COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a multiannual plan for fish stocks in the Western Waters and adjacent waters, and for fisheries exploiting those stocks, amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1139 establishing a multiannual plan for the Baltic Sea, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 811/2004, (EC) No 2166/2005, (EC) No 388/2006, (EC) 509/2007 and (EC) 1300/2008
Date: 2018-04-18
Institutions: Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, European Commission
Subjects: Atlantic Ocean, authorised catch, catch by species, catch quota, conservation of fish stocks, deep-sea fishing, fishing area, fishing controls, fishing rights, sea fish

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 18.4.2018 SWD(2018) 112 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT  Accompanying the document Proposal for REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a multiannual plan for fish stocks in the Western Waters and adjacent waters, and for fisheries exploiting those stocks, amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1139 establishing a multiannual plan for the Baltic Sea, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 811/2004, (EC) No 2166/2005, (EC) No 388/2006, (EC) 509/2007 and (EC) 1300/2008  {COM(2018) 149 final/2} - {SWD(2018) 113 final}  
 
 
Contents 

1. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT .................................... 3 

1.1.  Rationale of the reformed CFP and its main elements ...................................... 3 
1.2.  Scope of the initiative ........................................................................................ 5 
1.3.  Legal context ..................................................................................................... 7 

2.  WHAT IS THE PROBLEM AND WHY IS IT A PROBLEM?................................. 8 

2.1.  The Problem: Overfishing ................................................................................. 9 
2.1.1.  Underlying drivers of overfishing ..................................................... 10 
2.2.  The problem: Ineffective governance.............................................................. 13 
2.2.1.  Underlying drivers of ineffective governance ................................... 13 
2.3.  Complexity of the current rules ....................................................................... 14 
2.4.  Consequences of the problems of overfishing and ineffective governance .... 15 
2.5. 
Implications of "Brexit" .................................................................................. 16 
2.6.  Who is affected by the current situation and how? ......................................... 16 
2.6.1.  Fishing sector .................................................................................... 16 
2.6.2.  Processing sector ............................................................................... 18 
2.6.3.  Markets .............................................................................................. 19 
2.7.  Perception of the problems by consulted stakeholders ................................... 20 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? .............................................................................. 20 

3.1.  Perceptions of pertinence of EU action by consulted stakeholders................. 21 

4.  WHAT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED? ........................................................................ 22 

4.1.  Objectives of the initiative .............................................................................. 23 
4.2.  Perceptions by consulted stakeholders on these objectives............................. 24 

5.  WHAT ARE THE VARIOUS OPTIONS TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES? .... 24 

5.1.  Discarded policy options ................................................................................. 24 
5.2.  Retained policy options ................................................................................... 27 
5.2.1.  Option 1 Baseline scenario: ............................................................... 27 
5.3.  Perceptions of the options by consulted stakeholders ..................................... 33 

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE DIFFERENT POLICY OPTIONS AND 

WHO WILL BE AFFECTED? ................................................................................. 33 

6.1.  Approach to the impact analysis ..................................................................... 33 
6.2.  Option 1: Baseline (Status quo)....................................................................... 34 
6.2.1.  Environmental impacts ...................................................................... 34 
6.2.2.  Socio-economic impacts.................................................................... 34 
6.2.3.  Administrative costs .......................................................................... 35 
6.3.  Option 2: one mixed fisheries multiannual plan for western waters ............... 35 

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6.3.1.  Environmental impacts ...................................................................... 35 
6.3.2.  Socio-economic impacts.................................................................... 36 
6.3.3.  Administrative costs .......................................................................... 37 

6.4.  Option 3: Two mixed fisheries multiannual plans (south-western waters 

and north-western waters) ............................................................................... 37 
6.4.1.  Environmental impacts ...................................................................... 37 
6.4.2.  Socio-economic impacts.................................................................... 37 
6.4.3.  Administrative costs .......................................................................... 37 

7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? .................................................................. 38 

7.1.  Assessment of environmental, economic, social and other impacts ............... 38 
7.2.  Assessment against the objectives ................................................................... 39 
7.3.  Effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptability ................................... 41 
7.4.  The preferred option ........................................................................................ 42 

8.  HOW WOULD ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? .. 42 

ANNEX 1 

PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ................................................... 46 

ANNEX 2: 

MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY .... 48 

ANNEX 3 

ANNEX 4 

STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION .............................................. 52 

WHO IS AFFECTED BY THE INITIATIVE AND HOW .............. 57 

ANNEX 5.   ANALYSIS BY THE STECF: MAIN FINDINGS ..................................... 59 

ANNEX 6.   MODELS USED BY STECF IN SIMULATIONS ..................................... 75 

ANNEX 7. ......................................................................................................................... 76 

COHERENCE BETWEEN DIFFERENT EU MULTIANNUAL PLANS AND 

OVERVIEW OF EU MULTIANNUAL PLAN FOR BALTIC FISHERIES .......... 76 

ANNEX 8 .......................................................................................................................... 78 

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1. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 

This  impact  assessment  (IA)  concerns  a  proposal  for  a  multiannual  plan  to  manage 
fisheries  for  demersal  stocks  (fish  that  live  on  or  near  the  sea  bottom)  in  the  western 
waters  of  the  north-east  Atlantic,  in  the  context  of  the  reformed  Common  Fisheries 
Policy (CFP)1 which entered into force in on 1 January 20142.  

1.1. 

Rationale of the reformed CFP and its main elements 

Fisheries  management  means  regulating  the  activities  of  fishermen.  This  involves 
deciding what can and cannot be fished (e.g. prohibited species), how much can be fished 
(e.g. maximum amount of fish that can be caught), when fishing is allowed or forbidden 
(e.g. during the season when fish reproduce) and where fishing is allowed or forbidden 
(e.g. in marine protected areas). 

Fisheries management is an exclusive policy of the European Union under the reformed 
CFP.  The  rationale  of  the  CFP  is  that  fishing  activities  should  be  environmentally 
sustainable and managed in a way to achieve social, employment and economic benefits 
(see Annex 2).  

Fishing is a small segment of the EU economy, as the income generated represents less 
than  0.5%  of  the  EU  GDP.  It  is,  however,  important  in  relative  terms  in  many  coastal 
regions. Firstly, fishing provides jobs and income to coastal regions with few alternative 
options. Secondly, in a number of regions, fisheries go beyond pure economics and are 
part of the social fabric of communities. 

Fisheries  management  through  the  CFP  also  contributes  to  the  EU’s  growth  and  jobs 
agenda through an emphasis on sustainability and economic competitiveness, supported 
by EU funding through the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF)3. 

While  improved  fisheries  management  is  unlikely  to  directly  contribute  to  increases  in 
jobs, it has proven to increase the number of sustainable fisheries in Europe. For example 
in 2009 we had only 5 sustainable fisheries in EU waters, while in 2017 this number has 
increased to 44 sustainable fisheries. Sustainable fishing in turn can curtail the decline of 
jobs in the fishing industry and having more fish available from sustainable sources will 
stabilize profits and provide better salaries and better working conditions for fishermen. 
The  economic  figures  underpin  this,  as  over  the  2008  to  2014  period,  the  net  profit 
margin generated by the EU fleet has steadily increased to 11%, registering record-high 
profits in 2014 of 770 mio €. 

The CFP has the following management tools as a toolbox to achieve its objectives: 

1 

Regulation  (EU)  No  1380/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  December  2013  on  the 
Common  Fisheries  Policy,  amending  Council  regulations  (EC)  No  1954/2003  and  (EC)  No  1224/2009  and 
repealing  Council  Regulations  (EC)  No  639/2004  and  Council  Decision  2004/585/EC;  OJ  L354  of  28.12.2013, 
p.22.  

2   Article 4.2 of the Basic Regulation defines these waters as follows: 

 
 

'North western waters' means ICES zones V (excluding Va and only Union waters of Vb), VI and VII; 
'South western waters' means ICES zones VIII, IX and X (waters  around Azores), and CECAF zones ( 2 ) 
34.1.1, 34.1.2 and 34.2.0 (waters around Madeira and the Canary Islands). 

3   Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the European 

Maritime and Fisheries Fund (OJ L 149, 20.05.2014, p. 1). 

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Total Allowable Catch (TAC) is the maximum amount of fish that can be fished from 
the sea each year (i.e. output controls). These amounts are set per fish stock (e.g. “cod in 
the Irish Sea, Northern hake, southern megrim etc.”). The amounts are then allocated as 
fish  quotas  among  Member  States.  The  Member  States  in  turn  allocate  their  national 
quotas to their fishermen; 

Discard  plans  lay  out  how  the  landing  obligation  (i.e.  that  all  fish  caught  have  to  be 
landed), a key element of the reformed CFP, is implemented. This includes well-defined 
exemptions  for  returning  minimal  amounts  of  unwanted  fish  to  the  sea.  Fishing  effort 
limitations regulate how many hours or days a vessel can spend at sea (input controls). 
This instrument is used less and less in the management of fisheries. 

What, how, where and when to fish? Technical measures govern the way of fishing (for 
example gear type or closed areas), which aim to protect fish stocks (often juveniles) and 
ecosystems, and to avoid unwanted catches, and thus reduce discards. 

The CFP foresees the adoption of multiannual plans (MAPs) containing some or all of 
these  tools,  with  the  aim  to  provide  a  transparent,  predictable  and  stable  framework  to 
manage  fish  stocks  in  an  integrated  manner  by  sea-basin.  Such  plans  can  cover  one  or 
more  fish  species  in  specific  areas.  The  plans  on  the  one  hand  contain  management 
measures to help safeguard the stocks, for example by limiting the catches (e.g. when the 
amount of fish in the sea falls below a minimum level). On the other hand the plans set 
long term management measures to foster fisheries, which are both environmentally and 
economically sustainable.   
Multiannual  plans  have  been  foreseen  by  the  CFP  since  2002  as  an  option4.  However 
following the 2013 reform they became a priority: article 9 of the Basic Regulation states 
that "Multiannual plans shall be adopted as a priority, based on scientific, technical and 
economic advice, and shall contain conservation measures to restore and maintain fish 
stocks above levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield". The precise shape 
of future multiannual plans was the subject of work by an Inter-Institutional Task Force 
involving the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission,. This  Task Force 
provided  guidance  on  the  structure  and  content  of  these  multiannual  plans  and  solved 
issues on the sharing of competences among those EU Institutions5. Its conclusions were 
published in April 2014.  

Since  the  reformed  CFP  and  its  new  Basic  Regulation  entered  into  force  in  2014,  only 
one EU multiannual plan has been adopted, covering the Baltic Sea6. Other multiannual 
plans  have  been  prepared7  or  are  in  preparation  by  the  Commission  and  the  coherence 

4   Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of 

fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy 

5   Council  Document  No  8529-14  PECHE  117  CODEC  1004,  also  published  by  the  European  Parliament: 

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/pech/dv/taskfor/taskforce.pdf 

6     Regulation (EU) No 2016/1139 of the EP and the Council of 6 July 2016 establishing a multiannual plan for the 
stocks of cod, herring and sprat in the Baltic Sea and the fisheries exploiting those stocks, amending Council 
Regulation (EC) 2187/2005 and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1098/2007, OJ L 191,15.7.2016, p.1-15 

7     COM(2016)0493 final proposal for a regulation of the EP and the Council on establishing a 

multiannual plan for demersal stocks in the North Sea and the fisheries exploiting those stocks and 
repealing Council Regulation (EC) 676/2007 and Council Regulation (EC) 1342/2008 
COM(2017)0043 Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 

COUNCIL establishing a multiannual plan for small pelagic stocks in the Adriatic Sea and 
the fisheries exploiting those stocks 

2 

 
 
 
                                                 
 
between  these  initiatives  is  presented  in  Annex  78.  The  new  generation  of  multiannual 
plans under the reformed CFP should be better geared to the reality of EU fisheries and 
therefore  the  Basic  Regulation  sets  out  that  they  should  cover  mixed  fisheries,  where 
relevant,  taking  into  account  the  interactions  between  fish  stocks,  fisheries  and  marine 
ecosystems  (see  Annex  2,  point  4).  The  idea  is  to  move  from  annual  management 
decisions  for  fisheries  towards  multiannual  management  plans  for  all  EU  sea  basins, 
which are adapted to the specific fisheries in these sea basins. 

The  new  CFP  also  brought  greater  flexibility  and  simplification  by  introducing 
regionalisation. Regionalisation means involving Member States and stakeholders (e.g. 
industry,  environmental  NGOs)  at  a  regional  basis  (e.g.  Baltic  Sea,  North  Sea,  western 
waters) in the design of how to manage fisheries sustainably, with a view to increasing 
their  ownership  of  the  management  measures  and  thereby  the  effectiveness  of  these 
measures.  Concretely,  Member  States  sharing a  fishing  area  (this  can be  both  an entire 
seabasin  or  a  smaller  area  in  a  seabasin)  can  make  joint  recommendations  on 
management measures, and the Commission can adopt these measures as delegated acts, 
if  empowered  to  do  so.  Such  an  empowerment  would  typically  be  granted  in  a 
multiannual plan – hence the necessity of such multiannual plans. 

1.2. 

Scope of the initiative 

The  geographical  scope  of  this  initiative  is  the  north-  and  south-western  part  of  Union 
waters  of  the  north-east  Atlantic  (see  map  below).  These  waters  range  from  UK  and 
Ireland in the North to Madeira in the South and out to Azores in the West. The fisheries 
concerned  by  this  initiative  are  those  targeting  demersal  fish.  These  fisheries  comprise 
almost 50 % of total demersal fisheries regulated by TACs in the EU.  

The  TACs  for  the  main  demersal  target  species  in  western  EU  waters  (hereinafter 
referred to as "western waters") amounted to some 368 thousand tonnes in 2017 with a 
first sale value of around € 1,4 billion. Demersal fish live on or near the bottom of the sea 
(in contrast to pelagic fish which live in the middle range of the sea). The main demersal 
fish  caught  in  western  waters  and  covered  by  this  initiative  are  alfonsinos,  anglerfish, 
black  scabbardfish,  blue  ling,  cod,  haddock,  hake,  megrim,  Norway  lobster,  plaice, 
pollack,  red  seabream,  roundnose  grenadier,  saithe,  seabass,  sole  and  whiting.  Many 
other fish (including several deep sea fish) are caught as by-catches. The main gears used 
are bottom trawls and seines, gillnets, pole and lines and bottom longlines. 

“Targeting” means fishermen want to catch particular fish species and adapt their fishing 
strategy  to  catch  them.  Fishermen  will  always  also  have  “by-catch”  fish  in  their  nets. 
“By-catch”  is  that  part  of  the  catch  which  the  fisherman  was  not  aiming  for,  but 
nevertheless ends up in the net. Parts of this by-catch may be welcome, other parts not so 
(e.g.  fish  of  little  commercial  value,  or  fish  below  the  minimum  size).  For  example,  a 
fisherman targeting valuable sole will also have by-catch of less valuable plaice. While 
he  will  be  happy  to  sell  some  plaice,  he  would  prefer  not  to  keep  too  much  plaice  on 
board since it reduces the storage space available for the more valuable sole. Fishermen 
fishing for cod and haddock in north western waters will also catch whiting, while in the 
south when fishing for anglerfish, fishermen may also catch megrim and hake. 

8 Inception impact assessment for a multiannual plan for demersal species in the Western Mediterranean 

3 

 
 
 
                                                 
Some fish stocks such as hake or sea bass live in a wider area from the Atlantic to the 
North Sea, but the vast majority of the fisheries take place in western waters. For such 
fish stocks the scope of this initiative hence also includes the Union waters of the North 
Sea, to allow for measures to be taken for the entire stock9. This initiative thereby links in 
with  the  proposal  for  a  multiannual  plan  for  North  Sea  demersal  fisheries  as  it 
complements this plan in managing similar fisheries in waters adjacent to the North Sea. 
Both the proposed North Sea plan and the future Western Waters plan link very well with 
each other as they would manage demersal fisheries in the same way with MSY ranges 
for target fisheries and precautionary management for by-catch species. Both plans also 
have other similar mechanisms such as safeguards mechanisms for when the amount of 
fish  in  the  sea  would  decrease  below  a  minimum  level.  Furthermore  both  plans  would 
foresee mechanisms for regionalisation. The Western Waters plan is therefore the mirror 
initiative to the North Sea multiannual plan. 

This initiative intends to set the basis for management of mixed, demersal fisheries in the 
western waters of the Union, including the management of stocks predominantly present 
in  western  waters,  but  also  present,  however  to  a  lesser  extent,  in  adjacent  waters. The 
main objective of the initiative is to ensure that the fisheries are sustainable and thereby 
ensuring that the fishing sector can draw economic benefits from these fish resources in 
the long-term.  

This impact assessment will focus on assessing the impacts of introducing a multiannual 
management  plan  for  demersal  species  in  western  waters  compared  with  other  policy 
options.   

Procedural information about this impact assessment is given in Annex 1. The procedure 
included  two  consultations:  a  public  one  addressed  to  the  general  public  and  a  more 
technical  one,  addressed  to  specific  stakeholders  and  decision  makers.  The  results  of 
those consultations are summarised in Annex 3. 

9   These are defined by geographical areas IIa and IV of ICES. 

4 

 
 
 
                                                 
Figure 1: Map of the areas concerned by this initiative  
1.3. 

Legal context 

This section describes the legal framework for fisheries management in western waters in 
order  to  show  the  context  for  this  initiative.  This  legal  framework  is  exclusively  EU-
legislation, with certain national measures to supplement the EU legislation in the coastal 
waters of Member States.  

The  framework  includes  the  annual  fishing  opportunities  regulation,  where  the  EU 
establishes  the  amount  of  fish  that  fishermen  are  allowed  to  land  from  each  fish  stock. 
This amount is referred to as the total allowable catch (TAC) and the Commission bases 
its proposals for TACs on scientific advice given by ICES. 
Furthermore the framework includes the Basic Regulation10, (more details on the relevant 
provisions of the Basic Regulation of the CFP can  be found in  Annex 2),  the technical 
measures  regulation11,  the  western  waters  effort  regime12  and  the  Deep  Sea  Access 

10  Regulation  (EU)  No 1380/2013  of  the  European  Parliament and  of  the  Council on  the  Common  Fisheries Policy, 
amending  Council  Regulations (EC)  No 1954/2003  and  (EC)  No  1224/2009  and repealing  Council  Regulations 
(EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC 

11  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  850/98  for  the  conservation  of  fishery  resources  through  technical  measures  for  the 

protection of juveniles of marine organisms 

5 

 
 
 
                                                 
Regulation13.  The  technical  measures  regulation sets  out  when  and  where  what  kind  of 
fishing gears can be used. The western waters effort regime sets out limitations to how 
much fishing can be undertaken (i.e. how many vessels can fish for how many days) in a 
certain, limited area of western waters, in order to protect a sensitive biological area in 
the south-west of Ireland. 

Furthermore a number of MAPs were introduced under the former CFP and five of these 
MAPs for demersal fish are currently in force in western waters: 

a) 

b) 

c) 

d) 
e) 

The cod recovery plan (Regulation (EU) No 1342/2008), covering cod fisheries in 
the  Kattegat,  the  North  Sea  (including  Skagerrak  and  the  Eastern  Channel),  the 
West of Scotland and the Irish Sea; 
 The  multiannual  plan  for  sole  in  the  western  Channel  (Regulation  (EC) 
509/2007); 
 The  multiannual  plan  for  sole  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay  (Regulation  (EC)  No 
388/2006); 
 The recovery plan for the northern stock of hake (Regulation (EC) No 811/2004); 
 The  recovery  plan  for  hake  and  Norway  lobster  in  the  Iberian  Peninsula 
(Regulation (EC) No 2166/2005); 

The five recovery or multiannual plans, listed under a) to e), do not take into account the 
requirements of the reformed CFP and are therefore outdated: they neither have an MSY 
objective,  nor  do  they  take  into  account  the  landing  obligation  and  regionalisation,  nor 
are they compatible with the guidelines of the Inter-Institutional Task Force (see section 
1.1).  Most  of  them  also  focus  on  single  fish  species,  and  do  not  take  into  account  the 
mixed character of the demersal fisheries (see Annex 2). 

At  EU  level,  following  the  entry  into  force  of  the  new  CFP  Basic  Regulation  and  the 
gradual implementation of the landing obligation in demersal fisheries from 2016-2019, 
discard plans  for demersal fisheries where  adopted for the years 2016 to 201814. These 
allow for very small quantities of demersal fish to be discarded (thrown back to the sea) 
as a de minimis exemption from the landing obligation. In accordance with the CFP, the 
provisions  of  these  discard  plans  should  be  integrated  into  multiannual  plans  for  the 
fisheries  concerned.  Adopting  multiannual  plan  is  therefore  important  as  it  enables  to 
keep  the  flanking  measures  currently  contained  in  the  discard  plans  and  which  are 
necessary for the implementation of the landing obligation. 

2.  WHAT IS THE PROBLEM AND WHY IS IT A PROBLEM? 
There are two main problems concerning demersal fish in western waters: a number of 
fish stocks are overfished, such as cod in the Celtic Sea, hake in southern Iberian waters, 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1954/2003  on  the  management  of  the  fishing  effort  relating  to  certain  Community 
fishing areas and resources and modifying Regulation (EC) No 2847/93 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 685/95 
and (EC) No 2027/95 

13  Regulation  (EU)  2016/2336  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  establishing  specific  conditions  for 
fishing for deep-sea stocks in the north-east Atlantic and provisions for fishing in international waters of the north-east 
Atlantic and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 2347/2002  
14 Commission delegated regulation (EU) 2016/2374 establishing a discard plan for certain demersal 
fisheries in South-Western waters 
Commission delegated regulation (EU) 2016/2375 establishing a discard plan for certain demersal fisheries 
in North-Western waters 

6 

 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
sole in the Bristol channel and sole in the Irish Sea, and the governance framework is 
ineffective (see figure 2). 

Figure 2 Drivers, problems and consequences 

2.1. 

The Problem: Overfishing 

Overfishing is linked to the objectives of the CFP, which is to have stocks at maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY)15. We therefore consider that overfishing takes place when the 
mortality  caused  by  fishing  is  greater  than  the  mortality  compatible  to  MSY,  as  this 
means that stocks will be fished above the level that ensures sustainable stocks, also in 
the  long  term.  According  to  the  most  recent  data,  around  43  %  of  western  waters  fish 
stocks  assessed  are  overexploited  whilst  for  a  number  of  other  stocks,  the  status  still 
remains unknown. In the stakeholder consultation carried out in 2015, with a deadline 15 
September  2015,  in  the  context  of  the  current  impact  assessment,  stakeholders  agreed 
that too many fish stocks are overfished.  

