COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on transparent and predictable working conditions in the European Union
Date: 2017-12-21
Institutions: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, European Commission
Subjects: EU employment policy, collective agreement, dismissal, probationary period, work contract, worker information, working conditions

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 21.12.2017  SWD(2017) 478 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT  Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council   on transparent and predictable working conditions in the European Union {COM(2017) 797 final} - {SWD(2017) 479 final}  
 
 
Table of Contents 

1. 

2. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT ............................................................... 5 

PROBLEM DEFINITION .................................................................................................................... 7 

2.1  What are the problems? ..................................................................................... 7 
2.2  What are the problem drivers? .......................................................................... 9 
2.2.1. 
Some  workers  do  not  receive  a  written  statement  of  their  working 
conditions .................................................................................................................... 9 

2.2.2.  The information included in the written statements may sometimes be not 
sufficient and/or provided too late ............................................................................ 14 

2.2.3.  Enforcement mechanisms do not guarantee effective implementation of the 
legal provisions ......................................................................................................... 15 

2.2.4.  An  increased  instability  and  lack  of  predictability  in  some  working 
relationships .............................................................................................................. 16 

2.2.5. Decreased transparency in the labour market ................................................. 20 

2.3  Why is it a problem? ........................................................................................ 21 
2.3.1. Workers ........................................................................................................... 21 

2.3.2. Business .......................................................................................................... 23 

2.3.3. Member States ................................................................................................. 25 

2.4  How will the problem evolve? ........................................................................ 26 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ........................................................................................................ 28 

3.1  Legal basis ....................................................................................................... 28 
3.2  Results of the social partner consultations ...................................................... 29 
3.3  Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action and added value of EU action .............. 30 

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ............................................................................... 33 

5.  WHAT ARE THE CONSIDERED POLICY MEASURES? .............................................................. 34 

5.1  What is the baseline from which options are assessed? .................................. 34 
5.2  Measures discarded at an early stage ............................................................... 35 
5.3  Considered policy measures ............................................................................ 37 

6.  WHAT ARE THE POLICY OPTIONS AND THEIR IMPACTS? .................................................... 52 

6.1  Options: Four policy packages ........................................................................ 52 
Impacts of the options ..................................................................................... 54 
6.2 

7.  HOW DO THE POLICY OPTIONS COMPARE? ............................................................................. 65 

8. 

PREFERRED OPTION ...................................................................................................................... 68 

8.1  Overall impacts ................................................................................................ 70 
8.2  REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency) ............................................ 78 

 
 
 
 
8.3 Subsidiarity and proportionality .......................................................................... 81 

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? .................................. 82 

9.1. Monitoring .......................................................................................................... 82 
9.2. Evaluation ........................................................................................................... 86 

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................ 88 

ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION ....................................................................................... 92 

1. 
2. 
3. 

4. 

Results of the first phase Social Partners consultation .................................... 92 
Results of the Second phase Social Partners consultation ............................... 95 
Results  of  the  public  consultation  on  the  European  Pillar  of  Social 
Rights ............................................................................................................. 100 
Results  of  the  public  consultation  for  the  REFIT  evaluation  of  the 
Written Statement Directive .......................................................................... 100 

ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? ........................................................................................ 101 

1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 

Practical implications of the initiative ........................................................... 101 
Summary of costs and benefits ...................................................................... 102 
The SME Test – Summary of results ............................................................ 106 
Comparison of administrative costs to employers: SME v large firms ......... 110 
SMEs analysis: employer survey results ....................................................... 112 

ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS ................................................................................................... 116 

Research stages .............................................................................................. 116 
1. 
Approaches used to estimate numbers of non-standard workers .................. 121 
2. 
Impact assessment methods ........................................................................... 126 
3. 
4. 
Some specific methodological assumptions .................................................. 132 
5.  Multi-criteria analysis .................................................................................... 139 

ANNEX 5: .................................................................................................................................................. 146 

GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................................................... 146 

ANNEX  6:  FURTHER  INFORMATION  ON  RELEVANT  NEW  AND  NON-STANDARD 

FORMS OF WORK .......................................................................................................................... 147 

ANNEX 7: SUMMARY OF EU SOCIAL ACQUIS ................................................................................. 169 

ANNEX 8: FURTHER INFORMATION ON CONSIDERED POLICY MEASURES ............................ 175 

1.  A  scope  of  application  encompassing  all  EU  workers,  in  particular  the 

most precarious .............................................................................................. 175 
2. A right to information on the applicable working conditions ............................. 177 
3. Shortening the two-month deadline for issuing a written statement ................... 178 
4. New minimum rights for all workers .................................................................. 179 
5. Enforcement ........................................................................................................ 187 
6. Overview of legal changes required per Member State ...................................... 190 
7. Mapping of relevant collective agreements ......................................................... 198 

ANNEX 9: FURTHER INFORMATION ON IMPACTS OF POLICY PACKAGES B, C AND D ........ 201 

1. Impacts of policy package B ............................................................................... 201 
2. Impacts of policy package C ............................................................................... 205 

 
 
3. Impacts of policy package D ............................................................................... 210 
4. Impacts of extending the coverage of the Directive to domestic workers .......... 215 

ANNEX 10: COHERENCE ....................................................................................................................... 219 

1. Coherence with EU labour law ........................................................................... 219 
2. Coherence with Principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights .................... 221 

 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 

Protecting workers' rights and improving working conditions has been at the heart of the 
European project since its beginning. The social dimension has developed alongside the 
deepening  of  the  single  market,  to  ensure  a  level  playing  field  for  business  and  to 
promote concrete improvements for millions of workers across all Member States. 

In recent years the EU labour market has undergone deep transformations. The financial 
and  economic  crisis  has  exposed  weaknesses  in  social  protection  systems,  whereas 
globalisation  has  affected  production  models  and  unprecedented 
technological 
development  has  brought  new  opportunities  and  demands  for  skills  and  for  flexible 
working arrangements. There is a growing diversity of forms of work, which has created 
new jobs, but has also led to a growing precariousness and gaps in protection.  

While  economic  and  financial  recovery  was  the  immediate  priority  at  the  height  of  the 
crisis,  this  Commission  has  put  social  dimension  once  again  in  the  very  centre  of  its 
political agenda. As President Juncker has declared, 'Building a more inclusive and fairer 
Union  is  a  key  priority  for  this  European  Commission.'1  In  the  same  vein,  the 
Commission  underlined  in  its  reflection  paper  on  "Harnessing  Globalisation"2  the 
importance of addressing the impact of globalisation through strong social policies at EU 
and national levels to reinforce the resilience of citizens and workers. 

In  this  context,  through  the  initiative  the  European  Pillar  of  Social  Rights  ('the  Pillar'), 
the  Commission  launched  a  debate  whether  the  EU  social  policy  framework  is  still 
sufficient  to  maintain the EU's high social standards. The extensive public consultation 
on the Pillar3 in  2016 showed that  while the EU acquis is  indeed  comprehensive, there 
are gaps linked to developments on the labour market that need to be addressed in order 
for  the  acquis  to  retain  its  relevance.  This  was  also  emphasised  in  the  European 
Parliament's Resolution of January 2017 on the Pillar, and more recently in its Resolution 
of July 2017 on working conditions and precarious employment.4 The Parliament called 
to  extend  existing  minimum  standards  to  new  kinds  of  employment  relationships, 
improve  enforcement  of  EU  law,  increase  legal  certainty  across  the  single  market,  and 
prevent discrimination by complementing existing EU law to ensure for every worker a 
core  set  of  enforceable  rights,  regardless  of  the  type  of  contract  or  employment 
relationship.5 

1 See Political Guidelines for the next European Commission, "A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for 
Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change", 15 July 2014. 
2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-globalisation_en.pdf 
3 SWD(2017)206 Report of the public consultation accompanying the document establishing a European 
Pillar of Social Rights 
4 P8-TA(2017)0010 of 19.01.2017 and P8-TA(2017)0290 of 04.07.2017. 
5 European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2017 on a European Pillar of Social Rights 

5 

 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
On  17  November  2017  the  Council,  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Commission 
proclaimed the European Pillar of Social Rights, setting out a number of key principles 
and rights to support fair and well-functioning labour markets and welfare systems. The 
Principles  of  the  Pillar  explicitly  address  the  challenges  related  to  new  forms  of 
employment and adequate working conditions in atypical forms of employment, notably 
‘Secure  and  flexible  employment’  (Principle  5)  and  ‘Information  about  employment 
conditions and protection in case of dismissals’ (Principle 7). 

The  possible  revision  of  Directive  91/533/EEC  on  an  employer’s  obligation  to  inform 
employees  of  the  conditions  applicable  to  the  contract  or  employment  relationship 
('Written  Statement  Directive'),  is  one  of  the  concrete  initiatives  announced  by  the 
Commission in April 2017 when presenting the Pillar. Other initiatives, closely related to 
and  complementary  to  this  one,  include  a  legislative  proposal  on  work-life  balance  of 
parents and carers, a social partners' consultation on access to social  protection, and an 
interpretative communication on working time.   

The Written Statement Directive, adopted on 14 October 1991, gives employees the right 
to be notified in writing of the essential aspects of their employment relationship when it 
starts or within a limited time thereafter (two months maximum). Revising the Directive 
could contribute to the Pillar principles by improving workers' and employers' clarity on 
their contractual relationship and by ensuring this protection is extended to all workers, 
irrespective  of  the  type  of  employment  relationship,  including  those  in  new  and  non-
standard forms of work. The Directive's effectiveness could be enhanced by following up 
on the conclusions of its recent evaluation conducted in the framework of the European 
Commission's Regulatory Fitness and Performance programme (REFIT).6,7 Furthermore, 
by defining a set of minimum rights reflecting the challenges of the new labour market 
reality,  such  a  revision  could  support  upward  convergence  towards  equal  access  to  a 
number  of  new  rights  for  all  workers,  in  particular  those  in  precarious  employment 
relationships.   

These objectives should be addressed without obstructing the development of new forms 
of  work.  Labour  market  innovation is  a  powerful  engine  of  job  creation  and  these new 
forms  of  work  can  offer  opportunities  for  flexible  working  arrangements  and  for  the 
integration in the labour market of people who might have otherwise been excluded. If a 
set of minimum fair working conditions were ensured across the EU and across all forms 
of contracts, this would set a framework within which new forms of work could further 

6https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/overview-law-making-process/evaluating-and-
improving-existing-laws/reducing-burdens-and-simplifying-law/refit-making-eu-law-simpler-and-less-
costly_en 
7 REFIT Evaluation of the ‘Written Statement Directive’ (Directive 91/533/EEC), SWD(2017) 205 final, of 
26.04.2017; http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=706&langId=en&intPageId=202 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
develop.  This  framework  could  offer  fairer  protection  to  workers,  a  clearer  reference 
framework for national legislators and courts, and a better level playing field for business 
within the internal market, limiting incentives for regulatory arbitrage.  

To achieve this goal, between 26 April and 23 June 2017 the Commission conducted a 
first phase consultation of the European social partners on the possible direction of Union 
action8, in accordance with Article 154 TFEU, followed by a second phase between 21 
September  and  3  November  2017.9  The  social  partners  decided  not  to  launch  the 
negotiation foreseen in Article 155 TFEU with a view to reaching an agreement on the 
matter. It now falls to the Commission to make a proposal.  

therefore  presents  different  policy  measures 

the 
This  Impact  Assessment 
Commission  is  considering  in  order  to  improve  the  effectiveness  of  the  Written 
Statement  Directive  and  enhance  the  protection  of  workers,  notably  those  in  new  and 
non-standard  forms  of  employment.  It  analyses  possible  legal,  social  and  economic 
impacts  of  considered  policy  options  and  compares  them  in  terms  of  effectiveness, 
efficiency and coherence in line with the Commission's Better Regulation framework.  

that 

2.  PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1 What are the problems? 

While flexibility on the labour market is necessary, there exists a risk of insufficient 
protection  of  workers,  including  those  in  new  and  non-standard  forms  of 
employment.  

The  world  of  work  evolved  significantly  since  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  Directive 
91/533/EEC.  The  last  25  years  brought  about  a  growing  flexibilisation  of  the  labour 
market.  Demographic  changes  resulted  in  a  greater  diversity  of  the  working  population 
and digitalisation facilitated the creation of new forms of work. 

The  recent  evaluation10  of  the  Written  Statement  Directive  has  shown  that  while  the 
Directive remains fundamentally relevant, the labour market changes have exposed some 
gaps in its protection mechanisms. The following issues have been identified: 

8  Consultation  Document  of  26.04.2017,  First  phase  consultation  of  Social  Partners  under  Article  154 
TFEU on a possible revision of the Written Statement Directive (Directive 91/533/EEC) in the framework 
of the European Pillar of Social Rights, C(2017) 2611 
9  Consultation  document  of  21.09.2017,  Second  phase  consultation  of  Social  Partners  under  Article  154 
TFEU on a possible revision of the Written Statement Directive (Directive 91/533/EEC) in the framework 
of the European Pillar of Social Rights, C(2017)6121 
10 REFIT Evaluation of the ‘Written Statement Directive’ (Directive 91/533/EEC), SWD(2017) 205 final, 
of 26.04.2017 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  some  workers  do  not  receive  a  written  statement  of  their  working  conditions  at 

 

all; 
the  information  included  in  the  written  statements  may  sometimes  be  not 
sufficient and/or sometimes provided too late; 

  enforcement mechanisms do not guarantee effective implementation of the legal 

provisions. 

At the same time, as shown in the Pillar consultation11, the current EU social acquis does 
not sufficiently address some of the new phenomena in the labour market. Labour market 
innovation  is  a  positive  phenomenon,  flexibility  and  new  and  non-standard  forms  of 
work12 contribute to job creation and widen professional opportunities. However, lack of 
reasonable  advance  notice  in  case  of  on-demand  workers,  unjustified  exclusivity  or 
incompatibility clauses and long probation periods are measures which may put workers 
in  overly  precarious  situations.  These  contribute,  at  least  to  some  extent,  to  another 
element of the problem covered in this initiative, namely: 

 

instability and an increased lack of predictability in some working relationships, 
affecting especially workers in most precarious jobs.  

Furthermore,  access  to  training  is  needed  to  ensure  a  skilled  workforce.  Information 
about  available  training  and  cost-free  access  to  at  least  training  which  employers  are 
required  to  provide  related  to  basic  skillsets  necessary  for  the  job  is  essential  from  the 
point of view of the worker and has many advantages for employers in terms of quality 
of outputs and sustainability of workforce. Yet, another problem observed is: 

 

insufficient access of workers to mandatory training. 

Both with regard to the gaps in the provisions of the current Written Statement Directive 
and the question of broader gaps in the basic rights for workers an additional element of 
the problem is:  

  diversity  of  protection  among  Member  States  and  decreased  transparency  in  the 

labour market. 

Member  States  adopt  different  derogations  from  the  Written  Statement  Directive,  and 
have  different  approaches  to  regulating  new  and  non-standard  forms  of  work.  The  fact 
that  the  EU  intervenes  in  this  area  with  minimum  requirements  allows  for  differences 
between Member States but the question arises whether the existing minimum standards 

11 SWD(2017)206 Report of the public consultation accompanying the document establishing a European 
Pillar of Social Rights 
12 See Annex 6 for further precision on terminology 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
are still sufficient to ensure level playing field and effective worker protection across the 
single market. 

The following figure visualises the problem, its drivers and consequences. 

2.2 What are the problem drivers? 

The problem to be addressed results from an interaction of labour market developments, 
different  approaches  in  national  legislation  and  practice,  and  gaps  in  EU  social 
legislation. This section presents how those factors interact. 

2.1.1.  Some workers do not receive a written statement of their working conditions 

The Written Statement Directive gives employees the right to be notified in writing of the 
essential aspects  of their employment  relationship.  Having written information about 
their  rights  is,  indeed,  a  prerequisite  for  workers  to  invoke  their  rights. 
Transparency is also useful for employers and public authorities.  

9 

 
 
 
 
The  REFIT  evaluation13  indicated  however  that  the  scope  of  the  Directive  is 
problematic.  While  there  exists  a  core  group  of  protected  persons  (typically  working 
under  standard  open-ended  or  long-term  contracts),  many  workers  are  not  sufficiently 
aware of or do not possess a confirmation of some of their basic rights. 

This is a result of (1) diverse application of the exemptions envisaged in the Directive14, 
and (2) the fact that Member States have the possibility to define whom they consider as 
‘a paid employee’. 

As  for  the  first  point,  some  two  thirds  of  Member  States  use  at  least  one  of  the  three 
derogations in their national legislation.15  

Regarding  the  second  point,  most  EU  Directives  on  working  conditions,  including  the 
Written  Statement  Directive,  refer 
'employees'  or 
'employment relationship' for defining to whom they apply.  

to  national  definitions  of 

The Court of Justice of the EU has limited the discretion of Member States to define in 
national law the personal scope of certain EU social law instruments, thereby limiting the 
possibility to exclude  individuals who do not fall within the definition of worker under 
national  law.  According  to  the  Court's  case  law  on  the  Working  Time  Directive  as 
regards the application of Directive 2003/88 "the concept of worker has an autonomous 
meaning specific to EU law".16 

It  is  settled  case-law  as  regards  Article  45  TFEU  and  other  legal  acts  that  make  no 
reference  to  the  definition  of  the  term  “worker”  under  national  legislation  that  the 
essential feature of an employment relationship is that, for a certain period of time, a 
person  performs  services  for  and  under  the  direction  of  another  person,  in  return  for 
which he or she receives remuneration, the legal characterisation under national law and 
the form of that relationship, as well as the nature of the legal relationship between those 
two  persons,  not  being  decisive  in  that  regard.17  These  criteria  for  determining  the 
existence of an employment relationship, and so the status of "worker", were originally 
developed by the Court in a 1986 judgment on the application of Article 45 TFEU and 

of 

the 

Written 

evaluation 

13 REFIT Evaluation of the ‘Written Statement Directive’ (Directive 91/533/EEC), SWD(2017) 205 final, 
of 26.04.2017; http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=706&langId=en&intPageId=202; REFIT study to 
support 
(91/533/EC); 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=7941&type=2&furtherPubs=yes  
14 According to Article 1.2.b of the Written Statement Directive Member States may decide not to apply 
the  Directive  to  employees  having  a  contract  or  employment  relationship  with  a  total  duration  not 
exceeding one month and/or with a working week not exceeding eight hours; or of a casual and/or specific 
nature provided, in these cases, that its non-application is justified by objective considerations. 
15 Nine Member States did not implement any derogation: BE, BG, HR, FR, PL, PT, RO, SL, LV 
16 Fenoll, C-316/13, para 26. 
17 Ruhrlandklinik, C-216/15, para 27 

Statement 

Directive 

10 

 
 
                                                 
(the  predecessor  of)  Directive  2004/38/EC  on  free  movement  of  workers,18  and  have 
since been widely used by the Court to interpret references to the notion of worker in EU 
secondary  legislation.  These  criteria  should  therefore  represent  the  general  elements, 
directly deriving from the Treaty, for the identification of an employment relationship.19 
In the specific context of free movement of workers, activities carried out on such a small 
scale as to be regarded as purely marginal and ancillary, do not qualify a "worker" within 
the meaning of Article 45 TFEU . 

Most  recently,  with  the  Ruhrlandklinik  judgment20  the  Court  has  given  greater 
importance to the autonomous EU definition of worker also in the case where a directive 
specifically  refers  to  national  law,  to  prevent  any  definitions  under  national  law  from 
depriving the directive of its effectiveness. 

Nevertheless, the reference to the Member States' definition of employment relationship 
leads to the Directive being applied in the Member States in a different way to the same 
categories  of  workers.  Furthermore,  it  leads  to  inconsistencies  in  coverage  for  the 
growing category of non-standard forms of employment.  

While the situation differs across the Member States, some categories of workers21 may 
be (partially) excluded from the provision of written statements based on the national 
exemptions or differences in the national definitions of covered workers, as shown in the 
following table.  

Table 1 – Coverage by the Written Statement Directive – Personal scope22 

Current 
coverage  by  the 
WSD 
Domestic 
workers 

Platform 
workers23 

Voucher-based 
workers 

Yes  

Partially 

No 

AT, BE, CY, FI, FR, DE, 
EL, IT, LV, LT, LU, MT, 
PT, RO, ES, UK 
BE, CY, FI, DE, ES 

BE, HR, FI, FR, NL, ES 

BG, HR, CZ, DK, EE, 
IE, PL, SK, SL 

HU, NL, SE 

BG, HR, CZ, DE, EE, 
EL,  IE,  IT,  MT,  NL, 
PT, RO, SK 
RO 

AT, FR, HU, LT, LV, 
LU, PL, SL, SE, UK 

AT,  BG,  CY,  CZ, 
DK, EE, DE, EL, HU, 

18 Lawrie-Blum, C-66/85, para 12 
19 Also to distinguish such an employment situation from that of self-employed, which on the contrary fall 
under the scope of Article 56 and ff. of the Treaty, see Asscher Case C-107/94, para 26. 
20 C-216/15 
21 Further information on these categories and note on terminology is on Annex 6 
22  Source  "Study  to  support  Impact  Assessment  on  the  Review  of  the  Written  Statement  Directive"  by 
CSES and PPMI. 
23 To be noted that majority of platform workers operate as self-employed and as such are outside of scope 
of EU labour law. 

11 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Paid trainees 

than 

for 
1 

Workers 
employed 
less 
month 
People  working 
less 
than 
8h/week 

Casual  workers: 
1)  Zero-hours 
contracts 

Casual workers 
2)  On-demand 
workers 

Intermittent 

Casual workers 
3) 
workers 
Temporary 
Agency workers 

IE,  IT,  LT,  LV,  LU, 
MT,  PL,  PT,  SK,  SL, 
SE, UK 
CZ, FI, HU 

AT,  CY,  CZ,  DK,  FI, 
DE,  EL,  IE,  LT,  MT, 
SK, ES, UK. 

CY, DK, MT, SE 

AT,  BG,  HR,  EE,  IE, 
RO, SK, SE, UK 

SE 

- 

BG,  HR.  CY.  CZ, 
DK,  IE,  IT,  PL,  RO, 
SK, UK 

BG,  HR,  CY,  CZ, 
DK,  IE,  IT,  PL,  RO, 
SK, SL, UK 

AT,  HU,  LV,  LT,  SL 
(illegal)  
EE,  DE,  LU,  MT,  PT 
(do  not  exist  either  in 
law or practice) 
AT, LV (illegal) 
EE,  LU,  MT,  PT  (do 
not exist either in law 
or practice) 
LU,  MT  (do  not  exist 
AT, BG, HR, CY, CZ, 
law  or 
either 
DK,  HU,  IE,  IT,  PL, 
SK, SL, UK 
practice) 
BG, CZ, EL, ML, SL  AT, UK 

in 

BE,  CY,  DK,  FR,  DE, 
EL, IT, LV, LT, LU, MT, 
NL, PL, PT, SL, ES 
BE,  BG,  HR,  EE,  FR, 
HU, IT, LV, LU, NL, PL, 
PT, RO, SL 

AT,  BE,  BG,  HR,  CZ, 
EE, FI, FR, DE, EL, HU, 
IE,  IT,  LV,  LT,  LU,  NL, 
PO, PT, RO, SK, SL, ES, 
UK.  
BE,  FI,  FR,  EL,  NL,  ES, 
SE 

BE, FI, FR, DE, EL, HU, 
LT, NL, ES, SE 

BE,  EE, FI, FR,  DE, EL, 
LV, LT, NL, PT, RO, ES, 
SE 
BE, HR, CY, DK, EE, FI, 
FR, DE, HU, IE, IT, LV, 
LT, LU, NL, PL, PT, RO, 
SK, ES, SE 

The situation is also unclear with regard to the "bogus self-employed". While the Written 
Statement  Directive  applies  only  to  workers,  and  the  self-employed  are  in  principle 
outside  its  scope,  the  boundary  between  the  two  categories  is  in  fact  becoming  more 
difficult  to  draw.  Such  blurring  of  status  jeopardises  the  effectiveness  of  labour  law 
which  is  dependent  on  the  status  of  employment.  To  the  extent  that  workers  are 
wrongly categorised as self-employed, they are removed from the protection of the 
EU acquis to which they should in fact be subject. 

Table  1  in  Annex  6  summarises  available  data  concerning  the  categories  of  workers 
mentioned  above.  Further  information  on  those  forms  of  work  is  available  in  the 
Analytical  Document  accompanying  the  second  stage  consultation  of  the  Social 
Partners.24 

24 SWD(2017)301 final. 

12 

 
 
 
                                                 
Overall,  while  relevant  data  are  scarce  and  difficult  to  compare,  and  there  are  overlaps 
between  the  different  forms  of  employment,  an  estimated  number  of  2-3  million 
workers25  in  those  specific  forms  of  work  in  the  EU  are  excluded  from  the  right  to 
receive written confirmation of their working conditions. The  high diversity of national 
approaches constitutes an obstacle to the full effectiveness of the Directive. 

Among those who are at least partially excluded from protection of the Written Statement 
Directive is a relatively high proportion of vulnerable workers. Available data indicate 
jobs  -  are 
for  example 
disproportionately  held  by  younger,  less-educated  and  lower-skilled  workers.  There  is 
also a gender bias, with women over-represented among non-standard workers.26  

jobs  -  and  particularly  fixed-term 

that  non-standard 

Moreover,  while  in  the  original  Directive  the  possible  exemptions  from  scope  were 
envisaged  for  marginal  situations,  available  data  show  that  those  forms  of  work  have 
been growing  in  the last  decades. For example,  the number of workers  working  eight 
hours or less per week increased from 3.4 million in 2005 to 3.8 million in 2016.27 The 
number  of  employees  on  contracts  lasting  less  than  one  month  has  grown  from 
373,000  in  2002  to  almost  1.3  million  in  2016,28  indicating  that  this  extremely  short 
duration of work contracts will continue to be a feature of the EU labour market in years 
to  come.  People  active  on  platforms  currently  represent  0.5-2%  of  the  workforce 
according to different studies29 but their numbers have been increasing significantly over 
the last 5 years and thus their share in the workforce might also further increase. 

An increasing number of workers are not protected by the Directive, and therefore at risk 
of  not  being  (fully)  aware  of  their  employment  conditions  or  their  rights.  While  many 
Member States have extended their national legal framework to cover these workers; the 
legal analysis performed at Member-State level for the REFIT evaluation revealed high 
levels  of  variation  across  countries  and  uncertainty  over  whether  the  new  and  non-
standard forms of employment fall within the scope of the Directive.30 

25  Source  "Study  to  support  Impact  Assessment  on  the  Review  of  the  Written  Statement  Directive"  by 
CSES and PPMI. 
26  For  a  full  discussion  on  characteristics  of  non-standard  workers  see  the  Analytical  Document 
SWD(2017)301 final, pages 19-41.  
27 Own calculations based on EU-LFS 
28 Own calculations based on EU-LFS 
29 Inter alia "The Future of Work in the ‘Sharing Economy", Codagnone et al, JRC (2016) and Eurofound 
(2017), Aspects of non-standard employment in Europe, Eurofound, Dublin 
30 See section 5.1.7 of the REFIT Study.   

13 

 
 
 
                                                 
2.1.2.  The  information  included  in  the  written  statements  may  sometimes  be  not 

sufficient and/or provided too late 

Article 2 of the Directive creates the obligation for employers to notify employees of the 
essential  aspects  of  their  employment  relationship  and  defines  a  non-exhaustive  list  of 
these  essential  elements  which,  in  practice,  however,  generally  constitutes  the  standard 
package of information provided.  

The Directive stipulates also that the written statement must be provided to the employee 
not later than two months after the commencement of employment. Modifications to any 
of the elements in Article 2 must be notified within one month. 

According to the REFIT evaluation, while the information package was assessed by most 
stakeholders  as  being  sufficient  as  a  minimum  standard,  the  two-month  deadline  to 
provide a written statement creates transparency problems and increases the potential for 
undeclared  work  or  abuse  of  employee  rights.  Receiving  a  written  statement  earlier  is 
also especially important for the growing number of workers whose contracts are of very 
short duration. 

The  REFIT  evaluation  has  shown  that  a  vast  majority  of  the  Member  States  surveyed 
have  introduced  more  stringent  deadlines  for  the  employer  to  comply  with  the 
information  obligation.  Of  these,  eight  Member  States31  have  set  the  obligation  at  the 
beginning of the employment relationship. According to the national laws transposing the 
Directive  in  these  eight  countries,  the  employee  is  to  receive  the  information  required 
before the employment starts.  

This  issue  of  the  right  to  be  informed  is  taken  up  in  Principle  7a  of  the  Social  Pillar: 
"Workers have the right to be informed in writing at the start of employment about their 
rights  and  obligations  resulting  from  the  employment  relationship,  including  on 
probation period".32 Currently, every year some 8-16 million EU workers starting a new 
job receive a written statement later than on the first day.33  

In  the  light  of  the  Social  Pillar  principle,  and  in  the  light  of  the  very  modest  costs  of 
providing  a  written  statement,34  and  of  the  changes  to  the  types  and  diversity  of 
employment practices since the Directive was adopted in 1991, an adaptation of the list 
contained in Article 2(2) could be appropriate. As indicated by national experts consulted 
for the purpose of the external study, in the age of intensive labour migration between the 
EU Member States, the standard package of information prescribed by the Directive is no 
longer sufficient. Most migrant or low skilled workers lack information about the social 

31 BG, HR, LV, LT, LU, PL, RO, SI 
32 C(2017)2600 Commission Recommendation of 26.4.2017 on the European Pillar of Social Rights 
33  Source  "Study  to  support  Impact  Assessment  on  the  Review  of  the  Written  Statement  Directive"  by 
CSES and PPMI. Calculations assuming annual turnover of 10-20%. 
34 These are estimated as less than EUR 60 per worker, see SWD(2017)205 final, page 28 

14 

 
 
                                                 
security  system  to  which  the  employer  is  contributing.  This  leads  to  poor  social 
protection of such workers. Finally, the most pressing issue, as indicated by the national 
experts,  is  the  lack  of  information  about  working  time,  particularly  where  the  work 
schedule is variable. 

The  consultation  process  leading  to  the  REFIT  evaluation  gave  some  indications  of 
elements  that  could  be  added,  namely  information  on  hours  the  worker  is  expected  to 
work,  especially  when  the  work  schedule  is  variable;  information  about  overtime 
regulations  or  non-competition  clauses;  the  right  to  sickness,  maternity  and  paternity 
leave  and  pension  rights;  the  levels  of  collective  bargaining  applicable.35    Worker 
organisations responding to the second phase consultation proposed further additions, as 
summarised in Annex 2.  

2.1.3.  Enforcement  mechanisms  do  not  guarantee  effective  implementation  of  the 

legal provisions 

Rights  are  only  meaningful  when  they  are  implemented  and  taken  up  by  those  they 
protect.  The  2016  Commission  Communication  EU  Law:  better  results  through  better 
application highlights the importance of accessible and appropriate redress mechanisms 
for citizens whose rights under EU law have been breached.36 The public consultation on 
the European Pillar of Social Rights37 underlined that workers are often deprived of their 
rights by weak enforcement provisions. In the context of EU labour law, unlike in other 
areas, there are very few provisions directly concerned with enforcement of rights.  

Evidence collected through the REFIT evaluation indicated that there is medium to high 
observance  among  employers  of  the  Directive  as  transposed  into  national  law.  The 
main  issues  surrounding  observance  are  associated  with  the  ‘grey’  area  between  self-
employment  and  subordinate  employer-employee  arrangements  and  new  and  non-
standard forms of employment.  

At the same time, there is a medium to high level of understanding among employers of 
their information obligations towards employees. The level of awareness seems to greatly 
vary across Member States and there are also significant variations relative to the size of 
the  undertakings:  larger  enterprises  appear  to  be  more  familiar  with  the  national 
requirements related to the Directive, as compared to micro enterprises. 

35 Ramboll Management Consulting, REFIT study to support evaluation of the Written Statement Directive, 
March 2016, page 57.  
36 COM(2016)8600, section 4. 
37 
Rights, 
on 
Delivering 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1226&langId=en ;and Public consultation on the European Pillar 
of 
Rights 
Social 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=333&langId=en&consultId=22&visib=0&furtherConsult=yes 

European 

Social 

Pillar 

the 

of 

15 

 
 
 
                                                 
The  evaluation  further  highlighted  that  the  enforcement  of  workers'  rights  could  be 
improved by reviewing means of redress and sanctions in case of non-compliance.38  

The  Directive,  in  its  Article  8,  establishes  the  right  for  employees  who  consider 
themselves wronged by an employer’s failure to comply with its obligations arising from 
its  provisions  to  pursue  their  claims  by  judicial  process.  Member  States  may  also 
establish two steps that would precede judicial proceedings: (i) recourse to a competent 
authority  such  as  a  labour  inspectorate  or  an  administrative  body;  (ii)  a  formal  notice 
given to the employer calling on it to issue the written statement within 15 days.  

The  REFIT  evaluation  has  confirmed  that  all  Member  States  provide  for  access  to  the 
relevant national court which is in general the Labour Court.39  

As  regards  sanctions  imposed  on  employers  who  fail  to  comply,  the  REFIT  evaluation 
distinguishes between: (i) a majority of Member States where financial compensation can 
be  granted  only  to  employees  who  prove  that  they  have  suffered  damage;  and  (ii)  a 
minority of Member States where sanctions such as lump sum penalties or loss of permits 
can be imposed in addition on the employer for failure to issue the written statement.  

The REFIT evaluation concluded that redress systems based only on claims for damages 
are less effective than systems that also provide for sanctions such as lump sum penalties. 
The limited extent of case law indicates that workers whose rights under the Directive 
have  been  infringed  are  reluctant  to  pursue  litigation  while  in  employment. 
Generally  any  litigation  is  related  to  the  working  conditions  themselves  not  to  the 
absence of information about them. 

To achieve the goal of the Directive its enforcement must be ensured through adequate 
recourse  via  enforcement  authorities  and  appropriate  and  dissuasive  sanctions.  Greater 
clarity  on  legal  obligations  and  raising  awareness  of  employers  concerning  their 
obligations resulting from national transpositions of the Directive could also contribute to 
a better implementation of the Directive.  

2.2.4. An increased instability and lack of predictability in some working relationships 

The  European  Union  has  built  over  the  years  a  strong  core  of  individual  rights  for 
workers,  encompassing  information  to  each  worker  about  his/her  working  conditions; 
health and safety protection, including limits on working time; combating discrimination 
and  abuse  of  non-standard  employment  types;  equal  treatment  at  the  workplace; 
conditions  for  workers  posted  to  another  Member  State  and  third  country  nationals 
coming to work in the EU. A further set of Directives provide for minimum standards in 
relation  to  collective  rights:  for  representation  via  European  Works  Councils;  for 

38 SWD (2017)205, page 4. 
39 SWD (2017)205, page 17.  

16 

 
 
                                                 
information and consultation in relation to structural changes in companies; in relation to 
collective redundancies; and for transfers of undertakings.40  

These labour market developments have however created gaps and/or deficiencies in EU 
and  national  legal  frameworks.  As  a  result,  the  existing  EU  labour  law  acquis, 
including but not limited to the Written Statement Directive, does not apply today 
uniformly  to  all  workers,  creating  disparities  and  leading  to  inequalities  in  terms  of 
working conditions and social protection in general.41  

While  a  full-time  permanent  labour  contract  is  still  the  predominant  contractual 
employment relationship,  non-standard  work42 has  increased over  the  last 20 years. 
In  1995,  less  than  21%  of  the  EU-15  workforce  had  non-standard  contracts.  This 
proportion had increased to over 25% in the EU-28 by 2016. In the last ten years more 
than half of all new jobs were non-standard.43  

As the public consultation on the European Pillar of Social Rights clearly revealed, there 
is a growing challenge to define and apply  appropriate rights for many workers in new 
and non-standard forms of employment relationships across the EU. Such forms of work 
create opportunities for people to enter or remain in the labour market and the flexibility 
they offer can be a matter of personal choice. However, inadequate regulation may lead 
many of them being stuck in legal loopholes that make them subject to unclear or unfair 
practices and make it difficult to enforce their rights.44  

Moreover,  for  many  workers  non-standard  employment  is  not  a  voluntary  choice.  It  is 
estimated,  for  example,  that  over  two  thirds  of  employees  who  work  on  temporary 
contracts do so involuntarily. This is especially true of prime-age and older workers. In 
2016,  76.7 %  of  prime-age  and  older  temporary  employees  and  68.5 %  of  younger 
temporary employees were working on a temporary contract because they could not find 
a permanent one.45 

40 For a summary of EU social acquis see Annex 7. 
41  See  the  parallel  European  Commission  initiative  “Social  Protection  for  All”  which  addresses  the 
challenges  of  access  to  social  protection  for  people  in  all  forms  of  employment  in  the  framework  of  the 
European Pillar of Social Rights.  
42 Non-standard work here includes permanent part-time, temporary full-time and part-time. 
43 In absolute terms, there were 4.9 million more employees on non-standard contracts in 2016 compared 
with a decade before, but only 3.4 million more employees with standard contracts (permanent full-time). 
Own calculations based on EU-LFS. The growth of non-standard employment has also been pointed out by 
the  European  Parliament,  European  Parliament  resolution  of  4  July  2017  on  working  conditions  and 
precarious employment. 
44  See  launching  Communication  COM(2016)127  final  and  Report  of  the  public  consultation 
SWD(2017)206 final, pages 18-21.  
45 Own calculations based on EU-LFS. See Figure 1 in Annex 6 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Additionally, in the new world of work, working lives are expected to be longer and less 
linear: they will likely be marked by numerous transitions between jobs and professions, 
as well as by changing needs in demand, or life-cycle and work-cycle pressures requiring 
career  interruptions  or  breaks  for  caring  responsibilities,  or  for  seeking  access  to  re-
skilling  opportunities.46  Job  tenure  is  changing  at  a  rapid  pace.  Nowadays  only  2  in  5 
Europeans  work  for  the  same  employer  for  more  than  10  years.  It  was  3  in  5  only  10 
years ago.47 

Overall,  labour  market  developments  have  led  to  an  increase  in  various  mechanisms 
which affect working conditions of many workers in the EU, including some in the new 
and  non-standard  forms  of  work.  The  challenge  is  how  to  ensure  that  the  current 
dynamics, while allowing for job creation and labour market innovation, are framed in a 
way that allow for upward convergence in social standards across the EU. 

  Very variable work schedules  

Flexibility is a key charateristic of new forms of work and flexible hours can be positive 
for workers, as it generates new jobs and can allow them an entry into the labour market 
(e.g.  18%  of  workers  on  zero  hours  contract  in  the  UK  are  in  full-time  education),  but 
workers  in  lower-level  occupations  are  less  likely  to  have  the  bargaining  power  to 
negotiate  their  working  schedules,  or  more  likely  to  have  no  autonomy  or  control  over 
their  schedules.  The  consequences  of  precariousness  are  often  severe  for  workers  who 
need stable work schedules and income levels. Lack of reference hours and short or no 
advance  notice  before  an  assignment  are  features  of  working  relationships  especially 
affecting casual workers (on-demand and intermittent). There are some 4-6 million such 
workers in the EU (including but not limited to workers on zero-hours contracts).48 

The interval between being requested to work and the actual start of work varies in these 
types of jobs in line with company practice and the incidence of HR needs. Among the 
case  studies  set  out  in  the  Eurofound  report,49  there  are  examples  of  employers 
summoning  casual workers only one hour before the shift starts and others doing so as 
long as four weeks in advance. A UK survey showed that one-third of undertakings using 
zero-hours  contracts  have  a  set  policy  for  the  notice  period  required  for  staff  asked  to 
work, 40% had no policy, and the remainder did not know if they had one. Almost half of 
zero-hours workers said they have no notice; workers might even discover at the start of 
a shift that their work has been cancelled. On receiving a job offer, a casual worker may 

46  European  Commission,  SWD(2016)51  Key  economic,  employment  and  social  trends  behind  the 
European Pillar of Social Rights. 
47 European Commission, Reflection paper on the social dimension of Europe 
48  Source  "Study  to  support  Impact  Assessment  on  the  Review  of  the  Written  Statement  Directive"  by 
CSES and PPMI. 
49 Eurofound, New forms of employment, 2015, page 48. 

18 

 
 
 
                                                 
decline, in which case, the next candidate is contacted. However, in several case studies, 
respondents said that repeated refusal makes it less likely that a worker will be asked to 
come to work. In a UK survey, 17% of zero-hours workers said that they are sometimes 
penalised if they refuse a call-in, and 3% said they were always penalised. 

  Exclusivity and incompatibility clauses 

Exclusivity clauses prevent workers from taking on any other work at all. Incompatibility 
clauses  impede  them  from  taking  on  work  with  other  specific  employers  ('work 
providers'). Exclusivity and incompatibility clauses can put a disproportionate burden on 
the  worker,  particularly  if  not  employed  full-time,  who  has  limited  possibilities  for 
ensuring not only income security and stability, but also to seek further work to reduce 
the  risk  of  poverty.  In  economic  terms,  exclusivity  and  incompatibility  clauses  can 
exacerbate situations of underemployment.50 

In  the  EU  some  Member  States  limit  or  even  ban  the  use  of  exclusivity  and 
incompatibility  clauses,  while  in  others  such  clauses  are  permitted.  It  is  estimated  that 
among workers who are most negatively affected by such clauses (casual and voucher-
based) an estimated 0.5-1.5 million are subject to them.51 

  Limited  opportunities  to  transit  to  another  (more  permanent)  form  of 

employment 

New  and  non-standard  forms  of  employment  may  offer  good  opportunities  to  enter 
labour market for people who would otherwise have difficulties to do so. However, lack 
of  possibilities  to  move  on  to  more  permanent  positions  for  those  who  would  like  to 
contributes to labour market segmentation and underemployment. 

Indeed, the rate of transitions from temporary to permanent jobs is only some 23%, with 
a great variation across the EU (from 10% in France to 59% in the UK).52  

Also  among  part-time  workers  there  is  a  growing  proportion  of  people who  work  part-
time involuntarily and would like to work more hours. Self-reported involuntary part-
time  work  increased  from  22.4%  of  all  part-time  work  to  27.7%  between  2007  and 
2016.53 Women, younger workers, less educated workers and – especially – workers new 
to  their  current  job  (tenure  <  1  year),  those  on  temporary  contracts  and  in  low-paid 
professions are more likely to be involuntary part-time workers.  

50  EP-IPOL  Economic  and  scientific  policy,  Precarious  Employment  in  Europe:  Patterns,  Trends  and 
Policy Strategy, 2016  
51  Source  "Study  to  support  Impact  Assessment  on  the  Review  of  the  Written  Statement  Directive"  by 
CSES and PPMI. 
52 Eurostat. See Figure 2 in Annex 6. 
53 Eurostat. Note that part of this may relate to cyclical reasons (remaining labour market slack). 

19 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
According  to  the  ECB,  3%  of  the  working  age  population  is  currently  underemployed 
(i.e. working fewer hours than they would like). Currently there are around seven million 
underemployed  part-time  workers  across  the  euro  area  –  an  increase  of  around  one 
million  since  the  start  of  the  crisis.  Moreover,  the  number  has  declined  only  very 
modestly over the past two years, despite robust employment growth.54  

  Unjustifiably long probation periods 

Probation periods offer the worker the opportunity to be supported and developed to meet 
the requirements of the job, and the employer to test the suitability of the worker for that 
job.  During  probation  periods,  the  conditions  attaching  to  the  termination  of  the 
employment contract are often light and some protective measures that normally apply in 
case  of  dismissal  are  absent  (e.g.  notice  period  and  severance  pay).  Therefore,  overly 
long probation periods, in which employment rights are inferior to standard employment, 
may limit worker protection.55   

  Insufficient access to basic training  

Across the EU, 43% of adult employees have seen the technologies they  use change in 
the past five years and 47% have seen changes in working methods or practices.56 Yet, 
only 40% of workers in the EU receive training at work.57 While 40% of workers who do 
not receive training state that this is because they do not need it, there is a proportion of 
workers who are deprived of training opportunities because of lack of employer's support 
(4%),  too  high  costs  (7.5%)  or  lack  of  suitable  offer  (4%).58  Access  to  training  is  also 
more  limited  among  workers  in  non-standard  employment.59  Evidence  based  on  the 
OECD Adult Skills Survey shows that on average being on temporary contracts reduces 
the probability of receiving employer-sponsored training by 14%.60  

2.2.5. Decreased transparency in the labour market 

Apart from improving the protection of workers, the Written Statement Directive aimed 
to  increase  transparency  in  the  labour  market  and  improve  the  operation  of  the  EU 
internal  market.61  Indeed,  by  setting  minimum  requirements  for  the  information  to  be 

54 See Figure 3 in Annex 6. 
55 This could in practice apply to some 0.5-1.5 million workers in the UK and Ireland. 
56  Cedefop’s  European  skills  and 
(ESJS),  2014.  For  more 
jobs  survey 
http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/events-and-projects/projects/european-skills-and-jobs-esj-survey 
57 EWCS 2015 
58 Eurostat 2011 [trng_aes_179] 
59 See Figure 4 in Annex 76 
60 OECD Employment Outlook 2014, Non-regular employment, job security and labour market divide, p. 
141-209 
61 Explanatory memorandum to the proposal for a Directive, COM(90) 563 final. 

information,  see 

20 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
provided  individually  to  employees,  the  Directive  aimed  to  reduce  differences  between 
Member States' legislation. 

The minimum requirements set in the Directive corresponded to the labour market reality 
25 years ago. However, as described earlier, labour markets have since undergone deep 
transformations. As the EU level legislation remained stable, some Member States put in 
place some new regulations and certain national social partners developed new collective 
agreements, leading to an increasingly diverse picture across the EU. 

Just  as  there  are  significant  differences  across  the  Member  States  with  regard  to  the 
personal  scope  of  national  transpositions  of  the  Written  Statement  Directive  (see 
section 2.2.1), the situation also differs in relation to  the protection of workers in the 
most precarious situations. Most of the new and non-standard forms of work referred to 
above do not have a specific legal or collectively agreed basis in most Member States.62 
This  is  probably  due  to  their  newness  and  their  recent  emergence  through  individual 
company  practice  rather  than  a  strategically  planned  labour  market  development.  They 
are regulated (or not) in very different ways across the EU, and the legal frameworks are 
in constant change to address these new phenomena. The diversity of regulation is also 
related to the fact that in each Member State there is a different mix of the new forms of 
employment. 

This diversity of national provisions on new and non-standard work as they currently 
exist is a further regulatory driver. Some forms of work are not consistently covered by 
labour  market  regulation  across  the  EU,  and  this  diversity  hampers  equal  treatment 
between  workers  in  the  same  situation,  who  are  protected  in  very  different  ways  in 
different EU Member States. 

2.3 Why is it a problem? 

2.3.1. Workers 

The  problems  described  above  have  an  impact  on  all  workers  in  the  EU,  in  particular 
those who find themselves in the most precarious forms of employment.  

Those  on  standard  contracts  are  still  relatively  well  protected:  they  generally  receive 
written statements and some of the labour market measures which cause precariousness, 
such as lack of reference hours or lack of notice before assignements, do not affect them. 
However,  also  for  those  workers  written  statements  may  be  delivered  too  late,  the 
information provided may not be sufficient, enforcement mechanisms may not be strong 
enough to guarantee protection. Also, some workers on standard contracts can be subject 
to overly long probation periods and some 55% do not receive training at work.  

62 Eurofound (2015), New forms of employment, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 
page 136. 

21 

 
 
                                                 
Lack of written statements, delayed or incomplete information provided to some workers, 
as well as the broader issue of insufficient predictability of working conditions have an 
even more significant impact on workers in non-standard employment, in particular those 
in 
the  most  precarious  employment  situations.  Some  workers  suffer  negative 
consequences due to a combination of all the described problems: not only do they lack 
the  basic  protection  of  receiving  a  written  statement  but  also  have  extremely  variable 
working  schedules,  limited  access  to  more  permanent  positions,  limited  possibilities  to 
earn  additional  income  due  to  exclusivity  or  incompatibility  clauses  or  unpredictable 
work patterns.  

Non-standard jobs are disproportionately held by women, by young workers, and by less-
educated,  lower-skilled  workers  and  by  migrant  workers,  generally  not  on  a  voluntary 
basis.  

A combination of many such factors means that workers in new and non-standard forms 
of employment are more likely to suffer from job insecurity. Non-standard jobs tend to 
offer  lower  hourly  pay  than  permanent  full-time  jobs63  and  as  a  result  pose  the  highest 
poverty  risk  among  those  in  employment.64  Non-standard  employment  goes  together 
with  a  higher  risk  of  unemployment  and  inactivity.65  At  the  same  time  non-standard 
workers tend to have shorter and lower records of social security contributions and this 
negatively affects their eligibility for social security benefits, as well as the amount and 
duration of those benefits.66  

Some  categories  of  workers  in  new  and  non-standard  forms  of  employment  are  less 
protected  from  occupational  safety  and  health  risks  and  are  more  likely  to  suffer  from 
stress at work.67 Such negative health impacts are confirmed even among young people.68  

Workers  in  the  new  forms  of  employment  also  tend  to  have  more  limited  access  to 
representation  and  collective  bargaining.69  Low  transition  rates  from  temporary  to 

63  European  Commission  (2016),  "Employment  dynamics  and  social  implications",  Chapter  2  in 
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2016. Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European 
Commission. 
64 European Commission (2017), "Working lives: the foundation of prosperity for all generations". Chapter 
3 in Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2017, published on 18 July 2017. 
65 OECD Employment Outlook 2014, Non-regular employment, job security and labour market divide, p. 
141-209 
66  Matsaganis  M.,  Özdemir  E.,  Ward  T.,  Zavakou  A.  (2016),  "Non-standard  employment  and  access  to 
social security benefits", Social Situation Monitor research note, European Union. 
67 Eurofound (2010) Work-Related Stress, p.17. 
68  ‘Economic  activity  and  health  –  Initial  findings  from  the  Next  Steps  Age  25  Sweep’  by  Dr  Morag 
Henderson,  Centre 
(http://www.cls.ioe.ac.uk/shared/get-
file.ashx?itemtype=document&id=3301) 
69 Eurofound (2015), New forms of employment, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 
page 139. 

for  Longitudinal  Studies,  5.07.2016 

22 

 
 
                                                 
permanent  jobs  suggest  that  inequalities  tend  to  persist  over  time.  Evidence  for  EU 
Member  States  shows  that  less  than  50%  of  the  workers  who  were  on  temporary 
contracts in a given year were employed with full time permanent contracts three years 
later.70  

Inequalities in the access to rights, collective bargaining and enforcement deepen gaps in 
job  security,  income  and  access  to  social  protection,  and  limit  access  to  training  and 
professional development.71  

2.3.2. Business 

As described above, the direct consequence of diversity of national implementation of the 
Written  Statement  Directive  as  well  as  lack  of  EU  minimum  requirements  for  some  of 
the most flexible employment practices in new and non-standard forms of employment, 
is  a  decreased  effectiveness  of  the  EU  internal  market.  For  companies  this  means  a 
greater exposure to unfair competition, and for those operating across borders the need to 
adjust business models to 28 different legislative frameworks. 

Some  non-standard  or  atypical  forms  of  employment  can  offer  flexibility  both  to  the 
employer and the employee. Employers can benefit from the opportunity to expand or to 
respond  flexibly  to  fluctuations  in  demand  without  having  the  risks  associated  with 
taking on staff permanently. They can also retain the skills of workers who wish to work 
only  casually  or  intermittently  (e.g.  semi-retired  workers,  workers  with  family 
responsibilities). Some employees do not wish to commit to regular working hours, such 
as  students,  semi-retired  workers,  workers  with  family  responsibilities.  In  some  cases, 
workers may accept a second job with flexible working hours because they want to enjoy 
occasional  opportunities  for  additional  income  rather  than  committing  to  regularly 
working additional hours with a second employer. 

However,  employers  who  rely  to  a  large  extent  on  non-standard  work  are  exposed  to 
some longer-term disadvantages associated with such a business model. 

A  frequent  issue  is  that  relying  on  non-standard  employment  arrangements  can  have  a 
negative  impact  on  the  commitment  of  hired-in  workers  and  that  the  insufficient 
protection  of  working  conditions  of  certain  employees  leads  to  a  decrease  in 

70 OECD Employment Outlook 2014, Non-regular employment, job security and labour market divide, p. 
141-209 
71  European  Parliament  Policy  Department  C,  Temporary  contracts,  precarious  employment,  employees' 
fundamental rights  and EU employment law: A study for the PETI Committee, November 2017, Section 
1.2. 

23 

 
 
 
                                                 
commitment.72 A literature review from the ILO73 indicates that the weaker attachment is 
likely  to  be  manifested  in  a  reduced  attempt  to  assimilate  socially,  lower  performance, 
lower  motivation  and  effort  as  compared  to  regular  workers,  including  higher 
absenteeism, lower job satisfaction, or lower commitment to the organization. Innovation 
may be negatively affected by insecurity in employment relationships leading to a lack of 
trust and risk-averse behaviour.74 

The  increasingly  widespread  use  of  temporary  work  risks  harming  productivity  growth 
(ESDE  2017).75,76  There  is  evidence  that  a  high  proportion  of  temporary  work,  even 
when controlling for sectoral differences and for firm size, harms total factor productivity 
growth in various ways, with the impact being more damaging in skilled sectors.  

Data  from  the  European  Union  Structure  of  Earnings  Survey  (SES)77 reveals  that  in 
2014,  only  some  4%  of  firms  used  non-standard  forms  of  work  intensively  (more  than 
50 % of their workers were either fixed-term or temporary agency workers). 52% of the 
firms make no use of temporary employees, while for some 44% the share of temporary 
workers  ranges  between  0-50%.  In  the  same  vein,  2016  data  from  the  UK  shows  that 
only  some  7%  of  enterprises  make  some  use  of  contracts  that  do  not  guarantee  a 
minimum  number  of  hours  and  use  of  such  contracts  is  significantly  more  widespread 
among the biggest enterprises in comparison with SMEs.78  

This implies that the relatively large number of companies in Europe providing workers 
with  protection  related  to  standard  employment  status  risk  being  in  a  disadvantaged 
position in relation to companies which compete on the basis of reduced labour costs.  

66%  of  EU  companies  provide  some  vocational  training.79  However,  in  general,  the 
greater  the  proportion  of  non-standard  workers  in  an  organization,  the  less  the 

the  world:  Understanding  challenges,  shaping  prospects" 

72World  Health Organization,  Regional  Office  for  Europe,  Enterprise  for  Health-A  joint  project  between 
AOK for Lower Saxony and WHO, p.2 
73  "Non-standard  employment  around 
International Labour Office – Geneva: ILO. 
74  The  above  statements  are  based  on  a  literature  review  presented  in  the  "Non-standard  employment 
around  the  world:  Understanding  challenges,  shaping  prospects"  International  Labour  Office  –  Geneva: 
ILO 2016, and "Non-standard forms of employment. Report for discussion at the Meeting of Experts on 
Non-Standard  Forms  of  Employment"  (Geneva,  16–19  February  2015)/International  Labour  Office, 
Conditions of Work and Equality Department, Geneva, 2015 
75 Ibidem 
76 OECD Employment Outlook 2014, Non-regular employment, job security and labour market divide, p. 
141-209 
77  Establishment  level  survey  covering  private  sector  firms  with  at  least  ten  employees  in  22  European 
countries 
78https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/articles/c
ontractsthatdonotguaranteeaminimumnumberofhours/may2017 
79 Eurostat 2011 [trng_cvts02] 

24 

 
 
                                                 
organization will invest in training and development.80 Underinvestment in training, both 
for  temporary  and  permanent  employees,  reduces  incentives  to  invest  in  productivity-
enhancing  technology  and  patenting,  and  slows  down  innovation.  An  over-reliance  on 
temporary  workers,  especially  if  they  are  low  skilled,  may  end  up  deskilling  the 
organization as a whole and have a detrimental effect on the working environment for all 
workers.81 

2.3.3. Member States 

Lack of  written statements for a growing  number of workers, written statements  which 
are  delivered  too  late  or  do  not  contain  all  the  relevant  information,  as  well  as 
weaknesses  in  enforcement  mechanisms  can  have  direct  negative  consequences  for 
Member States in terms of the capacity to prevent undeclared work and prevent abuse of 
workers' rights. 

With regard to the broader question of regulation of new and non-stardard forms of work, 
Eurofound82 points out that these can have positive effects: creating new jobs, allowing 
for  a  professional  activation  of  a  greater  number  of  people  (including  vulnerable 
workers) and reconciliation between private and professional lives. However, lack of job 
predictability,  exacerbated  by  measures  such  as  extremely  variable  work  schedules, 
exclusivity  clauses,  lack  of  training  opportunities  or  opportunities  to  move  towards 
standard  forms  of  employment,  contribute  to  labour  market  segmentation  and  impact 
most  the  most  vulnerable  groups  of  workers,  leading  to  underemployment,  higher 
poverty risk and strain on social protection systems. As noted above, non-standard jobs 
tend  to  be  performed  by  women,  young,  migrant,  and  less  educated  workers,  so 
increasing labour market segmentation and the risk of social exclusion for these groups.  

Indirectly, there can be negative consequences for the sustainability of public finance, as 
well as for demography and social cohesion.  

Underemployment  caused  e.g.  by  exclusivity  clauses  and  unpredictable  work  shifts 
preventing a worker taking on more work has costs in reduced tax contributions, higher 
social spending or reduced consumption.  

The growing precariousness of the labour market is affecting household decisions across 
generations.83  The  increase  in  non-standard  jobs  for  younger  generations  has  started  to 
cause discontinuity and variation in income levels. As a consequence it has become more 

80    63% of  companies with  10-49  employees,  81%  in  companies with  50-249  employees,  93%  in bigger 
companies. 
81 Håkansson and Isidorsson, 2012 

83 ESDE, 2017 

25 

 
 
 
                                                 
 
common for their parents to make financial transfers to assist them with rent expenses or 
mortgage costs/deposits,84 and for those without access to such resources to be excluded 
from  the  housing  market  or  pushed  to  its  margins.  Such  processes  increase  the  risk  of 
socio political exclusion.  

The widespread increase in non-standard work is likely to be one of the causes of delayed 
parenthood.85 The mean age at which women become mothers is highly correlated to the 
proportion  of  non-standard  workers  among  younger  people  in  the  country  and  is 
increasing, so exacerbating demographic imbalances.  

2.4 How will the problem evolve? 

In the absence of EU action the insufficient protection of workers, including those in new 
and  non-standard  forms  of  employment,  and  the  resulting  negative  consequences  for 
businesses, Member States and the internal market will most likely increase.  

Firstly,  economic,  social  and  technological  developments  may  continue  to  increase 
different  forms  of  non-standard  work  as  well  as  to  further  diversify  new  forms  of 
employment,  thus  potentially  leading  to  a  further  increase  in  the  number  of  workers 
not  covered  by  the  provisions  of  the  Directive  and/or  exposed  to  some  of  the 
measures increasing insecurity of employment. 

The  future  of  work  will  be  marked  by  a  growing  need  for  flexibility,  fast  pace, 
adaptability  and  autonomy,  which  will  increase  incentives  for  companies  to  use  on-
demand work, short-term contracts, or outsourcing.86  

Across  the  EU,  as  discussed  in  section  2.2.1.,  the  volume  of  non-standard  work87  has 
increased over the last two decades. This steady increase indicates that the trend is likely 
to be of a structural, rather than a cyclical, nature. Some of the new and non-standard 
forms of work addressed by this initiative have been expanding particularly strongly over 
recent  years  and  have  potential  for  further  significant  growth  in  the  future.  This  is  the 
case  e.g.  for  platform  work,  temporary  agency  work,  domestic  and/or  voucher-based 
work. A growing trend has also been observed in individual Member States.88  

the  world:  Understanding  challenges,  shaping  prospects" 

84  "Non-standard  employment  around 
International Labour Office – Geneva: ILO. 2016, p.221 
85 ESDE, 2017 
86 https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/sites/epsc/files/strategic_note_issue_13.pdf 
87 Non-standard work here includes permanent part-time, temporary full-time and part-time. 
88  Source:  EPPO  network.  For  example,  in  Belgium  for  the  period  between  2008  and  2015,  there  was 
increase for temporary agency workers (from 384.000 to 424.000), for casual and seasonal workers (4.000 
to 6.000). A new regime of flexi-jobs (14.000 in 2015) was created and is likely to expand. 

