COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Follow-up on recommendations to the Commission report on the protection of the EU’s financial interests – fight against fraud, 2016 Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 29th Annual Report on the Protection of the European Union's financial interests - Fight against Fraud - 2017
Date: 2018-09-03
Institutions: European Anti-Fraud Office, European Commission
Subjects: EU programme, activity report, common strategy, crime, fight against crime, financial control, fraud, fraud against the EU

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 3.9.2018  SWD(2018) 383 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Follow-up on recommendations to the Commission report on the protection of the  EU’s financial interests – fight against fraud, 2016 Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 29th Annual Report on the Protection of the European Union's financial interests - Fight against Fraud - 2017 {COM(2018) 553 final} - {SWD(2018) 381 final} - {SWD(2018) 382 final} - {SWD(2018) 384 final} - {SWD(2018) 385 final} - {SWD(2018) 386 final}  
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

COMMISSION  STAFF  WORKING  DOCUMENT  FOLLOW-UP  ON 
RECOMMENDATIONS  TO  THE  COMMISSION  REPORT  ON  THE 
PROTECTION  OF  THE  EU’S  FINANCIAL  INTERESTS  –  FIGHT  AGAINST 
2016 

Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... 2 

1.

FOLLOW UP BY RECOMMENDATION .................................................................. 7 

1.1.

Revenue ........................................................................................................................ 7 

1.1.1.

  Management and control strategy with regard to customs valuation .......................... 7 

1.2.

Expenditure ................................................................................................................. 14 

1.2.1.

  Public Procurement .................................................................................................... 14 

1.2.2.

  Data Quality ............................................................................................................... 20 

1.2.3.

  Use of Risk Analysis Findings .................................................................................... 22 

2.

2.1.

2.2.

REPLIES OF MEMBER STATES ............................................................................ 28 

Revenue ...................................................................................................................... 28 

Expenditure ................................................................................................................. 71 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

In  the  2016  Article  325  TFEU  Report  on  the  protection  of  the  European  Union's  financial 
interests,  the  Commission  made  a  number  of  recommendations  to  the  Member  States,  one 
recommendation  for  the  revenue  side  of  the  budget  and  three  recommendations  for  the 
expenditure side as follows: 

A. REVENUE 

Recommendation 1:  

Member  States  were  invited  to  review  their  management  and  control  strategy  with 
regard to customs valuation. With a view to protecting the EU’s financial interests, they 
are requested to review their national procedures and control systems, in particular by: 

 

including in their risk management system EU-wide risk profiles based on ‘clean 
average  prices’  and  systematically  challenging  potentially  undervalued  goods 
detected by means of risk profiles; 

  not  releasing  the  goods  unless  the  declarants  of  potentially  undervalued  goods 
remove  the  authorities’  reasonable  doubts  about  the  accuracy  of  the  declared 
value  or  provide  a  guarantee  fully  covering  the  customs  debt  which  may  be 
incurred; 

  applying the customs valuation methodology provided by customs law. 

B. EXPENDITURE 

Recommendation 2:  

The Commission called on the Member States to:  

 

fully transpose Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU and put their 
implementation high on the political agenda;  

  enforce the new  Directives with a focus on transparency and integrity in public 
procurement,  prevention  and  detection  of  fraud  and  corruption  and  better 
monitoring of public procurement systems; 

  make  use  of  the  possibilities  offered  by  simpler  rules  and  fully  realise  the 
potential of e-procurement, which will become mandatory by October 2018. 

Recommendation 3: 

  When  reporting  irregularities  (fraudulent  and  non-fraudulent),  all  competent 
authorities are asked to provide information about the location and, for cohesion 
and fisheries policies, the priority area of the measures/projects affected.  

  When updating irregularities previously reported Member States are also asked 

to provide this information if they have not done so already. 

2 

 
 
 
 
Recommendation 4: 

  All Member States are invited to take into account the findings of this report in 
their  fraud  risk  assessments  for  the  programming  period  2014-2020  and  to  pay 
particular  attention  to  the  priorities  highlighted  and  to  interventions  which  are 
similar in scope and nature.  

  In  view  of  the  low  detection  results  for  ETC  programmes  and  considering  the 
increasing  threat  of  transnational  fraud,  Member  States  are  asked  to  increase 
their attention and cooperation.  

  All Member States are asked to review their fraud risk assessments in relation to 
market support measures taking into account the information highlighted in this 
report. 

As stated in the previous PIF Report 2016, there is increasing awareness of the threats posed 
by fraudsters and the difficulties for single national authorities to cope with the cross-border 
dimension of the various schemes put in place. This translated into a growing willingness to 
share information and best practices and, within adequate legal frameworks, relevant data. It 
was stated in the 2016 PIF Report that the EU and its Member States are now better equipped 
than a few years ago and there is an increasing commitment to do even more.  

The follow-up to the 2016 PIF Report recommendations, through the analysis of the Member 
States' replies and the illustration of the measures taken at national level to combat fraud as 
regards the four recommendations, aims to serve as a reference document to show the efforts 
made by the EU Member States in 2017. 

As a general remark, it can be seen that the efforts made by most Member States in 2017 were 
evident  through  their  detailed  follow-up  to  the  recommendations.  The  detailed  replies 
provided  by  the  majority  of  the  EU  Member  States  confirmed  the  growing  willingness  to 
share information  and  best  practices.  The  replies  also  illustrated  the  increasing  commitment 
by  Member  States  to  enhance  their  role  in  the  fight  against  fraud  and  the  protection  of  the 
European  Union's  financial  interests.  Measures  provided  by  the  Member  States,  as  well  as 
successful examples shared, are listed further in this document.   

As regards the first recommendation on customs undervaluation, the Commission has stated 
in the 2016 PIF Report that the Traditional Own Recourses inspections carried out in 2016 on 
control  strategy  in  customs  valuation  showed  that  flaws  in  the  management  and  control  of 
undervalued imports of textiles and footwear may have significant negative consequences for 
the EU budget. Appropriate risk profiles need to be in place, undervalued imports need to be 
systematically challenged and customs values corrected in line with EU regulations.  

Therefore,  with  the  first  recommendation,  EU  Member  States  were  invited  to  review  their 
management  and  control  strategy  with  regard  to  customs  valuation.  The  replies  received  by 

3 

 
 
 
Member  States  showed  that  the  majority  of  the  Member  States1  have  either  fully  or  partly 
reviewed  their  national  procedures  and  control  systems  with  regard  to  customs  valuation. 
Most  Member  States  reported  that  they  also  include  EU  wide  risk  profiles  based  on  'clean 
average prices'2 and all Member States3 reported that they systematically challenge potentially 
undervalued goods detected by means of risk profiles. Nevertheless, only 11 Member States4 
reported  that  they  implement  new  rules  regarding  the  non-release  of  goods  in  relation  to 
potentially undervalued goods in addition to providing a guarantee fully covering the customs 
debt  which  may  be  incurred  when  there  are  reasonable  doubts  about  the  accuracy  of  the 
declared  valued.  Lastly,  as  concerns  the  application  of  the  customs  valuation  methodology 
provided  by  customs  law,  most  Member  States5  reported  that  in  case  reasonable  doubts  are 
not  dispelled,  and  the  transaction  value  method  is  not  applicable,  they  make  use  of  this 
methodology, also known as the sequential approach.  

The second recommendation on public procurement was inserted in the 2016 PIF Report as a 
follow-up  to  the  fact  that  OLAF’s  investigations  have  shown  that  this  area  remains  an 
attractive marketplace for fraudsters, with many procurement fraud cases being transnational, 
as the new fraud scenarios often involve a contracting authority from one Member State and 
bidders  from  several  other  Member  States  who  subcontract  their  works  to  companies  in 
different countries.6 Quantitatively, over the last five years, 20% of all reported irregularities 
have been related to breaches of public procurement rules, accounting for 30% of all reported 
irregular financial amounts.  The public procurement directives should have been transposed 
by 18 April 2016, to introduce a modernised and streamlined legal framework.  

The  Member  States'  replies  to  the  second  recommendation  showed  that  24  Member  States 
reported  having  fully  transposed  the  public  procurement  directives,  introducing  at  the  same 
time  the  appropriate  legal  framework  to  facilitate  the  transposition  of  the  directives  into 
domestic law.7 Three Member States reported that the directives are currently under the last 
parliamentary  procedures  before  their  entry  into  force  in  the  near  future,  most  likely  within 
2018.8 Moreover, a very positive outcome through the follow-up to this recommendation was 

1  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  Greece,  France,  Croatia, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

2 Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, the Netherlands, 

Austria, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

3  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Croatia, 
Italy,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Poland,  Portugal, 
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

4  Denmark,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  Croatia,  Lithuania,  Malta,  Austria,  Romania,  Slovenia  and  the  United  

Kingdom. 

5  Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Slovenia,  Slovakia,  Finland,    Sweden  and  the 
United Kingdom. 

6  See 2016 PIF Report, page 32. 
7  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Greece,    France,  Croatia,  Italy,  
Cyprus,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Slovakia,  Finland, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

8  Spain, Luxembourg, Slovenia. 

4 

 
                                                 
that most Member States enforced the directives with an increased emphasis on transparency 
and  integrity,  prevention  and  detection  of  fraud  and  corruption9  and  better  monitoring  of 
public  procurement  systems10,  reporting  on  measures  taken  at  national  level  to  establish  a 
legal as well as administrative framework towards this end. Lastly, an additional constructive 
and encouraging follow-up was that the majority of the Member States reported making use 
of the possibilities offered by simpler rules and made steps to fully realise the potential of e-
procurement, which will become mandatory by October 2018.11 

The  third  recommendation  concerned  data  quality.  The  analysis  illustrated  in  the  previous, 
2016 PIF Report had been further deepened and refined to enable better targeting of specific 
areas  at  risk.  This  was  possible  because  of  the  quality  of  the  reported  data,  which  is 
progressively  improving.  Therefore,  Member  States  were  invited  to  provide  information 
concerning about, on the one hand, the location and, for cohesion and fisheries policies, the 
priority  area  of  the  measures/projects  affected,  and  on  the  other  hand,  whether  they  update 
irregularities  previously  reported.  The  follow-up  to  this  recommendation  revealed  that  most 
Member States took measures to include information about the location and priority area of 
the  projects  affected  in  the  respective  cohesion  and  fisheries  sectors.12  This  illustrates  the 
increasing attention given by Member States in providing data quality, which will expectantly 
lead to achieving an even better quality of analysis in the future.  

Nonetheless, less than half of the Member States reported that they update the irregularities 
previously reported13 and some Member States are doing this exercise in part.14 This means 
that  there  is  still  room  left  for  improvement  in  this  respect.  The  efforts  made  by  Member 
States to enhance data quality are well received by the Commission, with a remaining room 
for  enhancement  in  this  area.  The  endorsement  by  several  Member  States  of  training  and 
seminars  dedicated  to  the  efficient  use  of  IT  systems  and  tools  such  as  IMS,  used  by 
competent authorities for reporting of irregularities and fraud, was a very positive remark. 

Finally,  with  the  fourth  recommendation the  Commission  invited Member  States to  provide 
information on whether the findings of the 2016 PIF Report were taken into account in their 
fraud risk assessments for the programming period 2014-2020. It was positively reported that 
a  significant  amount  of  Member  States  took  into  account  the  findings  of  the  2016  PIF 

9    Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Croatia, 
Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania,  
Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland,  Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

10  Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, 
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Finland,  Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

11  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  Croatia,  Italy,  Cyprus,  Latvia, 
Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Slovenia,  Slovakia, 
Finland and Sweden. 

12    Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  France,  Croatia,  Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania, 

Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

   13    Bulgaria,  Germany,  Greece,  France  (Agricultural  Funds),  Italy,  Cyprus,  Latvia  (Ministry  of  Agriculture), 

Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden. 

14   Denmark, Ireland, France (ESI Funds), Latvia (Ministry of Finance), Lithuania, Hungary and Slovenia. 

5 

 
                                                 
Report15  and  in  particular  that  Member  States,  through  their  follow-up  showed  that 
instruments and tools offered by OLAF and the Commission are taken into account in the risk 
management of some Member States. In addition, as concerns the request for Member States 
to  increase  their  attention  and  cooperation  as  regards  European  Territorial  Cooperation 
Programmes,  the  fact  that  more  than  half  of  the  Member  States  reported  that  they  took 
measures16  to  tackle  the  low  detection  of  results  for  ETC  programmes  and  enhancing  the 
cooperation17 with other Member States in this respect is a positive outcome.  

Conclusively, the follow-up on the 2016 PIF Report recommendations overall illustrated that 
important and constructive efforts have been made or are ongoing by most Member States as 
concerns the areas of customs undervaluation, public procurement, data quality and use of risk 
analysis  findings.  All  recommendations  were  adequately  addressed  by  most  Member  States 
and were given appropriate attention by the majority of the Member States as it can be seen 
through their replies. Nevertheless, there are still opportunities for further enhancements such 
as implementing new rules as regards customs undervaluation and the non-release of goods in 
case  of  doubts  and  a  more  wide  use  of  the  EU-wide  risk  profiles  based  on  'clean  average 
prices' could be envisaged. In the field of e-procurement, even more could be done so as to 
achieve fully digital public procurement procedures across all Member States. Also, although 
training and seminars on using IT systems for reporting is performed and initiated by some of 
the  Member  States  to  enhance  data  quality  and  update  of  irregularities  already  reported, 
further  efforts  could  also  be  followed  by  other  Member  States.  Lastly,  cooperation  among 
Member States as concerns the increased threat of transnational fraud and ETC Programmes 
can be further enhanced.  

15   Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia (Ministry of Agriculture),  

Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom.. 

16  Bulgaria,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Spain,  Croatia,  Italy,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg, 

Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden. 

17  Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, 

Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden. 

6 

 
 
 
                                                 
1. 

FOLLOW UP BY RECOMMENDATION 

This  section looks at how and at what extent Member States  have implemented each of the 
recommendations.  It  aims  to  give  both  a  holistic  view  on  the  degree  each  recommendation 
was addressed by Member States and to highlight the best practices.  

This  section  is  divided  into  two  sub-sections  separating  the  recommendations  related  to  the 
revenue  and  expenditure  sides  of  the  budget.  Each  recommendation  is  analysed  firstly  by 
providing  accumulative  results  illustrating  the  number  of  Member  States  having  addressed 
each  of  the  recommendation  questions,  secondly  by  depicting  some  examples  reported  by 
Member  States  that  were  to  be  highlighted  and  thirdly,  by  listing  the  best  practices.  Each 
paragraph following the recommendations consists of titles which aimed to cover all aspects 
of  the  information  the  Commission  envisaged  to  receive  vis-à-vis  the  recommendations. 
These titles were used as guiding questions for Member States to assist them to provide their 
replies to the follow-up of the 2016 PIF Report recommendations.18 

For  the  reader's  specific  reference,  the  Member  States'  detailed  and  unprocessed  replies  as 
well as the guiding questions provided by the Commission are listed further in this document, 
under Section 2: "Replies of Member States".  

1.1. 

REVENUE 

1.1.1.  MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL STRATEGY WITH REGARD TO CUSTOMS VALUATION 

With  the  first  recommendation,  the  Commission  invited  Member  States  to  review  their 
management and control strategy as regards customs valuation. With a view to protecting the 
EU's financial interests, they were requested to review their national procedures and control 
systems. The Commission invited Member States to review them in particular by: 

(a) including in their risk management system EU-wide risk profiles bases on 'clean average 
prices'  and  systematically  challenging  potentially  undervalued  goods  detected  by  means  of 
risk profiles; 

(b) not releasing the goods unless the declarants of potentially undervalued goods remove the 
authorities' reasonable doubts about the accuracy of the declared value or provide a guarantee 
fully covering the customs debt which may be incurred and; 

(c) by applying the customs valuation methodology provided by customs law. 

18  Member States were given the choice either to make use of the guiding questions, or to present their reply to 

the various questions in the form of a single text.  

7 

 
 
 
                                                 
Review of national procedures and control systems 

Overall, 10 Member States19 reported that they have fully and 17 Member states20 have partly 
reviewed their national procedures and control systems. One Member State reported that no 
new  actions  were  taken  regarding  national  procedures  and  control  systems.21  18  Member 
States  provided  explanations  or  details  for  their  respective  actions  about  reviewing  their 
national procedures and control systems with regard to customs valuation.22  

France  reported  that  the  inspections  policy  for  combating  valuation  fraud  is  still  evolving, 
putting more emphasis on the importance of ex-ante checks, especially after its participation 
to operation SNAKE.  

In addition, with a view to addressing understatement of the customs value of goods imported 
into  EU  customs  territory  (mainly  textiles  and  footwear),  Poland  reported  having  adopted 
national  Guidelines  consisting  in  a  set  of  recommendations  for  measures  to  be  taken  at 
individual stages of the customs procedure, starting with the customs declaration.  

Romania  reported  that  it  has  initiated  a  procedure  in  2017  for  the  re-evaluation  of  the 
guidelines  issued  by  the  General  Customs  Directorate  with  regard  to  the  application  of  the 
procedure for delaying the determination of the customs value. 

The  countries  reported  having  fully  reviewed  their  national  procedures  and  control  systems 
provided information about the measures taken to do so in a very constructive manner. More 
specifically, Lithuania reported that customs control measures and procedures applied by the 
Lithuanian Customs are in line with the 2016 Commission's recommendations and Guidelines 
for  preventing  and  detecting  irregularities  (under-invoicing)  in  imports  of  textiles  and 
footwear. Austria reported that customs data review on valuation of high risk goods from high 
risk countries is one of the national customs priorities and done on a periodical basis for the 
early detection and prevention of fraud. Slovenia reported that a guidance was issued on the 
verification of the declared customs value of goods, in addition, created a working group and 
organised seminars and workshops for officials dealing with undervaluation cases.  

Italy  reported  that  it  has  re-examined  the  methodology  used  for  combating  under-invoicing, 
known  as  'credibility'  and  provided  information  on  the  use  of  the  so-called  Theseus  data 
mining tool to identify under-invoiced goods. 

19    Czech  Republic,  Croatia,  Lithuania,  Spain,  Hungary,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Portugal,  Romania  and 

Slovenia. 

20  Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, 

Poland, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

21   Cyprus. 
22   Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, France, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Austria, 

 Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

8 

 
 
 
                                                 
Inclusion of EU wide or national risk profiles based on ‘clean average prices’ (the lowest 
acceptable value) in the risk management system 

18 Member States23 reported that they have included EU wide or national risk profiles based 
on  'clean  average  prices'  in  their  risk  management  systems,  whereas  eight  Member  States24 
reported  not  including  them,  using  other  methods  to  calculate  baseline  prices.  Overall,  22 
Member States25 provided details justifying their reply.  

Poland  reported  that  risk  profiles  based  on  "clean  average  prices"  should  be  identified  with 
their "fair prices" available on the AFIS portal as part of the Automated Monitoring Tool.  

Czech  Republic  reported  that  the  more  strengthen  one  (CAP  vs.  national  database)  is  used. 
Estonia reported using the EU calculated 'clean average price' on a case-by-case basis.  

Hungary reported that the Hungarian risk management system contains risk profiles based on 
‘clean average prices’. The basis of the minimum acceptable value, that is, the threshold price 
is the fair market price constructed based on fused data on the import turnover of the EU28 as 
indicated in the AREP Automated Monitoring Tool module operated by OLAF and the Joint 
Research  Centre.  Slovenia  reported  that  the  lowest  acceptable  value  is  calculated  based  on 
OLAF  lowest  acceptable  value,  (different  for  tariff  codes  and  origin  of  goods).  In  the  case, 
that the declared value of goods is lower than the lowest acceptable value, the custom officer 
should make the complete control. Slovakia reported that the threshold value used in Visegrad 
4 countries is from the AREP AMT tool of AFIS system. 

Member  States  which  do  not  include  risk  profiles  based  on  'clean  average  prices'  in  their 
management  systems  explained  that  these  either  could  not  be  activated  in  their  territory,  or 
they have limited information on these values and thus use the national values, or there is no 
such profile in their established electronic systems. 

Implementation of risk profiles based on other values and how these values are calculated 
and updated  

15 Member States26 reported that they implement risk profiles based on other values and some 
of these Member States27 also explained how these profiles are calculated and updated. Ten 

23    Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Estonia,  Spain,  Croatia,  Italy,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Hungary,  the 

Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

24   Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, France, Luxembourg, Malta and Finland. 
25  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Italy,  Latvia, 
Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  Austria,  Romania,  Slovenia,  Slovakia,  Finland,  Sweden  and  the 
United Kingdom. 

26    Belgium,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Hungary,  Portugal, 

Slovenia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

27    Belgium,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Hungary,  Slovenia,  

Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

9 

 
                                                 
Member States28 reported that they do not implement risk profiles based on other values and 
six of them29 provided an explanation for their reply.  

Bulgaria  reported  that  the  customs  value  of  imported  goods  is  determined  in  line  with  EU 
legislation.  

France  similarly  reported  that  the  legal  basis  for  valuation  is  set  out  in  the  UCC  and 
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447.  

Poland reported that guidelines in place contain a comprehensive package of information on 
the interpretation of existing customs legislation on customs value. 

Systematic control of potentially undervalued goods detected by means of risk profiles 

All Member States30 reported that they systematically control potentially undervalued goods 
detected  by  means  of  risk  profiles  and  20  Member  States31  provided  details  to  explain  the 
actions  undertaken  including  the  type  of  check  done.  This  illustrates  that  there  is  a 
comprehensive  and  well  integrated  systematic  control  of  potentially  undervalued  goods 
detected  by  means  of  risk  profiles  as  this  was  reported  by  the  big  majority  of  the  Member 
States. 

Implementing  new  rules  regarding  the  non-release  of  goods  in  relation  to  potentially 
undervalued  goods  in  addition  to  providing  a  guarantee  fully  covering  the  customs  debt 
which  may  be  incurred,  when  there  are  reasonable  doubts  about  the  accuracy  of  the 
declared value 

12  Member  States32  reported  that  they  implement  new  rules  regarding  the  non-release  of 
goods in relation to potentially undervalued goods in addition to providing a guarantee fully 
covering the customs debt which may be incurred when there are reasonable doubts about the 
accuracy  of  the  declared  valued.  Out  of  these  Member  States,  eight  provided  explanation 
about  the  actions  taken  in  these  regard.33  Twelve  Member  States  replied  that  they  have  not 
implemented  new  rules  pursuant  to  this  matter.34    Four  of  these  Member  States  provided 

28   Germany, Croatia, Greece, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Romania and Slovakia. 
29   Greece, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Romania and Slovakia. 
30    Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Croatia, 
Italy,  Cyprus, Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Poland,  Portugal, 
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

31  Belgium,  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  Italy,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Lithuania, 

Hungary, Malta, Austria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

32    Denmark,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  Croatia,  Poland,  Lithuania,  Malta,  Austria,  Romania,  Slovenia  and  the 

United Kingdom. 

33   Ireland, Spain, Lithuania, Malta, Austria, Romania, Slovenia and the United Kingdom. 
34  Belgium,  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Estonia,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,    Hungary,  the  Netherlands, 

Slovakia, Finland, Sweden. 

10 

 
                                                 
explanation and details for not doing so. 35 Two Member States have not provided a reply to 
address the requested information.36 

Two Member States reported new rules (Guidelines) related to this matter, which can serve as 
best  practice.  Poland  reported  that  the  established  guidelines  designed  to  address 
understatement  of  the  customs  value  of  goods  imported  into  EU  territory  state  that  in 
situations where the declared customs value is less than the reference price, the goods may be 
released only in justified and fully documented cases.  Austria reported that it has adopted a 
special  guideline  with  rules  to  support  the  customs  officers  at  the  moment  of  clearance  in 
view  to  implementing  this  concept,  which  covers  the  processes  of  requesting  additional 
documents, collection of guarantee (customs duties and VAT) and procedure for establishing 
the customs value based on secondary methods. 

Some  Member  States  did  not  apply  new  rules  in  relation  to  this  matter  mainly  because 
Member States, as they reported, already have rules in place to cover this.37  

Systematically asking for additional information in case reasonable doubts arise providing 
the operator with the opportunity to respond  

25 Member States38 reported that they are systematically asking for additional information in 
case  reasonable  doubts  arise  providing  the  operator  with  the  opportunity  to  respond.  19  of 
these Member States39 also provided details to explain the actions undertaken. Two Member 
States40 have not provided information related to this matter.  

It can be seen that the concept of systematically asking for additional information in case of 
doubts is well implemented by the Member States.  

Systematically asking for a guarantee in case reasonable doubts are not dispelled and the 
operator wants the release of the goods  

23  Member  States41  replied  that  they  systematically  ask  for  a  guarantee  in  case  reasonable 
doubts  are  not  dispelled  and  the  operator  wants  the  release  of  the  goods.  Of  these  Member 
States, 18 Member States42 provided details to explain the actions undertaken. One Member 

35   Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg and Hungary. 
36   Italy and Portugal. 
37  Czech Republic, Estonia Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary. 
38  Bulgaria,  Belgium,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  Croatia,  Italy, 
Cyprus,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Romania,  Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

39  Belgium,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  Italy,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Lithuania, 

Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Romania, Slovenia, Finland and the United Kingdom. 

40  Portugal and Luxembourg. 
41  Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Lithuania,  Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and 
Finland. 

42  Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 

Hungary, Malta, Austria, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland. 

11 

 
                                                 
State43 replied that they do not systematically ask for a guarantee. Two Member States44 have 
not provided information related to this matter. 

In  case  reasonable  doubts  are  not  dispelled  and  thus  the  transaction  value  method  is  not 
applicable, did  Member  States  apply  an  alternative  value following the  customs  valuation 
methodology provided by customs law (sequential approach)?  

23  Member  States45  reported  that  in  case  reasonable  doubts  are  not  dispelled,  and  the 
transaction value method is not applicable, they make use of the sequential approach and 13 
Member  States46  also  provided  details  to  justify  their  reply.  Two  Member  States47  do  not 
apply the sequential approach.  

Successful practices ready to be shared with other Member States 

Member States  were asked to provide any successful practice they would like to share with 
other Member States. In this regard, Seven Member States48 provided examples of successful 
practices.  

  Belgium reported FPS Finances as best practice to be shared and given the example of 

RIFs exchanged via CRMS.  

  Czech Republic reported about the undervaluation working group within the Visegrad 

4 group.  

  Germany  gave  the  example  of  PCA  “Discount”  (application  of  German  Guidelines), 
JCO “Snake”, their active participation in Customs 2020 – Project Group on Financial 
Risk  Management  /  Financial  Risk  Criteria,  and  sharing  of  their  national  average 
prices with the Netherlands and Poland.  

 

Ireland reported the following as best practices:      
-  Profiles  put  in  place  following  post  clearance  checks  or  an  audit  of  a  trader 

targeting specific importers in relation to undervaluation of goods.  

-  RIFs are evaluated and transposed into risk profiles where it is considered a risk is 

likely to occur.  

-  Feedback is required following clearance of the goods as to the effectiveness of the 

profile.  

43   Sweden. 
44   Portugal and the United Kingdom. 
45  Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Slovenia,  Slovakia,  Finland,  Sweden  and  the 
United Kingdom. 

46    Belgium,  Czech  Republic,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Hungary,  Austria,  Slovenia, 

Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

47   Malta and Romania. 
48   Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia and Portugal. 

12 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
-  The  Irish  National  risk  analysis  tool  –  Customs  Risk  Intervention  Selection 
Programme  (CRISP).  This  system  provides  the  Regional  case  workers  with 
Reports  identifying  the  riskiest  Imports  and  SAD’s  based  on  a  number  of  Rule 
categories including valuation. Reports are analysed to facilitate case selection for 
Audit and post clearance interventions. 

 

Italy shared their credibility system as a best practice. The Risk Analysis office of the 
Central Anti-Fraud and Audit Directorate has set a threshold value in the computerised 
selection system (CCC) to check shipments whose declared value is below the suspect 
threshold value, when they are presented both  at customs and at locations for which 
the  trader  has  authorisation.  This  system  is  effective  and  leads  to  fewer  but  more 
selective  checks.  Also,  Italy  reported  as  best  practice  to  tackle  under-invoicing 
consists  in  linking  analyses  that  relate  to  imports  and  intra-EU  purchases,  and 
identifying  high-risk  economic  operators  in  other  EU  countries  so  that  they  can  be 
reported  to  the  customs  and  tax  authorities  there.  This  also  makes  it  possible  to 
improve cooperation and exchanges of information between Member States implicated 
in  the  same  fraudulent  schemes.  The  strengthening  of  cooperation  between  national 
Financial  Intelligence  Units  (FIUs)  is  another  key  activity,  since  FIUs  are  able  to 
analyse the impact of under-invoicing on banking and money transfer systems. 

  Latvia shared the practice in the SRS National Customs Board: after control measures 
have  been  applied  and  security  has  been  collected,  the  customs  value  is  determined 
during post-clearance in accordance with the provisions of Article 74 of the Code. 

  Portugal  shared  the  practice  that  in  cases  of  high  risk,  especially  related  to  customs 
procedure  42,  Portuguese  Customs  participates,  together  with  Portuguese  Tax  on 
EUROFISC  project.  This  allows  them  to  better  monitor  the  customs  operations  on 
both  sides  of  the  customs  procedures,  i.e.  where  Portugal  is  the  country  of  customs 
clearance or is the country of final destination. That permits early identification of any 
suspicious  cases  and  implementation,  in  those  cases,  of  closer  monitoring  of  all 
operations. 

  The  United  Kingdom  has  introduced  tailored  education  for  traders  and  agents  on 
combating  the  suspected  undervaluation  fraud  and  associated  criminal  finance  risks, 
both on a one-to-one and campaign basis. Trader education has proved very successful 
as  part  of  the  end  to  end  approach  HMRC49  has  adopted  to  tackling  MTIC50  and 
alcohol  fraud  –  creating  a  hostile  environment  for  fraudsters  and  helping  genuine 
businesses to secure their supply chains from infiltration. For genuine businesses, the 
objective is to raise awareness of risks and how their business can avoid being caught 
up in illicit supply chains so that they can take appropriate steps to avoid such risks. 

49 HM Revenue and Customs 
50 MISSING TRADER INTRA COMMUNITY  

13 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
For the non-compliant businesses and those presenting a high risk to tax and duty, the 
objective is to: 

o  change  the  perception  of  the  risk/reward  balance  for  involvement  in  import 
fraud by raising awareness of HMRC activity to counter import fraud and the 
sanctions for those who are caught; 

o  encourage those who are non-compliant to change their behaviour and put their 

tax affairs in order;  

o  make it more difficult for organised crime groups to operate by ensuring that 
genuine businesses will not deal with them and that potential risk takers see the 
risks involved as too great; and, 

o  make  it  easier  to  challenge  future  non-compliance  in  tribunals  and  courts  by 
giving formal knowledge of risks and issues to non-compliant businesses and 
individuals.  

1.2. 

EXPENDITURE 

1.2.1.  PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 

With the second recommendation, the Commission called on the Member States to:  

(a)  fully  transpose  Directives  2014/23/EU,  2014/24/EU  and  2014/25/EU  and  put  their 
implementation high on the political agenda;  

(b)  enforce  the  new  Directives  with  a  focus  on  transparency  and  integrity  in  public 
procurement, prevention and detection of fraud and corruption and better monitoring of public 
procurement systems;  

(c) make use of the possibilities offered by simpler rules and fully realise the potential of e-
procurement, which will become mandatory by October 2018. 

Transposition of Directive 2014/23/EU, Directive 2014/24/EU and Directive 2014/25/EU 

24  Member  States51  reported  that  they  have  fully  transposed  Directives  2014/23/EU, 
2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU, providing details concerning the respective enacted legislation 
fully transposing the Directives into national law.  

Slovenia reported that Directive 2014/23/EU is under Parliamentary procedure, a final reading 
is expected in April 2018 and completion of the transposition of the Directive is planned in 
the first part of 2018.  

Luxembourg reported  that the three public procurement Directives  have been  transposed  by 
law but have not yet entered into force. Entry into force is expected in April-May 2018.  

51    Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Greece,    France,  Croatia,  Italy, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Finland, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

14 

 
 
                                                 
Spain  reported  that  Directive  2014/25/EU  is  currently  passing  through  the  Congress  of 
Deputies and the deadline for tabling amendments has now expired.  

One Member State52 has not provided information regarding this issue. 

Measures taken in order to enhance transparency and integrity in public procurement  

Almost  all  Member  States  (27)  reported  that  they  have  enforced  the  new  Directives  with  a 
focus  on  transparency  and  integrity  in  public  procurement,  and  provided  detailed  measures 
which illustrated that enhancing transparency and integrity in this area has been put high on 
their political agenda.53  Some of the  most common  measures reported by Member States  to 
enhance  transparency  in  public  procurement  included  the  use  of  e-procurement,  the 
publication  of  documentation  and  notices  related  to  public  procurement  procedures,  the 
creation  of  publicly  available  databases  and  the  use  of  electronic  tools  related  to  these 
procedures.  

The notion of conflict of interests including its declaration and legislation adopted at national 
level to deal with conflict of interests situations was a very positive outcome stemming from 
the Member State's replies to this recommendation.   

For example, Bulgaria reported that with the goal of cooperation in preventing and combating 
conflicts of interest in public procurement, an Agreement was concluded in 2017 between the 
Public  Procurement  Agency,  the  Commission  for  the  Prevention  and  Ascertainment  of 
Conflicts of Interest, the Court of Auditors, the Public Financial Inspection Agency, the Audit 
of EU Funds Executive Agency and the AFCOS Directorate.   

Hungary reported that conflict of interest rules were extended: organisations owned by public 
law  dignitaries,  the  heads  of  certain  national  bodies  and  their  family  members  living  with 
them  in  the  same  household  may  not  participate  in  public  procurement  procedures  as 
tenderers. This is exceeding the rigour of the relevant EU Directives. 

Also, the fact that most Member States have established publicly available databases that are 
free  and  accessible  by  everyone  and  include  relevant  information  regarding  public 
procurement procedures significantly enhances transparency in the public procurement.   

Czech Republic reported going even further than the provisions enshrined in the Directives, 
and established an obligatory evidence of ownership structure of suppliers.  

Another  striking  example  is  the  one  by  Germany,  reporting  that  in  July  2017  the  law 
introducing a so-called competition register entered into force that will start operating at the 
latest in 2020. The aim of this register is to provide contracting authorities with the necessary 
information to decide whether a company which takes part in a procurement proceeding has 
to  be excluded  from the procedure because  the management level of the company has  been 

52   Austria. 
53    Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Croatia,  
Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

15 

 
                                                 
convicted for economic crimes. The law sets up a register that contains information on final 
criminal sentences and fines for crimes such as money laundering, fraud against the financial 
interests of the EU, corruption offences or tax evasion.  

In addition, Spain reported that they established profiling of the contracting party as well as 
abolishment of the negotiation procedure based on volume. As a result, this procedure should 
be used less frequently, thereby improving transparency and competition.  

Croatia  reported that  from  1.  January  2018,  the contracting authorities  and  entities  have  the 
obligation to publish procurement plans, contracts registers and public consultation on tender 
documents prior to the formal commencement of the public procurement procedure. 

In  conclusion,  Member  States  implemented  this  recommendation  in  a  very  satisfactory 
manner and measures reported illustrate the efforts made by the Member States to establish a 
framework which maintains an adequate protection of transparency in the public procurement 
sector.  This  is  a  significant  outcome  due  to  the  fact  that  as  the  2016  PIF  Report  indicated, 
Public Procurement remains a popular area for fraudsters in the European Union.  

Measures  taken  in  order  to  enhance  prevention  and  detection  of  fraud  and  corruption  in 
public procurement  

27  Member  States54  reported  that  they  have  enforced  the  new  Directives  with  a  focus  on 
prevention and detection of fraud and corruption in public procurement and provided detailed 
measures taken to this end. One Member State55 has not provided information regarding this 
issue. 

Establishment  of  relevant  Guidelines,  National  Action  Plans  and  National  Registers  and 
Agencies to support public procurement procedures, training of staff focussed on compliance 
with public procurement rules and clarification of the definition of conflict of interests were 
some of the measures reported by Member States. Some of the measures reported in detail can 
be depicted as follows: 

Italy,  Cyprus,  Luxembourg  and  Romania,  reported  that  training  was  organised  to  enhance 
prevention and detection of fraud and corruption in Public procurement. 

The  Netherlands  replied  that  they  make  use  of  COCOLAF's  recent  "comprehensive 
guidelines"  followed  by  managing  authorities  to  prevent  fraud  and  corruption  in  public 
procurement  and  detect  irregularities  in  a  timely  manner  and  also  the  deployment  of  the 
ARACHNE tool. 

Hungary  replied  that  with  regard  to  public  procurements  funded  by  the  EU,  managing 
authorities  apply  the  ARACHNE  data  mining  tool  for  risk  assessment  operated  by  the 
European  Commission  when  auditing  the  use  of  the  European  Structural  and  Investment 

54    Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Croatia, 
Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

55   Austria. 

16 

 
                                                 
Funds,  which  facilitates  their  work  by  analysing  and  signalling  risks  emerging  during  the 
carrying-out of operational programmes. 

Poland  reported  strengthening  public  procurement  supervision  by  the  competent  institutions 
in the system of implementation and control of EU funds. In the context of the fight against 
fraud,  sector-specific  rules  have  been  introduced  which  constitute  a  real  strengthening  of 
public procurement monitoring with a view to eliminating fraud and corruption. 

Romania  reported,  among  others,  using  information  systems  such  as  ARACHNE  and 
RECOM  in  order  to  increase  prevention  and  detection  of  fraud  and  corruption  in  public 
procurement. 

For  the  fight  against  corruption,  Slovenia  reported  that  following  the  national  Integrity  and 
Prevention of Corruption Act, persons responsible for public procurement have an obligation 
to declare their assets to the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption. 

Slovakia reported that in 2017 the active involvement of the Public Procurement Office in the 
working group of Member States' experts, directed and coordinated by the Fraud Prevention, 
Reporting and Analysis Unit in the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) which has created a 
Handbook “Fraud in Public Procurement, A collection of Red Flags and Best Practices.” 

Conclusively,  the  majority  of  Member  States  have  taken  adequate  measures  to  enhance 
prevention  and  detection  of  fraud  and  corruption  in  public  procurement,  which  shows  their 
renewed commitment to play an important role in the fight against fraud and corruption in this 
sector. 

Measures taken in order to ensure the better monitoring of the public procurement system  

26 Member States56 reported that they have enforced the new Directives with a focus on better 
monitoring  of  public  procurement  systems  and  provided  information  on  measures  taken  to 
enhance  monitoring  of  these  systems.  One  Member  State57  has  not  provided  information 
regarding this issue. 

Some  of  the  most  striking  measures  reported  by  some  of  the  Member  States  included:  the 
creation  of  registration  systems;  sending  a  monitoring  report  to  the  European  Commission 
pursuant to Article 83 of Directive 2014/24/EU; performance of random checks and audits on 
open/published public procurement procedures; the creation of special monitoring electronic 
tools  and  systems;  training  and  development  of  checklists  and  portals  as  well  as  the 
establishment of public bureaus dedicated to monitoring the public procurement systems.  

56  Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, 
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

57  Austria. 

17 

 
 
 
                                                 
Steps taken in order to fully realise the potential of e-procurement  

24 Member States58 replied that they have taken steps to make use of the possibilities offered 
by  simpler  rules  and  to  fully  realise  the  potential  of  e-procurement,  which  will  become 
mandatory  by October 2018. Three Member States59 reported that  they have  not  taken  such 
steps. One Member State60 has not provided information regarding this question. 

Most  Member  States  provided  detailed  information  on  the  steps  taken  to  fully  realise  the 
potential of e-procurement, supporting that this will also contribute to enhancing transparency 
and fraud prevention. Some of the most significant steps taken by Member States and reported 
as a follow-up to this recommendation consisted of the use of e-tendering; making or working 
towards  making  the  submission  of  tenders  via  electronic  means  obligatory;  drafting  of 
relevant legislation (e.g. for e-invoicing) and developing National Action Plans to establish e-
procurement rules.  

A striking best practice example is given by Estonia that reported a remarkable percentage of 
96% revealing that all procurement in Estonia is already e-procurement.  

Successful practices ready to be shared with other Member States 

13 Member States61 reported successful practices that they would be ready to share with other 
Member  States  vis-à-vis  this  recommendation.  Best  practices  examples  included:  national 
electronic  tools  to  administer  procurement  procedures;  national  registers  and  electronic 
platforms;  creation  of  checklists  and  online  databases;  national  guidelines  and  strategies; 
Framework Agreements; development of national specialised units/agencies to monitor public 
procurement procedures. 

More specifically: 

  Czech  Republic  shared  the  Czech  National  Electronic  Tool  for  administering 

procurement procedures.  

  Germany introduced the establishment of a federal register for unreliable companies as 
a best practice to be shared. The register aims at providing contracting authorities with 
the  necessary  information  to  decide  whether  a  company  which  takes  part  in 
procurement  proceedings  has  to  be  excluded  from  the  procedure  because  the 
management level of the company has been convicted for economic crimes.  

  Estonia  shared  the  creation  of  checklists  to  check  public  procurements  co-financed 

from the structural funds.  

58  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  Croatia,  Italy,  Cyprus,  Latvia, 
Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Slovenia,  Slovakia, 
Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

59   Denmark, Greece and France. 
60   Austria. 

         61    Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Estonia,  France,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Malta,  Romania,  Slovenia, 

Slovakia, Sweden. 

18 

 
 
 
                                                 
  France  reported  about  the  national  ‘public  procurement  good  practice  guide’  that 

contains specific recommendations on the fight against corruption.  

  Croatia  shared  the  Electronic  public  procurement  on  a  single  platform  as  a  best 
practice,    which  enables  the  production  of  an  annual  statistical  report  and  the 
availability  of  data  that  are  essential  for  monitoring  the  system  and  taking  action  to 
correct irregularities.  

  Cyprus  shared  Framework  Agreements  of  various  commonly  used  items  as  a  best 

practice. 

  Latvia  shared  the  use  by  contracting  authorities  of  on-line  databases  where  they  can 

obtain electronic reference on conditions for exclusion of candidate or tenderer. 

  Lithuania reported that the majority of the public data that is accumulated in the CPP 
IS  is  made  open  to  any  natural  or  legal  person  by  converting  it  into  user-friendly 
format at www.freedata/lt.vpt. This allows multiple-angle analysis of the procurement 
data, creating a basis for information-based actions and policies and making detection 
on irregularities easier. 

  Malta  introduced  its  Monitoring  and  Compliance  Unit,  the  introduction  of  a  career 
stream and professionalization of personnel in the field of procurement and the setting 
up  of  the  Ministerial  Procurement  Units  to  endorse  a  career  focussed  on  public 
procurement as best practices. 

  Romania shared the collaboration Protocol between the National Public Procurement 
Agency  and  the  National    Integrity  Agency  along  with  its  successful  results  in 
reporting  irregularities,  the  common  checklists  used  by  Managing  Authorities  for 
public procurement procedures and the PREVENT system for national and European 
funds which became operational in June 2017 and revises procurement procedures. 
  Slovenia shared the IT tool: “STATIST” with a purpose to provide a higher form of 
transparency  in  the  field  of  public  procurement  as  well  as  the  preparation  and 
publication of guidelines for procurement practitioners in different areas. 

  Slovakia reported about the Registry of Beneficial Owners: The aim of the registry is 
to enhance the transparency of the public sources management in public procurement. 
It is public and free of charge. 

  Sweden  reported  as  a  best  practice that  In  the  National  Public  Procurement  Strategy 
the Swedish government manifests how public procurement can be used as an efficient 
tool to ensure sustainable development. 

19 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
1.2.2.  DATA QUALITY 

With the third Recommendation, the Commission requested the following: 

(a) When reporting irregularities (fraudulent and non-fraudulent), all competent authorities are 
asked to provide information about the location and, for cohesion and fisheries policies, the 
priority area of the measures/projects affected.  

(b) When updating irregularities previously reported Member States are also asked to provide 
this information if they have not done so already. 

Measures  taken  to  enhance  the  quality  of  reporting  by  providing  information  about  the 
location and for cohesion and fisheries  policies the  priority area  of the measures/projects 
affected 

Concerning reporting irregularities (fraudulent and non-fraudulent), and information about the 
location  and,  for  cohesion  and  fisheries  policies,  the  priority  area  of  the  measures/projects 
affected,  20  Member  States62  reported  that  they  took  measures  to  enhance  the  quality  of 
reporting by providing information about the location and for cohesion and fisheries policies 
the priority area of the measures/projects affected. 19 Member States63 provided information 
on the kind of measures taken to enhance the quality of reporting.  

Some of the  most  important  measures  included: adherence to national legal requirements in 
place and OLAF Guidelines and Handbook on reporting; adoption of manuals to be used by 
the management; adoption of additional national measures to include information on location 
of  projects;  quality  controls;  making  use  of  OLAF  emails  on  data  quality;  enhancing 
cooperation among staff and performing training as well as seminars on the matter. 

7 Member States64 reported not having taken any measure to improve data quality, providing 
reasoning  in  this  respect.  The  reasons  for  not  doing  so  included  that  no  irregularities  were 
reported for the sector of fisheries, that there was no need for additional measures since the 
application  of  OLAF  Handbook  on  reporting  or  due  to  that  all  fields/boxes  in  IMS  are 
completed accordingly. 

Update of irregularities previously reported 

13  Member  States65  reported  that  they  fully  comply  with  the  question  regarding  when 
updating  irregularities  previously  reported  and  whether  they  update  already  reported 
irregularities  with  the  required  information.  Seven  Member  States66  reported  that  they 

62    Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  France,  Croatia,  Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania, 

Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

63    Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  France,  Croatia,  Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Hungary, 

Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

64   Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Cyprus, Poland, Romania, Slovakia.  
65  Bulgaria,  Germany,  Greece,  France  (Agricultural  Funds),  Italy,  Cyprus,  Latvia  (Ministry  of  Agriculture),   

Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden. 

66   Denmark, Ireland, France (ESI Funds), Latvia (Ministry of Finance), Lithuania, Hungary and Slovenia. 

20 

 
                                                 
partially implement this question. 7 Member States67 reported that they do not update already 
reported irregularities with the required information, providing explanation for not doing so. 

To  update  irregularities  previously  reported,  Bulgaria  provided  a  good  practice  example: 
when  carrying  out  quality  control  of  the  reporting  of  irregularities  to  OLAF,  the  Bulgarian 
AFCOS  directorate  requires  that  the  information  in  section  ‘territorial  unit  where  the 
operation is carried out’ be filled in in any follow-up notifications concerning already reported 
irregularities. In addition, France reported that it fully implements this regarding Agricultural 
funds and partly for ESIF and for ESIF, France is currently developing its information system 
(SIFA-SYNERGIE)  to  enable  automated  processing  of  alerts  to  OLAF.  Lithuania  reported 
that  the  information  of  irregularity  is  updated  in  the  IMS  quarterly,  if  in  that  quarter  the 
information of irregularity, about which the report was sent to OLAF before, was updated in 
national IT system for EU funds (SFMIS). 