15 The CFP Basic Regulation defines Maximum Sustainable Yield as follows: 'maximum sustainable yield' 
means the highest theoretical equilibrium yield that can be continuously taken on average from a stock 
under existing average environmental conditions without significantly affecting the reproduction 
process; 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Most  biologically  and  economically  important  stocks  in  EU  waters  are  assessed  by  the 
International  Council  for  the  Exploration  of  the  Seas  (ICES),  which  is  the  independent 
scientific body advising the Commission on the state of the stocks. 

For  cod  in  the  Celtic  Sea,  hake,  common  sole  and  Norway  lobster  in  southern  Iberian 
waters, sole in the Bristol Channel and whiting in the Irish Sea, the most recent scientific 
advice  from  ICES  indicates  that  these  fish  stocks  are  still  being  overexploited  beyond 
their reproduction capacities and that the situation is not improving sufficiently for these 
stocks to achieve MSY as soon as possible and by 2020 at the latest.  

ICES recommended in 2016 that to reach sustainable levels of fishing, catches need to be 
decreased for these species. Especially for cod in the Celtic Sea ICES advised that even 
setting  the  fishing  opportunities  for  2017  at  zero  would  not  prevent  the  stock  from 
staying below the precautionary  biomass level. This  situation has  precisely come about 
due  to  cod  being  caught  in  a  mixed  fishery  with  haddock  and  whiting.  Therefore  even 
when the fishing opportunities for cod have been low, they have still been caught in this 
mixed fishery, and subsequently discarded, when fishermen went fishing for haddock and 
whiting. This shows that overfishing is also linked to the mixed character of fisheries in 
western  waters.  The  fisheries  management  however  has  so  far  not  been  adapted  to  the 
fisheries, as the management approach has been to consider each stock separately. Sole in 
the Eastern English Channel is also below the precautionary biomass level, and fishing 
mortality  is  very  high.  This  is  furthermore  one  of  the  only  highly  priced  sole  stocks 
where  discarding  happens.  The  state  of  the  sole  stock  is  driven  by  it  being  caught  in  a 
mixed  fishery  with  plaice,  and  plaice  in  a  healthy  state,  where  the  advised  fishing 
opportunities for plaice are 3 times higher than the advised fishing opportunities for sole. 
Southern hake  is  currently being fished  above MSY. It is caught together with  megrim 
and anglerfish, whereby an advised increase in the fishing opportunities for one stock has 
been  used  as  an  argument  for  postponing  reductions  for  the  others,  due  to  the  single 
species management approach so far.  

2.1.1. 

Underlying drivers of overfishing 

i) Lack of a coherent framework to manage mixed fisheries 

The first underlying driver is the lack of a coherent management framework to deal with 
the reality that most fisheries for demersal stocks in western waters are  mixed fisheries. 
This  often  leads  to  situations  where  management  decisions  taken  for  one  species  are 
incompatible with those required for other species. For example, sole and plaice are often 
caught together. If scientific advice recommends catching less sole and at the same time 
more plaice, then the tools currently in place do not ensure a sustainable exploitation of 
both stocks. This is due to the fact that discarding (i.e. throwing fish back to the sea) has 
so  far  been  allowed  (for  amount  of  discards  see  table  1).  The  new  Basic  Regulation 
phases in the obligation to land all catches until 2019. In a situation with a higher plaice 
quota  than  sole  quota,  the  landing  obligation  will  mean  that  fishermen  will  continue 
fishing  sole until their quota is  used up. Once their quota for sole is  used up, they will 
have  to  stop  fishing  and  can  hence  no  longer  use  their  quota  for  plaice.  The  landing 
obligation  therefore  implies  that  fishermen  have  to  stop  fishing  when  they  run  out  of 
quota  for one of the stocks that they catch as discarding is no longer allowed. Thereby 
sole has the potential to be a 'choke species' for plaice. Sole is here just an example of the 

8 

 
 
 
complexity of managing mixed fisheries under a landing obligation. An analyses of this 
'choke  species'  issue  for  western  waters  fisheries  was  undertaken  by  STECF16,  which 
showed  that  for  many  Member  States  and  for  a  number  of  stocks  catches  were  well  in 
excess  of  the  available  quota  which  indicates  that  these  stocks  would  become  choke 
species as of 2019 when the landing obligation will come into force for all fisheries if we 
simply  continue  with  the  existing  fisheries  management,  including  the  current  single 
species  multiannual  plans.  In  order  to  have  measures  that  match  conservation 
requirements in mixed fisheries we need multiannual plans that are tailored specifically 
for such mixed fisheries. 

Table 1. Discards are very frequent in western waters. This discard problem is presented 
in  the  following  tables  (for  demersal  fisheries  of  western  waters).  These  figures  (from 
report 15-17 of STECF17) show that for the stocks covered between 2% and 55% of the 
catches were thrown back to sea.  

Species 

Haddock 

Nephrops 

Hake 

Nephrops 

Haddock 

Sole 

Whiting  

Sole 

Whiting 

Hake 

Hake 

area 

VIa 

VIa 

ICES stock 

Haddock in IIIa, IV & VIa 

Nephrops in FU11, N. Minch 

Nephrops in FU12, S. Minch 

Nephrops in FU13, Clyde 

VI & VII  Northern Hake 

VIIa 

Nephrops in FU14,  Irish Sea E 

Nephrops in FU15,  Irish Sea W 

Nephrops in FU17, Aran grounds 

Nephrops in FU19 

Nephrops in FUs 20-21 

Nephrops in FU22 

Haddock in VIIa 

Sole in VIId (Eastern Channel) 

Whiting in IV & VIId 

Sole in VIIf-g (Bristol Channel) 

Whiting VIIb-k 

Northern Hake 

Southern Hake 

VIIa 

VIId 

VIId 

VIIf-g 

VIIb-k 

VIIIa-e 
VIIIc  & 
IXa 

Nephrops in FUs 23-24 
Nephrops 
ii) Environmental factors, external to fishing  

VIIIab 

DR % 

10% 

12% 

10% 

21% 

14% 

13% 

25% 

14% 

49% 

45% 

21% 

55% 

11% 

29% 

2% 

20% 

14% 

16% 

44% 

16 https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/43805/830996/2014-11_STECF+14-19+-

+Landing+Obligations+-+part+4_JRC93045.pdf 

17   STECF  (Scientific,  Technical  and  Economic  Committee  for  Fisheries)  is  a  scientific  body  of  the  Commission, 
composed  of  scientific  experts  in  the  fields  of  marine  biology,  marine  ecology,  fisheries  science,  nature 
conservation, population dynamics, statistics, fishing gear technology, aquaculture, and the economics of fisheries 
and  aquaculture.  STECF  is  consulted  at  regular  intervals  on  matters  pertaining  to  the  conservation  and 
management  of  living  aquatic  resources,  including  biological,  economic,  environmental,  social  and  technical 
considerations. The report quoted in the text is found at the following link: 
https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/43805/1281129/2015-11_STECF+15-17+-
+Quota+top+ups_JRC98384.pdf 

9 

 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
                                                 
 
Secondly,  environmental  factors  influence  the  state  of  fish  stocks  and  can  compound 
overexploitation.  Environmental  conditions  (e.g.  water  temperature,  nutrient  changes) 
can influence the reproduction of fish stocks, and further contribute to the negative status 
of  stocks  caused  by  overfishing.  On  the  other  hand,  healthier  fish  stocks  are  more 
resilient  to  environmental  fluctuations  and  can  thus  sustain  exploitation  better  in  the 
long-term. 

In the long term, the various environmental factors, together with high fishing pressure, 
are likely to increase the vulnerability of the ecosystem and worsen the state of the fish 
stocks. This driver however falls outside the scope of this initiative.   

This initiative aims to address: 

Overfishing  because  several  fish  stocks  are  not  exploited  sustainably  in  line  with  the 
MSY  target  –  TACs  and/or  catches  are  too  high  compared  to  the  long-term  objective, 
which  endangers  the  stocks.  In  addition,  some  of  these  fish  stocks  are  outside  safe 
biological limits, or depleted.  

A  recent  report  of  the  Scientific,  Technical  and  Economic  Committee  of  Fisheries 
(STECF)  No  16-05  of  May  201618  shows  the  following  evolution  of  fish  stocks  in 
western waters: 

Table  2.  State  of  fish  stocks  in  western  waters.  This  table  contains  only  those  fish 
stocks  covered  by  this  initiative  for  which  MSY  assessments  were  available  at  the 
time.  

Year 

2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014 

No.  of  stocks 
assessed 
No.  fished  in 
of 
excess 
MSY 
No.  fished  in 
accordance 
with MSY 
No.  of  stocks 
outside 
safe 
biological 
limits19 

25 

24 

25 

26 

26 

26 

27 

26 

27 

28 

29 

27 

14 

15 

15 

14 

20 

17 

16 

13 

12 

17 

13 

12 

11 

9 

10 

12 

6 

9 

11 

13 

15 

11 

16 

15 

13 

14 

14 

12 

16 

14 

15 

12 

13 

16 

14 

14 

This  table  shows  that  too  many  fish  stocks  are  still  fished  in  excess  of  MSY,  many  of 
these  are  also  outside  safe  biological  limits.  This  leads  to  an  increased  risk  of  stock 
collapse,  which  means  a  stock is  at  such  low  levels  that it may  never  recover to  levels 
which allow for economically optimal exploitation. 

18   https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/43805/55543/2016-03_STECF+16-
05+Monitoring+performance+CFP+CORRIGENDUM_JRCxxx.pdf 

19   Outside safe biological limits means that a stock has fallen below the precautionary reference point for 
the spawning stock biomass (Bpa), and is fished above the precautionary reference point for mortality 
(Fpa). 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2.2. 

The problem: Ineffective governance 

The second problem is ineffective governance, which is defined as a governance set up 
(in  particular  management  measures)  not  achieving  the  desired  objectives.  The  Basic 
Regulation lays out the principles of good governance which should be followed under 
the CFP (Article 3). This includes: taking into account of regional specificities, through a 
regionalised  approach,  the  establishment  of  measures  in  accordance  with  the  best 
available  scientific  advice,  a  long-term  perspective,  administrative  cost  efficiency, 
appropriate involvement of stakeholders, in particular Advisory Councils, at all stages, 
consistency with other Union policies, the use of impact assessments. 

Despite  the  numerous  management  tools  currently  in  place,  which  includes  the  5 
existing,  but  outdated  multiannual  plans,  they  have  not  proven  sufficient  to  ensure 
sustainable fishing of demersal stocks in mixed fisheries. The former CFP provided only 
limited  ability  to  deal  with  specific  regional  issues  of  a  highly  technical  nature.  The 
decision-making  process  has  furthermore  been  too  rigid  to  allow  timely  adaptation  to 
new technical solutions and regional specificities. There is a need to target and improve 
the management framework to ensure it effectively manages the EU demersal fish stocks.  

The  reformed  CFP  has  taken  an  important  step  to  address  these  shortcomings  by 
introducing  regionalisation.  However  some  of  the  management  tools  in  the  Basic 
Regulation  are  not  directly  applicable;  instead  they  have  to  be  'activated'  through  other 
legislative  instruments,  either  discard  plans  or  multiannual  plans.  Member  States  are 
using regionalisation for the so-called discard plans to phase in the landing obligation for 
demersal  species  between  2016  and  2019.  Under  regionalisation  since  2015  Member 
States  have  sent  joint  recommendations  to  the  Commission  bringing  more  and  more 
demersal  fisheries  under  the  landing  obligation.  These  joint  recommendations  also 
contain  accompanying  measures  to  facilitate  the  implementation  of  the  landing 
obligation, namely 1) the so called de minimis exemptions allowing vessels to continue 
discarding  a  small  percentage  of  up  to  7%  of  fish,  on  the  basis  of  defined  criteria,  e.g. 
where further improvements in selectivity are difficult to attain, and 2) high survivability 
exemptions for those fish that will survive discarding. These joint recommendations have 
been put into EU law via delegated acts. These delegated acts however have a limited life 
span and will expire on 31.12.2018. Continuing these measures as of 1.1.2019 requires a 
legislative instrument empowering the Commission to adopt delegated acts. The western 
waters MAP is the legislative instrument for implementing the landing obligation. 

The specific drivers of this problem are detailed below. 

2.2.1. 

Underlying drivers of ineffective governance 

Management measures agreed in top down manner 

The underlying driver is that current management plans and other management measures 
have been agreed in a top-down manner via proposals from the Commission which are 
then agreed by the co-legislators. Input from stakeholders has been either lacking or is at 
best fragmented. Stakeholders have become more organised since the 2002 CFP via the 
Advisory Councils (ACs), but there is no structural framework in place for management 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
measures designed by stakeholders to be taken on board (e.g. a new closed area or a new 
kind of fishing gear) by the Member States or the Union. 

Furthermore, management cannot respond quickly to innovations by the fishing industry. 
This  works  as  a  disincentive  for  developing  more  selective  gears.  For  example,  if 
fishermen  design  more  selective  gears,  then  they  can  currently  only  use  them  once  co-
legislators have agreed these as a management measure. This leads to time lags of years 
before they are in place. By the time they are in place many are often already overtaken 
by new gear innovations and the measures risk being outdated. This limits much needed 
innovation  in  gears  that  are  more  selective  or  that  have  less  impact  on  the  marine 
environment.  To  implement  the  landing  obligation  discard  plans  have  been  adopted  by 
the  Commission  as  delegated  acts,  on  the  basis  of  joint  recommendations  from  the 
regional groups of Member States20. These plans contain locally tailor made measures for 
the implementation of the landing obligation and for any exemptions, e.g. based on high 
survivability  of  a  species.  However  these  plans  will  expire  by  January  2019.  If  no 
multiannual management plan is in place before 2019 there will be a legal void, where 
the tools to implement the landing obligation will no longer be available to the legislators 
and  stakeholders.  Such  a  void  risks  jeopardize  the  implementation  of  the  landing 
obligation.  

Furthermore  both  the  fact  that  management  cannot  respond  quickly  to  innovations  and 
the  top-down  management  approach  contribute  to  overfishing,  because  stakeholders  do 
not  participate  in  designing  measures  to  manage  the  fisheries,  despite  their  specific 
regional knowledge and capacity to innovate. Stakeholders therefore often feel a lack of 
ownership to the measures.  

2.3. 

Complexity of the current rules 

There is currently no comprehensive framework to manage demersal fisheries in western 
waters.  Instead  certain  stocks  are  subject  to  single  species  management  plans,  and  the 
scope of these differs from plan to plan. The effect of this situation is that stakeholders 
are faced with a complex system of several single species plans that are not adapted to 
the reality of mixed fisheries. 

Finally, the current management plans are not fit for monitoring whether the 2020 MSY 
objectives would be met, as no MSY objectives have been defined in the MAPs. This is a 
contradiction to the current policy as the MSY objective is an instrinsic part of the Basic 
Regulation.  As  the  management  tools  do  not  fit  together,  this  adds  complexity  to  the 
governance. 

2.4. 

Consequences of the problems of overfishing and ineffective governance  

Overfishing and ineffective governance have five concrete consequences.  

20 In western waters there is an established Member State group covering Member States that fish in north 
western and south western waters respectively. This is mirrored by Advisory Council, comprising 
stakeholders, for the north western and south western waters respectively.  

12 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
1) Lack of ownership: the current system of MAPs does not allow timely updates for e.g. 
including  bottom-up  innovations  like  more  selective  gears  to  cater  for  changing  needs. 
The  current  system  is  inflexible  and  slow.  The  results  in  a  lack  of  buy-in  from  the 
industry and avoidance of the rules. This undermines stable and long-term management. 

2) Lack of coherence in the implementation of rules: for most of the demersal stocks in 
western  waters  the  Council  does  not  take  its  annual  decisions  on  fishing  opportunities 
within the framework of a management plan. TACs are therefore set from a short-term 
perspective. This poses a real risk that the MSY target will not be reached in 2020. TAC 
decisions, while being among the most important decisions for the fishing industry, are 
thereby  made  largely  isolated  from  other  policy  discussions,  such  as  discard  plans,  or 
technical measures. 

3)  Progress  has  been  made  towards  sustainable  fishing21,  but  still  too  many  fish  stocks 
are not yet fished sustainably. Table 2 shows that  further  progress is  required  and only 
limited time is left until 2020 to achieve the sustainability goal of MSY. 

4)  Socio-economic  consequences:  threat  to  viability  and  profitability  of  the  sector:  the 
EU fishing fleet in western waters is currently losing potential economic rents, because 
too many fish stocks are fished at levels that cannot deliver sustainable yields. When fish 
stocks are smaller (due to fishing above sustainable levels), it takes more working hours 
and more fuel to fish your quota  in the same area. Moreover, fishing at too high levels 
risks stock collapse, and subsequently poses a real risk that the sector dependent on the 
stock will also collapse. Ensuring that fish stocks remain at safe levels is crucial for the 
social and economic well-being and for the fabric of the coastal communities.  

5)  Environmental  consequences:  excessive  levels  of  fishing  pressure  often  go  hand  in 
hand with increased impacts to fish habitats, causing loss of biodiversity, changes in the 
structure of fish populations (e.g. fewer large individuals), food web modifications (e.g. 
decline  of  top  predators  with  cascading  effects).  For  example,  intensive  fishing  of 
Norway  lobster  in  the  Celtic  Sea  caused  significant  changes  to  the  bottom  habitat, 
combined with discards of whitefish of around 55%, because of  the mixed character of 
these fisheries. 

Overfishing  and  ineffective  governance  hampers  sustainable  management:  short  term 
perspectives  trump  the  long-term  advantages  of  achieving  MSY  as  soon  as  possible; 
year-to-year fluctuations on TACs negatively impact market supply, prices and planning 
of  fishing  activities;  the  absence  of  mixed-fisheries  management  leads  to  choke  effects 
and inefficient quota consumption and  the lack of transparency and participation in the 
decision process prevents industry buy-in.  

2.5. 

Implications of "Brexit" 

Given the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, the majority of 
fish stocks in the North East Atlantic will be shared between the EU and the UK and will 
have to be managed jointly. The economic, social and environmental consequences of 

21  

In 2014 for 59 fish stocks scientists could give the MSY information on how to set quotas so that these fisheries 
are sustainable. Of these 59 fish stocks, 31 were at sustainable levels (of these, 11 are demersal stocks in western 
waters). 

13 

 
 
 
                                                 
Brexit and the modalities of the joint management cannot be envisaged at this early stage 
of negotiations. However, it is clear that the objectives of this initiative, notably to avoid 
overfishing and to make governance more efficient, would still be relevant after Brexit. 

2.6. 

Who is affected by the current situation and how?  

2.6.1. 

Fishing sector 

The problems  affect  fishermen fishing  for demersal species from the north and west  of 
Scotland over the Gulf of Cadiz down to Madeira in the South. These are fishermen from 
Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and the UK.  

According to the Annual Economic Report (AER) of 201622 more than 48 000 fishermen, 
and 18 000 vessels are active in western waters. This includes both the demersal and the 
pelagic sector and can be broken down by Member State as follows: 

Table 3 Fishermen and vessels active in Western waters 

Member 
State 

Estimated no 
of vessels 

Estimated 
employed 

Estimated 
FTE 

Live weight 
of landings 
(t) 

% of total 
landed 
weight 

Value of 
landings 
(1000 €) 

% of 
total 
value 

Belgium 

Germany 

Spain 

France 

UK 

Ireland 

Portugal 

Total 

39 

8 

7.898 

2.739 

2.464 

1.343 

3.803 

18.294 

120 

102 

76 

87 

17.371 

13.990 

6.015 

6.336 

3.154 

15.041 

48.139 

4.555 

4.240 

2.319 

7.316 

5.497 

8.623 

305.087 

297.890 

336.710 

226.954 

129.401 

32.583 

1.310.162 

21 

12 

33 

57 

45 

100 

79 

50 

20.628 

18.623 

569.774 

687.981 

511.903 

244.522 

259.754 

2.313.185 

25 

14 

27 

62 

48 

100 

74 

50 

In 2014 over 1.48 million tonnes were landed by the western waters fishing fleets, to a 
value of € 2.4 billion, representing 30% of the total revenue of the EU fleet.  

Between  2001  and  2016  TACs  for  demersal  species  have  increased  in  north-western 
waters by 40 %, and in south-western waters by 31 %, mainly due to the increase in the 
hake stocks. In north-western waters anglerfish has also increased by over 40 %, while 
the TAC for sole has decreased slightly. In south-western waters the TAC for sole and 
Nephrops  has  been  stable,  while  the  TAC  for  anglerfish  has  been  increasing  slightly. 
This will affect individual Member States depending on their quota availability. E.g. the 
Irish fleet is very dependent on Nephrops, while the Belgian fleet is very dependent  on 
sole.  

22   Every year an Annual Economic Report (AER) is produced by the STECF and the Joint Research Center (JRC). 
The  2016  AER  can  be  found  at  https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/eur-scientific-and-technical-
research-reports/2016-annual-economic-report-eu-fishing-fleet-stecf-16-11 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
In terms of volume hake was in 2014 the 3rd most important stock (82.500 tonnes) and 
the only demersal stock in the top 4 stocks in western waters. In terms of value however 
hake  was 2nd with  a landings value in  2014 of € 230 million, anglerfish  was 3rd with a 
landings value of € 173 million, while Norway lobster was 4th with a landings value of € 
161 million.   

The  impact  of  the  overall  fleet  segments  in  western  waters  can  be  broken  down  as 
follows: 

Table 4 Fishermen and vessels broken down in small scale and large scale fleet 

Fleet 
segment 

Small-scale 
fleet 
Large scale 
fleet 

Total 
number 
of vessels 

% of 
total 

Total 
employed 

FTE 

Live weight 
of landings 
(t) 

% of 
landed 
weight 

Value of 
landings 
(1000 €) 

% of 
landed 
value 

9.511 

52% 

19.874 

9.367 

137.220 

9% 

344.003 

14% 

8.793 

48% 

28.382  23.357 

1.332.795 

91% 

2.041.739 

TOTAL 

18.304 

100% 

48.256  32.724 

1.470.015 

100% 

2.385.742 

86% 

100% 

Demersal  species  are  often  targeted  by  the  small-scale  fleet,  however  a  number  large 
scale vessels also target demersal species. Consequently the difference between the share 
of  the  landed  weight  and  landed  value  shows  the  higher  value  of  demersal  species. 
Furthermore  the  difference  between  the  number  of  people  employed  in  the  small-scale 
fleet and the full-time equivalents shows the predominant part-time nature of this fishing 
fleet activity. 

