Opinion of the European Central Bank of 15 February 2018 on conferring new tasks relating to interchange fees for card-based payment transactions to the Bank of Greece (CON/2018/11)
Date: 2018-02-15
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: Greece, bank charges, banking supervision, consumer protection, electronic money, financial services, national law

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 15 February 2018 

on conferring new tasks relating to interchange fees for card-based payment transactions to the 

Bank of Greece 

(CON/2018/11) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On  3  January  2018  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  received  a  request  from  the  Greek  Ministry  of 

Finance  for  an  opinion  on  a  draft  law  on  measures  implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2015/751  of  the 
European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  29  April  2015  on  interchange  fees  for  card-based  payment 
transactions 1 (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC2, as 

the  draft  law  relates  to  the  Bank  of  Greece.  In  accordance  with  the  first  sentence  of  Article 17.5  of  the 

Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft law 

1.1  The  purpose  of  the  draft  law  is  to  introduce  implementing  measures  in  respect  of  Regulation 

(EU) 2015/751,  by  designating  the  competent  authorities  empowered  to  ensure  the  application  of 

its provisions and to impose penalties in cases of infringement. Regulation (EU) 2015/751 imposes 

a maximum cap on interchange fees and lays down technical and business requirements for card-

based  payment  transactions,  which  primarily  aim  to  promote  the  use  of  electronic  payment 

instruments for the benefit of payees and consumers, as well as to create a level playing field and 

to promote competition among players in the market for card payments. 

1.2  The  draft  law  designates  the  Bank  of  Greece  as  the  main  competent  authority  responsible  for 
ensuring  the  enforcement  of  the majority  of  the  provisions  of  Regulation  (EU)  2015/751 3,  and  for 

imposing penalties on payment service providers  in  cases of infringement. Furthermore, the  draft 

law designates the General Secretariat for Commerce and Consumer Protection of the Ministry of 

Economy  and  Development  as  the  competent  authority  responsible  for  ensuring  compliance  with 

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Regulation (EU) 2015/751 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on interchange fees for 
card-based payment transactions (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 1). 
Council  Decision  98/415/EC  of  29 June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 

Articles 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 (except for 8(2)), 9, 10 (except for 10(4)), 11 and 12 of Regulation (EU) 2015/751. 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
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all remaining obligations under Regulation (EU) 2015/7514, i.e. those not assigned to the Bank of 

Greece. 

1.3  More  specifically,  under  the  draft  law,  the  Bank  of  Greece  is  responsible  for  monitoring  and 

ensuring  the  application  of  a  maximum  cap  on  interchange  fees  for  consumer  debit  card 

transactions of no more than 0.20 % of the transaction value, and a cap for consumer credit card 

transactions of no more than 0.30 % of the transaction value, which are applicable to all domestic 

or  cross-border  transactions.  In  addition,  the  Bank  of  Greece  is  responsible  for  monitoring  the 

technical  and  business  requirements  that  will  apply  to  all  categories  of  card-based  payment 

transactions. The most significant of these are: (i) the prohibition of territorial licensing, namely that 

licences  delivered  by  payment  card  schemes  for  issuing  or  acquiring  purposes  should  cover  the 

entire Union territory; (ii) the separation of the payment card schemes and the processing entities 

in  terms  of  accounting,  organisation  and  decision-making  processes;  (iii)  the  prohibition  against 

applying  rules  hindering  or  preventing  co-badging  two  or  more  different  payment  brands  or 

payment  applications;  (iv)  changes  in  respect  of  the  application  of  the  ‘Honour  All  Cards  Rule’, 

whereby payees cannot be forced to accept all cards from a given payment card scheme; (v) the 

prohibition  against  preventing  payees  from  steering  consumers  to  the  use  of  any  payment 

instrument of their preference. In addition, the Bank of Greece is responsible for monitoring rules 

which  aim  at  increasing  transparency  in  respect  of  charges  applied  to  payees,  such  as:  (i)  the 

unblending and breakdown of the total fees charged to payees with respect to each category and 

brand  of  payment  card;  and  (ii)  the  obligation  of  the  payment  service  provider  to  provide  certain 

information  relating  to  individual  transactions  to  the  payee.  Finally,  the  responsibilities  conferred 

upon the Bank of Greece also include the imposition of penalties on payment service providers in 

cases of infringement of the abovementioned rules. 

