COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Evaluation of the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Midterm Review Report on the External Financing Instruments
Date: 2017-12-15
Institutions: Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, European Commission
Subjects: EU financial instrument, financial aid, international cooperation, nuclear fuel, nuclear power station, nuclear safety, radioactive pollution, radioactive waste, third country, waste management

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 15.12.2017 SWD(2017) 605 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Evaluation of the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation  Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Midterm Review Report on the External Financing Instruments {COM(2017) 720 final} - {SWD(2017) 463 final} - {SWD(2017) 600 final} - {SWD(2017) 601 final} - {SWD(2017) 602 final} - {SWD(2017) 604 final} - {SWD(2017) 606 final} - {SWD(2017) 607 final} - {SWD(2017) 608 final} - {SWD(2017) 609 final}  
 
 
Contents 

Executive summary .................................................................................................................... 3 

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 5 

Purpose of the evaluation ....................................................................................................... 5 

Scope of the evaluation .......................................................................................................... 5 

2. Background of the initiative ................................................................................................... 6 

Description of the initiative and its objectives ....................................................................... 6 

Baseline .................................................................................................................................. 7 

3. Method ................................................................................................................................... 9 

4. Implementation state of play ................................................................................................ 11 

Implementation status .......................................................................................................... 11 

Performance of the Predecessor programme ........................................................................ 12 

Result-Oriented Monitoring ................................................................................................. 12 

Key achievements ................................................................................................................ 12 

5. Answers to the evaluation questions .................................................................................... 15 

Relevance ............................................................................................................................. 15 

Effectiveness, impact and sustainability .............................................................................. 16 

Efficiency ............................................................................................................................. 18 

Added value .......................................................................................................................... 18 

Coherence, consistency, complementarities and synergies .................................................. 19 

Leverage ............................................................................................................................... 19 

6. Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 21 

Annex 1. Procedural information ............................................................................................. 23 

Annex 2. Synopsis report of the stakeholders' consultation ..................................................... 24 

Part A – OPEN PUBLIC CONSULTATION ...................................................................... 24 

Summary of OPC contributions on INSC ............................................................................ 24 

Question 1: How well do you think the INSC has addressed its objectives? ................... 24 

Question 2: Do you consider that concentration on accession countries and countries in 
the European neighbourhood area is appropriate? ........................................................... 28 

1 

 
 
 
Question 3: If you have any other views on the INSC you would like to share they are 
welcome here .................................................................................................................... 30 

Part B – TARGETTED CONSULTATIONS ...................................................................... 32 

Policy Forum for Development: consultation with Civil Society ........................................ 32 

Technical Seminar with Member States Representatives .................................................... 32 

Meeting of Council Working Party on Atomic Questions ................................................... 33 

INSC Committee .................................................................................................................. 33 

Annex 3. Acronyms .................................................................................................................. 34 

Annex 4. External evaluator's report, including its annexes .................................................... 35 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Executive summary 

This  Staff  Working  Document  evaluates 
for  Nuclear  Safety 
Cooperation1(INSC) over the period 2014-2017 to answer the question is the INSC is fit for 
its  purposes  to  promote  in  third  countries  a  nuclear  safety  culture,  the  safe  management  of 
radioactive waste and spent fuel, and effective safeguards of nuclear material. This evaluation 
is  informed  on  an  external  evaluation  by  a  Consortium  under  GDSI  part  of  the  mid-term 
review  of  ten  External  Financing  Instruments.  Opinions  from  the  Open  Public  Consultation 
mostly support those findings. 

Instrument 

the 

The Instrument is assessed as highly relevant2 for improving nuclear safety in third countries 
aligned to EU policies and priorities and addressing specific needs. The set-up in 2015 of a 
multilateral  Environmental  Remediation  Account  on  remediating  legacy  mining  waste  in 
Central  Asia  is  an  example  of  how  the  Instrument  addresses  needs,  in  coordination  with 
international  donors  and  organisations.  The  Instrument  duly  promotes  the  highest  standards 
and practices used in the European Union on the basis of the EURATOM Treaty and a set of 
relevant  Directives3.  The  Instrument  also  matches  recognised  priorities  as  pursued  by  the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the G7 Nuclear Safety and Security Group 
(NSSG).  Coordination  with  the  European  External  Action  Service  ensures  compatibility  of 
actions with international Conventions and Treaties

and international developments. 

A profound example of the effectiveness of implementation leading to a sustainable impact 
concern a National Management and Maintenance Training Centre for Energoatom (operator 
of  nuclear  power  plants  in  Ukraine).  The  efficiency  is  assessed  as  good  with  a  timely  and 
competent  support2.  The  high  staff  workload  is  alleviated  by  support  of  the  Joint  Research 
Centre  and by  reducing  the  administrative  burden  with  larger  projects.  Cross-cutting  issues, 
on environmental protection, sector management and gender equality are well-mainstreamed. 

The distinctive EU added value lies in the long experience in cooperation on nuclear safety 
and  security,  the  set-up  under  EURATOM  with  promoting  the  highest  safety  standards, 
especially  applicable  to  Neighbourhood  countries  pursuing  the  acquis  communautaire. 
Coherence and consistency are generally ensured for the relatively self-contained INSC with 
special  attention  to  actions  on  nuclear  security  (addressed  by  IcSP)  and  nuclear  safety. 
Financial  leverage  is  best  demonstrated  by  the  sliding  event  in  November  2016  of  the  new 
safe confinement over the destroyed Chernobyl reactor unit 4 in Ukraine. The EU support was 
a major catalyst for the international community to also contribute to restore safe conditions. 

The Commission services concur with the external evaluation that directly measuring nuclear 
safety  is  inherently  difficult,  the  staff  workload  is  high,  and  that  external  evaluations  on 
indirect  measures  as  achievements  and  impact  are  to  be  used  more  frequently.  Moreover, 
programming  documents  can  be  more  informative  for  non-experts  without  constraining  the 
flexibility.  The  direct  and  mainstreamed  support  to  environmental  protection,  sector 
management and gender equality deserves wider visibility and recognition. A special merit of 
this stable and well-established Instrument is  the promotion of policy  and political  dialogue 
linked  to  e.g.  the  Joint  Comprehensive  Plan  of  Action  with  Iran.  Conclusions  feeding  in 

1 Council Regulation (EURATOM) No 237/2014, 13 December 2013 establishing an INSC. 
2 External Evaluation of the INSC, Final Report, Vol I – June 2017, pages 12-15. 
3  EURATOM  Directives  on  Nuclear  Safety  (amended  2014),  Radioactive  Waste  management  (established 
2011), and Basic Safety Standards on radiation protection (amended 2013). 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
reflection  on  how  to  improve  the  INSC  until  2020,  and  beyond.  Overall  the  INSC  is 
favourably evaluated as fit for purpose. 

4 

 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 

Purpose of the evaluation 

This  Staff  Working  Document  is  informed  by  the  external  evaluation  of  the  Instrument  for 
Nuclear  Safety  Cooperation  (INSC)  for  the  period  2014  to  mid-2017 4  and  employs  six 
Evaluation  Questions 5  on  (i)  relevance,  (ii)  effectiveness,  impact,  and  sustainability, 
(3) efficiency, (4) added value, (5) coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergy, and 
on (6) leverage (see  Annex A) based on evaluation principles set by the criteria developing 
committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC6). 

The evaluation's purpose is to inform future work on the Instrument and its actions. It is also 
part of a set of ten evaluations covering all the EU External Financing Instruments (EFIs)7 and 
the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) that inform the Mid-Term Review Report8 which 
draws conclusions across the External Financing Instruments. 

Scope of the evaluation 

This evaluation covers the period from 1 January 2014 to 1 June 2017. However, due to the 
length  of  the  implementation  cycle  of  INSC,  the  availability  of  data  on  results  is  limited. 
Therefore the evaluation also looks at the previous Instrument covering the period 2007-2013 
for some of the evaluation criteria (e.g. efficiency and effectiveness). In order to usefully feed 
into the Mid-Term Review Report, the evaluation is set at Instrument level. In consequence it 
focuses, to the extent possible, on the INSC Regulation (e.g. on its principles and objectives), 
its programming and the measures that have been put in place for its implementation.  

The  beneficiaries  covered  under  the  evaluation  are  the  nuclear  regulatory  authorities,  the 
radioactive  waste  management  organisations  and  in  duly  justified  case  the  nuclear  energy 
operating organisation with priority given to neighbouring countries and to countries acceding 
to the EU. A specific case study on Ukraine, which is by far the biggest recipient of support 
under the INSC, has been used to validate the overall assessment of the Instrument. 

In  accordance  with  the  EU  Better  Regulation  Agenda9,  the  following  evaluation  criteria  are 
used:  relevance,  effectiveness,  efficiency,  coherence,  and  added  value,  complemented  by 
impact, sustainability, consistency, complementarity and synergies and leverage. 

4 External Evaluation of the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (2014 – mid 2017) Final Report – Vol. I, 
and Vol. II, EuropeAid/137211/DH/SER/Multi, by Consortium with GDSI limited as leader, June 2017. 
5 External Evaluation of the INSC, Final Report, Vol I – June 2017, page 1. 
6 DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance: Glossary of Key Terms, OECD, 2002.  
7  The  Development  Cooperation  Instrument,  the  European  Neighbourhood  Instrument,  the  European  Instrument  for 
Democracy and Human Rights, the Greenland Decision, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, the Instrument 
for  Pre-accession  Assistance,  the  Instrument  on  Nuclear  Safety  Cooperation,  the  Overseas  Countries  and  Territories 
Decision, the Partnership Instrument and the Common Implementing Regulation.  
8 In  line  with  Article  17  of  the  Common  Implementing  Regulation  (CIR),  Regulation  (EU)  No  236/2014  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of the 
Union's instruments for financing external action, OJ L77, p. 95. 
9 Commission Communication Better regulation for better results – An EU Agenda, COM (2015) 215, and Commission Staff 
Working Document Better Regulation guidelines, SWD (2015) 111. 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2. Background of the initiative 

The External Financing Instruments take up a major part of the MFF10 – Heading IV Global 
Europe,  which  provides  the  EU  with  the  tools  necessary  to  reinforce  its  role  on  the  world 
stage  and  to  ensure  that  it  is  able  to  live  up  to  its  ambitions  in  promoting  its  interests  and 
values such as democracy, human rights, peace, solidarity, stability and poverty reduction and 
to help safeguard global public goods.  

Adopted  in  early  2014,  the  External  Financing  Instruments  were  designed  to  facilitate  and 
support policy implementation, with the intention of remaining relevant until the end of 2020, 
thereby  enabling  the  EU  to  implement  external  action  policy  as  needed  within  the  defined 
principles and objectives. 

