COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Report on benefits for the people of Western Sahara and public consultation on extending tariff preferences to products from Western Sahara Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of an agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco on amending Protocols 1 and 4 of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part
Date: 2018-06-15
Institutions: Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission
Subjects: Mediterranean region (EU), Morocco, Union for the Mediterranean, Western Sahara, association agreement (EU), originating product, protocol to an agreement, ratification of an agreement, revision of an agreement, tariff preference

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 15.6.2018 SWD(2018) 346 final/2  CORRIGENDUM This document corrects document SWD(2018) 346 final of 11.6.2018. Concerns the English language version. On the cover page, the SWD title was omitted and has been added. The text shall read as follows:  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Report on benefits for the people of Western Sahara and public consultation on extending tariff preferences to products from Western Sahara  Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of an agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco on amending Protocols 1 and 4 of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part {COM(2018) 481 final}  
 
 
REPORT ON BENEFITS FOR THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA 
AND PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON EXTENDING TARIFF 
PREFERENCES TO PRODUCTS FROM WESTERN SAHARA 

Joint report by the Commission and the European External Action Service 

1. 

The Western Saharan economy 

Summary 

Though encouraging, recent growth in Western Sahara remains fragile. The economy is based 
on  a  limited  number  of  industries:  fishing  and  processing  of  fishery  products,  phosphate 
mining,  agriculture  (especially  fruit  and  vegetables  and  pastoral  nomadism)  and,  to  some 
extent, trade  and  craft industries.  Tourism  and  renewable  energy  are  nascent  but  potentially 
promising sectors. The Saharan economy is landlocked and still largely subsidised. 

2. 

Tariff preferences as a lifeline for exports 

Diversifying  the  economic  potential  of  Western  Sahara  means  encouraging  foreign 
investment.  This  means  offering  traders  legal  certainty,  especially  by  clarifying  the  tariff 
conditions for current and future  exports  from  Western Sahara  to the EU. Though available 
data  is  often  fragmentary,  this  study  concludes  that  certain  areas  of  the  economy  and 
production in Western Sahara deserve the same tariff preferences as those granted to the 
Kingdom  of  Morocco,  which  they  enjoyed  de  facto  until  21 December  2016.  Extending 
EU tariff preferences to such products would ensure the continuity of exports. It should also 
play a major role in boosting the Saharan economy, by stimulating current and planned 
investment liable to generate jobs (in particular in some phosphates, such as phosphoric acid 
or agricultural fertilisers, and in agriculture and fishing). 

Conversely,  not  granting  tariff  preferences  would  diminish  Western  Saharan  exports, 
especially  exports  of  fishery  and  agricultural  products,  and  would  further  narrow  its 
already  limited  range  of  production.  Without  tariff  preferences,  Western  Saharan  products 
would be subject to normal customs tariffs (as applicable in the EU under the most-favoured 
nation  clause),  without  privileged  access  to  the  EU  market.  Industrial  products  (such  as 
phosphates) would scarcely be affected, but exports of fishery and agricultural products to the 
EU would suffer greatly, with many jobs lost. 

In  the  longer  term,  boosting  free  private  enterprise  should  reduce  dependence  on  central 
government  subsidies,  while  opening  up  the  economy  to  greater  trade  and  other  types  of 
exchange should gradually lead to discernible socio-economic and cultural growth. 

3. 

Involving people 

On  the  one  hand,  the  Moroccan  authorities  have  consulted  all  national,  regional  and  local 
institutions concerned, to raise awareness and obtain their approval and input. This has led to 
broad  support  for  the  planned  amendment  and  to  some  recommendations  to  maximise  its 
effect.  

On  the  other  hand,  the  European  Commission  and  the  European  External  Action  Service 
(EEAS) have consulted elected officials and public opinion in Western Sahara, where a large 
majority are in favour of tariff preferences being extended to products from Western Sahara. 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most  of  those  interviewed  said  this  would  help  everyone,  stressing  the  key  role  such 
preferences would play in spurring private investment. They felt that privileged access to EU 
markets  would  encourage  business  and  EU  direct  investment,  promoting  Western  Sahara’s 
new  participatory  and  sustainable  development  model.  Conversely,  continuing  legal 
uncertainty  surrounding  trade  with  Western  Sahara  would seriously  hamper  socio-economic 
development, as already evidenced by the slowdown in trade between the territory and some 
Member  States  and  in  certain  sectors.  Restricting  access  for  Western  Sahara  to  foreign 
markets  and  investment  would  put  a  brake  on  its  economy  and  thwart  socio-economic  and 
political growth, just when development in the territory finally seems ready to take off.  

This  was  a  general  feeling,  despite  varying  opinions  as  to  the  status  of  the  territory,  which 
everyone agreed could be settled only through the UN-led process. Some also felt that the EU 
should be more involved in supporting the UN-led process. 

Technical  discussions  with  the  Polisario  Front,  which  is  an  interlocutor  with  the  UN  and  a 
party to the UN-led peace process for Western Sahara, highlighted the Front’s opposition in 
principle  to  amendment  of  the  Agreement,  largely  for  general  political  reasons  unrelated  to 
the amendment itself. 

4. 

Results by sector 

Consideration  of  the  three  main  sectors  potentially  affected  by  the  extension  of  EU  tariff 
preferences to products from Western Sahara leads to the following conclusions: 

(a) 

Agriculture 

The study shows that crops are grown in Western Sahara, especially early-growing crops 
(tomatoes  and  melons),  for  which  there  is  a  big  market  in  the  EU.  An  estimated 
64 000 tonnes of such crops were grown in 2016, accounting for some 14 000 direct jobs. 
Those crops would have an import value of some EUR 65 million. Without tariff preferences, 
such exports would be subject to EUR 6.6 million in customs duties.  

Those  economic  benefits  could  grow  if  Western  Sahara  increases  production  and  exports 
more to the EU under projects currently being planned. That would also increase the number 
of jobs, which some forecasts say could grow fivefold. 

Although more farming means using more natural resources, especially water, there seem to 
be  few  other  ways  at  present  for  the  territory’s  economy  to  grow.  Though  questioned  by 
some, Moroccan estimates suggest that the impact on groundwater reserves would be limited. 

(b) 

Fishery products 

The report shows that there is a major fish processing industry in Western Sahara. Exports of 
fishery products from the territory amounted to EUR 100-200 million in 2015 and 2016, 
according  to  different  sources.  Some  45 000  jobs  depended  directly  or  indirectly  on  those 
exports. As in agriculture, extending tariff preferences to those imports would have a major 
impact on the economy and thus on jobs in the territory. Conversely, not granting preferences 
would  harm  exports  and  jobs  and  encourage  a  shift  in  processing  to  other  places,  such  as 
Morocco.  That  would  jeopardise  investment  in  Western  Saharan  fish  processing  plants 
cofinanced by the EU. 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c)  

Phosphates 

Phosphate  production  is  a  major  industry  in  Western  Sahara.  However,  as  most  of  the  raw 
phosphate  produced  in  Western  Sahara  and  imported  to  the  EU  is  not  subject  to  customs 
duties,  not  applying  tariff  preferences  to  current  Western  Saharan  phosphate 
production  would  have  little  or  no  impact.  The  proposed  agreement  could  have  a  real 
impact only for certain phosphate derivatives (phosphoric acid and fertilisers) not currently 
produced in Western Sahara (and subject to duties of 4.8 to 6.5 %). The OCP Group (former 
Office  Chérifien  des  Phosphates),  which  is  the  main  employer  in  the  territory,  plans  to 
develop  an  industrial  complex  producing  fertilisers  (phosphoric  acid  and  fertilisers)  in 
Laâyoune  and  to  build  a  new  quay  in  the  port  of  Laâyoune.  Those  projects  would  be 
threatened without preferential treatment for the products in question, which could cost local 
jobs. 

5. 

Conclusion 

Though  the  Western  Saharan  population  cannot  be  neatly  divided  into  groups  with  specific 
backgrounds, there are signs that economic activity generated by exports to the EU creates 
local  jobs  and  thus  helps  all  parts  of  the  population,  regardless  of  background,  to  a 
greater or lesser extent. These benefits would be compromised if exports to the EU did not 
enjoy the same tariff preferences as those granted to Morocco. 

3 

 
 
 
 
4 

 
 
 
Contents 

1 

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 6 

1.1 

1.2 

Background .............................................................................................................................. 6 

Scope and method .................................................................................................................. 8 

1.2.1 

Scope ............................................................................................................................... 8 

1.2.2 

Methodological constraints ............................................................................................ 8 

1.3 

Consulting the people concerned ......................................................................................... 10 

2 

HUMAN RIGHTS IN WESTERN SAHARA ......................................................................................... 10 

2.1 

The human rights situation in Western Sahara .......................................................... 10 

2.2 

Framework for EU-Morocco cooperation in the fields of human rights and democracy ..... 11 

Consequences of amending Protocols 1 and 4 of the Association Agreement on the human 

2.3 
rights situation in Western Sahara .................................................................................................... 12 

3 

THE WESTERN SAHARAN ECONOMY – ECONOMIC BENEFITS FOR THE PEOPLE CONCERNED ..... 13 

3.1 

3.2 

Overview of the Western Saharan economy and the need to diversity it ............................ 13 

Potential benefits for the main export sectors of the economy ........................................... 15 

3.2.1 

Agriculture ..................................................................................................................... 15 

3.2.2 

Fishery products ............................................................................................................ 19 

3.2.3 

Phosphates .................................................................................................................... 24 

CONSULTATION OF THE PEOPLE CONCERNED BY THE AMENDMENTS TO PROTOCOLS 1 AND 4 OF 
4 
THE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT ............................................................................................................ 28 

4.1 

Aim and scope of consultation .............................................................................................. 28 

4.2  Main results ........................................................................................................................... 28 

4.3 

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 31 

5 

GENERAL CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 32 

Annex................................................................................................................................................. 34 

  Delegation of 85 associations jointly signing a letter to the European Commission and 
the EEAS on 3 February 2018 on amending the Protocols ......................................................... 34 

5 

 
 
 
 
1  INTRODUCTION 

1.1  Background 

Western  Sahara  is  a  territory  in  northwestern  Africa  bordering  Morocco,  Algeria  and 
Mauritania.  It  was  under  Spanish  administration  until  1976.  On  14  December  1960,  the 
UN General  Assembly  adopted  Resolution  1514  (XV)  on  the  Granting  of  Independence  to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples. In 1963, at the request of the Kingdom of Morocco and in 
response to information sent by the Kingdom of Spain under Article 73(e) of the UN Charter, 
the UN added  Western Sahara to its list of non-self-governing territories. It remains on that 
list today. 

Both the Kingdom of Morocco and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el-Hamra 
and  Río  de  Oro  (the  Polisario  Front)  claim  the  territory;  the  UN  has  long  been  working 
towards  a  peaceful  resolution  of  the  dispute.  The  EU  and  its  Member  States  have  refrained 
from  intervening  or  taking  sides  in  the  dispute and  will,  as  appropriate,  accept any  solution 
decided  in  accordance  with  international  law,  under  the  auspices  of  the  UN.  They  do  not 
recognise  Moroccan  sovereignty  over  Western  Sahara,  but  support  efforts  by  the 
UN Secretary-General  to  bring  about  a  just,  lasting  and  mutually  acceptable  solution  which 
will allow self-determination for the people of Western Sahara. 

Ever since Spain left in 1976, no statistics have been sent to the UN on economic, social or 
education conditions in the territory. 

Most  of  the  territory  is  currently  controlled  by  the  Kingdom  of  Morocco,  with  the 
Polisario Front controlling a smaller, sparsely populated area in the east. The area controlled 
by the Polisario Front and the area controlled by the Kingdom of Morocco are divided by a 
wall of sand, built by Morocco and guarded by the Moroccan military. Many refugees from 
Western Sahara live in camps run by the Polisario Front in Algeria, near Western Sahara1. 

Ever since Spain ended its presence and Mauritania withdrew, the Kingdom of Morocco has 
exercised sole de facto administration over the part of Western Sahara under its control. The 
Kingdom  of  Morocco  regards  Western  Sahara  as  part  of  its  territory.  The  EU  regards 
Morocco as administering the non-self-governing territory. 

This  report  uses  the  term  ‘Western  Sahara’  to  refer  to  the  part  of  the  territory  administered 
de facto by Morocco. 

