COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Tackling online disinformation: a European Approach
Date: 2018-04-26
Institutions: Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, European Commission
Subjects: Internet, digital literacy, disinformation, dissemination of information, education, election, freedom of expression, information, information user, press

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 26.4.2018 COM(2018) 236 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Tackling online disinformation: a European Approach  
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION  

The exposure of citizens to large scale disinformation, including misleading or outright 
false information, is a major challenge for Europe. 

Our  open  democratic  societies  depend  on  public  debates  that  allow  well-informed 
citizens  to  express  their  will  through  free  and  fair  political  processes.  Media  have 
traditionally played a key role in holding public authorities to account and in providing 
the  information  that  enables  citizens  to  form  their  own  views  on  societal  issues  and 
actively and effectively participate in democratic society. In Europe, traditional media is 
subject  to  a  wide  range  of  rules  on  impartiality,  pluralism,  cultural  diversity,  harmful 
content, advertising and sponsored content. Democracy in the European Union rests on 
the existence of free and independent media.1 

Today,  the  Internet  has  not  only  vastly  increased  the  volume  and  variety  of  news 
available to citizens but has also profoundly changed the ways citizens access and engage 
with news. Younger users, in particular, now turn to online media as their main source of 
information.  The  easy  availability  of  diverse  quality  information  has  the  potential  to 
make democratic processes more participatory and inclusive.  

Yet,  new  technologies  can  be  used,  notably  through  social  media,  to  disseminate 
disinformation on a scale and with speed and precision of targeting that is unprecedented, 
creating  personalised  information  spheres  and  becoming  powerful  echo  chambers  for 
disinformation campaigns.   

Disinformation erodes trust in institutions and in digital and traditional media, and harms 
our  democracies  by  hampering  the  ability  of  citizens  to  take  informed  decisions. 
Disinformation  also  often  supports  radical  and extremist  ideas  and  activities.  It impairs 
freedom  of  expression,  a  fundamental  right  enshrined  in  the  Charter  of  Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (Charter).2 Freedom of expression encompasses respect for 
media  freedom  and  pluralism,  as  well  as  the  right  of  citizens  to  hold  opinions  and  to 
receive and impart information and ideas "without interference by public authorities and 
regardless of frontiers". 

The  primary  obligation  of  state  actors  in  relation  to  freedom  of  expression  and  media 
freedom  is  to  refrain  from  interference  and  censorship  and  to  ensure  a  favourable 
environment  for  inclusive  and  pluralistic  public  debate.  Legal  content,  albeit  allegedly 
harmful  content,  is  generally  protected  by  freedom  of  expression  and  needs  to  be 
addressed  differently  than  illegal  content,  where  removal  of  the  content  itself  may  be 
justified.  As  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  has  concluded,  this  is  particularly 
important in relation to elections.3  

Mass online disinformation campaigns are being widely used by a range of domestic and 
foreign  actors  to  sow  distrust  and  create  societal  tensions,  with  serious  potential 

1 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2016-50/2016-fundamental-

colloquium-conclusions_40602.pdf 

2  Article 11, Charter. Article 6(1) of the Treaty of the European Union confers binding force on the 

Charter and states that it "shall have the same legal value as the Treaties." 

3   See e.g. Case of  Bowman v. The United Kingdom (141/1996/760/961) 

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58134. 

1 

 
 
 
                                                 
consequences for our security. Furthermore, disinformation campaigns by third countries 
can  be  part  of  hybrid  threats  to  internal  security,  including  election  processes,  in 
particular  in  combination  with  cyberattacks.  For  example,  Russian  military  doctrine 
explicitly recognises information warfare as one of its domains.4 

The  spread  of  disinformation  also  affects  policy-making  processes  by  skewing  public 
opinion.  Domestic  and  foreign  actors  can  use  disinformation  to  manipulate  policy, 
societal  debates  and  behaviour  in  areas  such  as  climate  change,  migration,  public 
security,  health5,  and  finance.  Disinformation  can  also  diminish  trust  in  science  and 
empirical evidence. 

In 2014, the World Economic Forum identified the rapid spread of misinformation online 
as one of the top 10 trends in modern societies.6 

In  2016,  social  media  news  aggregators  and  search  engines  were,  taken  together,  the 
main ways to read news online for 57% of users in the EU.7 As regards young people, a 
third of 18–24s say social media are their main source of news.8 

80%  of  Europeans  have  come  across  information  they  believe  was  false  or  misleading 
several  times  a  month  or  more. 85%  of respondents perceive this as  a problem in  their 
country.9 

The  online  platforms  that  distribute  content,  particularly  social  media,  video-sharing 
services  and  search  engines,  play  a  key  role  in  the  spread  and  amplification  of  online 
disinformation. These platforms have so far failed to act proportionately, falling short of 
the  challenge  posed  by  disinformation  and  the  manipulative  use  of  platforms' 
infrastructures.  Some  have  taken  limited  initiatives  to  redress  the  spread  of  online 
disinformation,  but  only  in  a  small  number  of  countries  and  leaving  out  many  users. 
Furthermore, there are serious doubts whether platforms are sufficiently protecting their 
users against unauthorised use of their personal data by third parties,  as exemplified by 
the  recent  Facebook  /  Cambridge  Analytica  revelations,  currently  investigated  by  data 
protection authorities, about personal data mined from millions of EU social media users 
and exploited in electoral contexts.  

