Evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian interventions in India and Nepal : 2013-2017 : final report.
Date: 2018-02-23
Institutions: Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO)
Subjects: India, Nepal, decontamination, education policy, environmental risk prevention, food aid, health policy, humanitarian aid, natural disaster, report, right to health, the EU's international role

Evaluation of the European 
Union’s humanitarian 
interventions in India and 
Nepal, 2013-2017 

Final Report  

February 2018 

Contract No ECHO-ADM-BUD-2017-01202 

This report was commissioned by the European Commission. 

The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors’ point of view which is not 

necessarily shared by the European Commission or by the authorities of the concerned 

countries. 

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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018 

ISBN: 978-92-79-78027-1 
doi:10.2795/627752 

© European Union, 2018 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This evaluation was commissioned by  
the Evaluation Sector of the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid 
Operations – ECHO (European Commission). 

This report was prepared by: 

Jock Baker (Team Leader) 
Albertien van der Veen 
Virginie Morillon 
Mihir Bhatt 
Megh Rai 
Gabrielle Smith 
Arsene Francois 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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Abstract 

This  report  is  an  independent  evaluation  of  the  European  Union's  humanitarian 
interventions in India and Nepal during the period 2013-2017, as managed by the European 
Commission's Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 
(ECHO). The evaluation draws upon evidence from project data, interviews, field visits and 
a literature review. 

The  evaluation  concludes  that  ECHO  country  programmes  succeeded  in  achieving  most 
project  output  objectives,  with  mixed  results  at  an  outcome  level  due  to  various  factors.   
Better outcomes have been achieved in Nepal than in India due mainly to a less challenging 
operating environment.  Community-based disaster risk reduction (DRR) projects in Nepal 
in  the  education  and  health  sectors  have  been  scaled  up  at  to  a  national  policy  level 
contributing  to  improved  resilience  of  communities  with  the  education  intervention 
providing a good practice example of collaboration.  

Five  strategic  recommendations  targeted  primarily  at  ECHO  include  1)  improving  the 
timeliness and predictability of funding decisions for quick-onset disasters, 2) promoting a 
programme-based approach for DRR activities, 3) improved cooperation with development 
actors,  4)  using  the  current  transition  in  Nepal  as  an  opportunity  to  build  on  ECHO’s 
previous DRR work and 5) exploring alternative models for future cooperation with India. 

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Table of Contents 

ABSTRACT 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

RÉSUMÉ EXÉCUTIF 

1. 

2. 

INTRODUCTION, STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE ....................................................... 1 

EVALUATION CONTEXT ...................................................................................... 3 

2.1.  TIMING OF THE EVALUATION ........................................................................................ 3 
2.2.  OPERATING CONTEXT ..................................................................................................... 3 
2.3.  ECHO SUPPORT TO NEPAL & INDIA .............................................................................. 6 

3.  METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................. 11 

2.1.  EVALUATION PHASES ..................................................................................................... 11 
2.2.  DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ............................................................................. 11 
2.1.  DEBRIEFINGS WITH COUNTRY LEVEL STAKEHOLDERS ........................................... 12 
2.2.  CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS................................................................................. 12 

4. 

RESPONSE TO EVALUATION QUESTIONS ........................................................... 15 

EQ 1 AND EQ2: NEEDS ASSESSMENT ...................................................................................... 15 
EQ 3: ENTRY AND EXIT STRATEGIES ...................................................................................... 24 
EQ 4: ALIGNMENT WITH ECHO POLICIES .............................................................................. 30 
EQ 5: ARTICULATION WITH OTHER ACTORS ......................................................................... 34 
EQ 6: EU ADDED-VALUE .......................................................................................................... 38 
EQ 7: ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES .................................................................................... 43 
EQ 8: ADVOCACY AND COMMUNICATION ............................................................................. 48 
EQ 9: EFFICIENCY (TRANSFER MODALITIES) ......................................................................... 51 
EQ 10: SUSTAINABILITY ............................................................................................................. 57 

5. 

6. 

CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................... 61 

RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................ 65 

ANNEX 1 – CASE STUDIES ........................................................................................... 69 

CASE STUDY 1 – RESILIENCE .................................................................................................... 69 
CASE STUDY 2 – EARLY RECOVERY AND LRRD .................................................................... 79 
CASE STUDY 3 – OPERATING IN SENSITIVE AND POLITICALLY COMPLEX CONTEXTS .. 87 

ANNEX 2 – LIST OF PROJECTS SELECTED FOR IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS ........................ 95 

ANNEX 3 – FIELD VISIT ITINERARY ........................................................................... 97 

ANNEX 4 – DOCUMENTS CONSULTED ........................................................................ 99 

ANNEX 5 – LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED ............................................................ 105 

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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ANNEX 6 – INTERVIEW GUIDE ...................................................................................111 

ANNEX 7 – TERMS OF REFERENCE ........................................................................... 115 

LIST OF TABLES 

TABLE 1 – MAIN TYPE OF DISASTER IN INDIA, 2013-2017 ..................................................... 4 
TABLE 2 – RESULTS OF INFORM AND FCA 2014-2017: REGIONAL COMPARISON ........ 17 
TABLE 3 – CHARACTERISTICS OF ASSESSMENTS* ................................................................... 21 
TABLE 4 – STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING UNMET NEEDS AS PER NEEDS ASSESSMENTS.. 24 

LIST OF FIGURES 

FIGURE 1 – EVALUATION SUBJECT, PURPOSE AND SCOPE ...................................................... 1 
FIGURE 2 – ECHO FUNDING TRENDS 2013-2017 .................................................................. 6 
FIGURE 3 – TIMELINE OF ECHO PROJECTS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 .................. 7 
FIGURE 4 – EU FUNDING TO INDIA, BY SECTOR AND BY YEAR ............................................. 8 
FIGURE 5 – EU FUNDING TO NEPAL, BY SECTOR AND BY YEAR ........................................... 9 
FIGURE 6 – OVERVIEW OF ECHO POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR INDIA AND NEPAL ........... 31 
FIGURE 7 – NEPAL EARTHQUAKE: COMMITMENTS BY TOP 10 DONORS (US$) ............... 41 
FIGURE 8 – TIMELINE FOR RESPONSES TO QUICK-ONSET DISASTERS (2013-2017) ........ 47 

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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 

ADE 
CBI 
CMAM 
CTP 
DCC 

DDC 

DDRC 
DEOC 

DEVCO 

DFID 
DIPECHO 
DRR 
EC 
ECHO/  
ECHO 
EEAS 
eSF 
EQ 
EU 
EUR 
FCA 
FICCI 
FGD 
IAF 
GDP 
GoI 
GoN 
GGOPHA 
HIP 
HOPE 
HQ 
ICRC 
IFRC 
INFORM 
INGO 
IOM 

Analysis for Economic Decisions 
Connecting Business Initiative 
Community-Based Management of Acute Malnutrition 
Cash Transfer Programming 
District Coordination Committees  
District Development Committees (replaced by DCC during 2017 as part of the 
restructuring process in Nepal) 
District Disaster Relief Committees  
District Emergency Operations Committee 
European Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and 
Development 
Department for International Development (UK) 
Disaster Preparedness ECHO programme 
Disaster Risk Reduction 
European Commission 
European Commission Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection 
European External Action Service 
ECHO Single Form 
Evaluation Question 
European Union  
Euro 
Forgotten Crisis Assessments  
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry 
Focus Group Discussion 
Integrated Assessment Framework 
British Pounds 
Government of India 
Government of Nepal 
General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for Humanitarian Aid 
Humanitarian Implementation Plan 
ECHO Operations Database (Humanitarian Office Programme Environment) 
Headquarters 
International Committee of the Red Cross 
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Index for Risk Management 
International Non-Governmental Organisation 
International Office for Migration 

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Acronyms  

 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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LRRD 
NFI 
NGO 
NRCS 
NRRC 
OCHA 
OFDA 
PDM 
RUTF 
SSDP 
TOR 
UK 
USAID 
UN 
UNDP 
UNHCR 
UNISDR 
VDC 
WASH 
WFP 
WHO 

Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development 
Non-food items 
Non-Governmental Organisation 
Nepal Red Cross Society 
Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USA) 
Post Distribution Monitoring 
Ready to use therapeutic food 
School Sector Development Plan  
Terms of Reference 
United Kingdom 
United States Agency for International Development 
United Nations 
United Nations Development Programme 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction 
Village Development Committee (Nepal) 
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 
United Nations World Food Programme 
United Nations World Health Organisation 

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Acronyms  

 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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Executive Summary 

Evaluation Subject, Purpose and Scope 

The  evaluation  covered  humanitarian  interventions  in  India  and  Nepal  during  the  period 
2013-2017 funded by the European Commission's Directorate-General for Civil Protection 
and  Humanitarian  Aid  Operations  (ECHO).  It  included  the  different  sectors  in  which 
support  was  provided,  notably  Shelter/Non-Food  Items  (NFIs),  Water  and  Sanitation, 
Health, Food Assistance, Protection, Recovery and Disaster Risk Reduction.  

The  evaluation  purpose  is  two-fold.    Firstly,  it  aims  to  provide  aims  at  providing  an 
assessment  of  ECHO’s  strategy/approach  and  provide  strategic  recommendations.  
Secondly,  relevant  results  will  help  to  inform  ECHO’s  future  funding  decisions  in  both 
countries and, at a global level, by feeding into a comprehensive evaluation of the European 
Commission’s humanitarian aid covering the period 2012-2016.  

Methodology 

The evaluation was divided into three-phases; inception, data collection and synthesis.  The 
data collection phase included both desk and field work covering the 10 evaluation questions 
in the terms of reference (TOR) for this evaluation.  The team conducted visits to Nepal and 
India during 15 days at the end of August 2017, including to selected project sites in each 
country.  The team interviewed a total of 156 stakeholders, either face-to-face, over Skype 
or  by  phone,  including  representatives  from  European  Commission  (EC)  headquarters, 
ECHO  field  offices,  European  Union  (EU)  Delegations,  government  officials,  bilateral 
donors, United Nations (UN) Agencies, national and local authorities, international and local 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and representatives of beneficiary communities. 
This included also on-site visits. The team reviewed hundreds of documents, including policy 
and strategy documents, evaluations, reviews, studies and other documents.  Details of eighty 
documents that were particularly relevant to the evidence base for the evaluation are attached 
as an annex. 

Preliminary  findings  and  emerging  conclusions  were  presented  to  ECHO  field  staff  at 
debriefing sessions with field staff at the end of each country visit.  In Nepal, ECHO partners 
also  participated  in  the  debriefing.    Feedback  from  ECHO  field  staff  and  partners  was 
considered when drafting the Progress Report that was presented to the Steering Group for 
this evaluation in September.  A workshop was held following circulation of the draft report 
where staff from ECHO and, in Nepal, from partners were given the opportunity to provide 
high  level  feedback  on  the  draft  report  and  provide  perspectives  on  the  relevance  and 
achievability of the recommendations. 

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Summary of Findings  

A summary of findings based on the judgement criteria agreed during the inception phase 
for each of the 10 evaluation questions is described below.  

Needs Assessments  

ECHO and partners in both India and Nepal had access to relevant needs assessment data 
of sufficient quality.   ECHO only occasionally participated in partners’ needs assessment 
but played an important role in relevant processes, both at a strategic and operational level. 
ECHO needs assessments were multi-layered. First phase assessments drawing on data from 
ECHO’s Index for Risk Management (INFORM) and Forgotten Crisis Assessments (FCA) 
were relevant and coherent.  Data collected during the second phase were less coherent.   

Needs assessments by partners were carried out in multiple phases and progressively focused 
on  identifying  priority  needs  and  target  groups.  This  approach  resulted  in  good  quality 
assessments.  Most  partners  regularly  consulted  with  communities  during  needs  during 
assessments,  apart  from  some  projects  in  Jammu  and  Kashmir,  mainly  due  to  political 
sensitivities.   

Needs  assessments  of  ECHO  and  partners  were  appropriate  and  timely,  including 
assessments by ECHO staff immediately following a disaster event to inform modifications 
to  Humanitarian  Implementation  Plans  (HIP).    Assessments  for  disaster  risk  reduction 
(DRR)  actions  included  a  mapping  of  stakeholder  roles  and  responsibilities  in  line  with 
ECHO guidelines. 

Entry and Exit Strategies  

ECHO  developed  strategies  adapted  to  the  specific  needs  and  contexts  in  each  country 
taking account of their vulnerability to natural disasters and need to strengthening people’s 
resilience, particularly in mitigating the impacts on marginalised groups.  

As part of ECHO’s preparedness plan, disaster events in both countries were entry points 
for ECHO and its partners to develop intervention strategies and/or as triggers to scale up 
operations. 

Exit strategies that were not over-reliant on government ownership proved more viable. An 
example of good practice was a school safety project in Nepal that emphasised community 
mobilisation while also engaging with other donors and the government.  In India, ECHO’s 
strategy has focused on improving access to services by conflict-affected populations, but 
these have been challenged by the government’s general lack of ownership. 

The  Government  of  Nepal  (GoN)  has  been  more  willing  to  work  with  international 
humanitarian agencies although ECHO’s strategy has been to engage with the government 
and other stakeholders by working through partners and relevant networks.  Entry strategies 
for DRR activities in Nepal have followed a national  district  community process to 
gain approval at national level and move down the ladder gaining approval and promoting 
ownership at each stage.  The exit strategy is a reverse process, with an aim of influencing 
policy  and practice at different levels.  Strategies were regularly  adjusted by modifying  the 
HIP and reallocating funding.   

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Exit strategies have faced challenges in both countries due to several factors including the 
relatively short duration of ECHO projects, operationalising LRRD with development actors 
and inadequate strategies for replicating and scaling up pilot projects. There are nevertheless 
several examples of replication of DRR activities in Nepal where the GoN has integrated 
good practice into guidelines, strategy and local development planning processes. 

ECHO lacked an exit strategy for their country programme in India and the phase out during 
2017 was done largely on an ad hoc basis without much support from ECHO to smooth the 
transition for its partners.     Based on relevant indicators, it is difficult to justify ECHO’s 
suspension of their programme in India based on unmet needs, although ECHO’s limited 
value-added in the Indian operating context meant that it did not make sense to continue 
without a substantial revision of the operating model. 

Alignment with ECHO Policies  

ECHO  country  strategies  and  operations  were  coherent  with  ECHO’s  broader  policy 
framework.  ECHO-supported  operations  in  Nepal  were  coherent  with  sectors  and 
approaches described in the HIP.   Sectoral interventions in India were broadly consistent 
with ECHO policies but, due to the operating context, ECHO found itself at the edge of its 
mandate since many of the activities it supported were bordering on development.   

Awareness  of  ECHO's  policies  amongst  partners  was  uneven  in  each  country  and  fairly 
limited. A combination of ECHO’s “hands on” monitoring approach combined with advice 
and quality assurance provided  by  Europe-based  staff of ECHO  partners helped  to align 
interventions  with  ECHO  policies.    However,  the  understanding  and  application  of 
humanitarian principles by partners and other stakeholders was inconsistent due in part to 
the relationships with governments in each country.     

Resilience  and Gender-Age Markers  were  useful  as they helped  to clarify  ECHO’s policy 
commitments and allowed ECHO staff to make transparent and evidence-based judgements 
on compliance with related ECHO policies on ECHO funded interventions. 

Articulation with other Actors  

There  was  a  lack  of  articulation  between  ECHO  and  the  European  Commission's 
Directorate-General  for  International  Cooperation  and  Development  (DEVCO)  in  DRR 
and resilience programming in both countries.  One good practice example of collaboration 
with  DEVCO  in  the  education  sector  in  Nepal  nevertheless  did  demonstrate  that  it  was 
possible to achieve impressive positive outcomes despite institutional and system challenges.   

There was little evidence of joint action by the EU Civil Protection and the ECHO antenna 
office in Nepal during the deployment for the Nepal earthquake response.  However, the co-
location of staff within the EU Delegation office did facilitate regular information-sharing 
during the earthquake response. 

ECHO’s role in facilitating coordination between partners in Nepal improved programme 
effectiveness.  ECHO made use of sector-wide partnerships with implementers, donors and 
other  stakeholders  active  in  supporting  DRR  and  resilience.      This  helped  to  improve 
efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  ECHO  interventions  through  better  alignment  and 
harmonisation  of  donor  approaches  to  fill  gaps  and  reduce  duplication  in  addition  to 
facilitating knowledge management 

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ECHO’s HIP for Nepal has been developed in consultation with other humanitarian actors, 
and other donors and was in line with the sectoral priorities and needs identified.  In India, 
the HIP was mainly developed by ECHO without much consultation with partners, although 
partners they found it relevant. There was no evidence of direct involvement of government 
actors in the development of the HIP in either country.   

ECHO’s relationship with governments in both countries usually has been indirect, either 
through its partners or the EU delegation.  ECHO missions tend to interact mainly at a local 
government level.  In Nepal, ECHO was an active participant in national DRR dialogues, 
where it has been viewed as a major player by the international community. 

Channelling ECHO funds through consortia have improved efficiency and effectiveness in 
some cases, providing they are well-managed and resourced.   

ECHO was well-informed about interventions of other humanitarian actors, particularly in 
Nepal,  where  ECHO  regularly  participated  in  collaborative  activities  with  other  donors, 
including joint assessments.   

EU Added-Value  

Partners were unanimous in their appreciation of the “demanding and hands-on” approach 
of  ECHO  with  their  partners  that  helped  them  to  focus  on  results  and  improve  quality.  
Compared to its peers, as a donor ECHO was seen by partners as the most knowledgeable 
of  the  situation  on  the  ground  and  thus  in  a  good  position  to  provide  useful  and  timely 
feedback.  This “hands on” approach has also resulted in ECHO being perceived by other 
donors with a presence in the countries as a useful resource for advice about the situation 
on the ground.  For EU members who do not maintain a permanent humanitarian presence 
in either country, information from ECHO has been a critical element for their analysis of 
needs, risk and vulnerability to guide their programmes. 

More than a decade of investment in DRR and resilience in Nepal has positioned ECHO as 
a recognised thematic expert.  This has led to expectations by partners and local governments 
that ECHO will make an important contribution in supporting the transition process to the 
new governance system.  ECHO’s successes in improving the understanding of DRR and 
resilience in Nepal has highlighted gaps in LRRD as communities try and find for funds to 
retrofit unsafe buildings identified when drawing up hazard maps.    

The lack of direct engagement with GoI and GoN has made it easier for ECHO to work 
independently,  which  should  be  value-added  for  ECHO.    However,  the  lack  of  direct 
government engagement has limited their ability to meet ECHO commitments relating to 
humanitarian  principles,  notably  the  impartial  provision  of  assistance  to  marginalised 
populations. 

Value-added of the EU’s humanitarian assistance model in the Indian operating context has 
been limited, even though partners confirmed the relevance of ECHO’s programme while 
emphasising that ECHO has been virtually the only donor regularly supporting and visiting 
conflict areas.  

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Achievement of Objectives  

ECHO Strategies in both countries include maintaining an adequate level of preparedness to 
be  able  to  respond  to  disasters  that  exceed  the  capacity  of  national  actors  to  address 
humanitarian needs.  While  DRR interventions supported by ECHO have contributed to 
increased resilience of affected communities, delays in ECHO funding decisions following 
quick-onset emergencies have reduced the effectiveness of ECHO’s interventions.   

The  strategic  objectives  as  formulated  in  each  country  were  consistent  with  ECHO’s 
mandate,  although  the  contribution  of  ECHO  actions  in  India  was  limited  by  various 
constraints. In India, ECHO’s strategy mainly focused on improving inclusion and quality in 
service  delivery  for  conflict-affected  communities  in  northern  India  and  Jammu  and 
Kashmir. ECHO’s strategy in Nepal had a specific focus on building resilience in hazard-
prone areas. 

A review of a sample  of  fifteen  ECHO-funded  projects1 found a  80-90%  success rate  in 
achieving,  or  exceeding,  planned  outputs  in  terms  of  beneficiaries  reached  and  sectoral 
assistance delivered. Results for outcomes were mixed, with more positive examples from 
Nepal regarding use and replication of interventions. 

Advocacy and Communication  

ECHO advocacy and communications strategies were appropriate and consistent with HIP 
objectives  in  each  country.      In  Nepal,  there  has  been  a  primary  focus  throughout  the 
evaluation period on advocacy towards the formulation of a "National Strategy for Disaster 
Management in Nepal".   In India, advocacy efforts for inclusion and quality improvements 
in service delivery in India were viewed as a key component of ECHO's interventions. 

ECHO did not have formal advocacy and communication strategies, although some partners 
had developed their own that incorporated ECHO projects.  Partners viewed ECHO’s role 
more as one of providing useful technical support rather than conducting advocacy. 

In India, ECHO’s scope for advocacy has been extremely limited due a constrained operating 
environment.  ECHO’s influence in Nepal, notably in thematic areas related to DRR, was 
more significant than would be expected from the level of investment.   This influence can 
be attributed to several factors, including  ECHO’s status as a thematic “expert” in DRR, 
ECHO’s active participation the Humanitarian Coordination Team “Plus”.  The Nepal Risk 
Reduction  Consortium  (NRRC)  offered  a  useful  forum  for  ECHO  and  their  partners  to 
share lessons and influence through joint advocacy. 

Efficiency - Transfer Modalities  

There  has  been  a  positive  evolution  in  both  countries  since  2013  in  more  systematic 
consideration and adoption of cash-based modalities by ECHO’s partners. However, this 
has not been the same for all sectors and needs identified and this has not been based on a 
consistent and rigorous analysis.   

1   The 15 projects collectively represent approximately 20% of ECHO’s total project portfolio budget for both countries. 

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ECHO has been a ‘quiet facilitator’ of this evolution, funding cash transfer programming 
(CTP) interventions that were proposed by partners for response and recovery without issue, 
and in some cases suggesting addition of or substitution to cash modalities for more effective 
programming.   

In  both  countries,  and  particularly  in  Nepal,  given  its  vulnerability  to  recurrent  natural 
disasters, increased investment in cash preparedness activities (both technical assistance and 
support to policy/institutions) as part of broader DRR work could have reduced some of 
the barriers to selection and implementation of the most efficient and effective modalities 
for response and recovery. 

Features  that  ECHO-funded  programmes  that  have  contributed  to  the  efficient  use  of 
resources include increasing use of cash-based modalities, working through consortia, strong 
coordination  and  knowledge  management,  coordination  with  governments  and  donors, 
decisions on operational based both on cost efficiency and cost effectiveness considerations. 

ECHO’s  practice  of  channelling  funds  through  multiple  layers  of  partner  agencies  may 
reduce cost-efficiency, but this is balanced by qualitative benefits that improve effectiveness. 

Sustainability  

Main categories of stakeholders targeted to help achieve sustainability of ECHO-supported 
interventions  were  governments,  communities,  local  NGOs  and  development  donors. 
Partners  used  different  methods  to  promote  ownership;  including  capacity  building,  co-
funding, joint planning and implementation.   

Sustainability for DRR and conflict-related interventions was often linked to a robust exit 
strategy, and many of the same influencing factors apply (e.g. short project time frame and 
uncertain  follow  up  funding,  lack  of  clarity  about  exit  strategies  and  protocols,  lack  of 
government ownership).   

Gaining the necessary level of buy-in from government has been one of the main challenges 
to achieving sustainability, particularly in India.  Despite the challenges in India, there have 
been some examples of activities continuing with GoI support.  Nepal, where GoN has been 
more  open  to  collaboration  with  international  humanitarian  partners,  provides  more 
examples of sustainable interventions.  ECHO partners and their local partners have placed 
emphasis community mobilisation to help promote ownership and sustainability.   

There is a strong demand for ECHO-supported interventions from national stakeholders.  
The Ministry of Health in Nepal has decided to replicate and scale up the emergency health 
preparedness activities and ECHO partners have received requests for training from newly-
elected local authorities in western Nepal for training in DRR and humanitarian response.    

Conclusions 

The section on conclusions begins with an overall statement on ECHO’s interventions in 
India and Nepal during 2013-2017.  Four of the conclusions support recommendations by 
providing a concise summary of findings and analysis at a project and programmatic levels.   
The  first  conclusion  relates  specifically  to  Nepal.    Given  the  specific  context  of  India, 
ECHO’s  operating  model  in  India  was  found  to  have  been  more  reactive  rather  than 
strategic.  The second conclusion is thus based on discussions with stakeholders regarding 

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alternative  business  case  options  to  support  the  final  strategic  recommendation.  The  last 
three conclusions are relevant to both country programmes, especially Nepal, and may also 
potentially relevant to other ECHO country programmes. 

Overall Statement on ECHO’s interventions in India and Nepal during 2013-2017 

ECHO has invested a total of some EUR 50 million in the two countries during 2013-2017, 
of which 60% was allocated to Nepal.  During this period ECHO supported responses to 
Cyclone Phailin India, two severe floods and the 2015 earthquake in Nepal.  The earthquake, 
the approval of a new Constitution in Nepal, the emergence of India as a humanitarian donor 
in  its  own  right  along  with  the  passing  of  legislation  to  regulate  activities  of  civil  society 
organisations  in  both  countries  all  had  a  significant  influence  on  ECHO  country 
programmes.   In India, the main effect has been to call into question ECHO’s operating 
model, even while unmet needs still remain, and ECHO’s intervention strategy continued to 
be relevant.  In Nepal, evidence indicates that these changes increased ECHO’s relevance as 
the earthquake highlighted the relevance of the work in DRR and resilience by ECHO and 
others.  These events in Nepal also provided the necessary momentum to endorse a much-
anticipated Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act where ECHO’s contribution has 
been widely recognised by partners.  

The team estimated that, measured in terms of assistance delivered and people reached, 80-
90%  of  the  project  portfolio  in  both  countries  achieved  their  objectives.    Both  country 
programmes  have  been  highly  relevant  to  priority  needs  and  ECHO’s  mandate.  ECHO 
received  high  marks  from  partners  and  other  humanitarian  stakeholders  for  its  in-depth 
understanding of the situation on the ground, its facilitation and technical oversight role that 
many partners recognise as contributing to the quality of their projects.   

Due in large part to the external influences described above, project outcomes have been 
very  different  in  each  country.      In  Nepal,  ECHO’s  contributions  during  the  evaluation 
period had a positive transformative effect at both community and at a national level.  In 
contrast,  in  India  ECHO  has  struggled  to  address  unmet  humanitarian  needs  in  conflict-
affected areas in a way that an international impartial humanitarian actor can add value. 

On ECHO’s potential role in DRR and resilience during the transition in Nepal 

Investments by ECHO and other donors in DRR and resilience over the past decade have 
yielded results in terms of increased awareness, organisation at a community and district level 
and improved capacities at all levels.  The recent restructuring of the government that shifted 
authority to elected leaders at a municipality level is a potential opportunity for ECHO and 
other humanitarian actors to institutionalise resilience into policies and ways of working.  The 
relatively low level of investment, the change in partners for DRR projects in western Nepal 
and low level of collaboration with DEVCO has reduced ECHO’s ability to support this 
transition and risks to undermine sustainability of prior interventions.   

On business case options for ECHO in India 

ECHO has had a more reactive, gap-filling, approach than a strategic programme.  Working 
with  civil  society  partners  in  conflict-affected  areas  has  been  in  line  with  ECHO’s  core 
mandate but, in the increasingly constrained regulatory environment in India for civil society, 
ECHO has had limited added value measured in terms of outcomes.  While ECHO could 

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potentially  help  in  addressing  unmet  humanitarian  needs,  particularly  in  conflict-affected 
areas or in a response to a mega disaster event, findings indicate there would be a need for a 
new operating model in India for ECHO to add value.  The option where there was a strong 
consensus amongst a range of interviewees was that the private sector in India should play a 
much more substantive role in DRR and disaster response and could benefit from learning 
from private sector networks, such as those in Europe. 

On the timeliness and appropriateness of ECHO funding decisions for a response 

There has been a pattern during the scoping period of ECHO funding decisions being taken 
weeks, or even months, after quick onset disasters which lack high media visibility.  Even for 
large disasters, grant amounts have tended to be relatively modest in comparison with other 
major donors, rarely exceeding a total of EUR 1-3 million.   In practice, this has meant that 
partners  have  had  to  rely  on  other  sources  of  funding  which  was  then either  reimbursed 
when they receive ECHO funding, or the funds were used for early recovery activities.  While 
this has helped to fill gaps, the lack of predictability of ECHO funding has compromised the 
ability of some partners to optimise their interventions. 

On the importance of a programme approach  

Project funding timelines puts pressure on partners to design resilience projects which often 
have unrealistically short timeframes instead of being based on realistic assessment of the 
timeframe  for  sustainable  outcomes.    Short  project  duration  without  a  programmatic 
approach,  lack  of  alignment  with  LRRD  and  project-based  approach  by  partners  have 
hampered  efficiency,  effectiveness  and  sustainability  of  ECHO  supported  interventions. 
Some ECHO partners have been using a programme approach that has made it easier for 
them to achieve intermediate and long-term outcome objectives.  However, there was still a 
prevalence of a project-based approach and examples were seen in both countries where an 
unexpected suspension in ECHO project funding forced partners to downsize their activities 
while searching for alternative donors to achieve planned outcomes. Exit strategies did not 
always include planning for learning and scale up of pilot projects and there have been some 
good practice examples from the health and education sectors that demonstrate how this can 
be done.  While the HIPs highlight priorities, many of the associated outcome objectives 
cannot  realistically  be  achieved  within  an  annual  cycle  and  ECHO  has  no  multi-annual 
strategy that provides relevant guidance. 

On achieving coherent LRRD 

ECHO, DEVCO and the European External Action Service (EEAS) have had successes in 
some countries in jointly operationalising the humanitarian-development nexus to strengthen 
resilience and LRRD but only one example around the theme of safer schools in Nepal stood 
out as a significant achievement. While ECHO and DEVCO continue their efforts to better 
align their systems, the experience with safer schools in Nepal has some important learning 
about  how  a  combination  of  risk-sharing,  strategic  partnership  and  more  flexible  use  of 
existing tools and instruments has facilitates LRRD. 

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Summarized Recommendations 

Five strategic recommendations targeted primarily at ECHO appear at the end of this report. 
The first three recommendations are not only common to both countries, but also potentially 
applicable to ECHO operations more generally.  The list below is a concise summary.  

R1. ECHO should improve the timeliness and predictability of decision-making processes 

for quick onset disasters.   

R2. ECHO should encourage partners to adopt longer term programmatic approach with 

realistic and sustainable resilience outcomes.  

R3.  ECHO  and  DEVCO  should  encourage  more  consistent  application  of  LRRD  to 
strengthen  the  effectiveness  and  sustainability  of  their  investments  in  resilience  and 
DRR.  

R4. ECHO should use the current window of opportunity that has recently opened in Nepal 
due to the change in governance and planned roll out of the newly-approved Disaster 
Risk  Reduction  and  Management  Act  to  support  effective  use  and  strengthen 
sustainability of ECHO investments in resilience and DRR. 

R5. ECHO should explore the potential value-added and feasibility of business case options 
and alternative operating models for emerging humanitarian actors such as India.   

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Résumé Exécutif 

Objectif, contexte et portée de l’évaluation 

L’évaluation  a couvert des interventions humanitaires en Inde et au Népal au cours de la 
période  2013-2017  financées  par 
la  direction  générale de l'aide  humanitaire et  de 
la protection  civile  (DG  ECHO).  Elle  comprenait  les  différents  secteurs  ayant  bénéficié 
d’une  assistance,  en  particulier 
l’Eau  et 
Assainissement,  la  Santé,  l’Assistance  Alimentaire,  la  Protection,  le  Relèvement  et la 
Réduction des risques de Catastrophe.  

les  Abris  /  Articles  Non  Alimentaires, 

L’objectif de l’évaluation est double. Tout d’abord, elle entend fournir une évaluation de la 
stratégie / l’approche d’ECHO et de formuler des recommandations stratégiques. Ensuite, 
les résultats pertinents aideront à informer les futures décisions de  financement d’ECHO 
dans  ces  deux  pays,  et,  au  niveau  mondial,  à  alimenter  une  évaluation  globale  de  l’aide 
humanitaire de la Commission européenne au cours de la période 2012-2016.  

Méthodologie 

L’évaluation était subdivisée en trois phases : démarrage, collecte de données et synthèse. La 
phase de collecte de données comportait un travail documentaire et de terrain, couvrant les 
10 questions d’évaluation des termes de référence pour cette évaluation. L’équipe a effectué 
des  visites  au  Népal  et  en  Inde  durant  15  jours  fin  août  2017,  avec  la  visite  de  sites 
sélectionnés dans chaque pays. L’équipe a interviewé un total de 156 parties prenantes en 
face  à  face,  par  Skype  ou  par  téléphone,  et  comprenant  des  représentants  du  siège  de  la 
Commission européenne (CE), des bureaux extérieurs d’ECHO, de délégations de l’Union 
européenne  (UE),  d’officiels  du  gouvernement,  d’agences  des  Nations  Unies  (NU),  des 
autorités  locales  et  nationales,  des  organisations  non  gouvernementales  (ONG)  locales  et 
internationales,  et  des  représentants  des  communautés  bénéficiaires.  Cela  comprenait 
également des visites sur place. L’équipe a analysé des centaines de documents, en ce compris 
des documents de politique et de stratégie, des évaluations, des revues, des études et d’autres 
documents. Les détails de quatre-vingts documents particulièrement pertinents comme bases 
factuelles pour l’évaluation figurent en annexe.  

Les constats préliminaires et les conclusions émergentes ont été présentées au personnel de 
terrain d’ECHO lors des sessions de débriefing au terme de chaque visite de pays. Au Népal, 
les  partenaires  d’ECHO  ont  également  participé  au  débriefing.  Les  commentaires  du 
personnel  de  terrain  d’ECHO  et  des  partenaires  a  été  pris  en  considération  lors  de  la 
rédaction du rapport d’avancement présenté au Comité de Pilotage en septembre. Un atelier 
a été organisé après diffusion du rapport provisoire, et le personnel d’ECHO ainsi que les 
partenaires au Népal ont eu la possibilité de fournir des commentaires stratégiques quant à 
ce projet de rapport, mais aussi de donner leur vision quant à la pertinence et à la faisabilité 
des recommandations. 

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Résumé des constats 

Un  résumé  des  constats  basé  sur  les  critères  de  jugement  convenus  lors  de  la  phase  de 
démarrage pour chacune des 10 questions d’évaluation est présenté ci-dessous. 

Evaluations des besoins 

ECHO et ses partenaires en Inde et au Népal avaient accès à des données d’évaluation des 
besoins de qualité suffisante. ECHO n’a participé qu’occasionnellement à l’évaluation des 
besoins  des  partenaires,  mais  a  joué  un  rôle  important  dans  des  processus  pertinents  au 
niveau  stratégique  et  opérationnel.  Les  évaluations  des  besoins  d’ECHO  étaient 
multicouches. Les évaluations de la première phase basées sur des données de l’Indice de 
Gestion  du  Risque  d’ECHO  (INFORM)  et  les  Evaluations  des  Crises  Oubliées  étaient 
pertinentes et cohérentes. Les données collectées au cours de la seconde phase étaient moins 
cohérentes. 

Les évaluations des besoins auprès des partenaires ont été effectuées au cours de plusieurs 
phases,  se  concentrant  progressivement  sur  l’identification  des  besoins  prioritaires  et  des 
groupes cibles. Cette approche a débouché sur des évaluations de bonne qualité. La plupart 
des  partenaires  ont  régulièrement  consulté  les  communautés  durant  les  évaluations  des 
besoins, à l’exception de certains projets à Jammu et dans le Cachemire, principalement en 
raison de sensibilités politiques. 

Les évaluations des besoins d’ECHO et des partenaires étaient appropriées et opportunes, 
comprenant des évaluations par le personnel d’ECHO juste après une catastrophe afin de 
documenter les modifications apportées aux Plans de Mise en Œuvre Humanitaire (HIP). 
Les évaluations des actions de réduction des risques de catastrophe (RRC) comprenaient une 
modalisation  des  rôles  et  des  responsabilités  des  parties  prenantes  conformément  aux 
directives d’ECHO. 

Stratégies d’entrée et de sortie  

ECHO  a  développé  des  stratégies  adaptées  aux  besoins  et  aux  contextes  spécifiques  de 
chaque pays, en tenant compte de leur vulnérabilité face aux catastrophes naturelles et du 
besoin de renforcer la résilience de la population, principalement en atténuant les impacts 
sur les groupes marginalisés. 

Dans le cadre du plan préparatoire d’ECHO, les catastrophes survenues dans les deux pays 
constituaient les points d’entrée pour ECHO et ses partenaires en vue du développement de 
stratégies d’intervention et/ou comme déclencheurs pour l’intensification des opérations. 

Les stratégies de sortie qui n’étaient pas trop dépendantes du gouvernement se sont avérées 
plus viables. Un exemple de bonne pratique est celui d’un projet de sécurité des écoles au 
Népal, mettant en avant la mobilisation de la communauté tout en faisant appel à d’autres 
donateurs  et  au  gouvernement.  En  Inde,  la  stratégie  d’ECHO  se  concentrait  sur 
l’amélioration de l’accès aux services au sein de populations touchées par des conflits, mais 
elle a été mise à mal par le manque d’appropriation général du gouvernement.  

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Le  gouvernement  du  Népal  était  davantage  désireux  de  travailler  avec  des  agences 
humanitaires  internationales,  bien  que  la  stratégie  d’ECHO  était  de  s’engager  avec  le 
gouvernement  et  d’autres  parties  prenantes  en  travaillant  par  le  biais  de  partenaires  et  de 
réseaux  pertinents.  Les  stratégies  d’entrée  pour  les  activités  RRC  au  Népal  ont  suivi  un 
processus  national    district    communauté  afin  d’obtenir  une  approbation  au  niveau 
national pour ensuite redescendre et obtenir l’approbation et promouvoir une appropriation 
à  chaque  niveau.  La  stratégie  de  sortie  est  un  processus  inverse,  qui  vise  à  influencer  la 
politique et les pratiques à différents niveaux. Les stratégies ont régulièrement été adaptées 
en modifiant le HIP et en réallouant des fonds.  

Les stratégies de sortie ont été confrontées à divers défis dans les deux pays, en raison de 
plusieurs  facteurs,  en  ce  compris  la  durée  relativement  courte  des  projets  d’ECHO, 
l’opérationnalisation  du  LRDD  avec  les  acteurs  du  développement  et  des  stratégies 
inadéquates  pour  la  reproduction  et  l’intensification  des  projets  pilotes.  Il  y  a  toutefois 
plusieurs exemples de réplication des activités RRC au Népal où le gouvernement népalais a 
transposé des bonnes pratiques en directives, stratégies et en processus de planification du 
développement local. 

Il  manquait  à  ECHO  une  stratégie  de  sortie  pour  le  programme  national  en  Inde,  et  la 
cessation progressive en 2017 s’est en grande partie faite sur une base ad hoc, avec un soutien 
d’ECHO  trop  limité  pour  permettre  une  transition  en  douceur  pour  les  partenaires.  En 
fonction des indicateurs pertinents, il  est difficile de  justifier la suspension par ECHO du 
programme en Inde sur la base de besoins non comblés, bien qu’en raison de la valeur ajoutée 
limitée d’ECHO au contexte opérationnel indien, cela n’avait pas de sens de continuer sans 
révision substantielle du modèle opérationnel. 

Alignement avec les politiques d’ECHO  

Les stratégies et les opérations nationales d’ECHO étaient cohérentes avec le cadre politique 
plus  vaste  d’ECHO.  Les  opérations  bénéficiant  du  soutien  d’ECHO  au  Népal  étaient 
cohérentes  avec  les  secteurs  et  les  approches  décrits  dans  le  HIP.  Les  interventions 
sectorielles en Inde étaient largement cohérentes avec les politiques d’ECHO, mais en raison 
du contexte opérationnel, ECHO s’est retrouvé à la limite de son mandat, car de nombreuses 
activités soutenues confinaient au développement.  

La connaissance des politiques d’ECHO parmi les partenaires était inégale dans chaque pays, 
et assez limitée. Une combinaison de l’approche pratique de suivi d’ECHO avec les conseils 
et  l’assurance  qualité  fourni  par  les  bureaux  européens  des  partenaires  d’ECHO  a  aidé  à 
l’alignement des interventions avec les politiques d’ECHO. Toutefois, la compréhension et 
l’application  des  principes  humanitaires  par  les  partenaires  et  les  autres  parties  prenantes 
étaient incohérentes, en partie en raison des relations avec les gouvernements de chaque pays. 

Les marqueurs de Résilience et de Sexe et Age ont été utiles, car ils ont permis de clarifier les 
engagements  politiques  d’ECHO  et  ont  permis  à  son  personnel    d’établir  des  jugements 
transparents  et  fondés  quant  à  la  conformité  avec  les  politiques  d’ECHO  pour  les 
interventions financées par ECHO. 

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Coordination avec d’autres acteurs  

Il y avait un manque de coordination entre ECHO et la Direction générale du développement 
et  de  la  coopération  de  la  Commission  européenne  (DEVCO)  pour  la  RRC  et  la 
programmation de la résilience dans les deux pays. Un bel exemple pratique de collaboration 
avec  DEVCO  dans  le  secteur  éducatif  au  Népal  a  toutefois  démontré  qu’il  était  possible 
d’obtenir  des  résultats  positifs  impressionnants  malgré  les  défis  institutionnels  et 
systémiques. 

