How West African migrants engage with migration information en-route to Europe : studies on communication channels used by migrants and asylum seekers to obtain information in countries of origin and transit, with particular focus on online and social media.
Date: 2018-04-17
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs
Subjects: Africa, Europe, access to information, geographical mobility, information technology, means of communication, migrant, migration policy, refugee, report, right of asylum, virtual community

How West African migrants 
engage with migration 
information en-route to 
Europe 

Studies on communication channels used by migrants 
and asylum seekers to obtain information in countries 
of origin and transit, with particular focus on online and 
social media 

Written by Optimity Advisors and SEEFAR 
September – 2017 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs 
Directorate C — Migration and Protection 
Unit C.1 — Irregular Migration and Return Policy 

Contact: Agnieszka Sternik  

E-mail:  HOME-ANTISMUGGLING-C1@ec.europa.eu   

European Commission 
B-1049 Brussels 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers  
to your questions about the European Union. 

Freephone number (*): 

00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 

(*) 

The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone 

boxes or hotels may charge you). 

LEGAL NOTICE 

This document has been prepared for the European Commission however it reflects the views only of the 
authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information 
contained therein. 

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://www.europa.eu). 

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018 

PDF  

ISBN 978-92-79-79987-7 

doi: 10.2837/97937 

DR-01-18-101-EN-N 

© European Union, 2018 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Contents 

POLICY SUMMARY ......................................................................................................... 6 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................... 9 

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 13 

SECTION ONE: DECISION-MAKING ............................................................................... 14 

Summary ............................................................................................................ 14 
Drivers of migration and onward movement ............................................................ 14 
Intended destinations ........................................................................................... 16 
Influential information .......................................................................................... 20 

SECTION TWO: EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES OF THE JOURNEY .................................... 22 

Summary ............................................................................................................ 22 
Knowledge and expectations of the journey ............................................................ 22 
Knowledge of legal migration options and alternatives .............................................. 24 
Realities of the journey ......................................................................................... 25 
Life in Libya ........................................................................................................ 27 
Protection ........................................................................................................... 28 

SECTION THREE: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION CHANNELS .................................. 30 

Summary ............................................................................................................ 30 
Stage 1: Pre-departure in source ........................................................................... 31 
Stage 2: Transit before Libya ................................................................................ 35 
Stage 3: Transit through Libya .............................................................................. 35 
Stage 4: Europe .................................................................................................. 35 
Irregular migration awareness raising campaigns (origin and transit) ......................... 37 

SECTION FOUR: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA ................................................................ 39 

Summary ............................................................................................................ 39 
Facebook ............................................................................................................ 40 
WhatsApp ........................................................................................................... 42 
Websites ............................................................................................................. 42 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................... 45 

Summary ............................................................................................................ 45 
Strategic communications ..................................................................................... 45 
Wider policy ........................................................................................................ 49 

TECHNICAL ANNEXES .................................................................................................. 50 

Messaging ........................................................................................................... 52 
Channels ............................................................................................................ 52 

Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs 

2017 

EUR   EN 

   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POLICY SUMMARY 

The  report  findings  support  the  case  to  invest  in  strategic  communications  as  a  means  to  effect 
behaviour  change  among  potential  migrants  in  origin  countries  and  transit.  Influencing  the 
decision-making  processes  of  (potential)  migrants  is  a  demand-based  approach  to  reducing 
irregular  migration.  Reducing  the  number  of  people  wanting  to  migrate  irregularly  reduces 
corresponding  costs  of  border  control,  voluntary/  forced  return,  welfare  services,  and  asylum 
processing. Strategic communications therefore offer a high return on investment relative to other 
migration  management  and  protection  measures.  Where  implemented  appropriately,  they  also 
offer a non-coercive, rights-compatible approach to migration management. 

Measures to counter irregular migration, people smuggling, and human trafficking along routes to 
Europe  have  proliferated  since  the  onset  of  a  new  European  crisis  in  migration  in  2015.  With 
inflows  originally  concentrated  at  Europe’s  Eastern  Mediterranean  border,  since  the  EU-Turkey 
statement  on  March  2016,  nationals  arriving  irregularly  from  West  Africa  via  the  Central 
Mediterranean have constituted the majority of irregular arrivals. The persistence of the challenge 
is  illustrated  by  looking  back  to  the  2006  migration  ‘crisis’  in  the  Canary  Islands,  where  West 
African nationals were also prominent.  

The  main  EU  policy  document  addressing  the  migrant  crisis  is  the  2015  European  Agenda  on 
Migration.  It  comprises  a  package  of  measures  totalling  over  €10  billion  with  the  aim  to  reduce 
irregular flows and the vulnerability of irregular migrants by strengthening the protection space in 
the EU  neighbourhood,  and  by  bolstering  the  migration management  capacity of  EU  and external 
actors.1  

Key  to  this  strategy  is  the  EU  Trust  Fund  for  Africa.  Amounting  to  €2.9  billion,2  it  has  been 
established  to  address  the  drivers  of  migration,  mostly  through  conventional  international 
development programming in  major countries of  origin.  The Sahel and Lake Chad  Window  covers 
12 countries, six of which are studied in this report.3 Examples of projects in the region include €11 
million for economic opportunities in Gambia, €37 million in Mali, and €106 million in Senegal.4 EU 
Trust  Fund-financed  projects  have  a  broad  range  of  objectives,  and  many  have  no  specific  or 
measurable objective of influencing irregular migration. Project objectives are instead articulated in 
terms  of  protection  and  resilience,  with  the  link  to  the  rationale  of  the  Fund,  namely  to  reduce 
irregular migration, left implicit.  

However,  the  high-level  objectives  of  the  EU  to  reduce  irregular  migration  and  bring  an  end  to  a 
sense  of  migration  ‘crisis’  are  clear.  The  2015-2020  EU  Action  Plan  against  migrant  smuggling  is 
explicit  in  its  objectives  to  reduce  migrant  smuggling.  Among  far-reaching  measures  to  improve 
migration  management  through  deterrence  and  coercive  means,  it  resolves  to  utilise  strategic 
communications as a means of developing a “counter-narrative” against smugglers’ often deceitful 
marketing.5  A  commitment  to  “increase  the  awareness  of  the  risks  of  irregular  migration  and 
migrant  smuggling  […]  among  vulnerable  groups”  was  reiterated  in  the  European  Council 
conclusions  of  10  March  2016.  This  approach  assumes,  firstly,  that  smugglers  rely  principally  on 
social media to recruit migrants. Secondly, it assumes that migrants are persuaded to migrate by 
online  marketing  techniques.  The  findings  of  this  study  suggest  that  both  assumptions  are 
overstated. That is, on the West African-Central Mediterranean route, smugglers’ online marketing 
exists but is not a core factor in motivating decisions or in recruitment.  

Communications  campaigns  targeted  at  migrants  have  been  launched  by  the  EU  and  Member 
States  in  various  guises  over  the  past  decade,  and  their  prevalence  is  increasing.  At  the  end  of 
2009, at least four Member States had information campaigns in origin and transit countries, aimed 
at  reducing  irregular  migration.6  By  2016-2017,  at  least  13  Member  States  had  launched  such 
campaigns.7  The  EU  has  funded  a  pilot  information  and  awareness  campaign  run  by  the 

1https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20170302_eam_state_of_play_en.pdf 
2 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund-africa_en 
3 Nigeria, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Senegal, and Mali 
4 Additional funds are earmarked for resilience, migration management, and support to returnees. For a full list of approved projects see 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/contracting-status-sahel-lake-chad-jan-2017.pdf 
5 Concerns were driven by smugglers’ effectiveness on social media, where many use misleading messages to secure custom. For a discussion of 
such materials, see UNHCR (2017), From a refugee perspective, http://www.unhcr.org/publications/brochures/5909af4d4/from-a-refugee-
perspective.html 
6 Three other member states had limited campaigns targeted at prevention of trafficking in persons. https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/ad-hoc-queries/illegal-immigration/186._emn_ad-
hoc_query_prevention_campaigns_and_irregular_migration_23dec2009_wider_dissemination.pdf 
7 See ‘Summary of EMN Ad-Hoc Query No. 2016.1100: Migration information and awareness raising campaigns in countries of origin and transit’, 
available at https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/.../03/.../tk-bijlage-summary-ahq-info-campaign.pdf as well as section 5 5.8 of http://www.emn.lv/wp-
content/uploads/study_on_smuggling_of_migrants_final_report_master_091115_final_pdf.pdf 

 
 
 
                                                 
International Organization for Migration in Niger, and is one of the funders of UNHCR’s ‘Telling the 
Real  Story’  campaign  in  the  Horn  of  Africa.8  Objectives  are  to  raise  awareness  of  the  risks  of 
irregular  migration,  and  “uncover  [the]  lies”  of  smugglers.  Social  media  is  highlighted  as  core  to 
smugglers’ strategies.9  

Campaigns  have  typically  sought  to  raise  awareness  of  the  risks  of  migrating  irregularly  –  for 
instance,  by highlighting the  physical dangers  of the journey  –    or  to  sensitise populations to the 
risks  of  trafficking.  Fewer  have  explicitly  aimed  to  tackle  the  demand  for  irregular  migration  and 
associated  smuggling  services  by  identifying  key  points  of  intervention  in  the  decision-making 
process.  

The  study  finds  that  potential  migrants  from  across  the  region  rely  on  word-of-mouth 
communication  to  devise  and  implement  migration  plans.  In  contrast  to  other  major  regions  of 
origin,  such  as  Afghanistan,  people  smugglers  play  a  diminished  role  in  motivating  migration 
journeys, and their presence on social media is a ‘red herring’, distracting from primary migration 
decision-making  processes.  Despite  smugglers’  evident  presence  online,  most  migrants  engage 
their services face-to-face or by personal recommendation, usually after arriving in smuggling hubs 
such as Agadez.  Meanwhile, mainstream  media channels  –  television  far more  than printed press 
or radio – contribute to the ‘greener pastures’ principle, namely the widely-held idea in regions of 
origin that reaching a European destination will inevitably improve outcomes.  

Given  the  pressing  concern  to  address  high  flows  through  the  Sahel  to  Libya,  communications 
strategies should  aim  to provide  localised, trusted  information  to those  considering embarking  on 
journeys towards Libya and Europe. Social media becomes more important in transit, as migrants 
seek  to  connect  with  advisors  in  the  diaspora  online.  Effective  strategic  communications  in  this 
context requires focus in four key areas:10  

•  Targeting  –  addressing  interventions  to  the  groups  most  at  risk  of  attempting  irregular 
journeys  with  inadequate  information,  and  tailoring  them  appropriately.  The  report 
indicates  that  lower  educated  (and  poorer)  groups  tend  to  be  the  most  confident  about 
migration plans, despite having the least information.  

•  Channels  –  the  best  way  to  reach  target  audiences  through  trusted  sources.  There  are 
important  differences  between  national  groupings  in  how  information  is  accessed  and 
processed,  and  the  degree  to  which  sources  are  trusted.  Compatriots  with  experience  of 
Europe,  who  had  not  ‘failed’  the  journey,  and  who  were  not  associated  with  authorities 
(including governments and international organisations) are most likely to gain the trust of 
the target audience.  

•  Messaging  –  the  type  of  information  in  demand  among  potential  migrants  that  has  the 
potential  to  shape  knowledge,  attitudes,  and  practices.  Study  respondents  most  keenly 
demanded  information  about  destination  countries,  and  needed  support  in  calculating  the 
likely  rewards  for  what  they  usually  already  understood  was  substantial  risk.  Where  risks 
and  rewards  are  more  accurately  assessed,  there  are  likely  to  be  fewer  decisions  to 
migrate. 

•  Measurability  –  indicators  that  programmes  have  brought  about  the  desired  change  in 
knowledge, attitudes, and practices, and an  understanding  of the  changing  relevance  and 
impact of channels and messages over time and between towns, cities and countries. 

This study responds to a need for policies that assist West African migrants and potential migrants 
in  more  accurately  appraising  the  risks  versus  rewards  of  irregular  migration  on  the  Central 
Mediterranean route. Many migrants underestimate physical and financial risks, overestimate their 
chances  of  successfully  reaching  destination  and  acquiring  legal  status,  and  have  vague  or 
inaccurate perceptions of what life is like after arrival.  

A strategic communications campaign with a robust theory of change would offer:  

•  Value for money – irregular migrants generate significant costs en-route and after arrival 
in  Europe.  Investment  in  strategic  communications  offers  high  returns  where  it  removes 
the  imperative  for  humanitarian  aid,  coercive  migration  management  measures  and 

8 https://www.refugeecouncil.ch/news/archive/2016/e-platform-and-information-campaign-telling-the-real-story.html 
9 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-informs/emn-
informs-00_emn_inform_on_social_media_in_migrant_smuggling.pdf 
10 The challenges of strategic communications are discussed in more detail here: https://www.wodc.nl/binaries/Cahier%202016-
11_2683_Volledige%20tekst_tcm28-239610.pdf 

7 

 
 
                                                 
security,  and  the  costs  of  reception,  processing  asylum  claims  and,  where  unsuccessful, 
return.  

•  A reduction in the demand for smuggling services – the flexible, horizontal structure 
of smuggling along the Central Mediterranean route has made counter-criminal operations 
largely  ineffective  against  people  smugglers.  A  more  promising  way  to  undermine  the 
‘business  model’  of  people  smugglers  is  to  remove  demand  for  their  services  by 
encouraging the use of legitimate channels for migration.   

•  Social  impact  –  effective  strategic  communications  are  aligned  with  the  motivations  of 
those  considering  irregular  migration.  Appropriately-designed  campaigns  serve  a  social 
function  of  increasing  potential  migrants’  capacity  to  make  choices  in  their  own  best 
interests.  Moreover,  the  lines  between  smuggling  and  trafficking  on  the  Central 
Mediterranean route are blurred. Strategic communications can be designed in such a way 
to  undermine  the  recruitment  of  trafficking  victims,  in  line  with  the  EU  Trafficking 
Strategy.11  

11 EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings (2012-2016), https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/eu-policy/new-
european-strategy-2012-2016_en 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

As  part  of  the  European  Union’s  comprehensive  approach  to  the  migration  crisis,  the  Directorate 
General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG Home) commissioned Optimity Advisors and Seefar to 
strengthen  the  evidence  based  on  communications  for  migration  in  West  Africa  and  the  Central 
Mediterranean  route,  as  well  as  information  gathering  by  migrants  and  asylum  seekers  travelling 
from  West  Africa  to  Europe.  The  study  findings  will  support  the  development  of  a  strategic 
communications campaign aimed at influencing migratory choices in countries of origin and transit.  

A mixed methods study was designed to address the research questions. Fieldwork was carried out 
between May and July 2017:  

•  Review of the literature on migration and people smuggling from West Africa and through 

the Central Mediterranean route.  

•  A  quantitative  survey  of  1,053  ‘potential’  migrants  in  Senegal  (169),  Cote  d’Ivoire  (182), 

Gambia (180), Guinea (177), Mali (167), and Nigeria (178).  

•  Qualitative  in-depth  interviews  with  85  West  African  migrants  in  transit  in  Agadez,  Niger 

(25) and in Libya - Sabha (15), Bani Walid (15), Zuara (10), Sabratha (20).  

•  Qualitative in-depth interviews with 30 returnees from Europe (16) and Libya or Niger (14). 

•  Qualitative in-depth interviews with 15 Malians who had considered irregular migration but 

changed their plans, conducted in Bamako (10) and Mopti (5). 

•  Social media and online analysis using automated and manual searches of social media and 
online  sources  based  on  key  words  and  phrases  present  in  migrant  interviews.12 
Researchers  noted  that  with  more  time  and  resources,  more  sophisticated  APIs  can  be 
utilised, allowing access and analysis of a greater volume of data.  

• 

The  social  media  analysis  included  10  additional  short  interviews  in  Mali13  to  further 
investigate  the  use  of  social  media  and  online  information  in  decisions  around  irregular 
migration.  These  qualitative  insights  were  designed  as  a  case  study  to  give  some 
contextual understanding to quantitative findings. 

The  findings  of  the  report  are  shaped  around  evidence  of  1)  the  kind  of  messages  that  influence 
migratory behaviour, namely how migrants make decisions to migrate, and 2) the expectations of 
migration versus the reality; and 3) the sources of trusted information that shape decision-making, 
the channels by which it reaches migrants and potential migrants, and finally 4) the specific role of 
social media.  

Decision-making 

•  Respondents were motivated to migrate for diverse reasons, with common economic roots. 
Wealthier respondents in Mali and Cote d’Ivoire were more likely to base their decision on 
specific  assumptions  and  goals,  while  poorer  and  less  well-educated  respondents  from 
Guinea  and  Gambia  had  less  clearly  defined  aspirations.  Respondents  acted  on  their 
aspiration  to  migrate  after  encouragement  from  peers  at  home  or  in  the  diaspora,  or  in 
rarer cases, after being approached/recruited by a smuggler or trafficker. 

• 

European destinations were chosen on the basis of the respondent’s perception of whether 
he/she  would  be  successful  in  finding  work.  Legal  alternatives,  such  as  applying  for 
European  visas,  were  dismissed  on  the  basis  of  low  likelihood  of  success,  high  cost,  and 
high administrative requirements.  

•  Respondents were mostly confident in their migration plans. This was despite Guinean and 
Gambian  respondents  admitting  relatively  little  knowledge  of  essential  components  of 
migration, such as life in transit and destination.  

12 See the Technical Annexes for a full social media analysis methodology. 
13 This brought the total number of interviews in Mali to 25. 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Experiences of the journey 

•  Migrants’  experiences  in  Libya  were  variable.  Most  cited  problems  with  insecurity  and  the 
difficulties  in  finding  work.  Wage  theft  and  physical  abuse  from  employers  was  also  a 
problem,  and  women  were  particularly  vulnerable  on  this  route  to  sexual  assault.  At  the 
same time, a number of interviewees had established fairly stable livelihoods in Libya. 

•  With  the  exception  of  Ivorians,  who  more  often  arranged  smugglers  from  home,  and 
Nigerian  women,  who  were  often  trafficked,  migrants  did  not  usually  engage  a  smuggler 
until  they  reached  Agadez.  Smugglers’  intermediaries  approached  migrants  on  arrival  in 
Agadez and took them to the ‘ghetto’. 

•  Migrants  continue  to  pass  from  Agadez  to  Ghatrun  and  onwards  to  Sabha  in  Libya,  while 
others  travel  through  Algeria  and  into  Ghat  or  Ghadames.  Although  migrants  are  usually 
free  to  agree  terms  with  whichever  broker  he  or  she  encounters,  smugglers  remained 
decision-making power over routes.   

•  Migrants knew there were risks involved with the desert and sea crossings, and some had 
heard  about  kidnapping,  killing  and  violence  against  African  migrants  in  Libya.  However, 
many  did  not  understand  the  extent  to  which  these  risks  were  true,  especially  once  they 
experienced trauma crossing the Tenere desert stretch from Agadez to Sabha. 

•  Overwhelmingly,  returnees  felt  that  they  had  been  sold  an  inaccurate  picture  of  life  in 
Europe.  Many  did  not  expect  that  their  considerable  physical,  financial,  and  emotional 
sacrifices  to  take  the  journey  would  not  result  in  rewards  in  Europe  such  as  finding 
employment  or  quickly  receiving  asylum.  The  situation  of  returnees  was  further 
complicated  by  the  fact  that  many  faced  stigma  from  relatives  and  friends  once  they 
returned home and found themselves without support. 