1.4  The draft law also designates the General Secretariat for Commerce and Consumer Protection as 

the competent authority responsible for ensuring that consumers may obtain two or more different 

payment brands on a card-based payment instrument from a payment service provider, as well as 

for ensuring payees’ obligation to display which cards they accept at the entrance of their business 

and  at  the  till  in  a  clear  and  unequivocal  manner.  The  General  Secretariat  for  Commerce  and 

Consumer  Protection  is  also  empowered  to  impose  penalties  in  cases  of  infringement  of  the 

abovementioned rules. 

2. 

General observations 

In this opinion, the ECB will only assess those provisions of the draft law that may impact on the role and 

tasks of the Bank of Greece as a national central bank (NCB), national supervisory authority and member 

of  the  Eurosystem  and  the  European  System  of  Central  Banks  (ESCB).  Consequently,  this  opinion  will 

not address the question of whether the draft law, if adopted as proposed, would represent an effective 

means of implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/751 in Greece. 

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Articles 8(2) and 10(4) of Regulation (EU) 2015/751. 

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3. 

New tasks of the Bank of Greece 

3.1  The draft law expands the current supervisory functions of the Bank of Greece, by assigning to it 

the  responsibility  for  supervising  interchange  fees  in  respect  of  payment  service  providers  and 

payment  card  schemes  and  other  technical  and  business  requirements  relating  to  card-based 

payment  transactions.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  Bank  of  Greece  is  already  the  competent 
authority  for  supervising  payment  service  providers  pursuant  to  Law  No  3862/20105,  which 
transposed  Directive  2007/64/ΕC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council6,  Directive 
2007/44/ΕC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council 7  and  Commission  Directive 
2010/16/ΕU8 into the Greek legal order. However, the Bank of Greece does not have any statutory 

powers in the fields of competition and consumer protection, nor does it exercise any supervisory 

tasks over payment service providers or payment card schemes as regards their compliance with 

competition and consumer protection rules. Thus, the conferral upon the Bank of Greece under the 

draft  law  of  the  power  to  monitor  and  ensure  the  compliance  of  payment  service  providers, 

payment card schemes and payees with their obligations under Regulation (EU) 2015/751, and to 

impose  penalties  in  cases  of  infringement  pursuant  to  Article  59(2)  of  Law  No  4261/2014,  are 

considered to be new tasks of the Bank of Greece.  

3.2  The ECB underlines that a proposed conferral of tasks on an NCB in the ESCB must be assessed 

against the prohibition on monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty. For the purposes of 
that  prohibition,  Article  1(1)(b)(ii)  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  3603/939  defines  ‘other  type  of 

credit facility’ as, inter alia, ‘any financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties’.  

Ensuring that Member States implement a sound budgetary policy is one of the key objectives of 
the  monetary  financing  prohibition,  which  may  not  be  circumvented10.  Therefore,  the  task  of 

financing  measures,  which  are  normally  the  responsibility  of  the  Member  States,  and  which  are 

financed from their budgetary sources rather than by the NCBs, must not be entrusted to NCBs. To 

decide what constitutes financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties, which can 

be translated as the provision of central bank financing outside the scope of central bank tasks, it is 

necessary  to  carry  out,  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  an  assessment  of  whether  the  task  to  be 

undertaken  by  an  NCB  is  a  central  bank  task  or  a  government  task,  i.e.  a  task  within  the 

responsibility  of  the  Member  States.  In  other  words,  adequate  safeguards  must  be  in  place  to 

