Opinion of the European Central Bank of 31 January 2018 on key information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (CON/2018/5)
Date: 2018-01-31
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: Slovenia, administrative sanction, central bank, credit institution, disclosure of information, financial supervision, insurance, national implementing measure, regulation of investments, supervisory body

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 31 January 2018  

on key information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products  

(CON/2018/5) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On  27  December  2017  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  received  a  request  from  the  Slovenian 

Ministry of Finance for an ECB opinion on a draft law implementing Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 on 

key  information  documents  for  packaged  retail  and  insurance-based  investment  products  (the  “draft 

law”.) 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC1 as 

the  draft  law  relates  to  Banka  Slovenije.  In  accordance  with  the  first  sentence  of  Article  17.5  of  the 

Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft law 

1.1  The  main  purpose  of  the  draft  law  is  the  implementation  and  application  of  Regulation  (EU) 
No 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council2 into Slovenian legislation.  

1.2  The draft law designates the competent authorities in Slovenia for supervising the key documents 

for  PRIIPs  pursuant  to  Regulation  (EU)  No  1286/2014.  In  this  respect,  the  draft  law  designates 

the  following  three  competent  authorities:  Banka  Slovenije,  the  Insurance  Supervision  Agency 

(Agencija za zavarovalni nadzor) and the Securities Market Agency (Agencija za trg vrednostnih 

papirjev). Banka Slovenije is designated as the competent authority for credit institutions, which 

are  to  be  regarded  as  manufacturers  of  or  persons  selling  PRIIPs  pursuant  to  Regulation  (EU) 

No 1286/2014.   

1.3  Pursuant  to  the  draft  law  Banka  Slovenije  is  granted,  in  the  context  of  its  supervisory  role,  the 

power to impose administrative sanctions and measures listed in points (a) to (d) of Article 24(2) 

of  Regulation (EU)  No  1286/2014  and  to  impose  administrative  fines  in  misdemeanour 

proceedings in accordance with point (e) of the same Article..  

1  

2 

Council  Decision  98/415/EC  of  29 June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 

Regulation  (EU)  No  1286/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26  November  2014  on  key 
information  documents  for  packaged  retail  and  insurance-based  investment  products  (PRIIPs)  (OJ  L  352, 
9.12.2014, p. 1).  

 
 
 
 
                                                 
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1.4  The  draft  law  provides  that  each  competent  authority  may  introduce,  as  a  part  of  its  applicable 

tariffs, a new fee to be paid by supervised entities for performing supervisory duties pursuant to 

the draft law and Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014. 

2. 

Observations 

2.1  This  opinion  does  not  address  the  issue  of  whether  the  draft  law  effectively  implements  and 

applies Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014. The ECB only assesses those provisions of the draft law 

that  may  impact  on  the  role  and  tasks  of  Banka  Slovenije  as  an  NCB  and  as  a  member  of  the 

Eurosystem and of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).  

2.2  The  supervision  of  financial  markets  is  shared  in  Slovenia  between  three  institutions:  Banka 

Slovenije, the Insurance Supervision Agency and the Securities Market Agency. Currently Banka 

Slovenije has a limited role in relation to the supervision of PRIIPs. The Securities Market Agency 

is  primarily  responsible  for  supervising  financial  instruments  markets,  and  therefore  also  for 
supervising investment products3. In performing its prudential supervisory tasks Banka Slovenije 

also takes into account the risks that arise for credit institutions active in the investment products 

market,  however  it  does  not  supervise  the  market  conduct  of  credit  institutions  in  relation  to 

investment  products,  with  the  exception  of  structured  deposits  as  defined  in  point  43  of 
Article 4(1)  of  Directive  2014/65/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council4,  for  which 

Banka Slovenije is responsible for supervising the market conduct of credit institutions active on 

that market. As regards the insurance sector, Banka Slovenije’s role is limited to issuing licences 
to  banks  for  insurance  brokerage  services5.  The  draft  law  therefore  confers  a  new  task  upon 

Banka  Slovenije  namely  that  of  supervising  the  compliance  of  credit  institutions  with  the 

provisions  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  1286/2014  and  the  draft  law,  which  are  deemed  to  be 

manufacturers  of  or  persons  selling  PRIIPs,  including  the  provisions  of  Regulation  (EU) 

No 1286/2014 on imposing administrative sanctions and measures.  

