COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, amending Annex XVII to Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors
Date: 2018-04-17
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: approximation of laws, chemical product, civil defence, dangerous substance, explosive, illicit trade, market approval, marketing standard, terrorism, trade restriction

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Strasbourg, 17.4.2018  SWD(2018) 104 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT  Accompanying the document proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council  on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, amending Annex XVII to Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors {COM(2018) 209 final} - {SWD(2018) 105 final}  
 
 
Table of Contents 

1. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT ..................................... 6 

2.  PROBLEM DEFINITION .......................................................................................... 8 

2.1.  What are the problems? ..................................................................................... 8 
2.1.1.Explosives precursors continue to be misused for the manufacturing of HMEs .. 9 

2.1.2.Economic operators face unnecessary obstacles to the free movement of 
explosives precursors in the internal market ............................................................... 11 

2.2.What are the problem drivers? ............................................................................ 13 
2.2.1.The level of access to restricted substances for non-professional use is no longer 
 .......................................................................................... 13 
adequate 

2.2.2.New and evolving threats ................................................................................... 14 

2.2.3.Insufficient awareness along the supply chain ................................................... 15 

2.2.4.Restrictions and controls are not applied and enforced by public authorities in a 
sufficient or fully effective manner ............................................................................. 15 

2.2.5.Fragmentation of the system of restrictions and control across the EU ............. 16 

2.2.6.Certain provisions in the current Regulation are not clear ................................. 17 

2.3.  How will the problems evolve? ....................................................................... 18 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? .............................................................................. 20 

3.1.  Legal basis ....................................................................................................... 20 
3.2.  Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action ............................................................... 20 
3.3.  Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action .......................................................... 21 

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ..................................................... 21 

4.1.  General objectives ........................................................................................... 21 
4.2.  Specific objectives ........................................................................................... 21 

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? .......................................... 22 

5.1.  Description of the policy options .................................................................... 22 
5.1.1.Policy Option 0 – Baseline ................................................................................. 22 

5.1.2.Policy Option 1 – Reinforce the application of the Regulation with non-
legislative measures 

 .......................................................................................... 23 

5.1.3.Policy Option 2 - Strenghten and clarify the restrictions and controls of the 
Regulation 

 .......................................................................................... 25 

5.1.4.Policy Option 3 – Introduce further controls along the supply chain ................. 28 

5.2.  Measures discarded at an early stage ............................................................... 31 

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? ................................. 31 

6.1.  Effectiveness .................................................................................................... 31 
6.2.  Economic impacts ........................................................................................... 36 
6.3.  Social impacts .................................................................................................. 41 

2 

 
 
6.4.  Environmental impacts .................................................................................... 45 
Impact on fundamental rights .......................................................................... 46 
6.5. 

7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? .................................................................. 48 

8.  PREFERRED OPTION ............................................................................................. 50 

8.1.  Advantages and proportionality of the preferred option ................................. 51 
8.2.  REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency) ............................................ 51 

9.  HOW  WILL  ACTUAL 

IMPACTS  BE  MONITORED  AND 

EVALUATED? ......................................................................................................... 52 

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ................................................................ 53 

ANNEX 2: SYNOPSIS REPORT OF THE STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION ........ 58 

ANNEX  3:  EVALUATION  OF  REGULATION  EU  98/2013  ON  THE 

MARKETING AND USE OF EXPLOSIVES PRECURSORS ............................... 75 

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 75 

Purpose of the evaluation  75 

Scope of the evaluation 

75 

BACKGROUND TO THE INITIATIVE ................................................................. 76 
Description of the initiative and its objectives ............................................................ 76 

Baseline 

79 

METHOD .................................................................................................................. 81 
IMPLEMENTATION STATE OF PLAY ................................................................ 83 
Security and market context ........................................................................................ 83 

Compliance and implementation measures ................................................................. 84 

Overall effect of the Regulation .................................................................................. 88 

Key challenges arising from the application of the Regulation ................................... 89 

ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS ............................................... 92 
 .......................................................................................... 92 

Relevance 

Effectiveness 

 .......................................................................................... 97 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

 ........................................................................................ 101 

 ........................................................................................ 106 

EU Added Value 

 ........................................................................................ 107 

CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................... 109 

ANNEX 4: MARKET ANALYSIS ................................................................................ 111 

ANNEX  5:  ANALYTICAL  MODELS  USED  IN  PREPARING  THE  IMPACT 

ASSESSMENT ....................................................................................................... 158 

ANNEX 6: WHO IS AFFECTED BY THE INITIATIVE AND HOW? ....................... 165 

ANNEX 7: DISCARDED OPTIONS ............................................................................. 174 

ANNEX 8: MONITORING AND EVALUATION INDICATORS .............................. 178 

3 

 
ANNEX  9:  MAP  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  REGIMES  IN  THE  EU  FOR  THE 
EXPLOSIVES 

MARKETING  AND  USE  OF  RESTRICTED 
PRECURSORS ....................................................................................................... 185 

ANNEX  10:  DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  PROPOSED  COMMISSION 
RECOMMENDATION  SETTING  OUT  GUIDELINES  FOR  LICENSING 
(MEASURE  UNDER  POLICY 
AND  REGISTRATION  REGIMES 
OPTION 1) .............................................................................................................. 186 

ANNEX 11: TABLE WITH OVERVIEW SCORES ASSESSMENT CRITERIA ....... 187 

ANNEX 12: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS..................................................................186 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Glossary 

ANFO 
DG HOME 
ECTC 
EEA 
EU 
EU INTCEN  
FTE  
HME 
HMTD  
IASG  
IED 
NACE  
NCA 
NCP 
REACH  

RSB 
SCP  
SME 
TATP 
TE-SAT  
TFEU 
TNT  

Ammonium nitrate / fuel oil  
Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs 
European Counter Terrorism Centre 
European Economic Area 
European Union 
EU Intelligence and Situation Centre  
Full Time Equivalent 
Homemade Explosive 
hexamethylene triperoxide diamine 
Impact Assessment Steering Group  
Improvised Explosive Device 
Nomenclature des Activités Économiques dans la Communauté Européenne  
National Competent Authorities 
National Contact Points 
Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals   
Regulatory Scrutiny Board  
Standing Committee on Precursors  
Small and medium-sized enterprises 
Triacetone Triperoxide 
Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union  
Trinitrotoluene 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 

Explosives  precursors  are  chemical  substances  that  can  be  misused  to  manufacture  homemade 
explosives  (HMEs).  These  substances,  or  mixtures  containing  them,  serve  a  variety  of  purposes. 
Lower concentrations of explosives precursors can be found in printer ink cartridges, disinfectants, 
fuels, pesticides, shampoos, carpet cleaners and nail polish removers. High concentrations are used 
in  industrial  settings  to  treat  metal  surfaces,  coat  products  and  produce  pharmaceuticals.  In  the 
European  Union  (EU),  substances  and  mixtures  containing  certain  explosives  precursors  above 
specific limit values are in principle not available to the general public, because their potential use 
in the illicit fabrication of HMEs poses a threat to security. Professional users, who need access to 
these chemicals for their trade, business or profession, can use higher concentration levels.  

At  the  same  time,  HMEs  have  been  used  in  the  vast  majority  of  terrorist  attacks  in  the  EU, 
including  those  in  Madrid  in  2004,  London  in  2005,  Paris  in  2015,  Brussels  in  2016,  and 
Manchester  and  Parsons  Green  in  2017.  HMEs  have  also  been  been  responsible  for  the  vast 
majority of victims of such attacks in the last decades. 

Regulating the availability of explosives precursors on the market was identified as a policy priority 
in the 2008 EU Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives1. Following the adoption of 
the Action Plan, the European Commission established a Standing Committee on Precursors (SCP), 
an expert group that brings together experts from Member State authorities and stakeholders from 
the chemicals industry and retail. Based on the recommendations of the SCP and the outcomes of 
an impact assessment of the possible options2, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Regulation 
on explosives precursors in 2010.3  
Regulation  (EC)  No  98/2013  on  the  marketing  and  use  of  explosives  precursors4  ("the 
Regulation") entered into force on 1 March 2013 and became applicable on 2 September 20145. The 
Regulation establishes a system of restrictions and controls aimed at limiting the availability of an 
agreed  list  of  explosives  precursors  to  the  general  public  and  ensuring  appropriate  reporting  of 
suspicious  transactions  through  the  supply  chain.  The  substances  concerned  are  divided  in  two 
categories, listed in the Annexes to the Regulation. The making available, introduction, possession 
and  use  of  the  precursors  listed  in  Annex  I,  either  on  their  own  or  in  mixtures  or  substances 
including them, is regulated by one of the three regimes described in the Regulation (i.e. a ban for 
the  general  public,  licensing  or  a  registration  regime)  or  a  combination  of  these  regimes.  The 
substances in Annex II are only subject to an obligation to report suspicious transactions.  

The importance of such restrictions and controls for disrupting the activities of terrorist networks by 
make  it  more difficult to attack targets and to access and deploy  dangerous substances  was again 
emphasised in the European Agenda on Security6, adopted by the Commission in April 2015 

1 Council of the European Union, ‘EU Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives’, 8109/08, 2008. 
2  Commission  Staff  Working  Document:  Impact  Assessment  Accompanying  the  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the 

European Parliament and of the Council on the Marketing and Use of Explosives Precursors, SEC(2010) 1041.  

3  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the  marketing  and  use  of  explosives 

precursors, COM(2010)0473. 

4 Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2013 on the marketing and 

use of explosives precursors, OJ L 39 252/262. 

5 Following the decision of the joint EEA committee to amend the EEA agreement and incorporate Regulation, the act 

also entered into force in Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway on 13 December 2014. 

6 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 

Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The European Agenda on Security, COM(2015) 185 final. 

6 

 
 
 
                                                            
After the attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 and in Brussels on 22 March 2016, the Commission 
highlighted in the Action Plan against illicit trafficking in and use of firearms and explosives7 
and the Communication on delivering on the EU agenda on security to fight against terrorism8 
that  explosives  precursors  remained  too  easily  available  and  that  existing  controls  should  be 
reinforced.  
In February 2017, the Commission adopted a report on the application of the Regulation9. The 
report outlined a series of challenges faced by Member States and the supply chain to implement 
the  Regulation  and  the  need  to  increase  the  capacity  of  all  those  involved  in  implementing  and 
enforcing  the  restrictions  and  controls.  Limitations  of  the  legislation  relating  to  awareness  in  the 
supply  chain,  and  the  multiplicity  of  different  regimes  across  the  EU,  which  creates  important 
security gaps and challenges for the supply chain actors which conduct business across the EU were 
brought forward. 

A  Commission  recommendation  on  immediate  steps  to  prevent  misuse  of  explosives 
precursors10  was  adopted  in  October  2017.  Member  States  were  urged  to  take  all  necessary 
measures  under  the  existing  Regulation  to  prevent  terrorists  from  accessing  restricted  substances 
and invited to carry out a thorough assessment of the prohibition, licensing or registration systems 
they had put in place.  

The Council of the European Union welcomed the recommendation in the Council conclusions of 
7 December 201711and called on Member States to limit the availability of explosives precursors to 
the general public. The European Parliament also expressed its concern about the wide availability 
of firearms and explosive precursors on hidden networks and growing links between terrorism and 
organised crime.12  

  Substances and mixtures that can be used to manufacture illicit explosives are also subject to several 
other  EU  acts,  which  aim  to  ensure  the  functioning  of  the  internal  market.  They  mostly  concern 
public  health, the environment and safety aspects of chemicals  At present, there are provisions 
on  ammonium  nitrate 
in  both  Regulation  (EC)  No  1907/2006  concerning  the 
Registration,  Evaluation,  Authorisation  and  Restriction  of  Chemicals  (REACH)13  and 
the  Regulation  on  the  marketing  and  use  of  explosives  precursors.  Under  REACH, 
ammonium  nitrate  containing  nitrogen  above  a  certain  concentration  is  prohibited  to  be 
placed on the market except for the supply to downstream users, distributors, farmers for the 
use in agricultural activities and natural or legal persons engaged in professional activities. 

7 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Implementing the European 
Agenda on Security: EU Action Plan Against Illicit Trafficking in and use of Firearms and Explosives, COM(2015)624. 
8 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council delivering 
on  the  European  Agenda  on  Security  to  fight  against  terrorism  and  pave  the  way  towards  an  effective  and  genuine 
Security Union, COM(2016)230. 
9  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the  application  of,  and  delegation  of 
power  under,  Regulation  (EU)  98/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the  marketing  and  use  of 
explosives precursors, COM(2017)103. 
10 Commission Recommendation on immediate steps to prevent misuse of explosives precursors, COM(2017)6950 
11  Council  of  the  European  Union,  ‘Council  conclusions  on  strengthening  the  European  Union  response  to  CBRN 
related risks, reducing access to explosive precursors and protecting public spaces’, 15648/17, Brussels.  
12 European Parliament resolution of 3 October 2017 on the fight against cybercrime (2017/2068(INI)). 
13  Regulation  (EC)  No  1907/2006  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  concerning  the  Registration, 
Evaluation,  Authorisation  and  Restriction  of  Chemicals  (REACH),  establishing  a  European  Chemicals  Agency, 
amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC 
and 2000/21/EC, OJ L 396 1. 

7 

 
 
 
                                                            
The  Regulation  on  explosives  precursors  subjects  the  supply  of  ammonium  nitrate  to  a 
mechanism  for  reporting  suspicious  transactions,  and  also  enables  Member  States,  via  a 
safeguard clause, to put in place further restrictions if there are reasonable grounds for doing 
so. 

  Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances 
and mixtures (CLP Regulation).14 A substance or a mixture fulfilling the criteria relating to 
physical  hazards,  health  hazards  or  environmental  hazards,  laid  down  in  Parts  2  to  5  of 
Annex I of Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 is hazardous and shall be classified in relation to 
the respective hazard classes provided for in that Annex. In certain cases, the classification 
of a chemical is harmonised at EU level. The list of harmonised classification and labelling 
is included in Annex VI to the CLP Regulation. 

  Regulation (EC) No 2003/2003 relating to fertilisers15 lays down precise rules concerning 

safety and control measures for ammonium nitrate fertilisers. 

  Regulation (EC) No 1259/201316 and (EC) No 273/200417 respectively address the trade in 
drug precursors between the EU and third countries, and within the EU. Several explosives 
precursors can also be used as drug precursors.  

These  different acts are complementary, to  the extent  that they have  a different focus in  terms of 
scope and substances/products concerned. The evaluation (see Annex 3) concluded that there are no 
major inconsistencies and overlaps between the Regulation and other relevant EU initiatives.  

2.  PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1.  What are the problems? 

Following the analysis of the implementation of the Regulation, the Commission has carried out a 
broader  evaluation  as  part  of  this  impact  assessment  in  order  to  analyse  more  thoroughly  the 
effectiveness,  efficiency,  relevance,  coherence  and  EU  added  value  of  the  Regulation  (Annex  3). 
This analysis demonstrated that the Regulation has achieved a number of results but also showed a 
number of limitations in the Regulation and challenges which are impacting its added value and are 
causing security risks. They can be linked to two main problems.  

On the one hand, the existing access restrictions do not prevent explosives precursors to be accessed 
and misused for the manufacture of HMEs, while on the other hand, economic operators are facing 
a number of seemingly disproportionate obstacles in operating in the EU internal market. 

This  impact  assessment  report  cannot  provide  detailed  information  on  incidents  and  attacks 
involving  explosives  precursors,  as  this  risks  exposing  vulnerabilities  in  Member  States  and  may 
jeopardise ongoing investigations and prosecutions. 

14  Regulation  (EC)  No  1272/2008  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16  December  2008  on 
classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 
1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (OJ L 353, 31.12.2008, p. 1). 
15  Regulation  (EC)  No  2003/2003  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  October  2003  relating  to 
fertilisers, OJ L304, 1-194. 
16  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1259/2013  of  20  November  2013  amending  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  111/2005  
laying  down  rules  for  the  monitoring  of  trade  between  the  Community  and  third  countries  in  drug precursors,  (OJ  L 
330, 10.12.2013, p. 30). 
17 Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 on drug precursors 
(OJ L 47, 18.2.2004. p. 1). 

8 

 
 
 
                                                            
2.1.1.  Explosives precursors continue to be misused for the manufacturing of HMEs 

As  reported  by  the  Global  terrorism  Database,18  the  share  of  attacks  in  the  EU  which  used 
explosives has been on average increasing since 1970. Numbers decreased at the end of the 1990’s 
until  2012  and  then  started  to  increase  again.  The  share  of  deadly  attacks  was  about  60%  at  the 
beginning  of  the  1970’s  but  increased  to  reach  100%  and  since  2000,  all  terrorist  attacks  using 
explosives killed at least one person. The total number of deaths in terrorist attacks using explosives 
has dramatically increased in 2015 and 201619. 

Figure 1 - Number of terrorist attacks using explosives in the EU from 1970 to 2016 

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

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1
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Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2017) 
Global Terrorism Database  

Figure 2 - Share of fatal terrorist attacks using explosives in the EU from 1970 to 2016 

120%

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

0
7
9
1

1
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1
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1
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5
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2

6
1
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Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2017) 
Global Terrorism Database  

The human and social consequences in terms of lives lost and persons injured are considerable. The 
economic impact is also deemed to be very important. Although there is no way to provide a fully 
reliable  quantification  of  these  costs,  there  are  methods  which  are  used  and  illustrate  their 
importance.  For  example,  the  Institute  for  Economics  and  Peace  uses  the  Global  Terrorism 
Database to calculate the global costs of terrorism with regard to lives lost, injuries and damage to 
property  and  infrastructure.  The  figure  below  presents  the  cost  inflicted  by  terrorist  attacks  using 
explosives in the EU by year (the increase in 2015 and 2016 - up to EUR 778.8 million in 2015 and 
586.3 million in 2016 - reflect the increased number of deaths in these two years). 

18 A publicly available database including a large amount of information on worldwide terrorist events. 
19 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2017, Europol. 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Figure 3 - Cost of terrorist attacks using explosives in the EU from 1990 to 2016 

s
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o

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4.000 € 
3.500 € 
3.000 € 
2.500 € 
2.000 € 
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500 € 
0 € 

0
9
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Source: Institute for Economics and Peace based on GDT database 

HMEs have been the most common type of explosive used in recent terrorist attacks and continue 
posing a much higher threat in Europe than other types of explosives20. They are relatively easy to 
make,  fairly  simple  to  use  and  rather  effective21.  The  availability  of  explosives  precursors  has 
facilitated  their  use22.  Although  recent  attacks  and  incidents  have  mostly  involved  Triacetone 
Triperoxide (TATP), the threat concerns a wider range of HMEs and explosives precursors.23 

a) Dangerous substances remain accessible to illegitimate users  

As  evidenced  by  the  evaluation, the  amount  of  explosives  precursors available  on  the  market  has 
decreased  following  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Regulation.  Reports  from  national  authorities 
indicate that some economic operators withdraw products containing restricted substances from the 
market. In some Member States, in which restricted explosives precursors remain available to the 
general public, but are subject to licencing, reports show that consumers face significant difficulties 
in finding restricted substances on the market, which has led to lowering the illegal use of them. In 
addition,  in  some  Member  States,  a  significant  decrease  in  the  number  of  police  cases  involving 
explosives  precursors  has  also  been  reported  in  the  years  following  the  entry  into  force  of  the 
Regulation24. 

Nevertheless,  regulated  substances  continue  to  be  diverted  and  used  for  the  illicit  manufacture  of 
HMEs. In a number of investigated cases, terrorists have obtained explosives precursors covered by 
the Regulation legally or at least without having to resort to any form of theft. This suggests that 
under  the  current  framework  a  number  of  dangerous  substances  remain  accessible  to  the  general 
public.  

This is evidenced notably by recent attacks involving HMEs between 2015 and 2017, as well as by 
a number of foiled attacks, and by a number of additional incidents reported by national authorities, 
where HMEs and related materials have been found and seized by the police. The most commonly 
used  HMEs  in  attacks  in  the  EU  have  been  TATP  and  Hexamethylene  triperoxide  diamine 
(HMTD), created from hydrogen peroxide, a substance to which access to members of the general 
public  has  been  restricted  by  the  Regulation,  and  acetone  or  hexamine,  which  are  subject  to  a 
reporting of suspicious transactions obligation. 

20 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2017, Europol; ECTC Threat Assessment 2018, Europol. 
21 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2017, Europol. 
22 Ibid. 
23 See Annex 3.  
24 National assessments of effectiveness. 

10 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
Interviews from consulted stakeholders and feedback from the national assessments by the Member 
States raise additional concerns in relation to online sales25. In one of the recent terrorist attacks in 
the EU, explosives precursor substances that are currently not restricted but subject to the reporting 
obligations  under  the  Regulation,  have  been  successfully  acquired  by  the  perpetrators  through 
online purchase from different addresses. 

The Regulation’s aim is to restrict and control all substances proportionally to the threat they pose. 
The fact that explosives precursors continue to be accessed and misused in terrorist attacks suggests 
that tighter restrictions and controls on substances already covered by the Regulation are necessary. 

b) Detection of threats is not sufficiently effective throughout the EU 

Reporting  practices  have  overall  contributed  to  improving  detection  across  Member  States  of 
potential  threats  and  misuse  of  available  explosives  precursors26.  Large  stocks  of  explosives 
precursors  intended  to  manufacture  HMEs  have  been  discovered  and  seized  in  different  Member 
States and reports of suspicious transactions from economic operators have contributed, in several 
cases, to thwarting terrorist attacks. A known case in Germany, in 2015, of a planned terrorist attack 
targeting the Frankfurt bike race, has been thwarted by the police with the help of a report from a 
retail store of a suspicious purchase of explosives precursor substances.  

However, the evaluation has  demonstrated that the  level  of  reporting varies  significantly between 
Member States. Recent attacks also showed that explosives precursors used for the preparation of 
HMEs have been purchased in physical shops, in some cases, through false claim of professional 
use or through online retail. Changes in the acquisition methods over the last years raise additional 
challenges.  For  example,  information  received  suggests  that  a  number  of  attempts  to  acquire 
explosives  precursors  for  illicit  purposes  have  been  done  at  different  times  and  through  different 
methods, quantities and concentration levels, in order to avoid traceability and reporting. 

2.1.2.  Economic  operators  face  unnecessary  obstacles  to  the  free  movement  of  explosives 

precursors in the internal market 

One  of  the  main  objectives  of  the  Regulation  is  to  create  a  level  playing  field  for  economic 
operators  in  the  internal  market  while  ensuring  a  high  level  of  protection  of  the  security  of  the 
general public. However, the evaluation has shown that operators face difficulties implementing the 
Regulation  in  their  business  activities.  Obstacles  related,  among  others,  to  the  complexity  of  the 
framework or insufficient clarity on rules and obligations limit the freedom of movement of these 
substances.  This  causes  market  distortion  and  overcoming  these  hurdles  is  time-consuming  and 
adds in some cases extra costs. 

a)  Barriers to competition within the EU 

As confirmed in the course of the evaluation and stakeholder consultations, the different regimes in 
each Member State and the variety of requirements applicable across the EU are raising challenges 
for  economic  operators  that  conduct  business  throughout  the  EU.27  Furthermore,  differences  may 
also  create  situations  of  unfair  advantage  and  distorted  competition,  in  particular  in  relation  to 
registration regimes, when companies benefit from locating themselves or being located in Member 

25 Internet sales of explosives precursors raise concerns for 77% of the respondents to the open public consultation, 
mainly due to difficulties in identifying the buyer and detecting suspicious transactions 
26  Study  on  combatting  the  threat  posed  by  explosives  precursors:  evaluation  of  the  existing  policy  and  legislative 
framework and preparation of an impact assessment of possible options for a future EU initiative, Ernst & Young, 2018. 
27Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the  application  of,  and  delegation  of 
power  under,  Regulation  (EU)  98/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the  marketing  and  use  of 
explosives precursors, COM(2017)0103.  

11 

 
 
 
                                                            
States  were  the  level  of  restrictions  and  controls  is  more  lenient.  If  the  rules  differ  or  are  not  
applied in the same way, there is no longer a level playing field for economic operators.  

In addition, the lack of clarity of the Regulation also affects competitiveness. Most importantly, it is 
not  clear  how  the  verification  of  professional  use  should  be  done.  Whereas  for  some  economic 
operators,  dealing  mostly  with  other  economic  operators,  this  does  not  pose  a  problem;  for  other 
economic  operators,  dealing  mostly  with  consumers,  the  assessment  of  whether  a  customer  is  a 
member  of  the  general  public  or  not  generates  uncertainty  because  there  is  no  clear  definition  of 
what is professional use. Moreover, different Member States may have different approaches to this. 
In that regard, non-EU economic operators selling to consumers in the EU also have an advantage 
in  comparison  to  EU-based  economic  operators,  as  they  are  not  held  responsible  for  verifying 
professional use. 

b) Restrictions and controls are not always applied by online marketplaces 

Feedback  from  consulted  stakeholders28suggests  that  a  shift  towards  online  sales  of  explosives 
precursors have been observed. This shift stems from the rise of the online commerce in general, 
but  is  also  related  to  the  weaker  controls  applied  to  online  marketplaces  and  limited  reporting  of 
suspicious online transactions of explosives precursors as compared to physical shops. Such a shift 
poses  security  concerns  with  regard  to  possible  misuse  of  explosives  precursors,  but  also  raises 
concerns  as  regards  possible  distortion  of  competition  between  physical  stores  and  online  retail. 
Online suppliers being not always considered to be bound by the Regulation rules, they sometimes 
sell  explosives  precursors  without  verifying  if  the  buyer  is  a  member  of  the  general  public  and 
without verification  of licences and proper registration  of the sale. This gives them  a competitive 
advantage over conventional suppliers who are bound by the obligations in the Regulation. 

28  Study  on  combatting  the  threat  posed  by  explosives  precursors:  evaluation  of  the  existing  policy  and  legislative 
framework and preparation of an impact assessment of possible options for a future EU initiative, Ernst & Young, 2018. 

12 

 
 
 
                                                            
2.2.  What are the problem drivers? 

The core problems mentioned above can be linked to the following drivers.  

Problems 

Problem drivers 

Specific objectives 

General objectives 

Security threat 

Explosives precursors 
continue to be 
misused 

Internal market 

Economic operators 
face unnecessary 
obstacles to the free 
movement of 
explosives precursors 

The level of access to 
restricted substances for 
non-professional use is no 
longer adequate 

Further restrict access to 
certain explosives 
precursors and strengthen 
controls 

New and evolving threats 

Restrictions and controls are 
not effectively applied and 
enforced by public 
authorities 

Align restrictions and 
controls with the evolving 
threat  

Ensure high level of 
security 

Increase enforcement by 
the competent authorities 

Insufficient awareness along 
the supply chain 

Improve the transmission of 
information and compliance 
along the supply chain 

Certain provisions in the 
current Regulation are not 
clear 

Improve the clarity of the 
Regulation and ensure 
uniformity in its application 

Ensure the 
functioning of the 
internal market 

Fragmentation of the system 
of restrictions and control 
across the EU 

Facilitate intra-EU trade and 
prevent distortion of 
competition   

Illustration 1 - Problem tree 

2.2.1.  The  level  of  access  to  restricted  substances  for  non-professional  use  is  no 

longer adequate 

The  evaluation  confirmed  that  the  Regulation  covers  substances  that  pose  a  security  threat  to  the 
public but it also showed that the level of restriction applied to certain substances is not necessarily 
proportionate to the security concern they raise.  

Some  substances  that  are  widely  used  for  the  production  of  HMEs  in  the  EU  are  currently  only 
subject to  reporting of suspicious transactions, and remain  widely available to  the general  public, 
including in high concentrations.  

13 

 
 
 
With regard to licences, the absence of a common set of minimum requirements for granting or 
refusing  a  licence  leads  to  different  rules  and  practices  across  the  Member  States  with  regard  to 
type of information requested, reasons for refusal, rate of refusals, duration of validity, price of the 
service.    Some  Member  States  take  the  view  that  requests  for  a  licence  should  be  granted  unless 
there  is  a  stated  reason  not  to,  while  others  apply  the  opposite  approach,  refusing  licences  unless 
there is a specific reason to grant them.  

With  regard  to  registration,  actual  cases  show  that  terrorists,  especially  those  that  are  planning 
suicide  attacks,  have  no  problem  identifying  themselves  when  purchasing  explosives  precursor 
substances. The registration regime is then neither an obstacle in accessing to precursors, nor 
is effective in alerting national competent authorities (NCAs)  if the registration list is not timely 
made  available  to  law  enforcement.  Reportedly,  there  are  a  lot  of  cases  where  post-attack 
investigations  discovered  that  the  terrorists  had  been  registered  buying  precursors  on  different 
locations with their real identity.  

2.2.2.  New and evolving threats 

Existing threats have evolved and new security threats have appeared since the Regulation was adopted 
and entered into force in 2013. Terrorists are using new tactics and develop new recipes and bomb-
making techniques, which  are  –  at least  in  part  – intended  to circumvent  existing restrictions  and 
controls. 

As  a  consequence,  several  substances  which  are  not  restricted  under  the  Regulation  pose  a 
significant  security  threat.  For  example,  sulphuric  acid  can  be  misused  to  manufacture  TATP. 
Currently, it is listed in Annex II of the Regulation which means that it can be bought by members 
of the general public, without needing a license or registering the sale. The same is true for acetone 
and ammonium nitrate, which have been used to illicitly manufacture HMEs that were used to carry 
out  attacks  in  the  EU.  Ammonium  nitrate,  which  has  also  been  illicitly  used  in  this  manner,  was 
already  restricted  under  Directive  76/769/EEC  in  200829  and  that  restriction  was  transferred  to 
Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 in 200930.  

Other  new  threats  are  related  to  the  transfer  of  terrorist  tactics,  techniques  and  procedures  from 
conflict zones to Europe and the spread of bomb-making knowledge and instructions, including for 
HMEs, by terrorists via online communication channels and social media. According to Europol31, 
some of the attackers involved in recent incidents had received information about and guidance on 
the  illicit  manufacture  of  HMEs  via  (in)direct  contact  with  more  experienced  bomb-makers.  The 
Internet also remains an important source of information on the fabrication of IEDs.  

In  this  evolving  context,  it  is  important  that,  in  case  of  new  or  evolved  security  threats,  new 
substances of concern can be quickly added to the scope of the Regulation. Article 12 and 14 of the 
Regulation allow the Commission to adopt delegated acts only to add substances to Annex II and to 
change  the  limit  values  in  Annex  I  where  it  is  necessary  to  accommodate  developments  in  the 
misuse of substances as explosives precursors32. 

29 Decision No 1348/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 amending Council 
Directive  76/769/EEC  as  regards  restrictions  on  the  marketing  and  use  of  2-(2-methoxyethoxy)ethanol,  2-(2-
butoxyethoxy)ethanol, methylsenediphenyl diisocyanate, cyclohexane and ammonium nitrate, OJ L 348, 108. 
30  Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  552/2009  of  22  June  2009  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  1907/2006  of  the 
European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the  Registration,  Evaluation,  Authorisation and  Restriction  of  Chemicals 
(REACH) as regards Annex XVII, OJ L 164, 7. 
31 Ibid.  
32 In 2016, the Commission exercised its power to adopt delegated acts to add three substances to Annex II, notably, 
aluminium powder, magnesium nitrate hexahydrate and magnesium powder C(2016) 7657 final. 

14 

 
 
 
                                                            
However, if new substances have to be restricted or current restrictions have to be revoked, due to a 
change  in  the  risk  assessment,  the  Commission  has  to  adopt  a  legislative  proposal,  which  has  to 
undergo  the  ordinary  legislative  procedure33.  This  creates  significant  time  delays,  which  do  not 
allow the legal framework to respond in a timely fashion to a rapidly evolving threat picture.  

The criteria for determining which measures should apply to which explosives precursors are laid 
down in the Regulation (recital 20) and include: the level of threat associated with the explosives 
precursor concerned, the volume of trade in the explosives precursor concerned, and the possibility 
of establishing a concentration level below which the explosives precursor could still  be used  for 
the legitimate purposes for which it is made available. The criteria reflect the risk and threat level, 
whilst taking in consideration the economic importance and practical need of explosives precursors.  

2.2.3.  Insufficient awareness along the supply chain  

Because many of the substances concerned by the Regulation are widely used household products, 
the supply chain is significantly more diversified and complex than that of other products subject to 
specific  control  provisions  at  EU  level,  such  as  drug  precursors.34  This  poses  a  challenge  for 
competent authorities to reach all economic operators in the supply chain to inform them of their 
duties. Competent authorities in some Member States have, in collaboration with chemical industry 
and  retail  sector  associations,  conducted  awareness-raising  campaigns  and  engaged  with  a  wide 
range of operators  — from manufacturers to retailers, big companies to small independent stores, 
and internet sellers to marketplaces.  

Nevertheless, the evaluation showed that some economic operators have very limited awareness of 
the Regulation and notably of their reporting obligations resulting in considerable variation in 
the  level  of  effectiveness  of  reporting  mechanisms  and  therefore  significant  security  risks  across 
Member States. 

The  evaluation  also  showed  different  interpretations,  and  thereby  uncertainty,  along  the  supply 
chain  as  regards  responsibilities  for  labelling  and  information  exchange  on  product  content. 
Retailers often consider economic operators in upper stages of the supply  chain to be responsible 
for the identification and labelling of concerned products. In parallel, manufacturers do not consider 
themselves  to  be  concerned  by  the  labelling  requirements  of  the  Regulation  as  they  do  not  make 
available  restricted  explosives  precursors  directly  to  the  members  of  the  general  public.  A  recent 
market research performed in one Member State showed that an important number of retailers are 
not aware that they are selling explosives precursor substances.35  

2.2.4.  Restrictions and controls are not applied and enforced by public authorities in 

a sufficient or fully effective manner  

The evaluation showed that the level of awareness about explosives precursors by relevant public 
authorities,  such  as  customs,  law  enforcement,  and  first  responders,  is  still  not  sufficient.  As  a 

33 The Commission proposal for a Regulation on the marketing and use of explosives precursors initially proposed to 
give the Commission delegated powers to amend both Annexes. As the co-legislators were reluctant to provide the 
Commission with the power to add substances without their approval, this type of change requires a legislative proposal 
under the current Regulation.  
34 Council Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 of 22 December 2004 laying down rules for the monitoring of trade between 
the  Community  and  third  countries  in  drug  precursors,  OJ  L  22,  1–10;    Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU) 
2015/1013 of 25 June 2015 laying down rules in respect of Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 of the European Parliament. 
and  of  the  Council  on  drug  precursors  and  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  111/2005  laying  down  rules  for  the 
monitoring of trade between the Union and third countries in drug precursors, OJ L 162, 33–64. 
35  Impact  Assessment  of  the  EU  Regulation  on  the  Marketing  and  Use  of  Explosives  Precursors,  UK  Home  Office, 
2014. Available online: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukia/2014/237/pdfs/ukia_20140237_en.pdf. 

15 

 
 
 
                                                            
result, a number of instances of misuse or illicit possession or sale might not be identified and the 
response to incidents involving explosives precursors might often not be sufficiently adequate. 

Inspections are still not systematically carried out in all Member States. As a result, non-compliance 
by  economic  operators  might  sometimes  go  un-detected  and  penalties  do  not  have  the  deterrent 
effect they should have. 

Awareness-raising  campaigns  by  public  authorities  have  not  reached  the  entire  supply  chain. 
Therefore,  the  quantity  and  quality  of  reports  received  by  the  NCPs  still  leaves  much  room  for 
improvement. 

Information  of  cross-border  relevance  is  still  not  systematically  exchanged  between  National 
Contact  Points  (NCPs)  and/or  competent  authorities,  hindering  effective  investigations  and 
enforcement. 

2.2.5.  Fragmentation of the system of restrictions and control across the EU 

The asymmetric application of the Regulation in different Member States affects the movement of 
regulated  substances.  When  the  Commission  adopted  its  proposal  in  2010,  a  Regulation  was 
considered  the  most  appropriate  legal  instrument  as  it  would  ensure  the  greatest  degree  of 
uniformity.  However,  the  divergent  restriction  and  control  systems  in  Member  States  and  their 
different interpretations of the Regulation have created uncertainties that affect the free movement 
of explosives precursor substances in the EU internal market and security gaps. 

The Regulation introduces a ban on substances above a certain concentration limit for members of 
the  general  public.  Member  States  may,  however,  opt  for  a  licensing  or  a  registration  regime  to 
allow  access  of  the  general  public  to  certain  restricted  substances.  Twenty  Member  States  have 
established bans for members of the general public to different restricted explosives precursors, of 
which  twelve  Member  States  apply  a  ban  to  all  restricted  substances  under  the  Regulation  and 
eight  Member  States  apply  a  combination  of  regimes  of  a  ban  and  registration  (5),  a  ban  and 
licencing (2) or a ban and registration and licencing (1). Another eight Member States have put in 
place a licencing regime for all restricted substances.  

Economic  operators  that  conduct  business  across  different  countries  have  to  adapt  to  the  specific 
regime of each Member State in which they make a product available. If a substance or mixture is 
restricted, an economic operator will have to: 

- 

- 

- 

register the supply of the product to a member of the general public in Member States with a 
registration regime; 

check the validity of the licence of the member of the general public in Member States with 
a licensing regime; 

refuse making the product available to the member of the general public in Member States 
with a ban.  

Ensuring  compliance  with  the  different  regimes  is  a  complicated,  time-consuming  and  resource-
intensive process.  The majority of the respondents to the targeted consultation, more than 65%, are 
of  an  opinion  that  the  issue  of  market  distortion  in  the  context  of  the  Regulation  of  explosives 
precursors requires further action at EU level (see Annex 2).  

In addition, some Member States apply restrictions and controls to non-listed explosives precursors 
or  tighter  restrictions  to  substances  that  are  listed.  Five  countries36  currently  have  additional 

36 Ireland, Germany, Denmark, Malta, Norway. 

16 

 
 
 
                                                            
restrictions  in  place.  Member  States  are  allowed  to  have  stricter  measures  in  place,  if  they  have 
reasonable  grounds  to  believe  that  the  substances  concerned  could  be  used  for  the  illicit 
manufacture of explosives and have notified the Commission.  

However, even if Member States have the same regime, procedures for obtaining licenses vary per 
country. For instance, the criteria for granting or refusing licenses differ per Member State, as do 
the  length  and  type  of  validity  of  the  licence.  Notably,  the  existence  of  alternative  substances  or 
mixtures, which can be used for a same legitimate non-professional purpose but pose less security 
concerns,  is  taken  into  account  to  varying  degrees  in  the  assessment  of  licence  applications.  
The verification of criminal records is not done systematically in all Member States before granting 
licenses.  Conditions  to  holding  a  licence,  concerning  storage  and  the  reporting  of  thefts  or 
disappearances, also vary.  

The fragmentation of the system of restrictions and controls across the EU raises also concerns as 
regards competition, making it easier and cheaper for operators to supply explosives precursors to 
the  general  public  in  Member  States  that  have  lower  control  levels  or  impose  fewer  restrictions. 
Finally, terrorists and criminals can also exploit these differences to obtain explosives precursors. 
The substances acquired, or HMEs manufactured with these substances, could potentially be used 
anywhere  in  Europe,  lowering  security  across  the  Union.  One  Member  State  reported  at  least  6 
examples  where  individuals  based  in  countries  with  more  restrictive  regimes  have  acquired 
explosives precursors in that Member State. As these transactions were identified as suspicious, this 
led to investigations and arrests for the illicit manufacture of explosives. 

2.2.6.  Certain provisions in the current Regulation are not clear 

The  evaluation  has  showed  that  many  differences  and  shortcomings  in  the  implementation  of  the 
Regulation were due to a lack of clarity in its provisions. There are different areas of uncertainties. 

The first relates to significant difficulties in identifying legitimate users, namely at the point of sale 
due to the lack of relevant definitions or the lack of clarity in the current definitions set out in the 
Regulation.  

Consultations  of  public  authorities  and  economic  operators  have  repeatedly  shown  that 
identification of legitimate users at the point of sale is one of the major problems faced by industry, 
notably the retail sector. The Regulation does not provide a definition of professional users, but it 
nevertheless requires economic operators to report suspicious transactions involving such users and 
to consider professional use in their assessment of whether a customer is a member of the general 
public or not. 

This lack of clarity in the Regulation poses both issues of compliance of economic operators as well 
as  security  concerns.  Legal  entities  fall  outside  the  scope  of  the  general  public,  as  defined  in  the 
Regulation. As a result, any legal entity is implicitly allowed to introduce, possess or use explosives 
precursors, regardless of whether the access to these substances is necessary for the conduct of the 
entity's professional activities.  

The lack of provisions as regards professional users creates legal uncertainties for both competent 
national authorities and economic operators and pose practical difficulties for the identification of 
such users, notably at the point of sale. Recent terrorist attacks in Europe have shown that restricted 
explosives precursors have been purchased through the general supply chain for illicit use with the 
false claim of professional use. 

The  existing  uncertainties  are  part  of  the  problem  because  the  lack  of  clarity  and  certainty  has 
resulted in differences in the interpretation and application of the Regulation. If the rules differ or 

17 

 
 
 
are not applied in the same way, there is no longer a level playing field for economic operators. A 
very concrete example of a case where uncertainty has led to an uneven playing field is the online 
sale  of  restricted  substances.  The  Regulation  applies  to  the  off-  and  online  supply  of  explosives 
precursors but it does not explicitly mention that the obligations on economic operators also apply 
to  online  sales,  whereas  online  operators  deliver  products  and  services  on  the  market  just  like 
offline economic operators do. Online suppliers are therefore not always considered to be bound by 
these rules, which means that they are selling explosives precursors without verifying if the buyer is 
a member of the general public and without verification of licences and proper registration of the 
sale37. This  is a  very important  security gap38 and  also gives those  online suppliers a competitive 
advantage over conventional suppliers who are bound by the obligations in the Regulation, as well 
as over online suppliers that correctly apply the Regulation. The lack of clarity regarding the scope 
of application of the Regulation hence causes market distortion 

The importance of exploring opportunities to ensure the unified application of the Regulation was 
highlighted in a REFIT platform opinion.  The platform examined two suggestions, one concerning 
the national implementation of the Regulation and one regarding the many uncertainties related to 
Regulation’s implementation. The REFIT platform acknowledged the divergent application of the 
Regulation and recommended the Commission to look into this issue during the revision of the act. 

2.3.  How will the problems evolve? 

All things being equal, the Regulation would remain in force and would continue to be applied. As 
observed  in  the  evaluation,  the  Regulation  remains  relevant  to  the  current  EU  context  and  is 
addressing relevant and continuing needs. However, the identified problems, which have emerged 
in  spite  of  the  Regulation  and  have  not  been  resolved  within  the  existing  framework  and  will 
continue  to  exist  without  the  absence  of  EU  intervention.  As  the  unnecessary  barriers  and 
uncertainties  faced  by  the  supply  chain  will  persist,  the  functioning  of  the  internal  market  will 
continue to be hampered. Misuse of explosives precursors is also expected to remain a problem, if 
terrorists and criminals will continue to have access to these substances. It is hence more likely that 
the threat to security will increase rather than decrease.  

Several factors may affect the evolution of the identified problems: 

  Technological developments could influence the identified problems in different ways. Firstly, 
there is a risk that social media and the Internet will be increasingly used to spread instructions 
to make HMEs. Europol has reported that terrorists are using online services, including social 
media  platforms  and  file  sharing  sites,  in  diverse  ways  to  communicate  for  this  purpose.39 
Various websites and platforms contain detailed instructions and recipes for the manufacture of 
HMEs40. There also appear to have been transfers of terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures 
from conflict  zones (e.g. Syria, Iraq) to  Europe via online communication channels.41  If these 
trends persist and instructions for the manufacturing of HMEs from explosives precursors can 
be easily found and accessed, this will raise the security threat.  

Besides  learning  how to  make  HMEs, terrorists can  also use the Internet and the dark web to 
acquire  explosives  precursors.  A  large  proportion  of  the  stakeholders  interviewed  for  the 

37 Final report E-commerce II, Chemical Legislation European Enforcement Network, 2016 via: http://www.cleen-
europe.eu/projects/ecommerce-ii.html. 
38 See the example of the 2011 Norway attacks as described in Annex 3.  
39 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2017, Europol. 
40 The EU funded research project HOMER built a knowledge database mapping which HME recipes are available on 
the internet and the darkweb. http://www-homer-project.eu. 
41 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2017, Europol. 

18 

 
 
 
                                                            
preparatory  study  for  this  impact  assessment  expressed  concerns  about  the  online  market  and 
access to potentially dangerous substances42. Currently, only a small percentages of explosives 
precursors  online.  A  study  from  201043  estimated  the  online  sales  of  explosive  precursor 
substances at 0.5% of the total sales to the public, yet the percentage is likely to have increased. 
A research project on the illicit trade of firearms, explosives and ammunition on the dark web 
examined concluded  that the dark web has  the potential to become the platform of  choice  for 
lone actors and small groups to obtain weapons and ammunition behind the anonymity provided 
by the dark web.44  

An  increased  use  of  the  Internet  and  online  sales  platforms,  including  for  the  purchase  of 
restricted explosives precursors, could also further exacerbate problems with the enforcement of 
to  online  customers 
the  Regulation.  Various  retailers  supply  explosives  precursors 
internationally;  including  56%  in  Italy,  45%  in  the  UK  and  27%  in  the  Netherlands.45  If  the 
scope of the Regulation is not clarified and the offer of restricted explosives precursors online 
grows, it will become even more difficult for conventional suppliers to compete.  

  Scientific  progress  could  also  affect  the  evolution  of  the  problems.  Scientists  could  discover 
new  products,  whose  chemical  compounds  would  work  in  the  same  way  as  regulated 
explosives  precursors,  but  could  not  be  used  to  manufacture  HMEs.  Alternatively,  already 
existing  alternative  substances  could  be  further  developed  and  improved.  Inhibition  (i.e. 
preventing  or  mitigating  chemical  reactions  such  as  explosions  by  adding  an  inhibitor  to  a 
substance or mixture) could also help to reduce the security threat. A fair amount of research on 
these  topics  has  already  been  carried  out46,  but  additional  research  efforts  could  result  in  the 
development of marketable solutions.  

in  scientific  papers  published 

Advances  in  chemistry  related  to  explosives  and  explosives  precursors  are  for  instance 
disseminated 
journals.  The 
methodological/experimental  sections  of  these  articles  contain  detailed  information  which 
should  allow  the  reproduction  of  the  experiment.  Some  of  the  stakeholders  who  were 
interviewed  for  the  preparatory  study  carried  out  in  preparation  of  this  impact  assessment, 
expressed concerns about the potential misuse of developments in chemistry for the purpose 
of  manufacturing  HMEs.  Some  experts  have  therefore  advocated  restricting  access  to  open-
access scientific journals to avoid misuse of scientific developments. 

international  scientific 

in 

  An  evolution  of  the  terrorist  threat  is  likely  to  be  reflected  in  the  modus  operandi  and 
frequency  of  attacks.  As  such,  an  evolution  of  the  terrorist  threat  could  impact  misuse  of 
explosives precursors for the illicit manufacture of HMEs. In the EU, IEDs have been used by 
terrorists  across  the  spectrum  (i.e.  jihadists,  ethno-nationalists  and  separatists,  anarchists  and 
left-wing  terrorists,  and  extreme  right  wing  terrorists).  However,  most  of  the  recent  attacks 

42  Internet  sales  of  explosives  precursors  raise  concerns  for  77%  of  respondents,  mainly  due  to  difficulties  in 
identifying the buyer and detecting suspicious transactions. 
43 GHK, Rand Europe and Comstratos, 2010. Preparatory Study to Inform an Impact Assessment of Potential 
Legislative and Non-legislative Restrictions on Chemical Precursors to Explosives. 
44 RAND Europe, 2017: “Behind the dark curtain: the illicit trade of firearms, ammunition and explosives on the dark 
web”, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2091.html. 
45 DJS Research, 2015, “Hazardous Chemicals Research debrief prepared for: Anne-Marie Fry, Policy Lead Hazardous 
Site and Substances, Home Office, OSCT”.  
46  Through  the  European  research  and  innovation  framework  programmes  the  Commission  financed  two  research 
projects on inhibition: PREVAIL (PRecursors of ExplosiVes: Additives to Inhibit their use including Liquids) in 2010-
2013 and EXPEDIA (EXplosives PrEcursor Defeat by Inhibitor Additives) in 2014-2018. Some Member States have 
also financed their own research. 

19 

 
 
 
                                                            
involving  IEDs,  and  particularly  those  aimed  at  soft  targets,  were  carried  out  by  jihadists. 
According  to  Europol,  the  threat  posed  by  jihadist  terrorism  remains  high  and  there  are 
indications  that  the  threat  level  in  the  EU  will  continue  to  increase.47  The  return  of  foreign 
terrorist  fighters  from  (former)  conflict  zones  in  Syria  and  Iraq  might  further  exacerbate  this 
trend. Returnees have been subject to prolonged ideological indoctrination, were often trained to 
use weapons and explosives and may have established links with other foreign fighters.48 Their 
return to Europe facilitates the transfer of tactics, techniques and procedures from conflict zones 
(which  was  already  mentioned  in  the  section  on  technological  developments  in  reference  to 
transfers  via  online  communication  channels)  and  the  exploitation  of  current  security  gaps  on 
restrictions  of  explosives  precursors.  This  transfer  is  expected  to  lead  to  tactical  and 
technological advancements, such as the use of (suicide) vehicle-borne IEDs, which are already 
used Syria and Iraq.49 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? 

3.1.  Legal basis 

As Regulation (EC) No 98/2013 regulates the marketing and use of explosives precursors its legal 
basis  is  Article  114  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU),  which 
concerns the functioning of the internal market. In accordance with Article 4(2) TFEU, the EU does 
not have exclusive competence in this area, and shares its competence with the Member States. The 
subsidiarity principle hence applies and needs to be assessed. 

3.2. 

Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action 

The  need  for  EU  action  was  already  acknowledged  in  2013  when  the  Regulation  was  adopted. 
Given the transnational nature of the problems described in the previous chapter, the need for EU 
action is even stronger today.  

As  showed  by  the  attacks  involving  HMEs  carried  out  in  several  different  Member  States  e.g. 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, United Kingdom), while plots were thwarted in various other 
Member  States,  the  threat  posed  by  HMEs  remains  high  across  the  EU.  Different  security  levels 
resulting  from  the  different  interpretations  that  Member  States  provide  on  the  current  Regulation 
have an impact on the overall security of the EU.  

Different  rules  and  practices  may  also  be  exploited  to  illegally  acquire  explosives  precursors.  If 
terrorist  and  criminals  can  obtain  explosives  precursors  in  Member  States  with  fewer  restrictions 
and/or lower control levels and use these substances to commit attacks in other Member States, this 
is  impacting  the  security  of  each  Member  State  and  raise  security  concerns  at  EU  level.  EU 
intervention is necessary as this practice can only be prevented if Member States harmonise their 
control systems and enforce the rules uniformly.  

The differences in the practical application of the Regulation affect economic operators throughout 
the EU when they sell or buy products intra-EU. This is an internal market problem, which limits 
the  freedom  of  movement  of  explosives  precursors  in  the  EU.  The  problem  cannot  be  solved  by 
unilateral  actions  of  Member  States,  because  the  barriers  and  uncertainties  stem  from  differences 
between  Member  States’  laws  and  procedures.  Similarly,  the  uncertainties  about  the  existing  EU 
framework ask for an EU solution, as national measures would only lead to different interpretations 
of the Regulation.  

47 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2017, Europol. 
48 Ibid.  
49 IHS, 2018, “European Terrorism Forecast: Trends in Islamist Militancy in 2018.” 

20 

 
 
 
                                                            
3.3. 

Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action 

The evaluation showed the added value of the current Regulation in regulating the marketing and 
use of explosives precursors. According to the consulted stakeholders the strongest added value of a 
possible EU intervention in this area are:  

-  Creating a level playing field for on and offline suppliers:  whilst the Regulation applies to 
the  on-  and  offline  supply  of  explosives  precursors,  the  rules  are  not  always  correctly 
applied to online transactions, which distorts competition. EU action could help to close this 
gap and create a level playing field for conventional and online suppliers.  

-  Stimulating cooperation between public and private entities:  more and better collaboration 
between  public  and  private  entities  could  improve  reporting  and  help  to  raise  awareness 
along  the  supply  chain.  Cooperation  would  help  to  strengthen  controls  along  the  supply 
chain and would provide for opportunities to exchange knowledge and experiences.  

-  Facilitating  cross-border  exchange  of  information:  Regulation  98/2013  has  had  a  positive 
effect  on  cross-border  information  exchange,  particularly  through  exchanges  between 
national authorities within the context of the SCP. These exchanges are important, because 
the  misuse  of  explosives  precursors  to  fabricate  HMEs  is  a  cross-border  issue.  EU  action 
could  strengthen  and  facilitate  information  exchange  across  borders  by  encouraging 
information sharing and providing a forum to exchange information.  

Improving the capacity of Member State authorities to enforce the restrictions and controls that are 
in place, and to implement penalties where there are infringements, is key also to ensuring a good 
functioning of the internal market. In the absence of an appropriate level of enforcement in some 
Member States, others might judge it necessary to adopt measures at national level that go beyond 
the remit of this Regulation. This would have a negative effect on the free movement of people and 
goods and services across the Union.   

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? 

4.1.  General objectives 

There are two general policy objectives: 

1)  Ensure high level of security through measures to prevent and combat crime  
2)  Ensure the functioning of the internal market, preventing distortion of competition or trade 

barriers 

4.2. 

Specific objectives 

In light of the identified problems and the general objectives, the specific objectives are: 

  Further restrict access to certain explosives precursors and strengthen controls; 

  Align restrictions and controls with the evolving threat regarding explosives precursors;  

 

 

Increase enforcement by the competent authorities of the Regulation; 

Improve the transmission of information and compliance along the supply chain; 

  Facilitate intra-EU trade and prevent distortion of competition   

21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  To improve the clarity of the Regulation and ensure uniformity in its application. 

The  Problem  tree  in  section  2.2  presents  a  comprehensive  overview  of  the  problems,  problem 

drivers and the general and specific objectives identified and their links. 

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? 

The following policy options are available: 

  Policy option 0 (baseline) – The Commission, in consultation with the SCP, will continue 

to monitor and facilitate the application of the Regulation; 

  Policy Option 1 (Non legislative) – Reinforce the application of the Regulation with non-

legislative measures; 

  Policy Option 2 (Legislative) –Strengthen and clarify the restrictions and controls of the 

Regulation   

  Policy Option 3 (Legislative) – Introduce further controls along the supply chain.  

These policy options were designed around an increasing level of intervention (i.e. no EU action, 
non-legislative measures, and legislative measures). After having defined the problems and problem 
drivers,  for  each  policy  option  measures  were  identified  that  addressed  all  the  issues  and 
corresponded to the level of intervention and the level of restriction. It was ensured that each policy 
option includes a set of measures that address all the identified problems and problem drivers and 
that the different measures are consistent in their level of restrictiveness and overall approach to the 
problems.  Each  policy  option  and  the  related  policy  measures  are  described  in  the  following 
sections. 

5.1.  Description of the policy options 

5.1.1.  Policy Option 0 – Baseline 

The  baseline  scenario  would  imply  maintaining  the  situation  under  the  current  legal  framework 
with no additional legislative or non-legislative EU initiatives. 

Under the status quo, the three-tiered system of regimes and controls of the marketing and use of 
explosives  precursors,  i.e.  a  ban,  licensing  and  registration  regime,  will  be  maintained.  Access  of 
the general public to restricted explosives precursors will be possible for up to 7 substances from 
Annex  I  through  licenses  and  for  up  to  three  substances  from  Annex  I  through  registration.  No 
additional explosives precursor substances will be restricted for the general public and an ordinary 
legislative  procedure  will  be  required  for  adding  new  threat  substances  to  the  list  of  restrictions. 
Member States may restrict or prohibit the marketing and use of an explosives precursor not listed 
in the Annexes, if they have reasonable grounds for believing that that substance could be used for 
the  illicit  manufacture  of  explosives.  Since  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Regulation,  four  Member 
States have notified additional restrictions to the Commission. How this will develop in the future 
depends  on  the  substance,  evolution  of  the  threats  and  the  manner  in  which  the  EU  takes  action. 
Without  EU  action,  some  Member  States  are  expected  to  introduce  national  restrictions  on 
sulphuric acid.   Professional users will not be explicitly covered by the Regulation. 

The  Commission,  in  consultation  with  the  SCP,  will  continue  to  monitor  and  facilitate  the 
application of the Regulation. 

22 

 
 
 
5.1.2.  Policy Option 1 – Reinforce the application of the Regulation with non-legislative measures  

This  policy  option  would  entail  the  introduction  of  non-legislative  measures  aimed  at  reinforcing 
the application of the existing legal framework. A number of Member States and different actors in 
the supply chain have in the past undertaken voluntary efforts to exchange information, increase the 
level of awareness and engagement of the relevant economic operators and public authorities, and 
adopt  codes  of  conduct  and  guidance.  The  Commission  also  co-organised50  a  series  of  regional 
workshops  for  Member  State  authorities,  in  2016-2017,  and  the  SCP  and  SCP  Members  and 
Observers  have  produced  guidance  materials  to  facilitate  compliance  with  the  restrictions  and 
controls and to strengthen important aspects of the security of explosives precursors on a voluntary 
basis.  

The consultation of stakeholders gives evidence that voluntary efforts have markedly contributed to 
the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  the  restrictions  and  controls  in  place.  However,  initiatives  are 
now concentrated in a handful of Member States and supply chain actors. This policy option would 
involve  EU  action  to  promote  and  facilitate  non-legislative  measures  across  the  Union,  in  a 
coordinated and targeted way. The following measures are foreseen: 

  Establishing  an  SCP  sub-group  to  regularly  discuss  the  evolving  threat  posed  by 
explosives precursors and identify security gaps as they arise. In accordance with Article 
14 of the Commission Decision establishing horizontal rules on the creation and operation 
of Commission expert groups,51 the Commission may establish sub-groups for the purpose 
of  examining  specific  questions.  The  mandate  of  the  SCP  is  currently  rather  broad  and 
includes:  monitoring  and  implementing  the  enforcement  of  the  Regulation,  facilitating  a 
harmonised  implementation  of  the  Regulation  across  the  different  competent  authorities, 
exchanging  views  and  preparing  delegated  acts  and  legislative  proposals.  The  sub-group 
would focus specifically on new and evolving threats (e.g. changes in the substances used to 
manufacture  HMEs,  new  methods  to  gain  access  to  explosives  precursors,  shift  to  lower 
concentration  levels,  etc.)  and  exchange  information  to  identify  and  address  security  gaps 
before terrorists can  misuse  them. The procedure for adding substances to  the Annexes of 
the Regulation would remain unchanged.  Both general and sector-specific trends would be 
taken  into  account,  and  special  attention  would  be  paid  to  operational  and  investigative 
developments  and  to  the  experiences  of  Small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs).  The 
group  would  involve  both  Member  States’  representatives  and  supply  chain  actors,  and 
could  include  individuals  who  are  not  participating  in  the  SCP.  Meetings  would  be 
organised  in  a  classified  setting  if  the  topics  discussed  would  require  so.  The  sub-group’s 
work would feed into the work of the SCP and support the Commission.  

