Deir al-Zor after Islamic State : between Kurdish self-administration and a return of the Syrian regime.
Date: 2018-03-10
Institutions: European University Institute
Subjects: Islamic State, Kurdistan question, Syria, establishment of peace, governance, government violence, military intervention, peacekeeping, political power, regional security, religious fundamentalism, research report, terrorism

RESEARCH
PROJECT
REPORT

MARCH 2018/02

RESEARCH 
PROJECT 
REPORT

JUNE 2016

Deir Al-Zor 
after Islamic 
State: Between 
Kurdish Self 
Administration 
and a Return 
of the Syrian 
Regime

Ziad Awad

This work has been published by the European University Institute,
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.

© European University Institute 2018
Content and individual chapters © Ziad Awad, 2018

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Middle East Directions
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

Research Project Report
RSCAS/Middle East Directions 2018/02
March 2018

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Deir  Al-Zor  after  Islamic  State:  Between  Kurdish 
Self  Administration  and  a  Return  of  the  Syrian 
Regime 

Ziad Awad1 

Executive Summary 

Deir al-Zor was the main entry point for Islamic State of Iraq into Syria, the group that transformed in 
2013 into  what is known as Islamic State of Iraq and  the Levant (IS), because of the governorate’s 
strategic location on the eastern Syrian border with Iraq. IS managed to establish control over large 
swathes  of  territory  by  engaging  in  battle  on  multiple  fronts.  Subsequently,  though,  the  group 
gradually lost sway over much of this territory, leaving Deir al-Zor as its last bastion of influence in 
Syria.  

Despite its economic and human significance, Deir al-Zor was marginalised by the central government 
for decades prior to the outbreak of the Syrian revolution. The region only lately came to prominence 
on  a  national  and  international  level  in  light  of  the  fight  against  IS,  with  two  separate  military 
campaigns against the group being waged in the province. The first of these began in June 2017 and 
was led by the Syrian regime, with powerful support from its Russian and Iranian allies. The second 
was spearheaded by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with significant US backing. By the beginning 
of 2018, the two separate campaigns had divided Deir al-Zor geographically, militarily and politically. 
One of the two areas is governed by the Kurdish Self Administration2, while the other is under the 
control of the Syrian regime. The territory in Deir al-Zor controlled by IS, meanwhile, now comprises 
just two small areas, in the north east and the far east of the governorate. While international efforts 
are now concentrated on the governorate of Raqqa, the final stronghold from which IS has lately been 
pushed out, the local dynamics of the conflict in Deir al-Zor remain critical to the stability of the region 
as a whole. 

Today,  the  much  hoped-for  post-conflict  stability  in  Deir  al-Zor  is  being  severely  challenged.  The 
conflict has caused severe damage to the social and economic fabric of the region, as well as to its 
infrastructure,  which  could  well  cause  stabilisation-efforts  to  falter.  This  could  also  result  in  a 
resurgence of jihadi Salafism, whether under the banner of IS or of another group.  

1 Ziad Awad is the editor of Ayn al-Medina, a magazine specialising in issues relating to eastern Syria. Awad has 
also published numerous articles focusing on the local dynamics of the conflict in Deir al-Zor and Raqqa. 
This paper was written in January 2018 as part of Middle East Directions’ Syria Initiative, which includes a 
scheme to mentor Syrian researchers. The paper has been translated from Arabic by Mary Atkinson. 
2 A decentralised model of governance followed by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) since December 
2013, with the aim of establishing an autonomous region named the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, 
in the party’s areas of influence in al-Hasakah governorate, as well as in Kobani/Ayn al-Arab and Afrin. The idea 
then expanded to encompass the city of Manbij, and large areas of Raqqa and Deir al-Zor governorates. 

 
                                                           
Between 2012 and 2017, displacement and migration in its many forms and directions – one of the 
direct consequences of the war – exacerbated the divisions among local communities in Deir al-Zor. 
These pre-existing divisions are based on conflicting stances towards the revolution, the regime, IS 
and  most  recently  towards  the  new  Self  Administration.  The  state  of  division  and  disintegration  is 
most visible within tribes, which are the main social unit of local society in Deir al-Zor. Weakness and 
competition  within  the  tribal  structure  left  the  population  extremely  vulnerable  to  exploitation  by 
jihadi Salafism, although IS was ultimately unable to rally lasting support from the tribes.  

Under an exclusive mandate from the US, the SDF – whose core is composed of armed Kurdish units 
loyal to the Democratic Union Party (PYD) – have been able to impose their military control over part 
of Deir Al-Zor province. The Deir al-Zor Military Council, which took part in the battle against IS under 
the umbrella of the SDF, is mostly made up of locals. However, it did not take on a leadership role, and 
the Kurdish core retained a monopoly over decision-making within the SDF. While the battle against 
IS was ongoing, the Self Administration established the Civil Council of Deir al-Zor as a local governance 
authority.  However,  the  formation  of  the  Civil  Council  and  the  selection  of  its  members  was 
controversial, with doubts as to its legitimacy, as many considered it little more than a smokescreen 
for the PYD – which is seen as an extension of Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party –(PKK) and its political 
ambitions. Likewise, under the governance model followed by the Self Administration in Deir al-Zor, 
there  are  significant  tensions  between,  on  the  one  hand,  the  governance  model’s  ethnic  Kurdish 
identity and commitment to the ideology espoused by PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, and on the other, 
the local community’s conservative Arab Sunni identity. These tensions could lead to serious conflict 
in the medium-term.  

After  re-establishing  control  over  what  had  been  the  most  densely-populated  part  of  Deir  al-Zor 
before the revolution – and which is now practically empty – the Syrian regime is attempting to return 
those who had fled the area to their homes. This is referred to as ‘reconciliation’, but it is only focused 
on security. Politically, the regime needs to ensure the return displaced people for political, economic 
and  security  reasons.  On  a  political  level  the  regime  needs  to  demonstrate  its  legitimacy,  while 
economically a return of the displaced will stimulate agricultural production in the area. Likewise, from 
a security standpoint, it would allow for young men from returning families to be recruited into the 
newly-established Self-Defence Units which, it is hoped, will represent an alternative way of restoring 
the regime’s military control in the area following the army’s failure to do so.  

The regime is also betting on reviving its local power structures, which had been severely weakened 
by a loss of military control in the area over recent years. Part of this was the plan to restore the Baath 
party to its traditional role as a key player in the area, and to rebuild the regime’s executive apparatus 
from the public sector. However, the regime has little chance of success, because the damage to its 
governance  system  will  be  difficult  to  repair.  This  is  especially  true  given  its  inability  to  fund 
reconstruction efforts. In addition to official structures, the regime is also relying on a new, ascendant 
group: militia leaders, warlords and middlemen, some of whom have even made it into the People’s 
Council  of  Syria.  Moreover,  the  Shia  minority,  which  makes  up  a  very  small  percentage  of  the 
population, has also been able to exert greater power thanks to the growing Iranian influence. This 
will foster sectarian resentment, which will in turn be exploited by  IS, which is keen to reassert its 
influence. Similarly, IS will take advantage of weaknesses in the systems of governance offered by the 
regime and the Self Administration. As a result, efforts to establish stability might falter, leading to the 
potential for new unrest and conflict in the medium-term.  

Introduction 

Ever since Hafez al-Assad’s coup in 1970, Deir al-Zor has been overlooked by the central government. 
This is despite it being the largest governorate in eastern Syria in terms of population, with 1.6 million 
inhabitants3, and physical size, covering 33,000km2, and despite its considerable oil and agricultural 
resources.  

This did not change when Bashar al-Assad assumed power from his father in 2000, and Deir al-Zor 
continued  to  be  marginalised,  and  continued  to  suffer  a  low  rate  of  development  and  high 
unemployment.  Conditions  like  these,  along  with  the  oppression,  political  disenfranchisement  and 
corruption that characterised the rule of both father and son, eventually led to the revolution in March 
2011.  The  unrest  began  in  the  form  of  peaceful  demonstrations  calling  for  reform,  but  quickly 
transformed into a widespread popular uprising demanding the overthrow of the regime.  

