COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Midterm evaluation of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Midterm Review Report on the External Financing Instruments
Date: 2017-12-15
Institutions: Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, European Commission
Subjects: EU financial instrument, conflict prevention, financial aid, foreign policy, international cooperation, international security, peacekeeping, stability programme

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 15.12.2017  SWD(2017) 607 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Midterm evaluation of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Midterm Review Report on the External Financing Instruments {COM(2017) 720 final} - {SWD(2017) 463 final} - {SWD(2017) 600 final} - {SWD(2017) 601 final} - {SWD(2017) 602 final} - {SWD(2017) 604 final} - {SWD(2017) 605 final} - {SWD(2017) 606 final} - {SWD(2017) 608 final} - {SWD(2017) 609 final}  
 
 
Contents 

Executive summary .................................................................................................................... 1 

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 2 

Purpose of the evaluation ....................................................................................................... 2 

Scope of the evaluation .......................................................................................................... 2 

2. Background of the initiative ................................................................................................... 3 

Description of the initiative and its objectives ....................................................................... 3 

Structure ................................................................................................................................. 4 

Baseline .................................................................................................................................. 6 

3. Method ................................................................................................................................... 6 

4. Implementation state of play .................................................................................................. 7 

5. Answers to the evaluation questions .................................................................................... 10 

5.1 Relevance ....................................................................................................................... 10 

5.2 Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability ....................................................................... 13 

5.3 Efficiency ....................................................................................................................... 15 

5.4 EU Added Value ............................................................................................................ 16 

5.5 Coherence, Consistency, Complementarity and Synergies ............................................ 18 

5.6 Leverage ......................................................................................................................... 20 

6. Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 21 

Annex 1. Procedural information ............................................................................................. 23 

Consultation process ............................................................................................................ 23 

Evaluation questions ............................................................................................................ 23 

Annex 2. Synopsis report of the stakeholders' consultation ..................................................... 24 

Annex 3. Acronyms .................................................................................................................. 46 

Annex 4. External Evaluation report ........................................................................................ 49 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Executive summary 

This Staff Working Document (SWD) is based on the results of the external mid-term evaluation of 
the  Instrument  contributing  to  Stability  and  Peace  (IcSP).  The  evaluation  covered  the  three 
components of the Instrument in line with the IcSP Regulation adopted in March 2014: (1) response to 
situations of crisis or emerging crisis to prevent conflicts, (2) conflict prevention, peace-building and 
crisis preparedness and (3) addressing global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats.  

Based on the external evaluation, the Service considers that the IcSP is fit for purpose (i.e. achieves 
the  objectives  for  which  the  instrument  was  designed)  in  its  contributions  to  the  delivery  of  EU 
external policy objectives during the evaluation period (2014 to mid-2017). It considered that the IcSP 
performs  a  unique  function  of  crisis  response  and  conflict  prevention,  triggered  by  EU  political 
priorities, contextual needs and opportunities in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Its multilateral 
nature, the European values it promotes (including the core value of peace), its niche role, flexibility, 
and ability to take risks, are seen by Member States and other donors and stakeholders as the essential 
attributes which are the keys to its relevance and added value. Furthermore, it successfully provided 
complementarities and synergies within the wider set of the EU’s external financing instruments. The 
IcSP is considered to be aligned with the Global Strategy for foreign and security policy. It has been 
responsive to beneficiary needs and to new challenges that have arisen, such as the fragmentation and 
criminalisation of violent conflict, extremism and terrorism, and growing refugee and migrant flows.  

Based  on  the  external  evaluation,  the  Service  considers  IcSP  to  be  effective,  delivering  on  its 
objectives and commitments in a politically responsive manner. Findings also suggest that important 
contributions to the mainstreaming of conflict prevention, democracy and good governance are being 
achieved; underlining that more could still be done to mainstream gender and human rights. The role 
of  the  instrument  in  promoting  conflict  sensitivity  is  recognised  and  could  still  be  further  expanded 
(see Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability chapter).  

Among the challenges faced by the IcSP, is the question of how best to undertake immediate conflict 
prevention  and  how  to  use  early-warning  analysis  appropriately  in  this  context.  The  external 
evaluation  cautions  against  an  approach  to  conflict  and  crises  that  would  focus  too  narrowly  on  EU 
security. However it finds that the growing prominence of legitimate security concerns is a challenge 
where the IcSP has so far not been able to engage meaningfully with all relevant actors in the security 
sector. Engagement with military actors, in particular, is often key to preventing or ending a conflict 
and until now the IcSP has only had very limited means for such engagement (see Relevance chapter 
and reference to proposed amendment of the instrument as regards capacity building in security and 
development (CBSD)). 

The  contribution  that  IcSP  has  made  to  help  prevent  and  resolve  specific  conflict  situations  is  well-
documented  and,  in  many  instances,  progress  is  adequately  captured  through  indicators  even  if, 
particularly in the case of conflict prevention, evidence is hard to come by. The legislators deemed that 
aggregation  of  results  at  instrument  level  would  not  provide  a  tangible  means  of  judging  the 
performance of the IcSP and thus did not include performance level indicators in the Regulation (see 
Monitoring and evaluation chapter). 

The IcSP is found to be efficient due to its defining characteristics of speed and flexibility of action, 
and due to its added value. It is also recognised as  an important  driver of EU efforts  to  mainstream 
conflict-sensitivity. It also acts as a vector to promote complementarity with other areas of EU external 
action,  such  as  Common  Security  and  Defence  Policy  actions  in  the  context  of  the  Comprehensive 
Approach, EU engagement in the Kimberley Process1 and broader efforts to advance and support the 
Women, Peace and Security Agenda. 

1  The  Kimberley  Process  (KP)  brings  together  governments,  civil  society  and  industry  with  a  certification  scheme  to  reduce  the  flow  of 
conflict diamonds – i.e. rough diamonds used to finance and fuel violent conflict. 

1 

 
 
 
                                                            
The  conclusions  of  the  evaluation  are  feeding  into  the  current  reflections  on  how  to  improve  the 
implementation  of  the  IcSP  for  the  remaining  period  until  2020,  and  on  the  future  set  of  External 
Financing Instruments for the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). 

1. Introduction 

Purpose of the evaluation 

This Staff Working Document (SWD) presents the results of the mid-term evaluation of the 
Instrument  contributing  to  Stability  and  Peace  (IcSP)2  2014-2020.  The  evaluation  assesses 
whether  the  IcSP  is  fit  for  purpose,  based  on  its  performance  to-date,  to  deliver  on  its 
objectives of crisis response, conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness, and 
addressing  global  and  trans-regional  threats.  Its  purpose  is  to  inform  future  work  on  the 
instrument  and  its  actions.  It  is  part  of  a  set  of  evaluations  covering  all  the  EU  External 
Financing  Instruments  (EFIs)3  that  inform  the  Mid-Term  Review  Report4  which  draws 
conclusions across the External Financing Instruments. 

This SWD is based5 on an external evaluation by independent consultants (see Annex 4).  

Scope of the evaluation 

The  temporal  scope  of  the  evaluation  corresponds  to  the  requirements  for  the  Mid-Term 
Review  Report  set  out  in  Article  17  of  the  Common  Implementation  Regulation  (CIR), 
namely,  it  focuses  on  the  period  January  2014  to  June  2017.  However,  due  to  this  short 
implementation period, the data available from results are limited (see section 3 on Method).  

The  countries  covered  under  the  evaluation  are  those  eligible  under  the  IcSP  which  has  a 
global geographic coverage. 

In order to usefully feed into the Mid-Term Review Report, the evaluation is set at instrument 
level.  In  consequence  it  focuses,  to  the  extent  possible,  on  the  IcSP  Regulation  (e.g.  on  its 
principles and flexibility) rather than on the projects that have been put in place as a result of 
the  instrument.  However,  additional  information  from  projects  has  also  been  included  to  be 
able  to  analyse  how  the  instrument  has  been  implemented  (see  section  4  -  Implementation 
state of play).  

In  accordance  with  the  EU  Better  Regulation  Guidelines6,  the  following  evaluation  criteria 
were  used:  relevance,  effectiveness,  efficiency,  coherence,  and  EU  added  value. 
Complementarity, synergies, sustainability, impact and leverage of the instrument were  also 
considered. 

The external evaluation included short-term non-programmable and long-term programmable 
components, spanning the range of intervention-types as defined in Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the 
IcSP Regulation, namely: 

2 Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, OJ L77. 
3 The Development Cooperation Instrument, the European Neighbourhood Instrument, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights,  the  Greenland  Decision,  the  Instrument  contributing  to  Stability  and  Peace,  the  Instrument  for  Pre-accession  Assistance,  the 
Instrument  on  Nuclear  Safety  Cooperation,  the  Overseas  Countries  and  Territories  Decision,  the  Partnership  Instrument  and  the  Common 
Implementing  Regulation.  For  the  purpose  of  this  exercise,  the  evaluation  of  the  Overseas  Countries  and  Territories  Decision  is  included 
within the evaluation of the 11th European Development Fund. 
4 In line with Article 17 of the Common Implementing Regulation (CIR), Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 11 March 2014 laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union's instruments for financing 
external action, OJ L77, p. 95 
5 It also takes into account the Impact Assessment (IA) realised in 2011, SEC(2011) 1481 
6  Commission  Communication  Better  regulation  for  better  results  –  An  EU  Agenda,  COM  (2015)  215,  and  Commission  Staff  Working 
Document Better Regulation guidelines, SWD (2015) 111. 

2 

 
 
 
                                                            
• 

• 

• 

in a situation of crisis or emerging crisis, to contribute swiftly to stability by providing 
an effective response designed to help preserve, establish or re-establish the conditions 
essential to the proper implementation of the Union's external policies and actions in 
accordance with Article 21 Treaty European Union7 (Article 3 IcSP). 
to contribute to the prevention of conflicts and to ensuring capacity and preparedness 
to address pre-and post-crisis situations and build peace (Article 4 IcSP). 
to address specific global and trans-regional threats to peace, international security and 
stability (Article 5 IcSP). 

2. Background of the initiative 

Description of the initiative and its objectives 

The  External  Financing  Instruments  take  up  a  major  part  of  the  Multiannual  Financial 
Framework  (MFF)8  –  Heading  IV  Global  Europe,  which  provides  the  EU  with  the  tools 
necessary to reinforce its role on the world stage and to ensure that it is able to live up to its 
ambitions  in  promoting  its  interests  and  values  such  as  democracy,  human  rights,  peace, 
stability, solidarity, and poverty reduction and to help safeguard global public goods.  

Adopted  in  early  2014,  the  External  Financing  Instruments  were  designed  to  facilitate  and 
support policy implementation, with the intention of remaining relevant until the end of 2020, 
thereby  enabling  the  EU  to  implement  external  action  policy  as  needed  within  the  defined 
principles and objectives. In particular, the IcSP is a 
means  for  the  EU  to  respond  immediately  to  crisis 
situations  in  third  countries  world-wide,  to  build 
capacity for conflict prevention, peace-building and 
crisis preparedness and to address global and trans-
threats  with  a  security  or  stability 
regional 
dimension. 

EUR 
millions 
19 662 
15 433 
11 699 
6 622 

Heading IV9 Global Europe           

2 339 

With  a  total  initial  budget  of  EUR  2.34  billion  for 
2014-2020  (3.5%  of  the  overall  budget  for  Global 
Europe,  Heading  IV10)  the  IcSP  operates  as  a 
subsidiary  or  complementary  instrument,  meaning 
that it can only be mobilised in situations where an 
adequate and effective response cannot be provided 
under other EFIs11. 

Such cases arise where the action required is outside 
the  scope  or  mandate  of  other  EFIs;  where 
procedures  and  processes  limit  the  ability  of  other 
EFIs  to  respond  in  a  timely  manner;  where  the 
essential  clauses  of  international  agreements  are 
invoked  to  suspend  or  restrict  the  use  of  other 

2014 - 2020 
Development Cooperation Instrument 
European Neighbourhood Instrument 
Instrument for Pre-accession assistance 
Humanitarian aid 
Instrument contributing to Stability and 
Peace 
Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Margin 
Agencies, EU Aid Volunteers, 
Emergency Response Centre and others 
European Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights 
Guarantee fund for External actions 
Partnership Instrument 
Macro-financial Assistance 
Instrument for Nuclear Safety 
Cooperation 
Greenland  
EDF 
Table 
highlighted in blue 

1:  External 

Financing 

2 339 
2 286 

1 396 

1 333 

1 193 
955 
565 

225 

218 
30 506 
Instruments 

Source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/index_en.cfm  

7  Article  21  TEU  has  defined  common  overarching  principles  and  objectives  for  the  external  action  of  the  Union,  inter  alia  to  “preserve 
peace,  prevent  conflicts  and  strengthen  international  security  and  to  assist  populations,  countries  and  regions  confronting  natural  or  man-
made disasters. 
8 Council Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 1311/2013 of 2 December 2013 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 
2014-2020, OJ L 347/884, p. 884. 
9 The Multi-annual Financial Framework is divided into six broad groups of expenditure called "Headings". The EFIs make up the majority 
of Heading IV: Global Europe. 
10  The  MFF  2014-20  is divided  into  six  categories  of  expense  ('headings') corresponding  to different  areas  of EU activities.  The  heading 
'Global Europe' covers all external action ('foreign policy') by the EU. 
11 Article 2.3 of IcSP Regulation 

3 

 
 
 
                                                            
EFIs12 (Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement13 in relation to the use of EDF) or where there 
is  a  need  to  assist  the  transition  between  humanitarian  and  developmental  action.  In  most 
cases,  IcSP actions  remain  complementary  to  other  EFIs  and  ensure  continuity  with  actions 
under  the latter.  Support  for  military  or  purely  humanitarian  interventions  are  not  within  its 
remit14.  

Structure 

As  an  EU  instrument,  the  IcSP  operates  firmly  within  the  framework  of  the  principles  and 
priorities of EU external action. The latter are set out under Title V, Article 21 of the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU), where the priority described in paragraph (2) c) 'preserve peace, 
prevent  conflict  and  strengthen  international  security'  is  particularly  relevant  for  IcSP 
operations. Regarding the international policy framework, the EU is committed to implement 
Agenda  2030  and  the  IcSP  addresses  several  of  its  aspects,  in  particular  Sustainable 
Development Goal 1615. The IcSP is essentially different from more traditional development 
instruments as it operates as one of the largest global funds in the area of conflict, peace and 
security alongside similar funds such as the UK's Conflict Stability and Security Fund. 

The  largest  share  of  the  IcSP  budget  is  allocated  to  the  crisis  response  component  which 
provides  for  short-term,  rapid,  flexible  and  non-programmable  actions  in  countries  and 
regions experiencing situations of crisis or emerging crisis under Article 3 (at least 70% of the 
funds). Based on the Impact assessment of 2011, this component placed an increased focus on 
conflict prevention in comparison to its predecessor, the Instrument for Stability (IfS). 

The  conflict  prevention,  peace-building  and  crisis  preparedness  component  under  Article  4 
(up to 9% of the funds) provides for better tailoring of longer-term assistance and responses to 
peace  building  needs  worldwide.  The  remaining  component  on  global  and  trans-regional 
threats  and  emerging  threats  under  Article  5  (up  to  21%  of  the  funds)  provides  for  global 
assistance  in  new  areas  such  as  cyber-crime,  all  forms  of  illicit  trafficking  and  counter-
terrorism, as well as interventions  aiming  at mitigating risks related to chemical, biological, 
radiological  and  nuclear  (CBRN)  material  or  agents.  Actions  under  both  of  the  latter  two 
components  are  programmable  and  subject  to  scrutiny  via  comitology  (a  committee  where 
every EU Member State is represented). 

The  IcSP  focuses  on  peace  and  stability  in  a  rapid  and  flexible  way  that  no  other  EFI  was 
designed to achieve. It is the key external assistance instrument that enables the EU to take a 
lead in helping to prevent and respond to actual or emerging crises around the world.  

The  intervention  logic  of  the  IcSP  was  reconstructed  by  the  external  evaluators  during  the 
evaluation  and  is  presented  hereafter  (Figure  1).  It  shows  the  logical  paths  from  inputs, 
activities, outputs and outcomes to impact.  Outcomes at Instrument level are achieved in part 
by  largely  intangible  processes  (political  engagement,  confidence  building,  creating 
opportunities  for  dialogue,  or  promoting  change  in  attitude/  awareness/  behaviour)  that  are 
difficult to quantify or capture by current monitoring systems. 

12 Article 3.1 of IcSP Regulation 
13 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/03_01/pdf/mn3012634_en.pdf 
14 Articles 2.2 and  2.5 of IcSP Regulation 
15 The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a collection of 17 interrelated global goals set out by the United Nations. SDG  16 is: 
"Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and 
inclusive institutions at all levels". 