A positive outcome was that some Member States reported that they give dedicated training 
aimed at explaining to the users of the IMS system how the web platform for the reporting of 
irregularities/fraud works on IMS.68 

Successful practices ready to be shared with other Member States 

Seven  Member  States69    shared  successful  practices  with  other  Member  States.  These 
included:  successful  cooperation  examples  between  national  authorities;  successful 
application  of  the  Handbook  on  Reporting  of  Irregularities  issued  by  OLAF;  initiatives  to 
establish  training  on  IMS  and  irregularity  reporting;  maintaining  a  regular  update  of 
information;  establishment  of  experts'  forum  to  promote  effective  and  efficient  irregularity 
reporting; creation of roadmaps to simplify reporting. Two Member States70 did not provide 
information concerning Recommendation 3.  

  Czech Republic reported that in case of a breach of budgetary discipline the recovery 
is provided through the Tax Authorities. As the Tax Authorities are bodies outside the 
implementation structure, the independency is secured.  

  Greece endorsed that the handbook issued by OLAF is applied. 

 

Italy shared that the Italian AFCOS schedules and runs various training courses aimed 
at explaining to the users of the IMS system how the web platform for the reporting of 
irregularities  and  fraud  works,  and  in  the  light  of  the  changes  related  to  the  latest 
version of IMS (IMS4 and IMS5).This initiative, which has had considerable success, 
has become best practice and will be replicated in the future with more annual events, 
possibly also at regional level. 

67   Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Poland and Romania. 
68   Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary and Italy. 
69   Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
70   Austria and Luxembourg.  

21 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
  Lithuania  endorsed  as  a  best  practice  the  fact  that  information  update  is  made  on  a 

regular basis in accordance with the regulation provisions. 

  Hungary  shared  as  a  best  practice  the  personal  training  course  for  IMS  users  to 
enhance their skills as well as the establishment of an expert level forum (Irregularity 
Reporting  Task  Force)  which  aims  to  fully  comply  with  the  irregularity  reporting 
obligations of Member States imposed by sectoral EU Regulations in a uniform way 
and to promote the utilisation of the content of irregularity reports in order to prevent 
fraud/irregularities. 

  The Netherlands shared that in addition to OLAF’s manual on IMS messages, there is 
a  separate  ‘irregularities  roadmap’  with  a  direct  link  to  the  IMS  user  manual.  This 
simplifies and standardises the reporting of IMS messages and suggested that it would 
be worth investigating whether it could be extended to other funds. 

  Sweden  reported  that  responsible  authorities  in  Sweden  for  OLAF  reporting  have 

network meetings twice a year. 

1.2.3.  USE OF RISK ANALYSIS FINDINGS 

With  the  fourth  Recommendation,  the  Commission  invited  all  Member  States  to  take  into 
account  the  findings  of  the  2016  PIF  Report  in  their  fraud  risk  assessments  for  the 
programming  period  2014-2020  and  to  pay  particular  attention  to  the  priorities  highlighted 
and to interventions which are similar in scope and nature.  

Also, in view of the low detection results for ETC programmes and considering the increasing 
threat  of  transnational  fraud,  Member  States  were  asked  to  increase  their  attention  and 
cooperation.  

Lastly,  all  Member  States  were  asked  to  review  their  fraud  risk  assessments  in  relation  to 
market  support  measures  taking  into  account  the  information  highlighted  in  the  2016  PIF 
Report. 

Findings  of  the  2016  PIF  Report  taken  into  account  within  Member  States'  fraud  risk 
assessments  

Member States were invited to take into account the findings of the 2016 PIF Report in their 
fraud risk assessments for the programming period 2014-2020 and to pay particular attention 
to  the  priorities  highlighted  and  to  interventions  which  are  similar  in  scope  and  nature.  20 
Member  States71  reported  that  they  have  taken  into  account  the  findings  of  the  2016  PIF 
Report in their fraud risk assessments. Six Member States72 reported that they have not done 

71   Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia (Ministry of Agriculture),  

 Lithuania,  Hungary,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Poland,  Romania,  Slovenia,  Slovakia,  Finland,  Sweden  and  the 
United Kingdom. 

72   Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Latvia (Ministry of Finance). 

22 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
so, due to reasons they provided in detail. Three Member States73 did not provide information 
concerning this request.  

Nine Member States74 provided information on results they wished to communicate relating 
to the findings from the 2016 PIF Report.  

For example, Belgium reported that as regards this recommendation, every instrument offered 
by  OLAF  is  taken  into  account  in  the  risk  management  of  the  Belgian  Paying  Agency.  In 
March 2017 a memo was submitted to the highest level of the organisation with a view to the 
further  development  of  a  structured  anti-fraud  policy.  Two  separate  policy  statements  were 
drawn  up,  one  for  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (EAGF  and  EAFRD)  and  one  for  the 
Common  Fisheries  Policy  (EMFF).  These  policy  statements  were  issued  in  line  with  the 
guidelines  provided  by  the  European  Commission  for  an  anti-fraud  policy  in  agricultural 
funds.  

Poland reported that the competent institutions responsible for implementing and controlling 
EU funds are obliged to take account of the findings of the Commission's report in successive 
fraud risk analyses and assessments, drawn up during the programming period 2014-20, with 
particular focus on priority areas under the cohesion policy, and agricultural market activities 
with the highest incidence of fraud. 

Bulgaria  reported  that  the  authorities  took  into  account  the  findings  of  the  PIF  report, 
identifying a risk of omissions when determining errors and irregularities and has optimised 
the controls for checking fraud indicators (the so called red flags) in the existing checklists. 

Germany reported that as regards agricultural and fisheries funds, fraud risks are continuously 
assessed,  including  with  reference  to  the  PIF  Report.  As  regards  ERDF  and  ESF, 
comprehensive approaches by the managing authorities with ‘measures to prevent, detect and 
correct fraud and corruption’ consider assessments and findings on combating and preventing 
fraud in the 2016 PIF report and earlier Commission annual reports. 

Also, Croatia reported that in 2017 Croatian AFCOS Service performed the irregularity and 
fraud  risk  assessment  for  European  Regional  Development  Fund  and  Cohesion  Fund,  and 
European  Social  Fund.  Activities  which  preceded  risk  assessment  included  consultation  of 
papers issued by the Commission including the 2016 PIF Report. 

Thirteen Member States75 did not report any particular details on results related to the findings 
enshrined  in  the  2016  PIF  Report.  Four  Member  States76  did  not  provide  information 
concerning this request. 

Spain,  for  example,  reported  that  the  2016  PIF  Report  was  adopted  in  July  2017,  once  the 
various managing authorities had already carried out their fraud risk self-assessments which 

73   Austria, Luxembourg and Portugal. 
74   Bulgaria, Denmark, Croatia, Italy, Hungary, Malta, Romania, Finland and Sweden. 
75    Belgium,  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  the  Netherlands, 

Poland,   Slovenia and Slovakia. 

76   Estonia, Austria, Luxembourg and Portugal.  

23 

 
                                                 
are reviewed regularly in accordance with the timetables and criteria set by each authority, in 
line with the recommendation in the Commission's guidance on ‘Fraud Risk Assessment and 
Effective and Proportionate Anti-Fraud Measures’ and that the observations made in the PIF 
report  will  be  taken  into  account  in  the  next  review  of  or  update  to  the  fraud  risk  self-
assessment. 

Measures taken to tackle the issue of low detection for ETC programmes and steps taken to 
cooperate in this respect with other Member States 

In  view  of  the  low  detection  results  for  ETC  programmes,  Member  States  were  invited  to 
report whether they took measures to tackle the issue of low detection for ETC programmes, 
and  if  yes,  what  kind  of  measures  have  been  taken.  17  Member  States77  reported  measures 
taken in this regard. 6 Member States78 did not report such measures. Three Member States79 
have not addressed this request. 

In  view  of  the  low  detection  results  for  ETC  programmes  and  considering  the  increasing 
threat  of  transnational  fraud,  Member  States  were  asked  to  increase  their  attention  and 
cooperation.  Member  States  were  invited  to  report  whether they  made  steps  to  cooperate  in 
this respect with other Member States.  

16  Member  States80    reported  that  they  have  increased  their  attention  and  enhanced 
cooperation with other Member States regarding ETC programmes and provided information 
on the steps taken in that respect. 6 Member States81 reported that they did not make any steps 
or did not provide information that they cooperate with other Member States in view of this 
recommendation. Four Member States82 did not address this request. 

Some of the measures reported by Bulgaria to tackle the issue of low detection included: joint 
checks and regular meetings between authorities involved in the programmes, carrying out of 
annual  self-assessments  by  the  Managing  Authorities,  development  of  methodology  for  risk 
assessment  at  operational  level,  performing  analysis  on  irregularities  and  fraud  indicators 
related  to  the  contracting  procedures  by  the  beneficiaries  and  additional  analysis  on 
identification of red flags as well as introduction of measures to tackle conflict of interests.  

Estonia reported about the Estonia - Latvia Programme consisting in: regular meetings of the 
programme authorities, to discuss topical/important issues and exchange information; annual 
risk  assessments  where  different  programme  authorities  are  involved,  to  have  a  systematic 
overview  of  the  risks  and  problems  the  programme  is  facing;  and  the  implementation  of 
follow-up activities in accordance with the action plan is monitored.  

77  Bulgaria,  Denmark,  Germany,  Estonia,  Spain,  Croatia,  Italy,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg, 

Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden. 

78   Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Finland. 
79   Ireland, Austria and Romania. 
80  Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta,   

Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden. 

81   Belgium, Czech Republic, Croatia, France, the Netherlands, Poland, Finland 
82   Ireland, Greece, Austria and Romania. 

24 

 
                                                 
Also, Germany reported that ETC programmes are more stringently controlled because of the 
cooperation  with  a  number  of  Member  States  and  the  particular  control  structure,  and  that, 
extremely rigorous training and control mechanisms contribute to the low error rate. 

Croatia reported that the Croatian AFCOS issued Guidelines on Irregularity Management for 
ETC  programmes.  In  addition,  employees  of  Croatian  management  and  control  system  of 
ETC programmes were invited to participate in trainings organised by Croatian AFCOS. 

Another  remark  is  that  several  Member  States  reported  making  use  of  the  ARACHNE  IT 
tool83 for data mining and data enrichment developed by the European Commission with the 
objective is to support managing authorities in their administrative controls and management 
checks in the area of Structural Funds.  

As regards market support measures,  

Bulgaria  reported  that  a  draft  act  amending  the  Act  on  Implementation  of  the  Common 
Market  Organisation  of  Agricultural  Products  of  the  European  Union  is  currently  being 
prepared,  which  lays  down  the  rules  on  the  implementation  of  market  measures  and  on  the 
functions  of  the  competent  implementing  bodies  and  organisations  for  the  respective 
measures,  including  the  Measure  ‘Promotional  programmes  for  agricultural  products’.  In 
addition, an amendment will be made to Regulation No 8 of 5 May  2016 on the conditions 
and  procedures  for  implementation  and  control  of  promotional  programmes  for  agricultural 
and  food  products.  The  Regulation  will  specify  in  detail  the  criteria  for  ‘competitive 
procedures’,  taking  into  account  the  economic  importance  of  the  promotional  programmes 
while also guaranteeing non-discrimination, equal treatment and full transparency in respect 
of the selection and awarding criteria applied.  

Denmark  reported  that  the  Danish  Agricultural  Agency  has  assessed  its  current  anti-fraud 
operations  in  relation  to  the  market  support  mechanisms  and  those  conclusions  of  the  PIF 
reports will also be incorporated in subsequent risk assessments. With regard to the 2016 PIF 
report, no significant changes concerning trends in the types of irregularities were identified 
compared  with  previous  years.  Therefore,  no  new  fraud  risk  analysis  has  been  carried  out 
since the publication of the 2016 PIF report, but a new risk analysis is scheduled for 2018. 

Poland  reported  that  as  part  of  the ETC  programmes,  targeted  measures  have  been  taken in 
support of cooperation and the fight against fraud. Among those measures are the adoption in 
a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  of  provisions  designed  to  improve  the  programme 
management and control system, rules for reporting irregularities, implementation of effective 
anti-corruption  procedures,  publishing  anti-fraud  manuals,  warning  signals  (red  flags)  on 
Programme websites, and creation of a dedicated electronic mailbox to which whistleblowers 
can send information if they suspect fraud. Furthermore, the Managing Authority has a fraud 
risk  self-assessment  team  whose  main  task  is  to  perform  risk  analysis  (at  least  once  a  year, 
and in cooperation with the relevant institutions).  

83   Bulgaria, Italy, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. 

25 

 
                                                 
Romania  replied  that  as  regards  the  level  of  competence  of  the  Paying  and  Intervention 
Agency  for  Agriculture,  the  occurrence  of  fraud  cases  in  Romania,  in  the  case  of  market 
measures,  is  low.  Frauds  are  approached  on  the  basis  of  the  prevention  principle  and  the 
financial  aid  is  paid  only  after  the  administrative  and  on-the-spot  checks  have  been 
completed. In most cases, administrative checks are completed by on-the-spot checks to a rate 
of  100  %.  Where  the  on-the-spot  check  is  based  on  the  risk  assessment,  among  the  risk 
criteria the history of previous controls and the aid value are also taken into account. 

As concerns cooperation with other Member States, 

Italy  has  provided  striking  examples  such  as  the  various  actions  in  the  field  of  training, 
organised by the Italian AFCOS on information and cooperation with partners from other EU 
countries.  Specifically,  in  recent  years,  the  Italian  AFCOS  has  promoted  a  number  of  ‘anti-
fraud’ partnership initiatives consisting in the exchange of experience and good practice, with 
partners from the following countries: Bulgaria, Poland, Greece, Latvia, Denmark, Serbia and 
Romania. Between 2016 and 2017, the Italian AFCOS made its own contribution, in terms of 
providing  information  on  the  complex  subject  of  anti-fraud  measures,  to  the  creation  of  the 
European Territorial Cooperation Programme in the IPC Adriatic CBC area, in which various 
countries  took  part,  including:  Albania,  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  Croatia,  Montenegro  and 
Slovenia. In the same period (2016-2017), the Italian AFCOS carried out the project entitled 
‘Cooperation  Project  in  the  anti-fraud  sector’  (co-financed  by  OLAF  with  funds  from  the 
Hercule  II  programme),  following  on  from  the  main  initiative  implemented  in  the  recent 
(2014)  6-month  Italian  presidency  of  the  Council  of  the  EU’s  Anti-Fraud  Group  (AFG): 
namely,  the  proposal  for  new  rules  that  enable  ‘mutual  administrative  assistance’  between 
Member States in the now-transparent area of structural funds. Delegations from 15 countries 
took part in the project: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Latvia, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Spain. 

Successful practices ready to be shared with other Member States 

Five Member States84 provided examples of successful practices that were ready to be shared 
with other Member States. These included establishments of working groups to assess fraud 
risks,  training  of  staff  and  programme  recipients  concerning  the  fight  against  fraud,  regular 
evaluation of anti-fraud measures, and establishing good networking between participants of 
different programmes. 

  Czech Republic shared that the Managing Authority shall train its staff and recipients 

in the fight against fraud. 

  Estonia  reported  that  the  cooperation  between  first  level  controllers  from  different 
programmes  in  case  of  doubt  about  any  irregularity  or  fraud  is  a  best  practice  to  be 
shared.  

84   Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy, Malta and Sweden. 

26 

 
 
 
                                                 
 

Italy  shared  that  in  November  2017,  an  Italian  anti-fraud  delegation  attended  a 
conference  on  anti-fraud  activities  at  the  European  Parliament’s  Committee  on 
Budgetary Control. The debate focused on Italy’s anti-fraud strategy (with particular 
reference to structural funds and European initiatives - including at legislative level). 
Guardia di Finanza’s specific and unique know-how in combating fraud in EU funds is 
now considered veritable best practice at EU level and which Italy is prepared to share 
with all interested partners. 

  Malta  mentioned  the  importance  of  training  in  particular  in  the  ambit  of  combating 
fraud. For instance, how to detect red flags. The setup of an independent body (in the 
Maltese case referred to as the Financial Control Unit) to conduct independent checks 
from those performed by the first level controllers. 

  Sweden supported that networking with participants from different programs is a best 

practice to be shared.  

27 

 
 
 
 
 
2. 

REPLIES OF MEMBER STATES 

This year's exercise aims at obtaining focussed information with a view to producing a useful 'follow-up to the 2016 recommendations' document to serve 
as a practical reference tool.  

To this end, the Commission has provided relevant guidance to Member States on how to approach and structure relevant information in their replies to 
the Commission's recommendations. For each recommendation, the relevant background information is provided and a set of questions, meant as a guide 
and reference as to the insight the Commission wishes to acquire on Member States' actions, have been prepared in relation to each recommendation. 
Member  States  were  also  invited  to  share  any  best  practice  they  may  have  related  to  the  specific  field  concerned.  24  Member  States  have  chosen  to 
provide their follow-up via addressing the guiding questions. Three Member States have chosen to use a single text approach to provide their follow-up. 
Member States were given the choice either to make use of the guiding questions, or to present their reply to the various questions in the form of a single 
text. 

2.1. 

REVENUE 

Background information 

The measures taken at EU level in 2016 further strengthened the protection of the EU’s financial interests. The revised Regulation 515/97 serves as a 
powerful  tool  for  stepping  up  the  fight  against  customs  fraud.  The  joint  customs  operations  (JCOs)  conducted  by  OLAF  continue  to  be  an  important 
source of information for detecting irregularities in transactions involving certain types of goods. China was the country of origin with the highest level 
of fraud and irregularities detected both in number of cases and established amounts. 

Customs  control  strategy  involves  a  combination  of  different  controls.  Post-clearance  controls  have  been  reported  as  the  most  effective  method  of 
detection,  both  in  terms  of  the  number  of  cases  detected  and  in  terms  of  amounts.  However,  controls  before  and  during  clearance  of  goods  and 

28 

 
 
 
inspections carried out by anti-fraud services are indispensable for the detection of certain types of existing fraud, new fraud patterns and, generally, for 
the detection of all types of fraud. 

The  TOR  inspections  carried  out  in  2016  on  control  strategy  in  customs  valuation  showed  that  flaws  in  the  management  and  control  of  undervalued 
imports  of  textiles  and  footwear  may  have  significant  negative  consequences  for  the  EU  budget.  Appropriate  risk  profiles  need  to  be  in  place; 
undervalued imports need to be systematically challenged and customs values corrected in line with EU regulations. 

Recommendation 1: 
Member States are invited to  review their management and control strategy with regard to customs valuation. With a view to  protecting the 
EU’s financial interests, they are requested to review their national procedures and control systems, in particular by: 
• Including in their risk  management  system EU-wide  risk profiles based on ‘clean average prices’ and systematically challenging potentially 
undervalued goods detected by means of risk profiles; 
• Not releasing the goods unless the declarants of potentially undervalued goods remove the authorities’ reasonable doubts about the accuracy of 
the declared value or provide a guarantee fully covering the customs debt which may be incurred; 
• Applying the customs valuation methodology provided by customs law. 

29 

 
 
Questions (Recommendation 1): 

1.1  Did  you  review  your  national  procedures  and  control  systems?  Yes/Yes  (Partly)/No  (Please  provide  any  useful  detail  to  explain  the  actions 
undertaken or why only in part. If applicable, explain why no (new) action was taken). 

1.2 Did you include EU wide or national risk profiles based on ‘clean average prices’ (the lowest acceptable value) in the risk management system? 
Yes/Yes (Partly)/No (Please provide any useful detail to explain the actions undertaken). 

1.3 Did you implement risk profiles based on other values and how are these values calculated and updated? Yes/Yes (Partly)/No, Please explain. 
Please provide any useful detail to explain the actions undertaken including the methods used to calculate the baseline prices. 

1.4  Did  you  systematically  control  potentially  undervalued  goods  detected  by  means  of  risk  profiles?  Yes/Yes  (Partly)/No,  Please  explain.  Please 
provide any useful detail to explain the actions undertaken including the type of check done. 

1.5 Did you implement new rules regarding the non-release of goods in relation to potentially undervalued goods in addition to providing a guarantee 
fully  covering  the  customs  debt  which  may  be  incurred,  when  there  are  reasonable  doubts  about  the  accuracy  of  the  declared  value?  Yes/Yes 
(Partly)/No, Please provide any useful detail to explain the actions undertaken. 

1.6 Are you systematically asking for additional information in case reasonable doubts arise providing the operator with the opportunity to respond?  
Yes/Yes (Partly)/No, Please provide any useful detail to explain the actions undertaken. 

1.7  Are  you  systematically  asking  for  a  guarantee  in  case  reasonable  doubts  are  not  dispelled  and  the  operator  wants  the  release  of  the  goods? 
Yes/Yes (Partly)/No, Please provide any useful detail to explain the actions undertaken. 

1.8 In case reasonable doubts are not dispelled and thus the transaction value method is not applicable, did you apply an alternative value following 
the customs valuation methodology provided by customs law (sequential approach)? Yes/Yes (Partly)/No, Please explain. 

1.9 Do you have any successful practice that you would be ready to share with other Member States? Please explain. 

30 

 
 
 
BE 

1.1  YES, partly implementing the recommendation (FPS Finances) 
FPS Finances: 
A number of new risk profiles related to customs valuation (undervaluation of declared goods) have been activated in 2016 and 2017 (22 new 
profiles). 
The following information should also be taken into account: 

  “EU-wide” risk profiles (see recommendation 1) cannot be activated in BE (only profiles for goods released into free circulation  in BE can be 

activated in BE 

  however,  concerning  the  EU-wide  risk  management,  exchange  of  information  with  the  other  Member  States  are  possible  via  the  RIF(CRMS) 

system, in order to inform them of potential risk that can also materialise on their territory 
in our opinion, the risk profiles activated in the first line (at the moment before the release of the goods) are not the only and best way for fighting 
fraud in  customs valuation:  post clearance checks nearby selected economic operators can also be necessary (establishing the  real value of the 
goods sometimes requires an analysis of commercial documents or of the accounting). 

1.2 

 YES (FPS Finances) 

 YES (FPS Finances) 

1.3 
FPS  Finances:  Some  profiles  have  also  been  activated,  which  are  based  on  values  determined  by  data  mining.  Other  profiles  aim  at  selecting 
specific economic operators committing this kind of fraud. 
1.4 
FPS Finances: The word “systematically” can be interpreted in different ways. Here it should not be interpreted as “always” because risk profiles 
are not the only way to control potentially undervalued goods. 

 YES (FPS Finances) 

1.5 

 NO 

1.6  YES (FPS Finances) 
FPS Finances: In both cases (when a movement of goods is selected for a control or when an economic operator is selected for a post clearance 
check), additional information is requested. 

31 

 
 
1.7  YES (FPS Finances)   
FPS Finances: In all identified cases where there is a risk that additional duties could not be collected after the release of the goods, the controlling 
officers should take a guarantee. 

1.8  YES (FPS Finances). 

1.9 FPS Finances: Instruments already exist to exchange successful practice with the Member States and with the Commission (e.g. Rifs 
exchanged via CRMS) 

BG  No risk profiles based on ‘clean average prices’ have been included in the risk analysis module of the Bulgarian integrated customs information 

system (BIMIS) because the system’s functional capabilities do not allow the introduction of such profiles. 
With a view to protecting the financial interests of the EU, profiles concerning specific tariff codes of particular selected companies suspected of 
tax and duty evasion were activated for specific periods of time during 2017. For such profiles, the field ‘Action of the risk profile’ contains a note 
stating that the type of goods and the supporting documentation must be checked, paying particular attention to the declared customs value. 
Some of the activated risk profiles are processed jointly with the National Revenue Agency (goods at high fiscal risk) and the Directorate General 
for Combating Organised Crime at the Ministry of the Interior (in order to check particular companies). 
In  connection  with  the  implementation  of  the  new  customs  legislation  which  entered  into  force  on  1  May  2016  and  the  amendments  to  the 
Customs Act by Order No ZAM-1084/24.10.2016 of the Director of the Customs Agency, detailed Guidelines on the acceptance, determination 
and appeal of the customs value of imported goods have been approved. 
Given the direct effect of  European Union customs legislation, the customs value of imported goods is determined in line with the provisions of: 
Title II, Chapter 3 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the  Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union 
Customs  Code;  Title  II,  Chapter  2,  Article  71  of  Commission  Delegated  Regulation  (EU)  No  2015/2446  of  28  July  2015  supplementing 
Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards detailed rules concerning certain provisions of the Union 
Customs  Code,  which  specifies  in  detail  the  rules  and  procedures  on  determining  the  customs  value.  Title  II,  Chapter  3  of  Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Regulation 
(EU) No 952/2013. 
In accordance with Article 70(1) of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013, the basis for the customs value of goods is the transaction  value, that is the 

32 

 
 
price actually paid or payable for the goods when sold for export to the customs territory of the Union, adjusted, where necessary. 
Paragraph 2 of the same Article states that the price actually paid or payable shall be the total payment made or to be made  by the buyer to the 
seller  or  by  the  buyer  to  a  third  party  for  the  benefit  of  the  seller  for  the  imported  goods  and  include  all  payments  made  or  to  be  made  as  a 
condition of sale of the imported goods. 
On  the  basis  of  Article  128(1)  of  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  2015/2447,  in  conjunction  with  Article  70(1)  of  Regulation  (EU)  No 
952/2013, the transaction value of the goods sold for export to the customs territory of the Union is to be determined at the time of acceptance of 
the customs declaration on the basis of the sale occurring immediately before the goods were brought into that customs territory. 
In accordance with Article 70 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013, all costs referred to in Article 7 are to be added to the price of the goods actually 
paid or payable, excluding the elements not to be included in the customs value referred to in Article 72 of the same Regulation. 
In  this  connection,  we  draw  your  attention  to  the  fact  that  if  during  the  customs  value  acceptance  procedure  the  customs  authorities  have 
reasonable  doubts  as  to  whether  the  declared  transaction  value  represents  the  total  amount  paid  or  payable  referred  to  in  Article70  (1)  of 
Regulation  (EU)  No  952/2013,  the  provisions  of  Article  140(1)  of  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  2015/2447  apply,  i.e.  the  customs 
authorities may request that the declarant submit additional information. 
If their doubts are not dispelled, the customs authorities may decide that the value of the goods cannot be determined in accordance with Article 
70(1) of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013. 
Pursuant to Article 74(1) of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013, where the customs value of goods cannot be determined under Article 70, it is to be 
determined by proceeding sequentially from points (a) to (d) of paragraph 2 of said Article, until the first point under which the customs value of 
goods can be determined. 
In addition, we must note that the prices of imported goods depend on a number of additional factors such as the commercial arrangements of the 
economic operators concerned, the characteristics and quality of the goods, their variety, their different sizes and quantity, the type of transport 
and various types of discounts, while the customs value is determined at the time the import customs obligation arises, i.e. at the time of filing the 
customs declaration for placing the goods under the procedure of release for free circulation and end use, with the customs value, including the 
method  of  its  determination,  being  determined  at  the  customs  office  on  a  case-by-case  basis  depending  on  the  characteristics  and  type  of  the 
declared goods and the accompanying documents. 

33 

 
 
CZ 

1.1 

1.2 

1.3 

1.4 

1.5 

 YES, fully implementing the recommendation  YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

 YES – the more strengthen one (CAP vs. national database) is used. 

 YES – medians of national databases. 

 YES – physical and documents control. 

 NO – current rules are sufficient. 

1.6  YES – everything what is presented is being checked. 

1.7  YES – every time. 

1.8  YES – when the fraud is proven. 

1.9 Already sharing within V4 group and UWG (under valuation working group). 

DK 

1.1  YES, partly implementing the recommendation – Customs (SKAT) uses values other than ‘clean average prices’ (the lowest acceptable 
value), see question 1.3. 
1.2  NO 

 YES 

1.3 
In a number of cases there have been attempts to clear containers with textile products declared at very low values. In those cases, duties were 
recovered post clearance owing to under-invoicing. A difference of more than 90 per cent between the prices of the goods in question and the 
normal price for goods under the same commodity code has been observed.   
In  order  to  prevent  Denmark  being  used  as  a  country  of  entry  for  goods  declared  at  very  low  values,  Danish  Customs’  analysis  units  have 
established risk profiles in the electronic risk analysis system in order to detect consignments/goods with obvious signs of under-invoicing. In the 
case of repeated instances of containers entering Denmark with goods that may have been under-invoiced, a profile can identify the first instance. 
Profiles  also  take  effect  rapidly,  which  means  that  there  is  no  need  to  wait  for  possible  post-clearance  inspections  that  may  have  lengthy 
processing times during which a greater quantity of under-invoiced goods can be imported.  
Risk  profiles  and  physical  checks  are  intended  to  put  a  stop  as  early  as  possible  to  repeated  declarations  of  under-invoiced  goods,  where 

34 

 
 
necessary, by requesting a security as a condition for release.  
Currently, profiles exist for goods under the textile chapters 61 and 62, as well as for shoes under chapter 64 that originate in China. Precisely 
such goods were involved in the earlier cases in both Denmark and the rest of the EU.  
The profiles are based on a standard price. A standard price has been calculated for each 4-digit commodity code. The profile is meant to detect 
goods where the declared value per kilogramme is significantly lower than the standard price. An average difference of 93 percent was detected 
between the declared value and an average value for goods under the same commodity code in the above-mentioned cases.  
The profiles are therefore meant to stop the clearance of a good where there is a difference of more than 93 per cent between the declared value 
for the 4-digit commodity code and the standard price; i.e. if the good’s declared value is less than 7 per cent of the standard price. Thus, this 
threshold - or control price - determines which goods are selected for physical checks. 
For each 4-digit commodity code, a standard price is therefore calculated, as well as a control price (threshold value) corresponding to 7 per cent 
of the standard price, which is entered in the profile as a criterion. 
1.4  YES 

1.5  YES 

1.6  YES – but on the basis of a risk assessment 

1.7  YES – but from 1 May 2018, a new revised procedure will be used for this purpose. 

1.8  YES 

1.9 N/A 

DE 

1.1  YES, partly implementing the recommendation. 

 YES 

1.2 
It’s  not  clear  what  exactly  is  meant  with  the  expression  “clean  average  price”.  We  have  automatically  targeting  Risk  Profiles  on  the  basis  of 
nationally calculated average values (threshold is 50 % of the average value). 
1.3 

 NO 

35 

 
 
 YES 

1.4 
See 1.2 
1.5 

 NO 

1.6  YES 
We  have  separated  national  guidance  for  textiles  and  shoes  on  the  one  hand  and  for  other  commodities  on  the  other  hand,  which  foresee 
opportunities for operators to explain the declared value. There do exist different steps at clearance and post clearance and on each of them the 
operator can justify his declaration. 
1.7  YES 

1.8  YES 

1.9 Yes, we do have a successful practice and already shared it with other Member States and the Commission.  
Examples: PCA “Discount” (application of German Guidelines), JCO “Snake”, active participation in Customs 2020 – Project Group on Financial 
Risk Management / Financial Risk Criteria, share of our national average prices with NL and PL. 
1.1 YES, partly implementing the recommendation  

EE 

Implemented  partially.  The  review  of  national  procedures  and  control  systems  is  going  on  at  the  moment.  Currently  we  are  using  the  EU 
calculated clean average price on a case-by-case basis. For control purposes we use nationally calculated average prices as well, they cover or are 
targeted at the undervaluation of risks mitigation 

1.2 YES  
Partially. When national profiles of minimum prices are activated or a suspicion of undervaluing occurs, the EU calculated clean average price is 
used. 
1.3 YES 
Once a month we carry out data extraction of the weighted average price of a kilogram regarding the last 12 months by all commodity codes. 
Using  this  data  the  import  declaration  system  activates  the  minimum  price  risk.  These  risks  are  reviewed  by  a  separate  unit  in  charge  of  the 
monitoring of the traffic of goods. 
1.4 YES  

36 

 
 
In addition to the measures created by COM in TARIC, several national criteria have been created, too.  When a criterion is activated, the goods 
and/or documents in question are checked according to the instruction of the relevant criterion and recommendations by the expert (who created 
the criterion). 
1.5 NO  
EE has had a practice in place for some time already. If there are reasonable doubts as to undervalued goods or false documents (or inaccurate 
code, origin etc.), we behave according to the rules made for such cases. Should any doubts arise, our officer who is responsible for checking the 
goods/documents will contact an expert of the relevant field (origin, customs value, classification etc.) and a solution will be found in cooperation.  
Usually, the solution is to correct or amend declarations, but if undervaluation or incorrect origin and commodity code are suspected, the customs 
will require a guarantee and the case is passed on to the post-clearance control. 
1.6 YES  
Always. If a declaration is placed under verification, the official asks from the declarant all the necessary documents and other explanations. The 
declarant  can  give  supplementary  explanations  and  submit  complementary  documents.  The  customs  will  not  release  the  goods  until  sufficient 
answers have been received or a guarantee is provided. 
1.7 YES  
Requiring a guarantee is a last resort, at least in the case of customs valuation. Should reasonable doubts arise, we would rather ask the declarant 
to change the customs value so that it would be correct to the satisfaction of customs authorities. 
1.8 YES  
Such  cases  are  rather  uncommon  in  Estonia.  Undervalued  goods  are  generally  damaged  or  otherwise  of  a  lower  quality,  and  the  declarant  is 
usually able to justify the lower value, so the customs will check the justification to make sure that undervaluation is not artificial. 
1.9 N/A 

IE 

1.1  YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Profiles are put in place following post clearance checks or an audit of a trader targeting specific importers in relation to undervaluation of goods. 
RIFs are also evaluated and transposed into risk profiles where it is considered a risk is likely to occur. Feedback is required following clearance 
of the goods as to the effectiveness of the profile. These results are evaluated and if necessary updated. 
1.2  NO 
There is limited information available on ‘clean average prices’ therefore profiles have not been implemented. 

37 

 
 
 YES 

 YES 

1.3 
We engage our  national risk analysis tool  –Customs Risk  Intervention Selection Programme (CRISP). This  system provides the Regional case 
workers with Reports identifying the riskiest Imports and SAD’s based on a number of Rule categories including valuation. Reports are analysed 
to facilitate case selection for Audit and post clearance interventions. 
1.4 
Targeted  consignee  declarations  are  controlled  and  proof  of  payment  was  sought  to  verify  how  the  consignments  were  financed.  National 
legislation provides for the detention of such goods enabling the officer to engage with the importer for verification as to the price actually paid or 
payable for the goods. 
1.5  YES 
Where doubts exist for undervalued consignments additional information is sought. National legislation provides for a compromise penalty from 
the importer. The goods are held until any doubts are alleviated. If doubts still exist, the additional duty is paid prior to release of the goods. The 
declaration is amended to account for the additional duty liable. 
1.6  YES 
Where doubts arise regarding the value of the goods, the officer can detain the goods pending the production of satisfactory evidence of proof of 
payment. National legislation provides for this. In these instances the goods are not released until any additional duty considered liable is paid. 
1.7  YES 
Additional duty requested must be paid prior to release of the goods. The declaration is amended to take account of this. National legislation also 
provides for a compromise penalty from the importer in advance of release of goods. 
1.8  YES 
If the Transaction value cannot be used for the reason that there is no evidence that a transaction took place, then the Transaction Value of similar 
goods would be used. However, this would only occur in the absence of proof of payment or supporting documentation requested by the customs 
officer. 
1.9  
Only those that are set out in the above paragraphs. 

38 

 
 
 
EL 

 YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

1.1 
Risk profiles have been created in order to point out declarations for either physical or documentary control. A national customs operation was 
held during 2017 in order to combat the undervaluation in textiles and footwear originating from China. 
1.2 
Our  information  system  does  not  have  the  functionality  to  compare  declared  per  kilo  value  with  the  clean  average  price.  Instead,  profiles  for 
declared value in a certain range of per kilo value are implemented. 
1.3 

 NO 

 NO 

 YES 

1.4 
In the context of AMs and RIFs, risk profiles have been created in order to point out declarations of textiles and footwear originating from China 
for either physical or documentary control. Further to the AMs all available information was used for the creation of risk profiles. 
1.5 

 YES 

 YES 

 YES 

1.6 
According  to  our  national  guidelines  (ref.  no  ΔΔΘΤΟΚ  Α  5022799  ΕΞ  2015/29.10.15  .),  the  competent  customs  authorities  should  ask 
for additional information in case 
reasonable doubts arise. In addition, they should provide  the  operator  with  the  opportunity to respond in accordance to provisions of article 22 
UCC and the relevant IA provisions, which have been incorporated into relevant national guidelines (Ref.no ΔΤΔ Α 1121586 ΕΞ 2017/9.8.17.) 
1.7 
According to our national guidelines (Ref. No ΔΔΘΕΚΑ Α 113359 ΕΞ 2018 ΕΜΠ/7.3.2018), the competent customs authorities should ask for a 
guarantee in cases where reasonable doubts are not dispelled and the operator wants the release of the goods. 
1.8  YES 
According to our national guidelines (Ref. No ΔΔΘΤΟΚ Α 5026366 ΕΞ 2015/18.12.2015, ΔΔΘΤΟΚ Α 5022799 ΕΞ 2015/29.10.15, ΔΔΘΕΚΑ Α 
113359 ΕΞ 2018 ΕΜΠ/7.3.2018), the competent customs authorities should apply the alternative methods referred to in article 74 of UCC, in the 
hierarchical order foreseen therein, in case the reasonable doubts concerning the declared transaction value are not dispelled. 
1.9 N/A 

39 

 
 
ES 

 YES 

1.1  YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
The Spanish authorities consider that they are complying fully with this recommendation, and have been doing so since before 2016. Risk profiles 
linked to potentially undervalued goods have always been applied. 
1.2 
Our system involves checking declared values against a series of historic values declared to Spanish customs and identifying traders that present a 
risk.  
The risk profile is applied when an unusually low value is declared, and the reasonable doubt procedure laid down in EU law then begins. This by 
no means implies that values below the predetermined lowest value are not accepted, but the trader is required to dispel any doubts and, if they are 
unable to provide appropriate justification, the declared value is rejected. 
1.3 Answered under question 1.2. 

1.4 

 YES - Answered under question 1.2. 

1.5  YES 
Goods are not released until a guarantee is provided covering the amount of the duties that could be incurred if the trader is unable to justify the 
values declared at customs. 
1.6  YES 
Traders  are  asked  to  provide  all  information  they  feel  is  appropriate  to  justify  the  declaration  of  such  a  low  amount.  If  their  response  is 
unsatisfactory, they are informed of the reasons why this is the case, so that they may exercise their right to be heard. 
1.7  YES - Answered under question 1.5. 

1.8  YES 
The  alternative  method  is  generally  used,  first  giving  the  reasons  why  the  other  secondary  methods  cannot  be  used,  essentially  because  the 
requisite information has not been provided. 
1.9 N/A 

40 

 
 
FR 

The French authorities wish to present their reply to the various questions in the form of a single text, OLAF having clarified in COCOLAF on 7 
February 2017 that this is one of two possible ways of responding.  

The  Directorate-General  for  Customs  and  Indirect  Taxes  (DGDDI)  has  traditionally  dealt  with  customs  valuation  fraud  by  conducting  ex-post 
checks.  This  was  because  of  the  difficulty  in  rapidly  obtaining  the  documents  needed  to  establish  whether  the  declared  price  reflected  the 
transaction value of the goods. The cases of valuation fraud examined related for the most part to a failure to include compulsory elements, as 
specified  in  Article 71  of  the  Union  Customs  Code  (UCC).    From  taking  part  in  operations  to  combat  undervaluation  fraud  (Joint  Customs 
Operations - JCO - Operation SNAKE, in particular), the DGDDI has come to reconsider the importance of identifying this type of fraud early, at 
the  time  of  ex  ante  checks.  This  type  of  fraud  often  involves  patterns  of  fraud  on  a  massive  scale,  and  any  processing  delays  result  in  a  very 
significant increase in evaded duties and taxes. Moreover, such fraud is often linked to a fraudulent use of scheme 42. 

The DGDDI’s inspections policy for combating valuation fraud is still evolving: 
The office responsible for inspection policy (Office D2) is finalising a memo reiterating the importance of ex ante checks in this field. This memo 
is accompanied by several summary factsheets to facilitate the work of the inspection services. 
The factsheets cover the following points: 
– the legal basis for valuation set out in the UCC and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015; 
– the conduct of ex ante checks with regard to valuation. This factsheet was prepared in particular on the basis of the European inspection guide 
entitled ‘Handbook on Operational Controls’; 
– the setting-up of the guarantee provided for in Article 244 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015.  

This factsheet sets out the strict cumulative conditions under which a guarantee may be taken (existence of a strong suspicion of undervaluation, 
existence of a sudden, massive and suspicious flow, the guarantee must be the only way to stop the flow). These specific conditions help to ensure 
that guarantees are not systematically set up at the slightest suspicion. The factsheet also indicates alternative methods for determining value. 
The purpose of this factsheet is to enable inspection services to act autonomously and respond rapidly. Guarantees have already been put in place 
successfully by the DGDDI, but each time the intervention of the Directorate-General was required. 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
The publication of this note is only the first step in the process of updating the policy on valuation checks. 
Indeed, a working group of experts focusing on customs value checks will be set up shortly, with a view to preparing guidelines for checks. In 
addition  to  the  aforementioned  factsheets,  the  guidelines  will  also  include  several  summary  documents  on  targeting,  risk  analysis  and  ex  post 
checks. The European Customs Audit Guide will be used for preparing this factsheet. 

With regard to the targeting of undervaluation checks, the targeting engine (‘Risk Management System’ (RMS)) of the French customs clearance 
system (‘Delt@’) cannot be used to directly select declarations according to clean average prices, for it is not capable of calculating ratios such as 
mass to value or supplementary unit to value ratios.  
It  has  therefore  not  been  possible  to  directly  set  up  profiles  based  on  EU  recommendations  (by  OLAF  or  other  bodies).  As  a  result,  customs 
declarations with suspicious values are not systematically checked since it is not always possible to identify them. 
Nevertheless, the DGDDI is currently working on ways to overcome this issue relating to the targeting engine. 
Instructions are to be given for the Risk Analysis and Targeting Department (SARC) of the French customs administration, which is responsible 
for  establishing  national  targeting  profiles,  to  use  the  suspicion  measures  (measures  430  and  431)  included in  the  Automated  Integrated  Tariff 
Reference  (RITA,  the  application  which  implements  the  Common  Customs  Tariff  -  TARIC  in  France).  The  Risk  Management  System  (RMS) 
engine  is  unable  to  target  the  declarations  identified  by  these  measures.  Note  that  a  statement  of  needs  has  been  submitted  for  an  overhaul  of 
targeting. 
However,  the  French  customs  administration  has  at  its  disposal  a  risk  analysis  query  application  (‘Consult  and  Analyse  Shared  Data’  - 
CANOPEE), which enables all customs declarations identified by measures 430 and 431 to be retrieved. CANOPEE also enables searches to be 
conducted on ratios such as supplementary unit to value ratios.Thanks to these tools, the Risk Analysis and Targeting Department (SARC) will be 
in a position to perform traffic analyses to identify high-risk flows or operators. It will then be possible to set up targeting profiles accordingly, as 
well as planned first-level ex post checks or targeted investigations. 

SARC is also experimenting with data mining. The three cases of use tested relate to (i) searches for instances of undervaluation by statistically 
analysing the value to weight ratio and by creating a prediction model based on checked declarations (supervised learning), and (ii) the study of 

42 

 
 
 
 
 
express freight fraud using a flow chart visualisation tool. 

HR 

1.1 

1.2 

1.3 

1.4 

1.5 

1.6 

1.7 

 YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

 YES 

 NO 

 YES 

 YES 

 YES 

 YES 

1.8  YES 

1.9 N/A 

IT 

1.1  YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

Contribution of the Customs and Monopolies Agency: 
Following Recommendation 1, the methodology for combating under-invoicing, known as ‘Credibility’, has been re-examined. 
In particular, the Customs and Monopolies Agency has added risk profiles for goods that are systematically under-invoiced to the computerised 
system for the selection of operations. These goods were identified by the EU platform ‘Theseus’, a data mining tool that provides data produced 
by the JRC. Using this tool, priority is given to flows of goods to be checked based on the highest estimate of the taxable base. 
As discussed and agreed in the Customs 2020 Project Group on the use of data mining for identifying customs risks, notable improvements have 
been made to the methodology, which was enhanced as follows: starting from the flows of goods detected by Theseus, the risk profiles identified 
by the Agency are based on the ‘minimum acceptable value’, which is calculated with reference to ‘unit price percentiles’. 
Although  Theseus  is  crucial  for  detecting  systematic  under-pricing  and  price  clusters,  which  only  an  EU-level  tool  can  do,  it  needed  to  be 

43 

 
 
 
 
reviewed for the following reasons: 

  The Customs Tariff Code produced in Theseus is an 8-digit code, whereas it is much more useful to use the 10-digit TARIC Code, which 

is more precise at defining goods. 

  The Agency’s selection system (Customs Control Circuit) is updated on a daily basis, while the Theseus database is updated one or twice a 

year; 

  The  estimate  in  Theseus  is  the  total  value  /  total  kilos  in  a  month,  while  the  Credibility  method  uses  the  estimates  of  the  percentiles  / 
quartiles  of  the  unit  values  of  each  item.  These  estimates  are  calculated  by  a  national  system  called  SIDDA  (‘system  for  detecting 
statistical anomalies in customs declarations’). 

  Systematic controls based on average ‘fair prices’ would involve too many checks, which would not be manageable. 
  The Credibility methodology is heavily based on the results of the controls and the risk thresholds are updated accordingly. 

1.2 

 YES 

Contribution of the Customs and Monopolies Agency: 
The national computerised system for the selection of customs operations, known as the ‘Customs Control Circuit’, is supplied with risk profiles 
based on the ‘lowest acceptable value’ calculated by the Credibility system. 
1.3 

 YES 

Contribution of the Customs and Monopolies Agency: 
The  Credibility  methodology,  applied  to  a  group  of  high-risk  goods  flows  detected  using  Theseus,  sets  a  lower  initial  threshold  of  unit  values 
(value / net mass and value / additional unit), for example: 

-  One fifth of the first quartile of the unit values’ frequency distribution or, alternatively, the fifth millile of the frequency distribution of the unit 

values the increase or decrease in the threshold value is adjusted according to the results of the controls.  

This  methodology  has  already  been  agreed  by  the  Customs  2020  Project  Group  on  the  use  of  data  mining  to  for  identifying  customs  risks 
(financial risks subgroup).The Customs and Monopolies Agency has introduced an IT system (data warehouse) that can be used to query data with 
multiple  parameters  (time,  combined  nomenclature,  origin  of  the  goods,  delivery  conditions,  etc.)  so  as  to  define  risk  parameters  for  under-
invoicing relating to both high-risk goods and companies.  

44 

 
 
 
 
 
The risk threshold values were determined by using various inputs (cost of raw materials, statistical indicators, evidence acquired during police 
investigations). In addition, the authorities have developed an automated tool known as SIDDA.  

