COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories with the European Union including relations between the European Union on the one hand, and the Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other ('Overseas Association Decision') Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III) Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION establishing a European Instrument for Nuclear Safety complementing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Instrument on the basis of the Euratom Treaty
Date: 2018-06-14
Institutions: Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, European Commission
Subjects: Denmark, EU financial instrument, European integration, European neighbourhood policy, Greenland, cooperation policy, nuclear safety, overseas countries and territories, pre-accession aid, sustainable development

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 14.6.2018  SWD(2018) 337 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT  Accompanying the document Proposal for a  REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument  Proposal for a  COUNCIL DECISION  on the Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories with the European Union including relations  between the European Union on the one hand, and the Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other ('Overseas Association Decision')  Proposal for a  REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL   establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)  Proposal for a  COUNCIL REGULATION   establishing a European Instrument for Nuclear Safety complementing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Instrument on the basis of the Euratom Treaty {COM(2018) 460 final} } - {COM(2018) 461 final} } - {COM(2018) 465 final} } - {COM(2018) 462 final} } - {SEC(2018) 310 final}  
 
 
Table of contents 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 2 

1.1.  Context .............................................................................................................. 2 
1.2.  Scope ................................................................................................................. 3 

2. 

SUMMARY OF CURRENT PROGRAMMES AND LESSONS LEARNED .................................... 5 

2.1.  Summary of EU external action programmes ................................................... 5 
2.2.  Key findings from evaluations .......................................................................... 7 
2.3.  Feedback from stakeholders ............................................................................ 10 

3. 

THE CHALLENGES AND OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................ 11 

3.1.  Main  challenges  and  new  political  priorities  to  be  addressed  by  the 

new programme ............................................................................................... 11 
3.2.  Objectives of the programmes of the next MFF .............................................. 13 

4. 

PROGRAMME STRUCTURE AND PRIORITIES ........................................................................... 14 

4.1.  Proposed changes to the EU’s external action ................................................ 14 
4.2.  Structure of the broad instrument .................................................................... 15 
Geographic programmes ....................................................................................... 16 
4.2.1. 

4.2.2. 

Thematic programmes .......................................................................................... 17 

4.2.3. 

Rapid response component .................................................................................. 18 

4.3.  Justification for the changes ............................................................................ 18 
4.4.  Which instruments should be replaced by the broad instrument? ................... 20 
4.5.  Prioritisation .................................................................................................... 29 

5.  DELIVERY MECHANISMS OF THE INTENDED FUNDING ...................................................... 30 

5.1. 
Implementation modalities .............................................................................. 30 
5.2.  Delivery methods ............................................................................................. 31 

6.  HOW WILL PERFORMANCE BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED?....................................... 33 

6.1.  Monitoring arrangements ................................................................................ 33 
6.2.  Data provisions and sources ............................................................................ 35 
6.3.  Evaluations ...................................................................................................... 36 

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................ 38 

ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION ....................................................................................... 40 

ANNEX 3: EVALUATION RESULTS ....................................................................................................... 49 

ANNEX  4:  BROAD  INSTRUMENT  -  DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  PROGRAMMES  COVERED  

COMMON IMPLEMENTING REGULATION ................................................................................ 64 

ANNEX 4A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON MACRO-FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE ...................... 70 

ANNEX 4B ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE EXTERNAL LENDING MANDATE ............... 72 

ANNEX 5: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON IPA ............................................................................... 90 

ANNEX 6 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON CFSP .............................................................................. 93 

ANNEX 7 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE OVERSEAS ASSOCIATION DECISION 

(OAD) AND THE GREENLAND DECISION .................................................................................. 95 

ANNEX 8 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON HUMANITARIAN AID ................................................ 98 

 
 
 
ANNEX 9 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON UNION CIVIL PROTECTION MECHANISM .......... 101 

ANNEX  10  ADDITIONAL  INFORMATION  ON  SUPPORT  TO  THE  TURKISH  CYPRIOT 

COMMUNITY .................................................................................................................................. 102 

ANNEX  11  ADDITIONAL  INFORMATION  ON  INSTRUMENT  FOR  NUCLEAR  SAFETY 

COOPERATION .............................................................................................................................. 104 

ANNEX  12  MINUTES  OF  THE  INTER-SERVICE  STEERING  GROUP  MEETING,  23 

MARCH 2018 ................................................................................................................................... 105 

 
 
 
 
Glossary 

Term or acronym 

Meaning or definition 

ACP 

APF 

CBSD 

CIR 

CFSP 

CSO 

DAC 

DCI 

EDF 

EFI 

EFSI 

African Caribbean and Pacific 

African Peace Facility 

Capacity building in support of security and development 

Common Implementing Regulation 

Common Foreign and Security Policy 

Civil Society Organisations 

Development Assistance Committee 

Development Cooperation Instrument 

European Development Fund 

External Financing Instrument 

European Fund for Strategic Investments 

EIDHR 

European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 

EIB 

ENI 

IcSP 

INSC 

IPA 

MFA 

MFF 

MTR 

OECD 

OCTs 

ODA 

PI 

SDG 

TEU 

TFEU 

TF 

UMIC 

USD 

European Investment Bank 

European Neighbourhood Instrument 

Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 

Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 

Instrument for Pre-Accession 

Macro Financial Assistance  

Multi-annual Financial Framework 

Mid-Term Review 

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 

Overseas Countries and Territories 

Official Development Assistance 

Partnership Instrument 

Sustainable Development Goals 

Treaty on European Union 

Treaty on the Function of the European Union 

Trust Fund 

Upper Middle Income Countries 

United States Dollars 

1 

 
 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

1.1.  Context 

As stated in the Reflection paper on the future of EU finances (June 2017)1, the world has 
become a  more challenging place since the establishment of  the EU’s current  spending 
plan 2014-2020 (otherwise known as the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)). It is 
now  characterised  by  an  increasing  fragility,  brought  about  by  numerous  crises  in  the 
EU’s  neighbourhood  and  beyond.  Regional  conflicts,  terrorism,  economic  inequalities 
and  growing  migratory  pressures,  are  all  part  of  this  new  reality,  compounded  by 
population  growth,  climate  change  and  environmental  degradation.  Distant  crises  have 
not only far-reaching regional consequences, but often impact on the lives of EU citizens.  

At  the  same  time,  the  diversity  of  partners  with  which  the  EU  cooperates  has  become 
much  more  apparent.  More  partners,  including  some  with  large  populations,  are 
graduating  out  of  the  Development  Assistance  Committee's  official  development 
assistance  (ODA)  eligibility  criteria2.  Other  countries  have  made  progress  on  poverty 
reduction,  only  to  see  it  eroded  due  to economic  and environmental  shocks.  Others  are 
conflict-prone least developed countries that remain locked in fragility and poverty.  

This evolving landscape is also defined in the Global Strategy “Shared vision, common 
action: a stronger Europe”3. As stated in the Strategy, the new challenges and priorities 
faced by the EU’s external action highlights the need to examine the distribution of EU 
finances. Today, the EU’s external action budget equates to around 6% of the total EU 
budget (9% if the 11th European Development Fund is included). In line with the requests 
from  the  European  Parliament’s  resolution  of  6  July  20164,  this  budget  had  to  be 
reinforced in recent  years to tackle humanitarian and  other emergencies around Europe 
and beyond, increasing amounts of displaced people, and a number of complex crises that 
are set to continue.  

The  Commission’s  communication  on  a  new,  modern  MFF  for  an  EU  that  delivers 
efficiently  on  its  priorities  post  2020  (February  2018)5,  reinforces  the  high  level  of 
ambition for external action and that the EU must be able to deliver on its international 
goals  and  the  expectations  of  EU  citizens.  They  have  shown  concern  about  poverty 
reduction,  migration,  terrorism  and  external  security  threats  in  general  and  prefer  that 
these  issues  to  be  tackled  at  the  European  level.  They  expect  Europe  to  play  a  leading 
role in the world and to manage the effects of globalisation. They want the EU to defend 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and sustainable economic development and to 
project stability and security, in particular in Europe’s immediate neighbourhood6. 

The  policy  framework  for  external  action  provides  the  basis  for  the  EU  to  respond  to 
these  challenges  and  expectations.  This  framework  includes  international  commitments 

1 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/reflection-paper-future-eu-finances_en  
2  Forecasts  on  graduation  are  very  speculative,  nevertheless,  the  DAC/Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development tentatively predict around 15 countries to graduate to high-income status (therefore no longer eligible for 
ODA) before 2030. For further information see: http://ida.worldbank.org/about/ida-graduates 
3 See http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/regions/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf 
4 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2016-
0309+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN  
5 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM:2018:0098:FIN  
6 See the results from recent Eurobarometer polls including: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/special-eurobarometer-
report-eu-citizens-views-development-cooperation-and-aid_en and 
https://data.europa.eu/euodp/data/dataset/S1569_87_4_464B_ENG  

2 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development7, the Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change8, and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda9. Within the EU, the Treaty provisions on 
external  action  are  now  complemented  by  the  EU  Global  Strategy,  the  new  European 
Consensus  on  Development10,  the  renewed  EU-Africa  Partnership11,  the  reviewed 
European Neighbourhood policy12 and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid13, 
amongst others. 

Looking  ahead,  the  EU’s  external  action  should  build  on  what  works  well  today  while 
also  anticipating  the  challenges  of  tomorrow.  In  line  with  the  Rome  declaration14,  the 
EU’s  future  external  actions  should  help  enable  a  Europe  that  is  safe,  secure,  globally 
stronger, prosperous and sustainable.  

On  2  May  2018,  the  European  Commission  adopted  its  proposals  for  a  new  MFF  for 
2021-2027. Under these proposals15, the Neighbourhood, Development and International 
Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) will have a budget of EUR 89.5 billion over this period, 
of which EUR 300 million will be allocated to the European Nuclear Safety Instrument 
complementing the NDICI on the basis of the Euratom Treaty. 

1.2. 

Scope  

This impact assessment covers the current heading 416 programmes17 in order to provide 
a  comprehensive  picture  of  EU  external  action18.  It  reflects  the  decisions  of  the  MFF 
proposals  and  focuses  on  the  changes  proposed  to  the  heading  in  comparison  with  the 
current set-up.  

The main changes envisaged under the next MFF, in line with the Reflection paper on the 
future of EU finances (June 2017), and the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and to the Council (February 2018) are: 

1.  Merging  several  external  instruments  into  a  broad  instrument,  namely:  DCI,  EDF, 
EIDHR;  ENI;  IcSP;  INSC19,  PI,  and  the  CIR20,  as  well  as  several  budgetary 

7 See https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld   
8 See http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php  
9 See http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/AAAA_Outcome.pdf  
10 See https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/european-consensus-on-development-final-20170626_en.pdf  
11 See https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en  
12 See https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/neighbourhood/pdf/key-
documents/151118_joint-communication_review-of-the-enp_en.pdf  
13 See http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/media/publications/consensus_en.pdf  
14 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/25/rome-declaration/ 
15 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/democratic-change/future-europe/eu-budget-future_en  
16 Heading 4 is one of the six broad groups of expenditure (“headings”) contained within the MFF. The current heading 
4 covers external action spending.  
17 The programmes under heading 4 include: Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI); European Neighbourhood 
Instrument  (ENI);  Instrument  for  Pre-Accession  (IPA  II);  Instrument  contributing  to  stability  and  Peace  (IcSP); 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR); Partnership Instrument (PI); Instrument for Nuclear 
Safety  Cooperation  (INSC);  Greenland  Decision  (GD);  Humanitarian  Aid;  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy 
(CFSP); Macro-financial assistance (MFA); Guarantee fund for external actions (i.e. EIB External Lending Mandate 
and Euratom Loan Facility); European Fund for Sustainable  Development; EU Civil Protection; EU Aid Volunteers; 
and the Common Implementing Regulation (CIR). The EDF is also included in this impact assessment although it is 
not included in the EU budget.  
18  It  should  be  noted  that  a  separate  ex-ante  evaluation  has  been  prepared  for  the  European  Solidarity  Corps  that 
integrates  heading  4’s  EU  aid  volunteers  initiative.  There  is  also  a  separate  impact  assessment  for  the  Erasmus 
programme  for  which  funds  from  external  action  should  be  transferred  to  finance  actions  in  respect  of  learning 
mobility to, from or between partner countries as well as for policy dialogue with authorities.   
19  Since  part  of  the  nuclear  activities  need  to  follow  a  specific  procedure  of  the  Euratom  Treaty,  a  complementary 
instrument will be created. 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
guarantees currently under the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD), 
the  European  Investment  Bank’s  (EIB)  external  lending  mandate  (ELM)  and  the 
Guarantee  Fund  for  external  action.  The  broad  instrument  should  include:  a 
prominent  neighbourhood  window,  a  strong  focus  on  migration  including  in  the 
cushion for emerging challenges and priorities and provisioning for Macro-Financial 
Assistance21.  

2.  Integrating the current extra-budgetary EDF into the EU budget, including the EDF’s 

ACP investment facility. 

Table 1. List of current external action instruments 2014-2020 and those proposed 
for 2021-2027  

Instrument 2014-2020 

Instrument 2021-2027 

External action 

Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) 
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) 
Partnership  Instrument  for  Cooperation  with  Third  Countries 
(PI) 
European  Instrument  for  Democracy  and  Human  Rights 
(EIDHR) 
Instrument contributing to stability and Peace (IcSP) 
European Development Fund (EDF), including ACP investment 
facility and excluding African Peace Facility 
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) 
European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) 
External Lending Mandate (ELM) 
Guarantee Fund for external action 
Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) 
Overseas Countries and Territories 
Cooperation with Greenland 
Humanitarian Aid 
Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Support to Turkish Cypriot community 

instrument, 

Neighbourhood,  Development  and  International 
together  with 
Cooperation 
the 
European 
for  Nuclear  Safety 
Cooperation  complementing  the  Neighbourhood, 
International  Cooperation 
Development 
Instrument on the basis of Euratom Treaty  

Instrument 

and 

Cooperation  with  Greenland,  Overseas  Countries 
and Territories 
Humanitarian Aid 
Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Support to Turkish Cypriot community 

Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) 

Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) 

Pre-Accession Assistance 

Union Civil Protection Mechanism 

RescEU 

Crisis Response 

European Solidarity Corps 

EU Aid Volunteers initiative 

Investing in People and European Values 

European Solidarity Corps 

Emergency Aid Reserve 

Emergency Aid Reserve (internal and external) 

Instruments outside the MFF headings 

Common Foreign and Security Policy – Operations with Defence 
Implications (Athena Mechanism) 
European Development Fund – African Peace Facility 

European Peace Facility 

Off budget 

This  impact  assessment  satisfies  the  requirements  of  the  EU’s  financial  regulation22  in 
respect  to  preparing  an  ex-ante  evaluation  for  the  proposal  of  a  new,  broad  external 
financing instrument and other external instruments under heading 4. 

20  It  should  be  noted  that  the  CIR  is  not  a  financing  instrument  but  a  regulation  for  implementing  a  number  of  the 
instruments under heading 4. 
21 MFA will be activated on the basis of separate legal bases as needed. 
22 The financial regulation is the main point of reference for the principles and procedures governing the establishment, 
implementation and control of the EU budget. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/biblio/documents/regulations/regulations_en.cfm  

4 

 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
2.  SUMMARY OF CURRENT PROGRAMMES AND LESSONS LEARNED 

2.1. 

Summary of EU external action programmes 

Today, heading 4 covers EU external action with the exception of actions financed by the 
11th  EDF  and  the  Athena  mechanism23  which  are  not  funded  from  the  EU  budget  but 
from  direct  contributions  from  EU  countries.  A  description  of  the  programmes  under 
heading 4 can be found in the annexes.  

The EU has an external action budget for 2014-2020 of EUR 96.5 billion24. The external 
action takes place in partner countries outside the EU but also protects citizens’ interests 
and safety. Through the instruments under heading 4, the EU plays an important role in 
the promotion of, amongst others: human rights, stabilisation, development, humanitarian 
aid, security, trade, as well as the fight against climate change and the protection of the 
environment (including through ocean governance).  

Table 2. Funding baseline 

Heading 4 instruments and EDF 

Instrument for Pre-accession assistance (IPA II) 
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) 
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) 
Partnership Instrument (PI) 
European  Instrument  for  Democracy  and  Human 
Rights (EIDHR) 
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) 
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) 
Greenland Decision (GD) 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
Macro-financial Assistance (MFA) 
Guarantee Fund for External Actions 
Humanitarian aid 
Union Civil Protection Mechanism 
EU Aid Volunteers initiative (EUAV) 
European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) 

EUR millions  
(2014-2020) 
25 
– 
contributions 
28  Member 
States 
12.138,63 
16.496,26 
19.947,59 
958,53 
1.306,56 

EUR millions 
(2021-2027) 
– 
contributions 
27  Member 
States26 
10.621 
14.434 
17.454 
838,71 
1.143 

EUR  millions 
2021-2027 
(per  year)  – 
contributions 
27  Member 
States 
1.52 
2.06 
2.49 
119,9 
0.16 

2.365,85 
325,321 
217,8 
2.121,24 
294,843 
1.627,67 
7.553,60 
122,827 
126,02 
350 

2.070 
284,656 
190,575 
1.856 
257,988 
1.424 
6.609 
107,474 
110,268 
306,25 

0.30 
40.67 
27,23 
0.27 
36,86 
0.20 
0.94 
15,35 
15,75 
43,75 

3.72 

N/A 

11th  European  Development  Fund,  including  the 
Overseas Countries and Territories Decision 
Common  Implementing  Regulation  (not  a  financing 
instrument but a Regulation for the implementation of 
some of the above instruments) 

30.506,00 

26.02 

N/A 

N/A 

23 See  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/athena/  
24 Including the 11th EDF (EUR 30.5 billion) 
25 Figures include all transfers between instruments up to July 2017 and the Mid Term Review of the MFF. Source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/figures/index_en.cfm  
26 Following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
The baseline shows the amounts designated to each instrument for the 2014-2020 period. 
Based on these amounts, the table also highlights how much would be allocated to each 
instrument if nothing were to change except for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from 
the  EU.  The  main  consequences  of  the  United  Kingdom’s  withdrawal  on  the  EU’s 
external  action  would  mean  a  12.5%  reduction  for  all  instruments  except  the  European 
Development Fund to which the United Kingdom contributes 14%.  

The  EU  is  able  to  deploy  a  wide  array  of  external  instruments  in  support  of  conflict 
prevention  and  peace  building,  and  is  one  of  the  biggest  donors  in  this  area.  It  is 
committed  to  assisting  the  most  vulnerable  people  caught  in  natural  or  man-made 
disasters.  The  EU  actively  promotes  and  defends  human  rights  when  engaging  in 
relations with non-EU countries in its external actions. 

To the east and south of the EU, in accordance with Article 8 of the Treaty on European 
Union27  (TEU),  the  EU  has  developed  a  specific  relationship  with  neighbouring 
countries,  with  the  aim  of  establishing  an  area  of  prosperity  and  good  neighbourliness, 
founded on EU values and characterised by close and peaceful relations. The EU aims to 
build  effective  partnerships  with  its  neighbours  in  support  of  a  more  stable  EU 
Neighbourhood,  promoting  democracy,  good  governance  and  human  rights  while 
opening trade and cooperating in policy areas, including on migration and visa issues. 

Through its enlargement policy, the EU also largely contributes to meeting the broader 
European  objectives  of  ensuring  stability,  security  and  prosperity  in  the  immediate 
neighbourhood of the EU. Through this policy, the EU supports beneficiaries in adopting 
and  implementing  the  political,  institutional,  legal,  administrative,  social  and  economic 
reforms  required  to  comply  with  EU  values  and  to  progressively  align  to  EU  rules, 
standards, policies and practices with a view to EU membership. The EU’s commitment 
to the enlargement policy was also confirmed by the recent Commission Communication 
putting  forward  a  credible  enlargement  perspective  for  and  enhanced  EU  engagement 
with the Western Balkans. 

Through  its  development  cooperation  policy,  the  EU  contributes  to  reducing  global 
poverty, ensuring sustainable economic, social and environmental development, and the 
promotion  of  democracy,  the  rule  of  law,  good  governance  and  the  respect  of  human 
rights.  Together,  the  EU  and  its  Member  States  constitute  the  world’s  largest 
development  aid  donor,  providing  more  than  50%  of  assistance  worldwide.  EU 
institutions alone provide around 10% of total ODA.  

The  EU  and  its  Member  States  are  also  the  world’s  largest  donor  of  humanitarian  aid, 
assisting people affected by a wide range of crises including protracted conflict situations 
and  forgotten  crises.  It  provides  emergency,  life-saving,  needs-based  humanitarian 
assistance  to  people,  particularly  the  most  vulnerable,  hit  by  man-made  or  natural 
disasters. The EU also coordinates European civil protection assistance during worldwide 
disasters.  

27 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012M%2FTXT  

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
The  EU  promotes  its  further  interests  on  the  world  scene.  It  builds  multilateral 
relationships to promote the development of collective responses to common challenges. 
It  promotes  access  to  partner  country  markets,  boosting  trade,  investment  and  business 
opportunities. It also supports the external projection of its internal policies and works on 
enhancing  widespread  understanding  and  visibility  of  the  EU  especially  by  means  of 
public diplomacy. 

2.2.  Key findings from evaluations 

Relevance:  the  mid-term  review  report  (December  2017)28  of  ten  of  the  external 
financing instruments29, the ex-post evaluation reports on MFA and the mid-term review 
on the EIB external lending mandate30 all concluded that the external action instruments 
were  overall  fit  for  purpose  and  positive  trends  were  emerging  in  relation  to  the 
achievement of objectives.  

The  mid-term  review  report  has  shown  that  whilst  the  enabling  nature31  of  the  current 
instruments means they cover most needs and goals of EU external action, in the future 
they  would  benefit  from  better  reflecting  a  number  of  developments  such  as:  the  new 
policy framework  including  the universality of the 2030 Agenda, the migration/refugee 
crisis, and the external projection of internal policies. Also, more consideration needs to 
be given to the links between development and security and the overall level of ambition 
for peace and security in external action.  

28 The mid-term review report COM(2017) 720 final, was based on ten staff working documents, one per instrument 
(see  list  below),  which  in  turn  were  based  on  ten  independent  evaluations.  The  mid-term  report,  the  staff  working 
documents  and  the  independent  evaluations  can  be  found  at  here:  https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/public-consultation-
external-financing-instruments-european-union_en 
29  The  ten  instruments  were  the:  Development  Cooperation  Instrument  (DCI);  European  Development  Fund  (EDF); 
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI); Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA II); Instrument contributing to stability 
and  Peace  (IcSP);  European  Instrument  for  Democracy  and  Human  Rights  (EIDHR);  Partnership  Instrument  (PI); 
Instrument  for  Nuclear  Safety  Cooperation  (INSC);  Greenland  Decision  (GD);  Common  Implementing  Regulation 
(CIR). 
30 
mid-term 
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0584   
31 The instruments are enabling in the sense that they do not define the policies; they set the scope, objectives and 
procedures to allow for the implementation of the policies. 

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

review 

found 

ELM 

here: 

can 

be 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
The principle of graduation32 in certain instruments (i.e. the DCI) had intentionally left a 
gap in the EU’s ability to cooperate with upper middle income countries through bilateral 
cooperation. As situations in those countries may call for such support (e.g. the persistent 
presence  of  poverty  or  post-crisis  situations),  it  was  found  that  the  EU  should  pursue 
cooperation  with  all  countries  including  more  advanced  developing  countries  and 
strategic partners, in line with the universal coverage of the 2030 Agenda. 

The importance of promoting fundamental values and human rights is at the core of the 
instruments. However, findings point to the difficulties to promote and take this agenda 
forward  in  some  countries,  and  to  the  shrinking  space  for  civil  society  organisations  in 
many countries as well. This makes it challenging to work on these issues and highlights 
a tension between promoting this agenda versus partners’ priority interests. 

In the current context of multiple crises and conflicts, the EU needs to be able to react 
swiftly  to  changing  events.  However,  for  certain  instruments,  responsiveness  was 
hindered by a lack of financial flexibility. When new priorities emerged, problems were 
encountered when trying to reallocate funds within the instruments under the budget as 
large quantities had been tied up through long-term programmes33. As stated in the mid-
term  review  report,  flexibility  needs  to  be  built-up  and  the  balance  between  long-term 
commitments and short-term actions should be reassessed.  

Coherence:  There  are  many  types  of  coherence  needed  across  the  external  financing 
instruments including: coherence between one instrument’s component parts, coherence 
between  different  instruments  and  coherence  with  other  donors.  Overall,  the  mid-term 
review report notes mixed findings on coherence from past experience.  

In terms of coherence within the instruments, findings were satisfactory because efforts 
had  been  made  to  revise  guidelines.  There  was  some  level  of  coherence  between  the 
instruments but the multiplicity of programmes sometimes led to overlapping actions and 
complex  cooperation  with  more  advanced  developing  countries.  In  addition,  the 
separation  between  geographic  and  thematic  approaches  sometimes  resulted  in 
inconsistent responses at country level. Feedback from EU delegations showed they had 
difficulties  to  manage  and  exploit  complementarities  and  create  synergies  between  the 
instruments.  Overall,  it  was  considered  that  the  EU  was  missing  opportunities  for 
coordinated strategies for a given country/region.  

In  terms  of  coherence  with  Member  States,  findings  note  the  potential  for  joint 
programming to be further strengthened. However, this would require more commitment 
in certain cases from partner country governments and Member States.  

Box 1. Examples of overlapping programmes 

The EFSD and ELM can both provide EU budget guarantees for similar objectives in the 
same  regions.  Also  the  geographic  and  thematic  instruments/programmes  such  as  the 
EDF  and  the  thematic  programmes  under  the  DCI  can  cover  the  same  areas  in  certain 
countries. 

32 In the current context of EU cooperation, graduation means that upper middle income countries are no longer 
eligible for EU bilateral cooperation. 
33 Instead, ad hoc methods had to be created such as EU trust funds.  

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Added value: the mid-term report shows that the EU provides added value through the 
external financing instruments compared with the actions of EU countries in a number of 
ways including: 

(a)  The EU's competence or expertise in a given field;  
(b)  The  EU's  position  as  a  supranational  entity,  and  the  relative  neutrality34,  political 

influence and leverage this potentially entails; 

(c)  The  geographical  spread  of  some  instruments  including  the  presence  in  fragile 
contexts where there are fewer development partners and less funds available,  

(d)  The  scope  of  the  instruments  and  modalities  (such  as  budget  support,  grants, 
indirect  management,  blending  facilities  and  rapid  decision-making  for  crisis 
response); and 

(e)  The  ability  of  the  EU  to  lead  on  joint  actions  (i.e.  joint  programming  and  joint 

implementation), especially with Member States.  

Effectiveness: the mid-term review report points to positive trends emerging in relation 
to achieving results35. However, difficulties in measuring achievements were noted. For 
example:  there  was  often  limited  information  on  monitoring  systems  mentioned  in  the 
instruments; there was a lack data (including on baselines) to measure if the instruments 
were  on  track  to  meet  some  of  their  (particularly  high  level)  objectives;  as  well  as  an 
understanding that many external factors (e.g. partner country policies and other donors) 
influence the achievement of the objectives36.  

Box 2. Examples of results supported with EU cooperation37:  

-  Public administration reform in Georgia 
-  90% reduction in poverty in Vietnam over the last decade 
-  Stabilisation of Colombia after the peace agreement  

In  terms  of  mainstreaming  EU  priorities,  significant  progress  was  noted  in  the areas  of 
climate  change  and  environment38.  Mainstreaming  human  rights  including  gender 
equality  and  women’s  empowerment  was  considered  as  work-in-progress,  with  partner 
governments sometimes showing a lack of interest or resistance to these areas.  

Efficiency:  while  overall  organisational  performance  was  found  to  be  efficient,  some 
actors  considered  that  the  implementation  of  some  instruments  was  administratively 
burdensome.  At  times  the  Commission  was  perceived  to  be  more  focused  on  process 
rather than on policy objectives and results.  

Lessons learned from other donors: beyond these recent findings, there was an OECD 
DAC peer review of the EU’s development cooperation in 201239. The review came up 
with a set of recommendations with regard to the architecture, rules and procedures of the 

34 The EU is largely perceived by partners as an actor not defending or advancing the interest of a particular country, 
which is important for the EU in its role as a peace and security actor and for election observation missions.  
35 See annex 3 and box 2 for some examples.  
36 See section 6 for more information on monitoring. 
37 See recent annual reports including the 2016 Annual report on the implementation of the EU’s instruments for 
financing external action in 2015 
38  11th  EDF  climate  contributions  increased  from  3.3%  in  2014  to  23.3%  in  2016  and  DCI  climate  change 
contributions increased from 17.7% in 2014 to 24.9% in 2016. Source: Indicator 12b, EU international cooperation and 
development results framework with input from the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System. 
39 See http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/europeanunion2012dacpeerreviewmainfindingsandrecommendations.htm  

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
EU's external financial instruments. For example, the OECD called on the EU to further 
simplify and modernise its cooperation, by reducing the number of budget lines, aligning 
rules  of  DCI  and  EDF,  streamlining  approval  procedures  and  building  more  coherence 
between  regional  and  thematic  programmes.  The  EU  was  asked  to  become  more 
effective, timely and flexible both at programme level and at aggregate level of the whole 
set  of  instrument  architecture.  The  latter  was  particularly  asked  for  in  situations  of 
fragility and crisis, in which the OECD saw significant room for improvement. 

Summary: The lessons show that the EU’s external programmes are largely relevant and 
functioning well in terms of the content it covers, instead the main issues relate to  how 
the instruments are structured. A fragmented approach has led to a complex landscape of 
instruments with limited flexibility to respond to emerging challenges.  

Further  information  from  studies,  evaluations  and  consultation  activities  including  on 
Humanitarian Aid, the External Lending Mandate40 and Macro-Financial Assistance can 
be found in the annexes.  

2.3. 

Feedback from stakeholders 

When drafting the evaluation documents that fed into the mid-term review report, three 
types  of  consultations  with  stakeholders  took  place.  Evaluators  carried  out  around  one 
thousand  structured  or  semi-structured  interviews  with  EU  officials  and  representatives 
from EU institutions, Member States and partner countries. Several technical workshops 
to  present  and  discuss  the  draft  evaluations  were  held  with  participants  from  the 
European  Parliament,  Council  working  groups,  Member  States  committees,  and  civil 
society organisations and local authorities. An open public consultation was held in early 
2017.  It  aimed  at  gathering  feedback  from  stakeholders  on  the  findings  emerging  from 
the  evaluations  of  the  instruments  and  on  the  future  external  action  instruments  after 
202041.  

The  main  messages  emerging  from  the  consulted  stakeholders  are  summarised  below. 
Further details are available in Annex 2. 

Flexibility:  stakeholders  agreed  that  the  new  financing  instruments  should  be  more 
flexible to respond to unforeseeable challenges and crises. In particular, they underlined 
the  need  to  facilitate  the  shifting  of  funds  across  regions  and  among  aid  modalities. 
However, it was also underlined that increasing flexibility should not come at the cost of 
weakened  predictability,  country  ownership  and  less  focus  on  achieving  long-term 
development objectives. To ensure flexibility and predictability some respondents argued 
in favour of having sufficient reserves.  

Coherence: stakeholders considered it necessary to ensure greater coherence between the 
internal  and  external  policies  of  the  EU,  as  well  as  between  the  external  instruments 
themselves.  Some  emphasized  the  need  to  strengthen  complementarity  and  synergy 
between  geographical  and  thematic  instruments.  Others  argued  that  the  Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) provides the most appropriate basis for increasing coherence 
between  internal  and  external  policies.  Most  recommended  that  the  EU  take  a  leading 

40 In particular, the Commission has organised an ongoing assessment of the ELM in line with legislative requirements, 

the preliminary results of which can be found in the annex. 

41 For more information on the public consultation see https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/public-consultation-external-
financing-instruments-european-union_en  

10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
role in improving complementarity between various stakeholders both inside and outside 
the EU.  

On  the  structuring  of  future  instruments,  stakeholders  agreed  that  the  combination  of 
geographic and thematic instruments delivers positive results. They emphasized that the 
value  of  geographically  structured  instruments  lies  in  their  capacity  to  address  the 
specific needs of partner countries in a tailored manner. This is crucial given the diversity 
of the challenges and needs across these countries.  

While being in favour of having both geographic and thematic programmes, stakeholders 
also drew attention to the need for more complementarity. Some respondents highlighted 
the  risk  of  overlap  whereby  the  same  policy  objectives  are  funded  by  multiple 
instruments. Respondents also called for a clear delineation between instruments, while 
underlining the need to ensure that geographic and thematic programmes exploit cross-
sectoral synergies and linkages between themselves. 

Simplification:  the  EU  was  strongly  encouraged  to  further  simplify  the  overall 
architecture  of  the  instruments.  The  EU  should  also  continue  its  efforts  to  simplify 
cumbersome administrative and financial procedures. It was emphasised by civil society 
and  local  authorities  that  procedures  and  rules  currently  in  place  have  important 
implications for the ability of civil society and local authorities to become more involved 
in development cooperation. 

Leverage:  there  was  an  agreement  amongst  stakeholders  that  innovative  financing 
instruments can play an important role in leveraging public and private financing for EU 
external assistance. Positive findings on the leverage effects and financial additionality of 
such  instruments  emerging  from  the  recent  evaluation  on  blending42  are  considered 
encouraging.  However,  civil  society  respondents  raised  concerns  about  private  sector 
priorities overriding poverty reduction objectives in partner countries.  

3.  THE CHALLENGES AND OBJECTIVES  

3.1.  Main  challenges  and  new  political  priorities  to  be  addressed  by  the  new 

programme 

As set out under the context (section 1.1), global circumstances have evolved since the 
start of the current MFF in 2014.  

Security:  the  Global  Strategy  has  spelled  out  fundamental  external  challenges  that  are 
likely to persist over the course of the coming decade and may dominate external action 
under the next MFF. These include terrorism and hybrid threats; economic volatility and 
extreme  poverty  in  least  developed  countries  and  fragile  states;  and  energy  security.  In 
many  countries,  decisive  support  in  security  and  defence  is  essential  for  effective 
development, while at the same time development is crucial for sustained peace. 

Stability/resilience:  over  the  next  decade,  Europe  will  continue  to  be  surrounded  by 
unstable  regions  in  the  neighbourhood  and  beyond.  The  move  towards  more  resilient 
states and societies is both a major objective and a challenge.  

42 See https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-blending_en  

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Migration:  stability  issues  go  hand  in  hand  with  continuous  migratory  pressures  and 
challenges  of  forced  displacement.  For  the  coming  years,  Europe's  relative  economic 
affluence will be a strong pull factor for migrants, particularly from sub-Saharan Africa, 
a region experiencing constant growth in forcibly displaced people, triggered by various 
conflicts and protracted crises. The depletion of natural resources aggravated by climate 
change is becoming an additional factor of forced displacement and therefore migratory 
pressure.  