  Tasking  Europol  and  the  EU  Intelligence  and  Situation  Centre  (EU  INTCEN)  to 
regularly  report  to  the  SCP.  Europol,  the  EU’s  law  enforcement  agency,  enables  the 
exchange of crime-related information, gathers and analyses intelligence and provides threat 
assessments.  The  European  Counter  Terrorism  Centre  (ECTC),  which  operates  within 
Europol’s  regulatory  framework  and  organisational  structure,  aims  to  provide  an  effective 
response to terrorism by providing operational and strategic support to Member States. EU 
INTCEN provides assessments and briefings and a range of products based on open sources 
and  intelligence  from  Member  States’  intelligence  and  secret  services.  The  Commission 
would  request  Europol  and  EU  INTCEN  to  prepare  regular  reports  for  the  SCP  on  the 

50 Together with the UK Home Office. 
51  Commission  Decision  establishing  horizontal  rules  on  the  creation  and  operation  of  Commission  expert  groups, 
COM(2016)3301. 

23 

 
 
 
                                                            
evolvement of the threat posed by explosives precursors. Tasking Europol and EU INTCEN 
to provide such updates would improve awareness of new and evolving threats and facilitate 
information sharing between Member States. If necessary, the reports could be accompanied 
by presentations and/or discussions during the meetings of the SCP.  

  Adopting  a  Commission  recommendation  setting  out  detailed  recommendations  for 
licensing and registration regimes. To reinforce the existing restrictions the Commission 
would issue a  recommendation  with guidelines through which  Member States  could  make 
their licensing and registration systems more robust. The recommendation would be based 
on good practices and would go beyond the existing guidance documents produced by the 
Commission. An overview of the topics that would be addressed in the recommendation can 
be found in Annex 10.  

  Organising  dedicated  workshops  on  enforcement  for  public  authorities  and  develop 
guidelines. The Commission, in  cooperation with Member States, would  organise a series 
of  dedicated  workshops  on  the  enforcement  of  the  Regulation.  The  workshops  would  be 
targeted  at  national  authorities  such  as  law  enforcement,  customs,  inspections,  and  first 
responders.  The  workshops  would  result  in  the  adoption,  where  possible  by  consensus,  of 
guidelines. Issues that could be addressed in these guidelines would include:  

o  Overview  of  possible  surveillance  activities  with  concrete  examples  of  good 

practices; 

o  Clarification of the role of customs and best practices for custom’s controls; 

o  Clarification  of  reporting  obligations  (incl.  type  of  information,  procedures,  actors 

involved, format, etc.); 

o  Training and awareness raising targeted at first responders. 

  Establishing an SCP sub-group for inspection authorities. Similarly, to the first measure 
described under this option, this action would entail the creation of an SCP sub-group. This 
sub-group  would  organise  separate  meetings  specifically  aimed  at  representatives  of 
national inspections authorities. The focus of this group would be on reporting, surveillance 
and inspection activities. The group could serve as forum to exchange information as well as 
a platform to share best practices.  

  Organising dedicated workshops for the different actors in the supply chain. 

Besides the workshops on enforcement for public authorities, the Commission with support 
of the Member States would organise a series of targeted workshops aimed at the different 
actors and sectors (e.g. pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, fertilisers, etc.) in the supply chain. The 
focus  would  be  on  challenges  to  compliance  for  supply  chain  actors  and  good  practices. 
Based  on  the  input  and  feedback  received  during  the  workshops,  the  Commission  would 
prepare  guidelines  for  the  supply  chain.  Issues  that  could  be  addressed  in  the  guidelines 
would include:  

o  Differences between professional users and members of the general public; 

o  Correct implementation of the labelling requirement; 

o  Identification of suspicious transactions; 

o  Reporting of suspicious transactions, disappearances and thefts. 

24 

 
 
 
  Promoting  public-private  dialogue  between  public  authorities  and  online  operators. 
The  Commission  would  support  an  initiative  to  regularly  bring  together  public  authorities 
and online companies and marketplaces, in an effort to build a self-sustaining public-private 
dialogue  around  the  risks  related  to  the  internet  availability  of  explosives  precursors.  The 
aims  of  the  initiative  would  be  to  both  increase  the  understanding  of  the  threat  and 
vulnerabilities  relating  to  the  online  market  of  chemicals  and  identify  good  practices  to 
support  prevention  and  detection.  Among  other  topics,  key  challenges  to  discuss  are  the 
identification  of  products  of  concern,  the  short  timeframe  from  order  to  dispatching  and 
acquisition,  cross-border  transactions,  the  criteria  for  identifying  suspicious  transactions 
online,  strategies  for  detecting  non-compliance,  and  strategies  for  detecting  multiple 
purchases  across  different  marketplaces.  This  measure  would  address  the  concerns  raised 
about online sales of explosives precursors.  

5.1.3.  Policy Option 2 - Strengthen and clarify the restrictions and controls of the Regulation   

The  measures  in  this  policy  option  clarify  and  amend  the  existing  legal  framework.  They  do  not 
touch  upon  the  essential  characteristics  of  the  Regulation,  but  strengthen  and  clarify  existing 
restrictions  on  making  available  explosives  precursors  to  members  of  the  general  public.  More 
details  are  provided  on  how  the  supply  chain  and  competent  authorities  can  improve  compliance 
with the Regulation. The second policy option encompasses the following measures: 

  Expanding the scope of restricted explosives precursors. The current Regulation restricts 
the access to, and use of, seven restricted explosives precursors by members of the general 
public.  This  measure  aims  to  expand  the  list  of  restricted  precursors  in  Annex  I  with  two 
more chemical substances that are frequently used for the making of HMEs, such as TATP, 
namely ammonium nitrate and sulphuric acid. Sulphuric acid would be added to Annex I of 
the Regulation. Illicit explosives used in several terrorist attacks committed in the EU in the 
recent  years  have  been  manufactured  with  sulphuric  acid.  The  placing  on  the  market  of 
sulphuric  acid  is  already  regulated  in  the  Eu  due  to  its  hazardous  properties  as  a  skin 
corrosive  chemical  substance  (Annex  VI  of  Regulation  (EC)  1272/2008).  Below  the 
concentration limit of 15% w/w set in column 2 of Annex I, it is significantly more difficult 
to  manufacture  illict  explosives  with  sulphuric  acid,  while  it  could  still  be  used  for  the 
legitimate purposes for which it is made availble. Although the volume of trade in sulphuric 
acid  in  the  EU  is  signficant,  it  is  estminated  that  only  around  0,5%  of  the  sold  product  is 
made available to members of the general public.  

  Adopting a faster procedure to add restricted explosives precursors. In order to swiftly 
accommodate  developments  in  the  misuse  of  substances  as  explosives  precursors  the 
Commission would be given the power to adopt a delegated act to list additional substances 
that  are  not  to  be  made  available  to  the  general  public.  The  criteria  for  assessment  would 
include the level of threat associated with the explosives precursor concerned, the volume of 
trade  in  the  explosives  precursor  concerned,  and  the  possibility  of  establishing  a 
concentration  level  below  which  the  explosives  precursor  could  still  be  used  for  the 
legitimate  purposes  for which it is made  available. The Commission currently  already has 
the power to change the limit-values of these restricted explosives precursors.  

  Discontinuing  the  use  of  registration  regimes.  Instead  of  banning  the  access  and  use  of 
restricted  explosives  precursors  by  members  of  the  general  public,  the  Regulation  allows 
Member  States  to  set  up  a  registration  scheme  for  three  of  the  seven  restricted  explosives 
precursors,  namely  hydrogen  peroxide,  nitromethane  and  nitric  acid.  By  discontinuing  the 
possibility  for  these  regimes  under  the  Regulation,  the  general  public  would  no  longer  be 

25 

 
 
 
allowed to access and use these precursors through a mere registration of their transaction. 
The discontinuation of licensing schemes was considered at an early stage under this option. 
However, licensing is  seen  as  a proportionate measure, which  provides  a balance between 
legitimate  use  and  the  need  to  protect.  The  majority  of  Member  States52  with  a  licensing 
regime consider licensing as effective and efficient in preventing and detecting misuse and 
encouraging  a  behavioural  shift  of  consumers  towards  available  alternatives  or  lower 
concentrations, without restricting the free movement of explosives precursors. Stakeholder 
views confirmed this assessment. It was therefore decided that including the discontinuation 
of licensing schemes as a measure under policy option 2 would be too radical.  

  Reducing the scope of and set an upper concentration limit for licensing. Member States 
would  be allowed to set up or have in place licensing regimes, but licenses could only be 
requested  for  a  limited  number  of  restricted  explosives  precursors  for  which  there  exists 
substantial legitimate use by members of the general public (i.e. only the already restricted 
hydrogen  peroxide,  nitromethane  and  nitric  acid  and  the  newly  proposed  sulphuric  acid). 
Moreover, an upper limit will be set for those substances. Above that limit,  no licence may 
be  issued  as  there  is  no  substantial  legitimate  use  for  it  by  the  public.  This  is  already 
reflected  in  the  Regulation,  which  sets  the  same  upper  limits  in  registration  regimes  for 
acquiring  the  precusors  concerned.  That  means  that  a  complete  ban  for  members  of  the 
general  public  without  any  exeption  would  be  established  for  the  four  other  substances 
currently listed in Annex I of the Regulation above the concentration limit set out therein. 
As  described  in    the  evaluation,  these  four  substances  are  already  banned  in  20  Member 
States and have generated virtually no demand for use by members of the general public in 
the  eight  Member  States,  in  which  licenses  can  be  requested.  The  table  below  provides  a 
schematic overview of the measures explained above.  

Name of the substance 
and Chemical Abstracts 
Service Registry number 
(CAS RN)  

Hydrogen peroxide (CAS 
RN 7722-84-1)  

Nitromethane (CAS RN 
75-52-5)  

Nitric acid (CAS RN 
7697-37-2)  

Limit value   

Upper limit value for the purpose of 
licensing  

12 % w/w  

35 % w/w 

16 % w/w  

40%  w/w 

3 % w/w 

10% w/w 

Potassium chlorate (CAS 
RN 3811-04-9)  

40 % w/w  

Potassium perchlorate 
(CAS RN 7778-74-7)  

40 % w/w  

Sodium chlorate (CAS 

40 % w/w  

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

52 National assessments of the effectiveness of the Regulation: 60% (n=6) report that the licensing regime has been an 
efficient and preferred measure for limiting the availability of explosives precursors. 

26 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
RN 7775-09-9)  

Sodium perchlorate 
(CAS RN 7601-89-0)  

40 % w/w  

Ammonium nitrate (CAS 
RN 6484-52-2) 

16 % by weight of 
nitrogen in relation 
to ammonium nitrate 

N/A 

N/A 

Sulphuric acid (CAS RN 
7664-93-9) 

15 % w/w 

40%  w/w 

  Harmonising the circumstances to be taken into account by the competent authorities 
when issuing licenses. The Regulation currently requires the competent authorities to take 
into account all relevant circumstances, and in particular the legitimacy of the intended use. 
This  would  be  detailed  by  taking  into  account  specifically  the  availability  of  lower 
concentrations  or  alternative  substances  that  would  achieve  a  similar  effect,  the  proposed 
arrangements  to  ensure  that  the  restricted  explosives  precursor  is  kept  securely  and  the 
background of the individual applying for a licence, in particular his or her criminal records. 
A uniform template for national licences will be annexed to the Regulation to facilitate the 
mutual recognition of licences between Member States that apply a licensing regime.   

  Addressing the definitions of "member of the general public" and "professional user". 
The concepts of member of the general public and that of professional user are meant to be 
mutually  exclusive,  because  restricted  explosives  precursors  can  be  made  available  to 
professional  users.  The  Regulation  only  defines  the  concept  of  members  of  the  general 
public  to  which  restrictions  apply.  In  this  option,  the  definition  of  member  of  the  general 
public  will  be  extended  to  cover  also  legal  persons  when  they  are  acting  for  purposes  not 
connected  with  trade,  business  or  profession.  A  definition  of  professional  user  would  be 
inserted in the Regulation.   

  Clarifying  the  labelling  obligation.  The  labelling  provision  of  the  Regulation  will  be 
changed  to  make  clearer  on  which  economic  operator  the  obligation  to  label  applies.  The 
provision  will  also  be  amended  to  clarify  that  this  obligation  applies  irrespective  of  the 
regime that is applied in the Member State of sale. This measure would strengthen controls 
and transfer of information along the supply chain.  

  Require  retail  to  make  personnel  involved  in  sale  aware  of  the  obligations  of  the 
Regulation and perform checks. Retailers are to ensure that their personnel involved in the 
sale to members of the general public is aware of the products that it offers and that contain 
explosives  precursors,  and  demonstrably  instructed  regarding  the  obligations  of  the 
Regulation at this point in the supply chain. The checks as to licences would be reinforced 
by  an  identity  check  and  retail  would  also  be  required  to  verify  that  any  new  prospective 
customer is a professional user.  

  Clarifying that the Regulation also applies to companies operating online and establish 
guidelines. The Regulation will clarify that its restrictions and controls, and obligations on 
the  supply  chain,  including  retail  also  apply  to  companies  operating  online.  As  such,  it  is 
clear that online sales of explosives precursors would be within the scope of the Regulation 
and  that  restrictions  also  apply  to  online  supply  of  the  concerned  substances.    Dedicated 
discussions in the SCP would result in the adoption, if possible by consensus, of guidelines 
on the issue. 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  Requiring  Member  States  to  set  up  inspection  authorities,  training  and  awareness-
raising. The Regulation will require Member States to set up inspection authorities that are 
competent to inspect and control the correct application of the Regulation. Member States 
will also be required to provide training for law enforcement, first responders and customs 
authorities to recognise explosives precursors during the course of their duties and to react 
in  a  timely  and  appropriate  manner  to  suspicious  activity.  Member  States  will  also  be 
required to organise awareness-raising actions, targeted to the specificities of each different 
sector using explosives precursors. 

  Requiring members of the general public and professional users to report significant 

disappearances and thefts. The Regulation will expand the duty to report significant thefts 
and disappearances of substances in their possession to professional users and members of 
the public who have access to restricted substances.    

5.1.4.  Policy Option 3 – Introduce further controls along the supply chain  

Under  this  policy  option,  the  existing  legal  framework  would  be  revised  in  a  significant  way 
through  a  legislative  intervention  that  would  modify  the  essential  characteristics  of  the  current 
Regulation. The revision would introduce new controls along the supply chain and create additional 
obligations for the different actors involved. Proposed measures would include:  

  Revising  Annexes  I  and  II  –taking  a  more  proactive  approach.  At  present,  the 
Regulation covers eighteen explosives precursors: seven substances are restricted and eleven 
others are only subject to a reporting of suspicious transactions obligation. New substances 
can be added to the Annexes to accommodate developments in the misuse of substances as 
explosives  precursors.  This  decision  is  taken  on  the  basis  of  several  criteria:  the  level  of 
threat  associated  with  the  substance(s)  concerned;  the  volume  of  trade  in  the  concerned 
explosives precursor(s); and the possibility of establishing concentrations below which the 
substance(s) could still be used for the legitimate purpose(s).  The criteria would remain the 
same under policy option 3, but the first criterion (threat level) weighs heavier than the other 
two. Moreover, instead of responding to incidents by adding substances that have been used 
in  attacks,  the  list  of  regulated  substances  would  be  revised  and  substances  that  have  not 
(yet) been misused in  Europe but which could be used to manufacture HMEs and/or have 
been used  for  this purpose  in  other regions, would be added. As a result, the scope of the 
Regulation  would  be  extended  and  more  substances  would  be  covered  by  the  restrictions. 
Many  potentially  dangerous  substances  would  be  restricted  and  would  no  longer  be 
available to members of the general public due to their potential misuse. Limit values would 
also be lower than currently is the case to minimise the risk.  

  Requiring reporting of suspicious transactions of non-scheduled substances. On top of 
the revision of the two Annexes, the Commission would also extend the reporting obligation 
and  require  economic  operators  to  report  all  suspicious  transactions,  including  those  that 
concern non-scheduled substances. By redefining the scope of the obligation this way, the 
requirement  becomes  a  ‘catch  all  clause’.  As  such,  it  could  help  to  prevent  the  misuse  of 
substances  that  have  (not)  yet  been  identified  as  potentially  dangerous  explosives 
precursors. It would also encourage economic operators to monitor their transactions better 
and to ensure that they know exactly what they are selling, in which quantities, to whom.  

  Introducing a full ban on restricted explosives precursors for members of the general 
public  (including  online  sales).  This  measure  would  revoke  the  exemptions  for  Member 
States to set up and maintain licensing and registration regimes, in order to give members of 

28 

 
 
 
the  general  public  access  to  restricted  explosives  precursors  above  certain  concentrations. 
The  introduction  of  a  full  ban  would  end  the  three-tiered  system  that  currently  exists  and 
harmonise Member States’ regimes. Whilst this change would not affect the Member States 
that  already  have  a  ban,  it  would  represent  a  major  change  for  the  countries  that  have 
licensing or registration systems in place. The acquisition, possession and use of restricted 
explosives precursors above certain limit values would be limited to professional users, who 
need these substances for their profession, business or trade. Members of the general public, 
even if they intend to use the concerned products for legitimate purposes, would no longer 
be allowed to have access to restricted explosives precursors. This ban would equally apply 
to online sales of restricted explosives precursors.  

  Requiring the registration of transactions involving professional users. To monitor the 
use and acquisition of restricted substances by professional users, a new obligation would be 
introduced which would require the registration of all  transactions of restricted substances 
involving professional users. The procedure would be very similar to the system currently 
foreseen  for  the  registration  of  transactions  involving  members  of  the  general  public.  The 
register would have to be kept for five years from the date of the transaction and should be 
available  at  any  time  for  inspection.  The  following  information  would  be  included  in  the 
register:  the  name,  address  and  the  VAT  number  of  the  users  concerned;  the  name  of  the 
substance(s) or mixture(s) and the concentration(s), the amount of the substance or mixture 
concerned; the date and place of the transaction, and the signature of the professional user. 

  Requiring  electronic  registrations  of  transactions  involving  professional  users  to  be 
forwarded  to  the  competent  authorities  in  real  time.  In  addition  to  introducing  a 
requirement  concerning  the  registration  of  transactions  of  explosives  precursors  listed  in 
Annex I involving professional users, policy option three also foresees the real time transfer 
of  the  data  concerned  to  the  competent  authorities.  By  forwarding  information  about 
transactions  involving  restricted  substances  to  the  competent  authorities,  relevant  services 
would be aware of all transactions involving professional users that are taking place. In case 
of a suspicious transaction, the authorities could directly intervene and trace the professional 
user  involved  in  the  transaction.  If  necessary,  the  information  could  be  shared  with  other 
Member States’ authorities. This requirement would probably require the creation of an IT 
system  connecting  economic  operators  to  the  competent  national  authorities  and  allowing 
real time exchanges of information or another solution to transfer the electronic information 
to the competent authorities. 

  Requiring the registration of economic operators at national level. Economic operators 
who intend to manufacture, distribute or sell regulated substances (Annex I and/or Annex II) 
and/or  mixtures/substances  containing  them,  would  be  required  to  register  in  a  national 
register.  In  order  to  be  registered  they  would  have  to  provide  the  following  information: 
name,  address,  VAT  number;  contact  details,  and  the  activity  for  which  they  need  the 
concerned substances/role in the supply chain. 

Such  a  register  would  not  only  provide  a  comprehensive  overview  of  the  different  actors 
involved in the supply chain, it could also help the competent authorities to identify relevant 
economic operators and target them in their awareness campaigns.  

  Requiring the labelling of Annex I and Annex II substances and mixtures. The current 
Regulation requires economic operators who intend to make restricted explosives precursors 
(Annex  I)  available  to  members  of  the  general  public  to  label  their  products.  The  label 
signals  that  the  product  concerned  is  subject  to  certain  restrictions.  Under  policy  option 

29 

 
 
 
three,  members  of  the  general  public  would  no  longer  have  access  to  substances  listed  in 
Annex  I.  Nevertheless,  economic  operators  would  be  required  to  label  all  regulated 
explosives  precursors  (Annex  I  and  Annex  II)  and/or  substances  containing  them.  This 
would facilitate the identification of explosives precursors and help to raise awareness. The 
label  for  restricted  substances  would  clearly  indicate  that  the  product  should  not  be  made 
available  to  members  of  the  general  public.  The  label  for  substances  listed  in  Annex  II 
would  state  that  suspicious  transactions  involving  the  substance  concerned  should  be 
reported.  

  Requiring  information  on  explosives  precursors  to  be  incorporated  in  bar  codes.  To 
improve the transmission of information along the supply chain, economic operators would 
be  required  to  include  information  on  the  restriction  and  reporting  obligations  in  the 
barcodes  of  substances  and  mixtures  of  concern.  Bar  codes  are  already  used  to  transfer  a 
variety  of  (product)  information,  such  as:  type  of  product,  serial  number,  lot  number, 
expiration  date,  etc.  By  transmitting  information  about  the  applicable  requirements  in  the 
barcode, the different actors in the supply chain are automatically when they scan the code. 
This requirement would only apply to products that bear a bar code, it does not impose an 
obligation on economic operators to use bar codes, if they do not do so yet.  

Policy option 1 

Policy option 2 

Establishing an SCP sub-group to 
regularly discuss the evolving threat 
posed by explosives precursors and 
identify security gaps as they arise. 

Tasking Europol and the EU 
Intelligence and Situation Centre 
(EU INTCEN) to regularly report to 
the SCP. 

Adopting a Commission 
recommendation setting out detailed 
recommendations for licensing and 
registration regimes. 

Organising dedicated workshops on 
enforcement for public authorities 
and develop guidelines. 

Establishing an SCP sub-group for 
inspection authorities. 

Organising dedicated workshops for 
the  different  actors  in  the  supply 
chain. 

Promoting  public-private  dialogue 
between  public  authorities  and 
online operators. 

Expanding the scope of restricted 
explosives precursors. 

Adopting a faster procedure to add 
restricted explosives precursors. 

Discontinuing the use of registration 
regimes. 

Reducing the scope of and set an 
upper concentration limit for 
licensing. 

Policy option 3 
Revising Annexes I and II – taking a 
more proactive approach. 

Requiring reporting of suspicious 
transactions of non-scheduled 
substances. 

Introducing a full ban on restricted 
explosives  
precursors for members of the 
general public (including online 
sales). 

Harmonising the circumstances to 
be taken into account by the NCAs 
when issuing licenses. 

Requiring the registration of 
transactions involving professional 
users. 

Addressing the definitions of 
"member of the general public" and 
"professional user". 

Clarifying the labelling obligation. 

Require retail to make sales 
personnel aware of the obligations 
of the Regulation and perform 
checks. 

Clarifying that the Regulation also 
applies to online sales and establish 
guidelines. 

Requiring Member States to set up 
inspection authorities, training and 
awareness-raising. 

Requiring electronic registrations of 
transactions involving professional 
users to be forwarded to the 
competent authorities in real time. 

Requiring the registration of 
economic operators at national 
level. 

Requiring the labelling of Annex I 
and Annex II substances and 
mixtures. 

Requiring information on explosives 
precursors to be incorporated in bar 
codes. 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Requiring members of the general 
public and professional users to 
report significant disappearances 
and thefts. 

5.2.  Measures discarded at an early stage 

The following measures were considered at an early stage but subsequently discarded:  

  Extending the scope of the Regulation to cover pyrotechnic articles.  
  Ban sales of restricted explosives precursors over the internet.  
  Exempt inhibited substances from the restrictions.  
 
  Require economic operators to obtain a licence from the competent authorities before they may 

Introduce requirements on storage.  

possess, use, or make available restricted explosives precursors.  
Introduce restrictions on exports.  

 
  Develop  a  platform  at  EU  level  to  exchange  information  on  suspicious  transactions, 

disappearances, and thefts, as well as licences granted and denied.  

At an early stage, it was also decided to examine and compare four different, separate policy 
options  instead  of  combinations  of  sub-options.  A  detailed  overview  of  the  measures 
considered and the reasons why they were discarded can found in Annex 7.  

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? 

The  policy  options  have  been  assessed  against  their  potential  effectiveness,  economic,  social, 
environmental and fundamental rights impacts. 

6.1.  Effectiveness 

Effectiveness  measures  to  what  extent  the  different  policy  options  contribute  to  the  specific 
objectives described in section 4.2. 

The  baseline  scenario  would  make  a  limited  contribution  to  the  achievement  of  the  specific 
objectives of the initiative. Under this scenario, some of the challenges that have emerged from the 
evaluation  would  persist  and  hinder  the  effective  achievement  of  the  specific  objectives  of  the 
Regulation. 

Should  the  status  quo  be  maintained,  limited  harmonisation  among  Member  States  would 
continue  to  exist,  as  differences  in  national  implementing  practices  of  the  Regulation  would 
remain. In the absence of EU intervention, unclear provisions of the Regulation would continue to 
be  differently  interpreted  by  Member  States  and  economic  operators  would  continue  to  face 
difficulties  in  identifying  products  of  concern  and  legitimate  users,  and  encounter  challenges  for 
compliance  with  the  Regulation’s  requirements.  Costs  to  comply  and  information  costs  would 
therefore continue to be high.  

The level of enforcement  could progressively increase over the years, since concerned national 
authorities would become more familiar with the punishable offences related to the Regulation and 
would  improve  their  knowledge  of  the  supply  chain  and  identified  the  relevant  actors  to  control. 
However,  the  framework  would  remain  fragmented  as  Member  States  would  continue  to  put 

31 

 
 
 
 
 
 
different efforts in the enforcement of the Regulation and the complexity of the supply chain would 
continue to hinder the proper identification of relevant economic operators.  

Due to the difficulties encountered in reaching all actors of the explosives precursors supply chain, 
it is likely that awareness raising activities of NCAs would continue to cover only part of the 
relevant  actors.  Moreover,  the  voluntary  nature  of  awareness  raising  activities  of  economic 
operators, together with the poor clarity of some Regulations’ provisions and difficulties to identify 
concerned products would continue to reflect in different implementing practices. 

Should the present situation be maintained, the  level of reporting to the NCP could increase as 
practices  and  rules  will  be  better  known,  but  differences  would  continue  to  remain  from  one 
Member  State  to  the  other,  and  the  level  of  reporting  is  expected  to  remain  suboptimal,  as 
awareness would likely continue to be uneven.  

Differences in the implementation of the EU Regulation would continue to generate security issues, 
such  as  limited  traceability  of  transactions,  insufficient  levels  of  reporting  and  different  practices 
and  enforcement  efforts  in  different  Member  States,  and  obstacles  would  remain  as  for  the  free 
movement of substances across Member States.  

Possible deterioration of the status quo may derive from the absence of certain threat substances in 
Annex I to the Regulation and from the insufficient level of attention given to internet sales. As for 
this latter, ambiguities on the application of the Regulation to online market places would remain 
therefore leaving security concerns and distortions in the market of chemical substances. 

Policy option 1 makes an overall positive contribution towards the achievement of all specific 
objectives.  However,  the  impact  level  across  these  objectives  varies  significantly,  between 
moderate and small, and could be deemed, as a whole and owing largely to the voluntary nature of 
the measures proposed, insufficient to address the current security context.  

The measures proposed under this option would be effective, to a moderate extent, in achieving two 
specific  objectives:  increasing  enforcement  capacity  of  the  relevant  public  authorities  and 
improving transmission of information and compliance along the supply chain. As for the former, 
workshops targeting the different public authorities with a role in implementing and enforcing the 
Regulation (notably, law enforcement, first responders, and customs authorities) would facilitate the 
exchange  of  different  experiences  and  views,  allow  the  identification  of  good  practices,  and 
increase  the  exchange  of  relevant  cross-border  information,  all  of  which  would  contribute 
effectively  towards  increasing  enforcement  capacity.  An  SCP  sub-group  for  inspectors  could 
facilitate the setting up of dedicated inspections systems in Member States that do not already have 
them,  and  building  a  platform  for  dialogue  with  online  operators  would  also  provide  tools  to 
Member States who have not traditionally engaged internet companies and marketplaces.  

With  regard  to  the  second  specific  objective,  bringing  together  the  different  actors  and  sectors  of 
involved  in  the  supply  chain,  in  dedicated  workshops,  would  increase  the  level  of  awareness  and 
understanding  and  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  transmission  of  information  along  the  supply 
chain. This would facilitate key aspects of compliance, such as the identification of products falling 
under  the  scope  of  the  Regulation  and  the  identification  and  reporting  of  suspicious  transactions. 
Building  a  public-private  dialogue  on  internet  availability  would  similarly  contribute  to 
effectiveness  in  that  very  specific  sector.  In  addition,  measures  aimed  at  Member  States,  like  the 
workshops for public authorities and the SCP sub-group for inspectors, would indirectly contribute 
to improved compliance by the supply chain, as better enforcement practices would certainly bring 
about a more constructive approach to engaging the supply chain and working in partnership with 
businesses. 

32 

 
 
 
To an important, but lesser extent, the measures would also allow the EU, Member States, and the 
supply  chain,  to  align  restrictions  and  controls  with  the  evolving  threats.  The  participation  of 
competent authorities, NCPs, relevant stakeholders from the supply chain, as well as Europol and 
EU  INTCEN  to  regular  meetings  dedicated  to  the  threat  posed  by  explosives  precursors,  would 
ensure all parties with a role in restricting and controlling have the latest information and can adjust 
their efforts accordingly. Law enforcement, in particular, would be able to focus their actions on the 
most  urgent  threats,  including  emergent  threats.  Competent  authorities  would  gain  a  better 
understanding  of  the  security  context  and  factor  this  understanding  into  their  decision-making 
process. The supply chain could adjust their criteria for identifying suspicious transactions and their 
strategies for knowing customers and verifying the intended use of the substances supplied. Europol 
and  EU  INTCEN  would  collect  valuable  data  to  analyse  and  cross-check  at  EU  level,  and  the 
quality  and  relevance  of  their  reporting  back  to  Member  States  would  improve  over  time.  The 
Commission would be able to make sure of its delegated powers to add substances into Annex II 
and change the limit values of substances in Annex I, on the basis of the information received and 
in  a  relatively  short  time,  although  the  addition  of  substances  into  Annex  I  would  remain  slow. 
Importantly, this option would help, over time, build trust over the sharing of sensitive but valuable 
information.  

However, this  policy option  would fall  short of ensuring effectiveness in what concerns the three 
remaining specific objectives.  

Regarding the strengthening of restrictions and controls, in the absence of legislative measures, the 
Commission’s  Recommendation  would  contribute  to  making  some  of  the  current  licensing  and 
registration regimes more robust. However, Member States who do not take action on the basis of 
the  Recommendation,  and  those  maintaining  a  ban  regime,  would  not  strengthen  the  level  of 
restrictions and controls in their territories since the legal framework would remain the same. The 
Commission  would  have  to  rely  on  a  future  legislative  initiative  to  tighten  security  around 
explosives precursors in a significant way and across the entire Union. 

With  regard  to  simplifying  and  clarifying  the  Regulation,  dedicated  workshops  for  the  relevant 
public authorities and supply chain actors would shed some clarity on a limited number of issues, 
such as who is responsible for labelling and who is or is not a member of the general public. This 
would  be  mostly  the result  of  discussing  the  meaning  of  certain  provisions  in  the  Regulation  and 
agreeing on a common interpretation. On a number of issues, agreeing on a common interpretation 
might prove elusive, however, and therefore the impact on this specific objective would be at times 
null.  This  policy  option  would  therefore  not  be  as  effective  in  simplifying  and  clarifying  the 
Regulation as if the text of the Regulation itself was amended. 

As for facilitating intra-EU trade and preventing distortion of competition, the Recommendation for 
licensing and registration regimes and an SCP sub-group for inspection authorities would achieve 
some  uniformity  in  the  practical  application  of  the  Regulation.  This  would  effectively  reduce 
uncertainty for  economic  operators who  conduct  their  business  across  EU  borders, as  they  would 
face  more  similar  approaches  to  the  rules  in  the  different  regimes.  As  a  result,  their  operations 
would  gain  in  agility  and  competitiveness.  The  gain,  however,  would  risk  being  minimal  as  the 
legal framework, and therefore the actual rules, would not change. The incentive for Member States 
to  change  their  practices  and  adopt  the  Recommendation  and  the  good  practices  identified  in  the 
SCP  subgroup  would  be  limited  and  adoption  itself  would  likely  be  too  slow  to  be  effective  in  a 
reasonable timeframe. 

Despite the positive contribution of policy option 1 to effectiveness, across all specific objectives, 
the level of impact would be limited. The main reason behind this is the non-legislative nature of 

33 

 
 
 
the  measures.  Because  participating  to  the  proposed  sub-groups  and  workshops,  and  putting  the 
recommendations, guidance, and codes of conduct into practice, would be ultimately voluntary, full 
coverage across the Union and along the supply chain is unlikely to be achieved.  

As a result, this policy option would most likely lead to Member States and different actors in the 
supply  chain  advancing  at  different  speeds.  In  the  context  of  the  threat  posed  by  explosives 
precursors, this would create opportunities for terrorists and criminals to exploit the weakest links 
and would therefore be detrimental to maximising the effectiveness potential of an initiative by the 
Commission.  

Policy option 2 would contribute equally to the security–oriented and internal market-related 
specific objectives.  

The  list  with  restricted  substances  is  extended  in  line  with  the  evolving  threat  of  HME,  which 
shows that sulphuric acid has repeatedly been used to manufacture the most popular HMEs (TATP 
and HMTD) and with reportedly relative ease. The substance is already dangerous as such due to its 
corrosive nature and has been used to inflict injuries upon people in acid attacks.  

The  concentration  up  to  which  nitromethane  can  be  made  available  to  the  general  public  will  be 
lowered,  in  line  with  a  recommedation  of  a  EU  funded  project  that  considers  this  would 
significantly reduce the threat and potential misuse of nitromethane.53  

The  transfer  of  the  restriction  related  to  Ammonium  Nitrate  from  REACH  will  make  the  legal 
framework  more  coherent  and  hence  the  more  likely  to  be  complied  with  and  enforced.  By 
delegating the power to add substances for restriction to the European Commission, the Regulation 
will  be  more  agile  and  adaptable  to  close  security  loopholes  in  a  rapidly  evolving  threat 
environment.  

The  possibilities  for  the  general  public  to  access  precursors  that  are  already  restricted,  but 
remain popular for the production of HME, will be further reduced. Explosives precursors will 
be completely banned above a certain concentration for which the general public has no need54. For 
those explosives precursors for which the public has a need, they will only be able to access those 
explosives  precursors  through  a  licence,  which  would  allow  for  background  checks  of  the 
individual  before  a  purchase  is  made.  It  will  therefore  no  longer  be  possible  to  access  highly 
concentrated hydrogen peroxide through a mere registration of the transaction.  

By contrast, experience demonstrates that licensing regimes can be very effective in restricting 
access  of  precursors  above  the  concentration  limit  to  the  general  public,  while  allowing  for 
legitimate  use  by  members  of  the  general  public.  The  cost  of  the  licence  and  the  burden  of  the 
procedure  to  apply  the  inconvenience  of  applying  for  a  licence,  seems  to  deter  individuals  from 
purchasing  the  above  concentration  threshold  chemicals.  The  number  of  licence  applications  has 
decreased  significantly  every  year  since  the  Regulation  is  into  force55.  Although  licences  can  be 
provided  for  a  period  of  up  to  three  years,  it  also  indicates  that  restrictions,  such  as  a  licensing 
regimes, have a limiting effect on the demand for precursors above the concentration limit. In most 
cases,  it  may  be  assumed  that  consumers  would  use  products  with  lower  concentrations,  as  they 
may  be  discouraged  from  applying  for  a  license.  Producers  have  anticipated  and  reacted  to  the 
decrease  in  demand  by  seeking  to  manufacture  and  market  products  containing  alternative 
substances or containing lower concentration of restricted explosives precursors. The result is that 

53 EXPEDIA (EXplosives PrEcursor Defeat by Inhibitor Additives), see www.expedia-fp7.eu/. 
54 See Annex 4: Market Analysis; SEC(2010) 1040 final of 20.9.2010. 
55 See Annex 3: Evaluation . 

34 

 
 
 
                                                            
precursors  are  less  available  to  the  general  public  and  consequently,  also  to  terrorists  and  other 
criminals.  

The  establishment  of  minimum  common  criteria  for  granting  or  refusing  licences  would  lead  to 
more  uniform  security  standards  and  will  further  restrict  access  to  explosives  precursors  in 
those Member States which applied less stringent rules and strengthening controls, for example by 
making background checks compulsory. The positive impact on security will be strengthened by the 
addition  of  conditions  on  the  acquisition  of  precursors,  for  example  asking  end-users  to  respect 
storage conditions and reporting of thefts and disappearances. The existence of common licensing 
criteria will create a more homogeneous playing field, and facilitate the work of companies active 
in  different  Member  States.  This  measure  will  aid  mutual  recognition  of  licences,  which  would 
smooth the functioning of the internal market, favouring the movement of precursors that may be 
acquired for legal purposes in the same way in those countries applying licensing. 

In  general,  limiting  exceptions  to  the  ban  for  the  general  public  will  simplify  the  legal 
framework  and  make  it  clearer.  Rules  across  the  EU  will  be  more  homogeneous,  facilitating 
intra-EU trade, competition and close forum-shopping.  

The clarification  that online operators fall  under the Regulation  will  also contribute to  ensuring a 
level  playing  field  among  companies  operating  on-  and  offline,  and  closing  a  significant  security 
gap which criminals and terrorist are currently increasingly exploiting. 

A  majority  of  respondents  to  the  OPC  consider  the  lack  of  restrictions  and  controls  applied  to 
legal persons as posing a security concern. By being included in the definition of "members of 
the general public", legal persons would only be allowed to access precursors if they have a need 
for  this  following  from  their  profession.  This  need  would  also  be  reflected  in  the  newly  defined 
concept  of  "professional  user",  clarifying  who  can  and  who  cannot  have  access  to  restricted 
explosive  precursors.  These  clarifications  in  the  definitions  will  have  a  positive  impact  on 
uniformity in the application of the Regulation and reduce difficulties for companies. It will reduce 
the current subjectivity and uncertainties that leave room to unlawful transactions.   

The  whole  supply  chain  will  be  better  informed  through  targeted  awareness  raising  actions.  By 
clarifying the labelling obligation, downstream actors of the supply chain will be supplied with the 
information  needed  to  apply  consistently  the  requirements  of  the  Regulation.  It  will  diminish 
current  uncertainties  of  economic  operators  linked  to  the  lack  of  clarity  in  the  allocation  of 
responsibilities  along  the  supply  chain  and  therefore  ensuring  similar  types  of  costs  for  similar 
economic  operators  between  MS.  By  clarifying  that  the  label  applies  in  all  Member  States, 
irrespective of what regime is applied, cross-border trade is facilitated and distortion of competition 
avoided. 

The staff involved in sale to final users will be trained on which product can only be made available 
after a  check, leading to  better compliance  with  the  Regulation. This  staff is  responsible in the 
first  instance  to  identify  suspicious  transactions.  In  doing  so,  this  measure  should  improve  the 
compliance of retailers to the Regulation's requirement and eventually ensure a wider a consistent 
assessment  of  suspicious  transactions.  This  measure  will  also  improve  the  functioning  of  the 
internal  market  by  ensuring  a  level  playing  field  where  all  retailers  operating  in  the  explosives 
precursors  market  will  bear  the  same  costs  for  training  and  ultimate  contribute  to  ensuring  equal 
conditions to sale transactions of professional users and members of the general public in all MS. 

A dedicated inspection authority in each Member State, and training for public authorities that may 
deal with explosives precursors, will increase the enforcement capacity across the EU. This will 
improve the awareness of LEAs, first responders and customs authorities on the requirements of the 

35 

 
 
 
Regulation and on its "weakest links" (e.g. controls on internet sales, controls on imports from third 
countries)  and  eventually  improve  the  quality  of  controls  performed  on  products  entering  and 
circulating in the internal market. Similar controls applied in all Member States will likely create a 
more  secure  environment  for  businesses  and  limit  potential  market  distortions  linked  to  the 
existence  of  different  enforcement  systems  at  national  level.  By  implementing  training  for  law 
enforcement, first responders and customs authorities, this measure will also contribute to create a 
more secure environment for businesses and cross-border transactions. 

Policy option 3 would contribute more to the security –oriented specific objectives than those 
related to the internal market. Policy option 3's effectiveness is high for the objective to further 
restrict  access  and  strengthen  controls,  in  line  with  the  evolving  threat.  The  Regulation  would 
anticipate  to  future  developments  by  restricting  additional  substances  that  could  be  used  to 
manufacture  HMEs  and  making  all  substances  that  can  be  used  to  make  HMEs  reportable. 
Moreover, restricted explosives precursors would no longer be made available to the general public, 
without exceptions.  

Enforcement by the competent authorities of the Regulation would increase because they would be 
able  to  monitor  and  analyse  all  transactions  with  professional  users.  The  register  of  economic 
operators  would  also  facilitate  the  identification  of  supply  chain  actors  working  with  regulated 
substances, which could help the competent authorities to better target information campaigns.  

The  full  ban  on  restricted  explosives  precursors  for  members  of  the  general  public  would  make 
rules  across  the  EU  more  similar,  facilitating  intra-EU  trade  and  competition.  More  streamlined 
restrictions would simplify the Regulation, but the addition of numerous obligations would make it 
overall slightly more complicated and less clear. The policy option therefore scores much lower on 
the simplification of the framework.  

The  transfer  of  information,  through  labels  and  barcodes,  of  all  products  that  contain  explosives 
precursors would facilitate retail to identify the relevant products and comply with the restrictions 
of  access  and  reporting  of  suspicious  transactions.  The  awareness  raising  activities  that  would 
accompany the revision of the Regulation and the introduction of new obligations could also have 
an indirect effect on the awareness along the supply chain. By informing the different stakeholders 
about their obligations and drawing their attention to the revised framework for producing, selling 
and using explosives precursors, awareness along the supply chain could be increased.  

6.2.  Economic impacts 

To evaluate the economic impacts of the different policy options, the effects of each option on the 
EU economy and on different economic actors (e.g. producers, retailers, consumers) was assessed, 
as well as their costs and potential for cost savings. Particular attention was also paid to the impact 
of  the  different  options  on  SMEs.  The  impacts  below  are  estimates  based  on  an  external 
study56.This study has estimated the impacts of each measure of the three options, by basing itself 
on existing studies and on interviews with affected stakeholders. These stakeholders were asked to 
assess for each measure the expected impact on all aspects relevant for an impact assessment such 
as  the  compliance  costs,  administrative  burdens  and  economic  losses  for  economic  operators. 
Accordingly, the study has scored the measures as having a slight (<10%), moderate (10-30%) or 
significant  (>30%)  impact  on  all  those  aspects,  in  either  a  negative  or  positive  way.  With  all  the 
scores  of  the  individual  measures,  the  study  has  calculated  the  total  impacts  for  each  option. 

56 Study on combatting the threat posed by explosives precursors: evaluation of the existing policy and legislative 
framework and preparation of an impact assessment of possible options for a future EU initiative, Ernst & Young, 2018. 

36 

 
 
 
                                                            
Additional  information  can  be  found  in  Annex  4,  which  provides  a  market  analysis  and  Annex  6 
which provides more detailed assessments of the costs and benefits for option 2.  

It is important to note that the chemical market in the EU is large and diversified, with multiple 
end-users using the precursors concerned. Most is consumed by industry for formulated products, 
but  some  of  the  precursors  have  substantial  markets  in  their  own  right  (e.g.  nitrate fertilizers  and 
acids). The market for the general public was estimated at 1.5% of the annual turnover in 2010,57 
before the adoption and entry into force of the restrictions. The restrictions had a reducing effect on 
offer  and  demand  of  restricted  explosives  precursors  to  the  general  public  since  then.  Public 
authorities  have  reported  that  the  availability  of  such  precursors  in  stores  that  sell  to  the  general 
public  has  reduced  significantly  and  producers  and  manufactures  report  to  have  adapted  to 
restrictions by lowering concentrations and offering alternative substances. It seems therefore safe 
to  assume  that  the  affected  part  of  the  market  is  therefore  currently  smaller  than  1.5%  (see 
Table 16 in Annex 4). 

Under the baseline option, the fragmentation of the system of restrictions and controls across the 
EU,  as  well  as  differences  in  the  enforcement  impacts  in  the  Member  States,  would  continue  to 
generate uncertainties and an uneven level playing field, as economic operators would continue 
facing different rules in different countries. The ambiguity on the application of the Regulation to 
online  stores  and  market  places  would  persist  and  continue  to  create  market  distortions  with 
physical shops, the latter bearing more costs than online shops for which controls are more difficult 
to perform. Moreover, limited harmonisation of rules across Member States would continue posing 
a strain on the free movement of explosives precursor substances. The insufficient transmission of 
information along the supply chain and the lack of clarity of certain provisions would leave burden 
on retailers that would continue to face costs to identify the products that fall under the Regulation.  

The current level of availability and awareness about the existence of alternative substances could 
have a negative impact on the perceived product choice and availability among the general public. 

The  lack  of  clarity  of  some  provisions  would  continue  to  create  unnecessary  costs  for  industry, 
notably  in  relation  to  training  and  identification  of  concerned  products.  These  costs  particularly 
affect SMEs that are the predominant type of enterprise among retailers. 

Furthermore, the baseline would not raise costs for industry, public authorities and consumers, 
nor would it lead to cost-savings or reducing of the burden. Administrative costs for industry for 
reporting activities will remain in the margins of day of work for a full time equivalent (FTE) per 
months  for reporting  suspicious  transactions.  The  most  burdensome  activity  for  public  authorities 
will continue to be the registration and processing of licensing applications, amounting to up to a 
working day of FTE 

Policy option 1, in comparison to the baseline, could benefit to competition over time and would be 
neutral  on  consumers  and  SMEs.  It  would  have  a  limited  cost  saving  and  burden  reduction 
potential. 

The impact on competition would be overall positive, mainly due to economic operators being 
able to expect, over time, more uniform practices across the Union’s internal market and therefore 
reducing  the  costs  of  obtaining  information  about,  and  adapting  their  business  practices  to,  the 
specificities of each regime. Concretely, the promotion of a more harmonised approach to licensing 
and registration, a clearer application of the restrictions and controls, and better enforcement, would 
all allow economic operators who conduct business across borders to gradually face similar regimes 

57 SEC(2010) 1040 final of 20.9.2010. 

37 

 
 
 
                                                            
and  interpretations  of  the  rules  across  an  increasing  number  of  EU  Member  States.  This  would 
reduce  distortions  of  competition,  as  economic  operators  would  not  be  as  dependent  on  the 
particularities  of  the  regimes  in  which  they  operate  and  could  save  costs  by  conducting  similar 
business  practices  across  the  Union.  The  workshops  targeting  the  supply  chain,  and  resulting 
increase in the level of awareness by economic operators, would further help reduce barriers on the 
basis  of  knowledge.  Furthermore,  increased  exchanges  between  the  public  authorities  of  different 
Member States would allow the identification of administrative practices that incur lower burdens 
while  obtaining  the  same  level  of  effectiveness,  and  therefore  have  the  potential  to  reduce 
administrative burdens in some Member States. 

The impact on consumers, both professional users and members of the general public, would 
be  null  in  the  short  and  medium  term.  In  the  longer  term,  as  emerging  threat  substances  are 
identified,  the  impact  is  uncertain  but  could  depend  much  on  the  substances  used  and  activities 
carried out by each consumer.  

Consumers  of  emerging  threat  substances  could  be  eventually  facing  restrictions  that  would 
compromise  their  legitimate  professional  or  non-professional  activities.  To  compensate  this 
negative  impact,  Member  States  and  the  EU  institutions  would  have  to  ensure  that  consumers, 
including  members  of  the  general  public  who  carry  out  legitimate  non-professional  activities,  are 
duly and timely consulted before adding substances into Annexes I and II.  

Conversely,  consumers  with  legitimate  non-professional  activities  would  benefit  from  more 
uniformity  in  the  rules applied in  licensing  and  registration  regimes,  and,  in  the  former,  from  the 
issuing  of  licences  that  are  mutually  recognised  across  the  Union.  Since  they  are  also  subject  to 
penalties for non-compliance, especially ‘possession’ and ‘use,’ consumers that are members of the 
general public would equally benefit from a clearer application of the restrictions and controls and 
better enforcement, for reasons similar to those of economic operators (reduce costs of finding out 
about the specificities of each regime, adapting to the different  rules, and avoiding  fines  for non-
compliance). 

The  impact  on  SMEs  would  be  the  same  as  for  other  types  of  economic  operators  although 
SMEs have less resources available, both in terms of financial and human resources, to dedicate to 
the  participation  to  workshops  and  following  the  activities  of  Member  States  and  the  EU  in  this 
area.  Many  SMEs  are  not  part  of  Member  State-  or  European-level  associations  that  could 
potentially represent them in the proposed fora or kept them informed about relevant developments 
and how these may affect them. As a result, they are generally less connected to the policy-making 
process in what concerns security policy and are therefore unlikely to influence it or, in the case of 
non-legislative efforts, benefit from them. 

As regards the impact of this policy option on enforcement costs, these could initially increase for 
public authorities, by less than 10% of what they are in the baseline scenario, in view of the human 
resources needed to participate in the various proposed meetings and to put the recommendations 
concerning  licencing  and  registration  regimes  in  place.  However,  the  expected  increase  in 
enforcement capacity would, after this initial period, compensate these costs. 

The administrative burden for competent authorities would lighten, to some extent, because through 
this  policy  option  the  Commission  would  provide  increased  support  for  competent  authorities  in 
their efforts to improve the practical application of the restrictions and controls by both the relevant 
public authorities and economic operators.  

Similarly, the Commission would provide increased support for the supply chain, relieving some of 
the administrative burden involved in raising awareness. 

38 

 
 
 
In the mid-term, this policy option would have a positive effect on compliance costs by economic 
operators, as a result of increased awareness along the supply chain and increased uniformity in the 
practices adopted by Member States.  

Economic  operators  would  not  experience  any  economic  losses  since  this  policy  option  does  not 
entail changes to the Annexes to the Regulation. 

Policy option 2's economic impacts would be noticeable. Both large and small companies would 
be affected, as well as consumers. The measures proposed, and in particular the discontinuing of the 
registration  regimes,  are  expected  to  have  positive  impacts  on  competition.  Option  2  would 
enhance an EU level playing field by harmonising Member States’ regimes and imposing the same 
obligations  on  all  manufacturers  regarding  labelling  and  the  transmission  of  information.  The 
streamlining of restrictions and controls across the EU would facilitate the operations of companies 
operating  in  several  Member  States.  Option  2  would  also  improve  compliance  by  online 
companies with the Regulation, avoiding distortion of competition. Better enforcement would put 
an  end  to  the  illegitimate  advantage  that  those  companies  have  by  not  complying  with  the 
Regulation. 

The  impact  on  consumers  is  expected  to  be  limited,  and  confined  to  perceptions  of  a  reduced 
product  choice  and  availability.  There  will  be  also  a  negative  impact  on  legal  persons,  as  legal 
persons with no professional interest would not be able anymore to acquire restricted products (in 
MS where the ban is applied) or acquire restricted products only with a license (in MS where the 
licensing  regime  is  applied).  Furthermore,  defining  a  "professional  user"  may  negatively  affect 
users that operate in a Member State where the concept is understood more broadly but it will also 
increase  the  potential  market  for  users,  including  companies,  which  operate  in  a  Member  State 
where the concept is understood more restricted. 

The potential loss in sales to the general public by making sulphuric acid a restricted substance is 
also mitigated by the fact that household use is estimated only at 0.5% of the total market. The use 
of  nitromethane  among  the  general  public  is  even  less  widespread.  Annex  6  provides  a  detailed 
explanation of the potential loss in sales to the general public for the two substances.  

Sales  would  also  decline  by  removing  the  possibility  to  make  precursors  available  through 
registration  of  the  transaction.  In  comparison  to  a  registration  regime,  the  cost  of  the  licence, 
including the procedure involved to apply for a licence, may deter individuals from purchasing the 
above  concentration  threshold  chemicals.  Some  retailers  currently  under  a  licencing  regime  have 
completely stopped selling some substances, even though it was still allowed for them.  

The economic impact of setting upper limits to licensing is very small. After all, these correspond to 
the  limits  currently  set  for  registration,  which  is  based  on  the  estimation  that  there  is  no  use  for 
product above that limit by the general public. The evaluation did not show any economic loss as a 
result of those restrictions.   

Companies that specialise in the supply of (highly concentrated) restricted precursors (such as fuel 
based  on  nitromethane)  would  be  more  affected  than  those  that  offer  a  much  broader  range  of 
products,  including  alternatives  to  the  restricted  explosives  precursors.  The  impact  will  therefore 
also be relatively higher for SMEs with smaller sales volumes, but small for bigger suppliers.  

However,  whereas  the  restrictions  in  option  2  can  decrease  the  consumption  and  demand  of 
restricted  products,  they  can  also  increase  the  consumption  and  demand  for  lower  concentrations 
which have the same effect, or alternative products which will continue to be developed. This can 
reduce  the  business  for  companies  that  are  producing  or  selling  restricted  goods  but  it  can  create 

39 

 
 
 
new  opportunities  for  companies  producing  or  selling  alternative  goods  and  lower  concentrations 
and provides an incentive to innovative companies. All things considered, there would therefore not 
be a significant impact on the turnover of the chemical sector as a whole.  

As  to  the  administrative  burden  for  companies,  manufacturers and  suppliers  will  need  to  adjust 
the  production  processes  (dilution),  packaging  and  labelling  of  products  intended  for  non-
professional use.  

Retail  will  bear  extra  regulatory  costs  and  investments  in  human  resources  due  to  the  required 
training  and  the  performance  of  checks  (see  Annex  6).  It  will  however  positively  impact  those 
retailers  that  are  already  applying  the  Regulation  in  a  responsible  manner,  by  ensuring  that  all 
retailers  operating  in  the  explosives  precursors  market  will  bear  the  same  costs  for  training  and 
ultimate  contribute  to  ensuring  equal  conditions  to  sale  transactions  of  professional  users  and 
members of the general public in all Member States. The streamlining of restrictions and controls 
across the EU would also facilitate the operations of companies operating in several Member States. 
Finally, clearer definitions make it easier for retailers to understand who can and who cannot have 
access to restricted explosive precursors. 

The burdens on public authorities would significantly increase through the requirement to have in 
place inspections authorities, raise awareness and to provide training for law enforcement and other 
competent authorities. This is mitigated by the circumstance that many Member States have already 
taken  steps  to  facilitate  the  application  of  the  Regulation.  Member  States  that  would  set  up  a 
licensing regime, now that the registration regime is discontinued, would be faced with setting up a 
new  procedure  and  authority.  However,  from  the  feedback  provided  by  Member  States  already 
applying  a  licensing  regime,  it  is  clear  that  such  a  regime  does  not  generate  a  large  number  of 
applications, and is not perceived as a burden to the authorities.  

Policy  option  3's  economic  impacts  would  be  significant.  Large  and  small  companies  would  be 
affected, as well as consumers and the costs and administrative burden of competent authorities and 
economic operators would significantly increase. 

The  measures  proposed,  and  in  particular  the  introduction  of  a  full  ban  on  restricted  explosives 
precursors for members of the general public, would have  mixed effects on competition. On the 
one hand, policy option 3 would create a more level playing field by harmonising Member States’ 
regimes  and  imposing  the  same  obligations  on  all  manufacturers  regarding  labelling  and  the 
transmission  of  information,  which  would  have  a  strong  positive  impact  on  competition.  On  the 
other hand, extending the scope of the Regulation and adding a substantial number of theoretically 
dangerous  explosives  precursors  to  the  list  of  regulated  substances,  would  have  a  significant 
negative  impact  on  the  competitiveness  of  affected  producers  and  suppliers  in  terms  of 
compliance costs and loss of sales.  

Producers and suppliers would be affected by the restrictions in terms of adapting to the new rules. 
This  would  be  particularly  problematic  for  SMEs,  which  might  not  have  the  capacity  to  adapt 
their products, purchase (more expensive) alternatives or target a different market.  

The  restrictions  introduced  by  policy  option  3  would  stimulate  research  and  development,  as 
manufacturers  would  have  to  modify  the  composition  of  certain  consumer  goods  and  look  for 
alternatives  to  replace  restricted  substances.  This  would  have  a  positive  impact  on  research  and 
innovation and facilitate the introduction of new products.  

The  overall  impact  on  consumers  would  be  negative.  Whilst  better  labelling  practices  would 
provide  more  clarity,  the  introduction  of  a  full  ban  and  the  substantial  revision  of  the  Annexes 
would imply that many substances and mixtures would no longer be available to members of 

40 

 
 
 
the general public. The complete ban would primarily affect consumers from Member States that 
currently  have  licensing  or  registration  regimes.  As  noted  before,  only  a  small  share  of  all 
consumers of explosives precursors is members of the general public. Yet many of them would no 
longer  be  able  to  carry  out  particular  hobbies  or  activities  due  to  the  proposed  measures58. 
Following  the  revision  of  Annex  I,  some  manufacturers  would  have  to  adapt  the  composition  of 
their  consumer  products.  This  could  result  in  a  (temporary)  decrease  in  the  variety  of  products 
available and an increase in price, which could also affect professional users.  

Lastly,  if  consumers  would  need  to  use  greater  quantities  of  certain  products  to  obtain  the  same 
effect (due to the fact that the concentration of a substance had been lowered) they would end up 
spending more to achieve the same results.   

Policy  option  3  would  also  significantly  increase  the  costs  and  administrative  burden  of 
competent authorities and economic operators. According to the economic operators replies on 
the potential ranges of these impacts, the administrative burden and compliance costs of economic 
operators would increase by more than 30%, due to the time and costs associated with: additional 
training  of  sales  staff,  identification  of  new  restricted  products,  registration  of  transactions 
involving  professional  users,  additional  reporting  and  registration  in  a  national  register  for 
economic  operators.  This  increase  would  be  partially  mitigated  by  the  harmonising  effects  of  the 
introduction  of  a  full  ban,  which  would  slightly  reduce  the  administrative  burden  of  economic 
operators (particularly for those doing business in different Member States). However, the overall 
increase could be expected to be between 10 and 30%.   

The enforcement costs and administrative burden of the competent authorities are also expected to 
rise. The additional monitoring and inspection activities, the awarding of penalties, and adjudication 
would  increase  enforcement  costs  between  10-30%.  The  increase  in  the  administrative  burden, 
linked to the monitoring of transactions and the managing of the register of economic operators, is 
expected to be below 10%, although the exact impacts would differ per country.  

