Local specificities of migration in Libya : challenges and solutions.
Date: 2018-10-12
Institutions: European University Institute
Subjects: Libya, fight against crime, illegal migration, migrant, migration policy, trafficking in human beings

Issue 2018/04
March  2018

Local Specificities of Migration 
in Libya: Challenges and 
Solutions

Abdulrahman al-Arabi1

Executive Summary
Current policies aimed at curbing illegal migration to Europe through 
Libya, such as the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between 
the Italian government and Libya’s Government of National Accord 
(GNA) signed early 2017, are unlikely to be sustainable in the mid- 
to  long-term.  The  GNA  has  limited  control  beyond  Tripoli,  which 
reduces its ability to impose policies in areas that are key to smuggling 
operations, in particular in southern Libya. One major reason for the 
expected ineffectiveness or adverse effects of these policies is that they 
do not take into account the interests and concerns of the local actors.

1.  Abdulrahman al-Arabi was born in Tripoli. He is a civil society activist with 
a particular interest in migration, and Libyan and international law related to 
migration.

  This paper was written in March 2018 as part of Middle East Directions’ Libya 

Initiative, which includes a scheme to mentor young Libyan analysts.

BRIEFPOLICYsignificant  level  of  social  protection  –  as    tribal  leaders 
have tended to turn a blind eye to their activities in order 
to prevent conflict – it  could also provide an entry point 
for successful policies to combat illegal migration. 
Local  social  and  municipal  councils  generally  have 
a  significant  level  of  influence  and  control  over  their 
communities.  If  they  were  convinced  that  smuggling 
is  doing  more  harm  than  good  to  their  people,  they 
could  become  efficient  partners  for  both  the  Libyan 
government and its international partners. The relatively 
weak influence of smugglers on the local economy in this 
region  would  be  an  asset.  One  key  challenge,  however, 
will  be  the  continuing  isolation  of  communities  from 
the  central  region  after  2011,  as  well  as  their  refusal  to 
recognise the central political and security authorities. 

Coastal Region
The  local  armed  groups  that  have  increasingly  seized 
control over migrant smuggling operations in the coastal 
region since 2014 focus on maximising profit and have 
only  limited  impact  on  the  local  economy.  Security 
campaigns  conducted  by  local  police  forces  and  the 
coast  guard  have  a  track  record  of  success  in  certain 
areas, especially when they could take advantage of the 
local  community’s  rejection  of  smuggling  activities  and 
competition between smuggling networks.
Further  efforts  to  reinforce  the  capacity  of  security 
structures  and  incentivise  police  forces  and  the  coast 
guard  to  combat  migrant  smuggling  can  bring  about 
positive results. For such efforts not to further empower 
local  security  structures  to  the  detriment  of  the  central 
government,  however,  particular  attention  will  have 
to  be  given  to  designing  mechanisms  for  encouraging 
local  and 
coordination  and  cooperation  between 
national  level  authorities.  In  general,  policies  aimed 
at  curbing  migrant  smuggling  will  gain  in  efficiency  if 
they capitalise on the increasing rejection of smuggling 
by  local  communities  and  the  growing  interest  of  local 
political  and  security  actors  to  demonstrate  their  anti-
smuggling commitment. Particular attention will need to 
be paid to avoid that offers of cooperation are presented 
to  some  groups  to  the  detriment  of  others,  triggering 
competition between networks and further instability.

A  field-based  analysis  of  migrant  smuggling  networks 
at the local level indicates that there are clear differences 
in  the  nature  and  organisation  of  migrant  smuggling 
networks  between  Libya’s  southern,  central  and  coastal 
regions.  As  such,  similiar  policies  in  all  regions  will 
not  produce  effective  results  and  may  even  prove 
counter-productive. It is important therefore that policy 
responses are designed to address the specific challenges 
of each region in terms of the actors involved in migrant 
smuggling and their connections to wider society. 

Southern Region
The  southern  region  is  key  to  migrant  smuggling 
as  it  is  the  entry  point  of  flows  heading  towards  the 
Mediterranean  from  sub-Saharan  Africa  and  remains 
largely  out  of  the  GNA’s  security  control.  Combatting 
smuggling in the South is also extremely complex as the 
issue has become politicised as a result of the struggle for 
influence between the various local tribes and non-Arab 
minorities,  and  unresolved  political  issues  relating  to 
rights to Libyan citizenship and nationality.
Therefore,  a relevant policy response  in  southern Libya 
ought  to  engage  and  include  all  of  the  different  groups 
competing for influence in the region so as not to further 
affect the local power balance (or be perceived as doing 
so). Although security will be part of the response, policy 
makers both inside and outside Libya should be wary of 
relying  on  supporting  select  armed  groups  that  appear 
most capable of curbing migration flows.
The  impact  of  smuggling  on  the  local  economy  is  also 
very important in the South. Smugglers in this area often 
re-invest their profits locally, and have come to constitute 
an alternative to the failing banking system and the lack 
of  basic  services.  This  has  made  smugglers  particularly 
influential in some areas. An effective policy to combat 
smuggling would therefore seek to disconnect smugglers 
from local communities by providing day-to-day services, 
incentivising  legitimate  trade  and  promoting  economic 
development.

Central Region
The sociology of the smuggling networks in the central 
region  differs  from  that  in  the  south  and  the  coastal 
region,  reflecting  the  highly  cohesive  and  homogenous 
social  fabric  of  the  area:  generally,  the  inhabitants  of 
each  town  or  area  belong  to  a  single  tribe.  While  this 
has  so  far  provided  smugglers  from  the  region  with  a 

2 ■  Robert Schuman Centre | March 2018

Introduction
Controlling  illegal  migration  flows  to  and  from  Libya 
has become a policy priority for Libya’s Government of 
National Accord (GNA)2 over the past year. This is largely 
due  to  the  intense  pressure  it  faces  from  destination 
countries  on  the  northern  shore  of  the  Mediterranean, 
Italy  in  particular.  However,  migration  has  now  also 
become  an  issue  of  public  interest  in  Libya,  especially 
since  CNN’s  November  2017  documentary  on  ‘slave 
markets’  of  sub-Saharan  African  migrants  transiting 
through  the  country3.  Over  the  course  of  the  past 
months,  illegal  migration  and  migrant  smuggling  have 
started to be considered by Libyans as a problem and a 
possible threat to the country’s stability, something which 
is relatively new.
The fall in the number of migrants attempting to launch 
across  the  Mediterranean  from  Libya’s  shores  in  mid 
2017,4  indicated  that  the  February  2017  MoU  signed 
between  the  GNA  and  the  Italian  government  may  be 
starting to bear fruit. However, questions are being raised 
with  regard  to  its  limitations  and  already  noticeable 
adverse effects,5 as well as its sustainability.
The strategy behind the MoU relies heavily on the GNA 
and  the  security  structures  affiliated  to  it  at  the  local 
level.  Yet  the  GNA  remains  unable  to  exercise  control 
over much territory, and even the security structures and 
armed groups that are officially part of the government 
are  often  loyal  to  it  in  name  only  –  when  they  are  not 
directly  involved  in  the  estimated  €500-million-a-year6 
migrant smuggling trade. 
The fact that migrant smuggling has essentially become 
a major sector of the economy and the principal source 
of income for many young people and families in some 
regions  is  largely  unaddressed  in  the  current  policy 
responses.  It  is  also  still  unclear  whether  the  reduction 

2.  The  Government  of  National  Accord  (GNA)  is  headed  by 
Fayez Al-Serraj, and was formed following signing of the Libya 
Political Agreement in December 2015 in Skhirat, Morocco. The 
agreement was with the participation and support of the United 
Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).

3.  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42038451.
4.  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/11/number-of-
migrants-arriving-in-italy-from-libya-falls-by-half-in-july 

5.  https://issafrica.org/research/north-africa-report/the-anti-
human-smuggling-business-and-libyas-political-end-game 

6.  For more information, see [Arabic]: http://al-ahd.net/2017/08/15/, 

page 2.

in  Mediterranean  crossings  is  mirrored  by  a  reduction 
in  migrants  entering  Libya  from  sub-Saharan  Africa, 
meaning  that  Libyan  concerns  over  the  permanent 
settlement  of  migrants  in  the  country  have  not  been 
addressed.
A  new  strategy  is  therefore  required,  one  which  takes 
into account the concerns of both Libyan and European 
policymakers.  In  an  attempt  to  contribute  to  such  a 
strategy, this paper looks at migrant smuggling networks 
at the local level, the actors involved in them and their 
connections  to  wider  society.  The  clear  differences 
between the southern region, central region and coastal 
region mean that a single policy implemented in the same 
way  across  all  three  regions  will  not  produce  effective 
results.  Rather,  while  being  framed  as  supporting  and 
reinforcing the capacities of the central state authorities, 
responses  should  be  designed  to  address  the  specific 
challenges of each area.
This  paper  is  based  on  field  research  and  interviews 
in  each  of  the  three  aforementioned  regions  between 
June  2017  and  February  2018,  as  well  as  the  author’s 
long  experience  in  the  field  in  another  capacity.  It  only 
addresses  migrant  smuggling  networks  in  the  west  of 
Libya,  because  smuggling  operations  there  account  for 
most  of  the  illegal  migration  flows  from  Libya  towards 
the  northern  shore  of  the  Mediterranean.  It  also  pays 
particular attention to southern Libya, which constitutes 
a key link in migrant smuggling networks to and through 
Libya.

