COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Turkey 2018 Report Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2018 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy
Date: 2018-04-17
Institutions: Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission
Subjects: Türkiye, accession criteria, accession negotiations, pre-accession strategy

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Strasbourg, 17.4.2018  SWD(2018) 153 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Turkey 2018 Report Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2018 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy {COM(2018) 450 final} - {SWD(2018) 150 final} - {SWD(2018) 151 final} - {SWD(2018) 152 final} - {SWD(2018) 154 final} - {SWD(2018) 155 final} - {SWD(2018) 156 final}  
 
 
Table of Contents 

1.  INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 3 

1.1.   Context ......................................................................................................................... 3 

1.2.   Summary of the report .................................................................................................. 3 

2. FUNDAMENTALS FIRST: POLITICAL CRITERIA AND RULE OF LAW CHAPTERS ............................. 8 

2.1.  Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform ................. 10 

2.1.1 Democracy ................................................................................................................ 10 

2.1.2 Public administration reform .................................................................................... 19 

2.2. Rule of law and fundamental rights ............................................................................... 22 

2.2.1 Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights .......................................................... 22 

2.2.2 Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security ................................................................ 41 

3. FUNDAMENTALS FIRST: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT & COMPETITIVENESS .............................. 52 

3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy............................................................ 52 

3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU ....... 58 

4. REGIONAL ISSUES AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ........................................................... 60 

5. ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP ........................................................ 62 

5.1.  Chapter 1: Free movement of goods .......................................................................... 62 

5.2.  Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers .......................................................... 64 

5.3.   Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services .......................... 65 

5.4.  Chapter 4: Free movement of capital ......................................................................... 65 

5.5.  Chapter 5: Public procurement ................................................................................... 66 

5.6.  Chapter 6: Company law ............................................................................................ 68 

5.7.   Chapter 7: Intellectual property law ........................................................................... 69 

5.8.  Chapter 8: Competition policy ................................................................................... 70 

5.9.   Chapter 9: Financial services ..................................................................................... 71 

5.10.  Chapter 10: Information society and media ............................................................... 72 

5.11.  Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development ......................................................... 73 

5.12.  Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy ................................... 74 

5.13.  Chapter 13: Fisheries .................................................................................................. 75 

5.14.  Chapter 14: Transport Policy ..................................................................................... 76 

5.15.   Chapter 15: Energy ..................................................................................................... 78 

5.16.  Chapter 16: Taxation .................................................................................................. 80 

5.17.  Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy .............................................................. 81 

5.18.   Chapter 18: Statistics .................................................................................................. 82 

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5.19.  Chapter 19: Social policy and employment ............................................................... 83 

5.20.  Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy .............................................................. 85 

5.21.  Chapter 21: Trans-European Networks ...................................................................... 87 

5.22.  Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments ............. 87 

5.25.  Chapter 25: Science and research ............................................................................... 88 

5.26.   Chapter 26: Education and culture ............................................................................. 89 

5.27.  Chapter 27: Environment and climate change ........................................................... 90 

5.28.  Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection ............................................................. 92 

5.29.   Chapter 29: Customs union ........................................................................................ 94 

5.30.  Chapter 30: External relations .................................................................................... 95 

5.31.   Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy ...................................................... 96 

5.32.   Chapter 32: Financial control ..................................................................................... 98 

5.33.   Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions ...................................................... 100 

ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND TURKEY .......................................................... 102 

ANNEX II – STATISTICAL ANNEX.............................................................................................. 104 

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1.  INTRODUCTION 

1.1.   Context  

Turkey  remains  a  key  partner  for  the  European  Union.  Turkey  has  been  linked  to  the  EU  by  an 
Association  Agreement  since  1964  and  a  Customs  Union  was  established  in  1995.  The  European 
Council  granted  the  status  of  candidate  country  to  Turkey  in  December  1999  and  accession 
negotiations  were  opened  in  October  2005.  Within  the  framework  of  accession  negotiations,  16 
chapters have been opened so far and one of these was provisionally closed. The Turkish government 
reiterated its commitment to EU accession but this has not been matched by corresponding measures 
and  reforms.  On  the  contrary,  Turkey  has  been  moving  away  from  the  European  Union.  The 
Presidency conclusions of December 2016 stated that under the currently prevailing circumstances, no 
new chapters are considered for opening. 

The  EU  and  Turkey  continued their  dialogue  and  cooperation  in  the  areas  of  joint  interest including 
with a number of high-level visits, Leaders' meetings in May 2017 and March 2018 and a High Level 
Political  Dialogue  in  July  2017.  Dialogue  was  pursued  on  foreign  and  security  policy,  notably  on 
Syria, Libya and Iraq, and a counter-terrorism dialogue was held in November 2017. Turkey and the 
EU  further  developed  their  cooperation  in  the  areas  of  energy,  transport  and  economy  and  trade, 
supported by high level dialogues. In December 2016, the Commission adopted a recommendation to 
open  negotiations  in  view  of  the  extension  and  modernisation  of  the  EU-Turkey  Customs  Union, 
which has since been under consideration in the Council. 

During  2017,  the  implementation  of  the  March  2016  EU-Turkey  Statement  has  continued  to  deliver 
concrete results in reducing irregular and dangerous crossings and in saving lives in the Aegean Sea. 
Turkey  sustained its  outstanding  efforts to  provide  massive and  unprecedented  humanitarian  aid  and 
support to more than 3.5 million refugees from Syria and some 365 000 refugees from other countries. 
Turkey and the EU further built on the fruitful cooperation under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. 
By  the  end  of  December  2017,  the  full  envelope  of  EUR  3  billion  had  been  contracted,  with  72 
projects and almost 1.2 million of the most vulnerable refugees benefited from monthly cash-transfers. 
Disbursements reached EUR 1.95 billion to date.  
1.2.   Summary of the report1 

The state of emergency declared in the wake of the attempted coup of 15 July 2016 remains in force, 
aiming  at  dismantling  the  Gülen  movement,  designated  by  the  Turkish  authorities  as  a  terror 
organisation  responsible  of  the  coup  attempt,  as  well  as  at  supporting  the  fight  against  terrorism, 
against the background of repeated attacks in Turkey.  

The EU, which immediately and strongly condemned the attempted coup, reiterated its full support for 
the  country's  democratic  institutions,  and  recognised  Turkey's  legitimate  need  to  take  swift  and 
proportionate  action  in  the  face  of  such  a  serious  threat.  However,  the  broad  scale  and  collective 
nature,  and  the  disproportionality  of  measures  taken  since  the  attempted  coup  under  the  state  of 
emergency, such as widespread dismissals, arrests, and detentions, continue to raise serious concerns. 
Turkey should lift the state of emergency without delay. 

Serious shortcomings affect the 31 decrees taken to date under the state of emergency. They have not 
been  subject  to  a  diligent  and  effective  scrutiny  by  parliament.  Consequently,  the  decrees  have  long 
not  been  open  to  judicial  review  and  none  of  them  has  yet  been  subject  to  a  decision  by  the 
Constitutional Court. These emergency decrees have notably curtailed certain civil and political rights, 
including freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and procedural rights. They also amended key 
pieces of legislation which will continue to have an effect when the state of emergency is lifted.  

1  This  report  covers  the  period  from  September  2016  to  February  2018.  It  is  based  on  input  from  a  variety  of  sources, 
including  contributions  from  the  government  of  Turkey,  the  EU  Member  States,  European  Parliament  reports  and 
information from various international and non-governmental organisations.  

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Since the introduction of the state of emergency, over 150 000 people were taken into custody, 78 000 
were arrested and over 110 000 civil servants were dismissed whilst, according to the authorities, some 
40 000 were reinstated of which some 3 600 by decree.  

A State of Emergency Appeal Commission became operational and received altogether some 107 000 
appeal requests. This Commission only started to take decisions in December 2017 and it has so far 
provided  redress  to  only  few  applicants.  Its  decisions  are  open  to  judicial  review.  It  still  needs  to 
develop  into  an  effective  and  transparent  remedy  for  those  unjustly  affected  by  measures  under  the 
state of emergency. 

Beyond the Appeal Commission, the capacity of Turkey to ensure an effective domestic legal remedy 
in  the  sense  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  has  been  further  undermined  by  a  number  of 
unfortunate precedents. In one instance a lower court refused to observe a ruling of the Constitutional 
Court  regarding  an  emblematic  case;  a  follow  up  ruling  by  the  Constitutional  Court  for  one  of  the 
defendants was eventually abided with by a lower court. Several court rulings favorable to prominent 
defendants, including Human Rights Defenders, were swiftly reversed by another or even by the same 
court, in some instances following comments from the executive.  

Key  recommendations  of  the  Council  of  Europe  and  its  bodies  are  yet  to  be  addressed  by  Turkey. 
Allegations  of  wrongdoing  need  to  be  established  by  transparent  procedures  and  on  an  individual 
basis.  Individual  criminal  liability  can  only  be  established  with  full  respect  for  the  separation  of 
powers, the full independence of the judiciary and the right of every individual to a fair trial. Turkey 
should lift the state of emergency without delay.  

In  April  2017,  Turkey  held  a  referendum  which  approved  by  a  close  majority  constitutional 
amendments  introducing  a  presidential  system.  The  amendments  were  assessed  by  the  Venice 
Commission as lacking sufficient checks and balances as well as endangering the separation of powers 
between the  executive  and  the  judiciary.  The  referendum  itself  raised  serious  concerns in  relation  to 
the overall negative impact of the state of emergency, the 'unlevel playing field' for the two sides of the 
campaigns and undermined safeguards for the integrity of the election.  

Under the state of emergency, the Parliament's key function as legislative power was curtailed, as the 
government resorted to emergency decrees with 'the force of law' to also regulate issues which should 
have  been  processed  under  the  ordinary  legislative  procedure.  In  light  of  the  worsening  political 
frictions  in  the  country,  the  space  for  dialogue  among  political  parties  was  further  narrowed  in 
Parliament. Following the one-off lifting of parliamentary immunities in May 2016, many lawmakers 
of the opposition party HDP have been arrested and ten of them were stripped of their seats. 

The  President  role  over  the  executive  increased,  following  several  transfers  of  powers  to  the 
Presidency  through  emergency  decrees.  The appointment  of  trustees to  replace  municipal  executives 
and elected representatives led to an important weakening of local democracy. 

Civil  society  came  under  increasing  pressure,  notably  in  the  face  of  a  large  number  of  arrests  of 
activists, including human rights defenders, and the recurrent use of bans of demonstrations and other 
types  of  gatherings,  leading  to  a  rapid  shrinking  space  for  fundamental  rights  and  freedoms.  Many 
rights-based organisations remained closed as part of the measures under the state of emergency and 
an effective legal remedy has not been available with respect to confiscations.  

The government overhauled the legal framework governing the civil-military relations and increased 
the powers of the executive over the military significantly, thereby strengthening civilian oversight. As 
part  of  the  constitutional  amendments,  high  military  courts  were  effectively  abolished.  The  military 
and intelligence services continue to lack sufficient accountability in Parliament.  

The situation in the south-east has continued to be one of the most acute challenges for the country. 
The  deteriorated  security  situation  has  in  part  shifted  to  rural  areas.  The  government’s  pledge  to 
continue  security  operations,  against  the  background  of  recurrent  violent  acts  by  the  Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK), which remains on the EU list of persons, groups and entities involved in acts of 

4 

 
terrorism, remained as a defining element of the situation in the region. While the government has a 
legitimate right to fight against terrorism, it is also responsible for ensuring this is done in accordance 
with  the  rule  of  law,  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms.  Anti-terror  measures  need  to  be 
proportionate. The government's investment plan for the reconstruction of damaged areas in the south-
east  has  resulted  in  the  ongoing  construction  of  thousands  of  dwellings  but  only  few  internally 
displaced persons received compensation so far. There were no developments on the resumption of a 
credible political process which is needed to achieve a peaceful and sustainable solution. 

Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of public administration reform, with a strong commitment 
to  a  more  open  administration  and  the  use  of  e-government.  However,  there  has  been  serious 
backsliding  in  the  area  of  public  service  and  human  resources  management  and  in  the  area  of 
accountability of the administration with regard to the right to administrative justice and the right to 
seek compensation.  A transparent and effective remedy still needs to  be provided  for the large-scale 
dismissals.  

Turkey’s judicial system is at an early stage of preparation. There has been further serious backsliding 
in  the  past  year,  in  particular  with  regard  to  the  independence  of  the  judiciary.  The  Constitutional 
amendments  governing  the  Council  of  Judges  and  Prosecutors  (CJP)  entered  into  force  and  further 
undermined  its  independence  from  the  executive.  The  CJP  continued  to  engage  in  large-scale 
suspensions  and  transfers  of  judges  and  prosecutors.  No  efforts  were  made  to  address  concerns 
regarding the lack of objective, merit-based, uniform and pre-established criteria in the recruitment and 
promotion of judges and prosecutors.  

The  country  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  fight  against  corruption,  where  no  progress  has 
been  achieved.  The  legal  and  institutional  framework  needs  further  alignment  with  international 
standards and continues to allow undue influence by the executive in the investigation and prosecution 
of high-profile corruption cases. Turkey’s track record of investigation, prosecution and conviction in 
corruption  cases  remained  poor,  particularly  regarding  high-level  corruption  cases.  No  progress  was 
made in bolstering the accountability and the transparency in the work of public bodies. A broad, inter-
party  political  consensus  and  strong  political  will  are  required  to  fight  against  corruption  decisively. 
Turkey still needs to follow up on nearly all recommendations of the Council of Europe's Assembly of 
the Group of States against Corruption. Corruption remains prevalent in many areas and continues to 
be a serious problem. Corruption perception also remains high.  

Turkey  has  achieved  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  fight  against  organised  crime  and  some 
progress  was  made  with  the  adoption  of  a  new  strategy  and  improved  institutional  capacity.  Turkey 
needs  to  improve  its  legislation  on  cybercrime,  asset  confiscation  and  witness  protection.  Data 
protection  legislation  is  in  place  but  it  is  not  yet  in  line  with  European  standards.  Financial 
investigations  remain  underused.  Precautionary  freezing  of  assets  is  rarely  applied  and  the  level  of 
confiscated assets is low. In the fight against terrorism, a comprehensive legal framework on terrorism 
financing  is  in  place.  Both  the  criminal  and  anti-terror  legislation  need  to  be  aligned  with  European 
Court of Human Rights case-law. The proportionality principle must be observed in practice.  

Turkey made good progress in the area of migration and asylum policy and remained committed to 
the implementation of the March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement effective management of migratory flows 
along  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  route.  As  regards  the  implemenation  of  the  Visa  Liberalisation 
Roadmap, at the beginning of February, Turkey submitted to the European Commission a work plan 
outlining  how  Turkey  plans  to  fulfill  the  seven  outstanding  visa  liberalisation  benchmarks.  The 
Commission  is  assessing  Turkey's  proposals  and  further  consultations  with  the  Turkish  counterparts 
will follow. 

The  Turkish  legal  framework  includes  general  guarantees  of  respect  for  human  and  fundamental 
rights,  which  have  however  been  further  challenged  and  undermined  by  a  number  of  emergency 
decrees. The serious backsliding on the freedom of expression continued, an area where Turkey is at 
an  early  stage  of  preparation.  The  scope  of  actions  taken  under  the  state  of  emergency  has  been 

5 

 
extended  over  time  to  many  critical  voices,  in  media  and  academia  amongst  others,  in  contradiction 
with  the  principle  of  proportionality.  Criminal  cases  against  journalists  –  more  than  150  of  them 
remain detained – human rights defenders, writers, or social media users, withdrawal of press cards, as 
well  as  the  closure  of  numerous  media  outlets  or  the  appointment  by  the  government  of  trustees  to 
administer them, are of serious concern and are mostly based on selective and arbitrary application of 
the  law,  especially  provisions  on  national  security  and  the  fight  against  terrorism.  The  Internet  Law 
and  the  general  legal  framework  continue  to  enable  the  executive  to  block  online  content  without  a 
court  order  on  an  inappropriately  wide  range  of  grounds.  There  was  also  serious  backsliding  in  the 
areas  of  freedom  of  assembly,  freedom  of  association,  procedural  and  property  rights.  Freedom  of 
assembly  continues  to  be  overly  restricted,  in  law  and  practice.  Measures  adopted under  the  state  of 
emergency  also  removed  crucial  safeguards  protecting  detainees  from  abuse  thereby  augmenting  the 
risk of impunity, in a context where allegations of ill-treatment and torture have increased. Emergency 
decrees  imposed  additional  restrictions  to  procedural  rights  including  on  the  rights  of  defence.  The 
enforcement  of  rights  is  hindered  by  the  fragmentation  and  limited  mandate  of  public  institutions 
responsible  for  human  rights  and  freedoms  and  in  a  context  where  the  judiciary's  independence  has 
been  undermined.  Extreme  poverty  and  a  lack  of  basic  necessities  remain  common  among  Roma 
households in Turkey. The rights of the most vulnerable groups and of persons belonging to minorities 
should  be  sufficiently  protected.  Gender-based  violence,  discrimination,  hate  speech  against 
minorities,  hate  crime  and  violations  of  human  rights  of  lesbian,  gay,  bisexual,  transgender  and 
intersex persons are still a matter of serious concern.  

Turkey  expressed  support  for  the  talks  on  the  Cyprus  settlement  between  the  leaders  of  the  two 
communities, and for the efforts of the UN Secretary-General and his Special Adviser. A Conference 
on Cyprus, convened in Geneva in January 2017 and in Crans-Montana in July 2017, closed without 
an  agreement.  Turkey  has  still  not  fulfilled  its  obligation  to  ensure  full  and  non-discriminatory 
implementation  of  the  Additional  Protocol  to  the  Association  Agreement  and  has  not  removed  all 
obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on direct transport links with Cyprus. 
There was no progress on normalising bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus. The conclusions 
on  Turkey  that  were  adopted  by  the  Council  of  the  European  Union  and  endorsed  by  the  European 
Council  in  December  2006  remain  in  force.  They  stipulate  that  negotiations  will  not  be  opened  on 
eight chapters2 relating to Turkey’s restrictions regarding the Republic of Cyprus and no chapter will 
be  provisionally  closed  until  the  Commission  confirms  that  Turkey  has  fully  implemented  the 
Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement.  

Cooperation  with  Greece  and  Bulgaria  on  migration  further  intensified.  However,  tensions  in  the 
Aegean  Sea  and  Eastern  Mediterranean  were  not  conducive  to  good  neighbourly  relations  and 
undermined  regional  stability  and  security.  Bilateral  relations  with  several  individual  EU  Member 
States  deteriorated,  including  at  times  offensive  and  unacceptable  rhetoric.  In  March  2018,  the 
European Council strongly condemned Turkey's continued illegal actions in the Eastern Mediterranean 
and the Aegean Sea and recalled Turkey's obligation to respect international law and good neighbourly 
relations and to normalise relations with all EU Member States. The European Council also expressed 
its grave concern over the continued detention of EU citizens in Turkey, including two Greek soldiers, 
and called for the swift and positive resolution of these issues in a dialogue with Member States.  

Turkey needs to commit itself unequivocally to good neighbourly relations, international agreements, 
and  to  the  peaceful  settlement  of  disputes  in  accordance  with  the  United  Nations  Charter,  having 
recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice. In this context, the EU has expressed once 
again  serious  concern  and  urged  Turkey  to  avoid  any  kind  of  threat  or  action  directed  against  a 
Member  State,  or  source  of  friction  or  actions  that  damages  good  neighbourly  relations  and  the 
peaceful settlement of disputes. 

2Free movement of goods, right of establishment and freedom to provide services, financial services, agriculture and rural 
development, fisheries, transport policy, customs union, and external relations. 

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Regarding  the  economic  criteria,  the  Turkish  economy  is  well  advanced  and  can  be  considered  a 
functioning market economy. The economy supported by government stimulus measures, managed to 
recover from the contraction witnessed in the wake of the attempted coup of 2016 and achieved strong 
growth  in  2017.  However,  high  growth  is  coupled  with  significant  macroeconomic  imbalances.  The 
current  account  deficit  remains  high  and  increased  towards  the  end  of  2017,  making  the  country 
dependent on capital inflows and vulnerable to external shocks. Inflation moved to double-digit rates 
(11.1  %) in  2017,  and  the  depreciation  of  the  Turkish  lira  continued,  highlighting  concerns  over  the 
degree  of  commitment  of  monetary  policy  decision-makers  to  price  stability.  Turkey's  economy 
continued to be characterised by a high level of informality. Overall, there was backsliding in this area. 
The  tendency  to  increase  state  control  in  the  economic  sphere  and  the  actions  targeting  companies, 
businessmen and political opponents and their businesses harmed the business environment.  

Turkey has made some progress and has a good level of preparation to cope with competitive pressures 
and market forces within the EU. Turkey is well-integrated with the EU market in terms of both trade 
and investment. Some progress was made in the energy sector, particularly in the gas market, and in 
increasing  research and development  spending. However, significant  problems  remained with  regard 
to the quality of education. There was no progress in improving the transparency of state aid. 

Regarding its ability to assume the obligations of membership, Turkey has continued to align with 
the acquis, albeit at a limited pace. There have been more instances of backsliding regarding a number 
of key aspects in the areas of information society, social policy and employment and external relations. 
Turkey  is  well  advanced  in  the  areas  of  company  law,  trans-European  networks  and  science  and 
research  and  it  has  achieved  a  good  level  of  preparation  in  the  areas  of  free  movement  of  goods, 
intellectual  property  law,  financial  services,  enterprise  and  industrial  policy,  consumer  and  health 
protection,  customs  union  and  financial  control.  Turkey  is  only  moderately  prepared  on  public 
procurement as important gaps remain in its alignment. Turkey is also moderately prepared in the area 
of statistics and transport policy where further significant efforts are needed across the board. Turkey 
has only reached some level of preparation on environment and climate change where more ambitious 
and  better  coordinated  policies  still  need  to  be  established  and  implemented.  In  all  areas,  more 
attention needs to be given to enforce legislation whilst many areas require further significant progress 
to achieve legislative alignment with the EU acquis. 

7 

 
 
2. FUNDAMENTALS FIRST: POLITICAL CRITERIA AND RULE OF LAW CHAPTERS 

Measures under the state of emergency 

The state of emergency declared after the attempted coup of 15 July 2016 remains in force. It 
has  been  extended  six  times,  each  time  for  a  three-month  period,  and  currently  runs  until 
18 April  2018;  its  renewal  for  another  three-month  period,  until  July  2018,  has  been 
announced. Its primary objective is to dismantle the Gülen movement, designated as a terror 
organisation  by  the  Turkish  authorities  in  May  2016  and  considered  responsible  for  the 
organisation and execution of the attempted coup of 15 July 2016. The state of emergency is 
aimed  more  generally  at  supporting  the  fight  against  terrorism,  against  a  background  of 
repeated attacks in Turkey, overall a traumatic period in Turkey. 

The  EU,  which  immediately  and  strongly  condemned  the  attempted  coup,  reiterated  its  full 
support for the country’s democratic institutions and recognised Turkey’s legitimate need to 
take  swift  and  proportionate  action  in  the  face  of  such  a  serious  threat. However,  the  broad 
scale  and  collective  nature  of  measures  taken  since  the  attempted  coup  under  the  state  of 
emergency,  such  as  widespread  dismissals,  arrests  and  detentions,  continue  to  raise  very 
serious concerns. 

Under the state of emergency and until early March 2018, the Council of Ministers issued a 
total  of  31  decrees,  which  have  ‘the  force  of  law’  according  to  the  Constitution.  These 
emergency decrees provided the basis for limiting certain civil and political rights, including 
defence  rights,  expanding  police  powers  and  those  of  prosecutors  for  investigations  and 
prosecutions,  large-scale  dismissals  of  public  officials  and  closures  of  entities  and  the 
liquidation  of  their  assets  by  the  state.  The  decrees  raise  serious  questions  over  the 
proportionality of the measures taken. They have not been subject to a diligent and effective 
scrutiny by parliament which received them for adoption only belatedly; 23 decrees were so 
far adopted by parliament, most of which only in the first quarter of 2018. Consequently, the 
decrees have long not been open to judicial review, as parliament adoption was a necessary 
prior step to any legal challenge before the Constitutional Court; none of them has yet been 
subject to a decision by the Constitutional Court. They affect key rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, such as the right to a fair trial, the right to an effective remedy 
and  the  right  to  protection  of  property.  They  introduce  amendments  to  key  pieces  of 
legislation  which  will  continue  to  have  an  effect  after  the  state  of  emergency,  notably  in 
relation  to  property  rights,  local  authorities,  public  administration  and  audiovisual  policy. 
They also extend to a wide range of issues unrelated to the attempted coup, stipulating among 
other  things  the  requirement  for  university  rectors  to  be  directly  appointed  by  the  President 
and  the  exemption  of  private  radio  and  TV  stations  from  monitoring  for  purposes  of  fair 
campaigning during elections.  

Overall,  over  150 000  people  have  been  taken  into  custody  since  the  state  of  emergency 
began. This included a large number of critical voices. Over 78 000 people have been arrested 
based  on  terror-related  charges,  of  which,  at  the  end  of  January  2018,  54  000  had  been 
released pending trial with judicial control and 24 660 remained in pre-trail detention. Judicial 
processes  involving  suspected  members  of  the  Gülen  movement  and  coup  plotters  raised 
serious questions about the respect of international standards. It is of particular concern that 
relatives  of  suspects  were  directly  or  indirectly  targeted  by  a  series  of  measures,  including 
dismissal  from  public  administration  and  confiscation  or  cancellation  of  passports.  A  set  of 
unofficial  criteria  were  relied  upon  to  determine  alleged  links  to  the  Gülen  movement, 
including the attendance of a child at a school affiliated with the organisation, the deposit of 

8 

 
 
 
money  in  a  bank  affiliated  with  the organisation  or  the  possession  of  the  mobile  messaging 
application  ByLock.  In  September  2017,  the  Court  of  Cassation  held  that  the  possession  of 
ByLock constitutes sufficient evidence for establishing membership of the Gülen movement. 
In  October  2017,  however,  it  ruled  that  sympathising  with  the  Gülen  movement  does  not 
amount  to  being  a  member  of  it  and  therefore  does  not  constitute  sufficient  evidence  of 
membership.  Several  people  who  had  been  arrested  as  a  result  of  alleged  usage  of  ByLock 
were  released,  after  it  was  proven  in  December  2017  that  hundreds  of  people  had  been 
wrongfully accused of using the mobile application.  

In the reporting period, the government also continued its large-scale dismissals of officials 
from  public  service.  A  total  of  115  158  civil  servants,  judges  and  prosecutors  have  been 
dismissed since the introduction of the state of emergency. While a relationship of trust and 
loyalty should exist between civil servants and the state, the broad scale and collective nature 
of  these  measures  raised  serious  questions  with  regard  to  the  lack  of  transparency  in  the 
administrative processes leading to dismissal from the civil service, and the vagueness of the 
criteria  used  to  determine  alleged  links  to  the  Gülen  movement  and  establish  personal 
involvement  in  the  attempted  coup.  Dismissals  have  particularly  affected  the  Ministries  of 
Interior and Education. Thousands of police officers, teachers, academics, health workers and 
members of the judiciary are among those who have been removed from office. Among those 
dismissed  from  the  education  sector  are  teachers  who  are  members  of  a  left-wing  teachers’ 
union, and academics who had signed the ‘Peace Declaration’ of January 2016. Until the State 
of  Emergency  Appeal  Commission  was  established  and  started  handing  down  decisions  in 
December 2017, 3 604 people had been reinstated to office by decree whilst another 36 000 
reinstatements  took  place  (according  to  the  authorities),  following  an  unclear  and  opaque 
administrative process across various institutions. 

In  its  December  2016  opinion,  the  Venice  Commission  assessed  in  detail  the  state  of 
emergency  and  the  decrees  and  found  a  number  of  shortcomings.  In  January  2017,  some 
improvements were made to the measures taken under the state of emergency in response to 
scrutiny  by  the  Council  of  Europe  and  the  recommendations  made  by  its  Secretary-General 
including  the  establishment  of  a  State  of  Emergency  Appeal  Commission.  In  addition,  the 
maximum length of police detention was reduced from 30 days to a maximum of 7 days, with 
the  possibility  of  prolonging  this  by  another  7  days,  and  a  limit  of  only  24  hours  without 
access to a lawyer was introduced.  

The  task  of  the  seven-member  State  of  Emergency  Appeal  Commission,  which  became 
operational in July 2017, is to individually review all complaints it receives. Its decisions will 
be open to judicial review before a designated administrative court in Ankara and then before 
the Constitutional Court. 220 staff, including judges, prosecutors, inspectors, experts and civil 
servants, have been seconded to the Appeal Commission. In August 2017, the Constitutional 
Court ruled some 70 000 individual applications were inadmissible as they had not exhausted 
all  earlier  domestic  remedies,  directing  applicants  to  the  Appeal  Commission  and/or  to 
administrative  courts.  The  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  also  re-directed  some  28 000 
applications it had received to the Appeal Commission. As a result, the Appeal Commission 
had by early March 2018 received altogether some 107 000 appeal requests. Decisions began 
to  be  handed  down  in  December  2017.  Until  early  March  2018,  a  total  of  6  400  cases  was 
examined,  including  1  984  preliminary  examination  decisions  regarding  people  who  were 
reintegrated by decree. The Appeal Commission took over 4 400 examination decisions. Of 
these,  100  were  favourable  and  4  316  were  rejected.  There  is  a  need  for  increased 
transparency in the Appeal Commission’s work and for clear reasoning to be provided for its 

9 

 
 
 
decisions, following an individualised examination of each file based on its own merits. The 
Appeal Commission still needs to develop into an effective and transparent remedy for those 
unjustly affected by measures under the state of emergency. 

It  is  also  crucial  that  the  judicial  safeguards  for  all  those  who  have  been  dismissed  or 
imprisoned  are  based  on  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  and  on  case-law  from 
the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights.  Beyond  the  Appeal  Commission,  the  capacity  of 
Turkey  to  ensure  an  effective  domestic  legal  remedy  in  the  sense  of  the  European  Court  of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) has been further undermined by a number of unfortunate precedents. 
In one instance a lower court refused to observe a ruling of the Constitutional Court regarding 
an emblematic case; a follow up ruling by the Constitutional Court for one of the defendants 
was eventually abided with by a lower court. In its decisions of 20 March 2018, the European 
Court  of  Human  Rights  expressed  support  to  the  reasoning  and  the  role  of  the  Turkish 
Constitutional  Court.  Several  court  rulings  favourable  to  prominent  defendants,  including 
Human Rights Defenders, were also swiftly reversed by another or even by the same court, in 
some instances following comments from the executive.  

In April 2017, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe decided to reopen its full 
monitoring procedure in respect of Turkey, closed since 2005, until its serious concerns about 
the respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law have been addressed. This will 
entail regular visits by rapporteurs to conduct a dialogue with authorities and plenary debates 
to  review  progress.  In  February  2018,  the  Assembly's  Committee  on  Legal  Affairs  and 
Human  Rights  submitted  to  the  plenary  a  report  which  found  a  number  of  serious 
shortcomings  regarding  the  proportionality  of  the  state  of  emergency  in  Turkey  and  urged 
Turkey  to  lift  the  state  of  emergency.  Similar  findings  were  recorded  by  the  Office  of  the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in a Report issued in March 2018 on 
the impact of the state of emergency on human rights in Turkey, including an update on the 
South-East (January – December 2017).  

2.1. 

Functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform 

2.1.1 Democracy 

Constitutional amendments 

In  April  2017,  Turkey  held  a  referendum  which  approved  constitutional  amendments 
introducing  a  presidential  system.  The  Venice  Commission  assessed  the  constitutional 
amendments as lacking sufficient checks and balances as well as endangering the separation 
of  powers  between  the  executive  and  the  judiciary.  The  referendum  itself  raised  serious 
concerns  for  international  monitors  in  relation  to  the  overall  negative  impact  of  the  state  of 
emergency,  the  'unlevel  playing  field'  for  the  two  sides  of  the  campaigns  and  undermined 
safeguards for the integrity of the election. Turkey should use the period of adjustment to the 
new system in order to introduce checks and balances and to safeguard the basic principle of 
democracy, in line with its commitments and obligations as a candidate country and a member 
of  the  Council  of  Europe.  In  view  of  the  far-reaching  implications  of  the  constitutional 
amendments  and  the  close  referendum  result,  the  Turkish  authorities  also  need  to  seek  the 
broadest possible societal consensus on the implementation of the constitutional amendments. 
Turkey needs to address all the recommendations made by the OSCE/ODIHR relating to the 
constitutional referendum and past elections. 

In the aftermath of the attempted coup, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and 
the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) agreed on amendments to the Constitution, aimed at 

10 

 
 
 
in  Turkey.  The  constitutional  amendments  were 
introducing  a  presidential  system 
subsequently  approved,  in  January  2017,  by  a  three  fifths  majority  in  Parliament.  The 
parliamentary process suffered from certain procedural shortcomings. There was no genuine 
opportunity for open discussion with all  political forces  nor  did it involve  civil society,  and 
was  held  against  a  background  of  a  general  ban  on  assemblies  and  rallies  in  Ankara  and  in 
other  parts  of  Turkey.  The  constitutional  changes  were  endorsed  in  a  close-run  referendum 
(51.41 % in favour and 48.59 % against) which took place on 16 April 2017, while the state of 
emergency was in force. The Electoral Commission and Turkish courts rejected all objections 
to  the  results  of  the  referendum.  The  presidential  system  is  set  to  be  fully  operational 
following the next presidential and legislative elections, due to be held in November 2019 at 
the latest. 

The International Referendum Observation Mission conducted by the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe  (OSCE)  concluded  that  the  constitutional  referendum  held  on  16 April  2017  was 
generally  well  administered  and  that  referendum  day  proceeded  in  an  orderly  manner. 
However, it highlighted serious concerns, particularly in relation to the broader environment 
in  which  the  referendum  took  place,  underlining  the  overall  negative  impact  of  the  state  of 
emergency.  It  found  that  the  one-sided  media  coverage  and  the  limitations  on  fundamental 
freedoms  did  not  create  a level  playing  field  in  which  the  two  sides  of  the  campaign  could 
enjoy equal opportunities. The power the Supreme Election Council normally has to penalise 
private radio and television channels for making one-sided, biased broadcasts during election 
removed  under  an  emergency  decree. The 
and 
OSCE/ODIHR  further  found  that  instructions  issued  on  referendum  day,  which  relaxed  the 
validity criteria for ballots, had undermined an important safeguard protecting the integrity of 
the election. 

referendum  campaigns  had  been 

Each sovereign state has the right to decide for itself on the form of its government and state. 
However,  in  its  March  2017  opinion,  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Venice  Commission 
highlighted several features of the new political system which raise particular concerns with 
regards to the basic principles of democracy. It concluded that the constitutional amendments, 
which were drafted without consultations with the Council of Europe, represent a dangerous 
step  backwards  in  Turkey’s  constitutional  democratic  tradition.  The  Venice  Commission 
underlined  that  the  future  presidential  system  was  characterised  by  a  lack  of  the  necessary 
checks and balances required to safeguard against an excessive concentration of power in one 
single  office  and  to  ensure  the  independence  of  the  judiciary.  Under  the  new  system,  the 
President’s  political  accountability  will  be  mainly  limited  to  elections.  Several  provisions 
curtail  the  independence  of  the  judiciary  from  the  executive  and  run  contrary  to  European 
standards. 

Under the new political system brought about by the constitutional amendments, elections of 
the President and of Members of Parliament (which increased from 550 to 600 members) are 
to  be  held  on  the same  day.  The  entry into  force  of  the  presidential  system  will  abolish the 
office of Prime Minister, and vice-presidents and ministers will be appointed directly by the 
President, with no role for Parliament. The President will have the power to:  

→  appoint and dismiss senior government officials; 

→  set national security policies and take the necessary implementation measures; 

→  declare a state of emergency;  

11 

 
 
 
→  issue presidential decrees on executive matters outside the scope of the law; 

→  indirectly dissolve Parliament by calling for new Parliamentary and Presidential elections; 

→  draw up the government budget; 

→  veto laws; and  

→  appoint 4 out of 13 members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors and 12 out of 15 

judges of the Constitutional Court.  

Parliament’s traditional instruments for scrutiny of the executive, such as a vote of confidence 
and the possibility of oral questions to the executive, will no longer be possible; only written 
questions  will  be  able  to  be  addressed  to  vice-presidents  and  ministers.  If  three  fifths  of  its 
members agree,  Parliament  will be able to launch a parliamentary investigation into  alleged 
criminal actions by the President, vice-presidents and ministers related to their functions. The 
principle of precedence of laws over presidential decrees is enshrined in the new system and 
the  President  may  not  issue  decrees  in  areas  reserved  to  the  legislature  by  the  Constitution. 
The President has the power to veto any law although Parliament can override this veto if an 
absolute majority agrees, while Parliament can only apply to the Constitutional Court to annul 
presidential decrees.  

Three constitutional amendments were implemented in May 2017: the reform of the Council 
of Judges and Prosecutors (see Chapter 23 — Judiciary and fundamental rights); the right for 
the President to also chair a political party; and the abolition of high military courts. In these 
constitutional  amendments,  Parliament  was  given  six  months  to  harmonise  ordinary 
legislation with the amendments to the Constitution, but this extensive work has not yet been 
completed. 

Parliament 

Under  the  state  of  emergency,  Parliament’s  key  function  as  the  legislative  power  was 
curtailed,  as  the  government  resorted  to  decrees  with  ‘the  force  of  law’  to  regulate  issues 
which  should  have  been  processed  under  the  ordinary  legislative  procedure.  Parliament 
discussed  only  a  handful  of  key  pieces  of  legislation,  notably  the  law  amending  the 
Constitution  and  controversial  changes  to  its  rules  of  procedure.  Following  the  worsening 
political  frictions  in  the  country,  the  space  for  dialogue  among  political  parties  was  further 
narrowed  in  Parliament.  The  opposition  People's  Democratic  Party  (HDP)  was  particularly 
marginalised, with many HDP lawmakers being arrested on the grounds of alleged support for 
terrorist activities and ten of them being stripped of their seats. The system of parliamentary 
immunity  in  Turkey  should  be  reinforced  to  ensure  the  freedom  of  speech  of  Members  of 
Parliament.  

The ordinary  legislative process was  applied only  to  a handful of key  pieces of legislation, 
since  the  government  resorted  extensively  to  emergency  decrees  with  ‘the  force  of  law’ 
according  to  the  Constitution.  The  31  issued  emergency  decrees  were  used,  under  a  broad 
interpretation of the needs of the state of emergency, for a wide range of social and economic 
policy  issues  (including  the  regulation  of  horse  riding  races  and  use  of  winter  tyres), 
amending  some  altogether  over  360  pieces  of  legislation,  effectively  circumventing  the 
ordinary legislative process. Amendments to Parliament’s rules of procedure were jointly put 
forward  by  the  AKP  and  MHP  in  July  2017  without  any  involvement  of  the  other  political 
parties. They provide for shortened procedures and interventions by Members of Parliament 
(MPs)  and/or  party  groups;  penalties  for  MPs  who  bring  any  protest-related  materials  into 

12 

 
 
 
Parliament;  and  the  possibility  of  temporarily  suspending  a  MP  who  makes  insults  and 
accusations against the history and past of the Turkish nation, makes statements in violation 
of the first four articles of the Constitution in relation to the integrity of the Turkish state, its 
republican form, its anthem and symbols, or uses names and adjectives for the administrative 
structure  of  the  Republic  of  Turkey  that  are  contrary  to  the  Constitution  and  Turkish 
legislation.  These  changes  run  contrary  to  a  long-standing  recommendation  to  Turkey  to 
improve the inclusiveness, transparency, and quality of law-making. They also carry the risk 
of  limiting  the  freedom  of  expression  of  MPs,  in  contravention  of  the  principle  of 
parliamentary privilege, an essential element of parliamentary immunity.  

Parliamentary  oversight  of  the  executive,  which  was  already  weak,  was  further  curtailed 
under  the  state  of  emergency.  There  was  a  lack  of  effective  parliamentary  scrutiny  of 
emergency decrees issued by the government. As of February 2018 all 31 emergency decrees 
had been submitted to  Parliament but  well beyond the set deadlines,  whilst only  23 decrees 
have  been  so  far  discussed  and  approved,  in  some  instance  with  limited  adaptations.  There 
was  no  improvement  in  executive  follow-up  to  ordinary  parliamentary  oversight,  such  as 
committee  work,  parliamentary  questions  or  parliamentary  inquiry  committees.  Some 
parliamentary  committees  scrutinise  government  work  by  assessing  implementation  of  the 
major policies and legislation, but there is no systematic approach. 

Parliamentary  oversight  of  public  spending  also  continues  to  need  improvement.  The  audit 
reports from the Turkish Court of Accounts are only considered in the Planning and Budget 
Committees  in  connection  with  the approval  of the  final  accounts  and  the  draft  government 
budget for the following year, but there is no formal parliamentary discussion of these audit 
reports.  The  special  parliamentary  investigation  committee  set  up  in  October  2016  to  probe 
the  attempted  coup  held  hearings  with  many  witnesses.  Its  draft  report  from  May  2017 
provides a very detailed account of the attempted coup and of the attribution of responsibility 
to the Gülen movement. The opposition criticised the fact that key individuals only submitted 
written  testimonies  and  the  committee  allegedly  failed  to  reveal  the  full  details  of  the 
attempted coup. 

There was no progress  on aligning the  legal  framework on elections and political parties 
with European standards, including the 10 % threshold requirement for parties to obtain seats 
in  national  elections  and  funding  for  political parties  and elections,  in  line  with  outstanding 
recommendations by the OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe's Group of States against 
Corruption  (GRECO).  In  March  2018,  amendments  to  the  laws  on  elections  and  political 
parties  were  approved  by  the  ruling  AKP  supported  by  MHP  and  strongly  criticised  by  the 
opposition  CHP  and  HDP.  They  provided  for  the  possibility  to  form  electoral  alliances 
between  parties,  gave  new  powers  to  the  Supreme  Board  of  Elections  to  relocate  or  merge 
polling stations on security grounds and removed a requirement for ballot papers to be sealed 
by  the  polling  station  officials,  regarded  as  an  important  safeguard  for  the  integrity  of  the 
election. 

Following the one-off lifting of parliamentary immunity in May 2016, a series of detentions 
of and/or arrests of MPs began, mainly from the HDP, mostly based on public speeches and 
on the grounds of alleged support for terrorist activities. As of early March 2018, nine MPs 
from  the  HDP,  including  its  two  co-chairs  Selahattin  Demirtaş  and  Figen  Yüksekdağ, 
remained under arrest. Six of them have been convicted. In addition, one MP from the CHP 
was arrested and initially received a sentence to 25 years imprisonment, which was reduced to 
five  years  and  ten  months,  on  charges  of  revealing  state  secrets,  following  review  by  the 

13 

 
 
 
regional  court  of  appeal.  In  all  these  cases,  MPs  were  subjected  to  long  pre-trial  detention 
before charges were presented before the courts. Until January 2018, requests by HDP MPs to 
appear in person at court hearings were systematically rejected, the courts only granting them 
the  right  to  take  part  through  a  video-conferencing  system.  Despite  numerous  attempts, 
international observers, including from the European Parliament, were denied the right to visit 
the  two imprisoned  HDP  co-chairs.  Ten  MPs  from  the  HDP,  including  one  of  its  co-chairs, 
were stripped of their seats in Parliament. This emphasises that the restrictive interpretation of 
guarantees provided by the Constitution and shortcomings in anti-terror legislation continue to 
pose a direct risk to the freedom of expression of MPs. Freedom of expression of MPs is an 
essential part of democracy and should also be protected when they speak outside Parliament. 

