COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Evaluation of the Development Cooperation Instrument Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Mid-term review report of External Financing Instruments
Date: 2017-12-15
Institutions: Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, European Commission
Subjects: EU financial instrument, democracy, developing countries, development aid, financial aid, human rights, poverty, rule of law, sustainable development

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 15.12.2017  SWD(2017) 600 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Evaluation of the Development Cooperation Instrument Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Mid-term review report of External Financing Instruments {COM(2017) 720 final} - {SWD(2017) 463 final} - {SWD(2017) 601 final} - {SWD(2017) 602 final} - {SWD(2017) 604 final} - {SWD(2017) 605 final} - {SWD(2017) 606 final} - {SWD(2017) 607 final} - {SWD(2017) 608 final} - {SWD(2017) 609 final}  
 
 
CONTENTS 

Executive summary .................................................................................................................... 2 

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 3 

1.1 Purpose of the evaluation .............................................................................................................. 3 

1.2 Scope of the evaluation ................................................................................................................. 3 

2. Background of the initiative ................................................................................................... 4 

2.1 Description of the DCI and its objectives ..................................................................................... 4 

2.2 Structure of the instrument ............................................................................................................ 5 

2.4 Baseline ......................................................................................................................................... 9 

3. Method ................................................................................................................................... 9 

4. Implementation state of play ................................................................................................ 10 

5. Answers to the evaluation questions .................................................................................... 14 

5.1 Relevance .................................................................................................................................... 14 

5.2 Effectiveness, impact, and sustainability .................................................................................... 15 

5.3 Efficiency .................................................................................................................................... 16 

5.4 Added Value ............................................................................................................................... 17 

5.5 Coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies ........................................................... 18 

5.6 Leverage ...................................................................................................................................... 19 

6. Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 19 

Annex 1. Procedural information ............................................................................................. 21 

Annex 2. Synopsis report of the stakeholders' consultation ..................................................... 26 

Annex 3. Acronyms .................................................................................................................. 36 

Annex 4. Indicators for dci countries ....................................................................................... 37 

Annex 5. External Evaluation .................................................................................................. 43 

1 

 
 
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  

This  Staff  Working  Document  evaluates  the  Development  Cooperation  Instrument  (DCI)  at 
its mid-term, covering the period January 2014 to June 2017. 

With  an  initial  financial  envelop  of  EUR  19.7  billion,  the  DCI  is  the  main  financing 
instrument within the EU budget available to support its development policy. It is one of the 
External  Financing  Instruments  of  the  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  2014-2020  of  the 
EU. Its overall objective is to eradicate poverty in partner countries and provide a long-term 
response to global challenges. It is made of three components: a) the geographic programmes 
that, so far, have funded bilateral cooperation with 29 countries and 3 regions; b) the thematic 
programmes which finance Global Public Goods and support Civil Society Organisations and 
Local Authorities; c) the Pan-African programme which funds the implementation of the joint 
Africa-EU Strategy. 

The  DCI  remains  overall  relevant  and  fit  for  purpose,  both  when  it  was  adopted  and  at  the 
mid-point of its implementation. It is broadly in line with new policy documents (e.g. the new 
European  Consensus  on  Development  and  the  2030  Agenda  for  Sustainable  Development) 
although implementing certain priorities,, could be difficult in its current format. It has largely 
been able to respond to new challenges that have arisen (e.g. the migration crisis); and has for 
the most part responded to beneficiary needs although they can place a different weight on EU 
values/global agenda. 

Concerning  effectiveness,  while  bearing  in  mind  the  difficulties  in  measuring  development 
progress due to, for example, the number of other actors contributing to the same or similar 
goals,  the  DCI  appears  to  be  largely  on  track  to  deliver  on  its  long-term  objectives  and 
commitments.  Countries  receiving  the  bulk  of  DCI  assistance  are  showing  signs  of  poverty 
reduction. Data on results is nevertheless limited for 2014-2017 and because monitoring and 
evaluation  at  instrument  level  was  not  well  defined  in  the  DCI  Regulation,  systems  are  not 
always in place to ensure proper follow up. 

The  DCI's  principles  of  differentiation  and  graduation  have  intentionally  left  a  gap  in  the 
instrument's  ability  to  cooperate  on  poverty  with  Upper  Middle  Income  Countries  through 
bilateral cooperation. As situations in those countries may call  for such support (e.g. due to 
the  persistent  presence  of  poverty,  inequalities  and  post-crisis  situations),  the  thematic  and 
regional programmes were expected to meet this gap but this was not always the case.  

The  DCI  is  generally  efficient  when  looking  at  organisational  performance  but  some  of  its 
users still view it as administratively burdensome.  

The  EU  and  the  DCI's  added  value  are  apparent  through  a  number  of  factors  such  its 
independent/supranational status and its ability to lead on joint actions with Member States.  

There  is  some,  often  anecdotal,  evidence  of  coherence  existing  between  the  different 
components of the DCI, and with the other External Financing Instruments.  

When  it  comes  to  leveraging  funds,  the  DCI  has  seen  significant  results,  however,  the 
outcomes  appear  less  positive  on  the  instrument's  ability  to  support  political  and  policy 
leveraging.  

The findings/conclusions of the evaluation will feed into the reflection on how to improve the 
implementation  of  the  DCI  for  the  remaining  period  until  2020,  and  on  the  future  set  of 
External Financing Instruments for the next Multiannual Financial Framework. 

2 

 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  

1.1 Purpose of the evaluation 

This document sets-out the results of a mid-term evaluation of the Development Cooperation 
Instrument1  (DCI)  2014-2020.  The  evaluation  assesses  whether  the  instrument  is  fit  for 
purpose, based on its performance to-date, to deliver on its objectives of reducing and, in the 
long term, eradicating poverty, and of contributing to fostering sustainable economic, social 
and environmental development and consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law, 
good governance, human rights and the relevant principles of international law2. Its purpose is 
to inform future work on the instrument and its actions. In particular, this evaluation, which is 
part of a set of ten evaluations covering all the EU External Financing Instruments3, informs 
the  Mid-Term  Review  Report4,  which  draws  conclusions  across  the  External  Financing 
Instruments. 

This paper is largely based on an external evaluation by independent consultants provided in 
annex 5.  

1.2 Scope of the evaluation 

The  temporal  scope  of  the  evaluation  corresponds  to  the  requirements  for  the  Mid-Term 
Review Report set out in Article 17 of the Common Implementation Regulation. It therefore 
focuses  on  the  period  January  2014  to  June  2017.  However,  due  to  the  length  of  the 
implementation cycle of the DCI, the availbility of data and results are limited. Therefore the 
evaluation  also  looks  at  the  previous  DCI  (2007-2013)5  for  some  of  the  evaluation  criteria 
(e.g.  efficiency  and  effectiveness).  When  using  the  previous  DCI  as  a  source  of  data,  it  is 
important to note that the overall objective of the DCI (poverty reduction) has remained the 
same for both the former and the current instrument. 

This mid-term evaluation concentrates on the DCI as an instrument of the EU's development 
policy and external action. This means the evaluation focuses, to the  extent possible, on the 
instrument's features as set out in the DCI Regulation (e.g. its principles, scope, flexibility and 
complementarity with other instruments) rather than the projects that have been put in place 
as  a  result  of  the  instrument.  Development  cooperation  policies  associated  to  the  DCI  legal 
base are not in the scope of this evaluation and are the object of other evaluations6.  

The countries  covered under the evaluation are those eligible under  the DCI  regulation (see 
also section 2.1 on Description and 2.2 on Structure)  

1 Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, OJ L77, p. 44 
2 Article. 2.1 of the DCI Regulation. 
3 11th European Development Fund, European Neighbourhood Instrument, European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights,  Greenland  Decision,  Instrument  contributing  to  Stability  and  Peace,  Instrument  for  Pre-accession  Assistance, 
Instrument  on  Nuclear  Safety  Cooperation,  Overseas  Countries  and  Territories  Decision,  Partnership  Instrument  and  the 
Common  Implementing  Regulation.  For  the  purpose  of  this  exercise,  the  evaluation  of  the  Overseas  Countries  and 
Territories Decision is included within the evaluation of the 11th European Development Fund. 

4  As  requested  in  Article  17  of  the  Common  Implementing  Regulation:  Regulation  (EU)  No  236/2014  of  the  European 

Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, OJ L77, p. 95 

5 Regulation (EU) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006, OJ L 378 
6  For  example,  see  the  review  of  strategic  evaluations  managed  by  DEVCO  to  assess  the  European  Consensus  on 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/review-strategic-evaluations-managed-devco-assess-european-consensus-

Development 
development_en  

3 

 
 
                                                 
In  accordance  with  the  EU  Better  Regulation  guidelines7,  the  following  evaluation  criteria 
have  been  used:  relevance,  effectiveness,  efficiency,  coherence,  EU  added  value,  and 
leverage. 

2. BACKGROUND OF THE INITIATIVE  

The  External  Financing  Instruments  make  up  a  major  part  of  the  2014-2020  Multiannual 
Financial Framework's8 Heading IV "Global Europe"9 which provides the EU with the tools 
necessary to reinforce its role on the world stage and to ensure that it is able to live up to its 
ambitions  in  promoting  its  interests  and  universal  values  and  principles  such  as  democracy, 
human rights, peace, solidarity, stability and poverty reduction and to  help safeguard global 
public goods.  

Adopted in early 2014, the External Financing Instruments were designed to enable the EU to 
implement external action policies, with the intention of being relevant for the entire duration 
of the Multi-annual Financial Framework.  

2.1 Description of the DCI and its objectives  

In  particular,  the  DCI  is  the  EU's  main  financing 
instrument within the EU budget available to support 
it's  development  policy  as  an  important  part  of  the 
EU's  relationship  with  the  outside  world.  It  is 
complementary to the European Development Fund11 
which  is  funded  outside  of  the  EU  budget  and 
specifically  covers  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific 
countries.   

response 

long-term 

The  overall  aim  of  the  DCI  is  to  eradicate  poverty 
and  provide  a 
to  global 
threats/challenges, many of which have their roots in 
poverty  and  under-development.  Within  this  overall 
objective, the DCI is also tasked with contributing to 
the  achievement  of  more  specific  objectives  of  EU 
external  action,  in  particular:  fostering  sustainable 
economic, social and environmental development  as 
well as promoting  democracy, the rule of law, good 
governance and respect for human rights. 

Table 1. Heading IV Global Europe 
2014 – 2020 10

Development Cooperation Instrument 
European Neighbourhood Instrument 
Instrument for Pre-accession assistance 
Humanitarian aid 
Instrument contributing to Stability and 
Peace 
Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Margin 
Agencies, EU Aid Volunteers, Emergency 
Response Centre and others 
European Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights 
Guarantee fund for External actions 
Partnership Instrument 
Macro-financial Assistance 
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 
Greenland  

€ millions 

19 662 
15 433 
11 699 
6 622 

2 339 

2 339 
2 286 

1 396 

1 333 

1 193 
955 
565 
225 
218 

EDF (outside the EU budget) 

30 506 

By  using  this  instrument,  the  EU  finances  actions  aimed  at  supporting  geographic  and 
thematic cooperation with developing countries included in the list of aid recipients compiled 

7  Commission  communication 

'Better 

regulation 

for  better 

results 

http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/better_regulation/documents/com_2015_215_en.pdf 
Guidelines' 
regulation/guidelines/docs/swd_br_guidelines_en.pdf. 

Staff  Working 

Commission 

Document, 

SWD 

-  An  EU  agenda',  COM 
, 
111 

(2015)  215 
'Better  Regulation 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-

(2015) 

and 

8  Council  Regulation  (EU,  EURATOM)  No  1311/2013  of  2  December  2013  laying  down  the  Multiannual  Financial 

Framework for the years 2014-2020, OJ L 347/884, p. 884. 

9 The Multi-annual Financial Framework is divided into six broad groups of expenditure called "Headings". The EFIs make 

up the majority of Heading IV: Global Europe. 

10 External Financing Instruments are highlighted in blue. Source: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/index_en.cfm  
11 Regulation 2015/322 of the Council on 2 March 2015 on the implementation of the 11th European Development Fund, OJ 

L 58 of 03.03.2015, p. 1 

4 

 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
by  the  Development  Assistance  Committee  of  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation 
and Development12. Unlike other External Financing Instruments, the actions under the DCI 
must  be  designed  so  as  to  fulfil  the  criteria  for  Official  Development  Assistance.  A  few 
exceptions exist in the case of the thematic Global Public Goods and Challenges programme 
and the Pan-African programmes, where a limited percentage (5 and 10 % respectively) can 
be used for non-Official Development Assistance. 

2.2 Structure of the instrument 

The components of the DCI are as follows:  

•  Geographic Programmes  (EUR  11.8  billion):  supporting  actions  in  North  and  South  East 
Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and other countries (South 
Africa).  The  programmes  distinguish  between  regional  and  bilateral  cooperation:  only 
partner  countries  which  are  not  Upper  Middle  Income  Countries  according  to  the 
Development  Assistance  Committee  list  (see  footnote  12)  and  with  less  than  1%  world 
Gross Domestic Product are eligible for bilateral cooperation unless the exception clause 
is used13. 

•  Thematic programmes – which fall into two groups: 

1.  Global  Public  Goods  and  Challenges  (GPGC)  (EUR  5.1  billion):  covering 
environment  and  climate  change,  sustainable  energy,  human  development  including 
decent  work,  social  justice  and  culture,  food  and  nutrition  security  and  sustainable 
agriculture,  and  migration  and  asylum,  while  ensuring  coherence  with  the  poverty 
reduction objective.  