4 

 
 
 
                                                            
Figure 1: IcSP reconstructed intervention logic  Source: Annex 4, p.53 

5 

TYPOLOGIESOFOUTPUTS:TYPOLOGIESOFINPUTS:INTERVENTION LOGIC OF THE INSTRUMENT CONTRIBUTING TO STABILITY AND PEACE (ICSP)OUTPUTSOUTCOMES *IMPACTSPHERE OF CONTROLSPHERE OF DIRECT INFLUENCESPHERE OF INDIRECT INFLUENCEACTIVITIESEXPECTEDIMPACT: The EU contributes to international security and peace through the prevention of conflicts, crisis response, and the resilience of societies in conflict or disaster-affected countries/regionsOVERALLOBJECTIVE: SUPPORTEU’SEXTERNALACTIONPRIMEOBJECTIVESOFPRESERVINGPEACE, PREVENTINGCONFLICTS, STRENGTHENINGINTERNATIONALSECURITYANDASSISTINGPOPULATIONSAFFECTEDBYNATURALORMAN-MADEDISASTERS, ASLAIDOUTINARTICLE21 OFTHETEUICSPCOMPONENTS(ACTIVITIESFALLUNDERONEOFTHEFOLLOWING): IcSPAlignment:IcSPRegulation; EU policy priorities and commitments (Global Strategy; SDGs);European Parliament views;Consistent with CFSP actions Complementary to other EU instruments;Coordinated with EU Member States (MS), UN and other international organisations, other donors;Cooperation with other MS and non-EU peace and security funds/instruments* The term 'outcome' equals the term 'result' as in the new instructions from the Secretary General linked to the Better Regulation Guidelines and the development of Strategic Plans of DGs. Due to the fact that the IcSPis an external action instrument with a strong influence of OECD/DAC terminology, the term outcome is used.** Threats including threats to law/order, to security/safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to public health***SALW = Small Arms and Light WeaponsINPUTSARTICLE 3: ASSISTANCEINRESPONSETOSITUATIONSOFCRISISOREMERGINGCRISISTOPREVENTCONFLICTS1 : ANALYTICAL, PLANNINGANDSTRATEGICDOCUMENTS•A shared situation analysis (conflict or early warning/risk analysis) has been developed and used as the basis for EU and donor crisis prevention/response •National plans/systems for risk mitigation and preparedness developed (e.g. CBRN agents and materials; dual use exports control)•Risk mitigation and contingency plans are identified and developed in cooperation with local and national authorities•…POLITICAL:•EU political commitments (normative and political)•Specific priorities for partner-country engagement•Multilateral commitmentsASSUMPTIONS AT INPUTS LEVEL•An IcSPorganisational structure and human resources policy is in place, which is operational and effective;•Rapid identification of action, decision-making and effective use of flexible procedures enabling adapted and timely responses to situations of crisis/emerging crisis (Article 3);•Availability of implementing partners with the necessary contextual knowledge, capacities and expertise; •Programming/planning is informed by dialogue with civil society, partner countries/regions and Member States; •‘Do no harm’ and conflict-sensitivity approaches are integrated into the design of actions and programmes;•Exit and transition strategies are part of the design of actions and programmes;•Formal/informal coordination mechanisms/processes with other EU instruments/actors that enable the IcSPto fill gaps or bridge other EU funding in a timely way;•Clear strategies guide investments in global and regional peace and security architectures.ASSUMPTIONS AT ACTIVITIES LEVEL•The design of decisions are in line with partner country needs and priorities, as identified by key local stakeholders;•IcSPdecision-making and programming processes are conducive to the timely identification and implementation of interventions and their adaptation, where and as required;•Implementation is in accordance with regulations, consistent with aid effectiveness principles (e.g. local ownership; partnership; coordination) and cross-cutting issues are effectively mainstreamed where relevant; •Implementing partners are willing to take risks and use the rapid and flexible procedures allowed by the IcSP;•Coordination with other EU EFIs is seen in the design and run-up to implementation of actions/programmes;•There is adequate capacity of IcSPstaff and at HQ to manage, monitor implementation and provide guidance to EUDs and implementing partners as relevant.ASSUMPTIONS AT OUTPUTS LEVEL •Target groups have the means/capacities to take benefit of the outputs;•Outputs are complementary or support other actions by EU or non-EU actors;•Other relevant actions implemented in the beneficiary country do not negatively impact on the IcSPactions; •Absorption capacity of the participants/target groups is sufficient;•Activities and context are closely monitored for timely and relevant adaptation to contextual changes;•‘Do no harm’ and conflict-sensitivity approaches are integrated into the implementation of actions and programmes.ASSUMPTIONS AT OUTCOMES LEVEL•The EU makes strategic use of policy and political dialogue created by the IcSPto leverage change;•Efforts are made to ensure that the IcSPcontributes to or complements actions of other donors, particularly Member States;•Stakeholders involved in IcSPactions effectively participate and take ownership;•Commission services promote complementarity and synergy between IcSPprogrammes and the interventions of other EU EFIs (including EDF and Trust Funds); and•Efforts are made to ensure complementarity and synergy between IcSPprogrammes and interventions and EU foreign and security policy (CFSP) activities.3 : AWARENESSANDCAPACITY•National Governments and regional authorities advised/trained in line with good practice•Guidance on ‘do no harm’ and conflict-sensitive programming on securitised sectors is prepared•People living in mined areas have been trained on the risk of mines•Ex-combatants received guidance/ vocational training  •Women and girls trained in conflict prevention and peace-building techniques•…2 : INSTITUTIONDEVELOPMENT•A crisis response capacity development plan is prepared for a regional organisation•Specialized staff (Ministry of Justice Officers, lawyers, Judges, etc.) are trained on how to manage the risk of terrorism in line with international instruments and standards•State officials/police staff are trainedon human rights and sensitized to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)•Admin units in charge of migrants registration supported•…4 : POLITICALDIALOGUEANDCIVILSOCIETY•Mediators are deployed to engage with parties to an evolving crisis•Policy dialogue and communication channels established between state-and non-state actors•Civil society and media stakeholders trained to dialogue with and monitor observance of governance norms•Logistical support is provided to enable parties to a conflict to participate in talks•…5 : INFRASTRUCTURE, HARDWAREANDEQUIPMENT•Infrastructure provided to national authority has been built/rehabilitated•Specific equipment for the national SALW*** authority has been provided•Specific equipment for mine destructions has been provided•Arsenals/ secure weapons storages and other related facilities  have been built/ rehabilitated or secured•…ARTICLE 4 –ASSISTANCEFORCONFLICTPREVENTION, PEACE-BUILDINGANDCRISISPREPAREDNESS.ARTICLE 5: ASSISTANCEFORADDRESSINGGLOBALANDTRANS-REGIONALTHREATSANDEMERGINGTHREATSTECHNICAL:•Know-how•Analysis•Strategy•Identification•Formulation•CIR and IcSPRegulationsPROCEDURAL:•Consultation•Coordination•Examination•Negotiation with IP•Strategic planning•M&E•ApprovalsFINANCIALANDHUMAN:•EU financial resources•Human resourcesException Assistance Measures (EAM) and Interim Response Programmes (IRP) (art. 7, IcSPRegulation)Thematic Strategy Papers and Multiannual Indicative Programmes (Art 8, IcSPRegulation)Thematic Strategy Papers and Multiannual Indicative Programmes (Art 8, IcSPRegulation) Implemented by regional organisations, IOs, INGOs, State and non-state organisationsSPECIFICOBJECTIVES: SO1: INSITUATIONSOF(EMERGING) CRISISTOCONTRIBUTESWIFTLYTOSTABILITYANDPRESERVEOR(RE-)ESTABLISHTHECONDITIONSESSENTIALTOTHEPROPERIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHEUNION‘SEXTERNALPOLICIESANDACTIONSINACCORDANCEWITHARTICLE21 OFTHETEUSO2: TOCONTRIBUTETOTHEPREVENTIONOFCONFLICTSENSURINGCAPACITYANDPREPAREDNESSTOADDRESSPRE-ANDPOSTCRISISSITUATIONSANDBUILDPEACESO3: TOADDRESSSPECIFICGLOBALANDTRANS-REGIONALTHREATSTOPEACE, INTERNATIONALSECURITYANDSTABILITYEXPECTEDOUTCOMES:•Swift contribution to stability in situations of crisis or emerging crisis •Contributions to global conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness architectures and capacity•Contributions to strengthened architectures and capacity to address global and trans-regional security threats•Understanding and visibility of the EU and of its role on the world scene is enhanced and widened 
 
Baseline  

At  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  IcSP  there  was  no  existing  baseline16  against  which  to 
measure  progress  at  instrument-level.  Therefore,  the  external  evaluators  took  into  account:- 
existing project and sector-evaluations (focussing mainly on the IcSP starting from 2014 and, 
where  direct  links  existed,  taking  into  account  actions  under  the  IfS);  the  IcSP  regulatory 
framework; an EU-specific timeline of institutional, instrument and policy developments; and 
case-studies  on  focal  themes.  Contrary  to  other  external  action  instruments,  the  IcSP 
Regulation  contains  no  performance  indicators  as  the  legislators  recognised  the  inherent 
difficulties involved in measuring the performance of conflict prevention and crisis response 
activities at aggregate level. Notwithstanding, an attempt at aggregation is made for each IcSP 
component (Articles 3, 4 and 5) in the relevant programme statements provided in each year's 
budget17.   

On  this  basis  the  evaluation  had  sufficient  action/programme-level  evidence  (through  case 
studies,  surveys,  interviews,  reports,  field  visits,  etc    to  conclude  that  the  IcSP  has  made 
important  contributions  to  effectively  address  threats  to  international  and  EU  peace  and 
security.  

3. Method 

The Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) was in the lead for managing the external 
evaluation. As part of a wider set of evaluations carried out in an interlinked and co-ordinated 
manner, coherence of the different evaluations has been ensured by an Inter-service Steering 
group (ISG). The external evaluation of the IcSP involved an inception phase; a desk report 
(providing initial responses to evaluation questions); field visits to meet key interlocutors to 
obtain first-hand views in-country (Jordan, Morocco, Turkey, Georgia, Somalia/Kenya, Niger, 
and  Colombia);  a  survey  of  EU  delegations  covering  all  instruments;  an  Open  Public 
Consultation on the draft report, which comprised a specific 12 weeks online survey as well 
as targeted stakeholder consultation meetings with Member States, civil society organisations 
and implementing partners in March 2017; and a final report.   

The  evaluators  gathered  evidence  using  a  conceptual  framework  and  a  mixed  methods 
approach combining quantitative and qualitative data. That approach involved the application 
of  several  tools  throughout  the  different  evaluation  stages,  in  particular:  an  extensive 
document review including technical, financial and reporting data; an assessment of a sample 
of actions across Articles 3,  4 and 5; surveys to gather information on the implementation of 
actions and perceptions of achievements; targeted interviews on an individual or group basis 
structured around the evaluation questions; the above mentioned field visits; and supporting 
studies.  

Data  analyses,  synthesis  and  triangulation  were  also  used  to  corroborate  findings  from 
complementary  and  multiple  sources  (such  as  documentation,  surveys  and  key  informant 
interviews).  In  that  context,  evaluators  paid  due  attention  to  the  different  categories  of 
stakeholders  —  EU  delegation  and  Headquarters  staff,  Member  States  government  and 
agencies,  UN  agencies,  international  organisations,  private  sector  and  civil  society 
organisations.   

16 A “baseline” is defined here as the measurement of conditions at the start of a project/instrument, against which subsequent progress can 
be assessed 
17  Draft  General  Budget  of  the  European  Union  for  the  Financial  Year  2018-    Working  Document  Part  1  -  Programme  Statements  of 
operational  expenditure,    COM  (2017)  400,  May  2017  –  see  under    Heading  IV  Global  Europe,  Instrument  contributing  to  Stability  and 
Peace, pp.543-554 

6 

 
 
 
                                                            
Limitations — robustness of findings 

The  evaluation  confirmed  that  measuring  and  aggregating  the  results  of  IcSP  actions  is 
complicated as  a  result of several  factors: the actions  often play a catalytic role and are not 
stand-alone; they are relatively small  in  size, vary  significantly in  nature, are spread around 
the  world  and  place  a  premium  on  being  responsive  to  political  imperatives  and  timely 
deployment. All of these factors render the attribution of cause and effect more difficult than 
it already is for larger geographical or more targeted thematic instruments.  Furthermore, the 
timing of the evaluation meant that most projects initiated under the IcSP were still ongoing 
when the evaluation was done, (which means that outcomes were still being delivered making 
it difficult to assess impact and sustainability). Other challenges encountered were:  

  Measuring political (as opposed to developmental) outcomes;  
  Data over-abundance in some areas and scarcity in others; 
  Defining/attributing the degree to which IcSP interventions have contributed to results 

(causality and attribution); 

  Aggregating results to delineate broader instrument impacts. 
  Access: Many of the areas of the world where the instrument is active are insecure or 

difficult to access. 

Notwithstanding  these  limitations,  the  evaluators  expressed  confidence  in  their  findings, 
drawing  on  a  host  of  project  and  sector  evaluation  findings  as  well  as  a  review  of  best 
available  quantitative  and  qualitative  evidence  of  causality18  between  actions  and  effected 
changes.  Extensive  use  was  made  of  stakeholders’  and  experts’  views,  field  visits,  case 
studies and, where appropriate, anecdotal evidence, informing the conclusions by the Service. 

4. Implementation state of play 

This section illustrates the progress in the implementation of the IcSP since 2014. 

Up to June 1, 2017 the total commitments and payments for all Articles of IcSP (in EUR) and 
its percentage (%) compared to the total IcSP 2014-2020 MFF amount are:  

Category 

EUR 

% of 
allocated 

Allocated 
Decided 
Contracted 
Paid 

2,338,719,000 
994,720,043 
851,641,388 
534,788,732 

43% 
36% 
23% 

Source: Data Warehouse, based on operational    
appropriations 

Crisis response component (Article 3) 

Article 3 of the IcSP remains a key element of the EU's diplomatic efforts to respond to crises 
with many of the actions funded taking their cues directly from the political priorities agreed 
in the Foreign Affairs Council. Overall, in the period 2014 to mid-2017, EUR 670.5 million 
were  committed  under  the  crisis-response  component,  with  over  100  financing  decisions 
adopted  and  over  220  interventions  implemented  (closed  or  ongoing).  These  are  non-

18  See  annex  1  of  External  Evaluation  of  the  Instrument  contributing  to  Stability  and  Peace,  Final  Report,  June  2017 

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/documents/key-documents/icsp-mte-final-report-annex.pdf 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
                                                            
  
programmable,  short-term  rapid  actions  (duration  of  up  to  18  months,  with  possible 
extensions of 6+6 months). They enable timely and flexible EU responses to prevent conflict, 
support post-conflict political stabilisation and early recovery in situations of crisis, emerging 
crisis  or  disaster.  They  contribute  to  fostering  the  conditions  for  implementation  of  EU 
assistance  and  cooperation  policies  and  programmes,  when  financial  assistance  cannot  be 
provided  through  other  EU  financing  instruments.  Activities  cover  a  wide  range  of  sectors: 
mediation,  dialogue  and  reconciliation,  confidence  building;  support 
to  democratic 
institutions,  rule  of  law,  transitional  justice,  security  sector  reform  (SSR)  and  disarmament, 
infrastructure  rehabilitation  and 
demobilisation  and  reintegration  (DDR)  processes, 
reconstruction,  employment  generation,  demining,  counter  terrorism  and  countering  violent 
extremism (CT/CVE), stabilisation; and migration, refugees and internally displaced persons 
(IDPs). 

207,5 

96,9 

235,4 

366,0 

195,9 

1,2 

139,8 

35,3 

62,8 

Mediation, dialogue and
confidence building
Migration, refugees, IDPs

Stabilisation, CT/CVE,
SSR

Figure 2: IcSP 
Article 3 Financial 
allocations (EUR 
million) 2014-2017 
by theme 

Africa (Sub-Saharian)

Americas

Asia/Pacific

Europe

Global

MENA

Figure 3: IcSP 
Article 3 Financial 
allocations (EUR 
million) 2014-2017 
by region 

Conflict  prevention,  peace-building  and  crisis  preparedness  -  The  “Peace-building 
Partnership” (Article 4) 

Peace-building and conflict prevention efforts under this article19 placed increasing emphasis 
on early and preventive action and strengthened capacity at community level. They allowed 
the EU to build and strengthen its own capacity and that of its partners20 to prevent conflicts, 
enhance  resilience  and  build  peace.  Actions  are  set  in  Annual  Action  Programmes  (AAPs) 

in 

19 
Council 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122911.pdf 
20 These partners as defined in Article 4.1 are international, regional, sub-regional organisations, States and civil society  

Conclusions 

Prevention 

Conflict 

with 

line 

on 

of 

June 

2011: 

8 

 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
which  are  based  on  specific  Thematic  Strategy  Papers  and  the  Multiannual  Indicative 
Programme 2014-2017 (adopted in August 2014).21 The actions address pre- and post-crisis 
needs including post-conflict and post-disaster recovery. Overall, in the period from 2014 to 
mid-2017, EUR 71 million were committed. 

AAP year 

  Overview of AAPs, number of actions fiches, total amounts decided 
Number of 
actions fiches 
5 
7 
7 
7 
26 

Decided amount 
(EUR mln) 
19,0 
25,0 
27,0 
29,0 
100,0 

AAP 2014 
AAP 2015  
AAP 2016  
AAP 2017  
Total 

Assistance in addressing global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats (Article 
5)  

Actions under Article 5 have been funded at either a global, trans-regional or regional level.  
Particular emphasis was placed on good governance and international law across the different 
priorities: 1) counter threats to law and order, to security and safety of individuals, to critical 
infrastructures and to public health; and 2) mitigate and prepare against risks, whether of an 
intentional,  accidental  or  natural  origin,  related  to  chemical,  biological,  radiological  and 
nuclear materials or agents.   

While IcSP Article 5 activities are divided into the priorities listed above, there are naturally 
some interlinks. As the lines between threats such as terrorism, organised crime, maritime and 
cybercrime,  and  chemical,  biological,  radiological  and  nuclear  (CBRN)  related  threats 
become  blurred,  the  different  themes  also  seek  synergies,  both  within  the  two  overall 
objectives as well as across them. Overall, in the period from 2014 to mid-2017, EUR 275.55 
million  were  decided  through  annual  financing  decisions.  These  funds  are  divided  between 
the  different  priorities,  identified  in  the  Thematic  Strategy  Paper  and  the  Multiannual 
Indicative Programme 2014-2017, and presented as follows. 

4% 

29% 

31% 

4% 

10% 

22% 

Counter-Terrorism (29 %)

Fight against Organised
Crime (22%)

Critical Infrastructure
Protection (10 %)

Climate Change and
Security (4%)

CBRN Risk Mitigation (31
%)

Expert Support Facility (4
%)

Figure 4: 
IcSP Article 
5 Financial 
allocations 
(%) 2014-
2017 by 
theme 

21 Commission Implementing Decision C(2014)5607 of 11.8.2014 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Monitoring and evaluation 

Project/programme  and  sector  evaluations  are  used  to  assess  and  measure  the  progress  and 
results  of  IcSP  actions.  Limited  means  existed  to  aggregate  this  information  to  instrument 
level.  Work  is  ongoing  through  the  further  elaboration  of  an  IcSP  manual  of  outcome 
indicators  and the use  of  Theories  of  change22 to  better capture performance.  A new, large 
knowledge-sharing  platform,  OPSYS,  will  provide  appropriate  better  means  for  IcSP  and 
other instruments to advance in this regard.  