Governance  

The President's role over the executive increased further, in particular with several transfers of 
power  to  the  Presidency  through  emergency  decrees.  A  partial  government  reshuffle  took 
place  in  July  2017.  The  government’s  activities  continued  to  be  marked  by  efforts  to 
dismantle  the  Gülen  movement  and  by  the  security  challenges  it  is  facing,  including  in  the 
south-east.  The  appointment  of  trustees  to  replace  municipal  executives  and  elected 
representatives led to a significant weakening of local democracy. 

The  President  continued  to  weigh  in  over  the  executive,  notably  by  regularly  chairing  the 
Council of Ministers and the National Security Council and steering  the country’s domestic 
and  foreign  policy,  in  line  with  the  current  Constitution.  The  powers  of  the  President  were 
further  strengthened  as,  under  the  state  of  emergency,  decrees  are  made  by  the  Council  of 
Ministers  under  the  chairmanship  of  the  President.  The  President  was  also  given  authority 
over  the  National  Intelligence  Agency  and  the  power  to  directly  appoint  rectors  of  public 
universities.  In  May  2017,  in  accordance  with  one  immediately  applicable  change  to  the 
Constitution, President Erdoğan was elected chair of the ruling AKP. The presidential system 
will enter into full force from the next presidential election. 

Turkey  faced  major  domestic  and  foreign  policy  challenges  during  the  reporting  period. 
Following  the  attempted  coup  in  July  2016,  the  government’s  primary  focus  has  been 
dismantling  the  Gülen  movement  and  tackling  its  influence  over  and  infiltration  of  state 
structures and society. The government increased  its diplomatic efforts to curb the presence 
and  influence  of  the  Gülen  movement  abroad.  Internal  and  cross-border  security  also 
remained major priorities, with the continued risk of spillover from developments in Syria and 
Iraq. Following frequent terror attacks in late 2016, the government further intensified its fight 
against the PKK and conducted frequent operations against Da’esh cells inside Turkey.  

In July 2017, there was a partial cabinet reshuffle affecting 11 out of 26 ministerial posts. The 
cabinet now includes two women, increased from one. 

As  regards  local  government,  the  detention  or  arrest  under  terrorism-related  charges  of 
elected representatives and municipal executives in the east and south-east continued. As of 
November  2017,  93  mayors  and  co-mayors  had  been  dismissed  and  arrested  within  the  last 
three years, of which 22 were released following proceedings and 71 are still in prison. Eleven 
local administrators were sentenced to a total of 89 years and 3 months of imprisonment due 
to terror-related charges. The number of municipalities to which a trustee has been appointed 
increased from 33 up to 99. 94 of these were municipalities run by the Democratic Regions 
Party (DBP), the regional affiliate of the HDP, in relation to alleged links with the PKK, and a 
trustee  was  also  appointed  to  administer  the  Union  of  south-eastern  Anatolia  Region 

14 

 
 
 
Municipalities.  Trustees  were  appointed  to  four  municipalities  run  by  the  AKP,  one  by  the 
MHP, mainly on the grounds of alleged links to the Gülen movement. It is crucial that citizens 
are permitted to choose new local elected representatives in accordance with Turkish law and 
with  the  European  Charter  of  Local  Self-Government,  to  which  Turkey  is  a  party.  In  its 
October  2017  opinion,  the  Venice  Commission  expressed  concerns  over  the  introduction  of 
structural  changes  to  the  system  of  local  government  through  emergency  decree.  In  March 
2017,  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Congress  of  Local  and  Regional  Authorities  adopted  a 
resolution  on  the  situation  of  the  mayors  who  had  been  removed  from  office.  In  a  separate 
development,  seven  mayors  from  the  ruling  AKP,  including  the  mayors  of  Istanbul  and 
Ankara,  were  asked  to  resign  from  office,  as  part  of  a  renewal  of  officials  launched  by  the 
AKP in the aftermath of the constitutional referendum, a move also seen as a further erosion 
of local democracy in Turkey. 

The  Ombudsman  further  built  up  its  track  record.  In  2017,  it  received  17  131  new 
applications in 2017, almost three times as many as on average in the previous four years. It 
completed its examination of some 14 700 cases, and adopted 422 recommendations or partial 
recommendations. The public administration acted on about 65 % of these recommendations, 
confirming a trend of steady increase in their follow-up. The Ombudsman has been active in 
raising  awareness  of  the  role.  However,  lacking  powers  to  initiate  investigations  and  to 
intervene  in  cases  with  legal  remedies,  the  Ombudsman  remained  silent  on  certain  human 
rights  concerns,  most  notably  on  reported  human  rights  violations  in  the  south-east.  The 
limited powers of the Ombudsman reduce the effectiveness of his contribution to the fields of 
human rights and good governance. 

The  legal  framework  insufficiently  protects  Turkey’s  eight 
independent  regulatory 
authorities from undue political interference. They have a broad legal mandate to undertake 
quasi-judicial  regulation,  inspection  and  supervisory  functions  in  their  sectors,  including 
determining  standards  and  tariffs.  Given  these  important  responsibilities,  there  is  a  need  to 
ensure greater accountability and independence for the independent regulatory authorities. 

Civil society 

There  has  been  serious  backsliding  regarding  civil  society  as  it  came  under  increasing 
pressure, notably in the face of a large number of arrests of  activists, including human rights 
defenders,  and  the  recurrent  use  of  bans  of  demonstrations  and  other  types  of  gatherings, 
leading to a rapid shrinking of space for fundamental rights and freedoms. Many rights-based 
organisations remained closed as part of the measures under the state of emergency and they 
have not been offered any legal remedy in relation to confiscations. Despite this, civil society 
remained  active and involved in  public life as  far as was possible. The map of civil  society 
organisations  has  started  to  change  significantly,  with  a  more  visible  role  given  to  the  pro-
government  organisations.  Administrative  burdens, 
international  non-
governmental  organizations  (NGOs),  continue  to  hamper  civil  society  activities.  Systematic 
and  inclusive  mechanisms  for  consulting  a  wide  spectrum  of  civil  society,  notably  on  new 
legislation and policies, need to be put in place and used consistently. 

including  for 

An empowered civil society is a crucial component of any democratic system and should be 
recognised  and  treated  as  such  by  the  state  institutions.  Turkish  civil  society  organisations 
(CSOs) continued to make crucial contributions on key challenges facing the country, notably 
in the areas of education, female workforce participation, awareness-raising regarding ethnic 
and social tolerance, and support for refugees. Many of the more than 23 000 CSOs in Turkey 
are  dedicated  to  researching  or  advocating  on  political  and  social  issues  such  as  education, 

15 

 
 
 
gender rights and environmental justice or to supporting refugees. There are a limited number 
of CSOs operating in the field of human rights. 

Civil society continued to face increasing pressure, in particular following the high number of 
detentions and arrests of civil society activists and human rights defenders. Smear campaigns 
in  some  media  outlets  against  some  of  these  activists,  including  for  accepting  funds  from 
international donors, became a recurrent feature and a matter of serious concern. Defamatory 
public rhetoric cast serious doubt on Turkey’s respect for due process and the presumption of 
innocence. International NGOs also faced difficulties in their work in Turkey, including those 
providing humanitarian aid to refugees. More than 1 400 associations were closed on the basis 
of emergency decrees. These associations were active in a wide spectrum of activities, such as 
children’s rights, women’s rights, cultural rights, and victims’ rights, among others. 358 were 
allowed to reopen following a re-examination of their case. While there has been no effective 
domestic  remedy  available  in  respect  of  confiscation  of  assets  from  CSOs  closed  by 
emergency  decrees,  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  State  of  Emergency  Appeal 
Commission will become effective for the re-establishment of such entities.  

in  place.  Some  associations  and  foundations  are  subject 

Other  barriers  to  civil  society  remain.  Administrative  burdens  imposed  on  NGOs  by  the 
authorities  are  still 
to 
disproportionately  long  and  repetitive  audits.  The  legislation  on  freedom  of  association  for 
national  and  foreign  organisations  and  the  implementation  of  this  legislation  should  be 
brought  in  line  with  European  standards.  Provisions  restricting  registration,  procedures  for 
obtaining required permissions and the functioning of associations need to be revised to meet 
these standards, including to facilitate the work of international NGOs working with refugees 
in Turkey. 

The  EU-Turkey  civil  society  dialogue  programmes  have  so  far  involved  approximately  900 
Turkish  CSOs  together  with  their  counterparts  in  the  EU.  These  programmes  support  the 
development of civil society and enable greater recognition of CSOs at local level. However, 
there is no comprehensive government strategy in place in relation to cooperation with civil 
society. Independent rights-based CSOs are mostly excluded from consultations as part of law 
and policy-making processes and monitoring. Overall, the legal, financial and administrative 
environment  needs  to  be  more  conducive  to  developing  civil  society,  as  there  is  still  no 
coordination  body  for  monitoring,  no  transparent  mechanism  for  public  funding  and  no 
appropriate fiscal incentives. 

Civilian oversight of the security forces 

The  government  overhauled  the  legal  framework  governing  civil-military  relations  in  the 
aftermath  of  the  attempted  coup  of  July  2016  and  significantly  increased  the  powers  of  the 
executive  over  the  military,  thereby  strengthening  civilian  oversight.  High  military  courts 
were abolished. A large number of high-ranking officers were dismissed and arrested on the 
grounds  of  their  alleged  involvement  in  the  attempted  coup.  Security  personnel  who  have 
counter-terrorism  duties  continue  to  enjoy  extensive  legal  protection.  The  military  and 
intelligence services continue to lack sufficient accountability before Parliament. 

Emergency  decrees  introduced  major  changes  to  the  organisational  structure  of  the  Turkish 
armed forces. The force commands  were attached to the Ministry of National Defence. In a 
similar  vein,  the  coast  guard  commands  were  attached  to  the  Ministry  of  Interior.  The 
Supreme Military Council was convened in August 2017. It pursued established practice to a 
large extent in promoting and appointing military staff. Alongside a number of other security 

16 

 
 
 
and  defence  issues,  the  organisational  structure  of  the  National  Intelligence  Agency  (MIT) 
was  overhauled  outside  the  ordinary  legislative  process  through  an  emergency  decree.  The 
MIT  was  brought  under  the  authority  of  the  President.  The  MIT’s  powers  to  gather 
intelligence  about  the  Turkish  armed  forces  and  its  personnel,  abolished  in  2011,  were 
reintroduced. As part of the constitutional amendments, high military courts were effectively 
abolished. 

Despite  credible  reporting  of  serious  allegations  of  human  rights  violations  and  of  the 
disproportionate  use  of  force  by  the  security  forces  in  the  south-east,  the  track  record  of 
judicial  and  administrative  examination  of  these  cases  remains  poor.  A  law  enforcement 
oversight commission, set up in 2016 but lacking independence from the executive and with 
no powers to launch its own investigations, remained ineffective. 

Parliamentary,  administrative  and  judicial  oversight  and  accountability  of  security  and 
intelligence forces remains inadequate. The parliamentary security and intelligence committee 
continued to have a very limited mandate for oversight. The legal framework for overseeing 
military expenditure has not yet been improved. 

Situation in the east and south-east 

The situation in  the south-east has continued to be one of the most  acute challenges for the 
country.  The  deterioration  of  the  security  situation  in  the  region  since  the  collapse  of  the 
Kurdish settlement process in 2015 continued, affecting urban areas to a lesser extent in 2017, 
instead  shifting  to  rural  areas.  The  government’s  pledge  to  continue  security  operations, 
against the background of the recurrent violent acts by the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK) and PKK-affiliated groups, remained a defining element of the situation in the region. 
The PKK remains on the EU list of persons, groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism. 
While the government has  a legitimate right  to fight against  terrorism, it is also responsible 
for  ensuring  that  this  is  done  in  accordance  with  the  rule  of  law,  human  rights  and 
fundamental  freedoms.  Anti-terror  measures  need  to  be  proportionate.  The  government’s 
investment plan for reconstructing damaged areas in the south-east, announced in September 
2016,  has  resulted  in  the  ongoing  construction  of  thousands  of  dwellings.  Only  a  small 
number  of  internally  displaced  persons  have  so  far  received  compensation.  There  were  no 
developments on the resumption of a credible political process which is needed to achieve a 
peaceful and sustainable solution. 

The  PKK  or  its  affiliated  groups  continued  to  commit  a  large  number  of  violent  terrorist 
attacks  during  the  reporting  period, including  the  killing  of individual  politicians.  The  PKK 
killing of a minor in Trabzon stirred anger and condemnation in Turkish society and from all 
political parties. Dozens of other terrorist attacks by the PKK targeted cities in the south-east 
and  east  of  Turkey  and  Istanbul.  The  EU  unambiguously  condemned  these  attacks  and 
expressed solidarity with the families of the victims. 

Province governorates reacted by declaring curfews and security zones, at times open-ended, 
in  at  least  47  districts  in  11  provinces.  These  have  only  been  lifted  in  some  areas.  These 
curfews disrupted the daily lives of the 1.8 million inhabitants of the affected areas, affecting 
their access to healthcare and education. The Venice Commission’s recommendations in their 
June  2016  opinion  on  the  legal  framework  governing  curfews  have  yet  to  be  implemented. 
Investigations into the deaths of civilians in 2015 during security operations under curfews in 
towns  such  as  Cizre  have  not  progressed.  In  March  2017,  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Human 
Rights Commissioner asked to intervene as a third party in 34 ongoing applications before the 

17 

 
 
 
European Court of Human Rights in relation to curfews and to basements where people lost 
their lives in Cizre, in the province of Şırnak and in the Sur district of Diyarbakır. 

Human rights organisations and opposition parties reported serious violations of human rights 
by  security  forces,  including  alleged  instances  of  torture,  ill-treatment,  arbitrary  arrests  and 
breaches  of  procedural  rights.  Ten citizens  have  filed  criminal  complaints  regarding  alleged 
use  of  torture  in  Hakkari.  There  were  several  reported  instances  where  civilians  were 
allegedly  killed  in  anti-terror  operations.  A  report  by  the  Office  of  the  UN  High 
Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  published  in  February  2017  stated  that  it  has  seen  no 
evidence that effective and independent investigations had been conducted into the reported 
killings and the numerous other serious human rights violations allegedly committed between 
July  2015  and  December  2016  in  relation  to  security  operations.  The  UN  Commissioner 
reported  that  human  rights  defenders  face  major  difficulties  in  accessing  areas  affected  by 
ongoing  violence,  also  impeding  their  work  in  the  field  on  forced  disappearances  that 
occurred  in  the  1990s.  Using  a  very  broad  interpretation  of  the  fight  against  terrorism, 
increasing  restrictions  were  put  in  place  on  the  rights  of  journalists  and  human  rights 
defenders  working  on  the  Kurdish  issue.  Other  associations  and  Kurdish-language  media 
outlets were closed. 

There  were  numerous  new  detentions  and  arrests  of  elected  representatives  and  municipal 
executives  in  the  east  and  south-east,  under  terrorism-related  charges,  and  trustees  were 
appointed in their place (See section above — Governance). 

The clearance of landmines continued. The South-eastern Anatolia Project (GAP) continued 
to  run,  with  the  aim  of  improving  socioeconomic  development  in  the  region.  The 
government’s investment plan for reconstructing damaged areas in the south-east, announced 
in  September  2016  and  worth  more  than  EUR 3  billion,  has  resulted  in  the  ongoing 
construction of thousands of dwellings. There were some initial work done by the government 
to  restore  the  cultural,  historical  and  religious  heritage  sites  damaged  in  2015  and  2016. 
However,  civil  society  has  continued  to  be  critical  of  projects  such  as  the  Ilısu  Dam  which 
risks  damaging  natural  habitats,  agricultural  land  and  historical  heritage  sites  such  as 
Hasankeyf. Some neighbourhoods of Sur district in Diyarbakır continued to be closed to the 
public. It was reported that only a small percentage of internally displaced persons have been 
offered  new  housing  and  only  limited  overall  assistance,  including  compensation,  has  been 
made available. The expropriation of Sur district in 2016 by the government remains a legal 
issue.  Cases  brought  by  people  against  the  expropriation  have  been  lost  in  administrative 
courts. 

There  is  still  no  comprehensive,  consistent  approach  in  relation  to  missing  persons,  the 
exhumation  of  mass  graves  and  the  independent  investigation  of  all  alleged  cases  of 
extrajudicial killing by security and law enforcement officers. The February 2017 Council of 
Europe  report  on  missing  persons  and  victims  of  enforced  disappearance  in  Europe 
highlighted  the  excessive  length  of  trials.  Most  of  the  investigations  into  cases  of  enforced 
disappearances from the 1990s are, or will soon be, facing the 20-year statute of limitations. 
The 2011 Uludere/Roboski case on the killing of 34 civilians by the military is pending before 
the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights.  The  2015  recommendations  by  the  UN  Special 
Rapporteur  to  tackle  the  lack  of  prosecutions  over  extrajudicial,  summary  or  arbitrary 
executions have not been followed up. 

18 

 
 
 
The village guard system is still in place, despite criticism. There were reported incidents of 
human  rights  violations  by  village  guards  and  of  the  PKK  kidnapping  and  killing  village 
guards. 

Refugees and internally displaced persons 

At  the  end  of  2017,  Turkey  hosted  the  largest  number  of  refugees  worldwide  for  the  third 
consecutive  year,  comprising  about  3.5  million  Syrians  and  365 000  people  of  other 
nationalities.  Around  228 000  Syrians  live  in  21  camps  managed  by  the  Disaster  and 
Emergency  Management  Agency  (AFAD)  along  the  Turkish-Syrian  border.  Significant 
efforts  were  made  to  provide  wider  access  to  schooling  and  healthcare.  Out  of  1.5  million 
Syrians  of  school  age  in  Turkey,  about  605 000  now  have  access to  primary  and  secondary 
education.  By  the  end  of  2017,  15 700  work  permits  had  been  issued  to  Syrians  under 
temporary protection (see Chapter 24 — Justice, freedom and security). 

There has been only limited progress on the situation of internally displaced persons resulting 
from the violence  in  the  south-east, and only  a  small  percentage  of them have  been offered 
new housing (see section above — Situation in the east and south-east). 

2.1.2 Public administration reform 

Turkey is moderately prepared in the field of public administration reform. There has been 
serious  backsliding  in  the  areas  of  public  service  and  human  resources  management:  no 
effective  remedy  has  been  provided  for  large-scale  dismissals  or  in  relation  to  the 
administration’s accountability, notably the right to administrative justice and the right to seek 
compensation.  At  the  same  time,  very  good  progress  has  been  made  on  e-government.  The 
European  Commission’s  recommendations  from  2016  have  not  been  implemented.  There  is 
still neither a comprehensive public administration reform strategy nor political ownership of 
this reform. Inclusive and systematic public consultations and regulatory impact assessments 
for  major  legal  reforms  have  either  not  been  carried  out  or  have  not  been  publicised.  The 
politicisation  of  the  administration  and  the  low  level  of  female  representation  in  the  higher 
echelons of bureaucracy continue to be of serious concern.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular:  

→  ensure  that  the  State  of  Emergency  Appeal  Commission  becomes  an  effective  remedy 
safeguarding the right of every individual to a fair administrative process; 

→  prepare  changes  to  its  legislation  to  introduce  merit-based,  competitive  recruitment  for 
senior managerial positions in the civil service; 

→ start to systematically conduct impact assessments for planning documents and legislative 
proposals, in line with the legislation in force. 

Policy development and coordination 

Turkey has a coherent policy-making system. Policy coordination among central government 
institutions  has  been  traditionally  strong,  but  annual  planning,  monitoring  and  reporting  of 
whole-of-government  performance  continue  to  be  lacking.  The  planning  process  could  be 
further  improved,  with  greater  participation  by  stakeholders  and  by  ensuring  that  objectives 
are better formulated and targets are properly quantified. The lack of systematic links between 
policy  and  fiscal  planning  has  continued  to  jeopardise  the  implementation  of  strategies, 
reform programmes and legislation. 

19 

 
 
 
With regard to  European integration related issues, a comprehensive legal framework  exists 
for planning and legislative harmonisation with the acquis. The main shortcoming stems from 
unrealistic planning, with a large backlog of legislation to be adopted or amended, and a low 
implementation  rate.  Based  on  the  latest  available  implementation  information  for  2017, 
progress  has  only  been  made  on  only  one  third  of  planned  European  integration-related 
legislative commitments. 

Legislation  and  policy  formulation  do  not  follow  an  inclusive  and  evidence-based  policy 
development process. Draft policies and laws are not subject to public consultation, despite 
legal requirements. The legal requirement to produce medium-term cost estimates and fiscal 
impact  assessments  for  draft  policies  and  laws  continues  not  to  be  respected.  Regulatory 
impact  assessments  are  a  formal  exercise  and  they  are  neither  sent  to  Parliament  nor 
published.  The  lack  of  uniform  monitoring  and  reporting  on  implementation  of  key 
government  programmes  and  sector  work  hinders  effective  public  scrutiny  of  government 
work, especially as most reports are not made publicly available. 

Public financial management 

Turkey  still  does  not  have  an  overarching  public  financial  management  reform 
programme. Overall, fiscal discipline is ensured, despite the absence of an independent fiscal 
council.  Budget  transparency  still  needs  to  be  further  improved  at  various  levels. 
Transparency of public investment programmes and state assets is weak. Participation by civil 
society in the budgetary process remains limited. Legislation to bring revolving funds into the 
budget process is progressing slowly. 

Public service and human resources management 

The Law on Civil Servants gives an extremely broad definition for public service, including 
different categories of public servants such as contractual civil servants, temporary staff and 
other workers who do not all fall under the same legislation. Women’s participation in public 
service, which was around 37 % both in 2016 and 2017, needs to be improved, as does the 
percentage of women in senior managerial positions (7.8 % in 2017 and 7.6 % in 2016). The 
employment rate for staff with disabilities remains short of the 3 % target. 

The  civil  service  legal  framework  does  not  fully  guarantee  neutrality,  continuity  or  merit-
based recruitment and promotion procedures. Investigations into the entry exam procedures 
have  been  further  extended,  following  allegations  that  these  had  been  rigged  by  the  Gülen 
movement. 

The  government  continued  its  large-scale  dismissals  of  public  servants.  While  the  legal 
framework normally guarantees application of uniform criteria for demotion, dismissals and 
disciplinary measures, with provision for appeal against these, the large-scale dismissals made 
under the state of emergency did not identify verifiable evidence relating to each individual 
case and lacked minimum procedural safeguards in the absence of judicial review. At the end 
of  February  2018,  out  of  a  total  number  of  110  778  people  who  had  been  dismissed,  3 604 
people had been reinstated to office by decree whilst another 36 000 reinstatements took place 
(according to the authorities), following an unclear and opaque administrative process across 
various institutions. The State of Emergency Appeal Commission had received some 107 000 
appeal requests by early March 2018 and by that date had completed the examination or pre-
examination of 6 400 cases. The Appeal Commission started to make decisions in December 
2017,  but  so  far  provided  redress  to  only  a  small  number  of  applicants.  There  is a  need  for 
increased  transparency  in  the  Appeal  Commission’s  work  and  for  clear  reasoning  to  be 

20 

 
 
 
provided for its decisions, following an individualised examination of each file based on its 
own  merits.  The  Appeal  Commission  needs  to  examine  all  alleged  wrongdoings  by  these 
public  servants  on  an  individual  basis,  with  due  process  and  transparent  procedures,  thus 
safeguarding the right of every individual to an equitable administrative process. It still needs 
to  develop  into  an effective and transparent remedy  for those unjustly affected by measures 
under the state of emergency. It remains difficult to precisely assess the effect of dismissals 
on the institutional capacity of public administration in Turkey, in particular as the situation 
varies  from  one  ministry  or  governmental  agency  to  another.  The  impact  on  institutional 
capacity  has  been  significant  in  those  public  institutions,  including  in  the  judiciary,  the 
security forces and key regulatory bodies in the areas of public finance, energy, banking and 
capital  markets,  where  a  large  percentage  of  staff,  including  senior  management,  and 
decision-making structures have been affected. 

The State Personnel Presidency continued to lack the necessary coordination and monitoring 
capacity  to  ensure  implementation  of  modern  human  resources  management  policy  and 
standards  across  the  administration.  The  civil  service  remuneration  system  is  not 
standardised  across  institutions  and  lacks  transparency.  Although  central  institutions  offer 
some training and are responsible for some aspects of training policy, the administration lacks 
sufficient tools to support the professional development of civil servants. While integrity in 
public  service  is  boosted  by  ethics  committees  and  an  ethics  board,  set  up  in  the  Prime 
Ministry, no integrity plans have been issued since 2014.  

Accountability of the administration 

The state administration is organised in a hierarchical and rational way, ensuring basic  lines 
of  accountability.  Most  executive  agencies  are  formally  embedded  under  ministries,  while 
they have a lot of autonomy in operational management. Some institutions have  a culture of 
managerial  accountability  and  delegation  of  responsibilities  (see  Chapter  32:  Financial 
control). 

Internal  and  external  oversight  arrangements  regarding  the  citizens’  right  to  good 
administration need to be better implemented. The role of oversight institutions such as the 
Ombudsman remained limited, in the absence of ex officio powers (see Governance). The rate 
at which oversight institutions’ recommendations are implemented is difficult to assess due to 
a lack of data collection.  

Citizens'  right  to  access  public  information  is  regulated  by  the  law  on  the  right  to 
information,  which  does  not  require  proactive  disclosure  of  information  and  provides  for 
broad  exemptions  on  grounds  of  protecting  state  secrets,  commercial  secrets  and  personal 
data. A simplified online access system received about 1.5 million applications for access to 
information in 2017. The percentage of requests refused remained small (approximately 8 % 
in 2017, similar to 2016). The Board of Review of Access to Information is responsible for 
considering appeals filed against a refusal to provide access to public information. Filing an 
appeal is free of charge. 

Citizens’ rights to administrative justice and their right to seek compensation could not be 
directly  exercised  by  natural  and  legal  persons  affected  by  measures  under  the  state  of 
emergency. While the State of Emergency Appeal Commission was created to fill this legal 
vacuum, it only  began to  make  decisions in  December 2017. These  will  be open to judicial 
review,  and  the  commission  has  yet  to  develop  into  an  effective  remedy.  The  lack  of 
compensation remains an issue of concern for people in the east and south-east of Turkey.  

21 

 
 
 
Service delivery to citizens and businesses 

Strong  commitment  to  a  user-oriented  administration  has  led  to  the  expansion  of 
e-government  services  and  provision  of  smart  identity  documents.  Very  good  progress  has 
been made on e-government. The number of registered users has reached 35 million in 2017, 
up  from  25.2  million  in  2015  Public  services  are  to  a  large  extent  accessible  through  e-
government  tools.  One-stop-shops  and  points  of  single  contact  for  citizens,  particularly  at 
local level, need to be further extended. A monitoring system is to be set up to reduce barriers 
in accessing services for people with disabilities. 

Simplifying administrative procedures and cutting red tape is hindered by the absence of a 
law  on  general  administrative  procedures,  which  is  necessary  to  provide  citizens  and 
businesses with greater legal certainty. 

Strategic framework for public administration reform 

the 

Turkey  has  no  overarching  public  administration  reform  strategy.  There  are  various 
planning  documents  and  sub-strategies  relating  to  different  aspects  of  public  administration 
reform,  but 
lack  of  political  support  and  administrative  ownership  hinders 
comprehensive  reform  efforts.  An  administrative  unit  with  a  legal  mandate  to  coordinate, 
design, implement and monitor public administration reform needs to be set up. The financial 
sustainability  of  overall  public  administration  reform  is  not  guaranteed,  as  key  planning 
documents do not specify the expected costs of reform measures. 

2.2. Rule of law and fundamental rights 

2.2.1 Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights 

The EU’s founding  values  include the rule of law and respect for  human rights. A properly 
functioning  judicial  system  and  an  effective  fight  against  corruption  are  of  paramount 
importance, as is respect for fundamental rights in law and in practice. 

Turkey is at an early stage of applying the acquis and European standards in this area. There 
was serious backsliding in this area and the recommendations in the previous report were not 
implemented. Continued political pressure on judges and prosecutors and collective dismissal 
of  a  large  number  of  judges  and  prosecutors  following  the  2016  attempted  coup  had  a 
significant negative effect on the independence and the overall quality and efficiency of the 
judiciary. 

There  has  been  no  progress  in  addressing  the  many  gaps  in  the  Turkish  anti-corruption 
framework. Corruption remains widespread and is an issue of concern. 

Fundamental  rights  have  been  considerably  curtailed  under  the  state  of  emergency  and 
pursuant to the decrees issued under it. As a result, there was no progress on the outstanding 
issues  identified  in  previous  reports.  On  the  contrary,  further  backsliding  continued  in  all 
areas  of  human  rights,  most  notably  on  freedom  of  expression,  freedom  of  assembly  and 
association,  protection  of  human  rights  defenders,  property  rights  and  procedural  rights. 
Emergency  decrees  also  removed  crucial  safeguards  protecting  detainees  from  abuse  in  a 
context where allegations of ill-treatment and torture increased. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→   lift the state of emergency; 

22 

 
 
 
→  reinstate  the  necessary  conditions  to  ensure  the  independence,  accountability,  quality, 
efficiency and professionalism of the judiciary; 

→  effectively  implement  its  international  obligations  in  relation  to  the  fight  against 
corruption,  including  the  United  Nations  Convention  against  Corruption  and  the  Council  of 
Europe Conventions; 

→  respect  its  international  obligations  in  relation  to  respect  for  fundamental  rights  and 
freedoms  and  effectively  address  serious  human  rights  violations,  including  effectively 
investigating allegations of ill-treatment and torture. 

Functioning of the judiciary 

Turkey  is  at  an  early  stage  in  this  area.  There  has  been  serious  backsliding  and  the 
independence  of  the  Turkish  judiciary  was  severely  undermined  following,  among  other 
issues, the dismissal and forced removal of 30 % of Turkish judges and prosecutors following 
the 2016 attempted coup. These  dismissals had a chilling  effect on the  judiciary as a whole 
and risk widespread self-censorship among judges and prosecutors. No measures were taken 
to  restore  legal  guarantees  ensuring  the  independence  of  the  judiciary.  On  the  contrary, 
constitutional changes in relation to the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (CJP) have further 
undermined  its  independence  from  the  executive.  No  changes  to  the  institution  of  criminal 
judges of peace were made. No measures were taken to address concerns regarding the lack of 
objective,  merit-based,  uniform  and  pre-established  criteria  for  recruiting  and  promoting 
judges and prosecutors. The Commission’s 2016 recommendations therefore remain valid.  

In the coming year, Turkey should: 

→  create  a  political  and  legal  environment  that  allows  the  judiciary  to  perform  its  duties 
independently  and  impartially;  strengthens  judicial  responsibilities,  with  the  executive  and 
legislature  fully  respecting  the  separation  of  powers;  and  ensures    that  judgments  by  the 
Constitutional  Court,  whose  decisions  should  follow  European  Court  of  Human  Rights 
(ECtHR)  jurisprudence, are respected by lower courts; 

→  limit  the  role  and  influence  of  executive  power  within  the  CJP  and  provide  effective 
guarantees against transfers of judges against their will; 

→ introduce further safeguards against any interference by the CJP in judicial proceedings. 

In addition, Turkey should: 

→  limit  any  suspension  of  judges,  as  a  major  infringement  of  guaranteed  judicial 
independence  under  the  Constitution,  to  cases  where  there  are  well-founded  suspicions  of 
serious  misbehaviour;  and  ensure  that  the  system  of  disciplinary  proceedings  is  guided  by 
objective criteria without undue influence from the executive; 

→ in relation to the measures taken against individuals following the attempted coup, ensure 
that  any  allegation  of  wrongdoing  or  crime  is  subject  to  due  process,  based  on  evidence,  in 
line with fully transparent procedures under the authority of an independent judiciary. These 
procedures  must  fully  respect  fundamental  rights,  including  procedural  rights,  including  in 
particular the presumption of innocence, individual criminal responsibility, legal certainty, the 
right to a defence, the right to a fair trial, equality of arms and right to an effective appeal. 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
Strategic documents 

Implementation of the  judicial reform strategy for 2015-2019 has continued. However, no 
measures  were  taken  to  revise  the  strategy  following  the  substantial  changes  within  the 
judiciary in the aftermath of the 2016 attempted coup. Changes to the strategy should include 
measures  to  improve  the  planning  of  legislative  changes  and  move  away  from  frequent  and 
hasty changes, made without sufficient prior consultation with the relevant stakeholders or via 
emergency decrees. 

Management bodies 

The constitutional amendments adopted following the referendum of April 2017 regarding the 
restructuring of the CJP became effective in May 2017. The number of members of the CJP 
was reduced from 22 to 13. While four members are now appointed by the President (almost 
one  third  of  the  members),  seven  members  are  appointed  by  Parliament  by  a  qualified 
majority. Although nine of these members are judges and prosecutors, none of them are any 
longer elected by the judiciary itself. The remaining two seats are attributed ex-officio to the 
Justice Minister and his Undersecretary, who will also be appointed by the President when the 
presidential  system  enters  into  force.  The  CJP  continues  to  enjoy  autonomy  in  managing  a 
budget of some EUR 14 million for 2018.  

The changes to the CJP, and in particular to the procedure governing the appointment of its 
members,  raise  serious  concerns  in  relation  to  its  independence  from  the  executive.  The 
election of the presidents of CJP chambers and CJP’s acting president and the appointment of 
members  to  the  different  chambers  were  done  in  the  absence  of  secondary  legislation.  The 
perceived close ties of some candidates for CJP membership with the governing party and the 
government stirred controversy regarding further politicisation of the judiciary.  

In  December  2016,  the  European  Network  of  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  (ENCJ)  decided  to 
suspend the CJP’s observer status and to exclude it from participation in ENCJ activities. This 
decision was explained by the CJP’s failure to comply with the ENCJ Statutes and its lack of 
independence from the executive and legislative powers.  

Improved  transparency,  full  independence  from  the  executive  and  strict  adherence  to 
procedures  in  line  with  European  standards  are  needed  to  restore  not  only  the  CJP’s 
credibility, but also public trust in the entire judiciary. 

Independence and impartiality 

While the principles of independence and impartiality are set out in the amended Constitution, 
the  CJP  continued  to  engage  in  large-scale  suspensions  and  transfers  of  judges  and 
prosecutors without  their  consent.  There  is  a  need  for  legal  and  constitutional  guarantees to 
prevent judges and prosecutors from being transferred against their will, except where courts 
are being reorganised. In total, since the attempted coup, 4 399 judges and prosecutors have 
been dismissed from their positions of which 454 were later reinstated to their positions by the 
CJP.  There  are  currently  over  4  000  judges  and  prosecutors  against  whom  legal  action  has 
been taken (dismissals or suspension). Judges and prosecutors who were in pre-trial detention, 
remained without an indictment for more than a year on average.  

In its December 2016 opinion, the Venice Commission stated that every decision ordering the 
dismissal  of  a  judge  needs  to  be  individual  and  reasoned,  must  refer  to  verifiable  evidence, 
and that the procedures before the CJP must respect at least minimal standards of due process. 
The Venice Commission also emphasised that an appeal against disciplinary measures should 

24 

 
 
 
normally  be  available  to  judges  who  have  been  dismissed,  which  was  not  the  case  in  these 
decisions. Dismissals in circumstances such as these have the potential to cause general self-
censorship within the judiciary. This may weaken the judiciary as a whole, its independence 
and the separation of powers. 

No  changes  to  the  institution  of  ‘criminal  judges  of  peace’  were  made.  The  perceived 
influence  of  the  executive  over  their  decisions  and  their  jurisdiction  and  practice  continue 
raising serious concerns. These particularly relate to their extensive powers, such as to issue 
search  warrants,  detain  individuals,  block  websites  or  seize  property,  with  considerable 
financial consequences; and to the fact that objections to their decisions are not reviewed by a 
higher judicial body but by another single-judge institution. Their rulings increasingly diverge 
from European Court of Human Rights case-law and rarely provide sufficiently individualised 
reasoning. The recommendations of the Venice Commission in its March 2017 opinion should 
be urgently implemented. 

Pluralism in judges associations was affected by the closure under the state of emergency of 
two important associations, the Association of Judges and Prosecutors and the Judges Union. 
The  biggest  association,  the  Association  for  Judicial  Unity,  with  around  9  145  members,  is 
perceived as being close to the government. 

Representatives of the executive and legislative branches continued to publicly comment on 
ongoing judicial cases, disregarding the presumption of innocence of the suspects, in a clear 
violation  of  European  standards.  In  January  2018,  a  lower  court  refused  to  implement  a 
Constitutional Court ruling to release two prominent journalists and one of the two journalists 
was  shortly  afterwards  sentenced  to  an  aggravated  life  imprisonment,  all  of  which  further 
increased the EU’s serious concerns relating to the independence of the judiciary in Turkey. 
In the case of the other journalist, the Constitutional Court confirmed on 16 March its January 
ruling,  following  which  a  lower  court  assigned  him  to  house  arrest.  The  European  Court  of 
Human Rights examined the applications of each of the two journalists and ruled on 20 March 
2018  that  the  Turkish  authorities  had  violated  their  rights  to  liberty  and  security  and  their 
freedom of expression. The ECtHR also supported the reasoning and the role of the Turkish 
Constitutional  Court  and  criticised  the  lower  court  for  not  having  conformed  with  the 
Constitutional Court ruling of January 2018. 

A  ceremony  for  1236  new  judges  and  prosecutors  was  held  in  the  Presidential  palace  in 
March 2018 and contributed to the perception of an increased influence of the executive over 
the judiciary.  

Accountability 

In 2017, nearly all judges had declared their assets as required by law. Judges and prosecutors 
are under the obligation to declare their assets on years ending with 0 and 5. However, if they 
earn  assets  worth  5  times  their  salary,  they  have  to  declare  it  in  that  given  year.  It  remains 
important to have a credible verification system and to ensure that due follow up is given to 
late  or  wrong  declarations  of  assets.  The  Office  of  Judicial  Ethics  was  founded  in  February 
2016.  A  Law  on  Code  of  Ethics  for  judges  and  prosecutors  is  still  pending  adoption.  The 
Court  of  Cassation  adopted  codes  of  conducts  in  the  last  quarter  of  2017.  Disciplinary 
procedures are in place for both judges and prosecutors but the system has been perceived as 
undermining  important  guarantees  that  safeguard  the  independence  of  the  judiciary. 
Mechanisms to detect breaches of the integrity rules and to enforce disciplinary penalties need 
to be made effective and free from political interference.  

25 

 
 
 
Professionalism and competence 

Following  the  wave  of  dismissals  after  the  attempted  coup,  vacancies  are  gradually  being 
filled, by allowing the majority of candidates for positions as judges and prosecutors to enter 
the  system  through  a  fast  track  procedure,  after  the  previous  requirement  for  two  years  of 
training was waived.  4 680 candidate judges and prosecutors were  integrated in  the judicial 
and  administrative  jurisdictions  since  the  attempted  coup,  following  an  accelerated  and  un-
transparent selection process, which raised questions as to the application of the merit-based 
criteria. 31 % of them were lawyers.  

Concerns remain over the lack of objective, merit-based, uniform and pre-established criteria 
for recruiting and promoting judges and prosecutors. The CJP is not sufficiently independent 
from the executive and the Ministry of Justice runs the selection boards for new judges and 
prosecutors and manages their yearly appraisal. The CJP itself plays no role in the selection 
boards (nor does the Justice Academy), even though it takes the final decision on recruitment. 

Quality of justice 

In December 2016, a new training board was set up in the Ministry of Justice for in-service 
training although there are already multiple providers of similar training in Turkey. There are 
concerns  that  this  fragmentation  prevents  the  Justice  Academy  from  developing  a  proper 
unified  training  capacity  based  on  a  multiannual  planning  process,  with  a  sufficient  budget, 
for  in-service  training.  The  academy  should  be  allocated  sufficient  resources  to  tackle  the 
increased  need  for  pre-service  and  in-service  training  for  newly  recruited  judges  and 
prosecutors.  The  composition  of  the  Board  of  the  Justice  Academy  does  not  sufficiently 
guarantee its independence, which affects its capacity to operate and define and run training 
curricula independently. 

Frequent transfers of judges and prosecutors have negatively affected the quality of justice. 
Indictments  often  reflect  allegations  and  are  not  supported  by  credible  evidence.  These 
indictments, which are often based on statements by people who have been accused in other 
cases or by secret witnesses, raise serious concerns. In some cases, evidence presented by the 
defence  is  not  included  in  the  court’s  assessment.  Overall,  there  are  serious  concerns 
regarding the quality of judicial decisions, particularly in terrorism-related cases, in relation to 
their legal reasoning and the factual evidence they are based on.  

The budget for the judiciary was TL 14 billion in 2017 (around EUR 3 billion), representing 
0.50 % of GDP and EUR 38 per inhabitant. 

Two new departments, for mediation and for alternative dispute resolution, were created in 
the  Ministry  of  Justice.  As  a  positive  step,  a  law  adopted  in  December  2016  expanded  the 
scope  of  offences  falling  under  plea  bargaining,  amicable  settlement  or  conciliation.  Efforts 
have started to increase and promote alternative dispute resolution methods to help reduce the 
burden  on  the  courts.  Over  223  000  cases  were  resolved  with  conciliation  in  2017,  a  sharp 
increase compared to 2016. 

Efficiency 

Following  the  constitutional  changes,  the  high  military  court  was  abolished,  ending  a 
long-standing dual-headed system. 

Large parts of the Turkish judiciary continue to be under severe pressure to handle cases in a 
timely manner. The ability of the judiciary to effectively perform its tasks has suffered in the 
aftermath  of  the  attempted  coup  and  the  large-scale  dismissals,  indictments  and  other 

26 

 
 
 
administrative  measures  that  followed.  There  is  still  no  specific  human  resources  strategy 
for the judiciary. 

Regarding  the  backlog  of  cases,  in  the  High  Courts  the  number  of  pending  cases  until 
November  2017,  were:  38  454  for  the  Constitutional  Court  and  224  737  for  the  Council  of 
State. The clearance rate of the Council  of State has  dramatically improved up to  170 %  in 
2017 from 50 % in 2016.  

In 2017, the Court of Cassation received a total of 1 294 336 cases (486 449 new cases and 
807 887  cases  transferred  from  2016),  and  dealt  with  628  652  cases,  resulting  in  a  reduced 
backlog  of  665  684  cases  for  2018.  This  reduction  stems  from  the  creation  in  2016  of  nine 
regional courts of appeal. These regional courts of appeal continued to operate, but for both 
civil and criminal cases, their clearance rate remained below 100 % leading to an increasing 
backlog. 

As  regards  first  instance  courts,  the  clearance  rate  for  criminal  courts  in  2016  was  55  % 
compared  to  61 %  in  2015.  The  total  number  of  cases  finalised  in  2016  was  1  324  153 
compared  to  1 560 520  in  2016.  As  regards  the  total  length  of  proceedings  it  went  up  from 
231 days to 274 days. The clearance rate for civil courts was 56 % in 2016 compared to 61 % 
in 2015. The total number of cases finalised in 2016 was 1 970 973 compared to 2 069 303 in 
2015.  As  regards  the  total  length  of  proceedings  it  went  up  from  218  days  to  248  days. 
Systemic solutions are therefore still needed to further address the emerging backlog as well 
as the excessive length of some trials. 