Strategic  partners:  New  players such  as  China  have  enhanced  their  external  outreach, 
and  more  countries  have  moved  to  upper  middle-income  status,  with  different 
cooperation  needs  and  expectations.  Consequently,  there  is  a  risk  that  unless  new 
cooperation activities with such countries are put in place, the EU could lose part of its 
leverage  to  promote  international  values  globally,  while  opportunities  for  building 
alliances are increasing, supported by other forms of cooperation. 

Human  rights:  there  is  a  growing  number  of  countries  that  do  not  share  the  universal 
values of open and democratic societies. Shrinking spaces for civil society and challenges 
to the universal acceptance of human rights may continue to increase.  

Environment  and  climate  change:  The  impact  of  environmental  degradation  and 
climate  change  has  already  exposed  large  parts  of  the  world’s  population  to  natural 
disasters.  In  the  future,  climate  change  is  expected  to  increase  the  frequency  and 
magnitude  of  such  natural  disasters  around  the  world.  Addressing  this  challenge  will 
require cooperation with major economies including those not currently eligible for EU 
bilateral cooperation. 

Information  and  communication  technologies  (ICT):  ICTs  are  powerful  enablers  of 
inclusive growth and sustainable development. However, a lack of connectivity remains a 
major obstacle to development in many developing countries, notably in rural and remote 
areas,  especially  in  Africa.  Moreover,  limited  competition  can  often  make  digital 
technologies inaccessible and unaffordable for a large part of the population. 

Beyond these policy challenges, there are other challenges related to the way the external 
instruments operate.  

Simplification: with more than 15 instruments, many of which have the same legal base, 
heading  4  could  be  regarded  as  overly  complex  compared  to  other  headings.  For 
example,  heading  243  currently  has  six  times  the  level  of  funds  but  less  than  half  the 
number of instruments.  

The number of instruments has created obstacles in the use of funds across regions and 
themes  due  to  each  instrument’s  different  scope  and  rules.  From  the  perspective  of 
partner  countries  and  implementing  partners,  the  complicated  legal  framework  has 
created a multiplication of procedures that need to be followed. 

Coherence: the previously mentioned evaluations have identified a number of challenges 
related  to  coherence  and  synergies,  such  as  weaknesses  in  assuring  coherence  between 
geographic programmes and global (thematic) programmes.  

43 Heading 2 concerns the preservation and management of natural resources. It includes the common agricultural 
policy, common fisheries policy, rural development and environmental measures. 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
In the past, the EU has tried to use ad hoc solutions to overcome fragmented approaches. 
For  example,  a  pan-African  programme44  was  created  in  2014  to  respond  to  continent-
wide  issues  in  Africa  but  in  reality,  it  has  added  another  layer  of  programmes  for  the 
African  region  on  top  of  the  EDF  and  the  DCI  thematic  programmes.  The  creation  of 
further  ad  hoc  tools  and  instruments  should  be  avoided  in  the  future  in  favour  of  more 
integrated approaches.  

Several of the challenges mentioned above, including on migration and climate change, 
straddle the line between the EU’s internal and external policies. Looking ahead strong 
coordination  between  internal  and  external  expenditures  will  be  needed  to  ensure 
consistency.  

Flexibility, resources and leverage: the current volume of financing for external action 
has been stretched to the limits with all margins of flexibility exhausted. This is not only 
due to recently emerging challenges such as migration and security but also because of 
Member States' and citizens’ expectations that the EU can do more in external relations. 
Such pressures and demands on the external budget45 illustrate the need to build in more 
flexibility into the budget so that the EU can mobilise its resources more swiftly in the 
face of evolving contexts.  

To  deliver  on  the  aid  volumes  needed  to  meet  the  SDGs  by  2030  will  be  a  significant 
challenge.  Broad  estimates  of  current  flows  of  development  finance  and  the  estimated 
annual  costs  of  meeting  the  goals  point  to  a  persistent  gap  in  resources.  The  United 
Nations conference on trade and development estimates that meeting the SDGs will cost 
approximately USD 333 billion to USD 466 per year.  At the same time, the most recent 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development report shows that in 2016 total 
ODA reached a peak of USD 142.6 billion, less than half of the estimated needs46.  This 
underlines  the  importance  of  ensuring  increased  resource  mobilisation  to  meet 
development  needs.  In  line  with  the  European  Consensus  on  development  and  the 
Reflection  paper  on  the  future  of  EU  finances,  the  EU  will  also  need  to  employ 
innovative financing mechanisms to leverage additional public and private funds. 

3.2.  Objectives of the programmes of the next MFF 

In  accordance  with  Articles  8  and  21  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union,  the  specific 
objectives of the broad instrument should cover those mentioned below: 

(a) To support and foster dialogue and cooperation with third countries and regions 
in  the  Neighbourhood,  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  in  Asia  and  the  Pacific,  and  in 
Americas and the Caribbean; 

(b)  At  global  level,  to  consolidate  and  support  democracy,  rule  of  law  and  human 
rights,  support  civil  society  organisations,  further  stability  and  peace  and  address 
other global challenges including migration and mobility; 

44 This programme is a component of the DCI. 
45 Which are likely to be exacerbated by the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU.  
46 World Bank, Financing for Development post 2015. 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
(c)  To  respond  rapidly  to:  situations  of  crisis,  instability  and  conflict;  resilience 
challenges  and  linking  of  humanitarian  aid  and  development  action;  and  foreign 
policy needs and priorities. 

In order to measure progress towards achieving these objectives, while at the same time 
responding  to  the  lessons  learned  about  the  lack  of  monitoring  information  (e.g. 
indicators) at instrument level, indicators would be set, see section 6 for examples.  

4.  PROGRAMME STRUCTURE AND PRIORITIES 

The  following  section  sets  out  the  proposal  for  the  future  external  action  heading 
focusing  in  particular  on  the  changes  in  relation  to  the  current  set-up.  The  guiding 
principle  is  to  preserve  what  works  well  while  improving  what  hinders  the  EU’s 
effectiveness to deliver on its policies and priorities.  

4.1. 

Proposed changes to the EU’s external action 

Building on the lessons learned and stakeholder feedback that show that the instruments 
are largely relevant and delivering results, it is proposed that the content covered by the 
current  instruments  should  largely  continue.  Instead,  modifications  and  improvements 
should focus on how the instruments operate. 

In particular the main modification proposed is to streamline several instruments into one 
broad  instrument.  Included  in  the  broad  instrument  would  also  be  the  EDF,  which  is 
currently outside the EU budget. It is therefore also proposed to integrate the EDF into 
the EU budget and by doing so, extend its flexibility features, to the extent possible, to all 
countries,  including  those  currently  covered  by  the  DCI  and  the  ENI.  The  flexibility 
features include its 20% reserve and multi-annuality in the form of carrying over unused 
funds and recommitments of uncommitted funds47. 

47 The EDF is not subject to the annuality rules of the EU budget so funds can be used any year according to needs. 
Annuality refers to the EU budgetary principle whereby expenditure and revenue are programmed and authorised for a 
given  year,  starting  on  1  January  and  ending  on  31  December.  Since  this  principle  cannot  be  waved  under  the  EU 
budget, a similar approach can be achieved with the broad instrument by allowing (i) uncommitted funds to be used the 
following year; and (ii) committed funds that have not been spent for a specific project/programme to be reused for 
another project/programme in subsequent years.   

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Chart 1. Current situation of heading 448 

Chart 2. Proposed external action heading49 

4.2. 

Structure of the broad instrument  

The  broad  instrument  should  regroup  the  current  actions  of  certain  instruments  under 
three components: geographic, thematic and rapid response actions. Within the first two 
components,  defined  regions  and  thematic  priorities  should  be  set-out,  including 
dedicated  amounts.  Prioritisation  within  the  third  component  should  be  made  in 
accordance with  the need to  respond rapidly to emerging  crises, build resilience and in 
line with foreign policy objectives. 

48  The  percentages  are  based  on  current  figures  for  programmes  (budget  execution  until  2017,  adopted  budget  until 
2018 and programming/planning for 2019-2020). 
49  The  percentages  for  the  proposed,  future  external  action  heading  redistributes  the  current  figures  for  existing 
programmes under the new structure. They are for comparison purposes only and do not prejudge the final allocations. 

15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Climate  change,  environmental  protection  and  gender  equality  would  be  mainstreamed 
throughout50.. 

Beyond  the  three  components  the  instrument  should  provide  a  substantial  cushion  for 
emerging challenges and priorities. This should allow for an appropriate response of the 
Union in the event of unforeseen circumstances; for addressing new needs or emerging 
challenges, such as those linked to crisis and post-crisis situations, migratory pressure at 
the  EU’s  or  its  neighbours’  borders;  or  for  promoting  new  international  initiatives  or 
priorities. 

The  broad  instrument  should  also  provide  for  budgetary  guarantees  for  lending 
operations to promote investment and macro-economic stability in partner countries. This 
will provide the legal basis for the guarantees required for financial operations under the 
current  EFSD,  ELM  and  MFA.  The  use  of  financial  instruments  and  budgetary 
guarantees as an aid modality should be promoted by creating a one-stop shop/platform 
for  financial  instruments/blending  and  budgetary  guarantee  operations.  The  overall 
management should remain with the Commission.  

While  recognising  that  the  European  Investment  Bank  is  a  key  partner  of  the 
Commission and a natural actor for implementing these types of operation, the decisions 
to use lending operations through the European Investment Bank (particularly sovereign 
lending),  which  are  currently  carried  our  through  the  ELM,  should  be  taken  during  the 
programming process and reflected in  the programming  documents. As regards Macro-
Financial  Assistance,  although  the  funds  should  be  provisioned  from  the  geographic 
envelopes  of  the  broad  instrument,  the  current  decision  making  applied  today  (full 
legislative procedure for every case of assistance to a third country) could continue to be 
used. 

The EU and its Member States have collectively committed to spend 0.7% of their GNI 
as ODA51. The broad instrument, as well as all other external action instruments should 
contribute to this goal.  

The internal governance systems used today to decide how funding will be allocated to 
projects  should  continue  and  where  possible  be  enhanced,  notably  when  it  comes  to 
upstream  work  with  all  key  Commission  services  and  the  European  External  Action 
Service.  In  the  case  of  programming  documents,  Member  States  should  continue  to 
exercise control through committee procedures.  

The  funds  mobilised  from  the  cushion  for  emerging  challenges    should  also  follow  the 
standard Commission decision-making  procedures.  

4.2.1.  Geographic programmes 

The broad instrument should mainly be implemented through geographic programmes.  

The  geographic  programmes  would  comprise  country  or  multi-country  actions.  The 
potential beneficiaries of the programmes are all third countries (i.e. non EU countries). 

50 External action spending is an important contributor to the EU’s target to mainstream climate action and to ensure 
that  at  least  20%  of  the  total  EU  budget  be  dedicated  to  climate  action-related  spending.  The  success  of  the 
see: 
for  example, 
mainstreaming  approach  has  been  highlighted 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/lib/COM-2016-603/SWD-2016-299_en.pdf  
51 See http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm  

the  MFF  Mid-Term  Review, 

in, 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
The  only  exception  would  be  for  candidate  and  potential  candidate  countries  to  avoid 
overlaps with the successor to IPA.  

This programme would succeed the current geographic programmes under the DCI, EDF, 
ENI  and  part  of  the  INSC52  and  PI.  In  line  with  political  orientations  from  the 
Commission53, it includes a prominent Neighbourhood window with a clear ring-fenced 
allocation.  Furthermore,  it  will  allow  for  conducting  current  thematic  activities  that  are 
not global and pursuing EU economic and policy interests (including non-ODA classified 
actions) in all partner countries – including on the external dimension of internal policies. 
This would ensure more comprehensive programmes at country or regional level. 

The  beneficiaries  would  be  grouped  into  the  following  regions  each  with  ear-marked 
amounts: 

-  Neighbourhood  
-  Sub-Saharan Africa 
-  Asia and the Pacific  
-  Americas and the Caribbean 

4.2.2.  Thematic programmes  

A  number  of  thematic  actions  currently  financed  by  thematic  programmes  and  taking 
place  at  country  level  will  instead  be  covered  under  the  geographic  programmes.  The 
remaining  thematic  actions  should  be  complementary  to  the  geographic  actions  and 
should  address  global  and  trans-regional  initiatives  supporting  internationally  agreed 
goals such as the Sustainable Development Goals or global public goods and challenges. 
The thematic actions would only be undertaken where there is no geographic programme 
(to  ensure  no  overlaps),  where  there  is  no  agreement  on  the  action  with  the  partner 
country  concerned,  or  where  the  action  cannot  be  adequately  addressed  by  geographic 
programmes.  

The thematic component would  merge the current thematic programmes under the DCI 
and the EIDHR (including election observation missions) and part of the PI.  

The  potential  beneficiaries  would  be  all  third  countries  and  overseas  countries  and 
territories to ensure a global approach to common challenges. The thematic programmes 
will  also  cover  actions  that  are  political  flagship  initiatives.  It  should  be  linked  to  the 
universal  agenda  for  the  pursuit  of  the  SDGs  and  the  EU  policy  frameworks  to 
implement them.  

In particular, actions under the thematic component should address actions linked to the 
pursuit of the Sustainable Development Goals at global level, in the following areas:  

(i)   Human  rights,  democracy  and  Civil  Society  Organisations  (including  actions 
formerly covered by EIDHR and the CSOs part of the CSOs/Local Authorities 
programme). 

52 Except for those activities that are covered by the Euratom Treaty. 
 53 See Commission’s communication on a new, modern MFF for an EU that delivers efficiently on its priorities post 
2020 (February 2018) 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
(ii)   Stability and peace (currently covered by article 4 and 5 of the IcSP54).  

(iii)   Support to the preservation of global public goods (these programmes are 

currently covered by the global public goods and challenges programme and 
the Local Authorities part of the CSOs/LAs programme of the DCI, and some 
actions under the PI). 

4.2.3.   Rapid response component 

Rapid  response  actions  should  be  complementary  to  geographic  and  thematic 
programmes. They should be designed and implemented to enable their continuity under 
those programmes, wherever relevant.  

This component would be dedicated to crises of a political, security or economic nature. 
It would provide rapid response capacity for crisis management and conflict prevention, 
resilience  building,  including  linking  relief,  rehabilitation  and  development,  and  short-
term foreign policy action. 

The  potential  beneficiaries  of  the  component  are  all  third  countries  and  overseas 
countries and territories. 

This  component  would  need  to  retain,  and  build  on,  the  current  modalities  for  fast, 
flexible  and  responsive  actions,  with  funds  that  are  immediately  available.  The 
component would include actions which:  

(a) 

b) 

contribute  to  stability  and  conflict  prevention  in  situations  of  urgency, 
emerging crisis, crisis and post-crisis; 

contribute to strengthening resilience of states, societies, communities and 
individuals and to link humanitarian and development action; 

c) 

address foreign policy needs and priorities. 

4.3. 

Justification for the changes 

Reduced administrative burden 

As  noted  by  the  Commission55  and  supported  by  feedback  from  partners,  the  current 
architecture of the external financing instruments is too complex. Streamlining a number 
of instruments into a broad instrument would provide an opportunity to rationalise their 
management and oversight systems therefore reducing the administrative burden for EU 
institutions  and  Member  States.  Having  a  simplified  oversight  system  would  allow  the 
relevant  institutions  to  have  a  better,  more  comprehensive  view  of  EU  external  action. 
Instead of focusing on multiple programming processes, debates would be more focused 
on political objectives and engagement with external partners.  

Simplification does not mean there would be less scrutiny. The inter-institutional balance 
would  be  fully  preserved.  Rather,  the  budgetary  and  scrutiny  powers  of  the  European 
Parliament would be extended by the incorporation of the EDF into the budget.  

54 Article 4 concerns peace-building partnerships. Article 5 concerns global and trans-regional threats and emerging 
threats. 
55  In  particular  the  Reflection  paper  on  the  future  of  EU  finances  (June  2017),  and  the  Communication  from  the 
Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council (February 2018) 

18 

 
 
 
                                                            
Fewer gaps and overlaps between instruments  

With  lines  between  foreign  and  development  policy,  and  between  internal  and  external 
policies  blurring,  the  challenges  the  EU  is  facing  often  cannot  be  contained  within 
geographic  and  thematic  boundaries.  To  respond  to  these  challenges  and  support  the 
implementation  of  universal  goals  such  as  the  2030  Agenda,  a  broad  instrument  would 
provide a more geographically and thematically comprehensive approach, facilitating the 
implementation  of  different  policies  in  a  trans-regional  and  multi-sectoral  way.  By 
merging several instruments, the EU would facilitate coherent responses, breaking down 
thematic and geographic silos and better enabling the exploitation of synergies.  

By ensuring thematic programmes will in principle only cover those actions that cannot 
be financed through the geographic component, or which need specific approaches (e.g. 
where approval by the counterpart cannot take place because of their global nature), the 
broad  instrument  would  ensure  a  more  systematic,  integrated  approach  to  its 
programming/planning.  Overlaps  between  programmes  would  be  eliminated, 
in 
particular where they might occur in relation to more advanced developing countries, and 
between the geographic and thematic programmes (i.e. the EDF geographic programmes 
and the DCI thematic programmes). Policy lines and operational needs would drive the 
programming rather than specific instrument (thematic/geographic)-based needs.  

At  the  same  time,  the  broad  instrument  would  also  reduce  the  complex  framework  of 
interfaces  between  the  EU’s  external  and  internal  policies.  For  example,  on  migration, 
while  numerous  instruments  and  ad  hoc  tools,  such  the  creation  of  the  EU  emergency 
trust  funds  for  Africa56  have  helped  the  EU  support  this  issue,  the  broad  instrument 
would go further by ensuring full geographic coverage of support.  

The EU would be able to engage with partners in a more coherent way. The 2030 Agenda 
is  based on equal partnerships  that transform our  way of cooperation and applies to all 
countries.  A  broad  instrument  would  allow  the  EU  to  remove  artificial  boundaries  to 
ensure a right policy mix for different countries and regions. Along these lines, the issue 
raised in section 2.2. on differentiation, including graduation, should be reviewed so that 
cooperation  with  upper  middle  income  countries  can  be  pursued  through  bilateral 
cooperation.  Further,  cooperation  with  industrialised  countries  should  also  be  covered 
under  the  instrument,  to  ensure  a  coherent  approach,  notably  through  regional 
cooperation  and  rapid  response  activities  for  foreign  policy.  These  funds  should  be 
limited to ensure no inverse impact on ODA figures.  

Finally,  cooperation  and  joint  programming  with  Member  States  would  be  enhanced 
since coordination would only be needed with fewer EU instruments. It is worth noting 
that by creating the broad instrument the EU will be mirroring more closely the set-up of 
the  Member  States  who  do  not  regulate  their  external  spending  according  to  different 
geographic and thematic instruments. 

More reactive to evolving needs and priorities 

56 Established by the Commission in 2015, this trust fund was created to address the root causes of instability, forced 
displacement  and  irregular  migration  and  to  contribute  to  better  migration  management.  For  more  information: 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund-africa_en  

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
The  broad  instrument  will  provide  an  opportunity  to  enhance  the  responsiveness  and 
flexibility of EU actions.  

By  reserving  a  substantial  amount  of  un-allocated  funds,  the  emerging  challenges  and 
priorities  cushion,  building  on  the  successful  experience  of  the  EDF57  would  provide 
more flexibility to shift funds more easily. These funds would be used according to needs 
for  unforeseen  events,  new  initiatives/priorities  or  to  respond  to  migratory  pressures  at 
the  EU’s  or  its  neighbours’  borders.  Such  a  precaution  would  allow  for  top-ups  to  the 
different  regions/themes  covered  under  the  broad  instrument,  helping  to  ease  the 
pressures on the external action budget as unforeseen events and new priorities emerge.  
The balance between flexibility and predictability  should be ensured as the cushion for 
emerging challenges will exist alongside dedicated amounts per region. 

In  today’s  fast-changing  world,  the  transfer  of  budgetary  flexibilities  to  the  broad 
instrument would allow the EU to better cope with unpredictable events. Under the broad 
instrument, EDF practices such as making sure non-committed funds and funds that have 
not  been  spent  for  a  project/programme  would  still  be  available  in  subsequent  years, 
would  make  the  instrument  more  flexible.  More  funds  will  become  available  for  new 
projects.  

Furthermore,  based  on  current  experience  there  is  a  sound  justification  for  having  a 
dedicated flexible component to cover a full range of security, humanitarian-development 
nexus, and political, economic and other issues where a rapid EU response is necessary. 

While lessons learned have shown the EU needs to be more agile in mobilising its funds, 
feedback from stakeholders has also shown the importance of balancing flexibility with 
predictable  levels  of  funding.  Such  predictability  is  currently  provided  through  certain 
partner-driven,  long-term  instruments  (i.e.  the  DCI,  EDF  and  ENI),  which  together 
account  for  approximately  70%  of  heading  4.  The  broad  instrument  should  continue  to 
provide a similar proportion of predictable funding through its geographic programmes. 

More focus on performance 

Concerning performance, in parallel to the broad instrument, a new IT platform will be 
created that will facilitate the encoding of results data at project level. This would help 
increase the availability of results data for monitoring, reporting and evaluation purposes. 
For further information on performance, see section 6.  

4.4.  Which instruments should be replaced by the broad instrument? 

With more than 15 external relations instruments currently under heading 4, not all can 
justifiably be replaced by the broad instrument. What follows is an analysis (advantages 
and  disadvantages)  of  the  instruments  that  are  proposed  to  be  replaced,  mainly  due  to 
their common legal bases or similar objectives. 

European Development Fund 

Advantages  of  integrating  the  EDF  into  the  broad  instrument  and  therefore  the  EU 
budget: As the 11th EDF is the largest external instrument with a volume of EUR 30.506 
billion, a broad instrument will be more meaningful if such a significant programme can 

57 As a comparison, the EDF’s un-allocated envelope is currently 20% whereas for the DCI, it is 6% of the geographic 
programme. 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
be part of it. The possibilities of harvesting its previously mentioned flexibility features 
are much higher by bringing EDF on-budget into the broad instrument.  

The level of democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament will be enhanced with the 
EDF  on-budget.  Unlike  the  current  arrangements,  the  same  Parliamentary  procedures 
would apply across all development cooperation. This would help strengthen the public 
legitimacy and political visibility of the EU's external assistance as a whole. 

At the same time, the criticism that some EDF funding is being used to finance military 
expenditures  as  part  of  a  “development  instrument”  will  cease  to  be  an  issue. 
Expenditures related to military actions, which cannot be financed by the EU budget due 
to Treaty limitations, could be taken up under a new off-budget security fund (see further 
information on the security fund later in this section).  

EU external action would become more coherent. Artificial interfaces across instruments, 
in  particular  with  regard  to  geographical,  partner-oriented  programming  would  be 
reduced. There would be increased transparency in the EU budget, covering all external 
action  expenditure  (except  military  related  expenditure),  therefore  providing  a  better 
global picture. The merge into a broad instrument would also provide an opportunity to 
review  the  EDF's  specific  implementation  procedures  (e.g.  the  obligation  to  have  a 
national authorising officer). There would also be no need for a separate EDF key58 - the 
contributions from Member States would be those made (in percentage terms) to the EU 
budget, as for any other programme. It should be noted that several efforts have already 
been  made  to  align  the  two  percentages  so  that  now  there  is  little  difference  between 
them. 

Disadvantages  of  integrating  into  the  broad  instrument:  The  political  and  financial 
implications  of  bringing  the  EDF  on-budget  include  that  the  EU  would  lose  its  visible 
and  symbolic  financial  basis  for  cooperation  with  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific 
countries.  Implications  for  ACP  partners  include  that  they  may  see  their  relations  with 
the EU as being downgraded as certain procedures would change. There could also be a 
risk that the broad instrument would receive less funding than the sum of the EDF and 
the other external action instruments combined.  

The  EDF’s  flexibility  features  may  be  lost  if  it  is  integrated  into  the  EU  budget  and 
military related expenditure currently funded by the EDF’s African Peace Facility (AFP) 
could stop being funded for legal reasons.  

Conclusion:  The  advantages  of  integrating  the  EDF  in  the  EU  budget  outweigh  the 
disadvantages  as  long  as  partners  can  be  reassured  on  the  implications  and  certain 
preconditions can be met. The additionality of the EDF full amount for external relations 
must  be  ensured.  Existing  EDF  flexibilities  (e.g.  large  reserve  and  multi-annuality) 
should be imported as far as is possible within the annuality of the EU budget. Activities 
currently financed by the APF should continue through an off-budget mechanism. 

Development Cooperation Instrument 

Advantages of integrating into the broad instrument: There would be a reduction in the 
artificial  interfaces  between  the  DCI  and  the  other  external  action  instruments  –  in 
that  provide  geographical,  partner-oriented 
particular  regarding 

instruments 

the 

58 The EDF key sets out the contributions (in  percentage terms) the Member States have to contribute.  

21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
programming. For example, the Latin America and Caribbean region would be covered 
by  one  instrument  instead  of  both  the  current  combination  of  DCI  and  EDF.  Global 
issues such as climate change would be better addressed in a coherent manner across all 
partner  countries.  Currently  they  are  split  between  DCI  geographic  and  thematic 
programmes, the EDF and the PI. Links between development, security, and migration, 
which are currently split across several instruments can be better ensured.  

Disadvantages of integrating into the broad instrument: There could be the perception of 
diluting  the  importance  of  development  policy  within  a  broader  external  action 
framework.  

Conclusion: The advantages of integrating the DCI outweigh the disadvantages as long 
as the DACability59 objective for a proportion of the fund and communication efforts are 
made to explain that placing the DCI in a broad instrument does not represent a “down-
grading” in EU priorities.  

European Neighbourhood Instrument  

Advantages of  integrating into the broad instrument:  During the current  MFF, the ENI 
has been one of the most stretched instruments in terms of funding due to multiple crises 
in its regions. A major advantage of being part of the broad instrument would be that the 
Neighbourhood would have access to the emerging challenges and priorities cushion in 
addition  to  ring  fenced  amounts.  98%  of  ENI  actions  are  reported  as  ODA.  As  the 
pressure  to  continue  actions  that  can  be  reported  as  ODA  increases,  merging  within  a 
broad  instrument  may  provide  scope  for  more  flexibility  in  defining  the  actions  to  be 
financed.  It  would  allow  for  easier  cooperation  between  ENI,  African  and  Asian 
neighbouring countries on issues such as migration and energy. 

Disadvantages of integrating into the broad instrument:  A dedicated instrument for the 
Neighbourhood  gives  this  policy  a  visible  financial  basis.  Partner  countries  may  be 
hesitant about the cooperation being merged into a broad instrument. This may create a 
negative  political  signal 
through  appropriate 
communication. 

to  be  addressed 

that  will  need 

Conclusion: The advantages of integrating the ENI outweigh the disadvantages as long as 
a  prominent  ring-fenced  window  for  the  Neighbourhood  is  kept  and  communication 
efforts are made to explain that (i) a merge does not represent a “down-grading” in EU 
priorities  and  (ii)  the  existence  of  distinct  policies  and  strategies  will  be  maintained 
ensuring political visibility. The same should apply to specific approaches and tools such 
as the more for more mechanism60. 

Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 

Advantages  of  integrating  into  the  broad  instrument:  Including  short-term  crisis 
response,  conflict  prevention  and  CBSD  actions  under  the  IcSP  within  the  broad 
instrument  would  reinforce  further  coherence  and  complementarity  with  other 
instruments, providing an enhanced coordination of activities at country level. Likewise, 
the  coordination  of  the  medium  and  long-term  activities  under  the  IcSP  with  the  long-

59 Meaning actions have the main objective of being administered with the promotion of the economic development 
and welfare of developing countries or are concessional in character, conveying a grant element of at least 25% 
60  The  'more  for  more'  mechanism  ensures  additional  reform  efforts  by  Neighbourhood  countries  are  rewarded  with 
additional financial and other support. 

22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
term/programmed  activities  from  other  instruments  could  be  further  reinforced.  Links 
between security and development would also be enhanced.  

Disadvantages  of  integrating  into  the  broad  instrument:  There  is  a  risk  of  a  loss  of 
flexibility and distinctive modalities for crisis response and conflict prevention, reducing 
the EU's role and reputation in helping partners in crises and conflicts. 

Conclusion: As the disadvantages can be mitigated by ensuring that the IcSP’s specific 
focus  and  the  existing  flexibilities  are  maintained  within  a  broad  instrument,  it  is 
proposed to merge the instrument into the broad instrument. 

European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 

Advantages  of  integrating  into  the  broad  instrument:  While  it  has  limited  funds 
compared to other external financing instruments, the EIDHR is at the core of the EU's 
values.  As  democracy  and  human  rights  are  being  put  under  greater  stress,  additional 
funding  may  be  needed.  As  part  of  the  broad  instrument,  democracy  and  human  rights 
actions  potentially  have  greater  access  to  un-allocated  funds.  Boundaries  with  other 
instruments  would  be  reduced  and  more  integrated  programming  approaches  and 
coherence with country actions would be possible. 

Disadvantages  of integrating into  the broad instrument:  It could  be  perceived  by some 
actors that putting the EIDHR in the broad instrument reduces the visibility of its actions.  

Conclusion:  Overall,  by  ensuring  financial  visibility  of  democracy  and  human  rights 
through  ring-fencing  inside  the  thematic  programme  together  with  the  fast  disbursing 
mechanism,  the  advantages  of  integrating  the  EIDHR  inside  the  broad  instrument 
outweigh the disadvantages. 

Partnership Instrument  

Advantages  of  integrating  into  the  broad  instrument:  The  PI’s  integration  into  a  broad 
instrument would help confirm that the promotion of political and policy issues in the EU 
and mutual interest, including external projection of EU internal policies, with no ODA 
requirements,  is  recognised  as  an  integral  part  of  a  broad  EU  external  action.  
Complementarity  with  other  instruments  would  be  enhanced,  strengthening  integrated 
approaches and coherence. For example, regional initiatives could be tackled in a more 
consistent and harmonised way regardless of the different levels of development amongst 
the countries.  

Disadvantages  of  integrating  into  the  broad  instrument:  The  integration  into  a  broad 
instrument might weaken the flexible and fast reaction approaches of the PI which allow 
it to respond to emerging needs and priorities of the EU, or to seize political windows of 
opportunity which depend on the political cycle in partner countries or on the dynamics 
of bilateral relations or inter-regional/ multilateral dialogues. 

Conclusion: Overall, the integration of the PI’s activities into a broad instrument presents 
a potential for coherence and synergies with other types of external action. The potential 
risks  mentioned  above  can  be  mitigated  by  appropriate  measures such  as  preserving  PI 
approaches  and  visibility,  in  order  for  the  advantages  of  integrating  the  PI  inside  the 
broad instrument to outweigh the disadvantages. 

Macro Financial Assistance  

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Advantages  of  being  into  the  broad  instrument:  The  inclusion  of  MFA  under  the 
budgetary guarantee component of the broad instrument would ensure that the required 
provisioning arrangements for the guarantee of MFA lending operations would be in line 
with the provisions under the new financial regulation. Furthermore, it would allow for a 
more efficient management of guarantee resources pooled in the Common Provisioning 
Fund.  

Disadvantages of being into the broad instrument: Not having a specific legal base, but 
being  based  directly  on  the  Treaty,  MFA  will  continue  to  be  governed  by  the  ordinary 
legislative procedure, which requires the approval of the European Parliament and of the 
Council  for  each  specific  operation.  This  legislative  and  decision  making  process  is 
different  from  the  one  envisaged  for  the  broad  instrument.  This  lack  of  alignment  of 
procedures would therefore be against the objectives of streamlining and simplification in 
the  broad  instrument.  Changing  the  current  legal  setup  to  enter  into  a  single  regulation 
would require intensive consultations with the co-legislators.  

Conclusion: It is more effective to keep MFA separate from the broad instrument due to 
its different legislative and decision making processes.  MFA grants  will continue to be 
treated under a separate budget line. However, including the provisioning arrangements 
for  MFA  in  the  budgetary  guarantee  component  of  the  broad  instrument,  should  help 
safeguard the important leverage capabilities of the MFA and allow for a more efficient 
management of provisioning resources. 

European Fund for Sustainable Development 

Advantages  of  being  into  the  broad  instrument:  Integrating  into  the  broad  instrument 
would simplify the legal framework and efficiency of processes and operations. It would 
improve visibility delivered by the current fragmented instruments and facilitating better 
communication  of  impact  and  results.  There  would  be  a  stronger  policy  alignment  and 
complementarity of actions.  

Disadvantages  of  being  into  the  broad  instrument:  It  would  be  difficult  to  regulate 
distinct governance models within the same basic act. In the case of EFSD, governance 
bodies include the Member States and the European Parliament as an observer, which is 
not  always  the  case  for  other  financial  instruments.  Some  confusion  may  be  created 
because  the broad  instrument  would  concern  investment  structures  beyond  its  coverage 
(e.g. pre-accession). 

Conclusion:  The  disadvantages  of  having  the  EFSD  in  the  broad  instrument  can  be 
overcome  by  ensuring  the  complexities  of  having  an  investment  structure  serving 
programmes beyond the broad instrument can be avoided by making cross-references in 
the relevant legal bases. 

External Lending Mandate  

Advantages  of  being  in  the  broad  instrument:  The  objectives  of  the  ELM  would  be 
defined  alongside  and  coherently  with  those  of  other  instruments,  in  particular  other 
budgetary  guarantee  instruments  such  as  the  EFSD  in  order  to  ensure  maximum 
coherence  and  added-value  of  the  EU's  budgetary  guarantees.  This  would  avoid  the 
current situation whereby two guarantee instruments exist (EFSD and ELM) which could 
theoretically support the same kinds of projects, one exclusively for the EIB and the other 
open  to  a  range  of  international  financial  institutions.  Positive  experience  with  climate 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
finance under the ELM could be imported into the new instrument, and the application of 
common standards (do no harm/Paris Agreement compatibility) would be harmonised. 

Disadvantages of being in the broad instrument: The challenge will be to account for the 
governance specificities of the ELM while ensuring close policy alignment of the EIB's 
activities under the EU guarantee with EU objectives as well as complementarity with the 
EFSD. 

Conclusion:  In  order  to  unlock  the  value-added  of  including  the  ELM  in  the  broad 
instrument while avoiding the disadvantages, it should incorporate certain features of the 
EFSD such as a governance structure which allows for more granular policy alignment of 
EIB projects (in the way of the EFSD Strategic Board or the European Fund for Strategic 
Investments61  investment  committee).  The  objectives  of  the  ELM  should  be  defined  in 
such a way as to clarify the complementarity between the EFSD windows and the ELM. 
For more detailed information see the annex on ELM. 

Common Implementing Regulation 

Advantages of integrating into the broad instrument: There will be enhanced clarity on 
the  principles  and  policy  framework  that  will  apply  during  the  implementation  of  the 
broad  instrument.  There  will  also  be  opportunities  to  further  harmonise  existing 
implementing articles that are currently included in the individual instruments but not in 
the CIR.  

Disadvantages of integrating into the broad instrument: Current specificities included in 
the CIR, such as support to people with disabilities could risk being diluted in a broader 
framework. 

Conclusion:  As  long  as  efforts  are  made  to  ensure  the  specific  concerns  in  the  current 
CIR  are  given  attention  in  the  broad  instrument,  the  advantages  of  merging  the  CIR 
would outweigh the disadvantages. 