Peu  d’éléments laissent  supposer une  action conjointe  par la Protection Civile de  l’UE et 
l’antenne d’ECHO au Népal durant le déploiement pour le tremblement de terre. Toutefois, 
la colocalisation du personnel dans les bureaux de la délégation de l’UE a permis de faciliter 
un partage d’informations régulier durant les interventions d’urgence mises en place suite au 
tremblement de terre.  

Le  rôle  d’ECHO  dans  la  facilitation  de  la  coordination  entre  les  partenaires  au  Népal  a 
amélioré l’efficacité du programme. ECHO a recouru à des partenariats sectoriels, avec des 
exécutants, des donateurs, et d’autres parties prenantes actives dans le soutien à la RRC et à 
la  résilience.  Cela  a  permis  d’améliorer  l’efficacité  des  interventions  d’ECHO,  grâce  à  un 
meilleur alignement et  une  meilleure  harmonisation des approches des donateurs, afin de 
combler les lacunes et de réduire la duplication tout en facilitant la gestion des connaissances. 

Le  HIP  d’ECHO  pour  le  Népal  a  été  développé  en  collaboration  avec  d’autres  acteurs 
humanitaires et d’autres donateurs, et était conforme aux priorités sectorielles et aux besoins 
identifiés.  En  Inde,  le  HIP  a  été  principalement  développé  par  ECHO,  sans  véritable 
consultation des partenaires, bien que les partenaires trouvaient ce HIP pertinent. Rien ne 
prouve une implication directe d’acteurs gouvernementaux dans le développement du HIP 
dans chaque pays. 

La relation d’ECHO avec les gouvernements des deux pays a généralement été indirecte, 
passant soit par ses partenaires, soit par la délégation de l’UE. Les missions d’ECHO tendent 
à  interagir  principalement  au  niveau  du  gouvernement  local.  Au  Népal,  ECHO  a  été  un 
participant actif aux dialogues RRC nationaux, dans le cadre desquels il était considéré par la 
communauté internationale comme un acteur majeur. 

L’affectation des fonds d’ECHO par le biais de consortiums a permis d’améliorer l’efficience 
et l’efficacité dans certains cas, pour autant qu’ils soient bien gérés et approvisionnés.  

ECHO était bien informé des interventions des autres acteurs humanitaires, en particulier au 
Népal,  où  ECHO  a  régulièrement  participé  à  des  activités  collaboratives  avec  d’autres 
donateurs, en ce compris des évaluations conjointes. 

Valeur ajoutée de l’UE  

Les partenaires étaient unanimes quant à leur appréciation de l’approche « pragmatique et 
exigeante » d’ECHO avec ses partenaires, qui les a aidés à se concentrer sur les résultats et 
sur l’amélioration de la qualité. Comparé à ses pairs, ECHO était perçu en tant que donateur 
comme étant le plus au fait de la situation sur le terrain, et donc en bonne position pour 
fournir un retour utile et opportun. Grâce à son approche pragmatique, ECHO a également 

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été perçu par les autres donateurs présents comme une source précieuse de conseils sur la 
situation  sur  le  terrain.  Pour  les  membres  de  l’UE  qui  ne  maintiennent  pas  une  présence 
humanitaire  constante  dans  ces  pays,  les  informations  d’ECHO  sont  cruciales  pour  leur 
analyse des besoins, des risques et de la vulnérabilité, afin d’orienter leurs programmes. 

Plus  d’une  décennie  d’investissements  de  RRC  et  de  résilience  au  Népal  ont  positionné 
ECHO comme un expert thématique reconnu. Cela a entraîné, dans le chef des partenaires 
et des gouvernements locaux,  des attentes quant à une  importante  contribution d’ECHO 
visant  à  soutenir  le  processus  de  transition  vers  le  nouveau  système  de  gouvernance.  Les 
réussites  d’ECHO  en  matière  de  compréhension  des  RRC  et  de  résilience  au  Népal  ont 
permis d’identifier des lacunes en LRDD lorsque les communautés tentent de trouver des 
fonds pour moderniser des bâtiments dangereux identifiés lors de la cartographie des risques.  

Le manque d’engagement direct avec les gouvernements indien et népalais a permis à ECHO 
de travailler de manière plus indépendante, ce qui devrait être source de valeur ajoutée pour 
ECHO. Toutefois, le manque d’engagement gouvernemental direct a limité leur capacité à 
respecter  les  engagements  d’ECHO  en  matière  de  principes  humanitaires,  comme  la 
fourniture d’une assistance impartiale aux populations marginalisées. 

La valeur ajoutée du modèle d’assistance humanitaire de l’UE dans le contexte indien a été 
limitée, même si les partenaires ont confirmé la pertinence du programme d’ECHO tout en 
soulignant qu’ECHO a pratiquement été le seul donateur assurant un soutien régulier et se 
rendant dans les zones de conflit. 

Réalisation des objectifs  

Les stratégies d’ECHO dans les deux pays comprennent le maintien d’un niveau adéquat de 
préparation, afin d’être en mesure de réagir en cas de catastrophe dépassant la capacité des 
acteurs nationaux et de satisfaire les besoins humanitaires. Alors que les interventions RRC 
soutenues par ECHO ont contribué à une amélioration de la résilience des communautés 
touchées,  des  retards  dans  les  décisions  de  financement  d’ECHO  dans  les  situations 
d’urgence ont réduit l’efficacité des interventions d’ECHO. 

Les  objectifs  stratégiques  tels  que  formulés  dans  chaque  pays  étaient  cohérents  avec  le 
mandat d’ECHO, bien que  la contribution des actions d’ECHO en  Inde était limitée par 
diverses contraintes. En Inde, la stratégie d’ECHO ciblait principalement l’amélioration de 
l’inclusion et de la qualité de la fourniture de services pour les zones touchées par les conflits 
dans le nord de l’Inde, à Jammu et dans le Cachemire. La stratégie d’ECHO au Népal ciblait 
spécifiquement le développement de la résilience dans les zones à risque. 

La revue d’un échantillon de quinze projets financés par ECHO2 donne un taux de réussite 
de  80-90%  pour  l’obtention,  voire  le  dépassement,  des  résultats  envisagés  en  termes  de 
bénéficiaires  touchés  et  d’assistance  sectorielle  fournies.  Le  constat  est  plus  nuancé 

2   Les 15 projets représentent collectivement environ 20% du budget total du portefeuille de projets pour les deux pays. 

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concernant  l’obtention  d’effets,  avec  des  exemples  plus  positifs  pour  le  Népal  quant  à 
l’utilisation et la réplication des interventions. 

Mobilisation et communication  

Les  stratégies  de  mobilisation  et  de  communication  d’ECHO  étaient  appropriées  et 
cohérentes avec les objectifs HIP dans chaque pays. Au Népal, tout au long de la période 
d’évaluation, la mobilisation pour la formulation d’une « Stratégie Nationale pour la Gestion 
des  Catastrophes  au  Népal »  a  bénéficié  d’une  grande  attention.  En  Inde,  les  efforts  de 
mobilisation en vue de l’inclusion et de l’amélioration de la qualité de la fourniture de services 
ont été perçus comme un composant majeur des interventions d’ECHO. 

ECHO ne disposait pas de stratégies de mobilisation et de communication formelles, bien 
que  certains  partenaires  aient  développé  des  stratégies  propres,  incorporées  aux  projets 
d’ECHO. Les partenaires ont davantage considéré le rôle d’ECHO comme portant sur la 
fourniture d’une assistance technique utile plutôt que sur la mobilisation. 

En  Inde,  la  portée  de  la  mobilisation  d’ECHO  a  été  très  limitée,  en  raison  d’un 
environnement d’exploitation restreint. Au Népal, l’influence d’ECHO, notamment dans les 
domaines thématiques en relation avec la RRC, a été plus importante que prévu au niveau de 
l’investissement. Cette influence peut être attribuée à divers facteurs, en ce compris le statut 
d’ECHO comme expert thématique en RRC et la participation active d’ECHO à l’Equipe de 
Coordination Humanitaire « Plus ». Le Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC) a offert 
un forum utile à ECHO et à ses partenaires pour le partage de leçons apprises, mais aussi 
pour exercer une influence par le biais d’une mobilisation conjointe. 

Efficacité – Modalités de transfert  

Il  y  a  eu  une  évolution  positive  dans  les  deux  pays  depuis  2013,  avec  une  prise  en 
considération et une adoption plus systématiques des modalités de transfert monétaire par 
les partenaires d’ECHO. Toutefois, il n’en a pas été de même pour tous les secteurs et les 
besoins identifiés, et cela ne reposait pas sur une analyse cohérente et rigoureuse. 

ECHO  a  été  un  facilitateur  silencieux  de  cette  évolution,  finançant  des  programmes  de 
transfert monétaire (PTM) proposées par des partenaires pour le relèvement des populations, 
et suggérant dans certains cas l’ajout ou le remplacement de modalités monétaires en vue 
d’un programme plus efficace. 

Dans les deux pays, et en particulier au Népal – en raison de sa vulnérabilité aux catastrophes 
naturelles récurrentes – un investissement accru dans des activités de préparation (assistance 
technique et assistance sur le plan politique / aux institutions) dans le cadre d’une RRC plus 
vaste aurait pu limiter certains obstacles à la sélection et à la mise en œuvre des modalités les 
plus efficaces pour l’intervention et le redressement.  

Les  caractéristiques  des  programmes  financés  par ECHO  qui  ont  contribué  à  l’utilisation 
efficace  des  ressources  comprennent  l’utilisation  croissante  des  modalités  monétaires,  le 
recours  aux  consortiums,  une  forte  coordination  et  la  gestion  des  connaissances,  la 
coordination avec les gouvernements et les donateurs, et les décisions opérationnelles basées 
sur la rentabilité. 

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La pratique d’ECHO visant l’affectation des fonds par le biais de couches multiples d’agences 
partenaires peut réduire la rentabilité, mais cela est contrebalancé par des avantages qualitatifs 
bénéfiques à l’efficacité. 

Durabilité  

Les  principales  catégories  de  parties  prenantes  ciblées  pour  parvenir  à  la  durabilité  des 
interventions  soutenues  par  ECHO  étaient  des  gouvernements,  des  communautés,  des 
ONG  locales  et  des  donateurs  d’aide  au  développement.  Les  partenaires  sont  utilisés 
plusieurs méthodes pour promouvoir l’appropriation, en ce compris le développement des 
capacités, le cofinancement, et la planification et mise en œuvre conjointe.  

La durabilité des interventions RRC et dans le cadre de conflits était souvent liée à une solide 
stratégie de sortie, et bon nombre des même facteurs d’influence s’appliquent (courte durée 
du  projet  et  financement  incertain  du  suivi,  manque  de  clarté  quant  aux  stratégies  et 
protocoles de sortie, manque d’appropriation par le gouvernement). 

Obtenir le niveau d’engagement nécessaire du gouvernement était l’un des principaux défis 
pour parvenir à la durabilité,  particulièrement en  Inde. Malgré  les défis en  Inde, il  y  a eu 
quelques  exemples  d’activités  se  poursuivant  avec  le  soutien  du gouvernement  indien.  Le 
Népal,  dont  le  gouvernement  était  plus  ouvert  à  une  collaboration  avec  des  partenaires 
humanitaires  internationaux,  a  fourni  davantage  d’exemples  d’interventions  durables.  Les 
partenaires  d’ECHO  et  leurs  partenaires  locaux  ont  souligné  la  mobilisation  de  la 
communauté pour aider à la promotion de l’appropriation et de la durabilité. 

Il existe une forte demande pour des interventions soutenues par ECHO dans le chef des 
parties prenantes nationales. Le Ministère de la Santé népalais a décidé de répliquer et de 
développer les activités de préparation à une urgence sanitaire et les partenaires d’ECHO ont 
reçu des demandes de formation sur les interventions RRC et humanitaires pour les autorités 
locales nouvellement élues dans l’ouest du Népal. 

Conclusions 

La section des conclusions commence par un bilan global des interventions d’ECHO en Inde 
et au Népal entre 2013 et 2017. Quatre de ces conclusions soutiennent des recommandations 
en  fournissant  un  résumé  concis  des  résultats  et  de  l’analyse  au  niveau  des  projets  et 
programmes.  La  première  conclusion  concerne  spécifiquement  le  Népal.  En  raison  du 
contexte  spécifique  de  l’Inde,  le  modèle  d’exploitation  d’ECHO  pour  l’Inde  s’est  avéré 
davantage  réactif que  stratégique. La deuxième conclusion repose  par conséquent sur des 
discussions avec les parties prenantes sur les options alternatives afin de soutenir la dernière 
recommandation  stratégique.  Les  trois  dernières  conclusions  sont  pertinentes  pour  les 
programmes  des  deux  pays,  en  particulier  le  Népal,  et  peuvent  être  potentiellement 
pertinentes pour les programmes d’ECHO dans d’autres pays. 

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Déclaration générale sur les interventions d’ECHO en Inde et au Népal entre 2013 
et 2017 
ECHO a investi un total de 50 millions d’euros dans ces deux pays entre 2013 et 2017, et 
60% de cette somme ont été affectés au Népal. Au cours de cette période, ECHO a soutenu 
des actions suite au passage du cyclone Phailin en Inde, dans le cadre de deux inondations 
importantes  et  du  séisme  de  2015  au  Népal.  Le  séisme,  l’approbation  d’une  nouvelle 
constitution au Népal, l’émergence de l’Inde en tant que donateur humanitaire de plein droit 
et l’adoption d’une législation visant à réguler les activités des organisations de la société civile 
dans les deux pays ont eu une influence significative sur les programmes nationaux d’ECHO. 
En Inde, le principal effet a été la remise en question du modèle d’exploitation d’ECHO, 
alors même que des besoins n’étaient pas encore satisfaits, et que la stratégie d’intervention 
d’ECHO  demeurait  pertinente.  Au  Népal,  tout  porte  à  croire  que  ces  changements  ont 
souligné  la  pertinence  d’ECHO,  car  le  séisme  a  mis  en  évidence  la  pertinence  des 
interventions RRC et sur la résilience par ECHO et d’autres intervenants. Ces événements 
au  Népal  ont  également  fourni  la  dynamique  nécessaire  à  l’approbation  d’un  Traité  de 
réduction des risques de catastrophe et de gestion des risques de catastrophe très attendu, 
pour lequel la contribution d’ECHO a été largement reconnue par les partenaires. 

L’équipe a estimé qu’en termes d’assistance fournie et de personnes touchées, 80 à 90% du 
portefeuille du projet ont atteint leurs objectifs dans les deux pays. Les programmes des deux 
pays  ont  été  très  pertinents  par  rapport  aux  besoins  prioritaires  et  au  mandat  d’ECHO. 
ECHO  a  reçu  d’excellentes  appréciations  de  ses  partenaires  et  d’autres  parties  prenantes 
humanitaires, en raison de sa compréhension approfondie de la situation sur le terrain, sa 
facilitation  et  son  rôle  de  surveillance  technique  reconnu  par  de  nombreux  partenaires 
comme ayant contribué à la qualité de leurs projets. 

Les résultats des projets ont été très différents dans chaque pays, principalement en raison 
des  influences  externes  susmentionnées.  Au  Népal,  les  contributions  d’ECHO  durant  la 
période  d’évaluation  ont  un  effet  transformateur  positif  au  niveau  national  et 
communautaire. En Inde, par contre, ECHO connu des difficultés pour satisfaire les besoins 
humanitaires dans les zones de conflit d’une manière appréciable pour un acteur humanitaire 
international impartial. 

A propos du rôle potentiel d’ECHO dans les interventions de RRC et la résilience 
durant la transition au Népal 

Les investissements d’ECHO et d’autres donateurs pour la RRC et la résilience au cours de 
la  décennie  écoulée  ont  donné  des  résultats  en  termes  de  prise  de  conscience  accrue, 
d’organisation au niveau de la communauté et du district, et d’amélioration des capacités à 
tous  les  niveaux.  La  récente  restructuration  du  gouvernement,  avec  un  glissement  de 
l’autorité à des leaders élus au niveau municipal constitue une opportunité potentielle pour 
ECHO et d’autres acteurs humanitaires pour l’institutionnalisation de la résilience dans les 
stratégies et les méthodes. Le niveau d’investissement relativement faible, le changement des 
partenaires pour les projets de RRC dans l’ouest du Népal et le faible taux de collaboration 
avec DEVCO a mis à mal la capacité d’ECHO de soutenir cette transition, avec le risque de 
saper la durabilité des interventions antérieures. 

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A propos des options de modèle opérationnel pour ECHO en Inde 

ECHO  a  plutôt  une  approche  réactive  et  complémentaire  qu’un  programme  stratégique. 
Travailler avec  des partenaires  de  la société  civile  dans des zones de  conflit cadre avec le 
mandat de base d’ECHO, mais dans l’environnement réglementaire de plus en plus restreint 
de l’Inde pour la société civile, la valeur ajoutée d’ECHO est limitée en termes de résultats. 
Alors  qu’ECHO  pouvait potentiellement  aider  en  comblant  des  besoins  humanitaires,  en 
particulier dans des zones de conflit ou suite à une grosse catastrophe, les résultats indiquent 
qu’il faudrait un nouveau modèle opérationnel en Inde pour ECHO en vue d’apporter de la 
valeur. L’option pour laquelle il y a eu un fort consensus parmi les personnes interrogées 
était celle selon laquelle le secteur privé indien devait jouer un rôle nettement plus substantiel 
en RRC et en réactions aux catastrophes, et pourrait tirer profit d’un échange avec les réseaux 
des secteurs privés, et notamment européens.  

A propos de la rapidité et de la pertinence des décisions de financement d’ECHO 
en cas de catastrophe 

La  tendance,  durant  la  période  d’évaluation,  pour  la  prise  de  décisions  de  financement 
d’ECHO portait sur des semaines, voire des mois après des catastrophes soudaines, avec un 
manque  de  visibilité  médiatique.  Même  pour  les  grosses  catastrophes,  les  montants  de 
subvention étaient relativement modestes par rapport à d’autres donateurs importants, et ne 
dépassaient que rarement un total d’un à trois millions d’euros. Dans la pratique, cela exigeait 
des  partenaires  qu’ils  se  fient  à  d’autres  sources  de  financement,  avec  un  remboursement 
ultérieur une fois les fonds d’ECHO reçus, à moins que les fonds ne soient utilisés pour les 
activités de redressement rapide. Bien que cela ait aidé à combler les lacunes, le manque de 
prévisibilité des fonds d’ECHO a compromis la capacité de certains partenaires à optimiser 
leurs interventions. 

A propos de l’importance de l’approche programmatique 

Les calendriers du financement des projets poussent les partenaires à concevoir des projets 
de résilience dont la durée est souvent irréalistement courte, plutôt que d’être basée sur une 
évaluation réaliste de la durée pour des résultats durables. La courte durée du projet sans 
approche programmatique, le manque d’alignement avec le LRRD et les approches basées 
sur  les  projets  des  partenaires  ont  entravé  l’efficacité  et  la  durabilité  des  interventions 
soutenues  par  ECHO.  Certains  partenaires  d’ECHO  appliquaient  une  approche 
programmatique facilitant l’obtention des objectifs à moyen et long terme. Toutefois, il  y 
avait toujours une prévalence d’une approche basée sur les projets, et il y a eu dans les deux 
pays des exemples où la suspension inattendue du financement d’un projet d’ECHO a forcé 
les  partenaires  à  réduire  leurs  activités  tout  en  recherchant  des  donateurs  alternatifs  pour 
obtenir les résultats prévus. Les stratégies de sortie n’incluaient pas toujours la planification 
pour l’apprentissage et l’intensification des projets pilotes, et il y a eu des exemples de bonnes 
pratiques dans le secteur de la santé et de l’enseignement, montrant comment procéder. Alors 
que  les HIP soulignaient  les priorités, bon  nombre des objectifs associés aux  résultats ne 
pouvaient être atteints au cours d’un cycle annuel, et ECHO ne dispose pas d’une stratégie 
multi-annuelle fournissant une guidance pertinente. 

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A propos de la réalisation du LRRD 
ECHO, DEVCO et le Service européen pour l'action extérieure (SEAE) ont enregistré des 
réussites dans certains pays par l’opérationnalisation conjointe du lien entre l’humanitaire et 
le développement, afin de renforcer la résilience et le LRRD, mais un seul exemple sur le 
thème  des  écoles  plus  sûres  au  Népal  se  démarque  comme  réalisation  majeure.  Alors 
qu’ECHO et DEVCO poursuivent leurs efforts d’alignement de leurs systèmes, l’expérience 
des écoles plus sûres au Népal comporte d’importantes leçons quant à la façon dont une 
combinaison de partage des risques, de partenariat stratégique et d’une utilisation plus flexible 
des outils et des instruments existants facilite le LRRD. 

Synthèse des recommandations 

Cinq  recommandations  stratégiques  ciblant  principalement  ECHO  figurent à  la  fin  de  ce 
rapport.  Les  trois  premières  recommandations  sont  non  seulement  communes  aux  deux 
pays,  mais  aussi  potentiellement  applicables  aux  opérations  d’ECHO  de  manière  plus 
générale. La liste ci-dessous en présente un bref résumé. 

R1. ECHO devrait améliorer la rapidité et la prévisibilité des processus décisionnels pour les 

catastrophes soudaines. 

R2.  ECHO  devrait encourager les partenaires à adopter une  approche  programmatique à 

plus long terme, avec des résultats réalistes et durables en termes de résilience. 

R3. ECHO et DEVCO devraient encourager une application plus cohérente du LRRD afin 
de renforcer l’efficacité et la durabilité de leurs investissements dans la résilience et la 
RRC.  

R4. ECHO devrait utiliser la fenêtre d’opportunité qui s’est récemment ouverte au Népal 
suite  au  changement  de  gouvernement  et  au  déploiement  du  Traité  de  réduction des 
risques de  catastrophe  et  de  gestion  des risques  de  catastrophe  afin  de  soutenir  une 
utilisation  efficace  et  de  renforcer  la  durabilité  des  investissements  d’ECHO  dans  la 
résilience et la RRC. 

R5.  ECHO  devrait  explorer  la  valeur  ajoutée  potentielle  et  la  faisabilité  des  options  de 
modèles  d’exploitation  alternatifs  pour  les  acteurs  humanitaires  émergents  tels  que 
l’Inde. 

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1.  Introduction, Structure and Purpose 

This is the Evaluation Report of the ECHO-funded operations in India and Nepal during 
the period 2013-2017.   Figure 1 summarises its subject, purpose and scope. 

Figure 1 – Evaluation subject, purpose and scope 

The  evaluation  scope  covers  ECHO-funded  operations  in  India  and  Nepal  during  the 
period  2013-2017.  It  encompasses  the  different  sectors  in  which  support  was  provided, 
notably Shelter/NFIs, Water and Sanitation, Health, Food Assistance, Protection, Recovery 
and Disaster Risk Reduction.  

The evaluation purpose is twofold:  

  Retrospective: to provide accountability for the portfolio of funds channelled through 
ECHO in India and Nepal over the evaluation period. The assessment will  cover the 
evaluation  issues  of  relevance,  coherence,3  EU  added  value,  effectiveness,  efficiency 
(including cost-effectiveness) and sustainability; 

  Forward-looking: its results should fit into ECHO’s future funding decisions and the 
already ongoing comprehensive evaluation of the European Commission’s humanitarian 
aid, 2012-2016.  

3   Coherence will also consider the alignment between ECHO’s crisis response and Civil Protection. 

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2.  Evaluation Context 

2.1.  Timing of the evaluation 

Launched in mid-2017, the evaluation came at a time when earthquake recovery operations 
in Nepal were phasing out and, in India, there were questions about ECHO’s value-added in 
humanitarian operations due to a combination of their significant response capacities and 
government attitudes regarding international actors working in areas of civil strife. 

It also comes after a period of reallocation of ECHO’s funding. At the beginning of the 
evaluation scoping period, ECHO had an active programme in India, with an injection of 
funds for the response to cyclone Phailin that struck north-eastern India in October 2013.  
In Nepal, following a long period without a significant disaster event, the  bulk of ECHO 
resources were being channelled to DRR in recognition of Nepal’s vulnerability to natural 
disasters. While the 2014 floods and, especially, the 2015 earthquake in Nepal led to a increase 
in funding, in India no new project funding to partners was provided after 2016.  

2.2.  Operating Context 

There has been a significant evolution in operating context for ECHO and their partners in 
both countries during 2013-2017.  In India, a combination of reprioritisation of resources by 
ECHO  at  a  global  level  combined  other  factors,  including  India’s  emergence  as  an 
international humanitarian actor in its own right, resulted in the phase out of virtually all of 
ECHO-supported  project  activities  in  2017.    In  2015,  in  Nepal  the  earthquake  caused 
extensive loss of life and extensive damages and this was followed by the adoption of Nepal’s 
2015 Constitution that set the stage for a decentralised government structure.  ECHO’s work 
with civil society organisations has also been impacted by increasingly restrictive regulatory 
environments in both countries. 

Key context elements: India 

India, the second-most populous country in the world (with over 1.2 billion people), is highly 
vulnerable  to  floods,  cyclones,  earthquakes  and  drought  (see  table  below).  Flooding 
associated with the summer monsoon is an annual event in different parts of the country.4 
Persistent inequality is reflected in the low human development attainments of the country’s 
most marginalized groups including scheduled castes, which were the most impacted by these 
natural disasters.  

Hunger has been dropping at a moderate rate since 1990 in India, but malnutrition still affects 
194.6 million people, i.e. one quarter of all undernourished people and a third of children in 
the world (WFP, 2016).  39% of children under the age of 5 were stunted and 15% were 
wasted (UNICEF, Southern Ontario Water Consortium 2016). 

4   HIP India 2013, p.3 

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Table 1 – Main type of disaster in India, 2013-2017 

Total 
deaths 

Total affected 

Total damage (US 
million) 

Flood 

Storm 

Drought 

Earthquake 

Extreme temperature  

Transport accident 

Technological 

8.608 

557 

109 

3.285 

914 

744 

28.861.432 

14.296.668 

330.000.000 

70.728 

907 

3.957 

22.314 

9.964 

3.000 

195 

Source: ADE, based on CRED database 

India is considered as a high-risk country according to the Index for Risk Management Mid 
2017 (INFORM). India is highly vulnerable to natural disaster (7.9) and experiences a high-
level of man-made hazards exposure (projected conflict risk).  

The Indian authorities have progressively improved their preparation and coping capacity to 
natural  disasters,  as  demonstrated  by  their  reaction  to  the  2013  Cyclone  Phailin:  Odisha 
residents were evacuated before the storm, and food and medicine were moved close to the 
affected areas. Those preparations were credited with the large reduction in casualties (47 
deaths) in  comparison with the last storm as powerful who hit India (the 1999's Cyclone 
Orissa which killed 10,000 people) (IFRC, 2014). 

The  country  also  faces  frequent  situations  of  instability  and  violence,  which  generate 
significant humanitarian needs. In the state of Jammu and Kashmir (North), the intensity of 
the 1947 partition-related conflict showed a decrease 2010 until 2016, when there was an 
upsurge  of  violence  with  a  resulting  rise  in  civilian  casualties.  Central  India,  particularly 
southern Chhattisgarh, also experienced sporadic bursts of violence in recent years (Naxalite 
crisis), as well as the north-eastern states which experience insurgencies. 

Key context elements: Nepal 

Nepal is a landlocked central Himalayan country of 27 million inhabitants, facing frequent 
natural  disasters  that  affect  lives,  livelihoods  and  infrastructures  (see  table  below).    The 
earthquake in 2015 (see box below) was the most powerful to strike Nepal since the 1934 
Nepal–Bihar earthquake.  Every year, around 1,000 people are killed by landslides and floods 
during the monsoon season. Nepal also still hosts over 12 000 refugees from Bhutan, who 
live in camps and are almost entirely  dependent on international humanitarian  assistance.  
During  the  scoping  period,  Nepal  experienced  three  major  disaster  events;  the  2015 
earthquake along with severe flooding during 2014 and again in 2017. 

Nepal is considered as a high-risk country according to the Index for Risk Management Mid 
2017 (INFORM)5. It has a lower global vulnerability to natural disaster than India (5.5) but 
its vulnerability to earthquakes is extremely high. The level of man-made hazards exposure 

5   Each type of risk is ranked from 0 (low risk) to 10 (high risk). 

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(projected  conflict  risk)  is  high.  Nepal  also  faces  a  lack  of  national  coping  capacity  (5.9), 
notably in terms of governance and institutional capacities.  Nepal was one of the Flagship 
Countries that fell under the EU Resilience Action Plan.6   

In  Nepal,  there  were  two  key  events  during  2015  that  significantly  altered  the  operating 
environments for international agencies.   One was the magnitude 7.8 earthquake in April, 
followed by a magnitude 7.3 aftershock three weeks later that collectively killed nearly 9,000 
people, injured another 25,000 and resulted in extensive damage to both infrastructure and 
livelihoods.    The  other  major  event  was  the  adoption  and  promulgation  of Nepal’s  2015 
Constitution.  One of the main resulting changes was that administrative divisions in Nepal 
were restructured in March 2017 so that all former municipalities and villages (more than 
3,900 in total) were restructured and amalgamated into 753 urban and rural Municipalities. 
The  former  district  development  committees  (DDC)  have  been  replaced  by  77  District 
Coordination Committees (DCC).  Local elections were held in Nepal during 2017 over three 
phases; 14 May, 28 June and 18 September, were the first local elections in two decades.   

The  earthquake highlighted  deficiencies in Nepal’s disaster management legal framework7 
and corresponding institutional  capacities, something that had been foreseen prior  to the 
earthquake based on an analysis8 of Nepal’s outdated national disaster legislation.9  In 2017, 
a  long-anticipated  bill  relating  to  the  disaster  risk  reduction  and  its  management  was 
approved.   As a result, a National Disaster Management Authority has been established that 
will have an independent head, although still under the Ministry of Home Affairs.10  This 
authority has a centralised structure which is widely seen as a challenge for operation within 
the new federal structure and associated devolution of power to local governments. 

6   2016 Humanitarian Implementation Plan for South Asia 

7   http://reliefweb.int/report/nepal/nepal-s-horrific-earthquake-international-community-doing-too-much-prepare 

8  

IFRC (2011) International Disaster Response Law (IDRL) in Nepal: A study on strengthening legal preparedness for 
international disaster response 

9   His Majesty’s Government of Nepal (1982) Natural Calamity (Relief) Act, 2039 (1982 A.D.) http://saarc-

sdmc.nic.in/pdf/nepal/file1.pdf   

10   Kathmandu Post (2017) Bill on disaster risk reduction and management registered. September 11, 2017 

http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2017-09-11/bill-on-disaster-risk-reduction-and-management-
registered.html  

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2.3.  ECHO support to Nepal & India 

2013-2017 coincided with the period when ECHO’s resources were reprioritised to address 
humanitarian impacts in the Middle East and Europe (Figure 2 below).  

Figure 2 – ECHO Funding Trends 2013-2017  

ECHO  has  had  a  presence  in  India  since  1995.  The  last  strategic  Humanitarian 
Implementation Plan (HIP) dated October 2013 specific to India11 aimed mainly to support 
the victims of the cyclone Phailin. More broadly, ECHO strategy in India focuses on the 
most vulnerable segments of the society (children, marginalized communities, and displaced 
people),  disproportionately  affected  by  disasters  and  not  always  reached  by  local  aid 
responders.    Since  2013,  ECHO’s  focus  has  shifted  to  conflict-affected  and  displaced 
communities in the north-east and Jammu and Kashmir.  As an example, in 2016 ECHO 
provided €500,000 to fund a project focusing on access to education for displaced children 
in Assam and €3.4 million to people affected by conflict in Jammu and Kashmir.   

In Nepal, the last HIP (dated 2014) aims to support refugees from Bhutan (around 38,000 
in 2013). The last HIP South Asia (dated July 2016) highlighted the importance of the 2015 
earthquake and its implications for Nepal.  For example, ECHO allocated €3.1 million to 
Nepal for disaster-preparedness efforts in 2016.  

11   After 2013, India had HIP allocation in 2014 and 2015 included under the South Asia HIP.  Nepal was also included  

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At regional level, ECHO strategy focuses on disaster preparedness, disaster risk reduction 
and resilience. This approach is inspired from ECHO overall policy documents on resilience 
(2012) and DRR (2013). 

In terms of funding, the EU allocated approximately EUR 21 million during the period 2013-
2017 to India, and EUR 29 million to Nepal. ECHO has a field presence in India through a 
Regional Office (New Delhi) and in Nepal with an antenna (Kathmandu).  ECHO recently 
decided in mid 2017 to downgrade its office in New Delhi to an antenna.   

Figure 3 – Timeline of ECHO Projects in India and Nepal 2013-2017 

India 

Many donors, including the EU, have withdrawn funding in recent years due to India’s status 
as a middle-income country which is thus ineligible for bilateral assistance. ECHO was the 
top humanitarian donor in India from 2013 to 2015 according to OCHA’s Financial Tracking 
System (FTS), but its interventions have been gradually phased out over the period, from 
nearly 10 million in 2013 (in food security and livelihoods, health, water, sanitation & hygiene, 
etc.) to less than 1 million in 2016 (protection and health). No EU funding was allocated to 
India so far in 2017.  

ECHO’s interventions focused on three major areas: food security and livelihoods (above 
EUR  6  million),  health  (above  EUR  5  million),  and  protection  (above  EUR  3  million)  - 
including in contexts of forgotten crises such as the conflicts in Jammu and Kashmir, districts 

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of central India, and in the north-eastern states. These three major areas represent in total 
75% of ECHO’s interventions over the period.12 

As  part  of  its  Disaster  Preparedness  ECHO  Programme  (DIPECHO),  the  Commission 
supported  vulnerable  communities  in  reducing  the  impact  of  floods,  cyclones  and  other 
natural  disasters  through  early  warning  systems  and  the  building  of  adapted  physical 
infrastructure (EUR 700.000). 

Figure 4 – EU funding to India, by sector and by year 

Nepal 

ECHO has been a significant player in the international response to the humanitarian needs 
of  the  2015  earthquake  in  Nepal.    However,  over  the  period  2013-2017  ECHO  funding 
remains  well  below  that of  the  top  donors  (Asian  Development  Bank,  United  Kingdom, 
USA, etc.). 

In Nepal, annual ECHO funding was usually less than 5 million during the period 2013-2016 
(see Figure 5) though it increased to more than EUR 17 million in 2015 in response to the 
2015 earthquake. ECHO’s funding following the 2015 earthquake represents about 60% of 
the total envelope spent in Nepal during the period under review. 

During  the  evaluation  period,  ECHO’s  funding  to  Nepal  focused  on  three  major  areas: 
shelter and settlements (more than EUR 13 million), disaster risk reduction (around EUR 
9.5  million),  and  food  security  and  livelihoods  (more  than  EUR 2.5 million).  These  three 
major areas represent in total more than 85% of ECHO’s interventions over the period. 

12   It is anticipated that sectors can be better defined with data gathered during the research phase from ECHO’s EVA 

database and other sources. 

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Figure 5 – EU funding to Nepal, by sector and by year 

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3.  Methodology 

3.1  Evaluation Phases 

The evaluation was divided into three-phases; inception, data collection and synthesis.  Key 
milestones  during  the  evaluation  process  were  the  inception  report,  a  progress  report 
presented to the Steering Committee for this evaluation following completion of field visits 
and a workshop facilitated by the Team Leader following circulation of the draft report to 
review findings, conclusions and recommendations in an interactive forum.   

3.2  Data Collection and Analysis   

The team carried out a desk review during the inception phase and during the brief interval 
between the approval of inception report and departure of the team on the field visit.   In 
addition to the single form and annexed documents available on the HOPE database, the 
team  collected  additional  documents  from  partners  during  field  visits  including  country 
strategies,  assessment  reports,  monitoring  reports,  presentations,  evaluations  and  lessons 
learned reviews.  Desk reviews were supplemented by interviews with selected ECHO and 
partner staff to help in understanding different stakeholder perspectives on the purpose and 
anticipated use of the evaluation.   Preliminary discussions with field-based staff also helped 
ensure  that the  field visits proceeded relatively  smoothly,  despite  challenges posed  by the 
flooding. 

Field visits to Nepal and India took place during August 14-31 where the team divided into 
two  sub-teams  to  increase  coverage.13    Challenges  due  to  weather,  logistics  and  time 
constraints due to the monsoon season had been anticipated.  The team arrived in western 
Nepal immediately following the worst floods in more than a decade resulting in delays and 
cancelling of planned visits to some beneficiary communities due to inaccessibility.  At the 
same time, the visit to western Nepal provided an opportunity to observe the government-
led interagency  response  in “real-time”, including partner performance  and the  return on 
ECHO’s investments in DRR over previous years.   

The team facilitated orientation meetings at the beginning of each country visit to clarify the 
purpose and proposed methodology and fine tune the itinerary.  In Nepal, the orientation 
was done jointly with partners.  A stakeholder workshop and a meeting with the Steering 
Committee for this evaluation during December 2017 to review findings, conclusions and 
recommendations in an initial draft of this report. 

A range of stakeholders were interviewed in each country.  In addition to staff from ECHO 
field  offices  and  partners,  representatives  from  government  (national  and  local),  UN, 
community members, local NGOs and, in India, private sector stakeholders.  A noteworthy 
perspective missing from key informants was from the EU Delegation in each country.  The 
team,  supported  by  ECHO  field  staff,  made  repeated  attempts  to  meet  with  senior  EU 

13   Field visit itinerary is provided in the annex. 

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Delegation staff, but were largely unsuccessful due to absence or their lack of availability due 
to  competing  priorities.  A  list  of  key  informants  and  details  of  focus  group  discussions 
(FGD) is attached as an annex. 

3.3  Debriefings with country level stakeholders 

The evaluation team facilitated debriefing sessions at the end of the visit to each country 
when the team presented preliminary findings and hypotheses and provided participants with 
opportunities  to  validate  these  and  complement  with  additional  data.    In  Nepal,  the 
debriefing was with ECHO and partner staff.  In India, it was originally planned to involve 
partners in the debriefing session, but this did not prove to be feasible as very few partner 
staff were based in New Delhi.   In Nepal, this consisted of a half-day session that allowed 
sufficient time for working groups to review hypotheses and provide their views on their 
relevance  and  which  were  priorities.    Participants  found  the  preliminary  findings  and 
hypotheses to be valid, while suggesting minor corrections and suggestions for improvement.  
Feedback from these debriefing sessions, subsequent desk research and feedback from the 
Steering  Committee  during  the  meeting  during  September  to  review  the  Progress  Report 
helped to inform the conclusions and recommendations presented in this report. 

3.4  Constraints and Limitations 

Major challenges faced had already been identified in the inception report and the resulting 
contingency planning helped to mitigate their effects.  The main constraints and limitations 
encountered during this evaluation included: 
  Need to cover two countries with significantly different contexts and operating 
models with a limited budget.  A total of only 16 days was allocated to field visits 
for both countries. The team split into two sub-teams each during site visits to 
increase coverage in Nepal.  Since ECHO has phased out funding to partners in 
India from 2017 onwards, the team spent relatively less time in the country and 
only two team members visited project sites.  The itinerary for the field visit 
itinerary is attached as annex.   

  The field visit not only coincided with the monsoon season in both countries, but 
the team arrived immediately after the worst floods the region had experienced 
in more than a decade.   Time constraints and poor road conditions meant that the 
teams could only visit more easily-accessible communities and, even then, the 
team traveling to western Nepal had to cancel some of the planned visits to some 
beneficiary communities.  At the same time, the visit to western Nepal provided an 
opportunity to observe the government-led interagency response in “real-time”, 
including partner performance and the return on ECHO’s investments in DRR over 
the years.   
Interviews of key informants.  A combination of phase out of project activities in 
India, staff turnover and staff absences meant that not all key informants were 
available.  Some key informants were therefore interviewed by phone after the 
field visit.   

 

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  Access to reference documents. The team was provided with access to the HOPE 
database during the inception phase. During the field visit a number of additional 
annexes to the ECHO single form were provided that were not found on the 
database.  

Overall there was a high level of engagement by staff from ECHO and partners with the 
evaluation process in both countries.  Most partners viewed this evaluation as a useful and 
timely exercise and this, along with logistic support provided, greatly facilitated the team’s 
work to compensate for these constraints and helped to ensure that the evaluation team was 
able  to  provide  reliable  statements  on  all  essential  aspects  of  the  interventions  in  each 
country. 

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4.  Response to Evaluation Questions 

This section presents findings for each of the ten evaluation questions listed in the TOR.  

EQ 1 and EQ2: Needs Assessment 

EQ 1 

To what extent have needs assessments been of good quality? 

This evaluation question looks at the relevance, timeliness and quality of needs assessments and how partners 
and affected communities where involved.    

EQ 1 – Answer Box 

  ECHO  and  partners  in  both  India  and  Nepal  mostly  had  access  to  relevant  needs 
assessment data of sufficient quality.   ECHO only occasionally  participated in partners’ 
needs  assessment  but  played  an  important  role  in  the  process,  at  both  strategic  and 
operational levels.  