• 

• 

Potential migrants were split in the levels of confidence they had in their knowledge of the 
journey.  Many  felt  confident  that  they  had  sufficient  knowledge  to  plan  their  journey. 
However, they exhibited poor knowledge when asked to respond to various aspects of the 
journey,  including  knowledge  of  life  in  transit  and  destination  countries,  physical  and 
financial risks, people smugglers, and routes.  

There  is  demand  from  migrants  and  potential  migrants  for  more  information  prior  to 
departure,  en-route,  and  after  arrival  in  Europe.  If  provided  via  the  right  channels,  this 
information could influence behaviour. 

Information and communication 

• 

There  is  a  difference  in  which  information  sources  raise  migration  aspirations,  and  which 
shape migrants’ decisions at departure, en-route and after reaching Europe: 

• 

Pre-departure: 

o  Pull factors to Europe– a high proportion of respondents watched television, and it 
appears  that  this  plays  an  important  role  in  shaping  a  positive  image  of  Europe. 
Sports  and  drama  programming  were  the  most  popular.  However,  except  for 
Guineans’  high  trust  of  television  for  migration  information,  it  was  usually  not  a 
direct source of migration information. 

o  Diaspora  plays  an  important  role  in  conveying  messages  and  information  about 
Europe and migration, and Facebook is an important channel of communications for 
these.  

o  Very few actively searched  for  information online before migrating; those who did 
were  mostly  Nigerians  and  said  they  searched  key  words  relating  to  the 
destination,  such  as  ‘asylum  in  Germany.’  Decisions  on  route/modus  operandi  – 
respondents relied on encouragement and information from peers and/or family at 
home and in the diaspora before migrating.  

• 

In transit: 

o  Migrants  in  transit  communicated  with  each  other  and  smugglers’  intermediaries 
overwhelmingly face  to face  and by telephone.  Some migrants made  contact  with 
smugglers through social media, though this was comparatively rare.  

o  While the internet and internet-based applications such as Facebook and WhatsApp 
were popular, usage depended on access. Less educated migrants and Senegalese 
had less internet access at origin.  

10 

 
 
 
o  Migrants communicated with family while en-route using telephone calls and social 
media.  While  internet  appeared  more  readily  available  in  Niger,  access  was  more 
difficult in Libya. Some migrants were illiterate and did not use the internet at all.  

• 

In Europe: 

o  Most migrants who had reached Europe said they called home at least sporadically. 
Some said they were not able to do so or could not do so as often as they wanted 
to because of high costs of phone calls.  The internet offered a cheaper alternative 
for some. However, even though migrants often had access to the internet in Italy, 
family and friends in the country of origin often did not, meaning that migrants had 
to make contact via telephone.   

The role of social media 

• 

• 

The  social  media  analysis  consisted  of  additional  qualitative  interviews  with  potential 
migrants in Mali, searches for keywords identified in the core research using Facebook and 
Twitter’s integrated search function (applied programming interface – API), and analysis of 
engagement with migration-related web and social media pages using BuzzSumo.  

Facebook,  WhatsApp  and  Viber  are  more  commonly  used  as  channels  of  communications 
rather  than  platforms  to  gather  information  on  migration.  Comparatively,  Twitter  and 
Skype are rarely used either to communicate or obtain information on migration. 

•  Social  media’s  primary  role  in  migration  is  to  facilitate  private  communication  between 
migrants, potential migrants and their networks. However, it has important secondary and 
tertiary functions:  

o  To connect migrants with smugglers  –  there  was evidence  of  migrants connecting 
with smugglers over social media, with several Arabic-language smuggling pages in 
Libya  appearing  active.  There  was  no  evidence  of  migrants  using  social  media  to 
engage with smugglers prior to Libya. 

o  To  expand  migrants’  diaspora  networks  –  migrants  en-route  and  in  Europe  used 
social media, primarily Facebook,  to connect with others in the diaspora. Migrants 
then  used  these  contacts  as  a  source  of  information  for  the  journey.  A  manual 
search of diaspora-themed social media pages showed occasional migration-related 
content but this kind of content was not often posted. Some used dating websites 
to  find  friends  (of  the  same  nationality),  or  with  the  explicit  aim  of  starting  a 
relationship with someone of the host country nationality.  

Online content 

•  Migrant-dedicated  pages 

infomigrants.net  and 
awaremigrants.org were rarely mentioned, and most content has not been shared beyond a 
few hundred people. In contrast, Arabic website ‘Migrate with us’ (immig-us.net), active on 
several social media platforms, has 320,000 ‘likes’ on its Facebook page. It hosts an active 
forum where people pose and answer questions.  

funded  by  EU  actors  such  as 

• 

In searching  for the ‘migrate with  us’ and other  websites,  some migrants were  led to  the 
EU’s  own  immigration  portal.  The  EU’s  own  website  therefore  has  some  influence  on 
migrants.  

Recommendations 

• 

The study recommends implementing a strategic communications programme in origin and 
transit countries.  

•  At origin:  

o  Deliver messages targeted at remedying challenging misleading stereotypes about 
countries  of  origin  and  Europe  using  sports  (men)  and  dram  (women) 
programming, though note this is a medium to longer term endeavour.  

11 

 
 
 
 
 
o  More  urgently,  use  word  of  mouth  advisers  (i.e.  in  person  or  over  the  phone 
counsellors)  to  provide  a  credible  alternative  source  of  information  to  migrants. 
Advisors  can  support  target  groups  in  calculating  the  risks  and  rewards  of 
migration,  becoming  more 
legal  migration  options,  and 
understanding  the  reliability  of  advice  coming  from  family.  Recruit  advisors  from 
target communities to ensure maximum trust and local knowledge. 

informed  about 

o  Ensure  that  campaigns  are  sufficiently  flexible  to  respond  to  target  groups,  in 

particular, potential migrants who are ‘high confidence, low knowledge’. 

o 

Incorporate language of ‘fate and faith’ into messaging, to counter dismissal of the 
dangers of the journey as ‘bad luck.’  

o  Target  television  and  social  media  content  towards  demographics  more  likely  to 

have access to the internet and television. 

o  Target migrants via television, word of mouth advisors, peers at origin, and via the 
diaspora  pre-departure.  In  transit,  target  migrants  via  social  media  such  as 
Facebook and WhatsApp.   

o  Centre messages on the asylum process and likelihood of success.  

o  Target key influencers with a distinct strategy. Key influencers include male family 
members of male migrants who often support the financing of journeys, and female 
family members of female migrants who exert pressure on them to provide for the 
family.  Female  family  members  (i.e.  mothers)  were  often  reported  to  oppose 
migration but less often influential. 

• 

In transit:  

o 

Increase migrants’ knowledge of support and safe areas in Libya.  

o  Further work with host communities to soften  stigma of return  –  with a particular 
focus in Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire. Key influencers in countries of origin should also 
be  encouraged  to  forgive  debts  incurred  to  finance  migration  and  support 
returnees. 

o  Create  or  partner  with  credible  diaspora-based  social  media  channels  that  allow 
migrants and potential migrants to interact with real people; demonstrate that not 
all in the diaspora can be relied on to deliver accurate information. 

• 

The study findings also suggest wider policy considerations:  

o  Analysis  should  be  conducted  to  understand  the  possible  adverse  impacts  of 
migration management policies in key transit countries such as Algeria and Sudan. 
In both countries, there are indications that authorities’ handling of undocumented 
migrants is encouraging onward movement towards Libya and Europe.  

o 

o 

Improve  local  integration  opportunities  of  migrants  in  transit,  in  particular  in 
Algeria and Libya, which are often the intended destination of migrants.  

Introduce  strategic  ‘enabling  measures’  for  legal  migration  from  the  country  of 
origin that support migrants in overcoming practical barriers to obtaining visas. 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 

Between the start of 2017 and 30 June 2017, approximately 47,000 West African migrants arrived 
irregularly in Italy.14  Nigeria, Guinea, Côte  d’Ivoire, Gambia,  Senegal, and Mali  were  all placed in 
the top ten countries of origin in this period, making West African irregular migrants15 the biggest 
contributor  to  the  ‘migration  crisis’  in  the  EU  since  dramatic  reductions  in  arrivals  from  Syria, 
Afghanistan and Iraq to Greece. 

While the establishment of relocation and resettlement programs aims to ease the pressures placed 
on  Italy  and  Greece  from  irregular  arrivals,  West  African  nationals  do  not  receive  international 
protection at high enough rates to qualify. With returns of West Africans from Italy and elsewhere 
in Europe also low, interventions at earlier stages of the migration journey are also underway.  

An  array  of  preventive  tools  has  been  used  by  European  policymakers  to  address  the  issue, 
including  information  awareness  campaigns.16  However,  campaigns  have  often  operated  on 
assumptions about the gaps in migrant knowledge, how migrants obtain and process information, 
and  what  kinds  of  information  would  a)  keep  migrants  safer;  and  b)  influence  migratory 
behaviours. 

The  Directorate-General  for  Migration  and  Home  Affairs  (DG  HOME)  commissioned  Optimity 
Advisors  and  Seefar  to  undertake  a  study  on  communications  channels  used  by  migrants  and 
asylum seekers to obtain information on migration.  

DG HOME stipulated four tasks to be achieved with this study: 

1.  Assess  overall  level  of  migrants’  and  asylum  seekers’  knowledge  of  the  journey  (routes, 
distances,  risks  and  smuggling  services  available),  intended  destination  (situation  in 
destination country) and how they plan to reach the destination (procedures to get asylum 
and legal migration options) across different migrants’ profiles. 

2.  Provide an overview on information and communication channels used by migrants arriving 

and staying in the EU (pre-departure, along the route and upon arrival): 

a)  How they obtain relevant and ‘trustworthy’ information 

b)  How they communicate with smugglers 

c)  How  they  keep  themselves  up-to-date  during  their  journey  and  during  the  initial 

period of stay in the EU 

3.  Assess how migrants relay such information and which channels they use to communicate 
and exchange information with their peers in countries of origin, between themselves and 
the diaspora members in the country of intended destination in the EU. 

4.  Assess the role of social media in relation to  other information channels in the context of 

migration and identify who is funding and operating the online content identified. 

The report sections address these tasks as follows:  

•  Section one of the report, on decision-making, responds to task one.  

•  Section two on comparing perceptions and reality of the journey also responds to task one. 

•  Section three on information and communications channels responds to both task two and 

task three. 

•  Section four on social media responds to task four.  

•  Recommendations and technical annexes follow these four sections. 

14 http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5205 
15 ‘Irregular migrant’ is used as an umbrella term applicable to all migrants who cross borders without legal authorisation, and includes asylum 
seekers and refugees. 
16 https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/eu_action_plan_against_migrant_smuggling_en.pdf, 6-8 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
SECTION ONE: DECISION-MAKING 

Summary 

At a basic level, the decision to migrate is based on a combination of motivations to move, or  the 
aspiration and capability (financial, physical, or otherwise) to realise migration goals.17  

Both  aspiration  and  capability  are  based  on  perceptions  of  the  risks  and  rewards  of  the  journey, 
whose  accuracy  is  determined  by  access  to  reliable  information  and  its  credibility  in  the  eyes  of 
potential migrants.  

This  section  explores  the  key  drivers  of  migration  from  origin  countries,  and  factors  in  onward 
movement from transit countries. It then investigates how respondents plan to reach destinations, 
and  the  extent  to  which  migrants  have  considered  legal  alternatives  to  irregular  journeys.  The 
section  then  continues  with  an  assessment  of  migrants’  destination  intentions  and  motivations 
behind those choices. It concludes with reflections on the type of information which might influence 
decisions. 

Findings 
Findings from this section are:  

• 

Economic  challenges  raise  the  aspiration  to  migrate,  and  migrants  perceive  the  causes  of 
this as poor governance and nepotism in the workplace; Malians often migrated with very 
specific goals, while others had more general ideas of ‘greener pastures.’     

•  Decisions to migrate are catalysed by encouragement from friends at home, the diaspora in 

the EU or, more rarely, approach from a recruiter or broker. 

•  Destination  choices  were  based  on  migrants’  assessment  of  where  they  would  be  able  to 
successfully arrive and find work. Sometimes this coincided with the presence of contacts, 
who assured migrants of support, or a perception of the economic vibrancy of a country.  

Drivers of migration and onward movement 

There is a distinction to be made between the factors that build the propensity to migrate, which 
are prevalent in the countries of origin, and the catalysts for departure, which determine how many 
actually migrate. The propensity or aspiration to migrate among the sample is primarily a product 
of  economic  conditions  expressed  differently  between 
groups.  

Overcoming  poverty  motivated  most  respondents  in  the 
study  to  leave  their  country  of  origin  (figure  1).  A 
majority  (65%)  of  survey  respondents  overall  cited 
either  poor (27%) or  no (38%) job  opportunities  as the 
primary  push 
interviewees 
explained  they  were  employed,  but  incomes  were 
unreliable,  and  prospects 
it  poor. 
Gambian,  Guinean,  and  Malian  respondents  often 
performed  dirty,  dangerous  and  difficult  jobs,  without  guaranteed  wages.  Decisions  to  migrate 
were  often  taken  as  a  household  income  diversification  strategy  in  response  to  poor  economic 
prospects, with encouragement and financial support from family members.  

Some  migrants  explained  their 
precarious  position  as  a  function 
of limited access to education and 
poor governance. 

factor.  Most  migrant 

increasing 

for 

Respondents who had not finished secondary school, financial pressures usually forcing them out, 
felt there was little chance of advancement at home. Rather than aspiring to further education in 
Europe,  most  interviewees  explained  they  expected  their  (low  skilled)  labour  to  command  higher 
wages  in  Europe  –  among  survey  respondents,  only  20%  cited  education  as  the  main  reason  for 
migrating.  

Several  Guinean  and  Senegalese  migrants  said  corruption  and  nepotism  prevented  economic 
progress.  They  viewed  opportunities  in  education  and  employment  as  reserved  exclusively  for 

17 http://compasanthology.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/deHaas_COMPASMigrationAnthology.pdf 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
higher  classes  or  favoured  ethnic  groups.  Conversely,  Malians  stayed  in  Mali  after  finding  jobs 
through their family network. 

Figure 1: Main reasons to migrate 

Various  circumstances  can  increase  the  financial  pressures  on  somebody  and/or  decrease  their 
perception  that  problems  can  be  solved  in  the  country  of  origin.  Conflict  and  livelihoods  often 
interact in this way. Notable in the sample was how  break-up of the nuclear family—the loss of a 
parent  to  remarriage  or  death,  for  example—narrowed  the  prospects  of  children,  often  because 
there  was  no  longer  somebody  to  support  education.  It  also  increased  financial  pressure  on  the 
eldest  children,  who  often  felt  a  duty  to  provide  for  siblings.  Family  breakdown  was  a  common 
factor in Nigerian departures. 

The  research  findings  revealed  the  reasons  that  people  acted  on  their  intention  to  migrate—the 
‘catalysts’—were primarily:  

•  Encouragement  from  the  diaspora  in  the  EU:  Many  migrants  departed  because 
contacts  in  the  diaspora  advised  them  to  migrate,  or  because  they  knew  somebody  who 
they  perceived  to  have  successfully  migrated  to  the  EU  or  Libya.  Nearly  all  (70%)  knew 
somebody  who  had  (or  was  perceived  to  have)  successfully  illegally  migrated,  rising  to 
nearly all Gambian (95%) and Nigerian (93%) respondents. 

•  Local  peer  pressure:  Qualitative  interviews  signalled  that  respondents  often  considered 
migration for long periods but did not act on it until friends encouraged them to accompany 
them on the journey.  

•  Presentation  of  an  ‘opportunity’  by  a  recruitment  agent/  broker/  smuggler/ 
trafficker:  Migrants  often  lack  the  know-how  of  how  to  migrate,  or  the  confidence  or 
contacts  to  do  so.  Agents  often  fill  that  void,  and  migrants  often  struggled  to  judge  their 
trustworthiness.  This  was  common  but  not  limited  to  Nigerian  women  recruited  from  Edo 

15 

 
 
 
State in the south-east of the country, a known origin region of sex trafficking to Libya and 
Europe.  Most  respondents  (84%)  had  not  had  contact  with  a  smuggler.  However,  over  a 
third (34%) of Malian respondents had been in contact with smugglers within the preceding 
six months. While this does not  reveal  who approached whom, it is suggestive of a much 
more active broker network in Mali.  

It  is  worth  noting  that  gaining  access  to  funds  was  essential  for  people  to  migrate,  but  not  the 
primary  catalyst.  While  the  migration  literature  increasingly  asserts  that  many  do  not  migrate 
because they are too poor,18 there was not always a positive association between acquiring funds 
and  making  plans  for  departure.  Indeed,  Malian  interviewees  who  had  changed  their  migration 
plans  indicated  the  opposite  –  that  gaining  access  to  funds  enabled  them  to  stay  and  open 
businesses (case study 1).  

The journey is relatively affordable, even for poor families where they pool resources. The costs of 
the journey to Agadez were attainable for most, at around EUR 50, or EUR 150 with bribes (all paid 
in local currency), and there is a widespread feeling that funds can be raised en-route. Moreover, 
just over a quarter (26%) of Nigerian women were offered ‘depart now, pay later’ packages. With 
no  upfront  fee,  payment  for  the  journey  is  recuperated  later,  likely  through  prostitution  work  in 
Niger and Libya.19  

CASE STUDY 1 

Changing plans: when development reduces migration 

Interviews with Malians who intended to migrate then changed their mind offer strong evidence 
that development interventions can be effective, if targeted well. Respondents offered a range 
of reasons  for abandoning  plans, including  a realisation  that the journey carried real dangers, 
and that Europe is no longer ‘El Dorado.’ Many were afforded more time to consider their plans 
because they were unable to raise the necessary funds to pay for the journey.  

Common  to  all  accounts  was  an  economic  or  education  breakthrough.  Malians  opened  or 
expanded businesses thanks to loans from family and friends who did not want them to risk the 
journey, an opportunity for further training provided by the Ministry of Education, and a grant 
through the Programme de développement des compétences et d’emploi des jeunes (PROJEC), 
which was used to open a bakery in Bamako. 

Intended destinations 

Decisions  to  travel  to  Europe  are  often  stretched  or  ‘fragmented’  over  the  journey.20  Migrants 
adjust  intentions  and  decisions  in  response  to  new  information  and  experiences  encountered  en-
route.  Understanding  how  and  when  decisions  are  made  is  key  to  designing  interventions  which 
respond effectively to migrants’ information needs:  

1.  Europe  from  outset:  most  survey  respondents  (78%)  and  the  majority  of  qualitative 
interviewees indicated that Europe had been their target from the start of the journey. This 
varied by nationality,  from  nearly  all  Ivorians (98%), to a smaller majority of Senegalese 
(64%). This category can be sub-divided into categories:  

a.  Without work: Some migrants aimed to travel as quickly as possible to the Libyan 
coast  and  depart  for  Italy.  Migrants  in  this  category  were  rare,  as  it  requires 
substantial  payments  up  front  and  most  respondents  were  poor.  Migrants  in  this 
category  can  be  especially  vulnerable  if  they  encounter  problems  en-route  or  run 
out of money. 