5   

6  

7  

8   

9  

10  

Νόμος  υπ’  αριθμ.  3862/2010  «Προσαρμογή  της  ελληνικής  νομοθεσίας  στις  Οδηγίες  2007/64/ΕΚ,  2007/44/ΕΚ  και 
2010/16/ΕΕ  που  αφορούν  υπηρεσίες  πληρωμών  στην  εσωτερική  αγορά,  προληπτική  αξιολόγηση  προτάσεων 
απόκτησης συμμετοχής σε επιχειρήσεις του χρηματοπιστωτικού τομέα και άλλες διατάξεις», [ΦΕΚ A/113/13.7.2010]. 
Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in 
the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 
97/5/EC (OJ L 319, 5.12.2007, p. 1). 
Directive  2007/44/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  5  September  2007  amending  Council 
Directive  92/49/EEC  and  Directives  2002/83/EC,  2004/39/EC,  2005/68/EC  and  2006/48/EC  as  regards  procedural 
rules  and  evaluation  criteria  for  the  prudential  assessment  of  acquisitions  and  increase  of  holdings  in  the  financial 
sector (OJ L 247, 21.9.2007, p. 1). 
Commission Directive 2010/16/EU of 9 March 2010 amending Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and 
of  the  Council  as  regards  the  exclusion  of  a  certain  institution  from  the  scope  of  application  (OJ  L  60,  10.3.2010, 
p. 15). 

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  3603/93  of  13  December  1993  specifying  definitions  for  the  application  of  the 
prohibitions referred to in Articles 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1). 
Article  123  of  the  Treaty  also  serves  the  objective  of  maintaining  price  stability  and  reinforces  central  bank 
independence. 

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ensure that circumventions of the objective of the monetary financing  prohibition of maintaining a 

sound budgetary policy of Member States do not take place. 

3.3  As part of its discretion in the exercise of its duty, on the basis of Article 271(d) of the Treaty and 

Article 35.6 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 

Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), to ensure that NCBs honour the obligations laid down 

by the Treaty, the Governing Council has endorsed safeguards of that kind in the form of criteria for 

determining what may be seen as falling within the scope of a public sector’s obligation within the 

meaning of Article 1(1)(b)(ii) of Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 or, in other words, what constitutes a 

government task as follows:  

First, central bank tasks are in particular those tasks that are related to  the tasks that have been 

conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. These tasks are 

mainly defined in Article 127(2), (5) and (6) and Article 128(1) of the Treaty, as well as Article 22 

and Article 25.1 of the Statute of the ESCB.  

Second,  Article  14.4  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB  allows  NCBs  to  perform  ‘other  functions’,  new 

tasks, i.e. tasks that are not related to tasks that have been conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs, 

are  not  precluded  per  se.  However,  new  tasks  that  are  undertaken  by  an  NCB  and  which  are 

atypical of NCB tasks or which are clearly discharged on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of 

the government or other public sector entities should be considered government tasks.  

Third, an important criterion for qualifying a new task as atypical of an NCB task or as being clearly 

discharged  on  behalf  of  and  in  the  exclusive  interest  of  the  government  or  other  public  sector 

entities  is  the  impact  of  the  task  on  the  institutional,  financial  and  personal  independence  of  the 

NCB.  

In particular, the following aspects should be taken into account:  

(a)  whether  the  performance  of  the  new  task  creates  conflicts  of  interest  with  existing  central 

bank tasks which are not adequately addressed and does not necessarily complement those 

existing  central  bank  tasks.  If  a  conflict  of  interest  arises  between  existing  and  new  tasks, 

sufficient  safeguards  to  mitigate  that  conflict  should  be  in  place.  The  complementarity 

between a new task and the existing central bank tasks should not be interpreted broadly, so 

as  to  lead  to  the  creation  of  an  indefinite  chain  of  ancillary  tasks.  Such  complementarity 

should also be examined in relation to the financing of those tasks; 