This  tool  helps  the  Italian  Customs  authority  analyse  trends  for  under-invoicing,  over-invoicing  and  the  identification  of  anomalous  values 
(‘outliers’)  based  on  statistical  analyses  of  customs  declarations  data.  SIDDA  also  allows  operations  to  be  categorised  using  three  specific 
anomaly indicators. 
 YES 
1.4 

Contribution of the Customs and Monopolies Agency: 
The risk profile associated with under-invoicing is usually drawn up based on the entirety of the physical or documentary check. The checks can 
therefore be said to be systematic. 
The risk profiles select the customs declarations that must undergo a documentary and/or physical check. In the last few years, more than 100 000 
ad-hoc checks have been carried out on imports to combat under-invoicing. Checks have also been carried out at the offices of companies deemed 
to represent a higher specific risk. Checks at company offices have increased in importance since Italy receives large quantities of textiles and 
footwear  from  other  EU  countries  such  as  Germany,  Spain  and  the  UK,  with  the  declared  value  most  likely  under-invoiced  on  importation. 
Accordingly, efforts to tackle under-invoicing also comprise analyses of intra-EU purchases followed by substantial distortions, including those 
using Customs procedure 42, made by other EU countries. Moreover, investigations have been carried out into criminal networks involved in the 
declaration of under-invoiced goods. 
1.5 N/A 

1.6  YES 
Contribution of the Customs and Monopolies Agency: 
Importers are required to provide further documentation on contracts, freight costs, insurance, transport and bank transactions. Under national law, 
customs  officials  can  request  further  documentation  from  other  economic  operators  involved  in  imports,  such  as  freight  forwarders,  terminal 
operators  and  transport  companies.  If  importers  do  not  satisfy  their  requests,  the  Customs  Agency  can  impose  a  penalty  of  EUR 5 000  to 
EUR 10 000 and can also revoke authorisations. 

45 

 
 
 
1.7  YES 

1.8  YES 

1.9 
Contribution of the Customs and Monopolies Agency: 
Using  the  Credibility  system,  the  Risk  Analysis  office  of  the  Central  Anti-Fraud  and  Audit Directorate  has  set  a  threshold  value  in  the 
computerised selection system (CCC) with the aim of checking shipments whose declared value is below the suspect threshold value, when they 
are presented both at customs and at locations for which the trader has authorisation. 
The Credibility system is very effective in terms of the reporting of irregularities, the balancing of the risk of under-invoicing and the resources 
used for controls, leading to fewer but more selective checks. 
Under-invoicing  is  a complex  form  of  fraud  that  must  be  tackled in  various  ways. As  well  as  implementing  risk  profiles  relating  to  value  and 
carrying  out  checks  on  high-risk  companies  both  on  importation  and  in  their  offices,  it  is  crucial  to  analyse  intra-EU  trade  because  of  the 
substantial distortions in flows between Member States. For these reasons, in our experience, best practice to tackle under-invoicing consists in 
linking analyses that relate to imports and intra-EU purchases, and identifying high-risk economic operators in other EU countries so that they can 
be reported to the customs and tax authorities there. This also makes it possible to improve cooperation and exchanges of information between 
Member States implicated in the same fraudulent schemes.   
The real value of the goods is not declared on import declarations and documentation (invoices, contracts), thereby committing numerous offences 
such as forgery of customs import declarations and intra-EU lists, tax evasion and money laundering. Accordingly, it must be taken into account 
that under-invoicing entails falsification of the means of payment used between exporting, importing and final destination countries, since the true 
value of the goods has to be paid with untraceable or irregular means of payment (undeclared currency, use of fictitious companies, immigrants’ 
remittances). It is therefore important to increase currency controls on specific nationalities, routes, and countries of arrival or departure that may 
be more involved. The strengthening of cooperation between national Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) is another key activity, since FIUs are 
able to analyse the impact of under-invoicing on banking and money transfer systems. 
1.1 
No actions were taken regarding National procedures and control systems. 

 NO 

CY 

46 

 
 
1.2 

1.3 

 YES 

 NO 

 NO 

 YES 

1.4 
Undervalued  goods  were  detected  mainly  through  evaluation  of  OLAF  information,  RIF,  own  resources  system  and  ad-hoc  information  by 
Customs Offices. Also undervalued goods (especially shoes, clothes, auto spare parts, motorcars) were detected through emergency action plans 
for post clearance control and audit. 
1.5 
This task is undertaken by Valuation Sector. In case of motor vehicles guarantee incurred. 
1.6  YES 
Additional information regarding bank payments, bank statements, accounting reports, supplier statements are provided in case reasonable doubts 
arise. 
1.7  YES 
This  task is  undertaken by  Examination  Sector. In  case  of  reasonable  doubts  are  not  dispelled  and  the  operator  wants  the  release  of  the  goods 
Customs Authorities may ask for a guarantee.  
1.8  YES 
This task is undertaken by Valuation Sector. 
1.9 N/A 

LV 

In National Customs Board of the State Revenue Service (hereinafter – SRS) risk management strategy has been implemented in all processes of 
customs  clearance.  For  performance  of  risk  analysis  and  assessment  of  fiscal  risks,  both  national  and  international  customs  risk  information  is 
used. Information regarding fiscal risks is obtained by the SRS National Customs Board from other Member States and the European Commission 
through  Anti-Fraud  Information  System  (AFIS)  of  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office  (OLAF)  and  Common  Customs  Risk  Management  System 
(CRMS) of the Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union of the European Commission (DG TAXUD). The information is used for 
planning and applying risk mitigation measures, including establishment of risk profiles related to fiscal risks that have been identified in other 
EU Member States. The risk mitigation measures are directed towards preventing declaration of reduced customs value and false origin of goods, 

47 

 
 
as well as declaration using incorrect CN and TARIC codes.  
In cases where the application of risk mitigation measures lead the customs officials to suspect that the goods have been declared with reduced 
customs value, security shall be collected and post-clearance controls shall be carried out.   
Additionally, post-clearance controls are carried out regarding goods that had been released into free circulation without customs controls at the 
time when the goods were declared (green channel). 
Thus, the SRS National Customs Board ensures control measures based on risk analysis both during the customs clearance, as well as during post-
clearance activities. 
Based  on  international  and  national  laws  and  regulations,  the  SRS  National  Customs  Board  has  drawn  up  internal  regulations  specifying  the 
actions that shall be taken by customs officials when carrying out customs controls regarding application of CN and TARIC codes, determination 
of customs value and ensuring post-clearance. 
1.1  YES, partly implementing the recommendation. 

In  order  to  ensure  customs  control  measures  related  to  determination  of  customs  value  of  goods,  the  SRS  National  Customs  Board  uses 
comparison  of the declared customs values  against  historical  data, i.e., the customs  values  of goods to  be checked are compared with  customs 
values of identical or similar goods previously released into free circulation in the Republic of Latvia, thus assessing the  possible reduction of 
customs  value  of  goods.  When  assessing  risks  related  to  circumvention  of  anti-dumping  measures,  the  SRS  National  Customs  Board  uses 
information received from OLAF, that has been published in AFIS. The SRS National Customs Board has reviewed the tool offered by OLAF for 
determination of statistical value of goods; however, this tool is not actively used at the moment, because, for example, the contained information 
provides the statistical price of goods proportionate to the weight of goods, while the SRS National Customs Board analyses the average statistical 
price in relation to one unit of goods. The SRS National Customs Board is still considering the possibilities to use the tool offered by OLAF for 
planning of control measures. 
1.2 
The  SRS  National  Customs  Board  in  the  framework  of  risk  mitigation  measures  has  established  several  national  risk  profiles  intended  for 
controlling  the  declared  customs  value  of  goods.    Customs  values  of  identical  or  similar  goods  previously  released  into  free  circulation  in  the 
Republic of Latvia are used for the controls of the declared customs value of goods. 

 YES. 

48 

 
 
 
 NO 

 YES 

 YES 

1.3 
The  SRS  National  Customs  Board  in  the  framework  of  risk  mitigation  measures  has  established  several  national  risk  profiles  intended  for 
controlling the declared customs value of goods. The measures require collection of security in cases where the customs officials suspect that the 
goods might be declared with reduced customs value. The so-called average prices of goods are determined based on historical data  – customs 
values  of  identical  or  similar  goods  previously  released  into  free  circulation  in  the  Republic  of  Latvia.  Information  regarding  these  values  is 
collected and updated every 1 – 3 months. 
1.4 
The  SRS  National  Customs  Board  applies  risk  mitigation  measures  both  on  the  basis  of  received  risk  information,  and  also  by  carrying  out 
preventive measures  for groups of goods,  which have  most often been  identified  to have  been  imported with reduced  customs value of goods. 
Customs officials who develop risk profiles are responsible for monitoring and assessment of risk profile. Where necessary, the relevant changes 
are made in the operation of a risk profile. 
1.5 
The SRS National Customs Board systematically applies collection of security in cases where there is suspicion that the goods have been declared 
with reduced customs value. This process was not revised; risk mitigation measures are applied regularly, including developing and correcting risk 
profiles. 
1.6  YES 
In cases where customs officials suspect that goods have been declared with reduced customs value of goods, the customs officials shall request 
additional information from the declarant before taking a decision on collecting security. 
1.7  YES 
In cases where customs officials suspect that goods have been declared with reduced customs value, the customs officials shall request additional 
information  from  the  declarant.  If  the  declarant    does  not  provide  documents  certifying  the  true  value  of  goods  in  accordance  with  the  actual 
circumstances of the transaction or if the information in the provided documents indicates that the customs value of goods is considerably lower 
than customs values of identical or similar goods previously released into free circulation in the Republic of Latvia, the customs official shall take 
a decision on collecting security. 
1.8  YES 
In cases where the customs officials suspect that goods have been declared with reduced customs value, security shall be collected. During post-

49 

 
 
LT 

clearance the SRS National Customs Board by contacting the declarant determines the customs value of the imported goods in accordance with 
one of the valuation methods (to be applied successively) provided for in Article 74 of the Code. After the risk mitigation measures have been 
applied, the companies, to which measures concerning determination of customs value and collection of security have been applied previously, no 
longer import goods with reduced customs value. Furthermore, a trend has been identified, where a certain number of companies, to which control 
measures directed towards determination of customs value had been applied, no longer import the specific goods. 
1.9 The practice in the SRS National Customs Board is that after control measures have been applied and security has been collected, the customs 
value is determined during post-clearance in accordance with the provisions of Article 74 of the Code. 
1.1  YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
Customs control measures and procedures applied by the Lithuanian Customs for the customs valuation of imported goods are in  line with the 
2016  European  Commission`s  recommendations  and  European  Commission`s  Guidelines  for  preventing  and  detecting  irregularities  (under-
invoicing)  in  imports  of  textiles  and  footwear.  The  Rules  for  Control  over  Customs  Valuation  of  Imported  Good,  applied  at  the  Lithuanian 
Customs have been approved by Order No. 1B-431 of 28 April 2004 of the Director General of the Customs Department under the Ministry of 
Finance of the Republic of Lithuania. 
1.2 
According to the average customs values of the unit of goods calculated by the Lithuanian Customs the Lithuanian Customs authorities apply risk 
profiles to control the declared customs value of import goods, except vehicles falling under headings 8701, 8702, 8703, 8704 and 8711.  
The declared customs value of imported used vehicles is controlled on the basis of the prices provided in the vehicles prices catalogue approved 
by the Customs Department. To control the customs value of imported sensitive goods (individual goods classified in CN Chapters 61-64, 68 and 
95), the Lithuanian Customs authorities apply additional risk profiles based on the “fair prices” assessed by the Director General of the European 
Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC). 
1.3 
Once a month, the Lithuania Customs calculates goods` average prices based on the import statistics of the last 3 months. This calculation is based 
on  the  data  of  the  declared  transaction  values  which  have  been  recognized  by  the  Lithuanian  Customs  and  is  not  the  subject  of  an  additional 
verification of customs value. The arithmetic average price is calculated by the: 
• 
• 

CN code;  
CN code and country of origin. 

 YES 

 YES 

50 

 
 
 YES 

The average prices are calculated for all CN codes, except vehicles classified in CN positions 8701, 8702, 8703, 8704 and 8711 (vehicles prices 
catalogues are used for the control of the customs value of vehicles). The average prices are placed in the Risk Management System and are used 
for the assessment of risk management at the time of customs clearance and during post-clearance. 
1.4 
Risk profiles that control the customs value of goods are constantly functioning in the Risk Management System, their functionality covers all 
import goods. The Risk Management System activates risk profiles depending on the difference of the declared price and the average price (for 
the particular categories of goods, different percentage margins are set). If the risk profile is activated, the customs officer at the time of customs 
clearance  shall  verify  the  declared transaction  value.  After  the  initial  verification  of  the  declared  transaction  value,  the  customs  officer  takes  a 
decision  whether  to  recognize  the  declared  transaction  value,  or  to  transfer  documents  to  the  territorial  customs  administration  for  further 
verification. 
Depending  on  the  check  done  at  the  time  of  customs  clearance  and  on  the  difference  of  the  declared  price  and  the  average  price,  the  Risk 
Management System assesses whether it is expedient to check the customs value of the goods after the customs clearance. 
The Lithuanian Customs authorities also constantly monitors the declared customs value of import goods, they prepare once a quarter summaries 
and  recommendations  for  the  improvement  of  the  control  of  the  potentially  incorrect  declaration  of  the  customs  value  (the  review  of  risk 
management measures takes place, post-clearance controls are initiated etc.). 
A separate risk management model is applied to control the declared customs value of imported used vehicles: vehicles prices catalogues are used 
for the control of the customs value of vehicles, and the conclusions of experts are used for the control of the customs value of damaged vehicles. 
1.5 
Additional guarantees covering the customs debt that may be incurred has been applicable at the Lithuanian Customs since 2001 when there are 
doubts about the accuracy of the customs value of goods being released for free circulation. 
1.6 
To  this  end,  the  functionality  has  been  introduced  in  the  Customs  Declaration  Processing  System  allowing  communicating  with  the  importer 
(declarant)  by  means  of  the  system:  additional  information  is  requested  to  justify  the  declared  transaction  value  (if  there  are  doubts  about  its 
accuracy).  If  the  additional  information  provided  by  the  Customs  authorities  does  not  dispel  the  doubts,  a  notification  on  the  post-clearance 
control of the customs value is delivered to the importer (declarant) together with the list of concrete documents that may be submitted to the unit 
of  the  territorial  customs  office  performing  the  controls  for  the  justification  of  the  transaction  value.  Before  issuing  an  unfavourable  decision 

 YES 

 YES 

51 

 
 
regarding the customs value of the goods, the customs authorities always provide the importer with the opportunity to respond. 

 YES 

1.7 
If additional information and documents on the value of goods submitted by persons during customs clearance do not dispel reasonable doubts of 
the Customs authorities, the importer must provide the Customs authorities with an additional guarantee for the additional charges that may be 
incurred, and the goods are released for free circulation. In such case, the Customs authorities deliver to the importer an information note stating 
that  the  customs  value  of  the  goods  will  be  checked  after  the  customs  clearance  and  which  documents  may  be  additionally  submitted  to  the 
Customs authorities to justify the declared transaction value. 
1.8 
If the transaction value method is not applied to the customs value of import goods, the customs value of the goods is determined following UCC 
Article 74 by applying the secondary customs valuation methods. The exhaustive sequence of the application of the secondary customs valuation 
methods is regulated in detail in the Rules for Control over Customs Valuation of Imported Goods applicable at the Lithuanian Customs approved 
by  Order  No.  1B-431  of  28  April  2004  of  the  Director  General  of  the  Customs  Department  under  the  Ministry  of  Finance  of  the  Republic  of 
Lithuania. 
1.9 N/A 

 YES 

LU 

1.1  YES, partly implementing the recommendation. 

Risk management systems do contain a full range of risk profiles related to undervaluation. As a background, pertinent intelligence used during 
Commission’s  common  priority  control  area  “Discount”  2011  and  OLAF  JCO  “Snake”  2013  has  been  integrated  in  Customs  risk  engine. 
However,  current  risk  profiles  are  built  upon  goods  nature,  weight,  provenance  and  origin  of  goods,  meaning  the  full  range  of  possible 
infringements are targeted. Customs officer are then called upon to compare declared prices with the list of “fair prices” set by EU institutions. 

Thus,  the  check  box  with  “partly  implementing  the  recommendation”  has  been  ticked  as  the  “clean  average  price”  is  not  directly  used  for  an 
electronic check. 

To  conclude,  LU  opted  for  a  two-layered  approach,  i.e.  targeting  at  higher  level  by  electronic  means  and  checking  by  manual  assessment  the 

52 

 
 
“clean average prices” as a consequence. 

The explanation above covers questions 1.2 and 1.3. 

1.2 

1.3 

 NO (see 1.1 above) 

 NO (see 1.1 above) 

1.4 

 YES 

 NO 

Risk instructions clearly indicate a possible risk of undervaluation. Thus, customs declaration is immediately blocked in clearance system and a 
check by a customs officer needs to be carried out. 
1.5 
The procedure of requiring a guarantee in order to release the goods if the customs value is challenged is already provided in national procedures 
on customs controls. 
1.6 
 YES 
Any useful documentation is to be provided by the declarant or its representative as commercial documentation, proofs of payment. In case the 
documents are not sufficient, the customs officer can challenge the value by special procedure with decision to be taken at central level. 
1.7 

 YES (see 1.5 above) 

1.8 

 YES 

1.9 N/A 

HU 

1.1  YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
All elements of the recommendation were fully implemented as follows: 
-inclusion  in  their  risk  management  system  EU-wide  risk  profiles  based  on  ‘clean  average  prices’,  and  systematically  challenging  potentially 
undervalued goods detected by means of risk profiles; 
-not releasing the goods unless the declarants of potentially undervalued goods remove the authorities’ reasonable doubts about the accuracy of 

53 

 
 
 YES 

 YES 

 YES 

the declared value or provide a guarantee fully covering the customs debt which may be incurred; 
-applying the customs valuation methodology provided by customs law. 
1.2 
The Hungarian risk management system essentially contains risk profiles based on ‘clean average prices’. The basis of the minimum acceptable 
value, that is, the threshold price is the fair market price constructed based on fused data on the import turnover of the EU28 as indicated in the 
AREP AMT (Automated Monitoring Tool) module operated by OLAF and the Joint Research Centre. 
1.3 
Based on information sent by the Commission in an AM message and in accordance with the threshold prices set therein, further risk profiles were 
created for products where the Commission brought suspicions that products imported on prices lower than the given value were likely to have 
been imported into the EU undervalued or subject to an incorrect trade classification. 
1.4 
Undervalued products undergo at least documentary checks in most cases. As from July 2017, the number of physical checks was also increased. 
When justified by the documentary check or goods inspection, a customs value check is introduced. 
1.5 
In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  EU  Customs  Code,  the  customs  authority  requests  a  guarantee  based  on  its  doubts  arising  from  the 
declared customs value prior to releasing the goods. 
1.6  YES 
In the case of doubts, a customs value check is ordered, during which the operator has to submit several documents, including the following:  
Customs value declaration, external trade contracts, invoices relevant for the transaction which are registered in the accounting records/accounted, 
bank  record  on  the  transfer,  business  correspondence,  invoices  on  transportation  and  insurance,  detailed  turnover  in  the  main  ledger  of  the 
suppliers, accounting items relevant for the transaction. 
1.7  YES 
If the operator requests to release the goods and the doubt arising during the customs procedure remains, a guarantee is provided before releasing 
the goods. 

 NO 

54 

 
 
1.8  YES 

Where the transaction value method is not applicable, the method of transaction value of similar goods or the 'fall-back method' is applied from 
among the secondary methods. 

1.9 
No, since the only case where the Court gave a judgment favourable for the customs authority from among all cases affected by court proceedings 
was Case C-291/15 where a preliminary ruling had been requested. 

MT  1.1 

 YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

 NO 

The Customs Department submitted the replies pertaining to Recommendation 1 and are being reproduced in this document. 
Our national procedures and control systems are reviewed and adjusted on a need basis - also taking into consideration all information emanating 
from the different sources available to the Department. 
1.2  NO 
There is no such profile in the Customs electronic system but ‘clean average prices’ are counter checked on footwear and clothing based on the 
values outlined on ‘Operation Snake. 
1.3 
Risk profiles on certain commodities (namely clothing and footwear) are uploaded on the Customs electronic systems for eventual verification of 
values with ‘clean average price’ as outlined in ‘Operation Snake'. 
1.4 
Generally, samples are retrieved from consignments and the valuation process is triggered accordingly. 
1.5  YES 
When there are reasonable doubts that a consignment includes undervalued goods, samples of the items concerned are elevated and referred for a 
valuation exercise. In the meantime, the consignment is withheld pending the outcome of the valuation process. 
The Department may also opt to release the consignment against a guarantee to safeguard potential loss of revenue, pending the fulfilment of the 
valuation process. 
1.6  YES 

 YES 

55 

 
 
Usually, proof of payment certificates Including contract of sales are requested and verified through the mutual agreements in place. 

1.7  YES 
The reply to 1.5 above applies in this case as well. 
1.8  NO 

1.9 
No successful practice other than normal procedure to share. 
1.1 - YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

NL 

1.2 - YES 

1.3 - NO 

1.4 - YES 

1.5 - NO 

1.6 - YES 

1.7 - YES 

1.8 - YES 

AT 

1.9  
Not specific 
1.1  YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
A review of the customs data regarding valuation of high risk goods from high risk countries is one of the national customs priorities and done on 
periodical basis for the early detection and prevention of fraud. 
1.2 
National risk profiles are implemented for specific high risk goods from specific high risk countries on the basis of national “clean average prices” 
(lowest acceptable value). As trigger for the profile we use calculated minimum prices, which are calculated on the basis of the lowest accepted 
and not suspected value declared for a specific good within the last three years. 

 YES 

56 

 
 
 YES 

1.3  NO 
We do not use the EFP (European fair price), we use the national calculated clean average price, because the UCC does not foresee the EFP as a 
method of customs valuation. 
1.4 
See the answers to 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 
1.5  YES 
A special guideline with rules to support the customs officers at the moment of clearance was developed by the Central Anti-Fraud Department of 
Ministry of Finance. The guideline is embedded in the profiles. It covers the processes of requesting additional documents, collection of guarantee 
(for customs duties and VAT) and procedure for establishing the customs value based on the secondary methods (Art 74 par. 3 UCC). 
1.6  YES 
See the answer to 1.5 
1.7  YES  
See the answer to 1.5 
1.8  YES 
We follow the procedure of Art 74 UCC applying the secondary methods for customs valuation where we finally determine the customs value 
according to Art 74 par 3 UCC as the lowest accepted and not suspected value declared for a specific good within the last three years (= clean 
average price = national minimum price). 
1.9  
Since we apply the above described procedure (answers from 1.1 to 1.8) we did not identify new cases of obvious undervaluation of the goods 
covered by the profiles. 
Poland assumes that risk profiles based on 'clean average prices' should be identified with their 'fair prices' available on the AFIS portal as part of 
the  AMT  (Automated  monitoring  tool).  For  potentially  undervalued  goods  (textiles  and  footwear),  Poland  uses  the  reference  pricing  system 
(RPS),  which  automatically  identifies  cases  where  there  is  a  high  probability  that  the  customs  value  of  the  goods  has  been  understated  on  the 
customs declaration. The RPS is a tool on the basis of which risk profiles are introduced into the system for recording imports of goods. Using 
special algorithms, threshold values are determined which underpin the activation of a risk profile. 'Fair prices' are one element of the RPS and the 
50% threshold suggested by OLAF is the minimum value. A customs declaration which is below this threshold triggers the activation of a risk 
profile. The added value of the national system is that threshold values are determined periodically for each subsequent month. 

PL 

57 

 
 
With a view to addressing understatement of the customs value of goods imported into EU customs territory (mainly textiles and footwear), the 
Polish  customs  and  treasury  authorities  have  adopted  a  set  of  instruments  (guidelines)  aimed  at  strengthening  and  supplementing  existing 
legislation designed to reduce the prevalence of that phenomenon. The guidelines consist in a set of recommendations for measures to be taken at 
individual stages of the customs procedure, starting with the customs declaration. In order to facilitate practical implementation of the guidelines, 
tools  for  supporting  the  procedure  itself  as  well  as  risk  analysis  have  been  designed  and  implemented  in  the  form  of  a  reference  price  system 
(support for risk analysis), comparative databases (support for customs procedures) and the Rej-Tex system (data registration). The guidelines also 
contain a comprehensive package of information on the interpretation of existing customs legislation on customs value, with links to additional 
material that might be useful in the process of verifying and recalculating declared customs values. The guidelines state that in situations where, 
for example, the declared customs value is less than the reference price, the goods may be released only in justified and fully documented cases. 
If,  however,  in  the  course  of  verification  of  the  customs  declaration,  there  are  found  to  be  irregularities  that  may  lead  to  import  duties  being 
calculated at an amount higher than what is stated in the customs declaration, and if it is not possible to determine the amount of duty before the 
goods are released for import, the goods may be released only after provision of a guarantee to cover the customs debt. 
1.1  YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

PT 

1.2  

 YES 

1.3 

1.4 

 YES 

 YES 

1.5 N/A 

1.6 N/A 

1.7 N/A 

1.8 N/A 

1.9  
In cases of high risk, especially related to customs procedure 42, PT Customs participates, together with PT Tax on EUROFISC  project, which 
allows us to better monitor the customs operations on both sides of the customs procedures, i.e. where PT is country of customs clearance or PT is 

58 

 
 
RO 

 YES 

 YES 

country of final destination.  
That permits early identification of any suspicious cases and implementation, in those cases, of closer monitoring of all operations. 
1.1  YES, fully implementing the recommendation 
In 2017, a procedure was initiated for the re-evaluation of the guidelines issued by the General Customs Directorate (Direcția Generală a Vămilor) 
with regard to the application of the procedure for delaying the determination of the customs value, as established by Government Decision No 
973/2006. The databases from the General Customs Directorate are currently under assessment in order to complete this action. 
1.2 
At the General Customs Directorate, a permanent risk profile is being implemented in the RMF (Risc Management Framework) Module with a 
view to applying Government Decision No 973/2006 on the methodology for delaying the determination of the customs value declared on import. 
The reference values used in the customs activity are those in the OLAF database, more specifically EFP (estimated fair prices). These values are 
included in the risk profile used in the application of Government Decision No 973/2006, the alert thresholds being set to 50 % of the EFP value. 
1.3 
If  the  investigations  conducted  at  the  General  Customs  Directorate  reveal,  based  on  the  accounts  of  economic  operators  and/or  the  mutual 
assistance and cooperation with other states, data and information on certified transaction values in regard to their reality and accuracy, it will be 
reported to the specialised service, which will compare it with the national database.  
If differences are found compared to the existing indicative values, they are to be reassessed. The risk profile values are to be updated on a regular 
basis in accordance with Decision No 40/2014 of the General Customs Directorate. 
1.4 
In  the  case  of  customs  operations  with  goods  the  declared  value  of  which  is  below  the  reference  values  in  the  database,  the  procedure 
implemented  by  Government  Decision No 973/2006  provides  obligatorily  for  the  selection  of  operation  on  the  orange  clearance  route 
(documentary  control)  and  the  delay  in  determining  the  customs  value  as  a  final  value  and  the  economic  operator  must  submit  additional 
documents in order to ascertain the declared value. The risk profile used in the application of Government Decision No 973/2006 is a permanent 
action whereby customs declarations containing goods that are likely to be undervalued are selected. 
The customs value declared for the goods in the customs declarations selected by the risk profile is verified as per the methods described in the 
Agreement on the application of Article VII GATT in accordance with the methodology implemented by Government Decision No 973/2006. 
1.5  YES 
In  accordance  with  the  procedure  established  under  Government  Decision  No  973/2006,  the  goods  that  are  likely  to  be  undervalued  are  only 
released after a precautionary guarantee has been submitted, as calculated at the values in the DGV database, based on a written application from 

 YES 

59 

 
 
the economic operator, as approved by the customs office where the clearance is performed. 

1.6  YES 
When selecting the customs operation on the orange clearance route, on account of the suspicious undervalued customs value, the customs office 
requests in writing from the representative of the declarant to provide data and information on the declared value.  
Please note that there are cases when the additional documents submitted are subjected to further investigations. 
1.7  YES 
The  goods  subjected  to  undervaluation  control  are  released  for  the  declarant  only  after  it  has  submitted  the  additional  documents  requested  in 
writing  by  the  customs  office  and  after  it  has  submitted  a  precautionary  guarantee  covering  the  customs  duties  and  the  other  customs  related 
duties, as calculated at the customs value accepted by the General Customs Directorate, and it has deposited that guarantee to the account of the 
customs office or in the form of a letter of bank guarantee. 
1.8  YES 
In these cases, the Internal Working Procedure designed for the customs staff for the application of Government Decision No 973/2006 on the 
procedure applicable when the final determination of the customs value needs to be delayed is applied.  
This procedure covers, among others, the method for finding that, on the date of the formalities for release for free circulation, the customs value 
cannot be determined by applying Article 1 of the Agreement, even if the final determination of the customs value was delayed, and that Articles 
2-7 in Chapter VII of the Agreement must be applied in the order provided therein, the customs value thus determined being final.  
It also provides for the method for preparing the Decision for the final determination of the customs value, which is taken by the customs office by 
a control report prepared on the customs value, which establishes the availability or receipt, totally or in part, of the established guarantee and 
includes the detailed description of the reasons underlying the measure.   
With a view to establishing a sufficient guarantee to recover the amount of import duties and of other duties and taxes due to the state, under the 
law, under the customs operations, as calculated based on the customs value determined provisionally by the customs office, from which import 
duties and other duties and taxes due to the state are deducted under the law, under the customs operations, as calculated based on the customs 
value declared by the importer and wired to the State budget, the values in the statistical database of DGV (a database created in accordance with 
Section 1.2 above), which is available for all the goods, are to be applied. 
1.9 NO 

Sl 

1.1 - YES, fully implementing the recommendation 

60 

 
 
 
Financial Administration of the Republic of Slovenia has reviewed national procedures and control systems with: 

•  including  in   risk  management  system  EU-wide  risk  profiles  based  on  ‘clean  average  prices’  and  systematically  challenging  potentially 
undervalued goods detected by means of risk profiles and; 
• not releasing the goods unless the declarants of potentially undervalued goods remove the authorities’ reasonable doubts about the accuracy of 
the declared value or in some cases provide a guarantee fully covering the customs debt which may be incurred. 

Financial Administration of the Republic of Slovenia took the following actions: 

-  Creation EU wide or national risk profiles based on clean average prices in the risk management system; 
- 

Issued  the  guidance  on  the  verification  of  the  declared  customs  value  of  goods  and  procedure  for  the  determination  of  new  customs  value  of 
goods, No 35/2017, dated on 27. 11. 2017; 

-  Preparation of a protocol form for recording the process of a verification of the customs declaration due to undervaluation; 
-  Creation the Working group for undervaluation;  
-  Organised the seminar about undervaluation which took place on 21 November 2017; 
-  Organised several workshops for financial officers who are working with undervaluation cases at the local level concerning actual undervaluation 

cases; 

-Use of national application “Qlik View” as a tool for controlling customs value. 
1.2 - YES 
Financial  Administration  of  the  Republic  of  Slovenia  includes  EU  wide  and  national  risk  profiles  based  on  ‘clean  average  prices’  (the  lowest 
acceptable value) in the risk management system. The lowest acceptable value is calculated based on OLAF lowest acceptable value, (different for 
tariff codes and origin of goods). In the case, that the declared value of goods is lower than the lowest acceptable value, the custom officer should 
make the complete control. 
1.3 - YES 
Financial  Administration  of  the  Republic  of  Slovenia  implements  risk  profiles  also  based  on  other  values  (for  example:  information  about 
economic operators involved in undervaluation fraud exchange via RIF or AFIS).  

Exchanges  of  information  at  EU  level  are  made  in  the  framework  of  either  the  mutual  assistance  regulation  or  the  customs  risk  management 

61 

 
 
 
 
 
 
system for risk-related information (as an example RIF and AM Communications). On the base of this exchange Financial Administration of the 
Republic  of  Slovenia  implements  risk  profiles  helping  to  identify  potential  cases  of  undervaluation  when  there  are  also  other  risks  or  fraud 
indicators, such as suspicious traders involved in the import. 

Moreover the customs authority shall decide to control declared customs value of the goods basis on manual risk analysis or random selection. 
1.4 - YES 
Financial Administration of the Republic of Slovenia systematically control potentially undervalued goods detected by means of risk profiles for 
all import declarations (procedure 40 and 42).  It is possible that some limit exception may apply (in the case where customs duty is 0 % or in the 
case if the total value of goods is less than 1000 EUR or description of tariff code contains word “part” or “other”).     

Nevertheless the customs authority shall decide to control declared customs value of the goods basis on manual risk analysis or random selection. 
1.5 - YES 
The goods are not releasing unless the declarants of potentially undervalued goods remove the authorities’ reasonable doubts about the accuracy of 
the declared value or in some cases provide a guarantee fully covering the customs debt which may be incurred. When there are reasonable doubts 
whether the declared value represents the actual transaction value, customs authorities may ask, when performing release controls, for additional 
information and the submission of additional documentation (invoices, sales contracts, bank statements …). 

The  complete  procedure  is  described  in  the  guidance  on  the  verification  of  the  declared  customs  value  of  goods  and  procedure  for  the 
determination of new customs value of goods, No 35/2017, dated on 27. 11. 2017. With the line of this guidance the complete procedure should be 
noted in accordance with the protocol form for recording the process of a verification of the customs declaration due to undervaluation. 
1.6 - YES 
When  there  are  reasonable  doubts  whether  the  declared  value  represents  the  actual  transaction  value,  customs  authorities  may  ask,  when 
performing release controls, for additional information and the submission of additional documentation (invoices, sales contracts, bank statements 
…). Economic operator has the opportunity to respond. The complete procedure is describe in the guidance on the verification of the declared 
customs value of goods and procedure for the determination of new customs value of goods, No 35/2017, dated on 27. 11. 2017. In line with this 
guidance  the  complete  procedure  should  be  noted  in  accordance  with  the  protocol  form  for  recording  the  process  of  verification  of  a  customs 
declaration due to undervaluation. 
1.7 - YES 

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In the case of that reasonable doubts are not dispelled and the operator wants release of the goods is possible to ask for a guarantee. Nevertheless 
for the Financial Administration of the Republic of Slovenia is the first option not releasing goods unless the declarants of potentially undervalued 
goods remove the authorities reasonable doubts about the accuracy of the declared value. This option is more efficient for challenging potentially 
undervalued goods detected by means of risk profiles. 
1.8 - YES 
In  the  case  reasonable  doubts  are  not  dispelled  by  economic  operator  and  thus  the  transaction  value  method  is  not  applicable,  Financial 
Administration of the Republic of Slovenia applies an alternative value following the customs valuation methodology provided  by customs law 
(sequential approach) as follow: 

(a) the transaction value of identical goods sold for export to the customs territory of the Union and exported at or about the same time as the 
goods being valued; 

(b) the transaction value of similar goods sold for export to the customs territory of the Union and exported at or about the same time as the goods 
being valued; 

(c) the value based on the unit price at which the imported goods, or identical or similar imported goods, are sold within the customs territory of 
the Union in the greatest aggregate quantity to persons not related to the sellers; or 

(d) the computed value. 

Where the customs value cannot be determined using the above-mentioned methods it is determined using a fall-back method. 

The complete procedure is describe in the guidance on the verification of the declared customs value of goods and procedure for the determination 
of new customs value of goods, No 35/2017, dated on 27. 11. 2017. 
1.9 N/A 

63 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SK 

1.1 - YES, partly implementing the recommendation  
The risk profiles are set only for certain risky goods items or risky countries of origin according the analysis of statistical data. Among the V4 
countries  we  have  common  risk  profiles  on  certain  textile  goods  and  footwear  on  the  basis  of  the  Joint  Declaration  of  the  Customs 
Administration of the V4 countries on introducing risk profiles regarding textile and footwear products imported from Asian countries, signed 
in Trenčín on 17 September 2015. 

1.2 - YES  
The threshold value used in V4 countries (declaration - see point 1.1) is from the AREP AMT tool of AFIS system. 

1.3 - NO 

1.4 - YES  
In the case of reasonable doubts of undervaluation of goods we ask the customs offices (using the risk profiles) to provide physical check of 
the next shipment. In all cases of undervalued goods there is a obligation to ask the guarantee from the importer. 

1.5 - NO 

1.6 - YES  
In the first step we are asking the DV1 – declaration of the customs value. Next we can ask for providing any other documents confirming the 
declared customs value. 

1.7 - YES  

1.8 - YES  
In cases where the transaction value method is not applicable due to the fact that customs authorities have reasonable doubts concerning the 
declared customs value, they are entitled to determine the customs value by using one of the secondary methods stated in Article 74 of Union 
Customs Code. 
Following the provisions of Article 74 UCC the customs authorities are obliged to respect an order of the secondary methods. For that reason 

64 

 
 
 
the customs authorities in their rulings apply method by method approach giving at the same time the arguments why the particular secondary 
method cannot be used unless they reach the secondary method upon which they have determined the customs value and consequently the 
customs debt. 
In each and every ruling issued by the Slovak customs authorities the sequence of the secondary methods is mentioned and elaborated so that 
the declarant will be given a clear picture of the way how the customs authorities have proceeded. 

1.9 N/A 

FI 

1.1  YES, partly implementing the recommendation 

Finnish Customs have done systematically different kind of risk analysis of customs value by our fiscal risk management group. After analysis 
work, we have targeted potential risk companies to our post-clearance audit unit.  

We have co-operation with other authorities, especially Tax Administration. We have exchange of information e.g. about transfer pricing.  

We had  a study visit to Holland to hear how they tackle these problems (transfer pricing). Because of this study visit; we established customs 
value group (members are inside customs but different units; risk management, foreign trade and taxation). 

  NO 

1.2 
Our import declaration system is old and because of that, we are not able to put clean average price risk profiles to the system. However, we are 
developing new import declaration system (it should start during years 2019-2020).  

We tackle these problems by doing systematic risk analysis after clearance phase. In this phase, we analyse e.g. tariff codes, origins and average 
prices. Result of this analyse work we suggest possible targets for audit unit.  

Our customs statistics unit have a system to do data checking to import declarations and customs value. They do credibility tests to numerical 
variables: e.g. statistical value/ quantity 1 and statistical value/invoice value. They asks for the companies or agencies about the results of these 
test (statistical corrections). 

65 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 YES 

1.3 
Partially  yes.  We  are  analysing  not  only  commercial  traffic;  we  have  analysed  also  low  value  shipments  and  started  to  use  e.g.  intensive 
surveillance to these couriers’ low value shipments (under 22 euros).  
We use OLAF`s and JCO`s working methods/IT-systems during the analysis process. Systems are used afterwards declaration process. 
1.4 

 YES 

Yes, we analyse potentially undervalued goods but normally we do it afterwards (not in a phase of releasing the goods (because of the old import 
system).  
We can of course put risk profiles also to the import system (e.g. when we have reasonable doubts that the value is not right), but normally we put 
these profiles under companies ID- number. Profiles are then more specific, not in general level.  
We use also random selection and officers have to check then also the customs value (document control). 
1.5  NO 

 YES 

1.6 
The Finnish Customs can ask documents and other explanations if we have reasonable doubts during real time declaration process or during 
post clearance process. 

1.7 

 YES 

Guarantees are  handled and  managed  by  Finnish  Custom`s  Foreign  Trade  and  Taxation  Unit.  EU-wide  guarantees  will  be  reserved from  other 
Member States as fixed reservations; not including the transit procedure. National guarantees are reserved per transaction. 

When Custom officers have reasonable doubts, we ask documents and verification of the guarantee and the right value of the import. The question 
is a little bit unclear; what does this “systematically asking” mean? It depends who the representative is, has the company general guarantee. We 
have instructions how to handle guarantees and it is normally that we ask documents (e.g. invoices). 

 YES 

1.8 
In practice, these cases often lead to using the fall back method under UCC 74 (3) article, due to lack of information available for using other 

66 

 
 
 
 
 
 
secondary methods. It should be stressed, that in the majority of cases it is very clear from the start that there either is or isn’t a transaction under 
UCC article 70. The distinction is easy to make at first glance and there is no need as such for reasonable doubt, which would need to be dispelled. 
However, in some cases doubt has arisen, the importer has provided more information, and then the declared transaction value has been accepted 
consequently. 
1.9 N/A 

SE 

 YES 

1.1  YES, partly implementing the recommendation 
Swedish Customs does not apply the fair prices (from AMT) on all goods. We have some low risk profiles based on those prices. The majority of 
goods are however validated by our own trade statistics/price control system. 
1.2 
Swedish Customs has had 30 risk profiles (on textiles and shoes) active since 2014, based on “fair prices” (from the automated monitoring 
tool) 
1.3 
Yes, we have a system for trade statistics and price control validation. It is based on continuous cooperation with Statistics Sweden, who provide 
up-to-date price limits for all goods. The import declaration system reacts to divergent values. 
1.4 
The normal control is a document control at clearance. The officer has the option to make a physical control if necessary. 
1.5 

 YES 

 YES 

 NO 

1.6  YES 

1.7 

 NO 

1.8  YES 
The officer always has the mandate to apply alternative valuation methods in case of doubts. 
1.9 N/A 

UK 

1.1  YES 
The UK treats the issue of customs duty undervaluation fraud very seriously. The UK has over the years taken a series of steps to tackle the issue 
of alleged undervaluation fraud. The UK’s current strategy is comprised of the following elements: 
• Physical pre-clearance checks targeted at high risk traders. Where appropriate HMRC will request that importers provide securities before goods 

67 

 
 
 
are released. HMRC is seizing goods that are mis-declared; 
• A trader monitoring programme, which involves HMRC officers visiting traders on a monthly or even weekly basis, examining supply chains 
and checking relevant documentation for accuracy; 
• Post-clearance activity including business audits on a cross-tax basis to check the credibility of information provided by traders; 
• Tailored education for genuine traders and agents designed to help them avoid involvement in supply chains tainted by suspected undervaluation 
fraud and  publication  of a  Customs Information  Paper, which is also being circulated to the appropriate Trade Associations, regarding the due 
diligence that they should exercise when making customs declarations; 
• Education is also provided to suspect traders to give them formal knowledge of fraud risks and therefore make it easier to challenge their actions 
in courts/tribunals; 
• Issuing duty demands and VAT assessments as appropriate, with associated debt management/civil recovery action. 
1.2 
The UK is using a risk matrix which has been running successfully since July 2015. The risk profile is formed by overlaying profiles for CPCs 42 
and 40 for commodity codes used in JCO Snake with: 
a. UK fair price information based on actual UK CHIEF data; and  

 YES 

b. HMRC compliance knowledge of the trader population ((i) inclusion of known high risk businesses; and (ii) identification and removal of large 
high street businesses trading in genuine low value goods). 

1.3 

 YES Please see response to 1.2 

1.4 

 YES 

In July 2015 HMRC set up an operation to tackle importers involved in suspected undervaluation and Onward Supply Relief fraud focussing on a 
post-clearance approach.  The trader population is identified using the risk matrix described at 1.2 which allows the UK to target efforts on the 
highest risk traders for Chinese textiles and footwear, thereby minimising the impact on compliant, low value importers. This population includes 
any  companies  still  live  from  JCO  Snake  and  phoenix  companies  which  have  come  into  being  where  the  original  company  has  gone  into 
insolvency.  Building upon this work and the work from JCO Snake, the UK continues to develop its relevant policies and practices. In relation to 
pre-clearance,  the  UK  has  continued  to  evolve  its  response  and  has  introduced  pre-clearance  physical  examinations  and  appropriate  levels  of 

68 

 
 
 
 
 
 
sampling of sea and air consignments, targeted using the same risk matrix. 

1.5 

 YES 

The  UK  has  introduced  pre-clearance  physical  examinations  and  appropriate  levels  of  sampling  of  sea  and  air  consignments.    Consignments 
relating to suspect importers are examined and if potential undervaluation is identified, securities are imposed on a consignment by consignment 
basis, as appropriate, for both customs duties and import VAT before goods are allowed to be entered.  

1.6 

 YES 

As  part  of  preclearance  checks  operators  are  asked  to  provided  documentary  evidence  to  support  declared  value,  to  be  considered  alongside 
evidence obtained through physical examination and sampling of the goods.  Where there are reasonable doubts as to the accuracy of the declared 
valuation, operators are notified of the potential amount of security to be applied and are given the opportunity to exercise their right to be heard. 

1.7 

 YES Please see response to 1.5  

1.8  YES 

The UK authorities will look to challenge declared method 1 valuations where we have reasonable doubts that the values declared represent the 
full  or  true  amounts  paid  or  payable  and  the  importer  is  unable  to  assuage  those  doubts  in  accordance  with  Art.140  UCC  IA  (or  Art.181a 
CCIP). Once a declared method 1 valuation has been discarded, we will look to determine a replacement value, in accordance with Article 101(1) 
of the UCC (or Article 78(3) of the Code), under the first available secondary method of valuation.  

The UK has developed a robust methodology for the calculation of replacement valuation under method 6 which involves arriving at a statistical 
average or lowest reasonable price determined following an analysis of the values declared at importation of comparable goods. After discarding 
the method 1 values declared at importation, and in the absence of a suitable valuation under the preceding valuation methodologies, the UK has 
used this to issue demands for additional customs duty and import VAT in a number of test cases.  

69 

 
 
 
 
 
 
1.9 The UK has also introduced tailored education for traders and agents on combating the suspected undervaluation fraud and associated criminal 
finance risks, both on a one-to-one and campaign basis. Trader education has proved very successful as part of the end to end approach HMRC 
has adopted to tackling MTIC and alcohol fraud  – creating a hostile environment for fraudsters and helping genuine businesses to secure their 
supply chains from infiltration.  

For genuine businesses, the objective is to raise awareness of risks and how their business can avoid being caught up in illicit supply chains so that 
they  can  take  appropriate  steps  to  avoid  such  risks.  For  the  non-compliant  businesses  and  those  presenting  a  high  risk  to  tax  and  duty,  the 
objective is to: 

a.  change the perception of the risk/reward balance for involvement in import fraud by raising awareness of HMRC activity to counter import fraud and the 

sanctions for those who are caught; 

b.  encourage those who are non-compliant to change their behaviour and put their tax affairs in order;  
c.  make it more difficult for organised crime groups to operate by ensuring that genuine businesses will not deal with them and that potential risk takers see 

the risks involved as too great; and, 

d.  make it easier to challenge future non-compliance in tribunals and courts by giving formal knowledge of risks and issues to non-compliant businesses and 

individuals.  

70 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. 

EXPENDITURE 

Background information 

As  OLAF’s  investigations  have  shown,  public  procurement,  which  remains  the  largest  channel  of  public  spending,  is  an  attractive  marketplace  for 
fraudsters, who use corruption and offshore accounts to facilitate fraud. Many procurement fraud cases are transnational, as the new fraud scenarios often 
involve  a  contracting  authority  from  one  Member  State  and  bidders  from  several  other  Member  States  who  subcontract  their  works  to  companies  in 
different countries.  

Over the last five years, 20 % of all reported irregularities have been related to breaches of public procurement rules, accounting for 30 % of all reported 
irregular financial amounts.  

The Public Procurement Directives should have been transposed by 18 April 2016, to introduce a modernised and streamlined legal framework. Eleven 
Member States have yet to transpose the three Public Procurement Directives in full. 

Recommendation 2: 
The Commission calls on the Member States to:  
• Fully transpose Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU and put their implementation high on the political agenda;  
•  Enforce  the  new  Directives  with  a  focus  on  transparency  and  integrity  in  public  procurement,  prevention  and  detection  of  fraud  and 
corruption and better monitoring of public procurement systems;  
•  Make  use  of  the  possibilities  offered  by  simpler  rules  and  fully  realise  the  potential  of  e-procurement,  which  will  become  mandatory  by 
October 2018. 