The repressive measures employed by the regime  in an attempt to put down the growing calls for 
change were the principal catalyst for the establishment of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which began 
as a number of small armed groups tasked with protecting demonstrators. As the months wore on, 
however,  the  FSA  organised  itself  into  larger  brigades  that  began  to  engage  in  large-scale  military 
confrontations. By the summer of 2012, it had taken control of all of the rural areas surrounding the 
city of Deir al-Zor, and most of the neighbourhoods within the city. The regime’s territory shrank to 
just three of the city’s neighbourhoods, as well as military outposts on the city’s outskirts controlled 
by the army.  

In the wake of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Deir al-Zor had its share of the rising number of 
jihadi Salafists,  since its position on the  border  with Iraq meant it served as an important crossing 
point for budding jihadist fighters. Fighters from Deir al-Zor who returned from the battlefield in Iraq 
formed organised jihadist cells which would go on to play a pivotal role in the formation of Jabhat al-
Nusra in the second half of 2011. These cells maintained a key position until the declaration of the 
Islamic  State  of  Iraq  and  Levant  (IS),  which  would  overrun  Deir  al-Zor  in  the  summer  of  2014  and 
occupy it for almost three years. 

In September 2017, the Syrian regime – backed up by its Russian and Iranian allies – was able to break 
the siege imposed by IS on regime-held areas of the city of Deir al-Zor. Following this, it re-established 
control over the city and surrounding rural areas on the right bank4 of the Euphrates River, as well as 
over a small strip on its left bank. In the same month, SDF forces launched a separate military campaign 
against  IS,  named  al-Jazeera  Storm,  which  was  carried  out  with  the  support  of  the  international 
coalition. The operation saw the SDF seize control of rural areas in the north of the governorate, as 
well as of a strip of land skirting the left bank of the Euphrates. Moreover, despite its ability to launch 
damaging surprise attacks within areas under the SDF’s control, IS sustained heavy losses that severely 

3 The number of inhabitants recorded in the Civil Registry for the governorate in early 2011. Central Statistics 
Office: http://cbssyr.sy/yearbook/2011/Data-Chapter2/TAB-1-2-2011.htm. 
4 The eastern bank of the river, referred to as the right bank. The western bank is referred to as the left bank, 
in line with the Arabic terms used. 

 
                                                           
damaged its organisational structure, with the result that by early 2018 it was essentially out of the 
arena of conflict.  

The battles against IS saw the US and Russia enter into non-aggression agreements, which prevented 
the  outbreak  of  large-scale  conflict  between  their  allies  on  the  ground,  the  SDF  and  the  regime. 
However,  there  does  not  appear  to  have  been  any  agreement  between  the  Americans  and  the 
Russians regarding the post-IS period in Deir al-Zor, nor regarding the future of the governorate in 
general, which is linked to the future of Syria as a whole. With the  full military defeat of IS on the 
horizon,  and  Deir  al-Zor  still  divided  between  the  regime  and  SDF,  there  is  increasing  risk  of  fresh 
conflict between the latter two. This is especially the case in view of the regime’s need for oil and gas, 
the largest fields of which are under the SDF’s control. In addition, the growing Iranian influence in 
the Syrian steppe (badiya al-Sham) on both sides of border is a cause for concern for the Americans 
in particular, and thus a potential source of tension. The political ambitions of the regime – which has 
been bolstered by its success fighting IS in Deir al-Zor as well as by the dwindling risk posed by the 
armed opposition in other governorates – will also play a role in increasing the likelihood of conflict. 

Despite  a  slowdown  in  military  operations  in  Deir  al-Zor,  which  are  now  confined  to  small, 
geographically-isolated  areas,  the  governorate  remains  in  a  state  of  great  disarray.  The  security 
situation is highly volatile, and is likely to continue to be so, at least in the short term. However, the 
prospect of the military defeat of IS does create opportunities for stability and peace-building in the 
region in the medium and long term. In this context, this paper will analyse some of the lasting impacts 
the war has had on the social fabric of Deir al-Zor, lay out the local communities’ likely responses to 
the Self Administration and the regime. The mechanisms of governance employed by each authority 
will be examined, as well as the impact that these may have on efforts to re-establish stability within 
the governorate.  

This paper consists of three sections. The first of these looks at the societal breakdown caused by the 
conflict and by waves of displacement, as well as the conflicting political allegiances that coexist in the 
area and the divisions they cause. In this respect it appears that the tribe, which is the main social unit 
in the governorate, will not play a significant role in restoring stability to the region. The second section 
looks at the mechanisms of local governance employed by the Self Administration, derived from the 
Kurdish  federalist  project,  and  the  challenges  it  is  likely  to  face  in  governing  an  Arab-majority 
population5.  The  third  section,  finally,  looks  at  the  regime’s  attempts  to  restore  its  authority  by 
reviving  its  pre-2011  mechanisms  of  governance,  and  will  examine  the  challenges  inherent  in  that 
attempt, given the fundamental changes that have occurred in the intervening years. 

The paper is based on the author’s long experience of following the situation in Deir al-Zor, as well as 
on several meetings held during the last three months of 2017 and into January  2018  with former 
leaders of the FSA, current leaders of the SDF and the Self Administration. Interviews were also held 
with public figures, activists, supporters  of the various  parties to the conflict and eye-witnesses to 

5Ethnic Arabs make up 90% of the population of Deir al-Zor governorate, the vast majority of them Sunnis. A 
small minority converted to Shiism beginning from the 1980s, a community that does not exceed 5,000 members 
according to the highest estimates. There is a Christian minority with deeper historical roots, which according to 
2010 estimates numbers around 1,000 members.  

                                                           
 
some of the events. Additionally, the paper makes use of a survey that was carried out in the Turkish 
city of Urfa with a cohort of Syrian refugees who had fled from regime-held areas of Deir al-Zor. 

Map of military control in Deir al-Zor 

Source: https://syria.liveuamap.com 

Conflict-driven breakdown of the local society 

Mapping displacement and its political implications 

Displacement caused by the escalating conflict between the FSA and regime forces starting in summer 
2012, has been a major cause of social breakdown in Deir al-Zor, alongside major friction between 
supporters of the regime and the revolution. The subsequent rise of IS, which seized control of the 
governorate in summer 2014, exacerbated these divisions. At that time, new waves of displacement 
began,  initially  comprising  FSA  fighters  and  civil  society  activists  involved  in  revolutionary 
organisations6, and later including ordinary citizens fleeing repression at the hands of IS, and the social 
rules  the  group  imposed.  The  largest  wave  of  displacement  took  place  in  the  summer  and  early 
autumn  of  2017,  comprising  the  remaining  population  from  the  right  bank  of  the  Euphrates.  They 
were finally forced to flee due to intense aerial bombardment by the regime and its allies, and their 

6 In 2013, there were 29 non-governmental and civil society organisations registered in Deir al-Zor governorate, 
as well as 73 local councils. Karam Alhamad, Deir Al-Zor: A legacy of marginalisation and suffering, Syria notes 
24 October 2017. 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
advancing troops on the ground. Other, smaller waves of displacement were also taking place at the 
same  time  as  a  result  of  Operation  al-Jazeera  Storm,  the  SDF  operation  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Euphrates. 

By the end of 2017, the population of Deir al-Zor was spread out over several regions, each of which 
is characterised by a  distinct  political context that differs from the overarching political realities in 
other areas. Activists and international organisations estimate between 400,000 and 450,000 people 
have fled Deir al-Zor to Turkey. Meanwhile, it is thought that between 100,000 and 150,000 of those 
who left the province are now internally displaced in Aleppo and Idlib governorates, areas that, with 
Turkey, are home to some of the most outspoken opponents of the regime, as well as of IS and the 
Self Administration. According to the same estimate, the number of people from Deir al-Zor living in 
areas  under  regime  control  is  somewhere  between  200,000  and  250,000.    Of  these,  fewer  than 
100,000 are thought to still be living in Deir al-Zor, while the remainder have been internally displaced 
to Damascus, Homs, Hama or al-Hasakah governorates, or to coastal areas, all of which are areas of 
strong regime support. In terms of areas under SDF control, it is thought that between 350,000 and 
400,000  people  from  Deir  al-Zor  are  living  there,  whether  in  areas  of  the  governorate  under  SDF 
control or in IDP camps in al-Hasakah and Raqqa. Between 100,000 and 150,000 people from Deir al-
Zor  have  fled  to  countries  in  the  EU,  the  majority  of  whom  are  opponents  of  the  regime,  and 
approximately 100,000 people to the Gulf and other Arab countries. 