18  See for example, Michael Clemens (2014), Does Development Reduce Migration? http://ftp.iza.org/dp8592.pdf. The challenge may lie in 
reconciling macro- and micro-level assessments of migrant motivations, with the increased propensity to migrate at the national level obscuring 
more nuanced patterns at the individual and household level. For further exploration of this phenomenon see Paul Clewett and Isaias Tesfalidet, 
Thinking Like a Migrant, Migrating out of Poverty conference paper, http://migratingoutofpoverty.dfid.gov.uk/files/file.php?name=clewett-
thinking-like-a-migrant-update.pdf&site=354 
19 The dynamics of this have changed little since 2006, when Jorgen Carling published Migration, Human Smuggling, and Trafficking from Nigeria 
to Europe, http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mrs23.pdf. See also Seefar (forthcoming), Human Trafficking from Nigeria to Europe, 
based on fieldwork carried out in 2016 with victims of human trafficking.  
20 Other studies have also raised the issue of ‘fragmented journeys’ as a challenge to the image of unbroken flows from Africa to Europe. See 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/irs/crossingthemed/ctm_final_report_4may2017.pdf, 58 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
b.  With work: Those without sufficient funds saved to pay for the journey must work 
to  fund  subsequent  legs.  Most  worked  in  Libya  to  fund  the  journey.  Malian 
interviewees often  worked in Algeria – for example, two migrants washed cars for 
between one and six months in Tamanrasset – while others found work in Burkina 
Faso  and  Niger.  Some  in  this  category  can  become  settled,  and  not  act  on  their 
intention to travel to Europe for prolonged periods. 

2.  Europe en-route: Interviewees in transit and returnees had sometimes decided to migrate 
to  Europe  while  in  a  purported  ‘transit’  country,  usually  Libya  and  sometimes  Algeria, 
Senegal,  Mali,  and  Burkina  Faso.  They  make  the  decision  to  migrate  onwards  to  Europe 
because economic conditions are unsatisfactory (e.g. inability to find employment or send 
remittances) or security is threatened (e.g. discrimination in Algeria or instability in Libya) 
in  the  transit  country.  Migrants  of  this  category  may  make  the  decision  to  migrate  to 
Europe as a ‘best worst’ option, because it is easier than returning.  

Of  those  intending  to  travel  to  Europe,  there  were  no  overwhelming  preferred  destinations.  For 
instance, destination choice cannot be easily predicted by nationality. No majority in any nationality 
aspired to one single destination. France was the most popular ‘first preferred’  destination among 
francophone country nationals, but they were also more likely not to choose France than to choose 
it:  over  half  of  Ivorians  (59%)  and  more  than  three  quarters  of  Guineans  (76%),  Senegalese 
(79%), and Mali (80%) did not choose France.  

In  contrast,  nationals  of  anglophone  countries  did  not  show  a  preference  for  the  UK.  Gambians 
(24%)  and  Nigerians  (16%)  both  preferred  Germany  to  the  UK.  Although  not  overwhelming,  the 
popularity  of  Germany  since  the  2016  influx  appears  to  have  remained.  Notable  was  migrants’ 
sense that the United Kingdom, though desirable, was too difficult to reach.  

“In  Great  Britain  there  are  strict  rules...entering  Britain  with  illegal  way  will  cost  a  lot  of 
money if you don’t want to get arrested by the police.” (Nigerian male) 

That this opinion was held by several Nigerian migrants is indicative that it is more important for 
Nigerians to succeed in reaching or settling in Europe than it is to reach any one ideal destination 
country.  

Figure 2: First preferred destinations of survey respondents 

The  fact  that  most  migrants  had  contacts  in  their  first  country  of  preference  appears  to  suggest 
that  it  was  important  to  reach  a  specific  destination  within  Europe  -  Senegalese,  Ivorian  and 
Guinean migrants were clear that joining friends and family was the reason why they had chosen 
this  destination.  However,  there  were  indications  that  migrants  were  willing  to  change  their 
destination  of  choice  where  it  improved  chances  of  success.  Migrants  did  not  always  follow  the 
advice  of  key  influencers  in  the  destination  of  choice.  Equally,  migrants  in  Europe  do  not  always 
advise migrants to continue their journey to the same destination. 

17 

 
 
 
There is not a clear and direct correlation between potential migrants’ network overseas and their 
preferred  destination.  The  influence  of  network  on  the  preferred  destination  varies  by  country. 
Networks  of  potential  migrants  are  the  most  influential  in  Italy  (45%  of  respondents  aiming  to 
migrate to Italy had contacts here), Spain (33%), and France (30%). This trend can be explained 
by the relative weakness of the Spanish and Italian labour markets: migrants were open to moving 
beyond the countries in which they had the strongest networks, only to countries where they were 
confident of securing employment without personal connections. 

Countries such as Germany (26%) and Belgium (22%) most evidently attract migrants for reasons 
other than the presence of existing migrant networks. Germany is popular among Senegalese and 
Nigerian,  and  some  Malian,  migrants.  This  was  due  to  a  perception  that  there  are  good 
employment opportunities, and the German government treats migrants and refugees well: 

“My preferred destination is Germany because there are so many job opportunities there, and 
because  Germany  provides  good  financial  support  that  can  reach  200  Euros.  When  I  reach 
Germany and after one year of my arrival, I will be able to receive financial support and I can 
get residency.” (Senegalese, male, 23) 

Despite  a  relatively  weak  association  between  networks  and  destination  preferences,  many 
migrants  were  explicitly  told  by  friends  and  family  in  the  diaspora  in  Libya  and  Europe  that  they 
could  find  them  work.  Information  on  destinations  was  often  limited  to  reassurances  of  the 
presence of a waiting job.  

Jobs  offered  by  friends  to  male  migrants  were  in  agriculture  and  construction,  and  other  manual 
labour. Many claimed it was impossible for them not to find employment in Europe, and none found 
they  had  cause  to  be  sceptical  of  job  offers.  Examples  of  positions  offered  are  sales  assistant  in 
France  (Nigerian),  cleaner  in  Switzerland  (Nigerian),  at  a  horse  stable  in  France  (Senegal),  and 
domestic help in Germany (Malian). Despite migrants’ confidence in their destination choice, they 
had not conducted any prior research. Despite contacts in Europe often being strong advocates for 
migration, they often shared little of the detail of life at destination with migrants.   

Nigerian  and  Gambian  migrants  had  contacts  in  Italy  but  most  had  not  been  advised  to  migrate 
there. Migrants inferred that this was because contacts were not confident that they would be able 
to find work once arrived – when friends and family already in Europe would explain it is difficult to 
find a job, migrants would just change destination country.  

Italy  is  a  popular  destination  within  the  Guinean  and  Senegalese  migrant  communities.  They 
usually have friends and family there, either settled or not. This contrasts directly with Nigerians, 
Malians,  and  Gambians,  many  of  whom  did  not  want  to  travel  to  Italy  despite  having  contacts 
there.  

Within the Ivorian migrant respondents, the most cited destination countries were France (because 
they  have  friends  and  relatives  there  and  speak  the  language),  Sweden  (many  mentioned  job 
opportunities,  asylum  opportunities  and  humanitarian  assistance),  the  UK  and  Germany  equally. 
The  UK  and  Germany  were  described  as  governments 
who  grant  asylum  for  three  years.  Germany  was 
referred as having good policies for migrants, providing 
residency  and  financial  support  for  three  years  or  until 
they  find  a  job.  Respondents  know  migration  is  illegal 
but  did  not  mention  any  EU  regulations  and  rules  on 
immigration.  

“It’s impossible not to find work 
in France” 

This  speaks  to  a  trend  running  throughout  the  data  that  respondents  base  a  large  part  of  their 
migration  decision-making  on  where  they  think  they  will  find  work.  Respondents  use  different 
indicators of the likelihood of finding work (a government good to migrants; contacts in the country 
of destination; language ability, etc.), but are motivated by the same broad pull factor – jobs.  

Given  this,  it  is  important  for  migrants  to  understand  their  prospects  of  gaining  legal  status  and 
finding  work  at  destination.  The  data  showed  that  this  is  a  major  gap  in  respondent’  knowledge. 
Respondents  could  not  give  details  on  their  pathway  to  work,  or  the  pathway  to  intended 
destination once in Italy. Nearly none mentioned asylum processes, immigration rules and policies, 
language  barrier  or  integration  matters.  Where  migrants  acknowledge  that  there  was  a  process, 
they were often vague on the details: 

18 

 
 
“There are people in Belgium who I know have applied for residency and they are waiting 
for approval now. They say that life in Belgium is good, and if you look for asylum, you 
need to be patient because it takes time.” (Senegalese male) 

Many did not have specific job ‘offers’ but claimed it is impossible for them not to find any kind of 
job in Europe: “it’s impossible not to find work in France”. 

The  fact  that  the  lack  of  detailed  knowledge  did  not  appear  to  concern  migrants  should  also  be 
noted  as  one  indicator  of  respondents’  willingness  to  travel  to  Europe  unprepared,  confident  that 
life is guaranteed to improve. Interviews with returnees demonstrated the dejection that can ensue 
when  migrants  in  Europe  realise  that  it  is  difficult  or  impossible  to  realise  their  ambitions,  with 
interviewees  expecting  to  easily  get  legal  status  and  integration  support  in  Germany,  Italy,  and 
France, often failing to do so.  

The  great  majority  of  migrants  said  they  would  have  a  much  better  life  in  Europe.  Most  did  not 
specify  what  this  entails,  but  work  and  a  good  income  are  the  most  used  terms.  All  Ivorian 
respondents said they would receive asylum within a year in France, Germany or the UK, without 
disclosing  how.  Some  migrants  made  reference  to  marriage  once  they  are  in  Europe,  associating 
stable work and a good income with the ability of getting married. 

“I am looking to build my own house to get married and start my family life”. (Senegalese, 
male, 24) 

“After one year of my arrival, I will have a good job with a good income and I can expect 
that my life will be changed for the best”. (Senegalese, male, 23) 

Most returnees said they were very disappointed when arriving in Europe. Nearly none managed to 
apply for or receive asylum or otherwise regularise their status. As a result, they failed to access 
the  expected  services  for  migrants  and  refugees.  Only  one  Senegalese  returnee  managed  to 
receive  asylum  in  France  because  he  pretended  to  be  from  Ivory  Coast.  He  returned  because  he 
had his status revoked on discovery of his real identity.  

Many returnees from  Italy thought  they  were going  to receive  language classes,  accommodation, 
financial  support  and  even  vocational  training  in  Italy.  Although  they  did  not  disclose  where  they 
had obtained this information, it clearly indicates its inaccuracy or misinterpretation. It may be that 
previous waves of migrants did enjoy superior reception conditions in Italy, and have passed this 
experience back to current migrants. This points to a wider problem with migrants’ perception that 
the  diaspora  in  Europe,  by  virtue  of  their  ‘success’,  have  the  most  accurate  and  reliable 
information. The rapid changes to migration policy in transit and destination countries meant that 
the migration experience now is very different to the experience of even a year ago.  

Returning from the UK: The case of Olumide 

CASE STUDY 2 

Olumide returned to Nigeria from the UK after three years living in Manchester without legal status. 
During that time, he sought advice from his church pastor, a Nigerian living in Manchester, on what 
he should do to regularise his position. His pastor advised him against applying for asylum, as he 
had heard that the process often did not work out for Nigerians. He nonetheless recommended to 
him that he visit the ‘Home Office’ for advice. Indicating the severely limited understanding of both, 
Olumide said he had thought the Home Office was a branch of the Nigerian government. In the end, 
he decided that return to Nigeria was the best option. He crowdfunded his return to Nigeria through 
the social website Plenty of Fish and the support of the church congregation. Ethnic and non-ethnic 
churches are a place of sanctuary and trusted advice for many new immigrants, and potentially 
good interlocutors for diaspora messaging.  

Migrants  were  aware  irregular  migration  was  illegal  in  the  European  Union.  They  knew  in  theory 
that  deportation  was  possible  but  were  confident  that  they  would  never  be  deported  because  of 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
Europe’s  commitment  to  the  human  rights  of  migrants.  One  Guinean  respondent  specifically 
compared  how  he  expected  Europeans  to  treat  him  with  the  bad  experience  treatment  received 
from ‘Arabs’ in Libya:  

“Everybody  knows  that,  but  the  Europeans  are  good  people.  They  don’t  have  strict 
rules  like  in  Arab  countries.  For  example,  even  if  they  arrested  you,  they  will  treat 
you with respect and will not beat you.” (Guinea, male, 23) 

In  general,  migrants  were  unrealistic  about  their  prospects  in  Europe.  Researchers  judged  the 
proportion  of  respondents  with  realistic  expectations  on  the  length  of  the  asylum  process  and  on 
the speed with which respondents expected to find work. The findings assume that seven months is 
the minimum  period to get asylum status,  and  nobody  would  find  work in less than five months. 
The  above  calculation  also  assumes  that  all  migrants  would  be  awarded  asylum  status.  As  such, 
they  represent  a  ‘best  case  scenario.’  It  found  that  a  maximum  of  one  third  (32%)  of  migrants 
were  realistic  about  their  prospects.  Guineans  were  most  realistic  (61%),  while  only  6%  of 
Nigerians were (see figure 3). 

Figure 3: How realistic are respondents about asylum prospects? 

Influential information 

Broadly, those who have decided to migrate are likely to be influenced by changes in three areas:  

1)  perceptions of their home country and the economic opportunities available,  

2)  a better understanding of the risks of the journey, and  

3)  a better understanding of the reality of life after reaching destination.  

Respondents  differed  in  the  extent  to  which  they  believed  economic  ‘fixes’  could  improve  their 
situation. Ivorians (84%) and Malians (81%) overwhelmingly attributed their decision to leave to a 
lack  of  (good)  jobs.  Yet,  stable  employment  (Ivorian  38%;  Malian  31%)  or  increased  incomes 
(Ivorian  47%;  Malians  32%)  would  not  persuade  the  majority  to  stay.  The  reason  for  this 
contradiction is not exactly clear.  

20 

 
 
 
 
However, Ivorians were mostly in work on departure, and simply did not believe their income could 
improve without migrating, suggesting a belief that regardless of immediate individual needs, long-
term  economic  malaise  necessitated  migration.  Meanwhile,  several  Malian  interviewees  did  not 
intend to permanently abandon their households, but migrate temporarily to raise sufficient capital 
to  start  or  improve  businesses.  In  short,  economic  motivations  do  not  necessarily  mean  that 
immediate economic opportunities will change minds. 

In contrast, Gambians and Guineans indicated that they do make their decisions on a cost-benefit 
analysis.  That  is,  a  change  in  economic  circumstances  at  home  would  make  a  difference  to  their 
migration choices. For example, more money (Gambian 79%; Guinean 95%) or stable employment 
(Gambian 84%; Guinean 92%) would make them more likely to stay in the country of origin. This 
suggests that interventions to signpost potential migrants towards jobs, or low skilled job creation 
schemes, might be expected to influence the desire to migrate.  

Credible information on the  journey and the reality at destination and in transit countries is likely 
to  be  influential.  Migrants  interpreted  the  risks  of  the  journey  in  terms  of  how  they  affected 
anticipated  rewards.  That  is,  migrants  feared  less  they  would  come  to  harm  on  the  journey  than 
they would fail and efforts would have been in vain.  

Even before departure, most survey respondents from Gambia (73%) and Guinea (71%) declared 
they  would  likely  stay  at  home  if  they  learned  their  destination  country  would  not  fulfil  their 
expectations.  Many  interviewees  were  migrating  because  they  were  confident  that  they  would 
quickly find work at destination or had been quoted a minimum salary, which is likely unattainable 
in many cases. This discussion is expanded in the subsequent section. 

21 

 
 
 
 
SECTION TWO: EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES OF THE JOURNEY 

Summary 

This  sub-section  describes  the  knowledge  and  expectations  migrants  had  of  their  journeys 
beforehand, as well as the actual experiences of migrants in transit and returnees in the context of 
their  original  perceptions  and  the  ensuing  reality.  The  objective  of  the  section  is  to  explore  the 
accuracy  of  migrants'  own  perceptions  of  their  knowledge  before  departing  and  the  information 
they would find (or would have found) useful to improve their prospects.  

Findings 
Findings from this section are: 

•  Respondents are confident overall that they have sufficient information to plan the journey, 
despite  many  conceding  they  knew  little  about  the  journey,  and  life  in  destination  and 
transit countries.  

•  Respondents  claim  to  be  knowledgeable  of  legal  migration  opportunities  but  most  are 

sceptical of their ability to access them and few have attempted to do so.  

•  Almost  all  migrants  contacted  smugglers  in  Agadez,  which  for  many  migrants  is  the  last 
stop  before  return  to  the  country  of  origin  becomes  expensive  and  difficult.  Smugglers 
determine  routes  and  migrants  thought  it  logical  to  defer  to  them  as  they  were  the 
‘experts’.  Migrants  thought  routes  via  Morocco  and  Algeria  were  more  difficult  and  more 
expensive than Libya.  

•  All migrants found Libya insecure. Nonetheless, experiences in Libya ran a spectrum from 
relatively  stable  migrants  with  jobs  to  repeated  victims  of  abuse  and  severe  hardship. 
Migrants in the more stable group primarily wanted to migrate onwards to Europe because 
of the difficult economic situation in Libya.  

Knowledge and expectations of the journey 

The  level  of  knowledge  of  respondents  contemplating  and  embarking  on  irregular  journeys  is  an 
important indicator of priority areas of need for communications campaigns. Discrepancies between 
the  expectations  and  reality  of  the  journey  highlight  the  most  likely  influential  areas  for 
communications  messaging.  This  sub-section  explores  knowledge  of  the  routes,  distances  and 
system of smuggling, and expectations of risks and outcomes.  

Migrants  encountered  hardship  en-route  they  were  not  expecting,  but  mostly  did  not  regret 
embarking  on  the  journey.  Most  qualitative  interviewees,  and  87%  of  survey  respondents,  knew 
there  were  risks  involved  with  the  desert  and  sea  crossings.  Several  Gambian  and  Nigerian 
migrants  had  seen  posters  or  billboards  in  Agadez  warning  of  the  dangers21  but  did  not  learn 
anything  that  raised  doubts  in  their  mind  about  continuing  the  journey.  Similarly,  Ivorian 
respondents  had  heard  about  kidnapping,  killing  and  violence  against  African  migrants  in  Libya. 
Once  migrants  had  crossed  the  Tenere  desert  stretch  from  Agadez  to  Sabha,  the  reality  and 
trauma of the journey was evident. Migrants who thought they knew the risks of the journey, did 
not understand their extent.  

The  hardships  experienced  en-route,  usually  between  Agadez  and  Libya  or  in  Libya  itself,  made 
migrants more determined to continue their journey to Europe. The hardships endured in the first 
portion of the journey often increased migrants’ appetite to continue the journey through Europe. 
As discussed below in this section in more detail, the cost to return overland to Niger and home is 
greater than the sea crossing to Italy. Migrants have a choice to pay more to once again repeat the 
hardships of the desert, and perhaps return to disappointment and debt, or take the risk to cross 
the sea to an assured better future in Europe. 

