COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 767/2008, Regulation (EC) No 810/2009, Regulation (EU) 2017/2226, Regulation (EU) 2016/399, Regulation XX/2018 [Interoperability Regulation], and Decision 2004/512/EC and repealing Council Decision 2008/633/JHA
Date: 2018-05-16
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: EU migration policy, EU visa policy, Schengen Information System, border control, cross-border cooperation, exchange of information, external border of the EU, foreign national, illegal migration

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 16.5.2018  SWD(2018) 195 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT  Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 767/2008, Regulation (EC) No 810/2009, Regulation (EU) 2017/2226, Regulation (EU) 2016/399, Regulation XX/2018 [Interoperability Regulation], and Decision 2004/512/EC and repealing Council Decision 2008/633/JHA {COM(2018) 302 final}  - {SWD(2018) 196 final}  
 
 
Table of contents 

1. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT ............................................................... 5 

1.1.  Visa Information System and the security of the Schengen area ...................... 5 
1.2.  Closing the information gap on long-stay visas and residence documents ....... 7 
1.3.  The VIS setup .................................................................................................... 8 
1.4.  VIS REFIT Evaluation .................................................................................... 10 
1.5.  Consequences for the VIS ............................................................................... 11 

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION ................................................................................................................... 12 

2.1.  What are the problems? ................................................................................... 12 
2.2.  What are the problem drivers? ........................................................................ 23 
2.3.  How will the problem evolve? ........................................................................ 24 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ......................................................................................................... 26 

3.1.  Legal basis ....................................................................................................... 26 
3.2.  Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action .............................................................. 26 
3.3.  Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action .......................................................... 27 

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ................................................................................ 27 

4.1.  General objectives of the revised VIS proposal .............................................. 27 
4.2.  Specific objectives ........................................................................................... 28 

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? ..................................................................... 29 

5.1.  What is the baseline from which options are assessed? .................................. 29 
5.2.  Description of the policy options .................................................................... 32 
5.3.  Options discarded at an early stage ................................................................. 38 

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? ........................................................... 38 

6.1.  Assessment of policy options .......................................................................... 39 

7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? ............................................................................................ 55 

7.1.  Copy of the travel document ........................................................................... 55 
7.2.  Fingerprinting of minors ................................................................................. 56 
7.3.  Long-stay visas and residence documents ...................................................... 58 
7.4.  Migration and security checks ......................................................................... 63 

8. 

PREFERRED OPTIONS ..................................................................................................................... 64 

8.1.  Copy of the travel document ........................................................................... 64 
8.2.  Fingerprinting of minors ................................................................................. 65 
8.3.  Long-stay visas and residence documents ...................................................... 65 
8.4.  Migration and security .................................................................................... 66 
8.5.  REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency) ............................................ 66 

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? .................................. 67 

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................ 68 

ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION ....................................................................................... 70 

ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? ........................................................................................... 78 

ANNEX 4: REFIT ........................................................................................................................................ 82 

ANNEX 5: METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................................... 85 

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ANNEX 6: MONITORING AND EVALUATION...................................................................................... 90 

ANNEX 7: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE STUDY ON STORING A SCANNED COPY OF 
THE  VISA  APPLICANTS'  TRAVEL  DOCUMENT  IN  THE  VISA  INFORMATION 
SYSTEM (VIS) ................................................................................................................................... 92 

ANNEX  8:  EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY  OF  THE  STUDY  ON  FEASIBILITY  AND 

IMPLICATIONS OF LOWERING THE FINGERPRINTING AGE FOR CHILDREN ................. 102 

1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 

Analysis of the problems ............................................................................... 102 
Objectives ...................................................................................................... 102 
Policy options ................................................................................................ 102 
Assessment of impacts .................................................................................. 103 

ANNEX 9: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE LEGAL ANALYSIS ON THE NECESSITY AND 
PROPORTIONALITY  OF  EXTENDING  THE  SCOPE  OF  THE  VISA  INFORMATION 
SYSTEM  (VIS)  TO  INCLUDE  DATA  ON  LONG  STAY  VISAS  AND  RESIDENCE 
DOCUMENTS .................................................................................................................................. 107 

1. 
Context of the study ...................................................................................... 107 
2.  What is the problem? ..................................................................................... 109 
3.  What are the objectives of the initiative? ...................................................... 112 
4.  Why an EU action? ....................................................................................... 112 
5.  What are the options to address the problem? ............................................... 113 
Findings and conclusions of the study .......................................................... 114 
5. 
The way forward/what are the next steps ...................................................... 118 
6. 

ANNEX 10: CONSIDERATIONS ON THE USE OF BIOMETRIC DATA (TOPIC 3) .......................... 119 

ANNEX 11: AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS OVERVIEW (PREFERRED OPTION IN BOLD) ....... 121 

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Glossary 

Term or acronym 

Meaning or definition 

CFR 

CVCA 

EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 

Country Verifying Certificate Authority 

ECRIS-TCN 

European criminal records information system  

regarding third country nationals and stateless persons 

EU 

EDPS 

EES 

EIS 

ESP 

ESPs 

eu-LISA 

ETIAS 

EURA 

FADO 

FRA 

GDPR 

HLEG 

IA 

ICAO 

JHA 

JRC 

LEA 

European Union 

European Data Protection Supervisor 

Entry/Exit System 

Europol data 

European Search Portal 

External Service Provider 

European  Agency  for  the  operational  management  of 
Large-Scale IT Systems in the area of freedom, security 
and justice 

European Travel Information and Authorisation System 

EU readmission agreement 

Database of False and Authentic Documents Online 

EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 

General Data Protection Regulation  

High-level Expert Group 

Impact Assessment 

International Civil Aviation Organization 

Justice and home affairs 

Joint Research Centre 

Law enforcement access 

3 

 
 
LSV 

MRTD 

MS 

OJ 

PA 

REFIT 

RC 

RP 

SIRENE 

SIS 

SLTD 

TCN 

TD 

TDAWN 

VH 

VIS 

Long-stay visa 

Machine-readable travel document 

Member State 

Official Journal 

Passive Authentication 

Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme 

Residence card 

Residence permit 

Supplementary  Information  Request  at  the  National 
Entries – national single point of contact for SIS. 

Schengen Information System 

Stolen and Lost Travel Documents database 

Third-country national 

Travel document 

Interpol's database of Travel Documents Associated with 
Notices 

Visa holder 

Visa Information System  

4 

 
 
 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 

1.1.  Visa Information System and the security of the Schengen area 

The abolition of checks at internal borders of the states forming part of the Schengen area 
is one of the most valued achievements of EU integration. To uphold this achievement and 
as  a  response  to  the  increase  of  irregular  migration  to  the  EU  and  the  threat  to  internal 
security, in recent years EU information systems for border management and security 
the 
have  been  considerably  strengthened,  new  ones  are  being  developed,  and 
interoperability between them has been established1 with the aim of creating a framework 
for fast, seamless and systematic communication to face these challenges. 

The  common  visa  policy  for  short-stay  visas  is  one  of  the  Schengen  area's  "flanking 
measures"  (together  with  the  harmonisation  of  the  external  border  controls,  enhanced 
cross-border  police  cooperation,  and  the  creation  of  the  Schengen  Information  System 
(SIS))  accompanying  the  establishment  of  a  common  area  without  checks  at  internal 
borders.  The  common  visa  policy  encompasses  a  set  of  harmonised  rules2,  allowing  the 
Member States3 to mutually recognise short-stay visas issued.  

As stated in the Commission Communication on the Delivery of the European Agenda on 
Migration4,  the  EU's  common  visa  policy  is  not  only  an  essential  element  to  facilitate 
tourism  and  business,  but  also  a  key  tool  to  prevent  security  risks  and  risks  of  irregular 
migration to the EU.  

Around  18  million  applications  for  short  stays  are  lodged  with  the  Member  States  every 
year  by  nationals  of  the  over  100  countries  around  the  world  under  visa  obligation,  and 
more than 90% of them are issued a visa. In an area without internal border controls, the 
risk of irregular migration and the risk to security and public order of one Member State 
have  an  impact  on  the  other  Member  States.  This  is  why  the  decision  to  issue  a  visa  is 
a decision taken by national authorities, who should take into account not only  their own 
interests but that of all Member States. The VIS was established in 2004, following several 
calls by the Council to have a common system to store visa data and it is operational since 
2011. By January 2018, data on more than 52 million visa applications, with 52.27 million 
facial-images and nearly 50 million fingerprint sets had been entered in the VIS.5 

In line with the April 2016 Communication on Stronger and Smarter Information Systems 
for Borders and Security, the Commission proposed additional information systems in the 
area of border management. The Entry/Exit System (EES) Regulation6 will register entry, 

COM(2017) 794 final and COM(2017) 793 final. 

1  
2   Visa  Regulation  (539/2001)  laying  down  the  common  "visa  lists"  of  countries  whose  nationals  require  a  visa  to 
travel to the EU and those who are exempt from that  requirement; Visa Code (Regulation 810/2009) establishing 
the procedures and conditions for issuing short-stay visas; Regulation 1683/95 laying down a uniform format for 
the visa sticker; and the VIS Regulation (767/2008) setting up the Visa Information System (VIS), in which all visa 
applications  and  Member  States'  decisions  are  recorded,  including  applicants  personal  data,  photographs  and 
fingerprints. 
In  this  document,  ‘Member  States’  means  Schengen  Member  States,  i.e.  EU  Member  States  that  are  Schengen 
members, as well as the Schengen Associated countries. 
COM(2017) 558 final, p.15.  
Figures from EU-Lisa. 
Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 establishing an 
Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing 
the  external  borders  of  the  Member  States  and  determining  the  conditions  for  access  to  the  EES  for  law 

4  
5  
6  

3  

5 

 
 
                                                      
 
exit  and  refusal  of  entry information  of  third  country  nationals  crossing  the  external 
borders of  the  Schengen  area,  thus  identifying  overstayers.  The  EES  Regulation  also 
amends the VIS Regulation and stipulates rules on interoperability between EES and VIS, 
establishing a direct communication channel between the two systems for the use of border 
and visa authorities. This will allow border authorities to verify the validity of the visa and 
the  identity  of  a  visa  holder  directly  against  the  VIS  at  the  external  borders.  Consular 
authorities  will  be  able  to  consult  the  EES  file  of  an  applicant  to  verify  the  use  made  of 
previous visas. 

The  Commission  also  presented  a  proposal  for  a  European  Travel  Information  and 
Authorisation  System  (ETIAS)7  aiming  at  a  more  efficient  management  of  the  EU’s 
external borders, and improved internal security by introducing advance checks on all visa-
free travellers before their arrival at the external borders.  

In  December  2017,  the  Commission  presented  a  proposal  to  ensure  interoperability 
between  EU  information  systems  for  security,  border  and  migration  management8.  The 
proposal  also  seek  to  facilitate  and  streamline  access  by  law  enforcement  authorities  to 
non-law enforcement information systems at EU level including the VIS, where necessary 
for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of serious crime and terrorism. 
However, ensuring various information systems are interoperable is only the first step. In 
order  to  make  use  of  interoperability,  concrete  measures  need  to  be  taken  to  make 
interoperable IT systems work together. 

In  addition  to  these  legislative  developments,  in  September  2017,  the  Commission 
Communication on the Delivery of the European Agenda on Migration9 acknowledged the 
need  to  further  adapt  the  common  visa  policy  to  current  challenges,  taking  into  account 
new  IT  solutions  and  balancing  the  benefits  of  facilitated  visa  and  visa-free  travel  with 
improved  migration,  security  and  border  management,  and  making  full  use  of 
interoperability. In this context, the Commission presented a Communication on adapting 
the common visa policy to new challenges on 14 March 2018,10 in parallel with a proposal 
to  amend  the  Visa  Code.11  The  proposal  to  amend  the  Visa  Code  aims  to  simplify  and 
strengthen  the  visa  application  procedure,  to  make  it  easier  for  tourists  and  business 
travellers to come to Europe with a visa while strengthening the prevention of security and 
irregular migration risks,  most  notably  by linking visa policy with  the return policy. The 
VIS  fits  into  this  context  as  the  electronic  processing tool supporting  the  visa  procedure. 
The  March  Communication  also  announced  the  work  towards  enhancing  security  by 
revising  the  VIS  and  making  full  use  of  interoperability.  It  furthermore  announced  the 
three  main  modalities  in  which  enhanced  security  would  be  achieved:  1.  by  enhancing 
checks in visa processing using interoperability; 2. by closing remaining information gaps 
for borders and security through the inclusion of long-stay visas and residence documents 

enforcement purposes, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) 
No 767/2008 and (EU) No 1077/2011. 
COM(2016)731 of 16.11.2016. 
7  
8  
COM(2017) 794 final and COM(2017) 793 final. 
9  
Cited above. 
10   COM(2018)251. 
11   COM(2018)252. 

6 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
in the VIS and 3. by addressing remaining information gaps in short-stay visa processing, 
in respect of fingerprinting age of applicants and keeping copies of travel documents. 

1.2.  Closing  the  information  gap  on  long-stay  visas  and  residence 

documents 

The  Commission's  April  2016  Communication  on  Stronger  and  Smarter  Information 
Systems  for  Borders  and  Security12  identified  a  need  to  address  information  gaps  in  the 
EU's architecture of data management, including on third country nationals holding a long-
term  visa.  This  Communication  also  signalled  a  shift  from  the  principle  of  disconnected 
databases towards their inter-operability in full compliance with fundamental rights. On the 
other hand, the EU has also strengthened its data protection rules by adopting the General 
Data  Protection  Regulation  and the Data  Protection  Directive  for  the  police  and criminal 
justice sector in 201613. The new rules are based on principles of data protection by default 
and by design (privacy and data protection as key considerations from the earliest stages of 
development of any system). 

On  10  June  2016,  the  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  (JHA)  Council  endorsed  a  roadmap  to 
enhance information exchange and information management14. One of the objectives was 
to address the existing information gap in the documents issued to third-country nationals. 
The Roadmap concluded that the fragmentation of information through different Member 
States  and  systems  is  inefficient  and  could  lead  to  errors  when  assessing  a  third-country 
national’s situation and makes the border-crossing procedure more difficult.  

The  Final  Report  of  the  High-Level  Expert  Group  on  Information  Systems  and 
Interoperability (HLEG)15 of May 2017 further described the existence of the information 
gap at EU level and recommended  the Commission  to  undertake, as a matter of priority, 
a feasibility study on the establishment of a central EU repository containing information 
on the documents which allow a TCN to stay for a longer period than the 90 days within 
any 180 days allowed by the short-stay visa in a given Member State and whose issuance 
falls under national competence. 

In  its  Conclusions  of  9  June  2017  on  the  way  forward  to  improve  information  exchange 
and  ensure  the  interoperability  of  EU  information  systems16,  the  Council  acknowledged 
that new measures might be needed in order to fill the current information gaps for border 
management  and  law  enforcement,  such  as  in  relation  to  border  crossings  by  holders  of 
long-stay  visas,  residence  cards  and  residence  permits.  The  Council  invited  the 
Commission to undertake a feasibility study as a matter of priority for the establishment of 
a  central  EU  repository  containing  information  on  long-stay  visas,  residence  cards  and 
residence permits, as recommended in the Final Report of the HLEG. 

12   COM(2016) 205 final (see page 3). 
13    Regulation (EU) 2016/679  (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016) and Directive (EU) 2016/680 (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016). 
14   Roadmap to enhance information exchange and information management including interoperability solutions in the 

Justice and Home Affairs area (9368/1/16 REV 1).  

15   http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=3435. 
16   ST/10151/17. 

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The Report on the VIS Evaluation adopted in 201617 already included a recommendation 
for further development of the VIS to include these documents. 

In  response,  the  Commission  undertook  a  study  to  assess  the  need  for  a  centralised  EU 
repository  containing  information  on  long-stay  visas,  residence  permits  and  residence 
cards, including its necessity, technical feasibility and proportionality. It analysed whether 
including  long-stay  visas  and  residence  documents  in  a  central  database  was  technically 
feasible and desirable, compared to the creation of a new database to store data on these 
documents.  The  study  concluded  that  re-using  the  VIS  structure  to  include  these 
documents  would  be  the  most  feasible  option  in  terms  of  IT  security,  ease  of 
implementation and cost-effectiveness.18 The study also concluded on the need to further 
analyse the necessity and proportionality of such a measure, which is done in this impact 
assessment. 

1.3.  The VIS setup 

 A comprehensive legal framework was adopted to establish the Visa Information System 
(VIS)  as  a  large-scale  IT-system  for  exchanging  short-stay  visa  data  between  Member 
States19.  The  VIS  was  created  for  the  purpose  of  processing  data  on  short-stay  visa 
applications.  The  purpose,  functionalities  and  responsibilities  accompanying  the  VIS  are 
specified  in  the  VIS  Regulation  and  in  a  number  of  implementing  acts20.  The  overall 
objectives  of  the  VIS  are  to  improve  the  implementation  of  the  common  visa  policy, 
consular  cooperation  and  consultation  between  central  visa  authorities  by  facilitating  the 
exchange  of  data  between  Member  States  on  applications  and  on  the  decisions  relating 
thereto, in order to: 

  Facilitate the visa application procedure; 
  Prevent ‘visa shopping’; 
  Facilitate the fight against identity fraud;  
  Facilitate  checks  at  external  border  crossing  points  and  within  the  Member  States’ 

territory; 

  Assist  in  the  identification  of  any  person  who  may  not,  or  may  no  longer,  fulfil  the 

conditions for entry to, stay or residence on the territory of the Member States; 

  Facilitate the application of the Dublin Regulation21; 

17   Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council the implementation of Regulation (EC) 
No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Visa Information System (VIS), the 
use of fingerprints at external borders and the use of biometrics in the visa application procedure/REFIT Evaluation 
COM(2016) 655 final. 

18   Full report of the study can be accessed at DG HOME website. 
19   Council  Decision  2004/512/EC  of  8  June  2004  (the  VIS  founding  Decision)  established  the  VIS  as  a  system  for 
exchanging visa data between Member States; Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of 9 July 2008 (the VIS Regulation) 
laid down the VIS’s purpose, functionalities and responsibilities, as well as the conditions and procedures for the 
exchange  of  visa  data  between  Member  States  to  facilitate  the  examination  of  visa  applications  and  related 
decisions; Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of 13 July 2009 (the Visa Code) set out the rules on the registration of 
biometric identifiers in the VIS. Council Decision 2008/633/JHA of 23 June 2008 (the Law Enforcement Access 
Decision) consequently laid down the conditions under which Member States’ designated authorities and Europol 
may obtain access to consult the VIS for the purposes of preventing, detecting and investigating terrorist offences 
and other serious criminal offences. 

20   For a full set of adopted acts see DG HOME online library. 
21   Regulation  604/2013  establishing  the  criteria  and  mechanisms  for  determining  the  Member  State  responsible  for 

examining an asylum application. 

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  Contribute  to  the  prevention  of  threats  to  the  internal  security  of  any  of  the  Member 

States. 

The  variety  of  the  purposes  requires  that  the  VIS  is  used  by  different  authorities 
(migration,  law  enforcement,  and  border  control  authorities)  in  full  respect  of  access 
safeguards. The VIS allows to verify that the person presenting a visa is indeed its rightful 
holder, and that the visa is valid. Furthermore, by using VIS checks and issuance of visas 
are  made  easier  and  abuses  can  be  better  detected.  In  addition,  asylum  authorities  can 
consult the VIS to determine the Member State responsible for the asylum procedures and 
migration authorities can use it to identify unambiguously third country nationals subject to 
a  return  procedure.  Finally,  law  enforcement  authorities  (national  and  Europol)  may 
consult  the  VIS  when  there  are  suspicions  of  terrorism  or  serious  criminal  offences  (see 
Figure 1 below for VIS process and access).22 

The VIS central system was developed by the Commission and handed over to eu-LISA23 
in December 2012. It was gradually rolled out in all Member States' consulates around the 
world between October 2011 and February 2016.  

As  one  of  the  centralised  EU  information  systems  for  security,  border  and  migration 
management,  the  VIS  is  an  integral  part  of  the  Commission's  new  approach  to  the 
management of data for borders and security24 that seeks to ensure that border guards, law 
enforcement  officers,  immigration  officials  and  judicial  authorities  have  the  necessary 
information  at  their  disposal  to  better  protect  the  external  borders  and  enhance  internal 
security  for  the  benefit  of  all  citizens.  To  achieve  that,  there  is  a  need  to  maximise  the 
benefits  of  existing  information  systems  including  the  VIS,  to  develop  the  system  to 
address  information  gaps  including  on  long-stay  visas,  residence  permits  and  residence 
cards, and improve the interoperability of EU information systems, in line with the April 
2016  Communication  on  stronger  and  smarter  information  systems  for  borders  and 
security25  and  the  call  by  the  European  Council  of  23  June  2017  to  improve  the 
interoperability between databases.26 

22   Such access must be necessary for ‘the prevention, detection, or investigation of terrorist offences or other serious 
criminal offences,’ it must be necessary in a specific case, and there must be reasonable grounds to consider that 
consultation  of  VIS  data  ‘will  substantially  contribute  to  the  prevention,  detection  or  investigation  of  any  of  the 
criminal offences in question’ (Brouwer, 2010). 

23   As provided by Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 
establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, 
security and justice, OJ L 286, p. 1 of 1.11.2011.  

24   COM(2017) 261 final (16.5.2017). 
25   COM(2016) 205 final (6.4.2016). 
26   European Council conclusions, 22-23 June 2017. 

9 

 
 
 
                                                      
Figure 1: VIS process and access: current situation  

1.4.  VIS REFIT Evaluation 

As required by the VIS legal basis27 and as part of the Commission’s REFIT programme, 
in  2015,  the  Commission  launched  an  evaluation  of  the  system.  The  results  of  the 
evaluation  and  the  ensuing  recommendations  to  improve  the  functioning  of  the  system 
were transmitted to the European Parliament and the Council on 14 October 2016.28 

Overall, the VIS evaluation showed that the system is effective in meeting its objectives, in 
particular as regards simplifying and facilitating the visa application process, reducing the 
administrative  burden  of  national  administrations,  helping  to  fight  fraud,  facilitating  at 
external border crossing and within the territory of the Member States and identifying third 
country nationals for migration or return purposes or examining asylum applications. 

The  evaluation  also  demonstrated  a  need  to  further  develop  the  VIS  in  order  to  better 
respond  to  new  challenges  in  visa,  border  and  security  policies,  including  by  seeking  to 
establish interconnectivity with existing and upcoming IT systems and exploring ways to 
have information on national long-stay visas, including biometrics, registered in the VIS. It 
also showed the need for improvements in particular in relation to the monitoring of data 
quality and the production of statistics. 

As regards the protection of personal data processed in the VIS, the evaluation found that 
the  VIS  has  a  very  good  track  record:  inspections  on  the  spot  by  the  European  data 
Protection  Supervisor29  to  monitor  the  lawfulness  of  the  processing  of  personal  data  and 
security  audits  of  the  VIS  central  system  have  not  led  to  identify  any  data  protection 
concern.  After  five  years  of  being  in  charge  of  the  operation  of  VIS,  eu-LISA  has  not 
received  any  complaint  related  to  data  protection  in  VIS.  VIS  has  been  subject  to  two 
auditing  inspections  by  the  EDPS  –  in  2012  and  2015.  Furthermore,  regular  meetings 

27   Article 50 of the VIS Regulation and Article 57(3) of the Visa Code. 
28   COM(2016)655, SWD (2016) 327, SWD (2016) 328. 
29   VIS Security audit, June 2012; VIS Inspection Report 2016; VIS Supervisory Coordination Group Activity Report 

2015-2016; VIS Supervisory Coordination Group Report on access to VIS data subjects' rights, 2016. 

10 

 
 
                                                      
(twice  a  year)  of  VIS  Supervisory  Coordination  Group  are  held,  where  national  data 
protection  authorities  and  the  Commission  are  gathered  to  discuss  data  protection  issues 
arising  from  the  activity  of  the  VIS,  providing  a  forum  to  raise  any  data  protection 
concerns.  

1.5.  Consequences for the VIS 

The  migratory  and  security  challenges  faced  by the  EU  in  the  recent  years  together  with 
the  update  of  EU  information  systems  for  border  management  and  security  and  the 
development  of  new  ones  require  the  update  of  the  VIS.  A  number  of  changes  to  be 
introduced  in  the  VIS  stem  directly  from  the  2016  evaluation.  Most  of  them  are  of  a 
technical nature and serve to further align the system with the new legislative proposals in 
this area, while not presenting a significant economic, social or fundamental rights impact. 
Therefore  a  detailed  assessment  of  the  impact  of  these  technical  improvements  is  not 
needed. These changes mainly concern: 1) improvement of data quality; 2) integrating the 
VISMail  functionality  into  the  VIS;  3)  centralising  the  consultation  and  representation 
functions; 4) support for facial image recognition or with latent fingerprints and 5) set up 
of a reporting and statistics engine based on VIS data. The study on all envisaged technical 
impacts  resulting  from  the  VIS  evaluation  was  carried  out  by  eu-LISA  between  October 
2016  and  July  2017  and  its  input  was  factored  into  this  impact  assessment  to  the  extent 
relevant. 

However,  several  issues  identified  in  that  evaluation  report  require  not  only  a  technical 
analysis, but also a further analysis of relevant impacts. There are four such key issues: 

1.  the  experienced  difficulties  to  complete  procedures  to  return  irregular  migrants  to 

their countries of origin in case travel documents are missing; 

2.  the risks of irregular migration and visa fraud, including in particular for reasons of 
trafficking in human beings and other abuse involving children30 under 12 years old 
when applying for a visa; 

3.  the difficulties regarding the verification of long stay visas and residence documents 

and their holders, by border or migration authorities; 

4.  the  information  gap  on  checks  for  irregular  migration  and  security  risks  when 

processing visa applications. 

In order to analyse them two studies were contracted. The first one addressed aspects 1 and 
2  and  the  second  one  aspect  3.  In  addition,  it  also  seems  necessary to  update  the  VIS  to 
take  into  account  the  evolution  that  took  place  after  the  2016  evaluation  regarding  EU 
information  systems  for  border  management  and  security.  Therefore,  in  striving  to  align 
the initiative with the recently adopted (EES), proposed (recast Eurodac proposal, ETIAS, 
interoperability)  or  envisaged  Commission  proposals  (ECRIS-TCN31),  a possibility  to 

30   Apart from child trafficking, child protection phenomena also encompass other violations which could be addressed 
under this section, such as children in possession of a visa subsequently gone missing, parental child abduction etc. 
Due to the very nature of these phenomena, available data is very scarce, therefore as a methodological strategy the 
study exclusively focused on trafficking as the phenomenon most feasible to quantify.  

31   Proposal  for  a  REGULATION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND  OF  THE  COUNCIL  establishing  a 
centralised  system  for  the  identification  of  Member  States  holding  conviction  information  on  third  country 

11 

 
 
                                                      
 
enable  automatic  consultation  of  the  other  existing  databases  in  the  area  of  security  and 
borders  for  visa  processing  was  raised,  which  is  further  analysed  as  problem  4.  The 
analysis builds upon the findings of ETIAS feasibility study, therefore no new studies were 
contracted. 

2.  PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1.  What are the problems? 

2.1.1.  Lack of travel document as evidence in return proceedings 

Currently Member States have different national practices regarding the storing the travel 
document presented when applying for a short-stay visa. Many of them require applicants 
to submit hard copies of the bio data page (as a minimum) of the document, which are then 
archived for an average period of 1-3 years in the consulates’ archives. However, national 
authorities  have  no  information  regarding  the  existence  of  those  copies  kept  by  other 
Member States and there are no EU-wide rules regulating their exchange. In the absence of 
a valid travel document (or copy thereof), return proceedings for TCNs irregularly found 
on EU territory and who entered the EU using a visa are slow and often unsuccessful. 

The  common  EU  rules  governing  return  proceedings  are  stipulated  in  the  Return 
Directive32, which contains clear, transparent and common rules for the return and removal 
of  the  irregularly  staying  migrants,  while  fully  respecting  the  human  rights  and 
fundamental freedoms of the persons concerned. 

In the wake of the migration crisis of 2015, the numbers of irregular migrants in the EU 
expected to return to their home country has grown considerably. In the six-year period of 
2011-2016, 2 891 260 persons were ordered to leave, out of which 1 118 385 were returned 
to third countries. This means that 1 772 875 persons were not returned, out of which 600 
925 in 2015-2016 alone. It can be assumed that the majority of these persons remain in the 
territory  of  the  EU  Member  States.33  Irregular  migrants  staying  in  the  territory  of  the 
Member States and waiting for return to their home country cause high costs for Member 
States  in  terms  of  housing,  food,  medical  expenses  and  related  expenses,  as  well  as 
administrative  costs,  hampering  in  addition  fast  and  effective  procedures  for  legal 
migration  and  asylum  seekers.  The  failure  to  efficiently  return  migrants  to  their  home 
country is also an incentive for further irregular migration. The dangers along the road to 
Europe  are  often  disregarded  by  irregular  migrants  because  they  know  that  the  risk  of 
being returned once in Europe is relatively low. The proposal to amend the Visa Code has 
also pursued options on how to better link visa policy and return. 

Among  third  country  nationals  (TCN)  to  be  returned,  there  is  a  number  of  TCN  who 
overstayed  their  visa  and  became  subject  to  return  procedures.  The  total  number  of 

nationals  and  stateless  persons  (TCN)  to  supplement  and  support  the  European  Criminal  Records  Information 
System (ECRIS-TCN system) and amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011. 

32   Directive  2008/115/EC  of  the  Council  and  the  European  parliament  on  common  standards  and  procedures  in 

Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals.  

33   Eurostat:  Third-country  nationals  ordered  to  leave  –  annual  data  (rounded);  Third-country  nationals  returned 

following an order to leave – annual data (rounded). 

12 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
detected  overstayers  at  EU-level  is  estimated  at  around  294  000  cases  across  the  EU,  on 
average.34 

Visa overstayers who no longer possess a travel document 

Based on the data provided by the Member States, it is estimated that roughly 10 to 20% of 
all visa overstayer return cases involve TCN visa holders who no longer possess, or fail to 
produce their travel document on request. This amounts to an estimated 26 445  – 52 891 
cases of missing travel documents (as of December 2017).  

Stakeholder testimony35 further suggests that a significant number of return decisions are 
not  executed  due  the  authorities’  inability  to  obtain  satisfactory  evidence  proving  the 
nationality of the third country national in question. If it is estimated that between 60% to 
75%  of  such  return  cases  are  not  implemented  on  these  grounds.  This  amounts  to  an 
estimated 15 867 to 39 668 returns of visa overstayers that could not be executed, which 
represents a high administrative burden for Member States.36 

The 2016 VIS evaluation revealed that 8 out of 26 Member States had never even accessed 
the  VIS  for  the  purpose  of  identifying  TCN  for  return.  Furthermore,  3  out  of  the  19 
responding Member States declared that they communicated VIS data to non-EU countries 
or  international  organisations  for  the  purpose  of  return.  It  has  to  be  noted  that  non-EU 
countries usually do not accept information extracted from VIS as prima facie evidence of 
nationality for return purposes. Recent trends37 showed an increased use of the VIS as an 
instrument  which  provides  a  proof  of  identity  necessary  in  a  return  procedure.  However, 
there  is  currently  no  mechanism  in  place  to  mutually  inform  and  to  exchange  travel 
document  copies  of  TCN  between  Member  States,  when  needed  to  complete  a  return 
procedure  in  cases  where  the  Member  State  which  has  to  execute  the  return  is  different 
from  the  Member  State  which  issued  the  visa.  The  absence  of  such  a  mechanism  means 
that  Member  States  have  both  practical  and  legal  difficulties  when  exchanging  travel 
document copies to this end. 

34   Supporting  study  by  Ecorys:  Feasibility  and  implications  of  lowering  the  fingerprinting  age  for  children  and  on 
storing  a  scanned  copy  of  the  visa  applicants'  travel  document  in  VIS,  based  on  2014  –  2016  average  data.  It  is 
worth  noting  that  the  figure  is  in  line  with  the  figure  on  visa  overstayers  that  was  used  in  the  2016  Impact 
Assessment  report  on  the  introduction  of  an  Entry-Exit  System,  which  estimated  a  stable  annual  average  of 
approximately 250.000 visa overstayers EU-wide - SWD(2016) 115 final.  
35   Targeted stakeholder consultations conducted in the scope of the Ecorys study.  
36   Calculations within the Ecorys study estimate additional annual costs of EUR up to 33.3m. For more see Annex II 

to the study. 

37   COM(2016)  655  final,  “Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the 
implementation  of  Regulation  EC)  No  767/2008  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  establishing  the 
Visa  Information  System  (VIS),  the  use  of  fingerprints  at  external  borders  and  the  use  of  biometrics  in  the  visa 
application procedure/REFIT Evaluation,” Brussels: 14 October 2016. 

13 

 
 
                                                      
Figure 2: Problem tree: storing a copy of the travel document in the VIS 

Difficulties  faced  by  Member  States  to  acquire  a  copy  of  the  travel  document  from  the 
diplomatic/consular representations of the issuing countries places a high burden on them 
as  they  have  to  devote  considerable  time  and  resources  to  confirm  the  identity  and 
nationality  of  a  TCN.38  Not  having  a  copy  of  the  travel  document  means  that  it  is 
disproportionately  difficult  to  carry  out  the  return  of  TCNs  issued  return  decisions  in 
practice.  In  this  way,  lack  of  travel  document  copies  in  VIS  undermines  the  smooth 
functioning of the EU return policy and, due to its role to prevent and respond to the risk of 
irregular migration, indirectly also on the visa policy.  

2.1.2.  Lack of fingerprinting data allowing to identify minors 

Current  EU  legislation  on  the  visa  application  procedure  for  short-stay  visas  exempts 
children under the age of 12 from providing fingerprints. This was mainly due to technical 
limitations regarding fingerprinting children available at the time the provisions were set in 
law.39 However, the legislator requested the Commission in Article 57(4) of the Visa Code 
to address in the future the issue of sufficient reliability for identification and verification 
purposes  of  fingerprints  of  children  under  the  age  of  12.  Without  fingerprints  it  is  more 
difficult  to  unambiguously  verify  the  identity  of  a  child  holding  a  visa  at  the  border  or 
within the Schengen territory. This phenomenon is exponentially amplified by the fact that 
a Schengen visa can go up to 5 years validity, which means that a child who applied with 
12 years old can obtain a multiple entry visa with validity until the age of 17. On average, 
children under 12 make up 10 to 15 % of visa applicants40, meaning that between 1.4 and 

38   According to the stakeholders consulted in the scope of the Ecorys study, the return procedure may be delayed by 2 
days  during  low-seasons,  and  up  to  2  weeks  during  busier  periods  which  brings  additional  annual  costs  of  up  to 
EUR 12.7m. For detailed calculation see Annex II to the study. 

39   Taking into account technologies available at the time, 12 years old was considered to be a reasonable minimum 

age for automated fingerprint recognition. 

40   For more details on the estimate methodology see Ecorys study, Chapter 4.1.2., p.109. 

14 

 
 
 
                                                      
2.1 million new visas are granted to children under 12 each year. Out of this category, it is 
estimated that between 0.7 and 1.05 million are children younger than 6 years.  

On  the  other  hand,  based  on  available  data41,  it  is  estimated  that  on  a  yearly  basis  there 
could be between 1 500 and 2 000 TCN children <12 victim of trafficking in the Schengen 
area.  Although  there  is  no  precise  information  possible  on  how  many  of  these  child 
trafficking victims have travelled with a visa to the Schengen area or come from countries 
subject  to  the  visa  obligation  (but  have  tried  and  failed  to  obtain  such  a  visa), 
extrapolations  can  be  made  on  the  basis  of  information  available  regarding  the  main 
countries of origin42 of the trafficked children according  to  which it is likely that around 
25 %  of  them  went  through  the  visa  process  (375-500  children  on  a  yearly  basis43). 
Furthermore,  a  multiplying  factor  should  be  taken  into  account,  given  that  with  a  MEV 
valid for up to 5 years, the real scope of the problem is extended potentially to children up 
to 17 years old. For this age group figures on children victims of trafficking climb up to 
3200-425044  on  a  yearly  basis.  Taking  all  these  factors  into  considerations,  it  can  be 
estimated  that  between  820-1000  trafficked  children  arrive  with  a  visa  which  was  taken 
without fingerprints each year. 

The  Commission  Report  on  the  progress  made  in  the  fight  against  trafficking  in  human 
underlined that traffickers exploit loopholes in enforcement or control and that tools, such 
as  the  VIS  can  assist  in  identifying  victims  of  trafficking  in  human  beings  and  detecting 
traffickers.  “When  a  person  regularly  requests  a  new  visa  or  has  been  issued  with  a 
multiple-entry visa and is travelling repeatedly with different 'other' persons (for example 
other  children),  there  could  be  a  suspicion  of  trafficking.  The  biometric  data  in  the  VIS 
makes it furthermore impossible for multiple persons (looking alike) to travel on the same 
visa or passport.” 45 

A  typical  case  scenario  of  trafficking  would  entail  a  family  with  children  applying  for  a 
Schengen  visa.  A  photo  of  the  child  (which  does  not  have  to  be  taken  live)  must  be 
presented with the application. The child may or may not be present, although the family 
would  have  to  present  a  breeder  document46  (e.g.  birth  certificate)  proving  the  relation 
between the child and the adult applicant(s). If a visa is issued (which could be valid for up 
to 5 years), the family does not have to appear again in the consulate for the period during 
which the visa is valid, and multiple travels to the EU are possible. Verification  that  the 
children  travelling  with  the  family  are  the  rightful  holders  of  the  visas  are  done  at  the 
border only on the basis of visual inspection of the travel document, by checking that the 
child  in  front  of  the  border  guard  resembles  to  a  reasonable  degree  to  the  child  in  the 

Idem. 

41  
42   According to Commission's Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the progress made in the fight 
against trafficking in human beings, SWD(2016) 159 final Nigeria, China, Albania, Vietnam and Morocco are the 
top 5 source countries for trafficked TCN children. 

43   Source: Eurostat data on trafficked children.  
44   According to figures from Eurostat Report on Trafficking in Human Beings, 2% of victims of trafficking are under 
12, whereas 17% are in the 12-17 age range. Using the same extrapolation logic, the number of potential victims of 
trafficking is substantially higher if this age range is taken into consideration. 

45   Commission  Report  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the  progress  made  in  the  fight  against 

trafficking in human beings, SWD(2016) 159 final. 

46   Abundant evidence has been gathered by the Commission from Scheval Report and Local Schengen Cooperation 
Reports, in particular from sub-Saharan Africa, on false applications involving fraudulent breeder document and the 
low reliability of breeder documents issued in many third countries subject to visa obligation. 

15 

 
 
                                                      
passport in which the visa is affixed. Thus, while the travel document could be genuine and 
the  visa  genuinely  obtained,  a  trafficker  could  travel  multiple  times  bringing  different 
children to EU territory without being detected at borders. 

In  case  the  child  is  later  on  found  by  authorities  as  a  victim  of  trafficking,  it  would  be 
impossible  to  retrieve  the  information  regarding  the  true  identity,  country  of  origin  and 
real  family  of  the  child,  since  identifications  against  the  VIS  (or  other  systems)  are  not 
possible on the basis of facial image only, especially when the facial image initially stored 
in the system is based on a scanned photograph. 