The fragmentation outlined above has, over recent years, led to the creation of distinct communities 
in each area, each now siding with either the opposition, the regime, IS  or the Self Administration. 
Each of these distinct communities has its own goals, concerns and issues, as well as its own actors. 
Such fragmentation clearly contributes to the creation of challenges that could thwart efforts by both 
the regime and the  Self  Administration in their different strategies to restore stability in the areas 
under their control.  

Large sectors of the IDP and refugee population are not politically engaged as supporters of any of the 
three  parties  to  today’s  conflict  (the  opposition,  the  Self  Administration  and  the  regime). 
Nevertheless, the potential for return appears slim, unless the security, infrastructure and economic 
situation  improves  in  both  parts  of  Deir  al-Zor.  The  massacres  committed  by  regime  forces7  also 
decrease the likelihood of even politically disengaged refugees’ return to areas under the control of 
those same forces. 

By  the end  of  January  2018,  the  regime  was  in control of  an  urban  area  measuring  approximately 
200km2, barely populated, with the exception of the area of Deir al-Zor city that was originally densely 
populated8. On the other hand, areas under SDF control represented a destination and a crossing point 
for people fleeing the regime. Moreover, in general, people fled from areas that had been under SDF 
only for as long as it took to expel advancing IS fighters from their towns and villages. This is evidence 
of the different treatment the civilian population experienced at the hands of the SDF and the regime, 
and reflects the general image of both among locals. 

7 This is especially true in the case of recent massacres carried out during the regime’s anti-IS operation (see 
http://sn4hr.org/public_html/wp-content/pdf/arabic/Some_370,000_displaced_people_in_Deir_al-
Zour_and_Raqqa_2017.pdf), and the arrest and extrajudicial execution of Deir al-Zor civilians (see 
http://orient-news.net/ar/news_show/140928/0/روص-ةحادرقلاب-ابح-  
8 Specifically, the neighbourhoods of al-Jura, al-Qusur and Harabish. 

 ييندم-مدعي-يدسأ-حيبش). 

                                                           
From a tribal way of life to a cycle of conflict 

Tribes are considered the most significant social unit in the rural areas of Deir al-Zor, as well as in parts 
of the governorate’s three biggest cities (Deir al-Zor, al-Mayadeen and Abu Kamal). All parties in the 
conflict have supporters from each tribe, although the ratios vary from one to the other. In the case 
of the Syrian conflict, the diversity of allegiances  found within each tribe  – and hence within local 
communities – is not the result of lively intellectual debate or constructive diversity, but rather of 
years of political infighting, ongoing war and displacement, as well as conflicting interests both within 
and between tribes. 

Historically, tribes generally had limited, non-political aspirations, making it easier for the authorities 
to deal with them without having to meddle with the internal tribal structure. However, during the 
three-decade reign of Hafez al-Assad (1970-2000), and subsequently during his son Bashar al-Assad’s 
rule  up  until  the  revolution  began,  the  tribal  formations  underwent  a  gradual  but  significant 
transformation which saw them cede much of their power to the regime, and tribal sheikhs lose their 
position as community leaders to become merely high-profile followers of the regime.  

After 2011, in the wake of the outbreak of the revolution and amidst the war and mass displacement 
that followed, the tribal system found itself tested beyond its capacities. In general, the different clans 
failed to adopt a unified position. There were, however, some instances of partial unity, such as the 
involvement  of  large  numbers  of  young  men  from  the  Bu  Khabour,  Qaraan,  Bu  Kamal,  Shaitat,  Bu 
Rahma and Bu Saraya9 tribes in anti-government demonstrations, and subsequently in the ranks of 
the first FSA’s units. In these cases, the tribesmen involved had other  things in common, the most 
important being relatively high rates of education (above secondary school level). Moreover, the fact 
that several members of these tribes had already become activist leaders played a role in widening 
the  revolution’s  youth  base  within  these  individuals’  immediate  tribal  circles.  This  new  movement 
went  against  the  will  of  regime  supporters  within  those  same  tribes,  mostly  older  men  who  were 
government  employees,  Baath  Party  activists,  regular  informants,  and  notables.  Some  of  these 
elements collaborated with the security apparatus in an attempt to put down the uprising, but to little 
effect.  

During the first year of the uprising, the first wave of revolutionaries was able to move past the tribal 
structure and forge new links to unite their supporters. However, after FSA units took control of rural 
areas around Deir al-Zor city and most of the city’s neighbourhoods in the summer and autumn of 
2012, they failed to build a military structure strong enough to deter attacks on a local level. This is 
despite the fact that the units belonged to an umbrella military organisation which was ostensibly 
united.  Because  of  this  failure,  tribes  that  were  distancing  themselves  from  the  conflict  began  to 
establish their own armed groups under the name of the Free Syrian Army in hopes of taking over 

9 These tribes are based in the small towns of Al-Muhasan, Al-Quriyah, Al-Shahil, Abu Hamam, al-Jazri al-Sharqi, 
and al-Kharita. All belong to the same confederation, the ‘Egaidat, which is the major tribal confederation in Deir 
al-Zor. 

 
                                                           
state property that had been left unprotected, most significantly oil wells and fields10. However, they 
did not take part in front-line battles against the regime alongside more established FSA factions.  

In this chaotic environment, the revolutionary spirit and its influence gradually started to decline, due 
to internal conflicts between its leaders and increasing tribalism. This led to increasing divisions within 
the  original  factions  of  the  FSA,  and  tribal  divisions  re-emerged.  In  this  context  of  collapse  and  a 
multiplication of different power centres,  first Jabhat al-Nusra and then IS gradually began to gain 
influence in Deir al-Zor.  

The tribe and the jihadi movement 

The tribe has shown itself to be fragile structure, easily penetrated by outside influences, most notably 
in its encounter with jihadi Salafist movements. Jihadi Salafism in Deir al-Zor only really began to grow 
after the US invasion of Iraq, and up until the outbreak of the revolution in 2011 it remained a marginal 
movement comprising a few cells of young men returning from Iraq. One of these cells, made up of 
young men from the Bu Kamal clan in al-Shahil, played a pivotal role in the growth of Salafi jihadism 
in Syria. During the summer and autumn of 2011, these men offered refuge to the Iraqi jihadists Haji 
Bakr and Abu Maria al-Qahtani, as well as the Syrian Abu Mohammed al-Jolani11 and several others. 
The group had been sent by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, then head of the Islamic State of Iraq, to establish 
a jihadist military faction that would be announced in January 2012 under the name Jabhat al-Nusra 
Li-Ahl al-Sham (Victory Front for the People of Levant). The team sent by Baghdadi would go on to 
play a significant role in the growth of the jihadist movement in Syria, first by way of Jabhat al-Nusra 
– of which Jolani was leader, and of which Qahtani became head “religious scholar” – and then of the 
IS, of which Haji Bakr was considered the effective leader in Syria until he was killed in January 2014. 

With  the  declaration  of  the  Islamic  State  of  Iraq  and  Syria  in  April  2013,  Jabhat  al-Nusra  was  left 
divided,  with  IS  managing  to  attract  the  most  important  bloc  of  foreign  fighters  and  experts.  This 
created  gaps  in  the  leadership  structure  of  Jabhat  al-Nusra  that  were  filled  by  locals,  the  most 
prominent  of  whom  were  members  of  the  “Shahil  Cell.”  The  ascension  of  these  leaders  gave  the 
impression  that  the  Bu  Kamal  tribe  had  particular  influence  within  Jabhat  al-Nusra.  Meanwhile, 
tensions emerged between Jabhat al-Nusra’s central leadership and the local branch, with Abu Maria 
al-Qahtani – who had by then become the effective leader of Jabhat al-Nusra in Deir al-Zor – imposing 
his own specific style, one that differed from the al-Qaeda approach that Abu Mohammed al-Jolani 
tried to consolidate12.  