Overall the western waters fleets are not as profitable as e.g. the North Sea fleets. In 2014 
the  gross  profit  per  day  was  three  times  higher  in  the  North  Sea  (€  828)  compared  to 
western waters (€ 264). Broken down to fleet segments this difference is widened, as the 
gross  profit  margin  of  the  western  waters  demersal  fleet  was  4.5  times  lower  than  the 
North Sea demersal fleet in 2014.  

This notwithstanding all fleets operating in western waters, apart from the Belgian fleet, 
made a profit in 2014. The Belgian fleet's deficit was linked to a drop in the price of sole. 

The  economic  performance  of  the  demersal  fleets  in  western  EU  waters  has  recently 
improved.  However  it  is  clear  that  overfishing  harms  the  social  and  economic 
development of the fleets and the fishermen, also taking into account that roughly half of 
the total revenues of fishermen go into salaries and profits for the fishing communities. 
With the gradual implementation of the landing obligation in the demersal fisheries, there 
is however a need for new tools and approaches to ensure that the process of achieving 
MSY, is sustained and strengthened, in a way that does not disproportionally strain the 
fishing  communities  socio-economically,  while  also  ensuring  effective  governance. 
Maximizing yields, through MSY, will have a further positive effect on the upstream and 
downstream  related  industries:  suppliers,  service  providers,  maintenance,  processors, 
retailers,  etc.  by  increasing  the  availability  of  raw  material  and  offering  additional  and 
more  stable  income  and  job  opportunities  and,  ultimately,  more  locally  sourced  fish  to 
consumers.  

15 

 
 
 
 
The  current  situation  is  instead  still  characterized  by  the  persistence  of  overfishing, 
despite progress and a management framework that is not well adapted to the reality of 
mixed fisheries, which reduces the fleet's potential economic performance.  

The large majority of fishing businesses are micro-enterprises and small or medium-sized 
enterprises (SME) who would be the first to benefit from maximized yields (see Table 5 
below).  

Table 5: No of fishing firms Structure and economic performance by fleets 
operating in the western waters, including demersal and pelagic vessels (source: 
AER 2011)23 

MS 

No vessels 

Total 
income 

(EUR mio) 

Income 
per  vessel 
(EUR mio) 

Total 
FTE 

FTE  per 
vessel 

Total 
firms 

Firms 
with 

1 vessel 

Firms 
with  2-5 
vessels 

Firms  with  6+ 
vessels 

BE 

DE 

ES 

FR 

IE 

NL 

PT 

UK 

80 

1508 

9921 

7069 

2095 

735 

8256 

6552 

85,39 

134,6 

2035,18 

1171,71 

320,55 

384,69 

364,88 

1117,98 

Totals 

36216 

5614,98 

1,07 

0,09 

0,21 

0,17 

0,15 

0,52 

0,04 

0,17 

0,30 

293 

1253 

28629 

7545 

2395 

1680 

8515 

7909 

58219 

3,66 

0,83 

2,89 

1,07 
1,14 

2,29 

1,03 

1,21 

1,76 

77 

1016 

9195 

6059 

1843 

576 

3657 

5606 

75 

718 

8588 

5321 

1672 

481 

3474 

5032 

2 

289 

599 

723 

170 

93 

180 

564 

28029 

25361 

2620 

0 
9 

8 

15 

1 
2 

3 

10 

48 

% 

90,48% 

9,35% 

0,17% 

About 95% of fishing firms in western waters own 5 vessels or less and employ around 
10 crew members or less and around 90% of the fleets own just one vessel and employ 
around two crew members (micro-enterprises).SMEs are not the only  firms affected by 
these problems, but they are impacted disproportionally. These figures refer to the entire 
fleet of the relevant Member States.  

2.6.2. 

Processing sector 

The problem also affects the processing sector. Most of the catches of demersal species 
in  western  waters  are  sold  fresh,  however  in  terms  of  secondary  sectors  that  are 
dependent on fisheries, the processing sector is the most important one. Overall in the EU 
the  processing  value  of  whitefish  in  2014  reached  11.6  billion  €,  a  3  %  increase  from 
2013. This amounts to almost 60 % of total revenues (19.85 billion) from the processing 
sector in 2014. The processing sector is heavily dependent on imports of whitefish, while 
the  EU  almost  fully  covers  its  need  for  flatfish  in  the  processing  sector.  The  main 
whitefish  species  supplied  by  the  EU  fishing  fleets  (cod,  hake,  saithe,  haddock)  meet 
only  a small percentage of the market needs, providing between  10%  for cod and 30% 
for  haddock.  Cod  is  the  most  important  source  of  whitefish  for  the  EU  processing 

23   This table includes vessels in waters outside western waters and vessels fishing for pelagic fish, not concerned by 

this initiative. 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
industry,  and  is  widely  used  in  the  UK,  France  and  Spain.  Hake  is  the  third  most 
important whitefish  species  for the processing industry. The processing of hake,  on the 
basis of both fresh hake caught in the EU and imports, mainly takes place in France and 
Spain. Only France has increased its whitefish processing since 201024.  
As far as the processing industry is concerned, firms tend to be larger. The proportion of 
SMEs and micro-enterprises is slightly above 50%: 

Table 6: Number of processing firms in the EU and employment data  
(elaborated from data extracted from AER 2013) 
2009 
No of jobs 
1779 
<10 employees 
1139 
11-49 employees 
416 
50-249 employees 
81 
>250 employees 

2008 
1758 
1088 
476 
81 

2010 
1798 
1091 
408 
79 

Total 
Proportion of SMEs 

3402 
51.68 

3415 
52.09 

3376 
53.26 

2.6.3. 

Markets 

2011 
1850 
1016 
400 
78 

3344 
55.32 

Markets are also affected by the problem. Demersal fish are sold mostly on the fresh fish 
market and some are frozen25. Fishery products in western waters are sold by wholesale 
fish traders and only a minor part is sold directly by fishermen. EU consumers overall in 
2015  spent €54  billion on  fisheries  and  aquaculture  products  -  the  highest amount  ever 
recorded.  The  seafood  supply  in  the  EU  grew  by  almost  650.000  tonnes  between  2013 
and  2014  (+4.5%).  The  main  driver  was  internal  production,  which  rose  by  570.000 
tonnes,  mostly  originating  from  fishing  activities.  The  EU’s  self-sufficiency  also 
improved, moving from 44.5% to 47.5%26.  

In  2015,  Spain,  Italy,  the  UK  and  France  covered  85.7%  of  the  total  EU  fresh  fish 
consumption  by  volume  and  85.2%  by  value.  Of  these,  Spain  ranks  first  with  38%  of 
total  fish  consumed  (€4.95  billion,  686,000  t)  with  the  most  important  species  being 
hake,  salmon,  cod  and  flounder.  By  value  the  most  important  demersal  species  in  the 
wider region are hake (€230 million), anglerfish/monkfish (€173 million) Norway lobster 
(€161 million)27. 

Cod is one of the EU's most consumed fish species, with 2.4 kg consumed per person per 
year  and  household  purchase  of  €1.4  billion.  However  most  of  this  is  supported  by 
imports  from  third  countries,  with  an  EU  self-sufficiency  rate  of  only  12%  in  2014. 
Similarly, hake (1kg per capita per year) and anglerfish/monkfish have only a 37% and 
56% self-sufficiency rates, respectively.  

All  downstream  related  industries  (see  above)  are  also  affected  by  the  problems 
described  and  therefore  rely  on  imports  to  alleviate  these  effects.  Data  on  other 
downstream  industries  (market  distribution,  retailers)  were  not  available  at  the  time  of 

24 EUMOFA: The EU fish market, 2016 
25 DG-MARE-EUMOFA (2016)  
26 EUMOFA: The EU fish market, 2016 
27 The 2016 Annual Economic Report on the EU Fishing Fleet (STECF 16-11) 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
carrying  out  this  exercise.  It  may  be  taken  that  in  this  field  firms  tend  to  be  larger, 
especially in the field of retailers (supermarkets).  

2.7. 

Perception of the problems by consulted stakeholders  

A summary of the stakeholder consultations is shown in Annex 3. 

During  the  public  consultation  stakeholders  were  asked  about  their  views  on  the  main 
problem: (1). the fact that a number of stocks are not yet at MSY and hence the industry 
cannot fully enjoy the economic benefits of sustainable fishing; and (2) the fact that the 
current  MAPs  are  inadequate  to  use  the  management  measures  of  the  new  CFP.  18 
respondents out of 23 agreed fully (5) or mostly (13), while 5 stakeholders agreed only 
partially. Comments received pointed to the fact that the problem was not due to obsolete 
or inadequate MAPs, but to wrong TAC decisions and a too rigid management system. 

On  the  severity  of  the  problem,  22  out  of  23  replies  qualified  it  as  very  severe  (17)  or 
severe  (5);  only  1  stakeholder  considered  the  problem  as  moderate.  Most  of  the 
comments received agreed that it is an important social and economic issue. 

Parallel  to  this  Public  Consultation,  a  targeted  survey  was  done  with  more  precise  and 
technical  questions.  It  was  addressed  to  the  Advisory  Councils,  to  Member  States 
authorities,  to  the  PECH  Committee  of  the  European  Parliament  and  to  the  NAT 
Committee  of  the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee.  In  response  to  this 
targeted  consultation,  one  Member  State  mostly  agreed  with  the  identification  of  the 
problem and considered it as a severe one. The other Member State which replied agreed 
only partially and considered it a moderate problem. 

In  the  relevant  sections  below,  further  reference  is  made  to  the  specific  responses 
received. 

3. 

WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? 

The principle of proportionality requires that the involvement of the institutions must be 
limited to what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.  

According  to  Article  3.1.d)  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union 
(TFEU)28 the EU has exclusive competence for the conservation of the marine biological 
resources  under  the  CFP,  managed  directly  through  EU  regulations.  Furthermore,  both 
fish  stocks  and  fishing  vessels  concerned  move  freely  across  national  boundaries  so 
action at Member State level alone is unlikely to be effective in achieving the objectives. 
For  measures  to  be  effective,  these should  be taken  in  a  coordinated  manner  and made 
applicable to the whole area of distribution of the stock and to all fleets concerned.  

This initiative respects the principle of subsidiarity and fulfils its requirements. 

In  addition,  most  contributors  to  the  public  consultation  agreed  that  EU  intervention  is 
necessary, in the form of either one or two EU management plans (see Annex 3). 

The EU should act, because otherwise we risk that: 

28   Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union . 

18 

 
 
 
                                                 
  Sustainable  fishing,  defined  as  maintaining  fish  stocks  over  the  long  term  at  levels 
corresponding  to  MSY,  will  not  be  achieved  for  all  fisheries  by  2020.  This  will 
jeopardize  the  objectives  of  the  Basic  Regulation,  as  this  will  have  socio-economic 
implications  with  the  fishing  industry  and  coastal  regions  in  the  EU  losing  potential 
economic  rents.  There  would  also  be  a  negative  impact  on  the  environmental 
sustainability  as  certain  stocks  in  a  mixed  fishery  will  either  be  overfished  or  fisheries 
will  need  to  be  closed  early,  because  of  a  mismatch  in  available  quotas.  Furthermore 
stocks  fished  above  MSY  will  fail  to  deliver  on  the  objective  of  contributing  to  the 
availability of food supplies.  
  implementation  measures  for  the  landing  obligation  via  discard  plans  cannot  be 
continued after 2019 as there is no MAP in place which caters for measures such as  de 
minimis and survivability exemptions and; 

 this in turn will mean no regionalisation for fisheries management measures. A lack of 
regionalisation will lead to a further loss of industry buy-in, as stakeholders will become 
increasingly disappointed that there is no structural framework that allows them to design 
together with the Member States management measures and to ensure that measures can 
be taken quickly so that they are always up to date. Regionalisation thus constitutes an 
important shift from instrument-based to results-based management. 

From a legal point of view, the CFP has as an objective to achieve MSY by 2020, and 
MAPs  are  prescribed  as  a  measure  to  achieve  this  objective.  Without  MAPs  in  place, 
essential  measures,  such  as  the  landing  obligation,  cannot  be  implemented  in  the  long 
term and this will make it more difficult to achieve the CFP objectives. 

Finally,  considering  the  fact  that  the  EU  is  one  of  the  most  adamant  promoters  of 
sustainable fishing at global level, not being able to ensure a proper management of fish 
stocks in the EU also risks putting at stake the EU's credibility globally. 

3.1. 

Perceptions of pertinence of EU action by consulted stakeholders  

All the contributions to the online public consultation have agreed to act at EU level (out 
of  23  replies,  20  fully  agreed  with  the  need  for  the  EU  to  act,  1  mostly  agreed  and  2 
partially  agreed).  It  was  noted  that  beyond  the  need  to  act,  there  is  a  legal  obligation 
under the Treaty to manage fisheries by MAPs, and some requested a better involvement 
of stakeholders. 18 stakeholders fully agreed, 2 mostly agreed and 3 partially agreed that 
action should be multiannual and proactive rather than annual and reactive. It was noted 
that  there  should  also  be  a  capability  to  react  swiftly  to  changing  circumstances. 
Technical Measures introduced on the basis of the management plan should be agreed on 
at a regional level. See further details in Annex 3.  

4. 

WHAT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED? 

The general objective and specific objectives and their relation to the problems being 
addressed by this initiative are presented in Figure 3 and detailed below under point 4. 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Specific and general objectives and their relationship to the problems 

4.1. 

Objectives of the initiative 

The  main  objective  is  to  contribute  to  the  objectives  of  the  common  fisheries  policy 
(CFP) listed in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, namely:  

"The CFP shall ensure that fishing (…) activities are environmentally sustainable 
in the long-term and are managed in a way that is consistent with the objectives 
of achieving economic, social and employment benefits, and of contributing to the 
availability of food supplies;  

The  CFP  shall  apply  the  precautionary  approach  to  fisheries  management,  and 
shall  aim  to  ensure  that  exploitation  of  living  marine  biological  resources 
restores and maintains populations of harvested species above levels which can 
produce  the  maximum  sustainable  yield  (…)  by  2015  where  possible  and,  on  a 
progressive, incremental basis at the latest by 2020 for all stocks; 

The CFP shall provide conditions for economically viable and competitive fishing 
capture and processing industry". 

These objectives fit very well with the priorities of the Commission and will help deliver 
on the key objective of jobs and growth in Europe. 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
To  achieve  the  main  objective,  it  is  necessary  to  address  the  identified  problems  of  
overfishing and ineffective governance with specific objectives as follows: 

Overfishing is addressed by the following specific objectives of the initiative: 

To provide a transparent framework to achieve that stocks are fished sustainably by 2020 
at  the  latest  for  western  waters  fisheries,  to  ensure  environmental  sustainability  and  to 
achieve  a  socio-economically  sustainable  fisheries  sector  for  demersal  fisheries  in 
western waters. 

Ineffective governance is addressed by the following specific objective of the initiative: 
To provide an effective governance framework for demersal fisheries in western waters, 
which is simpler and provides stakeholders with greater ownership; 

To  facilitate  the  achievement  of  these  objectives  the  initiative  will  also  facilitate  the 
implementation  of  the  landing  obligation  established  under  the  Basic  Regulation,  by 
providing  a  basis  for  derogations  for  selected  demersal  fisheries  in  western  waters  in 
certain circumscribed situations. 

The  initiative  shall  be  coherent  with  the  Union  environmental  legislation,  in  particular 
with the objective of achieving a good environmental status by 2020 as set out in Article 
1(1) of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD)29. 

4.2. 

Perceptions by consulted stakeholders on these objectives 

Out  of  23  stakeholders,  16  agreed  fully  (3)  or  mostly  (13)  and  7  agreed  just  partially. 
Generally speaking, the fishing  sector  found that  the current MAPs did  not  address the 
real  problem  (for  them  the  problem  lies  with  too  rigid  and  obsolete  rules)  and  NGOs 
believed  that  the  objectives  should  mirror  those  of  the  CFP  and  include  MSFD-related 
objectives. For details on the respondents see Annex 3. 

5. 

5.1. 

WHAT ARE THE VARIOUS OPTIONS TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES? 

Discarded policy options  

i) No action at EU level 

Because fisheries policy is an exclusive competence of the Union, the first policy option 
that can be discarded is that of no action at the European level.  

ii) Amendment of the existing management plans 

The 5 existing management plans do not meet the requirements of the CFP nor those of 
the Inter-Institutional Task Force and would thus be unable to achieve the objectives of 
the  CFP.  Reviews  of  current  MAPs  by  the  Scientific,  Technical  and  Economic 

29   Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework 
for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive).  

21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Committee of Fisheries (STECF) and the International Council for the Exploration of the 
Sea (ICES)30, concluded as follows: 

a)  On  the  cod  plan  (Regulation  (EU)  No  1342/2008),  STECF  concluded  in  2011 
"the plan is not delivering reduced F [fishing mortality rate] and additionally in 
many areas does not have stakeholder support."31;  

b)  On  the  plan  for  western  Channel  sole  (Regulation  (EC)  509/2007),  STECF 
concluded in 2014 that, 'The TAC restriction  is the only effective element  of the 
plan'.. Furthermore STECF concluded that: 'Given the multispecies nature of all 
the  fisheries  in  the  area,  STECF  considers  that  efficient  management  of  the 
fisheries would best be achieved through the development and implementation of 
'make 
a  regional  multiannual  fishery  management  plan',  as  this  would: 
management more efficient and avoid problems of TAC unbalance'32 

c)  The Bay of Biscay sole plan (Regulation (EC) No 388/2006) has the objective to 
rebuild the stock but no target has been set under the plan for reaching MSY; In 
2011  STECF  commented  that,  the  plan  'requires  that  new  biological  targets  be 
fixed once the stock has recovered to its precautionary biomass level33'. Even if 
the stock reached this level in 2010, no revision has taken place. 

d)  In  the  Northern  hake  plan  (Regulation  (EC)  No  811/2004),  the  objective  is 
considered to be achieved when the size of the spawning stock is kept above safe 
biological  limits  for  two  consecutive  years.  It  is  therefore  not  specifically 
designed to achieve MSY.  Besides, ICES has reported that "the current recovery 
plan (EC Reg. No. 811/2004) is based on precautionary reference points that are 
no longer appropriate";34 

e)  Similar  comments  apply  to  the  Southern  hake  and  Nephrops  plan  (Regulation 
(EC) No 2166/2005): it is not designed to achieve MSY and, according to ICES, 
it  uses  "precautionary  reference  points  that  are  no  longer  appropriate".  In  2010, 
STECF assessed that "the F reduction from 2006 expected from the plan has not 
been achieved" and that "Fmsy will probably not be reached by the intended date 
of  2015.  In  consequence  the  plan  is  not  succeeding  in  achieving  its  stated 
objectives35"; 

These plans were introduced to rebuild and recover fish stocks above defined levels that 
at the time were considered safe in terms of sustainability. However these definitions are 
today outdated and moreover these older plans do not contain any MSY objectives. 

30   STECF  reports  assessing  the  performance  of  the  existing  multiannual  plans  can  be  found  in 

https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reports/management-plans . 

31 STECF: Evaluation of multiannual plans for cod in Irish Sea, Kattegat, North Sea, and West of Scotland 
(STECF-11-07), p. 12 
32 STECF: Evaluation/scoping of Management plans - Evaluation of the multiannual plan for the 
management of Western Channel sole (Regulation EC 509/2007) (STECF-14-04), p. 7 and 10 
33 STECF: Impact Assessment of Bay of Biscay sole (STECF-11-01), p. 12 
34 http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2016/2016/hke-nrtn.pdf 
35 STECF: Report of the Sub Group on Management Objectives and Strategies (SGMOS 10-06). Part d) 
Evaluation of Multiannual Plan for hake and Nephrops in areas VIIIc and IXa, p. 6 

22 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
This  option  would  entail  amending  the  5  existing  management  plans,  and  subsequently 
need the introduction of a series of many more new single-species plans for other stocks 
and fisheries not covered by the current plans. Existing plans would be amended to meet 
the challenges of the new CFP, and in light of their evaluations - introduce amendments 
on  the  current  scope  (in  terms  of  stocks,  fisheries,  area),  introducing  MSY  targets, 
objectives and safeguards for conservation and technical measures. Delegation of powers 
to the Commission should also be introduced in order to implement regionalisation. Over 
time,  new  additional,  plans  could  be  introduced  for  stocks  not  currently  under  a 
management  plan.  This  would  entail  the  development  of  a  range  of  plans  for  the 
main/driving demersal fish stocks for which ICES currently provides scientific advice on 
maximum  sustainable  yield  (45  stocks  are  considered  target  stocks  in  western  waters), 
and potentially further plans for other commercially important bycatch stocks (34 stocks 
are considered as bycatch stocks in western waters). 

Each  multiannual  plan  would  address  a  "cluster"  of  fisheries  sharing  certain 
characteristics. Examples of clusters could be the fisheries for roundfish36 with important 
by-catch  of  megrim  and  anglerfish,  Nephrops  fisheries  (with  by-catch of  roundfish  and 
also  megrim  and  anglerfish),  and  fisheries  targeting  flatfish15  (sole  and  plaice  mainly), 
also  with  considerable  by-catches.  Clusters  would  need  to  be  chosen  following 
consultation  and  on  the  basis  of  scientific  advice.  Ultimately  from  a  management 
perspective  such  clusters  would  be  much  less  optimal  than  one  or  two  new  mixed-
fisheries plans, which address species caught together. 