  ECHO needs assessments were multi-layered. First phase assessments that drew on data 
from INFORM and Forgotten Crisis Assessments (FCA) were relevant and coherent.  Data 
collected during the second phase were less coherent.  IAF’s relied on macro-level data and 
indexes and only the needs in DRR and the food and nutrition sectors and were elaborated. 
Needs in other sectors were hardly mentioned even when needs assessments and surveys 
carried out by others provided this data.  Links between needs in IAFs and HIPs were not 
always clear, with examples including the lack of emphasis in the 2015 HIP on recovery 
following the 2015 earthquake in Nepal and in the 2016 HIP for India regarding forgotten 
crises.      Based  on  assessment  of  relevant  indicators,  it  is  difficult  to  justify  ECHO’s 
suspension of their programme in India from 2017 onwards based on unmet needs alone.   

  Needs  assessments  by  partners  were  typically  carried  out  in  multiple  phases  and 
progressively focusing on priority needs and target groups.  The first phase drew upon both 
primary and secondary data.    The second phase mainly consisted of collecting qualitative 
data  for  more  detailed  needs  assessments.  The  final  phase  of  needs  assessment  usually 
consisted of the identification of beneficiaries, nearly always with the participation of their 
local partner. This approach resulted in good quality assessments. 

  Links between needs in IAFs and HIPs were not always clear.  Examples included lack of 
emphasis in the 2015 HIP on recovery following the 2015 earthquake in Nepal and in the 
2016 HIP for India regarding forgotten crises.  

  Although ECHO rapid and unplanned urbanisation as an important global driver of disaster 
risk  in  2014,  needs  assessments  in  IAFs  and  HIPs  for  India  and  Nepal  provided  few 
concrete examples.  The IAFs for Nepal 2016 and 2017 addressed risks particularly in the 
Kathmandu valley.  There was no mention of the risk of disasters in other rapidly growing 
cities in areas affected by conflicts, such as Srinagar in India. 

  Most partners regularly consulted with communities during needs during assessments, apart 
from some projects in Jammu and Kashmir, where the context posed challenges.  Partners 

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relied on existing local government structures or established committees to help identify the 
most vulnerable.  Local partners and authorities participated in most needs assessments in 
the projects reviewed, although not necessarily in all phases of assessments. 

  The needs assessments carried out by ECHO and partners were  appropriate and timely, 
including assessments by ECHO staff immediately following a disaster event to inform HIP 
modifications.    Approaches  and  methodology  in  line  with  internationally-accepted 
standards.   The first phase of needs assessments often consisted of a multi-sectoral joint or 
inter-agency  assessment  and  rapid  initial  assessments  were  at  times  combined  with 
distributions  of  relief  items.    Assessments  for  DRR  actions  included  a  mapping  of 
stakeholder roles and responsibilities in line with ECHO guidelines. 

JC. 1.1 ECHO and their partners had access to relevant needs assessment data 

ECHO and partners in both India and Nepal had access to timely and relevant needs 
assessment  data.      The  approach  and  sources  used  by  ECHO  and  its  partners  for  data 
collection of data is described below. 

The description of the context and numbers of affected beneficiaries in the HIP and 
IAF was satisfactory.  In all five HIPs reviewed, results of assessments were in line with 
ECHO’s General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for Humanitarian Aid (GGOPHA). 
Assessments in HIPs referred to needs identified in IAF reports after these were introduced 
in 2015.  The 2013 HIP for India and 2014 HIP for Nepal for the Bhutanese refugee project 
provided descriptions of the results of second phase assessments carried out by field experts 
in coordination with EC.14  

Results of the first phase of ECHO’s needs assessments, based on INFORM15 and 
FCA data, provided relevant data to guide ECHO’s intervention in the two countries. 
INFORM  data  from  2014  -  2017  indicated  the  risk  of  humanitarian  crises  and  disasters 
ranked high in both India and Nepal (Table 2 below).  India was given a FCA risk rating of 
9-11 during 2014-2016.  India did not feature in the 2017 FCA assessment, even though it 
has bene flagged in the 2017 INFORM database as one of 26 countries in the world at risk 
of “Highly Violent Conflict”.16  Note that based on these indicators, it is difficult to justify 
ECHO’s suspension of their programme in India from 2017 onwards.   

14   UNHCR / WFP (2014) UNHCR / WFP Joint Assessment Mission Report. 

15   INFORM data is available from 2014 onwards and was used 1) to prioritise countries by risk to support decisions on 
resource allocation, programme location, etc.); 2) for risk profiling to support decisions about risks to focus programmes 
on for greatest impact and; 3) trend analysis for changing risks in countries and relative rankings.  

16   INFORM Mid 2017 

http://www.informindex.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=CMQ71j1pf_c%3d&tabid=124&portalid=0. 

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Table 2 – Results of INFORM and FCA 2014-2017: Regional Comparison17 

2017 

INFORM 

Risk 

Rank 

2016 

INFORM 

Risk 

Rank 

2015 

INFORM 

Risk 

Rank 

FCA 

FCA 

2014 

INFORM 

Risk 

FCA 

FCA 

- 

- 

- 

12 

9 

10 

- 

5.7 

5.4 

7.8 

6.6 

6.6 

5.8 

25 

32 

3 

12 

12 

23 

2.9 

113 

10 

- 

- 

10 

10 

10 

- 

5.6 

5.1 

7.9 

6.7 

6.6 

5.7 

24 

33 

4 

11 

13 

23 

2.8 

117 

11 

- 

- 

11 

9 

11 

- 

5.7 

5.3 

7.9 

6.8 

6.2 

5.9 

3.2 

24 

31 

3 

10 

16 

21 

84 

9 

- 

- 

11 

8 

9 

- 

5.7 

5.3 

7.9 

6.8 

6.2 

5.9 

3.2 

Country 

India 

Nepal 

Afghanistan 

Myanmar 

Pakistan 

Bangladesh 

Bhutan 

The IAF relied on macro-level data and indexes, with insufficient links with other 
relevant needs assessments or surveys.18  The in-depth descriptions in the IAF focused 
on  Food  and  Nutrition  Needs  Assessments,19  along  with  a  response  analysis  and  DRR 
rankings,  which  were  not  always  sufficiently  comprehensive.    IAFs  for  India  contained 
descriptions  of  the  food  and  nutrition  needs  in  central  India  and  areas  affected  by  the 
Naxalite insurgency, but an analysis of nutrition data per state20 provided little evidence for 
prioritisation of these areas in terms of unmet needs.21  Response options were limited to 
pilot community-based management of malnutrition (CMAM) in areas for which nutritional 
data were either lacking or not presented in the IAFs.  The IAF for Nepal in 2015 provided 
an extensive description of food needs, but section C was left blank in the next IAF although 
ECHO continued to support food assistance. 

Links between needs in IAFs and HIPs were not always clear. For example, in the 2015 
HIP (Section  3.4) ECHO’s plans do not include  detailed priorities for early recovery and 
emergency response to the earthquake.  Likewise, there were no references to the nutrition 
crisis although the 2013 HIP for India prioritised addressing nutrition needs and the IAFs 

17   INFORM (2015): http://www.inform-index.org/Results-and-data/INFORM-2015-Results-and-data , INFORM 

(2015); INFORM Mid 2015 (11/03/2015) http://www.inform-index.org/Results-and-data/INFORM-2015-Results-
and-data, INFORM (2017) http://www.inform-index.org/INFORM-2017-Results-and-data. 

18   Examples  include  the  2014  SPHERE  post  flood  assessment  in  Jammu  in  Kashmir,  the  2015  post  disaster  needs 

assessment for the Nepal earthquake carried by the National Planning Commission. 

19   GGOPHA’s prior to 2014 indicated that a specific food insecurity needs assessment was to be carried out in the 

countries/regions with food assistance/ nutrition interventions, given the importance of food assistance/ nutrition 
(which was the Commission's single largest aid sector). 

20   National Family Health Survey 3 and 4 for 2005 and 2015 respectively. 

21   The data didn’t indicate that acute malnutrition was a serious problem in central India as per the ECHO analysis. There 
were also states in in East India (Bihar) and the Northeast (Meghalaya) with a very high prevalence of acute malnutrition 
that were excluded. Analysis of the data shows that wasting was mainly related to poverty and lack of education. 

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for 2015, 2016 and 2017 provided a similar analysis.  India’s ban on ready to use therapeutic 
food (RUTF) in CMAM in 2013, which was an important influence on ECHO’s intervention 
strategy, was not mentioned in later IAFs.  There was a similar disconnect between IAFs and 
the HIP for 2016 regarding Forgotten Crises, which was included in the IAF for India, but 
not in the HIP.   

Although  the  General  Guidelines  on  Operational  Priorities  for  Humanitarian  Aid 
(GGOPHA) highlighted rapid and unplanned urbanisation as an important driver of 
disaster risk from 2014 onwards, needs assessments in IAFs and HIPs for India and 
Nepal provided few concrete examples.  ECHO strategic guidelines for DIPECHO 7 in 
201522 recommended giving more priority to growing urban populations in South Asia and 
piloting urban approaches.   Operational priorities for Nepal outlined in the 2015 HIP for 
South Asia included pilot projects on a small scale to develop risk assessment and community 
mobilization  tools  and  approaches  in  urban  settings  along  with  identifying  a  government 
agency that could coordinate with multiple stakeholders.  The IAFs for Nepal 2016 and 2017 
specifically  mentioned  the  risks  associated  with  the  fast  growth  of  Kathmandu  and  the 
GGOPHA for 2017 reiterates that ECHO will focus on earthquake preparedness, with an 
emphasis  on  high  population  density  urban  areas  in  Bangladesh,  Bhutan  and  Nepal. 
However,  there  was  no  mention  of  the  risk  of  disasters23  in  other  rapidly  growing  cities 
affected by conflicts, such as Srinagar in India. 

Partners  carried  out  needs  assessments  and  analysis  in  accordance  with  ECHO 
requirements.  The only exceptions amongst the sample of 15 projects were two projects 
in  conflict-affected  areas  in  India  where  no  needs  assessments  were  carried  out,  which 
ECHO monitoring felt to be justified given the security challenges and the fact that both 
projects,  ICRC  in  Jammu  &  Kashmir  and  MSF  in  Chhattisgarh,24  were  continuations  of 
previous projects.  

Needs  assessments  were  typically  carried  out  in  multiple  phases,  with  some 
differences in the scope and approach depending on the type of intervention.  Typical 
phases are listed below:  

  The  first  phase  used  secondary  data  and  primary  data,  including  data  collected  at 
community  level.    Methods  for  collecting  primary  data  included  FGD  with  affected 
communities,  often  with  the  government.    Partners  sometimes  held  workshops  to 
identify gaps and review lessons learned, particularly for DRR projects.  

  The  second  phase  mainly  consisted  of  collecting  qualitative  data  for  more  detailed 
needs assessments.  Five of the assessments in the sample of 15 projects reviewed (three 
in Nepal and two in India) collected quantitative data via surveys to help determine the 
number of vulnerable households and sectoral priorities.  

22   ECHO 2015. Technical Annex South Asia, version 10, 14/10/2015. 

23   Rockefeller Foundation (2015); Asian Cities Climate Resilience, Policy Brief 2015. Available from; 

http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10726IIED.pdf. 

24   eSF 2015/91001 and eSF 2015/91006. 

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  The  final  phase  of  needs  assessment  usually  consisted  of  the  identification  of 
beneficiaries,  nearly  always  with  the  participation  of  the  local  partner.    To  the  extent 
applicable,25  partners 
individuals  or  households  using  vulnerability 
characteristics  identified  during  the  second  phase,  in  line  with  ECHO’s  operational 
guidelines. Sometimes existing tools such as score cards were used as well.  In 80% of 
the projects beneficiary selection was done by local partners.26 

identified 

ECHO only occasionally participated in partners’ needs assessment but played an 
important role in the process, at both strategic and operational levels.  Of the sample 
of  15  projects  reviewed,  ECHO  staff  only  participated  in  one  needs  assessment  as  an 
observer  in  the  UNHCR-WFP  JAM  for  Bhutanese  refugees  in  Nepal.    ECHO  regularly 
provided technical input to partners to guide their assessments by, for example, suggesting 
inclusion  of  mine  risk  awareness  in  conflict  affected  Kashmir  and  nutrition  needs  in  the 
Naxalite  crisis  in  India.    Partners  were  also  informed  in  advance  which  activities  ECHO 
would not fund, including post-earthquake livelihood activities in Nepal.  

JC. 1.2 Involvement of affected communities and local partners in assessments.  

Most  partners  regularly  consulted  with  communities  during  needs  during 
local 
assessments.  ECHO’s  proposal  format  requires  partners  to  describe  how 
communities  were  involved.27    Approaches  varied,  with  most  partners  using  FGDs  in 
affected communities or individual interviews with local authorities, service providers and 
representatives of minorities and vulnerable groups. The exception was in conflict areas in 
India, where communities were rarely consulted during the first and second phases of the 
assessment.    Communities  occasionally  played  a  role  in  beneficiary  selection  in  both 
countries.    Partners  relied  on  existing  structures  such  as  Disaster  Management  and 
Preparedness Committees or VDC’s in Nepal or established committees to identify the most 
vulnerable  individuals  or  households,  such  as  injured  children  in  Kashmir.    Community 
workers or community-based service providers occasionally played a role to help ensure that 
assistance was appropriately targeted.    

Local  partners  have  often  been  involved  in  needs  assessments.  Only  two  needs 
assessments were carried out without active involvement of local partners or concerned local 
authorities.   On the other hand, local partners were involved in all phases of the assessment 
in less than half of the needs assessments in the 15 selected projects reviewed.  In only one 
(out of four) projects aimed  at strengthening DRR capacities and resilience were national 
authorities involved in all phases.  

25   Not applicable = the project was not targeting individual beneficiaries but e.g. institutions, a pre-defined group such as 

all IDPs in a certain area / all detained / refugees etc) or the project consists of services. 

26   ECHO 2015. Technical Annex South Asia, version 10, 14/10/2015   

27   ECHO 2015. Technical Annex South Asia, version 10, 14/10/2015 and ECHO 2017 Technical Annex South Asia, 

version 3, 13/09/2017  

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J.C. 1.3 The needs assessments carried out by ECHO and partners were timely, 
appropriate, of good quality and used effectively.  

The needs assessments carried out by ECHO and partners were timely.  HIPs with 
needs assessments were available to coincide with ECHO’s annual planning cycle.  These 
were updated following unforeseen events with significant humanitarian impact, such as the 
earthquake in Nepal, often on the basis of assessments by ECHO staff immediately after the 
disaster  event.    This  was  one  of  the  areas  where  partners  praised  ECHO’s  “hands-on” 
approach. 

Needs assessments were appropriate, with approaches and methodology in line with 
internationally-accepted  standards.28    The  first  phase  of  needs  assessments  often 
consisted of a multi-sectoral joint or inter-agency assessment, carried out by partners with 
complementary  expertise.  Rapid  initial  assessments  were  sometimes  combined  with 
distributions of relief items.  Needs assessments in 7 out of the 15 projects reviewed in the 
sample covered multiple sectors, all focussing on post disaster response and recovery needs.  

Needs  assessments  by  partners  disaggregated  gender,  age  and  mainstreamed 
resilience.  The number of affected people was usually broken down by age and sex, even 
during rapid assessments. FGDs were often sex-disaggregated and partners made specific 
efforts to include the most marginalized.  Several partners trained local partners to carry out 
more in-depth second phase needs assessments.  Even so, none of the proposals, including 
proposals which referred to ECHO’s toolkit,29 received a score of 2 for the gender and age 
marker at the initial stage. Scoring for the resilience was good with six out of nine projects 
in Nepal scoring 2.   The marker had not yet been applied for half of the projects reviewed 
in India.  Table 3 below provides more detail for 13 out of 15 projects in the selected sample 
where assessments had been done. 

28   SPHERE (2011) Core Standard - 3. Assessment  

29   European Commission 2014; Gender Age Marker Toolkit, Humanitarian Aid and Civil protection 

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Table 3 – Characteristics of assessments* 

s
r
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l
i
s
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r

r
e
k
r
a
m

1 

2 

3 

4+  Y    N 

1 

2 

3  Y  N 

some  Y  N 

some 

0 

1 

2 

0 

1 

2 

2 

1 

1 

2 

1 

1 

1 

1 

2 

1 

1 

1 

2 

1 

- 

1 

- 

1 

2 

- 

3 

6 

- 

1 

2 

3 

5 

1 

- 

6 

- 

- 

1 

4 

- 

- 

1 

4 

1 

2 

- 

1 

? 

? 

1 

2 

1 

1 

2 

1 

2 

1 

1 

1 

3 

- 

- 

2 

2 

)
3
(

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6
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* The gender/age marker and resilience markers were not yet applied in some of the older projects 

Assessments  for  DRR  actions  included  a  mapping  of  stakeholder  roles  and 
responsibilities  in  line  with  ECHO’s  guidelines.  Most  partners  involved  national 
authorities at different levels through workshops and, in two of the projects reviewed, as part 
of the assessment team.  Gap analyses and lessons learned contributed to comprehensive 
identification  of  needs  and  response  analyses.  In  disaster  response  and  recovery  projects, 
local  authorities  at  district  and/or  community  level  were  consulted  through  FGDs  or 
interviews, including in conflict areas when feasible.  

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EQ 2 

What was the fit between needs assessments and projects funded? 

This Evaluation Question covers two different aspects: 1) Comparison of results of needs assessment 
described under EQ1, both assessments by ECHO and by and partners and project design and 2) To 
what extent the identified needs were funded by ECHO and how gaps where addressed by other means 

EQ 2 – Answer Box 

  Projects largely reflected identified at needs at a macro-level if they were seen as relevant to 
ECHO’s  mandate  although  cases  were  identified where  there was  a  disconnect  between 
ECHO’s description of sectoral needs and needs identified by partners.  A related issue was 
ECHO’s decision to suspend programme funding to India after 2016, an action that was 
inconsistent with identified needs and ECHO’s mandate in Forgotten Crises. 

  There  was  a  strong  link  between  project  activities  and  needs  identified  during  in-depth 
assessments during the second phase of the assessment.   Project design did not include 
activities seen as being outside of ECHO’s mandate.  Needs assessments, either wholly or 
in part, were frequently shared with other donors by partners (see Table 4 for more details).  
Approximately two-thirds of sampled projects were funded from other sources.    

  There were remaining unmet needs that were not covered by ECHO project funding or 
from other sources.  This was a particular challenge in conflict areas in India where unmet 
needs in protection, livelihood and nutrition were identified. 

JC. 2.1 Alignment between needs assessment and project design. 

Projects  largely  reflected  identified  at  needs  at  a  macro-level  if  they  were  seen  as 
relevant to ECHO’s mandate.   ECHO’s HIP aimed to reflect their mandate and country 
strategy priorities, taking account of priorities and resources of other donors, and available 
budget on the one hand and partners presence and expertise on the other hand. However, 
the links between needs and response analysis as outlined in the HIPs, and presented during 
meetings with partners, was not always clear.  Several partners in India referred to the lack 
of  clarity  regarding  ECHO’s  prioritisation  of  nutrition  during  2013  and  its  subsequent 
reversal in 2015.  Another example cited by partners and other stakeholders was ECHO’s 
decision to stop funding projects in conflict after 2016, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir 
where the conflict intensified during 2016.   Partners pointed to the disconnect between the 
decision  to  withdraw  from  Jammu  and  Kashmir,  where  ECHO  was  the  only  major 
international humanitarian donor, with ECHO’s policy of funding forgotten crises   In Nepal 
two partners expressed  surprise that  ECHO funding for 2016 in their modified HIP was 
restricted  to  capacity  building  in  DRR,  despite  many  remaining  recovery  needs  in  the 
aftermath of the 2015 earthquake.     

In some cases, there was a disconnect between ECHO’s description of sectoral needs 
and needs identified by partners. For example, in the 2013 HIP for India the most acute 
humanitarian health needs in conflict affected areas were described as “Access to basic primary 
health services in remote and conflict-affected areas is poor or non-existent ...”  Data from partners show 
that in some regions affected by the Naxalite crisis access to health was indeed the major 

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problem.30    However,  in  Jammu  and  Kashmir  psycho-social  support31  was  identified  as  a 
higher priority than lack of access, apart from the most remote areas.  ECHO accordingly 
agreed to fund projects aimed at increasing access to basic health care in the region affected 
by the Naxalite crisis and a project to address mental health needs in Jammu and Kashmir.   

There  was a strong link between project activities  and needs identified during in-
depth  assessments  during  the  second  phase  of  the  assessment.    The  scope  of  the 
second  phase  of  assessments  was  however  more  limited  in  sectors  addressed  and 
geographical  coverage,  the  latter  often  depending  on  presence  of  partners  or  their  local 
partners. 

Overall projects funded were well aligned to partners’ needs assessments, but did not 
include activities seen as being outside of ECHO’s mandate.  Needs which ECHO 
didn’t fund because they were outside its mandate, such as permanent shelter in Nepal, didn’t 
appear  in  partner  project  proposals.    Needs  assessments,  either  wholly  or  in  part,  were 
frequently shared with other donors by partners (see Table 4 for more details).  

JC. 2.2 Assessment results were relevant 

There were remaining unmet needs that were not covered by ECHO project funding 
or from other sources.  Examples cited by partners included gaps in geographical coverage, 
numbers of vulnerable families identified and assisted and assistance for sectors not covered 
in the ECHO project.  The latter was a particular challenge in conflict areas in India where 
unmet needs in protection, livelihood and nutrition were identified, as illustrated by partner 
survey results:   

  Two different surveys carried out in 201532 and 201633 respectively highlighted a high 
prevalence of mental health disorders and the gap between needs and service delivery in 
Kashmir.  According to the 2016 survey, 88% of mental health needs went unaddressed.  

  An end-line survey revealed that, even after provision of assistance to mitigate the loss 
of livelihood activities and assets resulting from conflict in Assam, the percentage of 
households falling below an acceptable level of household food security still increased 
from 8% to 14%. 

As shown in Table 4 below, with the exception of conflict areas in India, nearly all partners 
were able to cover needs through other means. In Nepal, partners were able to leverage funds 
from both emergency and development funding envelops.  In India, partners were able to 
secure complementary funding from other donors for natural disasters.  Approximately two-
thirds of sampled projects were funded from other sources, either from the agency’s own 

30   MSF H (eSF 2014/01180/RQ/01/01) 

31   Action Aid and IMHANS Kashmir (2016); Mental Health Illness in the Valley. Available from: 

https://www.actionaidindia.org/publication/mental-health-illness-in-the-valley/ 

32  MSF 

India  and 

IMHANS 

(2015);  Kashmir  Mental  Health  Survey  Report  2015.  Available 

from: 

https://www.msfindia.in/meeting-mental-health-needs-jammu-and-kashmir 

33   Action Aid and IMHANS Kashmir (2016); Mental Health Illness in the Valley: A Community-based Prevalence Study 
of Mental Health Issues in Kashmir; Available from: https://www.actionaidindia.org/publication/mental-health-
illness-in-the-valley/ 

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resources or another institutional donor, and most contributions were already foreseen while 
partners  were  drafting  proposals.    Some  fund-raising  was  done  locally  for  some  of  the 
medical needs of victims injured in the conflict in Kashmir to complement ECHO funding.  
In two cases, partners were able to mitigate funding deficits by linking up with other projects 
in the same geographical area, including with long term development projects.  

Table 4 – Strategies for addressing unmet needs as per needs assessments  

Co-
funding 
by 
applicant 

Co-
funding by 
instutional 
donor(s) 

Linkages 
(complementary 
projects) 

Not 
applicable 
(no unmet 
needs) 

India 

Nepal 

Total 

2 

3 

5 

1 

6 

7 

- 

2 

2 

1 

1 

2 

Other solutions 

partner raised 
funds locally for 
individual 
beneficiaries  
One  project  was 
topped  up  by 
ECHO  

2 

No 
additional 
funds 

2 

- 

2 

The impact on the two projects with no complementary funding was mainly a reduction in 
beneficiary number, and it was left mainly to local partners to explain why some vulnerable 
households received assistance while others that had satisfied selection criteria did not. 

EQ 3: Entry and Exit Strategies  

EQ 3 

To what extent has ECHO ensured having put in place and implemented 
appropriate entry and exit strategies for its interventions? 

This Evaluation Question seeks to whether there were coherent entry and exit strategies in place developed 
as part of a participatory process.  It also looks at how these strategies were put into practice and were 
modified as needs changed.   

EQ 3 – Answer Box 

  ECHO  developed  strategies  adapted  to  the  specific  needs  and  contexts  in  each  country 
taking account of their vulnerability to natural disasters and need to strengthening people’s 
resilience, particularly in mitigating the impacts marginalised groups who often experience 
disproportionate disasters impacts.  

  Disaster events in both countries were entry points for ECHO and its partners as part of 
ECHO’s preparedness for development of intervention strategies or use as triggers to scale 
up their operations. 

  There has been little involvement of GoI during development of strategies.  Once response 
and recovery operations for cyclone Phailin were completed, ECHO’s strategy has focused 
on northern India where years of conflict have displaced populations and hindered access 
to government services.  While GoI has not prevented ECHO from accessing these areas, 
they have  forced some  of its  partners to suspend  operations and have  showed  relatively 
little interest in working on common strategies with civil society actors.. 

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  ECHO  India  lacked  an  exit  strategy  for  their  country  programme.    The  phasing  out  of 
ECHO India’s programme during 2017 was largely done on an ad hoc basis without much 
support from ECHO to smooth the transition for its partners.     

  GoN has been willing to work with international humanitarian agencies.  ECHO’s strategy 
has  been  to  engage  with  the  government  and  other  stakeholders  by  working  through 
partners and relevant networks.  Entry strategies for DRR activities in Nepal have followed 
a national  district  community process to gain approval at national level and move 
down the ladder gaining approval and promoting ownership at each stage.    

  Exit strategies that were not over-reliant on government ownership were more viable. An 
example of good practice was a school safety project in Nepal that emphasised community 
mobilisation while engaging with other donors and the government. 

  Exit strategies have faced challenges in both countries due to several factors including the 
relatively  short  duration  of  ECHO  projects,  operationalising  LRRD  with  development 
actors  and  inadequate  strategies  for  replicating  and  scaling  up  pilot  projects.    There  are 
nevertheless several examples of replication of DRR activities in Nepal where the GoN has 
integrated good practice into guidelines, strategy and local development planning processes. 

 

In India, partners were faced with a higher bar to developing and implementing viable exit 
strategies with a high reliance on GoI continue support despite weak ownership.  

  Strategies were regularly adjusted by modifying the HIP and reallocating funding.  Partners 
were  very  positive  during  interviews about  ECHO’s  flexibility  in  modifying  contracts  to 
accommodate adaptations due to changing needs.       

JC. 3.1 ECHO and their partners had clearly-defined strategies developed with the 
involvement of key stakeholders 

ECHO  developed  strategies  adapted  to  the  specific  needs  and  contexts  in  each 
country.  Both countries are highly vulnerable to natural disasters including cyclones, floods, 
landslides, earthquakes and drought and strengthening people’s resilience to natural disasters 
was an essential part of ECHO’s intervention strategy.   A strategy common to both countries 
has been to mitigate the impacts on those at the lowest level of the caste system experience 
a disproportionate effect of the impacts of disasters who have low coping capacities due to 
a combination of poverty, lack of assets and difficult access to the government services and 
entitlements.34   

Disaster events in both countries were entry points for ECHO and its partners as part 
of ECHO’s preparedness for development of intervention strategies or use as triggers 
to scale up their operations where international intervention where national actors have 
difficulty in covering humanitarian needs.  Examples of such entry points during 2013-2017 
include: 

34   ECHO (2017) HIP Technical Annex: South and East Asia and the Pacific v.4 

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  2013 Cyclone Phailin in India: “The government had put in place robust 

preparedness measures, which prevented massive loss of life.  The government is 
also distributing emergency relief packages to affected households, but the 
magnitude of the emergency and early recovery needs calls for external assistance 
to be provided to the most vulnerable people, to complement the immediate aid 
efforts of the local responders…ECHO has allocated EUR 3,000,000 for immediate 
and early recovery assistance for the most vulnerable victims of cyclone “Phailin”.35 

  2014 floods in mid-western Nepal: “As a result of the devastating floods last 

August (the most severe since 2008) … 150 000 people in the Mid-Western districts 
have lost their homes and more than 34 000 were displaced…Despite urgent calls 
from the Nepalese Government, the international community has provided very 
little humanitarian assistance. The Commission through ECHO1 provided EUR 
250,000 with a small-scale response intervention. Huge unmet gaps still remain, in 
particular in terms of shelter repair, WASH and food/livelihood recovery. It is 
therefore appropriate to increase the allocation under the present HIP by EUR 
500,000”.36 

  2015 Nepal earthquake: “On 25 April 2015, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck 
Nepal and in the following days several aftershocks up to 7.1 magnitude were 
recorded. The Central Regions of Nepal, including Kathmandu Valley districts have 
been badly affected, including mountain and hilly areas, where rural populations 
are dispersed, as well as some very densely populated districts and Nepal’s two 
largest cities – greater Kathmandu and Pokhara. Thousands of people have been 
killed and tens of thousands injured. There is massive destruction of infrastructure, 
property and livelihoods. An allocation of EUR 3,000,000 is required to cover the 
most urgent and immediate needs”.37 

  2017 floods in Nepal: There was no modification in the HIP, apart from the funding 
decision.  The description of interventions was as per guidance in the regional HIP; 
"Flooding associated with the monsoon is an annual event in most of the region. 
While the national governments' initial response is usually rapid and effective in 
terms of search-and-rescue, humanitarian gaps in the post-disaster phase 
frequently remain unaddressed…The main value added of external assistance to 
victims of natural disasters in the region is to address gaps in the coverage of relief 
operations and to overcome the barriers limiting access to social schemes”.38  On 
October 19th, an allocation of EUR 2 million was made to respond to monsoon 
floods that had struck Bangladesh and Nepal in two months earlier.  Priority was 

35   ECHO (2013) HIP India. v. 3. 22 October 2013 (page 1) 

36   ECHO (2014) HIP Nepal/Refugees from Bhutan v.2 (page 1) 

37   ECHO (2015) HIP India. v. 3. 30 April 2015 (page 1) 

38   ECHO (2017) HIP South and East Asia and the Pacific v.3 (page 5)  

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given to ECHO partners who were already implementing humanitarian actions in 
the most affected areas.39 

India 

There  has  been  little  involvement  of  GoI  during  development  of  strategies.    As 
described  under  EQ1,  there  was  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  focus  on  nutrition  as  a  core 
programmatic area.  With the exception of cyclone Phailin response and recovery operations, 
ECHO’s strategy during the evaluation period in India focused on three protracted crises; 
Jammu & Kashmir, the North-Eastern States and Naxal-affected areas in central India where 
years of conflict have displaced populations and hindered access to services and protection, 
health and nutrition needs remains priorities.  While GoI has not prevented ECHO from 
accessing these areas, they have suspended activities of some of its partners, and GoI has 
shown little interest in working with ECHO on a common strategy. 

In  India,  the  period  between  2013-2017  saw  significant  reductions  both  in  staffing  and 
funding for ECHO.   This period coincided with a time when other donors were phasing 
down their programmes40 and international civil society actors were feeling the effects not 
only of decreased funding, but also pressures from an increasingly restrictive legislative and 
operational environment.  India has also been significantly increasing its own humanitarian 
capacities  to  respond  both  internally  and  internationally.    ECHO  was  faced  with  the 
challenge of finding a suitable strategic focus and alternative operating model where it could 
add value with a relatively small budget.  

In the bigger picture, ECHO India lacked an exit strategy for their country programme.  The 
phasing out of ECHO India’s programme during 2017 was largely done on an ad hoc basis 
without much support from ECHO to smooth the transition for its partners.    

Nepal  

GoN has been willing to work with international  humanitarian agencies.  ECHO’s 
strategy has been to engage with the government and other stakeholders by working through 
different  networks,  notably  the  Nepal  Risk  Reduction  Consortium  (NRRC),41  the 
Humanitarian “Plus” Coordination Team chaired by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator and 
informal donor groups.  ECHO has had a special emphasis on community-based activities 
designed to strengthen people's resilience, the focus of Flagship IV in the NRRC.  Interviews 
with different stakeholders indicated that ECHO’s strategy was generally widely-known, and 
endorsed, by humanitarian actors in Nepal.  The exception was at the national government 
level,  where  there  was  less  awareness  of  ECHO’s  strategy  which  was  attributed  to  a 
combination of a lack of direct interaction and turnover of government staff.  

39   ECHO (2017) HIP Technical Annex: South and East Asia and the Pacific v.4 

40   Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies in India (2016) Changing Dynamics of Humanitarian Financing in India 

41   The NRRC brings together humanitarian and development actors in partnership with the government in order to reduce 
Nepal’s vulnerability to natural disasters. The NRRC focusses on five broad themes (“Flagships”): school and hospital 
safety, emergency preparedness and response, flood risk management, community based disaster risk management and 
policy/institutional strengthening. 

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Entry strategies for DRR activities in Nepal have followed a national  district  
community process to gain approval at national level and move down the ladder gaining 
approval  and  promoting  ownership  at  each  stage.      Nepal  has  maintained  a  consistent 
strategic  and  longer-term  programmatic  focus  on  DRR  and  resilience  along  with 
preparedness to respond to significant disaster events, notably the 2015 earthquake. The exit 
strategy was a reverse process, with the aim of influencing policy and practice at all levels.  
This approach has resulted in some lessons learned that could potentially be very helpful in 
promoting good practice in DRR during the current governance transition in Nepal.  The 
process for approving projects can take a long time, with partners reporting delays of up to 
9 months in obtaining project approval from GoN. 

ECHO’s guidance for exit strategies in Nepal during the evaluation period is summarised in 
the 2015 HIP: “Actions will have to include a strong focus on institution building to facilitate an exit 
strategy. They are also to have strong linkages with the National Risk Reduction Consortium. Target actions 
may be envisaged to this end, contributing concretely to the overall resilience agenda.”42   

JC. 3.2 Strategies were put into practice and adapted to account for changes in 
operating contexts 

A review of the selected project proposals found some well-developed exit strategies.  
Many of these relied on the expectation that governments will assure continued funding.  In 
fact, more detailed exit strategies were available in the individual multi-year country strategies 
that  most  of  the  ECHO  partners  have,  where  ECHO  projects  figured  as  one  of  the 
components.43    

Exit strategies that were not over-reliant on government ownership were more viable. 
One of the best examples found was the school safety project44 in Nepal implemented by 
Save the Children. It placed considerable emphasis on  community mobilisation (teachers, 
students and community leaders) while engaging with other donors and the government at 
different  levels,  both  directly  and  via  community  leaders  as  a  local  level  and  via  strategic 
partners such as UNICEF and the NRRC (Flagship 1) at a national level.  The project design 
specifically  aimed  at  reinforcing  local  capacities  and  encourage  replication.    Observations 
during  field  visits  indicated  good  coordination  with  other  agencies  implementing  DRR 
activities.   

One  of  the  key  components  of  a  project  in  western  Nepal  was  the  training  of  “Master 
Trainers” in DRR.45  Based on interviews and observations during the team’s site visit to 
western  Nepal,  the  training  had  been  well-received,  and  the  flood  response  provided  an 
opportunity  to  observe  this  training  being  put  into  action.    However,  due  to  the  rapid 
turnover of government administration staff in the region, very few of the trainees are still 

42   ECHO (2015) HIP Technical Annex: South Asia v.10 (page 17) 

43   For example, the selected Red Cross project describes this as “The activities of this action are embedded in the long-term strategy 
of the National Red Cross and therefore expected to be self-sustainable with a clear exit strategy for ECHO funding.” (eSF 2014/0117b2) 

44   eSF 2014/01185 

45   eSF 2015/91004 

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present  in  those  areas  and  remaining  training  resources  were  thus  much  reduced.    Some 
interviewees felt that the new structure with elected leaders may reduce the turnover. 

Exit  strategies  have  faced  challenges  in  both  countries  due  to  a  combination  of 
factors, some of which are shared. The main challenges have been: 

  The relatively short duration of ECHO projects.  The projects with the most viable 

exit strategies were those where there had been a relatively seamless continuation 
between successive projects.  This can be illustrated by the project implemented 
by WHO Nepal to strengthen health sector capacities of the Ministry of Health and 
population in the Kathmandu Valley in preparation for a mass casualty incident.46  
As described under EQ7 and EQ10, achievements and sustainability of this project 
have been good, but would have been impossible to achieve during a single project 
cycle. 

  Operationalising LRRD in collaboration with development actors has been a 

challenge for ECHO, particularly with DEVCO.47 

  Relatively modest budgets have meant that most ECHO longer-term projects were 
conceptualised as pilots.   However, project designs sometimes lacked specifics 
about mechanisms for capturing lessons learned, replicating and scaling up of the 
interventions to promote sustainability.   While there are examples of pilots that 
have been scaled up in Nepal, notably in the education and health sectors, there 
has been a tendency for pilots to be relatively ad hoc without communication and 
advocacy strategies that could have supported replication and scale-up.   

In  India,  partners  were  faced  with  a  higher  bar  to  developing  and  implementing 
viable  exit  strategies  with  a  high  reliance  on  GoI  continued  support  despite  weak 
ownership.    With  most  of  the  portfolio  focused  on  improving  inclusion  and  quality  for 
people marginalised due to conflict, ECHO’s exit strategy depended on the success of these 
efforts in improving service delivery and coverage.48   There was little alternative to GoI since 
local partners lacked capacity and resources  to continue  without external support.   There 
have nevertheless been some examples of projects in Assam and in Chandigarh where GoI 
has  taken  over  health-related  activities.  Handicap  International  initiated  a  cost  recovery 
system for disabled people in Jammu and Kashmir but ECHO’s phase out meant there was 
only a short implementation period and it proved unsustainable. 

ECHO  strategies  were  regularly  updated  and  adjusted  by  updating  the  HIP  and 
reallocating of funding.  By mid-2017 there had been two modifications, three during 2016 
and, during 2015, there were eight modifications.  Additional allocations were provided for 
disaster response as well as for conflict related assistance.  Response plans and project designs 
of partners were by and large consistent with the context and needs analysis.   Some updates 
adjusted numbers of targeted beneficiaries or projects were modified to cover unmet needs 
following a monitoring visit by ECHO.  Partners were very positive during interviews about 
ECHO’s  flexibility  in  modifying  contracts  to  accommodate  adaptations  due  to  changing 
needs.     

46   ECHO/-SA/BUD/2015/91005 

47   More details are provided under EQ6 and in the LRRD case study in the annex. 

48   ECHO (2015) HIP South Asia v.9 (page 12) 

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EQ 4: Alignment with ECHO policies  

EQ 4 

How well aligned were ECHO’s operations with ECHO’s policies? 

This evaluation question covers the coherence of the country strategies and specific operations with ECHO 
relevant internal policies. It aims at assessing the extent to which ECHO funded humanitarian activities in 
India and Nepal have been coherent to their relevant policy frameworks. 

EQ 4 – Answer Box 

  ECHO  country  strategies  and  operations  were  coherent  with  ECHO’s  broader  policy 
framework.  ECHO-supported  operations  in  Nepal  were  coherent  with  sectors  and 
approaches described in the HIP.   

  Sectoral interventions in India were broadly consistent with ECHO policies but, due to the 
operating context, ECHO found itself at the edge of its mandate since many of the activities 
it supported were bordering on development.   

  Awareness of ECHO's policies amongst partners in each country was uneven and relatively 
limited. A combination of ECHO’s “hands on” monitoring approach combined with advice 
and quality assurance provided by Europe-based partners helped to align interventions with 
ECHO policies.  However, the understanding and application of humanitarian principles 
by  partners  and  other  stakeholders  was  inconsistent  due  in  part  to  relationships  with 
governments and the blurred lines between relief and development in both countries.   

  Project documents often do not mention specific ECHO policies, with the exception of 
Resilience and Gender-Age Markers.  These markers were useful since they helped to clarify 
ECHO’s policy commitments for resilience and gender/age inclusion and allowed ECHO 
staff  to  make  transparent  and  evidence-based  judgements  on  compliance  with  related 
ECHO policies on ECHO funded interventions. 

JC. 4.1 ECHO funded operations have been implemented in line with relevant ECHO 
policies 

ECHO country strategies and operations were coherent with ECHO’s broader policy 
framework. The overall policy framework for humanitarian assistance was outlined in the 
Council Regulation No 1257/96 on humanitarian aid. It sets out the main goals, principles 
and  procedures  for  implementing  EU  humanitarian  aid  operations.  The  European 
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (2007) aims to ensure coordination and complementarity 
between EU countries and institutions to improve EU’s humanitarian assistance. It defines 
the  EU’s  common  vision,  policy  objectives  and  principles  on  a  large  number  of  topics, 
including  international  humanitarian  cooperation,  good  humanitarian  donorship,  risk 
reduction and preparedness, civil protection and civil and military relations.  

ECHO has developed thematic policies and guidelines on how to implement and coordinate 
EU humanitarian aid and civil protection policies for several thematic (e.g. regarding food 

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assistance, nutrition, health, and disaster risk reduction)49. This include a statement on the 
objectives pursued, response options, and the definition of entry and exit criteria. 

This  policy  framework  was  illustrated  in  the  figure  below  for  ECHO’s  main  sectors  of 
intervention in India and Nepal. 

