Solidarity in Europe.
Date: 2018-09-06
Institutions: European University Institute
Subjects: EU Member State, aid to disadvantaged groups, aid to refugees, emergency aid, international conflict, mutual assistance, natural disaster, public debt, public financing, sample survey, unemployment

Issue 2018/01
May 2018

Solidarity in Europe
Philipp Genschel, Joint Professor of European 
Public Policy, Department of Political and Social 
Sciences and the Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies 
Anton Hemerijck, Professor of Political Science 
and Sociology, Department of Political and 
Social Sciences, European University Institute 

Abstract

European  solidarity  is  in  high  demand  but  short  supply.  By  using 
survey evidence on attitudes towards European solidarity, conducted 
by YouGov in 11 member states (April 2018), the paper explores viable 
strategies for leveraging European solidarity. The survey reveals three 
important findings:

1.  Public support for European solidarity varies by issue (solidarity 
for what?), by instrument (solidarity how?) and by member state 
(solidarity by whom for whom?).

2.  Variance in support offers opportunities for leveraging European 

solidarity by linking different issues and instruments

3.  European  publics  are  often  uncertain  in  their  attitudes  towards 
European solidarity. This opens space for political leadership on 
European  solidarity  by  issue-  and  instrument-linkage.  Voters, 
who in large majority wish to stay in the EU, should be ready to 
listen.

Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Stefano Ronchi for research assistance, Richard 
Maher and Laura Seelkopf for comments, and Louisa Bayerlein, Daria 
Glukhova, Eleonora Milazza, Daniel Paierl, Delia Radu, and Martin 
Weinrich for the stimulating discussions during the graduate seminar 
Saving Europe, Spring of 2018. 
Author contacts: Philipp.Genschel@eui.eu; Anton.Hemerijck@eui.eu

BRIEFPOLICYI. The demand-supply gap 

European solidarity is in high demand but short supply. 
Following the global financial crisis of 2008, the demand-
supply gap has grown considerably, seriously fraying the 
social,  economic,  institutional  and  political  cohesion  of 
the  European  Union  (EU).  Just  consider  the  following 
examples: 

•  The  Eurozone  crisis  quickly  turned  into  a  blame 
game between creditor and debtor countries that left 
the burden of saving the Euro mostly to the (consti-
tutionally inadequate) ECB. 

• 

In some member states (youth) unemployment rose 
to levels not seen since the 1930s, while leaving other 
member  states  unaffected  and  seemingly  uncon-
cerned. 

•  The  refugee  crisis  led  to  finger-pointing  between 
frontline  states,  transit  states,  host  states,  and  unaf-
fected  bystanders  while  (not  so)  temporary  border 
controls sprang up throughout the Schengen area. 

•  Calls  for  more  unity  in  European  Security  and 
Defence  policy  go  hand  in  hand  with  manifest  dis-
agreement on defence spending and the pooling and 
sharing of defence equipment, technology, and pro-
duction. 

How  can  the  demand-supply  gap  be  closed?  There  are 
two approaches. One is to reduce demand for solidarity 
through disintegration. This is the Brexit approach. The 
partial or complete exit from the EU and its common pol-
icies reduces the need for risk and burden sharing with 
other EU states and societies. The solidarity gap is closed 
by dismantling policies and institutions that require sol-
idarity. 

The  other  approach  is  to  increase  supply  of  solidarity. 
This  is  the  EU  approach.  The  Treaties  are  replete  with 
exhortations of solidarity, social cohesion, mutual assis-
tance, etc.: “Europe can be built only through real prac-
tical achievements which will first of all create real soli-
darity” (Preamble of the ECSC Treaty). Yet, as the crises 
of the past decade demonstrate, the meaning of real sol-
idarity is essentially contested. The supply of solidarity is 
often blocked by disagreement about who owes what to 
whom, when and where. 

How can the zone of agreement be expanded? How can 
European  solidarity  be  leveraged  to  achieve  the  most 
effective risk and burden sharing between member states 

2 ■  STG | Policy Brief | Issue 2018/01 | May 2018

TAKE  
AWAY

▶ The signature crisis 
of the EU today is a 
solidarity crisis

▶ The task at hand is 
to expand the supply of 
solidarity

with the least risk of antagonising anybody? In this paper 
we use new survey evidence on attitudes towards Euro-
pean  solidarity  in  eleven  member  states  to  map  areas 
of  agreement  and  disagreement  on  European  solidarity 
across  policy  issues,  policy  instruments,  and  member 
states. This helps to identify politically viable issues and 
strategies  for  expanding  European  solidarity  and  to 
develop persuasive narratives for explaining them to the 
broader public.

