Quality of public administration : a toolbox for practitioners. Theme 9, Public administration reform – making positive change happen.
Date: 2017-11-30
Institutions: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
Subjects: administrative structures, fund (EU), public administration, public institution, public policy, public service, social well-being, socioeconomic conditions, user guide

Quality of Public Administration
A Toolbox for Practitioners

Theme 9: Public administration reform – making positive change 
happen

Reform is a process. Positive change should be the result. This theme is not about reviewing and revising specific 
public policies (e.g. education, energy, enterprise), but is focused solely on administrative reforms intended to achieve 
stronger  governance,  better  policy  decisions  and  higher  quality  services,  with  resulting  benefits  for  citizens  and 
businesses. How do we ensure reform is embedded and change is enduring, rather than fragile and fleeting? This 
chapter characterises resistance to reform and inertia as an impediment, and counters with 12 drivers that can give 
impetus to the change process. It then looks at alternative approaches, from large leaps forward (functional reviews 
and comprehensive ‘root and branch’ reforms) to more incremental steps, and explores the potential pathways that 
public administrations can take to make change sustainable. 

Social 
Europe

The Quality of Public Administration “Toolbox” is developed on behalf of the European Commission’s Inter-service 
group on Public Administration Quality and Innovation. 

It is based on a joint effort by the following Commission’s services: BUDG, CNECT, DEVCO, DIGIT, ECFIN, EMPL, 
EUROSTAT, GROW, HOME, HR, JRC, JUST, NEAR, REGIO, RTD, SG, SRSS and TAXUD.

Editor: Florian Hauser, European Commission, Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 

The publication was produced with the technical assistance of the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) 
and Mackie O’ Sullivan Consulting Ltd.

Manuscript completed in August 2017

Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use 
that might be made of the following information.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2017

© European Union, 2017 

Reuse is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 
The reuse policy of European Commission documents is regulated by Decision 2011/833/EU (OJ L 330, 14.12.2011, p. 39).

For any use or reproduction of photos or other material that is not under the EU copyright, permission must be 
sought directly from the copyright holders.

© Cover photo: Shutterstock

PDF 

doi:10.2767/331952 

  KE-06-17-208-EN-N

Contents 

Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 2 

9.1 

Reform ingredients and impediments .......................................................................... 10 

9.1.1 

Obstacles to overcome ................................................................................................. 10 

9.1.2 

Drivers of reform ........................................................................................................... 15 

9.2 

Potential approaches to reform ................................................................................... 19 

9.2.1 

Functional reviews ........................................................................................................ 19 

9.2.2 

Comprehensive ‘root and branch’ reform .................................................................... 22 

9.2.3 

Incremental change ...................................................................................................... 32 

9.3 

Possible paths to reform .............................................................................................. 35 

9.3.1 

The Kotter ‘8-step model’ for sustainable organisational change ................................ 35 

9.3.2 

Changing mindsets ........................................................................................................ 45 

9.3.3. 

Learning points from past reforms ............................................................................... 48 

9.4 

Conclusions, key messages and inspiration for future action......................................... 54 

Contents 

 
 
  
 
Quality of Public Administration – A Toolbox for Practitioners 

2 

Previous chapters of the Toolbox set out many different dimensions to strengthening governance in 
EU  Member  States,  covering  principles  and  values,  policy,  structures,  organisations,  people, 
technology,  finance,  procurement,  service  delivery  and  stakeholders.  They  considered  the 
functioning  of  civil  and  judicial  administrations,  and  their  interaction  with  citizens  and  businesses. 
They  dwelt  on  timeless  themes,  such  as  the  public  interest  in  ensuring  ethical  behaviour  and 
effectively  managing  funds,  as  well  as  more  recent  ‘hot  topics’  like  big  data  analytics,  behavioural 
insights, co-creation, multi-level governance, performance and talent management.  
This chapter: 
  Explores how these tools can be introduced into public administrations, sometimes in the face of 

resistance and inertia; 

  Describes  the  reasons  for reform,  its  scope  and  sources,  building  the  case  for making  positive 

change happen by looking at motivations and drivers; 

  Examines the obstacles to reform - the barriers and constraints that must be overcome; 
  Sets  out  three  potential  approaches,  namely  functional  reviews,  comprehensive  ‘root  and 

branch’ reforms, and incremental change; 

  Summarises the ‘Kotter eight-step model’ for lasting organisational change, which is drawn from 

the business world; 

  Focuses on the role of changing mindsets in the reform process; and 
 

Identifies learning points from past reforms, as a guide for practitioners on things to avoid and 
things to do.   

Introduction 

‘Reform’  is  not  the  same  as  ‘change’,  although  one should  lead to  the other:  reform  is  a  process, 
positive change should be the result. This theme is about reform of the public administration, rather 
than reforms in policy fields (e.g. pensions, transport), including those that directly benefit citizens 
and businesses (e.g. regulatory reform, tax reform). Ultimately, administrative reform should lead to 
better  policy  decisions,  a  more  conducive  business  environment  and  more  customer-oriented 
service delivery.  

“Governance reform is not an end in itself - it is a means to achieve public policy results for citizens 
and businesses efficiently and effectively… Good governance is about enhancing trust in government, 
its institutions, the quality of its services and decisions, because they are perceived to be made in the 
general public interest”, OECD, Public Governance Review Spain, 2013 

As  the  OECD  has  highlighted1,  there  are  two  ways to  manage  change:  planned and  systematic;  or 
responding to events over which organisations have little direct control. In practice, of course, reality 
intervenes in even the best-made plans. In a continually altering world, public administrations must 
deal  with  conditions  in  the  economy,  environment  and  society  as  they  arise,  and  the  myriad 
expectations of citizens and enterprises.  

This  theme  is  not  about  reactive  change,  but  rather  the  intentional  process  of  reform  in  which 
public administrations seek to address their weaknesses and improve their performance to achieve 
better societal outcomes. It  is also specifically about  sustainable  reform  –  how do we ensure that 
positive change is internalised and embedded, rather than fragile and fleeting. 

1 O. Huerta Melchor (2008), Managing Change in OECD Governments: An Introductory Framework, OECD Working Papers 
on Public Governance, No. 12, OECD publishing. 

Introduction 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                           
Quality of Public Administration – A Toolbox for Practitioners 

3 

It  is  also  clear  that  reforming  public  administrations  is  often  a  difficult  and  complex  challenge, 
culturally,  technically  and  politically,  typically  involving  fundamental  changes  in  the  ‘rules  of  the 
game’ for many public officials, but also private citizens2.  

Reforms take place within a political, economic and financial context, which continues to produce 
profound changes in the landscape of government across the EU.  

Many of the main reform movements in Europe and 
globally, over  the last century  but  especially  recent 
decades, have aimed to improve the performance of 
public administrations (see topic 4.1).3 This takes us 
from the time when social reformers first turned to 
survey  tools  to  understand  society’s  problems 
better,  and  governments  started  to  adopt  a  more 
‘scientific’  and  cost-accounting  approach  to  public 
Later 
administration 
of 
innovations 
performance budgeting, the use of social indicators, 
the  advent  of  planning-programming-budgetary  systems  (PPBS)  and  management  by  objectives 
(MBO),  the  search  for  self-improvement  through  quality  management,  and  the  attempt  to  make 
decisions more robust through evidence-based policy-making.  

right4). 
introduction 

(see 
included 

graphic, 
the 

There  has  also  been  a  more  fundamental  shift  in  the  underlying  model  of  public  administration, 
which  has  taken  place  and  gathered  pace  over the  last  30-40 years,  and  indeed  has  shaped  these 
reforms. This has been characterised by commentators in two terms: 

  The traditional model of organisation that prevailed for most of the 20th century is described 
legalistic,  monolithic  and  hierarchical  administration 

as  Weberian  bureaucracy5,  a 
responsible for all aspects of both policy development and the delivery of public services.  

  A  new  doctrine  came  to  the  fore  from  the  1980s  onwards,  which  has  been  termed  ‘new 
public  management’  (NPM),  involving  a  rethinking  of  the  State’s  role  and  size  (in  the 
aftermath  of  the  expansion  of  the  welfare  state),  and  importing  private  sector  disciplines 
and  quasi-market  mechanisms  to  try  and  make  bureaucracies  more  ‘business-like’  and 
thereby more efficient.  

In  practice,  these  two  models  of  public  administration  have  intertwined.  Hence,  the  following 
descriptions are idealised caricatures, simplified for the purposes of presentation, based on their key 
features.6 

2 See World Bank (2000), Reforming public institutions and strengthening governance.  
3 W. Van Dooren, G. Bouckaert and J. Halligan (2015), Performance Management in the Public Sector, 2nd edition, 
Routledge Masters in Public Management 
4 Source: presentation by Wouter van Dooren. 
5 Named after the essay The Nature, Conditions, and Development of Bureaucratic Herrschaft, by the renowned German 
sociologist, Max Weber, published in his 1922 book, “Economy and Society”. 

Introduction 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Quality of Public Administration – A Toolbox for Practitioners 

4 

Weberian bureaucracies and NPM 

Max Weber saw ‘bureaucracy’ as an organisational form that constrains individual freedom in the cause of the 
common good. The Weberian bureaucracy is characterised by hierarchical  and delineated structures, whose 
broad features are: 

  Action taken on the bases of clear written rules and regulations, rather than personal discretion; 
  Clear allocation of competences (division of labour); 
  A formal hierarchical structure (clear lines of authority and a chain of command); 
  Specific professional training for becoming an official; and 
  Neutral officials,  who can grow in their career,  according to their qualifications and are subject  to  strict 

control. 

In the context of public administration, Weberian bureaucracies can be characterised as paternalistic towards 
citizens, whose role is to elect the government of the day. As a counter-balance to the power vested within the 
institution,  however,  the  essence  of  best  practice  is  professionalism:  competent  officials  operating  within  a 
highly procedural system which should be applied  consistently, fairly  and impartially, thereby blending rules 
with  values  (civil  servants  should  always  act  in  the  public’s  best  interests).  In  return,  they  enjoy  secure 
employment and guaranteed salaries, and their careers would advance through seniority or merit. 

New public management was coined as a term in response to neo-liberal politicians introducing market-type 
operations  into  the  traditional  administration,  starting  in  the  ‘Anglo-Saxon’  countries.  Like  Weberian 
bureaucracy,  there  is  a  wealth  of  literature  analysing  NPM  (and  sometimes  disagreeing  over  its  defining 
features). In broad terms, NPM can be characterised by: 

  Lean and highly decentralised structures; 
  The separation of policy design from its execution, reflected in the segregation of organisational structures 

(such as the creation of executive agencies, for example);  

  A managerial role for the core administration, holding service providers to account against performance 
standards & measures (e.g. outputs) in a more contractual relationship than the traditional bureaucratic 
one; 

  The  use  of  privatisation,  contracting-out  and  public-private  partnerships,  to  bring  managerial  expertise 

(and investment) from the commercial to the public sector; 

  The injection of competition into public service delivery to increase choice by ‘customers’;  
  A shift from managing inputs towards outputs and outcomes and increased accountability.  

In the NPM perspective, citizens are not just seen as voters, but service users, along with enterprises and other 
administrations. 

As  the  NPM  orthodoxy  spread  from  its  origins  in  the  so-called  Anglo-Saxon  countries  (UK,  US, 
Australia and New Zealand) to continental Europe7, it crossed the boundaries of legal traditions and 
administrative cultures, which can be summarised as follows:8 

  The  Anglo-Saxon  model:  This  is  characterised  as  a  ‘public  interest’  culture,  whereby  the 
State is instrumental, but the common law9 tradition means no comprehensive codification 

6 There is no suggestion that politicians and senior managers ‘choose’ to apply a model of public administration, or that 
administrations strictly adhere to their parameters. Administrations today are an amalgam of various practices. 
7 Increasingly South America, Asia and Africa too, within the financial and technical assistance provided by of the IMF, 
World Bank and other international financing institutions (the so-called ‘Washington consensus’). 
8 Based on S. Kuhlmann and H. Wollmann (2014), Introduction to Comparative Public Administration: Administrative 
Systems and Reforms in Europe, which makes further distinctions within the Continental European model (Napoleonic & 
federal) and introduces a ‘Scandinavian model’ among the Nordic countries which also centres on a ‘rule of law’ culture, 
but with a more open and highly decentralised administrative system. 

Introduction 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Quality of Public Administration – A Toolbox for Practitioners 

5 

of  legal  rules,  and  hence  legislation  is  about  enacting  political  programmes,  and  public 
administrations  are  characterised  as  pragmatic,  flexible  and  concerned  with  reconciling 
different interests.  

  The  Continental  European  model:  This  is  characterised  as  a  ‘rule  of  law’  (Rechtsstaat) 
culture, which sees the State as an integrating force of society (intérêt general). There is a 
legal  rules  under  the  Roman  tradition,  and  public 
comprehensive  codification  of 
administrations  are  characterised  by  implementing  the  law,  equal  treatment,  neutrality  of 
interests, etc. 

  The Central and South-Eastern Europe model: This is also based on  a ‘rule of law’  culture 
like  the  continental  European  model,  but  shaped  by  the  legacy  of  the  pre-1990  model  of 
socialist  State  organisation  during  which  the  public  administration  at  national  and  sub-
national levels was subordinated to centralised party rule.  

Many  of  the  recent  reform  innovations  within  the  NPM  orthodoxy  were  either  borrowed  from 
business or introduced to replicate market mechanisms, such as MBO and performance agreements, 
metrics and payments. They sit more easily in an Anglo-Saxon ‘public interest’ system than the more 
rules-based culture of Continental European and Central / South-Eastern European administrations, 
and can fail to produce intended results if not adapted to the administrative context.10 In any case, 
administrations  are  confronted  by  more  diverse  objectives  and  audiences  than  their  business 
counterparts,  need  the  democratic  consent  of  the  public  for  major  changes  in  direction,  and  face 
more  operational  constraints  due  to 
legal  and  procedural  rigidities  (often  necessary  for 
accountability and sometimes unnecessary).  

Within this sophisticated environment, public administrations are increasingly having to adjust their 
modus operandi to new realities and concepts, summarised below: 

Context 
Recognising policy 
as an iterative 
process 

Issue 
While  some  administrative  actions  are  relatively  routine,  the  environment  for  public 
policy  and  its  implementation  is  often  characterised  by  difficult  choices,  complicated 
scenarios,  and  complex  situations  (see  theme  1).  Public  administrations  need  to  be 
nimble,  to  respond  with  resilience  to  changing  circumstances  and  longstanding 
challenges,  such  as  climate  change,  shifting  trade  and  migration  patterns,  and  the 
impact of automation on employment. Policy-making rarely follows an idealised ‘cycle’, 
with a chain of events from design to delivery to evaluation. It is often iterative, which 
places the emphasis on putting the ‘fundamental qualities’ in place to ensure robustness 
and  resilience,  including  clear  goals,  evidence-based  ideas  and  rigorous  assessment. 
Increasingly,  policy-makers  are  engaging  directly  with  policy  implementers,  to  ensure 
policy is fit for purpose, including through pilots and randomised control trials. 

9 Law based upon societal customs, recognised and enforced by the judgments and decrees of the courts. http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/common+law 
10 For example, the EU-funded Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future (COCOPS) research project found 
that “outsourcing was not associated with a reduction in the size of the public sector in regard to expenditure and 
employment, either in the short or long term. Even if outsourcing did not lead to a smaller public sector … reforms were 
beneficial if they led to better public sector working conditions or improved service quality and/or social welfare. If, 
however, the increase in government spending was not accompanied by such improvement, this could suggest the existence 
of high transaction and coordination costs, or that the private provision of public goods does not necessarily entail 
efficiency gains.” (Final Policy Brief). 

Introduction 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Quality of Public Administration – A Toolbox for Practitioners 

6 

Context 
Acknowledging the 
real ways people 
act and respond to 
policy 

Working with 
many stakeholders 

Joining up 
institutions for 
seamless services 

Dealing with 
demographic 
change and the 
digital agenda 

Enabling 
accountability and 
civic activism 

Embracing co-
responsibility 

Issue 
One  of  the  reasons  that  policy  execution  can  be  unpredictable  is  that  people  are  not 
automatons, acting rationally and independently of each other. We are emotional and 
social beings, each with our own cognitive biases and ‘rules of thumb’, and affected by 
the  behaviour  of  those  around  us  (see  topic  1.2.2).  The  rise  of  units  and  networks 
specialising  in  behavioural  insights  and  innovation  e.g.  JRC,  Mind  Lab,  Nudge  Unit,  La 
27e  Region,  etc.)  is  an  attempt  to  operate  outside  traditional  thinking,  challenge 
mainstream  orthodoxies  and  find  innovative  solutions.  These  units  and  networks 
contribute  to  evidence-based  policy-making  and  testing,  are  typically  multi-disciplinary 
in their make-up, and cross sectorial & institutional boundaries.  
Increasingly, public bodies are relying on networking approaches to achieve their goals, 
rather than command and control, contracting and target-setting - dialogue not diktat. 
This places a  premium on  coordination capacity,  vertically and horizontally, and hence 
the  importance  of  Centres  of  Government  as  the  hubs  of  the  public  administration, 
setting and applying standards across the administration (see topic 3.3). 
The  widespread  use  of  one-stop  shops  for  external  service  delivery  to  citizens  and 
enterprises,  re-engineering  the  relationship  between  front  and  back  offices  of  the 
administration, and shared service centres for internal service delivery to other parts of 
the  administration,  requires  new  organisational  arrangements  based  on  systems 
thinking  (see  topic  5.2).  The  increasing  expectation  of  citizens  and  enterprises  for 
customised  services  at  a  time  and  place  of  their  convenience,  especially  online,  with 
once-only  registration  and  ‘clouds’  of  public  services,  makes  interoperability  an 
essential element of systems thinking (see topic 5.4). 
With an ageing workforce (more than 1 in 3 public officials in the EU over 50), the small 
percentage  of  ‘millennials’  in  the  workforce  can  be  expected  to  increase.  Public 
administrations will need to engage in workforce planning and become more attractive 
to potential recruits, if they are to satisfy their staffing and skills requirements, through 
active employer branding, a stimulating environment and recognising growing diversity 
in  the  workforce.  After  training  budgets  were  often  cut  in  the  fiscal  crisis,  employee-
centric learning and development will be necessary to strengthen digital skills and other 
competencies,  while  also  investing  in  knowledge  transfer  and  management  (including 
mentoring,  coaching,  learning  networks,  inter-generational  transfer,  etc.)  to  preserve 
institutional memory and enhance collective know-how (see topic 4.3). 
Social networks and constant  media scrutiny have made  society and governance  more 
transparent  (see  topic  2.2).  New  mechanisms  are  emerging  that  allow  the  public  to 
exercise  their  right  to  hold  administrations  accountable,  including  through  open 
government  and  open  data,  which  alters  the  environment  for  performance 
measurement,  indicators  and  agreements.  Moreover,  the  Dutch  experience  with 
accountable  budgeting  shows  a  greater  reliance  on  qualitative  intelligence  over 
traditionally quantitative performance information.  
Citizens  increasingly  demand  more  open  and  participatory  decision-making  (see  topics 
1.1, 1.2, 5.6 and 8.1). The rise of co-creation, which gives citizens and businesses a much 
greater  stake  in  the  policy  process  (including  co-design,  co-budgeting,  co-decision,  co-
production and co-evaluation), requires a paradigm shift from public administrations. 

The  latest  movement  and  alternative  approach  to  reforming  public  administrations  has  come 
forward  under  the  guise  of  ‘strategic  agility’,  which  reflects  the  pressure  on  accountable 
administrations  to  become  robust,  resilient  and  adaptive  (and  again  originated  as  an  idea  in  the 
private  sector).  It  acknowledges  that  existing  structures  and  systems,  focusing  primarily  on 
effectiveness and efficiency, have created ‘silo thinking’ and often become too rigid or captured by 
organisational inertia to respond to changing society, environment and technology. In the past, the 
strategy has tended to be mitigation of risks, rather than adaptation to external challenges.   

Introduction 

 
 
 
  
 
 
Quality of Public Administration – A Toolbox for Practitioners 

7 

Principles of strategic agility  

The  concept  of  strategic  agility  comes  from  the  private  sector,  where  companies  are  finding  new 
organisational  solutions  within  a  business  environment,  characterised  by  new  technologies,  globalisation, 
increasing  specialisation,  growing  interdependencies,  and  evolving  consumer  preferences.  A  similar  rapidly 
changing, uncertain and complex operating context is evident in the public sector.  

The Finnish Innovation Fund (SITRA) and INSEAD Business School have conducted research on strategic agility 
which  refers  to  “the  capacity  of  an  organisation  to  proactively  identify  and  respond  to  emerging  policy 
challenges so as to avoid unnecessary crises and carry out strategic and structural changes in an orderly and 
timely manner”.  Their analysis identifies three elements that enable an organisation to be strategically agile: 

  Strategic sensitivity:  Recognising  emerging issues  early; high quality dialogue  with internal and external 
key stakeholders; framing opportunities and threats in new, insightful ways, overcoming complacency and 
routine ways of thinking;  

  Collective commitment: Developing a widely-shared vision and strategy as an open, participatory process 
with all interested parties; establishing cross-governmental priorities; developing shared incentives and a 
common agenda; open discussion within cabinet; and rotating responsibilities among ministers; and 

  Resource fluidity: Mobilising and redeploying resources effectively to new opportunities and challenges; 
keeping part of public sector resources in a common pool to be used when new needs arise in different 
policy areas, thereby reducing path-dependence in public sector budgeting by breaking the link between 
past  activities  and  the  allocation  of  new  resources;  reallocating  tasks  among  different  units  to  improve 
resource  utilisation;  fostering  the  mobility  of  people  (job  rotation)  to  match  the  best  people  to  the 
emerging  challenges;  conducting  regular  leadership  reviews  to  obtain  up-to-date  information  about  the 
managerial  pool;  openly  posting  all  new  job  openings;  providing  individual  career  counselling,  honest 
performance  feedback  and  long-term  training  opportunities;  moving  a  whole  team  to  a  new  task  if 
appropriate, rather than just  individual workers; and creating a ‘pool of senior  managers’ directly under 
the leadership team. 

