeking  to  implement  new  working  practices. 
Europe  can be  considered a relatively uncharted territory in particular when it comes to 
litigation  cases  in  the  field  of  labour  law.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  workers’ 
classification  is  not  an  issue  of  genuine  relevance.  A  number  of  different  dynamics  may 
have  led  to  this  situation.  First  and  foremost,  despite  the  current  ascent  phase  in  the 
development of collaborative economy, the diffusion of these digital infrastructures is still 
relatively  limited.  Unfortunately,  many  workers  –  especially  those  in  a  vulnerable  or 
isolated situation – are unaware of the lack of compliance with labour law provisions that 
could be invoked in their favour and, additionally, they are not really in a position to join 
forces due to the  competitive nature  of their relations (also with one  another)  or to the 
subjection  to  the  employer’s  volatile  will.  Moreover,  in  certain  cases,  the  delimitation  of 
the areas of “contract for service” and “contract of service” has regularly posed practical 
difficulties and still represents a subject under constant debate. One could comment that 
the  platform  economy  has  ossified  a  relatively  old  policy  and  judicial  concern.  As 
observed,  already  existing  problems  gain  new  attention  and  visibility  –  it  is  glaringly 
obvious  the  reference  to  the  role  of  new  media  in  denouncing  indecent  conditions,  now 
more than ever. While it is true that a whole different level of exposure has recently been 
reached,  there  is  no  denying  that  labour  platforms  have  added  new  dimensions  to 
stratified  issues,  and  it  would  be  erroneous  to  consider  this  entire  phenomenon  as  an 
astonishing “déjà vu”. 

Whilst  dealing  with  antitrust  issues,  the  ECJ  ruling  in  C-434/15  (194)  is  one  of  the  most 
important  contributions  one  may  refer  to  when  analysing  the  judicial  interventions 

(191) It has been proposed to create an intermediary, third category of workers, that would be specifically suited 
for  crowdworkers.  HARRIS  S.  D.  and  KRUEGER  A.  B.  (2015),  A  Proposal  for  Modernizing  Labor  Laws  for 
Twenty-First-Century  Work:  The  “Independent  Worker”,  Hamilton  Project,  Brookings  (according  to  the 
proposal  cornering  the  U.S.A.  system,  such  “independent  workers”  would  gain  rights  to  organise  and 
bargain  collectively  under  the  NLRA  and  would  also  gain  anti-discrimination  protections.  However,  the 
Hamilton  project  proposal  excludes  payment  for  overtime  and  minimum  wage  arrangements).  See  also 
KENNEDY  J.  V.  (2016),  Three  Paths  to  Update  Labor  Law  for  the  Gig  Economy,  Information  Technology  & 
Innovation Foundation. 

(192) See CHERRY M. A. (2016), Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work in Comp. Lab. L. & 
Pol’y  J.,  37(3),  p.  579  ff.  (providing  a  “temporal  snaphot”  of  current  on-demand  worker  litigation  in  the 
United States). 

(193)  HUWS  U.  (2016),  New  forms  of  platform  employment  in  FOUNDATION  FOR  EUROPEAN  PROGRESSIVE  STUDIES 

(FEPS), The Digital Economy and the Single Market, Brussels, p. 65. 

(194)  In  general,  it  could  be  said  that,  if  a  platform  exercises  a  significant  organisational  power  over  the 
underlying  service,  it  has  to  be  considered  a  provider  of  the  concrete  service,  rather  than  a  mere 
matchmaking  system.  As  a  result,  the  principles  stated  by  the  ECJ  in  C-434/15  can  be  considered 
restrictive for services rendered by non-professional workers, since it requires them the be subject to the 
general legislation of the relevant sector (if any). The AG Szpunar has reiterated this point in the Opinion in 
Case C-320/16, confirming that “the UberPop service falls within the field of transport and, consequently, 
does  not  constitute  an  information  society  service  within  the  meaning  of  the  directive”.  See 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-07/cp170072en.pdf. 

41 

 
                                           
regarding  the  collaborative  economy  at  the  European  level.  In  UK  grassroots 
organisations  such  as  IGWB  (which  stands  for  “Independent  Workers  Union  of  Great 
Britain”)  have  started  promoting  lawsuits  claiming  the  improper  classification  of  gig-
workers  and  achieving  remarkable  victories  (195).  The  same  is  with  a  landmark  case 
before the Employment Tribunal that has stated that drivers working for Uber in London 
had  to  be  considered  workers  and  not  self-employed  within  the  meaning  of  the 
Employment  Rights  Act  (196).  The  first  caveat  is not  a legal,  but  a  more  significant  one. 
Besides  uncertainty,  these  lawsuits  require  hefty  investments  in  time  and  money,  thus 
discouraging any initiative. As a consequence, they cannot be considered the only tactic 
aimed at restoring workers’ rights unilaterally denied. Literature has  nonetheless casted 
doubt  on  the  potential  of  these  very  preliminary  decisions.  The  second  warning  is  that 
every  litigation  is  made  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  therefore  the  solution  depends  on  the 
concrete  facts  and  cannot  be  used  but  between  the  parties.  There  is  no  general 
application,  although  it  could  be  said  that  consistent  case  law  may  impose  a  particular 
view  on  this  issue.  As  a  result,  what  applies  to  one  situation  does  not  necessarily  have 
any  implications  for  those  workers  working  for  other  platform  with,  paradoxically,  very 
similar business model. 

The case Aaslam Y.  & Farrar J. against Uber is insightful in this regard. Although it was 
called  a  major  victory  determining  a  profound  advance  of  employment  rights  into  the 
realm  of  the  platform  economy,  the  decision  only  concerns  unmeasured  work  (197). 
Accordingly,  working  time  is  to  be  calculated  in  accordance  with  Work  Time  Regulation 
(198) and the working hours are to be reckoned in accordance with the National Minimum 
Wage  Regulations.  In  France  (199),  a  judgement  of  the  Conseil  des  Proud’hommes  de 
Paris  on  December  20,  2016  has  qualified  the  relation  between  a  private-hire  driver 
(“voiture de transport avec chauffeur”) and a digital platform (Le Cab (200)) as that of an 
employment  contract  in  the  light  of  the  exclusivity  clause  which  prevented  the  driver 
from  using  other  platforms  or  to  serve  a  customer  on  his  own  (201).  In  particular,  “les 
contraintes  excessives  qui  lui  étaient  imposées”  compromise  the  autonomy  commonly 
enjoyed  by  a  contractor  thus  leading  to  the  reclassification  (202).  The  judgement  gives 
rise  to  unnecessary  ambiguity  because  it  could  be  interpreted  in  two opposing  ways.  In 
particular, what if a platform exercises substantial control power but does not impose an 
exclusivity clause? For the sake of completeness, the tribunal asserted that “the status of 

(195)  First  gig-economy  company  to  admit  to  unlawfully  classifying  its  couriers  as  independent  contractors 
(2017,  May  12),  retrieved  from  https://goo.gl/A8VFDk;  NHS  blood  service  admits  couriers  are  “workers” 
(2017, June 30), retrieved from https://goo.gl/g9yGDZ.  

(196)  Employment  Tribunal,  Mr  Y  Aslam,  Mr  J  Farrar  and  Others  v  Uber,  Case  Numbers:  2202551/2015  & 

Others, 28 October 2016. 

(197)  Although  the  Tribunal  judgment  only  applies  to  the  two  drivers  who  brought  the  case,  the  doctrine  of 

precedent in common law may reinforce this outcome. 

(198)  Employment  Rights  Act  1996,  s  230(3)  (b),  the  Working  Time  Regulations  1998,  reg  36  (1)  and  the 

National Minimum Wage Act, s 54(3). The Working Time Regulations 1998, reg 2 (1). 

(199) The scope of a new legal framework should be broad enough to cope with issues such as protection of fair 
competition, clients and workers. A first step in this direction has been taken by the Law Macron in France, 
which  has  reinforced  the  information  obligations between the  platforms  and  the  clients.  According  to  this 
law,  both  the  service  providers  and  the  owners  of  the  platform  must  supply  clear  and  transparent 
information (art. 134). The law requires the platforms to provide detailed information on the service, the 
different offers on  line,  civil  and  fiscal rights,  obligations of  the  different  parties  involved  and  information 
about  the  professionals,  service  providers  and  consumers  who  use  the  platform.  L121-17  Code  de  la 
consommation.  Comments  at  Economie  de  partage  et  loi  Macron:  nouvelles  obligations  pour  les 
plateformes collaboratives 

(200) LeCab is a service provided by the company “Voxtur”. See https://www.lecab.fr/. 
(201) VAN DE CASTEELE M. (2017, January 5), Un chauffeur VTC (LeCab) requalifié en salarié: quel impact pour le 
modèle  Uber?,  retrieved  from  https://goo.gl/SAj3xw.  More  recently,  the  Court  of  Appeal  reclassified  a 
driver as an employee. See LERNOULD S. and PELLOLI M. (2017, December 15), Un ex-chauffeur VTC LeCab 
requalifié en salarié, retrieved from https://t.co/P0DpUyIzT1. 