The increase in costs and administrative burden resulting from the measures proposed under policy 
option 3 would seem disproportionate. 

6.3. 

Social impacts 

To assess the social impacts of the different policy options, the potential effects of each option on 
European  society  was  examined.  On  the  one  hand  this  would  include  the  impacts  on  crime, 
terrorism and security, as a whole, and on the other the impacts labour market and public health.  

Under the baseline scenario, the overall level of security in the EU would not improve as existing 
security gaps would persist. Explosives precursors would continue to be accessed by members of 
the general public differently according to the specific regime adopted, and divergent implementing 
practices  would  give  rise  to  different  levels  of  security.  The  enforcement  capacity  of  relevant 
authorities would probably increase with the improvement of their knowledge of the Regulation and 
the supply chain, but enforcement levels are expected to remain uneven across Member States and 
challenges  in  dealing  with  cross-border  cases  would  persist,  thus  limiting  the  overall  level  of 
security ensured in the EU.  

Moreover the fragmented application of restriction and controls to online sale would leave security 
gaps  that  would  affect  the  overall  effectiveness  of  the  Regulation  in  limiting  the  access  to 
explosives  precursors  to  members  of  the  general  public.  The  level  of  awareness  along  the  supply 
chain would improve over time but it is likely to remain uneven for some actors, especially SMEs 

58 See Annex 5: Market analysis. 

41 

 
 
 
                                                            
and online retailers. The lack of clarity on certain provisions of the Regulation would continue to 
allow  different  interpretations  and  different  implementing  practices  among  Member  States.  All 
these  factors  would  negatively  affect  public  security,  as  terrorists  and  other  criminals  would 
continue to exploit differences in the application and enforcement of the Regulation across Member 
States to find ways to illegally acquire explosives precursors.   

Possible deterioration of the status quo may derive from the absence of certain threat substances in 
Annex I to the Regulation and from the insufficient level of attention given to internet sales. 

Without practical measures for increasing the exchange of information on potential threats, and for 
enhancing the enforcement capacity of public authorities and encouraging compliance of economic 
operator, the impact on the labour market and public health would be null.  

Policy option 1 would contribute somewhat to increasing security in the EU Member States. 

Discussing  evolving  threats  in  an  SCP  subgroup,  regularly  and  in  classified  environments  when 
necessary,  and  with  input  from  Europol  and  EU  INTCEN,  would  increase  the  exchange  of 
information and improve the quality of this information over time. Public authorities and the supply 
chain  would  obtain  comprehensive  and  up-to-date  information  allowing  them,  to  some  extent,  to 
adapt their implementation strategies in a timely and targeted way, tackle new and evolving threats 
as  they  arise,  and  strengthen  their  preventive  capabilities.  With  increased  and  up-to-date 
information  about  threats,  the  supply  chain  would  be  able  to  exercise  better  control  over  their 
transactions,  especially  cross-border  transactions,  and  benefit  from  increased  certainty  in  their 
operations across the internal market.  

Detailed  guidance  to  strengthen  licensing  and  registration  regimes,  in  the  form  of  a  Commission 
Recommendation,  would  lead  to  some  Member  States  adopting  the  proposed  measures  and 
therefore  applying  similar  and  higher  standards  in  their  territories.  This  would,  to  some  extent, 
increase  the  level  of  security  in  those  Member  States  and  facilitate  compliance  for  economic 
operators  who  operate  across  borders  and  at  the  present  time  have  to  spend  time  adjusting  to  the 
different specificities of each regime. 

In  a  similar  way,  an  SCP  subgroup  of  inspection  authorities  and  dedicated  workshops  for  public 
authorities  on  enforcement  and  for  the  different  sectors  and  actors  in  the  supply  chain,  would  all 
raise  the  level  of  awareness  of  relevant  stakeholders,  align  enforcement  and  compliance  efforts, 
allow the identification of good practices, and encourage the adoption of similar and more effective 
ones.  

However,  although  the  level  of  security  should increase  as  a  result, the impact  of  these  measures 
would remain limited. To increase the magnitude of the impact, a special effort should be made to 
reach out and engage those stakeholders who are least aware and engaged at the present day. 

The above is equally true for the online market, where promoting a public-private dialogue would 
contribute  to  reducing  the  security  threat  online.  However,  the  level  of  impact  would  be  highly 
dependent on successfully engaging a wider number and range of online operators. 

Practical  measures  to  increase  the  exchange  of  information  about  threat  developments  and  to 
improve  the  enforcement  capacity  of  public  authorities  and  compliance  by  economic  operators 
would also have a positive but minimal impact on the labour market and public health.  

The  labour  market  would  benefit  from  a  more  regular  and  constructive  dialogue  with  public 
authorities  and  EU  institutions.  Economic  operators  would  be  able  to  adjust  their  marketing  of 
substances and mixtures that may be identified as emerging threats before they are regulated, and 
would  also  be  able  to  participate,  from  an  early  point  in  time,  in  the  regulatory  decision-making 

42 

 
 
 
process. This could avoid negative impacts of future regulation on the labour market, as economic 
operators would be able to adapt their resources, including human resources, to developments early 
on and at lower costs, thus in an efficient way. In addition, increased levels of awareness along the 
supply chain would translate into economic operators avoiding fines for non-compliance, similarly 
lowering costs, which could negatively impact the labour market. Both of these factors (being able 
to  foresee  regulatory  changes  and  avoiding  non-compliance)  are  of  particular  importance  to 
SMEs,  whose  hiring  and  firing  decisions  are  much  more  affected  by  sudden  regulatory  changes, 
including on a single substance, or an eventual economic fine.  

This impact level of this option on the labour market would nevertheless be minimal to null. On the 
one  hand,  because  many  key  actors  in  the  supply  chain,  especially  SMEs,  would  likely  not 
participate,  themselves  or  through  associations  representing  them,  in  the  above-mentioned 
exchanges. On the other hand, the benefits of this option would be more about avoiding negative 
impacts  than  generating  positive  ones,  such  as  promoting  investment  into  the  labour  market  and 
creating jobs. 

A  similar  analysis  can  be  made  for  the  impacts  on  public  health,  where  increased  exchanges  and 
level  of  awareness  would  bring  some  small  but  positive  benefits.  When  an  attack  involving 
explosives happens, harmful chemical particles are realised into the air. The victims of the attack, as 
well as first responders that arrive at the scene are exposed to toxic and corrosive substances, which 
can impact their health both in an immediate way and in the longer term. Discussing trends in the 
use of chemical substances to make HMEs can alert public health authorities and first responders to 
the type and magnitude of hazardous conditions present both immediately after an attack and in the 
longer-term, and allow them to prepare and intervene accordingly to minimise the impact on public 
health. It is also not negligible to consider that intensified efforts by all stakeholders involved in the 
prevention of terrorist attacks would lead to a public perception of increased security and, with that, 
a  perception  of  strengthened  collective  resilience  which  can  be  valuable,  in  the  aftermath  of  an 
attack, to mitigate the negative psychological effects on the population. 

The impact level of this policy option on public health would remain small though as participation 
in  the  exchanges  and  adoption  of  guidelines  and  good  practices  would  be  facultative  for  public 
authorities,  and  the  public  at  large  would  most  likely  remain  unaware  about  these  efforts.  It  is 
therefore  unlikely  that  all  public  health  authorities  across  the  Union  would  substantially  modify 
their preparedness and contingency plans on the basis of the exchanges and that this policy option 
would improve the public perception of security in a consequential way. 

Under policy option 2 more restrictive and streamlined measures relating to the making available 
of  explosives  precursors  will  make  it  more  difficult  for  illegitimate  users  to  acquire  explosives 
precursors. This is expected to have a significant impact on enhancing security across the EU. The 
general public, which may include legal persons, will not be able to access explosives precursors, 
unless  Member  States  have  provided  for  the  possibility  of  access  through  a  licence,  issued  in 
accordance with common criteria.  

The  Regulation  would  be  aligned  with  the  evolving  threat  of  HME  and  will  be  kept  up  to  date 
through delegated acts. Through a better supply of information, awareness raising and training, the 
supply chain will be better equipped to apply restrictions and controls and detect illegitimate use. 
The same  effects  can  be envisaged  by the setting up of inspection  authorities and  training of law 
enforcement and custom authorities. All of this will limit the risk that terrorists and other criminals 
have access to explosive's precursors and make explosives. 

Policy option 2 would also decrease the consumption and demand of restricted products. As a 
consequence of reduced sales and lower production rates, manufacturers and suppliers may reduce 

43 

 
 
 
their  production  staff.  On  the  other  hand,  this  could  be  neutralised  by  an  increase  in  the 
consumption and demand for lower concentrations and alternative products, as well as the need for 
new or modified products, which could have a positive impact on employment in the research and 
development sector. 

Retail  will  bear  additional  regulatory  costs,  administrative  cost  and  investments  in  human 
resources  due  to  the  required  training  and  the  performance  of  checks.  This  policy  measure  can 
increase the workload and costs of the retails on a short-term, but would have a neutral impact on 
the labour market in the long term.   

Consumers would be affected in the exercise of household chores and hobbies, for which they use 
(without  the  assistance  of  a  professional)  explosives  precursors.  For  the  social  impact  on 
consumers,  it  is  essential  to  take  into  account  whether  they  can  still  carry  out  their  legitimate 
activity with less concentrated or alternative substances. The assessment depends on the explosives 
precursor concerned59 and is subject to scientific developments (see 2.3). 

Generally,  it  is  assessed  that  there  is  no  real  need  for  non-professional  consumers  regarding 
concentrated sulphuric acid (with a few exceptions like for etching circuit boards) as diluted acids 
may  also  be  used,  as  well  as  other  alternatives  (e.g.  enzyme  based  drain  cleaners).  For  pH 
adjustment of swimming pools and fish tanks, other acids are reported to be more efficient and less 
dangerous for an equal or smaller price.  

The  same  applies  to  the  use  of  concentrated  nitromethane,  for  which  there  is  almost  no  need  by 
members of the general public. For those who use it as an ingredient for model car and aircraft fuel, 
lower concentrations are sufficient. 

Hydrogen peroxide, nitromethane and nitric acid above the concentration limits are not widely used 
by members of the general public (see Table 16 in Annex 4) and certain alternatives are available 
(e.g.  chlorine  for  cleaning  and  ethanol  for  disinfecting).  Under  option  2,  the  general  public  could 
have  access  to  these  substances  after  obtaining  a  licence.  Member  States  that  already  apply  a 
licensing  regime  for  these  three  substances  generally  only  receive  a  few  applications  for  these 
substances  per  year,  with  only  one  Member  State  reporting  double  digits.  The  addition  of 
ammonium nitrate to Annex I would have no implications, because it already is restricted under 
REACH in the same manner as intended under option 2.   

The  impact  on  public  health  is  assessed  as  high,  due  to  the  security  benefits  described  in  6.2 
Moreover some precursors also have intrinsic risks to public health, with sulphuric acid being used 
in acid attacks. Nitromethane has been classified as “possibly carcinogenic to humans” (see Annex 
6). 

Policy option 3 would contribute significantly to ensuring a high level of security in the EU. 

This  option  would  introduce  further  controls  along  the  supply  chain.  The  additional  obligations 
resulting from these controls and the actions that the different stakeholder groups would be required 
to take are expected to have an impact on employment.  

The  introduction  of  a  full  ban  on  restricted  substances  for  members  of  the  general  public  would 
have  a  negative  impact  on  employment,  primarily  in  Member  States  with  a  licensing  or 
registration regime. Manufacturers and suppliers who are currently producing or selling products 
containing  restricted  substances  above  the  permitted  limit  values,  would  see  a  reduction  in  their 

59  SEC(2010)  1040  final  of  20.9.2010,  p.  56  provides  estimates  for  each  explosives  precursor  on  "price  elasticity", 
related to the availability of alternatives.  

44 

 
 
 
                                                            
sales  due  to  the  fact  that  they  would  no  longer  be  allowed  to  make  these  products  available  to 
members of the general public.  

Expanding  the  Annexes  of  the  Regulation  to  substances  that  could  potentially  be  used  to 
manufacture HMEs, would have a serious impact on the manufacturing and sales of the concerned 
chemical  substances  and  consumer  products  containing  them.  Newly  restricted  substances  and 
products containing concentrations above certain limit values could no longer be sold to members 
of the general public. As a result, manufacturers and retailers targeting the consumer market would 
have to find ways to lower concentrations or replace newly restricted substances, which could be a 
time-consuming  process.  Meanwhile,  the  sales  and  production  of  the  concerned  goods  would 
decrease. In response to reduced sales and lower production rates, manufacturers and suppliers may 
reduce their sales and production staff. On the other hand, the need for new or modified products 
could have a positive impact on employment in the research and development sector.  

Requiring  the  labelling  of  Annex  II  substances  and  mixtures  and  the  introduction  of  a  new 
obligation  on  information  to  be  included  in  barcodes  would  increase  the  costs  and  workload  of 
manufacturers,  but  it  would  facilitate  the  identification  of  regulated  substances  for  retailers. 
Consequently, the impact of these measures on overall employment is difficult to quantify but 
could be neutral.  

The other  measures proposed under policy option 3 would mainly  affect the capacity need  of the 
relevant national authorities. The introduction of the obligation to also report transactions involving 
non-scheduled substances, may lead to an increasing number of reported suspicious transactions to 
NCPs.  The  management  and  administration  of  a  national  register  of  economic  operators  working 
with regulated substances and the real-time monitoring of transactions involving professional users 
would also require additional personnel, which would have a positive impact on employment.  

By  limiting  members  of  the  general  public’s  access  to  (high  concentrations  of)  potentially 
dangerous  chemical  substances  this  option  would  have  a  positive  impact  on  public  health.  The 
proposed  measures  could  not  only  help  to  prevent  terrorist  attacks  with  HMEs  that  might  have 
disastrous  impacts  on  the  health  of  victims,  it  would  also  limit  the  general  public’s  exposure  to 
substances that might be poisonous, corrosive, carcinogenic or otherwise harmful to human health.  

6.4.  Environmental impacts 

Based on the available information and data an estimate of the environmental impact of each policy 
option was made. As the actual effects on the environment depend on a number of factors including 
substances affected, available alternatives, changes in volumes used and consumer behaviour, it is 
difficult  to  estimate  the  exact  environmental  impacts.  Moreover,  the  impacts  on  the  environment 
have to be put into perspective of the relatively small part of market on explosives precursors that is 
addressed by this Regulation.  

The  Baseline  scenario  would  bring  no  changes  to  the  existing  situation,  which  has  an  overall 
insignificant impact on the environment. 

Policy option 1 would have a neutral and insignificant impact on the environment. 

A slight negative impact could arise from increased travel by stakeholders to participate in meetings 
and other activities that require physical presence.  

In  addition,  there  is  a  risk  that  while  promoting  the  use  of  alternative  substances  members  of  the 
general public turn to lower concentrations, likely to require the use of larger volumes of chemicals, 
and/or  to  other  substances  with  a  different  (possibly,  although  not  necessarily,  worse) 

45 

 
 
 
environmental impact.  This level of uncertainty would be justified, however, as the products used 
by members of the general are already assessed against environmental considerations through other 
legislation and policies, and the quantities used represent in any case a very small share of the total. 

Policy option 2 would further restricting the access to high concentrations of explosives precursors 
would have the effect that consumers would have to use greater quantities of the same product in 
lower  concentration  in  order  to  obtain  the  desired  effect.  This  would  entail  increased  packaging 
and  transport,  as  well  as  increased  releases  to  the  environment  of  chemical  compounds/additives 
present in the product. 

Restrictions  would  also  have  the  result  that  alternative  substances  are  used,  that  could  have 
more  detrimental  effects  on  the  environment,  such  as  the  use  of  chlorines  as  an  alternative  to 
hydrogen peroxide.  

Policy option 3’s impact on the environment is difficult to predict since it would depend on a 
number of factors, including: the substances affected, the reduction in the amount of chemicals used 
and the availability of suitable alternatives. The effects would however be similar to those described 
under policy option 2. The exact impact would depend on the substances that would be included 
and the available alternatives. 

6.5. 

Impact on fundamental rights 

To determine the impact of the different policy options on fundamental rights, the effects of each 
option on the following rights were assessed: right to the protection of personal data, right to non-
discrimination,  freedom  to  conduct  a  business.  As  the  impacts  of  the  options  on  crime,  terrorism 
and  security  were  already  assessed  under  ‘Coherence’  and  ‘Effectiveness’  (sections  6.1.1.  and 
6.1.2.),  this  section  will  not  detail  the  extent  to  which  the  measures  further  the  right  to  life  and 
liberty.  

The baseline scenario is not expected to bring any noticeable impact on fundamental rights. 

In the absence of additional practical measures for improving compliance of along the supply chain 
and  enforcement  of  public  authorities,  no  particular  improvement  is  expected  with  regard  to  the 
application  of  the  Regulation's  provisions  on  the  protection  of  personal  data,  notably  during 
reporting of suspicious transactions. 

No  impact  on  the  freedom  to  conduct  a  business  is  expected.  However,  certain  obstacles  to 
competition of economic operators involved in the trade of explosives precursors would remain in 
the  absence  of  new  EU  action  to  improve  the  free  movement  of  substances  in  the  EU  internal 
market. 

Policy option 1 would have a positive and important impact on fundamental rights.  

The proposed measures would have a positive impact on right to the protection of personal data. 
Improved compliance along the supply chain and enforcement by public authorities would translate 
into  a  better  application  of  Article  10  of  the  Regulation  which  lays  out  that  the  processing  of 
personal  data  required  in  licensing  and  registration  regimes,  as  well  as  during  the  reporting  of 
suspicious  transactions,  comply  with  the  Data  Protection  Directive60.  During  meetings  and 
workshops, EU institutions, Member States, and the supply chain should pay attention to the type of 
information disclosed and foresee appropriate arrangements if personal data is to be shared.  

60 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. OJ L 281, 31–50. 

46 

 
 
 
                                                            
The right to non-discrimination would also be reinforced with a better application of the current 
framework.  Engaging  the  supply  chain  and  relevant  authorities  to  discuss  the  reporting  of 
suspicious transactions and, in particular, the indicators and criteria used to assess the risk posed by 
each transaction, would help to reduce, or avoid, discriminatory practices stemming from prejudices 
based on physical features or the background of customers. 

No  impact  on  the  freedom  to  conduct  a  business  is  expected  as  the  legal  framework  remains 
unchanged,  although  any  removal  of  distortions  to  competition,  even  if  small,  would  indirectly 
create a more conducive environment to exercise this freedom. 

Policy option 2, compared to the baseline scenario, would not have a much bigger impact on the 
protection  of  personal  data.  The  proposed  measures  will  reduce  the  amount  of  personal  data 
collected  and  processed,  but  could  also  lead  to  the  same  amount  or  slightly  more  data  being 
collected and processed. Discontinuing the registration regime will bring about that companies no 
longer  have  to  register  and  retain  personal  data  of  customers  from  the  general  public.  If  such 
countries were  to  adopt a licensing regime, their personal data would be processed and stored by 
competent public authorities, as is currently already the case. The requirement to conduct identity 
and criminal records checks for the general public that seeks to acquire explosives precursors with a 
licence  concerns  personal  data.  The  requirement  for  the  general  public  and  professional  users  to 
report  thefts  and  disappearances  can  lead  to  personal  data  being  processed  and  stored  by  the 
competent public authorities. 

The further restrictions on the type and concentration of substances have a negative impact on the 
freedom  to  conduct  a  business.  As  the  proposed  measures  prohibit  sales  of  certain  restricted 
substances to the general public, the freedom to conduct a business is limited.  

Policy option 3 would cause a shift from a three-tiered system to a full ban, which would end the 
collection  of  personal  data  for  the  purpose  of  requesting  a  licence  to  access  restricted  explosives 
precursors.  At  the  same  time,  several  of  the  proposed  measures  (i.e.  registration  of  transactions 
involving professional users, forwarding registrations of transactions to the competent authorities in 
real  time,  reporting  of  suspicious  transactions  involving  non-scheduled  substances  and  requiring 
economic operators to register) would involve the collection and processing of personal data. Given 
that the market for professional users is much bigger than that of the general public, much more 
personal data would be collected. It can also be  expected that the competent authorities, in  line 
with  the  general  rules  on  data  protection,  would  process  that  data.  The  data  would  only  be 
processed  for  the  purpose  of  detecting  and  preventing  the  illicit  manufacture  of  HMEs  and  could 
only be accessed by specifically designated authorities. Registrations of economic operators would 
only be accessed by inspection authorities, and the retention of the data collected would be limited. 
Regardless  of  any  mitigation,  the  measures  proposed  would  amount  to  a  significant  increase  in 
personal  data.  The  collection  of  this  data  is  already  very  broad  and  does  not  appear  to  provide 
significant  efficiency  gains  to  justify  the  infringement  of  the  right  to  protection  of  personal  data. 
Any measures to put in place at a later stage in the stage of processing and storage would have a 
very limited effect.   The impact on the protection of personal data is therefore rather significant.  

The introduction of a full ban on restricted explosives precursors for members of the general public 
and  the  additional  obligations  imposed  on  economic  operators  have  a  negative  impact  on  the 
freedom to conduct a business. As the proposed measures add requirements that would increase 
the  costs  for  the  economic  operators  concerned  and  prohibit  sales  of  restricted  substances  to  the 
general public, the freedom to conduct a business is limited. The policy option would not impact 
the right to non-discrimination.  

47 

 
 
 
 
7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE?   

To compare the different policy options, each option was scored against the assessment criteria of 
effectiveness,  efficiency,  fundamental  rights  and  coherence.  Each  of  these  criteria  has  an  equal 
weight, but effectiveness is measures against 6 sub-criteria, efficiency against 5, fundamental rights 
impact against 3 and coherence against one. The total score at the bottom of each table is sum of the 
different sub-criteria scores. Scores range from -3 (very negative) to +3 (very positive) and options 
are ranked and compared based on their scores.  

A  table  showing  all  criteria and  scores  is  available  in  Annex  11.  Annex  12  explains  the  different 
weightings and provides a sensitivity analysis.  

Comparison of ‘Effectiveness’ 

Policy  option  1  has  low  positive  to  medium  positive  scores  (i.e.  +0.5-+1.5)  for  all  six  specific 
objectives, but has the lowest overall score of the three policy options (+5.5)  Policy option 2 has 
the  highest  overall  score  (+11)  as  the  proposed  measures  would  contribute  considerably  to 
achieving  the  5  out  of  6  specific  objectives  and  moderately  to  one  (i.e.  facilitate  EU-trade  and 
prevent  distortion  of  the  market).  Compared  to  policy  option  2,  policy  option  3  has  higher  sub-
scores for increasing the enforcement by the competent authorities and further restricting access and 
strengthening controls (+2.5), but this policy option has a negative score for improving clarity and 
uniformity (-0.5) which lowers the overall score (+10.0). 

Policy option 1  Policy option 2 

Assessment criteria 
Align restrictions and 
controls with the evolving 
threat 
Further restrict access and 
strengthen controls 
Increase enforcement by the 
competent authorities of the 
Regulation 
Improve the transmission of 
information along the supply 
chain 
Improve the clarity of the 
Regulation and ensure 
uniformity in its application 
Facilitate intra-EU trade and 
prevent distortion of the 
market 
Total effectiveness  

Comparison of ‘Efficiency’ 

+1.0 

+0.5 

+1.5 

+1.5 

+0.5 

+0.5 

+5.5 

+2.0 

+2.0 

+2.0 

+2.0 

+2.0 

+1.0 

Policy option 3 
+2.0 

+2.5 

+2.5 

+2.0 

-0.5 

+1.5 

+11.0 

+10.0 

Policy  option  1  scores  best,  with  a  low  positive  overall  score  (+1.5)  because  of  the  cost  and 
administrative burden reducing effects of the proposed measures. Policy option 2 has a marginally 
negative score (-0.5), mainly due to increased costs and burden for the competent authorities (-0.5). 
The  burden  of  compliance  for  economic  operators  is  divided  in  a  fair  and  proportionate  way,  by 
allocating some obligations early in the supply chain (e.g. labelling) and others at a later point (e.g. 

48 

 
 
 
 
trainings  and  checks).  Compared  to  policy  option  2,  policy  option  3  scores  much  lower  (-9.5) 
because of the considerable increase in costs and burden (-1.5/-2.0) for the different actors Supply 
chain actors (in particular retail) would see a substantial increase in their (administrative) burden61. 
This is mainly the result of the extended scope of the Regulation, both in terms of restrictions and 
reporting, and the introduction of measures such as the registration, transmission and processing of 
all transactions of professional users.  

Assessment criteria 
Enforcement costs competent 
authorities 
Administrative burden 
competent authorities 
Administrative burden 
economic operators 
Compliance costs etc. 
operators 
Economic losses etc. 
operators 
Total efficiency  

Policy option 1  Policy option 2 

0 

+0.5 

+0.5 

+0.5 

0 

+1.5 

-0.5 

-0.5 

+0.5 

+0.5 

-0.5 

-0.5 

Policy option 3 
-2.0 

-2.0 

-2.0 

-2.0 

-1.5 

-9.5 

Comparison of Impact on fundamental rights  

Policy  option  1  is  the  only  policy  option  that  would  overall  have  a  positive  impact  on 
fundamental rights (+1.5). It is the only option with positive scores for the protection of personal 
data (+1.0) and the right to non-discrimination (+0.5). Policy option 2 has a slightly negative impact 
(-0.5)  due  to  the  consequences  the  proposed  measures  would  have  for  the  freedom  to  conduct  a 
business (-0,5). Policy option 3 receives the lowest score (-3.0) because it would negatively impact 
the freedom to conduct a business (-1.5) and the right to the protection of personal data (-1.5).   

Policy option 1  Policy option 2 

+1.0 
+0.5 
0 

+1.5 

0 
0 
-0.5 

-0.5 

Policy option 3 
-1.5 
0 
-1.5 

-3.0 

Assessment criteria 
Protection of personal data 
Right to non-discrimination  
Freedom to conduct a 
business  
Total Impact on fundamental 
rights  

Comparison of Coherence 

On the basis of the evaluation (Annex 3), it emerged that the Regulation is in general consistent and 
complementary  to  key  relevant  EU  legislation,  such  as  the  REACH  and  CLP  Regulation  and  the 
Regulation  on  Drug  Precursors.  However,  the  analysis  of  the  evaluation  also  showed  that  the 
framework would benefit in terms of coherence with regard to REACH, if the relevant provisions 
on ammonium nitrate are transferred to the Regulation without lowering the level of restrictions and 
controls.  It  is  therefore  estimated,  that  option  2  would  make  the  framework  more  coherent  as 

61 This was confirmed by a vast majority of the consulted stakeholders.  

49 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
compared to  the non-legislative option 1, which would not make  the existing Regulation  more or 
less  coherent.  Moreover,  policy  option  2  complements  other  product-specific  legislation  (e.g.,  on 
pyrotechnic  articles  and  civil  explosives)  and  would  continue  to  exclude  from  its  scope  products 
that  are  specifically  regulated  by  other  EU  legislation.  By  defining  "professional  user",  option  2 
would also promote coherence and ensure synergies with the corresponding definitions in CLP and 
REACH.    Streamlining  terminology  and  promoting  synergies,  whilst  taking  into  account  the 
differences in context and objectives, is important because it ensures the overall coherence of the 
EU legislative framework.  

Option  3  would  require  the  reporting  of  suspicious  transactions  involving  non-scheduled 
substances, similar to the Regulation on Drug Precursors. However, the substantive extension of the 
Annexes under this option risks creating inconsistencies between the Regulation and other EU acts 
regulating the same chemicals, mixtures and substances.  

Assessment criteria 
Coherence  

Policy option 1  Policy option 2 

0 

+1 

Policy option 3 
-0.5 

8.  PREFERRED OPTION 

An overall assessment of the three policy options, shows that policy options 1 and 2 have positive 
total scores for the evaluation of the assessment criteria (+8.5 and +11) and policy option 3 has a 
negative score (-3.0).  

Policy option 1 has positive scores for all assessment criteria, but the impacts or contributions of the 
proposed measures are moderate or small. Policy option 1’s scores for effectiveness (+5.5), which 
measure to what extent the policy options contribute to the specific objectives set out in chapter 4, 
are low compared to the scores of policy options 2 and 3. The option’s total score is also slightly 
lower than policy option 2's overall score. A majority of the SCP supported measures from policy 
option 1 as complementary, non-legislative initiatives to policy option 2. 

Policy option 2 has the highest overall score and scores best on effectiveness (+11.0). The negative 
impacts  on  fundamental  rights  are  small  (-0.5)  and  were  outbalanced  in  the  comparison  by  the 
positive scores on the other assessment criteria. It has a slightly negative effect as regards efficiency 
due to the limited increase of the compliance and enforcement costs the set of new measures would 
imply.  From  the  consultation  process  it  emerged  that  the  vast  majority  of  the  SCP  and  industry 
representatives of manufacturers and distributors supported policy option 2. 

Policy option 3 has also high scores for effectiveness (+10.0), yet the negative scores regarding its 
efficiency and impacts on fundamental rights considerably lower the overall score. Policy option 3 
is  considered  as  unbalanced  and  disproportionate  in  terms  of  its  economic  impact  and  additional 
costs  and  administrative  burden  for  stakeholders.  Stakeholders  consulted  through  surveys, 
interviews and workshops in the preparation of the impact assessment did not express support for 
policy  option  3,  estimating  measures  in  this  option  as  generally  disproportionately  restrictive  and 
burdensome for economic operators and national authorities. 

Based on this assessment, policy option 2 is the preferred policy option. Its positive impact would 
be  increased  if  combined  with  certain  measures  under  policy  option  1,  which  should  be  further 
discussed with the SCP.  

50 

 
 
 
 
Assessment 
criteria  
Effectiveness  
Efficiency 
Impact on fund. 
rights 
Coherence 
Total  

Policy option 1 

Policy option 2 

Policy option 3 

+5.5 
+1.5 
+1.5 

0 
+8.5 

+11 
-0.5 
-0.5 

+1 
+11 

+ 10 
-9.5 
-3 

-0.5 
-3 

8.1.  Advantages and proportionality of the preferred option 

The  most  important  feature  of  policy  option  2  is  to  strengthen  and  clarify  the  existing  legal 
framework  without  touching  upon  the  essential  characteristics  of  the  Regulation.  The  proposed 
measures address the weaknesses and potential security gaps identified in the evaluation, but they 
do  not  constitute  a  complete  overhaul  of  the  system  that  is  currently  in  place.  Whilst  this  policy 
option  would  significantly  contribute  to  all  six  specific  objectives,  none  of  the  proposed  actions 
would be disproportionate in view of their limited expected impacts on the market and in terms of 
implementation and enforcement burden and costs. As the existing Regulation has at least partially 
reached the main objectives identified at the outset, a complete overhaul would seem unnecessary.  

The negative impacts that some of the proposed measures may have on stakeholders, particularly in 
relation  to  the  expected  costs  and  additional  administrative  burden  and  the  economic  impacts. 
While these additional costs would not be disproportionate, their impact should be noted.  

There will be a potential negative impact on the right to conduct business, notably for legal persons 
with no professional interest who would not be able to acquire restricted products, in MS where the 
ban is applied, or acquire restricted products only with a license, in MS where the licensing regime 
is applied. 

8.2.  REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency)  

In  the  framework  of  the  REFIT  Platform,  stakeholders  recommended  the  Commission  to  explore 
possibilities  for  facilitating  a  unified  application  of  the  Regulation  in  the  Member  States  such  as 
establishing  common  conditions  and  criteria  for  licences  as  well  as  clarification  of  ambiguities. 
Member States also agreed that there was a need to clarify requirements on supply chain actors. 

The  measures  proposed  will  clarify  and  improve  the  efficiency  of  the  control  measures  currently 
applied.  There  is  no  data  to  quantify  this  simplification  effect,  but  the  outcome  was  positively 
assessed by operators consulted and is estimated to lead to a decrease of around 10% (€25 and 75 
million) of the current costs of companies to comply with the Regulation,62  

As explained in section 6.1, the various measures under option 2 limit the divergences in restriction 
on explosive precursors across the EU, which will simplify the legal framework and make it clearer 
and  easier  to  comply  with  the  rules.  This  is  especially  useful  for  companies  operating  across  the 
EU,  who  currently  have  to  adapt  to  different  regimes.  The  transfer  of  the  restriction  related  to 

62 See Annex 2 and Study on combatting the threat posed by explosives precursors: evaluation of the existing policy and 
legislative framework and preparation of an impact assessment of possible options for a future EU initiative, Ernst & 
Young, Rand Europe, 2018.   

51 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
Ammonium  Nitrate  from  REACH  will  make  the  legal  framework  more  coherent  and  hence  the 
more likely to be complied with and enforced. 

Clarifications in the definitions of 'professional users' and ‘members of the general public’ will have 
a  positive  impact  on  uniformity  in  the  application  of  the  Regulation  and  reduce  difficulties  for 
companies in applying the Regulation. The labelling provision is amended to make clearer what is 
required  from  whom.  This  will  reduce  burdens  on  retailers  and  facilitate  their  identification  of 
products concerned by the Regulation, making it easier for them to apply the requirements.  

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED?  

In order to ensure an effective implementation of the measures foreseen, and monitor its results, the 
Commission should continue working closely with the SCP Members and observers, as well as 
any other relevant stakeholders from the Member State authorities, the chemical supply chain, and 
EU agencies and institutions (especially Europol and EU INTCEN).  

The  monitoring  and  evaluation  framework  should  be  based  on  a  combination  of  surveys  and 
reporting  requirements  for  Member  States  which  would  provide  the  Commission  with  data  and 
information that is essential to both monitoring the implementation of the restrictions and controls 
introduced and evaluating the Regulation at a later date. Most of this information will be gathered 
by  the  competent  authorities  and  NCPs  during  the  course  of  their  duties  and  will  therefore  not 
require additional data collection efforts. Through the SCP, the Commission will also aim to collect 
data and information from the economic operators along the supply chain. 

The table in Annex 8 summarizes the indicators proposed to monitor the achievement of the general 
and specific objectives as well as the operational objectives linked to the preferred option.  

Indicators related to operational objectives are result indicators, which correspond to the activities 
to  be  implemented  for  the  selected  policy  measures.  Indicators  related  to  specific  objectives  are 
outcome indicators, and those related to general objectives are impact indicators. 

This monitoring framework is adding a negligible burden on Member States as it only requires the 
authorities responsible for the implementation of specific provisions of the Regulation to share data 
on their functioning (for example, NCPs on number of received reports). They would both benefit 
from, and contribute do, information exchange and cross-border cooperation. An important issue to 
take into account is the level of confidentiality of much of the data and information involved: the 
Commission  will  consult  Member  States  on  the  appropriate  level  of  confidentiality  necessary  for 
reports and meetings, in order to overcome concerns over information sharing. 

Some  of  the  necessary  data  and  information  might  not  be  readily  available  to  Member  States 
authorities and economic operators. To collect these, a targeted survey could be conducted by the 
Commission, coinciding with the reporting requirement for the Commission on implementation. 

The  Commission  intends  to  adopt  a  delegated  act  in  accordance  with  Article  16  to  establish  a 
programme for monitoring the outputs, results and impacts of this Regulation. A formal evaluation 
of  the  effectiveness,  efficiency,  relevance,  coherence  and  EU  added  value  of  the  resulting  legal 
framework should be carried out 6 years after the deadline for implementation, to ensure that there 
is  a  sufficiently  long  period  to  evaluate  after  full  implementation  in  all  Member  States.  The 
evaluation  shall  include  stakeholders’  consultations  to  collect  feedback  on  the  effects  of  the 
legislative changes and the soft measures implemented. The benchmark against which progress will 
be measured is the baseline situation when the legislative act enters into force. 

52 

 
 
 
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION 

Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references 

  Lead  DG:  the  Directorate-General  for  Migration  and  Home  Affairs  (DG  HOME) 

prepared this initiative.  

  Decide reference: PLAN/2016/505.  

  CWP reference: this initiative appears in CWP 2018 under action 16 'Completing the 
Security Union': REFIT revision of the Regulation on marketing and use of explosive 
precursors (legislative, incl. impact assessment, Art. 114 TFEU, Q2 2018). 

Organisation and timing 

Chronology of the IA: 

 

 

 

 

In December 2015, the Commission's Action Plan against illicit trafficking in and use 
of  firearms  and  explosives63  announced  the  acceleration  of  the  review  of  the 
Regulation foreseen in Article 18. 

In  a  first  step,  the  Commission  adopted  in  November  2016  three  delegated  acts64 
adding threat substances to Annex II of the Regulation. The acts were published in the 
Official Journal of the EU on 9 February 2017.  

In  a  second  step,  on  28  February  2017,  the  Commission  adopted  a  report  on  the 
application of the Regulation.65 This report concluded that changes to the Regulation 
were  to  be  considered  in  order  to  increase  the  capacity  of  all  those  involved  in 
implementing and enforcing the restrictions and controls. The Commission committed 
to carefully assessing the impact of possible new and strengthened measures.  

In  a  third  and  final  step,  a  revision  of  the  Regulation  was  formally  launched  on  30 
May  2017  with  the  publication  of  an  Inception  Impact  Assessment  (IIA).66  The 
feedback  obtained  on  the  IIA  was  taken  into  account  in  the  Commission's  design  of 
the evaluation and impact assessment exercise and the drafting of Terms of Reference 
for an external supporting study. 

  To  contract 

for  services  No  24, 
HOME/2016/ISFP/FW/EVAL/0107  was  launched  in  the  context  of  the  multiple 

the  external  supporting  study, 

request 

63  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  Implementing  the 
European Agenda on Security: EU action plan against illicit trafficking in and use of firearms and explosives. 
COM(2015) 624 
64 Commission delegated Regulations (EU) 2017/214, 2017/215 and 2017/216 of 30 November 2016. 
65 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of, and delegation 
of power under, Regulation (EU) 98/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the marketing and 
use of explosives precursors, COM(2017)103 
66  Inception  Impact  Assessment  on  the  Revision  of  the  Regulation  on  the  marketing  and  use  of  explosives 
precursors,  Ares(2017)2706122.  Available  online:  http://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-
2017-2706122_en.  

53 

 
 
                                                            
framework contract HOME/2015/EVAL/02 on 18 August 2017. An evaluation of the 
offers  received  was  conducted  in  early  November  and  a  contract  was  signed  on  28 
November  with  Ernst  &  Young  Special  Business  Services  (lead  partner),  the  Centre 
for International Legal Cooperation, and RAND Europe (hereafter, the consortium is 
referred to as 'EY'). 

  On  24  October  2017,  the  Commission  announced  the  initiative  in  its  2018  Work 
Programme67  and  advanced  the  foreseen  adoption  date  from  the  original  Q4-2018 
mentioned in the IIA to Q2-2018. 

  The  consultation  activities  that  inform  this  impact  assessment  were  carried  out, 
informally,  during  the  SCP  meetings  of  5  April  and  12-13  September  2017,  and, 
formally,  between  December  2017  and  February  2018.  The  consultation  process  has 
involved  relevant  stakeholders,  including  Member  States'  experts  from  various 
relevant  authorities,  and  representatives  of  the  chemical  supply  chain,  including 
manufacturers,  distributors  and  retail.  A  Consultation  Strategy  followed  the  IIA  and 
was published on Europa in a webpage dedicated to the revision of the Regulation.68  

  The  methods  and  tool  applied  during  the  consultation  process  were  in  line  with  the 

consultation strategy: 

o  An open public consultation was available between 6 December 2017 and 14 

February 2018 on the Europa website.69 

o  A  targeted  consultation  comprised  two  meetings  of  the  SCP,  on  12-13 
December  2017  and  on  21  February  2018,  a  survey  sent  by  EY  to  over  200 
stakeholders,  in-depth  interviews  with  over  50  stakeholders  conducted, 
separately,  by  the  Commission  and  EY,  and  a  series  of  online  workshops  by 
EY. 

  The consultations, as well as desk research and analysis, allowed the Commission to 
define  the  problem  and  identify  policy  objectives,  policy  options,  and  a  preferred 
option.  In  addition,  academic  experts  in  the  field  of  explosives  have  reviewed  the 
supporting  study  produced  by  EY.  The  impact  assessment  is  accompanied  by  an 
evaluation, in an annex, assessing the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, 
and EU added value of the Regulation. 

  The drafting of the impact assessment took place in February 2018 and March 2018, 
including the incorporation of feedback from the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB). 

Impact Assessment Steering Group (IASG) 

67 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions,  Commission  Work  Programme  2018:  An  Agenda  for  a 
More United, Stronger and More democratic Europa. COM(2017)650 
68  Dedicated  webpage:  https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-is-new/work-in-progress/initiatives/revision-
regulation-marketing-and-use-explosives-precursors_en  
69  Open  Public  Consultation  on  the  Revision  of  the  Regulation  on  the  marketing  and  use  of  explosives 
precursors: https://ec.europa.eu/info/consultations/revision-eu-regulation-explosives-precursors_en  

54 

 
 
                                                            
  An IASG chaired by the Secretariat-General (SG) and DG HOME was formally set up 

in March 2017. 

  The  following  DGs  participated  in  the  IASG:  the  Legal  Service;  DG  GROW,  DG 
ENV, DG JRC, DG TAXUD, and EEAS. In addition, DG ECHO, DG  TRADE, DG 
SANTE, and were invited but did not attend. Europol also attended the IASG. 

  The  IASG  met  five  times  between  February  2017  and  February  2018.70  The 
discussions  held  covered  the  inception  impact  assessment,  the  consultation  strategy, 
the  terms  of  reference  for  a  supporting  study,  the  questionnaire  for  the  public 
consultation,  the  survey  for  the  targeted  consultation,  and  the  various  drafts  of  the 
impact assessment. 

Consultation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board 

The  Regulatory  Scrutiny  Board  received  the  draft  version  of  the  present  impact 
assessment report on 2 March 2018. It issued an impact assessment quality checklist on 
16  March  2018  with  a  number  of  comments.  A  response  to  the  RSB  quality  checklist 
was sent in advance to the RSB meeting on 20 March 2018, which specified how each of 
the RSB comments would be incorporated to the final version of the impact assessment.  

During the meeting with the RSB on 21 March 2018, the following was discussed: 

  The  criteria  and  risk  assessments  used  to  determine  what  substances  are  included  in 

the Annexes 

  Online sales of explosives precursors 

  Enforcement measures taken by the Commission (incl. infringements) 

  The likely costs of the different policy options for the private and the public sector 

The  risk  of  inconsistency  with  other  legislation  on  chemicals  The  RSB  issued  a  positive 
opinion on 23 March 2018 with a number of recommendations that completed the previously 
issued quality checklist. All of the RSB comments were incorporated into the final version of 
this  document.  The  recommendations  described  in  the  RSB  opinion  were  incorporated  as 
follows: 

RSB comment 

How it was incorporated in the IA 

The report does not present a full range of 
policy options. It does not examine 
intermediate options between the preferred 
option and a maximalist option that is more 
effective but also more costly.  

Section  5  now  explains  how  the  different 
policy options were designed, and why these 
particular  options  were  selected.  Why  sub-
options  were  not  included  is  explained  in 
section 5.2. In the description of policy option 
is  explained  why  discontinuation  of 
2 

70  The  first  meeting,  on  7  February  2017,  was  informally  held  as  the  initiative  had  not  yet  been  politically 
validated. 

55 

 
 
 
                                                            
The report does not present stakeholders’ 
views transparently enough.  

The  report  should  clarify  how  the  preferred 
policy option also makes the regulation more 
proactive.  For  example,  the  preferred  option 
modifies  the  selection  process  of  substances 
that  will  be  regulated  in  ways  that  respond 
more rapidly to emerging concerns. As there 
is  a  large  gap  between  the  preferred  policy 
option  and  the  more  ambitious  one  that  the 
report  finds  disproportionately  costly,  the 
report  should  explain  why 
it  does  not 
consider  an  intermediate  policy  option  that 
includes  some  of  the  less  costly  components 
of this ambitious policy option. 

The  report  should  more  transparently  report 
the  available  evidence  of  what  different 
stakeholder groups think about the alternative 
policy  options.  A  table  showing  numbers  of 
positive  and  negative  responses  as  well  as 
blank responses on key questions might help. 
The  report  could  usefully  explain  the  points 
on  which 
stakeholders  have  expressed 
concerns  and  how  the  preferred  option  takes 
those concerns into account. 

The  report  should  clarify  how  the  preferred 
policy  option  ensures  consistency,  now  and 
in  the  future,  between  this  Regulation  and 
other  EU 
the  same 
chemical substances (e.g. REACH). It should 
explain  relevant  differences  in  scopes  and 
purposes  of  the  various legislations and  how 
undue burdens are avoided. 

that  regulates 

law 

licensing  regimes  was  not  considered  under 
this option.  

Stakeholders'  views  have  been  incorporated 
in various sections in the report. Annex 2 has 
been  revised  to  better  reflect  the  views  of 
different stakeholder groups and the results of 
the OPC have been included in this Annex.  

Section  5  now  explains  how  the  different 
policy options were designed, and why these 
particular  options  were  selected.  Why  sub-
options  were  not  included  is  explained  in 
section  5.2  and  in  Annex  7  on  the  discarded 
options. 

results  of 

transparency.  Throughout 

The 
the  OPC  have  been 
incorporated in the report, to address the issue 
report 
of 
references  to  stakeholders'  views  have  been 
incorporated.  Additional  information  on  how 
these  concerns  have  been  addressed  has  also 
been added.  

the 

Coherence with other EU legislation has been 
clarified in sections 1, 7 and 9. Section 1 now 
better  explains  the  differences  in  scope  and 
purpose.  Sections  5  and  7  explain  how 
coherence  is  ensured  under  the  different 
options, and in particular under the preferred 
option. _ 

the  selection 
The  report  should  clarify 
process  of  the  substances  in  the  annexes  of 
the  Regulation. 
show  which 
authorities  and  stakeholders  are  involved  in 
evaluating  threat  levels  and  assessing  risks 

It  could 

DG  HOME  included  information  on  the 
selection  process  of  the  substances  in  the 
Annexes of the Regulation (see sections 2 and 
5).  

56 

 
 
 
 
 
 
linked  to  substances.  It  should  explain  how 
these  decisions  are  prepared  and  taken  in 
practice. 

to  online 

The report should clarify how the Regulation 
applies 
sales  of  explosives 
precursors.  It  could  also  show  how  the 
various  policy  options  address  the  issue  of 
online  sales.  More  generally,  the  report 
should  present  Commission  measures 
to 
improve enforcement of the Regulation.  

that 

The  report  now  clearly  states 
the 
Regulation  applies  to  online  sales.  Section  5 
has  been  modified,  and  for  each  section  is 
now  explained  how  the  issue  of  online  sales 
will  be  addressed.  Additional  information  on 
enforcement  has  been  included  in  the  report, 
including  in  the  monitoring  and  evaluation 
section.  

Evidence, main sources and external expertise 

Ernst and Young (2018), Study on combatting the threat posed by explosives precursors: 
evaluation of the existing policy and legislative framework and preparation of an impact 
assessment of possible options for a future EU initiative, Brussels. 

European  Commission  (2016),  ‘September  infringements'  package:  key  decisions‘, 
MEMO/16/3125, Brussels. 

European  Commission  (2017),  ‘February  infringements'  package:  key  decisions‘, 
MEMO/17/234, Brussels. 

European  Commission  (2017),  ‘Minutes  of  the  Sixth  REFIT  PLATFORM  stakeholder 
group meeting, 8 June 2017’, Brussels. 

Europol  (2017),  EU  Terrorism  Situation  and  Trend  Report  (TE-SAT),  Europol,  The 
Hague. 

EUROSTAT International Trade in Goods, available here. 

EUROSTAT PRODCOM Database, available here. 

EUROSTAT Structural Business Statistics (SBS), available here.  

Global Terrorism Database (GTD), available here. 

57 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 2: SYNOPSIS REPORT OF THE STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION 

This  annex is  the synopsis report of all stakeholder consultation activities  undertaken in the 
context of the evaluation and the impact assessment. 

Objectives of the consultation 

The consultation aimed to:  

1)  Collect  objective  data,  information,  and  evidence  which  is  necessary  in  assessing  the 
five key evaluation criteria under the Commission's Better Regulation guidelines;71 

2)  Collect  views  on  the  issues  at  stake  and  suggested  EU  involvement,  as  well  as 

opinions, ideas and concerns about possible solutions and impacts; and 

3)  Collect  evidence,  data  and  views  on  the  possible  policy  options  and  their  potential 

impacts. 

The following stakeholder groups were concerned by the initiative: 

  Members of the general public 
  Public authorities: In the Regulation, reference is made to: 

  Competent authorities, who are responsible for implementing, applying and enforcing 
any measure they adopt to implement the Regulation. Their role is especially important 
when it comes to 1) disseminating information about the restrictions and controls to the 
economic operators, 2) evaluating requests for licenses in Member States where there 
is a licensing regime, and 3) ensuring that rules on penalties are enforced. Typically, 
the designated competent authorities72 are from the ministries of interior or economics. 
  NCPs,  who  are  responsible  for  receiving  reports  of  suspicious  transactions, 
disappearances and thefts. Typically the designated NCPs73 are within the police.  

  Economic operators: (i.e. 'any natural or legal person or public entity or group of such 
persons  and/or  bodies  which  delivers  products  or  services  on  the  market').  This 
category  includes  a  wide  range  of  types  of  operators,  such  as  manufacturers, 
distributors, retailers; SMEs, online marketplaces, and professional end-users, with at 
times  diverging  interests  and  views.  National-  and  European-level  associations 
representing economic operators were also consulted. 

  Members and Observers of the Commission's SCP74 were among the key stakeholders 
consulted.  This  expert  group  brings  together  Member  States,  stakeholders  from 
industry, 
retail,  other  Commission  groups  discussing  explosives, 
pyrotechnics, fertilisers, and the REACH Regulation,75 and relevant EU agencies, such 
as Europol.  

including 

71 Effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, relevance and EU added value. More at http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/guidelines/tool_42_en.htm.  
72 A list is available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-
terrorism/explosives/explosives-precursors/index_en.htm  
73 Same as above. 
74 http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=3245  
75 OJ L 396, 30.12.2006, p. 1. 

58 

 
 
                                                            
The consultation process aimed at reaching a geographical and sectorial balance within the 
European Economic Area (EEA),76 and ensuring that the pool of consulted stakeholders was 
representative of the larger societal and economic interests in Europe.  

The  aim  of  this  synopsis  report  is  to  give  evidence  of  the  main  opinions  of  the  different 
categories of stakeholders on the trends linked to the application and effects of the Regulation.  

Consultation methods and tools 

This  Synopsis  report  is  structured  according  to  the  main  consultation  activities  undertaken 
within the context of the evaluation and the impact assessment namely:  

  The  survey  carried  out  by  the  external  contractor  (Ernst  &  Young)  launched  on  21 
December  and  closed  on  20  January  which  addressed  NCAs,  NCPs  and  Economic 
Operators;  

  The Interviews performed by the external contractor (EY) with a selected number of 

NCAs), NCPs and economic operators ; 

  The  Open  Public  Consultation  carried  out  by  DG  HOME,  launched  on  6  December 

and closed on 14 February. 

The main results of each activity are reported in two different sections: the evaluation and the 
Impact  assessment.  The  results  are  reported  according  to  the  context  description  and  the 
evaluation criteria for the evaluation part.77  

Results of the consultation activities - Evaluation 

 Survey carried out by the external contractor 

Context 

The  majority  of  respondents  reported  that  the  substances  that  are  now  regulated  were  not 
subject  to  any  restrictions  before  the  Regulation  became  applicable,78  and  the  main  non 
legislative  measures  concerned  awareness  raising  activities.79  Economic  operators  and 
NCAs/NCPs  consulted  are  now  more  aware  of  the  restrictions  and  controls  set  by  the 
Regulation.80 

  The  Regulation  contributed  to  a  low/very  low  extent  to  the  smooth  movement  of 
explosives  precursors  within  the  internal  market  according  to  most  economic 
operators81  whereas  NCA/NCP  do  not  show  to  have  a  predominant  opinion.  It 

76 Regulation EU 98/2013 is EEA-relevant. 
77 Relevance, Coherence, Effectiveness, Efficiency and EU Added Value. 
78 On average 46% (n=19). 
79 Survey feedback: 12 representatives from economic operators and 23 representatives from NCAs/NCPs. 
80 Survey feedback: 100% (n=31) of the respondents among the economic operators and 98% (n=40) among the 
NCA/NCP category answered ‘yes’ to the question “Are you aware of the restrictions and controls set by 
Regulation 98/2013 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors?”. 
81 Survey feedback: 74% of the economic operators (n=14) answered ‘low extent’ or ‘very low extent’ to the 
question “Based on your experience, to what extent has Regulation 98/2013 contributed to the following results: 
smooth movement of explosives precursors within the internal market?”. 

59 

 
 
                                                            
moreover contributed to a low/moderate extent to harmonising controls and penalties 
across Member States.82  

  The Regulation contributed to a moderate extent to improving traceability of sales and 
transactions  concerning  explosives  precursors  only  for  NCA/NCP  whereas  for 
economic operators it contributed to a moderate/high extent.83 

  The Regulation contributed to a moderate extent to increasing the security84 and to a 
moderate/high extent to raising awareness of the supply chain concerning risks related 
to the misuse of explosives precursors.85 

  The  main  issues  that  raise  security  concerns  are  the  unauthorised  internet  sales  of 
explosives  precursors86  followed  by  the  insufficient  level  of  awareness  along  the 
supply chain87 and the existence of different criteria to grant or refuse licences across 
the EU.88 

  The current and future challenges in preventing the misuse of explosives precursors to 
manufacture HMEs concern  control on the internet sales,89 the identification and  the 
awareness raising of the last segment of the supply chain,90 the further harmonisation 
of regimes across Member States,91 and the possible use of alternative substances by 
terrorists.92 

  There  are  not  sufficient  data  to  design  a  trend  on  the  number  of  suspicious 
transactions,  disappearances  and  thefts  involving  substances  listed  in  Annex  I  and  II 
reported to the NCPs since the Regulation became applicable.  

82 Survey feedback: 57% (n=13) of economic operators and 67% of NCAs/NCPs (n=24) answered ‘low extent’ 
or ‘moderate extent’ to the question “Based on your experience, to what extent has Regulation 98/2013 
contributed to the following results: harmonised controls and penalties across Member States?”. 
83 Survey feedback: 53% (n=20) of NCAs/NCPs answered ‘Moderate extent’ and 63% (n=15) of economic 
operators answered ‘Moderate extent’ or ‘High extent’ to the question “Based on your experience, to what extent 
has Regulation 98/2013 contributed to the following results: Improved traceability of sales and transactions 
concerning explosives precursors?”. 
84 Survey feedback: 48% (n=12) of economic operators and 69% of NCAs/NCPs (n=25) answered ‘Moderate 
extent’ to the question “Based on your experience, to what extent has Regulation 98/2013 contributed to the 
following results: increased security?”. 
85 Survey feedback: 79% (n=17) of economic operators and 92% of NCAs/NCPs (n=34) answered ‘Moderate 
extent’ or ‘High extent’ to the question “Based on your experience, to what extent has Regulation 98/2013 
contributed to the following results: raised awareness of the supply chain concerning risks related to the misuse 
of explosives precursors?”. 
86 Survey feedback: 65% (n=41) of the respondents answered ‘High extent’ or ‘Very high extent’ to the question 
“In your opinion, to what extent do the issues listed below raise today a security concern in your country: 
unauthorised internet sales of explosives precursors?”. 
87 Survey feedback: 43% (n=29) of the respondents answered ‘High extent’ or ‘Very high extent’ to the question 
“In your opinion, to what extent do the issues listed below raise today a security concern in your country: level 
of awareness along the supply chain?”. 
88 Survey feedback: 39% (n=19) of the respondents answered ‘High extent’ or ‘Very high extent’ to the question 
“In your opinion, to what extent do the issues listed below raise today a security concern in your country: 
existence of different criteria to grant or refuse licenses across the EU?”. 
89 Survey feedback: Ten economic operators and 12 NCAs/NCPs. 
90 Survey feedback: Seven representatives from economic operators and 11 representatives from NCAs/NCPs. 
91 Survey feedback: Three representatives from economic operators and six representatives from NCAs/NCPs. 
92 Survey feedback: One representative from economic operators and six representatives from NCAs/NCPs. 

60 

 
 
                                                            
  Verifications  that  the  conditions  under  which  the  licences  were  granted  are  still 
fulfilled  are  never  performed93  whereas  investigations  related  to  reported  suspicious 
transactions, disappearances and thefts are often/always performed.94 

Relevance 

  The scope and content of the Regulation meet current needs in terms of ensuring the 
free movement of explosives precursors within the internal market and in preventing 
the  misuse  of  explosives  precursors  against  public  security  to  a  moderate/high 
extent.95  

  Substances  that  should  be  added  to  the  list  of  restricted  substances  (Annex  I)  are 
Ammonium nitrate,96 and sulphuric acid97 –even if there is less consensus on this last 
one–  while  hydrogen  peroxide  should  be  added  to  Annex  II  according  to 
stakeholders.98 

  The  definition  of  "member  of  the  general  public"  is  appropriate  to  a  high/very  high 

extent.99 

 Coherence 

  There  are  no  inconsistencies  or  overlaps  between  the  Regulation  and  Regulations 
1907/2006 and 1272/2008, and Directives 2013/29/EU and 2014/28/EU.100 The bone 
of contention is the presence of ammonium nitrate in the Regulation and in REACH 
that generates confusion on how it should be regulated.101 

 Effectiveness 

93 Survey feedback: 54% (n=13) of NCAs/NCPs respondents answered ‘Never’ to the question “How often are 
the following monitoring and control activities performed in your country: verification that the conditions under 
which the licenses were granted are still fulfilled”. 
94 Survey feedback: 54% (n=15) of NCAs/NCPs respondents answered ‘Often’ or ‘Always’ to the question 
“How often are the following monitoring and control activities performed in your country: investigation related 
to reported suspicious transactions, disappearances and thefts?”. 
95 Survey feedback: 67% (n=18) of respondents from economic operators and 71% (n=22) from NCAs/NCPs 
answered ‘Moderate extent’ or ‘High extent’ to the question “To what extent does the scope and content of 
Regulation 98/2013 meet current needs in terms of: ensuring the free movement of explosives precursors within 
the internal market”. Whereas, 79% (n=23) of respondents from economic operators and 81% (n=29) of 
respondents from NCAs/NCPs answered ‘Moderate extent’ or ‘High extent’ to the question “To what extent 
does the scope and content of Regulation 98/2013 meet current needs in terms of: preventing the misuse of 
explosives precursors against public security”. 
96 Survey feedback: Eight representatives from NCAs/NCPs. 
97 Survey feedback: Three representatives from NCAs/NCPs. 
98 Survey feedback: Four representatives from NCAs/NCPs. 
99 Survey feedback: 67% (n=18) of economic operators and 57% of NCAs/NCPs (n=21) answered ‘High extent’ 
or ‘Very high extent’ to the question “To what extent is the definition of "member of the general public" 
appropriate?”. 
100 Survey feedback: 71% (n=25 on average) of respondents answered “no” to the survey question “Are there 
inconsistencies or overlaps between Regulation 98/2013 and any of the following EU pieces of legislation?” 
101 Survey feedback: Five representatives from economic operators and six representatives from NCAs/NCPs. 