The tribal nature of Jabhat al-Nusra in Deir al-Zor was one of the factors that distanced other tribes 
from it. Tribal allegiances meant, for example, that it was more tolerant of attempts by members to 
control  a  greater  share  of  bulk  oil  resources  under  the  cover  of  Jabhat  al-Nusra’s  Central  Shariah 
Committee, the group’s backbone13.  The group was lenient towards the Bu Kamal tribe, with tribal 

10 See The Stance of the Tribes, page 10 of Oil in Deir al-Zor From Revolution to Islamic State, Ayn al-Medina, 
special edition of August 2015, http://ayn-almadina.com/content_images/users/1/contents/2932/1568.pdf. 
11 On developments of the jihadi movement since 2003, see Hassan Abu Hanieh and Mohammad Abu Rumman 
in The “Islamic State” Organization: The Sunni Crisis and the Struggle of Global Jihadism, Friedrich Ebert, 
Amman [in Arabic].  
12 See: al-Jolani Reveals his True Face by Hossam Juzmani, https://www.aljumhuriya.net/35409.  
13 This body was established in March 2013 under the name of the “Shariah Committee” for the Eastern 
Region, which then morphed into the Central Shariah Committee, bringing together Jabhat al-Nusra and 
various FSA factions, and subsequently Ahrar al-Sham and Liwa al-Islam. 

                                                           
allegiances  taking  precedence  over  organisational  and  legislative  considerations.  This  was  a  key 
weakness exploited by IS, which secured the support of other tribes against Jabhat al-Nusra14 during 
a period of increasing conflict between the two, starting from autumn 2013. IS also took advantage of 
competition between different tribes and factions over external funding and ammunition, as well as 
competition for control of oil wells close to their respective strongholds. This strategy meant that, by 
the summer of 2014, IS was able to seize control of the governorate. 

In  many  instances,  the conflict  became  very  complex  and  multilateral,  with  increasing  numbers  of 
different factions, tribes and jihadi elements. At times of danger, before IS seized full control, tribes 
would  often  protect  members  who  were  supporters  of  the  organisation  under  the  pretext  of 
maintaining tribal solidarity, which is sometimes invoked and at other times disappears. However, IS 
elements who had previously received tribal protection were quickly rejected after IS seized control 
of  Deir  al-Zor  and  engaged  in  oppressive  practices  targeting  the  local  population.  Such  expulsions 
occurred, moreover, after the organisation gradually eliminated the tribal power centers in its own 
ranks that had grown up around figures from its  first local supporters and exhausted the ability of 
these personalities to bring new members.  

During the three years in which it was in control of Deir al-Zor, IS welcomed thousands of locals into 
its ranks. Small numbers of these were motivated by a true dedication to jihadi ideals, while others 
wanted to fight the regime, and found that taking up arms under the IS banner was the only way of 
doing so. However, the vast majority fought alongside IS simply for their various individual ends, since 
at the time the group effectively represented the most significant authority in the region. But just as 
IS rapidly swelled its ranks immediately after seizing control, it also quickly diminished in power as a 
result of numerous military defeats. Up until IS’s most significant defeat at the end of 2017, thousands 
of its local fighters died during battles within Deir al-Zor and in other locations. Hundreds were also 
taken prisoner by,  or surrendered to, the SDF, while  many others melted away into the masses of 
people  forced  to  flee  (although  some  of  these  were  captured  while  passing  through  territory 
controlled by the SDF, the opposition, or within Turkey). Those who have remained are now fighting 
to defend an ever-decreasing pocket of territory, despite numbering just a few hundred, according to 
January 2018 estimates15. It is likely that, after it finally loses control over its remaining territory, IS 
will go underground, continuing to operate as a secret organisation. It is also  within the  realms of 
possibility  that  the  group,  after  its  probable  defeat,  will  nevertheless  remain  capable  of  launching 
damaging and far-reaching attacks. In any case, however it transformations it will be not be any less 
radical than previously, and may even become even more fundamental.  

In short, the future of IS will depend on the success or failure of today’s winners – the SDF and the 
regime  –  in  building  a  successful  bulwark  against  a  resurgence  by  the  group,  an  effort  that  must 
encompass economic, security and political change. This effort must also pay close attention to the 
morale of local communities, which will continue to suffer as long as there is an absence of justice. 

14 And also against FSA factions that were fighting alongside Jabhat al-Nusra. 
15 According to a military source who requested to remain anonymous. 

                                                           
The Self Administration: a governance model fraught with challenges  

The SDF and its Deir al-Zor Military Council  

By early 2018, the SDF’s military presence on the ground in Deir al-Zor consisted of the Deir al-Zor 
Military  Council,  most  of  whose  fighters  and  leaders  are  from  the  local  area,  the  Kurdish  People’s 
Protection Units (YPG) and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), which are respectively the male and 
female armed wings of the PYD and mostly composed of Kurdish fighters.  

The SDF announced the establishment of the Deir al-Zor Military Council in November 2016. The move 
provoked  considerable  controversy  and  criticism  within  opposition  circles  from  Deir  al-Zor  at  that 
time,  for  at  least  three  reasons.  Firstly,  the  establishment  of  the  Council  was  considered  a  grave 
interference  by  outside  powers  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  governorate  as  opposition  figures 
expected that the Council would derive its power solely from the PYD16. Secondly, the accusations that 
surrounded the head of the Council, Ahmed al-Khabayn, and those around him, helped to confirm the 
general sentiment that the PYD promoted marginal Arab figures with little influence in order to be 
able  to  control  them  more  easily.  Thirdly,  the  initiative  was  considered  a  pre-emptive  attempt  by 
Kurdish forces to pull the rug out from under negotiations taking place at the time between leaders 
of armed opposition groups from Deir al-Zor and the international coalition. The talks were aimed at 
establishing a single military force composed of local fighters from Deir al-Zor, who at that time were 
spread out in different factions of the FSA across various regions of the country. The idea was to add 
to  these  forces  thousands  of  former  FSA  fighters17.  However,  the  US  scrapped the  initiative  in  the 
summer of 2017, instead telling fighters that the FSA could only take part in the battle of Deir al-Zor 
under the banner of the SDF. A number of FSA leaders rejected this proposition, declaring “the SDF, 
the regime and IS” enemies in equal measure18. As a result of the failure of these negotiations, FSA 
factions were excluded from taking part in the battle for Deir al-Zor19. 

A large proportion of the membership of the Military Council20 comes from tribes based on the left 
bank of the Euphrates, which unlike the right bank is an area in which the SDF focuses its activities. 
The Bakkeir, Baggara and Shaitat tribes appear to be the best represented of these. The fact that the 
head of the Military Council and several other leading figures belong to the Bakkeir has meant that 
more tribesmen have joined, and much the same can be said of the Baggara. As for the Shaitat tribe, 
the desire to seek vengeance from IS – which committed grave massacres against them in summer 
2014 – helps to explain the presence of large numbers of their tribesmen in the SDF. 

16 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed al-Aboud, former head of the Revolutionary Military Council 
in Deir al-Zor, and subsequently a member of the High Negotiations Committee. 
17 In the spring of 2017, the FSA counted around 4,000 fighters from Deir al-Zor among its ranks, according to 
estimates by FSA leaders.  
18  Quote  from  Lieutenant  Colonel  Muhanned  al-Talaa,  head  of  the  Maghawir  al  Thawra  (Revolutionary 
Commando group), taken from a YouTube broadcast: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hImClcP2GgU. 
19 Among these factions, Ahrar al-Sharqiyya, Abna al-Sharqiyya, and other factions present in Aleppo and Idlib 
provinces, as well as Usud al-Sharqiyya and Maghawir al Thawra from the Syrian steppe, and Quwwat al-
Nukhba (Elite Forces) that were concentrated in pockets of territory under US sponsorship, in areas under SDF 
control, close to the city of al-Shaddadah.  
20 According to a leader from the Military Council who requested anonymity, the council had 3,000 active 
fighters as of January 2018. 