2.  Civil  Society  Organisations  and  Local  Authorities  (CSO-LA)  (EUR  1.9  billion): 
encouraging  civil  society  (e.g.  non-governmental  organisations  and  citizens’ 
organisations) and local authorities to play a greater role in development strategies. 

The  eligibility  of  the  thematic  programmes  is  wider  than  the  geographic  programmes. 
Thematic  programmes  may  take  place  in  any  developing  country  on  the  list  of  Official 
Development Assistance Recipients14 as published by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee.  

•  Pan-African  programme  (EUR  845  million):  supporting  the  EU’s  strategic  partnership 
with Africa15. This programme complements other instruments which are used in Africa, 
such as the European Development Fund and the European Neighbourhood Instrument16. 
Activities under this programme are of a trans-regional, continental or global nature. 

12 http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist.htm  
13 DCI Regulation, Article 5.1. To be noted that the declaration attached to the instrument already provides for the use of the 

exception clause for Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Peru and South Africa. 

14  Except  for  the  CSO-LA  Priority  3  programme  component  called  Development  Education  Awareness  Raising.  This 
programme includes initiatives for raising public awareness of development issues, empowering people to become active 
and responsible citizens and promoting formal and informal education for development in the EU Member States, candidate 
countries and potential candidates. See DCI Regulation, annex 2.b 
15 The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership – A joint Africa EU Strategy 
www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/eas2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf  
16 Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, OJ L77, p. 27 

5 

 
 
                                                 
Table 2. DCI allocations in EUR millions per geographic, thematic and Pan African 
programme17 

The intervention logic of the DCI is presented below. To reflect the level of the evaluation, it 
focuses  on  the  instrument  and  its  relationship  between  the  DCI  and  the  other  External 
Financing Instruments.  

The  intervention  logic  was  constructed  based  on  three  main  sets  of  documents:  policy 
documents  such  as  the  European  Consensus  on  Development  (2005)18  and  the  Agenda  for 
Change  (2011)19;  the  Regulations  establishing  the  DCI  and  the  Common  Implementing 
Regulation;  and  programming  documents  for  the  Pan-African  Programme,  CSO/-LA,  and 
GPGC,  as  well  as  selected  regional  and  country  programming  documents  under  the 
geographic programme. 

17 Source: DCI Regulation, annex 4. 
18  The  European  Consensus  on  Development  was  signed  in  2005  and  published  in  the  EU  Official  Journal  in  2006. 

https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/european-development-policy/european-consensus-development_en  

19  Communication  from  the  European  Commission:  Increasing  the  impact  of  EU  Development  Policy:  an  Agenda  for 
Change, COM(2011) 637 final, 13.10.2011; Council Conclusions on "Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an 
Agenda for Change” (3166th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels, 14 May 2012). 

6 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Table 3. DCI Intervention Logic

7 

 
 
Table 4. Selected Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals indicators20 

MDGs / SDGs 

Selected indicators 

Years 

Target 

Deve-
loping 
regions 

Carib-
bean + 
Latin 
America 

Norther
n Africa 

Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 

Western 
Asia 

Souther
n Asia 

South-
Easter
n Asia 

Caucasus 
+ Central 
Asia 

MDG 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and 
hunger / SDG 1: End poverty in all its 
forms everywhere 

Percentage of people 
living on less than USD 
1.25 a day  

MDG 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and 
hunger / SDG 2: End hunger, achieve 
food security and improved nutrition 
MDG 2: Achieve universal primary 
education / SDG 4: Ensure inclusive and 
equitable quality education 

MDG 3 and SDG 5: Promote gender 
equality and empower women 

MDG 4: Reduce child mortality / SDG 3: 
Good health and well being 

MDG 5: Improve maternal health / SDG 
3: Good health and well being 

MDG 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
other diseases  

Proportion of under-
nourished people  

Adjusted net enrolment 
rate for primary 
education 
Gender parity index for 
gross enrolment ratio in 
secondary education 
Under five mortality rate  
(deaths per 1 000 live 
births) 
Maternal mortality ratio  
(maternal deaths per 100 
000 live births, women 
aged 15-49) 
Estimated number of new 
HIV infections per year 
per 100 people aged 15-
49  

Halve, between 1990 and 
2015, the proportion of 
people living under poverty 
line 
11.8% (i.e. half of the 
percentage in 1990) 

Children to complete a full 
course of primary schooling 

Between 0.97 and 1.03 

Reduce by 2/3 between 1990 
and 2015  

To be reduced by ¾ between 
1990 and 2015 

1990 

41% 

12% 

5% 

56% 

5% 

51% 

45% 

10% 

2010 

26% 

6% 

1% 

48% 

4% 

30% 

14% 

4% 

1990 

24% 

15% 

<5% 

33% 

7% 

26% 

26% 

14% 

2013 

14% 

8% 

<5% 

25% 

10% 

17% 

11% 

7% 

1990 

80% 

87% 

80% 

52% 

84% 

75% 

93% 

95% 

2012 

90% 

94% 

99% 

78% 

93% 

94% 

94% 

95% 

1990 

0.77 

1.06 

0.77 

0.76 

0.65 

0.59 

0.90 

0.98 

2012 

0.96 

1.07 

0.99 

0.84 

0.92 

0.93 

1.02 

0.98 

1990 

99 

54 

73 

177 

65 

126 

71 

73 

2012 

53 

19 

22 

98 

25 

58 

30 

C 300 

1990 

430 

190 

160 

990 

130 

530 

320 

70 

2013 

230 

LA 130 

69 

510 

74 

190 

140 

36 

39 

Have halted by 2015 and 
begun to reverse the spread 
of HIV/AIDS 

2001 

0.10 

2012 

0.06 

77 

C 0.12  

0.05 
LA 0.03 
0.03 

0.01 

0.01 

see 
note21 

<0.01 

0.03 

0.04 

0.02 

0.01 

0.02 

0.03 

0.02 

MDG 7: Ensure environmental 
sustainability / SDG 6: clean water and 
sanitation 

Proportion of population 
using an improved 
drinking water source  

MDG 8: Develop a global partnership for 
development / SDG 17: Partnerships for 
the goals 

Debt burden measures as 
external debt service 
payments to proportion of 
export revenues 

Halve by 2015 the 
proportion of population 
without sustainable access to 
safe drinking water  
Deal comprehensively 
with developing 
countries' debt22 

1990 

70% 

85% 

87% 

48% 

85% 

72% 

71% 

87% 

2012 

87% 

94% 

92% 

64% 

91% 

91% 

89% 

86% 

2010 

3.0% 

6.7% 

4.4% 

2.4% 

8.0% 

2.8% 

3.1% 

1.1% 

2012 

3.1% 

6.6% 

4.4% 

3.3% 

6.6% 

3.0% 

2.5% 

1.1% 

20Source:  The  Millennium  Development  Goals  Report,  2014  http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2014%20MDG%20report/MDG%202014%20English%20web.pdf   The  17 
Sustainable  Development  Goals  build  on  the  successes  of  the  MDGs,  while  including  new  areas  such  as  climate  change,  economic  inequality,  innovation,  sustainable 
consumption, peace and justice, among other priorities.   

21 For this indicator, results are broken down per African region: West Africa 0.41 to 0.16; Central Africa 0.63 to 0.29; Eastern Africa 0.36 to 0.21; Southern Africa 1.98 to1.02. 
22 The debt burden of developing countries was much lower than in the year 2000 but not declining further. 

8 

 
                                                 
2.4 Baseline 

As this is a mid-term evaluation, the baseline has been set at January 2014 when the DCI 2014-2020 
was adopted. Therefore the evaluation compares, to the extent possible, the situation on 1 January 
2014 with the situation as of June 2017. For some evaluation criteria, where data is unavailable for 
this reference date, earlier baselines have been used as described later in the document (see section 
5.2  "Effectiveness"  and  5.3  "Efficiency"),  considering  that  the  main  objectives  of  the  instrument 
have not been changed from the former 2007-2013 DCI.   

To measure the performance of the DCI in achieving its overall aim i.e. poverty reduction and its 
specific  objectives  of  (1)  fostering  sustainable  economic,  social  and  environmental  development 
and  (2)  supporting  democracy,  the  rule  of  law,  good  governance,  human  rights  and  the  relevant 
principles of international law, the Regulation makes reference to the indicators of the Millennium 
Development  Goals  and  Sustainable  Development  Goals.  Table  4  shows  figures  for  selected 
Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals as reported in 2014.  

However, the Millennium Development Goal/Sustainable Development Goal indicators only show 
global  progress  towards  development  results  (based  on  the  actions  of  partner  countries  and  all 
donors).  Therefore  these  results  cannot  be  directly  attributable  to  the  DCI  (see  also  section  4.2 
"Monitoring" and 5.3 "Effectiveness").  

Other indicators at outcome/output level are being monitored by the European Commission for the 
DCI but these were not developed until 2015 and therefore could not be included in the Regulation. 
See section 4.2 "Monitoring" for more information and annex 4 for the outcome/output results for 
the DCI from 2014-2016. 

At the time of design and adoption of the DCI, poverty remained a problem in the countries eligible 
under the instrument. The 2015 deadline for the MDGs' achievement was looming with insufficient 
global progress being achieved. Moreover, for certain countries that had been able to move out of 
poverty,  progress  was  sometimes  temporary.  Security  issues,  economic  shocks,  environmental 
degradation  and  climate  change,  food  insecurity  are  among  factors  that  directly  threaten  the 
sustainability of hard-won gains over poverty. 

3. METHOD 
This evaluation follows the approach set out in the DCI evaluation roadmap23. It is supported by an 
external evaluation carried out from August 2016 to May 2017. The external evaluation of the DCI 
was  managed  by  the  reference  group  through  the  following  steps:  an  inception  report  (which 
explained  how  the  evaluation  design  would  deliver  the  information  required);  a  desk  report 
(providing  initial responses  to evaluation  questions);  visits to Bolivia, Cambodia,  Bangladesh and 
Ethiopia  (due  to  it  hosting  the  Headquarters  of  the  African  Union  which  is  relevant  for  the  Pan-
African  programme)  to  meet  key  interlocutors  to  obtain  first-hand  view  in-country;  and  a  final 
report. The external evaluator's work was complemented by a survey to EU delegations covering all 
instruments and an Open Public Consultation24 on a draft of the final report which comprised a 12 
week online survey and targeted meetings with Member States in March 2017.   

As mentioned in the "Scope of the Evaluation" this Staff Working Document is set at instrument-
level.  In  terms  of  the  method  used,  a  focus  was  put  on  reviewing  strategic  documents  such  as 
country/thematic evaluations and programming documents, rather than project-level documents.  

This  Staff  Working  Document  relies  on  and  concurs  with  the  findings  and  conclusions  of  the 
external evaluation unless mentioned otherwise. 

23 http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2017_devco_001_evaluation_dci_en.pdf    
24 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/public-consultation-external-financing-instruments-european-union_en  

9 

 
                                                 
Limitations 

The  process  of  this  evaluation  is  robust  and  the  evidence  reasonably  solid.  However,  several 
limitations faced by the external evaluation need mentioning (see annex 1 for further details): 

  The evaluation was pitched at instrument-level meaning project-level data was not the focus, but 
such  data  could  have  further  informed  the  overall  findings.  The  instrument-level  focus  also 
means that the development policies which are set outside the instrument, but upon which the 
instrument is based, were not analysed.  

  There was no comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system defined in the DCI legal base.  

  The DCI's implementation was in its early stages when the collection of evidence was made. To 

mitigate this, evidence has also been collected from the DCI 2007-2013. 

  Some evidence used is general to all External Financing Instruments rather than specific to the 
DCI.  Where this is the case, the links with the DCI are explained. For example, see section 5 
"Relevance"  where  a  review  of  DCI  and  non-DCI  evaluations  is  cited  as  a  source  explaining 
partner governments' perspective on global values.  

  The very broad nature of the objectives and the partner countries where interventions take place 

(over 100 countries) made aggregation and comparisons between data difficult. 

When evaluating the instrument it must be taken into consideration that its support can only be seen 
as a contributing factor towards any results achieved: 

  The fight to eradicate poverty in partner countries is a highly ambitious agenda.  Many factors, 
both internal and external, affect the development of those countries.  An important number of 
official aid providers play an active role, together with an increasing number of private donors.   

 

In  addition,  pursuant  to  the  principle  of  ownership  at  the  core  of  the  EU's  development 
cooperation, it is for the beneficiary governments to adopt and implement the necessary reforms 
and policies that are the driving force behind these achievements. 

4. IMPLEMENTATION STATE OF PLAY 

This  section  looks  at  the  progress  made  in  implementing  the  DCI  since  2014  and  the  monitoring 
systems used to measure progress.  

4.1 Programme implementation 

The  financial  resources  linked  to  the  DCI  have  been  implemented  through  a  comprehensive 
programming  process.  The  result  of  the  process  has  been  a  set  of  programming  documents  that 
define  per  bilateral/regional/thematic  programme:  the  priority  areas  for  financing,  the  specific 
objectives, expected results, indicators and indicative allocations.  

In  order  to  improve  on  implementation  compared  to  the  2007-2013  period,  the  Regulation  took 
steps to simplify the programming  process (see section 5.3 "Effectiveness"). However, the results 
were not as expected with evidence showing the exercise remained complex25. This shows there is 
still room to improve the programming process as defined in the DCI Regulation, although it should 
be kept in mind that any simplifications could also lead to trade-offs with other DCI principles such 
as  ownership26.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  not  all  the  complexities  of  the  programming  process 

25 See annex 5, Volume II page 114 
26 DCI Regulation, Article. 3.8 

10 

 
 
 
                                                 
stem from the DCI Regulation, but also from other applicable legislation, such as the Comitology 
Regulation27. 