The fact that IcSP actions are meant to be, and usually are, part of a comprehensive response 
strategy involving many EU actors, often playing a catalytic role, further complicates the task 
of  quantifying  how  much  value  IcSP  has  concretely  added.  The  legislators  deemed  that 
aggregation of results at instrument level would not provide a tangible means of judging the 
performance  of  the  IcSP  and  thus  did  not  include  performance  level  indicators  in  the 
Regulation.  This  does  not  stop  lessons  being  learnt  from  its  implementation  but  it  does 
present  limitations  and  challenges  in  a  context  where  performance-based  budgeting  is 
becoming the norm. 

Lastly, the Commission's decision to create dedicated IcSP sections with a regional remit in 
key delegations to manage devolved actions under Articles 3 and 4 (as of September 1, 2017) 
will provide an additional means of ensuring more consistent monitoring of projects. 

5. Answers to the evaluation questions 

5.1 Relevance  

To  what  extent  do  the  overall  objectives  (IcSP  Regulation)  and  the  design  of  the  IcSP 
respond  to:  (a)  EU  priorities  and  beneficiary  needs  identified  at  the  time  the  Instrument 
was  adopted  (2014)?  And  (b)  Current  EU  priorities  and  beneficiary  needs,  given  the 
evolving challenges and priorities in the international context (2017)? 

Overall  answer:  the  objectives  and  design  of  the  IcSP  in  2014,  when  the  Instrument  was 
adopted,  were  and  remain  today  aligned  with  the  evolving  EU  priorities,  strategies  and 
external action policy23, namely the IcSP responds to the priorities set out in Article 21 of the 
Treaty  of  the  European  Union,  it  supports  the  Global  Strategy24,  it  takes  an  integrated 
approach  to  conflicts  and  crises,  supports  cooperative  regional  orders,  and  promotes  global 
governance.  

When  the  IcSP  was  adopted  in  2014,  it  incorporated  several  lessons  learned  from  its 
predecessor,  for  example  by  further  enhancing  the  flexibility  of  the  Instrument  through  the 
possibility of longer (and extendable) implementation periods. 

The IcSP is also seen to have stood the test of time by accommodating important new policy 
developments,  notably  the  adoption  of  the  Global  Strategy25  where  the  principles  and 

22 The on-going process of reflection to explore change and how it happens. It describes how and why change happens, and what the role of 
actions/programmes  is  in  that  particular  change  process.  In  articulating  that  understanding  of  change,  it  also  challenges  the  thinking  by 
questioning the underlying assumptions and exploring different pathways to change. It gives the big picture, including contextual factors and 
actors that influence change but which 
23 See page 14 of Annex 4.
24 “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy” (2016) 
(referred to as the ‘Global Strategy’)  https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union 
25 “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy” (2016) 
(referred to as the ‘Global Strategy’) https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union 

 out of the control of the project, acknowledging the complexity of change.

can be

10 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
 
priorities for EU action on peace and security are set. IcSP actions are now aligned to support 
the implementation of the Global Strategy (notably in the realms of security, promoting state 
and  societal  resilience)  and  IcSP  continues  to  adapt  its  actions  in  line  with  the  needs  and 
priorities  of  the  specific  context.  The  present  uncertain  security  environment  and  the 
emergence of various new security threats and challenges underscore the political relevance 
of  the  IcSP,  which  provides  the  Union  with  an  instrument  that  can  promptly  respond  to 
various needs and requirements in crisis and conflict contexts, as recognised by stakeholders' 
replies to the Open Public Consultation (OPC)26. 

Article  3  actions  on  response  to  situations  of  crisis  or  emerging  crisis  to  prevent  conflicts 
often provide a rapid way to implement new or urgent policy priorities identified by the EU 
Foreign Ministers (e.g. Security and Development Strategy for the Sahel; European Agenda 
on  Migration,  etc.),  and  other  policy  frameworks  agreed  within  broader  regional  or 
international frameworks (e.g. the EU-Africa Partnership, UN Resolutions). 

Examples of IcSP actions that follow up on immediate EU political priorities:  

 

In  Ukraine,  since  2014  the  IcSP  has  undertaken  significant  investments  (EUR 76 
million)  to  support  the  implementation  of  the  Minsk  Agreement  by  bolstering  the 
manpower and technical means of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe  (OSCE)  Special  Monitoring  Mission,  addressing  the  needs  of  displaced  and 
conflict-affected  populations  and  complementing  efforts  under  the  Common  Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) to support the reform of the National Police of Ukraine.  

  On  the  Syrian  crisis,  the  IcSP  has  supported  community  resilience  whilst  also 
assisting  communities  and  authorities  in  neighbouring  countries  to  continue  coping 
with the effects of displacement. Peace-building and dialogue initiatives are designed 
to complement the work of the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria while efforts to 
identify  the  victims  of  the  conflict  and  to  help  investigate  potential  crimes  against 
humanity are necessary preparations for a time when reconciliation and transitional 
justice may become possible. Overall contribution since 2014: over EUR 120 million.  

  On migration, the IcSP contributed to the immediate European response to the crisis 
situation in the Mediterranean as well as to address root causes of migration linked to 
instability  and  conflicts.  Such  actions  respond  directly  to  priorities  set  in  the 
European  Agenda  on  Migration  as  well  as  in  the  Communication  on  Forced 
Displacement. 

  With the increased threat of terrorism and violent extremism the IcSP contributed to 
the response through dedicated programmes in the Middle East and North Africa, in 
West Africa and the Sahel as well as in the Horn of Africa. 

  The IcSP has mobilised over EUR 25 million in Colombia since 2015 to support the 
peace  process  between  the  Government  of  Colombia  and  the  Revolutionary  Armed 
Forces of Colombia—People's Army (FARC-EP), first supporting confidence-building 
measures  designed  to  buttress  the  peace  talks  in  Havana,  then  shifting  to  support 
rapid-response projects in the run up to signature of the final peace agreement, and 
finally helping with its early implementation.  

26 See page 36 – Annex 2. 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
The evaluation emphasises that more and more strategic efforts to build the capacity of those 
who  undertake  regional  and  multilateral  conflict  prevention  and  peace-building  efforts  are 
warranted27.  Furthermore,  at  present,  none  of  the  existing  financing  instruments  within  the 
field  of  external  action  explicitly  allows  for  building  the  capacity  of  the  military  in  partner 
countries  in  order  to  contribute  to  sustainable  development,  despite  urgency  on  the  ground. 
This  shortfall  affects  the  efficiency  and  sustainability  of  the  Union’s  external  action28. 
Military  actors,  in  particular,  are  often  key  to  ending  a  conflict.  A  proposal  to  amend  the 
regulation  to  address  this  concern  is  currently  under  discussion29.  Capacity-building  in 
support  of  security  and  development  (CBSD)  aims  to  tackle  this  shortfall  and  enables  the 
Union  to  enhance  the  capacity  of  the  military  actors  in  partner  countries  to  ensure  human 
security in their countries. This need was also recognised by the respondents to the OPC30.  

The  IcSP  conflict  prevention,  peacebuilding  and  crisis  preparedness  component  (Article  4), 
has also been highly relevant to the EU's external action objectives (Title V, Article 21 TEU) 
and  its  international  commitments,  particularly  with  regard  to  preserving  peace,  preventing 
conflicts and strengthening international security (Title V, Article 21 (2) c TEU).  

Article 4 actions on conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness are designed 
to  help  prevent  conflict,  build  peace  and  address  pre-  and  post-crisis  needs  in  close  co-
ordination  with  international,  regional  and  sub-regional  organisations,  and  state  and  civil 
society actors and are closely aligned with current EU conflict prevention efforts and with the 
priorities set in the Global Strategy. Forty Article 4 actions were launched in the period 2014-
2017,  addressing  a  variety  of  issues  articulated  around  the  five  priority  areas  set  out  in  the 
IcSP Regulation and in the Thematic Strategy Paper.  

A  variety  of  stakeholders  (Member  States,  International  Organisations,  Civil  Society 
organisations  (CSO))  were  regularly  involved  in  the  preparation  and  implementation  of 
Article 4 interventions, including through a regular political dialogue. 

IcSP has supported in-country civil society actors in their endeavours to prevent conflicts and 
build peace. A total of 40 actions were launched in  almost 20 countries in the period 2014-
2017  focusing  on  themes  such  as  mediation  and  dialogue,  reconciliation,  women 
empowerment, peace and security and youth as agents for peace31.  

  The project European Resources for Mediation Support (ERMES) enabled the EU to 
support  third  parties'  efforts  in  mediation  processes.  In  2016  alone,  25  assignments 
related to 12 conflicts were undertaken, assisting, for example, the members of the De-
escalation  and  Ceasefire  Committee  (DCC)  in  Yemen;  or  supporting  the  dialogue 
between the Government and the main opposition group, "Renamo" in Mozambique; 
or  providing  political  and  technical  support  to  the  peace  process  between  the 
Government and the FARC, in Colombia.  

  The  project  European  New  Training  Initiative  for  Civilian  Crisis  Management 
(ENTRi),  implemented  by  12  EU  governmental  and  non-governmental  partners, 
helped  train  and  prepare  specialised  personnel  for  EU  Civilian  Missions  and  other 
international  civilian  crisis  management  missions  to  undertake  their  often  delicate 
tasks.  

27 See page 14 - Annex 4 
28 Joint Staff Working Document – Impact Assessment-SWD(2016) 222 final  
29 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council COM(2016)447 
30 See page 35 – Annex 2 
31 See Service for Foreign Policy Instruments 2014 to 2016 Annual Activity Reports

12 

 
 
                                                            
 
As  outlined  by  the  evaluators32,  programmes  implemented  under  Article  5  on  addressing 
global  and  trans-regional  threats  and  emerging  threats  reflect  the  adaptations  made  in  the 
EU’s  foreign  and  security  policy  in  response  to  increasing  complexity  of  global  threats  and 
mirror  advances  and  activities  under  the  Common  Security  and  Defence  Policy  (CSDP)  as 
laid  down  under  Article  21  of  the  TEU.  Early  involvement  of  local  stakeholders  (including 
competent national authorities and CSOs) is common practice in Article 5 programming, such 
as,  for  example,  in  the  EU  Centres  of  Excellence  (CoE)  system,  which  involves  setting  up 
inter-ministerial  National  Teams,  National  Focal  Points  (NFP)  and  Regional  Secretariats 
worldwide.  This  is  complemented  by  an  active  process  of  conducting  national  needs 
assessments by partner countries that in turn develop and adopt National CBRN Action Plans.  

5.2 Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability 

To  what  extent  does  the  IcSP  deliver  results  against  the  Instrument's  objectives,  and 
specific EU priorities? 

Overall answer: the IcSP is effective and has delivered on Instrument objectives. IcSP actions 
and programmes translate EU political priorities into concrete activities. Funding allocations 
have  been  responsive  to  the  political  priorities  set.  Important  contributions  to  the 
mainstreaming of conflict prevention, democracy and good governance were achieved; further 
attention  on  gender  and  human  rights  is  recommended.  With  few  IcSP  actions  and 
programmes concluded, it is too early to assess Instrument-level impacts and sustainability33. 

The IcSP is found to effectively deliver on its objectives, remaining closely aligned with and 
advancing  EU  political  priorities.  The  evaluators  found  instances  where  activities  under 
Article  3  have  deepened  political  and  policy  dialogue  with  governments  and  other  relevant 
parties.  In  other  instances  there  was  a  trade-off  between  speedy  delivery  and  in-depth 
engagement with stakeholders, making it imperative for projects to flexibly adapt throughout 
implementation.  Not  surprisingly,  the  impact  of  IcSP  projects  is  noted  to  be  greater  where 
IcSP  has  remained  engaged  over  a  longer  period  of  time  or  where  adequate  follow-up  has 
been  given  through  other  Instruments  and/or  through  political  dialogue.  This  later,  catalytic 
effect is desirable and in line with the subsidiary nature of the Instrument but renders it more 
difficult to capture its impact comprehensively through instrument-based evaluations (see also 
Coherence  Report34).  While  it  is  generally  recognised  that  stabilisation  and  peace-building 
activities would often benefit from longer preparation and implementation times than the IcSP 
currently  has,  it  must  also  be  recognised  that  the  speed  and  flexibility  with  which  the 
Instrument can deliver is directly linked to its short-term engagement. Short time frames and 
relatively  limited  amounts  of  funding  make  it  easier  for  the  Instrument  both  to  take  and  to 
limit risks. The circumstances in which Article 3 is mobilised often require a willingness to 
try new approaches and the evaluation finds the IcSP enabling in this respect. 

The  speed  of  deployment  is  found  to  be  a  major  asset  of  the  IcSP  and  requires  constant 
monitoring  and  improvement.  In  practice,  the  time  between  adoption  of  decisions  and 
contracting can vary considerably depending on the nature of the action, the local conditions 
on the ground or  the readiness of the implementing partners. In  some  cases  implementation 
may even start prior to the signing of the relevant contract in others delays occur not just as a 

32 See page 15 – Annex 4 
33 See page 18 – Annex 4 
34 
"Coherence  Report: 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/coherence-report-insights-external-evaluation-external-financing-instruments_en  

the  external  evaluations  of 

the  external 

financing 

insights 

from 

instruments" 

(July  2017), 

13 

 
 
                                                            
result  of  administrative  hurdles  but  also  because  local  contexts  can  change  rapidly  and 
activities need to adapt in order to remain relevant and effective.  

Sustainability, based on the external evaluation, the Service finds that it is not necessarily a 
relevant requirement for every IcSP action as, particularly in crisis response, activities can be 
self-standing. For those activities requiring follow-up, either in the form of funding through 
other  instruments/donors  or  through  political  dialogue,  the  question  of  how  this  will  be 
ensured  is  routinely  asked  prior  to  the  adoption  of  new  actions.  In  some  cases,  the  lack  of 
perspective for adequate follow-up has stopped the IcSP from getting involved, for example 
in certain Security Sector Reform (SSR) or Integrated Border Management processes which 
are, by definition, long term. But a more common scenario is that an IcSP action starts with a 
prospect,  but  not  a  guarantee,  of  follow-up.  Sustainability  then  needs  to  be  gradually  built 
during  the  lifetime  of  a  project  and  for  those  aspects  of  it  that  are  found  to  make  a 
contribution worth preserving and carrying forward. 

In  terms  of  mainstreaming  EU  priorities,  based  on  the  evaluators'  findings,  the  Service 
considers  that  important  contributions  to  conflict  prevention,  democracy  and  good 
governance, calling for further attention to gender and human rights, but recognising on-going 
efforts in this respect.  

Article  4  actions  are  found  to  enhance  EU  and  third  countries  capacities  for  supporting 
conflict prevention, peace-building and addressing pre- and post-crisis needs including post-
conflict and post-disaster recovery. Contrary to Article 3 interventions, those under Article 4 
can  undergo  comprehensive  consultation  with  all  stakeholders  involved  and  engage  in  the 
longer term. 

An important portion of Article 4 funding was allocated to support "in-country civil society 
engagement in conflict prevention" via calls for proposals designed to specifically address the 
needs of pre-selected countries on a number of priorities/issues. In the field of mediation, the 
European  Resources  for  Mediation  Support  (ERMES)  has  effectively  supported  several 
mediation and peace processes through rapid and ad-hoc deployment of expertise in emerging 
crises.  The  Post  Disaster  Needs  Assessment  and  Recovery  and  Peace  Building  Assessment 
(PDNA–RPBA)  projects  provided  expertise  in  post-crisis/post-disasters  settings  to  prepare 
recovery plans, while strengthening the partnership in this field with the World Bank and the 
UN.  The  training  initiatives  for  EU  and  third  countries'  staff,  as  well  as  for  police  and 
gendarmerie  forces  through  the  European  Union  Police  Services  Training  Programme 
(EUPST) and the Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi) 
have  contributed  to  enhanced  global  knowledge,  expertise  and  awareness  of  civilian 
stabilisation  missions.  The  Civil  Society  Dialogue  Network  (CSDN)  has  contributed  to 
strengthen  the  dialogue  mechanism  between  EU  policy-makers  and  civil  society  actors  to 
enhance  EU  and  civil  society  capacities  to  anticipate,  prevent  and  respond  to  threats  to 
stability  posed  by  violent  conflict  and  crisis.  Regarding  natural  resources  and  conflict, 
cooperation  with  OECD  has  contributed  to  dissemination  and  implementation  of  the  due 
diligence standards outlined in the "OECD Due Diligence Guidance for responsible sourcing 
and trading of minerals from conflict affected and high risk areas".    

long-term 

investment  was  considered  necessary 

Several of the above actions built on previous successful initiatives that started under the IfS, 
to  obtain  effectiveness  and 
where 
sustainability. Some of the above actions, such as for example ERMES or the PDNA-RPBA 
directly  complement  Article  3  activities.  All  actions  contributed  to  mainstreaming  policy 
priorities of the EU, in particular the programmes in the area of democracy, good governance 
and human rights, as well as gender equality and empowerment of women.  