The support to nuclear safety in third countries by the European Communities started in 1991 
under TACIS11 in response to increased awareness of trans-boundary effects of the Chernobyl 
accident (1986) and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The new independent states 
had  an  urgent  need  for  assistance  for  safe  operation,  regulation  and  remediation  of  legacy 
waste. International co-operation (IAEA, G7, EBRD - European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development)  was  at  the  basis  of  the  European  Communities'  cooperation,  which  –  after 
addressing highly urgent needs  –  became  more centred around assistance  to regulators, safe 
management  of  radioactive  waste  and  safeguards,  while  its  geographic  scope  has  been 
enlarged  since  2007  to  a  world-wide  dimension  with  focus  on  countries  near  the  EU.  This 
approach is confirmed by both the stakeholders and during the open public consultation, see 
Annex 2. Synopsis report of the stakeholders' consultation 

Description of the initiative and its objectives 

The  current  INSC  was  set  up  to  improve  nuclear  safety  and  reach  the  highest  standards  to 
ensure  a  safe  environment  for  the  present  and  future  generations.  The  intervention  logic  in 
Figure 1 shows the achievement of this goal through the cause - effect relationships: 

1.  The  rational  for  EU  engagement  in  nuclear  safety  cooperation  is  derived  from  the 
awareness that accidents have cross-boundary effects and that the EU has a solid basis for 
cooperation with third countries to improve nuclear safety. 

2.  A budget  for  EU  engagement allows for a pursuit of three specific objectives, aligned 
with  the  EU  external  policy  objectives  on  promoting  regulatory  reform  and  Union 
standards and practices. 

3.  The  implementation  of  the  INSC  is  carried  out  through  the  adoption  of  a  Strategy 
document, a Multi-annual Indicative Programme and Annual Action Programs focusing 
on the objectives and priorities of the Instrument. These documents are adopted following 
consultation with partners and Member States. 

10  Council  Regulation  (EU,  EURATOM)  No  1311/2013  of  2  December  2013  laying  down  the  multiannual 
financial framework for the years 2014-2020, OJ L 347/884, p. 884. 
11 Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States. 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4.  The  INSC  outputs  are  achieved  through  an  efficient  use  of  the  inputs  (resources) 
including competitive tendering, efficient management and implementation either directly 
with Partner Countries or in partnership with IAEA or EBRD. 

5.  The outcomes are generated by the outputs for the three objectives with due regard to EU 

crosscutting priorities as Sustainable Development Goals. 

6.  Ultimately,  sustainable  impacts  are  achieved  in  concert  with  the  policy  of  partner 

countries and others. 

Baseline 

As this is a mid-term evaluation, the baseline has been set at January 2014 when INSC 2014-
2020 was adopted. Therefore the evaluation compares, to the extent possible, the situation on 
1 January  2014  with  the  current  situation.  For  some  evaluation  criteria,  where  data  is 
unavailable for this reference date, earlier baselines have been used, as described later in the 
document. 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: INSC Intervention Logic12 

12 External Evaluation of the INSC (2014 – mid 2017) Final Report, Vol. II - June 2017, page 1. 
MS = Member State,  NS = Nuclear Safety 

8 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
3. Method 

This evaluation is informed by the mid-term external evaluation of the Instrument for Nuclear 
Safety Cooperation13 which focused on the instrument level processes and aimed to contribute 
to  lesson-learning  and  accountability.  The  mid-term  external  evaluation  covered  the  period 
1 January  2014  to  June  2017  in  line  with  the  Common  Implementing  Regulations  (CIR)14. 
The external evaluation comprised the following phases:  

  Desk  Phase,  from  August  2016  to  November  2016,  with  two  main  deliverables:  i) the 
Inception Report with design and workplan of the evaluation with judgement criteria, and 
ii)  the  Desk  Report  being  an  interim  response  to  the  Evaluation  Questions  containing 
hypotheses and identified information gaps for the subsequent verification.  

  Validation  Phase  for  gathering  supplementary  information  to  substantiate  or  reject  the 
hypotheses and  for developing  preliminary findings  and “emerging  messages” presented 
to the Inter Services Group on 15 December 2016. Access to project and executive staff of 
the  Commission  services  allowed  the  external  consultant  to  obtain  an  informed 
appreciation of the project cycle processes. In addition, representatives of a working group 
of  ENSREG  (European  Nuclear  Safety  Regulators  Group)  were  consulted  as  well  as 
executive  management  at  EBRD.  A  case  study  for  Ukraine  informed  the  evaluation  on 
achievements and impact at project and country level, also to compensate for the limited 
external  assessments  and  monitoring  reports,  and  the  lack  of  direct  measurability  of  an 
improved nuclear safety. 

  Synthesis Phase for finalising the draft evaluation report on 31 January 2017 on the basis 

of feedback and supplementary information.  

  Consultation  Phase  compliant  with  the  Better  Regulation  Guidelines  including:  i) Open 
Public  Consultation  from  7  February  to  8  May  2017  resulting  in  51 reactions  with  20 
reactions  from  associations  and  organizations  and  11  from  public  authorities,  and 
ii) targeted consultations with the Civil Society, the Parliament, the Council and Member 
States, the Council Working Party on Atomic Questions, and the INSC Committee. 

The responses did not dispute the draft findings, neither led to modifications of findings. 
The  targeted  consultations  strengthened  the  dialogue  on  the  Instrument  with  support  to 
strategic  recommendations  on  how  the  instrument  could  improve  its  effectiveness.  A 
summary of the responses is given in  

13 External Evaluation of the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (2014 – mid 2017) Final Report – Vol. 
I, and Vol. II, EuropeAid/137211/DH/SER/Multi, by Consortium with GDSI limited as leader, June 2017. 
14 Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 laying down common rules and procedures for implementation of EU's EFIs. 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Annex 2. Synopsis report of the stakeholders' consultation 

  Finalisation Phase in which the draft final report is completed reflecting responses from 
the  Consultation  Phase  and  supplementary  review  comments  together  with  an  update  of 
significant events since January 2017 for truly covering the period up to 1 June 2017. The 
Evaluation Report was issued 5 July 2017. 

The Commission services fully facilitated the evaluation as coordinated with other evaluations 
compliant to the Terms of Reference. The findings are regarded as a balanced and unbiased 
external view, valuable to be considered in improving the INSC implementation. 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Implementation state of play 

Implementation status 

With  reference  to  the  INSC  Regulations,  the  Strategy  2014-202015 provides  a  concise  basis 
for  the  cooperation  with  an  indicative  budget  for  the  three  objectives  of  promotion  of  an 
effective nuclear safety culture, safe management of radioactive waste and remediation, and 
safeguards  of  nuclear  material.  The  Strategy  presents  the  geographic  priorities  and  the 
coordination  with  international  organisations 16 .  Synergies  are  being  pursued  as  nuclear 
security  is  in  the  scope  of  the  Instrument  contributing  to  Stability  and  Peace.  The  Multi-
annual  Indicative  Programme  2014-201717 further  elaborates  the  Strategy  and  sets  out  the 
priority  areas  for  financing  after  consultation  of  the  European  Nuclear  Safety  Regulators 
Group (ENSREG). The Programme gives attention to international coordination and avoiding 
duplications. 

The  Annual  Action  Programmes  2014 18 ,  2015 19  and  2016 20  comprise  28  actions  with 
14 actions  in  pre-accession  countries  and  the  EU  neighbourhood:  Armenia  (2  actions), 
Belarus (2), Iraq, Ukraine (5), Morocco, Turkey and Contributions to the Chernobyl Shelter 
Fund  (2),  6 actions  in  countries  and  areas  at  larger  distance:  Central  Asia  (2),  China,  Iran, 
South  East  Asia,  and  Tanzania;  and  8  horizontal  actions:  IAEA  cooperation,  Safeguards, 
Support  Measures  (3),  Technical  support  from  the  Joint  Research  Centre,  and  Training  and 
Tutoring (2). 

These  actions  are under implementation  or  are waiting  to  be implemented. Contracts for all 
above  actions  are  expected  to  be  signed  before  the  end  of  2017.  Actions  not  requiring  a 
Financing  Agreement  with  the  Beneficiary  Country  have  been  contracted  before  the  end  of 
the year following the Annual Action Programme.  

The status on decided, contracted and paid budgets of the Multiannual Financial Framework 
according to the Commission’s accounting system per 1 June 2017 is as follows: 

Decided  Contracted 

Paid 

MFF 

Decided  Contracted 

Paid 

Budget in million EUR 

Percentage of Multiannual  
Financial Framework (MFF) 

INSC 

164.56 

131.44 

102.10 

225.32 

73% 

58% 

45% 

15 Strategy  for  a  Community  Cooperation  Programme  in  the  field  of  Nuclear  Safety  2014-2020,  Commission 
Implementing Decision C (2014)3763. 
16 Most notably the IAEA and its Regulatory Cooperation Forum, and the G7/8 Nuclear Safety Security Group. 
17 Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2017, Commission Implementing Decision C (2014)3764. 
18 Annual Action Programme 2014 for Nuclear Safety Cooperation to be financed from the general budget of the 
European Union, Commission Implementing Decision C(2014)4302. 
19 Annual Action Programme 2015 for Nuclear Safety Cooperation to be financed from the general budget of the 
European Union, Commission Implementing Decision C(2015)3961. 
20 Annual Action Programme 2016 for Nuclear Safety Cooperation to be financed from the general budget of the 
European Union, Commission Implementing Decision C(2016)2182. 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Performance of the Predecessor programme 

The  INSC  is  to  be  considered  as  a  follow-up  of  its  predecessor  programme  INSC-I  (2007-
2013) the implementation of which was evaluated21 as being in accordance with its regulation, 
and  with  the  criteria  and  priorities  set  in  its  revised  Strategy.  The  cooperation  with  support 
regulatory  authorities,  decommissioning, 
the  management  of  radioactive  waste  and 
environmental  remediation  continued  throughout  INSC-I.  The  enlargement  of  projects  was 
appraised as a good measure to increase efficiency. However, the evaluation mostly addresses 
the thematic scope and provides little pertinent conclusions on the actual effectiveness. 

The  Fukushima  Daiichi  accident  in  2011  again  highlighted  the  importance  of  preventing 
accidents  through  support  to  independent  and  competent  regulatory  authorities  to  ensure  a 
safe use of nuclear energy.  

Interventions now at the core of the current INSC programme were prepared under INSC-I for 
instance  with  feasibility  studies  and  environmental  impact  assessments  for  remediating  the 
uranium mining legacy sites in Central Asia.  