Questions (Recommendation 2): 

71 

 
 
 
2.1 Did you transpose in full the Directive 2014/23/EU? Yes/No (Please Explain) 

2.2 Did you transpose in full the Directive 2014/24/EU? Yes/No (Please Explain) 

2.3 Did you transpose in full the Directive 2014/25/EU? Yes/No (Please Explain) 

2.4 What kind of measures did you take in order to enhance transparency and integrity in public procurement? Please explain. 

2.5 What kind of measures did you take in order to enhance prevention and detection of fraud and corruption in public procurement? Please explain. 

2.6 What kind of measures did you take in order to ensure the better monitoring of the public procurement system? Please explain. 

2.7 Did you take steps in order to fully realise the potential of e-procurement? Yes/No  

2.8 What kind of steps did you make? Please explain. 

2.9 Do you have any successful practice that you would be ready to share with other Member States? Please explain 

BE 

2.1 

 YES 

  Royal Decree of 25 June 2017 on the awarding of and general implementation rules for concession contracts  
  Law of 17 June 2016 on concession contracts 
  Law  of  17  June  2013  on  the  grounds,  information  and  means  of  redress  in  respect  of  public  works  contracts,  certain  works  contracts, 

supplies contracts and services contracts and concessions (consolidated text) 

2.2 

 YES 

  Law of 17 June 2016 on Public Procurement  
  Royal Decree of 18 April 2017 on the award of public works contracts in the classical sectors   
  Royal Decree of 14 January 2013 laying down the general implementing rules for public procurement 

72 

 
 
2.3 

 YES 

  Law of 17 June 2016 on Public Procurement 
  Royal Decree of 18 June 2017 on awarding public works contracts in special sectors 
  Royal Decree of 14 January 2013 laying down the general implementing rules for public procurement 

2.4  
Contribution VO Department of Agriculture and Fisheries: The law on Public Procurement of 17 June 2016 contains provisions that ensure 
that the principle of equality, non-discrimination, transparency and proportionality are respected. (art.4, 6…) 

2.5  
Contribution VO Department of Agriculture and Fisheries: We organise working groups for measures of EAFRD to communicate guidelines 
concerning compliance with the public procurement and trainings on how to check the compliance of public procurement rules to help the 
implementing services to further develop their control and sanction system for the compliance with the public procurement rules. 

2.6  
Contribution VO Department of Agriculture and Fisheries: 
General:  
eDelta is a registration system for public procurement. The registration of public contracts has become necessary since the new European 
directive.  
On the 21th of January 2016, the commitment was made to enrol the registration system in all Flemish departments.  
The law on Public Procurement of 17 June 2016 also provides provisions in title 4 that are linked to the monitoring. 
Specific: organisation of training course (cfr 2.5). 

2.7 

 YES 

2.8  

73 

 
 
Contribution VO Department of Agriculture and Fisheries: 
The Government of Flanders has since long focused on digital communication, more specifically by deciding on 20 May 2011 that the use of 
e-tendering within the Flemish government will be imposed as of 1 January 2012. 
More information can be found on: https://overheid.vlaanderen.be/beleid-eprocurement. 
This means that the submission of applications and tenders for public contracts from the Flemish government can only be done digitally via 
the online platform e-tendering. 
On 22 June 2012, after an evaluation, the recommendation to impose the electronic procedure for submitting tenders for public procurement 
was  approved  by the  Flemish Government.  The  Government  of Flanders  made  the  recommendation  to the  services  of the  Government  of 
Flanders and to the Flemish institutions to impose on the tenderers the use of electronic means for the submission of tenders for all public 
contracts published from 1 July 2012, with the exception of the two-step procedures. 

2.9 N/A 

BG 

The  new  base  directives  (Directive  2014/24/EU  and  Directive  2014/25/EU),  the  Directive  on  Defence  and  Security  Procurement  and  the 
directives concerning appeals, amended by Directives 2007/66/EC and 2014/23/EU, were incorporated into the Public Procurement Act (ZOP) 
(published SG 13/2016, in force since 15.4.2016).  
Directive 2014/23/EU and the directive on appeals were incorporated into a separate Act: the Concessions Act  (published SG 96/2017, in force 
since 1.1.2018).  
It  should  be  noted  that  in  2014  the  Bulgarian  National  Strategy  on  the  development  of  public  procurement  for  the  period  2014-2020  was 
adopted, and a plan for its implementation approved. The Strategy contains measures to ensure transparency, enhance competition, put an end to 
existing poor practices, etc. A number of implementing actions are also planned.  
Realising the potential of e-procurement is one of the measures included in the National Strategy. The introduction of e-procurement aims at 
improving  the  overall  efficiency  of  public  expenditure,  enhancing  the  transparency  of  procurement  and  improving  the  opportunities  for 
interested parties to participate in public procurement procedures. 

74 

 
 
 
With a view to ensuring greater publicity and transparency in procurement, several national measures have been introduced into the ZOP: 
Procuring entities are required to publish on the buyer’s profile page all documents (decisions, announcements, agreements and others) relating 
to the contracts awarded by them.  
National documents are published alongside European public procurement notices in the Public Procurement Register maintained by the Public 
Procurement Agency. Such documents include decisions on the launch of negotiated procedures without publication of a contract notice. This is 
a specific national decision differing from the provisions of the applicable directives, which do not require the launch of this type of procedure to 
be made public. Another type of document is the notice on the completion of a public procurement contract, in which procuring entities provide 
information on the results of the contract’s performance and the funds disbursed under it.  
Calls for tender for low-value contracts are published on the public procurement portal.  
The extension of the scope of ex ante controls carried out by the Public Procurement Agency is one of the measures included in the National 
Strategy. In this connection, amendments to ex ante controls were introduced in the ZOP, in force since 15 April 2016. Procedures that are to 
undergo ex ante checks are selected at random using a risk-based methodology. The controls apply both in respect of procedures which require 
the publication of information in the Official Journal of the EU and procedures carried out under national procurement rules. They are carried 
out in two steps: before and after the publication of the procedures. The new controls apply also to the technical specifications of the procuring 
entities. When carrying out the controls, the Public Procurement Agency is assisted by external experts in the respective fields. Their names are 
included in a list maintained by the Agency and published on the public procurement portal.  
With  the  goal  of  cooperation  in  preventing  and  combating  conflicts  of  interest  in  public  procurement,  an  agreement  was  concluded  in  2017 
between the Public Procurement Agency, the Commission for the Prevention and Ascertainment of Conflicts of Interest, the Court of Auditors, 
the Public Financial Inspection Agency, the Audit of EU Funds Executive Agency and the AFCOS Directorate. 
With  a  view  to  ensuring  better  market  monitoring,  the  Public  Procurement  Agency  carries  out  checks  of  opened  and  published  public 
procurement procedures selected at random. The procedure for the checks is based on internal guidelines established by the executive director of 
the Agency and published on the public procurement portal.  
In order to perform a comprehensive review and assessment of the Bulgarian public procurement system, an agreement was concluded between 
the Public Procurement Agency and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on 2 November 2017. The agreement is already 
being implemented, and an assessment report will be drawn up with recommendations on the system’s development.  

75 

 
 
Pursuant  to  the  European  directives,  the  Public  Procurement  Agency  will  periodically  draw  up  and  present  to  the  European  Commission  a 
monitoring report with information on the system's functioning. In light of the upcoming report, the Public Procurement Agency has taken the 
necessary organisational measures for the collection of information from the relevant bodies. 
With a view to contributing to the quicker and more efficient performance of functions by government bodies in the area of public procurement, 
the  Public  Procurement  Agency  concluded  cooperation  agreements  with  the  Public  Financial  Inspection  Agency  and  the  Competition 
Commission in 2017. 
By its Decision No 108 of 19 February 2015, the Council of Ministers adopted the model for the creation of a single, centralised platform for the 
development  of  e-procurement  in  Bulgaria,  which  will  be  implemented  through  the  development  of  a  centralised  electronic  platform  and  the 
integration of already existing systems for e-procurement used by the central purchasing bodies. 
The national centralised e-procurement system will be maintained by the Public Procurement Agency. A call for tenders was launched in 2017 
for the selection of a contractor to  build the system. The contract was signed on 15 December 2017, with  the relevant information  published 
accordingly in TED and on the public procurement portal. 
The  single  national  web-based  platform  will  be  built  on  a  modular  principle  in  two  stages.  The  first  stage  includes  the  development  of 
functionalities,  including  for  electronic  submission  and  opening  of  tenders/applications  for  participation.  Modules  such  as  e-registration,  e-
notice, e-submission, exchange of information during the procedure and others are to be developed.  
The second stage will cover functionalities relating to the awarding of public contracts and tracking of contract implementation, including links 
to possible electronic payment systems. It is expected that the second stage will be completed by the end of 2020. It will cover such modules as 
needs planning, selection and assessment of offers, electronic awarding of contracts and contract management etc.  
Training courses for the users of the platform (procuring entities, business operators, control bodies and others) are planned for both stages of the 
project. 
All national institutions using public funds in Bulgaria adhere strictly to the requirements of the Public Procurement Act and the implementing 
rules for the Public Procurement Act, which are harmonised with the legislation at European level. 
2.1 

 YES 

2.2 

 YES 

CZ 

76 

 
 
2.3 

 YES 

2.4  
Transparency is the one of basic principles of public procurement procedures (see Art 6 of the Czech Act of Public Procurement, PPA). 
Czech authorities are obliged to choose suppliers in procurement procedures according to the PPA in case the  estimated value of contract 
exceeds CZK 2 million (supplies, services contracts) or CZK 6 million (work contracts). As obvious, those thresholds are much lower than 
the EU thresholds. 

In  the  Czech  Republic,  transparency  and  integrity  of  public  procurement  is  enhanced  not  only  by  obligatory  electronic  means  of 
communication (see Art. 211 of PPA), but also by use of electronic tools that, in case of some contracting authorities, is obligatory. Within 
electronic tools, the course of procurement procedure is easy to be checked and tracked. 

Among  others,  the  obligatory  storage  of  procurement  procedure  documentation  (see  Art.  216  of  PPA)  can  be  mentioned  as  a  tool  of 
transparency and integrity of procurement procedures as a whole. 

Far beyond the directives, PPA states the obligatory evidence of ownership structure of suppliers by means of the obligation of the suppliers 
- joint-stock companies to have issued exclusively booked shares, the obligation of contracting authorities to check the real owners pursuant 
to the Act on Selected Measures against Legitimisation of Proceeds of Crime and Financing of Terrorism. 

2.5  

The  PPA  is  transposition  of  the  “review”  directives  (89/665/EEC,  92/13/EEC,  2007/66/EU)  and  regulates  all  the  provision  of  those 
directives.  
Shall the review procedure be commenced by the Office for the Protection of Competition, the contracting authority is obliged to provide 
this review body with the procurement procedure documentation. 

77 

 
 
As  mentioned  above,  PPA  states  the  obligation  of  the  suppliers  -  joint-stock  companies  to  have  issued  exclusively  booked  shares  and  of 
contracting authorities to check the real owners of successful suppliers pursuant to the Act on Selected Measures against Legitimisation of 
Proceeds of Crime and Financing of Terrorism. 
Conflict of interests is regulated in the PPA fully in compliance with the procurement directives. It must be mentioned that  long before the 
“package” of procurement directives even came into force, conflict of interest was regulated by Czech laws (the former PPA stated that “the 

members of the evaluation committee shall not be biased in relation to the public contract and the tenderers, they shall, in  particular, not 
engage in drawing up a tender, they shall gain neither any personal advantage nor sustain any harm with a view to the outcome of an award 
procedure, they shall have no personal interest in the award of the public contract and they shall have neither personal nor occupational or 
any  other  relationship  of  this  kind  with  the  tenderers.  The  member  of  the  evaluation  committee  shall  make  a  written  declaration  to  the 
contracting authority in respect of his/her impartiality at the beginning of the initial session of the evaluation committee  at which he/she is 
present for the first time.” 

2.6  

National Electronic Tool or any other electronic tool ensures the better monitoring of public procurement procedures.  
Also, the national Tenders Electronic Daily includes the tools for monitoring (the monitoring itself is a significant and important part of the 
IT system of national Tenders electronic Daily). 
Regarding  the  possibility  of  full  text  search  in  any  electronic  tools  (including  National  Electronic  Tool)  and  in  the  national  Tenders 
Electronic Daily, the “Czech way” of public tenders monitoring can be considered full and absolute.  
The obligatory storage of procurement procedure documentation (see Art. 216 of PPA) may be also considered a tool of monitoring of the 
public procurement system. 

2.7 

 YES 

2.8  

78 

 
 
Electronic means of communication in the procurement procedure is obligatory (effective from the exact dates according the directives). 
Electronic tools, National Electronic Tool is obligatory for some contracting authorities. 
The PPA allows the economic operator to comply with the duty to submit a document by making a reference to relevant information kept in 
the  public  administration  information  system  or  in  a  similar  system  kept  in  another  Member  State  that  enables  unlimited  long-distance 
access. 

2.9  
National Electronic Tool can be considered a helpful tool for procurement procedures administering. 
The  System  of  Certified  Economic  Operators  and  the  List  of  Qualified  Economic  Operators,  tools  for  qualification  proving,  can  be 
recommended (as a tool useful both for contracting authorities and for economic operators. 

DK 

 YES 

 YES 

 YES 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4  

The  Danish  Business  Authority,  MA  for  ERDF  and  ESF  has  produced  eligibility  rules  to  enhance  transparency  and  integrity  in  public 
procurement. The rules should be seen as guidelines. The eligible projects are recommended to follow the guidelines to ensure compliance 
with the law, including transparency and integrity. 

Furthermore,  the  Danish  Business  Authority,  MA  for  ERDF  and  ESF  has  formulated  a  declaration  for  the  purpose  of  procurement.  The 
eligible  projects  are  recommended  to  complete  the  declaration  in  connection  with  each  procurement  to  ensure  compliance  of  the 
procurement process. 

2.5 

79 

 
 
  
The managing authority for the ERDF and the ESF has an action plan that provides a foundation for the overall framework and operations in 
respect of the fight against fraud. The action plan will also improve the prevention and detection of fraud in public procurement. In order to 
improve  the  framework  for  assessing  public  procurement,  the  beneficiary  must  state  in  the  project  accounts  to  which  central  business 
registration number (CVR No) the external expenditure has been paid. A declaration has also been drawn up for use in cases of procurement 
involving values below the threshold values laid down in the Procurement Directive.   

2.6 N/A 

2.7 

 NO 

2.8 N/A 

2.9 N/A 

 YES 

 YES 

 YES 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4  

DE 

The transposition of the three EU Directives on Public Procurement in Germany enhances transparency and integrity in public procurement, e.g. 
by introducing fraud as an obligatory exclusion ground in the procurement law. 
In addition, to make the provisions on the exclusion of bidders in the case of corruption, fraud and other offences more effective in practice and 
to  further  enhance  integrity  in  public  procurement,  Germany  is  establishing  a  national  register  of  unreliable  companies.  In  July  2017  the law 
introducing a so called competition register (“Wettbewerbsregister”) entered into force. The new register will start operating after its technical 
set-up, at the latest in 2020. The aim of this federal register is to provide contracting authorities with the necessary information to decide whether 
a company which takes part in a procurement proceeding has to be excluded from the procedure because the management level of the company 

80 

 
 
has been convicted for economic crimes. The law sets up a register that contains information on final criminal sentences and fines for crimes 
such as money laundering, fraud against the financial interests of the EU, corruption offences or tax evasion. The prosecutor’s office and other 
law enforcement authorities are obliged to submit to the register relevant convictions that can be attributed to a certain company. Contracting 
authorities are then obliged to draw information on bidders from the register before awarding a public contract. That way the register ensures 
that contracting authorities obtain all relevant information to assess whether a bidder should be or has to be excluded from a tender. 

2.5  
The contracting authorities are - according to the new provisions - expressly obliged to examine if an exclusion ground (e.g. fraud or corruption) 
exists before awarding a public contract. To ensure that the contracting authorities have accurate and up-to-date information to assess whether a 
bidder should be or has to be excluded from a tender, Germany is establishing a federal register on unreliable companies (cf. answer on question 
2.4). We expect the new register to have a deterring effect as well and thereby to help prevention of fraud and corruption in public procurement. 

2.6  
We sent the European Commission in April 2017 a monitoring report according to Article 83 of Directive 2017/24/EU. 

2.7 

 YES 

2.8  
We transposed the provision on e-procurement in the EU Directive on time. In addition we introduced an obligation to use e-procurement also 
for public contracts below the thresholds. 
2.9  
The introduction of a national register on unreliable companies (cf. answer to question 2.4). 
2.1 

 YES 

EE 

2.2 

2.3 

 YES  

 YES  

2.4  Every  measure  stipulated  in  the  directives.  In  addition,  96%  of  public  procurement  is  e-procurement,  which  is  extremely  transparent. 

81 

 
 
Nevertheless, the new Public Procurement Act allows even more transparency by defining more clearly which information can be considered to 
be a business secret that cannot be disclosed (see § 111 (5) of the Act). 

https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/505092017003/consolide 
2.5  
Every measure stipulated in the directives. In addition, the Public Procurement Act § 9 (4) p 6 foresees that contracting authorities must provide 
in their procurement rules measures for prevention, identification and remedying of a conflict of interest in public procurement. 
2.6  
96%  of  public  procurement  is  e-procurement,  which  is  carried  out  through  a  centralized  national  register  operated  by  the  state.  This  allows 
excellent monitoring of public procurement, if required. 
2.7 YES  

2.8  
96% is exceptional as it is. Further increase is curtailed by some exemptions to e-procurement stemming from legislation. 
2.9  
The Public Procurement Directives have been transposed on 01.09.2017. Managing Authority have produced new very detailed check-lists how 
to check public procurements co-financed from the structural funds. 
2.1 

 YES 

IE 

2.2 

2.3 

 YES 

 YES 

2.4  
Ireland continues to comply with the obligations constituent to the suite of public procurement Directives, including measures in order to 
enhance transparency and integrity in public procurement. Responsibility for compliance with the (Irish) statutory instrument lies with each 
contracting authority.  

82 

 
 
2.5  
Ireland continues to comply with the obligations constituent to the suite of public procurement Directives, including measures in order to 
enhance  prevention  and  detection  of  fraud  and  corruption  in  public  procurement.  Responsibility  for  compliance  with  the  (Irish)  statutory 
instrument lies with each contracting authority. 

2.6  
Ireland continues to comply with the obligations constituent to the suite of public procurement Directives, including measures in order to 
ensure the better monitoring of the public procurement system. Responsibility for compliance with the (Irish) statutory instrument lies with 
each contracting authority. 

2.7 

 YES 

2.8  
Ireland is working to ensure that the associated e-procurement requirements are met by the deadlines set out in the relevant Directives. 

2.9  
Only those that are set out in the above paragraphs. 

EL 

2.1  YES 

2.2  YES 

2.3  YES 

2.4 
a. Development of risk assessment tools to identify and tackle threats to the smooth operation of the public procurement system. 
b. Drawing up and publishing risk management strategies. 
c. Information/awareness and training on integrity standards and rules of conduct. 

2.5  

83 

 
 
a. Drawing up uniform control standards, integrity standards and codes of conduct for the control bodies. 

2.6  

a. A system for carrying out checks on public works and concessions with assessment of award criteria. 
b. A system for carrying out checks on supplies and services in the health sector with assessment of award criteria. 
c. Measures to strengthen the Public Works Inspectorate (staffing, training etc.). 
c. Measures to strengthen the Health and Welfare Services Inspectorate (staffing, training etc.). 

2.7  NO 

2.8 N/A 

2.9 N/A 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

 YES 

 YES 

 NO  

ES 

Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts and Directive 
2014/24/EU  of  the  European Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  public  procurement  and  repealing  Directive  2004/18/EC,  also  of  26  February 
2014, were transposed into Spanish law by Law 9/2017 of 8 November 2017 on Public-Sector Contracts (LCSP), which was published in the 
Official State Gazette on 9 November 2017. The LCSP will enter into force four months after it was published, with certain exceptions.  
As regards the transposition of Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014, it should be noted that 
the draft law on procurement procedures in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, which transposes into Spanish law Directive 
2014/25/EU (registry number 121/000003), is currently passing through the Congress of Deputies and the deadline for tabling amendments has 
now expired. The text of the draft law and the tabled amendments can be found on the website of the Congress of Deputies (www.congreso.es). 

84 

 
 
 
2.4  
Some of the key measures in the new LCSP are listed below: 
1)  For  the  first  time,  the  principle  of  integrity  is  expressly  referred  to  (in  Article  1),  as  a  principle  that  should  guide  the  interpretation  and 
application of the provisions of the LCSP. 
2) The new LCSP introduces new and more detailed rules concerning the profile of the contracting body. The new rules give the contracting 
body a key role in terms of publicising the various procedural acts and phases relating to each entity's contracts. 
3)  It  will  no  longer  be  possible  to  use  the  negotiated  procedure  (currently  the  tendering  procedure  with  negotiation)  based  on  volume;  this 
procedure will remain in place only in the circumstances provided for in the Directive. As a result, this procedure should be used less frequently, 
thereby improving transparency and competition. 
More  detailed  rules  have  also  been  introduced  for  the  negotiated  procedure,  with  a  view  to  ensuring  that  -  across  the  board  -  there  is  real 
negotiation of the terms of the contract to prevent this procedure from becoming something akin to a direct award. 
4) The new LCSP lowers the thresholds below which contracts can be awarded directly without any sort of tender procedure (contracts of lesser 
value).  
These thresholds are lowered from EUR 50 000 to EUR 40 000 for public works contracts, and from EUR 18 000 to EUR 15 000 for supply and 
services contracts. 
5) In-house providers must meet a greater number of requirements if awards made to them are to remain outside the scope of application of the 
LCSP (and contracts can therefore be awarded without a tender procedure). The aim here is to prevent improper use of in-house providers as a 
means of avoiding tender procedures, which undermines the principles of transparency and free competition. 
6) The tender procedure has been tightened up for awarding bodies that are not public authorities.  
Specifically,  when  these  bodies  enter  into  contracts  that  are  not  subject  to  harmonised  rules  (i.e.  those  where  the  contract  value  is  below  the 
threshold set by EU Directives), the award procedures that apply to public authorities will also apply to them; this means it will no longer be 
possible for bodies that are not public authorities to approve their own internal procurement rules and for each body to decide how to run its own 
tender procedures. 
This will require significant efforts to harmonise the procurement rules that apply to public-sector bodies and an extension to those bodies of the 
guarantees and checks that already apply to public authorities, even when the contracts are below the thresholds set in the Directive. 

85 

 
 
Furthermore, and for the first time, the new LCSP sets out rules concerning the effects and the termination of the contracts entered into by those 
bodies, as regards aspects such as amendments to the contracts and transfers and subcontracting. 
7) Political parties, trade unions and business organisations and professional associations are included in the subjective scope of the LCSP, as are 
foundations and associations with links to any of the above, if they meet the criteria to be considered awarding bodies. 

2.5  

Some of the key measures are: 

1) The new LCSP introduces a special rule on the fight against corruption and the prevention of conflicts of interest, obliging contracting bodies 
to  take  the  necessary  measures  to  combat  fraud,  favouritism  and  corruption,  and  to  prevent,  detect  and  effectively  address  any  conflicts  of 
interest that may arise in a procurement procedure. To this end, the concept of conflict of interest has been expanded. 

2) Secondly, the LCSP reinforces special appeals relating to procurement procedures in two ways:  
a) Firstly, appeals can be brought for contracts of a lower value than was previously the case, and the thresholds are now below those set by the 
EU Directives. Specifically, once the LCSP enters into force, it will be possible to bring an appeal against the acts covered by the LCSP when 
they relate to (i) contracts for works with an estimated value of over EUR 3 000 000; (ii) supply and service contracts with an estimated value of 
over EUR 100 000; and (iii) concessions of works and services with an estimated value of over EUR 3 000 000.  
b) Secondly, appeals may be brought in a wider range of situations; for example, an appeal may be brought in the case of an award to an in-
house  provider  when  the  legal  requirements  are  not  met.  It  will  also  be  possible  to  challenge  amendments  to  specific  administrative  clauses 
(whether or not these were set out in the tender specification), when it appears that these amendments should have been the subject of a new 
tender, as well as concession buy-back agreements.  

3) The new law retains the extended list of offences that if committed lead to a ban on entering into public-sector contracts. This list, which was 
extended when the law was last amended, includes corruption involving private individuals, illegal financing of political parties, perversion of 
the course of justice, and involvement in negotiations and activities in which public officials may not engage. 

86 

 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, as regards the ban on contracting due to incompatibility or conflict of interest, the new law retains the extension to relatives in the 
ascending and descending lines and second-degree relatives of the person directly involved in the situation that gives rise to the ban. 

4) Contract award committees have been made more professional, and are now defined as a specialist technical body. It will not be possible for 
public representatives (politicians) or their temporary or management staff to be members of a contract award committee, in order to ensure there 
is no political influence on the committee’s decisions (its work includes assessing the administrative documents, ranking the bids and proposing 
the award of the contract). 
Nor  will  it  be  possible  for  anyone  involved  in  drafting  technical  documents  relating  to  the  contract  to  be  a  member  of  the  contract  award 
committee, in order to guarantee a proper separation of duties. 

5) Contracting bodies are required to regularly submit information to the Court of Auditors, and they must submit contracts worth over a certain 
amount. In addition, the new LCSP makes it mandatory to submit an overview of all other contracts entered into, including contracts of lesser 
value, listed by tenderer. 

2.6  

The new LCSP establishes a new system of public governance geared towards combating fraud and corruption.  

- To this end, the LCSP establishes the Independent Office for the Regulation and Monitoring of Public Procurement (Oficina Independiente de 
Regulación  y  Supervisión  de  la  Contratación  Pública).  Focusing  on  the  area  of  public  procurement,  the  Office  will  ensure  that  legislation  is 
applied  correctly,  and  in  particular  will  promote  competition  and  combat  unlawful  activity.  It  will  be  fully  independent  both  in  terms  of  its 
structure and its operations. 

-  The  Independent  Office  for  the  Regulation  and  Monitoring  of  Public  Procurement  will  be  responsible  for  approving  the  National  Public 
Procurement  Strategy,  which  will  be  binding  on  the  public  sector.  Covering  a  four-year  period,  it  will  set  out  the  measures  needed  to  meet 
objectives  such  as  combating  corruption,  increasing  the  professionalisation  of  those  involved  in  public  procurement,  promoting  economic 

87 

 
 
 
 
efficiency,  rolling  out  e-procurement,  using  public  procurement  to  support  environmental,  social  and  innovation  policies,  and  promoting  the 
participation of SMEs in public procurement. 

Using  the  information  gathered  through  all  its  monitoring  activities,  it  will  draft  an  annual  report  that  will  be  published  on  the  Public 
Procurement Platform. 

- The National Assessment Office (Oficina Nacional de Evaluación) will be established within the Independent Office for the Regulation and 
Monitoring  of  Public  Procurement.  It  will  be  tasked  with  assessing  the  financial  sustainability  of  contracts  for  concessions  of  works  and 
contracts for concessions of services. 

- The State Advisory Board on Public Procurement (Junta Consultiva de Contratación Pública del Estado)  which, as  well as  performing  the 
traditional  duties  of  the  Advisory  Board  on  Administrative  Procurement,  is  being  established  as  a  key  contact  point  for  cooperation  with  the 
European Commission. As a result, it will take on a supervisory role, and will be responsible for submitting a report on all the awarding bodies 
to the European Commission every three years. This report will contain the information in the monitoring report drawn up by the Independent 
Office  for  the  Regulation  and  Monitoring,  information  on  the  level  of  SME  participation,  details  of  the  bodies  tasked  with  fulfilling  the 
obligations stemming from EU law and the obligation laid down in Article 328. 

-  Furthermore,  within  the  Board,  a  new  Public  Procurement  Cooperation  Committee  (Comité  de  cooperación  en  materia  de  contratación 
pública) will be established. Representatives of the Autonomous Communities and of the largest association or federation of local authorities 
will be members of the Committee, which will be responsible for ensuring coordination in public procurement at all levels of the public sector 
(at national, Autonomous Community and local level). It will also be tasked with drafting the National Public Procurement Strategy. 

2.7 

 YES 

2.8  
The new LCSP (15th additional provision) includes a general obligation to ensure that only electronic methods are used for notifications and 
communication at every stage of the procurement procedure, including for the submission of tenders and requests to participate. 

88 

 
 
FR 

2.9 N/A 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

 YES 

 YES 

 YES 

2.4 N/A 

2.5 N/A 

2.6 
As set out by France as an additional measure in the PIF 2016 questionnaire, the Directives have been fully transposed into national law in the 
following legislation:  

  Order No 2015-899 of 23 July 2015 on public procurement, supplemented by two implementing decrees: Decree No 2016-360 of 25 March 2016 
on  public  procurement  and  Decree  No 2016-361  of  25  March  2016  on  defence  or  security  procurement,  which  entered  into  force  on  1 
April 2016;  

  Order  No 2016-65  of  29  January  2016  on  concession  contracts  and  implementing  decree  No 2016-86  of  1 February 2016.  The  Order,  which 
entered into force on 1 April 2016, includes the provisions on tendering bans contained in the Directive (Articles 39, 40 and 42 of the Order);  
  Order No 2015-899 of 23 July 2015 on public procurement and Order No 2016-65 of 29 January 2016 on concession contracts have been ratified 

by Law No 2016-1691 of 9 December 2016 on transparency, combating corruption and modernising economic life.  
The transposition of the ‘public procurement’ Directives (Directive 2014/24/EU and Directive 2014/25/EU) provided an opportunity to build on 
the procedures currently in place, in particular: 

  by  specifying  that  the  final  conviction  on  corruption  charges  of  a  member  of  an  administrative,  management  or  supervisory  body  of  a  legal 
person,  or  of  a  natural  person  who  has  powers  of  representation,  decision-making  or  control  therein,  shall  lead  to  the  exclusion  from  public 
procurement procedures of that legal person, as long as the natural person is performing these functions; 

  by enhancing transparency through the obligation to disclose any amendments that are made;  

89 

 
 
  by reproducing the definition of conflict of interest as set out in the European ‘public procurement’ Directives 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU, as 
well as all the measures provided for by these directives to restore normality (in particular, exclusion of persons who are subject to a conflict of 
interest when the situation cannot be effectively remedied by less intrusive measures). 
Moreover, Law No 2016-731 of 3 June 2016 enhancing  the fight against organised crime, terrorism and the  financing thereof, and improving 
effectiveness and safeguards in criminal proceedings, has introduced new tendering bans for public procurement and concession contracts for 
defence or security. Individuals who have been convicted by final judgement of arms trafficking under one of the offences referred to in Articles 
L. 222-52 to L. 222-59 of the Criminal Code (cf. Article 46 of Order No 2015-889 and Article 40 of Order No 2016-65) may no longer conclude 
such contracts. 
The Law on Ethical Conduct of 20 April 2016 has introduced the concept of ethics into the Staff Regulations of French civil servants, along with 
a number of provisions for combating conflicts of interest and preventing attempted fraud or corruption (provisions on declaring the interests and 
assets of senior civil servants, preventive measures, support measures). 
The issue of corruption and of the fight against it is essentially tackled through tendering bans, namely by excluding from the procedure those 
persons: 

  who have been convicted by final judgement on corruption charges; 
  who have attempted to influence the decision of a public purchaser; or 
  who have caused distortion of competition. 

In  cases  where  the  law  so  provides  and  which  relate  to  convictions  for  involvement  in  a  criminal  organisation,  corruption,  fraud  or  money 
laundering,  and  also  in  cases  of  professional  misconduct  or  false  declarations,  the  judge  may  impose  a  ban  on  taking  part  in  public  tenders. 
Persons who may be subject to a ban on this basis are those ‘who have, in the last five years, received a final conviction for one of the offences 
provided for (...) in Article 433-1 [active corruption practices and trading in influence], (...) in Article 435-2 [active corruption of EU officials 
and officials of Member States], (...) of the Criminal Code’. This rule stems from the public procurement directives themselves, which require a 
‘final  judgement’.  This  replicates  the  requirement  contained  in  the  Agreement  on  Government  Procurement  (GPA)  concluded  within  the 
framework of the WTO. 

90 

 
 
 
The  fight  against  corruption  and  fraud  in  public  procurement  is  also  underpinned  by  factors  that  are  not  specific  to  rules  governing  public 
procurement, such as:  
• fast and effective redress mechanisms before the administrative court (pre-contractual interim relief in particular), with stronger powers for the 
judge, open to any person who may wish to contest a public-contract award decision; 
• services focused on the detection of corruption cases (the TRACFIN Financial Intelligence Unit and, to a lesser extent, the regional chambers 
of  accounts)  and  the  prosecution  thereof  (in  particular  the  National  Financial  Prosecutor,  established  by  Organic  Law  No 1115-2013  of 
6 December 2013);  
• protection procedures for people reporting corruption, pursuant to Law No 2007-1598 of 13 November 2007 on the fight against corruption and 
Article 35 of Law No 1117-2013 of 6 December 2013 on the fight against tax fraud and serious economic and financial crime; 
the fact that a conviction for breach of probity (and in particular for corruption) may, as an additional penalty, lead to a prohibition on holding 
elected  office,  and  thus  the  inability  to  participate  in  public  procurement  procedures,  the  exclusion  of  convicted  businesses  from  public 
procurement, etc. Accordingly, ever since the version issued with the circular dated 29 December 2009, the ‘public procurement good practice 
guide’, drawn up by the Legal Affairs Department of the Economic and Finance Ministries, has contained specific recommendations on the fight 
against corruption.  
The guide reminds readers that a corruption conviction will result in a ban on taking part in tendering procedures, and also  recommends that 
public purchasers adopt a code of practice governing the conduct of both their purchasing departments and final decision-makers. For example, it 
contains rules relating to bans on accepting gifts or invitations, the need to disclose connections of any kind between a public servant and a given 
supplier  and  the  requirement  for  purchasing  managers  to  take  sufficient  leave,  as  well  as  rules  relating  to  accessing,  securing  and  storing  all 
documents that record communications with suppliers.  
This information is repeated in the ‘Handbook on Public Procurement’, which was made available online on 7 July 2015 by the Legal Affairs 
Department and brings together the following: the September 2014 version of the public procurement good practice guide; datasheets for the 
contracting  authorities;  tables  of  advertising,  procedures  and  deadlines;  and  flowcharts  of  procedures  (diagrams  of  the  steps  in  the  different 
public procurement procedures). 
2.7 

 NO 

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HR 

2.8 N/A 

2.9 N/A 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

 YES 

 YES 

 YES 

2.4  
All public procurement notices are published on a single portal - Electronic Public Procurement Classifieds (EPPC) in the Official Gazette. 
Since mid-2016, the bids in public procurement procedures have been submitted electronically. Also, in order to raise transparency in the 
EPPC, three new modules were created. From 1. January 2018, the contracting authorities and entities have the obligation to publish:  
- procurement plans 
- contracts registers 
- Public Consultation on Tender Documents prior to the formal commencement of the public procurement procedure. 
2.5  
Measures are explained under point 2.4. 
2.6  
Measures are explained under point 2.4. 
In addition, Ministry of Regional Development and EU funds as the Managing Authority for the Operational programme „Competitiveness 
and  Cohesion“  (further  in  the  text:  MRDEUF)  has  developed  within  the  Common  National  Rules  detailed  checklists  for  verifying  public 
procurement procedures. Also, MRDEUF has established the network of coordinators for irregularity management and network for  public 
procurement at the level of the operational programme, which the aim of improving the management and control systems of ESI funds in the 
Republic  of  Croatia  and  preventing  irregularities  deriving  primarily  from  the  public  procurement  procedures.  MRDEUF  in  the  role  of 
Managing  Authority  provides  the  bodies  in  the  management  and  control  system  for  the  Operational  programme  ‘Competitiveness  and 
Cohesion’  with  the  advice  and  recommendations  regarding  public  procurement  procedures  in  the  context  of  verifying  that  part  of  project 

92 

 
 
 
activities financed from EU funds. 

2.7 

 YES 

2.8  
Public  procurement  is  electronic  at  the  stage  of:  publishing  notices  and  other  procurement  documents,  communication,  bidding,  public 
opening  of  the  bids  and  appellant  procedure.  Also, Electronic Public  Procurement  Classifieds (EPPC) is connected  to  the  public registers 
(judicial  and  crafts  register,  criminal  records  and  tax  administration),  which  enables  contracting  authorities  and  entities  to  carry  out 
verification of the selected bidder without having to seek certificates and evidence. In addition, the law on E-invoicing in public procurement 
is being drafted. Its entry into force is expected in 2018. 
2.9  
Electronic public procurement on a single platform enables the production of an annual statistical report and the availability of data that are 
essential for monitoring the system and taking action to correct irregularities. This statistical report includes all public  procurement, above 
and below the EU thresholds. 
2.1 

 YES 

IT 

 YES 

 YES 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4  

Contribution of the Customs and Monopolies Agency: 
National law requires tendering information to be published on the Agency’s website. This information includes: 
• 
• 
• 
• 

Exploratory opinions; 
Decisions to contract; 
Tender specifications; 
Notices of exclusion; 

93 

 
 
Notices of appointment of tender committees; 
Contract award notices; 
Summary tables. 

• 
• 
• 
To  this  end,  the  Customs  and  Monopolies  Agency  has  issued  provisions  highlighting  the  need  to  ensure  a  prompt  and  regular  flow  of 
information,  while  requiring  those  in  charge  of  spending  bodies  to  publish  on  the  website,  in  a  timely  manner,  all  documentation  relating  to 
negotiation  activities.  The  Agency  oversees  the  publication  of  the  documentation  in  accordance  with  Legislative  Decree  No 33/2013,  as 
amended. 

Contribution of the Agency for Territorial Cohesion 
The Agency for Territorial Cohesion has adopted acts and measures on compliance with existing administrative transparency laws. With regard 
to  public  procurement  and  within  its  areas  of  responsibility,  the  Agency  for  Territorial  Cohesion  ensures  the  regular  publication  of  all  acts 
relating to the scheduling of work, services and supplies, and public tender award procedures for services, supplies and work, as required by law. 

2.5 

Contribution of the Customs and Monopolies Agency: 
The Customs and Monopolies Agency has taken the following measures in this area:  

 

 

instructions and guidelines, including specific operating instructions and guidelines on the requirement to use the ‘Consip’ system, on 
framework agreements and on the electronic market (tools to ensure greater cost-effectiveness and transparency of award procedures, 
pursuant to Article 26 of Law 488 of 23 December 1999 and Article 58 of Law 388/2000); 

  application of automated tools to support operational activities, which can be used to harmonise behaviour and monitor procedures; 
  distribution of responsibilities within offices with the definition of internal organisational staff (department/section heads) able to 

coordinate subgroups of homogeneous activities; 

  provisions to ensure the transparency and accessibility of information relating to decisions reached by the authority at the stage when the 
contractor is selected, so as to allow - in accordance with recent laws on transparency - the ‘accounting and purchase’ support system to 

94 

 
 
 
 

automatically collect the information that must be published every six months (pursuant to Article 23 of Legislative Decree No 33/2013) 
and annually (pursuant to Article 1(32) of Law No 190/2012); 
instructions aimed at ensuring that procurement procedures comply with ANAC guidelines and the provisions of Law 190/2012 (on the 
inclusion of a template integrity agreement in the tender documentation, to be signed by the legal representatives of economic operators 
in order to participate in the procurement procedure) and the Three-Yearly Corruption Prevention Plan adopted by the Agency, including 
by means of pre-prepared template declarations to prevent potential conflicts of interest; 

  operating rules relating to the new Public Procurement Code (Legislative Decree No 50/2016) and the ANAC guidelines; 
  approval of the Agency's Two-Yearly Programme of Goods and Services and the Three-Yearly Work Plan, within the meaning of 

Article 21 of the new Public Procurement Code; 
  verification of operators’ requisite self-certifications; 
 
training activity for buyers at central and local level. 

Contribution of the Agency for Territorial Cohesion: 

The Agency for Territorial Cohesion has adopted a special Three-Yearly Corruption Prevention Plan (2017-2019). This Plan is the instrument 
laid down by Law No 190/2012 (Article 1(8)), under which the administration defined an anti-corruption strategy. This Plan first analyses the 
activities  of  the  Agency  and  its  processes,  organisation  and  practices,  in  order  to  identify  possible  exposure  to  corruption.  Based  on  the 
identification of high-risk areas, as well as cross-cutting and further prevention measures, a programme of activities has been outlined to prevent, 
reduce and neutralise corruption. 
With  specific  reference  to  the  regulations  on  procurement,  the  new  legislation  states  that:  ‘The  compulsory  National  Register  of  members  of 
selection  boards  in  tendering  procedures  for  the  award  of  public  contracts  shall  be  set  up  within  the  National  Anti-Corruption  Authority 
(ANAC), which shall manage and update it according to appropriately identified criteria’. In any event, the entry into force  of the Register is 
postponed  until  the  adoption  of  an  ANAC  Regulation  governing  the  computerised  procedures  for  guaranteeing  a  random  selection,  the 
conformity  of  the  required  professional  skills,  the  rotation  of  experts,  and  the  means  of  communication  between  the  Authority,  contracting 

95 

 
 
 
 
 
authorities and tender committees, while also establishing the time limit of the transitional period from which the obligation to use the Register is 
triggered. 
The measures that have been adopted for first-level controls include administrative checks on all procedures and expenses and the presence of 
specific  control  items  in  the  field  of  public  procurement  within  the  checklists  aimed  at  assessing  the  functioning  of  the  internal  controls 
implemented by the beneficiary. 

The Agency for Territorial Cohesion, in compliance with the legal provisions (Decree of the General Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office of 
9.7.2014  on  the  procedure  for  reporting  malpractice  and  irregularities.  Rules  for  the  protection  of  civil  servants  who  report  malpractice 
(whistleblowers)) and taking into account the ‘Guidelines for the protection of civil servants who report malpractice (whistleblowers)’ issued by 
the ANAC in Decision No 6 of 28 April 2015, also has a form dedicated to so-called whistleblowing, for the reporting of alleged malpractice by 
employees. 

Contribution by the Guardia di Finanza (Finance Police): 

The  Guardia  di  Finanza,  with  the  help  of  EU  funds,  has  set  up  an  IT  platform  to  conduct  targeted  risk analyses  in  this  area,  with  the  aim  of 
improving the system for tackling fraud and other offences committed against the public authorities in the field of public procurement. 

Once  it  is  operational,  this  application  (named  ‘Mo.Co.P’  or  ‘Monitoraggio  Contratti  Pubblici’  -  monitoring  of  public  contracts),  which  is 
currently being  tested, will be used by Guardia di  Finanza units operating in  the regions covered by the ‘convergence’ objective of the EU’s 
2007-2013 financial programme. 

2.6  

Contribution of the Customs and Monopolies Agency: 

The  Three-Yearly  Corruption  Prevention  Plan  adopted  by  the  Customs  and  Monopolies  Agency  addresses  the  requirement  to  monitor 
relationships  between  the  authorities  and  taxable  persons  that  enter  into  contracts  with  them  or  who  are  involved  in  procedures  for  the 
authorisation,  granting  or  disbursement  of  economic  benefits  of  any  kind,  while  verifying  any  family  or  affinity  relationships  between  the 

96 

 
 
 
owners, directors, partners and employees of the same taxable persons and the managers and employees of the authorities. 
Provisions have therefore been taken to ensure that all those involved in the procedure in any capacity (from preparing the tender documentation, 
through  taking  part  in  the  awarding  committee,  to  testing  and  verifying  the  proper  implementation  of  the  contract)  make  the  appropriate 
certifying declarations pursuant to Article 46 of Presidential Decree No 445/2000, whereby they declare that they have no marital, cohabitation, 
family or affinity relationship up to the second degree with the owners, directors, partners or employees of companies that may be interested 
taking part in the tender (in the first phase of the procedure) or companies that compete in or win the tender (in subsequent phases) and that, in 
the  last  two  years,  they  have  not  entered  into  any  private  contracts  with  the  same  companies,  except  those  concluded  within  the  meaning  of 
Article 1342 of the Civil Code. 
Moreover, pursuant to Article 46 of Presidential Decree No 445/2000, before executing the contract the appropriate certifying statements must 
be signed by the legal representative of the winning company, declaring that: 

 

 

its employees, consultants or associates do not include any persons already employed in any capacity by the Customs and Monopolies 
Agency who, having left service less than three years previously, exercised authoritative or negotiating powers in the last three years of 
service (pursuant to Article 35-ter of Legislative Decree 165/2001); 
there  are  no  marital,  cohabitation,  family  or  affinity  relationships  up  to  the  second  degree  with  managers  or  holders  of  positions  of 
responsibility within the Agency. 

The Agency carries out spot checks based on these statements, cross-checking with the available databases. 

Contribution of the Agency for Territorial Cohesion: 

The Agency for Territorial Cohesion recently entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with ANAC, for the ‘identification of corruption 
risk indicators and indicators for preventing and combating corruption in public administrations’.  
The Memorandum, which was entered into together with other authorities, aims to: 

  promote  the  implementation  of  the  project  entitled  ‘Identification  of  corruption  risk  indicators  and  indicators  for  preventing  and 

combating corruption in public administrations’, which covers the following: 

o  cooperation  in  carrying  out  the  activities  envisaged  by  the  project  and,  in  particular,  the  creation  and  supply  of  the  databases 

designed to allow indicators to be calculated;  

o  participation in the definition of the relevant indicators, at the stages when they are identified, evaluated, tested and monitored, as 

set out in the project proposal;  

97 

 
 
 
 
  Guaranteeing  the  production  and  publication  of  statistical  data  and  indicators  on  the  corruption  risk  and  on  measures  to  prevent  and 
combat  it,  based  on  structured  information  reports  provided  beforehand  by  the  signatory  authorities  and  by  other  institutions  and 
organisations that may eventually sign the Memorandum. The activities must be carried out so as to ensure, even after the completion of 
the project implementing them for the first time, the periodic updating of the information forming the basis of the system of indicators 
identified,  which  must  be  provided  with  data  automatically  and  regularly,  as  far  as  possible,  in  order  to  guarantee  its  economic  and 
organisational sustainability over time. 

  Supporting the development of further relevant areas of cooperation that the parties will be able to identify during the implementation of 

the project. 
 YES 

2.7 

2.8  
Department for European Policies (PCM): 
Italy is developing a national plan for e-procurement that provides for the full implementation of EU law on e-procurement and the strengthening 
of the use of e-procurement tools. 
Contribution of the Customs and Monopolies Agency: 
Provisions (Decree-Law No 95 of 2012) have been issued laying down a requirement for public authorities to carry out procurement by means of 
the  arrangements  referred  to  in  Article 26(1)  of  Law No 488/1999  or  the  other  e-procurement  tools  made  available  by  the  central  purchasing 
body (Consip) and regional purchasing bodies. 
2.9 N/A 

CY 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

 YES 

 YES 

 YES 

2.4  
Our e-procurement system has been upgraded so when tenders are submitted electronically, upon opening, a Table is automatically filled in with 
details of the name of the participating tenderers and their prices.  The table is automatically published and available to all system users. 