After  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Euro-Mediterranean  Agreement  establishing  an  association 
between  the  European  Communities  and  their  Member  States,  of  the  one  part,  and  the 
Kingdom  of  Morocco,  of  the  other  part2  (the  ‘EU-Morocco  Association  Agreement’), 
products from Western Sahara benefited de facto from the tariff preferences established in the 
Association Agreement, as they were certified by Morocco as being of Moroccan preferential 
origin.  However,  in  its  judgment  of  21  December  2016  in  case  C-104/16 P3,  the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the Agreement applied only to the territory of the 

1 The EU supports the Sahrawi people through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and 
by  providing  humanitarian  aid  for  refugees.  See  Report  on  EU-Algeria  Cooperation  –  2016  Edition: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/rapport_de_coorperation_2016_v.numerique.pdf 
2  
3  

OJ L 70, 18.3.2000, p. 2. 
ECJ Judgment of 21 December 2016, Council v Front Polisario, C-104/16 P, ECLI:EU:C:2016:973. 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Kingdom  of  Morocco  and  not  to  the  non-self-governing  territory  of  Western  Sahara4.  After 
that  judgment,  the  EU  immediately  stopped  granting  the  above  tariff  preferences;  those 
preferences  can  be  restored  only  if  the  relevant  provisions  of  Protocol  1  (access  to  the 
EU market  for  agricultural  products,  processed  agricultural  products  and  fish  and  fishery 
products) and Protocol 4 (rules of origin) are amended, clearly establishing the principle that 
products from Western Sahara may enjoy the same treatment as products from Morocco. 

Therefore,  on  29  May  2017,  the  Council  authorised  the  Commission,  in  the  form  of  an 
Exchange of Letters, to negotiate an international agreement on behalf of the EU to amend the 
Association  Agreement  as  necessary.  But  the  Council  attached  two  conditions  to  that 
authorisation:  First,  before  the  new  Agreement  is  signed,  the  Commission  must  have 
evaluated  its  potential  impact  on  sustainable  growth  in  Western  Sahara,  considering  in 
particular its advantages for local people and the impact of natural resource use on the areas in 
question.  Second,  the  people  concerned  by  the  Agreement  must  have  been  adequately 
involved. 

As the people of Western Sahara have the right to self-determination, it is not for the EU to 
carry out a local census or decide who to count as part of the population5; at the same time, 
UN  documents  on  economic  activity  in  non-self-governing  territories  also  refer  to 
socio-economic  benefits  for  their  inhabitants6.  Keeping  in  mind  these  differences  and  the 
difficulty of assessing the impact of the amendment on a people which has yet to be defined, 
this analysis focuses on the benefits for the population of Western Sahara, as preferences are 
granted  to  products  from  a  given  territory,  with  advantages  associated  mainly  with  that 
territory. 

This report aims to respond to those requests from the Council. It is based on: 

information exchanged between the EU and Morocco; 

  all available statistical data; 
 
  consultations  with  a  wide  range  of  socio-economic  and  political  actors 

in 
Western Sahara,  especially  through  interviews  with  civil  society  organisations, 
Western Saharan MPs, economic operators and representatives of the Polisario Front;  
  observations  submitted  by  the  Polisario  Front  in  action  T-512/12  and  by  the 

Western Sahara Campaign in the national dispute which led to case C-266/16; 

  annual reports by the UN Secretary-General on the situation in Western Sahara and the 

website of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara7;  
information in the public domain. 

 

The  Commission  and  the  EEAS  have  also  maintained  regular  contact  with  the  team  of  the 
Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Western Sahara. The aim has been to ensure 

4 
According  to  the  above  judgment  of  21  December  2016,  the  territory  of  Western  Sahara  has  a 
‘separate  and  distinct  status’,  by  virtue  of  the  principle  of  self-determination  (par.  92).  In  its  judgment  of 
27 February  2018  (C-266/16,  Western  Sahara  Campaign)  on  the  EU-Morocco  Fisheries  Agreement,  the 
ECJ states: ‘the territory of Western Sahara is not covered by the concept of “territory of Morocco” ’ (par. 64), 
and  ‘the  waters  adjacent  to  the  territory  of  Western  Sahara  are  not  part  of  the  Moroccan  fishing  zone’ 
(par. 69). 
5  
6  
interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories (document A/RES/72/94 of 14 December 2017). 
7  

See point 1.2.2, third paragraph. 
General Assembly Resolution of 7 December 2017 on Economic and other activities which affect the 

https://minurso.unmissions.org/  
https://minurso.unmissions.org/secretary-general-reports  

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
that  the  proposed  agreement  will  support  efforts  by  the  UN  Secretary-General  to  achieve  a 
solution providing for self-determination for the people of Western Sahara in accordance with 
the principles and objectives of the UN Charter.  

1.2  Scope and method 

1.2.1  Scope 

This  evaluation aims  to determine the benefits for the people of Western Sahara, guided by 
the  parameters  in  Article  73  of  the  UN Charter.  It  will  analyse  the  potential  impact  of  the 
agreement on sustainable growth in Western Sahara, especially in terms of advantages for the 
people  concerned  and  the  impact  of  using  natural  resources  in  the  areas  in  question.  Of 
course,  the  real  impact  on  sustainable  growth  and  local  people  can  be  assessed  only  if  the 
granting of tariff preferences has an effect on trade between the EU and Western Sahara. The 
first aspect to consider is the impact of tariff preferences on trade from Western Sahara to the 
EU.  

Only  later  can  the  real  impact  on  sustainable  growth  and  local  people  be  considered  or 
assessed, as this question arises only if the granting of tariff preferences has an effect on trade 
between the EU and Western Sahara. 

Tariff  preferences  provide  for  preferential  customs  duties  (zero  for  most  products)  to  be 
applied to goods entering the EU, subject to certain conditions. The duty applied to goods is 
determined  by  three  factors:  their  tariff  position  in  the  customs  nomenclature8;  their  origin, 
i.e.  their  purported  country  of  origin;  and,  in  some  cases,  their  value.  Those  concepts  are 
examined in detail later in this report. 

1.2.2  Methodological constraints 

There are various types of methodological constraints, involving: 

the quality of available information;  

 
  practice following the Court judgment of 21 December 2016; 
 
 

the defined scope of the study; 
the  difficulty  for  the  EU  as  a  third  party  to  assess  the  impact  of  the  agreement,  in 
particular its benefits for the people concerned. 

Information  available  Statistics  on  Western  Sahara  generally  remain  patchy  and  disparate, 
due to the territory’s unique political situation. For example, though much information can be 
found on the websites of various Moroccan institutions (including the Economic, Social and 
Environmental Council and the High Planning Commission), the territory of Western Sahara 
the 
does  not  correspond  exactly 
Moroccan authorities in their publications or in information exchanged with the Commission 
(the regions of Laâyoune-Sakia el Hamra, Dakhla-Oued ed Dahab and Guelmim-Oued Noun). 
But that obstacle can be overcome, as this report considers economic activity in the regions of 

‘southern  provinces’ 

referred 

to  by 

the 

to 

8  Reference  is  to  the  nomenclature  governed  by  the  Convention  on  the  Harmonised  Commodity  Description 
and Coding System (the ‘Harmonised System’).  

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Laâyoune-Sakia el Hamra and Dakhla-Oued ed Dahab.  

Practice following the Court judgment of 21 December 2016 The methodological limits on 
data  available  to  the  EU  institutions  are  linked  to  the  practice  which  was  in  place  until  the 
ECJ judgment  of  21 December  2016.  As  goods  from  Western  Sahara  imported  to  the 
EU de facto enjoyed the same preferences as goods from Morocco, it is generally impossible 
to distinguish Moroccan imports from Western Saharan imports using EU statistics on foreign 
trade (such as the Eurostat Comext database) and therefore to estimate what portion of those 
imports  is  from  Western  Sahara.  It  is  only  for  fishery  products  that  data  from  the 
Commission’s  Trade Control and Expert  System (Traces) make  it possible to  estimate what 
portion is processed in the territory and imported to the EU. 

Defining  the  scope  of  the  study  The  term  ‘people  concerned’  is  liable  to  different  or  even 
divergent  interpretations9.  It  can  be  understood as  referring  to  people  living  in  the  territory; 
this is Morocco’s interpretation, which does not distinguish between inhabitants on the basis 
of  ethnicity  or  community.  It  can  also  be  understood  as  referring  to  a  specific  set  of 
inhabitants,  in  particular  on  the  basis  of  ethnicity  or  community  (Sahrawis);  in  that  case,  at 
least  some  of  the  people  concerned  may  be  living  outside  of  Western  Sahara  (as  refugees), 
while some newer inhabitants may not be included. This is the interpretation preferred by the 
Polisario Front.  If  the  people  concerned  are  to  be  defined  on  the  basis  of  ethnicity  or 
community, three things should be kept in mind: (1) The UN Mission for the Referendum in 
Western  Sahara  (MINURSO)  worked  for  13  years,  from  1991  to  2004,  to  determine  which 
people would be allowed to exercise the right to self-determination for the people of Western 
Sahara,  without  arriving  at  a conclusive result. (2)  People identifying as  Sahrawi  inhabit  an 
area  much  larger  than  Western  Sahara  including  southern  Morocco,  Mauritania,  part  of 
Algeria and sizeable groups in Europe and North America; (3) Sahrawi people, traditionally 
nomadic, have family ties extending beyond the borders of the region. This shows how great 
the challenge is for the Commission, which has no precise, reliable way of deciding who to 
include in the (Sahrawi) ‘people concerned’. 

Also,  the  effect  of  tariff  advantages  on  natural  resources,  employment  and  human  rights  is 
indirect and therefore quite hard to gauge. 

Though  this  report  has  been  prepared  as  objectively  as  possible,  it  is  limited  by  natural 
constraints: On the one hand, the parties to the dispute on Western Sahara and its status have 
radically  diverging  positions;  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  independent  UN-commissioned 
analysis of the benefits of international trade agreements for Western Sahara. Moreover, the 
EU has no competence for or direct means of investigating the territory of Western Sahara.  

In  any  event,  we  decided  to  start  by  assessing  whether  the  agreement  helped  trade  between 
Western  Sahara  and  the  EU.  If  so,  we  wished  to  gauge  its  impact  on  jobs  and  the  use  of 
natural  resources.  Where  possible,  we  sought  to  determine  whether  that  impact  could  be 
associated with differences in the background (indigenous or not) of the people. 

So  all  available  data  have  been  used  in  preparing  this  study.  Though  incomplete,  that 
information  allows  for  an  approximate  estimate  of  the  impact  of  extending  the  trade 

9 For example, the French language version of the negotiating directives uses the word ‘populations’, while the 
English version uses the word ‘people’. This shows a varying use of words even in UN documents. For example, 
the conclusion to the ICJ opinion of 16 October 2074 says ‘populations’ in the French version and ‘people’ in 
the English version. 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
preferences  established  in  the  Association  Agreement  to  exports  from  Western  Sahara  or, 
conversely,  the  impact  of  not  granting  such  preferences  on  the  territory’s  economy, 
sustainable growth and the people concerned. 

An  examination  of  economic  activity  in  Western  Sahara  shows  that  the  sectors  with  the 
largest volume of exports to the EU are fisheries and agriculture. The potential impact of the 
Agreement on those sectors is analysed below. Because of its potential, the phosphates sector 
is analysed as well. 

1.3  Consulting the people concerned 

One of the aims of the negotiation was to fulfil the condition that ‘the people concerned by the 
agreement  have  been  adequately  involved’  in  preparing  to  amend  Protocols  1  and  4  of  the 
Association Agreement. With no other way of directly consulting people in Western Sahara, 
the Commission and the EEAS consulted a broad range of Sahrawi civil society organisations, 
MPs, economic operators and other organisations, including the Polisario Front. Most of those 
organisations and associations, including the Polisario Front, shared their views with us; a few 
declined to do so. The main aim of the consultation was to exchange views and comments on 
the  potential  benefits  for  the  people  and  the  economy  of  Western  Sahara  of  extending  the 
preferential  treatment  granted  to  Moroccan  products  to  products  imported  from  Western 
Sahara to the EU. 

2  HUMAN RIGHTS IN WESTERN SAHARA 

2.1  The human rights situation in Western Sahara 

The  human  rights  situation  in  Western  Sahara  is  generally  similar  to  that  in  Morocco. 
Mechanisms and laws ensuring protection are the same. However, there are some differences 
in  Western  Sahara  because  of  the  political  dispute,  especially  in  freedom  of  expression, 
freedom  of  demonstration  and  freedom  of  association.  Any  ‘threat  to  territorial  integrity’, 
including  advocating  independence  as  the  Polisario  Front  does,  is  punishable  by  fine  or 
imprisonment.  

In  case  T-512/12,  the  Polisario  Front  claims  that  Morocco  has  violated  the  human  rights  of 
Sahrawi  civilians  during  protest  demonstrations.  According  to  some  NGOs10,  violations  of 
socio-economic as well as civil and political rights are more common in Western Sahara than 
in  Morocco.  This 
latest  report  on 
Western Sahara11.  Given  the  nature  of  the  dispute,  some  Sahrawi  organisations  report 
violations  of  freedom  of  expression,  freedom  of  demonstration  and  freedom  of  association. 
They report difficulties in operating as they have no legal recognition. Despite an encouraging 

the  UN  Secretary-General’s 

is  confirmed 

in 

10 See reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch: 
https://www.amnesty.org/fr/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/morocco/report-morocco/ (viewed on 
23/4/2018) 
https://www.hrw.org/fr/middle-east/n-africa/morocco/western-sahara (viewed on 23/4/2018). 
11 Secretary-General’s report on the situation in Western Sahara. UN Security Council Document 
No S/2018/277. See points 65-73. 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
climate  of  reform  in  recent  years,  repressive  practices  remain  and  NGOs  continue  to  face 
daily obstacles. 