A  "training  and  tutoring"  initiative  started  to  provide  young  nuclear  safety  professionals  of 
regulatory authorities and technical support organisations opportunities to cope with evolving 
challenges.  In  November  2015,  the  1000th  trainee  completed  a  training  course.  Especially 
important for countries embarking on the use of nuclear power is the availability of necessary 
expertise for the regulatory assessment of the subsequent licensing stages.  

Result-Oriented Monitoring 

In  the  period  January  2014  to  early  2017,  in  total  11  Result-Oriented  Monitoring  (ROM) 
reports were issued. All projects belong to INSC-I. The projects’ budgets mostly range from 
EUR  0.8  million  up  to  EUR  3  million.  Geographically  the  projects  subject  to  ROM  cover 
Ukraine (5 projects), China (4 projects), Mexico (1 project) and Egypt (1 project). The ratio of 
ROM  reports  compared  to  the  total  number  of  projects  is  fully  aligned  with  the  European 
Commission's practices for the other EFI's. 

Key achievements 

A multilateral Environmental Remediation Account for Central Asia established in 2015 
is to finance the clean-up of legacy uranium mining site. Central Asia states inherited a legacy 
of hazardous waste from the Soviet-era uranium mining and processing. Toxic chemical and 
radioactive residues in legacy sites in the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan impact 
the  local  population  and  environment,  the  socio-economic  development  and  increase  the 
political  risk  in  a  volatile  region  as  severe  cross-border  impacts  would  occur  in  case  of 
contamination  of  the  water  resources  (for  example  due  to  seismic  induced  land-slides  or 
ferocious  alpine  rainfall).  The  European  Union  has  financed  under  the  INSC  a  series  of 
feasibility studies and environmental impact assessments at priority legacy sites; this flagship 
programme is now mature for implementation and the EBRD upon Commission’s request has 
established  in  2015  the  mentioned  Environmental  Remediation  Account.  The  EU  being  the 

21 Report from the Commission on the evaluation of the implementation of the Council Regulation (EURATOM) 
No 300/2007 (INSC) in the period 2007-2013, Italtrend, March 2014. 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
first donor to contribute to this fund (EUR 16.5 million in December 2015) is organising an 
international  donor  conference  in  2018  together  with  the  EBRD  and  the  IAEA.  A  new  EU 
contribution will be pledged at this conference. 

A  first  phase  of  remediation  of  the  Prydniprovskiy  Chemical  Plant  was  concluded  in 
November 2016. This plant in Ukraine was from 1947 to 1992 a major uranium processor for 
the  Soviet  Union.  Uranium  ores  of  different  origin  (Ukraine,  Central  Asia  and  Eastern-
Europe) were processed in this plant leaving behind a legacy of five tailing storage facilities 
and  two  industrial  disposal  facilities.  Since  1992,  activity  has  been  continued  in  privatised 
buildings, which has led to limited regulatory control and uncontrolled exposure of workers. 
The absence of restricted access to the site led to trafficking (in e.g. contaminated scrap metal) 
and  unrestricted  presence  of  the  public.  The  EU  in  close  coordination  with  the  Ukrainian 
Government  agreed  on  a  first  phase  of  support  resulting  in  topographical  and  radiological 
surveys for identifying the most contaminated facilities and public awareness actions directed 
to  persons  working  at  or  living  near  the  site.  Follow-up  is  under  preparation  with  the 
Ukrainian  authorities  to  implement  the  complete  remediation  plan  drafted  under  the  first 
phase. 

The  sliding  of  the  New  Safe  Confinement  over  the  destroyed  Chernobyl  unit  4  on  29 
November 2016 is a major milestone making the site environmentally stable and safe again. 
The accident with unit 4 occurred in April 1986. The giant arch-shaped structure with a height 
of over 100 metres and a design life of 100 years prevents any further radioactive release and 
allows  for  ultimate  removal  of  the damaged  reactor  and radioactive  material  in  a controlled 
atmosphere. This milestone was achieved through joint efforts of the EU, Ukraine, EBRD and 
the international community after more than 15 years of work and at a total project cost in the 
order  of  EUR  1.5  billion.  The  EU  contributed  more  than  EUR  430  million  (under  TACIS: 
EUR 210 million and INSC programmes: EUR 220 million) apart from bilateral support by 
individual European countries being de facto the first donor after the EBRD itself. In 2017 the 
last  EU  pledge  to  the  Chernobyl  on  the  Nuclear  Safety  Account  has  been  executed  to 
complete the Interim Storage Facility for spent nuclear fuel. 

INSC  finances  follow-up  to  the  Joint  Comprehensive  Plan  of  Action  Cooperation 
(JCPoA) with Iran through engaging in a civil nuclear safety co-operation starting in 2017. 
Preparatory  actions  concerned  two  short  expert  missions  (July  and  September  2016)  to 
support the Iranian Nuclear Regulatory Authority in developing legislative documents. In line 
with  the  agreed  timeline,  civil  cooperation  on  nuclear  safety  starts  in  2017  supporting  the 
design of a nuclear safety centre, enhancing the capabilities of the regulator and performing a 
stress  test  exercise  (evaluation  of  lessons  from  the  Fukushima-Daiichi  accident)  at  the 
Bushehr nuclear power plant. This contribution part of the EU commitments under the Annex 
3 of the JCPoA is completed by supporting the IAEA's safeguards verification activities in the 
country (Annex 1 of the JCPoA). 

Agreement with Turkey was reached in 2016 to support the capacity building of the nuclear 
regulatory authority in view of a decision to introduce nuclear in the national energy mix. 

The  Training  and  Tutoring  programme  is  acknowledged  by  all  stakeholders,  being 
beneficiary or implementers on behalf of the EU, as a successful, flexible and powerful tool22 

22 External Evaluation of the INSC (2014 – mid 2017) Final Report, Vol. I - June 2017, page 11. 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
to  promote  the  nuclear  safety  culture  worldwide  and  build  capacity  in  the  partner  countries 
and organisations. 

The EU has successfully engaged with the  Sub-Saharan African countries to establish a 
harmonised and appropriate regulatory framework for sustainable uranium mining activities23 
to  avoid  a  future  need  for  very  expensive  remediation  as  encountered  currently  in  Central 
Asia. 

Since 2011 and following the Belarussian decision to introduce nuclear in its energy mix, 
the  EU  is  supporting  the  regulatory  authority  in  the  licensing  process  and  the  stress  tests 
exercise of the Astravets nuclear power plant currently under construction. This power plant 
is less than 50 km away from the Lithuanian capital Vilnius. 

Engagement  with  Serbia  has  just  started  to  address  the  issue  of  the  legacy  of  radioactive 
wastes at the Vinca research center. 

The EU continues to closely monitor the situation at the Medzamor nuclear power plant 
in  Armenia,  providing  support  to  the  regulatory  authority  in  the  review  of  the  safety 
assessment  of  the  lifetime  extension  process  and  supporting  the  plant  operator  in  the 
implementation of the recommendations of the stress tests exercise. 

23 Press release; Regional seminar on Uranium mining, milling and transport, Brussels, Belgium October 2014. 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5. Answers to the evaluation questions 

Relevance 
To what extent do the specific objectives (INSC Regulation, Article 2) and the design of the 
INSC respond to:  
(i)  EU priorities and beneficiary needs identified at the time the Instrument was adopted (end 

2013)? 

(ii) Current EU priorities and beneficiary needs, given the evolving challenges and priorities 

in international context (up to mid-2017)? 

The INSC specific objectives as set in the Regulation24 concerning the promotion of a nuclear 
safety  culture,  the  safe  management  of  radioactive  waste  and  spent  fuel,  and  safeguards  of 
nuclear material are well aligned to the EU policies and priorities25. The pursued promotion of 
high-level  regulations,  standards  and  practices  are  shared  with  the  Europe  2020  strategy26, 
while  environmental  remediation  (of  radioactive  waste  legacy  sites),  building  strong 
regulators  and  life-long  learning  are  at  the  core  of  the  2030  Agenda  for  Sustainable 
Development. INSC interventions are contributing as well to cross-cutting issues and pursue 
direct or indirect several of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG)27 on education (No. 
4),  gender  equality  (No.  5),  elimination  of  water  pollution  by  hazardous  material  (No.  6  & 
14),  affordable  energy  and  combat  climate  change  (No.  7  &  13),  and  effective  and 
accountable institutions (No. 16). 

The INSC is set to promote and transfer advanced nuclear safety rules, standards and practices 
to  third  countries  in  line  with  provisions  of  the  EURATOM  Treaty  and  a  set  of  three 
Directives on radiation protection, nuclear safety, and management of radioactive waste and 
spent  fuel 28  (acquis  communautaire).  High  standards  in  Member  States  underpin  the 
regulatory  basis.  The  diversity  of  the  national  set-up  in  Member  States,  though  all  being 
compliant with the EU Directives, adds flavour to the cooperation and demonstrates that the 
practical  implementation  in  specific  partner  countries  is  to  fit  to  the  national  legal  and 
industrial framework. The common denominator of all nuclear legislation are the fundamental 
safety  principles29 established  by  the  IAEA  in  2006.  This  unique  dedicated  Instrument  for 
Nuclear  Safety  therefore  finds  its  rationale  in  the  specialised  know-how  needed  which  is 
available  in  the  EU  Member  States  and  the  need  to  support  the  establishment  of  competent 
and independent nuclear regulatory authorities that in turn will guarantee the deployment of 
the highest safety standards in the partner countries. 

The  Commission  maintains  a  long-standing  cooperation  with  IAEA  and  EBRD.  The  INSC 
promotes  international  cooperation  based  on  conventions  on  nuclear  safety  and  radioactive 
waste  management,  and  the  Treaty  on  the  Non-Proliferation  of  Nuclear  Weapons.  Partner 
countries are encouraged to become party to these conventions allowing for an IAEA-assisted 

24 Council  Regulation  (EURATOM)  No  237/2014,  13  December  2013  establishing  an  Instrument  for  Nuclear 
Safety Cooperation. 
25 External evaluation of the INSC, Final Report, Vol I – June 2017, pages 3-7. 
26 EUROPE 2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020 final. 
27 The  Sustainable  Development  Goals  (SDGs)  and  their  impact  on  the  European  SD  governance  framework 
Preparing for the post-2015 agenda, European Sustainable Development Network (ESDN), January 2015. 
28 EURATOM  Directives  on  Nuclear  Safety  (amended  2014),  Radioactive  Waste  management  (established 
2011), and Basic Safety Standards on radiation protection (amended 2013). 
29 Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA, Safety Fundamentals, SF-1, 2006. 

15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
periodic  peer  review  of  relevant  national 
systems.  Conventions’  summary  review 
reports  provide  an  external  view  on  the 
state-of-play  and  challenges  in  nuclear 
safety.  