98 

 
 
2.5  
- Electronic submission for contracts above the EU thresholds has been made compulsory as from 2015 and in the current year this will also 
apply for contracts below EU thresholds. This measure reduces the risk of any possible fraudulent actions occurring during the opening of the 
tenders. 
- All competitions (for below and above the EU thresholds) are published on the system and the relevant tender documents are uploaded in the e-
procurement  system  so  all  interested  economic  operators  can  download  them,  free  of  charge,  and  can  submit  their  questions  thereon.  All 
clarifications and addenda are also published. 
Trainings were organised to enhance prevention and detection of fraud and corruption in Public procurement. 
2.6  
A single procurement portal is used where all competitions are published (above and below EU thresholds) and at the same time all procurement 
information  (tender  documents,  addendums,  clarifications,  submissions,  awards  etc)  is  concentrated  in  one  place,  facilitating  access  to  all 
stakeholders  including  the  Auditor  General,  the  Attorney  General  and  the  Accountant  General  as  the  Competent  Authority  for  Public 
Procurement in Cyprus. 
For procurements undertaken in the concept of co-financed projects, the Public Procurement Directorate (PPD) is involved in the certification of 
the  procurement  procedure  undertaken  for  all  procurements  above  EU  thresholds.    The  certification  covers  the  tender  documents  used,  the 
addenda issued, the contract assignment and an assessment of need for negotiated procedures.  For procurements below the EU thresholds, the 
PPD has drafted self-assessment checklists to be filled in by all contracting authorities.  Contracts below the thresholds are then verified on a 
sample basis by Intermediate Bodies involved in the management of the Funds using special checklists drafted by the PPD. 
2.7 

 YES 

2.8  
Please see responses above (2.4 – 2.6). 
Additionally, e-catalogues have been set up through the e procurement system. 
2.9  
Framework  Agreements  of  various  commonly  used  items  are  carried  out  centrally  based  on  which  contracting  authorities/entities  do  their 
purchases. A parameter, among others, that has rendered this practice necessary, possible and successful is the small size of Cyprus, as many 
contracting authorities are small and lack resources and expertise to conduct their own competitions. 
Through  these  agreements,  those  small  sized  contracting  authorities  which  do  not  have  the  necessary  capacity  and  expertise  are  benefited  by 
concentrated  volumes  and  expertise  and  at  the  same  time  the  larger  contracting  authorities/entities  utilise  their  resources  on  the  tendering 

99 

 
 
procedures necessary to cover more specific needs. 

LV 

 YES 

 YES 

 YES 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4  

  All procurement notices are published on one website - Procurement Monitoring Bureau’s website. Also in future all procurement 

documents will be available on one website – Electronic procurement system’s website. 
  From October 1, 2017 gradual transition to electronic submission of applications and tenders. 
  Conditions for on exclusion of candidate or tenderer can be check by contracting authority on on-line database. 
  All contracts exceeding the EU thresholds must be published on the website of the contracting authority. However, if the contract is 

below EU thresholds it is mandatory to publish information on type of the contract (public works, goods or services), date of entering 
into the contract and validity period, subject-matter of the contract, supplier and contract price. 
It is mandatory to publish information on planned public procurements on Electronic Procurement System’s website within a month after 
the annual budget is approved.  

 

  Contracting authority is required to document each stage of the procurement procedure and publish report on contracting authority's web 
page. Report shows the progress of the procurement procedure. Also notice must be prepared for each procurement after taking of a 
decision on the results of procedure and issued within three days after it is required. 

2.5  
 

In new Public procurement law we have widened meaning of conflict of interests. We have included requirement that contracting 
authority exclude a candidate or tenderer from participation in a procurement procedure if person that drafted public procurement 
documentation is connected with candidate or tenderer. 

  Procurement Monitoring Bureau is entitled to impose administrative penalties for those members of the procurement committee who fails 
to respect a conflict of interest. It is mandatory to establish a procurement committee, which consists of at least three members and if the 
estimated contract price of a procurement is exceeds 1 000 000 euro - at least five members. Also all members of procurement committee 
are public officials and must submit declarations to State Revenue Service and then if necessary State Revenue Service, Corruption 

100 

 
 
Prevention and Combatting Bureau of Latvia and State Police can check these declarations. 

2.6  
Procurement  Monitoring  Bureau  compiles  statistics  from  contracting  authorities  announcements  of  the  procurement.  As  well  as  contracting 
authority  is  required  to  submit  statistical  surveys  to  the  Procurement  Monitoring  Bureau.  Transition  to  e-procurement  system  will  give 
opportunity to have more detailed information on statistics. 
2.7 

 YES 

2.8  
The contracting authority foresees electronic submission of applications and tenders: 
 - From October 1, 2017 to procurement procedures whose estimated contract price is above EU threshold; 
 - From April 1, 2018 to procurement procedures whose estimated contract price is below EU threshold; 
 - From January 1, 2019 to all procurement procedures. 
Contracting authority in e-procurement system can check the conditions for exclusion of candidate or tenderer directly from on-line databases, 
but only if candidate or tenderer is registered in Latvia.  
 In addition, we are working on implementing e-invoicing in our legal system. 
2.9  
Contracting  authority  using  on-line  databases  can  obtain  electronic  reference  on  conditions  for  exclusion  of  candidate  or  tenderer.  This  and 
ESPD reduces administrative burden to contracting authority. 
2.1 

 YES 

LT 

2.2 

2.3 

 YES 

 YES 

2.4  
Besides  the  EU-wide  publication  of  notices,  the  contracting  authority  shall  publish  the  notices  in  the  Central  Information  System  of  Public 
Procurement (CISPP). In addition, the notices may be published on the Internet website of the contracting authority and in other publications as 
well as elsewhere on the Internet. 
According  to  the  Law  on  Public  Procurement  of  the  Republic  of  Lithuania  and  the  Law  on  Procurement  by  Entities  operating  in  the  Water, 

101 

 
 
Energy, Transport or Postal Services Sectors of the Republic of Lithuania, the contracting authorities also have to publicize information about 
the  planned  public  procurements,  as  well  as  tenders  of  the  successful  tenderers  (except  confidential  information),  contracts  awarded  and 
amendments of the contracts in the CISPP. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  CISPP  provides  electronic  means  for  conducting  public  procurement  procedures  electronically.  Contracting 
authorities are obliged to carry out all procedures electronically (except very limited cases listed in the Law). 
Contracting authorities can publicize the drafts of technical specifications in the CISPP. 
The tenderers can submit the encoded tenders via the CISPP. The tenderers shall submit the codes for encoding their tenders just in time when 
the time limit set for submission of them expires. 
The candidates have the right to get familiarised with the winning tender or his request to participate, except confidential information. 
Contracting authorities can invite observers from other state and municipalities institutions to participate in the meetings of Public Procurement 
Commission. 
The mentioned measures bring more transparency to public procurement. 
2.5  

National law transposes the requirements of the Directives, and establishes the “blacklisting” of suppliers that fail to present information on the 
compliance with the requirements set in tender documents or present fraudulent information. 
Other measures to enhance prevention and detection of fraud and corruption in public procurement, are: 
  establishing an obligation to sign an impartiality pledge and confidentiality declaration and foreseeing the means in case of possible conflict 
of interest: Public Procurement Law, Art. 21, establishes that in order to prevent conflicts of interests, each employee of the contracting 
authority or a subject that conducts ancillary purchasing activities, member of the Procurement Commission, procurement expert, observer 
that participates in procurement procedure or can influence its outcomes must sign the confidentiality and impartiality declarations before 
they start performing the assigned functions in the procurement. 
In case the contracting authority receives information that any of the above-mentioned subjects may be in a situation of conflict of interests 
and did not abstain from decision making or observing the procedures, the head of contracting authority or another authorized person halts 
the subject’s performance and investigates the subject’s activities. If the investigation shows that the situation of conflict of interests indeed 
exists, contracting authority excludes that subject from further participation in decision making or observation of procedures and evaluates if 
there is a ground for supplier’s exclusion, as it is established in PPL Art. 46 (4)(2) (the supplier is excluded if it appears in a situation of 

 

102 

 
 
conflict of interests and the situation can’t be rectified. The situation is regarded as such if subjects in a conflict of interest had influence on 
Commission’s or contracting authority’s decisions and changing those decisions would be contrary to the requirements of PPL). If it is the 
observer that happens to be in a conflict of interests, contracting authority also must inform the institution/organization that authorized the 
observer’s participation in the procedures about the decisions regarding him/her; 

  establishing a wider spectrum of persons obliged to declare their interests: the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests in 
Public Service, Art. 4, requires that members of the Procurement Commission, procurement experts and experts, participating in the 
procedure, would present a declaration on their private and public interests which entails such information as concluded contracts, 
participation in associations, etc. (there was no such obligation before as far public procurement officials are concerned); 

  educating public procurement experts on the subject matter: Public Procurement Office has prepared Guidelines on Ethical Conduct in Public 

Procurement85 and Guidelines on ethical conduct in contracting authority86 (both are available only in Lithuanian). 

As far as inter-institutional co-operation is concerned, Public Procurement Office had signed two important agreements regarding the detection 
of fraud and corruption in public procurement: 

  a tripartite agreement with Competition Council and Special Investigation Service (February 2017) which creates a basis for supply of 

expertise and technical assistance, allows exchange of information needed for ongoing investigations on corruption, public procurement 
infringements and conclusion of agreements aimed at distortion of competition, and raising the level of professionalism of each entities 
employees; 

  an agreement between 7 institutions (April 2017) regarding cooperation on disclosure of foreign bribery when concluding international 
business transactions. The list of institutions includes Special Investigation Service, General Prosecutor‘s Office, Financial Crime 
Investigation Service, State Tax Inspectorate, Customs Department, Police Department. 

2.6  

Lithuania  is  often  admired  for  a  proper  collection  of  wide  spectrum  of  data  through  the  procedural  reports  and  annual  reports  on  public 
procurement.  This  data  is  systematized,  aiming  at  making  information-based  decisions  and  policies.  Public  Procurement  Office  prepares 

85http://vpt.lrv.lt/uploads/vpt/documents/files/2017%2002%2001%20Etisko%20elgesio%20viesuosiuose%20pirkimuose%20gair%C4%97s_%20pdf.pdf 
86 http://vpt.lrv.lt/uploads/vpt/documents/files/2017%2002%2001%20Atmintin%C4%97_%20pdf.pdf  

103 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
quarterly and annual reports and analyses of specific sectors of public procurement (the risky ones such as construction, road building, IT). All 
the statistical data and reports are publicly available on the PPO Internet site http://vpt.lrv.lt/lt/statistika-ir-analize (available only in Lithuanian). 
PPO  also  administers  the  Public  Procurement  Risk  Management  Information  System  which  accumulates  and  processes  information  on 
procurement,  covering  both  data  stored  in  CPP  IS  and  information  from  other  sources  such  as  complaints,  notices,  media  information, 
information  from  the  Control  Division  and  Prevention  and  Public  Contract  Supervision  Division,  information  from  other  PPO  divisions, 
information  from  the  Commission  for  Complaints  Resolution  (established  in  PPO,  in  order  to  “filter”  the  complaints  that  should  be  further 
handled  by  the  Control  Division).  This  information  is  a  basis  for  rating  contracting  entities  according  to  their  risk  levels  and  indicating  the 
behavioural patterns of certain contracting entities or in certain sectors/types of procurement. 
2.7 

 YES 

2.8  
A state-developed e-procurement tool – Central Public Procurement Information System – entails a full process of the procurement (notifications 
on  public  procurement  procedures,  communication  during  the  procedure,  submitting  tenders,  submitting  procedural  reports)  and  submitting 
annual reports. There is a possibility to sign the tenders electronically, to encrypt the tenders and trace actions in audit sequence, also opening the 
tenders becomes technically possible only after the term for submitting tenders ends. Annual procurement plans are also publicized in the CPP 
IS. The use of CPP IS is mandatory (except some cases for low value procurement), no tools developed by private entities are allowed, therefore 
ensuring  transparency,  gathering  data  and  conducting  analysis  of  that  data  for  detecting  fraud  and  corruption,  also  conducting  overall 
monitoring, is much easier. 
2.9  
Yes. The majority of the public data that is accumulated in the CPP IS is made open to any natural or legal person by converting it into user-
friendly  format  at  www.freedata/lt.vpt    This  allows  multiple-angle  analysis  of  the  procurement  data,  creating  a  basis  for  information-based 
actions and policies and making detection on irregularities easier. 
2.1, 2.2, 2.3 
The directives 2014/24 and 2014/25 are transposed by means of a Law and a technical regulation, which have not yet come into force. The 
Law has been adopted by the Parliament (Chambre des Députés) on March 18th. The technical regulations are now ready to be published. 
The Law and the technical regulations still have to be published into the Official Journal, in order to enter into force (three days following 
their publication). The related steps are being processed. The publication of the new provisions is expected in April 2018. 
The  directive  2014/23  is  transposed  by  means  of  a  Law  and  a  technical  regulation  which  have  not  yet  come  into  force.  Although  some 

LU 

104 

 
 
progress has been made in 2017, the parliamentary works are on hold. The Council of State is expected to publish a further opinion in March 
2018. The adoption of the new provisions are expected in April 2018 (meaning that they could come into force in May 2018). 

2.4 

National  rules  on  public  procurement  apply  to  below-the-threshold  public  procurement.  In  the  new  legislation,  provisions  from  the  directives 
2014/24 on conflicts of interests (among others) will apply to below-the-threshold public procurement.  

It will be the same for the legislation on concessions transposing the directive 2014/23 
2.5 

Mandatory training of civil servants at the very beginning of their career (INAP). 

In the new legislation, provisions from the directives 2014/24 on exclusion grounds and cancellation of the contracts (among others) will apply 
to below-the-threshold public procurement. 
2.6 
The provisions of the 2014/24 and 2014/25 directives on 'Governance' will be fully transposed in the new legislation. 
2.7  

 YES 

2.8 
By actions like training and raising awareness the use of eProcurement in the pre-award phases has been substantially increased.  
For instance eAccess to tender documents and eCommunication during the procurement procedure are widely used. 
For  the  moment  further  efforts  are  underway  to  increase  eTendering  which  will  be  mandatory  for  all  procurement  above  the  European 
threshold from October 2018 on. 
2.9 N/A 

105 

 
 
HU 

 YES 

 YES 

 YES 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4  

Act CXLIII of 2015 on public procurement (hereinafter: the Public Procurement Act), which entered into force on 1 November 2015, provides 
for several measures to prevent public procurement-related corruption and to enhance transparency. Some measures of the Public Procurement 
Act were further tightened by the amendment of the Public Procurement Act adopted at the end of 2016 which entered into force on 1 January 
2017.  

Key measures of the Public Procurement Act as entered into force on 1 November 2015 are the following: 

-  The  scope  of  applicability  of  the  so-called  ‘small  value’  procedures  was  reduced  where  a  public  procurement  procedure  can  be  carried  out 
without a contract notice, with or without negotiations within the discretion of the contracting entity, in procedures of the smallest value of the 
procedural order below the EU threshold:  
- In the case of the purchase of goods and the order of services, the threshold of the applicability of this procedure by contracting entities was 
reduced from the former HUF 25 million (~ EUR 80 000) to HUF 18 million (~EUR 60 000), while in the case of works it was reduced from the 
former HUF 150 million (~EUR 480 000) to HUF 100 million (~EUR 320 000). This equalled to a 28 % reduction for the purchase of goods and 
the order of services and a 33 % one for works, amounting to a significant limitation to the applicability of the procedures. This rule was further 
strengthened by the amendment of the Public Procurement Act which entered into force on 1 January 2017 (see below) 
-  This  procedure  may  not  be  applied  if  the  purchase  is  financed  from  EU  funds  and  relates  to  a  project  crossing  the  borders  of  Hungary. 
Otherwise the rules of the new Public Procurement Act require at least 4 tenderers instead of the 3 under previous rules to call to propose in such 
procedures. 
- Contracting entities have to publish more data in the Public Procurement Database, e.g., they have to publish a summary of the evaluation of 
the submitted tenders or applications for participation  by the contracting entity and of the method according to  which it granted the contract. 
Under the Act, a failure to publish public data may result in a legal remedy procedure against contracting entities by the President of the Public 
Procurement Authority. 

106 

 
 
- Conflict of interest rules were extended: organisations owned by public law dignitaries, the heads of certain national bodies and their family 
members living with them in the same household may not participate in public procurement procedures as tenderers. This is among the strictest 
conflict of interest rules in Europe, well exceeding the rigour of the relevant EU Directives. 
-  Grounds  of  exclusion,  that  is,  circumstances  which  give  rise  to  the  exclusion  of  an  operator  from  public  procurement  procedures  were 
extended.  The  new  Public  Procurement  Act  provides  for  fair  competition  and  public  procurement  more  efficiently  due  to  the  extension  of 
grounds of exclusion, including when the tenderer committed a crime of agreement restricting competition in a public procurement procedure 
(e.g. cartel practices) within 5 years preceding the procedure. 
- As regards negotiated procedures of extraordinary urgency without a notice, the Public Procurement Authority has to take a decision about the 
existence of the legal base with a detailed reasoning and it has to publish this decision on its website. This rule was further strengthened by the 
amendment of the Public Procurement Act which entered into force on 1 January 2017 (see below) 
- A so-called normative fitness was introduced, significantly facilitating the participation of tenderers, especially SMEs in public procurement 
procedures. Accordingly, tenderers may be requested to submit a reference certificate with an amount of maximum 75 % of the estimated value 
of the public procurement procedure, and the fitness certificate relating to the whole price revenue may be maximum 100  % of the value of the 
public procurement for a total of 3 years. This rule was further strengthened by the amendment of the Public Procurement Act which entered into 
force on 1 January 2017 (see below) 
- Reduction in legal remedy fees - fees of legal remedy procedures of the Public Procurement Arbitration Board were reduced by 50  %. 
- A novel provision was introduced on a detailed audit of the performance and amendment of contracts by the Public Procurement Authority: 
such audits may be performed on the contracting entity and the tenderer as well. The Public Procurement Authority reports about the success of 
such  audits  on  its  website,  too.  If  the  Authority  identifies  infringements  as  a  result  of  the  audits,  it  may  initiate  a  procedure  by  the  Public 
Procurement  Arbitration  Board  which  may  impose  a  penalty  as  well.  Infringements  other  than  those  of  the  public  procurement  law  may  be 
referred to the court by the Public Procurement Authority. 
- The carrying-out of public procurement procedures of high value funded by the EU (exceeding the EU threshold for goods purchase and the 
order  of  services  [ca.  HUF 60 million],  and  exceeding  HUF 500 million  for  works)  is  subject  to  the  involvement  of  experts  with  guaranteed 
higher  education  qualifications  who  have  up-to-date  professional  skills,  experience  and  liability  insurance,  that  is,  the  so-called  responsible 
accredited public procurement advisors, which also contributes to transparency and the prevention of fraud. Organisational units auditing public 
procurements of the Prime Minister’s Office cooperate with the Hungarian Competition Authority in detecting competition law infringements 
and cartel practices. Such cooperation is also provided for in the rules of the new Public Procurement Act. 

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Key measures of the amended Act as entered into force on 1 January 2017 are the following: 

- Introduction of electronic public procurement through the development and installation of a central system:  the application of the system is 
optional from 1 January 2018 and is obligatory for all public procurement procedures from 15 April 2018; centralised public procurement has 
been subject to e-public procurement since 1 February 2017. 
- In the case of the purchase of goods and the order of services, the threshold of the obligatory internet publication of procedures was reduced 
from  the  former  HUF 18 million  to  HUF 15 million;  anyone  may  apply  to  these.  Simultaneously,  the  applicability  of  the  ‘small  value’ 
procedures was terminated for the purchase of goods and the order of services. 
- For works, the ‘small value’ procedure is applicable under the estimated value of HUF 300 million, based on the Austrian example but subject 
to stricter rules. All documents of such procedures shall be published on the internet and five tenderers have to be called to propose the person of 
whom has to be changed in such procedures. 

Rules of negotiated procedures without a notice were reinforced:  

- In all negotiated procedures without a notice, the Public Procurement Authority shall take a reasoned decision with regard to the legal base 
publishing it on its website. All documents of the procedures, including data of operators called to propose, shall be published on the internet, 
thus making such procedures more transparent than ever before (the reason the contracting entity concluded a contract, its subject and the other 
party). 
- With regard to negotiated procedures without a notice referring to exclusive rights or technical specificities, the Act requires the publication of 
a prior transparency notice, too. 
- The amended Act reinforced the liability of undertakings, too: a new ground of exclusion was introduced. If the Public Procurement Arbitration 
Board identifies an infringement of the public procurement rules governing the performance stage of the contract, the operator affected shall be 
excluded from public procurements for 90 days.  
- Rules of normative fitness were reinforced, too, so the amendment further clarified and tightened the rule by providing that the submission of a 
fitness  certificate  of  a  maximum  of  75 %  of  the  value  of  the  public  procurement  may  be  required  with  regard  to  the  price  revenue  from  the 
subject of the public procurement. 

108 

 
 
2.5  

Based on a cooperation agreement concluded with the Hungarian Competition Authority (hereinafter HCA), organisational units auditing public 
procurements of the Prime Minister’s Office continuously check eventual infringements of the competition law during their public procurement 
audit work. The investigation of suspected public procurement law infringements and behaviours restricting competition includes the checking 
of  risk  factors  which  are  identified  as  corruption  risk  factors  (red  flags).  Identified  infringements  are  signalled  to  the  HCA  by  the  Prime 
Minister’s Office, which sends data obtained from the auditing of the public procurement concerned (except for classified data) in the form of a 
market signal. There is a continuous information flow between the Prime Minister’s Office and the HCA. Such market information generally 
facilitates  the  exploratory  work  of  the  HCA  apart  from  identifying  specific  cartel practices.  To  date, the Prime  Minister’s  Office  sent  market 
signals in 33 cases to HCA. 
The  above  measures  also  allow  for  the  eventual  identification  of  crimes,  apart  from  that  of  the  infringement  of  public  procurement  law, 
competition law, etc. 
Under  Article 420  of  the  Hungarian  Criminal  Code  (Act C  of 2012),  the  conclusion  of  an  agreement  restricting  competition  in  public 
procurement and concession procedures qualifies as a crime. The new the Public Procurement Act establishes a ground of exclusion with regard 
to operators committing such a crime. 

As regards the enforcement of rights, we have to highlight that the Public Procurement Authority has to audit the amendment and performance 
of contracts concluded as a result of public procurement procedures as a new task conferred upon it by the new Public Procurement Act If the 
Authority identifies infringements as a result of the audits, it may initiate a procedure by the Public Procurement Arbitration Board which may 
impose a penalty as well. Infringements other than those of the public procurement law may be referred to the court by the Public Procurement 
Authority, which can initiate penal proceedings, too. 

In 2016, the Public Procurement Authority submitted a total of 13 criminal complaints and 2 reports (information) to the investigative group of 
offshore cases of the National Investigation Bureau of the Emergency Police. 

According to the Criminal Code, the suspected committing of the following crimes may give rise to complaints or reports: 
• 
• 
National Tax and Customs Administration, where the facts were re-qualified as budgetary fraud (Article 396 of the Criminal Code) 

usage of a false private deed (Article 345 of the Criminal Code) 
fraud  (Article  373  of  the  Criminal  Code):  the  complaint  was  based  on  the  committing  of  fraud  but  such  cases  were  referred  to  the 

109 

 
 
failure to comply with the obligation to provide economic data (Article 409 of the Criminal Code) 

• 
With regard to public procurements funded by the EU, we also have to stress that the managing authorities apply the ARACHNE data mining 
tool for risk assessment operated by the European Commission when auditing the use of the European Structural and Investment Funds, which 
facilitates  their  work  by  analysing  and  signalling  risks  emerging  during  the  carrying-out  of  operational  programmes.  The  system  compiles  a 
comprehensive database from the data of projects financed from the Structural Funds, complements it with further external public data and then, 
using 102 indicators, it tries to detect projects, beneficiaries, contracts or contracting parties where there is an increased risk of fraud, conflict of 
interest or irregularity. 
2.6 

In order to verify the use of support from EU funds, Hungary operates an extensive institutional audit system. The operation of the organisational 
unit examining public procurements of large value of the audit system was classified into the second best category from among the four possible 
ones during the audits of the European Commission in recent years. (We have to note that the Commission very rarely awards the first category 
to Member State’s bodies.) Accordingly, the audit system is operative and requires some improvements only. Findings and recommendations on 
the  development  of  the  audit  practice  by  Commission  audits  are  always  considered  and  translated  into  practice  as  fully  as  possible  by  the 
auditing organisational system. 

Goods purchases and orders of services reaching EU thresholds as well as works reaching or exceeding the amount of HUF 300 million undergo 
an ex-ante multi-stage audit system which is embedded in the process.  

First a technical-professional and accountability audit is carried out and if the audit body finds the concerned procedure eligible according to 
such  criteria,  the  embedded  audit  of  public  procurement  law  compliance  follows.  This  embedded  audit  has  several  stages.  Calls  undergo  a 
preliminary  audit, that is, the public procurement call for proposals is checked for any elements  restricting or  limiting/distorting competition, 
then the audit body continuously monitors the regularity of the procedure. The embedded audit of such procedures is carried out by the Public 
Procurement Supervision Department of the Prime Minister’s Office (hereinafter: PPSD). 

For goods purchases and orders of services under the EU threshold and for works under the value of HUF 300 million, there is an ex post audit 
during which technical-professional, accountability and public procurement law compliance audit is performed following the procedure. 

110 

 
 
If any infringement is detected as a result of the audits, irregularity proceedings may be brought or, in the case of non-repairable infringements, 
legal remedy proceedings may be initiated before the Public Procurement Arbitration Board. 

Based  on  the  ex-ante  audits,  no  EU  funds  may  be  paid  in  irregular  procedures;  while  ex-post  audits  may  give  rise  to  the  order  of  the 
reimbursement of EU funds, that is, to the so-called correction. 
In a publication by the European Commission entitled ‘E-library of good practices in public procurement in the context of European Structural 
and  Investment  (ESI)  Funds’  (http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/fr/policy/how/improving-investment/public-procurement/e-library),  Hungary 
is listed as a good example of countries applying good practice in the obligatory audit of public procurement: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/good_practices/GP_fiche_14.pdf 

Negotiated  procedures  without  a  notice  undergo  a  double  audit:  apart  from  the  institutional  system  established  for  the  auditing  of  the  use  of 
support,  these  are  also  audited  by  the  Public Procurement  Authority.  In  all  procedures,  the  Public  Procurement  Authority  takes  a  reasoned 
decision with regard to the legal base publishing it on its website. If the Authority is not able to ascertain the existence of the legal base without 
doubt,  it  initiates  legal  remedy  proceedings  before  the  Public  Procurement  Arbitration  Board  and  requests  to  impose  a  fine.  Furthermore,  all 
documents  of the procedures, including  data of operators called to  propose,  are published  on the internet, thus  making such  procedures more 
transparent (the reason the contracting entity concluded a contract, its subject and the other party). 

Besides, we highlight that it is not only public procurement procedures affected by EU funds that are audited; public procurements funded from 
domestic sources of budgetary bodies and institutions managed or supervised by the Government, legal entities in the majority ownership of the 
State,  public  foundations  of  the  Government  and  public  foundations  managed  or  founded  by  these  also  undergo  a  public  procurement  law 
compliance audit. The practice of the audit body is coordinated with the practice of bodies auditing EU-funded public procurements. 

2.7 

 YES 

2.8  

In  order  to  comply  with  the  Directives,  Hungary,  as  all  Member  States,  has  to  ensure  e-communication  in  all  Hungarian  public  procurement 
procedures which it wishes to implement through the introduction of the central single electronic public procurement system of the State. 

111 

 
 
 
In line with the Act on public procurement, the application of the electronic public procurement system (hereinafter: EPPS system) operated by 
the Prime Minister’s Office in public procurement and concession purchase procedures is optional within the discretion of the contracting entity 
from 1 January 2018 and is obligatory from 15 April 2018.  
Detailed rules of the EPPS system are set forth in Government Decree No 424/2017 of 19 December 2017 on the detailed rules of electronic 
public procurement. 
The priority aim of establishing and applying the EPPS system is to enhance the transparency of public procurement procedures, to carry out the 
procedures more quickly, to perform procedural acts more simply, to reduce the administrative burden, to link certain databases and to support 
the auditing of public procurement procedures. 
In the EPPS system, all procedural acts can be precisely documented and all public procurement documents relevant for the specific procedure 
are directly available from a single location, thus facilitating the monitoring of Hungarian public procurement and also making the assessment of 
the impact of market changes and legislative amendments on public procurement possible. 

This  change  makes  electronic  communication  obligatory  in  public  procurement  procedures  since  the  Act  provides  an  exhaustive  list  of  cases 
where derogation from electronic contact is possible, based on the provisions of the Directive.  

The introduction of this system is accompanied with several changes reducing the administrative burden,  
e.g., 
-  formerly  the  contracting  entity  was  obliged  to  send  public  procurement  related  documents  upon  the  request  of  the  Public  Procurement 
Authority or another body authorised thereto by law, while in the future the Public Procurement Authority, the Hungarian Competition Authority 
and other bodies authorised to audit the procedure concerned by law may access documents of the public procurement procedure in the EPPS 
system;  
- the Public Procurement Authority shall continue to have a right to access the documentation electronically during the legal remedy procedure;  
- the tenderers do not have to attach certificates which have already been submitted in a former electronic procedure to the contracting entity 
concerned; 
- certain declaration obligations (e.g., SME declaration) are lifted since the operators may enter the relevant data during the registration;  
- data are automatically broken down by the EPPS system on the day of the expiry of the tendering or that of the application deadline and a 
breakdown report is also generated automatically;  
- public procurement documents are directly available electronically in the system and operators may express their interest with a simple click;  

112 

 
 
- simplification of compiling the tender is served by e-forms made available to make certain declarations in the system. 

Electronic  communication  also  contributes  to  quicker  procedures  since  EU  Directives  allow  for  the  shortening  of  tendering  deadlines  by 
introducing electronic communication. 
Besides, electronic communication is expected to reinforce the integrity and transparency of the procedures by the legislator. The IT system for 
carrying out the procedures ensures the integrity of the tenders until their submission and provides for a logging of certain procedural acts which 
can be traced back later. 
Parallel to the EPPS system, the Public Procurement and Supply Directorate-General operates a centralised public procurement portal. 
2.9 N/A 

MT 

 YES 

 YES  

2.1
The  transposition  of  the  three  new  directives  is  now  complete  and  have  been  duly  published  on  28th  October  2016.  This  Directive  was 
transposed to LN 353/2016. 
2.2
The  transposition  of  the  three  new  directives  is  now  complete  and  have  been  duly  published  on  28th  October  2016.  This  Directive  was 
transposed to LN 352/2016. 
2.3
The  transposition  of  the  three  new  directives  is  now  complete  and  have  been  duly  published  on  28th  October  2016.  This  Directive  was 
transposed to LN 351/2016. 

 YES  

2.4 

The Department of Contracts identified the following as some of the measures adopted by the Department: 

• Decreased the local  threshold vis-a-vis Call for Quotations to Euro 5,000 excl. VAT and imposed an obligatory use of government’s  e-
procurement platform known as ePPS (Electronic Public Procurement System) for procurement having an estimated value which is equal or 
above this threshold. 

113 

 
 
 
 
• The appeals are now applicable for quotations/tenders estimated equal to or above €5,000 (as opposed to Euro 12,000 excl. VAT as per 
previous legislation). All objections are to be lodged with the Public Contracts Review Board (PCRB). The timeframe for objections is set at 
ten (10) calendar days. 
• Introduced Ministerial Procurement Units (MPUs) to supervise procurement at Contracting Authority level. 
A  “Ministerial  Procurement  Unit”  means  an  entity  that  is  established  under  each  Ministry  which  processes,  publishes,  administers  and 
recommends the award of a call for tenders published under the open procedure, where the estimated value of a call for tenders exceeds ten 
thousand  euro  (€10,000)  but  does  not  exceed  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  euro  (€250,000).  Both  thresholds  are  net  of  VAT.  This 
decentralisation  is  effected  upon  the  issue  of  the  necessary  approval  by  the  Ministry  for  Finance.  There  shall  be  in  each  Ministry  a 
Ministerial Procurement Unit (for the time being, only in specific Ministries) which shall fall under the office of the Permanent Secretary 
responsible for that Ministry, or under another person in an equivalent post, being so delegated by the Minister responsible for that Ministry. 
• The first MPU was established in the Ministry for Education and Employment (MEDE). 
A unit was set up and training was delivered to the personnel recruited accordingly. This was the initiation of a pilot project and eventually 
the  following  Ministries  were  also  included  under  Schedule  16  ofLN352/2016:  o  Ministry  for  Education  and  Employment  (MEDE)  o 
Ministry for Justice, Culture and Local Government (MJCL) o Ministry for the Family and Social Solidarity (MFSS) o Ministry for Home 
Affairs and National Security (MHAS) o Ministry for Gozo (MGOZ) 
o Ministry for the Environment, Sustainable Development and Climate Change (MESDC) 
In the fullness of time, all Ministries will have an MPU. 
• Introduced new public procurement law/guidelines for 68 Local Councils: 
Together  with  the  Directorate  for  Local  Government,  a  set  of  Guidelines  were  discussed  and  drafted/published.  Eventually  all  procurers 
within this sphere shall undergo training accordingly. 
• A major change in the tender templates used throughout Government (to enhance integrity) is the ESPD. 

The  ESPD  is a reusable  generic  document  which shall  be  used  across all  EU  Member States. This  means that  the  questions in  the ESPD 
cannot be amended. Instead, Contracting Authorities must set out the specific requirements related to selection criteria, including relevant 
exclusion/blacklisting  grounds  as  established  under  part  VI  of  the  Public  Procurement  Regulations  and  any  other  minimum  standards 

114 

 
 
 
relevant for the procurement exercise as established, in the procurement documents. 
Economic  Operators  now  submit  a  completed  ESPD  in  response  to  the  requirements  established  in  the  procurement  documents.  The 
Economic Operator, subcontractor or other parties may rely on their ESPD response as a self-declaration that they have not breached any of 
the exclusion grounds. If an Economic Operator is in a situation which might result in its exclusion, it may provide evidence to show that it 
has taken appropriate remedial action to demonstrate its reliability. This is known as ‘self-cleaning’. In such cases the Economic Operator 
must not be excluded from the procurement procedure on such exclusion grounds. 
A word document of the ESPD, for completion by Economic Operators, may be retrieved through the official Government’s e-Procurement 
website;  that  is,  the  Government’s  e-  Procurement  Platform  (available  from  www.etenders.gov.mt/Resources).  The  items  within  the 
sections/parts therein are also numbered for ease of reference. 
Training is also delivered by the department both for the Contracting Authorities and the Economic Operators. 
2.5 
The  new  regulations  essentially  consolidated  important  procurement  measures  to  increase  effectiveness,  transparency  and  accountability. 
These are the key elements that help to build trust and confidence in public procurement and permit that citizens recognize how taxpayers’ 
money  is  administered.  Streamlining  of  the  procurement  process  has  shown  that  such  key  elements  in  the  long  term  will  result  in  lower 
costs, greater innovation, as well as strong and profitable markets all delivering better value for the taxpayer. 
The transition to e-procurement across Government was a vital step in preparation for the entry into force of the new Public Procurement 
Regulations.  The  new  rules  cover  the  use  of  electronic  communications,  including  the  use  of  two  important  electronic  tools,  mainly, 
Electronic Auctions (e-auctions) and the Dynamic Purchasing System (DPS). 
It is widely agreed that electronic communication can help reduce fraud and corruption by encouraging access to procurement opportunities 
to  all  stakeholders,  facilitate  compliance  with  the  rules,  and  promote  traceability,  transparency  and  accountability  in  the  procurement 
process. 
The  changes  envisaged  in  the  new  Public  Procurement  Regulations  enable  Contracting  Authorities  to  procure  goods,  services  and  works 
faster, through reduced time limits, with less bureaucracy, and with a greater focus to secure best value for public money in line with good 
governance practices. 
Concurrent  to  the  new  Regulations,  new  procurement  document  templates  (including  one  for  departmental  tenders),  together  with  a 

115 

 
 
 
through 

the  eGovernment  Procurement  Platform  (ePPS)  under 

comprehensive Manual of Procedures (MoP) and the customary .xml template structure for all Calls for Tender (CfT), have been prepared. 
These  are  accessible 
the  Resources  section,  which  portal 
(www.etenders.sov.mt) is the official procurement platform for Government. 
2.6 
The new regulations have brought  about a further regulatory and monitoring role of the Department of Contracts. This Junction is mainly 
coordinated through the Compliance and Monitoring Unit (CMU), forming part of the Policy Development and Programme Implementation 
Directorate, within the Department of Contracts. 
The CMU was set up to further ensure good governance and better monitoring of public procurement. The Unit is construed to investigate 
complaints  raised  by  Contracting  Authorities,  Economic  Operators  and  the  public  in  general  (citizen  complaints),  in  respect  of  all 
Government procurement procedures. Subsequent actions involve the drawing up of related reports including recommendations for the best 
timely solutions. Reports are directly addressed to the Director of Contracts, who in turn may decide to raise issue at Permanent Secretary’s 
level. At times salient issues were even raised up to Principal Permanent Secretary ’s level. 
The Compliance and Monitoring Unit is responsible for gathering all available information, which ultimately will facilitate in determining 
whether  or  not  a  Contracting  Authority  is  in  compliance  to  the  Public  Procurement  Regulations,  especially  when  the  drawing  up  and 
publishing of the tender document was at departmental level. It is the general rule that such pre-contractual issues are raised by prospective 
bidders who may feel aggrieved by the contents of the tender document, with special emphasis to the technical specifications, when it is felt 
that an undue advantage may be given to a particular economic operator/importer/brand over another. At post-contract stages, an economic 
operator (contractor) may be investigated, following one or more complaints, which may arise either from the related Contracting Authority 
or any concerned citizen, indicating that the agreed to contractual agreement is not being fully complied with. 
It is paramount to clarify that the Compliance and Monitoring Unit may not be utilised as a direct substitute to the remedies published in the 
Public Procurement Regulations, but merely a more amicable and alternative solution. 
Personnel  from  the  Compliance  and  Monitoring  Unit,  on  a  regular  basis,  attend  meetings  for  the  Inter-Ministerial  Task  Force  on  Green 
Public Procurement (GPP), representing the Department of Contracts (DoC). This Unit is also responsible for the weekly reporting to the 
GPP focal point assigned to the Ministty for Finance. 
In accordance with Contracts Circular № 2/2017, the Compliance and Monitoring Unit is entrusted to monitor and ensure that every six (6) 

116 

 
 
 
months all Contracting Authorities publish, in the Government Gazette, a full list of all departmental contracts awarded and a list of all cases 
involving variations which exceed the original contract values by more than 5%. 
Moreover, it is to be noted that the Department is the owner of the working group of the Commission on the new Monitoring Template (the 
ESWG - Economic and Statistical Working Group). Consequently the CMU is working on the compilation of the statistical report due in 
April 2018 as one of the  obligations under the new Directives. This will also be done through collaboration with the PPCD, FPD and the 
IAID 

2.7 

 YES  

Yes,  as  already  referred  to  in  Answer  2.5  above,  the  Department  of  Contracts  regularly  publishes  procurement-related  documentation  to 
assist Contracting Authorities in the understanding of the procurement regulations (which serve as reference in case of difficulty) as well as 
concise  templates  that  provide  the  basis  of  a  CfT  procurement  document.  Such  documentation,  although  aimed  primarily  at  Contracting 
Authorities,  indirectly  also  assists  Economic  Operators  as  once  the  procurement  process  is  harmonised  across  Government,  tender 
submission becomes easier for potential bidders. 
Training  is  delivered  regularly  to  Contracting  Authorities  and  to  Economic  Operators  so  as  to  make  all  stakeholders  aware  of  the  e-
procurement potential. The said stakeholders are informed about the advantages of e-procurement when utilising Framework Agreements. In 
addition, the ePPS shall also start being utilised for another two (2) tools, namely the Dynamic Purchasing System (DPS) and e-Catalogues. 

2.8 

The  publication  of  documentation  provides  the  Contracting  Authorities  with  the  appropriate  tools  to  prepare  their  procurement,  thus, 
indirectly  shortening  and  harmonising  the  tendering  process  also  for  Economic  Operators,  as  a  result  of  having  the  foundations  of  the 
procurement  ready.  The  main  documents  published  by  this  Department,  to  be  utilised  in  tandem  with  the  electronic  Public  Procurement 
System (ePPS) are the following: 
o  The  Manual  of  Procedures,  which  provides  a  comprehensive  and  detailed  interpretation  of  the  Procurement  Legislation,  in  simpler  and 
clearer terminology, utilising diagrams and tables for ease of reference o Guidance Notes on specific procurement elements (such as MPUs, 

117 

 
 
 
Modifications, Abnormally Low Tenders, PMC, DPS) of the Procurement Cycle, thus, highlighting salient provisions, explaining procedures 
and clarifying any grey areas encountered. 
Another initiative introduced by the DoC included the revamping of the e-tender dossier template (for CfTs whose budget estimate meets or 
exceeds €135,000 excl. VAT) inclusive of all related forms and documentation. In addition, the Department has now also introduced an e-
tender dossier template, specifically for departmental tenders, hence, CfTs whose budget estimate meets or exceeds €10,000 excl. VAT but 
is less than €135,000 exc VAT. Furthermore, other templates were made available, namely one for Non-Governmental Organisations and 
other templates that may be utilised for Quotations (depending on the respective thresholds of Euro 5,000 and Eurol 0,000). 
The  Department  of  Contracts  is  also  responsible  to  publish  Procurement  Policy  Notes  (PPN),  which  aim  is  to  clarify  and  supplement  the 
PPRs,  whilst  momentarily,  ensuring  consistency  and  streamlining  across  all  Contracting  Authorities.  Such  documentation  is  publicly 
available on the Department’s website as well as on ePPS, thus, granting access to such policies to all concerned parties. 
From 2013 till today, more than 20,000 Call for Tenders (CfTs) have been published. A significant yearly increase of Cf Ts publication from 
2013 (since when the first Procurement Policy Note was published in December 2013) until today has been reported as follows: 

This shows that through the measures taken by this Department to harmonise the process through the e-procurement, Contracting Authorities 
were provided with the appropriate tools and therefore could publish more Call for Tenders in accordance to their procurement exigencies. 

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Workshops are also held at the Institute for Procurement Services (IPS) by officials of the Department of Contracts for Economic Operators. 
During  these  workshop,  Economic  Operators  are  given  the  opportunity  to  familiarise  themselves  with  Government’s  e-  Procurement 
platform.  Among  other  issues,  tutors  also  address  what  are  the  actual  requirements  that  may  need  to  be  filled  in  the  ESPD  by  Economic 
Operators. 
Economic Operators are given the opportunity to register to attend a workshop with every Call for Tenders published. In order for Economic 
Operators to benefit from this free hands-on training they must register their interest by sending an e-mail to: etenders@gov.mt. 
Since 2012, the Department of Contracts has worked tirelessly in order to increase the uptake of e-procurement across Government. In this 
regard significant progress has been registered over the last few years and this trend continued during 2016. In fact, whereas by the end of 
December 2015, 15,231 e-tenders were published across Government, the figure increased to 22,206 by the end of December 2016, that is, a 
46% increase. In terms of registered Economic Operators whereas at the end of December 2015 there were 3159 of which 1262 were non-
Maltese Economic Operators, by the end of December 2016 this figure increased to 4160 of which 1480 were non-Maltese, that is, a 32 per 
cent increase. An important tool for the Department of Contracts to achieve this progress has been the regular delivery of hands-on training 
to  Economic  Operators  in  respect  of  how  to  use  of  the  e-  procurement  system  (ePPS).  In  fact,  during  2015,  206  and  during  2016,  283 
Economic Operators were given training. 
Furthermore, the Department of Contracts is in the  process of simplifying further the ESPD process, whereby Economic Operators rather 
than all the time having to select which criteria to complete in the ESPD, they will find a set criteria that are pre-selected within the ePPS 
system, from their individual Company Profile; this means that the Economic Operators will have a profile within the ePPS and information 
requested in the ESPD will be pre-filled subject to any changes which Economic Operators would still deem necessary through the ePPS. 
2.9 
• A successful practice, as already referred to in Answer 2.6 above, is the Monitoring and Compliance Unit, which rendered its committed 
services  in support of 219 different complaints (iro lack of conformity/breach of the Public Procurement Regulations) across three (3) years, 
split as per below: 
   2015—73 cases 
   2016 - 82 cases 

 
 

119 

 
 
 
 

   2017 - 64 cases 
• Another successful measure is the introduction of a career stream and professionalization of personnel in the field of procurement. As the 
Commission itself states:  

- The new public procurement rules adopted in 2014 provide a toolbox for EU countries to make more efficient and strategic use  of public 
procurement.  More  professional  public  procurement  bodies  will  deliver  more  efficient  public  procurement  markets,  greater  savings  for 
public buyers, and provide more opportunities for European businesses, including small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). They will be 
able to make the  most out of the tools at their disposal to deliver better value for money and pursue overriding policy objectives through 
strategic public procurement. However, this will only happen if public buyers are able to procure in accordance with the highest standards of 
professionalism and are provided with the tools to deliver professional results. 

In line with this principle, the Department of Contracts is providing an initial training programme on public procurement, in collaboration 
with  several  institutions.  Furthermore,  currently,  a  number  of  public  officers  are  enrolled  in  the  degree  course  BA  Public  Projects.  The 
course contents include presentations by officials from the Department who have developed good practice through experience in the field of 
procurement.  The  theoretical  aspect  shall  be  followed  by  physical  practical  sessions  at  the  department.  The  aim  is  that  of  allowing 
participants  to  acquaint  themselves  with  the  main  desired  features  of  professionalization  tools  such  as  guidance  notes  and  templates, 
trainings, job shadowing, efficiency tools to be applied on the ground and experience exchange platforms. 
In  addition,  the  Department  has  also  started  implementing  the  launch  of  a  3-year  course  leading  to  an  award  of  a  degree  level  in  public 
procurement through MCAST. 
To fully harmonise the attainment of procurement qualifications with a career path, the Department of Contracts has identified motivational 
career schemes specific to the procurement functions; in fact, Malta’s setting up of the Ministerial Procurement Units is a step in the right 
direction so as to have procurement regarded as a career of choice. 
2.1 YES 

NL 

2.2 YES 

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2.3 YES 

2.4 

The ERDF Manual for Beneficiaries sets out the public procurement rules. On the basis of the guidelines, the ERDF managing authorities assess 
whether beneficiaries are in compliance with the rules and whether a procurement procedure has been conducted transparently and correctly. 
2.5  
COCOLAF  recently  issued  comprehensive  guidelines.  For  the  designation  of  UVB  (Uitvoering  van  Beleid,  formerly  SZW)  as  management 
authority,  these  guidelines  were  followed  in  order  to  prevent  fraud  and  corruption  in  public  procurement  and  detect  irregularities  in  a  timely 
manner. We have developed our audit approach on that basis. Also, at the time of the establishment of the ESF Regulation, a check for abuse and 
improper use (‘M&O-toets’) is carried out as a matter of routine. That check involves examining the possible risk of abuse and improper use in 
(European) procurement.  The European anti-fraud tool ARACHNE is also deployed. 
2.6  
The ERDF managing authorities apply recently updated guidelines in auditing procurement in ERDF projects.  All obligations under the 2012 
Dutch Procurement Act are carefully checked on the basis of these guidelines. 
2.7 YES 

2.8  
As of 1 July 2017, e-procurement is mandatory for European tenders where the tender notice was published on or after 1 July 2017. This means 
that all communication between the contracting authority and the companies concerned must take place electronically. 
2.9 NO 

AT 

2.1 N/A 

2.2 N/A 

2.3 N/A 

2.4 N/A 

2.5 N/A 

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2.6 N/A 

2.7 N/A 

2.8 N/A 

PL 

2.9 N/A 
Directives 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council were transposed into Polish law by the Act of 22 June 
2016 amending the Public Procurement Act (PPA) and certain other acts (Journal of Laws 2016, item 1020), while Directive 2014/23/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council was transposed by the Act of 21 October 2016 on concessions for works or services (Journal of Laws 
2016, item 1920). The above items of national legislation fully transpose EU legislation on public procurement and concessions. 