The authorities have made efforts in recent years to respond to concerns of the international 
community  and  civil  society,  but  the  means  of  measuring  those  efforts  and  verifying  their 
impact  on  the  human  rights  situation  need  to  be  improved.  One  major  step  forward  is 
Morocco’s recent recognition of the Sahrawi Association of Victims of Serious Human Rights 
Violations, the first registered Sahrawi association. The regional commissions of Morocco’s 
National  Human  Rights  Council,  operating  in  Dakhla  et  Laâyoune,  have  also  been 
strengthened, making it easier to monitor the human rights situation in the territory. 

Morocco underwent its third Universal Periodic Review by the UN Human Rights Council in 
September  2017,  receiving  244  recommendations.  Those  focused  mainly  on  abolishing  the 
death  penalty,  stopping  violence  against  women,  gender  equality,  ending  discrimination 
against children born out of wedlock and decriminalising sexual relations between consenting 
adults  of  the  same  sex.  The  Review  highlighted  challenges  in  respecting  the  prevalence  of 
international over national human rights law. 

2.2  Framework for EU-Morocco cooperation in the fields of human rights 

and democracy 

Western  Sahara  has  long  been  the  subject  of  dialogue  between  the  EU  and  Morocco  in  the 
fields of human rights and democracy under the Association Agreement, Article 2 of which 
states:  ‘Respect  for  the  democratic  principles  and  fundamental  human  rights  established  by 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights shall inspire the domestic and external policies of 
the Community and of Morocco and shall constitute an essential element of this Agreement.’ 

EU-Morocco  relations  in  the  field  of  human  rights  have  been  accompanied  by  regular 
dialogue – both political, at high-level meetings of the Association Council and official visits 
by  senior  officials,  and  technical,  in  the  Sub-Committee  on  Human  Rights,  Democracy  and 
Governance12, which has met annually since its creation. 

Though  informal  contacts  on  the  matter  have  continued  in  recent  years,  the  difficulties  in 
bilateral relations since the Court judgment of 10 December 2015 (Case T-512/12) have made 
it  impossible  to  hold  such  meetings  officially.  As  part  of  the  process  of  normalisation  and 
with a view to restoring bilateral ties, the EU is planning to relaunch the dialogue before the 
end of 2018. 

Discussions  have  dealt  with  progress  in  implementing  reform  for  various  individual  and 
collective  rights,  as  well  as  EU-financed  human  rights  and  governance  programmes.  They 
have  also  touched  on  individual  cases  of  alleged  human  rights  violations  –  a  matter  of 
particular relevance to Western Sahara. 

As part  of the political dialogue, the EU regularly  underscores the importance of upholding 
the  rule  of  law,  in  particular  in  the  field  of  justice.  This  dialogue  accompanies  major 
EU support for reform of the Moroccan judicial system, aiming to improve access to justice, 

12  Decision  No  1/2006  of  the  EU-Morocco  Association  Council  of  26  September  2006  creating  the 
Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance (OJ L 276 of 7.10.2006, p. 73). 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
to  ensure  better  legal  protection  for  public  rights  and  freedoms,  and  to  make  the  judicial 
system  more  effective.  Institutional  dialogue  on  political  and  technical  issues  goes  hand  in 
hand with dialogue with civil society. 

The  EU  Delegation  to  Morocco  holds  frequent  contacts  with  Morocco’s  National  Human 
Rights  Council.  That  independent  institution  plays  a  major  role  in  monitoring  the  human 
rights situation in Morocco, in particular through its regional commissions in Western Sahara. 
The EU supports the Council through a programme dedicated to strengthening its institutional 
capacity, including that of its regional commissions in Dakhla and Laâyoune.  

The EU is also in regular contact with other bodies, in particular international organisations 
and third countries with a presence in Western Sahara, which provide detailed information on 
the situation there. The EU Delegation also travelled to Western Sahara in 2015, before the 
break in bilateral ties. 

Finally,  the  EU  consults  reports  by  UN  human  rights  agencies  which  visit  Western  Sahara, 
including the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Special Rapporteur on 
torture. 

2.3  Consequences of amending Protocols 1 and 4 of the Association 
Agreement on the human rights situation in Western Sahara 

Amending Protocols 1 and 4 of the EU-Morocco Association Agreement will improve access 
to  the  EU  market  and  spur  foreign  investment  in  Western  Sahara,  driving  economic 
development,  which  should  help  promote  socio-economic  rights  such  as  access  to 
employment and  social benefits.  In the longer term, opening up the economy to  the outside 
world and increasing trade and other types of exchange should stimulate socio-economic and 
cultural  growth,  helping  to  enlarge  and  consolidate  the  middle  class  and  to  promote  social 
mobility. Boosting free private enterprise and entrepreneurship should reduce dependence on 
central power, which poses a threat to the territory’s long-term socio-political growth. 

EU-Morocco ties weakened after the Court judgment of 10 December 2015 (case T-512/12), 
making it harder to hold a regular human rights dialogue; the spirit of increased engagement 
brought  about  by  the  normalisation  of  contractual  relations  will  now  help  restore  that 
dialogue.  The  reference  framework  for  amending  the  Protocols  (Article  2  of  the 
Association Agreement, which guarantees respect for democratic principles and fundamental 
rights) should make it easier to monitor respect for human rights, in particular socio-economic 
rights,  in  Western  Sahara.  Establishing  a  regular  mechanism  for  exchanging  information  on 
the  sustainable  use  of  natural  resources  under  the  amendment  to  the  Agreement  will  also 
favour  a  more  equitable  distribution  of  the  dividends  of  growth.  That  will  make  it  easier  to 
target  cooperation  projects  for  those  benefiting least  from  the  amended  Agreement  (such  as 
nomads). 

In  general,  extending  tariff  preferences  to  products  from  Western  Sahara  should  have  a 
comparable  effect  on  human  rights  in  the  territory  to  the  effect  of  the  EU-Morocco 
Association  Agreement  on  human  rights  in  Morocco.  By  promoting  a  convergence  of  rules 
with  EU  standards  in  various  fields,  the  Agreement  will  lead  to  indirect  improvements  in 
areas  such  as  working  conditions  (including  safety),  labour  legislation  (including  child 
labour), plant health measures and consumer protection. 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3  THE WESTERN SAHARAN ECONOMY – ECONOMIC BENEFITS FOR 

THE PEOPLE CONCERNED  

3.1  Overview of the Western Saharan economy and the need to diversity it 

Still  suffering  from  a  historical  development  deficit  and  long  left  outside  the  international 
economic and commercial mainstream, Western Sahara is a territory of 266 000 km², mostly 
covered by desert, with a population of some 584 00013. 

According to available information, Western Sahara is a small market economy based mainly 
on fishing and fish processing, phosphate mining, agriculture (especially early-growing fruit 
and  vegetables  and  pastoral  nomadism),  trade  and  craft  industries.  Other  sectors,  such  as 
tourism and renewable energy, are still nascent. 

Under  a  development  model  based  on  close  ties  between  centre  and  periphery,  the  central 
Moroccan  government  is  the  main  shaper  of  development  policy  for  the  Western  Saharan 
economy and plays a major role in employment, infrastructure and social redistribution in the 
territory. This leading role played by the central government has grown in the last ten years, 
allowing  Western  Sahara  to  catch  up  to  some  extent  with  the  more  developed  parts  of 
Morocco.  According  to  the  Department  of  Studies  and  Financial  Forecasts  of  the 
Moroccan Ministry  of  Economy  and  Finance,  growth  in  the  regions  of  Dakhla-Oued  ed 
Dahab  and  Laâyoune-Sakia  el  Hamra  was  5.6  points  higher  than  national  growth  between 
2007 and 2010, and 4.9 points higher between 2011 and 2014. They explain that this is due to 
public investment in the southern regions to make them competitive nationally14. 

A March 2013 report by the Economic, Social and Environmental Council15 also states: ‘GDP 
in the three southern regions in 2017 was MAD 21.7 billion, or 3.5 % of annually produced 
wealth.’  It  goes  on  to  say:  ‘Unemployment  there  [according  to  a  2007-2011  survey  by  the 
High  Planning  Commission]  affects  15.2 %  of  the  active  population,  compared  to  8.9 % 
nationally (35.1 % for women, compared to 10.2 % nationally); the regions of Laâyoune and 
Dakhla  are among  the  least  poor  in  the  country  (with respective  poverty  rates  of  2.2 %  and 
2.6 %, compared to 8.9 % nationally).’ Finally, the report states that ‘the private sector there 
is  weak’,  while  ‘the  State,  as  sovereign  power  and  supported  by  public  investment, 
administrative spending and payment of social benefits, has been the driving force behind this 
transformation’. 

No  commercially  viable  source  of  oil  has  yet  been  found  in  Western  Sahara;  some 
prospecting operations continue, though less intensely than before. Given the small size of the 
domestic  market  in  Western  Sahara  and  the  fact  that  production  focuses  on  a  very  limited 
range of products, the major challenge for the territory’s economy is to diversify, extending to 
other  sectors  liable  to  create  jobs  and  revenue  for  the  territory  and  its  people  as  a  whole, 
which is the key to ending its commercial isolation.  

13 http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/pdf/Western-Sahara2017.pdf (viewed on 23/4/2018) 
14  Department  of  Studies  and  Financial  Forecasts.  Studies,  June  2017:  Economic  Growth  Profile  of  Regions  (viewed  on 
23/4/2018).  
https://www.finances.gov.ma/depf/SitePages/publications/en_catalogue/etudes/2017/croissance_des_regions.pdf 
15 Economic, Social and Environmental Council – Regional Development Model for the Southern Provinces – Evaluation of 
Respect 
23/4/2018)  
the 
in 
http://www.cese.ma/Documents/PDF/Web%20Rapport%20Effectivite%20des%20droits%20VF%2011042013.pdf 

Fundamental 

Provinces 

Southern 

(viewed 

Human 

Rights 

for 

on 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Diversifying the economy by opening it up to the world is all the more important given the 
general  economic  stagnation  of  the  Maghrebi  region,  which  is  suffering  from  very  weak 
intraregional  trade,  a  lack  of  cross-border  cooperation  and  the  continued  closure  of  some 
borders.  

In  November  2015,  the  Moroccan  government  announced  a  series  of  investments  aimed  at 
diversifying  activity,  while  the  Moroccan  Confederation  of  Industry  planned  an  investment 
initiative  of  some  609  million  dollars  in  the  region  in  March  2015.  According  to  figures 
announced by Morocco’s National Investment Commission at its January 2018 meeting under 
the authority of the Prime Minister, government investment planning for 2018 would focus on 
Western Sahara, involving some EUR 1.5 billion and hoping to create nearly 3 000 jobs.   

Government investment in 2018  

Past and future investment by Morocco in the territory stands in sharp contrast to the shortage 
of  international  investment  and  the  wait-and-see  attitude  which  seems  to  be  blocking  its 
expansion.  

A  major  argument  by  those  opposed  to  extending  the  Association  Agreement  to  cover 
Western  Sahara  is  the  fact  that  Morocco  will  be  increasing  structural  investment  in  the 
territory many times over, with a political view to annexing it by changing its identity. It has 
allegedly  implemented  an  overall  administrative  and  economic  policy  to  this  end16.  The 
Polisario  Front  describes  the  exploitation  of  natural  resources  in  Western  Sahara  under 
Moroccan control as ‘economic plunder aimed at altering the structure of Sahrawi society’17. 

Similarly, it is claimed that Morocco has pursued a policy of using various incentives to alter 
the population of Western Sahara by bringing in new inhabitants from Morocco. Since 1975, 
thousands of Moroccans have allegedly been brought to live in Western Sahara, making the 
Sahrawi  people  a  minority  in  their  own  land.  Whether  or  not  these  new  inhabitants  are 
counted as part of the ‘people of Western Sahara’ or the ‘local population’ will of course have 
major consequences for a future referendum on the territory’s status18. 

16 See in particular the report prepared by the Polisario Front in case T-512/12: Western Sahara – Status and 
Economic Exploitation – Legal study commissioned by the Polisario Front – May 2012. 
17 See point 242 of judgment in case T-512/12. 
18 See Second Witness Statement by John Gurr in the national dispute which led to case C-266/16. 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
The  first  argument  does  not  concern  the  subject  of  this  report:  it  deals  with  an  aspect  of 
general policy, but not directly with the question of extending tariff preferences established in 
the  EU-Morocco  Association  Agreement  to  products  from  Western  Sahara.  Of  course,  all 
production  involves  using  natural  resources;  still,  this  cannot  mean  banning  all  economic 
activity  a  priori,  as  that  would  make  economic  growth  impossible.  Several  of  those 
interviewed in the consultation of Western Saharan economic operators in February 2018 said 
that  the  people  had  a  right  to  development  and  that  it  was  not  reasonable  to  make  growth 
contingent on a UN-brokered solution to the dispute. They felt that such an approach would in 
practice stop all activity in the territory and amount to punishing the local population.  