The Law on Court Experts entered into force in November 2016. It regulates qualifications 
and criteria in the process of selection and appointment of court experts. 

Individual applications increased considerably in 2016, to 80 576 (up from 20 376 in 2015), in 
the aftermath of the attempted coup and the measures taken under the state of emergency. The 
Court received another 40 530 applications in 2017. In August 2017, the Constitutional Court 
ruled  that  some  70  000  individual  applications  regarding  measures  taken  under  the  state  of 
emergency were inadmissible, as they had not exhausted all available domestic remedies. The 
court  directed  these  applicants  to  the  State  of  Emergency  Appeal  Commission  and/or  to 
administrative courts. Regarding other cases, the Constitutional Court took 19 673 decisions 
in 2017 compared to 16 107 in 2016.                                                                                                                                                                                

As of early 2018, there are 13.9 judges and 5.9 prosecutors per 100 000 inhabitants (16 104 
judges and prosecutors in total). According to the European Commission for the Efficiency of 
Justice (CEPEJ) the European average is 21 judges/11 prosecutors per 100 000 inhabitants. 

Fight against corruption 

Turkey has some level of preparation in the fight against corruption. No progress has been 
made  in  the  reporting  period,  in  the  absence  of  any  new  legislation.  Legal  and  institutional 
frameworks  both  need  further  alignment  with  international  standards  and  continue  to  allow 
undue  executive  influence  in  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of  high-profile  corruption 
cases.  No  progress  was  made  on  increasing  accountability  and  transparency  in  the  work  of 
public bodies. A broad, inter-party political consensus and strong political will are required to 
decisively  fight  against  corruption. Turkey  has  not  yet followed up on  all  of the Council of 
Europe’s Group of  States  against  Corruption  (GRECO)  recommendations.  The Commission 
therefore reiterates the recommendations in its 2016 report.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

27 

 
 
 
→  set  up  a  functionally  independent  anti-corruption  body,  in  line  with  the  United  Nation’s 
Anti-Corruption Convention; 

→  ensure  effective  follow-up  to  the  recommendations  issued  by  the  GRECO,  including  by 
adopting the necessary legislation; 

→ establish a track record of successful prosecution and convictions on high level corruption. 

Track record 

Turkey’s  track  record  of  investigation,  prosecution  and  conviction  in  corruption  cases 
remained  poor,  particularly  in  relation  to  high-level  corruption  cases.  Corruption-related 
convictions  by  the  courts  decreased  from  5  497  in  2016  to  3  889  in  2017.  With  few 
exceptions, sentences do not have a deterrent effect and suspects convicted of tender-rigging 
charges  can  take  advantage  of  deferred  sentences.  Audit  and  inspection  units  sent  a  limited 
number of suspicious cases to the prosecution. Particularly vulnerable to corruption are local 
administrations, land administration and management, public procurement processes, and the 
construction  and  transportation  industries,  including  when  implemented  via  public-private 
partnerships. 

The  existing  legal  and  institutional framework  leaves  room  for  potential  political  influence 
on  judges  and  prosecutors,  law  enforcement  officers  and  inspection  units.  Financial 
investigations  are  not  systematically  required  in  cases  of  corruption  and  organised  crime. 
Following investigations for corruption in public procurement, there were 583 convictions in 
2017, down from 1 115 in 2016. The track record of audits on the financing of political parties 
and  electoral  campaigns  demonstrates  a  very  low  level  of  effectiveness.  Regarding 
transparency of party funding, while the adoption of the Guidebook on the Financial Audit of 
Political Parties is a positive development, considerable progress is yet to be made regarding 
all other GRECO recommendations in this field. 

Institutional framework 

Prevention measures 

There  is  still  no  permanent,  functionally  independent  anti-corruption  body,  nor  is  there 
sufficient  coordination  of  the  various  institutions  in  charge  of  prevention  or  combating 
corruption.  The  Prime  Ministry  Inspection  Board  coordinates  preventive  anti-corruption 
measures,  but  it  is  not  independent  and  has  no  autonomous  investigative  powers.  Anti-
corruption awareness-raising campaigns have not been conducted regularly and the impact of 
these remains limited. 

There is no comprehensive policy in place to prevent corruption in the private sector, though 
some  foreign  companies  have  been  active  in  the  fight  against  corruption  as  they  are  also 
bound by legislation in their country of origin. 

Law enforcement 

The country still lacks a specialised prosecution service to lead anti-corruption investigations. 
There are also few specialised courts. The current legal framework prevents officers acting as 
judicial  police  from  carrying  out  effective  investigations,  without  undue  influence  from  the 
executive.  An  information-sharing  system  between  the  police  and  the  financial  intelligence 
unit  exists  and  electronic  access  to  databases  for  the  relevant  agencies  is  at  a  moderately 
prepared level. Inter-agency cooperation needs to be further developed. 

28 

 
 
 
Legal framework 

The  legislative  amendments  envisaged  in  the  previous  anti-corruption  strategy,  i.e. the  Law 
on  General  Administrative  Procedure,  the  Law  on  Public  Procurement,  the  code  of 
ethics  for  Members  of  Parliament  and  the  Law  on  Whistle-blower  Protection,  are  still 
pending.  The  updated  anti-corruption  action  plan  (2016)  has  not  been  followed  up.  Turkey 
should fully implement the United Nation’s Anti-Corruption Convention, to which it is party. 

Turkey  so  far  did  not  implement  in  a  satisfactory  manner  20  of  the  22  recommendations 
provided  by  GRECO  in  its  last  evaluation  round  on  preventing  corruption  among 
parliamentarians,  judges  and  prosecutors.  In  addition,  10  of  the  17  recommendations 
contained in the third evaluation round on incriminations and transparency of party funding 
remain  to  be  implemented  by  Turkey.  Turkey  is  strongly  encouraged  to  comply  with  all 
remaining recommendations.  

Shortcomings remain in the corruption-related provisions of the Criminal Code, which do not 
meet  the  standards  put  in  place  by  the  Criminal  Law  Convention  on  Corruption.  The 
definition of active bribery, though covered in Article 252 of Turkish Criminal Code, is still 
not  in  line  with  international  conventions.  The  shortcomings  concern,  in  particular,  the 
provisions on bribery in the private sector. 

Public  procurement  legislation  is  not  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis  in  a  number  of  respects. 
Public tenders remained corruption-prone, largely due to a multitude of exemptions inserted 
into  the  framework  law,  particularly  for  tenders  at  municipal  level  and  for  public-private 
partnerships for large infrastructure investments. Legal privileges granted to public officials, 
such  as  the  requirement  for  prior  authorisation  from  their  managers  before  starting  an 
investigation,  continued  to  provide  a  legal  shelter  for  public  officials  in  anti-corruption 
criminal  and  administrative  investigations.  Anti-corruption  legislation  sets  out  inadequate 
provisions on preventing, prosecuting and issuing penalties for conflicts of interest as well as 
on declaring, verifying and disclosing assets. Turkey has no legislation governing lobbying. 

Strategic framework 

The  2010-2014  anti-corruption  strategy  and  action  plan  failed  to  meet  most  of  their  initial 
objectives. Measures envisaged in the transparency and anti-corruption action plan announced 
in  2016  have  not  yet  been  implemented.  In  the  absence  of  political  ownership,  these  were 
limited  in  scope  and  have  not  resulted  in  concrete  outcomes.  Drafting  of  a  follow-up  anti-
corruption strategy is advisable, along with the establishment of an independent coordinator to 
monitor  implementation.  Turkey  needs  to  strengthen  its  overall  capacity  to  coordinate, 
implement  and  monitor  all  anti-corruption  actions  among  the  many  relevant  preventive 
institutions and law enforcement agencies. 

Fundamental rights 

The  legal  framework  includes  general  guarantees  of  respect  for  human  and  fundamental 
rights. However, these have been undermined by a number of emergency decrees and need to 
be effectively implemented. There was further serious backsliding in the areas of freedom of 
expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and procedural and property rights. 
Severe restrictions were imposed on the activities of journalists, human rights defenders and 
critical voices on a broad scale. Measures adopted under the state of emergency also removed 
crucial safeguards protecting detainees from abuse, thereby augmenting the risk of impunity 
for the perpetrators of such abuse, in a context where allegations of ill-treatment and torture 

29 

 
 
 
have  increased.  Enforcement  of  rights  is  hindered  by  the  fragmentation  and  limited 
independence of public institutions responsible for protecting human rights and freedoms and 
by the lack of an independent judiciary. 

There was no progress on any of the outstanding issues identified in previous reports. 

Turkey should in particular: 

→ put an end to the state of emergency as soon as possible and ensure that any measure is 
taken only where it is strictly required by the exigencies of the situation and meets the tests of 
necessity  and  proportionality;  effectively  ensure  full  respect  for  fundamental  rights  and 
freedoms; 

 →  put  an  end  to  pre-trial  detentions  that  contravene  standards  set  out  in  the  European 
Convention on Human Rights and case-law of the European Court of Human Rights; ensure 
that any allegation of wrongdoing or crime is subject to due process, based on evidence and 
fully  transparent  procedures  under  the  authority  of  an  independent  judiciary,  and  fully 
respecting  relevant  procedural  rights,  in  particular  the  presumption  of  innocence,  individual 
criminal responsibility, legal certainty, the right to defence, the right to a fair trial, equality of 
arms  and  right  to  an  effective  appeal;  develop  the  State  of  Emergency  Appeal  Commission 
into an effective remedy; 

 →  align  Turkish  criminal  and  anti-terror  legislation  and  their  interpretation  with  European 
standards and European Court of Human Rights case-law; 

 → implement measures to fight against impunity; urgently undertake effective investigations 
into allegations of ill-treatment and torture; and implement the recommendations made in the 
relevant reports by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe; publish all 
reports by the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  

Turkey  is  party  to  most  international  human  rights  instruments.  It  has  yet  to  ratify  the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
Third  Optional Protocol to  the Convention on the Rights  of the Child, and the International 
Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance. 

Since  the  state  of  emergency  was  declared,  there  have  been  no  developments  on  Turkey’s 
decision  to  invoke  Article 15  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights,  which  gives 
governments the possibility to derogate in a temporary, limited and supervised manner from 
their  obligation  to  secure  certain  rights  and  freedoms  under  the  Convention  in  times  of 
emergency.  

Since  September  2016,  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (ECtHR)  has  found 
violations of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 163 cases (out of 168) 
relating  mainly  to  the  right  to  a  fair  trial,  freedom  of  expression,  freedom  of  assembly  and 
association,  right  to  liberty  and  security  among  others.  During  the  reporting  period,  33  373 
new  applications  were  registered  by  the  Court.  On  1  February  2018,  the  total  number  of 
applications  pending  before  the  Court  was  7  059.  There  are  currently  478  cases  against 
Turkey in the enhanced monitoring procedure.  

The implementation of the Cyprus v. Turkey case regarding missing persons and restrictions 
on the property rights of Greek Cypriots displaced or living permanently in the northern part 
of Cyprus is still pending, as is the question of ‘just satisfaction’ (compensation). Regarding 

30 

 
 
 
the  implementation  of  the  Demopoulos  v.  Turkey  decision  of  5 March  2010,  6  414 
applications  from  Greek  Cypriot  owners  have  to  date  been  lodged  with  the  Immovable 
Property Commission (IPC), 113 of them during the reporting period. As of 21 March 2018, 
888  applications  had  been  concluded  through  amicable  settlements  and  27  through  formal 
hearings.  Altogether,  the  IPC  has  so  far  paid  out  the  equivalent  of  EUR  310  million  in 
compensation. On 14 March, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe reviewed 
the Cyprus v. Turkey case as well as Varnava and others and Xenides-Arestis group v. Turkey. 
No progress was made on any of those cases. 

On the promotion and enforcement of human rights, Turkey has two main institutions on 
human  rights:  the  National  Human  Rights  and  Equality  Institution  (NHREI)  and  the 
Ombudsman  institution.  Both  are  authorised  to  monitor,  protect  and  promote  human  rights, 
and  to  prevent  violations  in  this  area.  They  can  also  investigate  individual  complaints  or 
allegations.  The  National  Human  Rights  and  Equality  institution  will  provide  an  individual 
application mechanism for complaints in the field of alleged discrimination cases. The major 
difference with the individual application procedure of the Ombudsman Institution is that the 
latter  deals  only  which  complaints  against  the  actions  of  the  public  administration.  The 
NHREI also acts as the national preventive mechanism against torture and has the mandate to 
investigate  ill-treatment  and  torture  upon  application  or  ex  officio.  It  has  also  the  power  to 
launch  investigations  of  its  own  initiative  into  potential  human  rights  violations.  Neither  of 
these institutions has operational, structural or financial independence and their members are 
not appointed in compliance with the Paris Principles. 

While the members of the NHREI were appointed in March 2017, and secondary legislation 
was laid down in November 2017 regarding its mandate on discrimination cases, it is not yet 
fully  operational  due  to  a  lack  of  other  key  pieces  of  secondary  legislation.  As  a  result  the 
NHREI  has  not  yet  handed  down  any  decision  on  applications  it  started  to  receive  and 
process.  Moreover  other  types  of  alleged  violations  are  currently  not  being  investigated  or 
followed  up.  This  vacuum  causes  particular  concern  in  light  of  the  high  number  of  alleged 
violations  in  the  aftermath  of  the  attempted  coup.  The  NHREI  can  no  longer  accept 
applications that are in the remit of the Ombudsman. However, the efficiency and capacity of 
the  Ombudsman  to  deal  with  such  applications  also  need  to  be  stepped  up.  Turkey  should 
urgently ensure that any and all cases of alleged human rights violation are effectively dealt 
with  and  processed  and  put  an  end  to  the  current  legislative  and  administrative  vacuum. 
Turkey should also ensure that these bodies are compliant with the Paris Principles. 

There was limited implementation of and no revisions to the 2014 action plan on preventing 
violations of the ECHR. The implementation reports continue to be prepared but these are not 
made  public,  which  limits  the  accountability  of  institutions  responsible  for  implementation. 
Several  legislative  changes,  not  in  line  with  European  standards,  were  introduced  by 
emergency  decrees.  These  impinge  in  particular  on  freedom  of  expression,  freedom  of 
assembly and on the rights to a fair trial, to an effective remedy and to protection of property. 

During  the  reporting  period,  Parliament’s  Human  Rights  Inquiry  Committee  visited  prisons 
and  published  reports.  The  committee’s  Chairperson  followed  up  some  key  human  rights 
defenders’ cases personally. 

Conditions  surrounding  the  activities  of  human  rights  defenders  have  deteriorated  even 
further.  Many  of  them  continue  to  be  subject  to  intimidation,  judicial  prosecution,  violent 
attacks,  threats,  surveillance,  prolonged  arbitrary  detention  and  ill-treatment.  Smear 
campaigns in some media outlets against human rights defenders who have been detained or 

31 

 
 
 
arrested,  including  for  accepting  funds  by  international  donors,  have  become  a  recurrent 
feature,  casting  serious  doubt  on  the  respect  for  due  process  and  the  presumption  of 
innocence.  Lawyers  who  provide  legal  assistance  to  human  rights  defenders  and  civil  and 
political activists also face huge obstacles in performing their work and are at risk of arrest, 
detention  and  prosecution.  The  arrest  of  the  chairperson  of  Amnesty  International  Turkey 
branch, the detention of a group of ten human right defenders in Büyükada Island, including 
the  director  of  Amnesty  International  Turkey  on  charges  of  links  to  a  terrorist  organisation, 
the  arrest  of  the  philanthropist  and  chairman  of  Anadolu  Kültür,  added  to  the  long  list  of 
detentions and arrests of civil society representatives, journalists, academics and others over 
the  reporting  period,  further  eroding  fundamental  rights  and  freedoms  and  leading  to  a 
shrinking space for civil society. Long detention and pre-trial periods have become the norm 
rather than the exception. The public rhetoric and accusations used against these activists cast 
serious doubt on the respect of due process and the presumption of innocence 

With regard to the right to life, Turkey is a party to Protocol 13 of the ECHR, abolishing the 
death penalty in  all  circumstances. The  most  problematic situation persists  in  the south-east 
with  a  lack  of  follow-up  and  investigations  into  reported  killings  by  the  authorities,  in  the 
context of security operations and PKK attacks, as noted by the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights in March 2017. Statements on the possibility of reinstating the death penalty 
have been made by public officials, including by the President in early 2017. 

Legislation  passed  in  June  2016  is  still  in  place,  granting  security  forces  judicial  privileges 
and thereby increasing the risk of impunity, as is an emergency decree of July 2016 limiting 
their criminal liability. Another controversial decree was issued in December 2017, removing 
criminal liability for civilians who acted to resist the 15 July 2016 attempted coup, as well as 
any acts in the aftermath of the attempted coup. There were also alarming reports of alleged 
cases  of  abductions  and  enforced  disappearances.  The  UN  Working  Group  on  Arbitrary 
Detention issued three public opinions in 2017 which found Turkey to have imposed arbitrary 
detentions. 

The situation with regards to the prevention of torture and ill-treatment remains a source of 
serious  concern.  Several  credible  reports  from  human  rights  organisations  have  alleged  that 
the removal of crucial safeguards by emergency decrees has augmented the risk of impunity 
for perpetrators of such crimes and has led to an increase in the number of cases of torture and 
ill-treatment  in  custody.  The  handling  of  complaints  is  also  reported  to  be  ineffective  and 
allegedly  entails  a  risk  of  reprisals.  After  his  visit  to  Turkey  in  late  2016,  the  UN  Special 
Rapporteur  on  torture  also  voiced  concerns  on  Turkey  as  an  ‘environment  conducive  to 
torture’.  

The prohibition of torture and ill-treatment needs to be fully observed in law and in practice in 
line  with  the  country’s  international  obligations,  in  particular  the  European  Convention  on 
Human  Rights  and  the  UN  Convention  against  Torture  and  other  Cruel,  Inhuman  or 
Degrading  Treatment  or  Punishment.  All  allegations  of  torture  or  ill-treatment  need  to  be 
swiftly,  effectively  and  impartially  investigated.  Perpetrators  must  be  prosecuted  and 
convicted in accordance with the gravity of their acts. 

The  NHREI,  which  acts  as  the  national  preventive  mechanism,  does  not  meet  the  key 
requirements under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman  or  Degrading Treatment  or  Punishment  and  is  not  yet effectively  processing  cases 
referred to it. Turkey should ensure that this institution effectively fulfils its mandate with a 
dedicated structure and appropriate resources for that purpose. The prison monitoring boards 

32 

 
 
 
were replaced with new members, but their effectiveness cannot be assessed as their reports 
are  not  public.  The  recommendations  of  the  fourth  periodic  review  by  the  UN  Committee 
against  Torture  have  not  been  implemented  so  far.  The  Council  of  Europe’s  Committee  for 
the Prevention of Torture carried out a visit to Turkey in May 2017. This focused on people 
detained  by  the  police/gendarmerie,  the  situation  in  prisons  and  the  situation  in  detention 
centres for migrants. Turkey authorised the publication of two reports for earlier visits by the 
CPT:  the  visit  in  June  2015  focusing  on  foreign  nationals  detained  under  aliens  legislation, 
which included recommendations notably on the holding facility in the transit zone of Istanbul 
Atatürk Airport and more generally on improving detention conditions; and in April 2016 to 
the  Imralı  special  detention  facility,  which  found  that  material  conditions  had  improved  but 
expressed serious concerns regarding the prisoners' quasi absence of contacts with the outside 
world.  In  line  with  its  stated  zero  tolerance  policy  for  torture,  Turkey  should  authorise  the 
publication of all pending CPT reports, including the one on its ad hoc visit in summer 2016, 
following the attempted coup.  

As regards the prison system, overcrowding and deteriorating prison conditions are a source 
of deep concern. The prison population rate has grown to 290 per 100 000 inhabitants and the 
prison population now stands at 234 673. There are currently over 600 children staying with 
their  detained  mothers.  The  shortage  of  psychologists,  social  workers  and  sociologists 
continues to negatively affect the rehabilitation of inmates. There have been many allegations 
of human rights violations in Turkey’s prisons, including arbitrary restrictions on the rights of 
detainees  and  the  use  of  torture,  mistreatment  and  solitary  confinement  as  disciplinary 
measures. There are allegations that sick inmates are regularly denied access to medical care. 
State-run  commissions  responsible  for  monitoring  prison  conditions  have  either  been 
dissolved following the attempted coup or remain largely ineffective. The result is that prison 
guards and administrations operate largely without oversight. 

On the protection of personal data, the country has ratified the CoE Convention 108 on the 
Protection  of  Individuals  with  regard  to  Automatic  Processing  of  Personal  Data  and  its 
additional  protocol.  The  Personal  Data  Protection  Authority  has  become  operational  and  its 
nine-member Board has been appointed by the Parliament, the President and the Government. 
However,  the  law  is  still  not  fully  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis.  This  concerns  notably  the 
powers  of  the  Data  Protection  Authority,  the  balancing  of  data  protection  with  the  right  to 
freedom of expression and information.  

On  freedom  of  thought,  conscience  and  religion,  freedom  of  worship  continued  to  be 
generally respected. The Bulgarian Sveti Stefan Church and the Greek Orthodox Aya Yorgi 
(Saint  George)  Church  and  Monastery  were  reopened  following  their  restoration.  The 
controversial use for marking religious celebrations of the Hagia Sophia, which is a museum 
situated within a listed UNESCO world heritage site, continued to trigger reactions. Insulting 
religion  and  blasphemy  are  recognised  as  criminal  offences.  The  government  did  not 
implement  the  action  plan  it  submitted  in  2016  to  the  Council  of  Europe  Committee  of 
Ministers related to the European Court of Human Rights decisions on Cem Houses and on 
compulsory  religion  classes.  A  comprehensive  legal  framework  in  line  with  European 
standards needs to be put in place and appropriate attention must be paid to implementing the 
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  judgments  on  compulsory  religion  and  ethics  classes, 
indication  of  religious  affiliation  on  identity  cards  and  Alevi  worship  places.  Inter-religious 
dialogue needs to be strengthened. The Venice Commission recommendations on the status of 
religious  communities  in  Turkey  and  the  right  of  the  Orthodox  Patriarch  to  use  the  title 
‘ecumenical’ are yet to be implemented. No steps were taken to open the Halki (Heybeliada) 

33 

 
 
 
Greek  Orthodox  Seminary.  Requests  by  different  Christian  communities  to  open  places  of 
worship  and  curricula  for  clergy  are  still  pending.  Hate  speech  and  hate  crimes  against 
Christians  and  Jews  continued  to  be  reported  (see  below  —  minorities).  Turkey  is  the  only 
member of the Council of Europe that does not recognise the right to conscientious objection 
for conscripts.  

Freedom of expression 

Turkey is at an early stage in this area and the serious backsliding continued. The scope of 
restrictive  measures  adopted  under  the  emergency  decrees  has  extended  over  time  to  many 
opposition voices in the media and in academia, contrary to the principle of proportionality. 
Freedom of expression has come under serious strain. Legislation and practice do not comply 
with  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  case-law.  Criminal  cases  against  journalists,  human 
rights defenders, writers, or social media users, the withdrawal of press cards, and the closure 
of  numerous  media  outlets  or  the  appointment  by  the  government  of  trustees  to  administer 
them, are of serious concern. These are mostly based on selective and arbitrary application of 
the  law,  especially  provisions  on  national  security  and  the  fight  against  terrorism.  The  high 
number  of  arrests  of  journalists  -  over  150  journalists  remain  in  prison  -  is  of  very  serious 
concern. The Internet Law and the general legal framework continue to enable the executive 
to  block  online  content  without  a  court  order  on  an  inappropriately  wide  range  of  grounds. 
The judicial control for requests relating to content takedowns or blocking content continued 
to rely on individual decisions by criminal judges of peace. A large number of media workers 
(journalists, engineers, sound and image technicians, etc.) were laid off in 2016 (2 708) and 
2017 (166).  

The  Commission’s  2016  recommendations  were  not  followed  and  are  therefore  restated  in 
this report. In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ release journalists, human rights defenders, writers and academics being held in pre-trial 
detention; refrain from and end the practice exercised in various forms by both state and non-
state  agents  of  intimidating,  interfering  with  and  putting  pressure  on  the  media;  ensuring  a 
safe, plural and enabling environment for the media to carry out their work independently and 
without fear of reprisals; 

→  refrain  from  undue  restrictions  on  freedom  of  expression,  including  in  relation  to  anti-
terrorism operations, in line with the Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe on protecting freedom of expression and information in times of crisis; 

→ ensure that existing legislation, in particular the Anti-Terror Law, the Criminal Code and 
the  Internet  Law,  is  revised  to  comply  with  European  standards  and  is  implemented  in  a 
manner which does not curtail freedom of expression and ensures proportionality and equality 
before the law. Ensure that criminal law provisions, in particular articles on defamation and 
other  similar  offences,  are  not  used  as  a  means  of  putting  pressure  on  critical  voices,  by 
ensuring  that  courts  apply  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  case-law  and  are  able  to  act 
independently. 

Intimidation of journalists 

Heavy pressure on the media continued, with arrests, detentions, prosecutions and dismissals 
of media staff, as well as increasing censorship and self-censorship. The number of journalists 
in  prison  is  estimated  by  many  sources  to  be  over  150,  as  of  March  2018.  Civil  society 
documented: threats and physical attacks on journalists and media organisations; government 

34 

 
 
 
interference  with  editorial  independence  and  pressure  on  media  outlets  to  fire  journalists 
critical of the government; the state’s takeover or the closure of private media companies; and 
restrictions on access to the airwaves, and fines and closure of TV and radio channels critical 
of the government.  

The  criminal  justice  system  allowed  journalists  to  be  prosecuted  and  jailed  on  sweeping 
charges  of  terrorism,  insulting  public  officials,  and/or  committing  crimes  against  the  state. 
The right to a fair trial and the respect of the principle of the presumption of innocence were 
often not ensured. Indictments mostly did not establish a link with the alleged offence and, in 
some  high-profile  cases,  the  defences  provided  by  the  defendants  were  not  taken  into 
consideration by the court. Details of prosecution files of journalists appeared in mainstream 
media  which  amplified  smear  campaigns  against  them.  The  judicial  case  against  several 
Cumhuriyet journalists continued, and after the release pending trial of two more journalists 
in  March  2018,  the  newspaper's  chairman  remains  the  sole  suspect  in  pre-trial  detention.  A 
limited  number  of  other  writers  and  journalists  have  also  belatedly  been  released  pending 
trial.  Several  court  rulings  favourable  to  prominent  defendants,  including  Human  Rights 
Defenders (i.e. Chair of Amnesty International), were swiftly reversed by another or even by 
the same court, in some instances following comments from the executive.  

Evidence relating to the charges brought against two prominent journalists was also examined 
by  the  Constitutional  Court,  which  ruled  on  11  January  2018  that  the  applicants’  right  to 
personal  liberty  and  security  as  well  as  their  freedoms  of  expression  and  press  had  been 
violated and that they should be released. It was of serious concern that a lower court refused 
to observe the ruling and maintained them in pre-trial detention. One of them, together with 
five  other  journalists,  writers  and  media  workers  were  sentenced  on  16  February  2018  to 
aggravated  life  sentences,  on  charges  related  to  the  July  2016  coup  attempt,  a  ruling  which 
was  criticised  by  international  watchdogs  as  ‘unprecedented’  and  done  ‘without  presenting 
substantial proof of involvement in the coup attempt or ensuring a fair trial’. In the case of the 
other  journalist,  the  Constitutional  Court  confirmed  on  16  March  2018  its  January  ruling, 
following which a lower court accepted to release him but assigned him to house arrest. In its 
first  judgments  on  20  March  2018  regarding  journalists  arrested  in  the  aftermath  of  the 
attempted coup, the European Court of Human Rights examined the applications of each of 
the two journalists  and  found that  the Turkish authorities  had violated their  rights  to liberty 
and security and their freedom of expression.  

The editors of Turkey’s leading media outlets were summoned to a meeting in January 2018 
at which the Prime Minister gave them 15 ‘recommendations’ on how to cover the military 
operations  in  a  ‘patriotic’  manner.  This  and  the  detention  of  dozens  of  journalists,  human 
rights activists and liberal professionals across Turkey for their social media activities in the 
days  that  followed,  once  again  raised  serious  concerns  about  freedom  of  expression  and 
freedom of press in Turkey.  

Legislative environment 

The  current  legal  framework  and  practice  do  not  guarantee  the  exercise  of  freedom  of 
expression  in  the  media  and  internet.  Legislation  on  anti-terrorism,  on  the  internet  and  on 
intelligence  services  impede  freedom  of  expression  and  run  counter  to  European  standards. 
The  Criminal  Code  provides  for  prison  sentences  for  insulting  the  President  and  senior 
politicians.  Prison  sentences  are  also  provided  for  insults  to  religion.  In  addition  to  prison 
terms, high fines have a deterrent effect on media reporting. Legislation on hate speech is not 
in line with European Court of Human Rights case-law. 

35 

 
 
 
The  Internet  Law  and  the  general  legal  framework  enable  the  executive  to  block  online 
content  without  a  court  order  on  an  inappropriately  wide range  of  grounds.  In  March  2018, 
amendments were adopted which raised new serious concerns, by extending the scope of the 
regulation  of  broadcasting  performed  by  the  Radio  and  Television  Supreme  Council  to  any 
online media service providers and platform operators, including those operating from abroad. 
The amendments also gave the Council the power to impose bans on internet broadcasting. 

Implementation/institutions 

The government continued to  issue emergency  decrees ordering  the  closure  of TV channels 
and  radio  stations,  initially  mainly  for  alleged  links  to  the  Gülen  movement,  but  over  time 
extending  these  to  a  number  of  channels  broadcasting  in  the  Kurdish  language,  an  Alevi 
channel and some opposition channels. Although 25 media outlets were authorised to reopen, 
175  media  outlets  remained  closed  down.  The  OSCE/ODIHR  concluded  that 
the 
constitutional referendum ‘took place on an unlevel playing field’ and that restrictions on the 
media reduced voters’ access to a plurality of views. The trend of prosecutions of journalists, 
writers,  social  media  users  and  other  citizens,  even  children,  for  insulting  the  President  of 
Republic  continued.  Such  cases  often  end  with  prison  sentences,  suspended  sentences  or 
punitive fines. The increased use of harsh rhetoric against any form of critical voice by public 
officials,  including  at  the  highest  level,  is  of  particular  concern.  This  restrictive  and 
intimidating  environment  leads  to  increased  self-censorship  and  is  not  in  line  with  the 
emerging  European  consensus  on  decriminalising  defamation  of  heads  of  state,  or  limiting 
this  offence  to  the  most  serious  forms  of  verbal  attacks,  while  restricting  the  range  of 
sanctions to exclude imprisonment. Regarding the internet, Turkish access to Wikipedia has 
been  blocked  since  April  2017.  Twitter  Transparency  reported  over  2700  removal  requests 
and  9  200  accounts  reported  by  Turkish  authorities  in  the  first  half  of  2017.  According  to 
unofficial  sources, some 110  000 websites have been banned,  only 2.6 %  of which were  on 
the  basis  of  a  court  decision.  In  one  case,  the  Constitutional  Court  ruled  to  reverse  a  local 
court’s  decision  to  ban  access  to  a  news  website.  There  have  been  a  growing  number  of 
people  sentenced  to  prison  for  blasphemy.  Independent  artists  have  also  been  negatively 
affected  by  pressure  from  authorities  and  reduced  public  funding.  In  many  Kurdish 
municipalities,  there  was  increased  pressure  from  trustees  appointed  in  place  of  elected 
officials on the production of art. 

Disciplinary  and  criminal  proceedings  continued  against  the  ‘Academics  for  Peace’,  who 
signed a declaration in January 2016 condemning the security operations in the south-east and 
calling for resumption of the peace talks, while falling short of condemning the terrorist acts 
from  the  PKK.  As  of  the  end  of  January  2018,  386  out  of  the  total  of  5  822  academics 
expelled from 118 universities were among the ‘Academics for Peace’, Many of them are now 
facing criminal charges. 

In 2017, 87 press cards, including 17 permanent ones, were cancelled.  

Public service broadcasters 

While the work of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) is fairly transparent, 
with  decisions  and  supporting  expert  reports  being  published,  there  are  concerns  about  the 
Council’s  independence  and  neutrality.  Members  are  elected  by  Parliament  without  input 
from civil society or professional organisations. Regulation of the public service broadcaster 
is not in line with European standards. The editorial policy of the public service broadcaster, 
the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), displays a significant pro-government 

36 

 
 
 
line. Under the state of emergency, RTÜK continued to take a number of channels off the air 
as  well  as  suspending  and  fining  channels  for  broadcasting  content  that  is  ‘contrary  to  the 
national and moral values of society, general morality and the principle of family protection’.  

Economic factors 

The lack of transparency of media ownership continues to casts doubt on the independence of 
editorial policies. The concentration in the media market increased sharply after the sale of the 
Dogan holding to Demiroren holding. The takeover of media outlets and the appointment of 
trustees  to  control  media  groups  have  had  a  negative  economic  impact,  with  the  loss  of 
hundreds of jobs. Emergency decrees led to the closure of a large number of media outlets. 

State-sponsored advertising is not fairly and transparently distributed. This further distorts the 
market  and  adds  to  the  economic  pressure  on  some  media  outlets  from  major  customers, 
including the state. Independent and sustainable financing of the public service broadcaster is 
not  ensured.  The  broadcasting  law  does  not  ensure  fair  competition,  as  it  does  not  prevent 
monopolisation. 

Professional organisations, professional conditions 

The representation of journalists continues to be divided between the professional journalists’ 
associations  and  the  pro-government  union.  Journalism  in  Turkey  is  an  increasingly 
precarious profession with low wages, the risk of judicial harassment and lack of job security. 
Working conditions, insufficient trade union rights and application of labour legislation, the 
difficulty  of  obtaining  a  press  card  and  arbitrary  accreditation  decisions  remain  major 
concerns. 

There  was  further  backsliding  in  the  area  of  freedom  of  assembly  and  association. 
Legislation  on  this  issue  and  its  application  are  far  more  restrictive  in  practice  than  that 
provided  for  in  the  Constitution.  In  December  2017,  the  Constitutional  Court  abolished 
several  restrictions  on  meetings  and  marches  further  to  an  application  from  an  opposition 
party.  However,  the  state  of  emergency  expanded  the  administration’s  powers  to  limit  the 
right to  peaceful assembly.  Numerous peaceful  meetings  by opposition groups were banned 
and  blanket  bans  were  issued  for  weeks  or  months  for  all  kinds  of  public  events  in  several 
provinces. There was an increased number of penalties for participants in unauthorised events 
which  acted  as  another  deterrent.  While  a  number  of  commemoration  ceremonies  and 
meetings  were  allowed,  many  events  and  demonstrations  relating  to  the  Kurdish  issue  were 
prohibited  on  security  grounds.  The  unauthorised  holding  of  such  demonstrations  at  times 
resulted  in  forceful  dispersal  by  the  police  forces.  Lesbian,  gay,  bisexual,  transgender  and 
intersex  (LGBTI)  marches,  including  in  Istanbul  and  Ankara,  were  banned  for  security 
reasons for the third year in a row. The applicable European Court of Human Rights case-law 
on  freedom  of  assembly  needs  to  be  implemented  and  relevant  national  laws  need  to  be 
revised  accordingly.  The  number  of  associations  closed  on  the  basis  of  emergency  decrees 
amounts to more than 1 400. These associations were active in a wide spectrum of activities, 
such as children’s rights, women’s  rights, cultural rights, and victims’ rights, among others. 
358 were allowed to reopen following a re-examination of their case. The executive sharply 
criticised  the  Turkish  Union  of  Bar  Associations  and  the  Turkish  Medical  Association  for 
acting  against  the  national  interest  by  failing  to  support  the  government's  struggle  against 
terrorism. There was mention of amendments to the legislation to reform their statuses which 
are a source of serious concern.  

37 

 
 
 
On  property  rights,  confiscations  under  the  state  of  emergency  of  property  of  many 
institutions,  companies  or  private  individuals,  for  which  there  is  no  domestic  remedy, 
continue  to  be  a  serious  concern.  In  the  south-east,  the  authorities  have  started  a 
reconstruction  process  in  a  number  of  cities  and  towns.  Appeals  against  expropriation 
decisions  for  large  parts  of  the  historical  centre  of  Diyarbakır  were  rejected  in  the  court  of 
first instance. Regarding the implementation of the Law on Foundations, most of the appeals 
against rejected claims for restitution of properties are pending either before local courts or at 
the European Court of Human Rights. Earlier favourable decisions have been challenged by 
the  Treasury  and  are  awaiting  final  judgments.  The  case  in  relation  to  the  ownership  of  the 
Syriac  Orthodox  Mor  Gabriel  Monastery’s  land  is  ongoing.  After  a  number  of  Syriac 
properties had momentarily been at risk of expropriation in Mardin, amendments to the Law 
on Foundations were introduced in March 2018 as a first step towards the registration to the 
Syriac community foundations of a list of 56 properties in Mardin, out of over 110 disputed 
immovables.  The  Council  of  Europe’s  recommendations  on  protecting  property  rights  and 
education rights still need to be fully implemented. Council of Europe Resolution 1625 (2008) 
regarding property rights on the islands of Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos) needs 
to be fully implemented. 

The  principle  of  non-discrimination  is  not  sufficiently  protected  by  law  nor  enforced  in 
practice. The National Human Rights and Equality institution which is in charge of applying 
anti-discrimination legislation has not yet finalised any of the cases it has started to process. 
This  should  happen  without  delay.  Hate  crime  legislation  is  not  in  line  with  international 
standards  and  does  not  cover  hate  offences  based  on  sexual  orientation.  Turkey  signed  the 
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts 
of  a  racist  and  xenophobic  nature  committed  through  computer  systems  in  April  2016,  but 
ratification is still pending. Turkey should urgently adopt a law on combating discrimination 
in  line  with  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights,  including  with  regards  to  sexual 
orientation  and  identity.  Turkey  should  also  ratify  Protocol  12  of  the  Convention,  which 
provides for the general prohibition of discrimination, and implement the recommendations of 
the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance. 

A legislative and institutional framework on equality between women and men is generally 
in  place.  However,  discrimination  against  women  and  gender-based  violence  were  not 
sufficiently  addressed,  due  to  weak  implementation  of  legislation  and  the  low  quality  of 
support services available. There is a lack of strong political commitment to gender equality, 
exemplified  by  frequent  public  statements  of  high-level  officials  reflecting  a  conservative 
view  of  the  role  of  women.  School  enrolment  for  girls  needs  to  improve,  especially  in 
secondary  education.  Early  and  forced  marriage  continued  to  be  a  major  concern.  11 
independent  women’s  NGOs  were  closed  down  under  the  state  of  emergency  and,  in  some 
provinces, events on International Women’s Day were banned. Provincial and district muftis 
were given powers to conduct civil marriages which undermined the secular principles of the 
civil code and risked affecting the prevention of early and forced marriages. While it was the 
first  country  to  ratify,  in  2014,  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Istanbul  Convention  on  preventing 
and  combating  violence  against  women,  Turkey  has  still  not  adapted  its  legislation  but 
adopted  a  action  plan  for  2016-2020  and  started  to  raise  awareness  on  this  topic.  Domestic 
violence led to the death of 282 women in 2017. There is very limited follow-up to cases of 
domestic  violence,  with  no  referral  to  social  services.  Violence  Prevention  and  Monitoring 
Centres are in service in 68 provinces as of January 2018.There are 137 shelters for victims of 
domestic violence but some were closed down in the south-east. There is no comprehensive 

38 

 
 
 
data on gender-based violence and the number of reported cases remained low, casting doubt 
on the level of reporting. 

There  was  little  progress  on  the  rights  of  the  child.  Implementation  of  the  2013  national 
children’s  rights  strategy  and  action  plan  remained  insufficient.  No  national  strategy  is  in 
place  to  prevent  violence  against  children.  An  effective  system  to  monitor  rehabilitation 
centres and institutions is also lacking. Research on sexual abuse and ill-treatment of children 
is  inadequate.  The  proportion  of  religious  education  has  been  increasing  and  represents  a 
significant proportion of the education budget. Juvenile courts have not been established in all 
provinces  and  more  than  half  of  juvenile  offenders  continue  to  be  tried  in  non-specialised 
courts.  The  number  of  children  in  pre-trial  detention  increased  to  1  746.  130  juveniles 
continued  to  be  detained  or  were  convicted  on  charges  of  terror  or  organised  crime.  The 
quality of legal aid for juveniles and rehabilitation activities in prisons is a matter of concern. 
Several CSOs dealing with juvenile rights were closed down by the authorities. 

On  the  rights  of  people  with  disabilities,  Turkey  has  legislation  in  place  to  promote  equal 
opportunities for students with special educational needs and the number of students receiving 
inclusive  education  is  increasing  steadily.  A  large-scale  financial  support  scheme  for  home-
based care is also in place. However, there are discriminatory clauses in several laws such as 
the  Criminal  Code,  the  Civil  Code  and  the  Law  on  Judges  and  Prosecutors.  The  Human 
Rights  and  Equality  Institution  needs  to  become  effective  in  dealing  with  discrimination  on 
the  basis  of  disability.  Most  public  services  and  buildings  are  inaccessible  for  people  with 
disabilities. Public awareness campaigns need to be stepped up. Turkey also lacks data on the 
participation  of  people  with  disabilities  in  economic  and  social  life.  Turkey  has  no  mental 
health legislation and no independent body to monitor mental health institutions. 

There  are  serious  concerns  on  the  protection  of  the  fundamental  rights  of  lesbian,  gay, 
bisexual,  transgender  and  intersex  (LGBTI)  people.  No  changes  have  been  introduced  to 
the  military  disciplinary  system  and  medical  regulations  which  define  homosexuality  as  a 
‘psychosexual disorder/illness’. For the third year in a row, LGBTI marches were banned for 
in  an  unauthorised 
security  reasons.  Activists  have  been  sued  for  ‘participating 
demonstration’. LGBTI-themed events were forbidden in Ankara and other cities causing an 
international outcry. The detention and release under judicial control of an activist following 
his  social  media  posts  regarding  Ankara  governor’s  ban  on  LGBTI  events  for  an  indefinite 
period is testimony of the pressure exercised against activists in this field. In February 2018, 
an Administrative Court rejected the request of two NGOs' to lift the execution of this ban. 
Intimidation and violence against the LGBTI community continues to be a major problem and 
hate  speech  against  LGBTI  people  is  not  effectively  prosecuted,  as  it  is  mostly  considered 
within the boundaries of freedom of speech. There is no specific legislation to address these 
crimes.  There  is  limited  protection  given  to  LGBTI  organisations  who  have  been  receiving 
threats. Discrimination towards the LGBTI community is still widespread. 

On labour and trade union rights, see Chapter 19: Social Policy and Employment. 