2.3  The ECB underlines that a proposed conferral of a new task on a national central bank (NCB) in 

the  ESCB must be assessed against  the  prohibition on monetary financing under Article 123 of 

the  Treaty.  For  the  purposes  of  that  prohibition,  Article  1(1)(b)(ii)  of  Council  Regulation  (EC) 
No 3603/936 defines ‘other type of credit facility’, inter alia, as ‘any financing of the public sector’s 

obligations vis-à-vis third parties’. 

2.4  Ensuring that Member States implement a sound budgetary policy is one of the key objectives of 
the  monetary  financing  prohibition,  which  may  not  be  circumvented7.  Therefore,  the  task  of 

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4  

5  

6  

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The Law on Financial Instruments Market (2007). 
Directive  2014/65/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  15  May  2014  on  markets  in  financial 
instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 349). 
Article  558(5)  of  the  Law  on  Insurance  (2015)  and  Article  97(2)  in  connection  with  Article  6  of  the  Law  on 
Banking(2015). 
Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  3603/93  of  13  December  1993  specifying  definitions  for  the  application  of  the 
prohibitions referred to in Articles 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 1).   

Article  123  of  the  Treaty  also  serves  the  objective  of  maintaining  price  stability  and  reinforces  central  bank 
independence. 

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financing measures,  which  are  normally the  responsibility of the  Member States, and  which  are 

financed from their budgetary sources rather than by the NCBs, must not be entrusted to NCBs. 

To decide what constitutes financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties, which 

can  be  translated  as  the  provision  of  central  bank  financing  outside  the  scope  of  central  bank 

tasks, it is necessary to carry out, on a case-by-case basis, an assessment of whether the task to 

be  undertaken  by  an  NCB  is  a  central  bank  task  or  a  government  task,  i.e.  a  task  within  the 

responsibility  of  the  Member  States.  In  other  words,  adequate  safeguards  must  be  in  place  to 

ensure that circumventions of the objective of the monetary financing prohibition of maintaining a 

sound budgetary policy of Member States do not take place. 

2.5  As part of its discretion in the exercise of its duty, on the basis of Article 271(d) of the Treaty and 

Article 35.6 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 

Bank  (hereinafter  the  ‘Statute  of  the  ESCB’),  to  ensure  that  NCBs  honour  the  obligations  laid 

down by the Treaty, the Governing Council has endorsed safeguards of that kind in the form of 

criteria for determining what may be seen as falling within the scope of a public sector’s obligation 

within  the  meaning  of  Article  1(1)(b)(ii)  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  3603/93  or,  in  other  words,  what 

constitutes a government task as follows: 

First, central bank tasks are in particular those tasks that are related to the tasks that have been 

conferred upon the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. These tasks 

are  mainly  defined  in  Article  127(2),  (5)  and  (6)  and  Article  128(1)  of  the  Treaty,  as  well  as 

Article 22 and Article 25.1 of the Statute of the ESCB. 

Second, as Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB allows NCBs to perform ‘other functions’, new 

tasks,  i.e.  tasks  that  are  not  related  to  tasks  that  have  been  conferred  upon  the  ECB  and  the 

NCBs, are not precluded per se. However, new tasks that are undertaken by an NCB and which 

are  atypical  of  NCB  tasks  or  which  are  clearly  discharged  on  behalf  of,  and  in  the  exclusive 

interest  of  the  government  or  of  other  public  sector  entities  should  be  considered  government 

tasks. 

Third,  an  important  criterion  for  qualifying  a  new  task  as  atypical  of  an  NCB  task  or  as  being 

clearly on behalf of and in the exclusive interest of the government or other public sector entities 

is the impact of the task on the institutional, financial and personal independence of that NCB. 