As  for  the  second  argument,  it  is  true  that  the  impasse  in  the  dispute  has  resulted  in  an 
intermingling  of  Moroccans  and  indigenous  Western  Saharans,  which  has  of  course  altered 
the structure of the territory’s population. Yet that does not justify drawing conclusions as to 
which people could be consulted in a referendum on the territory’s status. Moreover, while a 
sizeable portion of the Sahrawi population lives  outside  the territory of  Western Sahara19, a 
major portion does live in the territory. Those people are entitled to participate in the process 
of economic growth. 

Because  of the small  population, the territory’s economic growth  model is  based largely on 
production of a  limited range of exports.  Assessing  the benefits  of the proposed Agreement 
for the people concerned means analysing its impact on the main current and potential export 
sectors for products from Western Sahara. 

3.2  Potential benefits for the main export sectors of the economy 

3.2.1  Agriculture 

3.2.1.1  Introduction 

Because  of  the  region’s  topography,  Western  Saharan  agricultural  production  focuses  on  a 
very narrow range  of sectors.  Due to its desert climate, the region’s main  activity is animal 
(mainly camel, goat and sheep) herding, which is helped by the presence of range land and the 
local  demand  for  bred  animal  products.  Animal  products  from  Western  Sahara  do  not  yet 
comply with health standards for access to the EU market, so no such products are exported to 
the EU20.  

Moreover,  the  area  of  Dakhla  enjoys  a  temperate  climate  (18-25° C  year-round),  constant 
sunshine  and  slightly  sulphurous  water,  all  of  which  favour  the  growing  of  above-ground 
greenhouse crops, which are high in value and slightly ahead of Moroccan production21. 

19 This part of the population could not be quantified as there are no census records for the refugee camps in 
Tindouf  (Algeria).  According  to  various sources,  this is  between  20 % (according  to  ‘pro-Moroccan’  Sahrawis) 
and 50 % (according to the Polisario Front) of the total Sahrawi population. 
20 The consultations in February 2018 found that animal – especially camel – herding is particularly common. 
Several  of  those  interviewed  said  that  Sahrawis  were  traditionally  nomadic  herders  and  engaged  largely  in 
herding.  This  shows  that  a  limited  study  assessing  the  direct  impact  of  the  Agreement  cannot  grasp  the  full 
complexity of Western Saharan society. 
21 To place Western Saharan agricultural production in a broader context, note that Morocco is traditionally a 
nation  of  farmers.  In  2016,  the  share  of  agriculture  in  the  economy  was  an  estimated  12 %  of  GDP  for  the 
country as a whole. The utilised agricultural area (UAA) is 8.7 million hectares, of which 52 % is used for cereals 
and  3 %  for  early-growing  crops.  The  main  agricultural  exports  from  Morocco  to  the  EU  are  vegetables 
(EUR 951 million in 2016), followed by non-citrus fruit (EUR 347 million) and citrus fruit (EUR 175 million). The 

15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
According to Morocco, there were 6 847 farms in the region (including all types of activity 
and  products)  in  2016.  Agricultural  activity  seems  to  be  a  major  source  of  employment, 
generating  the  equivalent  of  35 000  jobs,  in  a  region  with  584 000  inhabitants  and  an 
unemployment of some 15 %, far above the national average (9 %).  

3.2.1.2  Agricultural production, trade with the EU and socio-economic impact 

Early-growing  fruit  and  vegetables  are  one  of  the  main  sectors  of  exports  from 
Western Sahara  to  the  EU.  According  to  information  received  by  the  Commission, 
64 000 tonnes  of  early-growing  crops  were  harvested  in  the  territory  in  2016,  covering 
an  area  of  some  900  hectares22.  According  to  available  data,  these  are  high-added-value 
crops,  78 %  of  which  are  tomatoes  (50 000  tonnes  of  various  types  and  varieties)  and 
22 % melons (14 000 tonnes). These crops are apparently grown for export to the EU, Russia, 
African countries and the local market. As harvested crops are sent to sorting and packaging 
sites in the region of Agadir, it is hard to obtain precise figures for their final destination, but 
fruit  and  vegetables  grown  in  Western  Sahara  are  assumed  to  be  included  in  exports  to  the 
EU, which is a profitable market.  

Under  the  EU-Morocco  Association  Agreement,  Moroccan  agricultural  products  enjoy 
preferential  conditions  for  access  to  the  EU  market.  Those  conditions  include  unlimited 
exemption from customs duties for most products23, with some fruit and vegetables subject to 
specific provisions such as limits on quantity (tariff quotas). 

Based  on  data  available  for  2016  and  assuming  that  all  crops  grown  in  Western  Sahara  are 
exported  to  the  EU,  applying  the  preferences  stated  in  the  Association  Agreement  to 
14 000 tonnes of melons would mean savings of some EUR 1.3 million in customs duties. 
For tomatoes, if preferences were granted for all production (50 000 tonnes), the savings in 
customs duties would be some EUR 5.3 million, as long as the specific duty did not apply24. 
Note  that  the  volume  of  tomatoes  exported  would  be  subject  to  the  tariff  conditions 
established in the Agreement and thus included in the quota for Morocco. Tomato and melon 
exports  would  have  represented  12.7 %  and  31.09 %  of  the  total  export  volume  in  2016 
respectively. Fruit and vegetable imports from Morocco in 2016 totalled 1.2 billion tonnes in 
volume and were worth EUR 1.4 billion. 

In socio-economic terms, early-growing crops are a major source of jobs. High-added-value 
early-growing  crops  are  labour-intensive,  often  grown  in  greenhouses and  above  ground.  In 
2016,  they  accounted  for  some  14 000  direct  jobs  (with  an  average  of  15  workers  per 
hectare). That represents some 40 % of all agricultural jobs in the region. 

portion of the active population employed in agriculture is 39 % nationally, and as much as twice that in rural 
areas. 
22 The area used for early-growing crops in Western Sahara is less than 0.4 % of the total for Morocco. 
23 No preference is granted for ‘sugar’ (products falling within CN codes 1701 and 1702, with the exception of 
some tariff subheadings). 
24  For  this  calculation,  the  unit  price  for  2016  was  set  at  EUR 1 066  per  tonne  for  melons  (45  million  tonnes 
imported, at a customs value of EUR 48 million), with a regular customs duty (applicable in the EU under the 
most-favoured  nation  clause)  of  8.8 %.  For  tomatoes,  the  unit  price  is  set  at  EUR 1 059  per  tonne 
(417.14 million  tonnes  imported,  at  a  customs  value  of  EUR  393.75  million),  with  a  regular  customs  duty  of 
8.8 to 14.4 % depending on the time of year, with some 80 % of exports taking place between early November 
and late April (8.8 % duty). 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
It  has  been  claimed  that  this  activity  would  not  benefit  the  local  population.  That  argument 
was  put  forward  in  the  national  dispute  which  led  to  case  C-266/16,  with  4 000  seasonal 
workers  said  to  be  on  10-month  contracts,  coming  from  Morocco  for  the  harvesting  season 
and then returning home, and some 200 permanent workers employed in agriculture around 
Dakhla  in  2008.  According  to  Western  Sahara  Resource  Watch,  agriculture  is  seen  by 
Morocco as a means of populating the territory and is on the rise. 

Morocco  has  not  provided  job  figures  for  the  early-growing  crops  sector  broken  down 
between  Sahrawi  and  other  workers.  This  has  been  the  subject  of  discussions  with  the 
Moroccan authorities, who say  that establishing statistics  on an ‘ethnic’  basis  would violate 
the  principle  of  non-discrimination.  However,  those  interviewed  in  the  consultations  in 
February  2018,  most  of  whom  identified  as  Sahrawi,  felt  that  growth  of  the  sector  would 
benefit the local (Sahrawi) population. Note that all local elected officials (MPs and governors 
of  regions)  and  economic  operators  (including  presidents  of  chambers  of  commerce, 
agriculture and  fishing) who participated  in  the consultations identified as  Sahrawis coming 
from the territory. But recall that the EU has no investigation powers in a non-EU country to 
determine  whether  people  in  a  specific  sector  of  activity  belong  to  a  given  segment  of  the 
population25. 

3.2.1.3  Use of resources 

Any  agricultural  activity  involves  using  natural  resources,  especially  land  and  water.  The 
primary  constraint  in  Western  Sahara  is  water,  due  to  the  type  of  terrain  and  the  lack  of 
rainfall.  Research  shows  that  there  is  groundwater  in  the region,  though  it  is  hard  to  put  an 
exact figure to the level of reserves and their rate of replenishment.  

the  Region  of  Dakhla-Oued  ed  Dahab,  produced  by 

According  to  Morocco,  groundwater  is  present  in  a  large  area  (90 000  km²),  is  deep  (up  to 
reserves.  The 
1 800  m)  and  contains  an  estimated  3 billion  m³  of  permanent 
General Monograph  of 
the 
Directorate-General  for  Local  Authorities  of  the  Moroccan  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  says: 
‘[There is a] sedimentary basin (called Laâyoune-Dakhla) extending along the Atlantic coast 
in the west and covering an area of some 110 000 km² on the continent. It is relatively rich in 
extensive underground water reserves, but not enough is known about them and they are quite 
varied in depth, lithology, productivity and water quality. In hydrogeological terms, however, 
there are signs that the basin includes several layers of groundwater, containing a potentially 
major but non-renewable water source.’ 

Irrigation  water  for  early-growing  crops  has  so  far  come  from  groundwater  (also  used  for 
drinking  water).  According  to  Morocco,  less  than  3 million  m³,  or  some  0.1 %  of  available 
volume,  is  currently  used  for  agriculture.  Western  Sahara  Resource  Watch  claims  that 

25  The  same  application  stated  that  6 480  people  were  employed  in  the  Moroccan  agriculture  industry  in 
Western Sahara in 2010. According to the Moroccan Ministry of Agriculture, that figure is set to triple by 2020; 
2 000 hectares is expected to be under cultivation by then and production for export is expected to grow to 
160 000 tonnes. The application also stated that 95 % of agricultural production, including tomatoes, melons 
and cucumbers, was exported, but that the savings from the preferential arrangements were not invested in 
infrastructure benefiting the Sahrawi people (see national dispute which led to case C-266/16: Second Witness 
Statement  of  John  Gurr  –  pp.  C-74-75).  It  would  be  very  restrictive  to  assess  whether  an  agreement  was 
beneficial  for  a  given  population  by  determining  whether  all  profits  from  products  sold  returned  to  that 
population.  It  is  more  appropriate  to  consider  whether  people  receive  benefits  in  general  or  suffer 
discrimination in hiring. Again, the consultations in February 2018 found no indication of current discrimination 
in hiring. This was confirmed by several of those interviewed, including Sahrawis. 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Western Saharan underground water reserves are currently over-used by agro-industry in the 
territory, especially in Dakhla. The Moroccan authorities are aware of the problems and have 
taken  corrective  action.  Similar  comments  have  also  been  made  by  various 
Moroccan institutions, underscoring the fact that ‘intensive farming of some crops (melons or 
tomatoes)  for  export  is  especially  detrimental,  as  irrigation  in  the  region  uses  fossil 
groundwater, with potential consequences that have not been clearly assessed.’26 In 2013, the 
Moroccan  High  Planning  Commission  also  commented  on  the  use  of  groundwater,  saying: 
‘Consideration of environmental constraints in the southern regions is clearly insufficient. The 
government’s  means  of  oversight  and  prevention  of  coastal  pollution,  though  improving, 
remain limited. The over-pumping of water resources poses a serious threat.’27 Page 26 of the 
report  adds:  ‘Intensive  farming  of  some  crops  (melons  or  tomatoes)  for  export  is  especially 
detrimental,  as  irrigation  in  the  region  uses  fossil  groundwater,  with  potential  consequences 
that have not been clearly assessed.’ 

The exact volume and characteristics of the groundwater are still unknown, as is the risk of 
depleting it, which would be detrimental to natural resources in Western Sahara. 

Still,  to  optimise  the  use  of  groundwater  today,  local  (drip)  irrigation  systems  have  been 
introduced  for  early-growing  crops.  For  a  number  of  years,  the  Moroccan  authorities  have 
also been developing measures to limit water use and raise awareness among users in the form 
of ‘groundwater contracts’ (work on the contract for Western Sahara is currently ongoing). 

They have also published a call for projects to build seawater desalination plants, mainly to 
provide  drinking  water  but  also  for  irrigation,  in  Dakhla  and  Boujdour.  According  to  the 
timetable,  the  plant  in  Dakhla  should  be  operational  as  of  2020.  Such  infrastructure  would 
make  it  possible  to  increase  the  cultivated  surface  area  to  5 000  hectares,  as  part  of  a 
PPP irrigation project. Actual investment and the timetable for it remain to be confirmed. 