Looking  beyond  the  process  at  the  content  of  the  programming  documents,  a  review  of  the 
documents as well as evidence from interviews undertaken by the external evaluation28 support the 
finding  that  the  objectives  of  the  DCI  Regulation  have  been  translated  into  the  programming 
documents.  

4.1.1 Geographic programmes 

The  programming  documents  for  geographic  cooperation  (country  and  regional)  were  drafted 
between 2012 and 2014. In total, 29 geographic programmes were adopted for: Latin America (10 
countries  including  Cuba),  Asia  (16  countries  in  South,  Central,  North  and  South  East  Asia),  the 
Middle East (2), and Africa (1).  

For 2 of the 29 countries (Iraq and Turkmenistan), it was necessary to use the clause in the DCI to 
exceptionally continue bilateral cooperation (DCI Regulation, Article 5.2.b.ii). Both had graduated 
(i.e. became Upper Middle Income Countries) from the list of developing countries as published by 
the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development/  Development  Assistance 
Committee meaning they were no longer eligible for DCI bilateral cooperation. However, given the 
special  context  (e.g.  continued  presence  of  poverty/inequality,  the  post-crisis  situation)  the 
exception clause was invoked so bilateral cooperation could continue.   
A  recent  evaluation  on  joint  programming  with  Member  States  (2017)29,  shows  there  has  been 
progress  on  this  and  it  has  proven  to  be  a  valuable  tool  to  promote  development  effectiveness, 
although it is still in its early stages and faces challenges30. Joint programming is an active, ongoing 
process  in  17  out  of  a  possible  29  partner  countries  where  the  EU  has  bilateral  cooperation.  This 
means 17 countries have either a scoping exercise, roadmap or a joint response document31 with EU 
Member States and other donors. No targets have been set on the number of countries that should 
have joint programming as this is a field-driven process. There are cases where joint programming 
has  not  advanced  because  partner  country  governments  are  hesitant  that  closer  European 
cooperation  may  result  in  reduced  development  cooperation  or  because  Member  States  want  to 
ensure their visibility vis-à-vis the partner country32 33.  

In 2014, three regional programmes were also adopted for Asia, Central Asia and Latin America. 

4.1.2. Thematic programmes 

Both DCI thematic programmes were adopted in mid-2014: one for GPGC, the other for CSO-LA.  
Compared to the DCI 2007-2013, the thematic programmes were merged from five programmes34 
to two in order to create efficiency gains. However, in practice, this has been a superficial merge: 
each of the five programmes under the 2007-2013 instrument, remain either as they did before (i.e. 
as  with  CSO-LA)  or  as  sub-themes  under  the  GPGC  programme.  Within  the  GPGC  programme, 

27 https://ec.europa.eu/info/implementing-and-delegated-acts/comitology_en  
28 See annex 5, Volume II page 43 
29  See  the  external  evaluation  on  joint  programming:  http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-eu-joint-programming-process-

development-cooperation-2011-2015_en 

30 EU joint programming means the joint planning of development cooperation by the EU development partners (e.g. EU Member 

States or other donors) working in a partner country. 

31 A joint Programming exercise has been established for the following DCI countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Laos, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan. 

32 Source: the above-referenced external evaluation on joint Programming (2017) and Heads of Mission reports (2016) by DCI EU 

Delegations on the state of play of joint Programming.  

33 See also section 5 "Coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies ". 
34  The  five  thematic  programmes  were:  non-state  actors  and  local  authorities;  environment  and  natural  resources;  migration  and 

asylum; food security; and investing in people. 

11 

 
                                                 
separate  earmarked  amounts  were  also  established  per  sub-theme35,  thus  limiting  the  instrument's 
ability to flexibly reallocate resources. Finally, basic procedures for thematic programmes remained 
largely the same. Therefore in the end the evidence suggests that efficiencies were not achieved36.  

4.1.3. Pan African programmes 

The  Pan-African  programme  was  adopted  by  the  Commission  mid-2014  following  extensive 
consultations  with  the  African  Union,  African  Development  Bank,  United  Nations  Economic 
Committee for Africa and EU Member States.  

Efforts were made to identify interventions that could provide continental added value rather than 
multi-country/regional  actions.  As  no  Member  State  has  a  dedicated  programme  aligned  to  the 
scope/characteristics  of  the  Pan-African  programme,  the  use  of  joint  programming  is  not 
relevant.4.1.4. Unallocated funds 
The unallocated funds in the DCI were EUR 758 million in 2014 and are now EUR 263 million37. 
These unallocated funds have been used to help ensure the flexibility of the instrument. It allowed 
the  EU  to  respond  to  unforeseen  circumstances,  in  particular  for  fragile,  crisis  and  post-crisis 
situations as well as allowing for the modification of indicative financial allocations as a result of 
programming  reviews  that  were  carried  out.  For  example,  EUR  300  million  from  the  unallocated 
fund was added to Afghanistan's indicative programming allocation in 201438.  
Table 5. State of play of DCI implementation per programme39 

DCI progress on implementation in terms of amounts decided and contracted is on track. 

The financial allocations that have been programmed (i.e. the amounts that have been set-out in the 
programming  documents40)  are  much  higher  for  geographic  programmes  (76%)  than  for  thematic 
(52%) or Pan-African programmes (49%). The main reason behind this is because the geographic 
programming  documents  cover  seven  years,  as  opposed  to  three/four  years  for  the  thematic  and 
Pan-African programmes.  

One advantage of allocating a significant amount of funds early on in the implementation cycle is 
that our cooperation is seen to be predictable by our partner countries. However, the trade-off has 
been that the instrument is less flexible when it comes to responding to unforeseen needs. While the 
unallocated fund can help meet emerging challenges, the proportion of this fund to the geographic 

35 See DCI Regulation, annex IV 
36 See annex 5, Volume I page 28 and Volume II page 108-110 
37 Figures as of June 2017 
38  https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/multi-annual-indicative-programme-2014-2020_en_0.pdf  
39 Source: DEVCO Data Warehouse 
40 Such amounts are always indicative. 

12 

 
 
 
                                                 
programme is only 6% compared to the 11th European Development Fund, where the relation of the 
unallocated funds to the geographic programme is around 20%41. 

4.2 Monitoring and evaluation systems 

In the DCI Regulation, no specific monitoring or evaluation system was mentioned for the purpose 
of  measuring  its  overall  performance  (e.g.  its  flexibility  and  complementarity  with  other 
instruments). Neither was an intervention logic established at the time the instrument  was adopted 
which would have shown the external and internal assumptions on which it was based, thus making 
it possible to measure changes.  

The  only  references  to  indicators  in  the  Regulation  are  for  impact-level  indicators  (namely  those 
from the Millennium Development Goals and subsequently the Sustainable Development Goals). A 
number  of  these  indicators  are  included  in  the  EU  International  Cooperation  and  Development 
Results  Framework  which  was  created  in  201542.  However,  these  indicators  only  show  the  EU's 
contribution  to  development  results  as  many  factors  such  as  partner  government  policies  and 
interventions of other donors will influence what has been achieved. 

The  EU  Results  Framework  mentioned  above  defines  quantitative  indicators  for  the  collection, 
aggregation  and  presentation  of  three  types  of  result  data:  (level  1)  wider  development  progress 
made by partner countries(see impact-level indicators mentioned above); (level 2) partner country 
results  to  which  the  EU  contributed  through  EU-funded  projects;  (level  3)  the  European 
Commission's  own  organisational  performance  in  respect  to  international  cooperation  and 
development.  

In  terms  of  level  2 (outcome  and  output indicators),  it is  possible  to  aggregate  these  indicators  at 
instrument  level;  however  they  have  their  limitations  for  the  purpose  of  this  evaluation.  For 
example,  they  only  report  results  from  projects  that  have  closed  from  mid-2013  to  mid-2016  and 
they only measure quantitative aspects such as number of teachers trained and numbers of children 
immunised.  The  results  are  therefore  coming  from  projects  implemented  under  the  previous  DCI 
and will not, for the time being, show the performance of the current instrument. 

41 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/internal-agreement-11th-edf_en  
42  Commission  Staff  Working  Document  "Launching  the  EU  International  Cooperation  and  Development  Results  Framework", 

SWD(2015)80 final. See: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/devcos-results-framework_en  

13 

 
 
                                                 
5. ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS  

5.1 Relevance 

To what extent do the overall objectives (DCI Regulation, Article 2) and the objectives of each of its 
three components, the designated areas of co-operation (DCI Regulation, annexes I, II, III) and the 
design of the DCI respond to: 

 

 

(i)  EU  priorities  and  beneficiary  needs  identified  at  the  time  the  instrument  was  adopted 
(2014) and  
(ii)  Current  EU  priorities  and  beneficiary  needs,  given  the  evolving  challenges  and 
priorities in the international context (2017)? 

Looking at the creation of the DCI 2014-2020, following on from the 2011 Impact Assessment43, it 
can  be  concluded  that  several  of  the  problem  drivers  mentioned  in  the  assessment  have  been 
addressed in the current DCI Regulation making it more able to meet its objectives44. For example, 
in response to problems raised of fragmented support: (1) the Regulation established the need for a 
clear  differentiation  amongst  partner  countries  in  order  to  focus  more  effectively  on  where  EU 
assistance  could  have  the  greatest  impact;  and  (2)  the  instrument  also  created  the  Pan-African 
programme:  an  African-wide  framework  to  support  cooperation  across  the  continent  to  solve  the 
drawback of having cooperation fragmented across three instruments (DCI, European Development 
Fund and European Neighbourhood Instrument).  

Since 2014 a number of new EU policies and international commitments have emerged such as the 
Sustainable  Development  Goals  (SDGs)45  (2016)  and  the  new  European  Consensus  on 
Development46  (2017).  Poverty  reduction  remains  a  central  goal  for  all47,  ensuring  the  continued 
relevance  of  the  DCI's  main  objective.  While  there  is  a  broad  alignment,  parts  of  the  new  policy 
framework  may only  be  dealt  with by the DCI with  some  difficulties in particular circumstances. 
For  example,  to  achieve  SDG  16  on  peaceful  societies,  actions  may  include  peace  and  security 
operations,  some  of  which  may  not  be  feasible  given  the  DCI  commitments  on  Official 
Development Assistance.  

Emerging priorities such as migration have overall been integrated into the DCI programmes, such 
as the DCI contribution to the European Trust Fund to fight the root causes of migration in Africa48. 
A  clear  intention  when  designing  the  DCI  was  to  create  an  "enabling"  instrument  meaning  that 
could  be  used  flexibly  to  implement  the  evolving  policy  framework  (e.g.  the  change  from 
Millennium  Development  Goals  to  Sustainable  Development  Goals),  and  it  could  be  used  to 
implement  interventions  under  a  wide  range  of  areas  of  cooperation49.  Therefore,  and  as  also 
reflected  by  the  feedback  from  the  public  consultation,50,  in  this  regard  the  DCI  has  been  able  to 
meet expectations.  

From the beneficiaries' perspective, a mixed picture emerges on the DCI's ability to respond to their 
needs. On the one hand, the DCI was able to ensure EU cooperation was aligned to partner country 
priorities through the use of their development plans, where they existed, instead of using EU-led 
documents.  The  programming  process  has  reflected  this  principle,  with  almost  all  geographic 

43 http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/cia_2011_en.htm#devco  
44 See annex 5, Volume II, page 14-15 
45 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld  
46https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/new-european-consensus-development-our-world-our-dignity-our-future_en  
47 See annex 5, Volume II page 1-11 
48 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund-africa_en  
49 See DCI Regulation annex I, II, and III 
50 See annex 5, Volume II page 213 and 218  

14 

 
 
                                                 
programmes  based  on  national  plans,  resulting  in  a  higher  degree  of  ownership  by  the  partner 
countries.  

However,  the  DCI  was  also  designed  to  support  key  EU  values  and  global  public  goods  such  as 
human rights, environment and climate change. A recent review of strategic evaluations51 suggests 
that partner governments gave a different weight to the importance of EU values/the global agenda, 
such  as  human  rights  issues  and  participation  of  CSO-LAs  in  domestic  policy/cooperation 
processes. This means the DCI principles of ownership and promoting EU and international values 
and  implementing  global  agreements  can  be  at  odds  with  each  other,  potentially  hindering  the 
instruments ability to perform to its capacity.  

5.2 Effectiveness, impact, and sustainability 

To  what  extent  does  the  DCI  deliver  results  against  the  instrument's  objectives,  and  specific  EU 
priorities? 

Most  DCI  partner  countries  have  experienced  progress  in  poverty  reduction  and  human  and 
economic  development  over  the  last  ten  years52.  For  example,  the  last  Millennium  Development 
Goal Report (2015)53 shows that Vietnam saw a 90% reduction in the incidence of poverty in the 
last  decade,  Cambodia  an  88%  reduction,  Peru  a  74%  reduction  and  Bolivia  a  50%  reduction54. 
However,  it  is  difficult  to  measure  the  direct  impact  of  the  DCI  2014-2020  on  development 
outcomes such as poverty reduction because those indicators reflect development progress over the 
long-term  and  the  DCI  2014-2020  has  only  been  operational  for  two  years.  The  results  achieved 
stem from actions taken under the DCI 2007-2013. Moreover multiple actors contributed to these 
development outcomes; they cannot be directly attributable to the DCI. 