Box 1 INSC needs assessment in Ukraine 
The  Ukraine  Supervisory  Board  (USB),  co-
chaired  by  the  Ministry  of  Energy  and  Coal 
Industry and Commission services, provides an 
effective  mechanism  to  support  the  project 
cycle  management 
needs 
assessment  up  to  the  final  endorsement.  The 
USB  includes  the  Regulator,  the  Radioactive 
waste  management  organisation,  and 
the 
Operator. 

including 

a 

of 

current 

Oversight 
international 
challenges  is  provided  through  meetings 
with  IAEA,  EBRD  and  the  G7-NSSG. 
The Instrument has adequate flexibility to 
adjust 
as 
demonstrated by the response to the ‘Iran Deal’30 on a comprehensive intervention, as defined 
in  the  INSC  Annual  Action  Programme  for  the  year  2016.  This  expedient  action  realised 
within  one  year  is  a  favourable  example  of  the  Instrument’s  responsiveness  to  international 
challenges. Additionally, the INSC Regulation provides a special provision for responding to 
nuclear accidents and emergencies. 

challenges, 

evolving 

to 

INSC  objectives  are  also  relevant  to  the  third  country  partners’  needs  and  priorities. 
Compliance with the INSC Regulation, partners’ policies and needs are accounted for through 
consultations,  road  maps,  strategies  and  dedicated  structures  as  the  Joint  Support  Office  in 
Kiev  assisting  Ukrainian  partners 
identify  and  prioritise  projects  eligible  for 
implementation. Additionally, the  needs assessment in Ukraine is facilitated by a dedicated 
supervisory board (see Box 1).  

to 

Effectiveness, impact and sustainability 
To what extent does the INSC deliver results against the Instrument´s objectives and specific 
EU priorities? 

Based  on  the  experience  gained  under  the  TACIS  nuclear  safety  programme,  the  INSC 
consistently  delivered  outputs  contributing  to  its  specific  nuclear  safety  objectives,  see  also 
Box 2.  The  INSC  also  contributed  to  EU  cross-cutting  issues,  particularly  well  to  better 
environmental  protection  and  sector  governance,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  to  ownership  and 
gender equality31.  

A  good  example  of  effectiveness,  impact 
and  sustainability  of  the  INSC  is  the 
completion of a National Management and 
Maintenance  Training  Centre  for 
the 
Operator  ‘NNEGC  Energoatom’,  which 
was  co-funded  by  the  EU  (EUR  14 
million)  and  Ukraine  (EUR  26  million). 
in 
This 
the 
(INSC  2007-
predecessor 
the 
2013),  marks 
termination  of 
revenue  generating 
support 

intervention, 

Instrument 

defined 

the 

the 

to 

is  “effective 

Box 2 Response of ENSREG Working Group 1 ‘Improving 
Nuclear Safety Arrangements’ to a questionnaire 
results 
in  delivering 
INSC 
contributing 
to  nuclear  safety  goals.  The 
priorities  of  the  Instrument,  first  of  all  the 
cooperation  with  national  nuclear  regulatory 
authorities and the promotion of nuclear safety 
culture, are well addressed”. 

Questionnaire of the external evaluation. 

30 Agreement (16 Jan. 2016) with Iran by (E3/ EU+3) China, EU, France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom, 
and United States on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA). 
31 External evaluation of the INSC, Final Report, Vol I – June 2017, pages 5, 8, 10. 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
operating  organisations,  as  they  have  become  able  to  generate  adequate  revenues  by 
themselves  for  sustaining  the  improved  nuclear  safety  culture.  Therefore,  the  current  INSC 
2014-2020  only  supports  the  regulatory  authorities,  safe  management  of  legacy  radioactive 
waste and remediation, and safeguards. 

The  external  evaluation  made  a  profound  effort  to  become  fully  informed  on  the  specific 
nature of the Instrument. The Commission services recognise that an increased measurability 
of  effectiveness  and  impact  is  to  be  further  pursued  also  to  facilitate the  communication  on 
performance with non-expert decision makers. However, as the focus in nuclear safety is on 
preventing incidents and accidents, a reduced rate of incidents is difficult to measure. On the 
contrary, the resolution of design deficiencies at nuclear power plants, which were at the basis 
of  TACIS,  could  be  measured  directly  by  the  replaced  obsolete  equipment.  Correction  of 
shortcomings  in  the  safety  culture  and  in  the  regulatory  process  mostly  comes  down  to  the 
correction  of  human  errors,  for  which  lasting  results  are  more  difficult  to  measure  and  to 
ascertain.  

For these reasons, dedicated IAEA services, such as IRRS and INIR32 are relied on to improve 
the  measurability  of  the  assistance  to  the  regulatory  authorities.  Using  these  services  also 
gained  support  through  responses  to  the  Open  Public  Consultation  performed  by  the 
Commission  services.  However,  as  the  IRRS  review  imposes  a  significant  administrative 
burden  to  the  authority  under  review,  deriving  suitable  metrics  through  a  less  intrusive 
method would be preferred as the performance indicators as put forward in the annex of the 
Multi-Annual Indicative Programme33. Concerning the safe management of radioactive waste, 
a strategic road map in Ukraine facilitated by the Kiev-based Joint Support Office provided 
initially  the  pursued  measurability  with  milestones  at  a  national  level,  while  at  the  regional 
level,  the  IAEA-assisted  Coordination  Group  for  Uranium  Legacy  Sites  (CGULS)  gives  a 
suitable forum for coordinated international activities.  

The  executive  summary  of  the  external  evaluation  stressed  that  the  “Strategy  and 
programming  documents  34  need  increased  detail” 35  with  further  developed  baselines  at 
national and regional levels. The IAEA-assisted peer review meetings of national reports for 
the  two  major  conventions  on  nuclear  safety  and  the  safe  management  of  radioactive  waste 
provide an appropriate forum for such analysis with overall acceptance. Although the assets 
and  the  mandate  of  the  INSC  are  well-known  in  the  nuclear  safety  community,  the 
Commission  services  agree  that  the  summary  findings  the  Conventions’  peer-review 
meetings 36 as  well  as  the  recent  annual  IAEA  nuclear  safety  reviews 37,  are  to  be  better 
reflected in the INSC programming documents.  

The  Instrument  made  very  limited  use  of  external  evaluations  with  focus  on  measurable 
changes  and  sustainable  impact.  Nevertheless,  the  Instrument  fully  complies  with  its  legal 

32 Integrated  Regulatory  Review  Service,  Integrated  Nuclear  Infrastructure  Review;  independent  expert  review 
services organised by IAEA. 
33 Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014-2017. 
34 INSC, Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014-2017. 
35 External evaluation of the INSC, Final Report, Vol I – June 2017, page v and page 13. 
36 7th  Review  Meeting  of  The  Convention  on  Nuclear  Safety,  Summary  Report,  27  March  –  7  April  2017; 
Summary  report,  5th  Review  Meeting of  the  Joint  Convention of  the  Safe  Management  of  Radioactive  Waste 
and Spent Nuclear Fuel, 11 to 22 May 2015. 
37 IAEA, Nuclear Safety Review 2016, GC(60)/INF/5. 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
requirements and the limited use of external 
evaluations  is  partially  due  to  the  limited 
resources  for  the  implementation  of  the 
INSC programme.  

Efficiency 
To  what  extent  is  the  INSC  delivering 
efficiently? 

Source: JRC 
Figure 2: Number of trainees male/female for age categories 
- INSC Training & Tutoring Project 

INSC  is  a  well-performing  Instrument35 
with mechanisms and resources appropriate 
to  support  the  project  pipeline  and  the 
delivery of outputs. Stakeholders expressed 
a desire for more efficiency as well. An important factor constraining project performance is 
the limited absorption capacity of Partner Countries. Support arrangements provide adequate 
capacities  comprising  technical  expert  support  (JRC)  and  dedicated  support  for  the 
beneficiaries and end-users in Ukraine.  
Centralized  management  of  the  INSC  is  a  justified  arrangement  to  ensure  that  qualified 
assistance is provided on the basis of high-level nuclear expertise. Centralized management in 
the same unit also supports close coordination of the INSC with the Instrument contributing to 
Stability and Peace (IcSP dealing with nuclear security). 

The Instrument is also well tuned to the need for flexibility, speed of delivery and, partially, in 
promoting ownership. An example of increased attention to visibility of cross-cutting issues 
concerns the JRC’s Database on Training and Tutoring which since 2015 monitors the gender 
and age balance in training actions, Figure 2, showing the focus on young professionals and 
29% of women participants). 

Added value 
To  what  extent  do  the  INSC  programmes  add  value  compared  to  interventions  by  Member 
States or other key donors?  

The Instrument fosters unique added value as its distinctive features allow for interventions in 
the  nuclear  safety  sector  well  beyond  actions  by  Member  States  and  other  donors 38.  In 
particular: 

i. 

Support  by  its  institutional  framework  and  engagement  in  international  collaborations 
allows INSC to act at a global level, featuring specialised know-how and expertise, high 
nuclear safety standards and exclusive EU competences to handle nuclear safeguards.  
ii.  A relatively large financial allocation and continuity of nuclear safety cooperation with a 

iii. 

track record of over a quarter of a century. 
The Instrument allows the EU to assume a leading role in nuclear safety on the basis of 
the advanced safety requirements and standards as established under EURATOM and by 
the Member States; the Instrument also allows engaging in policy and political dialogue 
with Partner Countries as follow-on to cooperation arrangements. 

38 External evaluation of the INSC, Final Report, Vol I – June 2017, page 16. 

18 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
The Convention on Nuclear Safety under secretariat of IAEA has in its charter to achieve and 
maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide. The Contracting Parties have the obligation 
to submit every three years a national status reports and engage in a mutual peer review. The 
final  plenary session  of the 2017 peer review meeting  of the Convention on Nuclear  Safety 
(May 2017, Vienna) with currently 79 State Parties reflected on the worldwide achievements 
and identified "the implementation of the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation program 
for assisting non-EU countries" as one of the four good practices. In general the Instrument 
allows  the  EU  to  assume  a  world  leading  role  in  nuclear  safety  and  permits  engagement  in 
policy  level  dialogue  with  Partner  Countries  and,  in  specific  cases,  triggering  a  political 
dialogue in the wake of nuclear safety negotiations as for instance with Iran39. 

Coherence, consistency, complementarities and synergies 
To what extent does INSC facilitate coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies 
(CCC&S) both internally between its own set of objectives and programmes and vis-à-vis 
other EFIs (see also INSC Regulation, Article 4)?  

INSC  mechanisms  and  management  processes  support  a  sound  level  of  coherence, 
consistency, complementarity and synergies throughout programming and implementation.  