In particular, the following aspects should be taken into account: 

(a)   whether the performance of the new task creates conflicts of interest with existing central 

bank  tasks  which  are  not  adequately  addressed  and  does  not  necessarily  complement 

those existing central bank tasks. If a conflict of interest arises between existing and new 

tasks,  sufficient  safeguards 

to  mitigate 

that  conflict  should  be 

in  place.  The 

complementarity  between  a  new  task  and  the  existing  central  bank  tasks  should  not  be 

interpreted  broadly,  so  as  to  lead  to  the  creation  of  an  indefinite  chain  of  ancillary  tasks. 

Such complementarity should be examined in relation to the financing of those tasks; 

(b)  whether  without  new 

financial  resources 

the  performance  of 

the  new 

task 

is 

disproportionate to the NCB’s financial or organisational capacity, and may have a negative 

impact on the capacity to perform properly the existing central bank tasks; 

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(c)   whether the performance of the new task fits into the institutional set-up of the NCB in the 

light of central bank independence and accountability considerations; 

(d)  whether the performance of the new task harbours substantial financial risks; 

(e)  whether  the  performance  of  the  new  task  exposes  the  members  of  the  NCB  decision-

making bodies to political risks which are disproportionate and may also have an impact on 

their personal independence and, in particular, on the guarantee of term of office set out in 

Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 

3. 

Specific observations  

3.1  New tasks of Banka Slovenije  

On the basis of the criteria set out in paragraph 2.5, the following paragraphs assess whether the 

new task of Banka Slovenije is in line with the monetary financing prohibition. 

3.1.1  New  tasks  related  to  the  tasks  conferred  upon  the  ECB  and  the  NCBs  by  the  Treaty  and  the 

Statute of the ESCB  

Supervising compliance with the provisions of the draft law and Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014, 

including  the  provisions  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  1286/2014  on  imposing  administrative  sanctions 

and measures, is not among the basic central banking tasks listed in Article 127(2) or (5) of the 

Treaty or otherwise conferred upon the NCBs by the Statute of the ESCB. Although the new task 

conferred on Banka Slovenije relates to supervising  credit institutions’ compliance with Union law 

requirements, it does not form part of the prudential supervisory tasks of Banka Slovenije. Banka 

Slovenije’s  new  task  relates  mainly  to  the  protection  of  consumers.  Against  this  backdrop,  the 

new  task  conferred  on  Banka  Slovenije  under  the  draft  law  is  not  directly  related  to  the  tasks 

conferred on the ECB and the NCBs by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. Consequently, a 

careful  assessment  of  the  conferral  of  this  task  on  Banka  Slovenije  is  required  to  determine 

whether it constitutes a government task, and whether the related funding gives rise to monetary 
financing concerns8.  

3.1.2  Tasks which are atypical of NCB tasks  

The  new  task  conferred  on  Banka  Slovenije  by  the  draft  law  does  not  appear  to  be  atypical  of 
NCB tasks. While the majority of Member States have designated national capital markets9 and 

8  

9  

See,  for  example,  paragraph  3.4.1  of  Opinion  CON/2017/12,  paragraph  2.2.1  of  Opinion  CON/2017/32, 
paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2017/43 and paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2017/52. 
The following Member States have designated their national capital markets supervisors as either their sole or one 
of  their  competent  authorities  under  Regulation  (EU)  No  1286/2014:  Austria  (Finanzmarktaufsicht  –  the  Austrian 
Financial  Market  Authority),  Belgium  (Autorité  des  Services  et  Marches  Financiers  –  Belgian  Financial  Services 
and  Markets  Authority),  Bulgaria  (Financial  Supervision  Commission),  Cyprus  (Securities  and  Exchange 
Commission  –  one  of  the  competent  authorities),  Denmark  (Finanstilsynet  –  Danish  Financial  Supervisory 
Authority),  Estonia  (Finantsinspektsioon  –  the  Estonian  Financial  Supervisory  Authority),  France  (l'Authorité  des 
marchés  financiers  –  the  French  Financial  Markets  Regulator;  one  of  the  competent  authorities),  Germany 
(Bundesanstalt  für  Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht  –  the German  Federal  Financial  Supervisory  Authority),  Finland 
(Finanssivalvonta  - the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority), Italy (Commissione Nazionale per le Società et la 
Borsa  –  Italian  Companies  and  Exchange  Commission  –  one  of  the  competent  authorities),  Latvia  (Finanšu  un 
kapitãla tirgus komisijas – the Latvian Financial and Capital Market Commission), Malta (Malta Financial Services 
Authority),  Netherlands  (Autoriteit  Financiële  Markten  –  Dutch  Authority  for  the  Financial  Markets),  Poland 

