COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL A stronger global actor: a more efficient decision-making for EU Common Foreign and Security Policy
Date: 2018-09-12
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Council of the European Union, EU Member State, EU activity, common foreign and security policy, decision-making, foreign policy, human rights, majority voting, operation of the Institutions

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 12.9.2018  COM(2018) 647 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL A stronger global actor: a more efficient decision-making for EU Common Foreign and Security Policy                
 
 
1.  Introduction 

Over the past 60 years, the steps taken towards European integration have created a common 
destiny  for  the  citizens  of  the  Union.  The  question  Europe  faces  is  a  simple  one:  whether 
Europeans will decide on their common destiny, or whether that destiny will be decided by 
others. Whether the European Union wants to be a pillar of the emerging multipolar global 
order or whether it will resign itself to being a pawn. 

The  challenges  that  Europe  faces  today  will  not  go  away.  Global  competition  will  harden. 
The pace of technological change will increase. Geopolitical instability will grow. The effects 
of  climate  change  will  be  felt.  Demographic  trends  mean  that  migration  to  the  EU  will 
continue. 

The  2017  Rome  Declaration1,  adopted  on  the  occasion  of  60th  anniversary  of  the  Treaty  of 
Rome, recognised that a stronger European Union was a necessity. The Leaders emphasised 
in  particular  that  the  EU  should  become  a  stronger  global  actor.  It  must  be  better  able  to 
shape  global  events  and  better  equipped  to  shoulder  international  responsibilities.  The 
European  Union  must  increase  its  capacity  to  ‘act  credibly  on  the  global  stage’ 
("Weltpolitikfähigkeit").2 The present Communication is a contribution to the debate amongst 
the Leaders that will be pursued at their meeting in Sibiu on 9 May 2019. 

In  the  complex,  connected  and  contested  world3  of  today,  the  EU  must  protect  its  citizens, 
promote  its  values  and  interests,  support  the  rules-based  international  order  and  export 
stability  to  its  neighbourhood  and  beyond.  The  EU  must  also  be  able  to  respond  to  the 
expectations of third countries, international organisations and other international actors for it 
to play a key role in tackling regional and global challenges.  

No Member State can meet these challenges or seize these opportunities alone. The EU and 
its Member States must pool their strength to promote shared interests and values.  

In his State of the Union speech of 2018, President Juncker identified a number of policies 
that must be pursued to this end. The EU must work more closely still with its partners across 
the globe. It should step up its partnership with Africa, notably by launching an Alliance for 
sustainable  investment  and  jobs.  The  EU  must  be  able  to  stand  on  its  own  two  feet.  For 
instance, it must strengthen the international role of the Euro. The EU must also speak with a 
single, clear and strong voice in response to international events.  

To achieve these objectives and become a stronger global actor, the EU must equip itself with 
the necessary instruments, notably by making its decision-making more efficient.  

To this end, in his State of the Union speech of 2017, President Juncker suggested ‘looking at 
which foreign policy decisions could be moved from unanimity to qualified majority voting’.4 
This can be done on the basis of the Treaties as they stand. The Meseberg Declaration of June 
2018  on  Renewing  Europe’s  promises  of  security  and  prosperity,  by  German  Chancellor 

1   Rome Declaration of the leaders of 27 member states and of the European Council, the European Parliament 

and the European Commission.  

2   Notion coined by President Juncker in his speech at the 54th Munich Security Conference. 
3   Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European’s Foreign and 

Security Policy, from June 2017. 

4   President Juncker 2017 State of the Union address. 

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Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron, addressed the same matter. It called 
to ‘look into new ways of increasing the speed and effectiveness of the EU’s decision making 
in our Common Foreign and Security Policy’ and ‘explore possibilities of using majority vote 
in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the framework of a broader debate 
on majority vote regarding EU policies’.5 

The  discussion  is  a  longstanding  one.  The  EU  has  moved  gradually  from  unanimity  to 
qualified majority voting many times in its history. First introduced by the Single European 
Act6, today qualified majority is the standard voting rule for EU decision-making, including 
in  the  area  of  Justice  and  Home  affairs.  The  reason  for  replacing  unanimity  by  qualified 
majority  is  simple,  compelling  and  has  always  been  the  same.  Member  States  have 
recognised  that  when  a  certain  level  of  ambition  is  sought  in  particular  policy  area,  there 
comes  a  moment  when  the  unanimity  rule  slows  down  progress  and  in  some  cases 
prevents  the  EU  from  adjusting  to  changing  realities.  In  this  sense,  every  move  towards 
qualified majority has been a major step forward for the EU.  

