Legal analysis on the necessity and proportionality of extending the scope of the Visa Information System (VIS) to include data on long stay visas and residence documents : executive summary.
Date: 2018-07-02
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs
Subjects: EU Member State, EU visa policy, Schengen Information System, biometrics, data protection, exchange of information, fraud, identity document, information storage, migration policy, passport, personal data, regulation (EU), residence permit

Legal analysis on the necessity 
and proportionality of 
extending the scope of the 
Visa Information System (VIS) 
to include data on long-stay 
visas and residence 
documents 

Executive Summary 

PwC 
March – 2018 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs 
Directorate B — Migration, Mobility and Innovation 
Unit B.2 — Visa Policy and document security 

Contact: HOME/VIS 

E-mail:  HOME-NOTIFICATIONS-VIS@ec.europa.eu  

European Commission 
B-1049 Brussels 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Legal analysis on the necessity 
and proportionality of 
extending the scope of the 
Visa Information System (VIS) 
to include data on long-stay 
visas and residence 
documents 

Executive Summary 

Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs  

2018 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  

CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 

General context 

The  fragmentation  of  information  through  different  MSs  and  systems  is  inefficient.  It 
could lead to errors when assessing a third-country national’s situation and makes the 
border-crossing procedure difficult. These challenges have already been identified and 
described  by 
in  April 2016  a 
Communication  on  Stronger  and  Smarter  Information  Systems  for  Borders  and 
Security,1  in  which  it  commits  to  working  to  enable  better  use  of  the  data 
collected. 

the  European  Commission,  which  published 

On 10 June 2016, the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council endorsed a roadmap to 
enhance  information  exchange  and  information  management.  It  included  an 
action  plan  listing  50 actions  to  be  taken  by  different  stakeholders.  Action 50  set  an 
objective  of  addressing  the  existing  information  gap  in  the  (travel)  documents 
of third-country nationals. 

The  Final  Report  of  the  High-Level  Expert  Group  on  Information  Systems  and 
Interoperability  of  May 2017  identified  an  information  gap  at  EU  level  concerning 
three types of documents: long-stay visas, residence permits and residence cards. The 
Report recommended that the Commission undertake, as a priority, a feasibility study 
on  establishing  a  “central  EU  repository  containing  information  on  long-stay  visas, 
residence cards, and residence permits”. 

The  High-Level  Expert  Group’s  sub-group  on  new  systems  further  discussed  the  idea 
of such a database. It concluded that there were a number of similarities (in terms of 
desired  functionalities,  purpose  and  uses)  with  the  database  on  short-stay  visas:  the 
Visa  Information  System  (VIS).  Hence,  the  VIS  could  potentially  be  extended  to 
include  long-stay  and  residence  documents.  In  this  respect,  the  Report  on  the  VIS 
Evaluation  (2016)2  also  included  a  recommendation  to  further  develop  the  system  to 
include these documents. 

In line with the High-Level Expert Group’s recommendation, an initial feasibility study 
was undertaken.3 It analysed whether including long-stay and residence documents in 
a central database was technically feasible and desirable, compared to creating a new 
dedicated  database  to  store  data  on  these  documents.  It  concluded  that  reusing  the 
VIS  structure  to  include  these  documents  would  be  the  best  option.  The  study  also 
concluded  on  the  need  to  carry  out  further  research  and  consultations  on  the 
necessity and proportionality of such a measure. 

Objective and scope of the study 

The  European  Commission’s  Directorate-General  for  Migration  and  Home  Affairs  (DG 
HOME)  commissioned  this  study,  with  the  aim  of  analysing  the  necessity  and 
proportionality of including data on long-stay visas and residence documents in the 
VIS.  As  required  by  the  necessity  test,  the  study  identified  other  options  that  could 
potentially  also  address  the  problem,  using  the  input  collected  during  stakeholder 
consultations. More specifically, the study aims at answering the following questions: 

1 Available at: http://www.eulisa.europa.eu/Newsroom/News/Documents/SB-
EES/communication_on_stronger_and_smart_borders_20160406_en.pdf (see page 3). 
2 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Visa Information System (VIS), the use of fingerprints at external borders and the 
use of biometrics in the visa application procedure/REFIT Evaluation COM(2016) 655 final. 
3 Feasibility Study to include in a repository documents for Long-Stay visas, Residence and Local Border Traffic Permits – Phase 1: Analysis of 
Options, 2017. 