II. What is European solidarity?
Solidarity refers to the normative expectation of mutual 
support  among  the  members  of  large  anonymous 
groups (the class, the party, the nation). Group members 
ought to share one another’s risks and burdens in order to 
secure the goals and cohesiveness of the group as a whole: 
one for all, all for one, with no one left behind. 

The advantage of solidarity is that it provides the members 
of a group with insurance against ‘bad risks’. This allows 
individual members to accept more risk, and enables the 
group as a whole to pursue more ambitious goals and to 
better defend its cohesiveness under conditions of adver-
sity. Yet, there are also disadvantages:

• 

• 

Solidarity  is  costly.  It  requires  that  group  members 
pass some of their own physical, financial, human or 
organisational resources to members of the group in 
order  to  improve  the  well-being,  or  reduce  the  suf-
fering  of  these  other  members.  Solidarity  involves 
sharing in a real, material sense. 

Solidarity  is  uneven.  Solidarity  involves  transfers 
from better-off to less well-off group members. The 
transfers  are  zero-sum,  at  least  in  the  short  term. 
They flow from good risks to bad risks, from givers 
to takers, from net-contributors to net-beneficiaries 
with no immediate compensation. 

of  enlargement  to  bad  risks  (i.e.  poor  and  vulnerable 
states  entering)  and  the  exiting  of  good  risks  (i.e.  rich, 
resilient member states leaving). 

Hierarchical  enforcement  is  weaker  partly  because  the 
EU lacks the institutional apparatus to enforce payment 
obligations  or  behavioural  restrictions  on  the  member 
states. Perhaps more importantly, given the pre-existence 
of  rather  popular  national  (welfare)  sharing  commu-
nities,  EU  level  enforcement  of  European  contributory 
obligations or behavioural constraints can easily be seen 
as foreign imposition. As a consequence, European soli-
darity has to rely more on spontaneous public support 
by  EU  citizens  and  member  governments,  and  can  rely 
less on institutional facilitation than national solidarity. 

TAKE  
AWAY

▶ European solidarity 
organisation is potentially 
beneficial because it 
encompasses a large and 
heterogeneous risk pool.

▶ European solidarity is highly 
contingent on spontaneous 
public support because it cannot 
draw on the institutional 
support structures that sustain 
solidarity at the national level: 
definite borders and nation-wide 
hierarchies.

III. Public support for European solidarity

How  strong  is  public  support  for  European  solidarity? 
In  April  2018,  YouGov  conducted  a  survey  in  11  EU 
member states1 to explore this question. The results show 
that the support for European solidarity varies with the 
issues  involved  (solidarity  for  what?),  the  instruments 
used (solidarity how?) and by member state (solidarity by 
whom and for whom?). 

• 

Solidarity  breeds  moral  hazard.  Solidarity  unbur-
dens actors from the need to self-protect against bad 
risk. This may induce careless or even openly exploit-
ative and fraudulent behaviour that triggers unneces-
sary bad risks, i.e. risks that could have been avoided 
through appropriate self-protection, and thus further 
increasing the costs of solidarity. 

There  are  solutions  to  each  of  these  problems  but  they 
are somewhat contradictory. To reduce the costs of sol-
idarity,  risk  should  be  put  on  many  shoulders.  The  risk 
pool  should  be  large.  To  avoid  the  same  actors  always 
ending  up  at  the  paying-end  of  the  solidarity  relation, 
the risk pool should be heterogeneous so as to increase 
the chances of turn-taking in solidary giving and taking. 
Yet, to reduce moral hazard, the risk pool should be kept 
small and homogeneous. People tend to trust people who 
are  like  them  because  they  have  more  scruples  before 
betraying each other. 