Based  on  a  culture  of  compromise,  qualified  majority  voting  opens  up  more  space  for 
discussion  and  pragmatic  outcomes  that  reflect  the  interests  of  all.  Flexible,  efficient  and 
quick  decision-making  has  thus  allowed  the  Union  to  become  a  global  reference  and 
standard  setter  in  policy  areas  such  as  environmental  and  consumer  protection,  data 
protection as well as free and fair trade.  

The  EU  is  becoming  an  increasingly  important  global  player  and  is  considered  by  many 
worldwide  as  a  champion  of  universal  values.  From  facilitating  the  normalisation  of  the 
relations between Belgrade and Pristina, responding to the violation of international law by 
the  Russian  Federation  on  the  Crimean  peninsula  and  in  Eastern  Ukraine,  to  initiating  and 
brokering  the  negotiations  related  to  the  Iranian  nuclear  programme,  the  Union  has 
consistently supported peace and prosperity in its neighbourhood and beyond.  

Nevertheless,  more  qualified  majority  voting  would  benefit  the  Common  Foreign  and 
Security  Policy.  This  Communication  sets  out  the  rationale  for  more  efficient  decision-
making in some areas of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, explores the possibilities 
to do so that exist in the Treaty on European Union and identifies concrete and achievable 
areas  where  the  Council  could  act  by  qualified  majority  rather  than  cling  to  unanimity. 
The specificities of foreign policy are reflected in the Treaties. Tailor-made safeguards exist 
and would continue to apply. At a later stage, the Commission could explore how qualified 
majority voting could be used to further strengthen the Union's relations with third countries.  

2.  The case for more qualified majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy  

In the Common Foreign and Security Policy, most EU decisions are adopted by unanimity. 
Normally, this has not prevented the Union from being active and taking strong positions 
on foreign policy matters. But it has increasingly affected the speed and ability of the EU to 
act in the global arena. In  international politics, time is  of essence and the  credibility of an 

5    Meseberg  Declaration  by  French  President  Emmanuel  Macron  and  German  Chancellor  Angela  Merkel. 
During the European Convention various Member States had already recognised the importance of changing 
the direction and introducing qualified majority voting. This was, in particular, the position of France and 
Germany (Réf. Contribution franco-allemande à la Convention européenne sur l'architecture institutionnelle 
de  l'Union  du  15  janvier  2003,  faite  à  Paris  et  à  Berlin;  Contribution  de  M.  Dominique  de  Villepin  et  M. 
Joschka Fischer).  

6   For more information, Building Europe through the Treaties in the EUR-lex summaries of EU legislation. 

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international actor hinges on its ability to react in a quick and coherent way to international 
crises and events. Likewise, the strength, effectiveness and impact of a global actor depend 
on its ability to act consistently and efficiently on the international scene and in global fora.  

Since the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, where Member States empowered the Union for the 
first  time  to  act  in  foreign  policy  and  security  matters,  considerable  progress  has  been 
achieved  through  the  substantial  development  of  the  EU's  Common  Foreign  and  Security 
Policy  and  Common  Security  and  Defence  Policy.  Nevertheless,  there  are  still  instances 
where  the  EU  is  unable  to  reach  common  positions,  or  they  are  not  sufficiently  solid  or 
sufficiently fast (see section 3).  

Those  instances  have  a  real  political  cost  for  the  Union  and  its  Member  States:  EU 
institutions  are  precluded  from  acting  decisively,  Member  States  that  are  more  active 
internationally  are  limited  to  representing  their  individual  positions  rather  than  carrying  the 
combined weight of 28, and Member States who do not have their own seat at the negotiating 
table are unable to exercise direct influence on the matter at stake.  

The  fact  that  such  instances  still  occur  demonstrates  that  the  unanimity  rule  prevents  the 
Union from achieving its full potential in foreign policy. In a 2025 perspective, overcoming 
these limits will be essential in view of the possible enlargement of the EU. The EU must be 
stronger and more solid, before it can be bigger.7 

In  the  future,  therefore,  certain  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  decisions  should  be 
taken  by  qualified  majority.  The  use  of  qualified  majority  would  make  the  Union  a 
stronger, more effective and more credible international actor, as it would make it easier for 
the Union: 

  To act on the global scene on the basis of robust and consistent positions; 

  To react with speed and efficiency to pressing foreign policy challenges, both where 
a  new  position  needs  to  be  established  and  in  the  implementation  of  an  agreed 
strategy; 

  To  strengthen  the  resilience  of  the  EU  by  shielding  Member  States  from  targeted 

pressure by third countries that try to divide the EU. 