Some aspects of procedural rights are guaranteed by law, including legal aid and the right to 
translation  and  interpretation  in  criminal  matters,  but  legislation  needs  to  be  further  aligned 
with European standards. According to data from 2014 compiled by the Council of Europe's 
European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), Turkey dedicated a substantial 
EUR 780 of legal aid per case, but this was provide to a limited number of eligible cases (171 
000)  with  an  overall  limited  effort  of  EUR  1.33  per  capita.  Turkey  has  been  repeatedly 
criticised by the European Court of Human Rights for violating the right to a fair trial, notably 

39 

 
 
 
due  to  its  failure  to  ensure  trials  take  place  within  a  reasonable  timeframe.  Under  Turkey’s 
Anti-Terror Law, lawyers’ meetings with clients in police detention can be legally prohibited 
for the first 24 hours. Emergency decrees imposed additional restrictions to procedural rights 
including on the rights of defence. Even after the introduction of certain improvements to the 
rights of defence in January 2017, some lawyers claim that they have had limited opportunity 
to  speak  to  their  clients  in  confidence.  Lawyers  are  increasingly  at  risk of  being  charged  in 
relation to the cases of their clients. In November 2016, the government issued an emergency 
decree closing down three Turkish lawyers’ associations that had played an important role in 
promoting  fair  trial  standards  and  the  rights  of  detainees  and  defendants.  Another  decree  in 
December 2017 imposed specific uniforms for convicts or defendants arrested in relation to 
specific crimes when appearing before the judge endangering the principle of presumption of 
innocence and the right to a fair trial. 

Discussions between the government and representatives of minorities continued. However, 
hate speech and threats directed against minorities remained a serious problem. A civil society 
survey on hate speech in the media revealed that articles/news targeting national, ethnic and 
religious groups increased during the reporting period. Anti-Semitic rhetoric in the media and 
by  public  officials  continued.  School  textbooks  need  to  be  revised  to  delete  remnants  of 
discriminatory  references.  State  subsidies  for  minority  schools  declined.  The  main  case 
launched  in  connection  with  the  assassination  of  Armenian  journalist  Hrant  Dink  in  2007 
continued.  In  February  2018,  the  Court  of  Cassation  accepted  the  case  filed  by  Armenian 
Patriarchate regarding the restitution of the Sanasaryan Han, an education centre which was 
seized  by  the  state.  With  this  decision,  the  legal  personality  of  the  Patriarchate  of  the 
Armenians  of  Turkey  has  been  de  jure  recognised  for  the  first  time.  A  Greek  minority  pre-
school opened in Gökçeada (Imvros) in 2017.   

The  national  strategy  (2016-2021)  and  action  plan  (2016-2018)  for  Roma  citizens  is  being 
implemented but the committee for monitoring and evaluating the strategy only met once, in 
February  2017  The  strategy  needs  to  be  supported  by  sufficient  budget  allocation, 
measureable indicators and time-bound targets. In addition, the monitoring system needs to be 
strengthened and all stakeholders need to be included in the consultation processes. According 
to a comprehensive survey, education levels are rising among young Roma citizens. However, 
overall educational attainment levels are low. Extreme poverty and a lack of basic necessities 
remain  common  among  Roma  households.  The  overall  employment  rate  is  low,  at  31 %, 
while just 11 % of Roma people have full time paid jobs and 6 % are self-employed. Roma in 
general  live  in  very  poor  housing  conditions,  often  lacking  basic  services  and  facing 
segregation.  The  urban renewal  project  often  resulted in  demolishing  Roma  settlements  and 
displacing  families.  Access  to  any  public  services  is  extremely  challenging  for  Roma  not 
having a permanent address. Two court cases on a lynching campaign against Roma people 
continue  before  the  Court  of  Cassation.  There  has  been  research  drawing  attention  to 
discrimination and social exclusion faced by Syrian Dom communities. Turkish authorities have 
agreed to hold the first EU-Turkey Roma seminar in 2018. 

On  cultural  rights,  the  government  has  not  legalised  the  provision  of  public  services  in 
languages other than Turkish. Legal restrictions on mother tongue education in primary and 
secondary schools remained. Optional courses in Kurdish continued in public state schools, as 
did university programmes in Kurdish, Arabic, Syriac and Zaza. Some university lecturers on 
the Kurdish language and literature were dismissed by an emergency decree in January 2017, 
adding to the lack of qualified lecturers in Kurdish. According to civil society organisations, 
numerous  theatres,  libraries,  cultural  and  art  centres  were  closed  down  as  a  result  of  this 

40 

 
 
 
decree. On a positive note, children’s channel Zarok TV, which had been shut down following 
the attempted coup, began broadcasting again in December 2016. However, in 2017 another 
TV channel broadcasting in Kurdish was dropped from the state-owned satellite TÜRKSAT 
and two more Kurdish-language news outlets were closed down (see Chapter 10: Information 
society  and  media).  Several  commemorative  and  literary  monuments  marking  important 
Kurdish personalities as well as two Assyrian sculptures were removed by authorities in the 
south-east. Some Kurdish festivals were prohibited on security grounds.  

2.2.2 Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security 

The EU has common rules for border control, visas, external migration and asylum. Schengen 
cooperation entails the lifting of border controls inside the EU. There is also cooperation in 
the  fight  against  organised  crime  and  terrorism,  and  judicial,  police  and  customs 
cooperation. 

Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of justice, freedom and security. There was good 
progress  in  the  past  year,  in  particular  in  the  area  of  migration  and  asylum  policy.  Turkey 
remained committed to implementing the March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement and played a key 
role  in  ensuring  effective  management  of  migratory  flows  along  the  Eastern  Mediterranean 
route. Turkey is not yet implementing the provisions relating to third-country nationals in the 
EU-Turkey  readmission  agreement,  despite  these  entering  into  force  on  1 October  2017. 
Turkey still needs to align its legislation in key areas in the fight against organised crime, in 
particular its Data protection legislation, as well as for the fight against terrorism.  

For the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ continue implementing the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 and implement all the 
provisions of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement towards all EU Member States; 

→  align legislation on personal data protection with  European  standards and implement the 
necessary  requirements  for  the  negotiations  of  an  international  agreement  allowing  for  the 
exchange of personal data with Europol; 

→ revise its legislation and practices on terrorism in line with the European Convention on 
Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights case-law and the EU acquis and practices. 
The proportionality principle must be observed in practice. 

Fight against organised crime 

Turkey has some level of preparation in the fight against organised crime. There was some 
progress,  notably  through  the  adoption  of  a  new  strategy  and  improvement  of  institutional 
capacity notably regarding coordination of financial investigations. Turkey needs to improve 
its  legislation  on  cybercrime,  asset  confiscation  and  witness  protection.  An  operational 
agreement  could  not  be  finalised  with  Europol  due  to  data  protection  requirements,  and 
Turkish data protection law is not yet in line with European standards.  

For the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

 → implement the necessary requirements for the negotiation of an international agreement 
allowing for the exchange of personal data including with Europol and Eurojust; 

→ take measures to improve its track record, in particular by dismantling criminal networks 
and confiscating criminal assets;  

41 

 
 
 
→  collect  and  use  appropriate  aggregate  statistics  to  facilitate  threat  assessment,  policy 
development and implementation; 

→ develop a strategic approach towards financial investigations, including by adopting the 
Financial  Action  Task  Force  concept  of  financial  investigations;  implementing  financial 
investigations  as  a  standard  when  dealing  with  organised  crime,  terrorism  and  serious 
corruption  cases;  starting  financial  investigations  from  the  very  start  of  the  criminal 
investigation;  applying  a  multidisciplinary  cooperation  and  a  pro-active  approach  with 
regard to financial investigations. 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

Over recent years, Turkey has increased the number of specialised departments in the police 
and/or the gendarmerie to deal with specific forms of organised crime (e.g. drugs, migration, 
human  trafficking,  cybercrime,  witness  protection).  The  gendarmerie’s  anti-smuggling  and 
organised crime department was reorganised in March 2017. 

Turkey’s  legal  framework  in  the  fight  against  organised  crime  and  police  cooperation  is 
partially  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  witness  protection  law  still  has  shortcomings.  Its 
scope  needs  to  be  expanded  to  include  all  types  of  serious  crime  and  procedural  rules  need 
third-party  confiscation,  on  extended  confiscation  and  on 
improvement.  Rules  on 
precautionary  freezing  of  assets  need  to  be  aligned  with  the  acquis.  Turkey's  capacity  to 
identify  and  trace  criminal  assets  needs  to  be  strengthened,  notably  by  establishing  or 
designating  a  centralised  agency  (Asset  Recovery  Office)  in  order  to  enhance  the 
effectiveness of the national asset recovery system and facilitate the operational cooperation 
with the Asset Recovery Offices in the Member States.  

The Ministry of the Interior continues to coordinate implementation of the 2016-2021 strategy 
for  combating  organised  crime  strategy  and  the  related  2016-2018  action  plan.  Turkey  is 
implementing  a  number  of  sectoral  strategies  and  action  plans,  such  as  a  national 
cybersecurity strategy and action plan (2016-2019). 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

In 2017, of 1564 cases of organised crime, 189 people were convicted. This compares to 450 
cases in 2016 with 66 convictions. 

The operational capacity of the forces of public order has been affected by the measures taken 
after  the  attempted  coup  of  July  2016.  Since  October  2016,  23  095  staff  in  the  General 
Directorate  Security,  186  Coast  Guard  staff  and 3456  gendarmerie  officers  (including 
conscripts) have been dismissed.  The capacity of the training academy has been stretched to 
meet the increasing number of training courses required. 

In terms of equipment, law enforcement bodies continue to have appropriate modern vehicles, 
radio  communication  systems,  software,  hardware  and  premises.  Most  of  the  expected 
databases are in place, though they are not always interconnected. 

An  operational  agreement  could  not  be  finalised  with  Europol  due  to  data  protection 
requirements, and Turkish data protection law is not yet in line with European standards. The 
Commission  adopted  in  December  2017  a  recommendation  to  open  negotiations  of  an 
international agreement allowing for the exchange of personal data including with Europol. A 
strategic agreement with Europol has been in force since 2004, while a Turkish liaison officer 
has  been  seconded  to  Europol  since  2016.  Closer  cooperation  between  Turkish  law 

42 

 
 
 
enforcement  and  Europol  can  be  achieved  by  making  better  use  of  the  existing  strategic 
cooperation  agreement  and  liaison  agreement.  Closer  cooperation  would  be  desirable  in 
addressing the Foreign Terrorist Fighters. 

Cooperation between the  European Union Agency for Law Enforcement  Training (CEPOL) 
and the Turkish National police Academy has continued.  

Turkey  has  signed  51  cooperation  agreements  in  relation  to  the  fight  against  terrorism  and 
crime  with  21  Member  States,  with  a  view  to  sharing  information  and  conducting  joint 
operations. In total, 169 security cooperation agreements have been signed, with 92 countries. 

In  2017,  the  number  of  suspicious  transaction  reports  submitted  to  the  Financial  Crimes 
Investigation  Board  has  increased  from  132  570  in  2016  to  almost  175  000  in  2017.  The 
number of files that have been analysed and evaluated increased from 839 in 2016 to 10 554 
in 2017. However, only nine people were convicted for money laundering down from 23 in 
2016. In 2016, Turkish law enforcement authorities detained 114 276 suspects in connection 
with 81 222 drug-related crimes and courts issued 37 367 convictions. 

Turkey is a destination and transit country, and to a lesser extent source country, for women, 
men and children subjected to trafficking in human beings for sexual and labour exploitation. 
Authorities reported that 303 victims of trafficking  in  human beings were detected in 2017, 
compared with 181 in 2016. The main shortcomings identified are a limited accommodation 
capacity  for  victims  and  weak  inter-agency  cooperation,  which  has  a  particularly  negative 
impact  on  identifying  victims.  A  comprehensive  multidisciplinary,  victim-focused  approach 
to trafficking in human beings needs to be developed. 

As regards trafficking in firearms, with war-torn countries at its borders, Turkey is becoming 
increasingly a source and transit country for trafficking of weapons, including small arms and 
light weapons.  It is desirable for Turkey to strengthen its efforts to prevent and fight illegal 
trafficking of firearms, such as with the adoption of an Action Plan and amending the Law on 
Firearms to further align with the EU acquis in this area.  

The  National  Cyber  Security  Council  operated  according  to  their  2016-2019  strategy  and 
action plan.  

Cooperation on the ground between law enforcement bodies needs to be further improved, in 
particular  between  the  police  and  the  gendarmerie.  Courts  need  greater  specialisation  in 
organised crime cases. 

The  confiscation  of  criminal  assets  should  become  a  strategic  priority  in  the  fight  against 
organised crime, terrorism and corruption in Turkey. Turkey should develop and implement a 
more  comprehensive  and  coherent  legal  framework  for  the  confiscation  of  proceeds  of 
crime. In addition, it is crucial that financial investigations into a person’s assets are allowed 
to continue (for years if needed) after a criminal conviction in order to fully and effectively 
implement a previously issued confiscation order. Finally, Turkey should urgently improve its 
capacity to manage frozen or confiscated assets so that they do not lose economic value (asset 
management). 

88  people  were  enrolled  in  the  witness  protection  scheme  in  the  period  September  2016  – 
September 2017, showing an important reduction compared to the previous period. 

Fighting  organised  crime  and  corruption  remains  fundamental  to  countering  the  illicit 
influence of criminal groups on the political, legal and economic systems. 

43 

 
 
 
Fight against terrorism 

Turkey continued to be struck by several terrorist attacks attributed to PKK and Da’esh in the 
reporting period. The EU has condemned all acts of terrorist violence. Turkey has a legitimate 
right  to  defend  itself  against  such  terrorist  violence,  but  the  measures  taken  need  to  be 
proportionate In its efforts to fight terrorism, Turkey has been giving high priority to the PKK, 
particularly following a severe surge of violence in the country since July 2015 (see Situation 
in the east and south-east). The PKK remains on the EU’s list of persons, groups and entities 
involved in acts of terrorism. The authorities have also continued to address the terrorist threat 
from  Da’esh  vigorously.  The  Turkish  authorities  have  mobilised  considerable  resources  on 
the dismantling of the Gülen movement which they designated as a terror organisation in May 
2016  and  to  which  they  attributed  the  organisation  and  execution  of  the  attempted  coup  of 
July 2016.  

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

Turkey  continued  its  work  on  countering  the  financing  of  terrorism.  Following  the  2016 
ratification  of  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Convention  on  Laundering,  Search,  Seizure  and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, Turkey aligned 
its  legislation  with  the  provisions  of  the  Convention.  Legislation  on  the  confiscation  of 
criminal assets is partly in line with the acquis. Turkey needs to further align with the acquis 
by strengthening its measures to prevent the misuse of its financial system for the purpose of 
terrorism  financing.  Turkey’s  legislation  on  terrorism  and  corresponding  implementation 
should  be  revised  in  accordance  with  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights,  the 
European Court of Human Rights case-law and the EU acquis and practices, without reducing 
Turkey’s  capacity  to  fight  terrorism.  The  proportionality  principle  must  be  observed  in 
practice. Turkey has not made any such legislative changes in the reporting period. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

The  Financial  Crimes  Investigation  Board  (MASAK)  serves  as  the  national  financial 
intelligence  unit.  It  increased  its  administrative  and  enforcement  capacity  and  improved  its 
cooperation  with  law  enforcement  agencies  and  judicial  authorities.  Currently,  there  is  no 
strategy/action  plan,  however  MASAK  has  been  preparing  a  comprehensive  national  risk 
assessment document in view on the next FATF assessment in 2018. Turkey’s track record on 
suspicious transaction reports has improved. Turkey’s counter-terrorism dialogue with the EU 
continued  actively,  with  specific  attention  being  paid  to  foreign  terrorist  fighters.  Turkey 
developed  its  cooperation  with  EU  Member  States  on  detecting  foreign  terrorist  fighters 
(FTF) wanting to cross Turkey to reach Syria or Iraq. Turkey has issued entry bans for more 
than  38  000  suspected  FTFs  and  deported  more  than  3  500  FTFs  in  2016  and  2017  whilst 
about  1  030  FTF  were  taken  into  custody.  Turkish  increased  efforts  to  counter  both  home-
grown and FTF cells operating in Turkey. However, police and judicial cooperation with EU 
Member States and EU agencies in combating terrorism remained limited, due to the absence 
of  a  personal  data  protection  law  in  line  with  European  standards  and  differences  over  the 
definition  of,  and  penalties  for,  terrorist  offences.  Turkey  should  continue  its  efforts  to 
effectively prevent and counter radicalisation. This needs to be done in close cooperation with 
religious  leaders  and  communities,  social  workers,  the  education  system  and  youth 
organisations. 

Legal and irregular migration 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

44 

 
 
 
Legislation in this area is partially aligned with the EU acquis. Following the entry into force 
in  2013  of  the  Law  on  Foreigners  and  International  Protection,  the  Directorate-General  for 
Migration  Management  (DGMM)  continued  to  increase  its  capacity.  DGMM  developed  a 
strategic  plan  for  2017-2021  which  contains  objectives  for  regular  migration,  irregular 
migration,  international  protection,  the  fight  against  trafficking  in  human  beings,  improved 
harmonisation  and  communication,  and  increased  institutional  capacity.  DGMM  employs  a 
total  of  3 675  staff  centrally  and  in  the  Turkish  provinces,  and  there  are  currently  1 500 
vacancies. Recruitment  and  training  continued  and  work  on  creating the  DGMM’s  overseas 
structure is ongoing. GöçNet, an internal online platform containing data on every foreigner 
residing in the country, is now operational in all 81 provinces in Turkey. Turkey has also set 
up KÜRE, its country of origin report acquisition system, with the objective of providing staff 
in charge of international protection with accurate country of origin information. 

DGMM continued to expand its capacity to accommodate irregular migrants. Turkey has 18 
removal  centres  with  a  total  capacity  of  8 276,  and  DGMM  is  planning  to  increase  this 
capacity  to  15 476  by  2020.  Turkey  needs  to  align  its  practice  with  European  standards  for 
services provided in removal centres where access to legal counsel and sufficient staffing of 
centres with well-trained professionals need to be ensured. Turkey needs to set up appropriate 
procedures and  provide sufficient resources, including staff from law enforcement agencies, 
to identify and deal with vulnerable migrants and asylum seekers, including those with special 
needs. 

A  bilateral  readmission  agreement  with  Montenegro  entered  into  force  on  1  December 
2016. The  internal  procedures  for  approval  of  the  readmission  agreements  with  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  were  completed,  but  the  agreement  has  not  yet  entered  into  force.  Bilateral 
readmission  agreements  were  signed  with  Nigeria,  Yemen,  Kosovo*  and  Norway,  and 
internal  ratification  procedures  are  ongoing.  Negotiations  for  a  readmission  agreement  with 
Switzerland were finalized in December 2016. Turkey still awaits responses from Afghanistan 
and Sudan about its readmission agreement draft proposals. 

The  Law  on  Foreigners  and  International  Protection  has  been  amended  by  two  emergency 
decrees. One decree, passed in October 2016, stipulates that people who are considered to be 
affiliated with terrorist organisations can be removed from Turkey without the possibility of 
suspending a removal decision by filing an appeal. This decree also provided DGMM with the 
authority to collect passenger and crew information from carriers that operate within Turkey. 
Another decree, adopted in August 2017, introduced new categories of people that can obtain 
short-term  residence  permits  and  extended  the  duration  of  short-term  residence  permits  and 
family  residence  permits.  It  also  expanded  the  categories  of  students  that  can  receive 
residence permits for the duration of their studies in Turkey. The amendment also introduced 
the possibility of external service providers applying for residence permits. 

Throughout  2017,  the  Migration  Policies  Board  met  four  times.  Convening  the  Migration 
Advisory  board  –  a  mechanism  established  by  the  Law  to  support  DGMM  -  with  the 
participation  of  academia  and  rights-based  civil  society  organizations  working  in  the  field 
would promote dialogue between the government and civil society on migration management 
and also support migration policy development. Not all regulations issued with respect to the 

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ 
Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence. 

45 

 
 
 
                                                            
implementation  of  the  Law  on  Foreigners  are  made  public  and  there  is  a  lack  of  public 
awareness  about  legislation  related  to  migration,  including  emergency  decrees  and 
regulations. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

The  EU-Turkey  Statement  of  18 March  2016  continued  to  deliver  results,  with  both  parties 
committed  to  its  effective  implementation.  According  to  the  International  Organisation  for 
Migration,  the  number  of  lives  lost  in  the  Aegean  Sea  stemming  from  irregular  crossing 
attempts dropped significantly from 434 (1 January - 31 December 2016), of which 366 were 
in  the  three  months  before  the  activation  of  the  Statement,  to  62  (1 January  -  31 December 
2017). Likewise, the daily average of irregular crossings from Turkey into the Aegean islands 
fell  from  1  794  in  the  period  from  January  to  March  2016,  just  before  the  activation  of  the 
Statement, to 80 from its activation to 7 March 2018. This trend was supported by intensified 
efforts  by  Turkey’s  law  enforcement  agencies  to  prevent  irregular  departures  from  coastal 
areas, the Turkish coast guard patrolling in the Aegean Sea, and the introduction of measures 
restricting  the  free  movement  of  people  seeking  international  protection  and  people  under 
temporary  protection  to  the  provinces  to  which  they  had  been  assigned.  According  to  the 
Turkish  authorities,  175  752  people  were  intercepted  in  2017  while  crossing  the  border 
illegally, an increase of 0.7 % from 2016. 21 937 irregular migrants were apprehended by the 
coast  guard  in  2017,  compared  to  34 841  in  2016.  The  number  of  human  smugglers 
apprehended increased from 3 314 in 2016 to 4 641 in 2017.  

Turkey took proactive action to prevent the opening of a new migratory route in the Black Sea 
in  August-September  2017.  It  also  took  some  measures  to  prevent  irregular  departures  to 
Cyprus  and  Italy.  Turkey  actively  facilitated  the  implementation  of  the  ‘One-for-One’ 
resettlement  scheme  under  the  EU-Turkey  Statement  by  pre-selecting  candidates  for 
resettlements. Between 4 April 2016 and 31 December 2017, 11 711 Syrians  were resettled 
from Turkey to the EU. Respecting the commitments under the EU-Turkey Statement, Turkey 
has readmitted - from the start of the implementation until the end of 2017 – 1 484 persons, 
including  236  Syrians  who  had  reached  the  Greek  islands  directly  from  Turkey.  Technical 
cooperation between Greece and Turkey on returns under the Statement has been facilitated 
by regular trilateral meetings also involving the EU.  

Implementation of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement remained unsatisfactory. Provisions 
of  the  agreement  that  apply  to  Turkish  nationals  are  not  implemented  consistently  by  all 
Turkish  diplomatic  missions  in  the  EU.  Turkey  maintained  its  position  that  it  would  not 
implement  the  provisions  in  relation  to  third-country  nationals  that  entered  into  force  on 
1 October 2017 until the visa requirement for its citizens travelling to the Schengen zone for a 
short  stay  has  been  lifted.  Implementation  of  Turkey’s  existing  bilateral  readmission 
obligations towards Greece significantly deteriorated in 2017. Turkey does not readmit third-
country nationals from Bulgaria, either under the bilateral border agreement or under the EU-
Turkey readmission agreement. 

Turkey has become a major destination country for regular migration. At the end of 2017, 593 
151 non-Turkish nationals held a temporary residence permit in Turkey, up from 461 217 in 
2016. The Law on International Labour Force adopted by the Turkish Parliament in July 2016 
introduced simplified procedures for granting work permits. A new work permit system called 
the ‘Turquoise Card’ was introduced, aiming to attract qualified labour force into Turkey. A 
circular  was  issued  in  May  2017  regulating  work  permits  allowing  foreigners  to  work  in 
special economic zones. The Law on International Labour Force also led to the establishment 

46 

 
 
 
of  a  Directorate-General  for  International  Labour,  which  has  157  staff  members  handling 
matters  concerning,  among  others, 
investments  and 
international and temporary protection. 

labour  policies,  foreign  direct 

Asylum 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

Turkey’s  asylum  legislation  is  partially  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  Under  the  Law  on 
Foreigners  and  International  Protection  and  two  implementing  regulations,  DGMM  is  the 
main state body responsible for all refugee-related issues. A specificity of the Turkish asylum 
system is linked to the fact that the country signed the 1968 New York Protocol of the 1951 
Geneva Convention with a geographical limitation. Accordingly, under Turkish law the vast 
majority of persons seeking international protection in Turkey cannot apply for fully-fledged 
refugee  status  but  for  ‘conditional  refugee’  status  and  subsidiary  protection  only.  If 
conditional  refugee  status  is  granted,  this  limits  the  stay  in  the  country  until  the  moment  a 
recognised  conditional  refugee  is  ‘resettled  to  a  third  country’.  While  relevant  legislation 
avoids the term ‘integration’, there is a need to design integration pathways for different status 
holders. Refugees under ‘temporary protection’ are largely prohibited from acquiring Turkish 
citizenship. Against the backdrop of an amendment to the Law on Turkish Citizenship, which 
entered  into  force  in  November  2017,  Turkish  authorities  completed  the  exceptional 
naturalisation  process  for  36 323  Syrian  individuals  in  2017.  Around  50 000  Syrians  have 
been identified for naturalisation. These individuals were highly-qualified and well-educated 
Syrians, including those who had lived in Turkey without temporary protection since before 
the start of the conflict in Syria.  

Non-Syrian asylum seekers are subject to a dual asylum registration system. Newcomers must 
apply  for  asylum  at  a  DGMM  Provincial  Directorate  of  Migration  Management  office 
(PDMM). They are also registered by the Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and 
Migrants  on  behalf  of  UNHCR.  Once  registered,  they  receive  the  status  of  ‘international 
protection applicant’. PDMMs issue an ID card to each applicant, which legalises the person’s 
stay  in  Turkey.  Applicants  for  international  protection  (including  for  conditional  refugee 
status) and people under temporary protection can apply for a work permit. According to the 
Turkish  authorities,  15 700  work  permits  had  been  issued  to  Syrians  under  temporary 
protection  by  the  end  of  2017.  Applicants  for  international  protection  and  people  under 
temporary protection are also allowed to enrol in the general health insurance scheme, register 
at public schools, receive interpretation services free of charge and apply for social assistance. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

As of December 2017, Turkey was hosting about 3.5 million Syrian and 365 000 non-Syrian 
refugees, the largest refugee community in the world. There are currently 62 ‘satellite cities’ 
in  Turkey  where  asylum  seekers and  recognised conditional refugees  are  required  to  reside, 
although  Syrian  refugees  are  exempt  from  this  requirement.  They  may  register  in  any  of 
Turkey’s 81 provinces, but must then reside in that province. Biometric registration in these 
provinces  is  done  by  the  PDMM.  According  to  a  Ministerial  Circular  issued  in  November 
2017, PDMM may cancel the temporary protection status granted to Syrians if they leave their 
province  of  residence  without  authorisation  on  three  successive  occasions  without  notifying 
PDMM and in the absence of a valid justification. 

Around 228 000 of the 3.5 million Syrian refugees live in 21 camps managed by the Disaster 
and Emergency Management Agency (AFAD) along the Turkish-Syrian border, while more 

47 

 
 
 
than 3.2 million live in host communities spread across the entire country. Throughout 2017, 
significant  work  was  done  to  provide  wider  access  to  schooling  and  healthcare  to  Syrians 
under  temporary  protection,  including  with  EU  support  under  the  Facility  for  Refugees  in 
Turkey. Out of 1.1 million Syrians of school age in Turkey, about 605 000 now have access to 
primary and secondary education. Work by the Ministry of National Education and AFAD to 
enable more Syrian children to have access to education continues. Syrians under temporary 
protection  have  the  right  to  access  healthcare  at  hospitals  in  the  province  of  their  first 
registration. Migrant health centres are being set up, where both Turkish and Syrian doctors 
who have obtained a professional authorisation certificate are employed. 

Since late 2016, DGMM has been carrying out an exercise to check information about Syrians 
under  temporary  protection,  updating  and  completing  the  information  taken  during  their 
original registration. This will provide updated data that can be used to design evidence-based 
programmes for targeted assistance. 

There  is  a  risk  that  children  of  Syrians  under  temporary  protection  born  in  Turkey  become 
stateless if the father is not present. This should be taken into account during the registration 
and  certification  process.  More  information  should  be  provided  to  migrants  and  refugees 
about  their  rights,  and  more  should  be  done  to  raise  awareness  of  these  among  the  host 
population. 

There have been reports of alleged expulsions, returns and deportations of Syrian nationals, in 
contradiction of the non-refoulement principle. 

As regards non-Syrians, the latest available figures from UNHCR indicate that at the end of 
2017,  364 966 asylum-seekers and refugees from countries other than Syria were registered 
with UNHCR in Turkey, among them 163 413 Afghans, 152 976 Iraqis, 33 923 Iranians,  and 
14 654   classified  as  ‘other  nationalities’.  Of  these,  UNHCR  reported  that  as  of  the  end  of 
2017, the number of individuals recognised as refugees by UNHCR stood at 56 111. 

The  number  of  asylum  seekers  continued  to  increase  in  Turkey  and  a  substantial  backlog 
remained  in  determining  international  protection  status.  Turkey  had  by  mid-March  2018 
granted  international  protection  to  69  614  applicants,  refused  13  079  applications,  and  251 
574  cases  remained  under  review.  A  new  registration  centre  is  planned  in  Ankara  to  work 
towards evaluating and processing 25 000 applications per year. 

In 2017, DGMM started to cooperate with the European Asylum Support Office. 

Visa policy 

Turkey needs to further harmonise its visa policy with the  EU common visa policy. Further 
efforts are needed to align its legislation with the  Visa Regulation, the Visa Code and other 
relevant EU legislation. This would include aligning Turkish visa requirements with the  EU 
lists of visa-free and visa-required countries, full phasing-out of the issuing of visas at borders 
and of e-visas and ensuring that the issuing of visas at consulates is carried out in line with the 
conditions  and  procedures  set  out  in  the  Visa  Code.  Turkey  continues  to  apply  a 
discriminatory visa regime towards 11 Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus for 
which  the  e-visa  system  refers  to  the  country  option  Greek  Cypriot  Administration  of 
Southern Cyprus. The Polnet integrated police database and the Konsolosluknet  Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs database have been connected to DGMM’s Göçnet database.  

The  EU-Turkey  visa  liberalisation  dialogue  continued.  Turkey  made  some  progress  in 
preparing to issue biometric passports that meet EU standards, but has yet to fulfil 7 out of 72 

48 

 
 
 
benchmarks  on:  the  fight  against  corruption,  judicial  cooperation  in  criminal  matters, 
cooperation  with  Europol,  data  protection  legislation,  anti-terrorism  legislation,  EU-Turkey 
readmission agreement, and biometric passports. At the beginning of February 2018, Turkey 
submitted to the European Commission a work plan outlining how Turkey plans to fulfil the 
seven  outstanding  visa  liberalisation  benchmarks.  The  Commission  is  assessing  Turkey's 
proposals and further consultations with the Turkish counterparts will follow. 

Using a new visa online system, activated in February 2016, applicants are required to upload 
relevant  data,  which  is  later  verified  against  original  documents  by  Turkish  diplomatic 
missions abroad, followed by an interview. In 2017, 13 training courses including modules on 
document security were delivered to border and consular staff. New Turkish visa stickers with 
higher security standards are under development and need to be put in place.  

Schengen and external borders 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

While Turkey’s legislation on external borders and Schengen is inspired by the EU acquis and 
practices,  its  legislative  and  administrative  frameworks  are  not  fully  aligned  with  EU 
standards.  Some  progress  was  made  in  the  area  of  external  borders  and  Schengen.  Joint 
operations by all law enforcement authorities (gendarmerie, coast guard and national police) 
have  increased  and  led  to  an  increased  number  of  apprehensions  of  irregular  migrants  and 
organisers of human smuggling in 2017. An important step forward in relation to inter-agency 
cooperation  was  the  setting  up  of  a  joint  law  enforcement  training  academy  for  the 
gendarmerie and the coast guard.  

To ensure better alignment with the EU  acquis, specialised and professional staff should be 
put in charge of border check and border surveillance tasks. Risk analysis units need to be put 
in place, both in central administrations dealing with border management and also locally at 
border crossing points. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

The March 2016 Regulation on Inter-institutional Cooperation and Coordination in the field 
of  Border  Management  needs  to  be  implemented.  The  Integrated  Border  Management 
Coordination  Board  set  up  under  this  regulation  has  not  yet  met.  Another  forum  that  was 
created,  the  Border  Management  Implementation  Board,  has  met  only  twice.  The  National 
Coordination  and  Joint  Risk  Analysis  Centre  (NACORAC)  that  was  set  up  under  the 
regulation needs to start functioning, in order to collect, exchange and process data on border 
security  and  to  carry  out  joint  risk  analysis  among  border  authorities.  Intense  inter-agency 
cooperation  based  on  risk  analyses  is  necessary  to  improve  effectiveness  in  tackling  cross-
border crimes and smuggling networks. Local sub-governors and deputy governors received 
the  requisite  training  and  a  training  manual  was  adopted  by  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior. 
Legislation to create a single organisation in charge of border security has been put on hold, 
mainly due to instability in the border regions.  

DGMM has taken on responsibility for managing pre-arrival information and conducting risk 
analysis  on  passenger  travelling  by  air.  Advance  passenger  information/passenger  name 
record (API/PNR) data should also be shared and analysed by the Turkish national police to 
efficiently identify passengers where there is an increased risk and take measures accordingly. 

Mobile border surveillance capacity was considerably increased during the reporting period at 
land and sea borders. New technology was rolled out and the infrastructure was modernised. 

49 

 
 
 
Demining the eastern borders continued in the province of Iğdır, at Turkey’s border with Iran. 
The Turkish national police’s capacity to identify forged and falsified documents needs to be 
further strengthened,  including in the transit zone to  prevent irregular border  crossings. The 
coast guard’s maritime surveillance capacity needs to be ensured. The Land Forces Command 
and  Turkish  national  police  need  to  deploy  professional  staff  who  are  specialised  in  their 
respective areas.  

Turkey improved its border cooperation with neighbouring Greece and Bulgaria through the 
trilateral  common  contact  centre  for  police  and  customs  cooperation,  which  became 
operational  in  November  2016.  Cooperation  among  the  Turkish,  Romanian  and  Bulgarian 
coast guards resulted in the prevention of irregular border crossings in the Black Sea. In 2017, 
the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCGA) and Turkey continued to intensify 
their  operational  cooperation,  supported  by  the  presence  of  an  EBCGA  Liaison  Officer  in 
Turkey.  EBCGA  delivered  training  on  risk  analysis  and  data  collection,  and  cooperation 
continued on joint analysis. 

Judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters 

The  main  Turkish  legislation  governing  judicial  cooperation  in  criminal  matters  is  in  place. 
The Law on International Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters entered into force in May 
2016 and aims to  speed up procedures. These  procedures include the introduction of video-
conferencing  for  mutual  legal  assistance  requests,  and  the  introduction  of  a  ‘consensual 
extradition’ procedure. The  mechanism  of  ‘exact  execution’  was  introduced  for  people  who 
have  been  convicted  and  are  transferred  to  Turkey.  However,  the  independence  and 
accountability  of  the  justice  system  still  needs  to  be  strengthened  so  that  the  principle  of 
mutual  recognition  of  judgments  and  court  decisions  in  criminal  matters  can  be  smoothly 
implemented.  

Turkey  has  provided  training  courses  on  the  new  law  but  only  to  prospective  judges  and 
prosecutors  at  the  Justice  Academy.  Such  training  should  be  extended  to  sitting  judges  and 
prosecutors. 

Turkey  has  assigned  direct  contact  points  under  the  central  authority,  including  for  the 
Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom. Justice consultants have also been appointed 
in Turkey’s diplomatic missions in Paris, Berlin, Brussels, and The Hague. 

In 2017, EU Member States accepted 13 extradition requests out of 202 from Turkey, while 
Turkey  accepted  none  of  the  16  requests  from  EU  Member  States.  EU  Member  States 
accepted no transfers of convicts to Turkey and Turkey accepted 2 transfers to an EU Member 
State. 

An  operational  agreement  could  not  be  finalised  with  Europol  due  to  data  protection 
requirements, and Turkish data protection law is not yet in line with European standards. The 
list of Eurojust contact points in Turkey was updated several times in 2016 and 2017. In May 
2017,  the  College  of  Eurojust  approved  an  action  plan  on  Turkey  and  contact  points  were 
newly appointed. Eurojust will consider how to reinforce cooperation with Turkey.  

In 2017, Turkey was involved in four Eurojust cases. These criminal cases mainly concerned 
terrorism, illegal immigrant smuggling, money laundering and fraud. 

Cooperation between the Turkish national police and Interpol needs to be improved to make 
more  efficient  use  of  Interpol’s  database  to  identify  fraudulent  documents  and  stolen 
passports. 

50 

 
 
 
On  judicial  cooperation  in  civil  matters,  Turkey  is  now  party  to  most  international 
conventions  in  this  area,  including  the  1996  Hague  Convention  on  Jurisdiction,  Applicable 
Law,  Recognition,  Enforcement  and  Cooperation  in  Respect  of  Parental  Responsibility  and 
Measures  for  the  Protection  of  Children.  The  2007  Hague  Convention  on  the  International 
Recovery  on  Child  Support  and  Other  Forms  of  Family  Maintenance  entered  into  force  in 
February 2017. Turkey still needs to take effective measures to ensure shorter timeframes for 
proceedings in the context of the 1980 Hague Convention on civil aspects of the international 
child abduction. Turkey has not yet acceded to relevant international conventions in the area 
of civil justice. Turkey has signed, but not yet ratified, the 1983 European Convention on the 
Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes. 

Cooperation in the field of drugs 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

The High Council for the Fight against Drugs is responsible for inter-ministerial coordination 
on drug policy issues in Turkey. It is tasked with high-level strategy development, developing 
interinstitutional  coordination  and  monitoring  strategy  implementation.  The  High  Council 
includes  ministers  from  all  of  the  ministries  involved  in  delivering  the  objectives  of  the 
national drug strategy. The Board for the Fight against Drugs supports the work of the High 
Council. In July 2017, the Ministry of Interior adopted its own institutional plan to implement 
specific  projects  in  this  field,  the  ‘implementation  policy  on  the  fight  against  drugs  (2017-
2018)’.  In  November  2017,  a  research  committee  was  set  up  to  conduct  research  on  drug 
addiction and new types of addictions and to identify reasons for addiction and measures to be 
taken to address the issue. There is a scientific committee, composed of academics, which is 
tasked  with  making  recommendations  for  studies  and  carrying  out  training  on  reducing 
demand for drugs. There is also a National Early Warning System for the control procedures 
at  the  Turkish  National  Monitoring  Centre  for  Drugs  and  Drug  Addiction  tasked  with 
identifying new substances to be covered by relevant legislation. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Turkey  lies  on  the  main  transit  route  for  drugs  between  Asia  and  Europe.  Turkish 
law-enforcement  bodies  conducted  successful  operations  during  the  reporting  period,  which 
resulted in the seizure of 146 954 kg of cannabis, 845 kg of cocaine, 5 585 kg of heroin, 3 783 
737 ecstasy tablets and 12 918 309 captagon tablets. Four controlled delivery operations were 
carried  out  with  2  countries  (United  States  and  Austria).  Since  2008  a  total  of  692  new 
psychoactive  substances  were  included  in  the  scope  of  the  legislation  as  a  result  of  the 
activities  of  National  Early  Warning  System  for  the  control  procedures  at  the  Turkish 
National  Monitoring  Centre  for  Drugs  and  Drug  Addiction  working  group.  The  number  of 
sniffer dogs used by the Turkish National Police u increased to 391. 

Since December 2014, specialist drugs teams have been set up in 50 provinces to support the 
fight against drugs in high-risk locations such as schools. (There were 11 such teams in 2015, 
29 in 2016 and xx in 2017). Turkey reports annually to the European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs  and  Drug  Addiction.  The  quality  and  quantity  of  data  Turkey  provides  is  improving. 
Rehabilitation and treatment capacity in the country needs to  be further  increased. Turkey’s 
capacity for data collection and analysis needs to be strengthened. 

Customs cooperation - see Chapter 29 (Customs Union).  

51 

 
 
 
 
3. FUNDAMENTALS FIRST: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT & COMPETITIVENESS 

Key economic figures 

Gross domestic product per capita (% of EU28 
in PPS) 

2015 

62** 

2016 

62 

GDP growth (%) 

6.1 

3.2 

2017*** 

NA 

7.2 

Unemployment  rate  and  older  (female;  male) 
(%) 

10.3        
(12.6; 9.3) 

10.9       
(13.6; 9.6) 

11.0 
(14.5;9.6) 

Economic  activity  rate  for  people  aged  20-64: 
proportion of the population aged 20-64 that is 
economically active (female; male) (%) 

Current account balance (% of GDP) 

 Net  foreign  direct  investment  inflows  (%  of 
GDP)* 

59.9        
(32.6; 75.3) 

60.9    
(33.2;75.5) 

NA 

-3.8 

2.0 

-3.7 

1.5 

-4.5 

1.3 

Source:  Eurostat,  National  Statistics  Agency,  *World  Bank,  **  Turkstat  revised  its  national 
accounting  methodology  leading  to  a  20 %  increase  in  its  GDP  from  the  last  country 
report.*** Reporting period: for GDP - first three quarters; for unemployment – first eleven 
months; for current account and FDI – 12 month rolling basis up to 2017 Q3 

In  line  with  the  conclusions  of  the  European  Council  in  Copenhagen  in  June  1993,  EU 
accession  requires  the  existence  of  a  functioning  market  economy  and  the  capacity  to  cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. 

The  monitoring  of  these  economic  criteria  should  be  seen  in  the  context  of  the  central 
importance  of  economic  governance  in  the  enlargement  process.  Each  enlargement  country 
prepares  an  Economic  Reform  Programme  (ERP)  annually,  which  sets  out  a  medium-term 
macro-fiscal policy framework together with a key structural reform agenda aimed at ensuring 
competitiveness  and  inclusive  growth.  These  ERPs  are  the  basis  for  country-specific  policy 
guidance jointly adopted by the EU and the Western Balkans and Turkey at ministerial level 
in May each year. 

3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy 

The  Turkish  economy  is  well  advanced  and  can  be  considered  a  functioning  market 
economy.  The  economy,  supported  by  government  stimulus  measures,  managed  to  recover 
from the contraction witnessed in the wake of the attempted coup of 2016 and achieved strong 
growth  in  2017.  However,  high  growth  is  coupled  with  significant  macroeconomic 
imbalances. The current account deficit remains high and increased towards the end of 2017, 
making the country dependent on capital inflows and vulnerable to external shocks. Inflation 
moved  to  double-digit  rates  in  2017,  and  the  depreciation  of  the  Turkish  lira  continued, 
highlighting concerns over the degree of commitment of monetary policy decision-makers to 
price stability. The tendency to increase state control in the economic sphere and the actions 
targeting  companies,  businessmen  and  political  opponents  and  their  businesses  harmed  the 
business environment. Overall, there was backsliding in this area. 

In order to support long-term growth, Turkey should pay particular attention to: 

→ reduce macroeconomic imbalances by promoting domestic savings; 

52 

 
 
 
→ achieve a more inclusive labour market, increasing flexibility and reducing informality; 

→  improve  the  business  environment,  including  by  strengthening  the  rule  of  law  and  the 
judiciary. 