As  the  COP  RPM  Sourcebook  says  “the  key  levers  of  strategic  agility  are  thus  relational,  cognitive  and 
organisational, as well as emotional (commitment, pride, motivation). The concept of strategic agility has the 
potential  to  help  governments  act  faster  and  more  effectively,  creating  more  openness  in  society  and 
enhancing the mobility of people and knowledge.” 

Source: T. Hämäläinen, M. Kosonen and Y.L. Doz (2013), “Strategic Agility in Public Management”, SITRA and 
INSEAD; and the Sourcebook of the ESF-funded Community of Practitioners on Results Based Management 
(COP RBM) 

Finland’s  SITRA  has  identified  several  ingredients  to  introducing  strategic  agility  that  can  be 
summarised as follows: 

  Shifting the emphasis from outputs to outcomes, to focus on the ultimate positive effects to 

be accomplished by policies, funding, regulations and services; 

  Developing a big picture for the whole of government that recognises the increasing need to 
work across  traditional boundaries  to deliver outcomes and the importance of embedding 
shared values across the public administration; 

  A  citizen-driven  philosophy  to  enable  public  access  to  government,  improve  consultation 
and provide a citizen-centric approach to policy-making, legislation and service delivery; 

Introduction 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quality of Public Administration – A Toolbox for Practitioners 

8 

  An  innovative  and  risk-taking  spirit  to  devise  solutions  to  complex  and  multi-dimensional 

policy challenges; and 

  Ambitious vision statements that challenge conventional organisational practices and public 
services  and  can  be  reinforced  by  ‘bridge-burning’  public  announcements,  in  which  public 
leaders commit themselves and their organisations to major change.  

This evolution in thinking from the traditional bureaucratic model to an outcome-oriented and user-
centric one is summarised crudely by the following diagram: 

As  with  NPM,  putting  ‘strategic  agility’  into  practice  is  less  straightforward  compared  with  the 
private  sector  from  which  the  concept  originally  came.  While  new  techniques  are  already  taking 
root,  and  examples  of  innovation,  citizen-centricity  and  co-creation  are  illustrated  in  the  Toolbox, 
these experiences remain embryonic.  

In practice, the boundaries between these organisational models are blurry. Administrations draw 
on  aspects  of  all  three.  The  essence  of  old-style  Weberian  bureaucracy  is  still  relevant  today, 
according  to  the  EU-funded  project  ‘Coordinating  for  Cohesion  in  the  Public  Sector  of  the  Future’ 
(COCOPS). Good governance continues to depend on firm Weberian foundations, such  as values11, 
“civil  service  laws,  due  process  and  the  absence  of  corruption”12.  Reform  does  not  happen  in 
isolation,  but  is  shaped  by  the  administration’s  prevailing  principles  &  values,  such  as  integrity, 
impartiality,  accountability,  sustainability,  openness,  inclusiveness,  etc.  In  2003,  for  example,  a 
World Bank research paper found that a universal value for public sector performance is meritocracy 
in  the  civil  service,  underpinned  by  a  well-functioning  system  of  administrative  procedures.  It 
concluded  that  “strengthening  of  both  meritocratic  civil  service  management  systems  and 
administrative  systems  should  precede  extensive  efforts  to  build  performance  management 
systems”. 

In this context, this chapter looks at actions that public administrations and judiciaries can take to 
make reform a reality, and sets out ways and tools to address them. 

11 B.G. Peters and J. Pierre (2017), Two Roads to Nowhere: Appraising 30 Years of Public Administration Research. 
Governance, 30: 11–16. 
12 S. Van de Walle (2016), In Europe, Weber still rules 

Introduction 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Quality of Public Administration – A Toolbox for Practitioners 

9 

Key questions  
9.1 What are the ingredients and 
impediments of reform? 
9.2 What are the potential approaches 
to reform? 

9.3 What possible paths to reform can 
administrations follow? 

Ways and tools 

  Reasons to reform 
  Obstacles to reform 
  Functional reviews 
  Comprehensive ‘root and branch’ reform 

Incremental change 

  The Kotter ‘8 step model’ for sustainable organisational change 
  Changing mindsets 
  Learning points from past reforms 

Introduction 

 
 
 
 
Quality of Public Administration - A Toolbox for Practitioners 

10 

9.1  Reform ingredients and impediments 

inspire,  enable  or 

Reform does not  happen in a vacuum. There are  many  factors 
in  some 
that  can 
circumstances, demand it. Equally, there can be countervailing 
forces which can act as a brake on progress, resisting reform or 
maintaining  the  modus  operandi  through  simple  inertia.  This 
topic starts with the latter. 

invite  action  –  or 

9.1.1  Obstacles to overcome 

The  OECD  refers  to  ‘receptivity’  for  reform:  how  ready  are 
people  and  organisations  to  participate?  To  make  positive 
change  happen, 
the 
countervailing forces of resistance to change.  

to  understand 

important 

is 

it 

Obstacles to overcome 

Drivers of reform 

Obstacles to overcome 

Drivers of reform 

Public sector reforms are complex, in many cases unpopular, contested, fraught with risk, and require 
a long time to produce results and prove their benefits …They can be supported or opposed by people 
depending  on  their  point  of  view;  may  produce  unintended  results;  may  be  difficult  to  implement; 
may generate the need for further reforms; or simply may not work at all endangering the survival 
and legitimacy of public organisations and its managerial and political leadership. OECD13. 

The  table  below  sets  out  some  of the  key  impeding  factors.  These  elements  of  resistance  are  not 
mutually exclusive. In many cases, more than one hurdle may be placed in the path, with the effect 
of  reducing  the  likelihood  that  reforms  will  get  off  the  ground  or  be  carried  through  to  their 
conclusion. The way in which these factors interplay will depend on the context. 

Factor 
Legal 
constraints & 
complications 

Lack of 
political will  

Description  
The reform agenda might not be feasible because the legal and regulatory framework either 
restricts or proscribes the proposed initiative (e.g. the provision in German law that prevents 
public  administrations  from  sharing  personal  data  and  hence  enacting  the  ‘once-only’ 
principle). In some cases, the solution will be simply to change the law, which might slow the 
pace of change, rather than stop it completely.  
The lead decision-makers on reform are often the politicians and top public officials. As the 
Urban  Institute  has  remarked:  “Evidence-based  policy  stops  where  politics  and  values 
start”.14  If  elected  officials  are  not  committed  to  reform,  there  could  be  a  multitude  of 
reasons,  some  of  which  are  covered  by  other  factors  described  below.  Irrespective  of 
individual motives, however,  all politicians face a  fundamental dilemma  in a  democracy,  at 
least  occasionally,  especially  in  the  context  of  the  electoral  cycle,  as  encapsulated  by  the 
Member of Parliament, Edmund Burke in 1774: 
  Are  they,  first  and  foremost,  representatives  of  the  people?  If  so,  they  will  tend  to  do 
whatever is necessary to try to reflect voter preferences in the short-medium term. 
  Or are they entrusted with stewardship of the public good above all? If so, they will tend 
towards doing the right thing for society, and what is sustainable, even if this might risk 

13 See O. Huerta Melchor, op. cit 
14 Taken from National Research Council (2012), Using Science as Evidence in Public Policy, Committee on the Use of Social 
Science Knowledge in Public Policy, edited by K. Prewitt, T.A. Schwandt and M.L. Straf, Division of Behavioural and Social 
Sciences and Education. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 

Topic 9.1: Reform ingredients & impediments 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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11 

Weak political 
competition 

Consensual 
political 
systems 

Endemic 
corruption 

Influence of 
vested 
interests 

The battle of 
ideas 

their re-election. 

In many cases, there is no significant conflict between what is immediately popular and the 
long-term  public  interest,  but  sometimes  they  diverge.  If  public  opinion  is  polarised,  for 
example,  politicians  may  focus  on  ‘counting  the  votes’  at  cost  to  the  impact  on  minority 
views and needs and/or future generations. 
Lack of political willpower can reflect poor political competition. This can occur, for example 
if the system favours large incumbent parties that have an interest in protecting (rather than 
challenging) the  status quo,  or because the party in power is controlling the  media and/or 
manipulating  the  instruments  of  state  in  its  own  interests,  such  as  through  judicial 
appointments,  or  gerrymandered  spending  on  communities  in  its  power  base.  Reform 
rhetoric during election campaigns can dissipate after the vote is held, unless the party that 
takes power feels other pressures, such as from civil society. 
The  nature  of  the  political  process  can  also  affect  the  initiation  and  implementation  of 
change. In majoritarian and adversarial systems, radical reforms  can be driven through and 
quickly, whereas more consensual set-ups - especially those involving coalition government - 
can take longer, and the aims or impact might be diluted or the process abandoned due to 
political  ‘horse-trading’  or  delays.  It  is  more  likely  that  the  reforms  will  be  revised  through 
dialogue and negotiation. However, this does not necessarily mean that they will be any less 
effective in the end. Indeed, they might be more so, if they have been strength-tested and 
subjected to a wider spectrum of inputs and insights.  
Employed  officials  take  their  lead  from  elected  officials  and  senior  management,  as  the 
OECD15 has observed: “Leadership is often identified as a key determinant of organisational 
culture.  In  fact,  some  research  suggests  that  the  behaviour  of  leaders  and  organisational 
supervisors is the primary influence on employees’ ethical behaviour. Employees will do what 
they  see  their  supervisors  do,  rather  than  what  the  policy  manual  dictates.”  If  the 
government  is characterised by grand corruption, this will tend to cascade  into lower level 
resistance to change (as captured by the expression ‘the fish rots from the head down’). This 
modus  operandi  can  become  systematised  as  ‘legal  corruption’,  if  legislators  (ab)use  their 
power to slant the rules in their favour, so that contracts and jobs are awarded ‘legitimately’ 
based on favouritism, for example (see theme 2). 
In  a  democracy,  interest  groups  should  have  a  voice  and  be  capable  to  ‘speak  truth  to 
power’.  This  principle  lies  behind  encouragement  of  civil  society  and  the  process  of 
consultation with citizens and businesses over policy intentions and instruments (legislation, 
spending, etc.).16 However, at what point does legitimate representation cross the line into 
undue influence and, ultimately, state capture (see theme 2)? 
Some voices speak louder than others. Incumbents and insiders tend to hold more sway than 
prospective  entrants  and  outsiders.  But  their  influence  wins  out  when  their  worldview  has 
become  the  ‘conventional  wisdom’,  accepted  by  most  of  society  at  large17.  “Powerful 
interests rarely get their way in a democracy by nakedly arguing for their powerful interests. 
Instead,  they  seek  legitimacy  for  their  arguments  by  saying  these  policies  are  in  the  public 
interest18… Taking ideas into account … provides a way of bridging the sharp divide between 
policy analysis (what should be done) with political economy (what actually happens)”.  

15 OECD (2014), Innovating the Public Sector: from Ideas to Impact 
16 Two recent studies from contrasting sources argue that power relationships and asymmetries within society are pivotal 
to reform. The World Bank’s 2017 World Development Report Governance and the Law defines power as “the ability of 
groups and individuals to make others act in the interest of those groups and individuals and to bring about specific 
outcomes”. Oxfam’s Duncan Green in 2016’s How Change Happens takes a broader view of power to shape change, both 
positively and negatively, citing a colleague, Jo Rowlands’s four-pronged typology: “power within - personal self-conﬁdence 
and a sense of rights and entitlement; power with - collective power, through organisation, solidarity and joint action; 
power to - meaning effective choice, the capability to decide actions and carry them out; power over - the power of 
hierarchy and domination”. 
17  D.  Rodrik  (2014),  When  Ideas  Trump  Interests:  Preferences,  Worldviews,  and  Policy  Innovations,  Journal  of  Economic 
Perspectives, Volume 28, Number 1, Winter 2014, pages 189–208 
18 The quote continues with an example: “The argument in favour of financial deregulation was not that it was good for 
Wall Street, but that it was good for Main Street. Other observers have argued that the financial crisis was a result of 
excessive government intervention to support housing markets, especially for lower-income borrowers. These arguments 
were also grounded on certain ideas- about the social value of homeownership and the inattentiveness of the financial 

Topic 9.1: Reform ingredients & impediments 

 
 
                                                           
Quality of Public Administration - A Toolbox for Practitioners 

12 

Public apathy  

Risk-averse 
administration 

Copying 
without the 
context  

Over-
simplification  

Over-reaction 

The absence of reform activity can reflect a passive acceptance of the  status quo in society. 
This  may  be  due  to  an  education  system  or  media  controls  that  discourage  citizens  from 
challenging  conventions,  or  populaces  that  are  ground  down  by  the  corrosive  nature  of 
systemic corruption (‘nothing can be done’).  
As the OECD19 has observed: “Reforms are not risk-free. They can be supported or opposed by 
people depending on their point of view; may produce unintended results; may be difficult to 
implement;  may  generate  the  need  for  further  reforms;  or  simply  may  not  work  at  all 
endangering  the  survival  and  legitimacy  of  public  organisations  and  its  managerial  and 
political leadership”. The Commission’s Expert Group on Public Sector Innovation highlighted 
risk aversion as a constraint on creativity in the public administration. The OECD has reached 
the  same  conclusion:  “An  Australian  government  report  suggests  that  a  risk-averse  culture 
discourages  employees  from  bringing  forward  innovative  ideas  to  decision-makers  with  the 
power  to  move  them  forward.  Structural  and  institutional  factors  reinforce  an  incentive 
structure that encourages risk-aversion, while innovation as a concept is not easily measured, 
and  is  therefore  not  well  tracked  or  rewarded  at  the  individual  level.”  This  principle  also 
applies to internal reforms. There can be a tendency to inertia without a countervailing force 
to push the administration in new directions. 
Some  administrations  have  sought  to  improve  themselves  by  borrowing  practices  from 
either  other  countries’  administrations  or  from  the  private  sector  (see  topic  4.1  on 
performance  management  and  topic  4.3  on  human  resources  management).  This  can 
happen, for example, if politicians are driven to emulate the comparator country’s prosperity 
and higher ranking on an international benchmark  (e.g. achieve a top 20 ranking) and sees 
the solution in improving their administrative performance. But context is everything, which 
can cause problems if the administration is trying to transplant practice from a very different 
politico-administrative  culture  (e.g.  from  a  pragmatic  Anglo-Saxon  environment  to  a  more 
legalistic and rules-based Continental or Central / South Eastern European one). This can lead 
to  what  is  called  isomorphic  mimicry:  “the  semblance  of  change,  with  little  real  progress 
achieved:  a  bureaucracy  gets  reorganised  to  look  like  those  from  advanced  countries,  but 
bureaucratic efficiency hardly improves”.20 
Public  administrations  are  complex  systems,  with  multiple  layers  and  units,  organised 
vertically  and  horizontally  (see  theme  3  on  MLG)  and  populated  with  public  officials  each 
with their own strengths and idiosyncrasies. As the US Academy of Sciences21 has observed: 
“Policy interventions unfold in large, complex, dynamic social systems. A systems perspective 
helps  decision  makers  and  researchers  think  broadly  about  the  many  effects  a  policy  may 
produce  and  the  ways  in  which  a  planned  social  intervention  interacts  with  other  existing 
interventions and institutional practices… There are systems effects on individual actors and 
the  system  as  a  whole,  including  emergent,  indirect,  and  delayed  effects,  as  well  as 
unintended and unpredictable consequences from the  interactivity of a  system’s elements.” 
There is a risk in performing piecemeal reforms that do not take account of the associations 
and interlinkages across the whole administrative system. 
In  the  words  of  Professor  Christopher  Pollitt22:  “There  are  more  media  and  they  are  more 
aggressive/less respectful of governments than 50 years ago. Short term media and popular 
pressures on politicians to ‘do something’ are even more acute than previously.  In the short 
term, a re-organisation may be the only thing, or at any rate the least difficult thing, that a 
minister  can  do.  In  some  countries,  the  media  have  actually  become  significant  reform 
advocates themselves, calling for particular types of solutions, and fiercely attacking types of 
reform they do not approve of”. 

sector to those with lower incomes. Again, ideas apparently shaped politicians’ views of how the world works - and 
therefore their interest in acting in ways that precipitated the crisis”. 
19 Huerta Melchor, op. cit. 
20 M. Andrews (2013), The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions, Cambridge 
University Press 
21 National Research Council (2012), op. cit. 
22 C. Pollitt (2010), What can we learn from 30 years of public management reform? Paper to support presentation at the 
SSPA-SDA Bocconi Conference ‘Reforming the public sector:  how to make a difference’, Rome, 2-3 December 2010 

Topic 9.1: Reform ingredients & impediments 

 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
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Absence of 
vision  

Top-down 
diktat 

Inflexible 
governance 

Group-think 

Insufficient 
capacity or 
resources  

Weak 
coordination 

Transition 
costs 

Winners and 
losers 

Uncertainty 

Reform 
fatigue 

The reform process can be undermined, unless there is a clear view of the desired end-point 
in the eyes of decision-makers. This does not mean that reform must slavishly pursue a pre-
determined path. The same principle of versatility (adopt-and-adapt) should apply whatever 
the policy arena (see theme 1 on policy-making). But there should be a purpose and goal to 
PAR which is coherent and compelling. 
Vision  should  be  matched  by  intelligent  execution.  The  best-laid  plans  are  unlikely  to  be 
effective, unless they are underpinned by an understanding of the  ex-ante situation on the 
ground. As a minimum, this requires consultation with affected parties, and ideally, shared 
ownership of the administrative changes. If the reform is conceived and carried out without 
this level of evidential insight and dialogue, there is a higher risk of failure, especially if it is 
imposed on employees. This can lead to passive or even active resistance. 
Most  public administrations tend to follow a  ‘command & control’ model internally, in  the 
interests of political accountability. In implementing policy, however, they might also take a 
similar  hierarchical  approach,  or  have  a  proclivity  for  ‘market  mechanisms’  (outsourcing, 
encouraging competition, and importing business-style management), or alternatively more 
consensual  ‘networking’  approaches  with  stakeholders.  The  reform  appetite  of  public 
administrations  can  be  stifled  if  they  are  too  wedded  to  one  approach,  and  downplay  the 
merits of employing others in the right circumstances (see topic 9.3.3 on meta-governance). 
Behavioural  sciences  have  revealed  that  the  reality  of  human  behaviour  is  not  always 
‘rational’  as  the  textbooks  teach  us  (especially  in  economics).  Instead,  we  are  prone  to 
cognitive  and  emotional  biases,  and  influence  by  others.  People  tend  to  subjugate  their 
opinions to the dominant or average view of the group, rather than speak up and stand out 
from the crowd, risk losing face, or subordinating the group leader’s expressed stance. This 
characterises  administrations  in  all  sectors.  The  most  visible  and  tragic  example  was  the 
NASA  Space  Shuttle  ‘Challenger’  disaster,  which  the  inquiry  concluded  was  the  result  of 
institutional failings, as well as technological (see topic 1.2.2 on behavioural insights). 
Public  administrations  are  often  fixated  with  managing  performance  when  proposing 
reforms, but without fully considering the contribution of capacity (see theme 4). Inadequate 
resourcing  can  also  constrain  reform.  Decentralisation  of 
functions  without  the 
commensurate funding, for example, can be counter-productive (see theme 3 on MLG). 
As  administrations  are  complex  organisms  on  multiple  levels,  the  reform  process  often 
requires  a  ‘helicopter  view’  in  both  conception  and  implementation,  which  is  where  the 
centre of government (COG) has a role to play, assuming it has the powers and the people 
(see topic 3.3 on COG coordination). 
Even if the change is fully justified and supported, and other hurdles have been jumped, the 
reform might fail on the simple matter of cost. This is more likely to be a show-stopper if the 
reform  requires  upfront  investment  (new  ICT  system,  staff  training,  etc.),  there  will  be  a 
period  of  process  or  service  disruption,  and/or  there  will  be  an  extended  transition  time 
before the benefits become apparent. Even the perception of cost can create inertia around 
established practices. 
The effects of reform are not always even, with the benefits accruing to some groups within 
the  workforce  or  society,  and  the  costs  /  losses  falling  on  others.  On  its  own,  this  can 
generate resistance, especially if the ‘losers’ identify and organise themselves, but especially 
if  they  perceive  that  they  have  been  treated  fairness.  The  onus  is  on  the  reformers  to 
communicate the reasons behind the change and convince on its equity. 
Whether there are some ‘losers’ or even 100% ‘winners’, reform resistance is likely to rise if 
affected parties are left unaware for a significant period about the potential effects, good or 
bad, building fear of the unknown. Again, communication is critical 
A never-ending sequence of reform announcements can risk alienating the affected parties, 
who  see  process  without  purpose.  This  can  be  worsened  by  over-selling  the  potential 
benefits as ‘revolutionising’ the civil service, and generate scepticism around new initiatives.  

These  sources  of  resistance  can  lead  the  politico-administrative  elite  to  rein  in  their  ambitions, 
choosing  what  can  be  achieved  over what  might  be  optimal.  As Professors  Christopher Pollitt  and 

Topic 9.1: Reform ingredients & impediments 

 
 
 
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14 

Geert Bouckaert put it23: “Reformers are frequently in the position of desiring something more than 
what they actually propose, but ‘censoring’ their own aspirations in the interests of framing a lesser 
package that stands a better chance of being accepted.” 

Inertia can also be an impediment in its own right. Once an institution, system or practice is in place, 
it tends to justify its own continued existence. 

Turning the super-tanker 

With management reform, staff  must relinquish old ways and learn new. Well-oiled networks of information 
and influence are disturbed, and new, less certain ones put  in their place. Politicians who were used to one 
configuration of authority within those state agencies that  most  interested  them now  have to get  used to a 
new pattern, and possibly one that will be more difficult for them to influence or communicate through. And 
so on.  

[Political  structures  and  administrative  systems]  act  jointly  to  temper  the  ardour  of  the  reformers  with  the 
sober  difficulties  of  shifting  the  status  quo.  Thus,  we  depict  them  as  enclosing  and  surrounding  the  more 
specific and dynamic pressures of the moment. Administrative systems are often difficult to change in more-
than-incremental ways.  For  example, the  UK civil  service is built around a  core of generalists  whereas  many 
Continental civil  services, including the French and  German, consist  mainly of  staff trained in law.  A cultural 
and disciplinary difference of this type cannot be eliminated overnight—it influences the way in which officials 
conceptualise and approach a wide variety of issues.  