3.2.1.4  Looking ahead 

The Green Morocco Plan includes a regional agricultural plan to increase the area of farmland 
(from  900  to  some  5 000  hectares),  which  could  mean  increasing  production  to  some 
500 000 tonnes  of  early-growing  crops.  If  that  happens,  the  increase  in  farmland  and 
production  could  create  60 000  new  jobs  (depending  on  task,  production  techniques  and  a 
possible diversification of crops); those jobs would remain in the region, generating revenue. 
Such high-added-value production would have major export potential. To be sustainable, this 
growth will need to involve responsible use of natural resources, especially water.  

Jobs and benefits could also grow when animal products meet the health criteria for access to 
the  EU  market.  Yet  it  is  hard  to  tell  exactly  what  the  economic  and  social  impact  of  such 
exports would be.  

It  is  clearly  impossible  to  say  that  the  overall  economic  impact  of  such  growth  would 
systematically and directly benefit indigenous people. It can only be assumed that they would 
benefit,  at  least  indirectly.  Several  of  those  interviewed  in  February  2018  stressed  the 
importance  of  agriculture  for  regional  growth,  suggesting  that  a  lack  of  tariff  preferences 

26 See General Monograph of the Region of Dakhla-Oued ed Dahab, produced by the Directorate-General for 
Local Authorities of the Moroccan Ministry of the Interior – 2015, pp. 25-26. 
27http://www.cese.ma/Documents/PDF/Web%20Rapport%20Effectivite%20des%20droits%20VF%2011042013.
pdf (viewed on 23/4/2018) 

18 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
would end agricultural development in the territory.  

3.2.1.5  Conclusion 

Crops are grown in  Western  Sahara, especially early-growing crops (tomatoes  and  melons), 
for  which  there  is  a  big  market  in  the  EU.  An  estimated  64 000  tonnes  of  such  crops  are 
grown,  accounting  for  some  14 000  direct  jobs.  They  have  an  import  value  of  some 
EUR 65 million. Without tariff preferences, such exports would be subject to EUR 6.6 million 
in customs duties. 

Those  economic  benefits  could  grow  if  Western  Sahara  increases  production  and  exports 
more to the EU under projects currently being planned. That would also increase the number 
of jobs, which some forecasts say could grow fivefold.   

Though agricultural production has an impact on water resources, that impact is mitigated by 
various  measures.  Overall,  there  currently  seem  to  be  few  other  viable  ways  to  help  the 
Western Saharan economy grow, while the disadvantages linked to the use of water resources 
are offset by the economic benefits for the territory. 

3.2.2  Fishery products 

3.2.2.1 

Introduction  

Before looking more closely at the fisheries sector in Western Sahara, recall that the aim of 
this report is to assess the impact of the Agreement on sustainable development, considering 
in  particular  the  advantages  for  local  people  and  the  impact  of  natural  resource  use  on  the 
territory.  This  means  assessing  the  potential  effect  of  the  Agreement  on  exports  from  the 
territory to the EU. A key part of that is determining the origin of the products in question. 
Products of maritime fishing outside territorial waters (12 nautical miles) acquire the origin of 
the fishing vessel which caught them. The conditions on the origin of fishery products, laid 
down  in  Article  5  of  Protocol  4  of  the  Association  Agreement,  state  that  fish  caught  by  a 
vessel of a party to the Agreement are regarded as being of preferential origin. 

Fish  caught  outside  territorial  waters  acquire  preferential  origin  on  the  basis  of  vessel 
ownership,  flag,  crew  and  registration  (criteria 
the 
Association Agreement). As no fishing fleet flies a Western Saharan flag, fish caught (outside 
territorial  waters)  never  acquire  Western  Saharan  preferential  origin.  It  is  only  at  the 
processing stage that a processed product may acquire Western Saharan origin and enjoy tariff 
preferences, through cumulation of origin28. 

in  Protocol  4  of 

laid  down 

Therefore, to assess the impact of the Agreement, this study must focus on the processing of 
fishery products in the territory of Western Sahara and the impact which granting or refusing 
preferences  would  have  on  that  production.  This  does  not  include  fishing  activity  or  the 
location  (waters)  where  it  takes  place,  which  are  of  limited  relevance  to  the  aim  of  this 
analysis. 

28 Products sufficiently processed from originating material are regarded as being of preferential origin under 
Protocol 4 of the Association Agreement. 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Processed products are generally from fish caught along the coast of Western Sahara, within 
territorial  waters  (12  miles)  or  in  the  adjacent  EEZ  (200  miles),  but  may  also  be  from  fish 
caught outside that zone (Moroccan territorial waters or EEZ). 

3.2.2.2  Fisheries in Western Sahara 

Most  of  the  fisheries  sector  is  in  Laâyoune,  Boujdour  and  Dakhla.  According  to  Morocco, 
those  towns  have  141  fish  processing  companies,  directly  or  indirectly  employing  some 
90 000  people  and  processing  products  worth  an  estimated  MAD  4.9  billion  (some 
EUR 450 million), of which MAD 2.6 billion (around EUR 240 million) are for export (some 
60 % of those being for the EU). 

The  fisheries  and  fish  processing  sector  is  the  main  sector  providing  employment  in  the 
territory, as well as the main export sector29. Still, most fish are not processed, as there are not 
enough processing plants for products to be better utilised30. So this is one of the sectors with 
the greatest potential for growth and jobs in Western Sahara. 

The EU has helped develop the processing of fishery products in Western Sahara. Under the 
sectoral  support  provisions  of  the  Protocol  to  the  Fisheries  Partnership  Agreement  between 
the  EU  and  Morocco,  the  EU  has  also  financed  a  large  number  of  actions,  including 
infrastructure  and  equipment,  to  improve  competitiveness  and  create  jobs  in  the  fish 
processing sector. 

3.2.2.3 

 Exports of fishery products to the EU 

According to Morocco, exports of fishery products31 from Western Sahara to the EU and 
duties  not  paid  because  of  the  preferences  established  in  the  EU-Morocco  Association 
Agreement are as follows: 

Value of 
imports 

2015 
Amount of import 
duties 

Value of 
imports 

2016 
Amount of import 
duties  

€ 1 000 

€ 1 000 

Average 
duty 

€ 1 000 

€ 1 000 

Average 
duty 

Morocco and 
Western Sahara 
Western Sahara 
% 

1 087 952  133 356  12.3 %  1 171 854  136 562  11.7 % 

121 823 
11.2 % 

9 093 
6.8 % 

7.5 % 

134 010 
11.4 % 

9 477 
6.9 % 

7.1 % 

€/MAD exchange rate used: 10.819 (2015) and 10.836 (2016) 

29 In 2012, the territory provided 78 % of catches in the combined area of Morocco and Western Sahara in 
terms of volume and 79 % in terms of value. 
30  See Economic, Social and Environmental Council report: New Development Model for the Southern 
Provinces – October 2013, p. 44.  
http://www.ces.ma/Documents/PDF/Web-Rapport-NMDPSR-FR.pdf (viewed on 23/4/2018) 
31 The fishery products included here are those mentioned in Chapter 3 of the Tariff Nomenclature (fish and 
crustaceans,  molluscs  and  other  aquatic  invertebrates)  and  under  headings  1504  (fats  and  oils  and  their 
fractions, of fish or marine mammals, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified), 1603 (extracts and 
juices of meat, fish or crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates), 1604 (prepared or preserved fish; 
caviar  and  caviar  substitutes  prepared  from  fish  eggs)  and  2301  (flours,  meals  and  pellets,  of  meat  or  meat 
offal, of fish or of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates, unfit for human consumption; greaves). 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
According to Morocco, exports from Western Sahara amounted to 44 891 tonnes in 2015 
in  20163233.  Imports  from  Western  Sahara  amounted  to 
and  54 637  tonnes 
EUR 121 million in 2015 and EUR 134 million in 2016, representing just over 11 % of the 
total value of imports from Morocco and Western Sahara34. 

Thus, the Moroccan figures for the value of exports of fishery products from Western Sahara 
to  the  EU  are  lower  than  the  EU  figures  for  imports,  while  the  Moroccan  figures  for  total 
exports  from  Morocco  and  Western  Sahara  to  the  EU  (EUR  1.01  billion  in  2015  and 
EUR 1.14  billion  in  2016)  are  comparable  to  the  EU  figures.  In  terms  of  preferential 
concessions,  the  following  table  shows  the  amount  of  duties  not  collected  because  of 
application of the tariff preferences established in the EU-Morocco Association Agreement as 
being between EUR 9 and 9.5 million per year. 

As  regards  fish  processing  sites  in  Western  Sahara,  exports  to  the  EU  must  come  from 
‘authorised’  sites  or  processing/storage  companies.  The  list  of  authorised  sites  is  publicly 
available  on  the  website  of  the  Directorate-General  for  Health  and  Food  Safety  of  the 
European Commission (DG SANTE) 35. 

That  list  shows  the  authorised  sites  for  processing  fishery  and  aquaculture  products  in  the 
territory as being in the three coastal towns of Dakhla (in the south), Laâyoune (in the north) 
and Boujdour (in the centre). 

According  to  Morocco,  the  numbers  of  direct  jobs  in  sites  exporting  to  the  EU,  including 
some factory ships, are as follows: 

Town 

Dakhla 
Laâyoune 
Boujdour 
Total 

Number of 
sites 

89 
48 
4 
141 

Number of workers 

Permanent 

Temporary 

2015 
1 908 
1 197 
118 
3 223 

2016 
1 994 
1 248 
124 
3 366 

2015 
5 723 
3 591 
354 
9 668 

2016 
5 983 
3 743 
371 
10 097 

According to Morocco, some 50 % of production in those sites is for the EU. This suggests 
that  half  of  those  jobs  (more  than  6 500  people  in  2016)  depend  directly  on  exports  to 
the EU. 

32 All these imports entered the EU with tariff preferences (zero duty) under the rules on origin in Protocol 4 of 
the EU-Morocco Association Agreement. 
33 According to EU figures (estimates from Traces database and Eurostat), imports to the EU of fishery products 
from approved sites in Western Sahara amounted to an estimated 69 350 tonnes in 2015 and 58 436 tonnes in 
2016. These figures represent 30.9 % and 23.9 % respectively of the total volume of imports of fishery products 
from  Morocco  (and  Western  Sahara)  for  the  years  in  question.  Differences  between  these  figures  and 
Moroccan data may be due to the method of calculating exports of products from Western Sahara. 
34 According to Commission estimates, imports from Western Sahara amounted to 21.2 % of the total value of 
imports  from  Morocco  and  Western  Sahara  in  2015,  and  10.6 %  in  2016:  imports  of  fishery  products  from 
Western Sahara to the EU amounted to EUR 215 million in 2015 and EUR 122 million in 2016 (corresponding 
official Eurostat figures for total exports from Morocco and Western Sahara amounted to EUR 1.01 billion in 
2015 and  EUR  1.14 billion  in  2016). According  to  Morocco,  exports  of  fishery  products  from  Western  Sahara 
amounted to EUR 121 million in 2015 and EUR 134 million in 2016. These differences may be due to the fact 
that the EU figures refer to imports to the EU and are expressed in EUR, while those  from Morocco refer to 
exports and are expressed in MAD converted to EUR. 
35 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/sanco/traces/output/MA/FFP_MA_en.pdf 

21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
The list of sites provided by Morocco matches the list of sites authorised in accordance with 
EU law. 

3.2.2.4 

Impact of applying trade preferences 

Extending the preferences established in the EU-Morocco Association Agreement to products 
from  Western  Sahara  would  allow  EUR 100-200  million  worth  of  fishery  products  from 
Western  Sahara  to  be  imported  duty-free  to  the  EU.  Extending  tariff  preferences  to  those 
exports would mean the EU foregoing EUR 9-9.5 million in duties per year. 

The following table shows the main species of fish and seafood exported from the territory in 
2015 and 2016 in terms of duties not collected: 

Species 

Octopus, frozen 
Sardines, frozen 
Mackerel, preserved 
Sardines, preserved 
Cuttlefish, frozen 
Squid, frozen 
Mackerel, frozen 

Rate of 
duty (*) 
8 % 
23 % 
25 % 
25 % 
6 % 
6 % 
20 % 

2015 
€ 1 000 
5 412.73 
1 137.41 
417.14 
452.67 
255.02 
188.32 
128.39 

2016 
€ 1 000 
5 348.19 
1 198.29 
608.01 
378.55 
370.30 
325.16 
292.70 

(*)  Customs  duty  applicable  in  the  EU  under  the  most-favoured  nation 
clause (no preference applied) 

Finally,  the  following  table  shows  the  numbers  of  jobs  created  directly  or  indirectly  in 
Western Sahara by fish production and processing on board fishing vessels, at fish processing 
sites or in industries linked to fishery production36: 

Town 

Number of workers 

Dakhla 

Laâyoune 

Boujdour 

TOTAL 

On land 

At sea 

On land 

At sea 

On land 

At sea 

On land 

At sea 

Temporary 
Permanent 
Temporary 
Permanent 
Temporary 
Permanent 
Temporary 
Permanent 
Temporary 
Permanent 
Temporary 
Permanent 
Temporary 
Permanent 
Temporary 
Permanent 

2015 
22 915 
7 638 
- 
15 082 
14 338 
4 779 
- 
15 633 
1 419 
473 
- 
5 528 
38 672 
12 891 
- 
36 243 

2016 
23 931 
7 977 
- 
15 082 
14 973 
4 991 
- 
15 633 
1 482 
494 
- 
5 528 
40 386 
13 462 
- 
36 243 

36 Includes jobs mentioned in the preceding table. 

22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
According to Morocco, some 50 % of production in those sites is for the EU, suggesting that 
some 45 000 jobs depend directly or indirectly on exports to the EU. 

