The Trump Presidency : policy outlook, scenarios and possible implications for the EU.
Date: 2017-11-25
Institutions: European Political Strategy Centre
Subjects: EU relations, European Union, United States, foreign policy, head of government, presidential election

EPSC Brief

14 February 2017

The Trump Presidency
Policy Outlook, Scenarios  
and Possible Implications for the EU*

A political hurricane has swept over Washington DC since Donald Trump was sworn in as the 45th president 
of the United States of America on 20 January 2017. The flurry of activity and tweetstorms that followed, 
from an administration that is not yet fully in place due to the slow pace of Senate confirmations, have left 
countless Americans and governments around the world in dismay and confusion. Many have engaged in 
the fierce political debates and demonstrations that have trailed President Trump’s early decisions – from 
abandoning the Trans-Pacific Partnership and banning visitors and refugees from seven different Muslim-
majority countries, to defunding the International Planned Parenthood Federation and ordering the building of 
the infamous wall on the US-Mexico border. Yet, irrespective of their immediate anxieties, Europeans need to 
take a step back from the noise and concentrate on the issues that are of strategic importance to 
the European Union and its Member States.

The inauguration of Donald Trump as president of the 
most powerful nation in the world – and Europe’s closest 
ally to date – could essentially be the harbinger of 
a new era in international relations; it could be a 
strategic game changer for the current international 
liberal order and the existing global governance system, 
with clear implications for Europe, the transatlantic 
relationship and the world at large. For Europe, it could 
also turn out to be the unifying political trigger 
that has so far been missing, highlighting the 
consequences of abandoning the logic of integration and 
interdependence. However, the temptation to demonise 
the new US president and his administration should be 
avoided as this in itself will not serve the EU’s longer-
term interests and may prove counter-productive.

Even if some trends of US ‘disengagement’ from world 
affairs are not new – as illustrated by the Obama 
Administration’s policy in the Middle East – a strong 
‘America First’ US presidency may serve as an 

accelerator for the transformation of the post-
Cold War order initially set off by Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea and intrusion in Eastern Ukraine, and 
reinforced by China’s rising global importance. Moscow’s 
revisionist behaviour and Beijing’s assertiveness are 
neither new nor unexpected. But an American president 
that would – willingly or unintentionally – undermine 
the institutions, values and principles that his forbearers 
defended, forged together with allies, and upheld for 
the past 70 years, would have strategic geopolitical 
implications that are hard to anticipate.

The American democratic system has a number of 
‘checks and balances’ that seek to constrain the 
power of the Executive Office. Although the first 
weeks of the Trump administration seemed to point to 
a clear dominance of the President’s inner circle in his 
decision-making, the reality of the complex political, 
institutional and legal environment already appears to 
be catching up with the White House. 

1

EPSC Briefs are papers on topics chosen by the President of the European Commission. They are produced by the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC), the European Commission’s in-house think tank. DisclaimerThe views expressed in the EPSC Briefs are those of the authors and do not necessarily correspond to those of the European Commission.* The note describes the situation as observed on 14 February 2017. The temporary suspension of the Muslim ‘travel ban’ 
that was ordered by a Washington State federal judge 
and subsequently upheld by a federal appeals court, 
illustrates this point, as does President Trump’s own 
admission that the replacement of Obama’s Affordable 
Care Act may only take place in 2018, despite his 
first Executive Order being aimed at speeding up the 
process. The resignation of the National Security Advisor 
less than one month into the new administration, on 
allegations that he had illegally discussed US policy with 
a Russian diplomat before the president’s inauguration, 
is just another example of this reality check.