Amending  the  existing  plans  would,  however,  make  it  more  difficult  to  achieve  the 
objectives of implementing regionalisation and facilitating the introduction of the landing 
obligation.  This  is  because  integrated  approaches  to  the  implementation  of  the  landing 
obligation (introduced per fishery) or of technical measures to be introduced at a regional 
level  would  be  much  more  difficult  because  the  same  technical  measures  applying  to 
fishing different stocks would have to be introduced in separate delegated acts based on 
different  (multiple)  single-stock  plans  –  and  would  therefore  create  a  proliferation  of 
delegated acts. In a mixed fishery it would be unclear which of the species/stock-based 
plans  would  have  to  include  details  on  the  fisheries-based  phasing  in  of  the  landing 
obligation.  Additionally,  future  exemptions  from  the  landing  obligation  for  western 
waters would need to be distributed over many different plans instead of being contained 
within  one  document  as  is  the  case  for  the  current  2  discard  plans  covering  western 
waters,  with  one  discard  plan  covering  south-western  and  north-western  waters 
respectively.  

The  foreseen  outcome  would  create  a  complex  legal  framework,  with  complicated 
management challenges and an increased administrative burden in developing each plan 
and  implementing  and  updating  them  to  ensure  coherence  between  them.  The  risk  of 
unforeseen loopholes would also increase. The objective of simplifying legislation would 
clearly not be met (see North Sea IA section 5.1.2)37. 

36   These  are  fish  such  as  cod,  haddock,  whiting,  saithe,  hake,  etc.  Opposite  to  this  there  is  flatfish  sole,  plaice, 

megrim, etc.) 

37 Commission staff working document impact assessment accompanying the proposal for a regulation 
establishing a mixed fishery multiannual plan for demersal stocks and their fisheries in the North Sea, 
SWD (2016) 272 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
The  Public  Consultation  showed  that,  among  stakeholders,  there  has  been  strong 
criticism  of  the  complexity  of  the  existing  legislation,  so  any  further  complications 
arising  from  a  multiplicity  of  even  more  plans  will  be  further  criticised.  Additionally, 
stakeholders  fully  or  mostly  agreed  that  a  multiannual  plan  for  western  waters  should 
manage  the  fisheries  coherently,  by  taking  into  account  the  interactions  between  fish 
stocks (that these are mixed fisheries). There is thus general support by stakeholders that 
the existing plans should be replaced by a new holistic plan (see Annex 3).  

5.2. 

Retained policy options 

For the purposes of this impact assessment, three options have initially been considered: 

5.2.1. 

Option 1 Baseline scenario: 

Use  the  existing  relevant  rules  of  the  CFP.  This  should  be  considered  as  a  background 
against which the other options can be assessed. 

The main tools currently used to manage stocks are:  

o  Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and quota setting 

Each year, the TACs for western waters are decided by Council based on a Commission 
proposal.  For  some  fish  stocks  the  TAC  setting  is  governed  by  one  of  the  existing 
multiannual management plans, which have outdated objectives that are no longer in line 
with  the  new  CFP.  Decisions  are  made  on  a  stock-by  stock  basis  and  do  not  take  into 
account fisheries which are mixed. 

o  Discard plans to implement the landing obligation 

Member States propose specific measures to help implement the landing obligation under 
discard plans. Such measures are particularly useful to manage mixed fisheries, but the 
discard  plans  will  run  out  after  3  years  (i.e.  31  December  2021  for  demersal  fisheries) 
and cannot be renewed.  

o  Technical measures 

The recent Commission proposal for a new Regulation on technical measures38 simplifies 
existing rules, with a number of provisions common to all sea basins (the baseline) and 
further to this, provisions on regionalisation, with a view to set further specific measures 
in regionalisation. The following measures can, according to the proposal be adopted in 
regionalisation: species and size selectivity of fishing gears, closed or restricted areas to 
protect  juveniles  and  spawning  aggregations,  minimum  conservation  reference  sizes, 
real-time  closures  and  moving-on  provisions,  innovative  fishing  gears  and  nature 
conservation  measures.  This  proposal  is  likely  to  enter  the  trilogue  process  in  autumn 
2017. 

38 Proposal for a regulation on the conservation of fishery resources and the protection of marine 
ecosystems through technical measures, COM (2016) 134 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
These  regionally  adopted  technical  measures  should  contribute  to  achieving  the 
objectives  of  the  MAPs  for  the  different  regions  and  ensure  alignment  of  technical 
measures  with  other  conservation  measures  within  each  region.  To  allow  for  this 
synergy, regionally based MAPs need to be adopted. 

o  Existing single-species management plans 

The status quo or no policy change at EU level means to continue applying the existing 
outdated management plans in combination with all other existing rules of the new CFP. 
Under this option the objectives of the CFP would not be reached for all fisheries as the 
outdated plans have biomass safeguards only for sole in the Bay of Biscay (ICES has not 
evaluated this plan), while a biomass target is set for the recovery of Northern hake and 
southern hake. For southern Nephrops and Bay of Biscay sole no biomass target is set in 
the  plan.  For  cod  stocks  under  the  cod  plan  the  2016-amendment  deleted  the  biomass 
safeguards.  Thereby  no  biomass  safeguards  are  foreseen  in  legislation  for  most  target 
fisheries  in  western  waters.  Furthermore  they  lack  the  objective  to  achieve  maximum 
sustainable yields. Moreover this option does not enable Regionalisation in the western 
waters. This means it would not be possible to replace the discard plans after they have 
lapsed  and  the  landing  obligation  would  then  have  to  be  applied  in  cases  where  this  is 
disproportionate.  

Option  1  reflects  the  status  quo  which  does  not  effectively  address  the  problems  of 
overfishing  and  ineffective  governance  (see  sections  1.4  and  3).  The  problems  of  the 
status  quo  are  instead  precisely  what  the  initiative  intends  to  address.  Due  to  the 
contradictory  provisions  that  would  hence  remain  in  force,  this  option  clearly  does  not 
reach the specific objectives shown in figure 3. 

Additionally stakeholders are against this option. The public consultation for the western 
waters  multiannual  plans  showed  that,  among  stakeholders,  there  has  been  strong 
criticism  of  the  complexity  of  the  existing  legislation,  so  any  further  complications 
arising  from  a  multiplicity  of  plans  are  unlikely  to  be  welcomed.  Additionally, 
stakeholders  fully  or  mostly  agreed  that  a  multiannual  plan  for  western  waters  should 
manage  the  fisheries  coherently,  by  taking  into  account  the  interactions  between  fish 
stocks (that these are mixed fisheries). There is thus general support by stakeholders that 
the existing plans should be replaced by a new holistic plan (see Annex 3). Additionally 
the current plans have been criticised for not being flexible enough to address the issues 
that  have  evolved  during  their  implementation.  The  Member  States  directly  concerned 
have requested to replace these plans as soon as possible. There are high expectations by 
all stakeholders that these plans will be replaced. In addition there are expectations from 
the European Parliament to bring more fisheries under multiannual plans in the future. In 
2012 the European Parliament adopted a resolution which "calls on the Commission  to 
provide for the establishment of long term management plans for all EU fisheries". 39 

Options 2 and 3: Replace existing plans with one (option 2) or two mixed-fisheries 
multiannual plans (option 3) 
The  content  of  plans  and  their  structure  would  be  very  similar  and  the  following 
considerations are relevant for the structure of both options:  

39 European Parliament Resolution of 12 September 2012 on the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy – 

Overarching Communication (2011/2290(INI)) 

25 

 
 
 
                                                 
i) Which species should be included?  

The  demersal  species  in  western  waters  that  are  defined  as  targeted  fisheries  are 
alfonsinos,  anglerfish,  black  scabbardfish,  blue  ling,  cod,  haddock,  hake,  megrim, 
Norway lobster, plaice, pollack, red seabream, roundnose grenadier, saithe, seabass, sole 
and whiting. These account for 89 % of volume of catches of demersal species in western 
waters and have been assessed by scientists (and therefore conservation reference points 
are available for most). Furthermore, they are caught in mixed fisheries, with by-catch of 
other  species  and  to  date  high  levels  of  discarding.  Industry  stakeholders  during  the 
public consultation considered that the measures of a possible multiannual plan should be 
focused on species currently driving the main fisheries, such as cod, hake,  megrim and 
anglerfish.  They  did  not  suggest  including  data  poor  species  in  multiannual  plans,  but 
there should be a move to coherence between catch composition and quota.Taking into 
account that the landing obligation for demersal species will only come fully into force 
for all stocks in 2019 the current discard plans for demersal fisheries in western waters 
covering  2016-2017  cover,  for  north-western  waters  fisheries  catching  above  a  certain 
threshold of the following species: cod, haddock, hake, Norway lobster, pollack, saithe, 
sole,  whiting.  For  south-western  waters  the  discard  plan  covers  certain  gears  catching: 
anglerfish,  black  scabbardfish,  hake,  Norway  lobster,  place,  red  seabream  and  sole  – 
furthermore  for  several  of  these  demersal  species  specific  derogations  were  considered 
necessary to facilitate the implementation of the landing obligation.  

ii) Management of target stocks 

-  The  species  driving  the  fisheries  in  western  waters,  by  being  the  main  targeted 
species. are alfonsinos, anglerfish, black scabbardfish, blue ling, cod, haddock, hake, 
megrim, Norway lobster, plaice, pollack, red seabream, roundnose grenadier, saithe, 
seabass, sole and whiting. 

-  The fisheries for these species in western waters are mixed fisheries which means that 
the  same  fishers  and  vessels  will  inevitably  catch  a  mix  of  species  in  one  fishing 
operation,  also  including  by-catch  species  such  as  plaice,  ling  or  tusk.  It  therefore 
makes sense to manage these species together rather than under separate multiannual 
plans.  This  also  follows  STECF's  recommendation,  that  having  larger  MAPs  may 
“promote” more coherent regulations in terms of objectives and safeguards for each 
stock  and  avoid  over-regulating  the  sector40.  Furthermore  these  MAPs  need  to 
specifically  address  the  mixed  character  of  demersal  fisheries.  The  measures 
contained  in  these  plans  would  mean  that  management  of  each  species  would  take 
into account the state of the other species caught together.  

iii) The geographical scope  

Several demersal species in western waters occur in different parts as distinct stocks (i.e. 
populations).  There  are  e.g.  8  distinct  sole  stocks  considered  as  drivers  in  each  their 
fisheries in western waters. Few stocks in western waters are however only present in one 
seabasin.  Here  the  Irish  Sea  is  an  exception  with  several  stocks  (cod,  haddock,  plaice, 
sole and whiting) restricted to this seabasin. Many other stocks in both the north and the 
south  of  western  waters  cut  across  seabasins,  and  are  present  in  larger  areas. 

40 https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/43805/1023356/2015-07_STECF+15-08+-

+MAPs+SWW+and+NWW_JRCxxx.pdf  

26 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Furthermore, the fisheries on these stocks often happen in larger areas, and consequently 
the  TACs  are  most  often  set  for  a  larger  area  in  order  to  cover  all  catches  of  a  certain 
stock. As an example the cod stocks in western waters are the most localised stocks often 
only  being considered belonging  to  one  seabasin,  while  there  are  only  two  hake  stocks 
spread over rather large areas, namely the whole Iberian Atlantic area for southern hake 
and the area stretching from the Atlantic to the North Sea for northern hake.   

The EU multiannual plan would cover all EU vessels fishing in EU waters, and beyond 
EU waters, where stocks extend into international waters, hence the full coverage would 
be ensured in terms of the EU fishing sector  

iv) Deadline for achieving sustainable fishing levels 

Article 2(2) of the Basic Regulation provides for a binding obligation to reach sustainable 
fishing levels but leaves some flexibility regarding the timeframe for reaching this target 
(by  2015  where  possible  and  […] at  the  latest  by  2020).  The  multiannual  plans  should 
specify this deadline of 2020 for the western waters fisheries.  

v)  Conservation  reference  points  including  the  range  of  sustainable  fishing 
mortality 

On the basis of Article 10 of the Basic Regulation, the multiannual plan would contain 
the following reference points for the target fisheries: 

  A  range  of  target  fishing  mortality  which  is  considered  compatible  with  sustainable 

fishing (FMSY range).  

  Safeguard values in terms of fish biomass which serve as triggers for management action: 
when the stocks concerned fall below these pre-defined sizes, safeguard measures should 
be adopted. 

 

the by-catch species would be managed following the precautionary approach; 

As the multiannual plan should be based on the best available science, the conservation 
reference  points  would  be  based  on  the  latest  scientific  advice.  At  the  time  of  drafting 
this  impact  assessment  the  latest  scientific  advice  from  ICES  with  MSYranges,  the 
independant  scientific  advisory  body  for  fisheries,  was  of  July  201641  and  these  values 
were used to model the impacts under Option 2 (Annex 2).  

vi) Management measures to ensure the targets are reached 

As demonstrated by the scientific advice (Annex 5), current fishing mortality and hence 
catch levels will need to be adapted to reach sustainable levels by 2020 at the latest. EU 
fish stocks are managed using catch-limits, whereby a total allowable catch (TAC - for 
the whole stock) and national quotas (per Member State) are fixed annually or biennially 
(see  Annex  5).  The  use  of  TACs  and  quota  in  the  Baltic  Sea,  the  North  Sea  and  the 
Atlantic is thought to have contributed to the overall improvement in stock status, with 
an increasing number of stocks being fished sustainably in recent years42. 

41http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2016/Special_Requests/EU_FMSY_ranges

_for_selected_Western_Waters_Stocks.pdf   

42   Between 2009 and 2017, the number of TACs fished sustainably (in line with MSY) increased from 5 

to 44.   

   COM (2015) 239 final - Communication from the Commission to the European parliament and the 

Council. Consultation on the fishing opportunities for 2016 under the Common Fisheries Policy, p. 4   

27 

 
 
 
                                                 
For these reasons, the multiannual plan would include MSYranges  to determine TACs 
and quotas as the management approach in order to further increase the number of stocks 
fished sustainably. In practice, the plan would, where available, set the range of fishing 
mortality  for  alfonsinos,  anglerfish,  black  scabbardfish,  blue  ling,  cod,  haddock,  hake, 
megrim,  Norway  lobster,  plaice,  pollack,  red  seabream,  roundnose  grenadier,  saithe, 
seabass, sole and whiting (at stock-level) that needs to be respected to ensure sustainable 
fishing  levels  are reached  by  2020.  Each  year the  Commission  would  adopt  a  proposal 
for TAC and quotas compatible with these target fishing mortality ranges, based on the 
most recent scientific advice. The Council should then adopt annual TAC and quotas in 
line with these fishing mortality ranges. For deep sea species the Council would adopt bi-
annual TACs and quotas in  line with the ranges.  Where ranges  of fishing mortality are 
not  yet  available  ICES  will  be  asked  to  deliver  these  and  in  the  meantime  the  species 
would be managed by the ICES precautionary approach. 

TACs  and  quotas  managed  by  MSYranges  should  provide  the  necessary  flexibility 
needed for mixed fisheries. Furthermore Member States can foresee additional measures 
at national level to adapt the quota share system to the likely catch mixture of the fleets 
or at regional level to recommend closing areas/periods to fishing etc.   

The  mechanism  to  achieve  sustainable  fishing  levels  would  therefore  be  set  in  the 
multiannual  plan  (F-ranges/precautionary  biomass  levels  as  the  basis  for  TAC  and 
quotas)  but  the  exact  management  tools  to  deliver  on  this  would  be  left  to  Member 
States,  through  regionalisation.  This  is  in  line  with  the  request  of  stakeholders  in  the 
public consultation to let the multiannual plan focus on the orientation and determination 
of  the  objectives,  while  the  micro  management  is  decided  in  a  more  flexible  way 
(regionalisation).   

vii) Choice of how to introduce measures regarding the landing obligation  

As described in Annex 2, the Basic Regulation allows the adoption of so-called "discard 
plans"  through  Regionalisation  to  adopt  exemptions  from  the  landing  obligation  for  no 
more  than  three  years.  After  the  expiry  of  these  discard  plans,  exemptions  will  still  be 
needed,  in  order  to  allow  for  the  discarding  of  species  that  survive  discarding  (i.e.  it 
makes more sense for them to be thrown back in the sea if they will survive as they can 
reproduce and increase the biomass) and to allow for exemptions in situations where the 
landing obligation would put a disproportionate burden on the industry (e.g. in terms of 
the cost of implementing the landing obligation). The Basic Regulation itself foresees in 
Article 15(5) that such exemptions should be adopted as parts of a multiannual plan and 
could be done on the basis of Regionalisation.  

When drafting a multiannual plan, the Commission will have to decide which elements 
of the future exemptions from the Basic Regulation will be included in the multiannual 
plan itself and which elements will be adopted as a part of a delegated act to be adopted 
on  the  basis  of  joint  recommendations  by  Member  States.  The  approach  for  this  will 
follow the future political compromise on the North Sea plan. The discard plans covering 
the  demersal  fisheries 
in  north-  and  south-western  waters  respectively  were 
supplemented for 2017, through joint recommendations from the regional groups, and are 
supplemented further for 2018, with new fisheries coming under the landing obligation. 
This includes additional exemptions on the basis of new scientific research for example 
on survivability of species after discarding. In line with the current system, respondents 
during the public consultation expressed a preference for not fixing the specific measures 

28 

 
 
 
in  the  multiannual  plan  but  leaving  this  to  be  decided  through  regionalisation.  The 
adaptive, flexible approach of regionalisation would therefore be the preferred option for 
this  element  of  the  plan  rather  than  having  to  amend  the  multiannual  plan  through  the 
ordinary legislative proposal for such non-essential supplements or amendments.  

The  choice  of  how  to  introduce  provisions  to  implement  the  landing  obligation  is  not 
considered  to  affect  the  possible  environmental,  social  or  economic  impacts  of  an  EU 
multiannual plan or the effectiveness in achieving the objectives.  

In  conclusion  the  WW  MAP,  to  be  adopted  under  the  Ordinary  Legislative  Procedure, 
would  thereby  translate  the  provisions  of  the  Basic  Regulation  relating  to  the  MSY 
objectives,  regionalisation  and  the  landing  obligation  into  a  specific  geographically 
targeted framework, taking into account the most up–to–date scientific information about 
demersal  fisheries  in  that  area.  This  will  include  allowing  certain  technical  parametres 
(e.g.  closed  areas,  gear  specifications,  exemtions  from  the  landing  obligation)  to  be 
updated  through  regionalisation,  in  order  to  ensure  updated  and  fit-for-purpose 
management tools.  

Summary for options 2 and 3: 

Option 2: One mixed-fisheries multiannual plan covering western waters 

Following the outline above this option would imply one plan covering all of the western 
waters. This option would take into account that many of the same Member States and 
the same fleets fish in both north- and south-western waters.  

Furthermore  one  plan  would  also  allow  presenting  joint  recommendations  covering 
specific fisheries in either the north-western waters or south-western waters respectively. 
Further to this there is a significant overlap in the Member States represented in both the 
north- and the south-western waters groups.  

Option  3:  Two  mixed-fisheries  multiannual  plans  covering  north-western  waters 
and south-western waters 

Following  the  ouline  above  this  option  would  imply  two  plans,  covering  north-western 
waters and south-western waters respectively. The difference between this and option 2) 
would be that this option would emphasise the current set-up for regionalisation, as these 
two  areas  are  covered  by  the  Advisory  Council  for  the  north-western  waters  and  the 
Advisory  Council  for  the  south-western  waters  separatly.  These  are  also  the  areas 
covering  the  north-western  waters  Member  State  Group  and  the  south  western  waters 
Member State Group, which produce joint recommendations for the discard plans. Two 
plans could thereby work as a natural continuation of the work done through the discard 
plan recommendations within the regional Member State Groups.  

The  differences  between  options  2)  and  3)  are  thereby  mainly  associated  to  issues  of 
consistency, involvement of stakeholders and administrative burden. 

5.3. 

Perceptions of the options by consulted stakeholders 

This  question  was  only  addressed  in  the  targeted  consultation.  In  total  there  were  28 
replies  from  a  mix  of  environmental  non-governmental  organisations  (NGOs), 

29 

 
 
 
 
 
 
professional organisations (POs) and one from a Member State authority (UK), details of 
which can be found in Annex 3. The Member State who replied (UK) and the majority of 
other respondents either "Fully" or "Mostly" agreed that MAPs (Options 2 and 3) would 
be  the  most  effective  options.  All  agreed  on  the  need  for  the  EU  to  take  action.  For 
further details please refer to Annex 3. 

6. 

WHAT  ARE  THE  IMPACTS  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  POLICY  OPTIONS  AND  WHO 
WILL BE AFFECTED? 

6.1. 

Approach to the impact analysis 

Annex 1 describes the procedural steps followed for this Impact Assessment Report. This 
impact assessment is a revised version of the report examined by the Regulatory Scrutiny 
Board  (RSB)43  on  12  February  2016.  The  RSB  suggestions  for  improvements  at  that 
occasion,  together  with  a  summary  description  of  how  they  have  been  addressed,  are 
described in Annex 1. 

DG  MARE  asked  STECF  to  provide  a  technical  and  scientific  analysis  of  the  options 
considered,  which  is  provided  in  Annex  5.  STECF  provided  expert  judgement  on  the 
advantages and disadvantages of setting alternative geographic coverage of MAPs and 
ran forecast models to describe the likely situation of the fisheries on 1 January of 2017, 
2021  and  2025  -  using  given  environmental,  economic  and  social  indicators  for  the 
different options. On the basis of this study, the following indicators have been used: 

1. Socio-economic impacts: 

Catches,  revenues  from  catches,  costs,  Total  Allowable  Catches  (TACs)  or  quota  and 
their  inter-annual  variability,  quota  usage,  fleet  dependency  and  employment  were  all 
considered  to  have  both  social  and  economic  dimensions  and  have  been  considered 
together  in  one  section.  Higher  revenues,  sustainable  catches,  stable  and  predictable 
TACs  or  quotas  and  lower  fleet  dependency,  with  stable  or  increased  employment  are 
considered to be beneficial and desirable during analysis of the options as they provide 
more  certainty  of  financial  income  and  stability  of  employment  for  the  fishing 
community. 

2. Environmental impacts: 

FMSY  ranges,  fishing  mortality,  fishing  effort,  stock  size/biomass,  risk  to  biomass  were 
used  to  consider  the  environmental  and  conservation  elements  of  the  different  options. 
Sustainable or reduced fishing mortality and effort leading to an increased stock size and 
biomass, in line with Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) objectives were considered a 
positives. This is especially the case when comparing sustained use of different points of 
the FMSY ranges and boundaries. In scenarios where sustained use of an upper boundary 
led to increased fishing mortality and reductions in the fisheries’  population, especially 
the  spawning  stock  biomass,  such  scenarios  were  considered  as  not  beneficial  or 

43   The  Regulatory  Scrutiny  Board  is  a  Commission  body  which  provides  a  central  quality  control  and  support 
function for Commission impact assessment and evaluation work. It was set up on 1 July 2015 and replaced the 
Impact  Assessment  Board.  The  Board  examines  and  issues  opinions  on  all  the  Commission's  draft  impact 
assessments and of major evaluations and "fitness checks" of existing legislation. 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
desirable  in  the  subsequent  analysis.  These  scenarios  may  result  in  a  deviation  from 
sustainability objectives such as MSY and even risk possible overfishing. 