As  regards  missing  children  (i.e.  in  case  of  a  genuine  family  arriving  as  bona  fide 
travellers but where the child, for various reasons, might go missing during the stay in the 
territory), the search, although legally possible through SIS alerts47 on missing persons, is 
not effective in practice because only alpha-numeric identity data could be included in the 
alert (name, surname, place and date of birth, nationality48), and which, depending also on 
the age and maturity of the child, would not be sufficient to allow identifying the child in 
case found by the authorities. 

Due  to  the  lack  of  fingerprints  for  TCN  children  under  12,  VIS  benefits  to  prevent  visa 
fraud and facilitate checks at external borders and within the territory of the Member States 
or asylum examination do not extend to all children. This is a loophole which can be used 
by fraudsters and traffickers and does not contribute to ensure the protection of TCN (<12 
years  of  age  at  the  time  of  applying  for  a  visa)  children  at  risk  of  abuse,  either  from 
trafficking  with  the  help  of  a  visa,  or  in  case  they  are  found  in  Schengen  territory  in  a 
situation  where  their  rights  may  be  or  have  been  violated  (through  trafficking,  missing 
children, unaccompanied minors applying for asylum). 

2.1.3.  Lack of sufficient information on long-stay visas and residence documents 

The  issuance  of  long  stay  visas  and  residence  documents  is  not  fully  harmonised  at  EU 
level, since only for certain categories of third-country nationals admission conditions and 
procedures are regulated under EU law.49 Such authorisations give the right to the holder to 
stay  and  move  freely  within  the  entire  Schengen  territory  for  90  days  in  any  180-day 
period50,  provided  they  fulfil  the  entry  conditions  set  out  in  the  Schengen  Border  Code. 
Residence  documents  include  residence  permits51  –  issued  to  third  country  nationals  for 
stays longer than 90 days in 180 days for reasons varying from study, research, work, to 
family  reunification  by  third  country  nationals,  and  residence  cards52  –  issued  to  third 
country  nationals  who  are  family  members  of  mobile  EU  citizens  (i.e.  those  who  have 
exercised the right to free movement). 

47   By  April  2018,  nearly  70,000  missing  children  were  reported  in  the  SIS  (although  it  is  impossible  to  know  the 

nationality, whether EU or TCN). 

48   Pursuant to Article 20(3) of Regulation (EU) No 515/2014. 
49   This is the case in respect of rules on family reunification, long term residence, for the admission of seasonal and 
highly skilled workers, Intra-Corporate Transferees, students, researchers and trainees with university degrees. For 
more information, see the dedicated site.  

50   Article 21 Schengen Convention provides the mutual recognition of these documents as documents allowing free 
movement within the Schengen area for 90 days in any 180 days (i.e. similar to a Schengen short-stay visa). 
51   As defined under Article 2(16) of Regulation 399/2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of 

52  

persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Issued under Article 21 TFEU, concerning the freedom of movement of EU citizens. Mobile citizens are those EU 
citizens who are residing in another EU member state than their own. 

16 

 
 
                                                      
Currently, only TCN who applied for short-stay visas are in the VIS, as it is a centralised 
mechanism at EU level containing short-stay visa applications and visas issued. Long-stay 
visas, residence permits are residence cards are not contained in any EU system.  

The  lack  of  a  centralised  mechanism  at  EU  level  enabling  Member  States  to  exchange 
information  on  these  documents  and  their  applicants  or  holders  result  in  a  two-fold 
problem:  

1.  authorities at borders others than of the Member State who issued a document have 
difficulties to effectively and efficiently verify the authenticity of these documents 
in  connection  with  their  rightful  owner,  or  to  fully  ascertain  the  identity  of  the 
person holding them. Identity and document fraud are the major risks in this respect 
(as elaborated further down). 

2.  Member States do not have access to nor can exchange, in an effective and efficient 
manner, information  enabling  them to  properly check whether the person is  not  a 
threat to the security of the Member States before or when the person reaches the 
external border (see further below).  

Figure 3: Information gap on a category of third-country nationals 

From a border-control point of view and for checks carried out within the territory of 
the Member States, it is crucial to be able to ascertain the authenticity and validity of the 
documents  and  the  legitimate  relation  with  the  holder.  Currently,  this  is  done,  for  the 
documents provided with security features, by verifying these elements. Of the three types 
of  documents  (long-stay  visas,  residence  permits,  residence  cards),  only  some  residence 
permits  and  residence  cards  issued  in  a  residence  permit  format  have  a  chip53,  which 
allows  electronic  verification  and  the  possibility  to  verify  the  bearer  identity54.  Frontex 
observes  that  both  the  quantity  and  quality  of  fraudulent  residence  documents  (2546 

53   The check that the residence permit belongs to the bearer is done by reading the facial image from the chip of the 
document and comparing it with the one of the bearer. In case of failure or doubt, the stored fingerprints can be 
accessed.  However,  the  information  on  the  chip  needs  to  be  checked  on  its  authenticity  which  can  be  done  by 
exchanging cryptographic certificates between Member States. 

54   However,  to  achieve  a  high  level  of  security  of  checks,  MS  would  need  to  systematically  exchange  the  Country 
Verifying Certificate Authorities (CVCA), which currently is only partially done. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
showing that Member States use the fingerprints stored in the residence permits issued by another Member State to 
carry out identity verification at borders.  

17 

EESETIASEurodacSISVISTCN who reside in the EU, coming for a long stayor who often cross the external borders Visa-required TCNs coming for short staysAsylum seekers and some categories of irregular migrantsTCNs’ entries and exits in and out of Schengen, coming for short staysVisa-exempt TCNs coming for short staysFuture systems?Current systemsLaw enforcement and border controls 
 
                                                      
detections  in  2017  on  both  permits  and  cards)  circulating  in  the  EU  have  increased  in 
recent years. 

Moreover,  an  unsuccessful  document  authentication  procedure  based  exclusively  on 
verifying  the  security  features  of  the  document  does  not  automatically  establish  a  fraud 
case, and because it implies further second line checks, does not help to carry out a smooth 
and fast border check procedure. 

In addition, while many residence permits and long-stay visas formats are harmonised, and 
for the residence cards measures to harmonise and secure them are under way55, this is not 
yet the case for all these documents. Thus, the visual inspection of the document’s security 
features is made  difficult by the different formats and  – for some documents  – the rarity 
with which they appear at certain border-crossing points, in addition to the heterogeneous 
use of security features. 

The  border  guards  have  different  tools  to  gather  information  to  assess  the  validity  of 
a document,  some  automated  (SIS  and  SLTD  for  lost,  stolen,  misappropriated  and 
invalidated documents), others to be used at second-line border checks (like the FADO56 
for  images  of  authentic  and  forged  documents).  However,  the  information  provided  by 
these systems is very limited and the objective of border checks cannot be achieved on this 
basis  in  an  efficient  and  effective  manner.  The  SIS  (which  is  the  only  EU  centralised 
databased used at borders) does not provide information on previous fraud attempt(s) by an 
applicant  and  cannot  provide  information  on  documents  that  have  not  been  reported  as 
stolen or lost, it does it include information on withdrawn documents, nor any information 
on long stay visas.  

In  case  of  a  doubt  concerning  the  document  or  its  holder,  border  guards  have  to  rely  on 
bilateral  contacts  with  the  issuing  Member  States,  via  communication  channels  like 
SIRENE57, the Police and Customs Cooperation Centres National Contact Centre (NCC), 
phone, emails or fax58, which is limited by inherent constraints like language barriers and 
waiting  times  for  the  traveller,59  who  sometimes  runs  the  risk  of  being  wrongly  denied 
entry or passage.  

Moreover,  the  issuance  of  a  residence  document  constitutes  the  enactment  of  a  right 
established under legal migration or freedom of movement legislation to enter and stay on 
the territory of the Member States. The document is thus also a material proof that the right 
exists, but it is not to be confused with the right A person may lose the document or the 
document may expire (as it is the case with the validity of a residence card), but this is not 
equivalent  to  the  holder  losing  the  right  enacted  by  that  document.  However,  in  case  of 

55   The European Commission 2018 Work Programme includes the legislative initiative to harmonise and secure the 
residence documents. The idea of such harmonisation is considered both in the contracted study and in this report 
as covered by option (3.2) “Further harmonise and secure long-stay visas and residence documents”. COM(2018) 
212 final, 17 April 2018. 

56   The  FADO  is  a  public  register  of  images  of  typical  authentic  or forged  travel  and  identity  documents  as  well  as 

information on security and forgery techniques that Member States can check online.  

57   Which is limited to providing supplementary information in case of a SIS alert. 
58  

In  the  questionnaire  of  the  2017  Feasibility  Study  to  include  in  a  repository  documents  for  Long-Stay  visas, 
Residence and Local Border Traffic Permits  - Phase1: Analysis of Options, 2017, Member States explained that 
these procedures are used after an examination of the security features of the document at second-line border check. 
59   For  illustration  purposes,  an  example  from  the  public  consultation  can  be  given  where  a  TCN  described  the 
embarrassing experience of how their residence document was called into question by suspicious border guards on 
the count of never having encountered such document before. 

18 

 
 
                                                      
expiry, loss or theft, the person cannot prove its right to enter, stay or move freely within 
the territory of the Member States, and currently existing systems to be checked at borders 
and within the territory cannot provide evidence to support the person ascertain its rights in 
such cases.  

 Ultimately, this situation leads to inefficient border-crossing procedures, which are not 
in  the  spirit  of  freedom  of  movement  of  bona  fide  TCN  who  have  a  right  to  enter  and 
reside  in  the  territory  of  a Member  State  (Article  21  of  TFEU  and  Directive  2004/38). 
Consulted  Member  States60  complained  about  these  procedures  as  being  time-consuming 
and  inefficient.  For  the  large  majority  (80%)  the  lack  of  shared  information  on  these 
documents was a hurdle to their day-to day activities and as such creates administrative 
burden.  

The  absolute  majority  of  respondents  to  the  open  public  consultation  also  perceive  the 
identified  information  gap as leading to  problems in  the management of external borders 
and  irregular  migration  within  the  EU61.  The  lack  of  centralised  storage  of  data  on  these 
documents renders them more likely to be tampered with, thus more susceptible to being 
misused.  In  order  to  be  able  to  assess  whether  the  person  could  pose  a  threat  to  the 
security of the Member States or whether he or she could be an identity fraudster, it is 
important to have access to relevant information on the previous applications made by that 
person and which were rejected by other Member States on grounds of national security or 
because of established fraudulent claims (of identity or documents). When a TCN applies 
for a short stay visa, a full picture of the history of movements, enabling to assess security 
and migration risks, including fraud, is possible by connecting information from either VIS 
or (in the future) ETIAS with EES, ETIAS, Eurodac and VIS. However, there is no similar 
possibility  if  the  same  TCN  applies  for  a  long  stay  document,  as  this  information  is  not 
connected  with  any  central  system.  Information  is  not  flowing  either  from  the  short  stay 
history  of  a  person  into  a  long  stay  assessment,  nor  vice  versa.  Apart  from  checking 
national systems, the only EU-level exchange of information migration authorities have at 
their disposal is the SIS for alerts on entry bans. There is no tool to share information on 
applications and reasons for refusal for long stay applicants, which might lead to identity 
fraud  or  security  risks.  This  also  affects  negatively  the  efficiency  of  checks  against  the 
integrated IT systems for borders, i.e. checks against the border and security systems using 
interoperability is not possible if the information on the document is not present in at least 
one of these systems.  

Criminals  are  taking  advantage  of  this  loophole  in  the  information  exchange  between 
Member  States.  Consultations  with  Europol  and  national  law  enforcement  authorities 
revealed that due to the lack of information sharing between Member States on long stay 
documents, combined with the lack of checks between the various centralised systems, the 
exact  size  of  the  security  risk  posed  by  TCN  holders  of  long  stay  visas  or  residence 
documents  is  difficult  to  measure.  However,  individual  national  authorities  provided 

60   Member  States  were  consulted  as  part  of  the  supporting  study  carried  out  by  PwC,  see  the  Executive  Summary, 

Annex 9. 

61   Open public consultation on sharing information at EU level on long-stay visas and residence document feedback 

(see Annex 2). 

19 

 
 
                                                      
information62 on cases involving serious criminality by TCN going through various legal 
migration/asylum/residence statuses in the territories of Member States, which indicate that 
the phenomenon is real and raises serious concerns63. 

Stakeholder testimony: 

In  one  such  case64  a  TCN  applied  for  asylum  in  Austria.  His  claim  was  rejected  and  he 
received an entry ban (recorded in the SIS) after several convictions for drug dealing and 
serious property crimes in Austria and other Member States. His biometrics and DNA were 
recorded by the Austrian police on that occasion. Three years later a DNA hit against his 
data was obtained in a rape case and a European Arrest Warrant, registered in the SIS, 
was issued on his name. 

The  same  TCN,  under  a  different  identity,  applied  for  and  successfully  obtained  a 
Schengen  visa from  another Member State, with the help  of which he travelled regularly 
from  Nigeria  to  the  EU  territory.  Since  SIS,  VIS  and  Eurodac  are  not  currently 
interoperable and checks are not systematically launched to the other IT systems when a 
visa application is lodged, the identity fraud could not be detected and the visa was issued, 
although an arrest warrant was present in the SIS.  

Later  on  the  TCN  married  an  Austrian  national  and  obtained  a  residence  permit  on  the 
basis  of  his  status  as  family  member  of  an  EU  national.  The  residence  document  was 
issued without problems as there are no compulsory checks against EU databases as part 
of the issuance procedure for these documents. 

The TCN was finally apprehended by the Austrian police when he was reported by his wife 
for  aggravated  domestic  violence.  Based  on  fingerprints  taken  at  that  time  and  checked 
against the Austrian police files, the link with the previous entry ban and arrest warrant 
issued years before could finally be established.  

In  addition  to  the  two  main  problems  identified  above,  this  information  gap65  and  the 
persisting fraud problem that comes with it can create spill over effects in the form of blind 
spots  in  the  border-management  security  framework,  thus  ultimately  creating  increased 
risks  for  internal  security  and  irregular  migration.  According  to  Frontex’s  2017  Annual 
Risk Analysis66, smugglers frequently provide migrants with fraudulent travel and identity 
documents.  Fraud  is  used  by  organised  crime  as  a  means  for  a  series  of  related  serious 

62   See Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation. 
63   See  also  the  phenomenon  of  marriages  of  convenience.  Available  statistics  support  the  fact  that  marriages  of 
convenience do occur, but it is not yet possible to fully quantify this across all (Member) States and certainly not in 
a comparable manner. In 2010, the EU-27 total of permits issued for family reasons was 747 785, some 510 305 (or 
68.2%  of  the  total)  of  which  were  issued  to  a third-country  national  joining  with  a  third-country  national.  With 
regard to the identified cases of marriages of convenience, and noting that in many cases no distinction between 
those  occurring between  third-country  nationals  and  those  occurring  between a third-country  and  an  EU  national 
was possible, residence permits refused or revoked by a (Member) State ranged, in 2011, from 5 up to 990, and in 
2010 again from 5 up to 1 360. In terms of marriages of convenience detected in other ways by a (Member) State, 
this varied, in 2011, from 5 to 130 and, in 2010, from again 5 up to 425. Suspected marriages of convenience in a 
(Member)  State ranged in  2011 from  1  740  down  to  35  (Misuse  of  the Right  to Family  Reunification,  European 
Migration Network,2012). 

64   Source: Ministry of Interior – Criminal Intelligence Service, Austria. 
65   Currently, Member States can use alerts stored in the Schengen Information System (SIS) to inform other Member 
States  of  lost,  stolen,  misappropriated  or  invalidated  residence  documents  and  the  European  Image  Archiving 
System (FADO) to detect counterfeit documents at the borders. However, these systems do not constitute a positive 
list of issued documents. 

66   Risk Analysis for 2017, Frontex, page 22.  

20 

 
 
                                                      
offences, notably for terrorism, trafficking in human beings, migrant smuggling or drug67 
and  firearm  trafficking68.  Smugglers  are  supported  by  criminal  networks  with  access  to 
expert counterfeiters who, financed by the strong demand, have set up print shops. 

Figure 4: Problem tree – long stay documents  

Finally,  this  gap  also  entails  costs  for  the  society  as  people  obtaining  residency  through 
fraudulent means make wrongful use of social security benefits or gain unjustified access 
to the labour market. 

2.1.4.  Lack of sufficient checks on migration and security risks when processing visa 

applications 

Currently the visa procedure is not taking into account the possibilities offered by available 
large-scale IT systems nor  interoperability between  them.  For instance, when assessing a 
visa  application,  SIS  is  checked  as  part  of  the  risk  assessment  for  irregular  migration 
pursuant  to  the  Visa  Code.  However,  only  the  checks  against  alerts  for  the  purpose  of 
refusing entry are currently done because this is an automatic ground for refusal under the 
Visa Code. In practice, Member States' implementation of SIS and other national databases 
checks depend on the technical availability and national arrangements in any case, varying 
from direct access to SIS in consulates to consultations of national police authorities, who 
themselves carry out a number of checks for migration or security risks purposes, including 
larger checks against SIS categories, as well as SLTD, TDAWN, as well as a number of 
national migration and security databases. However this remains in all cases a manual non-
automated operation. 

This leads to different checks carried out by each Member State, which creates an uneven 
playing  field  for  visa  applicants  who  are  subject  to  more  or  less  stringent  checks, 
depending on each Member State and consequently could lead to undetected security risks 
and  granting  a  right  to  enter  the  territory  to  (see  case  on  page  21  also  relevant  for  this 
problem).  

This  problem  is  worsened  by  the  fact  that  in  some  third  countries  e.g.  West  Balkan, 
Caucasus countries but also in some EU countries the legal change of personal data, either 
family  or  first  names,  is  rather  easy  and  cheap  administrative  procedure.  International 
criminals  convicted  or  wanted  for  arrest  in  EU  can  change  their  names  and  get  new 
identities.  It  is  therefore  cheaper  for  them  to  legally  change  identity  than  to  use  alias 
identities  and  forged  documents.  They  can  obtain  genuine  biometric  travel  documents, 

67   See Eures-Crim projet (for instance a drug criminal network of TCN with Spanish residence permits operating in 

Belgium). 

68   Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  an  “Action  Plan  To 

Strengthen The European Response To Travel Document Fraud” of December 2016. 

21 

Fragmentation of the information Operational difficulties at the borders Difficulties in gathering information to perform an assessment of the TCN’ situation1.Fraud 2.Security and migration risks3.Administrative burden 4.Lengthy border-crossing procedures 5.Lack of statisticsProblem DriverProblemsConsequences 
 
 
                                                      
which  do  not  yield  any  hit  against  previously  known  identities  for  irregular  migration  or 
criminal acts carried out with alpha-numeric data only. 

Furthermore,  this  situation  does  not  ensure  the  same  minimum  level  of  checks  against 
large-scale databases in the field of border and security to which visa free TCNs – who in 
principle  pose  lower  risks  in  terms  of  security or  irregular  migration  – will  be  submitted 
through ETIAS69, nor those to which EU nationals are currently subject when crossing an 
external border70, both at entry and exit.  

Moreover, the current system of checks during the visa examination is no longer adequate 
for  the  new  layered  border  management  strategy  comprising  a  number  of  large-scale  IT 
systems, as illustrated in Figure 5, which depicts the role that different IT systems currently 
have for visa-required (VIS) and visa-exempt travellers (ETIAS), in combination with the 
upcoming EES, as part of EU integrated border management. 

Not having the possibility of direct, seamless and efficient checks of other databases adds 
to the burden of visa application processing, making it more cumbersome. In this way it is 
hampering the functioning of the common visa policy. 

Figure 5: Place of VIS in the EU layered border management strategy  

69   Article  18  of  the  proposal  for  ETIAS  Regulation  (see  footnote  7)  provides  for  the  automated  processing  of  all 
applications  for  an  ETIAS  authorisation  against  all  centralised  databases  mentioned  under  the  current  measure. 
Article 28 of the same proposal provides for screening rules along similar conditions as those provided under the 
current measure, although tailored for the particular situation of visa free TCN. 

70   As of 7 April 2017 systematic checks against relevant databases are carried out on all EU citizens who are crossing 
the EU's external borders (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/07/regulation-reinforce-
checks-external-borders/)   

22 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
2.2.  What are the problem drivers? 

2.2.1.  Lack of travel document as evidence in return proceedings 

Two main drivers were identified in the course of the study.  

  Driver  1:  The  absence  of  a  legal  framework  allowing  Member  States  to 
exchange/transfer information on travel documents of TCN subject to return. 

Currently, EU legislation – including in the areas of visa policy and migration – does not 
provide for the storage of digital copies (i.e. scanned pages) of the visa applicants’ travel 
document  in  a  centralised  European  system,  nor  for  making  them  available  to  other 
Member  States.  Member  States  may,  however,  establish  such  an  obligation  in  their 
national legislation.71 In practice, many Member States systematically require applicants to 
submit  such  copies  of  the  bio  data  page  (as  a minimum),  which  are  stored  in  paper  or 
digital  format  by  the  individual  Member  States  (i.e.  there  is  no  central  storage  of  travel 
documents associated to the visa). 

  Driver 2: Insufficient (or non-existent) and/or slow cooperation of third countries 
in return procedures in the absence of a (copy of) the travel document. 

The  consensus  view  among  consulted  stakeholders  is  that  the  degree  to  which  third 
countries cooperate in this field is critically dependent on the quality of relations between 
the third country and the returning Member State, or the EU more broadly. Bilateral return 
agreements  between  Member  States  and  countries  of  origin  and  EU  readmission 
agreements  (EURAs)  are  one  of  the  tools  that  can  be  used  to  ensure  cooperation  with 
countries  of  origin  for  the  effective  and  smooth  implementation  of  return  decisions. 
However,  even  in  the  context  of  EURAs  and  bilateral  readmission  agreements,  Member 
States  face  practical  challenges  to  their  implementation  in  the  absence  of  valid  travel 
documents  which  can  prove  the  nationality  of  the  person  to  be  returned.72  In  particular, 
Member  States  have  reported  that  third  countries  often  do  not  issue  travel  documents  to 
enable  the  readmission  /  return,  do  not  reply  within  deadlines  or  they  require  different 
levels of evidence to confirm a person without travel documents as their national.73 

2.2.2.  Lack of fingerprinting data allowing to identify minors  

The lack of a legal basis allowing to collect fingerprints from children under 12 and check 
with  these  data  was  identified  as  the  main  driver  behind  this  problem.  Competent 
authorities  are  having  difficulty  to  identify  or  verify  the  identity  of  some  of  the  third 
country nationals below 17 who enter or try to enter the EU territory using a short stay visa 
because  the  EU  legal  framework  does  not  allow  for  collecting  fingerprints  for  TCN  visa 
applicants under 12.  

71   Only  three  Member  States  were  identified  as  not  having  formulated  the  obligation  (within  the  Ecorys  study 

stakeholders consultation). 

72   European Migration Network, Synthesis Report for the EMN Focussed Study 2014 – Good practices in the return 
and  reintegration  of  irregular  migrants:  Member  States’  entry  bans  policy  and  use  of  readmission  agreements 
between Member States and third countries, 2014.  
Ibid.  See  also  the  national  reports  of  Austria  and  Greece  in  support  of  the  EMN  2014  study:  “Austria’s  return 
policy:  application  of  entry  bans  policy  and  use  of  readmission  agreements,”  p.  52;  “EMN  Readmission  Report 
Greece,” p.21, amongst others.  

73  

23 

 
 
                                                      
The inclusion of biometric identifiers, comprising the facial image and ten fingerprints in 
the VIS is provided for in Article 13(2) of the Visa Code. However, children under 12 are 
exempt  from  this  obligation  to  have  their  fingerprints  taken.  Therefore,  competent 
authorities have difficulties to identify and/or verify the identity of third country nationals 
under the age of 17 (taking into account the possible 5-year validity of the visa) who enter 
or  have  tried  to  enter  the  EU  using  a  visa.  Current  legislative  framework  does  not 
correspond to the technological progress either  – taking fingerprints of children under 12 
was not technically feasible at the time of the adoption of the original VIS legal act, as will 
be demonstrated later when presenting the rationale for policy options. 

2.2.3.  Lack of sufficient information on long-stay visas and residence documents 

The  identified  problem  driver  has  to  do  with  the  lack  of  and  fragmentation  of  the 
information on long-stay and residence documents. 

Data  on  long-stay  visas  and  residence  documents  are  kept  at  national  level.  They  allow 
border guards to check the information on a document presented against these systems and 
a  match  occurs  when  the  document  is  valid  and  issued  by  the  same  Member  State. 
However,  border  guards  and  migration  authorities  have  no  fast  and  systematic  access  to 
information  on  documents  issued  by  another  Member  State.  The  available  data  is  partial 
and scattered in different systems and tools (SIS, SLTD, FADO, bilateral contacts between 
Member States etc.) which leads to lengthy procedures to collect all the necessary data for 
the day-to-day activities of national authorities. Member States and the respondents to the 
public consultation74 confirmed this: 86% agreed with the identified information gap that 
leads  to  problems  in  management  of  external  borders  and  irregular  migration  within  the 
EU. 

2.2.4.  Lack of sufficient checks on migration and security risks when processing visa 

applications 

The  problem  stems  from  the  changed  security  and  migratory  context,  legislative 
developments,  such  as  ETIAS  and  new 
from 
interoperability. Furthermore, the outcome of the Schengen evaluation shows that Member 
States  would  welcome  the  security  cross-check  against  other  applications  as  a  way  of 
enhancing  security. This also  leads to  difficulties when assessing  irregular  migration and 
security risk in the process of issuing short-term visas. It also leads to less stringent, less 
harmonised and less evidence-based assessment of these risks because of the impossibility 
to use automated database-searching.  

feasibility  stemming 

technical 

2.3.  How will the problem evolve? 

2.3.1.  Lack of travel document as evidence in return proceedings 

Return  of  a  TCN  to  the  country  of  origin  or  to  another  country  of  transit  requires  an 
individual  assessment  of  the  person's  situation  and  in  particular  an  unequivocal 
establishment of his nationality. In the absence of solid proof such as a travel document, 
third  country  authorities  are  usually  unwilling  to  confirm  that  a  TCN  subject  to  return  is 
their  national,  which  further  hampers  cooperation  in  return  procedures.  As  regards  TCN 

74   Open public consultation on sharing information at EU level on long-stay visas and residence documents feedback 

(see Annex 2). 

24 

 
 
                                                      
subject to a visa, their identity and nationality could currently be established on the basis of 
a biometric match against the VIS, which is however not an acceptable evidence for third 
countries. These two factors: no systematic obligation for storage and the unwillingness of 
third countries to accept VIS data instead of copy of travel document lead to the problem 
of  difficult  returns  and  accrued  additional  costs.  This,  in  turn,  leads  to  hampering  of  the 
return and indirectly of the common visa policy. 

Based  on  forecast  data  on  future  trends  in  visa  applications,  it  is  estimated  that,  in  the 
absence  of  further  action  at  EU  level,  the  proportion  of  visa  overstayers  in  2019  will 
increase to more than 350 000, between 30 000 to 60 000 of which will find themselves in 
return  proceedings  without  valid  travel  documents.75  It  can  be  assumed  that  the  political 
pressure to enforce return decisions will grow accordingly.  

2.3.2.  Lack of fingerprinting data allowing to identify minors  

In  the  continuous  absence  of  fingerprinting  from  the  visa  application  procedure  and 
consequently of the means to verify the identity of a TCN child going up to the age of 17 
years, the identified problems will continue and might even grow, as networks of irregular 
migration and trafficking could become increasingly aware of the existing gap and would 
try to exploit it. 

As  organised  criminal  networks  are  increasingly  professionalising  and  modernising  their 
modus operandi and there are no indications of a reversal in migration trends76, the number 
of children that are at risk of being trafficked will probably remain high or even increase. 
Under  the  assumption  of  the  continuation  of  the  current  scenario,  it  is  expected  that  the 
trafficking  of  TCN  children  (<17  and  who  therefore  potentially  entered  with  a  visa 
obtained  without  fingerprints,  thus  making  their  subsequent  identification  nearly 
impossible)  into the EU using genuine visas  will  remain high  –  or  may  even  rise  further 
due  to  the  increasing  number  of  applications  and  the  involvement  of  organised  criminal 
networks, which are becoming more professional.77  

2.3.3.  Lack of sufficient information on long-stay visas and residence documents 

The  risks  for  internal  security  and  irregular  migration  created  by  the  information  gap 
regarding  long  stay  visas  and  residence  documents  may  increase  with  the  existing  and 
ongoing strengthening of border checks for other categories of travellers (e.g. ETIAS for 
short-stay  visa-exempt  travellers  and  EES  for  all  short  stay  visitors,  combined  with  the 
existing VIS for short-stay visa holders). This has an impact on overall security and safety 
of  the  Schengen  Area,  as  well  as  the  freedom  of  movement.  These  developments  could 
motivate  irregular  travellers  to  look  for  other,  less  secure types  of  documents  that would 
still  allow  them  to  enter  the  Schengen  area  and  move  across  Member  States.  This 
phenomenon  has  already  been  observed  with  ID  cards,  whereby  fraudsters  target  less 
secure  EU  ID  cards  for  intra-Schengen  movements78  (fraud  based  on  the  ‘weakest  link’ 
approach). 

75   For more information see Chapter 3.1 of Ecorys study. 
76   Eurostat  reported  that  4,7  million  immigrants  immigrated  to  one  of  the  EU-28  Member  States  in  2015.  An 

estimated 2.4 million citizens came from non-member countries, around 19.000 were labelled stateless. 

77   Europol (2016). Situation Report Trafficking in human beings in the EU. 
78   Risk Analysis for 2017, Frontex, page 23.  

25 

 
 
                                                      
2.3.4.  Lack of sufficient checks on migration and security risks when processing visa 

applications 

If  all  the  envisaged  proposals  are  finally  adopted  and  subsequently  implemented  (EES, 
ETIAS,  interoperability  proposal),  it  would  lead  to  an  asymmetric  situation  where 
automated  checks  would  be  mandatory  for  visa-free  TCN  in  ETIAS  against  all  EU 
information  systems79  and  other  databases80,  whereas  for  visa  required  TCN  –  who  are 
considered, in general, to pose a higher irregular migration or security risk, which is why 
they need a visa to enter the EU, there is no possibility of automated checks. This would 
have an impact on a better assessment of migration and security risks when deciding on an 
application, and would create a less favourable treatment for visa-free TCN in comparison 
with  TCN  under  visa  obligation,  as  well  as  lead  to  additional  administrative  burden  for 
Member  States  when  trying  to  overcome  the  lack  of  direct  means  to  properly  assess 
migration and security risks. 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? 

3.1.  Legal basis 

The current legal basis of the VIS is provided in Article 77 (2) (a) and (b), Article 87(2)(a) 
and Article 88(2)(a). Similar to other recent proposals in the area of IT systems for security 
and  borders,  Article  16(2)  could  be added  in  the  revised  VIS  Regulation,  as  a  horizontal 
principle. Article 74, and Article 77(2)(c) and (d) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union can be added to the legal basis for amending the VIS Regulation. Article 
78(2),  and  Article  79(2)  (c),  and  (d)  correspond  to  ancillary  objectives  of  the  VIS  and 
could also be added. 

3.2.  Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action81 

The  objectives  of  the  revised  VIS  Regulation,  to  set  up  a  common  system  and  common 
procedures  for  the  exchange  of  visa  data  between  Member  States,  cannot  be  sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale and impact of the 
action,  be  better  achieved  at  EU  level.  The  further  improvement  of  these  common 
procedures and rules on the exchange of data consequently requires EU action. 

The  problems  elaborated  in  the  previous  sections  are  unlikely  to  disappear  in  the  near 
future and they are directly related to the current provisions of the VIS. Amendments of the 
VIS legal framework and related legislation are only possible at EU level. By reason of the 
scale, effects and impact of the envisaged actions, the fundamental objectives can only be 
achieved efficiently and systematically at EU level. As regards in particular the copy of the 
travel  document  and  fingerprinting  of  minors,  the  subsequent  analysis  of  the  option  will 
further  demonstrate  how  non-EU  action  cannot  sufficiently  address  the  problem,  as  they 
require  a  solution  through  a  centralised  storage  and  access  to  data  that  none  of  the  MS 
taken individually can achieve. As regards in particular the problem of long-stay visas and 

79   ETIAS  Central  System,  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS),  Visa  Information  System  (VIS),  Entry/Exit  System 
(EES).  Interoperability  with  Eurodac  for  the  purpose  of  the  automated  processing  of  ETIAS  applications  against 
Eurodac is pending adoption of the recast Eurodac proposal.  

80   Europol data, Interpol databases (SLTD, TDAWN). 
81   For  more  information  on  this  please  see  relevant  section  in  the  executive  summaries  of  supporting  studies  in 

Annexes 7, 8 and 9. 

26 

 
 
                                                      
residence documents, more than 90% of the Member States consulted considered necessary 
an  EU  legislative  response  to  address  the  information  gap.  As  regards  migration  and 
security checks, it relies by its nature on an immediate access to all other MS information, 
which can only be achieved through EU action. 

The  initiative  will  further  develop  and  improve  the  rules  in  the  VIS,  which  implies  the 
highest degree of harmonised rules that cannot be solved by Member States acting alone 
and can only be addressed at EU level. 

3.3.  Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action82 

As  described  in  the  baseline  scenario(s)  below,  the  continued  application  of  the  current 
legal framework is not going to lead to resolving these problems. 

Regarding  taking  fingerprints  for  visa  applicants  under  12,  the  Member  States  cannot 
unilaterally  decide  on  changing  the  system  because  the  VIS  Regulation  is  already 
stipulating a number of rules.  

National  action  is  possible,  and  desirable,  to  try  to  obtain  better  cooperation  of  third 
countries  on  matters  of  return  of  irregular  migrants.  Nevertheless,  it  is  unlikely  that  any 
such activities will achieve the same effect as making the travel document available in VIS 
for duly justified purposes. 

Regarding  long-stay  visas  and  residence  documents,  it  is  unlikely  that  national  action 
would  address  the  problem;  Member  States  could  act  on  an  individual  basis,  by 
strengthening their documents, their issuance process, document checks at border-crossing 
points or by reinforcing or systematising bilateral cooperation. However, this approach has 
inherent limitations, as will be explained further below. 

Regarding  automated  checks  of  other  databases,  Member  States  are  free  to  develop 
solutions  to  consult  both  their  national,  as  well  as  EU  and  international  databases. 
However, harmonising those rules at EU level seems preferable in order to enable Member 
States to apply the common Schengen rules in a coordinated way. 

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? 

This section lists the general and specific objectives any initiative should have to address 
the above-mentioned problems faced by Member States and visa applicants.  

4.1.  General objectives of the revised VIS proposal 

  Contribute to the implementation of the common visa policy; 

  Facilitate  the  checks  at  EU  external  borders  and  the  subsequent  movement  within  the 

area without internal borders; 

  Improve security within the EU and at its borders;  

  Improve the management of the Schengen external border. 

82   For  more  information  on  this  please  see  relevant  section  in  the  executive  summaries  of  supporting  studies  in 

Annexes 7, 8 and 9. 

27 

 
 
                                                      
4.2.  Specific objectives 

The specific objectives are defined for each area for which problems and problem drivers 
were described. 

4.2.1.  For copy of the travel document  

  Contribute to improving the identification and return of third country nationals that do 
not, or no longer fulfil the conditions for entry to, or stay on the territory of the Member 
States in accordance with the Return Directive.  

  Improve the efficiency of the VIS for the purposes of facilitating return procedures.  

Achieving  these  objectives  would  lead  to  lowering  administrative  burden  for  Member 
States – with positive impacts in terms of cost savings for Member States public authorities 
(in terms of housing, food, administration and  related expenses), better acceptance of the 
EU  migration  policy  by  the  European  public  and  a  deterrent  effect  on  potential  future 
irregular migrants, thus reinforcing EU common visa policy. 

4.2.2.  For fingerprinting of minors  

Two specific objectives are defined: 

  Better  achieving  the  VIS  objectives  in  relation  to  the  facilitation  of  the  fight  against 
fraud,  facilitation  of  checks  at  external  border  crossing  points  and  facilitation  of  the 
application of the Dublin II Regulation. 

  Strengthen the prevention and fight against children's rights abuses, such as trafficking, 
in particular the identification/verification of identity of TCN children who are found in 
Schengen  territory  in  a  situation  where  their  rights  may  be  or  have  been  violated 
(through trafficking). 

4.2.3.  For long-stay visas and residence documents 

Figure 6: Schematic representation of the specific objectives 

4.2.4.  For migration and security checks 

Making full use of interoperability, granting fast, seamless and systematic access to other 
IT systems in the area of migration, border management and security would contribute to 
lowering the burden for Member States and contributing to the objective of a more secure 
common visa policy  by facilitating  and improving the assessment of the risk of irregular 

28 

 
 
 
migration  and  security  in  the  visa  procedure  (while  following  the  rules  stipulated  by  the 
Visa Code). 

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? 

5.1.  What is the baseline from which options are assessed? 

General considerations concerning data protection aspects  

Data protection is closely linked to respect for private and family life protected by Article 
7  of  the  Charter.  This  is  reflected  by  Article  1(2)  of  the  General  Data  Protection 
Regulation83,  which  indicates  that  the  EU  protects  fundamental  rights  and  freedoms  of 
natural persons and in particular their right to the protection of personal data. It has also to 
be noted that the Court of Justice of the EU84 has stated that the right to the protection of 
personal data is not an absolute right, but must be considered in relation to its function in 
society85. 

The  GDPR,  and,  where  relevant,  Directive  (EU)  2016/68054  apply  to  the  processing  of 
personal data carried out for the purpose of processing the visa application by the Member 
States and by the EU institutions, bodies and agencies involved, respectively. 

According to the Commission Communication of July 2010 on information management in 
the area of freedom, security and justice, data protection rules should be embedded in any 
new instruments relying on the use of information technology. This implies the inclusion 
of  appropriate  provisions  limiting  data  processing  to  what  is  necessary  for  the  specific 
purpose  of  that  instrument  and  granting  data  access  only  to  those  entities  that  ‘need  to 
know’.  It  also  implies  the  choice  of  appropriate  and  limited  data  retention  periods 
depending  solely  on  the  objectives  of  the  instrument  and  the  adoption  of  mechanisms 
ensuring  an  accurate  risk  management  and  effective  protection  of  the  rights  of  data 
subjects.  

In this respect, the VIS revision is based on data protection by design and by default86. The 
importance  of  the  concepts  of  data  protection  by  design  and  by  default87  was  repeatedly 
highlighted by the European Data Protection Supervisor regarding the e-Privacy reform88.  

Safeguards are already part of the current VIS setup, namely:  

-  Data  protection is  embedded into the design and architecture of the existing VIS and 

apply to all new functionalities added to it.  

83   Regulation  (EU)  2016/679  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of the  Council  of  27  April  2016  on  the  protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).  

84   Court of Justice of the EU, judgment of 9.11.2010, Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke 

85  

and Eifert [2010] ECR I-0000.  
In line with Article 52(1) of the Charter, limitations may be imposed on the exercise of the right to data protection 
as long as the limitations are provided for by law, respect the essence of the right and freedoms and, subject to the 
principle  of  proportionality,  are  necessary  and  genuinely  meet  objectives  of  general  interest  recognised  by  the 
European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.  
In the meaning of Article 25 of the General Data Protection Regulation.  

86  
87   A recent Eurobarometer  survey showed  that  almost  90  %  of  EU  citizens  indeed agree  on the importance  of  data 
protection  by  default  settings.  TNS  Political  &  Social  at  the  request  of  the  European  Commission,  ‘Flash 
Eurobarometer 443 — July 2016, ‘e-Privacy’ Report, EN’ (December 2016), at p. 43.  