Structural differences can also be significant: in Sweden and Finland central government for long consisted of a 
group  of  modest-sized  ministries  surrounded  by  a  circle  of  relatively  independent  administrative  agencies, 
which  had responsibility  for  most  operational issues.  This was a  more decentralised system than that which 
obtained  (until  recently,  at  least)  in  France  or  the  UK.  Many  of  the  issues  for  which  local  or  municipal 
authorities in the UK would deal directly with a central ministry would be taken care of by agencies in Finland 
or  Sweden.  For  the  Nordic  countries  to  change  required  new  legislation  and  a  reconsideration  of  the  highly 
political  issue  of  relations  between  central  government  and  municipalities.  It  could  be  done  (and  to  some 
extent has been), but not quickly or lightly.  

[Personnel  regulations]  are  clearly  necessary  to  ensure  that  public  servants  behave  with  propriety  and 
consistency. Yet they tend to develop a momentum of their own. Over the years, huge manuals are built up, 
with each unusual occurrence leading to more paragraphs or pages being added to the magnum opus. It can 
be very difficult  fundamentally to reduce or revise this tangle of interlocking rules and regulations. When in 
1993 the US Vice-President launched the National Performance Review (NPR), the federal personnel manual 
was ceremonially burned on the lawn of the White House. The reality was less impressive than this publicity 
stunt—a huge civil service could not really throw away all its internal rules, and most agencies seem to have 
continued  to  apply  most  of  the  rules  as  before.  As  one  American  colleague  put  it  to  us,  ‘the  copy  that  was 
burned cannot have been the only one’.  

Source: Extracted from C. Pollitt and G. Bouckaert (2003), op cit. 

23 C. Pollitt and G. Bouckaert (2003), Evaluating Public Management Reforms: An International Perspective in ‘Evaluation in 
Public-Sector Reform’, edited by Hellmut Wollmann. 

Topic 9.1: Reform ingredients & impediments 

 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                           
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15 

9.1.2  Drivers of reform 

Given  all  the  hurdles  potentially  in  the  way,  what  are  the 
sources  that  can  inspire  and  achieve  change?  Reform  can 
come from the top, directed by politicians as elected officials 
anticipating  societal  demands  or  seeking  a  mandate  for 
reform from the public. Alternatively, the initiative can come 
from within the administration itself, from senior or middle-ranking public servants, within the limits 
of  their  remits  as  advisers  and  implementers.  Sometimes,  it  reflects  an  irresistible  groundswell  of 
pressure  for  change  from  civil  society  -  citizens  instructing  politicians  through  the  ballot  box,  or 
demanding reform between elections through popular pressure. 

Obstacles to overcome 

Drivers of reform 

From  their  studies  of  public  administration  reform,  Professors  Christopher  Pollitt  and  Geert 
Bouckaert  observe  that  the  motives  “have  been  fairly  international,  even  if  their  relative  priorities 
have  varied  over  time  and  according  to  the  particular  starting  points  and  circumstances  of  the 
jurisdictions concerned”.24 They present three main motivations: 

  Saving money by cutting public expenditure or at least reducing its rate of growth; 

  Remedying the perceived under-performance of parts of the public sector, by improving 

productivity and service quality, and thereby increasing citizen trust; and 

  Searching for new mechanisms to enhance public accountability and standards in public 

life. 

At the heart of all three rationales are principles and values – becoming more accountable, efficient, 
ethical, inclusive, connected, etc.  

is 

“intended  as  a 

Pollitt  and  Bouckaert  formulated  a  model  of 
(reproduced 
public  administration  reform 
right),  which 
first 
approximation.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  a 
for  subsequent  discussion  by 
framework 
depicting  the  broad  forces  that  have  been  at 
work in both driving and restraining change. A 
model  such  as  this  is  a  conceptual  map,  a 
diagram of forces, and a heuristic device”.25 

The central feature of the model is the process 
is  a 
of 
recognition  that  most  reforms  are  initiated  - 

‘elite  decision-making’,  which 

24 C. Pollitt and G. Bouckaert (2003), op. cit. 
25 C. Pollitt and G. Bouckaert (2011), Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis - New Public Management, 
Governance, and the Neo-Weberian State, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press 

Topic 9.1: Reform ingredients & impediments 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Quality of Public Administration - A Toolbox for Practitioners 

16 

or  at  least  carried  through  -  by  executive  politicians  and/or  senior  civil  servants,  especially  within 
central  administrations.  However,  the  model  also  acknowledges  that  these  politico-administrative 
elites may be “heavily influenced by ideas and pressures from elsewhere”. In most cases, this involves 
selecting which instruments and techniques are chosen to take change forward. Hence, the model 
draws a distinction between those reforms that are desirable and those that are viable.   

includes:  demographics  (population  movements,  ageing  society, 

With  respect  to  these  influencers,  12  potential  drivers  of  change  can  be  identified  within  public 
administrations.  This  does  not  include  socio-economic  forces  (the  first  box  above)  as  this  is  more 
contextual,  and 
increasing 
diversity);  technological  advances  (the  digital  society);  and  the  economic  cycle  and  developments 
(patterns  of  production  and  trade),  etc.  These  factors  can  dictate  policy  development  and 
governments’  capacity  to tax,  borrow  and  spend,  but  are  largely  exogenous.26  Where  they  have  a 
direct  effect  on  the  administration  itself  (e.g.  workforce  and  ICT),  they  are  incorporated  below  as 
endogenous drivers.  

The drivers below represent a mix of internal and external stimuli, which can trigger both reactive 
and pro-active behaviour, and act as a counter-weight to the obstacles to reform.  

1.  Political  competition:  Well-functioning,  pluralist  democracies  enable  out-of-power  political 
parties  to  offer  a  competing  vision  to  the  public,  including  an  enforced  rule  of  law  and  more 
effective administration. 

2.  Media scrutiny: Among the most important checks and balances to political power is a free and 
independent media that can exercise the right to scrutinise government decisions, including the 
quality of public administration, and to use investigative journalism to shed light on government 
actions. 

3.  Civic  engagement  and  activism:  Civil  society  can  exert  powerful  upward  pressure  to  demand 
reform, as illustrated by the 2015 ‘corruption kills’ street protests in Romania which led to the 
resignation of the prime minister and replacement of the government (see  theme 2). It can be 
prompted  by  the  government’s  ineffective  response  to  a  crisis,  such  as  an  economic  crash, 
health epidemic, or natural disaster, which serves to fuel dissatisfaction and distrust. It can also 
arise  more  organically  from  public  participation  in  policy-making  (see  topic  1.1.4  on  co-
responsibility).  The  longstanding  trend  towards  decentralisation  reflects  a  perception  that 
people  trust  decisions  taken  closer  to  their  communities  (see  theme  3  on  multi-level 
governance). More mundanely, citizens (and businesses) are increasingly demanding a quality of 
public services, and hence administration, on a par with the private sector, especially online – at 
the user’s pace and place of convenience (see theme 5 on service delivery).   

26 As Pollitt and Bouckaert observe, “economic pressures do not themselves translate directly into some particular type of 
management reform. Reformers need ideas—models or patterns or plans or visions of how the public sector could be better 
organised. Markets may provide the pressure but they do not supply the ideas.” 

Topic 9.1: Reform ingredients & impediments 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Quality of Public Administration - A Toolbox for Practitioners 

17 

4.  New political leadership: In their book, Leighton and López27 place special emphasis on political 
entrepreneurship in making reform possible. For ideas to overcome vested interests, it must be 
the  case  that  “entrepreneurs  notice  and  exploit  those  loose  spots  in  the  structure  of  ideas, 
institutions, and incentives … [T]he public face of political change may be that of a madman, an 
intellectual,  or  an  academic  scribbler.  But  whatever  form  these  leaders  may  take,  they  are 
political  entrepreneurs—people  whose  ideas  and  actions  are  focused  on  producing  change.” 
Crises can be an example of such ‘loose spots’ (see 12. below). 

5.  Professional  and  depoliticised  civil  service:  The  public  administration  itself  can  be  a  counter-
balance  to  abuse  of  power  and  an  agent  in  driving  forward  change,  if  employees  are  not 
dependent on political patronage for appointment and advancement, but are selected according 
to merit instead. This makes it more likely that public servants will serve the public interest. 

6.  Technology as enabler: ICT is not merely an electronic tool for making processes more efficient 
and  services  more  accessible.  Its  processing  and  networking  capabilities  make eGovernment a 
‘game-changer’,  with  the  potential  to  open-up:  new  methods  of  working  within  and  across 
administrations through interoperability (see topic 5.4 and theme 3); new sources of knowledge 
through  so-called  ‘big  data’  (see  topic  1.1.2  on  big  data  analytics);  and  ways  to  connect  with 
citizens and enterprises to co-create policy and services (see topic 1.1.4 on co-responsibility).  

7.  Workforce demographics: Public administrations are microcosms of society (or should be) and 
hence wider demographic trends can reveal themselves in the changing nature of the workforce, 
as it gets older and more diverse. This creates opportunities as staff bring a wider spectrum of 
experiences  into  the  workplace,  but  also  challenges  in  an  era  where  digital  skills  are  both 
demanded and scarce (see theme 4 on human resources management). 

8.  External sources of financial & technical support: Public administrations at various levels have 
experience of receiving funds with conditions attached (e.g. public borrowing from international 
financial  institutions  such  as  EIB,  EBRD  and  IMF  at  national  level;  appropriations  to  ministries 
under performance budgeting; and fiscal transfers from central to regional / municipal levels). At 
the EU level, 17 Member States currently receive ESIF under TO11, on the condition of adopting 
a  strategic  policy  framework  for  reinforcing  administrative  efficiency 
including  public 
administration  reform  (ex-ante)  and  demonstrating  performance  against  output  and  results 
indicators  (ex-post).  The  EU  is  also  influential  through  its  technical  assistance  (the  Structural 
Reform Support Service and other Commission Services), while other bodies, such as the OECD, 
perform peer reviews to help strengthen public governance. 

9.  External  policy  guidance:  More  oblique  in  effect  than  direct  sources  of  technical  assistance, 
international sources of policy advice can also shape ideas and initiatives in Member States. In 
many  cases,  the  guidance  might  be  generic,  rather  than  targeted  at  specific  countries  or 
institutions,  but  attains  a  high  profile  and  hence  impact.  Sources  include  the  EU  (in  specific 
fields),  the Council of Europe  (rule of law), the  OECD, the IMF (finance management), and the 
World Bank. 

27 W. Leighton and E. López (2013), Madmen, Intellectuals, and Academic Scribblers: The Economic Engine of Political 
Change, Stanford University Press. 

Topic 9.1: Reform ingredients & impediments 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Quality of Public Administration - A Toolbox for Practitioners 

18 

10. International benchmarks: Still more oblique is the reference that some governments make to 
indicator-based  comparators  to  define  their  own  performance  goals,  such  as  the  World 
Economic  Forum’s  Global  Competitiveness  Index,  the  World  Bank’s  Doing  Business  or 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (see topic 1.3). These also frequently 
appear in the media, placing pressure on politicians to explain and justify their ‘league position’. 
Benchmarks  are  sometimes  also  used  at  the  sub-national  level,  for  example  to  compare 
municipal performance, or the health outcomes in different regions, or examination results by 
school. These indicators can be helpful if they spark a positive debate about the reasons behind 
the performance and the lessons that can be drawn from ‘successful’ systems and practices, and 
understanding the context and causes (see topic 4.1 on performance management). 

11. Isomorphism:  Some  public  administrations  seek  to  emulate  other  administrations  -  or  copy 
aspects  of  them  -  that  are  perceived  as  (more)  successful,  either  to  meet  donor  demands 
(coercive isomorphism),  or  to try and  replicate the structures and success  factors, for example 
because  the  comparator 
international  benchmarks  (mimetic 
isomorphism), or because such reforms are being carried out by others which has effectively set 
a standard to follow (normative isomorphism). 

is  more  highly  ranked  on 

12. Crisis  response:  The  emergence  of  a  crisis  -  whether  economic,  financial,  natural  disaster  or 
other cause - can provoke a fundamental re-think of how the public administration operates and 
is  organised,  in  some  cases  out  of  pure  necessity.  “Whether  the  crisis  triggers  larger  public 
administration  reforms  or  not,  it  is  likely  to  cause  changes  in  public  management  practices 
because  of  the  need  to  adapt  to  changes  both  in  the  internal  and  the  external  environment.” 
(COCOPS 2013, “Fiscal Consolidation in Europe: A Comparative Analysis”) 

These drivers set  the scene  for the next topic:  how do public administrations that are disposed to 
reform go about doing so? 

Topic 9.1: Reform ingredients & impediments 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Quality of Public Administration – A Toolbox for Practitioners 

19 

9.2  Potential approaches to reform 

Functional reviews 

In  the  context  of  reform  ingredients  and 
impediments,  how  can  administrations  both 
seize  the  opportunities  and  circumvent  the 
obstacles?  Three  scenarios  are  set  out  here, 
which  draw  on  reform  experiences  over  the 
past  20-30 
reviews; 
comprehensive  ‘root  and  branch’  reforms;  and  the  ‘permanent  evolution’  of  incremental  change. 
The most appropriate scenario for any administration will depend in part on its political, legal and 
cultural context.  

Comprehensive 'root and branch' reforms 

Incremental change 

functional 

years: 

9.2.1  Functional reviews 

instrument  which  have  been 

An 
largely 
applied  in  a  pre-accession  context  in  the  EU, 
functional  reviews  emerged  as  a  reform 
instrument  in  the  context  of  the  Central 
Europe  and  South  East-Europe  model,  which 
carried the legacy of the pre-1990 regime into 
the transition to a modern market economy:28  

Functional reviews 

Comprehensive 'root and branch' reforms 

Incremental change 

  Public administration systems were  highly politicised, with political reliability and loyalty a 

key criterion in recruiting and promoting process, prevailing over professional qualities.  

  Public administrations were not responsible for channelling societal interests, which was the 
function  of  the  party  administration.  Public  administrations  were  machines  for  policy 
implementation and the strict application of the law, rather than public service delivery.  

  Public  administrations  were  designed  on  an  economic  branch  model,  each  ministry  being 
responsible for a specific sector. The  public administration was oriented  vertically in silos, 
and focused on control and enforcement, not policy-making. Coordination was the domain 
of the party administration, not the public administration. 

These  three  features  contrasted  starkly  with  the  expectation  of  quality  public  administration  as 
professional,  policy-oriented,  coherent  and  responsive  to  the  public  and  society  in  general.  The 
immediate  policy  prescriptions  post-1990  -  characterised  by  the  United  Nations  Development 
Programme  (UNDP)  as  first  ‘reform-by-law’  and  then  ‘reform-by-across-the-board-cuts’  -  were 
ineffective and even counter-productive to weak structures. 

28 Drawn from the United Nations Development Programme (2001), Rebuilding state structures: methods and approaches, 
UNDP/RBEC Policy Advocacy Papers. 

Topic 9.2: Potential approaches to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Quality of Public Administration – A Toolbox for Practitioners 

20 

Functional reviews focus on systemic and institutional objectives and seek to establish conditions for 
modernising  administrations  to  function  more  effectively  in  the  longer  term.  The  process  of 
functional  review  always  begins  with  an  attempt  to  clarify  the  roles,  missions  and  objectives  of 
administrative bodies under study, and to derive from these relevant functional requirements. 

Functional  reviews  represent  a  considered  and  holistic  approach,  not  a  ‘quick  and  dirty’  analysis, 
based  on  rigorous  assessment  and  engaging  with  expert  opinion.    They  take  the  form  of  either 
vertical, horizontal or system reviews, with four potential objectives:  

  Remove redundant functions; 
  Reduce duplication between and within institutions; 
  Add missing functions; and/or 
  Rationalise the distribution of functions 

The streamlining of administrative systems by avoiding duplication and rationalising distribution of 
functions  is  established  practice  (see  theme  3  on  multi-level  governance).  The  removal  of  some 
functions  and  the  addition  of  others  might  appear  less  obvious.  One  example  would  be  the 
privatisation  of  utilities  and  infrastructure,  such  as  water  supply,  electricity  distribution  or  airport 
management,  whereby  the  direct  planning  and  control  of  a  state  enterprise  would  no  longer  be 
required as a function, and the regulation of market operations should be introduced.  

The  UNDP’s  review  of  the  use  and  usefulness  of  functional  reviews  highlights  the  importance  of 
motivation: 

  When reviews are solely donor-driven, their conduct tends to be tokenistic and their results 
often sub-optimal, as they are performed largely as a formality – part of the deal. To use an 
old phrase: to change, you must want to change. 

  When  they  are  driven  by  a  genuine  desire  by  governments  “to  make  a  breakthrough  in 
reforming  public  administration  systems  that  had  become  an  impediment  to  successful 
economic  reform  …  review  processes  have  often  helped  to  put  reform  measures  that 
previously  could  not  be  considered  on  the  political  agenda,  and  stimulated  a  radical  and 
much needed change in administrative organisation and practice.  

The  10  lessons  learned  from  UNDP’s  study,  which  included  analysis  of  functional  reviews  in  three 
countries  that  are  now  EU  Member  States  (Bulgaria,  Latvia  and  Slovakia)  and  three  EU 
neighbourhood  countries  (Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan  and  Ukraine),  are  summarised  below  and  stand 
the test of time: 

Lesson 
1. Agree a clear goal 
between key players 

2. Assign ownership 
to a government 
body 

Explanation 
Before  starting,  an  agreement  should  exist  between  public  structures  (executive  and 
individual  ministries),  civil  society  and  the  private  sector  on  the  basic  directions  and 
problems  of  public  administration  reform.  While  difficult  to  secure,  a  unifying 
philosophy and the willingness of government to carry out the reforms are key factors. 
The  establishment  of  a  government  unit  or  body  strictly  responsible  for  public 
administration  reform,  or  perhaps  even  strictly  for  the  functional  review  process, 
ensures that the momentum of reform is maintained and may also serve as a dispute 

Topic 9.2: Potential approaches to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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21 

3. Establish and 
follow an action 
plan 

4. Provide adequate 
training 

5. Communicate 
regularly across 
government and 
with any functional 
review consultants 

6. Take account of 
the specifics of the 
situation under 
review 

7. Establish 
monitoring 
mechanisms and 
follow-up 

8. Plan for using 
freed-up resources 

9. Recap regularly 
on purpose 
10. Place the review 
in a wider reform 
agenda 

resolution  mechanism  throughout  the  process.  The  establishment  of  such  a  body 
allows  for  the  possibility  of  a  more  flexible  strategy  that  can  be  modified  based  on 
feedback and observed needs as they arise. 
The  need  for  a  clear  implementation  plan  was  emphasised  in  all  the  countries.  This 
includes  the  need  for  a  realistic  assessment  of  the  necessary  time  and  resources  to 
complete this plan. Clarification may be improved by the  signing of an agreement  of 
understanding  on  the  roles  and  expectations  between  various  bodies  involved,  i.e. 
between  the  ministry  under  review  and  the  monitoring  body,  thus  providing  a 
benchmark for the review as it progresses. 
Where  government  officials  will  be  responsible  for  implementing  the  reform  or 
heading working groups, sufficient attention must be paid to training  with regards to 
the overall methodology of the functional review (objectives, tasks), as well as specific 
functional review approaches. Where a large gap exists between current and proposed 
systems of public administration, special effort  is needed to foster awareness among 
all  stakeholders.  Ministries  must  receive  relevant  technical  assistance  and  financial 
support to implement the results of the functional review. 
Communication should occur on a regular basis to ensure that all parties will buy into 
the project. This communication may take the form of the submission of a draft report 
with  recommendations  to  ministry  officials  for  review  and  comment,  or  through 
consultations  with  officials  and  politicians  from  other  ministries.  Throughout  the 
process,  the  press  may  be  used  to  communicate  activities  to  the  public  and  to  sway 
public sentiment in favour of implementation of the reforms. 
This determines the type of functional review to be carried out. Factors to consider are 
the size of the country, levels of development, and the political and popular  support 
for  further  reforms.  This  is  especially  true  for  certain  types  of  reviews,  the 
relationships  between  the  various  ministries,  as  well  as  the  expected  impact  of  the 
reform  on  other  ministries.  For  example,  privatisation  of  public  services  must  be 
balanced  with  the  consideration  of  the  transaction  costs  of  a  market  and  contract-
based relationships. Systems based on command and control principles require a less 
sophisticated set of institutions and management tools, and can therefore sometimes 
be  preferable.  Furthermore,  distinctions  should  be  made  between  long-  and  short-
term  possibilities  for  change,  particularly  with  reference  to  such  external  factors  as 
political business cycles. 
There is the need for an ongoing monitoring mechanism to ensure the action plan is 
followed. Assigning the task of monitoring to a specific institution guarantees the focus 
of the review is maintained, targets set and methodology ensured (see point 2. above). 
The  media  may  also  serve  an  informal  monitoring  role  for  implementation  of  the 
desired  reforms.  With  regards  to  the  results  themselves  parties  must  be  aware  that 
results  may  not  be  what  was  expected  and  the  ministries  must  receive  relevant 
technical  assistance  and  financial  support  to  implement  the  results  of  the  functional 
review. 
Prior to beginning the review, involved parties should be aware of the likely outcome 
of  budgetary  alterations  and  provisions  should  be  made  on  how  to  deal  with  them 
when the review is completed. 
During  the  implementation  of  the  review,  it  is  important  to  refer  to  the  initial 
philosophy of the review, as well as to clearly define those tools available. 
It is important  to  embed the functional review policy in overall public  administration 
reform. It is important that the review is not seen as an initiative standing alone, but 
that  it  is  widely  recognised  that  its  success  is  dependent  upon  its  position  among  a 
larger commitment to reform. 