The rise of disinformation and the gravity of the threat have sparked growing awareness 
and  concerns  in  civil  society,  both  in  EU  Member  States  and  internationally.  In  March 
2015, the European Council invited the High Representative to develop an action plan to 
address  Russia’s  on-going  disinformation  campaigns,10  which  resulted  in  establishing 
East  Stratcom  Task  Force,  effective  as  planned  since  September  2015.  In  a  June  2017 
Resolution,  the  European  Parliament  called  upon  the  Commission  “to  analyse  in  depth 

4 https://www.rusemb.org.uk/press/2029 
5 In the area of vaccine hesitancy, the Commission is proposing a Council Recommendation including 

specific measures to monitor and tackle disinformation in this area. See COM (2018)245/2 
6  http://reports.weforum.org/outlook-14/top-ten-trends-category-page/10-the-rapid-spread-of-

misinformation-online/.  

7  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/eurobarometer-internet-users-preferences-accessing-

content-online. 

8  Digital News Report 2017, Reuters Institute, https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/risj-review/2017-

digital-news-report-now-available.   

9  http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instruments/flash/ 

surveyky/ 2183. 

10  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/20/conclusions-european-council/  

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the  current  situation  and  legal  framework  with  regard  to  fake  news  and  to  verify  the 
possibility  of  legislative  intervention  to  limit  the  dissemination  and  spreading  of  fake 
content."11  In  March  2018,  the  European  Council  stated  "social  networks  and  digital 
platforms need to guarantee transparent practices and full protection of citizens' privacy 
and personal data."12 The Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and "Fake News", 
Disinformation and Propaganda, adopted in 2017 by Special Rapporteurs appointed by 
international  organisations,13  provides  a  focused  treatment  of  the  application  of 
international human rights standards to this phenomenon.  

Several Member States are currently exploring possible measures to protect the integrity 
of  electoral  processes  from  online  disinformation  and  to  ensure  the  transparency  of 
online political advertising.14 

It is clear, however, that while the protection of the electoral process lies primarily within 
the competence of Member States, the cross-border dimension of online disinformation 
makes a European approach necessary in order to ensure effective and coordinated action 
and to protect the EU, its citizens, its policies and its Institutions. 

This Communication has been developed taking into account the extensive consultations 
with citizens and stakeholders. The Commission set up in late 2017 a High-Level Expert 
Group to advise on this matter. The Group delivered its report on 12 March 2018.15 The 
Commission  also  launched  a  broad  public  consultation  process,  comprising  online 
that  received  2,986  replies,16  structured  dialogues  with  relevant 
questionnaires 
stakeholders,17 and a Eurobarometer opinion poll covering all 28 Member States.18 

This Communication sets out the views of the Commission on the challenges associated 
with  disinformation  online.  It  outlines  the  key  overarching  principles  and  objectives 
which should guide actions to raise public awareness about disinformation and tackle the 
phenomenon effectively, as well as the specific measures which the Commission intends 
to take in this regard.   

2.  SCOPE AND CAUSES OF ONLINE DISINFORMATION 

2.1.  Scope 

Disinformation is understood as verifiably false or misleading information that is created, 
presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public, and 

11  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2017-

0272+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.  

12  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/03/23/european-council-conclusions-22-

march-2018/.  

13 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and "Fake News," Disinformation and Propaganda, 

http://www.osce.org/fom/302796?download=true. 

14 Some Member States have adopted – or are planning to adopt - measures regarding political advertising. 
These include inter alia the recent French draft law on false information and non-binding guidelines 
proposed by the Italian regulator.  

15 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-

online-disinformation. 

16 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/summary-report-public-consultation-fake-news-and-

online-disinformation. 

17 https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/events/high-level-hearing-preserving-democracy-digital-age_en and 

https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/fake-news. 

18 http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instruments/flash/ 

surveyky/2183. 

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may cause public harm. Public harm comprises threats to democratic political and policy-
making processes as well as public goods such as the protection of EU citizens' health, 
the environment or security. Disinformation does not include reporting errors, satire and 
parody,  or  clearly  identified  partisan  news  and  commentary.  This  Communication  is 
without prejudice to the applicable legal rules at Union or national level relating to the 
illegal  content.19  This 
issues  discussed, 
Communication  is  without  prejudice  to  ongoing  approaches  and  actions  in  relation  to 
illegal  content,  including  as  regards  terrorist  content  online  and  child  sexual  abuse 
material. 
83%  of  Europeans  consider  fake  news  to  present  a  problem  for  democracy  in  general, 
either "definitely" (45%) or "to some extent" (38%).20  

including  disinformation  containing 

Intentional disinformation aimed at influencing elections and immigration policies were 
the  two  top  categories  considered  likely  to  cause  harm  to  society,  according  to 
respondents to a public consultation conducted by the Commission. These were closely 
followed by disinformation in the fields of health, environment, and security policies.21 

2.2.  The context and main causes of disinformation 

The  proliferation  of  disinformation  has  interrelated  economic,  technological,  political, 
and ideological causes. 

First, the spread of disinformation is a symptom of wider phenomena that affect societies 
facing rapid change. Economic insecurity, rising extremism, and cultural shifts generate 
anxiety  and  provide  a  breeding  ground  for  disinformation  campaigns  to  foster  societal 
tensions,  polarisation,  and  distrust.  Organisations  and  agencies  of  influence  (be  they 
undertakings,  states,  or  non-governmental  organisations  with  a  stake  in  political  and 
policy  debates,  including  sources  external  to  the  EU)  can  use  disinformation  to 
manipulate  policy  and  societal  debates.  The  impact  of  disinformation  differs  from  one 
society  to  another,  depending  on  education  levels,  democratic  culture,  trust  in 
institutions,  the  inclusiveness  of  electoral  systems,  the  role  of  money  in  political 
processes, and social and economic inequalities. 

In the long term, tackling disinformation will only be effective if accompanied by clear 
political will to strengthen collective resilience in support of our democratic bearings and 
European values. 