88   European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion 6/2017, EDPS Opinion on the Proposal for a Regulation on Privacy 

and Electronic Communications (ePrivacy Regulation).  

29 

 
 
                                                      
-  Specified purposes should be clear, limited and relevant to the circumstances (purpose 
specification);  the  collection  of  personal  information  is  limited  to  that  which  is 
necessary for the specified purposes (collection limitation); the collection of personally 
identifiable  information  is  kept  to  a  strict  minimum  (data  minimisation);  the  use, 
retention,  and  disclosure  of  personal  information  is  limited  to  the  relevant  purposes 
(use, retention and disclosure limitation). 

It is important to note that the safeguards currently present in VIS (baseline scenario) will 
also be part of the revised VIS, for any of the proposed options. 

Each of the proposed measures will be assessed against the following three criteria: 

(a) Whether they meet an objective of general interest;  

(b) whether they are necessary;  

(c) If so, whether they are proportional.  

When assessing these criteria, a series of principles are taken into account under the terms 
of  the  GDPR,  including  respect  of  the  data  minimisation  principle  (Article  5(1)(c)), 
according to which access to personal data must be adequate, relevant and limited to what 
is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed, data accuracy (Article 
5(1)(d)) and purpose limitation (Article 5(1)(b)), according to which data is to be collected 
for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is 
incompatible with those purposes. 

For the purpose of understanding the ensuing data protection considerations, it is important 
to clarify the scope of current data processing in the VIS: 

-  the  VIS  processes  and  stores  data  from  the  application  form,89  which  includes 
biographical information of the person; 
- picture 
- fingerprints 
-  decision  of  Member  States  on  the  application,  i.e.  visa  issued,  visa  refused,  visa 
revoked or annulled. 

No  information  is  stored  on  supporting  documents  (secure  messaging  system  VISMail  is 
used to exchange additional information, upon request).The VIS setup already includes a 
robust set of data protection safeguards, such as limited and strictly controlled access to 
the  data  (Article  6),  limited  retention  period  with  clear  deletion  deadlines  (Article  23), 
advanced data deletion in case the data subject has acquired the nationality of a Member 
State  (Article  25),  responsibility  for  the  use  of  data  (Article  29),  rights  to  request 
amendments and deletion of data and obligations for the Member States to do so in case of 
unlawfully or erroneously processing (Articles 24 and 38), strict data security rules (Article 
32),  strict  embargo  on  transfer  to  third  countries  (Article  31)  –  except  for  very  limited 
situations in case of return (further explained in section 2.1.1), strict rules on the liability in 
case of misuse of data (Article 33), detailed rules on keeping of records (Article 34), self-
monitoring by Member States (Article 35), cooperation between Member States to ensure 
the  right  to  data  protection  of  the  applicants  is  upheld  (Article  39),  right  to  effective 
remedy in respect of the personal data (Article 40), as along with a supervisory framework, 

89   According to Annex I to the Visa Code. 

30 

 
 
                                                      
both by National Supervisory Authorities (Article 41) and by the European Data Protection 
Supervisor (Article 42). 

5.1.1.  Copy of the travel document  

The  current  divergent  approaches  taken  by  Member  States  regarding  the  collection  and 
storage of copies of visa applicants’ travel documents during the visa application procedure 
and  the  possibility  of  making  them  available  to  other  Member  States  will  continue.  This 
would  lead  to  an  increased  backlog  of  TCN  under  return  procedure,  with  increased 
administrative burden and costs for Member States. The TCN under return procedure will 
remain  in  limbo,  often  in  administrative  detention.  The  inefficiency  of  the  return  policy 
will lead more TCN staying irregularly in the territory of the Member States. .  

5.1.2.  Fingerprinting of minors  

Current VIS rules regarding taking fingerprints from children under 12 remain unchanged. 
Technological progress and available means are not  taken into  account, while  the risk of 
children  right's  abuses,  such  as  trafficking  of  children,  remains  insufficiently  addressed, 
given  the  available  possibilities.  Relevant  authorities  would  continue  to  have  challenges 
both to identify or verify the identity of young children and to offer appropriate protection 
if  case  of  suspected  trafficking,  and  to  use  more  effective  means  enabling  to  detect  and 
fight against trafficking networks. 

5.1.3.  Long-stay visas and residence documents  

In the current situation Member States do not share information prior to or upon issuance 
of a long stay document. SIS is the only system required to be checked in respect of a TCN 
applying for a visa or residence document, but only as regards refusals of entry and stay 
(i.e.  entry  bans).  However,  no  means  are  in  place  to  check  whether  the  holder  of  the 
document is not a threat to the security of the Member States other than the one that issued 
the visa or residence document. 

Current  inefficient  border-crossing  procedures  will  continue.  In  case  of  doubt  on  the 
document or the bearer (i.e. document unknown to the border guard due to the non-uniform 
format,  expired  document,  document  with  non-functioning  chip  or  simply  a  document 
holder  who  lost  the  document),  there  are  no  rapid  and  effective  means  at  the  border  to 
verify  the  identity  of  the  traveller.  This  has  consequences  on  the  waiting  time  for  the 
traveller  with  negative  consequences  on  the  right  to  move  freely  of  bona  fide  TCN  who 
have a right to enter and reside in the territory of a Member State (Article 21 of TFEU and 
Directive  2004/38).  Consulted  Member  States90  complained  about  these  procedures  as 
being  time-consuming  and  inefficient.  For  the  large  majority  (80%)  the  lack  of  shared 
information  on  these  documents  was  a  hurdle  to  their  day-to  day  activities  and  as  such 
create administrative burden. 

5.1.4.  Migration and security checks 

As  regards  the  assessment  of  the  irregular  migration  and  security  risks  at  the  time  of 
application,  Member  States  will  continue  to  rely  on  national  checks  and  on  existing 

90   Member  States  were  consulted  as  part  of  the  supporting  study  carried  out  by  PwC,  see  the  Executive  Summary, 

Annex 9. 

31 

 
 
                                                      
bilateral exchange of information on a case-by-case basis. Member States would still have 
to  check  SIS  (manually),  as  there  would  be  no  possibility  of  automated  checks  and, 
depending on their national rules, check their national or other international databases. A 
full assessment of the risks is not possible, which leads to both an uneven playing field for 
the applicant (i.e. conditions are more or less stringent, depending on the Member State of 
application)  and  security  gaps  are  possible,  depending  on  checks  carried  out  by  Member 
States. 

5.2.  Description of the policy options 

5.2.1.  Copy of the travel document 

Policy options to address the problem of lack of travel documents for return should ensure 
that the Member States' need for a travel document to certify the identity and nationality of 
a TCN is covered in each individual case.  

  Option 1.0 – Status quo – this situation corresponds to the baseline situation described 

above.  

  Option  1.1  –  Include  a  digital  copy  of  the  travel  document  in  the  central  VIS 

(centralised) 

Under  this  option,  the  digital  copy  of  the  visa  applicants’  travel  document  would  be 
systematically  stored  in  the  VIS  system.  The  competent  authorities  for  identification 
(and/or  verification  within  the  territory)  and  return  –  namely  migration  and  return 
authorities – and which already have access to search the system using the fingerprints of 
the apprehended TCN, would be able to retrieve this copy, subject to strict access rules. 

Article 2(e) of the VIS Regulation foresees that one of the objectives of VIS is ‘to assist in 
the identification  of any person who may not,  or  may no longer, fulfil the conditions for 
entry to, stay or residence on the territory of the Member States.’ Article 31(2) enables the 
Member States to transfer or to make available a limited set of these data to a third country 
for  the  purpose  of  proving  the  identity  of  third-country  nationals  for  the  purpose  of 
return.91  Thus,  although  not  explicitly  defined  in  Article  2,  when  taken  together,  these 
provisions  foresee  that  the  VIS  can  be  used  to  facilitate  both  the  identification  of  the 
irregular migrant and the return itself.92 

  Option 1.2 – Include a digital copy of the travel document in national visa systems 

(decentralised) 

Under this option the digital copy would be stored in the national visa systems (NS-VIS) of 
the  Member  States  with  which  the  application  for  a  visa  was  lodged.  When  a  VIS  hit  is 
obtained in respect of a TCN subject to return procedure, the MS responsible would submit 
a  request  to  the  MS  that  owns  the  data.  In  this  scenario,  a  fast  and  secure  channel  of 
communication must exist between the Member States' authorities allowing them to send 

91   The Regulation allows the designated competent authorities to transfer the following data from the visa application 
file:  first  name,  surname  and  former  surname  (if  applicable);  sex,  data,  place  and  country  of  birth;  current 
nationality and nationality at birth; type and number of the travel document, the authority which issued it and the 
date of issue and of expiry; residence; and in the case of minors, the surname and first name(s) of the applicant’s 
father and mother.  

92   EMN Ad-Hoc Query on COM AHQ on Member States’ Experiences with the use of the Visa Information System 

(VIS) for Return Purposes. Requested by COM on 18th March 2016. 24 responses were provided 

32 

 
 
                                                      
the  request  and  receive  the  information.  This  channel  could  be  ensured  by  the  existing 
VISMail facility within the VIS. 

In  addition  to  the  main  options,  two  additional  sub-options  were  defined  regarding  the 
scope of the data to be stored in VIS:  

 

Sub-option A – Storage of biographical page only 

This  sub-option  will  involve  the  incorporation  of  the  standardised  MRTD  size  3  data 
page.93  

 

Sub-option B – Storage of all used pages of the applicant’s travel document  

Another approach would be to scan and store a digital copy of all used visa pages of the 
applicants’  travel  document,  i.e.  those  containing  visa  stamps  and  stickers.  Blank  pages 
and any other pages in the TD (i.e. annotations, the back-side of the biographic data page, 
the page adjacent to the data page) would not be stored in VIS. 

The two sub-options can be applied to both Option 1.1 and Option 1.2 described above. 

5.2.2.  Fingerprinting of minors 

Policy  options  to  address  this  problem  should  ensure  that  children  having  obtained 
a Schengen visa before they were 12 years old have their verification of identity correctly 
made at the border or within the territory, or are correctly identified in case found victims 
of  trafficking  or  other  forms  of  abuse.  The  reason  for  taking  fingerprints  stems  from  the 
fact  that  misidentification  is  more  likely  when  based  exclusively  on  alphanumeric  data. 
Adding fingerprints to the file reduces the likelihood of misidentification to virtually zero. 
By storing fingerprints in the VIS the system provides a secure link to the identity to the 
visa applicant through biometrics. This applies to adults as well as children. Consultations 
with stakeholders that technological developments, including on the collection and use of 
biometrics, could  contribute and  should  be  used to  enhance the protection of children.  A 
majority of the respondents also consider fingerprinting children applying for a short-stay 
visa necessary or useful to address or prevent trafficking or other forms of abuse94. 

 

 

Option 2.0 – Status quo – this situation corresponds to the baseline situation 
described above. 

Option 2.1 – Lowering the fingerprinting age to 6 years95 

Under this scenario, fingerprints  will be taken from every visa applicant  from 6 years of 
age  and  above,  thereby  effectively  increasing  the  group  of  applicants  by  adding  the  age-
group of 6 to 11 year-old.  

This option is based on technological progress: in 2013 the European Commission’s Joint 
Research  Centre  (JRC)96  carried  out  a  study  on  the  question  whether  or  not  automated 
fingerprint  recognition  for  children  is  possible  with  recognition  rates  similar  to  those 

93   According to ICAO standards, this is the page onto which the issuing State or organisation enters the personal data 
relating  to  the  holder  of  the  document  as  well  as  the  data  concerning  the  issuance  and  validity  of  the  machine 
readable travel document (MRTD). 

94   Open public consultation feedback (see Annex 2). 
95  

It  is  worth  noting  that  Option  2.1.  is  also  in  line  with  the  proposal  for  a  revised  EURODAC  Regulation,  which 
would lower the fingerprinting age from 14 to 6. 
JRC (2013). Fingerprint Recognition for Children. 

96  

33 

 
 
                                                      
reached for adults. The JRC study concluded that fingerprint recognition of children aged 
between  6  and  12  years  is  achievable  with  a  satisfactory  level  of  accuracy  under 
appropriate  conditions.  One  such  condition  would  be,  for  example,  to  ensure  an 
appropriate level of training of operators to acquire high quality images.  

 

Option 2.2 – Lowering the fingerprinting age including all ages 

Under  this  scenario,  fingerprints  would  be taken  from  visa  applicants  of  all  ages  thereby 
effectively increasing the group of applicants by adding the age-group of 0 to 11 year-old.  

In the same JRC study evidence is presented from other studies that it is feasible to take 
reliable fingerprints of children even younger than 6, although this would have an impact 
on  the  reliability  of  the  fingerprints  and  be  more  challenging  in  terms  of  technical  and 
procedural requirements. 

5.2.3.  Long-stay visas and residence documents  

The policy options to address the identified problem should ensure that verifications of the 
irregular migration and security risks for a TCN applying for a long stay visa or residence 
document,  verifying  the  entry  conditions  at  external  border,  as  well  as  any  subsequent 
exchange of information on the person are done in an efficient and effective manner. 

 

Option 3.0 – Status quo – corresponds to the baseline situation described above 

Non-legislative options: 

 

Option 3.1.a – Improve the exchange of bilateral information on a case-by-case 
basis 

This would mean strengthening the ways MS currently exchange information in case of a 
doubt  on  long-stay  or  residence  documents  at  a  border  check  or  during  an  application 
process. The  main  means of collaboration are via phone, fax, email  and through existing 
networks;  SIRENE,  national  liaison  offices,  Police  and  Customs  Cooperation  Centres 
(PCCC), National Contact Centre (NCC), etc.). However, this would overload already busy 
communication  networks,  like  SIRENE,  while  not  meeting  the  policy  objectives.  Since 
stakeholders  described  it  as  burdensome  and  inefficient,  this  option  did  not  meet 
sufficiently the objectives to be further assessed. 

 

Option 3.1.b – Improve the feeding and use of information in the SIS as regards 
alerts on withdrawn long-stay and residence documents  

This option would entail improving the amount and quality of data fed into the SIS. Article 
38.2(e)  of  Council  Decision  on  the  establishment,  operation  and  use  of  the  second 
generation  Schengen  Information  System  (SIS  II)  requires  MS  to  log  “issued  identity 
papers  such  as  passports,  identity  cards,  driving  licenses,  residence  permits  and  travel 
documents  which  have  been  stolen,  misappropriated,  lost  or  invalidated''.  Although 
undoubtedly  beneficial,  this  option  would  not  make  the  exchange  of  information 
systematic and would only focus on SIS alerts. Since it does not contribute to the objective 
of  addressing  the  lack  of  cooperation  and  information  exchange  at  time  of  issuance  it  is 
also discarded from further analysis. 

 

Option 3.1.c – Promote the use of security features for the documents containing 
a chip: Passive Authentication and Extended Access Control 

34 

 
 
This  option  would  promote  the  necessity  among  MS  to  perform  the  systematic 
authentication of the content of the electronic chip of the documents that have a chip. Even 
if  used  at  its  full  extent  and  in  combination  with  the  harmonisation  of  residence  cards, 
would not have any benefits for long-stay visas (since they do not contain a chip). As well 
as  the  previous  option,  it  cannot  address  the  objective  of  cooperation  and  information 
exchange  at  time  of  issuance  and  it  only  partially  addresses  the  objective  of  fast  and 
effective border controls. This is why it was not further assessed. 

Legislative options: 

 

Option 3.2 – Further harmonise and secure long-stay and residence documents 

Residence  permits97  and  long-stay  visas98  are  already  issued  in  harmonised  format 
throughout the Schengen area. Both legal bases have been reinforced in 2017. In practice, 
this sub-option would mean strengthening the format and security features of the remaining 
residence  cards99  issued  without  the  harmonised  format  of  residence  permit.  During  the 
adoption of Regulation 380/2008, Member States committed100 to use the uniform format 
for residence permits for residence cards. However, some Member States still do not apply 
this approach (7/25).101  

 

Option 3.3 – Create an interconnection between national databases that would 
allow all MSs to query each other’s relevant national databases 

This  option  entails  setting  up  a  distributed  database102  system  by  interconnecting  the 
existing  national  databases  of  long  stay  visas  and  residence  documents.  A  distributed 
database  system  would  allow  all  MS  to  query  each  other’s  relevant  databases  when 
assessing a long-stay visas or residence document together with the identity of a document 
holder at an external border crossing point (at second line border check). 

 

Option 3.4.A and 3.4.B – Integration in the VIS 

This  option  is  the  integration  of  data  on  long-stay  visas,  residence  permits and  residence 
cards  from  national  systems  into  the  VIS.  Whether  to  store  data  or  not  on  applications 
differentiates the two sub-options analysed 3.4.A (without data on rejected applications) or 
3.4.B (with data on rejected applications, which would allow to support future assessment 
procedures). 

Long-stayers as a category are now the only TCN category not covered in any of the IT-
systems (as was already illustrated with ''missing piece of the puzzle'' in Figure 3, section 
2.1.3). By including the category of documents in VIS would ensure they are included in a 
EU IT-system, under a comparable regime for the same TCN for documents issued either 
under visa-free conditions (the category of TCN whose data will already be in ETIAS, and 

97   Regulation (EU) 2017/1954 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 amending Council 
Regulation  (EC)  No  1030/2002  laying  down  a  uniform  format  for  residence  permits  for  third-country  nationals 
(amended in 2017). 

98   Council Regulation (EC) No 1683/95. 
99   A  further  harmonisation  on  long-stay  visas  (e.g.  change  of  format  of  the  sticker  and  addition  of  a  chip)  and 

residence permits has been deemed not feasible and therefore not discussed in this study.  

100   Council Document of 11 June 2008 (13.06), PV/CONS 26 JAI 188, 8622/08 ADD 1. 
101   CSES study. 
102   For more information see the supporting study ''Legal analysis on the necessity and proportionality of extending the 
scope of the Visa Information System (VIS) to include data on long stay visas and residence documents'', chapter 
.3.1,3, p. 34. 

35 

 
 
                                                      
EES)  and  visa-required  (TCN  coming  for  a  short-stay,  whose  data  is  already  in  VIS,  as 
well as EES).  Since long-stayers are not  covered by EES, VIS would be the  only system 
where their data could be checked. 

5.2.4.  Migration and security checks 

For visa-free travellers, the ETIAS proposal stipulates automatic consultation of ''the data 
present  in  a  record,  file  or  alert  registered  in  the  ETIAS  Central  System,  the  Schengen 
Information  System  (SIS),  [the  Entry/Exit  System  (EES)],  the  Visa  Information  System 
(VIS), [the Eurodac], [the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS)], the 
Europol  data,  the  Interpol  Stolen  and  Lost  Travel  Document  database  (SLTD)  and  the 
Interpol Travel Documents Associated with Notices database (Interpol TDAWN)''.  

The  same  principle  could  by  analogy  be  applied  to  checks  on  visa  required  travellers 
through  VIS  by  extending  its  possibility  to  query  additional  databases.  In  this  respect, 
several options exist: 

 

Option 4.0 – Status quo 

In  this  option  the  current  situation  of  uneven  and  manual  checks  against  other  non-
connected systems would persist. Depending on which Member State is doing the checks, 
the visa applicants would be checked against different national and European databases. As 
compared  to  visa-free  travellers,  fewer  checks  will  be  carried  out  against  centralised 
European databases. 

 

Option  4.1  –  Systematic  and  automated  check  against  available  databases 
(ETIAS model) 

Since  the  VIS  is  also  part  of  the  legal  framework  setting  up  interoperability,  technical 
possibilities  have  opened  up  to  explore  the  practical  communication  between  various 
databases in a fast, seamless and systematic manner by authorised users. In fact, after the 
interoperability proposal was presented, this is the first time that this framework is applied 
to an EU policy line. In this way, the option 4.1 is building on the benefits opened by the 
interoperability proposal. 

VIS automated database check would follow the same logic as ETIAS. When verifying and 
assessing the information submitted by applicants, the system would  automatically cross-
check  each  application  against  each  of  the  above  mentioned  systems  (also  illustrated  in 
Table  1  below),  as  well  as  a  dedicated  watchlist  and  would  consist  of  data  related  to 
persons  who  are  suspected  of  having  committed  or  taken  part  in  a  criminal  offence  or 
persons regarding whom there are factual indications or reasonable grounds to believe that 
they will commit criminal offences. 

In this option, the interoperability components will be used. The risk assessment based on 
checks  against  databases  will  be  performed  in  an  automated  manner  using  the 
interoperability component (European Search Portal). 

36 

 
 
Table 1: Databases to be checked for the purpose of VIS risk assessment 

Risk assessment 

Security 

Migration 

Selection criteria 

r
e
d
r
o
b
s
s
o
r
c

/

s
u
o
i
r
e
S

e
m

i
r
c

+ 

+ 
+ 

m
s
i
r
o
r
r
e
t

+ 

+ 
+ 

n
r
u
t
e
r

/

s
n
a
b
y
r
t
n
E

s
n
o
i
s
i
c
e
d

y
r
t
n
e

f
o
l
a
s
u
f
e
R

+103 

+ 

y
a
t
s

r
a
l
u
g
e
r
r
I

)
y
a
t
s
r
e
v
o
(

+104 

+ 

+ 

Databases 

SIS 

ETIAS 

SLTD 

TDAWN 

EES 

VIS Components 
Screening 
Rules 
Candidate databases for future integrations 

+ 

+ 

ECRIS 

EIS 

Watchlist 

EURODAC 

+ 
+ 
+ 

+ 
+ 
+ 

+ 

n
o
i
t
c
e
t
o
r
p
a
t
a
D

n
o
i
t
a
t
n
e
m
e
l
p
m

I

y
t
i
x
e
l
p
m
o
c

+ 

+ 
++ 
+ 
+ 

- 

-- 
- 
- 
-- 

+ 

++ 
++ 
++ 
++ 

++ 

-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 

e
c
n
a
v
e
l
e
R

 

 
 
+ 

 

++ 

-105 
++ 
++ 
--106 

 

Option 4.2 – Automated cross-checks + screening rules 

In  addition  to  automated  cross-checks  of  other  databases  (option  4.1),  automated 
processing  through  introducing  screening  rules  in  VIS  could  be  envisaged,  analogous  to 
the ones used in ETIAS. The screening rules is a new tool, which would be an algorithm 
enabling the comparison of data in the applications for a short stay visa with specific risk 
indicators. The screening rules would thus contain on the one hand data analytics rules, and 
on the other specific values provided by Member States as well as statistics generated from 
other  relevant  border  management  and  security  databases.  This  would  enhance  risk-
assessment capability and in particular to allow for the data-analytics method to be applied. 
The screening rules would not contain any personal data and would be based on statistics 
and  information  provided  by  Member  States  concerning  risk  indicators  or  threats, 
abnormal rates of refusal or overstay by certain categories of TCN and public health risks. 

As  was  stated  for  the  option  4.1,  this  option  is  also  about  applying  the  interoperability 
framework, building even further on the benefits opened by the interoperability initiative. 

103   According to ongoing discussions, return decisions could be stored in the SIS in the future. 
104   ETIAS would be checked for applicants coming from a country which has just changed visa regime.  
105   The  assessment  of  ECRIS  is  based  on  the  current  situation.  Should  the  system  evolve  into  ECRIS-TCN,  the 

assessment could have to be repeated. 

106   The  assessment  of  Eurodac  is  based  on  the  current  situation.  Should  Eurodac  evolve  into  a  case-management 

system, the assessment would be repeated. 

37 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
5.3.  Options discarded at an early stage 

  Copy of the travel document 

Regarding  travel  documents,  the  option  of  incorporating  a  digital  copy  of  the  travel 
document  in  another  system,  e.g.  EES,  was  discarded,  because  there  are  no  other  large-
scale  IT  systems,  existing  or  planned,  which  could  be  used  to  obtain  the  same  result  in 
respect of the same target population. 

  Long-stay visas and residence documents 

Three non-legislative options were discarded early on: 

 

 

 

Option 3.1.a – Improve the exchange of bilateral information on a case-by-case 
basis. 

Option 3.1.b – Improve the feeding and use of information in the SIS as regards 
alerts on withdrawn long-stay and residence documents  

Option 3.1.c – Promote the use of security features for the documents containing 
a chip: Passive Authentication and Extended Access Control 

To sum up, while acknowledging their benefits, none of the non-legislative options would 
fully support the objective of exchange of information, therefore they would not reduce the 
fragmentation of the information available on TCNs during the issuance process of a new 
document107. 

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? 

A  summary  of  different  impacts  (including  fundamental  rights,  social  impacts  and 
economic impacts) can be found in Annex 3. 

A  detailed  consideration  on  the  available  data,  categories  impacted  by  the  envisaged 
measures and general considerations on data protection are presented in Annex 5. 

107   See supporting study Legal analysis on the necessity and proportionality of extending the scope of VIS to to include 

data on long stay visas and residence documents (chapter 3.2.1.) for in-depth explanation. 

38 

 
 
                                                      
6.1.  Assessment of policy options 

6.1.1.  Copy of the travel document  

Economic costs and benefits 

Two  cost  estimates  were  provided  during  the  study108  on  all  relevant  costs  (both  one-off 
and  recurrent,  as  well  as  recurrent  compliance  costs)  from  the  options  and  their  sub-
options. Eu-LISA estimates the one-off cost for the central system (option 1.1) between € 
3,3 – 4 m, while the study places it above € 5 m. For the decentralized system (option 1.2) 
the study suggests it would entail costs as high as € 200 m. As regards operational costs, 
eu-LISA places them at around € 375,000 – 560,000 / year.  

As  shown  in  the  following  table,  the  measures  will  also  produce  several  important 
economic  benefits  for  consulates  as  well  as  Member  States’  migration  and  return 
authorities. If implemented, they would reduce administrative burden for processing return 
cases,  reduce  delays  in  the  procedure  and  eliminate  inefficient  procedures  involved  with 
retrieving, scanning, zipping and coding hard copies. In fact, both options would be very 
feasible  in  practice,  since  the  vast  majority  Member  States  are  already  storing  copies  of 
travel  document  –  the  options  would  simply  impose  a  harmonised  rule  on  such  storing. 
Such a change of administrative procedures would in many cases lead to simplification of 
storing (digital storage). Furthermore, rules on the retention of the travel document (which 
currently vary among Member States which store copies of it) would be harmonised, which 
implies moderate changes in national administrative practices. 

The identified economic benefits are primarily driven by the choice of main option. While 
Option  1.1  (centralized  storage)  performs  marginally  better  compared  to  Option  1.2 
(decentralized storage), both options would significantly reduce inefficiencies associated 
with  the  current  procedures,  reflected  in  significant  cost  savings  (reflected  in  Table  2 
below).  

Table 2: Summary of benefits of the policy options 

Consulates  
Cost savings from time spent on responding 
to supporting document requests  
Migration and return authorities 
Cost savings from time spent on retrieving 
TD copy 

Option 1.1 – Centralised 

Option 1.2 - Decentralised 

€ 0,7m – € 2,8 m  
(€ 366 – € 1.462 per consulate) 

€ 0,7 – € 2,8 m  
(€ 366 – € 1.462 per consulate) 

€ 3,2 – 12,7 m 

€ 3,0 – 12,3 m 

Cost savings from reduced delays in return 
procedures 

Daily costs of delays reduced by 
up to 14 days  
€ 46,3 m – 92,6 m 

Cost savings from executing a higher 
proportion of return decisions, in less time 

Total benefits (50 % improvement) 
Total benefits (75 % improvement) 

€ 6,7 m – 21,4 m (if 50% 
improvement) 
€ 10,0 m – 32,1 m (if 75 % 
improvement) 
€ 57,5 m – 132,2 m 
€ 60,8 m – 142,9 m  

Daily cost of delays reduced by 
up to 13,5 days; costs incurred 
for delays of ½ day  
€ 44,6 – 89,3 m 
€ 6,6 m – 21,3 m (if 50% 
improvement) 
€ 9,9 m – 31,9 m (if 75% 
improvement) 
€ 55,6 m – 128,3 m 
€ 58,9 m – 139,0 m 

108   Further details on the estimates can be found in the Ecorys study (chapter 3.6.2) and in the annexed eu-Lisa study 

(p. 79) respectively. 

39 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
In  terms  of  the  impact  on  duration  and  timeliness  of  return  proceedings,  both  options 
would significantly reduce the waiting time of migration and return authorities during the 
process  of  confirming  the  identity  of  TCNs.  Under  Option  1.1,  the  delays  will  be 
effectively eliminated, resulting in a delay reduction of up to 14 days. Option 1.2 would 
have a slightly lower impact as Member States’ authorities may still be required to wait for 
several  hours  before  receiving  a  reply  from  the  responsible  national  authority  for  storing 
the  travel  document.  The  potential  benefits  to  be  realised  from  both  options  will  be 
sufficiently substantial to offset the costs incurred to implement and comply with the 
respective options, especially for option 1.1 (centralised storage).  

Policy impacts 

Whereas the baseline scenario could not achieve any of the two objectives, the storage of 
visa applicants’ travel documents in VIS will improve the implementation of the objective 
of facilitating returns of TCNs who have been issued with a return decision. Both Option 
1.1 and Option 1.2 will enable Member States to obtain the necessary evidence for proving 
the  nationality  of  TCN  visa  overstayers  who  have  been  issued  with  return  decisions,  but 
who  lack  a  valid  travel  document,  to  equal  effect.  Moreover,  the  VIS  is  the  only  EU 
instrument  storing  data  on  TCN  outside  the  EU  borders,  i.e.  in  the  country  of  origin  or 
another country where the person applies for a visa, therefore the only EU instrument that 
could  provide,  in  a  systematic  manner,  the  necessary  data  to  achieve  the  stated  policy 
objectives  in  this  case.  No  other  measure  is  currently  available  at  EU  level  enabling 
authorities to obtain a copy of the TCN's travel document. 

As regards the change of return effectiveness, the copy of the TCN’s travel document will 
be extremely useful as a means of evidence for the third country regarding the identity and 
nationality  of  the  person  to  be  returned  and  thus  sufficient  for  facilitating  the  return.  As 
return  effectiveness  hinges  also  on  external  factors,  such  as  general  cooperativeness  of 
third countries on return, the actual impact is not easy to measure. 

Table 3: Effectiveness in meeting the objectives 

Objective 

Specific objective I: assist in 
the identification and return 
of TCN 

Specific objective II: 
efficiency of VIS in return 
procedures 

Option 

1.0 Baseline 

1.1 Digital copy of the travel 
document in the central VIS 

1.2 Digital copy of the travel 
document in national systems 

A – Biographical page only 

B – All used pages 

0 

++ 

+ 

+ 

++ 

0 

++ 

+ 

+ 

++ 

Based  on  inputs  provided  during  the  stakeholder  consultation,  the  contracted  study 
cautiously  assumed  that  the  proportion  of  effectively  executed  returns  of  TCN  visa 

40 

 
 
overstayers  without  travel  documents  will  increase  by  50%  to  75%  as  a  result  of  the 
proposed options.  

  If the proportion of effectively executed returns increases by 50%, then the benefit is an 

additional 7.934 to 19.834 TCNs returned compared to the current situation.  

  If  the  proportion  increases  by  75%,  then  benefit  is  an  additional  11.900  to  29.751 

persons returned. 

These considerations are reflected in considering the scoring of the options for meeting the 
objectives in Table 3 (above). 

Table 4:  Estimated benefits for the implementation of returns 

Impact on the implementation of returns: Additional returns of TCNs without travel documents 

Estimated 
number of 
returns not 
implemented 
Lower  Upper 

15.867  39.668 

50% – 75%  

Fundamental rights impacts 

% improvement 

Number of additional returns: 
Scenario of 50% improvement 

Number of additional returns: 
Scenario of 75% improvement 

Lower 
+ 7.934  
TCNs returned 

Upper 
+ 19.834  
TCNs returned 

Lower 
+ 11.900 
TCNs returned 

Upper 
+ 29.751  
TCNs returned 

The storage of a digital copy of the visa applicants’ travel document in the central VIS 
(Option 1.1) or national VIS (Option 1.2) can have a positive impact for the right to asylum 
(Article 18 CFR) and the protection of the principle of non-refoulement (Article 19 CFR) 
by  providing  designated  authorities  which  already  have  access  to  the  VIS  with  access  to 
additional evidence to prove an asylum seekers’ identity. The sub-options could be useful 
to  asylum  authorities  for  verifying  the  identity  of  a  person  in  need  of  international 
protection (sub-option A) or for the assessment of merits of asylum cases (sub-option B). 
The  existing  safeguard  which  bans  the  transfer  of  personal  data  to  third  countries  if  that 
person has requested international protection continues to apply (Article 31(3)), mitigating 
the risk of serious harm for asylum applicants or their families.  

Sub-options A and B would create an interference with the right to privacy and family life 
(Article  7  CFR)  and  the  right  to  the  protection  of  personal  data  (Article  8  CFR),  as  it 
involves  the  processing  of  personal  data  and  access  to  these  data  by  public  authorities. 
Sub-option  A  implies  the  processing,  of  nearly  the  same  amount  and  type  of  personal 
data as is processed in the current situation, merely stored in a different format. The 
additional category of data is limited to the personal (national) identification number of the 
document  holder.  This  additional  information  does  not  further  affect  the  privacy  of  the 
person, and for this reason the limitation to the right to privacy is modest. With respect to 
the right to data protection, storing a copy of the passport involved further data processing 
of  the  image  of  the  document;  however,  it  does  not  extend  the  information  already 
available to authorities and the existing rules and conditions of access to this information. 

Sub-option B involves the processing of a larger amount of new data, consisting in images 
of used visa pages in addition to data in sub-option A, for all TCNs under visa obligation. 
Both  sub-options  meet  the  objective  of  enhancing  the  return  rate  of  TCN  under  visa 
obligation and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve this objective.  

41 

 
 
Existing  safeguards,  including  prohibiting  the  further  processing  of  these  data  by 
authorities  as  well  as  to  prevent  unauthorised  access  and  unlawful  sharing  with  third 
parties should limit any potential negative impacts implied by both sub-options. As regards 
sub-option B, additional safeguards should explicitly prohibit the sharing of these data with 
third  parties,  given  that  it  is  not  foreseen  to  positively  contribute  to  the  objective  of 
facilitating return. 

For  both  option  1.1  and  1.2  risks  with  regard  to  purpose  limitation  and  accessibility  of 
personal information can be mitigated by introducing strict safeguards against unauthorised 
access.  

6.1.2.  Biometric data of minors 

Economic costs and benefits 

In  terms  of  costs,  the  one-off  costs  are  higher  for  option  2.2  (taking  fingerprints  of  all 
children) than for option 2.1 (lowering the fingerprinting age to 6). This is due to the fact 
that taking fingerprints of children younger than 6 is likely to require a new, different type 
of scanners and software. 

Table 5: Overview cost-benefits option 1 and 2  

Option 1 (6-12 years) 

Option 2 (all ages) 

One-off costs 

Child- friendly equipment 

No costs 

€13 002 000 

Increased size of biometric 
samples in VIS- BMS costs 

Increased cost by 4.4 % 

increased costs by 8.8 % 

Training costs (ESPs, Consulates)  € 138 175 

€ 138 175 

Operational costs 
Workload and administrative 
burden 

Range from €52 208 to €261 066 

Range from € 208 832 to € 1 044 
264 

Costs for Member State authorities and opportunity costs 
Impacts on TCN visa applicants 
(not related to fundamental 
rights) 
Impacts for Member States’ visa 
authorities 

Less than one minute additional 
waiting time per child 

No costs/ savings 

Less than two minutes additional 
waiting time per child 

No costs/ savings 

Impacts for Member States’ 
authorities dealing with missing 
children/ unaccompanied children 

Policy impacts 

Savings unknown 

Savings unknown 

Taking  fingerprints  of  children  under  12  would  support  border  authorities  in  detecting 
identity fraud as it would help them to ascertain whether the child present at the border is 
the child that has been granted a visa, which means options 2.1 and 2.2 would satisfy the 
VIS  objectives.  However,  the  JRC  study  on  fingerprints  concluded  that  the  reliability  of 
fingerprints  is  lower  for  children  under  the  age  of  6.  This  is  reflected  in  the  scoring  of 
whether  the  measures  would  meet  the  objectives  (lowering  the  fingerprinting  age  to  all 
ages thus scores lower since fingerprint reliability cannot be guaranteed). 

42 

 
 
 
 
Fingerprints  constitute  a  child  protection  safeguard  since  collecting  and  storing  them 
facilitates the identification of traffickers and trafficking networks, as the file of the child 
in  the  VIS  is  linked  to  that  of  the  parent/adult  that  accompanied  the  child.  However,  as 
already  mentioned  in  the  Eurostat  Report  on  Trafficking  in  Human  Beings,  only  2%  of 
victims of trafficking are under 12 years old. On the other hand, 17% of victims are in the 
12-17  age  range  and  this  much  more  significant  percentage  of  victims  can  already  be 
helped  if  fingerprinting  is  lowered  under  12  years,  to  take  into  account  the  5-year 
maximum duration of the validity of the visa (i.e. the 12 to 17 age range for visa holders, 
corresponds to a potential range of applicants between 7 and 12 years of age). These two 
factors taken together: lower reliability of fingerprints for children under 6 and relatively 
lower number of children which could be helped with this measure means that options 2.1 
and 2.2 would satisfy the objective of fighting child trafficking to a different degree  – as 
reflected  in  the  scoring:.  option  2.2.  is  less  effective  in  fighting  child  trafficking  than 
option 2.1. 

The  prevention  of  identity  fraud  is  raised  by  several  consulates  consulted  as  part  of  the 
supporting  study  as  the  main  potential  benefit  of  the  proposed  measure,  which  means 
stakeholders recognize it as a positive measure. 

Table 6: Effectiveness in meeting the objectives 

Objective 

Specific objective I: VIS 
objectives (fraud, checks, 
Dublin regulation) 

Specific objective II: Fight 
against child trafficking 

Option 

2.0 Baseline 

2.1 Lowering the fingerprinting age 
to 6 years 

2.2 Lowering the fingerprinting age 
to all ages 

0 

++ 

+/0 

0 

++ 

+/0 

Under the baseline scenario the fingerprints of each incoming TCN child are not checked 
nor verified at Schengen entry ports, which means that the baseline scenario 2.0 does not 
help to meet either of the objectives (neither with VIS objectives nor with the fight against 
trafficking).  

Fingerprints  contribute  to  the  subsequent  identification  and  verification  of  the  identity  of 
TCN  children  who  were  <12  when  applying  for  the  visa,  on  Schengen  territory,  hereby 
allowing  for  family  unity  within  and  outside  the  Schengen  area,  verifying  the  family 
relationship, Dublin and asylum examination (i.e. VIS objectives). 

43 

 
 
Moreover, the VIS is the only EU instrument storing data on TCN children of nationalities 
subject  to  a  visa  obligation,  and  collecting  these  data  outside  the  EU  borders,  i.e.  in  the 
country of origin or another country where the person applies for a visa. Hence the VIS is 
the  only  means  to  ensure,  in  a  systematic  manner,  that  the  necessary  data  to  achieve  the 
stated policy objectives of the visa policy. No other instrument is currently available at EU 
level  enabling  authorities  to  perform  identifications  on  TCN  children  or  to  provide  such 
information in case needed for identifying victims of trafficking or launching SIS alerts on 
missing children. 

Fundamental rights impacts 

Both  options  2.1  and  2.2  should  have  an  overall  positive  impact  on  the  protection  of 
fundamental rights. Fingerprints would assist in protecting children against trafficking and 
in identifying children who have gone missing, or who are abducted or became victims of 
human  traffickers.  It  would  also  facilitate  reuniting  these  children  to  reunite  with  their 
family members (but only if it is in their best interest). 