26 

 
 
 
                                                 
Assuming  that  the  average  year-on-year  growth  rates  between  1995  and  2016  for  each 
type  of  non-standard  work  continue  into  the  future,  non-standard  work  would  go  from 
being a fourth of all employment contracts in 2016, to representing more than 35% of all 
employment in 2050 (see Chart 1). 89  In addition, these data only partially capture casual 
work.  

Chart 1 – Evolution of non-standard work (1995-2016) and projection for the future 
(2017-2080) by type of contract, EU-15 (1995-2001) and EU-28 (2002-2080) 

Note: For the evolution by type of contract from 2016 onwards, average year-on-year growth rates by type of contract 
share between 1995 and 2016 were used.  
Source: Own calculations based on EU-LFS.  

Moreover, it is likely that the extent and direction of national regulatory responses to 
the  new  and  non-standard  forms  of  work  will  continue  to  be  diverse,  leading  to 
diverging  levels  of  protection  of  workers  across  the  EU  and  consequently  different 
conditions for business as regards labour law conditions. Indeed, across the EU the legal 
frameworks are in constant change to try to regulate these new phenomena. 

89 Projections beyond 20 years are associated with a high degree of uncertainty. 

27 

 
 
 
                                                 
Regulation of on-demand work  
An example of developments in Member States' legislation on non-standard work 

  No regulation (e.g. PL, BE, FI, CY, HR, GR, SL). Either casual work is not a common 
practice,  or  exists  without  being  regulated.  For  instance  in  CZ,  agreement  on  working 
activities is allowed within a certain number of hours/year but is not subject to regulation 
so leads to very limited access to standard worker rights. 

  On-demand work and zero hours contracts are considered illegal (e.g. AT, FR, BG, LU, 
and LV). For instance in AT, every legally valid employment contract must include the 
number of hours the employee is expected to work.  

  Regulation of zero hours contracts and some types of casual work (e.g. UK, HU, IT, 
DE,  NL,  ES,  RO,  IT,  PT,  IE).  For  instance  in  DE,  an  on-demand  work  contract  must 
specify  the  number  of  daily  and  weekly  working  hours;  by  default  the  amount  of  daily 
working hours is deemed to be three. In  ES, RO and PT casual work is allowed in the 
agricultural  sector  or  for  seasonal  activities.  In  the  NL  zero  hours  clauses  can  only  be 
concluded for the first 6 months of employment with the same employer. 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? 

3.1  Legal basis 

The  initiative  will  support  Union's  aims  recognised  in  Article  3  TEU:  to  promote  the 
well-being  of  its  peoples,  the  sustainable  development  of  Europe  aiming  at  full 
employment  and  social  progress,  but  also  the  aim  to  promote  social  justice  and 
protection, equality between women and men and solidarity between generations.90 

In  the  current  Treaty  framework,91  the  appropriate  legal  basis  would  be  Article  153 
TFEU: 153(1)(b)" With a view to achieving the objectives of Article 151, the Union shall 
support and complement the activities of the Member States in the following fields: (b) 
working conditions"; 153 (2) (b) "to this end, the European Parliament and the Council 
may  adopt  (…)  by  means  of  directives  minimum  requirements  for  gradual 
implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in each of 
the  Member  States.  Such  directives  shall  avoid  imposing  administrative,  financial  and 
legal constraints in a way which would hold back the creation and development of small 
and medium-sized undertakings. 

90 TEU Art 3  
91 Directive 91/533/EU was adopted under Article 100 of the then EEC Treaty. 

28 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
Indeed,  Article  151  TFEU  provides  that  the  Union  and  the  Member  States  aim  at  the 
promotion  of  employment,  improved  living  and  working  conditions,  so  as  to  make 
possible  their  harmonisation  while  the  improvement  is  being  maintained,  proper  social 
protection,  dialogue  between  management  and  labour,  the  development  of  human 
resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion. 

3.2  Results of the social partner consultations 

Consultation  of  representative  social  partner  organisations  in  two  phases  in  accordance 
with Article 154 TFEU took place previous to the presentation of the proposal.  

The views of the social partners were mixed on the need for legislative action to revise 
Directive 91/533/EEC.  

In  both  phases  trade  unions  were  in  favour  of  clarifying  and  broadening  the  personal 
scope  of  the  Directive,  in  particular  through  removing  exclusions  from  personal  scope 
and  including  criteria  to  assist  with  identifying  the  existence  of  an  employment 
relationship. In addition, they argued for the inclusion of self-employed in the scope of 
application.  With  regard  to  the  information  package,  trade  unions  agreed  with  the  list 
suggested in the consultation document and argued for further additions to the package. 
They  called  for  written  statements  to  be  provided  prior  to  the  start  of  the  work  or 
immediately on signing the contract. The need to improve access to sanctions and means 
of redress was acknowledged, including by calling for the introduction of a presumption 
of  employment  in  case  the  employer  fails  to  provide  a  written  statement.  Finally,  they 
were  strongly  in  favour  of  new  minimum  rights  aimed  at  improving  transparency  and 
predictabiltiy  of  working  conditions.  They  however  requested  more  rights  than  those 
presented  in  the  second  consutlation  document  including  a  complete  ban  on  forms  of 
contractual arrangements not guaranting workers a minimum of paid hours and a right to 
adequate remuneration.  

In  both  phases  employers’  organisations  opposed  the  extension  of  the  scope  of 
application of the Directive and the insertion of a definition of worker, based on concerns 
related to flexibility for business and job creation potential as well as to subsidiarity. A 
majority did not support amending the information package nor reducing the 2 months' 
deadline.  No  organisation  supported  changes  at  EU  level  to  the  system  of  redress  and 
sanctions.  With  very  limited  exceptions,  employer  organisations  were  opposed  to  the 
inclusion of new minimum rights in a revised Directive. For that reason, they preferred 
not  to  express  views  on  specific  minimum  rights  set  out  in  the  consultation  document, 
arguing  that  such  issues  were  a  matter  of  national  competence  and  that  it  was  not 
necessary,  or  even  contrary  to  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  for  the  EU  to  act  in  these 
fields. 

29 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The social partners did not reach an agreement to launch the negotiation process provided 
for under Article 155 TFEU. It is however important to improve protection in this area by 
modernising  and  adapting  the  current  legal  framework,  while  taking  into  account  the 
diverging views expressed by the social partners.92  

3.3  Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action and added value of EU action 

The social dimension of the internal market – promoting fairness and social standards 

The  described  multiplication  of  forms  of  work  requires  an  assessment  of  the  need  for 
additional  common  standards  for  working  conditions  to  support  equal  treatment  of 
workers,  a  level  playing  field  across  the  EU,  and  upward  convergence  in  employment 
and social outcomes. 

An  increasing  number  of  workers  not  protected  by  the  Directive,  uncertainty  over 
whether new or non-standard forms of employment fall within its scope and divergencies 
in (timely) notification of essential elements of an employment relationship may lead to 
precarious  employment  relationships  or  employment  conditions,  additional  risks  to  the 
health and safety of workers, and harmful social competition within and across Member 
States.  While  collective  agreements  are  an  effective  tool  to  complement  and  extend 
protection  established  in  national  legislation,  these  are  also  diverse  and  workers  in  the 
most casual forms of work are currently often excluded from collective bargaining. There 
is therefore a need to explore the opportunity for improved common action at EU level.  

Furthermore, there is a risk of race to the bottom in standards applying to new forms of 
work where the regulatory framework is weaker and more patchy across Member States, 
and their efforts to ensure minimum protection of workers is likely to lead to increasingly 
divergent and even contradictory national solutions, creating regulatory loopholes when 
viewed  from  an  EU  perspective,  and  leading  to  inequality  in  the  protection  of  workers 
and  their  living  conditions.  Eventually  it  could  affect  the  quality  of  the  workforce,  the 
relative  competitiveness  of  employers,  companies  and  Member  States,  and  the 
functioning of the EU internal market.  

By acting at EU level there is a possibility to build on good practices developed in some 
Member  States,  and  to  create  a  momentum  for  Member  States  to  advance  together 
towards better outcomes, supporting upwards convergence.  

While the EU is working to increase fair labour mobility in Europe by removing barriers, 
the  potential  of  labour  mobility  is  not  yet  exploited  in  full.  The  EU  could  further 

92  See  Annex  2  for  a  more  complete  account  of  social  partners'  opinions  expressed  in  the  two  stages  of 
consultation. 

30 

 
 
 
                                                 
contribute to improving internal market mobility for (some categories of) workers and for 
businesses operating in different Member States.  

Moreover,  as  highlighted  in  the  Five  Presidents'  Report  on  Completing  Europe's 
Economic and Monetary Union,93 in a single currency area, there is a need to build up the 
shock absorption capacity and labour market adjustment mechanisms of Member States. 
Enhancing  convergence 
institutions  and  social 
infrastructure  can  facilitate  resilience,  social  cohesion  and  macro-economic  adjustment 
within the euro area and beyond. 

labour  market 

towards 

robust 

The  European  Parliament,  in  its  Resolution  of  January  2017,  calls  on  the  social 
partners  and  the  Commission  to  present  a  proposal  for  a  framework  directive  on 
decent  working  conditions  in  all  forms  of  employment,  extending  existing  minimum 
standards to new kinds of employment relationships, in order to improve enforcement of 
EU law, increase legal certainty across the single market and prevent discrimination by 
complementing existing EU law and ensuring for every worker a core set of enforceable 
rights, regardless of the type of contract or employment relationship.94 Its request is for 
an  instrument  that  guarantees  workers'  rights  across  a  wide  range  of  fields  including 
equal  treatment,  health  and  safety  protection,  protection  during  maternity  leave, 
provisions on working time and rest time, work-life balance, access to training, in-work 
support for people with disabilities, adequate information, consultation and participation 
rights,  freedom  of  association  and  representation,  collective  bargaining  and  collective 
action. 

The  Parliament's  request  represents  a  highly  ambitious  approach  to  addressing  the 
challenges set out in the problem definition section of this Impact Assessment. Indeed, it 
implies a revolutionary overhaul of the entire EU social acquis, bringing together into a 
single legal instrument the widest possible personal and material scope of rights, which 
would supersede the existing corpus of EU law.  

While the Commission shares much of the Parliament's diagnosis of the challenges and 
recognises  the  need  for  new  material  rights  for  workers  in  the  most  precarious  and 
vulnerable situations, who are often currently left outside the scope of protection of the 
current acquis, it takes the view that this does not require overhauling the entire acquis, 
and  that  a  more  proportionate  approach  lies  in  a  more  modest  and  targeted  instrument, 
namely  a  revision  and  possible  expansion  of  the  Written  Statement  Directive.  The 
obligation  to  provide  written  confirmation  of  the  essential  elements  of  an  employment 
relationship  is  seen  as  a  basic  right  that  applies  "regardless  of  the  type  of  contract  or 

93 "Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union", Report by Jean-Claude Juncker, in cooperation 
with Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario Draghi and Martin Schulz, June 2015. 
94  European  Parliament  resolution  of  19  January  2017  on  a  European  Pillar  of  Social  Rights 
(2016/2095(INI)) 

31 

 
 
                                                 
employment  relationship",  to  use  the  wording  of  the  Parliament's  Resolution.  Ensuring 
the  removal  of  gaps  in  coverage  of  workers  in  marginal  or  currently  excluded 
employment  relationships  is  one  of  the  key  objectives  of  this  proposed  revision,  along 
with an update in the contents of the information package. The creation of new material 
rights  particularly  for  workers in  precarious  situations  with  little  or  no predictability  of 
work  schedules,  addresses  the  essential  element  of  the  challenge  highlighted  by  the 
Parliament, but by means of a complement to, rather than replacement, of the existing EU 
social acquis. 

In its Opinion on the Commission's proposal for a European Pillar of Social Rights, the 
European Economic and Social Committee draws attention to the increasing diversity of 
types of employment and calls for the framework conditions in labour markets to support 
new and more diverse career paths, including through providing a suitable employment 
protection  legislation  environment  to  provide  a  framework  for  fair  working  conditions 
and  to  stimulate  recruitment  under  all  employment  contracts.95  In  its  Opinion,  the 
Committee of the Regions states that the emergence of non-standard forms of work leads 
to new risks of "grey zones" in terms of labour rights and access to welfare and calls on 
the  Commission  to  properly  define  flexibility  in  working  conditions,  so  as  to  strike  a 
balance between flexibility and security.96 The Commission's analysis of the problem to 
be addressed by the proposed Directive is aligned with that of both institutions and the 
measures considered in this Impact Analysis and the preferred option follow the lines set 
out in their recommendations for action.  

The Written Statement Directive  

Since the entry into force of the Directive in  1991 and  more recently as a result of the 
economic  and  financial  crisis,  diverging  and/or  precarious  working  conditions  and 
insufficient protection of workers have been observed across the EU.  

Currently, the Directive is not fully adequate and/or incomplete with respect to its scope, 
implementation  or  enforcement  as  not  every  worker  can  access  the  same  basic  rights 
everywhere, employers face unfair competition, and there is room for better prevention 
of undeclared work.  

A change to the Directive can only be made at EU level.  

EU action to revise the directive can work as a catalyst for a wider-scale improvement of 
the employment relationship:  

95  Opinion SOC/542 of the European Economic and Social Committee of 25.01.2017, paragraph 3.5. 
96 Committee of the Regions, Opinion on the European Pillar of Social Rights, adopted in plenary session 
11 October 2017, paragraph 18. 

32 

 
 
                                                 
-  for  workers,  alleviating  the  'burden  of  uncertainty'  by  providing  enhanced  workers' 
protection  (access  to  information,  enforcement  mechanisms),  less  precariousness 
(security,  predictability)  or  market  segmentation  (training  and  transition  opportunities) 
and better mobility conditions; 

- for businesses, creating a level playing field; better coherence and transparency across 
the labour market; 

  Member  States  and  the  society  at  large  would  gain  from  greater  certainty  and 
transparency in labour market functioning and enhanced social convergence.  

Achieving  our  common  goals  by  facing  our  common  challenges:  an  initiative  on  the 
information and better protection of EU workers 

Member States, the social partners and the EU institutions aim to use the European Pillar 
of  Social  Rights  as  a  guide  towards  efficient  employment  and  social  outcomes  in  the 
context  of  current  and  future  challenges,  in  order  to  fulfil  people's  essential  needs,  and 
ensure better enactment and implementation of social rights.  

Making  the  Social  Pillar  a  reality  for  citizens  is  a  joint  responsibility.  It  is  in  this 
framework  of  common  agreement  on  the  need to  find  common  solutions  to  common 
challenges  that  this  initiative  is  developed.  It  is  one  of  the  concrete  tools  that  the 
Commission is putting forward to contribute to the delivery on the Pillar.  

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? 

A  revised  Written  Statement  Directive  would  contribute  to  the  Treaty-based  goals  of 
promoting  employment  and  improved  living  and  working  conditions  (Article  151 
TFEU). It would also address the rights set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the  European  Union  in  relation  to  workers'  right  to  information  (Article  27)  and  their 
right to fair and just working conditions (Article 31).  

The general objective of the revised Directive would be to promote more secure and 
predictable employment while ensuring labour market adaptability and improving 
living and working conditions.  

It  is  appropriate  to  reflect  both  elements  from  Article  151  TFEU,  as  the  goal  of  the 
revision  is  to  secure  improvements  in  working  conditions,  and  thereby  also  the  living 
conditions  of  workers  and  their  families,  while  taking  account  of  the  need  to  promote 
employment  and  job  creation  and  avoid  imposing  administrative,  financial  and  legal 
constraints in a way which would hold back the creation and development of small and 
medium-sized undertakings.65 

These aspects are reflected in the specific objectives through which the general objective 
would be addressed: 

33 

 
 
 
(1) to improve workers' access to information concerning their working conditions; 

(2) to improve working conditions for all workers, notably those in new and non-standard 
employment, while preserving scope for adaptability and for labour market innovation 

(3)  to  improve  compliance  with  working  conditions  standards  through  enhanced 
enforcement; and 

(4)  to  improve  transparency  of  the  labour  market  while  avoiding  the  imposition  of 
excessive burdens on undertakings of all sizes. 

5.  WHAT ARE THE CONSIDERED POLICY MEASURES? 

5.1  What is the baseline from which options are assessed? 

Under the baseline scenario the Written Statement Directive  continues to apply without 
any  changes  to  its  personal  scope,  to  the  content  of  the  written  statement,  or  to  the 
deadline  for  providing  the  document  to  workers.  No  new  basic  rights  for  workers  are 
introduced and the enforcement mechanisms remain unchanged. 

Concerning the scope, the gaps in the coverage identified through the REFIT evaluation 
and  in  the  context  of  the  Social  Pillar  consultation,  persist,  leaving  some  groups  of 
workers in  some Member States without any written  confirmation  of their  employment 
conditions  and  thus  making  them  more  vulnerable  to  abuse.  In  some  cases,  other 
initiatives  or  improved  enforcement  arrangements  could  partially  address  the  gaps.  For 
example,  the  European  Quality  Framework  for  Traineeships,  recently  complemented 
with a new proposal for a Framework for Quality and Effective Apprenticeships, could 
increase  the  proportion  of  paid  trainees  who  receive  a  written  statement.  Overall, 
however,  the  number  of  workers  not  covered  by  the  provisions  of  the  Written 
Statement  Directive  is  likely  to  grow  in  the  next  20-30  years,  as  the  extent  of  new 
and non-standard forms of work is expected to increase (see section 2). 

As for the content and the deadline for the written statements, the effectiveness of the 
Directive  would  continue  to  be  negatively  affected  in  case  of  no  revision.  While  a 
relatively high number of Member States have adopted a range of shorter deadlines than 
the maximum set out in the Directive, lack of legislative action at the EU level will make 
it  difficult  to  fulfil  the  Social  Pillar  principle  that  workers  across  the  EU  get  a  written 
statement at the start of their employment. 

Without  the  proposed  revision  of  the  Written  Statement  Directive,  a  high  level  of 
insecurity  in  some  jobs,  notably  some  new  and  non-standard  jobs,  would  remain 
problematic  across  the  EU.  Insufficient  access  to  cost-free  mandatory  training  or 
opportunities  to  move  on  to  more  permanent  jobs  would  persist.  While  new  legislation 
and collective bargaining in some Member States could gradually improve conditions for 

34 

 
 
 
some  groups  of  workers,  the  lack  of  EU  minimum  requirements  would  sustain  and 
probably  deepen  divergences  across  the  EU.  Those  would  have  a  negative  impact  on 
equality of treatment for workers and potentially lead to distorted competition within the 
single market. 

Finally,  concerning  the  enforcement,  under  the  baseline  scenario  the  issues  identified 
through  the  REFIT  evaluation  on  obstacles  to  redress  would  persist,  leading  to 
insufficient protection of workers and undermined effectiveness of the Directive. 

Under  the  baseline  scenario  it  can  be  expected divergence  between  working  conditions 
across  the  EU,  if  not  divergence  towards  lower  standards  with  long-term  risks  for  the 
Union as a whole. As pointed in the European Parliament briefing of March 2017, the use 
of cheaper and  more vulnerable temporary  workers can  be one of the sources of social 
dumping across and within Member States.97 

5.2 Measures discarded at an early stage 

Guidance, recommendations, benchmarks 

The  economic  governance  through  the  European  Semester  process  is  well  suited  to  set 
out EU employment policy guidance in the area of labour market segmentation, but is not 
a process that can guarantee labour and social rights at the individual level in the Member 
States.   

Stricter  enforcement  could  improve  the  effectiveness  of  the  existing  Written  Statement 
Directive  as  well  as  other  elements  of  EU's  social  acquis.  However,  as  shown  in  the 
REFIT  evaluation,  enforcement  shortcomings  are  related  to  the  lack  of  adequate 
mechanisms  in  the  Directive.  Also,  enforcement  would  not  address  gaps  in  the  social 
acquis e.g. with regard to predictability of work schedules. 

Greater  clarity  on  legal  obligations  and  raising  awareness  of  employers  could  also 
contribute  to  a  better  implementation  of  the  Directive.  To  some  extent,  interpretative 
guidance (e.g. on the issue of blurred lines between employment and self-employment) 
could  increase  the  clarity  for  employers  and  those  tasked  with  enforcement  such  as 
inspectorates  or  labour  courts.  Such  guidance  could  however  not  amend  the  personal 
scope of the Directive, would not address the existing exclusions from its scope, and also 
would not be an effective tool to introduce any new rights for workers. 

The  growth  of  new  and  non-standard  forms  of  employment  has  resulted  in  groups  of 
workers  finding  themselves  excluded  from  the  benefits  of  transparency  on  working 
conditions, and more generally from the scope of EU labour law, as it has up to now been 

97 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599353/EPRS_BRI(2017)599353_EN.pdf 

35 

 
 
 
                                                 
largely framed around the concept of the standard employment contract or relationship. 
Therefore,  legislative  changes  appear  to  be  the  more  adequate  response  to  this 
fundamental  challenge,  particularly  in  respect  of  a  transparency  objective  on  working 
conditions that should apply to the widest concept of worker.  

Discarded legislative options 

As  explained  in  the  Section  3,  the  Commission  took  note  of  the  Parliament's  call  for 
establishing  a  new  framework  directive  on  decent  working  conditions  in  all  forms  of 
employment  but  considered  that  at  this  stage  a  more  proportionate  approach  lies  in  a 
more targeted instrument.  

Indeed  some  of  the  actions  proposed  by  the  Parliament  would  have  improved  the 
protection of workers more, and more decisively challenged some of the issues raised in 
the  problem  description,  specifically  for  workers  in  new  and  non-standard  forms  of 
employment.  Nonetheless  they  would  not  have  answered  to  the  policy aim  of  reducing 
the risk of insufficient protection of workers while at the same time balancing necessary 
flexibility on the labour market. 

Furthermore,  the  option  of  proceeding  with  a  proposal  centred  on  one  type  of 
employment  relationship  (for  instance  a  directive  on  on-call  or  casual  work)  has  been 
discarded.  Indeed,  the  problem  that  this  proposal  aims  to  address  relates  to  the 
multiplication of forms of employment relationships, some of which lack basic levels of 
protection  of  working  conditions.  The  aim  is  to  ensure  a  common  minimum  level  of 
universal protection across existing and future contractual forms for which the provision 
of universal rights via a revised Written Statement Directive would be a more effective 
entry point than a dedicated legislative instrument targeted at a form of employment that 
may  become  superseded  by  the  rapid  pace  of  change  on  the  labour  market.  This 
approach, in line with the universality of the Principles of the European Pillar of Social 
Rights,  aims  at  ensuring  that  the  provisions are  future-proof,  apply  broadly  and  remain 
relevant also in case of future innovation in contractual forms.   

The reasons for discarding other options are twofold. The first is the need to ensure that 
the  cumulative  effect  of  the  different  provisions  does  not  create  excessive  burdens  for 
employers or excessive rigidity on the labour market at this stage of its development. The 
importance  of  this  consideration  takes  into  account  the  diverging  views  of  the  social 
partners  and  the  obligation  in  Article  153(2)  TFEU  to  avoid  imposing  administrative, 
financial  and  legal  constraints  in  a  way  which  would  hold  back  the  creation  and 
development of small and medium-sized undertakings. The second reason relates to the 
Treaty  basis,  and  the  need  to  ensure  that  proposals  not  only  respect  EU  competence, 
proportionality and subsidiarity, but also that they are consistent with the scope of Article 
153(1)(b) on working conditions. 

36 

 
 
Taking  into  account  these  aspects,  the  Commission  discarded  some  of  the  avenues  of 
action reflected upon in its first stage social partners consultation document:  a right to a 
reasonable notice period in case of dismissal/early termination of contract, to receive the 
reason for the dismissal and to adequate redress in case of unfair dismissal or unlawful 
termination of contract; and a right to guaranteed hours after a certain seniority with the 
same employer set at the average level of previous worked hours. 

The  rights  relating  to  dismissal  could  indeed  create  an  excessive  burden  if  introduced 
together with other information and material rights. Additionally, they relate to another 
legal  basis  (Art  153(1)(d)  requiring  unanimity  voting  in  Council.  The  avoidance  of 
cumulative burden was the reason to exclude also the right to guaranteed hours. 

Regarding  training,  the  Commission  initially  considered  introducing  an  obligation  for 
employers to provide free of charge training necessary to enable workers to carry out the 
work for which they are employed. This was however considered as a disproportionate 
measure from the point of view of costs (which could amount to 1-4 billion EUR per year 
and be especially burdensome for SMEs) and lack of clarity on what constitutes training 
necessary for the job, which could lead to problems of transposition and implementation. 

Additionally,  for  the  same  two  types  of  reason,  the  Commission  did  not  pursue  certain 
proposals put forward during the consultation by the trade unions. 

 In  exercising  these  considerations,  the  Commission  addresses  the  need  to  balance 
essential  protection  for  workers  with  the  scope  for  job  creation  and  labour  market 
innovation.  

Repeal of the Directive 

A  complete  repeal  of  the  Directive  without  replacement  would  leave  it  entirely  to  the 
Member States to determine what information a worker should receive about his or her 
employment relationship and to establish any new material rights. This scenario has been 
discarded at the outset as it could result in a wider divergence of worker protection across 
the EU as well as deterioration in existing rights to information and material protection, 
in complete contrast with the aim of supporting upwards convergence. 

5.3 Considered policy measures 

Given the drawbacks in the protection through the Written Statement Directive identified 
by the REFIT evaluation as well as the challenges related to labour market developments, 
the Commission is considering a range of legislative measures. Those measures will be 
combined into options presented as policy packages in Section 6). They are all aimed at 
promoting  more  secure  and  predictable  employment  while  ensuring  labour  market 
to  support  upward 
adaptability  and 
convergence in working conditions across the Union. 

living  and  working  conditions, 

improving 

37 

 
 
Indeed,  these  measures  aim  at  limiting  unfair  competition  based  on  employment 
conditions,  inside  and  across  Member  States.  Building  measures  that  allow  common 
minimum social standards across both traditional and new business models seems central 
to set a level playing-field. This can support technological and organisational innovation 
within  a  common  regulatory  framework,  and  limit  competition  on  the  basis  of  social 
standards.  Only the first is a sustainable long-term strategy to support a more productive 
economy and fairer Union. 

Measure  one  relates  to  ensuring  a  scope  of  application  encompassing  all  EU 
workers, in particular the most precarious. 

The  proposed  measure  aims  to  extend  the  scope  of  the  Directive  by  removing  the 
exclusions now allowed under the Written Statement Directive (sub-measures 1 to 3) and 
codifying criteria derived from CJEU case-law for establishing who a worker is for the 
purpose  of  the  Directive  (sub-measure  4).  This  is  in  line  with  the  suggestions  of  the 
REFIT evaluation, and with requests of the European Parliament. 

Indeed, the Parliament called for a proposal for decent working conditions in all forms of 
employment,  extending  existing  minimum  standards  to  new  kinds  of  employment 
relationships,  that  increases  legal  certainty  and  ensuring  for  every  worker  a  core  set  of 
enforceable  rights,  regardless  of  the  type  of  contract  or  employment  relationship,  that 
should  apply  to  employees  and  all  workers  in  non-standard  forms  of  employment.  The 
Parliament  called  as  well  for  broadening  the  Written  Statement  Directive  to  cover  all 
forms of employment and employment relationships.  Additionally, it pointed to the need 
to support, for the purpose of EU law and without prejudice to national law, clarification 
to  distinguish  between  those  genuinely  self-employed  and  those  in  an  employment 
relationship. 

Introducing  a  set  of  common  criteria  to  assess  who  is  a  worker  for  the  scope  of  the 
directive would ensure equal treatment  of workers in the EU and combat the exclusion 
from  basic  protection  of  people  undertaking  economic  activities  that  might  not  be 
recognised as work at national level (as in some cases casual workers including zero-hour 
contract  workers).  This  will  support  the  goal  of  increasing  legal  certainty  and  ensuring 
for  every  worker  a  core  set  of  enforceable  rights,  regardless  of  the  type  of  contract  or 
employment  relationship.  Indeed,  the  measure  would  facilitate  identification  of  bogus 
self-employed  people  and  their  inclusion  under  the  scope  of  the  Directive  in  the  sense 
that  it  would  clarify  which  criteria  should  be  applied  to  establish  worker  status. 
Strengthened enforcement provisions under measure 5 would provide an avenue for those 
potentially  falsely  labelled  self-employed  to  establish  their  correct  status  and  the 
protection that comes with it.  

38 

 
 
 
 
 
To facilitate the implementation of the Directive, the proposal permits Member States to 
provide that very short relationships fall outside scope of the Directive98 by including a 
threshold of up to 8h per month (sub-measure 1.5.). This aims at bringing within scope of 
the  obligations  established  by  this  Directive  employment  relationships  that  are  of 
extremely  marginal  nature  and  where  the  protections  set  out  in  the  Directive  could  be 
disproportionate.  It  will  be  for  Member  States  to  determine,  in  the  light  of  national 
circumstances  and  traditions,  whether  to  introduce  such  an  exclusion  from  personal 
scope. Nonetheless, due to the unpredictability of on-demand work including zero-hour 
contracts,  the  derogation  of  8  hours  per  month  cannot  be  used  where  no  guaranteed 
amount of paid work is determined before the start of the employment relationship. This 
would  ensure  that  workers  on  zero-hours  contracts  effectively  gain  the  right  to 
information  about  essential  elements  of  their  working  relationship  as  well  as  the  other 
rights established in the Directive.  

Measure  two  relates  to  ensuring  a  right  to  information  on  the  applicable  working 
conditions. 

This  measure  updates  Article  2 of the  Written Statement Directive, taking into account 
the deficiencies identified by the REFIT evaluation  and the inputs from Social Partners 
during the first and second phase consultations by introducing new elements relating to 
duration and conditions of probation (sub-measure 1), training entitlements (sub-measure 
2),  better  information  on  procedures  for  the  termination  of  contracts  (sub-measure  3), 
arrangements for overtime and its remuneration (sub-measure 4), key information about 
the  determination  of  variable  working  schedules,  to  take  account  of  the  increasing 
prevalance  of  such  types  of  work  organisation  such  as  casual  or  zero-hours  contracts 
(sub-measure  5  to  7),  information  about  the  social  security  institutions  receiving  the 
social  contributions  and  and  any  social  security  protection  provided  by  the  employer 
(sub-measure  8),  and  updating  some  information  relating  to  expatriate  and  posted 
workers (sub-measure 10). 

The  REFIT  evaluation  drew  attention  to  the  practice  in  several  Member  States  of 
providing a template to employers in order to reduce the burden of producing the written 
statement, and suggested that such a template could be produced at EU level. While the 
Commission  does  not  consider  it  appropriate  to  produce  a  single  template  intended  to 
apply in all Member State jurisdictions, given the diversity of systems and approaches for 
which it would have to provide, it considers it would be helpful both to employers and to 
workers, not only as a way of reducing the burden of compliance for employers but also 
of  improving  the  quality  and  consistency  of  information  provided  to  workers.  The 

98 In the calculations of the CBA it is assumed conservatively only the removal of current exclusions not 
knowing  which  MSs  will  adopt  the  new  threshold.  This  derogation  does  not  apply  to  an  employment 
relationship where no guaranteed amount of paid work is predetermined before the employment starts. 

39 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
provision  of  such  templates  by  Member  States  would  be  mandatory  (sub-measure  9). 
Member  States  would  also  be  obliged  to  ensure  ease  of  access  for  employers  to  the 
information  provided  for  in  laws,  regulations,  statutory  provisions  or  collective 
agreements which they must communicate in the written statement.  

All  of  the  above  would  increase  transparency  and  reduce  the  information  disparity 
between an employer and a worker.  

Measure  three  relates  to  shortening  of  the  two-month  deadline  for  providing  the 
written information to at the latest on the first day of the employment relationship 

This  measure  replaces  the  current  maximum  timeframe  of  2  months  for  provision  of  a 
written statement set out in Article 3 of Directive 91/533/EEC with the first day of the 
employment relationship, in line with Principle 7 of the European Pillar of Social Rights 
and in coherence with the REFIT finding that the previous timeframe was excessive. 

Measure four provides for new minimum rights for all workers. 

As shown in the problem definition, while labour market flexibility is an important driver 
for job creation and growth, extreme flexibility of individual work arrangements without 
protection  of  basic  standards  for  workers  has  created  situations  which  can  jeopardise 
working  and  living  conditions,  equal  treatment,  fair  competition  between  employers 
across the EU and overall social cohesion and equity. 

Indeed, as the Parliament called for, it is necessary to complement existing EU law and 
ensure a core set of enforceable rights for every worker, regardless of the type of contract 
or  employment  relationship.  While  it  was  already  explained  why  it  is  not  considered 
appropriate to put forward all the rights suggested by the Parliament in a single piece of 
new legislation, some elements suggested seem to be of central importance to address the 
problems described in Section 2; this includes provisions to combat  the risk of workers 
being  trapped  in  insecure  contracts  without  a  tangible  prospect  of  transitions  to  more 
permanent  jobs,  and  provisions  to  support  access  to  training  and  to  introduce  limits 
regarding  on-demand  work.  Additionally,  some  proposals  aim  at  supporting 
predictability  in  line  with  the  call  from  the  Parliament  to  support  equal  treatment, 
working time and rest time, health and safety protection and work-life balance.  

A  minimum  common  level  of  predictability  (sub-measure  1)  can  prove  extremely 
important  for  living  and  working  conditions,  work-life  balance  and  health  of  workers 
without a fixed schedule, including on-demand work and zero-hour contract workers. As 
presented in the problem definition, workers in lower-level occupations are in particular 
less  likely  to  have  the  bargaining  power  to  negotiate  their  working  schedules,  or  more 
likely to have no autonomy or control over their schedules.  

This new right could include two elements: 

40 

 
 
 
- Right to reference days and hours within which work can take place: 

This  measure  provides  that  the  employers  must  notify  workers  of  the  periods  of  hours 
and days within which they may be requested to work –e.g. Monday to Friday between 
0800  and  1300.  That  would  enable  workers  to  make  arrangements  to  use  the  time  not 
covered by such reference hours/days, for instance in other employment or to fulfil care 
obligations.  

Workers  may  agree  to  work  outside  the  reference  hours  and  days,  but  could  not  be 
obliged to do so, and must not be subject to detriment if they refuse. 

- Right to a reasonable advance notice before a new work assignment:  

This measure provides that workers cannot be required to take up a work assignment if 
they do not receive reasonable advance notice from their employer. They may agree to do 
so but must not be subject to detriment if they refuse. 

This  right  to  predictability  is  relevant  for  workers  whose  work  schedule  is  mainly 
variable  and  mainly  determined  by  their  employer  and  is  therefore  limited  in  scope  to 
such situations, to avoid restricting workers' autonomy to determine their work schedule, 
where this is possible within their employment relationship. 

In  addition, for all  workers, it is important  to  ensure that they can  seek employment  in 
line  with  their  wishes,  ambitions  and  availability.  Indeed,  the  practice  of  including  in 
contracts exclusivity clauses (which prevent workers from taking on other work at all, no 
matter  what  the  type  of  employer),  or  incompatibility  clauses  (which  impede  workers 
from taking on work with certain other employers), can put a disproportionate burden on 
workers  and  restrict  their  freedom  to  increase  their  work  intensity.  Particularly  if  not 
employed full-time, workers are put in a situation where they cannot freely seek greater 
income security and stability, or even avoid poverty. In economic terms, exclusivity and 
incompatibility  clauses  exacerbate  situations  of  underemployment.  Sub-measure  2 
therefore  provides  for  a  prohibition  of  exclusivity  clauses  and  a  restriction  on 
incompatibility clauses to when they are justified by legitimate reasons. 

Sub-measures 1 and 2 respond to the Parliament's request to limit on-demand work; sub-
measure 3 responds to its call to combat the danger of people being trapped in insecure 
contracts  without  a  tangible  prospect  of  transition  to  more  permanent  forms  of 
employment.  Indeed,  sub-measure  3  would  provide  for  a  possibility  to  request  a  more 
predictable  and  secure  form  of  employment,  where  available,  after  achieving  a  certain 
degree of seniority with their employer, and to receive a reply in writing. This could ease 
the transition from extremely flexible forms of non-standard work to other forms of work 
(e.g. full time work). 

Sub-measure 4 responds to the need for security and predictability in the framework of 
the  increased  number  of  transitions  between  jobs  and  professions.  While  longer 

41 

 
 
probationary periods have often been used  in the perspective of entering very long  and 
stable employment relationship, this approach becomes less appropriate in view of a life-
time of changes of jobs. Workers risk spending considerable amounts of time during their 
career in a situation of unpredictability in terms of job security. It is proposed therefore to 
limit  probation,  where  it  exists,  to  6  months  maximum,  unless  a  longer  duration  is 
justified by the nature of the employment, such as managerial positions, or where this is 
in  the  worker's  interest,  such  as  when  he  or  she  has  been  prevented  by  illness  from 
fulfilling the original probationary period fully and would otherwise face dismissal. 

Finally,  sub-measure  5  responds  to  the  need  of  ensuring  equal  access  to  training. 
According to this provision Member States shall ensure that employers provide cost-free 
training  recognised  as  being  necessary  in  EU  legislation,  national  legislation  and  in 
relevant collective agreements to enable workers to carry out the work for which they are 
employed. 

Finally, measure five provides for revised enforcement provisions. 

Rights  are  only  meaningful  when  they  are  taken  up  by  right-holders.  Both  the  REFIT 
evaluation  of  the  Written  Statement  Directive,  and  the  public  consultation  on  the 
European  Pillar  of  Social  Rights,  have  underlined  the  importance  of  enforcement 
mechanisms  to  ensure  workers’  rights  are  respected  and  EU  law  is  effective.  This  has 
also been underlined by the recent Commission Communication on better application of 
EU law.99 

Sub-measures 1 to 3 follow from the findings of REFIT and apply to incompliance with 
the obligation to provide information on the employment relationship.   

The REFIT evaluation of the Written Statement Directive indicated that enforcement of 
workers'  rights  under  the  Directive  could  be  improved  by  rethinking  means  of  redress 
and sanctions for non-compliance.100 It also concluded that redress systems based only on 
claims for damages are less effective than systems that also provide for sanctions such as 
lump sum penalties. The limited extent of case law indicates that workers whose rights 
under  the  Directive  have  been  infringed  are  reluctant  to  pursue  litigation  while  in 
employment.  Generally  any  litigation  is  related  to  the  working  conditions  themselves, 
and not to the absence of information about them. 

Indeed  under  under  sub-measure  1,  Member  States  are  to  make  sure  that  a  'competent 
authority'  can  find  or  impose  a  solution  in  case  a  worker  does  not  receive  a  written 
statement. This could combine with sub-measure 2 to set up an injunction system, backed 
up with the possiblity to issue penalties. 

99 EU law: Better results through better application, C(2016)8600.  
100 SWD (2017)205, page 3,4. 

42 

 
 
                                                 
In  almost  a  third  of  the  Member  States  the  only  available  means  for  redress  in  case  of 
lack of written statement is litigation before civil or labour courts, which was considered 
under  REFIT  particularly  ineffective  as  means  of  enforcement  when  the  only  available 
remedy is the award of damages.  

Alternatively,  under  sub-measure  3  Member  States  may  establish  favourable 
presumptions for the employees as regards their working conditions in case of (unlawful) 
absence of written statements (proportionate to the missing elements). This is to include 
for instance presumption of  permanent employment relationship. Employers would have 
the possibility to rebut the presumption. 

It is suggested that Member States consider sub-measures 1+2, and 3, as alternative. 

In  relation  to  the  new  basic  rights,  sub-measure  4  aims  at  ensuring  their  enforcement. 
Indeed, one of the conclusions of the public consultation on the European Pillar of Social 
Rights101  was  that,  very  often,  citizens  are  deprived  of  their  rights  due  to  a  lack  of 
implementation and enforcement. In the context of EU labour law, unlike in other areas, 
there  are  very  few  EU  rules  directly  concerned  with  enforcement  of  rights.  Experts 
highlighted  various  ways  to  close  the  enforcement  gap.  It  was  proposed  to  ensure  that 
legislation in the field of labour law contains procedural provisions for enforcement, such 
as  provisions  improving  access  to  justice,  supporting  persons  whose  rights  have  been 
denied to initiate litigation, protecting against victimisation and providing for basic rules 
on remedies and dissemination of information. It was pointed out that inspiration could 
be  drawn  from  existing  instruments  e.g.  in  the  field  on  non-discrimination  or  free 
movement, where a range of enforcement tools have been adopted in recent years. Others 
asked for more and better labour inspections.  

Sub-measure 4 would enlarge the enforcement provisions of the revised Directive based 
on  enforcement  provisions  already  in  place  under  EU  anti-discrimination  and  gender 
equality law, and included in the new proposal for a Directive on Work-Life Balance. 

Indeed,  following  the  evolution  of  the  EU  acquis  and  case-law  in  the  field  of  gender 
equality and antidiscrimination in the last 30 years, now all Member States have put in 
place enforcement provisions that apply to the interaction between worker and employer. 
This  includes  provisions  on  defense  of  rights,  burden  of  proof,  compensation  or 
reparation,  protection  against  adverse  treatment  or  victimisation,  penalties,  compliance 
and  dissemination  of  information.102  This  corpus  of  enforcement  provisions  has 

on 

the 

Delivering 

101 
Rights, 
European 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1226&langId=en , and Public consultation on the European Pillar 
of 
Rights 
Social 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=333&langId=en&consultId=22&visib=0&furtherConsult=yes 
102 Existing provisions on Defence of Rights are Art. 17 of the Gender Recast Directive Dir. 2006/54, Art 7 
of the Race Equality Directive 2000/43, Art. 9 of the Employment Equality Directive 2000/78.On Burden 

Social 

Pillar 

of 

43 

 
 
                                                 
 
developed via legislative action and case-law to ensure the effectiveness of social acquis 
relating  to  equal  treatment.  Workers,  employers,  public  authorities,  social  partners, 
labour  courts  have  experience  in  applying  these  procedural  elements  –  in  all  Member 
States in equal treatment, and in many cases in other areas of labour law beyond equal 
treatment.  This  acquis  offers  an  extensive  system  that  can  be  used  to  ensure  the 
effectiveness of the rights provided for also in this Directive. 

In  particular,  providing  a  shared  burden  of  proof  in  case  of  dismissal103  due  to  the 
exercise  of  rights  provided  for  under  the  proposed  Directive  would  help  counter 
unbalanced access to information between worker and employer that is one of the factors 
addressed  by  the  proposed  Directive.  The  first  proposal  for  a  Directive  on  burden  of 
proof  was  already  adopted  in  1988,  with  key  CJEU  judgments  on  the  matter  since 
1989104, and the first Directive agreed upon in 1997105 with the assessment that "plaintiffs 
could be deprived of any effective means of enforcing the principle (of equal treatment) 
before  the  national  courts  if  the  effect  of  introducing  evidence  (of  an  apparent 
discrimination)  were  not  to  impose  upon  the  respondent  the  burden  of  proving  that  his 
practice  is  not  in  fact  discriminatory"106.  This  reasoning  is  transposable  to  the  need  for 
effective  means  of  enforcing  the  rights  provided  for  in  the  proposed  Directive,  in  a 
comparable situation where information on the reasons for employers' actions rests solely 
with the employers. This is already in place, beyond equal treatment, at least partially in 
21 Member States. 

Furthermore,  it  is  important  to  provide  that  workers  are  protected  against  adverse 
treatment by the employer as a reaction to a complaint or to any legal proceedings aimed 
at enforcing compliance with the Directive. This principle has been present in the equal 

of  Proof:  Art  19  of  Dir.  2006/54,  Art.  8  of  Dir  2000/43,  Art.  10  of  Dir.  2000/78.    On  Compensation  or 
reparation Art. 18 of Dir. 2006/54, aspects of Art. 15 of Dir. 2000/43, aspects of Art. 17 of Dir. 2000/78. 
On Protection against adverse treatment or consequences /Victimisation: Art 24 of Dir. 2006/54, Art. 9 of 
Dir.  2000/43,  Art.  11  of  Dir.  2000/78.  On  Penalties  Art  25  of  Dir.  2006/54,  partially  Art.  15  of  Dir. 
2000/43,  aspects  of  Art.  17  of  Dir.  2000/78.  On  Compliance  Art  23  of  Dir.  2006/54,  Art.  14  of  Dir. 
2000/43, Art. 16 of Dir. 2000/78. On Dissemination of information- as Art 30 of Dir. 2006/54, Art. 10 of 
Dir. 2000/43, Art. 12 of Dir. 2000/78 . 
103 Or equivalent, such as ceasing to offer work to an on-demand worker without formally terminating the 
employment relationship.  
104  C-109/88  Danfoss  para  14:  "the  concern  for  effectiveness  which  thus  underlined  the  directive  means 
that it must be interpreted as implying adjustments to national rules on the burden of proof in special cases 
where  such  adjustments  are  necessary  for  the  effective  implementation  of  the  principle  of  equality" 
confirmed and further elaborated also before the 1997 Directive in Enderby C-127/92, Royal Copenhagen 
C-400/93. 
105  Council  Directive  97/80/EC  of  15  December  1997  on  the  burden  of  proof  in  cases  of  discrimination 
based on sex 
106 Recital 17, Directive 97/80/EC 

44 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
treatment  acquis  since  2000107  as  "effective  legal  protection  must  include  protection 
against retaliation. Victims may be deterred from exercising their rights due to the risk of 
retaliation. Since fear of dismissal, for example, is generally one of the major obstacles to 
individual action, it is necessary to protect individuals against dismissal or other adverse 
treatment  (for  instance  down-grading  or  any  other  coercive  measures  due  to  such 
action)"108 The reasoning is transposable to the need for protection against retaliation for 
requesting  e.g.  another  form  of  work,  or  the  respect  of  reference  hours  and  notice 
periods.  It  seems  particularly  important  to  ensure  protection  against  detriment  in 
particular  for  on-demand  work,  where  the  standard  protections  against  unfair  dismissal 
often are difficult to apply. This principle is already at least partially in place, beyond the 
sphere  of  equal  treatment,  in  23  Member  States  either  for  all  matters  concerning  with 
labour law, or for specific provisions generally including dismissal. 

The table below presents more detailed information on the formulation of the considered 
measures, as well as populations and Member States potentially affected by their possible 
introduction. Annex 8 provides further information, including examples of Member State 
approaches  which  provided  a  basis  for  the  new  minimum  rights  and  the  enforcement 
measures.  To  be  noted  that  the  impact  of  the  considered  measures  could  also  vary 
depending on the extent that some of the rights are already established through collective 
agreements or practice. The provisions of major relevant collective agreements have been 
taken into account in the analysis (see section 7 of Annex 8). 

Table 2. Overview of policy measures under consideration109 

Description of measure 

Population 
affected  

Number of Member 
States  where  legal 
changes  would  be 
required  

1.  A  scope  of  application  encompassing  all  EU  workers,  in  particular  the  most 
precarious 
Removing  the  possibilities  under  the  existing 
Directive to exclude: 

2-3 
workers 

million 

1.1: people working less than 8h/week 
1.2:  people  whose  employment  relationship 
will last less than 1 month 
1.3:  people having  a contract  or  employment 
relationship  of  a  casual  or  specific  nature 

Inclusion  of  workers 
than 
working 
8h/week: 4 MS (CY, 
DK, MT, SE). 

less 

Inclusion  of  workers 
employed 
less 
than  1  month:  13-14 

for 

107 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 on equal treatment irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, 
then Directive 2002/73 on gender equality then recast in Directive 2006/54 recast. 
108  Explanatory  memorandum  accompanying  the  proposal  for  Directive  then  become  Council  Directive 
2000/43/EC COM(1999)566. 
109  In  the  impact  assessment  each  measure  is considered as including  the whole  set of  sub-measures  and 
including any clarifications or derogations as described in the table.  

45 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
provided  that  its  non-application  is  justified 
by objective considerations 

Confirming/ensuring that the Directive covers 
any  ‘natural  person  who  for  a  certain  period 
of  time  performs  services  for  and  under  the 
direction  of  another  person  in  return  for 
remuneration’.110 

The  Directive  would  apply  to  e.g.  domestic 
workers,  on-demand,  intermittent,  voucher-
based  and  platform  workers,  as  long  as  they 
fulfil the criteria.  

(1.1-1.3) 

A threshold of a work relationship of up to 8h 
working  hours  per  month  would  replace  the 
to  permit 
removed  exclusions 
Member  States  to  provide  that  isolated  very 
short  relationships  fall  outside  scope  of  the 
Directive.111 This threshold shall not apply to 
relationship  where  no 
an  employment 
guaranteed 
is 
predetermined before the employment starts. 

amount  of  paid  work 

Where  work  is  performed  for  a  household, 
Member  States  may  consider  that  natural 
persons  belonging  to  this  household  are  not 
subject  to  employers’  duties  for  the  purposes 
of  responding  to  a  request  for  a  new  form  of 
employment,  the  right  to  mandatory  training, 
and  are  not  subject  to  redress  based  on 
favourable presumptions.  
2. A right to information on the applicable working conditions 
about: 
Informing 
the 
the  duration  and  conditions  of 
2.1 
probationary 
any; 
period, 
2.2. the training entitlement, if any, provided 
employer; 
by 

5-31m 
benefitting 
practice 
recruits)112 

the 

if 

in 
(new 

MS  (AT,  CY,  CZ, 
DK,  FI,  DE,  EL,  IE, 
LT,  MT,  SK,  ES, 
UK, possibly SE) 

other 
on 
Impact 
of 
non-
types 
forms  of 
standard 
employment 
a 
in 
number  of  other 
MS  (see  table  1  in 
section 2.2.1 on legal 
regarding 
situation 
different 
types  of 
worker per MS). 

Introducing 
information on: 

- 
probationary 
period:  7  MS  (AT, 

110 These criteria are based on the jurisprudence of CJEU as developed since case Lawrie-Blum, C-66/85, 
and most recently stated in C-216/15 Ruhrlandklinik. 
111 The cost-benefit calculations assume conservatively only the removal of current exclusions not knowing 
which  Member  States  will  adopt  the  new  threshold.  This  derogation  does  not  apply  to  an  employment 
relationship where no guaranteed amount of paid work is predetermined before the employment starts. 
112 Number depends on the specific element of information. In addition, 4.6m-9.3m additional employees 
starting  a  job  could  receive  information  about  duration  and  conditions  of  probation  periods,  and  15.3m-
30.7m additional employees p.a. leaving a job could receive information about national law applicable in 
case of termination 

46 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
their 

including 

2.3.  information  on  the  procedure  to  be 
observed  by  the  employer  and  the  worker 
employment 
contract  or 
should 
relationship  be 
the 
terminated 
length  of  the  period  of  notice  to  be  observed 
or,  where  the  length  of  the  period  of  notice 
cannot  be  indicated  when  the  information  is 
given, the method for determining such period 
of  notice; 
  (beyond  the  already  present 
information  on  the  length  of  the  periods  of 
notice) 
2.4. if the work schedule is entirely or mostly 
not  variable,  the  standard  working  day  or 
week and any arrangements on overtime and 
its 
remuneration; 
2.5. if the work schedule is entirely or mostly 
variable, the principle that the work schedule 
is  variable,  the  amount  of  guaranteed  paid 
hours, the remuneration of work performed in 
addition  to  the  guaranteed  hours  and,  if  the 
work  schedule  is  mostly  determined,  directly 
or  indirectly,  by  the  employer:  (2.6.)  the 
reference  hours  and  days  within  which  the 
worker  may  be  required  to  work;  (2.7.)  the 
minimum  advance  notice  the  worker  shall 
receive before the start of a work assignment; 
2.8. the social security institution(s) receiving 
the 
the  social  contributions  attached 
employment  relationship  and  any  protection 
relating  to  social  security  provided  by  the 
employer. 

to 

2.9. Requiring Member States to develop, 
where this is not already the case, on-line 
standard 'Written Statement Models' or 
templates. 

2.10. Additional elements of information are 
required for posted workers. 

BE, DK, HR, IE, SE, 
UK) 

-  social  security:  19 
MS  (AT,  BE,  BG, 
CZ, DK, EE, FI, HR, 
HU,  IE,  IT,  LT,  LU, 
MT, PL, RO, SE, SI, 
SK) 

national 

- 
law 
applicable in case of 
of 
termination 
contract:  24  MS 
(BE,  BG,  CZ,  DE, 
DK,  EE,  ES,  FI,  FR, 
HR,  HU,  IE,  IT,  LT, 
LU,  LV,  MT,  NL, 
PL,  PT,  RO,  SE,  SI, 
SK) 

-  precise  working 
time:  19  MS  (AT, 
BE,  BG,  DE,  DK, 
EE,  ES,  FI,  FR,  HR, 
IT, MT, NL, PL, PT, 
RO, SE, SI, SK) 

Introducing 
templates:  13  MS 
(BE,  BG,  CZ,  DE, 
DK,  IT,  HR,  HU, 
NL, PT, SE, SI, SK) 

3. Shortening of the two-month deadline to the same day or before 
3. Shortening the deadline from 2 months to at 
the  latest  on  the  first  day  of  the  employment 
relationship.  

8-16  m  workers 
per  year  could 
in 
benefit 
practice 
from 
this right.  

This  measure  replaces  the  current  maximum 
timeframe  of  2  months  for  provision  of  a 
written  statement  set  out  in  Article  3  of 
Directive 91/533/EEC with the first day of the 

14 MS: 
-  HU  (currently  15 
days) 
-CY,  CZ,  DE,  DK, 
FI,  NL,  SE,  SK 
(currently 1 month) 
- EL, ES, IE, PT, UK 
(currently 2 months) 

47 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
employment relationship.113 

In  order  to  avoid  situations  where  failure  to 
provide the written statement on the first day 
could lead to the automatic triggering of legal 
presumptions,  Member  States  may  establish 
that  a  legal  presumption  or  administrative 
procedure  is  subject  to  the  notification  of  the 
employer  and  the  failure  by  the  employer  to 
the  omission  within  15  days  of 
rectify 
notification.   

4. New minimum rights for all workers 
4.1:  Right  to  greater  predictability  of  work 
for  workers  whose  work  schedule  is  entirely 
or  mostly  variable  and  entirely  or  mostly 
determined by the employer consisting of: 
- Right to be required to work only if it takes 
place  within  predefined  reference  days  and 
hours established in writing 
-  Right  to  be  required  to  work  only  if 
informed of a work assignment a reasonable 
period in advance  

Reference days and hours  

This  measure  provides  the  employers  must 
notify  workers  of  the  periods  of  hours  and 
days  within  which  they  may  be  requested  to 
work  –  e.g.  Monday  to  Friday  between  0800 
and 1300. That would enable workers to make 
arrangements  to  use  the  time  not  covered  by 
such  reference  hours/days,  for  instance  in 
other employment or to fulfil care obligations.  

Workers  may  agree  to  work  outside  the 
reference  hours  and  days,  but  could  not  be 
obliged  to  do  so,  and  must  not  be  subject  to 
detriment if they refuse. 

Reasonable advance notice  

This measure provides that workers cannot be 
required to take up a work assignment if they 
do not receive reasonable advance notice from 
their  employer.  They  may  agree  to  do  so  but 

Reference  days 
and hours:  

Reference  days  and 
hours:  

million 
and 

4-6 
casual 
voucher-based 
workers.  

Minimum 
advance  notice: 

million 
and 

5-6 
casual 
voucher-based 
workers.  

21  MS  (the  right 
exists  in  BE,  HR, 
DK,  EL;  in  AT,  LV, 
LT  on  demand  work 
is prohibited)  

Minimum  advance 
notice: 

17-18  MS  (the  right 
exists  in  DK,  DE, 
HU,  IT,  SL,  ES,  SE, 
and partially PT – for 
intermittent  only;  in 
AT,  LV,  LT  on 
is 
demand  work 
prohibited) 

113 In line with Principle 7 of the European Pillar of Social Rights referred to above 

48 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24  MS,  but 
different extent: 

to  a 

clauses 

allowed 

Exclusivity 
are  
-  fully  allowed  AT, 
HR,  LT,  LU,  FR, 
MT, SE 
under 
- 
certain 
conditions: 
AT,  CZ,  EL,  HU, 
PT, BE, LV, SK, ES, 
FI, IE, IT, NL, UK 
-  prohibited  but  with 
exceptions:  DE,  PL, 
SI, CY, RO 
13 MS (AT, BE, CZ, 
DK,  EE,  FI,  HU,  IT, 
LV,  MT,  PL,  SE, 
SK) 

0.5-1.5  million 
and 
casual 
voucher 
based 
workers.114  

must not be subject to detriment if they refuse. 

from 

4.2 Prohibition of exclusivity clauses  
This  measure  provides  that  employers  may 
not  prohibit  workers 
taking  up 
employment with other employers outside the 
work  schedule  established  with  the  first 
employer (so-called exclusivity clauses). They 
may  not  introduce  incompatibility  clauses 
(which  restrict  taking  up  employment  with 
specific 
e.g. 
employers 
competitors) 
  unless  this  is  justified  by 
legitimate  reasons  such  as  the  protection  of 
business  secrets  or  the  avoidance  of  conflicts 
of interest.  

types  of 

as 

4.3: Possibility to request transfer to another 
form  of  employment  and  receive  a  reply  in 
writing 

This  proposal  establishes  a  possibility  to 
request  from  employers  a  more  predictable 
and  secure  form  of  employment,  where 
available:  a  more  secure  form  of  work  for 
workers  working  part-time  and  wishing  to 
transition to full-time, or for workers with no 
or  few  guaranteed  paid  hours  per  week  or 
months  and  wishing  to  be  able  to  rely  on  a 
higher  number  of  guaranteed  paid  hours  and 
for  workers  desiring  to  agree  on  a  less 
variable  work  schedule.  Employers  are 
required  to  respond  in  writing  within  one 
month.  

In  micro,  small,  or  medium  enterprises, 
Member States  may provide for this deadline 
to  be extended to  no  more than three  months 
and/or allow for an oral reply to a subsequent 
similar request submitted by the same worker 
if the justification for the reply as regards the 

53%  of  fixed-
term  workers  in 
Europe  would 
prefer 
a 
permanent 
contract.115  This 
suggests that up 
to  14m  fixed-
term  workers 
to 
might  wish 
make use of this 
right. 

9.5m  part-time 
workers 
currently  work 
hours 
fewer 
than  they  would 
like. 

114  29%  of  part-timers  in  2015  were  involuntary  (source  EU-LFS).  It  can  be  assumed  that  most  of  the 
involuntary part-timers work less that they would want to because of lack of job opportunities rather than 
exclusivity clauses, but exclusivity clauses are a contributory factor  for involuntary part-time.   
115 European Commission (2017), Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2017 

49 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
situation of the worker remains unchanged.   

4.4:  Right 
probation period 

to  a  maximum  duration  of 

3-6 million in IE 
and UK.  

2 MS (IE, UK)  

This provision sets a maximum duration of six 
months  for  any  probation  period,  unless  a 
longer duration is justified by the nature of the 
employment, such as a managerial position. A 
substantial  number  of  Member  States  have 
established  a  general  maximum  duration  for 
probation  periods  which 
largely  varies 
between  three  and  six  months.  Some  apply 
derogations  to  managerial  positions  which 
often  are  double 
the  standard  probation 
period. 

4.5. Right to cost free mandatory training  

According  to  this  provision  Member  States 
shall  ensure 
that,  where  employers  are 
required in EU legislation, national legislation 
and  in  relevant  collective  agreements    to 
provide  the  training  recognised  as  being 
necessary  to  enable  workers  to  carry  out  the 
work  for  which  they  are  employed,  such  
training  shall  be  provided  cost-free  to  the 
worker . 

The  number  that 
would 
benefit 
might  however 
be  much  lower 
legal 
to 
due 
or 
arguments 
precedents 
that 
limit the duration 
in 
in  practice 
MS 
those 
(estimation 
at 
0.5-1.5  million 
per year). 
The  right  would 
cover  all  200m 
employees in the 
EU.  In  practice, 
only those whose 
employers do not 
comply 
with 
otherwise 
existing 
obligations 
would benefit.   