Recent  annual  reports  on  the  implementation  of  the  EU's  instruments  for  financing  external 
actions55 present numerous positive examples of DCI geographic and thematic programmes, such as 
support  to  protecting  vulnerable  refugees  (e.g.,  Myanmar  and  Pakistan)  or  addressing  failures  in 
basic service provision in situations of conflict or fragility (e.g., Afghanistan). 

While such evidence provides a useful insight into the positive contribution the DCI has made over 
time,  there  have  been  variations  in  the  effectiveness  of  its  actions.  For  example,  the  Review  of 
Strategic  Evaluations  (2016)  has  shown  that  where  no  link  exists  between  DCI  interventions  and 
broader  national  or  regional  strategic  frameworks,  contributions  to  sustainable  solutions  have 
remained  limited.  Also  results  in  the  area  of  human  rights  have  been  fragmented  and  of 
questionable sustainability56.  

Aside from the DCI's objectives, the specific commitments made in the DCI are likely to be met by 
the end of its mandate57. For  example, the data available from the Mid-term review of the Multi-

51 Review of strategic evaluations managed by DG Interanational Cooperation and Development to assess the European Consensus 
on  Development.  Final  Report, October  2016.  https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/consensus_review_full_report_0.pdf 
While the review also looked at evaluations outside the DCI (e.g. country level evaluations which receive bilateral allocations via 
the  EDF),  more  than  20  DCI  country  /regional  level  evaluations  were  taken  into  account.  In  addition,  the  majority  of  thematic 
evaluations analysed contain DCI programmes on various topics (e.g. health, environment, private sector). 
52 See table 4 for baseline and annex 4 for the figures from 2014-2016. Also see annex 5, Volume II page 69-85 
53 http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20(July%201).pdf  
54 See table 3 for further details on development progress by DCI countries. 
55  See  2016 

report:  https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/2016-annual-report-implementation-european-unions-instruments-financing-

external-actions-2015-0_en 

  2015: 

https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/annual-report-2015-european-unions-development-and-external-assistance-policies-and-

their_en  

56 See annex 5 Volume I page 29 
57 See annex 5, Volume I page 17 and Volume II, page 42 and 58-67 

15 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
annual Financial Framework58 indicates that the target on low carbon and climate resilient society 
was  on  track  for  2015  (20%)  and  given  the  estimated  commitments  for  upcoming  years,  it  is 
expected that the target will be also met in 2020 for the overall period. Concerning targets for basic 
social  services,  a  review  of  the  allocations  in  the  programming  documents  shows  that  while 
allocations made to education and health alone will not be sufficient to meet the 20% commitment, 
other  allocations  on  nutrition,  safe  drinking  water  and  sanitation  will  help  ensure  the  targets  are 
achieved59.  

In terms of mainstreaming EU priorities, a mixed picture emerges from the evidence. Progress has 
been  noted  in  the  areas  of  climate  change  and  environment60,  but  more  remains  to  be  done  to 
systematically  integrate  these  themes  across  all  areas  of  cooperation  covered  by  the  DCI.  The 
emergence  of  some  tools,  such  as  the  Environment  and  Climate  Change  Mainstreaming  Facility 
(2015)  has  helped  step-up  efforts  on  mainstreaming,  including  mainstreaming  guidelines. 
Mainstreaming  human  rights  issues  (including  on  gender  equality),  despite  the  creation  of  a 
Toolbox  on  a  rights-based  approach  to  development  (2014),  is  still  work-in-progress61.  Evidence 
from External Assistance Management Reports suggests that partner governments' lack of interest 
or  resistance  to  working  in  support  of  human  rights  often  represents  a  major  obstacle  in 
implementation62. 

In  line  with  the  DCI  Impact  Assessment  recommendations  (2011), the  principle of  differentiation 
(including graduation) was included in the DCI 2014-2020 and has been implemented through the 
programmed allocations63. As shown in the programming documents, this has led to a reallocation 
of  DCI  funds  to  Least  Development  Countries  (LDCs)  and  countries  in  situations  of  crisis,  post-
crisis or fragility. Under the DCI 2007-2013, LDCs accounted for a quarter of total DCI financial 
resources, whereas under the 2014-2020 allocations, they receive over half. As already mentioned 
in section 4.1.1., the European Commission used the exception clause in two cases, besides the ones 
already referred to in the Declaration attached to the DCI Regulation (see footnote 13) to ensure the 
EU could continue providing bilateral cooperation in countries where special considerations persist 
(e.g.  presence  of  poverty,  inequalities  or  post-crisis  situations).  While  Upper  Middle  Income 
countries  remain  eligible  for  regional  and  thematic  programmes  they  are  not  always  the  focus  of 
such programmes64.  

5.3 Efficiency 

To what extent is the DCI delivering efficiently? 

While a number of sources such as interviews with EU Delegations, the External Action Monitoring 
Reports and the public consultation on the DCI65 all view the instrument as administratively heavy, 
indicators of internal efficiency with the European Commission show it has performed efficiently66. 
and  its  performance  has  improved  since  the  DCI  2007-2013  period.  This  shows  how  different 
peoples' perceptions of the instrument can be compared with the corporate-level indicators that are 

58 http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/lib/COM-2016-603/SWD-2016-299_en.pdf see page 42 
59 See annex 5, Volume I page 17 and Volume II, page 44 
60 Based on internal Commission findings, DCI climate change contributions have been increasing, from 17.7% in 2014 to 24.9% in 

2016 under the DCI.  

61 See annex 5, Volume I page 44-45 
62 See annex 5, Volume I page 19 and Volume II, page 42 
63 See annex 5 Volume II page 85-86 
64 For example, see page 10 of the Asia regional programming document 2014-2020: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/regional-

asia-mip-2014-2020_en.pdf  

65 See annex 5 Volume I page 26 and Volume II page 214  
66 See annex 5 Volume I page 27 

16 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
used  to  measure  efficiency.  It  also  shows  that  indicators  only  measure  part  of  the  picture  on 
efficiency. For  example,  other  factors  such  as  the  efficiency  of  the  programming  exercise  are not 
covered.  

Indeed,  on  programming,  the  DCI  Impact  Assessment  (2011)  made  reference  to  the  complex 
programming  process  and  recommended  that  simplifications  be  made.  To  this  end,  the 
programming process was simplified so that certain steps were merged (e.g. quality check meetings 
were merged), also the drafting of lengthy (approx. 40 page) country strategy papers was dropped in 
favour of using partner countries' own development plans. Nevertheless, as shown in the paragraph 
above, procedures are still considered burdensome and lengthy by some users. However, this is not 
totally  attributable  to  the  DCI  but  also  other  legal  bases  (e.g.  the  Comitology  Regulation)  which 
impose certain processes during the programming exercise. 

As recommended in the Impact Assessment (2011), steps were introduced in the DCI Regulation to 
reduce  the  fragmentation  of  the  thematic  programmes,  in  particular,  by  reducing  the  number  of 
programmes  from  five  to  two.  However,  in  contrast  to  the  intended  outcome,  only  modest 
efficiency gains were made by this consolidation because all the previous programmes that existed 
under the 2007-2013 are still covered under the consolidated programmes.  

The DCI does not mention a comprehensive monitoring system to measure its overall performance. 
As  a  consequence,  finding  data  for  this  evaluation  has  been  a  challenging  exercise,  and  often 
produced  anecdotal  evidence  in  key  areas  such  as  complementarities.  However,  some  significant 
improvements  have  been  made  to  the  monitoring  systems  that  exist  to  facilitate  the  collection  of 
results. In particular, the introduction of the EU International Cooperation and Development Results 
Framework67  (2015)  which  sets  out  the  quantitative  indicators  used  for  collecting  various  results 
(see  section  4.2  "Monitoring").  The  external  evaluation  pointed-out  some  weaknesses  of  the 
Framework. For example, it only shows the EU's contribution to results (rather than showing what 
results are directly attributable to the DCI in a context where the EU is not the only player), is not 
able to measure qualitative results thus distorting the overall picture and it does not scale results by 
population or amount spent. Neverthless, the external evaluation and the Commission services agree 
such weaknesses are common to  most results fameworks. Overall the Framework has presented a 
significant step-forward in terms of the EU's ability to monitor results. 

5.4 Added Value 

To what extent do the DCI programmes add value compared to interventions by Member States or 
other key donors? 

An  analysis  of  the  programming  documents  shows  the  added  value  of  the  DCI  compared  to 
interventions by Member States and other donors is apparent on a number of issues, including: 

•  The previous experience and knowledge of a given sector derived from long-term experience, 

commitment and diversity of partnerships68.  

•  Specific technical/regulatory expertise or knowledge of best practices69.  
•  Departure of other donors70.  

67 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/devcos-results-framework_en  
68 See annex 5 Volume II page 128 
69 See annex 5 Volume II page 128 
70 See annex 5 Volume II page 128 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
•  The EU’s status as a supranational organisation, as a result of which it is perceived by dialogue 

partners as an agent not defending or advancing the interest of a particular country71.  

Another source of DCI value added is the EU’s ability to take the lead (or play one of the leading 
roles) in multi-donor actions. As set out in the DCI, the EU is committed to adding value through 
joint  programming,  particularly  with  Member  States.  The  Review  of  Strategic  Evaluations  found 
that EU added value has been highest when coordination with Member States and other donors has 
been  high.  Interviews  with  Member  State  representatives  show  that  they  might  not  be  able  to 
contribute  to  certain  programmes  without  the  support  of  the  EU  and  appreciate  the  coordination 
lead that the EU is willing to provide72.  

There is mixed evidence on whether the financial size of the DCI (and its projects and programmes) 
is  related  to  its  added  value73.  While  interviews  with  Member  States  stated  that  EU  added  value 
came from the supranational status rather than from the financial allocations, other geographic and 
thematic evaluations e.g. for Ecuador, Asia, Private Sector Development and Health state that the 
financial weight of funds provided through budget support operations has an effect on added value. 
Also, in the thematic components of DCI, the EU’s share of total donor support (both European and 
global)  in  relation  to  global  challenges  and  for  civil  society  is  large,  making  it  a  more  dominant 
player amongst other European and non-European contributions. 

5.5 Coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies 

To what extent does the DCI facilitate coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies both 
internally between its own set of objectives and programmes and vis-à-vis other EFIs? 

As reflected under section 5.1 "Relevance", a review of: the DCI Regulation, the policy framework 
(namely the Agenda for Change, the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security policy and 
the European Consensus on Development) and the programming documents shows that the DCI has 
been broadly consistent with key policies74. 

Across  the  External  Financing  Instruments  examples  exist  of  complementarity  with  the  DCI, 
including: the  Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace which intervenes in situations where 
there  is  a  risk  to  stability/peace,  laying  the  groundwork  for  later  actions  under  the  DCI;  the 
Partnership  Instrument  which  complements  DCI  actions  by  financing  policy  dialogue  on  areas  of 
specific  EU  interest;  and  the  European  Instrument  for  Democracy  and  Human  Rights  which 
finances support to specific civil society actors, while the CSO-LA programme provides support for 
more long-term capacity building75. 

Within  the  DCI,  evidence  on the level of coherence between its component  parts  is  mixed76. The 
thematic budget line reports77 show efforts were taken to ensure coherence between geographic and 
thematic  programmes.  Thematic  programmes  followed  the  geographic  programmes  in  terms  of 
timing to help create complementarities. However, while the strategic vision of having geographic 
programmes  for  building  country  partners  and  thematic  programmes  for  addressing  global 
challenges  is  valid,  in  reality,  coherence  between  the  two  at  country  level  is  a  frequently-cited 
problem. A review of the programming documents supports this analysis as most documents were 

71 See annex 5 Volume II page 126 
72 See annex 5 Volume II page 123 
73 See annex 5 Volume I page 32 and Volume II page 121 
74 See annex 5 Volume I page 35 
75 See annex 5 Volume I page 37-38 
76 See annex 5 Volume I page 36-37 
77 These are internal Commission reports. 

18 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
found  to  make  only  the  briefest  references  to  other  DCI  related  programmes  (i.e.  regional  and 
thematic).  

Turning  towards  interactions  with  other  donors,  a  number  of  sources  such  as  the  Council 
Conclusions  on  the  High  Level  Forum  on  Aid  Effectiveness,  201178  show  there  is  a  commitment 
towards joint programming. However, according to the External Action Monitoring Reports, some 
Member  States  are  still  reluctant  to  take  part79.  More  efforts  should  be  taken  at  EU  level  to 
communicate  the  benefits  of  joint  programming  in  improving  development  effectiveness  and  in 
strengthening a single European voice at country level. 

5.6 Leverage 

To what extent has the DCI leveraged further funds and/or political or policy engagement? 

The  main  success  of  the  DCI  in  terms  of  financial  leveraging  has  been  the  development  of  the 
blending  mechanism80.  A  number  of  DCI  regional  and  country  programming  documents  cite 
blending  as  playing  an  important  role  during  2014-2020.  Also,  although  a  relatively  new 
mechanism,  the  combined  operational  report  on  the  Asia,  Central  Asia  and  Pacific  Investment 
Facilities (2016)81  shows the  leveraging  of  substantial  sums:  over  eight  years,  2.7  EUR  billion of 
EU assistance has been used to unlock 50 EUR billion in investment.  

Concerning  political  dialogue,  both  national  and  regional  programming  documents  frequently 
mention  the  DCI  provides  an  opportunity  and  framework  for  such  dialogue  with  key  partners82. 
Also,  the  External  Assistance  Monitoring  Reports  underline  the  EU’s  engagement  in  policy 
dialogue in a broad range of thematic areas through DCI programmes83. However, the effectiveness 
of  DCI-based  policy  dialogue  is  often  only  effective  at  sector  level,  but  not  at  political  level:  at 
political  level,  DCI  priorities  are  sometimes  overshadowed  by  other  national  priorities  such  as 
trade84.  