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  There  is  a  moderate/high  deterrent  effect  of  the  Regulation  (especially  according  to 

economic operators):102 
o  Aspects that contribute to the deterrent effect are the fact that the selling of some 
products  was  discontinued  and  more  effort  is  put  to  limit  the  misuse  of 
precursors.103  In  general,  the  acquisition  of  explosives  precursors  is  more 
difficult.104  

o  Aspects  that  reduce  the  deterrent  effect  are  the  security  concerns  posed  by 
Internet,105  the  fact  that  the  Regulation  has  been  implemented  only  recently  by 
some  MS;106  there  is  not  the  desired  level  of  awareness;107  the  existence  of 
different regimes,108 the relevance of the deterrent effect mainly small crimes.109 

  The  Regulation  contributed  to  ensuring  the  appropriate  reporting  of  suspicious 

transactions throughout the supply chain to a moderate extent.110 

  The Regulation contributed to limiting the availability of explosives precursors to the 

general public to a moderate/high extent.111 

  The  Regulation  positively  contributed  to  raising  awareness,112  exchange  of  good 
practices,113  trainings,114  development  of  voluntary  code  of  conduct,115  and  cross 
border cooperation.116 

  There  is  less  consensus  on  the  contribution  of  the  Regulation  to  the  development  of 

public-private partnerships.117  

102 Survey feedback: 88% (n=21) of economic operators and 83% of NCAs/NCPs (n=29) answered ‘Moderate 
extent’ or ‘High extent’ to the question “In your opinion, to what extent did Regulation 98/2013 have a deterrent 
effect against the misuse of explosives precursors?”. 
103 Survey feedback: two representatives from economic operators.  
104 Survey feedback: Two representatives from NCAs/NCPs. 
105 Survey feedback: four representatives from economic operators, two representatives from NCAs/NCPs. 
106 Survey feedback: three representatives from economic operators. 
107 Survey feedback: four representatives from NCAs/NCPs and four from economic operators. 
108 Survey feedback: four representatives from NCAs/NCPs and one from economic operators. 
109 Survey feedback: Three representatives from economic operators, two representatives from NCAs/NCPs. 
110 Survey feedback: 40% (n=10) of economic operators and 56% (n=20) of NCAs/NCPs answered ‘Moderate 
extent’ to the question “Based on your experience, to what extent Regulation 98/2013 contributed to the 
following objectives: ensuring the appropriate reporting of suspicious transactions throughout the supply 
chain?”. 
111 Survey feedback: 78% (n=21) of economic operators and 79% (n=30) of NCAs/NCPs answered ‘Moderate 
extent’ or ‘High extent’ to the question “Based on your experience, to what extent Regulation 98/2013 
contributed to the following objectives: limiting the availability of explosives precursors to the general public?”. 
112 Survey feedback: 83% (n=19) of economic operators and 100% (n=39) of NCAs/NCPs answered ‘Increased’ 
to the question “How did the following initiatives develop since the Regulation 98/2013 became applicable: 
awareness of raising initiatives?”. 
113 Survey feedback: 74% (n=14) of economic operators and 79% (n=26) of NCAs/NCPs answered ‘Increased’ 
to the question “How did the following initiatives develop since the Regulation 98/2013 became applicable: 
exchange and adoption of good practices?”. 
114 Survey feedback: 74% (n=14) of economic operators and 66% (n=21) of NCAs/NCPs answered ‘Increased’ 
to the question “How did the following initiatives develop since the Regulation 98/2013 became applicable: 
training programs aimed at economic operators (included e-courses)?”. 
115 Survey feedback: 81% (n=13) of economic operators and 60% (n=18) of NCAs/NCPs answered ‘Increased’ 
to the question “How did the following initiatives develop since the Regulation 98/2013 became applicable: 
voluntary codes of conduct?”. 
116 Survey feedback: 80% (n=24) of NCAs/NCPs answered ‘Increased’ to the question “How did the following 
initiatives develop since the Regulation 98/2013 became applicable: cross border cooperation?”. 

62 

 
 
                                                            
  Practices  in  selling  explosives  precursors  of  economic  operators  changed  to  a 

moderate extent since the Regulation became applicable.118  

  Since  the  Regulation  became  applicable,  the  engagement  of  actors  increased  in 
bilateral  or  regional  meetings  with  other  Member  States,  information  exchange, 
participation  to  other  meetings  at  the  EU  level  and  participation  to  the  SCP.119  It 
remained the same in Joint enforcement operations.120 

  There is room for simplification for economic operators 121 whereas NCAs/NCPs have 

heterogeneous opinions.122 Areas for improvement concern: 
o  The labelling and identification of products;123  
o  The professional user definition;124 
o  The diversities in regimes;125 
o  The reporting of suspicious transactions.126 

 Efficiency  

  Costs  entailed  by  the  Regulation  borne  by  organisations  overall  stayed  broadly  the 
same. NCAs/NCPs reported that there was a little increase on costs incurred to carry 
out monitoring, inspections and reporting activities127 and costs related to investigation 
activities.128 

117 Survey feedback: 50% (n=6) of economic operators and 59% (n=19) of NCAs/NCPs answered ‘Increased’ to 
the question “How did the following initiatives develop since the Regulation 98/2013 became applicable: 
voluntary codes of conduct?”. 
117 Survey feedback: 80% (n=24) of NCAs/NCPs answered ‘Increased’ to the question “How did the following 
initiatives develop since the Regulation 98/2013 became applicable: establishment of private-public 
partnership?”. 
118 Survey feedback: 38% (n=8) of economic operators answered ‘Moderate extent’ to the question “To what 
extent did your practices in selling explosives precursors change since the Regulation 98/2013 became 
applicable?”. 
119 Survey feedback: 73% (n=24), 78% (n=28), 69% (n=25), 86% (n=31) of respondents answered ‘Increased’ to 
the question “Since Regulation 98/2013 became applicable, how has your engagement in the following cross-
border activities with other National Competent Authority/National Contact Point evolved?” against bilateral or 
regional meetings with other Member States, information exchange, participation to other meetings at the EU 
level and Participation to SCP respectively. 
120 Survey feedback: 73% (n=16) of respondents answered ‘Remained the same’ to the question “Since 
Regulation 98/2013 became applicable, how has your engagement in the following cross-border activities with 
other National Competent Authority/National Contact Point evolved: joint enforcement operations?”. 
121 Survey feedback: 65% (n=11) of respondents from economic operators answered ‘yes’ to the question “Do 
you see any room for simplifying the provisions of the Regulation 98/2013?”. 
122 Survey feedback: 53% (n=16) reported there is no room for improvement and 47% (n=14) that there is to the 
question “Do you see any room for simplifying the provisions of the Regulation 98/2013?”. 
123 Survey feedback: Four representatives from economic operators and two representatives from NCAs/NCPs 
124 Survey feedback: Three representatives from NCAs/NCPs and two from economic operators. 
125 Survey feedback: Three representatives from economic operators and 10 representatives from NCAs/NCPs. 
126 Survey feedback: Two representatives from economic operators and one representatives from NCAs/NCPs. 
127 Survey feedback: 53% (n=10) of respondents from NCAs/NCPs answered ‘increased a little’ to the question 
“Please select which costs, borne by your organisation, are entailed by the Regulation and indicate their trend 
under its application: costs incurred to carry out monitoring, inspections and reporting activities”. 
128 56% (n=9) of respondents from NCAs/NCPs answered ‘increased a little’ to the question “Please select which 
costs, borne by your organisation, are entailed by the Regulation and indicate their trend under its application: 
costs related to investigation activities”. 

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  The activities related to the implementation of the Regulation require low effort (less 
than  a  day  or  a  day  for  FTE  over  one  month).129  Activities  include,  for  instance, 
affixing or verifying labelling, checking a licence, dealing with reports of suspicious 
transactions,  disappearances  and  thefts,  identifying  products  concerned  by  the 
reporting  obligation,  imposing  penalties,  and  obtaining  information  about  the 
restrictions and controls.  

  Room for cost savings in the activities generated by the Regulation concern mainly the 

harmonisation of rules of labelling.130 

  The  use  of  additives  inhibiting  the  re-concentration  and/or  the  use  in  synthesis  of 
primary  explosives  of  explosives  precursors,  at  the  current  moment,  contribute  to 
reducing  compliance  costs  currently  entailed  by  the  Regulation  from  a  low  to 
moderate  extent131  and  to  reducing  risks  arising  from  the  misuse  of  explosives 
precursors  to  a  low/moderate  extent  for  EO  and  to  a  moderate/high  extent  for 
NCA/NCP.132 

  There is not sufficient data to design a trend over the years on the number of licence 

applications processed and granted and on the number of transactions registered. 

  There  is  not  sufficient  data  to  design  a  trend  over  the  years  on  the  number  of  cases 
where penalties related to infringements of the Regulation have been imposed and on 
the number of inspections performed. 

 EU Added Value 

  EU  intervention  will  continue  to  be  needed  especially  for  further  harmonisation  to  a 
high/very  high  extent133  but  also  to  mitigate  security  risks134  and  avoid  market 
distortion135 to a moderate/high extent.  

129 Survey feedback: 62% (n=8), 70% (n=7), 61% (n=11), 73% (n=8), 90% (n=9), 80% (n=12) and 64% (n=9) of 
respondents answered ‘Less than a day of work for a FTE’ or ‘A day of work for a FTE’ against Affixing or 
verifying labelling, Checking a license, Dealing with reports of suspicious transactions, disappearances and 
thefts, Identifying products concerned by the reporting obligation, Imposing penalties, Obtaining information 
about the restrictions and controls and Reporting a suspicious transaction, disappearance, or theft respectively to 
the question “How much effort do the following activities require during the course of one month to your 
organisation?”. 
130 Survey feedback: Four representatives from economic operators. 
131 Survey feedback: 63% (n=10) of economic operators and 62% (n=8) of NCAs/NCPs answered ‘Low extent’ 
or ‘Moderate extent’ to the question “In your opinion, to what extent could the use of additives inhibiting the re-
concentration and/or the use in synthesis of primary explosives of explosives precursors, at the current moment, 
contribute to the following: reduce compliance costs currently entailed by Regulation 98/2013?”. The option 
"reduce compliance costs currently entailed by Regulation 98/2013" had 68% (n=27) of ‘Do not Know’ answers. 
132 50% (n=8) of economic operators answered ‘Low extent’ or ‘Moderate extent’ while 58% (n=15) of 
NCAs/NCPs answered ‘Moderate extent’ or ‘High extent’ to the question “In your opinion, to what extent could 
the use of additives inhibiting the re-concentration and/or the use in synthesis of primary explosives of 
explosives precursors, at the current moment, contribute to the following: reduce risks arising from the misuse of 
explosives precursors?”. 
133 Survey feedback: 53% (n=13) of economic operators and 65% (n=27) of NCAs/NCPs answered ‘High extent’ 
or ‘Very high extent’ to the question “To what extent do the following issues addressed by the Regulation 
98/2013 continue to require action at the EU level rather than at national level: harmonisation at the EU level?”. 
134 Survey feedback: 56% (n=14) of economic operators and 59% (n=24) of NCAs/NCPs answered ‘Moderate 
extent’ or ‘High extent’ to the question “To what extent do the following issues addressed by the Regulation 
98/2013 continue to require action at the EU level rather than at national level: security risks?”. 

64 

 
 
                                                            
 Interviews  

 Context 

  Some  interviewees  did  not  notice  a  change  in  the  marketing,  use  and  reporting  of 
suspicious transactions of explosives precursors because some Member States started 
to implement the Regulation only recently,136 while some had already in place relevant 
restrictive measures.137  

  The  use  of  some  regulated  explosives  precursors  has  decreased.  Some  economic 
operators  took  off  the  shelves  products  including  explosives  precursors  and  some 
shops made “chemistry rooms” to better control the sales.138  

  After  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Regulation  some  economic  operators  restricted  the 
regulated precursors,139 however economic operators reported not to have faced major 
changes in the sector after the Regulation became applicable.140 

  There  was  an  increase  in  attempts  of  members  of  the  general  public  in  buying 
precursors from Member States applying a slack regime and through the Internet.141  
  Some online market places prohibited the sale of products with high concentration of 

regulated substances.142  

  Factors  influencing  the  misuse  of  explosives  precursors  concern  the  availability  of 
substances (e.g. as fertilisers (AN), as fuels (nitromethane) or as pyrotechnic articles 
(chlorates)) and the ease in their use. 143 The presence of jihad fighters and the unstable 
situation  in  the  Middle  East  may  influence  the  misuse  of  explosives  precursors.144 
These characteristics are aggravated by the fact that recipes to make HME are easily 
available online.145  

  Current and future challenges in preventing the misuse of explosives are: 

o  To identify all actors in the supply chain and the relative products concerned and 

make them aware of the potential dangerousness.146  

o  To  control  the  transactions  and  the  information  available  on  the  internet  and  on 

the dark web.147  

  Some underlined that the regulation of some substances may push terrorists to look for 
alternative substances for criminal purposes.148 Even if it has been proved that thanks 

135 Survey feedback: 48% (n=12) of economic operators and 40% (n=16) of NCAs/NCPs answered ‘Moderate 
extent’ or ‘High extent’ to the question “To what extent do the following issues addressed by the Regulation 
98/2013 continue to require action at the EU level rather than at national level: market distortions?”. 
136 Interview feedback: six representatives from NCAs, three from NCPs, and three from economic operators.  
137 Interview feedback: two representatives from NCAs and three from NCPs. 
138 Interview feedback: six representatives from NCAs, one from NCPs, and one from economic operators. 
139 Interview feedback: four representatives from economic operators. 
140 Interview feedback: 16 representatives from economic operators. 
141 Interview feedback: 10 representatives from NCAs, two from NCPs, and two from economic operators. 
142 Interview feedback: three representatives from NCAs and one from NCPs. 
143 Interview feedback: eleven representatives from NCAs and one from EU Agencies.  
144 Interview feedback: four representatives from NCAs. 
145 Interview feedback: eight representatives from NCAs. 
146 Interview feedback: six representatives from NCAs and one NCPs.  
147 Interview feedback: two representatives from NCAs four NCPs and four economic operators.  

65 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
to  the  use  of  some  additives  it  is  possible  to  inhibit  the  explosive  power  of  the 
precursors  with  the  garage  chemistry,  it  can  also  be  possible  to  come  back  to  the 
original status of the substance. Therefore, the challenge would be to make the process 
irreversible,  the  so-called  garage  chemistry  may  also  enable  the  self-making  of 
precursors. 149 

  Different regimes and the lack of mutual recognition of licences make the cross-border 

procurement more challenging.150  

 Relevance 

  The Regulation is judged overall relevant but solving some issues (e.g. moving some 
substances  and  a  more  precise  definition  of  labelling  and  economic  operator)  would 
make  it  more  relevant.151  Suggestions  include  to  reduce  the  level  of  Hydrogen 
peroxide and Nitromethane (as for this last one they took part to the "Expedia" project 
and they found that this value should be lowered),152 and the restriction of controls on 
Ammonium  Nitrate  (and  maybe  add  it  to  Annex  I  to  reflect  REACH)153  and  on 
Sulphuric Acid, that should be moved to Annex I.154 

  The definition of “professional user” 155 and that of Economic Operator156 seem not to 

be clear.  

  The provision on labelling seems not to be sufficiently clear, in particular with regard 
to  the  scope  of  the  precursors  concerned,157  and  who  should  be  the  responsible  for 
labelling  (retailers  or  manufacturers).158  It  seems  that  labelling  requirements  involve 
also the products under the ban, whereas it should not be the case as products should 
not be available to members of the general public.159 

Effectiveness 

  The Regulation contributed to improving the level of protection in the EU even though 
it is difficult to quantify its impact.160 Overall, the Regulation brought more awareness 
and willingness to  control  the regulated substances161 (even though  a higher level  of 
awareness  should  be  appreciated162)  and  it  strengthened  the  cooperation  between 
NCA, Police forces and industries.163 

148 Interview feedback: six representatives from NCAs one NCPs, one representative from EU Agencies and 
three economic operators. 
149 Interview feedback: four representatives from NCAs and one from economic operators.  
150 Interview feedback: two representatives from one NCAs, three economic operators, and two NCPs. 
151 Interview feedback: three representatives from NCAs three from NCPs and eight economic operators. 
152 Interview feedback: four representatives from NCAs. 
153 Interview feedback: one representative from EU Agencies. 
154 Interview feedback: four representatives from NCAs and four from economic operators.  
155 Interview feedback: 10 representatives from NCAs. 
156 Interview feedback: two representatives from NCAs and four from economic operators. 
157 Interview feedback: five representatives from NCAs and four NCPs. 
158 Interview feedback: 10 representatives from NCAs and one NCPs and 12 from economic operators. 
159 Interview feedback: eight representatives from NCAs. 
160 Interview feedback: eight representatives from NCAs and three from economic operators. 
161 Interview feedback: six representatives from NCPs, eight NCAs and eleven from economic operators. 
162 Interview feedback: three representatives from economic operators; one representative from EU Agencies. 
163 Interview feedback: seven representatives from NCAs and five NCPs. 

66 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
  The  Regulation  contributed  to  ensuring  the  appropriate  reporting  by  setting  the 
obligation  to  report  in  case  of  suspicious  transaction  but  the  definition  of  suspicious 
transaction seems not to provide sufficient guidance to detect them164 and requires the 
training of staff to be sufficiently competent to recognise them,165 especially when a 
transaction is performed online.166  

  The Regulation contributed to limiting the availability of explosives precursors167 but 
the  transport  of  explosives  precursors  across  Member  States  is  not  sufficiently 
monitored and could limit the effectiveness of the Regulation.168 

  The  freedom  in  choosing  different  regimes  to  apply  brought  to  a  lower  level  of 

harmonisation across Europe and creates security gaps and uncertainties.169 

  The  Regulation  contributed  to  improving  the  traceability  of  transactions  because 
economic  operators  have  requirements  of  registration  linked  to  reports.170  economic 
operators implemented awareness raising actions, included trainings to personnel;171 
  There  could  be  country  specific  factors  that  may  influence  the  effectiveness  of  the 
Regulation, i.e. the level of priority that countries give to precursors may depend on 
the risk of terrorist attacks (that is not evenly distributed across Member States).172 
  There is room for simplification if the registration regime was dropped and there was 
mutual recognition of licences,173 and if there was a clarification on the definition of 
economic operator and professional user.174 

Efficiency  

  Costs involve information activities and trainings.175 
 

Inspections are costly but in the coming years are expected to benefit from economies 
of scale.176 

  Overall  benefits  brought  by  the  Regulation  are  higher  than  costs  for  NCAs  and 

NCPs.177 economic operators have not encountered major costs.178 

  One  of  the  major  benefits  is  the  awareness  raised  among  the  actors  involved  in  the 

supply chain.179 

EU Added Value 

164 Interview feedback: 11 representatives from economic operators. 
165 Interview feedback: 10 representatives from NCAs, six NCPs and seven from economic operators. 
166 Interview feedback: two representatives from NCAs. 
167 Interview feedback: nine representatives from NCAs, two from economic operators and one NCPs. 
168 Interview feedback: five representatives from NCPs and nine from economic operators. 
169 Interview feedback: six representatives from NCAs, one representative from EU Agencies, three from 
economic operators, and two NCPs. 
170 Interview feedback: three representatives from NCAs and one NCPs. 
171 Interview feedback: nine representatives from economic operators. 
172 Interview feedback: eight representatives from NCAs and two from economic operators.  
173 Interview feedback: five representatives from NCAs and one NCPs and three from economic operators. 
174 Interview feedback: four representatives from NCAs. 
175 Interview feedback: two representatives from NCAs and one from economic operators. 
176 Interview feedback: two representatives from NCAs. 
177 Interview feedback: five representatives from NCAs and one from NCPs. 
178 Interview feedback: eleven representatives from economic operators. 
179 Interview feedback: six representatives from NCPs and nine NCAs. 

67 

 
 
                                                            
  The SCP is good for sharing information both between MS and among various actors 

(i.e. authorities and EO).180 

  The  Regulation  contributed  to  the  creation  of  a  common  language  on  explosives 
precursors  and  a  minimum  level  of  harmonisation  across  Europe  that  could  not  be 
achieved at national level only.181 

  The  creation  of  NCPs  and  NCAs  smoothed  the  process  in  creating  synergies  among 

Member States.182 

Open Public Consultation  

Overview of responses 

A total of 83 stakeholders participated in the public consultation.   

The majority of respondents are representatives from businesses/private companies (35) and 
non-profit organisations (16). The rest of the respondents include independent experts (8), EU 
citizens  (6),  representatives  of  public  authorities  (7),  pan-European  interest  groups  (5), 
national trade associations (5) and academic/research institutions (1). 

Most respondents reported that they reside or perform their activities in Germany (26), France 
(17), and Belgium (9). The remaining stakeholders reside or perform their activities in Italy 
(7),  the  Czech  Republic  (4),  Poland  (3),  Greece,  the  Netherlands  and  Portugal  (2  each), 
Austria,  Finland,  Hungary,  Romania,  Spain,  and  the  United  Kingdom  (1  each).  Five 
respondents  reside  or  perform  their  activities  in  non-EU  countries  (namely  Norway  and 
Switzerland). 

Two thirds of the respondents report being involved with restricted explosives precursors for 
their professional activities, including sale (48%), distribution (40%), manufacture (27%) and 
in  connection  with  their  professional  activities  (39%).  The  remaining  one  third  of  the 
stakeholders reports not being involved with restricted explosives precursors (23%) or using 
these substances for non-professional activities (11%).  

The majority of the respondents that are involved with explosives precursors mostly deal with 
Nitric acid, Hydrogen peroxide and Ammonium nitrate. 

Main findings 

Context  

The  current  system  of  controls  and  restrictions  on  the  marketing  and  use  of  explosives 
precursors ensures security of the general public against the misuse of explosives precursors 
from a moderate/high extent.183 

180 Interview feedback: three representatives from NCPs. 
181 Interview feedback: six representatives from NCPs eleven from economic operators and four NCPs. 
182 Interview feedback: four representatives from NCAs. 

68 

 
 
                                                            
Relevance 

  Elements that pose security concerns to a high/very high extent are the Internet sales 
of explosives precursor substances,184 to a moderate/high extent the existence of non-
regulated,  but  potentially  dangerous  precursor  substances  freely  available  on  the 
market,185  and  the  awareness  along  the  supply  chain  concerning  the  restrictions  and 
controls required by the Regulation.186  

Effectiveness 

Overall,  the  current  system  of  controls  and  restrictions  on  explosives  precursors 
contributed  to  a  moderate/high  extent  to  raising  awareness  of  the  supply  chain 
concerning risks related to the misuse of explosives precursors,187 and to improving 
the  traceability  of  sales  and  transactions  concerning  explosives  precursors.188 
However,  there  is  no  consensus  on  the  fact  that  the  Regulation  contributed  to 
harmonising controls and penalties across Member States. 

Overall, according to  the majority  of respondents (52%), the current system of controls and 
restrictions on  the  marketing  and  use  of  explosives  precursors  has  ensured  only  to  a  low  or 
moderate extent the security of the general public. Most of the respondents estimate that the 
current system has contributed to a moderate or high extent to improving traceability of sales 
and  transactions  concerning  explosives  precursors  and  raising  awareness  along  the  supply 
chain. However, respondents reported that, in their view, the Regulation did not substantially 
contribute to harmonising controls across Member States, considering significant differences 
in the implementation measures across the Member States (e.g. as regards labelling practices). 

A minority of the respondents, between 18 and 45% depending on the substance in question, 
are  of  an  opinion  that  the  substances  now  regulated  i.e.  hydrogen  peroxide,  nitromethane, 
nitric  acid,  potassium  chlorate,  potassium  perchlorate,  sodium  chlorate,  sodium  perchlorate 
cannot be effectively substituted with other non-restricted substances or concentrations. The 

183 OPC feedback: 68% (n=47) of respondents answered “Moderate extent” or “high extent” to the question “In 
your view, to what extent does the current system of controls and restrictions on the marketing and use of 
explosives precursors ensure security of the general public against the misuse of explosives precursors?”. 
184 OPC feedback: 54% (n=36) answered “high extent” or “completely” to the question “To what extent do the 
following elements pose security concerns?: Internet sales of explosives precursor substances“. 
185 OPC feedback: 59% (n=39) answered “moderate extent” or “high extent” to the question “To what extent do 
the following elements pose security concerns?: Existence of non-regulated, but potentially dangerous precursor 
substances freely available on the market. 
186 OPC feedback: 51% (n=37) answered “moderate extent” and “high extent” to the question “To what extent do 
the following elements pose security concerns?: Awareness along the supply chain concerning the restrictions 
and controls required by the Regulation“. 
187 OPC feedback: 71% (n=54) answered “moderate extent” or “high extent” to the question “Based on your 
experience, to what extent does the current system of controls and restrictions on explosives precursors 
contribute to the following results?: Raise awareness of the supply chain concerning risks related to the misuse 
of explosives precursors”. 
188 OPC feedback: 75% (n=53) answered “moderate extent” or “high extent” to the question “Based on your 
experience, to what extent does the current system of controls and restrictions on explosives precursors 
contribute to the following results?: Improve the traceability of sales and transactions concerning explosives 
precursors”. 

69 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
perception of effectiveness of respondents is however conditioned by the level of awareness 
of existing alternatives. 

Security concerns 

Internet sales of explosives precursors raise concerns for 77% of respondents, mainly due to 
difficulties in identifying the buyer and detecting suspicious transactions. From the responses, 
it  emerges  that  checks  for  the  professional  use  of  explosives  precursors  are  done  less 
frequently  online  than  in  physical  shops  (15%  of  the  respondents  report  being  requested  to 
demonstrate  professional  purpose  for  their  purchase  online,  while  24%  of  the  respondents 
report this for physical shops).  

The  majority  of  the  respondents  (70%)  report  that  the  availability  on  the  market  of  non-
regulated but potentially dangerous explosives raises security concerns. 

Limited  awareness  along  the  supply  chain  about  restrictions  and  controls  required  by  the 
Regulation  raises  concerns  to  a  moderate  or  high  extent  for  56%  of  respondents.  Not  all 
economic  operators  appear  to  be  aware  of  the  requirements  of  the  Regulation,  and  the 
complex and diverse nature of the supply chain makes it difficult for stakeholders to identify 
relevant actors to be targeted by awareness-raising activities. 

A  majority  of  the  respondents  (55%)  consider  that  the  capacity  to  distinguish  professional 
users  from  members  of  the  general  public  poses  to  a  moderate  or  high  extent  a  security 
concern.  

Efficiency  

Overall,  the  costs  entailed  by  the  Regulation  are  estimated  by  respondents  as  moderate. 
However a significant part of the respondents, up to 33%, find it difficult to estimate the costs 
entailed  by  the  Regulation.  A  majority  of  the  respondents  report  that  activities  related  to 
monitoring, inspections, compliance and reporting (63%) as well as distributing or obtaining 
information  on  regulated  substances  (55%)  implementation  of  licencing  and  registration 
(55%) generate costs to a moderate or high extent.  

Moreover, some respondents highlighted that following the entry into force of the Regulation 
and the national implementation measures, some people had to look for alternative substances 
in  order  to  continue  carrying  out  their  hobbies  or  other  legal  activities,  reportedly  entailing 
some  additional  costs.  Even  though  the  costs  entailed  by  the  Regulation  are  relatively  low, 
there is consensus on the importance to adequately assess the impacts and proportionality of 
any  future  revisions  of  the  EU  legislative  framework  for  the  different  categories  of 
stakeholders concerned. 

Future improvement 

In order to improve the current system of restrictions and controls on explosive precursors, the 
following elements appear to be a priority for respondents: 

  Clarification of rules applicable to internet sales and ways of enforcing them; 

70 

 
 
 

Improvement of the transmission of information along the supply chain  

  Clarification  of  the  definition  of  suspicious  transactions  and  related  criteria  to  be 

considered for their identification; 

  Harmonisation of implementation practices across Member States; 

 

Improvement of the awareness of relevant actors in the supply chain.  

Overall, there is consensus that any changes to the current legislative framework should take 
into  account  the  balance  between  risk  mitigation  and  market  related  effects,  while  ensuring 
simplicity and enforceability of the system. 

Results of the consultation activities – Impact Assessment 

 Survey carried out by the external contractor 

 

If  the  legal  framework  remains  unchanged  and  no  new  EU  initiative  is  adopted  the 
administrative costs and the enforcement costs are expected to increase for economic 
operators 189 whereas they would remain the same for NCAs/NCPs.190 

  The  policy  measures  that  would  be  effective  in  strengthening  restrictions  to  prevent 

and detect misuse of explosives precursors against public security are:  

o  To  impose  a  ban  on  access  by  members  of  the  general  public  to  restricted 

explosives precursors across the EU;191 

o  To increase cross-border exchange of information;192 

  The  policy  measures  that  would  be  effective  in  enhancing  awareness  and  the 

enforcement of the restrictions and reporting requirements are:  

o  Ensuring that the Regulation is applied for online retailers;193 
o  Training  law  enforcement,  first  responders  and  customs  authorities  in  all 

Member States;194 

189 Survey feedback: Administrative costs: 56% (n=9), and Enforcement costs: 74% (n=14) of economic 
operators reported that costs are expected to increase. 
190 Survey feedback: Administrative costs: 56% (n=19), and Enforcement costs: 52% (n=17) of economic 
operators reported that costs are expected to remain the same. 
191 Survey feedback: 52% (n=29) of representatives from economic operators and NCAs/NCPs answered ‘high 
extent’ ‘very high extent’ to the survey question “To what extent do you think that the following policy measures 
would be effective in strengthening restrictions to prevent and detect misuse of explosives precursors against 
public security?”. 
192 Survey feedback: 79% (n=44) of representatives from economic operators and NCAs/NCPs answered ‘high 
extent’ or ‘very high extent’ to the survey question “To what extent do you think that the following policy 
measures would be effective in strengthening restrictions to prevent and detect misuse of explosives precursors 
against public security?”. 
193 Survey feedback: 75% (n=43) of representatives from economic operators and NCAs/NCPs answered ‘high 
extent’ or ‘very high extent’ to the survey question “To what extent do you think that the following policy 
measures would be effective in improving the awareness and enforcement of the restrictions and reporting 
requirements?”. 
194 Survey feedback: 64% (n=39) of representatives from economic operators and NCAs/NCPs answered ‘high 
extent’ or ‘very high extent’ to the survey question “To what extent do you think that the following policy 
measures would be effective in improving the awareness and enforcement of the restrictions and reporting 
requirements?”. 

71 

 
 
                                                            
o  Setting up inspection systems in all Member States;195 
o  Improving  the  identification  of  regulated  explosives  precursors  along  the 

supply chain.196 

  The  following  policy  measures  will  increase  the  costs  for  some  actors  and  more 

specifically: 

o  Setting up inspection systems in all Member States for economic operators and 

NCA/NCP;197 

o  Requiring  economic  operators  to  register  transactions  involving  professional 

users;198 

o  Improving  the  identification  of  regulated  explosives  precursors  along  the 

supply chain.199 

 Online Workshops 

  NCPs think that the expansion in the number of substances in Annex I and Annex II as 
well  as  the  training  of  LEAs,  first  responders  and  customs  authorities,  and  the 
introduction  of  a  requirement  for  Member  States  to  set  up  specialised  inspection 
services  will  bring  additional  costs  since  they  will  probably  fall  under  their 
responsibility.200  For  Manufacturers/distributors  the  expansion  of  annexes  I  and  II 
seems  to  be effective, but  they stress  the importance of keeping simple any possible 
changes201  and  for  retailers  the  problem  should  be  linked  to  products  rather  than 
substances.202 

  Manufacturers/distributors would be fine with a faster procedure to restrict substances 

under Annex I but there is the need to be careful with the speed of changes.203 

  For  NCPs  and  NCAs  it  should  be  important  to  clarify  the  term  of  suspicious 

transaction and to encourage the reporting.204  

195 Survey feedback: 63% (n=35) of representatives from economic operators and NCAs/NCPs answered ‘high 
extent’ or ‘very high extent’ to the survey question “To what extent do you think that the following policy 
measures would be effective in improving the awareness and enforcement of the restrictions and reporting 
requirements?”. 
196 Survey feedback: 52% (n=32) of representatives from economic operators and NCAs/NCPs answered ‘high 
extent’ or ‘very high extent’ to the survey question “To what extent do you think that the following policy 
measures would be effective in improving the awareness and enforcement of the restrictions and reporting 
requirements?”. 
197 Survey feedback: 47% (n=17) of representatives from NCAs/NCPs and 45% (n=17) from economic operators 
answered ‘high extent’ or ‘very high extent’ to the survey question “To what extent do you think that the 
following policy measures will increase the costs of your organisation/institution?”. 
198 Survey feedback: 59% (n=13) of representatives from economic operators answered ‘high extent’ or ‘very 
high extent’ to the survey question “To what extent do you think that the following policy measures will increase 
the costs of your organisation/institution?”. 
199 Survey feedback: 46% (n=11) of representatives from economic operators answered ‘high extent’ or ‘very 
high extent’ to the survey question “To what extent do you think that the following policy measures will increase 
the costs of your organisation/institution?”. 
200 Feedback from online workshops with NCPs.  
201 Feedback from online workshops with manufacturers/distributors. 
202 Feedback from online workshops with retailers. 
203 Feedback from online workshops with manufacturers/distributors. 
204 Feedback from online workshops with NCPs.  

72 

 
 
                                                            
  Online  marketplaces 

represent 

a 

security 

threat 

for  NCAs 

and 

manufacturers/distributors205 

  Manufacturers/distributors  would  welcome 

regime.206 

the  revocation  of 

the  registration 

  Retailers do not encourage labelling of products: the making explicit of the presence 

of an explosives precursor could have a two side effect for terrorists.207 

  NCAs,  retailers  and  manufacturers/distributors  would  appreciate  the  establishment 
of  a  SCP  subgroup  to  regularly  discuss  evolving  threats  (in  classified  meetings), 
with  a  view  to  reacting  promptly  to  new  threats  and  one  subgroup  of  inspection 
authorities  and  a  task  Europol  and  EU  INTCEN  to  regularly  report  to  the  SCP. 
However,  NCAs  would  appreciate  the  involvement  of  NCAs  category  in  these 
subgroups and manufacturers/distributors would appreciate to be consulted.208 
  NCPs, NCAs and manufacturers/distributors think that Policy Option 3 would be too 

radical and costly to be implemented.209 

  NCPs  wish  more  information  exchange  with  economic  operators  210  and  NCAs 
support  the  introduction  of  a  requirement  from  economic  operators  to  inform  the 
next  link  in  the  supply  chain  when  a  substance  or  mixture  is  subject  to  the 
Regulation, including for Annex II. However, it should be important to identify the 
responsible(s)  who  have  to  inform  the  next  link  in  the  supply  chain  for 
manufacturers/distributors211  and  for  retailers  it  should  be  important  to  identify  all 
the products concerned.212 

Open Public Consultation 

  There is no consensus on the impact of the application of a ban in all Member States 
for  the  acquisition,  possession  and  use  of  restricted  explosives  precursors  by 
members of the general public on: 

o 

o 

the  increase  of  the  level  of  security  in  the  Union  against  the  misuse  of 
explosives  precursors  by 
respondents  on  behalf  of  a 
business/private company;  
the  increase  of  awareness  and  controls  over  transactions,  disappearances  and 
thefts of listed explosives precursors and on the improvement of traceability of 
sales and transactions; 

terrorists  for 

o  Smoother functioning of the internal market for chemical substances. 

  The application of a ban in all Member States for the acquisition, possession and use 
of restricted explosives precursors by members of the general public seems to have 
an  impact  on  further  harmonising  rules  concerning  the  making  available, 

205 Feedback from online workshops with NCAs. 
206 Feedback from online workshops with manufacturers/distributors. 
207 Feedback from online workshops with retailers. 
208 Feedback from online workshops with NCAs, retailers and manufacturers/distributors. 
209 Feedback from online workshops with NCPs and NCAs. 
210 Feedback from online workshops with NCPs.  
211 Feedback from online workshops with NCAs. 
212 Feedback from online workshops with retailers. 

73 

 
 
                                                            
introduction, possession and use of explosives precursors for respondents on behalf 
of a business/private company.213 

  There  is  no  consensus  on  the  impact  of  introducing  a  requirement  for  economic 

operators to register transactions with professional users on:  

o 

the  increase  awareness  and  controls  over  transactions,  disappearances  and 
thefts of listed explosives precursors; 

o  Improve traceability of sales and transactions. 

  The introducing a requirement for economic operators to register transactions with 
professional users seems to have a low impact on the increase the level of security in 
the  Union  against  the  misuse  of  explosives  precursors  by  terrorists214  and  on  the 
smoother functioning of the internal market for chemical substances.215 

  There  is  no  consensus  on  the  impact  of  extending  the  obligation  to  report 
disappearances and thefts of explosives precursors to members of the general public 
on  the  increase  of  awareness  and  controls  over  transactions,  disappearances  and 
thefts of listed explosives precursors. 

  Extending  the  obligation  to  report  disappearances  and  thefts  of  explosives 

precursors to members of the general public seems to have a low impact on:  

o 

the increase of the level of security in the EU against the misuse of explosives 
precursors by terrorists;216 

o  Improved traceability of sales and transactions; 217 

  Further  harmonising  rules  concerning  the  making  available,  introduction,  possession 

and use 

From the consultation held in preparation of the impact assessment report, the vast majority of 
SCP and industry representatives from manufactures and distributors, supported policy option 
2 as a preferred way forward for the revision of the current framework with complementary 
non-legislative measures from option 1. Stakeholders consulted through surveys, interviews 
and workshops did not express support for policy option 3, estimating measures in this option 

213 OPC feedback: 65% (n=21) respondents from a business/private company answered “agree” and “strongly 
agree” to the question “In your opinion, what would be the impact of the application of a ban in all Member 
States for the acquisition, possession and use of restricted explosives precursors by members of the general 
public?: Further harmonising rules concerning the making available, introduction, possession and use of 
explosives precursors”. 
214 OPC feedback: 49% (n=36) of respondents answered “strongly disagree” or “disagree” to the question “What 
would be the impact of introducing a requirement for economic operators to register transactions with 
professional users?: Increase the level of security in the Union against the misuse of explosives precursors by 
terrorists”. 
215 OPC feedback: 68% (n=50) respondents answered “strongly disagree” or “disagree” to the question “What 
would be the impact of introducing a requirement for economic operators to register transactions with 
professional users?: Smoother functioning of the internal market for chemical substances”. 
216 OPC feedback: 49% (n=34) respondents answered “strongly disagree” or “disagree” to the question “What 
would be the impact of extending the obligation to report disappearances and thefts of explosives precursors to 
members of the general public? Increase the level of security in the Union against the misuse of explosives 
precursors by terrorists”. 
217 OPC feedback: 56% (n=38) respondents answered “strongly disagree” or “disagree” to the question “What 
would be the impact of extending the obligation to report disappearances and thefts of explosives precursors to 
members of the general public?: Improve traceability of sales and transactions. 

74 

 
 
                                                            
as generally disproportionately restrictive and burdensome for economic operators and 
national authorities. 

ANNEX 3: EVALUATION OF REGULATION EU 98/2013 ON THE MARKETING AND USE OF 
EXPLOSIVES PRECURSORS  

INTRODUCTION 

Purpose of the evaluation 

This Annex to the Impact Assessment accompanying the Commission proposal for a revised 
Regulation  on  the  marketing  and  use  of  explosives  precursors  presents  the  results  of  the 
evaluation  of  Regulation  EU  98/2013  on  the  marketing  and  use  of  explosives  precursors 
(hereafter, the Regulation).  

The purpose of this evaluation is to: 

1)  Evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU added value of the 
Regulation and the situation created by the existing EU and national frameworks;  

2)  Make recommendations on the need for possible additional measures; and  
3)  Contribute to an assessment of the impact of possible new and strengthened measures.  

In line with the Commission Work Programme 2018, which envisages a possible revision of 
the  Regulation,  DG  HOME,  commissioned  a  study  on  combating  the  threat  posed  by 
explosives precursors. This study aimed to analyse the functioning of Regulation 98/2013, as 
well as to identify gaps and issues, and to assess the impact of possible policy changes. The 
study  supported  the  Commission  in  examining  ways  to  strengthen  protection  in  Europe 
against the illicit use of explosives precursors, by improving the effectiveness and efficiency 
of  the  EU  restrictions  and  controls  on  explosives  precursor  substances  and  ensuring  the 
appropriate reporting of suspicious transactions through the supply chain.  

Scope of the evaluation  

The  evaluation  takes  into  account  implementing  measures  at  national  level  of  the  main 
provisions of the Regulation as well as trends, challenges and recent cases related to misuse of 
explosives precursors. 

This report covers activities and data from the date of the entry into force of the Regulation, 
September 2014, to February 2018. In line with the geographical scope of the Regulation, the 
evaluation  targets  the  application  of  the  Regulation  in  the  EEA  members,  i.e.  the  EU  28 
Member States, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.  

The  Evaluation  addresses  the  five  mandatory  criteria  set  out  in  the  Commission's  Better 
Regulations Guidelines: (i) Relevance; (ii) Effectiveness; (iii) Efficiency; (iv) Coherence; and 
(v) EU added value.  

75 

 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND TO THE INITIATIVE 

Description of the initiative and its objectives  

Regulation EU 98/2013 and its objectives 

Explosives  precursors  are  chemical  substances  that  can  be  misused  to  manufacture  HMEs. 
Recognising the threat that these substances pose to public security, in the 2008 action plan on 
enhancing  the  security  of  explosives,  the  Commission  made  it  a  priority  to  examine  the 
possibility  of  regulating  substances  of  concern.  The  SCP,  a  Commission  expert  group  that 
brings  together  Member  States  and stakeholders  from  the  chemicals  industry  and  retail,  has 
been facilitating efforts at EU level since 2008.  

The  Regulation  aims  to  address  some  key  issues  related  to  the  availability,  introduction 
possession and use of explosives precursors in order to ensure a higher level of protection for 
the  general  public  against  the  threat  posed  by  HMEs  while  enabling  the  free  movement  of 
explosive precursor substances within the internal market. Notably, the Regulation establishes 
common  rules  and  restrictions  for  the  marketing  and  use  of  substances  that  pose  a  security 
concern, laid down in Annexes, with the strategic objectives of: 

-  Limiting the availability of explosives precursors to the general public across the EU; 
- 

Improving  detection  of  potential  threat  and  misuse  of  explosives  precursors  throughout 
the EU; 
Improving the free movement of explosives precursors within the EU. 

- 

To meet these strategic goals, the Regulation pursues the following operational objectives: 

-  Ensuring  controls  over  suspicious  transactions,  disappearances  and  thefts  through 

appropriate reporting obligations; 

-  Raising  awareness  along  the  supply  chain  of  relevant  restrictions  and  obligations  as 

regards the marketing and use of restricted explosives precursors; 

-  Harmonising rules that are likely to cause barriers to trade and distortion of competition. 

To  meet  the  objectives  of  limiting  the  availability  of  explosives  precursors  to  the  general 
public, the Regulation introduces three possible control regimes for the marketing and use of 
restricted substances:  

1)  Ban for the general public above the limit values of substances set in Annex I;  
2)  Licencing  regime,  allowing  access  for  members  of  the  general  public  to  restricted 
explosives precursors, subject to obtaining a licence issued by a designated competent 
authority;  

3)  Registration  regime,  allowing  access  for  members  of  the  general  public  to  a  limited 
number  of  restricted  explosives  precursors218  below  the  limit  value  set  in  the 
Regulation, subject to the registration of each transaction by the economic operator. 

The  Regulation  provides  a  safeguard  clause,  allowing  Member  States  to  adopt  further 
restrictions on substances than those set out in the Regulation in order to achieve higher levels 

218  As  per  art.  4  of  the  Regulation,  the  registration  regime  may  apply  only  to  the  following  three  substances 
below the respective limit values: hydrogen peroxide (between 12% and 35%); nitromethane (between 30% and 
40%) and nitric acid (between 3% and 10%). 

76 

 
 
                                                            
of  protection  (art.13).  Member  States  are  requested  to  establish  effective,  proportionate  and 
dissuasive  penalties  for  infringement  of  the  applicable  regimes  and  Regulation's  provisions 
(art.11). As regards economic operators, the Regulation imposes an obligation to report to a 
designated  national  contact  point  any  suspicious  transaction  as  well  as  significant 
disappearances  and  thefts  involving  explosives  precursors  (art.  9)  and  to  ensure  appropriate 
labelling of restricted substances (art. 5).   

The Regulation entered into force on 1 March 2013 and became applicable on 2 September 
2014. It was also incorporated into the EEA agreement by Joint Committee Decision219 on 12 
December 2014, entering into force also in Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. 

The  Regulation,  as  adopted,  differs  to  an  important  extent  from  the  Commission's  2010 
proposal.220  Most  importantly,  the  2010  proposal  foresaw  a  single  type  of  control  regime 
across  the  entire  Union,  consisting  of  licences  and  requiring  economic  operators  to  keep 
records  of  the  transactions.  The  2010  proposal  foresaw  restrictions  on  'imports'  rather  than 
'introduction,' as well as delegated powers to amend both annexes, not only Annex II and the 
limit values in Annex I. In addition, the 2010 proposal required economic operators to report 
suspicious transactions of any non-scheduled substances and transfer the relevant ammonium 
nitrate provisions from REACH, both of which were dropped and set to be re-examined at a 
later  date.  Finally,  the  adopted  Regulation  included  an  article  on  labelling  and  a  safeguard 
clause, neither of which were foreseen in the Commission's proposal. 

The  Regulation  was  amended  in  2016  with  the  addition  of  aluminium  powder,  magnesium 
powder and magnesium nitrate hexahydrate to Annex II.221 These additions were proposed to 
the SCP by Member States and were consulted with all relevant stakeholders, in particular the 
chemical industry and retail sector, to ensure they would not impose disproportionate burdens 
on economic operators or consumers.  

Policy context 

The 2008 EU action plan on enhancing the security of explosives222 called on Member States 
and  the  Commission  to  improve  the  regulation  of  explosives  precursors  on  the  market  and 
established the SCP with a mandate to identify threat substances and to consider options for 
restricting and controlling them. 

In 2010, judging that the general public had relatively easy access to these chemicals even in 
concentrations  sufficient  to  produce  a  powerful  explosive  device,  and  that  the  scale  of  the 
problem  was  amplified  by  the  fact  that  the  chemical  market  in  the  EU  was  large  and 
diversified, with multiple end-users, the Commission presented a proposal for a Regulation.  

Since  the  adoption  of  the  Regulation  in  2013,  the  SCP  has  met  regularly  to  facilitate  and 
monitor  its  implementation,  providing  a  platform  for  Member  States  and  representatives  of 
the  economic  operators  in  the  supply  chain  to  exchange  information  and  views  on  the 
Regulation and its practical implementation. 

219 Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 269/2014 of 12 December 2014 amending Annex II (Technical 
regulations, standards, testing and certification) to the EEA agreement [2015/2136]. 
220 2010/0246 (COD). 
221 Commission delegated regulations 2017/214, 2017/215, and 2017/216. 
222 Council document Doc. 8109/08. 

77 

 
 
                                                            
The  2015  European  Agenda  on  Security,  which  prioritises  fighting  terrorism,  reiterated  the 
importance  of  taking  action  at  EU  level  to  reduce  access  to  explosives  precursors.  In  the 
Action  Plan  on  firearms  and  explosives223,  which  implements  the  European  Agenda  on 
Security, the Commission announced that it would strengthen efforts to promote harmonised 
measures,  further  engage  the  supply  chain,  and  accelerate  work  towards  a  revision  of  the 
Regulation.  

In February 2017, the Commission adopted a report on the application of the Regulation.224 
The  report  outlines  the  main  challenges  faced  by  Member  States  and  the  supply  chain  and 
examines the feasibility and desirability of strengthening the system in the future. It concludes 
that the entry into force of the Regulation has helped reduce access for the general public to 
dangerous explosive precursors, but that additional changes to the Regulation are necessary to 
increase the capacity of all those involved in implementing and enforcing the restrictions and 
controls.  With  this  in  mind,  the  Commission  has  committed  to  carefully  evaluate  the 
Regulation  and  assess  the  impact  of  possible  further  measures.  The  comprehensive 
assessment of EU Security Policy, carried out by the Commission in 2017225, highlighted the 
added value of the Regulation to reducing the threat posed by explosives precursors in Europe 
and  reiterated  some  of  the  main  limitations  of  the  legislation.  Limitations  are  related  to 
awareness in the supply chain and on sharing information across borders, and the multiplicity 
of  different  regimes  across  the  EU,  which  creates  challenges  for  the  supply  chain  actors 
conducting business across the EU. 

In order to enable a more efficient application of the Regulation, the Commission adopted, in 
October 2017, Recommendations setting our immediate steps to prevent misuse of explosives 
precursors226.  The  Recommendations  called  for  an  improved  enforcement  of  the  restrictions 
and  controls  laid  down  in  the  Regulation  and  further  cooperation  and  engagement  with  the 
supply chain. The Recommendation also tasked Member States to assess the effectiveness of 
their national control measures for the marketing and use of explosives precursors and report 
to the Commission. In the Council conclusions227 of 7 December 2017, also the Council of the 
European  Union  has  acknowledged  the  need  to  introduce  further  steps to  prevent misuse  of 
explosives precursors.  

Despite  the  restrictions  and  controls  introduced  under  the  Regulation  and  measures  for 
improving  its  implementation  and  for  strengthening  cooperation  across  sectors  and  borders, 
regulated explosives precursors continue to be accessed by individuals and groups that pose a 
threat to public security. This is evidenced notably by recent attacks involving HMEs which 
left at least 195 dead and over 1000 injured in the period between November 2015 and May 
2017,228 by a number of failed attacks, 229 and by many additional incidents where HMEs and 

223 COM(2015) 624 final. 
224 COM(2017) 103 final. 
225 SWD(2017) 278 final.  
226 C(2017) 6950 final. COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 18.10.2017 on immediate steps to prevent 
misuse of explosives precursors. 
227 Council conclusions on strengthening the European Union response to CBRN related risks, reducing access to 
explosive precursors and protecting public spaces. 
228 Manchester arena (United Kingdom, May 2017), Ansbach music festival (Germany, July 2016), Brussels 
airport and metro (Belgium, March 2016), and Paris attacks (France, November 2015). 
229 Brussels Central Station (Belgium, June 2017), Alcanar explosion (Spain, August 2017, where two died in an 
accidental explosion during the preparation of HMEs), and Parsons Green tube station (United Kingdom, 
September 2017). 

78 

 
 
                                                            
related  materials  have  been  found  and  seized  by  the  police.  The  misuse  of  regulated 
explosives  precursors  for  illicit  manufacturing  of  HMEs  in  Europe  raises  the  question  of 
whether the Regulation is effective in limiting availability to the general public of explosives 
precursor substances and ensuring the appropriate reporting of suspicious transactions through 
the  supply  chain.  The  Commission  has  been  tasked  with  evaluating  the  Regulation  and 
assessing the need for further measures to strengthen the framework. 

Baseline 

Regulation  EU  98/2013  put  in  place  an  EU  legal  framework  for  the  marketing  and  use  of 
explosives precursors. The Regulation has created a legal basis for EU Member States to raise 
awareness among economic operators in the supply chain about the dangerous properties of 
some  of  their  products,  to  set  up  licensing  or  registration  regimes  through  which  restricted 
substances  can  be  made  available  to  the  members  of  the  general  public,  to  monitor 
compliance by economic operators with the restrictions and controls introduced, to inspect the 
registries of transactions kept by economic operators, to implement penalties on infringements 
of  the  Regulation,  and  to  gather  information  on  suspicious  transactions,  disappearances  and 
thefts.  

Prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  Regulation  the  situation  was  characterised  by  wide  availability 
and  easy  access  to  explosives  precursors,  including  those  in  high  concentrations,  by  the 
general  public and  a lack of an EU level playing field.  Some legislative and non-legislative 
measures  on  the  security  of  chemicals  have  been  adopted  at  national,  EU  and  international 
level  prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  Regulation230.  However,  these  measures  were  mainly 
focused on the security of explosives or chemicals used for weapons or drugs.  

Only  few  Member  States  had  measures  in  place  with  regard  specifically  to  explosives 
precursors  (legislative  measures  in  3  Member  States  and  non-legislative  measures  in  6 
Member  States)  before  the  adoption  of  the  Regulation.  In  addition,  Member  States' 
approaches to explosives precursors and their security varied significantly231 and many of the 
measures in place prior to the adoption of the Regulation addressed only a limited number of 
substances.  While  some  Member  States  have  deployed  efforts  introducing  restrictions  and 
controls  to  access  of  the  general  public  to  specific  explosives  precursor  substances,  other 
Member States focused on measures for increasing the security of precursors within the wider 
supply chain, with relation to  storage, transport etc. 

For  the  purpose  of  this  evaluation,  the  situation  before  the  adoption  of  the  Regulation  is 
therefore considered as baseline. 

The baseline is set on the basis of the key issues and problems identified by the 2010 Impact 
Assessment:232 

230 Examples include: UN Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Identification‟, 
adopted on 1 March 1999; The United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs‟, 1961; Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their 
Destruction‟. 
231 GHK, Rand Europe and Comstratos, 2010. Preparatory Study to Inform an Impact Assessment of Potential 
Legislative and Non-legislative Restrictions on Chemical Precursors to Explosives. 
232 Ibid. 

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  Wide availability and easy access to explosives precursors by the general public: 
the general public (in particular professional or other legitimate end users) could easily 
purchase (also on the internet) different types of explosives precursors available on the 
market; 

  High  ‘potency’  of  explosives  precursors:  the  concentration  levels  of  explosives 
precursors  available  to  the  general  public  and  to  legitimate  end-users  were  in  many 
cases  sufficient  to  produce  an  explosive  even  with  a  small  amount  of  the  chemical 
concerned.  Many  explosives  precursors  for  household  use  (especially  hydrogen 
peroxide,  liquid  nitromethane,  and  most  strong  acids)  were  available  to  the  general 
public  at  high  concentration  levels,  even  when  they  could  have  been  used  also  at  a 
lower  concentration  level  while  remaining  equally  effective  for  the  same  household 
purposes; 

  Insufficient  security  and  awareness  of  the  supply  chain:  actors  involved  in  the 
supply  chain  for  explosives  precursors  displayed  a  lack  of  awareness  about  the 
security  risks  related  to  terrorists  or  other  criminals  trying  to  obtain  explosives 
precursors,  with  cases  of  precursors  sold  in  quantities  that  should  have  raised 
suspicion. The lack of an obligation to report on suspicious transactions left room for 
the retailers to carry out opportunistic sales of large quantities of explosives precursors 
without worrying of committing any offence.  

  No  EU  level  playing  field:  despite  the  existence  of  several  legislative  and  non-
legislative  measures  at  international,  EU  and  national  level,  security  risks  associated 
with  explosives  precursors  were  not  adequately  addressed  throughout  the  entire  EU. 
Terrorists could indeed obtain precursors in Member States with less severe rules and 
possibly  misuse  them  in  other  Member  States  as  well.  Moreover,  the  adoption  by 
Member  States  of  different  regulatory  regimes  across  EU  creates  distortions  in  the 
internal  market  having  a  negative  impact  on  the  chemical  industry,  skewing  EU 
playing field. 

In 2010, there was evidence of few Member States233 having security measures in place 
to address explosives precursors, and they varied in nature, coverage and purpose. The 
main differences concerned:234  

  The  nature  or  type  of  instruments:  while  some  countries  mainly  relied  on  “soft” 
measures  such  as  voluntary  agreements,  industry-backed  guidelines  and  codes  of 
conduct (e.g. the Netherlands, the UK), others (e.g. Germany, Denmark, Ireland) had a 
regulatory  approach.  Nevertheless,  even  in  countries  with  a  structured  regulatory 
framework,  existing  legislative  measures  were  often  complemented  by  voluntary 
measures. Besides legislative measures, several types of measures has been identified, 
examples  are:  a)  Training  measures  for  staff,  law  enforcement  personnel  and  first 
responders235  b)  Awareness-raising  campaigns  targeting  supply  chain  actors  and 
notably retailers,236 c) National plans, strategies and other measures to map explosives 

233 Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
234 GHK, Rand Europe and Comstratos (2010),  op.cit. 
235 These included the UK “Know your chemical‟ booklet, a similar booklet launched in 2008 in Sweden and a 
training programme targeting police officers in Germany.  
236 Example: the UK‟s Self-storage initiative‟ and the UK Code of Conduct on Chemical Trade Controls. 

80 

 
 
                                                            
precursors  of  interest,237  and  d)  Research  into  explosives  precursors  carried  out  by 
Member States (e.g. Denmark, France and Sweden). 

  The  coverage  of  explosives  precursors:  while  some  countries  adopted  measures 
covering  a  wide  array  of  explosives  precursors,  other  Member  States  had  developed 
measures  focusing  only  on  a  specific  group  of  substances.  For  example,  the 
Netherlands,  Sweden  and  the  UK  implemented  measures  to  cover  a  wide  range  of 
explosives precursors that included nitrates/nitrogenous fertilizers, hydrogen peroxide 
and  acetone,  nitro-methane  and  hexamine,  strong  acids,  and  chlorates  and 
perchlorates. Poland  on  the other  hand, had  regulated only the category of hydrogen 
peroxide and acetone, Ireland only nitrates/nitrogenous fertilisers and France the nitro-
methane and hexamine category. 

  The  purpose  of  measures:  while  the  measures  in  some  Member  States  specifically 
aimed  at  restricting  or  controlling  the  access  of  the  general  public  to  the  relevant 
explosives  precursors,  other  Member  States  focused  on  increasing  their  security 
throughout the wider supply chain (e.g. handling, storage, transport).  

METHOD 

This evaluation builds on an independent study commissioned by DG HOME to an external 
contractor  on  the  implementation  of  the  EU  Regulation  of  explosives  precursors  in  view  of 
identifying possible options for a future EU initiative. 

The  evaluation  made  use  of  policy  and  legal  documents  at  EU  and  national  level,  position 
papers, studies, reports, statistical data and other pieces of written evidence provided though 
desk research, as well as field research including surveys and interviews. It also builds on a 
series of consultations, including an open public consultation carried out between 6 December 
2017 and 14 February 2018 and targeted consultations of the SCP and other stakeholders from 
the  chemical  supply  chain.  National  assessments  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  Regulation, 
carried  out  following  the  Commission  Recommendations  from  18  October  2017,  have  also 
contributed to the evaluation. 

