The civilian CSDP compact : a success story for the EU’s crisis management Cinderella?
Date: 2018-10-10
Institutions: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Subjects: European defence policy, European security, civil defence, common security and defence policy, international security, military personnel, professional army

The civilian dimension of the EU’s CSDP has tra-
ditionally played a Cinderella-like role in the EU 
crisis management system. And like the original 
fairy  tale,  it  seems  that  civilian  CSDP  will  need 
three essential elements to succeed: (1) a renewed 
and  credible  strategic  framework  –  the  ‘ball 
gown’; (2) adequate operational capabilities – the 
‘pumpkin carriage’; and (3) a solid commitment 
by relevant stakeholders – the ‘Prince Charming’.

Born  in  Feira  in  20001 as  the  little  sister  of  the 
military dimension envisaged in Cologne the year 
before, civilian CSDP was initially intended to im-
plement tasks related to police, rule of law, civil-
ian  administration  and  civil  protection,  and  fur-
ther extended to monitoring and support to the 
EU Special Representatives in 2004.2 Despite the 
ambitious quantitative targets set at the time – a 
total  of  over  12,000  personnel3  –  it  has  always 
suffered from a form of second child syndrome, 
affected by a lack of professionalisation and vis-
ibility,  and  limited  investments  compared  to  its 
military counterpart. 

Nevertheless, civilian CSDP has grown over time 
and indeed been the most common mission type 

1

The Civilian CSDP CompactA success story for the EU’s crisis management Cinderella?by Nicoletta Pirozzi Main findings >The civilian component of EU crisis man-agement has often been neglected in terms of visibility and resources, but it is mainly through civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions that the EU has been able to show its added value as a security provider. >After the adoption of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), civilian CSDP is now looking for its place in the sun through the adoption of a Civilian CSDP Compact by the end of 2018. >Civilian CSDP will need three essential ele-ments to succeed: (1) a renewed and credible strategic framework; (2) adequate operation-al capabilities; and (3) a solid commitment by relevant stakeholders. >A Concept Paper and a Civilian Capabilities Development Plan have identified new issue areas and capability requirements for civil-ian CSDP, but it is the Compact which shall clarify what will allow it to ‘live happily ever after’. 92018 © EEASEuropean Union Institute for Security Studies European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)October 2018since the launch of operational CSDP in 2003: 22 
civilian missions have been deployed (out of 34) 
to areas ranging from the Western Balkans to sub-
Saharan Africa, from the Middle East to southern 
Caucasus, and ten (out of 16) are still ongoing. 
They are certainly less controversial from a politi-
cal and financial point of view at a national level: 
they do not imply the use of military force and 
can be financed through the common EU budget 
(the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
budget line and other financial instruments). In 
general, they helped the EU to reaffirm its iden-
tity  as  a  ‘comprehensive  security  provider’4  and 
partly  balanced  the  embryonic  development  of 
its military capabilities.5 

After  the  adoption  of  the  EUGS  in  June  20166 
and  the  Implementation  Plan  on  Security  and 
Defence  in  November  20167,  civilian  CSDP  is 
now  looking  for  a  new  raison  d’être  within  the 
framework  of  the  renewed  concept  of  an  ‘inte-
grated  approach  to  conflicts  and  crises’.  This  is 
occurring in parallel with the relaunch of EU de-
fence cooperation through PESCO, the setup of 
a coordinated annual review on defence (CARD) 
and  the  creation  of  an  EU-funded  European 
Defence  Fund  (EDF).  These  developments  trig-
gered the process at EU level for the agreement 
on a Civilian CSDP Compact by November 2018, 
with a view to reform civilian CSDP in line with 
the  transformation  of  the  strategic  environment 
over the past years.