Topic 9.2: Potential approaches to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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22 

9.2.2  Comprehensive ‘root and branch’ reform 

Functional reviews 

Functional  reviews  can  be  the  springboard  for 
fundamental reforms. Extensive and far-reaching 
exercises can also arise out of a sense of ‘crisis’. 
The  Government  of  Belgium’s  Copernicus 
is  a  prime  example  of  a 
programme 
comprehensive reform package emerging from a 
period of public discontent with the state administration. In the specific context of Belgian political 
structures, Copernicus was concerned solely with the federal, not regional / community or municipal 
levels.  Its  official  lifespan  was  1999-2003,  but  as  the  case  below  shows,  it  continued  to  have  an 
impact beyond its formal termination. Both its intentions and limitations can yield lessons for other 
administrations that are contemplating similar reorganisations.  

Comprehensive 'root and branch' reform 

Incremental change 

Inspiring example: Reform programme ‘Copernicus’ (Belgium) 

The Belgian federation today consists of three regions (Flanders, Walloon and the Brussels-Capital region), and 
three communities (Flemish, French-speaking and German-speaking), each of which has its own government, 
parliament and administration. As there are no longer any truly national parties that appeal to all regions and 
especially  communities,  the  federal  government  is  now  always  a  coalition  of  community  interests,  which 
typically takes long and protracted negotiations to form. 

During  the  1990s,  Belgium  faced  a  turbulent  decade  that  reflected  citizens’  lack  of  confidence  in  the  state, 
further  eroded  public  trust  in  the  political,  judicial  and  official  elite,  and  provoked  protests.  This  included 
sequentially:  the  Agusta-Dassault  affair,  whereby  the  Socialist  Party  (PS)  was  found  to  be  receiving  illegal 
finance via defence contracts; the Dutroux arrest, which exposed major inefficiencies in the police and judicial 
systems;  the  ‘White  March’  demonstration  of  250-300,000  people  in  Brussels,  which  expressed  the  large 
dissatisfaction of the public with their government; and the discovery of toxic substances (dioxins) in Belgian 
chickens, presenting a danger to national health, adding to the already widespread feelings of national crisis 
and loss of legitimacy of governmental institutions.  

In the aftermath of the ‘dioxin chickens’ scandal, a new coalition government was formed surprisingly quickly 
after  the  1999  election,  consisting  of  Liberals,  Socialists  and  Greens.  Given  10  years  of  incidents  and  lack  of 
faith  from  the  public,  the  incoming  government  aimed  no  lower  than  to  make  Belgium  “a  model  state”. 
Consequently,  the  first  chapter  of  the  coalition  agreement  proposed  the  “intense  reform  of  the 
administration”.  To  take  this  goal  forward,  a  Minister  for  Administrative  Reform  was  installed,  having 
previously  pursued  a  similar  goal  in  the  Flemish  administration  during  the  mid-1990s.  The  first  reform 
blueprint was published in the so-called ‘Boullion paper’, which was prepared by a combination of politicians 
and consultants on a retreat in the Belgian town of the same name. The Bouillon paper would prove to be the 
basis  for  the  Copernicus  programme.  Unlike  the  1980s,  when  financial  problems  dominated  the  reform 
agenda, Copernicus was not about financial tightening, it was the working of the state that was perceived to 
fall short.  

The new government seized the opportunity to implement an ambitious reform program aimed at achieving 
two goals: making the federal administration a better service provider, and making it a better employer. The 
citizen should no longer serve politicians and the administration, but the other way around – in the same way 
that Nicolas Copernicus challenged the wisdom of the day and stated that the earth is circling the sun. In June 
2000, the government  sent  a brochure containing their reform plans to  every Belgian inhabitant  aged  16 or 
older, along with a survey questionnaire. It attracted criticism from both opponents and media as a costly ‘PR 
stunt’, even though the reform plans themselves were not criticised. The vast majority of respondents agreed 
that the administration should be more customer-oriented, but just  9% of the population had replied to the 
survey. The response was taken by the government as signalling “widespread approval”.  

Topic 9.2: Potential approaches to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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The two Copernicus goals were to be achieved by major changes in four domains: 

  Designing a new organisation structure: The outdated structure at the national level was replaced with 14 
new ministries, called Federal Government Services (FGSs) were created – each with their own minister - 
in  a  “virtual  matrix”  construction,  with  10  vertical  FGSs  (such  as  Internal  Affairs,  Social  Security,  Labour 
and Pensions, Economy, etc.) and four horizontal FGSs (Personnel and Organisation, ICT, Budget and the 
Services  of  the  Prime  Minister).  In  addition,  some  Programmatic  Government  Services  (PGSs)  were 
created, aimed at achieving some results in a limited period on a well-defined programme or action. This 
reshuffle was intended to increase the responsibility of managers and focus on results. Previously, Belgian 
ministers were always surrounded by their own cabinets helping them to formulate policy, but the reform 
reduced  their  role,  shifting  power  for  policy  preparation  to  the  FGS,  leaving  ministers  with  only  a  small 
political  secretariat.  A  ‘policy  board’  was  installed  between  the  minister  and  the  top  of  the  FGS 
administration (the chairman and the management committee), composed of the minister, the chairman 
of  the  administration,  and  members  of  the  management  committee,  and  supported  by  a  policy 
preparation cell, aimed at replacing the ministerial cabinets.   

 

 

Introducing a new vision of human resources management (HRM): In line with HR modernisation in other 
countries,  Belgium  would  evolve  from  the  ‘classical’  personnel  administration  to  a  well-functioning, 
strategic HRM policy. The old system was very rigid, prescribing the number of staff and what they should 
do, any changes has to be processed politically and legally, and hence it was focused on filling numerical 
gaps not meeting departmental needs. The new staff policy ended this situation by creating competency-
based  personnel  plans  and  a  newly  created  selection  organ  called  ‘Selor’  to  recruit  and  reward  civil 
servants on the basis of competencies. As a result, a lot of competency measurements were carried out in 
the  first  years  of  the  reform.  A  career  path  was  clearly  shaped  out  of  new  HR  instruments,  such  as 
development  cycles,  the  design  of  functional  families  of  jobs  and  weighting  of  these  functions.  In  this 
modern  strategic HRM policy, decision-taking  was decentralised, giving more autonomy to the different 
FGSs and responsibility to line managers, facilitated and supported by the horizontal FGS of Personnel and 
Organisation.  

Installing  a  new  management  culture:  The  government  sought  to  give  greater  autonomy  and 
responsibility to senior management to manage, with a shift from ex ante to ex post controls. Top officials 
were expected to produce management plans that they would have to carry out and would be the subject 
of  evaluation  afterwards.  To  increase  capacity  within  the  government,  external  managers  were  also 
encouraged to apply for vacant functions, with again the emphasis on competencies. A mandate system 
was introduced for top civil servants,  a contractual  arrangement  that meant  top civil servants  would no 
longer work under a system of permanent tenure, but instead would operate with an  increased focus on 
results,  rather  than  following  rules-based  and  process-driven  routines.  Explicit  targets  and  performance 
indicators  agreed  with  politicians  and  legislators  would  help  those  managers  prioritise  and  focus  their 
activities.  All  top  positions  in  the  federal  administration  were  declared  vacant,  and  senior  civil  servants 
told that they could re-apply for their positions. The two highest positions in the federal bureaucracy were 
open for competition also to external applicants. All candidates were assessed by innovative techniques 
(assessments) from  the private sector, with the expectation that this would lead to better management 
skills among the federal leaders. 

  Rethinking ways of working: The new government  wanted to inject  a greater customer orientation and 
more efficiency into public administration, supported by modern ICT infrastructure, as well as employees 
that are aware of their FGS’s mission and strategic  goals  and have the competencies to reach them. To 
achieve this new approach, it was decided that Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) projects would be 
the instrument to radically redesign the processes to deliver added value for the government’s customers, 
with  the  emphasis  on  service  simplification  and  improvement.  The  essential  questions  that  the  federal 
administration had to ask itself were: Why do we do what we do? What is the added value of what we do 
and  who  do  we  do  it  for?  Is  there  a  benefit  for  society  to  do  what  we  do  faster  and  better?  Do  our 
customers expect that we work faster and /or better? 

Copernicus was set in motion in 2000. It was the intention to start fast by creating first the new organisational 
structures, with the super-structures at the top of each FGS and the streamlining of ministerial cabinets. At the 

Topic 9.2: Potential approaches to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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24 

same time, work began on the new HRM policy by launching the new evaluation system (end-2000) and the 
new career system (mid-2001). The first BPRs were launched at the end of 2001, and in the meantime the new 
top  managers  were  selected  and  appointed  in  two  waves.  By  following  this  time  frame,  all  the  main 
parameters were put in place by end 2001 / start 2002, to roll out and implement the full reform across the 
entire administration over the following years.      

In  practice,  however,  the  government  started  to  face  resistance  to  its  reform  package  from  an  early  stage. 
These can be summarised as follows: 

  Legal  challenges:  The  new  procedure  for  selecting  top  manager  received  royal  assent,  was  published  in 
the law gazette on 8 May 2001, and the first group of top managers was selected and appointed. By the 
summer,  however,  it  was  being  subjected  to  legal  challenges  at  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court,  and 
was  subsequently  suspended,  revised,  challenged  again,  and  suspended  again.  A  new  Royal  decree  was 
finally  published  on  15  June  2004.  By  this  time,  a  lot  of  newly-created  FGSs  had  been  obliged  to  wait 
several years for their new top managers to be installed. 

  Marginalised top civil servants: The reforms were intended to instigate a new management culture, but 
relations between the most senior civil servants and the minister of modernisation were strained from the 
outset, as it was clear that the former would have only a little influence on the reforms. The reforms saw 
them as part  of the  system that was the problem, not  the solution.  The new cadre of  top civil servants 
(including outsiders) were expected to play a leading role in driving the change process, but their delayed 
appointment meant the dynamics of reform began to dissipate. Moreover, the time and energy absorbed 
by dealing with the small top layer of the  administration reinforced the impression that Copernicus  was 
only aimed at the highest level of the hierarchy. 

 

Influential unions: This response to Copernicus was not restricted to the top officials, but also reflected in 
the  reaction  of  civil  servants  at  large  in  a  staff  survey  called  Artemis,  in  which  many  expressed  their 
worries about the outlook for them. Because the focus was still on the ‘big picture’, it was not yet possible 
at that early stage to provide clarity in detail about the future of each individual civil servant. Copernicus 
became  quickly  politicised,  as  the  unions  took  up  the  employees’  concerns.  While  the  Flemish  Christian 
Democrat unions were more open to reform, the Walloon socialist union leveraged its strong links to the 
Walloon  Socialist  Party,  which  was  part  of  the  coalition.  This  made  some  of  the  reforms  unfeasible  and 
forced the government to diminish the pace of others.  

  Fragmented political support: The dividing lines between the unions were replicated among the  Flemish 
and  Walloon  politicians,  the  former  being  the  main  driving  forces,  the  latter  being  far  less  enthusiastic. 
The political resistance enabled the top officials to strengthen their objections, gathering support to block 
(some of) the reforms by turning first to their own minister, then their union, politicians of their party, the 
press and finally the Supreme Administrative Court. 

  Critical media: Copernicus started off with a large PR offensive via the survey  of all adult Belgian citizens 
which  attracted  media  coverage,  but  the  low  response  rate  and  criticism  of  survey  costs  created  ‘bad 
press’.  Soon  it  became  apparent  that  most  citizens  had  lost  their  interest  in  the  reforms,  which  was 
mirrored  in  the  media.  The  ‘quality  papers’  continued  their  coverage,  but  attacked  Copernicus  as  the 
rhetoric  often  did  not  match  reality,  an  inevitable  result  of  the  delays.  The  media  strategy  of  major 
exposure  backfired  as  it  created  attention  and  expectation,  exposed  failures,  put  pressure  on  the 
coalition, and diminished support for further reform.  

In May 2003, new elections took place in Belgium. The Minister for PA announced before the election that he 
would  not  go  for  a  second  legislature,  he  did  not  return  in  office  and  his  position  was  taken  over  by  a  new 
Minister (from the Walloon Socialist Party). After just one month in office, she declared the end of Copernicus 
via  a  press  communiqué.  In  her  statement,  she  underlined  the  urgent  need  for  a  social  dialogue  and 
communication.  She  declared  that  her  predecessor  had  too  much  confidence  in  the  private  sector  and  the 
competencies  of  the  people  working  in  it.  Consequently,  one  of  her  actions  was  to  stop  the  (expensive) 
contracts with the consultancy firms. The coalition agreement of the new government stated that civil servant 
should be more directly involved at the reforms. The new minister summarised her change of course by saying 
that “… change can only take place when everyone is able to give his opinion, be proud on the administration 

Topic 9.2: Potential approaches to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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25 

and  on  himself.  The  political  government  should  also  be  implied  with  the  aim  of  creating  consensus  for  the 
proposed changes. And this for one of the most beautiful matters: the common good and the spirit of public”. 

Officially, the Copernicus reform ended in 2003. Administrative reform became a less media-covered and more 
internal  affair.  The  new  Minister  took  a  more  traditional  ‘Weberian’  approach  towards  the  administrative 
system  with  equity and objectivity as core themes, rather than the New Public Management  (NPM) style of 
Copernicus (see theme 4 on performance management). The HR policy moved back to a more centralized and 
uniform  system.  In  practice,  however,  a  lot  of  elements  were  irreversible  and  could  not  be  wound  back. 
Others, sometimes in a changed way, also moved forward in the following years. The BPR project continued, 
for example, yet with a far greater role for civil servants.  

  New organisational structures: The matrix  structure continued,  all the FGSs were in place by 2002, and 
several  PGSs  were  established  as  “temporary”  structures,  but  became  a  permanent  fixture  of  the 
organisational  system.  The  main  break  from  the  initial  plan  concerns  the  new  relations  between  the 
political  level  and  the  administration.  During  the  time  of  the  1999  government,  just  two  policy  boards 
were  set  up  and  just  two  ministers  tried  to  slim  down  their  ministerial  cabinets  and  replace  them  with 
policy cells; under the 2003 government, even these two cabinets were restored.  

  New  HRM  policy:  Many  of  the  modernisation  reforms  were  introduced,  including  recruitment,  staff 
planning, development cycles, and career development. Regarding competencies,  the further the reform 
evolved, the more the initial plans were changed. The emphasis on competency measurement and linking 
it to remuneration could be seen as a case of ‘too much, too soon’, and hence it was soon replaced by a 
system of certified training.  

Installation  of  a  new  management  culture:  The  top  management  positions  were  indeed  opened  to 
external candidates, and selected using assessment procedures. However, most of the new managers are 
coming  from  the  federal  government  itself,  partly  because  the  selection  procedure  weighted  technical 
expertise  higher  than  management  capacities.  The  legal  delays  and  procedural  modifications  did  slow 
down the process, so that just 105 of the initial 400 offered positions had been filled by 2005. While the 
transformation  of  the  policy  and  management  cycle,  including  administrative  and  budgetary  control, 
proved difficult beyond legislative change, the culture of strategic and operational objectives and taking 
resources into account did take hold. 

  New ways of working (BPR and ICT): This pillar of the Copernicus reform can be considered as a relative 
success. By the end of 2005, 22 BPR projects had been launched. Civil servants are engaged at the heart of 
them, promoted by the 2003 government’s emphasis on staff participation. The projects have given the 
chance  to  (young)  promising  civil  servants  of  thinking  and  working  for  a  new  administration.  Initially 
knowledge and expertise came especially from external consultants, but later knowledge transfer and an 
increase in officials’ expertise could be  seen. In  2003, a  major Belgian newspaper (De Standaard) wrote 
that  “when  the  Copernicus  reform  would  be  undone,  e-government  will  perhaps  remain  as  the  most 
important achievement” Prior to Copernicus, every ministry or federal governmental service had their own 
approach  to  ICT,  which  led  to  the  creation  of  many  ‘islands’  –  the  reforms  lifted  ICT  policy  from  this 
distributed level to a federal model. More significantly, it allowed the federal government to implement 
the once-only principle (see topic 5.4) and introduce online service delivery. 

Source: Thijs, N. (2004), Modernising the Belgian Federal Public Administration: Points of attentions and lessons 
from an ambitious and large scale “Copernican” reform programme.  

As  well  as  ‘root  and  branch’,  comprehensive  reforms  can  be  top-to-bottom,  reaching  into  every 
territorial  level  of  the  country’s  structures,  vertically  and  horizontally  (see  theme  3  on  multi-level 
governance). 

Perhaps  the  best  contemporary  exemplar  is  the  Government  of  Spain’s  decision  to  launch  the 
Commission for the Reform of the Public Administration (CORA) in 2012, as a whole-of-government 
approach. It could be characterised as ‘zero-based’ in that it asked deep-seated existential questions 

Topic 9.2: Potential approaches to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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26 

about  the  current  set-up,  and  nothing  was  off  the  agenda  in  recalibrating  its  structures  and 
strengthening  its  systems.  CORA  has  been  described  by  the  OECD’s  Public  Governance  Review  as 
“one  of  the  most  ambitious  processes  of  governance  reform”  among  its  members.  The  reform 
package is “substantial, evidence-based and consistent with the ongoing process of modernisation” 
and “the result of a rigorous process of data collection, dialogue among practitioners, and diagnosis 
about the weaknesses of Spain’s public administrations”.  

Inspiring example: Comprehensive reform of the public administration (Spain) 

“A competitive economy demands modern, transparent and agile public administrations. It demands a public 
sector free of overlapping, duplicate functions and unnecessary expenditures. It requires public administrations 
that  are  devoted  to  the  service  of  citizens  and  businesses,  on  par  with  the  most  efficient  systems  in  our 
context. It is upon these assumptions that CORA was established”. Report of the Commission for the Reform 
of the Public Administration (CORA). 

Since  2012,  Spain  has  subjected  itself  to  a  far-reaching  reform  programme  that  touches  every  tier  and 
element of the administration. To put this into context, government in Spain operates at three levels: 

  Central: The State comprises 12 departments & 139 autonomous organisations. 
  Regional: There are 17 autonomous communities (ACs) & two autonomous cities. 
  Local: There are 8 108 municipalities, 41 county councils & 10 island councils. 

Data from OECD’s 2015 Government at a Glance shows that Spain has one of the most  highly decentralised 
administrations,  measured  by  the  distribution  of  general  government  expenditure  across  all  levels.  This 
important  process  of  decentralisation  had  brought  many  positive  benefits,  but  also  increased  complexity. 
Spain  needed  to  reduce  or  avoid  the  inefficiencies  that  arise  from  a  highly  decentralised,  multi-level 
administration,  namely  the  inflation  of  different  regulations  and  increased  administrative  burdens  for 
businesses in some cases, and the accumulation of duplicate and redundant agencies which was too costly for 
the budget and contributed to the overall deficit. 

The  motivation  for  administrative  reform  was  the  conviction  that  a  competitive  economy  requires  a 
transparent, agile (active & sharp) administration and a focus on efficient services to citizens and businesses. 
In the second half of the 2000s, Spain had undergone a mass 
proliferation  of  public  entities,  from  3  228  (2005)  to  4  036 
(2011), an increase of 808, and had created 285 000 additional 
jobs in the public sector (2007-2011), mostly in administrative 
posts  and  senior  positions 
in  public  companies  and 
foundations,  rather  than  priority  sectors  such  as  health  and 
education, which accounted for less than 10% of the increase. 
Although  the  crisis  began  in  late  2007  (see  GDP  chart,  right), 
public employees and structures continued to grow until 2010. 
The government tried to execute an expansionary policy with the contribution of public resources, to try to 
generate economic activity and work. 

The need to take urgent high-impact measures in 2012-2013 (along with other structural 
ones) and the conviction that the administration itself had an extensive knowledge of its 
strengths  and  weaknesses 
led  to  the  creation  of  a  high-level,  multi-disciplinary 
commission composed mainly of senior officials (experts in technical, organisational and 
legal  matters)  belonging  to  the  general  administration.  As  a  country  within  the 
Napoleonic legal tradition, an important package of policy and legal measures needed to 
be developed to undertake the necessary reforms.  

When the Council of Ministers adopted an agreement on 26 October 2012 to establish the  Commission for 
the Reform of the Public Administration (CORA), Spain was still experiencing the fall-out from the financial, 
economic and fiscal crisis in falling GDP and high unemployment and debt. The response was a wide-ranging 

Topic 9.2: Potential approaches to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quality of Public Administration – A Toolbox for Practitioners 

27 

package  of  reforms  affecting  the  financial  sector,  labour  markets,  tax  policy,  budgetary  stability  and  fiscal 
sustainability29, transparency and access to public information, and rationalisation and reorganisation of the 
public sector. The framework of austerity meant both budget and staff reductions. 

With a deadline to complete its work by 30 June 2013, CORA was created under the auspices of the Ministry 
for Finance and Public Administration, through the State Secretary for Public Administration, and chaired (as 
CORA president) by the Under-Secretary of the Ministry for the Presidency, with the Under-Secretary of the 
Ministry of Finance and Public Administration (as CORA vice-president). The CORA Secretariat was provided 
by the Director General for the Coordination of Competences with the Autonomous Communities (regions). 
Other members of CORA comprised one representative from the following: 

  Each ministerial department (minimum rank of Director General); 

  The Economic Office of the Presidency of the Government; 

  The Cabinet of the Presidency of the Government; 

  The Vice-President of Government and Minister for the Presidency. 

Given the nature of the subjects on the agenda, CORA`s president was also permitted to invite heads of other 
bodies and administrative units from the State General Administration to take part in CORA`s meetings, who 
could express their points of view but without voting power. 

CORA  could  also  establish  sub-committees,  and  define  their  responsibilities  and  membership,  as  needed. 
Each  could  invite  authorities  from  the  public  administration  and  members  of  the  private  sector  to  express 
their points of view and ideas, and reported to CORA on a regular basis. The following four sub-committees 
formed the core, established from the outset and on a permanent basis for the duration of CORA: 

  Avoiding  administrative  duplication:  Its  goals  were  to  identify  and  eliminate  overlaps  across  the 
administrations  of  the  Spanish  government  and  the  autonomous  communities  (regions),  and  to 
strengthen cooperation mechanisms to bring down the cost of administrative activities, in line with 
the  draft  bill  on  Basic  Regulation  for  Local  Administrations,  which  embraces  amendments  to  the 
powers of local administrations to avoid duplication.  