Programmes that should not be replaced under the broad instrument 

The  following  text  justifies  why  the  remaining  heading  4  instruments  should  not  be 
merged into the broad instrument, mainly due to their specific legal bases or objectives. 
Further information on these programmes can be found in the annexes.  

Humanitarian Aid  

The  delivery  of  humanitarian  aid  is  guided  by  the  principles  of  humanity,  neutrality, 
impartiality  and  independence.  Humanitarian  aid  is  provided  solely  on  the  basis  of  the 
needs of affected populations, regardless of any political, military or other objective. This 
is  fundamental  in  order  to  secure  access  for  humanitarian  actors  to  all  people  in  need 
while ensuring their own security in the field. A separate instrument for humanitarian aid 
is a safeguard which helps preserve the humanitarian principles and avoid confusion or 
blurred  lines  among  different  EU  policies,  political  (or  other)  objectives  and  actors 
present in crises. 

61 The European Fund for Strategic Investments is an initiative to help overcome the current investment gap in the EU. 
Jointly launched by the EIB and the European Commission, it aims to mobilise private investment in projects which 
are strategically important for the EU. 

25 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
The  consequence  of  the  principle  of  impartiality  is  the  EU's  commitment  to  a  needs-
based approach to humanitarian aid, to reach the most vulnerable, answer the most urgent 
needs  and  fulfil  the  humanitarian  imperative.  It  should  therefore  be  translated  into  a 
needs-based  allocation  of  funding,  which  is  better  guaranteed  with  a  clear  separation 
between  the  source  of  humanitarian  aid  funding  and  other  funding  instruments,  which 
may have legitimate political objectives, as is currently the case. 

Humanitarian  aid  does  not  function  like  other  instruments:  it  is  governed  by  the 
emergency  contexts  and  tight  timeframes  in  which  it  must  be  delivered.  The 
Humanitarian aid regulation and a specific budget line have made the humanitarian aid 
instrument more flexible in terms of programming than many others, in order to react to 
changing circumstances in crises and sudden onset crises. This has allowed the EU to be 
in  the  frontline  of  response  to  many  of  the  most  acute  crises.  A  specific  instrument 
therefore best matches the important operational necessity of reaching people before it is 
too late. 

Complementarity  with  the  broad  instrument  will  be  ensured  through  actions  that  link 
development  and  humanitarian  assistance 
(Linking  Relief,  Rehabilitation  and 
Development, LRRD), e.g. in the context of the operationalisation of the humanitarian-
development nexus and the resilience agenda.  

Union Civil Protection Mechanism  

The Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) has a specific mandate for prevention, 
preparedness  and  response  to  disasters  both  inside  and  outside  Europe62.  The  nature  of 
the instrument is very specific and distinct from other external instruments insofar as it 
ensures  the  coordination  of  in-kind  assistance  provided  by  the  participating  states. 
Moreover,  the  external  dimension  of  the  UCPM  is  closely  linked  to  humanitarian 
assistance  provided  by  the  EU.  The  UCPM  has  played  an  essential  role  in  providing 
rapid assistance in the aftermath of natural disasters in many occasions (e.g. Nepal, Haiti, 
Peru,  and  Bangladesh),  complementing  the  relief  assistance  provided  by  humanitarian 
aid. The close cooperation between the two instruments should be reinforced. With this 
in mind, the proposed reform of the UCPM tabled by the Commission in November 2017 
tries  to  deepen  this  cooperation  by  facilitating  the  combined  use  of  these  instruments 
when  responding  to  a  disaster  outside  the  EU.  Integrating  the  UCPM  (or  its  external 
component) into the broad instrument could undermine the capacity of the EU to provide 
disaster  relief  to  third  countries  using  the  most  effective  combination  of  assistance 
according to context. 

The UCPM has close  connections with other external instruments, namely IPA and the 
ENI.  The  cooperation  between  the  UCPM  and  the  ENI  relates  to  prevention  and 
preparedness programmes carried out in ENP countries, both in the South and the East. 
In addition to these programmes, the ENI also offers funding to neighbourhood countries 
from  national  allocations  to  cover  prevention  and  preparedness  activities  (twinning 
programmes or technical assistance programmes). 

Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA)  

62 It therefore straddles internal and external headings. 

26 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
IPA  pursues  objectives  that  are  completely  distinct  from  the  remaining  external  action 
instruments as it aims to prepare countries to become EU Member States by supporting 
their accession process. The different nature of its objectives therefore argues in favour 
of it remaining separate. 

According to the IPA II mid-term review, the instrument is relevant and fit for purpose, 
in line with EU priorities and beneficiary needs and has demonstrated a high degree of 
flexibility. Only minimal changes would be necessary to clearly position it in the context 
of the new Western Balkans Strategy, and reflect the developments in the relations with 
Turkey. At the same time, more efforts should be put in place to ensure coherence and 
synergies with the broad instrument, in particular with respect to the thematic and non-
programmable  component.  The  complementarity  of  the  instrument  with  other  external 
financing  instruments,  notably  EIDHR  and  IcSP  has  previously  been  good  but 
coordination  during  both  the  planning  and  programming  phase  has  not  been  sufficient. 
Close alignment between the programming cycles of IPA and the programmable parts of 
the broad instrument would facilitate complementarity. 

EU Aid Volunteers scheme  

The  EU  Aid  Volunteers  (EUAV)  objectives  are  different  to  the  broad  instrument.  The 
aim  will  be  to  enhance  the  engagement  of  young  people  and  organisations  in  activities 
that  will  strengthen  cohesion  and  solidarity  in  Europe  and  abroad.  Instead  it  should  be 
integrated into the European Solidarity Corps therefore extending its geographical scope.  

Both  programmes  are  partially  overlapping  with  a  common  overarching  objective  of 
involving young people and organisations in high quality solidarity activities. Integrating 
the activities  of the EUAV within the European Solidarity Corps would provide clarity 
through  a  single  entry  point  for  different  EU  volunteering  opportunities  inside  and 
outside  the  EU.  Moreover,  the  integration  of  the  two  initiatives  would  present  a  good 
opportunity  to  simplify  the  procedures  in  line  with  the  findings  from  the  interim 
evaluation of the EUAV (2017). 

Support to the Turkish Cypriot community 
This  programme  has  its  own  legal  basis63  and  is  based  on  article  352  TFEU  (Council 
unanimity and European Parliament consent) whereas other EU external instruments are 
based on articles 209 and 212 TFEU.  In addition, its duration is not linked to the MFF 
and it has no end date. Due to its unique nature and specific coverage, there is little scope 
for synergies with other instruments and the programme. 

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)  

The  CFSP  has  its  own  legal  base.  Moreover,  it  is  functionally  different  from  the  other 
instruments  with  the  main  focus  being  security.  Actions  funded  under  the  CFSP  are 
closely  coordinated  with  other  external  instruments  projects  and  programmes.  The 
conceptual  design  and  conduct  of  specific  CSDP  mandates  is  subject  to  dialogue  and 
analysis  involving  the  EEAS,  the  Commission  (the  Service  for  Foreign  Policy 
Instruments)  and  the  Council  through  PSC  and  the  relevant  working  groups,  which 
ensures strong coordination and synergy with other Union's programmes. 

Greenland and OCTs  

63 Council Regulation (EC) 389/2006 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
The OCTs and the Greenland Decisions should not be integrated in a broad instrument or 
to any other co-decided instrument due to their specific procedures of adoption: Council 
decision  following  consultation  of  the  European  Parliament.  However,  in  order  to 
streamline  the  number  of  programmes,  they  should  be  regrouped  under  one  decision, 
which would include a ring-fenced envelope for Greenland.  

The Greenland and OCTs programme will be connected to the broad instrument through 
the  latter’s  thematic  component.  A  number  of  OCT  priorities include global challenges 
such as environment and climate change. 

Instrument for Nuclear Safety and Cooperation  

Nuclear safety is an important part of the EU external action and should continue to be 
part  of  a  broad  instrument.  Nevertheless  some  nuclear  activities  are  the  competence  of 
the  Euratom  Treaty,  and  the  INSC  has  its  own  legal  basis  (Article  203  of  the  Euratom 
Treaty64) which is not compatible with the ordinary legislative procedure.  

Analysis  of  the  legal  base  has  shown  that  if  the  INSC  was  merged  into  a  broad 
instrument  it  would  not  be  possible  to  continue  the  actions  of  the  INSC  to  their  full 
effect.  As  the  INSC  cannot  be  totally  integrated  into  a  broad  instrument  a  separate 
instrument should be kept based on the Euratom legal base in order to pursue the current 
objectives of the INSC, complementing the broad instrument. Therefore actions carried 
out under this new instrument should be consistent with those of the broad instrument. 

Emergency Aid Reserve 

An enlarged emergency aid reserve would replace the current emergency aid reserve. It 
would cover crisis both inside and outside the EU.  

The current emergency aid reserve is a budget tool outside the normal allocation in the 
EU  budget.  It  is  intended  to  allow  for  a  rapid  response  to  specific  aid  requirements  of 
third  countries  following  events  "which  could  not  be  foreseen  when  the  budget  was 
established,  first  and  foremost  for  humanitarian  operations,  but  also  for  civil  crisis 
management  and  protection,  and  situations  of  particular  pressure  resulting  from 
migratory  flows  at  the  Union's  external  borders  where  circumstances  so  require"  (MFF 
Regulation 2014-2020).  

It  would  be  essential  that  a  significant  amount  of  the  emergency  and  crisis  response 
reserve is earmarked for external actions, in particular for humanitarian and emergency 
operations. 

European Peace Facility 

This  would  be  a  new  proposal  that  would  be  financed  outside  the  EU  budget  and 
therefore outside the broad instrument. In this facility, all existing military and security-
related funding actions, that cannot be on-budget according to Article 41(2) TEU would 
be  merged  (i.e.  APF  that  currently  sits  under  the  EDF,  and  other  crisis  management 
components, namely the Athena Mechanism). This off-budget facility would address the 
criticism that development funds are being misappropriated for security-related actions, 

64  See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012A%2FTXT  

28 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
while at the same time acknowledging the needs for funding military and security-related 
actions in/by partner countries, including Africa and beyond. This off-budget fund would 
have the following features: 

1.  Largely non-ODA actions in the military/security sector; 

2.  Greatly simplifies current arrangements and increases coherence and flexibility of 

those instruments covered; 

3.  Consistency  between  this  facility  and  the  non-programmable  component  and 

other security-related actions of the broad instrument. 

Security  related  expenditures  that  can  already  be  funded  under  the  budget  should 
continue being implemented through the existing modalities in post-2020 situation. The 
fund should be governed by the principles of coherence and complementarity, ensuring 
full  consistency  and  synergy  with  relevant  external  action  instruments  and  measures 
under the EU budget, in particular the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The High 
Representative,  the  Council  and  the  Commission  will  ensure  that  during  each  step  of 
implementation,  coordination  and  synergies  between  EPF  funded  actions  and  measures 
and  other  actions  funded  by  the  Union’s  budget,  is  systematically  sought  to  ensure 
relevance and complementarity in order to increase effectiveness and impact 

4.5. 

Prioritisation 

Prioritisation of actions should be based on the policy framework and on the objectives 
of  the  broad  instrument.  During  the  planning/programming  stage  of  the  project  cycle, 
allocation methods are used to determine envelopes for the partner countries. Currently, 
there  are  diverse  methods  to  define  financial  allocations  across  the  EU  instruments, 
ranging from quantitative methodologies to pure qualitative indicators.  

For  the  EDF  and  DCI,  the  EEAS  and  the  Commission  services  have  developed  a 
transparent  methodology  based  on  a  quantitative  model  that  uses  a  limited  number  of 
internationally  agreed  indicators,  and  foresees  and  adjustment  based  on  the  country 
situation and particularly evolutions in the political/security situation and the absorption 
capacity (demonstrated by past cooperation with the EU).  

The  DCI,  the  Cotonou  Agreement65  and  the  regulation  implementing  the  11th  EDF66 
specify  that  EU  should  allocate  resources  according  to  country  needs,  capacities, 
commitments, performance and potential EU impact; and that the EU must seek to target 
resources where needed the most to address poverty reduction, and where they can have 
the greatest impact, including in fragile countries.  

Where necessary and appropriate, the allocation methodology allows for adjustments on 
the  basis  of  a  qualitative  assessment,  reflecting  elements  such  as  commitments, 
performance,  impact,  inequality  recent  evolution  in  country  political/security  situation 
and  its  demonstrated  absorption  capacity.  Subsequently  the  allocations  are  set  in  the 
multiannual programming/planning documents for each partner country/region. 

For the Neighbourhood countries, Association Agendas, Partnership Priorities and other 
equivalent jointly agreed documents are key points of reference for setting the priorities 

65 See https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/african-caribbean-and-pacific-acp-region/cotonou-agreement_en  
66 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2015.058.01.0001.01.ENG  

29 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
for Union support to neighbourhood countries. Subsequently, the objectives and priorities 
together  with  indicative  allocations  are  set  in  relevant  multiannual  programming 
documents. The ENI regulation specifies that support to countries shall take into account 
needs; commitment to and progress in implementing mutually agreed political, economic 
and  social  reform  objectives;  commitment  to  and  progress  in  building  deep  and 
sustainable democracy; partnership with the EU, including the level of ambition for that 
partnership  and  absorption  capacity  and  the  potential  impact  of  EU  support.  The  EU's 
specific  relationship  with  neighbourhood  countries  will  also  be  reflected  through  the 
criteria governing the allocation of funds. 

For  the  EIDHR,  the  indicative  overall  financial  allocations  and  allocations  per  priority 
area are made on the basis of strategies papers. 

For  the  IcSP,  financing  of  actions  takes  into  account  the  particular  difficulties  of  the 
partner countries or regions concerned. 

For  the  PI,  the  methodology  is  not  based  on  binding  allocations  but  reflects  the  global 
scope and coverage of PI objectives.  

For the INSC, the geographical scope extends to all third countries, with a priority given 
to accession and neighbouring countries.  

5.  DELIVERY MECHANISMS OF THE INTENDED FUNDING 

The specific, diverse and rapidly changing context of EU external action requires the use 
of all the existing implementation modalities and delivery instruments currently used by 
the  external  financing  instruments  in  order  to  pursue  the  policy  objectives  and 
operational  priorities  described  early  in  this  document.  The  existing  choice  of  tools 
should  be  preserved  both  at  the  level  of  implementation  and  delivery  method.  In 
choosing the appropriate implementation modality and delivery method the EU will take 
into consideration the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Efforts will also be 
put in place to enhance leverage of public and private funds through the use of innovative 
financing as detailed below. 

5.1. 

Implementation modalities 

The  EU  should  continue  relying  on  a  variety  of  partners  such  as  international 
organisations,  Member  States  agencies  and  organisations,  civil  society  organisations, 
national,  regional  and  local  authorities,  international  and  development  financial 
institutions in situations where they have a clear added-value, building on the experience 
achieved  and  the  lessons  learned.  The  new  implementation  framework  should  balance 
flexibility with predictability, so key partners can justify the continuous investment into 
competences  and  resources,  which  ultimately  enable  the  smooth  running  of  planned 
operations and the ability to react in crisis operations. In the context of external action, 
the EU can employ direct, indirect or shared management modes.  

In direct management, the EU (including when it acts through the EU Delegation or an 
executive agency of the EU) contracts directly with the final recipient. This management 
mode  can  be  used  to  finance,  among  others,  budget  support  operations,  grants  to  civil 
society  organisations  and  contracts  assigned  through  procurement  procedures  for 
provision of services, works and goods. Erasmus+ also employs the direct management 
mode. 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In  indirect  management,  EU  funds  are  contracted  through  intermediaries  (called 
entrusted  entities).  The  entrusted  entity  is  only  allowed  to  channel  EU  funds  to  final 
recipients by way of grants, public procurement or financial instruments. The entrusted 
entity  either  uses  the  EU's  rules  or  follows  its  own  rules  if  they  were  considered  to  be 
equivalent in the ex-ante check known as a pillar assessment. Indirect management can 
be used with the following entrusted entities to serve specific purposes as follows: 

(a)  With a partner country or an entity designated by it to strengthen ownership and 
alignment with national procedures in line with aid effectiveness principles. This 
is often used in the context of the Instrument for Pre-Accession;  

(b)  With an agency of a Member States or an EFTA country (Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Norway,  Switzerland)  or,  exceptionally,  of  a  third  donor  country  to  reinforce 
donor coordination and harmonisation; 

(c)  With  an  international  organisation  to  make  the  best  use  of  the  comparative 
advantage of dedicated international organisations, foster long-term collaboration 
increase  donor  coordination  and 
with  key 
harmonisation; 

international  partners  and 

(d)  The  European  Investment  Bank  which  lends  and  provide  guarantees  and 
financial instruments in support of EU policies, often in conjunction with other 
forms of EU support (blending, ELM guarantee, ACP Investment Facility, etc; 

(e)  An EU specialised (traditional/regulatory, hence not executive) agency. 

Member States 

5.2.  Delivery methods 

In  accordance  with  the  new  European  Consensus  on  Development,  to  reflect  the 
framework set out in the 2030 Agenda and the Addis Ababa Agenda for Action67, the EU 
and its Member States must adapt their approach to mobilise and make effective use of 
all  means of implementation, including through innovative financing mechanisms. This 
requires a renewed focus on establishing an enabling and conducive policy environment 
at  all  levels.  This  includes  mobilising  and  making  effective  use  of  domestic  and 
international  public  finance,  mobilising  the  domestic  and  international  private  sector, 
strengthening  the  capacity  of  partner  countries  to  deliver  change,  stimulating  trade  and 
investment,  fostering  science,  technology  and  innovation,  as  well  as  addressing  the 
challenges and harnessing the positive effects of migration. 

In  this  context,  the  EU  will  continue  to  make  use  of  the  full  range  of  existing  delivery 
methods  available  such  as  grants,  procurement  contracts,  programme  estimates,  budget 
support,  trust  funds,  Technical  Assistance  and  Information  Exchange  (TAIEX)68  and 
twinning69,  guarantees,  loans  and  other  financial  instruments.  At  the  same  time  the  EU 
will  seek  to  extend  its  toolbox  to  broaden  the  use  of  innovative  financing  mechanisms 
including  through  the  use  of  policy  based  lending.  The  choice  of  the  most  appropriate 
delivery method will be policy driven and it will be guided by considerations concerning 

67  For more information: http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm 
68  TAIEX  supports  public  administrations  with  regard  to  the  approximation,  application  and  enforcement  of  EU 
legislation as well as facilitating the sharing of EU best practices. It is largely needs driven. 
69  Twinning  is  a  tool  used  for  institutional  cooperation  between  the  public  administrations  of  Member  States  and 
partner  countries.  Twinning  projects  bring  together  public  sector  expertise  from  Member  States  and  beneficiary 
countries with the aim of achieving concrete mandatory operational results through peer-to-peer activities. 

31 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
sound 
simplification, added value and focus on impact and results.  

financial  management, 

effectiveness, 

efficiency, 

flexibility, 

leverage, 

For  example,  budget  support  has  demonstrated  its  effectiveness  in  fostering  policy 
dialogue, ensuring ownership, supporting key reforms and delivery of results in external 
action. Grants have proven essential to support civil society and private organisations as 
well  as  local  authorities  in  delivering  public  services.  Similarly,  procurement  contracts 
have favoured involvement of the private sector. TAIEX and twinning have granted the 
provision of specific expertise for public administration reforms. Finally, trust funds have 
ensured  flexibility,  responsiveness, visibility,  leveraging and  targeted  approach  towards 
achievement of policy objectives. 

At  the  same  time,  the  EU  will  continue  to  use  budgetary  guarantees  and  financial 
instruments  (based  on  the  recently  created  External  Investment  Plan  and  the  European 
Fund  for  Sustainable  Development  as  well  as  a  refocused  ELM).  With  these  tools,  the 
EU  will  support  the  mobilisation  of  investments  and  leveraging  of  public  and  private 
funds  worldwide.  The  EU  should  also  continue  to  guarantee  lending  by  international 
financing institutions and the EIB in support of EU external policy objectives. 

Similarly, MFA will continue to reinforce the EU's capacity to act in the neighbourhood 
region  and  pre-accession  countries  as  it  produces  significant  financial  leverage.  MFA 
goes beyond budget resources in providing loans, in addition to grants. MFA belongs to 
an  area  of  shared  competence  and  it  complies  with  the  subsidiarity  principle  as  the 
objective  of  restoring  short-term  macroeconomic  stability  in  third  countries  can  be 
achieved more efficiently and effectively by the EU than by Member States individually. 
This  removes  the  need  for  recipient  countries  to  conduct  multiple  negotiations  with 
different  EU  Member  States.  Furthermore,  negotiating  as  a  single  entity  improves  the 
negotiating position of the EU vis-à-vis the recipient country and reduces the scope for 
contradictory  policy  programmes.  Ex-post  evaluations  have  also  concluded  that  MFA 
centralised management by the Commission is more cost-efficient than the provision of 
financial  support  by  Member  States  individually70.  It  is  important  to  distinguish  MFA 
from budget support under regular, programmable instruments. The trigger for MFA are 
balance of payments crises. The primary purpose of MFA is to help beneficiary countries 
overcome  such  crises,  which  manifest  themselves  in  a  shortage  of  external  financing. 
This is one of the major and specific as well as primary distinguishing characteristics of 
the MFA instrument, compared to other support instruments. 

In the future, the EU will continue its efforts to deliver its international cooperation in a 
flexible  manner  and  through  simple  mechanisms  and  rules.  In  the  current  context  of 
multiple crises and conflicts, the proposed broad external action instrument will have to 
be  able  to  adjust  swiftly  to  changing  priorities  and  unforeseen  events  and  to  deliver 
rapidly  on the ground. Sufficient  legal, financial  and procedural  flexibility is  needed to 
allow the EU to respond to the many challenges on the world stage. 

In  this  context,  emergency  procedures  will  ensure  the  quick  EU  capacity  to  respond  to 
crises, the resilience building and the short-term foreign policy reaction with world- and 
scope-wide coverage (political, security, economic). Rules, regulations and management 

70 MFA assistance is disbursed to the central bank (in order to support the country’s international reserves); however, 
the amounts can be subsequently transferred on to the budget (thus providing not only support for reserves, but also 
budget  financing  in  case  of  loans  or  budget  revenue  in  case  of  grants).  Even  when  transferred  to  the  budget,  MFA 
remains untied and undesignated. 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
structures  for  quick  response  activities  would  have  to  retain  their  fast,  flexible  and 
responsive nature. This also includes actions aimed at operationalising the humanitarian 
and development nexus. 

Finally, through the creation of the broad instrument the EU will continue to simplify the 
delivery  mechanisms  and  the  streamlining  of  their  governing  rules,  thus  making  the 
existing  toolbox  even  more  fit  for  the  implementation  of  geographical,  thematic  and 
horizontal actions.  

6.  How will performance be monitored and evaluated? 

6.1.  Monitoring arrangements 

During  the  mid-term  review  of  the  external  financing  instruments,  a  number  of 
limitations regarding the monitoring of the EU’s external action were noted:  

1.  The  instruments'  objectives  are  highly  ambitious  (in  line  with  the  TEU)  and 
require global efforts: success cannot be achieved by the EU alone. For example, 
the objective of poverty eradication depends on many factors that are outside the 
EU's  control,  such  as:  national  government  willingness  and  capacities  to 
implement relevant policies, other aid providers, and the international context. 

2.  The wide-ranging nature of both the objectives and the partner countries covered 
(approximately  140  countries)  makes  the  meaningful  aggregation  of  data 
challenging.  

3.  Data  collection  can  depend  on  sources  outside  of  the  EU,  meaning  there  are 

implications, for example, on the timeliness of data. 

4.  As  a  result  of  the  high  level  and  broad  nature  of  the  objectives,  the  use  of 
internationally  agreed  impact-level  indicators  such  as  the  ones  agreed  for  the 
Sustainable  Development  Goals  have  often  been  considered  the  most  suitable 
method to measure the attainment of the instruments' objectives. However, such 
indicators  are  not  directly  attributable  to  the  actions  of  the  EU  instruments71 
meaning it is difficult to consistently measure the EU's contribution to results. 

A number of lessons learned were also highlighted during the review, namely: 

1.  The lack of information about monitoring in the legal base. 
2.  The lack of data to measure effectiveness of the instruments. 

In  response  to  these  lessons,  the  Commission  will  propose  to  use  a  number  of  key 
performance  indicators  in  the  legal  base  which  will  show  how  success  towards  the 
specific  objectives  will  be  measured.  These  indicators  will  mainly  be  focused  at 
outcome/output level so the link with the EU’s contribution to results will be apparent.  

To help improve its collection of data, the Commission has launched: 

1.  An  EU  international  cooperation  and  development  results  framework  covering 

DCI, EDF, ENI, EIDHR72, Greenland, and Article 5 of the IcSP.  

71 Plus they do not cover the whole spectrum of EU international cooperation, in particular when it comes to measuring 
the impact of crisis response 
72 Except for the Electoral Observation Missions part of the instrument that is covered by the FPI Results Framework. 

33 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
2.  Yearly results reporting exercises covering EU funded interventions ending in the 

previous year – as financed under the instruments above; 

3.  Similar performance frameworks with strategic and operational indicators for the 

IcSP (Articles 3 and 4) and the PI.  

The frameworks will: 

-  Be  used  to  monitor  the  performance  of  the  instruments,  providing  a  clear  link 

- 

between the objectives and how they will be measured.  
Include  impact-level  indicators  (e.g.  linked  to  the  Sustainable  Development 
Goals)  as  well  as  output  and  result  (outcome)  indicators,  thus  measuring  the 
deliverables and direct effects of EU external action. 

-  Allow  for  the  preparation  of  implementation  reports  and  evaluations  after 

approximately three years of collecting results data.  

-  As  far  as  possible  harmonise  the  common  provisions  with  other  EU  budget 

programmes, including with regard to the climate mainstreaming methods.  

However  it  is  worth  noting  not  all  results  can  be  encapsulated  in  such  frameworks.  In 
particular  results  in  implementing  complex  structural  reforms  cannot  be  easily 
aggregated and captured beyond the country or sector level. 

Examples  of  indicators  used  to  measure  the  specific  objectives  could  include  the 
following.  Unless  stated  otherwise,  the  indicators  are  drawn  from  the  Commission’s 
results frameworks: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

(9) 

(10) 

Rule of Law score  

Proportion of population below the international poverty line  

Number  of  women  of  reproductive  age,  adolescent  girls,  and  children  under  5 
reached by nutrition programmes with EU support 

Number of 1-year olds fully immunised with EU support 

Number of students enrolled in primary and/or secondary education and training 
with EU support 

Greenhouse gas emissions reduced or avoided (Ktons CO2eq) with EU support  

Area  of  marine,  terrestrial  and  freshwater  ecosystems  protected  and/or 
sustainably managed with EU support  

Number  of  firms  and/or  individuals  with  access  to  financial  services  with  EU 
support  

Political stability and absence of violence indicator  

Number  of  processes  related  to  partner  country  practices  on  trade,  investment 
and  business,  or  promoting  the  external  dimension  of  EU  internal  policies, 
which have been influenced. 

In  terms  of  monitoring  arrangements  for  joint  programming,  joint  results  frameworks 
(i.e.  a  list  of  indicators  agreed  between  donors)  can  be  used.  These  would  measure  the 
collective results of the donors participating in the joint programme. With the expected 
increase  in  joint  programming  going  forward,  the  EU  expects  more  use  of  joint  results 
frameworks.  

34 

 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.  Data provisions and sources 

Data collected from EU funded interventions come from two main sources:  

-  Secondary  sources  available  at  country  level  (e.g.  country  statistical  office, 
international  organisations  collecting  data  at  country/sub  country  level  for 
internationally agreed indicators like the SDGs); and 

-  Project  monitoring  systems  set  up  by  implementing  partners  to  ensure  adequate 

follow up of results and project performance.  

Only  data  not  available  from  existing  sources  are  collected  by  the  latter  and  generally 
respond  to  project  specific  needs  (for  monitoring  and  evaluation  purposes).  Close 
coordination  between  the  Commission  and  its  implementing  partner  is  ensured  through 
the Commission’s operational managers to avoid any duplication of efforts at any level.  

Efforts  are  made  to  disaggregate  data.  Currently  disaggregation  by  sex  is  possible  for 
several  indicators  included  in  the  above  mentioned  frameworks.  For  other  categories: 
age, income, disabilities, data disaggregation remains a challenge particularly in the case 
of fragile countries. 

In  line  with  the  European  Parliament’s  call  to  establish  consistent  monitoring  and 
evaluation  procedures  to  track  progress  against  objectives73,  Commission  services  are 
currently  working  together  to  establish  an  electronic  system  which  will  track  project 
management,  monitoring  and  evaluation  via  a  single  IT  portal.  This  tool  will  use  a 
consistent framework of indicators to assess performance and identify results across the 
broad  instrument.  Work  on  the  portal  is  underway,  with  pilot  testing  planned  for  mid-
2018,  including  with  EU  Delegations.  The  portal  should  be  fully  operational  by  the 
beginning of 2020.  

In addition, the portal will offer a single-entry point for all operational information and 
will  allow  external  users  including  implementing  partners  to  encode  key  information 
directly  into  the  system.  This  means  it  will  contribute  to  greater  simplification  and 
coherence in the coming years. 

In  terms  of  indicators  being  monitored,  most  of  them  are  commonly  agreed  at 
international  level  and  therefore  have  a  standard  methodology.  The  same  applies  for 
those  indicators  used  in  the  EU  international  cooperation  and  development  results 
framework or similar frameworks used to report at sector level. Contextual indicators can 
also be defined and collected where appropriate. 

It  will  not  always  be  possible  to  set  targets  for  the  indicators  in  the  performance 
frameworks. For SDGs, targets are available and will be used. However, for a number of 
outcome indicators, as partner countries set their targets independently (or sometimes not 
at  all),  the  setting  of  targets  across  countries  and  at  instrument  level  would  not  be 
meaningful. In the case of political cooperation as well as the area of peace and security, 
which are prone to fast developments and changes, it would be inappropriate set targets 

73  See  draft European  Parliament  report:  Implementation  of  the EU  external  financing  instruments:  mid-term  review 
2017  and  the  future  post-2020  architecture  –  Schaake  Report  (2017/  2280  (INI)  of  12  January  2018.  And  also  the 
European  Parliament  study:  External  financing  instrument  and  the  post-2020  architecture:  European  Implementation 
Assessment (28 February 2018): 
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU(2018)615636  

35 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
ex-ante  at  the  overall  strategic  level;  targets  need  to  be  set  at  operational  level  within 
each single action. 

6.3.  Evaluations 

For the broad instrument, evaluations will continue to take place at different levels as 
follows:  

1)  The evaluations of specific projects and programmes which will  be managed by 
EU delegations and services responsible and cover a wide variety of actions, from 
relatively  small  or  innovative  projects,  to  large  facilities  mobilising  significant 
amounts of funds. 

2)  Strategic evaluations, which cover general policies and strategies in countries and 
regions,  and  in  sectors  or  themes,  will  be  managed  by  the  central  evaluation 
services.  

3)  In  addition  to  the  two  main  categories  of  evaluations  referred  to  above,  an 
instrument  level  evaluation  will  be  conducted  only  once  sufficient  data  can  be 
collected  on  performance.  The  instrument  shall  be  evaluated  according  to  the 
Better Regulation criteria and OECD-DAC good practice principles. In particular, 
the  evaluation  will  look  at  the  efficiency,  effectiveness,  added  value,  coherence 
and relevance of the instrument. 

The 3 levels are closely interlinked. The project and programme evaluations are essential 
sources of information for the strategic evaluations which in turn feed into the Instrument 
level  evaluation.  The  planning  of  evaluations  will  be  carefully  coordinated  so  as  to 
maximise coherence. 

The evaluations will use monitoring data, weighing it up and seeking to understand why 
and  how  the  respective  changes  have  been  brought  about.  The  project/programme 
evaluations will rely on monitoring systems set out at action level, while the instrument 
level and strategic evaluations will make use of the latter and of data collected as part of 
the results frameworks. The common principles and standards which will guide the way 
in which these evaluations will be conducted are defined in the evaluation policy for EU 
development cooperation74. The specific evaluation approaches and methods to be used 
for the various types of evaluations are set out in the evaluation guidelines75. 

As  per  these  guidelines,  most  evaluations  will  apply  a  theory  based  impact  evaluation 
approach,  gradually  building  evidence  to  test  the  soundness  of  the  intervention  logic, 
actions,  strategies,  and  instruments  being  subject  to  the  evaluation.  Experimental  and 
quasi-experimental  methods  might  also  be  used  in  some  cases,  in  particular  for  pilot 
projects, which are to be scaled up significantly in the future. Applying such methods for 
a large number of evaluations is however not feasible, for several reasons:  

1)   They require extensive financial resources;  

74 See https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/71167  
75 See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/methodology/index_en.htm and 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/financial_assistance/phare/evaluation/2016/20160831-dg-near-guidelines-on-linking-
planning-progrming-vol-1-v-0.4.pdf  

36 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
2)   There are ethical issues involved given that such methods require the existence of a 
control group, comprising people who must not receive any similar support (from 
the EU or other actors) over the intervention timeframe.  

3)   Even if these methods would be applied for all evaluations, it will not be possible 
to  aggregate  up  from  project  level  to  instrument  level.  This  is  because  of  the 
variety of actions implemented and the different contexts in which these take place. 

In  order  to  evaluate  joint  programming,  future  country  evaluations  by  the  EU  should 
include  the  joint  programming  process  (where  they  exist)  and  in  particular  indicators 
from the joint results framework.   

A number of joint evaluations (between EU and Member States) already exist and more 
will  be  expected  under  the  2021-2027  MFF.  Efforts  should  be  made  to  include  all 
partners involved in the joint programming exercise so that the collective impact of the 
donors can be evaluated.    

37 

 
 
 
 
Annex 1: Procedural information 

1.  LEAD DG(S) 

The lead DGs are as follows: 

International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) 

 
  European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR) 
  Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) 
  European External Action Service (EEAS). 

Other services contributing to the impact assessment include: 

  European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) 
  Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN) 
  Cyprus Settlement Support team 

2.  ORGANISATION AND TIMING 

In  agreement  with  other  external  action  services  (i.e.  NEAR,  FPI  and  the  EEAS),  DG 
DEVCO  has  coordinated  the  process  of  drafting  the  legislative  proposal  and  impact 
assessment for the post 2020 broad external action instrument.  

The  process  has  been  overseen  by  an  Inter-service  Steering  Group  comprising  all 
interested  policy  DGs  as  well  as  the  central  services  (e.g.  the  Secretariat  General,  DG 
Budget  and  the  Legal  Service).  This  Group  is  chaired  by  the  Secretariat  General.  The 
first  meeting  took  place  in  December  2017  to  kick  off  the  process  and  discuss  the 
inception impact assessment. The second meeting (March 2018) was used to discuss the 
draft  impact  assessment.  The  minutes  of  this  meeting  can  be  found  in  the  annex.  The 
third meeting took place in April to discuss the proposal for the legal base.  