(b)  whether without new financial resources the performance of the new task is disproportionate 

to  the  NCB’s  financial  or  organisational  capacity  and  may  have  a  negative  impact  on  the 

capacity to perform properly the existing central bank tasks; 

(c)  whether  the  performance  of  the  new  task  fits  into  the  institutional  set-up  of  the  NCB  in  the 

light of central bank independence and accountability considerations;  

(d)  whether the performance of the new task harbours substantial financial risks; 

(e)  whether the performance of the new task exposes the members of the NCB decision-making 

bodies  to  political  risks  which  are  disproportionate  and  may  also  have  an  impact  on  their 

personal  independence  and,  in  particular,  on  the  guarantee  of  term  of  office  set  out  in 

Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 

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3.4  On the basis of the criteria set out above, the following paragraphs assess whether the new tasks 

of the Bank of Greece are in line with the monetary financing prohibition. 

3.4.1  Tasks related to the tasks conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of 

the ESCB 

The  tasks  conferred  upon  the  Bank  of  Greece  in  relation  to  ensuring  enforcement  of  interchange 

fee caps between the issuing and the acquiring banks of card-based payment instruments as well 

as compliance  with the requirements of Regulation (EU) 2015/751  by  payment service providers, 

card payment schemes and payees are not among the central banking tasks listed in Article 127(2) 

and (5) of the Treaty (they have not, in other words, been conferred upon the NCBs under primary 

Union law). In addition, the tasks in question appear to go beyond the scope of the existing tasks of 

the Bank of Greece as supervisory authority of payment service providers, to the extent that there 

is  no  Greek  law  empowering  the  Bank  of  Greece  to  exercise  supervision  of  payment  card 

schemes, or which grants any competences in the fields of competition and consumer protection. 
In Greece, competences in the field of competition lie with the Hellenic Competition Commission11, 

whereas  competences  in  the  field  of  consumer  protection  lie  with  the  General  Secretariat  of 
Commerce  and  Consumer  Protection12.  The  General  Secretariat  for  Commerce  and  Consumer 
Protection  is  the  competent  authority  under  national  law13  to  receive  complaints  from  consumers 

and impose penalties on merchants where they violate their obligation to display which cards they 

accept  at  the  entrance  of  their  business  and  at  the  till  in  a  clear  and  unequivocal  manner.  The 

conferral of further tasks related to consumer protection on the General Secretariat for Commerce 

and  Consumer  Protection  is  within  the  abovementioned  division  of  competences  between  the 

national authorities. 

At  the  same  time,  the  new  tasks  complement  existing  supervisory  tasks  as  the  Bank  of  Greece 

already supervises payment institutions as payment service providers. These existing supervisory 

tasks must not be  viewed in isolation from the objective  of safeguarding the smooth and efficient 
functioning of the payment systems14. In this respect, pursuant to Law No 3862/2010, the Bank of 

Greece  is  responsible  for  authorising,  supervising  and  withdrawing  the  authorisation  of  payment 

institutions  providing  payment  services  after  assessing  their  programme  of  operations,  business 

plan,  the  holding  of  initial  capital  and  own  funds,  their  governance  arrangements,  internal  control 

mechanisms, structural organisation, and the identity  of the directors and persons responsible for 

their  management.  In  this  sense,  the  Bank  of  Greece’s  new  tasks  could  be  regarded,  in  the 

particular  context  of  this  Regulation,  as  also  related  to  the  task  conferred  upon  the  ESCB  in  the 

11  

12  

13  

14   

The  Hellenic  Competition  Commission  is  responsible  for  the  enforcement  of  Law  3959/2011  on  competition  (as 
amended)  and  Union  law  on  competition,  applied  on  the  basis  of  Articles  101  and  102  TFEU  in  accordance  with 
Article  5  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1/2003  of  16  December  2002  on  the  implementation  of  the  rules  on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1).  
The  General  Secretariat  for  Commerce  and  Consumer  Protection  is  responsible  for  consumer  protection  under 
Article  1  of  Presidential  Decree  147/2017  (Οργανισμός  του  Υπουργείου  Οικονομίας  και  Ανάπτυξης,  ΦΕΚ  (Α 
192/13.12,2017)). 