The Southern Region: A Struggle 
for Influence Amid Fragile 
Security Conditions and Economic 
Marginalisation 
Libya’s  southern  region,  extending  from  Kufra7  in  the 
east to Ghat8 in the west, and Brak al-Shati in the north, 
is  home  to  a  number  of  different  tribes  and  non-Arab 
minorities.  These  groups  have  taken  different  political 
stances since 2011 and have been competing for power 

7.  Kufra is the largest city in the south east, 1,050 km from Benghazi. 
It is located in the triangle formed by Libya’s borders with Egypt, 
Sudan  and Chad, and is  considered the main  smuggling  route 
from Sudan and other countries of the Horn of Africa.

8.  Ghat  is  located  in  the  far  west  of  Libya,  550  km  southwest  of 
Sebha, on Libya’s borders with Niger and Algeria. It is one of the 
smuggling routes from Mali and Niger.

3 ■ Local specificities of migration in Libya: challenges and solutions

Title: Southern region
Title: Southern region

and influence, including for the control of resources (oil 
fields, border crossings, smuggling routes). 
The principal challenge to tackling illegal migration in the 
Libyan south comes from the intersection of several key 
trends,  which  are  increasingly  intertwined:  weak  or  no 
central control over local security; political competition 
between  a  variety  of 
local  groups;  demographic 
transformations;  and,  a  weak  and  deteriorating  local 
economy. The combination of these factors in the Libyan 
south has allowed the smuggling networks to expand and 
increase their influence at the local level.
Since  2011,  migrant  smugglers  have  been  able  to  work 
faster and more easily as a result of the limited capacity of 
official security bodies (essentially the border guard9 and 
the Anti-Illegal Immigration Agency, AIIA10). According 
to one Ministry of Interior official11, the role of these bodies 
has  been  undermined  because  of  their  dependence  on 
weak and divided governments, and because smugglers’ 

Gharyan

military  capacities  put  them  under  severe  pressure.  As 
most  smugglers  are  backed  by  local  armed  groups  that 
protect  them  and  secure  their  trade,  the  border  guard 
and AIIA have tended not to engage actively with them, 
in  order  to  avoid  direct  armed  confrontation.  There  is 
no  military  force  assigned  to  protect  members  of  the 
border guard and AIIA, and more than once their patrols 
have been fired upon, particularly after 201412. The two 
agencies  have  also  faced  thefts  of  equipment  including 
SUVs  and  communications  equipment.  In  addition  to 
this,  the  AIIA  and  border  guard  workers’  low  salaries 
have  made  some  willing  to  cooperate  with  smugglers 
in  exchange  for  bribes,  or  even  to  engage  directly  in 
smuggling activities.13 
In  cities  and  areas  characterised  by  diverse  and 
complex  social  fabrics,  the  increasing  politicisation 
and  militarisation  of  society  after  2014  have  further 
contributed to the development and expansion of 

Algeria

Brak al-Shati

Ubari
Ubari

Sebha

Murzuq

Ghat

Gatrun

Egypt

Niger

Chad

Kufra

The main smuggling routes in the southern region go from the southern border towns such as Gatrun to Murzuq to Sebha, from Ghat 
to Ubari to Brak al-Shati, and from Kufra directly to Ajdabiya.

9. 

 The border guard is affiliated with the Ministry of Defense and is 
mainly tasked with monitoring and securing Libya’s borders. It 
was established by Decree No. 392 of 2000. For more information, 
see: http://security-legislation.ly/ar/node/33856.

10. The Anti-Illegal Immigration Agency (AIIA) is affiliated to the 
Ministry  of  Interior  and  was  established  by  Decree  No.  386 
of  2014.  It  is  mainly  tasked  with  preparing  and  implementing 
security  plans  to  combat  human  smuggling  crimes.  For  more 
information, see: http://security-legislation.ly/ar/node/34978.

12.  A border guard patrol was shot at by a group of smugglers to the 
south of Sebha in September 2014, forcing them to hand over the 
migrants they had caught.

11. Interview with a senior official in the AIIA who was dismissed in 
December 2016, after working with many successive governments 
(2009-2016).

13.  This was true even before 2011. The official strategy then was for 
border  guard  staff  –  especially  in  remote  areas  –  to  work  with 
migrant smugglers to combat arms and drug smuggling.

4 ■  Robert Schuman Centre | March 2018

migrant  smuggling.  Sebha14,  the  capital  of  the  south,  is 
a key example of this. Sebha’s inhabitants are a complex 
mixture of people originating from most southern towns 
and tribes, and there is a large number of armed groups 
present,  each  with  different  ideologies  and  political 
orientations. No single group has been able to impose its 
authority on the others and control the whole city. 
Competition and conflicts between multiple groups have 
had a negative impact on Sebha’s municipal council and 
local  security  directorate.  Almost  four  years  after  its 
election  in  2014,  the  municipal  council  remains  riven 
by  internal  disputes  that  have  significantly  reduced  its 
influence  and  actual  capacity  to  address  security  and 
governance issues in what has become the most dangerous 
city in the south.15
Armed factions in Sebha have largely turned a blind eye 
towards smuggling – when  they are not participating in 
it  or  relying  at  least  partially  on  the  proceeds  –  as  they 
are  unwilling  to  provoke  conflict  with  other  groups. 
Overall,  their  shared  objective  has  been  to  safeguard 
their respective positions in the city, and not to enter into 
open conflict unless sure that the outcome will be in their 
favour.
In  this  context,  relying  on  or  providing  support  to  one 
specific group within the city to combat smuggling and 
illegal  migration  could  prove  extremely  uncertain.  The 
fact that most of the armed groups present are either tribal 
or affiliated to a particular political faction at the national 
level  means  such  a  policy  might  affect  the  political  and 
military balance between them and trigger new conflicts. 
They would likely compete over any available support – 
and the legitimacy that comes with it – in an attempt to 
extend  their  influence  and  control.  Moreover,  the  other 
factions in the city would be unlikely to accept a single 
tribe or politically-affiliated group controlling Sebha.
Elsewhere in the southern region, the implementation of 
efficient  policies  to  reduce  migrant  smuggling  has  been 
further complicated by recent demographic changes. Over 
the last three years, demographic change has become one 
of the most sensitive issues in the South, particularly in 

14. The  city  of  Sebha  is  located  770  km  south  of  Tripoli  and  550 
km from the Libyan-Nigerien border. It is the largest city in the 
south and one of the most dangerous, and it is a major hub for 
human smuggling.

15. Based on the security directorate’s statistics on murder, theft and 

kidnapping.

relation  to  the  Tebu16  and  Tuareg17  communities.  These 
communities have a number of individuals who moved 
to  Libya  in  the  1990s,  but  have  not  received  Libyan 
citizenship. However, over the last three years there has 
been a new influx18 of Tebu coming from Chad and Niger 
into  the  regions  of  Umm  Al-Aranib  (130  km  south  of 
Sebha), Gatrun (300 km south of Sebha) and Murzuq19. 
Similarly,  members  of  the  Tuareg  community  coming 
from  Algeria,  Niger  and  Mali  have  been  settling  in  the 
areas  of  Ghat  and  Ubari.  Although  no  accurate  figures 
are  available,  it  is  estimated  that  these  communities 
have almost quadrupled in size since 2011 (based on the 
author’s observation in these areas). This influx has also 
resulted in a quiet exodus of people of Arab origins from 
these regions to elsewhere in Libya, as they were harassed 
by some members of the newly-settled Tebu community. 
Elements  from  the  newly-settled  Tebu  and  Tuareg 
communities  have  been  playing  a  major  role  in  the 
increased  smuggling  activities  –  both  of  migrants  and 
products – from neighbouring countries into Libya. These 
communities’ control over borders and smuggling dates 
back  to  the  Gaddafi  era;  however,  this  was  previously 
part of the regime’s policy of using these communities for 
particular  services,  whereas  now  no  one  is  supervising 
this  role.  These  communities  control  the  borders  from 
Kufra to Ghat, and are divided in terms of their political 
loyalties:  some  are  loyal  to  the  GNA,  and  others  to  the 
rival Interim Government in Bayda.
As a result, non-Arab minorities dominate smuggling in 
much of the south, which has had an impact on the local 
authorities’  response  to  it.  When  smugglers  and  local 
authorities’ members originate from the same community, 
they have tended not to address the issue. For example, in 
Gatrun,  Murzuq  and  Umm  al-Aranib,  which  are  Tebu-
majority  areas,  while  some  smugglers  come  from  local 
Arab tribes such as the Megarha and the Gadhadhfa, the 
majority  of  smugglers  are  from  the  Tebu  community. 

16. The  Tebu  are  one  of  Libya’s  non-Arab  minorities.  They  live 
primarily in southern Libya, and have their own language and 
customs.

17.  The  Tuareg  are  one  of  Libya’s  non-Arab  minorities.  They  live 
primarily in southern Libya, and have their own language and 
traditions.