3.  CONSULTATION OF THE REGULATORY SCRUTINY BOARD 

Services met  the Regulatory  Scrutiny Board twice  during the preparation of the impact 
assessment.  An  upstream  meeting  was  held  between  the  RSB  and  the  external  action 
services  in  January  2018  to  discuss  the  inception  impact  assessment  and  the  main 
expectations for the RSB. Main comments included: to focus on the changes compared to 
the current period; to look in particular at the architecture (programme structure); and the 
delivery  mechanisms;  and  to  take  on  board  the  lessons  learned  from  the  mid-term 
evaluations.  A  further  meeting  with  the  RSB  was  held  on  25  April  to  discuss  the  draft 
impact  assessment.  Following  the  meeting  a  positive  opinion  with  reservations  was 
received The following changes have been made to the impact assessment in response to 
the RSB’s main considerations: 

38 

 
 
 
 
RSB recommendations 
The report does not sufficiently explain the 
governance structure for the new broad 
instrument, and does not follow up on some of 
the problems it identifies.  It does not provide 
strong justification for merging individual 
programmes into the new broad instrument. 

The report does not sufficiently examine 
funding and policy implications of integrating 
the EDF into the EU budget. 
The report leaves several funding issues 
unclear. These include a funding baseline, 
funding prioritisation and eventual ring-
fencing, as well as how to finance additional 
flexibility reserves. 

The report does not sufficiently explain how 
future monitoring and evaluation would work. 

Changes made to the impact assessment 
  Governance information has been 
added under 4.2 “structure of the 
instrument”. 

  Concerning lessons learned, the text 

explains that these mostly relate to 
how the current heading is structured 
with fragmented instruments. Some of 
the problems, such as joint 
programming have been better solved 
throughout the document, e.g. under 
section 6 “monitoring and evaluation”. 

  The justification for merging 

individual programmes is explained 
under section 4.4. 

  Further information on implications on 

 

budgetising the EDF have been 
provided under section 4.4. 
Information has been added section 
under 4.2 “structure of the instrument” 
on what is being ring-fenced.  
  Funding baseline has been added to 
show the outcome of the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU on funding 
per current instrument. 

  Under section 6.1 information has been 
added on how the future monitoring 
and evaluation methods respond to the 
lessons learned from the mid-term 
review. 

  More information on how we will 

evaluate at instrument level has been 
added under section 6.3. 

4.  EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY 

Evidence has been drawn from the following sources: 

  The  mid-term  review  report  of 

the 
accompanying  staff  working  documents  and  the  external  evaluations  on  which 
they are based. 

the  external  financing 

instruments, 

  The  input  received  from  the  open  public  consultation  on  the  external  financing 

instruments (2017). 

This  evidence  base  is  considered  sufficiently  robust,  accurate,  coherent,  consistent  and 
comprehensive for the purposes of this impact assessment.  

39 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation  

The  stakeholders’  consultation  of  the  ten  external  financing  instruments76  took  mainly 
three  forms:  structured  or  semi-structured  interviews;  technical  workshops  held  in 
Brussels; and an Open Public Consultation.  

Evaluators carried out more than a thousand structured or semi-structured interviews to 
gather  views  and  information  from  EU  staff  at  headquarters  and  delegations, 
representatives from the Member States, the European Parliament and partner countries. 
The MTR evaluations have integrated the outcomes of the interviews, which also served 
to validate several findings. 

Technical  workshops  took  place  with  representatives  of  the  European  Parliament 
(Secretariats  of  the  Committees  and  assistants  to  MEPs),  Council  working  groups  and 
relevant  instrument  committees.  During  these  workshops  the  draft  MTR  reports  of  the 
instruments  were  presented.  Apart  from  instrument-specific  comments,  general  issues 
arising  from  these  meetings  concerned:  the  complex  architecture  of  the  EFIs,  the 
coherence  among  and  within  instruments,  the  coordination  between  EU  and  Member 
States, the need to ensure the flexibility of the instruments to respond to emerging crises 
while  preserving  predictability,  and  the  integration  of  new  policy  priorities  such  as 
SDGs, climate change and migration. 

The  draft  evaluation  reports  were  also  presented  at  the  Policy  Forum  on  Development, 
which gathers representatives from civil society and local authorities. Participants raised 
a  number  of  comments  regarding  access  to  funds,  including  that  more  opportunities 
should be made available for CSOs/LAs to apply for projects across the set of external 
financing instruments. Comments were also raised on mainstreaming commitments, such 
as climate change, and on the role of private sector in the instruments. 

An open public consultation on the external financing instruments of the European Union 
took place between 7 February and 3 May 2017. The objective of the consultation was 
twofold.  First,  it  intended  to  gather  feedback  from  stakeholders  in  both  EU  Member 
States and beneficiary countries, on the conclusions emerging from the evaluations of the 
instruments.  Second,  it  aimed  to  gather  feedback  on  the  future  external  action 
instruments after 2020. More details on the Open Public Consultation are reported in the 
sections below. 

More specifically to this Impact Assessment, ten forward-looking questions were posed 
to the public. They broadly concerned the types of instruments needed to respond to the 
evolving  policy  priorities,  the  coherence  among  instruments,  the  complementarity 
between  EU  and  MS  external  assistance,  the  use  of  innovative  mechanisms  to  enhance 

76  The  ten  instruments  were  the:  Development  Cooperation  Instrument  (DCI);  European  Development  Fund  (EDF); 
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI); Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA II); Instrument contributing to stability 
and  Peace  (IcSP);  European  Instrument  for  Democracy  and  Human  Rights  (EIDHR);  Partnership  Instrument  (PI); 
Instrument  for  Nuclear  Safety  Cooperation  (INSC);  Greenland  Decision  (GD);  Common  Implementing  Regulation 
(CIR). 

40 

 
                                                            
leveraging,  the  possible  future  architecture  of  the  instruments  and  how  to  ensure 
flexibility and simplification.  

Answers  were  received  from  around  100  respondents,  however  not  all  questions  were 
answered by everyone. Respondents represented a wide range of stakeholders from both 
inside and outside of the EU, the majority belonging to the former category (78%). 

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Respondents by origin 

78 

8 

3 

2 

European Union Neighbourhood

Latin America

Sub-Saharan
Africa

9 

Rest

Most  submissions  were  received  from  organisations  and  associations  (52%),  public 
authorities  (22%),  followed  by  EU  platforms,  networks  and  associations  (10%).  A 
limited  number  of  respondents  belonged  to  the  category  of  industry,  business  and 
workers' organisations (6%), research and academia (5%), citizens and individuals (4%) 
and consultancy (1%). 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research/academia 

Industry, business 
or workers' 
organisations 

EU platform, 
network, or 
association 

Respondents by type 

Citizen/individual 

Consultancy 
1% 

4% 

5% 

6% 

10
% 

Public authority 
22% 

Organisation or 
association 
52% 

1.  METHODOLOGY 

The  answers  provided  by  the  respondents  to  the  ten  forward-looking  questions  were 
summarised  on  a  question-by-question  basis  in  order  to  provide  a  comprehensive  yet 
concise overview of a large amount of written inputs. In order to ensure that it is based 
on  a  rigorous  approach,  the  summary  followed  a  number  of  simple  rules.  Specifically, 
inputs  were  prioritized  if  they  a)  were  relevant  to  the  question  to  which  they  were 
supposed  to  respond,  b)  were  recurrent  even  across  a  sub-set  of  respondents,  and  c) 
addressed  issues  which  were  more  cross-cutting  in  nature  and  less  specific  to  the 
respondent's  own  profile  or  mandate.  In  all  cases,  care  was  taken  to  ensure  a  balanced 
representation of inputs that were in contradiction with each other. 

To  account  for  their  distinctive  characters,  inputs  from  public  authorities  were 
summarised  separately  from  those  provided  by  civil  society  organisations.  This 
distinction  seemed  further  justified  in  light  of  the  inputs  received  from  these  two 
categories which often differed in terms of their respective focus and concern. In the next 
section,  the  main  results  of  the  Open  Public  Consultation  have  been  clustered  and 
presented  in  such  a  way  to  reflect  the  key  sections  and  elements  of  the  impact 
assessment.  

42 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  RESULTS FROM THE OPEN PUBLIC CONSULTATION 

PRIORITIES AND GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE 

Several  respondents  from  public  authorities  underline  the  need  to  align  the  new 
instruments  with  the  priorities  identified  by  the  EU  Global  Strategy  and  the  new 
European  Consensus  on  Development.  The  new  External  Financing  Instruments  (EFIs) 
should also reflect commitments taken under recent international agreements such as the 
2030 Agenda, the Paris Agreement, and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. Civil society 
respondents  are  more  specific  and  encourage  the  EU  to  reinforce  its  engagement  in 
thematic areas, which include climate change, environment, gender, democracy, human 
rights, civil society, peacebuilding, conflict prevention, security, resilience, fragility and 
nuclear safety.  

In  addition,  member  tates’  respondents  place  particular  emphasis  on  strengthening  EU 
action in the field of security. Some emphasize the need to build more on the link (nexus) 
between  security  and  development.  Others  suggest  creating  a  separate  instrument 
dedicated  to  Capacity  Building  in  Support  of  Security  and  Development.  Such  an 
instrument  would  enable  the  EU  to  respond  more  effectively  to  unexpected  challenges 
with  security  implications.  Finally,  some  respondents  mention  the  need  to  maintain  the 
African  Peace  Facility  due  to  its  important  role  in  supporting  regional  peacekeeping 
operations.  

Civil  society  respondents  highlight  that  emerging  EU  priorities,  in  particular  migration 
and security, should not affect funding for other key global challenges. They emphasize 
that  the  allocation  of  development  funds  must  be  based  on  objectively  assessed 
development needs rather than on the EU's emerging priorities. They also encourage the 
EU  to  uphold  its  rights-based  approach  to  development  cooperation.  Respondents 
underline the need to ensure the respect for human rights including the rights of children, 
workers  and  persons  with  disabilities.  Others  recommend  that  the  EU  should  include 
sustainability  criteria  in  the  procurement  processes  in  order  to  ensure  compliance  with 
international environmental, health and labor standards.  

In terms of geographical scope, respondents concur that the EU should continue to focus 
on  Least  Developed  Countries  and  countries  affected  by  fragility.  At  the  same  time,  a 
number  of  respondents  from  civil  society  also  emphasize  the  need  to  reshape  the  EU's 
engagement with Middle Income Countries. They highlight that despite the fact that the 
majority  of  the  world's  poor  live  in  these  countries,  the  EU's  development  assistance 
focuses  on  the  category  of  Low-Income  Countries.  At  present,  none  of  the  existing 
external financing instruments is dedicated to the objective of reducing poverty in MICs. 
As  for  the  EU’s  engagement  with  the  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  Group  of  States, 
there has been a variety of suggestions from public authorities’ respondents including to 
maintain an ACP-focused instrument and even to approach these regions separately given 
their specificities. 

43 

 
 
FLEXIBILITY  

Respondents agree that the new financing instruments should be more flexible in order to 
be  able  to  respond  to  unforeseeable  challenges  and  crises,  such  as  migration  and 
conflicts.  Member  states  respondents  recommend  that  efforts  to  increase  flexibility 
should  aim  to  simplify  lengthy  and  cumbersome  procedures,  as  well  as  to  address 
difficulties in adjusting programs and shifting funds between regions and aid modalities. 
Civil society respondents acknowledge that the rise of regional and global challenges has 
exposed  the  need  for  more  flexibility  across  the  EU's  External  Financing  Instruments. 
The migration and security crises in particular have shown the limits of the instruments' 
ability  to  give  adequate  response  to  rapidly  changing  circumstances.  Recognizing  this 
issue, civil society respondents agree that the future instruments must be able to support 
both short-term and long-term objectives in partner countries. 

However,  it  is  underlined  that  increasing  flexibility  should  not  come  at  the  cost  of 
predictability,  country  ownership  and  less  focus  on  achieving  long-term  development 
objectives.  Member  states  respondents  suggest  that  the  instruments'  flexibility  should 
result from sufficiently available reserves, which can be mobilized and deployed in line 
with  the  instruments'  original  objectives.  Related  to  flexibility,  some  Member  States’ 
respondents raise concerns about the recently-created trust funds highlighting that there 
has  been  limited evidence of the criteria used for the allocation  of resources  as  well  as 
limited data on impact. It is suggested that using special funds outside of the EU budget 
should be minimized. 

In  addition,  civil  society  respondents  encourage  the  EU  to  enhance  the  instruments' 
flexibility  also  in  terms  of  engaging  with  relevant  partners.  It  is  highlighted  that  civil 
society  organizations,  both  European  and  local,  are  facing  accessibility  challenges 
because of a new EU funding landscape. The increased grant sizes in calls for proposals, 
as  well  as  requirements  for  large  programs  and  consortia,  put  small  CSOs  at  a 
disadvantage  vis-à-vis  larger,  established  NGOs,  which  are  often  international  and 
already  have  experience  with  working  for  the  EU.  Respondents  point  out  the  risk  that 
such an approach to channeling funds can result in EU grants becoming concentrated in 
the  hands  of  a  small  group  of  international  NGOs.  In  order  to  make  funds  more 
accessible for smaller organizations, respondents recommend a number of measures such 
as  reducing  the  share  of  co-funding,  accepting  in-kind  contributions  as  part  of  the  co-
funding, adapting pre-financing requirements and simplifying calls for proposals. 

COHERENCE AND SYNERGY 

Most  respondents  consider  necessary  to  ensure  greater  coherence  between  the  internal 
and external policies of the EU, as well as between the external instruments themselves. 
In this respect, some public authorities’ respondents wish to ensure coherence within the 
instruments  themselves,  as  well  as  between  different  EU  policy  domains  such  as 
humanitarian  assistance,  development,  security  and  trade,  particularly  in  countries 
affected  by  fragility  and  conflict.  They  also  suggest  further  elaboration  of  the  existing 
comprehensive approach, which integrates development, security and diplomacy efforts. 

44 

 
 
Fostering synergies between development and commercial instruments is also viewed as 
necessary.  The  implementation  of  the  EU  Global  Strategy  is  viewed  as  an  appropriate 
basis  for  efforts  to  increase  coherence  between  policies.  Enhancing  dialogue  between 
different  bodies  of  the  European  Union  such  as  the  European  External  Action  Service 
(EEAS) and the Directorate-Generals of the Commission is highly relevant. Establishing 
joint  working  groups  and  promoting  better  information  sharing  are  seen  as  important 
contributors to coherence. 

Civil  society  respondents  assert  that  the  universal  and  integrated  character  of  the 
Sustainable Development Goals makes the SDGs framework the most  appropriate basis 
for  increasing  coherence  between  internal  and  external  EU  policies.  Respondents 
emphasized that efforts to increase coherence should be aligned with the principles of the 
EU's approach to Policy Coherence for Development. Civil society respondents identify a 
number  of  areas  where  major  challenges  remain  regarding  policy  coherence.  Some 
highlight  that  consumption  patterns  in  Europe  may  have  harmful  implications  for 
development processes and outcomes in the rest of the world, particularly in the domains 
of  food  production,  climate  change,  environment,  biodiversity  and  natural  resources. 
Others  point  to  the  tension  between  the  EU's  development  objectives  and  emerging 
European  political  priorities  related  in  particular  to  migration  and  security.  Some 
respondents  consider  the  ongoing  efforts  to  address  the  root  causes  of  migration 
problematic from a coherence perspective.  

Respondents  emphasize  the  need  to  strengthen  complementarity  and  synergy  between 
geographical and thematic instruments. Others encourage the EU to take a leading role in 
improving  complementarity  between  various  stakeholders  both  inside  and  outside  the 
EU. Given its status as a multilateral organization unbound by domestic interests, the EU 
is  encouraged  by  civil  society  respondents  to  play  a  leading  role  in  improving 
complementarity between various stakeholders both inside and outside the EU.  

In this context, the contribution that EU Delegations can make to better aid coordination 
and  complementarity  has  been  emphasized  by  many  respondents.  Public  authorities’ 
respondents encourage Delegations to work more closely with Member States' embassies 
and  play  a  stronger  role  in  information  sharing  in  particular  through  the  Heads  of 
Cooperation  meetings.  Civil  society  respondents  maintain  that  Joint  Programming  can 
have  the  potential  to  enhance  complementarity  and  synergy  between  EU  and  Member 
States  both  at  the  country  and  the  sectoral  level.  Findings  emerging  from  the  recent 
evaluation  of  Joint  Programming  should  influence  how  such  approaches  can  be  further 
improved in the future.  

SIMPLIFICATION  

The  EU  is  strongly  encouraged  to  further  simplify  the  overall  architecture  of  the 
instruments. In  this  respect, the EU should continue its efforts to  simplify cumbersome 
administrative and financial procedures. 

45 

 
 
Member states respondents consider that the instruments should be further simplified. It 
is  highlighted  that  the  multiplication  of  EU  funds  and  facilities  adds  extra  layers  of 
complexity to an already complex financing architecture. Member states also point to the 
excessive complexity of grant management rules and procedures and the consequent need 
to simplify them. In order to enable faster project adoption and implementation, efforts 
should also be made to revise the structure and different stages of the EU programming 
cycle. 

Civil  society  respondents  agree  with  the  need  to  further  strengthen  on-going  efforts  to 
simplify  the  current  administrative  and  financial  procedures  applied  in  EU  external 
assistance. Although important improvements have been made in particular as a result of 
the Structured Dialogue process, more needs to be done in terms of simplification. It is 
emphasized  by respondents  that  procedures and rules  currently in  place have  important 
implications  for  the  ability  of  civil  society  organizations  to  become  more  involved  in 
development  cooperation.  Given  their  limited  human  and  financial  resources,  small 
NGOs  are  often  constrained  in  their  capacity  to  participate  in  calls  for  proposals.  It  is 
underlined, therefore, that simplifying rules and procedures governing grant application 
and management is crucial to enable such organizations to access funding. 

PERFORMANCE FOR RESULTS  

To  make  best  use  of  existing  and  new  instruments,  an  incentive-based  approach  in 
external  assistance  is  viewed  positively  given  its  ability  to  promote  reforms  in  partner 
countries.  However,  some  respondents  highlight  the  increasingly  challenging  nature  of 
using  development  aid  as  an  incentive  due  to  the  rising  availability  of  alternative 
resources such as private finance and remittances. 

Most  public  authorities’  respondents  underline  that  the  decision  on  the  allocation  of 
funds should be made on the basis of a rigorous assessment which establishes objective 
criteria and is conducted by an independent panel of experts. It has also been highlighted 
that  the  incentive-based  approach  should  not  be  utilized  to  make  EU  assistance 
conditional on a partner country's cooperation in other policy areas such as migration and 
security.  It  is  suggested  that  the  effectiveness  of  the  incentive-based  approach  would 
increase  if  it  were  extended  beyond  development  assistance  to  other  –  often  more 
powerful – EU instruments such as trade.  

Civil  society  respondents  underscore  the  importance  of  maintaining  incentive-based 
approaches in the EU’s external assistance. They emphasize that incentives can improve 
accountability  for  results  and  also  enhance  the  EU’s  impact  in  policy  areas  where 
progress is difficult to make such as in the field of human rights, good governance and 
rule of law. 

Some  respondents  point  to  available  evidence  of  success  achieved  through  incentive-
based  mechanisms  such  as  the  ‘More  for  more’  approach  applied  to  Neighbourhood 
countries  or  the  Millennium  Development  Goals  contracts  introduced  under  the  10th 
cycle of the European Development Fund. Others recommend that the EU should utilize 

46 

 
 
its  preferential  trade  agreements  (e.g.  Generalised  Scheme  of  Preferences)  in  order  to 
strengthen respect for human rights and international labor standards in partner countries. 

Recommendations  on  efficiency  and  effectiveness  were  also  given.  As  for  efficiency, 
respondents  recommend  that  the  EU  simplify  burdensome  procedures  and  the  overall 
architecture  of  the  instruments.  As  for  effectiveness,  some  respondents  emphasize  the 
need  for  a  clear  results  framework  coupled  with  stronger  monitoring  systems  to  assess 
impact.  Better  monitoring  and  evaluation  of  results  is  seen  as  crucial  to  enhance 
institutional learning and to inform decision-making with a view to improve programme 
effectiveness. In this respect, respondents call for an improved traceability of results and 
accessibility of information on all actions financed by EU instruments.  

PROGRAMME STRUCTURE 

Respondents expressed diverging views on the most appropriate approach to take when 
structuring  the  future  instruments.  Some  Member  States  are  in  favour  of  maintaining 
both  geographically  and  thematically  structured  instruments.  As  regards  the  relative 
importance  of  these  categories,  however,  some  respondents  show  preference  for 
geographically-based instruments over thematic ones. Yet others suggest that instruments 
be thematically  structured but  have  a certain  geographical focus, which can  be flexibly 
adapted when circumstances change. Regarding the approach to geographical structuring, 
some respondents consider that the category of ACP countries is artificial when viewed 
from a development perspective. Others suggest moving from a regional approach to one 
based on income categories such as low-income and middle-income countries. 

Most  respondents  from  civil  society  agree  that  the  combination  of  geographic  and 
thematic  instruments  delivers  the  best  results.  They  emphasise  that  the  value  of 
geographically structured instruments lies in their capacity to address the specific needs 
of  partner  countries  in  a  tailored  manner.  This  is  crucial  given  the  diversity  of  the 
challenges  and  needs  across  these  countries.  It  has  been  suggested,  however,  that  this 
geographical  structuring  should  be  influenced  less  by  European  historical/political 
considerations  (e.g.  ACP  and  Neighbourhood  countries)  and,  instead,  more  by 
developing country needs.  

Civil  society  respondents  equally  agree  on  the  importance  of  maintaining  thematic 
instruments.  These  are  viewed  as  capable  of  delivering  on  transversal  priorities,  which 
are  not  specifically  addressed  in  bilateral  programmes  such  as  the  support  for  civil 
society organizations and marginalized groups. Furthermore, thematic programmes allow 
the EU to engage with graduated middle-income countries, which are no longer eligible 
for Official Development Assistance (ODA). 

While  being  in  favour  of  combining  geographic  and  thematic  instruments,  respondents 
also  draw  attention  to  the  need  for  more  complementarity.  Some  respondents  highlight 
the risk of overlap and double funding whereby the same policy objectives are funded by 
multiple instruments. Respondents call for a clear delineation between instruments while 

47 

 
 
also underlining the need to ensure that geographic and thematic programmes do exploit 
cross-sectoral synergies and linkages between themselves. 

DELIVERY MECHANISMS  

There  is  an  agreement  between  respondents  that  innovative  financing  instruments  can 
play  an  important  role  in  leveraging  public  and  private  financing  for  EU  external 
assistance.  Positive  findings  on  the  leverage  effects  and  financial  additionality  of  such 
instruments emerging from the recent evaluation of blending are considered encouraging. 

Nevertheless, some Member States identify areas where improvements should be made. 
Increasing the transparency of these mechanisms is considered necessary. Furthermore, it 
is  suggested  that  funds  become  subject  to  thorough  evaluations  in  order  to  inform 
decisions on their future application. Others stress that the use of funds should be limited 
to  justified  cases  where  other  instruments  cannot  be  deployed  effectively.  As  for  the 
implementation of blending projects, it is recommended that the group of entities mostly 
involved so far (EIB, AFD, KfW, EBRD, AECID) should be further diversified. 

Civil society respondents gave recommendations and raised concerns regarding the role, 
use  and  impact  of  such  innovative  mechanisms.  It  is  highlighted  that  private  sector 
funding should not substitute, but rather complement, public support in the fight against 
poverty.  In  order  to  have  an  added-value  when  compared  to  other  forms  of  finance, 
innovative financing mechanisms have to represent additionality, meaning that they are 
to  support  projects  which  are  not  commercially  viable,  and  therefore  would  not  have 
been  implemented without using ODA funds.  Civil society respondents  also emphasize 
the need for putting in place safeguards to ensure that innovative mechanisms contribute 
to  achieving  the  Sustainable  Development  Goals.  To  this  end,  the  EU  needs  to  make 
certain  that  private  sector  priorities  do  not  override  poverty  reduction  objectives  in 
partner countries.  

Most respondents agree on the need for a strengthened multi-stakeholder approach in EU 
external assistance. Partnership and dialogue with non-governmental actors such as civil 
society organizations and the private sector are considered necessary for building wider 
consensus  around  programmes  in  partner  countries  as  well  as  in  the  implementation  of 
EU development cooperation.  

The  EU  is  encouraged  to  strengthen  its  partnership  with  stakeholders  who  can  make 
significant  contributions  to  the  implementation  of  the  2030  Agenda.  Respondents 
highlight  the  need  to  build  more  on  the  capacity  of  Local  and  Regional  Governments, 
private partners, universities and research institutes. The EU can play an important role in 
facilitating  Public-Private  Partnerships 
in  developing  countries.  Civil  society 
organizations  and  NGOs  are  seen  as  key  partners  in  EU  external  assistance.  However, 
some respondents caution that recent funding trends (e.g. increasing grant sizes) may risk 
concentrating grants with large consortia of NGOs vis-à-vis smaller organizations. 

48 

 
 
 
Annex 3: Evaluation results 

Introduction 

From  2016-2017,  independent,  mid-term  evaluations  took  place  for  the  following 
external financing instruments: 

1.  Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI);  
2.  European  Development  Fund  (EDF)  including  on  the  Overseas  Countries  and 

Territories (OCTs) 

3.  European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI);  
4.  Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA II);  
5.  Instrument contributing to stability and Peace (IcSP);  
6.  European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR);  
7.  Partnership Instrument (PI);  
8.  Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC);  
9.  Greenland Decision (GD);  
10. Common  Implementing  Regulation  (CIR)  (not  a  financing  instrument  but  a 

regulation for implementing a number of the instruments mentioned above) 

The aim of the evaluations was to provide the EU and wider public with an independent 
assessment  of  the  external  financing  instruments,  including  how  each  instrument 
interacted  with  the  remaining  instruments77.  In  2017,  the  Commission  followed  the 
independent  evaluations  with  a  set  of  staff  working  documents  (one  per  instrument)  78. 
The  staff  working  documents  were  based  on  and  for  the  most  part  concurred  with  the 
findings  of  the  independent  evaluations.  In  order  to  gain  a  better  understanding  of  key 
messages occurring across the instruments, an independent coherence report (2017) was 
produced79. These documents all fed the Commission’s mid-term review report80 (2017) 
which  responds  to  the  requirement  set  out  in  the  Common  Implementing  Regulation81 
(Article 17) for a review of the instruments at their mid-point.  

Regulatory Scrutiny Board 

Two  of  the  Commission’s  staff  working  documents  were  assessed  by  the  Regulatory 
Scrutiny Board in 2017, namely the EDF and the ENI.  

For the EDF the main comments of the RSB were as follows: 

77  The  independent  evaluations  can  be  found  here:  https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/public-consultation-external-
financing-instruments-european-union_en 
78  The  staff  working  documents  can  be  found  here:  https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/mid-term-review-report-external-
financing-instruments_en 
79  The  coherence  report  can  be  found  here:  https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/coherence-report-main-
report-170717_en_0.pdf  
80  The 
instruments_en  
81  The  Common  Implementing  Regulation  can  be  found  here:  https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/43f92a44-af94-11e3-86f9-01aa75ed71a1/language-en  

found  here:  https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/mid-term-review-report-external-financing-

report  can  be 

49 

 
 
                                                            
Particular  challenges  with  evaluating  the  11th  EDF  were  noted,  and  appreciation  was 
made of the body of evidence that the external study compiled. The RSB considered the 
evaluation should be improved with respect to the following key aspects:  

The Staff Working Document (SWD) should be a self-standing document.  
The  analytical  approach  should  be  sufficiently  clear  on  how  it  assesses 

(1) 
(2) 
effectiveness rather than leaving out several relevant issues.  
(3) 
be more informative. 

The analysis of coherence with other instruments should be complete and  could 

For the ENI evaluation, the main comments from the RSB were as follows: 

Limitations  that  the  ENI  evaluation  faced  were  noted  concerning  tight  timing,  lack  of 
monitoring data and a changed context in many partner countries. The RSB considered 
the report should be improved by the following:  

(1) The report should draw lessons for the future.  
(2) The report should adequately take up and examine critical feedback from the Court of 
Auditors and stakeholders.  
(3) The report should be more reader-friendly. 

Evaluation conclusions 

The  independent  evaluations  and  staff  working  documents  on  the  external  financing 
instruments  have  overall  shown  that  the  instruments  are,  at  the  mid-point  in  their 
implementation, generally fit for purpose and positive trends are emerging in relation to 
the instruments' objectives. In conclusion, there is no need to amend the legislation that 
establishes the instruments.  

Relevance 

The evaluation staff working documents have confirmed that the instruments' objectives 
were largely relevant to the policy priorities at the time of their design. Compared to the 
2007-2013 MFF, the strategic relevance has improved substantially, as lessons from the 
past were integrated in the new regulations:  

-  confirmation of global reach (IcSP, PI);  
-  promotion of EU interests worldwide (PI);  
- 
increased focus on conflict prevention (IcSP);  
-  new common programming principles (DCI, EDF);  
-  greater differentiation (DCI, ENI, IPA);  
- 
-  clear delineation of specific objectives (EIDHR);  
-  enhanced  consistency  and  complementarity  between 

sharper focus on sector approaches (IPA);  

the  IcSP  and 

the 

geographical cooperation instruments29 and with CFSP operations;  

-  broader ambitions for the Greenland partnership (GD); and  

50 

 
 
 
 
-  harmonisation of implementing procedures (CIR)  

Furthermore,  the  external  evaluations  underline  the  strategic  relevance  of  the  thematic 
instruments,  in  particular  their  ability  to  act  without  the  explicit  consent  of  the  partner 
in  crisis  response,  human  rights  and 
country 
democratisation in a deteriorating context and promoting EU interests and global actions 
on public goods, including climate change.  

if  required,  such  as  engaging 

The set of broad, enabling instruments have been able to cover EU priorities without any 
major gaps, except for capacity-building in support of security and development (CBSD).  

However,  on  programming  (where  programming  applies)  and  implementation  of  the 
instruments,  this  potential  was  not  always  fully  exploited.  In  some  countries,  actions 
under the instruments were strategically combined82, whereas in others, the potential for 
strategically combining actions was not always used83.  

A  benefit  of  the  instruments'  relevance  is  the  flexibility  that  they  have  built  into  them. 
Flexibility to respond to unforeseen events is required at different levels:  

(i) short-term crisis response;  
(ii) flexibility in choice of programming and implementation methods;  
(iii)  financial  flexibility  with  reserve  funds  and  reallocations  within  and  between 
instruments;  
(iv) flexibility in the multi-annual programming with the possibility to adapt the duration 
of the programming to the situation on the ground and to swiftly redirect the funding in 
case of major changes; and  
(v)  the  use  of  special  measures  provided  for  by  the  Common  Implementing 
Regulation38.  

The evaluation staff working documents found that the instruments, due to their enabling 
character  and  sufficiently  broad  objectives,  facilitated  the  EU  to  respond  to  new  crises 
and  its  evolving  needs  and  policy  objectives  as  well  as  those  of  partner  countries. 
However,  the  ability  to  reallocate  financial  resources  was  fully  exhausted  with  the 
emergence of new crises in countries surrounding the EU.  

Internal resources and funds that were not earmarked were insufficient to deal with the 
crises. Consequently, Heading 4 had to be increased during the mid-term review of the 
MFF,  and  the  EU  had  to  set  up  different  crisis-related  trust  funds  and  coordination 
mechanisms such  as  a Facility for Refugees in Turkey  (FRiT). Through the trust  funds 
and  the  FRiT,  the  EU  was  able  to  respond  fairly  rapidly  to  the  crises  and  mobilise 
additional  funds  from  EU  Member  States  and  other  donors,  even  if  the  contributions 

82 See staff working document on the IcSP, section 5 
83 See coherence report, paragraph 16 

51 

 
 
 
  
                                                            
from Member States were less than expected. The response also had to be facilitated by 
the use of special measures outside the regular programming decisions. 

Overall, it appears that the priorities and sectors of intervention defined in the regulations 
for  the  11th  EDF,  EIDHR,  ENI,  DCI,  IPA  II,  IcSP  and  the  PI  are  still  relevant  and 
encompass  current  needs  and  priorities.  This  implies  that  no  amendments  to  the 
regulations  are  needed  at  this  stage84.  Nevertheless,  the  lessons-learned  from  the  mid-
term  review  of  the  MFF  in  terms  of  limited  financial  flexibility  and  complexity  of  the 
current  architecture,  thwarting  enhanced  complementarity  on  the  ground,  as  well  as  to 
cover gaps in the area of security would need to be considered in the future architecture 
of the instruments85.  

Effectiveness 

The staff working documents show that positive trends are emerging in relation to their 
objectives86.  For  example,  most  countries  where  the  11th  EDF  and  DCI  geographic 
programmes  operate  have  experienced  progress  in  poverty  reduction  and  human  and 
economic development over the last 10 years87.  

In the western Balkans, IPA II assistance contributed to the implementation of reforms in 
key  areas,  such  as  the  judiciary,  anti-corruption,  public  administration  and  social 
inclusion, and supported the progressive alignment with EU legislation and standards.  

In the Neighbourhood, ENI assistance produced visible results in various sectors, such as 
regional development, agriculture, the labour market, border management and migration. 
At  the  same  time,  the  instruments  (ENI  complemented  by  IcSP8826)  demonstrated  a 
capacity to respond to evolving needs and crisis situations.  

The  INSC  raised  levels  of  nuclear  safety,  for  example  by  supporting  follow-up  to  the 
joint  comprehensive  plan  of  action  cooperation  with  Iran,  and  stress  testing  nuclear 
power plants in various countries.  

The  PI  effectively  influenced  policy  developments  in  partner  countries  in  line  with  EU 
interests  and  contributed  to  development  of  mutual  relationship  with  third  countries89 
complementing  the  larger  thematic  activities  financed  under  the  DCI,  in  particular  the 
global public goods and challenges programme.  

However, difficulties in measuring the achievement of objectives should be noted. As at 
the time the independent evaluations were taking place, several of the instruments only 
recently started being implemented (following the drafting of EU strategy documents), so 
it was too early to measure the achievement of high-level (and long-term) objectives. To 

84 With the exception of the CBSD proposal. 
85 See coherence report, paragraph 65 
86 See staff working documents, section 4 for further examples of how the instruments are achieving their objectives. 
87  See 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20(July%201).pdf  
88 Source Commission staff working document on the evaluation of the IcSP, Section 5. 
89 Source Commission staff working document on the evaluation of the PI, Section 5 

last  Millennium  Development  Goal  Report 

indicators  on  poverty  evolution 

the 

in 

(2015) 

52 

 
 
                                                            
help mitigate this situation, the independent evaluations also collected data from previous 
instruments  (2007-2013).  That  said,  other  limitations  in  measuring  the  achievement  of 
objectives  must  be  taken  into  consideration.  Often  EU  support  can  only  be  seen  as  a 
contributing  factor  towards  any  results  achieved.  For  example,  the  fight  to  eradicate 
poverty is a highly ambitious endeavour. Many factors, both internal and external, affect 
the development of the EU's partner countries and other objectives. Other major external 
relations actors play an active role, together with an increasing number of private donors 
including foundations. In addition, it is for the partner countries to adopt and implement 
the necessary reforms and policies that the instruments support. Also a number of results 
can  only  be  measured  at  country  and/or  sector  level  and  cannot  be  aggregated  at 
instrument-level, partly because of the variety of countries and themes concerned. 