Given these inherent contradictions, real world systems 
of  solidarity  rely  extensively  on  institutional  support 
structures: borders and hierarchies. Borders restrict the 
territorial and social reach of solidarity to the members 
of a well-defined group. The rise of the national welfare 
state was linked to the emergence of social citizenship to 
clearly  demarcate  the  boundary  between  thick  national 
and  thin  cross-border  solidarity. The  rise  of  the  welfare 
state was also associated with the growth of nation-wide 
administrative structures for the provision of welfare sup-
port, the disciplining of welfare recipients and the collec-
tion  of  mandatory  welfare  contributions.  In  short,  bor-
ders and hierarchies facilitated the emergence of national 
welfare  states  and  national  communities  of  solidarity, 
both mutually reinforcing each other. 

EU solidarity can draw much less on borders and hierar-
chies than national welfare states. The borders of the EU 
are wide and incomplete. They include not only half a bil-
lion individuals but also 28 pre-existing national sharing 
communities at very different levels of economic devel-
opment. Also, EU borders are open to revision through 
enlargement or individual exit (e.g. Brexit). Wide borders 
increase the size and heterogeneity of the risk pool, thus 
raising  the  potential  benefits  of  solidarity.  At  the  same 
time, however, they also increase the moral hazard pre-
dicament.  Individual  moral  hazard  is  compounded  by 
national-level  moral  hazard,  as  member  state  govern-
ments  exploit  European  solidarity  in  order  to  facilitate 
national solidarity among their national citizens. In addi-
tion, the incompleteness of EU borders raises the spectre 

3 ■ Solidarity in Europe

Variation by issue 
Two survey items measure respondents’ support for Euro-
pean solidarity depending on the policy issues involved: 
Would respondents support or oppose financial solidarity 
with another member state suffering from unsustainable 
debt,  very  high  unemployment,  large  numbers  of  refu-
gees,  or  natural  disaster?  Would  they  support  military 
assistance to a member state under foreign attack? Figure 
1 summarizes the main results. 

Support for European solidarity by issue 

Figure 1

Natural disaster 

Military attack 

Refugees 

Unemployment 

Debt burden 

0% 

10% 

20% 

30% 

40% 

50% 

60% 

70% 

80% 

90% 

Don't know 

Oppose 

Support 

Survey question: Thinking about different sorts of problems and crises 
that could hit other members of the European Union, do you think EU 
countries should be willing to offer financial aid to another member 
state in the following circumstances?
Available answers: Other member states should give them financial 
help (support); Other member states should not give them financial 
help (oppose); Don’t know.
Survey question (military attack): If another European Union country 
came under military attack by a country outside the European Union, 
would you support or oppose your country coming to its military 
defence?
Available answers: Strongly support, tend to support (support); Strongly 
oppose, tend to oppose (oppose); Don’t know.

Figure 1 highlights two features. First, support for Euro-
pean  solidarity  varies  strongly  with  the  issue.  Support 
is  strongest  (and  opposition  lowest)  in  case  of  natural 
disaster.  Support  is  lowest  (and  opposition  highest)  in 
case of excessive debt. Support for European solidarity on 

4 ■  STG | Policy Brief | Issue 2018/01 | May 2018

issues  of  high  unemployment,  large  refugee  inflows,  or 
foreign attack ranges between these two extremes. 

Second, low support for European solidarity is associated 
with  ambiguity  and  uncertainty  about  the  desirability 
of  solidarity  as  indicated  by  the  share  of  ‘don’t  know’ 
responses.  While  less  than  10  percent  of  respondents 
‘don’t  know’  whether  they  should  support  (or  oppose) 
European  solidarity  in  case  of  a  natural  disaster,  close 
to 30 percent don’t know whether to support (or not) an 
over-indebted member state. 

Closer inspection of the data reveals low cross-country 
variation  in  issue  rankings.  Natural  disaster  triggers 
the highest support for solidarity in all 11 member states 
included  in  the  YouGov  survey.  Unsustainable  debt  is 
associated  with  the  lowest  support  for  solidarity  in  all 
states  but  Greece.  Also,  the  ranking  of  the  other  issues 
(unemployment, refugees, attack) largely follows the pat-
tern of figure 1.2 

Natural disaster is an easy issue for European solidarity 
because such disasters have exogenous causes (i.e. moral 
hazard  is  not  an  issue)  and  they  are  one-off  (no  long-
term  transfers  and  obligations  involved).  Unsustainable 
debt, by contrast, is a difficult solidarity issue because it 
has endogenous causes (i.e. moral hazard by the over-in-
debted  state  is  an  issue)  and  may  involve  long-term 
transfers  and  obligations  (because  national  debt  is  par-
tially driven by systemic interdependencies created by the 
Single Market or Monetary Union). 