Economic governance 

0

50

10

60

40

70

30

20

6,0

4,0

8,0

10,0

12,0

f
o
%

P
D
G

in 

its  commitment 

Figure 1 Turkey GDP growth 

Although  still  considered  a  functioning 
market  economy,  Turkey  has  been 
backsliding 
to 
market-oriented  approaches,  with  a 
deteriorating business environment and 
widening  macroeconomic  imbalances. 
There was only limited implementation of 
the  policy  guidance  jointly  adopted  in 
May  2017.  The  government’s  Economic 
Reform  Programme 
for  2018-2020, 
submitted  to  the  Commission  in  January 
2018, 
optimistic 
macroeconomic  scenario  in  which  GDP 
growth  continues  at  a  high  pace  and 
investment 
while 
unemployment,  inflation,  the  government 
deficit and the current account deficit decrease. In July 2017, a cabinet reshuffle strengthened 
economic management by concentrating the coordination of economic policy in the hands of 
the Vice Prime Minister responsible for the Treasury. At the same time, targeted government 
action  against  companies,  business  people,  political  opponents  and  their  businesses  and  the 
large-scale dismissal of judges and prosecutors continued. This further negatively affected the 
business  environment.  Uncertainty  over  the  central  bank’s  independence  in  carrying  out 
monetary policy increased, to the detriment of macroeconomic stability. 

2012
GDP per capita in PPS (EU28=100) (lhs)
GDP growth (rhs)

Source: Eurostat, national sources 

increases 

projects 

an 

2013

2015

2014

2016

2011

0,0

2,0

Macroeconomic stability 

Economic growth rebounded after the coup attempt. Following an average growth rate of 
7.4 %  from  2010  to  2015,  domestic  political  uncertainty,  geopolitical  conflicts  and  security 
concerns led to an economic slowdown in the second half of 2015.  High loan growth driven 
by  government  credit  guarantees  and  macro-prudential  measures,  a  waiver  for  employers’ 
social contributions and other policy measures, the depreciation of the lira, strong growth in 
the  construction  sector,  and  the  upswing  in  the  European  economy  have  contributed 
significantly to reviving the economy. Turkey recorded an average growth rate of 6.4 % year-
on-year  (2.4 %  quarter-on-quarter)  in  the  four  quarters  to  September  2017.  The  high 
contribution  from  the  construction  industry  to  recent  economic  growth  and  the  upward 
revision of GDP levels by 20 % under the new national accounting methodology complicate 
estimates of Turkey’s sustainable economic growth rate. This is particularly true in a context 
of high inflation, a depreciating trend in the Turkish lira, high credit and money growth, and 
high  unemployment.  GDP  per  capita  in  purchasing  power  standard  increased  from  58 %  of 
the EU average in 2012 to 64 % in 2016. 

Turkey’s current account deficit has stopped narrowing in recent years and widened in 
2017.  The  deficit  declined  from  7.7 %  of  GDP  in  2013  to  3.7 %  in  2016,  supported  by 
declining  oil  prices  and  the  depreciation  of  the  Turkish  lira.  However,  it  increased  during 

53 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 to 4.5 % of GDP on a 12 month rolling basis in 2017 Q3. Political uncertainty following 
the attempted coup, combined with regional instability and bilateral crises (in particular with 
Russia),  had  a  negative  impact  on  trade  revenues  and  on  foreign  direct  investments  (FDI). 
Most capital inflows tend to be portfolio investments. FDI inflows to Turkey declined sharply 
by  30.5 %  to  approximately  1.5 %  of  GDP  in  2016.  Dependence  on  volatile  capital  inflows 
makes  the  Turkish  currency  and  economy  vulnerable  to  a  sudden  loss  of  investors’ 
confidence.  Gross  external debt  stock as  a percentage  of GDP increased to  46.9 %  in  2016, 
most of which is owed by the private sector. 

Domestic  savings  have  been  revised  upward  under  the  revised  national  accounting 
methodology  but  still  fall  well  short  of  domestic  investment.  The  shortfall  in  domestic 
savings needs to be compensated with inflows of foreign capital. In order to promote domestic 
savings,  private  pension  savings  were  subsidised  and  the  Treasury  started  to  issue  gold-
denominated bonds and lease certificates. 

Inflation  remained  high  and  Turkey  faced  the  return  of  double-digit  inflation  for  the 
first time since 2012. The rise in food and energy prices and the depreciation of the Turkish 
lira put pressure on inflation in 2017, which was the first year to have a double-digit average 
headline (11.1 %) and a double-digit core inflation rate (10.1 %) since 2003, when the central 
bank  regained  control  over  inflation.  High  inflation  has  significant  costs  in  terms  of 
macroeconomic  stability,  resource  allocation  and  redistributive  effects.  It  also  risks  eroding 
the credibility of the central bank and reducing monetary policy’s effectiveness. 

The central bank continued to pursue multiple objectives as part of an overly complex 
monetary  policy  framework  in  a  context  of  challenges  to  its  independence.  Although 
price  stability  is  the  primary  objective,  the  central  bank  is  also  pursuing  macro-financial 
stability  and  trying  to  dampen  exchange  rate  fluctuations.  Together  with  political  calls  for 
lower  interest  rates  and  question  marks  over  the  usefulness  of  an  independent  monetary 
policy,  this  has  led  to  uncertainty  in  financial  markets  and,  as  a  result,  a  volatile  exchange 
rate.  The  ‘Late  Liquidity  Window’,  the  monetary  policy  for  providing  liquidity  to  banks  in 
exceptional circumstances has become the only policy tool as of November 2017. Monetary 
policy  should  focus  more  on  its  primary  objective  of  price  stability  in  order  to  reach  the 
official  inflation  target.  In  addition,  simplifying  the  monetary  policy  framework  would 
improve  its  transparency  and  predictability,  and  would  strengthen  the  central  bank’s 
credibility. 

Figure 2 Turkey fiscal developments 

Source: Eurostat, national sources, ESA2010 
till 2015 

led 

have 

Stimulus  measures 
to 
deteriorating public finances and a rise in 
contingent  liabilities.  The  government  has 
benefited  from  lower  interest  payments  and 
the primary deficit  has  decreased to close  to 
zero  in  recent  years.  At  the  same  time, 
contingent  liabilities  to  government  finance 
have  built  up  in  the  banking  sector,  from 
public-private 
from 
partnerships 
government  guarantees  for  the  KGF  credit 
fund.  Government  debt  exceeded  the  legal 
limit set for 2017 by the end of the first eight 
months of the year. The borrowing limit was 
increased  by  the  Parliament  a  first  time  by 

and 

54 

 
 
 
 
5% and by an additional 5% in October 2017. The Parliament also added TL 37 billion to the 
net  borrowing  amount.  The  2016  central  government  budget  deficit  amounted  to  1.1 %  of 
GDP,  which  is  marginally  lower  than  in  the  preceding  year  (1.2 %)  and  in  the  originally 
planned  budget  (1.6 %).  Revenues  increased  by  14.8 %  year-on-year,  while  expenditure 
increased  by  15.3 %.  Budgetary  figures  look  more  positive  under  the  revised  national 
accounting  methodology.  In  2017,  government  revenues  increased  by  13.8 %  year-on-year 
and  government  expenditure  increased  by  16.0 %.  The  general  government  debt  stock 
remained at a sustainable level. General government debt as a percentage of GDP increased 
from  27.5 %  in  2015  to  28.1 %  in  2016.  Taking  account  of  wider  macroeconomic  issues, 
however,  Turkey’s  fiscal  policy  stance  has  not  appropriately  addressed  the  country’s 
persistent external imbalance in recent years. Public finances have a significant role to play in 
increasing  overall  domestic  saving  and  reducing  the  need  for  capital  inflows  through  an 
appropriately tight fiscal policy stance. 

Turkey made some progress in increasing the transparency of its fiscal framework. As 
of  December  2016,  key  budget  documents  (with  the  exception  of  the  pre-budget  statement) 
are  made  publicly  available  online  within  a  period  that  is  consistent  with  international 
standards.  

Functioning of product markets 

Business environment 

Starting  a  business  has  become  easier.  The  number  of  procedures  to  start  a  company  has 
been reduced by one to seven, now taking 6.5 days instead of 7.5 days. Obtaining construction 
permits  is  still  burdensome,  but  the  costs  for  registering  the  transfer  of  property  have  been 
lowered. The number of company bankruptcies decreased by 8.9 % year-on-year in 2016 but 
it increased by 22.5 % in 2017. The number of newly created businesses decreased by 4.5 % 
in  2016,  but  increased  by  14.4 %  in  2017.  As  a  consequence,  the  net  creation  rate  of 
companies was negative 3.5 % year-on-year in 2016, but turned to a positive rate of 12.7 % 
year-on-year in 2017. 

Market exit remained costly and time-consuming. Insolvency procedures lasted an average 
of  five  years  and  recovery  rates  fell  further,  to  an  average  of  15.3 %.  Resolving  insolvency 
became  more  difficult  as  applications  to  postpone  bankruptcy  procedures  made  before  and 
during the state of emergency were suspended. 

Targeted  actions  against  media  companies,  business  people  and  political  opponents 
critical of the government had a negative effect on the overall business environment. The 
management of numerous companies has been transferred under the trusteeship of the Savings 
Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF). As of 1 February 2018, 985 companies across Turkey, with 
a  total  value  of  assets  of  TL  47.6  billion  (EUR  9.7  billion)  and  with  a  total  of  49 587 
employees, have been seized or have been moved under trusteeship following the attempted 
coup. The January 2017 introduction of a new communiqué law grants the minister in charge 
of the TMSF the power to decide on the sale and dissolution of companies transferred to the 
TMSF  and  to  lay  down  implementing  rules  for  their  management.  Trustees  assigned  to  the 
transferred companies are immune from administrative, financial and criminal liability. 

There has been serious backsliding in the past year with regard to the judicial system. 
Continued  political  pressure  on  judges  and  prosecutors  and  collective  dismissal  of  a  large 
number  of  judges  and  prosecutors  following  the  2016  attempted  coup  had  a  significant 
negative effect on the independence and the overall quality and efficiency of the judiciary. A 

55 

 
 
 
reasonably  well-functioning  legal  system  continues  to  be  in  place  with  regard  to  property 
rights. Although the introduction in 2015 of an electronic filing system for court users made 
enforcing contracts easier, the enforcement of commercial contracts remains a lengthy process 
that  took  an  average  of  580  days  in  2016.  Turkey  ranked  107th  out  of  138  countries  with 
regard  to  judicial  independence,  according  to  the  World  Economic  Forum’s  2016-2017 
Global  Competitiveness  Report.  Turkey  also  scores  poorly  on  the  efficiency  of  the  legal 
framework in settling disputes, ranking  96th. From 2015 to 2017, Turkey dropped from 80th 
(out of 102 countries) to 101st position (out of 113 countries) in the World Justice Project’s 
Rule of Law index. 

State influence on product markets 

The  state  is  still  active  in  price  setting  in  key  sectors.  More  than  25 %  of  the  consumer 
price inflation basket in Turkey is composed of goods whose prices are either set or heavily 
influenced  by  the  public  authority  either  directly  or  indirectly  (price  limits,  adjusting  tax 
rates). This practice, which changes relative prices outside of market forces, is mostly driven 
by other economic concerns such as the current account balance and limiting the pass-through 
of  foreign  currency  denominated  prices.  The  Food  and  Agricultural  Product  Markets 
Monitoring  and  Evaluation  Committee  is  seeking  to  contain  the  rise  in  the  food  prices  by 
taking  measures  to  improve  supply  conditions  for  unprocessed  food  products.  For  energy 
(natural  gas  and  electricity),  the  government  continued  to  set  end-user  prices,  effectively 
suspending automatic pricing mechanisms. A transparent and cost-based pricing mechanism 
for the electricity and gas sectors has not yet been properly implemented. 

There  was  no  progress  in  improving  the  transparency  of  state  aid.  Legislation  to 
implement the State Aid Law, originally scheduled to be passed by September 2011, has still 
not been adopted. The State Aid Authority has still not formally set up a comprehensive state 
aid  inventory  or  adopted  an  action  plan  to  align  all  state  aid  schemes,  including  the  2012 
incentives package, with the acquis. On 5 December 2017 provision of the Law Monitoring 
and Supervision of the State Aid related to the enforcement of implementing legislation was 
amended.  The  amendment,  repealing  the  set  of  previously  defined  deadlines  without 
introducing  a  new  one,  enabled  the  Council  of  Ministers  to  delay  the  enforcement  of  the 
implementing legislation for an unlimited period and caused a strong deterioration of Turkey's 
determination on aligning its State Aid legislation with the related EU acquis. 

Privatisation and restructuring 

The  pace  of  privatisation  slowed  down  further.  Following  a  surge  in  2013,  privatisation 
activities  slowed  down,  with  the  total  volume  of  completed  deals  decreasing  from  EUR 1.8 
billion in 2015 to EUR 1.2 billion in 2016. Continued liberalisation in the markets for goods 
and services could improve competition. 

In  2017,  a  large  proportion  of  state  assets  were  transferred  to  the  Turkish  Sovereign 
Wealth  Fund  (TWF).  This  was  set  up  in  August  2016  to  provide  funding  for  large-scale 
infrastructure  and  real  estate  projects  in  Turkey.  The  states  assets  concerned  are 
predominantly the shares previously held by the Treasury of large companies and banks (such 
as  Ziraat  Bankası,  Halkbank,  Borsa  Istanbul,  Türk  Telekom,  THY,  PTT,  TÜRKSAT, 
BOTAŞ, Eti Maden and Çaykur). While these assets are not subject to any inspection, audit or 
monitoring by the Court of Accounts, every action taken by the fund will be reported directly 
to the Prime Ministry. In January 2018, an emergency decree was issued that allows foreign 
borrowing by the TWF against its assets. 

56 

 
 
 
Functioning of the financial market 

Financial stability 

The  financial  sector  performed  well  and  continued  to  demonstrate  resilience.  The 
sector’s capital adequacy ratio remained unchanged compared to 2015, at 15.6 % in 2016, and 
increased to 16.9% in 2017. It continues to be well above the regulatory target of 12 %. The 
proportion  of  non-performing  loans  of  total  banking  sector  loans  slightly  increased,  from 
3.1 % in 2015 to 3.2 % in 2016, but declined in 2017 as loan growth outpaced non-performing 
loans  growth  (2.9 %  in  December  2017).  The  banking  sector’s  loans-to-deposits  ratio  has 
gradually increased to 126 % in 2017. The gap left by a lack of domestic deposits was funded 
from abroad, mostly by long-term financial instruments (bonds, deposits, loans) and financial 
instruments denominated in Turkish lira. The liquidity ratio of Turkish banks is below 100% 
for maturities between 7 days and 3 months and funded for half by derivatives (predominantly 
swaps).  This  may  expose  Turkish  banks  to  counterparty  risks,  in  particular  in  the  case  of 
exceptional events. 

Access to finance 

Banks continued to dominate the financial sector. Their rapid credit expansion continued 
in 2017, with total bank lending increasing by 22 % year-on-year. The value of the banking 
sector's assets as a ratio of GDP fell from 121 % in 2015 to 105 % in 2016. The size of the 
much  smaller  insurance  sector  (including  private  pensions)  increased  to  4 %.  State-owned 
banks’  proportion  of  total  banking  sector  assets  slightly  increased  to  34 %  as  of  September 
2017, while the proportion owned by foreign banks increased to 27 %. 

Functioning of the labour market 

Figure  2  Unemployment  in  Turkey  (% 
of Active population) 

Figure  3 Participation rates  in  Turkey  (% of 
Labour Force) 

25,0

20,0

15,0

10,0

5,0

0,0

80,0

70,0

60,0

50,0

40,0

30,0

20,0

10,0

0,0

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Unemployment rate

Youth unemployment rate

Women

Men

Source: Eurostat, national sources 

Unemployment  remained  high  despite  strong  economic  growth  and  government 
incentives.  The  employment  mobilisation  campaign  launched  in  2017  seems  to  have  had  a 
limited  impact.  In  2016,  the  unemployment  rate  (for  15-64-year-olds)  stood  at  10.9 %, 
representing an increase of 0.6 percentage points compared to 2015. Labour force growth is 
driven  by  a  growing  number  of  people  of  working  age,  as  well  as  a  rising  labour  force 
participation  rate  (up  from  56.1 %  in  2015  to  57 %  in  2016).    The  overall  employment  rate 
increased  from  53.9 %  in  2015  to  54.3 %  in  2016  with  a  large  difference  between  men 

57 

 
 
 
 
 
(75.5 %) and women (33.2 %). Turkey needs to focus on achieving a more inclusive labour 
market by increasing flexibility and reducing informality. The unemployment rate for people 
with higher education level reached 12.2 % in November 2017. 

3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU 

Turkey  has  made  some  progress  and  has  a  good  level  of  preparation  to  cope  with 
competitive pressures and market forces within the EU. Turkey is well-integrated with the EU 
market in terms of both trade and investment. Some progress was made in the energy sector, 
particularly  in  the  gas  market,  and  in  increasing  R&D  spending.  However,  significant 
problems  remained  with  regard  to  the  quality  of  education.  There  was  no  progress  in 
improving the transparency of state aid. 

In order to support long-term growth, Turkey should in particular: 

→ raise the quality of the education system; 

→ improve qualifications for low-skilled workers through training; 

→ increase research and development capacity. 

Education and innovation 

According  to  the  most  recent  PISA3  study  on  the  educational  performance  of  15-year-
old  students,  Turkish  students’  performance  fell  in  all  three  subjects  tested  (science, 
mathematics and reading) between 2012 and 2015. The measures taken by the government 
following  the  attempted  coup  in  2016  resulted  in  a  considerable  number  of  staff  dismissals 
and  changes  in  educational  institutions,  posing  risks  to  the  stability  of  Turkey’s  education 
sector.  The  continuous  changes  occurring  in  the  education  system  also  create  an  uncertain 
environment for both students and teachers. 

A mismatch continues to exist between the requirements of the labour market and the skills 
produced  by the education system.  Turkey  needs to  make  better use  of its human  capital to 
stimulate sustainable and inclusive growth and competitiveness, both through raising the level 
of qualifications for the workforce and creating a stable and solid framework for the education 
system. 

Public  and  private  sector  research  and  development  (R&D)  expenditure  slightly 
increased from 0.86 % of GDP in 2014 to 0.94 % in 2016, though it remained well below 
the  government’s  current  target  of  1.8 %  by  2018.  About  half  of  this  investment  came 
from  the  private  sector.  The  Production  Reform  Package  adopted  in  July  2017  contains 
measures to encourage R&D activities in universities and to strengthen cooperation between 
higher education institutions and the public and private sectors. However, intensified efforts 
are  needed  to  develop  a  comprehensive  strategy  to  support  R&D,  while  building  closer 
cooperation between research institutions and businesses. 

Physical capital and quality of infrastructure 

The estimate of gross fixed capital formation in the economy has increased significantly 
under  the  revised  national  accounting  methodology.  By  far  the  largest  proportion  of  this 
increase is attributable to an increase in construction investment. Total investment declined by 

3 OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment 

58 

 
 
 
                                                            
0.2  percentage  points  to  28.2 %  of  GDP  in  2016.  The  share  of  private  investment  in  GDP 
decreased  slightly  from  24.2  %  to  24.1  %  and  the  share  of  public  investment  of  GDP  fell 
slightly from 4.2 % to 4.1 % between 2015 and 2016.  

Turkey has undertaken sizeable investments in its infrastructure in the past decade and 
almost  all  provincial  centres  are  now  connected  by  dual  carriageways.  Major 
infrastructure works were completed and opened to traffic in 2016, such as the Eurasia tunnel 
under 
to 
third  bridge  over 
telecommunications, the number of internet subscribers increased by 28.1 % in 2016 and the 
internet penetration rate for households increased from 59.6 % in 2015 to 61.5 % in 2016 and 
to 66.8% in 2017. 

the  Bosphorus.  In  relation 

the  Bosphorus  and 

the 

Some  progress  was  made  in  the  energy  sector,  particularly  in  the  gas  market.  New 
implementing regulations on tariffs and organised wholesale markets are expected to further 
improve  existing  tariff  methodology  and  to  establish  a  fair  and  transparent  platform  for  gas 
traders.  Turkish  Electricity  Transmission  Company  (TEİAŞ)  has  been  an  observer  at  the 
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) since 2016, 
allowing  market  players  to  freely  import  and  export  electricity  between  the  EU  and  Turkey 
and  thus  improving  the  security  of  supply.  Although  the  Turkish  Energy  Stock  Company 
(EPIAS) became fully operational in 2016, progress on creating a competitive and transparent 
energy  platform  has  remained  rather  limited. Further  progress  is  needed  to  open  the  natural 
gas market and create competition for the state-owned corporation BOTAŞ. 

Sectoral and enterprise structure 

In  2016,  GDP  grew  by  3.2 %,  while  employment  increased  by  just  2.2 %,  indicating  an 
increase  in  labour  productivity  in  the  overall  economy.  The  sectoral  breakdown  of 
employment growth shows a continued shift towards the services sector, which accounted for 
53.7 %  of  employment  (and  62.3 %  of  GDP)  in  2016.  Industry  (including  construction) 
accounted for 26.8 % of employment (and 19.6 % of GDP). Agriculture employed 19.5 % of 
the  workforce  and  its  proportion  of  GDP  decreased  from  6.9 %  in  2015  to  6.2 %  in  2016. 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) employ around three quarters of Turkey’s work 
force  and  generate  more  than  half  of  the  economy’s  total  value.  In  exports,  Turkey  has 
specialised in low-to-medium tech in its exported goods. The largest proportion of exports is 
provided  by  the  automotive  sector.  The  increased  demand  from,  in  particular,  the  EU  has 
benefited Turkish exporters in recent years. 

59 

 
 
 
 
 
Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness 

80

160

120

140

100

40,0

60,0

30,0

20,0

50,0

10,0

and 

trade 

Figure  5  Turkey  trade  integration  with  the 
EU 

Turkey’s 
economic 
integration  with  the  EU  is  high  and 
increased  further  in  2016  and  2017. 
Turkey  is  the  EUs  fifth  largest  trade 
partner  and 
the  EU  remains  by  far 
Turkey’s  largest  trade  partner.  In  absolute 
terms  Turkey's  trade  with  the  EU  further 
increased in 2017, even if in relative terms 
the  share  of  Turkish  exports  going  to  the 
EU  and  Turkish  imports  coming  from  the 
EU  decreased  from  48  %  to  47.1%  and 
from  39 %  to  36.4  %  between  2016  and 
2017,  respectively.  The  EU  also  remains 
the largest source of FDI into Turkey with 
a  73 %  share  of  FDI  stocks  in  Turkey  in 
2016.  FDI  flows  from  the  EU  into 
Turkey  dropped  exceptionally  sharply 
from  a  historic  high  of  EUR 11.9 bn  in 
2015 to EUR 0.3 bn in 2016. Turkey’s international price competitiveness improved slightly 
in  2016 and strongly  in 2017 as  a consequence of the depreciation of the lira  outpacing  the 
rise  in  the  price  level.  Nonetheless,  competitiveness  based  on  wage  levels  did  not  improve 
over  these  two  years  due  to  increases  in  the  real  wage  following  a  30 %  increase  in  the 
statutory minimum wage in 2016. 

Share of Imports from EU
Share of exports to EU
Trade with the EU (2008=100) (RHS)

Source: Eurostat, national sources 

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

0,0

60

40

20

0

4. REGIONAL ISSUES AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 

Cyprus 

Turkey expressed support for the talks on a comprehensive settlement between the leaders of 
the two communities, and for the efforts of the United Nations Secretary-General and the UN 
Secretary-General’s  Special  Adviser.  During  the  reporting  period,  a  Conference  on  Cyprus, 
convened in Geneva in January 2017 and in Crans-Montana in July 2017, closed without an 
agreement. 

Turkey  continued  to  make  statements  challenging  the  right  of  the  Republic  of  Cyprus  to 
exploit hydrocarbon resources in the Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone for the benefit of all 
Cypriots. In February 2018, Turkey undertook repeated manoeuvres by naval vessels blocking 
the drilling operations of a vessel contracted by the Italian company ENI and commissioned 
by  Cyprus,  which  resulted  in  the  abortion  of  the  planned  drilling  activities.  The  EU  has 
repeatedly  stressed  the  sovereign  rights  of  EU  Member  States,  which  include  inter  alia 
entering  into  bilateral  agreements  and  exploring  and  exploiting  their  natural  resources  in 
accordance  with  the  EU  acquis  and  international  law,  including  the  UN  Convention  on  the 
Law  of  the  Sea.  The  EU  has  also  stressed  the  need  to  respect  the  sovereignty  of  Member 
States over their territorial sea and airspace.  

As emphasised in the Negotiating Framework and Council declarations, Turkey is expected to 
actively support the negotiations on a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus 
issue  within  the  UN  framework,  in  accordance  with  the  relevant  UN  Security  Council 

60 

 
 
 
 
 
resolutions  and  in  line  with  the  principles  on  which  the  EU  is  founded.  It  is  important  to 
preserve  the  progress  made  so  far  and  to  pursue  preparations  for  a  fair,  comprehensive  and 
viable settlement, including in its external aspects. Turkey’s commitment and contribution in 
concrete terms to this comprehensive settlement remains crucial. The process of granting the 
Committee on Missing Persons full access to all relevant archives and military areas has seen 
welcome  developments  but  needs  to  be  further  expedited.  Despite  repeated  calls  by  the 
Council and the Commission, Turkey has still not complied with its obligations as outlined in 
the Declaration of the European Community and its Member States of 21 September 2005 and 
in Council Conclusions, including those of December 2006 and December 2015. Turkey has 
not  fulfilled  its  obligation  to  ensure  full  and  non-discriminatory  implementation  of  the 
Additional  Protocol  to  the  Association  Agreement  and  has  not  removed  all  obstacles  to  the 
free movement of goods, including restrictions on direct transport links with the Republic of 
Cyprus. There was no progress on normalising bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus. 

Turkey continued to veto applications by the Republic of Cyprus to join several international 
organisations,  including  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development 
(OECD). 

Peaceful settlement of border disputes 

Bilateral exploratory talks were held between Greece and Turkey to find common ground for 
the  start  of  negotiations  on  the  delimitation  of  the  continental  shelf.  Greece  continued  to 
object to Turkey’s launch of a tender for offshore oil and gas exploration including part of the 
continental shelf off the Greek island of Castellorizo.  

The  threat  of  casus  belli  in  relation  to  the  possible  extension  of  Greek  territorial  waters,  as 
made  in  a  Turkish  Grand  National  Assembly  resolution  in  1995,  still  stands.  President 
Erdoğan visited Greece in December 2017, the first visit by a Turkish President in 65 years. 
However, statements made before and during his visit to Greece with regards to the Treaty of 
Lausanne caused public controversy. The agreement to ease increasing tensions in the Aegean 
Sea reached during the visit between the Turkish President and the Greek Prime Minister was 
not  followed  up  in  practice,  as  in  February  2018,  a  series  of  incidents  took  place  which 
culminated  in  the  collision  of  a  Hellenic  Coast  Guard  vessel,  co-financed  by  the  European 
Border  and  Coast  Guard,  by  a  Turkish  patrol  boat  off  the  islets  of  Imia.  Another  source  of 
serious  concern  has  been  the  detention  of  two  Greek  soldiers  who  were  patrolling  the  land 
border  between  Greece  and  Turkey.  Greece  and  Cyprus  made  formal  complaints  about 
repeated and increased violations of their territorial waters and airspace by Turkey, including 
flights  over  Greek  islands.  In  line  with  the  Negotiating  Framework  and  previous  European 
Council  and  Council  conclusions,  the  Council  has  reiterated  that  Turkey  needs  to  commit 
itself unequivocally to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful 
settlement  of  disputes  in  accordance  with  the  United  Nations  Charter,  having  recourse,  if 
necessary,  to  the  International  Court  of  Justice.  In  this  context,  the  EU  has  again  expressed 
serious  concern,  and  urged  Turkey  to  avoid  any  kind  of  threat  or  action  directed  against  a 
Member  State,  or  any  source  of  friction  or  action  that  would  damage  good  neighbourly 
relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes.  

Regional cooperation 

Good neighbourly relations form an essential part of Turkey’s process of moving towards the 
EU. Bilateral relations with other enlargement countries and neighbouring EU Member 
States  were  generally  good.  Cooperation  with  Greece  and  Bulgaria  on  migration  further 

61 

 
 
 
intensified.  However,  tensions  in  the  Aegean  Sea  and  Eastern  Mediterranean  were  not 
conducive to good neighbourly relations and undermined regional stability and security.  

Turkey  has  continued  its  policy  of  engagement  in  the  Western  Balkans,  maintaining  strong 
ties with countries in the region and supporting their respective efforts to join NATO and the 
EU.  Turkey  maintained  its  good relations  with  Albania  with  an  increasing  trend  of  Turkish 
investments  focused  on  the  infrastructure  and  energy  sectors. Contacts  with  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  developed  positively,  including  as  part  of  Turkey’s  trilateral  cooperation  with 
Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and its trilateral cooperation with Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  Turkey  maintained  good  relations  with  Kosovo  with  reciprocal  state  officials’ 
visits  during  which  commitments  were  made  to  increase  cooperation  on  the  economy  and 
trade.  Relations  with  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia  developed,  including 
through  high-level  contacts.  The  bilateral  readmission  agreement  with  Montenegro  entered 
into  force  in  December  2016  and  a  plan  for  bilateral  cooperation  on  defence  was  signed  in 
September 2017. Relations deepened with Serbia, which President Erdoğan visited in October 
2017, and a High Cooperation Council was set up.  

However,  bilateral  relations  with  several  individual  EU  Member  States  not  neighbouring 
Turkey (in particular with Austria, Germany and the Netherlands) deteriorated, notably during 
campaigns  on  the  constitutional  referendum  and  national  elections  in  EU  Member  States, 
including at times with offensive and unacceptable rhetoric. In early 2018, Turkey engaged in 
diplomatic efforts to mend ties with EU capitals, notably through Presidential and Ministerial 
visits.  The  Netherlands  and  Turkey  were  unable  to  normalise  relations  and  the  Netherlands 
recalled their Ambassador to Turkey after he had been subject to denial of entry into Turkey 
for almost one year. Reported tensions among members of the Turkish diaspora living in EU 
Member  States  and  pressure  on  them  to  report  on  other  members  of  these  communities 
allegedly belonging to the Gülen movement continued. 

In March 2018, the European Council strongly condemned Turkey's continued illegal actions 
in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea and recalled Turkey's obligation to respect 
international  law  and  good  neighbourly  relations  and  to  normalise  relations  with  all  EU 
Member  States.  The  European  Council  expressed  its  grave  concern  over  the  continued 
detention of EU citizens in Turkey, including two Greek soldiers, and called for the swift and 
positive resolution of these issues in a dialogue with Member States. 

5. ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP 

5.1.  Chapter 1: Free movement of goods 

The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU 
based on common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national rules, the 
principle of the free movement of goods prevents these creating unjustified barriers to trade. 

Turkey  is  at  a  good  level  of  preparation  for  the  free  movement  of  goods.  It  made  some 
progress,  mainly  in  aligning  with  the  ‘New  and  Global  Approach’  acquis  and  market 
surveillance. Some technical barriers to trade prevent the free movement of goods and some 
localisation schemes  and domestic requirements discriminate against  EU products,  violating 
Turkey’s obligations under the Customs Union.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

62 

 
 
 
 
→ eliminate obstacles to the free movement of goods that breach Customs Union obligations, 
such  as  export  restrictions and requirements related  to  registration, prior approval, licensing 
and surveillance; 

→  re-consider  its  localisation  schemes,  so  as  to  set  up  a  more  conducive  investment 
environment; 

→ continue to ensure prompt alignment to the EU acquis for this chapter, notably in the area 
of pharmaceuticals. 

General principles 

With regard to general principles, the framework for the free movement of goods is largely 
in place in Turkey. However, issues relating to implementation remain. Problems have been 
reported  in  the  implementation  of  the  risk-based  electronic import  control  system  TAREKS 
for goods coming from the EU and technical barriers to the free movement of goods persist. 
In addition, localisation schemes in the area of pharmaceuticals and agricultural and forestry 
tractors,  and  local  content  requirements  for  renewable  electricity  generation  create  de  facto 
market  access  barriers  for  EU  products.  The  most  recent  plans  adopted  in  mega  wind  and 
mega solar projects also provide for localisation of production. 

Non-harmonised area 

A  regulation  on  mutual  recognition  in  the  non-harmonised  area  has  been  in  force  since 
July  2013.  The  mutual  recognition  principle  has  been  introduced  to  certain  areas  where 
national rules apply. There have been an increasing number of notifications from Turkey in 
the last three years, mostly consisting of mandatory technical specifications. The number of 
notifications is, however, insufficient in light of Turkey’s legislative activity. 

Harmonised area: quality infrastructure 

There  is  a  legal  basis  and  an  administrative  structure  in  place  in  relation  to  technical 
regulations,  standards,  conformity  assessment,  accreditation,  metrology,  and  market 
surveillance. The framework law was partially revised as part of an omnibus law on industry 
in  July  2017  but  an  overall  revision  is  still  pending.  The  Turkish  Standards  Institute  is 
independent, able to implement European and international standards and has adequate staff 
resources and financing. As of October 2017, it adopted a total of 20 042 national standards 
aligned with European standards. The rate of harmonisation of CEN (European Committee for 
Standardisation)  standards  stands  at  around  98  %  and  at  94  %  for  CENELEC  (European 
Committee  for  Electrotechnical  Standardisation)  standards.  The  Turkish  Standards  Institute 
has been a full member of CEN and Cenelec since 2012. Eight Turkish economic operators 
are full members of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute, ETSI. A national 
standardisation strategy for 2017-2020 was published during the reporting period. 

There are 46 notified bodies in Turkey and 2 technical approval bodies as of November 2017. 
The  Turkish  Accreditation  Agency,  TÜRKAK,  is  a  signatory  of  multilateral  agreements  as 
part  of  the  European  cooperation  for  Accreditation  association.  TÜRKAK  signed  a  new 
multilateral agreement on proficiency testing providers in April 2017 (there are now 7). The 
National Metrology Institute, TÜBİTAK-UME, was accredited last year for the production of 
certified reference materials for proficiency testing and inter-laboratory comparisons. A three-
year national metrology strategy was adopted in 2015. 

63 

 
 
 
Turkey carries out a regular market surveillance programme in line with EU legislation and 
submits  its  annual  programme  to  the  European  Commission.  An  electronic  information 
system  enables  the  10  authorities  to  report  their  observations  and  an  annual  report  on  the 
results is published. According to the 2017 report, the overall budget increased by 30 % and 
the  number  of  market  surveillance  inspectors  increased  by  21  %  in  2016.  The  number  of 
market surveillance checks increased by 39 %. Penalties increased considerably in 2017 and 
legal provisions were further strengthened. 307 189 batches were inspected in 2016, of which 
215  876  were  produced  in  Turkey.  During  inspections  carried  out  by  Member  State 
authorities  on  products  originating  in  Turkey,  105  750  batches  were  found  to  be 
non-compliant or unsafe. The number of non-compliant or unsafe products detected increased 
by  164  %  in  2016,  mainly  due  to  an  increased  number  of  inspections,  resulting  in  fines 
amounting to some EUR 26 million on economic operators. However, actual measures taken 
in the case of non-compliance, including fines, are reported to be low in comparison with the 
level  of  market  surveillance  activity.  An  approach  that  gives  priority  to  particularly  risky 
products is also needed. 

Harmonised area: sectoral legislation 

For  the  ‘New  and  Global  Approach’  product  legislation,  Turkey  adopted  legislation  to 
align  with  the  acquis  on  civil  explosives  and  recreational  crafts  and  personal  watercrafts  in 
2017.  Legislation  was  amended  on  the  eco-design  requirements  for  lamps,  water  pumps, 
glandless  stand-alone  circulators,  toy  safety  and  noise  emission  by  equipment  for  use 
outdoors.  Implementing  legislation  was  issued  on  construction  products,  lifts,  personal 
protective  equipment,  toys,  measuring  instruments  and  recreational  crafts  and  personal 
watercrafts. 

On ‘Old Approach’ product legislation, Turkey adopted new and amending legislation on 
two-or  three-wheel  vehicles  and  quadricycles,  manufacturing,  modification  and  assembly  of 
vehicles, type approval of motor vehicles with respect to emissions from light passenger and 
commercial  vehicles  and  with  respect  to  emissions  from  heavy  duty  vehicles,  on 
manufacturing  sites  and  packaging  and  pricing  of  medicinal  products  for  human  use.  In  the 
area of pharmaceuticals, contrary to Customs Union rules, Turkey does not accept EU good 
manufacturing  practices  certificates.  The  Pharmaceuticals  Inspection  Convention  decided  to 
accept Turkey as a member as of 1 January 2018. Turkey adopted a regulation in June 2017 
aiming to improve alignment with the REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation, and 
Restriction  of  Chemicals)  legislation,  but  full  alignment  is  still  pending.  The  national 
registration system for chemicals is expected to be operational by 2023. Turkey’s localisation 
schemes  for  pharmaceuticals  and  agricultural  and  forestry  tractors  create  de  facto  market 
access barriers for EU products. 

There is a specific licensing and regulation system for economic operators dealing with drug 
precursors, with a strict follow-up and monitoring system in cooperation with the police and 
customs authorities. 

On procedural measures, Turkey adopted national legislation in 2002 on textiles, footwear 
and crystal glass. National legislation is in place setting out licensing procedures for firearms. 
There was no progress on alignment to the acquis on cultural goods. 

5.2.  Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers 

Citizens of one Member State have the right to work in  another Member  State and must be 
given the same working and social conditions as other workers. 

64 

 
 
 
Preparations in the area of freedom of movement for workers are at an early stage and there 
has been no progress during the reporting period. 

There  has  been  no  progress  on  access  to  the  labour  market  or  coordination  of  social 
security systems. So far, Turkey has concluded 16 bilateral social security agreements with 
EU  Member  States,  but  no  new  bilateral  social  security  agreements  were  signed  during  the 
reporting  period.  There  have  been  no  developments  on  future  participation  in  the  European 
Network of Employment Services (EURES). 

5.3.   Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services 

EU natural and legal persons have the right to establish themselves in any Member State and 
to provide cross-border services. For certain regulated professions, there are rules on mutual 
recognition of qualifications. Postal services are gradually being opened up to competition. 

Preparations  in  the  area  of  right  of  establishment  and  freedom  to  provide  services  are  at  an 
early stage. No progress was made in the reporting period. Substantial efforts are still needed 
to align with the acquis.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→  align  with  the  Services  Directive  on  the  provision  of  cross-border  services  and  set  up 
a single point of contact.  

There  was  no  progress  on  the  right  of  establishment,  a  right  still  restricted  by  many 
requirements  regarding  for  instance  nationality  and  residence  requirements  for  a  number  of 
professions where for most cases, multiple authorisations are required or the lack of point of 
single contact. 

Regarding  the  freedom  to  provide  cross-border  services,  requirements  for  registration, 
licensing  and  authorisation  remain  in  place  for  service  providers  registered  in  the  EU. 
Preparations began on transforming the information system in the retail sector (PERBIS) into 
a sector-specific point of single contact. 

Limited  progress  was  made  on  postal  services.  A  reserved  area  still  exists  in  the  standard 
letter-post service area, where the universal service provider enjoys exclusive rights. Turkey 
needs to further align this area with the  acquis, which does not allow maintaining exclusive 
rights  for  the  provision  of  postal  services.  Turkey  should  align  with  the  Postal  Services 
Directive as regards the provision of postal services. 

On  the  mutual  recognition  of  professional  qualifications,  the  Vocational  Qualifications 
Authority  continued  to  issue  occupational  standards.  Some  regulated  professions  remain 
subject to reciprocal recognition requirements. Nationality and language requirements remain. 
Turkey should continue aligning its national legislation with the acquis in the area of mutual 
recognition of professional qualifications. 

5.4.  Chapter 4: Free movement of capital 

In  the  EU,  capital  and  investments  must  be  able  to  move  without  restriction  and  there  are 
common rules for cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain 
rules to support the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  free  movement  of  capital.  There  was  some 
progress  during  the  reporting  period,  such  as  in  the  fight  against  money  laundering  and 

65 

 
 
 
financing of terrorism, in line with the recommendations of the previous report. Legislation on 
real estate acquisition is not aligned with the acquis.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ draft and adopt an action plan on real estate acquisition by foreigners to lift restrictions and 
increase transparency; 

→  further  align  with  the  acquis  by  strengthening  measures  to  prevent  the  misuse  of  its 
financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorism financing. 

On  capital  movements  and  payments,  Turkey’s  legislation  on  real  estate  acquisition  by 
foreigners remains opaque and does not apply to all EU citizens in a non-discriminatory way. 
Turkey needs to adopt and implement an action plan to further liberalise the purchase of real 
estate  by  foreigners,  bringing  its  laws  in  line  with  the  acquis.  Turkey  now  grants  Turkish 
citizenship  to  foreign  investors  under  certain  conditions  such  as  making  a  fixed  capital 
investment  or  buying  a  real  estate  for  a  determined  value  and  with  a  commitment  of  not 
selling it for three years. Foreign ownership is subject to restrictions in relation to radio and 
TV broadcasting, transport, education and the electricity market. 

Turkey has reached a good standard in payment systems. The central bank and the Banking 
Regulatory  and  Supervision  Agency  are  the  two  authorities  that  can  grant  licences  for 
payment system operators. 

Turkey has made progress in the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing. 
It  is  party  to  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Convention  on  Laundering,  Search,  Seizure  and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism. Turkey needs to 
further  align  with  the  acquis  by  strengthening  its  measures  to  prevent  the  misuse  of  its 
financial  system  for  the  purposes  of  money  laundering  and  terrorism  financing.  Legislative 
and  administrative  capacity  in  this  area  need  to  be  further  strengthened  to  comply  with  the 
Fourth Round of the Financial Action Task Force’s Mutual Evaluations. 

The Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK), which serves as the national financial 
intelligence unit, has strengthened its administrative and enforcement capacity and improved 
its  cooperation  with  law  enforcement  agencies  and  judicial  authorities.  The  number  of 
suspicious  transaction  reports  submitted  to  the  Financial  Crimes  Investigation  Board  has 
increased  from  132 570  in  2016  to  almost  175  000  in  2017.  The  number  of  files  that  have 
been analysed and evaluated increased from 839 in 2016 to 10 554 in 2017. However, only 
nine people were convicted for money laundering. In 2016, 23 people had been convicted on 
money laundering charges. Confiscations and the level of seizure of assets remain limited in 
relation to money laundering and terrorism financing as stand-alone crimes. 

5.5.  Chapter 5: Public procurement 

EU  rules  ensure  that  the  public  procurement  of  goods  and services in  any  Member  State  is 
transparent  and  open  to  all  EU  companies  on  the  basis  of  non-discrimination  and  equal 
treatment. 

Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of public procurement. No progress was made in 
the past year except for some improvement in enforcement capacity. Large gaps remain in its 
alignment  with  the  acquis.  Further  work  is  needed  in  this  area,  which  would  potentially  be 
covered by a modernised Customs Union.  

66 

 
 
 
In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

revise 

its  public  procurement 

→ 
to  cover  concessions  and  public-
legislation 
private partnerships and provide for remedies in line with EU public procurement directives, 
and to increase transparency; 

→  start  repealing  exceptions  contradictory  to  the  acquis,  as  envisaged  in  the  harmonisation 
schedule  of  the  national  action  plan  for  EU  accession,  and  eliminating  domestic  price 
advantages; 

→  create  a  fully  independent  Procurement  Review  Board,  separate  from  the  Public 
Procurement Authority. 

Institutional setup and legal alignment 

With  regard  to  the  legal  framework,  Turkey’s  national  public  procurement  legislation 
broadly  reflects  the  principles  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union. 
However, for certain goods, Turkey applies a compulsory domestic price advantage, which is 
discriminatory and therefore not in line with the acquis. 