6. CONCLUSIONS  

In line with the findings of the external evaluation, the key conclusions on the DCI are as follows: 

1.  At  the  mid-term  of  its  implementation,  the  DCI  2014-2020  has  overall  shown  itself  to  be  fit 
purpose. In light of the continuous global poverty problem, the instrument has broadly enabled 
the EU to implement its development policy framework and to some extent it is flexible enough 
to  respond  to  emerging  challenges.  However,  the  instrument  will  not  be  able  to  fully 
accommodate the objectives of the new policy framework, in part because of its commitments 
on  Official  Development  Assistance  which  prevent  it  from  providing  certain  support.  The 
instrument  also  contains  principles  that  can  be  at  odds  with  each  other:  i.e.  ownership  and 
promoting  EU  values/global  agenda.  These  tensions  may  hamper  the  performance  of  the 
instrument  and  highlight  the  importance  of  having  multi-actor  partnerships  (including  with 
CSO-LAs).  

78https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/eu-common-position-fourth-high-level-forum-2011_en  
79 See annex 5 Volume I page 36-37 and Volume II 161-171 
80 See annex 5 Volume II, page 39 
81https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/2015-operational-report-2015-asia-investment-facility-aif-investment-facility-central-asia-ifca-

and_en  

82 See annex 5 Volume I, page 42-43 
83 See annex 5 Volume I, page 42-43 
84 See annex 5 Volume I, page 43 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2.  The DCI is largely on track to deliver on its objectives and commitments. Countries receiving 
the bulk of DCI assistance are showing signs of poverty reduction. However, data on results is 
limited.  Indeed,  the  DCI  Regulation  is  lacking  details  on  a  monitoring  and  evaluation  system 
which can measure the instrument's performance. 

3.  The principles of differentiation and graduation have left a gap in the EU's ability to cooperate 
on  poverty  with  Upper  Middle  Income  Countries  through  bilateral  cooperation  under  this 
instrument. While this was intentional and the thematic and regional programmes were expected 
to meet this gap, in reality this was not always the case. The EU subsequently decided in some 
cases it was necessary to continue close cooperation (through the use of the exception clause in 
the  DCI  Regulation)  with  certain  Upper  Middle  Income  Countries  due  to  their  specific  needs 
(e.g. the persistent presence of poverty/inequalities, post crisis situations),.  

4.  The DCI is generally efficient when looking at indicators measuring organisational performance 
and some limited improvements have been made since 2007-2013. However, some of its users 
still view it as administratively burdensome. 

5.  The  DCI's  added  value  is  apparent  through  a  number  of  factors  such  as  its  perceived 
independent/supranational  status  and  its  ability  to  lead  on  joint  actions  with  Member  States. 
However,  evidence  is  mixed  on  the  importance  of  the  financial  weight  of  the  DCI's 
programmes.  

6.  While  there  is  some  evidence  of  coherence  between  the  DCI  and  other  EFIs  and  with  EU 

external action policies, a more strategic approach is lacking.  

7.  The DCI has helped bring about a significant leveraging of funds through blending. However, 

political and policy leveraging has shown mixed results.  

20 

 
 
ANNEX 1. PROCEDURAL INFORMATION 

Lead DG: International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) 

DECIDE reference: 2017/DEVCO+/001 

The  evaluation  of  the  DCI  is  one  of  a  set  of  ten  evaluations  covering  most  External  Financing 
Instruments  85  under  Heading  4  of  the  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  2014-2020.  In  view  of 
ensuring consistent EU external policies, all the evaluations have been carried out simultaneously 
and are interlinked. 

Organisation and Timing 
This evaluation was initiated in 2015. The evaluation roadmap was published in November 201586. 
An Inter-Service Group (ISG) was constituted to specifically steer the work of the DCI evaluation. 
It is composed of representatives from the European Commission and the European External Action 
Service. 

The evaluation is largely informed by an external evaluation conducted by independent consultants. 
The external evaluation started on June 1 2016. The Final report was received on June 26 2017, on 
schedule.  The evaluation process, lead by the ISG, was conducted in four phases, see Figure 2. 

Figure 2: Evaluation process 

Process overview and Quality assessment 

The external evaluation of the DCI 2014-2020 was commissioned to provide the main information 
for this Staff Working Document. The evaluation was carried out fully in line with the indications 
provided  in  the  above-mentioned  roadmap.  The  evidence  base  in  particular  consisted  of  primary 
sources, secondary sources, and consultations of key actors. A total of four countries were visited 

85 Development Cooperation Instrument, 11th European Development Fund (EDF), European Neighbourhood Instrument, European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, Greenland Decision,  Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, Instrument for 
Pre-Accession, Instrument on Nuclear Safety Cooperation, Overseas Countries and Territories Decision, Partnership Instrument and 
the  Common  Implementing  Regulation.  For  the  purpose  of  this  exercise,  the  evaluation  of  the  Overseas  Countries  and  Territories 
Decision is included within the evaluation of the 11th EDF. 
86 http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2017_devco_001_evaluation_dci_en.pdf  

21 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
by  the  evaluation  team.  Those  countries  were  selected  in  cooperation  with  the  ISG  to  ensure 
geographic of where the DCI operates.  

There were 7 ISG meetings over the course of the DCI external evaluation to cover initial briefing, 
provide feedback on inception, desk, key messages, draft Final, and Final reports.  There were also 
four meetings (2 in September 2016, 1 in December 2016 and 1 end of March 2017) among all the 
consultants  and  all  the  Commission  evaluation  managers  to  promote  understanding  and  exchange 
on complementarity and synergy between instruments. 

The ISG quality assessed the external evaluation as satisfactory at their meeting of 23 May 2017. 
The reliability of the data used by the external evaluators is found to be high. The quality of the data 
can easily be verified through the sources that are systematically mentioned. In case of information 
emanating exclusively from EU sources, the evaluators attempted as much as possible to triangulate 
with  external  sources  of  information  to  alleviate  any  possible  bias.  In  addition,  information  was 
collected through interviews with key internal and external interlocutors. A number of evaluations 
were reviewed. As these were commissioned by Commission services, they are quality assured. The 
quantity of information analyses also appears satisfactory. The overall evidence used by the external 
evaluation was quality assured by the ISG. 

Evaluation Questions 

RELEVANCE  

1.  To what extent do the overall objectives (DCI Regulation, Article 2) and the objectives 
of  each of its three components, the designated areas of co-operation (DCI Regulation, 
annexes I, II, III) and the design87 of the DCI respond to: 

(i)  EU  priorities  and  beneficiary  needs  identified    at  the  time  the  instrument  was 

adopted (2014)? 

(ii) Current  EU  priorities  and  beneficiary  needs,  given  the  evolving  challenges  and 

priorities in the international context (2017)?  

Information sought in this area includes: 

 

 A timeline showing congruence/divergence of the instrument against evolving context, 
including global challenges, and institutional policy changes  e.g. to what extent does the 
DCI  respond  to  the  demands  of  Agenda  2030,  including  the  need  to  co-operate  with 
emerging developing countries on implementing the SDGs. 

  To  what  extent  programmes  undertaken  under  the  GPGC  have  responded  to  'global 

challenges' 

EFFECTIVENESS, IMPACT, SUSTAINABILITY 

2.  To  what  extent  does  the  DCI  deliver  results  against  the  instrument's  objectives,  and 

specific EU priorities?88 

Information sought in this area includes: 

  To  what  extent  do  DCI  programmes  contribute  towards  poverty  reduction,  and  more 

specifically towards: 

87 i.e. how it all fits together 
88  Evaluators  will  need  to  look  at  both  the  current  DCI  2014-2020  and  the  previous  DCI  2007-2013  to  respond  to    this  question. 
Evaluators should distinguish the findings between the two periods. 

22 

 
 
                                                 
o  fostering sustainable economic, social and environmental development; 
o  consolidating and supporting democracy, rule of law and good governance, human 

rights and relevant principles of international law (DCI Regulation, Article 2) 

  To  what  extent  has  the  DCI  contributed  to  the  European  Union's  priorities  for  smart, 

sustainable and inclusive growth?  

  To  what  extent  does  the  DCI  mainstream  EU  policy  priorities  (e.g.  gender,  climate 
change) and other issues highlighted for mainstreaming in the instrument, and, where 
relevant,  deliver  on  the  commitments  including  the  financial  allocations  (DCI 
Regulation preamble, Article 3, annex IV) 

  To what extent does the DCI promote principles of aid effectiveness, such as ownership 

and joint programming (DCI Regulation, Article 3)  

  To what extent are the processes condusive to programming, identification/formulation 

of effective actions (DCI Regulation, Article 5-15)?  

  How has the process of differentiation (including graduation) been managed e.g. have 
countries  most  in  need  been  given  priority  in  the  resource  allocation  process,  have 
differentiated partnerships with new forms of strategic cooperation been developed as 
set out in Agenda for Change, have any negative effects been minimised? 

  To what extent is the DCI flexible enough to respond to changing needs? (e.g. changed 

policy priorities,changed contexts)  

EFFICIENCY 

3.  To what extent is the DCI delivering efficiently?89 

Information sought in this area includes: 

  What is the ratio of administrative costs (as defined as “DCI Support Expenditure” in 

the Draft General Budget of the EU90) to overall budget? 

  How  efficient  is  budget  execution  in  terms  of  time  taken  from  commitments  to 

payments? 

  Have  the  changes  made  to  DCI    2014  –  2020  from  the  previous  DCI    2007  –  2013 
brought  efficiency  gains  ?    e.g.  Has  the  merging  of  various  separate  thematic 
programmes into one GPGC brought positive change in terms of efficency of  delivery?   
To  what  extent  the  creation  of  designated  support  to  a  Pan  African  programme  has 
made a change ? 

  Are there areas, such as administrative/management procedures, where the DCI can be 

simplified to eliminate unnecessary burden? 

  To what extent is the DCI in line with the implementing rules of the CIR ? Specifically 

in terms of :  

o  Implementation 

  Subject matter and principles 
  Adoption of action programmes, individual measures and special measures 

89 Evaluations will need to compare, where possible, information from the current DCI 2014-2020 with the previous DCI 2007-2013. 
90 See Title 21, item 21-01-04, page 949 of the latest, 2016 draft budget http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/DB/2016/en/SEC03.pdf  

23 

 
 
                                                 
  Support measures 

o  Provisions on the Financing Methods 

  General financing provisions 
  Taxes duties and charges 
  Specific financing provisions 
  Protection of the financial interests of the Union 

o  Rules  on  nationality  and  origin  for  public  procurement,  grant  and  other  award 

procedures 

o  Climate action and biodiversity expenditure 
o  Involvement of stakeholders of beneficiary countries 
o  Common rules 

  Eligibility under the DCI 

o  Monitoring and evaluation of actions 

  To what extent are the following in place and functioning: 

o  appropriate  monitoring    processes  and  indicators    for  measurement  of  the 

performance of the DCI instrument 

o  relevant  strategic  and  operational  indicators    to  measure  results  achieved  by  the 

DCI? 

ADDED VALUE 

4.  To  what  extent  do  the  DCI  programmes  add  value  compared  to  interventions  by 

Member States or other key donors? 

Information sought in this area includes : 

  Where the DCI is operating in the same field as other donors, does it offer added value 
in  terms  of  size  of  engagement,  particular  expertise,  and/or  particular  weight  in 
advocacy ? 

COHERENCE, CONSISTENCY, COMPLEMENTARITY AND SYNERGIES 

5.  To  what  extent  does  the  DCI  facilitate  coherence,  consistency,  complementarity  and 
synergies both internally between its own set of objectives and programmes and vis-à-
vis other EFIs? 

Information sought in this area includes: 

  To  what  extent  are  the  different  DCI  programmes  coherent/overlapping  with  one 

another? 

  To  what  extent  are  the  different  DCI  programmes  aligned  with  EU  development 

policy? 

  To what extent are the programmes consistent with EU external action policies? 

  To what extent do the programmes complement/overlap/stimulate synergies with other 

external action financing instruments?91 

  To what extent does the DCI complement/overlap with other EU instruments outside of 

development policy? 

91 Note the respective mandates of DEVCO and FPI in EIDHR, PI and  IcSP  instruments 

24 

 
 
                                                 
  To what extent does the DCI complement/overlap with interventions of other donors?  

LEVERAGE 

6.  To  what  extent  has  the  DCI  leveraged  further  funds  and/or  political  or  policy 

engagement?  

7.  How could the DCI be enhanced to achieve its policy objectives more effectively and 

efficiently?  

8.  How can programming and implementation of DCI assistance be enhanced to improve 

the impact and sustainability of financial assistance? 

25 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 2. SYNOPSIS REPORT OF THE STAKEHOLDERS' CONSULTATION 

The stakeholder consultation for the mid-term review of the DCI began in late 2015 and came to an 
end  in  May  2017.  The  majority  of  the  consultation  activities  took  place  during  the  Open  Public 
Consultation at the beginning of 2017. As highlighted in the evaluation Roadmap92, the consultation 
approach involved collecting input from a wide range of stakeholders on the DCI 2014-2020 at its 
mid-point.  