Interviewees with returnees suggest that regret comes at a later stage, when migrants realise that 
their  considerable  physical,  financial,  and  emotional  sacrifices  did  not  elicit  expected  rewards.  All 
returnees interviewed had abandoned their plans to live in Europe either because they had either 
failed to reach Europe or had found Europe did not meet their expectations. Returnees from Libya 
had  often  been  arrested  –  unable  to  secure  release  to  attempt  the  boat  crossing  again,  many 

21 They could not provide additional detail on the organisation behind the posters. 

22 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
accepted that they had failed and resigned themselves to returning home. Disappointment among 
returnees in European destinations stemmed from the inability to attain legal status, find work or 
otherwise  integrate.  Returnees  were  unanimous  in  their  assessment  that  they  had  been  sold  an 
inaccurate picture of life in Europe. Many acknowledged they were not prepared for their journey 
and  did  not  calculate  the  risks,  finances  and  dangers 
adequately.  

Part of the reason that returnees,  and  other migrants, 
held  unrealistic  expectations  of  life  in  Europe  is  that 
their friends and family abroad, who are predominantly 
claimed  to  be  the  most  trusted  source  of  information 
on migration (see section 3), are not reliable sources of 
information.    Surprise  at  conditions  throughout  the 
journey and realities in Europe suggest that those who 
had  made  the  journey  before  do  not  effectively  or 
truthfully  convey  the  reality  of  the  journey  and  life  in 
Europe.  

There is demand from migrants 
and potential migrants for more 
information prior to departure, 
en-route, and after arrival in 
Europe. 

Potential migrants were split in the levels of confidence they had in  their knowledge. Respondents 
were  asked  whether  they  thought  they  had  sufficient  knowledge  to  plan  their  journey,  to  which 
75%  overall  (79%  male;  64%  female)  said  yes.  Despite  this  confidence  in  their  own  knowledge, 
when asked to respond to various aspects of the journey, including knowledge of life in transit and 
destination countries, physical and financial risks, people smugglers, and routes, many respondents 
had poor knowledge.  

The  interaction  between  perceived  knowledge  of  the  journey  and  readiness  to  depart  can  help 
refine  communications  in  regions  of  origin.  Overall,  respondents  are  confident  they  have  enough 
information  to  plan  the  journey  but  varied  to  a  large  degree  in  assessing  their  knowledge  of 
important  journey  components.  These  components  included  knowledge  of  financial  and  physical 
risks, people smugglers, transport options, and routes, as well as knowledge of life and policies in 
transit  and  destination  countries.  Respondents  were  more  likely  to  be  confident  in  planning  the 
journey if they knew somebody who had successfully migrated, were male (79%), of Senegalese or 
Malian  nationality  (91%  each),  or  have  completed  at  least  primary  (81%),  secondary  (74%)  or 
university (79%) education.   

The national typography below shows how  migrants  compare. It  shows that  Malians and  Ivorians 
were  most  confident  and  knowledgeable  on  separate  journey  components,  while  Guineans  and 
less 
Gambians  were 
knowledgeable.  As  might  be  expected,  the  overall  trend  was  for  migrants  who  claim  more 
knowledge of individual components to be more confident overall. 

least  knowledgeable.  Senegalese  respondents  were  confident  but 

Potential migrants with higher confidence in the journey but low knowledge are a priority group for 
intervention, as they are simultaneously the least likely to proactively search for information prior 
to departure and the most likely to make poor decisions.   

1.  Lower  confidence,  lower  knowledge:  Guineans  were  the  least  confident,  just  over  half 
(54%) feeling they had sufficient knowledge to plan their journey. This was reflected in the 
low  proportions  saying  they  were  ‘very  knowledgeable’  about  people  smugglers  (10%), 
legal migration options (12%), and returns (5%). Most (87%) did not know how much the 
journey  would  cost,  or  how  long  it  would  take  to  pay  back  debts  (95%).  Migrants  in  this 
group  are  likely  to  seek  information  but  lack  reliable  and  credible  sources.  They  may  be 
more likely to proactively engage sources of information where they are made available.    

Gambians  also had  low confidence  levels in  terms of their  own  knowledge of the journey, 
around  two  thirds  (64%)  feeling  they  had  sufficient  knowledge  to  plan  the  journey. 
Gambians  also  had  low  knowledge  levels:  around  two  thirds  (68%)  said  they  were 
uninformed about policies in destination countries, 81% about policies in transit countries, 
and 62% about life in transit – the least among all nationalities in these areas.  

2.  Lower confidence, higher knowledge: There were few in the study sample in this category. 
People in this category are less likely to want to migrate irregularly – the knowledge of the 
risks are off-putting for those without the confidence to tolerate them. 

3.  Higher confidence, lower knowledge: This group refers to the most overconfident migrants. 
Nearly all Senegalese respondents (91%) said they had enough information to embark on 

23 

 
 
the  journey,  yet  nearly  half  (46%)  admitted  they  did  not  know  the  countries  they  would 
transit.  Tellingly,  78%  did  not  plan  to  apply  for  asylum  in  the  destination  country,  even 
though 56% said they were knowledgeable about destination country policies. Respondents 
with primary level education were similarly very confident in their plans (81%) but usually 
claimed less knowledge in each area.  

4.  Higher confidence, higher knowledge: Nearly all Malians (91%) reported they had enough 
knowledge  to  plan  their  journey.  Most  (81%)  declared  being  knowledgeable  about  people 
smugglers  and  being  aware  of  physical  and  financial  risks  (80%  of  Malian  respondents). 
However, their knowledge on life in transit destinations is weaker – 60% of Malians are not 
at all knowledgeable about transit country policies, 46% of Malians do not know about what 
life is like in transit countries. This is pertinent as Malians often intend to stay and work in 
transit countries, and is an area of potential messaging.  

Some of the willingness to accept risk stems from a quasi-fatalistic attitude to events. The majority 
of  respondents  from  Cote  d’Ivoire  indicated  that  God  would  determine  whether  they  were 
successful  or  not.  Other  nationalities  were  not  explicit  about  placing  faith  in  God,  but  discussed 
failure  as  a  symptom  of  bad  luck.  Some  Malians 
explained that they had wanted to go, but had not been 
able  to  raise  the  money.  They  interpreted  this  as  fate, 
and  instead  focused  on  local  futures.  The  fatalistic 
aspects  of  this  could  to  some  extent  be  related  to  the 
lack  of  planning  and  research  into  the  journey,  as  well 
as  a  higher  tolerance  for  risk  among  those  who  were 
aware.   

Language around fate and faith 
may be powerful in 
communications. 

Knowledge of legal migration options and alternatives 

Migrants claimed to be aware of legal migration opportunities. Over three quarters (77%) of survey 
respondents  said  they  were  at  least  ‘somewhat’  knowledgeable  about  legal  migration  options. 
Respondents  with  university  education  (85%)  were  more  likely  to  say  they  were  knowledgeable 
about legal options. Guineans (61%) and Nigerians (65%) were less likely than other nationalities.  

However, for most respondents, European visas were not even worth contemplating. Most migrants 
thought  that  applying  to  migrate  through  legal  routes  was  out  of  the  question  because  of  the 
expense  and administrative requirements.  Most  said  that they  knew they  had  no  chance  because 
they  did  not  have  a  secondary  school  education  or  sufficient  funds.  A  few  migrants  specifically 
stated that illegal migration was cheaper than legal migration. Migrants were unaware of mobility 
schemes22 introduced before or since the migration crisis. They may in any case not be targeted at 
the  highest  risk  groups,  whose  pre-secondary  education  levels  exclude  them  from  university 
access.   

Passports were difficult to obtain. Several migrants from Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, and Guinea stated that 
it was too difficult to even obtain a passport. Again, this was because it often required the expense 
and time of travel to the capital, and the negotiation  of formidable  bureaucracy. Travelling in the 
ECOWAS  area  without  a  passport  was  possible  given  that  migrants  carried  funds  to  pay  bribes 
(EUR 10-30 each time).  

Regional mobility opportunities. Citizens of the ECOWAS region are able to legally live and work in 
other member states.23 It is estimated that millions have done so, and that intra-regional flows are 
greater  than  south-north  flows,  except  in  the  case  of  Nigeria  (more  emigrants  in  the  United 
States),  and  Gambia  (Spain).24  However,  many  travel  intending  to  do  so  but  find  that  economic 
opportunities  have  deteriorated  or  other  reasons  prevent  them  from  remaining,  and  they 
subsequently decide to move on. One interviewee had stopped to work in three countries (not all of 
them ECOWAS – Burkina Faso, Mali, and Algeria), before arriving in Libya. This is expanded on in 
the subsequent section. Schemes to encourage intra-African mobility, such as the EU-funded intra-

22 For example, Erasmus Mundus, which expanded the number of places offered to African students in response. For a full discussion of the 
challenges of barriers to education mobility see Collett, Clewett, and Fratzke (2016), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/no-way-out-
making-additional-migration-channels-work-refugees, 13  
23 Considerable practical and administrative barriers remain to cross-border work. Note also that the agreed protocol does not give citizens the 
‘right’ of free movement, and states still maintain the right to unilaterally deny entry to other members’ citizens. 
24 See ICMPD and IOM for Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (2015), A survey on migration policies in West Africa, 
https://www.icmpd.org/fileadmin/ICMPD-
Website/ICMPD_General/Publications/2015/A_Survey_on_Migration_Policies_in_West_Africa_EN_SOFT.pdf 

24 

 
 
 
                                                 
ACP  mobility  scheme,  which  has  provided  scholarships  for  temporary  exchanges  were  not  on  the 
radar of respondents.25 

Return  is  an  option  for  migrants  in  transit,  but  stigma  and  debts  are  formidable  barriers.  Many 
returned to families who could not understand how or why they had squandered an opportunity to 
live  outside  of  the  country.  In  some  cases,  this  meant  that  they  were  unable  to  return  home  or 
were  disowned  by  family.  Gambians  and  Senegalese  families  were  generally  receptive  and 
welcoming  and  there  were  exceptions  for  all  nationalities.  However,  stigma  on  return  was  not 
universal - Nigerians and Ivorians suffered the most shame on return.  

Realities of the journey  

Most  migrants  arranged  their  journey  to  Agadez  with  public  transport.  There  were  few  migrants 
who  arranged  the  whole  journey  in  advance.  Most  travelled  to  Agadez  on  the  basis  of  common 
knowledge of the routes in their local areas, then secured the services of a smuggler there. Almost 
all migrants contacted a smuggler for the first time in Agadez, Niger.  

In Agadez, “the smugglers come to you” – migrants reported being met in the bus and taxi stations 
by smugglers. An intermediary then escorts migrants to ghettos outside of Agadez. Staying outside 
of  town  allegedly  reduced  the  chance  of  being  intercepted  by  police.  Migrants  met  smugglers  or 
intermediaries  (referred  by  migrants  as  kamsho)  at  bus  and  taxi  stations  after  arriving  from  the 
previous journey. 

Migrants usually spent a period of four to ten days in Agadez before continuing the journey. Those 
who  did  not  have  funds  remained  in  Agadez  while  waiting  for  support  from  home.  There  was  no 
reported  violence  at  this  point,  in  Agadez  –  Nigerien  smugglers  were  described  by  migrants  as 
business-like but not abusive. Smugglers running  the  Agadez  –  Sabha route,  mostly  identified  as 
Libyan, were reportedly harsher.  

The  situation  from  Côte  d’Ivoire  is  different  in  that  most  respondents  had  arranged  a  smuggler 
from  home  before  departing.  Several  Ivorians  flew  the  first  leg  to  Niamey,  and  one  travelled  via 
Lagos,  joining  the  Nigerian  route  north  through  Kano.  They  travelled  quickly,  and  in  some  cases 
reached the Libyan coast in a week. This cost more, between EUR 590 (Abidjan to Sabha) and EUR 
3,050  (Abidjan  to  France).  One  Ivorian  who  had  run  out  of  money  in  Agadez  regretted  what  he 
perceived as excessive expenditure on the first leg, because he found he could not afford the fee to 
travel to Libya.  

Respondents knew relatively little about smugglers.  A substantial number of respondents from all 
nationalities  claimed  Nigerien  and  Libyan  smugglers  knew  each  other,  and  some  particularly 
closely, seemingly holding a friendly relationship. Other research points to the historic nature of the 
smuggling route,  and strong ties between  groups running separate segments of the route. Ethnic 
Tuareg  and  Arab  smugglers  have  lived  and  worked  on  both  sides  of  the  Niger-Libya  border  and 
collaborated and competed in the trade of licit and illicit good for centuries. 

In contrast, respondents themselves barley spoke to smugglers. Intermediaries took responsibility 
for  almost  all  contact  in  Niger  and  Libya.  Intermediaries  often  come  from  the  migrants’  own 
countries and speak the same language.  

Smugglers  usually  determined  the  route.  The  majority  of  migrants  travel  through  Niger,  before 
continuing their journey to Libya. Less often, migrants transited Algeria, before continuing to Libya. 
Malians,  Guineans,  and  Gambians  travelled  through  Burkina  Faso  beforehand.  Nigerians  usually 
travelled directly to Niger. Smugglers sometimes varied the route in response to changes in transit 
country border policies or conflict. Stricter enforcement by Algerian authorities, for example, may 
have  decreased  the  prevalence  of  migrants  on  that  route.26  Several  interviews  stated  that 
smugglers were the experts and it was logical to defer to them.  

Migrants from Guinea and Senegal compared the Moroccan route to Europe and the Algerian route 
to Libya as more expensive and difficult than the Libyan route to Europe or transiting through Niger 

25 For example, intra-ACP schemes have since 2011 granted scholarships to facilitate exchanges between African universities, 
http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/intra_acp_mobility/index_en.php 
26  For  example,  see  the  discussion  of  the  northern  Nigerien  town  of  Séguéduine  in  the  April  2017  IOM  Displacement  Tracking  Matrix 

report, https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_hLuy9q1oXQSW5fSzFyN21XbXc/edit 

25 

 
 
                                                 
to reach Libya.  Many stated that  the availability of  smugglers and the access  to Europe from  the 
sea  are  factors  that  increase  their  chances  of  success  in  Libya  compared  to  transiting  through 
Morocco. Many also referred to the Algerian route to Libya as difficult because of the border police 
controls  which  seem  relatively  frequent.  In  comparison,  borders  between  Niger  and  Libya  have 
been described as porous. 

Figure 4: Respondent migration paths from West Africa into Europe 

Payment for journeys was nearly always up-front in the local currency. Given the low cost for most 
migrants  of  reaching  Agadez,  this  implies  that  most  migrants  only  become  significantly  indebted 
once they leave Agadez. Several respondents identified debt as why they were reluctant to return 
voluntarily.  

As the journey becomes more difficult and expensive, migrants are less willing to halt and return – 
Agadez  therefore  continues  to  be  a  key  point of  intervention  for  programmes  aiming  to  influence 
northward flows. 

However,  the  situation  is  different  for  victims  of  trafficking.  That  their  journey  bore  many 
similarities to smuggled migrants makes it difficult to draw clear parameters for this category, and 

26 

 
 
 
so interventions targeted at irregular migrants would have to assume they were targeting potential 
victims of trafficking too.  

Most  trafficking  victims  are  recruited  by  means  of  deception  rather  than  coercion.  This  usually 
defined  the  stories  of  those  who  had  been  trafficked.  Some  Nigerian  women  travelled  to  Libya 
unaware  they  were  being  trafficked,  while  others  knew  they  would  travel  for  prostitution  but  did 
not understand fully the terms of the deal. This varied from women who were under the impression 
that jobs were waiting in Europe or Libya, while others knew that they were travelling to work in 
Libyan or European brothels, but did not understand the likely terms of the deal. These women are 
hard  to  identify  as  they  share  a  lot  of  the  characteristics  as  smuggled  migrants.  Interviewees 
indicated too that Ghanaian and Malian women may be in a similar situation.  

Life in Libya 

Migrants’  experiences  of  life  in  Libya  varies  between  the  relatively  normal  and  the  highly 
vulnerable. Levels of vulnerability impact how migrants think about their subsequent moves. While 
West African migrants are clearly vulnerable, their  migration to Libya is not exceptional  - Libyans 
are  used to their  presence  and depend  on  their  labour. At  one end  of the spectrum, respondents 
from Guinea and Senegal claimed they were satisfied with their lives in Libya and to have taken the 
decision  to  leave.  They  managed  to  find  a  job  and  regularly  send  money  to  their  families.  Many 
work  as  manual  labourers:  in  the  construction  sector,  as  carpet  cleaners,  car  washers,  in  marble 
factories, as tailors, and painters.  

Many migrants from Nigeria, Gambia and Mali were less positive about their life in Libya, but were 
nonetheless  stable.  Their  principal  concern  was  the  diminishing  value  of  the  Libyan  Dinar,  which 
was undermining their ability to send remittances home. Gambian interviewees indicated that they 
earned  around  LYD  20  per  day  on  average  -  and  LYD  50  if  they  were  lucky.  Currency  exchange 
takes place on the black market, with LYD 20 worth only around EUR 6.  

Interviewees  aimed  to  save  money  to  finance  travel  to  Europe.  Respondents  who  said  they  are 
satisfied with their lives in Libya and have a stable employment did not disclose how much they are 
paid,  but  they  used  the  terms  “good  income”  and  “good  money”.  However,  many  also  had  bad 
experiences at the hands of smugglers, and wanted to move on from Libya to escape violence and 
harm.  At  the  same  time,  many  migrants  were  surprised  at  how  little  they  earned  in  Libya,  given 
that it had offered gainful employment to compatriots for years before.   

From the survey’s responses, it seems the rule and not the exception for West African migrants to 
work  in  Libya.  Although,  many  acknowledge  the  difficulties  of  living  in  Libya,  such  as  insecurity, 
high  prices,  they  concluded  that  their  lives  in  Libya  were  still  better  than  in  their  home  country. 
One male migrant from Guinea stated: “I advised my friends in Guinea to come to Libya because 
here there are more chances than in our country”. 

However,  some  respondents  said  their  life  in  Libya  has  been  very  difficult.  One  Guinean  male 
respondent said his living conditions in Libya are rough. He rarely manages to work and therefore 
save money to pay for the travel to Italy. Another one said that despite the fact that he can work 
in  Libya,  living  conditions  are  very  difficult.  The  youngest  Guinean  respondent  of  the  survey  (18 
years old) said he sometimes had to work for 11 hours to earn very little money. 

Female  migrants  are  experiencing  the  most  difficult  lives  in  Libya.  The  only  female  Guinean 
respondent  said  her  journey  was  harsh  from  the  beginning  because  she  had  to  work  as  a  sex 
worker to finance her travel. She was also raped by two smugglers in Al Qatrun in Libya. She says 
she  continues  to  work  as  a  sex  worker  in  Libya  because  she  claims  she  cannot  find  any  other 
employment.  