                                                           
During the final phase of the battle of Deir al-Zor, opposition to the SDF within revolutionary circles in 
general remained strong. However, in some quarters it was thought wise to take advantage of any 
opportunity that presented itself to achieve gains on the ground. Consequently, a number of military 
leaders  ended  up  joining  forces  with  the  SDF  or  its  Military  Council,  accompanied  by  hundreds  of 
fighters. 

However, the leadership of the SDF remains monopolised by Kurdish military figures. The YPG and YPJ 
are more cohesive and disciplined than the Deir al-Zor Military Council and most other Arab groups. 
They also have at their disposal more effective weaponry than the Military Council, whose fighters 
only  have  light  and  medium  weapons.  In  the  case  of  the  Military  Council,  it  also  appears  that  the 
training and military preparation given to new volunteers are somewhat crude21.  

It is difficult to predict what role Arab fighters will play in the process of governance formation in the 
coming phase. However, based on similar experiences in Raqqa province,  where the SDF gradually 
weakened and ousted Arab elements from power, Arab communities in Deir al-Zor will not be given 
space to play a significant role. This is likely to include even those leaders of the Military Council who 
display  complete  loyalty.  Such  side-lining  is  particularly  likely  if  plans  to  establish  a  new  military 
structure are successful. The US position on this remains unclear22, but the idea expounded by some 
Kurdish leaders is to set up a new force under the banner of the “Army of Northern Syria”23, tasked 
with guarding the frontiers of areas under SDF control. If such a force is successfully established, the 
Deir al-Zor Military Council will be dissolved, and its members redistributed over a wider geographical 
area further from their homes, with the result that they will lose some of the territorial control they 
enjoy today.  

Controversy over establishing the Civil Council 

Just as Operation al-Jazira Storm was being launched on 24 September 2017, the newly-established 
Civil Council of Deir al-Zor was unveiled, following two weeks of fractious and speedy preparations at 
the end of which Ghassan Youssef was chosen as co-head of the council alongside a female colleague. 
Announcing its establishment, the council said that “the dictatorial regime has  no future in  Syria,” 
adding that the newly-created council would “take charge of administering the governorate once it is 
liberated24.” According to the statement, the council is composed of two co-presidents and 5 deputy 
presidents, in addition to 15 specialised committees.  

The Council has not yet published sufficient information about its members, leaving it vulnerable to 
accusations from opposition activists that is made up of marginal individuals with little influence or 
legitimacy.  Its  members  are  also  said  to  be  inexperienced  and  lacking  in  technical  knowledge.  In 
January 2018, during a general meeting attended by dozens of local tribal representatives, leaders of 
the  Self  Administration  pledged  to  restructure  the  Council  to  correct  the  “errors”  that  beset  its 
formation, with the aim of achieving greater diversity and effectiveness25.  

21 Ibid 
22 The US Secretary of State has denied Washington’s intention to establish a border force: 
http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-42730812. 
23 Head of the Self-Protection Units Siyaband Walat, http://www.hawarnews.com. 
24 Statement: http://www.hawarnews.com / ي
25 During a meeting held in the village of al-Suwar. 

 ندملا-روزلا-ريد-سلجمل-  يماتخلا-نايبلا /. 

                                                           
However, the existing structure of the Self Administration (or what it is assumed to be) remains tense 
and  in  conflict  over  its  powers  and  functions.  It  remains  difficult  for  observers  to  ascertain  where 
decision-making power and responsibility lies, damaging the council’s effectiveness in general, and 
lessening  the  likelihood  of  popular  participation.  Moreover,  despite  the  insistence  of  the  Self 
Administration’s leaders on explaining their governance project by way of recurring public meetings, 
it appears that much of the local population remains in the dark. In general, the level of participation 
by the local population in Deir al-Zor will remains weak, and limited to somewhat marginal  sectors 
related to public services and the economy, due to the  totalitarian nature of the ruling PYD and its 
unclear decision-making style.  

It is too early to predict the future of these local governance structures, but it is clear that they will be 
vulnerable to the effects of divisions that have left Deir al-Zor fragmented into distinct communities 
that are spread across different geographical areas, and which live under different political authorities. 
In this context, the Civil Council’s legitimacy will forever remain in doubt, and consensus will remain 
out of reach.  

Challenges facing the Self Administration in Deir al-Zor  

The communities living under SDF control in Deir  al-Zor suffer  from deep-seated fatigue stemming 
from  what  they  have  experienced  in  recent  years.  Long,  multi-layered  conflicts  involving  multiple 
actors and different sectors of society have sapped the population’s energy, and have robbed it of its 
power and its elites. This means that the local communities will not challenge the Self Administration’s 
political,  social  and  cultural  project,  the  aim  of  which,  according  to  Administration  officials,  is  to 
establish an autonomous region called the Federation of Northern Syria. However, the project may 
yet find itself facing numerous challenges in the short and long term in Deir al-Zor governorate.  

The  first  of  these  is  the  very  concept  of  Self  Administration  autonomous  administration,  which  is 
characterised by its Kurdish identity and its ideological content. While this concept may be by fully 
supported by Kurdish figures of influence in their communities, it will represent a stumbling-block for 
efforts  to  ensure  active  participation  from  elites  and  leading  figures  within  Deir  al-Zor,  whose 
population is 99% Arab. 

Secondly,  the  enormous  cultural  differences  between  the  social  model  the  PYD  is  looking  to 
implement  –  through  educational  and  legal  initiatives  –  and  the  traditional,  conservative  local 
community in Deir al-Zor, represent a major challenge to the success of the Self Administration. The 
model the PYD is following ignores the Arab heritage shared by almost a third of the population within 
the  borders  of  the  proposed  Federation,  and  instead  explicitly  discusses  the  “civilisation  of 
Kurdistan”26. Likewise, if the Self Administration continues to overlook, in both its written publications 
and its oral discourse, the importance of the uprising against the regime, it will drive a further wedge 
between itself and those who led the uprising in Deir al-Zor, one of the revolution’s strongholds. 

26 The Social Contract of the Federal Regime in Rojava – Northern Syria: 
http://www.rojnews.biz/ar/haber/1831/.html. 

 
                                                           
Thirdly,  the  Self  Administration  has  limited  options  in  its  search  for  capable  and  influential  local 
partners: its late arrival on the scene means that intellectual and economic elites, as well as influential 
figures in general, have fixed political positions, or else have settled in countries of asylum. 

The strength of the cohesion and belonging felt by Arabs fighting in the ranks of the SDF has not yet 
been put to the test, and neither fighting side-by-side in a united front against IS, nor support from 
the US, are necessarily enough to build a true sense of allegiance and belonging. Any failure by the 
Self Administration to establish a network of influential and locally-accepted partners will likely be a 
point  of  severe  weakness  when  it  comes  to  combatting  the  ongoing  influence  of  IS,  which  has 
experience  and  strong  understanding  of  the  dynamics of  the  local  community.  The  group  has  also 
likely achieved great influence over the thousands of children and youths who were subjected to its 
proselytism and education over the course of its three-year rule.  

Finally,  the  threat  posed  by  loyal  networks  that  the  regime  created  within  the  SDF  and  local 
communities will increase, as through these networks the regime will be able to destabilise the region 
and provoke further crises.  

The regime’s strategy to revive the pre-2011 status quo 

A militarily weak regime 

In September 2017, regime forces and their Russian and Iranian allies succeeded in breaking the siege 
imposed by IS on the pocket of regime-held territory in Deir al-Zor city. Subsequently, they established 
control over the entire city, and within two months had taken all the rural areas to the east and west 
of the city on the left bank of the Euphrates. Entering via a crossing point in the Syrian Steppe, the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard led combined  forces that managed to take control of the border area 
with Iraq and the city of Abu Kamal city in October of the same year. 