In  the  Implementation  Plan  on  Security  and 
the  High 
Defence, 
Representative  of 
the 
Union for Foreign Affairs 
Security  Policy 
and 
Federica 
Mogherini 
asked 
EU  member 
states to agree to review 
the structures and capa-
bilities for the planning 
and  conduct  of  CSDP 
missions 
in  particu-
lar.8  On  this  basis,  the 
Council  in  November 
20179 and the European 
Council in December 201710 invited her to pre-
sent  the  next  steps  in  the  development  of  civil-
ian  capabilities  and  to  produce,  in  consultation 
with  the  member  states  and  the  Commission, 
a  Civilian  CSDP  Compact  by  the  end  of  2018. 
Drawing  on  a  Concept  Paper  on  Strengthening 
Civilian CSDP presented in April 201811 and the 
guidance provided by the Council in its May 2018 
Conclusions12  and  by  the  European  Council  in 
June  201813,  a  Civilian  Capability  Development 
Plan (CCDP) was adopted in September 201814, 
and member states will be invited to commit re-
sources based on the capability gaps identified. 

The overall objective of the Compact is to provide 
a  new  EU  framework  for  civilian  crisis  manage-
ment and CSDP missions, with ambitious commit-
ments at EU and national levels. Both the Concept 
Paper and the CCDP shed light on key challenges 
for  civilian  CSDP  and  clarify  key  objectives  at 
the  strategic  and  operational  levels.  Building  on 
previous experience gained through the Civilian 
Capabilities Commitment Conferences and 2008 
and  2010  Civilian  Headline  Goals15,  they  also 
identify  what  capabilities  are  needed  to  realise 
these ambitions and propose some concrete meas-
ures and actions to member states about how to 
implement  them.  However,  the  shape  and  con-
tent  of  the  new  Compact  are  still  unclear.  Most 
importantly, the commitment by member states, 
relevant  line  ministers  in  national  capitals,  and 
stakeholders in Brussels cannot (yet) be taken as 
a given.

The ‘ball gown’: sewing a renewed and 
credible strategic framework

By failing to offer a consolidated definition of ci-
vilian crisis management in the Concept Paper re-
leased in April 2018, the Civilian CSDP Compact 
process missed a perfect opportunity to fill a con-
ceptual gap that has affected civilian CSDP since 
its  inception.  In  the  past,  EU  actors  have  pre-
ferred  to  take  shortcuts  and  chose  a  bottom-up 
approach, starting from the issue areas to be ad-
dressed, which necessarily change over time due 
to  the  shifting  security  context  and  internal  EU 
dynamics.  In  particu-
lar,  they  take  stock  of 
the  evolution  of  crisis 
management 
priori-
ties such as police, the 
rule  of  law  and  civil-
ian administration, the 
strengthening  of  the 
links between the mili-
tary  and  the  civilian 
dimensions,  and  the 
intensification of chal-
lenges  at  the  internal-
external  nexus.  Both 
the  Concept  Paper  and  the  CCDP  affirmed  that 
the  priorities  defined  at  Feira  are  still  valid  and 
relevant (except for civil protection, which is no 
longer applicable to CSDP), but they need to be 
updated  in  light  of  today’s  security  threats  and 
challenges,  including  those  linked  to  irregular 
migration,  hybrid  threats,  cyber  security,  terror-
ism  and  radicalisation,  organised  crime,  border 
management  and  maritime  security,  violent  ex-
tremism, and the protection of cultural heritage.

The  evolution  of  the  approach  to  civilian  CSDP 
reflects the change of paradigm since the release 

2

‘After the adoption of the EUGS in June 
2016 and the Implementation Plan on 
Security and Defence in November 
2016, civilian CSDP is now looking for 
a new raison d’être within the framework 
of the renewed concept of an ‘integrated 
approach to conflicts and crises’.’ 

European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)October 2018Civilian CSDP missions
number of contracted and seconded personnel. April 2018