3. Administrative Burden: 

The  complexity  and  coherence  of  management  frameworks  and  corresponding 
administrative  costs  and  burden  are  also  considered  for  each  of  the  options.  Where  an 
option is considered more complex, it has been considered more expensive, less coherent 
and more cumbersome to administer and therefore has been considered more negatively 
in the subsequent analysis and comparison of the options. 

6.2. 

Option 1: Baseline (Status quo) 

The environmental and socio-economic impacts of this option are presented in section 2. 
However the main impacts of continuing the status quo are summarised as follows: 

6.2.1. 

Environmental impacts 

Although  considerable  progress  has  been  made  in  achieving  sustainable  stocks,  some 
stocks remain in a bad state with low recruitment and low stock size and biomass. The 
status quo risks objectives of the CFP not being achieved, such as not reaching MSY, 
not  having  all  stocks  in  safe  biological  limits  and  not  taking  into  account  the  mixed 
fisheries aspects of fishing effort. Fishing mortality is still considerably high on several 
fish stocks in the western waters and is the principle source of mortality for several key 
fish species in the regions.  

6.2.2. 

Socio-economic impacts 

A  lack  of  "ownership"  and  connection  to  the  management  of  fisheries  by  stakeholders, 
could  threaten  the  viability  and  profitability  of  the  sector  due  to  overfishing  and 
ineffective  governance.  Inter-annual  TAC  variations  do  not  make  for  stable  and 
predictable  yields,  which  complicates  the  business  management  of  fishing  fleets  and 
their  dependant  enterprises  and  communities.  In  the  western  waters  region,  STECF 
identified a high fleet dependency, ranging from 15 to 60% on fleet segments in north-
western waters and 20 to 51% in south-western waters for a range of species from cod, 
whiting, haddock, hake and nephrops to plaice, sole, megrims and anglerfish. 

6.2.3. 

Administrative costs 

The  current  system  is  complex  with  a  mix  of  inter-annual  TAC,  quota  and  vessel 
catch  limits  and  single  species  plans.  Further,  these  do  not  take  into  account  mixed 
fisheries aspects, complicating the adoption of the landing obligation and the objective 
to minimise discards. There are also differences in geographical applications of fisheries 
management  measures  that  do  not  reflect  stock  and  fishing  fleet  locations,  causing 
ineffective implementation of regionalisation and in some cases a  lack of coherence in 
the  application  of  fisheries  management  and  regulations.  The  departure  of  the  United 
Kingdom  from  the  EUwill  add  a  layer  of  international  negotiations  to  this  system,  and 
will thus further complicate the system and increase administrative costs. 

31 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3. 

Option 2: one mixed fisheries multiannual plan for western waters  

STECF modelled the condition of key stocks in both the western waters up to the year 
2021. The models compared two scenarios under the establishment of a multiannual plan 
versus the baseline (status quo): The first assumes the systematic choice of lowest end of 
the  MSY  ranges  (FMSYlow)  under  the  plan;  the  second  is  the  opposite,  modelling  the 
systematic choice of the higher or upper end of the MSY range (FMSYupp). Further details 
are available in Annex 5. 

6.3.1. 

Environmental impacts 

Upper boundary of FMSY range: 

Fishing  Mortality  would  be  about  25%  higher.  spawning  stock  biomass  would  be 
around 10% lower for cod and haddock, around 5% lower for plaice, sole and whiting in 
the north-western waters, 20% lower for hake and megrim in the Bay of Biscay and up to 
10% lower for stocks in the Iberian Peninsula. For Iberian stocks of horse mackerel the 
model  results  show  the  probability  of  this  stock  falling  below  Blim  is  double  that  than 
under the baseline scenario. 

Lower boundary of FMSY range: 

Fishing  Mortality  would  be  about  25%  lower.  spawning  stock  biomass  would  be 
around 10% higher for cod and haddock, around 5% higher for plaice, sole and whiting 
in the north-western waters, 20% higher for hake and megrim in the Bay of Biscay and 
around 5-15% higher for all stocks in the Iberian Peninsula. For Iberian stocks of horse 
mackerel  the  model  results  show  the  probability  of  this  stock  falling  below  Blim  is  less 
risky, at around 75% less than the baseline scenario. 

In Summary: Environmental impacts can be most positive if the lower boundary of FMSY 
range  is  consistently  applied.  A  systematic  application  of  upper  boundary  values  when 
considering  TAC  and  quotas  would  have  negative  consequences  including  increased 
fishing mortality and lower spawning stock biomass. 

6.3.2. 

Socio-economic impacts 

Upper boundary of FMSY range: 

In  north-western  waters  TACs  and  Catches  would  be  around  20%  higher  by  2021. 
Inter-annual  variability  of  catches  would  be  around  20%  lower  (much  lower  for 
nephrops and Whiting in north-western waters), with quota consumption increasing for 
anglerfish (+20%) but decreasing for whiting (-20%) in north-western waters. In north-
western waters, there would generally be 30% larger catches except for Spanish and Irish 
fleets  of  demersal  trawls  and  seines  over  10m.  However,  these  increased  catches  also 
have increased costs of around 20%, again except for Irish and Spanish Trawlers.  

In the Bay of Biscay catches of hake and megrim would again be lower, with a similar 
decrease  in  TAC  for  hake,  but  megrim  TAC  remaining  the  same  as  baseline  scenario. 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Quota uptake would also remain mostly the same. Inter-annual variability would increase 
slightly, but far less than the lower boundary scenario, with the exception of sole, where 
variability  would  decrease  more  than  25%.  Higher  effort  is  associated  with  higher 
variable costs, but also revenues are higher under this scenario, depicting an increase in 
catch per unit effort in the Bay of Biscay. 

For the Iberian Peninsula, models depict TACs and catch to be up to 30% higher than in 
the  lower  boundary  scenario.  By  2021  all  indicators,  except  fixed  costs  and  number  of 
vessels  are  modelled  as  showing  similar  trends  with  30-40%  increases  compared  to 
baseline. 

Lower boundary of FMSY range: 

In  north-western  waters  TACs  and  Catches  would  be  around  20%  lower  by  2021. 
Inter-annual  variability  of  catches  would  be  around  10-50%  higher  (notably  for 
nephrops  and  Whiting  in  north-western  waters),  with  quota  consumption  being 
generally  lower  (especially  for  anglerfish  and  nephrops  in  north-western  waters,  but 
slightly higher for cod). Generally fleets in the north-western waters would have reduced 
effort, costs and catches, apart from Irish drift netters who would have a slight increase 
in catches. 

In  the  Bay  of  Biscay  catches  of  hake  and  megrim  would  be  around  5%  lower,  with  a 
similar decrease in TAC for hake, but megrim TAC modelled to increase by more than 
15%.  Quota  uptake  is  around  20%  lower.  Inter-annual  variability  would  also  be  much 
higher.  

For  the  Iberian  Peninsula  inter-annual  variability  is  higher  across  all  stocks  than  in  the 
upper  boundary  scenario,  compared  to  baseline.  For  Spanish  netters,  long-liners,  hand-
liners  and  trawlers,  revenue  differences  to  baseline  are  minimal.  For  Portuguese  fleets, 
models show 20-25% lower revenues. 

In  Summary:  Socio-economic  impacts  again  differ,  depending  upon  setting  TACs  and 
quotas  consistently  in  line  with  the  upper  or  lower  boundaries  of  FMSY  ranges.  Whilst 
choosing the upper boundary can lead to some short-term increases in quota and catches 
in some stocks, the STECF analysis suggests there can also be increases in costs. 

6.3.3. 

Administrative costs 

A single plan containing a single management framework for stocks and mixed fisheries 
over a longer period of time, would represent a considerable simplification upon the 
current baseline approach (option 1). The current baseline has a mix of inter-annual 
TAC and quota variations and several plans for several different areas and species. A 
single plan could still have built-in options for regionalisation and adaption to changes in 
fisheries, management and scientific advice. Coherence and compliance should be 
simpler than the current status quo and thus reduce the administrative burden. 

6.4. 

Option  3:  Two  mixed  fisheries  multiannual  plans  (south-western  waters 
and north-western waters) 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4.1. 

Environmental impacts 

The impacts of establishing multiannual plans versus  the baseline scenario of option 1, 
remain the same as option 2. STECF were also asked to assess the number and scope of 
multiannual  plans.  They  concluded  that  "provided  the  objectives  were  followed  and 
biomass safeguards applied", the number and scope of plans was largely a regulatory and 
policy  issue.  However  artificial  and  arbitrary  boundaries  that  do  not  reflect  stock 
distribution can cause inconsistencies in fisheries management and fishing fleet activity. 
This can, in turn, have a negative impact upon both stocks and the environment. Such a 
scenario  would  not  improve  upon  the  current  baseline  (option  1)  and  could  lead  to 
displaced  fishing  effort  that  may  have  a  disproportionate  effect  on  stock  structure  and 
recruitment. 

6.4.2. 

Socio-economic impacts 

Similarly  the  impacts  of  establishing  multiannual  plans  versus  the  baseline  scenario  of 
option 1, remain the same as option 2, except for the increased risks from having two 
separate  management  regions.  Again  this  could  lead  to  differences  in  regulations,  a 
lack of coherence and displaced fishing effort, with artificial or arbitrary lines that may 
not  reflect  fishing  fleets  activity  or  stock  distribution.  This  in-turn  may  limit  inter-area 
flexibility  for  usage  of  quota  allocations.  Complications  in  fisheries  management  may 
also limit quota uptake.  

6.4.3. 

Administrative costs 

The  establishment  of  two  multiannual  plans  would  be  less  complicated  than  the  status 
quo, baseline approach of option, but not as simple as a single framework approach. 
Different  regulatory  regimes  could  complicate  control,  compliance  and  cohesion  and 
require increased administrative effort to cover the two separate regimes. Fleets moving 
between regions and member states who administer national fleets operating in the two 
separate  regions  may  find  they  have  duplication  in  administrative  effort  and  expense. 
Adaptation of two different management plans may also be complicated and lengthier. 

7. 

7.1. 

HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? 

Assessment of environmental, economic, social and other impacts  

Table 7 provides a comparison of the options in terms of environmental, socio-economic 
and  administrative  impacts  of  new  mixed  fisheries  multiannual  plans  compared  to  the 
baseline. 

Table 7 shows that multiannual plans (Options 2 and 3) in general have far more positive 
environmental,  socio-economic  and  administrative  effects  than  the  baseline  (Option  1). 
However the STECF's assessment did highlight that multiannual plans using FMSY ranges 
could  potentially  have  negative  environmental  and  socio-economic  effects  versus  the 
baseline, depending on the systemic choice of upper or lower boundaries of FMSY ranges. 
The  division  of  the  western  waters  area  into  two  different  multiannual  plans  for  two 
different regions (Option 3) could lead to artificial and arbitrary boundaries that may not 
reflect  stock  distribution  and  may  lead  to  differences  in  management  regimes  and 
regulation  and  trans-boundary  "straddling  stock"  issues  compared  to  the  improved 

34 

 
 
 
cohesion of a wider, single multiannual plan for the western waters (Option 2). This, in 
turn,  could  lead  to  displaced  fishing  effort  that  may  have  a  disproportionate  effect  on 
stock  structure  and  recruitment  and  limit  quota  flexibility  and  uptake,  along  with 
complicated  administration  of  differing  fleets  and  management  regions.  For  these 
reasons, Option 3 has less positive effects than Option 2. 

Table 7. Comparison of options in terms of their environmental, socio-economic and 
administrative impacts. 

Option 1: Baseline 

Option 2: One 
MAP for all 
western waters 

Option 3: Two 
MAPs (north- and 
south-) western 
waters 

Environmental effects 

Socio-economic effects 

Administrative effects 

0 

0 

0 

+/-* 

+/-* 

++ 

+/-* 

+/-* 

+ 

Key: 0= neutral impact, +=positive impact, ++ = very positive impact (relative to other options), -= 
negative impact, +/- positive and negative impacts 

*N.B. The STECF analysis demonstrates that the results are dependent on the choice of the lower (FMSYlow) 
or the upper (FMSYupp) boundary of the ranges of FMSY. Please see Section 6 for more detail for comparison 
of use of upper or lower boundaries of FMSY range in each option 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2. 

Assessment against the objectives  

The section below, including  Table 8,  provides a  qualitative comparison  of each of the 
options against the objectives identified in Section 4. 

Main objective:   
Whilst both Option 2 and 3 are an improvement over the baseline (Option 1) in achieving 
the objectives of the CFP, the improved cohesion of having one plan (Option 2), versus 
several plans (Option 3) is considered an asset. The administrative, socio-economic and 
environmental benefits of not having fleets and stocks split over two arbitrarily defined 
areas are considered  more positive under  Option 2 and  should  facilitate meeting the 
objectives of the CFP. 

Specific objectives:  
The  baseline,  status  quo  of  Option  1  would  continue  with  the  existing  framework  and 
risks not meeting the majority of the objectives, as described in section 2. Options 2 and 
3 allow for one or two mixed fishery multiannual plans that would be an improvement on 
Option  1,  providing  a  transparent  framework  for  achieving  MSY  whilst  taking  into 
account  the  complexity  of  mixed  fisheries,  something  that  current  single  species  plans 
under Option 1, would not be able to achieve. Options 2 and 3 would therefore improve 
the  outlook  for  placing  all  stocks  in  safe  biological  limits  compared  to  the  baseline  of 
Option  1.  However  the  increased  administrative  burden  of  having  two  separate  plans 
(Option  3)  could  complicate  management  measures,  such  as  the  implementation  of  the 
Landing Obligation. Also, under Option 3, Regionalisation may be more complex than 
Option 2 and there is a risk that the units of regional management would not be defined 
by  fish  stocks  or  fleet  location.  This  could  lead  to  a  more  complicated  administration, 
control and inspection regime than one plan under Option 2 which would provide a more 
stable  and  predictable  management  framework.  However  both  options  are  an 
improvement over the status quo of Option 1. 

36 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Comparison of options against main and specific objectives. 

Option 1: 
Baseline 

Option 2: 
One MAP 
for all 
western 
waters 

Option 3: 
Two MAPs 
(north- and 
south-) 
western 
waters 

Main 
objective 

Specific 
objectives 

To contribute to the achievement of the 
broad objectives of the reformed CFP, in 
particular the long term sustainability of the 
stocks, expressed in terms of MSY, and the 
implementation of an ecosystem-based 
approach to fisheries management. 
To provide a transparent framework to 
achieve Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) 
by 2020 at the latest. 
To ensure that the relevant stocks are 
maintained within safe biological limits and 
those stocks outside of biological limits are 
brought within those limits as rapidly as 
possible. 
To ensure that the fishing opportunities on 
each of the stocks are set taking into account 
the nature of the mixed fisheries. 
To provide a management framework 
facilitating stability and predictability in 
the fixing and allocation of fishing 
opportunities. 
To facilitate the consolidation of the rules on 
the landing obligations introduced in the 
reformed CFP and establish the framework 
that is necessary for the implementation of 
regionalisation. 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

+ 

+ 

+ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

++ 

+ 

+ 

Key: 0= neutral impact, +=positive impact, ++ = very positive impact (relative to other options), -= 
negative impact, +/- positive and negative impacts 

37 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.3. 

Effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptability 

Effectiveness 
Option 2 is more effective than Option 1 (the CFP objectives are unlikely to be met under 
Option 1) and considered more effective than having 2 separate plans (Option 3) 

The  analysis  can  be  complemented  by  examining  the  effectiveness  of  the  options  in 
achieving  other  desirable  objectives  not  explicitly  mentioned  in  the  CFP.  For  example, 
the objective to simplify legislation, where Option 2 is clearly more advantageous than 
Option  1  since  it  replaces  all  former  MAPs  by  1  regulation,  and  an  improvement  on 
Option  3,  which  would  still  require  2  regulations.  Options  2  and  3  also  outperform 
Option 1 in that they bring legislation closer to the stakeholders through regionalisation. 
However  splitting the  management  framework  over  two  separate  areas would  still be  a 
complication (Option 3) and would be less effective than one multiannual plan (Option 
2). Overall Option 2 scores highest in effectiveness, as shown in Table 9. 

Efficiency 
Option  1  is  inefficient,  with  poor  results  and  high  administrative  burden,  especially  in 
monitoring and implementing year after year the complicated effort regimes associated to 
some  of  existing  MAPs.  There  is  a  lack  of  predictability  for  the  industry  because  of 
uncertainty in the annual TAC negotiations, which impacts negatively on efficiency. 

Options  2  and  3  are  clearly  more  efficient  especially  when  considering  administrative 
burden  and  burden  for  the  industry.  One  management  framework  would  be  the  most 
efficient, avoiding any trans-boundary complications. Therefore, Option 2 scores highest 
in efficiency (Table 9) 

Coherence 
Option 1 will lead to contradictions with the reformed CFP, especially because some of 
the  existing  MAPs  are  not  in  line  with  the  new  objectives,  and  some  use  biological 
reference points that are outdated. Neither is it coherent with the objective of simplifying 
legislation  and  it  creates  an  enormous  administrative  burden.  Options  2  and  3  are  both 
coherent with the current policy, legislation and practices equally and are given an equal 
score (Table 9). 

Acceptability 
The replies to the Public Consultation, although not expressly addressing the issue in 
detail, show that Option 1 has little or no support and that new mixed fisheries 
multiannual plans (Options 2 and 3), replacing the existing ones, are an acceptable way 
forward. There was no specific detail in the responses from stakeholders regarding one 
versus several MAPs, so they have been scored equally positive in comparison to the 
baseline of Option 1 (Table 9). 

38 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Comparison of the options in terms of effectiveness, efficiency coherence and 
acceptability in achieving the objectives. 

Option 1: Baseline 

Option 2: One 
MAP for all 
western waters 

Option 3: Two 
MAPs (north- and 
south-) western 
waters 

0 

0 

0 

0 

++ 

++ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

+ 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

Acceptability 

Key: 0= neutral impact, +=positive impact, ++ = very positive impact (relative to other options), -= 
negative impact, +/- positive and negative impacts 

7.4. 

The preferred option 

From the analysis above and from other practical, legal and political considerations, it is 
clear that, in order to better achieve the objectives defined to tackle the main and specific 
problems, it is justified to propose one mixed fisheries multiannual plan (Option 2) that 
would cover all demersal fish stocks, give clear rules for the stocks driving the fisheries 
and  set  procedures  to  bring  all  associated  stocks  within  sustainability  boundaries.  This 
would  address  environmental  objectives  and  implement  the  landing  obligation. 
Importantly it would put in place the legal framework for stakeholders to design concrete 
measures  to  achieve  sustainable  fisheries  together  with  the  regional  groups  of  Member 
States concerned via regionalisation. 

Whilst  Options  2  and  3  both  score  higher  than  the  baseline  Option  1,  the  preceding 
analyses  (see  Tables  4,5  and  6)  demonstrate  that  Option  2:  one    mixed  fisheries 
multiannual plan for all western waters scores best on the following criteria: 

  Effectiveness and Efficiency  
  Reducing administrative burden 
  Achieving the overall main objectives of the CFP 
  Provides a management framework facilitating stability and predictability 

8. 

HOW WOULD ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? 

This question was addressed in the targeted consultation, which asked which indicators 
should  be  used  to  measure  the  performance  of  MAPs.  One  Member  State  suggested  to 
measure  progress i) towards  good  environmental  status  (GES)  as  defined  in  the  MSFD 
and ii) towards good socio-economic status of the fishing sector. The other Member State 
suggested i) number of stocks at MSY, ii) economic indicators, iii) trajectories towards 
BMSY, iv) progress in discard ban implementation, v) stock trajectories in relation to safe 
biological  limits  for  species  not  directly  covered  by  the  MAP  and  vi)  degree  of 
satisfaction of the fishing industry.  

39 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under  the  CFP,  annual  monitoring  reports  are  required  on  progress  towards  the  MSY 
target, and progress on the implementation of the landing obligation.  

The Basic Regulation also anticipates that MAPs may be subject to periodic monitoring 
and assessment of progress in achieving the objectives of the plan (See Box 4 in Annex 
2,  Article  10(2b)).  Apart  from  such  specific  monitoring  of  the  objectives  of  the  plan, 
monitoring of the impacts happens through existing monitoring of fisheries: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

Catches from fish stocks are monitored by the Commission on a monthly basis in 
the context of the TAC system. Member States collect catch data at a much finer 
scale, by vessel and by day, as part of their quota management; 
Detailed  data  on  catch  (size  and  age  of  the  fish  caught)  are  also  collected  by 
scientific  bodies  in  order  to  provide  input  into  stock  assessments.  Data  on  the 
fleets is also collected regularly, allowing estimates of number of vessels by fleet 
segment,  their  fishing  capacity  and  fishing  effort,  as  well  as  economic  data 
allowing  an  assessment  of  their  economic  performance.  All  this  is  done  in  the 
context of the Data Collection Framework44; 
STECF  conducts  every  year  an  assessment  of  the  performance  of  the  fleets 
through an Annual Economic Report; 
The  effects  of  management  measures  are  also  reflected  in  ICES  annual  stock 
assessments. Every year, ICES assesses the status of fish stocks against MSY and 
other benchmarks related to sustainability. Historical values for fishing mortality 
and  spawning  stock  biomass  (SSB)  are  estimated  and  catch  projections  are 
conducted showing how different catch levels in the coming year would affect F 
and SSB relative to chosen benchmarks (FMSY, MSY Btrigger, Bpa, etc.). ICES also 
evaluates the effects of fishing on the wider marine ecosystem, including impact 
on habitats, sensitive species and food webs; 
The  markets  are  also  a  valuable  source  of  information.  The  EU  Market 
Observatory for Fisheries and Aquaculture products (EUMOFA45) enables direct 
monitoring  of  the  volume,  value  and  price  of  fishery  and  aquaculture  products, 
from the first sale to retail stage, including imports and exports; 
Progress  toward  MSFD  GES  is  already  an  obligation  for  Member  States  under 
that  Directive  and  both  ICES  and  Regional  Seas  Conventions  (OSPAR  in  the 
present case) collaborate in this work. 