18. Author’s field observations, in Gatrun, Murzuq and al-Sharqiyya. 
19.  The Murzuq area is located 150 km south of Sebha, and is on the 
most significant migrant smuggling route. It is the link between 
Sebha and southern border. Its major smuggling transit cities are 
Murzuq, Umm Al-Aranib and Gatrun, as illustrated in the map.

5 ■ Local specificities of migration in Libya: challenges and solutions

Official  bodies  such  as  municipal  councils  and  security 
directorates, local AIIA and border guard branches often 
controlled  by  members  of  the  Tebu20  community  have 
therefore often chosen to ignore their activities for social 
reasons or because of the difficult economic conditions.21 
Instead,  they  have  focused  primarily  on  the  positives 
of  migration  and  smuggling,  including  the  availability 
of  cheap  labour  throughout  the  year  in  remote  areas 
(where it is difficult to secure migrant labourers through 
official channels22 because of the deteriorating economic 
conditions).  Although  migrant  smugglers  are  arrested 
from time to time, this has had no real results.23
There is less significant smuggling in the Tuareg-majority 
areas  of  Ghat  and  Ubari.  Yet  the  challenge  here  is  the 
link  between  migrant  smuggling  and  the  smuggling  of 
drugs from west Africa via Libya to Egypt and the Middle 
East.  The  strong  collusion  of  shared  personal  interests 
(material  and  social)  between  smugglers,  members  of 
the  border  guard  and  local  armed  groups  has  reduced 
the capacity of the municipal and social councils to act 
against smuggling networks.
Unresolved political issues related to the status of Libya’s 
non-Arab  ethnic  minorities  have  also  had  an  impact 
on  illegal  migration  and  the  way  it  has  been  addressed 
by  local  authorities.  Non-Arab  ethnic  minorities  have 
specific political demands, such as the establishment of a 
quota for representation in the legislative, executive and 
judicial bodies. Some minority factions are also pushing 
for a new division of provinces and municipalities which 
would ensure their control over local government bodies 
in  their  areas  of  influence  and  at  the  national  level.24 
They have also been calling for a number of non-Libyan 

20.  Most municipal councils and security directorates in the region 
are controlled by members of the Tebu. Even when this is not the 
case, the military force at their disposal make them key actors in 
the region.

21.  According to an official from Gatrun. 
22.   Work  in  the  area  is  not  attractive  to  foreign  workers  coming 
legally into Libya, notably from Egypt and Bangladesh, given the 
deteriorating security conditions, the high cost of living and the 
decline of the Libyan dinar.

23.  Based on author’s observations and interviews: there have been 

no surveys since 2011.

24.  A good example of this has been the call by some members of 
the Tebu community for the division of Sebha municipality. The 
creation  of  two  municipalities  –  West  Sebha  and  East  Sebha  – 
would enable the community to control one of these, and use this 
to put pressure on national-level authorities based in the north to 
accept their demands.

members  of  their  communities,  who  have  identity 
papers but do not have Libyan nationality, to be granted 
citizenship.25  The  presence  of  more  radical  secessionist 
voices among these non-Arab minorities is increasingly 
a  matter  of  concern  for  the  Arab  communities  of  the 
region. 
Therefore,  because  of  the  very  political  nature  of 
demographics  in  the  south,  any  material  or  technical 
support  provided  to  ‘governmental’  bodies  such  as  the 
border guards or the AIIA in different areas of the southern 
region  could  affect  the  balance  of  power  and  provoke 
further instability. Capacity-building measures could be 
perceived as indirect support for specific groups and their 
expansionist  policies,  their  pressuring  of  the  national 
governments in the north to meet their demands, or even 
support for secessionist policies. Similarly, international 
support aimed at curbing illegal migration and migrant 
smuggling could end up reinforcing GNA’s opponents in 
the southern region (such as the tribal groups supporting 
Operation  Dignity  or  those  supporting  a  return  of    a 
Gaddafi-inspired rule). For this reason, policies seeking 
to combat illegal migration in the Libyan south need to 
support  multiple  factions  in  order  to  preserve  balances 
of  power  and  avoid  triggering  further  instability  or 
unexpected political developments.
The  economic  dimension  of  smuggling,  and  how  it 
intersects  with  local  politics  and  society,  is  also  a  key 
element  to  take  into  account  in  southern  Libya.  The 
economic situation in the region has been particularly dire 
since 2014 due to the large discrepancy between people’s 
incomes and the cost of living. Prices of basic necessities 
in  the  South  have  doubled  due  to  a  number  of  factors, 
most  importantly  the  depreciation  of  the  Libyan  dinar 
and the severe shortage of liquidity in the banks. Migrant 
smuggling  has  therefore  become  a  source  of  income 
for an increasing number of young people who have to 
cope  with  economic  collapse  and  high  unemployment. 
Many of them have engaged in migrant smuggling as an 
alternative to working in the civil service or to continuing 
education, as it guarantees them a regular income much 
higher than the civil service or the private sector. It is also 
low-risk and provides quick returns in the form of cash. 
This  is  unlike  government  salaries,  which  are  paid  into 
bank accounts; their recipients have to first wait for the 
money  to  be  paid,  which  is  often  delayed,  and  then  for 

25.  In this claim, they refer to the fact that a number of families of 
Arab origin was given Libyan nationality during the Gaddafi era.

6 ■  Robert Schuman Centre | March 2018

the banks to have sufficient cash to be able to withdraw 
their salaries.
Migrant smuggling has now become a normalised source 
of livelihood for a large number of southern families and 
young  men,  especially  in  the  areas  of  Murzuq,  Sebha 
and  Brak  al-Shati.  Furthermore,  smuggling  has  become 
the only source of income for a number of Tebu military 
personnel from Chadian and Nigerien origins26 who do 
not yet hold Libyan citizenship, despite having come to 
Libya during the Gaddafi era to join the security brigades 
the  regime  established  to  ensure  its  protection.  Many 
have been suspended from work since 2011 because they 
did not hold Libyan citizenship and therefore could not 
receive  salaries.  They  have  considerable  experience  in 
navigating the desert routes and forging the relationships 
that facilitate smuggling work. 
Given this reality, job creation and regional development 
alone will not be sufficient to deter people from engaging 
in smuggling, though it ought to be part of the strategy 
the  GNA  or  any  future  government  implements  in 
the  medium-  and  long-term.  It  is  also  important  that 
emphasis be placed on improving extremely poor service 
provision,  especially  healthcare  and  education27.  The 
lack of daily services is among the main factors pushing 
people  in  the  southern  region  to  seek  to  secure  their 
needs outside of the failing public sector.
The  lack  of  basic  services  has  allowed  smugglers  to  tie 
themselves to local communities in the Libyan south and to 
make themselves indispensable even to those not directly 
involved  in  smuggling  activities.  Migrant  smugglers  in 
southern Libya have invested in local economic activities, 
which  has  resulted  in  certain  services  and  legitimate 
economic  activities  being  tightly  connected  with  –  and 
reliant on – the income generated from smuggling. Most 
notably,  the  proceeds  from  smuggling  provide  more 
than 50 per cent of the available cash in some areas such 
as  in  Brak  al-Shati28  and  account  for  about  70  per  cent 
of  local  revenue  in  areas  like  Gatrun.  In  Murzuk,  Brak 
al-Shati and Umm al-Aranib, the majority of smugglers 

26.  Interview with a smuggler of Nigerien origins in Gatrun. He had 
worked  in  the  32nd  Brigade  of  Gaddafi’s  armed  forces  and  was 
dismissed in 2011. 

27.   Service provision in southern Libya is extremely poor. There is 
no higher education in most cities, and advanced health services 
are almost non-existent. Most patients have (when they can) to 
travel to coastal cities (for example Tripoli) for treatment.

invest their profits locally, such as through building shops 
or establishing construction and training companies. In 
addition to this, they contribute to local development and 
service provision, particularly in the healthcare sector,29 
and  are  involved  in  building  and  selling  houses  and 
other forms of trade that provide local job opportunities. 
Although  not  all  smugglers  do  this,  such  behaviour 
appears  to  be  widespread  in  the  southern  region,  with 
68  per  cent  of  smugglers  from  Sebha30  investing  their 
revenues in different types of trade. As a result of these 
dynamics,  local  residents  cannot  avoid  dealing  with 
smugglers on a daily basis. This has changed perceptions 
of the latter, as many have become prominent merchants 
in their local areas31. 
However,  the  investment  of  smuggling  revenues  in 
other  sectors  and  other  forms  of  trade  has  not  resulted 
in a reduction of smuggling activities. The sums earned 
through  migrant  smuggling  far  exceed  those  made 
through  other  forms  of  trade  and  investment.  In  the 
absence  of  strong  security  or  an  implementable  legal 
deterrent,  migrant  smugglers  are  therefore  unlikely  to 
halt  their  activities.  This  would  require  efforts  to  make 
the judiciary more effective and to implement sanctions.
Given  the  complex  interconnections  between  migrant 
smuggling  and  local  politics,  security,  society,  and 
economy,  an  effective  policy  to  counter  smuggling  in 
the south will likely have to work on all of these levels, 
and  across  all  communities.  A  successful  policy  would 
likely  aim  to  incentivise  legitimate  trade  and  providing 
services, and should focus on breaking the links between 
smugglers and local communities. 
Although  security  will  be  part  of  the  response,  policy 
makers both inside and outside Libya should be wary of 
relying on supporting and engaging in capacity-building 
with  the  armed  groups  that  appear  most  capable  of 
curbing  migration  flows,  such  as  the  recently  formed 
Murzuq-based  Tebu  unit  the  Desert  Hawks  (Suqour 
al-Sahra’)32,  whose  success  was  based  in  part  on  the 

29.   Some  smugglers  invested  part  of  their  revenues  in  the  health 
sector: for instance, one of them has established a pharmacy and 
another one a veterinary clinic; one is an associate in a clinic. 