EU 

At 
level, 
obligation  to  provide 
is 
training 
established  e.g. 
in 
Directive 
the 
(safety 
89/391/EEC 
and 
of 
health 
workers at work) and 
related 
specific 
and  health 
safety 
directives, 
some 
directives/regulations 
of 
in 
transport,  feed  and 
food 
law,  money 
laundering, 
energy. 
renewable 
Obligations 
are 
either put directly on 
employers  or  left  to 
to 
Member  States 
establish  who 
is 
responsible  for 
the 
delivery  and  cost  of 
training. 

area 

the 

5. Enforcement 
5. Requiring Member States to: 

The  right  would 
cover  all  200m 

Most 
States 

Member 
have 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legal  presumption  and  early  settlement 
mechanism 

a 

a 

of 

possibility 

-5.1:  make  sure  that  a  'competent  authority' 
can find or impose a solution in case a worker 
statement; 
receive  a  written 
does  not 
-5.2: set up an injunction system accompanied 
by 
penalty; 
-5.3:  establish  favourable  presumptions  for 
their  working 
the  employees  as  regards 
conditions  in  case  of  (unlawful)  absence  of 
the 
written  statements 
elements). 
missing 
5.4. enlarge the enforcement provisions of the 
revised  Directive  based  on  enforcement 
provisions  already  in  place  under  EU  anti-
discrimination and gender equality law 

(proportionate 

to 

5.1  to  5.3:  Legal  presumption  and  early 
settlement mechanism 

This  provision  provides  for  two  alternative 
avenues of redress for failure to provide all or 
some of the written information, either (i) the 
use  of  favourable  presumptions  proportionate 
to  the  missing  information,  including  at  least 
presumption  of  open-ended  relationship  if  no 
information is  provided about the  duration of 
the  employment  relationship,  a  presumption 
of  full-time  position  if  no  information  is 
provided  on  the  amount  of  guaranteed  paid 
hours,  and  a  presumption  of  absence  of 
probation  period  where  no  information  is 
provided on the existence and the duration of 
a  probation  period;  or  (ii)  access  to  an 
administrative  procedure  under  which  a 
competent  authority  (which  may  be  an 
existing body such as a labour inspectorate or 
a judicial body) has the authority to establish 
the facts of the case, to order the employer to 
issue the missing information, and to impose a 
fine  if  this  is  not  done.  This  provision 
the  existing 
addresses 

the  weakness 

in 

employees in the 
EU117. 
In 
practice, 
those 
whose  rights  are 
not 
respected 
could benefit. 

courts 

provided  for  means 
of  redress  judicial 
in 
process  either 
or 
civil 
labour 
special 
In  several 
courts. 
Member 
States 
labour inspectorates 
have  a  monitoring 
and/or  enforcement 
responsibility. 
In 
almost a third of the 
Member  States  the 
only 
available 
means  for  redress 
are  civil  or  labour 
courts,  which  are 
considered 
particularly 
ineffective as means 
enforcement 
of 
only 
when 
the 
available 
remedy 
are damages. 

In  10  MSs118  there 
is  no 
competent 
that  can 
authority 
impose a solution in 
case of lack of WS. 

In  14  MS119  there  is 
no  formal  injunction 
system  with 
lump 
sum  in  case  of  lack 
of WS. 

In  22 MSs120 in case 
(unlawful) 
of 
absence  of  written 
statements,  there  are 
no 
favourable 
presumptions  made 

117 unless otherwise excluded from the scope of the Directive 
118 AT, BE, DE, FR, HR, LU, NL, SE, SL, UK 
119 AT, BG, CZ, DE, FI, FR, LU, LV, NL, PT, RO, SE, SL, UK 
120 AT, BG, CY, CZ, DK, EL, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SK, UK 

51 

 
 
 
                                                 
in 

identified 

mechanisms 
the  REFIT 
evaluation, by which redress systems based on 
claims  for  damages  are  less  effective  than 
those based on other forms of penalty such as 
lump-sums.116 

it 

legislation,  which 

5.4:  An  extensive  system  of  enforcement  for 
the  EU  social  acquis  has  built  up  since  the 
adoption of Directive 1991/533/EEC, notably 
in  the  field  of  anti-discrimination  and  equal 
opportunities 
is 
appropriate  to  apply  to  the  new  material 
rights. This includes provisions on: 
-Right to redress 
-Protection  against  adverse 
consequences  
-  Burden  of  proof  in  cases  of  dismissal 
resulting  from  an  attempt  to  exercise  rights 
provided for in the directive 
- Penalties 

treatment  or 

for  the  employees  as 
regards their working 
conditions. 

the 

All 
28  Member 
States have in place 
enforcement 
provisions  that  apply 
to 
interaction 
between  worker  and 
employer in the field 
of  gender  equality 
and 
antidiscrimination.  

6.  WHAT ARE THE POLICY OPTIONS AND THEIR IMPACTS? 

6.1 Options: Four policy packages 

into  "policy  packages".  The  policy  packages 

For the sake of assessing impacts as well as for comparing effectiveness, efficiency and 
coherence,  the  individual  policy  measures  presented  in  the  previous  chapter  are 
combined 
represent  different 
configurations of measures, which when put together have different impacts than if they 
were  to  be  considered  in  isolation.  While  many  other  combinations  of  measures  are 
theoretically  possible,  the  policy  packages  above  represent  the  most  logical  sets  of 
proposals.  

The  strengthened  requirements  (measures  2  -  extension  of  the  content  of  the  written 
statements, and 3 - shortening the deadline for their provision to workers) are part of each 
of the options as those consequences of REFIT are the most modest modifications of the 
Directive,  and  could  be  combined  with  any  more  substantial  change.  Improved 
enforcement  (measure  5)  also  stems  largely  from  the  findings  of  REFIT  about  the 

116 The workers that would benefit from it in practice are expected to be mainly the workers in a new job - 
a range estimate based on a low rate of turnover (10%) and a high rate (20%): is 18-36m. EWCS showed 
that only 40% of EU workers receive training in the survey year – this shows that potentially 60% of new 
hires could benefit from the right 
116 SWD(2017)205 final, page 26. 

52 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
weaknesses of the current redress mechanisms, and takes account of provisions adopted 
in  the  EU  social  acquis  since  1991.  While  limiting  the  modification  to  only  those 
elements  would  not  justify  a  launch  of  a  legislative  process  and  would  not  address  the 
objectives set out in the Pillar, it is appropriate to include in all packages the provisions 
addressing the REFIT outcomes. 

Policy packages 

A.  Baseline: no change 
B.  Extended scope and strengthened requirements (measures 1, 2, 3, 5) 
C.  Strengthened requirements and minimum rights (measures 2, 3, 4, 5) 
D.  Extended scope, strengthened requirements and minimum rights (measures 1, 2, 

3, 4, 5) 

Policy package A is the baseline scenario, as described in the section 5.1. 

Policy package B consists, in addition to the REFIT measures common to B, C and D, of 
extending  scope  of  the  application  of  the  Directive:  existing  exceptions  would  be 
removed and replaced with a much lower threshold, and new and non-standard forms of 
employment would be better covered. In addition, a revised Directive would follow the 
suggestions of the REFIT evaluation (extension of the content of the written statements, 
shortening  the  deadline  for  their  provision  to  workers,  improved  enforcement).  No 
substantial new rights aimed at increasing job predictability and security would however 
be created. 

In policy package C the common REFIT suggestions would be followed and in addition 
new rights for workers would be added to the directive (rights related to predictability of 
work, maximum length of probation, possibility to request another form of employment, 
right  to  cost-free  training  which  employers  are  required  in  EU  legislation,  national 
legislation and in relevant collective agreements to provide to workers). The scope of the 
Directive would remain unchanged. 

It is important to note that, without the modification of the scope, the policy package C 
does not address the problem definition, which establishes that the new initiative should 
apply  to  all  workers.  This  policy  package  is  nevertheless  analysed  in  order  to  examine 
what  the  impact  of  the  new  rights  would  be  if  the  scope  of  the  Directive  remained 
unchanged and some 2-3 million workers in total (notably those in new and non-standard 
forms of work, including casual workers, workers on very short contracts or working less 
than  8  hours  per  week)  would  continue  to  be  excluded  from  the  provisions  of  the 
Directive.  

Policy package D is a combination of the previous two. It extends the personal scope of 
the  Directive,  introduces  changes  suggested  through  the  REFIT  and  creates  new  basic 
rights which in this scenario apply to the extended population of workers, including those 
in new and non-standard forms of work. 

53 

 
 
 
6.2 Impacts of the options 

This section presents an overview of main social, economic and legal impacts associated 
with  each  policy  package.121  Impacts  are  grouped  in  three  categories:  (a)  impacts  on 
workers  and  working  conditions,  (b)  impacts  on  employers,  including  competitiveness 
and productivity, (c) broader impacts (on labour markets, public finances, application and 
enforcement,  fundamental  rights).  No  relevant  environmental  impacts  could  be 
identified. 

The analysis is based mainly on results of a dedicated external study.122 Annex 4 presents 
an outline of the methodology underpinning the determination of effects, calculation of 
costs  and  benefits  as  well  as  development  of  the  multicriteria  analysis  for  comparing 
effectiveness, efficiency and coherence of the options. Other sources of data include the 
REFIT study of the Written Statement Directive, information provided by the European 
Labour Law Network, as well as own analysis of data produced by the Eurostat and the 
Eurofound. 

Where  quantification  was  possible,  numbers  and  values  are  sometimes  presented  as 
broad  ranges.  This  reflects  uncertainties  about  existing  data  (notably  concerning 
prevalence  of  new  and  non-standard  forms  of  work,  undeclared  work),  as  well  as 
outcomes  of  sensitivity  analysis  and  ranges  of  assumptions  applied  (e.g.  on  the  staff 
turnover). 

A. Main impacts on workers and working conditions (social impacts) 

Cos
ts 

A 
Growing  number 
of workers without 
the 
protection  of 
right  to  a  written 
statement 
(WS) 
and 
increasing 
skills  and  working 
conditions 
inequality 

Ben No change. 

B 
No direct costs. 

C 
No direct costs. 

D 
No direct costs  

limited 
Very 
possibility  for  some 
workers  to  become 
unemployed. 

security 
Social 
pension 
and/or 
contributions 
for 
some  workers  who 
were  undeclared  or 
bogus 
self-
employed. 

limited 
Very 
possibility for some 
workers  to  become 
unemployed. 
Some  2-3m  more  No increase in 

Social  security  and/or 
pension  contributions 
for  some  workers  who 
were  undeclared  or 
bogus self-employed. 

Very 
possibility 
workers 
unemployed. 

limited 
for  some 
to  become 

As in option B. 

121 A more detailed overview of different impacts for policy packages B, C and D is provided in Annex 9. 
122 "Study to support Impact Assessment on the Review of the Written Statement Directive" by CSES and 
PPMI. 

54 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
efit
s  

number of workers 
having right to a 
written statement. 

Gradual  reduction  in 
the  proportion  of 
workers  covered  by 
the Directive. 

3-4m  workers  get 
to 
rights 
predictability 

52m  workers 
  get 
possibility  to  request 
a 
of 
new 
employment. 

form 

3-6 million in IE and 
UK get right to max. 
of 
duration 
(in 
probation. 
practice  0.5-1.5  m 
could benefit) 

right  would 
The 
cover 
200m 
all 
employees in the EU. 
only 
In 
practice, 
whose 
those 
employers  do  not 
with 
comply 
existing 
otherwise 
would 
obligations 
benefit.   

The  most  vulnerable 
remain 
workers 
outside  the  scope  of 
the directive. 

workers  have 
right to a WS 

a 

additional 
5-31m 
workers 
having 
new  elements  of 
in 
information 
practice123 

45m 
additional 
employees  having 
new 
to 
right 
information  about 
working  time  will 
reduce 
involuntary/inadver
tent overtime 

8-16m  per  year 
additional 
employees  starting 
a  job  having  new 
right  to  receive  a 
WS  on  the  1st  day 
of  employment  or 
before 

in 
Fewer  people 
bogus 
self-
employment  and  in 
activities 
not 
protected as work. 

Better 
understanding  and 
protection of rights; 
legal 
increased 
better 
clarity; 
access 
social 
to 
security protection  

Reduced  abuse  of 
workers. 
More 
employees 
receiving  essential 

In addition:124 
additional 
4-6m 
workers  get  right  to 
reference hours 

5-7m  get right to min. 
advance notice period 

0.5-1.5m  freed  from 
exclusivity clauses 

Also: 
55m  get  possibility  to 
request  a  new  form  of 
employment 
in 
practice 

– 

14m 
fixed-term 
workers  might  use  the 
possibility to request a 
new 
of 
form 
employment 

3-6  million  in  IE  and 
UK  get  right  to  max. 
duration  of  probation 
(in  practice  0.5-1.5  m 
could benefit).  

200m employees in the 
EU  get  the  right  to 
mandatory  training.  In 
practice,  only 
those 
whose  employers  do 
comply  with 
not 
existing 
otherwise 
obligations 
would 
benefit.   

Fewer people in bogus 
self-employment  and 
in 
not 
activities 
protected as work. 

123 Number depends on the specific element of information. In addition, 4.6m-9.3m additional employees 
starting  a  job  could  receive  information  about  duration  and  conditions  of  probation  periods,  and  15.3m-
30.7m additional employees p.a. leaving a job could receive information about national law applicable in 
case of termination 
124 For the four points below, based only on the population of casual and voucher-based workers. 

55 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
information  about 
conditions 
to  any 
pertaining 
periods  of  work 
abroad. 

Improvement  in  work-
to 
life  balance  due 
reference  hours  and 
notice. 

In  the  three  substantial  options  (B,  C  and  D)  there  will  be  benefits  associated  with  the 
common  measures:  the  shortened  deadline,  the  more  complete  information  package  as 
well  as  the  improved  enforcement  mechanisms.  Those  measures  alone  should  result  in 
non-quantifiable  benefits  such  as  increased  clarity  and  better  protection  of  working 
conditions. 

In  option  B  and  D  the  scope  of  the  Directive  is  also  expanded.  This  has  a  significant 
effect  on  the  number  of  workers  who  can  enjoy  the  protection  of  the  Directive.  It  is 
assumed  that  some  450,000  employees  working  <8  hours  per  week  and  650,000 
employees  with  contract  duration  of  <1  month  would  fall  under  the  scope  of  the 
directive.  The  same  would  be  true  for  some  workers  in  other  forms  of  non-standard 
employment, mainly casual workers and voucher-based workers,125 bringing the total to 
some 2-3 million workers coming newly within scope. It should be noted that the types 
of worker who will mostly benefit are less likely to be covered by collective agreements. 
According  to  the  REFIT  study,  such  workers  are  more  likely  to  be  vulnerable,  such  as 
migrant workers or young people.  

In Option C and D, new measures are proposed to improve the predictability of working 
schedules,  give  the  possibility  to  request  a  new  form  of  employment,  limit  exclusivity 
and incompatibility clauses, and limit the period of probation. The population benefitting 
from  those  rights  is  larger  under  Option  D,  due  to  the  extended  scope.  When  looking 
specifically at casual workers and voucher-based workers as those who would benefit the 
most from most of the new measures, under Option C there would be some 3-4 million 
benefitting  from  the  new  rights  to  predictability,126  while  under  Option  D  these  rights 
would be extended to 4-7 million. 

The  new  rights  would  have  positive  impacts  on  legal  clarity  and  protection  of  working 
conditions. The predictability rights could improve the work-life balance of workers. The 
limitation  of  exclusivity  clauses  could  lead  to  some  90,000-360,000  on-call  workers 

125  Platform  workers  fulfilling  the  criteria  for  a  worker  are  assumed  to  be  captured  in  the  category  of 
employees working less than 8 hours per week. Domestic workers are assumed to be already captured by 
the following categories: (i) casual workers, (iii) voucher-based workers and (iii) employees with a contract 
duration of less than one month. 
126 Right to define with the employer reference days and hours; Right to a minimum advance notice before 
a new assignment or a new period of work 

56 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
taking up a second job.127 Some 14 million fixed-term workers could use the possibility 
to  request  another  form  of  employment  –  this  does  not  mean  that  their  request  will 
always  be  granted  but  if  not  thanks  to  the  written  reply  they  will  have  a  better 
understanding  of  their  professional  prospects  with  the  current  employer.  The  right  to 
cost-free mandatory training could in practice benefit workers whose employers currently 
do not comply with existing requirements established in national legislation or collective 
agreements.  The  right  to  a  maximum  duration  of  a  probation  period  to  six  months  is 
expected  to  have  the  least  impact  as  in  all  Member  States  apart  from  Ireland  and  the 
UK128 such a right already exists, and even in those two Member States legal precedents 
limit the duration of probation periods in practice.  

B.  Impacts  on  employers,  including  competitiveness  and  productivity  (economic 
impacts) 

Costs 

A 
No 
change 

costs 

B 
to 
One-off 
familiarize  with  new 
legislation:  (53EUR-
SMEs, 
larger company)129 

39EUR-  

One-off  cost  of  WS 
for  existing  newly 
covered  staff:  114-
152m EUR 

Additional 
annual 
newly 
for 
costs 
covered new recruits: 
EUR 
11-30m 
(assuming 
10-20% 
turnover) 

Costs 
compared 
labour costs. 

modest 
total 

to 

C 
One-off 
familiarization 
Option B. 

costs 

as 

D 
Like in option B. 

of 
in 

Additional  annual  cost 
of providing WS: 0 EUR 

Minimal 
annual 
reorganisation  costs  due 
to  unavailability  of  on-
demand/zero-hours  staff 
taking second jobs. 

20-258m 
EUR 
administrative  costs  to 
respond  to  requests  for 
of 
another 
employment  (likely  less 
as  less  casual  workers 
covered) 

form 

In addition: 
7-27m 
annual 
costs 
reorganisation 
due to unavailability of 
on-demand/zero-hours 
staff 
second 
taking 
jobs. 

20-258m 
EUR 
administrative  costs  to 
respond to requests for 
another 
of 
employment. 

form 

No costs for employers 
with 
complying 
to 
requirements 
as 
provide 
in  EU 
established 
legislation, 
national 
legislation  or  relevant 

training 

There  might 

be 

No  costs  for  employers 
with 
complying 

127 This is a very conservative estimate. Some part-time workers might also use the possibility to take up a 
second job when exclusivity clauses are lifted.  
128 In Belgium general probation periods were abolished in 2014. 
129  Removing  the  existing  exclusions  will  also  mean  that  more  private  households  will  need  to  provide 
written  statements  for  domestic  workers. See  Annex 9,  point 4  for  an  analysis of  the implications  of  the 
new obligation on private households. Generally, it is concluded that time and effort required from private 
households to comply with the requirement will not be more than in case of an SME. In addition, templates 
provided by national administrations will be of particular importance to facilitate compliance among those 
employers. 

57 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
negative  impacts  on 
flexibility, 
job 
and 
creation 
competitiveness,  but 
given  that  flexibility 
is  only  addressed  at 
these 
the  margin, 
would be expected to 
be moderate. 

requirements  to  provide 
training as established in 
EU  legislation,  national 
legislation  or 
relevant 
collective agreements 
(cost  per  employee  in 
non-compliant 
companies  only:  270 
EUR130) 

collective agreements 
(cost  per  employee  in 
non-compliant 
companies  only:  270 
EUR) 

Employers' 
organisations' concerns 
as in B.   

Benefits  No 

change 

Around  16-20%  of 
employers  who  do 
not  provide  WS  will 
benefit 
from 
increased 
productivity,  loyalty, 
reduction 
legal 
costs,  court  cases, 
etc. 

in 

Some  80-84%  who 
already  provide  WS 
are  likely  to  benefit 
from  reduced  unfair 
competition  

Employers' 
organisations'  concerns 
as in B.   
Increased  legal  certainty 
for  16%  of  employers 
(i.e.  those  not  currently 
a  written 
providing 
all 
statement 
employees  due  to  legal 
exemptions) 

for 

annual 
to 
employers 
to  prohibition  of 

Minimal 
additional  revenues 
secondary 
due 
exclusivity clauses. 

No  benefits  to  the  80% 
employers 
of 
unfair 
experiencing 
competition. 

Limited  benefits  from 
retention,  productivity, 
innovation, 
improved 
worker relations.  

As in option B. 

In addition, 42m-167m 
EUR annual additional 
revenues  to  secondary 
to 
employers 
prohibition 
of 
exclusivity clauses 

due 

Secondary  employers 
having  access  to  91-
364k workers for 33m-
per 
133m 
annum. 

hours 

from: 

Benefits 
retention/loyalty, 
productivity, 
innovation, 
improved 
worker relations, fewer 
complaints  and  court 
cases,  better  resource 
planning  &  work 
allocation,  decreased 
cost of recruitment. 

Options B, C and D share some common elements. These are expected to contribute to a 
greater legal clarity for employers as well as workers. Regarding costs: 

130 Estimation of cost of training per employee based on: Cedefop (2015). Job-related adult learning and 
continuing vocational training in Europe: a statistical picture. Luxembourg: Publications Office. Cedefop 
research  paper;  No  48.  http://dx.doi.org/  10.2801/392276.  The  cost  represents  the  "total  monetary 
expenditure"  (TME)  composed  of  direct  expenditure  (i.e.  the  sum  of  fees  and  payments  to  external 
organisations,  travel  and  subsistence  payments,  labour  costs  of  internal  trainers,  training  centre  and 
teaching materials) and contributions to collective or other funds. Receipts received to support training are 
deduced from such expenditure to derive the TME. 

58 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Shortening the deadline to the 1st day of the employment relationship appears feasible 
and  should  not  impose  significant  costs.  A  potential  risk  of  non-compliance  related  to 
this shorter deadline could be mitigated by Member States requiring employees to notify 
the  lack  of  a  written  statement  to  employers  before  taking  up  any  legal  action,  and 
granting  employers  15  days  to  fulfil  their  obligation.  Nine  Member  States  already 
require the written statement to be issued before the relationship starts (BG, FR, HR, IT, 
LT, LV, PL, RO, SI), three require this on the first day of the job (AT, BE, LU). 50% of 
the  employers  surveyed  in  October  2017  already  provide  written  statements  on  the  1st 
day or before. REFIT study shows no major differences in how burdensome employers 
consider  the  timeframe  to  be,  regardless  of  whether  it  precedes  the  employment  (BG, 
PL), is set at one month (DE, FR, IT, SE) or at two months (UK). 

Based on previous experience under the acquis in which these provisions were already 
introduced, new enforcement mechanisms are not expected to generate additional costs 
to employers who comply with the legislation. 

The costs for strengthening the information package are included in the estimation of 
costs  of  familiarisation.  They  will  be  further  mitigated  by  national  administrations 
providing  relevant  models  and  electronic  templates.  It  should  be  noted  that  under  all 
three options, any legislative change, even limited to the common elements mentioned 
above,  would  result  in  a  need  for  employers  to  familiarize  themselves  with  the 
legislation. 

As part of the strengthened information package posted workers covered by Directive 
96/71/EC would receive some additional elements of information (on the country of the 
work assignment abroad, the remuneration to which workers are entitled, information on 
allowances  and  the  address  of  the  official  national  website).  This  is  not  expected  to 
generate  any  cost  beyond  the  mentioned  costs  of  familiarisation,  especially  that  the 
proposed  measure  would  retain  the  current  derogation  for  workers  who  are  posted 
abroad for a period of one month or less. 

The  new  rights  introduced  under  option  C  and  D  can  also  generate  some  costs  –  and 
benefits.  Those  will  be  more  significant  under  option  D,  as  the  extended  scope  of  the 
Directive would  increase the number of workers benefitting from the new rights. Only 
some of those costs could be quantified. 

Concerning  the  rights  related  to  predictability,  surveyed  employers  expected  some 
modest additional administrative costs as well as increased labour costs and costs related 
to  reduced  workforce  flexibility.  On  the  balance,  however,  around  half  believed  they 
would  benefit  from  improved  staff  retention,  better  advance  planning  and  improved 
relations with workers  and more than two-thirds believed that such measures would be 
of overall benefit to the labour market in terms of better working conditions, improved 
workforce  productivity,  less  unfair  competition,  better  labour  relations,  greater  labour 

59 

 
 
market  transparency  and  greater  competitiveness.  Moreover,  a  significant  majority  of 
surveyed employers state that they already offer those rights in practice.131   

The  provision  on  the  possibility  to  request  another  form  of  employment,  where 
available,  and  receive  a  written  reply  will  generate  some  administrative  costs. 
Calculations  based  on  an  assumption  that  cost  of  such  a  written  reply  could  be 
equivalent  to  a  cost  of  a  new  written  statement  and  that  on  average  25%  of  entitled 
casual  workers  could  make  such  a  request  lead  to  an  estimate  of  20-258  million  EUR 
total  costs.  However,  also  in  the  case  of  this  right  a  majority  of  surveyed  employers 
reported overall benefits for their companies. 

As for the prohibition of exclusivity clauses, in the employers' survey nearly two-thirds 
of employers who employ casual workers (65%) include exclusivity clauses in some or 
all  the  contracts  of  those  workers.132  Only  a  minority  reported  that  they  had  suffered 
increased  labour  costs  (43%)  or  reduced  workforce  flexibility  (39%)  as  a  result  of not 
using exclusivity clauses – with 53-60% reporting benefits. When unconstrained by such 
clauses some casual workers might take up a second job and thus be less available for 
on-call work, so the first employers might need to reorganise their work, leading to costs 
of some 7-27 million EUR per year. 

In case of the right to maximum probation periods, both costs and benefits are rather 
insignificant  since  the  proposed  measure  (limiting  to  six  months)  would  require 
legislative change in only two Member States (IE, UK) and the extent of the change in 
practice would be limited.133 

Finally,  the analysis  of relevant  legislation focused on the  generally applicable EU law 
shows the right to training which the employer is required to provide without cost to the 
worker  would  not  generate  any  additional  costs  to  employers  complying  with  existing 
obligations.  Only  employers  who  are  non-compliant,  or  employ  people    previously  not 
recognised as  workers but  now falling  under the scope, and which have the practice of 

131  Reference  hours:  85%  for  all  or  some  casual  workers;  minimum  advance  notice:  75%  (47%  for  all 
casual workers). Minimum number of hours: 72% ( including 42% for all casual workers) 
132 65% represents employers, who employ casual workers (excluding those who answered “not applicable 
(do not employ casual workers)” and those, who responded “don’t know”). Out of those 65% of employers, 
27% stated they included exclusivity clause in some contracts with casual workers, and the remaining 38% 
said they included exclusivity clauses in all contracts with casual workers. 
133  In  Cyprus  a  probation  period  may  be  extended  from  the  legal  duration  of  6  months  up  to  104  weeks 
provided there is a written agreement between both contracting parties. In Greece for workers other than 
medium  and  high-skilled  probation  can  go  beyond  6  month  and  up  to  12.  However,  as  regards  unfair 
dismissals workers on probation have essentially the same rights as others. 

60 

 
 
                                                 
charging  the  worker  for  the  cost  of  training  they  are  obliged  to  provide  could  bear  the 
average cost of 270 EUR per employee.134,135  

SMEs versus larger companies 

It should be noted that administrative costs are expected to be higher in SMEs compared 
to  large  companies  in  the  case  of  all  options.  Larger  companies  can  use  economies  of 
scale to lower the costs.  

The average fixed cost of familiarisation is 53 EUR for an SME and 39 EUR for a large 
firm.  Given  the  high  total  number  of  SMEs  in  Europe,  the  total  costs  for  all  SMEs  is 
estimated at 851 million EUR and for larger companies at around 1 million EUR.  

The costs of issuing a written statement or a written reply to request for a new form of 
work are also higher for SMEs (18-153 EUR per written statement) compared to larger 
companies  (10-45  EUR).  In  case  of  those  costs,  the  total  costs  will  depend  on  the 
relative proportion of non-standard workers in companies, whether SMEs or larger.  

The indirect costs of introducing new rights under option D will also be related to the 
selected business model significantly more than to the size of companies. There is little 
data  to  establish  the  extent  of  the  use  of  non-standard  work  in  SMEs  as  compared  to 
large  companies.  The  survey  conducted  in  the  framework  of  the  supporting  study136 
found for example that the percentage of SMEs and large companies reporting that they 
rely on employees working less than 8 hours per week or on workers on demand is very 
similar  while  the  the  percentage  of  SMEs  reporting  to  follow  a  business  model  where 
atypical  forms  of  employees  working  less  than  eight  hours  play  an  important  role  is 
slightly higher compared to large companies. A UK study on zero-hours contracts found 
that these contracts are used in 12% of enterprises with less than 20 employees and 28% 
of enterprises with 20-250 employees compared to 47% of larger companies.137 An EU 
study  on  SMEs  established  that  in  2009,  50%  of  small  enterprises  in  EU27  employed 
staff with fixed-term contracts, as compared to 75% for medium-sized and 87% for large 
enterprises.138 The latter two sources could indicate that impact on companies in terms 

134  Cedefop  (2015).  Job-related  adult  learning  and  continuing  vocational  training  in  Europe:  a  statistical 
picture.  Luxembourg:  Publications  Office.  Cedefop 
research  paper;  No  48.  http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.2801/392276 
135 To note that an alternative source  estimated the cost of mandatory health and safety information and 
training  for  workers  to  be  less  than  50  EUR  per  employee  in  large  companies,  75  EUR  in  medium  and 
around 150 EUR in small companies (COWI (2015): Evaluation of the practical implementation of the EU 
OSH Directives. Main report) 
136  Note:  the  survey  targeted  employers,  who  were  more  likely  to  rely  on  atypical  workers  or  flexible 
working  arrangements,  to  achieve  more  meaningful  answers.  Therefore,  the  survey  answers  are  not 
representative  of  a  general  employer  population  but  specifically  relate  to  employers  employing  casual 
workers. 
137 Office for National Statistics (2014), Analysis of Employee Contracts that do not Guarantee a Minimum 
Number of Hours 
138 Jan de Kok et al: Do SMEs create more and better jobs? Zoetermeer, November 2011 

61 

 
 
                                                 
of business model adjustments could actually be considerably smaller in SMEs. 

Annex  3  (point  4)  shows  a  more  detailed  comparison  of  costs  between  the  two 
categories of firms. 

Overall,  compared  to  other  options  option  D  generates  the  most  costs  to  employers. 
Administrative costs are however modest in comparison with the overall personnel costs 
borne by companies.139 Concerning indirect costs of the new rights, these could be more 
significant in companies relying to a large extent on non-standard work. While employer 
organisations voiced some concerns about possible negative impacts on labour flexibility, 
appropriate  formulation  of  the  proposed  new  rights  could  mitigate  the  risk  of  this  and 
other unintended effects (see section 8.1 for more details on this point). Moreover, such 
concerns  have  not  been  confirmed  in  the  employer  survey  which  indicated  that  in 
practice  many  employers  already  apply  some  of  the  considered  measures  (e.g.  advance 
notice or reference hours) and more than two thirds saw benefits of introducing them.  

At the same time, option D is expected to generate most benefits as regards productivity, 
innovation, staff retention and worker-employer relations. 

C. Broader impacts (labour markets, public finances, application and enforcement, 
fundamental rights) 

Soci
al 

A 
Existing 
in 
gaps 
protection 
would 
continue. 
Over  time, 
as 
MS 
legislation 
diverges, 
there 
would  be 
adverse 
effects  on 
labour 
market 
transparen
cy 

and 

B 
Negligible  impact  on 
employment 

Very  slight  increase  in 
risk  of  workers  being 
replaced  by  informal 
agreements  or 
self-
employment contracts  

in 
Reduction 
undeclared 
work 
(value  of  40-120m 
p.a.) 
improved 
detection of undeclared 
work  

+ 

Reduction  of  bogus 

C 
No  increase  in  no.  of 
workers  receiving  right 
to information. 
Many 
non-standard 
workers  not  receiving 
any benefit. 

D 
in 
Reduction 
work 
undeclared 
(value  of  40-120m 
improved 
pa.) 
+ 
detection 
of 
undeclared work  

Modest  number  of  on-
demand/zero-hour 
workers 
contract 
enabled  to  get  a  second 
job  and 
thus  modest 
number  of  extra  hours 
worked  per  annum  and 
slight  increase  in  their 
gross annual earnings 

on-

91-364k 
demand/zero-hour 
contract 
enabled 
second 
another employer. 

workers 
to  get  a 
job  with 

As  a 
1,424m 
increase 

result,  355-
EUR 
gross 

in 

139 According to 2014 Eurostat data personnel costs amounted to some 29,000 EUR per employee per year 
in  an  SME  and  48,000  in  a  larger  company  (source:  SME  Performance  Review  2017  by  DIW-ECON). 
Personnel costs are made up of wages, salaries and employers' social security costs. They include taxes and 
employees'  social  security  contributions  retained  by  the  employer,  as  well  as  the  employer's  compulsory 
and voluntary social contributions. 

62 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
mobility of 
labour 
across 
EU. 

the 

self-employment 
activities 
recognised as work. 

and 
not 

Minimal  adjustments  by 
employers 
their 
workforces 

to 

Minimal 
undeclared work 

reduction  of 

Econ
omic 

Depending 
MS 
on 
choices, 
lost 
opportuniti
to 
es 
benefit 
from 
increased 
tax 
revenues, 
reduced 
social 
security 
payments.  

No loss of flexibility of 
casual workforce 

Modest  positive  effect 
on tax revenue. 

reduction 

Modest 
in 
social security spending, 
in 
increase 
and 
legitimate 
social 
security claims 

Additional 
tax 
revenues  from  a  1-3% 
shift  of  undeclared 
work  into  the  formal 
economy:  8-25m  EUR 
p.a. 

in 

Reduction 
social 
security  payments,  due 
to  undeclared  workers 
formal 
the 
entering 
economy: 
4m-24m 
EUR p.a.140  

annual  earnings  for 
those workers. 

Reduction  of  bogus 
self-employment  and 
activities 
not 
recognised as work. 

Some 
employers 
(likely  to  be  <50%) 
may  replace  casual 
with 
contracts 
forms  of 
standard 
employment. 
A 
proportion 
smaller 
may  simply  recruit 
casual 
fewer 
workers.  A 
yet 
proportion 
smaller 
might  replace  casual 
work  contracts  with 
informal  agreements 
or 
self-employment 
arrangements. 
Some  limitations  on 
flexibility  of  casual 
workforce 

46-185m 
EUR 
annual  tax  revenues 
(on-demand/zero-
hour  workers  taking 
a second job) 

Additional 
tax 
revenues  from  a  1-
3% 
of 
shift 
undeclared work into 
the  formal  economy: 
8-25m EUR p.a. 

Reduction  in  social 
security 
payments, 
due 
to  undeclared 
workers  entering  the 
economy: 
formal 
4m-24m EUR p.a.141  

140 Assuming that reductions equal about 10-20% of the value of undeclared work brought into the formal 
economy. 
141 As above. 

63 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Additional  modest 
in  social 
reduction 
security 
payments 
resulting  from  33m-
133m  extra  hours 
worked  per  annum 
by those workers.  

More harmonised 
information 
requirements across 
the EU 

Depending  on 
specific measure. 

the 

Substantial 
to 
contribution 
fundamental 
rights 
for  on-demand/zero-
contract 
hour 
currently 
workers 
prevented 
from 
taking  a  second  job 
exclusivity 
by 
clauses 

Lega
l  

No 
change. 

Depending  on  specific 
measure,  change  in  5-
24 MS 

Depending  on  specific 
measure, change in 4-23 
MS 

Increased 
costs 
enforcement  due 
higher 
number 
workers covered  

of 
to 
of 

increase 

Slight 
in 
number  of  employees 
using dispute resolution 

impact  on 
Positive 
fundamental 
rights 
(gender  equality,  right 
in  work, 
to  engage 
right 
effective 
to 
remedy,  solidarity  and 
access to justice) 

significant 
No 
contribution 
to 
fundamental  rights  or  to 
as 
gender 
workers 
remaining 
outside  the  scope  of  the 
Directive 
are  more 
likely to be female 

equality 

Also in this case in the three substantial options (B, C and D) there will be social benefits 
associated  with  the  common  measures,  mainly  relating  to  the  reduction  of  undeclared 
work, and some increased costs of enforcement.  

In  options  C  and  D  new  rights  are  included,  but  only  in  D  this  is  coupled  with  an 
expanded scope. The impact on the labour market of D is significantly higher. While for 
C  the  increase  of  on-demand/zero-hour  contract  workers  able  to  get  a  second  job  is 
modest, in D 91,000-364,000 on-demand/zero-hour contract workers would become able 
to get a second job with another employer with 355-1,424 million EUR increase in gross 
annual  earnings.  Based  on  the  employers'  survey  it  can  be  expected  that  while  in  C 
minimal  adjustments  of  employers  to  the  changed  composition  of  the  workforce  are 
expected,  in  D  some  employers  (likely  to  be  <50%)  may  replace  casual  contracts  with 
standard  forms  of  employment.  A  smaller  proportion  may  simply  recruit  fewer  casual 
workers.  A  yet  smaller  proportion  might  replace  casual  work  contracts  with  informal 
agreements or self-employment arrangements. 

64 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This  has  effects  of  economic  nature:  while  in  C  the  effect  on  tax  revenue  and  social 
security  payments  is  modest,  D  combines  the  effects  of  extended  scope  (8-25  million 
EUR p.a. in tax revenues and 4-24 million EUR p.a in social security payments reduction 
due to a shift of undeclared work into formal economy equivalent to some 40-120 million 
EUR  p.a.)  with  additional  46-185  million  EUR  annual  tax  revenues  and  a  reduction  in 
social  security  payments  resulting  from  33-133  million  extra  hours  worked  per  annum 
related to the application of the new rights to an extended group of workers. The baseline 
scenario A offers lost opportunities on this aspect. 

In  all substantial  options (B, C, D) there is an enhanced enforcement system. This  will 
create some costs for Member States due to expected increase of workers making use of 
dispute-resolution  systems.  Whether  Member  States  create  new  institutions  to  comply 
with the new requirements will be left to their discretion. The measures will at the same 
time create societal benefits due to enhanced application of rules not only on information 
on  working  conditions,  but  also  on  the  content  of  the  working  conditions  themselves 
thanks  to  enhanced  awareness.  Compliant  employers  should  not  incur  significant 
additional costs.  

The legal impact would take place in all scenarios except the baseline, with changes in 4-
24 Member States depending on the specific measures.  

Fundamental  rights  would  risk  being  not  impacted/only  slightly  positively  impacted  in 
the baseline scenario A and in scenario C including new rights but not an enlarged scope. 
Fundamental  rights  would  be  positively  impacted  by  an  extended  scope  and  in  larger 
measure  when  this  is  coupled  by  the  new  rights  in  scenario  D  (with  a  substantial 
contribution to fundamental rights for on-demand/zero-hour contract workers). 

7.  HOW DO THE POLICY OPTIONS COMPARE? 

As  shown  in  the  previous  chapter  the  different  policy  packages  produce  a  range  of 
qualitative and quantitative (including monetary and non- monetary) effects, with varying 
degrees  of  certainty.  Moreover,  the  effects  vary  for  the  different  parties  involved  – 
workers, employers, public authorities.  

As costs and benefits cannot be directly compared it is proposed to compare the options 
based  on  a  multi-criteria  analysis.  This  form  of  analysis  allows  combining  a  range  of 
positive  and  negative  impacts  (evidenced  by  a  mix  of  qualitative,  quantitative  and 
monetary  data)  into  a  single  framework.  It  brings  together  the  main  Better  Regulation 
criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence. 

The  table  below  presents  results  of  this  analysis,  based  on  elements  discussed  in  more 
detail for each scenario in the sections above. A seven-stage qualitative grading system 
(i.e., +++, ++, +, 0, -, --, ---) is proposed, based on the legend provided in Annex 4. 

65 

 
 
 
Criteria for comparing 
options 

Effectiveness 

1. Labour market impact 

2.  Effect  on  working 
conditions 

0 

0 

on 

public 

0 

3.  Effect 
finances 

Efficiency 

1.  Competitiveness  & 
productivity 

2.  Ease  of  application  & 
enforcement 

Coherence 

1. Fundamental rights 

2. Social Pillar objectives 

3. EU labour law acquis 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

A 

B 

C 

D 

+ 

++ 

+ 

++ 

+ 

++ 

+ 

+ 

++ 

+++ 

++ 

+ 

+++ 

++ 

+++ 

++ 

+ 

+ 

++ 

+ 

+ 

+++ 

+++ 

+++ 

Regarding  effectiveness,  options  B and  C  seem  to  be  closely  matched.  This  is  because 
each partially addresses the challenges related to labour market developments: option B 
extends and clarifies the scope of the Directive, and option C sets new rights for workers 
to improve predictability of work and opportunities to seek another form of employment. 

Option  D,  combining  those  two  elements,  would  most  significantly  increase  the 
effectiveness of EU action. By extending the scope of the Directive it would ensure that 
more  workers,  especially  those  in  most  precarious  working  relationships,  could  benefit 
from the new rights. This would have a positive spill over effect on public finances, as 
e.g. workers freed from exclusivity clauses could seek additional employment, and there 
would  be  positive  effects  on  their  disposable  incomes.  While  difficult  to  quantify, 
indirect  positive  impacts  could  include  e.g.  improved  health  and  socio  political 
engagement of workers. 

Concerning efficiency, the impacts on competitiveness and productivity are less positive 
in case of option C and D. This is the effect of the new rights which will generate some 
extra  administrative  costs,  though  modest,  and  may  have  some  impact  on  flexibility  of 
employment. These costs should however in the longer term be outweighed by benefits at 
company  level  (higher  productivity,  improved  retention,  motivation  of  staff,  upskilling 

66 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
etc.)  as  well  as  positive  effects  for  the  whole  internal  market  (more  sustainable 
competition and improved level playing field for companies).  

The ease of application and enforcement would be more improved with options B and D 
– this is  a result  of the extension and clarification of scope of the Directive that would 
facilitate detection of undeclared work. 

Finally, each policy option has been tested for coherence with EU policy objectives: 

Coherence with the EU social acquis legal framework142 

All policy options apart from Baseline include measures 2, 3, 5 that improve coherence 
with  the  social  acquis  and  other  policy  initiatives.  Packages  B,  C  and  D  ensure  better 
coherence  with:  the  posting  of  workers  provisions;  the  Temporary  Agency  Work 
Directive;  EU  action  on  combating  undeclared,  fraudulent  contracting  and  bogus  self-
employment and the equal treatment acquis covering discrimination in the workplace. 

Policy package B and D would also increase the coherence of the personal scope of EU 
labour  law.  This  enhances  coherence  with  the  Working  Time  Directive  and  the  Part-
Time, Fixed-Term and Temporary Agency Work Directive as interpreted by the CJEU, 
as allowing for the current exclusions to remain would give rise to incoherence. 

The provision of additional material rights present in options C and D supports the goals 
of  the  Working  Time  Directive,  Fixed-Term  Directive,  Part-Time  Directive  and 
Temporary  Agency  Directive,  the  Parental  Leave  Directive  and  the  Proposal  for  a 
Directive on Work-Life Balance.143 

Fundamental rights impact assessment 

The baseline scenario would represent no progress towards their achievement compared 
with the status quo. Scenario D emerges as the most coherent with the Charter. 

Coherence with the European Pillar of Social Rights144 

The baseline scenario would represent no progress towards their achievement compared 
with the status quo. Scenario D emerges as the most coherent with the European Pillar of 
Social Rights. 

8.  PREFERRED OPTION 

The preferred policy option is policy package D that allows to better achieve the policy 
goal. It includes policy measures 1 (on personal scope), 2 (on strengthened information), 

142 Annex 7 presents an overview of EU social acquis. 
143 More detailed information is provided in Annex 10. 
144 The coherence of measures with the Pillar principles is presented in a table in Annex 10. 

67 

 
 
                                                 
3 (on more timely information), 4 (new rights) and 5 (enforcement).  This policy package 
would  address  all  the  objectives  of  the  initiative,  as  illustrated  in  the intervention  logic 
presented in the Figure below. 

8.1 Overall impacts 

a) On workers 

Workers  are  expected  to  see  a  substantial  improvement  of  their  working  and  living 
conditions.  

2-3 million additional non-standard workers will benefit from the protection of a written 
statement. 

In  addition,  5-31  million  workers  will  in  practice  receive  additional  information  (on 
probation, working time, social security...). 8-16 million every year will be able to start a 
new job with clear information on rights and obligations from the very beginning instead 
of up to 2 months later.  

Between 4 and 7 million workers will get the possibility to look for additional work due 
to  the  enhanced  predictability  (reference  hours,  minimum  advance  notice).  Enhanced 
predictability should also have a positive impact on their work-life balance and health.  

68 

 
 
 
 
 
Some 14 million workers are expected to use the possibility to request another form of 
work and thus get support in their dialogue with employer to move to a more secure and 
predictable form of work, some 3-6 million workers will be protected against excessive 
probation  periods.  Thanks  to  freedom  from  exclusivity  clause  some  0.5-1.5  million 
workers  could  seek  additional  employment.  Only  considering  on-demand  employment, 
this could enable 91,000-364,000 workers to increase the intensity of their employment, 
work up to an additional 33-133 million hours per year and see an increase of earnings of 
355-1,424  million  EUR  per  year.  Workers'  right  to  receive  cost-free  training  which 
employers are obliged to provide through EU legislation, national legislation and relevant 
collective agreements would be reinforced and brought within the scope of the EU justice 
system. Workers whose rights are not respected would have easier access to redress.  

Workers who fall outside the scope of national definitions of worker due to casual work, 
short or intermittent hours or zero-hour contracts, but that 'perform services for a certain 
period of time for and under the direction of another natural or legal person or persons in 
return  for  remuneration'  will  be  entitled  to  basic  rights  as  receiving  information  on 
essential  aspects  of  their  employment  relationship,  and  material  rights  to  predictability 
and the possibility to seek redress if they are not respected. 

Persons  in  bogus  self-employment  (i.e.  with  self-employment  contracts  but  a  de  facto 
employment relationship as defined in the directive) will receive additional information, 
rights,  access  to  enforcement,  either  directly  via  the  transposition  or  via  court-based 
litigation.   

The risk of regression in worker protection has been duly considered (e.g. in case of the 
proposed right  to  a  maximum duration of probation  period, the 6-month  limit is  longer 
than what is in place in a number of Member States). To avoid such a risk, the proposal 
would  include  a  clause preventing  the  use  of  the  Directive as  grounds  for  reducing  the 
level of protection already afforded to workers within Member States. 

b) On business (including competitiveness) 

Costs 

The  proposed  policy  package  would  result  in  some  administrative  costs  to  employers. 
The  costs  per  company  amount  to  18-153  EUR  in  an  SME  and  10-45  EUR  in  a  large 
company for issuing a written statement or providing a reply to the request for another 
form of employment. The familiarisation costs would be, respectively, 53 and 39 EUR. 
These  costs  are  very  modest  in  comparison  with  the  overall  personnel  costs  borne  by 

69 

 
 
companies,  which  according  to  2014  Eurostat  data  amounted  to  some  29,000  EUR  per 
employee per year in an SME and 48,000 in a larger company.145  

Employers  anticipate  also  incurring  increased  indirect  compliance  costs  (legal  advice, 
revised  scheduling  systems,  HR  management  time,  staff  training,  and  information  of 
staff). These costs could not be quantified but the interviewed employers considered they 
would be to a modest rather than great extent.  

Apart from the familiarisation, costs will accrue mainly to those employers who rely to a 
large  extent  on  non-standard  forms  of  work,  and  so  far  have  not  introduced  in  practice 
any  of  the  measures  aimed  at  increasing  predictability.  Costs  for  training  will  affect 
mainly  those  companies  which  at  the  moment  do  not  comply  with  existing  legal 
obligations to provide training required by EU legislation, national legislation or relevant 
collective agreements and rely on the practice of deducting training costs from workers’ 
remuneration or charging them to workers.  

In  the  section  above,  a  possibility  of  a  positive  impact  on  individual  wages  of  workers 
was signalled. This would be a result of workers being able to work more hours or seek 
work  with  another  employer.  No  significant  aggregate  impact  on  minimum  or  hourly 
wage  levels  is  however  expected.  These  are  influenced  by  other  labour  market 
developments,  including  the  labour  supply  and  demand,  national  legislation  and 
collective  bargaining.  For  individual  employers,  a  direct  effect  on  wages  can  only  be 
expected  in  situations  where,  employees  currently  working  undeclared  would  come 
within scope of the Directive and would become eligible for the minimum wage, where 
such exists. 

Benefits 

Employers  already  providing  enhanced  information  and  using  more  secure  contracts 
would see additional benefits thanks to more sustainable competition. 16% of employers 
would benefit from increased legal certainty and cross-border hiring would be supported 
by more uniform minimum provisions.  

Thanks  to  prohibition  of  exclusivity  clauses,  workers  will  be  more  available  for 
secondary employers, which might generate some 42-167 million EUR annual additional 
revenues. The provision of templates and of information at national level will facilitate 
the  preparation  of  written  statements  and  awareness  of  existing  legislation  both  by 
professional employers and by more marginal employers.  

145 SME Performance Review 2017 by DIW-ECON ((Personnel costs are made up of wages, salaries and 
employers' social security costs. They include taxes and employees' social security contributions retained 
by the employer, as well as the employer's compulsory and voluntary social contributions.) 

70 

 
 
                                                 
Other  benefits  include  higher  staff  retention  and  loyalty,  improved  worker  relations, 
fewer complaints from workers, fewer court cases relating to working conditions, better 
resource  planning  and  work  allocation.  Overall,  the  proposed  measures  could  have  a 
positive impact on company-level productivity, in line with the ILO and ESDE finding 
reported  in  section  2.3.2,  and  as  indicated  by  employers  surveyed  in  the  context  of  the 
study.  

Competitiveness 

No significant impacts on competitiveness vis-à-vis third countries are expected.  

The administrative costs related to the preferred option are, as signalled above, minimal 
in comparison with the overall personnel costs.  

Indirect  costs  of  limitations  on  flexibility  would  affect  mainly  those  employers  who 
depend to a relatively great extent on on-demand/casual work. The use of non-standard 
forms  of  employment  is  usually  concentrated  in  certain  sectors,  such  as  hotels, 
construction  and  agriculture.146  Some  of 
traditionally 
characterised  by  non-standard  work  arrangements  (e.g.  construction  and  agriculture), 
while  non-standard  forms  of  employment  have  spread  in  industries  previously  not 
characterised  by  these  arrangements,  e.g.  the  hotel  industry.147  In  the  above  mentioned 
sectors  there  is  little  direct  competition  with  third  countries  based  on  labour  costs  and 
little scope for relocation to third countries. Moreover, if companies from third countries 
employ workers on the territory of the EU, those workers would also be covered by the 
proposed provisions. 

these  sectors  have  been 

Possibility to exempt microenterprises 

As noted in the SME test (Annex 3, point 4) direct administrative costs may be relatively 
higher for the smaller companies but indirect costs will depend on the extent a company 
–  irrespective  of  the  size  –  depends  on  non-standard  work  and  there  is  no  conclusive 
evidence  to  point  that  SMEs  would  have  a  higher  proportion  of  such  workers.  Some 
studies  point  in  fact  to  the  contrary.  Given  that  93%  of  EU  companies  are 
microenterprises,148  an  exemption  of  those  employers  would  render  the  proposal 
ineffective. That  being said,  some  mitigating measures  are  proposed in  order  to  further 
decrease  the  administrative  costs,  especially  in  SMEs  (see  section  8.3  below),  while 
taking  into  account  that  such  measures  should  not  unintentionally  make  SMEs  less 
attractive employers or discourage businesses from scaling up.149  

146 ILO (2015), Non-standard forms of employment.  
147 Weil, D. 2014. The fissured workplace: Why work became so bad for so many and what can be done to 
improve it (Cambridge, Harvard University Press).  
148 SBS 2014 
149 See e.g. Eurochambers (2017): SME Test Benchmark  

71 

 
 
                                                 
Possibility to exempt private households from certain provisions 

The  proposed  Directive  would  allow  Member  States  to  provide  that  where  work  is 
performed for a household, Member States may consider that natural persons belonging 
to this household are not subject to employers’ obligations in relation to the possibility to 
request a new form of work, the right to receive mandatory training cost-free and would 
not be subject to favourable presumptions in the event that the written statement was not 
provided or lacked essential information. Where domestic workers fulfil the criteria for 
worker status, they should receive information about their employment relationship and 
basic  rights  relating  to  predictability,  but  it  is  not  considered  appropriate  to  include 
private households within scope of the elements set out above, given the fact that they do 
not  function  as  organisations  and  will  not  generally  have  the  capacity  to  fulfil  such 
obligations.  

Unintended effects and mitigating measures 

Employer  organisations  raised  concerns  about  impacts  the  proposal  could  have  on 
flexibility in the labour market and associated potential for job creation. These concerns 
were  duly  taken  into  account  in  the  choice  of  measures  that  were  eventually  taken 
forward  in  the  impact  analysis  (see  discussion  on  discarded  options  (section  5.2)). 
Proposed measures were also analysed from the point of view of unintended effects (such 
as in the examples below) and formulated in a way to mitigate those risks.  

  Limited flexibility 

Flexibility is a crucial characteristic of today's labour market, where companies need to 
be agile, adapt quickly to new demands and to frequent fluctuations in demand. In some 
sectors services need to be delivered at short notice and/or outside usual business hours. 
For many workers, for example those reconciling work with caring obligations or studies, 
flexibility is also a key requirement. 

The  proposed  measures  (especially  advance  notice  and  reference  periods  for  workers 
with  variable  schedules,  as  well  as  a  limitation  on  exclusivity  clauses)  limit  somewhat 
flexibility  which  exists  in  some  Member  States  in  order  to  improve  predictability  for 
workers  and  to  protect  their  right  to  seek  work.  The  measures  have  however  been 
designed in order to preserve a significant scope for flexibility both for the worker and 
the employer, and not to hinder development of non-standard forms of work. 

For  example,  the  proposed  provision  on  advance  notice  does  not  strictly  specify  the 
length of such a notice (it should be "reasonable"), taking into account that in different 
sectors  different  notice  periods  might  be  realistically  possible.  Neither  are  there  any 
restrictions  on  the  reference  hours  other  than  what  already  exists  in  legislation  (e.g. 
Working Time Directive). For both rights  – employees will still be able to accept work 
outside  the  reference  hours  and  with  shorter  notice  so  it  can  be  expected  that  if  the 

72 

 
 
 
relationship  between  employer  and  worker  is  a  positive  and  constructive  one  the 
employee will be ready to adapt to justified business needs. 

  Fewer job opportunities, especially for vulnerable workers 

Regarding the risk of disincentives to recruit, the question was considered whether some 
employers might choose either to recruit fewer workers newly-covered by the Directive 
or to replace such workers with others that remain outside the scope of the Directive (e.g. 
self-employed).  

The employers' survey showed that more than 80% of employers already provide written 
statements for employees working less than 8 hours per week, employees with contracts 
of less than one month’s duration, on-demand workers and intermittent workers. It also 
indicated that in case the new provisions are introduced employers were more likely to 
convert casual work contracts into standard forms of employment than to replace casual 
contracts with informal agreements or self-employment contracts.  

When  considering  the  right  to  training,  however,  a  possibility  to  require  employers  to 
provide  free  of  charge  training  needed  to  perform  required  tasks  was  discarded  on  the 
basis  of  costs  but  also  the  possible  impact  on  employers'  attitude  to  recruiting  young 
workers  with  little  experience  or  workers  requiring  additional  support  (such  as  some 
migrant workers). 

  Recourse to undeclared work, in particular in case of domestic work 

Excessively heavy administrative procedures might lead some employers to decide not to 
comply with the obligations and not to declare their workers. This could theoretically be 
the case for example for private households employing domestic workers.  

Analysis has shown that already now in 15 Member States domestic workers fall under 
the scope of the Directive and have a right to a written statement. In some countries, such 
as Austria and Sweden, compliance is generally high, in others the level of compliance 
can  be  particularly  low  and  the  main  reason  is  the  wish  to  avoid  the  fiscal  and 
administrative burden associated with formal employment and to retain the flexibility to 
terminate the employment relationship as and when the employer wishes. 

Generally,  it  appears  that  the  level  of  compliance  with  regard  to  domestic  workers 
depends  on  the  national  context:  ease  of  application  as  well  as  the  level  of  other 
obligations on employers (fiscal, social security etc.). In the proposal the question of ease 
of application is addressed through the requirement for Member States to provide clear 
information  to  employers  and  develop  relevant  written  statement  templates,  and  the 
possibility to exempt private households from certain obligations under the Directive. 

  Risk of disproportionate costs of unintended non-compliance 

73 

 
 
 
 
The  proposed  measures  include  strengthened  enforcement  measures,  coupled  with  a 
significant  shortening  of  the  deadline  for  provision  of  a  written  statement  to  a  worker. 
There  is  a  risk  that  an  employer  who  unintentionally  misses  the  deadline  could  face 
rather  serious  consequences,  including  a  favourable  presumption  of  a  permanent 
employment contract. Such a result would be disproportionate to the employer's failure to 
comply. 

In  order  to  avoid  such  an  unintended  effect,  the  proposed  provisions  establish  that  the 
employer  is  notified about  the  missing  document  or  elements  of  information  and  given 
15  days  to  complete  them  before  any  administrative  action  can  be  launched  or  any 
presumption can be established. 

c) On Member States 

The specific impacts per Member State would depend on a number of factors. Firstly, the 
extent  of  the  necessary  legislative  adjustments  would  differ  –  for  some  Member  States 
the  changes  would  be  limited,  others  would  need  to  introduce  a  substantial  number  of 
new elements in their transpositions.150 Secondly, the extent to which non-standard forms 
of  work  are  present  in  the  Member  States  varies.151  Thirdly,  the  broader  current  and 
future  socioeconomic  context  would  have  an  influence  on  the  potential  impact  of  the 
changes: in Member States experiencing labour supply shortages, the better availability 
of  non-standard  workers  to  other  employers  might  be  especially  important,  in  those 
where  skills  mismatch  is  pronounced,  the  training  measure  might  have  a  particular 
impact, in others, where precarious working situations are widespread, the social effects 
of higher predictability in employment might play the greatest role.  

The  following  examples  illustrate  the  diversity  of  national  situations,  which  in  practice 
might lead to uneven playing field for companies across the EU: 

 

 

Wide  use  of  collective  agreements  in  some  Member  States  (e.g.  Nordic) 
means  workers’  rights  in  practice  are  often  more  extensive  than  those 
provided by the Directive and other EU legislation. 
On-call/Zero-hour  contracts  are  most  prevalent  in  northern/western  Europe 
(DK, IE, NL, SE, UK) as well as IT and MT. Such employment contracts are 
generally  allowed  in  law  but  typically  do  not  give  basic  rights  to  workers: 
provision  of  reference  hours,  minimum  advance  notice  period,  and  freedom 
from  exclusivity  clauses.  Some  such  workers  are  not  yet  covered  by  the 
Directive and would therefore be covered by an extension of the scope. 

150 See Annex 8, point 6 for an overview of changes required per Member State. 
151 See Tables 2-7 in Annex 6 for estimated numbers of some relevant categories of non-standard workers 
per Member State 

74 

 
 
 
                                                 
 

 

 

In  some  other  Member  States,  there  are  fewer  legally-employed  on-call 
workers. Instead, there are certain contractual forms that are not employment 
relationships  or  are  'intermediate'  or  grey  areas  or  potentially  bogus  self-
employment, e.g. civil law contracts in Poland, mini-jobs in Germany, auto-
entrepreneurs  in  France,  'if-and-when'  contracts  in  Ireland,  'day  workers'  in 
Romania.  Here,  the  issue  is  definitions  of  employment  –  which  would  be 
addressed  in  part  by  the  clarification  of  worker  status  in  the  proposed 
Directive. 
Similarly, in the UK and IE, certain contractual forms in the gig economy are 
increasingly  being  challenged  in  the  courts.  For  example,  'if-and-when' 
contract  workers  in  Ireland  have  gained  certain  rights  to  information  and 
consultation,  as  if  they  were  employees.  Some  platform  workers  in  the  UK 
have won cases regarding their employment status.  
In  some  other  Member  States  (mostly  southern/south-eastern),  employees 
may enjoy coverage under the Directive and casual workers have most/all the 
basic  rights  in  question.  However,  there  is  a  hidden  problem  of  undeclared 
work  and  bogus  self-employment,  e.g.  Italy,  Romania.  The  effects  of  the 
revised  Directive  will  depend  on  stronger  enforcement  and  sanction 
mechanisms. 