As  duties  on  fishery  products  are  high,  especially  in  some  cases  (e.g. 25 %  for  preserved 
sardines),  tariff  preferences  (zero  duty)  may  play  a  major  role  in  sourcing  decisions  by 
EU importers. For Western Sahara, a decision not to grant preferences may cause processing 
currently taking place in Western Sahara to move elsewhere – in particular to Morocco – to 
benefit from preferences, to the detriment of local people 37. 

It  has  been  claimed  that  this  activity  would  not  benefit  the  local  population.  Reference  has 
been  made  to  demonstrations  in  2012  by  graduates  of  the  Technical  Institute  for 
Maritime Fisheries  protesting  against  exclusion  from  the  fisheries  job  market,  as  hiring 
interviews for jobs in the sector were held in Morocco, and demanding that such interviews be 
held  in  Laâyoune.  Similar  claims  were  made  in  2011  and  2013  (see  various  reports  by 
Western  Sahara  Resource  Watch38  39  40).  Yet  there  is  no  publicly  available  information 
indicating that such practices continued afterwards or that similar demonstrations took place 
after early 2013. In any event, those claims are not proof that Sahrawis are actually excluded 
from working in the fisheries sector. Moreover, many of those interviewed in February 2018 
stressed  the  benefits  of  extending  preferences  for  agriculture  as  well  as  for  fisheries.  Some 
said that Sahrawis were likelier to work in agriculture, a traditional activity, than in fisheries, 
an activity generally less familiar to nomadic herders. 

3.2.2.5  Conclusion 

Western  Sahara  has  a  sizeable  fish  processing  industry,  including  141 sites  authorised  to 
export  to  the  EU.  Exports  of  fishery  products  from  the  territory  amounted  to 
EUR 100-200 million in 2015 and 2016. Some 45 000 jobs depended directly or indirectly 
on those exports to the EU. Extending tariff preferences to those imports would thus have a 
major impact on the economy and on jobs in the territory. It would also be consistent with the 
EU  practice  of  providing  financial  support  to  Western  Sahara  to  make  the  sector  more 
competitive,  create  jobs,  improve  the  lives  of  fishers  and  promote  the  sustainable  use  of 
natural resources. Refusing to grant preferences would harm exports and jobs and encourage a 
shift in processing to other places, such as Morocco. It would also go against the EU objective 
of supporting the growth of the sector in Western Sahara.  

European importers  of fishery products from  Western Sahara say that buying  such products 
would  be  much  less  advantageous  if  no  preferential  treatment  was  granted,  given  the  high 
level of the (non-preferential) common external tariff.  

37  Under  current  legislation  and  the  terms  of  the  EU-Morocco  Association  Agreement,  fish  processed  in 
Morocco receive preferential treatment in the EU as long as they have been caught outside Western Saharan 
territorial waters (12 miles) by a vessel of either party. 
38 http://www.wsrw.org/a214x2342 (viewed on 23/4/2018). 
39 http://www.wsrw.org/a204x2048 (viewed on 23/4/2018). 
40 http://www.wsrw.org/a217x2479 (viewed on 23/4/2018). Those demonstrations seem to have mainly 
involved Russian vessels. 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
3.2.3  Phosphates 

3.2.3.1 

Introduction 

Phosphates are ores used in making phosphate fertilisers for agriculture. More than 80 % of 
world  production  is  used  in  agriculture;  there  is  no  substitute  and  demand  is  rising.  The 
largest deposits are currently in Morocco41. 

The leading phosphate exporter in the world is the OCP group (former Office Chérifien des 
Phosphates)42, which controls the entire industry in Morocco and Western Sahara.  

The largest phosphate mines are in Morocco (Khouribga and Gantour), with only one mining 
site  currently  in  Western  Sahara,  in  Boucraa43.  Annual  reports  from  the  OCP  group  show 
production in Morocco and Western Sahara, without distinguishing between the two.  

The  Boucraa  site  is  operated  by  the  company  Phosboucraa.  It  currently  produces 
2.6 million tonnes  of  phosphate  ore44  and  has  some  300  years’  worth  of  minable  phosphate 
reserves (estimated at 1.1 billion m³). Investment planned between 2014 and 2020 amounts to 
MAD 17 billion (some EUR 1.6 billion)45. 

With  nearly  2 200  workers,  Phosboucraa  is  the  largest  private  employer  in  the  territory. 
According  to  OCP,  76 %  of  the  workers  were  local  in  2017,  compared  to  only  4 %  in  the 
1970s,  with  nearly  100 %  of  new  employees  now  hired  locally.  The  number  of  workers  in 
managerial positions  has  risen  from  1  in  2003  to  27  in  2017,  or  55 %  of  the  49  managerial 
positions.  This  economic  activity  benefits  the  entire  region  (50  local  businesses  accounting 
for  450  indirect  jobs,  social  benefits  paid  to  families  and  retired  workers,  medical  services, 
etc.). OCP also notes that there is a seawater desalination plant, that 13 000 trees have been 
replanted, and that the beach at Laâyoune has had a blue flag rating since 2008 thanks to the 
Clean  Beaches  project.  Between  2013  and  2022,  the  Phosboucraa  Management  Board 
earmarked  USD  250  million  for  social  development  in  the  region  and  USD  140  million  for 
building projects, for a total of some USD 2.2 billion. 

Others paint a less rosy picture. For example, Western Sahara Resource Watch maintains that 
there  were  1 600  Sahrawis  employed  in  the  phosphate  industry  in  1968,  in  what  is  now 
Western  Sahara.46  Today,  most  of  those  workers  have  been  replaced  by  Moroccan  settlers. 
The industry, it is said, now employs only 200 Sahrawis, out of a total workforce  of 1 900. 
Sahrawi  workers  are  said  to  suffer  discrimination  compared  to  their  Moroccan  colleagues. 
Also,  very  few  Sahrawis  are  said  to  have  been  promoted  since  1975;  most  are  said  to  have 
been dismissed47. 

41 https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/phosphate_rock/mcs-2017-phosp.pdf (viewed on 
23/4/2018). 
42 http://www.ocpgroup.ma/  
43 The OCP site in Phosboucraa has a website: http://www.phosboucraa.ma/ (viewed on 23/4/2018) 
44 According to Western Sahara Resource Watch, phosphate production at the Boucraa site amounts to some 
3 million tonnes per year, accounting for 10 % of total Moroccan production. http://www.wsrw.org/a117x521 
(viewed on 23/4/2018) 
45 http://www.phosboucraa.ma/company/key-figures (viewed on 23/4/2018). 
46 Relevant figures are sometimes contradictory: see report by French Association of Friendship and Solidarity 
with the Peoples of Africa on challenges to contractual rights of Phosboucrâa workers in Western Sahara: 
http://www.afaspa.com/IMG/pdf/RAPPORT_PHOSBOUCRAA.pdf (viewed on 14/5/2018) 
47 http://www.wsrw.org/a112x576 (viewed on 23/4/2018). 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
The first point to make in this respect is that it is impossible to compare the current situation 
to a time when Western Sahara was still a Spanish colony. Also, the figures provided by OCP 
refer to workers recruited locally, not workers of Sahrawi origin. The Commission has no way 
of checking locally to see which workers are Sahrawi; and again, it is not for the EU to decide 
who  should  be  counted  as  a  part  of  the  indigenous  population.  Moreover,  none  of  those 
interviewed in February 2018 reported ethnic discrimination in hiring. This is consistent with 
other published information48. 

As  regards  the  sustainable  use  of  natural  resources,  Phosboucraa  has  taken  major  steps  to 
maximise  energy  efficiency  by  switching  to  renewable  sources.  Since  July  2013,  99.8 %  of 
the energy used by Phosboucraa has been from the wind farm in Foum El Oued.  

3.2.3.2  Production, trade with the EU and socio-economic impact 

Phosphate production is a major industry in Western Sahara. So it is important to explore the 
potential of phosphates to promote Saharan industrial growth and benefit the population. But 
this  requires  more  than  trade  statistics.  Here  too,  overall  figures  (available  only  from 
Morocco) do not list Western Sahara separately. We know that 34 % of phosphate imported to 
the EU in 2015 was from Morocco, but there is no way of knowing what portion was from 
Western Sahara. 

Still, an analysis of specific reports on the sector does make it possible to assess the effect of 
not applying tariff preferences to various phosphate products imported to the EU. 

With respect to mineral or chemical phosphate fertilisers, the customs nomenclature applied 
by the EU distinguishes between ‘superphosphates’49 and other types of phosphate fertiliser. 
Most  raw  phosphate50  imported  to  the  EU  is  not  subject  to  customs  duty,  with  or  without 
preferential  arrangements.  So  for  those  products,  extending  the  EU-Morocco  Association 
Agreement to products from Western Sahara would have no effect. Only ‘superphosphates’51 
are subject to customs duty (4.8 %) when imported to the EU. So the question of the impact of 
the Agreement is relevant only to those products.  

Between 2014 and 2016, relevant customs duties ranged from EUR 1.13 to 1.83 million. It is 
fair to assume that only a tiny portion of those imports to the EU was from Western Sahara. 
Indeed, 
to 
Moroccan sites; also, according to Morocco, exports from that site are not for the EU52. 

the  Phosboucraa  site  has  relatively 

low  production  capacity  compared 

48 See: https://www.amnesty.org/fr/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/morocco/report-morocco/ 
(viewed on 14 May 2018) 
49 Superphosphates are mineral phosphate fertilisers. 
50 These are largely ‘natural calcium phosphates, natural aluminium calcium phosphates and phosphatic chalk’, 
coming under heading 25.10 in the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System (the Harmonised 
System).   
51 They come under heading 28.35 in the Harmonised System.  
52  Contradictory  observations  by  the  NGO  Western  Sahara  Resource  Watch  (2014  report  ‘P  for  Plunder’ 
http://www.wsrw.org/a105x3185)  mention  some  400 000  tonnes  of  exports  to  Lithuania  in  2014  (company 
AB LIFOSA). As available EU statistics show no similar imports, it is unlikely that the commodity in question is 
classified  as  a  phosphate  under  HS  31.03  or  is  for  the  EU  market  in  that  form;  it  is  also  possible  that  the 
commodity was only in transit to a destination outside the EU. In any event, a more recent report by Western 
Sahara  Resource  Watch  no  longer  mentions  any  exports  to  the  EU  (http://www.wsrw.org/a111x4160,  dated 
24 April 2018 and viewed on 13/5/2018).  

25 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
This suggests that not applying tariff preferences would have little or no effect on current 
phosphate  production  in  Western  Sahara  and  relevant  customs  duties  –  or,  conversely, 
that  granting  the  tariff  preferences  established  in  the  EU-Morocco  Association  Agreement 
would have no impact on current superphosphate imports from Western Sahara. 

However,  there  are  certain  phosphate  products53  not  currently  produced 
in 
Western Sahara  because  there  is  no  phosphate  processing  site  in  the  territory,  but  which 
could be produced and would then enjoy preferences, as imports of such products to the 
EU is currently subject to customs duties of 4.8 % to 6.5 % when coming from countries 
with  which  the  EU  has  no  preferential  agreement.  So  we  need  to  assess  the  impact  of 
excluding  Saharan  products  from  the  tariff  preference  established  in  the  EU-Morocco 
Association Agreement; to do so, we need to analyse whether the processing of material from 
Western Sahara at other sites, in Morocco, has an effect on determining preferential origin.  

The  rule  of  origin  applied  to  these  products  under  the  Association  Agreement  is  key  to 
determining  whether  there  would  be  a  potential  effect.  This  involves  phosphoric  acid  and 
certain fertilisers: 

Phosphoric acid (HS 29.19) 
29.19  -  Phosphoric  esters  and  their  salts,  including  lactophosphates;  their  halogenated, 
sulphonated, nitrated or nitrosated derivatives. 

The regular customs duty (under the most-favoured nation clause) is 6.5 %. 
The preferential duty under the Association Agreement is zero. 
The rule of origin  for preferential treatment is: change in  tariff heading or  value  added rule 
(maximum 40 % non-originating materials). 

The rule of origin for this product is a change in tariff heading. Phosphates (potentially from 
Western  Sahara)  come  under  Chapter  31  of  the  Harmonised  System,  so  the  production  of 
phosphoric  acid,  which  comes  under  Chapter  29,  involves  a  change  in  chapter  and  thus  in 
tariff  heading.  Therefore,  processing  is  sufficient  and  the  preferential  origin  of  phosphoric 
acid does not depend on the origin of the unprocessed phosphate. The origin, which is key to 
setting the applicable rate of customs duty, depends on the country where the phosphate was 
processed  into  phosphoric  acid.  So,  regardless  of  the  origin  of  the  unprocessed  phosphate, 
phosphoric acid produced in Morocco may enjoy preferential treatment when imported to the 
EU. 