30. Authors’ interviews with smugglers from Sebha, February-May 

2017.

31. Information  about  the  above-mentioned  cities  was  collected 
from more than one source (civil society, government agencies, 
security services), then cross-checked and verified.

28.  Interview with a researcher and civil society activist in Brak on 

the phenomenon of migration, July 2017.

32. Desert Hawks is a Tebu tribal force formed in late August 2017 to 
combat smuggling in the border region with Chad and Niger.

7 ■ Local specificities of migration in Libya: challenges and solutions

activities of Kufra-based Ways of Peace (Subul al-Salam)33 
brigade  of  the  eastern  Libyan  National  Army  (LNA).  It 
is difficult for the GNA and its allies to work with these 
groups, which do not recognise them as Libya’s legitimate 
executive authority. Even if these armed groups were to 
be  incorporated  under  the  GNA’s  Ministries  of  Interior 
and Defense, there are no mechanisms to guarantee their 
continuing to work to combat illegal migration. 
However,  the  example  of  the  Desert  Hawks  unit  also 
indicates  that  social  leaders  can  play  a  positive  role  in 
combating migration. The Desert Hawks unit was formed 
with the blessing of the notables, elders and chiefs of the 
Tebu  tribes  because  smuggling  across  the  borders  with 
Chad  and  Niger  was  causing  prices  of  food  and  fuel  to 
rise,  and  increasing  numbers  of  young  people  from  the 
region  were  using  and  trading  drugs.34    Social  leaders 
could therefore play a role, along with other actors, in a 
strategy to combat migration in southern Libyan if they 
deemed policies to be in the interest of their communities. 

Title: Central region

Central Libya: Tribal and Security  
Trade-Offs
The  central  region  links  southern  cities  to  the  cities  on 
the northern coast and is primarily a transit station. The 
most  significant  areas  involved  in  migrant  smuggling 
are Shwayrif, Bani Walid and Gharyan. The involvement 
of  the  central  region  in  migrant  smuggling  networks  is 
a  direct  consequence  of  its  geographical  position,  with 
migrants being transferred to the region from the town 
of  Dirj  to  the  west,  and  Sebha  and  Brak  al-Shati  to  the 
south, before being taken onwards to the coast. 
The sociology of the smuggling networks in this area differs 
from that in the South and the coastal region, reflecting 
the  highly  cohesive  and  homogenous  social  fabric  of 
the  central  region’s  towns:  generally  the  inhabitants  of 
each  town  or  area  belong  to  a  single  tribe.  While  this 
has so far provided smugglers with a significant level of 
social protection, as tribal leaders have tended to turn a 
blind  eye  to  their  activities  in  order  to  prevent  conflict 
within the tribe, it could also provide an entry point for 
successful policies to combat migrant smuggling. 

Tunisia

Gharyan
Gharyan

Bani Walid

Mizda

Mediterranean

Dirj

Algeria

Libya

Shwayrif

The central region is the link between the cities of the South (Sebha, Brak) and the coast (Sabratha, Garabulli). Shwayrif is the most central city to be 
engaged in smuggling. It is located between Gharyan and Bani Walid to its north and Sebha and Brak to its south, 300 km south of the latter and 360 
km north of the former. Gharyan is located about 90 km south of Tripoli, Bani Walid 180 km south of Tripoli, and Dirj 550 km south-west of Tripoli. 
Mizdah is the link between Dirj in the far west and Gharyan and Bani Walid; it is 90 km south of Gharyan and 160 km southwest of Bani Walid.

Sebha

Ubari

Brak al-Shati

33. Ways  of  Peace  is  a  military  force  formed  in  October  2015  in 
Kufra  to  counter  migrant  and  drug  smuggling,  and  to  protect 
the borders of Kufra.

34.   Interview  with  a  Tebu  activist  from  the  city  of  Murzuk  on  29 
October 2017. He stressed that the statement remains vague.

Chad

8 ■  Robert Schuman Centre | March 2018

Unlike the southern region, the link between smuggling 
and the wider local economy is relatively weak. However, 
the  fragile  position  of  any  government  bodies  or 
government-affiliated  security  actors  in  parts  of  this 
region presents a particular challenge to policymakers.
The town of Bani Walid35 has since 2012 become one of 
the largest assembly points for illegal migrants transiting 
through  Libya.36  It  provides  an  example  of  the  positive 
and negative roles that tribes can play in relation to illegal 
migration. The town is home to the Warfalla tribe, which 
has not recognised any of Libya’s post-2011 legislative or 
government bodies. The Social Council of Warfalla Tribes 
(SCWT) and the security actors are not linked to any of 
the post-2011 governments, which have not interacted in 
any real way with the influential local actors in the town. 
Smuggling  networks  in  the  area  are  organised  along 
tribal and family lines, as well as along political divides, 
which  means  that  they  operate  in  isolation  from  one 
another and are not on good terms. While this hostility 
is primarily based on competition over smuggling routes, 
it  is  also  divided  on  the  basis  of  political  orientation: 
some  smugglers  were  in  favour  of  the  February  2011 
uprising,  while  others  hope  for  a  return  to  Gaddafi 
rule.  This  hostility  has  on  occasion  resulted  in  direct 
clashes,  as  occurred  between  two  groups  in  February 
2016.37 While the SCWT in Bani Walid has managed to 
limit  confrontation  to  a  large  degree  in  recent  months, 
divisions occurring between smugglers belonging to the 
same  tribe  (the  Warfalla)  mean  that  tribal  leaders  must 
make  complex  calculations  and  trade-offs.  As  a  result, 

35. The  Bani  Walid  area  has  the  largest  concentration  of  migrants 
in  the  central  region,  which  makes  it  a  unique  case.  The 
majority of its inhabitants do not recognise any of the post-2011 
governments, making the area difficult to deal with from a policy 
perspective.

36. It  is  extremely  difficult  to  collect  information  on  the  topic  in 
Bani  Walid  itself,  but  it  is  possible  to  trace  back  the  migrants’ 
movements  when  they  reach  the  coastal  region.  Based  on  field 
observations and interviews with migrants in the coastal region, 
more than 60 % of those reaching the coast moved north through 
the region of Bani Walid.

37.  The  incident  in  5  February  2016  that  led  to  the  killing  of 
Muhammad  Dhiyab  al-Nuqrat,  one  of  the  main  smuggling 
chiefs  in  the  Bani  Walid  area.  He  was  affiliated  with  the  pro-
revolution  May  28  Battalion,  and  was  killed  on  the  river  road 
that  links  Bani  Walid  and  Shwayrif,  along  with  two  others,  by 
Muhammad  Makhzoum  al-Subai’e  (from  Bani  Walid)  who 
opposed the February revolution and another smuggler from the 
Megarha tribe (from Brak) after a disagreement over influence.

both  the  SCWT  and  the  residents  of  the  region  have 
largely overlooked migrant smuggling operations. 
Smugglers  have  taken  advantage  of  the  cautious  ‘social 
cover’  provided  by  the  tribe  –  whereby  the  SCWT  and 
tribal leaders protect members of their own tribe against 
outside interference and are at the same time unwilling 
to tackle the issue of migrant smuggling themselves – to 
conduct  their  activities  relatively  freely.  They  have  also 
persuaded  a  number  of  African  migrants  to  work  with 
them in their smuggling operations.
The  most  notorious  migrant  smugglers  in  Bani  Walid 
have also exploited the absence of security control in the 
area to purchase weapons and form armed groups. This 
adds  to  the  risks  community  leaders  would  face  if  they 
attempted to confront them. Even if the SCWT’s Security 
Unit38  carries  out  security  patrols  from  time  to  time  in 
key  areas  such  the  Great  Man  Made  River  road  linking 
Bani Walid and Shwayrif (the principal smuggling route), 
smugglers  generally  manage  to  avoid  them  by  using 
different  routes.  However,  in  rare  circumstances,  the 
security unit does apprehend smugglers, for example as 
occurred in April 2016 when it captured a car carrying 14 
illegal migrants39.
The Security Unit is loyal to the SCWT and is not linked 
in  any  way  to  any  of  the  governments’  Ministries  of 
Interior and Defence. It is made up of young volunteers, 
some of whom are unemployed, government workers and 
soldiers. They do not receive salaries from the unit, and the 
funding comes from SCWT and some local businessmen. 
Their  main  aim  is  to  protect  the  entrances  and  borders 
of  Bani  Walid.  It  is  the  most  significant  security  power 
in the area and is in very limited contact with the local 
security directorate and police force in relation to some 
issues.  The  unit  has  a  very  limited  role  in  countering 
illegal migration, because many smugglers have relatives 
in  the  unit.  As  such,  the  ‘social  cover’  provides  them 
protection.40 

38. The  Security  Unit  was  formed  by  SCWT  at  the  end  of  2014 
to  combat  crime  and  protect  the  borders  of  the  town.  For 
more 
see:  http://www.akhbarlibya.net/libya-
news/793101.html 

information, 

39. In April 2016, 14 Egyptian migrants and a Syrian national killed 
three smugglers from Bani Walid (Hamza al-Fayturi, al-Tawergi, 
and  Muhammad  al-Zulbi),  south  of  Bani  Walid  for  unknown 
reasons. The Security Unit captured them and imprisoned them 
in Bani Walid Police Station, before they were all shot inside the 
station by Mohammed al-Zulbi’s cousin in revenge.