All  Member  States  and a  wide representation  of  industry  have  provided  feedback and  input 
through  the  stakeholder  consultations.  Member  States'  assessments  on  the  effectiveness  of 
their national regimes for marketing and use of explosives precursors, carried out in line with 
the  Commission  Recommendations  on  immediate  steps  to  prevent  misuse  of  explosives 
precursors, have also contributed to this evaluation. 

The analysis encountered the following difficulties: 

  Data  and  information  on  the  misuse  of  explosives  precursors  are  limited  and 
often not publicly accessible. Information on chemical substances used as explosives 
precursors  in  terrorist  attacks  is  not  possible  without  referring  to  classified 
information.  Moreover,  open  source  intelligence  is  often  fragmented  in  a  number  of 
heterogeneous sources of information and, for most recent cases, not available or only 
partial. This limitation affected the quantification of the problem related to the misuse 

237 Example: the Danish Anti-Terrorism Action Plan adopted in 2005 and Dutch “Handbook on Precursors for 
"Home-made Explosives‟. 

81 

 
 
                                                            
of explosives precursors for criminal purposes and the analysis of the relevance of the 
Regulation to current security needs.  

  The assessment of the results of the Regulation is limited by some methodological 
considerations.  Firstly,  limited  time  has  passed  since  the  implementation  of  the 
Regulation in 2014, which means it may be too soon to adequately evaluate its impact. 
This  is  even  more  relevant  considering  that  some  Member  States  formally  adopted 
implementing measures only recently. Secondly, accurate data and statistics are rarely 
available,  which  makes  it  difficult  to  quantify  the  impact  of  the  Regulation  (e.g. 
number  of  granted  licences,  number  of  suspicious  transactions).  Thirdly,  the 
Regulation is only a part of the fight against the misuse of explosives precursors and 
more  in  general  terrorism;  there  are  naturally  many  other  initiatives  conducted  at 
national  that  aim  to  tackle  the  problem.  The  assessment  of  the  impact  is  performed 
mainly on a qualitative base, looking for ‘contributions’ made by the Regulation to the 
overall  results  achieved,  and  where  the  Regulation  is  being  of  value  compared  with 
what could have been achieved by Member States only. 

  Information  on  costs  related  to  the  implementation  of  the  Regulation  are  very 
limited  –  the  assessment  of  regulatory  costs  for  economic  operators  and  Public 
Authorities  (PAs)  strongly  relies  on  the  qualitative  feedback  provided  by  relevant 
stakeholders  during  survey  and  interviews.  Even  if  a  precise  quantification  and 
monetisation of them is not possible, stakeholder feedbacks allowed a prioritisation of 
the  most  burdensome  legal  requirements  and  the  identification  of  potential  measures 
for cost saving and efficiency gains. 

  Identification of the number of the economic operators affected by the regulation 
was not possible based on data available - The chemicals affected by the Regulation 
are  known  to  have  a  wide  range  of  uses  and  are  therefore  sold  by  a  wide  range  of 
businesses.  The  market  analysis  supporting  this  evaluation  was  able  to  identify  the 
main uses. However, the number of businesses that sell Annex I and II chemicals need 
to  be  estimated  using  EUROSTAT  data  on  the  number  and  size  of  EU  Businesses, 
sorted by Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community 
(NACE) codes. The NACE codes encompass a number of different types of business 
and different assumptions need to be done regarding what proportion of each NACE 
code would sell Annex I and II chemicals for each Member State.  

  Limited  responsiveness  of  economic  operators.  Despite  the  long  list  of  economic 
operators  targeted  through  the  web-based  survey  (273),  only  24  provided  an  answer 
and among them only few are retailers which, as shown by the following analysis are 
among  the  stakeholders  that  are  most  concerned  by  the  Regulation.  Despite  several 
rounds of consultations in the framework of the preparatory study, the rate of response 
remained  low.  The  information  provided  can  be,  nevertheless  considered  somewhat 
representative given that the main EU business associations provided a feedback.238 

238 Among survey respondents there are six European Business Associations. Even if not all of them have 
members from all Member States, they have a wide coverage of National Business Associations. Considering 
them jointly, all Member States are represented by the answers provided to the survey. 

82 

 
 
                                                            
IMPLEMENTATION STATE OF PLAY  

Security and market context  

The availability of explosive precursors has facilitated the use of HMEs. The threat posed by 
these HMEs in the EU has always been high. Prior to the entry into force of the Regulation in 
2013,  large  quantities  of  explosives  precursors,  currently  restricted  by  the  Regulation,  were 
found  during  investigations  of  thwarted  terrorist  attacks239.  Despite  the  restrictions  and 
controls  of  the  Regulation,  the  overall  number  of  terrorist  attacks  involving  explosives 
precursors,  as  well  as  the  number  of  fatalities  in  terror  attacks  using  explosives 
precursors has significantly increased since 2013.  

Explosives were used in about 40% of terrorist attacks in 2015 and 2016240. HMEs pose now 
a  much  higher  threat  than  other  types  of  explosives,  such  as  military  and  commercial 
explosives and pyrotechnics. The latter, which fall outside the scope of the Regulation, were 
more popular in the past241.  

Currently,  perpetrators  prefer  making  TATP,  which  was  used  in  the  vast  majority  of  the 
terrorist attacks in the EU in the last years, including those in Paris in 2015, Brussels in 2016 
and  Manchester,  Stockholm,  Cambrils  and  Parsons  Green  in  2017.  Another  often  made 
explosive  is  HMTD,  which  has  been  used  in  the  2005  London  tube  bombings  and  several 
terrorist attacks in the United States, including those in 2016 in New York and New Jersey. 
The  increasing  availability  of  bomb  making  manuals  on  the  Internet  and  the  fact  that  the 
substances themselves are increasingly available on the Internet has exacerbated the misuse of 
explosives  precursors  in  the  EU  and  increased  the  threat  also  of  substances  that  have  been 
used for the manufacture of HME outside the EU. Both TATP and HMTD are created from 
hydrogen  peroxide,  a  substance  to  which  the  Regulation  restricts  access  to  members  of  the 
general public. These HMEs also require acetone or hexamine, subject to reporting suspicious 
transactions under the Regulation.   

According  to  Europol,  the  threat  posed  by  HMEs  will  continue  to  be  high,  with  HME 
remaining the popular choice of explosive. The EU may see that a broader range of HMEs 
will  again  be  used,  such  as  those  based  on  ammonium  nitrate,  as  used  in  Oslo  in  2011  and 
Oklahoma in 1995, or those based on chlorates. Currently TATP however remains the most 
popular HME.242  

A  shift  in  the  user  profile  of  HME  has  occurred  in  the  last  years,  from  separatists  towards 
religiously inspired terrorists. A forecast regarding terrorism is that many foreign fighters may 
return  home  with  “high  tech”  weapons  knowledge  learned  on  the  battlefield,  including  on 
explosives. As a result of this injection of skills and knowledge to existing networks, the use 
of explosives is likely to increase further.243 

239 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend TE-SAT Report 2013, Europol. 
240 TE-SAT Report 2017. 
241 ECTC Threat assessment, Europol 2018. 
242 Ibid. 
243 Jane's, European terrorism forecast: Trends in Islamist militancy in 2018. 

83 

 
 
                                                            
Europol  warns  that  the  focus  of  terrorist  on  HMEs,  the  developed  capabilities  to  efficiently 
and  safely  manufacture  large  amounts  of  TATP  is  alarming  in  combination  with  the 
circumstance that they are still able to acquire significant amounts of explosives precursors244. 

In  addition,  evidence  of  some  growing  concern  about  transport  and  storage  of  explosives 
precursors;  incidents of theft of explosives from storage facilities are highlighted in several 
sources,    and  storage  of  some  explosives  precursors,  for  example  ammonium  nitrate,  is 
reported not to be secure enough at the end-user level.   

As  stated in  the  2017  report  on  the application of  the  Regulation,  the  amount  of  explosives 
precursors  has  decreased,  partly  because  many  economic  operators  have  turned  towards 
alternative substances245. In addition, it emerged from the same report that the supply chain 
has not been subject to significant economic losses, because of this substitution. 

Overall, the trade and production trends for certain substances suggest that the financial and 
economic crisis have had an effect of the price per unit,  exports and imports throughout the 
EU, such was the case for Ammonium Nitrate, Calcium Nitrate, Acetone, and Nitromethane.  

In general, the analysis of restricted substances did not reveal any strong aligned patterns that 
may suggest that the production or trade trends were affected downward by this requirement. 
In  fact,  a  generally  positive  export  trend  was  recorded  for  all  substances,  and,  with  the 
exception of Nitromethane, the value of sold production has also increased for all substances 
(Hydrogen  Peroxide  being  the  highest,  accounting  for  a  24%  increase  during  the  observed 
period).  Regarding  Nitromethane,  this  has  been  classified  by  the  IARC  as  a  possible 
carcinogenic  substance  to  humans,  and  its  drop  in  sold  production  value  might  suggest 
manufacturers are moving to alternatives.  

Regarding the substances in Annex II, those include mostly fertilisers, which are found to be 
used in professional and non-professional circumstances, with the exception of Hexamine and 
Acetone,  mainly  used  in  the  plastic  industry.  Trends  for  these  substances  highlight  both 
increases and decreases, with Acetone and Ammonium Nitrate sold production decreasing by 
31% and 55% respectively, over the course of the period between 2008 and 2016.  

The  preparatory  study  showed  virtually  no  availability  of  restricted  substances  among  the 
large  online  retailers  analysed.  Those  substances  remain,  however,  available  for  online 
purchase in lower concentration than those set in the Regulation, with Hydrogen Peroxide and 
Nitric  Acid  being  the  two  most  available  substances  across  all  markets.  Conversely,  the 
substances  of  Annex  II  are  more  widely  available,  as  they  are  not  subject  to  a  ban. 
Nonetheless,  these  results  should  be  taken  with  caution,  as  the  number  of  online  retailers 
analysed in the study cannot be considered statistically representative. 

Compliance and implementation measures 

As  of  March  2018,  all  Member  States  are  in  compliance246  with  the  requirements  of  the 
Regulation to set up NCPs for reporting suspicious transactions (Article 9(2)) and to lay down 

244 ECTC Threat assessment, Europol 2018. 
245 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
application of, and delegation of power under, Regulation (EU) 98/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, Op. Cit. 
246 An infringement case remains open for Romania but the Commission will proceed to close it as soon as the 
law that was adopted by Parliament in February 2018 is promulgated. 

84 

 
 
                                                            
rules  on penalties  (Article 11).  Although penalties for infringements of  the Regulation have 
been introduced in all Member States, their type and level of severity varies significantly.  

The  Regulation  is  EEA-relevant  and  therefore  also  applicable  to  Iceland,  Liechtenstein  and 
Norway. The EFTA Surveillance Authority is competent for monitoring the application of the 
Regulation in those countries. Whereas Norway and Liechtenstein are in compliance with the 
Regulation, the EFTA Court held  in June  2017  that  Iceland had failed to  take the measures 
necessary to make the Regulation part of its internal legal order247.  

Finally,  Switzerland  is  not  bound  by  the  provisions  of  the  Regulation,  but  has  nevertheless 
already  designated  a  national  contact  point  and  has  started  public  consultations  for  the 
adoption of national measures controlling and restricting explosives precursors. 

National control regimes for the marketing and use of explosives precursors 

Under  Article  4(1),  the  Regulation  bans  the  making  available,  introduction,  possession  and 
use of restricted explosives precursors (listed in Annex I of the Regulation) to members of the 
general  public.  Member  States  can  nevertheless  establish  and  maintain  licensing  and/or 
registration regimes through which the restricted explosives precursors can be made available, 
in a controlled way, to members of the general public (Article 4(2) and (3)).  

The application of the Regulation to date shows that national control regimes for the 
marketing and use of restricted explosives precursors vary significantly. 

As  of  February  2018,  20  Member  States  have  established  bans  for  members  of  the  general 
public to different restricted explosives precursors. Out of those, 12 Member States apply a 
ban  to  all  restricted  substances  under  the  Regulation  and  8  Member  States  apply  a 
combination of regimes of a ban and registration (5), a ban and licencing (2) or a ban and 
registration  and  licencing  (1).  Another  8  Member  States  have  put  in  place  a  licencing 
regime for all restricted substances.  

247 Judgement on case E-18/16 - EFTA Surveillance authority v Iceland from 7 June 2017. 

85 

 
 
                                                            
Overview of the regimes applied to restricted explosives precursors 

Among those Member States that maintain a licensing regime, there is significant variation in 
the number of applications, the processes for requesting licences, the criteria on which they 
are granted or refused, and the length and type of validity of the licence. Some Member States 
take the view that requests for a licence should be granted unless there is a stated reason not 
to, while others apply the opposite approach, refusing licences unless there is a specific reason 
to  grant  them.  This  could  explain  that  the  percentage  of  licences  granted  and  denied  in 
Member  States  differs  greatly.  From  the  information  shared  by  the  Member  States  with  the 
Commission, the percentage of licences granted in comparison to the number of applications 
ranges  from  86%  to  1%.  The  timeframe  for  issuing  a  decision  on  a  licence  also  varies 
significantly across the Member States, ranging from 28 days to three months. Most Member 
States require applicants to pay a fee to cover the cost of processing the application (ranging 
from 12 to 45 euros), in line with Article 7(3) of the Regulation. In some Member States, the 

86 

 
 
licensing request is free of charge. The duration of validity of licences varies across the EU, 
but does not exceed 3 years. Most Member States issue licences for multiple transactions over 
a period of time, but some can issue licences also for single transactions.  

To date, 6 Member States are applying a registration regime for the three substances listed in 
the Regulation. In most Member States applying a registration regime, there is no system in 
place  for  systematic  control  by  public  authorities  of  registered  transactions,  and  inspections 
are reportedly being carried out sporadically.   

National measures going beyond the Regulation 

Some  Member  States  do,  whenever  possible,  propose  alternative  substances  or 
concentration levels which can be used for legitimate purposes. The experiences reported by 
Member  States  suggest  that  alternatives  exist  for  many,  if  not  most,  known  legitimate  uses. 
Studies  show  that  some  economic  operators  chose  alternative  substances  to  explosives 
precursors  in  their  business  and  in  cases,  discontinue  marketing  products  that  contain 
restricted substances.248    

Some  Member  States  have  gone  beyond  the  minimum  requirements  determined  in  the 
Regulation and adopted stricter measures, including a requirement for economic operators to 
register  with  the  competent  authorities  and  to  periodically  declare  all  transactions, 
including imports, extend the scope of the Regulation to cover professional users, determine 
conditions for storage,  foresee the exchange  of relevant cross-border information  with  other 
Member States, or establish a role for customs authorities.  

In  addition,  some  Member  States  apply  restrictions  and  controls  to  non-listed  explosives 
precursors, or tighter restrictions to substances that are listed in line with  Article 13 of the 
Regulation. As of February 2018, 24 Member States apply restrictions only to the substances 
listed  in  Annex  I  of  the  Regulation  and  another  4  Member  States  as  well  as  Norway  apply 
restrictions  to  non-scheduled  substances.  In  all  current  cases,  Member  States  had  the 
restrictions and controls in place prior to the adoption of the Regulation.  

Awareness raising regarding the regulation of explosives precursors in the EU  

Not all Member States have taken measures to increase the awareness among the supply chain 
of the obligations deriving from Regulation 98/2013. Even though many Member States have 
reportedly conducted awareness-raising campaigns targeted at economic operators involved in 
the  supply  chain  of  the  listed  explosives  precursors,  the  frequency  and  scope  of  such 
campaigns differ significantly among them. Only some Member States actively engage with 
online suppliers and marketplaces as well as with umbrella organisations of professionals and 
trade unions in order to maximise the outreach to concerned users. Further national measures 
to  raise  awareness  include  transmission  of  the  Commission  Guidelines  through  national 
websites  or  competent  authorities,  development  of  information  materials  at  national  level 
including guidelines, leaflets and video materials, roll-out of targeted trainings and seminars 
for  economic  operators.  Market  surveillance  and  inspection  activities  have  also  reportedly 

248  Ernst  &  Young,  Rand  Europe,  (2018)  Study  on  combatting  the  threat  posed  by  explosives  precursors: 
evaluation of the existing policy and legislative framework and preparation of an impact assessment of possible 
options for a future EU initiative.  

87 

 
 
                                                            
contributed to raising awareness along the supply chain about the applicable national regime 
and the provisions of the Regulation. 

EU supporting measures 

The Commission has supported national efforts for the implementation of the Regulation, in 
close cooperation with the SCP, notably with the adoption and regular review of Guidelines 
and the adoption of three delegated acts, which added threat substances to Annex II.  

Through the SCP, the Commission has also facilitated cross-border exchange of information 
on reports of suspicious transactions, disappearances and thefts, and the granting and refusal 
of  licences,  and  has  supported  awareness-raising  efforts  by  the  chemical  industry  and  retail 
sector.  The  Commission  has  also  funded  projects  to  increase  the  awareness  of  companies 
selling  chemical  products  of  security  risks.  Specifically,  the  Security  of  Sales  of  High  Risk 
Chemicals  project developed guidance  materials for retailers, both  in physical  locations and 
on the internet, and for competent and law enforcement authorities. 

Overall effect of the Regulation 

The entry into force of Regulation (EU) 98/2013 has been a key factor to reducing access to 
dangerous  explosive  precursors  which  can  be  misused  to  manufacture  HMEs  and  to 
preventing terrorist attacks in Europe.  

As evidenced in the Commission 2017 report on the application of the Regulation, and in line 
with the results of consultations carried out with the SCP, and relevant stakeholders, and of a 
study carried out by independent expert consortium, it emerges that: 

The amount of explosives precursors available on the market has decreased249 250. This is 
partly due to the fact that many economic operators are applying the restrictions laid down in 
the Regulation. In addition, some manufacturers have stopped producing restricted explosives 
precursors  and  some  retailers  have  stopped  selling  these  substances  even  in  Member  States 
where  no  ban  is  applied.  The  supply  chain  has  not  reported  any  significant  disturbances  or 
economic  losses  as  a  result  of  this.  Also,  in  some  Member  States  that  maintain  licensing 
regimes,  authorities  have  reported  that  the  number  of  licence  applications  is  currently 
significantly  lower  than  it  was  during  the  first  year  of  application  of  the  Regulation.  This 
suggests  that  members  of  the  general  public  have  successfully  adopted  alternative  (non-
sensitive) substances for continuing with their legitimate non-professional activities. 

The  detection  of  potential  threat  and  misuse  of  available  explosives  precursors  has 
increased.  Member  States  have  reported  an  increase  in  the  number  of  reported  suspicious 
transactions,  disappearances  and  thefts,  in  part  due  to  greater  awareness  among  economic 
operators who handle explosives precursors. In addition, the competent authorities in Member 
States that maintain licensing regimes have a better understanding of which members of the 

249 National assessment of the effectiveness of the Regulation: 70% (n=12) of the NCAs that provided reports to 
the Commission on the effectiveness of the Regulation indicate that the availability of explosives precursors to 
members of the general public has tangibly decreased following the entry into force of the Regulation.. 
250  Survey  feedback: 94%  (n=65)  of  the  stakeholders  consulted within  the preparatory study  are of  an  opinion 
that  the  regulation  has  contributed  to  some  extent  to  limiting  the  availability  of  explosives  precursors  to  the 
general public. 

88 

 
 
                                                            
general  public  are  in  possession  of  restricted  substances  and  the  purpose  they  intend  to  use 
them for. 

Finally,  information  exchange  between  Member  States  has  improved  in  the  last  years, 
although  the  Regulation  does  not  set  obligations  on  cross-border  information  sharing. 
Specifically,  cross-border  exchange  of  information  on  reports  of  suspicious  transactions, 
disappearances  and  thefts,  and  licences  has  been  facilitated  thought  the  SCP.  In  addition, 
some Member States have, on an ad hoc basis, exchanged information on reports and refused 
licences.  

The free movement of explosives precursors has somewhat improved within the EU following 
the entry into force of the Regulation. The harmonisation of rules has made compliance easier 
for  business  operating  throughout  the  EU  and  has  also  diminished  the  possibility  that 
companies  take  advantage  by  locating  themselves  in  Member  States  were  the  level  of 
restrictions and controls is more lenient, thereby achieving an unfair advantage and distorting 
competition. Nevertheless, the positive effect of the Regulation on the internal market remains 
limited, as economic operators continue to face challenges. 

Key Observations 

  The amount of explosives precursors available on the market has decreased 

further to the entry into force of the Regulation  

  The detection of potential threat and misuse of available explosives precursors 

has increased after the entry into force of the Regulation  

  The free movement of explosives precursors has improved within the EU  

Key challenges arising from the application of the Regulation  

The study carried out to support this evaluation, as well as consultations held with the SCP, 
competent authorities and economic operators suggest that despite the overall positive effect 
of the Regulation for reducing the threat from explosives precursors in Europe, a number of 
challenges have nevertheless arisen from its application.  

Recent attacks and incidents involving HMEs in Europe provide evidence of the continuous 
misuse of explosives precursors (see 4.1). 

Control regimes for explosives precursors across the EU  

The Regulation only provides for a very moderate level of harmonisation of rules has made 
compliance easier for business operating throughout the EU. Having different control regimes 
in place across Member States have created certain difficulties for compliance of economic 
operators  that  operate  in  more  than  one  Member  State.  Economic  operators  that  conduct 
business throughout the EU also face the challenge of having to adapt to the specific nature of 
the different regimes in each Member State. The Regulation allows Member State authorities 

89 

 
 
 
to  define  key  aspects  of  its  application  in  their  territory.  Consequently,  economic  operators 
must be aware of the type of regime that applies in the specific Member State the product is 
destined  for,  and  must  register  the  sale,  verify  a  licence  or  ban  the  sale,  accordingly.  Some 
companies  have  robust  due  diligence  internal  procedures  which  facilitate  compliance  with 
complex  regulatory  frameworks.  However,  for  companies  without  such  procedures,  often 
smaller companies, this is a time-consuming process.  

In  addition,  the  moderate  level  of  harmonisation  of  rules,  in  particular  in  relation  to 
registration  regimes  makes  companies  benefit  from  locating  themselves  or  being  located  in 
Member States were the level of restrictions and controls is more lenient, thereby achieving 
an unfair advantage and distorting competition.  

Identification of legitimate users at the point of sale     

Another recurrent issue, notably for the retail sector, is to identify who is eligible to purchase 
explosives precursors. The Regulation imposes restrictions on members of the general public 
to make available, introduce, possess and use restricted explosives precursors. In parallel, the 
Regulation tasks economic operators to report suspicious transactions, including transactions 
involving  professional  users251.  Nevertheless,  the  current  framework  does  not  provide  a 
definition  of  professional  users,  which  leads  to  the  uncertainty  for  economic  operators  in 
distinguishing  persons  that  are  eligible  to  purchase  restricted  substances  from  those  that  are 
not. Recent attacks have shown that terrorists have managed to purchase restricted explosives 
precursors falsely claiming to be a professional user. 

Some  countries,  like  Norway,  have  introduced  stricter  measures  than  those  provided  in  the 
Regulation,  notably  extending  the  ban  to  legal  persons  with  no  professional  need  for 
explosives  precursors  and  by  introducing  mandatory  registration  of  sales  for  professional 
users. 

Identification of products that fall under the scope of the Regulation  

A main challenge for economic operators, particularly those in the retail sector, has been to 
identify  products  that  fall  under  the  scope  of  the  Regulation.  Products  containing  restricted 
explosives  precursors  must  be  labelled  accordingly.  When  that  is  not  done  early  on  in  the 
supply  chain,  it  is  difficult  for  operators  at  retail  level  to  properly  verify  that  the  label  is 
affixed and that the restrictions apply.  

In  addition,  the  explosives  precursors  listed  in  Annex  II  that  are  subject  to  reporting 
requirements  are  not  required  to  be  labelled  under  the  Regulation.  Economic  operators, 
particularly  those  with  high  staff  turnover,  need  to  devote  considerable  time  resources  to 
identify products of concern and train their staff appropriately. 

The practices related to labelling vary considerably along the supply chain. Many economic 
operators require that suppliers/producers identify whether their products  contain explosives 
precursors  in  concentrations  in  line  with  the  Regulation.  Other  operators  reportedly  review 
themselves  the  products  they  sell  to  identify  possible  presence  of  explosives  precursors.  It 
cannot be excluded that several economic operators do not take any measure to identify that 
the products they sell are subject to the rules of the Regulation. 

251 Art. 3.8, and art. 9, Regulation EU 98/2013 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors 

90 

 
 
                                                            
the  majority  of  retailers  reportedly  rely  on 

While  manufacturers  directly  verify  the  presence  of  restricted  explosives  precursors  in  a 
product, 
information  received  from 
suppliers/manufacturers for labelling. Thus, a recurrent issue for economic operators appears 
to  be  the  lack  of  clarity  on  allocation  of  responsibilities  as  regards  labelling  of  products 
containing  restricted  explosives  precursors.  This  uncertainty,  in  turn,  poses  difficulties  to 
economic  operators,  notably  retailers,  to  comply  with  the  Regulation's  provision  regarding 
labelling of explosives precursors.  

Awareness along the supply chain  

Because  many  of  the  substances  concerned  by  the  Regulation  are  widely  used  household 
products, the supply chain is significantly larger than that of other products subject to specific 
control  provisions  at  EU  level,  such  as  drug  precursors.252  This  poses  a  challenge  for 
competent  authorities  to  reach  all  economic  operators  in  the  supply  chain  of  explosives 
precursors to  inform  them  of  their duties.  However,  competent authorities  in  some  Member 
States  have,  in  collaboration  with  the  associations  that  represent  the  chemical  industry  and 
retail  sector,  conducted  awareness-raising  campaigns  and  engaged  with  a  wide  range  of 
operators — from manufacturers to retailers, big companies to small independent stores, and 
internet sellers to marketplaces. 

Online sales 

The online availability of explosives precursors in the EU is a further challenge. Explosives 
precursors  are  reportedly  more  widely  available  on  the  internet  than  in  physical  markets.  A 
concrete  example  of  the  internet  aiding  the acquisition  of  explosives  precursors  for  terrorist 
purposes is that of Anders Breivik for his attack in 2011 in Norway. An important number of 
the assessed online retailers allow for an easy access to explosives precursors with no mention 
of the Regulation, no requirement for a registration account, no check of identity and address 
of the requester. This poses a challenge for Member States in tracing movement of explosives 
precursors across the EU and monitoring and detecting suspicious transactions. Studies show 
that  the  majority  of  stakeholders  involved  in  the  marketing  and  regulation  of  explosives 
precursors  are  concerned  with  the  security  threat  posed  by  the  wide  availability  and 
insufficient  controls  of  online  transactions  involving  explosives  precursors.  Some  Member 
States  have  recently  started  working  with  online  retailers  and  marketplaces,  including  eBay 
and  Amazon,  to  raise  awareness,  improve  detection  capabilities  and  enhance  information 
exchange  with  competent  authorities.  The  main  challenges  for  operators  are  related  to 
identifying  products  of  concern,  detecting  non-compliant  items,  identifying  meaningful 
suspicious  activity  indicators,  and  handling  large  and  diverse  amounts  of  data.  There  are 
however good practices in the processing of orders, automatic data capturing and application 
of algorithm to report suspicious transactions that could be helpful to some operators. 

Key Observations 

  Explosives precursors continue to be misused for the manufacture of HME 

  Fragmentation of control regimes across the EU create challenges for 

compliance of economic operators and pose a security concern 

252  

   Economic operators face difficulties in identifying legitimate users at the point 

of sale and products falling under the scope of the Regulation  

  The level of awareness along the supply chain varies considerably and poses a 
91 

security concern 

  Online marketplaces face uncertainties about the scope of application of the 

Regulation. Traceability of online sales poses a security concern. 

 
 
                                                            
ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS 

The  evaluation  logic  is  framed  under  five  different  evaluation  categories:  Relevance, 
Effectiveness,  Efficiency,  Coherence  and  EU  Added  Value.  Effectiveness  considers  how 
successful  the  Regulation  has  been  in  achieving  or  progressing  towards  its  objectives  by 
comparing those with the effects generated by the Regulation (outputs, results, and impacts). 
Efficiency  considers  the  relationship  between  the  resources  used  (inputs)  and  the  effects 
generated  by  the  Regulation  (outputs,  results,  and  impacts).  Relevance  looks  at  the 
relationship between the current needs and the objectives of the Regulation. Coherence looks 
for  evidence  of  synergies  or  inconsistencies  between  the  Regulation  and  other  EU  policies 
which are expected to work together. EU added value assesses whether action continues to be 
justified at the EU level and looks for changes which it can reasonably be argued are due to 
EU  intervention,  rather  than  any  other  factors.  In  order  to  evaluate  the  performance  of  the 
Regulation, the following general questions were used to guide the analysis.  

Relevance  

  To  what  extent  have  the  objectives  of  the  Regulation  proved  relevant  to  the  needs 

identified at the outset? 

  Do  the  objectives  of  the  Regulation  correspond  to  Europe's  current  and  emerging 

problems and needs? 

Effectiveness 

  To  what  extent  have  the  effects  (outcomes  and  the  impacts)  generated  by  the 

Regulation contributed to achieving the objectives identified at the outset? 

  Are there barriers and limitations to the effectiveness of the Regulation? 

Efficiency 

  What are the costs and benefits associated with the implementation of the Regulation? 
  Have the objectives of the Regulation been achieved at lowest cost? 
  Could similar/greater benefits have been achieved at lower/similar costs?  
 

Is there potential for simplification? 

Coherence 

  To  what  extent  is  the  Regulation  coherent  with  other  EU  legislative  and  policy 

measures?  

  Are  there  inconsistencies,  gaps  and  synergies  between  the  Regulation  and  national 

legislative frameworks? 

EU added value 

  What  results  of  the  intervention  could  not  have  been  achieved  (or  would  have  been 

less effective/efficient) without coordinated effort at EU level? 

Relevance 

The initial objective of Regulation EU 98/2013 was to reduce the risk of misuse of explosives 
precursors  for  the  manufacture  of  HMEs  by,  among  others,  preventing  access  to  identified 
threat substances by the members of the general public. The objectives identified at the outset 

92 

 
 
 
 
 
of  the  Regulation,  remains  fully  relevant  today,  in  view  of  the  security  context  presented 
above, namely the continuous misuse and attempts for the misuse of explosives precursors for 
manufacturing HMEs. 

The Regulation is largely considered as relevant to the needs identified at the outset as well as 
to  the  current  context.  This  has  been  confirmed  through  consultations  of  a  wide  range  of 
stakeholders, including NCAs, including through the SCP, and industry. 

a)  Scope of the Regulation in terms of restricted substances 

The Regulation covers substances that continue to pose a security threat to the public by being 
used for the manufacture of HME. As evidenced earlier (see 4.1), HME pose a higher threat 
than other types of explosives, such as military and commercial explosives and are reportedly 
the  explosive  of  choice  for  jihadist  terrorism.  TATP  is  an  explosive  used  in  a  majority  of 
terrorist  attacks  in  Europe  in  the  last  few  years  further  to  the  adoption  of  the  Regulation253.  
The three  substances often used for manufacturing TATP are all covered by Regulation  but 
only  one  through  restrictions  on  their  marketing  and  sale  (hydrogen  peroxide),  whereas  the 
other two are merely subjected to or obligations to report suspicious transactions (acetone and  
sulphuric    acid).  Equally,  substances  used  for  the  manufacture  of  another  often  used 
explosive, HMTD, are also subject to the restrictions and controls of the Regulation254. 

However, studies  and  stakeholder consultations also suggest that  the framework is  not  fully 
relevant to certain current and emerging needs 

i.  Additional substances that pose security concerns 

Studies  and  consultations  of  relevant  stakeholders  carried  out  for  the  purpose  of  this 
evaluation suggest that there are substances that represent a security threat as they have been 
used for manufacturing HMEs. The explosives precursors, Ammonium Nitrate and Sulphuric 
Acid  are  currently  subject  to  the  reporting  obligations  on  suspicious  transitions  under  the 
Regulation,  but  not  to  the  restrictions  on  use  for  the  members  of  the  general  public.  These 
substances are largely considered to pose a security threat as evidenced through consultations 
of competent authorities and relevant industry representatives.  

Sulphuric Acid is a chemical substance widely used in a number of manufacturing processes 
in  the  EU,  including  for  the  production  of  fertilisers,  some  cleaning  products,  in  petroleum 
refining,  in  iron  and  steel  production.  The  substance  is  also  a  precursor  for  a  number  of 
powerful  explosives,  including  military  explosives  such  as  Trinitrotoluene  (TNT),  but  also 
various  HMEs,  including  the  often  used  in  terrorist attacks  TATP  as  well  as  HMTD.255  The 
substance  has  also  been  used  by  Anders  Breivik  in  the  2011  Norway  attacks.  Producing 
HMEs  based  on  sulphuric  acid  is  reported  to  be  relatively  easy,  with  little  or  no  need  of 
chemical  background.  However,  a  combination  of  precursors  is  always  necessary  for  the 
production of explosives, some of which are already restricted under the Regulation, such as 
hydrogen  peroxide  and  nitric  acid.  In  addition,  for  the  production  of  some  HMEs  such  as 
TATP, the sulphuric acid can be replaced by other acids to achieve a similar result.  

253 Europol TE-SAT, op. cit 
254 HMTD is based on the explosives precursors, hydrogen peroxide (listed in Annex I), hexamine (Annex II), 
and an acid as a catalyst. 
255 A specific study on Sulfuric Acid was commissioned by the European Commission and carried out in 2015.  

93 

 
 
                                                            
Ammonium nitrate is a substance widely used in fertilisers in the EU; it is also often used as 
a precursor for the manufacture of industrial explosives as well as a number of HMEs. Access 
to  ammonium  nitrate  is  restricted  under  the  EU  legal  framework.  At  present,  there  are 
provisions on ammonium nitrate in both REACH and Regulation on the marketing and use of 
explosives  precursors.  Restrictions  to  the  supply  of  ammonium  nitrate  as  a  substance  have 
been  set  out  in  REACH  at  a  time  when  no  EU  legal  framework  on  explosives  precursors 
existed.  In  addition,  the  Regulation  on  Explosives  Precursors  has  subjected  the  supply  of 
ammonium nitrate to a mechanism for reporting suspicious transactions.  

The issue of possible transfer of ammonium nitrate from REACH to the Regulation has been 
examined  by  the  Commission  in  a  special  report  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council256 and has also been discussed on numerous occasions in the SCP. The Commission 
considers that the provisions on ammonium nitrate are most relevant  to the objective of the 
Regulation  on  Explosives  Precursors  to  enhance  public  security  from  the  threat  posed  by 
HMEs, whereas the main focus of REACH is on ensuring substances are used safely. The fact 
that  provisions  on  ammonium  nitrate  are  being  dealt  with  by  different  EU  legislative  acts 
brings  questions  regarding  the  coherence  of  relevant  EU  measures.  This  matter  is  therefore 
further analysed in the section on Coherence.  

Further  security  concerns  are  related  to  metal  powders  that  have  been  used  for  the 
manufacture of HMEs in a number of attacks outside the EU. Specifically, aluminium powder 
has been reportedly used by ISIS in conflict zones257 as well as in a number of attempts for 
terrorist attacks in Europe. The supply of aluminium and magnesium powder is subjected to 
obligations  of  reporting  suspicious  transactions  under  the  Regulation  (Annex  II),  but  not  to 
the  restrictions  on  marketing  and  use.  The  above  metal  powders  have  reportedly  limited 
legitimate  use  for  the  members  of  the  general  public.  The  most  well-known  household 
applications of these  metal powders are for the preparation of certain paints and homemade 
pyrotechnics, which are illegal in a number of EU Member States. The powders are also used 
for some professional products such as paint, varnish, lacquer, coating, printing ink, cosmetics 
and deodorants, but mostly not in high concentrations. 

ii. 

Possible future threats 

Europe is facing possible new security threats stemming from changing technics in the use of 
explosives devices and continuous attempts for using new substances and lower concentration 
of existing substances for the manufacture of HME. One of the recent terrorist attacks in the 
EU showed that explosives precursors used were all substances in lower concentrations and 
not restricted under Annex I of the Regulation. The same case demonstrated that time for the 
preparation of the attack is becoming shorter, sometime a matter of two weeks. Reports from 
one  competent  authority  indicate  a  noticeable  wide  use  of  chemicals,  in  general,  by 
individuals  for  hobby  and  experimental  purposes258.  Many  of  these  substances  are  not 
restricted, but subject to the reporting mechanism under the Regulation.  

In a changing risk landscape, it is important to ensure that the framework can keep abreast of 
new  and  emerging  threats  and  that  it  takes  into  consideration  scientific  progress  explosives 

256 COM (2015) 122. 
257 Conflict Armament Research (2017), ‘Tracing the supply of components used in the Islamic State improvised 
explosive devices’. 
258 National assessments of the effectiveness of Regulation 98/2013. 

94 

 
 
                                                            
precursors.  To  this  end,  the  proposal  for  Regulation  laid  down  from  the  outset  provisions 
empowering  the  Commission  to  supplement  or  amend,  through  delegated  acts,  the  lists  of 
substances subject to restrictions and reporting obligations. The Regulation in force, however, 
differs  from  the  initial  proposal,  in  restricting  the  powers  of  the  Commission  to  adopt 
delegated acts concerning only changes in the limit values of restricted substances in Annex I 
and addition of substances to Annex II, where it is necessary to accommodate developments 
in  the  misuse  of  substances  as  explosives  precursors.  As  a  result,  in  order  to  add  or  delete 
restricted  substances,  the  Commission  has  to  adopt  a  legislative  proposal,  which  has  to 
undergo the ordinary legislative procedure. This procedure usually takes over 12 months.  

In 2016, the Commission exercised its power to adopt delegated acts to add three substances 
to  Annex  II,  notably,  aluminium  powder259,  magnesium  nitrate260  hexahydrate  and 
magnesium powder261. 

b)  Scope of the Regulation in terms of legitimate users 

In accordance with Article 4 of the Regulation, restricted explosives precursors shall not be 
made  available  to,  or  introduced,  possessed  or  used  by,  members  of  the  general  public.  A 
member  of  the  general  public  is  defined  by  the  Regulation  as:  "any  natural  person  who  is 
acting for purposes not connected with his trade, business or profession".  

i. 

Legal entities with no legitimate use 

Legal entities fall outside the scope of the general public, as defined in the Regulation. As a 
result, any legal entity is implicitly allowed to introduce, possess or use explosives precursors, 
regardless of whether the access to these substances is necessary for the conduct of the entity's 
professional  activities.  Consultations  of  stakeholders,  including  competent  authorities  and 
relevant industry representatives, suggest that that the current definition represents a security 
concern,  leaving  possibility  for  individuals  to  acquire  restricted  explosives  precursors, 
through  legal  entities,  not  necessarily  connected  to  their  professional  activities.  National 
investigations of reports of suspicious transactions have revealed several cases of individuals 
attempting to illicitly acquire explosives precursors through an enterprise262.  Qualitative 
feedback from stakeholders regarding the adequacy of the definitions of economic operators 
and members of the general public, referred to the need to cover legal persons and close the 
loophole  which  allows  entities  to  acquire  explosives  precursors  without  verification  of 
professional purpose. 

ii. 

Professional users 

The Regulation  does  not provide a definition  of professional users, but it nevertheless  tasks 
economic  operators  to  report  suspicious  transactions,  including  transactions  involving  such 
users.  Individuals  and  entities  that  use  restricted  explosives  precursors  in  connection  with 
their professional activity are concerned in practice by the provisions of the Regulation. Such 
users may have a wide range of activities, such as professional cleaning services, swimming 
pools maintenance, farming, to name a few. However, due to the lack of relevant definition in 
the  Regulation  and  lack  of  clarity  on  the  rights  and  obligations  of  this  group  of  users,  the 
current  framework  does  not  seem  to  fully  relevant  to  the  current  context  of  all  concerned 

259 C(2016) 7647 final. 
260 C(2016) 7650 final. 
261 C(2016) 7657 final. 
262 National assessments of the effectiveness of Regulation 98/2013.  

95 

 
 
                                                            
stakeholders.  The  lack  of  clarity  on the  restrictions  and  controls  with  regard  to  professional 
users  reportedly  pose  concerns  with  regard  to  security  as  evidenced  by  stakeholders' 
consultation263. This also raises questions regarding the effectiveness of the Regulation which 
will be further addressed in the respective section.    

iii. 

Economic operators 

Economic operators are covered by the scope of the Regulation and defined as "any natural or 
legal person or public entity or group of such persons and/or bodies which delivers products 
or  services  on  the  market".  The  definition  thus  covers  all  economic  operators,  regardless  of 
whether  their  activities  are  related  to  manufacturing  or  marketing  of  explosives  precursors. 
Feedback from consulted stakeholders and SCP shows that a number of representatives from 
industry  and  NCAs  does  not  find  the  current  definition  of  economic  operators  fully 
appropriate.  

iv.  Online retailers 

Restrictions  and  obligations  for  control  of  substances  set  out  by  the  Regulation  apply  to 
economic operators, including online retail. The Regulation does not make explicit provisions 
with regard to the online market. Feedback from consulted stakeholders as well as experts in 
the SCP suggests that there is a lack of clarity for some marketplaces on whether obligations 
under the Regulation apply to them. In addition to the reported issue of definition and scope 
of obligations for online retailers, there are reported security concerns with regard to online 
sales. These issues relate to the effectiveness of the framework and will be further analysed in 
the respective section. 

c)  Scope of the Regulation in terms of reporting obligations  

As evidenced in the section on the security context, there is a growing concern about transport 
and storage of explosives precursors (see section 4.1) in view of known incidents of theft of 
explosives  from  storage  facilities.  The  Regulation  does  not  lay  down  specific  security 
measures  relating  to  transport  and  storage  of  explosives  precursors,  but  it  nevertheless 
imposes  an  obligation  on  economic  operators  of  reporting  significant  disappearances  and 
thefts of the substances in Annex I and II, to the relevant NCPs264.     

Feedback from stakeholders consulted in the preparation of this evaluation reiterated concerns 
about  the  lack  of  transport  and  storage  provisions  in  the  Regulation.    Representatives  of 
industry highlighted that definitions of transport and storage are regulated at the UN level265 
and that possible future provisions at EU level on storage of explosives precursors should take 
due  account  of  how  substances  react  with  one  another  in  a  confined  space  and  of  the 
distinction between those that use explosives precursors and those that transport them.266  

263 The majority of the stakeholders consulted (OPC) considered that the lack of restrictions and controls applied 
to legal persons (including professional users) pose security concerns. 
264 Art. 9.4 Regulation 98/2013. 
265 Interview feedback: three representatives from economic operators.  
266 Interview feedback: two representatives from economic operators.  

96 

 
 
                                                            
Key Observations 

  The Regulation remains, in general terms, relevant to the current EU context and 

is addressing relevant and continuous needs, however: 

  Not all threat substances are covered by the current Regulation 

  The framework is not sufficiently flexible to adapt promptly to new and evolving 

threats 

  The Regulation does not cover all concerned parties or does not provide 

sufficiently clear provisions on all concerned parties 

Effectiveness 

This section analyses the effects generated by the application of the Regulation and assesses 
to  what  extent  the  Regulation  has  achieved  its  strategic  objectives  as  referred  to  in  the 
introduction section of the evaluation. 

a)  Effects of the implementation of the Regulation 

The  assessment  conducted  by  Member  States  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  Regulation  and 
through  consultations  within  the  SCP,  indicate  that  the  application  of  the  Regulation  have 
resulted  in  limiting  the  overall  availability  of  explosives  precursors  to  the  members  of  the 
general  public.  Some  competent  authorities  indicate  that  availability  of  restricted 
substances in Annex I has tangibly decreased in retail market and that public demand for 
these substances has diminished over the past years. The majority of the consulted industry 
representatives  and  public  authorities  consider  that  the  Regulation  has  contributed  to  a 
large extent to raise awareness of the supply chain concerning risks. 

Restrictions and control regimes 

A variety of regimes for the marketing and use of explosives precursors is observed across the 
Member States. The level of implementation and enforcement of the respective regimes also 
seems to differ across the EU, partially due to the fact that some Member States are still in the 
first years of implementation of their regimes.  

The ban of explosives precursors is reportedly most homogenously enforced from the three 
regimes and the least burdensome regime for public authorities and economic operators, while 
the licencing and registration regime require setting up additional procedures.  

The  licencing  regimes  has  been  assessed  by  Member  States  that  have  been  applying  it,  as 
overall  effective  method  offering  a  balance  between  the  need  to  protect  and  safeguard 
consumer  choice  and  legitimate  use.  As  regards  licencing,  the  Regulation  sets  out  some 
guiding principles for issuing licences to the members of the general public267, but does not 
define a common set of minimum requirements for granting or refusing a licence. As a result, 
different rules and practices on licencing are observed across the Member States with regard 

267 Article 7, Regulation 98/2013. 

97 

 
 
 
                                                            
to  type  of  information  requested,  reasons  for  refusal,  rate  of  refusals,  duration  of  validity, 
price  of  the  service.  Additional  concerns  arise  from  online  sale  of  explosives  precursors. 
Retailers selling restricted explosives precursors over the Internet need to ensure that they are 
selling  restricted  products  only  to  licences  members  of  the  general  public  or  relevant 
professional  users  and  businesses.  Some  online  retailers  have  introduced  systematic  request 
for licence information during purchases, but only in some cases, operators are able to check 
the validity of the licence in cooperation with the national competent authority268. 

The licencing regime has had an effect on a very limited number of users in the EU. Overall, 
less than 1000 licences have been requested in total in the EU since the entry into force of the 
Regulation. A significant part of the Member States applying a licencing regime has recorded 
virtually no requests, for licences269. The Member States with the highest demand for licences 
have received on average below 150 applications per year. Reportedly, less than 500 licences 
have been granted in total in the EU since the entry into force of the Regulation. Among the 
main  reasons  for  refusal  of  licences  is  the  availability  of  non-restricted  lower  concentration 
substances suitable for the requested use.  

The registration regime has had a limited applicability in the EU. Only six Member States 
apply  registrations  for  the  three  substances  identified  in  the  Regulation270.  Feedback  from 
consulted  competent  authorities  indicates  concerns  that  the  registration  regimes  may  have 
been  less  effective  than  licencing  in  controlling  access  to  restricted  explosives  precursors. 
Specifically, some Member States report in their national assessments of effectiveness of the 
Regulation  that  the  licencing  regime  has  offered  an  advantage  in  controlling  and  better 
monitoring  the  access  to  restricted  explosives  by  some  members  of  the  general  public  and 
easier detection of suspicious attempts for acquiring restricted substances271. Member States 
have reportedly laid down more homogenous rules on registration of transactions as compared 
to  licencing,  but  compliance  proves  to  be  more  challenging  for  economic  operators272.  One 
Member State reports more than 250 checks carried out by the national authorities since the 
entry into force of the Regulation, more than a quarter of which have found infringements of 
the obligations to register transactions of restricted explosives precursors. Enforcement of the 
registration  regime  remains  overall  challenging,  as  controls  and  inspections  of  registered 
transactions are reportedly not being carried our systematically by national authorities.  

Specific concern  emerges  with  regard to  the registration  of online  sales. One Member  State 
applying a registration regime, report significant difficulties in enforcing a registration regime 
on online sales, due to among others, lack of rules for the identification of legitimate users. 

Reporting of suspicious transactions, disappearances and thefts 

Reporting practices have overall contributed to improving detection across Member States of 
potential  threat  and  misuse  of  available  explosives  precursors  according  to  competent 
authorities.  Several  cases  of  reports  of  suspicious  transactions  from  economic  operators  are 
known to have contributed to thwarting terrorist attacks. A known case in Germany, in 2015, 
of a planned terrorist attack targeting the Frankfurt bike race, has been thwarted by the police 

268 Feedback from industry representatives consulted in the preparation of the evaluation. 
269 10 Member States apply a licensing regime to either all restricted substances or part of them, [4-5?] of which 
has registered from 0 to 10 applications since the adoption of the Regulation.  
270 Article 4 Regulation 98/2013. 
271 National assessments of effectiveness of Regulation 98/2013. 
272 Ernst & Young, Rand Europe, (2018), op. cit. 

98 

 
 
                                                            
with  the help of a report from a retail store of suspicious purchase of explosives precursors 
substances. The suspect has reportedly used a false identity when purchasing the substances.  

However,  the  level  of  effectiveness  of  reporting  mechanisms  varies  considerably  across 
Member States. One European country with a population of 5 million has recorded close to 
150 reports of suspicious transactions, thefts and disappearances since the entry into force of 
the  Regulation,  coming  predominantly  from  national  authorities  and  the  police  service273. 
However, the level of reporting varies significantly across Europe. Feedback from consulted 
competent authorities shows that some economic operators have very limited awareness of the 
Regulation and notably of their reporting obligations.  

Reports  from  competent  authorities  raise  additional  concerns  with  regard  to  online  sales.  In 
one  of  the  recent  terrorist  attack  in  the  EU,  explosives  precursor  substances  that  are  not 
restricted, but subject to the reporting obligations under the Regulation have been successfully 
acquired by the perpetrators through online purchase from different addresses. 

A  specific  security  concern  relates  to  the  lack  of  clarity  in  the  Regulation  with  regard  to 
professional  users.  Consultations  of  public  authorities  and  economic  operators  have 
repeatedly shown that identification of legitimate users at the point of sale is one of the major 
problems  faced  by  industry,  notably  the  retail  sector.  While  the  Regulation  introduces  the 
notion  of  professional  user  along  with  certain  reporting  obligations  for  Member  States,  it 
nevertheless  does  not  provide  a  definition  on  professional  users  or  measures  facilitating  the 
identification  of  such  group  of  users.  The  lack  of  provisions  as  regards  professional  users 
creates legal uncertainties for both competent national authorities and economic operators and 
poses practical issues for the identification of such users, notably at the point of sale. Recent 
terrorist  attacks  in  Europe  have  shown  that  restricted  explosive  precursors  have  been 
purchased through the general supply chain for illicit use with the false claim of professional 
use.   

Labelling  

Labelling  requirements  set  out  in  the  Regulation  prove  not  to  be  sufficiently  clear  for 
economic operators. A recent market research performed in one Member States showed that 
an  important  number  of  retailers  are  not  aware  that  they  are  selling  explosives  precursor 
substances.  Retailers  report  encountering  difficulties  to  identify  products  containing 
explosives  precursors  in  concentrations  above  the  limits  set  in  the  Regulation,  especially 
when they are marketed as an ingredient of a product rather than a single substance product. 
Retailers  often  consider  economic  operators  in  upper  stages  of  the  supply  chain  to  be 
responsible  for  the  identification  and  labelling  of  concerned  products.  In  parallel, 
manufacturers  do  not  consider  themselves  to  be  concerned  by  the  labelling  requirements  of 
the Regulation as they do not make available restricted explosives precursors directly to the 
members of the general public.  

In addition, there seem to be no consensus among competent authorities across the EU on the 
need to apply labelling requirements to explosives precursors sold in countries having a ban in 
place for the members of the general public. 

Feedback  from  consulted  national  authorities  and  industry  suggests  that  there  are  different 
interpretations  and  uncertainties  along  the  supply  chain  as  regards  responsibilities  for 
labelling and information exchange on products' content. 

273 National assessments of effectiveness of Regulation 98/20132 

99 

 
 
                                                            
b)  Achievements of the main objectives  

Limiting the availability of explosives precursors  

A majority of Member States indicate that availability of explosives precursors on the market 
has tangibly decreased since the entry into force of the Regulation. One Member State, facing 
numerous attempts to misuse of explosives precursors in the past years, reports that the annual 
number of police cases involving explosives precursors, have decreased with one third since 
the  entry  into  force  of the  Regulation274.    Information  from  distributors,  retailers  and  police 
forces in some countries applying a ban, indicates that members of the general public find it 
difficult  to  acquire  hydrogen  peroxide,  above  the  limit  value.  Considering  the  fact  that 
hydrogen  peroxide  is  the  substances  of  the  highest  demand  among  the  restricted  explosives 
precursors,  limiting  its  availability  to  the  general  public  has  had  a  significant  effect  on 
reducing  the  overall  risk  of  misuse  of  explosives  precursors  in  the  EU.  A  decrease  in  the 
overall  availability  of  restricted  substances  has  been  reported  also  by  a  Member  States 
carrying  out  regular  'mystery  shopping'  exercises  for  inspecting  compliance  with  the 
Regulation. 

However,  explosives  precursors  remain  easily  available  online.  Assessments  show  that  a 
in  high 
variety  of  products  containing  restricted  explosives  precursors, 
concentrations, are available for purchase through internet. 

including 

Improving detection  

Following  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Regulation,  all  Member  States  have  set  up  national 
contact point and respective mechanisms for reporting. Reports from the national authorities 
and  feedback  from  consulted  industry  evidence  an  overall  increase  of  the  amount  of 
information shared on suspicious transactions in the years following the entry into force of the 
Regulation.  

However, opinions of stakeholders suggest that the Regulation has contributed to improving 
reporting  only  partially  and  that  more  could  be  done  to  improve  the  effectiveness  of  the 
system. Awareness among the supply chain about obligations stemming from the Regulation 
varies  considerably  across  Member  States.  Uncertainties  of  economic  operators  in  applying 
the Regulation are to a certain extent related to the reported lack of clarity of the Regulation 
on  issues  related  to  the  identification  of  legitimate  users  of  restricted  substances  as  well  as 
responsibilities on labelling. 

Improving the free movement of explosives precursors within the EU internal market 

Feedback  from  stakeholders  suggests  that  the  Regulation  has  had  a  limited  effect  on  the 
harmonisation  of  the  internal  market  for  explosives  precursors.  The  Regulation  has 
contributed  to  a  low  or  very  low  extent  to  the  smooth  movement  of  explosives  precursors 
within the internal market and to a low/moderate extent to harmonise controls and penalties 
across Member States, according to the majority of industry representatives consulted275.  

The  absence  of  explicit  reference  to  e-commerce  in  the  Regulation  has  given  rise  to 
uncertainties of online marketplaces on the application of the Regulation. Only few Member 
States have adopted voluntary measures and partnerships between public authorities and big 

274 Ibid.  
275 Ernst & Young, Rand Europe, (2018), op. cit 

100 

 
 
                                                            
online  retailers.  Feedback  from  consulted  stakeholders  suggest  that  further  to  the 
implementation  of  restrictions  set  out  by  the  Regulation,  a  shift  towards  online  sales  of 
explosives precursors have been observed. This shift takes into account the rise of the online 
commerce in general, but may be partially attributed also to the weaker controls and limited 
traceability  of  transactions.  Such  a  shift  poses  security  concerns  with  regard  to  possible 
misuse  of  explosives  precursors,  but  also  raises  concerns  as  regards  competition  between 
physical stores and online retail.  

Key Observations 

  The application of the Regulation has resulted in limiting the overall availability of 
explosives  precursors  on  the  market  and  notably  to  the  members  of  the  general 
public.  However,  explosives  precursors  continue  to  be  accessed  and  misused  for 
HMEs: 

-  Not  all  regimes  across  Member  States  are  sufficiently  effective  in  reducing  

access to explosives precursors; 

- 

the issue of availability of restricted substances in online marketplaces has not 
been effectively regulated. 

  Reporting of suspicious transaction have showed positive examples of cooperation 
between  industry  and  competent  authorities,  but  detection  of  potential  threats 
remains overall challenging due to: 

- 

insufficient  awareness  along  the  supply  chain  on  rules  and  obligations 
stemming from the Regulation; 

-  economic  operators  face  difficulties  in  identifying  concerned  products  and 

legitimate users. 

  The  Regulation  has  had  a  limited  effect  on  the  harmonization  of  the  internal 

market for explosives precursors. 

Efficiency 

The  analysis  of  this  section  focused  on  identifying  the  main  types  of  costs  and  benefits 
assessing the extent to which results achieved compare to the costs incurred by the application 
of  the  Regulation  and  identifying  main  barriers  to  efficiency,  as  well  as  potential  for 
simplification and cost savings.  

Costs and benefits 

For the purpose of the evaluation, the following types of costs were considered, in line with 
the provisions of the Better Regulation Toolbox and Guideline: 

101 

 
 
 
-  Enforcement  costs,  incurred  by  public  authorities  with  implementation  measures, 

such as monitoring, enforcement and adjudication; 
-  Regulatory charges, which include fees, taxes etc. 
-  Substantive compliance costs, which encompass those investments and expenses that 
are faced by economic operators and members of the general public in order to comply 
with substantive obligations derived from the Regulation; 

-  Administrative  burdens,  including  the  costs  borne  by  authorities,  economic 
operators and home users as a result of administrative activities performed to comply 
with information and reporting obligations contained in the Regulation; 

-  Indirect costs, which generally refer to changes in the prices and/or availability and 
/or  quality  of  the  substances  subject  to  the  Regulation  and/or  products  containing 
them. 

The intended benefit of the Regulation is an increased public security through a reduced risk 
of  misuse  of explosives precursors for the manufacture of HMEs and enabling environment 
for the free movement of explosive precursor substances in the EU internal market. Benefits 
from the reduced risk of misuse of explosives precursors for the manufacture of HME relate 
to significant costs of and high threat of terrorist attacks. As reported by national authorities, 
the estimated overall costs of one of the recent attacks in the EU involving HME amount to 
more than 100 million euro276.  

From the study conducted in preparation of this evaluation, it emerged that the main costs for 
economic operators emerging from the application of the Regulation relate to  compliance, 
notably  costs  of  training  of  staff.  Industry  representatives,  consulted  during  the  evaluation 
process, report  that  costs  related to  the  training  of  staff  have  somewhat  increased  following 
the entry into force of the Regulation277. On the basis of the preparatory study, the total cost is 
estimated to be between EUR 4.6 to EUR 29.9 million per year, being EUR 17.3 million the 
best estimate. By contrast, the consultation suggests that no significant additional costs have 
been  incurred  by  economic  operators  for  the  identification  of  products  falling  under  the 
Regulation278. 

Cooperation between retailers and suppliers is necessary to ensure that products available to 
the  general  public  containing  Annex  I  substances  above  the  concentration  thresholds  are 
labelled appropriately. Based on information from the targeted survey and interviews with key 
industry  association,  as  long  as  manufacturers  and  formulators  are  made  aware  of  the 
requirement, the costs of adding a single line of text to a label would be comparable to less 
than a day of work for a FTE per month.  However, lack of data referring to the number of 
products  being  labelled  does  not  allow  estimating  the  total  cost  for  this  activity.  Other 
administrative  costs,  notably  those  incurred  economic  operators  to  carry  out  reporting 
activities  have  considerably  increased  following  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Regulation. 
Industry  representatives  consulted  in  the  preparation  of  this  study  report  spending  around  a 
day of work for a FTE per months for reporting suspicious transactions. Based on the results 

276 Data from NCAs within the consultations supporting the evaluation.  
277 34% of the consulted economic operators estimate that costs have increased a little (up to 30 %) or a lot (more 
than 30%). 
278 Majority of economic operators consulted report an effort of less than a day of work for a FTE per month in 
order to identify products concerned by the Regulation. 