14 

 
 
Article  5  programmes  delivered  outcomes  in  EU  priority  areas  related  to  addressing  global 
and trans-regional threats and emerging threats. Implementation covered all priority areas of 
Article  5,  including  cross-cutting  priorities  like  gender  equality,  human  rights,  and  climate 
change.  The  effectiveness  of  the  outcomes  depended  on  a  range  of  factors,  including 
absorption capacity of the partner countries involved, quality of the work of the implementers 
and  overall  programme  management.  The  regional  nature  of  the  programmes  facilitated 
cooperation where bilateral issues complicate work in sensitive security areas. Several Article 
5  projects  also  broke  new  ground  (for  example  in  relation  to  programmes  on  critical 
infrastructure  protection  and  Counter  Terrorism  and  Countering  Violent  Extremism 
(CT/CVE).  They  built  on  long-term  partnerships  (essential  for  any  type  of  collaboration  in 
security-sensitive thematic areas) and context analysis. 

the  Counter-Terrorism/  Organised  Crime/Critical 

Capacity-building  contributions  were  at  the  core  of  Article  5  programmes.  Those 
implemented  under 
Infrastructure 
(CT/OC/CI) portfolio were centrally managed or delegated to implementers such as Interpol, 
United  Nations  Office  on  Drugs  and  Crime  (UNODC)  or  regional  actors.  In  the  chemical, 
biological,  radiological  and  nuclear  (CBRN)  risk  mitigation  field,  equally,  there  is  a  stated 
intent  to  strengthen  national  and  regional  capacity.  Recent  projects  in  CT/OC,  as  well  as 
CBRN  risk  mitigation,  have  placed  more  emphasis  on  equipment  delivery  combined  with 
training.  

Sustainability  approaches  were  embedded  in  the  programming  approach  for  Article  5  and 
include  the  involvement  of  local  stakeholders  in  the  design  phase  as  a  key  principle.  The 
Centres  of  Excellence  (CoE)  system  took  this  approach  one  step  further  and  encourages 
partner countries to embed the activities and results into their own institutional programmes 
and action plans. In CT, OC and CI, projects were implemented with close involvement of the 
competent authorities of partner countries and this helped embed results into national systems 
and protocols by creating partnerships, promoting ownership and ensuring coordination with 
other donors / partners. For example, in the CBRN field, the CoE system35 was an example 
of  a  long-term  programme  that  creates  ownership  (National  Team  formation  and  partner 
countries setting out their strategies in national needs assessments and national action plans) 
and provides a platform for donors to align with these strategies using local systems. 

5.3 Efficiency 

To what extent is the IcSP delivering efficiently? 

Administrative costs are lower than other EFIs (the percentage of administrative costs to total 
budget  is  1%36).  Budget  execution  (time  taken  from  commitments  to  payments)  is 
satisfactory  overall.  Contractual  procedures  and  direct  selection  of  implementing  partners 
promote efficiency37. 

In  terms  of  budget  execution  (from  commitments  to  payments),  stakeholders  consulted 
indicated  a  general  level  of  satisfaction  among  implementing  partners.    Furthermore,  speed 
and  flexibility  remained  a  defining  characteristic  of  Article  3  actions,  especially  when 

35 http://www.cbrn-coe.eu/ 
36 See page 24 – Annex 4 
37 See page 26 – Annex 4 

15 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
compared to other EU EFIs. Examples from Turkey (support to the Turkish coast guard TCG 
as a deliverable of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan) and Niger (Agadez-Migration (AGAMI) 
project  in  Agadez)  as  a  deliverable  of  the  EU  Agenda  on  Migration)  illustrated  a  relatively 
rapid  follow  up  of  EU  political  decisions  and  commitments.  The  IcSP  Regulation  enables 
direct award of funding in specific cases. This option contributed to ensuring rapid response 
in situations of crisis or urgent need. Moreover, the IcSP crisis response component included 
several  budget  reinforcements  throughout  the  years  to  meet  the  greater  need  that  has  arisen 
from the larger number of crises around the world and their proximity to the EU. An internal 
audit  performed  in  2016  assessed  the  actual  speed  of  the  identification/  formulation  and 
contracting phases and found that the aim of adopting most financing decisions within three 
months  following  submission  to  the  Political  and  Security  Committee  (PSC)  is  often  met. 
When  not,  it  is  partly  due  to  external  factors,  i.e.  operating  in  crisis  situations  requires  due 
caution and planning, which takes time, and partly to the fact that even shortened procedures, 
which Article 3 actions are subject to, can still be time consuming. Still, measures to further 
reduce the time needed to adopt decisions to avoid missing windows of opportunities have to 
be identified and put in place as suggested as well by respondents to the OPC38.  

In  terms  of  flexibility,  the  external  evaluation  underlines  that  there  is  no  facility  under  the 
IcSP  to  allow  for  small  actions  to  be  decided  without  a  formal  decision-making  procedure 
(such  as  it  was  operationally  possible  under  the  IfS  via  the  Policy  Advice,  Technical 
Assistance,  Mediation,  Reconciliation  and  Other  Areas  of  Assistance  (PAMF)39.  This  was 
also noted by stakeholders in the OPC process, given that the absence of such a facility has 
negative  effects  on  efficiency.  Small  actions  (e.g.  conflict  analyses,  feasibility  studies,  etc.) 
undertaken  to  enhance  efficiency,  should  not  require  the  same  processes  to  be  followed  as 
large  decisions.  The  re-establishment  of  such  facility  could  be  explored  in  a  post  2020 
context. 

Long-term  interventions  under  Article  4  are  subject  to  the  usual  contracting  procedures 
following  the  adoption  of  Annual  Action  Programs.  The  design  and  adoption  of  AAPs  ran 
smoothly,  with  their  approval  in  the  first  half  of  each  year,  followed  by  about  45%  of 
contracting  done  within  the  same  year.  The  budget  execution  in  terms  of  commitments  for 
2014,  2015  and  2016  has  been  close  to  100%.  Article  4  projects  were  on  target  to  achieve 
their  outcomes  within  the  allocated  financial  resources  and  timeframe.  Even  in  difficult 
situations,  such  as  during  or  after  a  crisis  or  a  natural  disaster,  the  programmes  under  IcSP 
Article 4 allowed the mobilisation of experts to support mediation processes or to assess the 
needs and prepare the recovery plans.   

There  is  evidence  of  some  delays  in  project  implementation  for  Article  5.  However,  these 
were  not  due  to  administrative  issues  in  project  approval  to  contracting,  but  rather  to 
extensions of inception periods, therefore the project takes longer to be finalised. In regional 
projects, national needs assessments for participating partner countries were often undertaken 
sequentially by implementers, which create delays. There are proposals to improve the quality 
of  these  initial  assessments  by  more  strongly  involving  local  experts,  which  may  shorten 
inception periods. 

5.4 EU Added Value 

To what  extent  does  the IcSP add value compared  to  interventions  by Member  states and 
other key donors and partners? 

38 See page 37 – Annex 2 
39 See page 28 – Annex 4 

16 

 
 
 
                                                            
Overall  answer:  IcSP  value  added  is  seen  at  different  levels.  Within  the  EU  context,  and  in 
relation  to  the  EU’s  EFIs,  the  IcSP’s  speed,  flexibility  and  capacity  to  adapt  to  evolving 
contexts,  and  political  influence/leverage  are  valued.  Its  expertise/niche  role,  its  bridging 
function and ability to take risks are also viewed as broadly complementary to interventions 
by  Member  States  and  other  donors.  It  is  also  an  important  driver  of  the  EU’s  efforts  to 
mainstream conflict-sensitivity in other EFIs40. 

In general, the IcSP is known and valued for its speed and flexibility as substantiated in the 
feedback provided by respondents to the OPC41. If there is a need for a rapid first response 
from  the  EU  in  a  situation  of  crisis  or  urgency,  the  IcSP  is  often  the  most  appropriate  tool 
available. It can take risks that larger or slower funding mechanisms cannot and this is often 
key in crisis situations. The accumulated experience of delivering rapid responses in a broad 
range  of  contexts  all  over  the  world  also  allows  the  IcSP  to  assess  both  the  risks  and 
opportunities  of  particular  contexts,  providing  valuable  operational  feedback  to  political 
decision-makers. This then allows the EU to seize opportunities also in contexts where other 
donors  are  reluctant  or  constrained  (e.g.  the  de-mining  project  in  Colombia  involving  the 
FARC-EP alongside state actors). 

A key value added of Article 3 actions is in the policy and political dialogue they enable with 
relevant  governments  and  stakeholders.  Through  this  dialogue  EU  values  about  good 
governance or human rights can be conveyed in a more tangible, concrete way than through 
diplomatic  efforts  alone.  The  demand  for  actions  enabling  such  dialogues  is  increasing.  By 
contrast, the need for the IcSP to supplement the activities of other EFIs in cases where they 
had run out of funding has diminished with the advent of the EU Trust Funds (TFs). EU TFs 
are  well  placed  and  better  resourced  to  act  in  the  field  of  linking  relief,  rehabilitation  and 
development  (LRRD),  therefore  IcSP  activities  have  diminished  since  2014  in  this  field.  In 
recent years, the IcSP has limited its engagement in this field to situations where EU TFs were 
not present or unable to intervene. 

The main added value of Article 4 programmes has been their contribution to strengthening 
the  peace  building  capacities  of  third  countries  and  EU  partners,  and  to  complementing 
actions of Member States and other donors.  In addition, EU principles and values were well-
integrated into programming and linkages are being created through programmes between the 
EU  and  the  UN  system  and  other  international  and  regional  organisations  (OECD,  OSCE, 
League of Arab States) which enable the promotion of EU cross-cutting priorities.  

In the mediation sector Article 4 programmes have facilitated EU support to inclusive peace 
mediation and dialogue processes at the international, regional or local levels. Few others can 
provide technical assistance and training, or organise mediation events as quickly and flexibly 
as  the  EU  through  the  IcSP.  Another  example  of  particular  value  added  are  the  training 
initiatives for staff in civilian stabilisation missions and the support to initiatives such as the 
Kimberley  Process  and  the  guidance  on  the  responsible  exploitation  and  trade  of  minerals. 
Some funding has been made available where no other EU EFIs could be deployed because of 
security reasons, as was the case, for example, in Venezuela or Burundi, or in countries where 
important  peace-building/disaster  management  initiatives  (such  as  the  Post  Disaster  Needs 
Assessment (PDNA)) have been planned and implemented. Another key added value is that 
IcSP  remained  an  important  source  of  funding  for  many  groups,  in  particular  smaller  local 

40 See page 29 - Annex 4 
41 See page 36 – Annex 2 

17 

 
 
                                                            
civil  society  actors  in  a  period  of  significant  funding  cuts  to  UN  and  European  Non-
governmental Organisations (NGOs). 

As outlined by the evaluators42 and concluded by the Service, Article 5 programmes played a 
unique  role  as  a  niche  in  non-DAC  (OECD-Development  Assistance  Committee  criteria) 
interventions covering Counter Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (CT/CVE) and 
Organised  Crime  (OC),  as  well  as  certain  programmes  in  chemical,  biological,  radiological 
and  nuclear  (CBRN)  risk  mitigation  (e.g.  the  EU  People  2  People  programme  on  dual  use 
export  controls,  border  controls,  redirection  of  scientists,  capacity  for  the  elimination  of 
weapons of mass destruction and support to International Science and Technology Centre and 
the Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine). In other areas (such as critical infrastructure 
or Counter Terrorism in Sahel), in terms of added value the IcSP had an initial advantage by 
moving  into  geographical  zones  where  other  donors  were  absent.  Furthermore,  the  external 
evaluation  showed  evidence  that  Article  5  interventions  had  significant  interfaces  with 
interventions of Member States and other stakeholders or donors43. 

5.5 Coherence, Consistency, Complementarity and Synergies 

To  what  extent  does  the  IcSP  facilitate  coherence,  consistency,  complementarity  and 
synergies  both  internally  between  its  own  set  of  objectives  and  programmes,  and vis-à-vis 
other EFIs? 

Overall  answer:  In  relation  to  external  EU  initiatives  and  institutions,  there  is  evidence  of 
functional  interfaces  between  the  IcSP  and  Common  Security  and  Defence  Policy  (CSDP) 
missions, as well as with activities of the Directorate General for European Civil Protection 
and  Humanitarian  Aid  Operations  (DG  ECHO).  Effective  synergies  with  the  IcSP  are 
hampered by the lack of flexibility and lengthy procedures of most other EFIs. Actions and 
programmes  meet  the  Instrument's  objectives,  they  have  also  been  used  to  further  promote 
the objectives of other EFIs, to ‘gap fill’, as a forerunner for interventions by other (larger) 
instruments, and as a funding instrument of last resort. 

Coherence of Article 3 actions with interventions of other Instruments is assured during the 
decision-making process through substantial consultation to coordinate and identify synergies. 
The  subsidiary  and  complementary  function  of  IcSP  is  useful  to  make  sure  discussions  on 
follow-up  and  complementarity  take  place  early  on,  sometimes  well  before  activities  are 
decided  or  started.  The  external  evaluation  showed 
in  84%  of  all  actions, 
complementarity with other EU EFIs was identified44. IcSP actions have, in some cases been 
used deliberately to anticipate the start of activities foreseen under larger  instruments. Since 
other  EFIs  and  the  Trust  Funds  increasingly  address  peace-  and  state-  building,  as  well  as 
security and stabilisation, further work to enhance synergies between the IcSP and other EFIs 
will remain necessary. For example, the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) external 
evaluation report recommends that more resources to cover crisis prevention are allocated to 
the ENI while also underlining that a balance with long-term predictability needs to be struck, 
suggesting that there is a continued need for the IcSP45.   

that 

At present, there is a clear trend for the IcSP Article 3 actions to develop a greater focus on 
smaller,  politically  more  sensitive  projects,  some  of  which  do  then  lead  to  or  complement 

42 See page 31 – Annex 4 
43 See page 27 - Annex 4 
44 See page 35 – Annex 4 
45 Coherence Report –Insights from the External Evaluation of the External Financing Instruments –July 2017 

18 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
larger  interventions  by  other  EFIs.  Furthermore,  synergies  and  coherence  with  CSDP 
activities have also become an important priority for Article 3 actions, some of which directly 
complement  the  work  of  CSDP  missions  in  Mali,  Niger  and  Ukraine,  for  example.  Lastly 
within Article 3, there is internal coherence and examples of actions that build on and aim to 
consolidate effects or expand previous (IfS) actions (e.g. in South Sudan, Sudan, Niger). 

IcSP Article 4 coherence is supported by the decision-making process for its programmes. At 
Instrument level, complementarity between Article 4 and Article 3 is strong on issues such as 
mediation, early warning and conflict sensitivity46. In addition, throughout the programming 
process, as well as during implementation, coherence and complementarity were sought:  

a) with other EU instruments: regular consultations ensure complementarity and synergies, 
in particular for the interventions in favour of civil society organisations in third countries. A 
specific example of fruitful complementarity between IcSP and other EU external instruments 
is the Post Disaster Needs Assessment and Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (PDNA- 
RPBA) experts' mission in Central African Republic (CAR) whose conclusions have fed into 
the decision making process on the implementation of the Bekou Trust Fund47. 

b)  with  Member  States'  initiatives:  Article  4  interventions  enable  synergies  with  EU 
Common  Foreign  Security  Policy  activities.  Good  examples  were  the  programmes  for  pre-
deployment training provided for staff of CSDP missions (projects such as the European New 
Training  Initiative  for  Civilian  Crisis  Management  (ENTRi)  and  European  Union  Police 
Services  Training  Programme).  In  addition,  Article  4  programming  involves  upstream 
consultations with Member States and regular contacts with EU Delegations. This allows the 
complementarity  of  IcSP  actions  with  other  EFIs  or  other  actors'  interventions,  avoiding 
eventual overlapping.  

c) with other donors: several Article 4 programmes draw in other donors (such as the United 
States Agency for International Development in the Kimberley Process certification scheme; 
the  World  Bank  and  UN  in  Post  Disaster  Needs  Assessment  and  Post-conflict  Needs 
Assessment; the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the African Union 
in the ENTRi programme, and the UN in mediation support initiatives).  

d) with civil society: thanks to specific project such as the Civil Society Dialogue Network, 
regular exchanges both on policy and programmes were held with civil society. This allows 
the integration of civil society's point of view in the EU policy and programmes and it also 
enhanced the overall coordination and complementarity between EU-led and civil society-led 
initiatives. 

Article  5  interventions  in  the  area  of  nuclear  security  were  complementary  to  activities  in 
nuclear  safety  under  the  Instrument  for  Nuclear  Safety  Cooperation  (INSC).  There  was  a 
thematic synergy in the objectives pursued under the two instruments in a number of technical 
areas  (CBRN  Centres  of  Excellence  covering  both  natural  and  man-made  risks  related  to 
radiological and nuclear materials) and in some cases overlapping geographical coverage (e.g. 
uranium mining and related transport in Central Africa)48. 

Additional  thematic  complementarity  existed  on  Counter-Terrorism/  Organised  Crime 
activities  and  the  European  Neighbourhood  Instrument  (ENI)  programmes  on  human  rights 
and  security  sector  reform.  Other  examples  where  this  synergy  was  being  developed  in  the 
area  of  counter-terrorism  and  fighting  organised  crime  include  the  West  Africa  Police 

46 See page 36 – Annex 4 
47  "Linking  relief,  rehabilitation  and  development  to  make  a  long-term  difference  in  a  fragile  situation  like  the  Central  Africa  Republic 
crisis. The “Bêkou” Trust Fund will benefit the long-suffering population of the country, and will also contribute to reducing the fragility 
caused by this crisis in the wider region." 
48 See page 33 – Annex 4

19 

 
 
                                                            
 
Information System (WAPIS) in West Africa, Ameripol in Latin America and Strengthening 
Resilience against Violent Extremism (STRIVE) in the Horn of Africa.  

There were close ties between Article 5 programmes on Counter-Terrorism/ Organised Crime 
and export controls with activities of Member States that implement bilateral programmes in 
these sectors. There was also close coordination with the United States in many thematic areas 
at both strategic and working levels. With regard to UN and international organisations, and 
in the fields of Counter-Terrorism and Organised Crime, there was coordination with (and in 
certain cases implementation by) organisations such as United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime  (UNODC)  or  Interpol.  In  the  chemical,  biological,  radiological  and  nuclear  (CBRN) 
risk mitigation field,  the EU  Centres of  Excellence  (CoE) provided a by-now well-accepted 
and effective platform that involves a number of international organisations as partners at the 
programming as well as implementing ends. 

5.6 Leverage 

To what extent has the IcSP leveraged further funds and/or political or policy engagement? 