Second,  the  spread  of  disinformation  takes  place  in  the  context  of  a  media  sector 
undergoing profound transformation. The rise of platforms active in the media sector has 
deeply affected journalists and professional news media outlets, which are still generally 
seeking  to  adapt  their  business  models  and  find  new  ways  to  monetise  content. 
Moreover,  some  platforms  have  taken  on  functions  traditionally  associated  with  media 
outlets,  entering  the  news  business  as  content  aggregators  and  distributors  without 
necessarily  taking  on  the  editorial  frameworks  and  capabilities  of  such  outlets.  Their 
economic  incentives  lead  them  to  capture  a  large  users'  base  by  exploiting  network 

19 Commission Recommendation of 1 March 2018 on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online 
(C(2018) 1177 final), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/commission-recommendation-
measures-effectively-tackle-illegal-content-online. 

20 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/first-findings-eurobarometer-fake-news-and-online-

disinformation. 

21 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/summary-report-public-consultation-fake-news-and-

online-disinformation. 

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effects and to maximize the time users spend on their services by privileging quantity of 
information over quality, regardless of the impact.  

Between  2010  and  2014,  news  publishers'  total  print  revenues  decreased  by  €13.45 
billion and digital revenues rose by €3.98 billion: a net revenue loss of €9.47 billion (-
13%).22  In  addition,  news  publishers  report  that  the  current  decline  of  the  industry  has 
already led to closing down or reducing their editorial teams.23 

Third, social networking technologies are manipulated to spread disinformation through a 
series of sequential steps: (i) creation; (ii) amplification through social and other online 
media; and (iii) dissemination by users. 

(i) Creation of disinformation 

Disinformation is a powerful and inexpensive – and often economically profitable – tool 
of  influence.  To  date,  most  known  cases  have  involved  written  articles,  sometimes 
complemented  by  authentic  pictures  or  audiovisual  content  taken  out  of  context.  But 
new, affordable, and easy-to-use technology is now available to create false pictures and 
audiovisual  content  (so  called  "deep  fakes"),  offering  more  potent  means  for 
manipulating public opinion.  

(ii) Amplification through social and other online media 

A variety of drivers provide a fertile ground for the spread of disinformation online. The 
mechanics of the proliferation of disinformation are: 

–  Algorithm-based:  The  criteria  algorithms  use  to  prioritise  the  display  of 
information  are driven by the platforms'  business model and the way in which 
this  privileges  personalised  and  sensational  content,  which  is  normally  most 
likely  to  attract  attention  and  to  be  shared  among  users.  By  facilitating  the 
sharing of personalised content among like-minded users, algorithms indirectly 
heighten polarisation and strengthen the effects of disinformation.    

–  Advertising-driven:  Today's  digital  advertising  model  is  often  click-based, 
which  rewards  sensational  and  viral  content.  This  model  relies  on  advertising 
networks operated by agencies that ensure real-time placement of ads based on 
algorithmic decision-making. This facilitates the placement of advertisements on 
websites  that  publish  sensationalist  content  appealing  to  users'  emotions, 
including disinformation. 

–  Technology-enabled:  Online  technologies  such  as  automated  services  (referred 
to as "bots") artificially amplify the spread of disinformation. These mechanics 
can be facilitated by simulated profiles (fake accounts) which have no authentic 
user  behind  them,  sometimes  orchestrated  on  a  massive  scale  (referred  to  as 
"troll factories"). 

 (iii) Dissemination by users 

22 http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=17211. 
23 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/public-consultation-role-publishers-copyright-value-

chain-and-panorama-exception. 

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Users themselves are also playing a role in disseminating disinformation, which tends to 
travel  more  quickly  on  social  media  due  to  the  propensity  of  users  to  share  content 
without any prior verification. The ever-increasing volume and speed of content flowing 
online increases the risk of indiscriminate sharing of disinformation.  

Although  the  most  popular  news  websites  have  a  higher  average  monthly  reach,  false 
news  spread  more  virally.  For  example,  in  France,  one  false  news  outlet  generated  an 
average  of  over  11  million  interactions  per  month—five  times  greater  than  more 
established news brands.24 

Respondents  to  the  public  consultation  considered  that  disinformation  spreads  more 
easily via online media because it appeals to readers' emotions (88%), can influence the 
public debate (84%), and is designed to generate revenues (65%).25  

3.  A EUROPEAN APPROACH TO TACKLE ONLINE DISINFORMATION 

Given  the  complexity  of  the  matter  and  the  fast  pace  of  developments  in  the  digital 
environment, 
that  any  policy  response  should  be 
comprehensive, continuously assess the phenomenon of disinformation, and adjust policy 
objectives in light of its evolution. 

the  Commission  considers 

There should be no expectation that a single solution could address all challenges related 
to disinformation. At the same time, inaction is not an option. 

In  the  Commission's  view,  the  following  overarching  principles  and  objectives  should 
guide action to tackle disinformation: 

  First, to improve transparency regarding the origin of information and the way it 
is  produced,  sponsored,  disseminated  and  targeted  in  order  to  enable  citizens  to 
assess  the  content  they  access  online  and  to  reveal  possible  attempts  to 
manipulate opinion.  

  Second, to promote diversity of information, in order to enable citizens to make 
informed  decisions  based  on  critical  thinking,  through  support  to  high  quality 
journalism,  media  literacy,  and  the  rebalancing  of  the  relation  between 
information creators and distributors.  

  Third,  to  foster  credibility  of  information  by  providing  an  indication  of  its 
trustworthiness,  notably  with  the  help  of  trusted  flaggers,  and  by  improving 
traceability of information and authentication of influential information providers.  
  Fourth,  to  fashion  inclusive  solutions.  Effective  long-term  solutions  require 
awareness-raising,  more  media  literacy,  broad  stakeholder  involvement  and  the 
cooperation  of  public  authorities,  online  platforms,  advertisers,  trusted  flaggers, 
journalists and media groups.  