The Commission's procedure (the Quality Support Group, the Inter Service Group, the INSC 
Committee) and consultations held with the ENSREG Working Group 1 ‘Improving Nuclear 
Safety  Arrangements’  and  the  Joint  Research  Centre  are  conducive  to  supporting  internal 
coherence  and  complementarities,  as  ENSREG  is  fully  informed  on  the  requirements  in  the 
Directives and the Joint Research Centre also supports the IcSP dealing with nuclear security 
projects.  

The  external  evaluation  notes  that  an  overview  of  Member  States’  and  other  donors' 
interventions  is  not  included  in  programming  documents.  Although  duplications  of 
interventions  is  avoided  through  coordination  mechanisms  with  EBRD  or  IAEA  for  major 
actions  (Chernobyl,  and  Central  Asia  legacy  mining  for  example);  the  mentioned  mapping 
would contribute to transparency and accountability.  

The scope for overlap and synergies with other EU’s External Financing Instruments (IPA II, 
ENI and DCI) is limited, because of the specialised thematic focus on nuclear safety40. As a 
result,  even  though  the  Instrument  is  well  set  for  coordination  and  coherence  on  nuclear 
safety,  INSC  operates  in  relative  isolation  vis-à-vis  other  EFIs  also  due  to  its  technical 
specificities. Nevertheless, coordination  and interactions between  INSC (nuclear  safety)  and 
the  Instrument  contributing  to  Security  and  Peace  (IcSP)  is  well  facilitated.  No  significant 
interactions have been identified with the other instruments.  

Leverage 
To what extent has the INSC leveraged further funds and/or political or policy engagement? 

The  INSC  supports  leverage  of  both  political  engagement  and  financial  resources  for  the 
nuclear safety sector. The major example of this is shown in Figure 3. The EU contributions 

39 Agreement (16 Jan. 2016) with Iran by (E3/ EU+3) China, EU, France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom, 
and United States on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA). 
40 External evaluation of the INSC, Final Report, Vol I – June 2017, page 21. 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
to  the  Chernobyl  Shelter  Fund  and  the  Nuclear  Safety  Account  have  leveraged  substantial 
contributions from EU Member States, EBRD and other donors.  

Leveraging  interventions  with  the  private  sector  is  not  foreseen  as  nuclear  safety  is  not  a 
revenue generating activity which can attract private investment. 

With respect to policy and political engagement, the INSC has an important part in enabling 
the EU to play a leading role in the follow-up on challenges and initiatives identified in the 
G7 Nuclear Safety and Security Group. As demonstrated by interventions under both INSC-I 
and  INSC-II,  the  Instrument  gives  the  EU  the  opportunity  to  lead  cooperation  on  nuclear 
safety, by providing swift reactions to be carried out within a concerted political and policy 
effort,  In  specific  cases  the  Instrument  demonstrated  that  it  works  as  a  door-opener  for 
political  engagement.  For  example,  it  helped  obtain  the  engagement  of  Iran  on  a 
comprehensive  cooperation  on  civil  nuclear  safety,  once  the  international  agreement  on  the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was reached. The policy dialogue is supported by sound 
coordination  between  Commission  services,  the  Joint  Research  Centre,  and  the  European 
External Action Service. 

Figure 3:  Major funds with contributions by EU, Member States, EBRD and other donors 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 

The  conclusions  of  the  Commission  services  concern  the  main  assessment  criteria  and  are 
based on the analysis in this report. Conclusions that differ from the external evaluation are 
explained. The evaluation of the Commission services is confined to a retrospective analysis. 
Hence the recommendations of the external evaluation will be reflected without comment. 

1.  The  Instrument  is  fit-for-purpose 41  with  objectives  in  its  Regulation 42  aligned  with 
nuclear  safety  priorities  as  expressed  in  EURATOM  Directives43 and  compatible  with  the 
relevant  international  Conventions  and  Treaties,  most  notably  the  Convention  on  nuclear 
safety,  on  the  safe  management  of  radioactive  waste  and  the  Treaty  on  non-proliferation  of 
nuclear weapons. EU cross-cutting issues as protecting the environment and good governance 
are  directly  addressed  or  mainstreamed  in  interventions.  The  Instrument’s  highly  technical 
content and focus on transfer of know-how with an international outreach under a centralized 
management  are  appropriate.  This  conclusion  was  supported  by  the  stakeholder  and  public 
consultation.  

2.  The  Instrument  adequately  addresses  evolving  challenges  and  new 
issues  as 
demonstrated  by  the  support  to  stress  test  exercises  (evaluation  of  lessons  from  the 
Fukushima-Daiichi accident), the response to the ‘Iran Deal’ on engaging in a comprehensive 
intervention, and initiatives on environmental remediation of legacy uranium mining sites in 
Central Asia and now under preparation in Sub-Sahara Africa.  

3.  The  Instrument  processes,  including  programming  and  implementation  are  well 
coordinated within the Commission services and with the Member States which support the 
effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the Instrument.  

Although  the  external  evaluation  supports  this  overall  conclusion,  they  differ  on  the 
following: 
(i) 
(ii) 

the project cycle’s measurability is insufficient; 
the  Strategy  and  programming  documents  should  be  more  results’  oriented  and 
specific as also reflected in the stakeholder consultation; 
the accountability and lessons learning capacity is insufficiently supported by Results-
Oriented Monitoring (ROM) - a view also expressed by stakeholders during the open 
public consultation; and  
the direct and mainstreamed support to environmental protection, sector management 
and gender equality deserves wider visibility and recognition. 

(iii) 

(iv) 

In response, the Commission services: 
(i) 

maintain that indicators on an improved nuclear safety culture are difficult to define as 
well as indicators on an improved safety of the living conditions of the population in 
the vicinity of radioactive legacy sites, this generally implies that the living conditions 
are  at  risk  of  being  contaminated  by  an  uncontrolled  dispersion  of  radioactive 
material; 

41 External evaluation of the INSC, Final Report, Vol I – June 2017, pages 26-27. 
42 Council  Regulation  (EURATOM)  No  237/2014,  13  December  2013  establishing  an  Instrument  for  Nuclear 
Safety Cooperation. 
 43 EURATOM  Directives  on  Nuclear  Safety  (amended  2014),  Radioactive  Waste  management  (established 
2011), and Basic Safety Standards on radiation protection (amended 2013). 

21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
(ii) 

(iii) 

(iv) 

regard that the nuclear stakeholders were well informed on the INSC and its context, 
but  recognise,  as  also  appeared  at  the  stakeholder  consultations  that  the  non-expert 
community/ civil society is insufficiently informed on the global and country-specific 
nuclear safety status in the programming documents, such as the INSC Strategy;  
hold that the application of monitoring actions is generally in-line with the policy of 
other EFIs; and 
recall  that visibility of the Instrument has  been  given due  attention as  proved by the 
brochure assembled by the Kiev EU Delegation on the occasion of the sliding event of 
the Chernobyl Shelter on 29 November 2016. 

4. The INSC has been consistently delivering outputs enhancing the nuclear safety culture 
with  reference  to  the  major  achievement  in  the  nuclear  power  sector  in  Ukraine  with  the 
Operator  being  highly  motivated  to  roll-out  save  culture  initiatives  and  the  regulator  now 
being  properly  competent  on  nuclear  power  plant  regulation  and  licensing  reviews,  as 
revealed by the Case Study on Ukraine and as a result of highly committed partners. Outputs 
relate to an improved capacity and framework of nuclear regulatory authorities. Promoting the 
EU's  high  safety  and  regulatory  standard  worldwide,  of  which  this  case  is  an  example,  was 
also clearly recognised by stakeholders as a valuable role of the Instrument. 

5.  Instrument’s  programming  and  implementation  are  coherent  and  provide  added  value 
through  its  close  coordination  with  relevant  Commission  services,  Member  States  and  the 
ENSREG  Working  Group  1  ‘Improving  Nuclear  Safety  Arrangements’,  while  the  INSC 
promotes international cooperation. The role of ENSREG (Working Group 1) is important in 
the programming and results’ appraisal. The INSC has achieved a sector leadership as a result 
of  its  long  experience  in  nuclear  safety  cooperation  with  third  countries.  This  leadership 
supports its prominent role in the political and policy dialogue.  

Some stakeholders expressed a desire in their response to the Open Public Consultation to be 
more deeply involved in programming. However, the Commission services are of the opinion 
that the present set-up of programming strikes the right balance between stakeholder feedback 
and  the  final  responsibility  of  the  Commission  services  for  programming.  Moreover  the 
procedure followed to consult Member States and getting their endorsement for programming 
documents, is in line with those for the other External Financing Instruments. 

6.  The  EU  cooperation  on  nuclear  safety,  safe  management  of  radioactive  waste  and 
safeguards has  unique  features  not  to  be  compared  with  any  other  international  action  with 
respect  to  its  consistent  and  long  term  support  while  providing  comprehensive  support  in 
close  cooperation  with  authorities,  expert  institutes,  and  companies  in  third  countries.  In 
selected areas a profound impact is achieved leading to a self-sustainability properly linked to 
international  organisations  to  ensure  that  complacency  is  avoided  with  focus  on  continuous 
improvement and learning lessons from international experience. 

22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 1. Procedural information 

A Mid-Term Review Report on the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 2014-2020 is 
to be submitted to the European Parliament and the Council by the end of 2017 compliant to 
the Common Implementing Regulation (CIR) article 17 applicable fully or partially to the EU 
External Financing Instruments. This Mid-Term Review shall cover the period from January 
2014  to  June  2017.  With  a  view  to  achieving  the  objectives  of  each  Instrument,  that  report 
shall  in  addition  address,  the  added  value  of  each  Instrument,  the  scope  for  simplification, 
internal  and  external  coherence,  including  complementarity  and  synergies  between  the 
Instruments, the continued relevance of all objectives, and the contribution of the measures to 
a consistent Union external action. The review report shall take into account any findings and 
conclusions on the long-term impact and shall contain information on the leverage effect. 

In line both with the Better Regulation guidelines (2015), and the requirements of the CIR, the 
main assessment criteria are: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, EU added value, scope for 
simplification,  coherence,  complementarity  and  synergies,  consistency,  sustainability 
leverage,  and  impact.  Evaluation  issues,  and  questions  to  be  further  developed  are  set  out 
below. 

The  Directorate-General  for  International  Cooperation  and  Development  (DEVCO)  had  the 
lead  in  facilitating  the  external  evaluation  whereas  the  Inter  Service  Group  (ISG)  of 
Commission  services  guided  the  evaluation  process  and  gave  feedback  on  intermediate 
outcomes. 