The  application  of  national  regulations  implementing  the  provisions  of  new  directives  in  the  field  of  procurement  enhances  transparency  and 
fairness in the practical application of public procurement procedures. 

Transparency in the procedures is ensured by the obligation to publish public procurement notices and announcements in the national publication 
(the Bulletin of Public Procurement) and the Supplement to the Official Journal of the EU. Where an award is made under a scheme that does 
not require the publication of notices, Polish contracting authorities are obliged to notify the President of the Public Procurement Office (UZP) to 
initiate  the  procedure  for  contracts  with  a  value  above  the  EU  thresholds  and  to  set  out  the  factual  and  legal  grounds  for  a  non-competitive 
award.  

With a view to implementing the relevant regulations, the purpose of which is to ensure integrity in public procurement and to counter fraud, the 
rules  concerning  conflicts  of  interest  in  relation  to  persons  taking  part  in  a  procurement  procedure  were  amended  in  2016.  The  amendment 
consisted in increasing the number of persons on the contracting side, who are required to submit a declaration to the effect that there are no 
circumstances liable to affect their impartiality vis-à-vis contractors competing for public procurement contracts. These provisions are intended 
to ensure compliance with the principle of impartiality and objectivity. 

Appropriate arrangements for preventing and tackling conflicts of interest predate the relevant provisions of the EU Directives (they have been 
part of the Public Procurement Act since its adoption in 2004). The Act was also extended to include all mandatory and optional grounds for 
exclusion provided for in Directive 2014/24/EU (moreover, some of the optional grounds for exclusion listed in Article 57(4)  of the Directive 

122 

 
 
were made compulsory). 

A crucial role in monitoring proper application of public procurement procedures is played by control mechanisms at the stages before and after 
conclusion of a public procurement contract. Audits are performed by the president of the UZP to verify that the procedure complies with the 
Public Procurement Act. If circumstances which suggest a possible instance of corruption or fraud are detected, the law enforcement agencies 
are notified. 

As part of the Platform for e-Procurement, the UZP cooperates with the Minister for Digitalisation in constructing the Central Data Repository 
for e-Procurement Platforms. Its tasks include publishing the Public Procurement Bulletin and providing the service of accepting and securing 
tenders and applications until the day on which they are opened. The target date for making the services and data available is October 2018. It is 
also  planned  to  develop  service  and  data  standards  via  an  automated  process  for  the  award  of  public  contracts,  the  provision  of  services  and 
tendering  and  a  module  for  monitoring  and  analysis.  The  platform  services  will  be  made  available  free  of  charge.  E-services  allowing  the 
procedure to be completed electronically will be provided via external portals which satisfy the required standards. The portals will be required 
to send standardised data on the procedure to the repository. This will enable effective monitoring and analysis of public procurement and will 
simplify the procedure and reporting through reuse of the data that have been made available in the repository. 

At the same time, public procurement supervision is strengthened by the competent institutions in the system of implementation and control of 
EU funds. In the context  of the fight against  fraud, sector-specific rules have  been  introduced  which constitute a real strengthening of public 
procurement monitoring with a view to eliminating fraud and corruption. The OP Managing Authorities are required to develop principles of 
prevention and an approach to dealing with corruption and fraud, including mechanisms for preventing corruption in public procurement. 
2.1 

 YES 

PT 

2.2 

 YES 

2.3 

 YES 

Decree-Law No 111-B/2017 of 31 August 2017 amends for the ninth time the Public Procurement Code [CCP- Código dos Contratos Públicos], 
approved  by  Decree-Law  No  18/2008  of  29  January  2008,  and  transposes  Directives  2014/23/EU,  2014/24/EU  and  2014/25/EU,  all  of  the 
European Parliament and of the Council, of 26 February 2014 and Directive 2014/55/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 

123 

 
 
April 2014. 

2.4  

The public procurement portal (http://www.base.gov.pt/Base/pt/Homepage) collects information on two phases of the public procurement cycle): 
drawing-up and implementation of public contracts. 
To promote greater transparency, ‘information is available for public consultation on: 
a) the drawing-up and implementation of public contracts subject to Part II of the CCP, with the exception of information on the implementation 
of  concession  contracts  pursuant  to  Implementing  Order  No  85/2013  of  27 February  2013,  amending  Implementing  Order  No  701-F/2008  of 
29 July 2008; 
b) notices of opening of contract (tender) procedures and any subsequent notices; 
c) decisions and deliberations establishing procurement priorities in accordance with exceptional measures, particularly as laid down in Decree-
Law 34/2009 of 6 February 2009; 
d)  contracts  concluded  following  direct  award  (under  the  general  arrangements),  public  tenders,  tenders  limited  by  prior  qualification, 
negotiation procedure and competitive dialogue; 
e) contract modifications representing a cumulative value of over 15 % of the contract price; 
f) additional sanctions applied under Article 460 of the CCP. 
Final decisions on application of the additional sanction laid down in Article 460 CCP are also published on the Portal throughout the period of 
disqualification.’ 

2.5  

In the 2017 Plan to manage the risks of corruption and related offences [Plano de Gestão de Riscos de Corrupção e Infrações Conexas] of the 
Development  and  Cohesion  Agency  (AD&C),  the  area  of  public  procurement  was  identified  as  an  area  of  risk  by  the  CPC  that  is  dealt  with 
under a specific point in the document as it cuts across sectors. 

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All AD&C units that need to purchase external services in the framework of their activities are involved in procurement procedures for goods 
and services. 

By decision of 1 April 2014, the Management Board approved the establishment of the Unit on Public Procurement and State Aid  (NCPAE - 
Núcleo  de  Contratação  Pública  e  Auxílios  de  Estado),  which  is  tasked  with  ‘ensuring  support  for  the  other  AD&C  units  regarding  public 
procurement’, which in practice means preparing legal documents and monitoring procurement procedures launched by organisational units. 

Apart from formal verification of procedures, this Unit works to promote and step up the dissemination of guidelines on the subject of public 
procurement for organisational units, such as, for example, the NCPAE Memo of 5/12/2014 on good practices to observe in the direct-award 
procedure ‘Entendimento Interpretativo – Boas Práticas a Observar no Procedimento por Ajuste Direto’. 

2.6  
The AD&C has control mechanisms that make it possible to ensure that public procurement procedures are in order and comply with current 
legislation, in particular through specific procedures, duly established and standardised in the Manual of Procedures for purchasing goods and 
services  and  allowances  [Manual  de  Procedimentos  de  Aquisição  de  Bens  e  Serviços  e  Ajudas  de  Custo],  which  standardises  all  the  relevant 
procedures  and  clearly  defines  all  the  steps  entailed  and  the  parties  involved,  in  particular  the  Unit  on  Public  Procurement  and  State  Aid 
(NCPAE). 

Furthermore,  with  a  view  to  the  proper  classification  of  expenditure,  the  Institutional  Management  Unit  [Unidade  de  Gestão  Institucional], 
responsible for the procedure, analyses the regularity of expenditure and underlying procedures and, as a technical assistance beneficiary, takes 
action to check compliance of procedures and expenditure during the examination of applications for reimbursement. 

The public procurement procedures are documented in flow charts in the above-mentioned Manual of Procedures. Specific procedures are also 
described in the Manual in relation to: 
· stocks; 
· fixed assets; 
· essential services; 

125 

 
 
· framework agreement; 
· services to be implemented within 20 days of the award of the contract; 
· training of up to 132 hours; 
· Information and communication technology goods and services. 
2.7 

 YES 

2.8  
As described in reply to the questions above, the contracting authorities must use the public procurement portal and electronic platforms; use of 
the online repository of certificates (e-Certis) (Article 475 CCP) is also mandatory. 
2.9 N/A 

RO 

 YES 

 YES 

 YES 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

2.4  

- In order to enhance integrity in public procurement, the Guidelines of Contracting Authorities on Conflicts of Interests in Public Procurement 
Processes were prepared in order to help contracting authorities identify, prevent, remedy and sanction conflicts of interests at all the stages of 
the public procurement process, and to reduce the risk of irregularities and corruption. 

-  The  National  Public  Procurement  Agency  and  the  National  Integrity  Agency  signed  Collaboration  Protocol  No  7693/11  May  2017  for 
interinstitutional  cooperation  between  these  institutions  in  order  to  establish  a  mechanism  for  preventing  conflicts  of  interests  in  the  public 
procurement procedure. 

- A Code of Ethics was developed in order to strengthen the integrity rules applicable to the persons appointed to exercise their own preventive 
financial control in order to ensure that they are not affected by conflicts of interests. 

126 

 
 
- In June 2017, the National Integrity Agency implemented the Integrated Information System for Prevention of Potential Conflicts of Interests, 
hereafter  referred  to  as  the  “PREVENT  System”,  eight  months  after  Law  No  184/2016  establishing  a  mechanism  for  the  prevention  of  the 
conflict of interests in the award of public contracts entered into force. 

In short, through the PREVENT System, the National Integrity Agency is capable of preventing the conflicts of interests in the award of public 
contracts  by  establishing  an  ex-ante  control  mechanism  that  reviews  the  situations  which  are  likely  to  give  rise  to  conflicts  of  interests,  thus 
leading to enhanced transparency and integrity of the public procurement sector in Romania. 

- The Ministry of Regional Development, Public Administration and European Funds (Ministerul Dezvoltării Regionale, Administrației Publice 
și  Fondurilor  Europene)  and  the  National  Public  Procurement  Agency  (Agenția  Națională  pentru  Achiziții  Publice)  issued  Joint  Order  No 
6712/890/2017 approving the deployment of procurement procedures in the framework of EU funded projects implemented under a partnership. 

- Use of SEAP (Electronic Public Procurement System). SEAP is a single electronic infrastructure offering public institutions in Romania the 
possibility of purchasing products, goods and services by electronic means and economic operators the possibility of submitting tenders under 
electronic tendering procedures, thus contributing to enhanced transparency and integrity in public procurement. 

- The managing  authorities  collaborate with the National Integrity Agency  in  order to  identify and investigate effectively any fraud in  public 
procurement and to propose further adequate corrective measures that must be taken. 

2.5  

-  Emergency  Order  No  98/2017  on  the  ex-ante  control  function  of  the  award  of  public  contracts/framework  agreements  under  public 
procurement, of sector contracts/framework agreements and of works concession and services concession contracts was adopted; please note that 
intentions to amend contracts covered by the abovementioned law are also subjected to ex-ante control in order to ensure compliance with the 
principles of competition and transparency. 

- In the PREVENT System, the National Integrity Agency may conduct a complex ex-ante analysis with regard to all the public procurement 
procedures operated through the Electronic Public Procurement System, issuing warnings as to the integrity of public procurement procedures 
where  a  conflict  of  interests  is  likely  to  occur,  thus  enhancing  prevention  and  detection  of  fraud  and  corruption  in  the  sensitive  public 

127 

 
 
procurement sector. 

-  In  2017,  Guidelines  for  the  implementation  of  managerial  internal  control  standards  in  public  procurement  by  contracting  authorities  were 
developed  with  the  aim  of  increasing  the  administrative  capacity  of  contracting  authorities  in  procurement  procedures  by  ensuring  better 
organisation of the managerial internal control on the system. 

The  guidelines  (general  guidelines  and  the  three  guidance  sets  for  small,  medium  and  large  contracting  authorities)  include  a  series  of 
recommendations and a set of specific tools (such as methodologies, models, check lists) recommended to be applied in the public procurement 
procedure for the preparation and verification of procedural documents. 

-  The  Managing  Authorities  use  internal  operational  procedures  with  reference  to  the  national  and  Community  law  applicable  to  public 
procurement,  as  well  as  information  systems  such  as  ARACHNE  and  RECOM  in  order  to  increase  prevention  and  detection  of  fraud  and 
corruption in public procurement. 

-  Managing  Authorities  also  collaborate  with  the  Antifraud  Department  (Departamentul  pentru  Lupta  Antifraudă)  and  the  National 
Anticorruption Directorate (Direcția Națională Anticorupție) in order to investigate all the cases of fraud regarding the inappropriate application 
of the public procurement law. 

- Regular training events are conducted for the staff carrying out public procurement activities in regard to the relevant legislation, including to 
the prevention and finding of frauds and corruption in public procurement, the use of the PREVENT system etc. Procurement procedures are 
subjected to control and endorsement for preventive financial control. 

2.6  

- In performing its monitoring function, ANAP took the following measures: 

a)  Based  on  information  automatically  produced  from  SEAP  or  on  information  provided  to  ANAP  by  the  SEAP  operator,  a  specialised 
directorate of ANAP identified, calculated and analysed specific sets of indicators of the public procurement system. 

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The performance indicators of public procurement procedures in 2015 may be viewed on the ANAP website: http://anap.gov.ro/web/indicatorii-
de-monitorizare-ai-eficienței-procedurilor-de-achiziție-publică-finalizate-prin -contract / acord-cadru în anul-2015 /. 

The performance indicators of public procurement procedures in 2016 may be viewed on the ANAP website: http://anap.gov.ro/web/indicatorii-
de-monitorizare-ai-eficienței-procedurilor-de-achiziție-publică-pentru-anul -2016 /. 

b)  ANAP,  through  its  specialised  directorate,  published  a  set  of  26  indicators  for  the  period  2007-2016  on  its  website,  which  provide  an 
overview  of  the  national  public  procurement  system,  classified  according  to  several  terms:  the  public  procurement  action  size  (e.g.  the 
publication rate of the contract award notice for public procurement procedures initiated through notice/invitation to tender/simplified notice to 
tender, the average value of the contracts awarded under contract award notice procedures), the competition of tenders submitted under award 
procedures initiated through contract award notice on the public procurement market, remedies in the public procurement procedure (e.g. part of 
the public procurement procedures challenged) etc.; 

c)  In  certain  specific  situations  of  the  national  public  procurement  system,  various  regular  statistical  reports  and  analyses  are  performed  and 
posted on the website of ANAP. 

- The National Integrity Agency implemented the PREVENT System, which is a preventive tool. Moreover, through the Prevent System, ANI 
can  prepare  complex  reports  regarding:  the  number  of  integrity  warnings  issued;  the  number  of  public  procurement  procedures  analysed;  the 
number of public procurement procedures using EU/national funds etc. 

The reports enable ANI and the judicial bodies, the supervisory authorities, the supervisory bodies, the prevention and control authorities etc. to 
ensure better supervision of the public procurement process. 

- The monitoring activity is carried out over the entire period of implementation of the project by in-house specialised structures of the managing 
authorities, who follow up on progress reports, sustainability reports and on-the-spot monitoring visits. 

For  example,  at  these  authorities,  procurement  procedures  are  developed,  monitored  and  checked  by  several  persons  conducting  public 
procurement  in  accordance  with  the  “four-eye”  principle:  the  performance  officer,  head  of  service,  director  and,  providing  preventive 

129 

 
 
endorsement, the financial controllers. 

2.7 

 YES 

2.8  

-  In  March  2017,  four  Romanian  partners,  i.e.  the  Agency  for  digital  Agenda  of  Romania  (Agenția  pentru  Agenda  Digitală  a  României),  the 
National  Public  Procurement  Agency,  Deloitte  Audit  Romania  and  the  National  Authority  for  Administration  and  Regulation  in 
Communications  (Autoritatea  Națională  pentru  Administrare  și  Reglementare  în  Comunicații),  launched  the  project  “Solutions  for  Electronic 
Procurement in Romania - Strengthening the Use of the European Single Procurement Document (ESPD) and Integration of e-CERTIS Service”. 
The overall purpose of the project is to implement and strengthen the electronic procurement solutions in Romania, which will ultimately lead to 
Romania’s alignment to the European standards and directives in the field of public procurement. 

The  results  of  the  project  consist  in  the  implementation  of  the  ESPD  and  e-CERTIS  systems  in  the  national  public  procurement  system,  by 
connection of the ESPD service to the national registers. 

- Approximately 95 % of the total completed public procurement actions are conducted online, with the submission and evaluation of tenders on 
the relevant electronic platforms (SEAP). 

2.9  

-  The  National  Public  Procurement  Agency  and  the  National  Integrity  Agency  signed  Collaboration  Protocol  No  7693/11  May  2017  for 
interinstitutional  cooperation  between  these  institutions  in  order  to  establish  a  mechanism  for  preventing  conflicts  of  interests  in  the  public 
procurement procedures. 

In the exercise of its ex-ante control function, ANAP documents the notifications sent by ANI with regard to the situations where irregularities 
are suspected in the award procedures and which were subjected to checks by ANAP. 

At  the  same  time,  ANAP  will  report  to  ANI  whether  the  contracting  authorities/entities  implemented  the  measures  required  to  remove  the 

130 

 
 
potential conflict of interests that was the object of the integrity warning issued by ANI. 

For the award procedures included in the ex-ante control, ANAP will request from the contracting authorities/entities to complete and update the 
integrity form and will inform ANI if they do not comply with the respective requirements. 

- The PREVENT system became operational on 20 June 2017 for national and European funds, without any difference in the applicability of the 
law. 

The Department for Prevention and Analysis of the National Integrity Agency assesses conformity with the legal provisions on the conflicts of 
interests under the public procurement procedures developed through SEAP by the local public authorities, following up on the analysis of all 
the public procurement procedures developed in the previous year. 

From the date when it became operational until January 2018, 8 896 procurement procedures were revised by the PREVENT system in order to 
identify any potential conflicts of interests, with a total approximate value of RON 24.7 billion (~ EUR 5.3 billion). One third of these revised 
public procurement procedures were public procurement procedures with lots  (containing 36 568 lots) and 4 % of these referred to European 
funds. 

Moreover, integrity inspectors issued eight integrity warnings as regards public procurement procedures, of which in only seven cases did the 
leader  of  the  contracting  authority  which  launched  the  public  procurement  procedure  take  all  the  measures  required  to  avoid  a  conflict  of 
interests. In the other case, ANI initiated the evaluation procedure. 

Also, integrity inspectors sent 28 irregularities regarding potential connections between the members of the contracting authority and the persons 
in the tenders to the National Public Procurement Agency based on the collaboration agreement signed by the National Integrity Agency and the 
National Public Procurement Agency. 

The  agency  will  follow  up  on  the  consequences  of  the  issue  of  an  integrity  warning  until  the  situation  that  caused  the  irregularity  has  been 
removed and, in the event of non-compliance, ANI can initiate an investigation with regard to that conflict of interests. 

- The managing authorities use common checklists for public procurement procedures with the National Public Procurement Agency based on 

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the collaboration protocol for improvement of verification procedures. 

SI 

2.1 - NO 
It is in the Parliamentary procedure; in April 2018 a final reading is expected.  
The completion of the transposition of the Directive 2014/23/EU is planned in the first part of 2018. 
2.2 - YES 

2.3 - YES 

2.4  

In  April  1,  2016,  a  new  Public  Procurement  Act  (hereinafter:  ZJN-3)  entered  into  force,  which  transposed  the  Directive  2014/24/EU  and  the 
Directive 2014/25/EU. Deriving from transparency and anti-corruption program ZJN-3 was prepared with the intention of ensuring additional 
simplifications and bigger flexibility, transparency and efficiency of public procurement. 

Considering  publication  and  transparency  all  notices  regarding  public  contracts  whose  value  is  equal  to  or  greater  than  the  values  defined  in 
ZJN-3 must be published by the contracting authority on the Public Procurement Portal[1] and in some cases also in the Official Journal of the 

[1] Article 21 of ZJN-3 (Thresholds for the application of this Act):  
(1) This Act shall apply to procurements with a value net of value-added tax (hereinafter: VAT) estimated to be equal to or greater than the following thresholds:  
a) in the general field:  
– EUR 20,000 for public supply or service contracts or design contests;  
– EUR 40,000 for public works contracts;  
– EUR 750,000 for public service contracts for services listed in Annex XIV to Directive 2014/24/EU and Annex XVII to Directive 2014/25/EU (hereinafter: social and other specific 

services), with the exception of services which are covered by CPV code 79713000-5.  

b) in the infrastructure field:  
– EUR 50,000 for public supply or service contracts or design contests;  
– EUR 100,000 for public works contracts;  
– EUR 1,000,000 for public service contracts for social and other specific services, with the exception of services which are covered by CPV code 79713000-5. 

132 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
European Union[2]. ZJN-3 also specifies types of notices and the form and manner of their publication (eg. a prior information notice or periodic 
indicative notice; a notice on the existence of a qualification system; a contract notice or design contest notice; a voluntary ex ante transparency 
notice; a contract award notice or design contest organisation notice; a notice for additional information, information on incomplete procedure or 
corrigendum; a notice of modification of a contract during its term). Contracting authorities must draw up contract notices and send them for 
publication to the public procurement portal. Contract notices mentioned above must be published in full in the Slovenian language, though a 
summary of the important elements of each notice will also be published in other official languages of the European Union.  

The contract notices may be used as a means of calling for competition in respect of all procedures (except a negotiated procedure without prior 
publication). Not later than 30 days after the conclusion of a contract, following the decision to award or conclude it, contracting authorities must 
send for publication a contract award notice on the results of the procurement procedure. Contracting authorities must also publish a notice of 
modification of a contract during its term within 30 days of the modification of the contract and a notice for additional information, information 
on incomplete procedure or corrigendum when carrying out a procurement procedure. 

Contracting authorities must publish the procurement documents on or via the public procurement portal, except where they award contracts by 
negotiated procedure without prior publication or competitive procedure with negotiation. After the expiry of the time limit for the receipt of 
tenders, contracting authorities are not allowed to amend or modify the procurement documents. The information provided by the contracting 
authority  to  economic  operators  on  or  via  the  procurement  portal  is  deemed  to  be  an  amendment  to  or  modification  or  clarification  of  the 
procurement documents if its content implies that such information is to amend or modify the procurement documents or if a clarification is used 
to eliminate the ambiguity of information. 

With an intention to improve transparency the contracting authority must, no later than 48 days after the award of a contract, publish the contract 
(without  the  data  that  is  not  deemed  to  be  public  information).  All  contracts  and  their  later  amendments  must  be  published  on  the  public 
procurement portal. 

[2] As appointed by the European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/rules-implementation/thresholds_en 

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Due to even bigger transparency ZJN-3 has also established a new obligation for contracts with a value estimated to be less than the thresholds 
for the application of ZJN-3 (Article 21 of ZJN-3, see footnote n.1). Even in these cases the contracting authority is obliged to comply with the 
principles  of  economy,  efficiency  and  effectiveness  and  the  principle  of  transparency.  The  contracting  authority  must  annually  publish  on  its 
website or on the public procurement portal a list of public contracts awarded in the previous year with a value equal to or  greater than EUR 
10.000 net of VAT, describing the subject-matter and indicating the type of subject-matter, the value of the awarded contract and the name of the 
economic operator which was awarded the contract. 

Higher transparency in public procurement is also guaranteed through an important project: the IT solution named STATIST, widely 
available from the end of January 2016. It ensures an integrated, direct and modified publication of information on public contracts awarded in 
the Republic of Slovenia. STATIST contains all information on public contracts awarded since January 1, 2013; each user can examine the data 
using various filters. The application displays, for the chosen timeframe, in terms of contract value, ten largest contracting entities and ten largest 
tenderers, most frequently awarded contracts, according to the subject and legal basis. The data can be exported in a .cvs format, which enables 
its re-use. 

It  is  worthwhile  to  mention  that  the  Public  Payments  Administration  of  the  Republic  of  Slovenia  in  accordance  with  the  Slovenian  Public 
Information Access Act is authorized for the publication of account transactions of persons subjected to public information.  They prepared an 
online  application  which  offers  an  insight  into  the  public  information  on  transactions  carried  out  by  public  economic  institutions,  public 
corporations,  business  entities  100%  owned  by  public  sector  entities  and  other  users  of  budget  resources  registered  in  the  Public  Sector 
Authorities Register managed by The Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records and Related Services. The Public Payments 
Administration  acquires  transaction  data  from  its  own  records;  transaction  data  of  other  entities  is  acquired  from  commercial  banks  which 
manage their current accounts. 

The above mentioned obligatory use of public procurement portal, the widely used e-procurement solutions, public publications of documents 
and  contracts  made  during  the  public  procurement  procedure,  the  technical  solutions  made  to  monitor  public  spending,  etc,  are  all  meant  to 
empower the media, civil society organizations and the wider public. They are encouraged to use the data and scrutinize public procurement. 

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2.5  

Aiming to reduce corruption risks ZJN-3 provides that contracting authorities must effectively prevent, identify and remedy conflicts of interest 
arising  in  the  conduct  of  procurement  procedures  so  as  to  avoid  any  distortion  of  competition  and  to  ensure  equal  treatment  of  all  economic 
operators.  

ZJN-3 is stricter concerning provisions regulating the prevention of conflict of interests. Before awarding the contract, the person conducting the 
procurement procedure must notify in writing all persons involved in the preparation of the procurement documents or in the decision-making at 
any stage of the procurement procedure of which tenderer is to be awarded the contract. When the person is directly or indirectly associated with 
the selected tenderer in such a way that this person’s relationship with the successful tenderer or its private, financial or economic interests could 
affect the impartial and objective performance of his or her contract-related tasks or cast doubt on his or her objectivity and impartiality, he or 
she must, as soon as circumstances allow but no later than before the contract is awarded, notify in writing his or her superior or the contracting 
authority for which he or she performs activities or in any other way participates in the procurement. 

Before launching a procurement procedure, contracting authorities may conduct market consultations with a view to preparing the procurement 
and  informing  economic  operators  of  their  procurement  plans  and  requirements.  For  this  purpose,  contracting  authorities  may  conduct  a 
technical  dialogue  to  seek  or  accept  advice  which  may  be  used  in  the  preparation  of  the  procurement  documents,  if  such  advice  or 
recommendations  do  not  have  the  effect  of  preventing  or  restricting  competition  and  do  not  result  in  a  violation  of  the  principles  of  equal 
treatment  of  tenderers  or  the  transparency  of  public  procurement.  Where  a  candidate  or  tenderer  or  an  undertaking  related  to  a  candidate  or 
tenderer has advised the contracting authority or has otherwise been involved in the preparation of the procurement procedure, the contracting 
authority  must  take  appropriate  measures  to  ensure  that  competition  is  not  distorted  by  the  participation  of  that  candidate  or  tenderer.  These 
measures include dissemination of such information to other tenderers and application of appropriate time limits for the receipt of tenders. 

Besides  the  above  mentioned  ZJN-3  also  defines  exclusion  grounds.  Contracting  authorities  must  exclude  an  economic  operator  from 
participation in a procurement procedure where they have established or are otherwise aware, that that economic operator or a person who is a 
member of the administrative, management or supervisory body of that economic operator or has powers of representation, decision or control 

135 

 
 
 
 
 
 
therein has been the subject of a conviction by a  final judgment containing elements of several criminal offences. Furthermore, the economic 
operator may be excluded also if the economic operator has been guilty of serious misrepresentation in supplying the information required for 
the verification of the existence of grounds for exclusion or of the fulfilment of the selection criteria, has withheld such information, or if the 
economic  operator  has  undertaken  to  unduly  influence  the  decision-making  process  of  the  contracting  authority,  to  obtain  confidential 
information that may confer upon it undue advantages in the procurement procedure, or to negligently provide misleading information that may 
have  a  material  influence  on  decisions  concerning  exclusion,  selection  or  awarding.  They  may  exclude  an  economic  operator  regardless  of 
whether such exclusion was provided for in the procurement documents. 

The  Ministry  of  Public  Administration,  the  Public  Procurement  Directorate  for  the  purposes  of  joint  procurements  and  procurements  on  the 
behalf  of  the  authorities  of  the  Republic  of  Slovenia  carries  out  joint  public  procurements  of  the  Government  in  accordance  with  the  act  on 
public procurement, as well as other procurements for which the Government authorised the Ministry of Public Administration.  It also gathers 
the  needs  of  the  authorities  of  the  Republic  of  Slovenia  and  proposes  to  the  Government  joint  public  procurements,  as  well  as  manages  the 
information system which, in line with the contract or framework agreement, enables the awarding of an individual contract. Ministry of Public 
Administration  also  carries  out  joint  public  procurement  in  the  health  sector  (procurement  of  medication,  diapers,  gloves,  needles,  supplies, 
dilation material and catheters, etc).  

Following the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act persons responsible for public procurement have an obligation to declare their assets to 
the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption. Persons responsible for public procurement must communicate the information on their assets 
to  the  Commission  once  a  year  by  January  31  of  the  current  year  for  the  previous  year  if  in  the  previous  year  they  participated  in  a  public 
procurement procedure.  

In order to ensure transparency and to mitigate corruption risks any public-sector body or organisation which is subject to the obligation to carry 
out public procurement procedures must prior to the conclusion of contract exceeding the value of EUR 10.000 (net of VAT) obtain a statement 
or information on the participation of natural and legal persons in tenderer’s assets, including the participation of economic operators which are 
considered to be companies affiliated to the tenderer under the provisions of the Companies Act. The public-sector body or organization must 

136 

 
 
 
 
 
submit this statement or information to the Commission at the latter’s request. In the event that the tenderer submits a false statement or provides 
false information on the facts stated, the contract is null and void. 

An  important  part  of  fraud  detection  is  also  the  protection  of  whistleblowers.  The  Integrity  and  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act  states  that  the 
identity of a whistleblower, i.e. the person who reports instances of corruption, must not be disclosed. In connection with the report of corruption 
the conditions for the protection of the reporting persons and his family members can be fulfilled also under the law on witness protection. If as a 
consequence of filing the report the reporting persons have been subjected to retaliatory measures, they have the right to claim compensation. 

Under the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act an oﬃcial must also not act as a representative of a business entity that has established or 
is about to establish business contacts with the body in which the oﬃcial held oﬃce until two years have elapsed from the termination of his 
oﬃce.  The  body  in  which  the  oﬃcial  held  oﬃce  must  not  do  business  with  the  entity  in  which  the  former  oﬃcial  has  a  minimum  5% 
participation in the founders' rights, management or capital, either by direct participation or through the participation of other legal persons until 
one year has elapsed from the termination of the oﬃce. 
2.6  

The  monitoring  of  the  system  is  greatly  based  on  our  e-procurement  system  which  is  built  with  different  levels  of  interoperability  in  mind. 
Through e-procurement the ministry, as well as media and wider public, can see documents and contracts connected with public procurement 
procedures.  The  ministry  uses  the  data  for  its  overview  and  monitoring.  The  data  on  the  contracts  awarded  in  the  previous  year  and 
communicated by contracting authorities to the public procurement portal is processed. The ministry responsible for public procurement must, 
not later than by September 30 of the current year, prepare a statistical report on contracts awarded in the Republic of Slovenia using the data on 
contracts awarded in the previous year. A statistical report includes contracts as a share of GDP and expenditure in the national budget and, at 
least, data on the number and value of the contracts awarded. Where possible, the data is divided into the following categories:  
– category, activity and size of the contracting authority;  
– public procurement procedures applied by contracting authorities;  
– techniques and instruments for electronic and aggregated procurement;  

137 

 
 
 
 
 
– subject-matter of the contract and categories of the CPV nomenclature;  
– any social, ethical and environmental aspects taken into account in the award of the contract;  
– head office and size of the economic operator to which the contract was awarded;  
– contracts that were subcontracted;  
– contracts co-financed by European Union funds.  

Better  monitoring  is  provided  also  for  the  contracts  whose value is  estimated  to  be  less  than  the  thresholds  for  the  application  of  ZJN-3  (see 
footnote n.1). Even in these cases the contracting authority must annually publish on its website or on the public procurement portal a list of 
public contracts awarded in the previous year with a value equal to or greater than EUR 10,000 net of VAT, describing the subject-matter and 
indicating the type of subject-matter, the value of the awarded contract net of VAT and the name of the economic operator which was awarded 
the contract. Information on these contracts is also included in the yearly statistical report, described in the previous paragraph. 

More means of monitoring are available through the IT solution named STATIST that ensures an integrated, direct and modified publication of 
information  on  public  contracts  awarded  in  the  Republic  of  Slovenia.  STATIST  contains  all  information  on  public  contracts  awarded  since 
January 1, 2013; each user can examine the data using various filters. The application displays, for the chosen timeframe, in terms of contract 
value, ten largest contracting entities and ten largest tenderers, most frequently awarded contracts, according to the subject and legal basis.  

Ministry of Public Administration, Public Procurement Directorate also carries out tasks of providing general non-binding written interpretations 
of  the  Slovenian  Public  Procurement  Act,  ensuring  the  publication  of  useful  information  on  public  procurement  and  preparation  of 
recommendations,  guidelines  and  manuals  for  procurement  practitioners  in  different  areas  (such  as  construction,  engineering  services  and  IT 
services)  and  preparation  of  sample  tender  documentations,  etc.  Furthermore,  Ministry  of  Public  Administration  is  operating  a  telephone 
consultation  service  for  public  procurement  practitioners  twice  a  week.  Telephone  consultations  are  available  and  primarily  aim  to  support 
contracting authorities throughout the whole procurement procedure, from preparation of tender documentation to publication and execution of 
the  contract.  As  this  initiative  proved  to  be  useful  for  contracting  authorities,  the  Slovenian  government  decided  to  strengthen  it  with  the 
development of an enhanced helpdesk. Helpdesk enables contracting authorities to receive advice in the preparation of tender documentation and 

138 

 
 
 
 
 
implementation of public procurement procedure or the performance of contractual provisions. This will enhance  professionalisation in public 
procurement and ensure administrative capacity for implementation and application of EU rules on public procurement. The Ministry of Public 
Administration,  Public  Procurement  Directorate,  also  carries  out  free  presentations  of  public  procurement  legislation  and  good  practices  on 
different  locations  across  Slovenia.  All  mentioned  measures  help  us  monitor  both  the  troubles  and  the  needs  of  contracting  authorities  and 
economic operators in public procurement procedures. 
2.7 - YES 

2.8  

Regarding the provision of e-procurement we would like to clarify that the Ministry of Public Administration, as the ministry responsible for 
public procurement system in Slovenia, developed a public »state-developed« system called »eJN« (elektronsko javno naročanje) that fulfils all 
requirements  of  applicable  directives  and  is  free  of  charge.  However,  usage  of  system  »eJN«  is  not  mandated  to  be  used  in  e-procurement 
procedures in Slovenia (i.e. also systems that were developed by private sector can be used).  

Current  version  of  »eJN«  contains  five  modules  (eSubmissions,  eAuctions,  eDodssier,  eCatalogue  and  eInternal  procedures  for  public 
authorities). Individual modules were built on different platforms by three different contractors.  

In 2017 the Ministry carried out a public procurement procedure for the selection of a contractor for technological renewal and maintenance of 
the »eJN« system and signed a contract with the selected bidder. Within the framework of the technological renewal of the system, individual 
modules will be integrated into a comprehensive system on a single platform. At the end of 2017 the contractor started with development for 
renewal of module eSubmission and it is planned that it will be available to all users of the system (public authorities and economic operators) in 
the beginning of April 2018. 
2.9  

As mentioned above we developed an IT tool named “STATIST”. Its purpose is to provide a higher form of transparency in the field of public 
procurement. The application is in use since January 2016 and enables a complete and thorough overview over public contracts, awarded via 

139 

 
 
 
 
 
 
public procurement in Republic of Slovenia. STATIST contains all information on public contracts awarded since January 1, 2013. Each user 
can examine the data using various filters. The data can be exported in a .cvs format, which enables its re-use.  

The application is published (link) on the site of electronic public procurement, owned by the Ministry of Public Administration and its use is 
free  of  charge.  The  tool  is  designed  to  empower  the  media,  civil  society  organizations  and  the  wider  public  in  their  scrutiny  of  public 
procurement. The application, when launched, was well received and helps media prepare their reports. We noticed that since its launch we have 
fewer questions, posed by the media, since they can find the answers for themselves. 

The  application  automatically  displays,  for  the  chosen  timeframe,  in  terms  of  contract  value,  ten  largest  contracting  entities  and  ten  largest 
tenderers, most frequently awarded contracts, according to the subject and legal basis. Each user can use the tool according  to its needs using 
various  filters,  i.e.  search  parameters  like  the  contracting  authority  (name,  region  of  registered  seat  of  the  company),  procedure  (type  of 
procedure,  legal  basis,  CPV)  and  tenderer  (name,  country  and  region  of  registered  seat  of  the  company).  Users  can  easily  add  and  remove 
various filters and thus limit or wider the search according to their needs. The data is updated once a day. 

Secondly, we would like to share the good practice of preparing and publishing Guidelines for procurement practitioners in different areas. After 
the new ZJN-3 entered into force in April 2016 Slovenia decided to raise awareness and help practitioners with using the new rules. Guidelines 
are part of soft law, their use is not mandatory, but well recommended. We started the preparation of first guidelines slowly and thoroughly. We 
invited  the  ministries  and  several  Chambers  of  commerce  (who  are  in  jurisdiction  in  appropriate  subject  fields)  to  participate  with 
recommendations, solutions and exposing of practical problems. The first (Guidelines on ordering architectural and engineering services) were 
launched  in  June  2016.  They  were  followed  by  Guidelines  on  public  procurement  in  construction  in  December  2016  and  Guidelines  on  IT 
solution services in January 2017. Shortly Guidelines on private security services and Guidelines on cleaning services will also be published. 

We find the process and preparation of Guidelines itself  an example of good practice for professionalization of public buyers. All Guidelines 
contain references and examples on how should a typical public procurement procedure in the subject field under consideration go about. They 
address the whole “life circle” of the procedure using several tools, enabled by ZJN-3, with the goals of enabling wide competition and getting 

140 

 
 
 
 
 
 
the most for public money. They include several examples of good practices. 

SK 

2.1 - YES 
2.2 - YES  
2.3 - YES  
2.4  

The  Public  Procurement  Office  (hereinafter  as  “PPO”)  has  implemented  systematically  since  2014  measures  to  enhance  transparency  and 
integrity like electronic profile of contracting authorities, registry of persons banned on participation in public procurement, registry of beneficial 
owners (invented by the PPO and in February 2017 updated by the Slovak Ministry of Justice), compulsory disclosure of all remedies decisions. 
All information about the public procurement procedure are updated, public available and free of charge 
2.5  
The above mentioned measures not only helped to enhance transparency & integrity, but also helped to prevent and detect a fraud or corruption. 
All these measures are a very useful tools for the public control. In 2017 the PPO was an active member in working group of Member States' 
experts, directed and coordinated by the Fraud Prevention, Reporting and Analysis unit in the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) which has 
created a handbook “Fraud in Public Procurement, A collection of Red Flags and Best Practices.” 
2.6  
For better monitoring of secondary policies (social aspects, innovation and green public procurement) PPO has added a voluntary field into the 
template of contract notice. These measures shall help the state entities by the monitoring of the use of secondary policies in public procurement. 
According to the upcoming electronization of all  procedures in  public procurement with  the use  of electronic systems, all  procedures will be 
recorded and automatically stored. This will help the state entities by the detection of fraud, corruption or irregularities in the public procurement 
procedure. 
2.7 - YES  

2.8. 
PPO  has  done  the  first  step  to  fully  electronisation  and  had  cooperated  on  the  development  of  the  national  e-procurement  strategy  with  the 
OECD. On the national level PPO closely cooperates with the Deputy Prime Minister´s Office. 
2.9  

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PPO has good experiences with the Registry of beneficial owners. The aim of the registry of beneficial owners is to enhance the transparency of 
the public sources management in public procurement. The main reason for this is to ensure that the public procurement contract is concluded 
only with economic operators that have a known ownership structure up to the level of natural persons. Since 1 February 2017, a new act on 
registry of partners of the public sector (before known as “Registry of beneficial owners”) entered into force that covers all contracts financed 
from public sources. The registry of partners of the public sector is after the stricter regulation managed no longer by PPO, but by the Slovak 
Ministry of Justice. Pursuant the new act the identification and verification of the beneficial owner is carried out by an authorized person, such as 
by a lawyer, a notary, a bank, an auditor or a tax advisor. The registry is public available and free of charge. 
2.1 - YES 
2.2 - YES 
2.3 - YES 
2.4  

FI 

i) All call for bids (over threshold) are published in single website 
ii)  Planned  purchase  and  preliminary  schedule  for  purchase  published  in  a  single  website  at  the  beginning  of  year  for  the  government's 
contracting authorities 
iii) Data for state spending available to all interested. (Based on invoices, allows to monitor from who the state or individual agency is buying, 
who are the biggest suppliers etc.) The information is published as open data and in web service www.tutkihankintoja.fi 
iv)  In  accordance  with  Act  on  the  Openness  of  Government  Activities  all  official  documents  are  freely  available  for  anyone  asking  once  the 
confidential information is removed. 
2.5  

i) Supervising authority for public procurement established 
2.6  

i) Data for state spending available to all interested. (Based on invoices, allows to monitor  from who the state or individual agency is buying, 
who are the biggest suppliers etc.) The information is published as open data. www.tutkihankintoja.fi 
ii) Similar information is available for the big cities/municipalities. 
iii)  Finnish  Competition  and  Consumer  Agency  is  monitoring  the  public  procurement.  FCCA’s  monitoring  action  concentrates  especially  on 

142 

 
 
 
 
 
illegal direct award 

2.7 - YES 

2.8  
i) e-Tendering process available to all procurement units and all bidders 
ii) The automatic (thru e-procurement system) check of bidders acceptability available for all purchasing units. (information on criminal records 
not yet available) 
2.9 N/A 

SE 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

 YES 

 YES 

 YES 

2.4 
Public access to  official records is a fundamental principle in the Swedish  legal  culture.  The principle is codified  in the three national public 
procurement laws as part of the principle of transparency. 
2.5  
The National Agency for Public Procurement has the governmental task of supporting contracting authorities in carrying out public procurement 
according to existing legal obligations. Also, the Swedish Competition Authority has the governmental task of monitoring public procurement 
carried out in Sweden with the mandate of imposing financial sanctions. 
2.6  
In  addition  to  the  work  carried  out  by  the  Swedish  Competition  Authority  (see  reply  to  question  2.5)  the  National  Agency  for  Public 
Procurement conducts yearly inquiries among contracting authorities. 
2.7 

 YES 

2.8   

In Sweden all contracting authorities are required to conduct their procurement by use of electronic means. However, Sweden for example does 

143 

 
 
 
not yet have a common electronic platform for all public procurement. 

2.9  

In  the  National  Public  Procurement  Strategy  the  Swedish  government  manifests  how  public  procurement  can  be  used  as  an  efficient  tool  to 
ensure 
(http://www.government.se/4aba88/contentassets/9ec42c71c00442a39d67169d3c25faed/national-public-
procurement-strategy.pdf). 

development 

sustainable 

UK 

2.1 

2.2 

2.3 

 YES 

 YES 

 YES 

2.4 
In  order  to  ensure  that  documents  related  to  public  procurement  are  published  and  made  accessible,  Central  Government  buyers  must  publish  all  tender 
documents and contracts with a contract value of over £10,000 on the Contracts Finder website, wider public sector bodies (e.g. local government buyers) 
have to publish all contracts worth over £25,000. Guidance for buyers is available on the gov.uk website. Central government departments also proactively 
release information in line with the above commitments during the life of the contract. 

As part of the Government's transparency policies, all beneficiaries of EAGF and EAFRD aid are published on a public UK website managed by 
the UK Co-ordinating Body on behalf of the four paying agencies.  In the UK the main CAP schemes that involve procurement are financed 
under EAFRD and primarily involve capital-build projects.  Scheme rules require the work to be tendered on national procurement websites and 
the EU Official Journal depending on the value of the contract.  The monitoring my managing authority and paying agency officials of project 
applications focuses on procurement as being a key control.  All paying agencies have independent and dedicated staff specifically qualified to 
undertake public procurement duties. 

2.5  
Business areas within Government departments are required to perform risk assessments of all financial programmes to ensure they build-in good controls to 
manage  the  risk  of  fraud  where  there  are  vulnerabilities  or  by  designing  them  to  be  inherently  less  vulnerable  to  fraud.   For  example,  paying  agencies 

144 

 
 
undertake a number of checks throughout the procurement process designed to prevent and detect potential corruption and fraud.  The checks include internal 
checks by senior management, internal audit departments and human resource sections.  The system of checks also includes sharing information with external 
government departments and agencies including undertaking checks designed for specific schemes to avoid duplicate funding.  Checks are carried out on staff 
to ensure there are no conflict of interests and staff rotation takes place where there are sensitive posts.   
2.6  
The  UK  government  has  ensured  that  there  are  a  range  of  reviews  to  monitor  the  public  procurement  system.  For  example,  the  Crown 
Commercial  Service  provides  a  Mystery  Shopper  Service  which  allows  government  suppliers  and  potential  government  suppliers  to  raise 
concerns  anonymously  about  potentially  poor  public  sector  procurement  practice.  This  ensures  that  concerns  can  be  raised  and  will  be 
followed up on to ensure that public procurements do not impose unnecessary barriers, particularly to small businesses, when  bidding for 
public contracts. 
For shared management programmes, internal and external reviews are regularly undertaken to ensure there is compliance with the rules of 
public  procurement.    In  particular,  the  rural  development  programmes  have  robust  systems  in  place  to  verify  the  authenticity  and 
reasonableness of quotes submitted by applicants.   
2.7 

 YES 

for 

2.8 The Crown Commercial Service has published guidance on electronic procurement and electronic communication on the gov.uk website. UK 
Principles 
overarching 
policy 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/open-standards-principles/open-standards-principles), which were updated in April 2018, and the 
UK Digital Strategy (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-digital-strategy) 

e-communication 

the  Open 

Standards 

included 

policies 

such 

our 

as 

in 

is 

For paying agencies, procurements are approved via a work-flow process embedded within on-line finance systems.  This operates within set 
paying agency financial delegations ensuring control, assurance and availability of audit trails. 

2.9 We do not have any practices which we are ready to share at this stage.  

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Looking at the detections reported by national authorities over the last five years for the main expenditure sectors, there is no significant divergence from 
known  patterns.  There  are  small  variations  in  annual  programmes,  such  as  those  financed  by  the  EAGF,  from  one  year  to  another.  Multiannual 
programmes follow a different pattern, linked to the programming cycle, with a low number in the first years of the programme increasing towards its 
closure. 

This year's analysis has been further deepened and refined to enable better targeting of specific areas at risk. This was possible because of the quality of 
the reported data, which is progressively improving. However, more improvements could be made. 

Recommendation 3 

• When reporting irregularities (fraudulent and non-fraudulent), all competent authorities are asked to provide information about the location 

and, for cohesion and fisheries policies, the priority area of the measures/projects affected.  

• When updating irregularities previously reported Member States are also asked to provide this information if they have not done so already. 