(202) The other elements that had been raised were not taken into account by the employment tribunal. It has 
to  be  recalled  that  article  60  of  the  Loi  n°  2016-1088  relative  au  travail,  à  la  modernisation  du  dialogue 
social  et  à  la  sécurisation  des  parcours  professionnels  affords  individual  and  collective  rights  to  “les 
travailleurs  utilisant  une  plateforme  de  mise  en  relation  par  voie  électronique”  (independent  contractors 
using an electronic matchmaking platform). The law entered into force starting from January 1, 2018. See 
Décret 
at 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/decret/2017/5/4/ETST1710240D/jo. 

4/5/2017, 

2017-774 

available 

No. 

42 

 
                                           
self-employed  worker  has  been  chosen  by  the  company  in  order  to  ‘escape’  the 
constraints of the Labour Code while imposing obligations that can be considered proper 
of  an  employer-employee  relationship”  (203).  Moreover,  the  French  social  security 
institution  has  claimed  contributions  due  by  Uber,  as  a  worker  should  be  qualified  as 
employees  and  not  self-employed.  The  Special  Court  has  been  seized  and  the  request 
rejected on the grounds of infringement of an essential procedural requirement. 

As  rightly  pointed  out,  the  inclusion  of  clauses  denying  the  employee  status 
demonstrates  the  fact  that  platform  companies  are  aware  of  the  legally  ambiguous 
nature  of  the  relationship.  After  all,  gig-workers  may  display  some  characteristics  that 
are proper to independent contractors and others that are reminiscent of employees. In 
an  increasingly  relevant  number  of  industries,  the  blurring  of  employment  status  is  a 
topical  question  issue.  Originally  confined  to  the  lower-end  of  the  pay  spectrum,  this 
issue has come up repeatedly as regarding, for instance, freelance consultants labelled as 
self-employed  “with  working  arrangements  very  similar  to  those  of  the  employees  they 
work alongside”. As such, predictions are inherently uncertain.  

Moreover,  of  notable  concern  is  the  fact  that  the  “Terms  of  Conditions”  often  try  to 
obfuscate  the  actual  relationship  between  the  worker  and  the  platform,  since  the  latter 
unilaterally  states  that  providers  use  the  relevant  service  on  their  own  term.  Examples 
can  be  found  in  every  adhesion-styled  contract.  Such  clauses  are  unlikely  to  be  legally 
enforceable  (204)  and  the  “coerced”  labelling in  a  participation  agreement  may  be  easily 
disregarded as reality casts doubt on such naïve statements (205). As rightly pointed out, 
the  inclusion  of  clauses  denying  the  employee  status  demonstrates  the  fact  that 
platforms  are  aware  of  the  legally  ambiguous  nature  of  the  relationship.  A  contract  is 
usually drafted purporting to create a contract for self-employment (206). 

After  all,  gig-workers  may  display  some  characteristics  that  are  proper  to  independent 
contractors  and  others  that  are  reminiscent  of  employees.  In  an  increasingly  relevant 
number of industries, the blurring of employment status is a topical question issue (207). 
Using the “traditional” multifactorial test may lead to different conclusions as regards the 
question  whether  a  platform  worker  is  an  employee  or  an  independent  contractor.  This 
entails a larger question of who takes the responsibility. As is well known, an analysis of 
concrete circumstances is essential. None of the factors is considered dispositive; rather, 
the court has to ponder the full range of relevant factors in interpreting the relationship 
in  question.  The  qualification  of  the  legal  relationship  does  not  necessarily  follow  the 
designation chosen by the participant. Rather, the formal agreement and the intention of 
the  parties  may  be  overturned  in  order  to  give  value  to  the  actual  day-by-day  contract 
implementation. Anyway, the tests, consisting of a multifactorial test that courts apply in 
a flexible manner, are notoriously malleable, maybe quite byzantine, and fact-dependent. 
As such, predictions are inherently uncertain. Conceivably, the one thing that is certain is 
that, in future, many claims will hang on workers status also in other European countries. 

(203)  See  ESCANDE  VARNIOL  M.-C.  (2017),  What  protections  for  workers  acting via  digital  platforms  in  a  market 

economy? Presentation, methodology and a French case. 

(204) Platform firms seem to have taken advantage of the fact that, in a broad array of situations, “courts have 
become more and more willing to require enforcement of boilerplate clauses requiring arbitration of disputes 
and waiver of the right to bring class claims”. See COHEN J. E. (2017), Law for the Platform Economy in U.C. 
Davis  Law  Review,  51(1),  p.  165  (explaining  how  “platform  firms  enjoy  an  especially  privileged  position 
from which to exploit the relational turn in litigation avoidance”). 

(205) More strikingly, workers tend not to read such increasingly complex documents. As a consequence, it could 
be  said  that  they  do  not  “consent  in  the  sense  of  understanding  that  to  which  they  are  consenting”.  See 
MACNEIL I. R. (1984), Bureaucracy and Contracts of Adhesion in Osgoode Hall L.J., 22(1), pp. 5-28. See also 
CALO  R.  and  ROSENBLAT  A.  (2017),  The  Taking  Economy:  Uber,  Information,  and  Power  in  Columbia  Law 
Review, 117, p. 35 (arguing that terms of service may “vary frequently, such as on a weekly basis”). 

(206)  Moreover,  companies  may  choose  to  blatantly  misclassify  workers  as  a  result  of  arbitration  agreements 

containing class action waivers, which cut off their liability for aggregate claims. 

(207) Originally confined to the lower-end of the pay spectrum, this issue has come up repeatedly as regarding, 
for  instance,  freelance  consultants  labelled  as  self-employed  “with  working  arrangements  very  similar  to 
those  of  the  employees  they  work  alongside”.  See  HOUSE  OF  COMMONS  –  WORK  AND  PENSIONS  COMMITTEE 
(2017), Self-employment and the gig economy, London, p. 10. 

43 

 
                                           
4.1  Classification of workers: a gateway to protections. 

Being  one  of  the  most  crucial  and  controversial  issues  when  it  comes  to  put  the 
collaborative  economy  in  the  legal  context,  an  analysis  of  the  status  of  “crowdworkers” 
and  “workers  on  demand  via  platform”  should  be  handled  with  care.  Indeed,  resolving 
this thorny question is of the utmost importance also in order to address other areas of 
concern. 

The five-factor analysis carried out in the second section of this report, dealing with the 
main  phases  of  the  relationship  between  the  platform  and  the  worker  (and  the  final 
client,  too),  was  not  accidental.  Despite  the  varying  nature  of  these  tasks  and  the 
relevant  subsector,  several  aspects  have  been  emphasised  by  taking  into  account  the 
in  court. 
realities  commonly  assessed 
Oversimplifying,  it  can  be  said  that  labour  laws  only  regulate  the  employer-employee 
relationship  and  the  complete  range  of  protective  norms  can  be  enjoyed  only  entering 
the  realm  of  employment.  In  most  of  the  cases,  they  are  therefore  excluded  from 
fundamental  principles  and  rights  at  work  such  as  freedom  of  association  and  collective 
bargaining  or  protection  against  discrimination  or  unlawful  dismissal.  Moreover,  many 
self-employed workers have no pension rights and they have no insurance rights. If gig-
work  is  their  main  activity,  “the  coverage  and  capacity  to  contribute  to  pension 
insurances and other types of social security is limited” (208). 

the  classification 

issue  also 

to  solve 

The corpus of European social law fails to define uniformly who is a worker. Article 45 of 
the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU)  lays  down  a  definition  of 
worker  within  the  meaning  of  freedom  of  movement,  which  –according  to  the  case-law 
goes beyond a “classical” definition of a person involved in an employment contract (209). 
At  present,  there  is  too  much  confusion  regarding  the  term  “worker”,  as  the  definition 
varies  according  to  the  area  in  which  it  is  to  be  applied.  In  the  Communication,  the 
Commission  emphasises  that  the  CJEU  has  explained  that  this  definition  shall  also  be 
used to determine who is to be considered a worker when applying certain EU directives 
in the social field. The first thing one should have clear in mind is that there is no such a 
provision  whatsoever  in  the  Treaties  defining  the  legal  determinants  in  order  to  be 
classified as a worker. To get a sense of this situation, in many jurisdictions the definition 
of employee varies according to the field (tax, social security, health and safety) where it 
has to be applied (210). The normative chaos is evident. The CJEU came up with a unitary 
definition,  to  be  used  in  the  entirety  of  the  membership  of  the  Union.  Settled  case  law 
has established, as a key factor, that the employment relationship is when “for a certain 
period of time a person performs a service for and under the direction of another person 
in return for which he receives remuneration” (211). The Court of Justice has stated that 
the  essential  feature  of  an  employment  relationship  is  the  power  of  command 
(understood  as  determining  the  activities  carried  out  by  the  worker,  the  working 
conditions  and  conditions  of  remuneration)  stemming  from  the  internal  structure  of  the 

(208) EICHHORST W. and RINNE U. (2017), Digital Challenges for the Welfare State, IZA Policy Paper, No. 134, p. 