While  taking  the  above  into  account,  the  following  paragraphs  summarise  the  general 
impacts expected across all Member States. 

A  reduction  in  undeclared  work  and  increased  ease  of  detection  of  undeclared  and 
fraudulent  work  can  be  expected,  in  particular  in  sectors  which  see  both  casual  and 
undeclared  work,  resulting  potentially  in  severe  abuse  of  workers’  rights  and  human 
rights. The value of undeclared work brought into formal economy is estimated at 40-120 
million  EUR  per  year.  Better  and  more  complete  information  on  working  time  and 
additional rights will result in improved work-life balance and wellbeing. Training rights 
will enhance the upskilling and adaptability of the workforce.  

Productivity of national economies could increase as a result of the proposed measures. 
Improved job predictability can improve work-life balance, which in turn can positively 
impact  growth  as  it  allows  productive  workers  to  be  kept  in  their  jobs.152  Enhanced 
training  can  contribute  to  diminishing  skills  mismatch,  which  is  another  drag  on  the 
growth  potential  of  economies.  OECD  estimates  that  a  higher  level  of  skills  matching 
could  result  in  considerable  gains  in  aggregate  productivity  (e.g.  up  to  10%  in  Italy). 
Better  skills  match  is  especially  important  to  realise  the  full  dividend  of  innovative 
technologies.153 

152 OECD, The productivity-inclusivity nexus, Paris 2016, p. 78 
153 Ibid., p.65 

75 

 
 
 
                                                 
More uniform scope of application of the Directive and clearer information on working 
conditions  and  job  requirements  will  support  mobility  both  within  the  national  labour 
markets and across the EU. Enhanced access to redress could improve the consistency in 
the  application  of  the  legal  framework.  Social  cohesion  would  be  enhanced  by  the 
reduction  in  the  degree  of  precariousness  of  vulnerable  workers,  which  would  also 
support gender equality in the labour market due to the overrepresentation of women in 
more precarious work and involuntary part-time. 

Some modest one-off transposition and ongoing implementation costs can be expected as 
legal frameworks of Member States will need to be adapted.  

Additional 8-25 million EUR annually in tax revenues and 4-24 million EUR annually in 
social  security  payments  reduction  are  expected  due  to  a  shift  of  undeclared  work  into 
formal economy. There could also be an increase of some 46-185 million EUR per year 
in tax revenues and a reduction in social security payments because on-demand workers 
will  be  able  to  seek  other  employment  due  to  the  provision  on  exclusivity  clauses. 
Receiving information about social security contributions and entitlements can strengthen 
the  awareness  of  the  worker’s  own  status  and  contribute  to  an  early  activation  of  the 
population  to  invest  in  social  protection,  so  avoiding  moral  hazard,  and  potentially 
decreasing public expenditure in a life-long perspective. 

Significant  contribution  to  fundamental  rights  can  be  expected,  notably  concerning  the 
freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work, equality between men and 
women, right to effective remedy and access to justice.  

8.2 REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency) 

The preferred option - policy package D - aims at achieving the policy objective with the 
most  effective  and  efficient  tools,  ensuring  that  intended  benefits  are  achieved  without 
unnecessary burdens, particularly for SMEs. 

Follow-up to the REFIT evaluation 

The  preferred  option  includes  proposals  resulting  from  the  REFIT  evaluation  for 
improving effectiveness and efficiency, and achieving in the mid-term simplification. 

The preferred option would first of all improve the effectiveness of the existing Directive 
by addressing the main points raised in the REFIT evaluation. It would broaden the scope 
of application, shorten the deadline for delivering written statements, update the content 
of  the  written  statements  in  line  with  labour  market  developments,  and  improve  the 
enforcement mechanisms. 

Concerning efficiency, the REFIT evaluation concluded that, in general, the compliance 
costs  are  appropriate.  The  assessment  of  administrative  burden  caused  by  the  existing 

76 

 
 
 
Directive did not reveal any significant differences related to the size of the undertaking. 
The share of SMEs stating that they would still comply with the obligations even in the 
absence  of  minimum  requirements  was  in  fact  slightly  higher  than  the  average  and  for 
micro enterprises it was only slightly lower than the average. No particular aspects of the 
obligations stood out as particularly onerous or complicated to comply with. 

Additional costs related to new obligations 

The  preferred  option  creates  new  obligations  for  business.  As  shown  in  the  impact 
analysis the administrative costs related to those new obligations are rather limited: a cost 
of  issuing  a  new  or  revised  written  statement  is  expected  to  be  18-153  EUR  for  SMEs 
and  10-45  EUR  for  larger  companies.  Companies  would  also  have  costs  related  to 
familiarisation with the new Directive: an average of 53 EUR for an SME and 39 EUR 
for a larger company. In addition, in case of the provision on the possibility to request a 
new  form  of  work,  the  employer  would  incur  some  cost  related  to  the preparation of  a 
written reply. It is assumed that it should not on average exceed the cost of preparing a 
new  written  statement,  and  could  in  many  cases  be  substantially  lower  given  the  more 
limited scope of the letter. 

Type of cost 
Familiarisation 
Providing  written  statements 
newly covered employees 
Replying 
to 
another form of employment 
Total costs 

(maximum) 

requests 

the 

One-off 
852.5 m EUR154 
114-152 m EUR155 

to 

Recurrent (per year) 
none 
11-30 m EUR156 

for 

None 

20-258 m157 

977.5 m EUR 

288 m EUR 

As shown, a majority of the costs are one-off (in the first year) and relate to the need for 
employers  to  familiarise  themselves  with  the  legislation.  Such  costs  would  be 
encountered irrespective of the content of the proposal (i.e. would not be higher for the 
preferred option in comparison to other options). 

The following measures could mitigate the costs:158 

154  This  total  amount  represents  the  average  cost  per  company  (53  EUR  for  an  SME  and  39  EUR  for  a 
larger  company)  multiplied  by  the  number  of  all  companies  in  the  EU.  It  is  likely  an  overestimation  as 
mostly companies needing to issue new written statements will need to invest in familiarising with the new 
legislation. 
155 Cost per written statement: 18-153 EUR for SMEs and 10-45 EUR for larger companies. 
156 As above 
157  Cost  the  same  as  for  issuing  a  new  written  statement.  Assuming  25%  of  employees  submit  such  a 
request every year. The range reflects the lower and upper bound of a cost for a single written statement. 
158 The assumption of 30-40% savings per written statement in case of availability of electronic templates 
is  derived  on  the  basis  of  assumptions  in  the  "Proposal  for  a  Directive  on  e-invoicing  in  public 
procurement"  (COM(2013)449),  where  according  to  available  data  e-invoicing  could  lead  to  60-80% 

77 

 
 
 
                                                 
 
REFIT Cost Savings – Preferred Option(s) 

Description 

Amount – one-off 

Amount – recurrent 

1.  Member  States  are  required 
to develop electronic templates 
of  written 
and  models 
statements.159 

2.  In micro, small, or medium 
enterprises,  Member  States 
may  provide  for  the  deadline 
to reply to requests for another 
form  of  employment  to  be 
extended  from  one  month  to 
no  more  than  three  months 
and/or  allow  for  an  oral  reply 
to a subsequent similar request 
submitted  by  the  same  worker 
if the justification for the reply 
as  regards  the  situation  of  the 
worker remains unchanged.   

3.  Member  States  are  required 
to make information related to 
the  new 
the 
directive  easily  available  to 
workers and employers. 

content  of 

30-40%  savings  per  written 
statement. 
One-off: 46-60 m EUR 

30-40%  savings  per  written 
statement. 
Recurrent: 9-12 m EUR 

- 

Some savings (at least 10%) 
of 
facilitation 
and 
compliance 
the 
with 
administrative 
requirements. 

Recurrent: 2-26 m EUR 

savings  on 

10-20% 
familiarisation costs. 
(85-170 m EUR) 

the 

- 

Total savings  

230 m EUR 

38 m EUR (at least) 

It  is  expected  that  the  savings  could  materialise  relatively  quickly.  Information  by 
Member States, expected to save some of the familiarisation costs could be provided on 
adoption of national transposition, and templates developed in the course of the first year 
of  application  of  the  national  transposition.  Exemptions  for  SMEs  could  be  applied 
immediately upon adoption of the transposition. 

Simplification 

The administrative costs, mainly short- and mid-term, could be further set off by longer-
term benefits for employers.  

savings  in  the  administrative  costs.  As  e-invoicing  is  a  much  more  comprehensive  system  than  an 
electronic  template,  the  savings  for  electronic  templates  were  assumed  to  equal  half  of  those  for  the  e-
invoicing.  
159  There  will  no  obligation  for  companies  to  use  such  templates.  However,  it  can  be  assumed  that 
companies will want to use them to simplify processes and have better assurance of compliance. 

78 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
 
The increased coherence of the scope allows streamlining certain elements of information 
provision  beyond  contractual  statuses,  both  within  the  company  and  for  future 
recruitment.  This  allows  as  well  a  more  coherent  legal  framework  across  the  EU, 
providing  legal  clarity  that  is  expected  to  ease  cross-border  business  activity  and 
mobility. 

Increasing  the  consistency  of  written  statements  across  the EU  allows  simplification  of 
worker  mobility  and  cross-border  business  action.  Also  in  this  case,  the  easy  to  access 
and  available  information  on  applicable  national  law  is  expected  to  ease  cross-border 
business activity. 

8.3 Subsidiarity and proportionality 

The  preferred  option  aims  at  setting  a  framework  for  better  clarity,  predictability, 
transparency,  simplification  and  convergence  on  EU  labour  markets  for  workers, 
employers and Member States, while preserving flexibility and labour market innovation 
and aiming to avoid the imposition of excessive burdens on employers. 

Subsidiarity 

Given  the  EU-wide  dimension  and  the  scope  of  the  problem  to  solve,  the  measures 
included in the preferred policy option need to be adopted at EU level in order to achieve 
the identified objectives. In particular, action solely by Member States would not counter 
harmful divergence - and even potentially competition on the basis of social standards - 
in  their  individual  regulatory  responses  to  increasingly  new  and  non-standard  forms  of 
work and their related enforcement provisions.  

Indeed, the preferred option offers the highest added value based on a minimal degree of 
harmonisation between Member State systems which respects their own competences to 
set  higher  standards  and  for  social  partners  to  vary  the  mix  of  material  rights  and 
obligations by agreement.  

The preferred option would, in line with the legal basis Article 153 TFEU, support and 
complement  the  activities  of  the  Member  States  through  minimum  requirements  for 
gradual implementation.  

Proportionality 

By  striking  a  balance  between  opinions  of  the  two  sides  of  industry  expressed  in  the 
formal social partner consultation responses and building on practices already developed 
in  Member  States,  the  preferred  option  represents  a  realistic  and  proportionate  set  of 
measures appropriate to contributing to a realisation of the ambitions of the Social Pillar. 

The preferred option would require realistic means to implement that would not generate 
or  impose  disproportionate  new  obligations.  Measures  for  mitigating  burden  and 
supporting  compliance  are  therefore  included  in  the  proposals.  The  costs  that  the 

79 

 
 
preferred  option  would  entail  are  reasonable  and  justified  in  light  of  the  accrued  and 
longer-term benefits in terms of more secure employment, simplified procedures for both 
workers  and  employers  and  overall  improved  living  and  working  conditions  matching 
thereby the wider EU social ambitions: 

- no direct costs are expected for workers; 

-  for  employers  (including  SMEs)  the  fixed-costs  of  familiarisation  (an  average  of  53 
EUR  for  an  SME  and  39  EUR  for  a  larger  company)  and  variable  costs  related  to  the 
number  of  employees  that  would  be  covered  by  an  extension  of  the  Directive  and  the 
number of employees using the possibility to request a new form of employment;  

-  for  Member  States:  increased  costs  of  enforcement  due  to  higher  number  of  workers 
covered; 

- at EU level, monitoring and evaluation costs of the initiative, as such minimal impact 
on the budget of the EU. 

On the whole, the option does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective 
identified for the EU intervention. 

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? 

9.1. Monitoring 

The Commission will monitor the implementation of the Directive in the Member States 
in the context of labour market developments.  

For the sake of monitoring the objectives of the initiative are translated into operational 
objectives: 

Regarding specific objective (1): 

 

 
 

Increase  the  number  of  workers  receiving  written  information  on  working 
conditions 
Improve the quality of information on working conditions received in writing 
Improve the timeliness of working conditions received in writing 

Regarding specific objective (2): 

 
 
 

Increase the predictability of work schedules 
Increase  transitions from non-standard to standard employment 
Improve the match between willingness to work and the work available (decrease 
underemployment) 

80 

 
 
 
 
  Decrease abuse of probation periods 
  Facilitate the take up of mandatory training for all workers 

Regarding specific objective (3): 

  Facilitate identifying and resolving incompliance 
 

Increase incentives for compliance 

Regarding specific objective (4): 

  Company  level  simplification:  Increase  coherence  and  facilitate  creation  of 

written statements, including for micro-enterprises and SMEs 

  Labour  market  simplification:  Increase  the  consistency  of  written  statement 

requirements across the EU labour markets 

  Facilitate workers' mobility 

The  following  monitoring  framework  would  inform  on  progress  towards  achieving  the 
objectives of the Directive and will be subject to further adjustment according to the final 
legal and implementation requirements and timeline. Considering the diversity of current 
situations  and  regulations  prevailing  on  the  national  labour  markets  indicators  and 
relevant benchmarks success will be elaborated and, where appropriate, disaggregated by 
Member State, by type of company, by type of contract or work-status, by gender.  

To avoid putting additional administrative burden on Member States or employers due to 
the  collection  of  data  or  information  for  the  purpose  of  monitoring,  the  proposed 
indicators rely as far as possible on existing data sources.  

Table 3. Indicators on progress towards objectives 

Specific 
objectives 
Improve workers' 
access 
to 
information 
concerning  their 
working 
conditions 

Operational 
objectives 
Increase  the  number 
of  workers  receiving 
information 
written 
working 
on 
conditions 

Improve  the  quality 
information  on 
of 
working 
conditions 
received in writing 

Improve 
the 
timeliness  of  working 
conditions received in 

Indicators 

Source of data 

Number  of  workers 
entitled  to  written 
statements; 
Familiarisation 
costs for business; 

Number  of  workers 
more 
getting 
comprehensive 
information  in  the 
written statements 
Number  of  written 
statements 
issued 
on  the  1st  day  of 

Transposition 
Implementation report 

checks, 

Transposition 
Implementation report 

checks, 

Transposition 
Implementation report 

checks, 

81 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
writing 

employment 

Increase 
the 
predictability  of  work 
schedules 

Improve working 
conditions for all 
workers, notably 
those in new and 
non-standard 
employment, 
while preserving 
scope for 
adaptability and 
for labour market 
innovation 

transitions 
Increase 
from  non-standard  to 
standard employment 

Improve 
the  match 
between  willingness 
to  work and  the work 
available  (decrease  of 
underemployment) 

Decrease  abuse  of 
probation periods 

Number  of  workers 
getting 
reference 
days/hours;  
Number  of  workers 
receiving  advance 
notice  before  an 
assignment; 
employers 
%  of 
setting  a  policy  for 
the  notice  period 
for  staff 
required 
asked to work 

%  transition  from 
temporary 
to 
permanent work; 
%  of  workers 
involuntary 
temporary 
employment 

in 

part-time 

%  of  the  working 
population 
age 
underemployed; 
% 
of 
workers 
underemployed;  
Number  of  workers 
freed 
from 
exclusivity clauses;  
Number  of  workers 
available  for  extra 
work  following  ban 
on  the  exclusivity 
clauses; 

Number  of  workers 
getting the right to a 
max.  duration  of  a 
probation period; 

Transposition 
checks, 
Implementation report ; 
European 
Eurofound 
Conditions 
Working 
Survey  (Q:  How  often 
have you been requested 
to  come  into  work  at 
short notice? Q:How are 
time 
your  working 
arrangements 
set;  Q: 
How  well  do  your 
working  hours  fit 
in 
your  family  and  social 
commitments; ) 
transition 
Eurostat 
between  temporary  and 
permanent 
work 
(tepsr_wc230); 
Eurostat 
involuntary 
temporary  employment 
(tesem190);  if  available 
transitions 
nationally 
between very precarious 
forms of employment to 
traditional  non-standard 
employment  (e.g.  fixed 
term). 
ECB: 
Eurostat  underemployed 
part-time 
workers 
(fsi_sup_a);  Eurofound 
EWCS  if  you  had  a 
choice, how many hours 
per  week  would  you 
prefer  to  work  (answer 
'more 
than  currently' 
ranging  5-20%  in  EU); 
involuntary 
part-time 
rate;  

Transposition 
Implementation report 

checks, 

82 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
access 

Increase 
to 
training recognised as 
being  necessary 
in 
legislation, 
EU 
legislation 
national 
relevant 
and 
collective agreements 

in 

Relevant 
statistics 

EWCS 

Number  of  workers 
reporting  that  they 
have 
received 
training  recognised 
as 
in 
necessary 
national  legislation 
and/or  relevant  in 
collective 
agreements 

The  objectives  of  the  initiative  will  be  pursued  while  preserving 
flexibility,  which  will  be  monitored  via  Eurostat  statistic  including 
increased employment rate. 

Facilitate 
and 
incompliance 

identifying 
resolving 

Improve 
compliance  with 
working 
conditions 
standards  though 
enhanced 
enforcement 

Increase 
for compliance 

incentives 

Improve 
transparency  of 
labour 
the 
while 
market 
the 
avoiding 
imposition 
of 
excessive 
burdens 
on 
undertakings  of 
all sizes  

level 

Company 
simplification: 
coherence 
Increase 
and  facilitate  creation 
of  written  statements 
including  for  micro-
and 
enterprises 
SMEs. 

market 

Labour 
simplification: 
Increase  consistency 
written 
between 
statements 
requirements 

across 

Number  of  workers 
denouncing abuses; 
Number  of  workers 
getting better access 
to redress; 
Increased efficiency 
of 
redress 
mechanisms 
Number of abuse of 
rights  in  mid-term 
term 
(in 
short 
expected 
increase 
of  number  due  to 
additional 
behaviour 
becoming 
illegal 
due  to  change  in 
legislation). 
Number  of  MSs 
developing 
for 
Templates 
written  statements; 
Number 
of  MS 
providing  clear  and 
available 
information 
legal 
applicable. 
Increased 
comparability 
between contracts; 
Perceived 
certainty 
employers; 

on 
framework 

legal 
for 

National reports, studies 

Labour 
reports, studies 

inspection 

Transposition 
studies 

checks, 

Transposition 
Studies 

checks, 

83 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EU 

the 
markets 

labour 

Facilitate 
mobility 

workers' 

Transposition 
Studies 

checks, 

Increased 
consistency 
between  contracts, 
Number 
of  MS 
providing  clear  and 
available 
information 
legal 
applicable. 

on 
framework 

Overall,  the  monitoring  in  the  context  of  the  European  Semester  provides  with 
contextual data on national labour markets / working conditions. 

Furthermore,  the  policy  background  of  the  European  Social  Pillar  and  the  Social 
scoreboard  established  to  monitor  progress  on  the  ground  will  serve  to  track  general 
employment/labour  market/working  conditions  and  societal  trends  and  performances 
across  countries.  With  further  evidence  provided  through  the  annual  review  on 
Employment and Social Developments in Europe (ESDE), the Commission will be able 
to produce reporting on improved working conditions of workers.  

Eurostat (EU LFS, EU SBS) and National labour market data could also be used to 
monitor the impact of a revised Directive. Eurofound scrutinises and discusses working 
conditions  developments  including  various  issues  related  to  the  Directive.  In  particular 
the  recurrent  European  Working  Conditions  Survey  (EWCS)  allows  comparisons  over 
time  on  working  conditions  of  the  EU  workforce  that  can  be  of  high  relevance  to 
monitoring  the  impact  of  the  Directive.  The  recently  established  European  Platform  to 
enhance cooperation in prevention and deterrence of  undeclared work (including bogus 
self-employment)  will  contribute  with  its  work  to  provide  data  based  on  information 
from  enforcement  authorities,  such  as  labour  inspectorates,  social  security,  tax  and 
immigration authorities and social partners. 

The  Commission  might  also  run  Eurobarometer  surveys  and/or  promote  independent 
studies  to  survey  specific  aspects  of  the  Directive  along  the  policy  or  contextual  needs 
and where those aspects are requesting dedicated research. 

9.2. Evaluation 

The  Commission  will  proceed  to  a  review  of  the  Directive  and  an  evaluation  of  the 
impact  of  the  revised  Directive  in  consultation  with  the  Member  States  and  social 
partners at EU level in line with a review provision in the text of the revised Directive, 

84 

 
 
 
 
 
 
ensuring  that  there  is  a  sufficiently  long  period  to  be  able  to  evaluate  the  effects 
(observed  changes)  of  the  initiative  after  it  has  been  fully  implemented  across  all 
Member States.  

The  evaluation  will  include  an  assessment  of  whether  the  operational  objectives  of  the 
revised  Directive  have  been  reached.  The  benchmark  against  which  progress  will  be 
measured is the baseline situation defined in this Impact Assessment (see Policy package 
A in sections 6 and 7). This evaluation will take into account available monitoring data. It 
may  include  a  public  consultation  and/or  specific  stakeholder  consultation  and/or  a 
survey  of  stakeholders  to  review  the  effect  of  the  revised  Directive  on  the  different 
categories of stakeholders.  

A particular focus will be cast on the evaluation criteria required by the Better Regulation 
guidelines  as well as  on the significant economic and social effects of the initiative (in 
particular  those  identified  in  this  IA)  including  contribution  to  the  broad  objectives  of 
quality of work, work-life balance, wellbeing and health of workers..  

85 

 
 
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION 

Annex 1:  

Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references 
The lead DG is DG EMPL, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
Agenda planning/Work Programme reference 2017/EMPL/001 

Organisation and timing 
-The  Impact  Assessment  was  assessed  by  the  Interservice  Steering  Group  (ISSG)  on 
26/10/2017,on 16/11/2017 and on 01/12/2017. 
It was then assessed via a fast-track Interservice Consultation meeting on 08/12/2017. 

-  The  Analytical  Document  accompanying  the  second  phase  consultation  of  social 
partners  on  which  the  Impact  Assessment  is  based,  together  with  the  second  stage 
consultation  document,  was  assessed  by  the  ISSG  on  11/07/2017  (present  DGs  SG, 
GROW,  HOME,  JUST,  SANTE,  SJ,  TAXUD)  and  adopted  following  ISC  (DGs 
consulted  AGRI,  BUDG,  COMM,  COMP,  DEVCO,  EAC,  ECFIN,  ECHO,  ESTAT, 
HOME, HR, CNECT, JUST, MARE, MOVE, REGIO, RTD, SG, SJ, TAXUD, TRADE, 
GROW, SANTE, FISMA, EPSC). 

- The first stage consultation document and SWD on the REFIT evaluation were assessed 
by  the  Interservice  Steering  Group  12/01/2017  (present  DGs  SG,  ESTAT,  GROW, 
HOME, JUST, SANTE, SJ, TAXUD) and adopted following ISC (DGs consulted AGRI, 
BUDG, COMM, COMP, DEVCO, EAC, ECFIN, ECHO, ESTAT, HOME, HR, CNECT, 
JUST,  MARE,  MOVE,  REGIO,  RTD,  SG,  SJ,  TAXUD,  TRADE,  GROW,  SANTE, 
FISMA). 

- The first stage consultation document, SWD on the REFIT evaluation together with the 
terms of reference of the impact assessment study were discussed on ISSG on 6/12/2016 
(present  DGs  SG,  BUDG,  ECFIN,  ESTAT,  GROW,  HOME,  JUST,  SANTE,  SJ, 
TAXUD and Cabinet of President) . 

Consultation of the RSB 

The Impact Assessment report was reviewed by the RSB and discussed with the author 
DG in a meeting on 29 November 2017. On 1 December 2017 the RSB issued a positive 
opinion with reservations.  

The  revisions  introduced  in  response  to  the  RSB  opinion  are  summarised  in  the  table 
below: 

RSB main reservations  

Alignment between the IA and the 
latest version of the proposal 

Changes done in the IA 
The revised report has been updated throghout 
to  reflect  the  adaptations  discussed  at  the 
meeting  with  the  RSB:  regarding  the  criteria 
for  establishing  who  is  a  worker  (include  all 
elements of the CJEU definition); the right to 

86 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) The categories of workers that fall 
under the scope of the initiative are 
unclear, in particular as regards bogus 
self-employed or workers under zero-
hours contracts. 

(2) The report is not specific enough 
with regard to the rationale and 
expected benefits of the measures in 
terms of upward convergence towards 
better working conditions. 

legislation,  national 

training  (right  limited  to  training  required  in 
legislation  and 
EU 
relevant collective agreements); the measures 
the 
to  alleviate  burdens  with  regard 
possibility 
form  of 
employment. 
As  discussed  in  the  section  2  on  problem 
definition  the  initiative  refers  to  all  workers, 
including  those  in  new  and  non-standard 
forms of employment. 

request  another 

to 

to 

through 

removal  of 

A  more  thorough  presentation  of  measure  1 
(scope) in section 5.3. clarifies that extension 
of  the  scope  of  the  directive  would  be 
achieved 
existing 
derogations  and  application  of  the  CJEU 
criteria for establishing worker status. It states 
that such criteria would facilitate inclusion of 
bogus self-employed. It also explains that the 
proposed  derogation  of  8h/week  would  not 
apply to an employment relationship where no 
guaranteed 
is 
predetermined  before  the  employment  starts 
in  order  not  to  exclude  effective  coverage  of 
zero-hours workers. 

amount  of  paid  work 

it 

(section  6.1) 

In  the  presentation  of  considered  policy 
is  explicitly 
packages 
explained  that  policy  package  C  is  not  fully 
coherent  with  the  problem  definition  and 
objective  of  the  proposal  in  order  to  analyse 
what the impact of the new rights would be if 
the 
remained 
unchanged. 
Presentation  of  the  measures  (section  5.3) 
explains the rationale for the choice of options 
and explains that the goal of the initiative is to 
achieve an upward convergence. 

the  Directive 

scope  of 

The  baseline  (5.1)  also  refers  to  risks  related 
to social dumping and competition on reduced 
social standards.  

Under  point  8.1  c)  examples  of  diverse 
situations  across  MS  with  regard  to  non-
standard  work  provide  some  illustration  of 
risks in terms of social dumping. 

87 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) The report does not properly 
substantiate its selection or discarding 
of different options as well as their 
content. 

(4) The report does not sufficiently 
discuss risks and possible unintended 
consequences of the measures. 

In section 5.2. the report explains why another 
type  of  legislation  was  not  chosen  (targeting 
specific  categories  of  workers)  and  why  the 
Written Statement Directive is the appropriate 
tool  to  introduce  basic  rights  of  general 
application  and  ensure  the  future-proofing  of 
measures. 

Section  3.2.  presents  in  more  details  the 
positions  of  social  partners  in  the  two-stage 
consultation. 

(non-legislative 

thoroughly 
Section  5.2.  presents  more 
discarded 
and 
options 
legislative),  providing  further  explanation  on 
why  e.g.  some  measures  put  forward  by  the 
social  partners,  the  European  Parliament  and 
REFIT  were not taken forward. 

Policy  package  E  (repeal)  has  been  removed 
from the comparison of options and discarded 
upfront as suggested by the RSB. 

the  extent 

As  requested  by  the  RSB,  the  report  is  more 
explicit  on 
that  collective 
agreements  were  taken  into  account  in  the 
analysis  (see  section  5.3  of  the  main  report 
and section 7 of Annex 8). 
Section  8.1  includes  an  analysis  of  potential 
unintended  effects  (such  as  limitations  on 
flexibility, 
job 
of 
opportunities  for  vulnerable  workers,  risk  of 
increased recourse to undeclared work, risk of 
disproportionate  costs  of  unintended  non-
compliance).  It  presents  relevant  mitigating 
measures. 

decreased 

risks 

The  SME  test  (Annex  3,  point  3)  has  been 
expanded to develop on the incidence of non-
standard work in SMEs and related impacts.  

Section  8.2  (REFIT)  presents  measures  to 
decrease  administrative  burdens  for  SMEs 
and quantifies resulting savings. 

Evidence, sources and quality and external expertise 

88 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following expert advice has fed into the Impact Assessment: 
-  From  the  REFIT  Evaluation  of  the  ‘Written  Statement  Directive’  (Directive 
91/533/EEC) (SWD(2017) 205 final). 
- From the Report of the public consultation Accompanying the document Establishing a 
European Pillar of Social Rights (SWD(2017)206). 
- From the commissioned study "Study to support Impact Assessment on the Review of 
the Written Statement Directive" by CSES and PPMI. 
The  study  indicates  clearly  when  absence  of  comparable  data  at  European  level  could 
impact on robustness of calculations. 
-  From  the European  Centre  of  Expertise (ECE)  and  European  Labour  Law  Network  – 
(ELLN). 
- From literature review as referred to in footnotes. 

89 

 
 
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION  

Several strands of stakeholder consultation have been performed to inform this initiative. 

This includes the two Treaty-based Social Partners Consultations, the consultation for the 
REFIT evaluation of the Written Statement Directive, and the Public Consultation on the 
European  Pillar  of  Social  Rights.  The  two  latter  have  already  been  presented  as  Staff 
Working Documents. 

1.  Results of the first phase Social Partners consultation 

The first phase of social partner consultation closed on 23rd June 2017. 

Workers' organisations  

Six  trade  unions  replied  to  the  first  phase  consultation:  the  European  Trade  Union 
Confederation  (ETUC),  Eurocadres,  the  European  Confederation  of  Executives  and 
Managerial  Staff  (CEC),  the  European  Confederation  of  Independent  Trade  Unions 
(CESI), the European Arts and Entertainment Alliance (EAEA), the European Federation 
of Journalists (EFJ). It should be noted that ETUC's reply also took into account the view of 
10 ETUC sectorial trade union organisations.  

The  workers'  organisations  agreed,  broadly,  with  the  challenges  described  in  the 
consultation  document,  the  need  to  improve  the  effectiveness  of  the  written  statement 
Directive  and  to  broaden  its  objectives  in  order  to  improve  the  working  conditions  of 
vulnerable workers.  They welcomed, in  particular,  the initiative of a  minimum floor  of 
rights160 for workers and acknowledge the need for further action at EU level in line with 
the European Pillar of Social Rights. 

Possible improvements to the EU legal framework 

The  workers'  organisations  were  generally  in  favour  of  the  insertion  of  a  definition  of 
worker  based  on  the  CJEU  case  law.  However,  ETUC  argued  additionally  for  the 
inclusion  of  self-employed  in  the  scope  of  application.  Trade  unions  stated  the  need  to 
cover,  in  particular,  casual  workers,161  and  those  in  new  and  atypical  forms  of 

160  The  first  phase  consultation  document  used  the  terms  'floor  of  rights'  since  these  new  rights  will 
complement the existing floor of rights (as regards working conditions and protection of health and safety 
at work) already established at EU level. 
161  'Casual  work'  is  not  formally  defined  at  EU  level.  Eurofound  defines  'casual  work'  as  'a  type  of  work 
where the employment is not stable and continuous, and the employer is not obliged to regularly provide the 
worker  with work,  but  has  the  flexibility  of  calling  them  in  on  demand'.  Casual  work covers  on-call  / on-
demand (such as zero-hours contracts) and intermittent work. 

90 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
employment.  They  favoured  removing 
relationships and short working hours.  

the  exemptions  for  short  employment 

With regard to the extension of the information package, trade unions were in agreement 
with the list suggested in the consultation document. However, ETUC advocated broader 
and  more  detailed  information  requirements  regarding  working  time  arrangements  (rest 
periods,  length  of  break),  elements  of  remuneration  (bonus,  overtime,  sick  pay),  the 
identity  of  sub-contractors,  an  obligation  to  hand  out  and  ensure  access  to  relevant 
documents, information for temporary agency workers on the duration of assignment and 
name of user undertaking, information on worker representatives and on equal pay rights, 
information  on  (equal)  pay  and  social  contributions  for  workers  working  abroad, 
information  to  posted  workers  about  their  rights,  information  on  conditions  of 
accommodation,  as  well  as  a  series  of  specific  elements  for  interns,  trainees  and 
apprentices. 

Trade unions unanimously agreed with the proposal to reduce the 2 months deadline for 
the employer to provide the written statement and stated that this should be prior to the 
start of the employment relationship or immediately on signing the contract.  

The need to improve access to sanctions and means of redress and their effectiveness was 
acknowledged, including by calling for the introduction of a presumption of employment 
in case the employer fails to provide a written statement. 

Workers'  organisations  were  strongly  in  favour  of  a  floor  of  rights  for  workers.  In 
addition  to  the  proposals  in  the  consultation  document,  ETUC  advocated  a  minimum 
notice period (3 months), a right to decent working hours, a right to at least the minimum 
wage,  and  finally  a  right  to  social  protection  in  conjunction  with  the  access  to  social 
protection  initiative  of  the  Commission.  ETUC  also  argued  for  inclusion  of  collective 
rights in the floor of rights: the right to join and be represented by a trade union, the right 
to freedom of association and finally the right to collective bargaining.  

Willingness to enter into negotiations 
The  workers'  organisations  expressed  their  willingness  to  enter  into  negotiations  with 
employer  organisations;  however,  they  urged  the  Commission  to  come  up  with  a 
legislative  proposal  that  would  improve  the  situation  of  workers  in  case  negotiations 
were not launched or if they failed. 

Since  the  issue  of  the  qualification  of  on-call  time  as  working  time  is  a  separate  issue  dealt  with  in  the 
context of the Directive 2003/88/EC on working time, for ease of understanding this document will mainly 
use 'on-demand work' instead of 'on-call work'. Eurofound meaning does apply. Indeed, in the framework 
of  working  time,  on-call  time  refers  to  any  period  where  the  worker  is  not  required  to  carry  out  normal 
work with the usual continuity, but has to be ready to work if called upon to do so. 

91 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Employers' organisations  

Thirteen    employers'  organisations  replied  to  the  first  phase  consultation:  Business 
Europe,  the  European  association  of  craft  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises 
(UEAPME),  the  Council  of  European  Employers  of  the  Metal,  Engineering  and 
Technology  Based  Industry  (CEEMET),  the  Association  of  Hotels,  Restaurants  and 
Cafés  in  Europe  (HOTREC),  Eurocommerce,  the  Confederation  of  European  Security 
Service  (COESS),  the  European  Chemical  Employers  Group  (ECEG),    the  Council  of 
European  Municipalities  and  Regions  (CEMR),  the  World  Employment  Confederation, 
the  European  Farmers  Association  (GEOPA-COPA),  the  European  Community  Ship-
Owners  Associations  (ESCA),  the  European  Coordination  of  Independent  Producers 
(CEPI),  the  European  Centre  of  Employers  and  Entrerprises  providing  Public  Services 
and Services of general interest (CEEP).   

A large majority of employers' organisations stated their opposition to the revision of the 
Directive, and all of them rejected the idea of creating a minimum floor of rights for all 
workers. 

Possible improvements to the EU legal framework 

A  large  majority  were  opposed  to  the  extension  of  the  scope  of  application  of  the 
Directive  and  the  insertion  of  a  definition  of  worker.    They  argued  that  this  definition 
would  be  too  broad  and  would  hamper  flexibility  for  business  and  would  depress  job 
creation.  They  raised  concerns  about  subsidiarity  and  the  impact  on  Member  States' 
national  legal  arrangements.  However,  COESS  was  favour  of  introducing  an  EU 
definition  of  worker,  to  cover  all  forms  of  employment  and  to  simplify  the  exclusion 
provisions. For COESS, this would help in reducing unfair competition. 

All  employers'  organisations  expressing  a  view,  with  the  exception  of  COESS  and 
HOTREC,  did  not  support  amending  the  information  package.  COESS  supported  the 
possible extension outlined in the consultation document. HOTREC supported including 
information about probation and about the applicable social security system.  

Regarding  the  reduction  of  the  2  months'  deadline  for  providing  the  written  statement, 
most employer organisations were not in favour of any change. HOTREC stated that it 
could  be  reduced  to  1  month  but  exemptions  should  remain  so  as  to  avoid  creating 
additional administrative burden. 

No employers' organisation supported changes at EU level to the system of redress and 
sanctions.  Some  indicated  that  this  should  be  left  to  Member  States.  For  the  World 
Employment  Confederation,  better  implementation  and  enforcement  of  the  existing 

92 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Directive would be more effective than a revision. HOTREC indicated that some of its 
members could accept favourable presumptions of employee status.  

All  organisations  were  opposed  to  the  floor  of  rights  of  EU  workers,  arguing  that  this 
would  infringe  proportionality  and  subsidiarity  principles.  They  also  highlighted  the 
importance  of  respecting  the  autonomy  of  the  social  partners  and  stated  that  the  issues 
raised  in  the  consultation  should  be  tackled  either  at  national  level  or  in  collective 
agreements. 

Willingness to enter into negotiations 

In their responses to the first phase consultation, Business Europe, UEAPME, and CEEP 
expressed  their  willingness  to  engage  in  exploratory  talks  with  the  ETUC  in  order  to 
assess the feasibility and appropriateness of initiating a dialogue under Article 155 TFEU 
on the Written Statement Directive (challenge 1 of the consultation document). The other 
organisations were not in favour of opening discussions at EU level.  

Subsequent to the first phase consultation, ETUC, CEEP and Business Europe confirmed 
that they were not in a position to initiate formally the joint negotiation process provided 
for  in  Article  155  TFEU,  while  reserving  the  possibility  to  do  so  in  the  context  of  the 
second phase consultation.  

2.  Results of the Second phase Social Partners consultation 

The  second  phase  consultation  of  Social  Partners  started  on  21  September  2017  and 
closed  on  3  November  2017.  The  views  of  workers'  organisations  and  employer's 
organisations are summarised here below.  

Workers' organisations  

Ten  trade  unions  replied  to  the  second  phase  consultation:  the  European  Trade  Union 
Confederation  (ETUC)162,  Eurocadres,  the  European  Confederation  of  Executives  and 
Managerial  Staff  (CEC),  the  European  Confederation  of  Independent  Trade  Unions 
(CESI), the European services workers (UNI Europa), the European Cockpit Association 
(ECA), the European Arts and Entertainment Alliance (EAEA), the European Federation 
of  Journalists  (EFJ),  the  European  Federation  of  Food,  Agriculture  and  Tourism  Trade 
Unions (EFFAT) and the World Footballers' Association (FIFPro). 

In  addition,  two  sectoral  trade  unions  provided  a  joint  reply  with  a  corresponding 
employers'  organisation:  the  European  Transport  Workers'  Federation  (ETF)  with  the 
European Community Shipowners' Associations (ECSA) and the European Federation of 

162  It  should  be  noted  that  ETUC's  reply  also  took  into  account  the  view  of  its  10  sectoral  trade  union 
federations.  

93 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Food,  Agriculture  and  Tourism  Trade  Unions  (EFFAT)  with  the  Employers’  Group  of 
Professional Agricultural Organisations in the European Union (GEOPA-COPA).  

Views on personal scope of the Directive 

All  workers'  organisations  support  clarifying  and  broadening  the  personal  scope  of  the 
Directive by introducing criteria on the basis of which Member States would determine 
worker status, for the purpose of the Directive, under national competence. Some (CEC, 
ECA,  FIFPro)  endorse  the  proposal  to  base  criteria  on  CJEU  jurisprudence.  Several 
(ETUC,  EAEA,  EFJ,  UNI  Europa)  argue  that  the  scope  of  the  Directive  should  be 
extended  to  cover  "self-employed  workers"  (i.e.  the  economically-dependent  self-
employed)  and  "autonomous  workers",  and  also  include  trainees  and  apprentices,  and 
propose  additional  criteria  to  achieve  this.  Several  worker  organisations  emphasise  the 
need to use the Directive to combat bogus self-employment and to introduce a refutable 
presumption  of  employment  (ETUC,  ECA,  EAEA,  Uni  Europa,  and  FIFPro).  EFFAT 
calls for vulnerable cross-border seasonal workers in the agriculture sector as well as the 
food processing and tourism industries to be explicitly covered.  

ETUC  additionally  argues  for  clarifications  on  the  concept  of  employer,  including 
confirmation that on-line platforms may be employers for the purpose of this Directive, 
also where they act as intermediaries.  

ETUC,  endorsed  by  Eurocadres,  EFFAT,  FEJ,  UNI  Europa  and  FIFPro,  support  the 
removal  of  the  exclusions  contained  in  Article  1.2  of  the  current  Directive,  but  do  not 
support their replacement by an alternative threshold of economic activity below which 
the  obligation  to  provide  a  written  statement  would  not  apply.  By  contrast,  CESI  and 
ECA advocate stricter limitations on exclusions but not their complete removal.  

Modifications to information package and timing 

ETUC,  endorsed  by  EAEA,  FEJ  and  UNI  Europa,  support  the  modification  of  the 
information package proposed in the consultation document, and request in addition the 
inclusion of information concerning: the components of a working day or week such as 
breaks and rest; the components making up remuneration; the identity of contractors in 
case  of  subcontracting;  an  obligation  to  present  the  written  statement  in  a  permanent 
form,  also  when  in  electronic  format;  harassment  protocols;  information  about  the 
assignment and the identify user undertaking for temporary agency workers; information 
on equal pay for equal work and on posted workers' rights; and additional information for 
workers working abroad or coming from third countries. Additionally ETUC, supported 
by  EAEA  and  EFJ,  advocates  a  "catch-all"  clause  requiring  the  provision  of  essential 
information  relevant to  the nature of the work, to address the specific situations of e.g. 
domestic or voucher workers.  

ECSA  and  ETF  jointly  draw  attention  to  the  more  extensive  set  of  written  information 
required  for  seafarers  under  Directive  2009/13/EC,  and  request  that a  revised  Directive 
should be without prejudice to those rules.  

94 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All workers' organisations expressing a view supported provision of the written statement 
before the employment begins (Eurocadres) or at the start of the employment relationship 
(ETUC, EAEA, EFFAT, EFJ, and UNI Europa). 

Insertion of new minimum rights  

CEC and ECA support the proposals in the consultation document.  

ETUC, endorsed by EAEA, EFFAT, FEJ and UNI Europa and in part by CESI, support 
in principle all the new material rights set out in the consultation document, and propose 
amendments  to  reinforce  them.  These  include:  a  complete  ban  on  exclusivity  or 
incompatibility clauses, except in very limited circumstances; a restriction on the reasons 
for  which  employers  may  refuse  a  request  to  transfer  to  a  different  form  of  work 
(additionally from EAEA: no limitation on a worker's seniority before such a request can 
be made) and the right for the worker to be accompanied by a trade union representative 
in these discussions, , and additional provisions to sanction the unreasonable failure of an 
employer  to  comply  with  a  worker's  request  to  transfer  to  a  different  form  of  work; 
clarification that probation periods cannot be used to facilitate dismissal and should not 
be introduced where they do not currently exist.  

In  addition,  ETUC  supported  by  EAEA,  Eurocadres,  FEJ,  and  in  part  UNI  Europa  and 
ECA, advocate additional material rights and provisions, principally a ban on zero-hour 
contracts  and  an  obligation  on  employers  to  provide  a  minimum  number  of  guaranteed 
hours;  a  prohibition  on  split  shifts  covering  more  than  a  working  day  and  the  right  to 
decline shifts that are not in accordance with the written statement; a right to disconnect; 
a right to fair remuneration; a right to collective bargaining for self-employed workers; 
right to a reasonable notice period and to prevention of unjustified dismissal; and a new 
general right to fair terms and conditions of employment. ECA additionally proposes that 
any  hours  where  the  worker  is  at  the  disposal  of  the  employer  must  be  paid;  and  that 
there should be a right to essential training free of charge during paid working time; and 
minimum advance notice for any changes to work schedules.  

Enforcement  

Several  worker  organisations  argue  for  reinforced  anti-avoidance  measures  to  be  built 
into the material rights introduced by the revised Directive, such as making it an offence 
to knowingly understate the amount of guaranteed hours or an obligation to pay workers 
at  a  higher  rate  for  hours  worked  beyond  that  amount,  or  to  remunerate  last  minute 
cancelled shifts or work periods.  

ETUC, supported by UNI Europa, advocates increasing financial sanctions so that they 
become  dissuasive  and  not  capping  compensation;  introducing  personal  liability  for 
directors and a duty for due diligence; injunctions to enforce the provision of a written 
statement or the correction of an existing one; collective redress including the right for a 
worker to be represented by a union in seeking redress; establishing the principle of joint 
and several liability where more than one entity performs the function of employer. 

95 

 
 
 
 
FIFPro  supports  the  introduction  of  injunctions  to  require  employers  to  provide  the 
missing  information  and  favourable  presumptions  of  an  employment  relationship, 
proportionate  to  the  missing  elements.  As  regards  presumptions,  most  organisations 
highlight the 'refutable presumption of employment' mentioned above as a key principle 
for better enforcement.  

Others 

Some  worker  organisations  (ETUC,  Eurocadres)  emphasise  that  the  provisions  of  the 
Directive could be implemented by law or by collective agreements.  

ETUC  requests  a  clarification  that  no  provision  of  the  Directive  can  be  used  to 
undermine  collective  agreements,  which  should  take  precedence.  They  advocate 
introducing a provision for derogations from the obligations in the Directive by means of 
collective agreements, similar to that existing under Article 18 of Directive 2003/88/EC 
on working time.  

ETUC  and  UNI  Europa  advocate  inclusion  of  a  non-regression  clause in  the  Directive, 
specifying that its implementation cannot constitute any ground for reducing any element 
of worker protection. 

Willingness to enter into negotiations 

CEC state their willingness to enter into dialogue with the other social partners with the 
aim of signing an agreement.  

ETUC  states  that,  while  committed  to  social  dialogue,  it  does  not  believe  that  the 
conditions  exist,  in  terms  of  timing  and  scope,  to  launch  negotiations  with  EU  level 
employers'  organisations  about  a  revision  of  the  Directive.  It  states  that  the  employer 
organisations' proposal to negotiate is too limited in scope and too late to lead to a timely 
revision  of  the  Directive.  It  calls  on  the  Commission  to  act  expeditiously  to  propose  a 
revision  of  the  Directive.  EAEA,  Eurocadres,  UNI  Europa  support  this  position.  CESI 
calls on the legislator to act where possible if and when social dialogue reaches its limits.  

ECA,  a  non-affiliated  sectoral  worker  organisation,  asks  to  contribute  to  discussions, 
should a negotiation be launched.  

Employers' organisations  

Nine employers' organisations replied to the second phase consultation: Business Europe, 
European  association  of  craft  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (UEAPME),  the 
European Centre of Employers and Enterprises providing Public Services and Services of 
general interest (CEEP), the Council of European Employers of the Metal, Engineering 
and Technology Based Industry (CEEMET), the Association of Hotels, Restaurants and 
Cafés  in  Europe  (HOTREC),  Eurocommerce,  the  Confederation  of  European  Security 
Service  (COESS),  the  European  Chemical  Employers  Group  (ECEG),    the  World 
Employment Confederation - Europe (WEC-Europe). 

In  addition,  two  sectoral  employers'  organisations  provided  a  joint  reply  with  a 
the  European  Community  Shipowners' 
corresponding  employees'  organisation: 

96 

 
 
Associations  (ECSA)  with  the  European  Transport  Workers'  Federation  (ETF)  and  the 
Employers’  Group  of  Professional  Agricultural  Organisations  in  the  European  Union 
(GEOPA-COPA) with the European Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism Trade 
Unions (EFFAT). 

Views on personal scope of the Directive 

All organisations expressing a view were opposed to clarifying the personal scope of the 
Directive by introducing criteria on the basis of which Member States would determine 
worker  status.  HOTREC  emphasised  the  importance  of  flexible  and  short-term 
employment  relationships  in  the  hospitality  sector,  and  considered  that  determining 
criteria  at  EU  level  could  create  legal  uncertainty  if  it  conflicted  with  legislation  or 
collective  agreements  within  Member  States.  They  proposed  an  alternative  wording 
explicitly  excluding  self-employed  and  referring  to  the  existence  of  an  employment 
contract. CEEMET regarded the proposed criteria as too rigid, and potentially interfering 
with Member States' discretion in other fields such as social security and taxation.  

Most employer organisations were opposed to extending the coverage of the Directive by 
eliminating the existing exclusions in Article 1.2. HOTREC proposed that they should be 
augmented by reference to "special national legislation already in place".  

Modifications to information package and timing 

WEC-Europe strongly supported the proposed extension of the information package. All 
other employer organisations expressing a view either opposed the modifications to the 
information  package  set  out  in  the  consultation  document  in  totality,  or  selectively 
(CoESS).  In  the  latter  case,  it  is  not  clear  whether  those  additional  elements  not 
mentioned in the response are supported. Concern was expressed that such an extension 
could  add  burdens  to  employers,  especially  SMEs  and  micro-enterprises,  and  that  the 
issues  (e.g.  overtime,  determination  of  working  schedule)  were  often  covered  by 
collective agreements and so did not need to be reproduced in a written statement.  

ECSA  and  ETF  jointly  draw  attention  to  the  more  extensive  set  of  written  information 
required  for  seafarers  under  Directive  2009/13/EC,  and  request  that a  revised  Directive 
should be without prejudice to those rules.  

HOTREC considered that the deadline for issuing a written statement could be reduced 
from two months to one month.  

Insertion of new minimum rights  

With  very  limited  exceptions,  all  employer  organisations  expressing  a  view  were 
opposed to the inclusion of new material rights in a revised Directive. They argued that 
such issues were a matter of national competence and that it was not necessary, or even 
contrary  to  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  for  the  EU  to  act  in  these  fields.  CEEMET, 
HOTREC  and  WEC-Europe  were  concerned  that  the  rights  designed  to  limit 
precariousness  (e.g.  the  right  to  advance  notice,  reference  hours/days,  guaranteed 

97 

 
 
 
 
 
minimum  hours  after  a  certain  period)  could  go  beyond  minimum  standards  and  could 
restrict  flexibility  and  hamper  competitiveness.  HOTREC  and  CEEMET  expressed 
opposition to the right to request a new form of employment; WEC-Europe considered 
the matter sufficiently covered in Directive 2008/104/EC on temporary agency work, as 
concerns  their  sector.  HOTREC  states  that  the  employer  should  be  able  to  choose  the 
maximum duration of the probation period, but seems to be open to a restriction on the 
duration of probation periods, where these exist.  

Enforcement  

While WEC-Europe supported reinforcing enforcement of the existing EU social acquis, 
including  combating  bogus  self-employment  and  creating  a  stronger  role  for  Social 
Partners,  the  other  employer  organisations  expressing  a  view  were  opposed  to  any 
changes to the existing provisions on sanctions or enforcement. HOTREC argued that the 
provision  in  Article  8(2)  of  the  current  Directive  that  employers  should  have  up  to  15 
days to remedy a failure of notification to an employee, should be better transposed and 
utilised. 

Others 

/ 

Willingness to enter into negotiations 

The three cross-sectoral employer organisations, BusinessEurope, CEEP and UEAPME, 
expressed  readiness  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  the  employee  representatives. 
BusinessEurope and UEAPME noted that such negotiations should take into account the 
needs  of  differently  sized  enterprises,  especially  SMEs  and  micro-enterprises,  and  that 
they should respect the nature of the Written Statement Directive. The sectoral employer 
organisations  generally 
the  cross-sectoral 
organisations in any negotiation. 

their  readiness 

to  support 

indicated 

3.  Results of the public consultation on the European Pillar of Social Rights 

The results of the public consultation on the European Pillar of Social Rights have been 
published as SWD (2017)206. 

4.  Results  of  the  public  consultation  for  the  REFIT  evaluation  of  the  Written 

Statement Directive 

The outcomes were published in SWD (2017) 205 final, REFIT evaluation of the Written 
Statement Directive. 

98 

 
 
 
ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? 

1.  Practical implications of the initiative 

The initiative will apply to all employers, but the scale of action required to comply with 
it  is  estimated  to  be  limited  in  the  majority  of  cases.  While  employers  affected  are  not 
more likely to be SMEs than large enterprises, the following indications focus on SMEs, 
in line with Treaty obligations to avoid overburdening them. 

Key obligations for enterprises: 

Enterprises will have to ensure the following actions: 

- review the written statements they provide to their new workers, including any coming 
newly within scope of the proposed Directive, and to existing workers on request, with 
particular attention to (i) the provision of information to the workers previously outside 
the scope (ii) the provision of the additional information (iii) the changed timeline with 
the information to be provided at the latest on the day of beginning of the employment 
relationship; 

- if they use this type of work, review their schedule of on-demand work for fulfilling the 
predictability requirements included in the new initiative; 

- ensure that no exclusivity clauses are used; in case they are, modify the organisation of 
the business to eliminate them; 

-    review  whether  any  incompatibility  clauses  are  used,  and  if  so  whether  they  are 
justified  by  legitimate  reasons;  if  not,  modify  the  organisation  of  the  business  to 
eliminate them; 

- review any use of probation periods to ensure they are not excessively long;  

-  review  the  training  offered  to  workers  and  ensure  that  training  required  in  EU 
legislation, national legislation or relevant collective agreements is provided to workers 
free of charge. 

It is assumed that the deadline for the indicated actions is 2 years after adoption and entry 
into force.  

All employers will incur costs: fixed-costs of familiarisation and variable costs related to 
the  number  of  employees  that  would  be  covered  by  an  extension  of  the  Directive  to 
include minimum material rights. The one-off cost of familiarisation paid in the first year 
is expected to be, for SMEs, some 53 EUR. The cost per casual worker being in the range 
18-153 EUR, the actual cost will depend on the business model and use of atypical work 
rather  than  size  of  company.  Companies  that  rely  to  a  larger  extent  on  non-standard 
forms of work will have higher costs. 

There is evidence that the burden of a reduced timescale for providing written statements 
would not be any greater for SMEs than for large enterprises. 

99 

 
 
The provision of templates will mitigate some of the additional costs. 

Concerning  training,  there  is  evidence  that  fewer  SMEs  offer  on-the-job  training 
compared to large companies, largely due to their more limited capacity to do so. 

Key obligations for public administration: 

Public administrations will have to ensure the following actions: 

- review their  legal framework to,  if needed, ensure that the personal scope of the new 
directive is ensured; 

-  review  their  legal  framework  to,  if  needed,  introduce  the  additional  information 
elements relating to the provision of a written statement; 

-  specifically,  produce  templates,  if  not  yet  available,  for  the  use  of  employers,  and 
ensure  ease  of  access  to  information  on  the  relevant  legislation  and  other  provisions 
relevant for the items to be included in the information list (in particular for employers 
that come newly within scope of the Directive and have limited access to information on 
their duties, such as employers of domestic workers,); 

- review their legal framework to, if needed, integrate the new material rights; 

- review the legal framework to, if needed, integrate the enforcement requirements; 

- if needed, enhance support to labour inspectorates or other bodies that could receive an 
increased  request  due  to  breaches  of  additional  material  rights  and  additional 
enforcement provisions; 

It is assumed that the deadline for the indicated actions is by 2 years after adoption and 
entry  into  force  (while  ensuring  reasonable  and  adequate  dissemination  of  information 
and templates to employers and workers suitably in advance of this deadline).  

2.  Summary of costs and benefits 

I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option 
Description 

Amount 

Comments 

Higher  number  of  workers  entitled 
to written statements 

getting 

Workers 
more 
comprehensive  information  in  the 
written statements 

Direct benefits 

Some 2-3 million more workers 
have  a 
to  a  written 
statement 

right 

5-31 million workers per year 

100 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Written statements issued on the 1st 
day of employment 

Workers  getting  reference  hours 
and receiving advance notice before 
an assignment 

8-16 million workers per year 

4-6 million workers 

Workers  freed  from  exclusivity 
clauses 

6-7 million casual and voucher-
based workers 

29%  of  part-timers  in 
2015 
were 
involuntary 
(source 
EU-LFS).  It  can  be 
assumed  that  most  of 
the  involuntary  part-
timers  work  less  that 
they  would  want  to 
because of lack of job 
opportunities 
rather 
exclusivity 
than 
clauses, 
but 
clauses 
exclusivity 
contributory 
a 
are 
factor  for involuntary 
part-time.   

Workers  getting  the  possibility  to 
of 
request 
employment 

another 

form 

52 million (some 25% expected 
to use the right in practice) 

Workers getting the right to a max. 
duration of a probation period 

3-6 million workers per year 

Workers  getting 
mandatory 
deduction from salary 

the 
training 

right 

to 
without 

Negligible 

Workers  getting  better  access  to 
redress 

All  workers  whose  rights  are 
not respected 

Increased 
employers 

legal 

certainty 

for 

16% of employers 

tax 

Additional 
from 
workers enabled to get a second job 
with another employer 

revenues 

Indirect benefits 

46-185m EUR p.a. 

Additional  tax  revenues  from  a  1-
3%  shift  of  undeclared  work  into 
the formal economy 

8m-25m EUR p.a. 

Reduction 
payments, 

in 
due 

social 
to 

security 
undeclared 

4m-24m EUR p.a. 

Assuming 
that 
reductions  equate  to 

101 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
workers 
economy 

entering 

the 

formal 

10-20%  of  the  value 
of  undeclared  work 
brought 
the 
formal economy. 

into 

in 

social 

security 
Reduction 
payments  from  workers  enabled  to 
get  a  second  job  with  another 
employer 

Unquantified  but  related  to  the 
expected  additional  33m-133m 
extra hours workers per year by 
workers  freed  from  exclusivity 
clauses 

Increased  productivity,  retention, 
loyalty etc. 

16-20% of employers 

Reduced unfair competition 

Improved  availability  of  workforce 
for secondary employers 

Benefits  for  some  80-84%  of 
employers  who  already  provide 
written 
all 
statements 
workers 

to 

workers 
91,000-363,000 
available 
extra  work 
for 
following ban on the exclusivity 
clauses 

Additional  revenues  for  secondary 
employers as result of the above 

42-167m EUR 

Improved  detection  of  undeclared 
work 

unquantified 

Improved  health  and  work-life 
balance of workers 

unquantified 

Workers  enabled  to  get  a  second 
job with another employer 

355-1,424m  EUR  p.a.  increase 
in  gross  annual  earnings  for  those 
workers  

Undeclared  work  brought  into  the 
formal economy 

40m-120m EUR p.a. 

II. Overview of costs – Preferred option 

Workers  

Businesses 

Administration
s 

One-off  Recurre

One-off 

nt 

Recurrent  One-
off 

Recurr
ent 

102 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 
Extended 
scope   

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

None 

None 

852.5m EUR163 + 
114-152m EUR164 

None 167  None 168  None 

11-30m 
EUR165 
Limited169 

None 

Limite
d166 

None  None 

2. 
Extended 
informati
on 
package     

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

None 

None 

Included in 1. 

None  

None   None 

in 

Included 
1. 
Negligible171   None  None 

Limite
d170 

None 

3. 
Shortene
d 
deadline   

4.1. 
Rights  to 
predictab
ility173   

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

None 

None 

Included in 1.  

Limited172 

None 

Limite
d 

None  

None   None. 

None. 

None  None 

None 

None 

Included in 1. 

Modest174 

None  

None   Depending 
employers 
choices175 

on 

Depending 
on employers 
choices 

None 

Limite
d 

None  None 

4.2. 

Direct 

None 

None 

Included in 1.  