Since  the  establishment  of  the  instruments,  the  Commission  has  invested  efforts  and 
improved  reporting  on  the  results  of  projects  and  programmes.  For  example  with  the 
launch of the EU International cooperation and development results framework90 in 2015 
which  produced  its  first  report  on  selected  results  in  July  201691.  Other,  similar 
performance frameworks with strategic and operational indicators have also been created 
specifically for IPA II, IcSP and PI.  

The  range  of  implementation  arrangements  available  plays  a  major  role  in  the 
instruments’  effectiveness92.  The 
the  Common 
Implementation Regulation such as the possibility of sub-granting or awarding grants to 
entities without legal personality, have reinforced the EIDHR’s effectiveness. Benefiting 
from exceptions, crisis response under the IcSP can be as rapid as humanitarian aid.  

simplifications 

introduced 

in 

The introduction of the budget support modality and the related policy dialogue under the 
IPA  II  have  played  an  important  role  in  improving  policy  dialogue  in  support  of 
furthering real  reforms  and stabilisation programmes  in  beneficiary countries. This was 
particularly the case in the western Balkans where this was introduced for the first time93. 
Similarly in Greenland budget support arrangements resulted in stronger public financial 
management  systems  and  improvements  in  the  national  administration's  ability  to  plan 
and  implement  policies94.  However,  EU  procedures  (originating  from  the  Financial 
Regulation) are still perceived by interested parties as lengthy and burdensome95.  

In  terms  of  mainstreaming  EU  priorities,  significant  progress  has  been  noted  in  some 
programmes in the areas of climate change and environment96. However, more remains 

further 

the  EU 

information  on 

international  cooperation  and  development 

90  See 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/devcos-results-framework_en 
91 This report presents selected results achieved from EU funded development cooperation projects and programmes 
completed  in  mid-2013  -  mid-2014  in  EU  partner  countries.  See:      https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/eu-international-
cooperation-and-development-first-report-selected-results-july-2013-june2014_en 
92 See for example, PI, EIDHR and IcSP, staff working documents, section 5 
93 See IPA staff working document, section 5 
94 See Greenland staff working document, section 6 
95 See for example, EIDHR staff working document, section 6  
96  11th  EDF  climate  contributions  increased  from  3.3%  in  2014  to  23.3%  in  2016  and  DCI  climate  change 
contributions increased from 17.7% in 2014 to 24.9% in 2016. Source: Indicator 12b, EU international cooperation and 
development results framework with input from the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System. 

framework: 

results 

53 

 
 
                                                            
to  be  done  to  integrate  these  areas  across  all  sectors  in  view  of  the  scale  of  the 
challenges97. Mainstreaming human rights issues including gender equality and women's 
empowerment is still a work-in-progress although some positive messages have emerged 
from the study98 on the implementation of the EU gender action plan II, in particular for 
the  IcSP.  Overall,  the  external  evaluations  have  shown  partner  governments'  lack  of 
interest  or  resistance  to  working  in  support  of  human  rights  often  presents  a  major 
challenge in implementation.  

Efficiency  

The  level  of  administrative  expenditure  points  to  an  efficient  management  of  the 
instruments’ respective budgets99.  

While  overall  organisational  performance  may  be  efficient,  some  interested  parties 
consider  the  implementation  of  the  instruments  in  some  cases  as  administratively 
burdensome. The Commission is perceived by some stakeholders as being more focused 
on  process  rather  than  on  policy  objectives  and  results.  Requirements  such  as 
mainstreaming  different  policies  and  fulfilling  international  commitments  such  as 
ownership  and  partnership  imply  heavy  processes.  Other  regulations  (such  as  the 
Comitology Regulation100) add to the complexity and length of time needed to implement 
the instruments.  

Modest efficiency gains were made in comparison to the instruments from the 2007-2013 
MFF.  For  example  by  reducing  the  number  of  DCI  thematic  programmes  from  five  to 
two,  although  rigidities  remains  within  the  global  public  goods  and  challenges 
programme  since  five  different  budget  lines  were  created.  Some  efficiency  gains 
resulting from the simplification processes (such as the use of national strategies rather 
than  EU  country  strategies  and  that  joint  programming  documents  can  replace  multi-
annual indicative programmes if quality criteria are met) were introduced for DCI, EDF, 
ENI and IPA II programming processes.  

For geographic instruments, a lengthy programming process is in place to safeguard 
principles of ownership and partnership. In the case of the EDF, the procedures also 
include involvement of the National/Regional Authorising Officers whose function is 
often seen as hampering effectiveness and efficiency, in particular at regional level. An 

97 See for example, DCI and EDF staff working documents, section 5 
98  EU  gender  action  plan  2016-2020  at year  one: European implementation assessment  by the European  Parliament:  
  57  The 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU%282017%29603256 
gender  action  plan  2016-2020  is  the  EU's  framework  for  promoting  gender  equality  and  women  and  girls' 
empowerment  in  external  relations  in  external  relations.  The  above-mentioned  European  implementation  assessment 
by  the  European  Parliament  states  that  the  EU  has  mainstreamed  the  notion  of  gender  equality  and  women's 
empowerment in partner countries and has taken on board a number of lessons identified from the previous identified 
from the previous Gender Action Plan (2010-2015). The IcSP was particularly commended on results to date in terms 
of engagement with women’s NGOs/CSOs on the “whole of society” approach. 
99  See  staff  working  document  accompanying  the  document  '2016  Annual  Report  on  the  implementation  of  the 
European Union's instruments for financing external actions in 2015', SWD(2016)456 final of 19 December 2016. 
100  Comitology  refers  to  a  process  by  which  committees  made  of  representatives  from  Member  States  assist  in  the 
making,  adoption  and  implementation  of  EU  laws.  See  Comitology  Regulation:    http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32011R0182 

54 

 
 
                                                            
explanation often given relates to capacity issues despite regular support in capacity-
building101.  

The  establishment  of  the  Common  Implementation  Regulation  was  a  new,  simplifying 
feature  of  the  2014-2020  MFF  for  the  EU-budget  instruments  covered  by  this  report, 
which was largely replicated in the 11th EDF implementation regulation. By harmonising 
rules and limiting differences of interpretation across the external financing instruments, 
the external evaluations point to efficiency gains thanks to the Common Implementation 
Regulation, albeit on a modest scale. Under, for example, the EIDHR (in specific cases) 
and especially the IcSP, direct award of funding speeds up implementation in situations 
of crisis or urgent need.  

Internal  coherence,  external  coherence,  complementarity  and  synergies  between 
external financing instruments  

Each external financing instrument has its own specific scope either based on the issues 
of  substance  it  addresses  (e.g.  the  EIDHR,  INSC,  IcSP,  and  PI)  or  in  terms  of 
geographical focus (the DCI, EDF, ENI, GD, and IPA II).  

Three  instruments  are  clearly  designed  to  complement  others  through  their  distinct 
implementation modalities: 

1) EIDHR (independent and flexible actions);  
2) IcSP (for quick response with short and long-term actions); and  
3)  PI  (actions  in  the  EU  and/or  mutual  interest  that  are  not  possible  to  fund  under  the 
DCI, ENI or IPA II).  

The internal coherence within the instruments is  largely satisfactory because of revised 
geographic programming instructions, sector concentration, appropriate decision-making 
processes and improved quality review systems. However, significant variations can be 
observed at the level of EU delegations.  

The  evaluation  staff  working  documents  provide  some  examples  of  complementarities 
between the instruments. For example, the EIDHR and the PI support certain actions that 
other geographic instruments are not able to finance, such as direct cooperation with civil 
society  organisations  on  human  rights  issues  or  cooperation  with  industrialised 
countries102.  

Effective  synergies  between  the  IcSP  (with  its  ability  to  provide  short-term  reactions 
without  programming)  and  the  geographic  instruments  were  also  found.  Although 
effective  follow-up  is  hampered  by  the  lack  of  flexibility  in  procedures  of  most  other 
instruments which are bound by long programming periods103.  

101 See EDF staff working document, section 5 
102 Including with some strategic partner countries such as Brazil, China, India and Mexico 
103 See IcSP staff working document, section 5 

55 

 
 
 
                                                            
Nevertheless,  overall  coherence  between  instruments  could  be  further  improved,  in 
particular by streamlining the instruments to reduce the boundaries between geographic 
(the  11th  EDF,  ENI,  DCI,  and  IPA  II)  and thematic  instruments/programmes  (thematic 
programmes within the DCI, IcSP and PI) which can both intervene in the same areas104. 
The  specific  scope  of  the  geographic  instruments  has  made  it  difficult  to  engage 
strategically and coherently with some partner countries. Three geographical instruments 
are used to engage with Africa (the EDF, DCI and ENI) and cooperation at continental 
level  is  funded  both  from  the  DCI  (the  Pan  African  programme)  and  with  a  slightly 
reduced  scope  from  the  11th  EDF  (intra-ACP  programme)105.  Similarly,  it  has  proven 
difficult  to  build  bridges  between  regions  as,  for  example,  EU  relations  with  the 
Caribbean and Latin America are covered both by the DCI and the EDF.  

Policy  Coherence  for  Development106  has  gained  momentum.  The  analysis  of  trade 
policy support to  development in  regional cooperation shows an increasing  attention to 
the trade/development nexus.  

On geographic instruments (the DCI, ENI and 11th EDF), in terms of coherence between 
partner country and EU priorities, some external evaluations mention tendencies towards 
predominantly  EU  driven  agendas  during  the  programming.  This  was  despite  the 
extensive  consultation  of 
interested  parties  during  programming  and  project 
implementation,  and,  in  particular  in  the  EDF,  the  co-signature  of  the  multi-annual 
programming  documents  and  annual  actions.  This  apparent  trade-off  between  EU 
interests/international  values  and  partnership  principles  should  be  seen  within  the  new 
policy context of the universally agreed 2030 Agenda/SDGs107.  

Added-value  

A combination of several factors explains the added-value of the EU's instruments108:  

 
 

the EU's competence or expertise109;  
the EU's nature as a supranational entity, and the relative neutrality, political 
influence and leverage this potentially entails110;  

104 See coherence report, paragraph 33 
105 In addition, the IcSP crisis response component devoted 33% of its funds to Africa during the period under review. 
106 Through Policy Coherence for Development, the EU seeks to take account of development objectives in all of its 
policies  that  are  likely  to  affect  developing  countries.  It  aims  at  minimising  contradictions  and  building  synergies 
between  different  EU  policies  to  benefit  developing  countries  and  increase  the  effectiveness  of  development 
cooperation.  Policy  coherence  in  support  of  development  objectives  was  first  integrated  in  EU  fundamental  law  in 
1992 and further reinforced in the Treaty of Lisbon (Art. 208 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU) making the EU a 
forerunner  on  the  international  stage  in  this  area.  See  5th  EU  Policy  Coherence  for  Development  report,  2015:  
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/policy-coherence-development_en 
107 See coherence report, paragraph 51-53 
108 See coherence report, paragraph 37 and section 5 of the staff working documents 
109 See for example the IPA II staff working document, section 5 on the centres of thematic expertise created by the 
Commission. Or the PI staff working document, annex 3 
110 The EU is largely perceived by partners as an actor not defending or advancing the interests of a particular country, 
which is important for the EU as a peace and security actor under IcSP crisis response and for Election Observation 
Missions under EIDHR. 

56 

 
 
                                                            
  geographical spread of some instruments111 including the presence in fragile 

contexts where there are fewer development partners and the significant volume 
of funds available112,  
the scope of the instruments and modalities (such as budget support, grants, 
indirect management, blending facilities and rapid decision-making for crisis 
response); and  
(v) the ability of the EU to lead on joint actions (i.e. joint programming and joint 
implementation), especially with Member States.  

 

 

Additional factors are that the instruments can be used to intervene at various levels (i.e. 
national  regional,  continental),  the  predictability  of  funds  (especially  the  EDF  which  is 
not  subject  to  the  annuality  rule  of  the  EU  budget113),  the  emphasis  placed  on  regional 
cooperation114 and the unique position of the EU to prepare accession countries for EU 
membership through the IPA.  

More  specialised  instruments  have  specific  added-value  linked  to  their  scope.  For 
example,  the  IcSP’s  speed,  flexibility  and  capacity  to  adapt  to  evolving  contexts,  and 
presence  in  zones  where  other  actors  are  absent,  and  the  EIDHR  actions  in  sensitive 
human rights situations without needing partner governments' consent.  

Leverage effect  

Conditions  are  in  place  for  the  instruments  to  enable  a  strengthened  policy  dialogue  at 
country  level,  in  particular  when  programmes  are  implemented  through  budget 
support115.  The  PI  substantiates  policy  dialogues/partnerships  with  third  countries 
through support of specific cooperation activities (based on mutual interest) which help 
to promote EU interests and create a unique political leverage116.  

Another  important  leverage  effect  stems  from  the  donor  coordination  role  the  EU 
Delegations play: fostering complementarity and coherence between different EU actors 
and increasing the visibility of the EU. This is particularly true where joint programming 
processes have been launched117.  

The specialised instruments also engage in targeted policy dialogue, for example through 
the  INSC  or  the  EIDHR  on  election  observation.  The  IcSP  contributed  to  leverage  the 
EU's  policy  dialogue  in  increasing  donor  funds  spent  in  a  conflict-sensitive  manner118. 

rules 

111  EIDHR's  worldwide  scope,  including  Election  Observation  Missions  and  the  PI  (albeit  focused  on  strategic 
partners). 
112 Especially the EDF and the thematic component of the DCI 
113 Annuality is the budgetary principle according to which expenditure and revenue are programmed and authorised 
for  one  year,  starting  on  1  January  and  ending  on  31  December.    Source:  Article  9  of  Regulation  966/2012  on  the 
financial 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
budget 
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R0966&from=EN 
114 See IPA II staff working document, section 5 
115 See IPA II and ENI staff working document, section 5 
116 See PI staff working document, section 5 
117  See  external  evaluation  on  Joint  Programming:  https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-eu-joint-programming-
process-development-cooperation-2011-2015_en 
118 See IcSP staff working document, section 5 

the  Union: 

applicable 

general 

the 

of 

to 

57 

 
 
                                                            
The evaluations also point to some drawbacks for the political leverage exerted in terms 
of  enhanced  policy  dialogue  on  human  rights  and  fundamental  values.  The  drawbacks 
were  linked  in  particular  to  a  decreasing  acceptance  of  the liberal  democratic  model  of 
development,  the  diminishing  importance  of  official  development  assistance  and  the 
emergence of new actors119.  

The  instruments'  financial  leverage  varies  from  case  to  case.  Overall  it  is  reasonably 
high,  thanks  mainly  to  blending  facilities  (i.e.  for  DCI,  EDF,  ENI  and  IPA)120.  The 
creation  of  trust  funds  has  also  resulted  in  financial leverage,  even  if  not  always  at  the 
expected level.  

Scope for simplification  

Cost-efficient  and  effective  delivery  mechanisms  are  essential  to 
improve  the 
instruments'  performance.  The  Commission  has  embarked  on  a  simplification  process 
through  the  revision  of  the  multi-annual  programming  guidelines  and  annual  decision 
procedures. Nevertheless, the overall number of instruments as well as some instruments 
in  particular  was  still  viewed  by  interested  parties  as  complex,  administratively 
burdensome and lacking financial flexibility. The detailed budget distribution included in 
the  DCI  both  for  geographic  and  thematic  programmes  adds  to  the  complexity  and 
rigidity  of  the  instrument,  making  the  possibilities  to  transfer  funds  between  objectives 
and  for  changing  priorities  within the  instrument  difficult, in  particular  when  there  is  a 
need to face emergencies and crises.  

Before  the  2014-2020  Multi-annual  Financial  Framework,  each  instrument  had  its  own 
implementing  rules  which  led  to  divergences  in  their  implementation.  The  Common 
Implementing Regulation, to which the EDF implementing regulation is largely aligned, 
contributed to the simplification agenda in that it prevented divergences and problems in 
interpretation. Since 2014, the continued simplification efforts in external relations have 
been  focused  on  eliminating  unnecessary  burdens,  increasing  flexibility  and  reducing 
complexity for external partners at implementation level.  

Contribution to a consistent EU external action  

The  EU  ensures  the  security  and  prosperity  for  Europeans  by  actively  engaging  on  the 
world stage, to promote its interests and uphold the values of democracy, the rule of law 
and  protection  of  human  rights.  EU  external  action  policies  include  international 
commitments  such  as  the  2030  Agenda  and  the  Paris  Agreement  on  climate  change, 
together  with  the  Global  Strategy  for  the  EU's  Foreign  and  Security  Policy,  the  new 
European Consensus on Development, the renewed EU-Africa partnership, the reviewed 
European  Neighbourhood  policy,  the  Enlargement  policy  and  the  Consensus  on 
Humanitarian  Aid,  among  others,  which  taken  together  provides  the  necessary 
framework for the EU to achieve its objectives.  

119 See coherence report, box 1 
120 See for example, EDF and DCI staff working documents, section 5 

58 

 
 
                                                            
To meet these objectives, the EU toolbox for external policies encompasses development 
cooperation,  diplomacy,  peace,  security  and  defence  actions,  economic  cooperation, 
enlargement,  humanitarian  aid  and  civil  protection,  enhanced  neighbourhood  relations, 
macro-financial assistance, partnership on global challenges and trade.  

Furthermore,  to  improve  the  EU's  effectiveness  in  supporting  stability,  security  and 
sustainable  development  in  partner  countries  the  Commission  adopted  a  proposal  to 
amend the IcSP Regulation. The amendment closes the gap identified in the EU's ability 
to provide support when building EU partners' capacities in the security sector and would 
enable  the  EU  to  support  military  actors,  under  exceptional  and  clearly  defined 
circumstances.  

Through  the  use  of  joint  programming  with  Member  States  and  other  donors,  a  more 
coherent and visible EU response to partner countries' development has been created. A 
specific evaluation published in March 2017 found progress on joint programming with 
Member States showing that, despite still being in its early stages, it is valuable for the 
EU and its Member States121. Challenges linked to ensuring ownership of the process and 
results by partner countries would need to be further addressed.  

On civil society in partner countries, although the geographical instruments work mainly 
with  their  authorities,  cooperation  with  civil  society  organisations  remains  a  constant 
feature  across  the  instruments  with  a  view  to  contributing  to  reinforcing  the 
organisations’  capacity  and  to  a  civil  society  that  is  able  to  promote  reforms  and  hold 
governments to account. Some instruments and programmes, such as the EIDHR and the 
DCI CSO/LA are primarily intended to support civil society.  

The  close  interconnection  between  internal  and  external  policies  is  self-evident,  for 
instance, with the migration crisis where the coordination and complementarity between 
instruments  was  necessary.  EU  internal  policy  priorities  have  been  integrated,  to  the 
extent possible, in external actions in a coherent and consistent way, in order to safeguard 
EU interests and promote mutual interest solutions and also benefited from the specialist 
focus of PI on the internal/external policy nexus.  

To properly address external interest and achieve global objectives stronger collaboration 
between  EU  internal  and  external  services  have  been  pursued91  to  ensure  coherent 
approaches and to avoid duplication and overlaps. To help reinforce coherence, to ensure 
that EU actions are mutually reinforcing and to avoid contradictory approaches, external 
services need to have a more complete picture of the activities that take place outside the 
EU,  in  particular  on  global  challenges  such  as  climate  change,  biodiversity  or  the  fight 
against  terrorism.  The  current  multiple  programming  documents  covering  a  given 
country/region/continent make it difficult to have a clear overview of external actions. 

Contribution to EU priorities for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth  

121  See  external  evaluation  of  EU  Joint  Programming  Process  of  Development  Cooperation  (March  2017) 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-eu-joint-programming-process-development-cooperation-2011-2015_en 

59 

 
 
                                                            
Smart,  sustainable  and  inclusive  growth  is  at  the  heart  of  the  EU’s  external  assistance. 
The instruments contribute to smart growth through support to trade-related projects and 
the development of collective approaches on climate change and environment.  

In line with the Agenda for Change122 that aims to significantly increase the impact and 
effectiveness of the EU’s external assistance, EU assistance at country level has to focus 
on three or fewer sectors of concentration in most partner countries. EU support has since 
been  more  focused  on  the  two  priority  areas  of  the  Agenda  for  Change,  one  of  those 
being inclusive and sustainable growth for human development.  

IPA II has a clear objective of enhancing its beneficiary countries' economic and social 
development  with  a  view  to  attaining  the  targets  set  in  the  Europe  2020  strategy  for 
smart,  sustainable  and  inclusive  growth.  The  development  instruments  have  a  strong 
focus on smart, sustainable and inclusive growth as reflected in the actions adopted in the 
various Annual Action Programmes123. The PI also contributes to these EU priorities as 
does the Greenland Decision. On the PI, one of its specific objectives is the promotion of 
the  international  dimension  of  the  Europe  2020  strategy  in  all  its  aspects  (e.g.  jobs, 
growth, and investments, SMEs).  

Since 2008 the Commission has been setting up blending facilities in different regions of 
the  world,  resulting  in  the  leveraging  of  investments,  to  promote  sustainable  economic 
development.  These  blending  operations  have  covered  different  areas  of  intervention 
(infrastructure  projects,  Micro,  Small  and  Medium  Enterprise  financing,  etc.)  and  the 
value added they generate varies according to the specific additionality objective they are 
meant  to  address,  as  well  as  to  the  economic  conditions  in  the  given  country  of 
operations (e.g. macroeconomic framework, conducive business environment, investment 
climate).  

Long-term impact  

The external evaluations have highlighted that there are obvious difficulties in measuring 
the long-term impact of the instruments at the mid-point of their implementation, as some 
of  them  have  only  recently  started  implementing  a  significant  number  of  projects  and 
programmes and baselines have, in many cases, not yet been established.  

Nevertheless,  some  evaluations  were  able  to  look  at  achievements  under  previous 
instruments  to  show  positive  trends  in  key  indicators.  For  example,  the  DCI  supported 
the  drafting  of  50  national  and  regional  climate  strategies  over  the  last  years;  in 
Neighbourhood countries, and despite difficult circumstances  (e.g. the global economic 
crisis,  regional  crises,  civil  wars,  terrorism,  and  the  migration  crisis),  some  countries 
showed  significant  progress  in  certain  governance  areas  (e.g.  Georgia  in  the  area  of 
public  administration).  For  the  PI  the  mid-term  evaluation  concludes  that  the  support 
deployed is on track to deliver the expected impacts.  

122 COM (2011) 637, 13 October 2011 
123  See  Commission  2016  Annual  Report  on  the  implementation  of  the  European  Union's  instruments  for  financing 
external actions in 2015, SWD (2016) 456 final of 19 December 2016 

60 

 
 
                                                            
Performance  against  the  current  set  of  objectives  contained  in  the  instruments  is 
dependent  on  various  external  factors  outside  the  control  of  the  instruments,  such  as 
national  ownership,  political  will  and  a  country's  administrative  capacity.  The  cost  of 
non-action or late action in external relations would be catastrophic if instability, conflict 
and war were to increase, in particular in the EU’s Neighbourhood, with potential spill-
over effects for the EU itself. 

Evaluation results for Humanitarian Aid 

The  independent  comprehensive  evaluation  of  the  European  Union  humanitarian  aid 
during  the  period  2012-2016124  concluded  that  the  Commission-funded  humanitarian 
actions were overall needs-based and implemented in line with humanitarian principles. 
The actions made an important contribution to the core objectives to save lives, reduce 
morbidity and suffering as well as improve dignity of life of the populations affected by 
disasters.  The  evaluation  found  that  the  scale  of  funding  dedicated  to  humanitarian  aid 
actions  allowed  the  EU  to  have  a  real  impact  on  the  ground,  addressing  the  needs of  a 
significant number of beneficiaries in a large number of countries and regions. Positive 
impact  on  the  ground  was  also  found  in  regions  where  funding  allocations  were  more 
limited,  thanks  to  the  selection  of  projects  with  high  leverage  or  multiplier  effect 
potential.  

EU  added  value  was  found  primarily  in  the  very  fact  that  the  EU's  humanitarian  aid 
funding  helps  address  humanitarian  needs  around  the  globe.  In  a  global  context  where 
needs  largely  outpace  the  available  resources,  stopping  EU  humanitarian  aid  funding 
would  leave  a  significant  proportion  of  humanitarian  needs  globally  unaddressed.  EU 
added value was also found in relation to the Commission’s use of a global field network 
(key  unique  factor  compared  to  other  donors),  the  focus  on  forgotten  crises  and  the 
politically independent and principled approach.  

The  evaluation  confirmed  that  the  current  configuration  allows  for  a  rapid  response  to 
crisis  situations  as  they  develop  and  to  new  needs  as  they  emerge.  It  ensures  the 
necessary  flexibility,  adequate  expertise,  relevance,  efficiency  and  cost-effectiveness. 
The evaluation pointed to the fact that there is a clear and consistent approach towards 
the humanitarian principles. It also noted that keeping EU humanitarian aid separate from 
other external policy instruments supports its independence. 

This is also supported by stakeholders at all levels125, including the European Parliament. 
The [DEVE Committee report]  on the implementation of the Development Cooperation 
Instrument,  the  Humanitarian  Aid  Instrument  and  the  European  Development  Fund 
insists  on  the  need  to  ensure  that  humanitarian  aid  is  not  instrumentalised  and  that  the 
humanitarian  principles  are  respected.  The  report  also  calls  for  the  recognition  of  the 

124 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/funding-evaluations/evaluations/geographic-
evaluations_enhttp://ec.europa.eu/echo/funding-evaluations/evaluations/geographic-evaluations_en  
125 The evaluation included a wide-range of stakeholders' consultations, including an Open Public Consultation. 

61 

 
 
 
                                                            
specificity of humanitarian aid in the EU budget and recommends, therefore, keeping a 
separate instrument and budget for humanitarian aid. 

Evaluation results of the External Lending Mandate (ELM) 

An independent external evaluation undertaken in 2016 found that the ELM enabled the 
European  Investment  Bank  (EIB)  to  support  EU  external  policy  objectives  and  to 
respond  to  a  number  of  challenges  that  have  arisen  during  the  course  of  the  current 
mandate  (2014-2020).  It  found  that  all  the  operations  under  the  current  ELM  since  its 
inception in July 2014 are fully aligned with the three high-level objectives set out in the 
ELM  Decision.  It  also  found  that  the  three  objectives  themselves  are  aligned  with  the 
Sustainable Development Goals and that the ELM has supported the EU external policy 
agenda,  showing  sufficient  flexibility  and  reactivity  to  new  geopolitical  challenges  as 
demonstrated  in  Syria, Ukraine,  Egypt  and  Morocco  (the Arab  Spring)  and  Jordan  (the 
refugee crisis). The ELM has enabled the EIB, alongside other development partners, to 
play  a  positive  role  in  the  economic  and  political  stabilisation  of  these  countries  hit  by 
political  crises.  The  consistency  of  the  ELM  with  EU  external,  climate  and  allocation 
policies is ensured through regularly updated regional guidelines.  

The  evaluation  also  concluded  that  the  ELM  has  substantially  contributed  to  the  EU's 
climate change-related objectives, especially in terms of climate change mitigation. ELM 
operations enabled the saving of an estimated 1.35 Mt CO2-eq/year of GHG emissions 
based on operations signed between July 2014 and December 2015. EIB lending volumes 
exceed the quantitative target of 25% and even the target of 35% by 2020. 

The  evaluation  concluded  that  without  the  EU  guarantee,  the  EIB  would  not  have 
financed most of the projects it considered since the recipient countries were too risky for 
the  EIB  to  lend  to  on  its  own  risk.  The  financial  added  value  of  ELM  financing 
operations is substantial compared to the private sector both in terms of the interest rate 
and longer maturity.  Moreover, there  is  clear  evidence of non-financial  benefits for  the 
final  beneficiaries  generated  by  EIB  lending  under  the  ELM:  technical  assistance, 
promotion  of  good  financial  standards  within  the  local  banking  sector,  procurement 
standards, etc. 

ELM  projects  often  take  place  in  less  developed  markets  with  higher  risks  and  more 
complex  challenges.  The  EIB's  added-value  in  these  markets  is  often  its  ability  to 
mobilise  finance on terms that  are not  normally readily available in  these markets (e.g. 
longer loan tenors, grace period, etc.). In addition, the EIB brings further added value by 
using its signalling power to crowd-in private sector investors. 

A  further  mid-term  evaluation  required  by  recent  amendments  to  the  ELM  Decision  is 
ongoing  and will be published  before mid-2019. It will examine the ELM's capacity to 
crowd-in  private 
instruments  and 
investment,  synergies  with  existing  financial 
institutions, presence of experts on the ground, etc. 

Evaluation results for Macro Financial Assistance  

62 

 
 
 
All MFA operations are subject to an ex post evaluation, which is normally carried out 
within two years from the end of the availability period defined in the legislative decision 
granting  assistance.  The  objective  is  twofold:  (i)  to  analyse  the  impact  of  MFA  on  the 
economy of the beneficiary country and in particular on the sustainability of its external 
position; (ii) to assess the added value of the EU intervention.  

The  evaluations  carried  out  so  far  conclude  that  MFA  operations  do  contribute,  albeit 
sometimes  modestly  and  indirectly,  to  the  improvement  of  external  sustainability,  the 
macroeconomic  stability  and  the  achievement  of  structural  reforms  in  the  recipient 
country. In most cases, MFA operations had a positive effect on the balance of payments 
of the beneficiary country and contributed to relax their budgetary constraints. They also 
led to a slightly higher economic growth. A few examples of recent ex-post evaluations 
of MFA operations: 

- ON MFA I and II in Ukraine: "The main conclusions from the evaluation are that the 
MFA, in part because of the sped of its deployment, had a positive impact on Ukraine’s 
economy  helping  to  stabilize  the  financial  situation  and  avoided  measures  (such  as 
further public spending cuts) that would have had serious negative social impacts. It also 
contributed to the reform effort in the country"  

On  MFA  I  in  Jordan:  "The  evaluation  concluded  that  the  MFA,  combined  with  a 
simultaneous IMF SBA programme, effectively contributed to the timely stabilization and 
the  medium-term  sustainability  of  Jordan’s  external  financial  and  fiscal  positions;[…], 
EU added-value was most prominent in reinforcing the promotion of structural reforms 
in  several  EU  priority  areas  and  in  addressing  short  and  medium-term  social 
challenges". 

An  ex  post  evaluation  for  the  MFA  programme  in  the  Kyrgyz  Republic  is  currently 
ongoing and is expected to be finalised in 2018. Additionally, ex post evaluation for the 
MFA programmes in Tunisia I and Georgia II will be launched in mid-2018.126 

126  All  final  reports  of  completed  ex-post  evaluations  of  MFA  operations  are  published  on 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/economy_finance/evaluation/completed/index_en.htm  

63 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
Annex 4: Broad instrument - description of the programmes 
covered  
Common Implementing Regulation 

The  CIR  is  not  a  financing  instrument,  but  a  regulation  for  the  implementation  of  the 
financing instruments under its scope127. While each of the external financing instruments 
determine  the  objectives,  scope,  programming,  financial  envelope  and  process  for 
allocation  of  funds  for  the  respective  policy  they  implement,  the  CIR  provides  a  set  of 
common  rules  and  procedures  applicable  to  project  formulation,  implementation, 
evaluation  and  audit.  The  CIR  is  not  a  standalone  regulation:  its  provisions  are 
heterogeneous  and  vary  from  some  procedural/technical  provisions  which  complement 
the  Financial  Regulation,  to  some  overarching  cross-cutting  policy-commitments  (on 
diverse punctual topics, such as accessibility for persons with disabilities, rule of law or 
environmental  screening)  which  complement  the  commitments  made  in  each  external 
financing instrument.  

In the MFF 2007-2013, each individual External Financing Instrument contained its own 
implementing  rules.  The  CIR's  primary  achievement  hence  lies  in  the  establishment  of 
common rules, thereby ruling out the divergences which existed previously between the 
pre-2014  External  Financing  Instruments.  The  particularity  of  the  CIR  being  that  it  is 
merely  ancillary  to  the  External  Financing  Instruments  through  which  it  operates,  the 
2014-2020 impact of the CIR beyond this harmonisation-aspect, is difficult to assess128.  

Development Cooperation Instrument 

The  DCI  2014-2020  is  the  EU's  main  financing  instrument  within  the  EU  budget 
available  to  support  its  development  policy.  It  is  complementary  to  the  EDF  which  is 
funded  outside  the  EU  budget  and  specifically  covers  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific 
countries. The aim of the DCI  is to finance  actions aimed at the eradication of poverty 
and provide a long-term response to global threats/challenges in countries included in the 
DAC-OECD list of aid recipients. Approximately129 24% of the programme will be spent 
on  sustainable  agriculture,  food  and  nutrition  security;  14%  on  natural  resources  and 
environment;  11%  on  Civil  Society  Organisations  and  11%  on  education.  Unlike  other 
external financing instruments, the actions under the DCI must be designed to fulfil the 
criteria for Official Development Assistance130.  

127 \The CIR applies to the Heading 4 external financing instruments under the EU budget. It does not apply to the EDF 
although the EDF’s own implementation rules largely reflect those in the CIR. 
128 The qualitative and quantitative appreciation of the functioning of the CIR can only be based on the qualitative and 
quantitative results seen in the functioning of the various External Financing Instruments; 
129 Based on programmed amounts.  
130  A  few  exceptions  exist  in  the  case  of  the  thematic  global  public  goods  and  challenges  programme  and  the  pan-
African programmes, where a limited percentage (5 and 10 % respectively) can be used for non-Official Development 
Assistance. 

64 

 
 
 
                                                            
European Development Fund 

The 11th European Development Fund is funded by EU Member States outside of the EU 
budget.  It  is  the  EU's  main  financing  instrument  for  providing  development  aid  to  the 
ACP countries and the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs). The objectives of the 
EDF are to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty in the ACP countries, and to attain 
sustainable development of the OCTs. With total financial resources of EUR 30.5 billion, 
the  EDF  is  the  largest  of  all  EU's  external  financing  instruments  in  terms  of  volume, 
representing  the  equivalent  of  almost  half  of  the  Multiannual  Financial  Framework 
Heading 4 'Global Europe' of EUR 66.26 million for the same period. Approximately131 
21%  of  the  programme  will  be  spent  on  sustainable  agriculture,  food  and  nutrition 
security,  11%  on  infrastructure  and  transport,  10%  on  energy  and  8%  on  natural 
resources and environment.  

Key  features  of  the  EDF  includes  its  substantial  reserve:  20%  of  its  geographic 
programme  is  unallocated compared with  only 6%  for the DCI  meaning it can respond 
quickly to emerging challenges; it is able to move unused funds from one year to the next 
(multi-annuality), enhancing flexibility to respond to evolving needs; and its off-budget 
nature permits the funding of actions that could not otherwise be financed (e.g. support to 
peace keeping operations).  