102 

 
 
                                                            
of the preparatory study, the total cost of reporting activities is estimated to be between EUR 
96 to EUR 368 million per year, 232 million being the best estimate. 

Enforcement  of  the  Regulation  implies  costs  for  public  authorities,  among  others,  for  the 
monitoring  of  compliance,  carrying  out  inspections,  and  imposing  penalties.  Feedback  from 
competent authorities consulted in the preparation of the evaluation, suggests that most of the 
costs incurred for enforcement are related to activities that Member States have been carrying 
out before the Regulation and that authorities have in turn, faced only a moderate increase of 
these costs following the entry into force of the Regulation.  

The  preparatory  study  shows  that  the  most  burdensome  activity  for  public  authorities  is  the 
registration  and  processing  of  licensing  applications.  The  efforts  required  for  processing 
licencing application is estimated of not more than a working day of FTE. It should be noted 
that the majority of countries applying a licencing regime have received virtually no requests 
for  licences,  i.e.  between  0  and  30  applications  per  year  for  all  restricted  substances.  Only 
very  few  Member  States  have  faced  a  higher  demand  for  licences  from  the  general  public, 
which  still  remains  an  insignificant  share  of  less  than  0.01%  of  the  population  of  these 
countries,  with  up  to  150  application  per  year  for  all  restricted  substances  for  populations 
between 10 and 65 million people.   

In  order  to  comply  with  the  Regulation,  public  authorities  have  to  meet  some  information 
obligations,  such  as  to  notify  the  Commission  regarding  national  measures  to  restrict  the 
marketing and use of explosives precursors to the general public and disseminate Guidelines. 
These activities are perceived by the relevant authorities as not more burdensome to what was 
performed before the introduction of the Regulation. 

Main barriers to efficiency  

Labelling of products containing restricted substances is perceived by consulted competent 
authorities and industry representatives as the most burdensome issue, mainly due to the lack 
of clarity of the Regulation on this matter. Provisions of the Regulation are interpreted in the 
sense that retailers need to ensure that labels are affixed to products falling under the scope of 
the Regulation. The lack of clarity of the Regulation's provisions on labelling and in turn the 
different  interpretation  by  stakeholders  of  their  respective  obligations  for  labelling  relevant 
products leads to inefficiencies as retailers incur additional costs for labelling in cases when 
this is not necessary. Retailers need to make further investments to identify products falling 
under  the  scope  of  the  regulation  when  the  products  are  not  labelled  accordingly  by 
manufacturers.  

Raising  awareness  on  the  Regulation's  provisions,  notably  in  the  retail  sector,  is  another 
burdensome  activity  for  economic  operators.  Ensuring  that  all  operators  are  aware  of  their 
obligations under  the  Regulation  is considered costly,  due  to  the  high  number  of  concerned 
businesses, the need for face-to-face interaction and the costs of trainings, including materials. 
In some countries inspections are used also for the purpose of awareness raising, at least in an 
initial  phase  after  national  laws  enter  into  force,  and  the  related  costs  are  considered  to  be 
high. However, lack of awareness and of enforcement seriously hampers the application of the 
Regulation  provisions  and  limits  the  expected  benefits  in  terms  of  reduced  availability  of 
explosives precursors to the general public and improved detection of potential threats. 

103 

 
 
The  multiplicity  of  restriction  and  control  regimes  applicable  to  explosives  precursors 
across the EU lowers the expected benefits of the Regulation, notably for the harmonisation of 
rules,  traceability  of  transactions  and  limiting  the  access  of  the  general  public  to  threat 
substances.  The  licencing  regime  implies  costs  for  public  authorities  related  to  processing 
applications from members of the general public. For most of the restricted substances, there 
has been very low to virtually no demand for licences by the general public. This concerns 
notably  Nitric  acid,  Potassium  chlorate,  Potassium  perchlorate,  sodium  chlorate  and 
sodium perchlorate. These substances have generated very low demand for licences, in the 
margins of 0-30 applications per substance per year, for all MS applying licencing regimes.   

This data confirms that the general public does not have a need for these particular chlorates 
and perchlorates in concentrations above the limit set by the Regulation. Almost all household 
applications of these explosives precursors do not exceed that limit of 40% w/w. Some herbi- 
and pesticides are manufactured at higher concentrations, but the general public can achieve 
an adequate result with concentrations not exceeding 40% w/w.279 The industry consulted has 
confirmed this understanding.  

The vast majority of demands for licences issued since the entry into force of the Regulation, 
concern  hydrogen  peroxide  and  nitromethane  and  originate  mainly  from  two  Member 
States. The purpose of the majority of licences is related to either household use or hobbies, 
such  as  cleaning  product  for  swimming  pools  and  hunting  trophies  or  as  fuel  for  model 
vehicles (model cars, planes, helicopters etc.).  

Nevertheless,  concentrations  above  the  limits  set  in  Annex  I,  have  not  always  proved  to  be 
necessary for carrying out the above activities. The Regulation allows members of the general 
public to obtain licences for hydrogen peroxide and for nitromethane, respectively above 12% 
w/w  and  30%  w/w.  One  EEA  member  with  traditions  in  hunting,  indicates  that  the 
introduction of the ban of hydrogen peroxide above 12 % led to a behavioural adjustment280 
of the general public to lower concentration of the substances, which are considered sufficient 
to  achieve  the  same  end  result.  Most  "nitro  fuel"  for  model  vehicles  does  not  exceed  the 
concentration limit for nitromethane, but there is some reported use and licenses granted for 
more concentrated nitromethane.   

The Regulation also sets an upper limit for which hydrogen peroxide, nitromethane and nitric 
acid  can  be  made  available  to  members  of  the  general  public  through  registration  of  the 
transaction. The Regulation implies that there is no need for the general public to explosives 
precursors  above  such  limit,  and  this  is  confirmed  by  the  absence  of  any  reports  otherwise 
made by Member States that apply a registration regime. 

The  registration  regime  is  perceived  by  some  competent  authorities  and  industry 
representatives  as  the least  cost-effective  option  as  compared  to  licencing  and  a  ban  for  the 
general  public.  This  regime  reportedly  implies  higher  costs  for  both  industry,  to  register  all 
relevant  transactions,  and  for  national  authorities,  to  carry  out  inspections  and  check 
compliance of economic operators.  

The benefits of the registration regime are also reportedly lower than other regimes, as it adds 
value mainly for investigations of past incidents, but does not allow for suitability checks of 

279 GHK, Rand Europe and Comstratos, 2010, op.cit. 
280 Reportedly, hunters have widely used hydrogen peroxide 30% before the ban to bleach trophies.  

104 

 
 
                                                            
individuals  before  a  purchase  and  respectively,  for  detecting  attempts  for  illicit  use  of 
explosives precursors, as opposed to the licencing regime. Actual cases show that terrorists, 
especially those that are planning suicide attacks, have no problem registering and identifying 
themselves.  For  this  type  of  terrorist,  the  registration  regime  is  not  an  obstacle,  particularly 
having in mind that if the registration list is not timely made available to law enforcement, the 
perpetrators  will  have  enough  time  to  manufacture  the  HMEs  and  conduct  the  attack. 
Reportedly,  there  are  lots  of  cases  where  post-attack  investigations  recovered  that  the 
terrorists had already been registered buying precursors on different locations with their real 
identity.281 

Potential for cost savings and possible simplifications  

Clarifying labelling obligations and ensuring that manufacturers label appropriately products 
that fall under the scope of the Regulation and inform accordingly the remaining actors in the 
supply  chain,  particularly  the  retailers,  is  the  key  simplifying/cost  saving  measure  from  the 
perspective of the consulted economic operators.  

Reducing the number of regimes across the EU is the most quoted possible simplification by 
public  authorities.  The  application  of  the  licencing  regime  in  some  Member  States  has 
demonstrated good results in cost efficiency with regard to promoting alternative substances 
and  lower  concentrations.  One  Member  States  has  refused  99%  of  all  licence  requests  for 
hydrogen peroxide, considering that there are suitable lower concentrations available for the 
use  invoked  by  members  of  the  general  public.  However,  a  majority  of  the  consulted 
authorities and industry representatives seem to have diverging opinions on the availability of 
alternative substances. 

Some of the consulted stakeholders suggest that the use of additives in explosives precursors 
inhibiting  their  dangerous  properties  would  contribute  to  a  moderate  extent  for  reducing 
compliance  costs  for  economic  operators.  Nevertheless,  several  representatives  of  Member 
States  competent  authorities  pointed  out  during  the  consultations  that,  to  date,  there  is  no 
known viable market solution for additives that effectively inhibit the dangerous properties of 
explosives precursors without adversely affecting legitimate use of products containing these 
substances.  More  research  is  needed  before  a  sound  conclusion  can  be  reached  on  whether 
additives  can  constitute  a  more  cost  efficient  and  more  effective  alternative,  notably 
considering that methods for re-concentration may still be possible. 

Key Observations 

  The complexity and variety of regimes for marketing and use of explosives 

precursors across the EU rend compliance of operators with the Regulation more 
difficult  

  the Regulation has been able to respond to the need to add new substances, but has 
not done this in the most efficient way due to time-consuming procedures in place    

281 ECTC Threat assessment, Europol 2018. 

105 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
Coherence 

The analysis in this section takes into account the results of a preparatory study evaluating the 
coherence between the Regulation and relevant EU measures in the following legislative acts: 
REACH,  CLP  Regulation,  the  Directive  on  Explosives  for  Civil  Uses,  Directive  on 
Pyrotechnic articles, Fertilizers and the Regulation of drug precursors. 

These  above  legislative  measures have  different aims. For  example:  REACH  deals with the 
safety  of  chemicals  but  not  the  security  of  chemicals  (whereas  security  is  the  focus  of  the 
Explosives Precursors Regulation); the Directive on Civil Uses of Explosive aims to improve 
the safety of the explosives industry; the Directive on Pyrotechnic Articles aims to guarantee 
free movement of such articles and protect health and safety.  

These pieces of legislation are complementary, to the extent that they have a different focus in 
terms of substances/ products. For example, the Directive on Civil Uses of Explosive focuses 
on  explosive  products  compared  to  the  focus  of  the  Regulation  on  substances  that  are 
explosives  precursors;  the  Directive  on  Pyrotechnic  Articles  on  fireworks  and  other  articles 
(the Regulation does not apply to Pyrotechnic Articles). There was consensus among EU level 
stakeholders  that  there  were  no  major  inconsistencies  or  overlaps  between  these  Directives 
and the Regulation.   

However,  there  are  differences  in  terminology  and  definitions  between  these  pieces  of 
legislation. While REACH and CLP refer to "placing on the market", the Regulation refers to 
"making available" and the Directive on Pyrotechnics Articles – to “making available on the 
market” and “placing on the market”. 

Concerned industry actors are also defined in different ways in the different legislative acts: 
the  Regulation  refers  to  "economic  operators"  encompassing  the  retail  sector,  but  without 
defining a professional user. REACH and CLP refer to “distributors” (which includes retail) 
and  define  what  could  be  considered  a  professional  user  as  "downstream  user".  These 
differences  do  not  necessarily  cause  practical  problems  but  can  create  difficulties  in 
comparing the relative levels of protections and restrictions in different pieces of legislation.  

The  overall  objectives  of  the  Regulation  and  REACH  are  coherent  and  complementary. 
Whereas REACH deals with the safety of chemicals, but in general does not the security of 
chemical.  An  exception  is  the  case  of  ammonium  nitrate,  which  is  regulated  in  different 
aspects by both REACH and the Regulation on explosives precursors. 

Ammonium nitrate is a substance of wide use in fertilizers in the EU. The substance is also a 
precursor for often used industrial explosive ammonium nitrate – fuel oil (ANFO), as well as 
for  a  number  of  HME  through  a  combination  of  substances,  including  fuel,  sugar  and 
aluminium powder.  

At  present,  there  are  provisions  on  ammonium  nitrate  in  both  REACH  and  the  Regulation. 
Under  REACH,  substances  above  a  certain  tonnage  shall  not  be  manufactured  or  placed  on 
the internal market unless they have been registered. Moreover, under REACH  ammonium 
nitrate containing nitrogen above a certain concentration in relation to the ammonium nitrate 
is  prohibited  to  be  placed  on  the  market  except  for  the  supply  to  downstream  users, 
distributors, famers for the use in agricultural activities and natural or legal persons engaged 
in  professional  activities  (e.g.  horticultures,  plant  growing  in  green  houses,  maintenance  of 

106 

 
 
parks  and  gardens,  forestry,  etc.)  members  of  the  general  public  and  only  allowed  for 
professional users. The Regulation subjects the supply of ammonium nitrate to a mechanism 
for reporting suspicious transactions, and also enables Member States, via a safeguard clause, 
to put in place further restrictions if there are reasonable grounds for doing so. 

The  possibility  of  transferring  Ammonium  nitrate  from  REACH  to  Regulation  (EU)  No 
98/2013 has been discussed on a number of occasions in the SCP. The Commission examined 
the issue in 2015 and  submitted it would re-examine the possibility and the exact nature of 
such a transfer as part of a larger review that is currently being carried out.282  

EU Added Value 

The Regulation supported the efforts of Member States to reduce the availability of explosives 
precursors  by  introducing  common  restrictions  and  controls  on  explosives  precursors  to  the 
general public and therefore laying the ground for an increased level of harmonisation across 
Europe.  One  of  the  key  factors  calling  for  the  introduction  of  the  Regulation  were  the 
heterogeneous  legislative  and  non-legislative  measures  to  manage  the  risks  related  to  the 
misuse  of  explosives  precursors  existing  in  2010.  Legislative  and  non-legislative  measures 
existing  at  international  and  EU  level  did  not  address  the  threat  posed  by  the  misuse  of 
explosives precursors appropriately, or did not cover high risk chemicals in a comprehensive 
manner. The comparison of the current implementation state of play (section 3.4) and with the 
baseline (section 2.3) shows that the Regulation made a first step towards the harmonisation 
of measures in a field that was previously regulated unilaterally by Member States. This has 
been achieved mainly by introducing a common list of explosives precursors with indication 
of  concentration  limits,  together  with  restrictions  on  the  sales  to  the  general  public  and  an 
obligation to report suspicious transaction. To date, all Member States and Norway have set 
up specific legislative measures to address the security threat posed by explosives precursors 
and  the  analysis  of  the  implementation  state  of  play  shows  some  levels  of  convergence. 
Several Member States started to conduct controls throughout the supply chain. In addition, 
some  economic  operators  discontinued  the  sale  of  some  of  the  restricted  and  controlled 
substances and some Member States having in place a licensing regime reported to refuse the 
requests  for  licenses  if  there  exist  alternative  substances  for  a  legitimate  non-professional 
activity.  

Without the Regulation, it is reasonable to assume that explosives precursors substances that 
are currently restricted would have continued to be widely available to the general public and 
that there would have been less incentive to use of alternative and less dangerous explosives 
precursor substances.  

The  Regulation  was  introduced  as  a  single  policy  instrument  to  address  the  two  priorities  – 
the maintenance of high security across Europe and at the same time enhancing the internal 
market  –  taking  into  account  the  related  trade-offs.  This  has  been  possible  thanks  to  the 
flexible  nature  of  the  act  that  gives  the  possibility  to  adopt  a  ban,  licensing  or  registration 
regime.  The  Regulation  indeed  sets  common  minimum  thresholds  while  respecting  the 
subsidiarity  principle  and  leaving  Member  State  the  possibility  to  adopt  more  stringent 
measures  according  to  their  national  needs  and  backgrounds.  As  regards  security  needs, 
considering  a  Europe  without  borders,  Member  States  and  EU  citizens  have  been  provided 

282 COM (2015) 122.  

107 

 
 
                                                            
with the guarantee that the common security measures included in the Regulation concerning 
the  explosives  precursors  are  valid  in  all  Member  States  therefore  limiting  security  gaps 
potentially resulting from the different national approaches and commitment to the threat. The 
limits  imposed  contribute  also  to  the  functioning  of  the  internal  market.  Common 
requirements indeed foster the creation of a level playing field, they reduce information costs 
and asymmetries for economic operators. 

The Regulation also supported Member States' efforts to prevent and fight against the 
misuse of explosives precursors by introducing a legal obligation of reporting suspicious 
transactions  for  EO.  It  replaced  national  voluntary  and  heterogeneous  practices  with  a 
requirement of systematic reporting for all economic operators across the EU. This provided a 
new  source  of  intelligence  to  law  enforcement  authorities  to  support  mitigating  the  threat 
related to the misuse of explosives precursors.  Before the entry into force of the Regulation 
only  few  countries  had  recording  and  reporting  mechanisms  in  place  for  identifying  and 
reporting  suspicious  transactions.283  In  most  cases,  the  reporting  system  was  set  up  on  a 
voluntary basis by industry representatives. Smaller businesses did not have sufficient means 
to fully comply with voluntary measures, as these would have required high investments (e.g. 
nominating a security officer or attending dedicated training).284  

The  Regulation  contributed  to  national  efforts  towards  improving  detection  through 
increased  information  exchange.  In  particular,  the  creation  of  NCPs  also  facilitated  the 
process  of  reporting  and  supported  Member  State  efforts  to  prevent  and  fight  against  the 
misuse of explosives precursors. NCPs are responsible for receiving, analysing and storing the 
reports of suspicious transactions and for communicating with other countries if needed. The 
creation of NCPs is appreciated by some stakeholders that reported that it helped in sharing 
also  cross-border  intelligence,285  and  worked  as  a  point  of  reference  for  many  Economic 
Operators.286  Although  the  Regulation  does  not  set  obligations  on  cross-border  information 
sharing,  the  preparatory  study  shows  that  some  cross-border  activities  have  increased  since 
the entry into force of the Regulation, in particular through bilateral or regional meetings with 
other Member States, information exchanges, joint enforcement operations, and participation 
to  SCP  meetings  and  workshops.    In  addition,  some  Member  States  have  exchanged 
information  through  the  NCPs  on  cases  of  suspicious  transactions  with  cross-border 
dimension, which have resulted in arrests of persons. Through the national assessments of the 
effectiveness  of  the  Regulation  it  emerges  that  the  increased  information  exchange  on 
suspicious  transaction,  is  perceived  as  good  practice  that  could  be  further  promoted  at  EU 
level.  Nevertheless,  some  Member  States  recall  considerations  of  data  protection  for 
maintaining such information exchange between the relevant NCPs. 

The  Regulation  added  value  to  national  and  international  initiatives  in  so  far  as  it 
increased  the  awareness  on  the  emerging  threat  related  to  explosives  precursors  by 
giving  wide  visibility  to  the  threat  of  explosives  precursors,  and  creating  the  political 
momentum  to  push  for  the  prompt  adoption  of  national  restrictive  measures.  The 
Regulation gave to the misuse of explosives precursors a renewed importance for all actors of 
the  supply  chain  and  it  triggered,  following  a  top-down  approach,  the  implementation  of 
awareness  raising  activities  and regular  meetings  of  the  SCP.  Before  the  entry into  force  of 

283 E.g. the UK “Know your customer” campaign. GHK, Rand Europe and Comstratos, 2010.  
284 GHK, Rand Europe and Comstratos, 2010, op.cit. 
285 Interview feedback: two representative from NCA and two from NCP.  
286 Interview feedback: two representatives from NCA and one NCP. 

108 

 
 
                                                            
the Regulation, only five Member States had awareness-raising measures in place at national 
level and throughout the supply chain, and in particular end users were reported to be overall 
insufficiently  aware  of  the  risks  of  terrorists  and  criminals  attempting  to  obtain  explosives 
precursors.287  After  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Regulation,  NCAs  have  adopted  several 
measures to raise awareness and developed non-legislative measures to facilitate the correct 
implementation  of  the  Regulation.  In  some  countries  in  particular,  the  NCA  plays  a  very 
active  role.  In  Sweden  for  instance,  it  organised  awareness  campaigns  and  worked  together 
with associations and retailers to develop effective initiatives. Also the institution of the SCP 
contributed  to  add  value  to  national  initiatives  by  providing  a  platform  for  the  exchange  of 
information and mutual learning.288  

However, the overall EU added value linked to an EU intervention in this field appears 
to be limited by the fragmentation of restrictions and control regimes across the EU and 
the  insufficient  level  of  awareness  along  the  supply  chain.  The  existence  of  different 
regimes seems to negatively affect the cross-borders sales of regulated explosives precursors 
and with an impact on retailers wishing to sell the regulated substances across countries, who 
find it difficult to comply with different requirements.289 The multiplicity of regimes seems to 
raise  also  security  concerns  limiting  the  effectiveness  of  controls  and  more  in  general  the 
enforcement  of  the  Regulation’s  provisions.  In  addition,  some  stakeholders  reported  that  if 
Regulation limited the availability of explosives precursors to the general public in physical 
shops,  it might have brought  to a shift towards to the purchase of explosives precursors via 
internet, where the Regulation’s provisions are not fully applied.290  

With regard to  the  uneven  level  of awareness, there is  evidence of the difficulties to ensure 
full  awareness  along  the  supply  chain  and  there  is  consensus  of  economic  operators  on  the 
need  to  better  clarify  some  definitions  related,  among  others,  to  professional  users  and 
suspicious  transactions,  in  order  to  ensure  an  effective  reporting  and  adequately  support 
national prevention and repression initiatives.  

CONCLUSIONS 

It emerges from the evaluation that the overall objectives of the Regulation remain relevant to 
the  current needs,  due  to  the  continued  terrorist  threat  in  Europe.  Nevertheless,  the  analysis 
showed  that  not  all  relevant  threat  substances  and  concerned  stakeholders  are  covered  and 
clearly  defined  in  the  current  framework,  suggesting  that  the  level  of  access  to  restricted 
substances is not fully adequate to the current context and to address new and evolving 
threats.  The Regulation covers substances that continue to pose a security threat to the public 
by  being  used  for  manufacturing    HMEs.  However,  some  substances  that  currently  pose  a 
threat  are  not  subject  to  the  restrictions  of  the  Regulation.  The  lack  of  definition  or 
insufficient clarity in the Regulation as regards certain relevant categories of users and 
concerned  stakeholders,  such  as  professional  users  and  online  retailers,  creates  legal 
uncertainties  for  both  competent  national  authorities  and  economic  operators  and  pose 
practical  issues  for  reporting  suspicious  transactions,  detection  of  potential  threat  and 
prevention of illicit access to explosives precursors.  

287 GHK, Rand Europe and Comstratos, 2010. op.cit. 
288 Interview feedback: one representative of NCP and two representatives from NCA. 
289 Feedback from interview: four economic operators. 
290 Interview feedback: four representatives from NCA, one economic operator and one representative of NCP. 
Questionnaire to Member States on the effectiveness of Regulation (EU) No 98/2013.  

109 

 
 
                                                            
The  Regulation  proved  to  be  only  partially  effective  in  reaching  its  specific  objectives. 
Following  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Regulation  the  availability  of  explosives  precursors  to 
members  of  the  general  public  has  been  reduced  and  reporting  of  suspicious  transactions 
improved.  However,  limitations  have  been  identified  with  regard  to  the  application  and 
enforcement of the Regulation. The lack of uniform level of controls and the diversity of ways 
they  have  been  implemented  are  not  deterrent  enough.  Surveillance  and  reporting 
obligations have not always been effectively applied and enforced by public authorities. 
The lack of clarity of the notion of professional users and of the definition of members of the 
general  public  leaves  room  for  interpretation.  The  current  level  of  awareness  of  the 
Regulation requirements along the supply chain is still uneven and the lack of clarity of some 
definitions  creates  room  for  interpretation  that  eventually  affect  the  comprehensiveness  of 
existing  reporting  systems.  Fragmentation  of  control  regimes  across  the  EU  has  created 
challenges for compliance of economic operators and poses a security concern. 

Overall  the  costs  introduced  by  the  Regulation  are  estimated  as  proportionate  to  its 
general and specific objectives. The most affected stakeholders are economic operators, and 
in  particular  retailers.  The  most  burdensome  activities  are  reportedly  the  ones  related  to 
training and awareness raising of staff members and reporting suspicious transactions, thefts 
or significant losses. Most of the costs for national authorities are associated to activities that 
have been already carried out before the Regulation and increased only moderately following 
the entry into force of the Regulation. Potential for simplification and cost savings has been 
identified  in  possible  further  harmonization  of  the  system  of  restrictions  and  controls, 
clarification  of  some  labelling  obligations,  and  faster  and  more  flexible  EU  procedure  for 
enabling changes to the list of restricted substances.   

The  Regulation  is  in  general  consistent  and  complementary  to  key  relevant  EU  legislation, 
such  as  REACH,  the  CLP  Regulation,  the  Directive  on  Explosives  for  Civil  Uses,  the 
Directive  on  Pyrotechnic  Articles,  the  Directive  on  Fertilisers,  and  the  regulations  on  Drug 
Precursors. Some differences have emerged as regards certain definitions (e.g. ‘placing on the 
market’  vis-à-vis  ‘making  available’).  A  transfer  of  relevant  provisions  on  restrictions  on 
Ammonium  nitrate  from  REACH  to  the  Regulation  will  improve  the  coherence  of  the 
framework. 

The introduction of a binding measure as the Regulation brought a number of advantages that 
added  value  to  national  and  international  measures  aiming  at  tackling  the  threat  posed  by 
explosives precursors.  

However, the overall EU added value linked to an EU intervention in this field appears to be 
limited by the fragmentation of the system of restrictions and control regimes across the EU 
(i.e. ban, licencing, and registration) and by the diverging level of awareness along the supply 
chain.  

110 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 4: MARKET ANALYSIS  

Introduction 

In order to better contextualise the market for chemicals affected by Regulation 98/2013, and 
in  view  of  supporting  the  assessment  of  the  policy  options,  this  annex  reports  key  market 
features of the substances listed in Annex I and II of Regulation 98/2013. The annex first lists 
figures  for  production,291  as  well  as  imports  and  exports,292  and  information  on  the  supply 
chain  (market  concentration  and  users)  for  each  substance.  Data  from  2008  is  compared  to 
data from 2016, where available. After listing all substances, the annex analyses the potential 
market affected by Regulation 98/2013, and includes an estimate of the market for the general 
public  (non-professional  users).  The  size  of  the  online  market  is  illustrated  with  data  taken 
from a very large operator in the five largest national markets in the EU. 

Data used  

This  analysis  is  largely  based  on  information  retrieved  from  Eurostat  and  the  European 
Chemical  Agency  (ECHA),  as  well  as  information  gathered  during  a  preparatory  study 
commissioned  by  DG  HOME  to  inform  an  impact  assessment  that  preceded  the  legislative 
proposal  for  Regulation  98/2013.  Registration  data  from  the  European  Chemical  Agency 
(ECHA)  provides  information  on  the  suppliers,  importers  and  manufacturers  of  substances. 
The  information  gathers  the  companies  that  have  registered  their  substance  under  REACH, 
whether they are active or inactive. Nonetheless, it should be noted that under certain specific 
conditions, registrants may claim confidentiality of their identity. Thus, breakdown presented 
by  country  should  not  be  considered  as  exhaustive  lists.  Moreover,  it  should  be  noted  that 
retailers are not taken into account by the data provided by ECHA. This disclaimer is valid for 
all substances analysed in this section.  

General overview 

From  the  figures  presented  below  in  detail,  it  can  be  concluded  that  the  production  of 
restricted  explosives  precursors,  listed  in  Annex  I  of  Regulation  98/2013  in  the  EU  has  not 
changed substantially between 2008 and 2016. More fluctuation can be seen in the production 
regarding  those  explosives  precursors  listed  in  Annex  II,  which  in  some  have  increased 
(sodium nitrate) or decreased (calcium nitrate) exponentially. The proportion 

Hydrogen Peroxide (H2O2) – Annex I substance -  

Production 

In 2016, the EU28 sold 1,128 kt of Hydrogen Peroxide, amounting to a production value of 
€604 million (€535 per ton).293 In 2008, the total sold production of the substance amounted 
to  1,182  kt  of  Hydrogen  Peroxide  with  a  value  of  €487  million.  In  2018,  the  price  per  unit 
accounted for 414€ per ton. The production value increased by 23%, while volumes decreased 
by 4,6%.   

291 Value of sold production refers to the production sold outside enterprises of the EU during the reference 
period. 
292 Import and export data comprise the sum of trade with all third countries. 
293 Prodcom data, Eurostat 2018. 

111 

 
 
                                                            
The figure below shows the production trends of Hydrogen Peroxide between 2008 and 2016. 
Overall, for the period 2008 to 2016, the quantity of sold volume of Hydrogen Peroxide has 
slightly  decreased,  from  1,179  kt  to  1,128  kt.  The  volume  of  sold  production  reached  its 
lowest  point  between  2011  and  2012.  The  decrease  of  quantity  of  sold  production  was 
however been coupled by a steady increase of the price per ton of the substance between 2008 
and 2015, with a notable decrease in 2016.  

Figure 4: Hydrogen Peroxide - Production trends 

1.400

1.200

1.000

800

600

400

200

0

600 € 

500 € 

400 € 

300 € 

200 € 

100 € 

0 € 

s
n
o

i
l
l
i

M

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Sold volume (kg)

Value of sold volume (€) 

Unit price (per ton)

Source: PRODCOM 2018, Eurostat 

Export and import 

According  to  PRODCOM  statistics,  in  2016  the  EU28  Member  States  imported  7.3  kt  of 
Hydrogen Peroxide with a value of €23.5 million, representing a price unit of €3192 per ton. 
Moreover,  the  export  quantity  amounted  to  113  kt,  at  a  value  of  €72.8  million,  which 
represents  a  price  per  unit  of  €642  per  ton.  The  net  export  amounts  to  106  kt  of  Hydrogen 
Peroxide, representing €49.3 million. 

The  Figure  below  shows  the  imports  and  exports  (volume  and  value)  of  the  EU28 
towards/from third countries between 2008 and 2016. In terms of the volume and the value of 
exports  of  Hydrogen  Peroxide,  a  considerable  decrease  can  be  observed  between  2008  and 
2010;  the export  volume  of  the  substance  decreased  from  74.3  kt  in  2008  to  28  kt  in  2010. 
Also,  export  value  decreased  from  €36.6  million  in  2008  to  €18.7  million  in  2010. 
Nonetheless,  this  is  followed  by  a  trend  of  substantial  export  increase  (volume  and  value) 
between 2010 and 2015, before a sharp decrease in 2016. Conversely, the volume and value 
of imports of the substance remains stable for the period 2008-2014, before increasing slightly 
in 2016. 

Figure 5: Hydrogen Peroxide - Trade flows 

112 

 
 
 
 
160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

s
n
o

i
l
l
i

M

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Export volume (kg)

Export value (€) 

Import volume (kg)

Import value (€) 

Source: PRODCOM 2018, Eurostat 

Supply Chain: Market concentration and uses 

A  total  of  31  companies  that  have  registered  Hydrogen  Peroxide  under  REACH.  Germany 
arises  as  the  Member  State  with  the  most  companies  having  registered  the  substance  (6  in 
total), followed by Belgium and Spain, accounting for 3 companies each.  

As  stated  by  ECHA,  Hydrogen  Peroxide  is  manufactured  and/or  imported  in  the  EEA  in 
1,000,000 – 10,000,000 tonnes per year. The substance has several types of uses, including, 
consumers  uses,  manufacturing,  professional  uses,  in-formulation  or  re-packing,  and  uses at 
industrial sites. 

Almost  all  (98%)  of  hydrogen  peroxide  is  used  in  the  industry  as  a  process  reagent.  The 
substance  is  mainly  used  as  a  pulp  bleaching  agent.  Household  uses  of  hydrogen  peroxide 
include  hair  care  products,  tooth  products  (such  as  buccal  disinfectants),  cleaning  products 
(e.g.  dishwashing  detergents,  toilet  cleaners,  pool  cleaners),  bleaching  of  textiles,  food 
additives,  disinfectants,  and  deodorants.  The  table  below  summarises  the  main  professional 
and non-professional uses of Hydrogen peroxide. 

Table 1: Hydrogen peroxide - Substance uses 

Non-professional uses 
Consumer uses 
  Cosmetics  and  personal 

care products 

  Biocides 

Disinfectants, 
control products) 

(e.g. 
pest 

  pH  regulators  and  water 

treatment products 

  Textile 

treatment 

products and dyes 

Professional uses 

General professional uses  At industrial sites uses 
  pH  regulators  and  water 

  Metal 

surface 

treatment 

treatments products 

products 

  Laboratory chemicals 

  pH 

regulators 

and  water 

  Washing  & 

cleaning 

treatment products 

  Semiconductors 

treatment 

  Metal working fluids 

  Biocides 

(e.g.  disinfectants, 

products 

  Water 

chemicals 

  Cosmetics  and  personal 

pest control products) 

113 

 
 
 
 
  Washing  & 

cleaning 

care products 

  Laboratory chemicals 

products 

  Water 

chemicals 

treatments 

  Biocides 

disinfectants, 
control products) 

(e.g. 
pest 

  Leather treatment products 

  Lubricants and greases 

  Paper chemicals and dyes 

treatment 

  Textile  treatment  products  and 

dyes 

  Water treatment chemicals 

  Fertilisers 

  Leather 
products 

  Lubricants and greases 

  Textile 

treatment 

products and dyes 

Source: European Chemical Agency (ECHA), Substance information, 2018 

Availability of the substance via the internet 

Data collected from a large online retailer has shown (see Table 17) that there is a relatively 
large number of products linked to Hydrogen Peroxide available for sale. Indeed, the highest 
number  of  products  can  be  found  on  the  French  and  Spanish  version  of  Amazon  serviced 
regions, at 306 available products each. However, The German and British market display the 
highest number of different retailers, accounting for 143 and 136 respectively. Comparatively, 
each region displays similar returns of number of products.  

Nitromethane – Annex I substance -  

Production trends 

PRODCOM data does not include the substance of nitromethane as a single group. This issue 
was  identified  previously  in  the  Impact  Assessment  in  2010.  While  the  latter  used  a  proxy 
indicator (production in the US), in this case the aggregated group for nitromethane is used: 
“Derivatives of hydrocarbon containing only nitro or only nitroso groups” (PRODCOM code 
20.14.14.70)294. 

In 2016, data shows that the substance group amounted to 67 kt, which represents a value of 
€43.8 million. Thus, the price per unit amounts to €650 per ton. In 2008, the sold production 
volume amounted to 68 kt representing a value of €57 million, thus a price per unit of €833 
per ton of the substance group. 

The Figure below shows the volume and value of sold production, as well as the price per unit 
for nitromethane between 2008 and 2016. Overall, both volume and price have decreased 
during  the  period  considered.  Moreover,  a  sharp  decrease  should  be  noted  from  2014 
onwards.  The  substance  has  been  classified  by  the  International  Agency  for  Research  on 
Cancer  (IARC)  as  “possibly  carcinogenic  to  humans”  group  2B295.  The  price  drop  of 
nitromethane may suggest a certain degree of deselections and substitution for less hazardous 
products. 

Figure 6: Nitromethane - production trends 

294 Preparatory study for an impact assessment on restrictions to explosives precursors, 2010, not published.   
295 International Agency for Research on Cancer, World Health Organization, 2018, retrieved from: 
http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Classification/latest_classif.php. 

114 

 
 
                                                            
120

100

80

60

40

20

0

€ 1.000 

€ 900 

€ 800 

€ 700 

€ 600 

€ 500 

€ 400 

€ 300 

€ 200 

€ 100 

€ 0 

s
n
o

i
l
l
i

M

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Sold volume (kg)

Value of sold volume (€) 

Price per unit (€) 

Source: PRODCOM, 2018 

Export and import 

According to PRODCOM data, in 2016, the volume of nitromethane exported by the EU28 
amounted to 28 kt, amounting to a value of €28 million. Conversely, the amount of imports 
involved a volume of 11 kt of nitromethane, amounting to a value of €20.8 million. 

The Figure below shows the exports and imports volume and value between 2008 and 2016 
for  nitromethane  of  the  EU28  towards/from  extra-EU  countries.  Overall,  the  volume  and 
value of imports has decreased over the period considered. Notably, a sharp decrease in 2009 
could  suggest  the impact  of  the  economic  and  financial crisis.  Nonetheless,  the  volume  and 
value of exports has increased between 2008 and 2016. 

Figure 7: Nitromethane - trade flows 

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

s
n
o

i
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l
i

M

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Export volume (kg)

Export value (€) 

Import volume (kg)

Import value (€) 

Source: PRODCOM, 2018 

Supply chain: Market concentration and uses 

115 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Two  companies,  located  in  Germany,  registered  with  ECHA  for  nitromethane.  The  last 
dossiers  received  for  the  substance  were  in  2017,  which  indicates  that  registrations  for 
nitromethane are more recent than the other substances identified in this analysis. According 
to ECHA, Nitromethane is manufactured and imported in the EEA in 1000 to 10,000 tonnes 
per year.  

In  terms  of  uses,  nitromethane’s  main  uses  are  for  professional  uses,  consumer  use  is 
mainly  referred  to  motorsport  hobbyists,  notably  in  drag  races  and  radio-controlled 
engines ( 

Non-professional uses 

Professional uses 

Consumer uses 

  Fuels 

General professional uses 

At industrial site uses 

  pH regulators and water 

treatment products 
laboratory chemicals 

  pH regulators and water 
treatment products  

  laboratory chemicals 

).  

Table 2: Nitromethane - Substance uses 

Non-professional uses 
Consumer uses 

  Fuels 

Professional uses 
General professional uses 

  pH regulators and water 

treatment products 
laboratory chemicals 

  cleaning solvent 

  extractions 

  reaction medium in 

chemicals production 

  intermediate chemical in 
organic synthesis such as 
pharmaceuticals, 
pesticides, fibers, coatings 

At industrial site uses 

  pH regulators and water 
treatment products  

  laboratory chemicals 

  cleaning solvent 

  extractions 

  reaction medium in 

chemicals production 

  intermediate chemical in 
organic synthesis such as 
pharmaceuticals, 
pesticides, fibers, coatings 

Source: European Chemical Agency (ECHA), Substance information, 2018 

Availability of the substance via internet 

116 

 
 
The figures collected from a large online retailer (see Table 17) shows that there is relatively 
little  availability  of  the  substance  for  sale.  Indeed,  the  largest  number  of  products  available 
can be found on the French market, at 55 products, as well as the highest number of retailers, 
accounting for 15. The British and German markets are comparable in terms of retailers, with 
11 each, while the Italian market displays the lowest number of availability of nitromethane. 

A  report  from  2015  states  that  the  accessibility  of  the  substance  is  limited  to  products  that 
contain  concentrations  in  line  with  the  regulation296.  The  current  analysis  has  identified  an 
identical trend, as in that there are no products available that contain Nitromethane in higher 
concentrations than specified by the regulation. 

Nitric Acid (N) – Annex I substance -  

Production trends 

In 2016, EU Member States reported that 1,094 kt of Nitric Acid had been sold, accounting 
for a total value of €346.9 million. This represents a price per unit of €317.1 per ton of Nitric 
Acid. The total sold production of the substance in 2008 amounted to 917 kt, representing a 
value of €330 million. At the time, the price per unit was higher, at €360 per ton. 

The  Figure  below  displays  the  production  trends  of  Nitric  Acid  for  the  period  2008-2016. 
While  the  value  of  the sold  volume  has  remained  relatively  stable  over  the  considered  time 
period,  both  the  price  per  unit  and  sold  volume  have  fluctuated  considerably,  showing  a 
persistent diverging pattern between sold volume and unit price for the whole period.   

Figure 8: Nitric Acid - production trends 

Nitric acid 

s
n
o

i
l
l
i

M

1.800

1.600

1.400

1.200

1.000

800

600

400

200

0

400 € 

350 € 

300 € 

250 € 

200 € 

150 € 

100 € 

50 € 

0 € 

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Sold volume (kg)

Value of sold volume (€) 

Unit price (€) 

Source: PRODCOM 2018, Eurostat 

Export and import 

The figure below shows the trends in the value of exports and imports between 2008 and 2016 
for Nitric Acid of the EU28 towards/from third countries. Overall, between 2008 and 2016, 
the  value  of  exports  has  increased  while  the  value  of  imports  has  decreased.  According  to 

296 Brief Nitromethane, ENCO, November 2015, restricted. 

117 

 
 
 
                                                            
 
PRODCOM statistics, the value of exports in 2016 of Nitric Acid amounted to €25.8 million, 
while  the  value  of  imports  amounted  to  €9.08  million.  The  net  export  value  amounted  to 
€16.8 million in 2016.  

Figure 9: Nitric Acid - Value of imports and exports 

s
n
o

i
l
l
i

M

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Value of exports (€) 

Value of imports (€) 

Source: PRODCOM 2018, Eurostat 

Supply chain: Market concentration and uses 

In the case of Nitric Acid, the majority of the companies having registered their substances at 
the  European  Chemical  Agency  are  located  in  Germany,  with  14  registrations.  France 
represents  the  second  largest  share  in  terms  of  registrations,  with  7  companies  in  total.  The 
following  Member  States  in  terms  of  number  of  registrations  are  Poland  (6),  the  Czech 
Republic (5), Romania (5), Belgium (4), and the United Kingdom (4). 

The  majority  of  Nitric  Acid  (58%)  is  used  in  the  production  of  Ammonium  Nitrate. 
Other  consumption  patterns  of  the  substance  include  the  production  of  adipic  acid  (7%), 
isocyanates  (2%),  military  use  in  explosives  (6%),  production  of  fertilizers  (5%),  industrial 
explosives (3%), nitrobenzene (1%), and in other applications not listed (18%). Nonetheless, 
it was acknowledged that there is little household use of highly concentrated Nitric Acid, 
with the exception of metal worker hobbyist297. 

Table 3: Nitric Acid - Substance uses 

Table 1.  Consum
er uses 

Table 2.  Profession

Table 3.  Formulatio

Table 4. 

al uses 

n and re-
packaging 

Industri
al site 
uses 

  Washing & 

  Fertilisers,  

  Washing & cleaning 

cleaning products,  

  Washing & cleaning 

products,  

  Fertilisers,  

products,  

  Polishes and 

  Metal surface 

  Ph regulators and 
water treatment 

  Ph regulators and 
water treatment 
products,  

  Washing & 

297 Preparatory study for an impact assessment on restrictions to explosives precursors, 2010, not published.  

118 

 
 
 
                                                            
 
waxes and  

treatment products,  

products,  

  Air care products 

  Non-metal-surface 
treatment products,  

  Metal surface 

treatment products,  

  Ph regulators and 
water treatment 
products  

  Laboratory 
chemicals 

  Non-metal-surface 
treatment products  

  Fertilisers 

  Nylon precursor 

  Rocket fuel 

cleaning 
products,  

  Metal surface 
treatment 
products,  

  Non-metal-

surface treatment 
products,  

  Water treatment 
chemicals,  

  Semiconductors 

   laboratory 
chemicals 

Source: European Chemical Agency (ECHA), Substance information, 2018 

Availability of the substance via internet 

Data collected from a large online retailer servicing 5 European regions (see Table 17 ) shows 
that  the  highest  availability  of  products  containing  Nitric  Acid  is  in  the  United  Kingdom. 
Indeed,  the  online  retailer  returns  317  results,  along  with  157  different  retailers.  The 
aforementioned  market  is  much  larger  than  its  French  and  German  counterparts,  which 
account  for 190 and 144 products respectively. Conversely, the Spanish and Italian markets 
are smaller in comparison, with 81 and 91 products respectively.  

Potassium chlorate, potassium perchlorate, sodium chlorate, sodium perchlorate 

– Annex I substances -  

Production trends 

The  data  for  sold  production  and  value  is  not  available  at  substance  level  for  sodium, 
potassium chlorates and perchlorates. Instead, all four substances are aggregated at a higher 
level  of  chemical  compounds,  called  the  “chlorates  and  perchlorates;  bromates  and 
perbromates;  iodates;  and  periodates”  (code  20133250).  This  group  also  includes 
ammonium and barium perchlorate, which constitute significant part of production.298 

In  2016,  the  volume  of  sold  production  of  the  substance  group  amounted  to  600  kt,  at  an 
estimated value of €300 million, with a price per unit of €500 per ton in 2016, which states a 
slight increase over the period 2008-2016 (Figure ). 

298 Preparatory study for an impact assessment on restrictions to explosives precursors, 2010, not published. 

119 

 
 
                                                            
Figure  10:  Chlorates  and  perchlorates;  bromates  and  perbromates;  iodates  and 
periodates - production trends 

s
n
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i
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M

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

700 € 

600 € 

500 € 

400 € 

300 € 

200 € 

100 € 

0 € 

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Sold volume (kg)

Value of sold volume (€) 

Unit price (€) 

Source: PRODCOM 2018, EUROSTAT 

Export and import 

The  trade  balance  for  the  substance  group  is  negative  for  the  EU28  market  (€-0.4  million), 
with  imports  from  extra-EU  countries  always  higher  than  exports,  in  the  period  2008-2016. 
The  EU28  exported  (towards  extra-EU  countries)  a  volume  of  the  grouped  substance  that 
amounted to 4.5 kt in 2016, representing a value of €20.8 million. Conversely, the volume of 
imports  of  the  grouped  substance  accounted  for  9.6  kt,  which  represents  a  value  of  €21.2 
million. It is worth noting that the value of imports of the concerned group of substances did 
considerably  increase  between  2008  and  2013,  before  abruptly  decreasing  in  2014.  As 
aforementioned, the group includes various  substances.  Thus, trends  in  trade are difficult  to 
explain and cannot be related to a single event.  

120 

 
 
 
 
Figure  11:  Chlorates  and  perchlorates;  bromates  and  perbromates;  iodates  and 
periodates - Exports and Imports 

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

s
n
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i
l
l
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M

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Volume of exports (kg)

Value of exports (€) 

Volume of imports (kg)

Value of imports (€) 

Source: PRODCOM 2018, Eurostat 

Supply chain: Market concentration and uses 

In  the  case  of  this  substance  group,  potassium  chlorate,  potassium  perchlorate,  sodium 
chlorate, and sodium perchlorate have been aggregated under the same group to identify all 
companies  having  registered  their  substances  under  REACH.  France  represents  the  largest 
share in the EU28 with 4 companies. The following countries are Spain (2), Finland (2), and 
Sweden (2). 

With regards to the uses, it must be noted that: 

   The  use  of  sodium  chlorate  as  a  herbicide  was  banned  in  2008  due  to  its  harmful 

effects on human health.299 

   Sodium perchlorate is less widespread, mostly used as oxidiser agent. 

   Potassium  chlorate  and  potassium  perchlorate  are  mostly  used  in  industrial 

pyrotechnics. 

   Household use of both is mainly indirect: the access is mostly related to consumption 

products such as fireworks, matches, and pesticides. 

Table  4:  Potassium  chlorate,  potassium  perchlorate,  sodium  chlorate,  sodium 
perchlorate - Substances uses 

Name of substance 

Industrial and professional 

Uses 

Non-professional uses  
(Consumer Uses) 

Potassium chlorate 

Potassium perchlorate 

Sodium chlorate 

  Oxidizing/reducing agents 

  Oxidizing/reducing agents 

  Pesticide 

  Bleaching agents 

  Fuels and fuel additives 

299 Commission Decision 2008/865 (OJ L 307, 18.11.2008, p 7). 

121 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
Name of substance 

Industrial and professional 

Uses 

  Intermediates 

  Oxidizing/reducing agents 

  Processing aids, specific to 

petroleum production 

  Solvents  (for  cleaning  or 

degreasing) 

Non-professional uses  
(Consumer Uses) 

Sodium perchlorate 

  Oxidizing/reducing agents 

  Batteries 

  Explosive Materials 

  Plastic 

and 

Rubber 

products 

Source: European Chemical Agency (ECHA), Substance information, 2018 

Availability of the substance via the internet 

The analysis of the data extracted from a large online retailer in different serviced regions (see 
Table 17) shows that Sodium Chlorate is the most widely available product across the group 
of substances, accounting for 91 different products in the United Kingdom and 56 in France. 
The smallest market for Sodium Chlorate are in Spain and Italy, which count 1 product each. 
The  least  available  substances  are  Potassium  Chlorate  and  Sodium  Perchlorate.  Moreover, 
Italy displays the lowest availability of the products, as well as the lowest number of retailers, 
with only 1 result being returned for Sodium Chlorate. 

Hexamine – Annex II substance -  

Production trends 

PRODCOM data does not include the substance of hexamine or hexamethylenetetramine, as a 
single  group.  Thus,  the  aggregated  group  is  taken  into  account  as  part  of  the  analysis: 
“Compounds  containing  an  unfused  pyrazole  ring  (whether  or  not  hydrogenated)  in  the 
structure” (code 21103130). 

In 2016, the production volume of the substance group sold was 7.8 kt representing a value of 
€436.9 million. This represents a price per unit of €55,985 per ton. Conversely, in 2008 the 
production volume sold amounted to 8.3 kt representing a value of €229.6 million. Thus, the 
price per unit is €27,472 per ton. 

The Figure below represents the value of the sold volume and its price per unit between 2008 
and  2016.  The  production  volume  sold  is  not  represented  on  the  graph  as  the  differences 
between value and volume are too large. Nonetheless, the volume underwent a sharp decrease 
between 2008 and 2009, but  has  been  steadily increasing  thereafter. Moreover, the value of 
the volume sold steadily increased between 2009 and 2011, sharply increased between 2011 
and 2012, and steadily increased until 2016. The price per unit experienced a sharp increase in 
2011, before decreasing thereafter. During this timeframe, the number of hexamine producers 

122 

 
 
has decreased in the EU, which suggests an impact on the value of the volume sold, driving it 
upwards. 

Figure 12: Hexamine - production trends 

500

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

70.000 € 

60.000 € 

50.000 € 

40.000 € 

30.000 € 

20.000 € 

10.000 € 

0 € 

s
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2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Value of sold volume (€) 

Unit price (€) 

Source: PRODCOM 2018, Eurostat 

Export and import 

In 2016, the volume of exports amounted to 9 kt with a value of €539 million. Conversely, in 
2008,  the  volume  exported  accounted  for  7  kt  with  a  value  of  €441  million.  In  terms  of 
imports, 2016 shows that the volume imported was 5.9 kt with a value of €253.8 million. In 
2008, the volume of imports amounted to 4.3 kt with a value of €39.7 million. 

The figure below represents the volume and value of imports and exports between 2008 and 
2011 of the EU28 towards/from extra-EU countries. Trends show that the volume of both and 
imports and exports have been increasing. The same is relevant for the values of imports and 
exports. Nonetheless, the volume of exports sharply decreased in 2009. Moreover, the value 
of imports sharply decreased in 2015. 

123 

 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Hexamine - Trade flows 

€700 

€600 

€500 

€400 

€300 

€200 

€100 

€0 

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

s
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o

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l
i

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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Export value (€) 

Import value (€) 

Export volume (kg)

Import volume (kg)

Source: PRODCOM 2018, Eurostat 

Supply chain: Market concentration and uses 

The  country  having  registered  the  most  substance  as  Hexamine  under  REACH  is  the 
Netherlands with 3 companies in total. It is followed by Belgium (2) and Germany (2). 

98%  of  Hexamine  is  used  for  industrial  uses,  notably  in  polymers  of  the  plastics  and 
rubber  industry  for  vulcanisation300.  Moreover,  3%  of  hexamine  is  used  in  the 
production  of  C-4  and  RDX,  well-known  explosives,  used  for  industrial  and  military 
purposes. The substance is also used in fuel tablets in a concentration of 95%301. Finally, the 
substance  is  used  in  the  production  of  anti-biotics.  According  to  ECHA,  the  substance  is 
manufactured and imported in the EEA in 10,000 to 100,000 tonnes per years. 

Table 5: Hexamine - Substance uses 

Non-professional uses 
Consumer uses 

Professional uses 
General professional uses 

  Washing  & 

cleaning 

  Polymers 

At industrial site uses 

  Adhesives and sealants 

products,  

  Fuels  

  Cosmetics  and  personal 

care products  

  Antibiotics 

  Polymers  

Source: European Chemical Agency (ECHA), Substance information, 2018 

Availability of the substance via internet 

The collection of the number of products and retailers from a large online retailer (see Table 
17)  shows  that  Hexamine  is  comparatively  less  available  than  other  substances  online. 

300 Preparatory study for an impact assessment on restrictions to explosives precursors, 2010, not published. 
301 Preparatory study for an impact assessment on restrictions to explosives precursors, 2010, not published. 

124 

 
 
 
                                                            
 
Indeed,  the  United  Kingdom  returns  the  highest  number  of  products  at  26,  as  well  as  the 
highest number of retailers at 15. Italy shows that the substance is not available at all. 

Sulphuric acid (SO2) – Annex II substance -  

Production trends 

The data for sold production volume is limited in the PRODCOM database to the period 
of  2008  to  2011.  In  2011,  Member  States  reported  that  a  volume  of  8,631  kt  were  sold, 
representing a value of €554.6 million. Hence, the price per unit accounted for €64.2 per ton. 

The  Figure  below  shows  the  production  trends  of  Sulphuric  Acid  between  2008  and  2011. 
The sold volume of Sulphuric Acid slightly decreased during the period considered, as well 
as  the  value  of  the  sold  volume.  While  the  case  is  similar  for  the  price  per  unit,  the  figure 
below shows that there was a large drop between 2008 and 2009. The timeframe suggests that 
this can be a consequence of the financial and economic crisis started in 2007.  

Figure 14: Sulphuric Acid - production trends 

s
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10.000

9.000

8.000

7.000

6.000

5.000

4.000

3.000

2.000

1.000

0

€80 

€70 

€60 

€50 

€40 

€30 

€20 

€10 

€0 

2008

2009

2010

2011

Sold volume (kg)

Value of sold volume (€) 

Unit price (€) 

Source: PRODCOM 2018, Eurostat 

Export and import 

While the value of imports has remained relatively stable over time, the value of exports of 
Sulphuric Acid has increased during the period. Indeed, in 2008 the EU28’s value of exports 
accounted for €122 million, increasing to €168 million in 2011. The net exports value is equal 
to €157.9 million in 2011. 

Figure15: Sulphuric Acid - Exports and Imports 

125 

 
 
 
 
s
n
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180 € 

160 € 

140 € 

120 € 

100 € 

80 € 

60 € 

40 € 

20 € 

0 € 

2008

2009

2010

2011

Value of exports (€) 

Value of imports (€) 

Source: PRODCOM 2018, Eurostat 

Supply chain: Market concentration and uses 

In  the  case  of  sulphuric  acid,  Germany  represents  the  largest  number  of  companies  having 
registered  sulphuric  acid  under  REACH,  with  47  companies  in  total.  This  is  followed  by 
France  (15),  the  Netherlands  (15),  Belgium  (15),  Italy  (12),  Poland  (11)  and  the  United 
Kingdom (10). In total, there are 178 registrants for sulphuric acid under REACH. 

Sulphuric acid is widely used in the mining industry as a reagent in chemical processes 
and  in  agrochemicals,  for  fertilizers.  Other  major  areas  of  use  of  the  substance  include 
washing  and  cleaning  products,  as  it  is  an  important  component  in  clean  wash  agents. 
Additionally, the substance  is a key component of battery acid. Household  uses include  pH 
adjustments for swimming pools and fish tanks302.  

The  Table  below  shows  the  main  professional  and  non-professional  uses  identified  for 
Sulphuric Acid.  

Table 6: Sulphuric Acid - Industrial, Professional and Consumer uses 

Non-Professional uses 
Consumer uses 

General professional uses 

At industrial site uses 

Professional uses 

  Ph  regulators  and  water 

  Laboratory chemicals  

  Ph  regulators  and  water 

treatment products  

  Ph  regulators  and  water 

treatment products  

  Metal  surface 

treatment 

treatment products,  

  Metal 

surface 

treatment 

products  

  Metal 

surface 

treatment 

products  

  Washing  & 

cleaning 

products  

products  

  Washing  & 

cleaning 

  Non-metal-surface 
treatment products  

  Laboratory chemicals  

products  

  Extraction agents and  

  Non-metal-surface 
treatment products  

  Non-metal-surface 
treatment products  

  Washing  & 

cleaning 

products 

302 Preparatory study for an impact assessment on restrictions to explosives precursors, 2010, not published. 

126 

 
 
 
                                                            
 
Non-Professional uses 
  Extraction agents  

  Fertilizer 

  Extraction agents 

  Fertilizer 

Professional uses 

Source: European Chemical Agency (ECHA), Substance information, 2018 

Availability of the substance online 

Comparatively,  Sulphuric  Acid  is  widely  available  on  the  analysed  online  retailer.  Indeed, 
data collected from the large online retailer (see Table 17) shows that Sulphuric Acid returns a 
high number of products in Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy, accounting for 304, 295, 
and  133  respectively.  However,  there  are  no  results  for  the  substance  in  France  and  Spain. 
Moreover,  the  highest  number  of  retailers  are  found  on  the  Italian  online  market,  with  133. 
Nonetheless,  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom  follow  closely  with  131  and  116  online 
retailers. 

Acetone – Annex II substance -  

Production trends 

In 2016, the EU28 sold a volume of 1,298 kt of Acetone, which represents a value of €494 
million, hence a price per unit of €380.6 per ton. In 2008, the total sold production amounted 
to 1,524 kt of Acetone, while the value of the sold production accounted for €1,090 million. 
Hence, in 2008, the price per unit was €715 per ton. 

The figure below represents the production trends, including the sold volume, the value of the 
sold volume and the price per unit of acetone. Both value of sold volume and price per unit 
have  significantly  decreased,  while  the  volume  of  the  sold  production  has  only  slightly 
decreased between 2008 and 2016. Thus, the value of sold volume has decreased by more 
than  50  percent  over the  time  period  considered.  Moreover,  the  price  unit  has  decreased  by 
more than 46 percent.  

127 

 
 
Figure 16: Acetone - production trends 

1.800

1.600

1.400

1.200

1.000

800

600

400

200

0

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

s
n
o

i
l
l
i

M

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Sold volume (kg)

Value of sold volume (€) 

Unit price (€) 

Source: PRODCOM 2018, Eurostat 

Export and import 

The  EU28  is  a  net  exporter  of  Acetone.  According  to  PRODCOM  statistics,  in  2016,  the 
EU28 had exported towards extra-EU countries, a volume of 110 kt and imported a volume of 
87  kt,  with  values  of  €59  million  and  €43.9  million  respectively.  The  net  export  quantity 
amounted to 23 kt, representing a net exporting value of €15.1 million (Figure ). 

Overall, the volume and value of exports of the substance significantly decreased from 201o 
onwards. There are two significant decreases in the volume and value of exports, notably in 
2010  and  2014.  Conversely,  the  volume  and  value  of  imports  of  the  substance  have 
substantially increased during same period. 