7-27m EUR  Limite None 

163 Familiarisation (including e.g. adaptation of written statements to new information package). This total 
amount represents the average cost per company (53 EUR for an SME and 39 EUR for a larger company) 
multiplied by the number of all companies in the EU. It is likely an overestimation as mostly companies 
needing to issue new written statements will need to invest in familiarising with the new legislation. 
164 Cost per written statement: 18-153 EUR for SMEs and 10-45 EUR for larger companies. 
165 As above. 
166 Some costs related to transposition of the Directive – for all actions but not cumulative. 
167 Very limited possibility for some workers to become unemployed. 
168  Social  security  and/or  pension  contributions  for  some  workers  who  were  undeclared  or  bogus  self-
employed. 
169 Costs could be related to the need to replace workers covered by the directive with others, not covered 
(or  self-employed).  It  is  however  unlikely  that  many  employers  would  do  that,  just  because  of  the 
requirements to provide a written statement. 
170 Limited costs related to development of new models and templates, and making information available to 
employers. 
171 As established through interviews with stakeholders. 
172  As  explained  in  the  IA:  12  MS  already  comply;  REFIT  study  shows  no  major  differences  in  how 
burdensome  employers  consider  the  timeframe  to  be,  regardless  of  whether  it  precedes  the  employment 
(BG, PL), is set at one month (DE, FR, IT, SE) or at two months (UK). 
173 Reference hours and advance notice. 
174 Surveyed employers expected some modest additional administrative costs as well as increased labour 
costs  and  costs  related  to  reduced  workforce  flexibility.  The  extent  of  the  costs  will  depend  on  existing 
practice (many employers already provide those measures) and business models (extent of reliance on non-
standard forms of work).  
175 Costs in 4.1 and 4.2. will depend on the business models and strategic management decisions. 

103 

 
 
                                                 
of 

Prohibiti
on 
exclusivit
y  

costs 

Indirect 
costs 

None  

None   None 

None 

None  None 

d 

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

None 

None 

Included in 1. 

20-258m EUR  Limite

None 

d 

None  

None   None.176 

None. 

None  None 

4.3. 
Possibilit
y 
request 
another 
form 
employm
ent   

to 

of 

4.4.  Max. 
duration 
of 
probation   

4.5.  Cost-
free 
mandator
y training   

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

None 

None 

Included in 1. 

Limited177 

None 

Limite
d 

None  

None   None 

None 

None  None 

None 

None 

Included in 1. 

Limited 

None 

Limite
d 

None  

None   None. 

None. 

None  None 

5.Enforce
ment   

Direct 
costs 

Indirect 
costs 

None 

None 

Included in 1. 

None.178 

None  

None   None 

None 

Depen
ding 
on MS 
decisi
ons179 

Depen
ding on 
MS 
decisio
ns180 

None  Possibl

e181 

3.  The SME Test – Summary of results 

176 The provision does not oblige employers to accept the request. 
177 The new right would only have an effect in the UK, IE and CY – and also in those MS in practice, based 
on legal precedents, there is already a maximum duration of probation in place. 
178 No new costs for compliant employers. 
179  The  proposed  measures  leave  to  Member  State  the  choice  of  institutional  setting  for  establishing  the 
new procedures. When existing institutions are used, costs should be limited. 
180  The  proposed  measures  leave  to  Member  State  the  choice  of  institutional  setting  for  establishing  the 
new procedures. When existing institutions are used, costs should be limited. 
181 Possible increase in enforcement-related costs due to a higher number of cases. 

104 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
(1) Preliminary assessment of businesses likely to be affected  

The revision of the Directive will apply to all employers. It will however particularly 
affect  all  employers  of  employees  in  the  following  categories  (unless  national 
legislation has brought them within the scope of the Directive): 

Section  2,  especially 
2.2.3 

-  Employees working <8 hours per week 
-  Employees with contract duration <1 month 
-  Workers of a casual/specific nature 

There are little data to establish the extent of the use of non-standard work in SMEs 
as  compared  to  large  companies.  The  survey  conducted  in  the  framework  of  the 
supporting  study182  found  for  example  that  the  percentage  of  SMEs  and  large 
companies reporting that they rely on employees working less than 8 hours per week 
or on workers on demand is very similar while the percentage of SMEs reporting to 
follow a business model where atypical forms of employees working less than eight 
hours play an important role is slightly higher compared to large companies. A UK 
study on zero-hours contracts found however that these contracts are used in 12% of 
enterprises  with  less  than  20  employees  and  28%  of  enterprises  with  20-250 
employees  compared  to  47%  of  larger  companies.183  An  EU  study  on  SMEs 
established  that  in  2009,  50%  of  small  enterprises  in  EU27  employed  staff  with 
fixed-term  contracts,  as  compared  to  75%  for  medium-sized  and  87%  for  large 
enterprises.184 

Sectors that have a prevalence of casual workers are most likely to be affected, e.g. 
hotel, accommodation & restaurants, construction, agriculture. 

(2) Consultation with SMEs representatives 

Interviews  of  employer  representatives  were  undertaken  in  each  of  the  28  Member 
States. Representatives were invited to comment on the impact on SMEs. 

Annex 2 and 4 

A survey of employers attracted 347 responses from a diversity of sectors. Of these, 
79% were private firms. The breakdown of responses by company size is as follows 
(all countries combined): 

  SMEs (<250) – 68%, of which: 

182  Note:  the  survey  targeted  employers,  who  were  more  likely  to  rely  on  atypical  workers  or  flexible 
working  arrangements,  to  achieve  more  meaningful  answers.  Therefore,  the  survey  answers  are  not 
representative  of  a  general  employer  population  but  specifically  relate  to  employers  employing  casual 
workers. 
183 Office for National Statistics (2014), Analysis of Employee Contracts that do not Guarantee a Minimum 
Number of Hours 
184 Jan de Kok et al: Do SMEs create more and better jobs? Zoetermeer, November 2011 

105 

 
 
 
                                                 
-  Micro (<10) – 15% 

-  Small (10-49) – 19% 

-  Medium (50-249) – 34% 

  Large (250+) – 29% 

  The remaining 3% did not answer. 

The survey showed no major differences between SMEs and large companies with 
regard to the considered measures. The majority of SMEs in the survey reported that 
they  already  provided  the  required  employment  information  for  non-standard 
workers.  While  the  introduction  of  ban  on  exclusivity  clauses  is  perceived  by  the 
employers as having a small impact compared to the current situation (approximately 
47% of the respondents report no difference in case of implementation of this right), 
differences  are  likely  to  occur  when  introducing  rights  related  to  working  time. 
These  however  will  mainly  depend  on  the  extent  companies  (irrespective  of  their 
size) depend on on-demand work. Further information on the results of the survey is 
provided under point 5 of this Annex. 

UEAPME  was  among  the  three  cross-sectoral  employer  organisations  which 
expressed  readiness  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  the  employee  representatives. 
UEAPME  noted  that  such  negotiations  should  take  into  account  the  needs  of 
differently  sized  enterprises,  especially  SMEs  and  micro-enterprises,  and  that  they 
should respect the nature of the Written Statement Directive. 

(3) Measurement of the impact on SMEs 

All  employers  will  incur  costs:  fixed  one-off  costs  of  familiarisation  and  variable 
costs related to the number of employees that would be covered by an extension of 
the Directive.  

With  less  scope  for  economies  of  scale  than  larger  firms,  SMEs  will  incur  higher 
average fixed costs than large firms (53  EUR for  an  SME and 39 EUR for a large 
firm) and higher costs per atypical worker than large firms: €18-€153 versus €10-45. 
The cost range for SMEs (based on two different methods of establishing costs of a 
written statement: average annual cost per contract and annual average fixed cost per 
employed person) is an average for all sizes of SMEs. Break-down per size category 
is as follows: 

See: 

Cost sheet below 

Section 6.2 

Section 8.2 and 8.3 

- micro-enterprises: 22-198 EUR 

- small enterprises: 13-156 EUR 

- medium enterprises: 18-127 EUR. 

However,  the  costs  incurred  will  depend  on  the  business  model  rather  than  size  of 
company: companies that rely to a larger extent on non-standard forms of work will 

106 

 
 
bear higher costs. 

Overall, these costs are minor in comparison with general costs of personnel, which 
according  to  2014  Eurostat  data  amounted  to  some  29,000  EUR  per  employee  per 
year in an SME and 48,000 EUR in a larger company.185 

A  minority  of  affected  firms  (likely  those  heavily  relying  on  on-demand  workers 
with  exclusivity  clauses  and  no  advance  notice)  will  face  additional  indirect  costs 
related  to  adapting  the  business,  e.g.  HR  management  time,  legal  advice,  staff 
training.  

There  is  evidence  that  the  burden  of  a  reduced  timescale  for  providing  written 
statements would not be any greater for SMEs than for large enterprises. 

4) Assess alternative options and mitigating measures 

Given the large number of workers in the EU working in SMEs, overall derogations 
for SMEs are not considered appropriate. 

Section 8.3. 

However,  as  specified  in  section  8.3  the  following  mitigating  measures  are 
considered in order to limit the burdens on companies, and most notably SMEs: 

1. Member States are required to develop electronic templates and models of written 
statements. 

2.  In  micro,  small,  or  medium  enterprises,  Member  States  may  provide  for  the 
deadline to reply to worker's request for another form of employment to be extended 
from  one  month  to  no  more  than  three  months  and/or  allow  for  an  oral  reply  to  a 
subsequent similar request submitted by the same worker if the justification for the 
reply as regards the situation of the worker remains unchanged.   

3. Member States are required to make information related to the content of the new 
directive easily available to workers and employers. 

185 SME Performance Review 2017 by DIW-ECON (Personnel costs are made up of wages, salaries and 
employers' social security costs. They include taxes and employees' social security contributions retained 
by the employer, as well as the employer's compulsory and voluntary social contributions.) 

107 

 
 
                                                 
4.  Comparison of administrative costs to employers: SME v large firms 

The  table  below  provides  an  example  of  the  average  cost  incurred  in  the  first  year  following  the  revision  of  the  Directive  by  an  SME  and  a  large 
company under different scenarios. 

Average fixed cost per enterprise  
Cost per casual worker 

Costs in first year 

SMEs 

€ 53 
€ 18 - € 153  

Large firms 

€ 39 
€ 10 - € 45 

Staff turnover p.a. 

10% 

20% 

10% 

20% 

SMEs 

Large firms 

Scenario (B) (Options 1,2,3,4) 
Average cost of an enterprise with 0 atypical workers 
Average cost of an enterprise with 10 atypical workers 
Average cost of an enterprise with 50 atypical workers 
Average cost of an enterprise with 250 atypical workers 

Scenario C (Options 2,3,4,5) 

Average cost of an enterprise with 0 atypical workers 
Average cost of an enterprise with 10 atypical workers 
Average cost of an enterprise with 50 atypical workers 
Average cost of an enterprise with 250 atypical workers 
Scenario D (Options 1,2,3,4,5) 

€ 53 
€ 71 - € 206 
€ 143 - € 818 
€ 503 - € 3,878 

€ 53 
€ 89 - € 359 
€ 233 - € 1,583 
€ 953 - € 7,703 

€ 39 
€ 49 - € 84 
€ 89 - € 264 
€ 289 - € 1,164 

€ 39 
€ 59 - € 129 
€ 139 - € 489 
€ 539 - € 2,289 

€ 53 
€ 53 
€ 53 
€ 53 

€ 53 
€ 53 
€ 53 
€ 53 

€ 39 
€ 39 
€ 39 
€ 39 

€ 39 
€ 39 
€ 39 
€ 39 

Average cost of an enterprise with 0 atypical workers 
Average cost of an enterprise with 10 atypical workers 

€ 53 
€ 71 - € 206 

€ 53 
€ 89 - € 359 

€ 39 
€ 49 - € 84 

€ 39 
€ 59 - € 129 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Average cost of an enterprise with 50 atypical workers 
Average cost of an enterprise with 250 atypical workers 

€ 143 - € 818 
€ 503 - € 3,878 

€ 233 - € 1,583 
€ 953 - € 7,703 

€ 89 - € 264 
€ 289 - € 1,164 

€ 139 - € 489 
€ 539 - € 2,289 

Costs in future years (per year) 

Staff turnover p.a. 

10% 

20% 

10% 

20% 

SMEs 

Large firms 

Scenario (B) (Options 1,2,3,4) 
Average cost of an enterprise with 0 atypical workers 
Average cost of an enterprise with 10 atypical workers 
Average cost of an enterprise with 50 atypical workers 
Average cost of an enterprise with 250 atypical workers 

Scenario C (Options 2,3,4,5) 

Average cost of an enterprise with 0 atypical workers 
Average cost of an enterprise with 10 atypical workers 
Average cost of an enterprise with 50 atypical workers 
Average cost of an enterprise with 250 atypical workers 
Scenario D (Options 1,2,3,4,5) 

€ 0 
€ 18 - € 153 
€ 90 - € 765 
€ 450 - € 3,825 

€ 0 
€ 36 - € 306 
€ 180 - € 1,530 
€ 900 - € 7,650 

€ 0 
€ 10 - € 45 
€ 50 - € 225 
€ 250 - € 1,125 

€ 0 
€ 20 - € 90 
€ 100 - € 450 
€ 500 - € 2,250 

€ 0 
€ 0 
€ 0 
€ 0 

€ 0 
€ 0 
€ 0 
€ 0 

€ 0 
€ 0 
€ 0 
€ 0 

€ 0 
€ 0 
€ 0 
€ 0 

Average cost of an enterprise with 0 atypical workers 
Average cost of an enterprise with 10 atypical workers 
Average cost of an enterprise with 50 atypical workers 
Average cost of an enterprise with 250 atypical workers 

€ 0 
€ 18 - € 153 
€ 90 - € 765 
€ 450 - € 3,825 

€ 0 
€ 36 - € 306 
€ 180 - € 1,530 
€ 900 - € 7,650 

€ 0 
€ 10 - € 45 
€ 50 - € 225 
€ 250 - € 1,125 

€ 0 
€ 20 - € 90 
€ 100 - € 450 
€ 500 - € 2,250 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.  SMEs analysis: employer survey results 

5.1. Use of non-standard work between large companies and SMEs 

The use of non-standard forms of employment is mostly concentrated in certain sectors, 
such  as  hotels,  accommodation  and  restaurants,  construction  and  agriculture.  The 
construction and the accommodation and food sectors are included in the most important 
SME sectors in terms of employment.186 In these sectors, SMEs account for a large share 
of employment compared to large firms. Although this could lead to the conclusion that 
atypical forms of employment are more widespread among SMEs, no clear relationship 
exists: evidence from the UK shows that despite the use of contracts with no guaranteed 
number of hours is concentrated in the accommodation and food sector187, large firms are 
proportionately more likely than SMEs to employ one form of casual worker – zero-hour 
contract workers.188 

Evidence  collected  during  the  study  has  enabled  the  complex  relationship  between  the 
use of atypical forms of employment and the size of the company to be clarified to some 
extent.  The  employer  survey  included  questions  on  work  organisation,  asking  whether 
the  firm  strongly  relies  on  employees  with  different  type  of  atypical  forms  of 
employment. The respondents provided the following evidence: 

  more than 75% of companies strongly relying on employees working less than 8 

hours per week are SMEs; 

  almost 80% of companies strongly relying on employees working less than one 

month are SMEs; 

  approximately 70% of companies strongly relying on on-demand employees are 

SMEs. 

Despite  that,  the  difference  is  less  significant  when  analysing  the  percentage  of 
companies  reporting  that  they  strongly  rely  on  atypical  forms  of  employment  for 
different size classes: 

 

the percentage of SMEs and large companies reporting that they rely on 
employees working less than 8 hours per week or on workers on demand is very 
similar; 

  conversely the percentage of SMEs reporting to follow a business model where 

atypical forms of employees working less than eight hours play an important role 
is slightly higher compared to large companies. 

Based on the survey, it is not therefore possible to determine a clear relationship between 
the use of standard forms of employment and the size of the companies.  

186 European Commission (2016), Annual report on European SMEs 2015/2016 
187 https://www.istat.it/en/files/2015/04/Item-2.4-Measurement-of-zero-hours-contracts_UK1.pdf  
188  Department  for  Business,  Innovation  &  Skills  (2014),  Final  Impact  Assessment:  Banning  exclusivity 
clauses in zero-hours contracts. 

 
 
 
                                                 
A previous study in the UK offers more robust evidence in the form of a report based the 
Office for National Statistics Business Survey. The survey found that: 

  Around 1.4m employees have non-guaranteed hours contracts (NGHCs); 
  47% of large firms (250 or more employees) use NGHCs; 
  28% of medium-sized firms (20-249 employees) use NGHCs; 
  12% firms with <20 employees use NGHCs; 
  13% of all firms use NGHCs. 
  when  firms  with  <250  employees  use  NGHCs,  they  have  a  larger  proportion  of 

their workforce on NGHCs compared to larger businesses189 

Figure: Proportion of UK businesses using NGHCs by size of business 

1.  Application of considered measures 

The REFIT study reports that the costs to comply with the Directive were not perceived 
by SMEs or large firms to be burdensome and were mostly considered to be business-as-
usual costs 

According  to  the  REFIT  study,  no  evidence  of  disproportionate  burden  for  SMEs  is 
reported in case of an extension of the Directive. The majority of SMEs report that they 
would provide the same level of information and thus incur associated costs even in the 
absence  of  any  minimum  requirements:  between  61%  and  72%  of  survey  respondents 

189 Office for National Statistics (2014), Analysis of Employee Contracts that do not Guarantee a Minimum 
Number of Hours 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
replied that in the absence of minimum requirements the organisation would still provide 
the required level of information of the employees.  

This result is supported by the employer survey carried out during this study. Evidence 
collected  shows  that  the  majority  of  SMEs  already  provide  the  required  employment 
information for atypical workers. The main results of the employer survey are provided 
below. 

Do you already provide to employees with temporary contracts the 
required employment information in writing? 

82,7% 

82,5% 

76,7% 

Yes

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

on-demand (n=136)

< than 1 month (n=138)

< than 8 hours (n=211)

Source: CSES and PPMI 

Evidence suggests a more difficult application of minimum rights for atypical forms of 
employment.  While a restriction of exclusivity clauses is perceived by the employers as 
having  a  small  impact  compared  to  the  current  situation  (approximately  47%  of  the 
respondents report no difference in case of implementation of this right), differences are 
likely to occur when introducing rights related to working time.  

The  ability  to  apply  minimum  rights  is  to  a  great  extent  dependent  to  the  costs  and 
benefits associated to the introduction of each policy option.  

Reference hours 

In terms of benefits, companies that have introduced reference hours reported a reduction 
of the number of complaints for casual workers and improved their planning processes of 
workforce allocation tasks. On this point, there was little difference in the responses from 
SMEs and large firms. In terms of labour costs, the key factor is the business model used 
by  the  company  rather  than  the  company’s  size:  more  than  50%  of  the  companies 
strongly  relying  on  work  provided  on-demand  report  a  relevant  increase  in  the  labour 
costs,  while  companies  where  the  number  of  on-demand  workers  is  limited  or  not-
existent report no or moderate increase of the labour costs.  

 
 
 
 
Reasonable advance notice 

Employers  report  that  the  introduction  of  a  minimum  advance  notice  of  a  work 
assignment  reduced  the  flexibility  of  the  labour  market  and  required  SMEs  to  change 
their workforce organisation planning. This was confirmed by employers’ organisations, 
which  highlight  that  sometimes  it  is  the  nature  of  the  work  that  requires  flexibility  in 
workers'  availability.  For  example,  restaurants  and  hotels  might  require  on-demand 
employees  in  order  to  address  unexpected  issues.  Therefore  introducing  of  a  minimum 
advance notice might particularly affect the work organisation of these companies. In this 
respect,  the  employer  organisations  report  that  SMEs  relying  strongly  on  on-demand 
workers  will  be  more  affected  than  SMEs  where  the  number  of  on-demand  workers  is 
limited. 

Influence of minimum rights in recruitment decisions 

Employers report that the introduction of a minimum set of rights for atypical workers is 
likely  to  have  a  negative  impact  on  the  number  of  casual  workers  employed.  The 
employer  survey  reports  that  changes  in  recruitment  decisions  are  likely  to  occur  as  a 
result of the introduction of reference hours and a minimum advance notice. Conversely, 
the  restriction  of  exclusivity  clauses  is  expected  to  have  a  marginal  impact  on  the 
recruitment strategies of employers.  

However, the introduction of these rights will not automatically result in a displacement 
of  atypical  workers  to  informal  agreements  or  to  self-employed  positions,  as  suggested 
by several employer representatives: according to the survey, only one respondent out of 
five  believes  that  the  introduction  of  these  rights  is  likely  to  lead  to  an  increase  of 
informal work. The only exception is related to the introduction of a minimum advance 
notice,  where  slightly  less  than  30%  of  employers  report  that  casual  workers  could  be 
replaced  by  informal  work  or  push  atypical  workers  into  self-employment.  However, 
retaining the flexibility for employer and worker to agree to take up a work assignment 
with  less  than  the  set  advance  notice  could  reduce  the  scale  of  this  effect,  as  could 
variable  notice  periods  by  sector  determined  in  national  legislation  or  collective 
agreements.   

 
 
ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS 

This  Annex  describes  methods  used  in  the  external  study  underpinning  the  Impact 
Assessment. 

The study "Study to support Impact Assessment on the Review of the Written Statement 
Directive" was carried out by CSES and PPMI. 

1.  Research stages 

EU-level research 

Review  of  various  EU-level  documents  (e.g.  Eurofound  studies),  analysis  of  Eurostat 
data, and consultation of some EU-level stakeholders. 

National research 

The research team has carried out extensive national level research in each of the 28 EU 
Member States.  

Two stages of national research 

The  analysis  has  been  carried  out  in  two  stages  to  ensure  the  quality  of  evidence 
gathered. 

The  first  stage  aimed  at  establishing  a  clear  baseline  against  which  the  policy 
options/sub-options  could  be  assessed.  This  analysis  drew  on  the  desk  research 
undertaken in each country, namely: 

  extraction of country-specific findings from the REFIT evaluation and other EU-

level research; 
labour  market  data  on  the  situation  in  the  Member  State,  gathered  mainly  from 
Eurostat and/or national statistical offices; 
incidence of categories of workers covered by Option 1; 
identification of key groups of most numerous and most vulnerable workers; 
identification of current relevant Member State legal frameworks (i.e. governing 
extension  of  the  provisions  of  the  current  Directive  to  other  types  of  workers, 
removal of the possibilities to exclude certain workers (Option 1), and extension 
of basic rights in employment relationships (Option 5); 
identification of current Member State legal frameworks with respect to Options 
2, 3, and 4; 
review of relevant studies and reports at national level. 

 

 
 
 

 

 

Based on the collected evidence of the current situation, the research team developed an 
impact  assessment  framework  for  the  second  stage  of  the  national  research.  The 
analysis  relied  on  further  desk  research  and  consultations  undertaken  in  each  country, 
namely: 

  effects of the current Directive; 

 
 
 

the impact of current labour market practices on employees, employers, the state 
as  well  as  higher  level  impacts  (e.g.  on  public  finances,  productivity  and 
competitiveness, fundamental rights etc.); 

  current Member State legal framework (with respect to Options 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) 
impacts on employees, employers, the state as well as the higher level impacts; 
likely evolution of the baseline scenario and its possible impacts; 
interviews with employees' representatives; 
interviews with employers' representatives; 
interviews with other relevant national stakeholders. 

 
 
 
 

Two levels of national research 

The national level research consisted of a core-level research, covering each of the 28 
EU  Member  States,  and  an  additional  more  in-depth  research,  covering  selected  10 
Member  States.  The  core  research  involved  desk  research  and  at  least  2  interviews  – 
one with a representative of employers and one with a representative of employees. The 
additional more in-depth research involved at least 3 extra interviews in addition to the 
minimal 2 interviews (resulting in at least 5 interviews in total).  

Country selection for a more in-depth research 

The  selection  of  countries  for  a  more  in-depth  research  was  based  on  the  following 
criteria: 

  Extending or planning to extend the Directive to cover new and atypical forms of 
employment  (Option  1)  and  introduce  basic  rights  (Option  5).  Such  Member  States 
would  therefore  be  able  to  reflect  on  their  experience,  including  effects  on 
employees, employers and institutions responsible for dealing with labour disputes. 
  Labour  market  innovation/pioneering.  The  experience  of  countries  that  lead  the 
way  in  labour  market  innovations  should  also  be  analysed  as  it  gives  many 
observation points, which could be used for other countries.     

  Different  socio-economic  models.  This  composite 

includes  many 
important  contextual  features  that  might  influence  labour  relations  and  prevailing 
working conditions. 

indicator 

  Geographical location criterion to have a more or less equal coverage of countries 

across the EU. 

Countries selected for additional research (including specific issues) 

Nr  Selected 
country 

1 

Germany  

Socio-
economic 
models 
CME190 

Areas of coverage 

  mini-jobs,  
  marginal part-time employment 
 
longest minimum notice period 
  highest  employment  protection  legislation  index-

190 CME: Coordinated market economy 

 
 
 
                                                 
2 

France 

CME 

3 

Italy 

Hybrid 

4 

Slovakia  

Hybrid 

5 

Hungary 

LME191-
like (CEE) 

6 

Netherlands  LME-like  

7 

Spain 

LME-like  

permanent work 

  casual work 
  voucher-based work 
 
 
  highest  employment  protection  legislation  index-

lowest maximum duration of probation 
longest minimum notice period 

permanent work and temporary work 

  casual work 
  voucher-based work 
  highest  employment  protection  legislation  index-

permanent work and temporary work 

  casual work 
  platform (crowd) workers 
 
  highest  employment  protection  legislation  index-

longest minimum notice period 

temporary work 

longest minimum notice period 

  casual work 
  voucher-based work 
 
  casual work 
  platform (crowd) workers 
  voucher-based work 
 
 
  highest  employment  protection  legislation  index- 

lowest maximum duration of probation 
longest minimum notice period 

permanent work 
fixed-term workers 

 
  casual workers (zero hours) 
  platform (crowd) workers (planned) 
  voucher-based work (similar to it) 
  highest  employment  protection  legislation  index- 

temporary work 

8 

Poland 

LME-like 

  civil 

law  contracts  –  recognised  as  service 

providers, rather than employees/workers 

  highest  employment  protection  legislation  index-

permanent work 
labour market innovations,  
flexicurity 
longest minimum notice period 
lowest maximum duration of probation 
labour market innovations 

 
 
 
 
 

9 

Denmark 

LME 

10  UK 

LME 

Management of national research 

191 LME: Liberal market economy 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
The  national  research  has  been  carried  out  by  national  experts,  experienced  in 
delivering national research for similar studies for the EU institutions. Most of them have 
degrees and extensive experience in Law, Sociology, or Economics and hold a Lecturer 
or Professor positions within universities.  

The work of the pool of experts has been quality managed, which involved: developing 
templates  and  accompanying  guidance  for  data  collection,  briefing  by  skype  and  in 
person  to  ensure  consistent  understanding  of  the  required  outcomes,  continuous 
communication to solve any emerging issues. In addition, the research team carried out 
extensive  quality  assurance  and  gap  analysis  of  the  received  inputs,  followed  by 
clarifications and extra questions to gather comprehensive clean data for each country.  

Employer survey 

The  research  team  has  also  carried  out  a  survey  of  employers  to  collect  data  to  better 
understand the costs and benefits that employers might experience if they had to provide 
their atypical workers with key employment information in writing and additional rights: 
a right to reference hours, a minimum notice period, a possibility to request a different 
form  of  employment,  a  right  to  a  maximum  duration  of  probation,  and  forbidding 
exclusivity clauses in employment contracts.  

The  survey  was  carried  out  online  and  accumulated  a  total  of  347  responses  from 
individuals in the decision making positions in their companies from diverse sectors of 
the economy as  shown  in  the figure below, which were  more likely  to  rely  on atypical 
workers or flexible working arrangements.  

The survey has been carried out in 5 selected countries: the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Italy, Poland and Slovakia. These countries are of a considerable population size192 and 
importance,  which  have  gone  beyond  the  current  Directive  requirements  in  regulating 

192 Apart from Slovakia. 

 
 
 
                                                 
new  and  atypical  workers.  In  addition,  these  Member  States  represent  different  socio-
economic models and geographical areas. Therefore, the chosen countries could provide 
the  needed  data  in  terms  of  quantity,  depth  and  variety.  English  version  of  the 
questionnaire was translated into German, Italian, Polish, and Slovak by professional and 
experienced native-speaker translators. 

The  total  number  of  responses  is  split  between  the  five  countries  surveyed  in  the 
following way: 

  Germany – 83 responses 

 

Italy – 82 responses 

  Poland – 81 responses 

  UK – 80 responses 

  Slovakia – 21 responses. 

The breakdown of responses by company size is as follows (all countries combined): 

  SMEs (<250) – 68%, out of which: 

-  Micro (<10) – 15% 

-  Small (10-49) – 19% 

-  Medium (50-249) – 34% 

  Large (250+) – 29% 

  The remaining 3% did not answer. 

Gaps on trends and uncertainties 

Data  on  past  and  current  trends  of  atypical  employment  was  obtained  from  established 
sources:  principally  ILO  and  Eurofound.  In  addition, international  and  national  studies, 
EU-wide  surveys  (EU  LFS  and  Flash  Eurobarometers  from  Eurostat),  as  well  as 
contributions from national experts have been analysed.  

Categorisation  and  identification  of  trends  of  employment  not  exceeding  one  month 
were difficult because no consistent and reliable data on the number of workers with such 
contracts  or  employment  relationships  are  available  across  EU-28  and  very  often  not 
within  Member  States.  Therefore,  more  general  trends  of  fixed-term  and  part-time 
employment have been used. No exact trends with regard to employees working no more 
than 8 hours per week could be identified either, because they are rarely distinguished 
separately  in  labour  market  data  available  in  the  Member  States.  This  category  of 
workers  might  be  covered  by  other  categories,  such  as  domestic  work,  voucher-based 
work or casual work. 

There is major uncertainty with regard to future trends of crowd/platform employment, 
because  it  largely  depends  on  technological  progress  and  digital  management,  business 

 
 
decisions,  and  national  regulatory  responses,  which  are  currently  evolving.  So,  the 
anticipation  of  future  trends  of  this  new  form  of  employment  is  highly  speculative. 
Uncertainties  also  exist  with  regard  to  casual  work.  Not  all  Member  States  make  a 
distinction  between  very  short  fixed-term  work  and  casual  work,  which  also  might  be 
linked to informal or undeclared work and overlap with voucher-based work or platform 
work.  Therefore,  no  precise  trends  in  the  development  of  casual  work  could  be 
distinguished. Based  on the information available, trends in  the development of on-call 
work and intermittent work have been identified. 

2.  Approaches used to estimate numbers of non-standard workers 

This section provides an overview of the methodological approach taken to calculate the 
different  types  of  atypical  workers.  Since  data  are  not  available  for  most  forms  of 
employment  analysed  in  this  study,  the  overall  population  has  been  estimated  using  a 
variety of sources: 

  Eurostat Labour Force Survey provided information on the number of employees 
and the number of people in employment broken down by country and size of the 
company; 

  6th  European  Working  Condition  Survey  which  provides  information  on  the 

percentage of workers working less than eight hours; 
ILO statistics which present estimates on the percentage of domestic workers; 

 
  National level statistical databases. 

If no information was available assumptions were made, supported as far as possible by 
the qualitative evidence collected during the study. 

Domestic workers 

There are no official  statistics providing the  number of domestic workers broken down 
by country. Domestic work is very difficult to capture and characterised by high share of 
informal  work.193  This  number  has  been  estimated  using  the  following  sources  of 
information: 

  Eurostat  –  Labour  Force  Survey  (EU  LFS)  which  provides  information  on  the 

number of workers employed;194  

  The ILO carried out a study in 2013 which provides information on the Number of 
Domestic workers and on domestic workers as a percentage of total employment;195 

  Aggregated country fiche data collected from various sources. 

193  ETUC  (2012),  Decent  Work  for  Domestic  Workers.  The  state  of  labour  rights,  social  protection  and 
trade union initiatives in Europe. 
194 lfsa_egan2 
195 ILO (2013), Domestic workers across the world: global and regional statistics and the extent of legal 
protection/International Labour Office, Appendix II: table A2.1 

 
 
                                                 
The  total  number  of  domestic  workers  is  calculated  by  multiplying  the  number  of 
workers by the share of domestic workers in total employment. The number of domestic 
workers obtained has been triangulated with aggregated data extracted from the country 
fiches  from  national  level  sources.  The  numbers  estimated  through  both  methods  have 
been  merged,  meaning  that  the  estimated  number  of  domestic  workers  in  each  country 
shows the average point between the two methods. In case of missing data (e.g. Estonia 
and  Sweden)  the  share  of  domestic  workers  across  EU-28  (provided  in  the  ILO  study) 
was  multiplied  with  the total  number  of  workers  provided by the Labour  Force Survey 
from Eurostat. 

Main assumption related to this approach: 

  Data  have  not  been  calculated  broken  down  by  size  of  company.  It  is  assumed 
that  all  domestic  workers  are  employed  in  SMEs  (i.e.  companies  with  less  than 
250 employees). 

Affected population. The number of domestic workers affected by the extension of the 
Directive  has  been  informed  by  the  legal  mapping  carried  out  at  national  level.  In 
Member  States  where  domestic  workers  are  already  covered,  the  extension  of  the 
Directive was expected to have no impact. Conversely in Member States where domestic 
workers are not covered, it was assumed that an extension of the Directive would affect 
all  domestic  workers.  Whilst  domestic  workers  have  different  “employment  status”,  it 
was assumed that an extension of the Directive would affect all domestic workers. This 
conservative approach allowed to identify the largest possible population affected by the 
Directive. 

Finally,  a  number  of  countries  reported  that  domestic  workers  are  possibly  covered  by 
the Directive. For these countries a percentage of workers newly covered was assumed 
through a mix of evidence collected by experts, expert judgments and estimation.  

Platform workers 

Conventional statistical definitions do not capture many relevant aspects of this type of 
work.  While  traditional  classifications  usually  focus  on  the  employment  status  of  the 
worker,  digital  platform  work  can  include  different  forms  of  employment.  Indeed, 
evidence  collected  by  national  researchers  showed  that  many  platform  workers  are 
legitimately  self-employed,  i.e.  fall  outside  the  scope  of  the  Directive.  So  far,  it  is  far 
from  clear  how  “employment  status”  within  digital  platforms  can  be  captured  in  this 
framework (i.e. assumptions are required).  
Given  the  nature  of  platform  activities,  meaningful  measures  should  take  into  account 
employment  levels  at  a  single  point  in  time  or  correspond  to  an  annual  average,  rather 
than  capturing  whether  this  type  of  work  has  been  carried  out  at  any  time  during  for 
example  the  previous  year,  which  is  the  method  generally  used  in  the  existing  sample 
surveys. The reason is that there is a high risk of double-counting. Currently only a small 
number of surveys have tried to estimate the number of platform workers.  
For  this  study  the  percentage  of  platform  workers  has  been  informed  by  a  number  of 
studies  carried  out  both  in  the  US  and  in  Europe.  Main  results  extracted  from  the  US 
literature on platform work: 

 
 
  Katz and Krueger (2016) calculate that 0.5% of workers in 2015 were providing 

services through online intermediaries, such as Uber and Task Rabbit.196 

  Harris  and  Krueger  (2015)  estimated  the  number  of  platform  workers  based  on 
the  frequency  of  Google  searches  for  terms  related  to  online  intermediaries. 
According to this study 0.4% of the employed work with an online intermediary. 
  Farrell  and  Greig  (2016)  estimate  0.6%  of  the  working-age  population 
(representing  approximately  0.4%  of  the  workforce).  The  method  used  is  based 
on the frequency of bank deposits from online work platforms. 

A small number of available studies on EU-wide surveys have also been analysed: 

  The  CIDP  (2017)  interviewed  a  nationally  representative  sample  of  5,019  UK 
adults  aged  18  to  70  in  the  UK.  4%  of  employed  (excluding  pure  selling 
activities,  e.g.  eBay  and  Airbnb)  reported  to  have  used  online  platforms  in  the 
previous 12 months.197 Only 25% of this 4% reported that this was their main job, 
and 58% reported that they are permanent employees and see the gig-economy as 
a  supplements  income.  If  one  were  to  assume  the  25%  figure  as  a  basis  for 
calculating an approximation of a ‘gig employment status’, then one would arrive 
at a figure of 1% of the employed, i.e. 1% of employed people in the UK had a 
gig employment status at some time in 2016.  

  Huws et al (2016) found that between 5% and 9% of the online population were 
engaged in some type of crowd work in UK, Sweden, Germany, Austria and the 
Netherlands  in  the  first  two  quarters  of  2016.  According  to  the  survey  this 
accounted for more than half of all income for 2.4% of the respondents in Austria, 
2.6% in Germany, 1.7% in the Netherlands and 2.8% both in the UK and Sweden.  
  McKinsey Global Institute conducted an online survey in the USA and a few EU 
countries198 (and extrapolated the results to EU15). According to this study 15% 
of independent earners used online platforms, i.e. corresponding to approximately 
3%-5% of the working age population.199 

The  number  of  platform  workers  is  calculated  by  multiplying  the  share  of  platform 
workers with the number of workers employed (provided by Eurostat in the Labour Force 
Survey).200  Based  on  the  evidence  collected  from  US  and  EU-level  sources,  it  can  be 

196  The  authors  conducted  a  version  of  the  Contingent  Worker  Survey  (CWS)  to  track  alternative  and 
nonstandard  work  arrangements  using  the  RAND  American  Life  Panel.  This  survey  is  the  main  survey 
used by the US Labour of Statistics for tracking alternative and non-standard work. The authors report that 
the estimate required many caveats.  
197  Given  the  nature  of  the  work  (short  weekly  hours,  short  employment  duration,  and  usually  very 
marginal activities), this figure is likely to be in excess compared to the figures recorded at a single point of 
time, i.e. they cannot be compared. 
198 UK, France, Sweden, Germany and Spain 
199 This figure cannot be compared to the single point of time method used by Katz and Krueger (2016), 
which is the most appropriate one. However According to Eurofound this figure is “highly unlikely” that it 
would amount to more than 1% of the employment population measured at a single point of time 
200 lfsa_egan2 

 
 
                                                 
reasonably assumed that the number of platform workers at a single point of time varies 
between 0.5% (lower bound) and 1% (upper bound) for most European countries.201 
This approach implies strong assumptions:  

the same use of online platforms between the US and Europe; 

 
  each  Member  State  has  the  same  share  of  platform  workers  out  of  the  total 

number of workers (i.e. use of technologies etc. across countries). 

Affected population. The estimation of the affected population was based on the use of 
legal mapping, assumptions and evidence collected from the employer survey. The legal 
mapping allowed  the Member States  where  platform workers are currently not  covered 
by  the  Directive  to  be  identified.  This  was  informed  by  the  REFIT  evaluation  and 
updated by the national experts through their national research.  
The second step required was to make a clear assumption in order to determine the share 
of platform workers covered by the Directive.202 It was assumed that the extension of the 
Directive would have an impact only on platform workers working less than eight hours 
a week. Based on this assumption the share of platform workers working less than eight 
hours was applied. This evidence was collected through the employer survey carried out 
in the context of this study. 

Voucher-based workers 

Voucher-based work, i.e. a form of employment where an employer acquires a voucher 
from a third party to be used as a payment for a service from a worker, rather than cash, 
is  becoming  a  more  and  more  an  established  feature  of  European  labour  markets. 
However,  quantitative  data  on  voucher  work  are  very  difficult  to  collect.  This  is  partly 
due to the different legal frameworks and different modes of operations applied in each 
Member  State.  Therefore  statistical  data  in  this  area  should  be  assessed  very  carefully 
and considered only as an indication of the use of vouchers in the country. 
The study identifies voucher-based workers in eight countries, namely Austria, Belgium, 
Greece,  France,  Croatia,  Lithuania,  Netherlands  and  Slovenia.  Italy  used  to  make 
extensive use of voucher-based workers (latest statistics estimated more than one million 
people working through vouchers); however this form of employment has been recently 
banned.  
For each country bottom up data/estimates have been collected. Data have been provided 
either  by  national  level  experts  or  by  the  ICF  2016  study  entitled  “Social  Pillar  – 
Quantifying  atypical  employment  in  the  EU  Member  States”,  which  provides  national 
level  information  or  estimates  on  the  number  of  voucher-based  workers  across  Europe. 
Indeed,  the  collected  data  show  a  wide  range  of  limits,  with  different  units  of  analysis 
and  definitions.  With  regard  to  the  first  issue,  the  unit  of  analysis  considered  was  the 
number of workers. Where the number of voucher-contracts were provided (e.g. Croatia), 
one  worker  per  contract  was  considered.  Indeed,  this  assumption  is  likely  to  clearly 
overestimate the number of workers in the country. However, it also allows the highest 
possible number of voucher-based workers affected by the extension of the Directive to 
be  considered.  The  use  of  top-down  estimations  was  also  considered:  however  the 

201 This assumption is supported by Eurofound (2017) Aspects of non-standard employment in Europe. The 
study assessed the comparability of the patchy evidence provided by international studies and surveys on 
platform work. 
202  As  stated  above,  platform  workers  could  legitimately  be  self-employed  and  therefore  fall  outside  the 
scope of the Directive. 

 
 
 
                                                 
substantial  differences  of  the  legal  frameworks  and  implementation  in  each  Member 
States led to the decision to use a bottom-up approach. 
The  estimated  number  of  voucher-based  workers  was  split  through  between  SMEs  and 
large companies using the European Working Conditions Survey.203  

Affected population. The affected population was estimated through the legal mapping, 
which  allowed  the  Member  States  where  voucher-based  workers  are  currently  not 
covered by the Directive to be identified. 

Employees working less than one month 

Employees working less than month include a variety of workers hired through different 
temporary  contracts.  Official  statistics  for  this  category  of  workers  are  available  from 
the  EU  LFS  from  Eurostat,  which  provides  the  number  of  temporary  workers 
disaggregated by country and duration of the contract.204 Data gaps for 2016 have been 
identified in seven countries (AT, CY, DE, LT, LV, MT and RO). In these countries the 
population has been estimated by multiplying the number of employees in each Member 
State with the share of employees working less than one month in EU-28.  

In  addition,  data  have  been  broken  down  by  size  of  company  using  the  6th  European 
Working  Condition  Survey  (EWCS)  carried  out  by  Eurofound,  which  provides 
information on the share of SME and large companies by country.205 

Affected population. The affected population was estimated through the legal mapping, 
which  allowed  the  Member  States  where  employees  working  less  than  one  month  are 
currently not covered by the Directive to be identified. 

Employees working no more than 8 hours a week 

Employees working no more than 8 hours per week tend not to be identified separately in 
labour  market  statistics.  Therefore  it  has  been  necessary  to  estimate  the  number  of 
workers falling under this category. It was done using two main sources of information: 
(i)  the  EU  Labour  Force  Survey  from  Eurostat  and  (ii)  the  6th  EWCS,  which  collects 
microdata on the number of hours work per week by employees in their main job.206 The 
share of people working between one  and seven hours has  been  multiplied  by the total 
number of employees broken down by size class provided by Eurostat. 

Affected population. The affected population was estimated through the legal mapping, 
which  allowed  the  Member  States  where  employees  working  less  than  one  month  are 
currently not covered by the Directive to be identified. 

Casual workers 

203 Q16b of the survey: “How many employees in total work in your [IF Q15a ANSWERED: company or 
organisation] [IF Q15b ANSWERED: business]?” 
204 Temporary employees by duration of the contract (1000), lfsa_etgadc  
205  Q16b  of  the  questionnaire:  “How  many  employees  in  total  work  in  your  [IF  Q15a  ANSWERED: 
company or organisation] [IF Q15b ANSWERED: business]?” 
206 Q24 of the questionnaire: “How many hours do you usually work per week in your main paid job? 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
The  heterogeneous  and  often  marginal  nature  of  this  form  of  employment  makes  it 
difficult to collect robust and consistent data across countries. The availability of data is 
limited,  usually  difficult  to  compare  and  not  always  based  on  reliable  data  collection 
methodologies.  Therefore  the  on-call  contracts  (including  zero-hour  contracts)  and 
intermittent workers have been aggregated, providing estimates on the total number of 
workers with an employment relationship of casual nature. 

The approach used to determine the number of casual workers is based on the following 
steps: 

 

the  first  step  involved  mapping  Member  States  where  casual  employment 
contracts  are  allowed.  This  evidence  was  collected  through  desk  research  and 
interviews with national stakeholders; 

  subsequently,  national  level  statistics  were  scrutinised  to  identify  available 
information  on  the  number  of  casual  workers.  The  main  source  of  information 
was  the  national  level  statistics  collected  in  the  ICF  national  level  reports 
quantifying atypical employment in the EU Member States.207  

Some  countries  provided  information  in  terms  of  number  of  contracts  (e.g.  SK)  while 
other countries provided the number of people in working relationships of casual nature. 
This  required  to  assume  that  each  contract  corresponded  to  a  different  person,  i.e.  if  a 
country  reported  300,000  contracts  signed  we  assumed  that  it  corresponded  to  300,000 
people.  Given  the  nature  of  the  work,  typically  “on-demand”,  this  is  likely  to 
overestimate the number of workers with such type of working relationships. However it 
allows the highest possible number of casual workers in Europe to be determined.  
As  for  voucher-based  workers,  comparable  data  on  this  form  of  employment  are 
particularly  difficult  to  collect.  Casual  workers  are  governed  by  different  rules  and 
definitions.  Therefore  the  numbers  collected  and  analysed  during  the  study  should  be 
regarded as indicative. 

Affected population. The affected population was estimated through the legal mapping, 
which  allowed  the  Member  States  where  employees  working  less  than  one  month  are 
currently not covered by the Directive to be identified. 

3. 

Impact assessment methods 

The impact assessment looked at 5 policy measures: 

  Measure 1: Extension of the Directive to atypical workers 
  Measure 2: Strengthening information package 
  Measure 3: Reducing the deadline for provision of information 
  Measure 4 New minimum rights for all workers 
  Measure 5: Enforcement 

The following assumptions were used in establishing the impacts of the measures: 

207 ICF (2016) “Social Pillar – Quantifying atypical employment in the EU Member States”, unpublished 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Measure 1: extension of the Directive to atypical workers 

Population  covered 
by any extension 

legal  analysis  determined  whether  national  policy 
National 
currently  excludes  certain  types  of  workers  from  the  scope  of  the 
Directive. 

The  analysis  then  considered  the  number  of  workers  currently 
excluded that would be brought into the scope of the Directive: 

  Employees <8 hours per week (in countries where they are 

currently excluded by national legislation) 

  Employees with contracts of <1 month (where currently 

excluded) 

  Employment relationship of a casual nature (where 

currently excluded) 

  Employment relationship of a specific nature (where 

currently excluded) 

Within  the  “casual”  category,  some  types  were  specifically 
identified: voucher-based, domestic workers, platform workers. 

Data were gathered on the number of each type (see separate note). 
Some  data  on  the  number  of  employees  of  specific  nature  were 
gathered  (Annex  1)  but  not  taken  into  account  in  the  analysis  as 
they  are  relatively  few  in  number  and  not  always  well  defined. 
Many  are  covered  by  separate  agreements,  e.g.  diplomats, 
seafarers, civil servants. 

Some assumptions were made as to whether some types of workers 
are  i)  currently  covered,  and  ii)  would  be  covered.  This  was 
necessary  because  of: 
lack  of  clarity/consistency  over 
employment  status  of  such  workers;  ii)  uncertainty  over  current 
legal coverage (e.g. if not specifically recognised in law). 
Costs of familiarisation are covered under Measure 2 

i) 

  Number of workers that would be newly covered x unit cost 
  Unit cost based on REFIT, updated in line with inflation. 
  Differentiation between SMEs and large employers 
  Upper bound and lower bound per statement (based on 

of 

Cost 
familiarisation 
Cost  of  providing 
statements 

REFIT) 

Measure 2: strengthening information package 

Population  covered 
by any extension 

Cost 
familiarisation 

of 

  All companies except in countries that already require 
employers to provide all four additional types of 
information (probation, social security, etc.): two countries 
excluded on this basis: Cyprus, Greece 

  Unit cost based on unit costs of familiarisation for the 

REFIT Working Time Directive evaluation – updated in 
line with inflation 

  Unit costs differentiated between MS 
  Unit costs differentiated between SMEs v large companies 
  Cost = number of employers x unit cost 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cost  of  providing 
statements 

Zero.  Statements  for  existing  employees  would  not  need  to  be 
updated (unless employees request – expected to be negligible) 

Measure 3: reducing the deadline for provision of information 

Population  affected 
- firms 

Population  affected 
– employees  

  Number of firms in countries that have both not yet adopted 

the option 

  Differentiate: SMEs + large companies 
  Number of employees previously + newly covered by an 

extension to the Directive and benefitting from the right to 
a reduced deadline, i.e. in countries that have not reduced 
the deadline to: i) 1 month; ii) 15 days; iii) 1st day or earlier 

  Annual number of employees benefitting in practice (i.e. 
new starters) = 10-20% of total employees covered 
(assumed rate of staff turnover per year) 

  Number of employees <1 month who would benefit from a 
deadline of i) 15 days; ii) 1st day compared to current 
situation (i.e. employees who no longer leave without 
receiving one) 

Cost 
familiarisation 

of 

Additional  costs  to  employers  from  shortening  the  deadline 
assumed to be negligible because: 

  22 Member States have already reduced the deadline to one 

month or less 

  Nearly all employers responding to the survey reported that 
they already provide written statements within one month, 
even in the UK (where the deadline is two months) 
  REFIT study found that shorter timeframes were not 

considered by employers to be particularly burdensome 

Cost  of  providing 
statements 

Zero.  This  does  not  bring  additional  employees  into  the  scope  of 
the Directive. 
For public authorities: Qualitative analysis only. Costs will mostly 
only  arise  due  to  provision  of  templates,  information  and 
enforcement, and can be regarded as marginal. 
Measure 4 New minimum rights for all workers 
Measure 4.1 : reference hours, minimum advance notice) 

Population  affected 
- firms 

Population  affected 
– employees  

Cost 
familiarisation 

of 

  Number of firms in countries that have both not yet 
included casual workers under the Directive and not 
adopted the options 

  Differentiate: SMEs + large companies 
  Number of employees in countries that have both not yet 
included casual workers under the Directive and not 
adopted the options 

  Estimated number: lower range + upper range 
  Unit cost based unit costs of familiarisation for Working 

Time Directive evaluation – updated in line with inflation 

  Unit costs differentiated between MS 
  Unit costs differentiated between SMEs v large companies 
  Cost = number of employers x unit cost 

BUT:  cost  of  familiarisation  is  not  then  aggregated  with  other 
Measures (in order to avoid double counting). 

 
 
 
Cost  of  providing 
statements 

Zero.  These  options  by  themselves  do  not  bring  additional 
employees into the scope of the Directive. 

Population  affected 
- firms 

Population  affected 
– workers  

of 

Cost 
familiarisation 
Cost  of  providing 
statements 
Population  affected 
– 
zero-hour 
workers  

Effects 
for  zero-
hour  workers  (in  8 
countries) 

Measure4.2: exclusivity clauses 

  Number of firms in countries that have both not yet 
included casual workers under the Directive and not 
adopted this option 

  Differentiate: SMEs + large companies 
  Number of employees in countries that have both not yet 
included casual workers under the Directive and not 
adopted this option 

  Estimated number: lower range + upper range 

As for Measures 4.1 

Zero.  This  does  not  bring  additional  employees  into  the  scope  of 
the Directive. 

  Assumed that the most important effects of prohibiting 
exclusivity clauses will be for on-demand / zero hour 
contract workers rather than casual workers in general. 
  National research identified countries that allow/prohibit 

zero hour contracts 

  National research identified number of zero hour contract 

workers 

  8 countries make wide use of zero-hour contracts 
  Number of zero hour contract workers gathered from 

national sources in those 8 countries 

  National research identified existing prohibitions on 

exclusivity clauses in those 8 countries; Denmark thus 
excluded from the analysis (already prohibits exclusivity 
clauses) 

Previous research in the UK identified: 

  % of zero hour contract workers subject to exclusivity 

clauses; 

  % of those workers that would like a 2nd job but are 

prevented = 6% 

  Median number of hours worked by zero hour contract 

workers with a 2nd job = 7 hours per week 

  Median hours per week that a zero-hours worker with a 2nd 
job is not available to the main employer (above and 
beyond usual hours) = 4 hours per week 

  Reorganisation costs for main employer due to non-

availability of zero-hours worker with a 2nd job = 14% of 
labour costs 

  Total labour costs= 117.8% of wage costs 

These  figures  were  extrapolated  to  the  other  6  countries  where 
zero-hour contracts are used extensively and exclusivity clauses are 
legal. 

Low  and  high  estimates  of  %  zero  hour  workers  prevented  from 

 
 
 
 
getting  a  2nd  job  were  adopted,  taking  the  UK  figure  (6%)  as  a 
central estimate. 

On  that  basis,  the  following  were  calculated  for  the  7  countries 
(thus accounting for most zero-hour workers in the EU): 

  number of zero hour contract workers subject to exclusivity 

clauses; 

  number of those workers that would like a 2nd job but are 

 

 

 

 

 

 

prevented 
Increase in number of hours worked by zero hour contract 
workers getting a 2nd job after prohibition of exclusivity 
Increase in number of hours that zero-hours workers with 
2nd jobs are not available to main employer 
Increase in reorganisation costs for main employers due to 
non-availability of zero-hours worker with a 2nd job 
Increase in income for zero hour contract workers getting a 
2nd job after prohibition of exclusivity 
Increase in tax revenue from zero hour contract workers 
getting a 2nd job after prohibition of exclusivity 
Increase in revenues for secondary employers of zero hour 
contract workers after prohibition of exclusivity 

Eurostat provided data on 

  median hourly earnings (assumed low earners) 
 
 

lower earner hourly labour costs 
lower earner tax rates 

Measure 4.3: possibility to request new form of employment 

Population  affected 
- firms 

of 

Population  affected 
– workers  
Cost 
familiarisation 
Cost  of  providing 
statements 
Costs of replying to 
requests 

  Number of firms in countries that have both not yet 
included casual workers under the Directive and not 
adopted the options 

  Differentiate: SMEs + large companies 
  Number of employees in countries that have not yet 

adopted this option for all workers 

As for Measures 4.1, 4,2 

Zero.  This  option  does  not  bring  additional  employees  into  the 
scope of the Directive. 

  Assumed that the main costs arise from atypical workers’ 

requests (i.e. number of requests by employees on standard 
forms are minimal and in any case, many such workers 
already have a right) 

  Estimate number of atypical workers brought into the 

scope of the Directive and not yet having a possibility to 

 
 
 
 
 
request 

  Previous research shows that 53% of fixed-term workers in 

Europe would prefer a permanent contract.208 

  Therefore, assume that 25% might ask in any one year (i.e. 

each individual asks once about every two years). 

  Unit cost of replying = same as cost of written statement 
  Total cost = number asking x unit cost 
Measure 4.4: maximum period of probation 

  Number of firms in countries that have not yet adopted the 

option 

  Differentiate: SMEs + large companies 
  Number of employees in countries that have not yet 

adopted this option 

 
In practice, only new starters benefit 
  Assume labour turnover: 10-20% p.a. 
  High estimate: 20% of employees in countries that have not 

yet adopted this option 

  Low estimate: 10% of employees in countries that have not 

yet adopted this option  

As for Measures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3. 

Zero.  This  option  does  not  bring  additional  employees  into  the 
scope of the Directive. 

Measure 5: Enforcement 

Qualitative  analysis  only.  Some  costs  will  mostly  only  arise  to 
public authorities responsible for enforcement. 

Population  affected 
- firms 

Population  affected 
–  workers  having 
new right 
Population  affected 
workers 
– 
benefitting 
in 
practice 

of 

Cost 
familiarisation 
Cost  of  providing 
statements 

The measures were then combined into 4 policy packages or "scenarios": 

Scenarios 

A. Baseline (no change) 

B. Extended scope and strengthened requirements (Options 1, 2, 3, 5) 

C. Strengthened requirements and minimum rights (Options 2, 3, 4, 5) 

D. Extended scope and strengthened requirements and minimum rights (Options 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5) 

The following assumptions were used to assess combined impacts of the scenarios. 

A 

  Baseline 
  Assumed that Member States make no revisions to current legislation 

(otherwise, the baseline is unpredictable – Member States may choose to 

Scenarios 

208 European Parliament (2016), Precarious Employment in Europe: Patterns, Trends and Policy Strategies 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
B 

C 

D 

include/exclude atypical workers, increase/reduce the deadline, etc. using 
their freedom within the parameters set by the Directive) 

  Measures 1, 2, 3, 5 
  Assume firms only need to familiarise once, therefore total cost of 

familiarisation is for Measure 2 which affects all firms 

  Measures 2, 3, 4, 5 
  Assume firms only need to familiarise once, therefore total cost of 

familiarisation is for Measure 2 which affects all firms 

  Effects of Measures 5.1 to 5.4 are estimated only for casual workers that are 

already within the scope of the Directive (due to non-application of 
exclusions by national legislation) 

  Measures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
  Assume firms only need to familiarise once, therefore total cost of 

familiarisation is for Measure 2 which affects all firms 

4.  Some specific methodological assumptions 

4.1. Effects of extended scope on undeclared work 

The  REFIT  study  concluded  that  the  Directive  supports  the  fight  against  undeclared 
work. An extension of the scope of the Directive to more workers could be expected to 
facilitate  the  shift  of  undeclared  work  into  the  formal  economy.  This  may  be  because 
employers  choose  to  formalise  arrangements  that  are  currently  informal  or  because 
workers feel empowered to demand a formal contract or because labour inspectorates are 
better supported in their efforts to detect undeclared work. 

Comprehensive  data  on  the  extent  of  undeclared  work  is,  by  definition,  not  routinely 
collected  by  the  relevant  national  authorities.  However,  a  recent  Eurobarometer  survey 
provides some important indications: 

  4% of adults report that they have undertaken undeclared work in the past year;209 
  The median income from such work is approximately €300 p.a.210 

The  EU’s  adult  population  aged  15-64  years  is  333m.211  This  suggests  that  there  are 
around  13.3m  people  undertaking  undeclared  work  (4%  of  the  population).  The  total 
income from such work is approximately €3 990mper year. 

The  available  data  suggest  that  about  140,900  domestic  workers  in  12  Member  States 
would be brought into the scope of the Directive, i.e. about 1% of the number of people 
undertaking undeclared work. Given that other types of undeclared work might also be 
brought  into  the  formal  economy,  it  seems  reasonable  to  consider  that  the  total  shift 

209 Eurofound (2013), Undeclared work in the EU. 
210 Own calculation based on the findings of the Eurobarometer survey. Some 69% of respondents gave a 
figure. Of those, 20% reported <€100, 9% reported €101-200, 17% reported €201-500, 11% reported €501-
1000, and 12% reported >€1,000. Based on those figures the median is approximately €300. 
211 European Commission (2017), Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2017 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
might  be  between  1-3%  of  all  undeclared  work.  If  such  income  is  taxed  at  the  EU 
average  tax  rate  for  a  single  person  on  50%  of  the  average  national  wage  (20.66%)212, 
then the impact on tax revenues would be as shown in the table below. 

Such figures should be treated as no more than an indication which is entirely reliant on 
the  robustness  of  the  Eurobarometer  survey  data  and  the  reliability  of  the  (untested) 
assumptions of 1-3% shift of undeclared work into the formal economy. 

Percentage of undeclared work formalised as more workers come under the 
scope of the Directive 
1% 

3% 

2% 

Undeclared 
work 
brought  into  the  formal 
economy p.a. 
Marginal tax rate 
Increase in tax revenues 
p.a. 

€39.9m 

€79.8m 

€119.7m 

20.66% 
€8.2m 

20.66 
€16.5m 

20.66% 
€24.7m 

It can  be assumed that  some of the workers brought  into the formal economy  will also 
have  been  receiving  social  security  benefits.  It  is  impossible  to  know  with  any 
uncertainty the extent to which such benefit payments would be reduced once the work is 
formalised; this would depend on the conditions under which payments are made, i.e. as 
determined  by  eligibility  rules  of  national  systems,  and  also  whether  claims  were 
legitimate or bogus. However, one might assume that the loss of social security payments 
must be sufficiently small to incentivise the worker to enter the formal economy. On that 
basis,  we  could  estimate  that  the  reduction  in  social  security  payments  would  be 
equivalent  to  no  more  than  10-20%  of  the  value  of  undeclared  work  brought  into  the 
formal economy, in consequence of which savings of €4m-€24m might arise. 

4.2. Familiarisation with the new legislation 

This cost estimates the administrative action of employers familiarising themselves with 
the  new  legislation.  The  cost  associated  to  this  action  has  been  calculated  for  the 
following policy packages: 

  Extended scope and strengthened requirements (measures 1,2,3,5) 

  Strengthened requirements and minimum rights (measures 2,3,4,5) 

  Extended  scope,  strengthened  requirements  and  minimum  rights  (measures 

1,2,3,4,5) 

It is assumed that familiarisation costs are one-off costs. 