Fertilisers (HS 31.05) 
Mineral  or  chemical  fertilisers  containing  two  or  three  of  the  fertilising  elements  nitrogen, 
phosphorus and potassium; other fertilisers; products mentioned in this chapter, presented in 
tablets or similar forms or in packages of a gross weight not exceeding 10 kg. 

The regular customs duty (under the most-favoured nation clause) is 6.5 %. 
The preferential duty under the Association Agreement is zero. 
The rule of origin for preferential treatment is: change in tariff heading with a maximum of 

53 Statistics on EU-Morocco trade (in particular data from the Moroccan Exchange Office) include: natural and 
chemical fertilisers, phosphoric acid and phosphates, and in particular the following tariff headings:  
- Phosphoric acid – HS 29.19 
- Mineral or chemical phosphate fertilisers (including superphosphates) – HS 31.03  
- Mineral or chemical fertilisers containing two or three of the fertilising elements nitrogen, phosphorus and 
potassium; other fertilisers – HS 31.05. 

26 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
50 %  non-originating  materials,  or  value  added  rule  (maximum  40 %  non-originating 
materials). 

If tariff preferences were applied to products from Western Sahara, phosphoric acid produced 
at Laâyoune would enjoy preferential treatment; so would fertilisers, where there would be a 
double gain, as recognition of preferential origin would require at least 50 % originating raw 
material, which would benefit Phosboucraa. Plans by the OCP Group to develop an industrial 
complex  producing  fertilisers  in  Laâyoune  (phosphoric  acid  and  fertilisers),  and  to  build  a 
new  quay  in  the  port  of  Laâyoune,  could  thus  be  affected  by  non-preferential  treatment  for 
those products. 

In  fact,  there  have  been  announcements  of  future  investment  in  producing  a  wider  range  of 
fertilisers  as  part  of  a  development  plan.  The  plan  involves  creating  an  integrated  chemical 
complex  in  Phosboucraa,  which  would  also  make  it  possible  to  respond  more  flexibly  to 
changes 
is  an  estimated 
USD 1.2 billion). 

in  market  rates  for  raw  phosphate  ore  (the 

investment 

The  details  of  the  investment  plan  presented  by  OCP  show  a  total  (including  other, 
longer-term investment) of more than USD 2 billion54. Those projects would be compromised 
if preferential treatment was not granted to products from Western Sahara, with a knock-on 
effect on local employment. 

3.2.3.3  Conclusion 

Given its current state, the Western Saharan phosphate industry – and therefore economic 
activity  in  the  sector  as  well  as  employment  and  other  socio-economic  aspects  –  is  not 
immediately  and  directly  affected  by  the  exclusion  of  Western  Sahara  from  the 
Association  Agreement.  There  are  three  main  reasons  for  this:  1.  Some  (raw  phosphate) 
products  are  subject  to  zero  duty  (under  the  most-favoured  nation  clause).  2.  There  is  no 
EU market for phosphate production. 3. Processing in Morocco (or in another country which 
has  signed  a  preferential  agreement  with  the  EU)  of  some  phosphates  produced  in 
Western Sahara  would  be  sufficient  for  recognition  of  Moroccan  preferential  origin,  so 
preferential treatment for those processed products does not depend on the origin of the ores. 

At  the  same  time,  it  seems  that  granting  preferences  to  products  originating  in 
Western Sahara  would  have  an  impact  on  future  increases  in  the  production  of  some 
phosphates.  In  fact,  major  announced  investment  (more  than  USD 2 billion)  in  the 
production  of  phosphate  derivatives  in  Western  Sahara  (especially  phosphoric  acid  and 
fertilisers)  would  be  compromised  if  exports  of  those  products  to  the  EU  did  not  enjoy 
preferential  treatment.  Without  preferential  treatment,  investment  in  other  places  where 
production  would  have  preferential  treatment  (such  as  Morocco)  would  be  more  attractive 
than  in  Western  Sahara.  Halting  investment  in  Western  Sahara  could  affect  production 
capacity, product diversity and thus jobs in the region’s phosphate sector. 

The 

54 
stages. 
http://www.ocpgroup.ma/sites/default/files/filiales/document/presentation_phosboucraa_fr.pdf  (viewed  on 
23/4/2018). 

investment 

planned 

several 

in 

is 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
4  CONSULTATION OF THE PEOPLE CONCERNED BY THE 

AMENDMENTS TO PROTOCOLS 1 AND 4 OF THE ASSOCIATION 
AGREEMENT  

4.1  Aim and scope of consultation 

One of the aims of the negotiation was to fulfil the condition that ‘the people concerned by the 
EU-Morocco Association Agreement have been adequately involved’ in preparing to amend 
Protocols 1 and 4 of the Agreement. To that end, the Commission and the EEAS endeavoured 
to  ensure  that  their  approach  to  designing  the  amendments  and  to  consulting  the  people 
concerned  respected  the  ECJ  judgment  of  21  December  2016,  without  in  any  way  pre-
empting the outcome or standing in the way of the UN-led process. Therefore, the fact that the 
process  of  self-determination  for  Western  Sahara  was  still  unresolved  was  a  major 
consideration for the Commission and the EEAS. Moreover, and parallel to consultations in a 
highly complex and sensitive political context, the question was not so much the territory’s 
final status,  as  whether the EU should apply  tariff  preferences  under the EU-Morocco 
Association Agreement to products from Western Sahara. This perspective adopted by the 
Commission and the EEAS was based on the essentially economic nature of the Agreement, 
as well as the EU’s desire to avoid weakening traditional trade flows.  

4.2  Main results 

In this context, the consultation carried out by the Commission and the EEAS was threefold in 
nature.  As  a  party  to  the  negotiation,  the  Government  of  Morocco  carried  out  a  broad 
consultation  of  regional  elected  officials,  under  its  own  institutional  rules,  sharing  its 
conclusions with the Commission and the EEAS. In addition, the Commission and the EEAS 
wished to consult as broad a range as possible of political, socio-economic and civil society 
organisations likely to represent Western Sahara's local and regional interests. Finally, there 
were  discussions  with  the  Polisario  Front,  which  is  one  of  the  parties  to  the  UN-led  peace 
process.   

Results of Moroccan consultations with elected representatives in national, regional and local 
constitutional bodies in Western Sahara 

On  5  and  6  March  2018,  the  Moroccan  authorities  consulted  elected  representatives  in 
national,  regional  and  local  constitutional  bodies.  Those  consultations  involved  the  four 
regional  councils  most  directly  concerned55, 
their  respective  regional  professional 
Chambers of  Agriculture  and  the  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  of  the  upper  house  of  the 
Moroccan  Parliament  (the  House  of  Representatives).  Representatives  of  regional  councils 
were  elected  in  2015,  in  the  first  regional  elections  with  direct  universal  suffrage  held  in 
Morocco56.  As 
the 
Moroccan authorities states that all representatives of the regions of Laâyoune Sakia el Hamra 
and Dakhla-Oued ed Dahab, which together cover nearly all of Western Sahara, as well as the 
members of their regional Chambers of Agriculture, came from local Sahrawi tribes. Half the 
members of the Foreign Affairs Committee are also of Sahrawi origin, including its Chair. 

the  origin  of 

representatives, 

report  by 

regards 

the 

the 

55 Laâyoune Sakia el Hamra, Dakhla Oued Eddahab, Souss-Massa and L'Oriental. 
56  57.66 %  turnout  in  the  region  of  Laâyoune  and  52.14 %  in  the  region  of  Dakhla,  higher  than  the  national 
average. 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
The  official  Moroccan  report  on  the  results  from  consulting  Moroccan  legal  institutions 
stresses that local, regional and national representatives are all committed to the EU-Morocco 
agriculture and fisheries partnership, which they regard as completely consistent with national 
socio-economic  development  policy  in  those  areas.  The  representatives  were  happy  that 
negotiations  had  succeeded  and  stressed  the  socio-economic  benefits  that  would  result, 
especially  in  terms  of  promoting  exports.  For  example,  one  member  of  a  regional  council 
mentioned  citrus  fruit  and  vegetable  oils  as  promising  export  products  to  be  encouraged, 
while  one  regional  chamber  of  agriculture  stressed  the  potential  market  for  camel  products 
and the need to work with the EU to bring Moroccan products into line with EU sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards. The representatives also expressed interest in developing appropriate 
facilitating  mechanisms  to  ensure  the  exchange  of  information  and  follow-up  needed  to 
maximise the benefits of the EU-Morocco Association Agreement. 

Results  of  Commission  and  EEAS  consultations  with  political,  socio-economic  and  civil 
society organisations 

The  second  level  of  consultations,  carried  out  directly  by  the  Commission  and  the  EEAS, 
involved  the  broadest  possible  range  of  stakeholders  from  Western  Sahara.  The  aim  was  to 
gauge support for the EU-Morocco Association Agreement among organisations working in 
the field, in addition to institutional bodies. 

To  that  end,  an  invitation  was  sent  to  a  broad  regional  range  of  local  political  actors,  key 
economic  players  and  civil  society  organisations,  especially  in  the  field  of  human  rights. 
Meetings  were  held  from  mid-February  to  mid-March  2018.  A  full  list  of  the  organisations 
consulted is attached. 

Five of the civil society organisations consulted by the Commission and the EEAS declined 
the invitation57. Differing in terms of closeness to or sympathy for the Polisario Front, those 
organisations essentially argued  that  the Front should  be consulted instead  of them, that the 
consultation  was 
judgment  of 
21 December 2016,  and  that  no  consultation  on  a  trade  agreement  could  take  place  in  the 
presence of an ‘armed occupation’. In response, the Commission and the EEAS repeated their 
invitation  to  each  organisation  and  their  willingness  for  a  dialogue  with  an  open-ended 
agenda. 

incompatible  with 

international 

the  ECJ 

law  or 

The other civil society organisations and a number of local political representatives accepted 
the  invitation  to  express  their  views  on  the  proposed  amendment  (cf.  annex).  In  addition  to 
reflecting the polarised political debate on Western Sahara, the consultations showed general 
recognition of socio-economic progress made in Western Sahara in recent years. In this light, 
agreements with the EU are seen as a powerful lever for further progress towards sustainable 
growth. 

Most  of  the  political  representatives  consulted,  all  of  whom  were  of  Sahrawi  origin, 
welcomed  the  pursuit  of  trade  relations  between  the  EU  and  the  region  in  the  context  of 
EU-Morocco relations. While strongly attached to their Sahrawi identity and culture, they also 
acknowledged that prosperity and socio-economic growth in the region remained closely tied 
to  Morocco’s  development  efforts  and  access  to  foreign  markets.  To  show  that  they 
represented  the  people,  local  and  regional  representatives  from  Western  Sahara  pointed  out 

57 Sahrawi Association of Victims of Human Rights Violations, Al Ghad Human Rights Association, 
Western Sahara Campaign, Western Sahara Resource Watch, Independent Diplomat. 

29 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
that  they  had  been  elected  in  the  first  regional  and  local  elections  ever  held  with  direct 
suffrage, international observation and regional turnouts higher than the national average. 
They considered the promotion of trade relations with the EU an essential complement to the 
new development model pursued by Morocco in Western Sahara since 2015. That model aims 
to  move  the  country  from  a  statist-inspired  economy  overly  reliant  on  state  subsidies  to  a 
model  more  open  to  the  outside  world  and  economically  more  operational,  encouraging 
private investment through public-private partnerships. The possibility of trade relations with 
the  EU,  Morocco’s  main  trading  partner,  is  thus  seen  as  an  lifeline.  Without  that,  efforts  at 
diversifying the economy beyond the traditional use of raw materials (such as phosphates) to 
agriculture and fisheries would soon stop. 

While recognising that the Moroccan government has invested heavily in developing regional 
infrastructure, benefiting the population as a whole, Sahrawi political leaders stress that tariff 
preferences  with  the  EU  are  equally  necessary  to  ensure  that  such  investment  is  fully 
effective.  They  expect  such  preferences  to  encourage  business  and  EU  direct  investment, 
promoting  the  region’s  new  participatory  and  sustainable  growth  model.  Continued  legal 
uncertainty  surrounding  trade  between  the  EU  and  Western  Sahara  would  have  a  heavy 
socio-economic cost, as already evidenced by the slowdown in trade between Western Sahara 
and certain European countries and in certain sectors. Cutting off access for Western Sahara 
to  certain  markets  or  investments  would  only  increase  its  economic  dependence  on  an 
outmoded  system  of  ‘centre-periphery’  relations.  That  would  hamper  socio-economic  and 
political growth, just when economic growth in Western Sahara is finally taking off. 