153

EUAM
Ukraine

EULEX Kosovo

112

EUMM Georgia

250

EUBAM Rafah

178

EUAM Iraq

EUBAM Libya

EUPOL COPPS

EUCAP Sahel Mali

EUCAP Sahel Niger

total
personnel

EUCAP Somalia

0

100

200

300

400

Data: European External Action Service, 30/04/2018

of  the  EUGS,  particularly  with  reference  to  the 
growing  importance  of  the  nexus  between  in-
ternal  and  external  security.  Consequently,  ef-
forts  have  aimed  at  increasing  the  role  of  actors 
traditionally  working  in  the  field  of  Justice  and 
Home  Affairs  (JHA)  in  external  security/CSDP 
matters.  At  the  institutional  level,  this  means 
improving  coordination  in  Brussels  through  the 
existing  joint  meetings  between  the  Political 
and Security Committee (PSC) and the Standing 
Committee  on  Internal  Security  (COSI).  It  also 
means  establishing 
joint  meetings  between 
COSI and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of 
Crisis  Management  (CIVCOM)  to  address  key 

operational  issues  and  considering  a  reform  of 
the  composition  of  CIVCOM  to  include  repre-
sentatives  of  relevant  ministries  (beyond  minis-
tries of foreign affairs) in national delegations. On 
the ground, it means the pooling and sharing of 
personnel,  expertise  and  information  among  all 
relevant actors: CSDP missions, EU Delegations, 
and  JHA  agencies.  The  current  arrangements  in 
Libya between the EUBAM mission, the European 
Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency  (Frontex)  and 
Europol  are  a  case  in  point.  One  of  the  most 
interesting  proposals  included  in  the  Civilian 
Capability Development Plan is the creation of a 
country  situational  awareness  platform  (CSAP), 

3

secondedpersonnelcontracted personnel433524144241516514639519461858European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)October 2018to  be  set-up  in  all  theatres  where  civilian  CSDP 
missions are active. This platform, coordinated by 
the local Head of the EU Delegation, would bring 
together member states, EU actors and JHA agen-
cies on the ground. Situational awareness, infor-
mation sharing and joint programming could be 
part  of  its  set-up,  thus  facilitating  early  warning 
and early action. 

Nevertheless,  this  renewed  bottom-up  approach 
implies  the  continuation  of  the  conceptual  gap 
caused  by  the  lack  of  a  consolidated  definition 
of civilian crisis management, which in turn con-
tinues to present risks and shortfalls. One of the 
challenges included among the new priorities for 
CSDP is the prominent focus on migration, thus 
emulating  the  same  emerging  tendency  to  secu-
ritise the migration issue that some national gov-
ernments  have  demonstrated  in  their  domestic 
migration policies and in their relationships with 
third countries of origin and transit. The prepon-
derant influence of internal security priorities on 
the foreign policy agenda also has another nega-
tive  impact:  the  progressive  narrowing  down  of 
stabilisation efforts and capacity-building carried 
out by CSDP missions to migration management. 
This could be witnessed in the strategic review of 
missions such as EUCAP Sahel Niger, for instance, 
and has the potential to jeopardise the sustaina-
bility and effectiveness of peacebuilding interven-
tions.  The 
implemen-
tation  of  the  Compact 
provides  an  opportu-
nity  to  rebalance  this 
by ensuring that foreign 
policy actors and priori-
ties have a stronger role 
on  internal  security  is-
sues  through  appropri-
ate  mechanisms  at  the 
and 
decision-making 
planning 
levels.  The 
goal  would  be  to  im-
prove  the  awareness  of 
internal  security  actors 
on  the  repercussions  of 
their policy choices on the peace and stability of 
neighbourhood and partner countries, as well as 
their long-term impacts. 

dual-use  technologies,  which  can  serve  both  ci-
vilian and military purposes since they can have 
benefits  in  both  security  and  economic  terms. 
Among these dual-use technologies, satellites and 
Remotely Piloted Air Systems (RPAS) can contrib-
ute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding ac-
tivities by performing various tasks such as intel-
ligence,  surveillance,  the  monitoring  of  borders, 
force  protection,  and  support  to  police  and  law 
enforcement agencies.16 All these activities are in-
cluded within the mandates of several ongoing ci-
vilian CSDP missions and can be supported using 
RPAS and satellites. The fact that these aspects do 
not  feature  prominently  in  the  discussion  about 
the Compact so far represents a missed opportu-
nity.