European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 

The  EIDHR  2014-2020  with  EUR  1.33  billion,  the  equivalent  of  EUR  190  million  per 
year, is the EU's financing instrument dedicated specifically to the promotion and support 
of democracy and human rights, allowing for assistance to be provided independently of 
the  consent  of  the  third  countries'  governments  and  public  authorities.  The  EIDHR 
focuses,  in  complementarity  to  other  EU  financing  instruments,  on  urgency  situations 
where human rights and fundamental freedoms are most at risk and where disrespect for 
human  rights  is  particularly  pronounced  and  systematic.  The  EIDHR  mandate  is 
worldwide, with the exception of the EU Member States. In order to be able to respond in 
a  flexible  and  timely  manner,  the  EIDHR  enjoys  a  number  of  more  flexible 
administrative  procedures  and  is  untied.  The  EIDHR  is  mainly  (not  exclusively) 
implemented  through  civil  society  organisations  and  in  support  of  civil  society. 
Approximately 20-25% of the instrument is spent on Support to human rights and human 
rights  defenders  in  situations  where  they  are  most  at  risks;  20-25  %  on  other  EU 
priorities  in  the  field  of  human  rights;  15-20%  on  support  to  democracy,  25%  on  EU 
Election Observation Missions,  and 5-10%  on support  to  targeted key actors, including 
international and regional human rights instruments and mechanisms.  

European Neighbourhood Instrument 

The  European  Neighbourhood  Instrument  implements  the  European  Neighbourhood 
Policy.  With  an  envelope  of  EUR  16.49  billion  for  the  period  2014-2020,  it  aims  at 
further advance towards an area of shared prosperity and good neighbourliness involving 

131 Based on programmed amounts 

65 

 
 
                                                            
the EU and 16 countries and territories. The ENI as financial instrument is based in Art. 
208 and 208 TEU but it underpins the pursuit of Art. 8 of the TEU. Accordingly the ENI 
promotes  enhanced  political  cooperation,  deep  and  sustainable  democracy,  progressive 
economic  integration  and  a  strengthened  partnership  with  societies  between  the  Union 
and  the  partner  countries  and,  in  particular,  the  implementation  of  partnership  and 
cooperation agreements, association agreements or other existing and future agreements, 
and jointly agreed action plans or equivalent documents.  

The  ENI  features  traditional  bilateral  and  multi-country  programmes  (including  those 
specifically based on the priorities of the Eastern Partnership and the southern dimension 
of  the  ENP  as  well  as  an  ENI-wide  dimension),  along  with  cross-border  cooperation 
programmes.  The  latter  is  unique  to  the  ENI  and  IPA  II  instruments,  and  addresses 
cooperation  between  one  or  more  Member  States,  on  the  one  hand,  and  one  or  more 
partner  countries  and/or  the  Russian  Federation,  on  the  other  hand,  taking  place  along 
their  shared  part  of  the  external  border  of  the  Union.  The  ENI  makes  use  of  a 
differentiated  approach  and  it  establishes  country  specific  frameworks  for  bilateral 
cooperation in the form of Partnership Priorities, Association Agendas and Action Plans. 
The ENI employs an incentive-based approach ("more for more") to reward progress in 
key areas of cooperation. 

European Sustainable Development Fund  

The  EFSD  guarantee  is  established  by  Regulation  (EU)  2017/1601  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 September 2017 establishing the European Fund for 
Sustainable Development (EFSD), the EFSD guarantee and the EFSD guarantee fund.  

The  European  Fund  for  Sustainable  Development  (EFSD)  aims  to  support  investments 
primarily  in  Africa  and  the  Union’s  Neighbourhood  as  a  means  to  contribute  to  the 
achievement  of  the  Sustainable  Development  Goals  of  the  United  Nations  (UN)  2030 
Agenda  for  Sustainable  Development  (the  ‘2030  Agenda’),  in  particular  poverty 
eradication,  as  well  as  the  commitments  under  the  recently  revised  European 
Neighbourhood  Policy.  By  supporting  such  investments,  the  EFSD  aims  to  address 
specific  socioeconomic  root  causes  of  migration,  including  irregular  migration,  and  to 
contribute  to  the  sustainable  reintegration  of  migrants  returning  to  their  countries  of 
origin and to the strengthening of transit and host communities. 

The  EFSD  is  composed  of  regional  investment  platforms,  which  have  been  established 
on the basis of the working methods, procedures and structures of the external blending 
facilities of the Union and which should combine their blending operations and the EFSD 
Guarantee. 

The guarantee should give priority to funding projects which have a high impact on job 
creation and whose cost-benefit ratio enhances the sustainability of investment. In order 
to  fulfil  the  political  commitments  of  the  EU  on  climate  action,  renewable  energy  and 
resource  efficiency,  a  minimum  share  of  28  %  of  the  financing  under  the  EFSD 
Guarantee should be devoted to investments relevant for those sectors. 

The  EFSD  guarantee  shall  be  used  to  cover  the  risks  from  loans,  guarantees,  counter-
guarantees,  capital  market  instruments  as  well  as  any  other  form  of  funding  or  credit 
enhancement,  insurance,  and  equity  or  quasi-equity  participations  for  a  maximum 

66 

 
 
 
 
 
amount  of  EUR  1.5  billion.  The  provisioning  rate  shall  be  at  50  %  of  total  guarantee 
obligations.  

The guarantee will be implemented through ''investment windows'', targeted amounts for 
specific regions and/or sectors. So far, five investment windows have been set up. All of 
them  cover  the  two  regions  under  the  EFSD  (Africa  and  Neighbourhood)  and  have  a 
specific  sector  focus:  sustainable  energy,  MSMEs  financing,  sustainable  cities, 
sustainable agriculture and digitalisation. 

External Lending Mandate 

The  European  Investment  Bank  (EIB)  is  'the  EU  bank'  and  the  largest  multilateral 
borrower  and  lender  in  the  world.  In  addition  to  its  main  mission  to  contribute  to  the 
development of the internal market, the EIB is also a major partner in pursuing the EU's 
external objectives: about 10% (approx. EUR 8 billion) of its annual activity takes place 
outside the EU. Given the EIB's policy to maintain its AAA-rating, the EIB's ability to 
lend outside the EU in support of EU policy objectives using its own resources is limited 
to  relatively  lower-risk  projects.  Under  the  External  Lending  Mandate  (ELM)  the  EIB 
can benefit from an EU guarantee on part of its lending outside the EU, excluding those 
countries  covered  by  the  ACP  Investment  Facility.  The  ELM  thus  enables  the  EIB  to 
support  EU  external  policy  objectives  in  a  wider  range  of  countries  by  investing  in 
projects  which  the  EIB  would  be  otherwise  unable  to  finance.  For  most  projects  in  the 
private sector, the guarantee covers political risk only.  For projects in  the public sector 
and a limited number of projects in the private sector, the EU provides a comprehensive 
guarantee. Following recent amendments to the ELM Decision, the maximum amount of 
the  EU  guarantee  has  been  increased  to  EUR  32.3  billion  over  the  period  2014-2020, 
with sub-ceilings for each region. 

EIB  loans  guaranteed  by  the  EU  under  the  ELM  must  meet  one  of  four  high  level 
objectives: 1) local private sector development, in particular support to micro, small and 
medium-sized  enterprises  (MSMEs);  2)  development  of  social  and  economic 
infrastructure, including transport, energy, environmental infrastructure, and information 
and communication technology; 3) climate change mitigation and adaptation; and 4) the 
long-term  economic  resilience  of  refugees,  migrants,  host  and  transit  communities,  and 
communities  of  origin  as  a  strategic  response  to  addressing  root  causes  of  migration. 
Regional integration among beneficiary countries and between beneficiaries and the EU 
is an underlying objective. 

The ELM allows the EIB to grant large amount of loans with a limited impact on the EU 
budget. This is due to the mechanism whereby  the Guarantee Fund which cushions the 
EU budget against calls under the ELM need only be provisioned at a rate of 9% of the 
EU's  total  outstanding  liabilities  under  the  ELM  and  two  other  (smaller)  programmes 
including Macro Financial Assistance and Euratom loans. 

67 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace 

The  Instrument  contributing  to  Stability  and  Peace  (IcSP)  with  an  envelope  of  EUR 
2,366  million  is  primarily  devoted  to  crisis  response,  conflict  prevention  and  peace 
building  actions.  The  IcSP  makes  non-programmable  funding  available  in  a  timely, 
flexible way thereby providing a tool to address crisis or emerging crisis situations from 
a political perspective and allowing the EU to fulfil its Treaty mandate to preserve peace, 
prevent  conflicts  and  strengthen  international  security.  In  addition,  programmable 
funding is provided to structural peace building and crisis preparedness actions alongside 
support  to  reinforce  third  countries'  capacity  to  deal  with  global  risks  and  threats, 
ultimately  ensuring  long-term  stability.  The  IcSP  is  a  crucial  tool  for  the  EU  as  a 
respected  and  effective  peace  and  security  actor  and  underpins  EU  crisis  response 
policies with quick and flexible action.  

Macro Financial Assistance 

Macro-Financial  Assistance  (MFA)  is  an  EU  financial  instrument  designed  to  address 
exceptional  external  financing  needs  of  countries  that  are  geographically,  economically 
and  politically  close  to  the  EU.  It  is  conditional  on  the  existence  of  an  adjustment  and 
reform programme agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and can take the 
form of  either loans,  for which the Commission  borrows the necessary funds in  capital 
markets  and  on-lends  them  to  the  beneficiary  country,  or,  under  certain  circumstances, 
grants financed by the EU budget. MFA operations are triggered by balance-of-payments 
crises within a country; the instrument thus delivers assistance of 'last resort'. 

MFA has successfully contributed to both short-term stabilisation and medium- to long-
term  economic  stability  of  countries  around the  EU’s  borders.  This  dual  impact,  which 
has been confirmed by ex-post evaluations, is derived from the instrument’s two-pronged 
approach.  Its  primary  and  most  immediate  goal  is  to  help  countries  overcome  acute 
economic  crises  by  filling  an  external  financing  gap  and  thereby  restoring  an  adequate 
international  reserve  position.  The  second  objective  is  to  spur  lasting  change  through 
structural  and  economic  reforms; 
long-term 
stabilisation  is  achieved  through  policy  conditionality.  The  acute  need  of  beneficiary 
countries  for  emergency  funding  tends  to  increase  the  traction  of  MFA  conditionality 
compared with non-emergency, programmable support instruments. Thus, MFA endows 
the EU with significant policy leverage in beneficiary countries. Importantly, through its 
stabilisation and reform impetus in favour of a sound macroeconomic environment, MFA 
also supports the efficiency of other EU financing instruments. 

to  medium-  and 

this  contribution 

MFA is available to accession and pre-accession countries, as well as countries covered 
by the European Neighbourhood Policy. The instrument's geographical scope reflects not 
only  the  regional  priorities  of  EU  external  policy,  but  also  the  economic  imperative  to 
support economic stability in the EU's neighbourhood, which could otherwise be a source 
of negative spillovers to the EU economy. In this sense, MFA is part of the "network" of 
financial instruments contributing to the macro-financial stability of the EU, along with 
68 

 
 
the  financial  stability  instruments  put  in  place  for  EU  Member  States  (the  EFSM/BoP 
facilities and ESM).  

Each  MFA  operation  requires  the  adoption  of  a  stand-alone  legislative  decision  by  the 
European  Parliament  and  the  Council,  on  a  proposal  by  the  Commission.  A  previous 
proposal by the Commission of a Framework Regulation for MFA of 2011, which would 
have laid down the key features of the instrument and streamlined the decision-making 
process,  was  rejected  by  the  co-legislators,  as  they  were  not  prepared  to  give  up  their 
decision-making power on individual operations. 

Partnership Instrument 

The PI 2014-2020 with EUR 960 million in total, average annual allocation of EUR xxx 
million,  is  designed  to  pursue  policy  and  political  cooperation  and  alliance-building  on 
issues  of  own/mutual  interest  with  partner  countries  and  challenges  of  global  concern. 
The  PI  has  world-wide  coverage  and  is  not  subject  to  requirements  for  Official 
Development  Assistance  (ODA).  It  is  designed  to  support  the  EU  as  a  global  actor 
partnering  with  third  countries  -  notably  middle-income  countries  and  in  particular 
strategic partners - on a peer-to-peer basis. The PI addresses four specific objectives:  

1)  Promotion  of  EU  bilateral,  regional  and  inter-regional  cooperation  partnership 
strategies  by  promoting  policy  dialogue  and  by  developing  collective  approaches  and 
responses to global concerns;  
2) Implementation of the external dimension of 'Europe 2020';  
3) Improvement of access to partner country markets and boosting trade, investment and 
business opportunities for EU companies and elimination of barriers to market access and 
investment; and  
4)  Enhancement  of  widespread  understanding  and  visibility  of  the  EU  and  thereby 
promotion  of  its  values  and  interests  via  public  diplomacy  actions.  The  PI  also 
contributes to the Erasmus+ programme. 

69 

 
 
Annex 4a Additional information on Macro-Financial 
Assistance 

MFA is not a programmable instrument; it is intended for exceptional circumstances and 
has  been  used  to  address  key  crises  in  the  EU's  neighbourhood.  Future  crisis  moments 
will need to be catered for, but cannot necessarily be anticipated – even less so in terms 
of  their  magnitude  –  and  thus  it  is  difficult  to  evaluate  well  in  advance  the  possible 
financing needs. In this respect, it will continue to be important to keep a level of both 
grants  and  loans  sufficient  to  ensure  that  possible  specific  external  financing  needs, 
including in acute crisis moments, from third countries can be catered for. 

MFA  goes  beyond  budget  resources  in  providing  loans,  in  addition  to  grants.  This 
reinforces the EU's capacity to act as it produces significant financial leverage. 

In  this  context,  it  is  important  to  highlight  that  in  the  context  of  the  current  MFF  mid-
term  review,  the  Commission  proposed  to  increase  the  lending  volume  for  MFA  loans 
substantially, from EUR 0.5 billion to EUR 2 billion per year for the remainder of this 
MFF, precisely to cater for the geopolitical and economic instability of the region, which 
is  expected  to  persist.  The  Commission  proposal  was  supported  by  both  Council  and 
Parliament,  and  given  the  importance  that  has  been  put  on  instruments  that  provide 
positive leverage for external policy priorities the current annual lending volume of EUR 
2 billion as agreed in the current MFF mid-term review is taken as the baseline for also 
the  next  MFF  (post-2020)  period.  MFA  indeed  is  considered  to  be  a  programme  with 
strong  European  added  value  and  high  leverage.  A  future  new  Guarantee  Scheme  will 
have  to  make  sure  that  sufficient  provisioning  will  be  earmarked  for  enabling  these 
volumes  of  MFA  loans,  so  as  to  safeguard  the  important  leverage  capabilities  of  the 
instrument. 

Although  loans  provide  for  the  majority  of  assistance  disbursed,  in  line  with  the  logic 
behind  the  instrument,  grants  have  proved  to  be  a  key  element  for  complementing  the 
operations in situations of high vulnerability. Eligibility for MFA grants is guided by the 
Joint Declaration of the European Parliament and the Council of August 2013 and relates 
mainly  to  the  level  of  development  of  the  recipient  country  and  its  debt  sustainability 
and/or creditworthiness.  

A  sufficiently  provisioned  MFA  grants  budget  line  is  a  prerequisite  for  the  EU  to 
maintain  the  required  flexibility  of  the  MFA  instrument  and  intervene  with  a  suitable 
operation in case of emergency.  

Indeed, in the upcoming MFF post-2020, a number of countries could still require large 
MFA operations, in terms of both loans and grants, to restore BoP and financial stability. 
Some  of  these  might  require  large  interventions  from  the  international  community, 
including  possibly  in  the  form  of  grants  to  support  economic  reconstruction.  Syria,  a 
likely  future  priority,  could  be  such  a  case.  When  deciding  on  any  possible  cuts  or 
reallocations, it should therefore be considered that a cut in the budget for MFA grants 
could increase the risk of the EU being less well prepared for upcoming challenges in the 

70 

 
neighbourhood  and  candidate  countries.  For  that  reason,  the  option  to  use  grants  in 
exceptional  circumstances  to  incentivise  and  ensure  reform  implementation  and 
economic stabilisation should be retained, even in a scenario of a fundamental redesign 
of the external action budget; sufficient flexibility for this purpose would need to be built 
into any revamped budget allocation system. 

71 

 
 
 
Annex 4b Additional information on the External Lending 
Mandate 

Table of contents 

1. 

2. 

3. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT ............................................................. 73 

THE OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................ 76 

PROGRAMME STRUCTURE AND PRIORITIES ........................................................................... 80 

4.  DELIVERY MECHANISMS OF THE INTENDED FUNDING ...................................................... 85 

5.  MONITORING AND EVALUATION .............................................................................................. 86 

72 

 
 
INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 

Scope and context 

This  annex  presents  information  related  specifically  to  the  EIB  External  Lending 
Mandate  (ELM).  The  ELM  is  a  budgetary  guarantee,  not  a  grant-based  instrument,  so 
specific considerations apply to it beyond the discussion in the main body of this impact 
assessment.  

Introduction to the External Lending Mandate (ELM) 

The  ELM  supports  the  European  Investment  Bank’s  (EIB)  lending  outside  the  EU  in 
support of EU policy objectives. 

The EIB is 'the EU bank' and the largest multilateral borrower and lender in the world. In 
addition to its main mission to contribute to the development of the internal market, the 
EIB is also a major partner in pursuing the EU's external objectives: about 10% (approx. 
EUR 8 billion) of its annual activity takes place outside the EU.  

The EIB's ability to lend outside the EU in support of EU policy objectives is, however, 
limited given its policy of  maintaining its AAA  credit rating. Under the ELM, the EIB 
can benefit from an EU guarantee on its lending outside the EU in non-ACP countries. 
The ELM thus enables the EIB to support EU external policy objectives in countries with 
higher political risk by investing in projects that the EIB would otherwise be unable to 
finance. For most projects in the private sector, the guarantee covers political risk and not 
commercial  risk.  For  projects  in  the  public  sector,  the  EU  provides  a  comprehensive 
guarantee. 

The  ELM  therefore  increases  the  firepower  of  the  EIB,  allowing  it  to  increase  its 
investments outside the EU in support of EU external policy. The current mandate which 
runs  from  2014-2020  allows  the  EIB  to  lend  up  to  EUR  32.3  billion  under  the  ELM 
guarantee. Eighty-six percent of the overall guarantee ceiling is earmarked for operations 
in the EU's Neighbourhood partners and in Pre-Accession countries. The rest can be used 
in Asia, Latin America and South Africa. 

The ELM enables EIB lending in support of one or more of the following four high-level 
objectives: 

i) 

ii) 

iii) 
iv) 

local  private  sector  development,  in  particular  support  to  SMEs  and 
micro-enterprises;  
development  of  social  and  economic  infrastructure,  including  transport, 
energy, environmental infrastructure, and information and communication 
technology;  
climate change mitigation and adaptation;  
long-term  economic  resilience  of  refugees,  migrants,  host  and  transit 
communities  and  communities  of  origin  as  a  strategic  response  to 
addressing root causes of migration.  

The fourth high-level objective was recently added via amendments to the ELM Decision 
which will enter into force in April 2018. 

73 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  ELM  is  an  extremely  efficient  instrument  from  a  budgetary  perspective.  The 
Guarantee Fund for external actions was set up to protect the EU budget in the event of a 
default  on  an  EIB  loan  which  the  EU  has  guaranteed  under  the  ELM.  The  Guarantee 
Fund  (which  plays  a  similar  role  for  Macro  Financial  Assistance  and  Euratom  loans) 
must be maintained at a level of 9% of the EU’s total outstanding liability for these three 
programmes. In other words, each euro in the Guarantee Fund underpins approximately 
eleven euros of EIB investment abroad in support of EU policy objectives. 

The table below shows the amounts paid each year into the EU budget to maintain it at 
the target level of 9% of outstanding liabilities: 

Annual average amounts of the current budget in nominal terms - Provisioning of 
the Guarantee Fund for external actions 

2014 
      58,4  

2015 
     144,4  

2016 
     257,1  

2017 
     240,5  

2018 
         137,8  

In EUR million 
2020 
     287.8* **  

2019 
        103,2*  

 (*) Before use of external assigned revenue (which is EUR 55 million for both 2019 and 2020) 

(**) Forecast  

ELM in a changing context  

The  Reflection  paper  on  the  future  of  EU  finances  identified  the  need  to  align  EU 
external investment with new external action priorities to tackle challenges efficiently.132 
The paper indicated the need to leverage private funds to increase impact in line with EU 
objectives.  The  paper  also  identified  notably  the  need  to  tackle  the  root  causes  of 
irregular migration. 

The current ELM 2014-2020 has just been amended to add a fourth high-level migration-
related  objective  in  order  to  allow  the  EIB  to  invest  in  the  economic  resilience  of 
countries  most  affected  by  the  migration  crisis.  Due  to  the  efficient  nature  of  its 
budgetary provisioning, the ELM allows the EU collectively to 'do more with less.' 

Lessons learned from previous programmes 

There have been three recent independent evaluation studies analysing the ELM and one 
on the Guarantee Fund for external actions:  

  Mid-term evaluation of the 2007-2013 mandate (2010)133 
  Evaluation of the Guarantee Fund for external actions (2010) 134 
  Mid-term evaluation of the 2014-2020 mandate (2016)135 

132 COM(2017) 358, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-eu-

finances_en.pdf  

133  DG  ECFIN  (2010),  “Mid-term  evaluation  of  EIB’s  external  mandate”,  Final  report,  available  at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/economy_finance/evaluation/pdf/ecfin_eval_en.pdf    
134  COWI  (2010),  “EIB’s  external  mandate  2007-2013  Midterm  Review”,  the  Evaluation  of  the  Guarantee  Fund  for 
External 
at 
ECFIN, 
DG 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/economy_finance/evaluation/pdf/ecfin_eval_en.pdf  
135 PwC (2016), “Final Report for the External evaluation of the application of the European Union Guarantee for the 
at 
the  European  Union”,  DG  ECFIN,  Brussels, 
EIB 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/economy_finance/evaluation/pdf/mid_term_201612-final_report_pwc_en.pdf  

Copenhagen, 

operations 

available 

available 

Actions 

lending 

(March 

outside 

2010), 

74 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
  Further evaluation of the 2014-2020 mandate (ongoing in 2018) 

This  section  builds  on  the  2016  mid-term  evaluation  and  includes  very  preliminary 
results from the ongoing evaluation of the 2014-2020 ELM. 

Objectives 

The independent external evaluation undertaken in 2016 found that the ELM enabled the 
EIB to support EU external policy objectives and to respond to a number of challenges 
that have arisen during the course of the current mandate. It found that all the operations 
launched under the current ELM since its inception in July 2014 are fully aligned with 
the  three  high-level  objectives  set  out  in  the  2014  ELM  Decision  (which  was 
subsequently amended to include a fourth migration-related objective which comes into 
force in April 2018).  

The evaluation also found that the three objectives themselves are aligned with the EU’s 
policy objectives, notably the Sustainable Development Goals  and the fulfilment of the 
Paris climate agreement. It found that the ELM has allowed for sufficient flexibility and 
reactivity  to  new  geopolitical  challenges  as  demonstrated  in  Syria,  Ukraine,  Egypt  and 
Morocco  (the  Arab  Spring)  and  Jordan  (the  refugee  crisis).  The  ELM  has  enabled  the 
EIB  to  play  a  positive  role  alongside  other  development  partners  in  the  economic  and 
political stabilisation of these countries hit by political crises.  

The  evaluation  also  concluded  that  the  ELM  has  substantially  contributed  to  the  EU's 
climate change-related objectives, especially in terms of climate change mitigation. ELM 
operations  saved  an  estimated  1.35  Mt  CO2-eq/year  of  emissions  based  on  operations 
signed  between  July  2014  and  December  2015.  EIB  lending  volumes  under  the  ELM 
(39%)  currently  exceed  the  quantitative  target  of  25%  and  are  on  track  to  continue  to 
exceed the target of 35% by 2020.136 

Additionality 

The 2016 evaluation concluded that without the EU's guarantee, the EIB would not have 
financed  most  of  the  projects  it  considered  since  the  recipient  countries  were  too  risky 
(speculative-grade)  for  the  EIB  to  lend  at  its  own  risk.  In  some  cases,  with  important 
exceptions,  a  project  could  technically  have  been  realized  in  the  absence  of  the  EIB’s 
involvement,  as  the  borrower  may  potentially  have  found  an  alternative  source  of 
financing,  mainly  from  other  international  financial  institutions  (IFIs).  However,  the 
other IFIs face their own lending constraints, so it is unlikely that even all sound projects 
would  have  attracted  financing  in  the  absence  of  the  ELM.  IFIs  also  seek  to  diversify 
risks  and  aim  for  risk  sharing  when  engaging  in  project  financing,  in  particular  in 
emerging  and  developing  countries.  Thus  in  the  absence  of the  ELM, other IFIs  would 
probably scale down their overall lending volumes in proportion to the reduction in ELM 
lending, as the IFIs would reduce their risk exposure to some projects in the absence of 
the EIB's participation. Thus, other IFIs would not have been able to fill the gap entirely.  

Furthermore, the evaluation found that the projects financed in the context of the EIB’s 
external operations often take place in less developed markets with higher risks and more 

136 SWD(2016) 295 final, mid-term evaluation of the ELM 

75 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
tenors,  grace  periods,  etc.).  This  significant  financial  capacity 

complex  challenges.  The  EIB's  added-value  in  these  markets  is  often  its  ability  to 
mobilise  finance  on  terms  that  usually  are  not  easily  available  in  these  markets  (e.g. 
longer  loan 
is 
complemented  by  technical  expertise  for  the  assessment  of  viable  investments, 
leveraging the EIB's core experience within the EU. In addition, the EIB brings further 
added  value  by  providing  projects  with  both  an  EU  and  an  IFI  ‘label,’  enabling  it  to 
further crowd-in other investors including from the private sector. 

Other findings 

Preliminary  findings  from  the  current  ongoing  evaluation  (required  to  be  published  by 
mid-2019 by the amendments to the ELM Decision which will enter into force in April 
2018)  reinforce  the  above  conclusions.  However,  the  findings  also  point  to  the  need  to 
strengthen  the  granular  link  between  ELM  projects  and  the  EU’s  policy  objectives. 
Experience over the last several years suggests that for instance the Commission should 
have  greater  oversight  over  issues  such  as  conditionality  and  other  relevant  aspects 
insofar  as  these  elements  have  an  impact  on  the  EIB’s  ability  to  deliver  EU  policy 
objectives. 

The  ongoing  evaluation  has  also  pointed  to  monitoring  to  be  a  potential  area  for 
improvement in the next MFF, for example by changes in the timing of the EIB’s three 
year lending forecast and its provision to the Commission. A further recommendation is 
for  a  rationalisation  of  the  interaction  between  ELM  projects  and  the  EU’s  blending 
facilities which is currently organised on a more or less ad hoc basis. 

Consultation 

No open public consultation has been undertaken recently on the ELM, in line with the 
exemption  provided  for  in  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  Better  Regulation  Guidelines. 
However, each of the above  evaluations  has included a  variety of forms of stakeholder 
interviews,  workshops  and  online  surveys  of 
consultation, 
beneficiaries.  The  results  of  these  consultations  were  used  as  a  source  of  evidence  to 
arrive at the conclusions described above. 

including 

targeted 

THE OBJECTIVES  

Challenges for the programmes of the next MFF  

There are a number of challenges which the ELM must address in the next MFF. 

Based  on  the  findings  of  the  evaluations  described  above,  the  ELM  will  need  to  be 
reformed  in  order  to  ensure  a  stronger  alignment  at  the  project  level  with  EU  policy 
objectives. In addition, challenges deriving from the cross-cutting objectives of the new 
MFF  will  include  coherence,  synergies  and  simplification.  All  instruments  have  to 
reinforce their capacity to attract private investments in order to contribute to achieving 
the  Sustainable  Development  Goals.  Finally,  the  ELM  will need  to  continue  to  address 
rising political priorities in the next MFF, especially climate change and financing needs 
consistent  with  the  approach  of  the  Commission's  new  Action  Plan  on  Sustainable 
Finance 

76 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Complementarity 

The  ELM  operates  alongside  other  EU  external  instruments  such  as  the  blending 
facilities/platforms,  the  new  European  Fund  for  Sustainable  Development  (EFSD)  and 
the  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  (ACP)  Investment  Facility.  These  instruments  have 
largely similar objectives. All three instruments, although to differing degrees, target the 
root causes of migration, local private sector development and climate change mitigation 
and adaptation. The ELM and ACP both also contribute to the development of social and 
economic  infrastructure.  Each  instrument  should  strengthen  the  crowding-in  of  private 
investments to underpin the achievement the Sustainable Development Goals. 

The  ELM  and  the  ACP  Investment  Facility  are  geographically  almost  entirely  distinct, 
whereas both the ELM and EFSD cover the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood. The 
ELM  and  the  EFSD  are  complementary  tools  and  both  serve  the  objective  of  the  EU 
Neighbourhood policy. Coordination of efforts in the next MFF will thus be required to 
ensure synergies. The EIB has a role in the governance of the EFSD which is designed to 
enhance the coordination and complementarity between the two instruments. 

Climate change 

The EIB has already in 2015 expanded its climate-related target in developing countries 
from the current level of 25% to 35% by 2020, and the EU has increased the ELM target 
also  to  35%.  Any  new  legislative  proposal  should  take  into  account  such  expansion  as 
well as the EU's own commitments to climate policy in the coming years. Although the 
climate action under  ELM operations is already at 39% and total EIB external operations 
(i.e., including non-ELM operations) is also at about 32% already quite close to the target 
level by 2020, more needs to be done to ensure continued delivery. 

Economic diplomacy 

Economic diplomacy is an overriding EU policy goal, which not only seeks to defend the 
EU’s strategic economic interests (business internationalisation, market access, jobs and 
growth, etc) but is also fully compatible with EU development policy and works in the 
interests  of  our  development  partners.  Investment  climate,  the  participation  of  private 
operators  and  private  financing  are  critical  for  ensuring  sustainable  development  in 
partner  countries.  This  is  reflected  in  the  SDGs  Agenda  2030,  the  EU  Consensus  on 
Development and the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy. 

The importance of EU  Economic  Diplomacy  has  been  recognised in the  Commission’s 
Reflection Paper on Harnessing Globalisation adopted in May 2017. 

EIB  investments  supported  by  the  ELM  could  be  among  the  tools  for  achieving  the 
objectives of economic diplomacy,  for example through an adjustment or update to the 
underlying objective of regional integration or the inclusion of a new objective related to 
support  for  European  SMEs  in  third  countries,  one  of  the  key  aspects  of  economic 
diplomacy. 

Objectives of the programmes 

77 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
ELM Objectives 

EU external objectives 

EIB  external  financing  operations  are  required  to  support  the  EU  external  policy 
objectives  in  the  areas  of  development  cooperation,  Neighbourhood  policy,  climate 
action, addressing the root causes of migration, etc. With the exception of the SDGs and 
Paris Agreement, which were finalised in 2015, the broadest EU external objectives were 
essentially unchanged for the current mandate. 

The intervention logic of the current mandate as elaborated during the 2016 mid-term 
evaluation is below: 

The ELM currently has four high-level objectives which operationalise the link with the 
EU’s external objectives. These current objectives are stated below with some 
considerations for how they may need to be developed in a future mandate based on 
experience under the current framework. 

Objective 1: Local private sector development, in particular in support of small and 
medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs),  possibly  including  the  internationalisation  of 
European SMEs 

Access to finance is one of the key constraints to growth and private sector development 
in developing and transition countries. EIB funding through intermediaries aims to ease 
this  constraint,  consolidate  existing  jobs,  and  support  the  creation  of  new  jobs.  It  also 
supports  the  development  of  local  financial  sectors  to  improve  access  to  finance  over 
time. While the EIB uses a variety of instruments to enhance access to finance, the most 
common of which are credit lines to financial intermediaries (mainly banks) for lending 
to  SMEs.  These  credit  lines  aim  to  increase  the  number  of  loans  that  the  local 
intermediary  banks  are  providing  and  to  extend  the  duration  of  the  loans  they  offer  to 
SMEs and midcaps.  

Additionally,  lending  can  be  channelled  to  SMEs  through  other  sources.  For  example, 
risk-sharing  portfolio  guarantees  insure  banks  against  losses  on  lending  to  SMEs  in 

78 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
difficult and underserved markets. Direct (or intermediated) lending to companies is also 
used for specific infrastructure and R&D improvements. 

Objective 2: Development of social and economic infrastructure 

The  development  of  social  and  economic  infrastructure  provides  a  foundation  for 
economic growth, job creation and social development. It is also critical for the transition 
to  a  low-carbon  future.  The  EIB’s  activities  in  the  infrastructure  domain  mostly  target 
public  borrowers.  As  laid  out  in  the  2014  ELM  Decision,  this  high  level  objective  is 
realised  by  the  production  and  integration  of  energy  from  renewable  sources,  enabling 
energy  systems  to  utilise  lower  carbon  intensive  technologies  and  fuels,  sustainable 
energy security and energy infrastructure (including for gas production and transportation 
to the EU energy market), electrification of rural areas, environmental infrastructure (e.g. 
water,  sanitation,  and  green  infrastructure),  and  telecommunications  and  broadband 
network infrastructure. Support can also target health, education, and urban development 
infrastructure where specified by regional objectives. 

Objective 3: Climate change mitigation and adaptation 

Climate action is a cross-cutting objective addressed in projects in various sectors such as 
transport, energy, natural resources and water. The overall aim is to limit global warming 
to  2  degrees  Celsius  or  1.5  degrees  if  possible  as  compared  to  pre-industrial  times. 
Different  projects  contribute  to  climate  action  mostly  via  renewable  energy  generation 
and greater energy efficiency, but also by promoting a shift to a more circular economy, 
more sustainable transport modes and more sustainable management of forests and other 
natural resources. The financing is distributed among a large number of projects across 
almost  all  sectors.  In  fact,  the  funds  for  climate  action  also  contribute  to  the  above 
objectives of local private sector development or the development of social and economic 
infrastructure.  Typical  examples  include  credit  lines  for  SMEs  involving  achieving 
greater  energy  efficiency  in  buildings  or  installing  small-scale  renewable  energy 
generation capacity such as solar panels.  

also 

supports 

This  objective 
including:  Paris 
relevant  EU 
Agreement/UNFCCC;  the  Sustainable  Development  Goals;  the  EU  2020  climate  and 
energy package; the EU 2030 climate and energy framework; the EU 2050 low-carbon 
roadmap; the EU strategy on adaptation to climate change COP21; the Circular Economy 
Action Plan and the EU Strategy on Environmental Integration in External Policies.  

commitments 

The 2014 ELM Decision requires that 25% of ELM financing volumes support climate 
action,  while  the  EIB  targets  at  least  35%  of  external  lending  volume  in  developing 
countries  to  support  climate  action  by  2020.  Many  Member  States  agencies  also  have 
climate finance targets (e.g., AFD's target of 50%). 