The combined forces that took part in the campaign were notable for the limited presence of regular 
Syrian  army  units,  evidence  of  the  regime’s  increasing  reliance  on  militias.  This  casts  doubt  on  its 
future capacity to retain the vast swathes of territory currently under its control.  

The regime has so far relied on two types of Syrian militia force. The first is made up of local militia 
forces, the most important of which fight under the name National Defence Forces (NDF)27, followed 
in significance by “Liwa al-Shaitat”. The second type of militia upon which the regime relies draws its 
members from different regions all over the country – the biggest of these is the Tiger Forces (Quwwat 
al-Nimr),  led  by  air  force  intelligence  officer,  Suhail  al-Hassan.  These  are  joined  by  the  Palestinian 
group “Liwa al-Quds”28, the “Jaysh al-Ashai’r” militia29 and several other militias that participated on 
and off in the battle.   

27 The National Defence Forces ranks are estimated to number around 200 individuals, and are headed by Firas 
al-Jiham from Deir al-Zor. 
28 The majority of its fighters are Palestinian refugees from the al-Nayrab refugee camp close to the city of 
Aleppo. The group is led by Engineer Mohammad Said. 
29 The militia is made up of members of the Bu Hamad tribe, based in a village of the same name in eastern 
Raqqa, and is headed by Turki Abu Hamad. 

                                                           
The militias led by Iran can be divided into three kinds. The first type is local groups, like the one made 
up of Shia fighters from the small town of Hatla30. A second militia group of this type is “Liwa al-Baqir” 
(Baqir Brigade), composed of Shia and Sunni fighters from the small town of Marat (most of whom are 
from the Baggara tribe). The militia is headed by Nawaf Raghib al-Bashir, the de facto leader of the 
tribe, who  switched sides  from the opposition to join the regime.  The second type are Syrian Shia 
militia groups, the most important of which are “Quwwat al-Rida” (al-Rida Forces), made up of Shia 
fighters from rural areas of Homs, and “Hezbollah Brigades Syria – 5th regiment”, which bring together 
Shia fighters from different areas of Syria.  The third type of militia comprises fighters from various 
foreign countries including Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as groups of Lebanese Hezbollah 
fighters  in  leadership  roles.  There  are  also  Iranian  fighters  from  the  Quds  Force,  part  of  the 
Revolutionary Guard. The Russian presence in Syria, meanwhile, includes units of the official army, as 
well as mercenaries who likely belong to the Wagner Group.  

For the foreseeable future, it will be difficult for the regime to redevelop its own forces, due to the 
continuous  losses  suffered  by  its  army  over  recent  years,  including  through  defection,  death  and 
injury. The regime has been unable to sufficiently replenish its ranks by attracting new volunteers, or 
through  forced  recruitment.  Facing  this  impasse,  if  the  regime  were  to  attempt  to  decrease  its 
dependence  on  the  Iranians,  it  would  have  no  option  but  to  continue  establishing  so-called  “Self-
Defence Units” to serve as the principal military force in regime-held areas of Deir Al-Zor. According 
to available reports, it appears that the regime is attempting to absorb the militias fighting in its name 
together into one united force. This new force would also include thousands of young men returning 
from  forced  displacement,  under  the  terms  of  a  “reconciliation”  deal  which  will  see  their  names 
removed from wanted lists, and these individuals serving only in their own villages, towns or cities.  

However, the chances for the success of the Self-Defence Units project appear severely limited31. It 
remains doubtful  that young men returning from displacement will agree to fight according to the 
regime’s terms – including the guarantee of amnesty, and that they will only have to  serve in their 
local areas – in return for a salary that, according to the highest estimates, will not exceed $100 per 
month. In general, there are very low levels of trust in the regime among young people in Deir al-Zor, 
with public opinion holding regime forces responsible for the deaths of thousands of civilians in the 
area, and the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of others.  

Rebuilding a defunct apparatus 

In its approach to civilian administration in Deir Al-Zor, the regime appears to be attempting a return 
to the pre-2011 status quo. Since then, the regime’s sphere of influence has shrunk to a region that 
encompasses just 1% of the governorate and is home to fewer than 100,000 people. Nevertheless, 
the  regime  kept  in  place  the  essential  structure  of  its  multi-branch  civil  governance,  including 

30 The force is led by Tareq Bin Yassin al-Maayuf, one of the most important proponents of Shia thought in the 
town and surrounding areas during the 1980s and 1990s.  
31 In the first and only recruiting session the Self-Defence Units have carried out (as of the end of January 
2018), the total attendance was 96 people, all of them government employees from regime-held areas. 
Source: https://www.facebook.com/DearEzzorGov/posts/1308264392612547. 

 
 
                                                           
government 
organisations and syndicates (even though these bodies were present in form only in most cases). 

institutions,  the  security  apparatus,  Baath  Party  branches  and  party-affiliated 

In the wake of its military victory, there are clear indications that the regime is attempting to rebuild 
its traditional civil governance system within pre-set boundaries, such that it takes into account the 
fundamental changes brought about by the war, until such time as the effects of the conflict disappear 
for good. It appears that Damascus will bet on three groups of local mediators to secure social and 
political control: high-ranking local government officials, party figures and members of the People’s 
Council. Alongside them, the central government will also seek to rely on middlemen from unofficial 
centres  of  power,  including  tribal  leaders,  government  officials,  former  Baathists,  warlords  and 
informants.  

In  recent  years,  despite  losses  sustained  during  the  war,  government  bodies  and  institutions  have 
managed to remain in place. Even at times when there was no work that could practically be done, 
the government continued to pay the salaries of tens of thousands of its employees32, whether or not 
they lived in areas under regime control (apart from those government workers who were dismissed 
for political reasons). The heads of government institutions in Deir al-Zor, both those who remained 
in  Deir  al-Zor  city  and  those  who  fled  to  Damascus  or  the  nearby  city  of  al-Hasakah,  were  able  to 
maintain the institution’s basic structure, and in particular its higher levels. This was achieved through 
constant coordination with the ministries of the central government and with the governor, whom 
the authorities persuaded to remain in Deir al-Zor city as a civilian representative of regime. While the 
regime maintained a constant physical presence in Deir al-Zor, it is worth mentioning that this was in 
the form of five different governors since 2011. One of  these was from the governorate itself, and 
three  were  former  police  officers,  evidence  of  the  regime’s  attempt  to  consolidate  power  by 
appointing members of the security apparatus even to civilian roles like that of governor. 

In the final three months of 2017, there was a constant stream of ministerial delegations visiting from 
Damascus,  to  ensure  that  local  government  institutions  were  ready  to  take  on  the  task  of 
administering all the regime-held areas of Deir al-Zor. As part of this effort, most ministries issued 
decrees demanding that government employees who had fled return to Deir al-Zor and break links 
with the alternative governmental institutions where they had been working while displaced to areas 
under  regime  control.  Employees  who  did  not  comply  with  these  demands  were  threatened  with 
punishment. Government ministries appear determined to implement this decree, despite the very 
real challenges of doing so in a context like Deir al-Zor city, where at least 90% of areas have been 
destroyed  and  are  now  uninhabited,33  and  where,  consequently,  there  is  no  appropriate  living  or 
working environment.  

As well as the governor and government institutions, the regime also managed to retain a branch of 
the Baath party, even if this was more or less symbolic. Despite having few illusions as to its potential, 
the regime is currently in the process of attempting to rebuild and reinvigorate the party in Deir al-
Zor, in order to restore it to its previous role overseeing the work of government institutions, alongside 
the  local  security  apparatus.  It  is  also  hoped  that  it  will  play  a  key  role  as  a  tool  in  dismantling 
opposition communities, as well as those that kept their distance from the conflict. Likewise, the Baath 

32 According to oral reports, in 2010 the number of government employees in Deir al-Zor was estimated at 
between 30,000 and 35,000. 
33 According to press statements by Deir al-Zor governor Mohammed Ibrahim Samra.  

                                                           
party will be tasked with reinforcing the regime’s power, partly by acting as a façade to distract from 
the deeply-entrenched family-based nature of the regime’s security structure. 