Although  the  existing  VIS  legal  basis  has  no  explicit  purpose  in  regard  to  protecting 
children, VIS procedures and the application of the VIS should, like all EU actions, in all 
times respect the best interests of children as stipulated in Article 24 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. Explicit safeguards in this respect will be added in the Visa Code and 
the  VIS  Regulation  as  regards carrying  out  the  application  procedure  for  children. These 
safeguards  are  part  of  both  proposed  options  (against  the  benchmark  of  the  baseline 
scenario – which already contains strong safeguards, as explained in section 5.1). 

FRA  provided  insights  into  the  impact  on  children109  in  relation  to  the  proposal  for  a 
revised Eurodac Regulation, which also provides a lowering of the fingerprinting age for 
children in the asylum process to 6 years of age, which is why the comments are valid for 
this proposal as well. FRA reminded that, as is stated in the Article 3 of the United Nations 
(UN)  Convention  on  the  Rights  of  the  Child,  for  all  actions  and  decisions  concerning 
children,  the  child’s  best  interests  must  be  a  primary  consideration.  Children  are  an 
extremely vulnerable group and the storage of biometric data could have both positive and 
negative impacts, therefore lowering the age can only be justified if it explicitly pursues a 
child protection objective and sufficient safeguards are in place. 

Both  option  2.1  and  2.2  will  also  have  an  impact  on  the  rights  to  human  dignity  and 
privacy  and  personal  data  protection.  It  concerns  the  collection  and  storage  of  further 
sensitive data (fingerprints)  of a particularly vulnerable group in a large scale IT system. 
However,  fingerprints  are  the  only  means  to  unambiguously  identify  a  child  and,  in  this 
way,  to  better  prevent  child  related  abuses  using  visa,  such  as  using  false  identities  to 
traffic children into the EU.  

Furthermore,  the  processing  of  fingerprint  data  for  children  will  be  subject  to  the  strict 
safeguards, which already exist for the processing of biometric data of TCN visa applicants 
above the age of 12.  

As described earlier, cases of children entering or attempting to enter the EU on a visa who 
are  victims  of  child  trafficking  or  other  abuses,  could  be  detected  by  a  more  complete 

109   See http://fra.europa.eu/en/opinion/2017/impact-proposal-revised-eurodac-regulation-fundamental-rights.  

44 

 
 
                                                      
information  file  in  the  VIS.  This  objective  requires  that  the  relevant  or  designated 
authorities  would  need  access  to  search  and  process  the  data  stored  in  VIS.  Child 
protection authorities currently do not have access to the VIS.  

Fingerprints  must  be  taken  in  full  respect  of  human  dignity  and  in  a  manner  that  is 
appropriate to the child’s age and maturity. A provision to the Visa Code could be included 
explicitly requiring that fingerprints be taken in a child-friendly and child-sensitive manner 
by personnel who have been specifically trained to collect biometric data from children. 

6.1.3.  Long-stay visas and residence documents 

Economic costs and benefits 

The  Feasibility  Study110  already  looked  at  the  feasibility  of  different  options  for  storing 
long-stay  documents  and  assessed  IT-security,  ease  of  implementation,  management  and 
costs of different options, namely a decentralised and centralised database (corresponding 
to options 3.3 and 3.4a/b). It concluded that a central repository as part of the VIS would 
score  higher  in  all  the  criteria,  especially  at  technical  and  operational  levels.  The  impact 
that  the  repository  (option  3.4.a  /  3.4.b)  would  have  on  the  existing  VIS  is  low  when 
considering  the  data  model,  services  and  overall  capacity.  The  eu-LISA  study  on  the 
technical and budgetary impacts of the VIS developments estimated an on-off cost of 10-
12M€ for the repository. Economic costs and benefits of further harmonisation (option 3.2) 
are  analysed  in  more  detail  in  the  IA  for  residence  document  harmonisation  by  DG 
JUST.111 

Policy impacts  

With non-legislative options already discarded for not meeting the proposed objectives, all 
retained options would meet the general objectives, as seen below in Table 7. Whereas, the 
baseline scenario 3.0 meets neither of the two specific objectives, further harmonisation of 
documents  (option  3.2),  would  help  to  strengthen  checks  at  external  borders  /  in  the 
territory,  but  it  would  not  be  helpful  with  improving  security  though  better  information 
exchange, which is reflected in the scoring. In fact, the objective of information exchange 
can only be achieved if there is a data-base of documents, which means that only options 
3.3, 3.4.a/3.4.b meet this objective, as is reflected in the Table 7 below.  

110   See Feasibility Study, page 8. 
111   See IA on ID cards and residence documents, chapter 6.2. 

45 

 
 
                                                      
Table 7: Effectiveness in meeting the objectives 

Objective 

Specific objective 1: Strengthen 
checks 

Specific objective 2: Information-
exchange 

Option 

3.0 Baseline 

3.2 Further 
harmonisation 

3.3 Decentralised 
database 

3.4.a Store data on 
issued documents 

3.4.b Store data on 
applications112 

0 

+ 

+ 

+ 

++ 

0 

0 

+ 

+ 

++ 

Impact on fundamental rights 

Impacts  on  fundamental  rights  mainly  focus  on  data  protection  and  are  assessed  for  the 
options and sub-options that meet the two main policy objectives (non-legislative options 
were already discarded for not meeting the proposed objectives, as was the case with the 
baseline scenario). Therefore, the analysis focuses only on options 3.2, 3.3, 3.4.a and 3.4.b.  

Table 8: Analysis of impacts on fundamental rights (against Articles of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights ) 

Policy options 

Article 2 
(life) 

Article 7 
(privacy) 

Article 8 
(p.data) 

Option 3.2 Further 
harmonisation 

Option 3.3 Decentralised 
database 

Option 3.4 Include long-
stay documents in the VIS 

Sub-option a): Store data 
on issued documents 

Sub-option b): Store data 
on applications 

+ 

+ 

+ 

0 to - 

0 to -  

- 

-  

- - 

- - 

+ + 

- - - 

- - - 

Article 45(2) 
(freedom of movement) 
+ 
(if residence cards are included) 
0 (if they are not) 
+ 
(if residence cards are included) 
0 (if they are not) 

++ 
(if residence cards are included) 
0 (if they are not) 
++ 
(if residence cards are included) 
0 (if they are not) 

Option 3.2 (further document harmonisation) would have a limited impact on personal data 
protection,  as  it  would  not  significantly  change  data  processing  as  compared  to  the 
baseline. The situation is different for the options which entail collecting and storing data 
in a database. 

Whether  to  store  data  or  not  on  applications  differentiates  the  sub-options  3.4.a  (without 
rejected applications) and 3.4.b (with data on rejected applications) (see Figure below). In 
order to understand the impact of data processing, it is important to explain which data will 

112   Except on residence cards, whose sole requirement for issuing is a proof of a family link with a mobile EU citizen. 

46 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
be  collected.  The  following  categories  of  data  will  be  collected:  biographical  data  of  the 
holder or applicant, travel document data, decision data, issued document data. 

Figure 7: Dataset for long stay visa/ residence permit file 

Biographical   data 

1. First name 
2. Last name 
3. Date of birth 
4. Nationality 
5. Sex 

Document data 

6. Travel document (passport) number 
7. Type of document  
(long - stay visa, residence permit or residence card) 
8. Document number 
9. Issuing MS 
10. Validity period 
11. Status  ( valid/extended/withdrawn) 

Decision data 
12. Previously issued documents  
(short - stay visa, long - stay visa, residence permit) 
13. Rejected applications  
14. Authority   that took the  decision 
15. Date  and time of the   decision 
16. Reasons for the negative  decision 

(only sub - option b) 

(only  sub - option b) 

In the case of option 3.4.b, the data stored upon applying for a long-stay document would 
be a combination of the biographical and travel document data presented above and would 
also include: the fact that an application for a certain type of document was lodged, when, 
where and with which Member State authority. 

Figure 8: Dataset for residence card file 

Biographical data 

1. First name 
2. Last name 
3. Date of birth 
4. Nationality 
5. Sex 

Document data 
6. Travel document (passport) number 
7. Type of document  
(long-stay visa, residence permit or residence card) 
8. Document number 
9. Issuing MS 
10. Validity period 
11. Status (valid/extended/withdrawn) 

Residence cards are a special case: as regards the residence card file, information will only 
be stored upon issuing the document (i.e. the residence cards). Authorities responsible for 
issuing  these  documents  (consulates  or  legal  migration  authorities)  would  have  access  to 
introduce  and  store  data  upon  application/  issuance  (of  the  residence  card),  and 
subsequently to amend, and update the file. Border authorities and authorities responsible 
for checks within the territory, would only have access to check with the data provided by 
the person and would not have access to carry out modifications of the personal data. 

The table 9 below summarises the processing applicable to the options. 

Table 9: Data processing 

Option 

Collection 

Storage 

Access 

Transfer113 

Deletion 

3.3 Decentralised 
database 

3.4.a Store data on 
issued documents 

0 

√ 

0 

√ 

√ 

√ 

0 

√ 

0 

√ 

113   To  a  third-country  or  international  organisation  -  in  line  with  what  currently  exists  for  VIS  data,  exceptional 
transfer of some data could take place for the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorism or other serious 
criminal offences. In such case, the same conditions and safeguards that currently exist in the VIS would apply. 

47 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
  
3.4.b Store data on 
applications 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

Option 3.3 would have an impact on data protection, as it would add an additional access 
to existing data114 (and thus more processing, and more risks of unlawful access to or use 
of the data). 

Option 3.4.a would have a stronger impact on data protection, as, in addition to access, it 
entails the collection and storage of data.115 

Finally,  option  3.4.b  would  have  a  slightly  stronger  impact  on  data  protection  compared 
with  option  3.4.a  as  it  involves  the  processing  of  application  data  in  addition  to  issued 
document data. It would thus entail the processing of a larger dataset. 

Both  options  3.4.a  and  3.4.b  entail  more  risks  to  data  than  option  3.3  as  they  rely  on 
a central  database  (the  VIS)  for  storage.116  However,  it  also  has  to  be  taken  into  account 
that  while  more  data  is  at  risk,  the  likelihood  of  a  breach  is  smaller  as  there  is  only  one 
system to protect and monitor. This consideration should nevertheless be qualified, as both 
option  3.4.a  and  3.4.b  propose  a  limited  dataset:  as  per  the  current  proposal,  they  would 
entail  the  processing  of  16,  11  respectively,  data  items,  most  of  which  are  based  on  the 
document dataset. The dataset does not  encompass the special categories of data that are 
considered as particularly sensitive.117 The “reason for the negative decision” might, if left 
as  a  free  text  field,  reveal  data  related  to  private  life  or  sensitive  data  on  rare  occasions. 
The  use  of  a  drop-down  menu,  tick  boxes  or  another  technical  feature  of  the  form  will 
prevent  this  as  an  additional  safeguard.  The  reasons  for  the  negative  decision  should  be 
provided  in  a  manner  that  is  limited  to  allowing  the  designated  authority  to  achieve  the 
purpose of carrying out the assessment of security and irregular migration checks (through 
verifications on whether the person is registered in the system with previous refusal due to 
identity  or  document  fraud  or  for  being  a  threat  to  the  national  security  of  one  or  more 
Member  States),  subject  to  the  existing  limitations  in  law.  Additional  safeguards  will  be 
included to ensure that the use of the data is fully in line with applicable legislation in the 
field  of  legal  migration  or  freedom  of  movement,  as  applicable,  at  either  EU  or  national 
level, notably that a previous refusal of a document should not automatically lead to a new 
refusal and that each application should be considered on its own merits. 

Options 3.3 and  3.4  would  not  affect the right  of the individuals to  access their personal 
data,  rectification  and  objection.  No  derogation  to  the  general  data  protection  regime  of 
Member  States  or  of  the  VIS  Regulation  would  be  created.  All  existing  provisions  and 

114   According to the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, access and use of personal 
data by the authorities constitute a further interference with the right of privacy. See EDPS (April 2017) “Assessing 
the necessity of measures that limit the fundamental right to the protection of personal data: A Toolkit”, page 11. 
See also and Weber and Saravia v. Germany no. 54934/00, paragraphs 76 to 79,  

115   Indeed,  distinct processing  operations  may  constitute  separate  limitations  on  the  right  to  personal  data  protection 
and when applicable with the right to privacy. See EDPS (April 2017) “Assessing the necessity of measures that 
limit the fundamental right to the protection of personal data: A Toolkit”, page 11. 

116   From a data protection perspective, it is considered that central databases create a “single point of failure” and an 
addition  attractiveness  for  hacking  considered  the  amount  of  data  stored  in  a  single  place.  On  the  other  hand, 
consulted  stakeholders  mentioned  that  decentralised  storage  (having  multiple,  small  databases  only  containing  a 
subset of information) could be seen as more vulnerable than central storage of all data. 

117   Article 9 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 

48 

 
 
                                                      
safeguards  would  apply,  including  for  option  3.3  the  ones  present  in  the  current  VIS 
Regulation, among which Article 38 (Right of access, correction and deletion). 

Options  3.3,  3.4.a  and  3.4.b  would  not  affect  the  right  of  the  individuals  to  access  their 
personal  data,  rectification  and  objection.  No  derogation  to  the  general  data  protection 
regime  of  Member  States  or  of  the  VIS  Regulation  would  be  created.  All  existing 
provisions and safeguards would apply, including for option 3.3.  

Only  a  limited  data  set  would  be  collected,  at  most,  on  about  22 million  documents118 
(including residence cards). It must be taken into account that this figure does not represent 
net  new  sets  of  personal  data  as  compared  to  what  is  already  registered  in  the  EU  large 
scale IT systems for borders and migration: 

-  As regards TCN under a visa obligation, depending also on the regime in place in each 
Member  State,  there  is  a  high  likelihood  that  a  person  applying  for  a  residence 
document has already access the territory of the Member States with a short stay visa in 
order  to  apply  for  the  residence  document.  In  those  cases,  these  persons  are  already 
registered in the VIS.   

-  As regards a visa-free TCN, with the entry into operations of ETIAS the data of each 
person  travelling  for  a  short  stay  to  EU  will  be  registered  (except  fingerprints).  With 
the entry into operations of EES, the data of all visa free TCN entering the EU territory, 
including biometric (live facial image and four fingerprints), will also be registered in 
this system, with the exception of holders of residence cards (who are exempted from 
registration  in  the  EES  as  in  their  respect  the  obligation  of  stays  on  the  territory  not 
exceeding 90 days in any 180 days does not apply).  

The above considerations also imply that for the persons applying for a long stay document 
(visa or residence permit), the personal data is already recorded in a centralised database, 
VIS  and  in  the  future  ETIAS  and  EES,  and  therefore  creating  the  file  for  the  long  stay 
application  will  entail  reusing  personal  data,  including  biometrics,  where  available,  from 
existing records.  

Right to life (Article 2 CFR): options 3.2, 3.3 and both sub-options under 3.4 may have a 
positive impact on the right to life by increasing security. The extent of the link between 
long-stay and residence documents fraud and the right to life of EU residents is difficult to 
assess, due to limited data available.  

Option  3.2  would  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  right  to  life,  as  it  would  reinforce  the 
security of the EU through making long-stay and residence documents more secure; 

  Options 3.3 and 3.4.a would have a similar positive impact on the right to life, as they 
would both reinforce the security of the EU through the access of border guards, law 
enforcement and migration authorities to long-stay and residence document data. This 
positive  impact  may  be  more  significant  than  the  one  of  option  3.2  since  the  options 
would create a “white list” of valid documents adding another level of security on top 
of existing security features; 

118   Numbers taken from the previous study on the extension of the VIS. Currently there are an  estimated 22 million 
documents in circulation (19 million residence permits, 2 million long-stay visas and an amount of residence cards 
not exactly known but estimated at 1 million). 

49 

 
 
                                                      
  Option 3.4.b would have, compared to options 3.3 and 3.4.a, a more significant positive 
impact on the right to life, as it would further reinforce EU residents’ security via the 
consideration,  during  the  issuance  process  of  long-stay  visas  or  residence  permits,  of 
relevant information linked to the person’s previous applications. 

Similarly, access by law enforcement authorities for preventing terrorism and other serious 
criminal offences could also have a further positive impact on this right. 

Right to privacy (Article 7 CFR):  

  Option  3.2  would  have  a  limited  impact  on  the  right  to  privacy,  as  it  would  not 

significantly change data processing as compared to the baseline; 

  Option 3.3 would have a more significant negative impact on the right to privacy than 
3.2, as it entails additional access to and use of existing data by public authorities119; 

  Option    3.4.a  would  have  a  more  significant  negative  impact  on  the  right  to  privacy 
than 3.3, as the option entails the storing, access and use by a public authority of data 
related to private life120. 

  Option 3.4.b would have a more significant negative impact on the right to privacy than 
3.4.a, as the option entails the same processing by public authorities as 3.4.a, but for a 
larger dataset. 

Right of freedom of movement and of residence (Article 21 TFUE, Directive 2004/38, 
and  Article  45.2  CFR)121:  options  3.2,  3.3,  and  3.4  (both  sub-options)  would  have  a 
positive impact on this right if residence cards are included in their scope. It would lead to 
facilitation and time savings during external border checks (and internal ones, when they 
are exceptionally carried out as border guard would more easily  recognise the validity of 
the residence card. 

  Option 3.3 would have a slightly more significant, positive impact on the right than 3.2, 
as  the  check  to  the  database  would  also  solve  issues  related  to  technical  problems  in 
reading the chips and thus prevent lengthy second-line checks in such cases; 

  Option  3.4  (both  sub-options)  would  have  a  more  significant,  positive  impact  on  the 
right  than  3.3,  as  the  check  to  a  central  database  would  be  quicker  than  a  check  to  a 
decentralised one, therefore time and convenience as facilitation gained would be more 
important. 

As  regards  the  inclusion  of  TCN  members  of  family  of  a  mobile  EU  citizen  (i.e.  of 
residence cards data), it must be underlined that this impact assessment treats the situation 
of  all  categories  of  TCN  in  a  non-discriminatory  manner.  The  distinction  made  between 
family  members  of  mobile  EU  nationals  and  the  other  TCN,  family  members  of  an  EU 

119    See Digital Rights Ireland, paragraph 35, available at the following link.  
120   EDPS  (April  2017)  “Assessing  the  necessity  of  measures  that  limit  the  fundamental  right  to  the  protection  of 
personal data: A Toolkit”, page 11. The European Court of Human Rights has further specified that “data related to 
private life” should not be interpreted restrictively and encompasses business and professional activity. Within the 
proposed  dataset,  the  reason  for  the  negative  decision  on  an  application  could  contain  such  information  (e.g.  the 
person  employment,  family,  health  situation  has  changed).  See  European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  Amann  v. 
Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, § 65, available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["001-58497"]}  
Article  45.2:  “Freedom  of  movement  and  residence  may  be  granted,  in  accordance  with  the  Treaty  establishing  the 

European Community, to nationals of third countries legally resident in the territory of a Member State”. 

50 

 
 
                                                      
national or not, is driven by the difference in the residence document that is issued, i.e. a 
card  for  the  first  category,  a  permit  for  the  second.  The  difference  between  these  two 
categories of documents comes from the different conditions of issuance, i.e. based on EU 
legislation which distinguishes between the conditions applied to issuing residence permits 
to family members of EU nationals in general (the Family Reunification Directive), and the 
conditions applied to issuing cards to family members of mobile EU nationals (Directive 
38/2004).  

However,  this  initiative  is  without  prejudice  to  the  conditions  or  grounds  of  issuance  of 
these  documents.  Instead,  it  focuses  on  two  objectives  (faciliting  checks  at  borders  and 
ensuring the security of the Schengen area) which stem from the conditions of crossing an 
external  border  to  which  all  TCN,  irrespective  of  the  reasons  for  which  a  document  of 
residence was issued to them, are subject.  

There is currently no mechanism in place to exchange information among Member States 
enabling them to assess at borders and even before a residence document is issued, whether 
the person could pose a security risk or is an identity fraudster, as the current assessment is 
based exclusively on national information. Hence, if this category of TCN was left outside 
the scope of this initiative, the information gap and thus the security gap identified in the 
problem definition would be reduced, but not closed and advantage of this could be taken  
in order to obtain an easier, less checked and more comprehensive (due to extensive rights 
attached to it) access to enter, freely move and reside in the EU territory. 

Considerations on biometric data in option 3.4 

Adding biometric data, and particularly fingerprints, to the data set to be accessible in the 
database would have the advantage of allowing identification of the bearer of the residence 
permit, residence card or long-stay visa122 with a level of certainty much higher than as it 
would  be  without  (relying  solely  on  visual  identification  and/or  identification  based  on 
biographical  data).  It  would  thus  ensure  that  these  documents  are  solely  used  by  the 
genuine bearer. Border guards, law enforcement or migration authorities would be able to 
detect  cases  of  multiple  identities  across  systems  using  biometrics  in  line  with  the 
interoperability  proposal  recently  tabled  by  the  Commission123  and  similarly  to  what 
already  happens  for  short  stay  travellers  whose  biometrics  are  collected  in  the  EES  and 
VIS. 

However,  the  collection  and  storage  of  long-stay  travellers’  biometric  data  by  Member 
States  is  currently  not  harmonised.  While  some  Member  States  collect  and  store 
fingerprints  in  national  databases,  some  other  Member  States  delete  the  biometric  data 
from their databases after placing it on a residence permit or a card. Therefore,  while for 
some  persons  biometric  data  is  available,  for  some  others  it  is  not.  The  number  of 
fingerprints may also vary depending on the Member State. Due to this situation, collecting 
biometric  data  from  national  databases  to  store  them  in  the  EU  database  would  lead  to 

122   According to the 2017 Feasibility study (p.33), there is no EU legislative provision for the collection of biometric 
data  for  long-stay  visas.  Some  MSs  collect  fingerprints  (a  variable  number  depending  from  the  MS)  and  facial 
image. However, in some cases no biometrics are collected at all or they are deleted shortly after the issuance of the 
document (e.g. after 90 days). 

123   COM(2017) 794. 

51 

 
 
                                                      
differences  in  the  collected  data  set  depending  on  the  person  and  the  Member  State  that 
collects it. 

According to the strict necessity principle in data protection, if the system can achieve the 
objectives  without  biometric  data  for  some  persons  (e.g.  when  they  are  not  available,  as 
some Member States have not stored them in a database), it means that biometric data is 
not strictly necessary. However, given that biometrics of most of the TCN affected by this 
measure  are  or  will  be  available  in  the  central  EU  databases  and  that  with  the  proposed 
Shared BMS of the interoperability proposals there would be no technical issue in handling 
different types and different combinations of biometrics, the impact on data protection is 
significantly limited. The system could work with just storing the minimum denominator 
of biometrics per documents (e.g. two fingerprints and facial image for residence permits, 
facial image for long stay visa and residence cards). 

6.1.4.  Migration and security checks 

Economic costs and benefits 

The budgetary impact of this measure could be estimated on the basis of extensive existing 
analysis  of  the  similar  measure  in  ETIAS.  However,  it  must  be  taken  into  account  that 
significant differences exist: there are no setup costs for the VIS, which is already up and 
running. Costs to be taken into account would include the search interface to other systems 
to be developed. In option 4.1 the interoperability platform will be reused. This will reduce 
the  overall  cost  in  a  consistent  manner  and  would  avoid  natural  redundancies  of 
heterogeneous elements.  

Based on similarities with ETIAS (although for a size of the population of about half that 
of ETIAS) – and taking interoperability development costs as already incurred, a high level 
estimate would place the investment for the central system (eu-LISA implementation) for 
implementing option 4.1 (automated and systematic checks against multiple databases) at € 
10 m. Regarding the business impacts for the MS, the interface and process for the ETIAS 
may be reused, thus significantly limiting the costs and complexity for MS integration. 

Both  option  4.1  and  4.2  (automated  cross-checks  +  screening  rules)  would  entail  similar 
costs from this perspective. 

Policy impacts 

The legitimate public interest of ensuring a high level of security is positively affected by 
the  implementation  of  automated  data-base  check.  A  better  and  more  accurate 
identification of the security risk of TCN crossing the external border of the Schengen area 
supports  the  detection  of  cross  border  criminality,  and  it  more  generally  facilitates  the 
identification  of  persons  whose  presence  in  the  Schengen  area  would  pose  a  security, 
migration or public health threat. It would thus contribute to improving the security of the 
citizens present in the Schengen area and enhancing internal security in the EU.  

Benefiting from interoperability proposal, it would be illogical to enable such cross-checks 
for  visa-exempt  TCN,  yet  choose  not  to  use  it  for  visa  required  TCN,  who  by  definition 
come from countries with a higher migratory-security risk for the EU. Thus, the proposed 
measure,  for  both  options  4.1  and  4.2,  is  rebalancing  a  potential  unbalanced  treatment 

52 

 
 
between  visa-exempt  travellers  and  visa-required  travellers,  whereas  option  4.0  (the 
baseline) does not meet this objective.  

Table 10: Effectiveness in meeting the objectives 

Objective 

Migration and security assessment 

Option 

4.0: Baseline 

4.1: Automated cross-checks 

4.2: Automated cross-checks and screening rules 

Fundamental rights impacts 

0 

+ 

++ 

The proposed measure (for options 4.1. and 4.2 which entail taking action) has an impact 
(positive,  negative  or  both)  on  each  of  the  following  fundamental  rights:  right  to  liberty 
and  security  (Article  6  of  the  Charter),  the  protection  of  personal  data  (Article  8  of  the 
Charter),  the  right  to  non-discrimination  (Article  21  of  the  Charter),  and  the  right  to  an 
effective remedy (Article 47 of the Charter).  

As mentioned by FRA in its report on interoperability124: "Receiving the full picture about 
a person contributes to better decision-making. To this end, safeguards need to be in place 
to ensure the quality of the information stored about the person and the purpose of the data 
processing.  Such  safeguards  should  prevent  unauthorised  access  and  unlawful  sharing  of 
information  with  third  parties.  To  ensure  the  right  to  an  effective  remedy,  practical 
possibilities  to  rebut  a  false  assumption  by  the  authorities  and  to  have  inaccurate  data 
corrected  need  to  be  in  place."  At  the  same  time,  this  measure  guarantees  non-
discriminatory  checks  for  all  short  stay  visa  applicants,  irrespective  of  the  Member  State 
with which they are applying – which is currently not the case. The VIS Regulation already 
contains guarantees ensuring information for the person who submitted an application and 
effective remedies (as explained in section 5.1 in the baseline description).  

The  proposed  measure  aims  at  enhancing  security  and  irregular  migration  checks,  hence 
contributing to the legitimate public interest of ensuring a high level of security. As such, it 
can contribute to the protection of people’s right to life (Article 2 of the Charter). A better 
and  more  accurate  identification  of  the  security  risk  posed  by  TCN  applying  for  a  visa 
allowing  them  to  cross  the  external  border  and  move  freely  within  the  Schengen  area 
facilitates the identification of persons whose presence in the Schengen area would pose a 
security threat. This way the proposed measure would contribute to improving the security 
of the citizens present in the Schengen area and enhancing internal security in the EU.  

The  proposed  checks  against  a  number  of  migration  and  security  databases  do  not  entail 
collecting new data from the applicants, however they entail new processing, by checking 
their  bio-data,  in  particular  biometrics,  against  a  number  of  large-scale  databases  which 
were previously not part of the compulsory checks in the visa procedure. However, these 
checks  are  currently  either  already  done  by  national  authorities  (SIS,  Eurodac,  SLTD, 

124   Fundamental  rights  and  the interoperability  of EU  information systems:  borders  and  security, Report  by the EU 

Agency for Fundamental Rights.  

53 

 
 
                                                      
TDAWN) within the consulates (at an uneven or ad-hoc basis) or at borders (compulsory), 
or will become compulsory checks in the future (ETIAS). The only new system that will be 
checked  against  is  ECRIS-TCN,  which  is  however  included  as  a  compulsory  check  for 
ETIAS applicants.  

Given  the  purpose  of  the  visa  examination  procedure  which  entails  an  assessment  of  the 
security  and  migratory  risk  of  the  visa  applicant,  and  that  all  the  above  mentioned 
databases respond to this purpose, the processing against databases will be limited to what 
is  necessary  to  attain  the  objective  of  ensuring  a  high  level  of  security  of  the  visa 
processing.  The  checks  will  be  carried  out  with  a  limited  sub-set  of  biographical  data 
together  with  fingerprints,  thus  limiting  significantly  the  possibility  of  false  matches. 
Moreover,  the  searches  will  be  foreseen  so  as  to  return  an  informative  result  to  the  visa 
processing  authority.  They  will  not  trigger  an  automatic  refusal  of  the  visa  and  cannot, 
taken alone, constitute a reason for refusal.  

The search results will not be stored, therefore no possible breach of its integrity or of the 
confidentiality  of  the  data  subject  could  take  place.  The  measure  is  also  subject  to  the 
purpose  limitation  principle,  as  the  data  that  will  be  used  for  these  checks  will  not  be 
further processed in a manner that is incompatible with the stated purposes. The envisaged 
data processing is therefore adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes 
defined.  Finally,  all  existing  VIS  safeguards  regarding  the  right  of  the  data  subject, 
including the right to access, deletion and the effective remedy will apply to this procedure 
as well. 

As  regards  the  screening  rules,  they  are  devised  on  the  exact  same  conditions  as  those 
applied in ETIAS to visa free TCN. They do not entail processing of personal data, only a 
check  against  a  number  of  statistical  indicators,  based  on  a  model  customarily  used  in 
migratory and risk assessments (e.g. Frontex annual risk assessment). Specific safeguards 
ensuring  that  the  right  to  non-discrimination  based  on  a  person’s  race,  colour,  ethnic  or 
social  origin,  genetic  features,  language,  political  or  any  other  opinions,  religion  or 
philosophical  belief,  trade  union  membership,  membership  of  a  national  minority, 
property, birth, disability, or sexual orientation will be expressly provided. To ensure  the 
supervision of the set up and application of the screening rules and in particular of the non-
discrimination  principle,  the  specific  risk  indicators  on  the  basis  of  which  the  screening 
rules  will  be  developed,  will  be  defined,  established,  assessed  ex  ante,  implemented, 
evaluated ex post, revised and deleted based on the appraisal and recommendations of the 
Fundamental Rights Guidance Board established by the ETIAS Regulation, and which is 
composed  of  the  Fundamental  Rights  Officer  of  the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard 
Agency, a representative of the consultative forum on fundamental rights of the European 
Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency,  a  representative  of  the  EDPS,  a  representative  of  the 
European Data Protection Board and a representative of the Fundamental Rights Agency. 

In  terms  of  proportionality,  limitations  to  privacy  and  data  protection  brought  about  by 
options  4.1  and  4.2  (which  is  similar  to  4.1  in  terms  of  data  protection  impact,  as  the 
screening mechanism does not entail processing personal data) preserve the essence of the 
rights.  

54 

 
 
7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? 

The options for all four problems analysed will be scored for their effectiveness in meeting 
the objectives; the efficiency (the result of striking a balance between costs and benefits); 
their  social  impact  and  impact  on  fundamental  rights  –  given  the  fact  that  the  measures 
involve  a  trade-off  between  fundamental  rights  impacts  and  gains  in  other  terms  (i.e. 
security); and lastly for their coherence with overarching EU policies. 

7.1.  Copy of the travel document 

Efficiency and effectiveness 

Both  Option  1.1  (centralised  storage  of  travel  document  copy)  and  Option  1.2 
(decentralised  storage),  as  well  as  their  sub-options,  can  contribute  to  the  identified 
objectives  of  general  interest, though  Option  1.1  performs  moderately better  and  in  a  far 
more  cost-efficient  manner  than  Option  1.2.  This  is  reflected  in  the  scoring  for  cost 
efficiency and effectiveness in meeting the objectives, in Table 11 below. 

Beyond improvements that would be achieved by sub-option A – which would already be 
sufficient for the identified purposes of facilitating return procedures, sub-option B would 
translate  into  an  improvement  when  it  comes  to  proving  the  travel  history,  which  is 
important for VIS's ancillary purposes in return and asylum procedures. 

Social impacts and fundamental rights 

The  analysis  of  impacts  fundamental  rights  (section  6.1.1.)  showed  that  the  all  proposed 
options would have a positive effect on asylum procedures (to identify persons in need of 
international protection). 

In terms of negative effects on fundamental rights, storing a copy of the travel document 
would entail further processing of personal data. These considerations are also reflected in 
the scoring for fundamental rights in the Table 11 below. 

Necessity and proportionality 

For options 1.1, Option 1.2 and Sub-option A the measure would be demonstrably suitable 
with respect to achieving its purpose, therefore both options satisfy the proportionality test. 
The travel document data page is precisely what is required by third country authorities as 
proof of nationality in the absence of a valid travel document.  

While both options will achieve the same level of effectiveness in fulfilling the objectives, 
Option 1.1 achieves a higher level of efficiency (timeliness, cost-efficiency and security). 
Furthermore,  Option  1.2  (decentralised  storage)  cannot  necessarily  be  considered  as  less 
intrusive  given  that  the  same  information  would  ultimately  be  made  available  to  the 
designated return authorities in all Member States. No matter which technical architecture 
is  selected,  the  measure  is  intended  to  enable  a  Member  State’s  authority  to  access  data 
stored by (an)other Member State during the visa procedure. 

As to the proportionality of the sub-options, the scope of personal data to be stored under 
sub-option A is both relevant and necessary for the stated purposes of facilitating returns. 
The intrusiveness of the proposed sub-option is in itself very modest, as the same data are 
already entered in VIS in the current situation, albeit in a different format.  

55 

 
 
As  regards  sub-option  A,  assuring  that  appropriate  safeguards  prevent  against  the 
processing of these new data, the interference on the right to privacy and the protection of 
personal data would not be greater than the current VIS system, for which no complaint on 
data  protection  has  been  registered  to  date125,  and  adequate  safeguards  have  been  put  in 
place.  By  contrast,  the  data  implied  by  sub-option  B  is  more  intrusive  and  it  would  not 
substantially  contribute  to  the explicit  objective of  the  measure,  which is  to  facilitate  the 
return of TCNs without a valid travel document. Since sub-option B is more intrusive and 
no  more  effective  for  achieving  the  identified  objectives  it  could  be  concluded  that  the 
processing  of  these  data  is  considered  disproportionate  if  it  were  to  be  stored  centrally. 
Therefore, the necessity and proportionality of a measure involving storage  – either 
at central level (Option 1.1) or decentral level (Option 1.2)  – of a digital copy of the 
data  page  of  the  visa  applicants’  travel  document  in  the  VIS  system  would  be 
justified. 

Coherence 

All proposed options and sub-options are coherent with other EU policies also in particular 
the return policy, as well as the asylum policy. They are also fully coherent with the visa 
policy and the proposal amending the Visa Code.126 

Table 11: Overall comparison of policy options (1) 

Option 

Coherence 

Effectiveness in 
meeting the 
objectives 

1.0  Baseline 

0 

0 

Social impacts 
and 
fundamental 
rights 
0 

1.1 

Digital copy of the 
travel document in the 
central VIS 

A 

Biographical page only 

++ 

++ 

B  All used pages 

+++ 

+++ 

1.2 

Digital copy of the 
travel document in 
national systems 

A 

Biographical page only 

B  All used pages 

+ 

++ 

+ 

++ 

7.2.  Fingerprinting of minors 

Efficiency and effectiveness 

-/+ 

--/+ 

-/+ 

---/+ 

Efficiency 
(economic costs 
and benefits 

0 

++ 

- 

+ 

- 

As stated when describing the impacts in the section 6.1.2, lowering the fingerprinting age 
of  children  in  VIS  meets  the  objectives,  which  is  why  both  option  2.1  and  2.2  are 

125   See COM(2016) 655 final, page 12. 
126   COM(2018)252, Return of migrants is analysed here as a part of visa policy. 

56 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
considered  to  be  effective.  Option  2.1  is  more  effective  because  research  shows  that  the 
fingerprints of children under the age of 6 are not as reliable as fingerprints of the children 
above the age of 6. This scientific finding, coupled with the fact that there is a relatively 
low  number  of  children  affected  by  abuse  of  rights  phenomena  (including  trafficking)  in 
this age group (i.e. meaning below the age of 11 years, taking into account the maximum 
period of validity of a granted visa), means that the option 2.2. is less effective in meeting 
the objectives, which is reflected in the score for effectiveness in Table 12 below.  

From the description of the costs/benefits in section 6.1.2, results that option 2.1 (lowering 
fingerprinting age to 6) involves much less economic costs than option 2.2 (including all 
ages), which is fully reflected in the rating of efficiency in the Table 12 below. 

Social impacts and fundamental rights 

The  analysis  of  fundamental  rights  impacts  (section  6.1.2)  showed  that  the  measure 
includes a trade-off between positive and negative impacts: it would have a positive impact 
for  the  protection  of  the  fundamental  rights  of  children,  protecting  them  against  human 
trafficking or protecting the right to family life by reuniting trafficked children with their 
family members. However, storing such sensitive personal data of a vulnerable age-group 
would naturally also entail negative impacts, as was duly stated in the analysis. However it 
was  considered  that  the  positive  impacts  outweigh  the  negative  ones.  The  rating  of  the 
fundamental rights in Table 12 reflects these considerations.  

Necessity and proportionality 

From  a  data  protection  point  of  view,  both  options  are  found  to  be  appropriate,  strictly 
necessary  and  not  excessive  for  the  objective  of  border  checks,  by  providing  the  only 
means available to allow an unambiguous identification of the child at the border or within 
the  territory,  both  to  prevent  trafficking  but  also  allowing  to  identify  and  return  to  the 
family children that had gone missing or were found victims of trafficking. 

Option 2.1 –  Taking into account the immense positive impact for protecting the right to 
family  life  and  best  interests  of  the  child,  this  option  can  be  considered  a  proportional 
measure  under  specified  purposes  and  given the  strict  conditions  and safeguards  existing 
on  data  protection  ensuring  that  the  fingerprints  are  only  accessed  under  the  visa  and 
border  procedures  provided  by  law  and  otherwise  only  used  to  protect  children  from 
trafficking or identify and protect trafficked children and missing children.  

Option 2.2 – Since all children are entitled to protection, this option would have a positive 
impact with regards to the protection of all TCN children under 6 having applied for a visa. 
However, there are several limitations: the number of potentially affected (i.e. trafficked) 
children  appears  to  be  relatively  low,  for  this  age  group  there  is  less  reliability  of  the 
fingerprints taken and there would be significantly higher practical hurdles in carrying out 
fingerprinting  in  a  child-friendly  and  adequate  manner  for  very  young  children.  This 
hampers the overall effectiveness of the measure: the effectiveness of the measure for all 
children  from  0  to  12  years  is  lower  than  for  children  between  6  and  12  alone.  In 
conclusion, whereas taking fingerprints of children below the age of 6 would still meet the 
policy  objective  to  a  certain  degree,  it  appears  to  be  less  proportionate  in  view  of  the 
technical limitations it entails, as well as the relatively low number of children targeted in 
this age group.  

57 

 
 
In light of these considerations, the data collected under option 2.1 is relevant and needed 
to  contribute  to  the  first  objective  of  improving  the  implementation  of  the  common  visa 
policy, whereas the option 2.2 does not reach this threshold. 