Foreign attack and large refugee inflows resemble natural 
disasters  in  that  their  causes  are  mostly  exogenous  and 
the required assistance is of the one-off emergency assis-
tance  type.  Hence,  support  for  solidarity  is  fairly  solid. 
High unemployment, by contrast, resembles the problem 
of unsustainable debt: endogenous causes and a need for 
long-term  or  permanent  risk  and  burden  sharing.  Sup-
port for European solidarity is correspondingly low.

In conclusion, the good news is that solidarity instincts 
are  similar  across  member  states.  This  should  facilitate 
intergovernmental  agreement  on  joint  risk  and  burden 
sharing.  The  bad  news  is  that  spontaneous  solidarity  is 
highest for risk types that matter little in the EU, i.e. for 
natural disasters (usually too small to require European 
solidarity)  and  military  attacks  (core  competence  of 
NATO, not EU). Solidarity is lowest for risk types that are 
central to the EU’s Single Market and EMU – debt and 
unemployment. Yet, there is a glimmer of hope: the high 

35% 

30% 

25% 

20% 

15% 

10% 

5% 

0% 

-40% -

share of ‘don’t know’ responses associated with the issues 
of debt and unemployment points large groups of Euro-
pean  citizens  who  are  undecided,  and  potentially  open 
for political cueing. This opens a space for boosting sup-
port for European solidarity through political leadership 
in public discourse. National leaders in particular would 
have to speak up. Finally, also on a positive note, support 
for (financial!) solidarity on the refugee issue is surpris-
ingly high even in countries like Poland and Lithuania.

TAKE  
AWAY

▶ Public support for European 
solidarity is high, and 
uncertainty is low, if issues 
are exogenous and one-off 
(natural disaster, military 
attack).

▶ Support for solidarity is 
low, and uncertainty is high, 
if issues are endogenous and 
potentially permanent (debt 
crises, high unemployment).

▶ Little cross-national variation

Variation by instrument
What  do  respondents  think  are  the  best  instrument  for 
solidary risk and burden sharing in the EU? The YouGov 
survey offers three choices: a common  emergency fund 
set up ex ante by all member states to help any of them 
encountering  bad  risk  in  the  future;  ex  ante  investment 
aid  for  weak  member  states  to  strengthen  their  econo-
mies and reduce their vulnerability to future bad risk; ex 
post  emergency  assistance  mobilised  on  a  case-by-case 
basis after a member state was hit by bad risk. 
As  figure  2  shows,  the  ex  ante  emergency  fund  enjoys 
most support among survey respondents, followed by ex 
post case-by-case assistance, and ex ante investment aid. 
Closer inspection of the data reveals cross-national con-
vergence on the ex ante emergency fund as the preferred 
risk  sharing  instrument:  respondents  in  10  of  the  11 
member states in the YouGov survey rank the emergency 
fund over the two alternative risk sharing instruments. 

There  is  more  cross-country  variance  in  the  second  and 
third  preference.  Respondents  in  Denmark,  Finland, 

5 ■ Solidarity in Europe

Figure 2

Support for European solidarity by instrument 

Don’t know 

None of these 

Investment aid 

Case-by-case assistance 

Emergency fund 

0% 

5% 

10%  15%  20%  25%  30%  35%  40% 

Survey question: Thinking more specifically, which of the following do 
you think would be the best way for better off European Union coun-
tries to give financial aid to other member states?

Available answers: EU countries should pay into an emergency fund, 
which could be accessed in the future if a member country faces a crisis 
of some sort (Emergency fund); EU countries should not pay any extra 
money now, but contribute money on a case-by-case basis if a member 
country faces a crisis of some sort (Case-by-case assistance); EU coun-
tries should pay money into reducing potential risk now, with better off 
countries giving money to worse off countries to make their economies 
stronger (Investment aid); None of these; Don’t know.

France, Germany, Great Britain, and Sweden offer more 
support  for  solidarity  by  ex  post  case-by-case  assistance 
than  by  ex  ante  investment  aid.  One  assumes  this  is  in 
order to keep a closer check on where their money goes. 
Respondents  in  Greece,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Poland  and 
Spain, by contrast, prefer ex ante investment aid to ex post 
case-by-case assistance. Perhaps this is because they expect 
their home countries to be net-beneficiaries of investment 
aid. Also the Eurozone crisis may have undermined their 
trust in the reliability and generosity of ex post case-by-case 
assistance. We come back to these issues below. 