24Measuring  the  reach  of  "fake  news"  and  online  disinformation  in  Europe,  Reuters  Institute 

https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/our-research/measuring-reach-fake-news-and-online-
disinformation-europe. 

25 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/summary-report-public-consultation-fake-news-and-

online-disinformation.  

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Building  on  all  gathered  input,  the  Commission  intends  to  take  the  following  actions. 
They  complement  the  General  Data  Protection  Regulation,  which  will  apply  across  the 
EU as from 25 May 2018, and which will strengthen protection of the personal data of 
users of online platforms.26 The General Data Protection Regulation clarifies the notion 
of  consent  and  includes  the  key  concept  of  transparency  of  processing.  It  also  clarifies 
and harmonises the conditions under which personal data can be further shared (“further 
processed”). 

3.1.  A more transparent, trustworthy and accountable online ecosystem 

that  enable 

The  mechanisms 
the  creation,  amplification  and  dissemination  of 
disinformation rely upon a lack of transparency and traceability in the existing platform 
ecosystem and on the impact of algorithms and online advertising models. Therefore, it is 
necessary  to  promote  adequate  changes  in  platforms'  conduct,  a  more  accountable 
information ecosystem, enhanced fact-checking capabilities and collective knowledge on 
disinformation,  and  the  use  of  new  technologies  to  improve  the  way  information  is 
produced and disseminated online.  

3.1.1.  Online  platforms  to  act  swiftly  and  effectively  to  protect  users  from 

disinformation 

There are growing expectations that online platforms should not only comply with legal 
obligations  under  EU  and  national  law,  but  also  act  with  appropriate  responsibility  in 
views of their central role so as to ensure a safe online environment, to protect users from 
disinformation, and to offer users exposure to different political views. 

Overall, platforms have not provided sufficient transparency on political advertising and 
sponsored content. They also have not made sufficient information available on the use 
of  strategic  dissemination  techniques,  such  as  paid  human  influencers  and/or  robots  to 
market messages. This has been a major driver of initiatives in some Member States and 
third countries adopting measures on transparency around political advertising online. 

The Commission calls upon platforms to decisively step up their efforts to tackle online 
disinformation. It considers that self-regulation can contribute to these efforts, provided it 
is effectively implemented and monitored. 

To  this  end,  the  Commission  will  support  the  development  of  an  ambitious  Code  of 
Practice, building on the Key Principles proposed by the High Level Expert Group27 and 
committing  online  platforms  and  the  advertising  industry  to  achieve  the  following 
objectives: 

–  Significantly improve the scrutiny of advertisement placements, notably in order to 
reduce revenues for purveyors of disinformation, and restrict targeting options for 
political advertising; 

–  Ensure transparency about sponsored content, in particular political and issue-based 
advertising;  this  should  be  complemented  by  repositories  where  comprehensive 

26 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC.  

27 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-

online-disinformation, p. 32 of the HLEG report. 

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information  about  sponsored  content  is  provided,  such  as  the  actual  sponsor 
identity, amounts spent and targeting criteria used. Similar mechanisms should be 
put  in  place  so  that  users  understand  why  they  have  been  targeted  by  a  given 
advertisement; 

–  Intensify and demonstrate the effectiveness of efforts to close fake accounts; 

–  Facilitate users' assessment of content through indicators of the trustworthiness of 
content  sources,  based  on  objective  criteria  and  endorsed  by  news  media 
associations,  in  line  with  journalistic  principles  and  processes,  transparency 
regarding media ownership and verified identity;  

–  Dilute  the  visibility  of  disinformation  by  improving  the  findability  of  trustworthy 

content; 

–  Establish clear marking systems and rules for bots and ensure their activities cannot 

be confused with human interactions; 

–  Empower users with tools enabling a customized and interactive online experience 
so  as  to  facilitate  content  discovery  and  access  to  different  news  sources 
representing  alternative  viewpoints;  provide  them  with  easily-accessible  tools  to 
report disinformation; 

–  Ensure  that  online  services  include,  by  design,  safeguards  against  disinformation; 
this  should,  for  example,  include  detailed  information  on  the  behaviour  of 
algorithms  that  prioritise the display of content as  well as  development of testing 
methodologies;  

–  Provide  trusted fact-checking organisations and academia  with  access to  platform 
data  (notably  via  application  programming  interfaces),  while  respecting  user 
privacy,  trade  secrets,  and  intellectual  property;  this  will  enable  them  to  better 
understand  the  functioning  of  related  algorithms  and  better  analyse  and  monitor 
disinformation dynamics and their impact on society. 

Actions  pursuing  these  objectives  should  strictly  respect  freedom  of  expression  and 
include  safeguards  that  prevent  their  misuse,  for  example,  the  censoring  of  critical, 
satirical,  dissenting,  or  shocking  speech.28  They  should  also  strictly  respect  the 
Commission's commitment to an open, safe and reliable Internet. 

The Commission will convene a multistakeholder forum on disinformation, to provide a 
framework  for  an  efficient  cooperation  among  relevant  stakeholders,  including  online 
platforms,  the  advertising  industry  and  major  advertisers,  media  and  civil  society 
representatives, and to secure a commitment to coordinate and scale up efforts to tackle 
disinformation. This forum is separate from the EU Internet Forum on terrorist content 
online.    The  forum’s  first  output  should  be  an  EU–wide  Code  of  Practice  on 
Disinformation  to  be  published  by  July  2018,  with  a  view  to  producing  measurable 
effects  by  October  2018.  The  Commission  will  assess  its  implementation,  in  broad 
consultation with stakeholders and on the basis of key performance indicators based on 

28  As  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  has  observed,  freedom  of  expression  applies  not  only  to 
information  and  ideas  that  are  favourably  received  or  inoffensive,  but  also  to  those  "offend,  shock  or 
disturb."  Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72 (7 December 1976), § 49.   