The workings of the Washington bureaucracy and the 
influence of the more experienced members of the 
new US administration may help to restrain the 
most radical and unorthodox impulses of the 
presidential team and mitigate attempts to upend 
current policy fundamentals. Nonetheless, the EU 
ought to assume that President Trump will attempt 
to see through his revisionist campaign agenda. 
This means that at least three scenarios are possible 
for the future government of the US, under a leader that 
has never held public office, has no military experience 
and seems to thrive on disruption and uncertainty. The 
scenarios are not fully distinct from one another and 
might overlap on some issues. But in a context of growing 
uncertainty and volatility each has implications for 
Europe and the European Union.

President Trump’s  
World View and Policies

Before outlining the different possible scenarios, a closer 
analysis of some of the new administration’s early 
policy pronouncements is key to understanding their 
importance for Europe.

‘America First’ Foreign Policy 
President Trump has announced his intention to 
conduct a foreign policy focused on American interests 
and based on a vision of American national security 
anchored in the following basic tenets: ensuring respect 
for the US through projection of strength; maintaining 
unquestioned US military dominance; and embracing 
diplomacy with old enemies and new allies alike. 
President Trump seems to favour all things bilateral 
as a way of having the upper hand in any international 
negotiation. Instead of a win-win multilateral approach, 
his world seems to be one based on a zero-sum 
game where America needs to come out on top.

The following are the main foreign policy building 
blocks of the early stage of the Trump presidency:

•  Defeating ISIS and other radical Islamic  

terror groups
This is President Trump’s top foreign policy priority.  
In his inauguration address, he promised to eradicate 
radical Islamic terrorism ‘from the face of the Earth’.1 
In this effort, he will build on the achievements of 
the anti-ISIS coalition and the actions of the Obama 
administration. This is also where there may be room 
for opening avenues of cooperation with the EU and 
NATO partners. 

It remains to be seen whether President Trump will 
continue to have recourse to the high-intensity, 
intelligence-based, surgical military strikes against 
ISIS, as practiced under President Obama – but 
substantially scaling them up – or whether he will 
eventually be prepared to engage US troops on the 
ground in a more sizeable type of intervention.

•  Challenging China’s rise to  
international prominence 
President Trump named China as an ‘enemy’ of 
the US in his campaign manifesto.2 He accused 
China of manipulating its currency and of stealing 
US intellectual property and jobs. He threatened to 
introduce steep tariffs on Chinese products entering 
the US. He accused Beijing of militarising the South 
China Sea and complicating attempts to harness 
North Korea’s Kim Jong-un. Additionally, Secretary of 
State Rex Tillerson said, in his confirmation hearing, 
that the US would consider blocking access to the 
disputed territories in the South China Sea. Then, 
after almost three weeks in office, when President 
Trump finally spoke with his Chinese counterpart on 9 
February, he seemingly brushed all this aside. In the 
exchange, he said he would honour the ‘One China 
Policy’, allaying the alarm that his conversation with 
Taiwan’s President had raised in Beijing after his 
election victory. Both leaders vowed to continue their 
talks on issues of mutual interest and work towards 
successful outcomes. On the eve of this discussion, 
there had been an ‘unsafe’3 encounter between a 
Chinese and an American aircraft in international 
airspace on the South China Sea. 

•  Establishing a contractual relationship  

with Russia
President Trump displays a rare and intriguing type 
of political affinity for President Putin. On 11 January, 
at his first news conference after being elected, he 
said: ‘If Putin likes Donald Trump, guess what folks, 

2

EPSC Brief 
that’s called an asset, not a liability’.4 While admitting 
that Russia was behind the hacking of Democratic 
Party servers ahead of the elections, President Trump 
intends to improve relations with Moscow and believes 
that the Kremlin will respect the US more with him 
at the helm. In President Trump’s pronouncements, 
there is no trace of allegiance to the normative set of 
values in which US-Russia policy has traditionally been 
anchored. In a recent interview aired on 5 February, 
President Trump seemed to compare US policies with 
Russia’s actions. When asked about President Putin 
being a ‘killer,’ President Trump retorted: ‘There are a 
lot of killers. You think our country’s so innocent?’5 The 
most likely logic governing his approach to Russia is a 
contractual one, in line with which a deal, or a series of 
deals, would be agreed that would benefit both sides. 
In an early sign of this eventuality, President Trump 
had already signalled a readiness to reduce sanctions 
on Russia in exchange for a deal to reduce nuclear 
arsenals. Following a phone call between Presidents 
Trump and Putin on 28 January, the White House 
said the conversation marked ‘a significant start to 
improving the relationship between the United States 
and Russia that is in need of repair’.6