Overall answer: There is evidence that the IcSP has contributed to EU policy and political 
dialogue with beneficiary governments and stakeholders in several countries and that such 
dialogue  has,  in  return,  also  benefitted  some  of  the  funded  activities.  This  area  of  cross-
fertilisation  is  by  far  the  most  important  leverage  of  the  instrument.  A  further  area  of 
leverage is in increasing the amounts of donor funds spent in a conflict-sensitive manner, 
IcSP leverage or political influence is considered important by 56% of the respondents in EU 
either  by  attracting  additional  funding  for  specific  actions  or  by  helping  to  ensure  that 
Delegations,  in  the  survey  done,  as  one  of  the  main  comparative  advantages  of  the 
existing allocations take conflict relevant factors adequately into account. 
Instrument49. IcSP's leverage is achieved through fast, flexible and strategic interventions. 

Article  3  of  the  IcSP  is  instrumental  for  the  EU  to  deliver  on  its  political  commitments, 
particularly where new or shifting priorities require for an adaptation in the EU approach. In 
the Syria crisis, for example, a series of IfS and IcSP interventions were mobilised. First the 
focus  was  on  supporting  attempts  at  a  peaceful  resolution  of  the  conflict,  then  significant 
means were channelled to neighbouring countries, who started hosting those fleeing from the 
conflict, while pioneering the provision of non-humanitarian assistance to areas of the country 
that were not under the control of the Assad regime. More recently, support has been provided 
to  collecting  evidence  about  potential  crimes  against  humanity  that  may  hold  up  in  court. 
Meanwhile, helping to trace conflict victims or their remains has, sadly, become a priority to 
prepare  for  a  time  when  violence  ends  and  the  difficult  reconciliation  process  can  start. 
Perhaps the most eloquent example of how IcSP helps ensure that the EU has a capacity to 
actively  promote  peaceful  solutions  is  the  Comprehensive  Syria  Peace  Support  Initiative, 
which can provide financial, technical and operational support to peacebuilding processes at 
short notice. Each of the afore-mentioned activities provides the EU with leverage by quickly 
bolstering  political  commitments  through  concrete  actions.  In  addition,  many  of  the  above 
activities  evolved  into  larger,  more  long-term  and  often  also  more  sophisticated  projects 
through  other  EFIs  and  other  donors,  allowing  them  to  plan  and  operate  on  a  firmer  basis. 
Here, the leverage derives from IcSP being a sort of 'risk-capital'. 

On the migration and refugee crisis, the leverage obtained through the IcSP was particularly 
strong in the early phase by 'front-loading' prior to other EFIs coming in with more structural, 
long-term support. Thus, the support to the Turkish Coast Guard to help enhance its capacity 
to  save  lives  at  sea  anticipated  and  complemented  support  through  IPA  and  DG  ECHO50, 
ensuring that the EU could swiftly point to concrete actions when some alleged that promises 

49 See page 39 – Annex 4 
50 Directorate General for the European Commission Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
were  not  being  followed  up.  Similarly,  in  Agadez  (Niger)  the  setting  up  of  a  multi-purpose 
migration  centre  before  the  end  of  2016  was  one  of  the  first  concrete  deliverables  of  the 
European Agenda on Migration and helped to quickly gather relevant experience that then led 
to  a  larger,  more  structural  and  well-rounded  response  from  the  EU  Trust  Fund  (TF).  In 
Colombia,  the  IcSP  has  been  instrumental  in  supporting  confidence  building  between  the 
FARC  and  the  Government  of  Colombia  and  in  facilitating  the  peace  process,  thereby 
allowing the EU to quickly deliver on its political commitments through the offices of the EU 
Special  Envoy.  In  all  of  the  afore-mentioned  examples,  EU  Trust  Funds  play  an  important 
role.  In  Syria  and  on  the  migration  and  refugee  crisis,  IcSP  involvement  was  more  critical 
while  the  TFs  were  still  being  set  up  or  not  fully  operational.  Once  the  TFs  started to  fully 
operate,  the  need  for  IcSP  became  more  limited  to  niche  issues  which  fell  outside  of  the 
mandate of TFs or were outside their scope for political or operational reasons. 

In Ukraine, with over EUR 75 million of projects, the IcSP contributed to delivering on EU 
political priorities and dialogue. In Iraq, the IcSP demining action is an important leverage for 
other EU actions, on humanitarian, security and political aspects. 

There are many further examples of IcSP actions evolving into activities supported by other 
EFIs.  And  while  IcSP  actions  are  rarely  designed  to  leverage  more  funding  on  purpose  by 
others there frequently is a desired leverage effect in terms of greater conflict sensitivity and 
more solid project design in projects that follow on from IcSP activities.  

The EU role in mediation and peace processes was strengthened in particular through the EU-
UN  partnership  in  the  field  of  conflict  prevention,  supporting  the  international  and  insider 
mediation  capacities  in  several  countries  and  the  EU  programme  European  Resources  for 
Mediation  Support  (ERMES)  under  Article  4  which  has  allowed  the  EU  to  deploy  experts 
playing a decisive role in the support of several peace processes. The IcSP actions have also 
contributed to draw in other donors in the Kimberley Process certification scheme as well as 
in initiatives to promote the responsible exploitation and trade of minerals. Other programmes 
have helped to increase the EU's influence in the tripartite partnership with World Bank and 
UN in the PCNA-RPBA processes. 

Article  5  interventions  opened  opportunities  for  a  broader  political  exchange  and  the 
discussion  of  policy  objectives  on  key  topics  with  institutional  partners  and  beneficiary 
governments (CBRN, CT, Cybercrime, Drugs). As an example, the ISTC and STCU Centres 
are co-funded by the EU and other partners (US, Canada, commitments by the host countries) 
and implement, amongst others, partner projects funded by non-EU donors. This became an 
attractive way of organising scientific collaborations and for commercialisation efforts. 

6. Conclusions 

This SWD (based on the evidence from the external evaluation) confirms that the instrument 
has  achieved  its  objectives.  It  also  scores  well  with  regards  to  coherence,  consistency  and 
complementarity, both within the EU and its various actors and with other international actors 
and civil society.  

Article  3  crisis  response  measures  made  significant  contributions  to  allow  the  EU  pursuing 
new  and  urgent  policy  priorities  swiftly.  Overall,  this  component  has  delivered  on  its 
commitments,  yielded  important  outcomes,  and  is  responsive  to  a  fast-evolving  peace  and 
security context. The flexibility and swiftness are the essential factors of the IcSP's Article 3 
component, providing the EU with a key asset to react to unforeseen events and to be on the 
ground quickly with political projects that help to alleviate crisis, mitigate conflicts and open 
doors for dialogue and political processes.  

21 

 
 
 
At a policy level, the IcSP is instrumental in operationalising EU external action priorities and 
particularly  in  supporting  the  work  of  the  High  Representative/Vice  President  and  of  the 
European External Action Service (EEAS). The policy relevance of Article 3 actions is in line 
with the priorities of the TEU (Article 21), supports the implementation of the Global Strategy 
and adds value in the policy and political dialogue it enables with beneficiary governments. 
Furthermore,  aspects  of  the  IcSP  Regulation  promote  efficiency  including  flexible 
management  procedures  to  accelerate  contractual  procedures,  and  direct  selection  of 
implementing  partners  and  timely  support  to  critical  processes,  such  as  those  funded  under 
Article 3, can enhance the visibility and credibility of the EU thus contributing to its political 
leverage. 

Under Article 4 the IcSP has delivered on the Instrument's objectives translating EU political 
priorities  into  interventions  and  has  contributed  to  enhancing  EU  capacities  for  supporting 
conflict prevention, peace-building and addressing pre- and post-crisis needs including post-
conflict and post-disaster recovery. Positive feedback on the effectiveness of the IcSP Article 
4 projects was given by the stakeholders involved.  

Article 5 made important contributions to address threats to international and EU peace and 
security  and  address  existing  and  emerging  global  threats.  It  has  offered  opportunities  for  a 
broader  political  exchange  platform  on  key  security  policy  issues  with  beneficiary 
governments  and  institutional  partners  (e.g.  chemical,  biological,  radiological  and  nuclear 
(CBRN)  Centres  of  Excellence,  Counter  terrorism,  cybercrime,  protection  of  critical 
infrastructures and illicit trafficking). 

To conclude, at the mid-term of its implementation, the IcSP 2014-2020 has proven to be fit 
for purpose, and a key tool for the EU to underpin its diplomacy with flexible and tailor-made 
projects.  This  capacity  for  the  EU  to  react  speedily  to  the  unforeseen  and  to  address  key 
security issues globally must be further strengthened in any future architecture of EU external 
relations instruments.  

22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 1. Procedural information 

Consultation process  

Lead DG – DEVCO; Decide reference IcSP – 2017/FPI/004 

The  relevant  EU  services  have  established  an  Inter-service  Groups  (ISG)  to  ensure 
appropriate oversight of the various EFI evaluations (process, content and co-ordination). The 
system comprised a Global EFIs ISG with overall oversight, and individual Instrument ISGs. 
Core members of individual Instrument ISGs were also members of the Global EFI ISG. The 
ISG  was  composed  of  relevant  Commission  departments  (Service  for  Foreign  Policy 
Instruments  (FPI),  Directorate-General  for  International  Cooperation  and  Development  (DG 
DEVCO),  Directorate-General  for  Neighbourhood  and  Enlargement  Negotiations  (DG 
NEAR),  European  External  Action  Service  (EEAS),  Directorate-General  for  Budget  (DG 
BUDG)  and  the  Secretariat-General).  Its  first  meeting  was  held  on  14  October  2015.  It 
discussed the  evaluation  roadmap  and  validated  the  terms  of  reference and  the  Commission 
proposal to hire a team of independent experts to undertake the evaluations through the COM 
2015  FWC.  The  request  for  services  was  launched  on  19  May  2016.  The  offers  were 
evaluated and Landen Mills was selected as the winning tender, which contract started on 4 
July 2016. 

The external evaluation of the IcSP covered questions of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, 
EU  added  value,  and  coherence,  complementarity,  sustainability,  impact,  synergies  and 
leverage.  It  was  conducted  in  four  phases.  In  the  inception  phase,  the  methodology,  the 
evaluation  questions  and  judgment  criteria  were  further  specified;  In  the  ‘desk’  phase, 
documents  were  analysed,  surveys  were  conducted,  interview  were  held,  and  in  the  ‘field’ 
phase,  eight  partner  countries  were  visited.  An  open  public  consultation,  published  on 
Commission’s website ‘Your Voice in Europe’, was launched and in the synthesis phase, the 
final report was prepared.  

The report went through several revisions on the basis on inputs from the steering committee 
and comments from the Commission ISG. There were seven ISG meetings over the course of 
the IcSP external evaluation to cover initial briefing, provide feedback on inception, desk, key 
messages, draft Final, and Final reports. There were also four meetings (2 in September 2016, 
1 in December 2016 and 1 end of March 2017) of all the consultants with all the evaluation 
managers, and relevant EU staff to promote understanding and exchange on complementarity 
and synergy between instruments under evaluation. The draft conclusions were then presented 
in May 2017 and the final report was approved on 16 June 2017. The report and its annexes 
will be published in July 2017. 

Evaluation questions 

Relevance 
To what extent do the overall objectives (IcSP Regulation) and the design of the IcSP respond 
to: (a) EU priorities and beneficiary needs identified at the time the Instrument was adopted 
(2014)? And (b) Current EU priorities and beneficiary needs, given the  evolving challenges 
and priorities in the international context (2017)? 

Effectiveness 
To what extent does the IcSP deliver results against the Instrument's objectives, and specific 
EU priorities? 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Efficiency 
To what extent is the IcSP delivering efficiently? 

Added value 
To what extent does the IcSP add value compared to interventions by Member States or other 
key donors and partners? 

Coherence, Consistency, Complementarity and Synergies 
To  what  extent  does  the  IcSP  facilitate  consistency,  complementarity  and  synergies  both 
internally between its own set of objectives and programmes, and vis-à-vis other EFIs? 

Leverage 
To what extent has the IcSP leveraged further funds and/or political or policy engagement? 

Annex 2. Synopsis report of the stakeholders' consultation 

The  stakeholders'  consultation  on  the  Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No 
230/2014  establishing an  instrument  contributing  to  stability  and  peace  (IcSP)  began  in  late 
2016 till May 2017. It was carried out as part of the external evaluation on all the EFIs. The 
consultation  strategy  provided  by  the  external  consultants  included  three  sub-fields  of 
activities, namely: 

  Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) 

  Field Visits 

  Thematic Case Studies 

  Surveys 

  Open Public Consultation 

The  next  section  outlines  the  approach  taken  for  the  validation  of  the  findings  including 
details  on  the  process,  hypotheses  to  be  validated,  KII  and  case  studies,  and  Focus  Group 
Discussions (FGD) processes. 

The evaluation involved field visits to Jordan, Morocco, Turkey, Georgia, Somalia  (Kenya), 
Niger, and Colombia from November to December 2016. 

The external evaluators interviewed a range of Commission staff whose work relates to IcSP 
during  the  course  of  the  evaluation.    They  sought  their  perspectives  on  the  data  which  the 
evaluators  had  collected,  and  their  views  on  the  evaluation  questions  and  hypotheses  of  the 
evaluation.  The people interviewed are included in Annex 3 of the external evaluation report 
and the results are included throughout the external evaluation report  

The  following  section  describes  the  Open  Public  consultation,  which  took  place  between  7 
February  and  3  May  2017.    It  consisted  on  an  online  survey  and  targeted  meetings.  
Hereunder  is  the  summary,  including  views  of  Member  States  representatives.  All  key 
stakeholder groups have been reached. 

The online survey 

124  online  submissions  received  from  71  institutions/organisations  and  individuals  for  44 
countries  and  territories  both  EU  and  non-EU.  Participants  represented  research/academia, 
private business, CSOs and public authorities. Further details are provided in the table below. 
The  public  authorities  were  represented  by  the  Ministries  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Latvia, 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Finland,  Austria,  Belgium,  Mexico,  and  the  Czech  Republic;  the  Italian  Agency  for 
Development  Cooperation  and  the  UK  Department  for  International  Development;  and  sub-
national entities from Belgium and Morocco. 

Type of Organisation 

Number 

Percentage 

Private individuals 

Consultancies 

EU networks/association 

Business/Private Sector 

Organisations/associations 

Public authorities 

Research/academia 

Total 

8 

2 

7 

8 

16 

25 

5 

71 

11% 

3% 

10% 

11% 

23% 

35% 

7% 

100% 

2.1  Written submissions to the EU 

3 written submissions were delivered by the following institutions/ organisations: 

Foreign  and  Commonwealth  Office  (United  Kingdom),  “Foreign  Policy  Instruments  Mid-

Term Evaluation: United Kingdom Comments” – 3 May 2017. 

Secrétariat Général Des Affaires Européennes (France), “Réponses à la consultation publique 

sur les instruments d’action extérieure de l’Union européenne” – 5 May 2017. 

Search  for  Common  Ground  &  World  Vision,  “Written  Contribution  for  the  Mid-Term 

Evaluation of the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)” – No date. 

2.2 

Public presentations of Consultants involved 

3 public presentations were organised allowing face-to-face meetings with the Consultants 
in  Brussels  in  March  (see  details  in  Section  4).  These  events  saw  interactions  with  18 
organisations  and  8  governments  representing  a  wide  range  of  stakeholders  (EU 
government/European  Parliament  officials;  civil  society  organisations;  member  states 
agencies; implementing organisations). 

Direct Feedback received on the IcSP Guiding Questions 

The  Feedback  received  is  presented  in  the  chapter  below  following  each  guiding  question. 
Quantitative  data  from  the  online  submissions  is  supplemented  by  qualitative  responses/ 
narratives delivered separately in written format. As the public presentations, and subsequent 
Q&A sessions, did not follow a format that allows for ‘question specific results’ –minutes and 
notes from these sessions are given in the following section instead. 

3.1  Question 1: Addressing IcSP Objectives 

25 

 
 
 
How  well  do  you  think  the  IcSP  has  addressed  its  objectives?  The  main  assessment 
criteria  for  the  evaluation  are:  relevance;  effectiveness,  impact  and  sustainability; 
efficiency;  EU  added  value;  coherence,  consistency,  complementarity  and  synergies; 
and  leverage.  Feel  free  to  comment  on  the  findings,  conclusions  or  recommendations 
for any/all of the criteria. 

1. 

Summary of quantitative results 

Total 
replies 

no. 

of 

1 – Poorly 

2 
Adequately 

– 

3 – Well 

4 – Very well  N/A 

35 

2 

6 

16 

6 

5 

2. 

On-line survey Feedback 

The IcSP could be better and more effectively exploited in response to the emerging hybrid 
threats, terrorism and violent extremism. 

At the same time, we see some restrictions on the use of IcSP to prevent and combat hybrid 
and  cyber  threats  that  are  the  main  contemporary  challenges  for  international  security, 
including  the  EU  and  the  Member  States.  Bearing  in  mind  the  growing  interdependence  of 
development and security issues, we point out the need to adapt EU instruments to improve 
the  effectiveness  of  EU  support  and  action  towards  partner  countries.  In  this  context,  we 
recognise  the  need  to  implement  the  Capacity  Building  for  Security  and  Development 
(CBSD) Initiative, including in the immediate vicinity of the EU, and to identify sources of 
funding. 

We  anticipate  that,  due  to  the  proliferation  of  conventional  and  unconventional  threats,  the 
importance of a rapid and effective response from the EU and therefore the role of the IcSP 
will  increase,  so  it  is  important  to  consider  resolving  problematic  issues  and,  possibly, 
allocating  more  appropriately  the  budget.  We  are  aware  that  this  would  require  additional 
efforts,  including  ensuring  coherence  and  complementarity with  other  external  EU  financial 
instruments. 

Human  security  must  be  at  the  heart  of  EU  interventions  if  they  are  to  have  positive  and 
sustainable  results  on  the  ground.  It  is  crucial  to  keep  this  in  mind  as  today’s  geopolitical 
challenges  and  security  threats,  such  as  those  defined  as  stemming  from  terrorism  and 
migration, are pushing donors to prioritise short-term and security-focused interventions over 
long-term and people-centred approaches.  