1.  Evaluation Roadmaps 

The  consultation  process  began  with  the  publication  of  the  evaluation  Roadmap,  which  was 
published  on  the  European  Commission  website  November  2015.  As  per  the  Better  Regulation 
guidelines93,  the  aim  of  the  Roadmap  was  to  give  stakeholders  and  the  general  public  an  early 
opportunity to provide feedback on the evaluation and its approach. No feedback was received on 
the Roadmap.    

2.  Interviews 

This  external  evaluation  team  conducted  interviews  and  group  discussions  with  various 
stakeholders during all phases of the evaluation. In  total, the team held more  than 150 interviews 
including  with  members  of  EU  Headquarter  staff,  EU  Delegation  staff,  and  EU  Member  State 
representatives. 

The objectives of the interviews were to (i) address gaps in the documentation reviewed, (ii) better 
understand realities on the ground, especially during the four field visits (to Cambodia, Bangladesh, 
Bolivia  and  Ethiopia),  and  (iii)  triangulate  findings  especially  when  the  evidence  collected  was 
based on internal EU documentation and sources. 

Information  from  interviews  was  used  throughout  the  evaluation,  for  example:  when  highlighting 
that  the  instrument  is  viewed  as  labour  intensive  and  administratively  cumbersome94;  and  when 
highlighting the added value of the instrument is based on neutral/supranational status95. 

3.  Open Public Consultation – 7 February to 3 May 2017 

The Open Public Consultation on the draft evaluation report took place during 12 weeks and closed 
on the 3rd of May. It was carried out at the same time as the consultation activities for the set of ten 
External Financing Instruments. The aim was to gather feedback from the broadest possible range 
of  stakeholders,  including  those  in  beneficiary  countries  and  in  the  EU  Member  States,  on  the 
emerging conclusions from the evaluations. 

This  section  of  the  annex  focuses  on  the  retrospective  aspects  that  were  covered  under  the  Open 
Public Consultation. However, there was also a forward-looking element to the consultation which 
aimed  to  gather  preliminary  ideas  on  the  future  External  Financing  Instruments  after  the  current 
ones have expired by 31 December 2020. 

92 http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2017_devco_001_evaluation_dci_en.pdf   
93 http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/toc_tool_en.htm  
94 See annex 5, Volume I, page 27 and 30 
95 See annex 5, Volume I page 32 

26 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The  Consultation  took  the  shape  of  (i)  an  online  consultation  which  included  some  guiding 
questions  to  facilitate  providing  feedback  and  (ii)  face  to  face  meetings  organised  with  key 
stakeholders.  In that respect, a technical workshop with representatives of Council working groups, 
together with representatives of the European Parliament, took place end of March 2017.   

OPC online contributions 

From  the  online  consultation,  64  contributors  provided  responses  on  the  DCI.  Most  of  the 
contributions  were  made  by  organisations  or  associations,  followed  by  public  authorities.  In 
addition,  six  inputs  were  provided  in  written  form,  not  using  the  online  format.  The  graph  below 
illustrates the type of contributors received. 

Figure 1  Type of contributions from the online consultation 

Contributors were invited to respond to the following five DCI-specific questions: 

1.  How well do you think the DCI has addressed its objectives? 
2.  How  well  do  you  think  the  DCI  has  addressed  the  objectives  of  development  co-operation  more 
specifically  in  Least  Developed  Countries?  To  what  extent  has  the  DCI  had  an  impact  on  poverty 
reduction  and  sustainable  development  in  Middle  Income  Countries,  where  pockets  of  poverty 
persist and which may play a critical role to tackle regional and global challenges? 

3.  The evaluation has found that many partner countries often disagree on the place and weight to be 
given to human rights issues and governance, which are part of the principles that guide the external 
action of the EU, including the DCI. Has the DCI enabled the EU to project its principles and values 
(e.g. democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms)? 

4.  The  DCI  accommodates  internal  EU  policy  concerns,  such  as  migration  and  climate  change,  in 
external action. To what extent do you think the DCI has been able to adapt to shifts in policy and 
the external environment? 

5.  If you have any other views on the DCI you would like to share, they are welcome here. 

The following summary synthesises the main contributions received from the online consultation, 
additional  written  comments and the various  face-to-face consultations in relation to key findings 
and emerging conclusions of the evaluation. 

27 

Other; 1; 1%Research/ academia; 3; 5%Industry, business or workers's organisations; 4; 6%Citizen/individual; 4; 6%EU platform, network, or association; 7; 11%Public authority; 19; 30%Organisation or association; 26; 41% 
 
 
Question  1:  For  this  question  a  total  of  62  contributions  were  received.  The  majority  of 
contributions provided a mixed assessment on the extent to which the DCI has addressed its 
objectives.  The  graph  below  illustrates  the  number  contributions  that  were  mainly  positive, 
negative, mixed or other96. Where possible the contributions have been grouped by instrument 
component. 

Figure 2  Question 1: Type of contributions from the online consultation 

From the contributions received that provided a mainly positive assessment, most contributors feel 
that  the  DCI  has  been  relevant  and  provided  an  added  value,  while  some  also  highlighted  the 
effectiveness  of  the  instrument  and  complementarity  with  other  EFs.  In  this  context,  a  European 
think  tank  noted  that  “The  Regulation  was  updated  and  allowed  DCI  to  globally  function  as  an 
“enabling  instrument”  that  responded  to  both  EU  policy  priorities  and  partner  country 
expectations.  Efforts  were  made  to  consistently  apply  the  principles  of  the  Agenda  for  Change 
(including  differentiation)  and  Busan  (country  ownership).  Synergies  were  sought  with  other 
instruments  and  interventions  of  MS,  thus  trying  to  produce  EU  added  value.”  On  added  value, 
amongst others, the following explanations were provided: 

  “The  DCI  clearly  constituted  an  added  value,  particularly  thematic  programmes  that 
mainstreamed decent work for all, as stipulated in the DCI Regulation.” (Industry, business 
or workers' organisations) 

  “When  actions  have  been  taken  in  relation  to  disability,  the  added  value  of  the  European 
Union has been  very  large since disability  is  not  a priority issue in  the countries and this 
population is invisible” (Organisation or association) 

  The capacity of the DCI to intervene in several ways: geographic, thematic including CSO-
LA in relation to the needs of actors identified as key to achieving all other objectives, and 
who otherwise would be excluded “is a key factor in the success of the program. This ability 
to achieve these different targets and priorities is unique and an added value for the EU.” 
(Organisation or association) 

96 The category other includes contributions that are either neutral or considered as not being relevant for this question. 

28 

81223313111051015202530PositiveNegativeMixedOtherOverallThematicGeographicNeutralNot relevant 
 
                                                 
From  the  contributions  that  provided  a  mixed  assessment,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  DCI  with  its 
focus  on  poverty  reduction  is  perceived  as  a  highly  relevant  instrument  (especially  in  least 
developed  countries).  Yet,  several  factors  have  been  identified  which  could  potentially  limit  the 
relevance and effectiveness of the DCI:  

  Growing  need  to  adapt  to  changing  environment  and  challenges  (e.g.  migration  and 
addressing  root  causes  of  migration)  and  current  political  framework  and  priorities  of  the 
EU.  

  Shrinking space for Civil Society. 
  Growing  need  to  identify  and  include  multiple  stakeholders  (especially  CSOs,  private 

sector).  

  Growing need to systematically mainstream issues such as climate change, gender equality 

and disability. 

  Limited alignment to international commitments on funding for biodiversity and sustainable 

development (Organisation or association).  

Regarding  efficiency,  several  comments  noted  that  the  DCI  is  an  administratively  demanding 
instrument  posing  significant  burden  on  the  stakeholders  involved,  e.g.  “The  heavy  procedural 
requirements  continue  to  pose  challenges  both  to  EU  staff  and  to  grant  beneficiaries  (…)”  (EU 
platform,  network,  or  association)  Linked  to  this,  a  number  of  contributors  identified  a  lack  of 
human resources in EU Delegations and lack of transparency and flow of information between EU 
MS, HQ and EU Delegations as factors limiting efficiency of the DCI.  

Regarding  the  extent  to  which  the  DCI  was  perceived  as  being  complementary,  coherent  and 
consistent,  several  comments  expressed  some  concern,  noting  a  potential  risk  of  overlap  between 
EFIs and within DCI, calling for a more holistic approach. To provide some examples:  

  “Under  the  DCI,  flagship  programmes  were  set  up  with  the  aim  to  overcome  silo 
approaches. In the same line, the GPGC was initially set up as a new thematic programme 
to  increase  flexibility  and  avoid  a  fragmented  approach,  especially  to  respond  to  global 
crises  and  international  commitments.  While  several  thematic  programmes  were  merged 
into  the  single  GPGC,  the  problem  of  thematic  areas  being  treated  in  isolation  remains.” 
(Organisation or association) 

  “The portfolio  of  interventions  appears very diversified, in many sectors, and  fragmented. 
This  raises  the  issue  of  coordination  and  coherence  between  the  various  financial 
instruments  and  calls  for  a  more  direct  combination  of  these  instruments.”  (Public 
Authority) 

On EU added value, while it was recognised that more work needs to be done and the EU still needs 
to tap its full potential, several examples of EU added value have been identified: 

  The EU is usually seen as an honest broker striving to act on the basis of a true partnership 

with their development cooperation partners. (Public authority) 

  EU cooperation  has  a high  value for EU MS themselves  through regular coordination and 

“joint programming”. (Public authority) 

  Mainly  in  promoting  democracy,  civil  society,  gender  and  sexual  and  reproductive  health 
and  rights  which  have  been  sometimes  neglected  by  beneficiary  governments.  (Public 
authority) 

  EU added value relies also on the variety of European players such as European local and 
regional  governments,  who  can  share  their  experience  of  local  public  policies  and 
development, accessing and managing EU funds. (EU platform, network, or association) 

From  the  contributions  that  provided  a  mainly  negative  assessment,  the  following  main  reasons 
were identified as to why contributors felt that the DCI did not well address its objectives: 

29 

 
  Limited expertise at EUDs (Public Authority). 
  Need for better engagement with Middle Income Countries (Public Authority). 
  Limited  synergies  and  complementarity  between  geographic  and  thematic  instruments  and 

with other donors, e.g. due to fragmented approach (Public authority). 

Additional written comments expressed the following: 

  DCI  is  an  effective  tool  that  generally  meets  the  EU's  priorities  for  poverty  reduction,  yet 

several weaknesses of the DCI are to be noted: 

  The  monitoring  of  projects  must  be  improved,  including  better  formulation  of 

efficiency indicators.  

  The projects put in place are not always sustainable and strong enough to last.  
  Positive  experience  with  the  thematic  programme/  GPGC  on  food  security,  nutrition, 
agriculture,  and  rural  development.  The  thematic  programmes  reflect  a  shared  agenda  of 
development objectives in these areas and are complementary to EDF programmes. Through 
the DCI the EU has offered consistent and therefore more sustainable support to important 
shared agendas on global governance of food security; forest governance; etc. Through its 
flexible  approach  and  adaptation  to  local  context  and  needs,  the  DCI  helps  to  promote 
greater policy and investment coherence, and ensures complementarity between the actions 
of  various  development  agents.  The  DCI  has  also  allowed  the  creation  of  a  very  close 
partnership  and  synergies  between  support  provided  by  FAO,  EU,  Government  and  other 
development  partners,  better  linking  investment  and  policy  support  to  create  an  enabling 
environment for achieving SDG2. 

The responses to this question have been used throughout the evaluation. Under EQ 3 (efficiency), 
it  has  been  stated  that  the  DCI  is  regarded  by  stakeholders  as  an  administratively  demanding 
instrument, and one with only limited flexibility. The evaluation has been essentially positive on the 
complementarity  of  geographic  and  thematic  programmes,  while  stating  that  the  problem  of 
compartmentalisation within the GPGC programme remains a problem. 

Question  2:  Addressing  DCI  objectives  in  LDCs  and  poverty  reduction  and  sustainable 
development in MICs 

For  this  question,  a  total  of  47  contributions  were  received  from  the  online  consultation.  The 
majority  of  contributions  provided  a  mixed  assessment  on  the  extent  to  which  the  DCI  has 
addressed  its  objectives  in  Least  Developed  Countries  and  Middle  Income  Countries.  The  graph 
below illustrates the number contributions that were mainly positive, negative, mixed or other97.  

97 The category other includes contributions that are either neutral or considered as not being relevant for this question. 

30 

 
                                                 
Figure 3  Question 2: Type of contributions from the online consultation 

From  the  contributions  received  that  provided  a  mainly  positive  assessment,  contributors  felt  that 
the  DCI  programming  has  well  respected  the  principle  of  differentiation,  and  it  is  welcomed  that 
most of the funding is now targeted to LDCs, where it is expected to have bigger added-value (e.g. 
Public authority, Organisation or association, Research and academia, Other).  

Some  contributions  also  considered that  the  DCI  is  an  appropriate  instrument  for  both  LDCs  and 
MICs  (EU  platform,  network,  or  association).  In  this  context,  two  contributions  specifically 
mentioned the GPGC as an appropriate tool to reach MICs: 

  “Direct  benefits  to  local  communities  in  least  developed  countries  (Liberia)  and  middle 

income countries (Ghana)” are visible (Organisation or association). 