5 

 
 
                                                 
  What is the problem to be addressed? 
  What are the objectives of the initiative? 
  What are the legislative and non-legislative options that can be considered? How 

do they compare? 

  What are the impacts on fundamental rights? Are they proportionate (does any 
other option achieve the objectives with less interference on the rights of the data 
subjects)? 

The scope of the study does not cover, and is without prejudice to, MSs’ and the EU’s 
competence  to  define  the  conditions  of  issuing  long-stay  and  residence  documents. 
The  measure  assessed  would  only  address  issues  related  to  the  lack  of  shared 
information  on  these  documents  at  the  borders  and  when  processing  a  new 
application. 

Approach and methodology of the study 

To achieve its aim, the study follows the guidance provided in the Better Regulation 
Guidelines and Toolbox, in particular Tool 28.4 It follows the instructions given in the 
EDPS Toolkit for assessing the necessity of the measure as regards its impact on the 
right to data protection.  

The study used two main data-collection tools:  

  Desk  research  including,  among  others,  the  Treaties,  the  VIS  and  the  SIS  legal 

bases and relevant case law; and 

  Stakeholder  consultations:  consultations  with  the  European  Commission 
(including  two  meetings  with  the  relevant  Directorates-General),  one  interview 
with  Frontex  and  one  interview  with  eu-LISA  were  carried  out.  In  addition,  a 
questionnaire was sent to Member States. Finally, the study also took into account 
the  results  of  the  public  consultation  carried  out  by  the  Commission  between 
November 2017 and February 2018. 

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM? 

Figure 1: Problem definition 

4 “Fundamental Rights & Human Rights”. 

6 

1.Administrative burdern2.Lenghtyborder-crossingprocedures3.Fraud4.Security and migration risks5.Lackof statisticsOperational difficulties at the bordersDifficultiesin gatheringinformation to performan assessmentof the TCNs’ situationsInformation fragmentedProblem driverProblemsConsequences 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Problem  driver:  the  information  on  long-stay  and  residence  documents  is 
fragmented 

For short-stay visas (stays in the EU of less than 90 days within a period of 180 days), 
there  is  a  common  format  in  all  Schengen  Member  States  and  their  application  and 
issuance  procedures  have  been  harmonised.  Information  on  these  documents  and 
their applications is stored in the VIS. The system is used by migration authorities and 
border  guards,  as  well  as  national  and  European  law  enforcement  authorities  under 
special  conditions.  It  provides  reliable  information  on  the  authenticity  and  validity  of 
short-stay visas and on applications, including those handled by other MSs. 

Long-stay  and  residence  documents  are  not  fully  harmonised.  Their  application  and 
issuance  procedures  –  and  in  the  case  of  residence  cards,  their  format  –  can  differ 
from  one  issuing  Member  State  to  another.  Moreover,  there  is  no  systematic 
exchange  of  information  on  these  types  of  documents  and  their  holders  between 
Member States. Border guards and migration authorities have no fast and systematic 
access  to  information  on  documents  issued  by  another  Member  State.  The  data 
available  is  partial  and  scattered  across  national  systems  and  the  SIS  for  stolen  or 
invalidated  documents.  This  leads  to  lengthy  procedures  for  collecting  all  the 
relevant data for the day-to-day activities of national authorities.  

Member States and the respondents to the public consultation confirmed these issues: 
86%  agreed  with  the  identified  information  gap  that  leads  to  problems  in  the 
management of external borders and irregular migration within the EU. 