Figure 6 – Overview of ECHO policy framework for India and Nepal 

ECHO-supported operations in Nepal were coherent with sectors and approaches 
described in the HIP.  ECHO’s portfolio over the period mainly focused on DRR/disaster 
preparedness 
in  Nepal,  post-earthquake  shelter  prioritising 
communities in remote areas and food assistance for Bhutanese refugees and people affected 
by the earthquake,50 which corresponded to key sectors of intervention identified in HIPs 
and amongst twelve priority sectors identified by ECHO at a global level.51   

in  hazard-prone  areas 

Awareness of ECHO's policies amongst partners was varied and most partner staff 
in the country have only a vague knowledge.  Partner staff in Nepal and India were not 
very  familiar with  ECHO  policies, apart  from  those  that  were  directly applicable  to  their 
specific projects (e.g. resilience marker, protection, etc.).  As noted above, knowledge of a 

49   Include the following thematic : food assistance, nutrition, water sanitation and hygiene, health, cash and vouchers, 
protection, disaster risk reduction, helping children in need (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/policy-
guidelines_en) 

50   DRR, shelter and food assistance accounted for 26%, 14% and 7% of total ECHO budgets in Nepal respectively. 

51   List 

of 

sectors 

identified 

http://dgecho-partners-
helpdesk.eu/reference_documents/start):  Food  security  and  livelihoods,  WASH,  Health,  Nutrition,  Shelter  and 
settlements,  Disaster  risk  reduction  /  disaster  preparedness,  Protection,  Coordination,  Support  to  operations,  Mine 
action, Education in emergencies, Multi-purpose cash transfer 

helpdesk 

partners 

(ECHO 

ECHO 

by 

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specific  policy  has  not  meant  that  the  action  was  inconsistent  with  ECHO’s  policy 
framework.  Our assessment was that the combination of ECHO’s “hands on” monitoring 
approach combined with advice and quality assurance provided by Europe-based partners 
helped to align interventions with ECHO policies.   When responding to this question, some 
partners referred to examples where there were inconsistencies between ECHO’s approach 
and practice.  Examples most frequently cited were ECHO’s delay in making decisions about 
responding to quick-onset disasters, their approach to nutrition in India and a lack of clarity 
about the role of the EU’s Civil Protection capacity. 

Projects are aligned with ECHO policies even if they are not explicitly described in 
country  strategies  and  operations.    Project  documents  often  do  not  mention  specific 
ECHO policies, with the exception of Resilience and Gender-Age Markers.  These markers 
were  useful  since  they  helped  to  clarify  ECHO’s  policy  commitments  for  resilience  and 
gender/age inclusion and allowed ECHO staff to make evidence-based judgements on the 
coherence between policy and ECHO funded interventions.52 

ECHO’s  2014  Resilience  Marker was  being used as a reference by many partners.  
This tool supports the EU’s Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries: 2013-2020. 
In  Nepal,  partners  regularly  applied  ECHO  resilience  marker  and  were  able  to  present 
satisfactory analyses of shocks, stresses and vulnerabilities, risks, local capacity measures and 
support  to  long  term  strategies.  All  nine  projects  amongst  the  Nepal  sample  applied  the 
resilience marker, with 6 projects meeting all of the marker criteria. 

Few  of  the  projects  selected  for  detailed  analysis  met  all  criteria  of  ECHO’s  2014 
Gender-Age Marker.53 According to scoring by ECHO for these 9 projects, the design was 
not  sufficiently  adapted  to  the  specific  needs  and  capacities  of  different  gender  and  age 
groups. 

In India, partners felt that ECHO had been acting at the edge of its humanitarian 
mandate and country strategy, as many of its activities were developmental in nature.  
The sectors of intervention, food assistance, protection, and health, mentioned in ECHO 
strategy54 were part of its mandate.   This mix of humanitarian and development activities 
was seen to be due to a combination of the chronic nature of the conflict in northern India, 

52   The Marker records whether or not humanitarian actions meet each of the following criteria sufficiently: 

  Does the proposal include an adequate analysis of shocks, stresses and vulnerabilities? 
 

Is the project risk informed? Does the project include adequate measures to ensure it does not aggravate risks or 
undermine capacities? 

  Does the project include measures to build local capacities (beneficiaries and local institutions)? 
  Does the project take opportunities to support long term strategies to reduce humanitarian needs, underlying 

vulnerability and risks? 

53   The Marker records whether or not humanitarian actions meet each of the following criteria sufficiently: 

Is the assistance adapted to the specific needs and capacities of different gender and age groups? 

  Does the proposal contain an adequate and brief gender and age analysis? 
 
  Does the action prevent/mitigate negative effects? 
  Do relevant gender and age groups adequately participate in the design, implementation and evaluation of the 

Action? 

54   ECHO (2013) HIP India 

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increased restrictions on civil society activities, the fact that most of ECHO’s partners were 
also implementing development projects. 

Examples  of  ECHO-funded  that  were  more  oriented  towards  development  than 
humanitarian goals such as: the ‘Assistance to people with disabilities in Jammu and Kashmir’ 
(HI-Disabilities),  the  ‘Assistance  to  children  affected  by  conflict  in  Jammu  and  Kashmir’ 
(STC-Conflict) funded through the EU Children of peace Initiative which was more oriented 
towards  conflict  resolution,  the  ‘Assistance  to  address  malnutrition  in  Madhya  Pradesh’ 
(UNICEF),  the  ‘Early  recovery  support  to  vulnerable  populations  affected  by  floods  in 
Jammu & Kashmir’ (Action Aid), and the ‘Enhancing learning protection environment for 
children in conflict in Assam’55 (Terre des Hommes). 

At a portfolio level, coherence with prioritized sectors of the country strategy hides 
an implicit orientation of the interventions toward development.  In India, ECHO’s 
portfolio focuses on food assistance (21%), protection (18%) and health and medical services 
(12%) which correspond  to the key  sectors of intervention identified in the HIP 2013  as 
follows: 

  Food assistance – emergency needs in central India stemming from malnutrition 

and localized food insecurity;  

  Protection – child protection and respect of IHL; 
  Health – primary health care outreach, psychosocial support for trauma victims 

and assistance to people living with disabilities. 

Logical  frameworks  for  nutrition  projects,  such  as  ‘Assistance  to  address  malnutrition  in 
Madhya Pradesh’, where UNICEF developed a system to track the progress of children once 
they  leave  the  nutrition  centres  was  oriented  more  towards  development  goals.    ECHO 
described the project as ‘humanitarian-focused’ since it is targeted at stabilization centres. 
Similarly, ECHO’s interventions in health and medical services tend to go beyond ECHO 
mandate set out in the Thematic Policy Document n° 7 - Consolidated Humanitarian Health 
Guidelines (CHHG, 2014) and apply development-oriented approaches.  

55   This project was funded from ECHO’s global “EU Children of Peace Initiative” that funds humanitarian projects for 

children in crisis-affected regions https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/children-of-peace_en  

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EQ 5: Articulation with other actors  

EQ 5 

To what extent has ECHO’s crisis response been well articulated to interventions 
of other actors addressing the same crises (such as Civil Protection, Development, 
local authorities, other donors)? 

This Evaluation Question assesses the coherence between ECHO and other parts of the EU and with 
external stakeholders. 

EQ 5 – Answer Box 

  There  was  a  lack  of  articulation  between  ECHO  and  DEVCO  in  DRR  and  resilience 
programming in both countries.  A good practice example of collaboration with DEVCO 
in the education sector in Nepal nevertheless did demonstrate that it was possible to achieve 
impressive positive outcomes despite institutional and system-related challenges.    

  There  was  little  evidence  of  formal  collaboration  between  the  EU  Civil  Protection  and 
ECHO  during  the  deployment  for  the  Nepal  earthquake  response.    However,  their  co-
location  in  the  EU  Delegation  office  facilitated  regular  information-sharing  during  the 
earthquake response. 

  ECHO’s  role  in  facilitating  coordination  between  partners  improved  programme 
effectiveness in Nepal.  ECHO made use of sector-wide partnerships with implementers, 
donors and other stakeholders active in supporting DRR and resilience.   This helped to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness of ECHO interventions through better alignment and 
harmonisation  of  donor  approaches  to  fill  gaps  and  reduce  duplication  in  addition  to 
facilitating knowledge management 

  ECHO’s HIP for Nepal has been developed in consultation with other humanitarian actors, 
and other donors and was in line with the sectoral priorities and needs identified.  There 
was no evidence  of direct involvement of government actors in the  development of the 
strategy.  In India, the HIP was mainly developed by ECHO without much consultation 
with partners, but they found it was relevant.  

  ECHO’s relationship with governments in both countries usually has been indirect, either 
through its partners or the EU delegation.  ECHO missions tend to interact mainly at a 
local  government  level.    In  Nepal,  ECHO  was  an  active  participant  in  national  DRR 
dialogues, where it has been viewed as a major player by the international community. 

  Channelling ECHO funds through consortia have improved efficiency and effectiveness in 

some cases, providing they are well-managed and resourced.   

  ECHO was well-informed about interventions of other humanitarian actors, particularly in 
Nepal,  where  ECHO  regularly  participated  in  collaborative  activities  with  other  donors, 
including  joint  assessments.    In  India,  ECHO  is  following  in  the  footsteps  of  bilateral 
donors to phase out their programmes.  Some donors, such as USAID/OFDA, have been 
piloting alternative operating models working with UNDP in India to enhance resilience.   

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JC. 5.1 ECHO facilitated internal coherence of EU capabilities based on mandates 
and value-added 

Articulation with other parts of the EU Delegations in both countries has generally 
been poor.   This mirrors similar findings in other evaluations and reviews: 

 

In a 2010 evaluation of ECHO in Nepal that: “Coordination with the EU Delegation 
has in particular been weak”56  which was partly attributed to capacity constraints 
and process differences.  The lack of coordination was found to have reduced the 
influence of ECHO play a more significant role in influencing DRR policy-making.57 

  From more recent internal lessons learned reviews:  

o  A priority action to be taken was “LRRD needs to be on the agenda of ERCC 

coordination meetings from the very first meeting onwards in order to facilitate 
a structured exchange and follow-through”.58    

o  “In such emergencies, there is a great opportunity to improve the in-house 

ECHO cooperation, from the request for assistance to the elaboration of a joint 
plan…”59 

Interviews with ECHO staff in Brussels confirmed that this lack of articulation was by no 
means confined to these two countries and the underlying drivers, including lack of suitable 
training of ECHO and DEVCO staff, incentives and instruments to help bridge the gaps, 
were well known to leadership.   There were some positive exceptions, the most notable of 
which was a good practice example of collaboration involving a collective effort by ECHO, 
DEVCO, Save the Children, UNICEF and the Ministry of Education in Nepal.60   Other 
examples  included  the  active  participation  of  the  EU  Delegation  in  Nepal  in  Bhutanese 
refugee  donor  meetings  convened  by  UNHCR  along  with  the  role  of  ECHO  in  both 
countries in providing updates and talking points to the Delegation regarding humanitarian 
situations. 

The  only  time  during  the  evaluation  period  where  EU  Civil  Protection  capacities 
were  deployed  to  either  country  was  following  the  Nepal  earthquake  to  carry  out 
search  and  rescue  activities  and  subsequently UN  coordination  efforts  in  regional 
hubs.   There was little evidence of formal collaboration, such as joint action, between the 
EU Civil Protection and ECHO.  However, their co-location in the EU Delegation office 
facilitated regular information-sharing during the earthquake response. 

ECHO’s  role  in  facilitating  coordination  between  partners  improved  programme 
effectiveness in Nepal.  ECHO made use of sector-wide partnerships with implementers, 
donors and other  stakeholders active  in supporting DRR and resilience.    This  helped  to 

56   Aguaconsult Ltd. (2010) Evaluation of the ECHO’s Action in Nepal (page 39). 

57   Based on the findings from the current evaluation, there was no action taken on the corresponding recommendation 

to ECHO to strengthen links with the EU Delegation. 

58   European Commission (2015) Nepal Earthquakes, April – May 2015: Lessons Learnt (page 3). 

59   European Commission (2016) Outcomes of Technical and Operational Level Lessons Learnt Meeting on 19 October 

2015 (page 3). 

60   This is described in more detail as a good practice example in the annexed LRRD case study. 

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improve efficiency and effectiveness of ECHO interventions through better alignment and 
harmonisation  of  donor  approaches  to  fill  gaps  and  reduce  duplication  in  addition  to 
facilitating knowledge management. 

ECHO’s HIP for Nepal has been developed in consultation with other humanitarian 
actors, and other donors and was in line with the sectoral priorities and needs identified in 
the 2015 Flash Appeal.  There was no evidence of direct involvement of government actors 
in the development of the strategy.  In India, the HIP was mainly developed by ECHO 
without much consultation with partners although most partners interviewed found it to be 
relevant.  In India, partner coordination was mainly limited to pre-monsoon preparedness 
workshops. 

India 

As described in detail in Case Study 3 (attached as an annex), ECHO partners in India has 
been  operating  in  an  increasingly  restricted  regulatory  environment  in  India  and,  since 
ECHO works through civil society, this has translated in very limited engagement 
with  local  authorities  and  virtually  no  interaction  at  a  national  level.    GoI  disaster 
management officials interviewed had very little understanding about ECHO and partners 
noted that neither ECHO and the EU Delegation were actively participating in interagency 
DRR network meetings.   

For  partners  working  in  Jammu  &  Kashmir,  ECHO  made  a  binding  condition  in 
their funding decision.  During interviews, partners working in these areas acknowledged 
the need for good coordination and felt ECHO encouragement was helpful. 

JC. 5.2 ECHO coordinated with other humanitarian actors effectively 

Assertive governments have influenced the efficiency and effectiveness of projects.  
In India and Nepal there was evidence of how the strength of engagement of partners with 
can  influence  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  projects.  In  India,  there  was  limited 
engagement of partners with authorities at a local level and very little at a state or national 
level.  

Channelling  ECHO  funds  through  consortia  have  improved  efficiency  and 
effectiveness in some cases, providing they are well-managed and resourced.  In both 
India and Nepal, consortia approaches have been used several times by ECHO.  Examples 
of partner consortia in Nepal, such as that led by Save the Children, demonstrated that this 
approach  can  help  in  avoiding  duplication  of  effort  and  harmonising  approaches.  
Characteristics  of  good  practice  examples  were  efficient  segregation  of  duties  between 
partners based on their competencies, a common strategy shared by all partners, effective 
leadership;  a  manageable  number  of  members  and  cascade  approaches  to  training.61   
Conversely,  a  lack  of  internal  capacity  in  implementing  partners,  recruitment  of  large 

61   eSF: 2015/91044; 2015/91005; 2015/91007 

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numbers  of  local  partners  and  poor  leadership  was  observed  to  cause  delays  and 
inefficiencies.  In the case of the Action Aid consortium in India and IOM in Nepal, gaps in 
leadership and lack of human resources combined with a large consortium led to significant 
delays and unsatisfactory performance.62  

ECHO  was  well-informed  about  interventions  of  other  humanitarian  actors, 
particularly  in  Nepal,  where  ECHO  regularly  participated  in  collaborative  activities  with 
other donors, including joint assessments.63  This included coordination of activities across 
donors involved in DRR programming and filling gaps in shelter recovery programming left 
when some NGOs ceased temporary shelter assistance after the emergency phase was over 
in August 2015.64  Engagement with the GoI through partners and networks has been an 
integral part of the design of the DRR and promotion of sustainability.   

ECHO  and  the  EU65  have  been  the  only  major  source  of  funding  for  partners  in 
Jammu  and  Kashmir.    ECHO  partners  reported  that  they  could  usually  access  funding 
from other donors, including USAID, corporate donors and private sector foundations but 
these mainly support responses to natural disasters.  

The recent decision to downgrade the ECHO field presence in India to an antenna 
follows the trend of bilateral donors to phase out their programmes in India.66   It was 
noted that one of the justifications that DFID used to close their office in India was the 
continued presence of ECHO, which would allow them to continue to have a humanitarian 
foothold in the country.   

USAID/OFDA has been piloting alternative operating models for working in India.  
UNDP has been implementing a collaborative project “Enhancing resilience of institutions 
and communities to disaster risk and climate change” involving Ministry of Home Affairs, 
USAID  and  OFDA  to  support  GoI’s  efforts  to  strengthen  resilience  and  climate  risk 
management in urban settings.  The project targets six medium-sized cities (with populations 
of 100,000 – 500,000) located in hazard-prone areas.  Project objectives are to improve urban 
planning and disaster risk management.  

62   eSF: Action Aid; 2014/91002, eSF: IOM; 2015/91041 

63   ECHO  had  organised  a  joint  monitoring  visit  with  NGO  partners  and  representatives  from  DFID  and  OFDA  to 
western  Nepal  just  before  the  evaluation  team  arrived.    Subsequent  interviews  with  partners  and  donor  staff 
demonstrated confirmed this visit had helped to ensure there was a common understanding and coordinated approach 
to addressing humanitarian issues.  

64   Interview: IOM 

65   To support peace-building. 

66   Consortium  of  Humanitarian  Agencies  in  India  (2016)  Changing  Dynamics  of  Humanitarian  Financing  in  India:  A 

Discussion Paper 

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EQ 6: EU added-value  

EQ 6 

What  was  the  EU  Added  Value  of  the  ECHO  actions  in  the  region  during  the 
evaluation period? 

This Evaluation Question examines value-added of ECHO from the perspective of its role, mandate and 
how ECHO facilitated the work of its partners. 

EQ 6 – Answer Box 

  Partners were unanimous in their appreciation of the “demanding and hands-on” approach 
of ECHO with their partners that helped them to focus on results and improve quality.  
Compared  to  its  peers,  ECHO  was  perceived  by  partners  as  the  donor  that  was  most 
knowledgeable  about  the  situation  on  the  ground  and  able  to  provide  useful  and  timely 
feedback.   This “hands on” approach has also resulted in ECHO being perceived by other 
donors with a presence in the country as a useful resource for advice about the situation on 
the  ground.    For  EU  members,  such  as  Sweden,  who  do  not  maintain  a  permanent 
humanitarian presence, information from ECHO was a critical element for their analysis of 
needs, risk and vulnerability.  

  More than a decade of investment in DRR and resilience in Nepal have positioned ECHO 
as  a  recognised  thematic  expert.    This  has  led  to  expectations  from  partners  and  local 
governments that ECHO will make an important contribution in supporting the transition 
process to the new governance system.  ECHO’s successes in improving the understanding 
of  DRR  and  resilience  in  Nepal  has  highlighted  gaps  in  LRRD  as  community  members 
search for funds to retrofit unsafe buildings identified when drawing up hazard maps.    

  Factors contributing to a reduction in ECHO’s value-added included:  

o  The lack of direct engagement with GoI and GoN has made it easier for ECHO to 
be  impartial,  but  at  the  same  time  limited  their  ability  to  advance  humanitarian 
principles, notably provision of impartial assistance to marginalised populations. 

o  ECHO’s designation of Nepal as a “Resilience Flagship” country following the 2015 

earthquake was not supported by institutional investments. 

o  ECHO has not been a predictable donor for meeting immediate needs following 
quick-onset disasters and partners have needed to rely on other sources of funding 
to support their responses.   

o  Value-added of ECHO’s assistance model in the Indian operating context has been 
limited,  even  though  partners  confirmed  the  relevance  of  ECHO’s  programme 
while  emphasising  that  ECHO  has  been  virtually  the  only  donor  regularly 
supporting and visiting conflict areas. There was a consensus that to add value in 
India ECHO will  need to find a new operating model that is based  on an equal 
partnership.   

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JC. 6.1 ECHO drew on its specific role and mandate to create added value 

The ‘hands on’ approach by ECHO  was  considered as good practice  by partners.  
ECHO’s  partners  receive  funding  from  a  variety  of  donors,  but  ECHO  stood  out  as  a 
responsive  and  flexible  donor  in  comparison  to  its  peers.    Partners,  including  strategic 
partners  such  as  UN  agencies  involved  in  coordination,  appreciated  ECHO’s  technical 
expertise,  proactive  monitoring  of  projects,  flexible  project  management  systems  and 
frequent visits to the field to observe progress and consult with beneficiary communities.  
ECHO staff were perceived to have an in-depth understanding of the operating context and 
partners  feel  this  helped  them  to  improve  project  quality  and  facilitated  constructive 
dialogues when project revisions were needed to adapt to changed needs in rapidly changing 
environments.  

ECHO’s information and analysis is valued by other donors. ECHO was perceived by 
other donors present in the country as a useful resource for advice about the situation on the 
ground.  For EU members such as Sweden, who do not maintain a permanent humanitarian 
presence,  information  provided  by  ECHO  has  been  a  critical  element  supporting  their 
analysis  of  needs,  risk  and  vulnerability  that  guided  their  interventions  in  countries  like 
Nepal.67 

The lack of direct engagement with GoI and GoN has made it easier for ECHO to 
be  impartial,  but  at  the  same  time  limited  their  ability  to  advance  humanitarian 
principles, notably with regard to impartial assistance to the most vulnerable.  ECHO 
has instead promoted humanitarian principles during their ongoing collaboration with their 
implementing partners and engaging in formal and informal networks.  As described in Case 
Study 3 in the annex, governments in both countries have passed several pieces of legislation 
during the  evaluation period  that restricts activities of NGOs, including ECHO partners.  
ECHO’s potential to advance humanitarian principles was particularly limited in India, where 
GoI has shown itself willing to suspend activities of ECHO.   

In  Nepal,  ECHO  partners  and  the  Red  Cross  have  had  the  opportunity  to  play  a  more 
substantive role and generally maintained good contacts with government counterparts at 
different levels.  ECHO has also been able to use its influential role in the NRRC, the UN-
led Humanitarian “Plus” Coordination Team and other networks.  

The new governance system in Nepal where decentralised authority has been transferred to 
elected leaders has created both opportunities and challenges.  Partners reported that a good 
number  of  newly-elected  leaders  are  former  NGO  staff.    They  know  about  the  ECHO-
supported DRR projects and were requesting relevant training and other forms of support.  
At the same time, several incidents during the 2017 flood response have been reported by 
agencies claiming that members of political parties have interfered in needs assessments and 
distributions of relief items. 

67   Tasneem et al. (2016) Evaluation of Sida’s Humanitarian Assistance 

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ECHO’s designation of Nepal as a “Resilience Flagship” country following the 2015 
earthquake was not supported by institutional investments.68  There have been several 
good practice initiatives to increased resilience in Nepal, including the example cited above 
of successful ECHO and DEVCO collaboration in the education sector.  However, there 
was no evidence that, apart from a workshop facilitated by ECHO’s regional office soon 
after the announcement, there have been any investments in research, capacity building or 
attempt to capture relevant learning.   Evidence suggests that ECHO has shifted its focus 
instead  to  countries  selected  to  participate  in  the  “Humanitarian-Development  Nexus” 
agreed by the Council in early 2017.69   

JC. 6.2 ECHO and their partners could fill key gaps using their comparative 
advantage 

ECHO  has  not  been  a  predictable  donor  for  meeting  immediate  needs  following 
quick-onset disasters.  Partners have needed to rely on other sources of funding for their 
responses.  With the exception of the Nepal earthquake, partners have waited approximately 
two  months  before  signing  contracts  to  respond  to  major  disasters  during the  evaluation 
period  (see  Figure  8  for  a  timeline).    ECHO’s  2017  regional  HIP  states  that  national 
governments' initial response is usually rapid and “The main value added of external assistance to 
victims of natural disasters in the region is to address gaps in the coverage of relief operations and to overcome 
the barriers limiting access to social schemes.” 70  While this may apply for many countries in south 
and  south-east  Asia,  including  much  of  India,  findings  from  this  evaluation  indicate  that 
response capacities in Nepal and in some conflict-affected areas on India struggle to meet 
humanitarian needs, particularly for marginalised groups. 

ECHO funding for response and recovery operations has also been relatively modest. Figure 
7 below shows funding commitments 10 days after the earthquake struck on April 25, 2015.  
Of the EUR 3.3 m shown, a total of EUR 1.3 m was divided amongst ECHO partners for 
the response71  at a time when the UN was estimating requirements for immediate relief and 
recovery needs at some $422 million.72 

68   This approach contrasts with the approach of USAID/OFDA following designation of Nepal as one of eight countries 
to be included in their “Global Resilience Partnership” initiative.  The initiative aims to advance thinking and practice 
on risk and resilience measurement through consolidated learning and communication.   Following some two years of 
planning, training, developing a baseline and procurement, USAID/OFDA was in the process of launching a five-year 
resilience pilot project at the time of the field visit.    

69   European Council (2017) Council Conclusions on Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus. 19 May 

2017. 

70   ECHO (2017) HIP South and East Asia and the Pacific v.3 (page 5)  

71   Source: HOPE database 

72   OCHA (2015) Nepal Flash Appeal Revision: Nepal Earthquake April - September 2015 

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Figure 7 – Nepal Earthquake: Commitments by Top 10 Donors (US$)  

Source: OCHA (data as of May 25, 2015) 

More than a decade of investment in DRR and resilience have positioned ECHO as 
a thematic expert in Nepal.  Nepal remains a highly vulnerable and hazard-prone country.  
ECHO’s links at different levels should position them well to support large-scale disaster 
responses.     When  asked about ECHO’s value added, several partners said that being  an 
ECHO partner was key to understanding DRR in Nepal.  ECHO’s “hands on” approach 
that emphasizes regular monitoring by technical experts has a unique niche amongst donors 
that  goes  beyond  just  funding.    ECHO’s  status  as  DRR  “expert”  in  Nepal  has  led  to 
expectations, both by partners and local governments, that ECHO could make an important 
contribution in supporting the transition process to a new governance system.  During the 
visits to project sites, the team heard of several newly-elected leaders that had requested DRR 
training of the type provided by ECHO partners. 

ECHO’s successes in improving the understanding of DRR and resilience in Nepal 
has highlighted gaps in LRRD.   A key output of ECHO’s DRR capacity building has 
been community hazard maps.  ECHO’s mandate and scale of financial resources has meant 
that it can support training and small investments, but communities have become aware that 
some of their school buildings were unsafe without necessarily being able to access funds to 
retrofit buildings.   

India’s status as an emerging humanitarian donor means that knowledge exchange 
has been increasingly becoming more important rather than external funding.  GoI 
currently  maintains a national response  force of some  trained  12,000  individuals who are 
available to respond to natural disasters.  This means that the bar for international donors 
and agencies to add value has been rising higher and higher.   

For  ECHO  partners,  however,  relevance  was  connected  to  whether  ECHO  has 
funding for projects, especially since ECHO has been one of the few donors supporting 
and visiting conflict areas.  Although agencies such as Save the Children, ICRC, MSF have 
an  emergency  mandate,  they  were  constrained  in  applying  their  emergency  mandate  in 

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Kashmir. ECHO has not been subject thus far to the same pressures by GoI.  Apart from 
their work in conflict-affected areas, the other areas where ECHO-supported interventions 
had added value were their approaches to inclusive assessment and targeting. 

ECHO’s assistance model in the Indian operating context resulted in limited value-
added.  As described in Case Study 3 in the annex, it has become increasingly difficult for 
civil society to work independently in India and virtually all of ECHO’s “international” NGO 
partners are now registered as national NGOs in India.  The types of interventions supported 
by an impartial humanitarian like ECHO in conflict-affect areas (Kashmir and Assam) do fill 
humanitarian gaps, but continuation of project funding proved difficult to justify since the 
potential to influence and take activities to scale were limited in the absence of government 
ownership  and,  in  north-eastern  India,  relatively  high  cost  of  service  delivery.    During 
interviews with ECHO and partner staff, there was a consensus that ECHO also added value 
through its expertise in vulnerability assessment and monitoring. 

There was a consensus that to add value ECHO will need to find a new operating 
model in India that is  based on an equal partnership.  An  example  of an alternative 
model was the USAID-OFDA project implemented by UNDP to strengthen resilience in 
selected urban areas in high risk areas (see Case Study 1 in the annex).  This intervention was 
reported to be in line with GoI’s current priority on strengthening decentralised response 
capacities.  

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EQ 7: Achievement of objectives  

EQ 7 

To what extent has ECHO achieved its objectives in contributing to satisfying the 
humanitarian needs and building resilience? 

This Evaluation Question assesses whether ECHO had a coherent strategy in each country to meet 
humanitarian needs and build resilience, what results were achieved and to what extent were these results 
influenced by the strategy or by other factors.  

EQ 7 – Answer Box 

  ECHO Strategies in both countries include maintaining an adequate level of preparedness 
to  be  able  to  respond  to  disasters  that  exceed  the capacity  of  national  actors  to  address 
unmet  humanitarian  needs.    While  DRR  interventions  supported  by  ECHO  have 
contributed  to  increased  resilience  of  affected  communities,  delays  in  ECHO  funding 
decisions  following  quick-onset  emergencies  have  reduced  the  effectiveness  of  ECHO’s 
interventions.   

  The  strategic  objectives  as  formulated  in  each  country  were  consistent  with  ECHO’s 
mandate,  although  the  contribution  of  ECHO  actions  in  India  was  limited  by  various 
constraints. In India, ECHO’s strategy mainly focused on improving inclusion and quality 
in  service  delivery  for  conflict-affected  communities  in  northern  India  and  Jammu  and 
Kashmir. ECHO’s strategy in Nepal had a specific focus on building resilience in hazard-
prone areas. 

  A sample of 15 ECHO-funded projects reviewed found a 90% success rate in achieving, or 
even exceeding, planned outputs in terms of beneficiaries reached and sectoral assistance 
delivered. Results for outcomes were mixed, with many more positive examples from Nepal 
regarding use and replication of assistance where initial monitoring of the response to the 
2017 flood response indicated less loss of life and significantly increased resilience compared 
to a similar disaster during 2014. 

  Lack  of  preparedness  limited  the adoption  of cash  modalities and  represented  a  missed 
opportunity for ECHO and its partners to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
response.   

JC. 7.1 ECHO has a coherent strategy and guidance to satisfy humanitarian needs 
and build resilience in each country 

Strategies in both countries include maintaining an adequate level of preparedness 
to  be  able  to  respond  to  disasters  that  exceed  the  capacity  of  national  actors  to 
address unmet humanitarian needs. In addition to in-country capacities, ECHO can also 

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draw upon a number of tools and systems at a regional and global level to effectively support 
a response to a major disaster.73 

After 2013 Phailin response and recovery operations had been completed, ECHO’s 
strategy in India focused on improving inclusion and quality in service delivery for 
conflict-affected communities in northern India and Jammu and Kashmir.74  Five out 
of the six projects from the sample drawn from the India portfolio were located in conflict-
affected areas.   

The  strategic  objectives  as  formulated  were  consistent  with  ECHO’s  mandate 
although the contribution of ECHO actions in India was limited in terms of satisfying 
humanitarian needs and building resilience for three major reasons.   

  Unlike  in  Nepal,  ECHO  in  India  lacked  government  ownership  of  their  strategy  and 
there was no vehicle similar to the NRRC network which could have helped in scaling 
up ECHO interventions to strengthen resilience.  Many of the ECHO-supported project 
objectives were focused on provision of assistance to individuals or households and, as 
described  under  EQ3  (exit  strategies)  and  EQ10  (sustainability)  and  there  was  little 
evidence  of  moving  to  scale  resilience  outcomes  at  a  community  level,  let  alone  at  a 
regional or national level;  

  ECHO’s limited  financial resources,  which totaled  Euro 21  million during  2013-2016 
along  with  progressive  budget  reductions  limited  ECHO’s  influence,  especially  in  a 
country where humanitarian needs are so vast.  

  ECHO’s leverage in terms of policy influence on the Government of India has been very 
limited in an operating environment severely constrained by the government restrictions 
and where space for civil society and partnership with international humanitarian donors 
has progressively decreased. 

ECHO’s strategy in Nepal during the evaluation period has had a specific focus on 
building resilience in hazard-prone areas.  ECHO has accordingly prioritised resources 
for capacity building while at the same time promoted DRR mainstreaming during response 
and recovery operations following disasters. ECHO’s strategy also supported food assistance 
for Bhutanese refugees until phasing out in 2016 when the majority of refugees had been 
resettled.   Based on feedback from partners and other stakeholders, this strategy has proved 
to be effective since it has positioned ECHO as a DRR “expert” resource. 

JC. 7.2 ECHO and their partners have translated these strategies and guidance into 
concrete outputs and outcomes 

The sample of ECHO-funded projects reviewed found that 87% projects (13 out of 
15) examined in detail succeeded in achieving, or exceeding, their planned outputs 
in terms of beneficiaries reached and sectoral assistance delivered.  The two projects 
with unsatisfactory performances were an earthquake recovery project in Nepal led by IOM 
and a recovery project following a cyclone in India led by Action Aid.  Both of these projects 

73   https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/emergency-response-coordination-centre-ercc_en  

74   ECHO (2015) HIP South Asia v.9 (page 12) 

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faced challenges with relatively large consortia compounded by management gaps. The two 
projects  with  unsatisfactory  performances  faced  challenges  with  managing  relatively  large 
consortia along with other management issues. 

While  outputs  were  satisfactory,  outcomes  had  mixed  results.    The  main  factors 
influencing outcomes have been described elsewhere in this report,  including the degree of 
government ownership,  effectiveness of  piloting  strategies for replication and scale-up of 
activities  and  the  extent  to  which  partners  have  been  constrained  by  the  relatively  short 
project  length  in  achieving  longer  term  outcomes.75  Another  relevant  issue  encountered 
during  the  evaluation  was  the  availability  of  outcome  data  since  there  were  considerable 
variations between partners on the extent that they monitor project outcomes.   

In Nepal, DRR and resilience have been a major area of focus of ECHO with a third 
of  ECHO  funds  being  allocated  to  this  sector  during  the  period  2013-2017.  The  overall 
envelope however remains limited with a total of Euros 9.5 million.  

Four out of the  nine projects reviewed  from the Nepal sample focused  on strengthening 
DRR and preparedness capacities at local level through community-based approaches. Based 
on  reviews  of  ECHO  monitoring  reports  and  interviews,  they  all  showed  a  good  overall 
performance.  All  the  FDGs  conducted  by  the  evaluation  team  with  communities  and 
interviews with aid workers in western Nepal immediately after the August 2017 floods gave 
positive feedback about support received.  In comparison with the 2014 floods, they noted 
that everything was better organised and being prepared had made the response much less 
stressful.    While  the  sample  was  small,  these  findings  were  supported  by  subsequent 
monitoring  by  partners  which  found  that  the  overall  capacity  of  the  GoN  to  respond  to 
disasters such as floods had improved since the last flooding episode in 2014.  

In  India,  partners  have  mostly  been  successful  in  achieving  planned  output 
objectives  based  on  a  review  of  sample  projects,  interviews  and  a  site  visit  to  Kashmir.  
Despite  the  instable  of  the  security  environment  in  Kashmir,  Assam  and  Chhattisgarh, 
partners successfully delivered food assistance, health services and protection in contexts of 
forgotten crises such as the conflicts in Jammu and Kashmir, districts of central India, and 
in the north-eastern states.  Performance was unsatisfactory in the sixth project in the sample 
that supported response and recovery operations following cyclone Phailin.76 

Lack of ownership by GoI and progressively shrinking space for humanitarian actors in India 
during 2013-2017, including for ECHO partners, has limited most outcomes to responding 
to immediate needs of individuals and households.   

ECHO’s contribution to satisfying the humanitarian needs and building resilience 
has  been  constrained  by  relatively  modest  investments  in  both  countries.  
Approximately  EUR  20  million  and  EUR  30  million  were  allocated  to  India  and  Nepal 

75   The finding on project length was similar to findings from the 2010 evaluation: “Sectoral approaches were generally appropriate, 
effective and efficient in WASH, health and DRR, but the move towards more development activities creates increasing challenges for partners 
working with ECHO funding timescales”. Source: Aguaconsult Ltd. (2010) Evaluation of the ECHO’s Action in Nepal. 

76   eSF 2013/91017 

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respectively during 2013-2017.    The figure for Nepal includes the amount allocated to major 
response and recovery operations following the 2015 earthquake.   

Lack  of  preparedness  limited  the  adoption  of  cash  modalities  and  represents  a 
missed  opportunity  for  ECHO  and  partners  to  increase  the  effectiveness  and 
efficiency  of  the  response.    Interviews  with  different  stakeholder  groups  indicate  that, 
although understanding was improving, many agencies were still not all sufficiently prepared 
to  design  and  implement  humanitarian  cash  responses  of  sufficient  quality.77    This  was  a 
particular issue amongst national partners of ECHO partners who often did not understand 
the range of modality option or how to carry out a market analysis.  Despite efforts in India 
to improve financial inclusion along with technological innovations, partners still preferred 
to deliver cash in hand.  In Nepal, neither the GoN or most agencies were prepared to use 
humanitarian cash responses.  Lack of capacity and policy coherence for CTP in emergencies 
translated  into  opposition  in  some  parts  of  GoN,  which  discouraged  partners  from 
attempting  CTP.    Limited  financial  infrastructure  in  parts  of  the  country  was  also  a 
challenge.78    The situation is improving in, and CTP has been used more widely during the 
2017 Nepal flood response.  

Delays  in  funding  decisions  following  quick-onset  emergencies  have  reduced  the 
effectiveness  of  ECHO’s  interventions.    Evidence  from  project  documents79  and 
interviews  with  partners  and  ECHO  that  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  ECHO’s 
emergency responses were hampered by consistent delays in ECHO funding decisions and 
partner  contracting  for  responses  to  quick-onset  disasters  (Figure  8).  These  delays  meant 
that,  apart  from  the  relatively  small  amounts  to each  country contributed  to  the  Disaster 
Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) in response to an Appeal by the International Federation 
of the Red Cross (IFRC), there were consequently delays to the contracting and disbursement 
of funds to partners in country.   While the DREF may be an efficient way of channelling 
funds to a trusted partner to support a response, this tool does not make full use of ECHO’s 
value added as described under EQ6 above.   

77   Interviews: USAID, ECHO 

78   Willitts  King  and  Bryant  (2016)  Scaling  up  humanitarian  cash  transfers  in  Nepal.  ODI  working  paper;  Ferrie  and 

Gautam (2017); Bailey and Harvey (2017)  

79   For example, eSF 2013/91017 

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Figure 8 – Timeline for Responses to Quick-Onset Disasters (2013-2017) 

Funding  decisions  have  been  back-dated  to  the  disaster  event,  so  that  partners  can  be 
reimbursed for emergency operations.  Some partners interviewed said that they have limits 
on funds they can advance, particularly if funding is not guaranteed, and the contract signing 
date  is  more  relevant  to  when  they  can  start  operations  than  when  the  HIP  has  been 
approved.   

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EQ 8: Advocacy and communication  

EQ 8 

How successful has ECHO been through its advocacy and communication 
measures  in  influencing  other  actors  by  direct  and  indirect  advocacy  on 
issues like humanitarian access and space, respect for IHL, addressing gaps 
in  response,  applying  good  practice,  and  carry  out  follow-up  actions  of 
ECHO’s interventions? Is there an ‘advocacy gap’? 

This Evaluation Question looks at the extent advocacy and communication strategies supported the strategic 
objectives in the HIPs and how they contributed to achieve positive outcomes. 

EQ 8 – Answer Box 

  ECHO advocacy and communications strategies were appropriate and consistent with HIP 
objectives  in  each  country.      In  Nepal,  there  has  been  a  primary  focus  throughout  the 
evaluation period on advocacy towards the formulation of a "National Strategy for Disaster 
Management in Nepal".   In India, advocacy efforts for inclusion and quality improvements 
in service delivery in India were viewed as a key component of ECHO's interventions. 

  ECHO  did  not  have  a  formal  advocacy  and  communication  strategies,  although  some 
partners had developed their own that included ECHO projects.  Partners viewed ECHO’s 
role more as one of providing useful technical support rather than conducting advocacy. 

 

In  India,  ECHO’s  scope  for  advocacy  has  been  extremely  limited  due  a  constrained 
operating environment.   

  ECHO’s influence in Nepal, notably in thematic areas related to DRR, was more significant 
than would be expected from the level of investment compared to other major humanitarian 
donors in the country.   This influence can be attributed to several factors, including ECHO 
Nepal’s  membership  on  the  Humanitarian  Coordination  Team  “Plus.    The  Nepal  Risk 
Reduction Consortium (NRRC) offered a useful forum for ECHO and their partners to 
share lessons and influence through joint advocacy. 

JC. 8.1 Advocacy and communication strategies of ECHO and their partners were 
appropriate and consistent with strategic and HIP operational objectives 

ECHO  advocacy  and  communications  strategies  were  appropriate  and  consistent 
with HIP objectives in each country.  There has been a primary focus throughout the 
evaluation period on advocacy towards the formulation of a "National Strategy for Disaster 
Management in Nepal".80  In India, advocacy efforts for inclusion and quality improvements 
in service delivery in India were viewed as a key element of ECHO's interventions.81   There 
was little evidence of direct advocacy by ECHO in either country, but rather working with 
partners and participating in networks to help achieve outcome objectives.    

80   ECHO (2017) ECHO Factsheet: Nepal 

81   ECHO (2015) HIP South Asia v.9 (page 12) 

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ECHO  did  not  have  a  formal  advocacy  and  communication  strategies,  although 
some partners had developed these to support ECHO projects.  Since ECHO does not 
work  bilaterally  with  either  government,  but  rather  works  through  civil  society,  the 
opportunity for direct advocacy was limited.  As a whole, partners viewed ECHO’s role more 
as one of providing useful technical support rather than conducting advocacy.   