40.  In 2017, a new force was created in Bani Walid with the support 

9 ■ Local specificities of migration in Libya: challenges and solutions

In  comparison  with  the  South,  smugglers  in  the  Bani 
Walid  area  invest  a  lower  share  of  their  profits  in  the 
local area,41 and when they do so, they essentially benefit 
the  smugglers  themselves  and  their  family  circles. 
Bani  Walid’s  smugglers  also  do  not  have  large  trading 
enterprises  in  the  city  like  the  smugglers  of  Dirj  and 
Gatrun, for instance. Migrant smuggling therefore does 
not have a significant impact on the economic situation 
in the city. Most of the financial benefits of smuggling and 
of their secondary investments go directly to smugglers 
and their close relatives, creating a weaker link between 
smugglers and society than in the southern region.
Like in the case of Bani Walid, migrant smuggling  networks 
in  the  Shwayrif  area  operate  in  a  tribal  environment, 
dominated by the Megarha tribes42. They were generally 
pro-Gaddafi  and  have  therefore  not  engaged  with  the 
post-2011  political  and  institutional  process.  They  have 
established  their  own  armed  groups  autonomous  from 
the  central  government  to  ensure  the  protection  of  the 
community after 2011. These are more powerful than the 
local security directorate, and made up largely of groups 
of young men that also control the smuggling trade in the 
area, some of whom work in smuggling, and others who 
are only involved in the armed groups protecting the area. 
Out of fear of being overpowered, ‘official’ security bodies 
rarely engage with smugglers from the area directly.
Every  smuggling  group  from  Shwayrif  has  its  own 
geographical area and ways of operating. This is for several 
reasons, the most important of which is the exchange of 
material  benefits.  They  are  generally  capable  of  solving 
problems within the Shwayrif area through social means 
or  bribery.  Like  in  the  case  of  Bani  Walid’s  SCWT,  the 
capacity of influence of the local social council in Shwayrif 
– along with the municipal council – on smugglers has 
been most visible through their efforts to reduce conflict 
between  rival  groups.  In  Shwayrif,  however,  problems 
tend to occur between smugglers from the area and those 
from elsewhere, rather than internally. 

of the GNA called the Central Support Force, though it does not 
so  far  have  much  social  support  as  it  is  seen  as  representing  a 
specific tribe in the city.

41. Some  have  invested  their  profits  in  Bani  Walid.  For  example, 
one smuggler has built a mall in the city, and others own petrol 
stations, car showrooms or have invested in  agriculture. These 
investments are estimated to be worth millions.

42. The Megarha tribe constitutes a majority in Shwayrif and Brak. It 
is considered one of the largest and most socially cohesive tribes 
in Libya. For more information [Arabic]: http://afrigatenews.net/
node/67945

Migrant  smugglers  struggle  to  deal  with  armed  groups 
or  security  bodies  from  outside  their  designated  areas 
without  using  force.  For  example,  in  February  2016, 
three  smugglers  were  killed  in  clashes  between  rival 
groups  from  Shwayrif  and  Bani  Walid  after  one  group 
entered  the  others’  territory.  Because  of  its  geographic 
position,  smugglers  from  different  areas  cannot  avoid 
dealing  with  those  from  Shwayrif,  as  it  represents  the 
most important link between Sebha and the edge of the 
Megarha tribe’s main area of influence at Brak al-Shati to 
the south, and Bani Walid and Gharyan to the north. In 
the event of problems between smugglers such as killings 
or fraud, they are usually solved either by the smugglers 
themselves or by social means through the intervention 
of  the  municipal  and  social  councils.  Issues  between 
smugglers are not dealt with by any national-level official 
body  such  as  the  Ministries  of  Interior  and  Defence  or 
the  AIIA.  These  bodies  only  follow  events  and  release 
official statements, for instance if a smugglers’ convoy is 
intercepted. For example, in 2016 armed groups stopped 
an AIIA convoy on the road between Sebha and Shwayrif 
and forced them to hand over the migrants in the convoy, 
and  in  early  2017,  400  migrants  were  expelled  from 
the  al-Hamra  reception  centre  in  Gharyan  without  the 
central AIIA’s knowledge.
The mountainous city of Gharyan is located 80 km south 
of  Tripoli  and  is  the  most  important  city  of  the  Nafusa 
Mountains. It is essentially a transit area, connecting the 
coastal region to Shwayrif in the south. Migrants do not 
usually  stay  in  the  city  for  long  periods  of  time,43  and 
it  has  a  strong  security  and  military  presence44,  which 

43.  Except for those in the city’s reception centre, who stay there for 

six months or more in very difficult living conditions.

44.  There are many different security actors and armed groups in 
the city, the most important of which is the Shield Force (under 
the  GNA’s  Ministry  of  Defence).  It  has  significant  financial 
and  military  power.  The  largest  group  is  the  Confrontation 
Unit  under  the  GNA’s  Ministry  of  Interior.  However,  both  are 
considered tribal forces and there is no social influence on them. 
They do not play any role in preventing illegal migration or the 
widespread  drugs  trade  in  the  city.  The  forces  are  not  socially 
accepted. Another group is the Information Unit, which is part 
of  the  General  Intelligence  and  works  with  the  Rada  Special 
Deterrence  Force  in  Tripoli  (evidence  of  this  is  the  arrest  of 
Saber  ben  Eisa,  one  of  the  major  drug  traders  in  Gharyan,  in 
Tripoli  in  January  2018).  Salafists  following  the  teachings  of 
Saudi cleric Rabie al-Madkhali have also emerged as a key force 
in  the  city,  through  their  control  of  mosques  and  distributing 
their  proselytising  material.  Their  coordination  with  others  in 
the security sphere in the city became clear towards the end of 
2017 when their information led to the defusing of a car bomb. 

10 ■  Robert Schuman Centre | March 2018

would  likely  be  capable  of  combatting  smuggling.  Yet 
there are a number of active smugglers there. Although 
the  city  is  considered  one  of  the  safer  towns  in  the 
Nafusa  Mountains,  the  assassination  of  Colonel  Abdul 
Razzaq  al-Sadiq  Amish,  the  head  of  Gharyan’s  security 
directorate45,  in  July  2017  has  impacted  the  local 
security  directorate  and  the  conditions  in  the  city.  The 
appointment of Ali Shagroun, who is accused of killing 
and  kidnapping  in  Tripoli,  as  the  head  of  the  security 
directorate in Gharyan has also affected the work of the 
divided municipal council. Moreover, the voices that have 
lately been raised in support of Operation Dignity in the 
city, a political position which other local groups forcibly 
reject,  has  raised  questions  around  the  various  political 
positions  of  the  different  forces  in  the  city.  All  of  these 
conflicts and divisions within the city have signaled that, 
should  a  decision  be  made  to  combat  smuggling  in  the 
city by force, Gharyan’s population might be dragged into 
an armed conflict. While this is a possibility which no one 
wants  to  discuss  in  the  current  circumstances,  it  seems 
that  arresting  smugglers  secretly  and  moving  them  to 
prisons outside the city has been the solution privileged 
by Gharyan’s security forces so far. 
In  the  Dirj  area,  at  the  borders  between  Libya,  Algeria 
and  Tunisia,  the  situation  is  in  some  ways  closer  to  the 
southern  region  than  elsewhere  in  the  central  region. 
Smugglers operate in a context of tribal apathy and security 
services’ fear of provoking clashes (several border guard 
patrols have been directly shot at by smuggling groups in 
this  area).  Some  smugglers  in  Dirj  have  contributed  to 
improving the deteriorating local  economy through the 
investment  of  their  profits  locally  and  the  provision  of 
cash. A large number of young people have also worked 
with  smugglers  in  order  to  improve  their  personal 
economic  circumstances.  However,  unlike  in  the  south, 
this  resembles  seasonal  work  rather  than  being  their 
principal occupation. 
In terms of possible policy responses to combat migration 
in the central region, in most areas it would be crucial to 
involve  social  and  municipal  councils.  They  could  play 
a  pivotal  role  in  combating  migrant  smuggling  in  the 
region. Because of both the tribal nature of governance in 

Their military power may well increase, as it has in Sabratha and 
Zuwara. 