The ‘pumpkin carriage’: developing 
adequate operational capabilities

The Civilian CSDP Compact is aimed at making 
civilian  CSDP  faster,  more  flexible  and  effective. 
The  CSDP  practices  of  the  past  years  have  re-
vealed  the  persistence  of  major  obstacles  to  the 
full  accomplishment  of  EU  goals  in  the  civilian 
field:  a  still  embryonic  standardisation  of  train-
ing standards and curricula provided at a national 
level by various training institutions and recruit-
ment  procedures  used  by  national  governments 
for  civilian  personnel 
is accompanied by the 
lack of appropriate leg-
islation  and  resourc-
es.17  In  addition,  past 
attempts  of  pooling 
and  sharing  person-
nel  and  logistics  at  an 
EU  level  did  not  pro-
duce  the  expected  re-
sults,  as  demonstrated 
by  the  experiences  of 
the  Civilian  Response 
Teams  (CRTs)  and  the 
permanent  pool  of 
experts  in  the  field  of 
Security Sector Reform (SSR). This has often re-
sulted in slow force generation processes and in-
adequate capabilities to fulfil the missions’ man-
dates, from Afghanistan to Kosovo. 

‘Beyond training and recruitment, the 
pooling of experts to be employed in EU 
missions – as well as of the necessary 
logistics to equip them and ensure the 
rapid deployment to the mission area – 
are key factors in the development of a 
responsive, flexible and timely civilian 
CSDP.’ 

Conceptual  deficiencies  aside,  a  second  issue 
weakening  the  Compact  is  that  the  realisation 
of  a  truly  integrated  approach  through  civilian-
military cooperation seems to have been neglect-
ed.  The  process  in  the  civilian  field  mirrors  the 
evolution that led to the launch of PESCO on the 
military side in the framework of the EUGS im-
plementation,  but  the  opportunities  offered  by  
closer civilian-military cooperation are not being 
exploited.  For  example,  in  recent  years  the  EU 
has  significantly  invested  in  the  development  of 

To  address  these  shortcomings,  the  Civilian 
Capability Development Plan has foreseen a num-
ber of targets, correctly coupling the quantitative 
approach that characterised the previous capabil-
ity  development  exercises  with  a  stronger  atten-
tion to qualitative targets. As the key capabilities 
for  civilian  CSDP  are  mainly  about  staff  which 
have the right competencies and skills, the civilian 
capability development process should be mainly 
focused  on  improving  the  professionalisation  of 

4

European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)October 2018CFSP payments
2003-2018, € million 

400

300

200

100

47 
in 2003

0

2003

314 
in 2009

89 
in 2007

328 
in 2018

233 
in 2016

2005

2010

2015

2018

Data: European Commission Final Financial Reports, 2003−2017.

civilian personnel through training and ensuring 
that those trained are effectively employed on the 
ground. This is an element of capability planning 
in the civilian field that should be better acknowl-
edged and implemented.

Training activities in the EU are currently disper-
sive  and  uncoordinated  and  involve  a  variety  of 
actors,  and  training  standards  vary  considerably 
among  different  member  states  and  training  in-
stitutions. An enhanced training policy for EU ci-
vilian  personnel  should  be  based  on  three  main 
pillars:  (1)  the  standardisation  of  training  con-
cepts and curricula at European level; (2) the co-
ordination of existing training activities for civil-
ian personnel, i.e. through the European Security 
and Defence College (ESDC) with a more promi-
nent dimension of specialised training for civilian 
missions; (3) a stronger linkage between training 
and  recruitment,  with  a  view  to  ensure  that  the 
personnel trained are also deployed in CSDP mis-
sions. The Civilian Capability Development Plan 
entrusts the EU Civilian Training Group, which is 
still to be operationalised, with the coordination 
of  a  review  process  of  training  requirements,  as 
well as a mapping of the existing training offers, 
with a view to improving information exchange, 
and promoting quality standards and harmonisa-
tion. 