•  Reversing the logic of diplomatic  

engagement with Iran
President Trump has consistently criticised the Iran 
Nuclear agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action) – a hallmark of EU-led multilateral diplomacy. 
On 2 February, after Iran conducted ballistic missile 
tests, the White House announced that it had put 
Iran ‘on notice’7, with President Trump tweeting 
that Iran was ‘playing with fire’.8 Following that, 
the US introduced a new wave of sanctions against 
the country. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei responded by 
thanking President Trump for revealing America’s 
true face. On 5 February, Vice-President Mike Pence 
affirmed in an interview that no decision had been 
made on whether the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action should be scrapped or not, but that the 
administration was ‘evaluating’ what he termed a 
‘terrible deal’9 or, in President Trump’s words, the 
‘worst deal ever negotiated’.10 In a recent social 
media pronouncement, President Trump accused Iran 
of being number ‘#1 in terror’.11 It is possible that the 
Trump administration will increase pressure on Iran 
by means of fresh sanctions and countering Iranian 
influence in the Middle East. Assertive rhetoric will 
strengthen hardliners in Iran.  

•  Addressing the North Korean nuclear threat

Pyongyang’s near-ability to mount a nuclear weapon 
on a long-range missile capable of reaching the US is 
one of the most pressing national security challenges 
for President Trump. In the course of his campaign, 
Donald Trump said that he would ‘have no problem’12 
speaking to North Korea’s Kim Jong-un and suggested 
that Japan and South Korea should equip themselves 
with nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes. More 
recently, during his visit to the Far East, Defence 
Secretary James Mattis warned North Korea that 
any use of its nuclear weapons would be met with 
‘overwhelming’ force.13 In a defying move, North Korea 
nevertheless launched a mid-range missile on 12 
February that eventually fell into the Sea of Japan. 
Standing next to Prime Minister Abe of Japan, who 
was then visiting the US, President Trump reaffirmed 
Washington’s commitment to the security of the 
country. But officials in Seoul were somewhat dismayed 
that President Trump seemingly ignored South Korea in 
this situation. 

•  Correcting the perceived imbalance  

in trading relations
President Trump holds a world view that is 
fundamentally antithetical to the liberal international 
order. He believes that the set-up of the global trading 
system is biased against the US. His administration is 
therefore likely to engage in direct confrontation with 
China, Mexico and other partners, undermining the 
World Trade Organisation along the way. The possibility 
of a destructive logic being pursued is real. Increasing 
pressure on Mexico by raising tariffs up to 15 percent 
or more (President Trump spoke of a 35 percent tariff 
during the campaign) is likely to be the first tangible 
action, possibly followed by a challenge to China’s 
industrial overcapacity. At the same time, withdrawal 
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership leaves room for China 
to orchestrate a closer multilateral framework in Asia. 

•  Removing the constraints of international 

climate agreements
The new US administration is intent on cutting back 
on environmental regulations. The US commitment to 
being a champion on climate action and a catalyst for 
international cooperation in this domain is in jeopardy as 
well. At the same time, when President Trump was asked 
recently whether to withdraw from the Paris climate 
agreement, he responded that he is keeping ‘an open 
mind to it’14 and that there might be ‘some connectivity’15 
between climate change and human activity.