Taken together, this would help the Union to pull its weight acting in concert as more 
than the sum of its parts. Experience from other policy areas where qualified majority 
is  the  rule  shows  that  qualified  majority  fosters  common  solutions.  Practice  has  shown 
that, where qualified majority applies, decisions are, in the vast majority cases, de facto taken 
by consensus. The prospect of a vote by qualified majority is a powerful catalyst to engage all 
actors  in  finding  compromises,  an  outcome  acceptable  to  all  through  building  effective 
consensus, and to achieve unity. The pursuit of agreement means greater ownership of the 
decisions taken, which should be implemented in 'a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity'.8 

7   Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced 
EU engagement with the Western Balkans”, COM (2018) 65 final. 

8   Article 24(3) TEU. 

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Moreover, reflecting the specificities of Common Foreign and Security Policy, and in order 
to  protect  core  interests  and  prerogatives  of  Member  States,  the  Treaty  foresees  important 
safeguards in case of use of qualified majority voting (see section 4).  

Given the EU's culture of compromise, and taking into account such safeguards, qualified 
majority  would  function  as  well  in  Common  Foreign  and Security  Policy  as  it  has  in  other 
areas of EU policy.  

The example of Trade Policy 
Trade  policy  is  an  area  where  qualified  majority  applies.9  It  is  an  EU  policy  where  the 
Council  is  frequently  called  upon  to  take  decisions.  Yet,  despite  the  existence  of  diverging 
national  economic  interests,  up  to  the  present  day  the  Council  has  seldom  proceeded  to  a 
formal vote.  Member States always preferred to decide by consensus. What has prevailed is 
the common interest of the Union, which is more than the sum of Member States interests put 
together. And this has resulted in the EU being able to fulfil its potential on world trade.  

More  qualified  majority  voting  will  not  in  itself  solve  all  the  problems  facing  the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. Other challenges remain, such as fostering greater 
convergence among Member States' interests and the emergence of a common foreign policy 
culture. This is the core objective of the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy, 
welcomed  by  all  Member  States.  Over  time,  however,  building  EU  positions  through  the 
pragmatic  process  that  qualify  majority  voting  incentivises,  can  also  help  to  progressively 
foster a common sense of purpose and interests that all Member States are willing to pursue. 
There is also a challenge in ensuring that Member States effectively implement and defend 
the  positions  agreed  within  the  Council  in  their  bilateral  relations  with  third  countries. 
Member States' ambitions as regards the Common Foreign and Security Policy should also be 
reflected  in  the  budgetary  capacity  of  the  Union  in  the  next  Multiannual  Financial 
Framework.  

3.  Examples  where  the  unanimity  rule  weakens  the  EU's  Common  Foreign  and 

Security Policy 

Many  important  decisions  have  been  taken  in  recent  years  in  the  Common  Foreign  and 
Security  Policy.  In  addition,  the  Union  has  used  its  other  external  policy  instruments  to 
promote its values throughout the world, relying on qualified majority voting. 

Examples of EU acts promoting its values in its external relations governed by qualified 
majority voting 

  Trade  preferences  are  granted  to  third  countries  under  the  Generalised  System  of 
Preferences.  Countries  failing  to  respect  basic  human  rights  may  see  these 
preferences  suspended,  with  important  economic  consequences.  The  EU  has 
suspended or withdrawn trade preferences under this system from Myanmar, Belarus 
and Sri Lanka after serious violations of human rights. 

  The EU legal frameworks both on export controls for instruments used in torture 
and for the death penalty and on dual use goods are adopted by qualified majority. 

9   With very limited and conditional exceptions in Article 218 (8) TFEU, first sub-paragraph. 

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There have been examples where due to the unanimity practice, EU decisions on important 
Common Foreign and Security Policy issues, in particular on human rights, EU sanctions or 
key  regions  of  EU  interest,  were  blocked,  taken  too  slowly  or  diluted.  These  cases 
demonstrate the need to increase the Union’s efficiency in its foreign policy.  

Cases  where  unanimity  prevented  or  substantially  delayed  or  negatively  impacted  on 
the substance of Common Foreign and Security Policy decisions 

Human Rights 

One of the Union's key objectives is to promote human rights. In the past years, there have 
been  certain  cases,  where  a  Member  State  or  several  Member  States  have,  for  reasons 
unrelated  to  human  rights,  delayed,  blocked  or  diluted  the  Union’s  positions.  This  has 
happened  both  in  the  framework  of  the  Union's  bilateral  relations  with  third  countries  or 
within  international  organisations.  Each  of  these  cases  has  weakened  the  Union’s  ability  to 
promote  the  respect  of  human  rights  internationally,  impacted  negatively  on  its  credibility 
and has prevented it from delivering on its objectives.    