Coherence 

Both proposed options are coherent with other EU policies  – namely the visa policy, and 
also  respect  for  the  principle  of  primary  consideration  of  the  best  interests  of  the  child, 
which should be taken into account in all EU action. Additionally, option 2.1 presents full 
coherence with the recent Eurodac proposal which provides for lowering the fingerprinting 
age  for  children  in  asylum  procedure  or  found  in  irregular  migration  process  from  the 
(current)  14  years  of  age  to  6  years.  Taken  together,  the  data  registered  in  the  VIS 
(covering  children  arriving  on  EU  territory  as  part  of  a  regular  migration  process)  and 
Eurodac  (covering  children  arriving  with  irregular  flows  or  seeking  asylum)  cover  to  a 
very large extent the spectrum of third country national children arriving on EU territory 
and that could be identified in case they are found as victims of trafficking or other forms 
of  abuse  or  who  had  been  reposted  as  missing.  To  complement  this  framework,  the  SIS 
that  contains  alerts  on  missing  persons  (including  children)  could  be  fed  with  identity 
information, including biometrics, from the VIS, to support the search operations, in case 
the child that had gone missing is a TCN under visa obligation.  

Table 12: Overall comparison of policy options (2) 

Option 

Coherence 

2.0  Baseline 

2.1 

2.2 

Lowering the 
fingerprinting age 
to 6 years 
Lowering the 
fingerprinting age 
all ages 

0 

+++ 

+ 

Effectiveness in 
meeting the 
objectives 
0 

Social impacts 
and fundamental 
rights 
0 

Efficiency 
(economic costs 
and benefits 
0 

++ 

+/0 

++/- 

++/- 

++ 

-- 

7.3.  Long-stay visas and residence documents 

Efficiency and effectiveness 

Effectiveness:  Ultimately,  sub-option 3.4.b  (Integrate  in  the  VIS)  is  the  only  option  that 
fully  addresses  the  second  objective  (i.e.  information  exchange),  as  storing  data  on 
documents  and  applications  would  offer  migration  authorities  a  complete  picture  on  the 
situation of the TCN applying for a new document.  It would be effective regarding false 
documents, including forged documents, as in these cases the information in the database 
would  differ  from  the  information  in  the  document  presented  to  the  border  guard.  And 
would  be  effective  regarding  letting  migration  authorities  know  of  security  issues 
encountered by other Member States with previous applications or use of the document by 
the TCN. 

Concerning Option 3.3 (the distributed database), it would allow improving security within 
the EU and provide border guards and officers carrying checks within the territory access 
to  a  “white  list”  of  valid  documents.  However,  its  complexity  and  difficulty  of 

58 

 
 
implementation, together with the difficulties in delivering high performance searches with 
such setup, would reduce its effectiveness in addressing the policy objectives.  

While  taking  into  account  the  upcoming  Commission  proposal  to  further  harmonise  the 
format of the residence cards, the Option 3.2 (further harmonisation of the format)  would 
meet the general and the specific objectives related to checks at external border as it will 
make  it  more  difficult  to  forge  or  counterfeit  the  document  -  and  thus  improve  security 
within the EU. This option would also make it easier for border guards to recognise valid 
residence  document.  However  it  does  not  meet  the  specific  objective  of  exchanging 
information between Member States on third-country national holders of, or applying for, 
long-stay  and  residence  documents,  and  cannot  fully  address  the  problem  at  borders 
either.127  These  considerations  are  reflected  in  the  scoring  of  options  for  effectiveness  in 
Table 13 below. 

Efficiency: Option 3.2 – Further document harmonisation scores positively for efficiency in 
securing borders128, albeit limited to the documents that are subject to harmonisation and 
contain security features. However, for this option it must be emphasized that the objective 
of facilitating the exchange of information for enhancing the security of the Schengen area 
is not met (which is reflected in the score given to this option for effectiveness). 

Option 3.3  –  creating  a  decentralised  database  –  will  be  complex  and  overly  costly  to 
implement,  due  to  major  difficulties  deriving  from  the  different  governance,  legal  basis, 
languages  and  technical  solutions  used  across  national  systems.  These  difficulties  could 
delay  implementation  by  several  years.  Moreover,  it  would  not  leverage  on  the  existing 
infrastructure of the VIS.  

Option 3.4 – (either sub-option a/b) offers significant advantages and a much better cost-
benefit.  In  particular,  only  this  option  would  allow  ''triangular  verification''  (person  <=> 
document  <=>  system),  which  has  proven  to  be  a  successful  approach  for  the  efficient 
tackling of unlawful use of documents through the correct assessment of (i) their validity 
and authenticity and of (ii) the identity of the holder. It provides a higher level of security 
than  reinforcing  the  security  of  documents,  as  it  cannot  be  affected  by  material  damage 
(e.g.  broken  chip  in  a  residence  document)  or  loss  of  the  document.  This  approach  also 
allows accurate identification (in particular if biometrics are stored in the central database 
–  as  explained  in  section  6.1.3  in  the  consideration  on  biometrics)  in  a  less  cumbersome 
manner  than  using  fingerprints  stored  in  the  chip.  Overall,  this  option  would  have 
a positive societal impact both on EU citizens who would benefit of the additional security 
of  the  Schengen  Area,  and  on  TCNs  who  would  benefit of  an  automated  and  potentially 
faster  border  crossing.  Furthermore,  this  option  is  supported  by  the  public  consultation: 
a majority of the respondents who consider that an EU solution should be given to address 
the  identified  information  gap  would  also  support  a  repository  of  long  stay  visas  and 

127   As  described  by  Frontex:  by  making  documents  secure,  fraudsters  start  targeting  the  previous  steps  i.e.  breeder 

documents. 

128   Based on the assessment included in the IA of the DG JUST proposal. 

59 

 
 
                                                      
residence  documents  as  part  of  the  already  existing  Visa  Information  System,  while 
respecting the principle of separation of data and access rights by the various authorities129. 

Table 13: Overall comparison of policy options (3) 

Option 

Coherence 

 3.0  Baseline 

 3.2 

Further format 
harmonisation 

 3.3  Distributed database 

3.4.a 

3.4.b 

Extend the VIS with 
documents data 
Extend the VIS with 
documents and 
application data130 

0 

++ 

+ 

+++ 

+++ 

Effectiveness in 
meeting the 
objectives 
0 

Social impact 
and fundamental 
rights 
0 

Efficiency 
(economic costs 
and benefits) 
0 

+/- 

+ 

++ 

0/- 

+/--- 

+/-- 

+++ 

++/--- 

+ 

-- 

++ 

++ 

Additional  benefits  of  VIS  stem  from  the  fact  that  it  is  already  used  and  well  known  by 
Member  States131  and  it  serves  similar  business  processes.  As  part  of  the  new 
interoperability  platform,  the  inclusion  of  data  in  the  VIS  opens  the  possibility  for 
detection of multiple identities of TCN applying for one of these documents, and to police 
identity  checks  within  the  territory.  With  this  option,  MS  would  be  able  to  benefit  of  its 
search services offered centrally, in a proven, controlled and highly performing manner. It 
would maximise the re-use of existing infrastructure, including benefitting from ancillary 
services such as logging, reporting, data quality, statistic extractions, access control etc.  

For border checks: The central system would be consulted by border guards to verify the 
documents arriving at the borders against a centralised system and the travel document of 
the  holder  (triangular  verification).  It  would  simplify  the  administrative  burden,  by 
enabling  fast,  electronic  checks  via  the  central  system.  It  would  also  reduce  the  need  of 
bilateral  exchanges  triggered  by  doubts  on  the  documents.  It  would  also  help  efficiently 
implement  the  future  Carrier  Gateway  of  EES  and  ETIAS  –  in  the  absence  of  these 
documents in the system, the gateway would give a false negative as a short stay visa or an 
ETIAS travel authorisation would not be found for that traveller, thus generating confusion 
for  the  carriers,  adding  to  the  administrative  burden  of  procedure  and  potential  negative 
consequences  for  the  TCN  that  would  then  have  the  burden  of  proof  that  they  do  not 
require them. 

For  migration  and  security  assessment:  By  centralising  information,  this  option  would 
mitigate the information gap and support the cooperation among MS during the assessment 
of  new  applications,  by  enabling  them  to  perform  upstream  checks  on  the  applicant,  in 

129   Open public consultation feedback (see Annex 2). 
130   "application  data"  refers  to  whether  a  person  has  applied  for  a  document  and  what  was  the  outcome  of  the 

application process. 

131   As regards the particular case of residence cards, which give a right of free movement not only within the Schengen 
area but in all MS, additional access to the VIS will need to be provided, for the purpose of storing the cards and 
checking those issued by other MS, also to Bulgarian, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania and the UK (to be noted 
that Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania have already built the national VIS in the preparations to become part of the 
Schengen area, although they do not have legally the right to access the system for the purpose of processing short-
stay visas until a Council Decision on lifting the internal border controls with these countries is taken. Hence, new 
access to VIS repository on cards would be limited to Ireland and Cyprus. 

60 

 
 
                                                      
particular to assess irregular migration and security risks e.g. by accessing information on 
previous  applications  in  other  Member  States,  the  use  made  of  previously  issued 
documents,  or  to  use  VIS's  interoperability  to  other  databases  to  perform  basic  security 
checks and detect identity fraud. Additionally, the information on long-stay and residence 
document holders could support  the examination of asylum applications and determining 
the MS responsible for such applications (similarly to what is already done for short-stay 
visas  in  the  VIS132).  Furthermore,  the  stakeholders'  consultation  confirmed  the  need  for 
developing  a  shared  EU  repository  that  would  contribute  to  reducing  identity  and 
irregular  migration,  and  preventing,  detecting  and 
document  fraud,  combatting 
investigating terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences133. 

Social impact and fundamental rights 

In  terms  of  social  impacts  and  fundamental  rights  there  is  a  trade-off  between  increased 
security  for  the  society  and  impact  on  fundamental  rights  (namely  through  processing  of 
personal  data):  by  helping  to  increase  security  of  the  EU  through  information-exchange, 
the options which meet the objective of information exchange (options 3.3, 3.4.a and 3.4.b) 
also  score  high  for  their  social  impacts,  whereas  option  3.2  and  the  baseline  3.0  do  not 
meet the security objective, so they score much less in terms of benefits on social impacts. 
As  analysed  in  greater  detail  in  section  6.1.3  under  impacts  on  fundamental  rights,  the 
options  which  include  putting  personal  data  in  a  repository  (3.3.,  3.4.a/b)  will  have  an 
impact  on  fundamental  rights.  However,  already  existing  and  proposed  safeguards  will 
minimise these impacts, as is explained in more detail in the next section on the necessity 
and  proportionality  of  the  options.    These  considerations  are  reflected  in  the  scores  in 
Table  13.  It  is  important  to  note  that  option  3.4.b  (centralised  repository,  with  data  on 
applications)  scores  best  in  terms  of  trading  off  positive  social  impacts  and  impacts  on 
fundamental rights (on the other hand, option 3.2 of document harmonisation entails less 
impacts on fundamental rights, but positive social impacts are all minimized as well). 

Necessity and proportionality 

In an area without internal borders, no Member State alone is able to cope with irregular 
immigration and to cover for the risks to the security of this area, including international 
terrorism  and  serious  crime.  A  person  may  enter  the  Schengen  area  using  a  document 
issued under national competence by one Member State and circulate freely to the territory 
of the other Member States. A comprehensive verification of the compliance with EU rules 
on crossing external borders therefore cannot be ensured by Member States acting alone.  

While Member States will retain fully their current competence in issuing long stay visas 
and residence documents in accordance with national legislation and applicable EU law, in 
particular  data  protection  rules,  storing  data  on  these  documents  in  the  VIS  would  allow 
Member  State  authorities  to  access  data  on  third-country  nationals  who  cross  the  EU 
external border with a document issued by another Member State in an easy, safe, secure 
and  streamlined  manner,  as  well  as  use  the  data  stored  on  previous  applications  to  take 
informed decisions on whether the person could be a threat to the security of the Schengen 
area or an identity or document fraudster.  

132   Articles 21 and 22 of Regulation (EC) No 767/2008. 
133   Open public consultation feedback (see Annex 2). 

61 

 
 
                                                      
By reusing the VIS technical setup and infrastructure, the investments necessary are kept to 
a minimum and will only entail connections between the national systems and the VIS. As 
regards the former, the national visa systems are already fully interconnected to the VIS, 
for  the  issuance  of  short  stay  visas.  Therefore,  only  connection  of  national  systems  will 
only be necessary in those cases and for those Member States that have separate national 
systems  for  managing  residence  documents.  Therefore  the  preferred  option  is  also 
proportionate in terms of costs, taking into account the benefits the system will provide to 
all  Member  States  in  managing  the  common  external  border  and  protecting  the  area 
without internal borders. 

As  regards  fundamental  rights,  including  the  protection  of  personal  data,  the  preferred 
option  based  on  a  VIS  solution,  whose  concept  is  driven  by  the  privacy  by  design,  is 
proportionate in terms of the right to protection of personal data in that it does not require 
the collection and storage of more data and for a longer period than is currently the case for 
the same categories of affected TCN in similar processes – short stay visas, ETIAS, EES – 
and absolutely necessary to allow the system to function and meet its objectives, including 
what  a border  guard  currently  sees  when  checking  a  long-term  visa,  residence  card  or 
permit  presented  at  the  border.  Only  personal  data  that  is  adequate  and  relevant  for  the 
purposes of the processing would be collected and processed134

. 

Similar to what happens today with all existing EU information systems, the rights of the 
TCN applying for these documents are affected to a limited extent135. These limitations are 
necessary to achieve the general and specific objectives described in section 4 and so are 
necessary and proportionate. They will however be accompanied by all the safeguards and 
mechanisms  required  for  the  effective  protection  of  the  fundamental  rights  of  TCN 
concerned,  in  particular  the  protection  of  their  private  life  and  personal  data  will  be 
foreseen and implemented. 

Thus, the limitation is justified as the advantages outweigh the disadvantages caused with 
respect  to  the  exercise  of  fundamental  rights;  therefore,  the  limitation  is  deemed 
proportionate.  

Coherence  

All options (except the discarded status quo baseline 3.0) are coherent with the overarching 
objectives  of  EU  policies  at  least  to  some  extent.  Option  3.2  on  further  harmonising  the 
residence  documents  is  fully  coherent  with  existing  and  upcoming  developments  in  the 
area  of  harmonising  documents  and  securing  them136.  Option  3.3  on  the  decentralised 
database is coherent with the general efforts to increase the cooperation between national 
administrations.  Option  3.4  is  fully  coherent  with  the  EU  policy  on  the  gradual 
introduction of an integrated management system for external borders and on the checks to 
which persons crossing external borders are subject. Moreover, this option is also coherent 

134   Biographical and document data would be used to compare with the data of the presented document and to detect 
forged, counterfeited and stolen blank documents. Decision data would be used by migration authorities to inform 
their  decisions  during  the  application  process.  Data  generated  by  the  repository  would  be  used  to  structure  the 
database. 

135   The CJEU established the criteria for justification of such interference in the context of Regulation 2252/2004 in 

Case C-291/12 Schwarz v Stadt Bochum, ECLI:EU:C:2013:670. 

136   COM(2018) 212 final, 17 April 2018.  

62 

 
 
                                                      
with the EU policies in the field and return and asylum, respectively. This is reflected in 
scoring in the Table 13. 

7.4.  Migration and security checks 

Efficiency and effectiveness 

Both  proposed  options  meet  the  objectives  of  conducting  robust  migration/security 
assessment,  whereas  the  baseline  scenario  does  not  guarantee  that  this  objective  is 
uniformly  met  (as  analysed  in  section  6.1.4).  These  considerations  are  reflected  in  the 
scoring for effectiveness in Table 14 below. Both proposed options are building upon the 
costs undertaken for the interoperability proposal (as mentioned in section 6.1.4), which is 
reflected in their score for cost efficiency in Table 14. 

Social impact and fundamental rights 

In  terms  of  social  impacts  and  fundamental  rights  there  is  a  trade-off  between  increased 
security  (due  to  more  thorough  security  assessments  of  TCN)  and  negative  impacts  on 
fundamental rights of the TCN (since their personal data would be subject to new types of 
processing).  Achieving  the  goal  of  increased  security  prevails  in  this  case,  since  all 
appropriate safeguards will in place to limit the negative impacts on fundamental rights (as 
explained  in  the  description  of  the  baseline  scenario  and  further  developed  below  in  the 
section  on  necessity  and  proportionality).  These  considerations  are  reflected  in  the  score 
for social impacts and fundamental rights in the Table 14. 

Necessity and proportionality 

The assessment of whether additional systems should be queried during the assessment of 
a  visa  application  and  whether  such  searches  are  proportionate  and  necessary  as  part  of 
migration  and  security  risk  assessment  reveals  that  the  measure  is  needed  to  properly 
assess migratory risk and fraud and to ensure a level playing field across Member States. It 
is not a disproportionate measure since at least the same amount of checks would need to 
be carried out on visa applicants as would be done for visa free travellers under ETIAS and 
very  similar  to  the  systematic  checks  upon  entry  and  exit  to  which  every  EU  citizen  is 
currently subject. 

The VIS will be interoperable with other police, judicial and immigration systems in order 
to cross-check information contained in VIS against information recorded in these systems. 
From a data-protection point of view, it can be noted that cross-checking data available in 
the VIS with all information contained in  other systems may not  be relevant for the VIS 
purposes.  Therefore  as  an  additional  safeguard,  provisions  will  be  added  to  the  VIS 
Regulation  defining  precisely  with  which  set  of  limited  data  a  search  will  be  launched 
against other systems, and include biometrics in order to obtain the most accurate answer 
and  avoid  false  positives.  The  Visa  Code  provisions  in  this  respect  will  define  precisely 
which  information  in  other  systems  is  relevant  to  the  purposes  of  these  checks  and 
therefore  which  types  of  data  will  have  to  be  returned  by  the  checks,  in  order  to  strictly 
limit the cross-check of VIS data with this information. The existing safeguards in the VIS 
Regulation  and  the  Visa  Code  in  respect  of  data  processing,  fundamental  rights  and 
purpose  limitation  will  apply  (i.e.  the  information  obtained  will  be  strictly  used  for  the 

63 

 
 
 
purpose of checking whether the conditions of entry as set out in Article 21(3) of the Visa 
Code, while refusal of a visa must strictly correspond to one of the grounds laid down in 
Article 32 Visa Code). 

Coherence 

The proposed options 4.1 and 4.2 are using synergies created by the interoperability logic; 
therefore it is fully coherent with other EU existing legislation and proposals in the area of 
border management. A similar mechanism has been proposed137 to support the processing 
of  the ETIAS authorisation for visa-free TCN. The introduction  of the automated checks 
and  screening  rules  for  TCN  subject  to  a  visa  obligation  would  therefore  ensure  that  at 
least the same level of checks done for visa free TCN and thus ensure coherence between 
the regime applicable to the two categories of TCN by EU policies. 

By  enabling  authorities  to  have  readily  available  and  streamlined  security  and  migration 
information  on  the  applicant  during  the  examination  procedure,  the  mechanism  of 
automated  checks  accompanied  by  screening  rules  enables  the  detection  of  any  irregular 
migration or security risk early on in the process and thus contributes to the prevention of 
irregular migration and security risks on EU territory and is thus also coherent with the EU 
policies in these areas.  

Furthermore,  views  from  stakeholders  support  the  introduction  of  options  4.1  and  4.2. 
During regular Schengen evaluations, Member States and border management authorities 
stated  they  would  welcome  automatization  of  the  security  cross-check  against  other 
applications  in  order  to  facilitate  the  border  check  procedure  while  enhancing  security; 
additionally to this, introducing screening rules in VIS would allow for an advanced risk 
assessment138. 

Table 14: Overall comparison of policy options (4) 

Option 

Coherence 

4.0 Baseline  
4.1 Automated 
cross-checks  
4.2 Automated 
cross-checks and 
screening rules 

0 

++ 

+++ 

8.  PREFERRED OPTIONS 

Effectiveness in 
meeting the 
objectives  
0 

Social impacts 
and fundamental 
rights 
0 

Efficiency 
(economic costs 
and benefits 
0 

++ 

+++ 

++/-- 

++/- 

+ 

+ 

8.1.  Copy of the travel document 

The preferred option to emerge from this study is Option 1.1.A – Centralised storage of a 
digital copy of the bio-data page of the visa applicants’ travel document in the VIS.  

The contracted study concluded that sub-option B is more intrusive and no more effective 
for achieving the identified objectives and that as a result, the processing of the additional 

137   Agreed in trilogues between EP, Council and Commission during March 2018. 
138   Schengen Evaluation Report, presented by the Commission in October 2016. 

64 

 
 
                                                      
data  (all  used  passport  pages)  was  considered  disproportionate  if  it  were  to  be  stored 
centrally.  

8.2.  Fingerprinting of minors 

The preferred option is Option 2.1 – Lowering the fingerprinting age to 6 years.  

Option 2.1 (lowering fingerprinting age to 6 – thus covering visa holders as of 11 years of 
age,  which  is  at  the  start  of  the  age  segment,  12  to  17  years  of  age,  which  is  the  most 
affected  by  trafficking  and  other  abuse  of  rights  phenomena)  contributes  to  the  policy 
objectives as identified; it facilitates the protection of these children while traveling with a 
visa  and  after  arrival  in  the  Schengen  area,  while  attaining  necessity  and  proportionality 
thresholds.  

8.3.  Long-stay visas and residence documents 

Option  3.4.b  –  Extend  the  scope  of  the  VIS  to  include  long-stay  visas  and  residence 
documents – Store also data on all applications is the preferred option since it satisfies 
the criteria of necessity and proportionality, while also meeting the criteria of coherence, 
effectiveness  and  efficiency  more  than  any  other  alternative.  While  option  3.2  –  further 
harmonisation of residence documents – is not the preferred option for this IA, the analysis 
carried  out  recognises  its  significant  contribution  to  the  achievement  of  the  specific 
objective related to an increased security at borders. Ideally, all documents allowing a TCN 
to cross the external border, stay and/or reside in the territory of the Member States should 
be  harmonised,  to  facilitate  border  checks.  Exchanging  information  on  TCN  applying  an 
entry and residence document ensures upstream verification of the person and its bona fide 
intentions,  while  harmonisation  of  the  issued  documents  ensures  downstream  proper 
verification  at  the  border  or  within  the  territory.  Therefore,  important  synergies  exist 
between  these  two  options,  taking  into  account  in  particular  the  Commission  legislative 
initiative to harmonise and secure the residence cards, which would advance significantly 
the further harmonisation of documents and thus further contribute to the objective of an 
increased security at borders. 

Through  facilitating  the  systematic  and  better  exchange  of  information  among  Member 
States  on  TCNs  holding  or  applying  for  long  stay  visas  and  residence  documents,  the 
second  specific  objective  would  result  in  enhancing  the  internal  security  of  the 
Schengen area, thus closing the identified information gap. When records of long-stay or 
residence documents are placed in a central system and accessible to all relevant Member 
State authorities, each Member State would be able to make a more precise and impartial 
assessment of the security risk, based on the records found in the system while checking 
TCNs at the border crossing points or assessing the application.139 

The  second  specific  objective  also  presents  a  dimension  of  support  to  fraud  detection 
linked  to  obtaining  authentic  documents  on  the  basis  of  false  breeder  documents,140  as 
better  information  exchange  between  Member  States  could  help  identify  these  cases  and 

118  As  regards  residence  cards,  it  must  be  noted  that  application  data  will  not  be  stored,  as  the  sole  requirement  for 

issuing this document is a proof of a family link with a mobile EU citizen. 

119  E.g. birth, marriage and death certificates. 

65 

 
 
 
                                                      
pass the information to all Member States. Currently if a person tries to apply to a long-
stay visa or residence document in one MS with falsified application documents, there is 
no systematic ways for other MS to know about the situation of this TCN. 

In  addition,  facilitating  the  better  and  systematic  exchange  of  information  among  MS 
would  also  minimize  administrative  burden  and  overcome  the  language  barrier  when 
contacting another MS to verify authenticity of the TCN’s document.. 

8.4.  Migration and security 

The preferred Option is 4.2 – Automated cross-checks + screening rules. This option meets 
the  objectives  by  allowing  for  proper  migratory  and  security  checks  for  TCN  to  be 
conducted  uniformly  across  the  EU.  Furthermore,  the  option  puts  the  recently  proposed 
interoperability  initiative  to  practical  use,  by  making  interoperable  IT-systems  work 
together. The selected option is necessary and proportionate to meet the objectives, since 
the  trade-off  between  negative  impacts  on  fundamental  rights  and  the  gains  in  terms  of 
improved  security  is  offset  by  tight  safeguards  (already  existing  and  newly  developed  as 
part of the proposed option). 

8.5.  REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency) 

The  2016  REFIT  evaluation  of  the  Visa  Information  System  (VIS)  looked  into  the  legal 
framework of the VIS and examined whether this instrument is fit for purpose, delivers on 
its  objectives  at  reasonable  cost,  is  relevant,  coherent  and  has  EU  added  value.  The 
evaluation shows that the VIS was effective in meeting its objectives.  

The evaluation concluded that the VIS meets its objectives and functions well. The VIS’s 
benefits were found to outweigh its costs, and the system remains relevant and continues to 
have  EU  added  value.  No  specific  problems  of  regulatory  changes  were  identified,  or 
administrative  burden  that  needs  to  be  cut.  The  Report  recommended  that  the  VIS  be 
maintained and further developed to respond to the new challenges in visa, border and 
migration policy.  

The  measures  proposed  by  the  Commission  under  the  present  initiative  entail  both 
measures  addressing the problems identified in the evaluation, as well as  new initiatives, 
that extend the scope of the VIS beyond its current application (see notably topics 1 and 3 
addressed under the present IA).  

As  regards  the  costs  and  benefits  provided  by  the  measures  analysed  by  the  current  IA, 
they are presented in the tables in section 2 of annex 3. As regards the benefits, for a vast 
number of areas impacted, these are non-quantifiable by nature and so figures could not be 
provided.  

As  regards  the  costs  for  additional  technical  measures  which  will  be  dealt  with  by  the 
proposal but which were not identified with a major economic, social or fundamental rights 
impact  (and  are  thus  not  analysed  by  this  IA),  an  estimate  of  the  costs  entailed  for  the 
central  system  to  operate  the  proposed  modifications  was  made  by  eu-LISA  in  its  2017 
"study on VIS developments" and are presented in the tables in Annex 4. 

66 

 
 
 
9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? 

The  Commission  will  ensure  that  systems  are  in  place  to  monitor  the  functioning  of  the 
VIS and evaluate its main policy objectives. Four years after the start of the application of 
the revised VIS Regulation and every four years after, the Commission will submit a report 
to  the  European  Parliament  and  to  the  Council.  The  report  will  present  an  overall 
evaluation  of  the  functioning  of  the  system,  including  its  direct  and  indirect  impacts  and 
practical implementation on fundamental rights. It should examine results achieved against 
objectives, assess the progress with respect to the four main problem areas, and assess the 
continuing validity of the underlying rationale and any implications for future options. 

The  table  in  Annex  6  provides  a  list  of  operational  objectives,  its  detailed  performance 
indicators,  sources  and  methods  for  data  collection.  The  monitoring  will  be  facilitated 
through three  main  channels.  The  proposal is  introducing  a central repository  of  data  for 
the purposes of reporting and statistics which will allow for collecting data without causing 
an additional administrative burden. The monitoring indicators are essentially expected to 
be collected on an ongoing basis by the systems or technical components themselves. This 
will provide precise data on detected use of fraudulent documents, system security checks 
and  successful  hits,  and  identification  for  the  purpose  of  a  return/readmission  procedure. 
Secondly, Member States and Europol will prepare annual reports on the effectiveness of 
access to VIS data for law enforcement purposes containing information and statistics on 
the consultation including the type of terrorist or serious criminal offence, the number of 
requests  for  access  to  the  VIS  and  cases  which  have  ended  in  successful  identification, 
including  child  TCN.  In  addition  to  this,  consultations  with  stakeholders,  such  as 
FRONTEX  and  Member  States'  visa-issuing  authorities,  will  compliment  monitoring 
activities at the EU level and provide the Commission with their input on the impact of the 
proposed policy measures. 

67 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION 

1. 

Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references 

The  lead  DG  is  Directorate-General  for  Migration  and  Home  Affairs  (DG  HOME).  The 
Decide  Planning  reference  is  2017/HOME/208.  The  initiative  is  mentioned  in  the 
Commission  Work  Programme  for  2017  –  COM(2016)  710  final,  Annex  2,  No  18.  Visa 
Information System, and in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 – COM(2017) 650 
final, Annex 1, No 20. Delivering on the EU Agenda on Migration. 

2. 

Organisation and timing 

Work  to  prepare  the  draft  proposal  and  the  impact  assessment  began  in  2017.  The 
Interservice Steering Group for the impact assessment was composed of the representatives 
from  JUST,  SG  and  SJ.  Several  meetings  were  held  between  15  March  2017,  and  15 
March 2018 to discuss the ToRs, interim and final reports of the individual studies, as well 
as the draft COM IA Report, with numerous written consultations in between. 

3. 

Consultation of the RSB 

The draft Impact Assessment was submitted to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board on 16 March 
2018. The Board examined the Impact Assessment on 28 March and delivered its opinion 
on XXX.  

4. 

Evidence, sources and quality 

This  initiative  builds  on  the  evaluation  of  the  VIS141  which  analysed  its  performance  as 
a system,  its  implementation  in  practice  and  the extent  to  which  it  has  reached its  policy 
objectives,  including  its  added  value  to  the  common  visa  policy.  On  the  basis  of  this 
evaluation,  the  Commission  issued  recommendations  regarding  the  need  for  revision  or 
extension of the VIS functions. Despite the very good performance of the common system 
for  storing,  processing  and  exchanging  visa  data,  the  evaluation  demonstrated  a need  to 
further  develop  the  system  in  order  to  respond  to  new  challenges  in  visa,  border  and 
for  a  number 
security  policies.  The  evaluation 
of improvements  in  particular  in  relation  to  monitoring  of  data  quality  and  production  of 
statistics. 

further  demonstrated  a  need 

In order to collect widespread evidence, two open public consultations were launched by 
the  Commission.  The  Schengen  evaluation  and  monitoring  mechanism  consisting  of  the 
on-site  visits  and  questionnaires  also  provided  the  Commission  with  valuable  first-hand 
evince and the opportunity to carry direct stakeholder consultations right at the borders, the 
in-depth  knowledge  has  been  exploited  wherever  possible.  Additional  specific  data, 

141   Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the  implementation  of  Regulation 
(EC) No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Visa Information System (VIS), 
the use of fingerprints at external borders and the use of biometrics in the visa application procedure (COM(2016) 
655 final). 

Evaluation of the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and Council concerning 
the  Visa  Information  System  (VIS)  and  the  exchange  of  data  between  Member  States  on  short-stay  visas  (VIS 
Regulation) (SWD(2016) 328 final); Executive Summary (SWD(2016) 327 final). 

68 

 
 
                                                      
including opinions and testimonies of directly involved stakeholders, were collected in the 
scope of studies carried out by external contractors. 

A  specific  study  was  commissioned  in  order  gather  additional  data  on  the  necessity, 
proportionality  and  implications  of  lowering  the  fingerprinting  age  of  children  and  of 
storing  a  digital  (i.e.  scanned)  copy  of  the  travel  document  in  the  VIS.  Findings  of  the 
study  on  technical  feasibility  of  all  possible  VIS  developments  carried  out  by  eu-LISA 
during  November  2016  and  February  2017  were  also  taken  into  account.  Furthermore, 
a Feasibility  study  on  Integrated  Border  Management  (IBM)  for  persons  not  recorded  in 
EES  and  a  study  on  legal  analysis  on  the  necessity  and  proportionality  of  extending  the 
scope  of  the  VIS  to  include  data  on  long  stay  visas  and  residence  documents  have  been 
conducted. 

The data collection process was designed to meet the information needs; however, several 
limitations  were  encountered  in  the  data  collection  process,  which  have  implications  for 
the  ensuing  analysis.  While  Member  States  collect  various  data  on  two  topics  under 
investigation, methods and definitions can differ significantly across Member States, thus 
making  data  difficult  to  compare.  Moreover,  where  collected,  the  data  generally  do  not 
distinguish between cases of TCNs who have entered on a visa and those who have entered 
the  EU  via  irregular  channels.  Also  available  data  often  do  not  distinguish  between  the 
different age categories.  

For  the  quantification  of  key  impacts,  a  methodology  was  developed  to  assess  the  main 
changes that can be expected from the proposed measures relative to a continuation of the 
baseline  scenario.  The  quantitative  analysis  was,  however,  conducted  separately  for  each 
policy area, and therefore the presented quantification does not include considerable cost 
reduction  aspects,  such  as  economies  of  scale  and  potential  investment  overlaps,  which 
would finally result from implementing the combination of preferred policy options. 

The  calculation  of  costs  incurred  by  the  different  stakeholders  is  mostly  based  on 
a simplified estimation model relating to assumptions on the amount of time that might be 
reasonably taken to perform the additional activities, which would be required to comply 
with  the  proposed  changes.  The  evidence  base  underlying  these  assumptions  draws  from 
the  results  of  the  in-depth  interviews  with  Member  States’  competent  authorities  and 
consular staff, in combination with available statistics.  

69 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION  

In  preparation  of  the  revision  of  the  Visa  Information  System  legal  basis  and  the 
accompanying  Impact  Assessment,  the  Commission  services  conducted  directly  and 
indirectly  through  its  contractors  a  number  of  surveys  and  consultations.  The  objectives 
were to gather and analyse views, experience and suggestions for better practice from the 
main  stakeholders  in  order  to  tackle  the  identified  problem  drivers  in  the  most 
comprehensive manner. Additionally, findings of the previous studies, documents referring 
to one of the four policy aspects covered in this Impact Assessment, related consultations 
and  Schengen  evaluation  have  been  taken  into  account.  The  summary  of  the  stakeholder 
consultations is presented bellow following the four respective policy aspects. 

The  European  Commission  also  launched  two  open  public  consultations  on  (1)  lowering 
the  fingerprinting  age  for  children  in  the  visa  procedure  from  12  years  to  6  years  and 
(2) extending the scope of the Visa Information System to include data on long stay visas 
and  residence  documents  for  a  period  of  12  weeks.  The  consultations  were  conducted 
through an online questionnaire published on the internet in all EU official languages, with 
the  exception  of  Gaelic.  The  results  of  the  open  public  consultations  are  summarized 
below. 

The Inception Impact Assessment was published on the European Commissions' webpage 
on  28  March  2017  with  the  feedback  period  from  29  March  2017  to  26  April  2017.  No 
feedback was received. 

1.  Stakeholders 

In  the  course  of  the  study  on  lowering  the  fingerprinting  age  for  children  and  on  storing 
a digital  copy  of  the  visa  applicants'  travel  document  in  VIS142,  a number  of  interviews 
were conducted with following entities: 

  EU Agency of Fundamental Rights (FRA) 

  European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) 

  eu-LISA (and VIS Advisory Working Groups) 

  Europol 

  Frontex (EBCG) 

  Missing Children 

The study team also performed field visits to 4 third countries. Interviews were carried out 
with  consulates  of  the  pre-selected  Schengen  States.  The  following  four  countries  were 
visited:  

  The mission to Rabat, Morocco took place from 13 – 15 November, 2017. A total 
of  9  interviews  were  carried  out  with  a  combination  of  MS  consulate  staff,  ESPs 
and the EU Delegation. 

142   Feasibility  and  implications  of  lowering  the  fingerprinting  age  for  children and on  storing  a  scanned  copy of  the 

visa applicants' travel document in the Visa Information System (VIS). 

70 

 
 
                                                      
  The  Nigeria  mission  took  place  from  26  –  29  November  2017.  A  total  of  6 
interviews  were  carried,  including  with  4  consulates,  one  ESP  and  the  EU 
Delegation to Abuja. 

  The mission to Moscow, Russia took place from 4 – 6 December, 2017. A total of 8 
interviews  were  carried  out,  including  6  with  consulate  representatives,  1  with 
immigration liaison officers and 1 with the EU Delegation. 

  The mission to Istanbul, Turkey took place from 20 – 23 November, 2017. A total 

of 7 interviews were carried out with consulate officials and one ESP. 

In  addition  to  the  field  visits,  an  intensive  interview  programme  in  8  Schengen  Member 
States (BE, DE, EL, ES, FR, IT, LT, PL) was conducted in order to gather the necessary 
inputs. Consulted stakeholders represented departments responsible for managing National 
VIS  connection,  ESPs  (where  relevant),  migration  authorities143,  consular  affairs 
departments144,  border  police  authorities,  return  authorities,  law  enforcement  authorities 
dealing  with  terrorism  and/or  serious  crime,  National  Data  Protection  Authorities, 
Ministry/department  of 
the  child,  Anti-trafficking  authorities,  and 
Ombudsperson for Children. 

the  rights  of 

The  results  of  the  stakeholder  consultation  revealed  that  Member  States’  authorities 
overwhelmingly  agree  that 
if  digital  copies  of  scanned  travel  documents  were 
systematically available and accessible to the relevant authorities, it would: 

(i) 

(ii) 

(iii) 

greatly  reduce  the  burden  to  confirm  this  category  of  TCNs’  identity  and 
facilitate the return process; 

reduce  delays  associated  with  ad  hoc  communications  and  exchange  between 
Member States’ authorities and the consulates; and  

eliminate inefficient procedures involved with retrieving, scanning, zipping and 
coding hard copies. 

An  annual  average  of  1,100  to  17,445  visa  overstayers  was  detected  in  the  consulted 
Member States between 2014 and 2016.145 As a percentage of visas issued, the 6 Member 
States for which data was available indicate a rather consistent average of 2%. Indeed, one 
Member State estimates that the number of detected overstayers represents just 40% of all 
visa  overstayers  (i.e.  the  undetected  population).  According  to  stakeholders  interviewed, 
around 90% of visa overstayers eventually become subject to return proceedings, and it is 
estimated that 10% to 20% of these cases involve TCNs without travel documents at the 
time of apprehension; and that more than half will not be executed due to Member States’ 
inability  to  obtain  satisfactory  evidence  to  prove  the  nationality  of  the  third  country 
national in question.  

According to interviewed Member States’ authorities, the effort involved in confirming the 
identity of TCNs who no longer possess a valid travel document, or who fail to produce it 
on request, can be significant in the current situation. In such cases, Member States need to 

143   Typically: department of Interior Ministry (e.g. DE), Security/Justice (NL) or Work (FR). 
144   Typically: department from MFA. 
145   MS responses: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania and Poland.  

71 

 
 
                                                      
obtain  a  digital  copy  of  the  visa  holders’  travel  document  that  provided  the  basis  for 
issuing the visa from the issuing Embassy. Regardless of which route of communication is 
utilised,  interviews  with  Member  States  and  Consular  officials  indicate  that  the  average 
response time on the part of the consulates varies and is highly dependent on the workload 
at the respective consulate. As a result, return procedures may be delayed by 2 days during 
low-seasons,  and  up  to  2  weeks  during  busier  periods.  Whereas  the  proposed  policy 
options  would  effectively  eliminate  this  step  enabling  Member  States  to  directly  or 
indirectly search in the VIS for the required documents. 

Moreover, in the experience of several authorities interviewed, the consulates' and border 
authorities' staffs are not immune to making mistakes when it comes to translations. These 
problems  are  multiplied  in  the  event  of  court  proceedings,  or  if  other  Member  States 
require the information. Three Member States indicate that personal data used for a query 
does not always return any matches because the TCN received a visa in another Member 
State  using  different  personal  data.  The  consultations  also  revealed  further  unnecessary 
administrative burdens related to the current practice of retrieving, scanning, zipping and 
coding hard copies. The workload associated with each request may vary depending on the 
number  of  archived  files  at  the  consulate,  the accessibility  of  the  files, etc.  For  example, 
one  Member  State  indicated  that  the  paper  copies  are  not  destroyed  by  the  diplomatic 
representations, but rather continue to pile up, thus adding to an increasingly cumbersome 
retrieval process.  