8 

 
                                                 
the  above  objectives.  Should  the  results  prove  unsatisfactory,  the  Commission  may 
propose further actions, including actions of a regulatory nature. 

In parallel, the Commission will launch a study to examine the applicability of EU rules 
and possible gaps in relation to the identification of online sponsored content. In this 
context,  it  will  also  assess  the  effectiveness  of  possible  identification  tools  for  online 
sponsored content. 

3.1.2.  Strengthening  fact  checking,  collective  knowledge,  and  monitoring 

capacity on disinformation  

Fact-checkers  have  emerged  as  an  integral  element  in  the  media  value  chain,  verifying 
and assessing the credibility of content based on facts  and evidence. They also analyse 
the  sources  and  processes  of  information  creation  and  dissemination.  Fact-checkers' 
credibility depends upon their independence and their compliance with strict ethical and 
transparency rules. 

A dense network of strong and independent fact-checkers is an essential requirement for 
a healthy digital ecosystem. Fact-checkers need to operate on the basis of high standards, 
such as the International Fact-Checking Network Code of Principles.29 

In addition, many aspects of disinformation remain insufficiently analysed and access to 
online platforms' data is still limited. An effective response requires a solid body of facts 
and  evidence  on  the  spread  of  disinformation  and  its  impact.  Additional  data  gathering 
and  analysis  by  fact-checkers  and  academic  researchers  should  include  the  following 
activities: 

–  Continuously monitoring the scale, techniques and tools, and the precise nature and 

potential impact of disinformation;  

–  Identifying  and  mapping  disinformation  mechanisms  that  contribute  to  digital 

amplification; 

–  Contributing  to  the  development  of  fair,  objective,  and  reliable  indicators  for 

source transparency; and 

–  Sharing knowledge with news media, platforms and public authorities to enhance 

public awareness about disinformation.  

Providing  better  access  to  online  platforms'  data  and  a  secure  space  to  analyse  and 
exchange information are key requirements.  

As a first  step, the Commission will support the  creation of an independent European 
network  of  fact-checkers  to  establish  common  working  methods,  exchange  best 
practices, achieve the broadest possible coverage across the EU, and participate in joint 
fact-checking  and  related  activities.  The  network  will  be  invited  to  participate  in  the 
multistakeholder  forum  on  disinformation.  The  Commission  will  make  available  to  the 
network online tools (e.g. a secured shared space) to enable their collaboration. 

29 The International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) Code of Principles is for organizations that regularly 
publish  nonpartisan  reports  on  the  accuracy  of  statements  by  public  figures  and  major  institutions  and 
other widely circulated claims of interest to society, https://www.poynter.org/international-fact-checking-
network-fact-checkers-code-principles. 

9 

 
                                                 
As  a  second  step,  the  Commission  will  launch  a  secure  European  online  platform  on 
disinformation  to  support  the  independent  European  network  of  fact-checkers  and 
relevant  academic  researchers.  The  platform  should  offer  cross-border  data  collection 
and analysis tools, as well as access to EU-wide open data, such as reliable independent 
statistical  information.  This  will  enable  the  network  to  act  as  trusted  flaggers.    It  will 
also  facilitate  deeper  understanding  of  online  disinformation  and  formulation  of 
evidence-based strategies for further limiting its spread. To this end, the Commission will 
consider the use of the Connecting Europe Facility and build on the experience gained in 
implementing the "Safer Internet" programme.  

3.1.3.  Fostering online accountability 

Identification  of  the  source  of  disinformation  by  ensuring  its  traceability  throughout  its 
dissemination  is  essential  to  accountability,  as  well  as  to  increase  trust  in  identifiable 
suppliers of information and encourage more responsible behaviour online. For instance, a 
user  could  choose  to  only  engage  with  others  on  online  platforms  that  have  identified 
themselves. 

To this end, the Regulation on electronic identification30 provides a predictable regulatory 
environment  for  the  online  cross-border  use,  recognition  and  enforcement  of  electronic 
identification,  authentication  and  trust  services  that  could  be  relied  upon  to  foster  the 
development and the voluntary use of systems for the secure identification of suppliers of 
information based on the highest security and privacy standards, including the possible use 
of verified pseudonyms. 

To  facilitate  the  investigation  of  malicious  online  behaviour,  as  indicated  in  the  Joint 
Communication  on  Cybersecurity  presented  in  September  2017,  the  Commission  will 
continue  to  promote  the  uptake  of  Internet  Protocol  version  6  (IPv6),  which  allows  the 
allocation  of  a  single  user  per  Internet  Protocol  address.  It  will  also  pursue  its  efforts  to 
improve the functioning of and the availability and accuracy of information in the Domain 
Name  and  IP  WHOIS31  systems  in  line  with  the  efforts  of  the  Internet  Corporation  for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and in full compliance with data protection rules. 

The  Commission  will  encourage  the  eIDAS  Cooperation  Network  to  promote,  in 
cooperation  with  platforms,  voluntary  online  systems  allowing  the  identification  of 
suppliers of information based on trustworthy electronic identification and authentication 
means,  including  verified  pseudonyms,  as  provided  under  the  Regulation  on  electronic 
identification.  

Taken  altogether,  these  would  also  contribute  to  limiting  cyberattacks,  which  are  often 
combined with disinformation campaigns in the context of hybrid threats. 

3.1.4.  Harnessing new technologies 

Emerging  technologies  will  further  change  the  way  information  is  produced  and 
disseminated,  but  they  also  have  the  potential  to  play  a  central  role  in  tackling 
disinformation over the longer term. For instance:  

30 Regulation 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic 

identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 
1999/93/EC. 