  The  United  Nations  Human  Rights  Council  in  Geneva  is  the  core  global  forum  for 
discussing  human  rights.  Its  program  is  structured  along  10  items.  The  most  salient 
country-specific human right situations are discussed under Item 4.  

In June 2017, the EU was unable for the first time to deliver an Item 4 Statement at 
the  United  Nations  Human  Rights  Council.  This  resulted  from  objections  from  a 
limited  number  of  Member  States,  which  did  not  question  the  substance  of  the 
assessments  made.  The  Member  States  opposed  express  references  to  two  third 
countries that all other Member States wanted to mention due to their Human Rights 
record. Failure to end this stalemate led to the EU voice being silenced.   

In  September  2017,  a  Member  State  substantially  delayed  the  adoption  of  the  EU 
Strategic Work plan for the UN Human Rights Council and the EU Item 4 Statement 
due to a specific issue with a third State. In October, the same Member State blocked 
the draft EU Statement to be delivered at the UN General Assembly Third Committee, 
ultimately forcing all others to accept what was generally deemed a disproportionate 
reference  to  a  specific  case  both  in  substance  and  in  length  when  compared  to  all 
other references in the Statement. 

In February 2018, a number of isolated objections from a limited number of Member 
States substantially delayed and ultimately forced all others to accept to water down 
the adoption of the yearly annual priorities on Human Rights to be pursued by the EU 
in United Nations fora.  

 

 

  Such difficulties have also been encountered in the EU's bilateral relations with third 
countries. Against the backdrop of a new law severely restricting the space for Non-
Governmental  Organisations  in  Egypt,  a  limited  number  of  Member  States  blocked 
and  ultimately  substantially  went  against  the  wish  of  all  other  Member  States  to 
include  clear  language  in  the  draft  EU  Partnership  Priorities  with  Egypt  as  regards 
respect  for  Human  Rights  and  Civil  Society.  As  a  result,  the  framework  of  the 
bilateral  relations  with  Egypt  could  not  be  renewed  in  time  and  was  absent  in  early 
2017. 

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Other EU foreign policy statements 

 

 

In July 2016, the EU was unable to swiftly support the award by an arbitral tribunal 
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the South China Sea 
due to the objection of a limited number of Member States, unrelated to the award in 
question.  Following several days of intense negotiations, a statement was ultimately 
agreed.  However,  while  the  EU  was  able  to  belatedly  call  for  the  respect  of 
international law, it could not call for the implementation of the award. This was 
particularly  problematic  in  view  of  the  EU-China  and  the  Asia  Europe  Meeting 
(ASEM) Summits that were taking place in parallel.  

In December 2017 and in May 2018, the requirement of unanimity on every aspect of 
comprehensive  drafts  prevented  the  EU  from  issuing  unified  statements  on 
developments regarding Jerusalem, despite continued agreement of Member States on 
the  long-standing  and  well-established  position  on  the  status  of  Jerusalem  in 
accordance with international law. 

In both cases, the Union was unable to react in a timely and robust manner to an international 
development, on which its position was clear and well-established. 

EU Sanctions  

 

 

In  February  2017,  a  Member  State  blocked  the  renewal  of  the  arms  embargo 
against  Belarus  until  all  other  Member  States  finally  agreed  to  exempt  a  certain 
category of small arms to avoid the embargo expiring altogether. One year later, the 
same Member State conditioned the renewal to the expansion of the exception to an 
additional category of arms, which again all other Member States ultimately accepted 
for the same reason. 

In  the  summer  of  2017,  a  Member  State  blocked  the  adoption  of  targeted  EU 
to  domestic  political 
restrictive  measures  against  Venezuela 
developments  that  the  EU  had  earlier  indicated  would,  if  materialised,  lead  to  their 
adoption.  The  restrictive  measures  in  question  were  ultimately  adopted  only  in 
November  2017  following  a  further  substantial  deterioration  of  the  situation  on  the 
ground. 

in  response 

Again, these examples demonstrate that unanimous voting in the Council hampers the ability 
of the European Union to react quickly and firmly to international developments. While the 
establishment  of  sanctions  regimes  under  the  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  is 
decided by unanimity, the EU counter-sanctions regime, also called the Blocking Statute10 is 
governed by qualified majority, enabling it to be updated in response to international events 
in an expeditious way. 

Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy missions 

  More recently, in 2018, the extension of a capacity building mission in the Sahel 

10  Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extra-
territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting 
therefrom. OJ L 309, 29.11.1996, p. 1–6. 