3

EPSC BriefRelations with Europe

•  Strategic negligence in approach to NATO 

•  Distorted view of European integration

There is no love lost between President Trump and the 
European Union. His sentiment towards the EU appears 
to vacillate between ironic and dismissive to openly 
unfriendly and, at times, subversive. President Trump 
has called the EU a ‘consortium’ that came together, 
‘so that it could compete with the United States’.16 
It is worth noting that his past business interests in 
Europe seem to have collided with EU environmental 
regulations, shaping his personal views on the Union: 
‘Getting the approvals from the country [Ireland] was 
fast, easy and efficient. Getting the approvals from 
the group – I call them consortium – was very, very 
tough’.17 Additionally, he criticised Chancellor Merkel’s 
handling of the refugee crisis. He said that the EU 
was a ‘vehicle’18 for Germany and that he expected 
more countries would leave the EU, like the UK. He 
has claimed that Europe is a ‘mess’19 in terms of 
its immigration situation and even alleged that the 
media is not reporting on frequent terrorist attacks on 
European soil. He is set to visit European countries on 
several occasions in the next months, with a planned 
trip to the UK, and attendance to the May G7 Summit 
in Taormina, as well as the July G20 Summit in 
Hamburg. On 9 February, High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-
President of the Commission, Federica Mogherini, was 
in Washington DC for meetings with the new Secretary 
of State, Rex Tillerson, and also with then National 
Security Adviser, Michael Flynn, and Senior Adviser 
Jared Kushner at the White House.

President Trump has been ambiguous on NATO. While 
considering that the alliance was ‘obsolete’20 for 
not fighting terrorism, he has also said that the US 
‘strongly supports NATO’.21 He has consistently called 
for all NATO members to make their full and proper 
financial contributions to the alliance, a point stressed 
in President Trump’s phone call with Secretary-General 
Stoltenberg on 5 February. This position is more 
moderate than earlier pronouncements; during the 
campaign, he seemed to imply that US commitment to 
Article 5 was conditional on allies’ defence spending. 
EU NATO members have been slow to comply with the 
2 percent of GDP benchmark for spending on defence, 
even if a number of them do meet NATO guidelines for 
expenditure on equipment (Figures 1 and 2). President 
Trump has in any case accepted to participate in NATO’s 
Brussels Summit at the end of May. 

•  Mixed signals with respect to US engagement  

in Ukraine
While considering Ukraine to be mainly a European 
problem and arguing for easing sanctions on Russia 
during his campaign, in a recent phone call with 
President Poroshenko, President Trump said the 
US ‘will work with Ukraine, Russia, and all other 
parties involved to help them restore peace along 
the border’.22 It seems that President Trump is still 
in the process of forming his view on Ukraine and 
the conflict with Russia. Some reports suggest that 
he believes the conflict in Eastern Ukraine is a civil 
war, in line with the Kremlin’s view of the situation. 
However, others appear to show he believes that the 
US should have armed Ukraine to better defend itself. 

Figure 1: Defence expenditure as a share of GDP
Based on 2010 prices and exchange rates

2014

2015

2016

2.38

2.21 2.16

2.00

1.78

1.56 1.54 1.49 1.48 1.45 1.38 1.35 1.23 1.21 1.19 1.17 1.17 1.16 1.11 1.04 1.01 0.99 0.94 0.91 0.85

NATO Guideline 2%

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EPSC Brief 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Share of equipment in overall defence expenditure
Based on 2010 prices and exchange rates

2014

2015

2016

32.82

27.65

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25.79

24.51

25.60 25.03

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15.23 14.91 14.43

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9.43 8.27

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Source: NATO

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Scenarios for a New  
US Administration

Loud America 
Donald Trump may surprise the world 
and still turn out to be a president 

more in line with his predecessors in terms of 
America’s engagement with the world – although 
conspicuously more vocal on some issues. He could opt to 
have a more detached ceremonial role and get involved 
only on more symbolic issues that resonate with his 
domestic base of supporters and that he raised during 
his campaign (e.g. Trans-Pacific Partnership; threatening 
to impose ‘very major’23 border taxes on US companies 
that would move production overseas; building the wall 
with Mexico; and curbing illegal immigration) and leave 
the daily hard work and demands of high office to Vice-
President Mike Pence (who was the chairman of the 
transition team, has executive political experience and 
strong ties to the Republican Party establishment).