these areas and their lack of recognition of the post-2011 
central political authorities, social and municipal councils 
in  the  central  region  have  rarely  been  engaged  in  the 
implementation  of  policies.  Yet  these  bodies  often  have 
a good track record in finding solutions to the conflicts 
that  occur  from  time  to  time  among  the  smugglers  in 
their areas. Overall, they have also displayed good results 
in  terms  of  security  and  military  stabilisation  in  the 
region  over  the  last  few  years.  Working  with  municipal 
and social councils in areas where people are linked by 
strong social bonds is very important, as it is necessary 
to  involve  actors  with  social  influence.  Involving  key 
social  figures  from  the  social  and  municipal  councils 
would help design policies adapted to the specificities of 
the context and mitigate possible negative effects of these 
policies  when  they  are  implemented,  especially  during 
security  and  military  operations  and  arrest  campaigns. 
This is in opposition to the southern region, where social 
and municipal councils would be unable to play such an 
important  role,  as  the  social  fabric  is  more  fragile  and 
diverse. 
It is also important to recognise that so far the international 
community  –  including  international  organisations  –
have had no significant role in the central region, which 
is also largely deprived of resources. People in the central 
region even struggle to bury the bodies of those migrants 
who  die  on  the  road  or  to  transfer  migrants  to  shelters 
in  coastal  cities.  In  addition,  no  significant  support  has 
been set aside to implement programmes aimed at raising 
awareness about the dangers of migrant smuggling46, nor 
to  implement  investment  projects  for  young  people  or 
for  service  provision.  This  is  in  a  context  where  Italy’s 
Foreign Minister, Angelino Alfano47, stated that Italy has 
allocated €10m to the Trust Fund for Africa to strengthen 
Libya’s southern border, as well as the €18 million given 

46. For  example,  awareness-raising  programmes  in  schools  to 
reduce the number of young people being attracted to the trade; 
programmes to raise awareness of the consequences of migrant 
smuggling,  including  legal  penalties  and  exposure  to  dangers 
such  as  theft  and  violence;  and,  raising  awareness  of  migrants 
in reception centres around the security conditions in Libya and 
their possible exposure to trafficking, theft and extortion from 
smuggling gangs. Some programmes like this do exist, though 
very few, for example in Sebha and Sabratha.

45. The assassination of Colonel Abdul Razzaq al-Sadiq Amish on 
Sunday, 9 July 2017, in front of his house by unknown persons 
has  cast  serious  doubts  on  the  ability  of  security  services  to 
combat smugglers.

47.  Statements  by  Italy’s  Foreign  Minister  on  7  July  2017  on  the 
need to help Libya and to stop migrants before their arrival in 
Libya 
http://www.masrawy.com/news/News_PublicAffairs/
details/2017/7/7/1116430. 

11 ■ Local specificities of migration in Libya: challenges and solutions

by Italy to the International Organization for Migration 
to support the voluntary return of migrants.

The Coastal Region: Cautiousness and 
High-Cost Benefits
The coastal region in which migrant smugglers are active 
extends from the city of Misrata, 220 km east of Tripoli, 
to the city of Zuwara in the far west, 120 km from Tripoli. 
The  major  smuggling  stations  on  the  Libyan  coast  are 
Misrata,  Zliten,  Khoms  and  Garabulli  (Castelverde)  to 
the  east  of  Tripoli,  and  Zawiya,  Sorman,  Sabratha  and 
Zuwara to the west, as well as Tripoli itself. Migrants are 
primarily transferred to these areas from Bani Walid and 
Gharyan. 
Smuggling  in  the  coastal  region  is  enabled  by  fragile 
security  conditions  created  by  competition  between 
armed  groups  in  the  context  of  the  ongoing  post-2014 
political  struggle  and  influence  of  political  parties. 
Smugglers have used this to acquire material benefits and 
influence on the ground. The central government also has 
weak control in most areas for reasons linked to politics 
and regionalism.48 The majority of the armed groups in 
the  coastal  area  were  receiving  financial  support  from 
the  Ministries  of  Interior  and  Defence  of  the  Salvation 
Government and Interim Government49, though this has 

Title: Coastal region   

recently  stopped  as  resources  have  dried  up.  While  the 
economic situation in the coastal areas is slightly better 
than in the South, it has however pushed some militiamen 
to engage in smuggling and some to form armed groups 
to  provide  protection  to  smugglers  in  exchange  for 
money, as has occurred in Sabratha and Sorman. On an 
individual level, people’s motivations for getting involved 
in migrant smuggling differ from those that push people 
to  smuggling  in  southern  and  central  Libya.  The  main 
pull-factor  in  the  coastal  region  is  accumulating  wealth 
in as little time as possible.
Security campaigns in the coastal region have had some 
success  in  limiting  smuggling  in  specific  cities  where 
such campaigns are supported by a certain level of public 
opinion, although there are no mechanisms to hold the 
forces  that  have  ousted  smugglers  accountable.  Over 
the  last  few  years,  migrant  smuggling  operations  in  the 
coastal  region  had  largely  been  limited  to  the  cities  of 
Sabratha (80 km east of Tripoli) and Garabulli (65 km east 
of Tripoli), with more than 70 per cent passing through 
Sabratha. 
Ahmad Dabbashi (known as Al-‘Ammu) and his armed 
group  (the  most  powerful  in  the  city)  were  the  main 
actors  involved  in  smuggling  activities  in  Sabratha.  Yet 
the agreement signed between Dabbashi, the Italian 

Zuwara

Sabratha

Tripoli

Zawiyah

Garabulli (Castelverde)

Khoms

Zliten

Misrata

Sorman

Gharyan

Libya

Bani Walid

48. The 2014 Airport War (as it has come to be known) was fought 
between  Libya  Dawn  forces,  linked  to  the  General  National 
Congress, and Operation Dignity’s forces, linked to the House 
of Representatives, at Tripoli International Airport. The fighting 
reached  Al-  Watia,  south  of  Zuwara,  and  involved  most  of  the 
armed factions in the coastal cities from Misrata in the east, to 
Zuwara in the west.

49. The two rival governments prior to the formation of the GNA. 
The Interim Government continues to work in the east, while the 
Salvation government has largely ceded its place to the GNA.

12 ■  Robert Schuman Centre | March 2018

Ubari

Brak al-Shati

Sebha

government  and  the  GNA  to  work  together  to  combat 
smuggling  in  August  201750  was  met  with  a  high  level 
of  opposition  from  the  people  of  Sabratha,  as  well  as 
from  some  local  officials,  although  they  did  not  take  a 
public  stance.  This  cost  Dabbashi  the  support  of  three 
important fellow smugglers who opposed his concluding 
an  agreement  with  the  GNA  without  their  knowledge, 
in 
leading  to  direct  confrontation  between  them 
September  2017.  Ahmad  Dabbashi  and  his  men  were 
forced out of the city as his own (former) partners took 
up arms against him.
The  fact  that  the  force  opposing  Dabbashi  was  led  by 
former smugglers casts doubts on the real motivations of 
such ostensible “anti-smuggling” campaign: the operation 
may have been more akin to a leadership change (a move 
against  Dabbashi)  than  an  anti-smuggling  operation. 
Those who opposed Dabbashi may well restart operations 
in Sabratha or move them to other cities such as Zawiya 
(30 km east of Sabratha), Garabulli or Khoms.
A similar pattern occurred earlier in the city of Zuwara, 
where  hostile  public  opinion  played  a  key  role  in  anti-
smuggling mobilisation. The drowning of a large number 
of  migrants,  whose  bodies  washed  up  on  the  city’s 
shores51,  led  to  a  major  media  campaign  and  a  social 
movement  condemning  migrant  smuggling  in  the  city 
in  October  2015.  Since  that  time,  smuggling  activities 
have  reduced  somewhat,  owing  to  a  security  campaign 
by the Special Intervention Squad, known as “the Masked 
Ones”52. As a result, some of Zuwara’s smugglers moved 
to work with their counterparts in nearby Sabratha, with 
whom they had good relations, taking advantage of the 
unstable security situation there.53
Similarly,  in  August  2017,  the  citizens  of  Zuwara 
cooperated with their local security services in the arrest 

50.  For more information [Arabic]: https://almarsad.co/2017/10/03.
51. Zuwara is a coastal city located 120 km west of Tripoli and 40 km 
west of Sabratha. It was the most important human-smuggling 
port  and  until  2015  it  was  the  place  from  which  the  largest 
number of “death boats” sailed towards Europe.

