REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT in accordance with Article 21(3) of Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 implementing Article 10 of the United Nations’ Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UN Firearms Protocol), and establishing export authorisation, and import and transit measures for firearms, their parts and components and ammunition
Date: 2017-12-12
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: arms control, arms trade, export (EU), export licence, fight against crime, illicit trade, import (EU), import licence, military equipment, protocol to an agreement

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 12.12.2017 COM(2017) 737 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT in accordance with Article 21(3) of Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 implementing Article 10 of the United Nations’ Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UN Firearms Protocol), and establishing export authorisation, and import and transit measures for firearms, their parts and components and ammunition {SWD(2017) 442 final}  
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

1.1. 

BACKGROUND 

(1)   Once  they  have  been  legally  manufactured,  firearms  can  be  used  for  many  years. 
Without appropriate measures, they can easily be diverted away from the legal market 
and smuggled illegally from one conflict zone to another, or into organised crime or 
the hands of terrorists. Their use is therefore a key element of terrorist activities, and 
more  broadly  of  most  criminal  activities,  which  are  often  characterised  by  weapons 
use. 

for 

calls 

close 
level.  To 

cooperation 
between 
this  end,  a  Protocol  supplementing 

(2)   A fully traceable legal arms trade is a condition of the fight against the trafficking of 
competent 
firearms. 
It 
the 
authorities at international 
‘United Nations Convention 
(the 
Firearms Protocol)  focuses  on  preventing  the  illicit  manufacturing  and  trafficking  of 
firearms,  their  parts,  components  and  ammunition.  In  particular,  Article 10  seeks  to 
promote,  facilitate  and  strengthen  cooperation  at  global  level  to  eradicate  arms 
trafficking 
firearms 
manufacturing, marking, imports and exports under effective control. 

against  Transnational  Organized  Crime’ 

administrative  mechanisms 

that  bring 

establish 

and 

the 

(3)  

1  

2  

3  

The  European  Union’s  general  policy  on  military  small  arms  and  light  weapons  is 
based on the strategy adopted by the European Council in 20051. On civilian firearms, 
the European Union adopted Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and 
possession of weapons in order to establish common rules on the possession and use of 
firearms  for  legitimate  civilian  purposes  within  the  single  market2.  The  Union 
therefore also has exclusive competence for the conclusion of international agreements 
on  issues  relevant  to  its  internal  competence.  For  that  reason,  in  order  to  ratify  the 
Firearms Protocol3 and ensure firearms’ traceability at the EU’s external borders, the 
Union adopted Regulation (EU) 258/20124.  

EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and 
their ammunition, 16 December 2005. 

Council Directive 91/477/EEC of 18 June 1991 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, 
OJ L 256 of 13.9.1991, p. 51, as amended by Directive (EU) 2017/853 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 17 May 2017 amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and 
possession of weapons, OJ L 137 du 24.5.2017, p. 22. 

Council Decision 2014/164/EU of 11 February 2014 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, 
of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
(4)  

The overall strategic goal of combating illicit trafficking in civilian firearms has been 
enshrined in specific objectives5: 
  Ensure  harmonised  implementation  of  the  Regulation’s  provisions  in  all  the 

Member States, in line with Article 10 of the Firearms Protocol; 

  Help improve firearms traceability in international trade (i.e. between the point of 
export and point of import) in order to better inform the national authorities and 
make  it  easier  for  them  to  combat  trafficking  by  improving  prevention  and 
repression; 
Improve information exchanges between national authorities in order to facilitate 
cooperation on the tracing and control of firearms, and to prevent and investigate 
possible diversions away from the legal market. 

 

(5)  

In  addition,  a  fourth,  less  explicit  objective  relates  to  the  potential  impact  of 
Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 in terms of facilitating legal international transactions. 
In  this  respect  weapons  production  (mainly  ammunition)  and  weapons  exports  have 
risen steadily on a highly concentrated market (large companies account for 4.8 % of 
the total number of firms, but for 78.8 % of the total turnover). In contrast, although 
the market share of European arms exports decreased, this fall is not correlated to the 
entry into force of the Regulation. 

1.2.  MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE REGULATION  

(6)  

In  order  to  achieve  these  objectives,  the  Regulation  subjects  exports  of  civilian 
firearms  to  an  ‘export  authorisation’  principle.  Member  States  can  use  a  single 
procedure  for  exports  containing  both  military  weapons6  and  civilian  firearms.  The 
competent  authorities  have  a  maximum  of  60 working  days  in  which  to  respond  to 
applications. 

Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (OJ L 89, 25.3.2014). 

4  

Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 
implementing Article 10 of the United Nations' Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking 
in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime (UN Firearms Protocol), and establishing export authorisation, and 
import and transit measures for firearms, their parts and components and ammunition (OJ L 94, 30.3.2012, 
pp. 1-15). 

5   As described in the impact assessment carried out in 2010 (SEC(2010) 662 final) and the adopted final text. 

6  

In order to meet the obligations of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining 
common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment. 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
(7)  

(8)  

In  the  process,  they  are  required  to  check  whether  the  applicant  holds  an  import 
authorisation  in  the  third  country  of  destination  and,  where  applicable,  in  the  third 
country of transit (Member States may choose to accept tacit agreement for transit).  

The Member States must ensure that there is appropriate administrative cooperation on 
to  avoid 
the  refusal,  suspension  or  amendment  of  authorisations 
circumvention and differential treatment. 

in  order 

(9)  

The exporter has to supply the competent authority of the Member State with all the 
required documentation, translated where appropriate. 

(10)   Simplified procedures can be applied to temporary exports, in particular for hunters or 

sport shooters.  

(11)   The  data  relating  to  firearms,  export  authorisations  and  their  beneficiaries  must  be 

retained for at least 20 years. 

(12)   The  penalties  applicable  to  infringements  of  the  Regulation  must  be  effective, 

proportionate and dissuasive. 

1.3. 

EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 

(13)   The evaluation set out to determine whether the current procedures and arrangements 
established  by  the  Regulation  achieved  the  expected  results  and  whether  the 
Regulation  is  still  up  to  date.  Where  appropriate,  the  evaluation  may  lead  to  the 
identification  of  policy  options  that  could  conceivably  address  the  challenges 
identified, subject to the findings of a subsequent impact assessment.  

(14)   The  evaluation  was  based  on  exchanges  between  and  consultations  of 
various stakeholders:  competent  national  authorities 
the 
Firearms Exports Coordination  Group  established  by  Article 20  of  the  Regulation), 
industry  representatives,  representatives  of  firearm  users,  and  other  experts.  The 
Commission  also  organised  an  online  public  consultation  from  1 March 
to 
26 May 2017. 

(particularly  within 

(15)   An  externally  commissioned  evaluation  study7  was  based  on  documentary  sources 
(statistics, regulatory texts, open private data, reports and studies available online, and 
information  provided  by  the  stakeholders  consulted),  a  detailed  online  survey  and 

7  

Evaluation study on the implementation of Regulation 258, Ernst & Young, SIPRI, 2017. 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
48 in-depth  interviews.  Case  studies  involving  10 representative  Member  States 
allowed  specific  key  questions  to  be  analysed  in  greater  detail.  The  Member  States 
were consulted on the study’s findings in order to avoid any factual error in relation to 
them. 

2. 

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REGULATION 

(16)   Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 applies directly in the Member States from the date of 
its publication and does not require transposition measures. The information gathered 
shows that the Member States have taken different approaches to its implementation. 
While some have amended their national legislation, by including a direct reference to 
the  Regulation,  others  have  left  their  existing  laws  unchanged  and  merely  adapted 
their procedures and practices through administrative acts. 

(17)   Overall,  the  Member  States  are  correctly  applying  the  definitions  contained  in  the 
Regulation,  at  least  in  part,  largely  because  they  correspond  to  the  definitions 
contained  in  Directive  91/477/EEC  on  firearms  which  had  already  been  transposed 
earlier. 

(18)   No Member State seems to be applying the rules and procedures of the Regulation to 
transactions,  weapons  or  persons  excluded  from  its  scope.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
reality may be different in practice, particularly with regard to deactivated weapons or 
alarm  weapons8.  Furthermore,  the  competent  authorities  often  face  major  difficulties 
in  pinpointing  the  civilian  or  military  nature  of  firearms  (in  particular  as  regards 
weapons in category ML1)9 based on their technical characteristics. 

(19)   The  authorities  responsible  for  issuing  export  authorisations  vary  greatly  from  one 
Member State to the next. In 12 Member States, there are several authorities involved 
in the procedures granting export authorisations10.  

(20)   The Regulation leaves the methods for submitting authorisation requests in the hands 
of  the  Member  States.  As  a  result,  these  methods  vary.  The  use  of  electronic 
documents  shows  mixed  results.  Some  countries  appear  to  have  successfully 

8 

9 

Austria, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. No 
information available for the other Member States. 