Questions (Recommendation 3): 

3.1 Did you take measures to enhance the quality of reporting by providing information about the location and for cohesion and fisheries policies the 
priority area of the measures/projects affected? (if yes, next question is 3.2.a) (if no, question is 3.2.b) 

3.2.a What kind of measures did you take to enhance the quality of reporting? Please explain 

3.2.b Why didn't you take any measure to improve data quality? 

3.3 Did you update already reported irregularities with the required information? YES / YES partially (Please explain)/ NO (Please explain) 

3.4 Do you have any successful practice that you would be ready to share with other Member States? Please explain. 

BE  3.1 

 NO (if no, question is 3.2.b)  

Contribution VO Department of Agriculture and Fisheries: 

146 

 
 
To date, no irregularities have been reported to OLAF (> EUR 10 000) in respect of the Flemish Fisheries Fund. 

3.2.a  N/A 
3.2.b  

CONTRIBUTION VO Department of Agriculture and Fisheries: 
Should irregularities/fraud be reported in the future, the Department will pay due attention to the quality of the data provided. 
3.3 

 NO  

3.4 N/A 

BG  With regard to the statement of expenditure, when reporting irregularities to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the managing authorities 
of all operational programmes adhere strictly to the requirements of the national legislation in the area of managing and reporting irregularities, 
as well as to the OLAF guidelines concerning the input of information in the Irregularities Management System (IMS). 

Each  managing  authority  (MA)  has  adopted  a  management  manual  for  the  respective  operational  programme,  in  which  the  principles  and 
procedures  for  managing  irregularities  are  specified  in  detail.  The  managing  authorities  maintain  a  transparent  and  traceable  system  for  the 
registration  and  storage  of  documentation,  in  accordance  with  the  respective  record-keeping  system,  including  in  an  electronic  format  in  the 
modules of the Information System for the Management and Monitoring of EU Structural Instruments in Bulgaria (ISUN) for the 2007-2013 
programming period, the Information System for the Management and Monitoring of EU Funds for the 2014-2020 period (ISUN 2020), and the 
IMS for cases pursuant to Article 122(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2014. Each MA has appointed irregularities officers who are responsible 
for applying the procedures for managing irregularities, including entering information in the electronic systems. 

At national level, measures have been put in place so that for each irregularity reported, information on the location of project implementation is 
included. 

The  AFCOS  directorate  carries  out  quality  controls  of  the  irregularities  that  are  to  be  reported  to  OLAF  through  the  IMS  system,  checking 
whether  the  NUTS  (Nomenclature  of  territorial  units  for  statistics,  as  per  Regulation  (EU)  No  1059/2003)  fields  are  filled  in  in  the  section 

147 

 
 
‘Territorial unit where the operation is carried out’. If information is found to be missing, the respective irregularity is sent back to the managing 
authorities with instructions to fill it in. In addition, the AFCOS directorate regularly conducts training courses for the irregularities officers of 
the managing authorities, which emphasise the need to fill in the information in the section ‘Territorial unit where the operation is carried out’ 
and give a technical demonstration of how to fill in the dropdown forms. 

In the national ISUN system for the 2007-2013 programming period, the information on the location of contract implementation can be found in 
the  attached  files  in  the  module  ‘Contract  information’.  For  the  2014-2020  programming  period,  in  the  national  system  ISUN  2020,  the 
information on the location of project implementation can be found in the application form, which forms part of the administrative contract with 
a given beneficiary. This allows direct access to this information and minimises the risk of incorrect information being entered.  

When carrying out  quality  control  of the reporting of irregularities to  OLAF, the AFCOS directorate requires that the information  in section 
‘territorial  unit  where  the  operation  is  carried  out’  be  filled  in  in  any  follow-up  notifications  concerning  already  reported  irregularities.  It  is 
possible for this information to be missing only in isolated cases, due to technical reasons. (in approximately 16 cases out of 938). 

The  AFCOS  directorate  carries  out  training  courses  for  staff  working  with  IMS,  following  the  "training  for  trainers"  courses  conducted  by 
OLAF. In 2017, four courses were held, training 42 staff members of the competent authorities. 

CZ  3.1 

 NO (if no, question is 3.2.b) 

3.2.a N/A 

3.2.b  
We  have  had  no  irregularities  in  the  Operational  Programme  for  Fisheries  2014-2020.  During  the  last  programming  period,  the  information 
about the location and priority area was provided through AFCOS. Now it will be the same. 
3.3 
We  have  had  no  irregularities  in  the  Operational  Programme  for  Fisheries  2014-2020.  During  the  last  programming  period,  the  information 
about the location and priority area was provided through AFCOS. Now it will be the same. 

 NO  

148 

 
 
3.4  

We  have  had  no  irregularities  in  the  Operational  Programme  for  Fisheries  2014-2020.  The  recovery  of  the  funds  in  the  Czech  Republic  is 
provided through the Managing Authorities. In case of a breach of budgetary discipline the recovery is provided through the Tax Authorities. As 
the  Tax  Authorities  are bodies  outside  the implementation  structure, the  independency  is  secured.  Cooperation  proceeded  without  any  major 
problems. 

DK  3.1 

 YES (if yes, next question is 3.2.a) 

3.2.a  

There is continued emphasis in the area of the structural funds on improving the internal procedures for reporting irregularities, including the 
information transmitted via IMS. 
The staff members responsible for reporting on the agricultural funds have  received additional guidance on where  they can  find the relevant 
information in our case systems, and the importance of including the information has been emphasised.   
We have also used the current examples from OLAF’s e-mails or COCOLAF meetings concerning data quality in order to identify which IMS 
fields we should check with regard to data quality in connection with the original reporting for the agricultural funds. 
So as to ensure compliance with the deadlines for OWNRES reports, the relevant staff members are notified well in advance, thus ensuring that 
the  reports  are  submitted  on  time.  Well-established,  good  cooperation  exists  between  staff  in  the  customs  department  and  the  accounts 
department. The OWNRES cases are drawn up and submitted in accordance with the applicable rules, and it is ensured that there is a connection 
between the B account and the OWNRES reports. 
Internal guidelines have been drawn up to ensure that SKAT correctly settles the European Union’s own resources relating to customs duty in 
accordance with the applicable regulation. Those guidelines provide an overview of the rules and procedures for all settlements of the EU’s own 
resources relating to customs duty. The guidelines also lay down rules for OWNRES reporting. They are updated regularly. Finally, please note 
that the area is subject to SKAT’s internal quality assurance procedures. 
3.2.b N/A 

3.3 

 YES partially (Please explain)  

149 

 
 
We ensure that open cases relating to structural funds contain information on the area and the priority. In the area of agriculture, existing reports 
are also updated with that information in the context of any new developments in the case. 
3.4 N/A 

DE  3.1 

 YES (if yes, next question is 3.2.a)  

3.2.a  
To  supplement  OLAF’s  IMS-5  manual,  a  working  document  (guidance)  was  drawn  up  in  cooperation  with  the  reporting  authorities  in  the 
Federal  Länder  to  support  and  improve  the  reporting  of  irregularities.  Department  E A 6  of  the  Federal  Finance  Ministry,  responsible  for 
coordinating reports, has set up a permanent Federation-Länder working party on ‘Irregularities’, to share experiences and information, and also 
serves as a national helpdesk to ensure uniform and compliant reporting practice, including information on the place in which an irregularity 
was committed and on the priority axis of the measures/projects concerned in the fields of cohesion and fisheries policy.  
The  Country  Officers  of  Department  E A 6  also  conduct  quality  checks  on  every  individual  IMS  report  (request)  and,  where  clarification  is 
needed, check with the competent reporting authority before forwarding the report to OLAF. 

3.2.b N/A 

3.3 

 YES fully 

3.4  

See comments in Box 3.2a 

EE  The  Agricultural  Register  and  Information  Board  reports  the  irregularities  of  fisheries  policies.  The  priority  area  of  the  measures  /  projects 

affected (IMS fields 3.11, 3.12) is always keyed in. 
3.1 YES (if yes, next question is 3.2.a) 

3.2.a  

The officials of the Responsible Authority for the AMIF and ISF (the Estonian Ministry of the Interior) were trained and started to use the IMS. 

150 

 
 
Previously a Word file was used for submitting the report to the Ministry of Finance. 

3.2.b  

The Managing Authority for Cohesion have not added any priority information so far, because the OLAF priority axis list in field number 3.11 
and  the  Estonian  national  priority  axis  do  not  match.  We  cannot  choose  right  priority  at  the  moment,  so  we  leave  this  box  blank.  We  can 
improve it after our national priority axis in the IMS has been added. There is a problem in the IMS field number 3.12 “theme” as well – we 
cannot choose the right theme names either.  

We do not have any problem in the location information – when we report the irregularities, we import the data from our national Managing 
Information System (we get the location information automatically from our business register there). 
3.3 NO See the previous answer. 

3.4 N/A 

IE 

3.1

 YES (if yes, next question is 3.2.a) 

3.2.a  
When reporting irregularities we made every effort to provide detailed information and where possible we included information on the location 
and priority area of the project. 
3.2.b N/A 

3.3 

 YES partially (Please explain) 

This process commenced as part of the closure of the existing programmes and is ongoing at present. 
3.4 Do you have any successful practice that you would be ready to share with other Member States? Please explain. 

Only those that are set out in the above paragraphs. 

EL  3.1 

3.2.b  

 NO (if no, question is 3.2.b) 

151 

 
 
 
The handbook issued by OLAF is used and applied, so there has been no need for any additional measures. 

3.3 

 YES fully 

3.4  
The handbook issued by OLAF is applied. 
 YES (if yes, next question is 3.2.a) 
3.1 

ES 

3.2.a  

In 2017, a number of seminars were organised on the reporting of irregularities in accordance with the obligations laid down  in relevant EU 
legislation. The  seminars  were  designed  for  staff  working  for  the  managing  authorities,  who  are  responsible  for  filling  in  the  fields  with  the 
various  items  that  must  be  communicated  using  the  IMS  application.  The  seminars  involved  a  very  practical  component,  whereby  the 
participants were instructed how to fill in the most important fields, including the two mentioned in this recommendation, emphasising the need 
to complete all the fields. 
3.2.b N/A 

3.3 

 NO  

We will assess whether additional measures are needed to ensure that the fields relating to location and priority area are completed correctly. 
3.4 N/A 

FR  3.1 

3.2.a  

 YES (if yes, next question is 3.2.a) 

Regarding the EU agricultural funds (EAGF/EAFRD), the irregularities reported to OLAF are verified and corrected by the Secretariat of the 
Inter-ministerial  Commission  for  the  Coordination  of  Inspections  (CCIC)  for  the  EAGF  (‘Mission  COSA’  [checking  of  operations  in  the 
agricultural sector]  of  the  General  Economic  and  Financial Control  and  Auditing  Body  (CGEFI)  (Ministry  of  the  Economy  and  Finance),  in 
cooperation  with  the  paying  agencies  (ASP;  FRANCEAGRIMER;  ODEADOM;  ODARC).  This  close  cooperation  takes  place  through 
telephone  and  digital  communication  between  the  liaison  officer  of  the  Secretariat  of  ‘Mission  COSA’  and  the  official  correspondents 

152 

 
 
 
 
 
(‘managers’) of the paying agencies. 
Regarding the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), France is currently developing its information system (SIFA-SYNERGIE) to 
enable automated processing of alerts to OLAF. 
3.2.b N/A 

3.3 

 YES fully for the agricultural funds 

 YES partially for the ESIF (see above) 

3.4 N/A 

HR  3.1  YES (if yes, next question is 3.2.a) 

3.2.a  
Employees  of  Croatian  AFCOS  Service  perform  quality  checks  of  Irregularity  Reports  taking  into  account  criteria  stipulated  in  relevant 
regulations  (e.g.  Commission  Delegated  Regulation  (EU)  2015/1970).  If  mistakes  or  omissions  are  identified  during  the  quality  check, 
Irregularity Reports are rejected and sent to their creators for correction. In addition, AFCOS Service keeps a list of the most common mistakes. 
This list is a useful tool for eventual new employees of the AFCOS Service who are supposed to perform Irregularity Report quality checks and 
it is consulted in preparation of trainings for Irregularity Reporting System bodies. 
3.2.b N/A 

3.3 

 NO  

Since  Employees  of  Croatian  AFCOS  Service  perform  quality  checks  of  Irregularity  Reports  and  send  Irregularity  Reports  found  to  be 
incomplete  to  their  creators  for  correction,  there  were  no  cases  where  already  reported  irregularities  had  to  be  updated  with  the  required 
information. 
3.4 N/A 

IT 

3.1 

 YES (if yes, next question is 3.2.a) 

3.2.a  
Contribution of the Italian AFCOS (Anti-Fraud Coordination Service): 
As the national ‘manager’ of the IMS (Irregularities Management System), the  Italian AFCOS has, over time, issued all authorities reporting 

153 

 
 
 
cases of irregularities/fraud, with specific provisions concerning the need to implement the parts of the system dedicated to the beneficiary’s 
‘geolocation’ and the place where the offence was committed. 

Contribution of the Agency for Territorial Cohesion: 
The Agency for Territorial Cohesion uses the Irregularities Management System as an instrument for drawing up and submitting  irregularity 
reports (notifications) to the European Commission’s Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). This instrument consists in a series of fields that can be used 
to  provide  information  on  the  location  and  priority  areas  of  the  measures  /  projects  in  question.  For  example,  there  are  fields  relating  to 
territorial information (country, NUTS), both at the level of the personal data of people involved in the irregularities and at operational level. 
These fields are completed when a new report is opened, in order to comply with the abovementioned recommendation. 
3.3 

 YES fully 

3.4  

Contribution of the Italian AFCOS (Anti-Fraud Coordination Service): 

Every  year, the Italian AFCOS schedules and runs various training courses aimed at explaining to the users of the IMS system who may be 
interested (sub-managers, creators and observers) how the web platform for the reporting of irregularities/fraud works, and in the light of the 
changes related to the latest version of IMS (IMS4 and IMS5). 
This  initiative,  which  has  had  considerable  success,  has  become  best  practice  and  will  be  replicated  in  the  future  with  more  annual  events, 
possibly also at regional level. 

CY  3.1 

 NO (if no, question is 3.2.b) 

3.2.a N/A 

3.2.b  
In the national system (MIS) for reporting irregularities, (common system used by all authorities involved in the management of the Funds) all 
information for the irregularity is reported and available to all, including its location, measure, priority, project, contract, invoices etc.  For cases 
that need to be reported to OLAF (e.g. suspicion for fraud, irregularities above the set threshold etc) all the above information is included in the 
reports submitted to the AFIS system. 

154 

 
 
 
3.3 

 YES fully 

3.4 N/A 

LV  3.1 

3.2.a  

 YES (if yes, next question is 3.2.a) 

Ministry of Finance (Managing authority of ERDF, ESF, CF) gave the information, that in the year 2017, there were no OLAF requests to check 
and ensure that all the information about the location and the priority area of the measures/projects affected is complete and correct in IMS, 
therefore they consider that the data quality regarding location and the priority area of the measures/projects affected is appropriate. 
As  there  were  some  OLAF  e-mails  regarding  missing  data  in  IMS,  the  Managing  Authority  of  cohesion  policy  asked  to  national  authorities 
involved in ESI funds administration to perform a quality control on open cases and, if necessary, till 27.11.2017 to update the information in all 
mandatory fields  (including the location and the priority) on reported irregularities.   
Ministry of Agriculture (Managing authority of EAFRD and EMFF) gave the information that that all the necessary data were registered and 
confirmed in system. 

3.2.b N/A 

3.3 

 YES fully (information given by Ministry of Agriculture)

 YES partially (Please explain) (information given by Ministry of Finance) 

The  reason  for  amending  all  open  cases  was  to  get  a  clear  picture  of  the  current  situation  and  to  avoid  administrative  burden  to  national 
authorities involved in ESI funds administration. 
3.4 N/A 

LT  3.1 

3.2.a  

 YES (if yes, next question is 3.2.a) 

The following measures have been taken: 
- internal legal acts have been improved and amended by the National Paying Agency under the Ministry of Agriculture – the last amendment 

155 

 
 
was made on 11/12/2017; 
- European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) was administered manually and now it is systemised (has been transposed to the Sub-system 
for Administration of the Measures of the Rural Development Programme for Lithuania 2007-2013 (KPPAIS2 sub-system); 
- the list creation function was improved, EMFF programme was included and modification for including only those irregularities which exceed 
EUR 10 000 was introduced in the Oracle Accounting System. 
When reporting the irregularities, the IMS is used and the relevant fields of IMS are filled. Before the IMS is filled, responsible employee of the 
Managing Authority (MA) checks the reports about the irregularities which after each quarter are sent by implementing agencies to the MA via 
national IT system for the EU funds (Structural Funds Management Information System (SFMIS). The MA checks whether the information in 
SFMIS is correct and fills the check-list which helps to indicate which irregularities meet the requirements for reporting laid down in the EU 
regulations. After the check-list is filled, the employee of MA (IMS creator) enters the data of irregularity in IMS and fills-in all the relevant 
data fields. This information then is checked by other MA employee (IMS manager) and sent to OLAF.  
As  it  is  not  convenient  to  check  the  information  in  the  IMS  directly  and  these  data  fields  (the  location  and  the  priority  area  of  the 
measures/projects  affected)  are  not  mandatory  (IMS  does  not  show  error  messages  if  these  fields  are  left  empty),  it  is  easy  to  skip  the 
information  and  there  is  a  high  risk  of  technical  errors.  To  mitigate  this  risk,  before  sending  the  reports  to  OLAF,  their  information  will  be 
exported from IMS to Excel file, where it will be easier to indicate the missing data and then to correct it in the IMS. 
3.2.b N/A 

3.3

 YES partly 

The information of irregularity is updated in the IMS quarterly, if in that quarter the information of irregularity, about which the report was sent 
to OLAF before, was updated in national IT system for EU funds (SFMIS). 
3.4 Information update is made on a regular basis in accordance with the regulation provisions. 

LU  3.1 No information 
3.2 No information 

3.3 No information 

3.4 No information 

156 

 
 
HU  3.1 

 YES (if yes, next question is 3.2.a) 

3.2.a  

Irregularity  reports  affected  by  the  recommendation  were  identified  with  regard  to  programming  periods  and  funds  affected  under  sectoral 
regulations. In a professional event and by a written guideline, the Hungarian AFCOS informed organisations participating in reporting about 
the importance of recording the indicated information, simultaneously requesting the proper implementation of the recommendation. 
3.2.b N/A 

3.3 

 YES partly (Please explain) 

Yes, information was partially updated in irregularity reports. In the first reports, Hungarian organisations continue to pay special attention to 
the  recording  of  data  in  line  with  the  recommendation  according  to  the  usual  practice.  Besides,  Hungary  started  to  update  reports  prepared 
several years ago in the form of a retroactive data transmission in the framework of implementing the recommendation. We plan to send reports 
with complementary information to OLAF in every case by the reporting deadline for 2017. 
3.4  

AFCOS,  which  is  engaged  in  the  coordination  of  irregularity  reporting,  provides  a  personal  training  course  for  all  new  users  of  IMS  before 
using  the  system  which,  apart  from  the  technical  description  of  the  application  of  the  IMS,  includes  the  presentation  of  information  to  be 
recorded in the report, too. According to this practice, all Hungarian staff members participating in reporting activities can start their work with 
proper skills in this area. 
With  the  participation  of  Hungarian  organisations  engaged  in  reporting  activities,  AFCOS  established  an  expert  level  forum  (Irregularity 
Reporting  Task  Force)  which  aims  to  fully  comply  with  the  irregularity  reporting  obligations  of  Member  States  imposed  by  sectoral 
EU Regulations in a uniform way and to promote the utilisation of the content of irregularity reports in order to prevent fraud/irregularities. The 
Task Force meets depending on actual reporting-related developments. 

MT  3.1  X YES (if yes, next question is 3.2.a)   

The Planning & Priorities Coordination Division (PPCD) and the Funds and Programmes Division (FPD) submitted the replies pertaining to 
Recommendations 3.1 & 3.2 and are being reproduced in this document. 

157 

 
 
3.2. 

With  respect  to  Cohesion  policy,  the  reporting  was  improved  by  providing  information  on  the  investment  priority  of  the  measures/projects 
affected. The Maltese Authorities are of the opinion that there is limited use in further improving the reporting by including the location, in 
view of the limited size of Malta, which would lead to no relevance of such specific reporting requirement, as there is no added value. 

Furthermore, for the 2014+ programming period, the Management Information System used to record and disseminate information on financial 
corrections has been further improved and now has enhanced capabilities to provide analysis on the irregularities reported. Such 
enhancements include the name of the Category of Intervention the operation in question falls within together with the Type and Category of 
irregularity determining the case being reported (which mirrors the data being captured on the IMS as managed by OLAF). 

Such module, although managed by the MA, will also be available for viewing for the stakeholders including AFCOS - Malta. This measure is 
in line with Article 122(3) of the Common Provision Regulation stating that all exchanges of information between beneficiaries and a managing 
authority, a certifying authority, an audit authority and intermediate bodies can be carried out by means of electronic data  exchange systems. 
Such initiative will help to improve the regular reporting activity, further minimise administrative burden and ensure timeliness of data reported 
by the different stakeholders. 

With reference to Fisheries policy a considerable improvement in the current programming period (2014-2020) is that the irregularity report will 
be inputted directly in the management system which will then be at the disposal of AFCOS (Malta). The Funds and Programmes Division’s 
(FPD)  main  unit  in  charge  of  reporting  irregularities  i.e.  the  Financial  Control  Unit  (FCU),  already  includes  the  priority  area  of  the 
measures/projects affected. 

A further enhancement underway is the inclusion of the field ‘location’ referring to the place where the irregularity took place. 

3.2 b Not applicable 
3.3 X YES fully 

AFCOS Malta submitted the replies pertaining to Recommendation 3.3 & 3.4 and are being reproduced in this document. 

3.4 No successful practice to share other than the normal procedure. 

158 

 
 
 
NL  3.1 YES (if yes, next question is 3.2.a) 

3.2.a  
There is a general framework (covering all funds) which can be consulted by staff, in which the concepts are set out and defined and examples 
are  given.  The  framework  is  partly  based  on  instructions  from  OLAF.  It  is  explained  to  staff.  There  is  also  an  irregularities  roadmap. 
Specifically for the EMFF,  more detailed instructions can if necessary be provided by experts, with  more in-depth  focus on the location and 
details of the measure. 

3.2.b N/A 
3.3 YES fully 
3.4  

In addition to OLAF’s manual on IMS messages, there is a separate ‘irregularities roadmap’ with a direct link to the IMS user manual. This 
simplifies and standardises the reporting of IMS messages. It would be worth investigating whether it could be extended to other funds. 

AT  3.1 N/A 

3.2.a N/A 

3.2.b N/A 

3.3 N/A 

3.4 N/A 

PL  Poland makes every effort to meet its obligation to report irregularities to the Commission and pass on relevant notifications containing all the 
required information in a timely manner. To this end, it has developed and implemented an appropriate, uniform national procedure (coupled, 
where appropriate, with specific guidelines) for reporting irregularities for each financial perspective. As the authority supervising the process 
of reporting irregularities to the Commission in each reporting period, it continuously monitors and verifies the accuracy of reports submitted by 
the institutions at lower levels of the process. The quality of notifications is therefore consistent. The notifications contain detailed information, 
irrespective of  the  institution  which  draws  up  the  operational  programme  or  the  fund  where  the  irregularity  was  discovered.  The  format  and 
content of the notifications transmitted to the Commission are determined by the relevant EU Regulations and the IMS form, which currently 
contains  more  than  100  fields  to  be  filled  in  for  each  declaration.  All  notifications  sent  by  Poland  therefore  contain  information  on  the 

159 

 
 
 
 
address/activity/registration of the operator and the region or area where the operation was performed (using appropriate information such as the 
NUTS level), in accordance with Article 3(2)(b) and (c) of Regulation 2015/1970). Poland's interpretation of the Regulation is that it does not 
require Member States to provide information on the place where the irregularity was detected. 

Any shortcomings  in  the  declarations are  progressively  resolved by a process of updating  or  closing cases in  accordance  with  the Delegated 
Regulation. It should be noted, however, that these deficiencies are not always due to incomplete reporting by the institution concerned. Some 
of  the  data  already  present  in  the  system  were  lost  as  a  result  of  the  Commission’s  database  migrations  in  previous  years,  as  well  as 
harmonisation and alignment of data in previous separate modules (e.g. 1828, 1848, 498) in the common IMS 5 format. 

PT  3.1 

3.2.a  

 YES (if yes, next question is 3.2.a) 

For the 2014-2020 programming  period, a  new form for the communication  of irregularities was defined by the Audit Authority which uses 
IMS (information management system) codes such as Subject, Priority, NUTS, etc. 
In the framework of the Cohesion Policy and FEAD, there are two levels of validation between the AD&C and the Audit Authority as regards 
the treatment of irregularities. 
It  should  be  noted  that  an  AUDIT  2020  Information  System  module  is  being  developed  which  will  allow  for  validation  between  different 
sources of information, such as the audit findings, information systems of the certifying authority and the paying agency, thus reducing the risks 
associated with establishing and analysing various cases of irregularity. 
3.2.b N/A 

3.3 

 YES fully 

3.4 N/A 

RO  3.1 

 NO (if no, question is 3.2.b) 

3.2.a N/A 

3.2.b  

160 

 
 
It was not necessary to take measures to improve the quality of data reporting by offering location information and, in the case of cohesion and 
fisheries policies, as regards the priority area of measures/projects affected since the data requested by the European Commission has already 
been reported by the responsible authorities in Romania, which completed all the boxes/fields indicated in the Irregularity Management System 
as per the existing requirements. 
3.3 

 NO  

It was not necessary to take measures to improve the quality of data reporting by offering location information and, in the case of cohesion and 
fisheries policies, as regards the priority area of measures/projects affected since the data requested by the European Commission has already 
been reported by the responsible authorities in Romania, which completed all the boxes/fields indicated in the Irregularity Management System 
as per the existing requirements. 
3.4 N/A 

SI 

3.1 

 YES (if yes, next question is 3.2.a) 

3.2.a  

When MA is reviewing the report of irregularity the manager always checks the quality data including the information regarding the location 
and  priority  area  of  the  measures/projects.  However  regarding  the  priority  area  of  the  measures/projects  we  have  some  difficulties  when 
reporting in IMS, because the drop down list differs from the thematic objectives (as said in art.9 Reg.1303/2013). We suggest that this drop 
down list is unified with thematic objectives. 
3.2.b N/A 

3.3 YES partially (Please explain)  

Regarding the priority area of the measures/projects we have some difficulties when reporting in IMS, because the drop down list differs from 
the thematic objectives (as said in art.9 Reg.1303/2013). We suggest that this drop down list is unified with thematic objectives. 
3.4 N/A 

SK  3.1 - NO (if no, question is 3.2.b) 

161 

 
 
 
3.2.a  N/A 

3.2.b  

Information about location and priority area are available in national monitoring system ITMS2014+. These information are recorded on level 
of operation and operation is linked to concrete irregularity. You can open relevant operation right from irregularity. 

3.3 YES fully  

The  Certification  Authority  carried  out  several  changes  in  monitoring  system  in  order  to  enhance  quality  of  data  provided  to  OLAF.  For 
instance, automatic calculation of amount of irregularity in sum of expenditures which have already been declared in interim/final payments to 
the Commission or automatic initialization of some data fields based on data filled in other fields. 
Information about location and priority area are available in national monitoring system ITMS2014+ from the beginning of programming period 
2014-2020. 
3.4 N/A 

FI 

3.1  YES (if yes, next question is 3.2.a) 

3.2.a  

We always check the location and the priority are from the audit report or recovery decision. 
3.2.b N/A 

3.3 

 YES fully 

3.4 N/A 

SE 

3.1 

 YES (if yes, next question is 3.2.a) 

3.2.a  
ERUF: In the computer system for data processing we have built in parameters to get the basis for reporting irregularities directly in the system. 

162 

 
 
 
 
 
3.2.b N/A 

3.3 

 YES fully 

3.4. 

Responsible authorities in Sweden for OLAF reporting have network meetings twice a year. 

UK  3.1 

 YES (if yes, next question is 3.2.a) 

3.2.a  
For EAGF and EAFRD all irregularity cases are reported to the Commission's Anti-fraud Information System (AFIS) which requires details of 
the location of the measures and projects affected.  All irregularity cases reported in AFIS are input by a single dedicated team for the UK based 
at the UK Co-ordinating Body.  Reports are reviewed for accuracy and quality before input and where further information is deemed necessary 
to ensure that as much information as possible is loaded to AFIS, the UK Co-ordinating Body liaises with the relevant members of the paying 
agencies. 
3.2.b N/A 

3.3 N/A 

3.4. 

We do not currently have any practices which we are ready to share. 

163 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Direct  payments  financed  by  the  EAGF  form  a  relatively  low-risk  policy  area,  in  terms  of  fraud  and  irregularities  detected  and  reported  by  Member 
States. Fraud detection in market support measures is higher than in any other policy areas.  

For EAFRD programmes, the level of irregularities and fraud detection by the competent authorities is similar to that of other shared management areas. 

For  cohesion  policy,  analysis  of  the  2007-2013  programming  period  points  to  a  higher  detection  rate  for  convergence  objective  programmes.  An 
unusually low detection rate is found for ETC programmes. Specific priorities are identified as riskier. 

The  priorities  areas  with  the  highest  fraud  indicators  are:  ‘Tourism’,  ‘Research  and  technological  development  (R&TD)’,  ‘Transport’,  ‘Investment  in 
social infrastructure’ and ‘Technical Assistance Fisheries’. 

Recommendation 4 

• All  Member  States are invited to take into  account  the findings of this report in their fraud risk assessments for the programming period 
2014-2020 and to pay particular attention to the priorities highlighted and to interventions which are similar in scope and nature.  

• In view of the low detection results for ETC programmes and considering the increasing threat of transnational fraud, Member States are 
asked to increase their attention and cooperation.  

•  All  Member  States  are  asked  to  review  their  fraud  risk  assessments  in  relation  to  market  support  measures  taking  into  account  the 
information highlighted in this report. 

164 

 
 
BE 

4.1 

 YES  

VO Department of Agriculture and Fisheries + FPS Finances 

VO Department of Agriculture and Fisheries: Every instrument offered by OLAF is taken into account in the risk management of the Paying 
Agency. In March 2017 a memo was submitted to the highest level of the organisation with a view to the further development of a structured 
anti-fraud policy. Two separate policy statements were drawn up, one for the Common Agricultural Policy (EAGF and EAFRD) and one for 
the Common Fisheries Policy (EMFF). These policy statements were issued in line with the guidelines provided by the European Commission 
for an anti-fraud policy in agricultural funds: 

-  Guidance on anti-fraud measures as provided for in the context of accreditation requirements for paying agencies, 
-  Assessment of the risk of fraud and other serious irregularities with CAP funds; 

Work is also underway at Flemish government level, with input from the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, on a cooperation agreement 
between the federal and decentralised authorities on the basis of OLAF’s General Guidelines on National Antifraud Strategy. 

 NO  

4.2 
VO - Department of Agriculture and Fisheries VO – Department of Agriculture and Fisheries + FPS Finances 
VO – Department of Agriculture and Fisheries: Given the low risk and resources already committed previously, no direct results are visible as 
yet. But vigilance was reinforced in all areas. 

4.3 

 NO (FPS Finances) 

4.4 N/A 

4.5 

 NO (FPS Finances) 

4.6 N/A 

4.7 N/A 

BG 

With regard to the risk management procedure, the National Fund Directorate, in its capacity as Certifying Authority(CA) for the operational 
programmes funded by the European Social Fund, the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Territorial 

165 

 
 
 
Cooperation  (ETC)  programmes,  took  into  account  the  findings  of  the  European  Commission  report,  identifying  a  risk  of  omissions  when 
determining errors and irregularities. 

We  have  adopted  measures  for  maintaining  and  improving  the  administrative  capacity  of  the  certifying  authority  through  training  courses, 
seminars and discussions with a view to improving the procedures so as to ensure reliable controls to detect and correct errors in the financial 
management  and  control  system.  In  the  checklists  used  to  verify  beneficiaries’  reporting  documentation  and  completed  public  procurement 
procedures  under  the  programmes,  the  controls  for  checking  fraud  indicators  (the  so  called  red  flags)  have  been  optimised.  The  Certifying 
Authority uses the ARACHNE system in the performance of its control functions. 

With regard to the European Territorial Cooperation programmes, the CA uses individual and/or joint checks with the managing authority or 
the joint Secretariat. The results of the checks are documented and any discrepancies detected are communicated to the Managing Authority. 

All managing authorities of operational programmes carried out in Bulgaria have developed policies for combating fraud, which form part of 
the  management  and  control  system  of  the  respective  MA.  They  include  policies  on  fraud  prevention,  procedure  for  identifying  red  flags 
during  administrative  and  on-the-spot  checks,  risk  assessment  procedures  and  a  risk  register.  The  managing  authorities  of  the  operational 
programmes have developed procedures for managing cases concerning suspected and/or detected fraud. 

In  accordance  with  the  Guidance  Note  on  Fraud  Risk  Assessment  and  Effective  and  Proportionate  Anti-Fraud  Measures  2013,  Ref.  Ares 
(2013)3769073 - 19/12/2013 of DG Regional and Urban Policy of the European Commission, the manual of procedures for implementation 
and management of each operational programme describes the procedures for self-assessment of the internal controls for combating fraud risk. 
As per these procedures, the managing authorities of the operational programmes carry out annual self-assessments of the fraud risk. 

As part of their control activities, the managing authorities have developed a Methodology for risk assessment at both operational programme 
and operation level. The risk assessment is carried out by a specially designated working group; the review and assessment of the risks is to be 
carried out at least once per year. The risk assessment is carried out in line with the Guidelines on assessing fraud risk and on effective and 
proportional measures for combatting fraud. 

166 

 
 
As  part  of  the  risk  assessment,  and  while  carrying  out  verifications  of  payment  requests  received,  an  analysis  is  performed  concerning  the 
presence  of  irregularities  and  fraud  indicators  related  to  the  contracting  procedures  carried  out  by  the  beneficiaries  (red  flags).  For  each 
detected irregularity documented as per the instructions in point 1, the expert having detected the irregularity must also carry out an additional 
analysis for the presence of indicators of irregularities and fraud (red flags). The red flags and the methodology for performing the check are 
specified in the Manual of the Managing Authority. The obligation to carry out a check for the presence of fraud indicators may arise for each 
verification question in the checklists. If the expert detects one or more of the indicators in question, he/she must note this in the respective 
checklist and qualify them as fraud indicators. 

Effective  measures to  tackle  conflicts of interest  have  been introduced:  at the national  level, a specialised software  tool for risk assessment 
(ARACHNE) will be used in order to assist the managing authorities in the identification of projects at high risk of fraud, conflict of interest 
and irregularities, including in public procurement. 

In  this  connection,  by  order  of  the  Deputy  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  EU  Funds  and  Economic  Policy  a  procedure  was  approved  for 
managing  access to  the  ARACHNE  fraud  and  irregularities  risk  scoring  tool  of the  European Commission.  In  all cases  where  indicators  of 
conflict  of  interest  exist,  an  additional  check  is  performed  of  the  circumstances,  and  the  findings  are  sent  to  the  respective  competent 
authorities. 

A specific example: A working group was formed at the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works which successfully completed a 
procedure  for  assessing  the  fraud  risk  of  the  OPRD  2014-20202  by  completing  all  steps  specified  in  the  Management  and  Implementation 
Manual of the OPRD, namely: 

1. 

2. 

3. 

Identification of risks; 

Valuation of the effectiveness of the current controls of the specific fraud risk (gross risk); 

Assessment of the effectiveness of the current controls for lowering the gross risk; 

167 

 
 
4. 
risk). 

5. 

6. 

Valuation of the net risk after accounting for the impact of the existing controls and their effectiveness, i.e. the situation as is (residual 

Definition of the target risk, i.e. the risk level considered acceptable by the Managing Authority of the OPRD. 

Assessment of the planning of additional controls of the net (residual) risk. 

The MA of the OPRD took into account the conclusions of the Commission’s report; when identifying specific risks, it took as starting points 
the  risks  noted,  even  if  only  indicatively,  in  the  European  Commission’s  Guidelines  for  Member  States  and  Bodies  Responsible  for  the 
Operational Programmes. The work of the working group was accepted by the head of the managing authority of the OPRD on 11 January 
2018; the additional restrictive measures are currently being applied to the identified target risks. 

With regard to cross-border programmes in which Bulgaria participates, the recommendations are strictly followed. For these programmes an 
instrument for self-assessment of the fraud risk (Annex 4 of the European Commission Guidelines on combating fraud) has been introduced. 
Self-assessment  of  fraud  risk  and  development  of  effective  and  proportional  measures  to  combat  fraud  are  periodically  carried  out  by  a 
specially  formed  working  group,  established  under  an  Order.  The  group  is  tasked  with  the  identification  of  new  types  of  fraud  risks  at  the 
different  stages  of  the  project  cycle:  call  for  project  proposals  and  selection  of  projects,  implementation  and  verification  of  expenditure, 
certification  of  expenditure  and  payment/recovery  of  expenditure,  technical  assistance  and  sustainability/durability  of  operations.  Specific 
measures  for  minimising  and  removing  identified  risks  at  programme  level  have  been  introduced,  in  accordance  with  the  Action  Plan,  an 
integral part of the Instrument for self-assessment of fraud risk, Annex to the European Commission Guidelines on combating fraud Future 
meetings  of  the  working  group  are  to  include  representatives  of  the  national  authorities,  thereby  improving  cooperation  in  the  fight  against 
fraud.  

For  cross-border  cooperation  programmes  concerning  internal  EU  borders,  employees  of  the  Directorate  take  part  in  the  discussion  and 
adoption of working documents on risk assessment and play an active part in the performance of the actual self-assessment of fraud risk at 
programme  level.  If  indications  of  an  infringement  with  a  possible  cross-border  impact  have  been  detected,  the  Directorate  actively 

168 

 
 
communicates with the competent authorities of the partner Member States, submitting the relevant information to them so that the payments 
under  the  project  for  which  doubts  exist  may  be  suspended  until  such  time  as  checks  are  carried  out  to  confirm  the  existence/absence  of 
irregularities 

With regard to the prevention and fight against irregularities and fraud in respect of the Agricultural Funds: the criteria set for risk analysis, the 
operational experience of the Fraud Prevention Directorate of State Fund Agriculture and the capabilities of the IACS system contribute to the 
more  effective  detection  of  irregularities  and  fraud  and  to  the  prevention  of  abuse  of  EU  funds  and  funds  from  the  national  budget  under 
different support measures. With a view to exchanging good practices, workshops, roundtables and professional connections with counterpart 
services in other Member States are initiated. 

With regard to the risk analysis of its operational activities, and as part of its "toolkit", State Fund Agriculture carries out - both in its annual 
planning  and  as  part  of  its  various  auditing  responsibilities  -  a  risk  analysis  on  the  basis  of  predefined  criteria,  including  an  assessment  of 
quality,  good  practices,  the  use  of  IT  tools  and  specialised  software  (Arbutus),  the  capabilities  of  the  monitoring  system  in  place  and  the 
monitoring activities for detecting and preventing situations that give rise to irregularities and fraud. 

A  draft  act  amending  the  Act  on  Implementation  of  the  Common  Market  Organisation  of  Agricultural  Products  of  the  European  Union  is 
currently  being  prepared,  which  lays  down  the  rules  on  the  implementation  of  market  measures  and  on  the  functions  of  the  competent 
implementing  bodies  and  organisations  for  the  respective  measures,  including  the  Measure  ‘Promotional  programmes  for  agricultural 
products’. The Act is expected to be adopted in May 2018. Along with the amendments to the Act, an amendment will be made to Regulation 
No 8 of 5 May 2016 on the conditions and procedures for implementation and control of promotional programmes for agricultural and food 
products. This Regulation will contain a detailed description of the administrative checks which the competent authority must carry out before 
and after the procedure for the selection of the implementing organisation, and which will ensure the legality and regularity of the selection of 
implementing organisations in the future. The Regulation will specify in detail the criteria for ‘competitive procedures’, taking into account the 
economic  importance  of  the  promotional  programmes  while  also  guaranteeing  the  main  principles  of  EU  law:  non-discrimination,  equal 
treatment and full transparency in respect of the selection and awarding criteria applied. This will help minimise the risk of financial damage to 

169 

 
 
the European Union and ensure best value for money. The Regulation is expected to be adopted in May 2018. 

CZ 

4.1 

 NO   

No, because in ETC programme the rate of fraudulent is significantly lower than in other “convergence” programmes. Therefore there was no 
need to take extra effort or steps. 
4.2 

 NO  

We had no fraudulent irregularities in period 2007-2013. 
4.3 

 NO   

By far we had no issue with fraud in all CZ ETC programmes in the period of 2007-2013. Therefore we didn’t take any extra effort to reduce 
the risk of the fraud in ETC programmes. 
4.4 N/A 

4.5 

 NO  

As a nature of ETC programmes it is for sure clear to cooperate with other member states, but in the “anti-fraud” area it is done separately. It is 
responsibility of each member state (different law etc.) to set the system which prevent frauds and we didn’t take any best practises form other 
member states involved in ETC programmes. 
4.6 N/A 

4.7  
The Managing Authority shall train its staff and recipients in the fight against fraud. 
4.1 

 YES  

DK 

The Danish Agricultural Agency has assessed its current anti-fraud operations in relation to the market support mechanisms. The conclusions 
of the PIF reports will also be incorporated in subsequent risk assessments. 
With  regard  to  the  2016  PIF  report,  no  significant  changes  concerning  trends  in  the  types  of  irregularities  were  identified  compared  with 

170 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 YES  

previous years. Therefore, no new fraud risk analysis has been carried out since the publication of the 2016 PIF report, but a new risk analysis 
is scheduled for 2018.  
4.2 
All  non-IACS  measures are  managed by the same  administrative  unit  in the Danish Agricultural  Agency. The unit focuses on red flags for 
project expenditure and other anti-fraud measures relating to the EAFRD, which is therefore also useful in the fight against fraud involving the 
market mechanisms. 
 YES 
4.3 

4.4  
In  order  to  implement  the  recommendation  we  will  take  steps  to  ensure  that  the  fraud  issue  will  be  on  the  agenda  for  a  future  programme 
meeting of the Monitoring Committee and of the group of auditors meeting of the ETC programme having managing authority in DK. 
4.5 

 YES (if yes, 4.6) 

4.6  
Representatives of all programme Member States are members of the Monitoring Committee and of the group of auditors. 
4.7 N/A 

DE 

4.1 

 YES  

(a) Agricultural and fisheries funds: 
In  the  field  of  fraud  prevention  in  the  agricultural  sector,  fraud  risks  are  continuously  assessed,  including  with  reference  to  the  PIF  report. 
Should  this  assessment  indicate  that  there  is  an  increased  fraud  risk  for  certain  measures  (including  market  support  measures),  appropriate 
action is taken. 
4.2 
Findings not yet ready for presentation. 
4.1 

 YES  

 NO  

b) ERDF and ESF 
Comprehensive  approaches  devised  by  the  managing  authorities  with  ‘measures  to  prevent,  detect  and  correct  fraud  and  corruption’  take 

171 

 
 
 
 
account of assessments and findings on combating and preventing fraud in the 2016 PIF report and earlier Commission annual reports. 
The managing authorities’ strategies and measures to combat and minimise fraud basically follow the Commission Guidance Note  on fraud 
risk  assessment  and  effective  and  proportionate  anti-fraud  measures.  They  have  four  cornerstones:  prevention,  detection,  correction  and 
prosecution  and/or  recovery.  Self-assessment  teams  have  been  set  up  with  the  participation  of  certifying  authorities,  managing  authorities, 
intermediate bodies, contracting authorities and anti-corruption officials. The self-assessment instrument provided by the Commission with the 
Guidance Note is regularly reviewed and adjusted to the specific features of local situations. In addition, other risks are identified and taken 
into account. 

4.2 

 NO   

Findings not suitable for presentation. 

4.1 

 YES  

c) AMIF and ISF 

Comprehensive  approaches  devised  by  the  managing  authorities  with  ‘measures  to  prevent,  detect  and  correct  fraud  and  corruption’  take 
account of assessments and findings on combating and preventing fraud in the 2016 PIF report and earlier Commission annual reports. 

The managing authorities’ strategies and measures to combat and minimise fraud basically follow the Commission Guidance Note  on fraud 
risk  assessment  and  effective  and  proportionate  anti-fraud  measures.  They  have  four  cornerstones:  prevention,  detection,  correction  and 
prosecution  and/or  recovery.  Self-assessment  teams  have  been  set  up  with  the  participation  of  certifying  authorities,  managing  authorities, 
intermediate bodies, contracting authorities and anti-corruption officials. The self-assessment instrument provided by the Commission with the 
Guidance Note is regularly reviewed and adjusted to the specific features of local situations. In addition, other risks are identified and taken 
into account. 

The  risk  assessment  tool  provided  by  the  Commission  as  an  annex  to  the  Guidance Note  on  fraud  risk  assessment  and  effective  and 
proportionate anti-fraud measures is used at regular intervals in the context of AMIF. Account is also taken of those findings in the PIF reports 

172 

 
 
that are relevant to AMIF. 

The ISF Competent Authority’s management and control system has been updated and adjusted in line with EU requirements. 

4.2 

 NO 

No findings are available for presentation. 
4.3 

 YES 

As  part  of  the  designation  audit,  the  auditing  authorities  check  compliance  with  Article 125(4)(c)  within  the  managing  authority  as  regards 
fraud risk assessment and effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures in the period 2014-2020. Audits concluded so far have concluded 
that  the  procedures  put  in  place  by the  managing  authorities  are adequate  to  ensure that,  taking  account  of the  risks  detected,  effective  and 
appropriate fraud prevention measures can be taken. In addition, risk assessments are carried out following the principles of the Commission’s 
Guidance  Note  (see  above),  as  are  ad  hoc  risk  assessments  when  cases  of  fraud  are  detected;  where  appropriate,  action  plans  are  then 
developed to minimise risks. 

It should also be pointed out that the ETC programmes are more stringently controlled because of the cooperation with a number of Member 
States  and  the  particular  control  structure  (first-  and  second-level  controls),  and  that,  in  particular,  extremely  rigorous  training  and  control 
mechanisms contribute to the low error rate. It should moreover be stressed that in the case of ERDF funds, which are markedly lower, and for 
which additional consultation and agreement in the project consortium is required, the incentive for fraud is probably weaker than in the case 
of major investment measures. The fact that the majority of ETC project partners are public entities would also tend to suggest a certain respect 
for procedure and lawful conduct. The conclusion that a low rate of error can be traced back to insufficiently intensive auditing is therefore 
mistaken. 

4.4 (see under 4.3) 

4.5 

 NO (see also under 4.3) 

4.6 N/A 

173 

 
 
 
 
 
 
4.7 N/A 

4.1 NO  

EE 

The Agricultural Register and Information Board has developed its own risk assessment system, which was introduced in the OLAF working 
group  meeting  on  07.12.2017.  The  basic  findings  of  the  2016  PIF  reports  are  taken  into  account  in  our  national  risk  assessment  system  of 
EAFRD, EAGF and Fishery policy.  