Evaluation Questions 
1. RELEVANCE 
To what extent do the specific objectives (INSC Regulation, Article 2) and the design of the 
INSC respond to:  
(iii)EU priorities and beneficiary needs identified at the time the Instrument was adopted (end 

2013)? 

(iv) Current EU priorities and beneficiary needs, given the evolving challenges and priorities 

in international context (up to mid-2017)? 

2. EFFECTIVENESS, IMPACT, SUSTAINABILITY 
To what extent does the INSC deliver results against the Instrument´s objectives and specific 
EU priorities? 
3. EFFICIENCY 
To what extent is the INSC delivering efficiently? 
4. VALUE ADDED 
To what extent do the INSC programmes add value compared to interventions by Member 
States or other key donors?  
5. COHERENCE, CONSISTENCY, COMPLEMENTARITY AND SYNERGIES 
To what extent does INSC facilitate coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies 
(CCC&S) both internally between its own set of objectives and programmes and vis-à-vis 
other EFIs (see also INSC Regulation, Article 4)?  
6. LEVERAGE 
To what extent has the INSC leveraged further funds and/or political or policy engagement? 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 2. Synopsis report of the stakeholders' consultation 

Part A – OPEN PUBLIC CONSULTATION  

Introduction 
The  Open  Public  Consultation  on  the  INSC  evaluation  was  launched  on  7  February  2017, 
jointly  with  such  consultations  of  the  other  External  Financing  Instruments,  and  lasted  for 
over a 12-week period ending on 8 May 2017. Summary data, see Table 1, show how overall, 
the INSC consultation achieved a reasonable response rate in comparison with the other EFIs, 
with responses received from a wide range of stakeholders. In total 51 reactions were obtained 
with  20  reactions  from  associations  and  organizations  and  11  from  public  authorities. 
Reactions of respondent who did not object their opinion to be publicised are available at an 
EU website. 

Table 1: Response rate to the OPC on EU’s EFIs 

Category of respondent 

Respondents 
INSC 

Total 

Share of total 

Citizen/individual 
Consultancy 
EU platform, network, or association 
Industry, business or workers' organisations 
Organisation or association 
Other 
Public authority 
Research/academia 
Total 

25% 
50% 
58% 
63% 
32% 
100% 
44% 
60% 
41% 
Source: Altair Asesores’ calculation based on OPC responses received until 8 May 2017. 

8 
2 
12 
8 
62 
2 
25 
5 
124 

2 
1 
7 
5 
20 
2 
11 
3 
51 

Summary of OPC contributions on INSC 

Question 1: How well do you think the INSC has addressed its objectives?  

The main assessment criteria for the evaluation are: relevance; effectiveness, impact and 
sustainability; efficiency; EU added value; coherence, consistency, complementarity and 
synergies;  and  leverage.  Feel  free  to  comment  on  the  findings,  conclusions  or 
recommendations for any/all of the criteria. 

Summary of contributions 

The 18 relevant responses generally support the evaluation findings on INSC as expressed in 
the  final  draft  evaluation  report  published  on  the  internet  site  of  the  OPC.  The  majority  of 
responses provide specific recommendations aligned to conclusions and recommendations set 
out in the evaluation. The responses mainly confirm the identified lack of monitoring. Some 
improvements  beyond  the  evaluation  findings  are  identified  (e.g.  on  prioritisation  specific 
INSC-actions or on increasing the INSC budget). Responses did not challenge the findings. 

Views of public authorities 
The 6 responses are generally supportive to the findings; dissenting views on the evaluation’s 
conclusions or recommendations are not expressed. It is suggested to improve the efficiency 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(EQ3).  INSC-actions  on  strengthening  the  legal  framework  of  neighbouring  countries  are 
welcomed  as  well  as  INSC  actions  in  countries  facing  the  consequences  of  the  Chernobyl 
accident. Some concrete suggestions (EQ1, EQ2, EQ3) concern:  
(a)  Provision of a “complementary contribution” by the beneficiary country as a guarantee; 
(b)  A suggestion for a supplementary review cycle involving: 

  Annual  communication  of  all  INSC  project  proposals  to  the  EU  Member  States  to 
allow  the  latter  to  make  recommendations  on  the  INSC´s  geographic  and  thematic 
priorities;  

  The Commission should take the MS’s recommendations into account and submit the 
proposals to the group of experts who, in turn, should issue their recommendations;  
  Based  on  Taking  all  recommendations  into  account,  the  INSC  Committee  should 
decide  which  proposals  are  retained;  the  process  should  foresee  a  consultation  of 
ENSREG  WG1  at  programming  level,  even  when  time  constraints  render  this 
consultation difficult (e.g. 2018-2020); 

 

(c)  Creation of a streamlined methodology and evaluation framework (similar to other EFIs): 
Improvement  of  the  action  documents  having  more  details  on  inter  alia,  the  legal 
framework  in  partner  countries,  other  donor  actions  (IAEA,  EBRD,  G7),  and  with 
follow-up projects to set up an evaluation framework to avoid redundancies; 

  Communication of the provisional calendar of calls for tender to the INSC Committee 
at the presentation of the annual work plan and regular information in writing to this 
Committee of the results of the calls for tender; 

  Presentation by DEVCO of an evaluation report to the INSC Committee at the end of 

each project, in line with INSC Regulation;  

  More efficient project management modalities allowing for a larger impact in partner 
countries  including  some  specific  comments  on  criteria  for  no-key  experts  at 
regulatory/  TSO  level  and  tender  specifications  as  language  skills  and  hiring  local 
staff. 

The  added  value  of  the  INSC  (EQ4)  is  underlined  with  two  recommendations  on 
complementarity,  coherence  and  synergies  (EQ5):  (i)  the  INSC  should  remain  a  separate 
Instrument with the legal basis of EURATOM and exclusively dedicated to nuclear safety; not 
to be merged with the IcSP (strengthening INSC/IcSP links should only be done with respect 
to  the  INSC´s  strict  scope);  and  (ii)  coordination  between  the  INSC  and  the  IRRS  Peer 
Review service of the IAEA should be enhanced. 

Organisation or association 
The  two  responses  have  no  relevance  to  the  evaluation  report.  One  of  the  two  responses 
mentions only the word ‘coherence’ without any qualification. 

Industry, business or worker´s association 
The 5 responses are aligned with the findings of the evaluation all highlighting the relevance, 
effectiveness  and  the  efficiency  of  the  INSC.  To  maximise  the  Instrument’s  results,  the 
selection  of  partner  countries  should  be  reviewed.  The  unique  added  value  of  the  INSC  is 
stressed  with  specific  recommendations:  (i) optimize  the  prioritization  of  objectives; 
(ii) follow-up  of  project  and  programming  documents  be  more  transparent;  (iii) consider 
interests  of  the  European  industry;  (iv) enforce  monitoring  and  assessment  mechanisms 
(project-level evaluation, impact assessment, and assessment of results); (v) respect timelines 
for tendering procedure and give visibility to bidding organizations in particular for planning 
of  resources;  (vi) facilitate  and  extend  the  participation  of  the  European  industry  to  INSC 
projects together with EU regulators. 

25 

 
 
 
 
 
The  INSC´s  budget  reduction  is  considered  regretful  although  the  objectives  remain  as 
ambitious as initially. An opinion states that the mid-term evaluation is disappointing because 
allocated resources failed to achieve the Instrument' objectives and recommends an increase 
of the budget.  

Moreover, reactions point out that partner countries should provide a financial contribution to 
the EC in return for INSC assistance. Finally, the INSC´s important leverage role is stressed 
by stating that terminating the INSC would significantly weaken the EURATOM/EU´s role in 
promoting the EU´s high safety and regulatory standards world-wide. The response underlines 
that  the  INSC  provides  a  favourable  basis  for  political  dialogue  and  promotion  of  EU 
priorities at global level, e.g. the Iran Deal on nuclear safety cooperation. 

Research/academia 
Two  responses  praise  the  relevance of  INSC  (EQ1)  with  reference  to  the  completion  of  the 
Chernobyl´s New Confinement.  

Citizen/private individuals 
The one received comment has no relevance to the evaluation report. 

Consultancy 
One response mostly aligned with the evaluation findings provides useful recommendations:  
(i)  QSG feedback should be analysed to improve the design of INSC projects;  
(ii)  Mechanisms should be created to ensure that JRC´s institutional memory is adequately 

transferred to the other services of the European Commission;  

(iii)  Projects´  specific  objectives  and  indicators  should  be  formulated  to  allow  for  a 

measurement of cross-cutting issues;  

(iv)  TORs  should  be  drafted  in  a  way  that  binds  the  beneficiaries  of  the  INSC-projects  to 

(v) 

timely provide all required information and ensure speed of delivery;  
Joint project implementation (contractor/end-user) should be favoured where possible in 
order to foster ownership;  

(vi)  Cooperation with IAEA  should be further improved, especially as regards streamlined 
project management/monitoring and policy dialogues with the partner countries;  
(vii)  A  results/outcome-based  approach  should  increase  coherence  between  different  INSC 
projects (e.g. parallel actions benefiting a regulator, on the one hand, and an operator, 
on the other hand);  

(viii) Partner Country expertise in nuclear safety (acquired through TACIS/INSC) should be 
included in new INSC projects to promote ownership, facilitate the adoption of changes 
in “newcomer” countries and foster bilateral cooperation for the benefit of leverage;  
(ix)  Training and Tutoring (T&T) projects should be continued as an important (bottom up) 

element of the INSC’s leverage. 

Other 
The  one  received  contribution  confirms  the  findings  of  the  evaluation  and  in  particular  the 
unique added value of the Instrument. The transfer of EU know-how and expertise under the 
INSC  should  constantly  be  updated  in  accordance  with  the  applicable  EU  standards  and  be 
tested on all applicable installations, including the new generations of reactors. It also favours 
cooperation  between  EU  regulators  and  TSOs  with  a  view  to  harmonise  nuclear  safety 
standards. 

26 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Response of the Evaluation Team 

The  OPC  responses  converge  toward  the  Instrument  evaluation  and  generally  confirm  the 
findings, conclusions and recommendations of the draft evaluation report. Overall consensus 
exists on improving INSC monitoring, both at instrument level and project level. 

On the request to enhance the INSC´s efficiency, the evaluator refers to the recommendation 
to Reinforcing results delivery. The evaluator supports the endorsement of the INSC´s unique 
added  value,  as  well  as  the  confirmation  of  the  INSC´s  role  on  leverage.  The  evaluator 
supports  the  view  to  maintain  the  INSC  as  a  separate  instrument,  and  the  suggestion  to 
enhance coordination with the IAEA´s IRRS review service. 