Problem:  operational  difficulties  at  the  border  and  during  the  assessment  of 
TCNs’ situations 

From  a  border-control  point  of  view,  and  during  checks  carried  out  within  the 
territory of the MSs, it is crucial to  ascertain  the authenticity  and  validity of the 
documents,  as  the  holder  of  a  long-stay  or  residence  document  can  enter  the 
Schengen  Area  via  any  external  border-crossing  point  and  then  travel  across  the 
internal borders. Of the three documents, only residence permits and residence cards 
issued  in  residence-permit  format  have  a  chip,5  and  thus  allow  electronic  verification 
through  Passive  Authentication  (using  the  respective  Member  State’s  cryptographic 
certificate).  In  addition,  while  the  format  of  residence  permits  and  long-stay  visas  is 
harmonised, this is not the case for residence cards.6 Thus, the visual inspection of the 
document’s  security  features  is  made  difficult  by  the  different  formats  and  –  for 
some  documents  –  the  rarity  with  which  they  appear  at  certain  border-crossing 
points. 

The  information  contained  in  the  systems  currently  available  to  border  guards  is  not 
always  sufficient  to  assess  the  authenticity  of  such  documents.  In  fact,  national 
systems  can  only  be  consulted  by  the  issuing  MS,  and  the  SIS  can  only  provide 
information  on  documents  that  have  been  stolen  or  lost  and  have  been  reported  as 
such.  The  SIS,  being  at  most  a  blacklist  of  invalid  documents,  cannot  be  used  to 
detect  counterfeit  documents.  There  is  no  central  EU  list  of  valid  documents  and 
rightful  holders  to  quickly  and  easily  consult  to  verify  that  the  person  and  the 
document being checked are legitimate and exist.  

In  the  event  of  doubt,  border  guards  can  only  rely  on  bilateral  contacts  with  issuing 
Member  States,  via  communication  channels  like  SIRENE,  as  well  as  by  phone  and 
email.  The  MSs  consulted  complained  about  these  procedures,  describing  them  as 

5 The check that the residence permit belongs to the bearer is done by reading the facial image from the chip of the document and comparing 
it with the bearer’s face. In the event of failure or doubt, the fingerprints stored can be accessed. However, the information on the chip needs 
to be checked for its authenticity, which can be done by exchanging cryptographic certificates between MSs (this topic is further discussed in 
Section 3.1.2). 
6  Discussions within the European Commission are currently ongoing to table a proposal aiming at harmonising the format of residence 
cards. The specific details of such a proposal are not fully decided, and therefore the study cannot consider them. However, the idea of this 
harmonisation is considered in the study via option 3: “Further harmonise and secure long-stay visas and residence documents”. 

7 

 
 
                                                 
time-consuming  and  inefficient:  a  clear  majority  (80%)  consider  the  lack  of  shared 
information on these documents a hurdle to their day-to-day activities. 

From  a  migration-assessment  point  of  view,  it  is  important  to  have  relevant 
information  on  a  person’s  situation  to  assess  accurately  whether  the  applicant 
would pose a migration or security risk. In addition to checking national systems, 
the  only  EU-level  exchange  of  information  that  migration  authorities  have  at  their 
disposal is the SIS for alerts on entry bans. Authorities assessing applications for short 
stays have no information on the history of any long stays in other Member States.  

There is no dedicated tool to share information on applications and reasons for refusal, 
which might be linked to migration or security risks. Yet, 93% of MSs that responded 
to the survey consider it necessary to  know the application history  of  a third-country 
national in other MSs and/or the outcome(s) of the application(s). 

Consequences: fraud, security and migration risks, administrative burden and 
lack of statistics 

This situation leads to five main consequences: 

1.  Administrative  burden:  migration  and  border-control  authorities  have  to  go 
through  different  procedures  in  different  systems  and  tools  to  gather  an 
incomplete  picture  of  the  TCN  and  their  document.  The  bilateral  exchange  of 
information is the last resource they use, which has a different inherent constraint: 
language barriers and long waiting times. 