As  for  the  linkage  between  training  and  recruit-
ment, some steps forward have been made with 
the  reform  of  recruitment  procedures,  even  if 
there is still scope for improvement, especially in 
streamlining  and  accelerating  timelines  for  sub-
mitting applications and issuing dates for deploy-
ment.  The  creation  of  the  Goalkeeper  system, 
especially its Headhunter module, facilitates this 

by  standardising  and  expediting  the  production 
of job descriptions for positions in civilian CSDP 
missions.18

Nevertheless,  force  generation  remains  a  chal-
lenge  for  civilian  crisis  management.  A  further 
move  in  the  right  direction  might  be  the  crea-
tion  of  a  unified  roster  at  an  EU  level,  which  is 
particularly relevant today as the number of per-
sonnel seconded by member states is constantly 
decreasing  in  favour  of  personnel  contracted  by 
EU  institutions  (from  11%  to  41%  of  the  total 
number  of  international  staff  in  missions  from 
December  2005  to  April  2018).  However,  the 
main  challenge  remains  the  mobilisation  of  key 
categories  of  personnel  such  as  policemen  and 
policewomen,  judges  and  prosecutors,  who  are 
usually  employed  at  a  national  level  and  often 
lack the required knowledge to serve in interna-
tional  missions.  Since  there  is  tension  between 
national and European priorities for the employ-
ment of these categories of personnel, especially 
in connection with illegal migration and the ter-
rorist threat, there are clear political obstacles. But 
there are also administrative impediments such as 
inadequate  legislation  or  a  lack  of  incentives  in 
terms of career path for deployment which could 
be addressed and overcome. 

Beyond  training  and  recruitment,  the  pooling 
of  experts  to  be  employed  in  EU  missions  –  as 
well  as  of  the  necessary  logistics  to  equip  them 
and ensure the rapid deployment to the mission 
area – are key factors in the development of a re-
sponsive,  flexible  and  timely  civilian  CSDP.  The 
European External Action Service (EEAS) and the 
Commission are in the process of implementing 
crucial measures such as the Core Responsiveness 

5

European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)October 2018Capacity  (CRC),  which  is  composed  of  a  rein-
forced  Mission  Support  Platform  plus  resources 
placed in existing missions, to be complemented 
through  rapidly  deployable  assets  and  planning 
elements from member states. In addition, as of 
June 2018, a dedicated warehouse (Warehouse II) 
will improve logistical support to the ten existing 
civilian  CSDP  missions, 
another 
operational 
action  as  foreseen  by 
Article  28  of  the  Treaty 
on  European  Union 
(TEU)  and 
the  EU 
Special Representatives. 

Similarly to PESCO, it should be decided whether 
the Civilian CSDP Compact will favour collective 
engagement by member states in the civilian ca-
pability  development  process  or  whether  it  will 
opt for more ambitious commitments by groups 
of member states to develop specific capabilities 
on a modular basis. If the two goals are in prin-
ciple  not  mutually  ex-
clusive, the experience 
with PESCO so far has 
shown that it might be 
difficult to reach both. 
A  collective  engage-
ment  would  probably 
mean  more  inclusive 
but  less  advanced  ca-
pability  development 
projects.  It  could  be 
achieved  through  the 
proposed  Coordinated 
of 
Annual  Review 
Civilian  Capabilities 
(CARCC),  a  mecha-
nism  for  coordination 
and cooperation among the relevant stakeholders 
adapted from the CARD. 

Member states, the ‘Prince Charming’, 
are now called to turn the Compact 
into reality, either through collective 
engagement that should more effectively 
involve line ministries and institutions 
in all national capitals or advanced 
projects carried out by restricted groups 
of countries in the form of a ‘civilian 
PESCO’. 

specialised 

Where agreed, the CRC 
should  be  accompanied 
by 
teams 
and  multinational  for-
mations.  The  idea  to 
set up specialised teams 
for  CSDP  missions, 
composed  of  pre-iden-
tified  and  trained  civil-
ian  experts,  is  not  new.  The  creation  of  Civilian 
Response Teams (CRTs) was included in the 2008 
Civilian Headline Goal, but their employment has 
been limited. In the new Civilian CSDP Compact, 
they could be focussed on tasks related to the in-
ternal-external  security  nexus  and  be  employed 
in  modular  and  scalable  missions.  Nevertheless, 
the  challenges  that  impeded  the  full  operation-
alisation  of  CRTs  are  likely  to  remain  the  same. 
These  challenges  need  to  be  addressed  in  the 
Compact,  namely  the  difficulty  in  making  mul-
tinational, ready-made packages compatible with 
the force generation and implementation process 
of civilian CSDP and to ensure adequate financial 
resources. Moreover, the new priorities identified 
for  the  future  civilian  CSDP  further  complicate 
civilian-civilian interoperability, as they will make 
the  close  cooperation  between  police,  judicial, 
customs  and  intelligence  personnel  even  more 
relevant.