  Administrative  simplification:  Its  task  was  to  review  bureaucratic  barriers,  eliminate  red  tape  and 
simplify procedures (especially those handled by various administrations) for the benefit of citizens 
and  enterprises.  This  sub-committee  embraced  the  ongoing  work  of  the  Directorate  General  for 
Modernisation of Public Administrations. 

  Management of common services and resources: Its purpose was to centralise the management of 
specific activities that could be unified or coordinated to  bring about a more efficient use of public 
means.  

Institutional  administration:  It  analysed  the  different  types  of  public  entities,  reviewed  their 
regulatory  framework,  and  proposed  changes  and  integrations  to  achieve  a  better  organisational 
model. It will suggest changes in the list of public institutions. 

Many  of  the  proposed  measures  were  agreed  with  the  ACs  in  the  meetings  of  these  sectoral  commissions, 
where coordination between the central and regional administrations was carried out. 

On completion of its work in 2013, CORA published a  comprehensive study with concrete proposals (which 
can be found in English here), which was presented to the Ministry for Finance and Public Administration, and 
in turn submitted it to the Council of Ministers for its consideration. The  Council shared it with two special 
working groups created by the Conference of Autonomous Communities Presidents: 

29 Constitutional Law on Budget Stability and Financial Sustainability (Ley Organica de Estabilidad Presupuestaria y 
Sostenibilidad Financiera) 

Topic 9.2: Potential approaches to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Quality of Public Administration – A Toolbox for Practitioners 

28 

  A  Working  Group  for  Public  Administration  Reform  was  created  under  the  auspices  of  the 
Conference  of  Autonomous  Communities  for  Collaboration  on  Public  Administration  Affaires 
(Confererecia  Sectorial  para Adminsitraciones  Publicas),  to  produce  a  programme  of  administrative 
rationalisation  to  eliminate  bureaucratic  formalities,  simplify  regulation,  administrative  procedures 
and avoid duplicities. 

  The Programme for implementing the Liquidity Fund for Autonomous Communities gave birth to a 
special Working Group on Public Spending, to conceive a code of good practices to rationalise public 
expenditure and save money. 

The CORA analysis led to the recommendation of initially 217 measures, with a maximum timespan of 3 years, 
and  included  proposals  from  both  senior  civil  servants  across  the  administration  and  drawn  from  2  239 
contributions to the citizen’s participation suggestion box. As CORA is a living process, updated on an ongoing 
basis, this has since expanded to 222 measures.  

One  of  the  key  initial  recommendations  was  the  creation  of  a  dedicated  body  to  take  forward  the  reform 
process.  Consequently,  Royal  Decree  479/2013  was  passed  on  21  June  2013 
establishing  the  Office  for  the  Execution  of  the  Reform  of  the  Administration 
(OPERA), with the aim of ensuring the implementation of the measures contained in 
the CORA report, to take forward its promotion, coordination, monitoring, and where 
appropriate,  to  propose  new  actions.  Subsequently,  on  1  August  2014,  the  original 
decree  was  repealed  and  replaced  by  Royal  Decree  671/2014,  which  granted 
permanent status to OPERA and assigned additional functions relating to the Transparency Portal under the 
Ministry  of  the  Presidency,  which  will  facilitate  access  of  citizens  to  all  information  to  which  the  Act  refers 
concerning transparency. OPERA reported to the Under-Secretary of the Government (an administrative level 
between  Secretary  of  State  and  General  Director  in  Spain),  and  was  small  in  staff  but  wide  in  experience, 
pragmatic, cooperative, and open minded. Its mandate centres around cooperation, simplification, innovation 
and ICT (please see theme 5 on service delivery for a complimentary case study on eGovernment).  

Through its  strategic leadership and planning,  the ambition of OPERA  was to achieve  a  range of  outcomes: 
strengthened  public  policy,  improved  public  services,  simplified  procedures,  a  citizen-centric  vision,  more 
efficient use of resources, and environmental care.   

The work to strengthen governance in Spain is a continuous process. In 2015, the Government adopted the 
National Reform Plan, which established the need to promote measures to streamline administrative action, 
improve efficiency in the use of public resources, and increase productivity. The goals are to: 

Improve  administrative  efficiency  through  a  fully  paperless  eGovernment,  interconnected  in  its 
internal and external relations, with interoperable systems between administrations;  

Increase  transparency  in  the  functioning  of  the  public  administrations,  by  adopting  new  public 
records; 

  Streamline  the  administrative  structure  at  State  level,  by  strict  rules  governing  the  establishment, 

evaluation and dissolution of public entities; 

Improve the quality of regulations, by reforming the process of their preparation.   

These goals are linked. The replacement  of  manual and paper-based processes  with electronic processes in 
government  administration  will  generate  electronic  records  as  evidence  in  policy-making,  casework  and 
service delivery area. 

The Plan is being enacted through two legislative acts, processed in parallel: 

  The  Common  Administrative  Procedure  Bill  of  Public  Administrations  regulates  the  external 

relationships of the administration with citizens and businesses;   

Topic 9.2: Potential approaches to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quality of Public Administration – A Toolbox for Practitioners 

29 

  The Bill on Legal Procedure of the Public Sector regulates the organisation and internal relationships 

within each administration and between administrations. 

The  two  draft  bills  have  been  subject  to  widespread  consultation,  centrally,  regionally  and  locally.  This 
included public information, sessions at the Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation and Foundations of the 
legal and administrative fields, and reports from the following authorities: The Autonomous Communities; the 
Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Provinces (FEMP); the General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ); and 
the Personal Data Protection Agency. The process culminated in an Opinion of the State Council. 

The major developments arising from these reforms fall into five categories: 

  For  citizens:  The  changes  will  reduce  administrative  burdens  on  the  public.  Simplification  of  the 
identification and signature means that any citizen can use e-signatures and e-certificates to perform 
administrative procedures electronically, at the time they want. The administration can also alert the 
citizen  via  SMS  to  his/her  mobile  phone  that  a  notification  may  be  consulted  on  its  website.  As  a 
general  rule,  the  submission  of  original  documents  (such  as  income  tax  or  registration  certificates) 
that are already held by the administration will not be required. In addition, citizens will not have to 
submit  photocopies  of  documents  after  electronic  registration,  as  the  administration  shall  prepare 
the  copies  needed.  An  "express"  administrative  procedure  will  be  established  for  cases  of  lesser 
complexity gaining in sharpness and reducing deadlines. For those citizens that are not accustomed 
to  the  use  of  electronic  means,  officials  will  provide  personal  assistance.  Moreover,  an  annual 
regulatory plan will be published with  major reforms to pass in that year, which  will reveal  a priori 
initiatives that affect citizens’ rights and interests, providing greater certainty about changes in the 
regulatory environment. 

  For  businesses:  Companies  and  entrepreneurs  will  be  able  to  communicate  electronically  with  all 
levels  of  government,  as  they  already  do  with  the  Tax  Agency  and  Social  Security  System. 
Administrative  burdens  will  be  simplified  and  reduced  as  with  the  citizen´s  right  not  to  submit 
documents  that  are  already  held  by  the  administration  (i.e.  licenses  or  authorisations  issued). 
Empowerments of representation (power of attorney) shall be granted to individuals and companies 
to  engage  in  electronic  communication  with  the  administration,  and  an  electronic  record  of 
empowerments  which  can  be  consulted.  There  will  also  be  a  move  to  common  commencement 
dates  for  regulations,  so  that  rules  imposing  obligations  on  professionals  and  companies  regarding 
the development of their economic or professional activities must enter into force on the closest of 
January 2 or July 1 following their approval. 

  For greater transparency and improved procedures:  Communications between administrations will 
be entirely electronic in all their procedures. A public consultation will be held prior to the drafting of 
each legislative proposal to seek the views of those who will be affected by the regulation. Ex post 
control will be reinforced by evaluating approved regulations, to verify compliance with its objectives 
and, if that is necessary, make proposals for amendment or repeal. The scope of "the liability of the 
State"  for  any  harm  suffered  by  individuals  in  their  property  and  rights  arising  from  laws  declared 
unconstitutional  or  contrary  to  European  Union  law  will  be  regulated.  It  will  feature  a  unique 
inventory of all public agencies and entities linked or dependent of all administrations. Agencies and 
state  entities,  irrespective  of  their  denomination,  have  added  the  acronym  identifying  their  legal 
nature, for better visibility. There will be a state record with all bodies of cooperation in which the 
State administration takes part as well as the agreements it has signed with third parties. Sectorial 
Conferences  (between  the  State  and  the  Autonomous  Regions)  will  be  informed  when  draft 
legislation affecting the competences of other authorities is involved.   

  For  greater  control,  discipline  and  fiscal  consolidation:  The  institutional  architecture  has  been 
streamlined  to  rationalise  all  types  of  organisations  and  public  bodies  that  exist  at  the  state  level 
based  on  simplicity.  A  complete  and  sharper  system  of  transformations,  mergers,  dissolution, 
liquidation and abolition of state entities and public bodies has been established. New grounds for 
dissolution  of  entities  are  being  fixed,  such  as  unfitness  to  serve  the  purpose  for  which  they  were 
created.  A  system  of  continuous  monitoring  of  state  agencies  is  established  to  periodically  assess 

Topic 9.2: Potential approaches to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quality of Public Administration – A Toolbox for Practitioners 

30 

compliance  with  the  plan  of  action  and  an  effectiveness  to  assess  the  achievement  of  objectives 
entrusted. It shall be more demanding of the creation of any state agency as it will require an initial 
plan  of  action  and  a  mandatory  report  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Public  Administration  to 
prevent  unjustified  proliferation,  to  ensure  the  sustainability  of  the  new  entity  and  the  absence  of 
duplication  with  the  existing  ones.  The  minimum  content  of  the  agreements  between 
administrations is now clearer, following criteria from the Court of Auditors. 

  For better performance, cooperation and coordination between administrations: For the first time, 
the  law  will  regulate  the  basic  elements  of  the  composition  and  operation  of  the  Conference  of 
Presidents  (President  of  the  Government  and  regional  Presidents  and  of  the  autonomous  cities  of 
Ceuta  and  Melilla).  It  regulates  more  precisely  sectorial  conferences  as  organs  of  cooperation 
between  the  State  and  the  Autonomous  Regions  and  mechanisms  to  preventing  overlapping 
activities.  The  procedures  of  the  General  State  Administration  are  also  improved:  Members  of  the 
Government, Secretaries of State, Undersecretaries, General Secretaries, Government delegates and 
General Directors must meet the eligibility requirements under the regulations of the senior officials 
of the General State Administration, and he duties of the government support bodies are specified 
and completed. 

The OECD was invited to perform a Public Governance Review of the Spanish reforms in 2014, assessing the 
CORA agenda against good practices in OECD countries.30  This looked specifically at different fields, namely: 
public finance, the management of ICTs, multi-level governance, transparency, better regulation, and human 
resources management. The review presented a series of specific recommendations within the frame of the 
following conclusion: 

“The  CORA  reform  package  is  the  result  of  a  rigorous  process  of  data  collection,  dialogue  among 
practitioners  and  diagnosis  about  the  weaknesses  of  Spain’s  public  administrations.  The  reform 
package  is  substantial,  evidence-based  and  consistent  with  the  ongoing  process  of  modernisation. 
The number of policy issues included in the CORA reform, together with parallel initiatives in areas such 
as  budget  stability,  transparency  or  democratic  regeneration,  talk  about  one  of  the  most  ambitious 
processes  of  governance  reform  in  OECD  countries.  Indeed,  Spain  is  not  the  only  OECD  country  in 
search  of  new  sources  of  growth,  fiscal  consolidation  and  competitiveness,  but  few  countries  have 
articulated such a broad public administration reform plan. Indeed, the CORA reform agenda aims at 
serving  as  a  means  to  achieve  long-term  results  for  the  country  based  on  a  strategic  vision  for  its 
growth, including a framework for the role of government in implementing it and going further than 
short-term  ends  (i.e.  cost-savings,  downsizing).  The  review  indicates  that,  despite  the  richness  of  the 
reform agenda, the CORA could be strengthened through a whole-of-government approach that gets 
away  from  the  silos  structure  usually  privileged  by  governments.  Furthermore,  it  recommends  the 
Spanish government to persevere in its continuous efforts to consult and establish a genuine dialogue 
with  civil  society,  as  a  way  to  mitigate  side  impacts  of  reforms  and  achieve  buy  in  from  critical 
stakeholders, such as the ACs.”  

The OECD subsequently returned and prepared a further Progress Report in May 2016, which observed that 
76% of the CORA measures had been fully implemented by the end of July 2015, leading to accumulated total 
savings  of  €21.8  billion  according  to  reports  on  the  transparency  portal  (mainly  in  Spanish).  The  OECD 
highlighted the role of OPERA as “worthy of special mention and could be retained as an OECD best practice 
when it comes to the follow up and monitoring of horizontal policy assessment.”. The OECD also proposed:  

“Several strategic actions could reinforce the  sustainability of the reform effort in the long term: the 
setting  out  of  a  long-term  vision  for  the  Spanish  public  sector;  the  introduction  of  mechanisms  for 
adjusting the reform measures during their implementation; and the role of the civil service in ensuring 
continuous  improvement”.  Furthermore,  “As  a  new  legislature  starts,  efforts  must  focus  on  the 
implementation  of  the  remaining  reforms.  The  CORA  reform  has  been  a  driving  force  that  has  also 
inspired and fuelled reforms  at  the regional and local level. Autonomous communities contributed to 
the  implementation  of  the  CORA’s  measures  and  have  made  major  efforts  in  streamlining  and 

30 OECD (2014), Spain: From Administrative Reform to Continuous Improvement, GOV/PGC(2014)4/ANN1 

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rationalising  their  activities.  The  economic  crisis  has  also  revealed  regional  disparities  and  differing 
approaches  to  the  same  problems.  Spain  will  have  to  continue  to  improve  its  co-ordination 
mechanisms to make the most of its decentralised model and deliver better services to citizens”. 

A  key  point  to  highlight  is  that  there  was  no  special  budget  designated  for  the  work  of  CORA  and  its  Sub-
Committees, or for the functioning of the office created to implement the measures. All work has been done 
without cost or using the regular budget of the ministries. The main overall results over the period 2012-2016 
must be seen in this light:  

  Achieving total savings of more than €30 billion in three years;  
  Reducing  the  number  of  public  bodies  at  all  levels  of  administration  by  2,364  (returning  to  2002 

levels) with savings of €4.6 billion;  

  Maintaining  the  quality  of  public  services  while  reducing  the  number  of  public  employees  by 

 

130,000;  
Implementing the Transparency Law and the  Transparency Portal containing more than 1.5 million 
records of information; 

  Creating 28 Internet sites to provide information or direct processing with businesses and citizens;  
  Reducing processing times, with huge increases in electronic channel use, etc.;  
  Achieving a reduction in administrative burdens on citizens and businesses worth € 5 billion 

The election of a new national government in 2016 has led to the role of OPERA being taken over by a new 
General Directorate of Public Governance – but most importantly, the work and momentum continues.  

The CORA reforms and resulting developments, which are only partially completed and ongoing, already lead 
to several learning points from the implementation process, as follows: 

1.  Cooperation  is  an  obligation,  especially  in  countries  with  a  highly  decentralised  administrative 
organisation.  Cooperation  among  public  administrations  is  the  only  way  to  provide  joined-up 
services to citizens and enterprises. Systems need to be coordinated, common where possible, and 
interoperable. 

2.  Prioritisation  is  important  with  wide-ranging  reforms.  CORA  defined  222  measures,  so  it  was 
necessary to prioritise the implementation of some measures according to some key indicators, such 
as internal savings, administrative burden reductions, social impact, etc. 

3. 

Involve  citizens  in  the  reform  process  to  regain  trust.  It  was  clear  that  citizens’  trust  was  in  a 
downward trend. Communication policy is required to demonstrate reforms have not a rhetoric basis 
but  it is a  requirement  to generate social benefits. ICT-enabled channels have an important  role in 
the implementation of this policy.  

4.  Engage  public  employees  in  reforms  to  accelerate  the  implementation  of  measures.  Public 
employees must have continuous information about the final objectives of every measure proposed 
and the progress being made in the reform process. 

5.  Develop  and  reinforce  multi-level  dialogue,  co-operation  and  commitment  between  sub-national 
and national governments.  Since the ACs are the main stakeholders of reform in Spain, and the key 
actors  to  ensure  its  effective  implementation  (for  example,  embedding  transparency  as  a  basic 
principle of public administrations) multi-level dialogue should be continuously strengthened. 

Ultimately, the most  important  message is: be ambitious, but  use common sense. The  goal is  not to simply 
look good in a report. Have the will to do concrete things, be pragmatic about the process, and don’t look 
for perfection, but for continuous improvements. 

For further information: Fernando de Pablo Martín, Office for the Execution of the Reform of the 
Administration (2013-2016), fernando.depablo@segittur.es    

Topic 9.2: Potential approaches to reform 

 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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32 

9.2.3  Incremental change  

‘Big  bang’  reforms  tend  to  be  the  exception, 
rather  than  the  rule.31  Much  more  typical  are 
smaller-scale  initiatives,  some  of  which  have 
been  highlighted 
inspiring  examples 
as 
elsewhere in the Toolbox, such as: 

Functional reviews 

Comprehensive 'root and branch' reforms 

Incremental change 

  The  merger  of  two  county  authorities  in  Ireland  (North  and  South  Tipperary  Councils), 
within  a  tight  timeframe,  while  maintaining  delivery  of  services  and  maximising  resource 
deployment and savings, and involving extensive communication with affected parties (see 
topic 3.2.2 on reorganisation and regionalisation); 

  The execution of the ‘Room for the River’ programme of flood defences in the Netherlands, 
which  exemplifies  an  inclusive,  rigorous  planning  and  decision-making  process,  involving 
coordination  and  cooperation  across  all  administrative  boundaries  -  local,  provincial, 
national  and  international  -  as  well  as  with  local  citizens  and  enterprises  (see  topic  3.2.3 
within reconfiguring government); 

  The  transformation  of  the  working  culture  in  Belgium’s  Federal  Office  (FOD)  of  Social 
Security, by empowering the workforce, which inter alia has lifted the FOD’s status of least 
attractive  employer  in  the  Belgian  public  sector  to  the  most  attractive  (see  topic  4.3  on 
managing, motivating and developing staff); 

  The introduction of peer learning networks and mentoring into Belgium’s Federal Ministry 
of  Finance,  and  the  ‘Change  Makers  Network’  across  the  public  administration  in  Finland, 
both of which make the concept of knowledge management a reality (also topic 4.3); 

  The  application  of  behavioural  sciences  in  policy-making  in  France,  which  is  helping  to 
protect consumers, improve road safety, and increase online tax declaration and payment, 
inter alia (see topic 1.2.2 on applying behavioural insights); 

  The  creation  and  expansion  of  a  shared  services  centre  in  Estonia,  which  has  not  only 
delivered  efficiency  savings,  but  also  developed  a  customer-centred  model  for  internal 
clients across the administration (see topic 5.6.3). 

There  is  a  case  for  permanent  evolution  in  public  administration  reform,  which  can  be  more 
effective in the long run. As the OECD has observed: “An incremental approach, with provision for 
feedback and adjustment along the way, may reduce uncertainty and thus opposition”. This process 
of  continual  change  tallies  with  the  concept  of  ‘obliquity’  (see  topic  4.1  on  results-based 
management),  which  recognises  that  goals  are  often  achieved  indirectly,  not  as  intended.  Senior 
public servants, either elected or appointed, set out the reform objectives as the overall direction of 

31 As Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) put it: “Reformers try to improve an institution or a programme, or sometimes a whole 
sector (health, education), but they seldom attempt to remodel the entire sweep of public sector institutions in one go”. 

Topic 9.2: Potential approaches to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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33 

travel,  the  administration  makes  steps  towards  the  desired  destination,  and  takes  the  most 
appropriate paths on the way, learning from experience: there is no precise road map to the future.  

The experience from OECD member countries is that administrative reform “is successful when it is 
not perceived as a one-off exercise, but rather as a process of continuous improvement to constantly 
identify  waste,  shortcomings  and  opportunities  to  do  things  better  …  international  experiences 
suggest  that  political  support  weakens  with  time,  calling  for  a  concentration  of  resources  and 
political leadership. Prioritisation is also due to make the best use of political, financial and human 
resources  and  to  concentrate  them  on  those  reforms  that  deliver  the  best  cost-benefit  balance”, 
OECD, 2014 Spain Public Governance Review32  

As  the  above  examples  demonstrate,  reform  can  take  many  forms.  It  can  also  happen  at  varying 
speeds,  including  too  quick  and  too  slow.  Public  administrations  can  be  sluggish  in  adapting  to 
society’s changing expectations (such as retaining paper-based systems and long queues at counters, 
requiring repeat evidence of basic personal information), or can rush headlong into radical changes 
without  fully  reflecting  on  the  ramifications  (such  as  across-the-boards  cuts  in  staff,  or  abolishing 
whole tiers of sub-national government). Sometimes, reform is driven solely by electoral timetables 
and political appointments. For example, an incoming government, minister or mayor looks to put 
their stamp on the administration by cancelling the established modus operandi and replacing them 
with  new  ones.  There  is  always  the  risk  of  reform  for  reform’s  sake.  Equally,  some  reforms  are 
rhetorical only, announcements that never become reality. 

In  principle,  the  interaction  of  ‘politician  –  public  administration  –  civil  society’  in  a  thriving 
democracy should act as a safety-check on change, accelerating the slow march of progress when 
required, while acting as a brake against overly aggressive and inappropriate reform.  

In practice, this safeguard relies on all three parties being fully capable of playing their parts: 

  Politicians need to be focused on policy decisions and strategy, rather than the minutiae of 
daily  operations,  and  fully  appraised  of  what  options  are  available,  which  requires  robust 
advice from their officials.  

  Within  administrations,  senior  and  middle-ranking  officers  need  the  knowledge  and 
expertise to implement the politician’s instructions, but also sufficient independence to feel 
able to offer impartial advice.  

  The public need to be able to articulate their interests, access the channels to their elected 
representatives  to  enable  them  to  express  their  expectations,  and  trust  that  elected  and 
appointed public servants will act in the public interest. 