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insurance supervisors10 as their competent authorities under Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014, the 
ECB  has  identified  a  number  of  Member  States,  including  Cyprus11,  the  Czech  Republic12, 
Hungary13,  Ireland14  and  Slovakia15,  where  at  least  part  of  the  tasks  under  Regulation  (EU) 
1286/1014 have been conferred on NCBs16.  

3.1.3  In addition, Banka Slovenije’s new task related to the supervision of PRIIPs does not appear to 

be atypical also in the light of the consumer protection roles which are currently also fulfilled by 

numerous ESCB NCBs in the field of financial services. The ECB has consistently expressed the 

view that consumer protection tasks discharged by an NCB may be regarded as central banking 

tasks provided that such tasks do not interfere with the performance of the NCB’s ESCB-related 

tasks,  and  to  the  extent  that  those  tasks  complement  existing  supervisory  powers  and  thus 

contribute  to  the  soundness  of  the  financial  market  and  the  preservation  of  confidence  in  the 

marketplace. 

3.1.4  Impact of the new task on the independence of Banka Slovenije 

The potential impact of the new task on the institutional, financial and personal independence of 

Banka Slovenije must also be taken into consideration. 

(Komisja  Nadzoru  Finansowego  –  Polish  Financial  Supervision  Authority)  and  Sweden  (Finansinspektionen  – 
Swedish  Financial  Supervisory  Authority).  In  addition,  the  following  Member  States  are  in  the  process  of 
designating  their  national  capital  markets  supervisors  as  either  their  sole  or  one  of  their  competent  authorities: 
Croatia  (Hrvatska  Agencija  za  Nador  Financijskih  Usluga  –  Croatian  Financial  Services  Supervisory  Agency), 
Greece  (Hellenic  Capital  Market  Commission  –  one  of  the  competent  authorities),  Luxembourg  (Commission  de 
surveillance  du  secteur  financier  –  Luxembourg  Commission  for  Supervision  of  the  Financial  Sector;  one  of  the 
competent  authorities),  Portugal  (Commisao  do  Mercato  de  Valores  Mobiliaros  –  Portuguese  Securities  Market 
Commission;  one of the competent authorities), Romania (Financial Supervisory Authority) and Spain (Comisión 
Nacional  del  Mercado  de  Valores  –  Spanish  National  Securities  Market  Commission  one  of  the  competent 
authorities).  

The following Member states have designated their national insurance supervisors as either  their sole or one of 
their competent authorities under Regulation (EU) 1286/2014: Cyprus (Superintendent of Insurance – one of the 
competent  authorities),  France  (l'Authorité  de  contrôle  prudential  et  de  résolution  –  the  French  Prudential 
Supervision  and  Resolution  Authority;  one  of  the  competent  authorities)  and  Italy  (Istituto  per  la  Vigilanza  sulle 
Assicurazioni  –  Italian  Institute  for  Insurance  Supervision;  one  of  the  competent  authorities).  In  addition,  the 
following Member States are in the process of designating their national insurance supervisors as their sole or one 
of their competent authorities: Luxembourg (Commissariat aux assurances – Luxembourg Insurance Commission; 
one  of  the  competent  authorities),  Portugal  (Autoridade  de  Supervisão  de  Seguros  e  Fundos  de  Pensões  – 
Portuguese  Insurance  and  Pension  Funds  Supervisory  Authority;  one  of  the  competent  authorities)  and  Spain 
(Spanish sectorial competent authorities on insurance matters - one of the competent authorities). 
The  Central  Bank  of  Cyprus  is  one  of  the  designated  competent  authorities  pursuant  to  Regulatory  Act  Number 
283/2015, of 4 September 2015. 
Česka národní banka  is the sole designated competent authority pursuant to Articles 136, 137 and 179 of Law No. 
256/2004 Coll. on Capital Markets Undertakings. 