The  broad  support  of  emergency  fund  schemes  across 
member  states  is  good  news  for  projects  like  the  Euro-
pean Monetary Fund or the European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme that can plausibly be presented as ex ante emer-
gency  funds  of  this  sort.  Yet,  it  warns  against  attempts 
to  sell  a  potential  Eurozone  budget  as  an  ‘investment 
budget’. It may be more convincing to present it as a gen-
eral ‘rainy day’ fund providing re-insurance against bad 
risks across a broad range of policies – economic, social, 
security, defence – but leaves investment to the national 
level to increase ‘ownership’.

Note  also  that  large  majorities  of  respondents  in  all 
member states prefer ex ante instruments for European 
solidarity (i.e. an emergency fund or investment aid) to 

exclusive  reliance  on  ex  post  case-by-case  assistance.  In 
other  words,  there  is  support  for  precautionary  instru-
ments of solidarity. 

Figure 3a

Support for solidarity with country having high 
debt 

TAKE  
AWAY

▶ There is broad support for 
an ex ante emergency fund 
(‘rainy day fund’)

▶ Support for ex ante investment 
aid and case-by-case assistance 
splits along country lines

▶ Respondents in all member 
states prefer precautionary 
instruments (i.e. ex ante 
emergency fund or ex ante 
investment aid) to ex post 
improvisation through case-by-
case assistance

Variation by member state
Despite broad similarities in the rank ordering of issues 
and instruments, there are significant cross-national dif-
ferences  in  the  level  of  support  for  European  solidarity. 
As the YouGov survey shows, support for European soli-
darity depends on whether respondents expect their own 
country to end up at the giving or the receiving end of the 
solidarity relation. People favour solidarity if they think 
that other member states will pay for it; they oppose sol-
idarity when they think their own state will have to pay 
up. Importantly, however, there is variation across issues 
and instruments. 

Figures  3a  and  3b  show  a  strong  correlation  between 
respondents’  support  for  solidarity  on  debt  (issue)  and 
for  cross-border  investment  aid  (instrument),  on  one 
hand,  and  respondents’  perception  of  their  home  state’s 
net financial-contribution to European solidarity, on the 
other  hand.3 There  is  a  stark  divide  between  one  group 
of  self-perceived  net-contributors  (Denmark,  Finland, 
Germany,  Sweden,  UK)  and  another  group  of  self-per-
ceived net-recipients (Greece, Lithuania, Poland, Spain), 
with  France  and  Italy  somewhere  in  between.  Respon-
dents in net-contributor countries offer little support for 
European solidarity; respondents in net-recipient coun-
tries are all in favour. 

6 ■  STG | Policy Brief | Issue 2018/01 | May 2018

Greece 

Spain 

Italy 

Lithuania 

Poland 

80% 

70% 

60% 

50% 

40% 

30% 

20% 

10% 

0% 

France 

Germany 

UK 

Denmark 

Finland 

Sweden 

-40% -

20% 0

% 

20% 

40% 

60% 

80% 

Own state perceived as net contributor (+)/ recipient (-) 

 X-axes in figures 3a and 3b report the difference between the share of 
people in each countries that perceived their own state as net contribu-
tor and as a recipient of EU aids, taken from the following survey 
question: ‘Imagine there was an EU fund to help member states facing a 
crisis of some sort. Over the long term, do you think COUNTRY would 
end up being…
A country that puts more into such a fund than it gets out of it (net 
contributor); A country that gets more out of such a fund than it puts 
into it (net recipient); A country that gets about the same amount out 
of such a fund as it puts into it (not used); Not sure (not used).

Figure 3b

Support for solidarity through ex ante investment 
aid 

Greece 

Spain 

Lithuania 

Poland 

35% 

30% 

25% 

20% 

15% 

10% 

5% 

0% 

Italy 

Germany 

France 

Finland 

UK 

Sweden 

Denmark 

-40% -

20% 0

% 

20% 

40% 

60% 

80% 

Own state perceived as net contributor (+)/ recipient (-) 

Figures 4a and 4b replicate the set-up of figures 3a and 
3b to investigate support for financial solidarity for high 
refugee  numbers  (issue),  and  support  for  a  joint  emer-
gency fund (instrument) respectively. While the level of 
solidarity still reflects the perceived net-financial position 
of the respondents’ home state in European solidarity, the 
correlation is much more muted (figure 4b – emergency 
fund)  or  virtually  non-existent  (figure  4a  -  refugees). 
Wealth heterogeneities among the member states recede 

to  the  background.  Other  heterogeneities  come  to  the 
fore, some of them quite surprising. 