As for lowering the fingerprinting age for children, according to the interviewed Member 
States'  authorities  the  main  benefits  of  the  proposed  policy  measure  reside  in 
unambiguously identifying these children allowing for: 

(i) 

(ii) 

(iii) 

family  unification  of  children  found  unaccompanied  with  parents,  family  or 
care givers within and outside the Schengen area; 

verifying  the  family  relationship  between  a  child  and  adults  presenting 
themselves as parents or guardians; 

determining  which  Member  State  is  responsible  for  examining  an  application 
for international protection under the Dublin Regulation; and 

(iv) 

preventing visa fraud or irregular migration involving children. 

In  the  current  legislative  context  it  was  impossible  for  interviewed  stakeholders  to  have 
readily  available  data  on  this  phenomenon;  however, stakeholders'  testimonies  did reveal 
example cases and suggested potential benefits of the proposed initiative.  

A  general  statement  of  one  Member  States'  authority  summarised  the  initiative  as 
following: “the optimization of identification procedures for children at risk, irrespective 
of  where  they  are  located,  has  decisive  impact,  on  the  one  hand  for  the  protection  of 
children  on  the  other  hand  for  the  prevention  of  further  victimization  and  ultimately  the 
consolidation of the sense of security among the public”. 

Field  visit  in  Morocco  did  not  allow  to  obtain  conclusive  information  on  the  issue  of 
lowering  the  age  for  taking  fingerprints.  Interviewees  in  Turkey  noted  that  the  proposed 
measure would have more impact when fingerprints were taken and checked at Schengen 
borders. 

72 

 
 
On the contrary, lowering the fingerprinting age of children was unanimously considered a 
positive  measure  by  all  consulates and  interviewees  during  the  field  visit  in  Nigeria,  and 
apparently would not take much additional effort as it may take one to a few minutes per 
child  to  process  the  fingerprints.  The  necessary  equipment  is  already  available.  It  would 
not  be  necessary  to  create  separate  booths  for  this  purpose,  as  experience  shows  that 
children are generally excited to ‘do what the adults do’ and want to give their fingerprints 
eagerly. 

The  interviewees  in  Russia  were  not  aware  of  cases  of  child  trafficking,  smuggling,  or 
related trends of TCNs who enter the EU on a Schengen visa, all but one Member State are 
in  favour  of  the  measure.  As  one  interviewee  noted,  the  Member  States  should  not  be 
reluctant to increase the arsenal of tools available for the purposes of protecting children; 
thus, various databases, authorities and countries shall be coordinated to be effective. 

Example case indicated by two interviewees: 

A  family  of  three  from  the  North  Caucasus  applies  for  a  Schengen  visa  in  a  Schengen 
Consulate.  The  family  consists  of  the  two  parents  and  their  4  year  old  child.  The  family 
travels to the EU and, before the Schengen visa expires, the parents return to their country 
of  origin,  yet  leave  the  child  with  extended  family  residing  in  one  of  the  Member  States. 
The child then applies for asylum / residence as an unaccompanied minor, whose identity 
cannot be established via the VIS because fingerprints were not taken (and the parents did 
not  leave  the  passport  with  the  family,  or  they  fail  to  produce  it  on  request).  After  some 
time, once the residency is granted, the parents apply for a family reunification visa and 
move  to  the  Schengen  Member  State  to  receive  permanent  resident  status.  It  is  expected 
that  this  type  of  case  is  an  increasing  phenomenon,  based  on  the  observations  of  the 
interviewees; however none have concrete statistics to back this up. 

In  the  course  of  feasibility  study  on  including  additional  documents  into  the  VIS146, 
stakeholders were  consulted via a questionnaire sent to  the Member States  in May 2017. 
The questionnaire was divided into five sections: a general set of questions on the current 
situation at external borders, the main added value for the repository and its main uses and 
four  sets  of  questions  focusing  on  the  documents  analysed  (“as-is”  situation,  national 
repository, situation at the borders, data included…). 17 Members States answered to the 
survey; additionally, another 21 answers to a European Migration Network survey sent in 
April 2017 were also taken into account. 

All Member States answered that the repository would be useful/very useful, in particular 
for border control purposes. 

146   Integrated Border Management (IBM) - Feasibility Study to include in a repository documents for Long-Stay visas, 

Residence and Local Border Traffic Permits, Phase: Analysis of Options. 

73 

 
 
                                                      
Table 1: Answers from MS about the possible objectives for the repository 

Objectives of the repository 

Facilitate border checks 

Authentication of the document 

1 

1.a 

Determining  that  the  TCN  is  the  rightful  owner  of  the 
document 

1.b i) 

1.b ii) 

Identification of the document’s holder using biometric data 

2 

Assess migration risk 

Access 
issued/withdrawn documents 

to 

the  history  of  valid 

and  previously 

Access to the history of denied applications 

Support investigating a serious and organised crime 

2.a 

2.b 

3 

Importance147 

3.75/4 

3.8/4 

3.8/4 

3.7/4 

3.1/4 

3.3/4 

3.3/4 

3.4/4 

Additionally,  on  the  utility  to  include  the  different  documents  in  the  repository, 
the Member States replied the following: 

Table 2: Preliminary table summarising the MS questionnaire on the added value of the documents 

Documents  

Long-stay visas  

Residence permits  

Residence cards  

Local Border Traffic Permit  

Average score148 

3.7/4 

3.9/4 

3.8/4 

2/4 

One  Member  State  also  included  an  additional  objective  in  the  questionnaire:  support  to 
the  decision-making  process  for  asylum  authorities.  These  authorities  could  use  the 
biometric data to check if a TCN applying for asylum is known as a holder of a document 
issued by another country. This practice is of common use with the information contained 
in  the  VIS  (art.  22  of  the  VIS  Regulation),  so  reusing  the  system  would  allow  for  this 
objective to be met with less implementation complexity.  

The questionnaire from January 2018 revealed that all Member States have detected cases 
of false/counterfeit/forged long-stay visas, residence permits and residence cards issued by 
other Member State; documents and impostors being mostly counterfeit. Visual inspection, 
verification  of  the  documents'  security  features  and  checks  against  SIS  are  the  most 
common ways to check its authenticity at the border; whereas, only 5 out of 16 Member 
States use passive authentication to verify residence permits and only 6 out of 13 residence 
cards. When it comes to contacting other MS, the most common tools are National Contact 

147   From 1 to 4; 4 being the best score. 
148   From 1 to 4; 4 being the best score. 

74 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Points  (11/12),  emails  (11/12),  followed  by  telephone  (7/12),  SIRENE  (6/12);  some 
Member  States  noted  that  they  contact  the  issuing  embassy  if  necessary.  Additionally, 
some  Member  States  argued  that  the  major  obstacles  of  contacting  other  MS  are  the 
language  barrier  and  poor  reachability  between  some  Member  States.  The  majority  of 
responding  MS  (12  out  of  15)  noted  that  there  is  the  lack  of  shared  information  on  the 
long-stay visas, residence permits and residence cards that hurdle day-to-day activities; this 
is  mostly  seen  for  border  control  checking  residence  permits  and  for  processing  a  new 
application of long-stay visas and residence permits. 

A  majority  of  responding  Member  States  (13  out  of  16)  answered  that  an  EU  legislative 
response is needed for the extension of the VIS to long-stay visas, residence permits and 
residence  cards,  two  MS  noted  that  that  a  non-legislative  response  at  EU  level  would 
suffice  (better  use  of  existing  tools),  and  one  MS  abstained.  The  proposed  legislative 
option to extend the scope of the VIS to include long-stay visas and residence documents 
was rated highest score by the responding Member States. 

The  Schengen  evaluation  and  monitoring  mechanism  consisting  of  the  on-site  visits  and 
questionnaires  provides  the  Commission  with  the  first-hand  evince  on  weaknesses  of  the 
Schengen acquis application by Member States and direct stakeholder consultation right at 
the  borders.  One  of  the  main  findings  of  the  evaluation  presented  by  the  Commission  in 
October  2016  was  the  low  quality  and  insufficient  scope  of  data  in  VIS.  Moreover, 
verifying authenticity of the TCNs' documents and performing systematic security and risk 
checks  against  other  applications  and  national  databases  revealed  to  be  an  additional 
administrative  burden;  especially  concerning  the  current  migration  flows  and  security 
situation  at  the  external  borders.  The  Member  States  and  border  management  authorities 
would  therefore  welcome  automatization  of  the  security  cross-check  against  other 
applications  in  order  to  facilitate  the  border  check  procedure  while  enhancing  security; 
additionally to this, introducing screening rules in  VIS would allow for an advanced risk 
assessment. 

75 

 
 
 
 
2. 

Open public consultation 

The  European  Commission  launched  an  open  public  consultation  on  lowering  the 
fingerprinting age for children in the visa procedure from 12 years to 6 years on 17 August 
2017  which  closed  on  9  November  2017  and  attracted  a  total  of  25  responses. 
15 respondents replied as individuals and 10 in their professional capacity or on behalf of 
an organisation.  

The respondents didn't agree whether children should be submitted to the same procedures 
when applying for a Schengen visa as adults; however, 60% of respondents would support 
lowering  the  fingerprinting  age149.  A  majority  of  respondents  consider  fingerprinting 
children  applying  for  a  short  stay  visa,  by  helping  with  their  identification,  necessary  or 
useful to address or prevent – trafficking, child abduction, children going missing, irregular 
migration, visa fraud, and identity fraud. More than a half of respondents would consider 
specific or additional protection safeguards in place when collecting, biometric/fingerprint 
data  of  third  country  national  children150.  Finally,  the  majority  of  respondents  agree  that 
technological  developments,  including  on  the  collection  and  use  of  biometrics,  could 
contribute to and should be used to enhance the protection of children151. 

Table 3: To what extent do you consider that fingerprinting children applying for a short stay visa, by helping 
with their identification, is necessary or useful to address or prevent? 

Number of 
replies (n=25) 

Necessary and 
very useful 

Useful 

Child 
trafficking 

Child abduction 

Children going 
missing 

Irregular 
migration 

Visa fraud 

Identity fraud 

12 

12 

12 

12 

10 

11 

Very useful, but 
it can be 
achieved 
through other 
means 

Not useful 

4 

4 

4 

2 

5 

4 

2 

4 

2 

6 

3 

4 

7 

5 

7 

5 

7 

6 

The open public consultation on extending the scope of the Visa Information System (VIS) 
to include data on long stay visas and residence documents was opened from 17 November 
2017 to 09 February 2018. The consultation attracted a total of 28 replies out of which 19 

149   Open public consultation feedback: 24% as of birth, 36% as of 6, 20% as of 12, 20% as of 18 (n=25). 
150   Open public consultation feedback: 52% yes, 36% no, 12% no views (n=25). 
151   Open public consultation feedback: 44% fully agree, 36% partly agree, 4% neither, 16% partly disagree (n=25). 

76 

 
 
 
                                                      
respondents replied as individuals  and 9 in  their  professional capacity or  on behalf of an 
organisation. 

86%  of  respondents  agreed  with  the  identified  information  gap152  (i.e.  currently  Member 
States do not share information on long stay visas and residence documents they issue with 
other  Member  States)  that  leads  to  problems  in  management  of  external  borders  and 
irregular migration within the EU. A majority of respondents noted that it is necessary to 
share the data contained in  long-stay visas, residence permits and residence cards  among 
Member States authorities in order to allow their verification at the border and within the 
territory of the Member States. A shared EU repository is necessary first and foremost to 
combat irregular migration according to the most of respondents (92%), followed by better 
informing  visa  and  migration  authorities  for  an  authorization  to  enter  EU  territory  by 
a third-country national (89%). 

Full sharing of information between Member States' authorities in order to enable them to 
check their authenticity and validity was selected as the most appropriate mean to address 
the  gap  by  55%  of  respondents,  better  cooperation  between  national  authorities  by  29%, 
and  reinforcing  security  features  of  the  documents  by  9%.  As  for  a  proper  EU  tool  to 
address  the  identified  gap,  52%  respondents  support  a  repository  of  long  stay  visas  and 
residence documents as part of the already existing VIS, followed by 35% respondents in 
favour  of  storing  long  stay  visas  in  the  VIS,  together  with  short  stay  visas  and  creating 
a separate  new  instrument  to  store  residence  documents.  Furthermore,  the  stakeholders 
consultation  revealed  that  the  public  considers  a  shared  EU  repository  necessary  for 
reducing  identity  and  document  fraud153,  combatting  irregular  migration154,  better 
informing  visa  and  migration  authorities  as  to  the  history  of  previous  documents  for  an 
authorization to enter EU territory by a third-country national155, and preventing, detecting 
and investigating terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences156. 

152   Open  public  consultation  feedback:  61%  fully agree,  25%  agree  to  an  extent,  11%  mostly  don't  agree,  3%  don’t 

agree at all (n=28). 

153   Open public consultation feedback: 75% fully agree, 4% agree to an extent, 7% mostly do not agree, 4% do not 

agree at all, 4% do not know (n=28). 

154   Open public consultation feedback: 83% fully agree, 9% agree to an extent, 4% mostly do not agree, 4% do not 

agree at all (n=23). 

155   Open  public  consultation  feedback:  75%  fully  agree,  11%  agree  to  an  extent,  4%  do  not  agree  at  all,  4%  do  not 

know (n=28). 

156   Open public consultation feedback: 61% fully agree, 18% agree to an extent, 7% mostly do not agree, 4% do not 

agree at all (n=28). 

77 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
 
ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? 

1.  Practical implications of the initiative 

1.1. 

Including a copy of the travel document in the VIS 

Who? 

Citizens/Consumers 

Administrations 

How? 

The  additional  time  that  would  be  spent  per  applicant  /  application  for 
scanning  the  copies  may  result  in  longer  wait  times  and  fewer  appointment 
slots per day. 

Consulates  and  ESPs  will  be  required  to  carry  higher  workload  per 
application. The consulates will, however, benefit from the reduced number of 
supporting documents assistance requests. 

Migration  and  return  authorities  will  benefit  from  the  reduced  workload 
associated with contacting the consulates and obtaining the digital copy of the 
visa applicants' travel document. As a consequence, the return procedure will 
be more cost and time-efficient. 

Businesses 

No direct implications. 

1.2.  Lowering the fingerprinting age for children 

Who? 

Citizens/Consumers 

How? 

Children  will  be  required  to  provide  fingerprints;  additional  time  needed  for 
taking the fingerprints might bring negligible additional costs to their parents. 
In  the  current  situation,  children  already  need  to  join  their  parents  at  the 
consulate or the ESP in order to apply for a visa for them. 

Administrations 

Consulates and ESPs will bear additional costs resulting from higher workload 
per applications. 

Member  States'  authorities  dealing  with  trafficked/missing  children  will 
identifying/verifying  TCN 
benefit 
unaccompanied children found in the Schengen area.  

efficiency  when 

higher 

from 

Businesses 

No direct implications. 

Change in travel behaviour, and hence impact on businesses in the travel and 
tourism industry, is expected to be negligible.  

1.3.  Repository of long-stay visas and residence documents 

Who? 

Citizens/Consumers 

Administrations 

How? 

Third  country  nationals  who  are  holders  of  the  concerned  documents  will 
benefit from smooth a quick border checks. 

Border  management  and  law  enforcement  authorities  will  have  an  access  to 
data  on  concerned  documents  and  therefore  will  be  able  to  verify  its 
authenticity and status in a time efficient manner. 

78 

 
 
Migration and consular authorities will be able to better consult the history of 
applicants'  documents  and/or  decisions  on  applications  in  other  Member 
states. 

Businesses 

No direct implications. 

1.4.  Migration and security checks for when processing applications of visa required TCN 

Who? 

How? 

Citizens/Consumers 

Visa applicants will benefit from a faster visa application procedure. 

Administrations 

Migration and consular authorities will benefit from automatic checks of other 
databases which are currently conducted manually. 

Businesses 

No direct implications. 

2.  Summary of costs and benefits 

The tables below summarise the costs and benefits for the preferred option. Given the lack 
of available data, the tables have been filled to the extent possible. 

I.a Overview of Direct Benefits – Preferred options 

Description 

Amount 

Comments 

Savings  in  administrative  costs 
(Migration and return authorities) 

€ 3,2 m – € 12,7 m  Migration  and  return  authorities  will  not  be 
required  to  contact  the  consulates  when 
obtaining copies of travel documents. 

Savings  in  administrative  costs 
(Consulates) 

€ 0,7 m – € 2,8 m 

Consulates  will  benefit  from  the  reduced 
number  of  supporting  document  assistance 
return 
requests 
authorities.  

from  migration 

and 

(€ 366 – € 1,462 per consulate) 

Combatting identity theft 

Not  quantifiable  due 
to the scarcity of data 

Administration  will  be  provided  with  an 
effective tool to verify identity of children. 

Reduction of child trafficking 

Protection of children 

Not  quantifiable  due 
to the scarcity of data 

The proposed measure will have a restrictive 
impact  on  traffickers  coercing  children  to 
travel on a visa not theirs. 

Not  quantifiable  due 
to the scarcity of data 

Authorities  dealing  with  trafficked/missing 
children  will  be  able  to  identify/verify  TCN 
unaccompanied children more effectively. 

Improvement 
management 

of 

the 

border 

Not  quantifiable  due 
to the scarcity of data 

Border  management  and  law  enforcement 
facilitated 
authorities  will  benefit 
document checks. 

from 

79 

 
 
 
 
Reduced  workload 
security screening 

related 

to 

Not  quantifiable  due 
to the scarcity of data 

Consulates  and  migration  authorities  will 
primarily  benefit  from  the  automatic  checks 
against other databases. 

I.b Overview of Indirect Benefits – Preferred options 

Description 

Amount 

Comments 

Reduced 
procedures 

delays 

in 

return 

€ 46,3 m – € 92,6 m  Reduced delays in return procedure will help 
to  decrease  cost  related 
to  pre-removal 
detention  centres,  subsistence  and  other 
relevant costs. 

Executing  a  higher  proportion  of 
return decisions 

€ 6,7 m – € 32,1 m 

The  proposed  measures  will  provide  a 
to  systematically  present 
reliable  means 
evidence  of  a  TCN  visa  overstayers’ 
nationality,  thus  facilitating  the  execution  of 
return decisions. 

Family (re)unification 

Not  quantifiable 
principle 

in 

Verifying  the  parental/  guardian 
relationship 

Not  quantifiable 
principle 

in 

Facilitating  Dublin  and  asylum 
examination 

Not  quantifiable  due 
to the scarcity of data 

A  record  stored  in  the  VIS  might  help  to 
found 
reunite 
unaccompanied  in  the  Schengen  area  with 
parents, family or care givers. 

children 

who 

are 

Fingerprints  of  children  in  the  VIS  would 
allow  for  verifying  the  claimed  relationship 
between  a  child  and  adults  presenting 
themselves as parents or guardians. 

fingerprints  of  children  might 
Taking 
the  Dublin 
the  application  of 
facilitate 
Regulation,  which  determines  the  Member 
State  responsible  for  processing  an  asylum 
claim. 

Right  to  move  and  reside  within 
the EU 

Not  quantifiable 
principle 

in 

Third  country  nationals  will  benefit  from 
smooth and quicker border checks. 

Facilitated 
procedure 

visa 

application 

Not  quantifiable  due 
to the scarcity of data 

Visa  applicants  and  consulates  will  benefit 
from  more  efficient  security  screening  and 
thus faster procedure. 

Higher security 

Not  quantifiable 
principle 

in 

Societies  at  large  will  benefit  from  higher 
security 
from  more  effective 
resulting 
protection of external borders. 

80 

 
 
 
 
The  quantitative  analysis  was  conducted  separately  for  each  policy  area.  The  bellow 
presented  overview  of  costs  does  not  therefore  take  into  account  considerable  cost 
reduction  aspects,  such  as  economies  of  scale  and  potential  investment  overlaps,  which 
would finally result from implementing the combination of preferred policy options. 

II. Overview of costs – Preferred option (thousands EUR) 

Citizens/Consumers  

Businesses (ESPs) 

Administrations 

Preferred options 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

Direct costs 

1.1.A 

Indirect costs 

Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

2.1 

Direct costs 

3.4.B 

Indirect costs 

Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

4.2 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

6,708 

5,250 

3,325 –  
4,000 

375 – 560 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

44.6 – 223 

147.4 

7.6 – 38 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

10,100 – 
12,120 

2,400 – 
3,600 

- 

- 

10,000 

3,000 

- 

- 

81 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 4: REFIT 

Baseline 
records 

of 

100M 

One-time cost 

SV 

SW 

H
W 

Maintenance  
for 1 year 

G1 – Integration of VIS 
Mail into VIS 

from € 4,030,000.00  
to € 4,840,000.00 

100% 

0% 

0% 

G2 – Support for facial 
image recognition 

from € 17,265,000.00 
to € 20,715,000.00 

35% 

25% 

40% 

G3 – Searching with latent 
fingerprints 

from € 5,250,000.00  
to € 6,300,000.00 

60% 

30% 

10% 

G4 – Reporting and 
statistics engine 

G5 – Data quality 
indicators 

from € 6,090,000.00  
to € 7,310,000.00 

from € 1,500,000.00  
to € 1,800,000.00 

40% 

50% 

10% 

100% 

0% 

0% 

G5 – Central storage of 
scanned passports 

from € 3,325,000.00 
to € 4,000,000.00 

20% 

0% 

80% 

from € 320,000.00 
to € 480,000.00 

from € 1,850,000.00 
to € 2,780,000.00 

from € 630,000.00 
to € 945,000.00 

from € 535,000.00 
to € 800,000.00 

from € 120,000.00  
to € 180,000.00 

from € 375,000.00  
to € 560,000.00 

G5 – Support for the 
national visa 

from € 10,100,00.00 
to 12,120,000.00 

55% 

15% 

30% 

from € 2,400,000.00 
to €3,600,000.00 

G5 – Monitoring of service 
health and availability 

from € 800,000.00  
to € 960,000.00 

80% 

0% 

20% 

G5 – Remaining changes 

from € 1,390,000.00 
to € 1,670,000.00 

100% 

0% 

0% 

from € 65,000.00 
to € 100,000.00 

from € 110,000.00  
to € 165,000.00 

*Table  with  summary  of  estimated  costs  provided  in  the  feasibility  study  on  "VIS  Evolutions"  of 
July 2017 by eu-LISA. 

As  regards  the  benefits  for  implementing  these  measures,  they  are  non-quantifiable  and 
summarised in the table below: 

Description 

Comments 

Possibility to store copies of the travel document in the VIS 
(discussed as problem 1) 

Cutting  the  high  administrative  burden  for  return  and 
consular authorities in return procedures. 

Lowering the age limit for collecting fingerprints of children 
to 6 years of age (discussed as problem 2) 

Information on national long-stay visas registered in the VIS 
(discussed as problem 3) 

Interconnections  between  the  various  systems  (discussed  as 
problem 4) 

the  age 

Lowering 
limit,  whilst  providing  for  robust 
fundamental  rights  safeguards  and  protection  measures, 
would enable easier access for child protection authorities to 
an age group that is at a high risk of trafficking. 

time  efficient  manner,  alleviating 

Border management and law enforcement authorities will be 
able to verify the authenticity and status of these documents 
in  a  more 
the 
administrative burden for them. 
Migration  and  consular  authorities  will  be  able  to  better 
consult the history of applicants' documents and/or decisions 
on  applications  in  other  Member  states,  alleviating  the 
administrative burden when performing such checks. 

Cutting the administrative burden for authorities performing 
checks  on  migration  and  security  risks  by  using  existing 
interoperable IT-systems more efficiently. 

82 

 
 
 
Possibility  for  eu-LISA  to  use  anonymised  (alphanumeric 
and) FP for testing purposes (similar to Article 5 Operational 
management of Eurodac Proposal157) 

Improved  performance  as  a  result  of  testing  will  benefit  all 
end-users of the system. 

Extended responsibility of eu-LISA in generating/ publishing 
the  statistics  for  each  system  as  well  as  on  data  quality 
reports, including transfer of statistics reporting obligation on 
visas  from  COM  to  eu-LISA,  by  establishing  a  central  data 
repository/warehouse. 

Easier  access  to  reliable  statistics  for  all  stakeholders 
concerned, replacing the current system of manual gathering 
and  processing  of  annual  statistics  by  COM  and  MSs. 
Providing  MS,  COM  and  EU  agencies  with  more 
information for better evidence-based decision making. 

Change of the VIS back-up system into active/active 

, Shared backup infrastructure, centralised system continuity 
management 

Updating  the  legislative  framework:  by  enhancing  the 
business  continuity  aspect  of  the  system,  possible  risks  for 
all stakeholders will be mitigated. 

Measures improving the data quality  

Rules  aimed  at  improving  quality  would  ultimately  help  all 
authorities that are using VIS as end-users, most notably by 
reducing  the  risk  of  error  and  not  having  to  resort  to 
cumbersome  manual  procedures;  costs  related  to  managing 
complaints from data owners or paying fines related to data 
errors will be reduced. 

Integration  of  VIS  Mail  into  the  VIS,  also  with  regards  to 
necessary messages/notifications 

Reducing the administrative burden by enabling a quick and 
reliable  way  for  MS  to  get  informed  through  VIS  if  certain 
visas are granted. 

Possibility  to  search  in  the  VIS/BMS  with  latent  (partial) 
fingerprints  

Obligation  for  the  MS  to  register  the  authorities  in  the  VIS 
(Consular  posts,  central  authorities  etc.)  with  access  to  the 
VIS.  

Establish  reliable  communication  channels  between  the 
border crossing point and the visa issuing authorities. 

The  new  functionality  would  enable  a  new  service  (flat  FP 
search  for  wanted  individuals)  leveraging  on  an  already 
existing  system  –  without  impacting  current  workflows  and 
without affecting system performance, resulting in a net gain 
for end-users. 

Strengthening  oversight:  Currently,  a  list  of  authorities 
having  had  an  access  to  the  VIS  in  the  previous  day  is 
generated  when  such  an  authority  is  not  registered  in  the 
VIS.  By  compelling  MS  to  register  (undeclared)  authorities 
the  necessary  MS  oversight  on  the  national  authorities 
having  access  to  the  VIS  would  be  further  strengthened, 
without creating undue administrative burden. 

Providing  reliable  communication  channels  between  BCP 
and  the  visa  issuing  authorities  to  swiftly  address  cases 
where doubts exist on the visa data when crossing a border, 
thus  eliminating  the  need  for  ad  hoc  cumbersome  channels 
and  reducing  the  administrative  burden  for  the  authorities 
concerned. 

Enforce the obligation for a border guard to report simply and 
electronically  a  false  match  based  on  fingerprints  (false 
negative authentication, false positive identification) 

Digital  solutions  will  make  the  reporting  burden  as  light  as 
possible, while keeping its effectiveness.  

Extend  access  to  full  VIS  file  to  asylum  authority  to  use  in 
asylum examination 

Updating  the  legislative  framework  in  order  to  provide  the 
competent  authorities  with  access  to  the  data  they  need, 
which will lead to cuts in administrative costs. 

Multi-modal searches with biometrics 

Improving  the  quality  of  facial  images  to  enable  biometric 
matching  

By implementing fingerprint and facial image matching in a 
single system, rather than two separate systems, the overall 
infrastructure footprint (and hence investment) is 
considerably lower since computing resources for face and 
fingerprint recognition are shared. Multimodal identification 
will increase overall system accuracy, thus presenting a net 

157   COM(2016) 272 final 

83 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
benefit for end-users. 

Facial  image  recognition  (searches)  for  law  enforcement 
authorities.  

By updating rules for access by law enforcement authorities 
to  VIS  data,  with  substantial  safeguards,  a  contribution  is 
made to efficient investigations in Member States.  

Prior consultations carried out on persons holding more than 
one current nationalities 

Updating  the  legislation  to  respond  to  practical  needs  of 
consular authorities. 

Improvement  of  alphanumeric  search  for  the  different  end 
users  

Integration  in  the  VIS  of  the  list  of  recognized  travel 
documents 

search 

flexible 

the 
Introducing 
requirements of the different user groups (consulates, border 
control,  law  enforcement  agencies)  will  make  it  easier  for 
them  to  use  the  system,  resulting  in  saved  time  and  more 
efficient use. 

profiles  matching 

Cutting  the  administrative  burden  for  the  border  control 
authorities by providing an easier-to-use and up-to-date way 
to  check 
the 
administrative  burden  for 
the  Commission  services  – 
currently in charge to keeping the lists up to date. 

travel  documents.  Cutting 

recognized 

Interoperability  with  EURODAC 
consulates during the visa application process 

to  allow  checks  by 

Cutting the administrative burden for authorities performing 
checks  on  migration  and  security  risks  by  stipulating 
interoperability rules with existing IT-systems. 

84 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 5: METHODOLOGY 

1.  Available data 

A  general  caveat  has  to  be  stated  regarding  data  collection.  Both  studies  reported 
difficulties  in  finding  reliable  data  because  of  scarcity  of  readily  available  data.  Most 
notably, the number of TCN children that accessed the EU territory with a visa and who 
subsequently  became  victims  of  trafficking  or  other  forms  of  abuse  cannot  be  quantified 
precisely.  Similarly,  there  are  no  figures  currently  available  and  no  processed  to  collect 
that on third country nationals that accessed the EU territory legally and who subsequently 
became  irregular.  This  is  why  extrapolations  and  assumptions  were  used  when  complete 
data was not at hand, as duly noted in the supporting studies and in this report. 

The following assumptions were used calculating the costs of the policy options. 

Storing a copy of the travel document 

  Additional servers: 

o  Option  1  –  Number  of  entries  within  the  10  year  period  would 

approximately double; estimate based on the Smart Border study158; 

o  Option  2  –  Estimates  based  on  interview  feedback  with  relevant 

stakeholders159; 

  Additional VIS storage – Assumed storage cost is EUR 1,200 / 1 TB; 

o  Sub-option A requires additional 1100 TB storage; 
o  Sub-option B requires additional 4160 TB storage; 

  Scanning equipment – Estimated cost of one new scanning system is EUR 2,500; 

o  Consulates – 1881 consulates; 
o  EPSs – 2,683 VFS Global and TLS Contact application centres; 

  Sub-option B assumes that 20-30% of ESPs will require more than 

one additional scanner; 

  Training  and  awareness  raising  –  Based  on  interviewee  feedback  and  findings 

from relevant studies160; 
  System operational cost  

o  Option  1  –  The  current  operational  cost  of  the  VIS  infrastructure  is  EUR 

35 m. in FY2017161; 

o  Option  2  –  Estimates  based  on  interview  feedback  with  relevant 

stakeholders; 

  Workload  impact  –  Consulates  handle  approximately  10%  of  applications 
themselves (1.76m.) whereas the remaining 90% are outsourced to ESPs (15.8m.); 

o  Consulates – the labour costs is EUR 26 / hour; 

  Sub-option A requires additional 40 s / application; 

158   https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/smart-

borders/docs/smart_borders_costs_study_en.pdf. 

159   Detailed calculation in Annex 3 to the Feasibility and implications of lowering the fingerprinting age for children 

and on storing a scanned copy of the visa applicants' travel document in the (VIS). 

160   ETIAS Feasibility Study, 2016; Impact Assessment Report on the Introduction if the EES, 2016. 
161   http://www.eulisa.europa.eu/AboutUs/Finance/EULISA%20Budgets/eu-LISA%202017%20Initial%20Budget.pdf. 

85 

 
 
                                                      
  Sub-option B requires additional 190 s / application; 

o  ESPs – the labour cost is EUR 17 / hour; 

  Sub-option A requires additional 70 s / application; 
  Sub-option B requires additional 220 s / application. 

Table 1: Summary of investment (one-off) and recurrent compliance costs (thousands EUR) 

Costs (thousands EUR) 

Option 1.A 

Option 1.B 

Option 2.A 

Option 2.B 

One-off costs 

Additional servers 

Additional VIS storage 

Scanning equipment: Consulates 

Scanning equipment: ESPs 

Training and awareness raising 

Recurrent operational costs 

5,000 

1,320 

4,703 

6,708 

161 

5,000 

4,992 

4,703 

244,000 – 
414,000 

244,000 – 
414,000 

1,320 

4,703 

4,992 

4,703 

7,244 – 7,512 

6,708 

7,244 – 7,512 

161 

161 

161 

System operational cost (10 years ret.) 

35,000 

35,000 

Workload impact: Consulates 

Workload impact: ESPs 

3,875 

5,250 

5,750 

16,500 

16,000 – 
33,000 

3,875 

5,250 

16,000 – 
33,000 

5,750 

16,500 

Lowering the fingerprinting age for children 

  Child-friendly equipment – Assumed cost is EUR 3,000 / 1 new system; 

o  Consulates – 1,651 consulates162; 
o  ESPs – 2,683 VFS Global and TLS Contact application centres; 

  Additional VIS storage – Assumed storage cost is EUR 1,200 / 1 TB; 

o  Option 1 requires additional increase of storage by 4,4%, i.e. 7.7 TB; 
o  Option 2 requires additional increase of storage by 8,8%, i.e. 15.4 TB; 
  Training and awareness raising – Based on interviewee feedback and findings from 

relevant studies163; 

  System  operational  costs  –  Assumed  increase  in  operational  costs  is  4,4%,  8,8% 

respectively; 

  Workload  impact  –  The  number  of  children  applicants  is  estimated  0.7-1.05m. 
with the average of 875,000; consulates handle approximately 10% of applications 
themselves (1.76m.) whereas the remaining 90% are outsourced to ESPs (15.8m.); 

o  Option 1 requires additional 0.2-1 min.; 
o  Option 2 requires additional 0.4-2 min. 

162   Number of consulates in non-Schengen countries in 2016. 
163   ETIAS Feasibility Study, 2016; Impact Assessment Report on the Introduction if the EES, 2016. 

86 

 
 
  
 
                                                      
Table 2: Summary of investment (one-off) and recurrent compliance costs (EUR) 

Costs (EUR) 

One-off costs 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Child-friendly equipment: Consulates 

Child-friendly equipment: ESPs 

Additional VIS storage 

Training and awareness raising 

Recurrent operational costs 

- 

- 

9,240 

138,175 

4,953,000 

8,049,000 

18,480 

138,175 

System operational cost  

1,540,000 

3,080,000 

Workload impact: Consulates 

7,583 – 37,941.50 

30,332 – 151,766 

Workload impact: ESPs 

44,625 – 223,124.50 

178,500 – 892,498 

2.  Assessment criteria 

In  line  with  the  better  regulation  guidelines  on  impact  assessments,  the  methodology 
underpinning the present report and its supporting studies focused on the significant social, 
economic, and fundamental rights impacts. Depending on each problem area scrutinised by 
the present study, the exact categories of persons and processes impacted by the foreseen 
measure  could  vary.  This  is  why  the  impact  of  the  measure  will  be  examined  separately 
under each problem area, to take account of its specificity. 

The  VIS  concerns  mainly  two  types  of  actors:  visa  applicants  and  Member  States' 
authorities  and  hence  these  are  the  two  categories  most  impacted  by  the  envisaged 
measures.  These  impacts  in  turn  can  have  broader  consequences  for  the  societies  of  EU 
Member States and the EU's external relations.  

3.  Categories impacted by the envisaged measures 

The  first  group  which  is  directly  affected  are  applicants  for  a  short  stay  visa,  i.e.  third-
country nationals who are under the visa requirement and who apply for a short-stay visa at 
one  of  the  Schengen  consulates.  As  regards  checks  against  migration  and  security 
databases,  applicants  will  experience  any  change  in  the  checks  that  they  are  subject  of 
when  applying  only  indirectly.  As  regards  the  travel  document,  the  obligation  currently 
exist for them to present it in a consulate and most MSs consulates already make copies of 
it, therefore this change will not be immediately experienced by the applicant. However, if 
this is to be used as evidence of nationality and identity in a return procedure, the impact 
on the person will be direct. As regards the possibility to lower the fingerprinting age for 
children, this will have a direct impact on children under 12 and their families. The family 
member(s) accompanying the child will have to be physically present in a consulate with 
the child at least for the first application, in order to submit fingerprints.  

Under the proposed measure to include data on long stay visas and residence permits and 
their holders, a new category of data subjects will be added to the VIS. The impact on this 
category of TCN will not be direct, as the procedure to apply for these documents will not 

87 

 
 
 
 
 
be changed. However, they will be indirectly  impacted by the fact that their data will be 
placed  in  a  centralised  database  and  checked  against  other  databases  in  an  automated 
manner. 

The  second  group  directly  affected  are  Member  States'  authorities,  mainly  consulates  in 
third  countries  as  the  visa-issuing  authorities,  as  well  as  border,  migration  (including 
return), asylum (including Dublin) and in some cases law enforcement authorities. These 
authorities are directly impacted by all four measures. Additionally, the measure to extend 
the VIS to long stay visas and residence document may require access by authorities that 
currently  are  not  involved  in  the  VIS  process  (authorities  issuing  residence  permits  or 
cards, depending on national organisation). If the VIS is to be used for identifying children 
victims  of  trafficking  or  contribute  to  preventing  this  phenomenon,  anti-trafficking 
authorities and child protection authorities may also be granted access. 

There are further consequences on the society at large. Reinforced migration and security 
checks will impact the integrity of the visa processing and consequently the security of the 
Schengen  area.  Similarly,  increased  leverage  for  the  EU  readmission  policy  and  better 
return rates will improve migration management, and thus the reliability and credibility of 
the EU migration policy. As many people travel to the EU to visit their family members, 
the  protection  of  family  life164  will  also  be  indirectly  affected  by  increased  or  reduced 
possibilities for travel.  

Ultimately, the cumulative effect of changes on the categories of TCN and the number of 
checks  performed  will  have  positive  or  negative  impact  on  the  EU's  relations  with  third 
countries and the EU's image in the world. This is particularly relevant regarding the link 
between visa policy and readmission policy. 

4.  Summary of possible impacts of the policy options 

The following table summarises the possible impacts of the policy options:  

Table 4: Possible impacts of policy options 
Economic impacts 

  Costs for public authorities (visa authorities/consulates):  
  direct (equipment, procurement to implement new etc.) 
  indirect (enforcement costs) 

Social impacts 

Fundamental  rights 
impacts 

  benefits 

for 

public 

authorities 

(visa/border/migration/asylum/police authorities):  
  Reduced administrative burden 
  cost savings 
integrity and security of Schengen area 

 
  external relations/image of EU 

right to dignity (Article 1 CFR);  
right to liberty and security (Article 6 of the Charter), 
respect for private and family life (Article 7 of the Charter),  

 
 
 
  protection of personal data (Article 8 of the Charter),  
 

right  to  asylum  and  protection  of  the  principle  of  non-

164   Articles 7, 9 and 33 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  

88 

 
 
                                                      
refoulement (Articles 18 and 19 of the Charter) and protection 
in  the  event  of  removal,  expulsion  or  extradition  (Article  19 
of the Charter),  
the right to non-discrimination (Article 21 of the Charter)  
the rights of the child (Article 24 of the Charter)  
the right to an effective remedy (Article 47 of the Charter). 

 
 
 

The  different  possible  interventions  in  the  three  problem  areas  are  not  likely  to  all  have 
noteworthy impacts in all of the above-mentioned areas. Therefore the assessment for each 
problem area is focused on the fields where the different policy options are likely to have 
significant impacts. A selection of the most relevant impacts will be established for each 
problem area. However, given its significant impact on persons subject to VIS procedure 
and the horizontal nature of its principles, the following sub-section will focus in particular 
on  the  data  protection  aspects,  which  will  thereafter  be  specifically  analysed  under  each 
policy option.  