Regardless of the reason, for migrants who wish to leave Libya, it is easier and cheaper to finance 
the  journey  to  Europe  than  it  is  to  return  home.  The  costs  of  travelling  between  Agadez  and 
Ghatrun  were  reported  by  migrants  to  be  between  EUR  200  and  EUR  600.  With  the  crossing  to 
Europe around EUR 300 at the time of writing, and  migrants able to earn to pay for the journey, 
borrowing money to return home, possibly to condemnation of the failed migration attempt, can be 
least  attractive.  Compounding  this  is  low  awareness  of  the  existence  of  assisted  voluntary  return 
and  reintegration  (AVRR)  programmes.  The  concentration  of  AVRR  on  migrants  in  (official) 
detention centres in Libya,  almost  exclusively  in Tripoli, means that substantial numbers of  those 
living  in  private  accommodation  in  Tripoli,  Sabha,  Ghat  and  Ghatrun,  among  other  towns,  are 

27 

 
 
 
unlikely to hear of AVRR as an option. The crossing charged in Dinar also means that the currency 
challenges  in  Libya  are  less  of  an  issue  –  migrants  can  earn  in  Dinar  or  have  families transfer  in 
foreign exchange. 

Protection 

Experiences  of  the  journey  and  life  in  Libya  ran  a  wide  spectrum.  Most  migrants  were  aware  of 
violence en-route and in Libya, but it did not appear to be the norm to be a victim of violence en-
route  or  in  Libya.  Many  migrants  –  usually  those  who  were  able  to  pay  extra  –  found  the  desert 
crossing  hard  but  passed  into  Libya  without  major  issue.  Many  started  work  in  Libya  and  were 
broadly  satisfied  with  how  the  journey  has  worked  out.  Several  migrants  in  this  category 
commented on the dire situation of poorer migrants.   

The most vulnerable migrants were those who could not pay, and women. Women who could not 
pay  up  front  and  were  not  travelling  with  men  were  in  the  most  vulnerable  category.  Women 
experienced the most abuse and violence during the journey, including high vulnerability to rape. 
Interviews  conducted  with  female  migrants  in  transit  in  Sabha  illustrated  that  the  lack  of  work 
available to women in Niger and Libya, meant that while men could work in construction, tailoring, 
and agriculture, women lacked alternatives to sex work. This was the only realistic way for women 
to gather sufficient funds to travel to Europe.  

It  was  also  evident  that  migrants  had  a  high  tolerance  for  negative  experiences  en-route.  One 
respondent  from  Guinea  explained  the  harshest  part  of  his  journey  was  when  his  group  was 
arrested by an armed-group in Mali and detained for a week. Despite this, the respondent said his 
journey had been good so far. 

Some  migrants  interviewed  in  Sabratha  explained  the  difference  between  Sabha  and  Tripoli. 
Although there is a lot of violence and insecurity in Sabha, one survey respondent from Guinea said 
that  the  host  community  was  nicer  than  in  Tripoli  where  he  is  sometimes  not  paid  when  he 
completed some work. If  he  tries to claim  his fee,  the employer would threaten him  to denounce 
him to the police or beat him. 

One  Senegalese  migrant  explained  that  the  situation  for  African  migrants  in  Tripoli  has  improved 
since  April  2017,  when  a  militia  who  was  particularly  violent  towards  West  African  migrants,  was 
expelled from the city.  

28 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 

 
 
 
 
 
SECTION THREE: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION CHANNELS 

Summary 

Respondents generally  had access to a variety of information sources. Although migrants pointed 
to  a  great  variety  of  information  available  online,  this  was  not  central  to  the  decision-making 
process.  Rather,  migrants  relied  on  people  they  knew,  or  compatriots  for  information  (mostly  in 
Europe or Libya). Where neither were available, they relied on information provided by smugglers, 
especially while en-route. Mainstream and social media content provoked conversation, and partly 
motivated journeys, but did not determine important choices.  

Figure 5: How different sources of information influence migrants at different moments of the journey 

This  section  explores  the  relevance  of  communication  channels  to  migrants  at  each  stage  of  the 
journey. These  stages are pre-departure, transit (split between a. Niger, Algeria and Mali; and b. 
Libya), and ‘destination’, referring to any country in Europe.27  It then explores further the role of 
the diaspora in shaping journeys.28  

Findings 
Findings from this section are:  

•  Before departure, television influences the aspirations of  potential migrants in the country 
of  origin,  while  word  of  mouth  communication  with  peers  at  home  and  in  the  diaspora  in 
the  EU  assist  in  building  plans.  Radio  had  substantial  listenership,  especially  among 
Gambians, but was not linked by respondents to their migration plans.  

27 This structure is chosen for clarity and simplicity, acknowledging that for many migrants, Libya and Algeria – and even Mali – are often 
destinations in themselves.  
28 The focus is on the diaspora in Europe, rather than Libya, unless otherwise stated. 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
•  Migrants in transit rely on contacts in the diaspora for information the most and use social 
media, as well as peers travelling with them. If they have no existing contacts, they seek 
them  out  through  social  media.  Regular  phone  calls,  Facebook  and  WhatsApp  were  the 
most cited channels of communications with the diaspora. 

•  Access to the internet and its use are variable throughout the journey, with less educated 
and  Senegalese  respondents  less  likely  to  have  access.  Internet  is  mostly  used  for 
communication purposes rather than research. Those without access to the internet before 
departure are likely to be less confident about the journey.  

•  Migrants in Europe contact home and migrants in transit using social media and telephone.  

Stage 1: Pre-departure in source 

TV plays a particular role in providing information on migration to migrants (figure 6). Of the 37% 
of  survey  respondents  who  said they  frequently  referred  to  TV  for  migration  information,  40%  of 
the  overall  sample  said  they  trusted  this  channel  of  communication  the  most  with  regards  to 
obtaining information on migration. There is an exception for Guineans, where the majority claimed 
they  frequently  referred  to  TV  for  migration  information  (77%)  and  88%  said  TV  was  the  most 
trustworthy  source  of  information.  They  viewed  TV  as  trustworthy  because  it  relayed  authentic 
audio  and  images.  It  can  be  best  understood  as  building  an  image  of  the  destination  countries. 
Furthermore, TV viewership was high, with 64% overall; Malian 88%, Nigerian 76% watching daily. 

31 

 
 
 
Figure 6: Television viewing habits 

The  news  as  a  source  of  information  was  widely  discussed  among  qualitative  interviewees  in 
relation  to  migration.  The  BBC  was  often  mentioned  in  qualitative  interview  responses  (both 
anglophone  and  francophone  respondents),  along  with  France24  (francophone  respondents), 
indicating that these channels are very much viewed in relation to news. However, access to news 
sites was often online. TV viewership habits were reported more broadly to centre on sports (32%), 

32 

 
 
 
 
films  (24%)  and  drama  shows  (14%).  Sports  shows  were  particularly  popular  among  Guineans 
(51%)  and  men  (42%),  compared  to  2%  of  women.  Women  were  much  better  reached  through 
drama  shows  overall  (40%).  This  highlights  a  distinction  between  what  migrants  consider  to  be 
migrant  information  (stories  of  tragedies  and  successes  in  the  Mediterranean,  for  example),  and 
the sports and drama programming that builds an image of Europe over time.  

Despite the merits of TV as a medium through which to reach potential migrants, caution must be 
exercised  in  terms  of  who  it  leaves  behind.  Nearly  half  of  Senegalese  respondents  (45%)  and  a 
third of Ivorians (32%) never watched TV. Pertinently, there is an association between those who 
watch TV and those who have encountered awareness campaigns. Over a quarter (28%) of those 
without a TV were unaware of migration awareness campaigns – only 5% of those who were aware 
of campaigns had never watched TV.  

Moreover,  TV  was  an  important  source  of  inspiration  to  make  the  journey  –  migrants  built  an 
image  of  Europe  over  time  through  television  that  influenced  their  desire  to  travel  and  set  their 
expectations  for  life  there.  However,  it  is  important  to  note  that  migrants  planned  their  journey 
through information gained from  word of mouth sources. Awareness raising  over television would 
therefore be a medium to long-term endeavour with the potential to correct inaccurate stereotypes 
about destination and origin. 

The internet bears similarities to TV in that access is uneven, and its role in the migration process 
is quite specific. While most Guineans had accessed the internet at least weekly (92%), little under 
half of Senegalese respondents (44%) did not have access at all. Education was a good indicator – 
44% without any formal education lacked internet access, while only 8% of those with a secondary 
education did.  

Figure 7: Frequency of access to the internet 

Still, Gambian survey respondents appeared to have better access to the internet than the national 
average  of  5  users  per  100  people.29  Most  (69%)  accessed  internet  through  their  own  mobile 
phones,  rising  to  78%  of  Nigerians  and  87%  of  Gambians.  Note  that  the  use  of  ‘feature’  phones 
has proliferated in West Africa. These offer internet access in the form of basic browsing capability 
and  certain  supported  applications,30  but  with  slower  processors  will  not  be  able  to  handle  data-
heavy content, such as films.   

29 Gambians 17%; Nigerians 47%; Cote d’Ivoire 21%; Senegal 22%. Seehttp://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS 
30 Note that WhatsApp, widely used on feature phones in West Africa, withdrew support for older operating systems at the end of 2016. It 
appears that many study respondents have upgraded their mobile phone model or found other workarounds. See 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/12/02/whatsapp-stop-working-older-phones-find-model-affected/. Facebook Messenger 

33 

 
 
 
                                                 
Migrants  predominantly  claimed  their  most  trusted source  of  information  on  migration  were  their 
friends  and  family  abroad.  Respondents’  use  of  the  internet  most  frequently  centred  on  social 
media  (52%)  to  communicate  with  the  diaspora  and  seek  information  and  advice  on  migration. 
Social  media  was  particularly  important  for  Nigerians  (73%).  Social  media  are  widely  used  as  a 
channel of communication with the diaspora, who give advice on migration, rather than to search 
for content on (i.e. finding specific Facebook pages or groups).  

These findings are important because respondents across all six nationalities said their friends and 
or family in Europe encouraged them or supported their decision to leave, but also provided them 
with  advice  and  information  on  the  journey  or  life  in  Europe.  Therefore,  social  media  plays  an 
important role in how migrants communicate with the diaspora who has a substantive influence on 
making  people  leave.  Facebook,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  Viber,  WhatsApp  and  Skype  facilitate  this 
communication.  

Few  interviewees  had  conducted  general  online  research  before  departing  –  they  were  mostly 
based in Nigeria. Many Guineans, Nigerians, and Senegalese said they searched for online sources 
on migration, very few Gambians and Ivorians said they did. Keywords were generic, focusing on 
elements of the journey (migration to Europe, migration Libya, boats in Libya, migrants in Italy) or 
processes on arrivals (asylum in Germany, migrants in Italy).  

Even respondents who researched their journey online said they did not trust online sources.  The 
reason  behind  this  was  unclear,  but  indicates  that  online  sources  play  a  prominent  role  in 
distributing  information,  would-be  migrants  turn  to  other  sources  for  confirmation.  Migrants  said 
they  trust  their  friends  and  family  abroad  the  most  (either  well  settled  or  who  just  arrived  in 
Europe)  with  regards  to  migration.  The  BBC  website,  Irin  News  as  well  as  the  European 
Commission website were quoted a few times across respondents form all nationalities. 

Figure 8: Frequency of access to social media 

Radio  is  a  common  means  used  by  development  actors  in  West  Africa  to  reach  poorer  and  more 
rural demographic groups with poor  access to  electricity  or low  television  ownership.31  This study 
suggests  that  radio  would  have  a  more  limited  effect  in  influencing  potential  migrants.  A 
substantial  proportion  listen  to  the  radio  overall  (60%  listening  at  least  once  per  week),  and 
listenership  is  particularly  high  among  Gambians  (91%  at  least  once  per  week).  However,  few 
respondents  identified  radio  as  a  source  of  migration-relevant  information  (7%  overall,  16%  of 
Gambian respondents), and fewer said they trust it (5% overall, 7% of Gambians).   

launched a ‘lite’ version of its application to better serve feature phone-owners, concentrated in developing countries, but currently 
excluding West Africa. ‘Facebook for feature phones’ also works for selected models. See 
https://www.tweaktown.com/news/54241/facebook-launches-messenger-lite-app-feature-phones/index.html, and 
https://www.facebook.com/help/mobile-basic/486772934767829?helpref=platform_switcher&ref=platform_switcher&rdrhc. 
31  See  for  example  multiple  projects  by  BBC  Media  Action,  http://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/where-we-work/africa/nigeria/merci-

project-madubi-drama. 

34 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
Stage 2: Transit before Libya 

This section focuses  on how  migrants receive  information about the route and journey in general 
while en-route, how they receive this information (channel) and what source they trust the most. 
For  Senegalese,  Ivorian  and  Guinean  migrants,  Niger,  Mali  and  Burkina  Faso  are  the  principal 
transit countries. Algeria was less frequently transited by migrants.  

Migrants  relied  on  smugglers  for  information  about  the  route.  For  some  migrants,  it  was  obvious 
that  smugglers  would  be  trusted  to  guide  them  as  they  were  experts  on  the  route,  while  many 
thought nothing of trusting them. This is especially true for Senegalese and Guinean respondents, 
who  relied  on  the  diaspora  in  the  EU  or  migrants  already  in  Libya  to  receive  information  on  the 
journey.  Migrants  who  paid  in  advance  for  their  travel  often  had  good  experiences  and  had  no 
personal  reason  not  to  recommend  smugglers  to  others.  Malians  were  particularly  likely  to  trust 
smugglers’  information.  Other  nationalities  were  less  certain  in  their  assessment  of  smugglers’ 
credibility. Some migrants stated that smugglers could not be trusted but that they were forced to 
rely on them. Discussion between migrants is minimal. Migrants in transit often kept  a quiet, low 
profile,  so  as  not  to  draw  negative  attention  from  smugglers.  Women  were  advised  to  remain 
inconspicuous.  

Contact made with smuggler intermediaries (mostly in Agadez) was made with mobile phone calls. 
There  was  no  evidence  of  reliance  on  an  internet  connection  to  stay  in  touch  with  smugglers. 
Nevertheless, migrants did frequently appear to have some access to the internet in Niger, mainly 
using connections to contact home and overseas networks via WhatsApp and Facebook messenger.  

Stage 3: Transit through Libya 

A substantial number of migrants said they relied on the diaspora and other migrants in Libya to 
obtain information on the prices of the crossing, availability of boats, contacts for smugglers while 
in Libya. Many respondents said they regularly discuss these topics along with risks and incidents 
in  Libya  with  migrants  they  either  live  with,  or  who  have  already  reached  Italy  or  Europe.  They 
stay in touch via the phone, Facebook, WhatsApp or Viber. 

Migrants less often said they used the internet to find smugglers for the crossing. It is more likely 
that  migrants  who  have  been  in  Libya  longer  would  use  this  option,  as  most  online  information 
appears  to  be  in  Arabic.  While  migrants  may  use  the  automatic  translation  feature  provided  by 
most up to date web browsers, the field team in Libya observed migrants accompanying smugglers 
to internet cafes. In these instances, smugglers would translate website content for the migrants. 
Websites included those operated by smugglers themselves, for example the ‘boats from Libya to 
Italy’ Facebook page, which shared news of upcoming trips and displayed phone numbers by which 
migrants could get in touch.  

Stage 4: Europe 

This section analyses how migrants and asylum seekers send information back to their countries of 
origin and transit, including within the EU, and what type of information they send. 

Migrants in transit provided more detailed accounts on their communication with the diaspora than 
returnees  from  Europe  and  what  information  they  send  to  their  friends  and  family  in  their  home 
country  or  in  transit  countries.  This  section  will  therefore  mainly  focus  on  accounts  of  qualitative 
interviews  from  migrants  in  transit  rather  than  returnees  from  Europe,  as  there  are  too  few  of 
them.  

Diaspora in Europe is quoted unanimously as the most trusted source of information on migration 
(all  topics  alike)  by  all  respondents  of  qualitative  interviews  at  all  stages  of  their  journey.  This 
prevails  whether  people  abroad  are  close  relatives,  or  people  migrants  have  solely  contacted 
through  Facebook  and  never  met  in  person.  Regular  phone  calls  are  the  most  used  channel  of 
communication between migrants in Europe or the diaspora (33%) and migrants in origin countries 
or in transit. WhatsApp and Facebook are also used: 28% and 12% respectively.  

35 

 
 
 
 
 
Migrants in transit explained they ask or discuss with other migrants in Europe or the diaspora how 
to reach Europe, what the prices are, smugglers’ contacts, how life in Europe or a certain country 
is, how to reach Libya, what country they should go to, and other questions on the journey itself or 
life in Europe.  

From  the  qualitative  interviews  of  migrants  in  transit,  it  appears  common  for  the  diaspora  to 
encourage people to leave and irregularly travel to Europe. Some respondents said their friends or 
families  in  Europe  assured  them  they  will  have  a  job  as  soon  as  they  arrive  in  the  destination 
country.  

“In Europe, I have contact with only one friend who is from my town in Guinea  and he is 
working in France now. He has been there for three years and I communicate with him by 
Viber. He confirmed that  when I  arrive  there,  he  will find me a job  with him on  the farm 
where he works.” (Guinean, male, 18) 

“My  preferred  destination  is  Germany,  but  my  sister  migrated  eight  years  ago  and  she 
settled in Switzerland with her husband and children. They always encourage me to travel 
to Switzerland.” (Senegalese, male, 23) 

However,  migrants  in  Europe  are  not  reliable  sources  of  information.    Surprise  at  conditions  in 
Libya and en-route suggest that the diaspora is often not effective in communicating the reality of 
the journey. Moreover, most returnees were disappointed and were not prepared for the realities of 
life in Europe as a migrant. This seems to indicate that although a great majority of migrants are 
regularly in contact with the diaspora, they either receive inaccurate information or misinterpret it. 
The  following  account  is  very  common  among  migrants  in  transit  who  said  they  are  regularly  in 
touch with people in Europe, including migrants who recently arrived in Italy: 

“My journey  was so  hard  and so risky for  me.  I suffered  a lot to reach  to here.  I  did not 
expect that it will be as dangerous as it was.” (Guinean, male, 25) 

There were only two returnees who claimed they deterred peers at home from making the journey 
through  phone  calls  to  their  home  country.  Further  research  would  usefully  explore  further  the 
nature of conversations between migrants and home.  

36 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE STUDY 3 

Mali campaigns: Two active campaigns, but migrants unaware 

“Mon Eldorado c’est le Mali” / ”My Eldorado is Mali” (2014, 2015, 2016) 

Donor 

Ministère  des  Maliens  de  l’Extérieur  et  de  l’Intégration  Africain  (Ministry  of  External  Maliens 
and African Integration). 

Messages and Methods 

Awareness  campaign  on the dangers  and risks of irregular migration. Consultations with  the 
community on what sectors would create sustainable employment that would benefit from the 
government's  assistance  in  line  with  the  National  Policy  on  Migration  (Politique  Nationale  de 
Migration) adopted on September 3, 2014. 

Locations 

Bafoulabé,  October  2014;  Nioro  and  Yélimané  December  2014;  Kayes,  February  2015 
Koutiala;  March  17,  2016  (conference  with  local  authorities  and  officials);  Koury  March  18, 
2016 (meeting with border authorities of Mali and Burkina Faso on entry and leaving criteria 
for  migrants);  Sikasso,  March  19,  2016  (day  of  awareness  on  irregular  migration);  Zégoua, 
March  20,  2016  (meeting  with  border  authorities  of  Mali  and  Côte  d’Ivoire  on  entry  and 
leaving criteria for migrants). 