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was  blocked  by  one  Member  State  until  another  Member  State  dropped  its 
reservations on a separate mission to Iraq. Regrettably, this was not the first case of a 
Member State opposing or delaying moving forward as regards one specific Common 
Security  and  Defence  Policy  file  due  to  another  Member  State  doing  likewise  on 
another  one.  Such  situations  have  never  prevented  the  EU  from  ultimately  moving 
forward but have – in some cases – delayed the adoption of the necessary decisions. 

The  delays  in  decision-making  due  to  unanimity  go  beyond  the  decisions  to  launch  and 
establish Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy missions, but also cover aspects of 
practical  implementation,  such  as  the  endorsement  of  the  mandatory  Six-Monthly  Reports 
that each Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy mission has to submit regularly to 
the Council.  

These and other similar situations were not caused by unbridgeable differences in long-term 
interests, but because the ability to veto allowed Member States to block the decision-making 
process  for  reasons  not  always  related  to  the  specific  issue  at  stake  and  discouraged  them 
from seeking a constructive compromise.  

It is important to note that in most of the examples given above, due to the hard work of all 
involved parties, solutions were often found. However, these solutions came at a price. The 
protracted discussions due to the use of the 'veto' were often divisive and damaged the EU's 
influence and cohesiveness.  

4.  The existing decision-making framework in Common Foreign and Security Policy 

The Treaty on European Union sets the general rule that the Council adopts Common Foreign 
and Security Policy decisions by unanimity (Articles 24 (1) and 31(1) of the Treaty).11 It has 
remained the rule since the Treaty of Maastricht. At the same time,  the qualified majority 
rule  exists  and  is  already  applicable  in  certain  instances  in  the  Common  Foreign  and 
Security Policy. 

4.1. While  unanimity  is  the  general  rule  for  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy 

decision-making… 

The rule of unanimity in Common Foreign and Security Policy stands in contrast with other 
areas  of  EU  external  action  (such  as  the  Union's  policies  on  development  and  international 
cooperation  or  trade)  where  the  general  rule  is  that  decisions  are  taken  by  qualified 
majority.12  

Reflecting the difficulties to which this rule can lead, the Treaty on European Union provides 
for a rule that aims to facilitate the adoption of decisions by unanimity, giving a margin of 
flexibility that supports enhanced effectiveness in view of the adoption of decisions.  

The so-called ‘constructive abstention’ (Article 31(1) 2nd paragraph TEU) foresees the right 
for a Member State to abstain from a unanimous vote in the Common Foreign and Security 

11   The other areas where decisions are adopted by unanimity are taxation, social security or social protection, 

the accession of new countries to the EU and operational police cooperation. 

12   While  other  areas  of  EU  external  action  are  under  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the 
European  Union,  the  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  is  under  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  on 
European Union. 

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Policy and to qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration. The Member State will 
not be obliged to apply the decision. However, in a spirit of solidarity, the Member State is 
obliged to refrain from actions that would impede Union's efforts to implement the decision 
in question.  

So  far,  constructive  abstention  has  been  used  only  once,  by  a  Member  State  when  the  EU 
decided  in  200813  to  set  up  a  Civilian  Common  Security  and  Defence  Policy  mission  for 
Kosovo*. 

Reminder - voting procedures in the Council  

Simple majority (Article 238 TFEU): A simple majority is 15 out of 28 Member States.  

Qualified majority (Article 16 TEU and  Article 238(3) TFEU):  Qualified majority post-
2014 is reached if 55% of Member States vote in favour, which in practice means 16 out of 
28,  and  if  Member  States  in  favour  represent  at  least  65  %  of  the  total  EU  population. 
Abstention counts as a vote against.  

Unanimity  (Article  238  (4)  TFEU):  All  Member  States  have  to  agree  before  adopting  a 
decision. Abstention does not prevent the adoption of decisions taken by the Council acting 
unanimously.  

4.2. …qualified  majority  voting  is  foreseen  and  already  applicable  in  certain 

instances for Common Foreign and Security Policy…  

The  European  Council  declared  already  in  1990  that  qualified  majority  voting  should  be 
considered  for  the  implementation  of  previously  agreed  Common  Foreign  and  Security 
Policies.14  With  this  objective  in  mind,  Member  States  agreed,  through  successive  treaty 
amendments, to a gradual move towards decision-making by qualified majority. Article 31(2) 
TEU has great potential, which, so far, has remained untapped. 

Article 31(2) TEU foresees the Council deciding by qualified majority on Common 
Foreign and Security Policy matters in the following cases15: 

Cases in which Article 31(2) TEU enables the use of qualified majority voting 

 

‘a  Union  action  or  position  on  the  basis  of  a  decision  of  the  European  Council 

13   Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008, OJ L 42, 16.2.2008, p. 92–98. 