89 

 
 
 
ANNEX 6: MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

Specific objectives 

Key Performance Indicators 

Method of data collection/source 

- Contribute 

in 

to  assisting 

the 
identification  and  return  of  third 
country  nationals  that  do  not,  or 
no longer fulfil the conditions for 
entry to, or stay on the territory of 
the  Member  States  in  accordance 
with the Return Directive. 

- Improve efficiency of the VIS for 
the  purposes of  facilitating  return 
procedures. 

- Better meeting the VIS objectives 
(facilitation  of  the  fight  against 
fraud,  facilitation  of  checks  at 
external  border  crossing  points, 
facilitate  the  application  of  the 
Dublin II Regulation). 

- Support  with  the  prevention  and 
fight against child trafficking, and 
with the identification/verification 
of identity of TCN children. 

Copy of the travel document 

-  Number  of  cases  of  identity  / 
nationality proven regarding TCN 
visa  overstayers  who  lack  or  fail 
to  produce  a  copy  of  their  travel 
document upon apprehension 

-  Return 

rate  of 

third  country 
nationals in a return / readmission 
procedure 

-  Lower  administrative  burden  for 
return 
States 

in 

Member 
procedures 

-  Cost  savings  for  Member  States 
for 
public 
authorities; 
housing, food, administration and 
related  expenses  related  to  return 
procedures policy 

e.g 

Lowering the fingerprinting age 

-  Number  of 

cases  of 

child 
trafficking  TCN  <17  discovered 
through VIS 

-  Survey among Member States 

-  Eurostat  statistics,  SIS  statistics 

on return (eu-LISA) 

-  Survey among Member States 

-  Survey among Member States 

-  Annual 
States 
Commission 

report 
and  Europol 

from  Member 
the 
to 

-  Number  of  cases  of  a  VIS  file 
being  used  in  asylum  procedures 
for TCN <17 (Dublin II) 

-  Rating  by  relevant  authorities 
whether the change is helpful for 
combatting child trafficking 

-  Survey among Member States 

-  Survey among Member States 

-  Any  additional  costs  incurred  by 

-  Survey  among  Member  States 

consulates and ESP 

and ESP 

Repository of long-stay visas and residence documents 

- Facilitate  and  strengthen  checks 
at  external border  crossing  points 
the 
within 
Member States. 

territory  of 

the 

-  Number  of  checks  performed  at 
external border-crossing points 
-  Percentage  of  long  stay  visa  and 
for 

sent 

residence  document 
second line checks 

-  eu-LISA statistics 

-  eu-LISA statistics 

- Enhance  the  internal  security  of 
the Schengen Area by facilitating 
the  exchange  of 
information 
among  MS  on  TCNs  holders,  or 
applying 
stay  and 
long 
residence documents. 

for 

-  Border guards’ satisfaction 

-  Survey among Member States 

-  Number  of  frauds  detected  at  the 
border  for  LSV  and  residence 
documents 
- Migration 

rating 
whether  the  system  is  helpful  in 
the assessment 

officers’ 

-  eu-LISA statistics 

- Survey among Member States 

- Number  of  cases  in  which  fraud 
was detected  and reported during 
the issuance process 

- eu-LISA statistics 

90 

 
 
- Number  of  cases  where  previous 
or 

history 
of 
applications was checked 

documents 

- Contribute 

the  prevention 
to 
detection  and 
investigation  of 
terrorist offences or of the serious 
criminal offences. 

- Number  of 
accessed data 

investigations 

that 

- Number of successful hits 

- Survey among Member States 

- Annual 
States 
Commission 

report 
and  Europol 

from  Member 
the 
to 

- eu-LISA  statistics,  annual  report 
from Member States and Europol 
to the Commission 

- Gather 

statistics 

support 
evidence-based  European  Union 
migration policy making. 

to 

- Quality  and  usefulness  of  the 

- Survey among Member States 

statistics extracted 

Security checks for when processing applications of visa required third country nationals 

as 

standard 

Implementing  the  same  procedural 
other 
search 
constitutive  system-elements  of  the 
visa  policy, 
the 
thus 
burden  for  Member  States  and 
contributing  to  the  objective  of  a 
common visa policy. 

lowering 

-  System  statistics 

(number  of 

-  eu-LISA statistics 

cross-checks, number of hits) 

-  Rating  by  relevant  authorities 
the 

regarding  usefulness  of 
change 

-  Survey among Member States 

91 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 7: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE STUDY ON STORING A SCANNED 
COPY OF THE VISA APPLICANTS' TRAVEL DOCUMENT IN THE VISA 
INFORMATION SYSTEM (VIS) 

Article 2(e) of the VIS Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 foresees that one of the objectives of 
VIS is ‘to assist in the identification of any person who may not, or may no longer, fulfil 
the conditions for entry to, stay or residence on the territory of the Member States.’ Article 
31(2)  enables  the  Member  States  –  via  the  designated  competent  authorities  for  carrying 
out checks at external border or within the territory of the Member States are allowed to 
access certain VIS data for verification and identification purposes (specified in Article 19 
and 20) – to transfer or to make available a limited set of these data to a third country for 
the purpose of proving the identity of third-country nationals for the purpose of return.165 
Thus,  although  not  explicitly  defined  in  Article  2,  when  taken  together,  these  provisions 
foresee that the VIS can be used to facilitate both the identification of the irregular migrant 
and the issuing of travel documents for return.166 

In  its  report  on  the  implementation  of  VIS  of  October  2016,  the  European  Commission 
found  that  the  use  of  VIS  in  return  procedures  has  so  far  been  limited,  whereas  recent 
trends underline an increased need to use this instrument which provides a proof of identity 
necessary in a return procedure.167  

1.  Analysis of the problems 

Under  topic  1,  two  main  problems  are  identified  as  contributing  to  a  situation  in  which 
Member  States  face  high  barriers  to  complete  return  procedures  regarding  third  country 
nationals who overstay their visa  and fail to  produce a valid travel document on request. 
These two problems are: 

Problem 1: In the absence of a valid travel document (or copy thereof), return proceedings 

for TCNs who entered the EU using a visa are slow and often unsuccessful; 

Problem 2: Delays in the return process result in increased costs and administrative 

burdens realised by the Member States. 

Although  visa  applicants,  and  subsequent  visa  holders,  are  under  strong  obligation  to 
establish  their  identity  by  presenting  a  valid  travel  document  during  both  the  application 
process and upon entry to the EU, Member States report that many TCNs visa overstayers 

165   The Regulation allows the designated competent authorities to transfer the following data from the visa application 
file:  first  name,  surname  and  former  surname  (if  applicable);  sex,  data,  place  and  country  of  birth;  current 
nationality and nationality at birth; type and number of the travel document, the authority which issued it and the 
date of issue and of expiry; residence; and in the case of minors, the surname and first name(s) of the applicant’s 
father and mother.  

166   EMN Ad-Hoc Query on COM AHQ on Member States’ Experiences with the use of the Visa Information System 
(VIS)  for  Return  Purposes.  Requested  by  COM  on  18th  March  2016.  24  responses  were  provided: 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/ad-hoc-queries/ad-hoc-queries-
2016.1042_com_ahq_on_member_states_experiences_with_the_use_of_the_visa.pdf. 

167   COM(2016)  655  final,  “Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the 
implementation  of  Regulation  EC)  No  767/2008  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  establishing  the 
Visa  Information  System  (VIS),  the  use  of  fingerprints  at  external  borders  and  the  use  of  biometrics  in  the  visa 
application 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-is-new/work-in-
progress/initiatives/docs/gmige/report_from_commission_en.pdf. 

procedure/REFIT  Evaluation,”  Brussels: 

14  October 

2016: 

92 

 
 
                                                      
who  become  subject  to  a  (forced)  return  are  no  longer  in  possession  of  their  travel 
document, or fail to produce it upon request. In such cases, the sending Member State must 
file an application for a replacement travel document, or laissez-passer, either with the in-
country diplomatic representation of the country of origin, or directly with the competent 
authorities  of  the  country  of  origin,  pending  the  positive  identification  of  the  foreign 
national  in  question.  Most  third  country  diplomatic  representatives  only  issue  an 
emergency travel document once the identity and nationality of the TCN can be verifiably 
proven  by  the  sending  Member  State.  Notably,  the  authorities  of  the  majority  of  third 
countries  currently  do  not  accept  the  information  that  can  be  extracted  from  the  VIS  as 
sufficient  evidence  to  verify  the  person  as  one  of  ‘their’  nationals,  and  they  request  a 
scanned copy of the TCN’s travel document as proof. In this context, Member States can 
prove nationality by providing a scanned copy of the TCN’s travel document that provided 
the basis for issuing the Schengen visa. 

Indeed,  in  the  absence  of  a  valid  travel  document,  the  scanned  copy  of  a  former  visa 
holders’  travel  document  is  key  to  being  able  to  prove  the  nationality  of  a  TCN.  This  is 
particularly necessary  for  facilitating  returns to  traditionally non-cooperative countries  of 
origin in respect of readmission of their nationals. In the current situation, the process by 
which  Member  States  obtain  the  travel  document  copy  is  hampered  by  the  absence  of  a 
legal framework allowing Member States to exchange or transfer such information, as well 
as the slow or non-existent cooperation on the part of third country authorities. While the 
effectiveness  of  the  measure  ultimately  depends  on  the  willingness  of  third  countries  to 
cooperate with the Member States, the evidence suggests that the measure would make it 
more difficult for third countries to deny return, as both the information in VIS, as well as 
copies of the travel documents would be available.  

 The study estimates that the total number of visa holders becoming irregular migrants by 
overstaying  their  visa  is  approximately  294  000  persons  per  annum.  According  to 
stakeholders interviewed for this study, around 90% of visa overstayers (i.e. 264 453) will 
become  subject  to  return  proceedings,  and  we  estimate  that  10%  to  20%  of  these  cases 
involve  TCNs  without  travel  documents  at  the  time  of  apprehension;  and  that  more  than 
half will not be executed due to Member States’ inability to obtain evidence to prove the 
TCN’s nationality.  

On this basis, the number of return decisions concerning TCNs who entered the territory 
on a visa, and that could not be implemented due to missing travel documents, is estimated 
between  15  867  to  39  668  casesError!  Reference  source  not  found.  in  chapter  Error! 
Reference source not found.. This represents roughly 13% to 33% of effective returns of 
visa-required third country nationals.168 While the actual number of estimated cases is low, 
based on our calculations, the impact of undetected cases is potentially high. Indeed, one 
Member State estimates that the number of detected overstayers represents just 40% of all 
visa overstayers (i.e. the undetected population). Moreover, according to migration officers 

168   Based on the three-year average (2014 – 2016) of effective returns of nationals from visa-required third countries. 

93 

 
 
                                                      
that have run simultaneous searches of VIS against EURODAC for asylum searches, about 
30-35% of asylum seekers can be identified using the VIS.169  

2.  Objectives 

The general objectives of the proposed adaptations to the VIS system are the following:  

Contribute to assisting in the identification and return of third country nationals that do not, 
or no longer fulfil the conditions for entry to, or stay on the territory of the Member States 
in accordance with the Return Directive.  

Improve efficiency of the VIS for the purposes of facilitating return procedures.  

The specific objectives of the proposed measure may be formulated as follows:  

  Facilitate that Member States’ authorities are able to confirm the identity and prove 
the nationality of TCN visa overstayers who lack or fail to produce a copy of their 
travel document upon apprehension 

  Improve the return rate of third country nationals found in a return / readmission 

procedure  

3.  Policy options 

The following policy options were investigated:  

Option 0. Baseline (no change) 

Option 1. Include a scanned copy of the travel document in the central VIS (centralised) 

Option 2. Include a digital copy of the travel document in national visa systems 
(decentralised) 

In  addition  to  the  main  options,  two  additional  sub-options  were  defined  regarding  the 
scope of the data to be recorded in VIS:  

Sub-option A. Storage of biographical page only 

Sub-option B. Storage of all used pages of the applicant’s travel document 

The two sub-options can be applied to both Option1 and Option 2 described above. 

4.  Assessment of impacts 

Economic Costs 

Table 1 and Table 2 present an overview of all relevant costs (both one-off and recurrent, 
as  well  as  recurrent  compliance  costs)  from  the  options  and  their  sub-options.  The  cost 
estimations  are  based  on  various  sources  (experience  of  related  initiatives,  stakeholder 
consultation)  and  derive  from  a  number  of  assumptions,  which  have  been  detailed  in 
Chapter 3.5.1 and in Annex III.  

169   Commission  Staff  Working  Document,  XXX  (2017),  Impact  Assessment  accompanying  the  document  for  a 
proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  establishing  interoperability  between 
European Union information systems for security, border and migration management.  

94 

 
 
                                                      
Table 1   Summary of investment (one-off) and recurrent compliance costs (millions) 

Investment and operational costs 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Sub-option A 

Sub-option B 

One-off costs (m) 

Additional servers. VIS databases 

€ 5  

€ 244 – € 414  

- 

Additional VIS storage 

Scanning equipment: Consulates 

Scanning equipment: ESPs 

Training and awareness raising 

Total one-off costs  

Recurrent operational costs (m) 

Operational cost 10 year retention 

Total recurrent costs 

Workload  impacts:  Costs  to  scan,  prepare 

and transfer the TD copies(m) 

Consulates 

ESPs 

Total additional workload costs  

- 

- 

- 

€ 0,2  

€ 5,2  

€ 35  

€ 35  

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

€ 0,2  

€ 1.3  

€ 4,7  

€ 6,7  

- 

- 

€ 5  

€ 4,7  

€ 7,2 – 7,5  

- 

€244,2- 414,2 

€ 12,7  

€ 16,9 – 17,2  

€ 16 – € 33  

€ 16 – 33  

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

€ 3,9  

€ 5,3  

€ 9,1  

- 

- 

€ 5,8  

€ 16,5  

€ 22,3  

Total investment and recurrent compliance 

€ 40,2  

€ 260,2 – 447,2 

€ 21,9 

€ 39,1 – 39,5  

costs (m) 

Source: Ecorys calculations based on data provided during stakeholder interviews. 

Note: Calculations may not add up due to rounding.  

Table 2 Summary of additional workload-related costs 

Costs to TCNs 

Costs to TCNs 

Visa fees (per TCN) 

Opportunity costs (per TCN) 

Total costs to TCNs 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Sub-option A 

Sub-option B 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

€ 0,60  

€ 0,60 

€ 1 – € 5 

€ 1,89 

€ 2,89 – 5,89 

Source: Ecorys calculations based on data provided during stakeholder interviews. 

Note: Calculations may not add up due to rounding.  

Both  options  and  the  two  sub-options  require  some  one-off  costs,  both  to  implement  the 
proposed change and to train the relevant personnel and raise awareness along the chain of 
stakeholders.  

One-off  investment  costs  are  significantly  higher  for  Option  2  than  for  Option  1,  as  the 
former  would  involve  the  expansion  or  setting  up  of  national  systems.  The  study  notes, 
however, that since the history of previous applications can be easily checked in the VIS, 
no new copies are requested from the applicant if documents have already been submitted 
during a previous application, and if that document has not yet expired and been replaced 
with a new one. This suggests that required investments in storage capacity under Option 2 
may be substantially lower than the calculations suggest. The study was unable to collect 

95 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
data enabling an accurate estimation of the investments required at national level due to the 
late  inclusion  of  this  option  in  the  analysis.  Regarding  the  sub-options,  the  technical 
infrastructure  to  be  added  at  ESPs  and  consulates  is  limited  to  a  document  scanner 
connected to a computer.  

On-going compliance costs are summarised as follows:  

Costs  incurred  by  visa  authorities  and  ESPs  stem  from  the  additional  time  spent  to  (a) 
make the scanned copy of the travel document, (b) transfer the data to the consulate and (c) 
to  transfer  the  data  (digitised  copies)  from  the  consulate  to  the  NS-VIS.  The  costs  are 
driven  by  the  choice  of  sub-option;  the  main  options  do  not  affect  the  workload  of  the 
consulates  and  ESPs.  Thus,  the  costs  for  consulates  and  ESPs  are  substantially  higher 
under  sub-option  B  compared  to  both  sub-option  A  and  the  current  situation  (baseline 
scenario).  

Costs  incurred  by  third  country  nationals  are  similarly  driven  by  the  two  sub-options.  In 
the  event  that  sub-option  B  is  implemented,  ESPs  and  consulates  may  pass  additional 
workload  costs  onto  the  TCNs  in  the  form  of  increased  visa  service  fees  charged  to 
applicants. Given that the average service fee charged to applicants today is approximately 
€ 25,00, the average fee increase will range from € 1,00 to € 5,00 per applicant under sub-
option  B.  By  contrast,  sub-option  A  would  result  in  only  a  marginal  increase  in  the 
workload  of  ESPs  relative  to  the  current  situation,  therefore  the  ESPs  are  unlikely  to 
increase  the  service  fee  levied  on  visa  applicants.  Visa  applicants  may  additionally 
experience increased wait time at the application centres due to the increase in time spent 
by  ESP  personnel  for  receiving  each  application.  The  identified  opportunity  costs  are, 
however, minor compared to the current situation.  

Economic benefits  

As  shown  in  Table  ,  the  measures  will  produce  several  important  economic  benefits  for 
Consulates  (and  ESPs,  as  a  result  of  the  additional  visa  fees)  as  well  as  Member  States’ 
migration  and  return  authorities.  Implementation  of  a  measure  to  systematically  include 
scanned  copies  of  visa  applicants’  travel  document  in  the  VIS,  which  would  be  either 
directly or indirectly searchable and accessible to the relevant authorities, will:  

  Greatly reduce the burden to confirm this category of TCNs’ identity and facilitate 
the  return  process  while  facilitating  the  likely  cooperation  on  the  part  of  third 
country authorities to issue an emergency travel document to return their nationals; 
  Reduce  delays  associated  with  ad  hoc  communications  and  exchange  between 

Member States’ authorities and the consulates; and  

  Eliminate inefficient procedures involved with retrieving, scanning, zipping and 

coding hard copies. 

The identified economic benefits are primarily drive by the choice of main option (Option 
1 and Option 2). While Option 1 performs marginally better on these objectives compared 
to  Option  2,  both  measures  will  significantly  reduce  inefficiencies  associated  with  the 
current procedures. 

96 

 
 
Table 3 Summary of benefits of the policy options 

Consulates  

Option 1 

Option 2 

Cost  savings  from  time  spent  on  responding  to  supporting 

€ 0,7 – € 2,8 m  

€ 0,7 – € 2,8 m  

document requests  

Migration and return authorities 

(€ 366 – € 1.462 per consulate) 

(€ 366 – € 1.462 per consulate) 

Cost savings from time spent on retrieving TD copy 

€ 3,2 – 12,7 m 

€ 3,0 – 12,3 m 

Cost savings from reduced delays in return procedures 

Daily costs of delays reduced by up to 14 

Daily  cost  of  delays  reduced  by  up  to 

days  

13,5 days; costs incurred for delays of ½ 

€ 46,3 m – 92,6 m 

day  

€ 44,6 – 89,3 m 

Cost  savings  from  executing  a  higher  proportion  of  return 

€ 6,7 – 21,4 m (if 50% improvement) 

€ 6,6 – 21,3 m (if 50% improvement) 

decisions, in less time 

€ 10,0 – 32,1 m (if 75 % improvement) 

€ 9,9 – 31,9 m (if 75% improvement) 

Total benefits (50 % improvement) 

€ 57,5 m – 132,2 m 

€ 55,6 – 128,3 m 

Total benefits (75 % improvement) 

€ 60,8 – 142,9 m  

€ 58,9– 139,0 m 

The saved costs for consulates from the reduced number of supporting document assistance 
requests is estimated to range between € 0,7 million to € 2,8 million across all Schengen 
consulates worldwide. The impact is the same across both main options.  

The saved costs for migration and return authorities from the reduced workload associated 
with contacting the consulates and obtaining the scanned copy of the via applicants’ travel 
document is valued higher under Option 1 than under Option 2. This is due to the fact that 
under Option 2, Member States will still need to request the information from the national 
authorities  responsible  for  storing  the  scanned  copy,  a  procedure  that  would  require  an 
estimated 15 minutes or less to carry out. Option 1 is therefore  marginally more efficient 
than Option 2. 

The  cost  savings  from  executing  a  higher  proportion  of  returns  (in  less  time)  will  also 
increase  under  both  of  the  main  options.  The  benefits  are  only  marginally  lower  under 
Option  2,  due  to  the  remaining  workload  associated  with  making  requests  to  the  storing 
authority, as shown in Table 3 (lower benefit from slightly less efficient procedures). The 
full  impact  is  difficult  to  estimate  with  any  accuracy  as  it  is  wholly  dependent  on  the 
cooperativeness of the third country authorities. 

In  terms  of  the  impact  on  duration  and  timeliness  of  return  proceedings,  both  options 
would  significantly  reduce  the  wait  time  imposed  on  migration  and  return  authorities 
during the process of confirming the identity of TCNs. Under Option 1, the delays will be 
effectively eliminated, resulting in a delay reduction of up to 14 days. Option 2 would have 
a  slightly  lower  impact  as  Member  States’  authorities  may  still  be  required  to  wait  for 
several  hours  before  receiving  a  reply  from  the  responsible  national  authority  for  storing 
the  travel  document.  The  potential  benefits  to  be  realised  from  both  options  will  be 
sufficiently  substantial  to  offset  the  costs  incurred  to  implement  and  comply  with  the 
respective options.  

97 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy impacts 

The storage of visa applicants’ travel documents in VIS will improve the implementation 
of  the  objective  of  facilitating  returns  of  TCNs  who  have  been  issued  with  a  return 
decision.  Both  Option  1  and  Option  2  will  enable  Member  States  to  Member  States  to 
obtain  the  necessary  evidence  for  proving  the  nationality  of  TCN  visa  overstayers  who 
have  been  issued  with  return  decision,  but  who  lack  a  valid  travel  document,  to  equal 
effect. This is because both options entail the systematic collection and storage of the visa 
applicants’ travel document that provided the basis for issuing the Schengen visa in VIS. In 
both  cases,  however,  the  effective  change  is  highly  dependent  on  the  third  country  in 
question.  

The experience of Member States to date indicates that there is a direct correlation between 
the  rate  of  effective  returns  based  on  VIS  matches  combined  with  a  copy  of  the  travel 
document on the one hand, and the level of historical cooperation with the given country of 
origin  on  the  other.  In  other  words,  if  a  return  is  theoretically  feasible  (due  to  positive 
confirmation  of  identity),  and  the  country  in  question  is  typically  cooperative  in  dealing 
with returns, then the information in the VIS matches coupled with a copy of the TCN’s 
travel  document  will  be  extremely  useful  and  sufficient  for  facilitating  the  return. 
However,  if  the  country  in  questions  is  non-cooperative  on  returns  in  general,  Member 
States have few recourses to compel the return.  

Based on inputs provided during the stakeholder consultation, the study cautiously assumes 
that the proportion of effectively executed returns of TCN visa overstayers without travel 
documents will increase by 50% to 75% as a result of the proposed options.  

If  the  proportion  of  effectively  executed  returns  increases  by  50%,  then  the  benefit is  an 
additional 7.934 to 19.834 TCNs returned compared to the current situation.  

If the proportion increases by 75%, then benefit is an additional 11.900 to 29.751 persons 
returned.  

Table 4 Estimated benefits for the implementation of returns 

Impact on the implementation of returns: Additional returns of TCNs without travel documents 

Estimated number 
of returns not 
implemented 

Lower 

Upper 

15.867 

39.668 

50% – 75%  

Fundamental rights impacts 

% improvement 

Number of additional returns: Scenario A 
(50% improvement) 

Number of additional returns: Scenario B 
(75% improvement) 

Lower 

Upper 

Lower 

Upper 

+ 7.934  

+ 19.834  

+ 11.900 

+ 29.751  

TCNs returned 

TCNs returned 

TCNs returned 

TCNs returned 

In  accordance  with  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  EU,  to  which  EU  Member 
States  and  institutions  are  bound  when  they  implement  EU  law  (Article  51(1)  CFR),  the 
identified benefits of the proposed measure must be balanced with the obligation to ensure 
that any corresponding interferences with fundamental rights are limited to what is strictly 
necessary  to  genuinely  meet  the  objectives  of  general  interest  pursued,  subject  to  the 
principle of proportionality (Article 52(1) CFR).The study does not look at all fundamental 
rights  issues  arising  from  the  proposed  changes  to  the  VIS  Regulation.  This  analysis 

98 

 
 
focuses  on  the  possible  (negative  and  positive)  impacts  of  the  proposed  measure  for  the 
following fundamental rights of the CFR:  

Right to asylum and protection of the principle of non-refoulement (Article 18 and 19) 

Rights to non-discrimination (Article 21) 

Right to effective remedies (Article 47) 

Rights to the protection of privacy and personal data (Article 7 and 8). 

The  proposed  measure  brings  both  risks  and  opportunities  with  respect  to  fundamental 
rights. The storage of a scanned copy of the visa applicants’ travel document in the central 
VIS  (Option  1)  or  national  VIS  (Option  2)  can  have  a  positive  impact  for  the  right  to 
asylum (Article 18 CFR) and the protection of the principle of non-refoulement (Article 19 
CFR) by providing designated authorities access to additional evidence to prove an asylum 
seekers’  identity.  The  sub-options  could  in  fact  be  useful  to  asylum  authorities  for 
verifying the identity of a person in need of international protection (sub-option A) or for 
proving  the  escape  route  that  the  person  used  (sub-option  B),  which  is  important  in  an 
assessment of merits for asylum cases. The existing safeguard which bans the transfer of 
personal  data  to  third  countries  if  that  person  has  requested  international  protection 
continues to apply (Article 31(3)), mitigating the risk of serious harm for asylum applicants 
or their families.  

The  proposed  measure  would  create  an  interference  with  the  right  to  privacy  and  family 
life (Article 7 CFR) and the right to the protection of personal data (Article 8 CFR), as it 
involves the processing of personal data. The limitation is modest under sub-option A, as 
the only additional category of personal data that could potentially be stored relative to the 
current situation is the personal identification number of the document holder. In fact, the 
measure implies the processing of nearly the same amount and type of personal data as is 
processed in the current situation, merely stored in a different format (i.e. the scanned copy 
of  the  travel  document,  as  opposed  to  an  entry  in  the  VIS  file  based  on  information 
submitted as part of an application form). Safeguards prohibiting the further processing of 
these data by migration and return authorities as well as to prevent unauthorised access and 
unlawful sharing with third parties should limit any potential negative impacts implied by 
the sub-option. By contrast, sub-option B involves the processing of a large amount of new 
personal data, which would affect the entire population of TCNs under visa obligation. The 
data is not currently stored into VIS, therefore new safeguards would need to establish the 
purpose  of  the  data  processing.  Such  safeguards  should  explicitly  prohibit  the  sharing  of 
these  data  with  third  parties  given  that  it  is  not  foreseen  to  positively  contribute  to  the 
objective of facilitating return.  

Regarding the data protection impact of the main options, whereas Option 1 involves the 
central storage of the scanned travel document copy, Option 2 involves implies storage at 
national  level.  This  means  that  the  Member  State  which  entered  the  data  would  own  the 
data,  and  thus  be  responsible  for  sharing  its  data  with  the  requesting  Member  State 
following  a  positive  “hit”.  Option  2  may  include  less  risks  with  regard  to  purpose 
limitation  and  accessibility  of  personal  information  serving  as  an  additional  safeguard 
against unauthorised access.  

99 

 
 
The  measure  has  no  impact  on  the  right  to  an  effective  remedy  as  currently  provided  in 
Article  40  of  the  VIS  Regulation.  The  measure  would  also  not  affect  the  right  to  non-
discrimination, as it does not discriminate on any of the grounds established in Article 21 
CFR.  

Necessity and proportionality 

The  proportionality  test  requires  demonstrating  that  the  measure  would  be  suitable  with 
respect to achieving its purpose. The answer for Option 1, Option 2 and Sub-option A is 
affirmative, as the travel document data page is precisely what is required by third country 
authorities  as  proof  of  nationality  in  the  absence  of  a  valid  travel  document.  A  separate 
question is whether the measure can be made  more targeted to reduce its interference on 
the right to privacy and data protection. In addition to what is explained in the description 
of fundamental rights impacts (chapter 3.4.3), the measures analysed are targeted to TCN 
travellers to the EU who are under visa obligation.  

Regarding  the  choice  of  main  option,  while  both  options  will  achieve  the  same  level  of 
effectiveness,  Option  1  achieves  a  higher  level  of  efficiency  (timeliness  and  cost-
efficiency). Furthermore, Option 2 (decentralised storage) would not be considered as less 
intrusive  given  that  the  same  information  would  be  made  available  to  the  designated 
authorities  in  all  MS.  No  matter  which  technical  architecture  is  selected,  the  measure  is 
intended to enable a Member State’s authority to access data stored by (an)other Member 
State during the visa procedure. 

To  answer  the  question  as  to  the  proportionality  of  the  sub-options,  it  is  relevant  to 
distinguish between the personal data stored in the data page of one’s travel document and 
the  information  that  can  be  derived  from  the  visa  stamps  and  stickers  affixed  to  the 
documents’ visa pages. The scope of personal data to be stored under sub-option A is both 
relevant and necessary for the stated purposes of facilitating returns. The intrusiveness of 
the  proposed  sub-option  is  in  itself  very  modest,  as  the  same  data  are  already  entered  in 
VIS in the current situation, though accessible in a different format. The only category of 
data not  currently  collected and stored in  VIS from visa applicants,  which in some cases 
may  be  present  in  the  data  page  of  a  visa  applicants’  travel  document,  is  the  of  national 
personal  identification  number.  Assuring  that  appropriate  safeguards  prevent  against  the 
processing of these new data, the interference on the right to privacy and the protection of 
personal data would not be greater than the current VIS system, for which no complaint on 
data protection has been registered to date (COM(2016) 655 final, page 12), and adequate 
safeguards  have  been  put  in  place.  By  contrast,  the  data  implied  by  sub-option  B  is 
substantially  more  intrusive  and  it  will  not  contribute  to  the  explicit  objective  of  the 
measure,  which  is  to  facilitate  the  return  of  TCNs  without  a  valid  travel  document.  The 
study concludes that sub-option B is more intrusive and no more effective for achieving the 
identified  objectives.  As  a  result, 
is  considered 
disproportionate.  

the  processing  of 

these  data 

The analysis undertaken in the preceding sections suggest that it is possible to justify the 
necessity  and  proportionality  of  a  measure  involving  storage  –  either  at  central  level 
(Option 1) or decentral level (Option 2)  – of a scanned copy of the data page of the visa 
applicants’ travel document in the VIS system.  

100 

 
 
5.  Comparison of options 

The  preferred  option  to  emerge  from  this  study  is  Option  1,  sub-option  A:  centralised 
storage of a scanned copy of the bio-data page of the visa applicants’ travel document in 
the VIS. 

Both Option 1 and Option 2, in combination with sub-option A, will achieve the roughly 
the same level of effectiveness in terms of their contribution to the objective of facilitating 
the return of TCNs visa overstayers who lack valid travel documents. Option 1 achieves a 
marginally  higher  level  of  efficiency  (timeliness  and  cost-effectiveness)  than  Option  2, 
particularly in terms of: reducing the burden to Member States to confirm this category of 
TCNs’ identity and facilitating the cooperation of Member States to issue ETDs for their 
return;  reducing  delays  associated  with  ad  hoc  communications  between  Member  States 
and  their  consulates;  and  by  eliminating  inefficient  procedures  involved  with  retrieving, 
scanning, zipping and coding hard copies of travel documents.  

While Option 1 performs only marginally better on these objectives compared to Option 2, 
both  measures  will  significantly  reduce  inefficiencies  associated  with  the  current 
procedures.  Moreover,  the  costs  under  Option  1  and  the  sub-options  are,  however, 
expected to be broadly compensated in the first year of implementation, whereas Option 2 
will  be  compensated  within  3  to  5  years  by  the  expected  cost  savings  and  delay  cost 
reductions at the level of Member States (also to be realised under Option 1). By contrast, 
while sub-option B is slightly more costly than sub-option A, it does not provide any added 
value for achieving the policy objective relative to sub-option A. Therefore sub-option B 
can be discarded. 

From  a  fundamental  rights  perspective,  in  additional  to  the  fundamental  rights  impacts 
described above, the main potential benefit of Option 2 vis-à-vis Option 1 is that the travel 
document  copy  would  be  stored  nationally  and  therefore  access  by  the  designated 
migration  or  return  authority  in  one  Member  State  would  be  subject  to  the  authorisation 
granted by the Member State that entered the data into VIS. However, similar results could 
be  obtained  under  Option  1,  by  using  a  restricted  authorizations  regime.  Moreover,  in 
terms of privacy impacts and the degree of intrusiveness, Option 2 (decentralised storage) 
would not be considered as less intrusive given that the same information would be made 
available to the designated authorities in all MS. 

By ensuring  that  accessibility to  the copies  of travel documents  in  VIS is  limited for the 
purposes as currently provided in 15, 16, 18, 19 and 20 VIS Regulation, amending Article 
31  (2)  to  limit  transfer  of  travel  document  copies  to  third  countries  for  the  purpose  of 
facilitation  return  procedures,  Articles  18,  19  and  20  VIS  Regulation,  and  establishing 
adequate safeguards to ensure rights to privacy and data protection are respected, Options 1 
and 2, and sub-Option A pass the test of proportionality. 

101 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 8: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE STUDY ON FEASIBILITY AND 
IMPLICATIONS OF LOWERING THE FINGERPRINTING AGE FOR CHILDREN 

1.  Analysis of the problems 

Current  EU  legislation  on  the  visa  application  procedure  for  short-stay  visas  exempts 
children under the age of 12 from the provision of fingerprints. Without fingerprints it is 
more difficult to unambiguously verify the identity of a TCN child (<12) at the border or 
within  the  Schengen  territory.  In  relation  to  this  root  cause  2  problems  have  been 
formulated that the introduced adaptation might be able to address. 

Problem 2.1: sub-optimal achievement of various objectives of the VIS set out in Article 2 
of Regulation (EC) No 767/2008), in particular as regards to the prevention of visa fraud, 
to  facilitate  checks  at  external  border  crossing  points  and  within  the  territory  of  the 
Member States, and to facilitate the application of the Dublin II Regulation. 

Problem  2.1:  sub-optimal  provision  of  appropriate  protection  to  TCN  (<12)  children, 
either from trafficking with the help of a visa , or in the case they are found in Schengen 
territory in a situation where their rights may be or have been violated (trafficking, missing 
children, unaccompanied minors applying for asylum). 

2.  Objectives 

In relation to the defined problems, two objectives of the proposed second adaptation can 
be defined. 
  Better  meeting  the  various  VIS  objectives  (facilitation  of  the  fight  against  fraud, 
facilitation of checks at external border crossing points, facilitate the application of the 
Dublin II Regulation,) 

  Support  with  the  prevention  and  fight  against  child  trafficking,  and  with  the 
identification/verification  of  identity  of  TCN  children  who  are  found  in  Schengen 
territory  in  a  situation  where  their  rights  may  be  or  have  been  violated  (trafficking, 
missing children, unaccompanied minors applying for asylum). 

3.  Policy options 

The following policy options were investigated.  

Option 0. Baseline (no change) 

The  VIS  Regulation  (Article  9(6))  requires  Member  States  to  enter  the  fingerprints  of 
applicants  in  the  VIS.  The  inclusion  of  10  fingerprints  and  a  facial  image  is  arranged 
through Article 13(2) of the Visa Code. Biometric matching of fingerprints constitutes the 
main  method  for  of  identification  and  verification.  Children  under  the  age  of  12  are 
currently  exempt  from  the  obligation  to  provide  fingerprints.  In  the  case  the  measure  to 
take  fingerprints  of  children  under  the  age  of  12  would  not  be  introduced  relevant 
authorities continue to have challenges to identify and verify the identity of young children 
and to offer appropriate protection.  

102 

 
 
Option 1. Lowering the fingerprinting age to 6 years 

Under this scenario, fingerprints  will be taken from every visa applicant  from 6 years  of 
age and above, thereby effectively increasing the group of applicants by adding the cohort 
of 6 to 11 year-olds.  

In  2013  the  European Commission’s  Joint  Research  Centre  (JRC)  carried  out  a  study  on 
the question whether or not automated fingerprint recognition for children is possible with 
recognition  rates  similar  to  those  reached  for  adults.  The  study  concluded  that  under 
appropriate conditions, fingerprint recognition of children aged between 6 and 12 years is 
achievable  with  a  satisfactory  level  of  accuracy.  One  such  condition  would  be,  for 
example,  to  ensure  an  appropriate  level  of  training  of  operators  to  acquire  high  quality 
images.  

Option  1  is  also  in  line  with  the  proposal  for  a  revised  EURODAC  Regulation,  which 
would lower the fingerprinting age from 14 to 6. The JRC study and recent developments 
related to the protection of children in irregular migration were at the basis of this proposal.  

Option 2. Lowering the fingerprint age including all ages 

Under  this  scenario,  fingerprints  will  be  taken  from  visa  applicants  of  all  ages  thereby 
effectively increasing the group of applicants by adding the cohort of 0 to 11 year-olds.  

In the JRC study evidence is presented from other studies that it is feasible to take reliable 
fingerprints of children even younger than 6, although this may result in stronger technical 
and procedural changes (see paragraph 4.4.2 for detailed explanation). These indications, 
combined with the fact that all children have the same rights, including rights to protection, 
result in the inclusion of option 2.  

4.  Assessment of impacts 

Economic costs and benefits 

Three main categories of economic costs and benefits were included in the analysis:  

(i) 

(ii) 

(iii) 

the  investment  or  set-up  costs  (one-off  costs)  induced  by  modifications  in 
procedures and legal changes and; 

the impacts in terms of workload and administrative burden (operational costs), 
which  may  have  a  net  positive  or  negative  economic  impact  for  the  involved 
stakeholders;  

opportunity  costs  for  TCN  children  and  parents  resulting  from  additional 
waiting time at the visa application centres and costs incurred by authorities in 
the Schengen area.  

The  one-off  costs  are  higher  for  option  2  than  for  option  1.  This  is  first  of  all  because 
taking fingerprints of children younger than 6 is likely to require a new, different type of 
scanner and software. Further investigation into the technical feasibility is recommended. 
Secondly,  as  the  size  of  biometric  samples  to  be  included  in  in  the  case  of  the  second 
option is larger, more is requested in terms of storage of the system and the capacity of the 
BMS. The expected training costs are estimated to be the same for some options.  

103 

 
 
With  regards  to  operational  costs,  again  the  costs  are  expected  to  be  higher  for  option  2 
than for option 1. Not only are prints to be taken from double the number of children, but 
also the time that it takes to capture a print is expected to be longer.  

As  for  the  third  category  of  costs/  savings,  the  fingerprinting  time  of  the  youngest  age 
group  is  expected  to  be  higher,  resulting  in  more  additional  waiting  (/higher  opportunity 
costs) time for a child under 6 and its family than for children aged 6-12. For member state 
authorities no impacts are expected for Member States’ visa authorities. It is expected that 
the  adaptation  to  the  age  limit  might  save  Member  States’  authorities  dealing  with 
trafficked/  missing  children  considerable  time  identifying  children.  The  specific  impacts 
are unknown but it seems logic to assume that total benefits are higher in the case of option 
two as this option affects more children. 