The approach used to estimate the quantity and price variables as well as the total cost is 
presented below. 

212 Eurostat (Tax rate [earn_nt_taxrate] 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Quantity .  

To estimate the affected population of each scenario the following assumptions are made: 

 

 

It is assumed that the cost of familiarisation with the legislation is not cumulative, 
i.e. the affected company will take the same time if it needs to familiarise itself 
only  with  one  measure  (e.g.  measure  2)  or  with  more  than  one  measure  (e.g. 
measures 2 and 3). As a result, the time required is considered a constant variable. 
It is assumed that in each company one person is in charge of learning about and 
understanding  the  new  legislation  and  is  responsible  for  transferring  this 
information to others.  

The  affected  populations  are  calculated  for  each  measure  considered  under  the  three 
policy packages considered. Measure 2 covers the largest population and the population 
likely  to  incorporate  the  affected  populations  of  all  the  other  options.  In  addition, 
measure 2 is incorporated in all the policy packages analysed under this study. As a result 
it  was  assumed  that  the  number  of  affected  companies  under  measure  2  represent  the 
number of companies affected for the considered policy packages. 

The legal mapping informed the population affected by measure 2. If a Member State did 
not incorporate all the additional information requirements analysed under this measure, 
it was assumed that all the companies operating in this Member State would be affected 
by  the  policy  change.  According  to  the  legal  mapping  the  population  affected  by  the 
policy  packages  listed  above  includes  all  the  companies  operating  in  EU-28  Member 
States  exept  from  Estonia  and  Greece.  The  table  below  provides  the  number  of 
companies included in the affected population. 

Companies affected by the policy packages B, C and D 
SMEs 

Total 

Member State 

AT 
BE 
BG 
CZ 
DE 
DK 
EE 
ES 
FI 
FR 
HR 
HU 
IE 
IT 
LT 
LU 
LV 
MT 
NL 
PL 

321,243 
601,252 
325,550 
999,490 
2,396,998 
210,048 
67,952 
2,462,621 
228,515 
2,904,618 
146,256 
535,756 
232,726 
3,679,965 
186,131 
31,780 
109,442 
26,008 
1,090,703 
1,603,368 

Large companies 
1,082 
901 
669 
1,558 
11,354 
678 
172 
2,919 
581 
4,196 
381 
854 
448 
3,162 
337 
146 
200 
51 
1,540 
3,191 

322,325  
602,153 
326,219 
1,001,048 
2,408,352 
210,726 
68,124 
2,465,540 
229,096 
2,908,814 
146,637 
536,610 
233,174 
3,683,127 
186,468 
31,926 
109,642 
26,059 
1,092,243 
1,606,559 

 
 
 
PT 
RO 
SE 
SI 
SK 
UK 

806,396 
456,480 
685,459 
134,515 
428,993 
1,934,517 

787 
1,642 
974 
212 
531 
6,430 

807,183 
458,122 
686,433 
134,727 
429,524 
1,940,947 

The second assumption listed above allows to change the unit of analysis: the number of 
workers  reponsible  for  familiarising  with  the  legislation  corresponds  to  the  number  of 
companies affected. 

Price 

The  price  variable  was  estimated  using  as  a  reference  the  data  from  another  impact 
assessment estimating a similar cost.213 In this study the price was calculated by size of 
company as well as the role of the staff and include an additional 25% for overheads. The 
price  provided  by  ICF  was  updated  to  2016  values  using  the  labour  cost  index  from 
Eurostat. The total price for a person to familiarise him/herself with the EU legislation is 
provided in the table below. 

Member State 

Price to familiarise with the legislation per person (in €) 

AT 
BE 
BG 
CY 
CZ 
DE 
DK 
EE 
EL 
ES 
FI 
FR 
HR 
HU 
IE 
IT 
LT 
LU 
LV 
MT 
NL 

SMEs 
74.4 
69.2 
7.2 
34.1 
17.8 
68.3 
76.2 
14.3 
25.7 
44.6 
62.6 
65.0 
26.9 
19.3 
62.6 
73.2 
11.1 
84.1 
12.8 
24.6 
54.4 

Large companies 
53.6 
49.0 
5.5 
26.5 
12.9 
45.6 
51.0 
9.8 
18.3 
33.7 
43.9 
47.2 
20.7 
14.0 
43.0 
56.3 
8.0 
58.0 
8.0 
16.5 
35.3 

213 ICF (2014) Study measuring the impacts of various possible changes to EU working time rules in the 
context of the Review of the Directive 2003/88/EC 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
PL 
PT 
RO 
SE 
SI 
SK 
UK 

20.6 
33.0 
22.2 
74.3 
27.8 
11.8 
72.0 

15.2 
25.5 
16.3 
52.5 
18.5 
8.7 
50.8 

Source: CSES and PPMI calculations based on ICF (2014) 

Total cost of familiarisation with the new legislation. 

The total cost of familiarisation with the new legislation is calculated by multiplying the 
affected  population  by  the  price  estimated  in  each  Member  State.  A  breakdown  is 
provided in the table below. 

Member State 

Companies affected by the policy packages B, C and D (in €) 

AT 
BE 
BG 
CZ 
DE 
DK 
EE 
ES 
FI 
FR 
HR 
HU 
IE 
IT 
LT 
LU 
LV 
MT 
NL 
PL 
PT 
RO 
SE 
SI 
SK 
UK 
Total 

SMEs 
 23,906,531.7  
 41,634,643.8  
 2,348,917.8  
 8,879,410.5  
 81,839,409.8  
 15,995,612.9  
 971,842.0  
 54,880,985.0  
 14,316,380.5  
 94,472,530.8  
 3,934,200.7  
 5,165,463.6  
 14,577,457.8  
 269,223,027.3  
 1,028,774.1  
 1,336,709.8  
 699,280.3  
 639,368.5  
 29,682,500.6  
 33,014,728.9  
 13,308,693.4  
 10,141,181.7  
 50,929,978.2  
 3,740,167.2  
 5,048,403.0  
 69,645,121.1  
 851,361,321  

Large companies 
 58,008.1  
 44,117.4  
 3,680.2  
 10,036.2  
 258,943.5  
 34,580.7  
 1,692.8  
 49,246.6  
 25,482.2  
 99,092.4  
 7,887.1  
 5,958.3  
 19,254.0  
 178,025.5  
 1,340.2  
 4,231.6  
 798.0  
 843.6  
 27,170.9  
 48,485.9  
 10,031.7  
 26,708.8  
 51,174.7  
 3,912.4  
 4,640.8  
 163,466.2  
 1,138,810  

Total 

 23,964,539.8  
 41,678,761.1  
 2,352,597.9  
 8,889,446.7  
 82,098,353.3  
 16,030,193.6  
 973,534.8  
 54,930,231.7  
 14,341,862.8  
 94,571,623.2  
 3,942,087.8  
 5,171,421.9  
 14,596,711.8  
 269,401,052.8  
 1,030,114.3  
 1,340,941.4  
 700,078.3  
 640,212.1  
 29,709,671.4  
 33,063,214.8  
 13,318,725.1  
 10,167,890.5  
 50,981,152.9  
 3,744,079.6  
 5,053,043.8  
 69,808,587.4  
 852,500,131  

 
 
 
 
The total amount is likely an overestimation as mostly companies needing to issue new 
written statements will need to invest in familiarising with the new legislation. 

4.3. Costs of issuing written statements 

Cost of issuing written statements in the first year and recurring 

This  section  estimates  the  cost  for  employers  of  complying  with  the  provisions  of  the 
Directive.  In  particular  it  focuses  on  the  cost  of  issuing  a  written  statement  and 
transmitting it to the concerned employees. 

The approach used to estimate the quantity and price variables as well as the total cost is 
presented below. 

Quantity  

Overall,  the  total  number  of  workers  cannot  be  estimated  by  simply  aggregating  the 
number of workers estimated under each category because of the risk of double-counting. 
It  is  very  likely  that  some  workers  fall  under  more  than  one  category,  e.g.  a  platform 
worker can also work less than eight hours a week.  

As  a  result,  the  total  number  of  workers  newly  covered  by  the  Directive  has  been 
estimated using the following assumptions. These assumptions are partly informed by the 
evidence collected during the study and partly based on reasonable assumptions:214 

  All platform workers are assumed to work less than eight hours  
  As  reported  in  Eurofound  (2017),  casual  workers  and  voucher-based  workers 
show  clear  overlaps.  This  is  likely  to  be  related  to  the  intermittent  and  on-call 
nature of the work provided. To calculate the overall affected population of this 
option,  it  is  assumed  that  50%  of  the  voucher-based  workers  are  also  included 
under the category of casual workers. 

  Given  the  nature  of  their  work,  domestic  workers  are  likely  to  fall  under  the 
following  categories:  (i)  casual  workers,  (iii)  voucher-based  workers  and  (iii) 
employees  with  a  contract  of  duration  of  less  than  one  month.  As  a  result,  it  is 
assumed that all the domestic workers affected by this option are already included 
these three categories. 
In order to have a conservative approach, the three biggest categories of atypical 
workers, i.e. employees working less than eight hours, employees with a contract 
of  duration  of  less  than  one  month  and  casual  workers,  are  assumed  to  be 
mutually exclusive. 

 

Based on these assumptions, the total number of workers newly covered by the Directive 
is between 2.4m and 3.2m.  

214  More information on can be found in the document explaining how each category was estimated 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Cost of issuing a written statement  

The cost of issuing a written statement has been extrapolated from the REFIT study. The 
REFIT study assessed this cost in three steps. The first two steps showed two different 
methods  used  to  calculate  the  cost  of  issuing  a  written  statement,  while  the  third  step 
combined the two assessment methods.  

The cost of issuing a written statement was calculated as follows: 

  Assessed as average time per contract 
  Assessed as annual fixed costs 

The first method was calculated as follows: the respondents of an employer survey were 
used to estimate the time required by the employer to issue a written statement, which is 
multiplied  by  the  corresponding  annual  number  of  statements.  This  provides  the  time 
spent on complying with the Directive for each type of contract per annum. These time 
estimates  are  then  multiplied  by  the  hourly  wage  in  the  respective  Member  State using 
data  from  Eurostat  on  national  average  wages.  This  cost  per  company  is  then  divided 
with the number of employed persons in the company to calculate the cost per employed 
person.  The  second  method  used  by  the  REFIT  study  reported  the  average  costs  of 
companies  considering  the  cost  of  complying  with  the  obligation  of  the  Directive  as 
annual fixed cost. This information was collected from a panel survey carried out in eight 
Member States. 

The third step of the REFIT study consisted in merging the two types of estimates into 
one  overall  cost  assessment  to  include  a  larger  and  less  biased  share  of  the  survey 
population.  

The table below provides an overview of the average annual cost per contract in EURO 
estimated with the two methods. 

Method 1  
(average time per 
contract) 

Method 2 
(annual fixed costs) 

Merged approach 

22 
13 

18 

10 

198 
156 

127 

45 

44 
57 

57 

25 

Micro enterprises 
Small enterprises 
Medium 
enterprises 
Large enterprises 
Source: REFIT 

In the current study, SMEs are defined as companies with a number of workers between 
1  and  249  and  differ  from  the  data  reported  in  the  REFIT  study.  As  a  result,  it  was 

 
 
 
 
necessary to weight the data collected in the REFIT study to estimate the average annual 
cost for SMEs and large companies.215 

The costs used are provided in EURO in the table below. 

Method 1  
(average time per 
contract) 

Method 2 
(annual fixed costs) 

Merged approach 

SMEs 
Large enterprises 
Weighted average 

18.1 
10 
17.1 

153.5 
45 
128.7 

52 
25 
47.9 

Total cost for written statements provided to employees newly covered by the Directive 

The cost of issuing a written statement is included under option 1, which aims to extend 
the scope of the Directive. Under this option, employers will have  to provide a written 
statement  for  each  existing  worker  currently  not  covered  by  the  Directive  and  for  each 
new hire. In this study, the first group of workers are considered one-off costs whilst the 
latter are calculated as recurring costs. 

The  one-off  cost  is  calculated  by  multiplying  the  total  number  of  atypical  workers  not 
covered  by the  Directive  with  the  price  estimated  for  each written  statement.  Based  on 
the assumptions listed above, the total number of workers that would be newly covered 
by the Directive is estimated between 2.4m and 3.2m. This is multiplied by the weighted 
average of the merged approach, i.e. EUR 47.9. 

The  total  cost  of  extending  the  scope  of  the  Directive  is  therefore  between  EUR  114m 
and €152m. 

Recurring costs will be faced by employers and depend on the number of workers hired 
every  year.  The  recurring  costs  have  been  calculated  assuming  different  percentages  of 
staff  turnover  per  year:  the  table  below  provides  the  annual  estimated  cost  for  both 
scenarios. The costs are estimated in millions of EUR. 

Assuming turnover of 10%  Assuming turnover of 20% 

Annual costs 

between €11.4m and €15.2m   between €22.7m and €30.3m 

5.  Multi-criteria analysis 

We follow an approach to complete the impact assessment through multi-criteria analysis 
of the possible scenarios, which is consistent with the Better Regulation Guidelines (Tool 
#63).  The  results  of  the  multi-criteria  analysis  are  presented  in  a  performance  matrix 
comparing the options against the various criteria. Given the diversity of impacts, we use 

215 The REFIT study reported the size of the population providing information for each size of company. 
This allowed calculate the weighted average of the responses provided in the REFIT study 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
a simple form of grading using qualitative values reflecting performance (i.e., +++, ++, 
+, 0, -, --, ---). The grading requires a balanced assessment of the different impacts, but 
the underlying analysis should be able to support the judgments made.  

The  criteria  will  be  the  overall  economic,  social,  legal  and  fundamental  rights  impacts 
listed above. 

Weights are not used to provide overall scores for different scenarios. Instead, the table 
simply presents the relative scores of each scenario. 

The final analysis uses a matrix comparing five scenarios against the criteria. The tables 
below present: 

  scenarios 
  MCA matrix 
 

legend to explain the score against each criterion 

The multicriteria analysis undertaken by the contractors for the study was reviewed and 
completed in light of Commission's own research, notably into the impacts of the training 
provision and enforcement. 

Scenarios 

A. Baseline (no change) 

B. Extended scope and strengthened requirements (Options 1, 2, 3, 4) 

C. Strengthened requirements and minimum rights (Options 2, 3, 4, 5) 

D. Extended scope and strengthened requirements and minimum rights (Options 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5) 

A 

B 

C 

D 

Criteria for 
comparing 
options 

Labour  market 
impact 

on 

Effect 
working 
conditions 

Effect  on  public 
finances 

Competitiveness 
& productivity 

Ease 
of 
application  & 
enforcement 

Fundamental 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rights 

Legend: Labour market impact 

+++  All casual workers have the right to get a second job with another employer (if 

they wish and if such work is available) 
AND: negligible displacement of workers covered by the Directive by workers 
not covered 

++ 

+ 

0 

- 

-- 

--- 

A  majority of  casual  workers  have the right  to get  a  second  job  with  another 
employer (if they wish and if such work is available) 
AND: negligible displacement of workers covered by the Directive by workers 
not covered 

A  minority of casual workers have the right to get a second job  with another 
employer (if they wish and if such work is available) 
AND: negligible displacement of workers covered by the Directive by workers 
not covered 

No increase in the proportion of casual workers have the right to get a second 
job with another employer 
AND: negligible displacement of workers covered by the Directive by workers 
not covered 

A minority of employers of casual workers have the right to include exclusivity 
clauses in the contracts of casual workers 

A majority of employers of casual workers have the right to include exclusivity 
clauses in the contracts of casual workers 
OR:  Non-negligible  displacement  of  workers  covered  by  the  Directive  by 
workers not covered 

All  employers  of  casual workers  are  entitled  to  include exclusivity  clauses  in 
the contracts of casual workers 
AND:  Non-negligible  displacement  of  workers  covered  by  the  Directive  by 
workers not covered 

Legend: Effect on working conditions 

+++  Majority of workers not yet covered are brought into the scope of the Directive 

AND: Majority of casual workers enjoy improved basic rights 
AND: All workers covered have right to more information 

++ 

+ 

EITHER: Majority of workers not yet covered are brought into the scope of the 
Directive 
OR: Majority of casual workers enjoy improved basic rights 
AND: All workers covered have right to more information 

EITHER: Minority of workers not yet covered are brought into the scope of the 
Directive 
OR: Minority of casual workers enjoy improved basic rights 
AND: All workers covered have right to more information 

 
 
 
 
0 

- 

-- 

Zero net effect 

EITHER: A minority of workers currently covered are removed from the scope 
of the Directive 
OR:  Ability  of  a  minority  of  workers  to  enforce  rights  or  right  to  receive 
information is weakened 

EITHER:  Majority  of  workers  currently  covered  are  removed  from  the  scope 
of the Directive 
OR:  Ability  of  majority  of  workers  to  enforce  rights  or  right  to  receive 
information is weakened 

---  Majority  of  workers  currently  covered  are  removed  from  the  scope  of  the 

Directive 
AND:  Ability  of  majority  of  workers  to  enforce  rights  or  right  to  receive 
information is weakened 

Legend: effect on public finances 

Increase in tax revenues/savings likely to greatly exceed cost of transposition, 
enforcement, etc. 

Increase in tax revenues/savings likely to slightly exceed cost of transposition, 
enforcement, etc. 

Increases in tax revenues/savings in social security are likely to offset cost of 
transposition, enforcement, etc. 

No increase in tax revenues  

Slight loss of tax revenues 

Substantial reduction in tax revenues 

+++ 

++ 

+ 

0 

- 

-- 

--- 

Excessive reduction in tax revenues 

Legend: competitiveness and productivity 

+++  Majority  of  affected  employers 

likely 

in  staff 
loyalty/retention  or  workforce  productivity,  no  adjustment  costs  and 
administrative costs are “business-as-usual” 
AND: Increase in revenues of “second” employers of casual workers exceeds 
reorganisation  costs  of  “first”  employers  due  to  non-availability  of  such 
workers 

to  enjoy 

increased 

++  Majority  of  affected  employers 

likely 

in  staff 
loyalty/retention  or  workforce  productivity  and  administrative  costs  are 
“business-as-usual” 
OR:  Increase  in  revenues  of  “second”  employers  of  casual  workers  exceeds 
reorganisation  costs  of  “first”  employers  due  to  non-availability  of  such 
workers 

to  enjoy 

increased 

+ 

Minority  of  affected  employers 
in  staff 
loyalty/retention  or  workforce  productivity  and  administrative  costs  are 
“business-as-usual” 

to  enjoy 

increased 

likely 

 
 
 
 
0 

- 

-- 

AND: No change in revenues of “second” employers of casual workers and no 
change  in  reorganisation  costs  of  “first”  employers  due  to  non-availability  of 
such workers 

Limited  effect  on  staff  loyalty/retention  or  workforce  productivity  but 
administrative costs are “business-as-usual” 
AND: No change in revenues of “second” employers of casual workers and no 
change  in  reorganisation  costs  of  “first”  employers  due  to  non-availability  of 
such workers 

Minority of affected employers likely to face reduced staff loyalty/retention or 
workforce productivity and administrative costs are “business-as-usual” 
AND: No change in revenues of “second” employers of casual workers and no 
change  in  reorganisation  costs  of  “first”  employers  due  to  non-availability  of 
such workers 

Majority of affected employers likely to face reduced staff loyalty/retention or 
workforce productivity and administrative costs are substantial 
OR:  Increase  in  reorganisation  costs  of  “first”  employers  due  to  non-
availability  of  casual  workers  exceeds  increase  in  revenues  of  “second” 
employers  of  casual  workers  increase  in  revenues  of  “second”  employers  of 
such workers 

---  Majority of affected employers likely to face reduced staff loyalty/retention or 
workforce  productivity  and  adjustment  costs  and  administrative  costs  are 
substantial 
AND: No change in revenues of “second” employers of casual workers and no 
change  in  reorganisation  costs  of  “first”  employers  due  to  non-availability  of 
such workers 

Legend: application and enforcement 

+++  Ability  of  Member  States  to  enforce  workers’  rights  is  considerably 

strengthened 
AND: Costs of transposition, enforcement, etc. are not substantial for Member 
States 

++ 

+ 

0 

- 

-- 

Ability  of  Member  States  to  enforce  workers’  rights  is  considerably 
strengthened 
OR:  Costs  of  transposition,  enforcement,  etc.  are  not  substantial  for  Member 
States 

Ability of Member States to enforce workers’ rights is slightly strengthened 

No difference in ability of Member States to enforce workers’ rights 
Costs of transposition, enforcement, etc. are not substantial for Member States 

Ability of Member States to enforce workers’ rights is slightly weakened 

Ability of Member States to enforce workers’ rights is considerably weakened 
OR:  Transposition,  enforcement,  etc.  are  cumbersome  and  expensive  for 
Member States 

--- 

Ability of Member States to enforce workers’ rights is considerably weakened 
AND:  Transposition,  enforcement,  etc.  are  cumbersome  and  expensive  for 

 
 
 
Member States 

+++ 

++ 

+ 

0 

- 

-- 

Legend: fundamental rights 

Revision  of  the  Directive  considerably  strengthens  support  for  fundamental 
rights for a majority of workers 

Revision  of  the  Directive  considerably  strengthens  support  for  fundamental 
rights for a minority of workers 

Revision of the Directive slightly support for fundamental rights for a minority 
of workers 

No impact 

Revision  of  the  Directive  slightly  weakens  current  support  for  fundamental 
rights 

Revision  of 
fundamental rights 

the  Directive  considerably  weakens  current  support  for 

--- 

Revision of the Directive infringes fundamental rights 

The following criteria are used for the assessment of Coherence: 

Legend: European Pillar of Social Rights 

+++ 

Revision of the Directive considerably supports numerous Pillar principles  

++ 

Revision of the Directive considerably supports some Pillar principles 

+ 

0 

- 

-- 

Revision of the Directive slightly supports some Pillar principles  

No impact 

Revision of the Directive goes slightly against some Pillar principles  

Revision of the Directive goes against numerous Pillar principles 

--- 

Revision of the Directive goes considerably against numerous Pillar principles 

+++ 

++ 

+ 

0 

- 

Legend: EU social acquis 

Revision  of  the  Directive  considerably  strengthens  complementarity  and 
coherence with most relevant EU social acquis  

Revision  of  the  Directive  considerably  strengthens  complementarity  and 
coherence with some elements of relevant EU social acquis 

Revision of the Directive slightly strengthens complementarity and coherence 
with some elements of relevant EU social acquis 

No impact 

Revision  of  the  Directive  slightly  weakens  complementarity  and  coherence 
with some elements of EU social acquis 

 
 
 
 
 
-- 

Revision  of 
coherence with most EU social acquis 

the  Directive  considerably  weakens  complementarity  and 

--- 

Revision of the Directive makes it incoherent with EU social acquis 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 5: GLOSSARY 

Term or acronym 

Meaning or definition 

CJEU 

ECB 

ESDE 

Eurofound 

Court of justice of the European Union 

European Central Bank 

"Employment and Social Developments in Europe" 

European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions 

EWCS 

European Working Conditions Survey 

HR 

IA 

ICT 

ILO 

LFS 

MCA 

MS 

NGOs 

OECD 

REFIT 

RSB 

SBS 

SES 

SMEs 

SWD 

TA(W) 

TFEU 

WSD 

Human Resources 

Impact Assessment 

Information and communications technology 

International Labour Organization 

European Union Labour Force Survey 

Multi-criteria analysis 

Member States 

Non-governmental organisations 

Organisation 
Development 

for  Economic  Co-operation 

and 

European  Commission's  Regulatory  Fitness 
Performance programme 

and 

Regulatory Scrutiny Board 

European Union structural business statistics 

European Union Structure of Earnings Survey 

Small and medium-sized enterprises 

Staff Working Document 

Temporary Agency (Workers) 

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

Written Statement Directive 

144 

 
 
 
ANNEX  6:  FURTHER  INFORMATION  ON  RELEVANT  NEW  AND 
NON-STANDARD FORMS OF WORK 

Note on terminology 

Across the document, different categories of employment are presented.  

Non-standard  employment  is  described  by  the  ILO216  as  employment  arrangements  which 
deviate  from  the  'standard  employment  relationship'  (full  time,  of  indefinite  length,  part  of  a 
subordinate  relationship  between  an  employer  and  an  employee).  It    includes  temporary 
employment  (fixed  term,  casual,  seasonal  work),  part-time  and  on-call  work,  multi-party 
employment  relationship  (subcontracted  labour,  temporary  agency  work)  and  disguised 
employment (misclassified self-employment but also dependent self-employment).  

Atypical work (Eurofound): employment relationships not conforming to the standard/ ‘typical’ 
model (full-time, regular, open-ended employment with a single employer over a long time span). 

New  forms  of  employment  (Eurofound217)  include  employee  sharing,  job  sharing,  interim 
management,  casual  work  (including  intermittent  work  and  on-call  work),  ICT-based  mobile 
work, voucher-based work, portfolio work, crowd employment, collaborative employment. These 
forms  include  elements  of  non-conventional  workplaces,  support  of  ICT,  different  employment 
relationship organisation, different work patterns, networking. Eurofound underlines that there is 
currently no shared understanding of what constitutes ‘new forms of employment’.  

Precarious  work  is  described  by  the  European  Parliament  Policy  Department  A218  as  the 
intersection of: insecure employment (e.g. fixed term or temporary agency work), unsupportive 
entitlements  (i.e.  few  entitlements  to  income  support),  vulnerable  employees  (i.e.  few  other 
means  of  subsistence).  "Precarious  work"  does  not  have  a  universally-accepted  definition  in 
Europe and that it is always relative.  

Non-regular  employment  (OECD  publications):  work  in  all  forms  of  employment  that  do  not 
benefit from the same degree of protection against contract termination as permanent workers.219 

Some specific forms of work are also referred to: 

  Casual work 

According to Eurofound's definition220, casual work is a type of work where the employment is 

216  Non-standard  employment  around  the  world:  Understanding  challenges,  shaping  prospects  International 
Labour Office – Geneva: ILO. 2016. 
217 Eurofound (2015), New forms of employment, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. 
218  European  Parliament,  Policy  Department  A,  (2016)  Precarious  Employment:  Patterns,  Trends  and  Policy 
Strategies in Europe. 
219 OECD Employment Outlook 2014, Non-regular employment, job security and labour market divide, p. 141-
209.  

145 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
not stable and continuous, and the employer is not obliged to regularly provide the worker with 
work,  but  has  the  flexibility  of  calling  them  in  on  demand;  it  is  work  which  is  irregular  or 
intermittent with no expectation of continuous employment. Workers’ prospects of getting such 
work depend on fluctuations in the employer's workload.   

Eurofound divides casual work into two main categories: 
- 
- 

On-call work (including zero-hours contracts) 
Intermittent work 

The  first,  on-call  work,  involves  a  continuous  employment  relationship  maintained  between  an 
employer and an employee, with the option for the employer to call the employee in as and when 
needed. In some countries employers are obliged to indicate a minimum number of hours, while 
in  others  they  are  not  obliged  to  ever  call  the  worker  (i.e.  zero-hours  contracts).  The  second 
category  of  casual  work,  intermittent  work,  involves  an  employer  approaching  workers  on  a 
regular  or  irregular  basis  to  conduct  a  specific  task,  often  related  to  an  individual  project  or 
seasonal work. 

  Crowd employment/platform work 

‘Platform work' is not formally defined at EU level. However, the Commission Communication 
“A  European  agenda  for  the  collaborative  economy”  221    defines  the  concept  of  collaborative 
economy,  the  presence  of  an  online  platform  being  a  necessary  element  of  the  definition. 
Platform  work  is  carried  out  by  service  providers  who  can  be  professional  or  not;  they  can  be 
self-employed persons or workers. 

Eurofound  (2015)  defines  crowd  employment  as  an  employment  form  that  uses  an  online 
platform  to  enable  organisations  or  individuals  to  access  an  indefinite  and  unknown  group  of 
other  organisations  or  individuals  to  solve  specific  problems  or  to  provide  specific  services  or 
products in exchange for payment. 

Crowd workers are very rarely, if ever, employed by the platform.  Instead, they  predominantly 
operate  on  a  self-employed  basis  as  independent  contractors  and  outside  the  scope  of 
employment  legislation.  Eurofound  notes  that  crowd  employment  platforms  have  to  follow 
general  legal  frameworks  such  as  commercial  codes,  civil  codes,  consumer  protection  acts  and 
data protection legislation, but there are no legal or collectively agreed frameworks specifically 
addressing crowd employment in Europe. 222  

  Domestic work 

ILO defines “domestic work” in Article 1 of the Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189): 
(a) the term “domestic work” means work performed in or for a household or households; 
(b)  the  term  “domestic  worker”  means  any  person  engaged  in  domestic  work  within  an 
employment relationship; 
(c)  a  person  who  performs  domestic  work  only  occasionally  or  sporadically  and  not  on  an 
occupational basis is not a domestic worker. 

  Temporary Agency work 

220 Eurofound (2015), page 46 
221 COM(2016) 356 final 
222 Eurofound (2015), New forms of employment, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. 

146 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
'Temporary Agency Work' is a form of work where the worker has a contract of employment or 
an employment relationship with a temporary-work agency with a view to be assigned to a user 
undertaking to work temporarily under its supervision and direction. 223   

  Voucher-based work 

Eurofound defines 'voucher-based work' as 'a form of employment where an employer acquires a 
voucher  from  a  third  party  (generally  a  governmental  authority)  to  be  used  as  payment  for  a 
service  from  a  worker,  rather  than  cash'.  224    This  type  of  employment  has  been  introduced  in 
several  Member  States  as  a  way  to  better  regulate  domestic  work  and  improve  protection  of 
domestic workers, or tackle the problem of undeclared work in agriculture. 

  Paid traineeship 

According  to  the  EU  Quality  Framework  for  Traineeships,  'traineeships'  are  understood  as  a 
limited  period  of  work  practice,  whether  paid  or  not,  which  includes  a  learning  and  training 
component,  undertaken  in  order  to  gain  practical  and  professional  experience  with  a  view  to 
improving employability and facilitating transition to regular employment.  

  Bogus self-employed 

‘Bogus’  or  ‘false’  self-employment  refers  to  the  phenomenon  of  workers  who  would  usually 
meet the legal definition of an employee but instead are registered as self-employed . In this case, 
the subordinate employment relation is disguised as autonomous work, usually for fiscal reasons, 
or in order to avoid the payment of social security contributions and thereby reduce labour costs, 
or to circumvent labour legislation and protection, such as the provisions on dismissals . This can 
be  characterised  as  an  employer  abuse  of  contractual  relations,  and  these  workers  are  also, 
compared to employed workers, at a higher risk of precariousness due to a lack of social security 
and pension coverage and a lack of access to some employment rights.225 

223 Directive 2008/104/EC, Article 3 (1) (c) 
224  Eurofound  (2015),  New  forms  of  employment,  Publications  Office  of  the  European  Union,  Luxembourg, 
p.82. 
225  "Precarious  employment  in  Europe,  Part  1:  Patterns,  trends  and  policy  strategy"-  study  for  the  EMPL 
Committee, 2016 

147 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Figure 1. Percentage of temporary employees who could not find a permanent job as a 
share  of  all  employees  (permanent  and  temporary,  bars)  and  of  temporary  employees 
only (line), by age, EU-28, 2006-2016 

Note: 
Source:  Own calculations based on EU-LFS. 

Major  break  in  series  in  2005  so  not  possible  to  compare  with  earlier  years.  'No  answer'  category  was  not  included 

Figure 2. Share of temporary contracts and transitions from temporary to permanent 

25

20

15

10

5

0

s
e
e
y
o
l
p
m
e

y
r
a
r
o
p
m
e
t

f
o
%

O
R

T
L

E
E

V
L

G
B

K
U

T
A

T
M

E
I

E
B

L
E

U
L

Z
C

Temporary 2016

Source: Eurostat. 

I

T
I

K
S

E
D

U
H

8
2
U
E
Transitions to permanent 2015

K F
D

E
S

I

R S
F

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

%

t
r
a
n
s
i
t
i
o
n
s

t
o
p
e
r
m
a
n
e
n
t

Y
C

L
N

R
H

T
P

S
E

148 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Underemployment in the EU 

149 

 
 
Figure 4: Average share of employees receiving training in Europe 2010 and 
2015 by type of employment  
Source: EWCS 2010, 2015, weighted results, calculation Werner Eichhorst and Verena Tobsch. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table.1 Summary analysis of relevant new and non-standard forms of employment. 

Type 
of 
employmen
t 

Casual 
work:  on-
call, 
including 
zero hours 

Casual 
work: 
intermitten
t 

Numbers 

Usual profiles 

Sectors 

Tourism 
(esp. 
hospitality 
and 
catering), 
agriculture
, 
health 
and  social 
care, 
education 

4-6 
million227 

Low-skilled 
workers,  women, 
young workers 

Job 
predictability/security 

Covered 
by 
current 
WSD?226 
Partially  Very  low  (though  national 
policies  and  HR  practices 
vary) 

levels  of 

According  to  Eurofound: 
job  and 
low 
poor 
income 
security, 
social  protection, 
little 
access 
to  HR  measures 
and, in many cases, dull or 
repetitive  work.  The  high 
degree  of 
is 
valued  by  some  workers, 
from 
who  benefit 
an 
improved 
work–life 
balance,  but  is  reported  as 
excessive  for  the  majority 
of the casual workers, who 
more 
prefer 
would 

flexibility 

Trends 

Other comments 

Diverse  trends: 
On-call  work 
has emerged or 
grew 
in 
importance 
last 
the 
over 
decade  in  IE, 
IT, NL, SE and 
228  
the  UK. 
Intermittent 
work 
decreased  e.g. 
in  BE  and  SK, 
it 
while 
increased 
in 
HU and RO229   

On-call  work 
is 
illegal  in  AT,  HU, 
LV,  LT  and  SL.  It 
does  not  exist  in 
law  or  practice  in 
EE,  DE,  LU,  MT 
and PT. 

in 

Zero-hours  work  is 
illegal  in  AT  and 
LV.    It  does  not 
exist 
law  or 
practice in EE, LU, 
MT, PT. 
It  does  not  exist  in 
law  or  practice  in 
in LU and MT. 

Partially 

Agricultur
e,  tourism, 
audio-
visual 
sector 

226 See Table 1 in section 2.2.1 for a list of MS extending or not the coverage of the WSD to specific groups of workers. 
227 Based on the external study "Study to support Impact Assessment on the Review of the Written Statement Directive" by CSES and PPMI. – national research in 28 MS. 
Data very difficult to collect and compare.  
228 Eurofound (2015), New forms of employment, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, p.46 
229 Ibid, p. 49-52 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
of 
Type 
employmen
t 

Involuntar
y part-time 

Numbers 

Usual profiles 

Sectors 

Job 
predictability/security 

Trends 

Other comments 

Covered 
by 
current 
WSD?226 

of 
part-

27.7% 
all 
time 
workers 
(2016) 230 

7 
Around 
in 
million 
the 
euro 
area  alone 
in 2016.231 

younger 
Women, 
workers, 
less 
educated  workers 
and  –  especially  – 
to 
workers  new 
their  current 
job 
(tenure  <  1  year), 
those  on  temporary 
contracts  and 
in 
low-paid 
professions232 

('inter- 
mittent  du 
spectacle'  
in FR) 

continuity. 

Yes 

Medium 

Part-time  Work  Directive 
97/81/EC applies, which is 
a  specific  tool  to  ensure 
that 
part-time  workers 
should  generally  not  be 
treated in a less favourable 
manner  than  comparable 
permanent and/or full-time 
concerning 
staff 
employment 
conditions 
unless  there  are  objective 
reasons 
different 
for 
treatment. 

However,  working  fewer 

Has 
increased 
from  22.4%  in 
2007. 233 

Significant 
differences  across 
MS: 
of 
share 
part-
involuntary 
time 
in  all  part-
time employment is 
below  10%  in  BE, 
MT,  NL  and  ET  – 
while  over  60%  in 
ES,  IT,  CY  and 
EL.234 

230 EU LSF 
231 Eurostat and ECB calculations/ 
232 Eurofound (2017), Aspects of non-standard employment in Europe, Eurofound, Dublin 
233 EU LSF 
234 "Precarious employment in Europe, Part 1: Patterns, trends and policy strategy"- study for the EMPL Committee, 2016, p.75-78 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
of 
Type 
employmen
t 

Work 
between  1-
8 hours per 
week 

on 

Work 
contracts 
of  less than 

Numbers 

Usual profiles 

Sectors 

(though 
Women 
increasingly 
also 
young 
men), 
workers 
and 
workers  above  64 
years. 236 

Domestic 
work, 
cleaning, 
accommo-
dation, 
hospitality
,  hotel  and 
catering, 
care, 
security 
and 
constructi
on. 

According 
to  EU-LFS: 
3.8  million 
(2.1% 
of 
working 
age 
population 
in the EU – 
2016)235 

External 
study 
estimate: 
almost 
million 
4.8%  of  all 
temporary 
contracts  in 

4 

Covered 
by 
current 
WSD?226 

Partially  

Job 
predictability/security 

Trends 

Other comments 

than 
in 

necessary 
hours 
results 
inadequate 
income  and  consequently 
to 
lead 
may 
precariousness. 
Low 

also 

be 
They  may 
excluded  from  protections 
offered  by  the  Part-time 
Work  Directive  97/81/EC, 
to  the  extent  that  their 
employment relationship is 
qualified  as  on  a  casual 
basis. 

increased 
3.4 
in 

Has 
from 
million 
2005237 

Workers  working 
1-8 hours per week 
may  be  voluntary 
or  involuntary  –  in 
the  latter  case  they 
are  a  subcategory 
of  the  "involuntary 
part-time"  category 
above. 

Partially 

Medium 

To 

some  extent, 

such 

increased 
Has 
1.8% 
from 
(0.37  million) 

235 calculations based on EU-LFS 
236 Eurofound (2017), Aspects of non-standard employment in Europe, Eurofound, Dublin 
237 calculations based on EU-LFS 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
of 
Type 
employmen
t 

1 month 

Crowd 
work/ 
platform 
work 

Numbers 

Usual profiles 

Sectors 

Covered 
by 
current 
WSD?226 

2016 (1.275 
million)238 

the 

Estimates 
in 
external 
study:  1.6 
million. 
0.5-2%  of 
the 
workforce 
according 
to  different 
studies.240 

1.1-2.2 
million 
according 
the 
to 
estimations 
in 
the 
external 

Younger  and  better 
educated 
than 
average;  often  a 
or 
marginal 
complimentary 
activity 

as 
as 

High 
well 
low-
skilled 
sectors 

of 

Mainly 
out 
scope 
(mainly 
operating 
as 
self-
employe
d) 

Job 
predictability/security 

Trends 

Other comments 

in 2002239 

workers  may  be  protected 
the  Fixed-Term 
through 
Directive 
Work 
other 
1999/70/EC 
relevant 
law 
directives.    

and 
labour 

An exponential 
increase  in  the 
last 5 years. 

Low 

there 

Earnings are often allowed 
to fall below the applicable 
wage. 
minimum 
Moreover, 
is 
generally  no  provision  for 
paid  leave  or  breaks,  and 
workers  bear  all  the  costs 
of 
security 
risk  not 
payments,  or 
being  covered  by  social 
security  in  the  event  of 
loss  or 
job 
disability, 

social 

238 calculations based on EU-LFS 
239 calculations based on EU-LFS 
240  Inter  alia  "The  Future  of  Work  in  the  ‘Sharing  Economy",  Codagnone  et  al,  JRC  (2016)  and  Eurofound  (2017),  Aspects  of  non-standard  employment  in  Europe, 
Eurofound, Dublin 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Numbers 

Usual profiles 

Sectors 

of 
Type 
employmen
t 

Domestic 
workers 

study. 
Around 
million241 

3 

Household 
work, 
care, 
gardening, 
security 

Predominantly 
(89%)  – 
women 
migrant 
often 
women,  for  whom 
domestic  work  is  a 
main  entry  point 
labour 
the 
into 
market 

Covered 
by 
current 
WSD?226 

Yes  -  if 
employe
d under a 
contract 
or 
employm
ent 
relations
hip 
defined 
by 
national 
law. 
However
, 
majority 
operate 
under 
informal 
agreeme
nt 

– 

Job 
predictability/security 

Trends 

Other comments 

retirement. 
Very  low  –  especially  if 
lack 
employment 
contract 

of 

Low  wages.  Lack  of 
protection  against  illness, 
occupational accidents and 
workplace hazards, lack of 
access  to  social  security 
benefits, such as maternity 
and  pension 
protection 
Furthermore, 
schemes. 
is 
work 
domestic 
an 
by 
characterised 
of 
unspecified 
length 
employment 
and 
uncertainty  about  future 
Those 
employment. 
characteristics 
are 
exacerbated 
in  case  of 
undeclared work.242  

Likely  to  grow 
because 
of 
ageing 
populations 
and  increasing 
labour 
participation of 
women. 

High 
diversity 
across  the  EU:  in 
some  MS  (ES,  FR, 
IT) very significant 
numbers,  in  others 
(Nordic,  Eastern) 
very uncommon.   

to 

the 

According 
European 
for 
Federation 
Services 
to 
Individuals  (EFSI), 
in  2010,  the  share 
of informal work in 
for 
the  market 
personal 
services 
was 70%  in  IT and 
ES;  50% 
the 
UK;  45%  in  DE; 
the  NL; 
40% 

in 

in 

241 Research in the context of the external study "Study to support Impact Assessment on the Review of the Written Statement Directive" by CSES and PPMI. 
242 Invisible jobs. The situation of domestic workers, European Parliament briefing, December 2015 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Numbers 

Usual profiles 

Sectors 

of 
Type 
employmen
t 

Temporary 
Agency 
(TA) 
Workers 

1.7% of EU 
workforce
244 

Mainly 
low-
skilled 
(manual) 
and 
medium 
skilled 
profession
s 
(clerical). 

that 

Young  people  (15–
a  TA 
24)  had 
employment 
rate 
(2.9%)  more  than 
double 
of 
workers  aged  25–
54 
(1.3%).  The 
incidence  of  TA 
work  among 
the 
low-skilled  (1.8  %) 
is  also  more  than 
double  that  of  the 
high-skilled 
(0.8 
%).245 

Covered 
by 
current 
WSD?226 
often 
undeclar
ed. 
. 
Yes, 
an 
overwhel
ming 
majority 
of MS  

in 

Job 
predictability/security 

Trends 

Other comments 

30% in FR and BE; 
and 15% in SE. 243 

Medium 

TA  workers  are  covered 
by  a  specific  directive 
2008/104/EC  aiming  at 
ensuring  equal  pay  and 
conditions  with 
other 
employees. 

Has 
increased 
from  1.2%  in 
1999  to  1.7% 
of  workforce 
in 
– 
2016 
growing  trend 
in some MS 

among 

overall, 

However, 
a 
negative  perception  of  job 
security 
TA 
workers.  Diverse  situation 
across  MS:  in  at  least  8 
MS  open-ended  contracts 
between  the  agency  and 
the  worker  were 
the 
contractual 
dominant 

243 Invisible jobs. The situation of domestic workers, European Parliament briefing, December 2015 
244 Eurostat, [lfsa_qoe_4a6r2] - 2016 
245  EU-LFS data - Eurobase lfsa_qoe_4a6r2 - 2012 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Numbers 

Usual profiles 

Sectors 

of 
Type 
employmen
t 

Voucher-
based 
workers 

Some 
million247 

2 

Similar to domestic 
workers 

Household 
services, 
care, 
agriculture 

Covered 
by 
current 
WSD?226 

Partly 

Job 
predictability/security 

Trends 

Other comments 

in  others 
form, 
fixed-term contracts. 246 
Medium 

it  was 

some 

social 

work 
Voucher-based 
job 
entails 
insecurity, 
and 
professional  isolation,  and 
to  HR 
limited  access 
measures 
career 
and 
development,  but  offers 
workers the opportunity to 
work  legally,  better  social 
protection 
and  perhaps 
better pay.248 

is 

not 

There 
a 
significant  number 
of  MS  where 
voucher-based 
work 
is 
specifically 
recognized 
legislation/not 
widely  used  (CY, 
CZ,  DE,  DK,  EE, 
ES,  HU,  IE,  LU, 
LV,  MT,  PL,  PT, 
RO, SE, SK, UK) 

by 

the 
While 
of 
volume 
domestic  work 
to 
is 
likely 
the 
grow, 
of 
numbers 
voucher-based 
workers  will 
depend  on  the 
legislative 
developments 
in MS. 

Member  States 
are 
increasingly 
promoting 
internships  as 

Paid 
trainees 

of 

46% 
young 
people  (18-
years 
35 
had 
old) 

Young  people  (18-
35 years old) 

All sectors  Partially 

Medium. 

In  some 
MS  they 
are 

studies 

and 
Various 
surveys250 
confirmed 
concerns  about  the  quality 

246 OECD Employment Outlook 2014, Non-regular employment, job security and labour market divide 
247 External study "Study to support Impact Assessment on the Review of the Written Statement Directive" by CSES and PPMI. 
248 Eurofound (2015), New forms of employment, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, p.82. 
250 Interns Revealed, European Youth Forum, 2011; Eurobarometer on traineeships, 2013. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Numbers 

Usual profiles 

Sectors 

of 
Type 
employmen
t 

a 
done 
traineeship 
-  4  out  10 
received 
some 
financial 
compensati
during 
on 
their  most 
recent 
traineeship. 
249 

Job 
predictability/security 

Trends 

Other comments 

traineeships, 
of 
particularly  with  regard  to 
insufficient 
learning 
content  and  substandard 
working conditions. 

that 

The Eurobarometer survey 
on  traineeships  in  2013251  
showed that 1 in 5 trainees 
felt 
their  working 
conditions  were  not  on  a 
with 
regular 
par 
employees 
terms  of 
in 
equipment, working hours, 
workload and treatment. 

effective 
an 
tool in tackling 
rising 
youth 
unemployment 
and 
ensuring 
their school-to-
work 
transition.  
Likewise, 
employers 
increasingly 
see  traineeship 
not  only  as  a 
prerequisite for 
labour  market 
entry,  but  also 
as  a  cheap  or 
even 
free 
labour  that  can 
substitute 
regular staff.252   

as 

Covered 
by 
current 
WSD?226 
recogniz
ed 
employe
es, 
therefore 
are in the 
scope  of 
the 
Directive
. 
In 
others 
they  fall 
outside 
of 
scope 
(though 
in  some 
cases 
might 
have  the 
right 
to 
informati
on 

the 

249 Eurobarometer 378: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_378_en.pdf  
251 Eurobarometer 378: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_378_en.pdf  
252 European Commission (2012). Study on a comprehensive overview on traineeship arrangements in Member States. Final Synthesis Report. 

 
 
 
                                                 
of 
Type 
employmen
t 

Contracts 
or 
employmen
t 
relationshi
ps 
specific 
nature 

of 

Bogus  self-
employed 

Numbers 

Usual profiles 

Sectors 

Covered 
by 
current 
WSD?226 
similar to 
WSD 
provision
). 

Job 
predictability/security 

Trends 

Other comments 

Agricultur
e, 
seafarers, 
family 
jobs, 
temporary 
student 
jobs 

Partially 

Unknown. 

Very  diverse  groups  of 
workers  across  the  14  MS 
which  use  the  exclusion 
from the WSD on the basis 
or 
"Contracts 
of 
employment  relationships 
of specific nature" 
self-employment 
Bogus 
can  be  characterized  as  an 
employer 
of 
contractual  relations,  and 
these  workers  are  also, 
compared 
to  employed 
workers, at a higher risk of 
precariousness  due  to  a 
lack  of  social  security  and 
pension  coverage  and  a 

abuse 

are 

Self-
employe
d 
outside 
of  scope 
of 
the 
Directive
.  

Workers 

Between  2010 
and  2015  the 
share 
overall 
self-
of 
in 
employed 
total 
employment 
has 
rather 
except 

remained 
stable, 
in 

2015 

In 
dependent 
self-
employmen
t  amounted 
to  0.5%  of 
all 
employmen
t in the EU-
28.253  No 

253 European Working Conditions Survey for EU-28. Dependent self-employed defined as : workers who are (1) self-employed without employees, (2) have just one client 
and (3) obtain more than 75% of their income from that client 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Numbers 

Usual profiles 

Sectors 

of 
Type 
employmen
t 

data 
available  as 
to 
the 
proportion 
of 
those 
who  could 
be 
categorized 
as 
bogus 
self-
employed. 

Covered 
by 
current 
WSD?226 
wrongly 
classified 
as 
self-
employe
d  should 
however 
fall 
under the 
scope. 

Job 
predictability/security 

Trends 

Other comments 

lack  of  access  to  some 
employment rights. 254 

Greece  which 
recorded 
a 
substantial 
increase.  
The 
number 
and  share  of 
self-employed 
without 
employees 
have 
growing 
number 
Member 
States. 

been 
in  a 
of 

254 "Precarious employment in Europe, Part 1: Patterns, trends and policy strategy"- study for the EMPL Committee, 2016 

 
 
 
                                                 
Tables  2-7:  Estimated  numbers  of  some  relevant  categories  of  non-
standard workers 

Table 2. Estimated number of casual workers  

Country 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Czech Republic 

Germany 

Denmark 

Estonia 

Greece 

Spain 

Finland 

France 

Croatia 

Hungary 

Ireland 

Italy 

Netherlands 

Portugal 

Romania 

Sweden 

Slovenia 

Slovakia 

United Kingdom 

Total 

Estimated number of casual workers 
(in thousands) 

Lower range 

Upper range 

345.0 

6.5 

62.3 

30.1 

324.0 

49.7 

13.8 

94.0 

400.0 

83.0 

106.0 

1.5 

119.6 

500.0 

120 

378 

90.1 

516.0 

134.1 

36.1 

416.0 

516.0 

4,341.9 

345.0 

6.5 

75.0 

130.4 

324.0 

59.8 

13.8 

113.0 

400.0 

83.0 

106.0 

1.5 

119.6 

500.0 

120 

777.0 

108.4 

516.0 

134.1 

36.1 

416.0 

1422.0 

5,807 

Source:Own CSES PPMI calculations 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Estimated number of employees working less than eight hours 

Estimated number of employees working less than eight hours 
(in thousands) 

Country 

AT 

BE 

BG 

CY 

CZ 

DE 

DK 

EE 

EL 

ES 

FI 

FR 

HR 

HU 

IE 

IT 

LT 

LU 

LV 

MT 

NL 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SE 

SI 

SK 

Micro companies  
& SMEs (<250 
employees) 
 82.82  

 29.78  

 7.78  

 6.20  

 34.06  

 453.47  

 44.56  

 6.31  

 27.83  

 113.02  

 47.97  

 436.76  

 22.58  

 40.54  

 54.04  

 312.39  

 25.12  

 0.83  

 4.42  

 2.63  

 211.05  

 215.78  

 32.83  

 38.95  

 61.43  

 12.20  

 6.70  

Large companies (>=250 
employees) 

 65.03  

 32.49  

 2.67  

 3.70  

 7.95  

 233.26  

 72.23  

 3.36  

 30.69  

 149.25  

 31.92  

 97.06  

 7.36  

 33.87  

 14.54  

 91.25  

 5.27  

 0.81  

 4.65  

 4.30  

 69.43  

 83.66  

 8.97  

 20.18  

 50.35  

 7.11  

 10.22  

UK 
Source: Own CSES PPMI calculations 

 155.15  

 265.19  

Total 

 147.85  

 62.27  

 17.73  

 9.91  

 42.01  

 686.72  

 116.79  

 9.66  

 58.53  

 262.26  

 79.89  

 533.81  

 29.93  

 74.41  

 68.58  

 403.63  

 30.39  

 1.64  

 9.07  

 6.93  

 280.48  

 299.45  

 41.80  

 59.12  

 111.78  

 19.31  

 16.92  

 420.34  

 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Estimated number of employees working less than one month 

Estimated number of employees working less than one month 
(in thousands) 

Country 

Micro companies  
& SMEs (<250 
employees) 

Large companies (>=250 
employees) 

Total 

AT 

BE 

BG 

CY 

CZ 

DE 

DK 

EE 

EL 

ES 

FI 

FR 

HR 

HU 

IE 

IT 

LT 

LU 

LV 

MT 

NL 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SE 

SI 

SK 

UK 

14.0 

43.9 

7.7 

1.3 

1.1 

164.5 

4.8 

1.1 

3.4 

82.3 

13.4 

434.7 

10.8 

11.0 

1.9 

61.1 

6.6 

0.9 

2.5 

0.4 

4.8 

53.0 

45.1 

27.9 

53.0 

1.8 

6.7 

11.6 

Total 

1071.3 

11.0 

47.9 

1.37 

0.8 

0.25 

84.6 

7.7 

0.6 

3.7 

108.6 

8.9 

96.6 

3.51 

9.15 

0.51 

17.86 

1.38 

0.89 

2.65 

0.70 

1.58 

20.56 

12.32 

14.47 

43.43 

1.07 

10.21 

19.81 

532.2 

25.1 

91.8 

9.1 

2.1 

1.3 

249.1 

12.5 

1.7 

7.1 

190.9 

22.3 

531.3 

14.3 

20.1 

2.4 

79 

8.0 

1.8 

5.2 

1.1 

6.4 

73.6 

57.4 

42.4 

96.4 

2.9 

16.9 

31.4 

1603.5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own CSES PPMI calculations 

Table 5 Estimated number of domestic workers 

ILO study 

National research  

Estimated population 

Country 

AT 

BE 

BG 

CY 

CZ 

DE 

DK 

EE 

EL 

ES 

FI 

FR 

HR 

HU 

IE 

IT 

LT 

LU 

LV 

MT 

NL 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SE 

SI 

SK 

UK 

Share of domestic 
workers in total 
employment 
0.2% 

0.9% 

0.2% 

4.4% 

0.1% 

0.5% 

0.1% 

2% 

4% 

0.3% 

2.3% 

0.1% 

<0.1% 

0.5% 

1.8% 

0.1% 

1.4% 

0.4% 

0.1% 

0.1% 

0.1% 

3.4% 

0.3% 

0.1% 

0.2% 

0.6% 

Percentage of 
employees 

5% of employees* 

1% of workers* 

5% of workers* 

1% of employees* 

1% of employees 

3% of employees* 

4% of employees 

2% of employees* 

5% of employees* 

9% of employees* 

2% of employees* 

9% of employees255 

No. of workers 
(in thousands) 

                 132.8  

                   40.9  

                   16.0  

                   15.5  

                   23.4  

                 282.0  

2.7 

                     5.0  

                   72.2  

                 666.9  

                     7.1  

                 534.4  

                     1.8  

                     8.7  

                     9.8  

                 629.8  

                     1.3  

                     3.6  

                   35.6  

                     0.2 

                 8.2  

15.9 

                   44.8  

                   24.4  

                   39.0  

                     0.9 

                   96.7  

                   182.5 

255 Based on reporting by households employing domestic workers, thus heavily under-reported 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Total 

Source: Own CSES PPMI calculations 

Table 6 Estimated number of platform workers 

Country 

Estimated number of platform workers 
(in thousands) 

2902.4 

AT 

BE 

BG 

CY 

CZ 

DE 

DK 

EE 

EL 

ES 

FI 

FR 

HR 

HU 

IE 

IT 

LT 

LU 

LV 

MT 

NL 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SE 

SI 

SK 

UK 

Lower bound 
 20.71  

Upper bound 
 41.43  

 22.70  

 14.77  

 1.77  

 25.08  

 200.83  

 13.74  

 3.06  

 18.05  

 90.91  

 11.90  

 131.22  

 7.83  

 21.55  

 9.77  

 111.21  

 6.59  

 1.30  

 4.31  

 0.94  

 41.12  

 79.51  

 21.86  

 40.83  

 23.68  

 4.51  

 12.36  

 152.12  

 45.41  

 29.54  

 3.54  

 50.16  

 401.65  

 27.48  

 6.12  

 36.10  

 181.83  

 23.80  

 262.43  

 15.67  

 43.09  

 19.53  

 222.41  

 13.18  

 2.59  

 8.62  

 1.89  

 82.23  

 159.02  

 43.71  

 81.66  

 47.36  

 9.03  

 24.72  

 304.24  

Source: Own CSES PPMI calculations 

 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 Estimated number of voucher-based workers 

Country  Estimated number of voucher-based workers 

(in thousands) 

Micro companies 
& SMEs (<250 
employees) 

Large companies (>=250) 

Total 

AT 

BE 

EL 

FR 

HR 

LT 

NL 

SI 

Total 

4.0 

62.3 

33.3 

1080.0 

380.6 

12.4 

75.2 

3.8 

1651.6 

Source: Own CSES PPMI calculations 

3.1 

68.0 

36.7 

240.0 

124.0 

2.6 

24.8 

2.2 

501.5 

7.1 

130.3 

70.0 

1320.0 

504.6 

15.0 

100.0 

6.0 

2153.1 

 
 
ANNEX 7: SUMMARY OF EU SOCIAL ACQUIS 

The  protection  of  workers  at  the  EU  level  is  currently  ensured  through  secondary 
legislation, mostly  in  the  form of  Directives on the basis of what are  now Articles  153 
and  157  TFEU  on  social  policy,256  including  a  set  of  individual  and  collective  rights. 
Many  of  these  give  a  more  concrete  expression  or  implementation  of  social  rights  as 
derived from the Treaties and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.  

Several Directives aim to implement the principle of equal treatment between persons 
in  the  workplace.  The  Employment  Equality  Directive257  prohibits  discrimination  in 
employment  on  the  basis  of  sexual  orientation,  religious  belief,  age  and  disability, 
and  the  Racial  Equality  Directive258  prohibit  discrimination  on  the  basis  of  race  and 
ethnicity  in  employment,  in  education,  and  in  access  to  social  security  and  goods  and 
services. In 2006, the Gender Recast Directive consolidated into a single Directive earlier 
EU legislation relating to equal opportunities and equal treatment for men and women 
in employment and occupation.259  

The Pregnant Workers (Maternity Leave) Directive provides for paid maternity leave, at 
least  at  the  level  of  sick  pay  for  fourteen  weeks.260  In  addition,  the  Directive  on  self-
employed  workers  and  assisting  spouses  also  grants  a  maternity  allowance  that  is 
sufficient to enable an interruption of occupational activities for at least fourteen  weeks 
for  female  self-employer  workers  or  female  spouses  of  self-employed  workers.261  The 
Parental  Leave  Directive262  entitles  men  and  women  workers  to  a  minimum  of  four 
months' leave after the birth or adoption of a child. The proposal from the Commission 
for  a  Directive  on  work-life  balance  for  parents  and  carers  currently  in  the 
legislative  procedure263  would  replace  Council  Directive  2010/18/EU,  preserving 
existing rights but also introducing new rights to paternity leave, leave to take care of 
ill or dependant relatives, and to request flexible working arrangements. 

Three separate EU labour law Directives, concerning fixed-term work, part-time work 
and  temporary  agency  work  aim  to  ensure  equal  treatment  and  prevent  abuse  of 

256  For  a  detailed  overview,  refer  to  the  Commission  Staff  Working  Document  The  EU  Social  Acquis, 
accompanying  the  Communication  Launching  a  consultation  on  an  European  Pillar  of  Social  Rights, 
SWD(2016) 51 final. 
257 Directive 2000/78 
258 Directive 2000/43 
259 The Recast Directive 2006/54/EC 
260 Directive 92/85/EEC 
261 Directive 2010/41/EU 
262  Directive 2010/18/EU implementing the revised Framework Agreement on parental leave 
263  Proposal  for  a  Directive  on  work-life  balance  for  parents  and  carers  and  repealing  Council  Directive 
2010/18/EU,  COM(2017) 253 final 

167 

 
 
                                                 
‘atypical’ contracts.264 Where a worker is employed under such an atypical contract, he 
or  she  should  generally  not  be  treated  in  a  less  favorable  manner  than  comparable 
permanent  and/or  fulltime  staff  concerning  employment  conditions  unless  there  are 
objective reasons for different treatment. Under the Temporary Agency Work Directive 
for instance, from the first day of their assignment, temporary agency workers have to be 
subject to the same basic working and employment conditions as if they were recruited 
directly by the user firm to occupy the same job. The Fixed-Term Work Directive also 
includes  an  'anti-abuse'  clause  to  impede  unjustified  successions  of  such  contracts.  An 
additional Directive extends the EU rules on occupational health and safety to temporary 
workers,  generally  more  exposed  to  the  risk  of  accidents  at  work  and  occupational 
diseases.265    These  protections  do  not  however  always  apply  to  the  other  newer 
forms  of  atypical  employment  discussed  in  Section  2.2.1  above,  notably  casual, 
marginal part-time or platform work.  