2. 

(209) For instance, a person seeking work could also be considered a worker. Moreover, Article 49 ensures the 

same freedom to self-employed person, while Article 56 recognizes the freedom to provide services. 

(210) The Court of Justice of the European Union, CJEU, has stated that the definition provided for in article 45 
TFEU  and  regulation  No  1612/68  does  not  correspond  with  the  definition  used  in  Article  48  TFEU  and 
regulation  No  1408/71.  See  C—85/96,  EU:C:1998:217  paragraph  31.  See  BORELLI  S.  (2011),  Lavoratore 
(definizione  eurunitaria)  in  M.  PEDRAZZOLI  (Ed.),  Lessico  giuslavoristico.  Diritto  del  lavoro  dell’Unione 
europea  e  del  mondo  globalizzato,  3,  Bologna,  p.  123  (arguing  that  European  Social  Law  provides  for 
“case-by-case definitions”). The Court of Justice has developed a “functional” approach to the notion of the 
worker. See GIUBBONI S. (2009), La nozione comunitaria di lavoratore subordinato in CARUSO B. and SCIARRA 
S.  (Eds.),  Il  lavoro  subordinato,  Trattato  di  diritto  privato  dell’Unione  europea,  Torino,  p.  35  (explaining 
how,  under  European  Law,  the  definition  of  subordinate  worker  has  not  been  developed  for  “protective 
purposes”, as in the Italian system, but to ensure and promote the access to the common labour market). 

(211)  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  31  May  1989.  -  I.  Bettray  v  Staatssecretaris  van  Justitie.  -  Reference  for  a 
preliminary  ruling:  Raad  van  State  -  Netherlands.  Case  344/87.  CJEU,  C-66/85,  Deborah  Lawrie-Blum  v. 
Land  Baden  Wuerttemberg  (on  the  primacy  of  facts  principle).  The  CJEU  is  quite  vague  in  defining  what 
“under the direction” means. 

44 

 
                                           
contract (212). Understandably, national legislations and courts still could state and decide 
what  requirements  to  be  met  to  ascertain  the  existence  of  an  employment  relationship 
(213). 

Settled case law has established that the employment relationship is when “for a certain 
period of time a person performs a service for and under the direction of another person 
in  return  for  which  he  receives  remuneration”  (214).  Three  main  elements  can  be  listed, 
namely (i) the work has to be carried out by the worker on behalf of someone else, (ii) 
the  worker  must  be  under  that  person’s  supervision  and  (iii)  the  existence  of  a 
remuneration (215). The label (or “nomen juris”) placed on to the relationship is a factor 
in  the  outcome,  but  it  is  certainly  not  dispositive  (216).  According  to  the  so-called 
typological method (i.e. rule of thumbs), other subsidiary factors for detecting employee 
status  are:  the  continuous  nature  of  the  work  (217),  the  compliance  with  working  hours 
(218), and the provision of even non-specific guidance. The slight cautionary note is that 
no one of the factors represents a definitive test, while an appraisal of the overall picture 
is  pivotal  (this  approach  has  been  considered  as  a  kind  of  approximation  or  “sufficient 
conformity”) (219). 

(212)  See  VENEZIANI  B.  (2009),  The  Employment  Relationship  in  HEPPLE  B.  and  VENEZIANI  B.  (Eds.),  The 
Transformation of Labour Law in Europe. A Comparative Study of 15, 1945-2004, Oxford and Portland, Or., 
p. 109. 

(213) CJEU, C-94/07, Raccanelli v. Max-Planck Gesellshaft. 
(214)  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  31  May  1989.  -  I.  Bettray  v  Staatssecretaris  van  Justitie.  -  Reference  for  a 

preliminary ruling: Raad van State - Netherlands. Case 344/87.  

(215)  These  objective  criteria  are  aimed  at  assessing  whether  the  activities  are  effective  and  authentic,  rather 

than marginal or ancillary. ECJ, Bettray, para. 17. 

(216) The interpretation of the actual terms of the contract is a matter for the court. See BURCHELL B., DEAKIN S. 
and  HONEY  S.  (1999),  The  employment  status  of  individuals  in  non-standard  employment,  Department  of 
Trade and Industry, London (arguing that “the courts have consistently taken the view that the parties to 
the employment relationship cannot decide to ‘opt in’ or ‘opt out’ of the coverage of legislation, simply by 
chosing to describe their relationship in a particular way”). 

(217) See Cass. No. 8260 July 28, 1995. 
(218) See Cass. No. 6983 April 9, 2004. 
(219) This is a peculiar method of reasoning taking into account all the circumstances of the case (as opposed to 
the  basic  analytical  method  based  on  the  identity  between  the  case  and  the  abstract  designation).  Other 
factors  to  be  considered  are the  following:  (i)  the  functional  integration  into  the  employer’s  business,  (ii) 
the  organisational  dependence,  (iii)  the  obligation  to  provide  services  exclusively  or  personally,  (iv)  the 
ownership of work-related equipment, (v) the nature of remuneration (single fee vs. monthly salary), (vi) 
the existence of commercial risk, (vii) the duration of the relationship, (viii) the employer’s possession of 
the  work  tools,  (ix)  the  performance  of  the  work  at  the  employer’s  premises.  The  multifactorial  test  is 
“surprisingly similar” in many jurisdictions. Employment Relationship Recommendation, 2006 (No. 198) is 
perhaps the most relevant recommendation concerning the employment relationship. For the purposes of 
the  national  policy  of  protection  for  workers  in  an  employment  relationship,  the  determination  of  the 
existence  of  such  a  relationship  should  be  “guided  primarily  by  the  facts  relating  to  the  performance  of 
work  and  the  remuneration  of  the  worker,  notwithstanding  how  the  relationship  is  characterized  in  any 
contrary  arrangement,  contractual  or  otherwise,  that  may  have  been  agreed  between  the  parties”.  Clear 
methods  for  guiding  workers  and  employers  as  to  the  determination  of  the  existence  of  an  employment 
relationship should be promoted. “For the purpose of facilitating the determination of the existence of an 
employment  relationship,  Members  should,  within  the  framework of  the  national  policy  referred  to  in  this 
Recommendation,  consider  the  possibility  of  the  following:  (a)  allowing  a  broad  range  of  means  for 
determining  the  existence  of  an  employment  relationship;  (b)  providing  for  a  legal  presumption  that  an 
employment  relationship  exists  where  one  or  more  relevant  indicators  is  present;  and  (c)  determining, 
following  prior  consultations  with  the  most  representative  organizations  of  employers  and  workers,  that 
workers  with  certain  characteristics,  in  general  or  in  a  particular  sector,  must  be  deemed  to  be  either 
employed  or  self-employed”.  Moreover,  the  Recommendation  lists  14  factors  to  find  an  employment 
relationship:  “[m]embers  should  consider  the  possibility  of  defining  in  their  laws  and  regulations,  or  by 
other  means,  specific  indicators  of  the  existence  of  an  employment  relationship.  Those  indicators  might 
include:  (a)  the  fact  that  the  work:  is  carried  out  according  to  the  instructions  and  under  the  control  of 
another  party;  involves  the  integration  of  the  worker  in  the  organization  of  the  enterprise;  is  performed 
solely or mainly for the benefit of another person; must be carried out personally by the worker; is carried 
out within specific working hours or at a workplace specified or agreed by the party requesting the work; is 
of  a  particular  duration  and  has  a  certain  continuity;  requires  the  worker's  availability;  or  involves  the 
provision  of  tools,  materials  and  machinery  by  the  party  requesting  the  work;  (b)  periodic  payment  of 
remuneration  to  the  worker;  the  fact  that  such  remuneration  constitutes  the  worker's  sole  or  principal 
source  of  income;  provision  of  payment  in  kind,  such  as  food,  lodging  or  transport;  recognition  of 
entitlements such as weekly rest and annual holidays; payment by the party requesting the work for travel 