What is clear is that context is critical: each country’s legal tradition, administrative structures and 
system and its cultural traits contribute significantly to both the instigation and impact of reforms. 
For  example,  abolishing  the  ‘civil  service’  status  of  a  job  for  life  could  have  two  contrasting 

32 OECD Public Governance Reviews (2014), Spain: From Administrative Reform to Continuous Improvement, GOV/PGC 
(2014)4/ANN1 

Topic 9.2: Potential approaches to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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34 

outcomes, according to circumstances: it might liberate the administration to bring in new, talented 
staff  at  a  senior  level,  with  diverse  life  experience  and  fresh  perspectives;  or  it  might  trigger 
instability  by  removing  job  security,  and  encourage  favouritism  with  party-political  appointments 
and nepotism in recruitment and promotion.   

The extent to which civil society engages with politicians and public administrations is influenced by 
cultural dimensions, which were famously captured in the Hofstede model, which assesses country 
characteristics using six indices: 

Index 
Power distance 

Individualism vs. 
collectivism 

Uncertainty 
avoidance 

Masculinity vs. 
femininity 

Long-term vs. short-
term orientation 

Indulgence vs. 
restraint 

Explanation 
The extent to which the less powerful members of society and institutions accept and 
expect that power is  distributed unequally. A higher  score  indicates that hierarchy is 
clearly established and executed in society (e.g. France), while a  lower score signifies 
that people question authority and attempt to distribute power (e.g. Finland) 
The degree to which people in a society are integrated into groups, and whether they 
are ‘individualist’ with loose ties (e.g. the Netherlands) or ‘collectivist’ with tightly-knit 
communities that expect loyalty (e.g. Portugal)  
The extent to which society tolerates ambiguity - something unexpected, unknown, or 
away  from  the  status  quo  (e.g.  Greece)  or  opts  for  laws,  guidelines  and  codes  of 
behaviour  (e.g.  Belgium),  which  can  also  be  seen  as  a  measure  of  risk-taking  or  risk-
aversion 
In which ‘masculinity’ is defined as a preference in society for achievement, heroism, 
assertiveness  and  material  rewards  for  success  (e.g.  Hungary),  and  ‘femininity’,  as  a 
preference  for  cooperation,  modesty,  caring  for  the  weak  and  quality  of  life  (e.g. 
Sweden). 
In  which  ‘short-term’  is  expressed  in  terms  of  traditions  being  honoured  and 
steadfastness (e.g. Germany), and ‘long-term’ is reflected in adaptation and pragmatic 
problem-solving being perceived as necessary (e.g. Denmark) 
In which ‘indulgence’ is defined as a society that allows relatively free gratification of 
basic and natural human desires related to enjoying life and having fun (e.g. Sweden), 
and ‘restraint’ is defined as a society that controls gratification of needs and regulates 
it by means of strict social norms (e.g. Bulgaria). 

These  cultural traits indicate  the  extent  to which citizens  tend  to accept  or reject the authority of 
politicians  and  trust  public  administrations,  and  respond  to  the  reform  instruments  they  use  (e.g. 
laws  and  regulations,  outsourcing,  etc.).  It  also  signals  the  extent  to  which  they  expect  to  be 
consulted in decision-making or even to co-create their solutions, and their willingness to lobby for 
change.  While  cultures  can  evolve  over  time,  these tendencies  are  useful  guides  to  the  extent  to 
which reform will be encouraged and embedded, and an indicator of the most fruitful approaches.  

Topic 9.2: Potential approaches to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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35 

9.3  Possible paths to reform 

Changing mindsets 

The Kotter 8-step model 

Learning points from past reforms 

Public  administration  reform  can  take  many 
forms.  It can  seek to  improve  rules,  routines, 
procedures,  processes,  people  and  practices. 
It can aim  to influence  policies and priorities. 
It  can  look  to  shift  mindsets,  shape  attitudes 
and  steer  behaviour.  More  fundamentally,  it 
can define or refine values. It can aspire to alter the administrative culture. Depending on the goal, 
reform  can  aim  to  achieve  any,  or  all,  of  these  changes.  What  is  clear,  and  commands  a  broad 
consensus, is that there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution to reform, no silver bullet,  no magic wand. 
Experience  shows  that  public  administration  reform  is  a  ‘black  box’  that  contains  many  different 
actions, motivations and results. There is not just one entry point to public administration reform, 
there are many. The question is: what suits the situation? Across the EU, there is a wide diversity of 
legal  traditions,  administrative  systems  and  cultural  climates,  which  have  a  huge  influence  on  the 
chances of success. This topic sets out some of the ways forward, based on accumulated knowledge.  

9.3.1  The Kotter model for sustainable organisational change 

Reform can happen at all levels, the lowest one 
being  individual  organisations.  Professor  John 
Kotter  of  Harvard  Business  School  proposed  an 
eight-step  model  for  lasting  change,  based  on 
reviewing  experience  from  the  private  sector, 
described and presented graphically below.33  

The Kotter 8-step model 

Changing mindsets 

Learning points from past reforms 

33 From materials prepared by Sylvia Archmann (then Seconded National Expert to EIPA) and Jens Qvesel, (Senior Advisor in 
the Management Secretariat, Danish Regions) for the EIPA seminar ‘Managing Change in Public Administration’, which ran 
regularly from 2006 to 2013. 

Topic 9.3: Possible paths to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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Kotter  stressed  that  the  most  successful  cases  progress  through  all  eight  steps,  which  can  take 
considerable time, but that “skipping steps creates only the illusion of speed and never produces a 
satisfying result”. Moreover,  critical mistakes in any phase  can have  a “devastating effect,  slowing 
momentum  and  negating  hard-won  gains”.34  Each  step  is  elaborated  below,  and  placed  in  the 
context of public administration reform.35 

Step 1: Establish a sense of urgency 

The  argument  is that  complacency  is  the enemy of change,  whereas  urgency stimulates  efforts  to 
reform.  

  This  urgency  can  come  from  within  –  from  an  analysis  of  the  situation  facing  the 
administration,  by  drawing  on  available  data  and  analysing  the  evidence.  In  the  words  of 
Kotter, change is sparked when someone (either an individual or group) “facilitates a frank 
discussion of potentially unpleasant  facts”. In the  business  world, this would be  the threat 
from  a  new  competitor,  shrinking  margins,  falling  sales  or  market  share,  etc.  In  public 
administration,  such  existential  metrics  are  less  readily  available.  Performance  can  be 
assessed  in  other  ways,  and  is  ultimately  about  societal  outcomes  (see  topic  4.1),  but 
intermediate measures to desired outcomes can stimulate debate, such as user feedback on 
service delivery, analysis of administrative burdens, reported corruption, etc.  

  Due to the tendency to ‘shoot the messenger’, it is often easier for the  ‘bearer of negative 
news’  to  come  from  outside,  whether  media,  civil  society  organisations,  think  tanks, 
international  comparators,  new  political  leadership  /  change  in  government  (without  the 
predecessor’s baggage) or crisis.  

Whether internal or external, the aim should be to take decision-makers (top public servants) out of 
their ‘comfort zones’, widen their horizons, especially if they are too focused on narrow goals, and 
encourage them to face the reality of their operating environment.  

At  this  point,  administrations  need  leaders  (to  drive  change  and  overcome  indifference)  -  not 
managers  (to  mitigate  risk)  -  who  should  be  wary  of  becoming  paralysed  by  downsides,  such  as 
concern  about  falling  morale,  attracting  blame  for  the  crisis,  the  plan  for  change  spinning  out  of 
control, etc. Leaders, potentially at various levels, will need to overcome both fear and indifference, 
and speak honestly about what is and is not possible. The status quo should feel riskier than reform. 

34 J. P. Kotter (1995), Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail, Harvard Business Review, March - April 1995 
35 In their article, Managing Successful Organisational Change in the Public Sector: An Agenda for Research and Practice, 
Public Administration Review, 66/2, Sergio Fernandez and Hal G. Rainey set out an alternative but similar perspective with 
many shared elements, based on 8 factors: ensure the need; provide a plan; build internal support and overcome 
resistance; ensure top management support and commitment; build external support; provide resources; institutionalise 
change; and pursue comprehensive change. 

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37 

Step 2: Form a coalition for change 

To avoid key decision-makers becoming isolated, it is important that they are supported by a strong 
team  that  can  guide  them.  In  the  business  world,  this  would  be  drawn  from  top  executives,  plus 
managers  in  the  relevant  units  (production,  sales,  procurement,  accounting,  etc.).  In  public 
administrations,  this  team  should  also  involve  the  most  appropriate  mix  of  skills  and  knowledges, 
but  this  internal  competence  could  be  supplemented  (where  suitable)  by  a  wider  coalition  of 
interests  from  civil  society,  service  users  and  other  stakeholders.  This  support  team  can  feed  in 
information and insights, spread the message, keep the momentum, and in some cases (the wider 
coalition) ‘hold the feet to the fire’ to ensure that reform is carried through.   

In Kotter’s words: “Efforts that don’t have a powerful enough guiding coalition can make apparent 
progress  for  a  while.  But  sooner  or  later,  the  opposition  gathers  itself  together  and  stops  the 
change”.  

Concerning  composition,  the  team  should  be  credible  and  reputable,  bring  the  right  blend  of 
expertise and experience for the subject of change, and their collective contribution should produce 
synergies.  The  risks  of  ‘group-think’  (see  topic  1.2.2  on  behavioural  insights)  can  be  mitigated  by 
assembling contrasting personalities, to avoid the phenomenon of everybody thinking the same way 
that  results  in  nobody  thinking  at  all.  To  reduce  potential  conflicts  and  clashes,  it  is  necessary  to 
generate  enthusiasm,  commitment  and  trust.  Leaders  will  need  to  coordinate  and  moderate,  be 
mindful of power struggles, and use structured discussions and dialogue to build a team ethic.  This 
might  necessitate  off-site  retreats,  or  other  techniques  to  create  space  and  time  away  from  daily 
pressures.  To  keep  the  impetus  going,  leaders  will  need  to  feedback  regularly  on  progress  to  the 
group and presents results as they occur. 

Step 3: Develop a vision 

Without a compelling vision, it is hard to achieve transformation. The guiding team should develop a 
bold  and  optimistic  picture  of  the  future  –  the  destination  that  the  administration  is  seeking  to 
reach. The vision is about direction (not budgets and targets), should be easy to communicate, and 
appeal  widely  to  staff  and  stakeholders.  This  emerges  from  addressing  questions  such  as:  What 
change is needed? What needs to be altered? The initial outline of the vision may be blurry, and may 
need time  and several iterations to sharpen the  focus, before it reaches its final form that  can be 
signed off. This will involve “tough analytical thinking and a little dreaming”, in Kotter’s words.  

If  the  administration  lacks  a  reforming  vision,  and  relies  instead  on  procedures,  instructions  and 
directives  to  instigate  change,  the  impetus  is  likely  to  peter  out  in  the  face  of  interpretation  and 
confusion.  A  vision  for  the  change  process  sets  out  the  desired  state,  contains  ambitious  but 
achievable  goals,  can  be  readily  shared,  motivates  employees  to  take  initiative,  and  helps  to 
coordinate  their  actions.  What  is  needed  is  a  clear  and  compelling  statement,  that  is  not  over-
complicated. In Kotter’s words: “As a useful rule of thumb, if you cannot communicate the vision to 
someone in five minutes or less, and get  a reaction that  signifies  both understanding and  interest, 
you are not get done with this phase of the transformation process”.  

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38 

This is also the phase in which to develop strategies to achieve the vision. What is the best way to 
make  it  a  reality?  Which  change  strategies  are  realistic  and  which  are  unacceptably  risky?  The 
approach to this step should be thorough, even if it takes time.   

Step 4: Communicate the vision to get buy-in 

Having envisaged the future and translated it into a strategy, the next step is sharing it widely across 
the  administration.  It  is  essential  not  to  underestimate  the  importance  of  communication.  Putting 
the  vision  and  strategy  into  practice  will  require  the  active  participation  of  many  public  servants, 
potentially hundreds or thousands. They must feel a sense of ownership and inclusion, especially if 
the  vision  has  some  elements  that  affect,  for  example,  jobs  or  roles.  “Employees  will  not  make 
sacrifices,  even  if  they  are  unhappy  with  the  status  quo,  unless  they  think  that  useful  change  is 
possible”.  

Many forums can be utilised to create a debate about the vision, including online media. The main 
messages merit repeating. Mistakes are made when communication is one-way and left to a single 
mass  meeting,  or  one  staff  memo.  All  available  channels  should  be  used  creatively,  with 
straightforward and jargon-free language, stories, metaphors and examples where helpful.  

Even if the campaign involves multiple speeches, newsletters, message boards and blogs, time will 
also need to be invested in conveying messages directly to staff.  The coalition will need particularly 
to  address  head-on  any  scepticism  or  obstructive  behaviour,  especially  if  it  involves  management 
themselves. Employees will need to feel that any downsides will be approached equitably and staff 
treated fairly. If senior executives are found to be pursuing exceptions to the vision, the reasons why 
should be explained to staff to avoid cynicism setting in. 

To be most successful, communication should be integrated into daily operations, so that putting the 
vision  into  practice  is  the  topic  of  one-to-one  discussions  with  supervisors,  team  meetings, 
performance  appraisals,  training  workshops,  mentoring  and  coaching,  learning  networks  etc.  (see 
topic 4.3  on  human  resources  management).  When managers start  to  ‘walk  the  talk’  and  become 
living  embodiments  of  the  change  being  sought,  they  become  examples  to  other  employees.  As 
Kotter points out: “Communication comes in both words and deeds, and the latter are often the most 
powerful  form.  Nothing  undermines  change  more  than  behaviour  by  important  individuals  that  is 
inconsistent with their words.” 

Step 5: Empower action to realise the vision 

Once the vision is agreed and shared, increasing numbers of people should become involved in the 
process  of  transformation  as  it  rolls  out.  At  this  stage,  employees  should  be  encouraged  to  show 
initiative and to innovate, subject to staying within the parameters of the vision itself.  

This  will  necessitate  more  than  just  energising  the  staff,  it  also  means  removing  barriers.  These 
might  include,  for  example,  over-cautious  mindsets,  rigid  organisational  structures,  officious 
procedures,  narrow  job  classifications,  de-motivating  HRM  practices,  insufficient  training  or 
inadequate information systems.  

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39 

Worst  of  all,  in  Kotter’s  perspective,  are  bosses  who  block  change  through  their  behaviour,  only 
paying  ‘lip  service’  to  the  process.  Employees  are  less  likely  to  engage  if  their  immediate  line 
managers are disparaging or dismissive about the proposed reform, whether explicitly or implicitly, 
and  hence  shut  down  the  efforts  of  their  subordinates.  This  can  happen  when  managers  are 
unconvinced by the initiative or feel threatened by it. Either way, it needs to be confronted before it 
becomes fatal to the reform and to maintain the credibility of the change process.  

Step 6: Plan for short-term wins 

As  Kotter  puts  it:  “Real  transformation  takes  time  and  a  renewal  effort  risks  losing  momentum  if 
there  are  no  short-term  goals  to meet  and  celebrate”.  To maintain  the  urgency,  management  and 
staff  need  to  see  the  benefits  of  change  emerging  in  a  relatively  short  timescale,  so  ‘early  wins’ 
should be planned by the guiding team.  People should start to see visible results within 1-2 years (or 
sooner,  ideally  6  months),  depending  on  the  size  and  the  complexity  of  the  change  process.  This 
feedback  would  encourage  change  leaders  that  the  vision  is  valid  and  the  strategy  is  on  the  right 
track, and send a signal to employees - whether supporters or opponents of the reforms – as well as 
other stakeholders. 

This  requires  conscious  effort  –  an  active  plan,  not  a  passive  expectation.  In  other  words,  the 
strategy  to  realise  the  vision  (step  3)  should  incorporate  short-term  actions  that  aim  to  secure 
‘scheduled’  successes,  subject  to  the  inevitable  uncertainties  of  the  environment  in  which  public 
administrations  operate.  These  achievements  should  be  heavily  promoted  as  part  of  the 
communication  campaign.  It  also  helps  to  recognises  those  employees  who  contributed  to  the 
success, to encourage the others. 

Step 7: Don't let up 

With the quick wins, it is important to celebrate success, but not to declare ‘victory’ too early, before 
the reforms have fully taken root in the administrative culture. In the business world, Kotter assesses 
that  this  can  take  five  to  ten  years.  During  this  time,  new  ways  can  be  fragile,  ‘traditional’ 
perspectives can too easily take over again, and progress can be potentially reversed. 

Kotter uses a military metaphor: “Ironically, it is often a combination of change initiators and change 
resistors  that  creates  the  premature  victory  celebration.  In  their  enthusiasm  over  a  clear  sign  of 
progress,  the  initiators  go overboard.  They  are then  joined  by  resistors,  who  are  quick  to  spot  any 
opportunity to stop change. After the celebration is over, the resistors point to the victory as a sign 
that the war has been won and the troops should be sent home. Weary troops allow themselves to 
be convinced that they won. Once home, the foot soldiers are reluctant to climb back on the ships. 
Soon thereafter, change comes to a halt, and tradition creeps back in.” 

He proposes an alternative way: use the credibility of early wins to address even bigger problems. 
Short  term  successes  provide  the  cover  to  take  stock,  consolidate,  eliminate  unnecessary  systems 
and structures, remove demoralising activities, and keep the momentum going. 

Topic 9.3: Possible paths to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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40 

Step 8: Anchoring change 

The final phase is to achieve cultural change, so that the reform is embedded in shared values and, 
in  Kotter’s  phrase:  “the  way  we  do  things  around  here”.  To  institutionalise  the  change,  Kotter 
identifies two factors:  

  Make a conscious effort to show  staff that the  approaches, behaviours and attitudes  have 
helped improve performance. Don’t leave them on their own to  make the connections, as 
people can sometimes look for links in the actions of individual charismatic leaders, rather 
than seeing a systemic change. Again, this requires effective communication.  

  Taking enough time to ensure that the next generation of top management personifies the 

change, otherwise the risk remains of regressing to past practices. 

Values and habits (patterns of behaviour) tend to be deeply ingrained in people, so are likely to be 
the last thing to change. Nevertheless, it is important that the changes are anchored in the culture, 
which might involve changes in personnel, if individuals find they cannot adapt. 

The comprehensive CHANGE2 reform project in the German city of Mannheim is a prime example of 
an  inclusive  initiative,  with  strong  employee  participation,  which  illustrates  many  aspects  of  the 
Kotter model in operation. An impending fiscal crisis was the trigger for looking anew at the ways in 
which  the  city  authority  managed  its  resources,  with  the  mayor  setting  out  a  vision  of 
transformation  based  on  seven  strategic  objectives,  opening  dialogue  with  employees  and 
emphasising two-way communication, achieving a culture shift towards working together, breaking 
down  internal  administrative  silos,  and  developing  a partnership  with  the  participation of citizens, 
businesses and universities. The initial 5-year transformative phase has now migrated to a further 5-
year consolidation phase.   

Inspiring example: CHANGE² in the City of Mannheim - achieving more together (Germany) 

Since  2008, the  City of Mannheim  has  embarked on a  comprehensive and  multi-dimensional reform project 
under the name of CHANGE², to make it one of the most modern administrations in Germany. Initiated by the 
mayor, Dr. Peter Kurz, the aim was to improve the delivery of public services and to develop a better model for 
shaping the city by improving democracy in the City Council, promoting participatory approaches with citizens, 
and  developing  the  city  in  partnership  with  universities  and  businesses.  The  intention  was  to  achieve 
outcomes-oriented  management,  while  also  ensuring  sustainable  finances  through  fiscal  management  and 
strategy-based budgeting. (The effect of the global financial and economic crisis left Mannheim facing a budget 
shortfall of €350 million in fiscal years 2010-2013). CHANGE² pursues a holistic, strategic approach.  The first 
phase lasted from 2008 to 2013, and has since moved to a consolidation phase, which is again scheduled for 
five years to 2019. 

Phase I (2008 - 2013)  

In the first phase, the master plan ‘Modernization of the City of Mannheim 2008-2013’ was adopted, which set 
out the following seven objectives: 

  A model citizen-friendly and business-oriented city administration; 

Increased quality and effectiveness of management; 
Improved visibility and enhanced transparency; 

Topic 9.3: Possible paths to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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41 

Introduction of flexible, goal-oriented management of the administration; 

  Decentralisation of technical and resource responsibility; 
  Consideration  of  the  needs  of  the  staff  (higher  employee  satisfaction,  modern  management 

structures, and strengthening the motivation of employees); 

  Consideration of the principles of economics. 

To  achieve  these  strategic  objectives,  the  master  plan  contained  36  projects.  These  covered  many  topics, 
including  inter  alia  strategic  management,  inter-municipal  cooperation,  a  new  approach  to  economic 
development  (cluster  formation,  labour  markets  for  qualified  workers,  science  partnerships  with  the  private 
sector,  etc),  implementing  the  EU  Services  Directive,  the  city’s  work  in  neighbourhoods  and  communities, 
citizens’  services,  citizens’  participation,  housing  and  urban  renewal,  real  estate  management,  applying  for 
European  Capital  of  Culture  status,  public  procurement,  IT  re-orientation  and  optimisation,  quality 
management, diversity management, personnel management and financial management.  

At  the  same  time,  operational  objectives  were  set  for  all  administrative  and  service  units  of  the  city, 
introducing a new culture of results. The 2010-11 budget framework followed the prioritisation of the seven 
strategic  objectives.  A  new  ‘traffic  light’  budget  monitoring  tool  was  put  into  place,  covering  approximately 
€36 million in projected revenue increases and savings.  For the first  time, the 2012-13 budget  was explicitly 
based on strategic and operational objectives. 

Most  master  plan  projects  were  inter-linked,  cross-departmental  and/or  involved  external  partners.  In  this 
context, cooperation between administrative units is essential (breaking the silos). Hence, the second strand of 
the modernisation initiative was equally important. The City Administration looked to pursue  a  fundamental 
cultural  change,  captured  in  the  motto  “achieving  more  together”  (Gemeinsam  mehr  bewirken).  These  two 
strands  –  results-orientation  (“achieving”)  and  cooperation  (“together”)  -  underlie  all  aspects  of  the  reform 
process. The intention was to shift employees’ mindsets away from focusing only narrowly on the problem at 
hand,  and  to  raise  sights  to  the  strategic  goals  of  the  entire  city  administration.  Everything  being  tackled 
should be viewed in terms of its impact, not merely as a process or continuous task.  