In this scenario, while the rhetoric and the 
President’s twitter account may, at times, be 
harsh or inflamed, US policy would in fact not 
change considerably in practical terms. For 
instance, the US has long demanded that its European 
allies spend more on defence, in line with the 2 percent 
of GDP NATO benchmark. For many years, Europeans 
have been slow to comply, but this has not diminished 
Washington’s commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. 

The new president’s unpredictable nature should thus 
rather act as an incentive and an opportunity for 
Europe to step up its commitment to European security 
and defence, and to assume a more resolute role in 
defending multilateralism. 

The EU should also be on the ready and prepared 
to counter occasional gripes coming from 
Washington. Irritants of the past (e.g. tax policy, 
data privacy, internet firms) will still be there and 
will probably be harder to address, also taking into 
consideration that many incoming administration 
officials at various levels will have little or no knowledge 
of the EU and its workings. 

Walled America 
An ‘America Frist’ presidency, as 
announced by President Trump on 

inauguration day, may launch a period of increased 
retrenchment and protectionism. Broadly, US 
foreign policy has oscillated between internationalism 
and isolationism throughout past decades. This time 
round, and giving credit to the pronouncements of the 
new president, the US may turn further inward and 
accelerate its disengagement from the international 
system and from the institutions that make up today’s 
global governance architecture. It is unlikely that the 
US would be able to completely isolate itself in a still 
globalised and interdependent world, but this scenario 
will give rise to more uncertainty and volatility. 

5

EPSC Brief 
 
 
 
Given that there are no political vacuums in 
international politics, the void will naturally be filled. And 
this presents an opportunity for Europe, if it can 
rise to the challenge, to defend multilateralism 
and the present global order more forcefully and 
uphold the banner of Western values and institutions. 
On the other hand, there is risk that Europe, mired in its 
own internal problems and in the political uncertainty 
that 2017 brings, would opt to pursue its own 
introversion. In this case, it is likely that other actors, 
like Russia and China, will attempt to play an even more 
decisive role in trying to replace the global leadership 
role exerted by the US until now. 

Changes in the United Nations system, the International 
Financial Institutions (Internation Monetary Fund and 
World Bank), the World Trade Organisation, the G20 and 
G7, can be expected if the US becomes less active in 
these fora. The EU should be prepared for this and 
take a leadership role with a clear understanding that 
some of the international architecture and norms need 
to be preserved, while others may need to be reformed 
to better reflect the current distribution of power in the 
world. At the same time, new structures may need to 
be created to deal with emerging issues, from cyber-
security and internet governance to urbanisation. 

Trouble America 
In this scenario, the new administration 
not only actively and purposefully 

Implications for the EU

Unpredictability is likely to be the name of the 
game, at least in the first months of the new US 
administration. We may not see the dominance of one 
of the scenarios outlined above, but a combination of 
all three, possibly in a state of constant fluctuation 
between them. Events are likely to drive policy 
outcomes, at least as much as design. 

A further complicating factor in understanding what 
the new US administration will embark upon is the 
divergent views that many of Trump’s senior 
cabinet picks have expressed: they not only disagree 
among themselves on some issues (e.g. Russia), but 
they also contradict the president on some policies (e.g. 
trade). Before the inauguration, the incoming White 
House press secretary said that President-elect Trump 
was not looking for ‘clones’24 and that he supported 
this diversity of views. Among the principals and White 
House senior staff, it is likely that those that have the 
ear of the president and are last in the room will have 
a stronger influence in the President’s decisions. For the 
moment, and while the confirmations are still ongoing, it 
seems that those that are closer to the president have 
been calling the shots (e.g. the way in which the so-called 
Muslim ban was drafted and rolled out seems to point to 
an exclusion of key cabinet members from the process, 
not to mention executive agencies).