There  seems  still  room  to  improve  the  contribution  of  the  ELM  programme  to  climate 
action. 

There  are  several  options  to  achieve  this.  First,  some  carbon-intense  sectors  could  be 
excluded  from  financing  under  the  ELM.  Second,  the  project  pipeline  could  be  made 
more  climate-friendly  with  measures  to  increase  climate  adaption.  This  would  require 
more technical assistance in the pre-appraisal stage and a climate risk and vulnerability 
assessment  for  each  project.  Third,  special  windows  for  loans  to  SMEs/mid-caps  that 

79 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
deliver  a  climate  contribution  could  be  included  in  the  contracts  with  financial 
intermediaries. This category of loans currently delivers the lowest climate contribution. 
Finally, the successful climate finance target in the current MFF could be built upon in 
the next budget period. 

The  introduction  of  a  specific  climate  finance  window  would  require  that  the  financial 
intermediaries  begin  assessing  the  climate  contribution  of  the  SMEs/mid-caps.  Besides 
the climate target, it would be important to ensure that the part of the operations that do 
not  contribute  to  the  climate  action  target  are  not  detrimental  to  climate  change.  The 
climate  impact  of  the  entire  portfolio  should  therefore  be  measured  and  considered. 
Reflecting  a  targeted  external  report  on  climate  mainstreaming,  this  is  in  line  with  the 
Commission  analysis,  the  European  Court  of  Auditors  Special  report  31/2016,  related 
Council  Conclusions,  and  a  recent  statement  of  14  Member  States.  The  EP  Budget 
Committee has in the draft report on the next MFF: Preparing the Parliament’s position 
on  the  MFF  post-2020  (2017/2052(INI))  asked  for  a  thorough  climate  mainstreaming, 
underlining that the EU should not finance projects and investments that are contrary to 
the achievement of EU climate goals. In terms of an external climate target, 30% could 
be envisaged over the next budget period.    

Objective  4:  Long-term  economic  resilience  /  addressing  the  root  causes  of 
migration 

The  current  mandate  (2014-2020)  for  the  EIB  did  not  originally  contain  an  explicit 
objective  related  to  migration.  However,  the  refugee  crisis  has  made  migration-related 
issues an increasingly important element of the EU’s foreign policy.  

The recently agreed amendments to the 2014 ELM Decision will add a fourth high-level 
objective:  addressing  the  root  causes  of  migration,  i.e.  strengthening  the  long-term 
economic resilience of refugees, migrants, host and transit communities and communities 
of  origin.  The  revision  of  the  ELM  regional  guidelines  will  incorporate  the  new  high-
level objective and will define how to target the root causes of migration in practice. The 
fourth  high-level  objective  will  have  a  guarantee  envelope  specifically  earmarked  as 
described  in  the  EIB's  Economic  Resilience  Initiative  (ERI)  –  EUR  2.3bn  for  private 
sector projects and EUR 1.4bn for public sector projects. At present, no other objective 
has funds that are specifically earmarked. 

Underlying objective  

The  2014  ELM  Decision  also  stipulates  that  EIB  financing  operations  support  an 
underlying objective of regional integration among partner countries, including economic 
integration  between  Pre-accession  countries,  Neighbourhood  countries,  and  the  EU. 
Regional  integration  is  particularly  relevant  for  ELM  projects  targeting  transportation 
and communication infrastructure. 

PROGRAMME STRUCTURE AND PRIORITIES 

Subsidiarity 

The  ELM  complies  with  the  subsidiarity  principle,  as  it  allows  the  EIB  to  operate  at  a 
higher  risk  level  than  current  Member  State  cooperation  would  allow  by  pooling 
resources  and  diversifying  financing  operations,  thereby  enabling  the  EIB  to  undertake 

80 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
financing  operations  in  third  countries  in  support  of  the  EU’s  external  policies  without 
affecting the credit standing of the EIB. The ELM objectives could not be achieved by 
Member States acting alone due to the disparities in the capacities of national financial 
institutions.137 In addition, the ELM allows to invest in a larger number of countries than 
what national promotional banks typically do.  

Proportionality 

The proportionality principle requires that any EU action should not go beyond what is 
necessary to address the problem or meet the objectives spelled out in the Treaties. In this 
respect, based on stakeholders’ feedback and available evidence, the ELM has proven to 
be  an  efficient  tool  to  cover  the  political  and  sovereign  risks  related  to  EIB  external 
operations in support of EU external policies. In fact, with relatively little public support, 
the  ELM  is  able  to  spur  the  functioning  of  the  market  and  ensure  that  projects  aligned 
with EU external policy priorities are implemented.  

The leverage of the Guarantee Fund is relatively high, since the Fund is maintained with 
contributions  from  the  EU  budget  at  a  level  of  9%  of  outstanding  liabilities  under  the 
ELM, and the EIB can finance in the limit of 50% of the total project costs. In addition, 
between  1994  and  2017,  the  Fund  was  called  for  a  cumulative  amount  of  about  €850 
million  and  had,  over  that  period,  a  recovery  rate  of  100%,  except  more  recently  for 
defaults in Syria (which started in year 2012) and another more recent default of a project 
in the private sector in Tunisia, leading to a total default amounting to €270 million over 
a 24-year period. 

Changes to the structure of the programme: EFSD model 

Several  changes  could  be  made  to  the  structure  of  the  ELM  to  address  a  number  of 
challenges and lessons learned described above, notably related to complementarity. 

One  way  to  address  these  challenges  would  be  to  align  the  EU's  two  main  budgetary 
guarantee  instruments,  the  ELM  and  the  European  Fund  for  Sustainable  Development 
(EFSD), including potentially the integration of the ELM within the EFSD. 

The EFSD is the most recently launched EU external financial programme that integrates 
various  financial  instruments  and  blending  tools  and  replicates  recent  experiences  with 
similar  fund-structures  in  the  EU  (e.g.  EFSI  &  EFSI  2.0)  and  is  the  main  financial 
component  of  the  External  Investment  Plan  (EIP).  The  EIP  was  adopted  in  September 
2017  to  stimulate  investment  in  the  European  Neighbourhood  region  and  Africa.  Its 
objective  is  to  boost  inclusive  growth,  create  jobs  and  contribute  to  the  sustainable 
development of these regions, thereby addressing the root causes of irregular migration. 

The following table compares the current ELM set-up with the EFSD/EIP model: 

ELM 

EFSD/EIP 

Structure 
Financial 
instruments 
Technical assistance 

√ 

√ 

√ 

137 See Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Decision No 466/2014/EU 
granting  an  EU  guarantee  to  the  European  Investment  Bank  against  losses  under  financing  operations  supporting 
investment projects outside the Union, COM(2016) 583 final., p. 6. 

81 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
ELM 

EFSD/EIP 

Policy dialogue 
Financial instruments 
Loans or credit lines 
Intermediated loans 

Guarantees 

√ 
√ 
√  
(exceptional cases) 

Credit enhancement/ 
insurance 
Capital market 
instruments 
Equity or quasi-
equity 
Technical assistance  Ad-hoc basis138 
Transfer of EU 
standards 

Indirectly via capacity building 
and project requirements 

Coordination & Management 
Policy priorities 
Programme strategy  EIB in consultation with EC 
EIB 
Project pipeline 
EIB  
Project assessment 

European Commission 

Project decision 
making 

EIB (EC has influence through 
Article 19 of EIB statutes and 
EIB board) 

√ 

√ 
√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

Integrated 
Dedicated pillar focusing on local 
economic governance and the 
business environment 

European Commission 
European Commission 
EIB, other IFIs and NPBs 
European Commission (EIB provides 
opinion on banking-related aspects) 
European Commission (advised by 
G-TAG [EIB {Lead}, KfW, AFD] 
on risk assessment, impact, 
monitoring and reporting) 

Integrating the ELM into the EFSD would have as a main advantage that it would ensure 
a coordinated implementation of the EU's policy objectives for external actions by both 
the EIB and a wider range of international financial institutions. 

Integration would potentially allow the use of the most appropriate financing instrument 
for  an  operation  as  well  as  make  blending  with  grants  and  technical  assistance  more 
systematic,  which  could  improve  contribution  to  development  respectively  in  both  the 
EIB's own activities and those of other implementing partners. The coordination of such 
an  instrument  might  be  more  resource  intense  and  processes  more  time-consuming, 
unless  an  appropriate  governance  were  established  with  the  participation  of  the 
Commission and financial institutions.  

Structure of an integrated instrument 

The  architecture  of  an  integrated  instrument  would  expand  beyond  the  provision  of  a 
budgetary  guarantee,  incorporating  several  financial  instruments  and  supplementary 
tools.  

In its main structure, the instrument could follow the three-pillar architecture of the EIP 
see  figure  below).  The  first  pillar  of  the  EIP  is  the  European  Fund  for  Sustainable 
Development  (EFSD)  that  contains  besides  the  EFSD  guarantee  two  regional  blending 

138  For  example  through  the  Neighbourhood  Investment  Facility  (NIF),  Western  Balkans  Investment  Framework 
(WBIF), Latin America Investment Facility (LAIF), Asia Investment Facility (AIF), Investment Facility for Central 
Asia (IFCA) or the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment Partnership (FEMIP).  

82 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
platforms139. The second pillar provides technical assistance (TA) to projects to allow for 
capacity  building  and  improved  project  quality.  The  TA  can  be  provided  to  public  or 
private  entities.  These  measures  are  interlinked  with  the  third  pillar  aiming  to  improve 
the investment and business climate in the country/region through policy dialogue. 

Pillar 1 
Financial 
instruments 
supported by 
EU/MS guarantee 

Pillar 2 

Technical 
Assistance 

Pillar 3 
Policy dialogue 

(Improving the 
Investment 
Climate) 

The  three  pillar  structure  provides  a  holistic  approach  and  facilitates  the  inclusion  of 
technical  assistance  and 
into  projects. 
Encompassing the three elements under one umbrella aligns the tools for the purpose of 
investment windows or individual projects. 

investment  climate  enhancing  measures 

This  approach  may  have  an  impact  on  the  likelihood  that  technical  assistance  (TA)  is 
used  in  a  project  which  could  provide  a  substantial  advantage  to  beneficiaries  and 
contribute to the policy objectives. The ELM included TA measures in only around 15% 
of  its  operations  in  this  MFF  period.  An  explanation  for  this  low  rate  is  the  targeted 
recipients140  and  more  importantly  the  administrative  burden  associated  with  the 
application  for  a  TA  grant  from  external  providers,  such  as  EU  Member  States  (incl. 
public institutions or agencies thereof), IFIs or other entities. If the single fund structure 
mitigates  these  barriers,  it  could  be  a  great  added  value  since  previous  studies141  have 
shown that projects with TA deliver a higher contribution to long-term development.  

Moreover,  coordinating  the  TA  efforts  within  the  single  structure  could  realize 
economies of scale and thus improve efficiency. The aggregated impact depends on the 
required  additional  staff  resources  and  the  costs/efforts  to  attract  externally  organized 
TA. Another aspect is beneficiary awareness. Final beneficiaries are not always aware of 
the  possibility  to  include  TA  in  projects142,  thus  pointing  to  a  need  for  enhanced 
communication, which may be easier when integrated in a single instrument. 

A  single  EIP-style  instrument  incorporating  the  ELM  might  be  therefore  more  directly 
equipped  to  create  an  investment  package  catered  to  the  needs  of  beneficiaries  and 
regions  in  general.  This  is  also  reflected  in  form  of  the  range  of  financial  instrument 
which could be provided. The EFSD is endowed with a large set of financial instruments, 
while under the ELM the EIB receives the EU guarantee only for loans, credit lines and 
intermediated  loans  and  exceptionally  for  guarantees.  Innovative  financial  instruments 
could be added to the arsenal of a stand-alone structure such as counter guarantees and 
other types of financial instruments such as equity, credit enhancements and insurance.  

139 The Neighbourhood Investment Platform and the Africa Investment Platform. 
140 Public sector actors are less likely to require technical assistance than private sector activities. 
141 See for example Wise persons report (2010). 
142 See for example see European Court of Auditors (2015). 

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This  array  of  financial  instruments  enables  a  flexible  combination  targeted  to  the 
recipient’s needs. In many cases these financial instruments will still need to be bundled 
with  the  aforementioned  grants  to  finance  technical  assistance  or  provide  interest  rate 
subsidies.  Under  an  integrated  instrument,  the  financial  instruments  and  technical 
assistance can be centrally developed to properly reflect respective needs of the country, 
region,  sector  or  particular  beneficiary  –  an  advantage  highlighted  by  several 
stakeholders during the interviews in the context of the ongoing ELM evaluation. 

This  flexibility  could  also  be  extended  to  the  investment  windows  and  ceilings.  The 
current  ELM  is  flexible  in  allowing  its  operations  to  match  shifts  in  priorities.  An 
integrated  EFSD/ELM  instrument  would  bring  greater  flexibility  as  opposed  to 
stringently defined investment windows or separated instruments.  

Conversely, for monitoring and evaluation purposes, ensuring that investment windows 
are linked to specific (or high-level) objectives is desirable. There is a trade-off between 
flexibility  allowing  to  shift  priorities  on  the  one  hand  and  transparency  and  security  of 
minimum  allocation  to  certain  objectives/regions  on  the  other.  The  flexibility  of  the 
stand-alone  ELM  has  been  a  great  asset  and  an  integrated  structure  would  have  to  be 
well-designed to maintain this advantage. 

ELM as a potential window of the EFSD 

The analysis carried out shows the advantages of an integrated structure and the limits of 
a standalone instrument, setting the basis for the need of a financial tool-box where the 
ELM  is  one  of  the  budgetary  guarantees/financial  instruments  needed  for  the 
implementation  of  the  external  policy  objectives.  In  this  scenario  the  ELM  could  be 
integrated as an EIB-exclusive window inside the successor EFSD. 

There  are  currently  five  investment  windows  under  the  EFSD  covering  the  following 
areas: 

  Energy and connectivity 
  SMEs and micro-enterprises 
  Agriculture, rural entrepreneurs and agribusiness 
  Cities 
  Digital 

In  the  future,  the  ELM  could  be  folded  into  the  EFSD  potentially  as  an  investment 
window  exclusive  to  the  EIB.  This  would  require  an  adaptation  of  the  definition  of 
'investment window' to allow the coverage of a number of sectors. 

Such  an  investment  window  could  retain  a  separate  provisioning  rate  within  the  future 
Common Provisioning Fund which will replace the Guarantee Fund for external actions 
in the next MFF. 

Management and coordination 

To  ensure  complementarity  and  to  generate  synergies,  the  ELM  currently  relies  on 
extensive cooperation with other institutions and facilities. An integrated structure could 
internalize some of these channels, which could increase adaptability and the efficiency 
of coordination. 

84 

 
 
 
An  integrated  solution  would  allow  one  decision-making  body  to  build  a  coherent 
programme that reduces complexity and fragmentation and enhances synergies  between 
different objectives and actions. The integrated structure could theoretically facilitate the 
complementarity of the fund with the EU external action goals, however the ELM mid-
term  reviews  suggested  that  this  has  also  been  adequately  accomplished  in  the  current 
stand-alone structure of the ELM. 

In  terms  of  coordination  efficiency,  the  potential  impact  of  an  integrated  structure 
depends  on  the  efficiency  of  the  existing  structure  within  and  between  stand-alone 
programmes. Exchanges via the strategic board143 would in both cases provide guidance 
on the investment strategy and ensure activities are coordinated and complementary. In 
addition,  operational  boards  support  the  coordination  on  a  more  granular  level.  This 
structure allows for regular exchanges and coordination of the different stakeholders via 
the boards and secretariat. The integrated structure internalises some of these exchanges 
and could thereby increase the frequency of interactions and coordination, and improve 
responsiveness of the system.  

DELIVERY MECHANISMS OF THE INTENDED FUNDING 

The  ELM  entails  a  guarantee  from  the  EU  to  the  EIB  which  is  administered  by  the 
European Commission and protects the bank from potential financial risks linked to these 
operations.  The  guarantee  allows  the  EIB  to  preserve its  credit rating, while  expanding 
the lending portfolio and maintaining attractive lending rates.  

The need for this guarantee stems from the EIB's obligation under its statutes to ensure 
adequate  security  for  all  its  lending  operations  and  the  need  to  safeguard  its 
creditworthiness  in  general.  The  guarantee  allows  the  EIB  to  preserve  its  high  credit 
rating  despite  its  higher  leverage  compared  to  other  international  financial  institutions 
(IFIs)  and  the  significantly  higher  risk  of  lending  in  third  countries,  which  otherwise 
would potentially put the high credit rating at risk and consume more capital or reduce 
lending.  

An overview of the functioning of the guarantee under the External Lending Mandate is 
presented in the figure below. In principle, the EIB grants or issues loans, loan guarantees 
and  debt  capital  market  instruments  (for  example,  bonds)  for  eligible  EIB  investment 
projects. Loans in the public sector are covered by a comprehensive guarantee, which is 
provided for financing operations where the borrower (or a guarantor) is a local, regional 
or  central  government  or  corporations  under  state  control  (Public  borrowers).  The 
political guarantee is provided for cases not covered by the comprehensive guarantee and 
is  more  restricted.  It  only  covers  non-payment  due  to  non-transfer  of  currency, 
expropriation, war or civil disturbance, and denial of justice upon breach of contract. 

Simplified overview guarantee under External Lending Mandate 

143 This strategic board is currently composed not only of representatives of the EC but also of the high representative, 
experts from member states and representatives from the EIB. The European Parliament is taking part as an observer. 

85 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Monitoring and evaluation 

This  section  sets  out  the  arrangements  that  could  be  put  into  place  to  monitor  the 
performance  of  the  programme  in  delivering  the  objectives.  The  section  identifies  the 
information that will be needed to compile the indicators allowing an assessment of the 
degree  to  which  objectives  are  achieved.  It  takes  into  account  the  existing  information 
and what new information will need to be collected and by whom. Moreover, potential 
targets against which success will be measured are discussed. 

General 

The external financing activity under the EU guarantee is managed and monitored by the 
EIB under its own rules and procedures, which include measures for audits, control and 
monitoring.  Moreover,  the  Board  of  Directors  of  the  EIB  approves  each  financing 
operation and monitors whether it is managed according the provisions in the EIB Statute 
and with the general directives. The Commission is represented in the Board of Directors 
with  a  Director  and  an  alternate  Director.  The  EIB  must  inform  the  European 
Commission  when  it  obtains  any  information  or  considers  likely  that  a  guarantee  on  a 
project  will  be  called.  In  case  the  guarantee  is  actually  called,  the  EIB  is  obliged  to 
provide the European Commission with detailed information on it according to the ELM 
Decision and related guarantee agreement.  

The EIB has the obligation to provide the Commission statistical, financial and audited 
accounting data on every financing operation under the EU guarantee, necessary for the 
reporting to the European Parliament and the European Council. The European Court of 
Auditors can obtain the same information at request. Moreover, the EIB will also provide 
the  information  on  the  outstanding  financing  operations  covered  by  the  EU  guarantee 
with a certificate of an auditor. The Commission requests this information to determine 
the provisioning amounts for the Guarantee Fund. 

The Court of Auditors can also conduct audits on EIB financing operations under the EU 
guarantee. This is determined based on a Tripartite agreement of the Court with the EIB 
and Commission. While no ELM audit is presently available, the Court of Auditors has 
published  a  special  report  on  a  parallel  EIB  external  finance  instrument:  the  ACP 
Investment  Facility.  This  report’s  conclusions  may  apply,  mutatis  mutandis,  to  ELM 
activities as well. The ACP Investment Facility was found to generate added value and be 
coherent  with  EU  external  policy.  The  Court  of  Auditors  found  that  cooperation  with 
recipient  countries  and  coherence  with  EU  development  policy  had  improved  since  the 
EIB  began  taking  on  higher-risk  projects.  However,  the  special  report  found  that  the 
‘allocation  procedure’  was  not  always  effective.  Stated  simply,  numerous  banks 
receiving  EIB  loans  broke  their  contractual  agreement  by  failing  to  inform  the 
beneficiary SMEs of EIB funding. Additionally, TA provided to supplement credit lines 
did not always sufficiently target the end beneficiaries. To address these issues, the Court 
of  Auditors  recommended  systematic  disclosure  of  EIB  contribution  in  on-lending 
agreements,  and  greater  cooperation  between  the  EIB  and  financial  intermediaries  to 
ensure effective TA.  

Additionally,  the  EIB  must  regularly  conduct  evaluations  of  its  financing  activities  on 
relevance, performance and development effects. This is important for the accountability 

86 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of EIB, but also to find ways to improve the future financing activities. Furthermore, it 
must  provide  all  independent  evaluation  reports  assessing  the  results  of  EIB  external 
lending  activity  under  the  ELM  to  the  European  Commission,  European  Council  and 
European Parliament. 

The Commission reports annually to the European Parliament and the European Council 
on the EIB’s implementation of the mandate. The reports are based on information on the 
full portfolio or sector obtained via the ReM from the EIB, which provides information 
on various  indicators from the appraisal level  to the full implementation  of the project. 
The  indicators  include  for  instance  the  contribution  of  the  external  lending  to  the 
objectives (e.g. climate change, biodiversity), but also whether the financing is blended 
with  financing  under  other  programmes  or  other  European  or  international  financial 
institutions. This system of reporting from the EIB to the European Commission could be 
better synchronised, which would result in cost savings and more effective reporting.  

Currently  there  are  various  monitoring  and  reporting  provisions  in  the  Decision  and 
Guarantee agreements. The most important legal obligations for monitoring are found in 
the  Decision  and  EIB  Statute.  Article  19  of  the  Decision  is  a  particularly  important 
reporting requirement. Further consideration of Article 19 reporting requirements would 
be worthwhile as sometimes the information provided by the EIB to the Commission is 
in some cases too limited to allow for sufficiently detailed consideration.  

As noted above, one key finding of previous evaluations is that the final beneficiaries are 
frequently unaware that the EU is providing them funding. According to an interviewee 
in  the  context  of  the  ongoing  evaluation,  this  has  the  impact  that  beneficiaries  may  be 
unable to lodge a complaint if project implementation is contrary to relevant standards. 
For the EIB, control and accountability in this sense is provided with the EIB Complaints 
Mechanism (EIB-CM). The EIB is currently updating its complaints procedure. It will be 
important  for  future  evaluations  to  consider  the  ability  of  beneficiaries  to  lodge 
complaints, and the EIB to respond to them.  

Project level 

At  the  project  level,  monitoring  and  evaluation  is  primarily  accomplished  with  two 
frameworks: ReM (results measurement framework) and the RTOG (Regional Technical 
Operational  Guidelines).  Generally,  the  project  level  monitoring  and  reporting  is 
sufficient.  However,  given  that  the  EIB  is  demand-driven  and  operates  on  a  project  by 
project basis, additional efforts in identifying gaps, and the impact of ELM activities on 
market development, is advisable. Otherwise, it is possible that the ELM funds projects 
with individual merit, but no coherent strategy. 

The  RTOGs  are  agreed  between  the  Commission  and  the  EIB  and  set  out  in  greater 
operational  detail  how  the  EIB  should  contribute  to  the  high-level  objectives  set  in  the 
ELM Decision. These will need to be refined in any future programme to ensure that they 
are useful to the bank in its lending decisions and to the Commission in its consideration 
of EIB loans during the Article 19 process. 

ReM 

The ReM is a framework in place since 2012 that incorporated many best practices from 
other IFIs. The ReM is still evolving, as the EIB continues to exchange best practices and 

87 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
share lessons with other development banks. The ReM provides concrete criteria for ex 
ante assessments of the contribution of projects to ELM objectives, but also for tracking 
project  implementation,  and  ex  post  assessment  at  two  milestones.  The  milestones  are 
immediately upon project completion, and three years after project completion (or end of 
fund  life  for  micro-finance  and  equity).  At  both  milestones,  performance  is  measured 
against  benchmarks set at the beginning  of the project  cycle, then performance is  rated 
and reported to the EIB. The most recent ELM midterm assessment found that ReM had 
absorbed  best  practices  from  other  IFIs,  and  is  effective  for  monitoring  project 
contribution to operational objectives. As such, monitoring at the project level is mostly 
effective. 

The ReM framework is composed of three pillars. The first pillar evaluates consistency 
of the project with the three existing high-level objectives and overarching objective of 
regional integration. Contribution to the high-level objectives and overarching objective 
are  based  on  a  number  of  indicators.  For  example,  the  first  high-level  objective  -  local 
private sector development - is measured by indicators including number of sub-loans to 
SMEs,  average  size  of  sub-loans  to  SMEs,  and  employment  sustained.  Pillar  two 
evaluates  the  quality  and  soundness  of  a  project.  This  is  based  on  separate  sets  of 
guidelines  for  investment  loans,  intermediated  operations,  and  non-intermediated 
framework  loans.  Pillar  three  evaluates  the  EIB’s  technical  and  financial  contribution 
based  on  EIB  inputs  and  market  alternatives.  This  pillar  considers  the  EIB’s  ‘financial 
contribution’, or to what extent the loan makes a difference for the beneficiary, as well as 
the EIB’s ‘financial facilitation’, which concerns to what extent the EIB can contribute to 
raising project standards and attracting other financiers. Each pillar is graded on a scale 
of 1-4, with 1 corresponding to ‘unsatisfactory’ and 4 corresponding to ‘excellent’. Based 
on the 2016 EIB report, the majority of projects are found to be good or excellent across 
all three pillars. 

Pillars of EIB Result Measurement Framework 

Source: EIB (2017). 

ReM indicators are specific to sectors and beneficiary groups, and around 150 indicators 
are in use. The EIB is continuing its efforts to harmonise ReM indicators with those of 
other IFIs so that projects are more readily comparable, and their impacts can  be better 
understood.  In  2013  EIB  signed  a  MoU  with  25  other  IFIs  to  harmonise  27  indicators, 

88 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and 16 additional indicators are currently being harmonised. For indicators that concern 
‘blended’  projects,  which  contain  a  mixture  of  grant  and  loan  funding,  the  EIB  has 
harmonised indicators with the EC within the framework of the EU blending platform.  

ReM is an evolving instrument that the EIB seeks to continually improve, and additional 
changes  may  be  necessary.  Should  an  additional  high-level  objective  be  approved,  i.e. 
addressing the root-causes of migration, the EIB would need to develop guidelines for its 
implementation.  Given  the  new  emphasis  on  economic  resilience,  specifying  a  set  of 
relevant  indicators  would  be  helpful.  Furthermore,  the  EIB  only  recently  adopted  a 
gender strategy. Several interviewees indicated that it is not yet clear if this strategy is far 
reaching  enough.  The  EIB  should  ensure  its  gender  strategy  is  fully  incorporated  in 
practice, including with dedicated ReM indicators and guidelines. 

Most publicly available information on ReM is contained within the annual report ‘The 
EIB  outside  the  EU’.  These  annual  reports  aggregate  results  for  ELM  and  other  EIB 
activities,  so  it  is  not  possible  to  evaluate  ELM  activities  alone.  The  EIB  did  provide 
‘ReM sheets’ for the ten projects considered as case studies in time for the present impact 
assessment.  Still,  it  would  increase  transparency  and  allow  interested  parties  to  better 
understand the ELM if it were reported separately from other EIB activities. 

89 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 5: Additional Information on IPA 

The  Instrument  for  Pre-accession  Assistance  (IPA  II)  -  with  an  envelope  of  EUR 
12,138.63  million  for  the  period  2014-2020  -  aims  at  supporting  seven  beneficiaries  in 
adopting and implementing the reforms required for EU membership. IPA II assistance 
focuses  predominantly  on  a  selected  number  of  policy  areas  to  help  beneficiaries 
strengthen  democratic  institutions  and  the  rule  of  law,  reform  the  judiciary  and  public 
administration, respect fundamental rights and promote gender equality, tolerance, social 
inclusion  and  non-discrimination.  It  also  aims  at  enhancing  their  economic  and  social 
development  with  a  view  to  attaining  the  targets  set  in  the  Europe  2020  strategy  for 
smart,  sustainable  and  inclusive  growth.  In  addition,  IPA  II  assistance  supports  the 
progressive alignment of beneficiaries with EU legislation and standards.  

Support under IPA II is spelled out in indicative strategy papers, and takes the form of 
bilateral  assistance,  cross-border  cooperation  between  IPA  II  countries,  territorial 
cooperation with EU Member States, multi-country programmes in the Western Balkans 
and Turkey, and support measures.  

According  to  the  Mid  Term  Review  (MTR),  IPA  II  is  overall  fit  for  purpose.  It 
corresponds to EU priorities and to beneficiary needs. Compared to its predecessor, IPA 
II has become more strategic. In terms of priorities, it increasingly focuses on promoting 
key  reforms,  i.e.  the  three  "fundamentals"  of  the  enlargement  strategy  (rule  of  law  and 
fundamental  rights,  strengthening  democratic  institutions  and  public  administration 
reform,  and  economic  governance),  as  well  as  on  results  of  reforms,  through  the 
introduction of a performance framework. It has also demonstrated its capacity to react in 
a flexible manner to emerging crises/challenges (floods, migration, security). 

IPA  II  is  unique  in  addressing  the  objective  of  preparing  candidate  countries  and 
potential  candidates  for  EU  membership.  Through  IPA  II,  the  EU  is  by  far  the  biggest 
donor  in  the  beneficiary  countries  and  IPA  II  serves  as  an  important  catalyst  for  the 
actions by other donors, including EU MS and non-EU donors.  

The  introduction  of  the  sector  approach,  especially  when  implemented  through  budget 
support,  has improved the strategic focus of IPA II and the IPA beneficiaries' focus on 
reforms.  Key  results  have  been  achieved,  such  as  the  development  of  public 
administration reform strategies in most IPA II beneficiary countries.  

A  feature  of  the  Instrument  for  Pre-Accession  Assistance,  which  distinguishes  it  from 
other external instruments, is the use of indirect management by the beneficiary country 
that allows the latter to adapt to the possible management of EU’s structural funds after 
accession.  The  use  of  indirect  management  has  generally  increased  ownership  by 
beneficiary countries, although there have been poor contracting performance and longer 
delays of implementation, especially in Turkey. 

IPA II has an increased focus on performance and results, however, there is some room 
for  improvement.  Other  features,  such  as  the  use  of  Twinning  and  TAIEX  and  the 

90 

 
 
promotion  of  territorial  cooperation,  add  further  value  to  the  instrument.  Twinning  and 
TAIEX initiatives provide concrete benefits to recipient institutions through exchanges of 
valued European public expertise. 

The  Western  Balkans  Investment  Framework  (WBIF)  provides  co-financing  and 
technical  assistance  to  strategic  investments  in  the  energy,  environment,  social,  and 
transport sectors, and also supports private sector development initiatives. Such projects 
could not be funded solely from EU Member States' funds. 

Territorial  cooperation  in  the  form  of  cross-border,  transnational  and  interregional 
cooperation programmes, as well as macro-regional strategies, favours reconciliation and 
confidence  building  in  the  Western  Balkans,  overcoming  geographical  barriers  and 
legacies of the past, and developing good neighbourly relations. 

IPA  II  continues  to  be  relevant,  as  also  pointed  out  in  the  MTR,  and  only  minimal 
changes  would  be  necessary  at  the  level  of  objectives  and  main  principles  set  in  the 
current  IPA  II  regulation.  Three  key  elements  will  need  however  to  be  taken  into 
consideration: 

For the period 2021-2027, the new instrument should be clearly positioned in the context 
of the new Western Balkans Strategy , and reflect the developments in the relations with 
Turkey, and allow for sufficient flexibility to take into account evolving circumstances .  

For the Western Balkans an important element of IPA III is the indicative date of 2025 
mentioned in the Strategy when Montenegro and Serbia might be potentially considered 
ready for accession, if all conditions are met, i.e. within the next MFF period. This would 
mean  not  only  the  need  for  a  rapid  and  flexible  mobilisation  of  funds  under  the  next 
period, but also an increase of current IPA II allocations for these countries in order to 
ensure  that  the  necessary  financial  means  are  available  for  all  preparations  and 
investments  required  in  the  years  before  accession,  including  to  ensure  a  gradual  and 
seamless  transition  from  pre-accession  status  to  that  of  Member  State  to  allow  the 
necessary absorption capacity to be developed  

The countries are still adjusting to IPA II changes and the implementation for IPA II is 
still  in  an  early  stage  as  a  result.  While  continuity  should  be  secured,  a  phased-in 
approach should also be applied with intensity of support increased in the second half of 
the MFF period for the countries approaching accession. 

In terms of political priorities, IPA III will be shaped around the following key political 
priorities:  Rule  of  Law,  Fundamental  Rights  and  governance;  Socio-Economic 
development; EU policies and acquis; and Reconciliation, good neighbourly relations and 
regional  cooperation.  While  these  were  already  spelt  out  under  IPA  II,  new  challenges 
such as migration, security and climate change will also have to be taken into account. 

At the same time, in order to respond to the new priorities and integrate lessons from the 
MTR, IPA III  will  need to  be further aligned with  recent developments in  enlargement 
policy. This requires in particular close links to the objectives of the new Strategy for the 

91 

 
 
Western  Balkans,  to  maximise  the  impact  of  the  Flagship  Initiatives  set  forth  in  the 
Strategy to help the transformation process in the Western Balkans in the next period, to 
implement  robust  Economic  Reform  Programmes  (ERPs),  or  to  renew  the  focus  on 
reforms necessary for future membership. Greater flexibility in funding allocations will 
have to be ensured in order to cater for unexpected/emerging priorities and to take into 
account  the  level  of  progress  of  respective  countries  in  EU  related  reforms. 
Implementation  will  need  to  be  accelerated,  in  particular  in  the  first  years,  to  avoid 
structural contracting and implementation backlogs, and to progressively absorb current 
delays.  In  a  context  of  constrained  budgetary  resources,  IPA  III  will  have  to  work  to 
further mobilise the leveraging potential of IFIs and other partners, including the private 
sector,  in  particular  for  supporting  competiveness  and  inclusive  growth,  or  financing 
large scale infrastructure investments. The overall performance framework  will have to 
be strengthened and simplified.  

For  these  reasons,  whereas  the  objectives  and  logic  of  the  intervention  will  remain 
similar, on the planning and programming side it is proposed to structure the delivery of 
funding  in  a  different  manner  around  the  creation  of  facilities  reflecting  the  specific 
objectives of the instrument.  

The instrument will continue to be a toolbox and foresee all the existing implementation 
modes  deployed  in  a  coherent  way  depending  on  the  facility,  type  of  intervention  and 
state  of  preparation  of  countries  on  their  path  towards  EU  accession  and  their 
administrative capacities. An indicative allocation will be identified in the beginning of 
the  period  for  each  of  the  facilities,  and  a  mid-term  review  will  take  place  to  take  into 
account of the evolving situation and results achieved. 

No  fixed  or  indicative  national/geographical  envelopes  will  be  established,  although  a 
principle  of  "fair  share"  allocation  for  beneficiary  countries  will  be  integrated. 
Performance  will  be  part  of  the  process  of  accessing  to  funds,  which  will  be  based  on 
criteria such as project/programme maturity, absorption capacity, administrative capacity, 
expected  impact  and  progress  on  rule  of  law,  fundamental  rights  and  governance. 
Therefore, no additional performance reward mechanism will be needed. 