JC. 8.2 Strategies were executed in such a way to support strategic priorities and 
yield positive outcomes 

In India, ECHO’s scope for advocacy has been extremely limited due a constrained 
operating environment.  Partners understood this since they also found themselves in a 
position where they had to keep a low profile.  There were occasional requests to provide 
information and talking points for visiting missions of senior EC representatives.   There has 
been limited sharing of information between ECHO’s partners, though they found the the 
annual pre-monsoon preparedness meetings convened by ECHO to be useful.  

In Nepal, there were several examples of indirect advocacy where ECHO Nepal has 
played  an  effective  facilitation,  catalytic  and  networking  role  with  partners,  peer 
donors and UN-led initiatives.  ECHO Nepal’s approach has not only helped partners to 
meet project objectives, but also contributed to learning and influencing longer-term DRR 
outcomes at a community, district and national level.  Some partners expressed a wish that 
ECHO take a more proactive advocacy position with the government to facilitate project 
implementation in the face of an increasingly restrictive regulatory operating environment.  

Evidence  from  document  review,  interviews  and  field  observations  indicates  that  ECHO 
Nepal’s  approach  has  not  only  helped  partners  to  meet  project  objectives,  but  also 
contributed to learning and influencing longer term DRR outcomes at a community, district 
and national level. At the same time, many partners would like to see ECHO take a more 
proactive advocacy position with the government to facilitate project implementation in the 
face of an increasingly restrictive regulatory operating environment and widespread belief 
within  GoN  that  international  agencies  were  absorbing  excessive  amounts  of  funding 
destined for communities.  

ECHO’s influence, notably in DRR thematic areas, was more significant than would 
be expected from the level of investment during the evaluation period compared to 
other major humanitarian donors who have a permanent presence in Nepal. This influence 
can  be  attributed  to  several  factors,  including  ECHO  Nepal’s  membership  on  the 
Humanitarian Coordination Team “Plus.  The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC) 
offered a useful forum for ECHO and their partners to share lessons and influence through 
joint advocacy.   

The recently-approved Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act in the Nepal was one 
example, with many key informants acknowledging ECHO’s significant contribution.  This 

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is  illustrated  by  a  statement  released  by  Save  the  Children  after  the  long-awaited  Bill  on 
disaster risk reduction and management had been approved and registered by Parliament.82 

“Recent discourses on disasters of the past and the recent 2015 Gorkha Earthquake of Nepal have all 
brought about a shift in attitude on part of the planners, government officials, donor agencies and civil 
society. The calls were unanimous from all quarters for the need of a coordinated disaster preparedness 
and response mechanism. As a humanitarian donor, the European Commission-Humanitarian Aid 
and Civil Protection (ECHO) has always been pushing for evidence-based advocacy with special interest 
in Disaster Management among ECHO Consortia partners... 

…The  credit  for  the  replacement  of  the  1982  Relief  Act  with  Disaster  Risk  Reduction  and 
Management (DRRM) Act rests with all stakeholders. But the final push in the marathon was vested 
in the 34 television episodes revolving around the themes of post-disaster reconstruction and government 
accountability for Disaster Management.  The support from ECHO in the Inclusive Community Based 
Disaster Preparedness Project with a media engagement angle is something the public is aware of.”83 

82   Kathmandu Post (2017) Bill on disaster risk reduction and management registered. September 11, 2017. The bill 

named as the 'Act to Revise and Integrate Acts Related to the Disaster Risk Mitigation and Management-2074 BS' 
focuses on protecting public life, public and private property, natural and cultural heritages, physical properties and 
minimising the disaster risk.  The bill also proposes setting up a Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, 
which will have ministers for finance; supplies; agriculture; home affairs; physical infrastructure and transport; 
women, children and social welfare; defence; forest and soil conservation; education; urban development; irrigation; 
information and communications; and federal affairs and local development as the members. 
http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2017-09-11/bill-on-disaster-risk-reduction-and-management-
registered.html    

83   Save the Children (2017) Much Awaited Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act is Endorsed. 18 October 2017 

https://nepal.savethechildren.net/news/much-awaited-disaster-risk-reduction-and-management-act-endorsed  

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EQ 9: Efficiency (Transfer Modalities) 

EQ 9 

To what extent were the ECHO humanitarian actions efficient? 

During  the  inception  phase,  it  was  agreed  that  it  would  be  useful  to  focus  this  Evaluation  Question  on 
modalities, that is the extent that ECHO and its partners considered different transfer modalities during 
project design and implementation and the appropriateness and efficiency of the selected modality. 

EQ 9 – Answer Box 

  There has been a positive evolution in both countries since 2013 in more systematic 
consideration and adoption of cash-based modalities by ECHO’s partners. However, 
this has not been the same for all sectors and needs identified and this has not been 
based on a consistent and rigorous analysis.   

  ECHO has been a ‘quiet facilitator’ of this evolution, funding CTP interventions that 
were proposed by partners for response and recovery without issue, and in some cases 
suggesting  addition  of  or  substitution  to  cash  modalities  for  more  effective 
programming.   

 

In both countries, and particularly in Nepal, given its vulnerability to recurrent natural 
disasters, increased investment in cash preparedness activities (both technical assistance 
and support to policy/institutions) as part of broader DRR work could have reduced 
some of the barriers to selection and implementation of the most efficient and effective 
modalities for response and recovery. 

  Several features of ECHO-funded programmes have contributed to the efficient use 

of resources. This includes 

o  The  increasing  use  of  cash-based  modalities,  working  through  consortia,  strong 
coordination, knowledge management and links with government initiatives. 

o  Decisions  on  operational  models,  and  on  modality  choices,  have  not  just  been 

based on cost efficiency alone but also cost effectiveness considerations. 

o  ECHO and its partners made efforts to keep abreast of interventions of donor and 

government and this has helped to improve efficiency. 

  Channelling  funds through multiple  layers  of partner agencies  may not be  the  most 

efficient model but it has contributed to cost effectiveness. 

JC. 9.1 Implementation of ECHO strategies in each country systematically and 
periodically considered different transfer modalities 

Projects  funded  by  ECHO  increasingly  considered  and  adopted  cash  modalities 
during the evaluation period.  In line with ECHO’s global positioning on CTP, ECHO 
began to more proactively promote the use of cash with partners from 2013 onwards. 

In Nepal prior to the 2015 earthquake there was limited use of cash transfer programming 
CTP by ECHO partners, who had much more focus on in-kind assistance. The earthquake 
led to a ‘step change’ in cash assistance, which eventually made up approximately 10% of the 

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overall  earthquake  response  by  the  international  community.    The  response  in  Nepal 
represented  consideration  of  cash  from  the  outset  of  the  response  by  donors,  including 
ECHO, and international aid agencies, supported by their respective surge capacities.84 

In India, the “step change” in ECHO’s CTP occurred earlier, during the response to cyclone 
Phalin that struck India at the end of 2013.  Prior to the cyclone, ECHO partners prioritised 
in-kind  assistance.    Evidence  from  the  analysis  of  ECHO  single  forms  and  interviews 
indicates that promoting other modalities besides in-kind assistance came from the partners 
themselves prior to the cyclone.85  More systematic use of CTP by partners occurred from 
the Phailin response onwards, where ECHO actively promoted use of cash transfers.86 

ECHO’s  country  strategy  supports  the  use  of  cash-based  modalities  to  their  full 
potential during responses to and recovery from natural disasters.  It specifies that for 
natural disasters, cash based, and multi-sectoral assistance should be provided, in accordance to 
the needs identified, and to strengthen the communities’ resilience to future disasters.87  

The consideration of CTP – by partners and by ECHO - was restricted to particular 
sectors.  During the evaluation period, cash has been used predominantly for interventions 
in the food security and livelihood recovery sectors, whilst most shelter and all wash needs 
have continued to be provided in-kind. Analysis of project documents shows that partners 
generally do not provide justification for why an in-kind modality has been chosen for food, 
shelter materials, NFIs or hygiene. It seems likely that for the shelter and wash sectors there 
was no such consideration of alternative modalities; rather, in-kind was the traditional ‘way 
of working’ in these sectors. Analysis also shows that ECHO did not extensively and actively 
promote  alternative  and  perhaps  more  appropriate  modalities  with  these  partners.  All 
proposed projects were approved for funding, without queries.   

ECHO’s support for CTP in insecure environments was appropriate, and risks were 
considered  and  mitigated.    The  insecurity  and  political  sensitivities  in  Kashmir  raised 
specific challenges for CTP that partners needed to take on board. In the case of ActionAid, 
markets  were  still  emerging  in  some  areas  and  additional  measures  were  needed  by  local 
partners  to  make  the  cash  transfer  effective  –  including  providing  purchase  support  for 
traders, price negotiation, as well as finance literacy of the cash receiver. In the case of Save 
the Children’s project there were concerns, due to the political and security environment, 
that  cash  would  not  be  a  safe  modality.  However  rather  than  revert  to  in-kind  delivery, 
instead cash was retained for specific needs (medical treatment and associated transport) and 
provided conditionally.88  

84    US$24.5  million  delivered  by  more  than  30  international  Non-Governmental  Organisations  (NGOs)  and  United 
Nations (UN) Agencies: Ferrie and Gautam (2017); Bailey and Harvey (2017) Time for change: Harnessing the potential 
of humanitarian cash transfers. ODI report 

85   Interviews: ECHO; Save the Children  

86   For example,  ECHO-funded projects managed by Action Aid, SCUK and Christian Aid considered CTP from the 

outset and reached over 9700 households. 

87   ECHO HIP 

88   eSF 2016/91014 

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Partners  did  not  consistently  monitor  appropriateness  of  their  modality  choices 
during implementation.  There was limited evidence from analysis of project documents 
that  partners  have  monitored  the  appropriateness  of  their  interventions,  and  interviews 
confirmed the lack of consistency between partners. Where this has taken place, there was 
evidence that it has contributed to efficient and effective programming since it has identified 
limitations with the modality  selected and changes could be  made. For example, the case 
where the initially proposed modality of a conditional cash transfer for shelter recovery was 
changed  to  an  unconditional  modality  to  enable  more  flexible  use  of  the  assistance  by 
households,  due  to  a  continued  lack  of  government  support.89    Project  documents 
highlighted instances when ECHO provided feedback to partners so that they could adapt 
the project based on monitoring findings.   

ECHO’s  country  strategy  supports  the  use  of  cash-based  modalities  during 
responses to natural disasters but is not supporting the use of cash to its full potential.  
ECHO’s HIP for Nepal has been developed in consultation with other humanitarian actors, 
and other donors. It was in line with the sectoral priorities and needs identified in the 2015 
earthquake Flash Appeal90. There was no evidence of coordination with government actors 
in the development of the strategy. This would have been useful regarding setting of transfer 
modalities in the context of Nepal, where the government was a key player in provision of 
cash assistance, distributing approximately $70 million after the earthquake, but where there 
were  also  challenges  to  getting  government  agreement  on  such  modalities  in  the  early 
response phase (see below)91. 

As described under EQ1, ECHO’s HIPs don’t specify modalities for the majority of sectoral 
priorities.    Whilst  use  of  cash/vouchers  were  not  excluded  they  were  not  explicitly 
highlighted as options for assistance in any sector, except in the case of livelihood recovery.  
Interviews  with  ECHO  staff  indicated  that  a  preference  had  been  expressed  for  cash 
transfers as the preferred mechanism for relief assistance given the challenging logistics of 
delivering in-kind aid to remote mountainous areas and functioning markets in the majority 
of affected areas.  There was no mention in the HIP of multi-sectoral approaches, or multi-
purpose cash grants, which was inconsistent with the guidance both in the Flash Appeal for 
the Nepal earthquake92 and ECHO’s global position on this issue since late 2014.93 

ECHO did support the efficient and effective use of modalities to some degree, but 
not  consistently  across  sectors  and  with  missed  opportunities  for  harmonising 
assistance.  Analysis of project documents shows that most of the response and recovery 
projects funded by ECHO from 2015 onwards were multi-sectoral and combine cash and 
in-kind modalities. 

However, response modalities have generally remained sector-specific. Cash was proposed 
by partners for particular needs (for example cash for food, basic needs, shelter labour costs 

89   eSF 2014/92015 

90   OCHA (2015) Flash Appeal Nepal 

91   This includes both emergency cash assistance and standard social assistance programming - Ferrie and Gautam (2017) 
Cash Preparedness in Nepal: lessons from the 2015 earthquake. A report for the Cash Coordination Group Nepal 

92   OCHA (2015) Flash Appeal Nepal 

93   ECHO (2015) Ten Principles for MPGs 

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or winter NFIs).  This was even the case where different cash modalities have been used in 
the same project, to meet different sectoral needs within the same population. There was no 
justification from partners on the need for these multiple transfers and no querying of this 
approach from ECHO.  It reflects a silo approach to project analysis and design within both 
partners and ECHO and a lack of consideration for more holistic and potentially efficient 
and effective responses through the use of MPGs, despite these being promoted in the Flash 
Appeal 2015. Unconditional and unrestricted cash modalities have been mostly used for food 
and basic needs.  Partners have generally not justified their rationale for the use of restrictions 
(i.e. vouchers) or conditions over unrestricted and unconditional cash modalities. Evidence 
from  partner  interviews  and  project  documents  suggests  these  decisions  to  impose 
restrictions or conditions were made by the partner rather than ECHO – although literature 
highlights some specific instances where ECHO promoted more restricted modalities for 
shelter and NFIs.94  In general, ECHO has not queried these decisions or promoted the use 
of more flexible modalities by partners as per their guidelines.   

In-kind modalities have been proposed  primarily  for shelter materials and hygiene  needs, 
with food security assistance being a mix of cash and in-kind.  Partners have used different 
reasons to justify the choice of modality.  A limited number of projects cite poor access to 
markets and delivery channels. During interviews, it was clear that the lack of a government 
policy on use of CTP during the earthquake response was a significant influencing factor.  
None of the WASH projects provided a justification for distribution of hygiene kits instead 
of using CTP.  The impression was that there was no consideration of alternative modalities, 
a finding that was consistent with the overall earthquake response.95 

Whilst ECHO ultimately approved these in-kind assistance projects for funding, in several 
projects ECHO made recommendations for considering switching to cash or adding in cash 
as  a  complementary  modality.  However,  in-kind  provision  of  hygiene  kits  and  shelter 
materials do not appear to have ever been queried.   

ECHO and their partners actively monitored and adapted choice of modality where 
appropriate, for efficient and effective programming 

There  was  consistent  evidence  from  analysis  of  project  documents  and  interviews  that 
partners monitored the appropriateness of the intervention, and of the benefits of this in 
terms of contributing to their efficiency and effectiveness. ECHO’s hands on approach to 
monitoring  added  value  here.  Project  documents  highlight  numerous  instances  where 
ECHO have fed back to partners on the need to adapt the project according to monitoring 
findings, which was appreciated by partners96.   

Where appropriateness of modality choice has been monitored, there were several challenges 
identified  with  the  projects  that  were  using  in-kind  modalities.    For  example,  challenges 
identified include: lack of financial support for household labour costs on in-kind shelter and 
wash  reconstruction  projects;  lack  of  financial  support  for  household  labour  costs  on 

94   Willitts King and Bryant (2016) 

95   ibid 

96   Interviews: implementing partners 

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rehabilitation of communal wash infrastructure; lack of consideration of financial support 
for households to meet their winter needs during the needs assessment; delays in supply of 
goods or restrictions from government meaning the proposed activity was not viable; and 
beneficiaries stating a preference for cash compared to in-kind assistance. In contrast, where 
it was used monitoring shows that cash has generally been well received by beneficiaries. 

Channelling funds through multiple layers may not be the most efficient model but 
it  has  added  value  that  contributed  to  cost  effectiveness.    ECHO’s  present  funding 
model was to work through European NGOs, who then pass through funds to their national 
counterparts,  who  then  subcontract  local  partner  organisations.97    In  addition  to  agency 
overhead costs, ECHO field offices also absorb 3% of humanitarian budgets.   

It was not just donors who have increasingly been concerned about cost efficiency.  Cost 
efficiency was highlighted by government key informants as a problem during interviews due 
to the widespread perception amongst government officials that a disproportionate amount 
of  donor  funds  intended  for  affected  communities  was  being  absorbed  by  implementing 
agencies.  Some partner key informants noted that government officials were more positive 
at a local level since they could observe project outcomes themselves and felt that ECHO 
could play a useful role by helping to highlight the value-added of partner interventions in 
supporting the government’s own efforts at a national level. 

Evidence from analysis of project documents and interviews suggests that each level does 
add value through, for example:   

  ECHO is required to channel funds via Europe-based NGOs, who justifies  the costs 
they absorb through technical support, quality assurance and increased efficiency.    

  Local  partners  on  the  ground  with  an  in-depth  knowledge  of  the  context  and  close 
community  links  have  reduced  the  cost  and  time  required  to  reach  out  to  vulnerable 
households and groups.  Protection benefits have been found to be particularly relevant 
in  the  conflict  zones,  where  local  partner  organisations  that  were  embedded  in 
communities and had open lines of communication with different groups to help ensure 
access.   

There has been a growing recognition in the humanitarian community of the importance of 
working  with  national  actors.98    At  the  same  time,  national  actors  often  struggle  with 
administrative  procedures  and  quality  assurance  required  by  humanitarian  donors  like 
ECHO.    Building  projects  using  established  national  and  local  partnerships  was  also 
important to get authority  buy-in.99  Jammu and Kashmir provided  examples of role that 
international  humanitarian  agencies  can  play  in  managing  risks  that  local  NGOs  face  in 
conflict-affected environment to help ensure that assistance reaches the most vulnerable.100  

97   Poole (2013); CaLP (forthcoming) State of the World’s Cash Report. 

98   There is growing interest from donors in ‘rationalising’ the number of partner relationships in the interests of efficiency 
–  see  Poole  (2013)  ‘Funding  at  the  Sharp  End:  Investing  in  National  NGO  Response  Capacity’,  CAFOD;  and 
demonstrated by the commitments made to the localization agenda in the Grand Bargain and World Humanitarian 
Summit 

99   Interview: Action Aid; eSF: 2014/92015 

100   Interview: ActionAid 

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JC. 9.2.  The choice of transfer modalities was appropriate to the phase and 
operational context 

ECHO has regularly queried partners about the rationale for CTP in line with their 
guidelines  by,  for  example,  requesting  evidence  that  markets  were  functioning  and 
accessible, providing technical advice and questioning high transaction costs of aid delivery 
(both cash and in-kind). 

There  have  been  variable  levels  of  analysis  concerning  the  feasibility  and 
appropriateness of cash or vouchers.  Where CTP has been proposed, analysis of project 
documents  shows  that  partner’s  justification  for  this  decision  has  of  variable  quality.  In 
Nepal,  the  use  of  market  analysis  has  been  ad  hoc  and  there  was  limited  evidence  that 
beneficiary preferences have been taken into account. In India, there has been variable levels 
of justification given by partners for their choice of modality.  Some partners, such as Oxfam, 
systematically undertook market analysis but they were the exception.  It does not appear 
that  factors  such  as  beneficiary  preference,  costs  or  government  preferences  were 
systematically considered by partners.  In India, security was an additional consideration for 
modality choice, especially in the Kashmir region.  

ECHO  had  supported  the  recommendations  in  the  2013  and  2014  UNHCR/WFP  Joint 
Assessment  Missions101  that  WFP  shift  from  in-kind  food  distributions  to  cash-based 
assistance for Bhutanese refugees in Nepal.  WFP did not agree, arguing that it would be 
more  expensive  since  they  could  no  longer  purchase  food  in  bulk102  and  that  the  risk  of 
further aggravating tensions between local and refugee communities and introduction of cash 
may introduce needless complications. UNHCR subsequently implemented a CTP for non-
food items without significant problems while WFP continued with in-kind distribution.103  

ECHO’s approach been well aligned with other stakeholders. There is some evidence 
from analysis of project documents and interviews that ECHO and its partners made efforts 
to  keep abreast  of  interventions  of  government  and  other  donors  and  this  has  helped  to 
improve efficiency.   At the same time, there are cases where ECHO appears not to have 
taken into account the wider context in funding decisions. Save the Children implemented 
different CTP projects for shelter and winterisation in Nepal.  The project funded by DFID 
provided  unrestricted  cash  transfers but restricted to specific  items in  the ECHO-funded 
project.104   

101   UNHCR and WFP Joint Assessment Mission reports for 2013 and 2014 

102   An analysis using WFP’s Omega value tool concluded that the in-kind food assistance would be 45% less expensive 

compared to a cash and voucher transfer modality. Source: eSF 2014/01077 

103   WFP  also  carried  out  a  beneficiary  survey  in  2013  where  results  indicated  a  preference  for  continuation  of  in-kind 
assistance.  UNHCR introduced cash transfers for non-food items the following year and, when WFP repeated the 
survey the following year they found that preference had switched to cash after refugees had first-hand experience. 

104   Willitts King and Bryant (2016) 

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EQ 10: Sustainability  

EQ 10 

What  was  the  Sustainability  of the  ECHO  actions,  i.e.  how  did  they  manage  to 
achieve lasting effects, including in strengthening national and local governments’ 
long-term development policies and practices and preparedness for future crises? 

This Evaluation Question examines how stakeholder participation and ownership were developed and what 
was ECHO contribution.105 

EQ 10 – Answer Box 

  Four main categories of stakeholders have been targeted to achieve sustainability of ECHO-
local  NGOs  and 
supported 
development  donors.  Partners  have  used  a  variety  of  methods  to  promote  ownership, 
including capacity building, co-funding, joint planning and implementation.   

including  governments,  communities, 

interventions, 

  Sustainability for DRR and conflict-related interventions often was linked to a robust exit 
strategy, and many of the same influencing factors apply (e.g. short project time frame and 
uncertain  follow  up  funding,  lack  of  clarity  about  exit  strategies  and  protocols,  lack  of 
government ownership).   

  Gaining  the  necessary  level  of  ownership  from  government  has  been  one  of  the  main 
challenges to achieving sustainability, particularly in India.  Despite the challenges faced in 
India, there have been some examples of activities continuing with GoI support.  Nepal, 
where the operating environment has been more conducive, provides more examples of 
sustainable interventions.  ECHO partners and their local partners have placed emphasis 
community mobilisation to help promote ownership and sustainability.   

  There is a strong demand for ECHO-supported interventions from national stakeholders.  
The Ministry of Health in Nepal decided to replicate and scale up the emergency health 
preparedness activities and ECHO partners have received requests for training from newly-
elected local authorities in western Nepal.  

JC. 10.1 Ownership and stakeholder participation processes have been defined and 
developed 

Four main categories of stakeholders have been targeted to achieve sustainability of 
ECHO-supported interventions, including governments, communities, local NGOs 
and development donors. During the latter part of the period covered by the evaluation, 
ECHO partners in Nepal began to involve the private sector in a more substantial way during 
their  interventions.    Partners  have  used  a  variety  of  methods  to  promote  ownership, 

105   Short term emergency response projects have not been analysed for sustainability. 

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including  capacity  building,  joint  planning  and  implementation.    Partners  also  encourage 
contributions from counterparts, one example being co-funding of river protection micro 
infrastructure projects in western Nepal by VDCs.106   

Sustainability for DRR and conflict-related interventions was often linked to a viable 
exit  strategy,  and  many  of  the  underlying  drivers  applied  including,  predictability  of 
follow up funding to compensate for a relatively short project time frame, viability of exit 
strategies, degree of government ownership.    

In both countries, partners routinely made efforts to promote government ownership 
as part of their project design to both ensure their support during implementation and 
continue  to  fund  activities  after  the  project  had  ended.      Gaining  the  necessary  level  of 
ownership from government has been one of the main challenges to achieving sustainability, 
particularly in India.   In Nepal, other challenges to sustainability include a lack of a clear 
policy framework for post disaster recovery,107 lack of resources, delays in decision-making 
and regular turnover of government officials.   Another common challenge was that, with 
the exception of one successful example in Nepal in the education sector, there has been 
little cooperation between ECHO and DEVCO.  ECHO Nepal has had some success with 
LRRD with other donors such as DFID as part of the longer-term strategy of the individual 
ECHO partner.   

Despite the challenges faced in India, there have been some examples of activities continuing 
with GoI support, including three nutrition centres set up by UNICEF in north-east India 
and  a  Rehabilitation  Centre  in  Chhattisgarh  that  continued  to  operate  after  Handicap 
International phased out in 2014.   While the restricted nature of MSF’s mandate did not 
allow this partner to consider implementing long term resilience measures, project activities 
included  training  several  Community  Health  Workers  which  was  likely  to  have  some 
sustainable impact over the long term. 108 

Nepal,  where  the  operating  environment  has  been  more  conducive  for  international 
humanitarian actors, there are several examples of sustainable interventions.  ECHO partners 
and their  local  partners  have  placed an emphasis on  community mobilisation to  promote 
ownership and sustainability.  The team met members of community disaster management 
committees which had been established and trained during previous ECHO projects which 
continue to function.  

There  is  a  strong  demand  for  ECHO-supported  interventions  from  national 
stakeholders.  For example, as a result of the successful operationalisation of preparedness 
measures health system to respond to the 2015 earthquake, the Ministry of Health in Nepal 
decided  to  allocate  funding  to  replicate  and  scale  up  the  emergency  health  preparedness 
activities109 throughout the country by creating 25 hub hospitals in strategic locations of the 

106   eSF 2015/91004 

107   Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act 2074 has recently been endorsed and approved by Nepal’s parliament. 

108   eSF 2014/01180 

109   eSF 2015/91005 

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country.  The school safety project succeeded in to mobilise the support of other donors, 
including  DEVCO,  to  support  all  three  pillars  of  the  Comprehensive  School  Safety 
Framework.110 

The  new  system  of  governance  currently  being  rolled  out  in  Nepal  offers  both 
opportunities and risks.  There have already been demands from some of the newly-elected 
local authorities for DRM training by ECHO partners as they have to deal with constituents 
who were trying to recover from the recent floods.  On the other hand, with new actors and 
a new power structure there is a risk that the sustainability of some ECHO investments may 
be compromised due to lack of ownership given that DRR activities have been phased out 
in some areas. 

JC. 10.2 ECHO has contributed to the sustainability of interventions 

Achieving sustainable outcomes with short-term projects was a challenge highlighted 
by  many  interviewees  when  responding  to  this  question.    Most  of  successful  examples 
identifies were projects that had renewed for at least two more cycles.  As noted above, a 
lack of alignment between ECHO and DEVCO has obliged ECHO to look at alternative 
funding sources to support LRRD.   

ECHO  India  appeared  to  have  few  options  to  achieve  sustainability  of  its 
interventions  with  its  low  levels  of  investment  and  an  operational  model  that  was 
unable to promote ownership of GoI to the required level.  An abrupt suspension of 
ECHO  programme  funding  from  2017  onwards  posed  a  challenge  to  some  partners  to 
achieving some kind of sustainability.  Interviews indicated that all of ECHO’s partners had 
managed  to  identify  alternative  funding  to  continue  their  programmes,  although  in  many 
cases at a much-reduced scale while suspending virtually all of the humanitarian activities 
(e.g. direct support for victims of conflict).   

In Nepal, ECHO has played an active role as facilitator and catalyst that has helped in 
both bringing key agencies around the table on a regular basis to discuss relevant issues and 
also highlighted outstanding needs by organising joint assessments and monitoring visits with 
partners and other donors.  

110   The LRRD case study in the annex describes in more detail the key factors that contributing to the success. 

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5.  Conclusions 

This chapter presents conclusions emerging from findings and analysis of this evaluation.  
They are structured as follows: 
  An overall statement on ECHO’s interventions in India and Nepal during 2013-2017; 
  Conclusions supporting recommendations based on an analysis of evidence at a 
project and programmatic level relevant to the programme for each country.  
  Given the specific context of India, ECHO’s operating model in India has been 

reactive rather than strategic.  A second category of conclusions are presented 
based on discussions with stakeholders about alternate business case options, 
based on a request from the Steering Committee for this evaluation.  

Overall statement for ECHO’s interventions in India and Nepal during 2013-2017 

ECHO has invested a total of some EUR 50 million in the two countries during 2013-2017, 
of which 60% was allocated to Nepal.  During this period ECHO supported responses to 
Cyclone Phailin India, two severe floods and the 2015 earthquake in Nepal.  The earthquake, 
the approval of a new Constitution in Nepal, the emergence of India as an international 
humanitarian  donor  in  its  own  right  together  with  the  passing  of  legislation  to  regulate 
activities  of  civil  society  organisations  in  both  countries  had  a  significant  influence  on 
ECHO  country  programmes.    In  India,  the  effect  was  to  call  into  question  ECHO’s 
operating  model,  even  while  needs  remained  unmet  and  their  intervention  strategy 
continued to be relevant.  In Nepal, evidence indicates that these changes increased ECHO’s 
relevance as the 2015 earthquake and 2017 flooding illustrated the relevance of the work in 
DRR and resilience by  ECHO and others.    The  impact of the earthquake  in Nepal also 
provided  the  momentum  to  endorse  a  long-awaited  Disaster  Risk  Reduction  and 
Management Act.  

The team’s estimated that, measured in terms of assistance delivered and people reached, 
80-90% of the  project portfolio in both countries  have  achieved  their  output objectives.  
Both  country  programmes  have  been  highly  relevant  to  priority  needs  and  ECHO’s 
mandate. ECHO received high marks from partners and other humanitarian stakeholders 
for its in-depth understanding of the situation on the ground, its facilitation and technical 
oversight role that many partners recognise as contributing to the quality of their projects.   

Due in large part to the external influences described above, project outcomes have been 
very  different  in  each  country.      In  Nepal,  ECHO’s  contributions  during  the  evaluation 
period had a positive transformative effect at both community and at a national level.  In 
contrast, in India ECHO has struggled to address unmet humanitarian needs in conflict-
affected areas in a way that an impartial humanitarian actor can add value. 

As described in the Methodology section, many of the conclusions below were presented 
during debriefing sessions with ECHO field staff and, in Nepal, with ECHO partners at the 
end of each country visit.  Conclusions presented below have taken into account feedback 
during  a  stakeholder  workshop  and  a  meeting  with  the  Steering  Committee  for  this 
evaluation to review an initial draft of the report.

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Conclusion 1: ECHO investments in DRR and resilience in Nepal have yielded 
good returns which have the potential to constructively support the current 
transition in governance and roll out of the national Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Management Act.   

Investments by ECHO and other donors in DRR and resilience over the past decade have 
yielded results in terms of increased awareness, organisation at a community and district level 
and improved capacities at all levels.  The recent restructuring of the government that shifted 
authority to elected leaders at a municipality level is a potential opportunity for ECHO and 
other  humanitarian  actors  to  institutionalise  resilience  into  policies  and  ways  of  working.  
The relatively low level of investment, the change in partners for DRR projects in western 
Nepal and low level of collaboration with DEVCO has reduced ECHO’s ability to support 
this transition and risks to undermine sustainability of prior interventions.  

Based on EQ3, EQ7, EQ10, Case Study 1 

Conclusion 2: ECHO’s operating model in India has been reactive rather than 
strategic. 

Working with civil society partners in conflict-affected areas has been in line with ECHO’s 
core mandate, especially given the low levels of private sector and funds from other donors 
available for these areas.  There is however little alternative to working with GoI since local 
partners lack capacity and resources and the operating space for international civil society is 
being increasingly constrained by the regulatory environment.111  A lack of engagement with 
GoI has led ECHO to take a reactive approach to meeting humanitarian needs by  filling 
gaps rather than being strategic. Although partners have met most of their output objectives 
at a project level, the combination of low investment levels by ECHO and lack of ownership 
by GoI has resulted in limited and mostly unsustainable outcomes.  

GoI has not formally requested international assistance to respond to a disaster since the 
2001 Gujarat earthquake and it is very unlikely GoI that will formally request international 
assistance  in  future,  especially given  its  own  significant  emergency  response  capacity  and 
status as an emerging international humanitarian donor in its own right.  At the same time, 
there is likely to be a “grey area” following a major disaster event when national capacities 
are  effectively  overwhelmed  when  GoI  may  be  open  to  accepting  assistance  of  the  type 
where  ECHO  has  a  comparative  advantage  (i.e.  inclusive  assessment  and  delivery 
approaches, early recovery working with civil society, promotion of humanitarian principles). 

While there may still be a role for international neutral actors in areas such as Jammu and 
Kashmir, there is a need for a new operating model in India to achieve concrete outcomes 
before ECHO can add tangible value.  Findings from this evaluation indicate that a viable 
business case for ECHO in India must be seen as mutually beneficial to both the GoI and 
ECHO, while at the same time playing to ECHO’s strengths in working with civil society 
within its mandate.   

At the request of the Steering Committee for this evaluation, various options were explored.  
One option where there appeared to be strong consensus amongst both GoI and partners 
was that India could benefit from knowledge transfer of private sector engagement in DRR 
and disaster response.  The private sector in India has been active in disaster response but, 
up until recently,112 their approach has tended to focus on short term relief without much 
attention to quality or DRR.  There is currently no overall umbrella or private sector network 

111   See case study on “operating in sensitive and politically complex contexts” in the annex for more details. 

112   See, for example, https://asiafoundation.org/2014/09/17/engaging-asias-private-sector-in-disaster-risk-management/     

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in India that could help to develop standards or coordinate private sector activities during 
disaster response. There  was a consensus that the private sector could play a much more 
substantive role in DRR and improving the quality of disaster response and that India could 
potentially benefit from learning from private sector networks in other countries, an area 
which  ECHO  is  now  beginning  to  explore  through  their  involvement  in  the  Connecting 
Business initiative led by UNDP.113   

Based on EQ5, EQ7, EQ8, EQ10, Case Studies 2 and 3 

Conclusion 3: ECHO funding decisions for responses for quick onset disasters 
have not been timely and allocations were relatively modest. 

There has been a pattern during the scoping period of ECHO funding decisions being taken 
weeks, or even months, after quick onset disasters which lack high media visibility.  Even 
for large disasters, grant amounts have tended to be relatively modest in comparison with 
other major donors, rarely exceeding a total of EUR 1-3 million.   In practice, this has meant 
that partners have had to rely on other sources of funding for their response which was then 
either  reimbursed  when  they  receive  ECHO  funding  or  use  the  funds  for  early  recovery 
activities.  While this modus operandi  has helped to fill gaps, the lack of predictability of 
ECHO  funding  has  compromised  the  ability  of  some  partners  to  optimise  their 
interventions. 

 Based on EQ6, EQ7, EQ9  

Conclusion 4: Short project duration without a programmatic approach, lack of 
alignment with LRRD and project-based approach by partners have hampered 
efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of ECHO supported interventions. 

Project funding timelines puts pressure on partners to design resilience projects which often 
have unrealistically short timeframes instead of being based on realistic assessment of the 
timeframe  for  sustainable  outcomes.    Short  project  duration  without  a  programmatic 
approach, lack of alignment with LRRD and project-based approach by some partners have 
hampered  efficiency,  effectiveness  and  sustainability  of  ECHO  supported  interventions. 
Some ECHO partners have been using a programme approach that has made it easier for 
them to achieve intermediate and long-term outcome objectives.  However, there was still a 
prevalence of a project-based approaches and examples were seen in both countries where 
an unanticipated end to ECHO project funding forced partners to downsize their activities 
while searching for alternative donors to try and achieve planned outcomes. 

Exit strategies did not always include planning for learning and scale up of pilot projects and 
there have been some good practice examples from the health and education sectors that 
demonstrate how this can be done.  

ECHO’s systems and approaches do not lend themselves to a programmatic approach.   in 
the context of the yearly Worldwide Decision, ECHO prepares and publishes annual HIPs, 
which  provide  information  on  operational  priorities  and  funding  needed  to  address 
humanitarian needs within a specific geographic scope.  While the HIPs highlight priorities, 

113   ECHO  is  amongst  those  donors supporting  the  “Connecting  Business  initiative”,  which  is  a  demand-driven  multi-
stakeholder initiative transforming the way the private sector engages before, during and after crises to create more 
resilient  communities,  increase  local  capacity  and  alleviate  human  suffering.  Operational  and  technical  support  is 
provided by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian  Affairs  (OCHA)  while  United  Nations  Office  for  Disaster  Risk  Reduction  (UNISDR)  is  providing 
technical advice on disaster risk reduction www.connectingbusiness.org    

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many of the associated outcome objectives cannot realistically be achieved within an annual 
cycle and ECHO has no multi-annual strategy that provides relevant guidance.  

Based on EQ3, EQ7, EQ10, Case Studies 1and 2 

Conclusion 5: Apart from one exception in the education sector, ECHO and the 
EU Delegation have struggled to achieve coherent LRRD. 

ECHO,  DEVCO  and  EEAS  have  had  some  success  in  some  countries  with  the 
humanitarian-development  nexus  to  strengthen  resilience  and  LRRD.    Successful 
implementation of LRRD and NEXUS programs has tended to be more linked to context 
and  individuals  than  driven  by  strategic  decision-making.    Only  one  example  around  the 
theme  of  “safer  schools”  in  Nepal  stands  out  as  a  significant  ECHO  and  DEVCO 
collaboration even though DRR cuts across all sectors of development and 25 targets related 
to DRR appear in 10 out of 17 SDGs114 and LRRD lies at the core of Nepal’s development. 
While  ECHO  and  DEVCO  continue  their  efforts  to  better  align  their  systems,  the 
experience  with  safer  schools  in  Nepal  has  some  replicable  learning  about  how  a 
combination of risk-sharing, strategic partnership and more flexible use of existing tools and 
instruments can facilitate LRRD. 

Based on EQ3, EQ7, EQ10, Case Study 2 

114   UNISDR (2015) Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 

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6.  Recommendations 

Five  strategic  recommendations  targeted  primarily  at  ECHO  are  listed  below.    Each 
recommendation follows from the conclusion in the previous section with the same number. 
The  first  and  second  recommendations  are  targeted  specifically  at  Nepal  and  India 
respectively.    The  final  three  recommendations  are  not  only  applicable  to  country 
programmes in Nepal and, to some extent, India but also potentially applicable to ECHO 
global operations.   

R1. ECHO should use the current window of opportunity that has recently opened 
in Nepal due to the decentralisation process and planned roll out of the newly-
approved Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act to support application 
and strengthen sustainability of ECHO investments in resilience and DRR. 

ECHO can play a pivotal role in promoting application and scale up of new DRR policies 
so that they are consistent with humanitarian principles and community needs.  Increased 
ECHO investment and strengthened collaboration with DEVCO and other development 
actors  over  the  next  three  years  to  provide  additional  technical  support  to  Nepal  and 
expanded  pilot  projects  will  help  support  effective  use  and  sustainability  of  ECHO 
investments in DRR and resilience.  Feedback from ECHO partners during the validation 
workshop in Nepal was virtually unanimous that this recommendation should be seen as the 
top  priority.      Their  view  was  that  ECHO  is  well-positioned  in  terms  of  its  recognised 
expertise and modus operandi and there is a significant need to support DRR capacity building 
for newly-installed local authorities both by expanding pilot projects and also facilitating the 
involvement of development actors. 

R2.  ECHO  should  explore  the  potential  value-added  and  feasibility  of  alternative 

operational models for India and other emerging humanitarian actors.   

India is but one example of emerging economies that have developed significant emergency 
response  capacity  and  funding  instruments  that  were  being  deployed  both  internally  and 
internationally. ECHO should develop new partnership models for countries such as India 
that could involve cooperation with EU Civil Protection Mechanism, EU Aid Volunteers, 
DEVCO or other (non-EU) strategic partners whose modus operandi is working bilaterally as 
part of a multi-year strategy.   

Based on discussions with key informants from government and civil society actors in India, 
two options were identified where there appeared to be a potential business case, with the 
first option (private sector engagement) being viewed as a major gap/opportunity: 

Option  1:  Facilitation  and  networking  role  for  ECHO  with  Europe-based  private  sector 
humanitarian actors to promote good practice and humanitarian principles within the 
Indian private sector. A viable model for disaster response involving the private sector 
could  help  ECHO  to  add  value  by  continuing  to  advocate  for  incorporation  of 
humanitarian principles in disaster response and respond to needs in forgotten crisis. 

Option  2:  Facilitate  knowledge  transfer  with  GoI  and  Indian  civil  society  through 
involvement of EU Civil Protection capacities to support the GoI in decentralising its 

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disaster response capabilities. Areas where it was felt that ECHO could provide specific 
value-added by drawing upon its expertise in targeting vulnerabilities and early recovery.   

RELEVANT TO ECHO’S GLOBAL OPERATIONS 

R3.  ECHO  should  improve  the  timeliness,  transparency  and  predictability  of 

decision-making processes, particularly for quick onset disasters.   

Timeliness is used here as an indicator of effectiveness, i.e. support being provided at the 
“right”  time  to  optimise  the  value  added  of  ECHO’s  contribution,  not  just  how  quickly 
funding is provided.  In addition to providing humanitarian assistance to populations when 
they  were  most  in  need,  timely  and  more  predictable  funding  for  partners  and  technical 
support from ECHO will help to at the same time strengthen resilience of local capacities.     

R4.  ECHO  should  adopt  a  more  strategic  approach  both,  internally  and  with  its 
partners,  when  working  in  contexts  such  as  Nepal  and  India  to  improve  the 
impact and sustainability of resilience outcomes.  