By  virtue  of  Article  66(3)  of  Law  No  4446/2016  «Πτωχευτικός  Κώδικας,  Διοικητική  Δικαιοσύνη,  Τέλη-Παράβολα, 
Οικειοθελής  αποκάλυψη  φορολογητέας  ύλης  παρελθόντων  ετών,  Ηλεκτρονικές  συναλλαγές,  Τροποποιήσεις  του  ν. 
4270/2014 και λοιπές διατάξεις», (ΦΕΚ Α' 240/22.12.2016). 

See Article 2(e) of the Statute of Bank of Greece. 

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fourth  indent  of  Article  127(2)  of  the  Treaty,  as  well  as  in  the  fourth  indent  of  Article  3.1  of  the 

Statute of the ESCB, based on the understanding that these tasks are ancillary to the promotion of 
the smooth operation of payment systems15. 

3.4.2  Tasks which are atypical of NCB tasks 

Regulation  (EU)  2015/751  grants  Member  States  wide  discretionary  power  in  determining  the 

competent authorities which are responsible for monitoring compliance with its provisions, provided 

that  the  designated  authorities  have  adequate  resources  for  the  performance  of  the  duties 
assigned to them. A number of Member States 16 have already designated their NCBs as the sole 

competent authorities to ensure compliance with the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2017/751, while 
many  other  Member  States17  have  allocated  these  tasks  between  their  NCBs  and  other  public 

authorities  with  competences  in  the  fields  of  competition  and/or  consumer  protection.  There  are 

also Member States that have not assigned any of these tasks to their NCBs. As the majority of the 

Member  States  have  allocated  at  least  some  of  the  tasks  relating  to  the  application  of  the 

Regulation  to  their  NCBs,  the  new  tasks  conferred  upon  the  Bank  of  Greece  would  thus  not  be 

regarded as atypical of NCB tasks. 

In  addition,  the  ECB  has  consistently  expressed  the  view  that  consumer  protection  tasks 

discharged by an NCB may be regarded as central banking tasks provided that such tasks do not 

interfere with the performance of the NCB’s ESCB-related tasks, and to the extent that those tasks 

complement  existing  supervisory  powers  and  thus  contribute  to  the  soundness  of  the  financial 
market  and  the  preservation  of  confidence  in  the  marketplace18.  Without  prejudice  to  the  ECB’s 
expressed reservations as regards the assignment of pure competition related tasks to NCBs19, the 

new tasks assigned to the Bank of Greece by the draft law could, as further explained under 3.4.1 

above, be regarded as ancillary to the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems, and, 

as  such,  they  cannot  be  regarded  as  atypical  of  an  NCB,  nor  being  discharged  in  the  exclusive 

interest of the government.  

15  
16  

17  

18  
19  

See paragraph 3.1.3 of Opinion CON/2016/19 and paragraph 2.4.1 of Opinion CON/2017/2. 
This is the case in Bulgaria (Article 122(2) and Articles 124 and 139 of the Law on Payment Services and Payment 
Systems), Hungary (Article 41(19) of Law CXXXIX of 2013 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank and Law LXXXV of 2009), 
Lithuania (Article 62 of Law No XII-2561 of 30 June 2016 on Payments), Malta (Regulation 2 of Legal Notice 326 of 
2015), Spain (Law 18/2014 of 15 October 2014), and Slovenia (based on the list of competent authorities available 
website 
on 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/national_competent_authorities.pdf). 