The  Magyar  Nemzeti  Bank  is  the  sole  designated  competent  authority  pursuant  to  Article  186(5)  m)  of  Law 
CXXXIX of 2013 on the Hungarian National Bank. 
The Central Bank of Ireland is the sole designated competent authority pursuant to Regulation 3 of the European 
Union  (Key  Information  Documents  for  Packaged  Retail  and  Insurance-based  Investment  Products  (PRIIPS)) 
Regulations 2017 (S.I. 629/2017). 

Národná  Banka  Slovenska  is  the  sole  designated  competent  authority  pursuant  to  Articles  38g  and  38h  of  Law 
no 747/2004 Coll. on Supervision of the Financial Market as amended. 

In addition, the following Member States are in the process of designating their NCBs as either their sole or one of 
their  competent  authorities:  Greece  (one  of  the  competent  authorities),  Lithuania  (sole  competent  authority)  and 
Portugal (one of the competent authorities).  

10  

11  

12  

13  

14  

15  

16  

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3.1.5  Extent  to  which  performance  of  the  new  task  creates  conflicts  of  interest  with  existing  central 

bank tasks 

As  noted  above,  although  to  date  Banka  Slovenije  has  not  carried  out  any  activities  related  to 

insurance  products  or  PRIIPs,  Banka  Slovenije  is  currently  involved  in  supervising  other 

investment  products  such  as  structured  deposits.  Given  that  PRIIPs  go  beyond  deposit-related 

products  Banka  Slovenije’s  new  task  seems  to  only  partially  complement  its  existing  tasks.  As 

with  other  consumer  protection  tasks,  sufficient  mitigation  measures  must  be  put  in  place  to 
ensure that in the event of a conflict of interests supervisory considerations prevail17.  

3.1.6  Extent to which performance of the new task is disproportionate to the financial or organisational 

capacity of Banka Slovenije 

The principle of financial independence requires that Member States may not put their NCBs in a 

position  where  they  have  insufficient  resources  to  carry  out  both  their  ESCB-related  tasks  and 

their national tasks, from an operational and financial perspective. Furthermore, when allocating 

specific  new  tasks  to  NCBs,  each  NCB  concerned  should  have  sufficient  financial  and  human 

resources at its disposal to ensure that the tasks can be carried out without an adverse impact on 
the  NCB’s  financial  or  operational  capacity to  perform  its ESCB  tasks18. In  order  to  ensure  that 

the  capacity  of  Banka  Slovenije  to  perform  its  ESCB-related  tasks  is  not  impaired,  Banka 

Slovenije  must,  therefore,  be  in  a  position  to  avail  itself  of  the  necessary  resources,  including 

personnel  and  the  provision  of  IT  services,  to  carry  out  its  duties  under  the  draft  law.  In  this 

regard,  it  is  noted  that  pursuant  to  the  draft  law  Banka  Slovenije  can  introduce  a  new  fee 

applicable to supervised  entities for  the performance of its  new supervisory  duties,  which  has a 

positive impact on Banka Slovenije’s capacity to perform its new task, without negatively affecting 

the  performance  of  its  ESCB-related  tasks.  However,  the  impact  of  the  new  task  on  Banka 

Slovenije’s  operational  capacity  is  still  unclear,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  new  task  relates  to  a 

number  of  new  products  in  respect  of  which  Banka  Slovenije  has  no  previous  supervisory 

experience.   

3.1.7  Extent to which performance of the new task fits into the institutional set-up of Banka Slovenije, in 

the light of central bank independence and accountability considerations  

The performance of the new task does not appear to be problematic from the perspective of the 

institutional set-up of Banka Slovenije, nor does it raise accountability or personal and institutional 

independence concerns. However, the complementarity between Banka Slovenije’s new task and 

its  existing  tasks  should  not  be  interpreted  too  broadly,  as this  would  lead  to  the  creation  of  an 

indefinite  chain  of  ancillary  tasks  which  could  eventually  undermine  Banka  Slovenije’s 

independence. 