  “In  our  view,  the  DCI  thematic  instrument  on  ‘Global  Public  Goods  and  Challenges’ 
(GPGC) helped to respond to the need to involve MICs in addressing regional and global 
challenges.” (Research/ academia) 

From the contributions that provided a mixed assessment, most of the contributions agree that the 
DCI has been relevant for LDCs and contributed to progress in poverty reduction. However and in 
line with the evaluation findings, most of the contributions in this category expressed concerns as to 
what extent the DCI was able to reach MICs and UMICs where poverty still exists and suggested 
the deepening of partnerships (e.g. with CSOs) in these countries: 

  “(…)  Unfortunately,  so-called  “pockets  of  poverty”  still  persist  in  the  MICs,  and  it  has 
proven  difficult  for  DCI  to  address  this  issue  accordingly.  Therefore  other  forms  of 
partnership  with  these  countries  need  to  be  explored.”  (EU  platform,  network,  or 
association) 

  “The DCI was particularly relevant in poorer, weak and fragile states (…)The DCI was less 

relevant in Middle Income countries.” (Public authority) 

  “The DCI has to a large extent played a positive role in helping the EU meet its objectives 
of  development cooperation in  Least  Developed and Middle-Income Countries. The facing 
out of development cooperation in Middle Income Countries needs to be compensated with 
thorough  analysis  of  the  characteristics  of  poverty  in  the  country,  and  well  thought  out 
investment  in  human  rights  and  strengthening  of  civil  society  organisations  representing 

31 

127162111702468101214161820PositiveNegativeMixedOtherOverallThematicGeographicNeutralNot relevant 
 
and  supporting  people  who  are  discriminated  against  or  under-serviced.”  EU  platform, 
network, or association) 

The  contributions  that  provided  a  mainly  negative  assessment  were  often  related  to  the  issue  of 
lacking a platform for cooperation with MICs and UMICs or lack of achieving results in general:  

 

 “Countries that graduate from bilateral aid programmes would still need support from the 
EU  to  ensure  that  their  development  is  equitable,  with  a  reduction  in  inequalities  going 
parallel to opportunities for growth.” (Organisation or association) 

  “While  the  DCI  has  the  right  commitment  to  advance  development  cooperation  namely  in 
LDCs,  it  fell  short  in  doing  so.  The  understanding  of  human  development  (HD),  which  is 
fundamental  to  people-centred  policies,  under  the  DCI  thematic  programme  is  too  broad 
and should be refined.” (Organisation or association) 

Additional written comments noted that the DCI fulfils its role as a vector for development (health, 
food  security,  economic  and  social  development),  consistent  with  the  SDGs,  and  its  impact  is 
considered structured and relatively rapid in LDCs and UMICs. Yet, the lack of an accompanying 
mechanism  for  graduated  countries  prevents  it  from  making  it  an  instrument  capable  of  fully 
responding to the developments that can be observed. 

The  main  thrust  of  the  comments  appears  to  be  that  there  is  continuing  need  for  development 
cooperation in Middle Income Countries; one of the conclusions of the evaluation. The Partnership 
Instrument, while serving a valued role in particular related to regional and global challenges, is not 
well suited, either by size or goal, to addressing persistent poverty.  

Question 3: DCI enabling the EU to project its principles and values 

For this question, a total of 47 contributions were received. The majority of contributions provided 
a positive assessment on the extent to which the DCI enabled the EU to project its principles and 
values.  The  graph  below  illustrates  the  number  contributions  that  were  mainly  positive,  negative, 
mixed or other98.  

Figure 4  Question 3: Type of contributions from the online consultation 

98 The category other includes contributions that are either neutral or considered as not being relevant for this question. 

32 

93123121702468101214161820PositiveNegativeMixedOtherOverallThematicGeographicNeutralNot relevant 
 
                                                 
The majority of contributions provide a mainly positive assessment and agree that the EU’s external 
actions  should  be  guided  by  principles  of  democracy,  rule  of  law  and  human  rights.  Some 
contributions explicitly mentioned the crucial role of the CSO-LA component to work in this area: 

 

 “(…) there is no doubt that EU’s external action should be guided primarily by principles 
of democracy, rule of law, human rights, including the right to a healthy environment, and 
fundamental  freedoms.  The  DCI  has  great  potential  to  project  such  values.  The  CSO/LA 
programme has a strong emphasis on improving governance and strengthening the rule of 
law  by  engaging  civil  society  and  work  on  Civil  society  roadmaps  by  EU  delegations  is 
important in this respect.” (Organisation or association) 

The contributions that provide a mainly mixed assessment emphasised the importance of the DCI 
promoting the principles and values of the EU. An EU platform noted that “The EU is perceived as 
a reliable dialogue partner and more neutral than the single Member States. This is an additional 
added  value  in  order  to  promote  reform  processes  such  as  in  the  field  of  strengthening  local 
democratic  governance.”  While  progress  has  been  noted  (especially  in  relation  to  the  CSO-LA 
programme), several factors, mainly at EUD level and in relation to  CSO involvement have  been 
identified that have hindered progress: 

  EUDs  have  been  confronted  with  major  bottlenecks,  “originating  from  both  political 
resistance  among  partner  countries  (e.g.  the  phenomenon  of  “closing  space”  for  civil 
society  and  human  rights  associations),  internal  EU  constraints  (e.g.  lack  of  political, 
institutional  and  bureaucratic  incentives  to  mainstream  the  values)  and  MS  interests.” 
(Research and academia).  

  Limited  political  support  and  resources  in  EUDs  to  promote  human  rights  issues  and 

governance.(Organisation or association) 

From  the  contributions  that  provided  a  mainly  negative  assessment,  no  further  explanations  were 
provided. 

These  mixed  comments  underscore  the  predicament  faced  by  the  EU,  which  runs  throughout  the 
evaluation: the EU is commited to promote universal values, yet such values are often questioned in 
a number of partner countries.  

Question 4: DCI ability to adapt to shifts in policy and the external environment 

For this question, a total of 40 contributions were received. The majority of contributions provided 
a mixed assessment on the extent to which the DCI has been able to adapt to shifts in policy and the 
external  environment.  The  graph  below  illustrates  the  number  of  contributions  that  were  mainly 
positive, negative, mixed or other99.  

99 The category other includes contributions that are either neutral or considered as not being relevant for this question. 

33 

 
                                                 
Figure 5  Question 4: Type of contributions from the online consultation 

The majority of contributions provide a mainly mixed assessment. There seems to be a feeling that 
the  DCI  has  managed  to  address  EU’s  internal  policy  concerns  “such  as  climate  change  and 
environment,  especially  through  its  thematic  programme  Global  Public  Goods  and  Challenges” 
(EU platform, network, or association) and scaled up migration work following the the adoption of 
Trust  Funds  (EU  platform,  network,  or  association,  research/academia).  Yet,  some  concerns  were 
expressed  emphasising  that  EU's  internal  policy  concerns  (especially  related  to  migration)  should 
not interfere too much with DCI’s primary objective of poverty reduction: 

  “In  terms  of  responsiveness,  the  scaling  up  of  migration  related  work  has  shown  that  the 
DCI  can  respond.  However,  the  rationale  and  policy  framework  under  which  these  funds 
will  be  used  have  also  changed.  The  DCI  thus  increasingly  incorporates  shorter-term 
security  interests  into  its  development  funding  as  relates  to  migration.  While  this  may  be 
interpreted as accommodating ‘internal EU policy concerns’, long-term development effects 
in  the  area  of  migration  are  not  only  achieved  by  focusing  on  security-related  aspects.” 
(Research/academia) 

  “DCI  has  been  used  to  respond  to  changes  in  the  external  environment,  such  as  the 
migration  challenge.  Significant  resources  have  been  channelled  to  EU  Trust  Funds.  (…) 
activities have been proposed under the geographical programmes that are not in line with 
the DAC criteria. It is critical that the integrity of ODA is safeguarded.” (Public authority) 

The contributions that were mainly negative, mostly emphasised the lack of progress in the area of 
climate  change,  e.g.”  The  Paris  Agreement  has  not  induced  any  major  shift  in  climate  funding 
under DCI, which remains restricted to GPGC. The lack of biodiversity and climate mainstreaming 
through  DCI  funding  also  suggests  that  the  adoption  of  the  2030  Agenda  for  Sustainable 
Development and the international commitments to implement the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on 
Financing  for  Development  has  had  limited  impact  on  DCI’s  programming.”  (Organisation  or 
association) 

Question 5: If you have any other views on the DCI you would like to share, they are welcome 
here. 

In the other views on the DCI section, 42 contributions were provided via the online consultation. 
Main contributions included:  

Complementarity,  coherence  and  coordination  of  the  different  programmes  and  EFIs  and  with 
Member States: 

34 

410911150246810121416PositiveNegativeMixedOtherOverallThematicGeographicNeutralNot relevant 
 
  “In the short term the most important challenge is to further improve on effectiveness and 
coherence in particular with regard to potential overlaps between the regional and thematic 
programmes.  In  the  long  term:  the  DCI  should  be  merged  with  other  development 
cooperation  instruments  like  the  EDF.  This  one  development  cooperation-instrument  shall 
the implementation of Agenda 2030. This instrument needs to be flexible, the time to delivery 
shorter. It needs to be ready for cooperation in “multi actor partnerships.” The cooperation 
with  Middle  Income  countries,  promotion  of  democracy  and  equity  in  these  countries,  is 
critical.” (Public authority) 

  “The  geographic  part  and  the  thematic  part  are  not  well  integrated  within  the  same 
instrument and  those  who  do  not  have  in-depth  expertise  are  likely  to  confuse  the various 
plans” (Organisation or association) 

  “There are problems with communication and sharing of information concerning the DCI. 
Whereas  the  geographic  programs  are  well  known,  the  regional,  thematic  (GPGC  in 
particular) and Pan-African programs are not.” (Public authority) 

Efficiency 

  “The  DCI  globally  fits  for  purpose.  For  its  better  efficiency,  it  is  advisable  that  its 
procedures  and  access  be  simplified.  The  actions  it  finances  should  also  strive  to 
systematically be consistent with the core values of the EU. It should also fully respect the 
subsidiarity  principle  as  long  one  is  concerned  with  the  development  aid  impact  and 
efficiency.” (Public authority) 

  “1/  Due  to  heavy,  labor  intensive  processes, timelines  to  get  to  implementation  are  overly 
long. 2/ Whilst the introduction of the EU results framework has increased focus on results, 
there  is  room  to  improve  further  by  clearly  setting  out  expected  results  and  ensuring  that 
related indicators in logframes are measurable. 3/ Staffing capacity/ numbers/ skill sets in 
EUDs continue to remain problematic for example, there has been an emphasis on gender 
programming, but has there been sufficient expertise building in EUDs to be able to deliver 
this?” (Public authority) 

Involvement of stakeholder and building partnerships also in relation to co-operation with UMICs 
and MICs: 

  “Beneficiaries  should  be  more  involved  and  engaged  in  setting  and  developing  the  DCI 

from the beginning.” (Public authority) 

  “As  DCI  “looses”  development  partners  (following  graduation  processes)  the  question 
raises  whether  it  would  not  be  wise  to  bring  together  in  one  single  instrument  all  partner 
countries that will still be dependent on ”development aid” in next decade. It would allow 
the  EU  to  develop  a  global  approach  to  LDCs  and  fragile  countries  -irrespective  of  past 
frameworks and financial arrangements.” (Research/ academia) 

Technical workshop 27-28 March 

The technical workshop took place with representatives of the European Parliament (Secretariats of 
the Committees and assistants to MEPs), Council working groups and the DCI Committee. 

A few comments touched on how to integrate the new EU agenda in the DCI. Others mentioned the 
advantages and disadvantages of increasing the flexibility of the instrument. The issue of engaging 
with Middle Income Countries was also raised. Others highlighted the complex architecture of the 
DCI and how it should be more focused on fewer areas of cooperation to increase impact. The 
majority of the comments concerned the future direction of the instrument and will not be dealt with 
in this Staff Working Document. 

35 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3. ACRONYMS 

CIR 

CSO 

DAC 

DCI 

Common Implementation Regulation 

Civil Society Organisation 

Development Assistance Committee 

Development Cooperation Instrument 

DG DEVCO 

Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development 

EDF 

EEAS 

EFI 

European Development Fund 

European External Action Service 

External Financing Instrument 

EIDHR 

European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 

ENI 

GD 

European Neighbourhood Instrument 

Greenland Decision 

GPGC 

Global Public Goods and Challenges 

IcSP 

INSC 

IPA 

LA 

MDG 

MIP 

MS 

MTR 

ODA 

PI 

ROM 

SDG 

UMIC 

Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 

Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 

Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance 

Local Authorities 

Millennium Development Goals 

Multiannual Indicative Programme 

Member States 

Mid-Term Review 

Official Development Assistance 

Partnership Instrument 

Results-Oriented Monitoring 

Sustainable Development Goals 

Upper Middle Income Countries 

36 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 4. INDICATORS FOR DCI COUNTRIES 
Level 1 indicators from the EU International Cooperation and Development Results Framework 

Source:  First  Report  on  Selected  Results,  July  2013-June  2014,  Annual  Reports  on  the  implementation  of  the  European  Union's  instruments  for 

financing external actions in 2014, 2015 and 2016 

Name of indicator 

Proportion of 
population living 
below the international 
poverty line (%) 

Income share held by 
the lowest 40 % of 
income distribution (% 
income, period 
averages) 

Real GDP growth, 
latest available year 
(%) 

Real GDP growth, 
average over five last 
available years (%) 

Average Rule of Law 
score (Worldwide 
Governance Index, 
ranges from approx. -
2.5 (weak) to approx. 
+2.5 (strong) 
performance) 

Average Control of 
Corruption score 
(Worldwide 
Governance Index, 
ranges from approx. -
2.5 (weak) to approx. 
+2.5 (strong) 
performance) 

Average Voice and 
Accountability score 
(Worldwide 
Governance Index, 
ranges from approx. -
2.5 (weak) to approx. 
+2.5 (strong) 
performance) 

Number of violent 
deaths per 100 000 

2014* 

2015* 

2016 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2014* 

2015 

2016 

DCI 

12.4 

11.8 

11.5 

18.2 

18.0 

17.8 

4.1 

4.1 

3.8 

4.9 

5.1 

5.0 

-0.9 

-0.7 

-0.8 

-0.7 

-0.7 

-0.7 

-0.8 

-0.7 

-0.7 

9.4 

.. 