A number of ECHO partners were already implementing programme approaches, but these 
were not necessarily systematically considered when ECHO was appraising and monitoring 
projects  or  developing  logical  frameworks.  Components  programme  approach  usually 
include: 

 

Implementation strategies and monitoring systems based on a Theory of 
Change. 

  Reliance on multiple funding sources, with a risk management strategy that 

maintains core activities in the event of a funding shortfall; 

  Regular monitoring of outcomes using participatory approaches (including data 

collected via feedback and complaints systems);  

  A communication and advocacy strategy to promote ownership of partners and 

other stakeholders.  

  Where activities include pilots, there should be a coherent approach to 

capturing learning, replicating and scaling up good practice. 

R5.  ECHO  should  work  together  with  DEVCO  and  other  development  actors  to 
promote more coherent application of LRRD with the aim of strengthening the 
effectiveness and sustainability of ECHO investments in resilience and DRR.  

Drawing on good practice examples (e.g. from education sector in Nepal, as detailed in the 
case study in the annex, and from other countries) and existing guidance, pilot initiatives in 
other  sectors  by  applying  relevant  learning.    Protocols  for  communication,  coordination, 
monitoring  and  capturing  learning  together  with  key  stakeholders,  including  project 
beneficiaries, should be developed.  

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Annex 1 – Case Studies 

The  case  studies  support  this  evaluation  in  various  ways,  including  provision  of 
supplementary evidence to answer evaluation questions, support strategic recommendations 
and  describe  in  more  detail  key  challenges  faced  and  how  these  were  mitigated,  relevant 
outcomes and lessons learned.  

Case Study 1 – Resilience115 

Case 
Study 1 

Both  India  and  Nepal  have  been  paying  significantly  more  attention  to  resilience 
during recent years, in part due to learning by both countries from the 2015 Nepal 
earthquake.    In  addition,  India  hosted  the  Asia  regional  meeting  for  the  Sendai 
Framework  in  2016,  and  this  process  has  been  timely  since  it  has  offered  an 
opportunity for both countries to strengthen their respective resilience frameworks.   

In  India,  UNDP  has  helped  facilitate  support  by  international  actors  to  GoI-led 
efforts  to  increase  resilience,  including  a  joint  4-year  project  with  the  Ministry  of 
Home Affairs and USAID/OFDA to strengthen resilience in medium-sized urban 
centres located in disaster-prone areas.   

In Nepal, the primary convening point for international humanitarian actors working 
on resilience during the period covered by this evaluation has been the NRRC, where 
ECHO has been an active participant. More than a decade of investment in DRR and 
resilience has positioned ECHO as a thematic expert in Nepal and there are several 
examples of successful outcomes in terms of both increased community resilience and 
national policies.  With success, there have also been challenges, including trying to 
promote sustainable improvements in resilience with short project timeframes, host 
government  regulatory  frameworks  that  limit  activities  of  civil  society  and 
collaborating  with  development  actors  that  have  very  different  systems,  ways  of 
working and experience difficulties in applying humanitarian principles.   

ECHO has been supporting resilience project activities in areas where there have been 
subsequent responses to emergencies, notably 2013 cyclone Phallin in India and, in 
Nepal,  the  2015  earthquake  along  with  the  2014  and  2017  floods.    Preparedness 
planning  including  these  scenarios  was  factored  into  project  designs  and  logical 
frameworks.  The field visit to Nepal took place immediately after severe flooding, 
with  several  districts  experiencing  the  heaviest  rainfall  recorded  in  over  60  years 
affecting  some  1.7  million  people.116    Evaluation  team  members  were  thus  able  to 
observe relief operations first hand and take the opportunity to speak to humanitarian 
staff and affected communities.  There was a broad consensus amongst stakeholders 
that,  compared  to  the  2014  floods,  the  response  in  2017  was  more  effectively 
organised, including at a community level.  ECHO partner staff shared some examples 
outcomes of their resilience interventions, many of which were subsequently validated 
by the team during site visits.   

115   This case study complements findings under EQ2, EQ3, EQ4, EQ6, EQ7, EQ9, EQ10 and supports Conclusions 2 

and 4. 

116   National Planning Commission of Nepal (2017) Post Flood Recovery Needs Assessment. 

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Policy Framework 

ECHO was in the vanguard of the global movement towards DRR and resilience when it 
launched the Disaster Preparedness ECHO programme (DIPECHO) in 1996.  Since 2013, 
there has been a renewed focus on resilience, driven in large part by conflict and migration 
crises in the Middle East and drought emergencies in Africa. There are many EC/ECHO 
policy-related  documents  related  to  resilience.    A  selection  of  some  of  the  most  recent 
examples are listed below.    

Title 

Increasing resilience by reducing disaster risk in humanitarian action  

Year 
2013  Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries 2013-2020 
2013 
2014  Resilience Marker: General Guidance 
2017  New European Consensus on Development - 'Our world, our dignity, our future' 
2017 
Joint Communication on "A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's 
2017  A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's External Action 

Policy Framework: Partners 

Most of ECHO’s partners in Nepal are working in both relief and development and their 
policy  frameworks  have  mainstreamed  resilience.    The  one  exception  found  during  this 
evaluation  was  MSF,  whose  mandate  does  not  allow  the  organisation  to  consider 
implementing long term resilience measures.  Even though it is not an organisational priority, 
ECHO  monitoring  noted  that  MSF’s  approach  to  recruiting  and  training  of  community 
health workers as part of their project activities have the potential for long-term impacts.117  

Policy Framework: Nepal 

The  response  to  the  2015  earthquake  highlighted  gaps  in  Nepal’s  outdated  1982  Natural 
Calamity (Relief) Act provided a long overdue push to replace with a legal framework and 
restructure institutional capacities.118   The Sendai Framework process has been timely, as it 
has offered an opportunity for Nepal to develop a framework that not only taking advantage 
of learning from the earthquake, but from experiences around the globe during a structured 
process.   

The development of Nepal’s “National DRR Policy and Strategic Action Plan: 2017-2030” 
followed  a  participatory  process  involving  national,  sub-national  and  district  level 
consultations  with  government  staff,  UN  Agencies,  the  Nepal  Red  Cross  Society, 
NGOs/INGOs,  Community-Based  Organisations,  academia  and  the  private  sector.    A 
national  DRR  Portal  was  set  up  so  that  documents  could  be  shared  using  and  feedback 
collected. Key  principles were  (i) a focus  on disaster risk reduction  (ii) assessing  risks for 

117   eSF 2014/01180  

118   http://reliefweb.int/report/nepal/nepal-s-horrific-earthquake-international-community-doing-too-much-prepare  

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multiple  disaster  types  (iii)  mainstreaming  DRR  into  the  development  process  (iv)  multi-
hazard management and (v) Partnership (Whole-of-Society Approach).119 

The  main  convening  point  for  international  humanitarian  actors  working  on  resilience  in 
Nepal has been the NRRC, which was launched in 2011.    One advantage that the NRRC 
has  is  that  GoN  has  perceived  it  as  a  broad  international  effort  without  overly  political 
overtones.  ECHO, together with DFID and USAID, has been one of three major donors 
that supported the NRRC with significant financial and vocal support.120  The five NRRC 
Flagships  were  each  co-led  by  relevant  Ministries  and  international  agencies.    ECHO’s 
investments  mainly  targeted  Flagships  1  and  4  by  channelling  through  partner  consortia.  
Flagship 4 is led by IFRC, which together with the Nepal Red Cross Society, are key strategic 
partners for ECHO. 

Figure 9 – 5 Flagships of the NRRC 

Source: NRRC 

Nepal was also selected as one of the “EU Resilience Flagship Countries” in 2014, which 
was  expected  to  lead  to  more  “…effective  EU  collaboration,  bringing  together  the  humanitarian 
assistance, long-term development cooperation and on-going political engagement”.121  Based on findings 

119   Presentation of “Nepal’s National DRR Policy & Strategic Action Plan: 2017-2030” by the Under Secretary of Disaster 
Preparedness and Response Section Disaster Management Division in the Ministry of Home Affairs – 26 April 2017 
https://www.jica.go.jp/nepal/english/office/topics/c8h0vm0000b7cjnk-att/170426_04.pdf  

120   Taylor, G. et al. (2013) Review of the Nepal Risk Reduction. Consortium (NRRC). Final Report. 22 August 2013. 

121   European Commission (2014) Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2014-2020: Nepal (page 5) 

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during this evaluation, however, institutional support by ECHO was limited to facilitation of 
one workshop in Kathmandu with little evidence of substantive outcomes. 
Policy Framework: India 

The 2015 Nepal earthquake was also a significant milestone for India, since it was the largest 
humanitarian response they had done outside India.  Indian relief teams were the first to 
arrive after the earthquake and the they were also the largest donor, pledging US$ 1billion.122   

As part of its role as an emerging international humanitarian actor, India hosted the 2016 
first  Asian  Ministerial  Conference  on  Disaster  Risk  Reduction  (AMCDRR)  following  the 
adoption of the Sendai Framework where the key outcome was the “New Delhi declaration 
on disaster risk reduction in Asia and the Pacific 2016”.  Nationally, relevant policies and 
plans include the 2016 National Disaster Management Plan, which is aligned with the Sendai 
Framework for DRR and the 2013 Human resource plan for disaster management capacity 
building.123 

Background 

ECHO  has  been  supporting  resilience  project  activities  in  areas  where  there  have  been 
subsequent responses to emergencies, notably 2013 cyclone Phalin in India and, in Nepal, 
the 2015 earthquake along with the 2014 and 2017 floods.  Preparedness planning including 
these  scenarios  were  factored  into  project  designs  and  logical  frameworks  creating  the 
possibility  of measuring  outcomes relating to increasing resilience.  ECHO’s approach to 
resilience in India has primarily  focused  on improving access to services for marginalised 
populations.  Review of monitoring reports and interviews indicated that, apart from a few 
examples, most improvements in resilience resulting from ECHO projects had been at an 
individual or household level.   Findings from this evaluation indicate that limited outcomes 
are  mainly  caused  by  a  lack  of  ownership  by  GoI  together  with  increasingly  challenging 
regulatory  environment  for  ECHO  partners  and  other  civil  society  organisations  that  are 
described in more detail in Case Study 3.    

Nepal 

More than a decade of investment in DRR and resilience in Nepal has positioned ECHO as 
a thematic expert.124  Nepal remains a highly vulnerable and hazard-prone country and, when 
asked about ECHO’s value added, several partners said that being an ECHO partner was 
key  to having a good  understanding  DRR in Nepal.  ECHO’s “hands on” approach that 
emphasizes regular monitoring by technical experts has a unique niche amongst donors that 
goes beyond just funding.  ECHO’s status as DRR “expert” in Nepal has led to expectations, 
both by partners and local governments, that ECHO will make an important contribution in 
supporting the transition process to a new governance system.  During the visits to project 

122   Cook, A. et al. (2016) International Response to 2015 Nepal Earthquake Lessons and Observations NTS Report No. 

4 

123   National Institute of Disaster Management (2013) Human resource plan for disaster management capacity building 

124   Grünewald, François & Burlat, Anne (2015) Nepal earthquake: a rapid review of the response and a few lessons learnt  

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sites  in  flood-affected  areas  in  western  Nepal,  the team  heard  reports  that  several  newly-
elected leaders that had requested DRR training of the type provided by ECHO partners.   

Successes  have  created  their  own  challenges.    ECHO’s  support  to  improving  the 
understanding of DRR and resilience at community level in Nepal has highlighted gaps in 
LRRD  as  community  members  search  around  for  funds  to  retrofit  unsafe  buildings  they 
identified when drawing up hazard maps.  Other challenges ECHO and partners have faced 
have included  

  Building  resilience  takes  time:  Short  project  funding  timelines  puts  pressure  on 
partners to design resilience projects which often have unrealistically short timeframes 
instead of being based on realistic assessment of the timeframe for sustainable outcomes.  
Short project duration without a programmatic approach, lack of alignment with LRRD 
and  project-based  approach  by  partners  have  hampered  efficiency,  effectiveness  and 
sustainability of ECHO supported interventions. 

  Humanitarian  principles  and  resilience:  While  resilience  strategies  tend  to  be  less 
controversial  in  many  natural  disasters,  they  can  undermine  the  neutrality  of 
humanitarian  action  in  armed  conflicts if the improvement of political and economic 
structures is perceived to advantage one side against the other.  The tensions between 
adhering to the principles and strategic and operational choices are particularly apparent 
in  multi-mandate  organizations,125  which  describes  virtually  all  of  ECHO’s  partners 
implementing  resilience  activities.    While  partners  in  Nepal  are  not  working  in  an 
environment of violent conflict, they are working in a context where caste and ethnicity 
influence  access  to  services.    As  highlighted  in  a  recent  EU  Joint  Communication, 
resilience requires a political approach and that governments take primary responsibility 
for catering for the needs of their populations.126   

  Integrating  the  resilience  approach  into  EU  external  action:    findings  from  this 
evaluation indicate challenges in EU collaboration due to different systems, capacities 
and ways of working, although the example from the education sector shows it can be 
effectively done.  The EC is planning to improve practice by improving risk analysis of 
risks and resilience capacities, early warning monitoring to allow for early action along 
with financing partnerships with multilateral and bilateral institutional.127 

  GoN  regulatory  framework:  increasing  numbers  of  restrictions  during  the  scoping 
period have put constraints on civil society actors, including ways of working and delays 
in obtaining project approvals.  Case Study 3 describes these in more detail. 

  Design  of  pilots:  ECHO’s  resources  for  investing  in  resilience  have  been  relatively 
modest.  A third of ECHO funds were allocated to DRR/resilience during the period 
2013-2017 for a total of EUR 9.5 million.   This has required strategic investments in 
pilots that can be replicated and scaled up.  During the evaluation scoping period, there 
have been two examples of good practice    from the health and education sectors that 
demonstrate how pilots can be scaled up through a combination of strategic partnerships 

125   Labbe, Jérémie and Daudin, Pascal (2016) Applying the humanitarian principles: Reflecting on the experience of the 

International Committee of the Red Cross 

126   EC (2017) A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's External Action 

127   ibid 

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and positioning for demand-driven scaling-up. The 2015 earthquake generated such a 
demand within the government.   

As a result of the successful response by the health system during the 2015 earthquake, 
GoN  took  the  decision  to  replicate  and  scale  up  the  emergency  health  preparedness 
activities  throughout  the  country  by  creating  25  hub  hospitals  in  strategic  locations 
around  the  country.  The  education  initiative  is  described  in  more  detail  below  that 
illustrates  the  key  activities  and  milestones  of  this  example  of  a  strategic  partnership 
between ECHO and DEVCO.  

Outcomes from ECHO-supported Resilience Interventions 

Some examples of outcomes demonstrating resilience are below.  These are examples were 
compiled by ECHO Nepal for current and past projects they supported. 

ECHO Partner 

Actions taken in project sites 

Practical  Action 
(supported 
by 
from 
ECHO 
2002 
-  2014) 
Narayani,  West 
Rapti, Babai and 
Karnali  

  SMS texts to communities when flood reached warning in the 
flood forecasting station upstream. General alerts were issued 
based on the rainfall estimates.  

  Community based organisations (CDMC, task forces) helped in 
moving people in at risk areas to pre-identified safe places. 

 

Immediate relief from pre-positioned stocks in the NRCS 
warehouse in Tikapur municipality was provided to 233 families 
who had been temporarily displaced. 

NRCS: 
national 

  Prepositioned equipment in the districts, such as boats and life 

vests was used for rescue and evacuation of affected population.  
Tents provided temporary shelter for those who had been 
displaced.  

  Trained experts in assessment and coordination were deployed 

and supported the local response effort coordinated by the Chief 
District Officer.  The Ministry of Home Affairs used the 
Assessment Guidelines. that had been developed and socialised 
during the project.  The Initial Rapid Assessment was completed 
within one week in 26 districts. This was a significant 
improvement in comparison with the assessments for the 2014 
floods, which took 2 - 3 weeks.  

 

IM officers (NRCS staff seconded to DEOCs) played a key role 
in it by compiling of assessment data and sharing information 
with district stakeholders 

CARE  
Kailali district 

  The pocket booklets developed during the project were widely 

used by the communities.  The booklets contained contact details 

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ECHO Partner 

Actions taken in project sites 

of taskforce members, Disaster Management Committees, local 
authorities, NRCS, security forces which helped quickly establish 
communication with affected communities and organize the 
response. 

  The community-based flood early warning system communication 
system developed at Kailali by the project functioned well and all 
community members were kept informed by DEOC through 
SMS. 

  The small-scale flood mitigation works protected river banks and 

houses. 

the 

Save 
Children: 
Banke district 

  Under DIPECHO VIII, the project had supported 10 schools, of 

which 8 were flooded.  5 schools were used as community 
emergency shelters (higher floors were used in flooded schools)  
  The community knew which schools would be safe since barrages 
had been constructed the previous year with funds from the 
Village Development Committee.  

WHO:  
Kailali 
Banke districts 

and 

  Pre-positioned stocks deployed by Ministry of Home: Diarrheal 
Diseases Kits, Emergency Health Kits, community water filters, 
chlorine tablets  

  Department of Water Supply and Sewage mobilized the Water 

Quality Testing Mobile Van procured by WHO to the flood area 
with water purification supplies 

India and Resilience 

India’s 2016 Disaster Management Plan represented a significant milestone for India as they 
continue  to  shift  their  focus  from  relief  towards  an  institutional  mechanism  that  focuses 
more  on  prevention,  mitigation  and  preparedness  through  adequate  pre‐disaster  planning 
and pro‐active actions.128   

GoI currently has a deployable national response force of around 12,000 people, many of 
whom  are  based  at  state  level.    GoI  is  currently  taking  steps  to  decentralise  emergency 
management  to  the  state  level.    There  is  significant  variation  of  disaster  management 
capacities between states.  Some states, such as Orissa, Assam and Tripuda, have significant 
capacities.  Others, including Terengina (which is a new State) and Jammu and Kashmir have 

128   National Institute of Disaster Management (2013) Human resource plan for disaster management capacity building 

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much lower capacities.  GoI is currently developing a disaster resilience scorecard to help 
measure risks and resilience levels more systematically.129    

The  private  sector  has  been  increasingly  involved  in  responses  to  natural  disasters,  but 
mostly post disaster relief.   There is potential value-added with private sector involvement 
and efforts are currently being made to raise awareness of how supply chains are affected by 
disasters.130  The last decade has witnessed increased interest and involvement by the private 
sector and has been the subject of a recent study commissioned by OCHA.131  As described 
in  the  main  report,  ECHO  has  recently  joined  other  bilateral  and  private  sector  donors 
supporting the “Connecting Business Initiative” (CBI),132 which was launched following the 
World  Humanitarian  Summit  in  2016.    The  CBI  is  a  demand  driven  multi-stakeholder 
initiative designed to transform the way the private sector engages before, during and after 
crises  to  create  more  resilient  communities,  increase  local  capacity  and  alleviate  human 
suffering.  

Private  sector  network  engagement  in  response  and  resilience:  example  from  the 
Philippines 

The  Philippine  Disaster  Recovery  Foundation  (PDRF)  is  a  private  sector  network,  and 
member of the Connecting Business initiative, that is often cited as a model of good practice. 

History and Aims of the Philippine Disaster Recovery Foundation133 

After the devastation of typhoons Fengshen, Ketsana and Parma during 2008-9 the Office 
of the President issued  Executive  Order No. 838  to create the  Special National Public 
Reconstruction Commission (Public Commission) to spearhead reconstruction measures 
to  address  the  needs  of  disaster-stricken  communities.    The  Public  Commission  was 
mandated  to  tap  the  resources  of  the  private  sector  to  increase  support  for  its 
reconstruction programs.  Heads of some of the country's largest private corporations and 
non-government  organizations  (NGOs)  subsequently  came  together  to  form  the 
Philippine  Disaster  Recovery  Foundation  (PDRF).    In  October  23,  2009,  the  Public 
Commission and PDRF drew a cooperation agreement to further solidify the commitment 
of the private sector support to assist in the reconstruction programs of the Philippine 
government. 

In  2013,  the  Philippines  faced  successive  large-scale  disasters,  including  civil  unrest  in 
Zamboanga, the 7.2 magnitude earthquake in Bohol and Cebu and the world's strongest 
recorded cyclone Super Typhoon Haiyan.  Following these crises, PDRF was reorganized 
as  the  umbrella  organization  of  the  private  sector  for  disaster  preparedness,  relief  and 

129   Source: interviews with GoI and UN staff during the field visit to India 

130   ibid 

131   OCHA (2017) The Business Case: A Study of Private Sector Engagement in Humanitarian Action 

132   Operational and technical support to the CBI is provided by UNDP and OCHA, while UNISDR is providing technical 

advice on disaster risk reduction www.connectingbusiness.org   

133   Source: PDRF http://pdrf.org/  

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recovery. Corresponding programs have been focused on post-disaster recovery in five 
key  sectors;  shelter,  livelihood,  education,  environment  and  water,  infrastructure, 
sanitation and health. 

In 2015, PDRF formally changed its name to Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation 
to include the complete disaster risk reduction and management framework. 

International Bilateral Cooperation with India on Resilience 

Some  bilateral  donors  have  been  exploring  new  ways  of  working  with  newly-emerging 
humanitarian donors.   One such example in India is the 8 year Developing Resilient Cities through 
Risk  Reduction  to  Disaster  and  Climate  initiative  which  is  a  partnership  between  the  Home 
Ministry, UNDP and USAID.  The initiative aims to  support  GoI’s efforts to strengthen 
resilience and climate risk management in urban settings.  The project currently targets six 
medium-sized cities (with populations of 100,000 – 500,000) located in hazard-prone areas.  
Project  objectives  are  to  improve  urban  planning  and  disaster  risk  management  in  urban 
areas by enhancing institutional and community capacities to integrate climate risk reduction 
measures in development programs as well as to undertake  mitigation activities based  on 
scientific analyses.  The five outputs described below include engagement with the private 
sector.  A summary of the project describing the scope, target and objectives is below.  Note 
that  this  is  included  here  for  illustrative  purposes  only.    Given  its  mandate  and  modus 
operandi, ECHO may like to implement a similar type of intervention by itself due to the 
need to engage bilaterally. 

In  June  2016  USAID  awarded  an  additional  USD  2.5  million  to  the  United  Nations 
Development  Program  (UNDP)  to  implement Developing  Resilient  Cities  through  Risk 
Reduction to Disaster and Climate Change June 2016 to May 2020. It covers 6 cities from the 
states  of  Andhra  Pradesh  (Vijayawada &  Visakhapatnam),  Himachal  Pradesh,  (Shimla), 
Maharashtra (Navi Mumbai), Meghalaya (Shillong) and Odisha (Cuttack). The cities were 
selected in consultation with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), based on their hazard 
profile, and their participation in the Government of India’s (GOI) Smart Cities and/or 
Atal  Mission  for  Rejuvenation  and  Urban  Transformation (AMRUT)  schemes. This 
initiative is part of a wider effort between the Ministry of Home Affairs, the GOI’s nodal 
ministry for disaster management, and UNDP that focuses on mainstreaming disaster risk 
reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation (CCA) in 10 states launched in 2012-13. 
This initiative is built on a prior phase supported by USAID/India (USD 1.735 million) 
that worked in eight cities, including four of the current cities, which ended in Sep 2016.  

Four  of  the  current  cities  from  phase  I  (Navi  Mumbai,  Shimla,  Vijayawada  and 
Visakhapatnam) are showing strong progress and commitment. Two cities (Shillong and 
Cuttack) were added in Phase II. Since they are at different stages of risk assessment and 
some have already prepared risk-informed City Disaster Management Plans (CDMP), the 
activities  in  each  city  will  vary. Disasters  have  been  eroding  developmental  gains  by 
damaging public and private infrastructure and negatively affecting people and economic 
activities. Recognizing the significant role that private sector could play in furthering DRR 
and CCA strategies in urban India to protect the development gains, concerted efforts will 
be made to motivate private sector to invest in DRR. 

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The  focus  would  be  to  strengthen  the  resilience  of  cities  by  protecting  investments, 
minimizing economic disruptions and ensuring business continuity. To encourage greater 
partnership  with  the  private  sector,  the  project  plans  to  host  an  Innovation  Challenge 
focusing  on  four  sectors  such  as  healthcare,  water  management,  alternative  energy 
solutions and affordable housing. 

A.      PROJECT GOAL 

 Reduce the vulnerability of urban population, infrastructure and lifeline facilities to natural 
hazard induced disasters through risk sensitive planning. 

B.       PROJECT OBJECTIVE 

 The proposed project will have two main objectives:           

  Reduce disaster risk in urban areas by enhancing institutional capacities to integrate 
climate risk reduction measures in development programs as well as to undertake 
mitigation activities based on scientific analyses. 

  Enhance capacities  of  local  governments  and  urban  communities,  including 

private sector stakeholders, to manage disaster and climate risks. 

PROJECT ACTIVITIES  

Output  1:  Enhanced  Risk  Sensitive  City  Development  Planning  through 
preparation  of  City  Disaster  Management  Plans,  undertaking  Disaster  Risk 
Assessments and Structural Safety Audits: 

  City Disaster Management Plans (CDMP)  

  Hazard Risk and Vulnerability Analysis (HRVA)  

Output  2:  Action  plan  to  strengthen  Early  Warning  Systems  in  cities  based  on 
analytical studies: 

Output  3a:  Enhancing  capacity  of  the  government  to  respond  to  disasters  and 
mitigate risks in cities: 

Output  3b:  Local  Level  Training for  preparedness,  response  and  mitigation  in 
cities: 

  Communities in 620 wards trained to respond to disasters 

  Municipal officers trained in Incident Response System (IRS) to respond to disasters in cities 

  Training to Construction Fraternity 

  Enhancing School Safety 

  Psycho social Training 

Output 4: Knowledge Management: 

Output 5: Public Private Partnerships for Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery 
Facilitated and Enhancing Private Sector Investment for Risk Reduction through 
Innovative Pilots:  

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Case Study 2 – Early Recovery and LRRD134  

Drawing  upon  evidence gathered  during  the  evaluation  process,  this  case  study  identifies 
relevant  policies,  systems  and  approaches  and  examples  of  LRRD  during  2013-2017  and 
describes some of the underlying drivers.   

Case 
Study 2 

LRRD is widely understood as linking short-term relief measures with longer 
term development programmes in order to create synergies and provide a more 
sustainable  response  to  crisis  situations.    EC  policy  documents  all  stress  the 
need to enhance coordination internally within the EU institutions, between the 
EU  and  its  Member  States  and  with  external  actors.    They  acknowledge  the 
need for certain pre-conditions for effective LRRD implementation, including 
the need for multi-annual financing. 

Most  of  ECHO’s  partners  in  Nepal  and  India  work  in  both  relief  and 
development and have mainstreamed their policy frameworks into LRRD.  This 
has  translated  into  “build  back  better”  approaches  to  increase  community 
resilience during post-disaster operations.  Several examples of good practice 
were observed In Nepal, including a collaboration involving ECHO, DEVCO, 
Save the Children and the Ministry of Education to mainstream resilience at 
both a community and national level.  Partners in India have been faced with a 
higher bar to using recovery operations as a LRRD entry point due to lack of 
GoI ownership. There was little alternative to GoI since local partners lacked 
capacity and resources to continue without external support.   

Policy Framework  

LRRD  is  widely  understood  as  linking  short-term  relief  measures  with  longer  term 
development  programmes  in  order  to  create  synergies  and  provide  a  more  sustainable 
response  to  crisis  situations.135    ECHO  has  regularly  been  supporting  recovery  activities 
following  humanitarian  crises  throughout  the  globe  to  support  recovery  and  stabilise 
populations who have been affected by natural disasters and/or are displaced or are at risk 
of displacement due either to natural or man-made disasters. Project design often include 
“build back better” and conflict sensitivity elements objectives aimed at increasing resilience.  
There  are  numerous  EC/ECHO  policy-related  documents  related  to  early  recovery  and 
LRRD.  A selection of some of the most recent examples are listed below.    

Year 
2012  European Parliament - Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development: Towards 

Title 

more Effective Aid 

2017  The New European Consensus on Development ‘Our World, Our Dignity, Our 

Future’ 

2017  Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus - - Council conclusions       

(19 May 2017) 

134   This case study complements findings under EQ4, EQ6, EQ7, EQ9, EQ10 and supports Conclusions 2, 3 and 4. 

135   European Parliament (2012) Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development: Towards more Effective Aid 

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These  documents  all  stress  the  need  to  enhance  coordination  internally  within  the  EU 
institutions,  between  the  EU  and  its  Member  States  and  with  external  actors;  including 
emerging donors, UN departments and agencies, international development banks and the 
private sector.  The EC recognises that flexible and well-coordinated financing instruments 
and modalities are needed, to allow for quick response and modification in emergency and 
recovery activities, especially in fragile situations.  Policy documents at the same time also 
acknowledge  the  need  for  certain  pre-conditions  for  effective  LRRD  implementation, 
including the need for multi-annual financing.  

Early Recovery in Nepal and India 

The 2017 HIP for south- and south-east Asia acknowledges a key early recovery role for 
ECHO in the region in “…have a rapid and effective search-and-rescue and immediate relief capacities 
but are often unable to address various humanitarian gaps in the post-disaster phase, notably inclusion of 
marginalised groups into social protection schemes”.136 The HIP proposes that the main value added 
of external assistance to victims of natural disasters in the region is to address gaps in the 
coverage  of  relief  operations  and  to  overcome  the  barriers  limiting  access  to  social 
schemes.137   

Virtually all of ECHO’s partners in Nepal are working in both relief and development and 
have mainstreamed their policy frameworks into LRRD.  Several external influences, many 
of which are described in Case Study 3 below, have meant that agencies have faced a number 
of challenges in implementing LRRD.  As an example, a year after the earthquake, an IOM 
PDM  survey  of  895  randomly-selected  households  in  14  districts  found  that  63%  of 
respondents were still living in temporary shelters next to their damaged or destroyed house.  
Of  those  still  in  temporary  shelters,  75%  reported  that  had  not  yet  started  to  repair  or 
reconstruct their houses even though only 34% of respondents reported their existing shelter 
conditions were satisfactory.138 

One  of  the  more  positive  outcomes  following  the  2015  Nepal  earthquake  was  the 
establishment  of  a  National  Reconstruction  Authority  which  then  spearheaded  the 
development  of  a  Post  Disaster  Recovery  Framework,139  prepared  with  technical  and 
financial support from UNDP and the World Bank.   

India’s  framework  for  early  recovery  is  incorporated  into  the  2016  Disaster  Management 
Plan.  Interviews with key informants indicated that, while India has significantly reinforced 
its  emergency  response  capacities  over  recent  years,  there  is  not  yet  a  coherent  recovery 
framework in place.  Similar to Nepal,  with the exception of MSF, most ECHO partners 
have  made  efforts  to  systematically  incorporate  LRRD  in  their  relief  and  development 
programme design.   

Most of ECHO’s portfolio in India focused on improving inclusion and quality for people 
marginalised due to conflict and exit strategies largely depended on continued support from 

136   Based on findings from this evaluation, this claim rings true for India, but Nepal is still in the process of developing 

their response capacities.   

137   ECHO (2017) HIP Technical Annex: South and East Asia and the Pacific v.4 

138   IOM Nepal (2016) IOM Nepal Earthquake Emergency Response: 2nd PDM report. May 2016. 

139   National Reconstruction Authority (2016) Post-Disaster Recovery Framework 2016-2020 

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GoI to sustainably improve service delivery and coverage.   However, partners in India were 
faced with a high bar to LRRD due to a general  lack of GoI  ownership.  There  was little 
alternative  to  GoI  since  local  partners  lacked  capacity  and  resources  to  continue  without 
external support.  As a result, only a few isolated examples were found of projects in Assam 
and in Chandigarh where GoI has taken over health-related activities. Handicap International 
initiated a cost recovery  system  for disabled people in Jammu and Kashmir but ECHO’s 
phase out meant there was only a short implementation period and it proved unsustainable. 

Examples of ECHO-supported Early Recovery Interventions  

Examples  of  outcomes  compiled  from  the  selected  sample  of  ECHO-supported  project 
reports relating to recovery and LRRD issues are listed below. 

ECHO Partner 

Early Recovery Actions taken in project sites 

Action Aid  
Cyclone  Phailin, 
India 
2013/91017  

Action  Aid  received  support  from  ECHO  to  lead  a  consortium 
providing humanitarian and early recovery support to some 180,000 
people  from  some  of  areas  that  were  worst  affected  by  Cyclone 
Phailin.      Activities  incorporated  DRR,  gender  and  inclusion  of 
marginalised and poor.  The cash transfer program mainly targeted 
women  from  marginalised  tribes  and  castes.    Post  distribution 
monitoring of cash grants found that 36% of beneficiaries claimed 
that, if they hadn’t received this assistance, they would have migrated.  
Another  34%  said  that  they  would  have  taken  a  loan.    DRR  was 
incorporated into shelter interventions, with 448 local masons and 
carpenters trained on flood and cyclone resistant shelters, although 
25%  masons  dropped  out.    232  hand  pumps  were  repaired  and 
rehabilitated, 81 new hand pumps installed and 41 dug wells were 
rehabilitated.    The  project's  objectives  and  indicators  were  mostly 
met, although Action Aid struggled with managing a relatively large 
consortium, which contributed to project delays. 

Mercy 
Corps 
Golaghat,  Assam 
014/92015 

Mercy  Corps  received  funds  from  ECHO  to  support  recovery  of 
conflict affected communities in Assam.  All deliverables by January 
2015, except for the cash transfer component intended to catalyse 
early livelihood recovery in the returnee villages.  However, since the 
security situation in several of the targeted villages was not conducive 
to return, only 35% out of the targeted 70% was achieved. 

CARE  
western 
2014/00913 

Nepal 

CARE led a consortium providing emergency response and recovery 
for 2,600 vulnerable and severely affected households by flood and 
landslides in targeted districts in mid-western region of Nepal. The 
aim  was  to  improved  access  to  livelihood  opportunities,  targeted 
NFIs,  WASH  services,  safe  education  facilities  and  advocacy 
initiatives.    The  project  aimed  to  ensure  improved  access  to 

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ECHO Partner 

Early Recovery Actions taken in project sites 

livelihood opportunities, the provision of NFIs and WASH services, 
while  creating  safe  education  facilities  and  conducting  advocacy 
initiatives while using the opportunity to reinforce resilience though 
application of DRR principles. 

ADRA  
Dhading 
Nepal  
2015/00793 

district 

This project’s main aim was to provide humanitarian assistance to 
earthquake-affected  communities  through  provision  of  shelter, 
NFIs, water and sanitation needs of the most vulnerable households 
and  earthquake  affected  households.    The  partner  was  able  to 
reorient the project towards early recovery by recognising changing 
needs  and  switching  from  tarpaulin  distribution  to  iron  sheet 
distribution  with  the  same  target  and  cost  to  ECHO.  This  clearly 
added quality to the project. 

DCA  
Dhading, 
Makwanpur, 
Sindhupalchowk 
and 
districts 
2015/91041 

Rasuwa 

The project provided early recovery support for earthquake affected 
populations  in  Nepal  in  shelter,  WASH  and  other  emerging 
humanitarian  needs  of  earthquake  affected  communities.      Skill 
development  training  enhanced  communities’  capacity  towards 
investing  in  livelihoods  inputs.  In  earthquake  affected  districts  of 
Nepal,  training  to  the  carpenter  and  mason  has  helped  to  obtain 
additional  income  for  livelihood.  DCA’s  livelihoods  initiatives  not 
only supported to restoration of livelihood recovery and diversifying 
income,  but  also  linked  relief/response  work  to  the  development 
programme.    With  the  aim  to  improve  income  in  the  long  term, 
DCA’s  humanitarian  response  activities  have  included  a  strong 
component  of  DRR  and  long-term  recovery/rehabilitation  which 
was  assessed  as  best  practice  in  an  independent  evaluation.140  
However,  ECHO’s  assessment  was  that  the  improved  food  and 
livelihood security was too much of a developmental approach and 
recommended removing this component from the project and DCA 
duly identified another donor.  

IOM 
Dolakha, Sindhu-
palchok,  
Gorkha, 
Ramecchap, 

This  project  aimed  to  improve  shelter  solutions  for  earthquake 
affected  populations  in  displacement  sites  and  at  places  of  origin, 
through  upgrading  of  sites,  distribution  of  shelter  materials, 
provision of technical trainings and dissemination of guidance  for 
safer shelter to some 50,000 earthquake-affected individuals.  Shelter 

140   Bhattarai, Prakash and Gautam, Dhruba (2016) Joint Programme Evaluation. August 2106. DanChurchAid Nepal 

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ECHO Partner 

Early Recovery Actions taken in project sites 

Rasuwa,  Dhading, 
Nuwakot 
and 
Kathmandu Valley 

was a critical sector in early recovery, given its strong gender equality 
and social inclusion elements.141  ECHO monitoring and assessment 
by  the  team  found  several  gaps  in  the  project  in  terms  of  how 
gender/age specific needs and capacities were taken into account in 
the  project  along  with  a  focus  on  relief  and  lack  of  DRR 
mainstreaming.    A  significant  challenge  IOM  faced  with  early 
recovery and LRRD sustainability was that many beneficiaries lacked 
ownership documentation.   

One of ECHO’s key priorities in Nepal following the earthquake was to advocate for the 
respect of humanitarian principles during the recovery, notably in ensuring that vulnerability 
and  inclusion  of  marginalised  groups  was  not  side-lined.    Advocacy  was  largely  indirect, 
messaging  through  the  EU  Delegation  and  partners,  both  of  whom  engage  in  regular 
dialogue with both governments.    

DEVCO, who was a member of the NRA Coordination Committee, was also an important 
conduit for ECHO, especially after the EU pledged EUR 100 million for a State building 
contract  with  EUR  5  million  complementary  measures  (social  accountability,  capacity 
building, and reconstruction  support facility/technical assistance) during the International 
Conference on Nepal's Reconstruction in June 2015.142  

141   National Planning Commission of Nepal (2015) Nepal Earthquake 2015: Post Disaster Needs Assessment 

142   European Union (2015) Annex: of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Individual Measure in favour of 
Nepal to be financed from the general budget of the European Union. Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2014-
2020 – Nepal. 

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LRRD Good Practice: ECHO and DEVCO Cooperation in the Education Sector  

The  example  below  from  the  education  sector  in  Nepal  is  also  relevant  to  Case  Study  1 
(resilience)  in  addition  to  recovery.    It  provided  the  best  example  of  LRRD  cooperation 
between ECHO and DEVCO identified by the team in terms of:   

1.  Constructive working partnership between ECHO, an ECHO partner and DEVCO; 

2.  Integration of DRR/resilience into the national education sector plan; 

3.  Coordinated  networking  with  various  education  working  groups  that  brought 
together government, donors, UN agencies and NGOs to coordinate approaches; 
and 

4.  Leveraging  other  funding,  including  the  Ministry  of  Education  who  provided  the 

bulk of resources 

Background  

In 2015, the Government of Nepal initiated a process to review and update their education 
sector plan, previously known as the School Sector Reform Plan (SSRP). The School Sector 
Development Plan (SSDP) is the defining document for the education sector in Nepal and 
maps out government priorities for education across the country for  the period covering 
2016/2017-2022/2023. It includes chapters and budget on, for example, quality and effective 
pedagogy, curriculum frameworks, teacher management and professional development, as 
well as infrastructure and school safety. The total budget for the SSDP for seven years is 
more than USD 10 billion. 

As illustrated in Figure 2 below, , in order to integrate Comprehensive School Safety into the 
SSDP, the process required a significant amount of investment and time to make this happen, 
but  the  result  was  positive  as  it  has  resulted  in  strong  government  and  donor  coherence 
around Comprehensive School Safety. 

Figure 10. Contribution of School Sector Development Plan to DRR in Nepal 

Source: Save the Children International 

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Key Milestones and Lessons Learned  

1.  ECHO and DEVCO cooperation 

  Save the Children, in their lead role of the consortium, met in 2015 with a joint 
meeting in Brussels with ECHO and DEVCO in preparation for the start-up of a 
school safety project in Nepal.143   

 

In Nepal, ECHO and Save the Children and the DEVCO Education Adviser met 
together 2-4 times a year to discuss project progress. 

  The  EU  Delegation  drafted  and  finalised  an  education  sector  budget  support 
programme  in  Nepal  which  included  school  safety  and  all  three  pillars  of  the 
Comprehensive School Safety Framework (CSSF).144 Furthermore, the EU is the 
sponsor  of  the  School  Sector  Development  Plan's  (SSDP)  disbursement  linked 
indicator related to school safety. 

2.  Integration of DRR into the School Sector Development Plan which was finalised 
and approved by the Ministry of Education in 2017.  This is the foundation document 
for education in Nepal for the next seven years.   

3.  DRR and education working groups in Nepal. 

  As part of the roll out and implementation of the SSDP highlighted above, there 
is a school safety and DRR working group.  The SSDP DRR and school safety 
working group is led by the Ministry and Department of Education and involves 
representatives from UNICEF, EU, DFID, USAID, Save the Children and others 
who support key activities within the SSDP DRR and school safety chapter such 
as  the  development  of  implementation  guidelines  for  CSS  in  Nepal.  This  has 
proved to be an important space to demonstrate the linkages between response 
and development. DFID is providing 12 million GBP for all three pillars of the 
CSS in Nepal in the mid and far west. DFID’s call for proposal contained many 
of the elements of the ECHO-CSS project experience which demonstrates strong 
donor and government coherence.  