Commission’s 

European 

the 

This is the case in Belgium (Article XV.18/4 of the Code of Economic Law), Croatia (Article 4 paragraphs 1, 2, 5 and 
6, and Article 6 of the Law NN 50/2016 on Implementation of EU Regulations Governing Payment Systems), Ireland 
(Regulation 6 of Statutory Instrument No 550 of 2015 and of Statutory Instrument No 292 of 2016), Italy (Article 3 of 
legislative Decree No 218 of 15 December 2017 and Article 34-quater of the Law on payment services), Netherlands 
(Article  2(r)  and  Article  5  and  Annex  2  of  the  Administrative  Order  of  17  March  2017  amending  the  Administrative 
Order implementing EU Regulations on Financial Markets), Poland (Article 14 of the Law on Payment Services of 19 
August 2011 (Dz.U. 2017, item 2003)), Slovakia (Article 2(3) of Law 492/2009 Coll., Law 747/2004 Coll., Article 2b of 
Law No 291/2002 Coll., Article 36(1) of Law No 80/1997 Coll., Law No 514/2003 Coll., Article 90 of Law No 492/2009 
Coll.), and the Czech Republic (based on the list of competent authorities available on the European Commission’s 
website http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/national_competent_authorities.pdf). 
See paragraphs 3.2 and 4.4 of Opinion CON/2016/34 and paragraph 2.3.2 of Opinion CON/2017/3. 

See paragraphs 3.3.4.1, 3.3.4.2 and 3.3.4.3.1 of Opinion CON/2016/54. 

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3.4.3  Extent to which performance of the new task creates conflicts of interest with existing central bank 

tasks 

While the new tasks broadly appear to be of the same nature as the supervisory tasks of the Bank 

of Greece, conflicts of interest may arise in the course of the discharge of these new tasks. As with 

other consumer protection tasks, sufficient mitigation measures should be in place to ensure that in 

the  event  of  a  conflict  of  interest  supervisory  considerations  prevail.  Also,  the  Bank  of  Greece 

would  need  to  mitigate  any  potential  conflicts  of  interest  between  its  new  tasks  and  its  financial 

stability  mandate  by  ensuring  that  financial  stability  considerations  are  not  compromised  when 

imposing penalties for a breach of an obligation under Regulation (EU) 2015/751.  

3.4.4  Extent  to  which  performance  of  the  new  task  is  disproportionate  to  the  financial  or  organisational 

capacity of the Bank of Greece 

The  principle  of  financial  independence  requires  that  Member  States  do  not  put  their  NCBs  in  a 

position where they have insufficient financial resources to carry out their ESCB-related tasks, from 

an  operational  and  financial  perspective.  Furthermore,  each  NCB  concerned  should  have 

additional financial and human resources at its disposal to ensure that the new tasks can be carried 

out  without  impacting  on  the  NCB’s  operational  or  financial  capacity  to  perform  its  ESCB-related 

tasks.  In  order  to  ensure  that  the  Bank  of  Greece  has  the  capacity  to  perform  its  ESCB-related 

tasks,  the  Bank  of  Greece must  be  in  a  position  to  avail  itself  of  the  necessary  resources  for  the 

performance  of  its  new  tasks,  which  is  also  required  under  Article  13(5)  of  Regulation  (EU) 

2015/751.  For  instance,  the  Bank  of  Greece  will  be  required  to  impose  additional  reporting 
obligations on  payment service  providers and  payment card schemes20, and  will need to allocate 

additional  human  resources  and  IT  infrastructure  in  order  to  collect,  process  and  analyse  the 

relevant data. Further costs may be incurred in the context of imposing penalties. Nevertheless, the 

draft law does not specify the resources to be used by the Bank of Greece for the discharge of its 

new  tasks,  nor  does  it  provide  an  estimate  of  the  direct  costs  likely  to  be  incurred  in  the 

performance  of  these  tasks.  Thus,  it  cannot  be  excluded  that  the  new  tasks  will  impact  on  the 

regular budget of the Bank of Greece. The ECB therefore notes that it is important that adequate 

resources  are  available  to  the  Bank  of  Greece  in  order  to  ensure  that  it  can  properly  perform  its 

tasks, while maintaining, at all times, sufficient financial means to carry out its ESCB-related tasks 

and national tasks and to meet its administrative and operational expenses. 