Prior  to  2011,  anyone  could  become  a  member  of  the  ruling  Baath  party,  and  in  many  cases, 
membership was a prerequisite for those wanting to obtain government jobs or promotions. However, 
party affiliation in many cases had nothing to do with true political allegiance to the regime. This is 
evidenced by the fact that tens of thousands of nominal Baath party members took part in the anti-
government  demonstrations  in  Deir  al-Zor,  with  many  of  them  later  fighting  alongside  the  FSA  or 
joining forces with the civilian opposition. 

Today,  urgent  efforts  are  being  made  to  reinvigorate  the  party  by  working  with  individuals  most 
strongly allied to the regime, regardless of their position within the established party hierarchy. During 
the  final  three  months  of  2017,  there  was  a  succession  of  visits  to  Deir  al-Zor  by  members  of  the 
national party leadership, the most powerful  part of the Baath Party structure. In this context, the 
local branch of the Baath Party also became very active in a number of areas, the most important of 
which was in negotiating local reconciliation agreements, as well as in establishing the Self-Defence 
Units. A number of party officials in rural areas began to announce the establishment of local branches 
of the Self-Defence Units to absorb young people returning to their homes from displacement34. At 
the same time, efforts have begun to revive the Baath Vanguard and the Union of Revolutionary Youth, 
the Baath party’s two auxiliary groups for young people, children and adolescents35. The regime is also 
lesser  extent,  to  revive  professional  syndicates  and  grassroots 
attempting,  although  to  a 
organisations36. This is done in constant collaboration with the local security apparatus, represented 
by local branches of military intelligence, air force intelligence, the political security directorate and 
the state security directorate.  Throughout the chaos of recent years, these entities have remained 
effective; they are capable of utilising networks of informants and collaborators outside the pocket of 
territory  in  the  city  under  regime  control,  as  well  as  having  experience  of  taking  part  in  military 
missions alongside regime forces, on the frontlines surrounding regime-held areas in Deir al-Zor.  

Finally, the regime has continued to represent Deir al-Zor in the People’s Council, despite the fact that 
over a third of its population is present in areas outside of its control. The number of representatives 
for Deir al-Zor has in fact increased from 13 – comprising 3 independents, 9 Baathists and 1 member 
of the Baath-affiliated National Progressive Front – to 14 in the first round of elections held since the 
beginning of the revolution, with the addition of one independent member. This was an attempt to 
buy the support of as many tribe-affiliated individuals as possible.  

Throughout the reigns of Hafez and then Bashar al-Assad, most members of the People’s Council were 
faithful  to  the  ruling  junta,  more  than  they  were  to  the  sectors  of  society  they  theoretically 
represented. A place on the People’s Council was, in effect, a reward granted by the regime to its most 
faithful supporters. It was also used as a method to attract the support of tribal leaders, and bring 

34 For example, Ghazi Hussein al-Sahu, head of the Second Rural Division, from the village of al-Husseiniya 
north of Deir al-Zor city. See also statements by the head of the Deir al-Zor branch of the party, Sahir al-Sakr, at 
a general meeting in the local headquarters on 3 December 2017, regarding the role the party will play in 
establishing the Self-Protection Units: https://www.sana.sy/?p=6736412017. 
35 In November 2017 Maan Aboud, head of the Union of Revolutionary Youth, visited Deir al-Zor as part of 
efforts to revive the group there: http://tishreenonline.sy/2017/11/09. 
36 These include local branches of syndicates for workers, teachers, engineers and doctors, as well as the 
General Union of Agricultural Labourers.  

                                                           
them into the regime’s sphere of influence. Tribal leaders always won seats as independents during 
legislative elections, evidence that, despite the challenges faced by the tribal structure, tribal solidarity 
remained stronger than other types of social ties. This is in the context of a society characterised by 
ethnic,  religious  and  sectarian  homogeneity,  in  which  there  are  no  marked  economic  or  religious 
elites37,  nor  political  parties  nor  independent  organisations.  At  the  same  time,  electoral  laws  have 
always led to increased competition between tribal leaders, at times with conspicuous meddling by 
the regime in favour of a particular candidate.  

Between 2011 and 2017, a group of new local actors emerged as a result of the fragmentation caused 
by  the  war.  These  actors  took  advantage  of  the  regime’s  urgent  need  for  security,  military  and 
economic support of various kinds. Among these actors were individuals from various different social 
classes. Some individuals from working-class backgrounds experienced a significant rise in social status 
during the conflict, for example the head of the National Defence Force Firas al-Jiham. Prior to 2011 
he  had  worked  in  a  bakery  and  sold  drugs,  subsequently  sponsoring  a  gambling  outlet.  When  the 
uprising began, he became active among those the regime recruited to put down demonstrations. By 
the second half of 2012, these groups were known as the National Defence Force.  

Other new actors also emerged from the middle classes, such as Mohammed al-Meshaali, a member 
of the People’s Council elected in 2016. A small-time contractor before the revolution, he had made 
his living thanks to close relations with local intelligence officers, who helped him to win minor public 
sector contracts. These relations grew stronger and wider after the outbreak of the revolution, and 
Meshaali began to play a greater variety of roles as a fixer for the security apparatus. His role involved 
securing the support of high-profile individuals in the villages of Deir al-Zor and its principal city by 
granting them special privileges.  

Many new faces such as these would eventually find their way into the People’s Council. Ibrahim al-
Dayir, for example, an independent, was finally elected into the council in 2016 after many previous 
failed attempts. Al-Dayir managed to take advantage of a massacre committed by IS in the summer of 
2014 against his own tribe, the Shaitat, part of a wider effort by the regime to capitalise on the tribe’s 
ill feeling towards IS.  He spent vast sums of money on his successful campaign, enabled by many years 
in Kuwait, employed first as a construction worker and  then as a contractor for small construction 
projects.  

In  a  different  context,  Mohammed  Amin  Hussein  al-Rija38,  a  young  Shia  cleric  from  Hatla,  rose  to 
become Deir Al-Zor’s first Shia member of the People’s Council in 2016, representing the Baath Party. 
Unlike many others, al-Rija was not selected as a Baath Party candidate  – considered an automatic 
win –as a reward, but an acknowledgement of the rising influence of local Shias thanks to growing 
Iranian role in the area. 

37 Deir al-Zor, unlike the governorates of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama, does not have its own religious 
heritage, or a sector of important businesspeople.  
38 Al-Rija’s father, Hussein al-Rija, led attempts to spread Shiism in the small town of Hatla during the 1980s 
and 1990s. Shia sources estimate the number of people he converted to Shiism at over 1000. Source: 
http://bintjbeil.org/article/67270.  

                                                           
The regime’s vision of reconciliation  

By  the  end  of  2017,  only  an  estimated  20%  of  Deir  al-Zor’s  pre-2011  population  was  living  under 
regime control. The regime appears to be aware of the issues raised by the fact that a large majority 
of the population remains outside its control, with the decision by almost a million people to stay in 
exile casting doubt on the regime’s claims to enjoy broad-based support in the region. The regime also 
needs the local population to help achieve its plan to revive economic production, particularly in the 
agricultural  sector,  as  well  as  for  its  military  plan  to  establish  Self-Defence  Units.  Likewise,  on  a 
symbolic level, the regime’s sphere of influence in the region – which covers an area of approximately 
200 square kilometres – will remain practically meaningless as long as that area is nearly uninhabited. 

After losing military influence in 2012, the regime placed its trust in the effectiveness of the National 
Reconciliation Subcommittee, which was set up in the autumn of 2013.  The body  was tasked  with 
promoting public calls for a ceasefire and then a reconciliation process. However, this project was in 
general unsuccessful. Shortly after its military success, the regime redoubled its efforts to promote 
reconciliation,  focusing  in  the  main  on  one  aspect:  securing  the  return  of  communities  internally 
displaced to regions outside regime control. Owing to the size of this target population, the regime 
established  Small  Reconciliation  Committees  in  small  towns  and  villages  to  strengthen  its 
communication channels with displaced communities. It also employed a network of intermediaries 
who, working in a range of different roles, answer directly to high-ranking security officials. Under the 
guidance  of  the  security  services,  this  network  focuses  its  efforts  on  symbolic  members  of  the 
opposition whose return to regime-held areas would represent a heavy blow for the opposition39.  