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 (1999) and the 

ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence. 

14   See Council Conclusions in the preparation of the Intergovernmental Conference preceding the conclusion 
of the Maastricht Treaty http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20554/1990_october_-_rome__eng_.pdf. 
15   Other articles where decisions are to be adopted by qualified majority under the Treaty on European Union: 
Article 41(3) TEU, Article 45(2) TEU, Article 46(2) TEU. Recently, on the basis of Article 46(2) TEU, a 
large  majority  of  Member  States  have  decided  to  move  European  cooperation  on  defence  forward  by 
adopting  a  decision  by  qualified  majority  voting  for  the  establishment  of  the  Permanent  Structured 
Cooperation in security and defence. The establishment of such type of cooperation will enhance the EU’s 
capacity  as  an  international  security  partner,  and  maximise  the  effectiveness  of  Member  States  defence 
spending. 

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relating to the Union’s strategic interests and objectives as referred to in Article 22 
(1) TEU’. 

This  provision  offers  the  European  Council  the  possibility  to  adopt  a  unanimous 
Decision, setting out the EU's strategic interests and objectives in one or more specific 
areas  of  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy.  Once  the  European  Council  sets  the 
strategic  objectives  and  principles  of  the  envisaged  action  or  position,  the  Council 
would  then  adopt  by  qualified  majority  all  decisions  implementing  the  European 
Council's strategic decisions. 

 

‘a Union action or position on a proposal which the High Representative of the Union 
for  Foreign  Affairs  and  Security  Policy  has  presented  following  a  specific  request 
from  the  European  Council,  made  on  its  own  initiative  or  that  of  the  High 
Representative’. 

This provision allows the European Council (either on its own initiative or further to a 
proposal by the High Representative) to unanimously request the High Representative 
to submit a proposal to the Council for a decision defining a Union action or position. 
In such cases, the Council would decide by qualified majority. The potential content 
of such request of the European Council is not defined in the Treaties and could thus 
encompass all areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy.  

Cases in which Article 31(2) TEU requires the use of qualified majority voting  

 

‘implementation of a decision defining a Union action or position’. 

This concerns the situation following the adoption by the Council of an initial action 
or  position  by  unanimity,  it  would  adopt  all  further  implementing  decisions  by 
qualified majority. 

 

 ‘appointment  of  a  special  representative  (upon  a  proposal  by 
Representative/Vice-President) pursuant to Article 33 TEU’. 

the  High 

The special representatives have a mandate in relation to particular Common Foreign 
and Security Policy issues. Qualified majority has worked well in practice leading to 
speedy decisions, without even having to resort to formal voting. As in other areas of 
qualified  majority  decision-making,  the  appointment  of  special  representatives  has 
always been decided by consensus. 

The  TEU  establishes  two  important  safeguards  that  frame  the  use  of  qualified  majority 
voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy matters. 

Safeguards for the use of qualified majority in Common Foreign and Security Policy 

  Article  31(2)  TEU  foresees  an  ‘emergency  break’  that  allows  a  Member  State  to 
object  to  a  decision  being  taken  by  qualified  majority  for  ‘vital  and  stated 
reasons  of  national  policy’,  in  which  case  a  vote  will  not  take  place.  Should 
consultations between the High Representative and the Member State in question not 
succeed, the Council of the EU may by qualified majority request to refer the matter 
to the European Council for a decision by unanimity. 

  Article 31(4) TEU excludes decisions having military or defence implications from 

9 

 
 
 
the  scope  of  Article  31(2)  TEU,  thus  ensuring  that  decision  with  such  implications 
will not be taken by qualified majority. 

4.3. …and  the  use  of  qualified  majority  in  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy 

could be extended further 

The  Lisbon  Treaty  introduced  the  possibility  to  broaden  further  the  use  of  qualified 
majority voting. Based on the so-called ‘passerelle clause’ set out in Article 31(3) TEU, 
the European Council may authorise by unanimity the Council to act by qualified majority in 
other Common Foreign and Security Policy cases than those foreseen in Article 31(2) TEU. 

Thus, Member States clearly foresaw that for the European Union to become a truly effective 
and efficient actor in foreign and security affairs, it may be appropriate for the Council to act 
by qualified majority beyond the specific cases contemplated in Article 31(2) TEU.  

Both  safeguards  described  in  Section  4.2  will  continue  to  apply  after  the  ‘passerelle’  of 
Article 31(3) TEU has been used.  