of Fahmi Salim bin Khalifa,54 a Maltese national known as 
the “King of Smuggling” who had previously been given a 
fifteen-year prison sentence under the Gaddafi regime for 
drug trading. His extensive smuggling activities at Zuwara 
port led to it being referred to locally as “Fahmi’s port”. 
After his arrest, Bin Khalifa was transferred to a prison in 
Tripoli, showing the extent of the citizens’ opposition to 
smuggling operations in their city. 
The  examples  of  Sabratha  and  Zuwara  indicate  that  the 
security  environment  is  the  key  factor  which  enables 
smuggling  in  the  coastal  region,  rather  than  the  social 
protection  offered  by  tribes.  They  also  tend  to  indicate 
that fragmentation and competition between smuggling 
groups and networks could be exploited to weaken these 
networks,  particularly  in  an  environment  characterised 
by weak social and security control. Similarly, the recent 
developments  in  the  two  cities  have  shown  that  public 
opinion opposition and mobilisation at the local level do 
have  an  impact  on  the  smuggling  networks’  capacities 
to operate and could therefore be taken into account in 
designing anti-migrant smuggling policies. In this regard, 
the  situation  in  the  coastal  cities  appears  significantly 
different  from  that  of  the  southern  and  central  regions, 
where  smuggling  networks  have  so  far  been  relying  at 
least on social apathy. 
In both Zuwara and Sabratha, it is also important to point 
out that young Salafists (known in Libya as Madhkhalis) 
were involved in the security campaigns against smugglers. 
This  phenomenon  will  require  further  research,  as  will 
the  relationships  between  figures  like  Ahmad  Dabbashi 
and Fahmi bin Khalifa with smuggling groups based on 
the  northern  shore  of  the  Mediterranean,  or  the  links 
between  migrant  smuggling  and  fuel  smuggling  across 
the Mediterranean.
Only limited migrant smuggling operations take place in 
the other cities to the west of Tripoli, such as Zawiya and 
Sorman,55 which has generally been the case because the 
security environment has been less favourable. One of the 
key conditions that enables smuggling is the weakness of 
local  security  forces,  such  as  in  Sabratha.  However,  in 

52. The  Special  Intervention  Squad  was  formed  in  2013  with  the 
blessing  of  Zuwara’s  local  council  and  was  officially  included 
under the Criminal Investigation Department of the Ministry of 
Interior. It was joined by a number of Salafist youth who oppose 
smuggling.

54. Fahmi’s name was not unknown to the international community. 
It was mentioned in a report on Libya by the United Nations Panel 
of Experts that was submitted in August 2016 to the UN Security 
Council,  where  he  was  described  as  “the  chief  responsible  for 
smuggling activities”.

53. Evidence  of  this  is  the  fact  that  smuggling  through  Sabrahta 
increased by 800 per cent after operations reduced from Zuwara 
towards the end of 2015.

55. Zawiya is located 50 km west of Tripoli, and Sorman 70 km west 
of Tripoli. Smugglers work in both cities, though less frequently 
than in Sabratha and Garabulli.

13 ■ Local specificities of migration in Libya: challenges and solutions

some cities there are powerful groups that have different 
political positions and are outside of central government 
control. The possibility of clashes makes it more difficult 
for smugglers to carry out their operations in these cities. 
In  Zawiya,  for  example,  many  disparate  armed  groups 
engage  in  occasional  armed  clashes,  making  conditions 
less favourable to smugglers than elsewhere in the coastal 
region.56
The  local  coast  guard  branch  has  also  been  active  in 
carrying out rescue operations, which has made migrants 
lose trust in the Zawiya-based smugglers. Smugglers from 
other localities have also lost trust in those from Zawiya 
and  stopped  working  with  them  as  their  main  interest 
is in attracting as many migrants as possible. The recent 
events in Sabratha, however, could shift some smuggling 
activity  back  to  Zawiya,  or  to  other  areas  further  west 
(Al-Harsha, Al-Matrad). 
In  Sorman,  because  of  the  previous  balance  of  power 
between  its  military  and  security  factions,  smuggling 
operations have been limited. This balance was between 
two main forces: the generally socially accepted Criminal 
Investigation Force that was trying to combat smuggling, 
corruption and kidnapping in the city, and, the al-Aqabi 
group,  which  used  to  control  most  of  the  city.  Some 
members  of  the  latter  group,  which  controls  the  city’s 
reception  centre,  have  engaged  in  smuggling  activities. 
Armed clashes have previously taken place between these 
two groups. Consequently, smugglers from elsewhere in 
Libya preferred to work with Sabratha’s Ahmed Dabbashi. 
However,  since  his  ousting,  smugglers  have  started  to 
work  with  groups  from  Sorman,  the  most  important 
of  which  is  the  al-Aqabi  group.  This  makes  the  general 
movement of smuggling activities to Sorman in the future 
highly unlikely.
Smuggling activities have also been significantly affected 
by changes in the security context in the towns and cities 
to  the  east  of  Tripoli.  Garabulli57  has  a  long  history  of 
organised migrant smuggling. The city’s main smuggling 

56. The most recent example of this was in 2017, when armed clashes 
took  place  between  the  Ahnish  group  and  al-Khadrawi  group. 
Clashes  generally  last  several  days  and  cause  the  town  centre 
to  be  cordoned  off. This  affects  services  in  the  city  such  as  the 
hospital  and  the  university.  Most  smugglers  do  not  work  in 
areas  where  there  are  periodically  security  issues,  for  example 
smugglers stopped working in Kufra, Sirte and Benghazi because 
of the deteriorating security environment.

57.  Garabulli,  located  65  km  east  of  Tripoli,  was  one  of  the  most 
important concentration points for smuggling people across the 
coast of Libya.

figures  were  arrested  in  2009  but  returned  to  their 
activities after the 2011 uprising58. Some operations still 
take  place,  but  in  recent  years  smugglers  had  moved 
their  activities  to  Sabratha,  because  of  its  proximity  to 
Zuwara  –  then  considered  the  main  smuggling  area 
in  Libya  –  and  because  of  the  changes  in  the  security 
situation in Garabulli, especially after June 201659. At that 
time, the armed group from Misrata that had controlled 
Garabulli’s migrant reception centre, as well as securing 
the main road between Tripoli and Khoms, was expelled 
from the city. This group did not do anything to combat 
smuggling, and indeed some members had been involved 
in  smuggling  and  releasing  migrants  from  the  centre 
without  official  approval  to  be  sold  to  smugglers  or  as 
labourers.  Furthermore,  the  coastline  near  Garabulli  is 
within the area patrolled by the coast guard branch based 
in Tripoli’s eastern suburb of Tajoura and which operates 
in the area from Tripoli to Khoms. This is one of the most 
active  coast  guard  divisions,  which  has  made  migrant 
smugglers more cautious. 
Small-scale  smuggling  operations  also  occasionally 
take place from Khoms, Zliten and Misrata60. Changing 
conditions  in  cities  lying  further  westward  could  lead 
to increased activity in this region, especially in Khoms, 
which  is  closest  to  Garabulli  and  Bani  Walid.  Despite 
this, it would be possible to stop most of such activities 
by  working  with  security  forces  present  in  the  cities  to 
the east of Tripoli. Smugglers have occasionally tried to 
launch  boats  from  Tripoli  as  well,  though  this  has  not 
occurred during 2017 as a result of improvements in local 
security. While previously there were many disorganised 
groups who did not confront smugglers – if indeed they 
were  not  engaging  in  smuggling  activities  themselves. 
The  security  situation  markedly  improved  in  2017,  and 

58. The  most  prominent  smuggler  in  the  area  of  Garabulli  is  Abu 
Abdullah, who was arrested in 2009 and released in 2011, where 
he returned to smuggling activities immediately after the end of 
the conflict.

59. In  June  2016,  Garabulli  witnessed  armed  clashes  between  its 
youth and some militiamen from Misrata who were controlling 
the coastal road and the women’s shelter center in the area. The 
Misratans were expelled after bloody confrontations that lasted 
for two days and in which 26 young men from Garabullli were 
killed.

60. Khoms  is  located  120  km  east  of  Tripoli,  Zliten  160  km,  and 
Misrata,  210  km  from  the  capital.  They  are  coastal  cities  and 
frequent points of smuggling and gathering of migrants. They all 
have AIIA migrant shelter centres.

14 ■  Robert Schuman Centre | March 2018

migrant  smuggling  operations,  theft  and  kidnappings 
have reduced compared to the two previous years.
In  general,  smugglers  in  coastal  cities  operate  with  a 
high  level  of  caution  and  vigilance  with  regard  to  the 
security situation, both in terms of their operations and 
what  they  do  with  their  proceeds.  Some  transfer  their 
profits  outside  Libya,  such  as  smugglers  from  Zuwara 
and Sabratha. Others invest their profits in Libya, but far 
from their area of operations. Yet more use their profits to 
protect their trade through forms of bribery, protection 
money  or  salaries  to  armed  groups.  Fahmi  bin  Khalifa, 
for  example,  used  to  pay  for  the  medical  treatment  of 
some wounded members of armed groups from Zuwara, 
while Dabbashi invested in arms and ammunition over a 
period of three years to build up his own security force to 
control Sabratha. 
As well as differences in the environment in which they 
operate and the circumstances that make their activities’ 
development more or less favourable, smuggling networks 
in  the  coastal  area  also  distinguish  themselves  by  their 
members’ profile. Contrary to Libya’s southern and central 
regions, young people who work with migrant smugglers 
in Garabulli tend to do so only for short periods of time. 
Fearing arrests, they settle for making some money in a 
short amount of time, and then stop. 
As  such,  policies  that  seek  to  reduce  illegal  migration 
in  Libya’s  coastal  areas  should  be  primarily  security-
focused.  While  this  will  not  completely  eliminate 
smuggling,  it  has  already  proved  effective  in  reducing 
smuggling  operations  in  Sabratha,  Zuwara  and  Tripoli. 
Even  if  in  some  cases  smugglers  have  simply  moved 
elsewhere,  their  new  activities  have  tended  not  to  be  at 
the  same  speed  or  volume.  The  reduction  in  migrants 
reaching  Europe’s  shores  is  also  a  positive  indicator.  It 
is  also  important  to  cooperate  with  municipal  councils 
in  the  coastal  region,  as  they  have  the  decision-making 
authority to appoint heads of local security forces, security 
directorates and the local branches of the coast guard and 
the AIIA. Municipal councils in the coastal region tend 
to  have  social  influence  and  work  in  coordination  with 
local security actors, and with the central government in 
Tripoli. It would be possible to directly oversee their work 
by putting specific mechanisms in place when advancing 
support.  Implementation  will  prove  challenging  and 
will likely have to start at the local level as the national-
level authorities in Tripoli are unable to control security 
structures  even  in  areas  closest  to  the  capital.  This  lack 

of  control  and  coherence  within  the  bodies  that  relate 
to  countering  migration  is  in  part  due  to  a  lack  of 
administrative stability since 201161.