One Member State suggested monitoring the satisfaction of the fishing industry, and this 
could  be  dealt  with  by  occasional  or  recurrent  opinion  polls  which  may  be  ad  hoc  or 
included in other wider polls. 

Specific monitoring of the performance of plans could  happen through reporting on the 
indicators below, related to the specific objectives. Data for all of these is already being 
collected, so monitoring would imply a limited extra effort by Commission services. 

44 Regulation (EU) 2017/1004 on the establishment of a Union framework for the collection, management and use of     
data in the fisheries sector and support for scientific advice regarding the common fisheries policy and repealing 
Council Regulation (EC) No 199/2008 (recast) 

45 http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/market/market_observatory/index_en.htm. EUMOFA enables direct monitoring 
of the volume, value and price of fishery and aquaculture products, from the first sale to retail stage, 
including imports and exports. 

40 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Table 10. Objectives, indicators and targets 

Objectives 

To provide a transparent 
framework to achieve 
sustainable fisheries (MSY) by 
2020 at the latest 

To ensure that the relevant 
stocks are maintained within safe 
biological limits and those stocks 
outside of biological limits are 
brought within those limits as 
rapidly as possible 

To ensure that the fishing 
opportunities on each of the 
stocks are set taking into account 
the nature of the mixed fisheries 

To provide a management 
framework facilitating stability 
and predictability in the fixing of 
fishing opportunities 

To implement the accompanying 
measures for the landing 
obligations currently contained 
in the discard plans introduced in 
the reformed CFP 

To establish the framework that 
is necessary for regionalisation 

Monitoring indicators (and 
frequency) 

Possible targets 

Number of target stocks covered 
by plans that are fished at FMSY 

All stocks managed at 
MSY by 2020 

Number of stocks 
covered by plan that are within 
safe biological limits 

All stocks within safe 
biological limits by 2020 

Assessment of number of TACs 
where the upper part of the range 
of FMSY was used to take into 
account mixed-fisheries 
considerations 

Target depends on 
conditions in MAP – 
upper part of the range of 
FMSY should only be used 
under those conditions. 

Assessment of number of TACs 
that are set in line with plan 

All TACs set in line with 
the rules included in the 
MAP 

Number of stocks covered by 
plan which are entirely covered 
by the landing obligation 

All fisheries covered by 
regionally agreed discard 
plan 

n/a 

Number of joint 
recommendations received from 
regional Member State groups 
with input from stakeholders, and 
number of management measures 
included in resulting delegated 
acts  

In  addition,  the  socio-economic  impacts  of  the  plan  should  be  monitored.  Since  2010, 
STECF carries out an annual assessment of the economic performance of the EU fleet46 
on the basis of Member States' data (including assessment of employment, profit, salary). 
The  Commission  would  ensure that  this annual  assessment  continues  so  that  the  socio-
economic impacts of the plan can be monitored indirectly. 

Impacts  of  the  plan  on  markets  (prices,  trade  patterns)  will  also  be  monitored  by  the 
Commission  on  a  biennial  basis  through  the  EU  Market  Observatory  for  Fisheries  and 
Aquaculture products (EUMOFA).  

46   https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reports/economic . 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
There  are  however  some  aspects  whose  monitoring  is  not  done  routinely,  such  as 
administrative burden, which may need an ad-hoc system. Monitoring the satisfaction 
of  the  fishing  industry  is  also  be  done  for  example  through  regular  meetings  between 
Commission  services  and  stakeholders  both  at  Advisory  Councils  as  well  as  bilateral 
meetings throughout the year. 

As  far  as  evaluation  is  concerned,  Article  10(3)  of  the  Basic  Regulation  stipulates  that 
MAPs shall provide for their revision after an initial ex-post evaluation, in particular to 
take  account  of  changes  in  scientific  advice.  Under  the  assumption  that  the  MAPs  for 
demersal  fisheries  in  western  waters  are  adopted  by  mid-2018,  a  first  evaluation  could 
not take place reasonably before 2023, i.e. about 5 years after their entry into force. An 
earlier evaluation is not sensible, due to fact that there is an important time gap between 
implementation  of  the  plan  and  when  the  data  required  for  evaluation  are  available. 
STECF notes that a period of 48 months after implementation would be required in order 
to have 3 years of biological data at its disposal and 60 months for 3 years of economic 
data  to  be  available.  Furthermore,  it  would  be  sensible  to  allow  for  a  few  years  of  full 
implementation of the landing obligation (foreseen by 2019) before evaluating the plan. 

Indicators  to  be  used  for  the  evaluation  do  not  need  to  be  specified  in  the  legal  acts 
setting the MAPs; instead, they can be developed subsequently in consultation with the 
relevant  stakeholders  and  scientific  bodies.  In  any  case  they  should  be  environmental 
(such as fishing mortality and SSB for all relevant stocks), social (total employed (FTE), 
economic  (such  as  net  profits,  return  on  investment,  gross  value  added,  etc.),  average 
wage,  etc.)  and  cost-efficiency  related  (administrative  burden).  Disaggregated  analysis 
should be preferred in order to find out whether there are fleet segments or fish stocks for 
which specific action would be required.  

42 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 1  Procedural information 

Member States and the PECH Committee of the European Parliament were consulted on 
the possible scope of this initiative on 29 January 2015. The minutes of this meeting are 
appended to this Annex. 

This  was  followed  by  the  constitution  of  an  inter-service  steering  group  for  the  impact 
assessment (IASG). The services represented in this ISSG were: 

–  DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries; 
–  DG Environment; 
–  DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs; 
–  The Commission Legal Service; 
–  The Secretariat General. 

The  IASG  met  on  5  February  2015,  15  April  2015,  27  October  2015  and  27  January 
2017. The IASG contributed to the scoping of the exercise and the consultation strategy 
and reviewed the Impact Assessment Roadmap47, the terms of reference for STECF and 
this Impact Assessment Report. 

The Roadmap was later on adapted to take the form of an Inception Impact Assessment48 
which 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
consulted 
regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_mare_004_005_plan_demersal_fisheries_north_and_sou
th_western_eu_waters_en.pdf 

now 

can 

via 

be 

Commissioner  Karmenu  Vella  announced  his  intended  working  schedule  for  the  near 
future,  which  included  the  proposals  on  multiannual  plans,  at  the  December  2014 
Fisheries  Council  and  at  the  PECH  Committee  of  the  European  Parliament  during  its 
meeting of 22 January 2015. 

The  proposals  for  multiannual  plans  for  demersal  fisheries  in  western  EU  waters  were 
inserted  in  the  Agenda  Planning49  by  the  end  of  March  2015,  and  they  were  included 
within an extract of major planned Commission initiatives in September 2015. 

This  Impact  Assessment  Report  was  reviewed  by  the  IASG  during  its  meeting  of  27 
October 2015 and by correspondence. It was submitted to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board 
(RSB)  on  19  February  2016,  who  gave  a  negative  opinion  and  asked  to  re-submit  an 
improved  report  following  five  main  recommendations.  These  were  addressed  in  the 
present version of the report as follows (more details in table 9 below).  

47   Roadmaps for new major initiatives describe the problem to be tackled and the objectives to be achieved, explain 

48  

why EU action is needed and its added value and outline alternative policy options.  
If an impact assessment is planned, the roadmap is replaced by an Inception Impact Assessment which sets out in 
greater  detail  the  description  of  the  problem,  issues  related  to  subsidiarity,  the  policy  objectives  and  options  as 
well as the likely impacts of each option. 

49   Agenda Planning (AP) is the Commission-wide internal database used for programming and reporting purposes as 
regards legislative and other initiatives which the Commission plans to adopt. It translates the Commission Work 
Programme (CWP) and the DGs'/Services' Management Plans (MPs) into an operational planning of initiatives to 
be adopted by the College.  

43 

 
 
 
                                                 
(1) Clarify the policy context and the link to other initiatives. In the revised version 
the  main  features  of  the  CFP  reform  are  described  in  more  detail  in  simpler  language. 
The  legal  text  is  moved  to  an  annex.  The  general  context  including  description  of  the 
areas and the fisheries concerned and the links with other similar initiatives (MAPs for 
the Baltic Sea and the North Sea) is more clearly described. 

(2) Improve the problem definition. The main problems are now made more explicit, 
showing their main drivers, how these were addressed over time by successive reforms of 
the  CFP  and  what  are  the  remaining  problems,  which  the  present  initiative  intends  to 
tackle. It also shows the likely consequences of these problems if no action is taken. 

(3)  Clarify the  content  of  the  policy  options.  Apart  from  an  improved  explanation  of 
the policy options, which now refer to specific choices to be made when drafting MAPs, 
figures illustrate the link between the options and the problems to be addressed and the 
objectives to be achieved. 

(4) Better assess and compare the options. The revised version explains the rationale of 
the methodology proposed to STECF more clearly (e.g. the reasons for the choice of the 
target dates of 1 January 2017, 2021 and 2025) and refers to the results in a less technical 
language, while a more technical analysis is moved to an annex (although ultimately, the 
report also gives the links to  all  STECF analysis where  interested readers can  have the 
full details). 

(5) Improved presentation. This report uses plain language except where it is inevitable 
to include technical terms and in the latter cases these are explained the first time they are 
mentioned. All acronyms are equally described when first mentioned, and both terms and 
acronyms and their description are summarised in a glossary and a table of acronyms at 
the beginning of the document. 

The IASG was consulted on the revised IA in a meeting on 27 January 2017. 

The IASG members welcomed the significant process made compared to the first version 
of the report, especially in terms of presentation and clarity. The IASG emphasised the 
importance  of  clear  and  understandable  language,  and  noted  that  many  technical 
elements have been moved to the Annex. 

The IASG agreed with the re-submission of the revised report, and urged DG MARE to 
verify  the  text  again  for  consistency  and  to  do  a  final  editorial  control.  This  has  been 
undertaken with the current version of the Impact Assessment. 

44 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 2:  Main Elements of the Common Fisheries Policy 

The  new  CFP,  Regulation  (EU)  1380/2013  entered  into  force  on  1  January  2014.  The 
main elements of the new CFP are:   
(1)  Maximum  Sustainable  Yield  is  the  best  possible  objective  for  renewable  and 
profitable fisheries, harvesting the maximum amount of fish on a long term basis. 
The  objective  of  the  CFP  is  to  ensure  that  MSY  is  achieved  by  2015  where 
possible,  and  by  2020  at  the  latest.  Not  all  stocks  in  the  north-east  Atlantic  are 
MSY-assessed.  Of  the  assessed  stocks  57  %  (both  demersal  and  pelagic)  are 
fished in line with MSY (up from only 6 % in 2005).  

(2) 

Annual/biannual  legislation  on  fixing  fishing  opportunities  (TACs  and 
quotas):  to  fix,  based  on  scientific  advice  that  is  consistent  with  MSY  and  in 
accordance with  multiannual plans (where they exist), the amount  of fishing for 
the stocks concerned, and to allocate quotas to the Member States following the 
so-called  relative  stability  key.  In  turn,  Member  States  distribute  their  national 
quotas  to  their  fishermen.  Annually  fishing  opportunities  are  set  for  the  Baltic, 
North  Sea,  Atlantic  and  biannually  for  the  deep-sea  stock,  by  Council  only,  to 
determine the level of catches, for each stock. The COM outlines its approach for 
its proposals on fixing the TACs in spring each year in a Policy Statement. 

The COM  proposals are based on biological advice. The proposals for TACs in 
western  waters  are  no  longer  based  on  the  existing  MAPs  as  all  of  them  are  by 
now outdated (only the Baltic MAP is updated). TACs are shared out to Member 
States  following  fixed  allocation  keys  (so-called  relative  stability,  which  differs 
among  stocks).  TACs  (in  tonnes)  are  a  translation  of  fishing  mortality  (F, 
mortality caused by fishing as a ratio of the stock). In the context of multiannual 
plans  the  COM  will  be  seeking  updated  advice  on  MSY  expressed  in  ranges  of 
fishing  mortality  that  correspond  to  sustainable  fishing  and  MSY,  for  the  target 
species.  Under  some  of  the  outdated  exisiting  multiannual  plans  TACs  are 
accompanied  by  effort  schemes  for  certain  fleets.  These  effort  regimes  are 
currently  considered  ineffective,  causing  red  tape,  and  sometimes  creating 
conflicts  with  the  TACs.  They  are  likely  to  disappear  from  future  multiannual 
plans,  but  effort  figures  are  currently  still  being  proposed  as  part  of  the  TAC 
proposals, awaiting the repeal of the outdated MAPs. 

(3) 

The  landing  obligation:  The  new  CFP  includes  a  landing  obligation  for  all 
catches of species subject to catch limits (TACs).  

It  applies  to  all  Union  vessels  fishing  in  Union  and  non-Union  waters.  The 
landing  obligation  is  applied  in  a  gradual  way  and  is  fishery  based.  As  of  1 
January 2016 demersal fisheries are being phased in under the landing obligation. 
The landing obligation comes with a set of measures and flexibility instruments to 
make  the  transition  and  timely  implementation  possible.  These  include  quota 
flexibilities,  exemptions  for  species  that  have  a  high  survival  rate  (i.e.  it  makes 
sense to return these fish to the sea if they are likely to survive) and a de minimis 
exemption to cater for unwanted catches, where e.g. the costs of handling these is 
disproportiate. The plans may also fix conservation reference sizes for fish. These 

45 

 
 
 
 
(4) 

measures  should  be  developed  through  multiannual  plans,  but  in  the  absence  of 
such plans, discard plans can be adopted (with duration of maximum three years). 
EU  multiannual  plans:  they  contain  the  framework  for  management  of  stocks 
(by  fishery).  Multiannual  plans  are  designed  to  ensure  effective  management  of 
the fisheries and to bring conservation and management provisions for groups of 
stocks under  plans.  Plans contribute to  stability and a long-term security  for the 
industry.  The  elements  to  be  included  in  a  multiannual  plan  are  specified  in 
Article 9 and 10 of the Basic Regulation. The main elements of plans are:  

MSY-related targets (per target stock), deadlines for achieving MSY, and fishing 
mortality/exploitation  ranges  that  are  consistent  with  MSY  (FMSY  as  a  range  of 
values),  safeguard  provisions  if  science  indicates  that  stocks  are  in  trouble; 
specific conservation measures for non-target species, so as to keep them within 
sustainable boundaries, mechanisms to allow for regionalisation of implementing 
measures under the plan. 

involving 

the  Commission, 

The  precise  shape  and  content  of  multiannual  plans  were  subject to  work  by  an 
Inter-Institutional  Task  Force 
the  European 
Parliament  and  the  Council  in  order  to  provide  guidelines  on  the  structure  and 
content of these multiannual plans and to solve delicate issues on the sharing of 
competences  among those  EU Institutions50. A  Court ruling51  complemented  the 
conclusions  of  the  Task  Force,  confirming  that  the  adoption  of  measures 
necessary for the pursuit of the objectives of the CFP must be reserved to the EU 
legislature  under  Article  43(2)  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  EU 
(TFEU)52 as they entail a policy decision. Measures on the fixing and allocation 
of fishing opportunities can be adopted by the Council in accordance with Article 
43(3) of the TFEU, as they do not require such a policy assessment since they are 
of a primarily technical nature and are intended to be taken in order to implement 
provisions adopted on the basis of Article 43(2) of the TFEU. 

(5) 

Fleet  capacity rules:  these are provisions to  support that the fleet capacity of a 
Member State matches with the fishing opportunities that are allocated to it; fleet 
overcapacity potentially leads to overfishing. Member States on this basis cannot 
increase the engine power or storage capacity of their fleets. Each Member State 
has a maximum capacity threshold (in engine power (kW) and in vessel volume 
(GT). Nominally, all Member States' fleets are under these ceilings. 

Member States must report annually on the balance between capacity and fishing 
opportunities.  Historically  this  has  not  been  linked  to  targeted  actions.  For  the 
first  time,  under  the  new  CFP  Member  States  have  to  give  follow-up  to  the 
identification of overcapacity with an action plan to eliminate it, in order to have 
access  to  funding  for  decommissioning  of  excess  vessels.  The  assessment 
exercise  by  Member  States  on  the  balance  between  capacity  and  fishing 

50  Council Document No 8529-14 PECHE 117 CODEC 1004, also published by the European Parliament:  

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/pech/dv/taskfor/taskforce.pdf 
51  Court ruling of 1 December 2015 in joined cases C-124/13 – Parliament/Council and C-125/13 

Commission/Council.  

52 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  

OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 47–390 

46 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

opportunities is facilitated by common guidelines developed by the Commission. 
It  includes  technical  and  economic  parameters.  Member  States  will  have  to 
include  in  their  reports  an  action  plan  for  the  fleet  segments  with  identified 
imbalance.  In  the  action  plan,  Member  States  have  to  set  out  the  adjustment 
targets  and  tools  to  achieve  the  balance.  The  plan  has  to  include  a  clear  time 
frame for the implementation of the action plan as well. 

The  External  Dimension:  The  CFP  reform  enshrines  for  the  first  time  the 
external dimension of the CFP (Part VI of the Basic Regulation: Articles 28-33). 
It calls for strong external action that follows externally the same principles and 
standards  as  internally  while  promoting  a  level-playing  field  for  EU  operators. 
Under  the  CFP  new  international  agreements  should  contribute  to  long  term 
sustainability  worldwide  via  stronger  bilateral  relations,  e.g.  with  a  view  to 
promote  joint  management  of  joint  stocks,  tackling  global  issues  such  as  IUU 
fishing and fishing overcapacity, uphold and strengthen the global architecture for 
fisheries  governance  (UN,  FAO,  OECD,  etc.),  contribute  towards  a  more 
effective  functioning  of  RFMOs,  more  sustainable  Fisheries  Agreements  and 
ensure better coherence with other EU policies. 

Data  Collection  Framework:  a  set  of  requirements  on  collection  by  fishermen 
and  Member  States  and  management  of  biological  and  other  data  as  input  for 
biological, economic and other knowledge and advice in support of the policy. To 
align  to the new CFP, a recast Data Collection Framework  Regulation has  been 
adopted53.  It  introduces  simplifications  and  more  flexibility  and  adaptability, 
based on an evaluation of the previous framework.  

Advisory Councils: The Advisory Councils (ACs) were established since 2004 to 
advise  the  Commission  on  matters  related  to  fisheries  management  in  their 
respective  areas  of  competence.  Seven  ACs  were  established  for: 
the 
Mediterranean Sea, the south-western waters, the north-western waters, the North 
Sea, the Baltic Sea, small pelagic species, and the Long Distance Fleet.  

ACs  are  stakeholders'  organisations  that  bring  together  the  industry  (fishing, 
processing  and  marketing  sectors)  and  other 
interest  groups,  such  as 
environmental and consumers' organisations. They receive an annual grant of up 
to  €250.000  from  the  Commission  to  cover  part  of  their  operational  costs.  The 
new  CFP  foresees  the  creation  of  four  new  ACs  for  Aquaculture,  Markets,  the 
Black Sea and Outermost Regions. 
ACs  are  expected  to  expand  their  play  in  the  regionalised  CFP  and  are  to  be 
consulted  by  Member  States  when  preparing  joint  recommendations  on 
conservation measures. The functioning of ACs is set out in the Basic Regulation, 
articles 43-45 and Annex III. 

(9)   Regionalisation:  Another 

the  Basic 
Regulation  (Article  18)  is  "Regionalisation".  The  Basic  Regulation  enables 

introduced  by 

innovation 

important 

53 Regulation (EU) 2017/1004 on the establishment of a Union framework for the collection, 
management and use of data in the fisheries sector and support for scientific advice regarding 
the common fisheries policy and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 199/2008 (recast) 

47 

 
 
 
                                                 
Regionalisation  for  a  number  of  instruments  and  measures:  multiannual  plans, 
discard  plans,  establishment  of  fish  stock  recovery  areas  and  conservation 
measures  for  compliance  with  obligations  under  EU  Environmental  legislation. 
Where  regionalisation  applies,  EU  Member  States  with  a  direct  management 
interest may agree to submit joint recommendations for achieving the objectives of 
the  above-mentioned  plan  or  measure.  The  recommendations  have  to  be 
compatible  with  the  objectives  of  the  CFP,  with  the  scope  and  objectives  of  the 
measure or plan, and be at least as stringent as measures under EU law. The EU 
countries  have  to  consult  the  relevant  Advisory  Council(s)  on  the  joint 
recommendations  before  submitting  them  to  the  Commission.  If  all  these 
conditions are met, the Commission can then adopt a Delegated Act to transform 
these joint recommendations into EU law applicable to all operators in the region. 
Concretely,  in  most  cases,  regionalisation  may  only  be  used  in  the  context  of 
multiannual plans. 
The  aim  of  Regionalisation  is  to  increase  the  involvement  of  the  Member  States 
affected  by  Regulation  and  thus  their  ownership  of  the  measures.  The 
Commission's  role  is  to  ensure  that  the  adopted  measures  fulfil  the  objectives  of 
the Basic Act. Regionalisation thus constitutes an important shift from instrument-
based to results-based management.  

(10)   Establishment  of  fish  stock  recovery  areas:  Under  Article  8  of  the  Basic 
Regulation,  the  Union  shall  endeavour  to  establish  protected  areas  due  to  their 
biological  sensitivity,  including  areas  where  there  is  clear  evidence  of  heavy 
concentrations  of  fish  below  minimum  conservation  reference  size  and  of 
spawning grounds. In such areas fishing activities may be restricted or prohibited 
in  order  to  contribute  to  the  conservation  of  living  aquatic  resources  and  marine 
ecosystems.  Member  States  shall  identify,  where  possible,  suitable  areas  which 
may  form  part  of  a  coherent  network  and  shall  prepare,  where  appropriate,  joint 
recommendations  (in  line  with  regionalisation)  with  a  view  to  the  Commission 
submitting a proposal. The Commission may be empowered in a multiannual plan 
to establish such biologically sensitive protected areas. 

48 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 3  Stakeholder consultation 

Findings following a Public Consultation on the Development of Multiannual Plans 
for the management of demersal Fisheries in western EU waters 

1. 