45 

 
                                           
Coming  straight  to  common  arrangements  of  the  platform  economy,  it  has  to  be 
acknowledged that a critical assessment of the worker classification is rather problematic. 
While crowdworking platforms disclose their terms of services and relevant contracts, it is 
extremely  hard  to  retrace  paperwork  signed  by  workers  providing  services  in  the 
passenger  transport  sector  or  on  the  customer’s  premises  (whether  corporate  or 
individual)  (220).  Data  is  drawn  from  empirical  observations,  interviews  and  surveys.  In 
particular,  in  the  light  of  the  above-mentioned  criteria,  it  could  be  said  that  many 
requirements of platform-mediated arrangements sit uneasily with self-employed worker 
status.  Just  to  get  a  general  idea,  imposing  to  accomplish  the  job  personally,  either  by 
forbidding subcontracting or with the assistance of software, coupled with the prohibition 
of working on multiple platforms, puts genuine autonomy and control remain beyond the 
grasp  of  most  workers.  In  another  section  a  list  of  conducts  that  may  qualify  as 
managerial  prerogatives  has  been  provided:  a  strict  surveillance  system  –  based  on 
costumer  ratings,  GPS  features,  bar-coding  technology,  time  constraints,  constant 
metrics, regular screenshots, response rates and obscure algorithms or the possibility to 
determine the location of the performance and the allocation of time – represents a way 
to “shield platform owners from having to deal directly with service providers” (221). 

Upon  closer  examination,  these  realities  seem  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  self-
employment  status  of  workers  and  are  more  compatible,  at  least  in  theory,  with  the 
existence of an employment status, thus resulting in a “significant murkiness”. Far from 
supposedly  catering  freedom  and  flexibility  (222),  this  pattern  combines  a  strong 
command  power,  exerted  through  software,  with  the  tremendous  advantages  of  “liquid 
responsibilities” (223), as shown in the table below. There is no consistency between the 
contractual label of “self-employed workers” and the fact that platforms dictate the terms 
of the job: in some cases, the mischaracterisation of subordinate workers is blatant thus 
making the purported independent relationship a legal sham. As already said, the current 
results also suggest that a case-by-case assessment is necessary, and much will depend 
on the relative weight attached to each factor in a concrete ruling. 

undertaken by the worker in order to carry out the work; or absence of financial risk for the worker”. See 
also  INTERNATIONAL  LABOUR  OFFICE  (2013),  Regulating  the  employment  relationship  in  Europe:  A  guide  to 
Recommendation No. 198, Governance and Tripartism Department, Geneva. 

(220) As repeatedly stated, “the downstream party deploys authority (hierarchy) mainly by informal agreements 
in  order  not  to  get  in  conflict  with  legal  regulations”.  MUEHLBERGER  U.  (2005),  Hierarchies,  relational 
contracts and new forms of outsourcing in ICER Working Paper No. 22, p. 16. 

(221)  VAN  DOORN  N.  (2017),  Platform  labor:  on  the  gendered  and  racialized  exploitation  of  low  income  service 
work in the ‘on-demand’ economy in Information, Communication & Society, 20(6), p. 903 (providing a list 
of “strategies that enforce the immunity of both the buyer of a service”). 

(222) See SCHOLZ T. (2015), Think outside the boss in Public Seminar (explaining how workers “need to be glued 

to their computers all day long to catch higher paying tasks and respond to them immediately”). 

(223) DE STEFANO V. (2017), Labour is not a technology – Reasserting the Declaration of Philadelphia in Times of 

Platform Work and Gig-Economy in IUSLabor, 2, p. 16. 

46 

 
 
                                                                                                                                    
Table 1. Overview of a selection of concrete realities of the relationship224 

Online/global services 

Offline/local services 

Online:  
Professional Crowdsourcing 

At the customer’s premises 
manual services 

Passengers 
transport  

Non-routine 

Routine 

Complex 

Simple 

/ 

Tenuous 

Strong 

Tenuous 

Strong 

Strong 

Tenuous 

Strong 

Medium 

Strong 

Strong 

Episodic 

Episodic 

Constant 

Constant 

Constant 

High 

Medium 

Medium 

Low 

Low 

Rare 

Typical 

Rare 

Rare 

Strong 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 

1. Managerial and 
direction power 

2. Supervision and 
control power 

3. Coordination 
with the platform 

4. Flexibility in the 
time schedule 

5. Continuity of the 
performance 

6. Ownership of 
equipment 

7. Personal labour 
(irreplaceability) 

It  is  notable  that  there  is  a  great  temptation  to  “close  the  case”  urging  for  a  possibly 
generalised  reclassification  aimed  at  protecting  those  workers  engaged  in  particularly 
flexible  forms  of  employment.  This  is  an  easy  way  to  resolve  a  political  controversy 
quickly and definitively (225). Nonetheless, in defence of platforms, it has to be said that 
the idea that all platform work is consistently bogus self-employment could prove to be 
wrong: “newly created jobs may only under certain conditions be conceived of as classic 
standard  employment  relationships  with  long(cid:1)term  employment  prospects,  collective 
contractual classifications and full social security” (226). If such a trend was to be of such 
a direction, it must be said that all platform workers might lose the freedom they cherish 
to  choose  their  work  hours,  while  enjoying  a  wide  range  of  legal  entitlements  and 
safeguards  which  would  come  at  a  cost.  At  the  same  time,  even  the  lack  of 
distinguishable control power does not provide significant arguments in favour of a self-
employed  status  (227).  All  of  this  is  particularly  significant  when  one  considers  that 
subordinate nature is not “a freestanding and universal characteristic of being a worker” 
(228).  While  employment  on  a  discontinuous  basis  indicates  a  certain  degree  of 
independence, the fact that “workers commonly paid a low rate of pay and forced to brag 
and  beg  to  secure  work”  (229)  reveals  the  existence  of  a  relation  of  subordination. 

(224)  Table  1  considers  significant  factors  when  deciding  whether  someone  is  an  employee  in  the  platform 

economy scenario. Author’s own elaboration. 

(225)  ARTHURS  H.  (forthcoming),  The  false  promise  of  the  Sharing  Economy,  Paper  presented  at  the  LLRN  3rd 

Conference, Labour Law Research Network, Toronto 25-27 June 2017. 

(226)  EICHHORST  W.,  HINTE  H.,  RINNE  U.  and  TOBSCH,  V.  (2016),  How  Big  is  the  Gig?  Assessing  the  Preliminary 

Evidence on the Effects of Digitalization on the Labor Market, IZA Policy Paper, No. 117, p. 1. 

(227)  TIPPETT  E.  C.  (forthcoming),  Employee  Classification  in  the  Sharing  Economy  in  DAVIDSON  N.,  FINCK  M., 
INFRANCA J. (Eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Law and Regulation of the Sharing Economy, Boston, MA. 

(228) Bates van Winkelhof v Clyde & Co & Anor UKEAT/0568/11/RN. 
(229) HUWS U., SPENCER N. H. and JOYCE S. (2016), Crowd Work in Europe. Preliminary Results from a Survey in 
the UK, Sweden, Germany, Austria and The Netherlands, Foundation for European Progressive Studies. 

47 

 
 
 
 
                                           
Understandably,  even  practical  reality,  regardless  of  the  contractual  statement,  may 
sometimes be fuzzy and far from clear-cut. 

In the landmark judgment Aslam v Uber Bv the court focused on the “practical realities” 
of the relationship between Uber and its drivers (230). By conceptualising the conclusions, 
Uber drivers could be reclassified as workers (eligible for minimum wage, sick leave and 
paid holiday provisions but not entitled to any kind of protection against unfair dismissal 
or  the  right  to  a  notice  before  being  fired)  rather  than  independent  contractors,  as 
maintained by the company in the “terms of service”.  In particular, by denying the fact 
that  the  company  exercises  a  mere  enabling  activity  between  two  opposite  groups  of 
users,  the  British  court  emphasises  that  Uber  does  not  provide  the  opportunity  for 
individually  negotiating  the  content  of  the  obligation,  while  tasks  are  performed 
personally, with no possibility of being be replaced temporarily (231). However, the cause 
for  enthusiasm might be mitigated. There  can  be no denying of the negative aspects of 
this  verdict.  First  and  foremost,  workers  are  left  in  an  intermediate  area,  and  the 
narrowed definition of their status may “reinforce Uber’s penalizing practices which may 
deactivate drivers rejecting several consecutive trips” (232), at any time and for any or no 
reason.  Therefore,  those  victories  can  be  seen  as  only  partial  ones,  or  rather  as  a  total 
debacle  if  one  subscribes  to  the  view  that  claiming  full  employee  status  could  be  even 
more problematic in the future (233).  