The evaluator welcomes the operational recommendations, e.g. an enhanced involvement of 
the  EU  Member  States  and  EU  regulators  at  project  and  programming  level,  an  enhanced 
involvement of the INSC Committee in the tendering process, end-of-project results reporting, 
optimisation of prioritisation, enhanced transparency in project follow-up, etc. However, the 
evaluator  does  not  endorse  recommendations  relating  to  an  increased  participation  of  the 
European  industry  as  the  INSC  is  not  aimed  at  promoting  the  EU  nuclear  industry  but 
exclusively aimed at promoting nuclear safety. 

On comments  on the  INSC´s budgetary  cutback, the evaluator  acknowledges the significant 
budget  reduction  from  INSC-I  to  INSC  (some  60%)  but  nevertheless  concludes  that  (i) the 
INSC´s financial resources are adequate for targeted support, and (ii) the budget resources for 
cooperation is well beyond the reach of Member States (some EUR 30 million per year). 
The  international  collaboration  platforms  (IAEA,  EBRD,  G7,  etc.)  facilitate  co-financing 
arrangements,  which  also  increase  the  reach  of  the  Instrument.  In  the  G7  context,  pledging 
conferences are held on an ad-hoc basis to the benefit of Chernobyl, at which the EC usually 
pledges  substantial  amounts  triggering  additional  pledges  by  other  donors.  The  evaluator 
therefore  differs  with  the  suggestion  that  the  INSC´s  mid-term  review  is  disappointing 
because allocated resources have failed to achieve all the objectives. The evaluation´s overall 
conclusion is, on the contrary, that the Instrument is well fit to its purpose. The evaluator key 
recommendation  to  develop  result  orientation  and  measurability  will  provide  quantifiable 
evidence of the Instrument’s contributions to its objectives. 

Concerning the  increase  of  coherence  between  different  INSC  projects (e.g.  parallel  actions 
benefiting  a  regulator,  on  the  one  hand,  and  an  operator,  on  the  other  hand),  the  evaluator 
notes that it is unusual that support is provided to operators under INSC because of the fact 
the INSC exclusively promotes nuclear safety and does not promote nuclear energy. 

On the comment expressing a need for updating the transfer of EU know-how and expertise, 
the  evaluator  is  of  the  opinion  that  this  occurs  automatically  given  that  INSC  actions  are 
tailor-made for the beneficiary country´s proposed project and takes account of the applicable 
technology.  The  evaluator  also  observes  that  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  INSC-action  will  be 
called  upon  to  ensure  nuclear  safety  of  GEN-III  or  GEN-IV  reactor  technology.  As  to 
comments  on  cooperation  between  EU  regulators  and  TSOs  to  ensure  harmonisation  of 
nuclear safety, the evaluator refers to the recommendation on  Cooperation of nuclear safety 
should  be  pursued  and  reinforced.  This  cooperation  should  also  imply  EU  cooperation  in 
order to strengthen its transfer of solid know-how and expertise on nuclear safety. 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One  recommendation  supported  by  different  stakeholders  is  that  national  contributions  to 
nuclear safety programmes should be sought to increase ownership. The evaluator fully agrees 
with  this  approach,  as  this  measure  would  not  only  strengthen  ownership,  but  also  favours 
sustainability while leveraging additional resources to support nuclear safety goals. 

Question  2:  Do  you  consider  that  concentration  on  accession  countries  and 

countries in the European neighbourhood area is appropriate?  

Please give reasons to support your view. 

Summary of contributions 

The received 13 relevant responses all support the evaluation finding, that the INSC´s focus 
on accession countries and countries in the European neighbourhood area is appropriate. The 
reasons given include (i) this is in the interest of the EU and protects the EU from nuclear and 
radiation hazards; (ii) these countries are more inclined to successfully cooperate with INSC-
actions and absorb/implement INSC know-how; and (iii) at present, the regulatory framework 
of many of these countries does not comply with the international safety standards.  

Some stakeholders (all belong in the category Industry, Business and Workers´ Organisations) 
clarify  that,  even  though  it  is  important  that  INSC  focuses  on  the  European  neighbourhood 
area,  its  geographical  scope  should  not  be  confined  but  should  continue  to  be  of  a  global 
nature. None of the stakeholders suggest to confine the INSC´s focus to accession countries 
and countries in the European neighbourhood area; the unique added value concerns its global 
reach.  

Views of public authorities 
The 3 responses do not challenge the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations. 
Responses stress the key role played by INSC in strengthening nuclear safety in the European 
neighbourhood. Given the geographic proximity, a severe accident would likely affect the EU 
Member  States.  Hence,  an  improved  nuclear  safety  in  the  European  neighbourhood  area 
enhances the radiation protection in the EU against effects from accidents in third countries. 
The INSC is recommended to continue strengthening the legal framework of countries in the 
European neighbourhood area. This is particularly important for the regulatory framework of 
countries licensing or first constructing a new nuclear power plants, the long-term operation 
of nuclear power plants, and nuclear waste management. The need to support countries facing 
the consequences of the Chernobyl accident is underlined.  

Organisation or association 
The two respondents support the INSC´s concentration on accession countries and countries 
in the European neighbourhood area is appropriate. In particular, they recognize the relevance 
of nuclear safety in accession countries and countries of the European neighbourhood area for 
Europe´s  own  nuclear  safety  and  underline  these  countries´  tight  cooperation  links  with  the 
EU.  

Industry, business or worker´s association 
The  four  contributions  stress  that,  despite  the  importance  to  focus  on  the  European 
neighbourhood,  its  geographical  scope  should  not  be  confined  to  this  area  but  remain  its 
global nature. The importance was stressed of closely coordinating actions with other donors. 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Geographically, support to Ukraine and Armenia is highlighted with regard to the European 
neighbourhood while at a global level, following regions are highlighted: Africa, the Middle 
East, South East Asia, Central Asia (Kirgizstan) and Latin America (Brazil and Argentina).  
The INSC´s unique added value to engage in nuclear safety cooperation with third countries is 
underlined.  Indeed,  the  INSC´s  key  role  is  highlighted  in  disseminating  a  European  safety 
culture  and  European  solutions  for  the  management  of  radioactive  waste  and  spent  fuels 
world-wide: on the one hand, the INSC enables the EU, with a mature nuclear industry and a 
leading  EURATOM  regulatory  framework,  to  cooperate  with  third  countries  promoting 
nuclear activities are in line with highest standards of nuclear safety and security, and on the 
other hand, the INSC enables EURATOM to participate in joint actions with the IAEA. 

Research/academia 
The  only  response  converges  with  the  evaluation  finding  that  INSC´s  focus  on  accession 
countries and countries of the European neighbourhood area is appropriate. It highlights that 
nuclear  accidents  pose  very  high  safety  concerns  and  that  radiation  is  not  contained  by 
borders.  

Citizen/private individuals 
One  short  comment  agrees  with  the  concentration  on  accession  countries  and  the  European 
neighbourhood as such adequately increases the INSC´s impact in those countries. 

Consultancy 
The  received  contribution  highlights  the  importance  of  the  INSC´s  focus  on  accession 
countries  and  countries  of  the  European  neighbourhood  area.  Reference  was  made  to  the 
ageing, obsolete equipment used in nuclear power and nuclear waste disposal infrastructure in 
the  Newly  Independent  States  (NIS),  whose  regulatory  structures  do  not  meet  international 
safety  standards.  Additionally,  the  NIS´  dependence  on  nuclear  energy  is  likely  to  continue 
and even to increase due to an economic and political impossibility to diversify their energy 
mix. It identifies this as a commercial opportunity for the EU industry and recommends that 
the  latter  seeks  support  from  countries  in  the  Eastern  European  neighbourhood  that  already 
developed nuclear safety experience, such as Ukraine. It also links the INSC to the IcSP by 
stating  that  INSC  should  give  a  priority  to  countries  that  support  EU  security  and  peace-
building policies and quotes Jordan as an example. The response also notes that the INSC´s 
focus on accession countries and countries of the European neighbourhood area has decreased 
since 2013 and draws the attention to INSC actions in China, South-East Asia, Tanzania and 
Iraq.  

Other 
The  one  contribution  agrees  with  the  draft  evaluation  finding  that  the  geographic priority  is 
appropriate, as such corresponds with the interests of the EU and EURATOM Community. It 
adds that INSC-cooperation outside this area is legitimate if it serves EU interests. 

Response of the Evaluation Team 

The  OPC  responses  confirm  the  assessment  of  the  evaluator  on  the  appropriateness  of  the 
INSC´s concentration on accession countries and countries in the European neighbourhood.  

Key is the qualified statement emphasising that the INSC´s priority to accession countries and 
the  European  neighbourhood  should  not  obstruct  the  Instrument´s  global  reach.  This 

29 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
statement  is  fully  in  line  with  the  evaluator´s  assessment.  The  evaluator  supports  the 
Instrument´s  focus  on  its  close  neighbourhood  but  emphasizes  not  to  preclude  the  INSC´s 
global  reach.  The  EU´s  international  pivotal  role  in  nuclear  safety  matters  is  crucial  in  the 
light of the transboundary effects of nuclear accidents. Hence, the evaluator fully endorses the 
voiced unique added value of the INSC which, thanks to its distinctive features, mobilizes a 
critical  mass  with  specialized  expertise  in  the  EU,  disseminating  the  high  nuclear  safety 
standards of the EU Member States, and exclusive competences to handle nuclear safeguards 
under EURATOM.  

The  evaluator  does  not  endorse  an  additional  comment  that  "NIS´  dependence  on  nuclear 
energy  represents  a  commercial  opportunity  for  the  EU  industry"  and  the  associated 
recommendation  that  the  latter  are  to  seek  support  from  countries  in  the  Eastern  European 
neighbourhood with nuclear safety experience, e.g. Ukraine. The issue is not pertinent to the 
discussion of the Instrument and its evaluation. The evaluator stresses that INSC is not aimed 
at  supporting  any  commercial  activities  relating  to  nuclear  energy  but  exclusively  aimed  at 
promoting  nuclear  safety  and  that  INSC  objectives  are  typically  non-revenue  generating 
activities  (waste  remediation,  regulatory  support)  with  the  sole  aim  to  strengthen  nuclear 
safety. 

The  evaluator  does  not  endorse  either  an  additional  suggestion  that  INSC  should  prioritize 
countries  that  support  EU  security  and  peace-building  policies,  e.g.  Jordan.  The  INSC´s 
eligibility  rules  are  set  out  in  the  INSC  Regulation  (adequately  referring  to  CIR)  and  the 
evaluator´s position is that, even though the link between safety (INSC) and security (IcSP) 
deserves strengthening, the INSC should be maintained as a separate instrument from IcSP.  