Background 

The Commission services have taken the responsibility to propose multiannual plans 
(hereinafter, MAPs) as foreseen following the CFP reform in 2013. A MAP has in 
the  meantime  been  adopted  for  the  cod,  herring  and  sprat  stocks  in  the  Baltic  Sea 
and a proposal covering demersal fisheries in the North Sea is expected to enter the 
trilogue process in autumn 2017. A plan for small pelagic stocks in the Adriatic Sea 
is currently discussed in the Council and in the European Parliament. Work is also 
ongoing to prepare an MAP for the western Mediterranean. 

In  the  context  of  the  Commission's  better  regulation  policy,  an  impact  assessment 
has  been  carried  out  to  assess  the  potential  environmental,  economic  and  social 
impacts of alternative policy options for the Western Waters MAP in preparation for 
the relevant proposal. As an integral part of the impact assessment process an open 
public  stakeholder  consultation  was  launched  to  collect  inputs  about  the  main 
elements of the proposal for demersal fisheries MAPs in western waters.  

The  open  Public  Consultation  was  made  available  by  22  May  2015  to  the  main 
public  in  the  EUROPA  webpages  of  'Your  Voice  in  Europe'  and  dedicated  to 
Fisheries,  with  a  deadline  of  15  September  2015  for  submitting  replies  to  the 
consultation  document.  Parallel  to  this  Public  Consultation,  a  targeted  survey  was 
done with more technical questions. It was addressed to the Advisory Councils, to 
Member States authorities, to the PECH Committee of the European Parliament and 
to the NAT Committee of the European Economic and Social Committee.  

2. 

Number of Replies 

We  received  28  replies  to  the  consultation.  Of  these,  5  were  non-pertinent  (not 
really  addressing  the  issue),  14  came  from  environmental  NGOs  (hereinafter 
NGOs),  7  from  professional  organisations  (hereinafter  POs),  2  from  other 
organisations  OTHs)  and  one  from  the  authorities  of  a  Member  State  (UK), 
hereinafter MS. 

3. 

Detail of the replies 

This  summary  report presents the results of the consultation, without entering into 
the analysis of the extent to which the views of the respondents are right or wrong or 
of  the  question  whether  they  supported  or  not  the  views  of  the  Commission.  The 
texts in italics are referring to the relevant parts of the consultation document. 

49 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. THE PROBLEM 

The  overall  problem  is  that,  despite  recent  improvements,  most  demersal  fish  stocks  in 
the  area  are  not  yet  at  levels  above  those  capable  to  produce  MSY,  and  that  there  are 
also a few fish stocks clearly depleted. Therefore the fishing industry and the consumers 
cannot yet enjoy fully the benefits of a fishery in conditions of environmental, economic 
and social sustainability. 

Current fisheries management plans are no longer fit for purpose: they are either out of 
date  (their  targets  are  superseded  by  new  science)  or  they  have  proven  ineffective  (for 
instance restriction of the fishing effort –days that fishermen can spend at sea- have not 
yielded results). The current fisheries management plans do not allow the use of any of 
the  tools  of  the  new,  reformed  EU  fisheries  policy:  regional  decision-making, 
management  measures  that  are  adapted  to  regional  circumstances,  or  flexibility  to 
change management measures to new circumstances. 

Question 1: Do you agree with this perception of the problem? 

Fully 

2 POs 
2 NGOs 
1 OTHs 

Mostly 

1 PO 
11 NGO 
1 MS 

Comments received were: 

Partially 

Barely 

Not at all 

3 POs 
1NGO 
1 OTH 

POs:  MSY  not  achievable,  TAC  system  too  rigid  and  obsolete,  rules  should  adapt  to 
reality, not the opposite. 

NGOs:  Rather  than  inappropriate  rules  (existing  MAPs),  the  problem  is  that  the  rules 
have  not  been  adhered  to  (TACs  set  above  scientific  advice);  lack  of  data  and  science, 
precautionary principle not applied. 

Question 2: What is your perception of the importance of the problem? 

Very severe 

Severe 

Moderate 

Appreciable 

insignificant 

3 POs 
12 NGOs 
1 OTH 
1MS 

2 PO 
2 NGOs 
1 OTH 

1 PO 

All comments received agreed that there was an important social and economic issue. 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 3: Do you agree on the need for the EU to take action? 

Fully 

4 POs 
14 NGOs 
1 OTH 
1 MS 

Mostly 

Partially 

Barely 

Not at all 

1 PO 

1 PO 
1 OTH 

Comments received: NGOs remarked that, beyond the question of a need, an EU action 
was an obligation from the Treaties. POs demanded more collaboration with the fishing 
sector. 

2. MULTIANNUAL PLANS AS MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENTS 

Fishery  management  decisions  can  be  taken  just  in  a  reactive  fashion,  responding  to 
fluctuations  in  stock  sizes  produced  by  fishing  activities,  environmental  variations, 
natural or anthropogenic catastrophes or market disruptions (such as the recent Russian 
import ban on certain fish products from the EU). 

These decisions can also be taken in a proactive manner, establishing multiannual plans. 
These  would  determine  in  advance  the  type  of  measures  that  are  to  be  taken  in  each 
circumstance,  what  are  the  ultimate  and  intermediate  objectives  and  would  ensure  the 
transparency and predictability of the management measures, which can then be defined 
at the regional level and in response to specific circumstances. 

Question  4:  Would  you  prefer  a  multiannual,  proactive  approach  rather  than  an 
annual, reactive one? 

Fully 

3 POs 
13 NGOs 
2 OTH 

Mostly 

Partially 

Barely 

Not at all 

1 NGO 
1 MS 

3 POs 

Comments received: Some POs, NGOs and a MS noted that the approach should also be 
reactive  to  changing  circumstances.  Most  NGOs  noted  that  a  multiannual,  proactive 
approach was a legal obligation. 

The ultimate aim of this multiannual approach would be to address the main problem as 
described above, with the following specific objectives: 

– 
To  provide a  transparent  and  stable  framework  to  achieve  MSY,  avoiding  stock 
decline  and  taking  into  account  the  interactions  between  fish  stocks  and  the  diverse 
fishing modalities and the economic and social consequences of management measures;  

To  provide  a  legal  framework  for  the  long-term  implementation  of  the  landing 

– 
obligation and the regional approach to fisheries management 

51 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 6: Would you agree with these objectives? 

Partially 

Barely 

Not at all 

1 PO 
6 NGOs 

Fully 

2 POs 
1 OTH 

Mostly 

3 POs 
8 NGOs 
1 OTH 
1 MS 

Comments received: 

POs:  The  objectives  do  not  address  the  true  problems;  avoid  decline  of  fishermen 
populations (shared by 1 OTH). 

NGOs: The objectives are incomplete and ill-defined. Should refer to MSY objectives as 
stated in CFP; include environmental objectives (contribution to MSFD) 

3. SPECIES COVERED 

A number of fisheries have not so far been included in multiannual management plans. 
However, many fish species are being caught together in mixed fisheries. Managing them 
in  isolation  from  other  species  in  the  same  fishery  is  not  appropriate.  Some  of  those 
species, such as sea bass, have been over-exploited as a consequence.  

Question 8: Do you agree it is appropriate to establish a framework for managing 
the main species coherently within a multiannual management plan?  

Partially 

Barely 

Not at all 

3 POs 

Fully 

2 POs 
8 NGOs 
1 OTH 
1 MS 

Mostly 

1 PO 
6 NGOs 

Comments received: 

POs:  Coherence  is  difficult  in  the  multi-species  Celtic  Sea;  coherence  should  also  be 
between catch composition and quota allocation. 

NGOs: Cover also species other than the main species (shared with a MS); coherence to 
be  sought  with  geographical  distribution  in  biological  and  fishery  terms;  multi-species 
consideration to be phased in. 

52 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 9: Which fish species should be included in such a management plan as a 
matter of priority?  

POs and OTHs referred to the species leading the main fisheries as currently defined in 
the discard plans; some mentioned specifically cod, hake, megrim,  anglerfish. They did 
not suggest including data-poor species in these MAPs. 

NGOs  proposed  an  exhaustive  list:  demersal  fish  (hake,  sole,  plaice,  haddock,  whiting, 
cod, megrims, anglerfish, Norway lobster, pollack and saithe), deep-water species (lings, 
great  silver  smelt,  tusk),  elasmobranchs  (including  porbeagle,  skates  and  rays  and 
dogfish)  and  non-TAC  species  (sardine,  sea  bass,  lemon  sole,  all  these  either  as  main 
species  or  as  by-catch).  Nevertheless,  "group  TACs"  such  as  "skates  and  rays"  were 
opposed. 

4. GENERAL QUESTION 

Question  10:  Please  include  below  any  other  comments  you  may  have  on  this 
initiative 

Comments received:  

POs regretted not having taken part earlier in the scoping of this exercise; current scope 
is  too  narrow,  not  including  socio-economic  elements.  According  to  their  view,  CFP 
should take into account regional specificities. 

NGOs:  apply  a  precautionary  approach;  FMSY  should  be  a  limit  instead  of  a  target;  use 
BMSY  as  a  safeguard;  the  regional  approach  should  better  involve  stakeholders;  MAPs 
performance needs to be assessed against BMSY. Apply an ecosystem approach, include 
contribution to MSFD; review 2003 effort regime (WW); introduce clear harvest control 
rules. 

MS: use same structure and principles as for the Baltic MAP. 

53 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 4  Who is affected by the initiative and how  

Once the Regulation setting out the MAP for demersal fisheries in western EU waters is 
adopted, the immediate consequences will be as follows: 

1) for the EU institutions:  

–  The  Council  should  endeavour  to  adopt  total  allowable  catches  (TACs)  at  levels 
which,  according  to  scientific  advice,  would  be  compatible  with  objective  to  keep 
fishing  mortalities  within FMSY ranges  as  soon as  possible and by 2020  at the latest. 
TACs  should  also  be  set  so  as  to  minimise  "choke"  effects  while  ensuring  full 
utilisation  of  available  resources  and  avoiding  stocks  falling  below  safeguard  levels. 
In  practice  this  means  that  the  Commission  should  request  adequate  advice  from 
science  (ICES  and  STECF)  so  its  TAC  proposals  also  address  the  above-mentioned 
specifications; 

–  The  Commission  should  adopt,  as  appropriate,  delegated  acts  implementing  the 
discard  plans  foreseen  in  Article  15  of  the  Basic  Regulation  and  ad  hoc  technical 
measures  devised  by  regional  groups,  in  particular  those  aiming  at  contributing  to 
facilitate  the  specifications  of  the  previous  paragraph.  The  European  Parliament  and 
the Council will in this respect play their supervisory roles for Commission delegated 
acts 

–  The  Commission  should  ensure  that  the  work  programmes  of  ICES  and  STECF 
include  any  monitoring  and  assessment  requirement  not  already  foreseen  in  our 
current  arrangements  with  these  scientific  institutions.  It  should  also  anticipate  the 
associated costs and cover these as they are incurred. 

2) for Member States: 

–  Within  the  fish  quotas  allocated  to  them  by  the  Council,  Member  States  should 
distribute fishing opportunities to their fleets in accordance to the criteria specified in 
Article  17  of  the  Basic  Regulation  and,  especially,  in  a  manner  minimising  the 
likelihood of choke effects. Where quotas were imbalanced with regard to the existing 
fishing capacity, national measures should be adapted to restore such balance; 

–  They should gather in regional formations in order to devise discard plans and ad hoc 
the  Commission  via  delegated  acts 

to  be  adopted  by 

technical  measures 
(regionalisation); 

–  Member  States  should  also  continue  to  use  their  competences  on  surveillance  and 
control (Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 and associated legislation) in order to enforce 
the fair consumption of quotas, the landing obligation and any new measures adopted 
within the regionalisation process;  

–  Where adaptation to new control and surveillance needs would imply additional costs, 
the EMFF (see footnote 17) has a number of possibilities to alleviate or compensate 
for such costs; 

54 

 
 
 
 
–  Finally,  they  will  need  to  continue  to  comply  with  the  monitoring  requirements 
specified  in  the  above-mentioned  Control  Regulation  and  in  the  Data  Collection 
Framework  (see  footnote  18)  or  any  new  monitoring  requirement  required  by  the 
multiannual  plans.  The  Data  Collection  Framework  is  being  recast  and  will  include 
financial aid to cover these requirements. 

3) For fishing operators: 

–  Fishermen have the skills and the means to change their behaviour and adapt to new 
measures  and  cope  with  them  in  the  most  efficient  way.  They  can  exchange  their 
quota allocation, ensuring smooth consumption; they can apply their knowledge of the 
fishing  grounds  and  techniques  to  avoid  catching  "choke"  species;  they  can  adopt 
fishing  strategies  that  avoid  concentration  of  supply  leading  to  lower  prices.  They 
regularly come up with innovations that allow them to fish more selectively and in a 
more economical way.  They should, in  short,  make all  efforts  to  facilitate achieving 
the  objectives  of  the  CFP  with  minimum  economic  burden.  The  EMFF  can  also 
contribute to this end by providing financial support to initiatives concerning market 
organisation,  advisory  services,  partnerships  between  scientists  and  fishermen, 
diversification  of  activities,  systems  of  allocation  and  exchange  of  fishing 
opportunities,  port  facilities  to  handle  unwanted  catches,  permanent  and  temporary 
cessation of fishing activities, purchase of selective gear, etc.; 

–  Fishermen should also contribute with their skills and knowledge to participate in the 
conception  of  measures  under  regionalisation,  either  directly  or  within  their 
participation  in  Advisory  Councils.  Fishermen  play  an  important  role  in  the 
framework of regionalisation to design measures to achieve sustainable fishing for the 
benefit of the fishing industry in terms of improving the economic performance in the 
long run as well as for the benefit of consumers; 

–  Finally, the fishing industry is the main source of raw data to monitor the performance 
of  multiannual  plans.  By  providing  accurate  catch  and  effort  data  and  admitting 
scientific observers on board their vessels they play a decisive role in the monitoring 
process. The new multiannual plans, however, do not add additional requirements in 
this regard so no additional costs are expected. 

55 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 5.  

Analysis by the STECF: main findings 

Background: Developments since the analysis by STECF 

In  2015,  after  the  new  CFP  was  launched,  the  Commission  started  a  simultaneous 
dialogue  and  development  of  several  multiannual  plans  (MAPs)  for  relevant  regions, 
including the Western Waters. The STECF (STECF-15-08) were asked to assess several 
fisheries for a proposed Western Waters plan, including in the evaluation the impact of 
introducing ranges of Fmsy and evaluating the species to be covered. In this 2015 exercise, 
the STECF were asked to conduct an analysis within only two management options: no 
plan  (option  1),  and  multiannual  plans,  covering  SWW  and  NWW  respectively  (option 
2).  

For  the  2015  submission  of  the  impact  assessment  (IA)  and  subsequent  Regulatory 
Scrutiny Board (RSB) meeting of January 2016, the two options and the structure of the 
STECF assessment were followed and included the addition of a range of sub-options to 
the second option allowing for possible additional policy choices for the plan. These sub-
options  elaborated  on  the  number  and  geographical  scope  of  MAPs,  the  fisheries 
approach to management and possible multispecies TACs for bycatches, along with fast 
versus slow recovery of stocks towards 2020.  

Since  the  IA  submission  and  RSB  opinion  of  early  2016,  certain  developments  have 
justified a review of the policy options. These include the adoption by the co-legislator of 
the Baltic Sea multiannual plan as a template for future plans, the lessons learned from 
the IA of the North Sea multiannual plan and the progress in examination and discussions 
with  the  co-legislators  on  the  North  Sea  proposal,  including  further  dialogue  with 
stakeholders. While the IA can still take its scientific basis in the STECF assessment of 
2015,  the  revised  IA  focuses  on  the  most  relevant  options  at  this  stage;  leaving  the 
situation as it is with a series of older long-term plans (option 1), the adoption of either 
one multiannual plan for the whole of the western waters, from north of the UK all the 
way south to the Iberian waters (option 2) or two multiannual plans covering the northern 
and the southern Western Waters respectively (option 3).  

For  the  comparison  of  the  different  options,  the  work  done  by  STECF  in  2015  is  still 
relevant and valid on the substance of the parameters for comparison. 

The analysis by the STECF: 

In  2015  the  STECF  was  requested  to  analyse  the  evolution  of  EU  fisheries  and  to 
describe their likely situation in the short and medium term under two main management 
options:  no  plan  (option  1),  and  multiannual  plans,  covering  SWW  and  NWW 

56 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
respectively  (option  2).  STECF  was  also  requested  to  provide  guidance  on  the  sub-
options considered under option 254. 

On  the  setting  of  TACs  under  a  MAP,  and  in  the  absence  of  precise  harvest  control 
rules55, the STECF had no guidance on what precise values of F, within the FMSY ranges, 
the  Council  would  adopt  as  targets.  The  STECF  working  group  decided  that  the  best 
alternative  would  be  to  use  an  "envelope"  approach.  Such  an  approach  considered  the 
potential consequences of fishing at the limits (upper and lower) of the FMSY ranges, to 
simulate both high and low exploitation cases, and thereby inform managers on the range 
of potential outcomes of alternative tactical management decisions, without giving advice 
about  the  'best'  way  to  get  to  the  target.  Under  this  approach,  each  scenario  has  two 
management options that lead to two simulations: 

  upp: TAC is set as the catch that results from exploiting the stock at FMSYupp 

  low: TAC is set as the catch that results from exploiting the stock at FMSYlow 

Biomass  safeguards  were  set  as  the  precautionary  biomass  (Bpa).  In  the  absence  of 
harvest control rules to define the tactics to recover the stock, recovery was simulated as 
a linear increase in SSB up to the safeguard. Two recovery periods were simulated: fast 
and slow (5 and 10 years). 

For each scenario, STECF was requested to run the appropriate forecast models in order 
to describe the likely situation of the fisheries on 1 January of 2017, 2021 and 2025 using 
a set of given environmental, economic and social indicators. The choice of these years 
was made on the following grounds:  

i. 

ii. 

iii. 

2017  would  be  the  baseline,  since  the  stock  size  at  1  January  2017  would  be  a 
reflection of the pressure on the fishery during 2016, when the MAP would not 
yet be in force; 
The  status  of  the  stock  at  1  January  2021  would  be  a  reflection  of  whether  the 
target F was applied during 2020, as required by the main CFP objective; 
The status of the stock at 1 January 2025 would help see whether there is a trend 
(increase or decrease) after the 2020 deadline and the magnitude of such trend. 

STECF  was  also  requested  to  describe,  by  expert  judgement,  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages of setting alternative geographic coverage of MAPs like i) a single MAP 
for  all  western  waters,  ii)  distinct  MAPs  by  geographical  sub-region  and  iii)  several 
MAPs  addressing  specific  groups  of  fisheries  having  common  characteristics,  on  the 

54    With  Reference  to  the  two  original  options  submitted  to  STECF  in  2015.  Please  see  information  in  the  box 

'Background: Developments since the analysis  by STECF' 

55   Harvest control rules are mathematical formulas or algorithms that predefine how the TACs are to be set on the 
basis of the state of the stock and the exploitation rates that they are subject to, relative to target values of these 
parameters.  Due  to  lack  of  understanding  on  how  this  system  should  be  implemented  in  EU  law,  the  Inter-
institutional Task Force that discussed the form and content of MAPs (see footnote 1) decided that MAPs will not 
have explicit harvest control rules. 

57 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
basis  of  the  groups  of  fisheries  proposed  by  Member  States  in  their  joint  proposals  for 
discard plans56. 

Finally,  STECF  was  also  requested  to  examine  the  effects  on  by-catch  species  of 
addressing  the  MSY  objective  uniquely  for  the  target  species  that  define  the  fisheries 
mentioned  in  point  iii)  of  the  preceding  paragraph.  As  a  complement  to  this  request, 
STECF  was  asked  to  advise  on  the  appropriateness  of  multi-species  TACs  covering 
combinations of by-catch species. 

In  its  analysis,  STECF  noted  that  the  likely  responses  of  the  fishing  sector  to  any 
management decisions are of major importance when forecasting potential stock and fleet 
impacts.  The  range  of  potential  responses  is  very  wide,  which  makes  it  extremely 
difficult to forecast. Although a large effort was allocated to modelling fleet response to 
management,  the  results  obtained  were  not  satisfactory:  in  most  cases  there  were  large 
differences  with  what  was  observed  in  the  past,  and  the  scientists  participating  in  the 
STECF working  group in charge of the calculations were  not  able to find justifications 
for such differences. Consequently, only one fleet behaviour was simulated, in which the 
fleets distribute their fishing effort in the same way they have done in the past, reflecting 
a strong inertia to change in face of the new management options. 

The STECF working group could not undertake the simulation of the effects of technical 
measures since, in the absence of guidance about which precise measures are likely to be 
implemented  and  what  effects  were  expected  from  them  in  quantitative  terms,  the 
number of simulations required would be too large.  

The analysis for north-western waters was limited to the Celtic Sea (CS), and for south-
western  waters  it  was  broken  down  into  the  Bay  of  Biscay  (BoB)  and  Iberian  waters 
(IW).  For  the  purposes  of  this  exercise  (to  compare  Option  2  under  several  modalities 
against the baseline Option 1) this can be considered a reasonable compromise between 
data availability, computational effort and manpower. 

In  order  to  simulate  the  MAP  scenario  under  Option  2,  values  for  FMSY  ranges  were 
required. These should in principle have been provided by ICES. However, for the stocks 
in  this  area  the  ICES  advice  was  scheduled  for  around  February  2016,  so  STECF 
computed provisional FMSY ranges which try to keep the fundamental concepts required 
by  DG  MARE  i.e.,  the  fishing  mortality  ranges  that  produce  95%  of  the  maximum 
possible long-term catch while ensuring with a high (95%) probability that the stock will 
not fall below safeguard levels. The values for FMSY ranges used are presented below. 

56  

In  preparation  for  the  step-wise  introduction  of  the  landing  obligation  for  demersal  fish,  Member  States  have 
presented joint recommendations defining the main fisheries that would be covered by the landing obligation in 
2016 and the specific rules that would govern certain exemptions allowed by the Basic Regulation, such as the de 
minimis rule and the exemptions justified on the basis of survivability. 

58 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Table 11. Values of FMSY, and their lower and upper range, as used in the analyses. 