17  
18  

See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2015/21 and paragraph 2.2.2 of Opinion CON/2016/31. 

See,  for  example,  paragraph  2.2.5.  of  Opinion  CON/2017/32,  paragraph  3.3.2.  of  Opinion  CON/2017/43  and 
paragraph 3.3.2 of Opinion CON/2017/52. 

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3.1.8  Extent to which the performance of tasks harbours substantial financial risks  

The  draft  law  does  not  contain  any  specific  provisions  on  liability  in  relation  to  the  exercise  of 

Banka  Slovenije’s  powers  under  the  draft  law  or  the  failure  to  exercise  such  powers.  Banka 

Slovenije’s potential liability for the performance of the new task given to it under the draft law will 

thus  be  subject  to  the  rules  on  liability  for  damages  caused  in  the  exercise  of  public  authority 

pursuant to the Law on Banking  and the general liability regime under Slovenian law.  

3.1.9  Extent  to  which  the  performance  of  the  new  task  exposes  members  of  the  decision-making 

bodies  of  Banka  Slovenije  to  disproportionate  political  risks  and  impacts  on  their  personal 

independence  

The performance of the new task does not appear either to expose the members of the decision-

making  bodies  of  Banka  Slovenije  to  any  disproportionate  political  risk  or  to  have  an  impact  on 

their personal independence. 

3.1.10 Conclusion regarding the compatibility of the draft law with the prohibition on monetary financing  

The task of carrying out the duties in relation to supervising credit institutions’ compliance with the 

provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 and the draft law relating to PRIIPs can be regarded 

as  a  central  bank  task.  However,  as  the  new  task  conferred  upon  Banka  Slovenije  by  the  draft 

law  must  not  adversely  affect  its  capacity  to  carry  out  its  ESCB  or  Eurosystem  related  duties, 

careful consideration should be given to its impact on Banka Slovenije’s operational capacity due 

to  the  fact  that  the  new  task  relates  to  a  number  of  new  products  in  respect  of  which  Banka 

Slovenije has no previous supervisory experience. In addition, the complementarity between new 

tasks  to  be  conferred  on  Banka  Slovenije  and  its  existing  tasks  should  not  be  interpreted  too 

broadly,  as  this  would  lead  to  the  creation  of  an  indefinite  chain  of  ancillary  tasks  which  could 

eventually undermine Banka Slovenije’s independence. 

3.2  Division of competences between the three Slovenian supervisory authorities  

The ECB notes that the proposed division of competences under the draft law between the three 

Slovenian  supervisory  authorities  may  also  raise  certain  conflicts  when  applying  the  draft  law, 

these possible conflicts should be further clarified. The draft law divides supervisory competences 

based  on  the  identity  of  the  supervised  entities.  However,  since  the  obligations  under  the  draft 

law and Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 relate to both entities that manufacture PRIIPs and those 

that sell PRIIPs, situations could arise where two different competent authorities would exercise 

supervisory tasks over a single PRIIP. For example, in the case of insurance-based investment 

products these would be manufactured by an insurance undertaking, implying that the Insurance 

Supervision  Agency  would  be  regarded  as  the  competent  authority  in  relation  to  the 

manufacturer.  At  the  same  time  insurance-based  investment  products  may  be  sold  by  credit 

institutions  acting  as  intermediaries  selling  PRIIPs.  This  means  that  Banka  Slovenije  would  be 

regarded  as  a  competent  authority  in  relation  to  the  seller  of  the  PRIIPs.  Such  situations  could 

give rise to two divergent opinions from two different competent authorities in relation to a single 

PRIIP. Against this backdrop the consulting authority may wish to further reflect on the division of 

competences under the draft law.   

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This opinion will be published on the ECB’s website.  

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 31 January 2018. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Mario DRAGHI 

ECB-PUBLIC 

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