5.  Concrete  proposals  to  improve  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  decision-

making through qualified majority voting  

The  Commission  therefore  invites  Member  States  to  tap  into  the  potential  of  the  TEU  as 
regards  qualified  majority  on  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  matters.  It  does  not 
propose that the Council act by qualified  majority  in  all  areas of the Common Foreign and 
Security  Policy.  Instead,  the  focus  should  be  on  areas  where  qualified  majority  voting 
would clearly make a positive difference.  

The  Treaty  rules  on  ‘constructive  abstention’  under  Article  31(1)  TEU  and  on  the  use  of 
qualified majority voting under Article 31(2) TEU have great potential. These tools, had they 
been used, would have allowed some of the situations described in section 3 to be addressed. 
The  Commission  therefore  encourages  the  Member  States  in  the  Council  to  exploit  this 
potential in its full extent by applying the Treaties in letter and spirit.  

In this context, Council Conclusions are a useful tool to agree politically on EU positions on 
specific  foreign  policy issues. However, the  Council should refrain  from agreeing positions 
by  common  accord16  on  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  and  other  related  matters, 
through parallel or informal proceedings, when it could be possible to use the tools provided 
for in the Treaty. This would enable to use the potential of Article 31(1), Article  31(2) and 
Article 31(3) TEU. 

Furthermore, where a matter relates not to the Common Foreign and Security Policy but to 
the external aspects of a policy governed by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union,  the  corresponding  legal  bases  should  be  used  for  taking  decisions,  thereby  not 
applying  the  unanimity  rule.  The  potential  of  the  wide-spread  network  of  EU  Delegation 
across the world and at international organisation should be used to the full.17  

16   Common accord is a practice not foreseen by the Treaties of all the Member States explicitly agreeing 

without a possibility of abstention. 

17   Article 221 TFEU. 

10 

 
 
 
                                                            
Exploiting  the  potential  of  existing  qualified  majority  voting  provisions  under  Article 
31(2) TEU  

The  Council  has  already  used  qualified  majority  voting  when  amending  listings  under  EU 
restrictive measures (persons and entities subject to an asset freeze and travel ban), essentially 
in cases that reflected changes to international sanctions adopted by the United Nations and 
occasionally for the amendment of listings under autonomous EU sanctions regime where the 
amendment  itself  was  not  deemed  sensitive  by  the  Council  of  the  EU.18  The  Commission 
suggests  that,  the  Council  consistently  uses  qualified  majority  voting  for  amending  the 
listings of all EU sanctions regimes – including autonomous measures – in accordance with 
the procedures under Article 31(2) TEU (third indent).  

The European Council has the prerogative of identifying strategic interests and objectives of 
the  EU's  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy,  including  thematically  and  as  regards 
relations  with  a  specific  country  or  region.19  The  Commission  suggests  that  the  European 
Council  adopts  decisions  setting  out  thematic  or  geographical  strategies,  priorities  or 
guidelines, setting out the scope and conditions under which the Council can act by qualified 
majority voting to implement them, as per Article 31(2) TEU (first indent).  

While  exploiting  the  potential  of  existing  qualified  majority  provisions  under  31(2)  TEU 
would  represent  a  significant  improvement,  it  would  not  cater  for  many  of  the  identified 
shortcomings.  In  order  to  address  them,  the  Commission  suggests  also  exploring  more 
structural  solutions,  enhancing  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  decision-making 
under Article 31(3) of the TEU by using the ‘passerelle clause’.  

The Commission has identified three specific areas that would immediately benefit from the 
application of the ‘passerelle’ clause provided for in Article 31(3) TEU. 

5.1. EU positions on Human Rights in multilateral fora 

The  universality  and  indivisibility  of  human  rights  is  one  of  the  core  principles  that  have 
inspired  the  creation,  development  and  enlargement  of  the  EU  and  guide  its  external 
actions.20  Political  unity  on  human  rights  is  critical  for  maintaining  the  EU's  international 
credibility and soft power, within and beyond multilateral fora.  

When  EU  positions  on  Human  Rights  to  be  taken  in  international  fora  are  debated  in  the 
context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, they are currently agreed by common 
accord,  normally  in  the  form  of  Council  Conclusions.  Moving  to  qualified  majority  voting 
will enable more efficient and timely EU action. Situations as the one in June 2017, when 
the Union was unable to make a statement on Item 4 (Human rights situations requiring the 
attention of the Council) at the United Nations Human Rights Council  would no longer be 
possible.  

The  Commission  therefore  suggests  that  the  European  Council  unanimously  adopts  a 
decision  based  on  Article  31(3)  TEU  providing  that  EU  positions  on  human  rights  in 
international fora are adopted by qualified majority in the form of Council decisions.  