Managing  Authority  for  the  Cohesion  did  not  take  into  account  any  specific  findings  from  the  2016  PIF  report  during  our  fraud  risk 
assessment. We carry out the fraud risk assessment every year together with the annual general risk assessment and during the assessment we 
take into account different information we have included in the fraud cases if there have been any of them. 
4.2 N/A 

4.3 YES  

4.4  

As regards the implementation of the ETC programmes in Estonia, several steps have been taken to tackle the issue of low detection: 

Estonia - Latvia Programme:  
  Regular meetings of the programme authorities, to discuss topical/important issues and exchange information; 
  Managing Authority carries out annual risk assessments where different programme authorities are involved, to have a systematic overview 
of the risks and problems the programme is facing; and the implementation of follow-up activities in accordance with the action plan is 
monitored. In addition, risk assessment is carried out when the implementation system is significantly modified.  
If  during  the  risk  assessment  the  MA  finds  out  that  a  certain  type  of  problems  may  occur  (e.g.  in  relation  to  public  procurements),  the 
Managing Authority may carry out a systemic check. The content of the Commission model tool  
(http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/publications/guidelines/2014/fraud-risk-assessment-and-effective-and-proportionate-
anti-fraud-measures) is used for the exercise; 

  To  avoid  any  risk  of  double  financing,  several  measures  are  undertaken.  Cooperation  and  information  exchange  activities  take  place  in 

174 

 
 
 
 
 
 
cooperation with other ETC programmes. During project assessment, data of the project applications is checked against the information 
received on the activities of the projects that have been financed on the level of the mainstream programmes. The Joint Secretariat checks 
the projects that are stored in the SFOS system (IT system of Structural Funds in Estonia). Where a project includes the activities in the 
field of agriculture, the Joint Secretariat carries out the checks with the Estonian Agricultural Registers and Information Board information. 
Similar procedures are carried out on the Latvian side through the National Sub-Committee. 

  Pre-payments to projects are limited based on the previous experience and in agreement with the Member States. Projects may receive up 
to 50% of the total ERDF request of partner reports after all the project partners have submitted partner reports to the first level (financial) 
control bodies. The request cannot be submitted in case of the first and last reporting period; 

  Close  co-operation within  the framework of the Managing  Authorities of North-Eastern Europe, direct contacts with  neighbouring ETC 

programmes to exchange best practices, information, co-operate in specific cases, etc.; 
  Managing Authority may carry out on-the-spot visits and take other measures, if necessary.  

Estonian first level (financial) control: 
  Meetings with the first level (financial) controllers of other programmes; 
  Meetings with the controllers of the same programme from other Member States; 
  Sample-based control methodology that has been elaborated and will be used for the Estonia - Latvia Programme from 01.02.2018. Also, 
the  application  of  the  same  methodology  is  considered  for  ENI  Estonia  –  Russia  Programme  and  Estonian  partners  of  Central  Baltic 
Programme; 

Information analysis including the risk management analysis for making on-the-spot visits. Also, Estonian first level control is available for 
carrying out on-the-spot-visits by request of the lead partner of a project. 

4.5 YES (if yes, 4.6)  

4.6  

As  ETC  programmes  are  about  cooperation,  all  the  described  steps  of  the  Estonia  -  Latvia  Programme  were  carried  out  in  co-operation 
between the programme authorities and representatives of the Member States. 

175 

 
 
 
 
In addition, the responsibility to avoid overlapping with other activities financed by other national or international financial sources (double-
financing),  as  well  as  checking  background  information  about  potential  project  partners  lies  with  the  representatives  of  the  Member  States 
(National Responsible Authorities). They establish the necessary mechanisms for carrying out such tasks and share their information during 
MC  meetings.  As  regards  the  Estonia  -  Latvia  Programme,  this  activity  goes  hand-in-hand  with  the  Joint  Secretariat  of  the  programme,  as 
described above (see the answer to question 4.4). 

4.7  

When  there  is  a  doubt  about  any  irregularity  or  fraud,  first  level  controllers  from  different  programmes  co-operate.  During  the  2007-2013 
period there was one case when the first level controllers suspected an irregularity or fraud related to one project partner who participated in 
several  projects  in  the  frames  of  different  ETC  programmes.  The  first  level  controllers  (and  other  staff)  from  different  programmes  met  to 
discuss the situation, compare the costs, invoices and time sheets the project partner had submitted with their reports. A thorough analysis was 
carried out to confirm the costs in different programmes correctly. 

IE 

 YES  

4.1 
The priority areas with highest fraud indicators identified in the 2016 PIF Report were used as reference for focus of our fraud risk assessment. 
4.2 
No findings of any significance from significance. 

 NO  

4.3 N/A 

4.4 N/A 

4.5 N/A 

4.6 N/A 

4.7  
Only those that are set out in the above paragraphs. 

176 

 
 
 
EL 

4.1 

 NO  

The  Greek  authorities  use  the  Commission’s  fraud  risk  assessment  tool  (EGESIF  14-0021-00  16-/06/2014),  which  has  been  adapted  and 
improved in respect of all the existing control measures introduced by Greece in the 2014-2020 Handbook of Management and Control System 
Procedures, which help prevent and tackle fraud affecting structural measures (ex-ante checks on public contracts, management verifications 
etc.). This tool is applied systematically by all Managing Authorities. The added value of this tool is considerable, since the results from it are 
also used in the Internal Cooperation Network for the Strategy on Combating Fraud in Structural Actions (Article 52 of Law No 4314/2014), 
which  is  made  up  of  the  persons  responsible  for  fraud  matters  in  the  18  Managing  Authorities  and  coordinated  by  the  Special  Service  for 
Institutional Support. 

4.2 

4.3 

 NO  

 NO 

4.4 N/A 

4.5 N/A 

4.6 N/A 

4.7 N/A 

ES 

4.1 

 NO  

The 2016 PIF Report was approved and sent to the Member States at the end of July 2017, once the various managing authorities had carried 
out their fraud risk self-assessments.  

These  self-assessments  are  reviewed  regularly  in  accordance  with  the  timetables  and  criteria  set  by  each  authority,  in  line  with  the 
recommendation in the European Commission's guidance on ‘Fraud Risk Assessment and Effective and Proportionate Anti-Fraud Measures’ 
(EGESIF_14-0021-00). In paragraph 3.3, it recommends that, as a general rule, reviews should be carried out every year. If the level of risk 

177 

 
 
identified is very low and no instances of fraud were reported in the preceding year, the self-assessment may be reviewed every two years. 

Aside from the observations made in statistical reports such as the PIF report, the reviews should also take account of other issues, such as 
experience gained by the managing authorities themselves, regulatory or organisational changes that may have taken place the previous year 
and the instances of fraud detected by each authority. All of these factors should be borne in mind when reviewing the self-assessments, to 
ensure that the review is as thorough as possible. 

In the light of the above, the observations made in the PIF report will be taken into account in the next review of or update to the fraud risk 
self-assessment. 

4.2 

4.3 

 NO  

 YES 

4.4  
A session  on anti-fraud  measures has  always been  included in  the various seminars for beneficiaries  and inspectors (FLC) of  the  European 
Territorial Cooperation (ETC) programmes; this session is delivered by the National Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS). 
The Sub-Directorate General for European Territorial Cooperation, part of the Directorate-General for EU Funding, is the national coordinator 
for ETC programmes and has created a working group focusing specifically on ETC programmes. The aim of the working group is to agree on 
the criteria used for the management of fraud risk by the various people involved in managing these programmes.  
A centralised channel has been created by the AFCOS so that anyone can report incidents that could constitute fraud or an irregularity with a 
potential  impact  on  EU  funds.  This  channel  has  been  presented  at  most  of  the  training  seminars  for  beneficiaries  and  inspectors  of  ETC 
programmes to make as many people as possible aware of its existence. Furthermore, a link to the channel has been included on the national 
EU Funding webpage, where information on the European Territorial Cooperation programmes can be found. 

4.5 

 YES (if yes, 4.6) 

178 

 
 
4.6  

The  main  measures  are  adopted  in  cooperation  with  the  competent  authorities  in  the  other  countries  involved  in  the  territorial  cooperation 
programme in question. 

4.7 N/A 

FR 

The French authorities wish to present their reply to the various questions of this recommendation in the form of a single text, OLAF having 
clarified in COCOLAF on 7 February 2017 that this is one of two possible ways of responding.  

To  facilitate  and  safeguard  the  implementation  of  programmes  co-financed  by  the  ESIF,  the  General  Commission  for  Territorial  Equality 
(CGET) organises regular meetings for all the authorities responsible for European programmes, focusing on various topics including the fight 
against fraud: 

- 

In 2013, the CGET set up an inter-fund working group on this subject in direct response to their request (internal inspection, conflict of 
interest, whistle-blowers, etc.) and has  also prepared documents  to which they can refer. For example, a special meeting on internal 
control was organised by the CGET in June of last year. This was an opportunity to stress the importance of the challenges linked to the 
introduction of such a mechanism for preventing and combating fraud.  

-  Furthermore, in fortnightly meetings with the directors in charge of implementing the operational programme, the CGET gives regular 

briefings on the fight against fraud (through the follow-up of audit findings and the monitoring of related rules).  

-  The CGET, acting as a cross-fund coordination authority, has also been working in the framework of the Working Group on Rules with 
a view to presenting the various checks for 2014-2020 (scope, objectives and main audit points). At network meetings on the subject of 
fighting  fraud  in  the  framework  of  the  ESIF,  the  CGET  regularly  recalls  the  legal  basis  for  internal  control  with  reference  to  the 
European Commission’s guidance of 19 December 2013 on preventing and combating fraud and the guidance on management checks 
on projects co-financed by EU funds. Within the Working Group on Rules, a number of supporting documents have been developed 
and  made  available  to  all  managing  authorities,  including  sample  risk  maps,  which  can  be  changed  and  adapted  to  suit  the 

179 

 
 
particularities  of  each  operational  programme,  and  a  note  recommending  use  of  the  ARACHNE  tool.  There  have  also  been  regular 
exchanges with the European Commission about the ARACHNE information system and its content.  

The tools developed by OLAF and the National Anti-fraud Delegation (DNLF) for detecting fraud in connection with the ESIF are available 
on the CGET’s digital platform, bringing together all actors involved in implementing the ESIF in France.  

Lastly,  the  2014-2020  national  technical  assistance  programme  plans  to  fund  training  courses  for  programme  management  authorities, 
certifying authorities and audit authorities on different topics, including public procurement, taking particular account of the European Court of 
Auditors’ Special Report on problems with public procurement in connection with the ESIF. A national-level working group has been set up to 
organise implementation of these training courses, which should start in March; the concept of conflict of interest in public procurement will 
be addressed in particular. 
4.1 

 YES  

HR 

In  2017  Croatian  AFCOS  Service  performed  the  irregularity  and  fraud  risk  assessment  for  European  Regional  Development  Fund  and 
Cohesion  Fund,  and  European  Social  Fund.  Activities  which  preceded  risk  assessment  included  consultation  of  papers  issued  by  the 
Commission which are related to risk assessment and protection of the European Union’s financial interests in general (PIF Report, Annual 
report  of  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office,  Compendium  of  Common  Cases  in  the  area  of  the  Structural  Actions,  Identifying  conflicts  of 
interests  in  the  Agricultural  Sector  -  A  practical  guide  for  funds  managers,  etc.),  and  statistics  concerning  detected  irregularities  and  fraud 
presented  in  those  papers  was  presented  to  participants  of  training  organised  prior  to  risk  assessment  exercise  (risk  managers).  Finally,  the 
Irregularity and Fraud Risk Management Methodology formulated by the AFCOS Service includes a recommendation to risk assessment team 
members to consult the abovementioned papers and it provides a list of references to those papers. 

4.2 

 YES  

Results of statistical analysis of detected irregularities and fraud at the EU level are similar to that at the national level. Namely, with regard to 
irregularities, for cohesion policy, the most frequently detected modus operandi is infringement of public procurement rules. In order to ensure 
systematic analysis of public procurement irregularities and pinpoint weaknesses in management and control systems, more detailed typology 
of public procurement irregularities should be developed. With regard to fraud, the most frequently detected modus operandi is the use of false 

180 

 
 
or falsified supporting documentation.  

 YES  

4.3 
4.4  
The  Croatian  AFCOS  Service  issued  Guidelines  on  Irregularity  Management  for  ETC  programmes.  In  addition,  employees  of  Croatian 
management and control system of ETC programmes are invited to participate in trainings organised by Croatian AFCOS Service. 
4.5 
4.6 N/A 
4.7 N/A 

 NO 

IT 

4.1 

 YES  

Contribution of the Italian AFCOS (Anti-Fraud Coordination Service) 

In compliance with the Commission’s recommendations inviting Member States to devise a national anti-fraud strategy aimed, in particular 
(and pursuant to Article 125(4)(c) of EU Regulation No 1303/2013), at preventing illegal activities, through the timely scheduling of control 
activities based on risk analyses and with the support of suitable IT tools, the Italian AFCOS has introduced a range of initiatives and activities 
that have allowed major breakthroughs to be made in terms of reducing irregularities and fraud in European funds. 

Of  particular  importance  in  this  context  is  the  ongoing  project  to  set  up  a  ‘national  anti-fraud  platform’,  which  is  shared  between  all 
management and auditing authorities and acts as a special ‘IT analysis tool’ for EU funding with the specific aim of preventing and combating 
fraud and irregularities. 

Pending the practical implementation of this tool, the national authorities have adopted the Commission’s Arachne system. 

Pursuant to Article 125(4)(c) of Common Provisions Regulation No 1303/2013 and in accordance with the management and control systems of 

Contribution of the Agency for Territorial Cohesion 

181 

 
 
the NOPs run by the Agency for Territorial Cohesion, the Fraud Risk Assessment Group (‘Gruppo di Valutazione dei rischi di frode’, GVRF) 
has been set up, for the self-assessment and monitoring of fraud risks. 

To  guarantee  the  required  independence  and  objectivity  of  the  self-assessments  and  ensure  that  this  instrument  is  suited  to  the  particular 
characteristics of each body, the GVRF has organised its activity so that each authority can perform independent and internal analyses, risk 
mapping and assessments of the fraud risk associated with the actions of the relevant NOPs. At the same time, however - given the complexity 
of  the  analyses  to  be  carried  out  -  the  homogeneity  and  consistency  with  corresponding  activities  carried  out  by  other  operators/authorities 
forming  part  of  the  GVRF  has  been  ensured  through  a  series  of  technical  meetings  of  the  select  work  group,  aimed  at  sharing  working 
approaches  and  methods,  the  logic  and  interpretation  of  any  doubts/uncertainties,  and  the  process  of  building,  developing  and  compiling 
individual assessment tools.   

Moreover,  with  the  aim  of  addressing  specific  requirements  laid  down  in  EU  law,  such  as  the  creation  of  suitable  anti-fraud  measures 
(Article 72(1)(h)  and  Article 125(4)(c)  of  Regulation  (EU)  No 1303/2013,  the  Agency  for  Territorial  Cohesion  has  activated  the  use  of  the 
Arachne system and, in liaison with the IGRUE, has launched a training plan on the use of the system targeting all authorities within various 
national and regional Operating Programmes. 

4.2 

 YES  

Contribution of the Italian AFCOS (Anti-Fraud Coordination Service) 

The various initiatives launched by the Italian AFCOS in relation to coordination and ‘anti-fraud training’ for national and regional authorities, 
aimed at maximising the prevention stage of the improper or illegal use of EU funds, are recording significant gradual decreases in the ‘error 
rate’  in  the  use  of  such  funds,  leading  to  a  substantial  fall  in  the  number  of  reported  cases  of  irregularities/fraud,  especially  in  relation  to 
structural funds (-29% between 2015 and 2016), which are particularly vulnerable to fraud. 

4.3 

 YES 

182 

 
 
Contribution of the Agency for Territorial Cohesion 

Italy has decided to join the Arachne system. Access will be granted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance (IGRUE, Inspectorate 
General  for  Financial  Relations  with  the  EU)  via  the  National  Monitoring  System,  which  also  covers  the  CTE,  ENI  and  IPA  programmes. 
Various meetings have been held to allow the use of CTE data in the National Monitoring System and accordingly allow the use of Arachne, 
including as a preventive measure, i.e. at the project proposal evaluation phase. 

With regard to the requirements laid down in EU Regulations for the 2014-2020 programming period, all CTE programmes, in order to ensure 
the successful implementation of the designation procedure, have identified specific anti-fraud measures in their own management and control 
systems. In particular, as suggested in the EU Guidelines, various programmes have also envisaged a specific fraud self-assessment working 
group. 

4.4 Contribution of the Italian AFCOS (Anti-Fraud Coordination Service): 

The Italian AFCOS’ strategic lines of action have, for some time, included various actions in the field of training, information and cooperation 
with partners from other EU countries.  

Specifically, 

 

in  recent  years,  the  Italian  AFCOS  has  promoted  a  number  of  ‘anti-fraud’  partnership  initiatives  consisting  in  the  exchange  of 
experience  and  good  practice,  with  partners  from  the  following  countries:  Bulgaria,  Poland,  Greece,  Latvia,  Denmark,  Serbia  and 
Romania; 

  moreover, between 2016 and 2017, the Italian AFCOS made its own contribution, in terms of providing information on the complex 
subject of anti-fraud measures, to the creation of the European Territorial Cooperation Programme in the IPC Adriatic CBC area, in 
which various countries took part, including: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Slovenia; 
finally, in the same period (2016-2017), the Italian AFCOS carried out a major project entitled ‘Cooperation Project in the anti-fraud 
sector’ (co-financed by OLAF with funds from the Hercule II programme), following on from the main initiative implemented in the 

 

183 

 
 
recent (2014) 6-month Italian presidency of the Council of the EU’s Anti-Fraud Group (AFG): namely, the proposal for new rules that 
enable ‘mutual administrative assistance’ between Member States in the now-transparent area of structural funds. Delegations from 15 
countries took part in the project: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Luxemburg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Spain. 

Given the success of all of the above initiatives, the Italian AFCOS, in cooperation with the General Headquarters of the Guardia di Finanza, 
has  already  devised  a  new,  important  and  detailed  project  entitled  ‘Cooperation  Project  2’  (approved  and  co-financed  by  OLAF  in 
December 2017  with  funds  from  the  Hercule  III  programme).  This  project  follows  on  from  the  previous  initiative  from  2016/2017 
(Cooperation Project in the Anti-Fraud Sector), the main objectives  of which  were to  examine more deeply the issue of national and trans-
national fraudulent activities that impair the EU budget, consolidate relations between all AFCOS in EU countries and strengthen mechanisms 
for closer investigative cooperation aimed at bringing about a mutually-beneficial increase in the fraud ‘response capability’.  

Delegations  from  27  countries  (including  EU  Member  States,  pre-accession  countries  (candidate  and  potential  candidate  countries)  and 
countries  covered  by  the  European Neighbourhood  Policy)  have  already  confirmed  their  participation  in  the  project:  Albania,  Bosnia  & 
Herzegovina,  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Croatia,  Estonia,  Finland,  France,  Georgia,  Germany,  Greece,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Malta, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Czech Republic, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain and Ukraine. 

4.5 

 YES (if yes, 4.6) 

4.6  
Please refer to section 4.4 on cooperation with EU countries. 
4.7  
On 13 November 2017, an Italian anti-fraud delegation including the General Headquarters of the Guardia di Finanza and representatives from 
the national AFCOS attended a conference on anti-fraud activities at the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT). 
The  conference  was  also  attended  by  the  Chair  of  the  Committee  on  Budgetary  Control  (CONT),  the  Chair  of  the  Committee  on  Budgets 
(BUDG), and a number of MEPs from the REGI (Regional Development) and LIBE (Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs) Committees. 
The debate focused on Italy’s anti-fraud strategy (with particular reference to structural funds and European initiatives - including at legislative 

184 

 
 
CY 

 YES  

level - adopted by the Italian AFCOS in recent years). and the Guardia di Finanza’s specific and unique know-how in combating fraud in EU 
funds, which is now considered veritable best practice at EU level and which Italy is prepared to share with all interested partners. 
4.1 
As regards the CMO measures the Paying Agency, CAPO is looking into the matter in order to assess the need to implement further measures 
over  and  above  what  has  already  been  recently  provided  for  in  the  Regulations.  In  case  such  a  need  arises,  CAPO  will  proceed  with  such 
further measures. As regards Rural Development,   CAPO has adopted the following measures: 

  Update of the manuals of the new measures announced in the framework of the Rural Development Plan 2014 – 2020 to include check lists 

 

regarding public procurement. 
In  investment  actions  a  new  obligation  had  been  inserted  so  that  the  applicant/  beneficiary  must  submit  for  audit,  their  bank  account 
statements, in order to verify any payments made for which they will apply subsidy.  

  Organisation  of  presentations  regarding  control  techniques  to  Paying  Agency  staff  responsible  for  controls  in  investment  measures  and 

accredited advisors especially for invoices and other supporting documents for applications for aid. 

4.2 

4.3 

 NO 

 YES 

4.4  
Additional trainings offered to first level controllers with emphasis on risk areas. 
Updating of verification checklists to be used by first level controllers. 
4.5 

 YES (if yes, 4.6) 

4.6  

  Joint fraud risk assessment undertaken for ETC programmes (e.g. Greece-Cyprus programme) 
  The areas identified as red flags during the fraud risk assessment will be incorporated in a seminar to be offered to controllers and 

bodies involved in the management of the funds. 

LV 

 YES (please explain) 

4.7 N/A 
4.1
Ministry  of  Agriculture  -  Methodological  guidelines  have  been  developed  to  identify  warning  signs  or  "red  flags".  A  "red  flag"  indicates 
potential risk of fraud or corruption; conditions that are not in accordance with standard operation and need to be checked further. Warning 

185 

 
 
signs do not mean that fraud has occurred or is likely to take place, but that the situation needs to be carefully scrutinized. The evaluator marks 
a “red flag” on the event management check list. 

 NO  

Ministry of Finance- Regarding the fraud and corruption risk assessment in the monitoring and control system of the Operational Programme 
for the Implementation of the European Structural and Investment funds, practical fraud risk self-assessment tool (based on Annex 1 of the 
Commission's guidance EGESIF of 16 June 2014 “Programming period 2014-2020 GUIDANCE NOTE ON FRAUD RISK ASSESSMENT 
AND EFFECTIVE AND PROPORTIONATE ANTI-FRAUD MEASURES”) is used. 
 The  fraud  risk  self-assessment  tool  targets  the  main  situations  where  key  processes  in  the  implementation  of  the  programme  (selection  of 
applicants; implementation and verification of the operations; certification and payments) could be most open to manipulation by fraudulent 
individuals or organisations. 
4.2 

 NO  

4.3 

 YES 

4.4  
All the procedures for financial controls bodies are put in place, regular meetings / communication for harmonisation of approaches among MS 
respective bodies take place in order to ensure the early detection of possible irregularities and take necessary steps. 
4.5 

 YES (if yes, 4.6) 

4.6  
Irregularity procedures are set and approved by the respective MI. All implementing bodies are aware of their tasks and responsibilities, and 
notify MA without delay in case of risks. 
4.7 N/A 

LT 

4.1 

 YES  

The 2016 PIF  Report, together with other  documents (reports by national anti-fraud and anti-corruption bodies, Transparency  International, 
evaluation reports of the use of EU investments in various intervention sectors, audit reports, etc.) serve as a background to check the existent 
fraud  and  corruption  mitigating  measures  or  to  indicate  the  fields  or  areas  for  improvement.  For  example,  to  strengthen  the  abilities  of 
implementing  agencies  to  evaluate  the  applications  of  projects  in  the  field  of  “Research  and  technological  development  (R&TD)”  and  the 

186 

 
 
 
results of such projects, and to lower the risk of possible fraud and corruption, the requirements and criteria of hiring the experts were set in the 
National Rules of Project Management and Financing.  
Also, as the main source of irregularities and detected criminal cases in Lithuania are linked to public procurement, a wide range of trainings in 
this  field  was  (and  is)  provided  for  the  institutions  of  management  and  control  system  (MCS)  and  supporting  institutions  (National  Audit 
Office, Competition Council, Public Procurement Office, Special Investigation Service (anti-corruption body), Financial Crime Investigation 
Service under the Ministry of the Interior (anti-fraud body). Also, Managing Authority (MA) and Public Procurement Office work closely to 
find  the  best  ways  on  how  to  interconnect  the  managed  IT  systems  –  Structural  Funds  Management  Information  System  (SFMIS)  and  the 
system of e-procurement and its risk evaluation abilities. 
MA  in  2017,  aiming  to  strengthen  the  abilities  of  the  institutions  of  MCS  to  detect  possible  corruption  and  fraud  cases  and  to  manage  the 
conflicts  of  interests,  has  organised  the  seminars  in  cooperation  with  the  Special  Investigation  Service  and  Financial  Crime  Investigation 
Service. 
Legal acts have also been updated on a regular basis, e. g. Order No.  3D-80 of the Minister of Agriculture of the Republic of Lithuania of 5 
February 2010 “On the Approval of the Rules for Administration of Legal Acts Infringements related with the Implementation of Measures of 
the  European  Agricultural  Guarantee  Fund,  European  Agricultural  Fund  for  Rural  Development  and  European  Fisheries  Fund”  (updated 
version since 04/01/2017); amendments were adopted in order to accelerate the procedures for irregularities handling, e. g. the amount was 
increased for the irregularities to be sent from the National Paying Agency to the Ministry of Agriculture  (former amount  – EUR  28.962, 
current amount – EUR 50. 000); types of irregularities were identified for not being sent by the National Paying Agency for re-handling to the 
Ministry  of  Agriculture;  amendments  were  adopted to  Order  No.  3D-507  of  the Minister  of  Agriculture  of the  Republic  of  Lithuania  of  26 
August  2014  “On  the  Approval  of  the  Rules  for  Administration  of  the  Rural  Development  Programme  for  Lithuania  2014-2020    (updated 
version since 14/10/2017). 
4.2 

 NO  

4.3 

  YES  

4.4  
Fraud risk assessment is performed in the ETC programme applying EC guidelines on fraud risk assessment and effective and proportionate 
anti-fraud measures and proposed risk assessment tools. 

187 

 
 
4.5 

 YES (if yes, 4.6) 

4.6  

Close cooperation has been maintained with the ETC programme national authority, first level controllers and other responsible institutions in 
order to get necessary information for risk assessment, irregularities detection 

LU 

4.7 N/A 

4.1 

4.2 

4.3 

 YES 

4.4 

The anti-fraud measures adopted by the ETC programmes in Luxembourg (INTERREG Grande Région and ESPON 2020) have been defined 
in their management and control system descriptions. 

In particular, the ETC programmes INTERREG Grande Région and ESPON 2020 have put in place a number of measures aimed at preventing 
fraud.  They  include  close  monitoring  and  regular  quality  checks  of  the  co-financed  projects,  targeted  checks  on  public  procurement 
procedures,  training  and  awareness  raising  of  staff  from  managing  authorities  as  well  as  beneficiaries,  partner  authorities  and  first  level 
controllers  on  the  topics  of  fraud  and  conflict  of  interest,  and  use  of  electronic  monitoring  systems  which  help  improve  the  traceability  of 
expenditure. Also, the use of the ARACHNE tool will help detect risks of fraud, conflict of interest and irregularities. 

In addition, it should be noted that the implementation of ETC programmes in Europe has started with delay compared to mainstream regional 
and national programmes. The first payment applications to the European Commission for the ETC programmes INTERREG Grande Région 
and ESPON 2020 have been submitted in 2017 and the first audit campaigns have been launched in 2018. In consequence, no irregularities, 
and therefore no fraudulent irregularities could have been detected and reported so far by second-level auditors. 

188 

 
 
4.5 

 YES (if yes, 4.6) 

4.6 

The anti-fraud measures are approved by the Monitoring Committee of each programme which is composed by the partner authorities from 
different Member and Partner States. 

In the context of the INTERREG Grande Région programme, specific checks are conducted before any project approval in cooperation with 
other ETC programmes also covering the Greater Region area (e.g. North West Europe, Europe, Rhin Supérieur, France-Wallonie-Vlaanderen, 
Euregio  Maas-Rijn)  in  order  to  avoid  any  double-financing.  In  addition,  the  second-level  audits  are  coordinated  within  a  specific  Group  of 
Auditors which gathers representatives from all partners authorities (Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg). 
4.7 
The  anti-fraud  measures  should  be  evaluated  after  several  years  of  implementation.  It  is  therefore  too  soon  to  draw  conclusions  on  their 
efficiency and to share them with other Member States. 
4.1 
Risk assessment aspects were evaluated in the framework of a working group. The risk assessment of each area is being further developed. The 
draft instruction  on the integrated risk  management procedures  of the organisation was completed at the end of 2017  and is  expected to  be 
adopted in the first quarter of 2018. 

 YES  

 YES 

4.2 
All parts of the organisation were involved in training courses on this topic. Staff members of various organisational units  attended half-day 
training courses on 10 occasions. 

HU 

4.3 

 YES 

4.4  

In  this  new  period,  ETC  programmes  pay  special  attention  to  anti-fraud  measures.  A  specific  anti-fraud  strategy  was  developed  for  all 
programmes adopted jointly by the countries affected upon the launching of the programmes. The aim of these programme-specific documents 
is  to  organise  the  preparation  and  training  of  management  organisations  and  to  present  the  necessary  anti-fraud  channels  and  measures. 

189 

 
 
Colleagues employed in programmes managed by Hungary attend anti-fraud training courses organised by the Commission, too, in order to 
ensure a higher quality in carrying out their tasks. 
Furthermore,  the  employee  of  the  Managing  Authority  responsible  for  irregularities  in  ETC programmes  is  a  member  of  the  Irregularity 
Reporting  Task  Force  organised  by  the  OLAF  Coordination  Bureau  in  which  experts  engaged  in  irregularities  of  several  operational 
programmes participate in order to share their experiences. 
A good practice was introduced in the HUSRB programme, according to which Member State experts engaged in irregularities participated in 
consultations in order to share experiences and to harmonise the detection and management of irregularities on national level. 

4.5 

 YES (if yes, 4.6) 

4.6  
Anti-fraud strategies developed jointly, and consultations. Similarly, the full irregularity system of programmes is developed together with the 
other Member State concerned in a coherent way, in accordance with EU Regulations as well. 
4.7 N/A 

MT 

The Funds and Programmes Division (FPD) submitted the replies pertaining to Recommendation 4 and are being reproduced in this 
document 

4.1

 YES  

Yes.  One  example  is  the  enhancement  of  the  system  of  reporting  of  irregularities;  the  system  of  drawing  up  irregularity  reports  and  of  the 
actual reporting has now been computerised. The fraud risk registers will be reviewed on a regular basis to address new emerging fraud risks. 
The drawing up of risk registers for each Unit within the Funds and Programmes Division (FPD) was another step in the same direction. It is 
pertinent to point out also that the FPD has a specific unit titled ‘Financial Control Unit’ which reports directly to the Director General (FPD) 
and its work is independent of the verifications undertaken by the project desk officers. 

Audit/control checklists are updated on a regular basis to remain abreast with developments, as new trends and patterns emerge in the ways in 
which fraud is committed. 

190 

 
 
In the case of public procurement, in May 2017 the Department of Contracts (DoC) published a report titled ‘Addressing fraud and corruption 
in  public  procurement’.  This  report  was  generated  with  the  intent  to  highlight  the  various  measures  being  adopted  by  the  DoC  to  combat 
fraudulent  activities  in  public  procurement.  The  DoC,  as  a  regulator,  has  embarked  on  a  mission  to  further  enhance  good  governance, 
transparency and public accountability. 

4.2 

 YES 

Results may not be observed immediately, but the measures implemented so far (and other measures which we will encounter and implement 
in the future) will, to the extent possible, close all loopholes. A case in point is the FCU (referred to in answer 4.1) which is providing an added 
level of assurance to the Director General (FPD) as regards the financial management and control of funds. 

4.3 

 YES 

Yes. Rather than tackling the issue of the low detection of irregularities in the ETC programmes, it was more a question of building a robust 
system in place to prevent irregularities from happening. We have a decentralised system in place whereby the first level controllers perform 
100% checks. Moreover (as per answer 4.1 above) an FCU unit has been set up reporting directly to the Head of the National Contact Point; its 
work  is  independent  of  the  work  of  the  first  level  controllers  and  it  exercises  checks  on  a  sample  basis.  Having  such  structure  in  place, 
potential fraudsters are deterred from committing the crime. 

 The Head FCU attended a training held on the 12th and 13th of June 2007for the Interreg Med First Level Control Networks. 

4.4 
Please refer to answer 4.3. As referred to, an FCU has been set up to conduct sample checL· once the work of the first level controller has been 
completed. The FCU conducted also two training sessions on First Level Control; one on 14th November 2016 and one on 28th June 2017 and 
the presentations have been uploaded on the website,  
(vide  https://eufunds.sov.mt/en/EU%20Funds%20Proerammes/Financial%20Control%20Unit/Pases/Links-and-Downloads. asm). 

191 

 
 
 
The FCU issues circulars on relevant topics to  provide direction to stakeholders e.g. on procurement, on audit of accounts and on financial 
corrections. It is also to be noted that FCU officers participate in relevant training, to consolidate their knowledge and experience. 

4.5 

 YES (if yes, 4.6) 

4.6 
There  is  open  communication  and  good  relations  between  the  National  Contact  Point  and  the  Managing  Authority  and  the  Joint  Technical 
Secretariat. Regular meetings are also held. 
4.7 
The importance of training in particular in the ambit of combating fraud (e.g. how to detect red flags). 
The setup of an independent body (in our case referred to as the Financial Control Unit) to conduct independent checks from those performed 
by the first level controllers. 
4.1 YES  
Arachne has been examined and the provisional conclusion as far as the NL is concerned is that it could be further improved, for reasons to do 
with inter alia certain legal forms and the fact that the tool is not available online. In early March 2018 the European Commission will give a 
demonstration of Arachne to ERDF staff to show what Arachne can be used for. For the ESF, Arachne is in the testing phase.  

NL 

4.2 NO  
Nothing to communicate 

4.3 NO 

4.4  
Nothing to explain 
4.5 NO 

4.6 N/A 

4.7 N/A 

192 

 
 
 
AT 

4.1 N/A 

4.2 N/A 

4.3 N/A 

4.4 N/A 

4.5 N/A 

4.6 N/A 

4.7 N/A 

PL 

In accordance with the recommendation, the competent institutions responsible for implementing and controlling EU funds are obliged to take 
account of the findings of the Commission's report in successive fraud risk analyses and assessments, drawn up during the programming period 
2014-20,  with  particular  focus  on  priority  areas  under  the  cohesion  policy,  and  agricultural  market  activities  with  the  highest  incidence  of 
fraud. 

As part of the European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) programmes, targeted measures have been taken in support of cooperation and the fight 
against fraud. Among those measures are the adoption in a Memorandum of Understanding of provisions designed to improve the programme 
management  and  control  system,  rules  for  reporting  irregularities,  implementation  of  effective  anti-corruption  procedures,  publishing  anti-
fraud manuals, warning signals (red flags) on Programme websites, and creation of a dedicated electronic mailbox to which whistleblowers can 
send  information  if  they  suspect  fraud.  Furthermore,  the  Managing  Authority  has  a  fraud  risk  self-assessment  team  whose  main  task  is  to 
perform  risk  analysis  (at  least  once  a  year,  and  in  cooperation  with  the  relevant  institutions).  Regular  meetings  are  held  with  the  national 
auditors to disseminate information on audit recommendations, audit findings, project irregularities and the fight against fraud and corruption 
within ETC in the period from 2014 to 2020. 
4.1 N/A 

PT 

4.2 N/A 

4.3 

 YES 

193 

 
 
4.4  

In relation to the European territorial cooperation programmes covering Portuguese territory, we will refer only to the European cooperation 
programme, INTERREG Atlantic Area 2014-2020 (www.atlanticarea.eu), for which the IGF (Inspectorate-General for Finances) is the Audit 
Authority, and the Managing and Certifying Authorities and the Joint Secretariat are also located in Portugal.  
In previous programming periods, this and other territorial cooperation programmes recorded error rates below the materiality level. That may 
result from the combined impact of the various parties involved in the analysis of expenditure (chef de file, first level controller and national 
correspondent)  and  from  confirmation  of  the  corresponding  actions/tasks  carried  out  by  partners  prior  to  the  submission  of  payment 
applications for validation by management.   

In the ‘Atlantic Area 2014-2020’ programme, risk assessment and the adoption of anti-fraud measures by the MS are covered: 

 
  by the audit strategy, approved in June 2016 (prior to the designation of the managing and certifying authorities on 27 October 2017), that 
provides an approach for reducing audit risk to an acceptably low level. This involves establishing the appropriate scope of the audits to be 
carried out, and also the possibility of additional audits (matters to be examined horizontally and/or verified in connection with further 
random samples); 

  by the anti-fraud strategy, the Managing Authority’s initiative (set/2017), and also 
 

in the description of the Management and Control Systems (the MA will conduct the first fraud risk assessment within 6 months of 
approval of the proposed designation). 

  The quality and experience of the external auditors to be hired, the methodologies to be adopted and the supervision of the work by the AA 

are key factors in ensuring that the final audit findings minimise audit risk.   

4.5 

 YES (if yes, 4.6) 

4.6  

In  the  cooperation  programmes,  effective  cooperation  between  the  members  of  the  group  of  auditors  from  different  Member  States  is 
extremely significant, especially at the stage of review of the preliminary reports and analysis of allegations, in conjunction with the related 
external auditors. Indeed, the existence of different legislative frameworks in each of the Member States makes it more complicated to make a 
fair  assessment of legality/eligibility and a proactive approach is desirable, in  particular from  when the audits are carried out  until the final 
reports are issued.  Under the approved operational rules of the group of auditors, it is up to the Member State where the audited beneficiary is 

194 

 
 
 
located to provide the factual elements to enable the AA to conduct the assessment.  

4.7 N/A 

4.1 

 YES  

RO 

Most of the managing authorities took into consideration the conclusions of the Report on the protection of the EU’s financial interests for 
2016 by adopting internal operational procedures for the assessment of fraud risks, and by taking the following measures in order to detect and 
report fraud suspicions/frauds: 

a)  using  information  systems  to  identify  non-compliances/fraud  patterns  (ARACHNE,  SMIS/MySMIS,  the  ONRC  database,  the  ANAF 
database etc.); 

b) analysing the results of fraud risk assessments; 

c) improving the procedure for verification of fraud/conflict of interests indicators based on the experience gained; 

d) preparing the fraud case document at the level of the operational programme managed; 

e) reporting immediately fraud notifications to DLAF. 

The results of the assessments become the object of action plans and are taken into account when updating the managing authorities update 
their operational procedures. 

At the end of 2017, according to  the EC recommendations  on the frequency  of self-assessments,  the second fraud risk self-assessment  was 
completed based on the existing controls/checks applicable to the managing authority. 

-  As  regards  the  level  of  competence  of  the  Paying  and  Intervention  Agency  for  Agriculture  (Agenția  de  Plăți  și  Intervenție  pentru 
Agricultură),  the  occurrence  of  fraud  cases  in  Romania,  in  the  case  of  market  measures,  is  low.  Frauds  are  approached  on  the  basis  of  the 
prevention  principle.  The  financial  aid  is  paid  only  after  the  administrative  and  on-the-spot  checks  have  been  completed.  In  most  cases, 

195 

 
 
administrative checks are completed by on-the-spot checks to a rate of 100 %. Where the on-the-spot check is based on the risk assessment, 
among the risk criteria the history of previous controls and the aid value are also taken into account. 

The  manuals  of  procedures  are  constantly  updated  according  to  the  cases  encountered  and  the  types  of  checks  to  be  performed  and  the 
documents to be checked are extended.  

As regards the reporting of fraud indications, in order to provide immediate information to the internal specialised department, all the manuals 
of procedures contain clear specifications on the obligations pertaining to the management of such situations. 

- the Audit Authority encourages external public auditors to consult all the potential external sources with regard to indications of fraud and the 
fight  against  fraud.  Cases  of  suspicions  of  fraud  were  identified  in  the  reference  period,  being  referred  to  DLAF  for  investigation.  Fraud 
suspicions are reported to the European Commission in the annual control reports issued by this institution, along with the nature of the fraud 
suspicion and the systemic nature thereof, where applicable. 

4.2 

 YES  

The implementation of the ISO 37001:2016 – ANTI-MITA Management System at AFIR (Rural Investment Financing Agency) is at the stage 
of procurement. The ISO 37001 Standard is designed to be integrated with the existing management systems and controls. 

The  anticorruption  management  system  is  based  on  a  series  of  control  measures  and  means,  including  supporting  guidelines,  indicating 
requirements on the following aspects: 

-  adopting a policy and procedures for combating corruption; 
-  designating a person to supervise conformity with this policy; 
- 
the management proving its leadership and commitment; 
- 
training in the spirit of combating corruption; 
-  assessing corruption risks; 
-  checking history (due diligence) with regard to associates, staff, projects or business partners; 
- 

implementing means of financial or non-financial, commercial, contractual and procurement control; 

196 

 
 
- 
- 

initiating reporting, monitoring, investigation and audit procedures; 
taking corrective and ongoing improvement actions. 

The implementation of the standard helps the organisation by providing: 

- 

insurance for management, investors, employees, clients and other interested parties that an organisation has taken reasonable measures 
to prevent corruption; 

-  proof that the organisation has taken reasonable measures to prevent corruption in the case of an investigation; 
-  a basis for benchmarking the anticorruption management system with those of other organisations with similar systems. 

The standard is structured as per the applicable SL Annex and the other management standards (e.g. ISO 9001 or ISO 27001). The standard 
aims to ensure the high-level common structure for the ISO management system standards in order to ensure, when required, easy integration 
with the other systems of the organisation. 

The purpose of ISO 37001 is to support the creation of a worldwide culture combatting corruption and enhancing trust in the business world 
and in institutions.  

Thus, the prevention of corruption becomes a global initiative starting from the individual awareness raising thereof among organisations. This 
objective  can  only  be  achieved  by  commitment,  transparency  and  compliance  with  the  anticorruption  management  system  framework 
established under this standard. 

4.3 N/A 

4.4 N/A 

4.5 N/A 

4.6 N/A 

4.7 N/A 

SI 

4.1 YES  
The MA and IB have up-dated in 2016 prepared fraud risk self-assessment. Strategy MA for the development of an anti-fraud on the area of 

197 

 
 
cohesion policy was adopted already in 2016, but training of the members of MA and other participant included in European cohesion policy 
on the area of fraud is on-going task, also in 2017. 
For the purpose of on the spot verifications the MA has up-dated in 2016 prepared risk analysis, based on a different indicators  (depending on 
found,  on  beneficiary…)  which  could  be  amended,  changed  in  a  later  stages,  according  to  the  findings  of  the  management  verifications, 
audits…  
Slovenia has in 2017 also adopted Arachne IT tool. 
4.2 NO  
At the moment we not perceive any specifics. 
4.3 NO 

4.4 N/A 

4.5 YES (if yes, 4.6) 

administrative 

4.6  
For ETS programmes where Slovenia is taking the role of MA.  
Continuation of: 
programmes  
of  CBC 
at 
100% 
- 
-  workshops  for  potential  applicants  and  for  reporting  performed  by  MA  and  JS 
in  cooperation  with  national  controllers 
-  regular  bilateral  working  group  meetings  on  reporting  and  eligibility,  with  the  participation  of  all  relevant  programme  bodie 
- 
the  programme  website  
- and extension of use of Arachne at the level of FLC . 
4.7 N/A 

frequently  updating 

expenditure  on 

eligibility  of 

the  question 

verification 

concerning 

controllers 

performed 

national 

answers 

level 

and 

the 

by 

SK 

4.1 YES   
The Ministry of Transport and Construction of the SR as MA for OP Integrated Infrastructure set up the system of the self-evaluation of risks 
of the fraud occurrence. 

198 

 
 
In  the  framework  of  the  risks  assessment,  The  Ministry  of  Environment  of  the  SR  added  into  the  risks  analysis  of  the  OP  Quality  of 
Environment following risk factors: fraudulent behaviour, conflict of interests, incl. tools used for the identification of mentioned risk factors. 
One of considered tools is the ARACHNE (EC). Based on the assessment of these risks a list of the most serious risks will be generated to be 
system-solved. This area is covered by the Working Group for the Risks Management of the OP Quality of Environment, where the members 
are: representatives of the Managing Authority, Intermediary Bodies, incl. departments for control and audit. 
The Ministry of Health of the SR has in internal manual section called risk management system that contains for example whistle blowers, 
fraud prevention, creating task force for risk management - the annex of internal manual is risk catalogue. 
The Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the SR reported that the Risk Management Working Group of the Operational Program 
Human Resources would meet in March 2018 and the findings from this report would be taken into account. 
4.2 NO  

4.3 YES  

4.4  
MA for Interreg V-A has established a Public Procurement Unit to help detect unlawful practices in the Public Procurement process before and 
after its implementation. MA will use the ARACHNE system to identify possible frauds. 
4.5 YES (if yes, 4.6)  

4.6  
In  risk  assessment  group  there  is  a  representative  of  other  Member  State.  Audit  authorities  of  cooperating  Member  States  collaborate  and 
exchange experiences. 
4.7 N/A 

FI 

4.1 

 YES   

 YES   

4.2 
Training will be organized on the basis of the new plan. 
4.3 - NO 

199 

 
 
4.4 N/A 

4.5 - NO 

4.6 N/A 

4.7 N/A 

SE 

UK 

 YES  

4.1 
ERUF: The Risk Assessment team has reviewed the processing process from a fraud perspective and see the need to train both management 
and administrators/economists in public procurement. 
4.2 
ERUF: Risk assessment within the Risk Assessment team has found that most errors concern public procurement. Trainings including public 
procurement are planned in spring 2018. 
4.3 

 YES  

 YES 

4.4  
First Level Controllers in Sweden act as contact persons for Managing Authorities in other Member States in their respective programmes. 
4.5 

 YES (if yes, 4.6) 

4.6 
The  rapporteurs  have  primary  contact  with  first  Level  Controllers  in  Sweden,  but  if  necessary  they  have  direct  contact  with 
Secretariat/Managing Authority/Certifying Authority in other Member States. 
4.7  
Networking with participants from different programs. 
4.1 

 YES  

The  UK  Co-ordinating  Body  acts  as  the  dedicated  conduit  for  sharing  information  with  paying  agencies  with  regard  to 
OLAF/COCOLAF reports.  The 2016 PIF report was circulated to paying agencies for their information.  Respective paying agencies 
undertake regular reviews of the individual risk assessment and take into account a number of factors at local, national and EU level to 
best inform their risk assessments. 

200 

 
 
4.2 

 YES  

No – we did not obtain any results which are suitable for sharing at this stage. 

4.3 

 YES 

NA  –  Measures  like  this  are  coordinated  between  member  states,  by  ETC  programme  Managing  Authorities  (and  where  necessary  Audit 
Authorities). Further information could be set out by the Managing Authorities themselves.  

4.4  

NA  –  Measures  like  this  are  coordinated  between  member  states,  by  ETC  programme  Managing  Authorities  (and  where  necessary  Audit 
Authorities). Further information could be set out by the Managing Authorities themselves. 

4.5  
NA - The specific steps were undertaken at the programme level, under the coordination of the Managing Authorities, who – as above – could 
set out further details. 
4.6 
NA - The specific steps were undertaken at the programme level, under the coordination of the Managing Authorities, who – as above – could 
set out further details. 

4.7  
N/A 

201