 “Partir…Mais à quel prix?” / ”To leave...But at what cost?” (June 2008) 

Donor 

European Commission and the Government of Mali  

Messages and Methods 

Awareness campaign on the dangers and risks of irregular migration. As part of the campaign, 
IOM  will  travel  with  government  counterparts  to  the  western  and  southern  regions  of  Kaye 
and Sikasso, which have traditionally experienced high levels of migration to North and West 
Africa but also to Europe. 

Locations 

Kayes and Sikasso 

Irregular migration awareness raising campaigns (origin and transit) 

While  a  majority  of  migrants  said  they  had  seen  videos  and  pictures  on  the  TV  or  online  of 
migrants  dying  in  the  sea,  a  minority  mentioned  having  seen  in-country  campaigns  on  irregular 
migration.  None  referred  to  the  community-oriented  communications  activities  funded  under  the 
EU  Niger  pilot.  The  migrants  who  had  come  into  contact  with  campaigns  referred  only  to  visual 
elements: one Senegalese respondent mentioned pictures on illegal migration and its risks in Gao, 
Mali and Agadez, Niger: “it was a huge picture showing migrants lost in the desert and pictures of 
cars,  crashed,  accidently  upside  down,  [cars  carrying]  illegal  migrants…  and  some  of  them  are 
dead [sic]”.  

The  owner  of  the  campaign  is  not  disclosed  and  is  probably  not  known.  Only  a  few  migrants 
mentioned  IOM  and  its  preventive  campaigns  on  illegal  migration.  All  described  these  images, 
videos  and  campaigns  as  useless  in  preventing  people  from  leaving  or  pursuing  their  journey, 
regardless of their sources. This reason behind this is because migrants claim they know the risks 
and they are worth taking in trying to have a better life in Europe. 

“During  my  journey,  I  have  seen  many  campaigns  about  migration,  like  posters  trying  to 
discourage migrants from attempting to cross, but of course nothing will ever stop people 
from crossing.” (Senegalese migrant in transit, male, 17) 

37 

 
 
 
 
“I saw information about humanitarian organisation in Morocco during my short stay but I 
did not trust them much because their objective is to dissuade us from going to Europe. I 
did not even want to know more about those humanitarian organisations because they are 
created  by  European  nations  to  stop  the  illegal  immigration.  The  only  source  I  really 
trusted  is  my  friends  and  family  because  they  would  never  lie  to  me.”  (Senegalese 
returnee, male, 42). 

From  the  desk  research,  some  information  on  two  prevention  campaigns  against  irregular 
migration  that  were  carried  out  in  Mali  between  2008  and  2016  by  the  Malian  government  were 
collated (case study 3).32 Results on the impacts of these campaigns are not available. The limited 
anecdotal evidence of their impact collected as part of this study suggest some positive effect from 
the  creation  of  livelihood  opportunities  but  little  impact  from  media-based  interventions,  such  as 
those warning of the dangers of the migration. Migrants use social media to find information on the 
journey  –  by  connecting  with  real  people,  who  they  perceive  as  knowledgeable,  who  can  advise 
them on their next steps –and feel that campaign websites do not fulfil that need. This is not to say 
that migrants are not interested in understanding the dangers of the journey, but that usefulness is 
key  –  the  manner  in  which  such  information  is  presented  on  the  websites  was  not  considered 
useful by migrants. 

32 http://www.maliens-exterieur.gouv.ml/index.php/actualite/134-la-campagne-de-sensibilisation-sur-les-risques-et-dangers-de-la-migration-
irreguliere-dans-la-region-de-kayes-mon-eldorado-c-est-le-mali 
https://www.diasporaction.fr/conference-sur-les-risques-de-la-migration-irreguliere-a-sikasso/  
https://mali.iom.int/news/information-campaign-aims-prevent-irregular-migration-mali      

38 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
SECTION FOUR: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA  

Summary 

This  section  corresponds  to  Study  Task  4  and  will  “Assess  the  role  of  social  media  in  relation  to 
other  information  channels  in  the  context  of  migration  and  identify  who  is  funding  and  operating 
the online content identified” (see Appendix for methodology). Social media is not the main tool by 
which  migrants  receive  information  on  migration.  However,  social  media  such  as  Facebook  and 
WhatsApp  were  commonly  cited  channels  of  communication  with  the  diaspora  in  Europe  used  by 
migrants in transit.  Therefore, social media is important for connecting migrants to other people, 
rather than as a source of information about migration. 

The study engaged further with social media to better understand the extent of its use, and the key 
influencers behind its use. This analysis draws on four data sources: 

• 

Information from  the  quantitative survey and qualitative  interviews in  the six countries of 
interest  to  assess  relative  reliance  on  social  media  and  online  pages  as  a  source  of 
information and keywords to guide the search. 

•  Use  of  the  online  platform  BuzzSumo  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  websites  and  web 

pages with migration-related content were engaged with over the last six months.  

•  A  public  search  of  Twitter  and  Facebook  run  using  the  embedded  APIs  of  these  sites  to 
query the search terms in users’ tweets and Facebook pages, as well as groups and events 
to determine how much certain topics were being talked about.  

•  A  Malian  case  study:  ten  additional  interviews  to  generate  qualitative,  contextualised 

insights to quantitative findings.  

The  results  reflect  the  access  and  resource  constraints  of  the  study.  More  sophisticated  analysis 
using larger amounts of data is possible and recommended based on the findings of the study.  

Findings 
Findings from this highlight that migrants (potential or in transit) use open content on social media 
less  often  as  a  source  of  information  on  migration.  Social  media  is  very  much  used  to 
communicate, mainly with the  diaspora in Europe  or family and friends  in  countries  of  origin, but 
rarely used as a source of migration information.  

Some  migrants  conducted  research  prior  to  departure  by  searching  Facebook  or  Google  for  key 
terms.  However,  these  sources  are  not  trusted  enough  to  make  decisions  based  upon,  by  the 
majority of respondents.  

Other findings show that:  

•  Social  media  (Facebook,  WhatsApp,  Viber)  plays  a  limited  role  in  migration-related 
decisions.  Its  most  important  role  is  as  a  conduit  for  communication  with  friends,  family 
and acquaintances abroad who are the most trusted source of information about migration 
for migrants. 

• 

Facebook  is  primarily  used  to  communicate  with  friends  and  families,  not  as  a  source  of 
migration  information.  However,  open  and  closed  diaspora  pages  and  groups  may  be 
important in influencing and informing people about irregular migration through contact on 
Facebook.33  

• 

Twitter is not widely used, except among a minority of Ivorians (29%) using it weekly.  

•  Websites  providing  information  on  migration  were  not  often  referred  to.  The  website 
www.immig-us.com  (Arabic)  was  most  common  among  those  who  did  use  websites.  This 
forum and website is highly active. 

33 The social media analysis did not find much data on the use or efficacy of smuggler advertisements on Facebook. 

39 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
•  Migration related articles from general news websites in the region do appear to be among 
content  that  is  most  engaged  with.  In  contrast,  migration-specific  awareness  raising 
websites appear to receive fewer engagements. 

• 

• 

The case study in Mali (not compared to the other countries) reveals that people seek out 
general websites and Facebook pages and groups rather than migration-specific ones. 

The evidence suggests that migrants tend not to have direct contact with the smuggler at 
all,  but  instead  communicate  with  intermediaries  of  the  same  cultural  background,  who 
work for the smugglers. The mode of communication most used are telephone calls or face-
to-face. 

•  Social  media  is  an  important  communication  channel  between  migrants  in  transit,  the 

diaspora in Libya and Europe, and friends/family in source countries.  

•  Although Facebook is the most important social media source for informing migrants about 
the  journey  and  destination,  it  is  still  infrequently  used.  In  contrast,  migrants  frequently 
use social media to communicate with friends and family at home and in the diaspora. Most 
contact  with  smugglers  is  by  telephone,  with  the  exception  of  Facebook  connecting  some 
migrants and smugglers in Libya.  

Figure 9: Summary of use and frequency of social media 

Facebook 

Facebook  is  widely  used  among  all  nationalities.  Its  primary  use  in  decision-making  is  in 
facilitating  communication  between  migrants  and  the  diaspora  in  Europe.  Migrants  used 
Facebook  to  ask  or  discuss  a  wide  range  of  topics  on  migration  and  life  in  Europe.  Guinean 
migrants  use  Facebook  the  most  as  a  channel  of  communications  with  friends  and  family  abroad 
with (40%). 

Facebook was also used by several migrants as a tool to connect with compatriots in the 
diaspora. A number of Gambian, Guinean and Nigerian respondents described conducting a search 
on  Facebook  for  people  from  their  nationality,  then  connecting  with  people  in  the  diaspora  and 

40 

 
 
  
 
 
beginning conversations. One Nigerian built up a friendship network in the United Kingdom through 
the dating website Plenty of Fish.34   

In  some  rare  cases,  Facebook  was  used  to  seek  relationships  with  Europeans.  One  Nigerian 
returnee  from  Italy  who  had  aimed  to  reach  Denmark  wanted  to  “find  a  ‘whitee’  [to  marry].” 
Others knew people who had found girlfriends or wives through Facebook or other social media.  

Smugglers  in  Libya  used  Facebook  to  advertise  their  services.  Some  migrants  also  obtained 
smugglers’  contact  information  through  their  Facebook,  but  this  was  relatively  rare  among 
respondents. It appears that despite the activeness of smuggler pages online, social media can be 
something  of  a  red  herring  –  most  migrants  on  the  West  African-Central  Mediterranean  route 
appear to be connecting with smugglers in person and by word of mouth recommendation. Several 
different  pages  were  mentioned,  including  ‘boats  from  Libya  to  Italy’  (figure  10).  Most  migrants 
made contact with intermediaries face to face. Although researchers could not verify the identity of 
those  who  had  created  pages,  the  fact  that  most  Facebook  pages  are  in  Arabic  coupled  with 
existing knowledge on smuggling networks suggests they are run by Libyan smugglers in Libya.   

Figure 10: 'Boats from Libya to Italy' Facebook page, original language and translation 

Social media is more important as a tool for connecting migrants across the migration route. Many 
respondents said they are in touch with people through Facebook that they have never met  or do 
not know. They conduct a quick search on Facebook on what persons from their nationality might 
be  in  a  preferred  European  country  and  send  a  contact  request.  Once  contact  is  established, 
migrants continue to communicate and exchange information on the journey.   

A  minority  of  migrants  uses  Facebook  to  obtain  information  on  migration  on  specific  pages.  Only 
13% of respondent’s report receiving information on migration from Facebook. Similarly, the Malian 
case study also revealed that interviewees used both general websites and general Facebook pages 
to inform themselves about migration, not migration-specific pages.  

34 https://www.pof.com/ 

41 

 
 
 
                                                 
Because  of  migrants’  indication  that  they  used  Facebook  groups  to  connect  with  migrants  in  the 
diaspora, an additional  manual search was  conducted to try  to identify possible  influential groups 
or  pages  on  Facebook.  This  search  was  ad-hoc  and  influence  was  measured  by  the  number  of 
likes/followers.  Search  terms  included:  in  Europe,  nationality,  diaspora,  en  l’exterieur.  Table  2 
provides the results of this search and shows the popularity of pages, and reflects on the relevance 
of content. 

Table 2: Diaspora groups or pages based in Europe – search results 

Country 

Type 

Comment 

Gambia 

Gambians in Europe 
Public group  
12,208 members 

Mali 

Mali Jolies Dew 
Facebook page 
110,006 likes 
114,848 follows 

Nigerians 

Nigerians in Europe  
Public group 
17,689 members 

Cote 
d’Ivoire 

Diaspora Ivoirienne & 
Africaine 
Facebook page 
4,806 people like this 
4,771 followers 

Description: to share news and information about Gambia. 
Very little discussion on migration (fewer than 10 posts in 
2017) 

Identified through Mali case study (who described it as a 
diaspora group) Facebook description calls it a magazine. One 
interviewee in the case study described getting information 
about the journey from this page:  

"c'est grâce à Facebook notamment la page Mali jolies Dew 
sur laquelle j'ai pu écouter et visionner des témoins qui ont 
retracé leur parcours comme un enfer” 

Describes itself as fashion/lifestyle  
Approximately 10 posts on migration related topics in 2017 
(mainly about returnees from Europe, posts advertising 
services to immigrate to US, Australia). 

Page description: A US based NGO to discuss ideas about 
democracy and development. Difficult to search pages for 
migration-related material. 

Senegal 

Guinea 

Mixed 

Tous les Sénégalais du Monde 
Facebook page 
11,615 likes 
11,522 followers 

Very little description, posts do not seem to be about 
migration. Difficult to search pages for migration-related 
material 

Sénégalais de la Diaspora  
Closed Facebook group 
3,648 members 

Collectif Des Jeunes 
Democrates de la Diaspora 
Guinéenne 
Public Facebook group 
4,674 members 

Si Tu Sais, Tu Es Malien, 
Guinéen, Sénégalais, Ivoirien, 
Gambien Et Mauritanien Close 
group  
107,008 members 

Description: a group to bring together Senegalese living 
abroad. Linked to news website tukki.org  

Description: Group for sharing information about everything 
including politics. Three posts about migration in 2017  

Description: based in Mali but widely used by West Africans in 
the diaspora. A platform for sharing anecdotes, stories, and 
information about life in these countries 

WhatsApp  

WhatsApp is the most quoted channel of communications with friends and family abroad by Ivorian 
and  Gambian  migrants  (19%  and  62%  respectively).  They  use  these  to  be  in  contact  with  the 
diaspora in Libya and Europe, but also with family back home.  

Websites 

Analysis  from  the  qualitative  interviews  of  migrants  in  transit  revealed  several  websites  that 
migrants  use  before  departing,  on  a  more  or  less  regular  frequency  to  obtain  information  on 
migration.  A  manual  research  of  each  website  was  conducted  to  analyse  the  content  and  try  to 

42 

 
 
 
 
 
identify  the  producer  and  funder  of  such  information.  Obtaining  the  funder  of  these  webpages 
proved  difficult  (see  Appendix  for  limitations  in  the  social  media  analysis).  The  most  quoted 
websites are the following: 

•  Gate  to  Europe  was  mentioned  by  interviewees  from  four  out  of  the  six  countries 
(Senegal, Gambia, Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria). Based on Google searches it appears likely that 
interviewees  were  referring  to  this  forum  which  provides  posts  on  a  number  of  different 
topics. The forum contains practical information about different countries (entitled Gateway 
to Spain, Gateway to the UK etc.) such as how to use the underground in London. Many of 
these  posts  seem  to  be  posted  by  administrators  but  sometimes  the  posts  are  replies  to 
specific  questions  from  users.  The  forum  is  fairly  active  and  information  produced  on  the 
forums is in Arabic. The website presents itself as a tourism website for Arab travellers. The 
organisation  that  has  registered  the  domain  is  called  Domains  by  Proxy  and  it  is  unclear 
who produces the information and funds the site. 

• 

immig-us.com  was  mentioned  by  interviewees  from  Nigeria,  Senegal,  Guinea  and  Cote 
d’Ivoire.  This  website  is  the  top  result  that  appears  in  Google  searches  for  the  term 
“migrate with us”. The domain is registered by Mahmoud Zakaria based in Cairo. The most 
popular  article  of  the  period  between  1  Jan  and  30  June  was  entitled  ‘The  easiest 
nationalities  can  be  obtained  free  of  charge  or  for  a  fee’  which  had  3,300  Facebook 
engagements.  In  this  period,  each  article  on  the  site  had  an  average  of  177  shares  on 
Facebook.  The  website’s  associated  Facebook  page  has  320,128  likes  and  319,725 
followers.  The  site  mainly  posts  in  Arabic  with  information  about  migration  in  different 
countries.  For  example,  recent  posts  include  new  Australian  occupation  shortage  list,  tips 
for searching for housing in Switzerland, and a post about asylum laws in the Netherlands. 
The  site  produces  videos  such  as  “Questions  you  may  be  asked  in  the  Swedish  Asylum 
Interview”.  Many  posts  receive  upwards  of  90  engagements  (likes/comments)  with  some 
posts receiving over a thousand engagements.  

ةرجهلا

 نم بيل

•  Finding  smugglers  in  Libya:  interviewees  suggested  that  the  phrase  “

براوق
/migration  boats  from  Libya  to  Italy”  was  useful  for  searching  for  smugglers  in  Libya.  A 
search  with  this  phrase  in  Arabic  produces  two  Facebook  pages  of  smugglers.  The  first 
page  is  liked  by  4,896  people  and  followed  by  4,922  and  includes  posts  with  phone 
numbers  for  viewers  to  contact  on  Viber  or  WhatsApp.  The  most  recent  posts  are  from 
2015 and share a closed Facebook group targeted at Syrians in Libya  with 140 members. 
The second page is more active with recent posts from 24 July 2017. This page has 4,105 
likes and 4,141 followers. The page advertises with posts about planned trips and includes 
contact phone numbers. From this page, it is possible to find the profile of a person who is 
offering  boats  from  Libya.  This  person’s  most  recent  post  is  from  22  July  2017.  Posts 
include advertising the price of a car travelling from Algeria to Libya (€650) and advertising 
the  size  of  the  boat  (11  metres).  Most  of  his  posts  receive  at  least  20  engagements 
(combination of likes and comments). He has 289 friends  who mostly appear to be young 
men. All of these Facebook pages are very clearly marked by pictures of boats of migrants.  

The European Commission website appears in searches for both Immigration to Europe and Gate to 
Europe,  and  was  mentioned  by  one  interviewee  from  Senegal  as  a  source  of  information  on 
migration. However, it was not always possible to match search terms with specific websites. Some 
of the terms/phrases that re-occurred through interviews but were not identifiable were: 

•  To emigrate with us - mentioned by interviewees in Senegal, Gambia and Cote d’Ivoire. 
It is possible that this UK based website is a pair of consultants who help arrange visas to 
the US, Canada  and Australia. This may also  be a version of the ‘migrate with us’  phrase 
which often leads to immig-us.com.  

•  bawwabat Europa/ bawwabet Europa/ bawabat Europe - mentioned by interviewees from 
Guinea,  Gambia  and  Nigeria.  One  possibly  connected  result  is  a  Tunisian  forum  about 
travelling  and  tourism.  One  of  the  sub-forums  with  recent  activities  is  entitled  ‘Inquiries 
and  requests  for  travel  documents’  in  which  a  number  of  people  have  posted  questions 
regarding documents required for family reunification. The forum is mainly in Arabic. 

43 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Summary 

The study investigated how migrants obtain information for the journey, how they share it between 
themselves,  and  how  this  affects  decision-making.  In  relation  to  strategic  communications,  the 
recommendations are as follows: 

• 

• 

Implementation  of  a  strategic  communications  campaign  with  components  targeted  at 
origin, transit and destination countries could influence and reduce irregular migrant flows 
to Europe. 

There  is  a  need  to  separate  the  sources  of  information  that  influence  and  encourage  the 
aspiration  to  emigrate,  from  the  sources  of  information  and  migration  that  lead  to 
departure,  and  determine  the  smuggling  process  and  route.  For  example,  images 
transmitted via mainstream media construct the idea of a Europe of greener pastures. The 
knowledge and confidence necessary for departure is transmitted by word of mouth, locally 
and in the diaspora. 