4.  Programme approach supported by multiple donors 

 

It was clear to Save the Children from the beginning that ECHO could not provide 
long-term funding and was only intended for piloting.  A key component of the 
piloting  strategy  was  to  make  DRR  a  core  part  of  Save  the  Children  Nepal’s 
education  strategy  by  replicating  the  tools  and  approaches  to  school  safety 
developed  during  the  ECHO  project.    into  all  their  education  and  disaster 
management  projects  in  Nepal.  Their  projects  are  funded  by  several  donors, 
including  Norway,  Korea,  Bulgaria  amongst  others  and.  Save  the  Children 
included a replication and scale up strategy into their own education and disaster 
management programme as a specific activity within the design of the first CC-

143   eSF 2015/91007 “Promoting and strengthening school safety in Nepal” 

144   The three pillars are 1) Safe Learning Facilities, 2) School Disaster Management and 3) Risk Reduction and Resilience 

Education.  Source: UNISDR and GADRRRES (2017) Comprehensive School Safety.  March 2017. 

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DRR  project  and  had  to  report  on  progress.  This  has  helped  to  hold  Save  the 
Children to account and avoid soley relying on ECHO funds. 

  Save the Children Norway provided funding for Save the Children International’s 
global  CC-DRR  team.    With  these  resources,  their  team  was  able  to  provide 
adequate support to Save the Children in Nepal and, following the end of the initial 
project, to replicate school safety trainings in projects in Bangladesh and Bhutan 
while  disseminating  lessons  from  the  Nepal  experience  throughout  Save  the 
Children International. 

5.  Lessons learned 

  There was only one joint ECHO/DEVCO meeting in Brussels at the start of the 
project.  It would have been useful to have another meeting to share and capture 
lessons learned from this success story. 

  Technical Advisers in Save the Children and DEVCO participated throughout the 
process  which  both  helped  with  maintaining  the  momentum  and  in  replicating 
good practice in other projects they were working on. 

 

If there is an Education Sector Plan and Local Education Group in the country, it 
is important to engage with this group and the Education Development Partner 
Group through the DEVCO Education Advisor if the MIP supports Education.  
This helps to ensure the inclusion of CSS and school safety in the education sector 
plan and policy dialogue. 

  Time  and  technical  skills  are  required  to  engage  effectively  in  sector  planning 
processes. The results are potentially significant as it can result in shock-responsive 
development approaches and is therefore a worthwhile investment. 

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Case Study 3 – Operating in sensitive and politically complex 
contexts145 

This case  study aims to provide  additional evidence  to support  findings, conclusions and 
recommendations  in  the  evaluation  by  describing  the  policy  framework,  main  challenges 
faced and how they were mitigated related to operating in sensitive and complex contexts.  

Case 
Study 3 

While there have been no large-scale conflicts during 2013-2017 in either 
country,  ECHO  has  been  supporting  project  activities  in  India  with  a 
history  of  chronic  conflicts  and  periodic  displacement  caused  by  long-
standing tensions due to ethnic and caste and territorial disputes.  Governments 
in  both  Nepal  and  India  view  international  humanitarian  agencies,  and  civil 
society actors in general, with a certain amount of suspicion and have passed 
legislation that both limits activities of national and international civil society 
while at the same time strengthening the position of the government to lead 
humanitarian responses.  

There  has  been  a  marked  improvement  in  national  humanitarian 
response structures and capacities of government and civil society over 
the past few years, notably in preparedness and response for natural disasters.  
Once  response  and  recovery  operations  following  cyclone  Phalin  were 
completed, ECHO’s programme in India has focused on mitigating the impacts 
of civil strife in the north-east, north-west and the area affected by the Naxalite 
crisis.  Challenges have mainly been connected to humanitarian principles rather 
than access since most partners, apart from ICRC, managed to negotiate access 
to conflict areas with GoI.  

Most  relevant  challenges  in  Nepal  were  linked  to  governance  issues, 
including civil unrest surrounding the launching of Nepal’s Constitution soon 
after  the  earthquake  in  2015,  national  and  local  elections,  decentralisation 
reform  process.    An  outdated  disaster  management  policy  and  structure 
contributed to a considerable amount of confusion during the response and a 
relatively  slow  recovery  from  the  earthquake,  notably  for  repair  and 
reconstruction of housing.  

Policy Framework 

  ECHO’s policies with a significant relevance for working in sensitive contexts include 
among  others  the  European Consensus  on  Humanitarian  Aid,146  and Complementary 

145   This case study complements findings under EQ4, EQ5, EQ6, EQ7, EQ8, EQ9 and EQ10 and supports Conclusion 

4. 

146   European Union (2008); Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission,  Official Journal of the 
European Union 2008/C 25/01  

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Action plan approved in 2008, the 2015 follow-up implementation plan147, the thematic 
policy document on protection outcomes148 and the working document on children in 
conflict,149  Key commitments of the European Consensus include strong and consistent 
advocacy  for  International  Humanitarian  Law  and  promotion  of  good  humanitarian 
donorship.  The  mid-term  review  of  the  European  Consensus  on  Humanitarian  Aid 
Action  Plan  150  carried  out  in  2010  concluded  that  further  work  was  necessary  on 
strategies for humanitarian advocacy and outreach; as well as support for the work of 
mandated  organisations  to  promote  IHL  compliance.    A  later  evaluation  of  the 
implementation  of  the  European  Consensus  on  Humanitarian  Aid  (the  Evaluation)151 
performed in 2014 concluded among others that the EU and DG ECHO in particular, 
“supported and gave increasing importance to humanitarian principles”, for example, by 
requiring  in  its  funding  regulations  that  partners  demonstrate  commitment  to  these 
principles.  

  A later working document published in 2015 referred to these two evaluations, identified 
three  priorities  of  which  the  first  one  was  upholding  humanitarian  principles  and 
International  Humanitarian  Law  (IHL).  The  recommended  approach  consisted  of 
“undertaking actions to promote principled humanitarian action, the respect for IHL and 
the protection of humanitarian space by focussing both at the strategic – institutional – 
and  operational  levels…among  others  by  expanding  public  communication  and 
advocacy on humanitarian concerns and the mandate of humanitarian action targeting in 
particular non-humanitarian actors.”  The document also stressed the need put to put 
protection  more  at  the  centre  of  humanitarian  action  and  therefore  more  actively 
promote  and  support  protection-related  initiatives  as  well  as  work  more  closely  with 
partners  to  enhance  the  knowledge  and  ability  of  Member  States'  and  EU  staff  to 
promote access in humanitarian contexts.  

  The technical annexes for the HIPs for India/Nepal/South Asia during the period 2013 
- 2017 referred to many humanitarian principles including those of humanity, neutrality, 
impartiality and independence, the imperative to mainstream basic protection principles 
including the commitment of safe and equal access to assistance as well as the need for 
special measures to ensure access for particularly vulnerable groups.  In the HIPs itself 
there was also sometimes reference to the need to uphold IHL.  In the 2013 HIP for 

147   Commission of the European Communities (2015); Commission Staff Working Document, Implementation Plan of 

the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, Brussels, 27.11.2015 

148   DG ECHO (2016); Improving protection  outcomes to reduce risks for people in  humanitarian crises, DG  ECHO 

Thematic Policy Document no 8, May 2016 

149 Commission of the European Communities (2008); Commission Staff Working Document, Children in Emergency and 

Crisis Situations, Brussels 2008 

150Commission of the European Communities (2010); The mid-term review of the European Consensus on Humanitarian 

Aid Action Plan implementing effective, principled EU humanitarian action, 2010. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consensus/mid-term_review/1_EN_ACT_part1_v21.pdf 

151ADE (2014); Evaluation of the implementation of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, Final Report June 

2014. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2014/european_consensus_main_en.pdf 

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India support to protection, including child protection and increased respect of IHL, was 
identified as a top priority.  This was repeated in the paragraph on India in the 2015 HIP 
for South Asia.  The 2016 HIP for South Asia mentioned that during the implementation, 
special attention would be given to relevant aspects related to international humanitarian 
law and humanitarian access.  Protection needs, including the needs to target the most 
vulnerable  and  marginalised,  children  -  especially  those  in  conflict  situations  -  were 
consistently mentioned in all HIPs.   

  Many of ECHO’s partners, especially the larger agencies, have their own policies and 
approaches to guide operations in complex environments, but these are based on very 
similar  principles  as  outlined  above.  This  is  no  surprise,  given  that,  according  to  the 
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, that humanitarian aid provided by the EU is framed in 
an  overall  international  approach  that  brings  together  the  United  Nations,  the  Red 
Cross/Crescent  movement,  humanitarian  NGOs  and  others.      The  Consensus 
acknowledges the special role of organisations such as of the International Committee 
of  the  Red  Cross  (ICRC)  and  its  specialised  mandate  based  on  international  treaties, 
particularly  in  conflict  situations.    This  is  also  recognized  among  others  by  the  GoI.  
Consequently, DG ECHO’s facilitating role, in particular regarding principles in conflict-
like situations in India was found to be rather phlegmatic: “ECHO partners are able to find 
a way if they intervene transparently”.  

  Two of the five partners sampled carrying out projects in conflict-affected areas in India 
(ICRC  and  MSF)  referred  to  humanitarian  principles  in  their  proposal  and  logical 
frameworks.  For both agencies, working without compromising its core principles of 
neutrality and impartiality and acceptance of all parties of the conflict of these principle 
was a pre-condition to carry out activities. In not any of the ten other project proposals 
of  the  sample  were  humanitarian  principles  or  challenges  relating  to  a  humanitarian 
principled approach mentioned.   

Examples of challenges due to access, the political environment and/ or conflict that affected 
humanitarian space and ECHO’s activities to mitigate these challenges are described below. 

Findings common to both country contexts 

Governments  and  civil  society  in  both  Nepal  and  India  view  international  humanitarian 
agencies with a certain amount of suspicion and passed legislation that limits activities of 
national and international civil society while in the meantime positioning themselves to lead 
humanitarian responses (see Figure 3 below).  

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Figure 11 – Number of Pieces of Restrictive Legalisation Affecting CSOs 2015-
2016 

Source : www.icnl.org  
  ECHO has been the only major international donor providing humanitarian funding to 
civil  society  in  conflict-affected  areas  in  northern  India  since  2016  and  it  has  been 
challenged to uphold humanitarian principles.  ECHO felt they were unable to do any 
direct  advocacy.    Their  partners  agreed,  since  they  are  well  aware  that  leverage  of 
international donors in India and Nepal is limited, especially for actors like ECHO who 
do not work bilaterally.  

 

In  both  countries,  there  was  very  little  formal  interaction  between  ECHO  and  the 
government at the national level.  There were however many examples of advocacy for 
independent humanitarian assistance by ECHO through its partners. In Nepal, following 
a request by ECHO, the Danish Red Cross and Nepalese Red Cross trained its own staff 
and other partners on understanding and upholding humanitarian principles.  In India, 
ECHO consistently asked partners to include lobbying for the most vulnerable in their 
proposals.  Examples include Action Aid’s advocating for entitlements for people living 
below the poverty line affected by Cyclone Phailin in Odisha and Save the Children’s 
advocacy for connecting IDPs in tribal area villages with the system in Chhattisgarh.  In 
both  countries,  ECHO  ensured  that  partners  adequately  addressed  protection  and 
inclusion issues within their projects.  

India 

  ECHO’s funding of partners in conflict-affected areas was in line with their core life-
saving  mandate.    There  has  been  very  limited  alternative  project  funding  available  to 
partners  in  conflict  areas.    This  is  in  contrast  to  response  to  natural  disasters,  where 
partners find it easier to raise funds from the private sector and other donors.   ECHO 
has  this  been  filling  funding  a  gap  that  has  helped  to  mitigate  the  effects  of  conflict, 
notably  through  provision  of  medical  assistance  to  people  injured  in  the  conflict  and 
MSF’s support to mother and child health care in Chhattisgarh and psycho-social and 
livelihood activities in Kashmir.   

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  ECHO  provided  funds  for  surveys  on  needs  among  conflict  affected  populations  in 
Jammu and Kashmir, to give a voice from local to national level to injured children152 
supported by Save and adults suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome and other 
mental health conditions supported by Action Aid.153  

  Partners, especially those operating in conflict areas, praised ECHO as a valued partner 
in terms of active monitoring/ project visits and constructive dialogue. Typical of the 
partnership is ECHO’s flexible approach in what is working and what not, jointly looking 
at solutions and willingness to modify proposals accordingly.   

  Partners also appreciated ECHO’s efforts to bring the larger EU and the UN on board 
regarding  the  need  to  provide  support  in  conflict  areas.    Examples  include  ECHO 
facilitating  a  visit  to  Kashmir  by  the  EU  troika  and  also  playing  a  catalyst  role  with 
UNICEF to provide support in conflict-affected areas. Funding from ECHO enabled 
UNICEF to increase humanitarian space and develop partnerships with local agencies 
among populations in Chhattisgarh affected by the Naxalite crisis. 

  A number of interviewees referred to the lack of shared understanding of humanitarian 
principles between the various actors in India.  ECHO although recognizing the need to 
play a role in this, did little in terms of advocating the use of humanitarian principles and 
respecting  International  Humanitarian  Law  when  delivering  assistance.    Based  on 
interviews with ECHO and partner staff, key contributing factors include: 
o 

the relatively small amount of funding available for India since, with such modest 
resources ECHO had little influence.  

o  ECHO lack of involvement and influence with the GOI at all levels  
o  Knowledge  about  ECHO’s  mandate,  policies  and  strategies  among  partners,  in 
particular  among  local  partners.      Limited  awareness  of  partners  meant  that  the 
limited  opportunities  for  advocacy  on  humanitarian  principles  were  not  always 
capitalized on. 

  Over the last  few years  space response for  humanitarian  civil  society actors  has  been 
significantly reduced, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir.  Up until 2016, international 
staff  from  ICRC  and  UN  agencies  were  able  to  conduct  regular  monitoring,  but  this 
became increasingly difficult.  GoI has consolidated its lead humanitarian role, including 
in conflict areas, and partners reported that it has been increasingly difficult carry out 
direct assessments.  As a result, agencies have increasingly relied on indirect information 
sources  and  local  partners.      At  the  same  time,  there  was  a  strong  consensus  by  key 
informants of partners and their local partners of the need for international neutral actors 
to ensure assistance reaches those who need it most.   ECHO’s decision to no longer 
fund projects in forgotten crises in India could be perceived as at odds with this need.  
At the same time, ending funding could negatively impact on ECHO’s access to conflict 
areas  and  its  role  in  reconsidering  previous  approaches  and  models  for  providing 
independent humanitarian assistance, also building on experience in other countries.  

152   eSF 2016/91014 

153   esF 2013/91017 

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  Partners interviewed perceived ECHO’s humanitarian assistance in conflict as its biggest 
added value in India since it was the only major donor providing funding while at the 
same time helping to create some humanitarian space for its partners making use of its 
in-depth  knowledge  of  the  situation  on  the  ground.    Partners  questioned  ECHO’s 
decision to suspend funding given ECHO’s mandate for working in forgotten crises and 
pointed to other middle-income countries where ECHO was carrying out this mandate. 

Nepal 

  Most  challenges  relating  to  complex  operating  environments  in  Nepal  were  linked  to 
governance  issues,  including  civil  unrest  surrounding  the  launching  of  Nepal’s 
Constitution  soon  after  the  earthquake  in  2015,  the  ongoing  national  election  and 
decentralisation  process  along  with  an  outdated  disaster  management  policy  and 
structure.   One of the main effects of the civil unrest in mid 2015 was the prolonged 
closure of the border with India, the main pipeline for relief items and fuel.  Governance-
in  establishing  and 
related 
operationalising  the  National  Reconstruction  Authority,  which  contributed  to  the 
relatively slow recovery from the earthquake, notably shelter assistance. 

legislation  and  delays 

including  outdated 

issues, 

  The  ongoing  restructuring  of  the  government  devolves  authority  for  disaster 
management to elected leaders of 753 Gaunpalika (wards/ clusters of VDCs).  Districts, 
which used to have this role, will mainly be involved in coordination. This change raises 
several challenges including for instance loss institutional memory, but by and large, the 
change  fits  well  with  ECHO’s  strategic  objective  to  strengthen  involvement  of 
communities in disaster preparedness and response.  ECHO has consistently supported 
community-based early warning through its pilots and proactive engagement in Flagships 
1 and 4 of the NRRC.   The GoN’s adoption of those early warning components in its 
DRR strategies not only institutionalises the role of communities in early warning, but is 
viewed by partners as providing opportunities for their voices to be heard at a national 
level.             

  The priority target groups for DRR capacity building has thus shifted  due to the new 
structure.154  ECHO and its partners were well aware of that transitions in governance 
and roll-out of the new Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act 2074 is likely to 
mean  higher  transaction  costs.    ECHO  and  its  partners  were  already  discussing  ways 
transaction  costs  could  be  reduced  and  still  achieve  the  necessary  outreach,  including 
advocacy  for  DRR  and  identifying  new  structures/plans  and  cooperating  with 
municipalities who could act as models to promote scale up of good practice to others. 

154 In the past, 75 districts were developing and sending DRR plans to central government based on  inputs from some 
4,000 VDCs and 200 municipalities.  Under the new structure, there are 753 municipalities who will hold responsibility 
for this task. 

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  According  to  Nepalese  law,  international  agencies  are  only  able  to  work  through 
approved local partners.155  The current approach by ECHO and partners in working 
with and through local partners is however in line with the Great Bargain, except perhaps 
with localisation since ECHO continues to fund through European NGOs. The added 
value in working with local partners does not appear to be sufficiently highlighted during 
monitoring and reporting.   

  Negative consequences of restrictive legislation have included (1) lengthy processes of 
up to nine months for obtaining approval for projects.  This is partly due to the fact that 
programs have can only be implemented through local CSOs by entering into project-
specific  agreements  which  may  require  approval  from  as  many  as  seven  different 
ministries5 and (2) GoN restrictions on numbers of work permits for international staff 
(one  international  staff  per  organisation).    Given  the  administrative  capacities  and 
corruption risk, the latter was perceived as a particular threat. ECHO has not played an 
active role in mitigating these two consequences results, by for example, advocating for 
fast  track  approval  of  DRR  projects  with  the  Ministry.    The  value-added  of  ECHO-
supported  interventions  in  supporting  the  government’s  DRR  efforts  although 
substantial, is relatively little known at the national level.  

  Another  challenge  related  to  restriction  on  NGO  activities  ECHO  and  partners 
mentioned  was  GoN’s  insistence  on  providing  standardized  assistance,  in  the  case  of 
earthquake  response  projects,  rather  than  being  tailored  to  needs.  There  were  some 
interesting examples of ECHO assisting partners in (re)designing projects considering 
GoN  sensitivities  regarding  needs-based  response.  For  instance,  whereas  the  GoN 
insisted on the provision of temporarily shelter in-kind worth 200.000 NR per household 
(the one door policy), DCA in close collaboration with ECHO developed a conditional 
voucher system (vouchers that could be exchanged for a selection 10 different articles) 
to help meet needs of earthquake-quake affected communities.  Some partners suggested 
that  ECHO  had  missed  opportunities  to  advocate  for  independent  humanitarian 
assistance according to need and got the feeling that ECHO expects them to be at the 
forefront when advocating with government.  They felt that ECHO could have done 
more advocacy to mitigate challenges the effects of GON policy so that partners would 
be able to respond more effectively according to needs. 

155   Sidel, M. and Moore, D. (2016) The Law Affecting Civil Society in Asia: Developments and Challenges for Non-

profit and Civil Society Organizations. Report prepared by the International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) 
December 6, 2016  

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Annex 2 – List of Projects Selected for 
In-Depth Analysis 

In  addition  to  conducting  a  high-level  review  of  ECHO’s  2013-2017  project  portfolio,  6 
projects in India and 9 projects in Nepal were selected for more detailed analysis out of a 
total of 60 projects.  Selected projects were prioritised for site visits during the visit to Nepal 
and India. 

Theme 

Area (India) 

Contract 
No. 

Description 

Partner 

Amount 

Case 
Study 

Jammu  and 
Kashmir 

2014/ 
91004  

Health  & 
Nutrition 

Response 
& 
Recovery 

Chhattisgarh 

2015/ 
91006  

Odisha, 
Jajpur, 
Kendrapara, 
Cuttack, 
Bhadrak, 
Bargarh 
districts 

2013/ 
91017  

Assam 

2014/ 
92015  

Improve 
humanitarian 
assistance  to  people 
in 
with  disabilities 
conflict 
affected 
areas 
Chhattisgarh 
Conflict 
Intervention 

and 
recovery 
to 

Humanitarian 
early 
support 
vulnerable 
populations  affected 
by Cyclone Phailin  

Supporting 
the 
recovery  of  conflict 
affected 
communities 
Golaghat, Assam 

in 

FED 
HANDCP-FR  

500,000 

1,3 

MSF-NL  

400,000 

1,3 

ACTIONAID-
UK  

2,000,000 

1,2 

MCE-UK 

250,000 

1,2,3 

Jammu  and 
Kashmir 

2015/ 
91001  

ICRC 
Activities in India 

Protection 

CICR 

800,000 

3 

Protection 

Protection 

Jammu  and 
Kashmir 

2016/ 
91014 

to 

the 

Contribute 
humanitarian 
protection of conflict 
affected  children  in 
by enabling access to 
health  care  through 
cash 
transfer, 
assistance 
medical 
and specialist referral 
services. 

STC 

300,000 

1,3 

Final Report 

February 2018 

Annex 2 / Page 95 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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Selected Projects in Nepal 

Theme 

Area 
(Nepal) 

Contract 
No. 

Description 

Partner 

Amount 

Case 
Studies 

DRR 

Central 

2015/ 
91005  

and 

Mid 
Far 
Western  

2015/ 
91004  

Refugees 

East 
Nepal 

2015/ 
91008  

Tbd 

Dhading, 
Makwan-
pur, 
Sindhupal
-chowk, 
Rasuwa 

Central  

2015/ 
91041  

2015/ 
91044  

2015/ 
91026  

Mid-
Western 

2014/ 
91002  

Central, 
Mid  West, 
Far West 

2015/ 
91007  

Mid-
western 

2015/ 
91009  

Recovery 

Response 

Institu-
tional  
strength-
ening 

Strengthening 
Health 
Sector  Response  Capacity 
of  Ministry  of  Health  and 
Population  to  respond  to 
the  humanitarian  health 
needs in the event of mass 
casualty 
in 
Kathmandu Valley 
VISTAR  II-  Strengthening 
resilience  of  communities 
and  institutions  from  the 
impacts of natural disasters 
in  Far  and  Mid-  Western 
Region of Nepal 

incidents 

Assistance 

Food 
to 
Refugees  from  Bhutan  in 
Nepal 

Early  recovery  support  for 
earthquake 
affected 
populations in Nepal 

Early  recovery  support  to 
affected 
earthquake 
communities 
in  Nepal 
(NERP: Nepal Earthquake 
Recovery Project) 

Humanitarian Assistance to 
Earthquake affected people 
in Nepal 
Emergency  Flood 
and 
Landslide  Response  and 
Recovery 
Transitional 
Programme-Nepal-Mid 
West Region-2014 
Promoting 
and 
strengthening school safety 
in Nepal  
Delivering 
emergency 
and  response 
through 
partnership  between 
Red  Cross 
Government of Nepal 

improved 
preparedness 
in  Nepal 
enhanced 
the 
the 

and 

WHO 

850,000 

1,2 

CARE-AT  

800,000 

1,3 

WFP-IT  

500,000 

3 

IOM-CH  

900,000 

1,2,3 

DAN 
CHURCH 
AID -DK  

900,000 

1,2 

ADRA-DE  

840,000 

1,2 

CARE-AT  

500,000 

1,2 

STC-NO 
(Redd 
Barna) 

CROIX-
ROUGE-
DK  

850,000 

1,3 

800,000 

1,3 

Final Report 

February 2018 

Annex 2 / Page 96 

 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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Annex 3 – Field Visit Itinerary 

Date 

Sub-Team 1 

Sub-Team 2 

Tue 15.08  Orientation Meetings 

Wed 16.08  Travel to western Nepal 

Thu 17.08 

Site visits, interviews 

Travel to earthquake-affected zones 

Fri 18.08 

Site visits, interviews 

Site visits, interviews 

Sat 19.08 

Return to Kathmandu 

Site visits, interviews, travel 

Mon 21.08 

Interviews in Kathmandu 

Tue 22.08 

Interviews in Kathmandu 

Wed 23.08  Debriefing with ECHO & partners, internal team meetings 

Thu 24.08  Travel to India and orientation meeting with ECHO India 

Fri 25.08 

Interviews in New Delhi 

Sat 26.08  Desk review 

Travel to Kashmir, interviews 

Sun 27.08 

Site visits, interviews 

Mon 28.08 

Interviews  

Site visits, interviews, travel 

Thu 31.08 

Interviews in New Delhi 

Mon 28.08 

Interviews in New Delhi 

Thu 31.08  Evaluation team meeting 

Fri 01.09  Departure of team members from New Delhi 

Tue 05.09  Debriefing for ECHO India (remote) 

Final Report 

February 2018 

Annex 3 / Page 97 

 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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Annex 4 – Documents Consulted 

The following bibliography presents the list of documents consulted during the drafting of the 
evaluation report.  It is presented by order of author (alphabetical) and then year (ascending). 

Author 

Year 

Title 

ACAPS 

2015  Humanitarian Needs Assessment – The Good Enough 

Guide 

ADE, for the 
European 
Commission 

ADE, for the 
European 
Commission 

ADE, for the 
European 
Commission 

Aguaconsult Ltd., for 
the European 
Commission 

2016 

Evaluation of the Use of Different Transfer Modalities 
in the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid 
Actions 2011-2014 

2016 

Study on Approaches to Assess Cost-Effectiveness of 
DG ECHO’s Humanitarian Aid Actions 

2017 

Evaluation of the EU Approach to Resilience to 
Withstand Food Crises in African Drylands (Sahel and 
Horn of Africa) 2007-2015 

2010 

Evaluation of the DG ECHO’s Action in Nepal 

Bailey and Harvey 

2017 

Baker, J. et al. 

Bhattarai, Prakash 
and Gautam, Dhruba 

2015 

2016 

Cabot Venton, et al. 

2015 

CaLP 

Consortium of 
Humanitarian 
Agencies in India 

 Time for change: Harnessing the potential of 
humanitarian cash transfers. ODI report 

Real Time Evaluation of the Nepal Earthquake 
Response Operation. IFRC 

 Joint Programme Evaluation. August 2106. 
DanChurchAid Nepal 

Value for Money of Cash Transfers in Emergencies. 
DFID 

 State of the World’s Cash Report (forthcoming) 

2016 

Changing Dynamics of Humanitarian Financing in 
India: A Discussion Paper  

Cook, A. et al. 

2016 

International Response to 2015 Nepal Earthquake 
Lessons and Observations NTS Report No. 4 | 
October 2016  

Council of the 
European Union 

1996 

Council Regulation concerning humanitarian aid 

Duryog Nivaran 

2016 

Are we Building Back Better? Lessons from South Asia 

Final Report 

February 2018 

Annex 4 / Page 99 

 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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Author 

Year 

Title 

Secretariat 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

ECHO 

2012  Humanitarian Wash Policy: Meeting the challenge of 

rapidly increasing humanitarian needs in Water, 
Sanitation and Hygiene 

2013  Disaster Risk Reduction: Increasing resilience by 

reducing disaster risk in humanitarian action 

2013 

ECHO Factsheet Nepal / South Asia 

2013  Humanitarian Implementation Plan India 

2014 

2014 

ECHO Factsheet Nepal 

European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid 

2014  Health General Guidelines 

2014  Humanitarian Implementation Plan Nepal/Refugees 

from Bhutan 

2014 

2015 

2015 

2016 

Resilience Marker: General Guidance (November 
2014) 

ECHO Factsheet Nepal earthquakes, April and May 
2015 

 Ten Principles for MPGs 

ECHO Factsheet Nepal 

2016  Humanitarian Implementation Plan South Asia 

2016 

2017 

2017 

2017 

Regional Lessons Learned Workshop: ECHO Partners 
in South Asia 2015-2016 

ECHO Factsheet: EU Civil Protection 

ECHO Factsheet India 

ECHO Factsheet Nepal 

2017  Humanitarian Implementation Plan South and East 

Asia and the Pacific 

2017  Mission Report: Mission to India and Nepal 2 - 12 

April 2017 

European 
Commission 

2009 

Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament: EU strategy for 
supporting disaster risk reduction in developing 
countries 

European 
Commission 

2010 

Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament: Humanitarian Food 

Final Report 

February 2018 

Annex 4 / Page 100 

 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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Author 

Year 

Title 

Assistance 

European 
Commission 

European 
Commission 

European 
Commission 

European 
Commission 

European 
Commission 

European 
Commission 

European 
Commission 

European 
Commission 

European 
Commission 

European 
Commission 

European 
Commission 

European 
Commission 

European 
Commission 

European 
Commission 

European 
Commission 

European 

2012  General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for 

Humanitarian Aid in 2013 

2012 

2013 

2013 

2014 

Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council: The EU 
approach to Resilience: learning from food security 
crises 

Annual Strategy for Humanitarian Aid in 2014: 
General Guidelines on Operational Priorities 

Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries 
2013-2020 

European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid: ECHO 
Factsheet 

2014  General Guidelines for Operational Priorities on 

Humanitarian Aid in 2015 

2014  Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2014-2020: 

Nepal 

2015  General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for 

Humanitarian Aid in 2016 

2015  Nepal Earthquakes, April – May 2015 Lessons Learnt.   

2016 

2016 

Action Plan on the Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction 2015-2030: A disaster risk-informed 
approach for all EU policies.  17.6.2016 SWD (2016) 
205 final/2 

ECHO.B - Humanitarian and Civil Protection 
Operations B/1 - Emergency Response: Outcomes of 
Technical and Operational Level Lessons Learnt 
Meeting on 19 October 2015. 

2016  General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for 

Humanitarian Aid in 2017 

2017 

2017 

2017 

A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's 
External Action 

Council Conclusions on Operationalising the 
Humanitarian-Development Nexus of 19 May 2017 

European Consensus on Development - 'Our world, 
our dignity, our future' 

2017 

Towards the development of a common ECHO-

Final Report 

February 2018 

Annex 4 / Page 101 

 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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Author 

Year 

Title 

Commission 

European Court of 
Auditors 

2016 

European Union 

2014 

Ferrie and Gautam 

2017 

DEVCO guidance package on “Shaping social 
protection as an effective short and long-term 
response to multivariate shocks, protracted crises and 
displacement” 

Special Report: Union Civil Protection Mechanism: the 
coordination of responses to disasters outside the EU 
has been broadly effective 

Commission implementing regulation (EU) laying 
down rules for the implementation of Regulation (EU) 
No 375/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council establishing the European Voluntary 
Humanitarian Aid Corps (‘EU Aid Volunteers 
initiative’) 

 Cash Preparedness in Nepal: lessons from the 2015 
earthquake. A report for the Cash Coordination Group 
Nepal 

Global Note on 
Inter-Cluster Early 
Recovery 

2016  Guidance Note on Inter-Cluster Early Recovery 

GoI 

2013  Human Resource and Capacity Development Plan for 

ICF International 

2014 

Disaster Management and Risk Reduction in India 

Ex-post evaluation of Civil Protection Financial 
Instrument and Community Civil Protection 
Mechanism (recast) 2007-2013 

IFRC 

IOM Nepal 

Labbe, Jérémie and 
Daudin, Pascal 

2011 

2016 

2016 

International Disaster Response Law (IDRL) in Nepal: 
A study on strengthening legal preparedness for 
international disaster response 

 IOM Nepal Earthquake Emergency Response: 2nd 
PDM report. May 2016. 

Applying the humanitarian principles: Reflecting on 
the experience of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross 

Lain, Jonathan 

2017 

Resilience in Nepal: Impact evaluation of the Joint 
Programme on Disaster Risk Management and 
Humanitarian Preparedness. Oxfam. 

Mowjee, T., Poole, L.,  
Greenhalgh, L. and 
Gharbi, S. 

National Planning 
Commission of Nepal 

2016 

Evaluation of Sida’s Humanitarian Assistance 

2015  Nepal Earthquake 2015: Post Disaster Needs 

Assessment  

Final Report 

February 2018 

Annex 4 / Page 102 

 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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Author 

Year 

Title 

National Planning 
Commission of Nepal 

National 
Reconstruction 
Authority 

OCHA 

OCHA 

OCHA 

Poole, Lydia 

2017 

Post Flood Recovery Needs Assessment 

2016 

Post Disaster Recovery Framework for Nepal 

2015 

Flash Appeal for Nepal: Nepal Flash Appeal for the 
Response to the Nepal Earthquake April - July 2015 

2015  Nepal Flash Appeal Revision: Nepal Earthquake Apr - 

Sep 2015 

2017 

2013 

The Business Case: A Study of Private Sector 
Engagement in Humanitarian Action 

Funding at the Sharp End: Investing in National NGO 
Response Capacity. CAFOD   

Sanderson, D. and 
Ramalingam, B. 

2015  Nepal Earthquake Response: Lessons for operational 
agencies. Disasters Emergency Committee 

Taylor, G. et al. 

2013 

Review of the Nepal Risk Reduction. Consortium 
(NRRC). Final Report. 22 August 2013. 

UN Country Team 
for Nepal 

2015  Nepal Earthquake: Humanitarian Country Team After 
Action Review Workshop Summary Report 

USAID 

2016 

Resilience at USAID: 2016 Progress Report 

UNDP, GoI, USAID 
and FICCI 

2015  Workshop on Enhancing Private Sector Partnership 

for Disaster Risk Reduction, 24th August 2015, Hotel 
The Lalit, New Delhi 

UNHCR and WFP 

2013  UNHCR / WFP Joint Assessment Mission Report 

UNHCR and WFP 

2014  UNHCR / WFP Joint Assessment Mission Report 

UNISDR and 
GADRRRES 

2017 

Comprehensive School Safety: A global framework in 
support of The Global Alliance for Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Resilience in the Education Sector and 
The Worldwide Initiative for Safe Schools 

UNISDR 

2015  Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience in the 2030 

Agenda for Sustainable Development 

Willitts King and 
Bryant 

2016 

 Scaling up humanitarian cash transfers in Nepal. ODI 
working paper 

Zurich Insurance and 
ISET-International 

2015  Urgent case for recovery: What we can learn from the 
August 2014 Karnali River ﬂoods in Nepal? 

Final Report 

February 2018 

Annex 4 / Page 103 

 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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In addition to the  above list,  project documents available on HOPE database and related 
to ECHO projects in India and in Nepal for the period 2003-2017 (see Annex  5) have also 
been consulted during the evaluation process. 

Final Report 

February 2018 

Annex 4 / Page 104 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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Annex 5 – List of Persons Interviewed 

ECHO Brussels 
Anne Clear 

Flavio Bello 

Ionut Homeag 

Former Team Leader for South Asia  

Head of Sector South & East Asia and the Pacific, ECHO 

Emergency Response Coordination Centre Cordinator & Programme 
Assistant Civil Protection 

Joakim Nilsson 

Head of Evaluation, ECHO 

Maria Ralha 

Former Team Leader for South Asia 

Martin  Landgraf  & 
Flavio Bello 

Acting head of C/4 Unit - Asia, Latin America, Caribbean, Pacific, 
Head of Sector, C/4 South, East, South-East Asia and the Pacific   

Roger Bellers 

Policy Officer 

Nepal 
Piush Kayastha 

Programme Officer 

Bal Bahadur Shiladhar 

President, CSSD  

Bhola Ram Shrestra 

Coordinator HEOC  

Caterina Galluzzi  

Government Partnership Officer, WFP Nepal 

Craig Sanders 

former UNHCR Representative in Nepal  

Damodar Adhikari  

National Program Officer, WHO 

Delialah Borja  

SCI Country Director  

Dolakh Dangi 

NRCS Project Coordinator for ECHO Project 

Dr. Reuben Samuel 

Focal Point for Partnerships, WHO 

Francesca Caponera 

WFP 

Harun 
Sanjeeb Shakya 

Rashid  & 

Harun Rashid, CC-DRR consortium manager.Humanitarian Manager, 
Save the Children 

Jitendra Bohara 

Policy Adviser   

Joelle Goire 

Kaila LI  

Technical Expert, ECHO deployed to Nepal 

Partner for CCDRR 

Kevin J. Allen 

UNHCR Representative in Nepal  

Final Report 

February 2018 

Annex 5 / Page 105 

 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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Kiriti  Ray  &  Lora 
Wuennenberg 

Lydia Baker  

DRR Programme Manager & Country Director, CARE Nepal 

DRR and Climate Change Adviser for the Education Sector, 
Norwegian SCI 

Nityananda Pandey  

Project Office ECHO HIP WVIN  

Pippa Bradford 

Country Representative, WFP  

Prem Chand  

SCI Project Manager  

Prem Kushmi 

DRR Program Manager CSSD   

Samjhana Bista 

Regional funding Coordinator   

Shyam Jnavaly  

DRR Team leader  

Silvia 
Crespo 
Mariana Liptuga 

Willy Bergogne 

& 

Program Manager & Country Coordinator, Danish Red Cross 

CD, Handicap international and former CD for Terre des Hommes in 
India 

Yogendra Ojha 

DRR Focal Person,  DDRC 

Jérôme Kisielewisz 

Team Leader, ECHO Comprehensive Humanitarian Action 
Evaluation 

Hari Dangol 

Program Head, WVI  

Nityanand Pandey  

Program Manager , WVI 

Prem Kusumi 

CSSD Member  

Beneficiaries 
stakeholders 

and 

Sindhupalchowk communities 

SCI communities 

Keshav Bimali  

CDMC 

LDO 

Yogendra  Ojha,  Goma 
Kumari  Adhikari , Hari 
Singh Saud  

District Disaster Relief Committee 

Students  

School Disaster Risk Reduction Club 

School 
Committee 
CCDRR - teachers and 
parents 

Navin Karki 

School Disaster Management Committees 

Shelter beneficiaries  
Partner NGO 

Final Report 

February 2018 

Annex 5 / Page 106 

 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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DEOC and NRCS Nepalganj 

Dolakh 
Dang(NRRCS), 
AZIZAhmed Siddiqui ( 
NRRCS) 
,  Krishna 
Khadka (CDO) Prahlad 
vishwa karma (DEOC)  
Prem  Chand  (Program 
Manager SCI) 

Govind 
KhagendraMalla  

Thapa 

, 

Deputy Director District Education Office, Focal Point CCDRR  

Moira Reddick 

former Coordinator, Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium 

Bishnumaya  Dhungana 
Beldangi  

BRWF coordinator 

Champa Singh Rai  

Sanischare Camp Secretary  

Chakrapani Pandey 

 MOHA  ,UnderSecretary 

Pradeep Vaidya  

TUTH, IT department 

Laureen Reagan  

Directoir DR4 office , USAID  

Nicola Murray 

 UKAID , Disaster resilience Manager  

Chiranjibi Gautam  

Head DOE  

Jamie McGoldrick 

Former UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Nepal 

Robert Hynderick 

Rural Development TA, Delegation of the European Union to Nepal 

Wendy Fisher 

Education TA, Deleg. of the European Union to Nepal 

India 
Ahmed Meer 

Project  Beneficiary 

Ahyan Shandilya 

Country Coordinator, India Programme, Handicap International  

Ali Mohammad Malik 

Labourer, Project  Beneficiary 

Alka 

Save the Children (SC) 

Anna Lazar 

former Country Director, Terre des Hommes (TDH) and NERSWN 

Arshad Ahmed 

Project  Beneficiary 

Final Report 

February 2018 

Annex 5 / Page 107 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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Asma Dhar 

Save the Children (SC) 

Bilal Ahmad  Sahib 

Bipul Borah 

Former Humanitarian Manager Oxfam India, then Sr. Programme 
Manager for Mercy Corps 

Danish 

Project  Beneficiary 

David Burgess 

former Head of Regional Office, ECHO 

David  Sevcik,  Maya 
Nair, Tapan Mahapatra 

Head, ECHO South Asia Regional Office     Programme Officers 

Dr. Arshad 

Farida 

Action Aid ex staff 

Project  Beneficiary 

Fatima Begum 

Project  Beneficiary 

Fridaali 

Gulshan 

Haz Begum 

Irshad Ahmed 

Student 

Project  Beneficiary 

Project  Beneficiary 

Jeremy 
Surinder Oberoi 

England     

Head of Regional Delegation and Political Adviser, ICRC 

Lars Bernd 

Leon Prop 

Magali Roudaut 

Mahek 

Majid Dar 

Meer 

Chief, Disaster Risk Reduction Section, UNICEF India 

Head of the Country Cluster South Asia for the IFRC 

Head of Mission - India   
Doctors Without Borders  

Project Beneficiary 

Project Beneficiary 

Project Beneficiary 

Mohamad Abdulla 

Farmer 

Mohamad Assadulla 

Student, PG History 

Mohammed 
Bhat 

Mussaffar 

Sharif 

CEO, Save the Children (SC), Kashmir 

Project  Beneficiary 

Naseer Magrey 

Action Aid  

Nathalie Praz 

Ray Kancharla 

Head of Humanitarian Aid of HEKS/EPER and former Terre des 
Hommes India 

 National Humanitarian and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Manager, 
Save the Children 

Final Report 

February 2018 

Annex 5 / Page 108 

 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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Riyaz Ahmad 

Roxana Bano 

PG, Sociology 

Saleem 

Sarabjit Singh 

Project Beneficiary 

Disaster Risk Reduction Specialist  
UNICEF 

Sehjo Singh 

Director, Policy and Programmes Action Aid 

Shafia Naqshbandi 

Action Aid (AA) 

Shahida Akhtar 

Student 

Sunawala Dar 

Project Beneficiary 

Tabassum 

Vikram Patel 

Project Beneficiary 

Vikram Srivastava 

Advisor 

Vilayat Ali – Harinara 

Project Beneficiary 

Zubair Ahmad Keen 

Additional Director Mercy Corps 

Yatim Foundation Official 

J&K Yateem Trust 

Abhay  Kumar  Singh, 
Sr.  