undermines the current global order and institutions, 
but it gives ‘troublemakers’ a free rein in exchange 
for ‘good deals’ for America (e.g. Crimea in exchange for 
nuclear arms reduction). This is by far the most negative 
and unsettling outlook for the EU. US commitments to 
international treaties and its attachment both to the 
EU and European security and stability – hallmarks of 
the current world order – could become conditional or 
subject to a transactional cost-benefit analysis. This could 
potentially lead to disagreements and even hostility 
between transatlantic partners, weakening both. 

Irrespective of what will come next, the EU needs to 
be resilient and prepared for any possible situation. 
This could be the opportunity that many Europeans 
have longed for: without disavowing our enduring 
alliance with the US and its people, the EU has a 
chance to affirm itself on the global stage as a 
more autonomous political player, perhaps even 
strengthening the transatlantic partnership in the 
longer term. And this should be done with like-minded 
partners, such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, 
Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and South Korea.

Additionally, if President Trump lives up to his campaign 
promises, embarking on a revision of existing or 
expected trade deals (e.g. North Atlantic Free Trade 
Agreement, Trans-Pacific Partnership, and Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership), and confronting 
China with a spike in tariffs, this could lead to trade 
wars and undermine the current World Trade 
Organisation system. The repercussions would 
depend on how others react to such protectionist or 
offensive trade policies. A more confrontational America 
may also create a security dilemma for many countries 
in the world, including Russia and China. This could lead 
to further destabilisation of Eastern Europe, North Africa 
and the Middle East, with clear negative consequences 
for the stability and security of the European continent. 

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EPSC Brief 
Dealing with Possible Early 
Actions of the Trump Presidency

Europe’s responses to the immediate challenges posed 
by the Trump presidency will be of particular importance 
and will shape the future of the relationship. The EU 
should therefore be prepared to address the following 
contingencies: 

utmost seriousness by the Chinese authorities, 
as it affects the country’s entire subsidy system. 
Therefore, the EU has no reason to go beyond its 
latest policy recalibration and sympathise in any way 
with the US administration’s trade offensive vis-à-vis 
China. It should also take active steps to preserve the 
multilateral architecture, including the World Trade 
Organisation, by committing to respect its rules and 
arbitration mechanisms, also in a situation in which 
they would be challenged by the US. 

•  Possible lifting of Russia sanctions

•  US withdrawal from the Paris climate 

Such a decision could have several consequences: it 
could act to legitimate a Russian sphere of influence 
in Europe’s vicinity and embolden the Kremlin into 
more foreign adventurism in Europe, the Middle 
East and North Africa; it could further drive the US 
and Europe apart; break Europe’s unity vis-à-vis 
Moscow, leading to a serious crisis within the EU; and 
empower populist movements in Europe, provoking 
further domestic instability in a crucial electoral year.

Suggested response: The EU should maintain its 
position that sanctions are inextricably linked to the 
implementation of the Minsk agreement. At the same 
time, the EU should engage in a fresh diplomatic 
effort with Moscow and Kiev. It should step up 
pressure to stabilise the situation, by means of closer 
monitoring of the withdrawal of Russian military 
support to the separatists, and of the fulfilment of 
Ukrainian obligations, including the holding of local 
elections in Eastern Ukraine. The EU would need to 
enter this negotiation from a position of strength, 
declaring readiness to contribute to a potential 
United Nations peacekeeping mission to monitor 
border security along the Russian-Ukrainian border.  

•  Triggering a trade war between the US and China
Although there are real issues relating to China’s 
overcapacity, direct confrontation is likely to 
exacerbate the problem. China did engage in currency 
manipulation in the past decade but it has recently 
been supporting its currency instead to prevent 
excessive capital flows. Imposing a 45 percent tariff 
on 500 billion US dollars worth of US imports from 
China would be highly detrimental to both sides and 
could increase unemployment in the US to nearly 9 
percent by 2020, according to the Peterson Institute. 