The ‘Prince Charming’: ensuring 
commitment by relevant stakeholders

If the concept and a plan for capability develop-
ment have been put in place at an EU level, even 
with  the  aforementioned  problems,  the  biggest 
question  mark  remains  political  will,  which  is 
the essential element to turn the Compact into a 
success story for civilian CSDP and ultimately for 
the EU. Two months ahead of the release of the 
Compact, it is still not clear what level of engage-
ment will be ensured by member states and EU 
institutions, which tendency will prevail between 
inclusiveness and ambition, and which incentives 
will be offered to realise the objectives identified.

Even if the civilian field is not affected by the same 
level  of  sensitivity  in  information-sharing  that 
characterises  the  military  field,  levels  of  reluc-
tance for coordination among the 27 will proba-
bly be the same. Moreover, there are two elements 
that make this exercise more complicated: nation-
al stakeholders in the defence field can be easily 
identified in the ministers of defence, whereas the 
civilian sector is much more complex and varie-
gated,  and  involves  ministries  of  foreign  affairs, 
ministries of interiors, ministries of justice, police 
services and others. Thus, making it much more 
difficult to identify who should sit at the CARCC 
table  to  make  it  representative  and  effective. 
Second, the secretariat of CARD is performed by 
the European Defence Agency (EDA), which en-
sures that up-to-date and detailed information on 
defence  planning  is  both  extracted  from  already 
existing EDA databases and additionally collected 
and validated with member states. 

It is still to be defined which structures among the 
different actors involved in civilian crisis manage-
ment – PSC, CIVCOM, CMPD, CPCC – will do 
that for CARCC and with what resources. The ex-
perience with CARD showed it to be an extremely 
complex and time-consuming process and its ci-
vilian cousin could be even more so, considering 
that civilian capabilities come from different na-
tional administrations, thus multiplying the num-
ber of actors feeding information into the CARCC. 
The creation of restricted groups of member states 
to develop specific capabilities could lead to a sort 
of  ‘civilian  PESCO’  or  to  the  implementation  of 

6

European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)October 2018pilot projects in specific areas, from mediation to 
SSR, but this remains subject to available resourc-
es and capacities at member state level. 

It  will  therefore  be  crucial  to  stimulate  commit-
ment by member states through adequate support 
by  the  EU  institutions.  Both  the  EEAS  and  the 
Commission  could  mobilise  tools  and  resourc-
es  to  contribute  to  this  process,  with  two  main 
priorities: (1) to rationalise the EU civilian crisis 
management machine, from the political and in-
stitutional  level,  down  to  the  operational  reality 
on the ground; and (2) to guarantee financial in-
vestments. On the first aspect, the recent proposal 
put  forward  by  the  Commission  President  Jean-
Claude  Junker  in  his  State  of  the  Union  2018 
Address to extend qualified majority voting to de-
cisions on civilian missions might act as a “cata-
lyst to engage member states in building effective 
consensus  and  achieving  unity”.  A  clarification 
and rationalisation of competences between civil-
ian  crisis  management  structures  –  in  particular 
CMPD, CPCC and PRISM – is needed in order to 
mitigate inter-institutional competition and over-
lapping functions, together with the improvement 
of the working relationships between civilian cri-
sis  management  structures,  geographical  desks 
at EEAS and relevant Commission units. This ra-
tionalisation should also contemplate the stream-
lining of the chains of command for civilian CSDP 
missions, including also chairpersons of the PSC 
and CIVCOM, and aim at a better cooperation be-
tween CSDP missions and EU Delegations on the 
ground from planning to implementation and exit 
strategies. 