•  Migrants  in  transit  require  more  nuanced  consideration  of  their  motivations  and  decision-
making  while  in  Algeria  and  Libya.  Migrants  in  transit  in  these  countries  must  weigh  the 
known costs of remaining or ‘failure’ and return against the unknown risks and rewards of 
migrating  onwards  to  Europe.  Communications  should  aid  migrants  in  assessing  these 
choices. This is different for those in transit in Niger. Before arriving in Agadez, Niger, most 
migrants are yet to make their biggest financial, physical, and emotional investments in the 
irregular journey. Their return home and reintegration is therefore likely to be more easily 
facilitated from Agadez and key transit points earlier in the journey such as Kano (Nigeria), 
and Bamako (Mali). Interventions here should counsel migrants on likely outcomes and the 
choice to terminate the journey before the stakes are raised. 

•  Migrants are interested in information which would help them assess the likely rewards of 
risky behaviour—rather than just the risks themselves. In addition, migrants could benefit 
from  being  informed  about  outcome  risks,  such  as  chances  of  asylum  success  and  the 
consequences  of  failure  –  rather  than  just  the  risks  associated  with  the  journey  itself. 
Communications should therefore not be perceived as ‘scaremongering’ or patronising, and 
instead engage fully in the decision-making process. 

•  Social media  plays an important  but  limited  role in the  decision-making  process  for those 
that  have  access  to  the  internet.  Moreover,  some  of  the  individuals  with  the  highest 
likelihood  to  irregularly  migrate  do  not  have  access  to  the  internet.  Therefore, 
communication  campaigns  should  prioritise  offline  methods  among  the  poorest  target 
demographics.    Where  social  media  content  is  developed,  it  should  be  targeted  at  higher 
educated, wealthier potential migrants.   

•  Communications can address aspirations to migrate irregularly by seeking to correct overly 
positive views of Europe and negative views of countries of origin over the medium to long 
term,  principally  using  television  programming  and  advertising.  Processes  leading  to 
departure are best influenced through trusted personal networks.  

Strategic communications 

Humans interpret risk in ways that might appear irrational in terms of their self-preservation.  The 
decision  to  ride  a  motorcycle—statistically  far  more  dangerous  than  driving  a  car—shows  how 
people  make  sometimes  unnecessarily  risky  decisions.  The  decision  to  embark  on  an  irregular 
journey  is  similar  in  that  some  knowledge  of  the  risks  is  overlooked  for  the  potential  reward.35 
Moreover,  although  migrant  deaths  are  likely  underestimated,36  in  reality  most  migrants  who 
intend  to  reach  Europe  successfully  do  so  –  just  as  most  motorcycle  journeys  are  undertaken 
safely.  

Disappointing  outcomes  are  more  pertinent  sources  of  regret.  The  chasm  between  the  imagined 
outcome of an irregular journey and the actual outcomes result in poor calculations of opportunity 

35 http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/boat-understanding-migrant-journey 
36 https://missingmigrants.iom.int/methodology 

45 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
cost. In other words, potential migrants either over-estimate the likelihood of a successful outcome 
or do not make a conscious assessment. Nevertheless, migrants’ knowledge of the physical risks is 
often  incomplete.  While  mostly  assessing  macro  level  journey  risks  accurately,  migrants  under-
estimate the actual impact of personal trauma likely to be experienced.  

To some extent, migrants are aware of these gaps, evidenced by their demand for information on 
the asylum procedures and life in destination countries.  With the demand for information present, 
the key challenge is in delivering information that is trusted and influential. That is, it will be acted 
upon by migrants and potential migrants, and change behaviour.  

The key challenge is in delivering this information through trusted sources. While mainstream and 
social media is widely consumed, it is evident that social media performs an important but limited 
role  in  shaping  migration  decisions  and  trajectories.  Migrants  used  social  media  to  build  their 
networks of contacts, for private communication with other migrants, contacts in the diaspora and 
home,  and  in  some  limited  circumstances  to  connect  with  smugglers.  Publicly  held  content  on 
Facebook serves as a basis for discussion, or to signpost migrants towards real people, rather than 
encouraging departures in the first place. This is a use of Facebook that a communications strategy 
should seek to emulate. 

The  study  concludes  that  there  is  demand  from  migrants  and  potential  migrants  for  more 
information  prior  to  departure,  en-route,  and  after  arrival  in  Europe.  That  is,  the  study  findings 
showed  that  there  is  implicit  and  explicit  demand  for  information  from  migrants  that,  if  provided 
via the right channels, would influence behaviour.  

Recommendation  –  implement  a  strategic  communications  information  and  awareness 
programme targeting migrants at origin, en-route and in transit.  

Proposals  for  how  to  structure  such  a  programme  are  detailed  in  the  following  conclusions  and 
recommendations: 

I. 

[SOURCE]  Conclusion  –  aspirations  to  migrate  are  built  over  time,  based  on  a 
narrative  of  a  Europe  of  ‘human  rights’  and  economic  opportunity,  contrasted 
with poor governance and economic prospects at home. 

West  African  nationals  aspire  to  migrate  because  of  a  common  belief  that  a  better  life  is 
guaranteed  simply  by  reaching  a  European  destination.  This  is  perpetuated  by  mass  media,  in 
particular  television  images  (especially  Guinea),  and  successful  migrants  returning  with  wealth. 
Narratives  of  poor  governance  and  corruption  (especially  Gambia)  contrast  the  country  of  origin 
with a Europe of ‘human rights’, where regardless of the exact outcomes, life is bound to be better.  

Recommendation  – communicate using trusted voices and  factual messages customised 
to  the  circumstances  and  location  of  the  individual.  Use  mainstream  media  and  returning 
members of the diaspora in the EU to deliver messages. Be wary of using returnees who are seen 
to have failed to enter the EU or failed to make their life in Europe a success, unless there is special 
reason  to  believe  they  will  be  trusted.  Migrants  have  most  trust  in  family  and  friends  who  have 
been (or are) abroad to provide them with information about migration, more than various forms of 
media.  This  is  because  migrants  often  perceive  the  primary  aim  of  media-based  campaigns  is  to 
keep migrants out of Europe – a view exacerbated by overly negative content. 

Expatriates  and  returnees  who  have  made  the  journey  are  credible  for  their  knowledge  of  the 
journey but can quickly become discredited if they are associated with perceived attempts to deny 
opportunities  to  the  target  group.  Migrants  from  most  backgrounds  discussed  the  decision  to 
migrate with friends and family at home. 

Messages  should  centre  on  the  chances  of  success  at  destination  and  should  be  adapted  to  the 
(mis)conceptions held by potential migrants about destination countries. For example: 

-  Detailing the deterioration of reception conditions in Italy since previous years.  

-  Advising on the path to regularisation and employment, and the reality of working 

without documents, namely an inability to save and remit money. 

II. 

[SOURCE]  Conclusion  –  while  mainstream  media  and  social  media  are  influential 
in  building  the  aspiration  to  migrate  (the  general  feeling  that  life  is  better 
‘there’), word of mouth is core to the decision to depart countries of origin.   

Migrants often felt confident enough to migrate because they were encouraged directly by peers at 
home or in the diaspora in Europe. While en-route, migrants often met new people and expanded 

46 

 
 
their networks, but always sought advice from individuals rather than institutions. In specific cases, 
proactive ‘recruitment’, commonly associated with but not limited to traffickers of Nigerian women, 
can perceptibly ‘open’ pathways to migration to those who otherwise would lack the knowledge and 
means.   

Encouragement  by  family  is  also  a  key  driver  in  the  decision  to  migrate.  Moreover,  permission, 
blessing or financial support from family is important to many, with only a minority leaving without 
their  parents’  knowledge.  Nigerian  women  trafficked  into  sexual  slavery  made  decisions  based 
almost entirely on conversations with extended family. The breakdown of family support structures 
can  increase  pressure  to  provide  financially,  which  in  turn  can  make  migration  seem  a  more 
attractive, or necessary, option.  

Recommendation – communication campaigns on migration should seek to leverage the 
media  over  the  longer  term  to  change  perceptions  of  origin  and  desired  destination 
countries.  More  immediately,  the  strategy  should  harness  the  power  of  existing  trusted 
voices to drive behaviour change.   

Media,  in  particular  television,  could  be  used  over  the  medium  to  longer  term  to  challenge  the 
‘greener pastures’ narrative, whereby substantial numbers of West African citizens believe reaching 
Europe  inevitably  improves  prospects,  regardless  of  circumstances.  This  would  be  expensive  and 
difficult to execute well, but the research supports it.  

Questioning  cultural  stereotypes  is  a  subtle  process  that  would  be  undermined  by  ‘hard’  anti-
migration  messaging.  Among  the  target  audience,  any  message  delivered  by  authorities  on 
migration  can  be  perceived  as  anti-migration,  regardless  of  content.  Drama  and  sports-related 
programming  were  popular  among  female  and  male  respondents  respectively.  International 
programming aired in countries of  origin may  be particularly effective. Concepts should be tested 
with target audiences before production.  

Use mainstream media and social media to signpost would-be migrants to credible word of mouth 
sources.  Potential  migrants  widely  consume  information  on  mainstream  and  social  media  but  do 
not  trust  it  sufficiently  to  base  decisions  on  it.  Creating  content  that  both  engages  migrants  and 
leads  to  behaviour  change  would  require  signposting  to  a  credible  human  source  that  can  verify 
information.  Multimedia  may  also  make  risks  appear  more  real  prior  to  departure  because  of  the 
visual  aspect.  This  will  allow  migrants  to  get  beyond  an  impasse  where  they  migrants  know  the 
risks but do not understand their impact.  

Target  key  influencers  –  parents,  families,  diaspora  –  most  migrants  were  dependent  on  the 
support of family members at home, and sometimes even their permission, to be able to migrate. 
Messages  from  family  members  are  generally  more  trusted,  especially  where  they  are  ultimately 
responsible  for  financing  the  journey,  and  financiers  also  have  the  power  to  forgive  debts 
preventing  return.  Effective  targeting  would  mean  assessment  of  the  communications  habits  of 
family members, which may mean more offline outreach, in local languages.  

III. 

[SOURCE] Conclusion – while migrants share some commonalities with regard to 
migration  motivations,  when  put  in  context,  various  distinct  migration  drivers 
require tailored messaging. 

Core  to  this  is  how  migrants  define  ‘success,’  with  poorer  potential  migrants  (from  Gambia, 
Guinea) more often see no prospects of changing their life except through migration, and wealthier 
migrants (from Cote d’Ivoire, Mali) more likely to have made a strategic calculation that migration 
will help them attain a specific goal.  

Recommendation  –  ensure  that  campaigns  are  sufficiently  flexible  to  respond  to  target 
groups.  Strategic  communications  programmes  should  note  key  differences  between  how  socio-
economic  and  national  groups  consume  information  and  respond  to  messaging.  Guidance  on 
alternatives to irregular migration, their value relative to investment, and how to access them may 
be  more  appropriate  for  poorer  migrants  who  see  ‘no  option’  but  to  migrate.  Wealthier  migrants 
are more likely to have surveyed alternative options and calculated the relative risks and rewards 
of  migration  and  may  benefit  more  from  more  specific  probing  of  assumptions  made  in  their 
calculations, such as earning potential in Libya and Europe, and the ability to migrate onwards from 
Libya and beyond Italy. 

IV. 

[SOURCE]  Conclusion  –  potential  migrants’  family  members  are  key  influencers. 
As mentioned in preceding conclusions, many migrants are dependent on family members 

47 

 
 
to finance  journeys,  usually male relatives. Select Malian interviewees indicated that they 
were  persuaded  not  to  migrate  by  intervention  from  parents.  Some  (Nigerian)  female 
migrants  negotiated  their  migration  with  female  relatives  (but  did  not  always  agree  with 
their advice).  

Recommendation  –  target  components  of  the  communications  campaign  at  family 
members.  Make  it  clear  that  they  are  enabling  irregular  migration,  and  that  money  lent 
to  migrants  may  never  be  paid  back.  In  line  with  following  conclusions,  emphasise  the 
difficult  experiences  of  migrants  and  the  importance  of  accepting  and  supporting 
returning migrants.  

V. 

[SOURCE]  Conclusion  –  mass  and  social  media  have  wide  reach,  but  are  less 
effective for reaching the highest risk groups.  

There  is  an  association  between  those  who  had  internet  access  and  those  who  had  heard  of 
awareness campaigns.  Those  unaware  of  migration awareness campaigns  were significantly more 
likely  to  lack  internet  access  (30%).  Moreover,  lesser  educated  respondents  were  less  likely  to 
have internet access (44%).  Information is therefore less likely to reach them. Those with access 
are  likely  to  do  so  through  ‘feature  phones’,  which  often  run  on  a  Java  (rather  than  Android  or 
iOS).  Others  do  not  own  televisions  or  have  intermittent  power  and  so  will  only  watch  at  certain 
times of day, or in communal places with dedicated power supplies, such as bars and cafes.  

Recommendation  –  target  television  and  social  media  content  towards  demographics 
more  likely  to  have  access  to  the  internet  and  television.  In  poorer  areas  and  areas  with 
unreliable  power,  television  messaging  should  target  programming  most  likely  to  be  viewed 
communally,  such  as  sports  games  for  men.  Online  content  should  be  suitable  for  ‘feature’  cell 
phones. In poorer areas, place greater weight on radio and community relationships.   

VI. 

[SOURCE / TRANSIT] Conclusion  – Migrants often used the  language  of fate  and 
faith to dismiss concerns about the  dangers of the journey, believing they would 
not experience the ‘bad luck’ of those  who have  come to harm en-route. Despite 
this, the influence of religious leaders over potential migrants, in particular those 
in younger age categories, was found to be limited. 

Recommendation  –  communications  should  not  avoid  the  risks  of  the  journey,  but 
engage with this attitude. It should ensure that messages are highly adapted to the local 
context and the target audiences in those locations, with messages  countering fatalistic 
attitudes  to  human  life.  Assess  the  influence  of  local  religious  figures,  and  seek 
partnerships if appropriate.   

VII. 

[SOURCE  /  TRANSIT]  Conclusion  –  television  and  peers  have  great  influence  at 
origin, while trusted voices on social media can be effective at reaching migrants 
in transit. 

Before departure, television influences the aspirations of potential migrants in the country of origin, 
while peers at home and in the diaspora assist with the granular detail of planning. 

Migrants in transit rely on contacts outside of their country of origin for information the most and 
use  social media  to contact them.  If they  have  no  existing  contacts, they seek  them  out through 
social  media.  Regular  phone  calls,  Facebook  and  WhatsApp  were  the  most  cited  channels  of 
communications  with  the  diaspora.  Travel  companions  often  pool  information  received  from  the 
diaspora to make sense of it. 

Recommendation  –  use  a  combination  of  channels  customised  to  more  specified  target 
audiences.  

VIII. 

[TRANSIT]  Conclusion  –Migrants  must  invest  significantly  in  departing  Agadez, 
meaning  there  is  a  small  window  of  opportunity  whereby  migrants  in  Niger  can 
return  home  with  relatively  little  financial  loss.  Yet,  migrants’  awareness  of 
existing communications campaigns was low or unknown.  

Recommendation – carry out robust evaluations of awareness raising activities in Niger, 
and aim to capture the perspectives and experiences of migrants who have since moved 
on  or  returned  to  countries  of  origin.  These  perspectives  are  important  to  build  a  full 
picture of efficacy. Use this data to adjust communications activities in Niger.  

IX. 

[TRANSIT]  Conclusion  –  many  migrants  attempting  the  journey  to  Europe  had 
established relatively stable livelihoods in Libya.  

48 

 
 
A  more  nuanced  typology  of  the  needs  of  migrants  transiting  Libya  should  be  developed  and 
applied  in  order  to  ensure  the  relevance  of  strategic  communications  and  other  interventions. 
Although  economic  and  physical  insecurity  is  pervasive,  and  many  migrants  encounter  horrific 
abuses, it should not be forgotten that Libya continues to be a place where migrants live and work 
–  often  with  satisfaction.  Interventions  in  Libya  should  consider  that  the  struggle  to  find  work  in 
Italy would be a worse outcome than continuing to work in Libya. In addition, interventions should 
include  information  on  the  difficulty  of  being  granted  asylum,  life  in  refugee  camps  or  detention 
centres in the EU, life in Europe if denied asylum, and the general hardships of living illegally in the 
EU. 

Recommendation  –  increase  migrant’s  knowledge  of  support  and  safe  areas  in  Libya.  
Signpost  to  existing  livelihood  programmes  that  have  been  demonstrated  to  change  minds,  and 
address  other  reasons  for  inclusion/  exclusion.  Malians  who  changed  their  plans  to  migrate 
irregularly  often  did  so  because  of  a  new  opportunity  at  home.  Some  of  these  opportunities 
continue to exist but are not being accessed by the groups likely to migrate.  

X. 

[TRANSIT]  Conclusion  –  many  migrants  rule  out  return  because  they  anticipate 
stigma  from  origin  communities  and  because  they  are  unaware  of  assistance  to 
return voluntarily.  

Recommendation – further work with host communities to soften stigma of return – with 
a  particular  focus  in  Nigeria  and  Cote  d’Ivoire.  It  remains  extremely  difficult  to  return,  with 
many  returnees  unable  to  reconcile  with  families.  Greater  understanding  among  communities  in 
countries of origin would enable more to make the difficult decision to return voluntarily from Libya 
and Europe.  

XI. 

 [TRANSIT/  DESTINATION]  Conclusion  –  migrants  in  transit  rely  on  migrants  in 
the diaspora in the EU to make decisions.   

Migration plans are  often,  and  perhaps understandably,  modelled  after the  successful  journeys  of 
peers already  in Europe, and the diaspora continues to  be a trusted source  of information  on the 
journey. Many migrants seek out new contacts with compatriots based in Europe via social media 
channels. 

However, the study has shown that migrants in the diaspora are unreliable  interlocutors. The fast 
pace of change in transit and destination country policies and contexts, means that the journey and 
asylum  application  of  one  migrant  can  become  unrecognisable  just  weeks  later.  Most  pertinently, 
the severe difficulties migrants now face moving onwards from Italy are not known by migrants in 
transit.  

Recommendation  –  consider  a  diaspora  based  communications  campaign.  Migrants’ 
reliance on those who have successfully completed the journey  offers an opportunity to create an 
online platform for trusted interaction with migrants. This would be more effective than displaying 
content online, which migrants are less likely to absorb passively.  

Messages  should  also  communicate  that  many  voices  in  the  diaspora  provide  inaccurate 
information because the migration context changes rapidly, and those who were successful before 
faced  wholly  different  obstacles.  The  aim  should  not  be  to  discredit  diaspora  voices.  Rather, 
migrants  should  be  able  to  access  a  reliable  online  source  that  can  support  them  in  discerning 
between accurate and inaccurate information.  

Recommendations for wider policy  

XII. 

Conclusion  –  heavy  handedness  emanating  from  migration  management  policies 
in  Algeria  (and  Sudan)  may  be  increasing  onward  movement.  Testimony  from 
migrants  indicates  that  heavy-handedness,  discrimination,  and  a  lack  of  legal  status  in 
Algeria  has  made  it  more  difficult  for  migrants  to  live  and  work  there.  Similar  scenarios 
have  been  reported  in  Sudan.  Although  initiatives  to  improve  migration  management 
expect  to  reduce  irregular  migration,  there  is  evidence  that  such  measures  have  often 
encouraged onward movement to Libya and Europe.  