128 

 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Acetone - Exports and Imports 

300 € 

250 € 

200 € 

150 € 

100 € 

50 € 

0 € 

s
n
o

i
l
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M

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Volume of exports (kg)

Value of exports (€) 

Volume of imports (kg)

Value of imports (€) 

Source: PRODCOM 2018, Eurostat 

Supply chain: Market concentration and uses 

In total, 65 companies have registered their substance under REACH in the EU for Acetone. 
The largest share is represented by Germany with 19 companies. The following countries are 
the United Kingdom (12), the Netherlands (9), France (6), and Belgium (5). 

Acetone can be found in many household products such as vehicle anti-freeze products, 
paints,  superglue  remover,  nail  polish,  and  cosmetics.  The  plastics  industry  consumes 
about half of the production of acetone. In particular in the manufacturing of Bisphenol A, 
used to make polycarbonates and epoxy resins. It is a widely used solvent. 

Acetone is, according to the European Chemical Agency (ECHA) manufactured and imported 
in the EEA in 1,000,000 to 10,000,000 tonnes per year. It is used by consumers, in articles, 
by professionals, in formulations or re-packaging, and at industrial sites. The table below 
shows the main professional and non-professional uses for Acetone.  

Table7: Acetone - Industrial, Professional and Consumer uses 

Non-professional uses 
Consumers Uses 

  Fillers, 

putties, 
plasters,  modelling 
clay,  

  Finger paints,  

  Adhesives 
sealants,  

and 

  Coating products 

  Non-metal-surface 
treatment products,  

General professional uses 

At industrial site uses 

Professional uses 

  Anti-freeze products 

  Washing & cleaning products,  

  Coating products 

  Laboratory chemicals,  

  Lubricants and greases 

  Photo-chemicals,  

  Biocides (e.g. Disinfectants, 

  Pharmaceuticals,  

pest control products),  

  Cosmetics  and  personal  care 

  Coating products,  

products  

  Polymers,  

  Washing 
products 

& 

cleaning 

  Biocides 

(e.g.  Disinfectants, 

pest control products).  

  Extraction solvent 

129 

 
 
 
 
  Laboratory chemicals 

  Chemical precursor 

Professional uses 

  Solvents 

Non-professional uses 
  Washing  &  cleaning 

products,  

  Air care products,  

  Polishes and waxes  

  Welding  &  soldering 

products 

Source: European Chemical Agency (ECHA), Substance information, 2018 

Availability of the product on internet 

Data collected from a large online retailer (see Table 17) shows that Acetone is the substance 
with  the  most  retailers,  at  833  if  all  5  regions  are  added.  In  general,  the  same  relative 
number of products are available across the different countries. Moreover, the largest number 
of products are available in France, accounting 308. However, the highest number of retailers 
are found in Italy, with 179, followed closely by Spain at 174.  

Potassium nitrate (N) – Annex II substance -  

Production trends 

According  to  PRODCOM  data,  the  EU28  sold  a  volume  of  45  kt  of  Potassium  Nitrate  in 
2016, which represents a value of €45.3 million. Hence, the price per unit is €988.2 per ton. In 
2008, the volume of the substance sold amounted to 40 kt at a value of €22.9 million. Thus, a 
price per unit of €573.4 per ton. 

The figure below shows the trends between 2008 and 2016 for production volume sold, value, 
and  price  per  unit.  Overall,  the  data  show  that  the  volume  of  Potassium  Nitrate  sold  has 
slightly  increased  during  the  observed  period,  while  the  value  has  increased  substantially. 
Furthermore,  the  unit  price  has  nearly  doubled  over  the  period  considered.  Patterns  for 
volume and value of the substance sold over the period has evolved erratically.  

130 

 
 
Figure 17: Potassium nitrate –production trends 

s
n
o

i
l
l
i

M

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

1600

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Sold volume (kg)

Value of sold volume (€) 

Unit price (€) 

Source: PRODCOM 2018, Eurostat 

Export and import 

The EU28 Member States have reported that in 2016, the value of exports amounted to €60.3 
million and the value of imports amounted to €266.8 million. Thus, the net export is negative 
amounting  to  €-206.5  million  in  2016.  Nonetheless,  the  net  export  gap  has  been  decreasing 
since 2008. 

The  figure  below  shows  the  evolution  between  2008  and  2016  of  the  value  of  exports  and 
imports of potassium nitrate of the EU28 towards/from extra-EU countries; while the value of 
exports has relatively increased over the period considered, the value of imports has known a 
sharp drop in 2009. This suggests that the economic and financial crisis of 2008 has had an 
impact on the imports of the substance within the EU28. 

131 

 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Potassium nitrate - Trade flows 

s
n
o

i
l
l
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M

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Value of exports (€) 

Value of imports (€) 

Source: PRODCOM 2018, Eurostat 

Supply chain: Market concentration and uses 

In the case of potassium nitrate, there are 55 companies that have registered their substance 
under  REACH.  The  largest  share  of  these  companies  is  represented  by  Germany  with  9 
companies in total. This is followed by Spain (8), Belgium (8), Ireland (7), and France (5). 

Potassium  nitrate,  being  part  of  the  nitrate  family  is  widely  used  within  the  agrochemical 
industry  to  produce  fertilisers  and  signal  flares.  Potassium  Nitrate  is  largely  used  as  a 
source  of  Nitrates.  Household  uses  are  limited  to  gardening  downstream  products. 
Nonetheless,  other  uses  include  brake  fluid  in  vehicles,  as  well  as  heat  packs  as  the  nitrate 
component  of  the  substance  is  an  adequate  heat  transfer  fluid.  Although  the  major  uses  of 
potassium  nitrate  are  in  fertilizers,  other  important  uses  include  rocket  propellants  and 
fireworks.  Potassium  Nitrate  is  a  key  constituent  of  gunpowder.  It  is  also  used  a  food 
preservative.  According  to  the  European  Chemical  Agency,  this  substance  is  manufactured 
and imported in the EEA in 1,000,000 to 10,000,000 tonnes per year.  

Table  reports the main professional and non-professional uses of Potassium Nitrate.  

Table 8: Potassium nitrate - uses 

Non-professional uses 
Consumer uses 

Professional uses 
General professional uses 

At site industrial uses 

  Fertilisers,  

  Fertilisers,  

  Fertilisers, 

  Water treatment chemicals,  

  Cosmetics  and  personal 

  Cosmetics  and  personal 

  Anti-freeze products,  

  Heat transfer fluids,  

  Hydraulic fluids  

  Explosives.  

care products,  

care products,  

  Anti-freeze 
explosives,  

  Hydraulic fluids,  

products, 

  Anti-freeze products,  

  Explosives,  

  Hydraulic  fluids,  washing 

  Washing  & 

cleaning 

& cleaning products,  

132 

 
 
 
 
Non-professional uses 

Professional uses 

products  

  Water treatment chemicals,  

  Water treatment chemicals 

  Metal 

surface 

treatment 

  Fireworks, pyrotechnics 

  Food preservative 

products,  

  Ph  regulators  and  water 

treatment products  

  Heat transfer fluids.  

Source: European Chemical Agency (ECHA), Substance information, 2018 

Availability of the substance on internet 

Data  collected  from  a  large  online  retailer  (see  Table  17)  shows  that  the  United  Kingdom 
returns  the  most  products  containing  Potassium  Nitrate,  as  well  as  the  highest  number  of 
online retailers at 131. Conversely, the French and German markets follow with 203 and 85 
products  respectively.  The  Spanish  market  returns  the  lowest  number  of  products,  and  the 
Italian market returns the lowest number of retailers. 

Sodium nitrate (N)- Annex II substance -  

Production trends 

In 2016, the EU28 has sold a volume of 120 kt of Sodium Nitrate, which amounts to a value 
of €45.3 million. Hence, the price per unit amounted to €378 per ton. In 2008, the total sold 
production was 34 kt amounting to a value of €23 million, and thus a price per unit of €680.7 
per ton. 

The  evolution  over  time  for  the  period  2008-2016  shows  that  while  the  volume  sold  has 
considerably increased, the value of this volume sold only slightly increased. Hence, the sharp 
drop in the price per unit. The volume of sold production displays two spikes, notably in 2009 
and in 2015.   

Figure 1: Sodium nitrate - production trends

s
n
o

i
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l
i

M

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

1000

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Sold volume (kg)

Value of sold volume (€) 

Unit price (€) 

Source: PRODCOM, Eurostat 2018 

133 

 
 
 
 
Export and import 

The EU28 is a net importer of Sodium Nitrate. According to data from PRODCOM, in 2016, 
the  volume  of  exports  of  sodium  nitrate  amounted  to  8  kt  while  the  value  of  this  sold 
production  amounted  to  €3.7  million.  Figures  for  imports  show  that  the  volume  of  imports 
was  considerably  higher  at  45  kt,  which  was  valued  at  €14  million.  Thus,  the  net  exports 
volume amount to -37 kt, for a value of -€11 million. 

The figure below shows the trends over the period of 2008 to 2016 for the volume and value 
of imports and exports of the EU28 towards/from extra-EU countries; while only the volume 
of  exports  has  increased  over  the  period  considered,  all  other  figures  have  decreased. 
However,  a  considerable  increase  in  the  volume  of  imports  in  2010  was  registered,  before 
sharply dropping between 2012 and 2014, recovering slightly until 2016. The same is relevant 
for the value of imports of the substance. 

Figure 20: Sodium nitrate - trade flows 

s
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i
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M

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Volume of exports (kg)

Value of exports (€) 

Volume of imports (kg)

Value of imports (€) 

Source: PRODCOM 2018, Eurostat 

Supply chain: Market concentration and uses 

For sodium nitrate, 32 companies have registered their substance under REACH. The largest 
share of these companies is located in Germany (12 companies). This is followed by Belgium 
and  the  Netherlands  (4  and  3  respectively).  The  European  Chemical  Agency  states  the 
substance is manufactured and imported in the EEA in 100,000 to 1,000,000 tonnes per year.  

Sodium nitrate is a widely used fertilizer for both professional and non-professional uses 
(ECHA, 2018). Other professional uses include ceramics and photovoltaic products.303 Some 
cases have been reported to use sodium nitrate in improvised rocket propellants. 

The table below reports the main uses of Sodium Nitrate.  

303 Preparatory study for an impact assessment on restrictions to explosives precursors, 2010, not published. 

134 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
Table 9: Sodium nitrate - uses 

Consumers uses 

Professional uses 

  Fertilisers,  

  Cosmetics 
personal 
products,  

  Adhesives 
sealants,  

  Anti-freeze 
products,  

and 
care 

and 

  Anti-freeze 
products,  

  Ph  regulators  and 
treatment 

water 
products,  

  Fertilisers,  

  Water 

treatment 

chemicals,  

  Adhesives 
sealants,  

  Heat transfer fluids  

  Hydraulic fluids,  

  Heat transfer fluids  

  Washing 

& 

cleaning products 

  Hydraulic fluids.  

Formulation and re-
packaging 
  Fertilisers,  

and 

  Adhesives 
sealants,  

  Anti-freeze 
products, 
explosives,  

  Metal 

surface 
treatment products,  

and 

  Heat 

transfer 

fluids,  

  Ph  regulators  and 
treatment 

water 
products,  

  Water 

treatment 

chemicals  

Industrial site uses 

  Ph  regulators  and 
treatment 

water 
products,  

  Metal 

surface 
treatment products,  

  Water 

treatment 

chemicals,  

  Heat 

fluids,  

transfer 

and 

  Fertilisers,  

  Adhesives 
sealants,  

  Anti-freeze 
products, 
explosives  

  Hydraulic fluids.  

  Hydraulic fluids.  

Source: European Chemical Agency (ECHA), Substance information, 2018 

Availability of the substance on internet 

Collection  of  data  from  a  large  online  retailer  (see  Table  17)  shows  that  products  linked  to 
Sodium  Nitrate  are  available  in  great  numbers  solely  in  the  United  Kingdom,  with  292 
products  on  sale  and  111  different  retailers.  The  Spanish  online  market  does  not  return  any 
results for the product, while results a relatively low in Germany, France and Italy.  

Calcium nitrate (N)- Annex II substance -  

Production trends 

In 2016, the EU28 sold a volume of 29.4 kt of Calcium Nitrate, which was valued at €25.3 
million.  In  2008,  the  substance’s  sold  volume  amounted  to  75  kt,  accounting  for  a value  of 
€65.6 million. 

The  figure  below  shows  the  production  trends  of  Calcium  Nitrate  between  2008  and  2016. 
Both,  the  volume  sold  and  value  of  volume  sold  has  gradually  increased  until  2013  before 
sharply decreasing until 2015. Since 2015, the volume sold has increased. The price per ton 
has gradually increased until 2015, before sharply decreasing in 2016. 

135 

 
 
Figure 21: Calcium nitrate - production trends 

s
n
o

i
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120

100

80

60

40

20

0

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Sold volume (kg)

Value of sold volume (€) 

Unit price (€) 

Source: PRODCOM, Eurostat 2018 

Export and import 

The EU28 exported in 2016 a volume of calcium nitrate equivalent to 15.4 kt, at a value of 
€23.8 million. Moreover, the volume of imports of the substance amounted to 56.2.8 kt at a 
value of €47.3 million. 

The  figure  below  shows  the  period  between  2008  and  2016  in  terms  of  export  and  import 
volume  and  value  of  the  EU28  towards/from  extra-EU  countries.  The  trends  display  that 
imports  have  been  increasing  while  exports  have  been  decreasing.  Indeed,  the  volume  of 
exports has been gradually decreasing during the period, with a sharp decrease to be noted in 
2011.  However,  the  value  of  these  has  gradually  increased.  The  volume  of  imports  has 
substantially increased during the period, while its value has only slightly increased.  

136 

 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Calcium nitrate - trade flows 

s
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70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Volume exported (kg)

Value of exports (€) 

Volume of imports (kg)

Value of imports (€) 

Source: PRODCOM 2018, Eurostat 

Supply chain: Market concentration and uses 

In total, there are 39 companies that have registered their substance under REACH. Germany 
represents the largest share of these companies with 11 registrants. Spain and Poland follow 
with  6  and  4  companies  respectively.  The  European  Chemical  Agency  states  that  calcium 
nitrate is manufactured and imported in the EEA in 100,000 to 1,000,000 tonnes per year. 

The majority of calcium nitrate is used for fertilising purposes both for professional and 
non-professional uses. Some household uses include home experiments, in extremely small 
quantities, as well as in makeup for cosmetics. 

Table 10: Calcium nitrate - uses 

Non-professional uses 
Consumers uses 

Professional uses  
General professional uses 

At industrial site uses 

  Anti-freeze products,  

  Anti-freeze products,  

  Ph  regulators  and  water 

  Fertilisers,  

  Ph  regulators  and  water 

treatment products,  

  Cosmetics  and  personal 

treatment products,  

  Coating products,  

care products,  

  Fertilisers,  

  Metal 

surface 

treatment 

  Washing  & 

cleaning 

  Washing  & 

cleaning 

products,  

products,  

products,  

  Heat transfer fluids,  

  Water treatment chemicals,  

  Laboratory chemicals,  

  Textile  treatment  products 

  Ph  regulators  and  water 

  Metal 

surface 

treatment 

treatment products,  

products  

and  

  Dyes,  

  Adhesives and sealants,  

  Heat transfer fluids 

  Water treatment chemicals,  

  Coating products,  

  Metal  surface 

treatment 

  Laboratory chemicals  

  Anti-freeze products 

137 

 
 
 
 
Non-professional uses 

Professional uses  

products,  

  Non-metal-surface 
treatment products  

  Metal working fluids 

Source: European Chemical Agency (ECHA), Substance information, 2018 

Availability of the substance on internet 

Data extracted from a large online retailer shows (see Table 17) that products containing or 
related  to  Calcium  Nitrate  is  widely  available  in  the  United  Kingdom.  In  comparison,  the 
other markets show lower availability of products involved with the substance. Indeed, France 
follows  with  81  products  and  42  retailers,  while  Germany  is  last  with  only  1  product  and 
retailer. 

Calcium Ammonium Nitrate (CAN) 

Production trends 

In  the  case  of  Calcium  Ammonium  Nitrate  (CAN),  PRODCOM  data  is  not  available  at  the 
necessary granularity. However, the database from the Food and Agricultural Organization of 
the  United  Nations  (FAOSTAT)  offers  such  data  for  CAN.  Nonetheless,  the  analysis  is 
restricted  to  the  quantity  produced,  as  there  is  no  value  for  the  sold  production.  Thus,  the 
substance analysis will slightly differ from other substances.  

In 2014, the EU28 reported to FAOSTAT to have produced 2,945 kt of Calcium ammonium 
nitrate. This represents a substantial increase since 2008, which only accounted for 1,376 kt. 
Production of the substance has been substantially increasing over the past years. The figure 
below shows the production trends between the period of 2008 and 2016. 

According to one analysis, the CAN market was valued at US$3,056 million in 2013, growing 
at 2.7% annually, and expected to be worth US$3,488 million by the end of 2018, with the the 
EU is the largest producer of the substance in the world.304 

304 Socio-economic analysis, Grupa Azoty S.A., retrieved from: 
https://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/18584504/afa_tce-0021-01-sea_en.pdf/b151ff10-60f5-4f3f-94a7-
38833cc93d05  

138 

 
 
                                                            
Figure 23: Production trends - Calcium Ammonium Nitrate 

s
n
o

i
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M

4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Production of Calcium Ammonium Nitrate (kg)

 Source: FAOSTAT 2018 

Export and import 

In 2016, the volume of exports amounted to 6.382 kt in the EU28 for the substance, according 
to FAOSTAT statistics. Conversely, the amount of exports in 2008 only amounted to 2504 kt, 
which shows that there has been a substantial increase in the number of exports over the past 
few years. Moreover, the volume  of imports amount to  7715 kt  in  2016, while  in 2008 this 
number  only  amounted  to  4793  kt.  Thus,  imports  have  increased  considerably  during  the 
period between 2008 and 2014. The figure below shows the trend in the volumes of exports 
and imports between 2008 and 2014, of the EU28 towards/from extra-EU countries. 

Figure 24: Calcium Ammonium Nitrate - Trade flows 

s
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i
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9000

8000

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Volume of export (kg)

Volume of import (kg)

Source: FAOSTAT 2018 

Supply chain: Market concentration and uses 

139 

 
 
 
 
 
In  total,  the  ECHA  registrants  list  shows  that  there  are  20  companies  in  Europe  producing 
Calcium  Ammonium  Nitrate.  However,  it  must  be  noted  that  the  ECHA  website  lists  the 
substance under the name “Nitric Acid, Ammonium Calcium Salt”, another the name for the 
substance. The countries with the largest shares of companies registered for the substance are 
Germany and Ireland, with 4 each. Moreover, Belgium and Romania follow with 2 companies 
each. 

CAN is registered under REACH for manufacturing and importing at 1,000,000 to 10,000,000 
tonnes per year.  ECHA reports that the main  household purposes of the substance occur 
mostly in the case of indoor use in machine wash liquids and detergents, automotive care 
products, paints and adhesives, air fresheners and fragrances. Its main outdoor use for 
household is mostly in fertilisers and gardening products. 

Table 11: Calcium Ammonium Nitrate - uses 

Non-professional uses 
Consumer uses 

Professional uses 
General professional uses 

  Anti-free products 

  Fertilisers 

  Fertilisers 

  pH  regulators  and  water 

At site industrial uses 

  pH  regulators  and  water 

treatment products 

  Cosmetics  and  personal 

treatment products 

  Coating products 

care products 

  Anti-freeze products 

  Anti-freeze products 

  Coating products 

  Coating products 

  Metal 

surface 

treatment 

  Water Treatment chemicals 

  Heat transfer fluids 

  Water treatment chemicals 

  Explosives 

  Metal 

surface 

treatment 

products 

  Washing  & 

cleaning 

products 

products 

  Explosives 

  Heat transfer fluids 

  Water treatment chemicals 

Source: European Chemical Agency (ECHA), Substance information, 2018 

Availability of the substance on internet 

Data  extracted  from  a  large  online  retailer  shows  (see  Table  17)  that  Calcium  Ammonium 
Nitrate  is  the  least  available  substance.  Indeed,  the  United  Kingdom  is  the  only  country 
returning results, notably 28 products, and 12 retailers. All other countries did not return any 
results.  

Ammonium nitrate (N) – Annex II substance -  

Production trends 

In 2016, the EU28 sold a volume of 2,015 kt of Ammonium Nitrate, which represents a value 
of €1,129 million. Hence, the price per unit for that year amounts to €560.1 per ton. Back in 
in 2008, the sold volume accounted for 2,448 kt at a value of €1,633 million. This represents a 
price per unit for the substance of €666.9 per ton. 

140 

 
 
The  figure  below  shows  the  evolution  between  2008  and  2016  of  the  production  trends  of 
ammonium  nitrate.  Overall,  the  figures  have  slightly  decreased,  however,  the  value  of  the 
volume sold increased substantially between 2009 and 2011, which consequently affected the 
price  per  unit  accordingly.  Nonetheless,  there  was  a  notable  decrease  for  all  production 
figures after 2014. 

The  production  cost  of  ammonium  nitrate  is  reported  to  be  particularly  sensitive  to  the 
global  prices  for  energy305.  Moreover,  a  report  of  2015  anticipated  that  due  to  growth  in 
urea consumption, the substance is projected to lose market share during 2012-2017306. 

Figure 25: Ammonium nitrate - production trends 

s
n
o

i
l
l
i

M

3.000

2.500

2.000

1.500

1.000

500

0

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Sold volume (kg)

Value of sold volume (€) 

Unit price (€) 

Source: PRODCOM, Eurostat 2018 

Export and import 

According  to  PRODCOM  statistics,  the  EU28  Member  States  have  reported  decreasing 
figures for the volume and value of both exports and imports between 2008 and 2016, of the 
EU28 towards/from extra-EU countries, as represented in the figure below. Indeed, in 2016, 
the  volume  and  value  of  exports  accounted  for  162.8  kt  and  €140.4  million  respectively. 
Moreover,  the  volume  and  value  of  imports  represented  78.7  kt  and  €47.2  million 
respectively. The volume and value of net exports amounts to 84 kt and €93.1, respectively. 

The financial and economic crisis of 2008 seems to have impacted these figures in 2009, and 
2012-2013  for  imports.  Overall,  imports  and  exports  trends  seem  to  remain  stable  for  the 
considered period, with the exception of a sharp decrease in the volume and value of imports 
in  2016.  Trends  suggest  to  be  linked  with  a  cyclic  downturn,  as  well  as  energy  prices  and 
substitute for an alternative energy supplier.  

Figure 26: Ammonium nitrate - trade flows 

305 Study commissioned by DG GROW, Cumulative Cost Assessment for the EU Chemical Industry, 2016. 
306 Briefing on Ammonium Nitrate below, ENCO FR, 2015, restriced. 

141 

 
 
 
                                                            
 
300

250

200

150

100

50

0

s
n
o

i
l
l
i

M

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Volume of exports (kg)

Value of exports (€) 

Volume of imports (kg)

Value of imports (€) 

Source: PRODCOM 2018, Eurostat 

Supply chain: Market concentration and uses 

In  total,  there  are  105  companies  that  have  registered  their  substance  under  REACH  for 
Ammonium  Nitrate.  The  largest  share  of  companies  is  located  in  Germany  with  24 
companies.  The  following  countries  in  terms  of  the  number  of  registrants  are  Belgium,  the 
United  Kingdom,  and  France  with  8  each.  In  the  case  of  ammonium  nitrate,  there  are  26 
countries  in  which  are  located  companies  that  have  registered  the  substance.  According  to 
ECHA, this substance is manufactured and imported in the EEA in 10,000,000 to 100,000,000 
tonnes per year, respectively. 

Ammonium  nitrate  is  mostly  widely  used  as  a  fertiliser  in  the  EU,  whether  they  be  for 
consumer or professional usage. Further consumer uses of the substance include explosives, 
adhesives  and  sealants.  Regarding  professional  uses  of  the  substance,  ECHA  includes 
explosives,  water  treatment  chemicals,  adhesives  and  sealants,  coating  products,  washing  & 
cleaning products and metal surface treatment. The substance is also said to be used in instant 
cold packs, notably for its heat absorbing characteristics307.  

The table below shows the main professional and non-professional uses of the substance.  

Table 12: Ammonium nitrate - uses 

Non-professional uses 
Consumer uses 

Professional uses  
General professional uses 

  Fertilisers,  

  Explosives  

  Fertilisers,  

  Explosives  

At site industrial uses 

  Explosives,  

  Water treatment chemicals,  

  Adhesives and sealants.  

  Water 

treatment 

  Adhesives and sealants,  

chemicals.  

  Coating products,  

  Washing  & 

cleaning 

products  

307 Preparatory study for an impact assessment on restrictions to explosives precursors, 2010, not published. 

142 

 
 
 
                                                            
 
Non-professional uses 

Professional uses  

  Metal 

surface 

treatment 

products. 

Source: European Chemical Agency (ECHA), Substance information, 2018 

Availability of the substance on internet 

According to data extracted from a  large online retailer  in  5 distinct serviced  countries (see 
Table  17),  Ammonium  Nitrate  returns  the  highest  number  of  products  in  France,  followed 
closely by the United Kingdom, at 306 and 302 products respectively. The lowest amount of 
returns  arises  in  the  Spanish  market,  with  4  products.  Moreover,  France  and  the  United 
Kingdom also show the highest number of different retailers, with 76 and 68 respectively. 

The potential market affected by the regulation 

The  following  tables  report  key  statistics  on  the  number  of  companies,  the  number  of 
employees  and  the  industry  turnover.  They  were  created  by  linking  the  uses  and  their 
respective NACE codes, to inform the rest of this analysis on the potential market affected by 
the regulation and subsequent changes.  

It must be noted that these figures are collected at EU28 level suffer from limitations due to 
rounding up errors of national confidential data, which can be determined sometimes through 
a high error margin. Another limitation can be linked to missing NACE codes for some uses, 
or to too-aggregated NACE codes taken as reference. 

Each  table  reports  the  main  uses  identified  for  both  professional  and  non-professional  uses, 
and  segments  the  structural  business  statistics  by  actor  of  the  value  chain  (retailers, 
wholesalers,  producers).  The  number  of  retailers  and  wholesalers  are  listed  under  the  G 
NACE code (Rev. 2), while the number of producers is limited to the C NACE code (Rev. 2). 
These  NACE  codes  regroup  the  identified  economic  activities  linked  with  the  uses  of 
substances  for  each  annexes.  Thus,  one  economic  activity  for  Annex  I  may  regroup  several 
uses, as well as several substances. 

Retailers 

The NACE code displaying the highest number of enterprises is G4778 (“Other retail sale of 
new goods in specialised stores”). This largely encompasses all uses of the substances listed 
under  Annex  I.  Nonetheless,  the  NACE  code  G4719  (“Other  retail  sale  in  non-specialised 
stores “) accounts for the largest share of the turnover and number of employees.  

G4776  (“Retail  sale  of  flowers,  plants,  seeds,  fertilizers,  pet  animals  and  pet  food  in 
specialised  stores”)  accounts  for  the  highest  turnover  and  number  of  employees  for  the 
identified  uses  of  substances  specific  to  Annex  II,  at  €36,075.9  million  and  322,926 
employees. The number of enterprises is the highest under G4789 (“Retail sale via stalls and 
markets of other goods”) accounting for 138,050. 

143 

 
 
 
Table 13: Retailers potentially affected by the regulation throughout the supply chain  

Annex I/II 

NACE 
codes 

Annex I 

G4719 

Annex I 

G4778 

Annex I 

G473 

Annex I 

G4775 

Annex I 

G4774 

Annex I 

G4791 

Annex II 

G4776 

Annex II 

G4789 

Retail, 
NACE 
description 
Other retail 
sale in non-
specialised 
stores 
Other retail 
sale of new 
goods in 
specialised 
stores 
Retail sale of 
automotive 
fuel in 
specialised 
stores 
Retail sale of 
cosmetic and 
toilet articles 
in 
specialised 
stores 
Retail sale of 
medical and 
orthopaedic 
goods in 
specialised 
stores 
Retail sale 
via mail 
order houses 
or via 
internet 
Retail sale of 
flowers, 
plants, seeds, 
fertilisers, 
pet animals 
and pet food 
in 
specialised 
stores  
Retail sale 
via stalls and 
markets of 

Number of 
enterprises 

140,026 

Turnover 
(million 
euroes)  
150,000 

Number of 
employees 

1,000,000 

253,353 

88,514 

598,841 

62,209 

[confidential]  [confidential] 

46,144 

50,481.3 

385,298 

24,550 

17,154.5 

144,977 

187,260 

139,435.5 

401,317 

132,116 

36,075.9 

322,926 

138,050 

3,804.6 

23,865 

144 

 
 
 
TOTAL 

other goods 

587,542 
(Annex I), 
270,166 
(Annex II) 

Source: Eurostat, 2018 

Wholesalers 

NACE code G464 (“Wholesale of other household goods”) represents the largest number of 
employees, at 2,131,845 employees, as well as the highest turnover, at €1,100,100 million and 
number of enterprises, at 317,294. Code G4671 (“Wholesale of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels 
and related products”) also displays a high turnover, €984,164.2, concentrated around a lower 
number of companies 41,768. 

145 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Table  14:  Wholesalers  potentially  affected  by  the  regulation  throughout  the  supply 
chain 

Number of 
enterprises 

173,128 

Turnover 
(million 
euros)  
51,140.3 

Number of 
employees 

122,250 

136,963 

29,395.7 

111,273 

27,561 

171,548.1 

200,950 

15,928 

39,671.1 

81,806 

317,294 

1,100,000 

2,131,845 

41,768 

452,933.3 

630,064 

22,563 

984,164.2 

185,364 

17,008 

9,179.5 

18,826 

Annex I/II 

NACE code  Wholesaler, 

Annex I 

G4619 

Annex I 

G4618 

Annex I 

G4675 

Annex I 

G4644 

Annex I 

G464 

Annex I 

G4646 

Annex I 

G4671 

Annex II 

G4611 

NACE 
description 
Agents 
involved in the 
sale of a 
variety of 
goods 
Agents 
specialised in 
the sale of 
other 
particular 
products 
Wholesale of 
chemical 
products 
Wholesale of 
china and 
glassware 
cleaning 
materials 
Wholesale of 
other 
household 
goods 
Wholesale of 
pharmaceutical 
goods 
Wholesale of 
solid, liquid 
and gaseous 
fuels and 
related 
products 
Agents 
involved in the 
sale of 
agricultural 
raw materials, 
live animals, 
textile raw 
materials and 
semi-finished 
goods 

146 

 
 
Annex II 

G4615 

Annex II 

G4618 

Annex II 

G4645 

Source: Eurostat, 2018 

Manufacturers 

Agents 
involved in the 
sale of 
furniture, 
household 
goods, 
hardware and 
ironmongery 
Agents 
specialised in 
the sale of 
other 
particular 
products 
Wholesale of 
perfume and 
cosmetics 

40,239 

5,951.5 

21,340 

136,963 

29,395.7 

111,273 

22,917 

60,959.7 

175,360 

It  should  be  noted  that  previous  sections  have  reported  the  number  of  manufacturers  of  the 
substances  identified  on  the  ECHA  website.  Differently,  in  this  exercise,  the  figures  are 
referred to the NACE codes linked with the uses of the substances of both annexes. 

The  two  NACE  codes  associated  with  the  largest  European  markets  are  those  of  soaps  & 
detergents (C2041) and those of perfumes and toilet preparations (C2042). Both markets are 
for a large part in  European  companies aggregated under the “personal  care” denomination. 
This represents the largest chemical manufacturing market of Europe as identified through a 
study by308. 

Table15:  Manufacturers  potentially  affected  by  the  regulation  throughout  the  supply 
chain 

Annex I/II 

NACE code  Producer, 

Annex I 

C2110 

Annex I 

C2051 

Annex I 

C2059 

Annex I 

C2013 

NACE 
description 
Manufacture 
of basic 
pharmaceutical 
products 
Manufacture 
of explosives 
Manufacture 
of other 
chemical 
products 
Manufacture 

Number of 
enterprises 

Turnover 
(million 
euros) 

Number of 
employees 

[confidential]  22,151.9 

59,184 

533 

2,747.7 

15,983 

4,486 

60,355 

128,145 

1,030 

25,070.2 

53,665 

308 Study commissioned by DG GROW, Cumulative Cost Assessment for the EU Chemical Industry, 2016. 

147 

 
 
                                                            
of other 
inorganic basic 
chemicals 
Manufacture 
of other non-
metallic 
mineral 
products 
Manufacture 
of pesticides 
and other 
agrochemical 
products 
Other 
manufacturing 
n.e.c. 
Manufacture 
of fertilisers 
and nitrogen 
compounds 
Manufacture 
of soap and 
detergents, 
cleaning and 
polishing 
preparations 
Manufacture 
of perfumes 
and toilet 
preparations 

2,961 

21,670.7 

70,754 

626 

10,745.5 

29,134 

28,015 

15,508.9 

[confidential] 

1,336 

25,358.1 

57,088 

4,000 

30,072.2 

95,338 

5,513 

42,671.3 

149,360 

Annex I 

C2399 

Annex I 

C2020 

Annex I 

C3299 

Annex II 

C2015 

Annex II 

C2041 

Annex II 

C2042 

Source: Eurostat, 2018 

Estimation of the market for non-professional users 

The estimation of the market for non-professional users of the substances in Annex I and 
II, requires the collection of industry-specific data for the main uses of the substances. These 
data are generally not publicly available, or they are only upon request. Trade associations 
are expected to be the main data holders for such detailed data. Despite it was not possible to 
gather  updated  specific  data  by  use,  the  detailed  share  estimations  carried  out  for  a  similar 
exercise  in  the  Impact  Assessment  2010  were  considered  as  a  baseline  for  the  updated 
estimation  of  the  production  shares  sold  to  non-professional  uses  at  substance  level.  The 
estimates  presented  are  the  result  of  a  substance-by-substance  review  carried  out  through 
expert consultation.    

Together  with  the  share  estimation,  Table  16  reports  PRODCOM  data  on  the  market  size 
(volume of sold production, and value of sold production) for the available base chemicals for 
the year 2008 and  2016. 2008 has  been  chosen as  a comparator  year as  it was the last  year 
available  when  the  IA2010  was  carried  out,  and  because  it  constitutes  a  long-enough  time 

148 

 
 
period to observe potential chances co-caused by the Regulation 98/2013. Next to the market 
trends,  the  estimated  shares  sold  to  the  general  public  (value  and  volume)  are  presented  at 
substance level. 

149 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: Estimated proportion of volume and value sold to the general public for substances listed in Regulation 98/2013   

Base 
chemical 
precurso
r 

Volume of 
sold 
production 
(kg) 
(Prodcom, 
2008) 

I
I
x
e
n
n
A

/
I
x
e
n
n
A

Volume of 
sold 
production 
(kg) 
(Prodcom, 
2016) 
Red = < 
2008 
Green = > 
2008

Value of 
sold 
production 
(€) 
(Prodcom, 
2008) 

Value of 
sold 
production 
(€) 
(Prodcom, 
2016) 
Red = < 
2008 
Green = > 
2008

Estimate
d 
proportio
n sold to 
general 
public 
(non-
professio
nal user) 
(2016) 

Estimates sold 
production sold to the 
general public (kg) 
(2016) 

Estimated sold value to 
the general public (€) 
(2016) 

Minimu
m 

Maximum  Minimum  Maximum 

2  Ammoniu
m  nitrate, 
excl. 
CAN 
Sodium 
Nitrate 
Potassium 
Nitrate 

2 

2 

2  Calcium 

Nitrate 
1  Hydrogen 
peroxide 
2  Acetone 

1  Nitrometh
ane 

2,448,411,2
10 

2,015,844,4
77 

1,633,019,0
14 

1,129,129,5
25 

1-5% 

20,158,4
44 

100,792,22
4 

11,291,295  56,456,576 

34,077,131 

120,000,000

23,196,677 

45,368,190 

1-5% 

40,000,077 

45,893,159

22,937,435 

45,353,137 

1-5% 

1,200,00
0 
458,932 

6,000,000 

453,682 

2,268,409 

2,294,658 

453,531 

2,267,656 

75,053,960 

29,400,390 

65,636,545 

25,393,271 

0.5%-1% 

147,002 

294,004 

126,966 

253,932 

1,179,498,5
01 
1,524,990,9
33 
68,387,049 

1,128,086,9
77 
1,298,648,9
93 
67,513,700 

487,199,186 

604,488,012 1-2% 

1,090,577,4
79 
57,000,000 

494,370,527  5-10% 

43,884,604 

0% 
(approx.) 

11,280,86
9 
64,932,4
49 
N.a 

22,561,739  6,044,880 

12,089,760 

129,864,89
9 
N.a 

24,718,526  49,437,052 

N.a 

N.a 

N.a 

N.a 

2  Hexamine  8,358,420 

7,800,000 

229,626,462  436,690,075  0% 

N.a 

N.a 

(approx.) 

150 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
922,738,378  1,094,070,0

331,342,737  346,980,694  0.5%-1% 

10,940,700  1,734,903 

3,469,806 

 06
8,631,731,3
50 

9,267,876,5
86 
539,429,360  600,000,000  264,970,135  300,000,000  N.a. estimated very low (only pyrotechnics) 

651,001,848  554,682,957  0.5%-
1%% 

86,317,313  2,773,414 

5,546,829 

5,470,35
0 
43,158,6
56 

No data for this chemical are available on Prodcom 

n/a 

1  Nitric 

2 

acid 
Sulphuric 
acid309 
1  Chlorates 
and 
perchlorat
es 
2  Calcium 
Ammonoi
um 
Nitrate  

309 Based on figures for 2008-2011 only. 

151 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
The following considerations can contextualise the estimates reported:  

  For many substances a high share of the production concerns captive use (own use 

by the industry) thus it is absorbed during the process,  

  Shares for consumer use, considering the total market for the substance, are generally 
low,  thus,  when  the  aim  is  to  consider  the  effect  of  potential  changes  due  to  the 
review of the legislation, it is important to focus on absolute numbers, and to reason 
in terms of availability of alternative to which producers may want to shift in case of 
a policy change.  

  Shares  are  not  always  the  most  important  marker  as  in  fact,  in  case  of  some 
substances, like acids, small shares of the volume are more effective than for other 
families of substances. Thus, not only the shares but especially the uses should be a 
reference unit to understand potential market shifts.  

In  terms  of  shares  of  production  sold  to  the  general  public,  shares  around  1%  to  3-5%, 
depending on the specific country and market segment, are in line with the expectations for 
most  of  the  substances,  if  one  considers  the  totality  of  the  substance  produced.  When 
looking  at  specific  uses  (e.g.  bleaching  agent,  racing  car  fuel,  personal-care  products)  or 
specific concentrations, higher shares should be accounted for. For example, according to the 
IA 2010, 0.5% of the total Nitric Acid sold production is estimated to be sold to the general 
public, out of this small share, approximately 80% of Nitric Acid is used as domestic solvent 
or  household  detergent.  The  expert  consultation  suggested  that  these  specific  shares  by  use 
(e.g.  the  80%  of  Nitric  acid  as  household  detergent)  should  not  have  changed  substantially 
within the period under observation (2008-2016).  

Regarding the Nitrates family (Annex II), it must be noted that Nitrates are not corrosive and 
are  largely  used  by  consumers  as  fertilizers  at  home,  in  the  garden  or  to  grow  fruits  and 
vegetables. So, Nitrates are indeed largely used by non-professional users, and the use is even 
more visible as  excess quantities are often used by consumers due to  a lack of expertise on 
best  practices  in  the  use  of  fertilisers.  Ammonium  Nitrate  is  amongst  the  most  used 
fertilisers today, and it shows the highest estimated value sold to the general public in 2016, 
in  absolute terms  (€56.4  million).  However,  its overall  sold  production and  related value 
has  shrunk  during  the  period  observed.  The  expert  review  suggested  that  it  has 
increasingly been substituted by Urea or Potassium nitrate, which has a lower price per unit 
comparatively. The existence of a substitution effect between substances of the same family, 
and the existence of substitutes for some of these substances (Ammonium Nitrate) with safer 
alternatives,  suggests  that  the  Nitrates  family  can  be  subject  to  quite  an  important 
volatility  in  terms  of  reaction  to  policy  changes;  in  case  for  example,  of  additional 
requirement for registration. This in turn is deemed to affect the total volumes accessible by 
non-professional users too, as a consequence of a shrink of the market or a substitution effect.  

Acetone (Annex II) is another important substance for non-professional uses. Because of if 
its multiple uses in consumer products, it displays the highest estimated proportion sold to 
the  general  public  (5-10%  according  to  expert  consultation),  with  the  the  highest 
potential  volume  sold  to  the  general  public  as  a  consequence  (129.8  kt).  Its  market 
behaviour  registered  a  substantial  decrease  in  the  unit  price  and  value  in  the  recent  years, 
however  not  followed  by  an  equally  important  decrease  in  volume  sold.  This  suggests  that, 
when  sold  as  substance  for  non-professional  legitimate  uses,  the  substance  is  available  at 
cheaper prices. It would be extremely difficult to estimate how the price decrease of Acetone 

152 

 
 
has affected the final price of products and mixtures containing Acetone as one of the active 
substances, thus if so has had an impact on related non-professional users markets. 

In  the  case  of  Hydrogen  peroxide  (Annex  I),  a  number  of  different  uses  at  different 
concentrations  can  be  listed.  The  Impact  Assessment  2010,  based  on  reports  from  the  SCP, 
estimated 30% of the uses of Hydrogen peroxide to be captive use, thus, own consumption in 
chemical industry. The remaining consumption (70% of the total) indicates uses in pulp and 
bleaching  (50%),  textile  bleaching  and  manufacturing  of  chemical  products,  and  water 
treatment (2.5% each). High shares of non-professional users sold production can be found for 
household cleaning products, households textile bleaching products (around 50-80% for high 
concentrations),  which  represent  all  together  less  than  5%  of  the  total  market  for  the 
substance. Based on these assumptions, it can be roughly estimated that between 1% and 
2% of the total production is going to the general public.  

With respect to substances with estimated low or insignificant shares of sold production to 
non-professional users the following considerations can be done:  

 

In the case of Chlorates and Perchlorates (Annex I), only a very limited market for 
specialist  products  (non-professional)  seems  to  exist,  and  that  the  main  household 
use of the substances are limited to its inclusion into pyrotechnical artefacts. Hence, 
this results in the very low estimated percentage to household consumption.  

  Nitromethane (Annex I) is very limited in terms of household use, namely in the case 
of  rocket  propellant  and  fuel  composites.  Thus,  it  was  estimated  to  have  a 
considerably low percentage of household use.  

  Hexamine  (Annex  II)  is  mainly  used  for  military  purposes,  with  little  to  no 

implication in general public use. 

  Acids  (Nitric  Acid,  Sulphuric  Acid,  Hydrochloric  Acid)  (Annex  I  and  II)  are 
corrosive  substances  that  are  used  in  some  detergent  and  often  used  as  an  active 
ingredient for pipe cleaners. A small concentration is effective and therefore a small 
shares of the volumes is used in consumer users. 

Limitations of the market analysis: 

The  development  of  the  market  analysis  has  been  restricted  by  important  data  availability 
limitations,  as  well  as  data  aggregation  bottlenecks.  For  example,  certain  substances  do  not 
have specific PRODCOM codes, and are aggregated into larger substance groups. This flaws 
the analysis of trends for those particular substances. For example, chlorates and perchlorates 
–  which  regroup  potassium  chlorate,  potassium  perchlorate,  sodium  chlorate,  sodium 
perchlorate  –  are  aggregated  within  a  larger  PRODCOM  code  that  comprise  bromates  and 
perbromates,  iodates  and  periodates  as  well.  Moreover,  as  aforementioned,  bromates  and 
ioadates  are  subject  to  environmental  scrutiny,  which  might  impact  the  trends  of  the  other 
aggregated substances.  

The  table  below  shows  a  summary  of  the  data  availability  and  available  aggregation  at 
substance level through official statistics.  

153 

 
 
 
 
Table 17: Estimated EU market size of the Chemical precursors listed in Annex I and II 
of Regulation (EU) 98/2013 

Name of the 
substance 

Prodcom Code  Data availability/notes 

Hydrogen Peroxide 
Nitromethane 

20136300 
- 

Nitric Acid 
20151050 
20133250 
Potassium Chlorate 
Potassium Perchlorate  20133250 
20133250 
Sodium Chlorate 
20133250 
Sodium Perchlorate 

Chlorates and 
perchlorates; 
bromates and 
perbromates; iodates 
and periodates 
Hexamine 

20133250 

- 

Sulphuric Acid 

20132433 

Acetone 
Potassium Nitrate 
Sodium Nitrate 
Calcium Nitrate 

20146211 
20157600 
20156000 
20153400 

Calcium Ammonium 
Nitrate310 
Ammonium Nitrate 

- 

20153300 

 No data available in 
PRODCOM for the substance 

The four following substances 
are listed under the same code 
in PRODCOM as : “Chlorates 
and perchlorates; bromates 
and perbromates; iodates and 
periodates” 

 No data available in 
PRODCOM for the substance 
No data available for 2016; 
Code changed from 28070010 
to 20132433 

Double salts and mixtures of 
calcium nitrate and 
ammonium nitrate (excluding 
in tablets or similar forms or in 
packages of a weight of <= 10 
kg) 
 No data available in 
PRODCOM for the substance 
Ammonium nitrate (excluding 
in tablets or similar forms or in 
packages of a weight of <= 10 
kg) 

Number of Annex 
of Regulation 
(EU) 98/2013 
1 
1 

1 
1 
1 
1 
1 

(1) 

2 

2 

2 
2 
2 
2 

2 

2 

Source: Prodcom database (2016); Impact Assessment Study 2010 

310 The only chemical that is included in Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 but not in the annex I of the Impact 
Assessment Study of 2010, is Calcium Ammonium Nitrate. However, it was discussed alongside Ammonium 
Nitrate. Nonetheless, the Regulation (EU) 98/2013 distinguishes the two substances. 

154 

 
 
                                                            
  
  
 
  
  
  
This report refrains from estimating internal consumption through the value of sold volume, 
value  of  exports,  and  value  of  imports.  Eurostat  does  not  recommend  this  method  for  a 
number of reasons, including: 

   Heterogeneity of the composition of products is not guaranteed 

   Coverage of production statistics in not necessarily in line with trade statistics 

   Temporal delays in data collection and presentation 

   Second-hand goods are excluded from calculations 

   Value of exports cannot be compared directly to value of sold production 

   Provision of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 518/79, which allows for a simplified 
declaration for the export of complete industrial plants, which is not taken into account 
of the market calculation according to Eurostat 

Moreover, Croatia joined the EU on July 1st 2013. Thus, figures over the period of 2008 to 
2016 might be slightly distorted compared to figures of previous impact assessments, due to 
the addition of data from Croatia. However, the differences are expected to be minimal seeing 
that Croatia does not arise as a main player in the EU chemical industry according to Eurostat 
statistics.  

Finally, since the implementation of Regulation 98/2013, new substances have been added to 
Annex II. Indeed, on 30 November of 2016, the European Commission has adopted delegated 
Regulations 2017/214,311 2017/215,312 and 2017/216,313 adding the substances of “Aluminium 
powders”,  “Magnesium  nitrate  hexahydrate”,  and  “Magnesium  Powders”  to  Annex  II. 
However,  the  inclusion  of  these  substances  is  too  recent  for  them  to  be  part  of  the  market 
analysis. As the analysis is based mainly on PRODCOM statistics, data for the substances are 
not readily available for the timeline of the exercise.  

To  summarise  the  reasons  for  the  absence  of  robust  data  for  quantification  of  the 
market  for  explosives  precursors,  the  market  for  non-professional  uses  and  for  the 
analysis of the value chains, it must be said that: 

   There  is  a  complex  supply  chain  that  links  manufacturers  to  end  users.  The  supply 
chain  is  split  between  professional  use  (sales  B2B)  and  non-professionals  use  (sales 
B2C) via distributors and retailers. Within this chain there are divergences of NACE 
codes  because,  moving  away  from  manufacturers  to  downwards  downstream  users 
applications,  NACE  codes  become  larger  and  more  generic.  In  addition,  there  are 
some divergences between NACE codes and PRODCOM codes because both systems 
look  at  different  objectives  (NACE  codes  are  for  activity  sectors  while  PRODCOM 
are for products). 

   Manufacturers of basic chemicals listed as explosives precursors sell the largest share 
of their production as intermediate chemicals inside their organisation (sales to other 
subsidiaries  or  divisions  or  production  sites).  Another  share  is  sold  to  companies 
transforming  the  product  or  manufacturing  blends.  A  small  share  is  sold  in  bulk  to 
distributors  who  repack  the  product  and  sell  them  to  smaller  industrial  companies 
blending  those  of  transforming  those  into  other  products.  A  very  small  share  can  be 

311 OJ L 34, 9.2.2017, p. 1. 
312 OJ L 34, 9.2.2017, p. 3. 
313 OJ L 34, 9.2.2017, p. 5. 

155 

 
 
                                                            
sold  directly  to  consumers  in  small  bags  or  bottles  (ex.  acetone,  acids,  hydrogen 
peroxide). Although each actor of the chain is supposed to report the sales and uses of 
substances  listed  in  the  legislation,  obligations  to  report  vary  in  the  supply  chain, 
across  Member  States  and  according  to  national  reporting  obligations  and  NACE 
codes.  National  and  EU  Statistics  are  not  accurate  for  the  above  reasons  and  the 
granularity of statistics is way too rough to differentiate end uses and applications of 
substances. On the other side, distributors easily lose control on the use of substances 
that they sell to their clients and do not have rules and commands to get accurate data 
from  their  clients.  In  addition,  there  is  always  reluctance  of  interviewees  to  provide 
sales data because such data are confidential. 

   Estimations can be obtained via the trade associations (CEFIC sector groups – FECC 
distributors – AISE detergents – Colipa cosmetics), but often they must refer to their 
members to ask permission to provide data and often they need to collect new data as 
well.  

Estimation of the number of online distributors and retailers  

Table  17  shows  the  number  of  products,  as  well  as  the  number  of  retailers  selling  those 
products  on  Amazon,  for  the  five  largest  European  markets  for  Amazon  (United  Kingdom, 
Germany, France, Spain, Italy).  

For  the  number  of  products,  the  methodology  consists  of  collecting  the  number  of  “hits” 
when  searching  the  names  of  the  substances  through  each  European  region  serviced  by 
Amazon. For the number of retailers, the methodology consists of collecting the number of 
retailers for each product,  and further de-duplicating the results so  as to not  count  a retailer 
more than once. When searching for the products each substance was preliminary translated 
into the language of the website. 

It must be noted that estimating a price range of the products is not recommended as products 
are  not  comparable.  Moreover,  the  language  bias  affects  the  results  of  the  research,  which 
bears the importance of adequately translating the substance. After review, it has been decided 
not  to  include  numbers  estimated  through  web  scraping  of  e-Bay,  as  those  were  subject  to 
contain too many spurious information. Finally, for the group of chlorates and perchlorates, 
each substance was identified individually. However, results sometimes coincide as the search 
algorithm of the Amazon website tends to amalgamate them under the same designation. For 
example,  potassium  chlorate  and  potassium  perchlorate  return  identical  results  in  Spain  and 
Italy.  

For these reasons, the number reported are not intended to provide an accurate estimate of the 
total number of online retailers, but rather to give at least a partial idea of the latter, as they 
cannot  be  considered  as  statistically  significant  of  the  overall  market  of  online  retailers.  In 
addition, despite results have been cleaned to rid them of unwanted returns (i.e. non-chemical-
related products), the current figures could still contain a certain degree of spuriousness error. 

The  study  to  inform  the  Impact  Assessment  of  2010  assumed  that  only  about  0.5%  of  the 
goods  in  question  (i.e.  products  including  substances  listed  under  both  annexes)  are  sold 
online when sales to the general public is concerned.   

Table 18: Online retailers - Number of products and retailers selling on Amazon in 
January 2018 for the UK, Germany, France, Spain and Italy 

156 

 
 
Substanc
e 

Hydroge
n 
Peroxide 
Nitromet
hane 
Nitric 
Acid 
Potassiu
m 
Chlorate 
Potassiu
m 
Perchlora
te 
Sodium 
Chlorate 
Sodium 
Perchlora
te 

Hexamin
e 
Sulphuric 
Acid 
Acetone 
Potassiu
m Nitrate 
Sodium 
Nitrate 
Calcium 
Nitrate 
Calcium 
Ammoni
um 
Nitrate 
Ammoni
um 
Nitrate 

Amazon UK  Amazon DE  Amazon FR 

Amazon ES 

Amazon IT 

Num
ber of 
produ
cts 

Numb
er of 
Retail
ers 

Num
ber of 
produ
cts 

Numb
er of 
Retail
ers 

305 

136 

299 

143 

Num
ber of 
produ
cts 
Annex I 
306 

Numb
er of 
Retail
ers 

Num
ber of 
produ
cts 

Numb
er of 
Retail
ers 

Num
ber of 
produ
cts 

Numb
er of 
Retail
ers 

77 

306 

82 

305 

77 

37 

11 

15 

11 

55 

15 

317 

157 

144 

74 

190 

102 

12 

81 

5 

45 

1 

1 

91 

65 

6 

6 

18 

19 

11 

30 

91 

19 

28 

13 

28 

13 

9 

7 

18 

11 

17 

11 

15 

11 

56 

10 

9 

7 

26 

15 

7 

5 

Annex II 
11 

295 

116 

304 

131 

0 

7 

0 

2 

2 

1 

0 

2 

0 

2 

2 

1 

0 

2 

0 

0 

0 

1 

0 

0 

0 

1 

0 

0 

0 

133 

66 

304 
292 

160 
131 

291 
85 

163 
44 

308 
203 

157 
90 

301 
33 

174 
21 

303 
38 

179 
20 

292 

111 

12 

12 

183 

74 

28 

12 

1 

0 

1 

0 

18 

81 

0 

12 

42 

0 

0 

0 

17 

15 

0 

0 

11 

15 

0 

7 

5 

0 

302 

68 

41 

33 

306 

76 

4 

4 

37 

23 

157 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 5: ANALYTICAL MODELS USED IN PREPARING THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

Identification of the policy options 

Based  on  the  findings  of  the  evaluation  of  the  implementation  of  the  Regulation,  a 
shortlist of realistic policy measures which are likely to address the problems and related 
issues, was identified.  

The  identification  of  the  list  of  policy  measures  was  based  on  the  analysis  of  the 
legislation  of  the  Member  States,  the  work  already  undertaken  by  the  European 
Commission, and the elements - in terms of market issues and security threats - provided 
by the analysis of the problem.  

Policy measures have been then aggregated in policy options. Starting from the options 
included  in  the  Inception  Impact  Assessment  (IIA),314  three  main  policy  options  were 
defined, characterised by an increasing level of regulatory intervention.  

  Policy  Option  0  –  Baseline  (the  Commission,  in  consultation  with  the  SCP,  will 

continue to monitor and facilitate the application of the Regulation); 

  Policy  Option  1  (Non  legislative)  –  Reinforce  the  application  of  the  Regulation 

with non-legislative measures; 

  Policy Option 2 (Legislative) – Strengthen and clarify the restrictions and controls of 

the Regulation   
  Policy Option 3 (Legislative) – Introduce further controls along the supply chain. 

The  identification  of  policy  options  and  measures  took  also  into  account  the  feedback 
received  to  the  IIA,  input  received  from  the  external  supporting  study  and  comments 
from the Secretariat-General. 

Assessment of the policy options  

In order to assess the policy options, a set of assessment criteria was defined as well as a 
scoring system to be used to summarise the assessment of the adequacy of each policy 
measure composing the policy options with regard to each assessment criterion. 

The following assessment criteria were used to assess the policy measures:  

  Coherence with the general policy objectives of the future EU intervention; 

  Effectiveness  in  allowing  the  achievement  of  the  specific  policy  objectives  of  the 

future EU intervention; 

  Economic, social and environmental impacts;  

  Effects on fundamental rights;  

  Capacity  of  the  policy  measures  of  limiting  the  introduction  of  new  or  additional 
costs  for  all  stakeholders  impacted  by  the  Regulation  and  of  maximising  the 
probability of achieving the expected results/output (Efficiency). 

314 http://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2017-2706122_en  

158 

 
 
 
                                                            
Each  policy  measure  was  qualitatively  assessed  against  the  assessment  criteria  listed 
above  using  a  scoring  system  that  goes  from  -3  (very  negative  impact)  to  +3  (very 
positive impact).  

The  quantification  of  the  scores  was  guided  by  the  external  supporting  study,  the 
evaluation of the implementation of the Regulation, and the consultation of stakeholders. 
Stakeholders  provided  inputs  to  the  assessment  of  the  measures  through  (see  Annex  2 
and 4.1 for more details on consultation activities): 

  The Open Public Consultation managed by the Commission; 

  Eight  online  workshops  (two  per  main  category  of  stakeholders  -  NCAs,  NCPs, 
manufacturers and distributors, and retailers) organised by the external contractor; 

  Written contributions sent to the contractor based on an excel questionnaire shared 

in advance before the online workshops;  

  The Hearing of the SCP. 

Each  policy  measure  was  therefore  assessed  against  the  criteria  mentioned  above  and 
qualitatively  attributed  a  score  for  each  assessment  criterion.  Each  score  was 
accompanied by a descriptive assessment which provides the rationale of the score and 
illustrates the evidence supporting the judgment.  

The overall impacts  of the policy option have been  calculated as  the sum of the scores 
given to all policy measures that compose the specific policy option. 

Scores  were  used  to  compare  the  policy  options  between  each  other  and  against  the 
baseline (“No policy change” option) by quantifying the scale of the incremental positive 
(e.g. +1) or negative (e.g. -1) impacts.  
The table below shows the rationale for the assessment of each criterion and the type of 
analysis performed. 

Table  19:  Assessment  criteria,  rationale  for  the  assessment  and  type  of  analysis 
performed 

Assessment 
criteria 

Coherence 

 Rationale for the assessment 

Type of analysis  

Internal coherence with the general 
objectives of the EU intervention: 

-  GO1 - Ensuring the 

functioning of the internal 
market;  

-  GO2 - Ensuring high level of 

security.  

Reconstruction of the theory of change which 
links each measure to the general objectives of 
the future EU intervention. 

Scores range from 0 to +3 since all measures 
have been designed consistently with the 
general objectives. High scores correspond to 
measures that respond to both general 
objectives and address most of the underlying 
issues. 

The overall assessment of the policy options 
have been discussed with and validated by 
stakeholders during the Hearing of the SCP. 

Effectiveness 

Extent to which the policy 
measure/option will contribute to the 
achievement of the specific objectives 

Assessment of the likelihood that the expected 
results and outcomes (as described in the 
theory of change) will realise starting from the 

159 

 
 
Assessment 
criteria 

 Rationale for the assessment 

Type of analysis  

current implementation state of play of the 
Regulation and the factors that affected it. The 
analysis relied also on the feedbacks of 
representatives from economic operators, 
NCAs and NCPs gathered during the online 
workshops on the possible contribution of each 
measure to the specific objectives of the future 
EU intervention. 