The ML1 list includes smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic 
weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm or less and accessories. 

10  Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal and Romania 

and Spain. 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
implemented  electronic  procedures11,  whereas  frequent  changes  to  the  electronic 
licensing system in other countries place a considerable burden on companies. 

(21)   14 Member States and the Walloon Region opted for a single procedure to issue export 
authorisations, the arrangements for which vary greatly from one Member State to the 
next12. 

(22)   Almost  all  the  Member  States  apply  the  simplified  procedures  for  hunters  and  sport 
shooters, who do not have to produce an export authorisation where the Regulation so 
allows. According to the external evaluator, however,  the Regulation’s provisions on 
simplified procedures are not being complied with systematically, notably in terms of 
re-export  following  temporary  admission  or  storage,  and  where  hunters  or  sport 
shooters are subject to export authorisations not provided for under the Regulation. 

(23)   The Regulation offers the Member States the possibility to accept the tacit agreement 
of the third country of transit in order to simplify the Protocol’s very strict procedure 
(written notification of non-objection). 13 Member States apply the ‘tacit agreement’ 
principle; another 13 require written agreement. 

(24)   An infringement entered in the criminal record usually justifies a refusal to grant the 
export  licence.  However,  an  extract  from  the  criminal  record  is  not  systematically 
requested  and  there  is  no  indication  that  such  an  infringement  is  always  checked, 
either in the national criminal records, or a fortiori in the criminal records of the other 
Member States. 

(25)   14 % of the national authorities consulted stated that they have already refused to grant 
an export authorisation (a very small proportion of the total number of requests). For 
information  exchanges  on  authorisation  refusals,  21  national  authorities  report  using 
the COARM online system for conventional arms exports, less to notify refusals as to 
consult refusals issued by other Member States. More generally, communication and 
information  exchanges  between  Member  States  are  based  on  a  very  wide  range  of 
channels. 

(26)   Arrangements  for  data  retention  show  marked  differences,  and  in  some  cases  the 

minimum retention period does not meet the 20 years required by the Regulation13.  

11   The industry-funded SIGMA system allows information to be exchanged on intra-EU and extra-EU 

transfers between national authorities and the profession. 

12   The procedure can range from a simple request for an opinion from other relevant Ministries to 

implementation of the same procedure for all firearms (civilian and military), as well as a single form (or 
website) to request authorisation for the two types of licences. 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                            
(27)  

import 

to  confirm  receipt  of 

In cases of suspicion, the Regulation provides for the Member States to ask the third 
country  of 
the  exported  firearms.  However, 
11 Member States  never  ask  for  such  confirmation,  including  two  of  the  main 
exporters (France, United Kingdom). In contrast, other major exporters require it in all 
cases.  These  two  types  of  systematic  practices  raise  questions  with  regard  to  how 
requests are assessed on a case-by-case basis. 

(28)   For  imports,  although  nearly  all  the  Member  States  ensure  weapons  are  marked  in 
accordance with the Protocol, thereby making it possible to identify the first country of 
import  within  the  European  Union  in  addition  to  the  unique  marking  required  under 
Directive 91/477/EEC, only one (NL) takes a less restrictive approach, as it can under 
the Regulation, by deeming the unique marking, which simply indicates the country of 
production, as sufficient when the product is brought to market. 

(29)   Finally, the Commission notes the difficulties faced in collecting information and the 
often patchy nature of the information  conveyed by the Member  States, including in 
the context of preparing this report. 

3. 

EVALUATION CONCLUSIONS 

3.1. 

RELEVANCE 

(30)   The evaluation shows that the objectives and measures provided for in the Regulation 
are  relevant  on  the  whole.  The  international  trafficking  of  firearms  remains  a  major 
concern. Harmonised controls on imports of firearms in the customs territory remain a 
priority in order to control the conditions for legal trade. The Regulation remains fully 
relevant  to  exports14,  probably  even  more  so  now  than  at  the  time  of  its  adoption, 
given  the  political  instability  and  armed  conflicts  in  many  countries  near  the 
European Union. 

(31)   Only a European regulation is capable of ensuring the harmonised implementation of 
the  rules  in  all  the  Member  States,  in  accordance  with  Article 10  of  the  Firearms 
Protocol. The stakeholders agree that a non-harmonised approach would hamper law 
enforcement agencies in their efforts to counter arms trafficking. Moreover, rules are 
needed  more  than  ever  as  regards  information  exchanges  between  authorities  with  a 

13  

9 Member States according to the external evaluator. 

14   With particular regard to the Member States still to ratify the Protocol (France, Germany, Ireland, 

Luxembourg, Malta, United Kingdom). 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
view to intelligence gathering, risk analysis and ensuring uniform interpretation of the 
rules  governing  imports  and  exports  of  firearms  in  the  customs  territory  of  the 
European Union.  