The Commission and the EEAS also consulted more than fifteen key socio-economic players, 
exporters, entrepreneurs, and environmental and human rights organisations. Almost all said 
they were in favour of maintaining preferential trading relations with the EU. Such relations 
would be key to stable trading ties and investment, both of which were crucial for generating 
local employment. Yet some commented that benefits granted by the EU to Western Sahara 
should be more equitably distributed among the local population, especially given the lack of 
diversity  of  the  regional  economy.  So  they  felt  that  the  impact  of  tariff  preferences  on 
different parts of the population should be monitored and accompanying measures considered, 
to maximise the benefits for  disadvantaged  groups, such  as nomads. Shared values between 
the  EU  and  Morocco  would  help  cooperation  towards  establishing  such  monitoring  and 
guidance mechanisms. 

Some concerns expressed by civil society stakeholders on socio-economic and political rights 
in Western Sahara were similar to concerns on the general human rights situation in Morocco. 
Mention was made of restrictions on freedom of expression, instances of corruption and lack 
of public accountability. But some of the gravest concerns in Western Sahara involved civil 
and  political  rights.  Some  organisations  have  trouble  registering  with  the  authorities;  some 
human  rights  advocates  face  restrictions  on  their  activity;  and  some  foreigners  such  as 
journalists,  lawyers  or  human  rights  advocates  are  barred  from  entering  Western  Sahara. 
Though no policy of systematic ethnic discrimination in hiring or social benefits was reported, 
individual  cases  of  administrative  abuse  or  denial  of  rights  were  mentioned.  While  most  of 
those  interviewed  agreed  that  the  UN  should  continue  to  lead  the  political  process  in 
Western Sahara, many stressed that the people had a ‘right to development’ while that process 
moved  forward.  One  person  interviewed  summed  up  this  feeling  by  saying  that  Sahrawi 
people were already penalised by being denied the right to develop; denying them access to 
EU  markets  because  of  disagreement  on  an  EU-Morocco  agreement  would  penalise  them 
doubly. Many of those interviewed also stressed that human rights included economic growth 
and  that  access  to  decent  health  care  and  education  could  not  be  ensured  without  economic 
resources.  They  said  that  resources  from  fishing  and  agriculture  were  essential  for 

30 

 
 
 
 
Western Sahara, requiring an urgent solution to the question of the territory’s status. Pending 
a  political  solution,  immediate  socio-economic  needs  still  required  a  quick  response,  and 
resources needed to be used to ensure that people had decent lives. 

Interconnections  and  solidarity  among  regions  were  also  a  prime  concern.  For  example, 
mention was made of the town of Smara, where the consequences of isolation in the event of 
a break in trade ties with Tan-Tan would be disastrous. 

Regarding the equitable distribution of resources, the role of many Sahrawis in the economy 
was often mentioned, though no transparent monitoring system had been established to ensure 
that resources benefited the population as a whole. The role of civil society and associations 
was therefore essential to ensuring proper management of resources and public accountability. 

Another issue mentioned was the diaspora and the rights of people who had decided to return 
to Western Sahara. There were no restrictions on Sahrawis returning from Tindouf (Algeria) 
to Western Sahara. But Morocco had established a policy of positive discrimination, offering 
jobs  (sometimes  in  higher  positions)  and  housing  to  ‘repatriates’.  Still,  some  of  those 
interviewed said that people in camps were living under tight control and that anyone able to 
leave had already done so. 

Result of consultations with the Polisario Front 

The EEAS also carried out consultations with the Polisario Front, which is one of the parties 
to the UN-led peace process.  Recalling that  such consultations were technical in nature, the 
EEAS pointed out that they did not compromise the EU policy of Member States not giving 
the Polisario Front diplomatic recognition. 

Without  wishing  to  discuss  anything  directly  relating  to  amendment  of  the  Protocols  to  the 
Association Agreement, the Polisario Front regretted the fact that they had not been involved 
in  the  negotiation  although  they  were  entitled  to  representation  under  international  law.  For 
the  Polisario  Front,  the  EU  approach  amounted  to  circumventing  the  ECJ  judgment  of 
21 December 2016 by adopting Morocco’s ‘fait accompli’ policy, thus undermining the peace 
process. The Polisario Front thus rejected the amendment, both in content (all benefits would 
be  for  Morocco)  and  in  terms  of  the  consultation  procedure  followed,  and  say  they  would 
challenge it in court if it was adopted. In any event, all consultations had become invalid as 
the draft Agreement had already been signed. By making repeated concessions to Morocco, 
the EU ran the risk, according to the Polisario Front, of jeopardising the UN process. 

Under  the  circumstances,  the  question  of  whether  the  amendment  to  the  Protocols  of  the 
Association Agreement was beneficial for the Sahrawi people had become secondary. These 
arguments  are  summarised  in  a  press  release  published  shortly  afterwards  by  the 
Polisario Front (9 February 2018).  

4.3  Conclusion 

The  consultation  process  carried  out  by  the  Commission  and  the  EEAS  shows  that  most 
people  now  living  in  Western  Sahara  are  very  much  in  favour  of  the  extension  of  tariff 
preferences to products from Western Sahara under the EU-Morocco Association Agreement. 
A positive opinion was also expressed by Western Saharan elected representatives to national, 
regional and local bodies following the awareness and consultation exercise carried out by the 
authorities  among  Moroccan  institutions.  That  opinion  is  shared  by  a  large  majority  of 

31 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
grass-roots  socio-economic  organisations  in  the  region.  EU  tariff  preferences  and,  more 
generally, a stable legal framework for trade with the EU are considered essential to ensuring 
sustainable  growth  in  the  territory  and  improving  socio-economic  conditions  for  its 
inhabitants. Despite some human rights concerns, extension of the EU-Morocco Association 
Agreement or other agreements to cover products from Western Sahara is seen as a lever for 
improving  socio-economic  and  human  rights  standards  in  the  region.  This  was  a  general 
perception, despite varying  opinions as to the status of the territory,  which everyone agreed 
could be settled only via the UN. 

The  Polisario  Front  rejects  the  amendment  to  the  EU-Morocco  Association  Agreement 
extending  tariff  preferences  to  products  from  Western  Sahara,  not  because  doing  so  would 
hamper  development 
including 
Western Sahara  in  the  Agreement  is  seen  as  consolidating  Moroccan  sovereignty  over  the 
territory. 

there,  but  essentially  because 

for  people 

living 

In sum, the  consultation process carried out by the  Commission and the EEAS showed that 
most of those interviewed were in favour of extending the tariff preferences established in the 
EU-Morocco  Association  Agreement  to  products  from  Western  Sahara.  Most  felt  that  the 
Agreement should be amended in such a way as to avoid jeopardising the UN-led process and 
that care should be taken to ensure that the amendment was not seen as an implicit recognition 
of  Morocco’s  claim  to  sovereignty  over  the  territory  of  Western  Sahara.  There  were  also 
recommendations that the amendment should be accompanied by greater EU support for the 
UN-led process, as only a lasting and mutually acceptable peace agreement would be capable 
of bolstering the Agreement politically and legally. Finally, most felt that mechanisms should 
be created to ensure that the benefits from tariff preferences were more equitably distributed, 
especially among parts of the population living from traditional activities.  

5  GENERAL CONCLUSION 

Western Sahara  is  a  small  market economy based on a limited number  of activities: fishing 
and  processing  of  fishery  products,  phosphate  mining,  agriculture  (especially  fruit  and 
vegetables and pastoral nomadism), trade and craft industries. Other sectors, such as tourism 
and renewable energy, are still nascent. 

For  Western  Sahara’s  economic  potential  to  diversify,  foreign  investment  needs  to  be 
encouraged,  which  requires  greater  legal  certainty,  including  clarification  of  the  tariff 
conditions applicable to current and future exports from Western Sahara to the EU. Extension 
of  the  benefits  of  tariff  preferences  to  products  from  Western  Sahara  can  provide 
security  for  investment  and  spur  significant  and  rapid  growth  liable  to  generate  local 
jobs,  given the  territory’s  untapped  economic  potential  and  the  current low  level  of  foreign 
direct investment. 

Though  accurate  data  can  be  hard  to  obtain,  this  study  concludes  that  certain  areas  of 
economic  and  production  activity  in  Western  Sahara  would  benefit  greatly  from 
enjoying the same tariff preferences as those granted to the Kingdom of Morocco. Indeed, 
some  production  enjoyed  such  preferential  treatment  until  21 December  2016,  boosting 
economic activity and creating jobs in Western Sahara: this is especially true for fisheries and 
certain agricultural products. Extending EU tariff preferences to those products would make it 
possible to ensure the continuity of exports. 

Conversely, not granting tariff preferences would seriously jeopardise Western Saharan 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
exports,  especially  exports  of  fishery  and  agricultural  products.  Its  already  limited 
production would thus be likely to shrink further, creating a great handicap for the region. In 
fact,  without  tariff  preferences,  Western  Saharan  products  would  be  subject  to  normal 
customs  tariffs  (as  applicable  in  the  EU  under  the  most-favoured  nation  clause),  without 
privileged  access  to  the  EU  market.  Those  products  would  not  be  competitive  on  the 
EU market  without  preferential  tariffs.  Industrial  products  (phosphates)  would  scarcely  be 
affected, but exports of fishery and agricultural products to the EU would suffer greatly. 

More  generally,  granting  tariff  preferences  should  play  a  major  role  in  boosting  the 
Saharan  economy,  by  stimulating  investment  in  those  sectors.  This  is  true  for  certain 
phosphates  (such  as  phosphoric  acid  and  agricultural  fertilisers),  where  investment  has 
already  been  planned;  for  agriculture,  where  there  are  also  development  projects;  and  for 
fisheries. Conversely, if such preferences are not granted, investment, growth, diversification 
of economic activity and employment could suffer. 

The  Moroccan  authorities  have  consulted  all  national,  regional  and  local  institutions 
concerned,  to  raise  awareness  and  obtain  their  approval  and  input.  This  has  led  to  broad 
support  for  the  planned  amendment  and  to  certain  recommendations  to  maximise  its  effect. 
Following the involvement of the territory's elected representatives, the consultation of public 
opinion carried out by the European Commission and the EEAS shows that a large majority is 
in favour of amending the EU-Morocco Association Agreement to extend tariff preferences to 
products  from  Western  Sahara.  Most  of  those  interviewed  said  this  would  help  everyone, 
stressing the key role such preferences would play in spurring private investment. They said 
privileged  access  to  EU  markets  would  encourage  business  and  EU  direct  investment, 
promoting  Western  Sahara’s  new  participatory  and  sustainable  development  model.  By 
contrast, continuing legal uncertainty surrounding trade with Western Sahara would seriously 
hamper socio-economic development, as already evidenced by the slowdown in trade between 
the territory and  some  Member States  and  in  certain sectors.  Restricting access for  Western 
Sahara to foreign markets and investment would put a brake on its economy and thwart socio-
economic and political growth, just when development in the territory finally seems ready to 
take off.  

Technical discussions with the Polisario Front showed that they were opposed in principle to 
amending  the  agreement,  largely  for  general  political  reasons  unrelated  to  the  amendment 
itself. 

The  amendment  to  Protocols  1  and  4  of  the  Association  Agreement  as  suggested  by  the 
Commission  thus  aims  to  consolidate  and  facilitate  Western  Saharan  exports  to  the  EU, 
promoting economic growth and diversification in the region. 

* * * 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 

List  of  stakeholders  consulted  on  the  amendment  to  Protocols  1 
and 4 of the Association Agreement 

1. Political actors 

Presidents of two Regional Councils: 

  President  of 

the  Regional  Council  of  Dakhla-Oued  ed  Dahab: 

Mr Yanja El Khattat 

  President  of 

the  Regional  Council  of  Laâyoune-Sakia  el  Hamra: 

Mr Sidi Hamdi Ould Errachid 

MPs from Western Sahara:  

  Justice and Development Party (PJD): Mr Brahim Daaif 
  Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM): Mr Moulay Zoubeir Habbadi 

Representative of the Polisario Front: 

  Mr Mohamed Sidati 

2. Economic operators 

2.1. Agriculture 

  Sahrawi Development and Investment Association 
  Chamber of Agriculture of the region of Dakhla-Oued ed Dahab  
  EIG Agida Dakhla  
  Ajban Dakhla Cooperative  
  Halib Sakia El Hamra Cooperative  
  Al Joud Cooperative  

2.2. Fisheries 

  National Fisheries Research Institute  
  Chamber of Maritime Fisheries 

2.3. Miscellaneous economic actors  

  OCP Group (and Phosboucraa Foundation)  
  Agency for the Development of the Southern Provinces (Agence du Sud) 

3. Human rights associations  

Independent Human Rights Commission  

  National Human Rights Council  
  Sahara Observatory for Peace, Democracy and Human Rights 
 
  Moroccan Human Rights Association 
  Sahrawi Association of Victims of Serious Human Rights Violations 
  Al Ghad Human Rights Association 
  Western Sahara Campaign  
  Western Sahara Resource Watch  
 
  Delegation  of  85  associations 

Independent Diplomat 

signing  a 

the 
European Commission  and  the  EEAS  on  3  February  2018  on  amending  the 
Protocols 

jointly 

letter 

to 

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