With regard to funding, the good news is the in-
crease  of  the  CFSP  budget  planned  in  the  next 
multiannual  financial  framework  (MFF)  2021-
27. But it would be wise to think about a specific 
budget line for civilian crisis management to limit 
the  planned  redirection  of  resources  to  military 
and  defence-related  activities.  At  the  same  time, 
new funding schemes for civilian personnel to be 
employed in civilian CSDP missions (from train-
ing  to  salaries)  should  be  identified  to  promote 
the deployment of seconded personnel and not to 
lose ground to Frontex/JHA, which usually offer 
more  favourable  conditions  to  the  same  catego-
ries of personnel. 

What should the Compact (and civilian 
CSDP) look like?

crises and post-conflict instability. The EUGS and 
its Implementation Plan have recognised the role 
of soft power and civilian actions, placed empha-
sis on an integrated approach to conflicts and cri-
ses and advocated for a more flexible, faster and 
more  targeted  civilian  crisis  management.  The 
Civilian CSDP Compact can help with these ob-
jectives, in particular by: (1) providing a revised 
strategic framework for civilian CSDP in accord-
ance with the evolution of the security context – 
through  the  April  2018  Concept  Paper;  (2)  de-
veloping  and  adapting  existing  capabilities  and 
identifying  additional  needs  –  through  the  July 
2018 Civilian Capabilities Development Plan; (3) 
ensuring a sustainable and broader commitment 
by EU institutions and member states – through 
the Civilian Compact.

The  ‘ball  gown’  of  the  EU’s  crisis  management 
Cinderella – the Concept Paper – updated civil-
ian CSDP through the identification of additional 
issues areas to be addressed, but failed to recast 
civilian  crisis  management  by  providing  a  clear 
definition of goals and scope. The pragmatic ap-
proach chosen undoubtedly strengthens the link 
between  internal  and  external  security,  but  ulti-
mately  risks  being  short-sighted  and  hijacked 
by  the  current  hysteria  surrounding  migration, 
overlooking core stabilisation and peacebuilding 
tasks, as well as broader civilian-military coordi-
nation  objectives.  A  forward-looking  framework 
with a stronger focus on foreign policy priorities 
and a comprehensive vision of security should be 
promoted in the Compact and in its implementa-
tion, at least until the next overall strategic revi-
sion. 

The  ‘pumpkin  carriage’  offered  by  the  Civilian 
Capabilities Development Plan provides the blue-
print  to  tackle  well-known  shortcomings  in  the 
preparation and use of human capital of civilian 
CSDP  –  especially  the  fragmentation  and  inad-
equacy of training, recruitment and career paths 
for  civilian  personnel.  The  solutions  suggested, 
especially the creation of standing pools of trained 
experts to be employed at short notice and for tar-
geted civilian tasks, go in the right direction, but 
remain to be tested against the availability of re-
sources and the stickiness of consolidated opera-
tional procedures. Investing more in EU training, 
promoting the reform of national legislation to fa-
cilitate deployment, and creating a shared roster 
of civilian experts at an EU level are required ele-
ments to achieve the desired outcome. 

The civilian component of EU crisis management 
has often been neglected in terms of visibility and 
resources, but it is mainly through civilian CSDP 
missions that the EU has been able to show its add-
ed value – compared to other regional and inter-
national security actors – in addressing complex 

Member  states,  the  ‘Prince  Charming’,  are  now 
called  to  turn  the  Compact  into  reality,  either 
through collective engagement that should more 
effectively involve line ministries and institutions 
in all national capitals or advanced projects car-
ried out by restricted groups of countries in the 

7

European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)October 2018form  of  a  ‘civilian  PESCO’.  In  the  defence  field, 
the attempt to find a magic formula to make in-
clusivity and ambition compatible led to subop-
timal  results.  The  civilian  dimension  could  find 
its  own  way,  if  it  is  supported  by  a  rationalised 
civilian crisis management machine at an EU lev-
el and adequate financial incentives coming from 
the CFSP budget and other funding schemes. 