Likewise,  in  December  2017,  the  National  Reconciliation  Subcommittee  was  reshuffled,  and  other 
committees with similar missions were established such as one aimed specifically at army defectors, 
and another focusing on checkpoints. A third was set up with the aim of coordinating between the 
sub-committees  and  the  two  secret  security  agencies  that  were  working  semi-openly  behind  the 
scenes  (despite  the  fact  that  the  four  public  security  agencies  were  represented  on  the  National 
Reconciliation Subcommittee).  

Through its local proxies, Iran is also playing an increasing role in efforts to return internally-displaced 
people, with one Iranian delegate taking part in  meetings convened by  the National Reconciliation 
Subcommittee. More than this, though, its efforts in this regard are focused on a network of local Shia 
figures from military and civilian backgrounds, whose calls for return are more convincing than those 
of the regime. These individuals offer settlements that are processed more rapidly by officials from 
the security apparatus, as well as higher salaries for those who enlist in the militias. Moreover, the 
guarantees offered by Iran and its local proxies are considered more trustworthy than those of the 
regime. In one instance Tariq Yasin al-Maayouf, the prominent leader of a group of local Shia fighters, 

39 Salim al-Khalid, a prominent military leader within the FSA, reported having received numerous calls about 
reconciliation, urging him to return. The most high-profile individual involved in this was Ali Mamlouk, head of 
Syria’s National Security Bureau. During this discussion, Khalid reports having been offered incentives for 
returning, including large sums of money and leadership of the local Self-Defence Units. 

 
                                                           
appeared  on  regime  television  channel  calling  on  the  displaced  to  return,  offering  his  personal 
guarantee and promising to use every tool at his disposal to help those who did choose to go back40. 

With regard to local reconciliation efforts, Russia is also playing a significant role through its Russian 
Centre for Reconciliation in Syria, which is based in the Hmeimim air base in Latakia. At the beginning 
of November 2017, the body announced that it was opening an office in Deir al-Zor. It appears that 
Russian efforts are now focused on ensuring that conditions on the ground are suitable for returning 
IDPs, drawing on their experience following their destruction of the Chechen capital, Grozny41. Their 
approach does not involve building local networks or employing proxies, with this task being left to 
the regime – instead, they are focusing on providing technical plans for getting basic infrastructure 
back up and running, helping to remove debris from the streets of Deir al-Zor and providing general 
logistical support. 

Despite  these  efforts,  there  has  been  no  sign  that  significant  numbers  of  displaced  people  are 
returning  to  regime-held  areas42,  except  in  a  very  limited  fashion  in  some  villages  in  the  western 
countryside of Deir al-Zor. In a small survey of 100 people who fled regime-held areas of Deir al-Zor 
and are now living in the Turkish city of Urfa43, 87 said they were not planning to return, with 18 of 
those expressing their intention to remain living as refugees and denying the regime the legitimacy it 
might gain from their return. 41 others who do not plan to return said they would remain as refugees 
because they felt incapable of living under the regime again, while 28 said they would remain in exile 
because of the economic collapse and lack of job opportunities in regime-held areas. 

The results of this survey, admittedly carried out on a very limited scale, nevertheless suggest that 
there is a fundamental opposition to returning to life under regime rule. This may well scupper the 
regime’s  reconciliation  efforts  in  the  coming  phase,  since  the  amnesty  offered  to  those  currently 
outside regime areas is not considered a strong  enough incentive to return home. This situation is 
likely to be exacerbated by the regime’s likely failure to achieve its reconstruction goals. Even together 
with its allies, the regime is currently unable to meet the steep costs of rebuilding Deir al-Zor city, 90% 
of  whose  buildings  and  infrastructure  have  been  destroyed.  In  the  cities  of  al-Mayadeen  and  Abu 
Kamal the level of devastation is unlikely to be much lower, while in rural areas at least 50% of the 
buildings and infrastructure has been decimated.  

Conclusion 

Local  communities  in  Deir  al-Zor  are  fragmented,  divided  and  in  constant  competition  with  one 
another. As such, it appears unlikely that they will play a real role in bringing stability to the region. 
However, their current situation – the result of years of neglect – also means they will be unwilling 
and  unable  in  the  short  term  to  destabilise  the  rule  of  the  two  authorities  that  are  currently 
establishing themselves in the region, the Self Administration and the regime. 

40 https://www.facebook.com/groups/382771785160480/permalink/4606425269461756. 
41 According to a source close to the National Reconciliation Subcommittee who asked to remain anonymous. 
42 Between November 2017 and the end of January 2018 just 70 former defectors from the regime army 
submitted requests for settlement and return through brokers of the National Reconciliation Subcommittee 
(ibid). 
43 Conducted by assistants in December 2017, over the phone with 60 people, and in person with 40. 

                                                           
The Self Administration may, despite the significant challenges it faces, be able to encourage effective 
public participation in the local rule it seeks to build in Deir al-Zor. However, such participation will 
likely be superficial and focused solely on meeting the most urgent needs of the population, such as 
security,  basic  services  and  means  of  subsistence.  Similarly,  the  very  real  and  deep-seated 
contradictions  between  the  governance  model  adopted  by  the  Self  Administration  and  the 
fundamental  character  of  the  local  population  is  beginning  to  make  themselves  felt  through  the 
emergence of new crises.  

Likewise, attempts by the regime to restore the local governance frameworks it employed previously 
look unlikely to succeed, due to obstacles that it will only be able to overcome in a limited way. Even 
if it does succeed in restoring its earlier structures of power, which have lain dormant throughout the 
conflict,  the  regime  will  not  be  able  to  rely  on  them.  The  regime’s  bet  on  the  efficiency  of  these 
structures will be unsuccessful, as the regime no longer has a monopoly over power, resources and 
granting opportunities. This will further damage its structures of power, which before the outbreak of 
the revolution were already fragile and weak. As such, it would only be able to operate effectively in 
a closed environment, in which it represented the only available option for the population under its 
control. The regime’s reconciliation programme will falter if it is approached from a purely economic 
and security point of view, with displaced people – and in particular supporters of the opposition – 
surrendering in order to obtain amnesty and be allowed to return to their homes. 

The growing role played by Iran, which will not be content with a military role but will extend into 
other areas that confirm its sectarian ambition, will be yet another factor of unrest and will contribute 
to feelings of hopelessness, repression and disappointment in the general population. This will open 
the  door  to  a  new  revival  of  jihadi  Salafism,  which  has  far  from  disappeared  from  Deir  al-Zor,  but 
whose exponents are rather awaiting an opportune moment to relaunch. 

In  the  face  of  such  grim  prospects  of  division  between  two  separate  authorities,  the  international 
community – and the US in particular, due to the strength of its influence over the Self Administration 
– must put pressure on said administration to amend its political, social and cultural strategy, taking 
into account the political aspirations, identity and social specificities of the local population in Deir al-
Zor. The US should also, in partnership with the EU (which has very little presence in Deir al-Zor) push 
for greater participation by diverse civil society organisations independent of the Self Administration, 
focusing  on  areas  such  as  securing  job  opportunities,  reviving  the  agricultural  sector,  providing 
effective services and ensuring adequate healthcare and education for local communities.  

In areas under regime control, meanwhile, the US must not turn a blind eye to the growing Iranian 
influence, and must operate pro-actively to counter it. It must also take steps to prevent the regime 
securing the return of young IDPs only in order to enlist them in new militia groups that are currently 
being  established.  More  generally,  it  must  renew  its  efforts  to  urge  the  regime  to  take  part  in 
negotiations  with  concrete  outcomes  relating  to  political  transition,  and  with  the  ultimate  aim  of 
convincing it to cede power. Alongside the EU, it must also support efforts by Syrian and international 
human rights organisations to hold regime officials to account for war crimes – such a justice-based 
approach will be the principal, and indeed only, way to achieve any meaningful stability going forward.  

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RESEARCH 
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DOI:10.2870/78387

ISBN:978-92-9084-624-6