Policy impacts 

Taking fingerprints of young children could support border authorities in detecting identity 
fraud as it would help them to ascertain whether the child at the border is the child that has 
been  granted  a  visa.  In  addition,  it  facilitates  also  the  identification  of  traffickers  and 
trafficking networks.  

The  prevention  of  identify  fraud  is  raised  by  several  consulates  as  the  main  potential 
benefit of the proposed adaptation. However, no information is available to state the actual 
size of the problem. 

A necessary precondition to achieve the full potential effectiveness of entering fingerprints 
of TCN children (<12) for the prevention of trafficking of TCN children (<12), is having 
fingerprints of each incoming  TCN  checked and verified at Schengen  entry ports. At the 
moment such checks are not consistently executed. 

The adaptation could also contribute to the Identification and verification of the identity of 
TCN children <12 on Schengen territory, hereby allowing for: 

  Family unification within and outside the Schengen area 

  Verifying the familiar relationship 

  Dublin and asylum examination 

Fundamental rights impacts 

Both  options  under  investigation  could  have  positive  fundamental  right  impacts.  The 
adaptations  could  assist  in  the  prevention  of  children  being  trafficked  and  in  identifying 
children  who  have  gone  missing,  or  who  are  abducted  or  became  victims  of  human 
traffickers, thereby enabling these children to reunite with their family members (but only 
if it is in their best interest). Also, it could support the execution of the Dublin Regulation. 

The proposal of lowering the age of fingerprinting children, whether it being option 1 or 2, 
will  also  have  an  impact  on  the  rights  to  human  dignity  and  privacy  and  personal  data 
protection. Fingerprints must be taken in full respect of human dignity and in a manner that 
is  appropriate  to  the  child’s  age  and  maturity.  It  is  advised  to  include  a  provision  to  the 
Visa  code  explicitly  requiring  that  fingerprints  be  taken  in  a  child-friendly  and  child-
sensitive  manner  by  consulate  officials  or  ESP  personnel  who  have  been  specifically 
trained to collect biometric data from children. 

104 

 
 
With  regards  to  privacy  and  personal  data  protection,  as  children  are  a  particularly 
vulnerable  group,  the  pursued  objectives  of  data  processing  must  be  clearly  identified  to 
assess whether these measures are appropriate, proportionate and fully address the problem 
at  stake.  The  processing  of  fingerprint  data  for  children  will  be  subject  to  the  same 
safeguards  and  purpose  limitations  as  exist  for  the  processing  of  biometric  data  of  TCN 
visa applicants above the age of 12. The existing safeguards ensure the strict purpose limits 
of  the  data  processing.  The  safeguards  continue  to  prevent  unauthorised  access  and 
unlawful sharing of this information to third parties.  

As described in the problem analysis there are cases of children entering or attempting to 
enter  the  EU  on  a  visa  who  are  victims  of  child  trafficking,  or  have  gone  missing.  Such 
cases  could  be  detected  by  a  more  complete  visa  policy.  This  objective  requires  that  the 
relevant or designated authorities would need access to search and process the data stored 
in VIS. Child protection authorities currently do not have access to the VIS. If they should 
be  granted  access  this  should  be  specified  in  the  VIS  Regulation.  A  difference  must  be 
made  between  the  use  of  children  data  in  the  interest  of  children,  (such  as  with  the 
objective  of  protecting  children,  for  example  against  human  trafficking  or  re-unification 
with parents), and its use for objectives that could possibly be in their detriment.  

Necessity and proportionality 

Lowering  the  fingerprinting  age  of  children  in  VIS  may  have  a  positive  impact  for  the 
protection of the fundamental rights of children, protecting them against child trafficking 
or  protecting  the  right  to  family  life  by  reuniting  missing  children  with  their  family 
members. Considering this objective of tracing or identifying missing children in Europe, 
the  proposed  measure,  may  complement  the  existing  tool  in  SIS  II  for  the  reporting  of 
alerts on missing persons.  

The necessity and proportionality of the proposed measure of lowering the fingerprinting 
age to children of 6 year old (option 1), or to include all ages (option 2) depends on the 
size of the problem, with other words on the number of TCN children under 12 who after 
their  visa  application  are  found  to  be  involved  in  visa  fraud,  and  the  number  of  TCN 
children (<12) who have gone missing in the Schengen area.  

Between 1.4 and 2.1 million children under 12 are traveling into the Schengen area with a 
uniform visa each year, half of them are presumably younger than 6 years old. There are no 
numbers available on identity theft after a visa has been granted (as currently there is no 
possibility  to  verify  identity  at  border  crossings).  With  regards  to  victims  of  trafficking, 
taking the latest Eurostat data into account each year they are expected to be around 375-
500  TCN  victims  under  12  year  old  to  be  found  each  year.  Studies  and  expert  opinions 
suggest,  the  lower  the  age  the  lower  the  share  of  victims.  In  2015  it  was  estimated  by 
Europol that, at least 10 000 unaccompanied minors went missing (age unspecified). But it 
is not known if they have a VIS record. Interviewed stakeholders believe this number to be 
marginal.  One  remark:  with  regards  to  both  trafficking  and  missing  children  numbers  it 
may  be  expected  that  the  number  of  factual  cases  is  a  higher  than  the  number  of  known 
cases.  

Option 1. Although the number of potentially affected children appears to be low, taking 
into account the positive impact for protecting the right to family life and best interests of 

105 

 
 
the child, this option can be considered a proportional measure under specified purposes, 
strict conditions and safeguards, ensuring that the fingerprints are only accessed and used 
to  protect  children  from  trafficking  or  identify  and  protect  missing  children.  Considering 
the  data  protection  impact  and  the  right  to  information  included  in  Article  37  VIS 
Regulation, taking into account that children (generally) have no impact on the decision of 
their parents, strict time limits must be applied to ensure that their data are no longer stored 
than  for  what  is  strictly  necessary.  Sufficient  safeguards  must  be  provided  to  ensure  that 
the  fingerprint  are  taken  in  a  child  friendly  manner,  not  only  at  the  time  of  collection 
during  the  visa  application,  but  also  within  the  EU  territory  for  the  purpose  of 
identification of the child and the comparison of the fingerprints with data in VIS or other 
databases. ESP’s should be bound by the same standards and ensure the protection of the 
rights and best interest of the child when taking fingerprints. 

Option  2.  All  children  are  entitled  to  protection,  and  this  option  may  have  a  positive 
impact with regards to the protection of all TCN children with a visa. However, for this age 
group  there  are  practical  problems  with  regards  to  the  accurate  collection  of  their 
fingerprints. Further investigation is preferred but it is to be expected that investments in 
scanners and software need to be made. This, in combination with the even smaller number 
of  children  below  the  age  of  6  that  are  at  risk  of  human  trafficking  or  go  missing  this 
option could be concluded to lack both necessity and proportionality.  

Comparison of options 

The preferred option to emerge from this study is Option 1: lowering the fingerprinting age to 
6 years. 

Both  options  contribute  to  the  policy  objectives  as  identified  in  section  4.3.  The  policy 
impacts  achieved  by  the  options  are  in  essence  the  same,  they  both  facilitate  in  various 
ways in the protection of these children while traveling with a visa and after arrival in the 
Schengen  area,  but  the  main  difference  is  that  the  number  of  children  affected  by  the 
second option could be larger as it is encompassing all children.  

However, the evidence currently available indicates that the group of children under 6 that 
is likely to be affected by the proposed adaptation is very small. This, in combination with 
the  needed  additional  investigations  into  the  feasibility  of  taking  accurate  fingerprints  of 
this younger age group, and the presumed substantial investment costs that are associated 
with  the  purchase  of  new  tailored  machines  result  in  the  conclusion  that  necessity  and 
proportionality are lacking. 

106 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 9: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE LEGAL ANALYSIS ON THE 
NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY OF EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF THE VISA 
INFORMATION SYSTEM (VIS) TO INCLUDE DATA ON LONG STAY VISAS AND 
RESIDENCE DOCUMENTS 

1.  Context of the study 

General context 

The fragmentation of information through different MSs and systems is inefficient. It could 
lead  to  errors  when  assessing  a  third-country  national’s  situation  and  makes  the  border-
crossing procedure difficult. These challenges have already been identified and described 
by  the  European  Commission,  which  published  in  April 2016  a  Communication  on 
Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security170 in which it commits 
to working to enable a better use of the data collected. 

On  10  June  2016,  the  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  (JHA)  Council  endorsed  a  roadmap  to 
enhance  information  exchange  and  information  management.  It  included  an  action 
plan  listing  50  actions  to  be  undertaken  by  different  stakeholders.  Action  50  set  an 
objective  to  address  the  existing  information  gap  in  the  (travel)  documents  of  third-
country nationals. 

The  Final  Report  of  the  High-Level  Expert  Group  on  Information  Systems  and 
Interoperability of May 2017 identified an information gap at EU level concerning three 
types  of  documents:  long-stay  visas,  residence  permits  and  residence  cards.  The  Report 
recommended the Commission to undertake, as a matter of priority, a feasibility study on 
the  establishment  of  a  "central  EU  repository  containing  information  on  long-stay  visas, 
residence cards, and residence permits". 

The  High-Level  Expert  Group’  sub-group  on  new  systems  further  discussed  the  idea  of 
such a database. It concluded that there were a number of similarities (in terms of desired 
functionalities,  purpose  and  uses)  with  the  database  on  short-stay  visas:  the  Visa 
Information System (VIS). Hence, the VIS could potentially be extended to include long-
stay and residence documents. In this respect, the Report on the VIS Evaluation (2016)171 
also  included  a  recommendation  for  further  development  of  the  system  to  include  these 
documents. 

In line with the High-Level Expert Group’s recommendation, a first feasibility study was 
undertaken172.  It  analysed  whether  including  long-stay  and  residence  documents  in  a 
central database was technically feasible and desirable, compared to the creation of a new 
dedicated  database  to  store  data  on  these  documents.  It  concluded  that  re-using  the  VIS 

170   Available 

at: 

http://www.eulisa.europa.eu/Newsroom/News/Documents/SB-

EES/communication_on_stronger_and_smart_borders_20160406_en.pdf (see page 3). 

171   Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council the implementation of Regulation (EC) 
No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Visa Information System (VIS), the 
use of fingerprints at external borders and the use of biometrics in the visa application procedure/REFIT Evaluation 
COM(2016) 655 final. 

172   Feasibility  Study  to  include  in  a  repository  documents  for  Long-Stay  visas,  Residence  and  Local  Border  Traffic 

Permits - Phase1: Analysis of Options, 2017. 

107 

 
 
                                                      
structure to include these documents would be the best option. The study also concluded 
on  the  need  to  carry  out  further  research  and  consultations  on  the  necessity  and 
proportionality of such a measure. 

Objective and scope of the study 

The  European  Commission’s  Directorate-General  for  Migration  and  Home  Affairs  (DG 
HOME)  commissioned  this  study,  with  the  aim  of  analysing  the  necessity  and 
proportionality of including data on long-stay visas and residence documents in the VIS. 
As required by the necessity test, the study identified other options that could potentially 
also address the problem, using the input collected during stakeholder consultations. More 
specifically, the study aims at answering the following questions: 
  What is the problem to be addressed? 

  What are the objectives of the initiative? 

  What  are  the  legislative  and  non-legislative  options  that  can  be  considered?  How  do 

they compare? 

  What are the impacts on fundamental rights? Are they proportionate (does any other 
option achieve the objectives with less interference on the rights of the data subjects)? 

The  scope  of  the  study  does  not  cover  and  is  without  prejudice  to  MSs'  and  EU’s 
competence  to  define  the  conditions  of  issuing  long-stay  and  residence  documents.  The 
assessed  measure  would  only  address  issues  related  to  the  lack  of  shared  information  on 
these documents at the borders and during the processing of a new application. 

Approach and methodology of the study 

To  achieve  its  aim,  the  study  follows  the  guidance  provided  in  the  Better  Regulation 
Guidelines and Toolbox, in particular Tool 28173. It follows the instructions given in the 
EDPS Toolkit for assessing the necessity of the measure as regards its impact on the right 
to data protection.  

The study used two main data collection tools:  

  Desk research including, among others, the Treaties, the VIS and the SIS legal bases 

and relevant case law; 

  Stakeholder  consultations:  consultations  with  the  European  Commission  (including 
two meetings with the relevant Directorates-General), one interview with Frontex and 
one interview with eu-LISA were carried out. In addition, a questionnaire was sent to 
MSs.  Finally,  the  study  also  took  into  account  the  results  of  the  public  consultation 
carried out by the Commission between November 2017 and February 2018. 

173   “Fundamental Rights & Human Rights”. 

108 

 
 
                                                      
2.  What is the problem? 

Figure 1 Problem definition 

Problem driver: fragmentation of the information on long-stay and residence documents 

For  short-stay  visas  (stays  in  the  EU  of  less  than  90  days  within  a  period  of  180  days), 
there  is  a  common  format  in  all  Schengen  Member  States  and  their  application  and 
issuance  procedures  have  been  harmonised.  Information  on  these  documents  and  their 
applications is stored in the VIS. The system is used by migration authorities and border 
guards,  as  well  as  national  and  European  law  enforcement  authorities  under  special 
conditions.  It  provides  reliable  information  on  the  authenticity  and  validity  of  short-stay 
visas and on applications, including those handled by other MSs. 

Long-stay and residence documents are not fully harmonised, and in the case of residence 
cards, their format can differ from one issuing Member State to another. Moreover, there is 
no  systematic  exchange  of  information  on  these  types  of  documents  between  Member 
States, which lead to operational difficulties at the borders and during the issuance process.  

Border guards and migration authorities have no fast and systematic access to information 
on documents issued by another Member State. The available data is partial and scattered 
in  different  systems  and  tools  (SIS,  SLTD,  FADO,  bilateral  contacts  between  MSs…) 
which  leads  to  lengthy  procedures  to  collect  all  the  relevant  data  for  the  day-to-day 
activities of national authorities.  

Member states and the respondents to the public consultation confirmed these issues: 86% 
agreed  with  the  identified  information  gap  that  leads  to  problems  in  management  of 
external borders and irregular migration within the EU. 

Problem:  operational  difficulties  at  the  border  and  during  the  assessment  of  TCNs’ 
situations 

From a border-control point of view, and during checks carried out within the territory of 
the MSs, it is crucial to ascertain the authenticity and validity of the documents. The holder 
of a long-stay or residence document can enter the Schengen Area via any external border-
crossing points, and not all these documents possesses the same, strong security features. 
Of the three documents, only residence permits and residence cards issued in a residence 
permit  format  have  a  chip174,  thus  allow  electronic  verification  through  Passive 
Authentication (using the respective country cryptographic certificate). In addition, while 

174   The check that the residence permit belongs to the bearer is done by reading the facial image from the chip of the 
document and comparing it with the one of the bearer. In case of failure or doubt, the stored fingerprints can be 
accessed.  However,  the  information  on  the  chip  needs  to  be  checked  on  its  authenticity  which  can  be  done  by 
exchanging cryptographic certificates between MSs (this topic is further discussed in section 3.1.2). 

109 

Fragmentation of the information Operational difficulties at the borders Difficulties in gathering information to perform an assessment of the TCN’ situation1.Fraud 2.Security and migration risks3.Administrative burden 4.Lengthy border-crossing procedures 5.Lack of statisticsProblem DriverProblemsConsequences 
 
 
                                                      
residence  permits  and  long-stay  visas  format  are  harmonised,  this  is  not  the  case  for 
residence cards. Thus, the visual inspection of document’ security features is made difficult 
by the different formats and – for some documents – the rarity with which they appear at 
certain border-crossing points, in addition to the heterogeneous use of security features. 

Lastly, the border guards have different tools to gather information to assess the validity of 
a  document,  some  automated  (SIS  and  SLTD  for  lost,  stolen,  misappropriated  and 
invalidated documents), others to be used at second-line border checks, like the FADO for 
images  of  authentic  and  forged  documents.  However,  the  information  contained  in  the 
systems is not always sufficient (in terms of both quality and quantity). The SIS does not 
provide  information  on  previous  fraud  attempt(s)  by  an  applicant  and  cannot  provide 
information  on  documents  that  have  not  been  reported  as  stolen  or  lost.  Border  guards 
ultimately  have  to  rely  on  bilateral  contacts  with  the  issuing  Member  States,  via 
communication channels like SIRENE, but also by phone or emails. Consulted  

MS complained about these procedures as  being time-consuming  and  inefficient.  For the 
large  majority  (80%)  the  lack  of  shared information  on  these  documents  was  a  hurdle  to 
their day-to day activities. 

From a migration assessment point of view, it is important to have information on relevant 
elements of the situation of a person to assess accurately whether the applicant would pose 
a migration or a security risk. In addition to checking national systems, the only EU-level 
exchange of information migration authorities have at their disposal is the SIS for alerts on 
entry bans. There is no dedicated tool to share information on applications and reasons for 
refusal, which might be linked to migration or security risks.  

Consequences:  fraud,  security  and  migration  risks,  administrative  burden  and  lack  of 
statistics 

This situation leads to five main consequences: 

1.  Administrative  burden:  as  migration  and  border  control  authorities  have  to  go 
through  different  procedures  in  different  systems  and  tools  to  gather  an  incomplete 
picture on the TCN and her/his document. The bilateral exchange of information is the 
last  resource  they  use,  which  has  different  inherent  constraint:  language  barriers  and 
long waiting times. 

2.  Lengthy border-crossing procedures: the above-mentioned issues at borders directly 
impacts the journey of bona fide TCNs holding long-stay or residence documents, who 
suffers delays and who risk being wrongly denied entry or passage. When there is a 
doubt on a document, the further checks and bilateral contact between MS are carried-
out at second-line border check, which means that the TCN has to wait at the borders 
for  his/her  situation  to  be  clarified.  Ultimately,  this  situation  can  lead  to  the 
infringement  of  the  Freedom  of  Movement  of  bona  fide  TCN  who  reside  in  the 
territory  of a  Member  State  (Article  21  TFEU  and  Directive  2004/38) if  they  are  not 
allowed  to  cross  the  internal  (during  an  ad  hoc  check)  or  external  borders  due  their 
document not being trusted.  

3.  Document  fraud:  the  information  gap  can  create  blind  spots  in  the  border-
management framework and foster fraud on less secured documents. This is especially 
important  when  considering  the  existing  and  ongoing  strengthening  of  border  checks 
for  other  categories  of  travellers  (e.g.  mandatory  checks  of  EU  citizens  at  external 

110 

 
 
borders,  ETIAS  for  short-stay  visa-exempt  travellers,  VIS  for  short-stay  visa  holders 
and  EES  for  all  short-stay  visitors).  This  reinforcement  of  security  and  border 
management measures could motivate people with ill intentions to look for other, less 
secure  types  of  documents  that  would  allow  them  to  enter  the  Schengen  Area  and 
move  across  Member  States.  This  phenomenon  has  already  been  observed  with  ID 
cards,  whereby  fraudsters  target  less  secure  EU  ID  cards  for  intra-Schengen 
movements175 (fraud based on the ‘weakest link’ approach). 

In  addition,  obtaining  authentic  documents  based  on  false  application  documents 
(birth, marriage and death certificates) is one of the biggest challenges in terms of fraud 
as  it  is  very  difficult  to  detect.  This  type  of  fraud  is  increasingly  attractive  for 
fraudsters, as the document become more secure. Better information exchange between 
MSs during the application process could help identify more cases176. 

Table 1: Fraudulent documents – Fronex Risk Analzsis for 2017 

4.  Security  and  migration  risks:  the  fraud  problem  inevitably  leads  to  a  security  issue 
for the EU. Fraud is used by organised crime as a mean for a series of related serious 
offences,  notably  for  terrorism,  human  trafficking,  migrant  smuggling  or  drug  and 
firearm trafficking177. 

In addition, forged documents are the gateway used by irregular migrants to enter and 
move  within  the  EU.  According  to  Frontex’s  2017  Annual  Risk  Analysis,  smugglers 
frequently provide migrants with fraudulent travel and identity documents. The agency 
observes that both the quantity and quality of fraudulent documents circulating in the 
EU  have  increased  in  recent  years178.  In  fact,  smugglers  are  supported  by  criminal 
networks  with  access  to  expert  counterfeiters  who,  financed  by  the  strong  demand, 
have set-up print shops179.  

5.  Lack  of  statistics:  as  observed  in  the  2017  study180,  the  analysis  of  fraud  related  to 
long-stay  and  residence  documents  is  particularly  complex  due  to  a  lack  of  available 
data  on  the  problem.  On  the  one  hand,  and  as  explained  above,  any  statistic  on 

175   Frontex, 

Risk 

Analysis 

for 

2017, 

page 

23, 

http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2017.pdf 

176   Europol  funded  the  development  of  a  handbook  on  the  detection  of  false  application  or  “breeder”  documents.  It 
contains samples and short descriptions of European ID documents and breeder documents. It is not used as much 
as it should be according to the EC Communication on Action plan to strengthen the European response to travel 
document fraud. 

177   Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  an  “Action  Plan  To 

Strengthen The European Response To Travel Document Fraud” of December 2016, COM(2016)790. 

178   Ibid, p. 22. 
179   Ibid. 
180   Feasibility  Study  to  include  in  a  repository  documents  for  Long-Stay  visas,  Residence  and  Local  Border  Traffic 

Permits - Phase1: Analysis of Options, 2017. 

111 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
detection  of forgeries is bound to  underestimate the actual  size of the problem as  the 
successful fraudsters go undetected. On the other hand, there is a shortage of statistics 
at EU level concerning this category of TCNs: 

  The data is kept at national level in MSs’ information systems; 

  Eurostat  does  not  have statistics  on  long-stay  visas  and the  statistics on residence 

permits are limited; 

  Frontex  data  does  not  distinguish  between  residence  permits  and  residence  cards 
and  sometimes  does  not  distinguish  the  fraud  between  Schengen  (short-stay)  and 
long-stay visas. Similarly, frauds on the breeder documents are complex to quantify 
as the data is kept at national level. 

3.  What are the objectives of the initiative? 

General objectives 

In  line  with  the  problem  defined  above,  the  study  identified  the  following  general 
objectives, validated by the European Commission: 

I. 

II. 

To improve security within the EU and at its borders; 

To facilitate TCNs’ right to move and reside freely within the EU; 

III. 

To improve the management of the Schengen external border. 

Specific objectives 

Two main specific objectives and two ancillary ones supplement the general objectives: 

Figure 2: Policy objectives 

4.  Why an EU action? 

To  address  the  problem,  MSs  could  act  on  an  individual  basis,  by  strengthening  their 
documents,  their  issuance  process,  document  checks  at  border-crossing  points  or  by 
reinforcing or systematising bilateral cooperation.  

However, this approach has inherent limitations: 

  Its benefits are automatically dependent on the number of MSs committed to 
the initiative(s). The more MSs that implement individual actions, the more secure 

112 

 
 
 
the EU territory. The action of all MSs would therefore achieve greater benefits  – 
which EU action would necessarily entail, but which is unlikely without it181; 

  Part  of  the  problem  cannot  be  solved  without  the  coordination  of  all  MSs. 
There is currently no way for one MS to know if other MSs possess relevant long-
stay  information  on  a  person  without  contacting  each  one  of  them.  This  process 
would be overly cumbersome and lengthy, and is therefore infeasible; 

  Differences in MSs’ security levels may lead to weak points for the Schengen 
Area. For example, some MSs, on their own initiative, may continue to implement 
policies  towards  harmonising  long-stay  documents  by  gradually  phasing  out 
problematic ones and introducing improved security features based on international 
standards.  However,  this  approach  would  still  result  in  a  situation  where  the 
security  of  documents  would  be  inconsistent:  documents  from  some  MSs  would 
still be less secure than documents from others, therefore constituting a weakness 
for the security of the Schengen Area as a whole; 

  Additional difficulties may arise from uncoordinated actions. For example, the 
different  bilateral  cooperation  processes  are  likely  to  abide  by  different  rules. 
Systemising  them  would  increase  workload  and  possibilities  for  confusion  for 
border guards, thus increasing the possibility of mistakes. 

Therefore, Member States alone cannot adequately address the problem: they can, at 
best, partially address it. More than 90% of the MS consulted considered necessary an EU 
legislative response to address the information gap. 

5.  What are the options to address the problem? 

The study identifies five options, some of them including sub-options that could potentially 
address the problem. 

Table 2: Policy options  
No action 
Option 1: No policy change / “do nothing” 

Non legislative action 
Option 2: Improve the current exchange of information and checks 
2a 

Improve the exchange of bilateral information on a case-by-case basis  
Improve the feeding and use of information in the SIS as regards alerts on withdrawn long-stay 
and residence documents182 (improve amount/quality of information fed into the system) (e.g. 
whether a residence permit was stolen, invalidated, misappropriated or lost) 
Promote the use of security features for documents containing a chip: Passive Authentication 
and Extended Access Control) 

2b 

2c 

Legislative action 
Option  3:  Further  harmonise  and  secure  long-stay  visas  and  residence  documents  (e.g.  security 
features) 
Option 4: Create an interconnection between national databases that would allow all MSs to query 

181   As mentioned in footnote 23, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark would not be bound by EU action in the 

area of freedom, security and justice. 

182   Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, article 38.2(e) 

113 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
each other’s relevant national databases 

Option 5: Extend the scope of the VIS to include long-stay visas and residence documents 

5a 

5b 

Store data on issued documents (including biographical data provided for in the document) and 
the document’s history (withdrawn, renewed, etc.) 
Also  store  data  on  all  applications  (e.g.  the  fact  that  an  application  has  been  lodged,  when, 
where, by which MS, for what type of document, main reason for refusal if refused, etc.); 

5.  Findings and conclusions of the study 

Impact on fundamental rights 

The study assesses the impacts on fundamental rights of the options and sub-options that 
meet the two main policy objectives. Therefore, the analysis focuses on options 4, 5.a 
and 5.b. 

Necessity 

The table below summarises the assessment, on a scale of “----” (strong negative impact) 
to “++++” (strong positive impact). 

Table 3: Analysis of impacts on fundamental rights 

Policy options 

Article 2 

Article 7 

Article 8 

Article 45(2) 

Option 
decentralised 
database 

4: 

Option  5: 
Include 
long-stay  documents 
in the VIS 

Sub-option  a):  store 
data 
issued 
on 
documents 

Sub-option  b):  store 
data on all applications 

+  

(if residence 
cards are 
included) 

0 (if they are 
not) 

++  

(if residence 
cards are 
included) 

0 (if they are 
not) 

++  

(if residence 
cards are 
included) 

0 (if they are 
not) 

+ 

- 

-  

+ 

- - 

- - 

+ + 

- - - 

- - - 

114 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown above, options 4, 5.a and 5.b have negative impacts on the right to privacy and 
the  right  to  data  protection.  The  rights  to  privacy,  to  personal  data  protection  and  to 
freedom of movement are not absolute and may be limited, provided the limitations are: 

  Provided for by law; 
  Respect the essence of the rights; 
  Meet objectives of general interest or the need to protect the rights and freedom of 

others; 
  Necessary; 
  Proportionate183. 

All  options  would  meet  the  three  general  objectives,  but  to  a  different  extent,  as 
summarised by the table below. 

Table 4: Effectiveness in meeting the objectives 

Objective 

Option 

General 
objectiv
e I: 
security 

General 
objective II: 
freedom of 
movement 

General 
objective 
III: 
manageme
nt of 
border 

Specific 
objective 
1: 
strengthe
n checks 

Specific objective 
2: information-
exchange 

3: further 
harmonise 
and secure 

4: 
decentralise
d database 

5.a: store 
data on 
issued 
documents 

+ 

+ 

+ 

5.b: store 
data on all 
applications 

++ 

+ (if residence 
cards are 
included) 

0 (if they are 
not) 

+  
(if residence 
cards are 
included) 
0 (if they are 
not) 

++  
(if residence 
cards are 
included) 
0 (if they are 
not) 

++  
(if residence 
cards are 
included) 
0 (if they are 
not) 

++ 

+ 

0 

+ 

+ 

++ 

+ 

++ 

+ 

+ 

0 

+ 

183   EDPS  (April  2017)  “Assessing  the  necessity  of  measures  that  limit  the  fundamental  right  to  the  protection  of 

personal data: A Toolkit”, page 4 

115 

 
 
                                                      
The policy objectives to be achieved cannot be addressed by less intrusive measures than 
option  5.b.  Other  less  intrusive  measures  were  considered  but  they  do  not  reach  the 
objectives  at  all  or  only  partially.  The  more  intrusive  measure,  option  5.b,  is  therefore 
considered as necessary.  

Proportionality 

The limitations to fundamental rights brought about by option 5.b are proportionate to the 
desired aim, as demonstrated below.  

The  limitation  would  bring  about  significant  advantages:  limiting  the  rights  would 
enable  the  general  and  specific  objectives  to  be  met.  It  would  also  entail  some 
disadvantages  as  it  would  negatively  affect  the  right  to  data  protection:  option 5.b 
entails  collecting,  storing  and  accessing  17 data  items  related  to  issued  long-stay 
documents  issued  and  applications.  It  relies  on  the  VIS,  a  central  database,  for  storage. 
This limited data set would be collected, on about 22 million people184 (including residence 
cards). 

However, this limitation on the right to data protection is minor and strictly limited 
to  what  is  necessary  to  achieve  the  objectives.  The  data  set  does  not  encompass  the 
special categories of data that are considered particularly sensitive, and contains little data 
that  would  yield  information  on  a  person’s  private  life.  The  “reason  for  the  negative 
decision”  might,  if  left  as  a  free  text  field,  represent  a  risk  to  privacy  or  reveal  personal 
sensitive  data  (e.g.  health  data)  on  rare  occasions.  The  use  of  a  drop-down  menu,  tick 
boxes  or  another  technical  feature  in  the  form  could  prevent  this.  This  limited  data  set 
would  be  collected,  at  most,  on  about  22 million  people185  (including  residence  cards). 
Only personal data that is adequate and relevant for the purposes of the processing would 
be  collected  and  processed186.  This  data  set  does  not  go  beyond  what  a  border  guard 
currently sees when examining a long-term visa, residence card or permit presented at the 
border. 

Thus,  the  limitation  is  justified  as  the  advantages  outweigh  the  disadvantages  caused 
with  respect  to  the  exercise  of  fundamental  rights;  it  is  proportionate  to  the  desired 
objectives as it reaches a fair balance between them and the fundamental rights at stake (in 
this case data protection). 

Comparison of options: coherence, effectiveness and cost-benefit 

For  each  of  the  options  and  sub-options,  the  study  analysed  the  following  criteria  (in 
addition to impact on fundamental rights, necessity and proportionality): 

  Coherence: is the option coherent with the overarching objectives of EU policies? 

All  options  except  option 1  (“do  nothing”)  are  coherent  with  the  overarching 
objectives of EU policies. 

184 Amount of residence cards for ≈1 million people. 
185   Amount of residence cards for ≈1 million people. 
186   Biographical and document data would be used to compare with the data of the presented document and to detect 
forged, counterfeited and stolen blank documents. Decision data would be used by migration authorities to inform 
their  decisions  during  the  application  process.  Data  generated  by  the  repository  would  be  used  to  structure  the 
database. 

116 

 
 
                                                      
  Effectiveness: does the option meet the objectives? 

Sub-option 5.b  is  the  only  option  that  fully  addresses  the  second  objective,  as 
storing  data  on  documents  and  applications  would  offer  migration  authorities  a 
complete picture on the situation of the TCN applying for a new document. 

  Efficiency: do the benefits of the option outweigh its costs? 

Efficiency  was  analysed  for  the  options  and  sub-options  that  meet  the  two  main 
policy objectives (4, 5.a and 5.b). 

Option 4 – creating a decentralised database among all MSs with different data sets, 
technical standards and access rights (due to the variable geometry of the topic of 
legal  migration)  –  is  likely  to  be  very  expensive  and  time-consuming  to 
implement  and  pose  major  difficulties  deriving  from  the  different  governance, 
legal  basis  and  technical  solutions  used  across  national  systems.  Option 5  (either 
sub-option) offers significant advantages and a much better cost-benefit. 

The table below summarises the assessment of each option against the criteria. 

Table 5: Comparison of policy options 

 1   No change 

Option 

Improve  existing:  bi-lateral  exchange  of 
information  
Improve existing: use of the SIS 

2a  

2b 

Improve  existing:  use  of  the  electronic 
document authentication 

2c 
 3  Further document harmonization 
 4  Distributed database 

Extend the VIS with documents data 

5a 

5b 

Extend 
application data188 

the  VIS  with  documents  and 

Best-scoring option 

Coherence  Effectiveness  Efficiency 
0 
+ 

0 
++ 

++ 

++ 

++ 
++ 
+++ 

+++ 

+ 

+ 

+ 
+ 
++ 

+++ 

+187 
-- 
++ 

++ 

Option  5b  “Extend  the  scope  of  the  VIS  to  include  long-stay  visas  and  residence 
documents – Store also data on all applications” is the preferred option for the following 
reasons: 

  Necessity: There is no equally effective but less intrusive measure available: thus, the 

measure is necessary; 

187   The option scored positively for efficiency at securing the borders in term of efficiency based on the assessment 
included in the IA of the DG JUST proposal. However, the benefits cover only one of the two objectives in scope 
for  this  legislative  initiative.  As  explained  through  the  study  and  in  particular  in  section  3.2,  this  option  will  not 
help MS cooperation, nor the exchange of information to strengthen the issuance process. 

188   Not the full application data, but only whether a person has applied for a document and what was the outcome. 

117 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
  Proportionality:  The  measure’s  impact  on  fundamental  rights,  including  data 
protection and privacy, is limited while it brings significant advantages: the measure is 
proportionate; 

  Coherence,  effectiveness  and  efficiency:  The  measure  meets  the  criteria  more  than 
any  other  alternative.  In  particular,  option  5  would  allow  triangular  verification 
(person->document->system),  which  has  proven  to  be  a  successful  approach  for  the 
efficient  tackling  of  unlawful  use  of  documents  through  the  correct  assessment  of  (i) 
their validity and authenticity and of (ii) the identity of the holder. It provides a higher 
level  of  security  than  just  reinforcing  the  documents,  as  not  only  would  work  even 
when the chip cannot be read or verified, but it would also strengthen the application 
process. The system could be consulted easily at the border by scanning  the passport, 
thus simplifying the process at the border.  

Should the collection of fingerprints be harmonised across MS for all documents, these 
could be stored centrally further strengthening the EU against identity frauds, just like 
what  is  done  for  short  stay  travellers  whose  biometrics  are  collected  in  the  EES  and 
VIS. Finally, a central system setup would be able to leverage on the tools introduced 
with the recent interoperability legislative proposal and benefit in terms of efficient use 
of the information available.  

Overall, this option would have a positive societal impact both on EU citizens who would 
benefit of the additional security of the Schengen Area, and on TCNs who would benefit of 
a potentially faster border crossing. . 

6.  The way forward/what are the next steps 

This study is a first step towards the possible future adoption and implementation of the 
measure. The European Commission will present an  impact assessment building on the 
work carried out during the study.  

The final option, sub-option, design and set-up to be retained depend on political and 
policy  decisions.  Based  on  these  decisions,  the  European  Commission  is  expected  to 
present legislative amendments to the VIS. 

118 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 10: CONSIDERATIONS ON THE USE OF BIOMETRIC DATA (TOPIC 3) 

When  coupled  with  biometric  information,  border  checks  are  even  more  secure.  Indeed, 
the  triangular  verification  (person->document->system)  supported  by  biometrics  has 
proven to be a successful approach for the efficient tackling of unlawful use of documents 
through the correct assessment of their validity and authenticity and of the identity of the 
holder. 

Falsification  techniques  evolve  very  quickly  and  criminal  networks  are  increasingly 
specialised,  developing  new  forms  of  forgery  (manipulation  of  anti-forgery  devices  and 
techniques to circumvent biometric checks). As imposter fraud and fraudulent acquisition 
of authentic documents are increasing and counterfeiting slightly decreasing, the triangular 
verification is a better-equipped technique to deal with the new trends in document fraud. 
As observed by Frontex189, “the roll-out of the VIS and the obligation as of October 2014 
for  border-control  authorities  to  check  the  fingerprints  of  all  relevant  visa  holders  are 
likely to reduce the number of Schengen visa impostors in the future and (…) increase the 
likelihood of frauds of other types of travel documents”.  

Figure 1: Triangular verification 

Lastly,  the  inclusion  of  biometric  data  in  the  VIS  could  allow  for  the  identification  of 
undocumented TCNs, in cases in which they entered the Schengen Area via a long-stay 
or residence document before overstaying. 

It is,  however, important to  note some shortcomings  in  terms of biometric  data available 
for long-stay and residence documents. These documents are nationally issued, as opposed 
to  short-stay  “Schengen”  visas,  with  issuance  process  has  been  fully  harmonised  at  EU 
level.  Although  the  regulations  on  the  harmonisation  of  long-stay  visas  and  residence 
permits set a minimum biometric data to be collected, the situation very much differs from 
one Member State to another.  In fact, not all Member States collect and store biometrics 
and  even  when  they  do,  a  different  number  of  fingerprints  is  collected  with  different 
quality  criteria.  This  means  that  to  enable  such  a  use-case,  the  way  the  documents  are 
issued would have to be harmonised to include the requirements of capturing and storing 
biometric identifiers according to common standards.  

189   Annual Risk Analysis 2015 

119 

 
 
 
 
                                                      
Nevertheless, knowing MS collect biometric data for long-stay visas and residence permits 
(as laid down by the harmonised formats of these documents) and considering the technical 
capabilities for  the  proposed  Share BMS,  it  would  be  technically  feasible to  work  with 
the limited set of biometric data as currently contained in the documents (only with facial 
image for instance). The limitations observed are based on data protection considerations. 

In  light  of  the  technical  feasibility,  of  the  potential  benefits  stemming  from  the  use  of 
biometrics  to  fight  frauds  and  to  establish  a  person  centric  storage  of  information,  the 
inclusion of biometrics could be considered after a period of assessment  

120 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 11: AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS OVERVIEW (PREFERRED OPTION IN BOLD) 

Copy of the travel document 

Option 1.0 

Status quo 

Option 1.1 

Option 1.2 

Include a digital copy of the travel document in the central VIS 

(centralised) 

Include a digital copy of the travel document in national visa systems 

(decentralised) 

Sub-option A 

Storage of biographical page only 

Sub-option B 

Storage of all used pages of the applicant’s travel document 

Fingerprinting of minors 

Option 2.0 

Option 2.1 

Option 2.2 

Status quo 

Lowering the fingerprinting age to 6 years 

Lowering the fingerprinting age including all ages 

Long-stay visas and residence documents 

Option 3.0 

Status quo 

Option 3.1.a 

Improve the exchange of bilateral information on a case-by-case basis. 

Option 3.1.b 

Option 3.1.c 

Improve the feeding and use of information in the SIS as regards alerts on 

withdrawn long-stay and residence documents 

Promote the use of security features for the documents containing a chip: 

Passive Authentication and Extended Access Control 

Option 3.2 

Further harmonise and secure long-stay and residence documents 

Option 3.3 

Create an interconnection between national databases that would allow all 

MSs to query each other’s relevant national databases 

Option 3.4.A 

Integration in the VIS – without data on rejected applications 

e
v
i
t
a
l
s
i
g
e
l
-
n
o
N

e
v
i
t
a
l
s
i
g
e
L

Option 3.4.B 

Integration in the VIS – with data on rejected applications 

Migration and security checks 

Option 4.0 

Option 4.1 

Option 4.2 

Status quo 

Systematic and automated check against available databases (ETIAS model) 

Automated cross-checks + screening rules 

121