This created a challenge for leadership and communication. The main instruments for this culture change were 
direct discussion, involving new dialogue formats between managers and employees:  

  The  mayor  introduced  leadership  circles  for  regular  direct  exchanges  with  executives  on  the 

modernisation process, as well as current management themes; 

In the so-called extended management group, executives are integrated into the process right down 
to the level of department heads. 

  The mayor also  met a randomly-selected group of employees every quarter for an open discussion 
about the objectives and background of CHANGE², and to exchange ideas about the process and their 
experiences. 

  Strategic and operational  objectives  were presented and discussed with  all  City employees in more 

than 45 events.  

However, centralised direct communication is not practicable with every one of around 7,000 employees. By 
means  of  indirect  communication,  however,  regular  surveys  are  effective  instruments  to  reach  the  entire 
workforce,  to  involve  them  in  the  process  and  obtain  feedback.  Within  the  scope  of  CHANGE²,  two 
questionnaires  were  introduced,  both  in  collaboration  with  the  University  of  Mannheim  and  in  close 
consultation with the staff council:  

  An  employee  survey  based  on  100  questions  about  the  change  process,  divided  into  various 
categories such as information, expectation and benefits, objective clarity, participation in the process 
of  change,  management  and  management,  or  implementation  of  the  process.  Four  surveys  were 
conducted,  each  with  an  interval  of  approximately  one  and  a  half  years,  which  provided  valuable 
information and insights for the modernisation process (November / December 2008, February 2010, 
November / December 2011, and June / July 2013);  

Topic 9.3: Possible paths to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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42 

In  contrast  to  the  broad-based  employee  survey,  the  KliMA-Check  is  a  brief  "pulse  survey".  It 
measures at regular intervals (approximately every 4 months) the extent to which the guidelines for 
leadership, communication and cooperation play a role in everyday life.  

A  guarantee  of  no  compulsory  redundancies  for  the  life  of  the  budget  cycle  was  given  to  secure  employee 
engagement in return for acceptance of flexibility in tasks, processes and location of employment. The process 
was driven by a central steering unit of 10 staff reporting to the mayor. In parallel to this dedicated unit, many 
organisational  changes  and  new  processes  were  defined  across  the  municipality,  such  as  a  new  Bureau  for 
International and European Affairs and a core Strategic Steering Unit in the Mayor’s Office. 

Phase II (2014 - 2019)  

The  reform  process  CHANGE²  entered  a  new  phase  in  2014,  in  which  the  implementation  of  projects  is 
increasingly ‘mainstreamed’ by transferring responsibility from the project structure to the line organisations. 
The former master plan has been replaced by a new action programme. The thematic focus of phase II is: 

  Promotion and strengthening of cultural change and communication;  
  Optimisation  of  the  organisation,  with  greater  emphasis  on  process  consideration  and  the  clear 

allocation of responsibilities;  

  Strengthening of the employer function; 
  Targeted human resources development based on future personnel requirements; 
  The establishment of an ‘internal labour market’ for employees;  
  Further steering according to strategic objectives and their relationship with the City’s budget.  

For further information: Alexandra Kriegel, Head of Administrative Reform, alexandra.kriegel@mannheim.de  
Christian Hübel, Head of Strategic Steering Unit, christian.huebel@mannheim.de 

In a similar vein, the Hessian Administration for Land Management and Geo-informatics (in German, 
HVBG)  has  undergone  an  extensive  transformation  over  the  last  two  decades  (see  below)  – 
concentrating only on its core activities, consolidating its offices and cutting its headcount. Over this 
time, it has been able to raise its productivity through ICT and knowledge management. Throughout 
this reform period, HVBG has continued to invest in staff development, promoted work-life balance 
and employed quality management to imbue a culture of continuous improvement.  

Inspiring example: Continuous transformation and quality management (Germany) 

Based  in  Wiesbaden,  the  Hessian  Administration  for  Land  Management  and  Geo-informatics  (HVBG)  is  the 
government  agency  responsible  for  holding  all  relevant  and  comprehensive  information  on  land  and  the 
landscape within the State of Hessen, processing and providing spatial data (geo-informatics), and integrating 
data sources from state administrations and municipalities. Spatial data has become increasingly important for 
state administrations, municipal management, energy suppliers, environment protection (solar-/wind energy), 
flood  control/climate  change  etc.  HVBG’s  core  tasks  are  land  surveying,  real  estate  cadastre,  Geo-data 
infrastructure,  reorganisation  of  land/rural  development,  building  land  apportionment  and  real  estate 
evaluation. HVBG has been undergoing a far-reaching transformation process since 1999, most notably: 

  Privatising many of HVBG’s public services, leaving the agency to concentrate on its core and trying to 
offer  good  products  and  services  to  its  core  clients  (state  administration,  municipal  management, 
energy companies etc.) in different sales channels; 

Introducing the Common Assessment Framework (CAF) to improve performance;  

Implementing cost cutting and productivity improvements;  

Topic 9.3: Possible paths to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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43 

Investing in leadership and staff development;  

Instigating a new strategy since 2011. 

HVBG has been confronted since 2005 with the pressure of cutting costs and rationalising the workforce  – a 
challenging context for pursuing continuous improvement.  

  First, HVBG has been required to consolidate the number of offices from 56 (2005), to just 15 in 2016 
(eight main locations and seven branches), with a further streamlining to 12 by 2022 (seven plus five). 
The agency’s rental area has fallen in recent years by 17% (2010 to 2015), and is planned to reach 79% 
of the 2010 area by 2022. Consequently, expenditure on facilities (rent, services, 
utilities, additional costs etc.) was cut by  €350,000 (2011 to 2015), even though 
rent per square metre had increased by at least 15% over this time. 

  Second,  HVBG’s  workforce  has  also  contracted  considerably.  Since  2005,  an 
employment  freeze  has 
led  to  a  30%  staff  reduction.  HVBG  now  has 
approximately  1440  employees,  of  which  670  are  civil  servants.  It  is  estimated 
that the agency will lose nearly 200 more employees by 2022 due to retirement. 

Despite  the  reduced  headcount,  orders  and  turnover  have  remained  relatively  stable.  HVBG  generates  its 
revenue  by  selling  its  products  and  services  to  customers  in  both  the  public  and  private  sectors,  although 
several  public  administrations  are  entitled  to  access  products  and  services  for  free.  HVBG  runs  the  biggest 
online shop of Hessen’s state administrations. Since 2011, visits to the online shop have grown by nearly 80% 
and turnover generated by 44%.  

sectors 

“Liegenschaftvermessung” 

This reflects in part HVBG’s success in raising its productivity by improving processes and technology (e.g. new 
ICT  solutions  for  geo-data),  as  well  as  knowledge  management.  As  a  result,  treatment  /  process  times  in  its 
core  duties  have  fallen  by  up  to  30%  over  the  period  2010-2015  (see  chart,  below).  Cost  coverage  in  core 
duties has also improved over the same timescale. Between them, 
and 
the 
“Liegenschaftsdaten” (real estate data) generate more than 90% of 
orders  and  turnover,  and  have  enjoyed  improvements  in  cost 
coverage  of  over  20%  and  11%  respectively.  Process  costs  in  the 
sales  &  distribution  division  have  been  cut  by  €100,000  per  year 
and  complaints  on  products  &  services  fell  to  less  than  1.5%. 
Political 
improvement  activities  of 
HVBG.  In  2014-2015,  HVBG  was  rewarded  with  a  management 
dividend of €1 million.  

leadership  appreciates  the 

(surveying) 

In 2003, HVBG decided to employ an easy-to-use total quality management (TQM) tool to evaluate 30 change 
projects,  which  had  the  objective  to  introduce  performance  management  throughout  the  agency.  CAF  was 
considered the most effective instrument to respond to these demands. The CAF self-assessment was piloted 
in  2003  and  repeated  in  2006  and  2008.  In  2011,  HVBG  made  self-assessments  mandatory  for  the  whole 
agency,  and  they  have  subsequently  also  been  performed  in  2013  and  2016.  In  total,  about  250  CAF-based 
activities were launched and implemented over 2003-2016, and the agency has seen the benefit in improving 
CAF  scores.  By  building  an  understanding  of  TQM  within  the  organisation,  HVBG  has  pursued  continuous 
improvement, to produce a high quantity and quality of positive outputs and outcomes. Most importantly, the 
introduction of CAF has meant that the reform process has involved strong staff participation. 

Looking forward:  

  HVBG  is  faced  with  an  increasing  demand  for  its  work,  e.g.  in  land  consolidation  processes  across 

farms, transport planning, environmental protection and climate change projects.  

  New ICT solutions for geo-data and the EU’s INSPIRE Directive mean that the Agency must advise local 

government and state agencies on these issues. 

  Continuous ICT investments are required to keep up with rapid technological developments. 

Topic 9.3: Possible paths to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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44 

Throughout  the  transformation  period,  HVBG  has  continued  to  invest  in  its 
workforce. Spending on staff development activities and programmes has been a 
consistent  feature  since  1998,  but  leadership  development  programmes  are  a 
more recent innovation, being introduced for all hierarchical management levels 
since 2011. Appraisals of line managers by subordinates since 2005 reveal positive average scores. On a score 
of  1-5,  in  which  1  is  best,  the  average  scores  ranged  from  2.14  (2011)  to  2.11  (2016).  About  93%  of 
interviewees in 2016 are satisfied with cooperate leadership of their line manager. The average age of staff is 
currently  about  49  years.  The  HVBG  has  done  a  lot  for  work-life  balance,  by  increasing  flexibility  in  the 
organisation of working time and teleworking, and increasing managers’ awareness about the issue, to embed 
it  in  the  culture.  In  2016,  the  agency  received  the  quality  label  “Family  Friendly  Employer”  (right).  The 
organisation  also  invests  in  workplace  health  and  rehabilitation  management.  In  recent  years,  the  sickness 
absence rate has fallen from 6% (2011) to 5.1% (2016), lower than the average of public sector organisations in 
Germany and close to the level for private sector employees. 

Since  2010,  this  philosophy  of  continuous  improvement  has  found  a  fresh  impetus  in  the  development  and 
implementation of a new organisational concept and change strategies. Senior managers/steering board have 
developed HVBG’s mission and vision, which is now being implemented. Shared values have been defined, and 
a cooperative culture and leadership have been developed and communicated to staff. To drive the initiative 
forward,  an  executive  Department  of  Strategy  and  Control  was  established  in  2010,  tasked  with  strategic 
steering,  quality  management,  organisational  development,  project  management  and  process  management 
inter  alia,  which  is  supervising  and  supporting  all  activities  and  every  actor.  Strategic  and  impact-oriented 
concepts were developed for the periods 2011-2016 (already implemented) and 2017-2022, and agreed with 
the  responsible  government  department  of  the  State  of  Hessen.  These  cover  demographic  ageing,  the 
influence  of  stakeholders  (politicians,  core  customers  and  citizens),  customer  relationships,  costs, 
infrastructure  (ICT,  buildings  etc.),  rental  area,  products  and  services,  innovation,  staff  recruitment,  and 
cultural aspects - cooperative culture, leadership, shared values/company core values, and code of ethics/role 
models etc.  

For further information: Christoph Hehl, christoph.hehl@hvbg.hessen.de 

Leadership  plays  a  crucial  role  in  designing,  implementing,  monitoring  and  maintaining  change 
processes. In the context of the public sector, leadership is mostly regarded as an exclusive activity 
of  the  head  of  the  organisation  agency,  but  reform  also  draws  on  distributed,  shared  and  team 
leadership. 

Organisational change is ultimately about people – the public officials themselves. On the one hand, 
employees need to stay in stride with their organisations as they undergo their process of reform. 
On  the  other,  many  are  tasked  with  the  actual  responsibility  for  making  change  happen.  Changes 
might involve, for example: 

  Reassigning responsibilities across organisations (see theme 3) or through outsourcing; 
  Internal re-orientation, for example when re-engineering service delivery (see topic 5.2);  
  The establishment of new HRM practices (see topic 4.3); and/or 
  Interaction with online systems (see topic 5.4).  

As  step 4 of  the  Kotter  model  highlights,  successful  transformation  cannot  be  ‘enforced’  from  the 
top  level  down,  but  needs  to  be  understood  and  adopted  by  all  involved  to  maximise  buy-in  and 
minimise  resistance.  To  introduce  and  implement  reform,  organisations  need  to  fulfil  some  basic 
pre-conditions, such as a management policy which fosters communication and dialogue. We must 
not  forget  that,  to  the  individual,  change  might  represent  more  than  a  transition  and  can  pose  a 
threat to his or her status or even means of income, especially if it results in the loss of jobs. Every 

Topic 9.3: Possible paths to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quality of Public Administration – A Toolbox for Practitioners 

45 

process  of  change  tends  to  undergo  a  series  of  phases  linked  directly  to  the  reactions  of  the 
organisation’s members. This is a process during which we slowly begin to readjust our perceptions 
and behaviours to the new situation and to the changed reality with which we are confronted. Below 
is  a  description  of  the  ‘change  curve’36:  the  seven  emotional  or  psychological  phases  that  people 
tend to go through37, and which has also been extended by some analysts to organisations too. 

Phase 
1.  Shock 

2.  Denial 

3.  Realisation  

4.  Acceptance 

Meaning 
A huge discrepancy between our 
own expectations and outside 
expectations plus the new 
situation. 

A false sense of safety and security, 
exaggerated perception of the 
procedures and behavioural 
competencies.  
Realising the need for new 
procedures and approaches.  

Accepting the new situation: 
rejecting the procedures and 
approaches from the previous 
phase. 

5.  Experimentation  Searching for new procedures and 

6.  Understanding 

7. 

Integration 

approaches. Success – failure, 
problems – frustration. 
Understanding why certain 
procedures and approaches are 
successful and why others fail. 
Integrating the successful new 
procedures and approaches into 
the regular routines.  

Response 
People tend to feel threatened by the perceived 
changes. They may be resistant to changes 
because their expectations strongly differ from 
the expectations posed by those promoting the 
changes. 
During this phase, people overestimate their 
capability to deal with the new situation. 

At this point, the idea of taking some risks 
becomes more bearable; people begin to 
explore pros & cons of the changes at hand. 
Entering the phase of acceptance requires the 
rejection of the old situation and the ability to 
recognise the present requirements 

During this phase, the institution can prove its 
ability to explore change. 

People understand that the quality standards 
serve as an indicator for the institution’s, as well 
as for the individual’s, success 
Ultimately, the integration phase signifies that 
the process has been completed. This is a 
creative phase during which past and present 
procedures merge. Depending on the extent to 
which integration is consolidated, the 
application of the required procedures and 
approaches does not originate in the outside of 
the organisation but derives from the individual 
contributions of each person who adopts them 
and turns them into his or her own. 

9.3.2  Changing mindsets 

indicates,  achieving 
As  the  Kotter  model 
change is not merely a matter of practicalities, 
such as re-organising administrative structures 
and 
revising 
systems, 
and 
processes 
procedures,  or 
in  people  and 
investing 
technology.  It  is  often  about  modifying  the 

The Kotter 8-step model 

Changing mindsets 

Learning points from past reforms 

36 Based on the personal ‘grief curve’ originally conceived as 5 stages by Swiss psychiatrist Elisabeth Kübler-Ross in 1969  
37 There are variants of this model. See also, for example, UK Cabinet Office, Government Communication Service, which is 
based on John Fisher’s Process of Personal Transition 

Topic 9.3: Possible paths to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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46 

mindsets  of  public  officials,  whether  elected  or  employed.  This  takes  time,  but  also  frequently 
involves  embedding  new  concepts  -  especially  principles  and  values,  such  as  integrity,  efficiency, 
openness, citizen-centricity, etc.  

Public sector innovation is often inhibited by risk aversion, in other words an administrative culture 
that equates accountability of officials to the public with ‘safety first’ (see topic 1.3). In reality, most 
reforms are not reckless. They are about opening the mind to alternative options and scenarios.   

For  example,  a  change  in  mindset  is  essential  in  eGovernment,  to  both  see  and  seize  the 
opportunities that ICT offers - to make work simpler for administrations, life easier for citizens, and 
business better for enterprises. It can be captured in the phrase: think data, not paper (see theme 5 
on service delivery and digitalisation). 

Equally, it is integral to thinking strategically about the potential of public procurement. Purchasing 
has been seen for a long time as simply a technocratic instrument of policy implementation, in which 
the  decision  to order  supplies,  buy  services  or  commission  works  is  processed  through  rather  dull 
procedures,  to  select  the  right  tenderer  that  offers  the  best  value  for  money.  But  times  are 
changing: 

 

Increasingly,  public  administrations  are  recognising  what  private  companies  have 
understood  for  several  decades:  these  contractors  are  an  integral  element  of  the  ‘value 
chain’ that contributes to achieving results. They have their own expertise and insights into 
possible  policy  solutions,  which  should  be  optimised  (see  topic  5.6.4  on  creative 
commissioning).  

  Moreover, public  administrations have an important  public policy imperative  for engaging 
with contractors in a way which private buyers do not. Public purchasing accounts for 20% of 
GDP across the EU on average, which means the leverage effect is potentially huge. In this 
light, it is almost an obligation on public administrations to engage in strategic procurement 
to  deliver  better  societal  outcomes,  including  sustainability  (‘green  procurement’)  and 
innovation (see topic 8.2).  

Similarly,  officials  need  to be  open-minded  about  how  they  interact  with  each  other  and  external 
stakeholders. The term meta-governance38 encapsulates the concept of public servants being able 
and encouraged to select, blend or switch between the most suitable governance style, according to 
the  circumstances  at  hand.  The  choice  is  captured  in  the  following  framework,  each  specific  style 
having its own pros and cons: 

  Hierarchies  (H):  The  command  &  control,  rules-based  approach  to  problem-solving can  be 
best suited to situations when stability and order is needed, and especially in times of both 

38 For more information on meta-governance, see: L. Meuleman (2008), Public Management and the Metagovernance of 
Hierarchies, Networks and Markets; L. Meuleman (2010), The Cultural Dimension of Metagovernance. Why Governance 
Doctrines May Fail, Public Organization Review, Volume 10, Number 1 / March 2010, pp 49-70.; and L. Meuleman (2015), 
Owl meets beehive: how impact assessment and governance relate, Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, Vol. 33, No. 
1, pp 4–15.  

Topic 9.3: Possible paths to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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clearly-defined  problems  and  crisis  situations  (such  as  disaster  management).  Politicians 
tend  towards  hierarchical  solutions,  as  they  remain  ultimately  accountable  for  the 
administration’s  actions,  and  hence  they  typically  prefer  command  structures.  However, 
command  and  control  can  be  less  effective  in the  face  of complexity  and  uncertainty.  The 
perception  of  political  control  over  policy-making  and  implementation  can  be  illusory.  Co-
responsibility  with  affected  parties  can  be  more  effective,  especially  in  handling  ‘wicked 
problems’, by constructing an alliance of interests and building ownership of the issue. 

  Markets (M): The use of competition and contracts, based on incentives and indicators, can 
be efficient in dealing with routine and mechanistic matters, but are less appropriate when 
collaboration  is  called  for,  and  where  there  is  a  natural  monopoly  (a  ‘public  good’).  With 
market-based  solutions,  the  risks  of  contractual  failure  can  rebound  on  the  contracting 
administration. 

  Networks  (N):  The  inclusive  approach  to  problem-solving,  involving  cross-government 
working  and  reaching-out  to  non-state  stakeholders  can  be  valuable  in  constructing  trust 
relationships and reaching consensus solutions on complicated matters, but is rarely viable 
in crisis situations when rapid decisions must be reached. With networks, the solutions are 
spread across many stakeholders and hence accountability is hard to pin down. 

Administrative cultures have a propensity towards one of 
the  three  governance  styles,  and  hence  it  can  require  a 
conscious and decisive act to adopt an alternative stance 
to the preferred model in the face of natural resistance.  

A  mix  of  styles  that  reflect  the  situation  might  be  more 
appropriate,  although  the  convergence  can  also  create 
conflicts,  for  example:  reliability  (H)  v  flexibility  (M);  competition  (M)  v  cooperation  (N),  and 
decisiveness (H) v debate (N). 

As an example  of meta-governance  in motion, the  coalition for change  under step 2 of the Kotter 
model (see topic 9.3.1) will typically operate outside regular ‘command and control’ structures, even 
in a normally hierarchical organisation. Hence, for this phase of the reform, the organisation should 
typically  follow  more  closely  the  network  (N)  mode  of  meta-governance,  at  least  before  decision-
making is required, at which point hierarchy (H) is likely to dominate. Eventually, the reform process 
moves to implementation, when all modes - H, M and N - should be on the table, depending on the 
measures being adopted and executed.  

Finally, this capacity to step back and see the whole picture is illustrative of systems thinking, which 
challenges  the  conventional  way  of  looking  at  a  snapshot  of  policy  problems  (see  topic  1.1), 
organisations (see topic 3.2) and service delivery (see topic 5.2) in isolation. Instead, it demands we 
take  account  of  all  the  dynamics  within  a  policy,  organisation  or  service,  and  the  interplay  with 
external  factors.  Irrespective  of  specific  tools  and  techniques,  systems  thinking  is  a  valuable 
discipline for considering public administration reform from all angles. 

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9.3.3. Learning points from past reforms 

The Kotter 8-step model 

The evidence base on the success or failure of 
past  reforms  is  unfortunately  very  thin.  Few 
countries  have  commissioned  evaluations  or 
audits of their reform activities. Nevertheless, 
Pollitt’s  review39,  along  with  the  experiences 
from  the  Copernicus  programme,  the  Kotter 
model,  the  OECD’s  extensive  work  on  reform 
and  innovation40,  the  European  Commission  /  OECD’s  three  2014  Peer2Peer  workshops  and  the 
Commission’s two Toolbox seminars41, offer a handy guide to lessons from reform experience that 
are summarised below as 10 learning points.   