Stock  

Hake (south)  

Hake (north)  

Horse mackerel (south)  

Megrim (south)  

Sole (Bay of Biscay)  

Blue whiting  

Four spot megrim (south)  

Horse mackerel (western)  

White anglerfish (south)  

Haddock (VIIb-k)  

Cod (VIIe-k)  

Whiting (VIIe-k)  

Sole (VIIfg)  

Plaice (VIIfg)  

FMSY  

FMSYlow 

FMSYupp  Method  

0.24  

0.27  

0.11  

0.17  

0.26  

0.30  

0.17  

0.13  

0.19  

0.40  

0.40  

0.32  

0.31  

0.3  

0.17  

0.18  

0.08  

0.08  

0.17  

0.20  

0.11  

0.09  

0.13  

0.26  

0.27  

0.21  

0.21  

0,21  

0.36  

0.37  

0.16  

0.19  

0.36  

0.41  

0.24  

0.18  

0.26  

0.60  

0.55  

0.44  

0.43  

0.43  

YPR (WD: Abad et.al)  

PLM (WD: Jardim)  

PLM (WD: Jardim)  

YPR (WD: Abad et.al)  

PLM (WD: Jardim)  

PLM (WD: Jardim)  

PLM (WD: Jardim)  

PLM (WD: Jardim)  

PLM (WD: Jardim)  

EqSim (WD: Gerritsen and Lordan)  

EqSim  

PLM (WD: Jardim)  

PLM (WD: Jardim)  

PLM (WD: Jardim)  

STECF  gave  its  opinion  during  its  plenary  meeting  of  6-10  July  2015.  Plenary  and 
working group reports are to be found in the STECF website57. 

1. Results of the analysis of the scenarios proposed 

The results were presented as ratios between the values obtained under the MAP proposal 
scenario and the baseline scenario. Thus, they focus on the differences between the two 
options, with or without a MAP framework, and show in a simple way the effect of the 
MAP. A value of 1 means that there is no difference between the scenario considered and 
the  baseline.  A  value  below  1  means  that  there  was  a  reduction  of  the  variable  when 
compared  with  the  baseline  (e.g.  a  value  of  0.5  in  F  would  mean  that  F  in  the  MAP 
scenario  was  half  of  the  value  of  F  in  the  baseline  scenario),  and  vice-versa  for  values 
above 1. Results are given separately for management at FMSYlow and FMSYupp levels. 

STECF evaluated the relative effects of the two main options by 1 January 2017, 2021 
and 2025. Major differences started to appear only in 2021. Since 2021 is related to the 
deadline  at  which  MSY  should  have  been  attained  (FMSY  at  2020),  for  simplification 
purposes this report will only present the results for that year. Interested readers can have 
access to the whole set of results58.  

The main models used for the simulations were FLBEIA and IAM. Descriptions of these 
models can be found in Annex 6. 

57   http://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/43805/1099561/2015-07_STECF+PLEN+15-02_JRCxxx.pdf 
58   For  further  details,  see  the  STECF  report  (http://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reports/plenary)  and  the  STECF  EWG 

report (http://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reports/management-plans). 

59 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
1.1. North-western waters 

I. State of the fisheries by 2021 

Figure  4.  Ratios  of  various  indicators  for  the  upper  and  lower  MSY  ranges  against  the  baseline  (CFP) 
scenario, for the NWW MAP in 2021, and for seven stocks in the area. Species codes: ANF (anglerfish); 
COD (cod); HAD (haddock); NEP22 (Nephrops); PLE (plaice); SOL (sole) WHG (whiting). 

The  outlook  for  2021  under  the  tested  condition  shows  how  the  different  species 
incorporated in the model are more or less sensitive to the targeted FMSY value. Gadoids 
(cod,  whiting  and  haddock)  show  higher  differences  in  terms  of  biomass,  than  flatfish 
(sole and plaice). However, catches of sole can vary quite extensively. 

One way of interpreting these results is: 

-  Compared  to  the  baseline,  a  MAP  where  it  is  chosen  to  use  systematically  the 
lower boundary of the FMSY range (FMSYlow) results in fishing mortality about 25% 
lower,  TACs  and  catches  around  20%  lower,  spawning  stock  biomass  (SSB) 
around 10% higher and inter-annual variability of catches around 10-50% higher 
(notably  for  NEP  and  WHG).  Quota  consumption  is  generally  lower,  especially 
for ANF and NEP, but slightly higher for cod; 

-  Compared  to  the  baseline,  a  MAP  where  it  is  chosen  to  use  systematically  the 
upper boundary of the FMSY range (FMSYupp) results in fishing mortality about 25% 
higher,  TACs  and  catches  about  20%  higher,  SSB  around  10%  lower,  inter-
annual variability of catch around 20% lower (much lower for NEP and WHG). 

60 

 
 
 
 
Quota  uptake  increases  particularly  for  ANF  (+20%)  but  decreases  for  WHG  (-
20%). 

In  other  words:  the  use  of  upper  boundary  of  the  FMSY  ranges  leads  to  noticeable 
increases in yield (around 20%) for relatively small loss of spawning biomass (10%). The 
extent  to  which  this  decrease  in  biomass  constitutes  a  biological  risk  is  dealt  with  by 
STECF later on. 

II. State of the fleets by 2021 

Figure  5.  Ratios  of  various  indicators  for  the  upper  and  lower  MSY  ranges  against  the  baseline  (CFP) 
scenario, for the NWW MAP in 2021, and for fourteen fleets operating in the area. The codes for the fleets 
are given by the Member state code, the code for the main gear used (DTS: Demersal trawl and demersal 
seiner; TBB: beam trawl; DFN: driftnets and fixed nets; PG: passive gear) and the overall length of the 
vessels. 

In 2021, fishing at the upper limit of the FMSY ranges will produce larger catches (around 
30%  larger)  except  for  the  Spanish  and  Irish  fleets  of  demersal  trawls  and  seines  over 
10m,  which  do  not  show  a  noticeable  increase  in  catches.  However,  these  increases  in 
catches are at the cost of increased costs (around 20%) again except for Spanish and Irish 
trawlers. 

61 

 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2.1. South-western waters - Bay of Biscay 

I. State of the fisheries by 2021 

Figure  6.  Ratios  of  various  indicators  for  the  upper  and  lower  MSY  ranges  against  the  baseline  (CFP) 
scenario, for the SWW MAP (Bay of Biscay, FLBEIA) in 2021, and for 13 stocks in the area. Species codes 
are:  ANK:  black-bellied  anglerfish;  BSS:  seabass;  CTL:  cuttlefish;  HKE:  hake;  HOM:  horse  mackerel; 
MAC:  mackerel;  MEG:  megrim;  MON:  white-bellied  anglerfish;  MUR:  red  mullet;  OTH:  others;  SKA: 
skates and rays; SOZ: soles; WHB: blue whiting. 

Detailed  results  are  only  given  for  hake  and  megrim.  Biomass  is  expected  to  be  about 
20%  lower  in  the  FMSYupp  scenario  and  about  20%  higher  in  the  FMSYlow  scenario  with 
relation  to  the  baseline.  The  catches  of  hake  and  megrim  are  expected  to  be  lower  for 
both scenarios. In the case of hake there will be more catches in the FMSYlow scenario than 
in FMSYupp. As for TACs, these are expected to be lower for hake in both scenarios and 
higher for megrim in the FMSYlow scenario. Quota uptake in the FMSYlow scenario is about 
20% lower, and is maintained at the same value in the FMSYupp scenario, except for both 
species of anglerfish, for which the quota uptake increases by 20%. 

62 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulations  were  also  conducted  with  the  IAM  model  and  results  are  as  in  Figure 
A.5.4.below: 

Figure  7.  Ratios  of  various  indicators  for  the  upper  and  lower  MSY  ranges  against  the  baseline  (CFP) 
scenario, for the SWW MAP (Bay of Biscay, IAM) in 2021, and for three stocks in the area.  

The results obtained by the IAM model in 2021 show higher SSB and biomass of sole, 
Nephrops  and  hake  the  FMSYlow  scenario  as  a  result  of  decrease  in  F.  Risks  of  falling 
below  Blim  and  Bpa  are,  however,  not  increased.  Results  show  that  FMSY  objectives  for 
hake  and  sole  are  reached  (or  almost)  for  all  the  scenarios,  which  means  that 
reconciliation  of  objectives  for  sole  and  hake  is  possible.  Modelled  fleets  only  account 
however  for  a  part  of  the  fishing  mortality  on  hake  and  choke  effects  for  other  non-
explicitly  modelled  fleets  are  not  taken  into  account.  In  the  case  of  Nephrops  or  sole, 
modelled fleets account for more than 90% of the total mortality on those stocks.  

The decrease in F observed for Nephrops is to be linked with the management objectives 
for sole and hake. However, it should be underlined that correlations between Nephrops 
and sole are modelled in this application at the fleet-métier level and that spatio-temporal 
allocation of effort can modify correlation between species. Since both species have low 
geographical overlap, fishermen can catch both species almost separately. Nephrops and 
hake are more attached by their spatial distribution. 

63 

 
 
 
 
 
II. State of the fleets by 2021 

The IAM model allowed a more detailed analysis of the state of the fleets than by using 
the FLBEIA-based analysis. Results are shown in Figure 8.  

64 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Ratios of various indicators for the upper and lower MSY ranges against the baseline (CFP) 
scenario, for the SWW MAP (Bay of Biscay, IAM) in 2021, and for 21 fleets operating in the area. The plot 
on revenue is given amplified so fleet codes are more easily readable. 

Despite higher effort which is associated with higher variable costs (around 25% higher), 
revenues become substantially higher in the MAP-upp scenario, due to important 
increases in catch per unit effort. 

1.2.2. South-western waters – Iberian Peninsula 

I. State of the fisheries by 2021 

65 

 
 
 
 
Figure  9.  Ratios  of  various  indicators  for  the  upper  and  lower  MSY  ranges  against  the  baseline  (CFP) 
scenario, for the SWW MAP (Iberian waters, FLBEIA) in 2021, and for nine stocks in the area.  

As expected, biomass and SSB are always higher in the FMSYlow (>5-15% ), and lower in 
the  FMSYupp  scenario  (  up  to  10%)  compared  to  the  baseline  scenario.  The  risk  of  SSB 
falling below Blim is null for all the stocks and the risk of falling below Bpa is significant 
only for horse mackerel. For this stock the probability to fall below Blim is double under 
FMSYupp  than  in  the  baseline  scenario  and  under  FMSYlow  is  75%  lower.  TACs  and  total 
catch are up to 30% higher in the FMSYupp scenario and in the FMSYlow scenario catch is 
only  lower  than  in  baseline  scenario  for  horse  mackerel  (~15%  lower).  Inter-annual 
variability  is  always  higher  in  FMSYlow  scenario.  Quota  uptake  depends  greatly  on  the 
stock and scenario.  

66 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. State of the fleets by 2021 

Figure 10. Ratios of various indicators for the upper and lower MSY ranges against the baseline (CFP) 
scenario, for the SWW MAP (Iberian waters, FLBEIA) in 2021, and for five fleets operating in the area. 
Codes  for  the  fleets  are:  DFN_SP:  Spanish  netters;  DTS_PT:  Portuguese  trawlers;  DTS_SP:  Spanish 
trawlers;  HOK_SP:  Spanish  hooks  (handliners  and  longliners);  PGP_PT:  Portuguese  polyvalent  vessels 
using passive gear. 

In 2021 all the indicators except fixed cost and number of vessels follow similar trends. 
They are all around 30% and 40% higher in the FMSYupp scenario than in the baseline.  

In  terms  of  revenue,  under  the  FMSYlow  scenario  the  differences  with  the  baseline  are 
minimal for Spanish fleets (DFN_SP, DTS_SP and HOK_SP). For the Portuguese fleets 
revenues are between 20% and 25% lower than in the baseline. 

67 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary tables reflecting the 2015 STECF analysis 

Analysis of the scenarios under Options 1 and 259: 

Table 12. Indication of approximate values of certain biological and economic variables under Option 2 as 
compared to Option 1 (Baseline). Values under Option 1 are set to 100 for comparison. 

Option 1 
(Baseline) 

North-western waters 

Option 2 (MAPs) 

South-western  waters  (separately 
for  Bay  of  Biscay  and  Iberian 
waters) 

Systematic 
choice of 
FMSYlow 

Systematic 
choice of 
FMSYhigh 

Systematic 
choice of 
FMSYlow 

Systematic 
choice of 
FMSYhigh 

Fishing 
mortality (F) 

Fishing effort 
and cost 

TACs, catch 
and revenue 
from catch 

100 

100 

100 

75 

75 

80 

125 

125 

120 

75 (B. of B) 
85 (Iberia) 

80-90 (B. of B.) 
140 (Iberia) 

75 (B. of B) 
85 (Iberia) 

80-90 (B. of B.) 
140 (Iberia) 

75 (B. of B) 
85 (Iberia) 

100 (B. of B.) 
125 (Iberia) 

Quota uptake 

100 

70-100 

100-120 

80 (B. of B.) 

75-150 (B. of 
B.) 

Inter-annual 
variability of 
catch 

100 

100-150 

40-100 

200 (B. of B.) 
120-190 (Iberia) 

0-100 (B. of B.) 
90 (Iberia) 

Biomass 

100 

100-120 

95 

125-150 (B. of 
B.) 
110-120 (Iberia) 

75 (B. of B.) 
95 (Iberia) 

59With  Reference  to  the  two  original  options  submitted  to  STECF  in  2015.  Please  see  information  in  the  box 
'Background: Developments since the analysis  by STECF' 

68 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Fleet dependency 

I. North-western waters 

Table 13. Top 10 higher employment fleet segments in North-western waters, and dependency indicator. 

Country  

Gear  

Overall length 
(m) 

No of Fishers 
employed  

Dependency on  
target species 
(%).  

UK 

ES 

ES 

UK 

UK 

UK 

UK 

UK 

FR 

NL 

Pots and traps 

00-10 

Trawlers and 
seiners 

Hooks 

Trawlers and 
seiners 
Drift and fixed 
nets 
Trawlers and 
seiners 

Hooks 

Trawlers and 
seiners 
Trawlers and 
seiners 

24-40 

24-40 

18-24 

00-10 

12-18 

00-10 

24-40 

18-24 

Beam trawlers 

>40 

2846 

1632 

1595 

1080 

1011 

971 

860 

798 

783 

734 

15.6 

23.1 

32.2 

30.7 

33.8 

59.7 

2.8 

23.0 

38.3 

0.0 

69 

 
 
 
 
II. South-western waters 
Table 14. Fleets with highest dependency (≥ 20%). Those employing more than 500 workers are shaded. 

Country 

Gear  

Overall length 
(m) 

No of Fishers 
employed  

Dependency on  
target species 
(%).  

117 

278 

7 

330 

619 

351 

342 

327 

53 

588 

66 

579 

124 

51 

48 

44 

41 

40 

35 

32 

31 

25 

21 

20 

20 

ES 

FR 

FR 

FR 

FR 

PT 

ES 

FR 

PT 

ES 

PT 

FR 

PT 

Drift and fixed 
nets 
Drift and fixed 
nets 
Other active 
gears 
Drift and fixed 
nets 
Trawlers and 
seiners 
Drift and fixed 
nets 
Drift and fixed 
nets 
Drift and fixed 
nets 
Trawlers and 
seiners 
Drift and fixed 
nets 
Trawlers and 
seiners 
Drift and fixed 
nets 
Drift and fixed 
nets 

24-40 

18-24 

10-12 

12-18 

12-18 

18-24 

18-24 

24-40 

18-24 

12-18 

12-18 

10-12 

10-12 

70 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15. Top 10 higher employment fleet segments with the number of employed people and dependency 
degree. Those with a dependency above 10% are highlighted as shaded. 

Country 

Gear  

Overall length 
(m) 

No of Fishers 
employed  

Dependency on  
target species 
(%).  

ES 

ES 

PT 

PT 

ES 

ES 

ES 

ES 

PT 

ES 

Polyvalent 

Dredges 

Active and 
passive gear 

Polyvalent 

Trawlers and 
seiners 

Hooks 

Purse-seines 

Hooks 

Purse-seines 

Purse-seines 

00-10 

00-10 

00-10 

00-10 

24-40 

24-40 

24-40 

12-18 

18-24 

18-24 

4,223 

4,013 

2,852 

2,415 

1,632 

1,595 

1,123 

1,040 

1,002 

998 

2 

0 

0 

5 

14 

8 

0 

16 

0 

0 

71 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 6.  

Models used by STECF in simulations 

The main models used by STECF were FLBEIA and IAM. Further explanations on how 
the models were used can be found in the EWG Report STECF 15-0860 (especially Table 
IV) and Annexes 1 to VI to that report. 

Both  models  tackle  the  very  complex  interaction  between  the  human  utilisation  of 
ecosystem services and the dynamics of the ecosystem which provide such services. As 
such, the models project into the future the major components of the system and do not 
try  to  model/describe  all  the  existing  factors  and  their  interactions.  These  models  are 
particularly  suitable  to  compare  the  added  value  of  different  scenarios  in  relation  to  a 
baseline,  which  is  the  main  objective  of  this  study,  and  should  not  be  used  to  infer  in 
absolute numerical terms the outcome of each scenario/option.   

---------------------- 

60   https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/43805/1023356/2015-07_STECF+15-08+-

+MAPs+SWW+and+NWW_JRC96964.pdf  

72 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Annex 7.  

Coherence between different EU multiannual plans and 
overview of EU multiannual plan for Baltic fisheries  

Coherence between EU multiannual plans for fisheries 

One of the key tools provided by the CFP is the EU multiannual plan. Since the entry 
into force of the current Basic Regulation in 2014, only one EU multiannual plan has 
been adopted, concerning the Baltic Sea61, while the multiannual plan concerning the 
North Sea62 is still being negotiated between the EP and the Council and the MAP for 
pelagic species in the Adriatic is still being discused between the Member States in 
Council and in the European Parliament..   

At the time of submission of this Impact Assessment work is ongoing on the proposals 
for multiannual plans for fisheries in the Western Mediterranean.  

The coherence between the multiannual plans for western waters and the other 
multiannual plans referred to above relate to their shared objectives of reaching 
sustainable fishing levels by 2020 at the latest. The multiannual plans also all include 
provisions to facilitate the implementation of the landing obligation, and to enable the 
process of regional decision making for concrete management and conservation 
measures. Within this shared framework, each multiannual plan retains specificities 
stemming from the particular characteristics and problems faced by the fisheries and sea 
basins concerned.  

Baltic multiannual plan 
In July 2016, the multiannual plan for Baltic fisheries was adopted. The main elements 
are presented below. 

The Regulation establishes a multiannual plan for stocks of cod, herring and sprat in the 
Union waters of the Baltic Sea and for the fisheries exploiting the stocks concerned. It 
also contains measures concerning plaice, flounder, turbot and brill caught as by-catch in 
the Baltic Sea. 

Fishing mortality ranges 
The plan includes fishing mortality targets in the form of FMSY ranges in an annex to the 
plan, for the stocks covered by the plan. The FMSY ranges will be split into two parts and 
the use of the upper part of the ranges is conditioned as follows: the upper part of the 
range may only be used due to mixed-fisheries issues, to avoid serious harm to a stock 
caused by intra- or inter-species stock dynamics, or to limit variations in fishing 
opportunities between consecutive years to not more than 20%. Furthermore the upper 
part of the range can be used, when a stock is fished in accordance with MSY.  

61 Regulation (EU) 2016/1139 establishing a multiannual plan for the stocks of cod, herring and sprat in 
the Baltic Sea and the fisheries exploiting those stocks, amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2187/2005 
and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1098/2007 
62 Proposal for a regulation establishing a multiannual plan for demersal stocks in the North Sea and the 
fisheries exploiting those stocks and repealing Council Regulation (EC) 676/2007 and Council Regulation 
(EC) 1342/2008 

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The plan does not include an empowerment to the Commission to update the ranges 
when scientific advice changes. 

Safeguards 
The plan stipulates biomass safeguards for the main targeted stocks. Whenever the 
biomass of a stock falls below a certain threshold, stipulated in an Annex to the plan, 
remedial action shall be taken. This may include setting a TAC at a fishing mortality 
level below the FMSY ranges, suspending the targeted fishery for the stock in question and 
taking further measures, including technical measures of measures related to the landing 
obligation. 

Regionalised measures 
The plan empowers the Commission to adopt specific conservations measures when 
scientific advice states that remedial action is required to protect any of the stocks 
covered by this regulation. The plan also empowers the Commission to adopt follow-up 
measures of the current "discard plans", i.e. exemptions from the landing obligation. As 
established in Art. 18 of the Basic Regulation, both kind of regionalised measures will be 
based on Joint Recommendations from the Member States concerned and will be adopted 
as delegated acts. 

Control measures 
The plan sets out additional control measures, such as the use of prior notifications and 
logbooks and establishing thresholds for the obligation to land catches in designated 
ports as required by the fisheries Control Regulation Regulation (EC)63. 

Evaluation of the plan 
The Commission shall report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the 
results and impact of the plan on the stocks covered by this Regulation three years after 
the date of entry into force of the Regulation and every five years thereafter. 

63 Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 establishing a Union control system for ensuring compliance 
with the rules of the common fisheries policy 

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Annex 8 

Impact Assessment: Multiannual plan for the Demersal Stocks and 
their Fisheries in the Western EU Waters (WW IA). 
List of changes following 2nd Opinion of Regulatory Scrutiny Board 
(RSB) Ares(2017)4766788 – 29/09/2017 

The following are changes made to the revised document, based upon the comments and 
concerns of the RSB, specifically those detailed in section C "Further considerations and 
adjustment requirements" of their Opinion document received 29/9/17  

1) Address the implications of the UK's departure from the EU 
Page 15 – Paragraph inserted on "implications of 'Brexit'" 
Page 32 - further detail on Brexit and admin burden 

2) Streamline the description of options and improve the analysis of impacts 
Page 23 - some re-wording and grammatical changes to improved clarity and flow. 
Page 30 - changes to description of Option 3 wording to help clarify and differentiate 
from other options and prevent any prejudgement of elements of the eventual policy 
choice 
Page 31-32 - included more detail on what is considered a + or - in analysis and 
comparison of options in response to RSB concerns/comments on clear differentiation of 
benefits and costs (last paragraph of opinion) 
Page 33-34 – Restructuring of impacts and further information on what is considered 
positive or negative and summary paragraph to help explain why some terms/ variables 
are considered to have positive impacts and to reduce repetitive narrative. 
Page 35-36 – some minor grammar and re-wording to help with clarity. 

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