Scores range from -3 to +3 depending on the 
overall cumulative effects.  

The overall assessment of the policy options 
have been discussed with and validated by 
stakeholders during the Hearing of the SCP. 

of the EU intervention: 

-  SO 1 – Further restrict access 

to certain explosives 
precursors and strengthen 
controls;  

-  SO 2 – Align restrictions and 
controls with the evolving 
threat regarding explosives 
precursors; 

-  SO 3 – Increase enforcement 
by the competent authorities 
of the Regulation; 

-  SO 4 – Improve the 

transmission of information 
and compliance along the 
supply chain; 

-  SO 5 – Facilitate intra-EU 
trade and prevent distortion 
of competition; 

-  SO 6 – Improve the clarity of 
the Regulation and ensure 
uniformity in its application.  

Economic 
impacts 

- 

- 

- 

Social impacts 

- 

- 

Impacts on competition and 
more specifically on the 
structure of the supply chain 
of explosives precursors; 
Impacts consumers and 
more specifically impact on 
price, quality and availability 
of products or any other 
relevant dimension that affect 
the choice of consumers; 
Impacts on SMEs by 
making an assessment of the 
distribution of the effects of 
the policy measure/option on 
costs, barriers to entry, 
competition, for SMEs versus 
large companies. 

Impacts on labour market 
by assessing to what extent 
restrictions on the marketing 
and use of specific 
substances can lead to a 
reduction of workers for 
economic operators involved 
in the supply chain; 
Impacts on public health by 
making an assessment of the 
implications in terms of both 
safety and security for EU 
citizens. 

160 

Analysis of the impacts based on:  

- 

- 

- 

- 

qualitative estimates of the likelihood 
(e.g. high, medium, low) that each 
impact will occur (or conversely the 
risk that the impact will not occur);  
qualitative estimates of their absolute 
magnitude (see scoring system 
above);  
qualitative estimates of their evolution 
over time (e.g. increase, decrease, 
stable);  
qualitative estimates of their relative 
size for specific stakeholders, 
differentiating per group of players 
involved (e.g. economic operators, 
SMEs, members of the general public, 
NCAs and NCPs). 

The analysis of the efficiency of each policy 
measure relied also on feedbacks on the 
increase/decrease of costs provided by 
representatives from economic operators, 
NCAs and NCPs in writing and during the 
online workshops. 

Scores range from -3 to +3 depending on the 
overall cumulative effects.  

Overall impacts of the policy options have also 
been discussed and validated by stakeholders 
during the Hearing of the SCP. 

 
 
Assessment 
criteria 

Efficiency 

 Rationale for the assessment 

Type of analysis  

Capacity of the policy 
measures/options of limiting the 
introduction of new or additional costs 
for all stakeholders impacted by the 
regulation and of maximising the 
probability of achieving the expected 
results/output. 

The following types of costs were 
considered: 

-  Enforcement costs;315  
-  Regulatory charges;316  
-  Substantive compliance 

costs;317 

-  Administrative burdens;318  
- 

Indirect costs.319  

Environmenta
l impacts 

Effects that a policy measure/option 
might have in terms of reduction of 
pollutant emissions, use of means of 
transport or paper. 

Assessment of the possible effects on the 
environment starting from the assessment done 
for the 2010 impact assessment and integrating 
input from the external supporting study. 

Scores range from -3 to +3 depending on the 
overall cumulative effects.  

Overall impacts of the policy options have also 
been discussed and validated by stakeholders 
during the Hearing of the SCP. 

Qualitative analysis of the implications of each 
policy option/measure on the fundamental 
rights mentioned in the premises of the 
Regulation. 

Scores range from -3 to +3 depending on the 
overall cumulative effects.  

Overall impacts of the policy options have also 
been discussed and validated by stakeholders 
during the Hearing of the SCP. 

Impacts on 
fundamental 
rights 

Right to non-discrimination by 
assessing if and to what extent citizens 
risk to be discriminated. 

Protection of personal data by 
assessing the impact on the volume of 
persons who have to provide their 
personal data collected, the quantity of 
personal data collected from each of 
these persons and the quantity of 
persons and institutions having access 
to this data. 

Freedom to conduct a business by 

315 Costs incurred by authorities with activities linked to the implementation of the Regulation, such as 
monitoring, enforcement and adjudication. 
316 For instance fees and taxes. 
317 Costs which encompass investments and expenses that are faced by economic operators and members of 
the general public in order to comply with substantive obligations derived from the Regulation. 
318 Costs borne by authorities, economic operators and members of the general public as a result of 
administrative activities performed to comply with information and reporting obligations contained in the 
Regulation. 
319 Changes in the prices and/or availability and /or quality of the substances subject to the Regulation 
and/or products containing them. 

161 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
Assessment 
criteria 

 Rationale for the assessment 

Type of analysis  

assessing if and to what extent the 
economic operators are impacted for 
opening or continuing their business 
related to explosives precursors and 
the impact on the level of complexity 
and administrative burden required in 
order to do this business. 

As mentioned above, all policy options were assessed against a baseline scenario where 
no EU action is taken to address the existing problems. There will be no major changes in 
the overall policy framework, except for the revision of the REACH Regulation whose 
impact on the implementation of the Regulation cannot be assessed at this stage, and the 
practical  implementation  of  the  recently  adopted  Commission  recommendation  on 
immediate steps to prevent misuse of explosives precursors.320 It is also assumed, based 
on  existing  literature  and  past  trends,  that  terrorist  attacks  using  HMEs  are  likely  to 
continue  to  be  an  important  part  of  the  threat  landscape.  If  nothing  is  done  to  further 
approximate  the  different  national  regimes,  it  also  unlikely that  current implementation 
practices will become more harmonised and distortions in the internal market will reduce. 
However, the awareness of the requirements of the Regulation and their enforcement will 
progressively improve as a result of a learning curve that can be observed since the entry 
into force of the Regulation.  

Overall quality of the analytical methods used 

DG  HOME  critically  assessed  the  input  received  from  stakeholders  and  the  external 
supporting study. The results of the analysis have been shared with the IASG at different 
steps of the process and comments received were progressively integrated. 

However, a certain degree of uncertainty in the analytical results persists, and is linked 
to the limited availability of information on the following aspects of the baseline: 

  The practical implementation of the Regulation. There is no central repository for 
data  related  to  the  number  of  licences  granted,  registrations,  suspicious 
transactions, inspections and sanctions. Therefore, DG HOME had to rely on the 
only  possible  source  of  information:  national  authorities.  The  information 
gathered  was  heterogeneous,  not  always  complete,  and  the  quality  of  the  input 
received  varied.  It  did  not  allow  a  precise  quantification  of  the  impacts  of  the 
identified policy measures. However, stakeholder feedback helped to comprehend 
the scale of the impacts and compare them.  

  The costs  borne  by stakeholders  that  implement the Regulation.  The assessment 
of regulatory costs for economic operators and Public Authorities strongly relies 
on  the  qualitative  feedback  provided  by  relevant  stakeholders  during  the 
consultations.  Even  if  a  precise  quantification  and  monetisation  of  them  is  not 
possible, stakeholder feedback allowed the identification of the most burdensome 
requirements and potential measures for cost saving and efficiency gains. 

320 European Commission (2017), Commission Recommendation of 18.10.2017 on immediate steps to 
prevent misuse of explosives precursors, C(2017) 6950 final. 

162 

 
 
                                                            
  Trends  in  production  and  trade  of  explosives  precursors  listed  in  the  Annexes. 
The analysis of the market of explosives precursors was hindered by the lack of 
public  data  at  the  level  of  specific  substances.  Some  substances  do  not  have 
specific PRODCOM codes, and are part of larger substance groups whose trends 
are  affected  by  different  dynamics.  This  flaws  the  analysis  of  trends  for  those 
particular  substances.  For  instance,  chlorates  and  perchlorates  –  which  regroup 
potassium chlorate, potassium perchlorate, sodium chlorate, sodium perchlorate – 
are included in a PRODCOM code that also includes bromates and perbromates, 
iodates  and  periodates.  Differently  from  explosives  precursors,  bromates  and 
ioadates  are  subject  to  environmental  scrutiny,  which  might  impact  the  overall 
trends of the group of substances.  

  Level  of  consumption  of  explosives  precursors  in  EU28  MS  (i.e.  value  of  sold 
production in EU plus value of imports from non EU countries, minus the value 
of  exports  to  non  EU  countries).  The  contractor  that  carried  out  the  market 
analysis  restrained  from  estimating  internal  consumption  through  the  value  of 
sold  volume,  value  of  exports,  and  value  of  imports,  because  Eurostat  does  not 
recommend this method for a number of reasons, including: 

  Heterogeneity of the composition of products is not guaranteed; 

  Coverage  of  production  statistics  in  not  necessarily  in  line  with  trade 

statistics; 

  Temporal delays in data collection and presentation; 

  Second-hand goods are excluded from calculations; 

  Value of exports cannot be compared directly to value of sold production; 

  Provision  of  Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  No  518/79,  which  allows  for  a 
simplified  declaration  for  the  export  of  complete  industrial  plants,  which  is 
not taken into account of the market calculation according to Eurostat. 

  The market for members of the general public and professional users. The market 
analysis in this regard has been hindered by the lack of both convergence on the 
definition  of  ‘professional  user’  and  ‘member  of  the  general  public’  among 
sectors  and  Member  States,  and  official  statistics.  The  estimation  of  the  market 
for non-professional users, and the shares of the market linked to the specific uses 
proved to be difficult, both taken as a whole, and distinguishing by type of sale 
(i.e.  to  consumers,  to  professional  or  to  industry).  A  precise  estimation  of  these 
shares  would  have  required  an  extensive  data  collection  effort  and  multiple 
stakeholders’ consultations aimed at gathering data that are not publicly available 
and validating assumptions related to the use of each substance. Given the scope 
of the supporting study, the external contractor used assumptions included in the 
2010  Impact  Assessment,  discussed  them  with  experts  in  order  to  assess  their 
relevance to the current context, and applied them to estimate the share for non-
professional use only at substance level, and not for specific uses.  

The above  uncertainties  have been minimised through extensive discussions  with the 
external  contractor  and  stakeholders  regarding  the  results  of  the  analysis  and  the 
estimations  done  for  the  baseline.  Representatives  from  NCAs,  NCPs  and  economic 

163 

 
 
operators  were  consulted  through  in-depth  interviews,  online  workshops  (i.e.  52 
participants), and the Hearing of the SCP (i.e. 58 participants). 

164 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 6: WHO IS AFFECTED BY THE INITIATIVE AND HOW? 

Who is 
affected 

How is affected 

NCAs/NCPs 

The initiative would impose (directly or indirectly) new obligations to 
NCAs and NCPs.  

It will entail the obligation for NCA to make changes to the national 
laws, notably in Member States applying a licencing or registration 
regimes. It will require from them one-off activities, such as adapting 
national criteria for granting/refusing licences, setting up trainings for 
law enforcement, first responders and customs authorities, ensuring the 
appropriate inspections service has been established and assigning 
responsible staff for reporting progress to the Commission. 

This initiative will also entail the obligation for NCP to exchange 
reports on relevant suspicious transactions with other NCP and to make 
possible for end-users to report thefts and disappearances. These 
obligations are not expected to entail significant costs considering that 
reporting activities are already being performed by NCPs and may not 
necessarily require additional human resource. 

Furthermore, both NCA and NCP may have to adapt practices to tackle 
specifically online marketplaces. 

Overall, this will represent a slight increase in enforcement costs for 
NCA and NCP and a slight increase of their administrative burden. 

Manufacturers 
and 
distributors 

Manufacturers and distributors will have the obligation to comply with 
the restrictions related to the new substances that will be added to 
Annex I, including to report to the NCPs regarding any significant thefts 
or disappearances of new restricted substances.  

They will have costs related to raising awareness and train relevant staff 
dealing with explosives precursors 

Additionally, they will have to inform the next link in the supply chain 
when a substance or mixture is subject to the Regulation, including for 
Annex II. 

COM and SCP will need to discuss the rationale, target, and 
responsibility of the labelling requirement. A new obligation might arise 
for manufacturers from this specific decision. If labelling will be 
conceived as a signal for retailers that they have to apply restriction and 
monitor sales, then the label shall be put by manufacturers and apply to 

165 

 
 
Retailers 

all regimes. 

Economic operators, namely those carrying out business in several 
Member States, would benefit from more harmonised system of regimes 
and controls across the EU and obligations with regard to labelling and 
the transmission of information on product content along the supply 
chain. 

The introduced restrictions on substances can decrease the consumption 
and demand of some products containing substances in high 
concentration while possibly increasing the demand for lower 
concentrations or alternative products. Economic operator that are 
producing or selling restricted goods may be affected to a limited extent. 
Nevertheless, new opportunities will be provided for companies 
producing or selling products containing lower concentration of the 
substances covered by the Regulation as well as alternative substances. 
All things considered, no significant impact on the turnover of chemical 
sector is expected. 

Retailers will have the obligation to verify which are the new products 
falling under the Regulations’ requirements. In countries, applying a 
licencing regime, retailers will have to adapt to further restrictions, 
relating to the ban of part of the Annex I substances, which have been 
previously available to the general public through licenses. In countries 
that have been applying a registration regime to the three substances 
provided by the Regulation, retailers will have adapt to a new regime of 
restrictions, either a ban or a licensing regime. Retailers will continue to 
be required to check licences (where applicable) for purchases of 
restricted products by non professional users. They will be also 
requested to verify the legitimacy of the intended use of the substance or 
the intention of the users and to verify whether a customer is a member 
of the general public. 

Retailers should also ensure to raise awareness and train relevant staff 
involved in the marketing and sale explosives precursors.  

Internet retailers and general retailers having online sales services will 
need to adapt their trading system to improve detection of suspicious 
transactions. 

Retailers would benefit from improved clarity of the Regulation's 
provisions and simplified and more harmonised system of regimes and 
controls on substances. This in turn, would contribute to reducing the 
challenge for retailers of identifying legitimate users of restricted 
substances at the point of sail and will facilitate detection of suspicious 

166 

 
 
Members of 
the general 
public 

transactions.  

The access of members of the general public to some explosive 
precursors will be further restricted with the introduction of new 
substances in Annex I of the Regulation and the revocation of the 
registration regime. Specifically, for the members of the general public 
it will not be anymore possible to have access to some substances in 
high concentration,, neither through license nor through registration. For 
the remaining restricted substances in Annex I  members of the general 
public will be able to purchase them only after obtaining a license in 
Member States applying a licensing regime .  

Members of the general public will also need to report to the NCP 
significant thefts and disappearances related to explosives precursors 
included in the Annexes of the Regulation. 

The introduction of common minimum criteria for granting and refusing 
licenses will harmonise the approach to  issuing licenses and will ensure 
a common minimum level of security consideration are taken into 
account in this process. 

The general public would benefit from a higher level of security and 
reduced risk of misuse of explosive precursors for the manufacture of 
HME, stemming from the more restrictive and streamlined measures 
relating to the making available of explosives precursors. 

Professional 
Users 

The preferred policy option will slightly affect professional users. They 
will be requested to report to the NCP significant thefts and 
disappearances related to explosives precursors included in the Annexes 
of the Regulation.  

The clarification of the definition of professional users will address 
existing uncertainties in the identification of such users at the point of 
sale. 

167 

 
 
 
Summary of costs and benefits 

The  tables  below  summarise  the  costs  and  benefits  for  the  preferred  option.  Given  the 
limitations created by the lack of available data, the tables have been filled to the extent 
possible  (-).Where  there  are  no  relevant  costs,  the  table  states  this  as  NA.  The  data  is 
based on a number of sources, including the 2010 Preparatory Study prepared by GHK321 
and the subsequent Commission SWD Impact Assessment.322 Other studies that have been 
taken  account  are  those  conducted  by  ENCO  FR  in  2015,323  ECORYS  in  2016324  and 
Ernst&Young/RAND  in  2018.325  Due  to  the  differnet  sets  of  data,  the  tables  below 
provides estimates in ranging between a minimum and maximum.   

Table 20: Overview of Benefits 

I. Overview of Benefits – Preferred Option  
(€ million) 

Description 

Amount 

Comments 

Direct benefits 

Reduction of crime, 
including terrorist 
attacks326 

Savings in 
compliance costs  

500 

25-75 

Main beneficiary of reduction of crime is 
society at large. 

Main beneficiaries are economic operators. 
Savings arise mainly through increased 
simplification, facilitation of cross-border 
operations and prevention of distortion of 
competition. 

- 

- 

- 

Indirect benefits 

321  GHK,  Rand  Europe  and  Comstratos,  2010.  Preparatory  Study  to  Inform  an  Impact  Assessment  of 
Potential Legislative and Non-legislative Restrictions on Chemical Precursors to Explosives. 
322 SEC(2010) 1040 final of 20.9.2010. 
323 ENCO FR, Briefing Sulphuric Acid 2015, restricted. 
324 ECORYS, 2016. Preparatory study to inform the 2017 report on the application of Regulation 98/2013. 
325  Ernst  &  Young,  Rand  Europe,  2018.  Study  on  combatting  the  threat  posed  by  explosives  precursors: 
evaluation  of  the  existing  policy  and  legislative  framework  and  preparation  of  an  impact  assessment  of 
possible options for a future EU initiative. 
326 See figure 3.  

168 

 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Direct costs 

NA 

NA 

II. Overview of costs– Preferred Option  
(€ million) 

Citizens/ 
Consumers 

Businesses 

Administrations 

One-off  Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

NA 

negligible  

negligible 

negligible 

negligible 

5.5-25.3 

17.7-57.3 

- 

NA 

- 

- 

- 

 - 

- 

-     

- 

- 

NA 

- 

2.4-6.4 

- 

0.5-1 

- 

NA  

- 

0  

- 

NA 

- 

- 

- 

0.1 

- 

0.2 

- 

1.9-5.5 

- 

NA 

- 

0.7-2.2 

- 

NA 

- 

0.2 

- 

- 

- 

- 

negligible 

negligible 

 NA 

- 

3.2-17,9 

- 

NA 

- 

- 

- 

NA 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

NA 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

5.5-25.3 

23.8-82.6 

- 

- 

- 

NA  

- 

NA 

- 

- 

- 

- 

-  

- 

5.3 

5.3-10.3 

- 

- 

- 

5.6 

- 

- 

- 

8.1-18.2  

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

NA 

- 

NA 

- 

NA 

- 

NA 

- 

NA 

- 

NA 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

NA 

- 

NA 

- 

NA 

- 

NA 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Policy  
measure 

1 (expand 
Annex I) 

2 (faster 
procedure) 

3(no more 
registration) 

4(reduce 
licensing) 

5(harmonised 
licensing) 

Indirect costs 

Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

6 (definitions)  Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

7(labelling) 

Direct costs 

8 (staff 
training) 

Indirect costs 

Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

9(online 
clarification) 

Direct costs 

10 (MS 
inspection & 
training) 

Indirect costs 

Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

11(reporting)  Direct costs 

Total preferred 
option 

Indirect costs 

Direct costs 

Indirect costs 

Table 21: Overview of Costs 

The  table  summarises  the  estimated  costs  for  businesses  relating  to  administrative  and 
compliance costs of the different measures of policy option 2. As the measures in policy 

169 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
option 2 further restrict the scope of products containing restricted explosives precursors 
that  can  be made  available  to  the  general  public,  these  measures  will  lead  to  economic 
losses  in  the  sense  of  profit  foregone  by  businesses.  The  potential  profit  foregone  to 
business cannot be estimated with certainty and is therefore not included in the table, but 
explained seperately. The explanations focus on the restrictions related to sulphuric acid 
and nitromethane, which are the only measures which are expected to have a significant 
economic impact in terms of loss in sales to the general public.  

Sulphuric acid 

Policy  option  2  would  make  sulphuric  acid  a  restricted  explosives  precursor,  with  the 
effect  that  the  making  available  of  sulphuric  acid  above  a  concentration  of  15%  w/w 
would  not  be  allowed  to  members  of  the  general  public.  Member  States  may  decide  to 
allow members of the general public to acquire, through a licence, mixtures or substances 
containing sulphuric acid in concentration not exceeding 40% w/w .  

The sale of sulphuric acid is already regulated in Europe due to its hazardous properties 
as a skin corrosive chemical substance. 327 The packaging of sulphuric acid and aqueous 
solutions containing sulphuric acid in a concentration exceeding 15% must bear a hazard 
pictogram  for  corrosivity  and  the  hazard  statement  ‘Causes  severe  skin  burns  and  eye 
damage’. The packaging must also be fitted with child-resistant fastenings. This mitigates 
the  the  costs  of  companies  by  introducing  restrictions  related  to  security  for  the  same 
concentrations. 

The current annual volume of sulphuric acid sold in the EU is 8,095 kilotonnes (kt) with 
a value of €543 million per year. The household use of sulphuric acid is aproximately 
0,5% of the total market. This estimation is based on input from three different external 
contractors, as shown in the table below.   

Table 22 : market of sulphuric acid 

Source 

Ernst & Young 
2018328 
Ecorys 2016329 

ENCO FR 
2015330 

Reference 
period 

2008-2011 

2014 

2015 

Production volume 
(kt) 

Production value (€ 
million) 

Percentage of 
household use 

8,631    

8,095    

7,150  

554  

543 

515 

0.5-1% 

0.5% 

0.5% 

About 10-30% of sulphuric acid sold to the general public is in concentration above 40% 
w/w.  The  price  of  such  products  ranges  from  €5  –  25/kg,  averaging  at  €15/kg.  The 

327 Annex VI of Regulation (EC) 1272/2008 (CLP), OJ  L 353,31.12.2008, p.1). 
328  Ernst  &  Young,  Rand  Europe,  2018.  Study  on  combatting  the  threat  posed  by  explosives  precursors: 
evaluation  of  the  existing  policy  and  legislative  framework  and  preparation  of  an  impact  assessment  of 
possible options for a future EU initiative. 
329 ECORYS, 2016. Preparatory study to inform the 2017 report on the application of Regulation 98/2013. 
330 ENCO FR, Briefing Sulphuric Acid 2015, restricted. 

170 

 
 
 
                                                            
remaining 70 – 90% of sulphuric acid sold in products to the general public is estimated 
to be in concentration not exceeding 40% w/w, with an estimated price of about €5/kg.  

The table below provides estimation of the value of consumer products. The estimated 
volume of consumer products (40.5 kt) is multiplied by the price of the product category 
(i.e. €15/kg for the >40% w/w products and €5/kg of the <=40% w/w products). There is 
no data available regarding products with more or less than 15% of sulphuric acid.   

Table 23 - Value of consumer products containing sulphuric acid 

Estimated market size of 
base chemicals 
Volume 

Value 
(producer 
price) 
€393 million 

Sulphuric acid 

8.095 kt  

Estimated 
proportion 
sold to 
general 
public 
[0,5%] 

Estimated 
volume of base 
chemical used 
in consumer 
products 
40,5 kt  

40,5 kt  

€ 2 million 

- 

- 

Estimated value 
of consumer 
products 

€ 786 – 1.100 
million 
€ 200 – € 364 
million 

Consumer 
products 
containing 
sulphuric acid  
>40% (w/w) 

<=40% (w/w) 

10 – 30% 

4,1 - 12,1 kt  

70% - 90% 

28,3 – 36,4 kt  

€60.7 – €182.1 
million 
€141.7 – €182.1 
million 

Household  use  of  products  containing    sulphuric  acid  above  40%  is  limited  mainly  to 
etching activities for circuit boards and drain cleaners. These products are mostly used by 
professional plumbers, but are also commercially available for consumers. Sulphuric acid 
is also widely used for the manufacture of lead-acid batteries.331 Most of the battery acid 
will be handled by professional users. Prices for refill battery acid are in the magnitude of 
5-10  €/kg.  This  brings about  an  estimated  value  of  consumer  products  between  €35-70 
million. 

The  value  of  consumer  products  affected  by  policy  option  2  is  expected  to  be 
considerably lower  than the total estimated value of  €200 – €364 million of consumer 
products on the market containing sulphuric acid due to the following considerations: 

-  Products  containing    sulphuric  acid  in  concentration  not  exceeding  15%  would 
remain  available  to  the  general  public  without  restrictions.  There  is  no  data 
known on the relative size of this part of the market.  

-  Products containing  sulphuric acid in concentrations between 15% and 40% will 
be  only  partially  affected  by  option  2,  as  part  of  the  regular  users  of  these 

331  It  should  be  noted  that  batteries  are  considered  "articles"  for  the  purpose  of  the  Regulation  and  are 
therefore  not  restricted.  By  contrast,  refill  bottles  with  sulphuric  acid  between  30-40%  (w/w)  would  be 
restricted under policy option 2. 

171 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
products are likely to continue acquiring them through a licence in those Member 
States that provide for that possiblity.  

Moreover,  to  establish  the  potential  loss  for  businesses  in  case  of  a  restriction  of  the 
products  in  question  should  look  at  the  aggregate  profit  on the  product accruing  to  EU 
businesses  in  the  entire  supply  chain.332  This  shows  an  estimated  profit  foregone  to 
businesses  that  would  never  exceed  a  range  of  €66  -  120  million  EUR.  Since  that 
estimate includes products of all concentrations, the loss of profit foregone is more likely 
to  come closer to  the  loss  of profit related to  products containing  more than 40% w/w, 
which would be at least €10 million but no more than €30 million.333  

The  exact  magnitude  of  the  economic  loss  to  the  chemical  sector  cannot  be  estimated 
with  more  certainty.  Two  different  studies  assessing  the  restriction  of  sulphuric  acid 
above 40% w/w conclude that "overall the magnitude of lost sales / revenues EU-wide 
is  marginal."334  And  "the  restriction  is  not  expected  to  have  an  impact  on  retailers,  as 
alternative  products  are  available.  The  impact  might  be  significant  on  a  very  small 
number  of  speciality  manufactures  who  are  preparing  and marketing  the  sulphuric  acid 
based drain cleaner products. Nevertheless, the impact on this small number (who would 
also have a possibility to switch to biological-based products) might be considered to be 
very minor on the European scale."335   

Nitromethane 

Policy option 2 would lower the concentration limit for nitromethane from 30% w/w to 
16% w/w. Members of the general public would only be able to acquire nitromethane in 
concentrations  not  exceeding  40%  w/w  with  a  licence  in  those  Member  States  that 
provide for that possibility. 

The  market  for  nitromethane  is  very  small  in  comparison  to  the  market  of  other 
restricted explosives precursors, both in terms of weight and value (see table 18 in Annex 
4). Hydrogen peroxide, ammonium nitrate and nitric acid all have an annual production 
volume  of  around  1100  kt,  and  sulphuric  acid  of  around  8100  kt.  Nitromethane  has  an 
annual  production  volume  of  around  67kt  only.  The  value  of  the  sold  production  of 
nitromethane,  43  million  EUR,  is  also  very  little  in  comparison  to  the  other  four 
mentioned above, which range from 346 to 1129 EUR million. On top of that, Annex 6 
suggests  that  in  the  coming  years,  the  sale  of  nitromethane  may  further  decrease, 
possibly also due to it being classified as possibly carcinogenic. 

The  exact  magnitude  of  lowering  the  concentration  limit  from  30%  to  16%  w/w 
cannot  be  be  estimated  with  any  degree  of  certainty.  Before  nitromethane  was 
restricted, the value of the market of consumer products with no more than 30% w/w of 
nitromethane was estimated at €4 to 11 million. The potential profit foregone would be a 

332 SEC(2010) 1040 final of 20.9.2010. 
333 The decrease in value of consumer products sold in this segment is estimated between €60.7 and  €182.1 
million. It is estimated however that half of the users will divert to alternative substances, such as enzyme 
or micro-organism-based detergents, or lower concentrations. This would amount to a decrease in value of 
consumer products sold in the range of €30,4 to €91 per year, and a profit foregone to business between 
€10 to €30 per year. 
334 ECORYS, 2016. Preparatory study to inform the 2017 report on the application of Regulation 98/2013. 
335 ENCO FR, Briefing Sulphuric Acid 2015, restricted. 

172 

 
 
                                                            
percentage of this estimate, but there is no data on the relative size of the market above 
and below 16% w/w.   

However, the fact that the proposed reduction of the concentration limit concerns a very 
small, potentially further shrinking market, which is already subject to restrictions under 
the Regulation, leads to a conclusion that the economic impact of this measure must be 
considered to be very minor.  

173 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 7: DISCARDED OPTIONS 

The following measures were considered at an early stage but subsequently discarded for 
the reasons outlined below:  

  Extend the scope of the Regulation to cover pyrotechnic articles. This measure was 
considered  because  there  is  evidence  of  misuse  of  pyrotechnic  articles  for  both 
terrorist and criminal purposes336. The making available on the market of pyrotechnic 
articles  is  regulated  under  Directive  2013/29/EU,337  which  categorises  articles 
according to their level of hazard and purpose. According to Europol, categories F2 
and F3 fireworks, which present a low and medium hazard, are the most misused.338 
But  it  is  category  F4  fireworks,  which  are  intended  for  use  only  by  persons  with 
specialist  knowledge  and  are  already  subject  to  strict  rules,  that  presents  a  high 
hazard, either on their own or if the pyrotechnic content is extracted. The market for 
F4 fireworks in the EU is small, estimated annually at approximately 1,100,000 units 
with  an  approximate  value  of  some  €10  million,339  but  Europol  has  expressed 
concerns that misuse of this type of fireworks is on the rise. 

This measure was discarded to ensure coherence and avoid fragmentation in the legal 
framework  applicable  to  pyrotechnic  articles.  Regulation  EU  98/2013  currently 
exempts  from  its  scope  both  pyrotechnic  articles  as  well  as  articles  as  defined  in 
REACH.  Rather  than  cover  pyrotechnic  articles  in  the  Regulation,  measures  to 
improve  controls  over  the  sale  of  fireworks,  including  online,  should  be  introduced 
directly  in  Directive  2013/29/EU  after  careful  consideration  and  consultation  of 
stakeholders.  

  Ban  sales  of  restricted  explosives  precursors  over  the  internet.  This  measure  was 
considered because there is evidence that restricted explosives precursors have been 
procured  over  the  internet  to  carry  out  terrorist  attacks.  The  threat  posed  by  the 
availability of explosive precursors through the internet was discussed with Member 
States and online companies and marketplaces at a dedicated meeting on 11 October 
2017.340  During  the  meeting,  it  was  agreed  that  public-private  dialogue  and  the 
sharing  of  relevant  cross-border  information  among  public  authorities  are  essential 
and  have  already  made  a  difference  towards  preventing  a  number  of  explosives 
incidents. 

In  the  Commission's  2010  Impact  Assessment  accompanying  the  proposal  for  a 
Regulation,341 the option of banning sales of explosives precursors substances (policy 
option 2) was discarded as only 0.5% of sales of these substances to members of the 

336 Europol EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (Te-Sat) 2017.  
337  Directive  2013/29/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12  June  2013  on  the 
harmonisation  of  the  laws  of  the  Member  States  relating  to  the  making  available  on  the  market  of 
pyrotechnic articles (recast). OJ L 178, 28.6.2013, p. 27–65. 
338  Minutes  of 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=1323.  
339  Study  on  production,  import  and  use  in  the  EU  of  high  risk  pyrotechnic  articles  categorised  F4 
according to Directive 2007/23/EC and Directive 2013/29/EU. Prepared by DJS Research for the European 
Commission's Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs. 2006. 
340 Ares(2017)6125852. 
341 SEC(2010) 1040 final of 20.9.2010. 

the  Pyrotechnics  Working  Group,  10 

the  meeting  of 

June  2016. 

174 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
general  public  were  made  online.  Because  of  this,  it  was  concluded  that  the  ban 
would not strongly contribute to the achievement of the policy objectives and would 
be  disproportionate  to  the  burden  imposed  on  public  authorities  and  economic 
operators to implement it. 

Today, a ban on online sales would still not contribute significantly to enhancing the 
security of explosives precursors sold to the members of the general public. On the 
one hand, because, although the volume of sales online has markedly increased from 
2010,  it  still  represents a  small  share  of  the  total.  On  the  other  hand,  where  public 
authorities  and  industry  have  engaged  to  understand  the  online  market,  companies 
and  marketplaces  have  proved  instrumental  in  detecting  and  preventing  suspicious 
transactions.  Therefore,  the  costs  and  burdens  to  economic  operators  and  public 
authorities  would  be  disproportionate  to  the  security  benefits  this  measure  could 
bring. 

In  addition, this  measure  would  have  a  negative  effect  on  fundamental  rights,  as  it 
would  obstruct  the  freedom  to  conduct  a  business  and  discriminate  against 
businesses  who  exclusively  sell  online  or  who  depend  to  a  high  extent  on  internet 
sales. 

For the reasons above, this measure was discarded at an early stage. Instead of a ban, 
policy option 1 includes an initiative to promote public-private dialogue and policy 
option 2 includes the clarification in the Regulation that the restrictions and controls 
apply to online companies and marketplaces.  

is 

there 

to  conclude 

insufficient  evidence 

  Harmonise  penalties  across  Member  States.  This  measure  was  considered  because 
the  evaluation  of  the  Regulation  hinted  at  potential  barriers  to  the  internal  market 
stemming from the lack of harmonisation of penalties across Member States. Upon 
further  consultations  of  stakeholders,  however,  including  both  economic  operators 
and  competent  authorities, 
that 
harmonising penalties would have an effect on the freedom of movement of goods 
and on competition. The issue was also not identified as an issue by stakeholders in 
the Standing Committee on Precursors. The Regulation allows for different penalties 
by requiring “effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions” instead of setting a 
certain type and/or level of penalties. This respects the different legal traditional in 
the  Member  States  to  address  infringements  of  this  Regulation  (criminal  or 
administrative). Whereas it is clear that the penalties differ in legislation, there is no 
reliable  data  available  on  the  penalties  imposed.  All  rules  on  penalties,  when 
enforced,  have  a  dissuasive  effect  on  economic  operators.  The  magnitude  of  the 
effect might be different for large enterprises and for SME, the latter usually being 
more concerned about economic sanctions, but this is likely to remain the case even 
in  a  harmonised  system.  Rather  than  whether  the  level  of  penalties  is  harmonised 
across  Europe,  then,  what  does  make  a  difference  to  dissuasion  is  whether  the 
penalties  that  exist  on  paper  are  enforced  in  practice.  To  tackle  this,  all  policy 
options  have  measures  aimed  at  improving  the  enforcement  capacity  of  Member 
States,  notably  through  an  increased  number  of  inspections  and  checks  on 
compliance.  In  addition,  the  harmonisation  of  penalties  would,  in  the  short-tem, 

175 

 
 
 
 
 
 
bring significant administrative burdens to public authorities in order to change their 
rules. Such a burden would be unjustified if the impact on effectiveness is null. 

  Exempt  inhibited  substances  from  the  restrictions.  This  measure  was  considered 
because in recent years there has been noteworthy progress in research into additives 
that may inhibit the re-concentration and/or use in synthesis of primary explosives of 
explosives  precursor  substances.342  Effective  inhibitors  have  been  identified  for 
ammonium  nitrate,  nitromethane,  hexamine,  and  acetone.  However,  additional 
testing  is  needed  in  order  to  obtain  a  more  complete  picture  of  the  impact  of 
inhibited  substances  and  mixtures  on  the  legitimate  uses.  In  addition,  industrial 
implementation  is  not  straightforward,  owing  to  a  complex  supply  chain  and  the 
classified and/or proprietary nature of the research results.  
As  a  result,  this  measure  was  discarded  early  due  to  its  unfeasibility  at the  current 
moment.  Research  and  testing  should  continue  as  a  matter  of  priority,  in  order  to 
develop  commercial  solutions  that  can  prevent  explosives  precursors  from  being 
used to manufacture HMEs. 

 

Introduce  requirements  on  storage.  This  measure  was  considered  because  there  are 
currently  no  provisions  related  to  the  storage  of  explosives  precursors  in  the 
Regulation.  Secure  storage  by  economic  operators  is  key  to  identifying  significant 
thefts and disappearances and therefore to being able to comply with the obligation 
to  report  these  to  the  designated  national  contact  point(s).  Secure  storage  by  both 
economic operators and members of the general public is essential to preventing the 
diversion and misuse of explosives precursors substances and mixtures. 
The  SCP  Guidelines,  in  section  H,  offer  advice  for  companies  on  how  to  securely 
store explosives precursors and control access to premises. In addition, appendix five 
directs economic operators and users of nitrogenous fertilisers to check the rules and 
guidance materials that already apply and exist.343  
In  order  to  ensure  the  safety  of  chemicals  and  high  levels  of  protection  of  public 
health and the environment, storage requirements for hazardous chemicals, including 
explosives  precursors,  have  been  introduced  by  a  wide  range  of  EU  and  Member 
State  legislation.  Rules  are  very  much  substance-specific,  as  chemical  substances 
react  differently  to  basic  conditions,  such  as  temperature,  and  to  each  other's 
presence, often requiring storage to be separate.  
In  the  context  above,  setting  additional  requirements  on  storage  for  explosives 
precursors, based on security considerations, would certainly have a negative impact 
on the coherence of the overall framework and lead to disproportionate burdens on 
SMEs. Therefore, this measure has been discarded in favour of a voluntary approach 
in policy option 1. 

  Require  economic  operators  to  obtain  a  licence  from  the  competent  authorities 
before  they  may  possess,  use,  or  make  available  restricted  explosives  precursors. 
This  measure  was  considered  in  order  to  significantly  enhance  controls  along  the 

342 The European Commission's FP7 research programme financed PREVAIL (PRecursors of ExplosiVes: 
Additives  to  Inhibit  their  use  including  Liquids)  in  2010-2013  and  EXPEDIA  (EXplosives  PrEcursor 
Defeat by Inhibitor Additives) in 2014-2018. Some Member States have also financed their own research. 
343  For  example,  the  Agricultural  Industries  Confederation  issued  a  Guide  on  the  Storage,  Handling  and 
Transportation of Ammonium Nitrate-Based Fertilisers in 2015. www.agindustries.org.uk. 

176 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
supply chain and to improve the capacity of public authorities to inspect compliance 
with the restriction and reporting obligations. A similar system is in place for drug 
precursors  under  Regulation  (EC)  273/2004.344  It  was  discarded  as  being  too 
burdensome  on  both  economic  operators  and  the  competent  authorities.    The 
administrative burden this new procedure would create would not be outweighed by 
the additional facilitation it would provide. The measure was discarded in favour of a 
requirement  on  economic  operators  to  register  with  the  competent  authority, 
included in policy option 3.  

 

Introduce restrictions on exports. This measure was considered in light of evidence 
that  explosives  precursors  originating  in  the  Union  have  been  exported  legally  and 
subsequently  diverted  to  terrorist  groups.345  The  misuse  of  explosives  precursors 
outside of the Union, and especially in conflict areas, has the potential to harm EU 
interests,  as  attacks  may  be  directed  towards  EU  citizens  and  infrastructure  and 
substances may be used for the purpose of training individuals who attempt to carry 
out attacks in the Union. This measure was discarded in part due to its unfeasibility, 
as  it  would  not  be  possible,  in  practice,  for  economic  operators  to  check  whether 
customers  in  third  countries  are  members  of  the  general  public  or  not.  In  addition, 
this  measure  would  not  contribute  to  the  aim  of  the  legal  basis  of  the  Regulation, 
Article 114 on the functioning of the internal market. It could be re-considered, at a 
later  time,  through  a  new  instrument  based  on  Article  133  on  the  common 
commercial policy. An effort to better control export flows can be made through a 
more  active  engagement  of  enforcement  authorities  (policy  option  1)  or  through 
mandatory training for customs authorities (policy option 2). 

  Develop a platform at EU level to exchange information on suspicious transactions, 
disappearances, and thefts, as well as licences granted and denied. This measure was 
considered in order to improve the sharing of information between Member States, 
to  ensure  that  information  of  cross-border  relevance  reached  all  authorities 
potentially  concerned,  and  to  facilitate  an  analysis  of  the  trends  involving  the 
marketing and use of explosives precursors at EU level. It was discarded in part out 
of concerns that it would have a negative impact on fundamental rights, notably data 
protection, as the information shared may to a large extent contain personal data and 
would often be shared on the basis of suspicion, not a reasonable level of proof, and 
may  informally  associate  a  negative  judgement  to  the  act  of  requesting  a  licence. 
Therefore, the systematic sharing of all of this information, without prior screening 
and  with  all  Member  States,  is  not  necessarily  desired.  In  addition,  the  number  of 
reports  on  suspicious  transactions,  disappearances,  and  thefts,  and  of  licences 
granted and denied, has not been large enough in recent years to justify the costs that 
the  development  of  a  platform  would  entail.  Instead  of  a  platform  at  EU  level,  an 
increase  in  the  sharing  of  information  of  cross-border  relevance,  after  an  initial 
screening  at  Member  State  level,  can  be  promoted  through  policy  option  1  or 
mandated through policy option 

344 Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 on 
drug precursors. OJ L 47, 18.2.2004, p. 1–10. 
345 Conflict Armament Research. Tracing the supply of components used in Islamic State IEDs. February 
2016. http://www.conflictarm.com/download-file/?report_id=2279&file_id=2284.  

177 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
ANNEX 8: MONITORING AND EVALUATION INDICATORS  

Table 24 – Monitoring indicators 

Objective
s 

Monitoring 
indicators 

General  GO 1 – 

Ensure the 
functionin
g of the 
internal 
market. 
GO 2 – 
Ensure 
high level 
of security 
of EU 
citizens. 

Market share of 
companies 
working in 
NACE sectors 
concerned by the 
Regulation.  
N° of attacks 
perpetrated with 
HME containing 
explosives 
precursors 
Perception of 
security of 
European 
citizens. 

Sources 
of data 
and/or 
collection 
methods 
Eurostat 

Actors 
responsibl
e for data 
collection 

Data 
collec
ted 
alrea
dy? 
Yes  European 
Commissi
on 

Target 
values346 

- 

Yes  Europol 

Decrease 
in N° of 
attacks 
with 
HMEs 

Reports of 
incidents 
investigati
ons 
(confident
iality 
issue) 

346 The target values indicate how the values would evolve in six years (after the date of application) if the 
initiative is successful.  

178 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Objective
s 

Monitoring 
indicators 

Specific  SO 1 – 

Harmonise 
Member 
States' 
restriction 
and 
control 
regimes 
and ensure 
the 
uniform 
applicatio
n of the 
Regulation
. 

SO 2 - 
Clarificati
on and 
simplificat
ion of the 
legal 
framework
. 

Level of 
homogeneity in 
the 
implementation 
of the 
Regulation 
(analysis of how 
each provision is 
implemented 
nationally). 
N° of economic 
operators which 
notice an 
improvement on 
their business 
deriving from 
more 
homogeneity 
(perception of 
economic 
operators). 
N° of provisions 
clarified. 
N° of economic 
operators which 
notice an 
improvement on 
their business 
deriving from 
more clarity 
(perception of 
economic 
operators). 

Sources 
of data 
and/or 
collection 
methods 
Survey 

Actors 
responsibl
e for data 
collection 

Data 
collec
ted 
alrea
dy? 
Yes  European 
Commissi
on 

No 

European 
Commissi
on 

European 
legislative 
acts and 
guidelines 
Survey 

Target 
values346 

Increase 
in N° of 
economic 
operators 
which 
notice an 
imporvem
ent on 
their 
business; 
more 
positive 
perception 

Increase 
in N° of 
provision 
clarified 
and N° of 
economic 
operators 
which 
notice an 
improvem
ent 

179 

 
 
 
Objective
s 

Monitoring 
indicators 

Level of 
awareness of 
economic 
operators 
(perception of 
economic 
operators). 
N° of compliant 
and non-
compliant 
economic 
operators.  
% of increase in 
the number of 
reports received 
by NCPs on 
suspicious 
transactions, 
disappearances 
and thefts. 
New legislative 
and non-
legislative 
actions taken as 
a consequence of 
evolving threats 
(e.g. Delegated 
Acts, voluntary 
codes). 

SO 3 – 
Improve 
the 
transmissi
on of 
informatio
n along 
the supply 
chain. 

SO 4 – 
Ensure 
that 
restriction
s and 
controls 
on 
explosives 
precursors 
adjust to 
new and 
evolving 
threats. 

Actors 
responsibl
e for data 
collection 

Data 
collec
ted 
alrea
dy? 
Yes  European 
Commissi
on 

Sources 
of data 
and/or 
collection 
methods 
Survey 
Inspection 
services 
of the 
Member 
States 
NCPs 

European 
legislative 
acts, 
NCAs 

No 

European 
Commissi
on 

Target 
values346 

Decrease 
in N° of 
non-
compliant 
operators 
Increase 
in the 
number of 
reports 
received 
by NCPs 
on 
suspicious 
transactio
ns 
disappear
ances and 
thefts.  

In 
general, 
an 
increase 
would be 
positive, 
but this 
indicator 
also 
requires a 
qualitative 
assessmen
t 

180 

 
 
 
SO 5 – 
Further 
restrict 
access to 
certain 
explosives 
precursors 
and 
strengthen 
controls. 

SO 6 – 
Increase 
enforceme
nt capacity 
of the 
relevant 
public 
authorities
. 

Tackle 
new and 
evolving 
threats 
(reactive 
approach). 
Provide 
for a faster 
procedure 
to  restrict 
substances 
under 
Annex I. 

Operati
onal 
objectiv
es 

Objective
s 

Monitoring 
indicators 

Sources 
of data 
and/or 
collection 
methods 
NCAs 

Data 
collec
ted 
alrea
dy? 
No 

New legislative 
and non-
legislative 
actions taken to 
restrict access to 
explosives 
precursors. 

No 

Inspection 
services 
and LEAs 

N° and type of 
control activities 
per MS. 
N° and type of 
imposed 
penalties. 

Actors 
responsibl
e for data 
collection 

European 
Commissi
on 
(consolida
tion), 
NCAs 
(data 
collection) 

European 
Commissi
on 
(consolida
tion), 
NCAs 
(data 
collection) 

Target 
values346 

In 
general, 
an 
increase 
would be 
positive, 
but this 
indicator 
also 
requires a 
qualitative 
assessmen
t 
Increase 
in number 
and type 
of control 
activities 
Evolution 
of N° of 
penalties 
needs to 
be 
assessed 
with the 
general 
context. 
- 

of 

N° 
substances 
added 
Annexes.  

new 

to 

European 
legislative 
acts 

Yes  European 
Commissi
on 

Average  time  to 
implement 
the 
procedure to add 
to 
substances 
Annex I. 

European 
Commissi
on and 
SCP 

No 

European 
Commissi
on 

Decrease 
the 
in 
time 
to 
implemen
t 

181 

 
 
 
Actors 
responsibl
e for data 
collection 

European 
Commissi
on 
(consolida
tion), 
NCAs 
(data 
collection) 

Target 
values346 

Increase 
in 
the 
number  of 
criteria ; 
highest 
possible 
N° of MS  

Increase 
in  the  N° 
and 
type 
of training 
session.  

Highest 
N°  of  MS 
possible 

European 
Commissi
on 
(consolida
tion), 
NCAs 
(data 
collection) 
European 
Commissi
on 
(consolida
tion), 
NCAs 
(data 
collection) 

Sources 
of data 
and/or 
collection 
methods 
NCAs 

Data 
collec
ted 
alrea
dy? 
No 

NCAs 

No 

Objective
s 

Monitoring 
indicators 

N°  of  common 
criteria 
for 
granting/refusing 
licences 
effectively 
the 
adopted  at 
MS 
level  with 
respect to the list 
provided. 
N°  of  MS  using 
proposed 
the 
a 
format 
licence. 
N°  and  type  of 
training  sessions 
organised 
per 
MS;  
N° 
trained 
year per MS. 

staff 
in  one 

for 

of 

Increase 
homogene
ity  of  the 
licensing 
regime. 

Increase 
relevant 
authorities
’ 
enforceme
nt 
capacity. 

MS  to  set 
of 
up 
specialised 
inspection 
services. 

NCAs 

No 

N° of MS having 
specialised 
a 
inspection 
service. 

182 

 
 
 
types 

to 
MS 
report  on 
number 
and 
of 
incidents, 
suspicious 
transaction
s, 
disappeara
nces 
and 
thefts, 
licenses 
provided, 
inspection
s 
out 
imposed 
sanctions. 
Cross-
border 
exchange 
of 
informatio
n  (NCP  to 
NCP). 

carried 
and 

Require 
end-users 
to 
report 
significant 
thefts  and 
disappeara
nces. 

Objective
s 

Monitoring 
indicators 

reports 
N°  of 
provided  to  the 
EC  according  to 
the 
specified 
and 
format 
completed  to  the 
50% or more. 

Sources 
of data 
and/or 
collection 
methods 
NCAs, 
NCPs 

Data 
collec
ted 
alrea
dy? 
No 

Actors 
responsibl
e for data 
collection 

European 
Commissi
on 
(consolida
tion), 
NCAs  and 
NCPs 
(data 
collection) 

N°  of  NCPs  that 
they 
declare 
regularly 
share 
information  with 
other MS NCP. 
N°  of 
shared 
other MS NCP. 

reports 
with 

N°  of 
reports 
from  end-users 
on 
thefts  and 
disappearances. 

Survey 

No 

European 
Commissi
on 

NCPs 

No 

European 
Commissi
on 
(consolida
tion), 
NCPs 
(data 
collection) 

183 

Target 
values346 

In 
general, 
an 
increase 
would  be 
the  target, 
but 
the 
security 
context 
also  needs 
to 
be 
taken  into 
account.  

of 

Highest 
N° 
NCPs 
possible. 
Increase 
in  the  N° 
of reports.  

In 
general, 
an 
increase 
would  be 
the  target, 
but 
the 
security 
context 
also  needs 
to 
be 
taken  into 
account. 

 
 
 
 
Objective
s 

Monitoring 
indicators 

a 

Require 
economic 
operators 
to 
inform 
next 
the 
link  in  the 
supply 
chain 
when 
substance 
or  mixture 
is  subject 
to 
the 
Regulation
,  including 
for  Annex 
II. 
Require 
training by 
retail 
of 
their staff. 

Clarify  the 
notion  of 
profession
al 
user; 
Clarify 
labelling 
provision. 
Clarify 
the 
that 
regulation 
applies  to 
companies 
operating 
online. 

N°  of  retailers 
that declare their 
level 
of 
understanding  of 
products 
concerned by the 
Regulation  has 
increased  thanks 
to 
better 
communication 
with 
manufacturers/su
ppliers.  

retailer 
%  of 
that 
companies 
organise  at  least 
one 
training 
session per year. 

See SO 2. 

N° of companies 
operating  online 
complying  with 
the Regulation. 
N° of MS having 
a 
dedicated 
system to control 
online sales. 

Sources 
of data 
and/or 
collection 
methods 
Survey 

Data 
collec
ted 
alrea
dy? 
No 

Target 
values346 

Actors 
responsibl
e for data 
collection 

European 
Commissi
on 

Highest 
N° 
possible  

Survey 

No 

European 
Commissi
on 

An 
increase 
in  the  % 
and N°  of 
retailers 
that 
organises 
trainings  

Inspection 
Services 

Not in 
all 
MS 

European 
Commissi
on 
(consolida
tion), 
NCAs 
(data 
collection) 

Increase 
in  the  N° 
of 
companie
s;  highest 
possible 
N° of MS  

184 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 9: MAP OF THE DIFFERENT REGIMES IN THE EU FOR THE MARKETING AND 
USE OF RESTRICTED EXPLOSIVES PRECURSORS  

185 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 10: DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION SETTING 
OUT  GUIDELINES  FOR  LICENSING  AND  REGISTRATION  REGIMES  (MEASURE  UNDER 
POLICY OPTION 1)  

reinforce 

restrictions 

the  existing 

To 
issue  a 
recommendation  with  guidelines  through  which  Member  States  could  make  their 
licensing  and  registration  systems  more  robust.  The  recommendation  would  be 
based  on  good  practices  and  would  go  beyond  the  existing  guidance  documents 
produced  by  the  Commission.  The  recommendation  would  address  the  following 
issues:  

the  Commission  would 

  Common  criteria  for  granting  licences.  Member  States  that  maintain  licensing 
regimes would be recommended to adopt minimum criteria for granting licences. 
In addition to taking into account all relevant circumstances, and in particular the 
intended  use,  as  the  Regulation  already  requires,  competent  authorities  should 
take into account the availability of lower concentrations or alternative substances 
that would achieve a similar effect, the proposed arrangements to ensure that the 
restricted explosives precursor is kept securely, and finally the background of the 
individual applying for a licence,  in particular his or her criminal records. 

 

Identifying  economic  operators  in  registration  regimes.  Member  States  that 
maintain  registration  regimes  would  be  recommended  to  set  up  a  registry  of 
economic  operators,  giving  competent  authorities  a  clear  picture  of  who  are  the 
operators to which they should target awareness-raising and compliance checks.  

  Reporting  transactions  involving  the  members  of  the  general  public  to  the 
competent  authority.  Member  States  would  be  recommended  to  periodically 
submit  the  list  of  transactions  involving  members  of  the  general  public,  who 
acquired restricted substances via the presentation of a licence or the registration 
of  their  transaction,  to  the  competent  authority.  This  would  give  the  competent 
authority a clear picture of who are the members of the general public who are in 
legal possession of restricted substances. 

  Storage  conditions  and  securing  of  premises.  Economic  operators  possessing, 
using, storing, and/or handling explosives precursors in any way, would be urged 
to  ensure  they have  a written  policy and procedures  in  place in  order  to control 
access to substances in their premises. Actions such as installing physical barriers 
and  locks,  carrying  out  regular  inventories,  and  setting  out  clear  processes  to 
screen employees and service providers, such as transportation companies, would 
all contribute to establishing high levels of security around explosives precursors 
stored in business premises. In addition, Member States would be recommended 
to  set  out  storage  conditions  on  the  granting  of  licences  to  the  members  of  the 
general  public,  such  as  keeping  the  substances  locked  and  having  to  report  any 
thefts and disappearances within a specific period of time. 

186 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 11: TABLE WITH OVERVIEW SCORES ASSESSMENT CRITERIA 

Assessment criteria 

Coherence 
Effectiveness 
Align restrictions and controls with the 
evolving threat   
Further restrict access and strengthen 
controls 
Increase enforcement by the competent 
authorities of the Regulation 
Improve the transmission of information and 
compliance along the supply chain 
Improve the clarity of the Regulation and 
ensure uniformity in its application 
Facilitate intra-EU trade and prevent 
distortion of competition   
Economic impact 
Impacts on competition 
Impacts on Consumers – members of the 
general public 
Impacts on Consumers – professional users 
Impacts on SMEs 
Social impact 
Impacts on labour market 
Impact on public health 
Environmental impact 
Impact on fundamental rights 
Protection of personal data 
Non-discrimination 
Freedom to conduct business 
Efficiency 
Enforcement costs NCAs/NCPs 
Administrative Burdens NCAs/NCPs 
Administrative Burdens economic operators  
Compliance Costs economic operators  
Economic losses - economic operators  
Total Scores 

Policy 
Option 1 
0 
5.5 
1.0 

Policy 
Option 2 
1.0 
11.0 
2.0 

Policy 
Option 3 
-0.5 
10.0 
2.0 

0.5 

1.5 

1.5 

0.5 

0.5 

0.5 
0.5 
0 

0 
0 
1.0 
0.5 
0.5 
0 
1.5 
1.0 
0.5 
0 
1.5 
0 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0 
10 

2.0 

2.0 

2.0 

2.0 

1.0 

-0.5 
1.0 
-0.5 

-0.5 
-0.5 
1.0 
-0.5 
1.5 
-0.5 
-0.5 
0 
0 
-0.5 
-0.5 
-0.5 
-0.5 
 0.5 
 0.5 
-0.5 
11 

2.5 

2.5 

2.0 

-0.5 

1.5 

-2.5 
1.5 
-2.0 

-0.5 
-1.5 
1.0 
-1.0 
2.0 
-0.5 
-3.0 
-1.5 
0 
-1.5 
-9.5 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-1.5 
-5 

NB. The preferred option in section 8 is based on the scores for efficiency, effectiveness 
and impacts on fundamental rights.  

187 

 
 
  
 
 
 
Annex 12: Sensitivity Analsyis 

The  comparison  in  section  7  is  based  on  four  criteria:  effectiveness,  efficiency, 
fundamental rights and coherence. It was decided not to take the average scores of these 
four  main  criteria,  as  this  would  attach  too  much  weight  to  fundamental  rights  and 
coherence criteria. In fact, many of the measures considered do not have a strong impact 
on fundamental rights. As regards coherence, all options have been designed in order to 
be  coherent  with  other EU  measures,  which  make  this criterion  marginal  in  the  overall 
assessment.  

Instead  it  was  decided  to  aggregate  scores  by  adding  up  the  scores  of  all  sub  criteria. 
Effectiveness is hence assessed against 6 sub-criteria, Efficiency against 5, Fundamental 
rights impact on 3 and Coherence on one. As a result, the weights of the different criteria 
in the overall comparison are the following:  

•        Effectiveness : 40% (6 out of a total of 15 sub criteria) 

•        Efficiency 33% (5 out of 15) 

•        Fundamental rights impact: 20% (3 out of 15) 

•        Coherence: approx. 7% (1 out of 15) 

Effectiveness, which measures the extent to which the different policy options meet the 
specific  objectives,  is  the  most  important  criterion  counts  for  40%  of  the  assessment. 
Efficiency is given a weight of 33%, which is proportional to this criterion's importance. 
As  explained  above,  the  relative  smaller  weight  attached  to  fundamental  rights  and 
coherence reflects that they are not as relevant as the other criteria in this IA. 

The sensitivity analysis below compares the aggregate scores of the various criteria with 
the score that the options would obtain if equal weighting were given to all criteria, with 
the  aim  to  assess  the  sensitivity  of  our  comparison  to  such  changes.  The  result  of  the 
analysis shows that if all four criteria are given the same weight, policy option 2 still has 
the highest overall score. 

The scores in the impact assessment are the following: 

Criteria  

Policy Option 1  Policy Option 2  Policy Option 3 

(Weight)  

Effectiveness 
(6/15) 

Efficiency 
(5/15) 

Fund. Rights 
(3/15) 

5.5 

1.5 

1.5 

10 

-9.5 

-3.0 

11 

-0.5 

-0.5 

188 

 
 
Coherence 
(1/15) 

0 

Total score 

8.5 

1 

11 

-0.5 

-3 

 

If all criteria were given the same weight, the scores would be:  
Criteria 
Weight 

Policy Option 1  Polciy Option 2  Policy Option 3 

Effectiveness 

0.92 

Efficiency 

Fund. rights 

Coherence 

0.3 

0.5 

0 

Total score 

1.72 

1.83 

-0.1 

-0.17 

1 

2.56 

1.66 

-1.9 

-1.9 

-1.0 

-1.74 

189