The  content  of  the  Civilian  CSDP  Compact  is 
particularly rich, but what format will it take? It 
has been proposed to release it in the form of a 
Declaration by member states as an annex to the 
EU Council Conclusions, so as to ensure owner-
ship and engagement at a national level. However, 
in  order  to  transform  it  into  a  meaningful  exer-
cise,  it  should  be  accompanied  at  least  by  two 
additional documents: (1) an Action Plan 2019-
2024,  detailing  the  actions  to  be  carried  out  at 
the strategic, institutional and operational levels; 
and (2) a detailed Review Process which outlines 
responsibilities, required steps and timelines. 

Cinderella currently has to make do with a decent 
ball gown, a partially-transformed pumpkin car-
riage and a still undecided Prince Charming. But 
she is still waiting for her glass slipper to live hap-
pily ever after.

Nicoletta Pirozzi is the Head of the ‘EU,  politics 
and institutions’ programme at the Istituto 
Affari Internazionali (IAI) and an Associate 
Analyst at the EUISS.  

Disclaimer: the views expressed in this Brief are solely 
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the EUISS or of the European Union.

Endnotes

1) European Council (2000), “Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria 
de Feira,”, Brussels, June 19/20, 2000, http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/media/21027/santa-maria-da-feira-european-council-
presidency-conclusions.pdf.

 2) Council of the European Union, “Civilian Headline Goal 2008,” 
15863/04, Brussels, December 14, 2004, http://register.consilium.
europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015863%202004%20INIT.

 3) Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference (2004), 
Ministerial Declaration, November 22, 2004.

4)  Hans-Georg Ehrhart, What model for CFSP?, EUISS Chaillot 
Paper, no. 55, (October 2002), https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/
default/files/EUISSFiles/chai55e.pdf.

 5) Nicoletta Pirozzi, EU Crisis Management After Lisbon. A New 
Model to Address Security Challenges in the 21st Century? (Cambridge: 
Intersentia, 2015), http://intersentia.com/en/eu-crisis-management-
after-lisbon.html.

6) Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe; A Global 
Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, 
Brussels, June 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_
stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf.

7) Council of the European Union, “Implementation Plan on 
Security and Defence,” 14392/16, November 14, 2016, https://
europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/eu-global-strategy-implementation-
plan-security-and-defence.

8) Ibid.

9) Council of the European Union, “Council conclusions on 
security and defence in the context of the EU Global Strategy,” 
14190/17, Brussels, November 13, 2017, http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/media/31520/ccs-on-security-and-defence.pdf.

10)  European Council, “Conclusions,” 19/1/17 REV 1, 
Brussels, December 14, 2017, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
media/32204/14-final-conclusions-rev1-en.pdf.

11) Council of the European Union, “Strengthening civilian CSDP 
– concept paper,” 8084/18, Brussels, April 18, 2018.

12) Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on 
strengthening civilian CSDP,” 9288/18, Brussels, May 28, 2018, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35380/st09288-en18.pdf.

13) European Council, “Press Release 421/18,” Brussels, June 
28, 2018, , http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2018/06/29/20180628-euco-conclusions-final/pdf.

14) Council of the European Union (2018c), “Civilian Capabilities 
Development Plan,” 11807/18, September 4, 2018.

15) Council of the European Union, “Civilian Headline Goal 
2008,” 15863/04, December 7, 2004, http://register.consilium.
europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015863%202004%20INIT; 
Council of the European Union, “New Civilian Headline Goals 
2010,” 14823/07, November 9, 2007, http://register.consilium.
europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014823%202007%20INIT.

16) Andrea Aversano Stabile, Alessandro Marrone, Nicoletta 
Pirozzi and Bernardo Venturi, Dual use technologies and civilian 
capabilities: Beyond pooling and sharing, Policy report produced 
in the framework of the project EU-CIVCAP - Preventing and 
Responding to Conflict: Developing EU CIVilian CAPabilities for 
a sustainable peace, 25 September 2018, https://eucivcap.files.
wordpress.com/2018/09/eu-civcap_deliverable_2-5.pdf.

17)  Nicoletta Pirozzi, “The European Union and Civilian Crisis 
Management after Lisbon”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 20 
(2015): 287–306.

18) See https://goalkeeper.eeas.europa.eu.

October 2018

8

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