There  is  a  need  for  context-specific  analysis,  programming  criteria  and  calls  for  proposals. 
There  are  inherent  problems  and  contradictions  in  PVE/CVE  thinking  and  practice  in  the 
Horn of Africa (HOA). Initiatives on PVE/CVE are based on theories of change (TOCs) and 
models derived/developed in other contexts, from what the Life and Peace Institute (LPI) has 
observed  of  such  programmes/projects  in  Kenya  and  Somalia.  These  TOCs  and  models 
assume  that  a  process  of  ‘radicalisation’  invariably  precedes  ‘political  violence’,  emphasise 
the ‘ideological’ aspect at the expense of context, power relations and structural dynamics, are 
based  on  a  very  flimsy  and  flawed  data  and  evidence  base.      These  TOCs  and  models  are 
themselves based on problematic conceptual  premises such as radicalisation, extremism etc. 
Already PVE/CVE thinking and practice are in conventional thinking in some countries of the 

26 

 
 
 
region  associated  with  counter  terrorism  (CT)  and  counter  insurgency  (CI)  thinking  and 
imperatives. 

The present uncertain security environment both in our Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods 
and  the  emergence  of  various  new  security  threats  and  challenges  underscores  the  political 
relevance of the IcSP, as it provides the Union with an instrument that can promptly respond 
to various needs and requirements in crisis and conflict contexts. Engagement and the ability 
to  address  these  situations  are  crucial  for  our  credibility,  both  internally  with  regard  to  our 
citizens as well as externally vis-à-vis our partners. The real added-value of the instrument is 
embedded in its speed, flexibility and adaptability, providing means for active and responsive 
measures in support of peace and stability. The IcSP can, and should, also complement other 
Common  Security  and  Defence  Policy  (CSDP)  measures  (e.g.  crisis  management  missions) 
within the framework of the EU’s comprehensive approach.  

The  Instrument,  however,  faces  challenges  in  its  capacity  to  address  the  rise  of  hybrid 
conflicts  and  threats.  In  order  for  the  IcSP  to  fulfil  its  tasks  effectively  whilst  acting  in 
harmony with both humanitarian assistance and long-term development cooperation, the IcSP 
needs  to  remain  politically  driven.  The  IcSP  needs  to  be  integrated  in  a  political  strategy, 
considering all instruments and actions in a specific context.  

The  relevance  of  the  IcSP  as  a  funding  instrument  should  not  be  questioned  in  a  context 
where funding for peace and stability has otherwise undergone major cuts. Even if its budget 
allocation  is  limited  compared  to  other  EU  External  Financing  Instruments,  the  IcSP  is  a 
critical  source  of  funding  for  CSOs  which  contribute  to  peacebuilding  efforts  in  fragile  and 
conflict-affected partner countries.  

Conciliation Resources have received IcSP funding in a variety of contexts including: South 
Asia; the  Caucasus;  West  Africa;  CAR;  and  DRC.  It  is  the  instrument  most  closely  aligned 
with our organisational strategic objectives. Our funded projects under IcSP have been able to 
contribute to some extent to stability and peace in the contexts in which they have taken place 
and met the assessment criteria through the projects. Programme teams have also commented 
that  EU  engagement  has  often  been  positive  and  that  has  helped  to  navigate  politics  and 
relationships  with  host  governments.  What  we  have  not  been  able  to  do  so  effectively  is  to 
funding. 
link 

instruments 

continued 

other 

from 

IcSP 

for 

to 

In a long-term perspective, the new CBSD component may set a precedent for the next MFF 
which  could  lead  to  the  IcSP  and  Heading  IV  becoming  an  open  house  for  all  kinds  of 
military funding purposes and the related risks for CSO working with the EU being perceived 
as parties in armed conflicts. 

We  welcome  the  flexibility  of  the  EU  staff  in  Headquarters  and  Delegations  for  allowing 
implementing  partners  to  adapt  the  project  based  on  the  dynamics  on  the  ground  thus, 
showing  understanding  of  the  security  challenges  and  obstacles  they  face.  As  the  IcSP  is  a 
quick  and  responsive  tool  reflecting  the  global  needs  to  increase  investments  in  conflict-
affected countries, it has been one of the main drivers in keeping conflict prevention on the 
EU’s  agenda  in  spite  of  the  turbulent  political  environment.  With  a  globally  accepted  and 
well-recognised  instrument  that  also  plays  a  crucial  role  in  promoting  civil  society,  the  EU 
needs to leverage this role in its political discussions and diplomacy for peace and security. 

3. 

Separate written contributions: 

La gouvernance de l’instrument, la régularité et la qualité des échanges entre les gestionnaires 
et  les  partenaires  de  mise  en  œuvre  est  très  positive.  La  coordination  avec  les  agences  des 
Etats  membres  peut  être  améliorée  dans  la  phase  de  préparation  sans  remettre  en  cause  la 
valeur  ajoutée  de  l’instrument  par  la  mise  en  place  de  mécanismes  de  prévention  ou  de 

27 

 
 
 
consultation  rapides  et  informels.  Une  correspondance  plus  étroite  avec  les  praticiens, 
notamment via le Practitioners Network et le groupe de travail Crises, Fragilité et migrations 
est recommandée. 

Analysis of results by the external evaluation team 

The evaluation team finds submissions on this question to be in line with its conclusions; that 
the IcSP has addressed its objectives largely well (80% of OPC online responses range from 
appropriate to very well). 

Much  feedback  from  online  submissions  center  around  the  changing  nature  of  conflict  and 
new/emerged  threats,  and  the  need  for  the  IcSP  to  better  equip  itself  to  respond  to  these. 
Feedback also substantiates the conclusions drawn in the evaluation on the value added of the 
IcSP, ranging from both its speed and flexibility, ability to take risks, as an important source 
of funding in a period of funding cuts, to its multilateral nature and promotion of European 
values.  In  addition,  several  respondents  call  for  the  IcSP  to  better  leverage  its  strategic 
position  as  one  of  the  largest  dedicated  funding  instruments  in  the  sector,  and  engage  with 
other funds/donors on key policy issues. 

Several submissions were around the CBSD. This is beyond the scope of the IcSP MTE and 
has not been incorporated in the MTE. 

3.2  Question 2: IcSP Ability to Work 

Do you think the IcSP is able in its current format to work on crisis response, address 
global  threats  to  peace  and  to  seize  windows  of  opportunities  to  build  peace?  Please 
give reasons for your views. 

4. 

Summary of quantitative results 

Total 
replies 

no. 

of 

1 – Poorly 

2 
Adequately 

– 

3 – Well 

4 – Very well  N/A 

30 

5. 

6. 

1 

4 

7 

0 

18 

Qualitative contributions (online survey and written contributions) 

On-line survey feedback 

Sí  es  capaz  de  hacerlo  pero  sus  medios  son  escasos  por  lo  que  necesitaría  aumentar  sus 
recursos  en  general  y  los  destinados  a  Colombia  en  particular.  En  el  momento  coyuntural 
actual, con un acuerdo de paz con las FARC recién firmado y unas negociaciones en proceso 
con el ELN, es muy necesario apostar a las iniciativas de construcción de paz para reintegrar a 
esos grupos armados a la sociedad civil. Sin embargo, es tanto o más necesario combatir a los 
grupos paramilitares que representan la mayor amenaza para la paz en Colombia. La UE debe 
invertir  a  través  de  este  instrumento  en  medio  materiales  (y  no  sólo  técnicos)  para  que  la 
justicia y la fuerza pública hagan frente de manera decidida a esta amenaza y contribuyan a 
consolidar la posibilidad de la paz que se abre en el país.  

IcSP  should  work  on  finding  ways  to  be  more  responsive  and  fast  in  administrative 
procedures to avoid missing windows of opportunities as well as delay implementation. EU 
internal  coordination  and  communication  e.g.  regarding  proposals  should  be  enhanced  in 
order to smoothen application and reporting processes. Currently it takes a significant amount 

28 

 
 
 
of time to turn a proposal into actual activity implementation, much due to EU administrative 
processes. 

As recommended in the IcSP mid-term evaluation, it would be advisable to create a facility 
under the IcSP to fund small actions without a formal decision-making procedure. Currently 
even the so called rapid response instruments / tools (such as ERMES) can be rather stiff in 
their administration. 

As  demonstrated  in  the  evaluation  conflicts  are  increasingly  fragmented,  and  wars  have 
become highly localised, often involving local communities within a country. In this respect, 
it  will  be  essential  that  the  IcSP  also  contribute  to  strengthening  local  and  regional 
governments’ capacities as vector of stability and as peace keepers or mediators. 

We believe that it has to an extent but that it could be more flexible in doing so both in its 
responsiveness to changing situations and in dealing with varied partners. The work we have 
undertaken  with  IcSP  funding  has  contributed  to  addressing  global  threats  to  peace  and  to 
seizing  windows  of  opportunities  to  build  peace.  This  has  been  achieved  through  giving  us 
flexibility  in  project  implementation  to  take  projects  in  the  relevant  direction  and  make  the 
most  of  opportunities  according  to  the  contextual  needs.  Nonetheless,  as  an  instrument, 
considering  the  slow  timeframes  for  approving  projects  and  the  bureaucratic  nature  of 
decision-making,  the  instruments’  current  format  is  not  conducive  to  supporting  crisis 
response and seizing windows of opportunity, particularly as funding is only for a maximum 
of 18 months. 

To  better  work  on  crisis  response,  address  global  threats  to  peace  and  seize  windows  of 
opportunities  to  build  peace,  the  IcSP  needs  to  be  better  coordinated  with  other  funding 
streams and instruments. Currently there is a lack of strategic oversight and complementarity 
between the EU’s thematic and geographic instruments e.g., DCI, ENI, IPAII, EIDHR, EDF 
and EUTFs. This limits the instrument’s effectiveness and can sustainability. There is also a 
need for other instruments to better mainstream conflict sensitivity, with IcSP playing a role 
as technical consultant.  

The IcSP is effective in addressing crisis response but could be expanded to seize windows of 
opportunities  to  build  peace  in  the  longer-term.  By  expanding  the  conflict  prevention 
component  and  thinking  of  ways  to  mainstream  conflict  prevention  throughout  all  EFIs  the 
instrument could be even more effective. 

Yes but the IcSP has to improve some content of its work, like for example a better contextual 
and conflict analysis.  

7. 

Separate written contributions: 

Ces  dernières  années,  l’IcSP  a  permis  de  répondre  à  des  problématiques  nouvelles,  comme 
l’appui  à  la  prévention  et  à  la  lutte  contre  la  radicalisation.  Si  l’IcSP  n’a  pas  vocation  à  « 
construire la paix », il vise en revanche à favoriser les conditions permettant la stabilisation et 
la paix. 

Par ailleurs, « l’IcSP plus » qui intégrera le concept CBSD (dans l’attente de la création d’un 
instrument dédié à l’horizon 2020), devra être l’occasion d’élargir, de manière ambitieuse, les 
projets de l’IcSP vers un soutien plus direct aux forces de sécurité des pays partenaires. 

Analysis of results by the external evaluation team 

This  question  was  relatively  broad;  and  hence  there  is  variation  in  responses  –  with  several 
non-applicable ones. Among those responses that looked specifically at the balance between 
crisis  response  (reactive)  and  seizing  windows  of  opportunity  for  peace  (pro-active),  almost 
60% felt that this balance was struck adequately or well – but not very well.  

29 

 
 
An  important  pre-condition  for  such  a  balance  to  be  struck  is  effective  context  and  conflict 
analysis; better coordination with other EFIs; continued flexibility in allowing implementing 
partners to adjust to contexts; and continued to work ensure speedy decision-making. There is 
also a recommendation to re-establish a PAMPF like facility within the IcSP.  

Again,  the  comment  on  the  integration  of  CBSD  was  found  to  be  beyond  the  scope  of  the 
IcSP MTE. All other elements remain and have been brought forward by the evaluation team 
in the revised IcSP report. 

3.3  Question 3: IcSP and Civil Society/ International Organisations 

To  what  extent  have  the  means  provided  by  the  IcSP  to-date  proven  effective  in 
strengthening  civil  society  and  international  organisations  in  their  capacity  to 
contribute to global peace and security? 

8. 

Summary of quantitative results 

Total 
replies 

no. 

of 

1 – Poorly 

2 
Adequately 

– 

3 – Well 

4 – Very well  N/A 

27 

9. 

10. 

3 

4 

7 

2 

11 

Qualitative contributions (online survey and written contributions) 

On-line survey feedback 

As  has  come  out  of  the  draft  mid-term  review  report  (Landell  Mills,  January  2017), 
strengthened capacities at the regional level (e.g. OECD, OSCE, and League of Arab States) 
offers  the  EU  important  leverage,  which  in  itself  is  an  impact.  The  report  also  states  that 
support  under  Article  4  to  regional  and  UN  agencies  (such  as  UN  WOMEN,  UNDPA  and 
UNDP) is seen as a useful contribution to the global peace and security architecture. 

Strengthening  these  partnerships  and  supporting  actors  at  all  levels  will  contribute  to 
international peace and security as root causes of conflict can be local, regional or global and 
therefore  should  be  addressed  in  such  a  way.  Ensuring  that  this  support  is  non-military  and 
supports long-term solutions to conflict will ensure the EU places itself as a strategic ally for 
the long-term.  

IcSP  provides  important  opportunities  to  civil  society  and  international  organisations  to 
contribute  to  global  peace  and  security.  Nevertheless,  many  funds  seem  to  go  directly  to 
international  organisations,  like  the  UN,  without  giving  opportunities  to  non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) to apply for certain calls for proposals. In addition, given the complex 
nature of EC calls and proposals, it is quite difficult for local NGOs to apply for funding.  

Under the IcSP, assistance  to  CSO has  been and will be critical.  While IOs can also access 
other  programs,  particularly  geographic  programs,  support  to  CSO,  both  national  and 
international  is  paramount  in  the  midst  of  funding  reduction  at  national  European  level, 
stigmatisation of CSO globally, and systematic threats to fundamental values and rights.   

The IcSP has proven effective in enabling the requisite relationship between local civil society 
and international organisations, for example by enabling us lead on capacity building of local 
organisations  by  providing  accompaniment,  exposure  and  mentoring  to  local  partner 
organisations, in some cases allowing us to award small grants to reach out to and build the 

30 

 
 
 
capacities  of  local  organisations,  and  by  supporting  a  flexible  approach  throughout  projects 
(such as allowing minimal visibility of the EU’s support to projects which can be difficult in 
more sensitive contexts and providing training opportunities to civil society and international 
organisations). This process of skills and capacity building is key if we are to empower local 
civil  society  to  lead  on  peacebuilding  and  crisis  prevention  efforts  themselves.  In  a  global 
context of increased conflict more funding is undoubtedly needed to contribute to peace and 
security,  particularly  as  ICSP’s  budget  is  approximately  10%  of  DCI’s  for  example. 
Extending the maximum grant period from 18 months to 3 years would make the instrument 
more effective in achieving impact and results. 

Prior to the IfS and IcSP there were very few dedicated EU resources available to civil society 
and international organisations to respond to challenges of global peace and security and these 
were  complicated  to  access.  The  IfS  and  IcSP  have  significantly  increased  the  resources 
available, the focus of these resources and these resources have facilitated dialogue and joint 
working.  Despite  the  relatively  small  amounts  (compared  to  other  instruments)  involved  to 
civil society organisations and certain specialized units of international organisations the IcSP 
is a very important tool to enable response. Even though international organisations and civil 
society have additional EU resources from other EFIs to work on conflict issues, the benefit 
of IcSP is the focus on development of capacity and the specific direction on global peace and 
security (rather than on humanitarian or development response). The necessity for the EU to 
support the long-term development of capacity and thinking of international organisations and 
civil society is particularly important as instruments of other donors are increasingly focused 
on  short-term  crises  responses.  An  appropriate  balance  not  deviating  significantly  from  the 
current split should be kept between the longer and short term aspects of the IcSP as both are 
important and complement each other. 

11.  Written contributions 

Le renforcement de la résilience des acteurs de la société civile est un facteur clé pour la paix 
et la stabilité. Des projets intéressants ont été mis en oeuvre pour renforcer les capacités des 
communautés  à  lutter  contre  les  logiques  de  radicalisation.  Il  importe  toutefois  de  pouvoir 
faire régulièrement le bilan des programmes financés, afin d’en tirer des enseignements pour 
l’avenir. 

Outre  le  renforcement  nécessaire  des  acteurs  de  la  société  civile  et  des  organisations 
internationales, il importe de réfléchir à une meilleure visibilité de l’aide européenne dans le 
secteur de la paix et de la sécurité et de faire valoir la valeur ajoutée de l’expertise européenne 
en ayant recours aux agences des Etats membres et en faisant appel aux modalités existantes 
et futures de mise en œuvre conjointe. 

Analysis of results by the external evaluation team 

There is a spread among respondents on how well the IcSP has strengthened civil society and 
international organisations (the ‘global peace and security architecture’). Continued work on 
this is encouraged, but respondents call for greater investments in this kind of support. There 
are concerns that the balance is currently tilted towards international organisations (UN and 
the like) at the expense of civil society organisations. Respondents confirm that the IcSP is an 
important source of funding for organisations working in this sector.  

The evaluation team finds that a recommendation to set up a specific fund within Article 4 for 
core funding to civil society organisations should be considered. 

3.4  Question 4: Human Rights Challenges 

Responding to security concerns that affect both third countries and the EU may imply 

31 

 
 
working  with  authorities  whose  human  rights  approach  can  be  challenged.  Funding 
support to them, even after due precautions have been taken, implies certain risks. Can 
the  EU  still  add  value  in  such  circumstances  by  the  ICSP  being  more  proactively 
engaged  in  sectors  such  as  counter-terrorism,  organised  crime,  and  cybersecurity  or 
should the IcSP rather limit its engagement? Please give reasons for your views. 

12. 