2.  Lengthy  border-crossing  procedures:  the  above-mentioned  issues  at  borders 
directly  impact  on  the  journeys  of  bona  fide  TCNs  holding  long-stay  or  residence 
documents,  who  suffer  delays  and  risk  being  wrongly  denied  entry  or 
passage.  When  there  is  a  doubt  regarding  a  document,  the  further  checks  and 
bilateral  contacts  between  MSs  are  carried  out  at  a  second-line  border  check, 
which means that the TCN has to wait for their situation to be clarified. Ultimately, 
this  situation  can  lead  to  the  freedom  of  movement  of  bona  fide  TCNs  who 
reside 
and 
Directive 2004/38/EC) being infringed if they are not allowed to cross the internal 
(during  an  ad  hoc  check)  or  external  borders  due  to  their  document  not  being 
trusted.  

a  Member  State 

(Article 21 TFEU 

territory 

the 

of 

in 

3.  Fraud:  the  information  gap  can  create  blind  spots  in  the  border-management 
framework and foster fraud in less secure documents. This is especially important 
when  considering  the  existing  and  ongoing  strengthening  of  border  checks  for 
other  categories  of  travellers  (e.g.  mandatory  checks  of  EU  citizens  at  external 
borders,  ETIAS  for  short-stay  visa-exempt  travellers,  VIS  for  short-stay  visa 
holders  and  EES  for  all  short-stay  visitors).  This  reinforcement  of  security  and 
border-management measures could motivate people with ill intentions to look for 
other  types  of  documents  that  are  not  checked  through  centralised  means  and 
that  would  allow  them  to  enter  the  Schengen  Area  and  move  across  Member 
States.  This  phenomenon  has  already  been  observed  with  ID  cards,  whereby 
fraudsters  target  less  secure  EU  ID  cards  for  intra-Schengen  movements7  (fraud 
based on the ‘weakest link’ approach).  

In  addition,  obtaining  authentic  documents  based  on  false  application 
documents  (birth,  marriage  and  death  certificates)  is  one  of  the  biggest 
challenges  in  terms  of  fraud  as  it  is  very  difficult  to  detect.  This  type  of  fraud  is 
increasingly  attractive  to  fraudsters,  as  the  document  has  become  more  secure. 

7 Frontex, Risk Analysis for 2017, page 23, http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2017.pdf 

8 

 
 
                                                 
Better  information  exchange  between  MSs  during  the  application  process  could 
help identify more cases.8 

4.  Security  and  migration  risks:  the  fraud  problem  inevitably  leads  to  a  security 
issue  for  the  EU.  Fraud  is  used  by  organised  crime  as  a  means  for  a  series  of 
related  serious  offences,  notably  terrorism,  human  trafficking,  migrant 
smuggling, and drug and firearm trafficking.9 

In addition, forged documents are the gateway used by irregular migrants to enter 
and  move  within  the  EU.  According  to  Frontex’s  2017  Annual  Risk  Analysis, 
smugglers  frequently  provide  migrants  with  fraudulent  travel  and  identity 
documents.  The  agency  observes  that  both  the  quantity  and  quality  of  fraudulent 
documents  circulating  in  the  EU  have  increased  in  recent  years.10  Smugglers  are 
supported by criminal networks with access to expert counterfeiters who, financed 
by the strong demand, have set up print shops.11  

5.  Lack of statistics: as observed in the 2017 study,12 the analysis of fraud related 
to  long-stay  and  residence  documents  is  particularly  complex  due  to  a  lack  of 
available  data  on  the  problem.  On  the  one  hand,  and  as  explained  above,  any 
statistic  on  forgery  detection  is  bound  to  underestimate  the  actual  size  of  the 
problem,  as  successful  fraudsters  go  undetected.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a 
shortage of statistics at EU level concerning this category of TCNs because: 

 

the data is kept at national level in MSs’ information systems; 

  Eurostat  does  not  have  statistics  on  long-stay  visas  and  the  statistics  on 

residence permits are limited; and 

  Frontex  data  does  not  distinguish  between  residence  permits  and  residence 
cards,  and  sometimes  does  not  distinguish  fraud  between  Schengen  (short-
stay) and long-stay visas. 

WHAT ARE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE INITIATIVE? 

General objectives 

In  line  with  the  problem  defined  above,  the  study  identified  the  following  general 
objectives, validated by the European Commission: 

I. 
II. 
III. 

To improve security within the EU and at its borders;  
To facilitate TCNs’ right to move and reside freely within the EU13;   
To improve the management of the Schengen external border. 