The  Public  Procurement  Law  is  broadly  aligned  with  the  2004  EU  public  procurement 
directives but Turkey is still to fully transpose the 2014 Public Procurement Directives. The 
legislation is harmonised with and supported by budget and expenditure regulations, so that 
public  contracts  can  be  prepared,  awarded,  and  managed  in  line  with  sound  project 
management  principles.  However,  the  legislation  has  a  number  of  inconsistencies  with  the 
acquis.  A  range  of  sector-specific  laws  limit  transparency  and  establish  different  legal 
remedies, depending on the sector. New derogations were introduced for defence, security and 
intelligence related procurements. 

A  domestic  price  advantage  of  up  to  15  %  continues  to  be  compulsory  for  ‘medium  and 
high-technology  industrial  products’.  Turkey’s  tenth  development  plan  (2014-2018)  aims  to 
develop  local  manufacturing  capacity  via  public  procurement.  Legislation  now  enables  the 
procuring  authority  to  require  that  the  goods  and  software  are  domestically  produced  and 
implementing  legislation  sets  a  local  content  of  51  %  as  a  requirement  for  procurement  of 
vehicles  for  subway,  cable  cars  and  light  rail  transit  systems.  Turkey  should  eliminate 
restrictive  measures,  which  contradict  the  acquis,  and  consider  applying  the  new  means 
provided  for  in  the  2014  EU  directives  to  promote  innovation,  domestic  production  and 
technology transfer arrangements. 

The  Public  Procurement  Authority  (PPA)  is  responsible  for  implementing  the  Public 
Procurement Law and monitoring the public procurement system. The PPA is affiliated to the 
Ministry of Finance but is nominally autonomous. The Ministry of Finance was in charge of 
coordinating policy formulation and implementation in the reporting period. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Turkey’s  public  procurement  market  corresponded  to  6 %  of  the  country’s  GDP  in  2016 
(7.1%  in  2015).  Procedures  continued  to  generally  respect  transparency  and  efficiency 
principles.  The  public-private  partnerships  unit  in  the  Ministry  of  Development  provides  an 
early-stage  review  of  some  projects,  along  with  the  Treasury  and  the  Ministry  of  Finance. 
However,  Turkey  does  not  have  a  single  framework  for  coordinating,  supervising  and 
monitoring public-private partnership operations. Turkey should fill the substantial number of 
vacant posts in the PPA in order to strengthen its administrative and coordination capacity. 

67 

 
 
 
Monitoring  contract  awards  and  implementation  is  satisfactory.  The  PPA  issues  statistics 
twice  a  year  which  provide  the  basis  for  measuring  performance  and  outcomes  and  making 
improvements to the public procurement system. 

Contracting  authorities’  capacity  to  manage  public  procurement  processes  continues  to 
improve. Turkey uses e-procurement effectively. Mechanisms to identify and address corrupt 
and  fraudulent  practices  are  in  place,  including  rules  on  integrity  and  conflict  of  interest. 
However,  Turkey  should  develop  a  risk  indicator  system  that  signals  potential  integrity 
problems in the procurement process. 

Efficient remedies system 

The  right  to  legal  remedy  is  stipulated  in  the  Constitution  and  in  the  Public  Procurement 
Law. Any decision on complaints by a contracting authority can be appealed before the Public 
Procurement  Board  within  the  PPA.  The  review  and  remedies  system  provides  for  speedy, 
effective  and  competent  handling  and  resolution  of  complaints  and  sanctions.  However, 
several provisions in the Remedies Directive have not been implemented. 

The Public Procurement Board received 1 741 complaints in the first half of 2017, amounting 
to some 4 % of the contracts, which is within the normal range. The board’s position as part 
of  the  PPA  needs  to  be  reassessed.  A  fully  independent  Public  Procurement  Board  would 
avoid possible conflicts of interest. 

5.6.  Chapter 6: Company law 

The  EU  has  common  rules  on  the  formation,  registration,  and  disclosure  requirements  of  a 
company,  with  complementary  rules  for  accounting  and  financial  reporting,  and  statutory 
audit. 

Turkey is well advanced in the field of company law. Some progress was made through the 
entry into force of implementing legislation on continuing education for statutory auditors and 
enhancing the capacity of the public audit oversight authority.  

In the coming year, Turkey should pay particular attention to: 

→  finalise  the  technical  alignment  of  legislative  amendments  currently  being  prepared  and 
continuing its work to align with the latest accounting and statutory audit acquis. 

Turkey  has  a  high  level  of  alignment  on  company  law.  A  few  alignment  issues  remain  in 
relation  to  mergers,  divisions  and  takeovers.  The  central  registration  recording  system 
(MERSIS) maintains company registration data electronically, and online services continue to 
be improved. Disclosure of and public access to company financial documents in the business 
register (as required by EU company law and accounting rules) remains to be ensured. Work 
continues to enhance the effectiveness of corporate governance standards. 

Concerning  corporate  accounting  and  statutory  audit,  the  Turkish  financial  reporting 
standards  and  standards  on  auditing  are  based  on  international  financial  reporting  standards 
and  international  auditing  standards.  A  new  financial  reporting  standard  for  large  and 
medium-sized  companies  (July  2017)  aims  to  regulate  the  framework  rules  for  companies 
which  are  subject  to  independent  audit  but  which  do  not  apply  Turkish  financial  reporting 
standards. The Turkish Public Oversight, Accounting and Auditing Standards Authority and 
the Capital Markets Board further improved their administrative capacity through recruitment 
and  training  and  organised  awareness-raising  activities.  A  system  for  investigations  and 
sanctions  has  been  set  up  with  respect  to  statutory  audits  and  specific  requirements  are  in 

68 

 
 
 
place for auditing public interest bodies. A Communiqué on continuing education of statutory 
auditors entered into force. Further work is needed to align with the most recent EU corporate 
accounting and statutory audit acquis. 

5.7.   Chapter 7: Intellectual property law 

The  EU  has  harmonised  rules  for  the  legal  protection  of  intellectual  property  rights 
(IPRs)and  of  copyright  and  related  rights.  Rules  for  the  legal  protection  of  IPRs  cover,  for 
instance, patents and trademarks, designs, biotechnological inventions and pharmaceuticals. 
Rules for the legal protection of copyright and related rights cover, for instance, books, films, 
computer programmes and broadcasting. 

Turkey  has  a  good  level  of  preparation  in  this  area.  There  was  good  progress  on  legal 
alignment  with  the  EU  acquis  with  the  adoption  and  entry  into  force  of  the  new  Industrial 
Property Law in line with the recommendations made by the previous report. 

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ adopt pending copyright legislation in line with the acquis; 

improve  enforcement  measures 

→ 
infringements; 

to  combat 

industrial  and 

intellectual  property 

→  sustain  a  constructive  dialogue  with  intellectual  property  right  (IPR)  owners,  increase 
awareness  regarding  counterfeiting  and  piracy  and  focus  on  the  benefits  of  a  strong  IPR 
protection system for economic growth. 

With  regard  to  copyright  and  neighbouring  rights,  the  draft  copyright  law  remains  to  be 
adopted.  Collective  rights  management  remains  an  outstanding  issue that  the  new  copyright 
law  should  address,  particularly  in  relation  to  foreign  producers,  public  performance  rights 
and reproduction rights. 

The  new  Industrial  Property  Law  entered  into  force  in  January  2017,  followed  by  the 
relevant implementing regulation in April 2017. The law ensures greater legal alignment with 
the IPR acquis in relation to trademarks and design, and updates the Turkish IPR system in 
line  with  international  agreements  and  practices.  Simplified  registration  procedures  were 
introduced. The new law does not include specific provisions for biotechnological inventions. 
An IPR Academy was set up in July 2017, which will be responsible for all IPR training for 
civil  servants.  In  May  2017,  the  Regulation  on  the  Code  of  Conduct  and  Disciplinary 
Measures  for  Trademark  and  Patent  Agents  entered  into  force.  This  Regulation  addresses  a 
legal gap with regard to the liability of trademark and patent agents registered in the Turkish 
Patent  and  Trademark  Office.  The  Turkish  Patent  and  Trademark  Office  improved  its 
consultation on trademarks registration services with IPR owners and their representatives. 

On  judicial  enforcement,  the  new  Industrial  Property  Law  aims  to  ensure  a  higher  level  of 
legal alignment with the EU Enforcement Directive. However, actual enforcement needs to be 
strengthened  as  numbers  of  IPR  infringements  and  counterfeiting  and  piracy  levels  are  still 
very high. The implementation of the accelerated destruction procedure and the functioning of 
IPR criminal courts need to be improved. In 2016, the number of counterfeit goods seized by 
customs at border controls increased by 35 % compared to 2015. 

69 

 
 
 
 
 
5.8.  Chapter 8: Competition policy 

EU rules protect free competition. They include antitrust rules against restrictive agreements 
between companies and abuse of dominant position. EU rules also prevent governments from 
unduly granting State aid which distorts competition. 

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  competition  policy.  No  progress  was 
made in this field in the reporting period. Legislation on antitrust is largely aligned with the 
acquis. However, the gap in  the alignment between Turkey’s State aid policy and EU State 
aid rules remains.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ implement the State aid law without further delay and finalising an updated inventory of 
aid schemes. 

Antitrust and mergers 

The legislative framework is broadly aligned with the acquis. The Law on the Protection of 
Competition reflects the substance of Article 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU). Implementing legislation in this field is largely in place. 

Regarding  the  institutional  framework,  the  Competition  Authority  is  responsible  for 
implementing the Law on the Protection of Competition. Its mandate is very similar to that of 
the European Commission. Operationally, it is a largely independent body. 

The Competition Authority’s enforcement capacity is adequate. Implementation is effective 
overall, but has been decreasing in effectiveness. There is a fall in the number of decisions, in 
particular  on  antitrust  (from  191  in  2013  to  80  in  2017),  and  in  the  fines  imposed  (from 
EUR 280 million in 2013 to 194 million in 2016). The low number of ex officio investigations 
continued to fall (from 17 in 2012, to 9 in 2016, and 0 in 2017). The Competition Authority 
conducted an average of 75 raids annually between 2013 and 2016 (84 in 2017). The number 
of  complaints  resulting  in  an  investigation  fell  from  20  in  2013  to  5  in  2016.  In  2016,  the 
number  of  appeals  against  Competition  Authority  decisions  increased  to  257  (up  from  an 
average of 155 cases per year between 2013 and 2015). Three quarters of these decisions were 
upheld by national courts. 

State aid 

The  legislative  framework  is  partially  in  line  with  the  acquis.  State  aid  regulations  do  not 
cover  the  agriculture,  fisheries  or  the  services  sectors,  which  are  not  part  of  the  EU-Turkey 
Customs Union. Turkey’s Law on the Monitoring and Supervision of State Aid is broadly in 
line with Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The 
implementing legislation required to enforce this law is not in place yet. 

Regarding the institutional framework, the State Aid Monitoring and Supervision Board is 
responsible for implementing the law. It is not considered to be operationally independent. 

In  December  2017,  the  set  of  previously  defined  deadlines  in  the  Law  on  Monitoring  and 
Supervision of the State Aid were repealed, empowering the Council of Ministers to delay the 
enforcement  of  the  law  indefinitely.  Turkey  has  therefore  not  yet  aligned  its  State  Aid 
legislation  and  its  enforcement  with  the  related  EU  acquis  and  no  assessment  of  Turkey's 
enforcement capacity can be made. A State Aid inventory has yet to be set up and an action 
plan for alignment has yet to be adopted.  

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Liberalisation 

Competition  and  State  aid  rules  apply  to  state-owned  enterprises.  Turk  Telekomunikasyon 
and  TUPRAS,  Turkey’s  sole  oil  refiner,  have  de  facto  monopolies  in  the  fixed 
telecommunications and refined oil products markets, respectively. In 2016, the Competition 
Authority fined Turk Telekomunikasyon for abuse of its dominant position in the market. 

5.9.   Chapter 9: Financial services 

EU  rules  aim  to  ensure  fair  competition  between  and  the  stability  of  financial  institutions, 
namely  banking,  insurance,  supplementary  pensions,  investment  services  and  securities 
markets.  They  include  rules  on  the  authorisation,  operation  and  supervision  of  these 
institutions. 

Turkey has a good level of preparation in the area of financial services. Some progress was 
made, particularly in making it compulsory for employers to automatically enrol employees in 
pension schemes.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ further strengthen bank governance and supervision, crisis management and the resolution 
framework; 

→ support the development of Turkish capital markets and supervision of these. 

In the areas of banks and financial conglomerates, the Banking Regulatory and Supervisory 
Agency revised the measurement and evaluation of capital adequacy of banks as well as the 
liquidity  coverage  ratio  of  banks.  It  eased  reserve  requirements  and  debt  restructuring 
conditions to facilitate commercial loans and smooth the process for cross-border issuances. It 
also introduced changes in the calculation of banks’ own capital regarding real estate acquired 
in  exchange  for  their  customers’  unpaid  debt.  An  emergency  decree  gave  the  agency  the 
authority to regulate procedural rules for the sale to asset management companies of banks in 
which more than half of the shares are owned or controlled by the public. 

There  was  some  progress  on  insurance  and  occupational  pensions.  The  amended  Pension 
Savings Law entered into force on 1 January 2017 and made the enrolment of employees into 
a  pension  scheme  compulsory.  This  will  be  implemented  gradually  for  private  sector 
employees. In August 2017, a regulation on participatory insurance activities was adopted. In 
July  2017,  the  Undersecretariat  of  Treasury  amended  the  implementing  regulation  on 
measurement  and  evaluation  of  capital  adequacy  of  insurance,  reinsurance  and  private 
pension companies. Excessive premium increase risks are no longer taken into account when 
calculating capital adequacy. The Treasury also introduced amendments to the legislation on 
compulsory  third  party  motor  liability  insurance,  relating  to  the  mandatory  pooling  of 
insurers. 

There was no progress on financial market infrastructure but there was some progress on 
securities  markets  and  investment  services.  The  Capital  Market  Board  clarified  the 
requirements that apply to investment companies with a portfolio composed of infrastructure 
and services. The board also made provision for portfolio management companies to manage 
both venture capital and property investment funds. 

71 

 
 
 
 
 
5.10.  Chapter 10: Information society and media 

The  EU  supports 
for  electronic 
communications,  electronic  commerce  and  audiovisual  media  services.  The  rules  protect 
consumers and support universal availability of modern services. 

internal  market 

functioning  of 

the  smooth 

the 

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  information  society  and  media.  There 
was  backsliding,  notably  with  regards  to  changes  in  broadcasting  legislation  and  its 
implementation.  Overall,  the  sector  is  overregulated  and  overly  restrictive  in  relation  to  the 
protection  of  freedom  of  expression.  There  is  inadequate  competition  in  fixed  voice  and 
broadband  markets  and  excessive  taxation  and  costs  for  operators  and  consumers  of 
information and communications technologies.  

In the following year, Turkey should in particular: 

→  strengthen  the  independence  of  the  regulatory  authorities  and  their  board  members  and 

amend the Internet Law in line with the Venice Commission’s recommendations; 

→  further  align  authorisation  arrangements,  market  access,  rights  of  way  and  universal 

service in electronic communication with the EU acquis; 

→ take the steps required to complete the digital switchover as soon as possible.  

On electronic communications and information and communications technologies, there 
was no progress in aligning legislation with the acquis on market access and universal service. 
Competition  in  the  fixed  voice  and  broadband  market  is  not  effective.  A  minimum  capital 
requirement  for  fixed  phone  operators  remains  a  barrier  to  market  entry.  Fees  charged  by 
municipalities  for  rights  of  way  and  for  base  stations  installation  further  increase  costs.  In 
December  2017,  the  special  communication  tax  applied  to  the  electronic  communication 
services has been fixed to 7.5 %, increasing the rate for internet from 5 % and decreasing the 
rate  for  mobile  calls  from  25  %.  The  taxation  regime  remains  complex  and  taxes  are 
excessive.  Mobile  broadband  penetration  significantly  increased,  to  65  %,  though  it  is  still 
below the OECD average of 95 %. The fixed broadband penetration rate is 13 %, compared to 
an  OECD  average  of  30  %.  Within  8  months  of  implementation,  there  were  52  million  4G 
subscribers.  Full  independence  for  the  Information  and  Communication  Technologies 
Authority needs to be ensured. The Internet Law has not been amended in line with UN and 
Council  of  Europe  recommendations  and  serious  concerns  remain  (see  Chapter  23  — 
Judiciary and fundamental rights). 

A  national  strategy  covering  2015-2018  is  in  place  in  relation  to  information  society 
services. The proportion of citizens using e-government increased from 37 % to 42 %, while 
the  proportion  of  businesses  using  e-government  remained  at  86  %.  In  December  2017 
Turkey published the National Broadband Strategy and Action Plan (2017-2020). 

In the area of audiovisual policy, there was backsliding in the alignment with the acquis of 
the broadcasting law which was repeatedly amended by emergency decrees in relation to the 
grounds for sanctions and restrictive requirements for broadcasting over a single antenna, in 
contradiction with the European Cross-Border Broadcasting Agreement in terms of monopoly 
prevention. RTÜK was effectively stopped from ensuring unimpeded access to the media on a 
non-discriminatory basis for all  political groupings  and individuals  wishing to  participate in 
the electoral process which impacted the equitable campaigning for the 16 April referendum. 
Another effect was an increase in 2017 in the number of sanctions imposed on broadcasters 

72 

 
 
 
for praising terrorism, disturbing the public order and violating the integrity of the state. Since 
the beginning of the state of emergency, 36 TV channels (3 of which broadcasting from and 
licenced abroad) and 37 radio stations were dropped from TÜRKSAT and closed down. Many 
of these were critical towards the government, while some were closed down for alleged links 
to the Gülen movement and several were broadcasting in the Kurdish language.  

Membership of the RTÜK board of directors was renewed in October 2017, but no member 
was designated by HDP and, as a result, the board does not reflect the current composition of 
Parliament  as  required.  RTÜK’s  independence  needs  to  be  strengthened.  In  March  2018, 
amendments were adopted which raised new serious concerns, by extending the scope of the 
regulation  of  broadcasting  performed  by  RTÜK  to  any  online  media  service  providers  and 
platform operators, including those operating from abroad. The amendments also gave RTÜK 
the power to impose bans on internet broadcasting.  

The  editorial  autonomy  of  the  public  broadcaster  TRT  was  called  into  question  after  the 
government replaced its Director-General. The completion of the digital switchover remains 
uncertain as the re-tendering procedure has not yet been launched. 

5.11.  Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development 

The  common  agricultural  policy  supports  farmers  and  rural  development.  This  requires 
strong management and control systems. There are also common EU rules for quality policy 
and organic farming. 

There is  some level of preparation in the area of agriculture and rural development.  Some 
progress was made in the past year, especially in further alignment on quality policy and in 
further  improving  implementation  of  the  EU-Turkey  trade  agreement  for  agricultural 
products.  Preparations  have  advanced  on  general  agricultural  issues  and  alignment  with  the 
common agricultural policy.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ adopt a strategy for producing agricultural statistics; 

→ manage its import quotas properly and transparently. 

The Farm Accountancy Data Network covers all 81 provinces and has now been integrated 
with  the  agricultural  production  and  registration  system.  Development  of  a  land  parcel 
identification  system  has  continued,  with  EU  support.  The  agricultural  census  is  not  yet 
complete  and  the  strategy  for  agricultural  statistics  has  not  yet  been  adopted.  Further 
alignment with EU policies requires decoupling payments from production and linking area-
based payments to cross-compliance standards. 

The  EU  and  Turkey  agreed  to  amend  Protocol  2  to  Decision  No 1/98  of  the  EC-Turkey 
Association Council on the trade regime for agricultural products and agreed to broaden the 
scope of meat products sold from the EU to Turkey to include fresh and chilled bovine meat. 
This will be an important step forward if proper and transparent management of import quota 
are implemented effectively in parallel. 

In  rural  development,  the  EU  pre-accession  programme  for  agriculture  and  rural 
development  (IPARD  I)  provides  for  entrusting  budget  implementation  tasks  to  Turkey  for 
four  measures  implemented  under  IPARD  I.  The  entrustment  was  also  given  by  the 
Commission  for  pilot  actions  of  the  measure  on  agri-environmental,  climate  and  organic 

73 

 
 
 
farming. In the first call for applications for IPARD, nearly 1 600 contracts were signed. The 
IPARD  Agency  recruited  an  additional  200  staff  members.  There  has  been  some  further 
progress  in  preparations  for  LEADER  and  a  National  Network  for  Rural  Development  was 
launched. 

With regard to quality policy, good progress was achieved with the 2017 adoption of a law 
and  corresponding  implementing  regulation  on  industrial  property.  This  legislation  aims  to 
further align with the acquis on geographical indications. 

The  alignment  of  the  regulation  on  principles  and  implementation  of  organic  farming  is 
advanced.  The  government  supports  organic  production.  The  Turkish  Accreditation  Agency 
carries out the accreditation of certification bodies on organic agriculture. 

5.12.  Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy 

EU  hygiene  rules  for  foodstuff  production  ensure  a  high  level  of  food  safety.  Animal  health 
and welfare and the safety of food of animal origin are safeguarded together with quality of 
seeds, plant protection material, protection against harmful organisms and animal nutrition. 

There is  some level of preparation in the area of food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary 
policy. There has been some progress in the past year on the enforcement capacity in relation 
to food, feed and animal by-products and food safety legislation. Full implementation of the 
acquis in this area will require significant further work, particularly in areas such as animal 
by-products,  animal  welfare,  identifying  and  registering  animals  and  controlling  their 
movements.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→  upgrade  food  establishments  to  meet  EU  standards,  including  submitting  a national 
programme and a monitoring plan; 

→ take further steps to adapt and enforce rules on animal welfare and animal by-products. 

There  has  been  limited  progress  in  aligning  and  implementing  the  acquis  on  general  food 
safety. Work should be intensified to fully align veterinary policy with the EU acquis. The 
identification  and  registration  of  bovines  and  small  ruminants  has  continued.  Border 
inspection posts at land and sea borders and at the Sabiha Gökçen Airport in Istanbul are still 
not fully functioning. 

Turkey  has  continued  its  fight  against  animal  diseases.  Foot  and  mouth  disease  outbreaks 
have  decreased  as  a  result  of  mass  vaccination.  The  disease-free  zone  ensured  through 
vaccination  in  the  area  of  Western  Turkey  bordering  Bulgaria  and  Greece  has  been 
maintained  through  strict  movement  controls.  Vaccination  against  lumpy  skin  disease  has 
continued. Significant efforts are still needed to fully align with the  acquis on transmissible 
spongiform  encephalopathies  and  surveillance  systems,  including  full  compliance  with  the 
February  1998  Decision  of  the  EC-Turkey  Association  Council  on  the  trade  regime  for 
agricultural  products.  Further  structural  and  administrative  work  is  necessary  to  fully 
implement the acquis on animal welfare. There has been no progress on zoonoses. 

Turkey  continued  to  implement  training,  inspection  and  monitoring  programmes  for  the 
placing on the market of food, feed and animal by-products, and administrative capacity 
for  official  controls  has  been  improved.  No  progress  has  been  made  on  developing  the 
national  plan  for  upgrading  agri-food  establishments.  Significant  work  is  still  needed  on 

74 

 
 
 
applying the new rules on registering and approving food establishments. Substantial work on 
animal  by-products  is  still  required.  Provisions  for  funding  inspections  have  still  not  been 
aligned with the EU system. 

Alignment  of  food  safety  legislation  with  the  acquis  has  advanced  on  issues  such  as 
labelling, additives and purity criteria, flavourings, food supplements and enzymes. Relevant 
regulations  have  been  published,  e.g.  on  labelling  and  specifications  for  food  additives, 
among many others. 

Progress  on  specific  rules  for  feed  remained  limited.  There  has  been  no  progress  on 
phytosanitary  policy.  Alignment  is  yet  to  be  completed  for  new  foods  and  for  genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs). 

5.13.  Chapter 13: Fisheries 

The  common  fisheries  policy  lays  down  rules  for  management  of  fisheries,  protects  living 
resources  of  the  sea  and  limits  the  environmental  impact  of  fisheries.  This  includes  setting 
catch quotas, managing fleet capacity, rules for markets and aquaculture as well as support 
for fisheries and coastal communities. 

Preparations in this area remain at an early stage. Some progress was made on resources and 
fleet management, inspection and control, and on international agreements.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→  adopt  a  fisheries  law  which  aims  to  protect,  manage  and  develop  aquatic  products  in  an 
environmentally-sensitive manner in line with sustainability principles. 

Some progress was made on resources and fleet management. A further 214 fishing vessels 
were scrapped from the fleet under the ongoing subsidy scheme, bringing the total scrapped to 
1 225.  The  number  of  vessels  monitored  under  the  vessel  monitoring  system  has  reached  1 
350. A new support scheme and electronic logbook were introduced to update data on marine 
and inland artisanal fishing vessels to ensure the sustainable management of fisheries. Turkey 
signed  the  Malta  MedFish4Ever  Declaration  on  improving  the  sustainability  of  fishing 
resources in the Mediterranean. 

On  inspection  and  control,  some  progress  was  made  on  legislative  alignment  and  on 
implementing the recommendations by the International Commission for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) on bluefin tuna. In 2017, increased cooperation between Turkey and 
the  EU  in  the  ICCAT  led  to  substantial  progress  on  the  conservation  of  large,  highly 
migratory stocks in the Mediterranean, including the adoption of a scheme allocating fishing 
opportunities  for  Mediterranean  swordfish  on  the  basis  of  a  2016  recovery  plan.  A 
longstanding dispute over Turkey’s rights to fish for bluefin tuna was resolved. In the General 
Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) the EU-Turkey cooperation allowed the 
adoption  of  a  multi-annual  management  plan  for  Black  Sea  turbot,  setting  Total  Allowable 
Catches  for  all  riparian  states  and  measures  to  fight  Illegal,  Unreported  and  Unregulated 
fishing  (IUU).  No  progress  was  made  on  market  policy.  Regarding  international 
agreements, cooperation between Turkey and the EU continued. Turkey is signatory to, but 
hasn't ratified yet, the Food and Agriculture Organisation's Agreement on Port State Measures 
to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing. As the EU acquis implements provisions of the 
United  Nations Convention on the Law of the  Sea, including through the common fisheries 
policy, Turkey’s ratification of the Convention is necessary to improve cooperation with the 

75 

 
 
 
EU on fisheries and maritime policy. 

5.14.  Chapter 14: Transport Policy 

The EU has common rules for technical and safety standards, security, social standards, State 
aid  and  market  liberalisation  in  road  transport,  railways,  inland  waterways,  combined 
transport, aviation and maritime transport. 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  transport  policy.  Some  progress  has  been 
achieved in the reporting period, mainly on railways liberalisation. However, the institutional 
set  up  and  market  constraints  in  Turkey  risk  hindering  new  entrants  in  railways.  In  the 
maritime  sector,  the  institutional  and  technical  capacity  to  implement  international 
conventions  is  limited.  The  aviation  sector’s  institutional  and  technical  capacity  and  human 
resources need strengthening.  

In addition to addressing these shortcomings, in the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ pursue the vision zero / safe system approach when preparing the strategic framework for 
road safety, including improve road users’ behaviour by education, training and enforcement; 

→ provide the necessary conditions for genuine liberalisation of the railways sector; 

→  take  steps  towards  aligning  with  the  EU  acquis  legislation  in  the  areas  of  aviation, 
including  air  safety,  intelligent  transport  systems  and  EU  passenger  rights  in  all  modes  of 
transport.  

As  regards  the  general  transport  acquis,  Turkey  adopted  a  new  strategic  transport  plan 
covering  the  2017-2021  period,  which  does  not  refer  to  the  most  recent  EU  priorities  on 
sustainable urban mobility and climate change. The transport master plan covering all modes 
of  transport  has  been  finalised.  The  logistics  master  plan  is  still  being  prepared. 
Administrative capacity for all modes of transport remains too low, in particular for aviation 
and railways. 

On  road  transport,  the  legal  framework  is  at  a  good  level  of  alignment  with  the  acquis. 
Roadside inspections are being performed rigorously, but legislation and procedures need to 
be updated, especially to introduce new elements  of roadworthiness such as  cargo securing. 
Priority should be given to aligning road safety policies with the acquis and designating a lead 
agency to implement the ‘vision zero’ strategy. There has been no progress in developing a 
Clean Power for Transport package or intelligent transport systems. 

A new institutional set up is emerging in the rail transport sector, with a clear distribution of 
roles and responsibilities, but this is not fully aligned with EU unbundling alternatives. TCDD 
Infrastructure,  the  state-owned  company  in  charge  of  the  network,  issued  the  network 
statement  and  a  web  application  for  path  capacity  allocation.  However,  implementing 
legislation provides that only domestically produced freight and passenger rolling stock will 
be registered until 1 January 2020. This creates difficulties for the provision of rolling stock, 
the  flexibility  of  the  rail  market,  and  the  entrance  of  newcomers  into  the  sector.  TCDD 
Transport,  the  state-owned  company  that  manages  rolling  stock,  does  not  operate  as  an 
independent commercial company in an open market. It remains dependent on subsidies from 
its parent TCDD Infrastructure and from transfer prices from the three rolling stock suppliers 
which  are  associated  enterprises  of  TCDD  Holding.  TCDD  Holding  plays  the  role  of 
infrastructure manager,  which does not  provide the adequate conditions for fair  competition 
with other market players. The Directorate-General for Rail Regulation still acts as both the 

76 

 
 
 
regulatory  authority  and  the  safety  authority,  and  is  not  sufficiently  independent  from  the 
Ministry  of  Transport.  The  Ministry  currently  acts  as  the  economic  regulator,  which  is  not 
compatible  with  Directive  2012/34  establishing  a  single  European  railway  area.  Therefore, 
further alignment is required. 

In  maritime  transport,  emergency  response  centres  in  Tekirdağ  and  Antalya  are  not  fully 
operational as oil spill equipment is still being procured. Continued work by the authorities to 
protect the marine environment and strengthen their capacity for spill response is needed. The 
Maritime Labour Convention has been ratified in 2017. Turkey has not yet become a party to 
all of the basic conventions of the International Maritime Organisation, including Annex II of 
the  Convention  on  Facilitation  of  International  Maritime  Traffic,  and  has  not  yet  pursued 
signature  of  the  Paris  Memorandum  of  Understanding.  Maritime  authorities  also  need 
significant  institutional  and  technical  capacity-building  so  they  can  carry  out  their 
responsibilities  under  International  Maritime  Organisation  conventions  that  Turkey  has 
already  ratified.  Further  improvements  are  needed  to  the  legislative  and  technological 
framework for maritime transport monitoring, as required under international law applicable 
to  coastal  states,  with  a  view  to  becoming  part  of  the  Vessel  Traffic  Monitoring  and 
Information System. 

The  relevant  EU  legislation  in  the  area  of  inland  waterway  transport  remains  to  be 
transposed,  and  a  new  authority  responsible  for  inland  waterways  has  not  yet  been  set  up. 
Turkey does not participate in the EU strategy for the development of the Danube Region, and 
has not signed the main international agreements on inland waterways. 

In the area of aviation, since 2016 the EU and Turkey have been negotiating a comprehensive 
aviation  agreement,  covering  market  access  in  addition  to  regulatory  cooperation  and 
convergence  on  a  wide  range  of  aviation  issues  such  as  environment,  commercial 
opportunities, competition, security, safety and air traffic management. Turkey has stated its 
wish  to  fully  integrate  into  the  EU  aviation  system,  including  membership  of  the  European 
Aviation  Safety  Agency  (EASA),  but  needs  to  build  on  its  earlier  efforts  to  align  its 
regulations with the acquis. In regard to aviation safety, no significant progress was made in 
regulations  on  air  operations  or  aircrew.  Moreover  there  have  been  no  negotiations  on 
renewing  the  working  arrangement  between  the  Turkish  Directorate-General  for  Civil 
Aviation and EASA. Concluding a new arrangement would be an important step for ensuring 
aviation  safety  standards  and  would  enable  EASA  to  fully  perform  safety  inspections 
including in relation to safety aspects of air traffic management and air navigation services. 
Turkey's level of progress in these areas cannot therefore be ascertained at this stage nor the 
capacity  of  the  national  aviation  authority  to  properly  discharge  its  safety  oversight 
responsibilities.  The  lack  of  adequate  communication  between  air  traffic  control  centres  in 
Turkey  and  Cyprus  continues  to  compromise  air  safety  in  the  Nicosia  flight  information 
region. An operational solution needs to be found urgently to resolve this safety issue. In other 
areas  of  the  aviation  acquis,  Turkey  is  making  progress  in  aligning  its  regulations  with  the 
acquis but efforts should be stepped up, in particular in the area of air traffic management. 

There  has  been  no  progress  on  combined  transport.  The  strategy  on  combined  transport 
adopted in December 2014 has not been implemented yet. Considering Turkey's ambitions on 
modal shift in the long run, regulatory measures to shift freight to railways, inland waterways 
or short sea shipping in line with Directive 92/106/EEC and the EU White paper targets need 
to be approved. 

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As long as restrictions remain in place on vessels and aircraft registered in Cyprus, related to 
Cyprus,  or  whose  last  port  of  call  was  Cyprus,  Turkey  will  not  be  in  a  position  to  fully 
implement the acquis relating to this chapter. 

5.15.   Chapter 15: Energy 

EU  energy  policy  covers  energy  supply,  infrastructure,  the  internal  energy  market, 
consumers,  renewable  energy,  energy  efficiency,  nuclear  energy  and  nuclear  safety,  and 
radiation protection. 

Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of energy. Some progress has been made in this 
area, mainly on security of supply and the renewable energy sector. The Commission’s 2016 
recommendations remain valid.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→  complete  the  gas  market  reform  in  line  with  the  acquis,  by  setting  out  a  legally  binding 
plan and a timetable, including third party access to the transit network and the unbundling of 
activities; 

→  adopt  its  nuclear  energy  law  in  line  with  the  acquis,  including  restructuring  the  nuclear 
energy regulator to separate its operating functions and guarantee its full independence from 
any body involved in developing nuclear energy; 

→ make progress on transparent, cost-reflective and non-discriminatory tariffs for electricity 
and gas. 

Good progress has been made on security of supply. Turkey adopted its new national energy 
and  mining  strategy  which  aims  to  improve  security  of  supply,  promote  domestic  resources 
and  increase  predictability  in  the  market.  There  has  been  significant  progress  in  relation  to 
gas. The construction of the first phase of the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline project (TANAP) was 
largely completed at the end of 2017. (See Chapter 21 — Trans-European Networks). Turkey 
has  set  out  an  assertive  programme  to  increase  the  capacity  of  its  gas  storage  and  liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) facilities, including floating storage and regasification units, two of which 
are operational. Turkey has also commissioned its second underground gas storage facility (1 
billion cubic metres) in 2017. Turkey has set up a programme to double the entry capacity of 
its two LNG terminals within two years, along with setting up two additional terminals. There 
has  been  substantial  progress  on  the  TurkStream  gas  pipeline  project  with  regard  to 
infrastructure  for  delivering  gas  to  Turkey.  It  is  expected  to  be  operational  by  2019.  The 
construction of the offshore pipelines was launched in May 2017 and over one third has now 
been  completed.  There  has  been  limited  progress  on  the  interconnector  with  Bulgaria.  No 
further  progress  can  be  reported  on  setting  up  a  transparent,  cost-reflective  and  non-
discriminatory gas transit system. Turkey is at an advanced stage of implementing the acquis 
on  mandatory  oil  stocks  and  it  ensures  storage  of  the  necessary  volume.  However,  a  fuel 
market law regulating emergency oil stocks and oil security has not yet been adopted. Positive 
developments  continued  in  relation  to  electricity  networks.  The  Turkish  Electricity 
Transmission  Company  (TEİAŞ),  which  has  observer  status  in  the  European  Network  of 
Transmission  System  Operators  for  Electricity,  has  further  improved  its  interconnection 
capacity with neighbouring countries. 

As regards the  internal energy  market, good progress  was made  on the electricity market. 
The Energy Market Regulatory Authority produced two implementing regulations to improve 
information  security  and  cyber  security  for  its  critical  energy  infrastructure  and  redesign 

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electricity side services. The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) issued a new 
regulation  regarding  the  auditing  of  the  electricity  distribution  companies.  The  eligibility 
threshold allowing electricity consumers to change supplier was further reduced from 3 600 
kWh  to  2  400  kWh,  which  corresponds  to  a  theoretical  market  opening  of  almost  90  %.  A 
transparent  and  cost-based  pricing  mechanism  for  electricity  has  not  yet  been  properly 
implemented. There has been some progress in the gas market. Turkey has continued to adopt 
new  implementing  legislation  in  line  with  the  EU’s  Third  Energy  Package  on  tariffs  and 
organised wholesale markets, with a view to creating a fair and transparent platform for gas 
traders.  The  eligibility  threshold  for  natural  gas  was  kept  unchanged  at  75  000 m3, 
corresponding  to  a  theoretical  market  opening  of  80  %.  The  tendering  process  for  gas 
distribution was completed for Turkey’s 81 provinces and the gas network was extended to 77 
provinces.  A  draft  law  amending  the  Natural  Gas  Market  Law  to  address  shortcomings 
regarding  acquis  alignment  has  been  pending  in  Parliament  since  2014.  Full  cost-reflective 
pricing has yet to be properly implemented. 

Turkey’s legislation on hydrocarbons is at an advanced stage of alignment with the acquis. 
Turkey already implements the Hydrocarbons Authorisation  Directive but will need to align 
with the Directive on the Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations, including in relation to 
the transit of hydrocarbons. 

Good  progress  can  be  reported  on  renewable  energy,  which  is  a  key  pillar  of  the  national 
energy strategy. The government issued two new implementing regulations on the technical 
assessment of solar applications and the setting up of large-scale renewable energy resource 
regions.  Turkey  launched  two  mega  tenders  for  solar  and  wind  energy,  each  with  a  total 
1 000-megawatt installed capacity, designed on the basis of a fixed feed-in tariff, 80 % local 
content for R&D and manufacturing, as well as guaranteed R&D investment for a period of 
10 years. The proportion of the total installed power capacity provided by renewable energy 
accounted for 44 %, of which 34 % hydro, while the proportion of power generation reached 
33 % in 2016. 

Good  progress  has  been  made  on  energy  efficiency.  A  National  Energy  Efficiency  Action 
Plan  has  been  adopted  in  January  2018,  aiming  to  reduce  primary  energy  consumption  by 
14 %  by  2023.  Authorisations  for  energy  efficiency  services  and  work  to  raise  public 
awareness have continued. Small and medium-sized enterprises have been supported through 
efficiency-enhancing projects and voluntary agreements. There is no timetable for achieving 
full  alignment  with  the  Energy  Performance  of  Buildings  Directive,  or  with  the  Energy 
Efficiency Directive. Turkey urgently needs to strengthen its institutional structure to improve 
coordination between the different ministries on implementing policies, possibly by creating 
an effective agency to do this, as many EU Member States have done. 

Some  limited  progress  has  been  made  on  nuclear  energy,  nuclear  safety  and  radiation 
protection. The Turkish Atomic Energy Authority issued three implementing regulations to 
improve  nuclear  safety  and  security  standards.  Preparations  for  the  Akkuyu  nuclear  power 
plant continued. In June 2017, the Energy Market Regulatory Authority granted the Akkuyu 
nuclear  company  a  49-year  power  generation  licence  and  detailed  site  investigation  studies 
are underway for the Sinop nuclear power plant. Turkey’s existing legislation is only partially 
aligned with the Euratom acquis, specifically the Nuclear Safety Directive and the Spent Fuel 
and Radioactive Waste Directive. The draft framework law on nuclear energy is still pending. 
This  should  provide  for  the  creation  of  an  independent  regulatory  authority  and  more 
effectively deliver the safety objective of preventing and mitigating accidents. Turkey issued 

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the construction licence for the Akkuyu power plant. The stress test report on the design of the 
Akkuyu  power  plant  needs  to  be  completed.  Turkey  has  not  yet  acceded  to  the  Joint 
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste 
Management. Turkey is not yet a member of the European Community Urgent Radiological 
Information Exchange system. 

5.16.  Chapter 16: Taxation 

EU rules on taxation cover value added tax and excise duties as well as aspects of corporate 
taxation.  They  also  deal  with  cooperation  between  tax  administrations,  including  the 
exchange of information to prevent tax evasion. 

Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of taxation. No progress was made on this area 
except  for  the  2009  action  plan  on  tobacco  and  the  ratification  of  the  Convention  on 
administrative assistance in tax matters.  

In the coming year, Turkey should pay particular attention to: 

→ align the range of excisable energy products with the acquis; 

→ with regard to the 2009 action plan, ensure that discriminatory excise duties on alcoholic 
beverages and tobacco are fully eliminated in 2018; 

→ address the deficiencies identified by the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information; and the deficiencies in tax regimes that are considered potentially harmful. 

As  regards  indirect  taxation,  deviating  from  the  acquis,  a  wide  the  range  of  products  are 
subject to a 1 % value added tax. Legislation on structure, exemptions, special schemes and 
the scope of reduced rates need to be further aligned with the acquis. 

On  excise  duties,  the  specific  duty  on  imported  and  blended  tobacco  that  financed  the 
Tobacco  Fund  was  reduced  to  USD  150  per  ton  in  December  2017,  in  line  with  the 
2009 action  plan,  which  aims  to  fully  eliminate  the  discriminatory  duty  by  2018.  Turkey’s 
legislation  on  cigarette  excise  duties  contradicts  the  acquis  in  terms  of  the  specific  and  ad 
valorem elements of the tax, but the overall level of excise duties on cigarettes is close to EU 
levels. Regarding alcoholic beverages, Turkey continued to increase the taxation differentials 
in  absolute  terms  between  raki  (mainly  domestic  produce)  and  certain  alcoholic  beverages 
(mainly imported) by raising excise duties on all  alcoholic beverages by a fixed percentage. 
As  a  result,  the  excise  duty  gap  between  raki  and  equivalent  spirits  increased  in  absolute 
terms,  contradicting  the  2009  action  plan  which  aims  to  abolish  the  discriminatory  taxation 
difference in 2018. Excise duties on energy products are generally well above the EU minima 
rates,  but  kerosene,  coal  and  electricity  are  not  subject  to  excise  duties  as  required  in  the 
acquis. 

In the area of direct taxation, the Council of the European Union Code of Conduct Group (as 
well  as  the  OECD  Forum  on  Harmful  Tax  Practices)  has  evaluated  the  preferential  tax 
regimes  of  Turkey  and  has  assessed  the  Technology  Development  Zones  and  the  Regional 
Headquarters regimes as potentially harmful. Turkey committed to solving these issues. 

In  the  area  of  administrative  cooperation  and  mutual  assistance,  in  May  2017,  Turkey 
ratified  and  put  the  Convention  on  Mutual  Administrative  Assistance  in  Tax  Matters  into 
force  in  November  2017,  which  requires  the  competent  authorities  in  the  parties  to  the 
convention to mutually agree on the scope of the automatic exchange of information and the 

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procedures  to  comply  with.  In  June  2017,  Turkey  signed  the  Multilateral  Convention  to 
Implement  Tax  Treaty  Related  Measures  to  Prevent  Base  Erosion  and  Profit  Shifting.  This 
convention  provides  for  the  implementation  of  a  series  of  tax  treaty  measures to  update  the 
existing  network  of  bilateral  tax  treaties  and  reduce  opportunities  for  tax  avoidance  by 
multinational enterprises. 