3.4.5  Extent to which performance of the new task fits into the institutional set-up of the Bank of Greece, 

in the light of central bank independence and accountability considerations 

Given  the  complementarity  of  the  new  tasks  with  the  existing  tasks  of  the  Bank  of  Greece,  as 

further  explained  under  section  3.4.1  above,  in  particular  in  the  field  of  supervision  of  payment 

institutions, they appear to broadly fit into the institutional set-up of the Bank of Greece. That said, it 

is most likely that additional organisational units may need to be established to accommodate the 

new  tasks.  Also,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  assignment  of  the  new  tasks  to  the  Bank  of  Greece 

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See Recital 24 of Regulation (EU) 2015/751. 

7 

                                                 
ECB-PUBLIC 

deviates from the well-established national allocation of competencies under the current legal and 

institutional framework in the fields of competition and consumer protection. 

3.4.6  Extent to which the performance of tasks harbours substantial financial risks 

In the absence of any provision in the draft law excluding the liability of the Bank of Greece in the 

discharge  of  its  new  tasks,  the  Bank  of  Greece  could  potentially  be  held  liable  for  damages  in 

accordance with the rules of Greek law on liability applicable to the Bank of Greece. 

3.4.7  Extent to which performance of the new task exposes members of the decision-making bodies of 

the Bank of Greece to disproportionate political risks and impacts on their personal independence 

The  performance  of  the  new  tasks  does  not  appear  to  expose  the  decision-making  bodies  of  the 

Bank  of  Greece  to  any  disproportionate  political  risk  or  to  have  an  impact  on  their  personal 

independence 

3.4.8  Conclusion 

Without  prejudice  to  the  ECB’s  expressed  reservations  with  regard  to  the  assignment  of  pure 

competition tasks to the NCBs, the new tasks conferred upon the Bank of Greece could, as further 

explained  under  section  3.4.1  above,  be  regarded  as  central  banking  tasks  based  on  the 

understanding  that  they  are  complementary  to  the  Bank  of  Greece’s  existing  tasks  in  the  area  of 

supervision  of  payment  service  providers  and,  ultimately,  ancillary  to  the  task  of  promoting  the 

smooth  operation  of  payment  systems.  These  tasks  have  been  conferred  on  many  NCBs  in  the 

ESCB  and  therefore  cannot  generally  be  regarded  as  being  atypical  of  an  NCB  or  as  being 

discharged in the exclusive interest of the government. On the  other hand, some Member States 

have chosen to allocate these tasks between their NCBs and other competent  authorities. In this 

respect, it is noted that the performance of these tasks under Regulation (EU) 2015/751 requires 

expertise  in  the  fields  of  competition  and  consumer  protection,  neither  of  which  falls  within  the 

exclusive competence of the Bank of Greece under Greek law.  

Additionally,  it  is  essential  that  the  new  tasks  assigned  to  the  Bank  of  Greece  do  not  have  a 

negative impact on the institutional and financial independence of the Bank of Greece and do not 

adversely affect its capacity to carry out its ESCB-related tasks or central bank tasks. To this end, it 

must  be  ensured  that  the  Bank  of  Greece  can  avail  itself  of  the  necessary  resources  for  the 

performance  of  its  new  tasks.  Moreover,  sufficient  mitigation  measures  should  be  in  place  to 

adequately address any potential conflicts of interest between the new tasks of the Bank of Greece 

and its existing supervision and financial stability mandates. 

The ECB recommends that the Greek Ministry of Finance take the above considerations into  

8 

account in deciding on whether to confer the new tasks on the Bank of Greece.  

ECB-PUBLIC 

This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 15 February 2018. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Mario DRAGHI 

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