8 Europol funded the development of a handbook on the detection of false application or “breeder” documents. It contains samples and short 
descriptions of European ID documents and breeder documents. It is not used as much as it should be, according to the EC Communication 
on Action plan to strengthen the European response to travel document fraud. 
9 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on an “Action Plan To Strengthen The European Response 
To Travel Document Fraud” of December 2016, COM(2016) 790. 
10 Frontex Annual Risk Analysis 2017 
11 Ibid. 
12 Feasibility Study to include in a repository documents for Long-Stay visas, Residence and Local Border Traffic Permits – Phase 1: Analysis 
of Options, 2017. 
13 More specifically, this objective refers to the right to move and to reside of third-country nationals who are family members of an EU 
citizen, and are thus entitled to a residence card, as enshrined in Directive 2004/38/EC. 

9 

 
 
 
                                                 
Specific objectives 

Two  main  specific  objectives14  and  two  ancillary  ones  supplement  the  general 
objectives: 

Figure 2: Policy objectives 

WHY AN EU ACTION? 

To  address  the  problem,  MSs  could  act  on  an  individual  basis  by  strengthening  their 
documents, their issuance process and document checks at border-crossing points, or 
by reinforcing or systematising bilateral cooperation.  

However, this approach has inherent limitations: 

  Its  benefits  are  automatically  dependent  on  the  number  of  MSs 
committed  to  the  initiative(s).  The  more  MSs  that  implement  individual 
actions,  the  more  secure  the  EU  territory  will  be.  The  action  of  all  MSs  would 
therefore  achieve  greater  benefits  –  which  EU  action  would  necessarily  entail, 
but which is unlikely without it;15 

  Part  of  the  problem  cannot  be  solved  without  the  coordination  of  all 
MSs.  There  is  currently  no  way  for  one  MS  to  know  if  other  MSs  possess 
relevant  information  on  a  person’s  applications  for,  or  use  of,  long-stay 
documents  without  contacting  each  MS.  This  process  would  be  overly 
cumbersome and lengthy, and is therefore infeasible; 

  Differences  in  MSs’  security  levels  may  lead  to  weak  points  for  the 
Schengen  Area.  For  example,  some  MSs,  on  their  own  initiative,  may 
continue  to  implement  policies  towards  harmonising  long-stay  documents  by 
gradually  phasing  out  problematic  ones  and  introducing  improved  security 
features  based  on  international  standards.  However,  this  approach  would  still 
result  in  a  situation  where  the  security  of  documents  would  be  inconsistent: 
documents  from  some  Member  States  would  still  be  less  secure  than 
documents  from  others,  therefore  constituting  a  weakness  for  the  security  of 
the Schengen Area as a whole; and 

  Additional  difficulties  may  arise  from  uncoordinated  actions.  For 
example,  the  different  bilateral  cooperation  processes  are  likely  to  abide  by 
different  rules  –  as  they  do  today.  They  can  take  different  formats  (phone, 
email, existing networks) and are particularly cumbersome due to low response 
times  and  language  barriers.  Making  bilateral  cooperation  more  systematic 
would  increase  workload  for  border  guards  and  create  delays  for  both  the 
administrations and TCNs. 

14 The second specific objective apply to residence cards only partially, as the sole requirement for issuing this document is a proof of a family 
link with a mobile EU citizen, irrespective of his/her previous situation 
15 The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark would not be bound by EU action in the area of freedom, security and justice. 

10 

Facilitate and strengthen checksat external border-crossing points and within the territory of the Member States1Enhance the internal security of the Schengen Area by facilitating the exchange of information among MS on TCN holders, or applying for, long stay and residence documents2Contribute to the prevention, detectionand investigationof terroristoffencesand of other seriouscriminaloffences3Gather statisticsto support evidence-based European Union migration policymaking4Main objectivesi.e. reason for the collection of dataAncillary objectives 
 
  
                                                 
Therefore,  Member  States  alone  cannot  adequately  address  the  problem: they 
can, at best, partially address it. More than 90% of the MS consulted considered an EU 
legislative response necessary in order to address the information gap. 

WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM? 

The  study  identifies  five  options,  some  of  which  include  sub-options  that  could 
potentially address the problem. 

Table 1: Policy options  

No action 

Option 1: No policy change/“do nothing” 

Non-legislative action 

Option 2: Improve the current exchange of information and checks 

2a 

Improve the exchange of bilateral information on a case-by-case basis  

2b 

Improve  the  feeding  and  use  of  information  in  the  SIS  as  regards  alerts  on  withdrawn 
long-stay and residence documents16 (improve the amount/quality of information fed into 
the system, e.g. whether a residence permit was stolen, invalidated, misappropriated or 
lost) 

2c 

Promote  the  use  of  security  features  for  documents  containing  a  chip:  Passive 
Authentication and Extended Access Control) 

Legislative action 

Option  3:  Further  harmonise  and  secure  long-stay  visas  and  residence  documents  (e.g. 
security features) 

Option 4:  Create  an  interconnection  between  national  databases  that  would  allow  all  MSs  to 
query each other’s relevant national databases 

Option 5: Extend the scope of the VIS to include long-stay visas and residence documents 

5a 

Store  data  on  issued  documents  (including  biographical  data  provided  for  in  the 
document) and the document’s history (withdrawn, renewed, etc.) 

5b 

Also  store  data  on  all  applications  (e.g.  the  fact  that  an  application  has  been  lodged, 
when, where, by which MS, for what type of document, main reason for refusal if refused, 
etc.) 

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY 

Impact on fundamental rights 

The  study  assesses  the  impacts  on  fundamental  rights  of  the  options  and  sub-
options  that  meet  the  two  main  policy  objectives.  Therefore,  the  analysis 
focuses on options 4, 5.a and 5.b. 

Necessity 

The  table  below  summarises  the  assessment,  on  a  scale  of  “----”  (strong  negative 
impact) to “++++” (strong positive impact). 

16 Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, Article 38.2(e). 

11 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Table 2: Analysis of impacts on fundamental rights 

Policy options 

Article 2 
CFR 

Article 7 
CFR 

Article 8 
CFR 

Option 3: Further 
harmonise and 
secure the 
documents 
Option 4: 
distributed 
database 

Option 5: Include 
long-stay 
documents in the 
VIS 
Sub-option a): store 
data on issued 
documents 

Sub-option b): store 
data on all 
applications 

+ 

+ 

0 to - 

0 to - 

- 

-  

+ 

- - 

- - 

+ + 

- - - 

- - - 

Article 21 TFUE, 
Directive 2004/38 and 
Article 45(2) CFR 

+ (if residence cards are 
included) 
0 (if they are not) 

+  
(if residence cards are 
included) 
0 (if they are not) 

++  
(if residence cards are 
included) 
0 (if they are not) 
++  
(if residence cards are 
included) 
0 (if they are not) 

As shown above, options 4, 5.a and 5.b have negative impacts on the rights to privacy 
and  data  protection.  The  rights  to  privacy,  personal-data  protection  and  freedom  of 
movement  are  not  absolute  and  may  be  limited,  provided  that  the  limitations  (i) are 
provided  for  by  law;  (ii) respect  the  essence  of  the  rights;  (iii) meet  objectives  of 
general  interest  or  the  need  to  protect  the  rights  and  freedom  of  others;  (iv) are 
necessary;  and  (v) are  proportionate.17  All  options  would  meet  the  three  general 
objectives, but to varying extents, as summarised in the table below. 