Regarding  operational  capacity  and  computerisation,  Turkey  adopted  the  2017-2020 
integrated  public  finance  management  information  system  plan.  This  aims  to  design  an 
integration module for decentralised and institutional automation systems to be developed and 
used by various public institutions and ministries. 

5.17.  Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy 

EU rules require the independence of central banks and prohibit them from directly financing 
the public sector. Member States coordinate their economic policies and are subject to fiscal, 
economic and financial surveillance. 

Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of economic and monetary policy. There was no 
progress in the past year. Strong political pressure on the central bank persisted, undermining 
its independence and credibility.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ avoid any political interference in the independence of the central bank; 

→ submit fiscal notifications by the set deadlines. 

On monetary policy, further progress is needed on ensuring the independence of the central 
bank.  The  inflation  target  is  determined  jointly  by  the  central  bank  and  the  government.  In 
addition, the Prime Minister  holds the right  to  mediate if there is  disagreement between the 
central  bank’s  board  and  the  governor.  Inflation  moved  to  double  digits  in  2017,  drifting 
further  away  from  the official  target  of  5%.  There  has  been  increasing  political  pressure  on 
the  central  bank  to  lower  interest  rates  despite  this  significant  overshooting  of  the  inflation 
target. Political interference in the conduct of monetary policy needs to be avoided to reduce 
risks  to  the  central  bank’s  operational  and  institutional  independence.  The  central  bank’s 
interest rate increased by 3.6 percentage points in 2017, confirming its intention not to ease its 
policy stance until the medium-term inflation outlook shows significant improvement. Further 
work should be done to ensure full alignment with the acquis in relation to privileged access 
to financial institutions by the public sector. 

On  economic  policy,  further  alignment  with  the  Directive  on  Requirements  for  Budgetary 
Frameworks  is  needed.  Turkey  revised  its  national  account  system  to  comply  with  the 
European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA-2010). However, ESA-2010 has 
not  yet  been  implemented  for  government  accounts.  Further  improvements  are  needed  to 
ensure  the  credibility  of  macroeconomic  forecasts.  Turkey  does  not  have  numerical  fiscal 
rules  or  a  fiscal  council  that  monitors  fiscal  policy  independently,  as  is  required  by  the 
Directive. Turkey has started to submit fiscal notifications. 

Turkey submitted its 2018-2020 economic reform programme on 31 January 2018. (see also 
the economic chapter).  

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5.18.   Chapter 18: Statistics 

EU  rules  require  that  Member  States  are  able  to  produce  statistics  based  on  professional 
independence,  impartiality,  reliability,  transparency  and  confidentiality.  Common  rules  are 
provided for the methodology, production and dissemination of statistical information. 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  statistics.  Turkey  made  some  progress, 
especially  with  the  revision  of  national  accounts  and  the  use  of  administrative  registers. 
However, further work is needed on aligning macroeconomic and agricultural statistics with 
the EU acquis and improving statistics on asylum and migration.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→  improve  the  Gross  National  Income  (GNI)  inventory  by  aligning  it  with  Eurostat’s  GNI 
inventory guide; 

→  strengthen  coordination  between  the  National  Statistics  Office  and  other  data  providers, 
while further improving the quality and use of administrative records; 

→ improve statistics on agriculture, asylum and migration. 

As regards statistical infrastructure, legislation on statistics is based on the principles of the 
European statistics code of practice. It ensures the professional independence of the National 
Statistics Office. However, greater transparency should be applied to the appointment process 
for the President of the National Statistics Office. Cooperation between this office and some 
of  the  main  data  providers  needs  to  be  improved,  in  particular  the  Ministry  of  Food, 
Agriculture and Livestock. 

For macroeconomic statistics, the GDP data was revised to ensure greater compliance with 
the  system  of  national  accounts  (SNA  2008)  and  the  European  system  of  accounts  (ESA 
2010).  The  integration  of  administrative  registers  from  public  institutions  into  the  national 
accounting system is the biggest development in this revision process. The methods used to 
estimate  the  national  accounts  were  improved  with  the  2012  supply-use  and  input-output 
tables.  Turkey  submitted  the  2012  supply-use  table,  the  GNI  inventory  and  the  quarterly 
national  accounts  inventory  to  Eurostat  in  2017.  The  GNI  inventory  is  not  yet  in  line  with 
Eurostat’s  GNI  inventory  guide  and  therefore  the  Turkish  GDP/GNI  compilation  cannot  be 
checked.  TurkStat  compiled  for  the  first  time  the  annual  Institutional  Sector  Accounts, 
covering  the  years  2009-2015.  Turkey  produces  external  trade  statistics  in  line  with  the  EU 
acquis. In December 2016, Turkey submitted tables for the excessive deficit procedure for the 
years  2012-2015  to  Eurostat.  Regional  accounts  were  calculated  at  level  3  of  the 
nomenclature  for  statistical  regions  for  2004-2014.  Further  progress  is  needed  on  foreign 
affiliate  trade  statistics  and  on  publishing  government  finance  statistics  on  an  accrual  basis. 
The harmonised index of consumer prices is implemented in line with the acquis. 

In  business  statistics,  the  full  implementation  of  the  regulation  on  structural  business 
statistics  is  ongoing.  Business  statistics  are  being  recalculated  in  light  of  the  new 
administrative registers that have been collected. Turkey is implementing the latest version of 
industrial production statistics according to EU standards. PRODCOM (list of products of the 
European Community) is aligned. Short-term statistics are largely aligned, with the exception 
of  services.  Transport,  R&D  and  ICT  statistics  are  produced  according  to  the  EU  acquis. 
Tourism statistics are available. Statistics on science and technology are highly compliant. 

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As for social statistics, data from the survey on income and living conditions is available and 
labour  market  statistics  are  fully  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  methodology  for 
employment data follows EU practice. Alignment  in  public health  statistics is  very high  for 
data  relating  to  causes  of  death  and  health  surveys.  Further  progress  is  needed  on  data  on 
health expenditure and non-monetary healthcare. Social protection statistics are fully aligned. 
Crime statistics are available, as are education and vocational training data. Data on residence 
permits, asylum seekers and refugees are not yet sufficient to produce reliable migration flow 
tables. However, work is ongoing to improve international migration statistics. 

In  agriculture  statistics,  no  agricultural  census  has  been  carried  out  since  2001.  Animal 
production,  milk  and  dairy  statistics  are  available.  Supply  balance  sheets  are  available  for 
almost  all  basic  crop  products  and  for  wine.  However,  updated  economic  accounts  for 
agriculture and agricultural input price index data are not yet available. Turkey carried out a 
farm structure survey but the results have not yet been published. 

As  for  environment  statistics,  further  progress  is  needed,  in  particular  on  agricultural  and 
construction  waste  and  data  on  environment-related  taxes  by  economic  activity.  Turkey 
published  statistics  on  national  greenhouse  gas  emissions  for  2009-2015,  which  was 
submitted to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in April 
2017. However, environmental accounts are at an early stage. Energy statistics are in line with 
the EU  acquis.  Annual energy statistics and energy prices are available in  good quality and 
sent to Eurostat. 

5.19.  Chapter 19: Social policy and employment 

EU rules in the social field include minimum standards for labour law, equality, health and 
safety at work and non-discrimination. They also promote social dialogue at European level. 

Turkey has some level of preparation in the area of social policy and employment. There has 
been backsliding in this area owing to a strong deterioration of labour rights under the state 
of  emergency,  with  mass  dismissals  and  suspensions.  Some  implementing  measures  in 
relation  to  social  inclusion  and  employment  policy  were  taken.  Double  thresholds  for 
collective bargaining at workplace and sector levels and the lack of a right to strike for public 
servants  continue  to  be  major  obstacles  to  Turkey  meeting  this  chapter’s  main  opening 
benchmark: compliance with European standards and ILO conventions on trade union rights. 

In the coming year, Turkey should: 

→ remove obstacles limiting the full enjoyment of trade union rights and the functioning of 
bilateral and tripartite social dialogue; 

→ increase monitoring and implementation of legislation on health and safety at work; 

→ promote women’s employment by implementing appropriate work-life balance policies. 

Turkey has been backsliding on workers’ rights with mass dismissals and suspensions in the 
public sector. Due to high rates of informality (total 34.8 %, non-agricultural sector 22 %), a 
high ratio of the working population is not protected by the labour law. This law still does 
not apply to agriculture and forestry workplaces with less than 50 employees or to domestic 
workers, except in relation to matters of health and safety at work. Turkey abolished the ban 
on  night  shifts  exceeding  7.5  hours  in  certain  sectors,  conditional  on  the  consent  of  the 
employee.  Removing  this  right  in  situations  where  there  are  usually  weak  collective 
bargaining  mechanisms  is  particularly  worrisome.  Household  poverty,  combined  with  some 

83 

 
 
 
negative  social  representations  and  business  practices,  continues  to  lead  to  child  labour, 
including some of its worst forms, such as child labour in seasonal agricultural work, begging 
and  other  street  work.  In  March  2017,  Turkey  adopted  a  programme  to  eliminate  the  worst 
forms of child labour by 2023 and to reduce the rate of child labour below 2%. The current 
number  of  labour  inspectors  is  well  below  the  benchmarks  set  by  the  International  Labour 
Organisation. 

On occupational safety and health, the full entry into force of the law to align Turkey with 
the  acquis  in  this  area  has  been  postponed  once  more,  this  time  to  July  2020.  Occupational 
accidents claimed 1 405 lives in 2016, up from 1 252 in 2015. Deaths were predominantly in 
the  construction  and  land  transport  sectors.  Child  workers  continued  to  be  victims  of  fatal 
accidents.  The  independence  of  occupational  health  and  safety  professionals  from  their 
employers needs to be ensured. 

Social dialogue has backslid during the last year. The right of the Council of Ministers to de 
facto  ban  ongoing  strikes  has  been  expanded  to  include  grounds  of  economic  stability  and 
continuation of service. In 2017, five strike actions were postponed,  de facto banned. Trade 
unions  continued  to  report  dismissals,  harassment,  arrests  and  police  assaults  against  their 
members for carrying out legitimate trade union activities. Several press announcements and 
meetings  of  trade  unions  have  been  cancelled  by  the  authorities  on  the  grounds  of  security 
risks. The number of private sector employees covered by collective agreements remains very 
low. Trade union density among private sector employees has slightly increased, to 12 % in 
2017. Informal employees remain excluded from the right to join trade unions. In light of the 
very  high  level  of  informal  employment  in  Turkey,  actual  union  density  is  therefore  lower. 
Trade union density among public servants is high at 69 %, despite a 2.5 % decrease in 2017, 
but the trade unions that have been more critical of government policies have suffered a loss 
of affiliation. A wide range of public servants are not allowed to belong to unions. Turkey’s 
Economic  and  Social  Council  has  been  inactive  since  2009  and  the  tripartite  consultative 
committee only met once in 2017. 

In  2016,  the  overall  employment  rate  was  54.3  %,  and  33.2  %  for  women.  The 
unemployment  rate  was  10.9 %,  up  from  10.3 %  in  2015.  Unemployment  remained  high 
throughout  2017  despite  strong  economic  growth  and  government 
incentives.  The 
employment  mobilisation  campaign  launched  in  2017  seems  to  have  had  a  limited  impact. 
The  labour  force  participation  rate  was  56.9 %,  with  an  increase  in  female  labour  force 
participation  to  38.5  %.  23 %  of  employed  women  work  as  unpaid  family  workers  in 
agriculture. The youth unemployment rate was 19.5 % with an increase from 18.5 % in 2015. 
A sharp increase was observed in the number of women aged under 29 not in employment, 
education or training. The rate of informal work was stable at 33.5 %. 44 % of women are in 
informal  jobs,  but  this  rate  reaches  94  %  for  women  in  agriculture.  Turkey  has  set  modest 
targets for 2020: reducing unemployment to 9.6 %. In 2017, Turkey launched an employment 
mobilisation programme to create 2 million new jobs. This primarily consists of covering the 
employers’ share of social security premiums, but  with little targeting to categories needing 
support. State aid for employment will continue in 2018 through a new generation of support 
schemes. The number of people benefiting from public employment services is increasing. 

On  social  inclusion  and  protection,  Turkey  continued  to  extend  social  assistance  and 
services to an increasing number of refugees. Income inequality remained much higher than 
in  EU  Member  States,  with  a  Gini  coefficient  of  0.404  in  2016.  Inter-regional  disparities 
remain  high,  as  average  household  income  in  some  western  provinces  is  three  times  higher 

84 

 
 
 
than in south-eastern Anatolia where child poverty is particularly high. The impact of social 
transfers on alleviating poverty is limited. The relative poverty rate fell to 21.2 %, while the 
severe  material  deprivation  rate  increased  to  32.9  %.  The  overall  risk  of  poverty  and  social 
exclusion  has  increased  slightly.  People  with  disabilities  face  difficulties  in  accessing  the 
labour  market.  Effective  monitoring  mechanisms  and  further  budget  allocation  is  needed  in 
relation  to  the  inclusion  of  Roma  people  in  the  labour  market.  Turkey  lacks  an  integrated 
policy  framework  on  poverty  reduction,  social  inclusion  and  protection.  Social  protection 
expenditure represented 12.8 % of the GDP in 2016, with almost half of this spent on old age 
pensions. General health insurance premiums for around 8.7 million people in need are being 
covered by the state. High levels of unregistered work weaken the sustainability of the social 
security system. Social assistance beneficiaries are directed to the public employment service 
for  active  labour  market  measures.  In  addition,  as  a  means  to  promote  employment,  an 
implementing regulation has been issued in June aiming to cover the social security premiums 
of  persons  benefiting  from  regular  cash  social  assistance  programmes..  The  impact  of  this 
measure  on  the  employment  of  the  assistance  recipients  is  to  be  seen.  The  process  of 
transitioning  from  institutional  to  community-based  care  for  vulnerable  children,  elderly 
persons  and  persons  with  disabilities  continues  but  the  impact  is  modest  and  needs  to  be 
increased. The monitoring, evaluation and inspection system for all home-based care services 
need to be strengthened. 

There are no strategies or action plans in place on non-discrimination in employment and 
social  policy.  The  National  Human  Rights  and  Equality  institution  has  been  established,  its 
members  elected  in  March  2017,  and  secondary  legislation  laid  down  in  November  2017, 
setting  up  an  individual  application  mechanism  for  complaints  for  alleged  discrimination 
cases, but it has not yet finalised any of the cases it has started to process.  The grounds for 
prohibited discrimination do not include sexual orientation (see Chapter 23 – Judiciary and 
fundamental rights). 

On equality between women and men in employment and social policy, an implementing 
regulation was adopted in November 2016 in relation to part-time work for working parents in 
the  public  sector.  There  is  a  wide  gap  in  the  employment  rates  of  women  and  men,  and  a 
gender  pay  gap  observed  for  all  levels  of  educational  attainment.  Home-based  childcare 
services to support female employment are no longer financed from the national budget. The 
lack  of  institutions  and  services  providing  care  for  children  and  sick  and  elderly  people 
continues to hinder women’s employment, due to a gender bias in caring responsibilities. (See 
also Chapter 23). 

Turkey  has  reached  a  good  level  of  preparation  for  using  the  European  Social  Fund.  The 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security manages similar sectoral funds under the Instrument 
for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) and IPA II programmes. However, the implementation of 
the IPA II programme needs to be stepped up. 

5.20.  Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy 

EU enterprise and industrial policy strengthens competitiveness, facilitates structural change 
and  encourages  a  business-friendly  environment  that  stimulates  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises. 

Turkey has a good level of preparation in the area of enterprise and industrial policy. There 
was  some  progress  with  regard  to  the  legal  framework  for  doing  business  and  access  to 

85 

 
 
 
finance,  but issues such as  tackling the informal economy, the long-term  financing of small 
and medium sized enterprises and the legal framework for microfinance remain challenges.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→  improve  policy  compliance  following  the  results  of  the  Small  Business  Act  report  and 
focus on measuring the impact of policy tools. 

On  enterprise  and  industrial  policy  principles,  there  was  some  progress  on  the  legal 
framework  related  to  the  business  environment.  A  law  on  movable  collaterals  entered  into 
force in January 2017. This eased SMEs’ access to finance by giving them the opportunity to 
use  their  movable  assets  as  collateral.  Electronic  registration  of  enterprises  was  further 
facilitated.  Measures  were  taken  on  business  registration,  exemption  of  stamp  duties, 
industrial and technology development zones, industry-university cooperation and the setting 
up  a  higher  education  quality  system  to  increase  R&D.  EU  energy  efficiency  requirements 
were  made  mandatory  and  the  market  surveillance  of  products  was  strengthened.  However, 
Turkey maintained the 15 % domestic price advantage in public procurement, contrary to EU 
rules.  A  circular  on  the  use  of  domestic  products  particularly  for  the  light  rail  systems  was 
published  in  November  2017  and  an  inter-ministerial  Localisation  Steering  Board  was 
established  in  January  2018.  Such  steps  and  the  schemes  on  localisation  in  certain  sectors 
such  as  pharmaceuticals,  and  agricultural  and  forestry  tractors,  are  not  compatible  with  the 
general  principles  of  the  EU  common  industrial  policy  as  laid  down  in  the  EC  Treaty.  A 
regulation  on  health  tourism  set  out  the  procedures  and  minimum  standards  for  further 
development of this priority sector for Turkey. Sectoral strategies were adopted on software, 
machinery  and  nanotechnology,  while  two  cross-cutting  strategies  on  employment  and 
standardisation  were  issued.  Turkish  legislation  is  not  yet  fully  harmonised  with  the  Late 
Payment Directive. The informal economy is still large and the weakened rule of law under 
the state of emergency raises concerns about the business environment. 

Regarding  enterprise  and  industrial  policy  instruments,  Turkey  continued  to  implement 
various  schemes  supporting  companies,  mainly  SMEs.  The  scope  of  schemes  to  support 
participation  in  international  fairs,  market  research  and  market  entry,  international 
competitiveness, R&D and design, and technological products was further extended to cover a 
wider  range  of  beneficiaries  and  activities.  Companies’  expenses  for  participating  in  global 
value chains were included in the support scheme for certification for export markets. A credit 
volume of about EUR 50 billion was injected into the economy, including SMEs, through the 
Credit Guarantee Fund. In addition, several technical assistance and financing schemes run by 
the  SME  support  administration  (KOSGEB)  are  operational.  Turkey  continued  to  support  
technology  development  zones.  There  were  69  of  these  zones  in  2017  (compared  to  64  in 
2015).  In  2016,    640  patents  had  been  obtained  from  28  850  completed  projects  (compared 
with 627 patents from 19 322 projects in the previous reporting period). The OECD Forum on 
Harmful Tax Practices has assessed the technology development zones as potentially harmful 
from a taxation perspective. Turkey remains active in the COSME Programme, the Enterprise 
Europe Network and in the Small Business Act assessment process. 

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5.21.  Chapter 21: Trans-European Networks 

The EU promotes trans-European networks in the areas of transport and energy to strengthen 
the internal market and contribute to growth and employment. 

Turkey is well advanced in the area of trans-European networks. Good progress was made 
in the reporting period, notably in the area of energy networks. Implementation has started on 
the national transport master plan and the transport information  management system for the 
TEN-T, and planning and decision-making capabilities have been enhanced.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ increase its human resource and technical planning capacity in relation to the tools in the 
master plan; 

→  finalise  the  logistics  master  plan  and  accelerate  efforts  to  align  with  key  pieces  of  the 
acquis to facilitate alignment in TEN-T; 

→ set up a transparent, cost-reflective and non-discriminatory gas transit system in line with 
the acquis. 

As  regards  transport  networks,  the  national  transport  master  plan  for  Turkey  has  been 
adopted. The master plan and the planning tools it provides will improve Turkey’s transport 
policy-making and project planning capacity. The transport information management system 
has  been  set up. It will monitor performance indicators and data  for transport  for all  modes 
and  exchange  information  in  line  with  EU  standards.  The  Halkali-Kapikule  railway  line 
project  is  part  of  the  comprehensive  TEN-T  railway  network  and  lies  on  a  cross-border 
section of a TEN-T core network corridor. To ensure the sustainability of the project, Turkey 
needs to make a high level commitment to complete the link between the European and Asian 
rail networks through the third Bosphorus bridge in due time. 

As  regards  energy  networks,  positive  developments  continued  in  relation  to  electricity 
networks.  Turkey’s  capacity  for  electricity  interconnection  with  its  neighbouring  countries 
was improved. Significant progress has been made on gas networks, particularly on the trans-
Anatolian  pipeline  project  (TANAP).  The  project  is  expected  to  start  delivering  gas  to  the 
Turkish market on 1 July 2018 and to the EU by 2020. There has been limited progress on the 
interconnection between Turkey and Bulgaria. The TurkStream project has progressed rapidly 
with  regard  to  infrastructure  to  deliver  gas  to  Turkey  but  much  less  so  with  regard  to 
infrastructure  targeting  the  European  market  (see  Chapter  15  —  Energy).  The  Ministry  of 
Environment  and  Urbanization  approved  the  environmental  impact  assessment  for  the 
offshore  section  of  the  project  in  October  2017.  No  progress  was  made  on  setting  up 
a transparent, cost-reflective and non-discriminatory gas transit system. 

5.22.  Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments 

Regional  policy  is  the  EU’s  main  tool  for  investing  in  sustainable  and  inclusive  economic 
growth.  Member  States  bear  responsibility  for  its  implementation,  which  requires  adequate 
administrative capacity and sound financial management of project design and execution. 

Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of regional policy and coordination of structural 
instruments.  No  progress  was  made  in  strengthening  the  capacity  for  IPA  programme 
implementation leading to continued decommitments of EU funds, although there were efforts 
in the reduction of procurement and contracting backlog for IPA I.  

87 

 
 
 
 
In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ focus on the completion of ongoing operations and expedite mature operations within the 
existing pipeline by the set deadlines and deliver high quality results; 

→ improve the Audit Authority’s policies and procedures and further strengthen the capacity 
of  the  national  IPA  coordinator  and  the  national  authorising  officer  to  coordinate  operating 
structures and ensure effective strategic planning and risk management at programme level. 

On  the  legislative  framework,  implementing  legislation  on  Strategic  Planning  for  Public 
Administrations and related guidelines are yet to be adopted. 

There  was  slow  progress  on  the  institutional  framework.  All  four  operating  structures 
(environment  and  climate  actions;  competitiveness  and  innovation;  education,  employment 
and  social  policies;  and  transport)  have  been  entrusted  with  budget  implementation  tasks  to 
manage  multiannual  programmes  in  the  Instrument  for  Pre-accession  Assistance  (IPA)  II 
period  (2014-2020).  However,  their  roles  and  responsibilities  are  often  not  correctly 
understood.  The  national  IPA  coordinator  needs  to  further  develop  its  coordination  of 
implementation. Coordination between Turkish regional development policy and EU funded 
programmes is weak. 

Some  progress  was  made  in  improving  the  administrative  capacity  of  some  ministries  in 
charge  of  managing  EU  funds.  The  line  ministries  responsible  for  the  IPA  multiannual 
operational  programmes  gained  experience  and  developed  their  capacity  to  manage 
procurement  procedures  and  contracts.  For  IPA  I,  the  procurement  and  contracting  backlog 
has been reduced, although large decommitments took place, amounting to EUR 322 million 
for multiannual programmes. For IPA II, the increasing backlog reached EUR 756 million for 
multiannual  programmes;  this  remains  a  source  of  concern.  High  staff  turnover,  a  lack  of 
experience with contract enforcement and low levels of ownership by Operating structures led 
to significant delays in implementing operations and a low absorption of EU funds. 

There  has  been  some  progress  on  programming.  Project  pipelines  have  been  set  up  by  all 
IPA  structures  for  2014-2020.  Drafting  of  project  documentation  is  fairly  advanced  and 
procurement has started. 

On  monitoring  and  evaluation,  progress  is  slow  on  ensuring  the  effective  use  of  the 
integrated  monitoring  information  system  developed  by  the  Ministry  of  Development. 
Monitoring of sustainability and financial adjustment is not sufficient. 

Concerning financial management, control and audit, operating structures still suffer from 
a  lack  of  technical  capacity  to  prepare  tender  documentation.  Efficient  prioritisation  and 
organisation of the procurement processes are key to speeding up implementation. The Audit 
Authority continues to display methodological and organisational shortcomings and high staff 
turnover. The authority should improve its audit policies, procedures, and methodology. 

5.25.  Chapter 25: Science and research 

The  EU  provides  significant  support  for  research  and  innovation.  All  Member  States  can 
benefit from the EU’s research programmes, the more so where there is scientific excellence 
and solid investment in research. 

Turkey’s preparations in the area of science and research are well advanced. Some progress 
was made in the area of e-infrastructure.  

88 

 
 
 
In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ continue its work towards aligning its national research area with the European Research 
Area; 

→  intensify  its  work  to  increase  its  participation  and  success  rates  in  EU  Framework 
Programmes. 

Regarding research and innovation policy, the proportion of overall GDP provided by R&D 
expenditure remained at 1 %. Turkey’s overall research capacity is still limited in terms of the 
number  of  researchers  per  million  inhabitants  reaching  only  one  third  of  the  European 
average. 

Participation  in  framework  programmes  as  an  associated  country,  notably  in  the  EU 
research  and  innovation  programme  Horizon  2020,  is  a  key  element  of  Turkey’s  work 
towards aligning its national research area (TARAL) with the European Research Area. A 
positive  development  has  been  achieved  in  the  area  of  e-infrastructure,  where  Turkey 
implemented country-wide tools for accessing scientific information, supporting the Horizon 
2020  Open  Access  schemes.  However,  despite  the  ongoing  work  by  the  Scientific  and 
Technological Research Council (TUBITAK), participation by Turkish researchers and other 
R&D  actors  in  the  Horizon  2020  programme  has  not  increased.  Measures  taken  under  the 
state  of  emergency  (such  as  dismissals,  closures  of  institutions  and  travel  restrictions)  have 
also affected cooperation between European and Turkish researchers. 

Turkey  is  still  below  the  EU  average  in  almost  all  indicators  of  the  European  Innovation 
scoreboard. Turkey has been active in some of the mutual learning exercises offered by the 
Horizon  2020  Policy  Support  Facility.  Technology  development  zones  supporting  business-
academia cooperation increased from 64 in 2016 to 69 in 2017. 

5.26.   Chapter 26: Education and culture 

The EU supports cooperation in education and culture through funding programmes and the 
coordination  of  Member  State  policy  through  the  open  method  of  coordination.  Member 
States must also prevent discrimination and facilitate the education of children of EU migrant 
workers. 

Turkey is moderately prepared on education and culture. There was some progress on this 
chapter,  notably  regarding  the  national  qualifications  system  and  the  ratification  of  the 
UNESCO Convention.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→  further  improve  inclusive  education,  with  a  particular  focus  on  girls  and  children  from 
disadvantaged  groups  and  closely  monitor  and  continue  work  to  reduce  the  proportion  of 
school drop-outs; 

→ ensure the good functioning of the Turkish Qualifications Framework. 

In the area of education, training and youth, Turkey continues to successfully participate in 
the  Erasmus+  programme.  However,  Turkey’s  commitment  to  implement  the  Bologna 
process  has  not  been  sustained  in  practice.  Although  the  Turkish  qualifications  framework 
(TQF)  is  now  referenced  to  the  European  qualifications  framework,  Turkey  will  have  to 
ensure that principles and procedures relating to quality assurance, credit systems, inclusion 
of qualifications, and validation of non-formal and informal learning are fully in place. In the 

89 

 
 
 
formal vocational education and training sector, the implementation of modular curricula and 
a credited module system, instead of the current class passing system, remains an important 
issue for the effective implementation of the TQF. Significant quality differences also persist 
among  Turkey’s  higher  education  institutions.  Turkey  set  up  a  Higher  Education  Quality 
Board in charge of quality assessment and assurance. Turkey is however not yet a member of 
the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education. Following the measures 
taken under the state of emergency, over 33 600 public and 22 400 private school teachers and 
managers  have  been  dismissed,  as  well  as  8  800  higher  education  staff.  Thousands  of 
institutions  (private  schools,  universities,  associations,  student  dormitories,  etc.)  have  been 
closed.  Education  remains  at  high  risk  for  inappropriate  political  influence,  especially  in 
higher education. 

There  has  been  some  progress  in  the  enrolment  rate  of  children,  particularly  in  pre-school 
education where it stands at 52 %. However, this remains well below the EU target of 95 %. 
Adult participation in lifelong learning, which stands at 6 %, also needs to be increased. In the 
academic  year  2016-2017,  the  schooling  rate  for  children  was  91  %  for  primary,  96  %  for 
lower  secondary,  83 %  for  upper  secondary  education  and  82  %  for  girls.  Turkey  needs  to 
develop  a  system  to  reduce  early  school  leaving,  which  stands  at  34  %.  Progress  is  still 
needed  to  make  education  more  inclusive,  especially  for  Roma  children  and  children  with 
disabilities.  Based  on  the  latest  PISA  results,  Turkey  appears  at  the  bottom  of  the  ranking 
table, suggesting serious issues with the overall quality of education. 

In  the  area  of  culture,  Turkey  ratified,  with  some  reservations,  the  2005  UNESCO 
Convention  on  the  Protection  and  Promotion  of  the  Diversity  of  Cultural  Expressions  in 
March  2017,  thus  delivering  on  the  Commission’s  guidance  from  2016.  In  February  2017, 
Turkey ratified the Enlarged Partial Agreement on Cultural Routes. Turkey withdrew from the 
Creative Europe programme as of January 2017. 

5.27.  Chapter 27: Environment and climate change 

The  EU  promotes  strong  climate  action,  sustainable  development  and  protection  of  the 
environment. EU law contains provisions addressing climate change, water and air quality, 
waste  management,  nature  protection,  industrial  pollution,  chemicals,  noise  and  civil 
protection. 

Turkey has some level of preparation in relation to environment and climate change. Overall 
there  was  almost  no  progress  made  over  the  past  year,  except  in  areas  such  as  chemicals. 
Enforcement  still  remains  weak,  especially  on  waste  management  and  industrial  pollution. 
More  ambitious  and  better  coordinated  environment  and  climate  policies  still  need  to  be 
drawn  up  and  implemented.  Strategic  planning,  substantial  investment  and  increased 
administrative capacity are required as well. The Commission reiterates the recommendations 
in its 2016 report.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→  complete  its  alignment  with  the  directives  on  water,  waste  management  and  industrial 
pollution  and  ensure 
is  correctly 
implemented; 

the  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  Directive 

→  ensure  harmonisation  with  and  the  effective  implementation  of  cross-cutting  legislation, 
including  the  acquis  on  public  participation  and  the  right  to  access  environmental 
information; 

90 

 
 
 
→  complete  its  alignment  with  the  acquis  on  climate  change,  ratify  the  Paris  Climate 
Agreement on climate change, and implement Turkey’s contribution to this. 

Environment 

Turkey has reached some level of preparation in the area of horizontal legislation. Alignment 
with  the  Strategic  Environmental  Assessment  Directive  was  completed  in  2017,  with  a 
transition  period  in  several  sectors  from  2020  to  2023.  Implementation  of  the  Directive  on 
Infrastructure for Spatial Information is still at an early stage. Civil society remains critical of 
the implementation of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive, the application of the 
rule of law in court decisions on environmental issues, the respect for public participation and 
the right to environmental information. Turkey is still not a party to the Aarhus Convention. 
The  2016  law  that  waived  licensing  and  other  restrictions  for  strategically  important 
investment projects remains a concern in terms of complying with the acquis. Procedures for 
transboundary consultations have not yet been aligned with the acquis. 

On  air  quality,  there  has  been  no  progress  on  alignment  with  the  acquis  on  ambient  air 
quality,  national  emissions  ceilings  and  volatile  organic  compounds.  Severe  air  pollution  is 
reported  in  some  cities  each  year  which  requires  the  preparation  of  local  clean  air  action 
plans. A national strategy for air quality monitoring is in place and five out of eight planned 
regional networks have been set up and are operational. Air quality monitoring data is shared 
online. 

Regarding waste management, the legal framework is mostly aligned. Turkey’s capacity for 
sorting and recycling waste and for medical waste treatment has slightly improved, but there 
was  no  further  progress  on  alignment.  Further  work  is  needed  on  the  separate  collection  of 
different  types  of  waste,  reducing  biodegradables  going  into  landfills  and  incineration  of 
hazardous  waste.  Incentives  to  promote  these  activities  remain  limited.  The  preparation  of 
waste  management  plans  at  local  level,  in  line  with  the  Waste  Framework  Directive,  is 
ongoing. Turkey ratified the Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling 
of Ships in 2017 but alignment with the EU Ship Recycling Regulation is still not completed. 

In  the area of  water quality, there is moderate alignment and there has been  no substantial 
progress  in  the  reporting  period.  Over  780  bodies  of  water  out  of  2 500  were  identified  as 
sensitive areas for urban wastewater discharges and nitrates. Management plans for 11 out of 
25 river basins are being prepared in line with EU directives. Turkey has begun transboundary 
consultations  on  water  issues  with  neighbouring  countries  on  the  Maritsa  (Meriç)  river  but 
these  are  generally  still  at  an  early  stage.  Wastewater  treatment  capacity  has  slightly 
increased.  Alignment  has  not  yet  begun  with  regard  to  directives  on  marine  strategy  and 
bathing water. Alignment with the Water Framework Directive is not yet completed. 

The  framework  legislation  on  nature  protection  and  the  national  biodiversity  strategy  and 
action plan are yet to be adopted. The institutional framework for designating and managing 
future Natura 2000 sites has not yet been drawn up. Investments, particularly in hydropower 
and mining, need to be made in compliance with the relevant obligations to protect nature. 

In  the  area  of  industrial  pollution  and  risk  management,  alignment  with  most  of  the  EU 
directives  and  regulations  is  at  an  early  stage.  Compliance  with  the  Seveso  II  Directive  is 
high, but alignment is still pending for the Industrial Emissions and Seveso III Directives, the 
eco-management  and  audit  scheme,  the  Ecolabel  Regulations  and  the  volatile  organic 
compounds, including in paints, directives. 

91 

 
 
 
On chemicals, the implementing legislation on the registration, evaluation, authorisation and 
restriction of chemicals (REACH) was adopted in 2017. The Rotterdam Convention on import 
and  export  of  dangerous  chemicals  was  ratified  in  2017,  but  the  relevant  implementing 
regulation  is  pending.  Alignment  is  also  pending  on  persistent  organic  pollutants. 
Implementation of the regulation on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and 
mixtures  is  not  complete.  Implementation  of  the  biocides  legislation  has  been  postponed  to 
2020. 

Legislative alignment in the field of noise is well advanced. The preparation of noise mapping 
and local noise action plans is still underway. 

Turkey has been a member of the European Union Civil Protection Mechanism since 2016. It 
still needs to connect to the common emergency communication and information system. 

Climate change 

There  was  no  progress  in  this  area.  A  national  strategy  consistent  with  the  EU  2030 
framework  on  climate  and  energy  policies  has  not  yet  been  adopted.  The  national  climate 
change  strategy  and  action  plan  are  inconsistent  with  other  strategies,  such  as  those  for 
energy. A climate change adaptation strategy is yet to be adopted and enforced. Work to build 
climate  action  know-how  in  different  government  agencies  and  mainstreaming  of  climate 
change into different sector policies is still weak. 

Turkey  needs  to  ratify  the  Paris  Agreement  on  climate  change  and  start  implementing  its 
contributions  to  this.  Turkey  has  submitted  its  2017  annual  greenhouse  gas  inventory  under 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. 

Full  alignment  with  the  EU’s  economy-wide  greenhouse  gas  monitoring  mechanism  is  still 
pending.  Turkey  needs  to  comply  with  the  decision  on  accounting  rules  on  greenhouse  gas 
emissions and removals resulting from activities relating to land use, changes in land use, and 
forestry.  A  regulatory  framework  for  the  monitoring  and  reporting  of  emissions  from 
industrial installations  specifically is in  place,  but  full alignment  with  the Emission  Trading 
Directive  is  needed.  Further  efforts  should  be  made  to  fully  implement  national  legislation 
aligned  with  the  Fuel  Quality  Directive,  and  align  with  the  EU  Regulation  on  Emissions 
Standards for New Cars. Full alignment regarding ozone depleting substances and fluorinated 
greenhouse gases is still pending. 

5.28.  Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection   

EU rules protect consumers in relation to product safety, dangerous imitations and liability 
for  defective  products.  The  EU  ensures  high  common  standards  for  tobacco  control,  blood, 
tissues, cells and organs and medicines for human and veterinary use. The EU also ensures 
high  common  standards  for  upholding  patients’  rights  in  cross-border  healthcare  and 
tackling serious cross-border health threats including communicable diseases. 

Turkey has a good level of preparation in the areas of consumer protection and public health. 
Some progress was made on administrative and enforcement capacity in both areas.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→  improve  coordination  and  cooperation  among  all  stakeholders  including  enforcement 
actors and consumer organisations; 

→ ensure the confidentiality and security of health data in the national information system; 

92 

 
 
 
increase 

institutional/administrative  capacity, 

inter-sectoral  cooperation,  financial 
→ 
resources  and  appropriate  diagnostic  facilities  to  address  public  health  issues  at  central  and 
provincial level. 

National  legislation  is  partly  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis  on  consumer  protection.  A 
consumer  protection  programme  and  action  plan  for  2016-2020  is  in  place.  The  number  of 
safety  and  non-safety  related  inspections  performed  by  the  Ministry  of  Customs  and  Trade 
increased  slightly  over  the  reporting  period.  However,  the  capacity  to  carry  out  such 
inspections remains insufficient. On product safety related issues, national legislation is not 
fully  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  Regarding  non-safety  related  issues,  consumer  rights 
enforcement remains weak and consumer information about their rights is very low. 

With regard to public health, national legislation on healthcare is partly aligned with the EU 
acquis.  The  organisational  structure  of  the  Ministry  of  Health  was  changed  through  an 
emergency decree in August 2017, placing public health institutions and public hospitals back 
under the Ministry of Health, only a few years after the last reorganisation. 

Turkey’s tobacco control legislation is fully aligned with the EU acquis, but ratification of the 
Framework  Convention  on  Tobacco  Control  Protocol  on  Illicit  Trade  is  pending.  The  most 
recent data on smoking prevalence shows that 26.5 % of the population smoke. 

Turkey’s blood, tissues, cells and organs legislation still needs to be fully aligned with the EU 
acquis.  The  country  has  43  blood  establishments,  each  one  inspected  twice  a  year.  The 
hemovigilance  system has  to  become fully operational. As a result of capacity-building  and 
awareness-raising work, organ donation rates reached 7.1 per million of the population at the 
end of 2016. 

No legislative progress was made on patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare. The Ministry 
of Health is  responsible for e-health issues.  The Data  Protection  Board has  been  set up and 
aims to ensure confidentiality and security of health data in the national information system. 
National registries for rare diseases do not exist yet, but Turkey is a member of the Orphanet.  

No  legislative  progress  was  made  on  serious  cross-border  health  threats.  Regarding 
communicable  diseases,  in  2017,  Turkey  published  its  national  epidemic  preparedness  plan 
and  its  national  antimicrobial  resistance  strategic  action  plan  (2017-2022).  Prescription  of 
antibiotics needs to be strictly controlled to support the fight against antimicrobial resistance 

A national cancer control plan has been in place since 2007. There are cancer registry centres 
in  every  province  (81  in  total),  of  which  13  are  accredited  nationally  and  8  by  the 
International Agency for Research on Cancer. Cancer screening coverage reached 35.6 % for 
breast  cancer  and  81.3  %  for  cervical  cancer.  With  the  integration  of  the  cancer  control 
programme into primary healthcare, active surveillance and monitoring have been expanded 
to  cover  every  province.  The  National  Cancer  Institute  has  become  operational  after  the 
regulation to implement this was adopted in December 2017. 

Slow  progress  was  made  on  community-based  mental  health  centres.  In  2017,  14  new 
community-based  mental  health  centres  were  set  up,  making  a  total  of  163,  and  350  family 
physicians were given mental health gap training. 

National  action  plans  on  nutrition  and  physical  activity  and  alcohol-related  harm  reduction 
and prevention are in place, focusing on awareness-raising. 

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An updated action plan on preventing drug abuse (2016-2018), built around the pillars of drug 
demand and drug supply reduction, is in place. National coordination mechanisms have been 
set up on drug policy issues. According to the Ministry of Interior, there was an increase in 
the number of drug-induced deaths in Turkey from 520 in 2016 to 1 020 in 2017. Significant 
work is necessary both on supply and demand control. 

On  health  inequalities,  access  to  healthcare  services  needs  to  be  improved  for  people  with 
disabilities,  people  living  with  HIV,  and  children  and  adults  who  use  drugs.  The  hosting  of 
a large  Syrian  refugee  population  continues  to  put  an  additional  strain  on  the  national 
healthcare system and financing. 

5.29.   Chapter 29: Customs union 

All Member States are part of the EU customs union and follow the same customs rules and 
procedures.  This  requires  legislative  alignment,  adequate  implementing  and  enforcement 
capacity, and access to the common computerised customs systems. 

Turkey  maintains  a  good  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  the  customs  union.  There  has 
been no progress during the reporting period. Duty relief, free zones, surveillance measures 
and  management  of  tariff  quotas  are  not  fully  in  line  with  the  acquis  or  with  Turkey’s 
obligations under the Customs Union.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→  further  improve  risk-based  controls  and  simplified  procedures  in  line  with  the  acquis  to 
facilitate legitimate trade, while ensuring security and safety; 

→ remove import and export restrictions preventing the effective free movement of goods. 

No progress was made in the area of customs legislation. The level of alignment is generally 
high.  However,  harmonisation  with  the  EU  Customs  Code  remains  an  outstanding  issue. 
Some  work  was  done  on  improving  risk-based  controls  and  simplified  procedures,  in 
particular  through  increasing  the  capacity  of  the  local  risk  management  and  feedback 
mechanism between the central and local offices. 

Rules on surveillance and management of tariff quotas, free zones and duty relief are yet to be 
aligned with the acquis, but a small number of restrictions on the management of tariff quotas 
were  removed.  Turkey  has  continued  to  deviate  from  the  Customs  Union  by  imposing  new 
sets  of  additional  customs  duties  on  imports  of  goods  originating  in  third  countries,  namely 
stationery  products,  textile  and  leather  items,  cosmetics  and  personal  hygiene  products, 
certain  steel  pipes,  engines,  pumps,  electric  motors  and  tractors,  frames  and  mountings  for 
glasses and motorcycles. Additional duties also apply to such goods even if they are in free 
circulation  in  the  EU,  thus  eroding  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  Customs  Union.  The 
export  restrictions  on  certain  leather  products  are  in  breach  of  Customs  Union  rules. 
Designation of specialised customs offices and proof of origin requirements for goods in free 
circulation  in  the  EU  are  not  in  line  with  Customs  Union  rules.  Turkey  maintained  its 
disproportionally  high  agricultural  component  for  sweet  corn,  contrary  to  Customs  Union 
rules. 

With regard to administrative and operational capacity, the customs’ enforcement capacity 
in relation to intellectual property rights has increased (See Chapter 7 — Intellectual Property 
Law).  Further work is required to strengthen risk-based controls relating to enforcing safety 
and security measures. Turkey has implemented a computerised transit system as  part of its 

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membership of the Convention on a Common Transit Procedure. However, tariff IT systems 
(TARIC,  Quota  and  Surveillance)  are  not  yet  in  place.  A  strategy  to  bring  IT  activities 
together with business initiatives remains to be adopted. 