(32)   The definitions in Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 are deemed to be of overall relevance 
by the various stakeholders involved. Similarly, the export control procedures appear 
adequate in light of their purpose and the sensitive nature of the goods in question. 

(33)   However,  allowing  the  competent  authorities  to  choose  is  a  weakness  of  the 

Regulation, whose implementation and interpretation should in principle be uniform. 

(34)   The  Regulation  does  not  establish  a  harmonised  licensing  system  for  imports  and 
therefore  has  little  relevance  in  this  respect.  The  same  applies  to  the  rules  of  transit 
within the European Union, which is subject to customs law.  

3.2. 

EU ADDED VALUE AND SUSTAINABILITY OF THE INTERVENTION 

(35)   The  Regulation  has  enabled  the  EU  as  a  whole  to  ratify  the  UN  Firearms  Protocol. 
This has plugged the existing legal loopholes that were open to criminal exploitation. 
Although most of the stakeholders consider that a repeal of the Regulation would have 
little impact, none felt this to be desirable. The Commission feels that the effect of any 
repeal of the Regulation would be to deregulate exports of civilian firearms, leading to 
greater disparities between national practices and rules in terms of import and export 
authorisations.  

(36)  

In  contrast,  the  regulatory  and  administrative  landscape  remains  very  disparate 
because  of:  the  lack  of  clarity  of  some  provisions;  complex  articulations  with  other 
instruments; the leeway given to the Member States in their administrative procedures, 
in  evaluating  authorisation  requests  and  in  whether  or  not  to  recognise  the  tacit 
agreement of third countries of transit; the general nature of the provisions governing 
information  exchanges  and  administrative  cooperation.  As  the  Commission  is  not  an 
addressee  of  the  information  exchanges  on  authorisation  refusals,  it  is  unable  to 
monitor  the  situation  at  European  level  and  alert  the  competent  authorities  in  cases 
where their respective approaches diverge. As a result, exporters are still not presented 
with a truly unified export control mechanism. 

(37)   The evaluation also indicates that many rules were already in place at the time of the 
Regulation’s adoption and that the national procedures in many Member States have 
remained largely the same.  

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(38)   The rules, procedures and types of control governing imports and transit fall within the 
scope  of  customs  legislation,  not  the  Regulation15.  This  explains  the  lack  of  added 
value provided in this regard. 

3.3. 

EFFECTIVENESS 

(39)   A comparison  between the situation in  2010 and now shows that the Member States 
have  all  made  progress  in  uniformly  applying  the  Protocol.  The  provisions  of  the 
Regulation have been instrumental in terms of monitoring the movements of firearms 
through the external borders of the EU. 

(40)   However, harmonisation is still patchy. 

(41)  

In  particular,  the  Regulation  sought  to  make  a  clear  distinction  between  military 
weapons16  and  civilian  weapons  in  export,  import  and  transit  procedures.  However, 
many  of  the  Member  States  feel  that  the  single  procedure  allows  them  to  apply  an 
identical procedure and identical criteria to all exports of weapons, civil and military 
alike, and not, as is its aim, to make the same export operation of civilian and military 
weapons subject to a single administrative procedure on an exceptional basis. 

(42)   The absence of any provisions for export markings in the case of deactivated weapons 
or alarm weapons makes traceability impossible. On the other hand, the traceability of 
the  consignments  is  not  guaranteed  during  transit  operations  through  the  customs 
territory of the European Union. (It is something that falls within the scope of customs 
legislation, not the Regulation.)  

(43)   According  to  the  external  evaluator,  nine  Member  States  do  not  appear  to  be 
complying  with  the  minimum  data  retention  period  of  20  years,  preventing  the 
compilation  of  detailed  records  tracing  the  movements  of  firearms.  In  addition,  the 
disparate  practices  in  national  records  (no  single  national  register)  adversely  affect 
traceability. Similarly, the absence of interconnectivity between intra-EU transfer files 
and files for export licences complicates the full reconstitution of movements. 