Summary of quantitative results 

Total  no.  of 
replies 

–  Don’t 

1 
Engage 

2  –  Limited 
Engagement 

3  –  Engagement 
–  but  Do  no 
Harm 

4 – Engage 

N/A 

26 

13. 

14. 

2 

5 

11 

4 

4 

Qualitative contributions (online survey and written contributions) 

Online Survey feedback 

La UE puede tener un importantísimo valor añadido en el caso de Colombia para combatir el 
paramilitarismo.  La  Unión  debe  ser  capaz  de  comprometer  al  Estado  colombiano  en  esta 
lucha y de hacer un seguimiento cercano a sus recursos desembolsados para esta tarea con el 
objetivo  de  evitar  su  despilfarro,  su  utilización  para  otros  asuntos  o  su  pérdida  fruto  de  la 
corrupción  o  de  la  presunta  complicidad  de  funcionarios  estatales  con  grupos  paramilitares. 
Por tanto, la condicionalidad de la ayuda del instrumento por parte de la UE debe ser fuerte y 
dirigirse a favorecer una paz verdadera y sostenible en Colombia.  

A  Government  that  is  guilty  of  crimes  against  humanity  and  /  or  human  rights  should  not 
benefit  from  the  financial  support  of  the  EU  or  the  EU  risks  making  itself  guilty  of  these 
actions  by  extension.  However,  the  population  that  is  the  victim  of  such  crimes  and  abuse 
should benefit from EU support; thus, alternative channels of support should be sought, be it 
through  support  to  local  civil  society,  international  NGOs  on  the  ground  or  a  regional 
organisation  that  is  better  placed  than  the  EU  to  push  for  policies  or  activities  that  protect 
civilians  and prevent  human rights violations. The IcSP therefore has  a role to  play in  such 
circumstances through its ability to work with alternative actors. However, thorough analysis 
of  the  situation  and  assessing  who  to  partner  and  work  with  and  through  which  tool  and 
methodology should be sought in advance of any action.  

The strength of the EU is its support of norms and  values. Art.  21 TEU subordinate all EU 
external  actions  to  the  principles  of  democracy,  the  rule  of  law,  human  rights,  equality, 
solidarity and compliance with the UN Charter and international law. Also IcSP is subject to 
these standards. However, bearing in mind the dynamic changes in international security and 
the  emergence  of  new  threats,  as  well  as  the  growing  interdependence  of  development  and 
security  issues,  we  see  the  need  for  realistic  EU  attitudes  and  the  adaptation  of  EU 
instruments based on conditionality to improve the speed and effectiveness of EU support and 
action. […] When it comes to security, a sober, pragmatic assessment of the protection of the 
EU  interest  should  be  a  factor  as  important  in  the  decision-making  process  as  the  issue  of 
human rights. 

The problem with programmes that are designed to ‘counter terrorism’ or ‘violent extremism’, 
or  to  ‘fight’  organised  crime  is  that  they  risk  leading  to  crucial  drivers  of  conflict  being 
overlooked.  Specifically,  given  the  nature  of  these  security  challenges,  the  EU  may  look  to 
build the capacity of governments regardless of whether they are  responsible for creating or 
failing  to  address  the  conditions  that  have  led  to  insecurity  or  instability  in  the  first  place. 

32 

 
 
However, such programmes may very well backfire if all relevant drivers of violence are not 
addressed,  such  as  abuse  and  corrupt  practices  committed  by  the  security  sector.  It  is 
dangerous for the EU to be building states’ coercive capacities in the absence of commitment 
for  reform  or  space  for  public  engagement.  In  addition,  it  is  counter-productive  to  support 
civil society on the one hand, while providing repressive and abusive regimes with a cloak of 
international  legitimacy  at  a  time  when  more  scrutiny  on  their  domestic  policies  is  needed. 
These blind spots risk in turn allowing grievances to fester, violence to grow and conflicts to 
escalate. 

E’ importante non restringere il campo di azione, trattandosi di problematiche complesse a cui 
concorrono vari e diversi fattori 

Crisis  prevention  and  stabilization  by  necessity  require  international  actors  to  work  with 
governments and non-state actors who do not necessarily live up to the EU’s high standards 
regarding  democracy  and human rights.  While due diligence needs to  be applied the IcSP’s 
flexibility  and  responsiveness  must  be  maintained.  High  risk  tolerance  is  an  essential 
ingredient for any instrument that is meant to contribute to stabilization.  

The IcSP should apply a strict a Rights Based Approach in supporting themes and countries 
related to peacebuilding and conflict prevention. In the current deteriorating situations, where 
human  rights  and  democracy  are  systematically  challenged,  the  IcSP  should  ensure  a 
consistent respect of the EU fundamental values in its programming and actions. 

The  EU  IcSP  instrument  would  benefit  from  maintaining  a  more  exclusive  focus  on  human 
security  and  peace,  and  civil  society  capacity  building,  and  avoid  working  on  militarised 
approaches to security and stability, which could undermine the instrument’s objectives and 
credibility.  The  EU  should  maintain  its  independence  vis-à-vis  authorities  whose  human 
rights approach can be challenged, and working with such authorities should occur within an 
ethical  framework  which  recognises  the  importance  of  respect  for  human  rights  in  order  to 
support stability and peace. 

A  cautious  approach  is  necessary  vis-à-vis  countries  with  poor  human  rights  records. 
However  IcSP  has  been  created  to  address  also  difficult  cases,  when  potential  benefits  are 
substantial,  but  associated  with  higher  risks  of  not  attaining  the  intended  results.  It  goes 
without  saying  that  those  human  rights  deficits  are  addressed  when  working  with  such 
authorities. 

IcSP should be an instrument where a degree of risk is taken in engaging relevant actors who 
may not share EU values or to support engagement with authorities or armed groups that may 
be crucial to peace processes or addressing human rights abuses. A robust ‘conflict sensitive 
approach’  when  applied  should  assist  in  making  appropriate  decisions  throughout  the 
implementation  process  on  whether  that  risk  is  worth  taking  and  whether  this  risk  is  being 
effectively managed. Such initiatives often also need to be complemented by a robust political 
dialogue  beyond  the  level  of  the  EU  institutions  and  also  involving  the  EU  member  states 
with  particular  leverage.  There  also  have  to  be  a  level  of  overall  coherence  between  IcSP 
actions  and  those  of  other  instruments  and  political  dialogues  where  there  is  a  high  risk  of 
human rights abuses.  

Peace and security landscape is fast evolving and characterized by nearly emerged threats and 
trends  that  challenge  increasingly  weakened  global  governance  structures  and  cooperative 
regional  orders.  It’s  important  for  the  instrument  to  find  the  right  balance  between  non-
securitised and securitised actions/programmes in its contribution to EU security priorities and 
global commitments. We think that IcSP shouldn’t rather limit its engagement: but the design 
of its actions and programmes need to be revisited. 

33 

 
 
15.  Written contributions 

L’ICSP s’insère dans une action extérieure de l’UE qui articule projets concrets de soutien, de 
formation  ou  de  renforcement  de  capacités  et  dialogues  politiques.  Il  doit  intervenir  le  plus 
souvent possible en complément ou en soutien des autres actions de l’UE, y compris sur les 
sujets liés au crime-organisé, à la cybersécurité. C’est également le cas pour ce qui relève des 
mesures de soutien dans le domaine du contre-terrorisme : elles s’insèrent dans un cadre de 
coopération qui comporte un volet de dialogue technique et politique. Elles déclinent, dans le 
champ  opérationnel,  les  orientations  qui  sont  prises  au  niveau  politique,  dans  le  respect  des 
valeurs  défendues  par  l’Union.  Dans  ces  conditions,  le  risque  que  prend  l’IcSP  est 
implicitement accepté par l’Union au nom des nécessités de la gestion de crise.  

Analysis of results by the external evaluation team 

The evaluators note that the topic of managing tensions between human rights commitments 
and engagement with countries that have a challenged human rights record received a number 
of comments. Overall, there is a sense among respondents that engagement on security issues 
in human rights challenged contexts should take place, but that there need to have safeguards 
in place (42%). 15% of respondents saw no need for safeguards; while 26% called for limited 
or  no  IcSP  engagement  in  such  contexts.  The  evaluators  have  opted  for  a  line  of  IcSP 
engagement on security issues in human rights challenged context, but with safeguards. 

3.5 

 Question 5: Dialogue between IcSP and other donors 

Do  you  think  that  the  focus  of  dialogues  between  the  IcSP  and  other  relevant  donors 
has  been  appropriate  to  improve  the  global  donor  approach  to  stability  and  peace? 
Please give reasons for your views and/or suggestions. 

16. 

Summary of quantitative results 

Total 
replies 

no. 

of 

1 
– 
effective 

Not 

2 
Appropriate 

– 

3 – Effective 

N/A 

19 

17. 

18. 

2 

6 

1 

10 

Qualitative contributions (online survey and written contributions) 

Online survey feedback 

We agree  with  the  assessment by the authors of the IcSP  evaluation report that the issue of 
contributing to stability and peace is a field  for more intense and strategic  cooperation with 
other global actors / donors. This should help to better communicate the EU's priorities and 
increase  the  visibility  of  EU  support,  as  well  as  to  multiply  funding  and  better  disseminate 
funds to fight threats to international peace and security. 

The  dialogue  among  donors  has  been  effective  to  a  certain  extent.  Coordination  however 
should not preclude the possibility of providing funding to issues which might have been or 
are being already supported by another donor.  

In  some  contexts  where  we  work,  the  impact  of  the  IcSP’s  dialogues  with  other  relevant 
donors has contributed little to improving the regional donor approach to stability and peace. 
Nonetheless,  this  is  also  due  to  the constraints  of  bilateral  donors  /  governments,  which  are 
not  willing  to  take  risks  vis-à-vis  working  on  particular  contexts  (and  potentially 

34 

 
 
 
compromising 

relations 

with 

governments). 

There is a need for improved coordination between the multitude of actors working to address 
peace and security issues, particularly at national level. 

Analysis of results by the external evaluation team 

Most respondents understood this question as a call for greater donor coordination; rather than 
a question about IcSP engagement at a global level on systemic peace and security challenges. 
Those who did interpret the question as intended supported such a greater role for the IcSP. 
Many  respondents  saw  deficits  at  the  level  of  in-country  coordination.  The  evaluation  team 
has  nuanced  the  final  report  to  call  for  IcSP  strategic  engagement  with  other  funds  on 
systemic peace and security challenges. 

3.6 

Final Question - Other views on the IcSP 

If you have any other views on the IcSP you would like to share, they are welcome here. 

19. 

Qualitative contributions (online survey and written contributions) 

30 submissions were received on this question. 

20. 

Contributions 

There are limited sources of funding for mediation and conflict prevention,  and the IcSP is, 
for  the  work  that  HD  carries  out,  an  essential  and  unique  funding  partner.  (note  1:  that  the 
multilateral nature of the EU makes an EC instrument more accepted with parties to conflict) 
(note  2  on  scale:  there  is  more  that  needs  to  be  done  to  seize  windows  of  opportunity  and 
developments such as with hybrid threats and the increasing complexity of conflicts and peace 
processes) 

Several  recommendations  in  the  report  point  to  sensible  actions  concerning  concept 
definitions and M&E: ‘Require explicit theories of change…’ and ‘discourage over-ambitious 
metrics’ 

We  also refer to  the transfer  of  funds  from  ENI  to  IcSP. In  our  opinion,  there is  a  risk  that 
such  actions may contribute  indirectly to  the compromise agreed by the compromise  on the 
financing  of  the  Eastern  and  Southern  Neighborhood  dimension  and  redirecting  a  large 
proportion of the Eastern funds to the Southern programs 

We understand that under the proposal, EU assistance is not to be used to finance recurrent 
military  expenditure,  the  procurement  of  arms  and  ammunitions,  or  training  to  improve  the 
fighting capacity of armed forces. However, we urge the EC to continue supporting long-term 
peace-building  efforts  stricto  sensu.  It  should  also  closely  monitor  how  this  new  CBSD 
component will work in practice and ensure that CSOs are engaged in this exercise.  

We would generally urge the EU to take into account the following recommendations:  

Ensure the security-development nexus is always based on human and not state security.  

Short-term and especially securitised approaches aimed simply at stemming immediate forced 
displacement  may  siphon  resources  from,  and  even  harm,  the  long-term  investment  in 
peace  and  development  necessary  to  reduce  fragility  and  mitigate  against  drivers  of 
conflict.  

Prioritize 

long-term  conflict-sensitive  development  and  peace-building 

interventions. 
Economic  resilience,  social  cohesion  and  peaceful  conflict  resolution  are  mutually 
reinforceable and together can address the root causes of conflict and instability.  

35 

 
 
 
Do not use ODA in support of military or quasi-military expenditures, or channel aid through 
military actors. Any misuse of aid in this area can have extremely serious consequences, 
both  for  affected  people  in  recipient  countries,  but  also  for  the  credibility  and  public 
support for ODA. 

La  paix  n’est  plus  seulement  une  question  interétatique,  mais  un  enjeu  à  l’échelle  des 
territoires, notamment des territoires urbains.  

The IcSP like other EFIs has to represent a balance between narrow short-term EU interests 
and  longer-term  values  led  actions.  Yet  an  increased  ‘securitisation’  to  more  narrow  short-
term  EU  security  interests  to  fund  engagements  that  are  unproven  in  terms  of  impact  risks 
undermining not only EU values by the past success of the instrument.  

The  evaluation  should  focus  on  how  to  make  our  external  action  more  effective,  pragmatic 
and coherent in the remaining part of the funding period, with more emphasis on evaluation of 
results  of  our  external  action.  Evaluation  should  take  into  account  the  evolving  EU  policy 
framework,  notably  the  implementation  of  the  Global  Strategy  that  sets  out  EU’s  strategic 
objectives.  Thus  mid-term  and  long-term  future  of  External  Financing  Instruments  should 
complement  and  be  coherent  with  those  goals,  e.g.  strengthening  resilience,  strategic 
communication,  internal  and  external  security  of  the  EU,  assist  in  stabilization  of  EU’s 
immediate neighbourhood and regions in EU’s close vicinity (neighbours of our neighbours), 
and rise the EU visibility in this context. 

Analysis of results by the external evaluation team 

The  evaluation  team  notes  concerns  among  some  respondents  related  to  securitised  actions 
and programmes. These concerns are reflected in the final report; however, the evaluators see 
a need for the IcSP to engage in securitised sectors, albeit with adequate safeguards. Another 
area of controversy is around the CBSD, which is not in the scope of the MTE. There is some 
resistance to the transfer of funds from ENI to the IcSP; this has been noted and addressed in 
the final recommendations.  

The targeted meetings 

4.1    Session with CSOs and Implementing Agencies (21 March 2017) 

The  merits  of  flexibility,  velocity  and  context  sensitivity  of  this 
instrument  was 
overwhelmingly  praised  by  the  audience;  any  measure  of  change  in  the  future  should  be 
checked in as much it might have repercussions of these advantage (that goes in particular for 
the set-up of an overall strategic framework).  

Many  echoed  the  finding  that  coherence  and  coordination  could  be  improved,  and  so  is  the 
visibility  and  'marketing'  that  the  Commission  could  or  should  do,  especially  implementing 
agencies have the feeling that results achieved at project level are not communicated widely. 

The role of the IcSP for opening doors  (esp. Article 3)  and seizing  windows of opportunity 
should not be underestimated, it is in fact often a unique opportunity for the Commission to 
enter  into  political  dialogue  with  state  (and  non-state)  actors  -  this  can  be  considered  as 
substantial leverage. 

There was a call for improved interaction with CSDP mission, recognising at the same time 
the differences in scope and mandate. 

36 

 
 
 
 
With regard to funding activities involving military organisations under certain conditions, the 
tone was essentially along the lines of:  not  whether or  not  the EU/IcSP should engage  with 
military/security forces, but how. 

The CSO voiced their particular appreciation of the fact that IcSP is funded by a multi-lateral 
body, which helps with acceptance and adds political weight, as it would be perceived much 
more neutral than programmes funded by bilateral institutions (often perceived as following 
the political interest of the funding agent). 

The IcSP is seen as very important as it enables space for CSO to engage in times where this 
space is shrinking. 

They also emphasized the value of the direct contracting option under the IcSP. In addition, 
there were calls for "something like the PAMF" but with a sound legal basis. 

4.2  The Policy Forum on Development (PFD) conference (23 March 2017) 

The  PFD  was  broadly  representative  of  regional  and  some  national  CSO  of  beneficiary 
countries on  a  fairly  global  basis,  with  representatives  from  Africa,  South  East  and  Eastern 
Asia including the Pacific, South America, Eastern and South-eastern Europe, the Middle East 
and maybe other regions. The session on the MTE of all EFIs was held on the last day of the 
forum,  and  although  cast  as  a  feedback  session  to  the  evaluators  was  mostly  an  exercise  of 
sharing information about the different MTEs, raising general issues, and for the CSO present 
to  get  feedback  from  the  Commission about  process  issues  concerning  the  OPC  process 
(calendar, feedback opportunities etc.). 