Increased  financial  flexibility  could  be  achieved  by  strengthening  possibilities  for 
reallocating  funds  within  the  instrument,  in  particular  between  and  within  facilities. 
Establishing a reserve within IPA could be considered; this would mean that a share of 
the total budget (e.g. 10 %) could be kept unallocated to cater for unforeseen needs (e.g. 
migration) provided the carry over for commitments is allowed. 

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Annex 6 Additional information on CFSP 

The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) contributes to the 
preservation  of  peace,  the  prevention  of  conflicts  and  strengthening  international 
security.    It  is  one  of  the  main  instruments  used  to  implement  the  European  Union’s 
Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy, the relevance and importance of which 
are demonstrated by events worldwide.  

As  such  the  CFSP  continues  to  be  a  core  part  of  the  EU's  external  action  instruments; 
notably  contributing  to  safeguard  the  Union’s  values,  fundamental  interests,  security, 
independence and integrity as well as helping to support and consolidate democracy, the 
rule  of  law,  human  rights  and  the  application  of  principles  of  international  law 
worldwide.  As  such  CFSP  plays  an  essential  part  in  implementing  the  EU  Global 
Strategy and underpin the EU's role as a global actor. 

By  providing  for  joint  action,  the  EU  can  provide  added  value  beyond  the  activities  of 
individual  Member  States;  by  reaching  critical  mass  when  responding  to  global 
challenges and providing for joint ownership. CFSP also enjoys the credibility inherent 
in a proven mechanism and the ability to act as an impartial external actor on behalf of 
and alongside Member States. 

In contrast with other policy areas, the CFSP operations are not financed under an over-
arching  instrument  /  regulation  adopted  for  the  full  period  of  the  multiannual  financial 
framework  period.    For  the  CFSP  to  be  effective,  the  EU  needs  to  be  ready  to  react 
rapidly  and  with  determination,  to  respond  to  new  emerging  threats  to  its  strategic 
interests.    As  and  when  needs  or  opportunities  for  action  arise,  the  Council  adopts 
specific  decisions  for  each  CFSP  action  under  the  CFSP  provisions  of  the  Treaty  on 
European Union (TEU). Typically the decisions provide for: 

  The  conduct  of  civilian  CSDP  Missions  to  promote  stability  and  build  resilience 
through  strengthening  rule  of  law  on  the  strategic  and  operational  levels  in  fragile 
environments. 

  The  work  of  the  European  Union’s  Special  Representatives  (EUSRs)  who  promote 
the  EU’s  policies and interests  in  troubled  regions  and  countries  and  play  an  active 
role in efforts to consolidate peace, and to promote stability and the rule of law. 

  Actions to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (including their 
delivery  mechanisms)  and  to  combat  the  illicit  spread  and  trafficking  of  other 
conventional weapons, particularly through supporting effective multilateralism. 

In  addition,  through  the  CFSP  the  EU  provides  funding  for  the  European  Security  and 
Defence College (ESDC) and for the operation of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers.  The 
CFSP can also be used to fund other operations on the basis of Article 28 TEU. 

During  the  2014-2020  MFF  period,  the  funding  for  CFSP  operations  is  budgeted  in 
chapter  19.03  of  the  budget.  The  total  allocation  for  CFSP  operations  over  the  current 
MFF is EUR 2 121 million.  

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CFSP actions have concretely contributed to putting the EU's Global Strategy into place 
by  (a)  providing  capacity  building,  support  and  advice  through  the  civilian  CSDP 
missions  deployed  in  Africa,  Afghanistan  and  the  Middle  East  as  well  as  in  Ukraine, 
Georgia  and  Kosovo;  (b)  promoting  peace  and  stability  as  well  as  promoting  and 
advancing  the  values  of  the  EU  by  means  of  the  EUSRs;  (c)  promoting  multilateral 
responses  to  the  security  threats  posed  by  weapons  of  mass  destruction  and  the  illicit 
trafficking  and  accumulation  of  conventional  weapons 
through  dedicated  non-
proliferation and disarmament projects. 

The overall impact and achievements triggered by the CSFP budget are of much greater 
value than the sum of its individual actions. In particular in the field of CSDP missions, 
the scope and reach of the agreed actions goes beyond the limits of what a single EU MS 
could  do  alone.  CSDP  missions  profit  in  particular  from  their  multinational  EU  nature 
both in terms of image - EU credibility as a peace actor - and of accessing a larger pool 
of human resources and expertise. They also regularly attract contributions (co-financing) 
from interested third countries willing to participate in EU-led actions. Such missions are 
the concrete and visible operational translation of the EU's ambitions as a security actor.  

Given the political priorities of the EU and challenges worldwide, CFSP operations will 
remain  a  fundamental  pillar  of  the  EU  Global  Strategy  post-2020,  in  support  of  three 
strategic  priorities:  (a)  responding  to  external  conflicts  and  crises,  (b)  building  the 
capacities of partners, and (c) protecting the Union and its citizens.  

The  CFSP  operations  will  coordinate  with  the  future  EU  external  action  instruments  to 
ensure  synergies  and  avoid  overlaps,  but  they  will  keep  their  distinct  management  and 
implementation modalities, in order to ensure their responsiveness, flexibility and close 
alignment with the political priorities of the EU in the external field. 

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Annex 7 Additional information on the Overseas Association 
Decision (OAD) and the Greenland Decision 

Context 

The  mid-term  review  report  (December  2017)144  on  ten  of  the  external  financing 
instruments,  including  the  Greenland  Decision145  and  the  11th  European  Development 
Fund  (EDF),  which  includes  the  programming  for  the  other  Overseas  Countries  and 
Territories  (OCTs)  concluded  that  the  external  financing  instruments  were  ‘fit  for 
purpose’.  However,  in  the  report  and  in  the  consultations  conducted  during  the 
evaluation,  a  need  for  flexibility,  simplification,  coherence  and  performance  was 
reflected.  

The  Overseas  Association  Decision146  covers  the  relations  between  OCTs  –  including 
Greenland  –  the  Member  States  to  which  they  are  linked  and  the  EU.  This  Decision 
outlines the special relationship that OCTs have with the EU as part of the ‘EU family’ 
and the specific legal framework which applies to them.  

The  Greenland  Decision  complements  the  Overseas  Association  Decision  but  outlines 
some  specificities  of  the  relations  with  Greenland  as  well  as  providing  its  financial 
resources. 

The Overseas Association Decision and the Greenland Decision Greenland should not be 
integrated in the new broad instrument or to any other co-decided instrument due to their 
specific procedures of adoption: Council decision by unanimity following consultation of 
the European Parliament147. However, in order to streamline the number of programmes 
it  is  proposed  that  all  OCTs,  including  Greenland,  be  regrouped  by  merging  both 
Decisions in one single instrument. 

Rationale for integrating the Overseas Association Decision and the Greenland Decision 

into one sole decision for Overseas Countries and Territories 

The  financial  source  of  the  current  Overseas  Association  Decision  is  the  EDF  which 
covers  the  programming  and  funding  of  territorial  and  regional  programmes  for  OCTs 
other than Greenland, which is covered by the Greenland Decision and funded under the 
Budget. 

The  Overseas  Association  Decision  does  not  have  an  end  date,  but  would  need 
amendments due to the EDF being ‘budgetised’ and a need for a new financial envelope. 
The Greenland Decision ends on 31 December 2020. Historically, the need for defining 

144 The mid-term review report was based on ten staff working documents, one per instrument (see list below), which 
in  turn  were  based  on  ten  independent  evaluations.  The  mid-term  report,  staff  working  documents  and  independent 
evaluations  can  be  found  at  here:  https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/public-consultation-external-financing-instruments-
european-union_en 
145 Decision (EU) No 137/2014 of 15 March 2014 on relations between the European Union on the one hand, and 

Greenland 

and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other, OJ L76, p.1 
146 Decision (EU) No 755/2013 of 25 November 2013 on the association of the overseas countries and territories with 

the    European Union, OJ L344, 19.12.2013, p.1 

147 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C326, 26/10/2012 p.1 – article 203 

95 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
the  financial  cooperation  in  a  separate  manner  (other  OCTs/Greenland)  corresponds 
partly also to the fact that Greenland receives its funding from the EU budget (Heading 
4)  instead  of  the  EDF148.  With  the  budgetisation  of  the  EDF,  this  important  constraint 
disappears, as all the OCTs should now be funded under the Budget. 

Moreover, the legal basis of Article 203 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union is the same for the Overseas Association Decision as for the Greenland Decision. 
In light of this, it has been decided to keep the Greenland Decision under Heading 4 of 
the EU Budget and include the other OCTs under the same heading.  

Considering  the  specificities  of  the  OCTs  and  their  special  relationship  with  the  EU,  a 
new  financial  instrument  covering  all  OCTs  both  concerning  the  political  and  legal 
frameworks as well as the implementation of the cooperation will ensure: 

  unity of management with  all the OCTs under a same source  of financing  – 

the Budget – will create synergies in programming and implementation; 

  consolidation of shared objectives;  
  simplification and coherence in the legal framework; 
  more visibility for the OCTs as a group. 

As  both  Decisions  have  been  deemed  ‘fit  for  purpose’,  the  guiding  principle  is  to 
preserve  what  works  well,  while  improving  what  hinders  the  partners'  effectiveness  to 
deliver on their policies and priorities. 

The future instrument/decision 

-  The future OAD would comprise of a merger of the current Overseas Association 
Decision  and  the  Greenland  Decision,  integrating  the  two  decisions  in  all  the 
areas where they are similar or have synergies and highlighting specificities of the 
Greenland Decision such as the objective to  preserve the close and lasting links 
between  the  EU,  Greenland  and  Denmark,  the  acknowledgement  of  the 
geostrategic position of Greenland and policy dialogue and potential cooperation 
on Arctic issues and food security. 

- 

It  is  foreseen  that  the  structure  and  the  majority  of  the  current  Overseas 
Association  Decision  provisions  be  maintained,  with  specific  provisions  for 
Greenland such as Arctic issues and the special historical and political links to be 
integrated.  In  the  mid-term  review  report,  it  was  concluded  that  the  Greenland 
Decision was designed in such a way as to cover and better deliver on the wider 
political aims of the partnerships and it is important to ensure that this framework 
will still be provided in the new Decision. As such the new Decision will remain 
very  similar  to  the  current  Overseas  Association  Decision  with  few  new  and 
updated provisions.  

-  The  future  Decision  should  consist  of  the  same  pillars  as  the  current  Overseas 
Association Decision: political, trade and cooperation. The OCTs have a special 

148 Greenland was until 1985 part of the EU as a region in the Kingdom of Denmark, which entailed support through 

structural funds. When Greenland left the EU, the support to Greenland continued as well as the EU's fishing 
rights in Greenland waters. 

96 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
place in the EU as part of the 'EU family' and it is important to ensure that this 
continues to be reflected in the same way in the future instrument.  

-  The Instrument will take into account the consequences of the withdrawal of the 
United Kingdom (UK) from the EU and the fact that the special regime regulated 
in  Part  IV  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  would  no 
longer apply to the 12 UK OCTs. These OCTs would no longer come under the 
territorial application of the Overseas Association Decision from March 2019 nor 
in the future instrument. 

-  The  future  Instrument  should  provide  for  financial  allocations  under  the  Budget 
for the OCTs, including a ring-fencing of the financial allocation for Greenland.  

-  There  will  be  a  general  “clause  de  renvoi”  to  the  broad  instrument  for  the 
implementation  of  the  instrument.  Hence,  ensuring  the  coherence  between  and 
simplification  of  implementation  and  management  across  instruments,  the  new 
Decision  will  be  aligned  with  the  new  implementing  regulation  including 
implementation  modalities,  monitoring,  evaluation  etc.  as  outline  in  the  Impact 
Assessment.  

-  Following the latest developments in EU cooperation, it is envisaged to introduce 
a  specific  provision/facility  to  promote  a  better  integration  of  regional  projects 
between  OCTs,  African  Caribbean  and  Pacific  countries  and  the  Outermost 
Regions. 

97 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 8 Additional Information on Humanitarian Aid 

As  the  world's  largest  humanitarian  aid  donor,  the  EU  and  its  Member  States  play  a 
central role in tackling humanitarian challenges worldwide. 

The Humanitarian Aid programme provides emergency assistance to people, particularly 
the most vulnerable, hit by man-made or natural disasters. 

In line with the Humanitarian Aid regulation (1257/96), the EU’s humanitarian assistance 
goes directly to people affected by disaster or conflict, irrespective of their race, ethnic 
group, religion, sex, age, nationality or political affiliation and must not be guided by, or 
subject  to,  political  considerations.  The  EU  acts  on  the  basis  of  the  international 
humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.  

The  main  objective  is  to  provide  needs-based  delivery  of  EU  assistance  to  save  and 
preserve  life,  prevent  and  alleviate  human  suffering  and  safeguard  the  integrity  and 
dignity  of  populations  affected  by  natural  disasters  or  man-made  crises,  also  including 
protracted  crises.  In  addition,  the  EU  is  committed  to  build  capacity  and  resilience  of 
vulnerable  or  disaster-affected  communities,  in  complementarity  with  other  EU 
instruments, and has put in place a resilience action plan. These objectives contribute to 
the overall objectives, principles and actions of the Union's external action as defined in 
Article 21 of the Treaty. 

The EU is recognized as a leading player in humanitarian assistance both in terms of its 
ability to provide rapid and flexible assistance across a wide range of crises, and in virtue 
of  its  influence  in  shaping  the  global  humanitarian  policy  agenda.  Because  of  the 
financial weight and world-wide scope of its humanitarian actions, the EU is also able to 
encourage other humanitarian donors to implement effective and principled humanitarian 
aid strategies. A key comparative advantage of humanitarian aid stems from the fact that 
it is often the only EU instrument able to intervene in acute conflict situations. Thanks to 
its  flexibility,  humanitarian  aid  has  also  made  a  significant  difference on  the  ground  in 
many of the countries and crises at the origin of the global refugee and migration crisis.  

In a context of insufficient funding to address ever-growing needs, the EU is also able to 
fill  gaps  in  global  humanitarian  aid  by  addressing  needs  in  areas  which  are  difficult  to 
access and by providing response not only to the biggest and most visible humanitarian 
crises, but also to forgotten crises (i.e. crises receiving no or insufficient international aid, 
political and media attention). Moreover, Member States often look to the EU as a donor 
to provide assistance in crises where they are not able to intervene in a national capacity.   

Member  States  also  benefit  from  the  EU's  "humanitarian  diplomacy"  which  results  in 
more  effective  provision  of  humanitarian  aid.  Another  key  element  of  EU  added  value 
for Member States lies in the strong operational knowledge and technical expertise of the 
EU's unique network of humanitarian field offices spread over almost 40 countries. 

The Commission implements EU humanitarian aid operations through over 200 partner 
organisations,  including  United  Nations  agencies,  other  International  Organisations 
the  Red  Cross  and  Red  Crescent  movement  and  non-governmental 
including 

98 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
organisations  (NGOs).  The  EU  has  been  playing  a  leading  role  in  the  development  of 
new policy approaches (e.g. education in emergencies) and innovative funding modalities 
(e.g. cash-based assistance). 

The  scale,  frequency  and  duration  of  crises  that  demand  international  humanitarian 
response  is  increasing,  aggravated  by  long-term  trends  such  as  climate  change, 
population  growth,  rapid  and  unsustainable  urbanisation,  resource  scarcities  as  well  as 
increasingly  protracted  armed  conflicts.  These  are,  and  will  continue  to  be,  among  the 
main drivers of humanitarian crises, which in turn generate growing humanitarian needs 
globally. The projected number of people in need of humanitarian assistance worldwide 
in  2018  reached  a  new  record  high  (136  million  people  in  25  countries)149.  And  the 
figures are increasing every year. On the other hand, the amount of available resources at 
global level to respond to these ever growing humanitarian needs is not increasing at the 
same  level.  The  overall  gap  between  available  resources  and  humanitarian  needs  is 
expected to continue to grow. Against this background, there will be an ever greater need 
for front-line life-saving humanitarian assistance. At the same time, given the protracted 
nature of several crises, there will also  continue to  be a need for enhanced cooperation 
between  humanitarian  and  development  assistance  in  order  to  cater  for  the  needs  of 
people affected by protracted crises. 

Against this background, the EU will continue to play an active role as an important actor 
in  humanitarian  action  at  global  level,  also  beyond  2020.  The  EU  will  continue  to 
promote  the  development  of  more  effective  coordination  of  humanitarian  aid  at  global 
level,  to  push  for  the  development  of  new  policy  areas  (such  as  education  in 
emergencies) as well as to support efforts aimed at making the delivery of humanitarian 
aid more effective and efficient (for instance, through the continued roll-out of the use of 
cash  as  an  effective  delivery  modality;  or  by  exploring  possibilities  to  move  towards  a 
more programmatic partnership between the EU as a donor and its humanitarian partners, 
in  line  with  the  Grand  Bargain  commitments  agreed  at  the  2016  World  Humanitarian 
Summit).  

Providing  rapid  and  flexible  life-saving  assistance  both  in  the  major  crises  and  in  so-
called "forgotten crises" will continue to be a hallmark of the EU's profile as a donor. The 
EU's  extensive  network  of  humanitarian  field  experts  based  in  countries  in  crisis  will 
remain  a  key  element  of  the  EU's  humanitarian  aid  delivery  and  a  clear  comparative 
advantage as a donor. 

The EU's action as a humanitarian aid donor will continue to be complementary with EU 
Member  States'  bilateral  contributions  in  response  to  crises.  A  share  of  the  annual  EU 
humanitarian  aid  budget  will  continue  to  be  pre-allocated  to  on-going  crises  and  for 
prevention/preparedness  measures,  while  the  rest  will  be  deployed  to  respond  to  new 
crises or deterioration of existing ones. 

The policy and legal framework for the EU's humanitarian aid is not expected to change. 
The comprehensive evaluation on humanitarian aid for the period 2012-2016 confirmed 
the relevance of the current framework for humanitarian aid. The evaluation underlined 
that  the  EU  humanitarian  objectives  are  very  relevant  with  respect  to  the  continuing 
global  humanitarian  needs  and  that  they  are  future-proof  and  in  line  with  the 

149 See: https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/GHO2018.PDF  

99 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
humanitarian principles. Consultations at all levels also confirmed that stakeholders want 
the EU to continue most of what it has been doing to date. Some areas for improvement 
were also identified, but these do not require a change to the current legal framework.  

The  Humanitarian  Aid  Regulation  (HAR)  continues  to  offer  wide  flexibility.  This 
ensures  that  assistance  is  channelled  effectively  and  efficiently  to  people  in  need.  The 
Regulation  is  also  flexible  enough  to  allows  adaptations  to  working  modalities  where 
needed  (e.g.  to  fulfil  new  commitments  such  as  those  undertaken  at  the  World 
Humanitarian  Summit  in  2016;  or  to  allow  the  EU's  humanitarian  aid  to  contribute 
effectively to the humanitarian-development nexus or to resilience-building). 

In light of the above, and considering that the HAR is not linked by duration to a specific 
Multi-Annual Financial Framework, a revision of the HAR is not deemed to be necessary 
at this stage. 

100 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 9 Additional Information on Union Civil Protection 
Mechanism 

The  Union  Civil  Protection  Mechanism  (UCPM)  was  established  in  2013  by  Decision 
1313/2013/EU  with  the  objective  to  support,  complement  and  facilitate  coordination  of 
Member  States’  action  in  the  field  of  civil  protection.  The  UCPM  ensures  the 
coordination  of  in-kind  assistance  provided  by  the  participating  states  to  victims  of 
natural  and  man-made  disasters  in  Europe  and  elsewhere.  The  total  UCPM’s  financial 
envelope for the period 2014-2020 is EUR 368.4 million, 144.6 million out of which are 
funded by Heading 4 (40% approximately). There are two budget lines within Heading 4 
for  the  UCPM:  a)  Prevention  &  Preparedness  outside  the  EU,  and  b)  Response  actions 
outside  the  EU.  The  combined  budget  of  both  external  lines  amounts  to  approximately 
EUR 20 million per year. 

The  funding  provided  by  Heading  4  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  UCPM  is  not  an 
intra-EU  disaster  management  tool  solely,  as  it  can  be  activated  by  any  country  in  the 
world  (or UN body)  following  a disaster. Indeed, the external dimension of the UCPM 
has steadily grown in importance in recent years. According to the most recent data150, of 
the 96 times that the UCPM has been activated since 2014 64 of those activations were 
for activations from outside the EU, i.e. 66 % times. 

Despite  the  rather  positive  results  of  the  recently  conducted  UCPM  Interim  Evaluation 
(2017),  it  is  difficult  to  measure  the  expected  impacts  post-2020,  especially  for  the 
international  dimension  of  the  UCPM.  According  to  recent  scientific  research,  climate 
change  is  expected  to  significantly  increase  the  frequency  and  magnitude  of  natural 
disasters around the world151. Against this backdrop, the UCPM might be confronted to 
an  increasing  number  of  activations  outside  the  EU  borders,  sometimes  in  remote 
locations, which will put the UCPM to the test.  

The  European  Commission  adopted  in  November  2017  a  proposal  to  amend  Decision 
1313/2013  with  the  objective  of  improving  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  the 
Union's  Civil  Protection  Mechanism  by  developing  additional  overall  capacities  at  EU 
level  (rescEU),  increasing  funding  in  support  of  operations  and  reinforcing  the 
prevention component of the Mechanism. This proposal is currently under negotiation in 
the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, with the aim of reaching agreement 
before the end of 2018. 

150 Source: Emergency Response Coordination Centre, January 2018 
151 Forzieri, G. et al., 'Increasing risk over time of weather-related hazards to the European population: a data-driven prognostic 
study', Lancet Planet Health, vol. 1, 2017, pp. e200–08. 

101 

 
 
 
                                                            
Annex 10 Additional Information on Support to the Turkish 
Cypriot Community 

At the time of Cyprus' accession to the EU in 2004, the Council stated its determination 
to  "put  an  end  to  the  isolation  of  the  Turkish  Cypriot  community  and  to  facilitate  the 
reunification  of  Cyprus  by  encouraging  the  economic  development  of  the  Turkish 
Cypriot  community".  Therefore, 
to  supporting  negotiations  for  a 
in  parallel 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue, the EU provides support through a single 
EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot community. 

This  programme  was  established  in  2006,  following  a  request  of  the  Council  and 
amounts to 232 million (33 million yearly) for 2014-2020 

The  Programme  aims  at  facilitating  the  reunification  of  Cyprus  by  encouraging  the 
economic  development  of  the  Turkish  Cypriot  community  with  particular  emphasis  on 
the economic integration of the island, improving contacts between the two communities 
and  with  the  EU,  and  preparation  for  the  EU  acquis.  The  Aid  programme  pursues  six 
specific objectives: a) developing and restoring infrastructures; b) promoting social and 
economic  development;  c)  fostering  reconciliation,  confidence  building  measures,  and 
support to civil society; d) bringing the Turkish Cypriot community closer to the EU; and 
e)  preparing  the  Turkish  Cypriot  community  to  introduce  and  implement  EU  acquis 
following a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. 

The Aid Programme is an unique instrument with its own legal basis152. Contrary to most 
external action instruments, its duration is not linked to the MFF and the programme has 
not  an  end  date.  The  Aid  Programme  presents  little  scope  for  synergies  with  other 
instruments and the Aid Programme should remain a separate instrument financed under 
Heading IV allowing its implementation to pursue the scope and the objectives defined in 
the basic act. 

The  EU  is  in  a  unique  position  to  provide  political  and  economic  support  towards  the 
reunification of the island.  

The  programme  is  directly  implemented  by  the  European  Commission.    Some  projects 
are implemented under indirect management  by International Organisations or  Member 
States Agencies. 

A third of the Aid Programme funds have been dedicated to environmental infrastructure 
projects.  This  resulted  in  the  replacement  of  old  asbestos  pipes  in  water  distribution 
networks,  and  the  construction  of  wastewater  treatment  plants  and  sewerage  networks. 
Another  third  was  allocated  for  socio-economic  development  enabling  some  400  grant 
awards  to  farmers,  businesses  and  civil  society  organisations  to  help  modernise  and 
improve  competitiveness.  The  remaining  funds  were  allocated  for  bi-communal  efforts 
and  familiarisation  with  EU  matters  (including  the  EU  acquis).  This  allowed  the 
Committee  on  Missing  Persons  (CMP)  to  exhume  1217  sets  of  remains  out  of  2002 
missing persons. In addition, 72 island-wide Cultural Heritage initiatives were completed 

152 Council Regulation (EC) 389/2006 

102 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
involving  more  than  6000  Greek  and  Turkish  Cypriots.  More  than  1000  grants  for 
studying  in  the  EU  have  been  awarded  to  Turkish  Cypriot  students  and  professionals 
upgrading their qualifications and their EU awareness.  

Finally, the impact of EU investment through TAIEX medium term assistance has been 
significant, with around 200 legal texts prepared with the support of TAIEX experts.  

103 

 
 
 
 
Annex 11 Additional Information on Instrument for Nuclear 
Safety Cooperation 

The  INSC,  with  EUR  250  million,  is  addressing  nuclear  safety  in  third  countries, 
alignment  with  EU  policies  and  priorities  and  addressing  specific  needs.  The  set-up  in 
2015  of  a  multilateral  Environmental  Remediation  Account  on  remediating  legacy 
mining waste in Central Asia is an example of how the Instrument addresses these needs, 
in  coordination  with  international  donors  and  organisations.  The  Instrument  duly 
promotes the highest standards and practices used in the European Union on the basis of 
the  Euratom  Treaty  and  a  set  of  relevant  Directives153.  The  Instrument  also  matches 
recognised priorities as pursued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
the  G7  Nuclear  Safety  and  Security  Group  (NSSG).  Coordination  with  the  European 
External Action Service ensures compatibility of actions with international Conventions 
and Treaties and international developments. 

The  INSC  can  foster  unique  added  value  to  engagement  in  nuclear  safety  cooperation 
with third countries, well beyond the capacities of Member States and other donors. The 
institutional framework allows the Commission to act at a global level on nuclear safety 
cooperation  with  consultations  with  the  G7/8,  and  features  specialized  know-how  and 
expertise,  high  nuclear  safety  standards  and  exclusive  EU  powers  to  address  nuclear 
safeguards and based on continuity for nuclear safety cooperation with a track record of 
over a quarter of a century. It allows the EU to assume a world leading role in nuclear 
safety  and  permits  engagement  in  policy  level  dialogue  with  Partner  Countries  and,  in 
specific  cases  the  triggering  of  political  dialogue  in  the  wake  of  nuclear  safety 
negotiations.  

The activitites under this instrument should continue as much as possible under the broad 
instrument, notwithstanding the need for a specific instrument with a Euratom legal base, 
to  preserve  its  competence,  in  full  coherency  and  complementarity.  Therefore  a  new 
instrument complementing the broad instrument should cover these types of activities.  

153  Euratom  Directives  on  Nuclear  Safety  (amended  2014),  Radioactive  Waste  management  (established  2011),  and 
Basic Safety Standards on radiation protection (amended 2013).Common Implementing Regulation 

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Annex 12 Minutes of the Inter-service Steering Group 
Meeting, 23 March 2018 

REPORT – ISSG Meeting - MFF External Policy Cluster on 23 March 2018 

Services participating: BUDG, CLIMA, CNECT, DEVCO, EAC, ECFIN, ECHO, EEAS, 
ENV, HOME, MARE, NEAR, SG, SRSS, TRADE (participants list attached). 

The  SG  together  with  DG  DEVCO  provided  feedback  to  questions  on  the  draft  impact 
assessment  (IA),  and  invited  DGs  to  provide  written  comments  by  Monday  26  March 
12h. SG also outlined the next steps including the submission of the IA early next week, 
with the RSB meeting taking place on 25 April.  

The SG (W. Sleath) highlighted the context of the current draft impact assessment, and 
the  need  to  clearly  point  to  the  costs  of  a  non-Europe  and  the  European  added-value. 
Guidance  was  provided  by  the  joint  note  from  Commission  President  Juncker  and 
Commissioner Oettinger. The SG also reminded that the Impact Assessment (IA) was a 
document that would be shared with the general public and that the minutes of the ISSG 
meeting will accompany the IA when sent to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB). 

DG DEVCO underlined that the objective should be to secure a positive opinion from the 
RSB. The work on the new broad instrument in general, and the IA in particular, was a 
collaborative  undertaking of contributions  and  discussions with  several DGs. The  work 
was  based  on  the  mid-term  review  evaluations  (MTR),  taken  forward  by  sketching  out 
where the EU would like to go in the future, and taking into account RSB guidance. The 
SG  had  confirmed  that  the  ex-ante  evaluations  listed  in  the  guidance  note  were  not 
required  as  separate  texts  if  covered  properly  in  the  IA.  The  IA  was  an  analytical 
document  informing  future  discussions  -  not  a  position  paper-  focusing  on  the  future 
broad  instrument.  DG  DEVCO  stressed  that  the  instrument  would  be  primarily  an 
enabling instrument and not a place to set policies. The Annexes to the IA would focus 
on the instruments that would exist outside the new broad instrument.  

DG  CLIMA  asked  whether  the  Partnership  Instrument  (PI)  would  be  covered  by  the 
geographical  or  thematic  pillar  of  the  future  instrument,  highlighting  that  the  former 
instrument  would  deliver  through  both  channels.  A  link  to  the  SDGs  was  important, 
including in the context of G20 discussions, where PI support was a valuable bargaining 
chip. The FPI added that the PI had a proven track-record and in the future would also 
need a thematic perspective. DG DEVCO recalled that the new broad instrument was not 
a copy-paste of previous instruments and would not  put  entire  previous programmes in 
individual  pillars,  but  would  rather  look  at  the  actions  financed  under  the  former 
instrument and assign them to pillars where maximum synergies with other efforts could 
be  reaped.  This  would  also  apply  to  the  external  projection  of  EU  policies.  The 

105 

 
 
 
 
 
geographic pillar  would  focus  on  national  and regional  cooperation,  while the thematic 
pillar  should  address  truly  global  issues.  Crisis  management  and  the  development-
humanitarian  nexus  would  be  covered  under  the  un-programmed  pillar.  SG  added  that 
since EU interests apply overall, it is not useful to define the structure of the instrument 
based on such interests. 

DG HOME enquired on how migration would precisely be captured in the new external 
instrument,  given  the  emphasis  in  the  note  from  the  President  and  Commissioner 
Oettinger,  and  noted  the  importance  of  an  effective  delineation  with  the  funds  with  an 
internal  focus.  DG  DEVCO  highlighted  the  importance  of  migration  across  the  three 
pillars of the new instrument, with migration having a national, regional but also global 
and  possibly  an  emergency  dimension;  the  latter  of  these  would  be  covered  by  the  un-
programmed  part  of  the  new  instrument,  or  under  the  unallocated  heading  (20%  of  the 
instrument). It was too early to discuss amounts. 

DG ECHO wondered how the development-humanitarian nexus would be covered under 
the  un-programmable  pillar,  how  the  European  Development  Fund's  (EDF)  ability  to 
complement  for  emergencies  would  be  preserved,  and  how  the  internal  and  external 
dimensions  of  disaster  relied  actions  would  be  procedurally  captured  under  the  two 
respective headings (the SG pointed to the internal centre of gravity of RescEU financing 
actions).  DG  DEVCO  stressed  that  that  access  to  the  broad  instrument’s  unallocated 
funds  for  humanitarian  purposes  was  not  foreseen.  If  necessary,  the  successor  to  the 
emergency  reserve  should  supplement  funding  of  the  humanitarian  instrument.  The 
development-humanitarian nexus would be covered under the un-programmed pillar. 

The  Legal  Service  (SJ)  enquired  about  the  place  of  the  investment  related  parts  (e.g. 
guarantees) in the new architecture, and wondered about a 'plan B' in case the EDF could 
not  be  budgetised  (DG  DEVCO  confirmed  there  is  no  'plan  B').  The  SJ  also  provided 
comments on the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and the EU Aid Volunteers 
and  on  the  need  to  verify  the  legal  bases  of  the  Regulation  of  the  new  instrument  at  a 
later stage, when the shape and form of the Regulation is clearer. DG ECFIN added that 
the investment-related provisions were part of the new instrument but this would have to 
be made clearer in the current draft IA.  

DG BUDG asked for a clearer link between the objectives and the individual pillars, to 
which DG DEVCO replied that this was against the spirit (maximisation of synergies) of 
the new instrument, in the sense that objectives would be met by actions under all pillars 
(thereby  benefitting  from  the  possibility  of  addressing  challenges  at  the  most  effective 
level (national, regional, and/or global). The SG added that the new broad instrument was 
an enabling tool to fulfil political set (and possibly changing) objectives. 

The EEAS underlined that the Global Strategy should be clearly referred to, and pointed 
to  the  need  for  several  thematic  topics  (climate  change,  human  rights,  peace  and 
stabilisation) to maintain the current funding level, despite the smaller proportion of the 
thematic  pillar  compared  to  the  geographical  pillar.  DG  ENV  was  also  in  support  of  a 
thematic coverage to promote EU policies. DG MARE indicated their wish to maintain 
106 

 
 
the  financing  of  their  global  ocean  governance  actions  under  the  thematic  pillar, 
highlighting global challenges such as illegal fishing, climate change and water pollution. 
DG CNECT asked for higher visibility in the current draft IA text for the digitalisation of 
societies,  including  in  the  developing  world.  DG  EAC  recalled  the  importance  of 
simplifying  the  procedures  of  the  Erasmus+  programme  to  overcome  the  current 
(planning and programming) mismatch between the different budget headings. 

On the next steps, the SG invited the DGs and services to send written comments at the 
latest  by  Monday  26  March  noon.  Shortly  thereafter  the  IA  would  be  submitted  to  the 
RSB, which will meet on 25 April. College adoption of the MFF proposal is planned for 
2 May, and the adoption of the individual instruments for the end of May. 

SG.E3 

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 

L. Havas (LS) 

L. Forsberg (CNECT) 

M. Giacomini, F. Ceriani Sebregondi, M-L. de Bergh, M. Kreibich (EEAS) 

K. Morris, L-J. Magnusson (BUDG) 

F. Gaztelu Mezquiriz, J. D'Souza (HOME) 

A. Ladefoged, F. Sordet, (ENV) 

P. Owen, M. Kaspar (CLIMA) 

B. Nolan, C. Morel, G. Guazzugli Marini (EAC) 

R. van Bameveld (MARE) 

Y. Cimmarrasti (JRC) 

S. Weinberg, D. Lenaerts (ECFIN) 

H. Gerstbrein, G. Miller, K. Valica (FPI) 

R. Mengel-Jorgensen (TRADE) 

C. Gariazzo, M. Panigalli (ECHO) 

R. Henoumont (SRSS) 

107 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Lidou, A. Pires, G. Balducci (NEAR) 

V. Grimaud, B. San Emeterio, H. Dean (DEVCO) 

W. Sleath, J-C. Van Eeckhaute, T. Ketterer, D. Majoros, C. van den Boogert (SG) 

108