The  Working Time  Directive266  provides  a limit to  weekly  working  time, which  must 
not exceed 48 hours on average, including overtime. It also prescribes a minimum daily 
rest period of 11 consecutive hours, a rest break during working hours, and a minimum 
weekly rest period of 24 uninterrupted hours. The Directive also lays down the right to 
minimum paid annual leave of 4 weeks. The Working Time Directive allows flexibility 
to  accommodate  differences  between  national  rules  or  the  requirements  of  specific 
activities.  In  addition  to  the  Working  Time  Directive,  specific  directives  apply  to  a 
number  of  transport  sectors.267  An  interpretative  communication  providing  legal 
guidance  on  the  application  of  the  Directive  has  been  adopted  as  part  of  the  European 
Pillar of Social Rights deliverables.268 

264  Fixed-Term  Work  Directive  1999/70/EC;  Part-time  Work  Directive  97/81/EC;  Temporary  Agency 
Work Directive 2008/104/EC 
265 Directive 91/383/EEC 
266 Directive 2003/88/EC 
267 Minimum standards for working time in the civil aviation sector are laid down in Directive 2000/79/EC. 
Directive  2005/47/EC  implements  the  Social  Partners  agreement  on  certain  aspects  of  the  working 
conditions  of  mobile  workers  engaged  in  interoperable  cross-border  services  in  the  railway  sector. 
Directive 2002/15/EC in turn sets the framework for the organisation of working time for mobile workers 
in road transport activities and self-employed drivers. Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 provides for minimum 
requirements on the daily and weekly driving times, minimum breaks and daily and weekly rest periods for 
drivers engaged in the carriage of goods and passengers by road. These provisions reinforce the existing 
rules on the organisation of the working time and are strictly monitored by means of recording equipment. 
The  working  time  of  seafarers  is  regulated  by  Directive  1999/63/EC.  Also  to  be  mentioned  is  Council 
Directive 2014/112/EU of 19 December 2014 implementing  the European Agreement  concerning certain 
aspects  of  the  organisation  of  working  time  in  inland  waterway  transport,  concluded  by  the  European 
Barge  Union  (EBU),  the  European  Skippers  Organisation  (ESO)  and  the  European  Transport  Workers' 
Federation (ETF). 
268 Interpretative Communication on Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, C/2017/2601 

168 

 
 
                                                 
EU rules in the social policy area guarantee workers’ right to  occupational health and 
safety (OSH). A Framework Directive and 23 individual directives provide rules on the 
prevention  of  occupational  risks,  the  protection  of  safety  and  health,  the  elimination  of 
risk and accident factors.269 The Framework Directive establishes general principles for 
managing  safety  and  health,  such  as  responsibility  of  the  employer,  rights/duties  of 
workers,  using  risk  assessments  to  continuously  improve  company  processes,  and 
workplace  health  and  safety  representation.  All  individual  directives  follow  these 
common principles, tailoring the principles of the Framework Directive to specific tasks, 
specific hazards at work, specific workplaces and sectors, and specific groups of workers. 
The  individual  Directives  define  how  to  assess  these  risks  and,  in  some  instances,  set 
limit exposure values for certain substances or agents.  

To ensure fair and just working conditions also in the context of the temporary provision 
of services across borders, the Posting of Workers Directive270 provides that a host State 
is  required to apply to workers posted to its territory  certain basic standards of its own 
labour law system (e.g. minimum wage, working time, holidays) as laid down in national 
legislation  or  universally  applicable  collective  agreement.  The  Enforcement  Directive 
allows  host  States  more  effective  methods  of  enforcing  labour  standards  in  these 
situations.271  On  8  March  2016,  the  European  Commission  proposed  a  revision  of  the 
rules  on  posting  of  workers  within  the  EU  to  ensure  they  remain  fit  for  purpose.272 
Moreover,  the  Commission  adopted  a  proposal  for  a  directive  amending  Directive 
2006/22/EC  as  regards  enforcement  requirements  and  laying  down  specific  rules  with 
respect to Directive 96/71/EC and Directive 2014/67/EU for posting drivers in the road 
transport sector.273 

Free  movement  is  also  supported  via  the  Regulation  on  free  movement  of  workers 
(Regulation  492/2011)  and  the  Directive  on  free  movement  of  workers  (Directive 
2014/54/EU).  The  coordination  of  Social  security  systems  is  regulated  by  Regulation 

269  Framework  Directive  89/391/EEC  and  Directive  89/654/EEC  on  minimum  safety  and  health 
requirements for the workplace; 92/57/EEC on temporary or mobile construction sites; 92/91/EEC on the 
mineral-extracting industries through drilling; 92/104/EEC on workers in surface and underground mineral 
extracting industries; 93/103/EC on fishing vessels; 92/29/EEC on improved medical treatment on board 
vessels;  89/656/EEC  on  personal  protective  equipment;  90/269/EEC  on  the  manual  handling  of  loads; 
90/270/EEC  on  work  with  display  screen  equipment;  92/58EEC  on  safety  and/or  health  signs  at  work; 
2009/104/EC on work equipment; 92/85/EEC on pregnant workers; 2013/35/EU on electromagnetic fields; 
1999/92/EC  on  explosive  atmospheres;  2002/44/EC  on  mechanical  vibration;  2003/10/EC  on  noise; 
2006/25/EC on artificial optical radiation; 2000/54/EC on biological agents at work; 2010/32/EU on sharp 
injuries in the hospital and healthcare sector; 98/24/EC on chemical agents; 2004/37/EC on carcinogens or 
mutagens; 2009/148/EC on asbestos. 
38 Directive 96/71/EC 
39 Directive 2014/67/EU 
272 Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 96/71/EC of The European Parliament and of the Council 
of  16  December  1996  concerning  the  posting  of  workers  in  the  framework  of  the  provision  of  services, 
COM(2016) 128 final 
273 COM/2017/0278 final - 2017/0121 (COD)  

169 

 
 
                                                 
883/2004  and  by  Regulation  987/2009  on  its  implementation,  to  protect  the  social 
security rights of workers moving within the EU. 

A Directive on seasonal work sets important labour standards for third country nationals 
engaging  in  seasonal  work  in  the  EU.274  The  Directive  provides  the  principle  of  equal 
treatment between third country nationals and Union nationals, particularly as regards the 
freedom of association and the right to strike, concerning terms of employment, working 
conditions and social security benefits. The Single Permit Directive establishes a single 
application procedure for a single permit to work in the EU and a common set of rights 
for third country workers legally residing in a Member State.275  A common set of rights 
for  intra-corporate  transferees  when  working  in  the  EU,  facilitating  their  entry  and 
mobility between Member States is provided by Directive on the conditions of entry and 
residence of third country nationals in the framework of intra-corporate transfers.276 

Article  153  TFEU  provides  for  the  possibility  for  the  EU  to  support  Member  States  in 
ensuring  the  protection  of  workers  where  their  employment  contract  is  terminated, 
notably  through  the  adoption  by  unanimity  voting  of  Directives  laying  down  minimum 
standards. There is no secondary EU law to implement this right. Similarly, there are no 
EU rules regarding the length of probation periods.   

Three  different  Directives  are  concerned  with  the  potential  termination  of  the 
employment  contract  in  the  event  of  structural  changes  in  companies.  They  embody 
the  basic  right  to  protection  against  unjustified  dismissal,  but  only  in  ‘collective’ 
circumstances.  The  Insolvency  Directive  ensures  payment  of  employees'  outstanding 
claims  in  the  event  of  the  employer's  insolvency.277  The  Collective  Redundancies 
Directive regulates the situation of workers affected by decisions of employers to lay off 
a group of employees.278 The Transfer of Undertakings Directive279 protects employees’ 
rights in the event that an undertaking, business, or part of an undertaking or business is 
transferred from one employer to another, stipulating inter alia that such a transfer does 
not  in  itself  constitute  valid  grounds  for  dismissal.  The  Directives  on  transfer  of 
undertakings and collective redundancies provide for information and consultation rights. 
The  already  mentioned  Maternity  Leave  Directive280  prohibits  women's  dismissal  from 
work  because  of  maternity  for  the  period  from  the  beginning  of  their  pregnancy  to  the 
end  of  the  period  of  maternity  leave,  save  exceptional  circumstances,  for  which  the 

274 Directive 2014/36 
275 Directive 2011/98/EU 
276 Directive 2014/66/EU 
277 Directive 2008/94/EC 
278 Directive 98/59/EC 
279 Directive 2001/23/EC 
280 Directive 92/85/EEC 

170 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
employer needs to give justification in writing. The Recast Directive281 furthermore sets 
out that workers taking paternity or adoption leave should be protected against dismissal 
due to exercising those rights. 

The  Directive  establishing  a  framework  for  equal  treatment  in  employment282  protects 
workers against dismissal where there is discrimination on a prohibited ground, including 
victimisation.283 

The promotion of social dialogue is enshrined as a common objective of the EU and 
the Member States in Articles 151 and 152 TFEU. The rights of association, collective 
bargaining,  to  strike  or  to  impose  lock-outs  are  excluded  from  the  application  of  this 
article. The role of the social partners is recognised at EU level, taking into account the 
diversity  of  national  systems  and  their  autonomy  (Art  152  TFEU).  Eight  social  partner 
agreements have been implemented pursuant to Article 155(2) TFEU.284 

The  general  Information  and  Consultation  Directive285  establishes  a  framework  for 
informing and consulting employees at enterprise level. Information and consultation are 
required  on  the  development  of  the  undertaking's  activities,  economic  situation  and 
employment,  and  particularly  anticipatory  measures  where  there  is  a  threat  of 
restructuring, and likely changes in work organisation or in contractual relations.  

The European Works Council Directive286 provides for the creation of a Works Council 
(a  body  representing  the  employees  of  a  transnational  company,  to  inform  and  consult 
them  on  the  progress  of  the  business  and  any  decisions  significant  for  their  working 
conditions)  at  the  request  of  100  employees  of  at  least  two  undertakings  or 
establishments in  at least  two Member  States,  or  on the initiative  of the employer. The 
involvement  of  employees,  including  at  board  level,  is  also  provided  by  company  law 
Directives.287 Finally, the Cross-Border Mergers Directive288 provides for detailed rules 
of employee participation in the event of mergers of limited liability companies. 

281 Directive 2006/54/EC 
282 Directive 2000/78/EC 
283 Other EU anti-discrimination Directives (such as Directive 2006/54/EC or Directive 2000/43/EC) also 
provide specific protection against unfair dismissal. 
284 Articles 153 and 154 TFEU. Examples of such cross-industry agreements are: Parental leave (revised) 
(2009),  Fixed-term  contracts  (1999);  Part-time  work  (1997);  Parental  leave  (1996).  Autonomous 
Framework agreements implemented by social partners: Inclusive labour markets (2010); Harassment and 
violence at work (2007); Work-related stress (2004); Telework (2002). 
285 Directive 2002/14/EC 
286 Directive 2009/38/EC 
287  Firstly,  Directive  2001/86/EC  supplementing  the  Statute  for  a  European  company  with  regard  to  the 
involvement  of  employees  provides  that  the  establishment  of  a  European  company  will  not  mean  the 
disappearance  or  watering  down  of  existing  employee  involvement  arrangements,  calling  for  agreement 
between  the  employer  and  the  representatives  of  employees  and  providing  subsidiary  rules  applicable  in 
the  absence  of  agreement.  Secondly,  Directive  2003/72/EC  on  the  information,  consultation  and 

171 

 
 
                                                 
 
The  Young  People  at  Work  Directive289  requires  Member  States  to  take  the  necessary 
measures to prohibit work by children, particularly that the minimum working age is not 
lower than the minimum age at which compulsory full-time schooling ends, or 15 years 
in any event. Exceptions can be adopted by Member States for occasional work or short-
term  work,  involving  domestic  service  in  a  private  household  or  work  regarded  as  not 
being  harmful,  damaging  or  dangerous  to  young  people  in  a  family  undertaking,  for 
cultural,  artistic,  sporting  or  advertising  activities,  subject  to  prior  authorisation  by  the 
competent authority in each specific case, for children of at least 14 years of age working 
under  a  combined  work/training  scheme,  and  for  children  of  at  least  14  years  of  age 
performing  light  work.  The  Directive  provides  specific  limits  to  maximum  weekly 
working time, night work and minimum rest periods for children and adolescents when 
they engage in employment.290 

Finally, the worker is entitled to receive essential information relating to the employment 
relationship  in  writing,  not  later  than  two  months  after  the  commencement  of 
employment on the basis of the Written Statement Directive.291 

participation  rights  of  employees  in  a  European  Cooperative  Society  provides  that  information, 
consultation and in some cases, participation procedures at transnational level are to be used whenever a 
European Cooperative is created. 
288 Directive 2005/56/EC 
289 Directive 94/33/EC 
290 See also Commission Recommendation of 31 January 1967 to the Member States on the protection of 
young  workers  and  the  Commission  Recommendation  of  15  September  2000  on  the  ratification  of 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention No 182 of 17 June 1999 concerning the prohibition 
and immediate action for the elimination of the worst forms of child labour. 
291 Directive 91/533/EEC 

172 

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
ANNEX  8:  FURTHER  INFORMATION  ON  CONSIDERED  POLICY 
MEASURES 

1.  A scope of application encompassing all EU workers, in particular the most 

precarious 

The scope of application of the Written Statement Directive as it stands today is set out in 
its first Article: 

"1.  This  Directive  shall  apply  to  every  paid  employee  having  a  contract  or 
employment  relationship  defined  by  the  law  in  force  in  a  Member  State  and/or 
governed by the law in force in a Member State. 

2.   Member States may provide that this Directive shall not apply to employees 
having a contract or employment relationship: 
(a)  with  a  total  duration  not  exceeding  one  month,  and/or  with  a  working  week 
not exceeding eight hours; or 
(b)  of  a  casual  and/or  specific  nature  provided,  in  these  cases,  that  its  non-
application is justified by objective considerations." 

The  proposed  measure  aims  to  extend  the  scope  of  the  Directive  by  removing  the 
exclusions and reiterating criteria for establishing who is a worker for the purpose of the 
Directive: 

Removing the possibilities under the existing Directive to exclude: 

1.1: people working less than 8h/week 

1.2: people whose employment relationship will last less than 1 month 

1.3: people having a contract or employment relationship of a casual or specific nature 
provided that its non-application is justified by objective considerations 

1.4. Confirming/ensuring that the Directive covers any natural person who for a certain 
period of time performs services for and under the direction of another person in return 
for remuneration.292 

Member States affected: 

292 These criteria are based on the jurisprudence of CJEU as developed since case Lawrie-Blum, C-66/85, 
and most recently stated in C-216/15 Ruhrlandklinik. 

173 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  Workers  working  less  than  8  hours  per  week  excluded  by  the  Directive  in  CY, 

DK, MT, SE. 

  Workers employed for less than one month excluded by the Directive in AT, CY, 

CZ, DK, FI, DE, EL, IE, LT, MT, SK, ES, UK, possibly in SE 

  Domestic workers not covered by the Directive: HU, NL, SE, and possibly BG, 

HR, CZ, DK, EE, IE, PL, SK, SL 

  Platform  workers  not  covered  by  the  Directive:  AT,  FR,  HU,  LT,  LV,  LU,  PL, 
SL, SE, UK, and possibly BG, HR, CZ, DE, EE, EL, IE, IT, MT, NL, PT, RO, 
SK 

  Voucher based workers not covered by the Directive: 

AT, BG, CY, CZ, DK, EE, DE, EL, HU, IE, IT, LT, LV, LU, MT, PL, PT, SK, 
SL, SE, UK and possibly RO. However, it must be noted that in many of those 
MS,  voucher  work  does  not  exist.  In  the  six  MS  that  have  regulated  voucher 
workers,  they  either  have  a  specific  regulation  regarding  voucher  workers  (in 
Croatia)  or  they  are  covered  by  standard  labour  law  (for  example  in  Spain). 
Voucher-based work is reported to be used in about a third of EU Member States 
(AT, BE, EL, FR, HR, IT, LT, NL and SI). Where data are available, they show 
an increasing trend in voucher-based employment. 

  Paid trainees not covered in CZ, FI, HU and possibly AT, BG, HR, EE, IE, RO, 

SK, SE, UK 

  Zero-hour  contract  workers  not  covered  by the  Directive:  AT,  HU,  LV,  LT,  SL 
(illegal – no change needed) + EE, DE, LU, MT, PT (do not exist either in law or 
practice yet) and possibly BG, HR. CY. CZ, DK, IE, IT, PL, RO, SK, UK 

  On-demand workers not covered: AT, LV (illegal – no change needed) + EE, LU, 
MT, PT (do not exist either in law or practice yet) and possibly BG, HR, CY, CZ, 
DK, IE, IT, PL, RO, SK, SL, UK 
Intermittent workers not covered: LU, MT (do not exist either in law or practice 
yet ) and possibly AT, BG, HR, CY, CZ, DK, HU, IE, IT, PL, SK, SL, UK 

 

  Temporary agency workers not covered: AT, UK and possibly BG, CZ, EL, ML, 

SL 

To facilitate the practical implementation of the Directive, the proposal permits Member 
States  to  provide  that  very  short  relationships  fall  outside  scope  of  the  Directive293  by 
including  a  threshold  of  up  to  8h  per  month  (sub-measure  1.5.).  This  aims  at  avoiding 
uncertainties  on  relationships  that  are  of  extremely  marginal  nature  and  where  the 
protection provided for by the proposal may be disproportionate. 

293 In the calculations of the CBA it is assumed conservatively only the removal of current exclusions not 
knowing  which  MSs  will  adopt  the  new  threshold.  This  derogation  does  not  apply  to  an  employment 
relationship where no guaranteed amount of paid work is predetermined before the employment starts. 

174 

 
 
 
                                                 
2.  A right to information on the applicable working conditions 

This  measure  updates  Article  2 of the  Written Statement Directive, taking into account 
the deficiencies identified by the REFIT evaluation  and the inputs from Social Partners 
during the first and second phase consultations. 

It  does  so  by  introducing  new  elements  relating  to  (i)  duration  and  conditions  of 
probation, if any, (ii) training entitlements, if any, (iii) arrangements for overtime and its 
remuneration (in the light of CJEU judgment in Lange (C-306/07) that such information 
forms  part  of  the  'essential  aspects  of  the  employment  relationship'  about  which  the 
worker  should  be  informed  in  the  written  statement),  (iv)  key  information  about  the 
determination of variable working schedules, to take account of the increasing prevalance 
of such types of work organisation such as casual or zero-hours contracts, (v) information 
about the social security system attached to the employment relationship. 

The  REFIT  evaluation  drew  attention  to  the  practice  in  several  Member  States  of 
providing a template to employers in order to reduce the burden of producing the written 
statement, and suggested that such a template could be produced at EU level. While the 
Commission does not consider it feasible to produce a single template intended to apply 
in  all  Member  State  jurisdictions,  given  the  diversity  of  systems  and  approaches  for 
which it would have to provide, it considers it would be helpful both to employers and to 
workers, not only as a way of reducing the burden of compliance for employers but also 
of  improving  the  quality  and  consistency  of  information  provided  to  workers.  The 
provision  of  such  templates  by  Member  States  would  be  mandatory  under  the  revised 
Directive,  as  well  as  their  ensuring  ease  of  access  for  employers  to  the  information 
provided  for  in  laws,  regulations,  statutory  provisions  or  collective  agreements  which 
they must communicate in the written statement.  

Additions to the information package are suggested as specified in the Table in section 5.   

All  of  those  measures  above  would  increase  transparency  and  reduce  the  information 
disparity  between  employer  and  employee.  None  would  add  a  substantial  burden  to 
employers of any size, given that they require no new action but simply extend the list of 
information  to  be  provided  in  the  written  statement  and  depend  on  information  that  is 
readily available to the employer and would not require additional effort to acquire. The 
provision by Member States of templates for the written statement, and readily-available 
information  to  support  the  production  of  the  statement,  would  reduce  the  burdens  on 
employers further.  

To the extent that increased transparency about workers' rights may lead to a greater level 
of  demand  from  workers  to  exercise  them  (notably  in  respect  of  training,  sickness  or 
maternity/parental leave), there may be an indirect impact increasing costs for employers 
and/or  for  the  state.  This  is  likely  to  be  substantially  outweighed  by  the  benefits  in 
productivity, worker retention, and health deriving from greater use of these rights. 

To the extent that the provision of some types of information may constrain - by making 
visible and so potentially opposable in a court of law - unscrupulous employers' scope to 

175 

 
 
 
use  unfair  or  abusive  practices  (such  as  excessive  probation  periods,  unfair  dismissal, 
highly  variable  and  unstable  working  hours),  the  extended  information  package  would 
contribute to fulfilling Principle 5 "Secure and Adaptable Employment" of the European 
Pillar  of  Social  Rights294  and  Article  31  "Fair  and  just  working  conditions"  of  the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights. It would also help create a level playing field 
for  competition  among  undertakings  in  the  single  market,  by  reducing  the  scope  for 
competition based on "social dumping".  

Action  is  required  at  EU  level  to  prevent  the  existence  of  different  regulatory 
requirements  in  individual  Member  State  jurisdictions,  which  create  scope  for 
undertakings  in  some  Member  States  to  take  advantage  of  weaker  information 
requirements vis a vis employees, while those in others are prevented by law from doing 
so (regulatory arbitrage). Such an effect could not be achieved by Member States acting 
on  their  own.  Given  the  modest  cost  of  compliance  for  employers,  and  the  ready 
availability of information to fulfil the additional information requirements, the measures 
are proportionate to the economic and social aims sought.  

There  is  a  strong  interaction  of  this  measure  with  policy  measure  1  (clarification  and 
extension of personal scope) – due to the need to adapt the information requirements to 
the specificities of a wider range of (atypical) employment relationships, should these be 
brought within scope of the Directive – and with policy measure 4 (new minimum rights 
for  all)  –  which  would  complement  the  obligation  to  provide  information  with  a 
minimum standard to be observed with regard to several items on the list.  

3.  Shortening the two-month deadline for issuing a written statement 

The considered measure is to require that written statements are provided at the latest on 
the first day of the employment relationship.  

In terms of potential benefits, the provision of information at the start of the employment 
relationship could contribute to both improved employee protection and the fight against 
undeclared work. It could also help workers who move between short-term jobs without 
ever receiving a written statement on their rights. 

As  an  example, the recent  legislative  move  made  by  Poland  is  worth  highlighting.  The 
country  recently  changed  its  legislation  so  that  the  written  statement  must  now  be 
provided before the start of the employment relationship, and not at the end of the first 
day,  as  was  the  case  before.53  According  to  the  Polish  authorities,  under  the  previous 
approach, employers faced with an inspection could falsely argue that the worker had just 
been  employed  and  that  he/she  would  be  provided  with  the  written  information  by  the 
end of the first working day. In practice, this rule tended to favour undeclared work. 

At  the  same  time,  arguably,  the  shorter  deadline  could  be  more  complicated  for 
employers to comply with. Already the two-month deadline was pointed out by the High 

294 C(2017)2600 final 

176 

 
 
                                                 
Level  Group  on  Administrative  Burdens  as  a  particular  aspect  of  the  Directive,  which 
should be looked at with a view to further simplification.295 

The  REFIT  evaluation  of  the  Directive  paid  therefore  a  particular  attention  to  burdens 
related  to  the  deadline  but  did  not  confirm  the  concerns  of  the  High  Level  Group  on 
Administrative  Burdens.  The  following  figure  shows  that  only  a  small  share  of 
respondents found the time limits particularly burdensome. 

Figure  3.  Share  of  respondents  across  the  eight  surveyed  countries  who  found  the 
time  limits  in  which  to  provide  the  information  to  the  employee  particularly 
burdensome 

Source: Survey, Ramboll calculations 

The  employer  survey  showed  that  there  were  no  major  differences  in  how  burdensome 
the  timeframe  was  perceived  to  be,  regardless  of  whether  it  preceded  the  start  of 
employment (in PL and BG), was set at one month (DE, FR, SE, IT) or at the maximum 
two months (UK). 

4.  New minimum rights for all workers 

As shown in the problem definition, while labour market flexibility is an important driver 
for job creation and growth, extreme flexibility of individual work arrangements without 
protection  of  basic  standards  for  workers  has  created  situations  which  can  jeopardise 
working  and  living  conditions,  equal  treatment,  fair  competition  between  employers 
across the EU and overall social cohesion and equity. 

Indeed, a minimum level of predictability can prove extremely important for living and 
working conditions, work-life balance and health of workers in the most flexible forms of 
employment. 

295  European  Commission,  High  Level  Group  on  Administrative  Burdens  (2009):  Opinion  of  the  High 
Level Group. Subject: Stakeholders’ suggestions (‘offline-consultation’) – V. 

177 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
This  could  include,  for  workers  whose  work  schedule  is  mainly  variable  and  mainly 
determined by their employer: 

- Right to defined reference days and hours within which work may be required 

-  Right  to  a  reasonable  minimum  advance  notice  before  a  new  assignment  or  a  new 
period of work  

In addition, for all workers:  

- Prohibition of exclusivity clauses and limiting restrictions on incompatibility clauses to 
objectively justified situations. 

- Right for a worker to request another form of employment (permanent, more stable and 
predictable)  after  achieving  a  certain  degree  of  seniority  with  his/her  employer  and 
receive a reply in writing, which could ease the transition from extremely flexible forms 
of atypical work to other forms of work (e.g. full time, or permanent work). 

-  Right  to  a  maximum  duration  of  probation  of  6  months  where  a  probation  period  is 
foreseen, unless justified or in the interest of the worker. 

-  Right  to  receive  free of  cost  training  which  employers  are  obliged  by  EU  legislation, 
national legislation or collective agreements to provide to workers. 

Right to predictability of work 

consisting of: 

- Right to defined reference days and hours within which work may be assigned 
Flexibility in work schedules is entirely determined by employers for about two-thirds of 
workers  in  Europe.296  For  casual  workers,  working  schedules  vary  and  cannot  be  fully 
predicted.  Nonetheless,  workers  and  employers  could  be  assigned  reference  days  (e.g. 
Monday to Friday, or week-end, or any mix of days) or hours (e.g. 8 to 17 or 13 to 24 
etc.) in which the worker might be called to perform work. A worker would in this way 
know  the  days  and  times  in  which  he  or  she  can  organise  other  work  or  other 
engagements. This would limit the detrimental effects or even the impossibility to plan 
other engagements of a professional or private nature, improving work-life balance and 
allowing  additional  work  to  be  taken  on  and  so  reduce  under-employment.  This  would 
still allow a worker who wishes to do so to accept work beyond these periods, but cannot 
suffer detriment if he or she refuses. 

  The  right  to  reference  hours  has  been  introduced  and  casual  workers  (including 

on-demand workers) are covered: BE, HR, DK, EL 

296 Eurofound, sixth European Working Conditions Survey, 2016 

178 

 
 
                                                 
  The  right  to  reference  hours  has  been  introduced,  but  on-demand  workers  are 
excluded: CZ, IT (definitely excluded), SK, PL, SL (depends on the employment 
contract) 

  The  right  to  reference  hours  has  not  been  introduced,  but  casual  workers 
(especially on-demand workers) exist in law and would directly benefit: FR, DE, 
HU, NL, SE 

  The  right  to  reference  hours  has  not  been  introduced  and  casual  workers 
(especially  on-demand  workers)  are  not  recognised  in  law  and  therefore  require 
Option 1 in order to be covered by this right: BG, CY, EE, FI, IE, LU, MT, PT, 
RO, ES, UK. 

  The right to reference hours is not introduced, but on-demand work is prohibited: 

AT, LV, LT 

  An example from Member States: 

 

In  Belgium,  part-time  workers  with  variable  schedules  can  only  be  called  for 
work  within  the  working  schedules  mentioned  in  the  internal  rulebook  of  the 
workplace  ('Règlement  de  travail').  This  rulebook  is  negotiated  between 
employers  and  workers  and  a  copy  of  it  is  given  to  workers  when  they  start 
working. 

- Right to a reasonable minimum advance notice before a new assignment  

The scheduling of work hours or assignments is a recurrent issue for part-time and on call 
workers.  In some Member States social partners negotiate reasonable scheduling notice 
and - where possible - secure and regular shifts. 

For  casual  workers,  work  assignments  or  periods  of  work  are  not  predictable  but  are 
rather  on-demand  depending  on  needs  of  the  employer.  Setting  a  minimum  advance 
notice  period,  as  is  done  in  some  Member  States,297  would  allow  a  minimum  level  of 
predictability and a minimum planning of work needs also in undertakings which make 
extensive use of casual work. This would limit the detrimental effects of the impossibility 
or difficulty to plan other engagement of a professional or private nature, so improving 
work-life balance and potentially allowing additional work to be taken on.  

This  would  still  allow  a  worker  who  wishes  to  do  so  to  accept  work  beyond  these 
periods, but cannot suffer detriment if he or she refuses. 

  The  right  to  a  minimum  notice  period  has  been  introduced  and  casual  workers 
(including  on-demand  workers)  are  covered:  DK,  DE,  HU,  IT,  SL,  ES,  SE 

297 Germany, Hungary, Italy. 

179 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
(always), PT (intermittent included, but on-demand and zero-hours contracts have 
not yet occurred in PT) 

  The right to minimum notice period has been introduced, but on-demand workers 

are excluded CZ, FR (for all), IE (depending on contract) 

  The right to minimum notice period has not been introduced, but casual workers 

(especially on-demand workers) exist in law and would directly benefit: NL 

  The right to minimum notice period has not been introduced and casual workers 
(especially  on-demand  workers)  are  not  recognised  in  law  and  therefore  require 
Option 1 in order to be covered by this right: BE, BG, HR, CY, EE, EL, FI, LU, 
MT, PL, RO, SK, UK 

  The  right  to  minimum  notice  period  is  not  introduced,  but  on-demand  work  is 

prohibited: AT, LV, LT 

 

 

 

 

 

  Examples from Member States: 

In  Germany,  the  employer  shall  respect  a  minimum  advance  notice  period  of 
four days. This period can be modified by collective agreement. . 

In Hungary in so called call for work contracts the employer needs to inform the 
employee at least three days prior to the day of work.  

In Italy, a minimum notice of one working day is required for intermittent work.  

In  Portugal  for  intermittent  workers  get  a  notice  of  20  days  for  each  period  of 
work. 

In  Belgium,  part-time  workers  with  variable  schedule  have  to  be  notified  five 
days in advance of their work schedule. This period can be modified by collective 
agreement.  

Prohibition of exclusivity clauses  

Exclusivity  clauses  impede  workers  to  take  on  any  other  work  at  all.  Incompatibility 
clauses impede them from taking on work with certain other employers. Exclusivity and 
incompatibility clauses can  put a disproportionate burden on the worker who has limited 
possibilities for ensuring not only income security and stability, but also to seek further 
work  to  reduce  the  risk  of  poverty.  In  economic  terms,  exclusivity  and  incompatibility 
clauses exacerbate situations of underemployment.298 

Examples from Member States: 
In  the  Netherlands  exclusivity  clauses  in  flexible  employment  agreements  (temporary) 

298  EP-IPOL  Economic  and  scientific  policy,  Precarious  Employment  in  Europe:  Patterns,  Trends  and 
Policy Strategy, 2016  

180 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
are  allowed  but  only  exceptionally.  The  inclusion  of  this  kind  of  clause  needs  to  be 
motivated explicitly in writing in the contract of employment. 

In  the  UK,  for  zero-hours  workers  exclusivity  clauses  have  been  deemed  abusive  and 
have  become  unenforceable  since  May  2015.  The  law  of  26  May  2015  was  introduced 
for  preventing  employers  from  enforcing  'exclusivity  clauses'  in  a  zero-hours  contract 
restricting workers from working for other employers.  

In Spain, Romania, Italy, Germany, exclusivity clauses are considered as illegal as in 
breach with the principle of freedom to work or right to employment.  

In the Czech Republic the employee may only prevented from performing work for an 
employer with the same or similar objective of the activity as the main employer.  

Possibility to request another form of employment and receive a reply in writing 

Many workers in non-standard and new forms of work are in this situation involuntarily, 
which leads to precariousness, underemployment and segmentation of the labour market. 
A possibility to request another more favourable form of employment (e.g. longer hours 
for very marginal part-time, or a part-time contract for casual workers), where available, 
after  achieving  a  certain  degree  of  seniority  with  his/her  employer,  and  with  the 
corresponding  duty  on  the  employer  to  give  a  reply  in  writing,  would  create  space  for 
dialogue  between  worker  and  employer  on  career  possibilities  in  the  undertaking  and 
stimulate  changes  in  employment  statuses.  Such  a  right  might  also  support  social 
dialogue  to  ease  transitions  to  more  secure  and  predictable  work  for  workers  that  have 
proven their working skills and have developed on-the-job skills. 

The  EU  social  acquis  already  includes  similar  provisions  for  certain  types  of  worker; 
under the Part-Time Directive, employers should give consideration, as far as possible, to 
(a)  requests  by  workers  to  transfer  from  full-time  to  part-time  work  that  becomes 
available in the establishment, (b) requests by workers to transfer from part-time to full-
time  work  or  to  increase  their  working  time  should  the  opportunity  arise;  (c)  the 
provision of timely information on the availability of part-time and full-time positions in 
the  establishment  in  order  to  facilitate  transfers  from  full-time  to  part-time  or  vice 
versa.299  The  Fixed  Term  Work  Directive  provides  that  employers  shall  inform  fixed-
term  workers  about  vacancies  which  become  available  in  the  undertaking  or 
establishment  to  ensure  that  they  have  the  same  opportunity  to  secure  permanent 
positions  as  other  workers.  Such  information  may  be  provided  by  way  of  a  general 
announcement at a suitable place in the undertaking or establishment.300 Member States 
have transposed those provisions in their national legislation but few have implemented 
any more favourable measures such as obliging the employer to provide a reasoned reply 
to  this  request  or  granting  a  priority  for  part-time  workers  to  access  available  full  time 
positions in the undertakings.  

299 Clause 5, Directive 97/81 on Part Time Work 
300 Clause 6, Directive 1999/70 on Fixed Term Work 

181 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The Parental Leave Directive already provides for the possibility to ask for two types of 
flexible  working  arrangements  (working  patterns  and  working  hours)  for  parents 
returning from parental leave.301 The proposal for a Directive on Work-Life Balance for 
parents and carers introduces a proposed right, for workers with children up to at least 12 
years  old,  to  request  flexible  working  arrangements  for  caring  purposes;  employers 
would  have  then  a  duty  to  consider  and  respond  to  requests  for  flexible  working 
arrangements, taking into account the needs of both employers and workers, and justify 
any refusal of such a request. Employers would also have the obligation to consider and 
respond to requests to return to the original working pattern.302 

Examples from Member States: 
In France, the employer is obliged to inform atypical workers of available open ended 
contract  in  the  company  (without  obligation  to  reply  to  request).  Part  time  workers 
willing to be employed full time benefit from a priority in their employment, the same for 
night workers wanting to return to day work. 

In Romania employers are obliged to inform fixed-term workers about vacant permanent 
jobs  and  grant  them  equal  conditions  of  accessing  such  jobs  as  those  granted  to  the 
permanent  employees.  Employers  are  also  obliged  to  take  into  consideration  part-time 
workers'  requests  of  transfer  from  part-time  to  full  time  or  vice  versa,  or  to  extend  the 
duration of working time (the workload), and to provide information on vacant positions 
in due time to facilitate such transfers.   

In  Spain  part-time  workers  may  request  to  work  full  time  and  full  time  workers  may 
request to work part time. Employers must reply in writing; in case of refusal they must 
motivate the answer. 

In the UK the Right to Request Flexible Working was extended in 2014 to all employees 
with  26  weeks’  continuous  service.  A  right  to  permanent  employment  exists  after  four 
years  for  fixed-term  workers  (unless  there  is  a  business  reason  not  to  do  so). 
Casual/atypical workers are covered as long as they have an employee status (rather than 
worker).  The  Taylor et al. (2017) review suggests the following changes:  (1) a right  to 
request a direct contract of employment for agency workers who have been placed with 
the same hirer for 12 months, (2) for zero hours workers a right to request a fixed hours 
contract. 

In  Germany,  some  collective  agreements  guarantee  a  preferential  treatment  of  part-
timers  who  wish  to  work  full-time  and  an  obligation  of  the  employer  to  inform  on 
vacancies. A part time worker has a priority for a full time position if they want. 

301 Directive 2010/18 
302 Article 9, Proposal for a Directive on Work-Life Balance, COM(2017) 253 

182 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
Right to a maximum duration of probation period 

Probation periods offer the worker the opportunity to be supported and developed to meet 
the requirements of the job, and the employer to test the suitability of the worker for that 
job.  During  probation  periods,  the  conditions  attaching  to  the  termination  of  the 
employment contract are often light and some protective measures that normally apply in 
case of dismissal are absent (e.g. notice period and severance pay). Setting  a maximum 
duration for probation periods would prevent abuse of overly long probation periods, in 
which employment rights are inferior to standard employment.   

Examples from Member States: 

  The  Czech  Republic,  the  Netherlands,  Portugal,  Romania,  Spain  and 
Lithuania  have  specific  regulations  regarding  probation  periods  for  fixed  term 
workers, which are shorter than for workers with open-ended contracts. 

 

 

 

In the Czech Republic, if there is a probation agreed, it has to be made in writing 
and may not be longer than 3 months (6 months in the case of managers). In the 
case  of  fixed-term  contracts  it  may  not  be  longer  than  one  half  of  the  agreed 
period of the employment relationship. 

In Belgium there is currently only a probation period for agency work and student 
work. The general probation period was abolished in 2014. At the time of writing, 
the government was planning to reintroduce a probation period for all workers but 
without  the  same  consequences  as  the  old  one:  rather  mainly  entailing  shorter 
notice periods in the beginning of the contract. 

In  Austria  employees  may  be  subject  to  a  probationary  period  of  up  to  one 
month.  This  applies  to  all  classed  as  “employees”.  The  probation  period  is  3 
months for apprentices. 

Right to receive cost-free training which employers are required to provide in EU 
legislation, national legislation or collective agreements 

There is generally no statutory obligation to provide occupational training beyond health 
& safety training, which is often covered by collective agreements.  

Examples from Member States: 

In  the  Netherlands  employers  have  a  statutory  obligation  to  provide  any  training 
necessary to enable an employee to perform satisfactorily in their job and – as far as this 

183 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
can  reasonably  be  expected  of  the  employer  –  in  order  to  continue  the  employment 
contract,  even  if  the  employee's  job  ceases  to  exist  or  their  performance  falls.  Under 
certain conditions, an investment by an employer in making an employee more broadly 
employable  before  their  contract  is  terminated  can  be  deducted  from  the  financial 
entitlement to a transition allowance. Under certain conditions, it will also be possible for 
money  invested  by  the  employer  in  making  the  employee  more  employable  to  be 
deducted before their contract is terminated. 

In France, the Personal Training Account is an individual right of an employee to 150 
hours of training in more than 7 years (20 hours each year over 6 years then 10 hours per 
year thereafter). The Account can be used by the individual to follow any (registered in a 
national  list  decided  mainly  by  social  partners  end  employers)  training  course  and  is 
funded via a levy on companies (1 per cent of the wage bill for large companies 0.55 per 
cent for small companies). 

In  Estonia,  employees  are  obliged  by  law  to  improve  their  skills.  For  this  purpose, 
employers  are  also  responsible  for  developing  the  knowledge  and  skills  of  their 
employees  and  they  are  required  to  provide  employees  with  training  according  to  their 
interests, to bear the costs and to pay the usual wage during the training. 

5.  Enforcement 

Rights  are  only  meaningful  when  they  are  taken  up  by  rights  holders.  Both  the  REFIT 
evaluation of the Directive, and the public consultation on the Pillar, have underlined the 
importance of enforcement mechanisms to ensure workers that their rights are respected. 
This has also been underlined by the recent Communication on better application of EU 
law. 

One  of  the  conclusions  of  the  public  consultation  on  the  European  Pillar  of  Social 
Rights303  was  that  very  often,  citizens  are  deprived  of  their  rights  due  to  a  lack  of 
implementation and enforcement. In the context of EU labour law, unlike in other areas, 
there  are  very  few  EU  rules  directly  concerned  with  enforcement  of  rights.  Experts 
highlighted  various  ways  to  close  the  enforcement  gap.  One  proposal  is  to  ensure  that 
legislation in the field of labour law contains procedural provisions for enforcement, such 
as  provisions  improving  access  to  justice,  supporting  persons  whose  rights  have  been 
denied to initiate litigation, protecting against victimisation and providing for basic rules 
on remedies and dissemination of information. It was pointed out that inspiration could 
be  drawn  from  existing  instruments  e.g.  in  the  field  on  non-discrimination  or  free 

on 

Delivering 

303 
Rights, 
European 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1226&langId=en , and Public consultation on the European Pillar 
of 
Rights 
Social 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=333&langId=en&consultId=22&visib=0&furtherConsult=yes 

Social 

Pillar 

the 

of 

184 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
movement, where a range of enforcement tools have been adopted in recent years. Others 
asked for more and better labour inspections.  

The REFIT evaluation of the Written Statement Directive also indicated that enforcement 
of workers' rights under the Directive could be improved by rethinking means of redress 
and sanctions for non-compliance.304 

The  Directive,  in  its  Article  8,  establishes  the  right  for  employees  who  consider 
themselves  wronged  by  an  employer’s  failure  to  comply  with  its  obligations  to  pursue 
their  claims  by  judicial  process.  Member  States  may  establish  two  steps  that  would 
precede  a  judicial  process:  (i)  recourse  to  a  competent  authority  such  as  a  labour 
inspectorate or an administrative body; (ii) a formal notice given to the employer calling 
on it to issue the written statement within 15 days.  

The  REFIT  evaluation  has  confirmed  that  all  Member  States  provide  for  access  to  the 
relevant  national  court  which  is  in  general  the  Labour  Court305.    As  regards  sanctions 
imposed on employers who fail to comply, the REFIT evaluation distinguishes between: 
(i)  a  majority  of  Member  States  where  financial  compensation  can  be  granted  only  to 
employees  who  prove  that  they  have  suffered  damage;  and  (ii)  a  minority  of  Member 
States where sanctions such as lump sum penalties or loss of permits can be imposed in 
addition on the employer for failure to issue the written statement.  

The REFIT evaluation concluded that redress systems based only on claims for damages 
are less effective than systems that also provide for sanctions such as lump sum penalties. 
The  limited  extent  of  case  law  indicates  that  workers  whose  rights  under  the  Directive 
have been infringed are reluctant to pursue litigation while in employment. Generally any 
litigation  is  related  to  the  working  conditions  themselves  not  to  the  absence  of 
information about them. 

To achieve the goal of the Directive its enforcement must be ensured through adequate 
redress via enforcement authorities and appropriate and dissuasive sanctions.  

The revision proposes to improve the enforcement by requiring Member States to: 

5.1: make sure that a 'competent authority' can find or impose a solution in case a worker 
does not receive a written statement, if the omission is not rectified in 15 days following 
notification; 

5.2:  set  up  a  formal  injunction  system  to  the  employer,  possibly  accompanied  by  a 
possibility of a penalty; 

304 SWD (2017)205, page 3, 4 
305SWD 2017(2611) Refit evaluation of the Written Statement Directive  

185 

 
 
                                                 
5.3:  establish  favourable  presumptions  for  the  employees  as  regards  their  working 
conditions  in  case  of  (unlawful)  absence  of  written  statements  (proportionate  to  the 
missing elements) if the omission is not rectified in 15 days following notification. 

5.4.  enlarge  the  enforcement  provisions  of  the  revised  Directive  based  on  enforcement 
provisions already in place under EU anti-discrimination and gender equality law. 

Examples from Member States: 
In  Luxembourg,  in  case  of  absence  of  information  regarding  the  existence  of  a  fixed-
term  employment  contract,  there  is  a  presumption  that  the  contract  is  concluded  for  an 
indeterminate term. 

In France, in the absence of a written statement for a fixed term contract, the contract is 
deemed to be a permanent one. If the worker raises a complaint in front of the court the 
contract is automatically requalified as a permanent one. 

In  Latvia, in  case  an  employer  failed  to  conclude  an  employment  contract in  a  written 
form  before  the  commencement  of  a  work  and  an  employee  is  not  able  to  prove  the 
length  of  the  employment  relationship,  working  time  and  remuneration,  it  has  to  be 
presumed  that  a  worker  has  been  employed  for  3  months  with  normal  weekly  working 
time (40 hours) and minimum pay as defined by the law. 

In Denmark, questions as to whether the employer has complied with his/her obligation 
to provide information shall be decided by the Employment Committee of the National 
Social Appeals Board.  

In  the  Netherlands,  following  case-law,  when  the  employer  has  not  fulfilled  the 
information obligations, a shift in burden of proof regarding the type of employment and 
employment conditions applies. It is for the employer to prove that the allegations of the 
claimant employee are not accurate. 

In  Ireland,  the  Adjudication  Service  (formerly  Rights  Commissioner)  investigates  and 
decides on claims brought by individual or  small groups of workers. The employer has 
56 days to carry out the decision of the adjudication officer. If the employer fails to do 
so,  the  worker,  the  worker’s  trade  union  or  a  body  that  represents  the  interests  of  a 
particular  group  of  workers  may  apply  to  the  District  Court  for  an  order  directing  the 
employer to do so. In general, the District Court must make the order. 

The possibility to access to dispute resolution  through a judicial process is provided in 
all Member States. In five Member States (BE, CZ, DE, SL, SK) there is a possibility of 
arbitration, although in some countries arbitration is accessible only in case of collective 
agreements or collective disputes (SL, CZ). 

186 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Almost all Member States306 have the option of mediation available for labour disputes, 
although in most of them it is only rarely used. 

Most Member States have provided for redress in case of non-compliance with the rights 
conferred by the Directive either in civil courts or special labour courts. 

In  addition,  in  several  Member  States  labour  inspectorates  have  a  monitoring  and/or 
enforcement responsibility, which varies in terms of initiative and instruments available. 
In  most  countries,  the  inspectorates  monitor  employers’  activity  and  have  the  power  to 
(1) ensure compliance through coercive orders; and (2) impose fines when breaches are 
identified at the end of/during inspective actions and procedures. 

In almost a third of the Member States the only available means for redress is litigation 
before  civil  or  labour  courts,  which  is  considered  particularly  ineffective  as  means  of 
enforcement when the only available remedy is the award of damages. 

In 10 MSs there is no competent authority that can impose a remedy in case of lack of 
written statements: AT, BE, DE, FR, HR, LU, NL, SE, SL, UK 

In 14 MS there is no formal injunction system with lump sum in case of lack of written 
statements: AT, BG, CZ, DE, FI, FR, LU, LV, NL, PT, RO, SE, SL, UK 

In  22  MS  in  case  of  (unlawful)  absence  of  written  statements,  there  are  no  favourable 
presumptions made for the employees as regards their working conditions: AT, BG, CY, 
CZ, DK, EL, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SK, UK. 

Following the evolution of the EU acquis and case-law in the field of gender equality and 
antidiscrimination  in  the  last  30  years,  now  all  28  Member  States  have  put  in  place 
enforcement provisions that apply to the interaction between worker and employer. This 
includes  provisions  on  defense  of  rights,  burden  of  proof,  compensation  or  reparation, 
protection  against  adverse  treatmnet  or  victimisation,  penalties,  compliance  and 
dissemination of information. 

Only one MS does not have judicial procedures available for enforcement, also after the 
employment relationship has ended. 

The measures set out above could  not only reinforce enforcement of workers' rights by 
improving their right to redress in case of non-compliance but also avoid long and costly 
litigation that could be unproductive at the start of employment relationship for a worker 
and burdensome for the employers. 

Many national experts contributing to the study underlined that the level of compliance 
by  employers  is  linked  to  the  level  of  enforcement  by  public  authorities  or  action  by 

306 BE, HR, CZ, EE, FR, HU, IE, LV, LT, MT, NL, PT, RO, SK, SL, SE, UK. 

187 

 
 
                                                 
trade unions. Several experts witnessed an increase in compliance due to stronger labour 
inspectorates, presumptions in favour of the employee or due to newly introduced fines.  

The  provisions  of  5.1  to  5..  would  provide  benefits  to  workers  through  the  actual 
application of the rights provided in the revised Directive in their everyday working life. 

The  policy  package  5  is  clearly  dependent  on  the  rights  provided  for  in  measures  2 
(information), 4 (new rights) and on the personal scope provided in 1.   

These  packages  depend  fully  on  effective  compliance  supporting  the  take-up  of  rights, 
which  in  turn  depends  on  effective  enforcement  arrangements.  Otherwise  the  expected 
benefits presented in this assessment will be negated or mitigated. 

6.  Overview of legal changes required per Member State 

Table. 1. Extended scope, strengthened information and shorter deadline 

Would the legal change be required? 

1. A scope of 
application 
encompassing 
all EU workers, 
in particular the 
most precarious 
Inclusi
Inclusi
on of 
on of 
worker
worke
s 
rs 
employ
worki
ed for 
ng less 
less 
than 
than 1 
8h/wee
month 
k 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 

No 
No 
No 
Yes 

No 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Memb
er 
State 

AT 
BE 
BG 
CY 

CZ 

DE 

2. Introducing the right to information on the 
applicable working conditions 

Probati
on 
period 

Social 
securi
ty 
syste
m 

National 
law 
applicab
le in case 
of 
terminat
of 
ion 
contract 

Precis
e 
worki
ng 
time 

Templa
tes 

Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 

No 

No 

Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 

No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 

Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 

No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

DK 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

EE  
EL  

No 
No 

No 
Yes 

No 
No 

Yes 
No 

Yes 
No 

Yes 
No 

No 
No 

3.Shorten
ing of the 
deadline 
to 
the 
same  day 
or before 

No 
No 
No 
Yes  –  1 
month 
Yes  –  1 
month 
Yes  –  1 
month 
Yes  –  1 
month 
No 
Yes  –  2 
months 

188 

 
 
 
ES  

FI 

FR 
HR 
HU 

IE  

IT 
LT  
LU 
LV  
MT 
NL 

PL 
PT 

RO 
SE 

SI  
SK 

UK 

No 

No 

No 
No 
No 

No 

No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 

No 
No 

No 
Yes 

No 
No 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

No 
No 
No 

No 

No 

No 
Yes 
No 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

No 
Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 
No 

No 
Yes 
Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 

No 
No 

No 
Possibl
y 
No 
Yes 

No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 

No 
No 

No 
Yes 

No 
No 

Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 

Yes 
No 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 

No 
Yes 

No 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Yes  –  2 
months 
Yes  –  1 
month 
No 
No 
Yes  –  15 
days 
Yes  –  2 
months 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes  –  1 
month 
No 
Yes  –  2 
months 
No 
Yes  –  1 
month 
No 
Yes  –  1 
month 
Yes  –  2 
months 

No  –the  right  is  already  included  in  the  national  legislation,  no  legal  change  would  be 
required 
Yes – legal change would be required 

189 

 
 
Would the legal change be required?  
4. New minimum rights for all workers  

Prohibition of 
exclusivity clauses 

Possibility to request 
transfer to another 
form of employment 
and receive a reply 
in writing 

Right to a maximum 
duration of 
probation period of 6 
months 

Right to cost-free 
training required in 
legislation and collective 
agreements 

Table 2. New minimum rights 

Member 
State 

Minimum predictability 
of work  

Reference 
days and 
hours 

-  on 

No 
demand 
work 
prohibited 

is 

AT 

Minimum 
advance 
notice 
No 
- 
demand 
work 
prohibited 

on 

is 

BE 

No 

BG 

CY 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

CZ 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Partially  –  exclusivity 
clauses  allowed  under 
certain conditions 

No 

Partially  –  prohibition 
with exceptions 

Partially  –  exclusivity 
clauses  allowed  under 
certain conditions 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

No 

Yes 

No  

No 

No 

No 

No  

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

DE 

Yes 

No 

Partially  –  prohibition 
with exceptions 

No 

 
 
 
DK 

EE 

EL 

No 

Yes 

No 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

ES 

Yes 

No 

FI 

FR 
HR 

Yes 

Yes 
No 

HU 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 
Yes 

No 

IE 

IT 

LT 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

on 

-  on 

No 
demand 
work 
prohibited 

is 

No 
- 
demand 
work 
prohibited 

Yes 

is 

Partially  –  prohibited 
only for casual workers 
No 
Partially  –  exclusivity 
clauses  allowed  under 
certain conditions 
Partially  –  exclusivity 
clauses  allowed  under 
certain conditions 

Partially  –  exclusivity 
clauses  allowed  under 
certain conditions 

Yes 
Yes 

Partially  –  exclusivity 
clauses  allowed  under 
certain conditions 

Partially  –  exclusivity 
clauses  allowed  under 
certain conditions 

Partially  –  exclusivity 
clauses  allowed  under 
certain conditions 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

No 

Yes 

No 
No 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

No 

No  

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 
No 

No 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 
No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

 
 
LU 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

LV 

-  on 

No 
demand 
work 
prohibited 

is 

No 
- 
demand 
work 
prohibited 

on 

is 

MT 

Yes 

NL 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

PL 

Yes 

Yes 

PT 

Yes 

RO 

SE 

SI 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

SK 

Yes 

Partially  – 
only 
intermittent 

Yes 

No 

No 

Yes 

UK 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

Partially  –  exclusivity 
clauses  allowed  under 
certain conditions 

Yes 

Partially  –  exclusivity 
clauses  allowed  under 
certain conditions 

Partially  –  prohibition 
with exceptions 

Yes 

Partially  –  exclusivity 
clauses  allowed  under 
certain conditions 
Partially  –  prohibition 
with exceptions 
Yes 

Partially  –  prohibition 
with exceptions 
Partially  –  exclusivity 
clauses  allowed  under 
certain conditions 
Partially  –  prohibited 
only  in  cases  of  zero-
hours contracts 

No 

No 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No  

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No –the right is already included in the national legislation, no legal change would be required 

 
 
Yes – legal change would be required 

Table 3. Enforcement 

Would the legal change be required? 
5. Enforcement 

Member 
State 

Competen
t 
authority 

Formal injunction 
system 

Inclusion  of  favourable  presumptions  made 
for  the  employees  as  regards  their  working 
conditions  in  case  of  (unlawful)  absence  of 
written statement 

Enforcement provisions that already apply to 
the interaction between worker and employer 
in 
equality  and 
antidiscrimination 

field  of  gender 

the 

AT 
BE 
BG 
CY 
CZ 
DE 
DK 
EE  
EL  
ES  
FI 
FR 
HR 
HU 
IE  
IT 
LT  
LU 

Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 

Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 

Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 

Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 

 
 
 
 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 

LV  
MT 
NL 
PL 
PT 
RO 
SE 
SI  
SK 
UK 
No –the right is already included in the national legislation, no legal change would be required 
Yes – legal change would be required 

Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 

No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 

Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 

 
 
 
7.  Mapping of relevant collective agreements 

Czech 
Republic 
Denmark 

Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 

Table 1: Transposition of the current Written Statement Directive into national law (fully or 
partially) via Collective Agreements.  
Country 
Austria 
Belgium 

Collective Agreements used for transposition? 
No 
Partly,  through  National  collective  agreements  no.  35  (part-time)  and  no.  108 
(agency  work),  collective  agreement  no.  85  (telework)  complement  national 
legislation on the WSD requirements. 
No 
No 
There are different collective agreements covering sectors or industries. In 2011, 
the Ministry of Labour listed 19 industry level agreements in the private sector on 
its website, including agreements for construction, banking, private hospitals and 
the  clothing  industry  and  the  hotel  sector.  However,  although  industry  level 
bargaining  continues  to  be  important,  many  companies,  both  inside  and  outside 
the  coverage  of  the  industry  level  agreements,  negotiate  at  company  level.  The 
Department  of  Labour  Relations  estimates  that  there  are  450  company  level 
agreements, in some cases setting the pay and conditions of those not covered at 
industry  level,  in  others  improving  on  the  industry  rates.  Both  unions  and 
employers  consider  that  the  balance  between  company  and  industry-level 
bargaining  may  be  shifting,  with  company  level  bargaining  becoming  more 
important. It seems likely that the level of coverage has fallen over time, and the 
union  membership  and  collective  bargaining  estimated  the  overall  coverage  of 
collective bargaining at 52% in 2008. There has been a decline since, particularly 
after 2013. 
No 

Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 

No, however the transposition Act (Ansættelsesbevisloven) does provide that the 
Act  does  not  apply  if  the  employer’s  obligation  to  inform  the  employee  of  the 
employment conditions is covered by a collective agreement and that the rules of 
this agreement, as a minimum, correspond to those of the WSD. Most collective 
agreements refer to ‘Ansættelsesbevisloven’ and set out the various conditions for 
providing the employee with proof of his/her employment conditions. 
No 
No 
No 
No,  transposition  took  place  through  law.  However,  there  are  nine  different 
sector-specific  collective  agreements  with  regulations  related  to  the  Written 
Statement directive. 
No 
No 
No 
Partly. The WSD was transposed via a Decree, but further employers’ obligations 
to inform might be required by single collective agreements, where applicable. 
No 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
No 
Luxembourg  No 
No 
Malta 
Netherlands  No 
No 
Poland 
No 
Portugal 
No 
Romania 
No 
Slovakia 

Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 

 
 
 
Slovenia 
Spain 

Sweden 
UK 

No 
No, however, provisions imposing certain informative obligations on the employer may be 
found in some collective agreements. 
No, although collective agreements do exist which deal with further implementation. 
No 

Table 2: Collective Agreements establishing additional rights to non-standard workers  

Country 
Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Croatia 

Cyprus 
Czech 
Republic 

Denmark 

Estonia 
Finland 
France 

Germany 

Greece 
Hungary 

Do Collective Agreements exist which provide additional rights? 
No,  but  the  existing  rights  provided  for  atypical  workers  are  quite  high,  and  in 
particular sectors collective agreements have raised the bar even further. 
Yes,  complementary  to  legislation,  there  is  Collective  Agreement  nr.  35  on  part 
time  work,  Collective  Agreement  nr.  108  on  temporary  work.  Also  sector  or 
company level CA's may exist, e.g. putting down further conditions on temporary 
work,  or  agreeing  on  the  use  of  fixed  term  workers.  Rules  on  non-competition 
clauses are laid down in art. 65, 86 and 104 to 106 of the Act of 3 July 1978 on 
employment contracts and Collective agreement no. 1bis of 21 December 1978. 
In  the  available  Collective  Agreements  there  are  no  explicit  references  to  the 
directive;  it  is  transposed  in  the  labour  legislation.  Actually,  Collective 
Agreements arrange those rights and issues that are not treated by the legislation – 
see art. 3 of the Collective Agreement of the metal sector. In addition, as atypical 
work  is  relative  rare  in  Bulgaria,  the  Collective  Agreements  focus  on  the  core 
workers on open ended contracts. 
Partly.  Collective  agreements  usually  define  different  duration  of  the  probation 
period for the working places of lower and higher complexity. 
No  
EU directives are transposed via legislation only. The reason is that the collective 
bargaining  takes  place  predominantly  at  the  company  level  and  the  coverage  by 
collective  bargaining  is  not  high.  Thus,  the  WSD  and  its  provisions  are  not  an 
issue of collective bargaining 
Many collective agreements indicate that the parties (employer & employee) can 
come  to  an  agreement  on  a  different  type  of  employment  form/contract,  for 
example a permanent contract. 
No  
No 
No,  but  probation  period  or  notion  periods  can  be  regulated  through  collective 
agreements. 
Some  Collective  Agreements  improve  the  standards  of  the  NachwG  and  other 
German  laws  to  protect  precarious  workers.  The  most  important  improvements 
are: 
- 
month  
- 
according to the NachwG  
some  agreements  set  additional  standards  for  part-timers  especially  (a) 
- 
minimum hours per week (b) minimum hrs per day  (c) right to request a contract 
with more weekly hrs and (d) minimum period of notice  
- 
- 
- 
right to attend further training   
No 
The term of the probationary period may not exceed six months as provided for in 

a right to request part-time work for defined periods  
defined right to do a second job  
preferential  treatment  of  part-time  if  there  are  job  vacancies  and  equal 

a  written  contract  must  be  signed  before  the  start  of  work  or  within  a 

in some agreements the content of the written contract is specified mostly 

 
 
 
 
Ireland 
Italy 

the  collective  agreement.  Though  not  related  specifically  to  rights  5.1  –  5.5,  the 
collective agreement also provides for a working time bank, for example enabling 
the exchange of overtime for subsequent time off. 
No 
Not currently, but further employers’ obligations to inform might be required  by 
single collective agreements, where applicable. Negotiations are taking place for a 
Collective Agreement regarding minimum hours. 
No 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
No 
Luxembourg  No 
Malta 
No 
Netherlands  Only one Collective Agreement on temporary agency work.  
Poland 

Collective agreements in Poland are most often entered at the level of the company, so it 
is difficult to get sector specific examples. However, such an example is Grupa LOTOS 
SA where the Company Collective Labour Agreement applies to employees independently 
of the system and organization of working time. 
The average working duration shall be calculated by reference to the period established 
under a collective agreement that is not more than 12 months. In case of lack of those 
agreements the period is 4 months. Collective Agreements may reduce the duration of the 
probation period. 
No 
No 
No. Some collective agreements may stipulate extra components of an employment 
contract; however they do not relate specifically to atypical workers. 
Some national agreements, such as the Collective Agreement for Large Retailers and 
Department Stores, establish a larger minimum notice than the established by law in case 
of irregular distribution of working hours (7 days instead of 5 days). The same agreement 
also establishes that for part time workers whose daily working time is less than 4 hours, 
its distribution on the day must be continuous without any inactive hours in between. 
The national Collective Agreement for the Chemical Industry (BOE 19 August 2015) 
establishes a minimum notice of 7 days (instead of 5 days) in case of irregular distribution 
of working hours. 
In some regional agreements (vgr Steel Sector, Madrid), there are provisions extending the 
minimum notice before new work assignments; there are also provisions limiting the daily 
working hours in case of irregular distribution of working time along the year. 
The 1982 LAS law allows derogations from Sections 6c, 6d, 6e through a collective 
agreement entered into or approved by a central/nation-wide trade union, provided that 
such an agreement does not provide for the application of less beneficial rules to 
employees. Hence, there might be collective agreements which go further than the 
Directive. Collective agreements play a large role in the regulation of exclusivity clauses.  
No 

Portugal 

Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 

Spain 

Sweden 

UK 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX  9:  FURTHER  INFORMATION  ON  IMPACTS  OF  POLICY 
PACKAGES B, C AND D 

1. 