5.30.  Chapter 30: External relations 

The  EU  has  a  common  trade  and  commercial  policy  towards  third  countries,  based  on 
multilateral and bilateral agreements and autonomous measures. There are also EU rules in 
the field of humanitarian aid and development policy. 

Turkey is  moderately prepared in the area of external relations. There was  backsliding in 
the reporting period as Turkey extended the scope of additional customs duties, thus further 
deviating  from  the  Common  Customs  Tariff  (CCT),  infringing  the  EU-Turkey  Customs 
Union.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ urgently re-align its customs tariff with the CCT; 

→  complete  its  alignment  with  the  EU’s  Generalised  System  of  Preferences  and  dual-use 
export control regime. 

No  progress  was  made  in  the  area  of  the  common  commercial  policy.  Thanks  to  its 
adherence to the EU-Turkey Customs Union, Turkey has to date generally maintained a good 
level  of  alignment  with  the  EU  common  commercial  policy.  However,  Turkey  has  further 
substantially  deviated  from  the  CCT,  as  it  applies  additional  duties  to  a  large  and  growing 
number  of  imported  products  (See  Chapter  29  –  Customs  Union).  As  part  of  this  tariff 
deviation,  there  was  backsliding  in  the  level  of  Turkey's  alignment  with  EU  Generalised 
Scheme  of  Preferences  rules.  The  intensive  use  of  safeguard  measures  remains  a  cause  of 
concern.  Turkey  continues  to  open  new  investigations  based  on  weak  evidence  and  use 
safeguards where more targeted trade defence measures, such as the anti-dumping instrument, 
could be more appropriately used. Within the World Trade Organisation, in particular on the 
Doha  Development  Agenda,  in  the  OECD  and  the  G-20,  coordination  between  the  EU  and 
Turkey should be improved. With regard to export controls on dual-use goods, Turkey has not 
aligned  with  the  EU  position  on  membership  of  certain  multilateral  export  control 
arrangements,  such  as  the  Wassenaar  Arrangement  on  Export  Controls  for  Conventional 
Arms  and  Dual-Use  Goods  and  Technologies  and  the  Missile  Technology  Control  Regime. 
Alignment with the EU position on medium and long-term export credits is also needed. 

Regarding  bilateral  agreements  with  third  countries,  the  free  trade  agreements  Turkey 
signed with Moldova and the Faroe Islands entered into force. Although Turkey is generally 
aligned with the EU as regards the terms of the free trade agreements it has entered with third 
countries, it continued to implement its free trade agreement with Malaysia and its free trade 
agreement  with  Singapore  also  entered  into  force,  despite  the  EU  not  yet  having  concluded 
similar agreements with these two countries. 

As  for  development  policy  and  humanitarian  aid,  official  development  aid  granted  by 
Turkey  increased  to  EUR  5.3  billion  or  0.8  %  of  ODA/GNI  in  2016.  The  assistance  was 
largely  directed  towards  humanitarian  support  for  Syria-related  activities  on  Turkey’s  own 
territory. 

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5.31.   Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy 

Member  States  must  be  able  to  conduct  political  dialogue  under  EU  foreign,  security  and 
defence policy, to align with EU statements, to take part in EU actions and to apply agreed 
sanctions and restrictive measures. 

Turkey  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  foreign,  security  and  defence  policy.  Some 
progress  was  made  through  regular  political  dialogue  on  foreign  and  security  policy, 
including  at  ministerial  level.  The  EU  and  Turkey  continued  their  dialogue  on  counter-
terrorism.  Turkey  joined  Russia  and  Iran  in  the  Astana  process  with  Syria.  It  continued  to 
provide  substantial  humanitarian  assistance  to  Syrian  refugees.  In  January  2018,  Turkey 
launched a new military operation in Syria, in the Afrin area, against the PYD/YPG. Turkey 
continued to provide humanitarian and development aid in other regions, in Afghanistan and 
to Rohingya refugees.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→ take urgent steps to significantly improve its alignment with EU declarations and Council 
decisions on common foreign and security policy. 

The  political  dialogue  between  the  EU  and  Turkey  on  foreign  and  security  policy  issues 
continued  at  all  levels,  and  benefited  from  the  results  achieved  through  the  joint 
implementation  of  the  EU-Turkey  Statement  of  18  March  2016.  A  high-level  political 
dialogue  took  place  on  25  July  2017,  where  foreign  policy  issues  were  discussed  at  length. 
Ministerial  level  contacts  have  been  constant,  especially  on  Syria.  Political  Directors’ 
meetings took place in January and June 2017. Discussions focussed mainly on developments 
in  the  MENA  region  (Syria,  Iraq,  Libya,  Qatar,  Middle-East  Peace  Process)  and  on  key 
international  developments.  An  EU-Turkey  dialogue  on  counter-terrorism  took  place  in 
Ankara  in  November  2017  and  agreed  concrete  actions  to  increase  operational  cooperation. 
Turkey  attended  a  number  of  conferences  organised  by  the  EU  on  Afghanistan,  the  Central 
African Republic, Mali/the Sahel and Syria. 

(For  information  on  bilateral  relations  with  other  enlargement  countries  and  neighbouring 
Member States, see Regional issues and international obligations). 

The  institutional  framework  enabling  Turkey’s  participation  in  the  common  foreign  and 
security policy (CFSP) and security and defence policy (CSDP) is in place. 

On  common  foreign  and  security  policy  (CFSP),  Turkey  voiced  support  for  the  overall 
objectives  in  the  Global  strategy  for  the  European  Union’s  Foreign  and  Security  Policy. 
Turkey aligned itself, when invited, with 10 out of 64 EU declarations and Council decisions 
representing an alignment rate of around 16 % during the reporting period. Turkey has not yet 
signed the statute of the International Criminal Court. Turkey has held the Chairmanship of 
the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Summit since April 2016. 

In  March  2017,  Turkey  announced  the  completion  of  the  Euphrates  Shield  cross-border 
military ground operation in northern Syria capturing approximately 2 000 km² from Da’esh. 
In  January  2018,  Turkey  launched  ‘Operation  Olive  Branch’  in  cooperation  with  the  Free 
Syrian  Army  in  the  northern  Syrian  enclave  of  Afrin,  aiming  to  root  out  the  Democratic 
Union Party/People's Protection Units (PYD/YPG) which it regards as a terrorist organisation 
linked to the PKK. Since December 2016, Turkey has participated in the Astana talks together 
with  Russia  and  Iran  and  became  a  co-guarantor  of  the  ceasefire  and  contributed  to  the 

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creation of de-escalation zones which however did not translate into increased humanitarian 
access  and  sufficient  protection  of  civilians  and  civilian  infrastructure.  Turkey  continues  to 
support  the  National  Coalition  for  Syrian  Revolutionary  and  Opposition  Forces,  based  in 
Istanbul,  and  strives  to  prevent  the  weakening  of  the  Syrian  opposition  delegation  to  the 
Geneva talks. Turkey continued to provide extensive humanitarian assistance to more than 3.5 
million  Syrian  refugees.  Over  30  000  Syrian  refugees  have  reportedly  returned  to  the  de-
escalation zones. 

Turkey’s  relations  with  Iraq's  government  improved  following  the  referendum  on 
independence called by the Kurdistan Regional Government's President Barzani in September 
2017 to which Turkey strongly objected. Prime Minister Abadi’s visit to Ankara  in October 
2017  contributed  to  fixing  an  agenda  for  cooperation  on  the  basis  of  renewed  mutual  trust 
materialised through a number of common initiatives. Turkey continued to conduct air strikes 
against camps run by the PKK and its affiliates. 

US support for the PYD/YPG in the fight against Da’esh and the issue of the extradition of 
Fetullah Gülen remained major irritants in Turkey's relations with the US. The US recognition 
of Jerusalem as  the capital of Israel and the prosecution of a group  of Turkish officials  and 
businessmen  for  alleged  breach  of  sanctions  on  Iran  further  complicated  bilateral  relations. 
However,  following  a  series  of  high-level  contacts,  Turkey  and  the  US  reaffirmed  their 
commitment to resolve outstanding issues and agreed to establish a result-oriented mechanism 
for this purpose. 

Turkey  and  Russia  intensified  dialogue  and  cooperation,  in  particular  on  Syria.  Bilateral 
cooperation  developed  in  a  large  number  of  fields  such  as  energy  and  defence.  Russian 
sanctions were progressively lifted, while restrictions on the import of Turkish tomatoes and 
visa restrictions have not yet been resolved. 

Relations with Ukraine developed. While reiterating its condemnation of Russia’s annexation 
of  Crimea  and  concerns  over  the  Tatar  community,  Turkey  did  not  align  with  Council 
decisions, including EU restrictive measures relating to Russia and Ukraine. 

Turkey’s stance vis-a-vis the Qatar crisis impacted on its relations with Saudi Arabia, UAE, 
and  Bahrain.  Turkey’s  dialogue  with  Iran  intensified  and  resulted  in  some  concrete 
cooperation.  Turkey  continued  to  provide  humanitarian  and  development  assistance  to 
Afghanistan.  Turkey  continued  to  encourage  UN  initiatives  regarding  Yemen.  Turkey 
continued  to  increase  its  engagement  in  Libya.  Relations  with  Egypt  did  not  improve.  The 
US administration’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the extraordinary Summit 
of the OIC recognising Jerusalem East as capital of Palestine affected efforts to mend bilateral 
ties with Israel. Regarding South Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkey continued to engage 
closely  with  Azerbaijan,  Georgia,  and  Turkmenistan,  through  its  trilateral  dialogue 
mechanisms on foreign policy, transport and energy. Bilateral contacts developed at a steady 
pace.  The  2009  protocols  on  normalisation  of  relations  with  Armenia  were  not  ratified  and 
were renounced by Armenia in February 2018. Turkey continued to maintain close relations 
with the countries of the Western Balkans. 

Turkey  has  further  strengthened  its  relations  with  partners  in  Africa,  Asia  and,  to  a  lesser 
extent,  Latin  America.  Turkey  became  an  ASEAN  Sectoral  Dialogue  Partner  on  5  August 
2017. Turkey took a strong stance on issues in Myanmar concerning Rohingya refugees. 

Turkey  continued  to  participate  in  all  international  export  controls  arrangements  and 
instruments  on  non-proliferation.  It  has  not  yet  aligned  itself  with  the  EU  position  on 

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membership of the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Missile Technology Control Regime (see 
Chapter 30 — External relations). 

Turkey  continued  to  actively  participate  in  military  crisis  management  operations  under  the 
common  security  and  defence  policy  (CSDP)  notably  EUFOR  ALTHEA  in  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina. Turkish participation in EM Ukraine and EULEX Kosovo was suspended after 
Turkish seconded staff was withdrawn following the attempted coup of 2016, but Turkey later 
expressed its interest in continuing to contribute to these missions and submitted applications. 
The issue of EU-NATO cooperation, going beyond the ‘Berlin plus’ arrangements, involving 
all EU Member States, continues to be unresolved. 

5.32.   Chapter 32: Financial control 

The  EU  promotes  the  reform  of  national  governance  systems  to  enhance  managerial 
accountability, sound financial management of income and expenditure, and external audit of 
public funds. The financial control rules further protect the EU’s financial interests against 
fraud in the management of EU funds and the euro against counterfeiting. 

Turkey has a good level of preparation in the area of financial control. Some progress was 
made  in  the  reporting  period,  mainly  on  improved  methodological  guidance  by  the  central 
harmonisation units. However, most of the Commission’s recommendations on public internal 
financial  control  (PIFC)  from  2016  have  not  been  implemented.  Further  significant  work  is 
needed at all levels of the administration and in state-owned companies.  

In the coming year, Turkey should in particular: 

→  update  the  PIFC  policy  paper  and  its  action  plan  and  ensure  a  formal  monitoring  and 
reporting framework is put in place for the updated action plan; 

→  amend  the  Law  on  Public  Financial  Management  and  Control  in  line  with  the  national 
action plan for EU accession; 

→  develop  an  effective  monitoring  system  in  the  Turkish  Court  of  Accounts  to  follow  up 
implementation of the accepted audit recommendations by auditees. 

Public internal financial control 

The strategic framework in this area needs updating, as the PIFC policy paper dates back to 
2012.  There  is  no  mechanism  in  place  to  coordinate  implementation  and  ensure  regular 
monitoring and reporting on implementation. 

The  Turkish  administration  has  a  uniform  management  structure  that  combines  elements  of 
managerial  accountability  and  delegation  with  results-oriented  performance  management 
system.  The  Public  Financial  Management  and  Control  (PFMC)  Law  applies  to  all  public 
institutions  and  sets  out  the  relevant  responsibilities  of  the  heads  of  public  institutions, 
including managerial duties and the delegation of authority to authorising officers. However, 
there  are  weaknesses  in  accountability  arrangements  with  agencies  and  gaps  in  the 
functioning of audit systems, in relation to risk management and reporting and monitoring of 
irregularities (see Public Administration Reform). 

The  PFMC  Law  regulates  internal  control  implementation,  mostly  in  line  with  the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organisations model and the guidelines issued by the International 
Organisation  of  Supreme  Audit  Institutions  (INTOSAI).  Ensuring  a  systematic  approach  to 

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risk  management  in  Turkey  is  a  key  challenge. Also,  reporting  on  irregularities  needs  to  be 
further improved. 

Internal audit practice is also regulated in the PFMC Law. An internal audit manual and a 
code of ethics are in place, as are manuals prepared by the central harmonisation unit (CHU). 
More than half of internal audit posts in government are still vacant. Quality assurance needs 
to be systematically implemented. There is generally a lack of data on internal audit planning 
and implementation of recommendations. 

Two central harmonisation units in the Ministry of Finance supervise the implementation of 
public  financial  management  and  control.  The  central  harmonisation  unit  for  financial 
management  and  control  provides  methodological  guidance and  coordinates  internal  control 
implementation  in  line  ministries.  However,  it  does  not  systematically  follow  up  on  how 
internal  control  is  implemented  in  first-level  budget  organisations.  During  the  reporting 
period,  the  central  harmonisation  unit  for  internal  audit  published  handbooks  on  quality 
assurance  and  development  and  on  performance  audit  for  internal  auditors  in  public 
administrations.  

External audit 

The independence of the Turkish Court of Accounts (TCA) is enshrined in the Constitution. 
The TCA law is in line with INTOSAI standards. It provides for an exhaustive audit mandate 
and gives the TCA full discretion in discharging its responsibilities. 

The TCA board members are elected by Parliament. Concerning institutional capacity, 10 % 
of TCA staff has been dismissed under emergency decrees, leaving the TCA with 1 414 staff, 
759  of  whom  are  auditors.  The  TCA  has  a  strategic  development  plan  for  2014-2018, 
including  a training strategy. Given the high  number of potential auditees  at  local level, the 
capacity  of  the  TCA  to  audit  local  administrations,  municipal  companies  and  associations 
needs to be increased. 

The  TCA  seeks  to  improve  the  quality  of  audit  work  by  adopting  assessment  manuals  for 
performance audit and activity reports and by strengthening the external audit training centre. 
Audit  reports  comply  with  international  standards,  except  for  performance  audit  reports, 
which  continue  to  focus  on  performance  indicators.  Planning  for  audit  work  is  mostly  risk-
based.  The  TCA  submits  four  audit  reports  (on  general  evaluation,  accountability,  financial 
statistics  and  state  enterprises)  to  Parliament  annually,  in  addition  to  a  statement  of  general 
conformity. 

Regarding the impact of audit work, the TCA assesses the internal control environment of 
audited  entities  as  part  of  its  audit  work.  The  TCA  publishes  its  reports  on  its  website.  Its 
annual  audit  report  to  Parliament  is  analysed  by  the  Plan  and  Budget  Committee  and 
discussed in a plenary session. Despite the existence of a parliamentary follow-up mechanism, 
this follow-up process is neither systematic nor effective. A working group between the TCA 
and  the  Ministry  of  Finance  is  operational.  A  similar  working  group  is  needed  with 
Parliament. 

Protection of the EU’s financial interests 

As  regards  acquis  alignment,  Turkey  will  need  to  align  its  legislation  with  the  new  EU 
Directive  on  the  fight  against  fraud  to  the  Union’s  financial  interests  by  means  of  criminal 
law.  The  national  anti-fraud  coordination  service  continues  to  work  with  the  European 
Commission.  An  anti-fraud  network,  involving  other  relevant  authorities,  is  in  place. 

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However,  this  network  has  been  affected  by  staff  dismissals  under  emergency  decrees.  The 
anti-corruption  strategy  and  the  action  plan  for  2016-2019  need  to  be  implemented  in  an 
inclusive and participatory fashion and set a track record. A national anti-fraud strategy on the 
protection of the EU's financial interests is not in place yet. 

Turkey  cooperated  with  European  Commission  investigators  in  various  cases  in  2017.  It 
has  created  the  main  procedures  for  reporting  irregularities  and  suspected  fraud  cases, 
including  online  reporting  to  the  Commission  through  the  irregularity  management  system. 
371 cases have been reported through the system since 2006, including 57 cases in 2016 and 
83  cases  in  2017.  A  solid  track  record  on  investigation  activities  and  reporting  on 
irregularities still needs to be established. 

Protection of the euro against counterfeiting 

Turkey  has  reached  a  high  level  of  acquis  alignment  in  this  area.  Turkey  is  a  party  to  the 
1929  International  Convention  for  the  Suppression  of  Counterfeiting  Currency.  Technical 
analysis  of  counterfeit  money,  including  euro  banknotes  and  coins,  is  carried  out  by  the 
central bank. Credit institutions that do not withdraw counterfeits from circulation are subject 
to  financial  penalties.  Turkey  cooperates  closely  with  the  Commission  and  the  European 
Central Bank and takes part in the actions of the Pericles 2020 programme. 

5.33.   Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions 

This  chapter  covers  the  rules  governing  the  funding  of  the  EU  budget  ("own  resources"). 
These resources mainly consist of i) contributions based on the gross national income of each 
Member  State;  ii)  customs  duties;   and  iii)  a  resource  based  on  value-added  tax.  Member 
States  must  have  the  appropriate  administrative  capacity  to  adequately  co-ordinate  and 
ensure the correct calculation, collection, payment and control of own resources.  

Turkey  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  financial  and  budgetary  provisions. 
Some  progress  was  made  on  aligning  statistics  with  EU  standards,  required  for  the  gross 
national  income-based  resource.  Solid  coordination  structures,  administrative  capacity  and 
implementing rules will need to be set up in due course. 

Basic principles and institutions in the underlying policy areas linked to the application of the 
own  resources  system  are  already  in  place  (see  chapters  16–Taxation,  18–Statistics,  29–
Customs  union  and  32–Financial  control).  The  Customs  Union  with  the  EU  on  processed 
agricultural goods and industrial goods (with the exception of coal and steel products) ensures 
considerable  alignment  of  Turkey’s  customs  legislation  with  the  customs  acquis.  This  will 
facilitate  the  creation  of  Turkey’s  traditional  own  resources  system,  for  which  procedures 
still need to be set up. 

In  the  area  of  the  value  added  tax-based  resource,  preparation  is  needed  to  correctly 
calculate  the  statistical  VAT  base,  the  weighted  average  rate  and  the  positive  and  negative 
corrections to offset the impact of derogations from the  acquis. To ensure Turkey can make 
the appropriate contribution to the EU own resources system upon EU membership, measures 
are needed to combat fraud in VAT and customs duties and to tackle the informal economy. 

Concerning the gross national income-based resource, GDP data was revised in December 
2016 to achieve greater compliance with the system of national accounts (SNA 2008) and the 
European system of accounts (ESA 2010). Turkey will need to make considerable efforts to 

100 

 
 
 
ensure  its  national  accounts  and  GNI  calculations  are  exhaustive,  and  take  into  account  the 
informal economy. 

Regarding the administrative infrastructure, Turkey will need to set up a fully operational 
coordination  structure,  with  appropriate  administrative  capacity  and  implementing  rules,  to 
ensure that it will be able, from accession, to correctly calculate, forecast, account for, collect, 
pay, control and report to the EU on own resources in line with the acquis. 

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ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND TURKEY 

Within  the  framework  of  accession  negotiations,  16  chapters  have  been  opened  so  far  and 
one of these was provisionally closed. Under the currently prevailing circumstances, no new 
chapters  are  considered  for  opening.  Reforms  and  developments  in  Turkey  continue  to  be 
monitored  by  the  bodies  set  up  under  the  Association  Agreement.  The  Association 
Committee  met  in  November  2017,  while  subcommittees  kept  being  held  throughout  the 
reporting period.  

The  Commission,  jointly  with  the  European  External  Action  Service,  has  maintained  EU-
Turkey  relations  in  all  key  areas  of  joint  interest  based  on  a  broad  strategic  engagement. 
Several visits by Commissioners to Turkey took place during the reporting period. President 
Erdoğan visited Brussels on 25 May 2017 on the occasion of the meeting of NATO Heads of 
State and Government and met with the Presidents of the European Council, of the European 
Parliament  and  of  the  European  Commission.  A  follow-up  Leaders  meeting  between 
Presidents Tusk, Juncker and Erdogan was hosted on 26 March 2018 in Varna, Bulgaria, by 
Prime  Minister  Borissov.  Furthermore,  the  enhanced  political  dialogue  between  the  EU  and 
Turkey  was  maintained.  High  Representative/Vice  President  Mogherini  and  Commissioner 
Hahn took part in a High Level Political Dialogue with Ministers Çavuşoğlu and Çelik on 25 
July  2017  in  Brussels,  prepared  by  a  political  dialogue  at  directors'  level  in  June  2017. 
Regular discussions on foreign and security policy were held on a wide range of topics and 
regions including Syria, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Middle East and the Gulf, Afghanistan, 
Libya,  Russia,  Ukraine,  the  Western  Balkans,  the  South  Caucasus  and  Central  Asia.  A 
dialogue on counter-terrorism was held in November 2017 in Ankara. 

Developing further close economic ties was another shared priority. Turkey is the EU’s fifth 
largest  trading  partner,  while  the  EU  is  Turkey’s  largest.  Two  out  of  five  goods  traded  by 
Turkey  come  from  or  go  to  the  EU  and  over  70  %  of  foreign  direct  investment  in  Turkey 
originates  in  the  EU.  A  High  Level  Economic  Dialogue  was  held  in  December  2017  in 
Brussels,  where  both  parties  discussed  macroeconomic  and  investment  developments  and 
engaged  with  the  business  community.  Turkey  continues  to  participate  in  the  multilateral 
economic  dialogue  with  the  Commission  and  Member  States  to  prepare  the  country  for 
participation in multilateral surveillance and economic policy coordination as part of the EU’s 
Economic  and  Monetary  Union.  The  EU  and  Turkey  also  continue  to  coordinate  in  the 
framework of the G-20. Turkey and the EU continued to improve their sectorial cooperation; 
a High Level Dialogue took place on transport in November 2017 and a technical dialogue 
on  energy  in  February  2018.  Regarding  the  Customs  Union,  the  Commission  adopted  a 
recommendation  for  opening  of  negotiations  with  Turkey  on  the  modernisation  of  the 
Customs  Union  on  21  December  2016.  This  recommendation  has  been  forwarded  to  the 
Council where it has been under consideration, without prejudice to Member States' position. 
The  Customs  Union  Joint  Committee  met  in  May  2017  to  discuss  a  significant  number  of 
pending issues.  

In  the  area  of  visa,  migration  and  asylum,  the  implementation  of  the  March  2016  EU-
Turkey  Statement  has  continued  to  deliver  concrete  results  in  reducing  irregular  and 
dangerous crossings and in saving lives in the Aegean Sea. Implementation reports have been 
issued  in  December  2016,  in  March,  June,  September  and  November  2017  and  in  March 
2018.  Turkey  sustained  its  outstanding  efforts  to  provide  massive  and  unprecedented 
humanitarian aid and support to more than 3.5 million refugees from Syria and some 365 000 
refugees from other countries. Regarding the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue, Turkey presented 

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in  February  2018  a  work  plan  outlining  how  Turkey  plans  to  fulfil  the  seven  outstanding 
benchmarks,  out  of  72  listed  in  the  visa  roadmap.  Turkey  and  the  EU  further  built  on  the 
fruitful cooperation under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. By the end of December 2017, 
the whole envelope of EUR 3 billion had been contracted with 72 projects focusing mainly on 
humanitarian  assistance,  education,  migration  management,  health,  municipal  infrastructure, 
and socio-economic support and almost 1.2 million of the most vulnerable refugees received 
with monthly cash transfers under the Emergency Social Safety Net. Disbursements reached 
EUR 1.9 billion to date.  

Regarding financial assistance, in 2017, the Commission further reoriented funding towards 
the  rule  of  law,  fundamental  rights  and  civil  society  and  recentralised  the  management  of 
support  to  civil  society.  The  annual  programme  for  2017  with  EUR  123.1  million  of  EU 
contribution  is  designed  to  support  activities  on  fundamental  rights  and co-finance  Turkey's 
participation  in  Union  programmes  and  agencies  in  order  to  continue  to  enhance  people-to-
people contacts between Turkey and the European Union. Support to civil society, amounting 
to  EUR  18  million  will  be  implemented  as  part  of  the  Civil  Society  Facility  and  Media 
programme  2016-2017.  The  multi-annual  action  programmes  on  Environment  and  climate 
action,  Education,  employment  and  social  policies,  Competitiveness  and  innovation  and 
Transport  have  been  amended  to  provide  for  an  additional  EU  allocation  of  EUR  221.5 
million for 2017. Furthermore, the Commission  has  reviewed the performance of Turkey in 
implementing  effectively  pre-accession  funds  as  part  of  the  IPA  II  mid-term  performance 
review  for  the  years  2018-2020.  In  light  of  the  backsliding  in  the  areas  of  rule  of  law  and 
fundamental rights, as well as on public administration reform, two of the enlargement policy 
fundamentals,  as  well  as  because  of  the  poor  absorption  capacity,  the  Commission  has 
proposed to significantly reduce the 2018-2020 allocations for Turkey and to further reoriente 
funding towards civil society and democracy and the rule of law.  

Turkey  participates  in  the  following  EU  programmes:  Erasmus+,  Horizon  2020,  Customs 
2020, Fiscalis 2020, COSME, (Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises) and EASI (Employment and Social Innovation). As of 1 January 2017, Turkey's 
withdrawal  from  Creative  Europe  programme  became  effective.  Turkey  participates  in  the 
European  Environmental  Agency,  in  the  European  Monitoring  Centre  for  Drugs  and  Drug 
Addiction and since 2015 in the Civil Protection Mechanism. 

103 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex II – Statistical annex 

STATISTICAL DATA (as of 09.03.2018) 

Turkey 

Basic data 

Population (thousand) 

Total area of the country (km²) 

Note 

2005 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

68 010 

74 724 

75 627 

76 668 

77 696 

78 741 

785 34
7 

785 347 

785 347 

785 347 

783 562 

783 562s 

National accounts 

Note 

2005 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

Gross domestic product (GDP) (million 
national currency) 

Gross domestic product (GDP) (million 
euro) 

673 70
3 

401 70
7 

1 569 67
2 

1 809 71
3 

2 044 46
6 

2 338 64
8 

2 608 52
6 

678 484 

714 313 

703 412 

772 979 

780 225 

GDP (euro per capita) 

5 907 

9 080 

9 445 

9 175 

9 949 

9 909 

GDP per capita (in purchasing power 
standards (PPS)) 

GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU 
average (EU-28 = 100) 

Real GDP growth rate: change on previous 
year of GDP volume (%) 

Employment growth (national accounts 
data), relative to the previous year (%) 

Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP 
(in volume) per person employed, relative to 
the previous year (%) 

Unit labour cost growth, relative to the 
previous year (%) 

**3 year change (T/T-3) in the nominal unit 
labour cost growth index (2010 = 100) 

Labour productivity per person employed: 
GDP (in PPS) per person employed relative 
to EU average (EU-28 = 100) 

Gross value added by main sectors 

Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 

Industry (%) 

Construction (%) 

Services (%) 

Final consumption expenditure, as a share of 
GDP (%) 

Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of 
GDP (%) 

10 100 

15 600 

16 400 

17 800 

18 900 

18 800 

43 

58 

9.0 

4.8 

61 

8.5 

64 

5.2 

65 

6.1 

64 

3.2 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

10.6 

22.6 

6.4 

60.4 

76.4 

8.8 

21.9 

8.5 

60.8 

76.6 

7.7 

22.4 

9.2 

60.7 

76.0 

7.5 

22.7 

9.2 

60.6 

74.9 

7.8 

22.4 

9.3 

60.5 

74.3 

7.0 

22.3 

9.7 

61.0 

74.6 

26.7 

27.3 

28.5 

28.9 

29.7 

29.3 

104 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Changes in inventories, as a share of GDP 
(%) 

Exports of goods and services, relative to 
GDP (%) 

Imports of goods and services, relative to 
GDP (%) 

Gross fixed capital formation by the general 
government sector, as a percentage of GDP 
(%) 

Business 

Industrial production volume index (2010 = 
100) 

Number of active enterprises (number) 

Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the 
reference period (t) divided by the number of 
enterprises active in t (%) 

Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in 
the reference period (t) divided by the 
number of enterprises active in t (%) 

People employed in SMEs as a share of all 
persons employed (within the non-financial 
business economy) (%) 

Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial 
business economy) (EUR million) 

Total value added (in the non-financial 
business economy) (EUR million) 

0.4 

1.0 

1.2 

0.1 

-1.4 

: 

21.0 

23.7 

22.3 

23.8 

23.3 

22.0 

24.4 

28.6 

28.1 

27.6 

26.0 

24.9 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

Note 

2005 

86.4 

2012 

112.5 

2013 

116.5 

2014 

120.5 

2015 

124.1 

2016 

126.3 

: 

: 

2 646 11
7 

2 695 13
1 

2 677 31
6 

2 689 91
0 

12.8 

12.4 

12.2 

12.1 

17.1 

11.9 

12.4 

10.8 

: 

: 

: 

: 

75.8 

74.2 

73.5 

72.7 

91 137 

97 399 

95 399 

104 876 

168 180 

184 511 

178 415 

207 088 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

Inflation rate and house prices 

Note 

2005 

2012 

8.1 

9.0 

2013 

7.5 

2014 

8.9 

2015 

7.7 

2016 

7.7 

Harmonised consumer price index (HICP), 
change relative to the previous year (%) 

**Annual change in the deflated house price 
index (2010 = 100) 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

Balance of payments 

Note 

2005 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

Balance of payments: current account total 
(million euro) 

Balance of payments current account: trade 
balance (million euro) 

Balance of payments current account: net 
services (million euro) 

Balance of payments current account: net 
balance for primary income (million euro) 

1) 

1) 

1) 

-16 864 

-37 330 

-47 894 

-32 783 

-29 059 

-26 474 

-50 877 

-60 174 

-47 871 

-43 404 

12 758 

17 581 

17 830 

20 149 

21 738 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

105 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Balance of payments current account: net 
balance for secondary income (million euro) 

Net balance for primary and secondary 
income: of which government transfers 
(million euro) 

**3 year backward moving average of the 
current account balance relative to GDP (%) 

1) 

**Five year change in share of world exports 
of goods and services (%) 

Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) (million euro) 

Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad 
(million euro) 

of which FDI of the reporting economy in 
the EU-28 countries (million euro) 

Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 
reporting economy (million euro) 

of which FDI of the EU-28 countries in the 
reporting economy (million euro) 

**Net international investment position, 
relative to GDP (%) 

Year on year rate of change in gross inflow 
of remittances (in national currency) from 
migrant workers (%) 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

-6.8 

-7.1 

-5.6 

-5.0 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

-36.3 

-53.9 

-48.1 

-55.1 

-51.1 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

Public finance 

Note 

2005 

***General government deficit / surplus, 
relative to GDP (%) 

***General government gross debt relative 
to GDP (%) 

Total  government revenues, as a percentage 
of GDP (%) 

Total government expenditure, as a 
percentage of GDP (%) 

Financial indicators 

Gross external debt of the whole economy, 
relative to GDP (%) 

Gross external debt of the whole economy, 
relative to total exports (%) 

Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, 
overnight deposits, million euro) 

2012 

-0.2 

2013 

0.2 

2014 

0.2 

2015 

1.3 

32.6 

31.3 

28.6 

27.5 

34.9 

34.7 

33.9 

34.4 

35.1 

34.5 

33.7 

33.1 

2016 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

Note 

2005 

35.9 

2012 

38.0 

2013 

39.7 

2014 

47.0 

2015 

47.1 

2016 

: 

160.6 

165.5 

186.1 

182.1 

199.6 

216.0 

38 978 

76 513 

78 110 

91 571 

97 885 

: 

: 

Money supply: M2 (M1 plus deposits with 
maturity up to two years, million euro) 

150 15
2 

315 960 

309 213 

360 158 

373 608 

106 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Money supply: M3 (M2 plus marketable 
instruments, million euro) 

164 30
2 

333 144 

323 062 

375 844 

387 048 

Total credit by monetary financial 
institutions to residents (consolidated) 
(million euro) 

**Annual change in financial sector 
liabilities (%) 

**Private credit flow, consolidated, relative 
to GDP (%) 

**Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP 
(%) 

Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per 
annum (%) 

Lending interest rate (one year), per annum 
(%) 

Deposit interest rate (one year), per annum 
(%) 

Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 
euro = … national currency) 

Trade-weighted effective exchange rate 
index, 42 countries (2010 = 100) 

**3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-
weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 
countries (2010 = 100) 

Value of reserve assets (including gold) 
(million euro) 

83 772 

318 918 

341 791 

418 789 

443 147 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

2) 

19.67 

11.20 

10.05 

10.94 

11.02 

18.72 

10.87 

7.56 

11.68 

10.79 

3) 

14.72 

5.00 

3.81 

7.75 

7.27 

1.670 

2.314 

2.534 

2.906 

3.026 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

89 

92 

90 

86 

85 

84 

25.8 

1.3 

-9.6 

-2.3 

-7.1 

-7.3 

42 142 

92 748 

98 640 

95 824 

99 620 

: 

External trade in goods 

Note 

2005 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

Value of imports: all goods, all partners 
(million euro) 

Value of exports: all goods, all partners 
(million euro) 

Trade balance: all goods, all partners 
(million euro) 

Terms of trade (export price index / import 
price index * 100) (number) 

Share of exports to EU-28 countries in value 
of total exports (%) 

Share of imports from EU-28 countries in 
value of total imports (%) 

93 362 

184 087 

189 784 

182 338 

186 536 

179 468 

58 778 

118 644 

114 563 

118 654 

129 555 

128 792 

-34 584 

-65 443 

-75 222 

-63 684 

-56 981 

-50 676 

4) 

107 

97 

98 

100 

107 

111 

56.7 

38.9 

41.5 

43.5 

44.5 

47.9 

45.3 

37.0 

36.7 

36.7 

38.0 

39.0 

107 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demography 

Crude rate of natural change of population 
(natural growth rate): number of births minus 
deaths (per thousand inhabitants) 

Infant mortality rate deaths of children under 
one year of age (per thousand live births) 

Life expectancy at birth: male (years) 

Life expectancy at birth: female (years) 

Labour market 

Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–
64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 
that is economically active (%) 

*Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: 
proportion of the population aged 20–64 that 
are in employment (%) 

Male employment rate for persons aged 20–
64 (%) 

Female employment rate for persons aged 
20–64 (%) 

Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: 
proportion of the population aged 55–64 that 
are in employment (%) 

Employment by main sectors 

Industry (%) 

Construction (%) 

Services (%) 

People employed in the public sector as a 
share of total employment, persons aged 20–
64 (%) 

People employed in the private sector as a 
share of total employment, persons aged 20–
64 (%) 

Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour 
force that is unemployed (%) 

Male unemployment rate (%) 

Female unemployment rate (%) 

Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the 
labour force aged 15–24 that is unemployed 
(%) 

Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 

5) 

Note 

2005 

12.3 

2012 

11.7 

2013 

12.0 

2014 

12.3 

2015 

11.8 

2016 

11.2 

25.8 

11.6 

10.8 

11.1 

10.7 

: 

: 

Note 

2005 

52.9 

74.8 

80.5 

2012 

57.4 

75.4 

81.1 

2013 

58.4 

75.4 

80.9 

2014 

58.9 

75.4 

81.0 

2015 

59.9 

: 

: 

: 

2016 

60.9 

48.1 

52.8 

53.4 

53.2 

53.9 

54.3 

73.6 

75.0 

75.3 

75.0 

75.3 

75.5 

23.6 

30.9 

31.8 

31.6 

32.6 

33.2 

27.9 

31.9 

31.5 

31.4 

31.9 

33.4 

: 

: 

: 

: 

15.7 

24.6 

19.1 

6.9 

49.4 

13.8 

23.6 

19.4 

7.0 

50.0 

13.5 

21.1b 

20.5b 

7.4b 

51.0b 

13.1b 

20.6 

20.0 

7.2 

52.2 

13.5 

19.5 

19.5 

7.3 

53.7 

13.8 

84.3 

86.2 

86.5 

86.9b 

86.5 

86.2 

6) 

6) 

6) 

6) 

9.3 

9.2 

9.4 

8.2 

7.7 

9.4 

17.4 

15.7 

8.8 

9.9 

10.3 

10.9 

8.0 

10.6 

16.9 

9.1 

11.9 

17.8 

9.3 

12.6 

18.4 

9.6 

13.6 

19.5 

Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of 
the labour force that has been unemployed 

6) 

3.5 

2.0 

2.1 

2.0 

2.2 

2.2 

108 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for 12 months or more (%) 

Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–
64) having completed at most lower 
secondary education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%) 

Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–
64) having completed tertiary education 
(ISCED levels 5-8) (%) 

6) 

6) 

7.7 

6.7 

7.3 

8.4b 

8.9 

9.1 

5.9 

6.7 

6.9 

8.1 

8.4 

9.3 

Social cohesion 

Note 

2005 

Average nominal monthly wages and salaries 
(national currency) 

7) 

667 

2012 

1 327 

2013 

1 509 

2014 

1 648 

2015 

1 828 

2016 

2 031 

Index of real wages and salaries (index of 
nominal wages and salaries divided by the 
inflation index) (2010 = 100) 

GINI coefficient 

Poverty gap 

*Early leavers from education and training: 
proportion of the population aged 18–24 
with at most lower secondary education who 
are not in further education or training (%) 

Standard of living 

Number of passenger cars relative to 
population size (number per thousand 
population) 

Number of mobile phone subscriptions 
relative to population size (number per 
thousand population) 

Mobile broadband penetration (per 100 
inhabitants) 

Fixed broadband penetration (per 100 
inhabitants) 

Infrastructure 

Density of railway network (lines in 
operation per thousand km²) 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

38 

: 

49.8 

43 

30.3 

39.6 

42 

27.9 

37.6p 

41 

28.4 

38.3 

42 

27.8 

36.7 

: 

: 

: 

34.3 

Note 

2005 

84.9 

2012 

115.7 

2013 

122.8 

2014 

128.6 

2015 

136.3 

2016 

143.7 

640e 

895.0 

909.0 

925.3 

935.2 

940.4 

2 

0 

10 

26 

11 

32 

12 

42 

12 

50 

13 

65 

Note 

2005 

8) 

11.3 

2012 

12.5 

2013 

12.6 

2014 

13.1 

2015 

13.2 

2016 

: 

Length of motorways (kilometres) 

1 667 

2 127 

2 244 

2 278 

2 282 

2 542 

Innovation and research 

Note 

2005 

2012 

: 

4.4 

2013 

4.4 

2014 

4.4 

2015 

4.3 

2016 

4.6 

0.57 

0.83 

0.82 

0.86 

0.88 

0.94 

Public expenditure on education relative to 
GDP (%) 

*Gross domestic expenditure on R&D 
relative to GDP (%) 

109 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government budget appropriations or 
outlays on R&D (GBAORD), as a 
percentage of GDP (%) 

Percentage of households who have internet 
access at home (%) 

Environment 

*Index of greenhouse gas emissions,  CO2 
equivalent (1990 = 100) 

Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil 
equivalent per 1 000 euro GDP at 2010 
constant prices) 

Electricity generated from renewable sources 
relative to gross electricity consumption (%) 

Road share of inland freight transport (based 
on tonne-km) (%) 

: 

0.32 

0.37 

0.32 

0.32 

0.29 

8.7 

47.2 

49.1 

60.2 

69.5 

76.3 

Note 

2005 

2012 

157.6 

209.8 

2013 

206.6 

2014 

212.9 

2015 

222.0 

2016 

: 

172.2 

176.4 

157.5 

157.3 

160.7 

165.3 

24.5 

27.2 

28.8 

20.9 

32.0 

32.9 

94.8 

94.9 

95.2 

95.1 

95.9 

95.6 

Energy 

Note 

2005 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

Primary production of all energy products 
(thousand TOE) 

Primary production of crude oil (thousand 
TOE) 

Primary production of solid fuels (thousand 
TOE) 

23 710 

30 596 

29 161 

28 661 

31 248 

35 519 

2 264 

2 438 

2 484 

2 534 

2 566 

2 641 

10 575 

15 554 

13 542 

13 814 

12 799 

15 498 

Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) 

739 

521 

443 

395 

314 

302 

Net imports of all energy products (thousand 
TOE) 

Gross inland energy consumption (thousand 
TOE) 

Gross electricity generation (GWh) 

62 035 

90 290 

87 470 

93 575 

102 791 

105 287 

85 302 

119 320 

115 592 

121 452 

131 561 

139 687 

161 95
6 

239 496 

240 154 

251 963 

261 783 

274 408 

Agriculture 

Note 

2005 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

Agricultural production volume index of 
goods and services (at producer prices) 
(2010 = 100) 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) 

41 223 

38 399 

38 423 

38 558 

38 551 

38 328p 

Livestock numbers: live bovine animals 
(thousand heads, end of period) 

Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand 
heads, end of period) 

Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats 
(thousand heads, end of period) 

9) 

10 526 

13 915 

14 415 

14 223 

13 994 

14 080 

2 

3 

3 

3 

2 

1 

31 822 

35 783 

38 510 

41 485 

41 924 

41 329 

110 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Raw milk available on farms (thousand 
tonnes) 

Harvested crop production: cereals 
(including rice) (thousand tonnes) 

Harvested crop production: sugar beet 
(thousand tonnes) 

Harvested crop production: vegetables 
(thousand tonnes) 

11 108 

17 401 

18 224 

18 631 

18 655 

18 489 

36 472 

33 377 

37 489 

32 714 

38 637 

35 281 

15 181 

14 920 

16 489 

16 743 

16 023 

19 593 

26 472 

27 820 

28 448 

28 487 

29 552 

30 267 

: = not available 

b = break in series 

e = estimate 

p = provisional 

* = Europe 2020 indicator 

** = Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator 

*** = The government deficit and debt data of enlargement countries are published on an "as is" basis 
and without any assurance as regards their quality and adherence to ESA rules. 

Footnotes 

1)  Based on balance of payments manual edition 5 (BPM5). 

2)  Average of monthly data. Lending to enterprises more than one year. 

3)  Average of monthly data. Overnight deposit facility. 

4)  Underlying indices are calculated with Fisher index formula. 

5)  2012 and 2013: includes NACE Rev. 2 Group 98.1 (undifferentiated goods-producing activities of private 

households for own use). 

6)  Unemployment based on four weeks criterion and using only active jobs search methods. 

7)  2005: data have been converted (rescaled) to the current national currency. 

8)  Main lines only. 

9)  Excluding buffaloes. 

111