Question 3: If you have any other views on the INSC you would like to share they 

are welcome here 

Summary of contributions 

A  total  of  14  relevant  responses  addressed  the  INSC  mostly  supportive  to  the  evaluation 
findings.  Some  contributions  lack  relevance  and  not  taken  into  account.  However  most 
responses  provide  pertinent  recommendations  with  a  view  to  further  strengthen  the 
Instrument.  

Views of public authorities 
The three contributions stress that the INSC be kept as a separate instrument.  

Organisation or association 
The one response merely recommends that the INSC should not be discriminatory in nature.  

Industry, business or worker´s association 
The 4 responses are all in agreement with the evaluation findings. One response concerns that 
the  selection  criteria  for  INSC  contractors  should  not  be  limited  to  only  the  regulatory 
experience,  but  also  credit  implementation  experience  in  order  to  improve  the  execution  of 
projects.  A  better  exploitation  of  the  regional  centres  of  excellence  is  recommended.  The 
separation from security is stressed together with preserving and strengthening the budget. 

Research/academia 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One of the two contributions is irrelevant and the other is discussed under Question 2.  

Citizen/private individuals 
The two received comments lack relevance to the Instrument evaluation. 

Consultancy 
The  only  one  response  converges  with  the  evaluation  findings  and  strengthens  some  of  the 
recommendations: (i) Recommendation 2 should include End-of-Project Results Reporting (to 
illustrate  INSC  achievements  and  continuity  of  INSC  support),  allowing  for  the  creation  of 
baselines for further planning; (ii) Recommendation 3 should include tangible targets in terms 
of  cross-cutting  issues  in  INSC  project  design  (e.g.  target  values  for  tangible  indicators  for 
improved governance, environmental measures, etc.).; and (iii) Recommendation 4 (“opening 
up”) should take account of the EU Delegations´ frequent reluctance to be involved in INSC 
projects  and  their  involvement  should,  hence,  be  institutionalised,  e.g.  on  INSC  leverage 
(irrespective of the INSC´s centralized management, which is appropriate for its objectives). 

Other 
The  one  response  recommends  to  improve  the  INSC´s  governance  to  allow  for  an  effective 
transfer of know-how and expertise of EU regulators and TSOs. The response is also favours 
more cooperation with EU regulators and TSOs with a view to harmonising nuclear safety. 

Response of the Evaluation Team 

The OPC responses generally confirm the assessment of the evaluator. The evaluator concurs 
with the comments that the INSC should be maintained as a separate instrument and should 
not formally or informally be merged with IcSP. 
With  respect  to  the  recommendation  that  the  INSC  should  not  discriminate,  the  evaluator 
refers to the eligibility criteria of the INSC Regulation and CIR. The On suggestions relating 
to  Recommendations  2,  3  and  4,  the  evaluator  welcomes  these  suggestions,  which  do  not 
contradict  the  evaluation  findings.  On  the  general  recommendations  to  improve  INSC´s 
governance  and  selection  process,  the  evaluator  refers  to  Recommendation  2  Strengthening 
measurability and effectiveness.  

31 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part B – TARGETTED CONSULTATIONS 

Policy Forum for Development: consultation with Civil Society 

The  Consultation  was  held  on  March  23  2017  at  the  Policy  Forum  for  Development.  The 
consultation offered the opportunity of meeting with a large number of civil society and EC 
stakeholders;  however  the  discussion  was  short  and  for  all  the  EFIs  evaluations  the  time 
dedicated was limited to two hours.  

The INSC evaluation was presented, following the presentation of the other EFIs evaluations. 
Specific comments was not raised on the INSC evaluation. Most participants expressed a need 
to strengthen the role of Civil Society participation in EU Cooperation. 

Technical Seminar with Member States Representatives 

On  the  27  of  March  was  held  a  Technical  Seminar  for  Council,  European  Parliament  and 
Member  States  in  Van Maerlant building  in  Brussels.  Following  the  presentation  of  the 
evaluation  findings,  conclusions  and  recommendations  there  was  an  exchange  with 
participants. Minutes were taken by the evaluation team and comments recorded for possible 
adjustments  to  the  report.  Overall  participants  expressed  views  favourable  with  evaluation 
outcomes and no comment was raised to dispute findings.  
One participant expressed a positive assessment on the SWOT analysis carried out to identify 
opportunities  and  constraints  of  a  possible  merge  of  the  Instrument  with  the  IcSP.  The 
evaluation  team  evidenced  the  need  to  strengthen  the  nexus  between  nuclear  safety  and 
security across the Instrument interventions. However the analysis of whether the Instrument 
should  be  merged  or  not  goes  beyond  the  scope  of  the  evaluation.  The  analysis  of 
opportunities and threats clearly evidenced the advantages to maintain the INSC as a separate 
instrument, also in consideration of the high level of specialization and its specific mandate. 

Other comments addressed security issues and the nexus safety - security, and one participant 
evidenced  how  security  should  be  an  exclusive  competence  of  the  Member  States.  The 
evaluation  team  pointed  to  the  specific  evaluation  recommendation  for  strengthening  the 
linkage  of  the  Instrument  with  security  issues  and  the  need  to  strengthen  existing 
complementarities and synergies across the INSC and IcSP. The Instrument according to the 
evaluator should be faithful to its mandate and not intervene in security issues while linkages 
with security should be strengthened. 

Questions  were  also  addressed  about  criteria  for  selection  of  beneficiary  Countries  and 
geographic scope of the Instrument. The evaluation team responded that eligibility criteria are 
defined  by  the  Instrument  regulations  and  have  been  assessed  by  the  evaluation  as  relevant 
and adequately designed. 

Another comment was made on how to address an improved sustainability of interventions. 
The evaluation team recommended strengthening sustainability through improved design and 
analysis  of  sustainability  factors,  during  design  and  implementation;  also  adequate  exit 
strategies need to be developed for each intervention. 

A  participant  enquired  about  how  the  evaluation  assesses  the  dialogue  with  Member  States 
and  could  Member  States  play  an  increased  role  in  the  Instrument  programming.  The 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
evaluation  team  confirmed  the  finding  of  an  existing  structured  dialogue  and  the  specific 
recommendation to strengthen this dialogue and to strengthen the role of ENSREG Working 
Group 1 ‘Improving Nuclear Safety Arrangements’ also to support programming and follow-
up of the Instrument’s interventions. 

Meeting of Council Working Party on Atomic Questions 

On  10  April  2017,  the  evaluator  presented  the  Draft  Final  Report  to  the  Council  Working 
Party on Atomic Questions (WPAQ) at the Justus Lipsius building. Most EU Member States 
(27  out  of  28)  attended  the  meeting.  The  debate  on  the  INSC  concerned  a  support  (i)  to 
maintain the legal basis under EURATOM, and (ii) to leave the geographic scope unchanged 
with  focus  on  neighbourhood  and  pre-accession  countries  but  including  a  world-wide 
coverage.  

Another response concerned to pursue compliance of partner countries with provisions of the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety. However,  the INSC has  no  mandate and is  not  designed for 
this purpose; leading by example by EU Member States is a way forward in this area.  

The need for transparency and freely accessible project implementation reports was advocated 
where  further  transparency  is  supported  by  the  evaluation  as  well  as  access  to  concise 
information on completed projects (access to implementation reports may be difficult due to 
proprietary and confidentiality issues). 

INSC Committee 

On  4  May  2017,  the  evaluator  presented  the  Draft  Final  Report  of  the  INSC  Mid-Term 
Evaluation to the INSC Committee in Brussels (Borschette). The Member States attending the 
meeting  were  Austria,  Belgium,  Croatia,  the  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  France,  Italy, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden. The meeting was partially presided by DG DEVCO. 
The  debate  centred  on  the  absence  of  sufficient  indicators,  the  measurability  of  the  INSC 
performance,  on  improving  the  INSC´s  public  communication,  on  the  methodology  of  the 
Mid-Term  Evaluation,  on  the  encouragement  by  INSC  to  partner  countries  to  ratify 
international  nuclear  safety  conventions,  on  ex-Soviet  waste  management  within  the  INSC 
and on the appropriateness to maintain a distinction of the INSC under the EURATOM and 
the IcSP under the legal basis of the EU. 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 3. Acronyms 
AAP 
AD 
BSS 
CBRN 
CCC&S 
CGULS 
CIR 
CNS 
CSF 
DAC 
DG DEVCO  
DG ENER 
EBRD  
EC 
ECA 
EDF 
EEAS 
EESC 
EFI 
EIA 
ENSREG 
ENSREG WG1  ENSREG Working Group 1 ‘Improving Nuclear Safety 

Annual Action Programme 
Action Document 
Basic Safety Standards 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 
Coherence, Consistency, Complementarity and Synergies 
Coordination Group for Uranium Legacy Sites 
Common Implementing Regulation 
Convention on Nuclear Safety 
Chernobyl Shelter Fund 
Development Assistance Committee (of OECD) 
Directorate-General for International Co-operation and Development 
Directorate-General for Energy 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
European Commission 
European Court of Auditors 
European Development Fund 
European External Action Service 
European Economic and Social Committee 
External Financing Instrument 
Environmental Impact Assessment 
European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group 

EU 
EURATOM 
IAEA 
IcSP 
INIR 
INSC 
IPA 
IRRS 
ISC 
ISG 
JCPoA 
JRC 
JSO 
LTO 
M&E  
MAN 
MFF 
MIP 
MS 
MTR 

Arrangements’ 
European Union 
European Atomic Energy Community 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 
Integrated Regulatory Review Service 
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 
Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Integrated Regulatory Review Service 
Inter-service consultation 
Inter-Service Group 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
Joint Research Centre 
Joint Support Office 
Long-Term Operation 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
Management Support 
Multiannual Financial Framework 
Multi-annual Indicative Programme 
Member State 
Mid Term Review 

34 

 
 
 
NIP 
NPP 
NPT 
NRA 
NRC 
NSSG 
OECD 
OJT 
OSART 
PAGODA 
QSG 
ROM 
SNRIU 
T+T 
TACIS  
ToR 
TSO 
USB  
WENRA 
WPAQ 

National Indicative Programme 
Nuclear Power Plant 
Non-Proliferation Treaty 
Nuclear Regulatory Authority 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Nuclear Safety and Security Group 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
On Job Training 
Operational Safety Review Team 
Pillar Assessed Grant Or Delegation Agreements 
Quality Support Group 
Results-Oriented Monitoring 
State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine 
Training and Tutoring 
Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States 
Terms of Reference 
Technical Support Organisation 
Ukraine Supervisory Board 
Western European Nuclear Regulators Association 
Council Working Party on Atomic Questions 

Annex 4. External evaluator's report, including its annexes 

The external evaluation can be found here: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/public-consultation-
external-financing-instruments-european-union_en 

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