Learning points from past reforms 

Changing mindsets 

A.  Diagnose before prescribing 

Whether  the  reform  is  ‘big  bang’  or  incremental,  limited  to  one  organisation  or  extended  to  the 
entire administration, focused on a ‘narrow’ field (e.g. HRM, administrative simplification) or aiming 
for  comprehensive  coverage,  the  most  important  lesson  is:  understand  what  you  are  doing  and 
why, before embarking on change. Reform is not risk-free, and there is no guarantee that change 
will be positive. It should not be based on broad impressions.  

  This starts with a clear understanding and statement  of the problems to be  remedied and the 
challenges  to  be  met.  What  needs  to  be  changed?  Laws,  structures,  processes,  procedures, 
people  (competences,  motivation,  mindsets,  management),  values  and/or  cultures?  Any 
proposed reform should be tested against this analysis – how exactly will it make a difference? 
Do not reform for reform’s sake.  

  Wherever  possible,  this  analysis  should  be  backed  up  with  intelligence,  the  interpretation  of 
facts and figures. This is not easy to achieve, as the difficulties of evaluating the quality of public 
administration  make  it  hard  to  make  an  evidence-based  case  for  change.  Nevertheless,  the 
information that is available should be used to build up a picture. As this evidence will feed into 
other  success  factors  (vision,  leadership,  building  a  coalition,  communication),  it  should  be 
presented  in  a  way  which  is  easy  to  understand  for  non-experts  and  not  overwhelming  (be 
strategic and economical in the use of data). 

 

If the reform process  involves  an impact  assessment  (IA), this should not  be  treated  as a box-
ticking exercise, but performed rigorously (see topic 1.2). If the Centre of Government (COG) is 
tasked  with  setting  standards  and  vetting  IAs  (see  topic  3.3),  it  should  have  power  to  send 
impact  evaluation  reports  submitted  as  part  of  the  decision-making  process  back  to  the 

39 See C. Pollitt (2010) op. cit. and C. Pollitt (2013), What do we know about public management reform? Concepts, models 
and some approximate guidelines. Paper supporting a presentation to the conference and workshop, ‘Towards a 
Comprehensive Reform of Public Governance’, Lisbon, 28-30 January 2013.  
40 See earlier references, plus OECD (2010), Making Reform Happen: Structural Priorities in Times of Crisis 
41 ‘Modernising Public Administration - Working Together to Achieve Results, A Policy Discussion with Member States’ 
(Brussels, 1-2 October 2014) and ‘Making Positive Change Happen’ (Brussels, 21-22 September 2016) 

Topic 9.3: Possible paths to reform 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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originating  line  ministry  if  it  does  not  provide  relevant  information  and/or  does  not  follow 
identified procedures and practices. 

B.  See reform as a window of opportunity 

The Kotter model recommends ‘establishing a sense of urgency’ for organisational change. But is it 
always necessary or feasible in the wider context of administrative reform?  

Certainly,  big bang reforms  tend to be triggered by crises, scandals or disasters, which enable the 
(often incoming) government to purpose radical and ground-breaking measures, as exemplified by 
Belgium’s Copernicus (the White March, ‘chicken dioxins’, etc.) and Spain’s CORA (the 2007 financial 
crisis), also at the organisational level, as evidenced by CHANGE2 in Germany (the fall-out from the 
financial  crisis,  again).  They  can  even  bring  down  governments,  as  Romania’s  ‘corruption  kills’ 
campaign  illustrates.    Reform  leaders  can  use  crisis  language  to  strengthen  their  claim.  Belgian 
Minister  Van  den  Bossche,  who  initiated  the  Copernicus  programme,  stated:  “Announce  the 
apocalypse,  make  the  unthinkable  thinkable,  question  the  general  agreed  principles  of  the 
organisation, bring the abyss closer. Or in other words, define the burning platform for the reform”. 
Care  should  be  taken  to  avoid  raising  expectations  too  highly,  however,  as  sober  administrative 
reforms are typically a lot less revolutionary in impact than this type of sabre-rattling rhetoric. 

This is still less appropriate with incremental change. Administrative reform is simply not as exciting 
to the public as policy reforms such as schooling and healthcare. As the OECD points out, “there is 
rarely much social demand for public administration reform; while citizens are often dissatisfied with 
public  sector  inefficiency  or  the  quality  of  public  services,  the  issue  of  “internal”  changes  in  public 
administrations  usually  tends  to  be  of  low  political  salience;  generating  public  demand  for  reform 
may itself be one of the first challenges that would-be reformers have to tackle”.42 

Nevertheless, some public administrations might be able to engineer internal urgency, by employing 
evidence-based analysis to flag failings to decision-makers in their performance and hence impact on 
citizens  and  businesses  (societal  outcomes),  or  spotting  changing  circumstances  before  or  as  they 
arise. In other cases, it may be more realistic for administrations to respond with urgency to external 
events, encourage decisiveness and the necessity to reform at all levels of management and staff. In 
which case, the mantra ‘do not waste a good crisis’ applies.  

Ultimately,  it  is  probably  more  helpful  for  practitioners  to  think  in  terms  of  a  ‘window  of 
opportunity’,  as the  impetus  for  change.  Such  a  situation,  when  the  barriers  to  reform  have  been 
lowered temporarily or permanently, is the moment to be seized by ‘administrative entrepreneurs’, 
which could be politicians, but also other officials or outside actors. 

C.  Ensure leadership – from the centre … and everywhere 

To be realised, reform cannot be an abstract concept, it must be articulated and implemented by the 
public  servants  themselves,  even  if  it  is  initiated  by  external  agents.  Commentary  on  successful 

42 OECD (2010), Making Reform Happen, op. cit. 

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change processes tends to refer to ‘leaders’, but where do they emerge from? Certainly, the spark 
and stimulus can come from the ‘administrative entrepreneurs’, who see the open window and seize 
the moment. But beyond that, how does reform gain traction? In their review of the CORA plans, the 
OECD posited that a strong Centre of Government can play an important steering role.  

Leadership from the centre of government 

OECD experience suggests that strong political leadership from the centre is often about winning consent and 
building alliances among key actors across the government, rather than securing their compliance. Leadership 
is also about illustrating solidarity among key government players with a sound communication strategy that 
focuses on a small number of strategic objectives to be achieved over the medium and long term, aimed both 
internally  at  all  levels  of  the  bureaucracy,  and  externally,  to  the  wider  public.  Hence,  the  Centre  of 
Government  (COG)  institutions  should  define  clear  roles  and  responsibilities  to  facilitate  co-ordination  and 
avoid communication gaps between ministries. On top of that, whole-of-government performance monitoring 
can help COG institutions steer reform effectively and correct course, if and when required. 

Source: OECD (2014), Spain Public Governance Reform  

In the case of big bang reforms, an effective centre is almost essential, but leaders are needed at all 
levels, especially as reforms roll out. By its nature, incremental change can be a protracted process. 
In  the  OECD’s  words:  “…  sustaining  an  incremental  reform  over  an  extended  period  requires 
consistent  leadership.  Given  the  likelihood  of  government  turnover,  this  points  to  the  need  for 
independent, permanent organisations for steering reform”. If the reform process requires a series of 
smaller improvements, they will need to be made voluntarily – management (individual leadership) 
can stimulate change, but each employee also needs to participate, engage and own it, empowered 
to make decisions. 

D.  Start and stick to a holistic vision 

The Kotter model (step 3) emphasises the importance of vision for change. This is equally the case if 
the  reform  is  comprehensive  and  ‘all  at  once’  or  if  it’s  intended  to  build  up  over  time.  Both  the 
Copernicus  and  CORA  reforms  had,  at  their  heart,  an  intellectually  coherent  view  of  both  the 
direction  and  destination,  with  all  the  individual  components  forming  a  cohesive  whole.    This 
interdependence raises the risk of ‘failure’ in implementation or at least sub-optimal outcomes, but 
this clarity of vision is valuable for the next learning point - building a consensus around reform and 
carrying all affected parties along the journey. 

E.  Build a coalition around reform 

Again,  mirroring  the  Kotter  model  (step  2),  reform  cannot  be  left  to  ‘leaders’  alone,  even  if  it  is 
driven by a Centre of Government that is staffed by the brightest and best. In the case of big bang 
reforms  especially,  success  requires  a  coalition  of  support,  among  politicians,  officials  and  other 
affected  stakeholders.  In  the  words  of  Professor  Pollitt:  “…  work  needs  to  be  done,  in  advance  of 
reform  announcements,  to  build  the  strongest  and  widest  possible  supportive  network.  Reforms 
which are not embedded in such networks are frail flowers, likely to shrivel at the first touch of frost.” 

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51 

As an illustration, the fragility of the Copernicus programme was exposed when it started to face its 
first challenges, as it lacked any consensus beyond a small core. It was both conceived and carried 
out  as a top-down process, which was designed to be  elitist,  from the preparation of the Bouillon 
paper  onwards  (the  work  of  the  Minister  plus  private  consultants).  Rather  than  being  viewed  as 
capable of contributing to constructive change, the senior officials saw the strategy and its execution 
as centred on distrust in them. Almost inevitably, the response was indifference at best, resistance 
at worst. 

With  comprehensive  reforms,  extensive  consultation  with  the  officials  affected  by  reform  co-opts 
them in its planning and execution. Similarly, public participation in reforms helps to build a broad 
consensus of necessity and brings in the service users’ perspective and valuable insights as outsiders 
(as was illustrated by CORA’s engagement with citizens so they could feed in their ideas). If the plan 
involves costs / losses to some parties, these are easier to bear if the process itself is perceived as 
equitable  and  fair.  The  space  and  time  should  be  created  to  allow  for  proper  interaction,  if  the 
intention is to generate a genuine partnership for change.  

F.  Ensure reform has solid legal foundations  

As noted under ‘obstacles’ and experienced under Copernicus, reforms must be rooted in the legal 
base.  In  transposing  the  change  concept  into  its  legislative  form,  there  is  little  room  for  error  to 
avoid challenge by any malcontents who have stayed outside the coalition for change. This point is 
especially  pertinent  in  the  context  of  administrative  cultures  across  the  EU.  Most  Member  States 
operate under so-called ‘Rechtsstaat’ / rule of law traditions that are highly rules-based, and hence 
legislation is a minimum requirement for reforms to be enacted at all. 

However, legal underpinning is just a necessary but insufficient condition for the implementation of 
actual change. For example, creating a professional civil service  that  is capable  to advise ministers 
expertly and impartially requires a law to state that public servants  are neutral, but  that does  not 
mean it will happen unless followed up with codes, guidelines, awareness-raising, training, etc. and 
translated into practice in competency frameworks, management behaviour, etc. Legislation should 
not  be over-prescriptive  and place  constraints on implementation that run counter to the  spirit of 
the reform. 

G.  Don’t overcomplicate 

Just  as  the  vision  should  be  clear  and  easy  to  share,  the  strategy  that  emerges  from  it  should  be 
similarly  straightforward.  There  is  a  risk  if  the  proposed  reforms  are  unnecessarily  complex,  with 
over-engineered structures and systems to cover all eventualities.  

For  example,  the  Copernicus  ‘virtual  matrix’  is  a  compelling  concept  in  theory  for  breaking  down 
silos  within  government,  but  setting  up  horizontal  FSGs  and  at  the  same  time  devolving  functions 
such as HRM within virtual FSGs can lead to confusion about who is precisely responsible for what, 
and prompt unproductive interference.  

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52 

The  creation  of  new  bodies  can  be  merited,  but  if  they  are  not  soundly  conceptualised,  they  can 
become a burden, as they seek to justify their own existence. Abolishing institutions is much harder 
than  establishing  them.  Ultimately,  one  of  the  goals  of  reform  should  be  streamlined  and  user-
centred systems (see theme 3 on multi-level governance), which is where functional reviews are a 
useful instrument.   

H.  Anticipate the negatives 

As already noted, reform can have unexpected consequences – or even intended ones that are likely 
to  meet  resistance.  The  change  leaders  need  to  strength-test  their  plans,  and  consider  all  the 
potential downsides, especially any erosion of trust among officials, citizens or businesses, and any 
weakening of internal capacity that might take the administration below its critical mass to analyse, 
implement, regulate, procure, etc.  

Negatives  can  also  come  from  unmet  expectations.  Building  a  coalition  of  support  requires 
communication, but there is a danger in going ‘too big, too soon’ on claims of future impact. There 
are risks in major media exposure upfront, which are well illustrated by the Copernicus experience. 
As one minister put it, it would be better to work in silence and wait to present something to the 
press when most of the work is done.  

I.  Ensure enough implementation capacity 

Sufficient capacity to implement the vision is perhaps the most obvious learning point, but it is easy 
to  overlook  and  failing  to  plan  can  be  expensive  to  overcome.  This  touches  on  many  aspects  of 
public administration, especially resource planning and budgeting (see theme 8.1), and ensuring the 
right  people  with  the  right  skills  at  the  right  time  (see  topic  4.3  on  managing,  motivating  and 
developing staff), whether leadership, digital competences, tendering or contracting or whatever is 
suitable. If the administration does not yet possess the skills, how can they be acquired quickly?    

When  administrations  lack  in-house  capacity,  the  tendency  is  to  look  outside to  consultants to  fill 
the gap. External experts can play a valuable role if they bring in specialist knowledge that is needed 
immediately, and/or if they help organisations cope with short-term upsurges in activity. They can 
also  bring  a  fresh  pair of eyes  to  introduce  new  perspectives,  as  well  as  relevant  experience  from 
elsewhere. 

However, administrations also need to build on their own knowledge base and avoid becoming over-
reliant on outsiders. The people who know most about the organisation are already within it. Using 
experts can create a ‘dependency culture’, if administrations contract-out their know-how and lose 
internal  capacity.  The  balance  can  be  struck  by  combining 
imported  expertise  with  the 
administration’s own learning (see topic 8.3 on managing consultants). The learning process should 
be ongoing, and requires special attention and the provision of feedback loops. 

Topic 9.3: Possible paths to reform 

 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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53 

J.  Less haste, more sustainability 

Reforms  need  time  to  come  to  fruition,  especially  if  the  aim  is  a  change  in  mindsets,  values  and 
cultures.  This  implies  realistic  expectations  about  the  timeframe,  which  are  communicated  to  all 
affected parties when building the support coalition. It also means a feedback mechanism that can 
enable the administration to take a new  direction, as the reform rolls out,  especially if the plan is 
incremental change. Reform should be a learning process, which will usually involve assembling the 
experiences of an array of stakeholders.  

This might involve more than one electoral cycle, so the reform process must be able to survive a 
change  of  legislature  and  executive.  Depending  on  the  reform’s  nature,  this  might  argue  for  a 
coalition  of  support  that  crosses  political  boundaries,  so  that  the  process  is  not  jeopardised  or 
jettisoned  by  an  incoming  government.  This  is  easier  to  achieve  if  the  changes  are  viewed  as 
technocratic  and/or  beneficial  to  a  wide  community  of  interests  (e.g.  introducing  e-Services  for 
citizens and businesses).  

Administrative reforms might start with rallying cries from officials, such as ‘reinvent government’, 
‘bring  power  closer  to the  people’,  ‘reduce  bureaucratic  burdens’,  etc.  However,  as  the  OECD  has 
pointed  out,  the  impetus  tends  to  dissipate  over  time.  The  reform  agenda  can  quickly  lose  the 
support of politicians that are subject to competing demands, citizens and enterprise expecting rapid 
results, and public servants suffering from reform fatigue. Initial warm rhetoric  is soon confronted 
with  the  cool  reality  that  most  changes  take  time  to  implement,  involve  detailed  analysis, 
discussions and decisions, carry upfront costs to secure medium-long term returns, and can involve 
tough  choices  over  alternative  options  and  their  resourcing.    How  to  sustain  the  momentum  of 
change? 

There  is  no  substitute  for  rigorous  planning,  but  the  public  servants  that  are  tasked  with  taking 
forward  reforms  should  also  look,  where  possible,  for  ‘quick  wins’  –  intermediate  milestones  to 
demonstrate  to  politicians,  colleagues  and  the  public  that  the  journey  is  worth  continuing.  But 
perhaps  the  most  important  success  factor  in  managing  change  is  patience.  The  OECD’s  Making 
Reform  Happen  secretariat  has  concluded  that  successful  structural  reform  takes  time:  generally, 
several  years  to  prepare  and  adopt,  and  often  much  longer  to  implement.  Moreover,  successful 
reform often requires several attempts. Don’t give up. 

“Many of the biggest reform successes analysed in the secretariat’s work followed earlier setbacks, 
and less successful reform attempts can often be seen in hindsight to have helped set the stage for 
initiatives,  often  by  deepening  policy  makers’ 
subsequent,  sometimes  far-reaching,  reform 
understanding of the problems involved”, OECD ‘Making Change Happen’, 2010. 

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54 

9.4  Conclusions, key messages and inspiration for future action 

The  institutional  arrangement  of  every  country  is  the  product  of  political  choices  within  the 
constitutional  framework:  decisions  about  the  right  constellation  of  organisations  at  each  level  to 
achieve  policy  goals  (see  theme  3).  Certain  functions  will  always  be  carried  out  (such  as  defence, 
policing, tax collection, justice, etc.), others are discretionary. Today, many functions across Europe 
are  performed  by  private  or  non-profit  providers  on  the  administration’s  behalf.  Few  public 
administrations  or  individual  organisations  remain  untouched  by  change  over  time,  especially 
when  roles  are  re-assigned  across  public  bodies,  service  delivery  is  outsourced  and  savings  are 
sought.  

The message throughout the Toolbox is that the transferability of lessons from other administrations 
must be treated with caution, which is why the case studies are presented as illustrative examples 
for  inspiration,  not  ‘good’  or  ‘best’  practice  for  replication.  Even  within  the  same  country,  the 
success (or otherwise) of experiences elsewhere is typically context-specific. The philosopher and 
statistician, Nassim Nicholas Taleb, introduced the  concept of the  narrative  fallacy43.  This refers to 
people’s  predilection  for  stories44,  and  hence  our  tendency  to  look  at  a  sequence  of  facts  and 
concoct an explanation in our minds, with the benefit of the hindsight, that sees them as following a 
logical  path  –  from  event  to  consequence  –  which  suggests  a  clear  cause  and  effect.45  This  also 
triggers  a  behavioural  trait  that  tends  to  ignore  the  99  failures  out  of  100,  and  focus  on  the  one 
success  as  ‘inevitable’  (see  also  topic 1.2.2  on  behavioural  insights).  The  same  principle  applies  to 
reform stories. Lessons can be learned, but the conditions under which they occurred will never be 
identical. All the Toolbox inspiring examples should be interpreted in this light. 

Nevertheless, there  are patterns which emerge from the evidence of public administration reform 
over  the  years,  presented  here.  The  factors  and  forces  against  reform  (topic  9.1.1)  might  appear 
overwhelming, especially when listed, but positive change does continue - as the many examples in 
the Toolbox indicate - because the desire and drivers for positive change are equally, if not more, 
strong  over  time.  Ultimately,  above  all  else,  to  repeat  the  quote  from  the  Flemish  Integrity 
Coordinator (theme 2): “things change when people have had enough”.  

There are many roads to reform (see topic 9.2). The major packages, such as Spain’s CORA reforms 
at  the  country  level  or  Mannheim’s  CHANGE2  project  at  the  city  level,  are  both  eye-catching  and 
encouraging, as they become a beacon for administrations elsewhere. Most of the time, however, 
reform is about ‘marginal’ changes – of which there are many examples in the Toolbox - that might 
appear minor and isolated incidences, but can be equally important in impact to their beneficiaries.  

43 N.N Taleb (2007), The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, Random House 
44 See also G. A. Akerlof and R. F. Schiller (2009), Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It 
Matters for Global Capitalism, Princeton University Press 
45 One of Taleb’s illustrations of this point is the response to the 9/11 airplane hijackings and attacks. This resulted in 
cockpit doors being locked, plain-clothed armed guards accompanying flights in the US, and globally security checks at 
airports being significantly stepped up. With hindsight, these appear the obvious steps that should have been taken in 
advance of the atrocity, but if the authorities had in fact had the foresight to anticipate this was going to happen, and had 
instigated these measures beforehand, the complaints of fare-paying passengers about the inconvenience and additional 
cost would probably have led to their removal.  

Topic 9.4: Conclusions & key messages 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
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55 

Within  this  context,  the  European  Commission  provides  various  streams  of  support  to  assist 
Member  States  in  their  reform  activities,  from  many  perspectives.  Most  obviously,  this  includes 
financial  assistance  from  the  European  Structural  and  Investment  Funds  (ESIF)  under  thematic 
objectives 2 and 11, and technical assistance from the Structural Reform Support Service (SRSS). But 
it also comprises the initiatives of individual Commission Services in specific policy fields, such as the 
digital  agenda  and  connectivity  (CNECT),  the  interoperability  framework  and  ICT  tools  (DIGIT), 
budgeting  and  budget  management  (ECFIN),  regulatory  reform,  public  procurement  and  business 
environment  (GROW),  anti-corruption  (HOME)  and  a  quality  judicial  system  (JUST).  These  are  all 
opportunities  for  administrations  across  the  EU  -  at  all  levels  -  to  seize  to  achieve  their  reform 
ambitions.  

Topic 9.4: Conclusions & key messages 

 
 
 
 
Getting in touch with the EU 

In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct Information Centres. You can find the address of the centre 
nearest you at: http://europa.eu/contact 

On the phone or by e-mail 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this service  
– by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls),  
– at the following standard number: +32 22999696 or  
– by electronic mail via: http://europa.eu/contact 

Finding information about the EU 

Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa website at: 
http://europa.eu   

EU Publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: http://bookshop.europa.eu. Multiple copies of 
free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe Direct or your local information centre (see http://europa.eu/contact) 

EU law and related documents 
For access to legal information from the EU, including all EU law since 1951 in all the official language versions, go to EUR-
Lex at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu 

Open data from the EU 
The EU Open Data Portal (http://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data) provides access to datasets from the EU. Data can be 
downloaded and reused for free, both for commercial and non-commercial purposes. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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DOI 10.2767/331952