15   A Commission analysis: ‘Conclusions on the strengths, gaps, weaknesses in the customs legislation, 

procedures and risk-based control practices related to the illicit trafficking of firearms – PCA Firearms, 
April 2017 – TAXUD/B2/031/2017 – LIMITED’ highlights a ‘systemic trend’ in Member States to treat 
shipments of firearms in the same way as any other cargo in transit, without any obligation to declare that 
the goods have been received and that the transit procedure can be closed. 

16   Subject to the rules of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
(44)   Although 

the 

initial  Commission  proposal17 

included  specific  provisions  for 
information  exchanges,  the  co-legislator  opted  for  more  general  rules.  These 
provisions  have  proved  insufficient  to  meet  the  objective  pursued.  On  the  one  hand, 
the  Member  States  do  not  systematically  check  whether  the  applicant  has  had  their 
authorisation refused or  withdrawn in  the other Member States. Furthermore, checks 
are  mainly  carried  out  in  the  COARM  system,  which  is  used  to  notify  authorisation 
refusals  and  withdrawals  by  only  a  small  number  of  Member  States.  Consequently, 
43 %  of  national  authorities  report  having  already  granted  an  export  authorisation  to 
exporters  for  essentially  identical  transactions  which  had  been  refused  by  another 
Member State. 

(45)   Finally, although the Regulation’s entry into force had no adverse effect on the steady 
growth  in  European  exports  of  firearms,  most  exporters  feel  that  the  time  needed  to 
process  applications,  while  consistent  with  the  Regulation,  remains  too  long.  The 
leeway  left  open  to  Member  States  in  how  they  approve  authorisations  produces 
disparities  that  have  been  unanimously  criticised  by  professionals  as  they  create 
additional burdens. 

3.4. 

EFFICIENCY 

(46)   Although  the  economic  operators  feel  that  the  costs  outweigh  the  benefits,  this 
perception  is  not  based  on  an  objective  evaluation,  but  on  a  feeling  not  necessarily 
linked  to  the  Regulation  itself18.  In  the  Commission’s  view,  it  has  not  been 
demonstrated  that  the  Regulation’s  aims  have  been  achieved  at  the  price  of 
unreasonable costs or difficulties. Most of the costs introduced by the Regulation are 
administrative and linked to the obligations to uphold the rules and ensure compliance, 
which  is  a  direct  consequence  of  the  Member  States’  disparate  practices.  Public 
authorities  bear  the  Regulation’s  costs  relating  to  controls  and  implementation 
(including enforcement). 

(47)   While  the  Commission’s  original  proposal  set  out  to  address  the  problems  of 
administrative  costs  generated  by  the  diversity  of  national  laws  and  procedures,  the 
evaluation has not demonstrated that the impact of the Regulation, as adopted by the 
legislator, has been positive, in particular because harmonisation has been patchy. This 
finding is even more concerning since 76 % of operators are micro-businesses. 

17   COM/2010/0273 final. 

18   This is the case, for example, of the transit rules imposed by third countries, or of export procedures that 

would exist even in the absence of any regulation. 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
(48)   Confidentiality  and  the  patchy  nature  of  commercial  or  government  data  make  it 
difficult  to  analyse  the  Regulation’s  financial  impact  in  detail.  While  the  economic 
operators 
the 
is  negative, 
representatives of public authorities find the overall results to be slightly positive. 

the  Regulation’s  cost-benefit  balance 

that 

feel 

3.5. 

CONSISTENCY AND COMPLEMENTARITY 

(49)   Although  the  Regulation’s  consistency  with  various  other  regulatory  provisions  was 
guaranteed at the outset, in particular the concordance of the Regulation’s definitions 
and scope with those of Directive 91/477/EEC, making it possible to attribute the same 
meaning to the various concepts, this has been impacted by the May 2017 amendments 
to the Directive19, which substantially altered its scope, both substantive (categories of 
prohibited  weapons,  marking  requirement  for  deactivated  weapons  and  alarm  or 
‘show’ weapons, notion of ‘essential component’) and personal (collectors, museums). 

(50)   There  are  a  number  of  overlaps  between  Regulation  (EU)  No 258/2012  and  the 
Common  Military  List  under  EU  Common  Position  2008/944/CFSP.  The 
interpretation of the scope of these overlaps varies from one Member State to the next, 
the 
undermining  equal 
same. In contrast, 
the 
Union’s Customs Code.  

that  are  substantially 
transactions 
the  evaluation  confirmed  a  positive  articulation  with 

treatment  between 

4. 

CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 

(51)   The  rationale  of  the  Regulation  remains  unchanged.  The  unstable  international 
political  environment  in  several  regions  of  the  world,  and  the  strengthening  of  the 
European Union’s internal rules continue to justify its existence in order to adequately 
control civilian firearms as they enter and leave the European Union. Although most 
of the weapons diverted are military, a robust framework for civilian firearms remains 
vital  because  of  grey  areas  and  to  prevent  the  use  of  more  flexible  procedures  in  a 
related field promoting diversions of arms. 

(52)   However,  the  Commission’s  findings  on  the  implementation  of  Regulation  (EU) 
No 258/2012  are  mixed.  Although  it  has  broadly  achieved  its  assigned  goals,  the 
Regulation  is  nevertheless  also  the  victim  of  both  its  imprecision  and  its  complex 
articulations with other EU law instruments. 

19  

Directive (EU) 2017/853 of 17 May 2017, OJ L 137, 24.5.2017. 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
(53)   The  regular  exchanges  with  the  national  authorities,  the  study  carried  out  and  the 
public  consultation  have  pinpointed  a  number  of  possible  answers  to  the  challenges 
identified in the course of this exercise. 

(54)   The  Commission  intends  to  fully  assume  its  responsibilities  in  order  to  assist  the 
Member States and guarantee the Regulation’s full implementation, including, where 
appropriate, through formal exchanges should the evaluation reveal practices that are 
in breach of the Regulation.  

(55)   Under its powers to adopt delegated acts, the Commission  may intervene in order to 
update  Annex 1  to  the  Regulation  and  adapt  the  correlation  table  of  categories  of 
firearms and Combined Nomenclature codes in order to take account of the revision of 
Directive  91/477/EEC  (without  affecting  either  the  Regulation’s  scope  or  its 
definitions).  

(56)   On  the  other  hand,  the  externalised  evaluation  study  has  usefully  recommended  a 
number  of  non-legislative  actions  to  improve  exchanges  of  best  practices,  develop 
guidelines  for  the  Regulation’s  implementation  and  make  better  use  of  the 
Firearms Exports Coordination Group.  

(57)  

In  terms  of  information  exchanges,  improvements  to  the  COARM  system  for 
exchanges relating to Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 and the principle of direct access 
for  competent  authorities  are  promising  avenues.  The  arrangements  for  the 
involvement  of  customs  authorities  remain  open,  whether  for  external  transit  within 
the European Union, or between the customs clearance office and the office of exit, or 
between the office of entry and the office of clearance. 

(58)   More  generally,  beyond  any  clarifications  that  might  be  made  to  improve  the 
Regulation’s application, certain difficulties call for possible revision, in line with the 
principles  of  better  regulation.  Subject  to  the  Commission’s  final  decisions,  where 
necessary following an appropriate impact assessment, it is already possible to outline 
possible points of discussion. 

(59)   The evaluation shows that certain definitions in the Regulation should be made more 
consistent  with  other  pieces  of  legislation  (‘parts’  and  ‘essential  components’, 
‘temporary export’, ‘deactivated firearms’, etc.). 

(60)   The provisions on simplified procedures could be made clearer. If the guidelines are 
found to be insufficient, possible options might notably include encouraging the use of 
global  authorisations  or  a  tie-in  with  the  status  of  ‘authorised  economic  operator  for 
security and safety’. 

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(61)  

(62)  

In order to ensure reliable risk analysis, the methods used to process applications for 
export licences could  be aligned, in particular through  the systematic consultation of 
criminal  records  in  the  Member  States  (and  not  simply  in  the  country  in  which  the 
previous application was made). 

in 

line  with 

to  facilitate  administrative  procedures, 

In  order 
the  rules  of 
Directive 91/477/EEC  on  firearms,  the  Commission  and  the  Member  States  should 
consider a computerised system for submitting applications. This would also facilitate 
information exchanges on refusals, allow interoperability between the various systems, 
and  ensure  reliable  statistical  collections.  Such  an  interoperable  system  for  the 
computerised  management  of  applications  could  also  make  it  less  useful  to  provide 
translations  of  documents  already  required  by  a  competent  authority  in  another 
Member State. 

(63)   The matter of generally applying the principle of tacit agreement of third countries of 
transit (or some of them) could also be raised insofar as it enabled shorter procedures 
for exporters. 

(64)   Finally, as regards imports, the Regulation’s provisions could usefully be clarified so 
that,  in  accordance  with  the  Firearms  Protocol,  weapons  imported  are  systematically 
marked along harmonised lines to enable identification of the first country of import. 

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