18   See Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2018/1086 of 30 July 2018 concerning restrictive measures in 

view of the situation in Libya, OJ L 194, 31.7.2018, p. 150–151. 

19   Articles 22(1), 22(2) and 26(1) TEU. 
20   As foreseen by Article 21 TEU. 

11 

 
 
                                                            
5.2. Adoption and amendment of EU sanction regimes 

Sanctions policy is one of the EU's strongest foreign and security policy tools, as it leverages 
the Union’s significant economic power to promote its external objectives. Unity of action is 
essential in order to preserve the level playing field in the functioning of the internal market 
and the efficiency of the common rules under Schengen.  

Over the last years, the use of restrictive measures by the EU has increased in frequency and 
intensity,  proving  the  EU's  willingness  to  react,  deter  and  influence  developments  through 
political  and  economic  pressure.  As  in  the  case  of  trade  policy  where  qualified  majority 
voting applies,  defining a level  of political  ambition  and identifying an appropriate balance 
between  the  economic  interests  of  the  Member  States  is  at  the  core  of  any  sanctions 
negotiation. The ability of the EU to act decisively in its geopolitical interest, more often than 
not as part of an international mobilisation against severe violations of international law, is in 
the common interest of all Member States.  

The  Commission  therefore  suggests  that  the  European  Council  unanimously  adopts  a 
decision  based  on  Article  31(3)  TEU  providing  that  decisions  establishing  a  sanctions 
regime are adopted by qualified majority voting by the Council.21  

5.3. Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy missions 

Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy missions play an important role in the EU’s 
global  engagement  for  peace  and  security.  To  date,  when  launching  and  deciding  on  the 
implementation of civilian missions, the Council acts by unanimity.22  

In a dynamic international environment, the EU must be able to deploy its toolbox quickly to 
respond  and  engage  in  crisis  or  post-crisis  environments  in  a  swift  and  visible  manner  in 
direct  support  of  national  authorities  and/or  local  communities.  As  the  EU  seeks  to  export 
stability to its neighbourhood, the number of civilian missions is likely to increase. Given the 
fluid  environments  in  which  such  missions  typically  operate  once  established,  they  require 
effective and agile management.  

The  Commission  therefore  suggests  that  the  European  Council  unanimously  adopts  a 
decision  based  on  Article  31(3)  of  the  TEU  providing  that  all  decisions  regarding 
Civilian  Common  Security  and  Defence  Policy  missions  are  adopted  by  qualified 
majority voting by the Council.  

To start with, all Rule of Law Capacity Building and Security Sector Reform missions should 
be  considered  in  particular,  as  they  usually  operate  in  tandem  with  other  EU  instruments 
governed by qualified majority voting in the Council.  

In  any  case,  the  European  Council  could  decide  that  once  established  by  unanimity,  all 
decisions  regarding  the  implementation  of  Civilian  Common  Security  and  Defence 
Policy missions will be taken by the Council by qualified majority voting.23 

21   Beyond the possibility mentioned earlier in the first box of Section 5. 
22   On the basis of Articles 42(4) TEU, Article 43(2) TEU and Article 28 TEU. 
23   Including decisions taken by delegated authority.  

12 

 
 
 
                                                            
6.  Conclusion 

The EU Common Foreign  and Security Policy has been strengthened considerably since its 
inception. Its achievements, for instance in the Western Balkans, to support Ukraine and in 
relation to Iran's nuclear programme are significant. The EU's partners in the world expect it 
to stand up for its values and for the international rules based multilateral order.  

There is a growing realisation that the challenging international landscape we face requires a 
"change  of  gear"  in  the  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy.  The  EU  must  become  a 
stronger  global  actor,  so  as  to  be  able  to  continue  to  shape  our  future,  uphold  our  shared 
sovereignty and exercise a positive international influence.  

The efficiency of decision-making  can  be improved in  some areas of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy. Doing so would help the European Union to stand on its own two feet. 

For  this  reason,  the  Commission  advocates  tapping  into  the  potential  of  the  Treaty  on 
European  Union  by  using  the  full  range  of  possibilities  within  the  Common  Foreign  and 
Security Policy, in particular by increasing the use of qualified majority voting.  

In  order  to  contribute  to  building  a  more  united,  stronger  and  more  democratic  Union  in  a 
2025 perspective, the European Commission invites Leaders at the meeting on 9 May 2019 in 
Sibiu to endorse the proposals contained in this Communication. The Council should act 
by qualified majority in the following three areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy:  

  As regards human rights issues in multilateral fora;   

  As regards sanctions policy;  

  As regards civilian Common Foreign and Security Policy missions.  

13