Litigations “continue to play an important deterrence role, both drawing public attention 
to these practices and dissuading some firms from embracing the independent contractor 
business  model”  (234).  However,  it  could  be  said that  cases  like  the  British  one  have  by 
no  doubt  contributed  to  uncovering  actual  working  conditions  and  the  most  common 
business  model  in  the  industry  (235).  At  the  same  time,  European  Union’s  highest  court 
judgement  in  Case  C-434/15  is  much  more  significant  than  the  mere  legal  situation  at 
issue:  the  litigation  will  lead  authorities  to  better  understand  what  is  the  reality  of  the 
work  in  the  platform  economy.  To  conclude,  if  the  trend  unveiled  by  this  verdict 
continues (236), and if the multifactorial analysis defined in the Communication should be 
applied  in  a  strict  sense,  there  might  be  a  “domino  effect”  in  Europe.  While  litigation 
might  succeed  in  restoring  protections,  it  should  be  only  a  “part  of  a  comprehensive 
campaign that deploys multiple strategies” to promote economic and social advance (237). 

(230)  Case  2202551/2015 &  others,  Aslam,  Farrar  &  Ors  v.  Uber  BV  &  Ors,  judgement  of 28  Oct.  2016.  More 
recently  Uber  failed  to  overturn  the  ruling  as  the  Employment  Appeal  Tribunal  fully  upheld  Employment 
Tribunal’s findings. 

(231) “The notion that Uber in London is a mosaic of 30,000 small businesses linked by a common ‘platform’ is 

to our minds faintly ridiculous”. 

(232) JAMIL R. (2017), Drivers vs Uber–The limits of the Judicialization: Critical review of London’s employment 
tribunal  verdict  in  the  case  of  Aaslam  Y.  &  Farrar  J.  against  Uber  in  Revue  Interventions  Économiques. 
Papers in Political Economy, (58). 

(233) Moreover, as a direct consequence of opportunistic practices, “the use of the intermediate category may 
result  in  encouraging  leveling  down”.  See  also  BRISHEN  R.  (2016),  Employment  Rights  in  the  Platform 
Economy:  Getting  Back  to  Basics  in  Harvard  Law  &  Policy  Review.  See  also  GRIERSON  J.  and  DAVIES  R. 
(2017,  February  10),  Pimlico  Plumbers  loses  appeal  against  self-employed  status,  retrieved  from 
https://gu.com/p/5qjyy/stw. 

(234)  DUBAL  V.  B.  (2017),  Winning  the  Battle,  Losing  the  War?:  Assessing  the  Impact  of  Misclassification 

Litigation on Workers in the Gig Economy, op. cit., p. 747. 

(235) See, for instance, SACHS B. (2016, October 26), What the UK Decision Implies for Uber Drivers in the U.S., 

retrieved from https://goo.gl/4PqULs.  

(236)  Similarly,  Deliveroo  is  under  investigation  in  UK  by  the  central  arbitration  committee  to  determine  the 
employment status of its couriers. See MCGOOGAN C. (2017, March 6), Tribunal to rule on Deliveroo riders’ 
employment status, retrieved from https://goo.gl/d4whjY. 

(237)  CUMMINGS  S.  L.  and  RHODE  D.  L.  (2009),  Public  interest  litigation:  Insights  from  theory  and  practice  in 

Fordham Urb. LJ, 36, p. 603-651. 

48 

 
                                           
Box 2. Disguised employment relationship 

There  is  considerable  agreement  among  scholars  on  what  a  “disguised  employment 
relationship” is. There is little to interpret differently in the expression “falsely classified”: 
this  fraudulent  situation  occurs  when  a  company  manipulates  employment  contracts  in 
order  to  misrepresent  the  underlying  reality  thus  nullifying  or  attenuating  legal 
responsibilities  and  protection  afforded  by  the  law  (238).  But  there  is  actually  a  more 
important point here. Judges in different jurisdictions have been wrestling with the task 
of  correctly  classifying  workers.  Part  of  the  difficulty  in  defining  bogus  self-employment 
stems from how the definition of contract of employment is crafted and interpreted (239). 
In  the  absence  of  a  definitive  answer  to  the  characterisation  question,  the  expression 
“bogus  self-employment”  emphasises  the  intention  to  side-step  labour,  tax  and  social 
security rights and regulations, with a view to reducing costs and avoiding payments and 
obligations  (240).  In  this  case,  a  self-employment  arrangements  are  used  to  hide  a 
genuine employment relationship, thus depriving workers of the protection they are due 
(241). For this reason, the most effective way to contrast this condition is to challenge the 
formal  classification  before  a  tribunal  (242),  being  the  judiciary  the  first  line  of  defence 
when a new practice of evasion comes to light (243). 

(238)  According  to  the  Employment  Relationship  Recommendation,  2006  (No.  198),  “disguised  employment 
relationships” is the situation occurring “when an employer treats an individual as other than an employee 
in  a  manner  that  hides  his  or  her  true  legal  status  as  an  employee”.  In  all  systems,  the  judge  must 
normally  decide  on  the  basis  of  the  facts,  irrespective  of  how  the  parties  construe  or  describe  a  given 
contractual  relationship.  See  HEYES  J.  and  HASTINGS  T.  (2017),  The  Practices  of  Enforcement  Bodies  in 
Detecting  and  Preventing  Bogus  Self-Employment.  But  disguised  employment  relationships  “may  also 
involve  masking  the  identity  of  the  employer,  when  the  person  designated  as  an  employer  is  an 
intermediary,  with  the  intention  of  releasing  the  real  employer  from  any  involvement  in  the  employment 
relationship and above all from any responsibility to the workers”. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE (2006), 
The employment relationship, International Labour Conference, 95th Session, 2006 Report V(1). 

(239) Davidov has exhorted to put in practice a purposive approach o determining the scope of employment, for 
rehabilitative purposes. DAVIDOV G. (2005), Who is a Worker? in Industrial Law Journal, 34(1), pp. 57-71. 
See also ID. (2002), The three axes of employment relationships: A characterization of workers in need of 
protection  in  The  University  of  Toronto  Law  Journal,  52(4),  pp.  357-418  (identifying  three  dimensions  of 
what  make  employee  vulnerable,  namely  democratic  deficit,  psychological  and  economic  dependence, 
roughly overlapping with three traditional tests such as control, integration and economic realities).  

(240)  See  ALES  E.  and  FAIOLI  M.  (2010),  Self-employment  and  bogus  self-employment  in  the  European 
construction  industry,  Expert  Report,  Self-employment  and  bogus  self-employment  in  the  construction 
industry in Italy, p. 8 (arguing that “[t]he malpractice of bogus self-employment is mainly determined by 
the social security contribution gap between employment relationship and self-employment”). 

(241)  The  issue  of  disguised  employment  relationships  has  recently  occupied  a  prominent  place  in  the  policy 
debate in this country, with the U.S. Department of Labor warning that “misclassification of employees as 
independent  contractors  is  found  in  an  increasing  number  of  workplaces  in  the  United  States,  in  part 
reflecting  larger  restructuring  of  business  organizations”  and  observing  how,  instead,  under  a  correct 
interpretation  of  the  Fair  Labour  Standards  Act,  namely  the  federal  act  governing  minimum  wages  and 
working time, “most workers are employees” and should fall into the scope of the act. 