Support for European solidarity is often low among Polish 
and Lithuanian respondents even though they perceive 
their home countries as likely net-beneficiaries. Yet, their 

Figure 4a

Support for solidarity with country having large 
numbers of refugees 

Greece 

Italy 

Spain 

Sweden 

Germany 

Denmark 

Lithuania 

Finland 

UK 

Poland 

France 

80% 

70% 

60% 

50% 

40% 

30% 

20% 

10% 

0% 

-40% -

20% 0

% 

20% 

40% 

60% 

80% 

Own state perceived as net contributor (+)/ recipient (-) 

 X-axes in figures 4a and 4b report the difference between the share of 
people in each countries that perceived their own state as net contribu-
tor and as a recipient of EU aids, taken from the following survey 
question: ‘Imagine there was an EU fund to help member states facing a 
crisis of some sort. Over the long term, do you think COUNTRY would 
end up being…
A country that puts more into such a fund than it gets out of it (net 
contributor); A country that gets more out of such a fund than it puts 
into it (net recipient); A country that gets about the same amount out 
of such a fund as it puts into it (not used); Not sure (not used).

Figure 4b

Support for solidarity through ex ante emergency 
fund 

Italy 

Germany 

UK 

Sweden 

Finland 

Denmark 

France 

50% 

40% 

Poland 

Spain 

Lithuania 

Greece 

30% 

20% 

10% 

0% 

-30% - 20% - 10% 0 %  10%  20% 3 0%  40%  50%  60%  70% 
Own state perceived as net contributor (+)/ recipient (-) 

7 ■ Solidarity in Europe

solidarity on the refugee issue is actually higher than in 
France. France exhibits the lowest level of solidarity of all 
11 member states in figures 4a and 4b, and is also consis-
tently below the regression line in figures 3a and 3b. The 
Nordic  countries  also  exhibit  consistently  low  support 
for  European  solidarity.  German  respondents’  by  con-
trast  tend  to  exhibit  higher  levels  of  solidarity  than  the 
perceived  net-contributor  position  of  Germany  would 
suggest. German support for a joint EU emergency fund 
is  higher  than  in  all  other  states,  but  Italy.  Support  for 
European solidarity in the Southern periphery is gener-
ally  high.  Yet,  there  are  exceptions.  For  instance,  Greek 
support for an EU emergency fund is relatively low (on a 
par with the UK). 

TAKE  
AWAY

▶ Cross-national differences 
in wealth erode support for 
European solidarity in self-
perceived net-contributor 
states.

▶ The resistance of self-
perceived net-contributors to 
European solidarity varies 
strongly across issues and 
instruments. 

IV. Four lessons 
European solidarity is difficult
The scope for European solidarity is constrained by dis-
tributive  conflict  between  (self-perceived)  net-contrib-
utors in the North (especially the Nordic countries and 
Germany) and net-recipients in the South and, to a lesser 
extent, in the East. 

European solidarity exists 
There  are  issues  and  instruments  of  solidarity  that 
attract  spontaneous  support  across  the  distributive 
divide: European solidarity on issues of natural disaster, 
military  attack,  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  refugees  enjoys 
broad  support  in  Northern,  Southern,  and  Eastern 
member  states;  a  joint  emergency  fund  is  the  preferred 
instrument  of  solidarity  in  (almost)  all  member  states. 
In  fact,  national  publics  may  sometimes  be  more  sup-
portive  of  European  solidarity  than  their  governments. 
One wonders, for instance, whether parts of the German 

public are not closer to the Euro-vision of French Pres-
ident Macron than to the fiscal orthodoxy of their own 
ministry  of  finance.  As  the  YouGov  survey  shows,  the 
‘rainy day fund’ logic underlying proposals for an EMF, 
for  a  joint  deposit  insurance  scheme  or,  arguably,  for  a 
joint Eurozone budget receives very strong support from 
German respondents.