31 https://whois.icann.org/en 

10 

 
                                                 
–  Artificial  intelligence,  subject  to  appropriate  human  oversight,  will  be  crucial  for 

verifying, identifying and tagging disinformation; 

–  Technologies for media to enable customizable and interactive online experiences can 

help citizens discover content and identify disinformation; 

–  Innovative  technologies,  such  as  blockchain,  can  help  preserve  the  integrity  of 
content, validate the reliability of information and/or its sources, enable transparency 
and  traceability,  and  promote  trust  in  news  displayed  on  the  Internet.  This  could  be 
combined  with  the  use  of  trustworthy  electronic  identification,  authentication  and 
verified pseudonyms; and 

–  Cognitive  algorithms  that  handle  contextually-relevant  information,  including  the 
accuracy and the quality of data sources, will improve the relevance and reliability of 
search results. 

The Commission is active in the field of emerging technologies, in particular through its 
Next Generation Internet initiative.32  

The Commission will make  full use of the Horizon 2020 work programme to mobilise 
these  technologies.  Beyond,  the  Commission  will  also  explore  the  possibility  for 
additional  support  to  help deploy tools  to combat disinformation, accelerating time-to-
market  of  high-impact  innovation  activities,  and  encouraging  the  partnering  of 
researchers and businesses.  

3.2.  Secure and resilient election processes 

The  security  of  election  processes,  the  basis  for  our  democracy,  requires  particular 
attention.  Disinformation  now  forms  part  of  a  wider  array  of  tools  used  to  manipulate 
electoral processes, such as hacking or defacing websites or gaining access to and leaking 
personal  information  about  politicians.  Cyber-enabled  operations  may  be  used  to 
compromise  the  integrity  of  public  information  and  prevent  the  identification  of 
disinformation  sources.  This  is  critical  during  election  campaigns,  where  compressed 
schedules may prevent timely detection of disinformation and response. 

In  recent  years  online  manipulation  and  disinformation  tactics  were  detected  during 
elections  in  at  least  18  countries,  and  “disinformation  tactics  contributed  to  a  seventh 
consecutive year of overall decline in internet freedom”.33  
With  a  view  to  the  2019  European  Parliament  elections,  the  Commission  has 
encouraged34  the  competent  national  authorities  to  identify  best  practices  for  the 
identification,  mitigation  and  management  of  risks  to  the  electoral  process  from 
cyberattacks  and  disinformation.  In  the  Cooperation  Group  established  under  the 
Directive on the security of Network and Information Systems (NIS Directive), Member 
States have started to map existing European initiatives on cybersecurity of network and 
information  systems  used  for  electoral  processes,  with  the  aim  of  developing  voluntary 
guidance. 

32 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/next-generation-internet-initiative. 
33 Freedom on the net 2017 report, Freedom house, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-

net-2017.  

34 Commission recommendation of 14.2.2018 on enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

Parliament, 

the 
to 
content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AL%3A2018%3A045%3ATOC. 

European 

elections 

2019 

the 

11 

 
                                                 
The  Colloquium  on  Fundamental  Rights  26-27  November  2018  will  focus  on 
"Democracy".    Key  ingredients  for  inclusive  and  healthy  democratic  societies  will  be 
discussed, including opportunities and challenges brought about by digitalisation for an 
informed  and  pluralistic  democratic  debate  and  discuss  the  negative  impact  of 
propaganda. 

The  Commission  will  initiate  a  continuous  dialogue  to  support  Member  States  in  the 
management  of  risks  to  the  democratic  electoral  process  from  cyber-attacks  and 
disinformation,  particularly  in  view  of  such  processes  in  Member  States  and  the 
European elections of 2019. This will include: 

-  appropriate  follow-up  to  a  first  exchange  with  Member  States  at  the  conference  on 
electoral best practices held on 25-26 April 2018; 

- all the necessary support, together with the European Union Agency for  Network and 
Information Security, to the work that the NIS Cooperation Group is carrying out on the 
cybersecurity of elections. By the end of 2018, the Group should deliver a compendium of 
practical recommendations and measures that can be implemented by Member States to 
secure election life-cycles. 

-  a  high-level  conference  with  Member  States  on  cyber-enabled  threats  to  elections  in 
late 2018 under the auspices of the Security Union Task Force. 

3.3.  Fostering education and media literacy  

The  life-long  development  of  critical  and  digital  competences,  in  particular  for  young 
people, is crucial to reinforce the resilience of our societies to disinformation.  

The  Digital  Education  Action  Plan,  adopted  by  the  Commission  in  January  2018,35 
highlights the risks disinformation poses for educators and students and the urgent need 
to develop digital skills and competences of all learners, in both formal and non-formal 
education.  The  Digital  Competence  Framework  for  Citizens,  developed  by  the 
Commission, sets out the wide mix of skills needed by all learners, from information and 
data literacy, to digital content creation, to online safety and well-being.36  

A  majority  of  respondents  to  the  public  consultation  considered  that  educating  and 
empowering users to better access and use online information and informing users when 
content is generated or spread by a bot are measures online platforms can take that would 
have a strong impact on preventing the spread of disinformation.37 

Because of the cross-border dimension of disinformation, the EU has a role in supporting 
the  dissemination  of  good  practice  across  the  Member  States  to  increase  citizens' 
resilience,  and  the  Commission  can  further  strengthen  its  actions  addressing  young 
people and adults:  

35 https://ec.europa.eu/education/sites/education/files/digital-education-action-plan.pdf. 
36 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/digcomp/digital-competence-framework.  
37 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/summary-report-public-consultation-fake-news-and-

online-disinformation. 