(242) In 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated, in a breakthrough judgment, that “false self-
employed”  workers,  “disguised  […]  in  order  to  avoid  the  application  of  some  specific  legislation  (for 
example, labour or fiscal regulations) which  is considered unfavourable by the employer”, have access to 
the right to collective bargaining. CJEU 4 December 2014, C-413/13 (FNV KIEM) ECLI:EU:C:2014:2411 The 
CJEU  describes  false  self-employment  as  follows:  “[o]n  a  proper  construction  of  EU  law,  it  is  only  when 
self-employed service providers who are members of one of the contracting employees’ organisations and 
perform for an employer, under a works or service contract, the same activity as that employer’s employed 
workers,  are  ‘false  self-employed’,  in  other  words,  service  providers  in  a  situation  comparable  to  that  of 
those  workers,  that  a  provision  of  a  collective  labour  agreement,  such  as  that  at  issue  in  the  main 
proceedings, which  sets  minimum  fees for  those  self-employed service  providers, does not  fall  within  the 
scope  of  Article  101(1)  TFEU”.  The  case  was  about  a  collective  agreement  setting  a  minimum  salary  for 
both  employees  and  self-employed.  The  provision  of  a  minimum  pay,  provided  for  by  the  collective 
agreement, can be applied to falsely self-employed workers, regardless the national notion of worker and 
without  prejudice  to  competition.  As  a  consequence,  Article  101.1  TFEU  does  not  apply  “only  when  self-
employed  service  providers  who  are  members  of  one  of  the  contracting  employees’  organisations  and 
perform for an employer, under a work or service contract, the same activity as that employer’s employed 
workers, are ‘false self-employed’”. When the situation of self-employed workers is comparable to that of 
employees, a collective agreement cannot be seen as a restriction hampering competition. 

(243)  In  a  parallel  trend,  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  (CJEU)  has  stated  ensuring  that  the 
employment  law  entitlements  bestowed  to  EU  Member  States’  workers  by  European  directives  were 
actually  enjoyed  by  their  addressees,  whatever  the  position  of  national  jurisdiction.  “Where  it  perceived 

49 

 
                                           
The  rise  of  non-standard  forms  of  employment  (NSFE)  and  misclassification  of 
employment  relationships  are  strongly  intertwined,  not  least  because  the  emergence  of 
the  latter  “ambiguous”  forms  of  employment  could  make  the  disguise  of  “bogus  self-
employment” easier. This may happen usually for fiscal reasons, or in order to avoid the 
payment  of  social  contributions  and  thereby  reducing  labour  costs,  or  to  circumvent 
labour  legislation  and  protections.  As  it  was  pointed  out  above,  problems  concerning 
employment status and misclassification extend much beyond the boundaries of the gig-
economy  and  providing  for  a  specific  category  of  worker  in  this  sector  would  artificially 
segment the labour market and employment regulation and it would also add complexity, 
since  a  definition  of  the  gig-economy  that  overlaps  significantly  therewith,  would  be 
extremely  difficult  to  identify.  This  is  especially  the  case  when  there  is  no  clear 
organisational  separation  between  the  economically  dependent  worker  and  the  client. 
When the economically dependent workers work on the client's premises and/or use the 
client's equipment, a sharp distinction between these workers and the employees is more 
difficult  to  establish,  as  such  aspects  are  considered  to  be  features  of  an  employment 
relationship. This is particularly the case when self-employment is not a voluntary choice, 
but the outcome of forced outsourcing or contracting-out practices. 

Box 3. Economically dependent self-employment (the grey area) 

“Economically  dependent  workers”  might  be  defined  as  those  self-employed  persons 
situated in an intermediate area between labour law and private or commercial law. This 
characterisation  is  rather  vague  and  controversial.  It  is  convenient  to  focus  on  “quasi-
subordination”, described as the hallmark of those working relationships in which workers 
are  classified  under  a  contract  different  from  a  contract  of  employment  but  perform 
services predominantly or exclusively for one client. In this case, workers depend on the 
given principal for their income and may receive direct instructions on how the work has 
to  be  completed.  In  several  countries,  “[i]nstead  of  an  ‘all  or  nothing’  approach,  it  is 
acknowledged  (…)  that  some  workers  present  only  some  characteristics  of  “employees” 
but not others, and that it is justified to apply only some labor laws to them” (244): a floor 
of rights specifically has been “selectively extended” to this group of vulnerable workers 
(245). 

that  some  national  legal  systems  were  in  effect  depriving  some  of  their  workers  of  these  rights  by 
misclassifying them as ‘self-employed’ persons, or as workers employed under sui generis work relations, 
[the Court] has boldly asserted that ‘the formal classification of a self-employed person under national law 
does  not  exclude  the  possibility  that  a  person  must  be  classified  as  a  worker  within  the  meaning  of  [EU 
law] if his independence is merely notional, thereby disguising an employment relationship’,
and that ‘the 
sui generis legal nature of the employment relationship under national law cannot have any consequence in 
regard to whether or not the person is a worker for the purposes of European Union law’”. Coming now to 
the legal techniques, it must be said that, in these cases, “the CJEU, while refraining from labelling these 
domestic arrangements as ‘shams’, has superimposed an EU reclassification resulting in their falling within 
the protective coverage of EU employment protection laws. In some more recent judgments it went even 
further  by  suggesting  that,  even  in  those  cases  where  it  is  ultimately  for  national  referring  courts  to 
determine  whether  a  domestic  worker  is  also  a  worker  for  the  purposes  of  EU  law”.  In  addition  to  this, 
“[t]he Court may, however, mention to the referring court a number of principles and criteria which it must 
take  into  account  in  the  course  of  its  examination”.  See  FINKIN  M.  W.  and  MUNDLAK  G.  (Eds.)  (2015), 
Comparative Labor Law, Cheltenham, UK, p. 123. 

(244) DAVIDOV G., FREEDLAND M. R. and KOUNTOURIS N. (2015), The Subjects of Labor Law: ‘Employees’ and Other 
Workers  in  FINKIN  M.  W.  and  MUNDLAK  G.  (Eds.),  Comparative  Labor  Law.  Research  Handbooks  in 
Comparative Law Series, Cheltenham, UK – Northampthon, MA, p. 128. 

(245)  For  a  detailed  analysis  on  “the  expansion  of  employment  law”,  see  PERULLI  A.  (2017),  The  Notion  of 
‘Employee’ in Need of Redefinition, A Thematic Working Paper for The Annual Conference of the European 
Centre of Expertise (ECE) in the field of labour law, employment and labour market policies: The Personal 
Scope of Labour Law in Times of Atypical Employment and Digitalisation (describing the German, French, 
and British cases). 

50 

 
 
                                                                                                                                    
 
Understandably,  the  emergence  of  platform-based  labour  makes  these  discussions  even 
more  relevant  and  urgent,  as  many  elements  defining  such  intermediate  categories  (a 
functional link with the principal’s business organisation, a coordination mainly arranged 
by  the  client,  economic  or  organisational  dependence  as  opposed  to  personal 
dependence)  may  be  easily  found  in  a  common  relationship  between  an  Uber-like  firm 
and  its  fleet  of  “providers”.  As  envisioned  by  Sciarra,  the  model  of  economically 
dependent  work  might  attract  “new  forms  of  employment,  all  similarly  characterised  by 
the  non-continuity  of  employment,  the  low  level  of  earnings  and  the  lack  of  precise 
prospects  in  creating  career  paths”  (246),  thus  marking  a  fundamental  break  with  the 
traditional  notion  of  quasi-dependent  work  in  the  pre-digital  age.  As  far  as  working 
conditions  of  dependent  self-employed  are  concerned,  it  can  be  said  that  the  actual 
situation varies enormously. Despite dependent self-employed workers being more easy 
targets of abuses in working hours and facing greater difficulties in organising their task 
schedule,  this  is  not  necessarily  the  case.  Dependent  self-employment  is  often  used  to 
lower  social  insurance  contributions,  although  this  must  not  automatically  lead  to  an 
undermining of labour law (247). 

Furthermore, an intermediate category of “quasi-subordinate” workers already exists in a 
legal  sense  in  some  jurisdictions  and  its  acceptance,  or  tolerance,  whatever  it  may  be 
called, is increasing. More importantly, some authors have claimed that “[t]he description 
or  definition  of  economically  dependent  workers  starts  from  the  premise  that  (1)  such 
workers  are  not  employees,  and  (2)  economically  dependent  work  must  not  be  used  to 
hide  the  true  nature  of  the  employment  relationship”  (in  a  disguised  employment 
relationship  situation)  (248).  From  a  social  policy  point  of  view,  “[s]urely  when  an 
intermediate  category  is  considered,  it  should  not  be  seen  as  a  solution  to 
misclassification  (sham  self-employment);  rather,  the  goal  should  be  to  add  some 
(partial)  protection  to  people  who  are  not  (even  without  any  sham)  within  the  group  of 
‘employees’” (249). Depending on the specific national rules, these workers are commonly 
outside the scope of labour law protection (such as the rules on dismissals) and collective 
bargaining coverage and are subject to “promotional” fiscal and tax regulations. Whether 
it  is  called  “employee-like  person”  (as  in  Germany),  “para-subordinate”  (as  in  Italy), 
“economically  dependent  autonomous  worker”  (as  in  Spain),  simply  “worker”  (as  in  the 
United Kingdom) or “semi-dependent workers” (250), the goal of such class remains more 
or less the same: allowing for better refinement in the application of labour laws. 