European solidarity can be leveraged
The  scope  of  European  solidarity  can  be  expanded 
by  linking  controversial  issues  and  instruments.  For 
instance,  a  mix  of  ex  ante  investment  aid  and  ex  post 
assistance may garner more spontaneous public support 
across member states than each of these instruments on 
its own. For this purpose, ex post assistance would have to 
be made conditional on the proper use of ex ante invest-
ment aid. The investment aid would incentivise recipient 
countries; the conditionality would reassure donor coun-
tries. Why not, for instance, allow struggling economies 
to (temporarily) breach the 3% deficit rule on condition 
they use the additional fiscal space to fast-forward capac-
itating investments? In a similar vein, a link between the 
debt and the refugee issue may increase support for soli-
darity on both. On the one hand, large refugee numbers 
induce fiscal expansion in surplus countries like Germany 
and  Sweden,  thus  mitigating  adjustment  pressures  on 
deficit countries. On the other hand, large refugee num-
bers  in  debtor  countries  may  facilitate  support  for  debt 
relief in creditor countries. Obviously, such instrument- 
or  issue-linkages  would  have  to  be  explained  in  public 
because their logics are not necessarily self-evident. 

European solidarity needs explaining 
European publics often don’t know whether to support 
or  oppose  European  solidarity.  Their  uncertainty  rises 
with the complexity of European arrangements that mix 
and  match  risk  and  burden  sharing  across  issues  and 
instruments. This is a problem but also an opportunity. 
It opens space for increasing support for European soli-
darity through political leadership. This leadership would 
have to come primarily from the national level (with the 
usual brokering by EU actors in the background). Policy 
makers  in  (self-perceived)  net-contributor  states  would 
have  to  explain  why  European  solidarity  may  be  in  the 
long-run  national  interest  even  if  it  involves  short-run 
costs.  Policy  makers  in  net-recipient  member  states 
would have to explain why some measure of external dis-
cipline might be required to reassure donors. The polit-
ical risks are obvious. However, voters are not stupid and 
they may actually listen to good reasons. Large major-
ities across all member states want to stay in the EU. If 
this requires more European solidarity, it may be useful 
to tell them. 

Endnotes:   
1 The survey covers 11 EU member states. Total sample size was 1692 (Great 
Britain), 1005 (France), 1017 (Germany), 1030 (Denmark), 1019 (Sweden), 981 
(Finland), 956 (Poland), 738 (Lithuania), 746 (Greece), 1065 (Italy), and 1035 
(Spain)  adult  respondents.  Fieldwork  was  undertaken  between  18th  -  30th 
April 2018.  The survey was carried out online. All figures are based on data 
taken from the YouGov survey. 
2  There  are  five  exceptions.  Respondents  in  Poland  and  Lithuania  rank  sol-
idarity  in  case  of  unemployment  over  solidarity  in  case  of  refugee  inflows. 
Greek, Italian, and Swedish respondents support solidarity on the refugee issue 
more strongly than solidarity in case of a foreign attack. 
3 Replacing unsustainable debt by high unemployment in figure 3a yields an 
even stronger correlation. Replacing investment support by case-by-case emer-
gency assistance yields the reverse image of figure 3b: respondents in net-con-
tributor countries are in favor, respondents in net-recipient countries are more 
skeptical. 

School of Transnational Governance
European University Institute 
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Email: stg@eui.eu
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@STGEUI @EuropeanUni

8 ■  STG | Policy Brief | Issue 2018/01 | May 2018

The School of Transnational GovernanceThe European University Institute’s School of Transnational Governance (STG) brings the worlds of academia and policy-making together in an effort to navigate a context, both inside and outside Europe, where the chal-lenges of governance extend beyond the state.The STG policy brief series, published by the School of Transnational Governance at the European University Institute, provides topical perspectives on thematic issues of relevance to transnational governance. The contri-butions result from the proceedings of events hosted or sponsored by the STG. The briefs are policy-oriented and diverse in terms of the disciplines represented. They are authored by STG staff or guest authors invited to contribute on particular issues.doi:10.2870/70589ISBN:978-92-9084-580-5 ISSN:2599-5928 © European University Institute, 2018QM-AY-18-001-EN-NCo-funded by the Erasmus+ Programmeof the European UnionThe European Commission supports the EUI through the European Union budget. This publication reflects the views only of the author(s), and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.