9.3 

DCI - Asia (Central 
Asia, Middle East) 

DCI - Africa 

DCI - Latin America 

16.6 

16.6 

16.6 

6.7 

7.2 

7.2 

1.5 

1.5 

1.3 

2.4 

2.4 

2.1 

0.0 

0.2 

0.1 

0.2 

-0.1 

0.0 

0.6 

0.7 

0.6 

30.8 

.. 

33.0 

7.6 

6.7 

5.8 

12.1 

12.2 

12.6 

4.4 

3.8 

3.0 

4.4 

4.9 

4.5 

-0.9 

-0.7 

-0.8 

-0.5 

-0.6 

-0.6 

-0.3 

-0.3 

-0.3 

24.2 

.. 

21.8 

13.2 

12.6 

12.5 

20.3 

20.1 

19.9 

4.6 

4.8 

4.7 

6.0 

6.1 

6.0 

-0.9 

-0.8 

-0.8 

-0.9 

-0.8 

-0.8 

-1.1 

-1.0 

-0.9 

5.0 

.. 

5.2 

37 

 
  
2014 

3 520 

Cereal yield per ha (kg) 

2015 

Prevalence of stunting 
(moderate and severe) 
of children aged below 
five years (%) 

Prevalence of 
undernourishment (%) 

Percentage of the 
population with access 
to energy services 

Renewable energy 
production as a 
proportion of total 
energy production (%) 

Change in domestic 
revenue mobilisation as 
a percentage of GDP 
over three years 

2016 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2014* 

2015 

2016 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2014* 

2015 

2016 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2014 

Female 

2015 

2016 

2014 

Male 

2015 

2016 

2014 

All 

2015 

2016 

2014 

Female 

2015 

2016 

2014 

2015 

Male 

Primary 
Education 
Completion 
Rate (%) 

Lower 
Secondary 
Education 
Completion 
Rate (%) 

.. 

3 595 

34.5 

32.4 

32.3 

16.2 

15.4 

15.4 

78.8  

81.5 

.. 

32.6 

.. 

31.7 

-0.2 

.. 

-1.3 

 85.2 

86.9 

90.5 

 86.2 

89.1 

90.3 

85.8  

88.1 

90.5 

64.4  

70.6 

70.4 

63.2  

69.1 

3 569 

.. 

3 634 

37.4 

34.9 

34.9 

17.8 

17.0 

17.1 

76.2 

79.0 

.. 

33.3 

.. 

31.9 

-1.1 

.. 

-1.8 

82.3 

82.4 

88.5 

83.8 

86.1 

88.7 

83.1 

84.3 

88.7 

62.1 

67.2 

67.8 

61.7 

66.9 

38 

3 725 

.. 

4 320 

23.9 

23.9 

23.9 

5.0 

5.0 

5.0 

82.7 

85.4 

.. 

0.5 

.. 

1.1 

0.9 

.. 

2.3 

- 

98.0 

98.0 

- 

93.7 

93.7 

- 

95.8 

95.8 

- 

80.9 

80.9 

- 

70.8 

3 032 

.. 

2 918 

22.8 

20.7 

20.1 

12.0 

10.3 

10.3 

90.5 

92.3 

.. 

63.2 

.. 

61.6 

0.7 

.. 

-2.4 

98.5 

100.0 

96.8 

97.1 

100.0 

96.7 

97.8 

100.0 

96.7 

76.3 

86.7 

81.8 

71.3 

80.6 

 
2016 

2014 

All 

2015 

2016 

2014 

Female 

2015 

2016 

2014 

Male 

2015 

2016 

2014 

All 

2015 

Literacy rate 
of 15-24 
year-olds 
(%) 

Under-five mortality 
rate (per 1 000 live 
births) 

Maternal mortality 
ratio (per 100 000 live 
births) 

2016 

2014* 

2015 

2016 

2014* 

2015 

2016 

2014 

HIV 
prevalence 
among 
population 
aged 15-24 
years (%) 

Female 

2015 

2016 

2014 

Male 

2015 

2016 

2014* 

All 

2015 

Number of deaths per 
100 000  from climate-
related and natural 
disasters (average over 
ten years) 

2016 

2014 

2015 

2016 

68.9 

 63.8 

69.8 

69.6 

84.9  

85.0 

87.0 

88.8  

88.8 

89.9 

86.8  

86.9 

88.5 

47.6 

.. 

46.1 

164.7 

152.8 

.. 

- 

0.5 

0.7 

- 

0.4 

0.3 

0.5 

0.4 

0.5 

 1.8 

1.4 

2.1 

67.5 

61.9 

67.0 

67.7 

81.5 

81.7 

84.1 

86.5 

86.6 

87.9 

84.0 

84.1 

86.1 

52.6 

.. 

50.4 

178.5 

163.8 

.. 

- 

0.1 

0.1 

- 

0.1 

0.1 

0.1 

0.1 

0.1 

2.3 

1.7 

2.6 

70.8 

- 

75.7 

75.7 

99.3 

99.3 

99.4 

98.5 

98.5 

98.7 

98.9 

98.9 

99.0 

43.4 

.. 

40.5 

145.0 

138.0 

.. 

- 

8.1 

11.6 

- 

6.1 

4.0 

8.0 

6.1 

7.8 

0.1 

0.1 

0.1 

76.3 

73.7 

83.6 

79.0 

97.4 

97.4 

97.8 

97.3 

97.3 

97.8 

97.3 

97.3 

97.8 

22.3 

.. 

20.9 

95.7 

88.8 

.. 

- 

0.1 

0.1 

- 

0.2 

0.2 

0.2 

0.2 

0.2 

0.6 

0.6 

0.5 

CO2 equivalent 

2014* 

1 506 941 

880 536 

385 209 

241 196 

39 

 
emission (kilo tons) 

Proportion of 
population using an 
improved drinking 
water source (%) 

Proportion of 
population using an 
improved sanitation 
facility (%) 

Rate of net forest cover 
change, since 2000 (%) 

State of global 
biodiversity 
   Number of global 
species100 

2015 

2016 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2014 

2015 

2016 

1 590 081 

942 208 

392 719 

255 155 

.. 

 87.5 

87.8 

.. 

65.6  

69.6 

.. 

-5.3  

-5.8 

.. 

.. 

86.6 

86.9 

.. 

62.9 

68.3 

.. 

-5.6 

-6.4 

.. 

.. 

95.0 

93 

.. 

74.0 

66.0 

.. 

-14.0 

-15.0 

.. 

.. 

89.9 

90.5 

.. 

76.1 

77.2 

.. 

-5.0 

-5.4 

.. 

Number of global species 

3 038 

Road density (km. of 
road per 100 sq. km of 
land area) 

Proportion of 
employed people living 
below the international 
poverty line (%) 

2014 

 18.4 

2015 

19.3 

2016 

.. 

2014* 

24.5 

2015 

23.8 

2016 

.. 

19.7 

20.8 

.. 

29.9 

29.1 

.. 

2014 

34.4 

28.8 

Share of older persons 
receiving pensions (%) 

Average Global 
Competitiveness score 
(range 1-7) 

2015 

2016 

.. 

.. 

2014 

 3.9 

2015 

2016 

3.9 

3.9 

Exports of goods and 
services  as percentage 
of GDP 

2014 

 30.0 

2015 

29.5 

.. 

.. 

3.8 

3.9 

3.9 

33.9 

33.2 

Number of global species 

30.0 

29.9 

.. 

6.3 

6.3 

.. 

92.6 

.. 

.. 

4.4 

4.4 

4.5 

31.0 

31.3 

.. 

3 706 

13.3 

14 

.. 

5.6 

5.2 

.. 

32.8 

.. 

.. 

3.9 

3.9 

3.9 

23.8 

23.1 

100  This  indicator  covers  results  coming  from  the  European  Development  Fund,  the  Development  Cooperation  Instrument,  the 
European  Neighbourhood  Instrument,  part  of  the  Instrument  contributing  to  Stability  and  Peace,  the  European  Instrument  for 
Democracy and Human Rights, the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation  and the Greenland Decision. 

40 

 
 
                                                 
Proportion of seats 
held by women in 
national parliaments 
(%) 

Percentage of women 
aged 20-24 years old 
who were married 
before their 18th 
birthday 

Percentage of women 
aged 20-24 years old 
who were married 
before their 15th 
birthday 

2016 

28.7 

2014 

 20.1 

2015 

22.6 

2016 

22.9 

2014 

 27.0 

2015 

28.4 

2016 

24.8 

2014 

2015 

- 

- 

32.5 

17.9 

20.5 

20.7 

28.9 

28.9 

26.2 

- 

- 

2016 

5.8 

6.3 

30.9 

44.8 

41.5 

42.0 

5.6 

- 

5.6 

- 

- 

0.8 

21.7 

23.0 

27.2 

27.5 

25.0 

25.7 

24.1 

- 

- 

5.0 

Level 2 indicators from the EU International Cooperation and Development Results Framework 

Source: calculations from  results framework data set and Annual Report on the implementation of the European Union's instruments for financing 

external actions in 2016 

Name of indicator 

DCI Instrument 
projects and 
programmes ending 
between mid-2013 and 
mid-2014 

DCI Instrument 
projects and 
programmes ending 
between mid-2014 and 
mid-2015 

DCI Instrument 
projects and 
programmes ending 
between mid-2015 and 
mid-2016 

Number of human rights defenders who have received EU 
support 

Number  of  elections  supported  by  the  EU  where  the 
electoral  process  is  perceived  by  independent  observers  as 
free and fair 

Number  of  individuals  directly  benefitting  from  Justice, 
Rule  of  Law  and  Security  Sector  Reform  programmes 
funded by EU external assistance programmes 

Number  of  people  directly  benefitting  from  legal  aid 
programmes supported by the EU 

individuals  directly  benefitting  from  EU 
Number  of 
supported  programmes  that  specifically  aim  to  support 
civilian  post-conflict  peacebuilding 
conflict 
prevention  

and/or 

Agricultural  and  pastoral  ecosystems  where  sustainable 
land  management practices have been introduced with EU 
support (number of hectares) 

Number of people receiving rural advisory services with EU 
support 

Number of women and men who have secure tenure of land 
with EU support 

Number of women of reproductive age and children under 
5  benefiting  from  nutrition  related  programmes  with  EU 
support 

Number  of  food 
through social transfers supported by the EU  

insecure  people  receiving  assistance 

Number  of  people  provided  with  access 
sustainable energy services with EU support 

to 

Kilometres  of  transmission  /distribution  lines  built  or 
upgraded with EU support 

10 000 

- 

157 000 

201 000 

120 

1 

17 000 

76 000 

1 500 

1 

105 000 

102 000 

502 000 

165 000 

312 000 

2 869 000 

182 000 

196 000 

391 000 

928 000 

660 000 

51 000 

3 800 

330 

1 016 000 

3 976 000 

732 000 

260 000 

643 000 

454 000 

- 

- 

43 000 

16 

41 

 
 
 
 
531 000 

66 000 

6 716 000 

16 000 

70 000 

10 000 000 

165 000 000 

19 

Number  of  countries  where 
management has  improved 

  overall  public  financial 

Number of children enrolled in primary education with EU 
support 

Number  of  children  enrolled  in  secondary  education  with 
EU support 

Number of teachers trained with EU support  

Number of births attended by skilled health personnel with 
EU support 

Number of 1-year olds immunised with EU support 

- 

- 

- 

10 341 000 

89 000 

4 753 000 

9 398 000 

28 000 

566 000 

69 000 

199 000 

165 000 

5 303 000 

5 521 000 

Number of women using any method of contraception with 
EU support 

43 053 000 

13 238 000 

Number  of  people  with  advanced  HIV  infection  receiving 
antiretroviral therapy  with EU support 

Number of insecticide-treated bed-nets distributed with EU 
support 

4 233 000 

150 000 000 

Number of countries/regions with climate change strategies 
(a) developed and/or (b) implemented with EU support 

22 

- 

- 

9 

Number  of  hectares  of  protected  areas  managed  with  EU 
support 

Number  of  Micro,  Small  and  Medium  Enterprises 
and 
(MSMEs) 
Production practices with EU support 

applying  Sustainable  Consumption 

Total length of road constructed /rehabilitated /maintained 
with EU support (kms) 

Number  of  people  with  access  to  all  season  roads  with  EU 
support 

Number  of  people  who  have  benefitted  from  VET/  skills 
development  and  other  active  labour  market  programmes 
with EU support 

Number  of  countries  whose  capacity  to  trade  across 
borders has improved with EU support 

Number of firms with access to credit with EU support  

Number of quality certifications issued with EU support 

Number  of  countries  where  the  business  environment  has 
improved with EU support 

13 504 000 

3 928 000 

1 222 000 

3 700 

200 

5 300 

490 

9 600 

860 

494 000 

484 000 

335 000 

241 000 

163 000 

150 000 

6 

450 

88 

2 

7 

1 

3 600 

12 000 

43 

2 

4 

42 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 5. EXTERNAL EVALUATION 

The external evaluation can be found here: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/public-consultation-
external-financing-instruments-european-union_en   

43