Conclusion
Illegal  migration  and  migrant  smuggling  pose  many 
challenges  to  Libya’s  GNA,  which  is  coming  under 
increasing  pressure  from  both  European  countries  and, 
more  recently,  the  Libyan  public  to  reduce  migrant 
flows.  While  the  current  policies  to  combat  migrant 
smuggling increasingly combine security responses with 
development  support  and  humanitarian  assistance,  the 
GNA’s  limited  influence  outside  Tripoli,  the  unstable 
security situation and deteriorating economic conditions 
have reduced the effectiveness of such multi-layered, yet 
standard policy responses. 
The  economy  and  security  environments  are  not  the 
same in all regions of Libya. This, along with the varying 
social composition of the population in each region, has 
led to differences in terms of the way migrant smuggling 
networks  operate  at  the  local  level.  Libya’s  southern, 
central and coastal regions present significant differences 
with  regard  to  the  links  between  smugglers  and  local 
society,  the  potential  for  local  government  to  influence 
smugglers, and the level of competition between security 
actors.  Working  on  different,  interconnected  responses 
for  each  region  would  likely  prove  the  most  efficient 
strategy for curbing migrant smuggling in Libya. 
However,  while  it  is  important  to  understand  the  local 
contexts  and  which  actors  could  be  most  effectively 
mobilised in each region, it is equally important for long-
term stability and the sustainability of managing migrant 
flows  that  any  policy  responses  be  implemented  within 
Libya’s current legal and government frameworks. They 
should  also  be  designed  to  improve  the  relationship 
between  central  government  and  the  local  governance 
and security actors, rather than empowering local actors 
to the detriment of central authorities. In this context, it 
would be important to amend those articles of Law No. 
19  of  2010  for  combating  illegal  migration  that  are  not 
appropriate  in  the  current  context.  Particular  attention 
should be given to the articles on human trafficking, as 
well as fines and prison sentences attached to the offence. 

61. This was evidenced in 2016, for instance, when the Ministry of 
Interior released a decree to open a migration reception centre in 
one of Libya’s coastal cities, which was rejected by the AIIA.

15 ■ Local specificities of migration in Libya: challenges and solutions

therefore  be  capable  partners  in  implementing  policies. 
The  homogeneity  of  the  central  region’s  towns’  social 
fabric – where inhabitants tend to belong to a single tribe 
– enable these councils to be more influential than their 
counterparts  in  the  southern  region.  However,  as  many 
do not recognise the authority of the GNA, it is important 
that  work  on  amending  the  Libyan  Political  Agreement 
continues in order to facilitate the coordination between 
the GNA and local governance bodies in the central region. 
International organisations could also play a bigger role 
in  this  region,  particularly  in  providing  humanitarian 
assistance  to  migrants  and  raising  awareness  among 
local communities on the adverse effects of the migrant 
smuggling trade on the local society and economy.
In  contrast,  the  nature  of  the  coastal  region  and 
the  structure  of  migrant  smuggling  networks  there 
mean  that  greater  focus  should  be  placed  on  security 
responses.  These  would  need  to  include  mechanisms 
and  incentives  for  better  coordination  and  cooperation 
between  the  GNA’s  Ministries  of  Interior  and  Defense 
and  municipal  councils,  local  security  directorates  and 
the  AIIA.  Smugglers  in  the  coastal  region  generally 
exploit  fragmentation  in  the  security  sphere  to  operate, 
which  means  it  is  important  to  ensure  that  capacity-
reinforcement  measures  do  not  trigger  competition 
between rival local groups and provoke further instability. 
Recent developments show that security campaigns have 
been successful in cities of the coastal region where they 
have  received  popular  support.  Growing  community 
rejection  of  migrant  smuggling  could  therefore  become 
implementation  of  anti-migrant 
an  asset 
smuggling policies: it could be acknowledged and further 
encouraged. 
Civil  society  organisations  across  Libya  could  be 
supported to implement awareness-raising programmes, 
particularly  among  children  and  young  people,  to 
dissuade  them  from  entering  the  smuggling  trade.  The 
local  media  should  also  be  engaged  and  encouraged  to 
play  a  positive  role  in  combating  and  addressing  the 
challenges  of  illegal  migration  and  migrant  smuggling, 
something which it has not done so far.

the 

for 

The southern region is key to migrant smuggling as it is the 
entry point of flows heading towards the Mediterranean 
from sub-Saharan Africa. It is especially difficult to deal 
with,  however,  as  it  remains  largely  out  of  the  GNA’s 
security control and is home to a number of tribes and 
non-Arab minorities, the competition between which has 
been exacerbated by demographic changes after 2011.
Care  should  therefore  be  taken  to  avoid  that  security 
responses  based  on  providing  support  to  local  armed 
groups  are  used  to  put  pressure  on  the  national 
government  or  to  increase  the  influence  of  a  specific 
faction to the detriment of the others, thereby triggering 
further instability.
Although social and municipal councils in the southern 
region  do  not  have  very  much  influence  over  those 
engaged in smuggling, it would be important to include 
them  in  discussions  on  policy  design.  Security  support 
to official bodies such as the border guard and security 
directorates  operating  under  the  auspices  of  social  and 
municipal councils could form part of a successful policy 
response,  but  this  should  be  implemented  cautiously  as 
part of a wider strategy.
Policy  responses  would  need  to  work  on  several  fronts, 
from providing day-to-day services to citizens to agreeing 
on and implementing a constitutional framework which 
would clarify the issue of rights to Libyan nationality and 
citizenship.  This  would  help  to  discourage  people  from 
engaging  in  smuggling  and  to  break  the  links  between 
migrant smugglers and local communities. It is also very 
important  that  a  wider  strategy  for  the  South  includes 
local  economic  development  and  job  opportunities  for 
young people, based on thorough analysis of the specific 
context and opportunities offered by the different areas of 
southern Libya.
Taking  all  these  elements  into  account,  it  is  likely  that 
an  effective  and  sustainable  strategy  for  the  southern 
region would need to be phased, and would need a large 
amount  of  investment.  It  would  be  important  to  think 
broadly about the types of actors that could finance and 
implement  such  measures,  including  the  private  sector 
and foreign companies with interests in the region.
The central region requires a different approach, and first 
and foremost more inclusive policies combatting migrant 
smuggling that would help to break the relative political 
isolation the region has lived in since 2011. It would be 
important  to  work  directly  with  municipal  and  social 
councils as they have influence on the ground and would 

16 ■  Robert Schuman Centre | March 2018

Title: Southern region

Tripoli

Zawiyah

Garabulli (Castelverde)

Zuwara

Sabratha

Sorman

Gharyan

Bani Walid

Shwayrif

Khoms

Zliten

Misrata

Sirte

Ajdabiya

Tobruk

Jaghbub

Brak al-Shati

Sebha

Ubari

Murzuq

Ghat

Gatrun

Kufra

17 ■ Local specificities of migration in Libya: challenges and solutions

Middle East Directions
Robert Schuman Centre  
for Advanced Studies

European University Institute
Via Boccaccio, 121
50133 Florence
Italy 

Contact:
email: MED.Libya@eui.eu   
website: middleeastdirections.eu

18 ■  Robert Schuman Centre | Policy Brief | Issue 2018/04 | March 2018

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced StudiesThe Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major issues facing the process of European integration, European societies and Europe’s place in 21st century global politics. The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes, projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European integration, the expanding membership of the European Union, developments in Europe’s neighbourhood and the wider world.Middle East DirectionsThe MIDDLE EAST DIRECTIONS Programme, created in 2016, is part of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS). It has the ambition to become an international reference point for research on the Middle East and North Africa Region, studying socio-political, economic and religious trends and transformations. The programme produces academic outputs such as working papers and e-books. It also liaises with policy makers with a wide range of policy briefs, policy report and analysis.QM-AX-18-004-EN-NViews expressed in this publication reflect the opinion of individual authors and not those of the European University Institute or the European Commission.  © European University Institute, 2018Content © Abdulrahman al-Arabi, 2018doi:10.2870/301531ISBN:978-92-9084-604-8ISSN:2467-4540