(246)  SCIARRA  S.  (2004),  The  Evolution  of  Labour  Law  (1992-2004),  General  Report.  Project  for  the  European 

Commission, p. 22. 

(247)  With  regard  to  working  conditions,  the  actual  situation  of  dependent  self-employed  workers  varies 
enormously. See EICHHORST W., BRAGA M., FAMIRA-MÜHLBERGER U., GERARD M. et al. (2013), Social protection 
rights  of  economically  dependent  self-employed  workers,  European  Parliament  Directorate  General  for 
Internal Policies. 

(248)  ROSIORU  F.  (2014),  Legal  Acknowledgement  of  the  Category  of  Economically  Dependent  Workers  in 

European Labour Law Journal, 5(3-4), p. 296. 

(249) DAVIDOV G., FREEDLAND M. R. and KOUNTOURIS N. (2015), The Subjects of Labor Law: ‘Employees’ and Other 
Workers  in  FINKIN  M.  W.  and  MUNDLAK  G.  (Eds.),  Comparative  Labor  Law.  Research  Handbooks  in 
Comparative Law Series, Cheltenham, UK – Northampthon, MA, p. 129. 

(250)  As  proposed  by  FREEDLAND  M.  R.  (2003),  The  Personal  Employment  Contract,  Oxford,  UK.  For  a  first 
reaction to this proposal, see DEAKIN S. (2007), Does the ‘Personal Employment Contract’ Provide a Basis 
for  the  Reunification  of  Employment  Law?  in  Industrial  Law  Journal,  36(1),  pp.  68-83  (explaining  that 
Freedland’s  proposal  places  the  boundary  between  categories  “at  the  point  where  personal  service  gives 
way  to  a  contract  of  sale  or  other  commercial  relationship,  and  where  economic  dependence  –  that  is  to 
say,  the  dependence  of  the  worker  on  a  particular  enterprise  –  is  displaced  by  the  presence  of  a 
professional relationship or independence business entity”). 

51 

 
                                           
If employee status is the “gateway” to full employment coverage, in several jurisdictions 
an  intermediate  category  has  been  created  to  offer  a  “secondary  entrance”  to  a  limited 
set  of  social  rights.  Irrespective  of  labels  and  legislative  techniques  adopted,  the  main 
purpose of the legal recognition of such an intermediate category is to broaden the scope 
of protection to the advantage of people who may be “substantially distinguishable from 
‘employees’”  (251),  without  labelling  them  as  employees.  This  has  resulted  in  numerous 
initiatives  clarifying  the  legal  status  of  this  category  of  workers  through  various  routes: 
(i)  introduction  of  a  new  and  distinct  legal  employment  status:  (ii)  extension  of  labour 
protection  by  legislative  intervention  typically  social  security  coverage,  including 
sometimes  health  and  safety  provisions)  to  certain  forms  of  self-employment,  (iii) 
introduction  of  a  presumption  of  subordination  for  certain  categories  of  workers  or 
beyond  certain  thresholds  (252),  (iv)  the  interpretative  activism  of  courts,  and  (v) 
introduction  of  soft  regulation.  Despite  the  extension  of  protective  measures  that  has 
taken  place  over  time,  it  would  not  be  correct  to  maintain  that  quasi-subordinate 
employment  is  a  third  category  of  employment,  different  from  employment  or  self-
employment. In practice, it is still included in the self-employment category. 

Drawing preliminary conclusions by many national experiences, it could be said that the 
unintended consequences of an in-between category far outweigh those envisaged by its 
proponents as they have resulted in an increased level of uncertainty, paving the way for 
a possible legal arbitrage (253). Crafting an intermediate category has created more room 
for  mischief.  A  number  of  objections  have  been  presented  against  the  creation  of  an 
intermediate  category  of  workers  between  employees  and  self-employed.  The  above 
concerns  also  apply  to  a  category  specifically  designed  to  meet  the  needs  of  platforms. 
Many  scholars  have  recommended  a  cautious  approach  towards  ad  hoc  solutions  (254). 
Creating  an  intermediate  category  of  workers  such  as  dependent  contractors  or 
dependent  self-employed  persons  implies  to  identify  suitable  definitions.  First  and 
foremost,  proposing  a  new  legal  bucket  for  grey-zone  cases  may  complicate  matters, 
rather  than  simplifying  the  issues  surrounding  classification.  Moreover,  crafting  such  a 
new  model  could  be  fraught  with  practical  difficulties  regarding  classification,  as  an 
automatic extension of the scope of labour law to economically dependent workers could 
deprive this subject  of its legitimacy (255). More importantly, this solution overestimates 
the  role  of  the  legal  constraints,  since  legally  redefining  who  benefits  from  statutory 
protections  might  not  address  the  power  of  firms  to  choose  how  to  arrange  their 
workforce. 

(251) See also DAVIDOV G. (2005), Who is a Worker? in Industrial Law Journal, 34(1), p. 61 ff. (arguing that “the 
idea has been to extend protection to individuals that normally do not, and should not, enjoy the protection 
of labour laws”). 

(252) Perhaps not surprisingly, both the techniques were used in Italy, before the recent legislative intervention 

which limited the scope of the intermediate category and established employee status is the default. 

(253)  For  a  complete  review,  see  CHERRY  M.  A.  and  ALOISI  A.  (2017),  “Dependent  Contractors"  in  the  Gig 

Economy: A Comparative Approach in American University L. R., 66(3), pp. 635-689. 

(254)  WEISS  M.  (2016),  Tecnologia,  ambiente  e  demografia:  il  diritto  del  lavoro  alla  prova  della  nuova  grande 

trasformazione in Dir. rel. in., 3, p. 654. 

(255) For instance, fixing a thresholds may involuntarily encourage the development of contracts that skirt the 
boundaries of the definitions (for instance by specifying numbers of working hours that are just below the 
qualifying thresholds). 

52 

 
 
 
 
                                           
5  Final remarks and policy recommendations. 

This  report  has  tried  to  map  a  broad  array  of  app-enabled  working  arrangements, 
clustering  the  findings  into  three  main  subsets  (passenger  transport  services, 
professional  crowdsourcing,  on-demand  work  at  the  household’s  premises).  Due  to  the 
high  level  of  heterogeneity  among  platforms,  as  suggested  by  Eurofound  speaking  of 
non-standard forms of work, “a general discussions or policy recommendations (…) are of 
little  use”  (256).  The  research  has  reviewed  national  practices  as  well  as  legislations 
introduced  with  regard  to  labour  platforms  and,  more  broadly,  new  forms  of  Internet-
enabled work. It has to be argued that developing specific legislation targeting platforms 
might  prove  to  be  unfruitful.  Conversely,  different  approaches  are  needed,  taking  into 
account  the  defining  characteristics  of  each  employment  form.  Unnecessary  regulatory 
burdens should be avoided as well as the permanent state of exception, grounded on the 
allegedly  distinctive  class  of  the  innovation  sector,  should  be  denied.  These  strong 
intermingling of old and new challenges constitutes the underlying reason why gig work 
has catalysed so much attention in recent times. In a sense, this analysis constitutes an 
open-ended assignment, as the scrutiny of the platform economy has catalysed a much 
wider discussion over the future of work. 

The  fact  that  these  alternative  arrangements  tend  to  be  considered  as  something 
absolutely new may be questioned and it has been challenged in the previous chapters. 
Regulators  should  not  be  seduced  by  the  assertions  to  distinctiveness  of  these  rising 
models. The alarm on the irremediable obsolescence of existing legal notions is somehow 
misplaced.  Nevertheless,  recent  episodic  legislative  interventions  may  have  created  an 
infinite  series  of  subcategories,  instead  of  handling  these  “manifestations”  as  parts  of  a 
unique  family.  At  this  stage,  the  lawmakers’  reluctance  to  legislate  is not  to  blame,  not 
only because an extreme “activism” could impede the growth of this fast rising business 
segment.  In  the  last  decades,  indeed,  the  proliferation  in  contractual  solutions  has 
increased  the  room  for  legal  arbitrage,  not  to  mention  the  profound  differences  among 
European Member States determining an uneven playing field in the pillar of social rights 
(257). This moment of transition may encourage an in-depth reflection on how to reinforce 
and  redesign  established  institutional  solutions  in  the  field  of  social  protection.  Platform 
worker  do  not  necessarily  need  new  regulations,  but  a  more  effective  enforcement  and 
an unambiguous framework. Paradoxically, a courier performing the same activity can be 
classified as a quasi-subordinate worker in Italy, as a self-employed worker in France, as 
an  employee  in  Germany,  as  a  “zero-hours”  contract  worker  in  the  UK  or  as  an 
intermittent  worker  in  Belgium.  Definitely,  a  strong  showing  of  fragmentation  and 
weakness. 