There was one specific question addressed to the IcSP, which related to the support for local 
CSO  in  Colombia  during  and  after  the  peace  negotiations  between  the  government  and  the 
FARC. The other points brought up in the discussions were often addressed to the other EFI 
evaluation teams, some noteworthy, more general comments applying for the IcSP as well are 
given below: 

More emphasis should be placed by the Commission/donors on gender equality issues and the 
role  of  women  (relevant  to  crisis  mitigation,  confidence  building  and  post-crisis 
stabilisation) 

More emphasis on decentralising power and developing local infrastructure (relevant to IcSP 
work on such issues as migration and CVE, and also crisis mitigation and stabilisation); a 
related question was whether there should be a clearer separation between political actions 
and development actions - that may be of some relevance with regard to how do-no-harm 
is applied 

A strong call for coherence in EU interventions across the board -  the point was made with 
reference  to  human  rights  but  it  is  also  relevant  amongst  others  to  work  in  securitised 
sectors 

A  suggestion  that  there  should  be  a  dedicated  envelope  for  CSO  support  in  the  instruments 
to support local CSO (including  those  lacking  capacity or experience in dealing  with EU 
admin  requirements;  also  a  suggestion  to  allocate  some  funding  for  larger,  international 
NGOs  in  the  hope  that  this  will  trickle  down  to  local  CSO  and  help  them  deal  with  EU 
admin requirements - something like this is done in Georgia under Art. 3) 

The  EU  as  a  "safe  haven"  with  regard  to  funding  for  CSO  in  areas  where  a  principled 

approach is called for  

More  attention  to  the  impact  of  climate  change  on  such  issues  as  migration,  and  a  call  that 
development funding in this respect should also be available to CSO (as a side remark, the 

37 

 
 
Art. 5 funding on security challenges of climate change goes to UNEP and is thus likely to 
end up funding, at least initially, predominantly government actors) 

Evidence for development additionality, and in more general terms what should be the role of 
the private sector, of investment institutions, blending etc. - it was discussed in the context 
of human rights issues 

4.3 Public  Session  with  Member  State  and  European  Parliament  Officials  (27  and  28 

March 2017) 

1. Comments made 

Importance of linkage between ICSP and human rights/gender and stronger links with EIDHR 
was stressed. The level of integration between the African Peace Facility (APF) and IcSP 
and their relationship for establishing the peace and security architecture was questioned.  

The IcSP and DCI are welcomed to support the transition of a presence of the EU (politically/ 

SSR) in Afghanistan.  

The IcSP is appreciated because of its flexibility and the manner in which the three Articles 

complement one another. 

The idea to reinforce the ICSP and its short term measures is supported.  

The IcSP should contextualise its work more closely with political parallels in some areas of 
its work. Emphasis of the need for a stabilisation/resilience building narrative, based on a 
common  identification  of  drivers  of  conflict  in  country,  which  should  be  built  into  the 
instrument. 

There  is  a  key  need  for  stronger  and  closer  linkages  with  the  other  instruments,  which  can 

then come in with a longer term approach. 

It  would  be  useful  to  better  define  the  IcSP  framework  in  relation  to  other  instruments  to 

avoid overlapping (CS support etc). 

Provision of the example of the Turkish Facility for Refugees highlights that there could be 

synergies for the IcSP to be complementary but not part of other instruments. 

It  would  be  better  to  involve  more  Member  States  and  MS  embassies  and  encourage  their 

contribution to the design of IcSP projects in country.  

A  number  of  comments  provided  on  the  need  for  more  cooperation  on  the  ground  with 

Member States. 

A legislative procedure for IcSP is to be achieved as soon as possible – in order to elaborate 
on the projects to be implemented in the field of actions for reinforcing military actors in 
third countries  

2. Questions raised 

In  relation  to  the  second  recommendation  question  of  the  MTE,  what  would  the  stronger 

political focus for the future IcSP entail? 

Intervention  are  mainly  triggered  by  EUD’s,  is  this  the  most  effective  way  to  use  the 
instrument  or  would  it  be  better  to  involve  the  MS  embassies  to  a  greater  level  on  the 
ground?  

38 

 
 
 
 
Clarification  on  the  selection  of  implementing  partners  for  IcSP,  including  private  sector 

countries and UN contractors.  Are they the most effective?  

Question raised as to how the APF and IcSP could be brought closer together? Also raised the 

question of synergies between other approaches, including CFSF, APSA etc.  

Given  the  changing  global  context  and  the  particular  growth  of  hybrid  conflicts,  should  the 

IcSP grow/change? What does the post  

 nature of the instrument look like? 

Could  the  double  purpose/proposal  of  the  ICSP  long  term  and  short  term  approaches  be  a 

problem – is this difficult to manage? 

Should  the IcSP consider  a different direction now that  the Trust Funds can  react as fast or 

even faster than the IcSP?  

Can the coordination with Embassies and Delegations on the ground be increased and made 

more transparent in terms of design/implementing partners? 

Additional Comments submitted in written 

From the above mentioned three organisations’ written comments, the evaluation team notes 
the following: 

Calls from all submitters for the continuation of the IcSP beyond 2020 and appreciation of its 

increased relevance 

The  need  for  greater  coordination  with  Member  States  and  other  EFIs  reiterated  by 
governmental  submitters  (UK  and  France),  including  on  expertise  sharing  and  forward 
planning on key topics (migration, etc.). 

Continued  alignment  and  responsiveness  of  IcSP  actions  and  programmes  to  EU  strategies 

and policies (e.g. Global Strategy) 

A  pragmatic  approach  in  rights-challenged  contexts  to  build  into  actions  and  programmes 

adequate safeguards (do no harm and conflict sensitivity) 

Support to the CBSD reiterated by governmental submitters 

Articulation  of  principles  to  guide  IcSP  actions  and  principles  (e.g.  “a  comprehensive 

approach”, greater attention to building resilience, etc.) 

The need for continued learning to inform IcSP actions and programmes, particularly through 

the implementation of conflict analysis exercises 

Consolidated analysis of the external evaluation team on the consultation 

The evaluation team welcomed the wealth of feedback and questions received during the face 
to face meetings during public presentations. The team noted: 

Calls for greater IcSP coordination with Member States and other EFIs 

Affirmation of the value added of the IcSP when it comes to its speed, flexibility, multilateral 

nature, and promotion of EU values 

Calls  for  a greater IcSP  role  in  addressing  global  funding cuts  for  peace  and security  at  the 
same  time,  an  overarching  strategic  framework  appears  especially  suited  for  the 
programmable actions under Articles 4 and 5 

39 

 
 
 
 
Greater  need  for  a  bolstered  analytical  base  of  IcSP  funded  interventions;  including  more 

strategic thinking on the implications of hybrid conflicts on IcSP actions/programmes 

Better  articulation  of  how  to  integrate  conflict-sensitivity  and  do  no  harm  approaches  in 
actions and programmes that can have negative knock-on effects on cross-cutting priorities 

The  definition  and  concept  of  hybrid  threat  (as  opposed  to  hybrid  conflict)  should  be 

sharpened in the report 

Calls  for  better  mainstreaming  of  EU  cross-cutting  priorities  within  the  IcSP;  particularly 

gender and climate change 

The  team  has  reflected  calls  for  better  coordination  with  Member  States  and  EFIs  in  the 
revised report, and adjusted the recommendations to be more manageable for implementation. 
This  has  meant,  for  example,  not  re-iterating  in  recommendations  areas  of  work  where 
progress  is  being  made  (e.g.  mainstreaming  cross-cutting  priorities)  and  the  provision  of 
practical recommendations on measures to strengthen the value added of the instrument (e.g. 
the  re-creation  of  a  PAMF  like  facility  for  the  IcSP).  Comments  related  to  the  CBSD, 
however, remain outside of the scope of this MTE – and should be included in the Final IcSP 
evaluation instead. 

OPC List of Participants and Contributing Organisations 

Entity/Person 

Universita' Degli Studi Unirapida 

Cirad 

Chan Sotheavuth  

Jürgen Krone, DBE Technology GmbH 

Democratic Youth Foundation - DYF  

Country 

Italy 

France 

Cambodia  

Germany 

Yemen 

Oficina Internacional de Derechos Humanos - Acción Colombia 

Belgium 

Alexandru  Osadci,  Congress  of  Local  Authorities  from  Moldova 
(CALM) 

Republic 
Moldova 

of 

LOKMIS 

Flanders Department of Foreign Affairs 

Global Water Partnership Central and Eastern Europe 

Union des Communes du Togo 

Christian Kennes, Bel V subsidiary of the Belgian Federal Agency 
for Nuclear Control  

Adam Institute for Democracy and Peace 

Lithuania 

Belgium 

Slovakia 

Togo 

Belgium 

Israel 

40 

 
 
 
Peter Nilsson, Suxini Ek. för. 

Sweden 

Glevys  ROndon  (Ms)  Latin  American  Mining  Monitooring 
Programme (LAMMP) 

United Kingdom 

Chris Rotas at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 

Switzerland 

Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi 

GHC Smith 

People in Need Philippine Office 

Oleksander Sergiienko 

European International Contractors e. V. (EIC) 

Colombia 

Vietnam 

Philippines 

Ukraine 

Germany 

Jean Dimy Cherestal/Vision de Développement pour la Promotion 
Sociale de la Masse (VDPSMaH) 

Haiti 

Egest Gjokuta 

International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) 

Enterprise Greece 

Dilia  Zwart  and  Olivia  Caeymaex.  Quaker  Council  of  European 
Affairs  

Oleg V Kolesnikov (Kazka Solutions) 

EuroMed Rights 

ROM CMTP Project 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

Māra Engelbrehta 

Lumos 

Albania 

Belgium 

Greece 

Belgium 

Ukraine 

Denmark 

Belgium 

Lithuania 

Latvia 

Belgium 

Debbie Ball - International Alert 

United Kingdom 

Katarzyna  Rozesłaniec,  EU  Economic  Department,  Ministry  of 
Foreign Affairs of Poland 

Poland 

Saferworld 

Ministry of Public Sector Development 

European Network of Political Foundations 

London 

Jordan 

Brussels 

41 

 
 
Colombe  blanche  pour  les  droits  de  Personnes  en  situation  de 
handicap au Maroc 

Maroc 

Crisis Management Initiative 

CEFA Onlus 

Minister of Finance & Planning 

WWF European Policy Office 

Paola  Amadei,  Executive  Director  on  behalf  of  EU-LAC 
Foundation 

EUNIC Global 

The Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation 

State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate 

Dania Tondini, AVSI Foundation 

GRS Global Research for Safety 

Life & Peace Institute 

European University Association 

ENCO 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 

Red Cross EU Office 

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 

Andrea Maccanico 

Finland 

Italy 

Palestine 

Belgium 

Germany 

Belgium 

Sweden 

Lithuania 

Italy 

Germany 

Sweden 

Belgium 

Austria 

Denmark 

Belgium 

Sweden 

Italy 

Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development  

Germany 

Platforma 

Migrations & Développement 

European Partnership for Democracy 

Flanders Investment & Trade 

Belgium 

France 

Belgium 

Belgium 

Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) 

France 

International Disability and Development Consortium (IDDC) 

Belgium 

42 

 
 
Wouter Zweers and Jan Melissen 

Claire Mandouze  

United Cities and Local Governments of Africa 

Ittret Tina Thomas 

Santa Falasca 

Netherlands 

Belgium 

Morocco 

United Kingdom 

Belgium 

International Co-operative Alliance Africa ( The Alliance Africa)  Kenya 

CARE International 

Belgium 

AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) 

Belgium 

Organización Nacional de Ciegos Españoles (ONCE) 

International  Trade  Union  Confederation-Trade  Union 
Development Cooperation Network (ITUC-TUDCN) 

España 

Belgium 

Conciliation Resources 

United Kingdom 

European Technical Safety Organizations Network (ETSON) 

France 

Dana  Tjurina,  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Republic  of 
Latvia 

Latvia 

AREVA 

Arab NGO Network for Development 

DSW 

NGO Monitor 

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 

Andrea Bianchessi 

The Finnish NGDO Platform to the EU 

Régions de France 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia 

France 

Lebanon 

Belgium 

Israel 

Finland 

Kenya 

Finland 

France 

Latvia 

Italian Agency for Development and Cooperation - Tirana Officer 

Italy 

Front Line Defenders 

Ireland  

European  Federation  of  Engineering  Consultancy  Associations  Belgium 

43 

 
 
(EFCA) 

Gouvernement  de 
coopération régionale et des relations extérieures 

la  Nouvelle-Calédonie 

-  Service  de 

la 

Nouvelle-Calédonie 

Austrian Federal MFA - Departments for European Development 
Cooperation and Southern Neighbourhood Policy 

Austria 

World Vision 

United Cities and Local Governments Middle East and West Asia 
section (UCLG-MEWA) 

British Council  

Fern 

Belgium 

Turkey 

London/Brussels 

UK 

International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims 

Denmark 

International Fund for Animal Welfare 

Kingdom of Belgium 

Ines 

Susan Bassett 

More Europe - external cultural relations 

Search for Common Ground 

Institut de Recherche pour le Développement -IRD- 

World Vision  

World Bank Group 

Maeve McLynn, Climate Action Network Europe 

AVSI Brasil 

Belgium 

Belgium 

Belgium 

United Kingdom 

Belgium 

Belgium 

France 

Belgium 

USA 

Belgium 

Brazil 

Participation in OPC events organised in Brussels (March 2017) 

Country/ Institution/ Organisation 

Name of Representative (if known)  

Austria 

Belgium 

MS representative 

MS representative 

British Council 

Axelle Basselet/Krzys Jurek  

44 

 
 
 
Center for Humanitarian Dialogue 

Crown Agents 

DFID (UK) 

Chris Rotas 

James Blair 

Zentrum  für  Internationale  Friedenseinsätze 
(ZIF) 

Silvia Laufer 

EPLO 

EUNIDA 

Expertise France 

FIIAAP 

Finland 

Greece 

Ben Moore/Susan Wander 

Viv Davies 

Anne 
Lautier 

Budai/Benjamin  Hauville/Claire 

Cecilia Castillo 

MS representative 

MS representative 

International Center for Transitional Justice 

Santa Falasca 

International Alert 

Debbie Ball 

International  Organisation 
(IOM) 

for  Migration 

Jo De Backer 

Romania 

RUSI 

Safer World 

SCJS 

MS representative 

Andrew Glazard 

Kloé Tricot O’Farell 

Gary Linton/Nicholas Apps 

Search for Common Ground 

Fien de Baere 

Spain 

UNESCO 

MS representative 

Jan De Bisschop 

UN Liaison Office 

Tanya Baghy (DPA) 

UN Women 

UNICRI 

World Vision 

Laurence Gillois/Astrid Pertuisel 

Ludovic Dhoore 

Alexandra Matei/Pamela Thiebaut 

45 

 
 
 
  
Annex 3. Acronyms 

AAP 

AU 

CAR 

Annual Action Programme(s) 

African Union 

Central Africa Republic 

CBRN  

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 

CC 

CfP 

Council Conclusion(s) 

Call for Proposals 

CFSP   

Common Foreign and Security Policy 

CI 

CIR 

CoE 

CSR 

CSDN  

CSDP   

CSO 

CT 

CVE 

Critical Infrastructure 

Common Implementing Regulation 

Centre(s) of Excellence 

Corporate Social Responsibility 

Civil Society Dialogue Network 

Common Security and Defence Policy 

Civil Society Organisation(s) 

Counter-Terrorism 

Countering Violent Extremism 

CWC   

Chemical Weapons Convention 

DAC 

DCI 

DDR 

Development Assistance Committee 

Development Cooperation Instrument 

Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration 

DEVCO 

Directorate-General for International Co-operation and Development  

DG 

Directorate General 

DG ECHO  Directorate  General  for  European  Civil  Protection  and  Humanitarian  Aid 
Operations 

DG HOME   Directorate-General Migration and Home Affairs 

DG NEAR  Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations 

DG SANTE  Directorate-General Health and Food Safety 

EC 

European Commission 

EAM   

Exceptional Assistance Measure 

EDF 

European Development Fund  

EEAS   

European External Action Service 

EFI 

External Financing Instrument(s) 

EIDHR 

European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights  

ENI 

European Neighbourhood Instrument  

ENTRi  

Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management 

46 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EP 

European Parliament 

EPLO   

European Peace-building Liaison Office 

EQ 

Evaluation Question(s) 

ERMES 

European Resources for Mediation Support 

ESF 

EU 

European Security Fund 

European Union 

EUCAP 

European Conference on Antennas and Propagation 

EUD 

EU Delegation(s)   

EUPST 

European Union Police Services Training Programme 

EUROPOL  European Police Office 

EUTF   

EUTM  

FARC  

FD 

FPI 

FWC 

HQ 

HR 

IA 

IcSP 

IDP 

IfS 

European Union Trust Fund 

European Training Mission 

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army 

Financial Decision 

Service for Foreign Policy Instruments 

Framework Contract 

Headquarters 

High Representative 

Impact Assessment 

Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 

Internally Displaced People 

Instrument for Stability 

INGO   

International Non-Governmental Organisation(s) 

IO 

IP 

IPA 

IRP 

International Organisation(s) 

Implementing Partner(s) 

Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance  

Interim Response Programme(s) 

ISTC 

International Science and Technology Centre 

JC 

KII 

MIP 

MS 

MSU 

MTE 

NAP 

NAQ 

Judgement Criterion/Criteria 

Key Informant Interview(s) 

Multi-annual Indicative Programme(s) 

Member State(s) 

Mediation Support Unit 

Midterm Evaluation  

National Action Plan 

Needs Assessment Questionnaire 

47 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NFP 

NGO 

NT 

OC 

National Focal Point(s) 

Non-Governmental Organisation(s) 

National Team 

Organised Crime 

ODA 

Official Development Assistance 

OECD  

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 

OPC               Open Public Consultation 

OPCW  

OSCE   

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 

PAMF  
Areas of Assistance 

Policy  Advice,  Technical  Assistance,  Mediation,  Reconciliation  and  Other 

PBP 

PCD 

PCNA  

PDNA  

PI 

PSC 

Peace-Building Partnership 

Policy Coherence for Development  

Post-conflict needs assessment 

Post-disaster needs assessment 

Partnership Instrument 

Political and Security Committee 

SALW  

Small Arms and Light Weapons 

SDG 

SSR 

STCU   

STGs   

SWD   

TEU 

TOC 

UN 

Sustainable Development Goal(s) 

Security Sector Reform 

The Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine 

Sustainable Development Goal(s) 

Staff Working Document 

Treaty of the European Union 

Theory of Change 

United Nations 

UNDP  

United Nations Development Programme 

UNDPA 

United Nations Department of Political Affairs 

UNEP  

United Nations Environment Programme 

UNHCR 

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

UNODA 

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 

UNSC Res  United Nations Security Council Regulation 

USAID 

United States Agency for International Development 

UNICRI 

United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute 

VP 

Vice President 

WHO   

World Health Organization 

48 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WMD   

Weapons of Mass Destruction 

WPS 

Women Peace and Security 

Annex 4. External Evaluation report 

49