Table 3: Effectiveness in meeting the objectives 

   Objective 

Option 

General 
objective 
I: 
security 

General 
objective 
II: freedom 
of 
movement 

General 
objective III: 
border 
management 

Specific 
objective 1: 
strengthen 
checks 

Specific 
objective 2: 
information 
exchange 

3: further 
harmonise 
and secure 

4: 
distributed 
database 

+ 

+ 

+ (if 
residence 
cards are 
included) 

0 (if they are 
not) 

+  
(if residence 
cards are 
included) 
0 (if they are 
not) 

++ 

+ 

0 

+ 

+ 

+ 

17 EDPS (April 2017) “Assessing the necessity of measures that limit the fundamental right to the protection of personal data: A Toolkit”, 
page 4. 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5.a: store 
data on 
issued 
documents 

5.b: store 
data on all 
applications 

+ 

++ 

++  
(if residence 
cards are 
included) 
0 (if they are 
not) 

++  
(if residence 
cards are 
included) 
0 (if they are 
not) 

++ 

+ 

0 

++ 

+ 

+ 

The  policy  objectives  to  be  achieved  cannot  be  addressed  by  less  intrusive  measures 
than option 5.b. Other less intrusive measures were considered but either do not meet 
the objectives at all, or only do so partially. The more intrusive measure, option 5.b, is 
therefore considered necessary.  

Proportionality 

The limitations to fundamental rights brought about by option 5.b are proportionate to 
the desired aim, as demonstrated below.   

The  limitation  would  bring  about  significant  advantages:  limiting  the  rights 
would  enable  the  general  and  specific  objectives  to  be  met.  It  would  also  entail 
some  disadvantages,  as  it  would  negatively  affect  the  right  to  data 
protection: option 5.b  entails collecting, storing and accessing 17 data items related 
to  long-stay  documents  issued  and  applied  for.  It  relies  on  the  VIS,  a  central 
database,  for  storage.  This  limited  dataset  would  be  collected  for  about  22 million 
people18 (including residence cards). 

However,  this  limitation  on  the  right  to  data  protection  is  minor  and  strictly 
limited  to  what  is  necessary  to  achieve  the  objectives.  The  dataset  does  not 
encompass  the  special  categories  of  data  that  are  considered  particularly  sensitive, 
and  contains  little  data  that  would  yield  information  on  a  person’s  private  life.  The 
“reason for the negative decision” might, if left as a free-text field, represent a risk to 
privacy or reveal personal sensitive data (e.g. health data) on rare occasions. The use 
of  a  drop-down  menu,  tick  boxes  or  another  technical  feature  in  the  form  could 
prevent this. Only personal data that is adequate and relevant for the purposes of the 
processing would be collected and processed.19 This dataset does not go beyond what 
a  border  guard  currently  sees  when  examining  a  long-term  visa,  residence  card  or 
permit presented at the border. 

Thus,  the  limitation  is  justified,  as  the  advantages  outweigh  the  disadvantages 
caused with respect to the exercise of fundamental rights; and it is proportionate to 
the desired objectives, as it reaches a fair balance between them and the fundamental 
rights at stake (in this case, data protection). 

18 Number of residence cards for ≈1 million people. 
19 Biographical and document data would be used to compare with the data on the document presented and to detect forged, counterfeited 
and stolen blank documents. Decision data would be used by migration authorities to inform their decisions during the application process. 
Data generated by the repository would be used to structure the database. 

13 

 
 
 
                                                 
Comparison of options: coherence, effectiveness and cost-benefit 

For each of the options and sub-options, the study analysed the  following criteria (in 
addition to the impact on fundamental rights, necessity and proportionality): 

  Coherence: is the option coherent with the overarching objectives of EU policies? 

All  options  except  option 1  (“do  nothing”)  are  coherent  with  the  overarching 
objectives of EU policies. 

  Effectiveness: does the option meet the objectives? 

Sub-option 5.b  is  the  only  option  that  fully  addresses  the  second  objective,  as 
storing  data  on  documents  and  applications  would  offer  migration  authorities  a 
complete  picture  on  the  situation  of  a  TCN  applying  for  a  new  document.  As 
regards  option 4,  the  distributed  database,  its  complexity  and  difficulty  to 
implement,  together  with  the  difficulties  in  delivering  high-performance  searches 
with  such  a  set-up,  would  reduce  its  effectiveness  in  addressing  the  policy 
objectives. 

  Efficiency: do the benefits of the option outweigh its costs? 