FICCI 

Balaka Dey 

Project Management Specialist, USAID 

Dr. Muzaffar Ahmad  Member, National Disaster Management Authority 

Dr. Muzzafar Sahib 

National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) 

Dr. Shabin Ahmad 

Main Hospital 

G.Padmanabhan 

Emergency Analyst 
UNDP 

Kamal Kishore 

National Disaster Management Authority 

Prof. Santosh Kumar 

Policy Planning & Community Issues 
Former Director SAARC Disaster Management Centre 
Executive Director I/c NIDM Disaster Management Specialist 

Sohaib Aftab 

National Rural Livelihood Mission (NRLM) 

Final Report 

February 2018 

Annex 5 / Page 109 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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Annex 6 – Interview Guide 

The interview guide is based on the Evaluation Matrix in the Inception Report.  

EQ.  Questions 

Sub-Questions 

Case Study 

Perspective  of 
informant 

the  key 

To  what  extent  have  needs 
assessments  been  of  good 
quality? 

What  was  the  fit  between 
needs 
and 
assessments 
projects funded? 

To  what  extent  has  DG 
ECHO  ensured  having  put 
in  place  and  implemented 
appropriate  entry  and  exit 
strategies 
its 
interventions? 

for 

  What was the nature of the key informant’s involvement in the ECHO programme? 
  What relevant experience has the key informant had with ECHO and other secondments, 

either in this country or elsewhere? 

  How was the needs assessment carried out?  
  To what extent was the assessment information relevant?  How was the quality of the 

assessment data?  Was adequate data available at the right time? 

  How were local partners involved in assessments? 
  How were affected communities involved in assessments? 
  For partners – what role did ECHO play during assessments? 
  How was assessment data used in project management or otherwise? 
  To what extent did project activities meet identified needs?  
  Were there any needs identified that were not funded by ECHO?  If so, what happened? 
  What were the entry and exit strategies used?  
  How were these strategies informed by needs? 
  How were affected communities and other stakeholders involved? 
  What role, if any, did local partners play in entry and/or exit strategies?  
  Were these strategies revised?  If so, why and how? 
  How were the entry and exit strategies used?  What worked well and what were the 

challenges?  How could they have been improved? 

1 

2 

3 

1 – Resilience 

2  –  early  recovery 
/LRRD 
3 
contexts 

–  Complex 

Final Report 

February 2018 

Annex 6 / Page 111 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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4 

5 

6 

7 

EQ.  Questions 

Sub-Questions 

How  well  aligned  were 
ECHO’s  operations  with 
ECHO’s policies? 

To what extent has ECHO’s 
crisis  response  been  well 
articulated  to  interventions 
of  other  actors  addressing 
the same crises (such as Civil 
Protection,  Development, 
other 
authorities, 
local 
donors)? 

What  was  the  EU  Added 
Value of the ECHO actions 
in  the  region  during  the 
evaluation period? 

  Which of ECHO’s policies and related guidance were most relevant to this intervention? 

Why? 

  To what extent did ECHO’s policies inform the design, implementation and monitoring 
of the intervention?  What other policies and guidelines were used and to what extent did 
these align with or differ with ECHO’s policies.  

  What were the challenges in applying ECHO’s policies? 

  To what extent was there coherence between ECHO emergency operations and those of 
other actors (EU Civil Protection, EU Volunteers, host governments, UN agencies, other 
donors, etc.)? 

  Did ECHO take any specific measures to improve this coherence of their response to 

crises? If so, what were they, and what was the result? 

  How does ECHO mainly coordinate and with whom?  What are their main strengths and 

weaknesses in comparison with other donor coordination? 

Case Study 

1 – Resilience 
2  –  early  recovery 
/LRRD 
3 
contexts 

–  Complex 

–  Complex 

3 
contexts 

  What are the areas where ECHO’s adds significant value?  Are these consistent with their 

priority objectives, including those relevant to resilience and advocacy?     

  Are there any areas where they are working where their value added is questionable?  Are 
there any areas where ECHO should be supporting where they are not currently actively 
involved? Why? 

  Has the level of funding been appropriate in comparison to other donors?  Why/why 

1 – Resilience 
2  –  early  recovery 
/LRRD 
3 
contexts 

–  Complex 

not?   

  To what extent has ECHO adapted their funding based on local capacities and support by 

other donors? How was this done? Was this done appropriately?   

  How flexible is ECHO’s funding support?  To what extent is this based on humanitarian 

need?  

To what extent has ECHO 
achieved  its  objectives  in 
to  satisfying 
contributing 

  How useful is ECHO’s strategy, guidance and other forms of support in responding to 

humanitarian crises and promoting resilience? 

  To what extent have output and outcome objectives been achieved?  Why? 

1 – Resilience 
3 
contexts 

–  Complex 

Final Report 

February 2018 

Annex 6 / Page 112 

 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN INDIA AND NEPAL 2013-2017 
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EQ.  Questions 

Sub-Questions 

Case Study 

the humanitarian needs and 
building resilience? 

How successful has ECHO 
been  through  its  advocacy 
communication 
and 
measures 
influencing 
in 
other  actors  by  direct  and 
indirect  advocacy  on  issues 
like humanitarian access and 
space, 
for  IHL, 
addressing gaps in response, 
applying good practice, and 
carry  out  follow-up  actions 
of  ECHO’s  interventions? 
Is there an ‘advocacy gap’? 

respect 

To  what  extent  were  the 
ECHO 
humanitarian 
actions efficient? 

  Are affected communities aware of the objectives of ECHO’s support?  What community 
feedback mechanisms are in place and how do they function?  What are perspectives of 
affected communities on support provided by ECHO?  
  How did local partners contribute to meeting objectives?  
  Has ECHO’s advocacy or operations influenced other humanitarian operations (e.g. other 

donors, government policies, etc.)?   If so, how and what happened? 

  What are ECHO’s advocacy and communications strategies in the country?   
  To what extent are these aligned with comparable partner strategies?  
   Have ECHO strategies been based on stakeholder mapping and intervention strategies?  

How? 

  How have these been used?  What have been the results?  Are there specific examples of 

good practice that could potentially be replicated? 

  Are there examples where these strategies have contributed to building national 

capacities?  If so, what were the outcomes? 

  How has ECHO and their partners have tried to improve their efficiency?  Has this been 
successful (give examples)?  Are there areas where they need to improve efficiency? 

  How have local partners influenced efficiency?  
  Which aid transfer modalities (cash, in-kind) are ECHO supporting?  How do they decide 

which ones to use?  To what extent are their interventions coordinated with the 
government, the UN and/or other donors?  

What  was  the  Sustainability 
of  the  ECHO  actions,  i.e. 
how  did  they  manage  to 

  To what extent do implementation and exit strategies for ECHO-supported interventions 

promote sustainability?  What is the likelihood that sustainability objectives will be 
achieved?  Why? 

8 

9 

10 

–  Complex 

3 
contexts 

1 – Resilience 
2  –  early  recovery 
/LRRD 
3 
contexts 

–  Complex 

1 – Resilience 
2  –  early  recovery 
/LRRD 

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EQ.  Questions 

Sub-Questions 

and 

achieve 
effects, 
lasting 
including  in  strengthening 
local 
national 
governments’ 
long-term 
development  policies  and 
practices  and  preparedness 
for future crises? 

  To what extent are partners and other external stakeholders, including affected 

communities, willing to promote sustainability? How?  

  What contribution, if any, have local partners made to sustainability?  
  With short-term interventions, to what extent do these take into longer term 

development, advocacy and protection issues? 

  If there is a need for continued financial support, how will/has this be accomplished?  Is 

it adequate? 

  Have ECHO interventions contributed to environmental sustainability?  If so, how?  If 

not, why not? 

   Has ECHO contributed to building resilience and sustainability of national capacities?  If 

so, how?  What have been the main challenges?  Are there ways that ECHO could 
improve its support to national capacities? 

Case Study 

–  Complex 

3 
contexts 

Utility  of  the  evaluation: 
How can this evaluation be 
useful to stakeholders?  

Additional 
resources: 
documents/key informants 
Any  other  comments  or 
suggestions? 

What do you expect from this evaluation? 
How could be results of this evaluation be useful from your perspective? 

Are there any relevant documents that it would be very important for us to review? Is there 
anyone else that you think we should really try and speak to? 

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Annex 7 – Terms of Reference 

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL  FOR  CIVIL  PROTECTION    AND  HUMANITARIAN 
AID OPERATIONS - ECHO 
ECHO  A – Emergency Management 
A/3 - Disaster Risk Reduction,  EU Aid Volunteers 

ANNEX I 

Terms of Reference 

For the evaluation of the European Commission’s humanitarian 

interventions in India and Nepal, 2013-2017 

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Table of Contents 

1. 

EU HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION ................................................................. 117 

1.1.  FRAMEWORK .................................................................................................. 117 

1.2. 

SCOPE & RATIONALE ...................................................................................... 118 

2.  CONTEXT OF THE EVALUATION ........................................................................ 120 

2.1. 

INDIA .............................................................................................................. 120 

2.2.  NEPAL ............................................................................................................. 120 

3. 

ECHO RESPONSE ............................................................................................. 121 

3.1. 

INDIA .............................................................................................................. 121 

3.2.  NEPAL ............................................................................................................. 122 

4. 

PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION ....................................................... 122 

4.1.  PURPOSE AND GENERAL SCOPE ....................................................................... 122 

4.2.  EVALUATION QUESTIONS ................................................................................ 123 

4.3.  SUPPLEMENTARY TASKS ................................................................................. 124 

5.  METHODOLOGY AND PROJECT PHASES ............................................................ 125 

5.1. 

INCEPTION PHASE ........................................................................................... 126 

5.2.  RESEARCH PHASE ........................................................................................... 127 

5.3.  SYNTHESIS PHASE ........................................................................................... 127 

5.4.  DISSEMINATION AND FOLLOW-UP PHASE ....................................................... 129 

6.  MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF THE EVALUATION ................................... 129 

7.  AMOUNT OF THE CONTRACT ............................................................................ 129 

8. 

TIMETABLE ...................................................................................................... 129 

9.  CONTENT OF THE OFFER .................................. ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 

10.  AWARD ............................................................. ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 

2. ............................................................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 

3.  ANNEX: THE FINAL REPORT ............................. ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 

4. ............................................................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 

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1.  EU HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 

1.1. 

FRAMEWORK 

156

157

 of the Treaty on the 
1. The legal base for Humanitarian Aid is provided by Article 214
Functioning of the European Union, and the Humanitarian Aid Regulation (HAR; No. 
1257/96)
.  The  objectives  of  EU  humanitarian  assistance  are  outlined  in  these 
documents,  and  could  –  for  evaluation  purposes  –  be  paraphrased  as  follows:  From  a 
donor perspective and in coordination with other main humanitarian actors, to provide 
the right amount and type of aid, at the right time, and in an appropriate way, to the most 
vulnerable people affected by natural and/or manmade disasters, in order to save lives, 
alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity. 

2. The humanitarian aid budget is implemented through annual funding decisions adopted 
by the Commission, which are directly based on Article 15 of the HAR. In general, there 
are two types of financial decisions: The World Wide Decision (WWD), which is adopted 
in the context of non-emergency situations, and ad-hoc decisions which are adopted in 
emergency situations. The WWD defines inter alia the total budget, and budget available 
for specific objectives, mechanisms of flexibility. It is taken for humanitarian operations 
in each country/region at the time of establishing the budget. The funding decision also 
specifies  potential  partners,  and  possible  areas  of  intervention.  The  operational 
information about crises and countries for which humanitarian aid should be granted is 
provided through ‘Humanitarian Implementation Plans’ (HIPs). They are a reference 
for humanitarian actions covered by the WWD and contain an overview of humanitarian 
needs in a specific country at a specific moment of time. 

3. DG ECHO-funded actions are implemented by Humanitarian Partners on the basis 
of framework agreements. These actions cover assistance, relief and protection operations 
to  help  people  in  third  countries  on  a  non-discriminatory  basis,  particularly  the  most 
vulnerable  among  them.  Priority  is  put  on  people  in  developing  countries,  victims  of 
natural disasters, man-made crises, such as wars and outbreaks of fighting, or exceptional 
situations  or  circumstances  comparable  to  natural  or  man-made  disasters.  The  actions 
should extend the time needed to meet the humanitarian requirements resulting from these 
different situations. Furthermore, the actions should comprise preparations for risks or 
prevention of disasters or comparable exceptional circumstances.  

4. DG ECHO has a worldwide network of field offices that ensure adequate monitoring 
of projects funded, provide up-to-date analyses of existing and forecasted needs in a given 
country  or  region,  contribute  to  the  development  of  intervention  strategies  and  policy 
development,  provide  technical  support  to  EU  funded  operations,  and  facilitate  donor 
coordination at field level. 

156   http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-union-and-
comments/part-5-external-action-by-the-union/title-3-cooperation-with-third-countries-and-humantarian-
aid/chapter-3-humanitarian-aid/502-article-214.html  

157      Council Regulation 1257/96 concerning humanitarian aid  

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5. DG ECHO has developed a two-phase framework for assessing and analysing needs 
in  specific  countries  and  crises.  This  framework  provides  the  evidence  base  for 
prioritisation of needs, funding allocation, and development of the HIPs. 

The first phase is a global evaluation with two dimensions: 

 

Index for Risk Management (INFORM) is a tool based on national indicators and 
data which allows for a comparative analysis of countries to identify their level of 
risk  to  humanitarian  crisis  and  disaster.  It  includes  three  dimensions  of  risk: 
natural  and  man-made  hazards  exposure,  population  vulnerability  and  national 
coping capacity. The INFORM data are also used for calculating a Crisis Index 
that  identifies  countries  suffering  from  a  natural  disaster  and/or  conflict  and/or 
hosting a large number of uprooted people. 

  The  Forgotten  Crisis  Assessment  (FCA)  identifies  serious  humanitarian  crisis 
situations where the affected populations do not receive enough international aid 
or even none at all. These crises are characterised by low media coverage, a lack 
of  donor  interest  (as  measured  through  aid  per  capita)  and  a  weak  political 
commitment  to  solve  the  crisis,  resulting  in  an  insufficient  presence  of 
humanitarian actors. 

The second phase of the framework focuses on context and response analysis: 

 

Integrated  Analysis  Framework  (IAF)  is  an  in-depth  assessment  carried  out  by 
European  Commission's  humanitarian  experts.  It  consists  of  a  qualitative 
assessment of humanitarian needs per single crisis, also taking into account the 
population affected and foreseeable trends. 
1.2. 

SCOPE & RATIONALE 

1.  The  European  Union  aims  at  being  a  reference  humanitarian  donor158,  which 
provides a basis for its EU Added Value159. By this the European Commission ensures 
that its interventions are coherent with the humanitarian principles160, are relevant in 
targeting the most vulnerable beneficiaries, are duly informed by needs assessments, and 
promote resilience161 building to the extent possible. The Commission also takes the role 
of – when necessary – leading, shaping, and coordinating the response to crises, while 
respecting the overall coordination role of the UN OCHA.  

2. Interventions have a focus on  funding critical sectors and addressing gaps in the 
global  response,  mobilising  partners  and  supporting  the  overall  capacity  of  the 

158 I.e. a principled donor, providing leadership and shaping humanitarian response. 

159 Under the principle of subsidiarity (Article 5 Treaty on European Union), the EU should only act when the objectives 
can  be  better  achieved  by  Union  action  rather  than  by  potentially  varying  action  by  Member  States.  It  requires 
consideration of the value and improvements which are caused by the EU rather than another party taking action. 

160 Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality and Independence 
161   The EU Approach to Resilience: learning from food security crises 

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humanitarian system. As a consequence of the principled approach and addressing gaps 
in  overall  response,  the  EU  intervenes  in  forgotten  crises162,  i.e.  severe,  protracted 
humanitarian crisis situations where affected populations are receiving no or insufficient 
international aid and where there is little possibility or no political commitment to solve 
the crisis, accompanied by a lack of media interest. This refers primarily to protracted 
conflict  situations,  but  can  also  refer  to  crises  resulting  from  the  cumulative  effect  of 
recurring natural disasters, or, a combination of different factors. Although the bulk of 
EU funding went to major, recognised crisis like the Syrian, it allocated in 2015 almost 
17%  of  its  initial  humanitarian  aid  budget  to  forgotten  crises,  including  the  Sahrawi 
refugees in Algeria, the Rohingya people in Myanmar/Burma and Bangladesh, and the 
Colombian refugees in Ecuador and Venezuela. 

3.  Actions  funded  comprise  assistance,  relief  and  protection  operations  on  a  non-
discriminatory basis to  help  people in  third countries, particularly the most  vulnerable 
among them, and as a priority those in developing countries, victims of natural disasters, 
man-made  crises,  such  as  wars  and  outbreaks  of  fighting,  or  exceptional  situations  or 
circumstances comparable to natural or man-made disasters. The actions should extend 
the  time  needed  to  meet  the  humanitarian  requirements  resulting  from  these  different 
situations. EU humanitarian aid covers intervention areas such as:  

 

food and nutrition;  

  shelter;  

  health care;  

  water and sanitation;  

  protection; and  

  education in emergencies. 

4. In the frame of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)163 systematic efforts are undertaken 
to  prevent and prepare for adverse events. This  involves analyses and management of 
causal factors of disasters in terms of reducing exposure to hazards, decreasing people 
vulnerability, wise management of land and the environment. DRR aims at strengthening 
resilience  to  shocks  triggered  by  natural  hazards.  It  also  supports  climate  change 
adaptation. Humanitarian action should be based on risk assessments and focus on risk 
reduction while keeping a people-centred approach with special attention given to gender 
equality and inclusion of vulnerable groups. DG ECHO’s DRR initiatives often take the 
shape  of  community-based  demonstration  projects  (‘seed  money’),  aiming  at  handing 
over successful results to other actors (governments, development and humanitarian) for 
replication and scaling-up. Thus, DG ECHO must ensure vertical and horizontal linkages 
to relevant actors that are mandated and capable of exploiting those results. 

162 See also http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/needs-assessments_en 
163   http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/prevention_preparedness/DRR_thematic_policy_doc.pdf  

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5. A complementary component is humanitarian advocacy, by which DG ECHO strives 
to influence other actors on topics such as humanitarian access, respect of International 
Humanitarian  Law,  adherence  to  the  Humanitarian  Principles  and  Good Humanitarian 
Donorship, and uptake of project results in the area of Disaster Risk Reduction (etc.).  

2.  CONTEXT OF THE EVALUATION 

2.1. 

INDIA 

The  country  is  exposed  to  regular  hydro-meteorological  and  geo-physical  disasters, 
protracted  conflicts  (with  displacement  of  people  and  violations  of  International 
Humanitarian Law), and malnutrition – one third of the world’s malnourished children 
live in  India, with an estimated mortality of 500,000  – 1 million/year. Overall, floods, 
cyclones, earthquakes, droughts and landslides have inflicted tremendous suffering on the 
people  of  India  over  the  years.  Low  castes  and  tribal  populations,  whose  social  and 
economic  indicators  lag  behind  national  averages,  are  most  impacted.  This  was  again 
demonstrated  during  the  2013  Cyclone  Phailin  in  Odisha,  which  affected  hundreds  of 
thousands of people. 

Frequent natural disasters and situations of instability in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, 
as  well  as  in  central  and  north-eastern  India,  generate  significant  humanitarian  needs 
among the country’s most vulnerable populations. Over 700 000 of the state's residents, 
who have witnessed violence for years, bear symptoms of depression and post-traumatic 
stress. Many also need livelihood support, as insecurity hampers economic activities. 

Central  India,  particularly  southern  Chhattisgarh,  has  seen  sporadic  bursts  of  violence 
between Maoist insurgents and security forces in recent years. Indigenous people living 
in  remote  forests  have  been  the  most  affected.  Such  instability  limits  their  access  to 
already inadequate basic services, including health care. 

North-east India is a quagmire of insurgencies. The resulting violence affects thousands 
of  people.  Ethnic  tensions  over  land  rights  flare  up  time  and  again.  According  to  the 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, an estimated 616 000 people were displaced in 
India as a result of armed conflict and inter-communal violence as of April 2015. The 
prolonged conflict has disrupted access to education for thousands of children who are 
currently living in relief camps. Lack of access to health care services and potential child 
labour and sexual exploitation are another major concern.   

To address the problems, the government of India has built capacity for preparedness and 
response to humanitarian crises, including the world’s largest child nutrition programme. 
India rarely requests international assistance for humanitarian crises, and access to certain 
crisis-affected areas could be difficult for international humanitarian workers.  

2.2. 

NEPAL 

During the period of 2013-2017 the humanitarian crises in Nepal related largely to natural 
disasters (earthquakes, floods, etc.) and the situation of the Bhutanese refugees.  

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Nepal faces numerous natural disasters every year. Around 1 000 people are killed yearly 
by landslides and floods during the monsoon season. The threat of earthquakes, glacial 
lake outbursts, avalanches as well as cold and heat waves always looms over the country. 
Two devastating earthquakes struck central Nepal in April and May 2015 Almost 9 000 
people died, over 22 000 were injured and more than 600 000 houses were destroyed. 

Around 88% of the Bhutanese refugees have now been resettled, with some 12,600 people 
remaining in two camps in Nepal.  

The  political  uncertainty  following  the  10-year  Maoist  insurgency  that  ended  in  2006 
continues.  A  new  Constituent  Assembly  elected  in  the  November  2013  elections 
eventually resumed the task of finalising the country’s constitution, which was adopted 
in mid-2015. 

Although the capacity of Nepal to respond to natural disasters has improved, its response 
to major disasters remains problematic.  

3.  ECHO RESPONSE 

3.1. 

INDIA 

The European Commission has been present in India since 1995 and has responded to all 
major emergencies, including the Orissa cyclone in 1999, the Gujarat earthquake in 2001, 
the Tsunami in 2004, the Jammu and Kashmir earthquake in 2005, the Bihar floods in 
2008 and Cyclone Phailin in 2013. The EU’s total humanitarian assistance to India to date 
exceeds €128.9 million. 

Interventions  during the  evaluation  period focused on food assistance, health services, 
and protection, including in contexts of forgotten crises such as the conflicts in Jammu 
and Kashmir, districts of central India, and in the north-eastern states, as well as on relief 
assistance  following  several  major  natural  disasters.  The  allocated  EU  budget  was 
approximately EUR 21 million for the period 2013-2017. The interventions have been 
gradually phased out, and no funding has been allocated in 2017.  

In 2016, the Commission has provided €500.000 to fund a project focusing on access to 
education for displaced children in conflict-torn Assam. The funds will also be used to 
deliver much-needed health care assistance and increased protection to affected children.  

In  2015,  €3.4  million  was  allocated  to  provide  psycho-social  support  and  livelihood 
means to people affected by conflict in Jammu and Kashmir and the north-eastern states, 
as  well  as  health  and  protection  services  to  communities  in  remote  settlements  in 
Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh. 

Between 2001 and 2014, as part of its Disaster Preparedness Programme (DIPECHO), 
the  Commission  released  more  than  €8  million  to  support  vulnerable  communities  in 
reducing the impact of floods, cyclones and other natural disasters through community-
based initiatives, such as the creation of early warning systems and the building of adapted 

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physical  infrastructure.  Over  the  years,  disaster  risk  reduction  initiatives  have  been 
integrated in all humanitarian response programming. 

3.2. 

NEPAL 

Overall, the interventions during the evaluation period focused on DRR, shelter, and food 
assistance. The allocated budget from the EU was approximately EUR 29 million for the 
period 2013-2017, whereof 61% was spent in 2015 when the earthquake took place, and 
in 2017 the allocations have basically gone back to the pre-2015 level. 

A significant part of the European Commission's humanitarian assistance to Nepal goes 
towards helping communities resist, withstand and cope against natural disasters through 
the  creation  of  community-based  rescue  mechanisms,  disaster-resilient  infrastructure, 
early  warning  systems  and  flood  management.  The  funding  also  helps  enhance  the 
capacity of the medical community to cope with mass casualty situations that could be 
provoked  by  an  earthquake  through  retro-fitting  of  hospitals  in  Kathmandu  and 
stockpiling of fuels and surgical kits. 

In response to the 2015 earthquake, the European Commission released €16.4 million to 
help  address  the  most  urgent  humanitarian  needs,  including  clean  water,  medicine, 
emergency  shelter  and  telecommunications.  The  European  Commission  aid  to  the 
earthquake victims totalled about €150 million, including funds for early recovery and 
rehabilitation.  This  funding  came  in  addition  to  the  deployment  of  European 
Commission's humanitarian aid and civil protection experts to the crisis area, and to the 
search and rescue and first-aid teams, as well as relief items, sent from EU Member States 
through the EU Civil  Protection Mechanism. The European Commission's Emergency 
Response Coordination Centre monitored developments on a 24/7 basis and coordinated 
support from Europe. 

Nepal is one of the flagship countries of the EU’s Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis 
Prone Countries 2013-2020. 

4.  PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION 

4.1. 

PURPOSE AND GENERAL SCOPE 

Based on Regulation (EC) 1257/96 and the EU Financial Regulation, the purpose of this 
Request for Services is to have an independent overall evaluation of the ECHO actions in 
India and Nepal during the period 2013-2017, which should feed into the already ongoing 
comprehensive evaluation of the European Commission’s humanitarian aid, 2012-2016. 

To be particularly noted is that:  

  The  contexts  of  the  two  countries  are  highly  disparate,  which  means  that 
conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation must – to a certain extent – 
be provided separately for the two countries; 

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  The  timetable  of  the  current  evaluation  must  be  adapted  to  that  of  the  above-
mentioned  comprehensive  evaluation  to  ensure  that  results  are  available  when 
needed. Furthermore, the evaluators of the two exercises must liaise for a timely 
exchange  of  the  relevant  information.  Further  details  regarding  timing  are 
provided under section 8 below. 

Specifically, the evaluation should provide: 

  A comprehensive, retrospective assessment of DG ECHO's strategy/approach (as 
formalised by the Humanitarian Implementation Plans) covering  the evaluation 
issues of relevance, coherence, EU Added Value, effectiveness, efficiency and 
sustainability; 

  A maximum of 5 prospective, strategic recommendations to support ECHO’s 
future  funding  decisions.  These  strategic  recommendations  could  possibly  be 
supported by further, related, operational recommendations.  

The main users of the evaluation report include inter alia ECHO staff at HQ, regional and country 
level,  national  and  regional  stakeholders,  the  participating  implementing  partners,  and  other 
humanitarian and development donors and agencies. 

4.2. 

EVALUATION QUESTIONS 

The conclusions of the evaluation will be presented in the report in the form of evidence-
based, reasoned  answers to  the evaluation  questions presented below. These questions 
should be further tailored to by the Evaluator, and finally agreed with the Steering Group 
in  the  inception  phase.  Relevant  focal  issues  for  each  country  to  be  examined  in  the 
context of each evaluation question will be discussed and agreed at that stage. Although 
responses to some questions may be aligned for India and Nepal, the evaluator should be 
prepared to provide separate responses for the two countries considering the difference of 
contexts. 

Relevance 

1.  To what extent have needs assessments been of good quality?  

2.  What was the fit between needs assessments and projects funded?  

3.  To  what  extent  has  DG  ECHO  ensured  having  put  in  place  and  implemented 

appropriate entry and exit strategies for its interventions? 

Coherence 

4.  How well aligned were ECHO’s operations with ECHO’s policies?; 

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5.  To what extent has ECHO’s crisis response been well articulated to interventions 
of other actors addressing the same crises (such as Civil Protection, Development, 
local authorities)? 

EU Added Value 

6.  What  was  the  EU  Added  Value  of  the  ECHO  actions  in  the  region  during  the 
evaluation period? Issues to consider are e.g. how ECHO has drawn on its specific 
role  and  mandate  to  create  a  specific  added  value,  which  could/would  not  be 
achieved by other actors; 

Effectiveness 

7.  To what extent has ECHO achieved its objectives in contributing to satisfying the 

humanitarian needs and building resilience? 

8.  How  successful  has  ECHO  been  through  its  advocacy  and  communication 
measures in influencing other actors by direct and indirect advocacy on issues like 
humanitarian  access  and  space,  respect  for  IHL,  addressing  gaps  in  response, 
applying good practice, and carry out follow-up actions of ECHO’s interventions? 
Is there an ‘advocacy gap’?  

Efficiency 

9.  To what extent were the ECHO humanitarian actions efficient? Issues to consider 
are e.g. use of synergies, avoiding duplications, choice of transfer modalities, and 
efficiency of management and monitoring processes. 

Sustainability/Connectedness 

10. What was the Sustainability of the ECHO actions, i.e. how did they manage to 
achieve lasting effects, including in strengthening national and local governments’ 
long-term development policies and practices and preparedness for future crises? 
Issues to consider are e.g. contribution to LRRD and Resilience. What could be 
further  done  (enabling  factors,  tools,  mechanism,  change  in  strategy,  etc.)  to 
increase  the  uptake  of  results  and  lessons  learned  from  relief  projects  into 
development planning/programming? 

4.3. 

SUPPLEMENTARY TASKS 

The Contractor should:  

  Reconstruct the intervention logic for the ECHO-funded actions in the region. This 
should clarify how each type of ECHO intervention contributes resilience building, 
and the roles of other actors (beneficiary governments, development actors) having the 
same/similar objectives; 

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  Perform a selection of at least three case studies on themes relevant for this evaluation. 
The topics will be agreed with the ISG in the Inception phase, and the tenderer may 
provide a proposal in the offer; 

  On the basis of the research carried out for responding to the evaluation questions, and 
at a general level, identify the main factors limiting the success of the projects funded 
in the countries over the period covered by the evaluation. COMMENT: This relates 
to an audit recommendation; success-limiting factors should be identified in order to 
develop indicators for focused monitoring, with the overall purpose of strengthening 
the monitoring system; 

  Provide a statement about the validity of the evaluation results, i.e. to what extent it 
has  been  possible  to  provide  reliable  statements  on  all  essential  aspects  of  the 
intervention examined. Issues to be referred to may include scoping of the evaluation 
exercise,  availability  of  data,  unexpected  problems  encountered  in  the  evaluation 
process, proportionality between budget and objectives of the assignment, etc.; 

  Make a proposal for the dissemination of the evaluation results; 

  Provide  a  French  translation  (in  addition  to  the  English  version)  of  the  executive 

summary of the Final Report; 

  Provide an abstract of the evaluation of no more than 200 words. 

5.  METHODOLOGY AND PROJECT PHASES 

In  their  offer,  the  bidders  must  describe  the  methodological  approach  they  propose  in 
order to address the evaluation questions listed above, as well as the other tasks. 

This will include a proposal for indicative judgment criteria164 that they may consider 
useful  for  addressing  each  evaluation  question.  The  judgement  criteria,  as  well  as  the 
information sources to be used in addressing these criteria, will be discussed and validated 
by the Commission during the desk phase. 

To the extent possible the methodology should promote the participation in the evaluation 
exercise  of  all  actors  concerned,  including  beneficiaries  and  local  communities  when 
relevant and feasible. 

The  conclusions  of  the  evaluation  must  be  presented  in  a  transparent  way,  with  clear 
references to the sources on which they are based. 

164   A judgement criterion specifies an aspect of the evaluated intervention that will allow its merits or success to be assessed. 
E.g., if the question is "To what extent has DG ECHO assistance, both overall and by sector been appropriate and 
impacted positively the targeted population?", a general judgement criterion might be "Assistance goes to the people 
most in need of assistance". In developing judgment criteria, the tenderers may make use of existing methodological, 
technical or political guidance provided by actors in the field of Humanitarian Assistance such as HAP, the Sphere 
Project, GHD, etc. 

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Deliverables 

Within  the  framework  of  the  present  evaluation,  the  contractors  will  produce  the 
following deliverables, in accordance with the schedule defined in this chapter: 

1.  Inception Report 
2.  Progress Report 
3.  Report on preliminary conclusions 
4.  Final Report + annexes 

Meetings 

It  is  expected  that  the  contractor  participate  in  three  meetings  in  Brussels  with  the 
evaluation Steering Group, as specified below. For these meetings  minutes should be 
drafted by the contractor, to be agreed among the participants. 

5.1. 

  INCEPTION PHASE 

The inception phase starts from the moment the contract is signed. During the inception 
phase  the  evaluation  team  will  analyse  the  intervention  logic  on  the  basis  of  official 
documents  and propose the evaluation  questions and judgment criteria. The team  then 
will specify the indicators, and develop the final definition of the methodology and the 
schedule for the field visits. 

No  kick-off  meeting  is  planned  for  this  evaluation.  Necessary  initial  exchanges  will 
instead be carried out by phone and email. 

Inception report 

The Inception Report will be produced after the kick-off meeting and will contain, at a 
minimum, the following elements: 

  a finalised evaluation framework covering all evaluation questions; 

  an intervention logic; 

  A complete research framework, including the field visits; 

  a description of the methodology for data collection and analysis, including the 
chain  of  reasoning  for  responding  to  the  evaluation  questions,  and  indicating 
limitations; 

  draft questionnaires and interview guides; and 

  a final detailed work plan and timetable. 

Inception meeting 

One week after the submission of the Inception report the evaluation team will present its 
overall approach in the Inception Meeting which will take place in Brussels at DG ECHO 

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headquarters with the relevant Commission staff. The Inception report will be discussed 
and the evaluation team will have the possibility to ask for additional information and/or 
clarification  on  the  requirements  of  the  ToR,  as  well  as  to  obtain  relevant  security 
instructions  and  possibly  technical  support  relative  to  the  execution  of  the  tasks.  The 
Inception Report will be revised if needed according to the mutually agreed amendments 
and approved by the Commission.  

5.2. 

 RESEARCH PHASE 

The Desk and Field Phases will be merged for this evaluation, and the desk and field 
research will to a certain extent have to be carried out in parallel. The research phase will 
cover: 

  Collection and assessment of secondary data; 

  Meetings  with  Commission  staff,  other  donors,  organisations  and  partners,  as 

appropriate; 

  Field visits to the two countries, of which the details will be discussed and agreed 
with  the  Commission  in  the  Inception  phase.  The  travel  and  accommodation 
arrangements, the organisation of meetings, and the securing of visas will remain the 
sole responsibility of the contractor. At the end of the mission the consultants should 
meet  with  the  Delegation,  DG  ECHO’s  experts  and  DG  ECHO’s  partners  for 
discussion  of  observations  arising  from  the  evaluation.  The  evaluation  team  is 
required  to  share  their  findings  with  the  NGOs/IOs  concerned  to  allow  them  to 
comment upon. The purpose is to promote dialogue, mutual learning and ownership 
and to build capacity of the Commission’s partners. 

A Progress Report should be delivered to the Commission, covering the results of the 
Research phase. The format and contents are to be discussed and agreed in the Inception 
Phase. 

A meeting will be organized in Brussels to present the Progress Report to the Steering 
Committee. The evaluator will duly consider all comments from the Steering Committee, 
as  a  condition  for  approval.  In  case  of  disagreement,  the  evaluator  will  provide  an 
argumented reply explaining why a certain comment cannot be accepted. 

5.3. 

  SYNTHESIS PHASE 

Report on preliminary conclusions: This report must be delivered in end-September for 
the  purpose  of  providing  timely  inputs  for  DG  ECHO’s  comprehensive  evaluation  on 
humanitarian  aid.  The  exact  format  and  contents  of  this  report  will  be  discussed  and 
agreed with the Commission in the Inception phase. 

Draft  Final  Report:  Should  deliver  the  results  of  all  tasks  covered  by  these  Terms  of 
Reference, and must be clear enough for any potential reader to understand. 

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The structure of the report should follow a broad classification into three parts: 

  Executive  Summary:  It  sets  out,  in  no  more  than  5  pages,  a  summary  of  the 

evaluation’s main conclusions and the supporting main evidence;  

  Main body: The main report must be limited to 50 pages and present, in full, the 
results of the analyses and conclusions arising from the evaluation. It must also 
contain a description of the subject evaluated, the context of the evaluation, and 
the methodology used; and 

  Annexes:  These  must  collate  the  technical  details  of  the  evaluation,  and  must 
include the Terms of Reference, questionnaire templates, interview guides, any 
additional tables or graphics, and references and a full quotation of all sources. 

Draft Report Meeting 

A meeting will be organised in Brussels after the submission of the first draft final report. 
The  evaluator  will  make  a  PowerPoint  presentation  to  the  Steering  Committee  on  the 
main  findings,  conclusions  and  recommendations  of  the  evaluation.  The  date  for  the 
meeting will be agreed between the Steering Committee and the evaluator. The Steering 
Committee will provide comments to the draft final report. The comments should be taken 
into account in the final report.  

While finalising the report and its annexes, the evaluators shall always highlight changes 
(using track changes) and modifications introduced as resulting from the meeting and the 
comments received from DG ECHO Evaluation Sector and the Steering Committee. 

In case of disagreement, the evaluator will provide an argumented reply explaining why 
a certain comment cannot be accepted. In case of substantial disagreements, the evaluator 
may  be  called  for  another  meeting  in  Brussels  to  further  discuss  the  subject  of 
disagreement. The expenses for such a meeting will be covered by the existing budget of 
the Specific Contract. 

Final Report 

On the basis of the comments made by the Steering Committee, the evaluator shall make 
appropriate amendments, insofar as these do not interfere with the independence of the 
evaluator in respect of the conclusions they have reached and the recommendations made. 
The  Executive  Summary  should  be  translated  into  French  and  Portuguese  by  a 
professional translator, once it has been approved by the Steering Committee. 

The Final Report should be accompanied by a PowerPoint presentation in electronic form, 
covering  the  main  conclusions  and  recommendations  of  the  evaluation.  The  evaluator 
may be requested to present the evaluation results once in Brussels to DG ECHO's staff 
and / or stakeholders. 

For a further detailed description of the format required for the Final Report (incl. EU 
Bookshop requirements), see Annex. 

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5.4.  DISSEMINATION AND FOLLOW-UP PHASE 

The evaluation report is an important working tool for DG ECHO, and once finalised it 
will be published in the public domain on the Internet. Its use is intended for DG ECHO's 
operational and policy staff, EU Member States and citizens, and other international and 
national actors.  

Following  the  approval  of  the  Final  Report,  DG  ECHO  will  proceed  with  the 
dissemination and follow-up of the results of the evaluation. 

6.  MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF THE EVALUATION 

The  Evaluation  Sector  of  DG  ECHO  is  responsible  for  the  management  and  the 
monitoring  of  the  evaluation,  in  consultation  with  the  Unit(s)  responsible  for  the 
evaluation  subject.  The  DG  ECHO  Evaluation  Sector,  and  in  particular  the  internal 
manager  assigned  to  the  evaluation,  should  therefore  always  be  kept  informed  and 
consulted by the evaluator and copied on all correspondence with other DG ECHO staff. 

The DG ECHO Evaluation manager is the contact person for the evaluator and shall assist 
the  team  during  their  mission  in  tasks  such  as  providing  documents  and  facilitating 
contacts.  

A Steering Committee, made up of Commission staff involved in the activity evaluated, 
will provide general assistance to and feedback on the evaluation exercise, and discuss 
the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation.  

7.  AMOUNT OF THE CONTRACT 

The maximum budget allocated to this study is 200 000 €. 

8.  TIMETABLE 

The duration of the contract is 7 months starting from 1 June 2017.  

The evaluation starts after the contract has been signed by both parties, and no expenses 
may be incurred before that. The main part of the existing relevant documents  will be 
provided after the signature of the contract. 

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The timing of the following milestones is indicative: 

Timing 

Report 

Meeting 

T+3 weeks 

Draft Inception Report 

T+4 weeks 

Inception meeting 

T+13 weeks 

Draft Progress Report 

T+14 weeks 

T+17 

T+24 weeks 

T+25 weeks 

Report  on  preliminary 
conclusions 
Draft Final Report 

Progress Report meeting 

Draft Final Report meeting 

T+ 28 weeks 

Final Report 

Final Report 

February 2018 

Annex 7 / Page 130 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS 

Free publications: 

•  one copy: 

via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu); 

•  more than one copy or posters/maps: 

from the European Union’s representations (http://ec.europa.eu/represent_en.htm);  
from the delegations in non-EU countries (http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/index_en.htm);  
by contacting the Europe Direct service (http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm) or 
calling 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (Freephone number from anywhere in the EU) (*). 

(*)  The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels 
may charge you). 

Priced publications: 

•  via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu). 

Priced subscriptions: 

•  via one of the sales agents of the Publications Office of the European Union 

(http://publications.europa.eu/others/agents/index_en.htm). 

 
 
 
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doi:10.2795/627752