12 

 
                                                 
  The  Commission  steers  the  Media  Literacy  Expert  Group  and  supports  pilot 

project such as ‘Media Literacy for All’.38  

  The  Audiovisual  Media  Services  Directive  recognises  the  importance  of  media 
literacy,39  and  its  revision  aims  at  strengthening  the  monitoring  of  actions 
undertaken by the authorities of Member States on media literacy.40  

  The  Commission  supports  a  number  of  initiatives,  including  through  the 
Erasmus+ programme, on Internet safety, digital well-being and, digital skills that 
aim at fostering a critical awareness of citizens – in particular, young people – of 
the digital environment, which in turn helps strengthen digital media literacy. 

  Member States, social partners and education organisations share experience and 
good  practice  on  digital  education  through  the  EU's  Working  Group  on  Digital 
Skills and Competences.41  

  The Commission encourages Member States to mobilise resources and include in 
their  educational  policies  digital  citizenship,  media  literacy,  the  development  of 
critical-thinking  skills  for  the  online  environment,  and  awareness-raising 
activities  on  disinformation  and  online  amplification  techniques.  Support  for 
teachers, including training and sharing of good practice is vital in this respect. 

Furthermore, the Commission will: 

–  Encourage  independent  fact-checkers  and  civil  society  organisations  to 

provide educational material to schools and educators.  

–  Include 

in 
disinformation online.  

the  #SaferInternet4EU42  Campaign 

targeted 

initiatives  on 

–  Organise  a  European  Week  of  Media  Literacy  with  the  aim  of  raising 
relevant 

support  cross-border  cooperation  amongst 

awareness  and 
organisations.  

–  Report on media literacy in the context of application of the Audiovisual Media 

Services Directive. 

–  Work with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, in 
the  framework  of  the  Programme  for  International  Student  Assessment 
process, to explore the possibility of adding media literacy to the criteria used 
by the organisation in its comparative reports. 

38 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/2016-call-proposals-pilot-project-media-literacy-all  
39 The Audiovisual Media Services Directive states that “the development of media literacy in all sections 

of society should be promoted and its progress followed closely” (Recital 47). 

40 In its general approach, the Council has included an obligation for Member States to promote and take 
measures for the development of media literacy skills. This requirement is currently being discussed by 
the co-legislators as part of the revision of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive. 

41 https://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/strategic-framework/expert-groups/digital-skills-competences_en  
42 https://www.betterinternetforkids.eu/web/portal/saferinternet4eu. 

13 

 
                                                 
–  Further  encourage  the  work  of  the  Digital  Skills  and  Jobs  Coalition,43  to 

support digital skills, including for participation in society. 

–  Continue implementation of the Digital Education Action Plan44 and continue 
to support initiatives, such as the Digital Opportunity traineeship,45 which aim 
at  strengthening  digital  skills  and  the  awareness  of  European  citizens  –  in 
particular,  the  younger  generation  –  and  promoting  common  values  and 
inclusion. 

3.4.  Support  for  quality  journalism  as  an  essential  element  of  a  democratic 

society 

Quality news media – including public media – and journalism play an important role in 
providing  citizens  high  quality  and  diverse  information.  By  ensuring  a  pluralistic  and 
diverse media environment, they can uncover, counterbalance, and dilute disinformation.  

In an evolving digital environment, there is a need to invest in high quality journalism, 
reinforce trust in the key societal and democratic role of quality journalism both offline 
and online, and encourage quality news media to explore innovative forms of journalism. 

According to the Eurobarometer survey, citizens perceive traditional media as the most 
trusted  sources  of  news:  radio  (70%),  television  (66%)  and  print  newspapers  and  news 
magazines  (63%).  The  least  trusted  sources  of  news  are  video  hosting  websites  (27%) 
and online social networks (26%). Younger respondents are more likely to trust news and 
information they access online.46 

There is also a need to rebalance the relation between media and online platforms. This 
will  be  facilitated  by a  swift  approval  of  the  EU  copyright  reform,  which  will  improve 
the  position  of  publishers  and  ensure  a  fairer  distribution  of  revenues  between  right 
holders  and  platforms,  helping  in  particular  news  media  outlets  and  journalists  to 
monetise their content. 

Journalists and media professionals should also further embrace the opportunities offered 
by new technologies and develop the necessary digital skills to enable them to use data 
and social media analytics, with a view to enhancing fact-finding and verification.  

Finally,  public  support  to  media  and  public  service  media  are  very  important  to  the 
provision  of  high  quality  information  and  the  protection  of  journalism  in  the  public 
interest. Member State support measures in view of achieving objectives of common EU 
interest, such as media freedom and pluralism, have been declared compatible with EU 
State aid rules, as demonstrated by Commission Decisions on media aid.47  

43 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digital-skills-jobs-coalition.  
44 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/specific-actions-digital-education-action-plan.  
45 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digital-opportunity-traineeships-boosting-digital-skills-job.  
46 http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instruments/flash/ 

surveyky/2183. 

47  The  Commission  notably  has  approved  aid  for  news  agencies  (e.g.  SA.30481,  State  Aid  in  favour  of 
France,  
Agence 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_30481),  general  press 
to  written  media,  Denmark, 
aid  schemes  (e.g.  SA.36366,  Production  and 
schemes 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_36366) 

innovation  aid 

France-Press 

(AFP), 

and 

14 

 
                                                 
 
Member  States  are  encouraged  to  consider  horizontal  aid  schemes  to  address  market 
failures hampering the sustainability of quality journalism, as well as support measures 
for specific activities, such as training for journalists, service and product innovation.  