Efficiency  was  analysed  for  the  options  and  sub-options  that  meet  the  two  main 
policy  objectives  (4,  5.a  and  5.b).  Option 4  is  likely  to  be  overly  complex  and 
costly  to  implement,  due  to  major  difficulties  deriving  from  the  different 
governance,  legal  basis,  languages  and  technical  solutions  used  across  national 
systems. These difficulties could delay implementation by several years. Moreover, 
it would not leverage the existing infrastructure of the VIS.  

Option 5 (either sub-option) offers better performance and a much better 
cost-benefit. 

The table below summarises the assessment of each option against the criteria. 

Table 4: Comparison of policy options20 

Option 
 1   No change 

Coherence  Effectiveness  Efficiency 
0 

0 

2a  

2b 

 2c 

Improve existing: bilateral exchange of 
information  

Improve existing: use of the SIS 

Improve existing: use of electronic document 
authentication 
Further document harmonisation 

 3 
 4  Distributed database 

5a 

5b 

Extend the VIS with document data 

Extend the VIS with document and application 
data22 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 
++ 

+++ 

+++ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 
+ 

++ 

+++ 

+21 
- - 

++ 

++ 

20 On a scale of “---” (very poor score on the criterion) to “+++” (very positive score), “0” being “medium score”. 
21 The option scored positively for efficiency at securing the borders in terms of efficiency based on the assessment included in the 
IA  of  the  DG  JUST  proposal.  However,  the  benefits  cover  only  one  of  the  two  objectives  in  scope  for  this  legislative  initiative.  As 
explained in the study, and in particular in Section 3.2, this option will help neither MS cooperation nor the exchange of information 
to strengthen the issuance process. 
22 Not the full application data, but only whether a person has applied for a document and what the outcome was. 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Best-scoring option 

Option 5b  (“Extend  the  scope  of  the  VIS  to  include  long-stay  visas  and  residence 
documents  –  Store  also  data  on  all  applications”)  is  the  preferred  option  for  the 
following reasons: 

  Necessity:  There  is  no  equally  effective  but  less  intrusive  measure  available: 

thus, the measure is necessary; 

  Proportionality:  The  measure’s  impact  on  fundamental  rights,  including  data 
protection  and  privacy,  is  limited  while  it  brings  significant  advantages:  the 
measure is proportionate; 

  Coherence, effectiveness and efficiency: The measure meets the criteria more 
than  any  other  alternative.  In  particular,  option 5  would  allow  triangular 
verification  (person->document->system),  which  has  proven  to  be  a  successful 
approach  for  efficiently  tackling  the  unlawful  use  of  documents  by  correctly 
assessing  (i) their  validity  and  authenticity,  and  (ii) the  holder’s  identity.  It 
provides a higher level of security than just reinforcing the documents, as not only 
would  it  work  even  if  the  chip  cannot  be  read  or  verified,  but  it  would  also 
strengthen  the  application  process.  The  system  could  be  consulted  easily  at  the 
border by scanning the passport, thus simplifying the process at the border.  

Should  the  collection  of  fingerprints  be  harmonised  across  MS  for  all  documents, 
these  could  be  stored  centrally,  further  strengthening  the  EU  against  identity 
fraud,  just  like  what  is  done  for  short-stay  travellers  whose  biometrics  are 
collected  in  the  EES  and  VIS.  Finally,  a  central  system  set-up  would  be  able  to 
leverage  the  tools  introduced  with  the  recent  interoperability  legislative  proposal 
and benefit from efficient use of the information available.   

Overall,  this  option  would  have  a  positive  societal  impact  both  on  EU  citizens,  who 
would  benefit  from  the  additional  security  of  the  Schengen  Area,  and  on  TCNs,  who 
would benefit from a potentially faster border crossing.  

The way forward/what are the next steps? 

This study is a first step towards the possible future adoption and implementation of 
the measure. The European Commission will write an impact assessment building on 
the work carried out during the study.  

The  final  option,  sub-option,  design  and  set-up  to  be  retained  depend  on 
political and policy decisions. Based on these decisions, the European Commission 
is expected to present legislative amendments to the VIS as part of the 2018 revision 
of the VIS legal framework. 

15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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doi: 10.2837/442430 
ISBN 978-92-79-88854-0