Thus,  a  harmonised  frame  of  reference  is  much  more  desirable,  while  a  patchwork  of 
differing  legislations  may  result  in  an  open  invitation  to  legal  arbitrage  or  jurisdiction 
shopping.  It  is  worth  emphasizing  that  such  fragmentation  can  be  reduced  thanks  to 
uniform  measures,  which  in  turn  may  lower  the  costs  associated  with  expansion,  and 
hence  encourages  business  development.  Fortunately,  there  is  no  shortage  of 
international initiatives aimed at promoting Code of Conducts (258) or Guidelines (259), in 

(256) Eurofound (2015), New forms of employment, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. 
(257)  Last  January,  the  European  Parliament  adopted  a  resolution  on  a  European  Pillar  of  Social  Rights. 
European  Commission  Brussels,  26.4.2017  COM(2017)  250  final  Communication  from  the  Commission  to 
the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the 
Regions Establishing a European Pillar of Social Rights. A list of rights to be guaranteed to employees and 
all workers in non-standard forms of employment is provided including equal treatment, health and safety 
protection, protection during maternity leave, provisions on working time and rest time, work-life balance, 
access  to  training,  in-work  support  for  people  with  disabilities.  This  initiative  could  be  quite  rightly 
considered  a  significant  step  forward,  especially  if  read  in  connection  with  the  unequivocal  reference  to 
rights to adequate information, consultation and information, freedom of associations and representations, 
collective bargain and collective action. See European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2017 on a Pillar 
of Social Rights (2016/2095(INI)), available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2017-0010+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.  

(258) AUSTRIAN CHAMBER OF LABOUR, AUSTRIAN TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, DANISH UNION OF COMMERCIALAND CLERICAL 
WORKERS,  GERMAN  METALWORKERS’  UNION,  INTERNATIONAL  BROTHERHOOD  OF  TEAMSTERS  LOCAL  117,  SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNIONEN, CHERRY M. A., DURWARD D., KLEBE T., KÄMPF T., BERG J., DE STEFANO 

53 

 
                                           
order  to  discipline  the  minimum  levels  of  payment  by  the  platforms,  increase  the 
transparency  of  criteria  applied  in  the  operation  of  internal  rating  systems,  and  ensure 
the legitimacy of content exchanged online (260). At the same time, representative bodies 
should be set up in these new digitally mediated non-standard work environments (261). 
The  anecdotal  evidence  shows  that  ICT-based  casual  work  might  jeopardise  working 
conditions. It is therefore urgent to address the special need for protection of platforms 
workers, designing rules aimed at contrasting groundless rejections of the work done or 
unfair deactivation of their accounts. 

Therefore, reaffirming the major binary divide between workers genuinely self-employed 
and  those  in  an  employment  relationship  would  be  helpful  in  the  attempt  to  reduce 
labour  market  segmentation  and  rising  inequalities  (262).  Solutions  should  be  sought  by 
interpreting  the  notion  of  employment  in  a  resilient  way.  Moreover,  as  claimed  in  the 
previous  section,  the  existing  legal  framework  should  be  exploited  to  its  maximum 
possibilities as appropriate, also taking into account the great diversity of arrangements 
and  contexts.  Understandably,  another  answer  might  be  closing  legal  loopholes  that 
incentivise  exploitative  comportments  by  a  marginal  group  of  deceitful  companies  (263). 
In  this  respect,  many  scholars  have  always  loudly  advocated  to  extend  the  scope  of 
rights  such  as  unionisation,  collective  bargaining,  social  security,  and  legal  protection 
(such  as  minimum  wage  laws)  to  cover  online  workers.  The  application  of  existing 
regulation  is  to  be  reinforced,  in  order  “to  avoid  the  risk  that  these  workers  are 
considered  by  default  as  falling  in  a  normative  vacuum  with  no  access  to  labour  rights” 
(264). Despite minor attempts, at the moment, “platforms are self-regulating entities and 
their development has been largely extra-legal” (265). While it is correct that the internal 
mechanism  can  boost  the  implementation  of  certain  legal  standards,  the  myth  of  self-
regulation – defined as the freedom from any outside interference – is not panacea.  

It  can  be  argued  that  platform-mediated  arrangements  are  particularly  keen  sites  for 
investigating how classical legal notions and formats can adapt to new dynamics. Having 
decided how to treat platforms whose influence and command on the ultimate provider is 
intense,  “surgical”  regulatory  interventions  (266)  shall  help  the  collaborative  economy 
companies to adjust and improve their business model, building a new phase of “shared 
social  responsibility”.  In  this  sense,  the  current  European  attitude  is  perceived  as  a  fair 
balance  between  supporting  entrepreneurs’  confidence  and  implementing  workers’ 
protections,  but  considerable  efforts  need  to  be  done  in  order  to  ensure  a  stable  and 
sustainable future. 

V., KEZUKA K., LIEBMAN W., SCHOLZ T. and SCHRØDER P. A. (2016), Frankfurt Paper on Platform Based Work, 
Frankfurt.  Improvements  are  needed  to  make  gig  work  fully  beneficial  also  to  workers.  Several  distinct 
priorities appear urgent. See ALOISI A., DE STEFANO V. and SILBERMAN M. S. (2017, May 29), A Manifesto to 
Reform the Gig Economy, retrieved from https://goo.gl/fX67S9 (setting achievable objectives for a healthy 
“digital transition” such as employment contracts for “regulars”, a reference to the collective agreement of 
“comparable” professionals, working standards for all – whether professionals or amateurs, portability and 
interoperability of ratings, the removal of exclusivity clauses binding workers, to list but a few). 

(259) See OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, available at: http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/.  
(260)  See  Paid  Crowdsourcing  for  the  Better,  Guideline  for  a  prosperous  and  fair  cooperation  between 
companies, clients and crowdworkers, available at: http://crowdsourcing-code.com/. Moreover the German 
trade  union  IG  Metall  has  launched  www.faircrowdwork.org,  a  platform  supporting  crowdworkers  and 
promoting the share of information.  

(261)  An  example  is  offered  by  Foodora  couriers  in  Vienna,  Austria,  who  recently  established  the  first  works 
council for platform- or app-based workers. Other grassroots initiatives are taking place all around Europe.  
(262)  For  instance,  under  Swedish  labour  law,  the  social  partners  have  the  possibility  to  define  the  employee 
notion  based  on  industry  practice  through  the  means  of  collective  agreements.  Adapting  the  concept  of 
employment to new forms of work is therefore easier. 

(263)  Concomitantly,  it  is  important  to  claim  that  innovation  should  not  be  a  basis  for  an  exemption  or  a  sui 
generis status. CODAGNONE C., ABADIE F. and BIAGI F. (2016), The Future of Work in the ‘Sharing Economy’. 
Market Efficiency and Equitable Opportunities or Unfair Precarisation? (arguing that platforms cannot stand 
above the law). 

(264) DE STEFANO V. (2017), Labour is not a technology – Reasserting the Declaration of Philadelphia in Times of 

Platform-Work and Gig-Economy in IUSLabor, 2, p. 1-16. 

(265) FINCK M. (2017), Digital Regulation: Designing a Supranational Legal Framework for the Platform Economy, 
LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 15/2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2990043. 
(266) DAS ACEVEDO D. (2016), Regulating Workforce Relationships in the Sharing Economy in Emp. Rts. & Emp. 

Pol’y J., 20(1), p. 10. 

54 

 
                                                                                                                                    
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63 

 
 
List of boxes 

Box 1. The Communication on the European agenda for the collaborative 
economy ............................................................................................................29

Box 2. Disguised employment relationship ........................................................49

Box 3. Economically dependent self-employment (the grey area) .....................50

64 

List of figures 

Figure 1. Typologies of (labour) platforms. .............................................................10

65 

List of tables 

Table 1. Overview of a selection of concrete realities of the relationship ................... 477

66 

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