Recommendation  –  the  European  Union  and  member  states  should  aim  to  influence  the 
approach  to  migration  management  in  key  transit  countries  to  reduce  the  potential  for 
adverse  effects.  This  could  include  appraising  migration  management  policies  for  their  potential 
to  prompt  the  onward  movement  of  migrants  to  Libya  and  Europe,  as  well  as  their  impact  on 

49 

 
 
human and labour rights. Improvement to local integration opportunities and regularisation of work 
would be important corollary steps to reducing onward movement. 

TECHNICAL ANNEXES 

Study tasks and methods 

TASK 1 

Assess overall level of migrants’ and 
asylum seekers’ knowledge of the journey 
(routes, distances, risks and smuggling 
services available), intended destination 
(situation in destination country) and how 
they plan to reach the destination 
(procedures to get asylum and legal 
migration options) across different 
migrants’ profiles 

TASK 2 

Provide an overview on information and 
communication channels used by migrants 
arriving and staying in the EU (pre-
departure, along the route and upon 
arrival): 

How they obtain relevant and ‘trustworthy’ 
information 

How they communicate with smugglers 

How they keep themselves up-to-date 
during their journey and during the initial 
period of stay in the EU  

Research methods 

Section  

Quantitative survey 
among potential migrants 

Section 1. Decision-
making 

Qualitative interviews with 
migrants in transit 

Section 2: 
Expectations and 
realities of the 
journey 

Section 3: 
Information and 
communication 
channels 

Quantitative survey 
among potential migrants 

Qualitative interviews with 
migrants in transit 

Qualitative interviews with 
returned migrants 

TASK 3 

Assess how migrants relay such 
information and which channels they use to 
communicate and exchange information 
with their peers in countries of origin, 
between themselves and the diaspora 
members in the country of intended 
destination in the EU 

Quantitative survey 
among potential migrants 

Qualitative interviews with 
migrants in transit 

Qualitative interviews with 
returned migrants 

Section 3: 
Information and 
communication 
channels 

TASK 4 

Quantitative survey 
among potential migrants 

Section 4: The role of 
social media 

Assess the role of social media in relation 
to other information channels in the 
context of migration and identify who is 
funding and operating the online content 
identified. 

Qualitative interviews with 
migrants in transit 

Qualitative interviews with 
returned migrants 

Social media analysis 

Desk research 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 

 
 
 
 
Methodology 

This report focuses on how to support the development of contextualised migration information and 
awareness  raising  campaigns  by  better  understanding  how  migrants  gather  information  about 
routes towards the EU, transport possibilities, about the smugglers that can facilitate their journey 
and the costs of this facilitation. 11 research questions were designed focusing on messaging and 
channels of communications,  

Research questions  

The  research  questions  aim  to  generate  the  evidence  required  to  tune  existing  strategic 
communications  and  design  new  programmes.  Research  questions  therefore  contribute  to  two 
categories:  messaging  and  channels.  ‘Messaging’  refers  to  data  that  informs  the  content  of  the 
messages  that  are  part  of  the  awareness  raising  campaigns.  ‘Channels’  refer  to  evidence  that 
informs  how  to  best  communicate  those  messages.  There  is  some  cross-over,  but  research 
questions are broadly as follows:    

Messaging 

1)  What is the level of knowledge of migrants and asylum seekers of the journey?  
2)  What is the level of knowledge of migrants and asylum seekers on intended destination? 
3)  How do migrants and asylum seekers plan to reach the destination country (procedures to 
get asylum and legal migration options) and how does this differ between different types of 
migrants (age, gender, nationality)? 

4)  What is the experience of migrants on their journey? 

Channels 

5)  How do migrants and asylum seekers obtain relevant and trustworthy information? 
6)  How do migrants and asylum seekers communicate with smugglers? 
7)  How do migrants and asylum seekers keep themselves up-to-date during their journey and 

during the initial period of stay in the EU? 

8)  Do  migrants  communicate/keep  in  touch  with  peers  in  country  of  origin?  How  (including 

through which communication channels)? 

9)  Do migrants communicate/keep in touch between themselves throughout the journey? How 

(incl. through which communication channels)? 

10) Do  migrants  communicate/keep  in  touch  with  the  diaspora  members  in  the  country  of 
intended destination in the EU37? How (including through which communication channels)?   
11) What  social  media  (including  Facebook,  Twitter,  Instagram,  WhatsApp,  Skype,  etc)  do 

migrants use to gather information about migration?  

a.  Which are the most influential ones? 
b.  Who operates them? 
c.  Who funds them? 

12) What role do social media play vs other media types? 

Methods 

A mixed methods study was designed to address the research questions. Fieldwork was carried out 
between May and July 2017:  

•  Review of the literature on migration and people smuggling from West Africa and through 

the Central Mediterranean route.  

•  A  quantitative  survey  of  1,053  ‘potential’  migrants  in  Senegal  (169),  Cote  d’Ivoire  (182), 

Gambia (180), Guinea (177), Mali (167), and Nigeria (178).  

•  85  in-depth  interviews  with  West  African  migrants  in  transit  in  Agadez,  Niger  (25)  and  in 

Libya - Sabha (15), Bani Walid (15), Zuara (10), Sabratha (20).  

•  30 in-depth interviews with returnees from Europe (16) and Libya or Niger (14). 

•  15  in-depth  interviews  with  Malians  who  had  considered  irregular  migration  but  changed 

their plans, conducted in Bamako (10) and Mopti (5). 

37 Potential migrants, migrants in transit and returnees. 

52 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
•  Social media and online analysis using automated and manual searches of social media and 

online sources based on key words and phrases present in migrant interviews.38 

•  A  Malian  case  study:  the  on-the-ground  researcher  in  Mali  conducted  ten  additional 
interviews  to  investigate  further  people’s  use  of  social  media  and  online  information  in 
decisions  around  irregular  migration.  These  qualitative  insights  were  designed  as  a  case 
study to give some contextual understanding to quantitative findings. 

Sample recruitment and profiles39 

Respondents to the quantitative survey were recruited using a non-probabilistic snowball sampling 
technique in which respondents were identified through referral of other migrants within the same 
target  group.  This  form  of  sampling  is  used  when  research  subjects  are  difficult  to  locate,  and 
continues until the predetermined sample size is reached or exceeded. 

Figure 11: Survey sample demographics 

38 See the Technical Annexes for a full social media analysis methodology. 
39 Further detail is included in the Technical Annexes. 

53 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
A screening process defined the limits for both the quantitative survey and qualitative interviews. 
All  respondents  were  therefore  between  the  ages  of  16  -  44  years  old,  and  intending  to  migrate 
irregularly outside of the ECOWAS region within the next 12 months.  

Quotas aimed to collect a minimum sample of 20% women. Three quarters (75%) of respondents 
were men, 25% were women. Malian respondents were mainly men (95%). In contrast, more than 
a third of Ivorian respondents were woman (35%).  

No  other  quotas  were  applied.  The  sociodemographic  composition  of  the  sample  was  therefore  a 
product of the snowballing sampling technique. Most respondents had low formal education - 25% 
had not completed secondary school, and 38% had not progressed to further education. Less than 
a  fifth  (17%)  had  completed  an  undergraduate  degree.  Low  education  levels  and  income  levels 
were  similar.  The  majority  of  Gambian  (87%),  Malian  (57%),  and  Guinean  (55%)  respondents 
earned less than USD 100 per month. Nigerian respondents were better off, yet 86% nonetheless 
earned under USD 300 per month. Most high earners were found in Senegal, 15% of whom earned 
more than USD 301. 

Limitations 

•  Reliability of results – research focused on illegal or taboo activity, such as being smuggled, 
which  can  elicit  evasive  or  untruthful  responses.  To  mitigate,  enumerators  recorded  the 
level of difficulty of the survey for respondents (15% somewhat difficult, 1% very difficult), 
and impressions of honesty (96% ‘honest’).  

•  Bias in sampling technique – snowball samples naturally accumulate responses from within 
the  same  social  networks  used  to  share  information  on  migration.  Respondents  are 
therefore more likely to have knowledge and attitudes in common. This is considered in the 
analysis. 

•  Difficulty engaging returnees from Europe – the target number of interviews (3) was met in 
all target countries except Gambia (one returnee interview from Europe) and Guinea (one 
returnee interview from Europe). Returnees were recruited through personal networks and, 
in Senegal, gatekeeper NGOs. Difficulties in recruiting returnees stemmed from:  

o 

Locating returnees - in Senegal and Gambia in particular, identifying migrants who 
had  returned  from  Europe  was  difficult.  Even  after  approaching  NGOs  involved  in 
supporting their reintegration, researchers were unable to identify candidates.  

o  Persuading  returnees  to  engage  with  the  research  -  some  did  not  want  to  repeat 
their  story  after  multiple  approaches  by  journalists,  researchers,  and  government 
departments.  Some  asked  for  a  financial  incentive  for  participation,  especially  as 
some  were  in  considerable  financial  distress.  Researchers  were  not  permitted  to 
pay an honorarium. In Côte d’Ivoire, four returnees suspected the researcher was 
working for the government. As a result, they were unwilling to participate, as they 
feared reprisals for migrating illegally.  

Quantitative Survey Sample 

Location of respondents – total sample of 1,053 respondents took part to our survey in six different 
countries: Ivory Coast, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal. 

Age of respondents – lower and upper age limits of 16 and 44; almost half (45%) of respondents 
25 to 34 years old. 

Sex  of  respondents  by  nationality  –  75%  of  respondents  are  men,  25%  are  women.  Malian 
respondents were mainly men (95%). Over a third (35%) of Ivorian respondents were women. 

54 

 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Location of respondents 

Nationality 
Ivorian 
Gambian 
Guinean 
Malian 
Nigerian 
Senegalese 

Men # (%) 
119 (65%) 
129 (72%) 
122 (69%) 
159 (95%) 
127 (71%) 
137 (81%) 

Women # (%) 
63 (35%) 
51 (28%) 
55 (31%) 
8 (5%) 
51 (29%) 
32 (19%) 

Total # (100%) 
182  
180  
177  
167  
178  
169  

Figure 13: Migration destination intentions 

55 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Ethical considerations 

The  research  adhered  to  the  Market  Research  Society  (MRS)  code  of  conduct.40  All  interviewees 
and  survey  respondents  were  engaged  on  condition  of  anonymity.  Details  that  could  identify 
interviewees, such as names of personnel, or specific place names were removed by the field team 
prior to analysis. Interviews and surveys with minors were conducted in line with Seefar’s ‘Children 
in Research’ policy, developed together with an external consultant.41 

Market Research Code of Conduct 

Throughout  the  research  project,  Optimity  Advisors  and  Seefar  adhered  to  the  MRS  Code  of 
Conduct.42  The  key  principles  which  Optimity  Advisors  and  Seefar  will  adhere  to  can  be 
summarised as: 

•  Researchers shall ensure that participation in their activities is based on voluntary informed 

consent.  

•  Researchers  shall  be  straightforward  and  honest  in  all  their  professional  and  business 

relationships.  

•  Researchers shall be transparent as to the subject and purpose of data collection 

•  Researchers  shall  respect  the  confidentiality  of  information  collected  in  their  professional 

activities 

•  Researchers shall respect the rights and well-being of all individuals 

•  Researchers  shall  ensure  that  participants  are  not  harmed  or  adversely  affected  by  their 

professional activities 

•  Researchers shall balance the needs of individuals, clients, and their professional activities. 

•  Researchers shall exercise independent professional judgement in the design, conduct and 

reporting of their professional activities 

•  Researchers  shall  ensure  that  their  professional  activities  are  conducted  by  persons  with 

appropriate training, qualifications and experience 

•  Researchers shall protect the reputation and integrity of the profession. 

40 See appendices for full principles adhered to.  
41 [1] The policy requires researchers to adhere to the 11 principles of good practice. These are: 1) legal compliance; 2) justification for inclusion 
at research design phase; 3) assessment of and adjustment to risks specific to minors; 4) ongoing dialogue with donor, contractors and sub-
contractors; 5) enhanced informed consent; 6) training of researchers; 7) adult witnesses to interviews and focus groups; 8) secondary 
confirmation of informed consent; 9) anonymity and duty to inform of danger; 10) sensitivity of questioning; 11) proactive termination of 
interview. Note that all minors interviewed were at least 15 years of age. The basis on which the inclusion of minors in research is justified is a 
qualified assessment that the benefit of giving voice to minors outweighs the risks of their participation. Following this assessment, researchers 
decided to proceed. 
42 https://www.mrs.org.uk/pdf/mrs%20code%20of%20conduct%202014.pdf 

56 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Social Media Analysis Methodology 

Aims 
The aim of the analysis of social media was to: 

• 

• 

Establish how influential social media and online platforms are to potential migrants. 

Identify what types of websites/pages are engaged. 

•  Collect data on the demographics of those engaging with social media. 

• 

Identify who is funding/producing content for influential pages/websites. 

This analysis draws on four data sources: 

• 

Information from  the  quantitative survey and qualitative  interviews in the six countries of 
interest  to  assess  relative  reliance  on  social  media  and  online  pages  as  a  source  of 
information and keywords to guide the search. 

•  Use  of  the  online  platform  BuzzSumo  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  websites  and  web 

pages with migration-related content were engaged with over the last six months.  

•  A public search of Twitter and Facebook run using their embedded APIs to query the search 
terms in the users’ tweets and Facebook pages, groups and events to determine how much 
certain topics are being talked about.  

•  A  Malian  case  study:  ten  additional  interviews  to  generate  qualitative,  contextualised 

insights to quantitative findings.  

Limitations 
The project inception report envisaged this analysis being doing through three steps: 

•  Generating search terms/keywords/phrases - identified through qualitative research. These 
keywords/phrases  would  be  use  through  social  media  search  platforms  to  identify  key 
websites/pages of interest. 

•  Reviewing  the  websites/pages  to  collect  data  on  user  demographics  and  look  at  how 

content was engaged by potential migrants. 

•  Analysing trends in activity, influencers and demographics using a combination of keywords 
to  establish  popular/influential  websites,  as  well  as  gender  and  age  distribution  of  the 
online migration community and who is funding and/or producing content for these sites. 

It became apparent that it would prove difficult to fulfil all the aims that had been set out for the 
analysis. This was the result of a number of factors that fell into two broad categories: 

•  Keywords and languages: A key challenge, noted from the beginning of the project, was to 
identify  suitable  keywords  or  key  phrases.  Keywords  or  key  phrases  that  are  too  generic 
are likely to lead to a large amount of irrelevant data and false positives. Phrases that are 
too  long  or  specific,  however,  may  not  yield  insights  (and  miss  close  others).  In  the 
planning  stage,  it  was  envisioned  that  keywords  and  phrases  would  be  identified  through 
the  qualitative  interviews,  which  did  happen.  However,  in  many  cases,  keywords/phrases 
identified were quite generic. This may be in part because the interviews were conducted in 
local regional languages and not  in  English or French,  which were the languages used for 
the  keywords.  These  languages  were  picked  as  survey  respondents  reported  that  these 
were the languages they used when searching the internet. 

•  Availability of relevant data through online search platforms: There are limitations in terms 
of what online search platforms are able to provide. These platforms were designed to be 
used  by  marketing  agencies  to  monitor  brand  awareness  and  engagement  and  so  work 
best  with  very  specific  inputs.  In  addition,  there  are  limitations  around  the  data  that  is 
available. It is not possible to simply search with keywords on all publicly available content 
on  Facebook  (in  contrast  to  Twitter).  It  is,  of  course,  only  possible  to  search  publicly 
available  pages/groups  and  many  of  these  pages  and  groups  would-  be  private.  Gaining 
demographic data on users is also not always possible, as some social media platforms do 

57 

 
 
 
 
 
not  collect  this  data.  Pinpointing  location  with  accuracy  may  be  difficult  if  users  are  not 
geolocated.  On  websites/blogs  it  may  be  possible  to  easily  find  a  location,  but  on  social 
media  profiles it  may  be more  dependent  on  factors  such  as  language  used  or  time  zone 
set by user. Searches and analyses  of  this scale  would normally require a longer timeline 
and a more substantial investment.  

As a result, it was necessary to adapt the methods in order to try to answer some of the questions 
set out in the inception report. It is envisaged that with more time and financial resources, a more 
comprehensive  analysis  of  social  media  trends  could  be  conducted,  using  Application  Programme 
Interfaces (APIs) that more comprehensively mine social media data.  

58 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Websites and Facebook pages cited by respondents 

Website 
Gate to Europe43 

Language(s)  Content and usage 
Arabic 

Forum in Arabic discussing various aspects of 
migration. Mentioned by several Nigerian and Gambian 
migrants.  

Immigrate with us 
(immig-us.com)  

Arabic 

ابوروا

 ىلا

ةرجهلا

Website active on social media channels: Facebook 
(320,095 ‘likes); YouTube (997 subscribers, top video 
26,857 views); Twitter (2,804 followers). The most 
popular article between January and June of this year 
was: ‘The easiest nationalities can be obtained free of 
charge or for a fee.’ 

Mainstream: BBC 
News, France24 

English, 
French 

Cited widely by all nationalities as a reliable source of 
information 

Awaremigrant.org 

Funded by Italian Government. Website and active on 
social media channels: Facebook (44,000 followers), 
YouTube (five videos over 100 views, top video 39,000 
views), Instagram. Mentioned by one respondent 
(Ivorian).  

Infomigrant.net 

English, 
French, Arabic 

Collaboration between news outlets. 304 articles have 
an average of 426 shares, primarily on Facebook. 
Mentioned by one respondent (Malian) 

Google.com 

All 

Mostly Nigerians, Guineans and Senegalese said they 
googled information before departure 

Facebook: Migration 
boats from Libya to 
Italy 

Arabic 

ايلاطيإ

 ىلإ

ايبيل

 نم 

ةرجهلا

براوق

Mali Jolies Dew44 

French 

Smuggling website in Libya, offering boat travel in 
wooden boats and zodiacs from Sabratha, as well as 
other bespoke smuggling services such as forged 
documents. 4,195 followers 

Identified through Mali case study (who described it as a 
diaspora group) Facebook description calls it a 
magazine 

One interviewee in the case study described getting 
information about the journey from this page:  

"c'est grâce à Facebook notamment la page Mali jolies 
Dew sur laquelle j'ai pu écouter et visionner des témoins 
qui ont retracé leur parcours comme un enfer” 

Plenty of Fish45 

English 

Dating website used by undocumented Nigerian in the 
UK to build network of friends. 

43 https://www.otlaat.com/arabtravelersforum/forum36/  
44 https://www.facebook.com/Mali-Jolies-Dew-302747330070588/ 
45 https://www.pof.com/ 

59 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS 

Free publications: 

•  one copy: 

via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu); 

•  more than one copy or posters/maps: 

from the European Union’s representations (http://ec.europa.eu/represent_en.htm);  
from the delegations in non-EU countries 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/index_en.htm);  
by contacting the Europe Direct service (http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm) 
or calling 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (free phone number from anywhere in the EU) (*). 

(*)  The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may 
charge you). 

Priced publications: 

•  via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu). 

Priced subscriptions: 

•  via one of the sales agents of the Publications Office of the European Union 

(http://publications.europa.eu/others/agents/index_en.htm). 

60 

 
 
 
 
 
 
D
R
-
0
1
-
1
8
-
1
0
1
-
E
N
-
N

doi: 10.2837/97937