Impacts of policy package B 

Direct benefits for workers – 
right to written statement 

Direct benefits for workers – 
information 
strengthened 
package 

Direct benefits for workers – 
(1st  or 
shorter  deadline 
before) 

Direct benefits and costs 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.4m-3.2m increase in number of workers having the right to a written 
statement 
3.5m employees working <8 hours per week having the right to a written 
statement 
447,000 increase in number of employees working <8 hours per week 
having the right to a written statement 
1.6m employees with contract duration of <1 month having the right to a 
written statement 
658,000 increase in number of employees with contract duration of <1 
month having the right to a written statement  
1.2m-2.0m increase in number casual workers having the right to a written 
statement 

  Employees having: better understanding of basic working conditions & 

rights at work; clarity in employment relationship; better protection against 
possible infringements of rights; better access to social security protection 
through having proof of employment 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  Better integration of casual, part-time, fixed-term and other atypical 
workers in other countries due to provision of written statements 
46.3m additional employees having new right to information about 
duration and conditions of probation periods (of those, 37m whose 
contracts include probation periods) 
94.4m additional employees having new right to information about social 
security system into which the employer is contributing 
153.4m additional employees having new right to information about 
national law applicable in case of termination of contract 
145.2m additional employees having new right to information about 
working time (including possibility of extra hours) 
4.6m-9.3m additional employees p.a. starting a job and receiving 
information about duration and conditions of probation periods  
9.4m-18.9m additional employees p.a. starting a job and receiving 
information about social security system into which the employer is 
contributing 
15.3m-30.7m additional employees p.a. starting a job and receiving 
information about national law applicable in case of termination 
14.5m-29.0m additional employees p.a. starting a job and receiving 
information about precise working time (including possibility of extra 
hours) 
15.3m-30.7m additional employees p.a. leaving a job having had the right 
to receive information about national law applicable in case of termination 
Increased legal certainty from receiving written statements at an earlier 
date 
111.7m (60% of EU workforce) additional employees having new right to 
receive a written statement on the 1st day of employment or before 
11.2m-22.3m additional employees p.a. starting a job and having new right 
to receive a written statement on the 1st day of employment or before 
717,000 additional workers with contract duration of less than 1 month 
benefitting from a deadline of 1st day of employment or before 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Direct costs for workers 

  None 

198 

 
 
 
Direct 
employers 

Direct costs for employers 

Direct benefits and costs 

benefits 

for 

  Modest additional benefits since many employers already provide such 

 

information (either as required by national legislation or through choice) 
Increased legal certainty for 16% of employers (i.e. those not currently 
providing a written statement for all employees due to legal exemptions) 
  Significant one-off costs for companies to familiarise with the legislation 
  One-off cost of providing written statements for existing staff that are 
newly covered by an extension of the Directive: €114m-€152m 

  Additional costs to provide written statements for new employees that fall 

within the categories covered by the Directive: 

  Additional annual cost of providing written statements (assuming 10% staff 

turnover: €11.4m-15.2m 

  Additional annual cost of providing written statements (assuming 20% staff 

turnover: 22.7m-30.3m 

  Total cost of providing written statements in first year: €125.4m-182.3m 
  Cost of familiarisation, etc.: €852.5m307 

Change 
employed 

in  number  of  people 

in  number  of  hours 

Change 
worked 
Number of casual workers gaining 
a  second  job  after  prohibition  of 
exclusivity clauses 
Displacement  of  workers  covered 
by  the  Directive  by  workers  not 
covered 

Overall labour market impacts 

  Negligible: employers’ recruitment decisions unlikely to be 

significantly affected by an extension of the Directive, strengthened 
information package or shorter deadline 

  No change 

  No change 

  Overall substitution effects arising from provision of written 

statements likely to be negligible (majority of employers already 
provide written statements; requirement to provide written statements 
tends to have negligible influence on recruitment decisions) 

  Reduction in (already small) risk of workers covered by the Directive 

being replaced by workers not uncovered 

  Very slight increase in risk of workers with employment contracts 

being replaced by informal agreements or self-employment contracts 
(whether legal or bogus) 

Overall impact on working conditions 

Reduction 
undeclared work 

in 

  Considerable reduction in undeclared work, as absence of a written statement in an 

employment relationship is often indicative of undeclared work 

  Reduction in “unwitting” undeclared work by employees not receiving a written 

statement 

  Reduction due to reduced deadline for providing written statements (in part because 
fewer temporary workers will complete their contract before receiving a written 

307  This  total  amount  represents  the  average  cost  per  company  (53  EUR  for  an  SME  and  39  EUR  for  a 
larger  company)  multiplied  by  the  number  of  all  companies  in  the  EU.  It  is  likely  an  overestimation  as 
mostly companies needing to issue new written statements will need to invest in familiarising with the new 
legislation. 

199 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Overall impact on working conditions 

 

statement) 
Increase ease of detection of undeclared work (provision of information on the 
employment relationship and the declaration of the relationship to the relevant 
authorities typically occur at the same time) 

 

  Undeclared work occurs most often in sectors with high prevalence of casual work 
(e.g. construction, catering, agriculture) – bringing casual workers into the scope of 
the Directive will expose undeclared work and facilitate detection 
Increase in number of workers receiving written statement will reduce abuse, as 
written statements facilitate the control of other working conditions by the relevant 
body e.g. labour inspectorates 
Increase in number of workers having new right to written statement and thus 
information about collective agreements governing the employee’s conditions of 
work 
Increase in number of workers having new right to written statement and thus 
information about amount of paid leave and normal working day 
145.2m additional employees having new right to information about working time 
will reduce involuntary/inadvertent overtime 

 

 

 

  None 

 

  Reduction in abuse of probation periods, as all workers (except small number not 
covered by a revised Directive) will have information about the duration and 
conditions of probation period 
27.7m employees (IE, UK) will continue to have no right to a maximum probation 
period 
5.8m employees (21% of employees in IE, UK) will continue to have probationary 
periods with no maximum duration 

 

Reduced  abuse  of 
workers 

having 

Workers 
better 
reconciliation 
between  work  and 
family life 
predicable 
More 
working 
hours 
through  conversion 
of  on-call  jobs  into 
hour 
minimum 
contracts 
Less 
probation periods 

abuse 

of 

  Continuation of abuses linked to lack of statutory maximum probation period (IE, 

 

UK) 
137m employees will continue to have statutory maximum probation period >3 
months (AT, BG, CY, CZ, DE, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IT, LU, MT, NL, PT, 
RO, SE, SI SK) 

  Right to a written statement reinforces cases brought related to infringements of 

other rights 

  More harmonised information requirements across the EU 
 

Increase in workers written information will help them to move between employers 
and have their work recognised 

  More employees receiving essential information about conditions pertaining to any 

periods of work abroad 

Increased  ability  of 
workers 
to  gain 
redress 
Improved 
conditions 
transnational 
working 
greater mobility 

and 

of 

tax 
Increased 
revenues 
from 
change  in  number 
of hours worked 
Reduction  in  social 
from 
security 

Overall impact on public finances 

  Negligible 

  Reduction in fraudulent social security claims linked to bogus self-employment or 

undeclared work 

200 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall impact on public finances 

 

Increase in legitimate social security claims due to better employee awareness 

 

Increased costs of enforcement due to higher number of workers covered 

change 
employment 
hours worked 
Cost 
enforcement 
support 
employers 

in 
or 

of 
& 
for 

Overall impact on competitiveness and productivity 

 

Increase in compliance and administrative costs is negligible compared to total 
labour costs 

  Majority of employers do not find any particular aspect of the current Directive to be 

particularly burdensome at all 

  More than 80% of employers are likely to benefit from less “unfair competition”, as 
they already provide written statements for employees working <8 hours per week, 
employees with contracts of less than one month’s duration, on-demand workers and 
intermittent workers 

  No loss of flexibility of casual workforce 

  Around 20% of employers who do not currently provide written statements will 

benefit (the current Directive has been found to increase staff retention, loyalty and 
productivity plus a reduction in legal costs, court cases, etc. (REFIT)) 

of 

to  overall 

Significance 
administrative 
costs 
labour costs 
Number  or  %  of 
employers  likely  to 
an 
experience 
increase  /  decrease 
in  competitiveness 
into 
(taking 
reduction 
account 
in 
unfair 
competition, loss of 
flexibility, etc.) 
Number  or  %  of 
employers  likely  to 
an 
experience 
staff 
increase 
retention, 
loyalty 
productivity 
and 
plus  a  reduction  in 
legal  costs,  court 
cases, etc. 

in 

Overall impact on application and enforcement 

Extent 
options 
already 
adopted 

to  which 
have 
been 

  Measure 1 (8 hours per week): already adopted in 24 Member States 
  Measure 1 (<1 month): already adopted in 14 Member States 
  Measure 2 (information on probation period): already adopted in 21 Member States 
  Measure 2 (information on social security system): already adopted in 7 Member 

States 

  Measure 2 (information on probation period): already adopted in 4 Member States 
  Measure 2 (information on probation period): already adopted in 9 Member States 
  Measure 3 (1st day deadline): already adopted in 10 Member States (or shorter) 
  Measure 3 (before contract formed): already adopted in 7 Member States (or shorter) 
  Significant increase in number of workers receiving right to information (+ more 

information + earlier) which is essential to gaining justice 

  Significant contribution due to more accessible redress mechanisms, increased 

number of employees with their rights protected, stronger legal basis for complaints, 
increased court cases due to the stronger position of employees 
Increase in number of employees using dispute resolution to seek redress for 

 

Strengthening 
enforcement 
and 
ease  of  modifying 
strengthening 
or 
means  of  redress 
and sanctions 

201 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to 
between 

that 
Confirmation 
fundamental 
no 
rights  will 
be 
impinged (e.g. right 
to 
a 
operate 
business) 
Contribution 
equality 
men and women 
Contribution 
to 
freedom  to  choose 
an  occupation  and 
right  to  engage  in 
work 
Contribution 
right 
remedy 

to 
to  effective 

violations as a non-judicial dispute resolution is less damaging for employment 
relations 

Overall impact on fundamental rights 

  Confirmed: no change to the current situation (REFIT study found no obvious 

discrepancies between the Directive and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU) 

  Significant contribution, as workers not currently covered by the Directive are more 

likely to be female (<8 hours per week, casual, etc.) 

  Significant contribution to converting undeclared work and thus individual’s right to 

engage in legal employment 

  Significant increase in number of workers receiving right to information (+ more 

information + earlier) which is essential to gaining justice 

  Significant contribution due to more accessible redress mechanisms, increased 

 

number of employees with their rights protected, stronger legal basis for complaints, 
increased court cases due to the stronger position of employees 
Increase in number of employees using dispute resolution to seek redress for 
violations as a non-judicial dispute resolution is less damaging for employment 
relations 

to 

Significant contribution as: 

from 
dismissal, 
just 

and 

Contribution 
solidarity 
(protection 
unfair 
fair 
working 
conditions, 
and 
life) 
Access to justice 

family 
professional 

  Additional employees receiving written statement and thus having better 

understanding of basic working conditions & rights at work; clarity in employment 
relationship; better protection against possible infringements of rights; better access 
to social security protection through having proof of employment 
93.9m additional employees having new right to information about social security 
system into which the employer is contributing 
153.4m additional employees having new right to information about national law 
applicable in case of termination of contract 

 

 

  Significant increase in number of workers receiving right to information (+ more 

information + earlier) which is essential to gaining justice 

2. 

Impacts of policy package C 

Direct  benefits  for  workers 
– right to written statement 

  No increase in number of workers having right to a written statement 
  Gradual reduction in the proportion of workers covered by the Directive 

Direct benefits and costs 

Direct  benefits  for  workers 
–  strengthened  information 
package 

(number of people in atypical forms of employment is expected to grow at 
a faster rate than those in standard forms) 
43.9m additional employees having new right to information about duration 
and conditions of probation periods (of those, 35.6m whose contracts 
include probation periods) 
91.2m additional employees having new right to information about social 
security system into which the employer is contributing 
149.3m additional employees having new right to information about 

 

 

 

202 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Direct benefits and costs 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

 

 
 

 

 

 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

national law applicable in case of termination of contract 
141.4m additional employees having new right to information about 
working time (including possibility of extra hours) 
4.4m-8.8m additional employees p.a. starting a job and receiving 
information about duration and conditions of probation periods 
9.1m-18.2m additional employees p.a. starting a job and receiving 
information about social security system into which the employer is 
contributing 
14.9m-29.9m additional employees p.a. starting a job and receiving 
information about national law applicable in case of termination 
14.1m-28.3m additional employees p.a. starting a job and receiving 
information about precise working time (including possibility of extra 
hours) 
14.9m-29.9m additional employees p.a. leaving a job having had the right 
to information about national law applicable in case of termination 
Increased legal certainty from receiving written statements at an earlier date 
46.7m (25% of EU workforce) additional employees having new right to 
receive a written statement within 1 month of starting employment 
4.7m-9.3m additional employees p.a. starting a job and having new right to 
receive a written statement within 1 month of starting employment 
Increased legal certainty from receiving written statements at an earlier date 
103.1m (55% of EU workforce) additional employees having new right to 
receive a written statement within 15 days of starting employment 
10.3m-20.6m additional employees p.a. starting a job and having new right 
to receive a written statement within 15 days of starting employment 
32,000 additional workers with contract duration of less than 1 month 
benefitting from a deadline of 15 days 
Increased legal certainty from receiving written statements at an earlier date 
81.0m (37% of EU workforce) additional employees having new right to 
receive a written statement on the 1st day of employment or before 
8.1-16.2m additional employees p.a. starting a job and having new right to 
receive a written statement on the 1st day of employment or before 
52,000 additional workers with contract duration of less than 1 month 
benefitting from a deadline of 1st day of employment or before 
684,000 workers with contract duration of less than 1 month not benefitting 
from a deadline of 1st day of employment or before 
3.1m-3.8m casual and voucher-based employees (already having the right 
to a written statement) receiving right to reference hours, minimum 
advance notice period, minimum number of hours set at the average of the 
preceding period, freedom from exclusivity clauses 
52.5m additional employees receiving possibility to request a new form of 
employment 
31.5m additional employees receiving right to maximum duration of 
probation 

  None 
  Modest additional benefits since many employers already provide such 

 

information (either as required by national legislation or through choice) 
Increased legal certainty for 16% of employers (i.e. those not currently 
providing a written statement for all employees due to legal exemptions) 

  Minimal annual additional revenues to secondary employers due to 

prohibition of exclusivity clauses 

203 

Direct  benefits  for  workers 
– shorter deadline (1 month) 

Direct  benefits  for  workers 
– shorter deadline (15 days) 

Direct  benefits  for  workers 
–  shorter  deadline  (1st  or 
before) 

Direct  benefits  for  workers 
–  new  rights  for  casual 
workers 

Direct  benefits  for  workers 
– new rights for all workers 

Direct costs for workers 
Direct 
employers 

benefits 

for 

 
 
 
Direct costs for employers 

Direct benefits and costs 

  Additional annual cost of providing written statements: €0 
  Cost of familiarisation, etc.: €852.5m308 
  Minimal annual reorganisation costs due to unavailability of on-

demand/zero-hours staff taking second jobs 

Labour market impacts primarily relate to on-demand/zero-hour workers enabled to get 
a job by prohibition on exclusivity clauses. If the scope of the Directive is not extended 
(Measure 1), then only those on-demand/zero-hour workers which are already covered 
by  the  Directive  (due  to  scope  of  national  legislation)  will  benefit.  Precise  data  is  not 
available, since such workers are not always defined in national data sets, however, the 
number will be relatively modest. 

Change  in  number  of  people 
employed 
Change  in  number  of  hours 
worked 
Number  of  casual  workers 
gaining  a  second  job  after 
prohibition  of 
exclusivity 
clauses 
Increased income of workers 

Displacement  of  workers 
covered  by  the  Directive  by 
workers not covered 

Overall labour market impacts 

  Modest number of on-demand/zero-hour contract workers enabled to get a 

second job with another employer 

  Modest number of extra hours worked per annum by on-demand/zero-hour 

contract workers enabled to get a second job with another employer 
  Modest number of on-demand/zero-hour contract workers enabled to get a 

second job with another employer 

  Slight increase in gross annual earnings of on-demand/zero-hour contract 

workers enabled to get a second job with another employer 

  Minimal adjustments by employers to their workforces 

Reduction 
undeclared work 

in 

having 

Reduced  abuse  of 
workers 
Workers 
better 
reconciliation 
between  work  and 
family life 
More 
working 

predicable 
hours 

Overall impact on working conditions 

  Slight reduction due to reduced deadline for providing written statements 
  Overall, minimal reduction, as many/most atypical workers will remain outside the 
scope of the Directive (undeclared work occurs most often in sectors with high 
prevalence of casual work, e.g. construction, catering, agriculture) 

  Modest effect as many of the most vulnerable workers will remain outside the scope 

of the Directive. 

  Modest effect as many of the most vulnerable workers will remain outside the scope 

of the Directive. 

  Modest effect as many of the most vulnerable workers will remain outside the scope 

of the Directive. 

308  This  total  amount  represents  the  average  cost  per  company  (53  EUR  for  an  SME  and  39  EUR  for  a 
larger  company)  multiplied  by  the  number  of  all  companies  in  the  EU.  It  is  likely  an  overestimation  as 
mostly companies needing to issue new written statements will need to invest in familiarising with the new 
legislation. 

204 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
through  conversion 
of  on-call  jobs  into 
minimum 
hour 
contracts 
Less 
probation periods 

abuse 

of 

Increased  ability  of 
workers 
to  gain 
redress 
Improved 
conditions 
transnational 
working 
greater mobility 

and 

of 

Overall impact on working conditions 

  Some reduction in abuse of probation periods, as most workers will have 

 

 

information about the duration and conditions of probation period 
32.4m employees (IE, UK) will continue to have no right to a maximum probation 
period 
6.8m employees (21% of employees in IE, UK) will continue to have probationary 
periods with no maximum duration 

  Continuation of abuses linked to lack of statutory maximum probation period (IE, 

 

UK) 
163m employees will continue to have statutory maximum probation period >3 
months (AT, BG, CY, CZ, DE, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IT, LU, MT, NL, PT, 
RO, SE, SI SK) 

  Modest effect as many of the most vulnerable workers will remain outside the scope 

of the Directive. 

  More harmonised information requirements across the EU 
 

Increase in workers written information will help them to move between employers 
and have their work recognised 

  Minimal benefit for atypical workers that remain outside the scope of the Directive 

Overall impact on public finances 

  Modest effect as many casual workers that are subject to exclusivity clauses will 
remain outside the scope of the Directive (and thus remain unable to get a second 
job with another employer). 

  Modest effect as many casual workers that are subject to exclusivity clauses will 
remain outside the scope of the Directive (and thus remain unable to get a second 
job with another employer). 
Increase in legitimate social security claims due to better employee awareness via 
strengthened information package 

 

  No change 

tax 
Increased 
revenues 
from 
change  in  number 
of hours worked 
Reduction  in  social 
from 
security 
in 
change 
or 
employment 
hours worked 
Cost 
enforcement 
support 
employers 

of 
& 
for 

of 

to  overall 

Significance 
administrative 
costs 
labour costs 
Number  or  %  of 
employers  likely  to 
an 
experience 
increase  /  decrease 
in  competitiveness 

Overall impact on competitiveness and productivity 

 

Increase in compliance and administrative costs is negligible compared to total 
labour costs 

  Majority of employers do not find any particular aspect of the current Directive to be 

particularly burdensome at all 

  More than 80% of employers will continue to suffer from “unfair competition”, as 
they already provide written statements for employees working <8 hours per week, 
employees with contracts of less than one month’s duration, on-demand workers and 
intermittent workers 

205 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall impact on competitiveness and productivity 

  Some modest effects as workers receive more information and within a shorter 

deadline. 

  Overall, limited, as many atypical workers remain outside the scope of the Directive. 

into 
(taking 
reduction 
account 
in 
unfair 
competition, loss of 
flexibility, etc.) 
Number  or  %  of 
employers  likely  to 
an 
experience 
staff 
increase 
loyalty 
retention, 
and 
productivity 
plus  a  reduction  in 
legal  costs,  court 
cases, etc. 

in 

Overall impact on application and enforcement 

Extent 
measures 
already 
adopted 

to  which 
have 
been 

  Measure 1 (8 hours per week): already adopted in 23 Member States 
  Measure 1 (<1 month): already adopted in 13 Member States 
  Measure 2 (information on probation period): already adopted in 21 Member States 
  Measure 2 (information on social security system): already adopted in 7 Member 

Strengthening 
enforcement 
and 
ease  of  modifying 
or 
strengthening 
means  of  redress 
and sanctions 

that 
Confirmation 
fundamental 
no 
rights  will 
be 
impinged (e.g. right 
a 
operate 
to 
business) 
Contribution 
equality 
men and women 
to 
Contribution 
freedom  to  choose 
an  occupation  and 

to 
between 

States 

  Measure 2 (information on probation period): already adopted in 4 Member States 
  Measure 2 (information on probation period): already adopted in 9 Member States 
  Measure 3 (1st day deadline): already adopted in 10 Member States (or shorter) 
  Measure 3 (before contract formed): already adopted in 7 Member States (or shorter) 
  No increase in number of workers receiving right to information 
  Many atypical workers not receiving any benefit 
  For workers already covered, receiving more information + earlier which is essential 

to gaining justice 

  For workers already covered, some contribution due to more accessible redress 

mechanisms, stronger legal basis for complaints, increased court cases due to the 
stronger position of employees 

  Slight increase in number of employees using dispute resolution to seek redress for 
violations as a non-judicial dispute resolution is less damaging for employment 
relations 

Overall impact on fundamental rights 

  Confirmed: no change to the current situation (REFIT study found no obvious 

discrepancies between the Directive and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU) 

  No significant contribution, as workers remaining outside the scope of the Directive 

are more likely to be female (<8 hours per week, casual, etc.) 

  Slight contribution to converting undeclared work and thus individual’s right to 

engage in legal employment 

206 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
right  to  engage  in 
work 
Contribution 
right 
remedy 

to 
to  effective 

  Some contribution due to more accessible redress mechanisms, stronger legal basis 
for complaints, increased court cases due to the stronger position of employees 
  Some increase in number of employees using dispute resolution to seek redress for 
violations as a non-judicial dispute resolution is less damaging for employment 
relations 

to 

  Some contribution as employees already covered will have better understanding of 

from 
dismissal, 
just 

and 

Contribution 
solidarity 
(protection 
unfair 
fair 
working 
conditions, 
and 
life) 
Access to justice 

family 
professional 

basic working conditions & rights at work; clarity in employment relationship; better 
protection against possible infringements of rights; better access to social security 
protection through having proof of employment 

  Slight contribution as workers already covered will be better informed. 

3. 

Impacts of policy package D 

Direct benefits for workers 
– right to written statement 

Direct benefits for workers 
– strengthened information 
package 

Direct benefits for workers 
– shorter deadline (1st or 
before) 

Direct benefits and costs 

 

 

 

 

2.0m employees working <8 hours per week having the right to a written 
statement 
108,000 increase in number of employees working <8 hours per week 
having the right to a written statement 
1.6m employees with contract duration of <1 month having the right to a 
written statement 
664,000 increase in number of employees with contract duration of <1 
month having the right to a written statement  

  Workers having the right to a written statement due to new definition of 

employee 

  Employees having: better understanding of basic working conditions & 

rights at work; clarity in employment relationship; better protection against 
possible infringements of rights; better access to social security protection 
through having proof of employment 

 

 

 

 

  Better integration of casual, part-time, fixed-term and other atypical 
workers in other countries due to provision of written statements 
46.3m additional employees having new right to information about duration 
and conditions of probation periods (of those, 37m whose contracts include 
probation periods) 
93.9m additional employees having new right to information about social 
security system into which the employer is contributing 
153.4m additional employees having new right to information about 
national law applicable in case of termination of contract 
145.2m additional employees having new right to information about 
working time (including possibility of extra hours) 
4.6m-9.3m additional employees p.a. starting a job and receiving 
information about duration and conditions of probation periods  
15.3m-30.7m additional employees p.a. leaving a job having received 
information about national law applicable in case of termination 
Increased legal certainty from receiving written statements at an earlier date 
81.0m (37% of EU workforce) additional employees having new right to 
receive a written statement on the 1st day of employment or before 
8.1-16.2m additional employees p.a. starting a job and having new right to 
receive a written statement on the 1st day of employment or before 

 
 

 

 

 

207 

 
 
 
 
Direct benefits for workers 
– new rights for casual 
workers 

Direct benefits for workers 
– new rights for all workers 

Direct costs for workers 
Direct benefits for 
employers 

Direct costs for employers 

Direct benefits and costs 

 

696,000 additional workers with contract duration of less than 1 month 
benefitting from a deadline of 1st day of employment or before 
  Between 4.3m and 5.7m additional casual and voucher-based workers 

receiving right to reference hours 

  Between 5.2m and 6.7m additional casual and voucher-based workers 

receiving right to minimum advance notice period 

  Between 4.3m and 5.4m additional casual workers receiving right to 
minimum number of hours set at the average of the preceding period 
  Between 5.7m and 7.1m additional casual workers receiving right to 

 

 

 

freedom from exclusivity clauses 
55m additional employees receiving possibility to request a new form of 
employment 
14m fixed-term workers might make use of the possibility to request a new 
form of employment 
31.5m additional employees receiving right to maximum duration of 
probation 

  None 
  Modest additional benefits since many employers already provide such 

 

 

information (either as required by national legislation or through choice) 
Increased legal certainty for 16% of employers (i.e. those not currently 
providing a written statement for all employees due to legal exemptions) 
€42m-€167m annual additional revenues to secondary employers due 
to prohibition of exclusivity clauses 

  One-off cost of providing written statements for existing staff that are 
newly covered by an extension of the Directive: €114m-€152m 

  Additional annual cost of providing written statements (assuming 10% staff 

turnover: €11.4m-15.2m 

  Additional annual cost of providing written statements (assuming 20% staff 

turnover: 22.7m-30.3m 

  Total cost of providing written statements in first year: €125.4m-182.3m 
  Cost of familiarisation, etc.: €852.5m309 
 

€7m-€27m annual reorganisation costs due to unavailability of on-
demand/zero-hours staff taking second jobs 

  Total compliance costs policy package D: €1944.5 - €1987.2m 

Change in number of people 
employed 
Change in number of hours 
worked 
Number of casual workers 
gaining a second job after 
prohibition of exclusivity 
clauses 
Increased income of workers 

Overall labour market impacts 

 

 

 

91,000 – 364,000 on-demand/zero-hour contract workers enabled to get a 
second job with another employer 
33m-133m extra hours worked per annum by on-demand/zero-hour 
contract workers enabled to get a second job with another employer 
91,000 – 364,000 on-demand/zero-hour contract workers enabled to get a 
second job with another employer 

 

€355m-€1,424m increase in gross annual earnings of on-demand/zero-

309  This  total  amount  represents  the  average  cost  per  company  (53  EUR  for  an  SME  and  39  EUR  for  a 
larger  company)  multiplied  by  the  number  of  all  companies  in  the  EU.  It  is  likely  an  overestimation  as 
mostly companies needing to issue new written statements will need to invest in familiarising with the new 
legislation. 

208 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Displacement of workers 
covered by the Directive by 
workers not covered 

hour contract workers enabled to get a second job with another employer 
  Extent of adjustments by employers to their workforces are uncertain but 

might be modest 

  No overall pattern discernible: the majority will not adjust their 

workforces. Of those employing casual workers, a sizeable proportion will 
make no change. Some (likely to be <50%) may replace casual contracts 
with standard forms of employment. A smaller proportion may simply 
recruit fewer casual workers. A yet smaller proportion might replace 
casual work contracts with informal agreements or self-employment 
arrangements. 

Overall impact on working conditions 

Reduction in 
undeclared work 

  Considerable reduction in undeclared work, as absence of a written statement in an 

employment relationship is often indicative of undeclared work 

  Reduction in “unwitting” undeclared work by employees not receiving a written 

statement 

  Reduction due to reduced deadline for providing written statements (in part because 
fewer temporary workers will complete their contract before receiving a written 
statement) 
Increase ease of detection of undeclared work (provision of information on the 
employment relationship and the declaration of the relationship to the relevant 
authorities typically occur at the same time) 

 

Reduced abuse of 
workers 

Workers having 
better 
reconciliation 
between work and 
family life 

More predicable 
working hours 
through conversion 
of on-call jobs into 
minimum hour 
contracts 
Less abuse of 
probation periods 

 

 

  Undeclared work occurs most often in sectors with high prevalence of casual work 
(e.g. construction, catering, agriculture) – bringing casual workers into the scope of 
the Directive will expose undeclared work and facilitate detection 
Increase in number of workers receiving written statement will reduce abuse, as 
written statements facilitate the control of other working conditions by the relevant 
body e.g. labour inspectorates 
Increase in number of workers having new right to written statement and thus 
information about collective agreements governing the employee’s conditions of 
work 
Increase in number of workers having new right to written statement and thus 
information about amount of paid leave and normal working day 
45.2m additional employees having new right to information about working time 
will reduce involuntary/inadvertent overtime 

 

 

  Casual workers benefitting from reference hours and minimum advance notice 

period 

  Casual workers benefitting from reference hours and minimum advance notice 

period 

 

  Reduction in abuse of probation periods, as all workers (except small number not 
covered by a revised Directive) will have information about the duration and 
conditions of probation period 
32.4m employees (IE, UK) will continue to have no right to a maximum probation 
period 
6.8m employees (21% of employees in IE, UK) will continue to have probationary 
periods with no maximum duration 

 

  Continuation of abuses linked to lack of statutory maximum probation period (IE, 

 

UK) 
163m employees will continue to have statutory maximum probation period >3 
months (AT, BG, CY, CZ, DE, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IT, LU, MT, NL, PT, 
RO, SE, SI SK) 

209 

 
 
 
 
 
Increased ability of 
workers to gain 
redress 
Improved 
conditions of 
transnational 
working and 
greater mobility 

Increased tax 
revenues from 
change in number 
of hours worked 
Reduction in social 
security from 
change in 
employment or 
hours worked 

Cost of 
enforcement & 
support for 
employers 

Significance of 
administrative 
costs to overall 
labour costs 
Number or % of 
employers likely to 
experience an 
increase / decrease 
in competitiveness 
(taking into 
account reduction 
in unfair 
competition, loss of 
flexibility, etc.) 

Number or % of 
employers likely to 
experience an 
increase in staff 
retention, loyalty 
and productivity 
plus a reduction in 
legal costs, court 
cases, etc. 

Overall impact on working conditions 

  Right to a written statement reinforces cases brought related to infringements of 

other rights 

  More harmonised information requirements across the EU 
 

Increase in workers written information will help them to move between employers 
and have their work recognised 

  More employees receiving essential information about conditions pertaining to any 

periods of work abroad 

Overall impact on public finances 

 

€46m-€185m annual additional tax revenues from on-demand/zero-hour 
contract workers taking a second job due to prohibition of exclusivity clauses 

  Reduction in social security payments resulting from 33m-133m extra hours 

worked per annum by on-demand/zero-hour contract workers enabled to get a 
second job with another employer 

  Reduction in fraudulent social security claims linked to bogus self-employment or 

undeclared work 
Increase in legitimate social security claims due to better employee awareness 
Increased costs of enforcement due to higher number of workers covered 

 
 

Overall impact on competitiveness and productivity 

 

Increase in compliance and administrative costs is negligible compared to total 
labour costs 

  Majority of employers who replied to the survey do not find any particular aspect of 

the current Directive to be particularly burdensome  

  More than 80% of employers are likely to benefit from less “unfair competition”, as 
they already provide written statements for employees working <8 hours per week, 
employees with contracts of less than one month’s duration, on-demand workers and 
intermittent workers 

  Secondary employers having access to 91,000 – 364,000 workers for 33m-133m 

hours per annum 

  Of those not yet providing basic rights for casual workers, the majority of 

employers anticipate incurring increased indirect compliance costs from the 
provision of such rights – although mostly to a modest rather than to a great 
extent (legal advice, revised scheduling systems, HR manager time, staff 
training, informing staff) 

  Around 20% of employers who do not currently provide written statements will 

benefit (the current Directive has been found to increase staff retention, loyalty and 
productivity plus a reduction in legal costs, court cases, etc. (REFIT)) 

  More employers anticipate gaining than not gaining benefits from the provision 
of new basic rights for casual workers: higher staff retention/loyalty, improved 
productivity, improved worker relations, fewer complaints from workers, fewer 
court cases related to working conditions, lower training costs, lower other 
costs, better resource planning & work allocation. 

Overall impact on application and enforcement 

210 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent to which 
measures have 
already been 
adopted 

  Measure 1 (8 hours per week): already adopted in 23 Member States 
  Measure 1 (<1 month): already adopted in 13 Member States 
  Measure 2 (information on probation period): already adopted in 21 Member States 
  Measure 2 (information on social security system): already adopted in 7 Member 

States 

  Measure 2 (information on probation period): already adopted in 4 Member States 
  Measure 2 (information on probation period): already adopted in 9 Member States 
  Measure 3 (1st day deadline): already adopted in 10 Member States (or shorter) 
  Measure 3 (before contract formed): already adopted in 7 Member States (or shorter) 
  Significant increase in number of workers receiving right to information (+ more 

information + earlier) which is essential to gaining justice 

  Significant contribution due to more accessible redress mechanisms, increased 

 

number of employees with their rights protected, stronger legal basis for complaints, 
increased court cases due to the stronger position of employees 
Increase in number of employees using dispute resolution to seek redress for 
violations as a non-judicial dispute resolution is less damaging for employment 
relations 

Overall impact on fundamental rights 

  Confirmed: no change to the current situation (REFIT study found no obvious 

discrepancies between the Directive and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU) 

  Significant contribution, as workers not currently covered by the Directive are more 

likely to be female (<8 hours per week, casual, etc.) 

  Significant contribution to converting undeclared work and thus individual’s right to 

engage in legal employment 

  Substantial contribution for on-demand/zero-hour contract workers currently 

prevented from taking a second job by exclusivity clauses 

  Significant increase in number of workers receiving right to information (+ more 

information + earlier) which is essential to gaining justice 

  Significant contribution due to more accessible redress mechanisms, increased 

 

number of employees with their rights protected, stronger legal basis for complaints, 
increased court cases due to the stronger position of employees 
Increase in number of employees using dispute resolution to seek redress for 
violations as a non-judicial dispute resolution is less damaging for employment 
relations 

Significant contribution as: 

  Additional employees receiving written statement and thus having better 

understanding of basic working conditions & rights at work; clarity in employment 
relationship; better protection against possible infringements of rights; better access 
to social security protection through having proof of employment 
93.9m additional employees having new right to information about social security 
system into which the employer is contributing 
153.4m additional employees having new right to information about national law 
applicable in case of termination of contract 

 

 

  Significant increase in number of workers receiving right to information (+ more 

information + earlier) which is essential to gaining justice 

Strengthening 
enforcement and 
ease of modifying 
or strengthening 
means of redress 
and sanctions 

Confirmation that 
no fundamental 
rights will be 
impinged (e.g. right 
to operate a 
business) 
Contribution to 
equality between 
men and women 
Contribution to 
freedom to choose 
an occupation and 
right to engage in 
work 
Contribution to 
right to effective 
remedy 

Contribution to 
solidarity 
(protection from 
unfair dismissal, 
fair and just 
working 
conditions, family 
and professional 
life) 
Access to justice 

211 

 
 
 
 
 
 
4. 

Impacts of extending the coverage of the Directive to domestic workers 

The  Written  Statement  Directive  does  not  specifically  exclude  domestic  workers  from 
its  application.  However,  the  question  whether  domestic  workers  are  covered  by  the 
Directive  or  not  often  depends  on  whether  the  contract  or  employment  relationship  is 
defined  by  national  law.  For  that  reason,  it  is  not  possible  to  simply  state  whether 
Member State law has extended the Directive to all domestic workers or not. 

Many  domestic  workers  operate  under  the  terms  of  an  informal  or  verbal  agreement 
rather  than  a  contract  or  employment  relationship  defined  by  national  law.  Such  work 
can  also  be  undeclared.  In  these  cases,  the  worker  would  not  be  covered  by  the 
Directive.  

Some  domestic  workers  are  employed  under  a  contract  or  employment  relationship 
defined  by  national  law.  However,  these  might  be  a  minority.  In  these  cases,  the 
worker  would  be  covered  by  the  Directive.  In  some  Member  States,  the  labour  law 
makes specific reference to domestic workers. Some examples are provided in the box 
below. 

Based  on  their  level  of  coverage  of  domestic  workers  the  EU  MS  can  be  grouped  as 
follows: 

Categorisation of Member States regarding domestic workers 

Domestic 
workers 
covered? 
Countries 

Yes (16) 

Possibly (9) 

No (3) 

AT,  BE,  CY,  FI, 
FR,  DE,  EL,  IT, 
LV,  LT,  LU,  MT, 
PT, RO, ES, UK 

BG,  HR,  CZ,  DK, 
EE, IE, PL, SK, SL 

HU, NL, SE 

Source: Own CSES and PPMI research 

The  table  shows  that  in  15  Member  States,  domestic  workers  are  covered  by  the 
Directive and are entitled to receive a written statement. In 9 Member States, their right 
to a written statement depends on their employment relationship. Only in Hungary, the 
Netherlands  and  Sweden,  domestic  workers  are  excluded  from  the  scope  of  the 
Directive. 

The extent to which domestic workers will benefit from any revision of the Directive will 
depend  on  two  things:  i)  the  extent  to  which  such  workers  are  recognised  in  law  as 
workers  or  employees;  and  ii)  the  extent  to  which  employers  comply  with  any  legal 
requirement to provide a written statement – this latter point will depend on the ease with 
which private households are able to comply. 

212 

 
 
 
 
Regarding  the  first  point,  previous  research  by  the  ILO  has  found  that  some  countries 
have  already  enacted  specific  laws  or  regulations  dealing  with  domestic  work,  e.g. 
Austria,  Denmark,  Finland,  Hungary,  Italy,  Malta,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden.310    Other 
countries have devoted specific chapters, titles or sections in labour codes, employment 
acts  or  acts  respecting  contracts  of  employment,  e.g.  Belgium.  Some  countries  have 
enacted  national  collective  agreements  in  addition  to  the  Labour  Code,  e.g.  France. 
However, the ILO research found that only a few of those countries specifically required 
the  provision  of  a  written  contract  of  employment,  e.g.  Austria,  Finland,  France.311  In 
some  countries,  most  domestic  workers  are  covered  by  the  legislation  transposing  the 
Directive into national law, e.g. Poland, Romania. 

Where domestic workers are defined as workers or employees, they have the right to a 
written statement, unless excluded for other reasons (e.g. if the employment relationship 
has  a  duration  of  less  than  one  month  or  involves  a  working  week  not  exceeding  eight 
hours,  and  these  exclusions  have  been  transposed  into  the  national  legislation).  For 
example: 

  Sweden:  since  2008  the  Working  Environment  Act  has  applied  to  work  carried 
out in private households, bringing domestic work within the competence of the 
Working  Environment  Authority.  There  is  currently  a  proposal  (Ds  2017:10)  to 
bring  the  treatment  of  domestic  workers  up  to  the  standards  of  the  ILO 
Convention.  

  France: salaried domestic workers must have a written employment contract that 

specifies their function, remuneration and working hours. 

  Portugal:  domestic  workers  are  governed  by  specific  legislation  -  Decree-Law 
235/92,  24  October.  The  Domestic  contract  is  a  labour  contract  similar  to  the 
Labour Code employment contract. 

the 

  Poland: no groups of workers are excluded from information obligations related 
to transposition of the Directive in the Polish Labour Code. Any person who has 
the status of an employee/worker according to Article 2 Labour Code irrespective 
of 
(including  domestic  workers, 
notwithstanding the working time system or the working  time (flexible working 
time),  the  number  of  hours  worked  in  the  week  (<  8  hours)  or  the  number  of 
working days a month (< less than one month), is covered by protection resulting 
from the obligation to inform them of their working conditions. 

type  of  work  he/she  performed 

In those Member States that have defined domestic workers as employees, brought such 
workers  within  the  scope  of  labour  codes  or  otherwise  extended  the  scope  of  the 
Directive to such workers, the extent to which domestic workers benefit will depend on 
the level of compliance by employers. In some countries, such as Austria and Sweden, it 

310 ILO (2003), Domestic work, conditions of work and employment: A legal perspective 
311 The ILO research only covered 10 EU Member States: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, 
Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. 

213 

 
 
                                                 
was reported that compliance is generally high. For example, in Sweden, a recent survey 
found  that  87%  of  employers  in  Sweden  (all  employers,  not  only  private  households) 
would provide the relevant information, even where there are no minimum requirements 
established in law. 

However, the evidence suggests that in some Member States, the level of compliance can 
be particularly low in respect of domestic workers. The main reasons offered for the low 
level  of  compliance  in  Romania  were  reported  to  be  the  wish  to  avoid  the  fiscal  and 
administrative burden associated with formal employment and to retain the flexibility to 
terminate the employment relationship as and when the employer wishes. For example, 
in  Romania,  it  was  reported  that  most  domestic  work  is  not  generally  declared  and 
therefore no written statement is provided for around 70% of domestic workers (14,000 
out of 20,000). 

It was also reported that domestic workers typically find it difficult to gain redress if they 
do  not  receive  a  written  statement  or  if  other  rights  are  infringed.  For  example,  an 
employee  representative  in  Italy  interviewed  in  the  framework  of  the  study  reported 
domestic  workers  find  it  more  difficult  to  redress  compared  to  workers  in  standard 
contract  and  that  domestic  workers  or  workers  in  very  small  businesses  find  it 
particularly challenging to bring employers to court. 

Generally,  it  is  very  rare  that  employees  take  legal  action,  solely  on  the  basis  of  non-
provision of a written statement. However, where domestic workers bring legal cases for 
other  reasons  (e.g.  exploitative  working  conditions)  the  lack  of  a  written  statement  can 
support their case. 

Regarding the feasibility of private households complying, the  following considerations 
are relevant: 

First, by definition, the monetised cost of compliance would generally be zero, assuming 
that the private householder is providing the statement during his/her personal rather than 
professional time. 

Second, a private householder would probably require at least as much time as an SME 
to  familiarise  himself/herself  with  the  requirements  of  the  Directive  and  perhaps  more, 
given  the  likelihood  that  he/she  will  often  not  have  specific  legal  or  human  resource 
expertise.  The  estimated  time  is  around  90  minutes  for  an  SME.  At  the  same  time,  the 
householder would probably not have to transfer the information individually to multiple 
persons (as might be the case in a firm), which will limit the time required. 

Third, it is reasonable to assume that a private household would probably require at least 
as much time as an SME to provide the written statement (and perhaps more, given the 
likelihood  that  the  household  will  not  have  the  relevant  professional  expertise).  The 
REFIT study found that SMEs take 15-30 minutes to provide the written statement (per 

214 

 
 
contract/work  relationship).  A  conservative  estimate  would  therefore  be  that  a  private 
household would require at least 30 minutes per statement. 

Fourth,  private  households  would  particularly  benefit  from  provision  of  templates  by 
Member States. The REFIT review found that templates for a written contract or written 
statement are already available in over half of Member States, typically provided by the 
Ministry  of  Labour  or  a  labour  inspectorate.312  Such  templates  are  most  effective  at 
national  level,  given  the  different  national  traditions  of  collective  bargaining,  different 
approaches to the regulation of working time, etc. Rates of compliance would probably 
be increased by i) the provision of national templates specifically for private households 
employing domestic workers and by ii) specific advice for private households provided 
by the relevant advisory bodies. 

Fifth,  the  REFIT  study  found  little  evidence  to  suggest  that  a  disproportionate  burden 
was being placed on micro-enterprises (<10 employees) and that there was virtually no 
appetite for exemptions for micro-enterprises. Of course, private households are different 
from  micro-enterprises,  but  this  does  support  the  argument  that  limited  legal  or  human 
resource expertise is not necessarily a barrier to compliance. 

Lastly, domestic workers who provide services through the use of vouchers would be a 
special  case,  with  their  circumstances  depending  on  the  details  of  the  relevant  national 
scheme.  For  example,  voucher  workers  in  Belgium  are  employed  by  an  intermediary 
organisation  and  therefore  already  have  certain  rights  to  receive  information.  In  other 
cases, voucher-based systems often relate to an “intermediary” form of employment and 
it can be unclear if an employment relationship exists between the client and the worker – 
particularly, if work is provided only one a one-off rather than recurring basis.  

312 Such templates were not available in 13 MS: BE, BG, CZ, DE, DK, HR, HU, IT, NL, PT, SE, SI, and 
SK. 

215 

 
 
 
                                                 
ANNEX 10: COHERENCE  

1.  Coherence with EU labour law 

Each  policy  option  has  been  tested  for  coherence  with  EU  policy  objectives,  including 
the  Charter  for  fundamental  rights,  and  the  existing  legal  framework,  in  particular 
concerning EU labour law: EU Directives on fixed-term work, part-time work, temporary 
agency  work,  working  time,  sectoral  working  conditions,  posting  of  workers,  gender 
equality  and  anti-discrimination,  and  other  initiatives  in  the  field  (e.g.  proposal  for  a 
Directive on Work-Life Balance).  

All policy options apart from Baseline include measures 2, 3, 5. 

All  policy  options  apart  from  Baseline  include  measures  2,  3,  5  that  present  new 
provisions to improve coherence with the social acquis and other policy initiatives. This 
allows considering packages B, C and D as ensuring better coherence than the baseline 
option: 

  Coherence with posting of workers provisions has been enhanced as suggested by 

the REFIT evaluation. 

  Coherence  with  Temporary  Agency  Work  Directive  has  been  enhanced  (see 
enhanced scope and rules to allow more legal persons to perform employer-like 
duties) as suggested by the REFIT evaluation. 

  Due to the role of written statements as tool to detect undeclared work, as found 
in  the REFIT study, the change in the timeliness of the provision, the enhanced 
scope covering jobs at high risk of undeclared work, the additional information to 
be provided and the enhanced enforcement rules increase the coherence with the 
action on undeclared work. 

  Moreover,  the  goal  of  supporting  action  on  undeclared  work  is  also  pursued  by 
establishing  the  criteria  for  supporting  assessment  of  the  existence  of  an 
employment  relationship  for  the  scope  of  the  Directive.  This  should  support 
combating fraudulent contracting and bogus self-employment. 

  Coherence  with  the  equal  treatment  acquis  covering  discrimination  in  the 
workplace has been improved introducing consistent provisions on enforcement. 

Other  instruments  of  EU  labour  law  have  a  broader  personal  scope  than  the  current 
Directive.  Either  they  apply  to  ‘workers’  (e.g.  Working  Time  Directive)  or  they  have 
been  interpreted  as  having  a  scope  going  beyond  national  limitations  to  workers  (e.g. 
Temporary Agency Work). The exclusion criteria are also different across the spectrum. 
Moreover,  the  REFIT  evaluation  found  that  the  discrepancy  between  the  aim  of  the 
Directive stated in the preamble covering ‘every employee’ and the material scope of the 

216 

 
 
 
 
current  Directive  allowing  for  more  than  limited  exclusions  is  an  obstacle  to  internal 
coherence. 

Policy package B and D would therefore increase the coherence of the personal scope of 
EU  labour  law.  This  would  avoid  allowing  a  new  instrument  to  provide  for  a  personal 
scope  more  detrimental  to  equal  treatment  than  other  existing  ones.  This  enhances 
coherence  with  the  Working  Time  Directive  and  the  Part-Time,  Fixed-Term  and 
Temporary Agency Work Directive, allowing for the current exclusions to remain would 
give rise for incoherence. 

The provision of additional material rights is present in options C and D and absent from 
A and B. These additional rights also support the goals of the Working Time Directive, 
Fixed-Term Directive, Part-Time Directive and Temporary Agency Directive. Indeed: 

  Proposals to support predictability of working schedules support the achievement 
of an organisation of working time protective of safety and health of workers, as 
in the Working Time Directive. 

  The  elimination  of  the  exclusion  criteria  for  workers  working  less  than  8  hours 
per week supports the achievement of the aims of the Part-Time work Directive.  
  Additionally,  the  Part-Time  Work  Directive  aims  at  supporting  part-time  on  a 
voluntary basis only: provisions on the possibility to request and receive a reply in 
writing,  or  on  the  assessment  of  working  hours  at  a  preceding  average  should 
support this aim by decreasing involuntary part-time. 

  The elimination of the exclusion criteria for workers in contracts of less than one 
month supports the achievement of the aims of the Fixed-Term Work Directive. 
  The Fixed-Term Work Directive and the Part-Time Work Directive are aimed at 
improving 
the  quality  of  specific  forms  of  work  by  preventing  non-
discrimination,  and  establishing  a  framework  to  prevent  abuse  (clause  5    FTD) 
and to ensure the development of contractual form taking into account the needs 
of  employers  and  workers  (clause  1  PTD).  The  protection  of  non-standard 
workers,  the  improvement  of  the  quality  of  their  work  are  also  the  aims  of  the 
Temporary Agency Work Directive (Art. 2). The new rights proposed support the 
same goal, for the same categories of workers and beyond for other forms of non-
standard work (e.g. casual workers). 

Furthermore,  the  possibility  to  request  another  form  of  employment  relationship 
reproduces similar provisions existing in the Parental Leave Directive and in the Proposal 
for  a  Directive  on  Work-Life  Balance,  strengthening  similar  aims  in  the  Fixed-Term 
Work, Part-Time Work and Temporary Agency Directives.  

The Parental Leave Directive already provides for the possibility to ask for two types of 
flexible  working  arrangements  (working  patterns  and  working  hours)  for  parents 
returning  from  parental  leave.    The  proposal  for  a  Directive  on  Work-Life  Balance  for 

217 

 
 
 
parents and carers introduces a proposed right, for workers with children up to at least 12 
years  old,  to  request  flexible  working  arrangements  for  caring  purposes;  employers 
would  have  then  a  duty  to  consider  and  respond  to  requests  for  flexible  working 
arrangements, taking into account the needs of both employers and workers, and justify 
any refusal of such a request. Employers would also have the obligation to consider and 
respond to requests to return to the original working pattern.  Under the Part-Time Work 
Directive,  employers  should  give  consideration,  as  far  as  possible,  to  (a)  requests  by 
workers  to  transfer  from  full-time  to  part-time  work  that  becomes  available  in  the 
establishment, (b) requests by workers to transfer from part-time to full-time work or to 
increase  their  working  time  should  the  opportunity  arise;  (c)  the  provision  of  timely 
information on the availability of part-time and full-time positions in the establishment in 
order  to  facilitate  transfers  from  full-time  to  part-time  or  vice  versa.  The  Fixed  Term 
Work Directive provides that employers shall inform fixed-term workers about vacancies 
which become available in the undertaking or establishment to ensure that they have the 
same opportunity to secure permanent positions as other workers. Such information may 
be provided by way of a general announcement at a suitable place in the undertaking or 
establishment.  Member  States  have  transposed  those  provisions  in  their  national 
legislation but few have implemented any more favourable measures such as obliging the 
employer to provide a reasoned reply to this request or granting a priority for part-time 
workers to access available full time positions in the undertakings. 

2.  Coherence with Principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights 

Pillar Principle 
Education, 
1. 
training  and  life-
long learning 

2. 
equality 

Gender 

3. 
opportunities 

Equal 

Relevant text 
Everyone  has  the  right  to  quality  and 
inclusive  education,  training  and  life-
long  learning  in  order  to  maintain  and 
acquire  skills 
to 
participate  fully  in  society  and  manage 
successfully  transitions  in  the  labour 
market. 

that  enable 

them 

Equality 

treatment 

and 
of 
opportunities  between  women  and  men 
must  be  ensured  and  fostered  in  all 
areas,  including  regarding  participation 
terms  and 
in 
conditions  of  employment  and  career 
progression. 

labour  market, 

the 

Women and men have the right to equal 
pay for work of equal value. 

Regardless  of  gender,  racial  or  ethnic 
origin,  religion  or  belief,  disability,  age 
or  sexual  orientation,  everyone  has  the 
and 
right 

treatment 

equal 

to 

Proposal 
New  right  on  cost-free 
mandatory 
training 
(measure 4) Information 
on training (measure 2) 

Proposal  overall  will 
contribute 

Proposal  overall  will 
contribute 

218 

 
 
 
 
4. Active  support 
to employment 

and 

5.  Secure 
adaptable 
employment 

opportunities 
regarding  employment, 
social  protection,  education,  and  access 
to  goods  and  services  available  to  the 
public.  Equal  opportunities  of  under-
represented groups shall be fostered. 
Everyone  has  the  right  to  timely  and 
tailor-made 
improve 
assistance 
employment 
self-employment 
prospects.  This  includes  the  right  to 
receive  support  for  job  search,  training 
and  re-qualification.  Everyone  has  the 
right  to  transfer  social  protection  and 
training entitlements during professional 
transitions. 
Regardless  of  the  type  and  duration  of 
the employment relationship, … 

or 

to 

…workers  have  the  right  to  fair  and 
regarding  working 
equal 
conditions …and training… 

treatment 

transition 

The 
forms of employment shall be fostered. 

towards  open-ended 

necessary 

…the 
for 
employers to adapt swiftly to changes in 
the economic context shall be ensured. 

flexibility 

cost-free 
to 
Right 
training 
mandatory 
(measure 
4), 
information  on  training 
(measure 2) 

Changes 
(measure 1) 

in 

scope 

Proposal 
overall, 
specifically  new  rights 
(measure  4)  combined 
with 1 scope 
Proposal 
overall, 
specifically  New  rights 
(measure  4):  Possibility 
to  request  another  form 
of  work  and  receive  a 
writing, 
in 
reply 
combined with 1 scope. 
Proposal overall 

Innovative  forms  of  work  that  ensure 
quality  working  conditions  shall  be 
fostered.  Entrepreneurship  and  self-
employment shall be encouraged.  

Employment  relationships  that  lead  to 
precarious  working  conditions  shall  be 
prevented, 
including  by  prohibiting 
abuse of atypical contracts.  

Any  probation  period  should  be  of 
reasonable duration 
Workers  have  the  right  to  fair  wages 
that  provide  for  a  decent  standard  of 
living. 

overall, 
Proposal 
specifically  new  rights 
(measure 4), specifically 
limitation  of  exclusivity 
clauses,  combined  with 
1 scope. 
Measure 4, limitation of 
probation 
Proposal 
overall, 
specifically  new  rights 
(measure 4) allowing for 

219 

6. Wages 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information 

7. 
about 
employment 
conditions 
and 
protection  in  case 
of dismissals 

8.  Social  dialogue 
and 
involvement 
of workers 

9. 
balance 

Work-life 

additional  employment, 
limitation  of  exclusivity 
clauses,  reference  hours 
combined with 1 scope. 
Proposal 
overall, 
specifically  Measures  2 
and  3  on 
time  and 
of  written 
content 
including 
statement 
combined 
probation 
with 1 scope. 
Measure  5  combined 
with 1 scope. 

into 

takes 

Proposal 
consideration 
contributions 
from  2 
stages of consultation  + 
for 
derogations 
collective bargaining  

… In-work poverty shall be prevented.   

their 

Workers  have  the  right  to  be  informed 
in  writing  at  the  start  of  employment 
rights  and  obligations 
about 
resulting 
employment 
relationship, 
including  on  probation 
period.  

from 

the 

and 

impartial 

the  right 

to  access 

Prior to any dismissal, workers have the 
right  to  be  informed  of  the  reasons  and 
be granted a reasonable period of notice. 
They  have 
to 
effective 
dispute 
resolution  and,  in  case  of  unjustified 
dismissal,  a  right  to  redress,  including 
adequate compensation. 
The social partners shall be consulted on 
implementation  of 
the  design  and 
economic,  employment  and 
social 
policies  according  to  national  practices. 
They  shall  be  encouraged  to  negotiate 
and  conclude  collective  agreements  in 
matters 
them,  while 
respecting  their  autonomy  and  the  right 
to  collective  action.  Where  appropriate, 
agreements  concluded  between 
the 
social  partners  shall  be  implemented  at 
the  level  of  the  Union  and  its  Member 
States.  Workers  or  their  representatives 
have  the  right  to  be  informed  and 
consulted  in  good  time  on  matters 
relevant  to  them,  in  particular  on  the 
transfer,  restructuring  and  merger  of 
collective 
undertakings 
redundancies.  Support  for 
increased 
capacity  of  social  partners  to  promote 
social dialogue shall be encouraged. 

relevant 

and 

on 

to 

caring 
and  people  with 
Parents 
responsibilities have the right to suitable 
leave,  flexible  working  arrangements 
and access to care services. Women and 
men  shall  have  equal  access  to  special 
leaves of absence in order to fulfil their 
be 
caring 

responsibilities 

and 

Measure  4  combined 
with  measure  1  scope  – 
particularly 
to 
predictability 

rights 

220 

 
 
 
 
encouraged  to  use  them  in  a  balanced 
way. 
Workers have the right to a high level of 
protection  of  their  health  and  safety  at 
work.  Workers  have  the  right  to  a 
working  environment  adapted  to  their 
professional  needs  and  which  enables 
them to prolong their participation in the 
labour  market.  Workers  have  the  right 
to  have  their  personal  data  protected  in 
the employment context. 

10.  Healthy,  safe 
and  well-adapted 
work 
environment  and 
data protection 

11  to  20  -Chapter 
Social 
III: 
protection 
and 
inclusion 

Measure  4  specifically 
reference hours 

Information  on  social 
renewed 
in 
security 
information 
package 
measure  2,  combined 
with 1 scope 

221