Existing  rules48  clarify  the  conditions  under  which  public  support  may  be  granted  by 
Member States. To enhance the transparency and predictability of State aid enforcement 
in  this  area,  the  Commission  will  make  an  online  repository  publicly  available,  with 
reference  to  the  applicable  State  aid  rules  and  relevant  precedent  cases.  Moreover, 
regularly updated information on aid granted by Member States will be accessible on the 
transparency register. 49 

The  Commission  will  launch  a  call  in  2018  for  the  production  and  dissemination  of 
quality news content on EU affairs through data-driven news media.  

Building  on  ongoing  projects,  the  Commission  will  explore  increased  funding 
opportunities  to  support  initiatives  promoting  media  freedom  and  pluralism,  quality 
news media and journalism, including skills, training for journalists, new technologies 
for newsrooms, and collaborative data-driven platforms. 

The  Fundamental  Rights  Agency  toolkit  for  media  professionals  on  coverage  from  a 
fundamental rights angle will provide recommendations, tips and tools to journalists on 
how to deal with ethical dilemmas, including disinformation, from a fundamental rights 
angle.  

3.5.  Countering 

internal  and  external  disinformation  threats  through 

strategic communication  

Communication  and  awareness-raising  by  public  authorities  is  an  integral  part  of  the 
response  to  disinformation.  In  addition  to  detection  and  data  analysis,  strategic 
communication  requires  suitable  outreach  activities  to  counter  false  narratives.  The 
measures set out in Section 3.1 will make detection and analysis of online disinformation 
more accurate and timely, and will facilitate strategic communication about Europe and 
EU policies.  

This is particularly important since the EU is often a target of disinformation campaigns 
designed to undermine its Institutions, policies, actions and values. The sources of such 
activities  can  be  domestic  or  external,  the  actors  private  or  public  –  and  they  carry  out 
their  activities  both  on  EU  territory  and  in  third  countries.  As  noted,  in  2015  the  East 
Stratcom Task Force was set up within the European External Action Service to address 

targeting  publications  with  limited  advertising  revenue  (e.g.  SA.47973  French  Press  Aid  2015  Decree 
France, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_47973). 

48  Regarding  public  service  broadcasting,  specific  detailed  guidelines  are  in  place  (Communication  from 
the  Commission  on  the  application  of  State  aid  rules  to  public  service  broadcasting,  OJ  C  257  of  27 
October  2009,  p.1).  Depending  on  the  type  of  support  envisaged,  the  guidelines  for  R&D&I  aid 
(Communication  from  the  Commission  —  Framework  for  State  aid  for  research  and  development  and 
innovation, OJ C 198 of 27 June 2014, p. 1) and the General Block Exemption Regulation (Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the 
internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, OJ L 187 of 26 June 2014, p. 1, as 
amended by Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1084 of 14 June 2017, OJ L 156 of 20.6.2017, p. 1) may 
also be relevant.  

49 State aid transparency public search page: 

https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/competition/transparency/public/search/home?lang=en.  

15 

 
                                                                                                                                                 
Russia's on-going disinformation campaigns, in recognition of one important dimension 
of this challenge. Similarly, the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell was established in 2016 within 
the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre to monitor and address hybrid threats by foreign 
actors,  including  disinformation,  aimed  at  influencing  political  decisions  inside  the  EU 
and  in  its  neighbourhood.  These  institutions,  together  with  the  recently  established 
European  Centre  of  Excellence  for  Countering  Hybrid  Threats,  form  the  basis  of  a 
strengthened  European  response,50    and  are  important  elements  in  the  cooperation 
between EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to improve European resilience, 
coordination and preparedness against hybrid interference. 

The  Commission,  in  cooperation  with  the  European  External  Action  Service  will 
strengthen  its  strategic  communication  capability  by  first  reinforcing  the  internal 
coordination of its communication activities aiming at tackling disinformation. 

The Commission, in cooperation with the European External Action Service, will extend 
this collaboration, its knowledge and its activities to other EU institutions and, through 
an appropriate mechanism, to Member States. The network will use the data gathered by 
the  secure  online  platform  on  disinformation  referred  to  in  Section  3.1.2  in  order  to 
design  outreach  activities  aimed  at  countering  false  narratives  about  Europe  and 
tackling disinformation, within and outside the EU. 

The Commission and the European External Action Service will explore further options 
to  develop  strategic  communications  responses  and  other  mechanisms,  together  with 
Member  States,  to  build  resilience  as  well  as  counter  systematic  disinformation 
campaigns and hybrid interference by foreign governments towards citizens and entities 
in the EU.  

The  Commission,  in  cooperation  with  European  External Action  Service,  will  report  in 
June  on  the  progress  on  bolstering  capabilities  to  address  hybrid  threats,  including 
cybersecurity, strategic communication and counter intelligence areas. 

4.  CONCLUSION 

A  well-functioning,  free,  and  pluralistic  information  ecosystem,  based  on  high 
professional standards, is indispensable to a healthy democratic debate. The Commission 
is attentive to the threats posed by disinformation for our open and democratic societies. 
This Communication presents a comprehensive approach that aims at responding to those 
serious  threats  by  promoting  digital  ecosystems  based  on  transparency  and  privileging 
high-quality information, empowering citizens against disinformation, and protecting our 
democracies and policy-making processes. The Commission calls on all relevant players 
to significantly step up their efforts to address the problem adequately. It considers that 
the  actions  outlined  above,  if  implemented  effectively,  will  materially  contribute  to 
countering  disinformation  online.  However,  the  Commission  will  continue  its  work  is 
this area. 

By December 2018, the Commission will report on progress made. The report will also 
examine the need for further action to ensure the continuous monitoring and evaluation 
of the outlined actions. 

50 Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats: a European Union response, Joint Communication to the 
European Parliament and Council of 6 April 2016,  JOIN(2016) 18 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018&from=en. 

16