Case C-3/18 P: Appeal brought on 2 January 2018 by Confédération européenne des associations d’horlogers-réparateurs (CEAHR) against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 23 October 2017 in Case T-712/14: Confédération européenne des associations d’horlogers-réparateurs (CEAHR) v European Commission
Date: 2018-01-02
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: Switzerland, after-sales service, cartel, clock and watch industry, competition policy, dominant position, maintenance, spare part








C_2018104EN.01001902.xml










19.3.2018   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


C 104/19





Appeal brought on 2 January 2018 by Confédération européenne des associations d’horlogers-réparateurs (CEAHR) against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 23 October 2017 in Case T-712/14: Confédération européenne des associations d’horlogers-réparateurs (CEAHR) v European Commission
(Case C-3/18 P)
(2018/C 104/25)
Language of the case: English

Parties


Appellant: Confédération européenne des associations d’horlogers-réparateurs (CEAHR) (represented by: P. A. Benczek, Rechtsanwalt)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, LVMH Moët Hennessy-Louis Vuitton SA, Rolex, SA, The Swatch Group SA

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:






—


set aside the operative part of the Judgment of the General Court; and










—


annul the Commission Decision of 29 July 2014 in case AT.39097 — Watch Repair;










—


in the alternative, refer these proceedings back to the General Court for further consideration;










—


order the Commission and interveners to bear their own costs and to pay the costs of CEAHR, relating to both the proceedings and first instance and to any cost arising from this appeal;










—


in the alternative, order the interveners to bear their own cost relating to the proceedings at first instance and any costs arising from this appeal.





Pleas in law and main arguments

By its first ground of appeal, the appellant argues that the General Court erred in law by drawing an analogy between the assessment of selective distributions systems in the case-law of this Court and the proper assessment of the selective repair system at issue in this case.
By its second ground of appeal, the appellant argues that the General Court made a series of errors of law and assessment in reaching the conclusion that the selective repair systems and refusals to supply at issue in this case is justified and proportionate. The appellant submits that the General Court manifestly erred in its conclusion that the Commission was entitled to conclude that Prestige Watches are complex and that this justifies the selective repair system and refusal to supply at issue in this case. The appellants submits further that the General Court manifestly erred in its conclusion that the Commission was entitled to conclude that there is a risk of counterfeiting of Prestige Watches that justifies the selective repair system and refusal to supply at issue in this case. The General Court manifestly erred in its conclusion that the Commission was entitled to conclude that it was likely that the conditions imposed by the Watch Manufacturers do not go beyond what it necessary.
By its third and fourth grounds of appeal, the appellant challenges the General Court’s manifestly flawed assessment of the consequence of the refusal to supply spare parts on the existence of effective competition on the markets for the repair and maintenance of the relevant watches; and the related conclusion that there was a low likelihood of establishing an abuse of dominance in this case. The appellant submits the General Court erred in its conclusion that there is competition between authorized repairers and between those repairers and the manufacturers’ in-house repair centers.
By its fifth grounds of appeal, the appellant argues that the General Court violated procedural rights by not admitting the appellant to submit responses to interventions after having missed a deadline due to extraordinary circumstances and by refusing to reopen the hearing following appellant’s request to present new evidence.
By its sixth ground of appeal, the appellant argues that the General Court failed to exercise its discretion in determining whether the interveners are to bear their own cost incurred during the proceedings of the first instance.