Suggested response: The EU should insist that 
the World Trade Organisation framework needs to 
remain in place as an organising platform for the 
multilateral trading relationship. The EU’s reformed 
trade defence mechanism is a powerful and sufficient 
instrument which has already been treated with 

agreement
This decision would trail President Trump’s declared 
scepticism (if not denial) of climate change, whereby 
he has presented it as a Chinese scam to make US 
manufacturing less competitive. Whether the US 
should seek an informal or a formal withdrawal from 
the agreement, it will not happen overnight. In the 
short term, such a decision could act as a trigger 
for other reluctant countries that are parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) to take action undermining the 
pledges and goals agreed in Paris. At the same time, 
this could isolate the US on a key segment of future 
global market growth, potentially stimulating other 
major economies to invest in the climate agenda, as 
already indicated by China and India.

Suggested response: The EU should stay at 
the forefront of defending the Paris accord and 
multilateral mechanisms that drive forward the 
global climate agenda. It is key for the EU to position 
itself as a global leader in the competition for the 
next generation of clean technologies, such as 
renewable energy, electric cars and batteries, and 
digital infrastructures. If the past can serve as a 
guide, the parties to United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change should keep engaging 
and negotiating with the new US administration 
as they did when former President George W. Bush 
rejected the Kyoto Protocol. The EU should also 
actively demonstrate to its transatlantic partners 
that such a decision would destroy jobs in the US 
and would also generate huge public spending and 
healthcare costs. The EU should engage with leading 
US companies and civil society groups that advocate 
for renewables, low-carbon technology, as well as 
global climate action.

•  Abrogating the Iran nuclear deal

It should not come as a surprise if the new 
administration decides to repeal the Iran nuclear 
deal, even though it remains unlikely given that 
the US would then take responsibility for the likely 

7

EPSC Brief 
resumption of the Iranian nuclear programme. 
However, abrogation of the agreement would be 
consistent with President Trump’s public statements. 
Additionally, it is likely that Washington will push 
back more forcefully against Iran’s regional actions, 
also as a way to prop up the traditional allies of the 
US in the Middle East.

Suggested response: The EU should maintain its 
commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action and continue supporting its implementation. 
One year after its roll-out, the agreement is delivering 
on its main purpose: helping to ensure the civilian 
nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran is verifiably 
complying with its nuclear-related obligations, but 
permanent monitoring is needed. The EU should seek  

reassurances that Tehran remains committed to 
discontinuing the nuclear programme in exchange for 
lifting EU and international sanctions. It should also 
seek the continued engagement of other negotiating 
parties (especially China and Russia). In addition, the 
Union should find allies in the administration and in 
the Republican Party that could mitigate the effects 
of such a decision. US Secretary of Defence James 
Mattis has publicly supported the accord, while the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives Paul Ryan 
has said that it would not be possible to set the 
clock back and reintroduce abandoned multilateral 
sanctions, even if the deal is a ‘huge mistake.’25

Conclusions: Prepare for the Worst but Relentlessly  
Pursue a Positive Agenda

The Trump administration will remain ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’, as Winston 
Churchill once said of Russia. At the same time, the uncertainty and unpredictability of times ahead should 
not overshadow our judgment. The recent past of ‘polycrisis’ has been fertile in surprises and setbacks, but 
has also opened up new opportunities.

There is still a vast common agenda between 
the EU and the US that is no less relevant under 
the new American president. Instead of reacting 
to every single provocation that comes its way, 
the EU should tirelessly stress its commitment 
to transatlantic relations based on values of 
mutual respect. It should also identify issues, 
such as the fight against terrorism, where the 
Trump presidency might see an opportunity for 
closer cooperation. While being prepared for every 
possible contingency, the EU must remain true to 
itself, in the belief that time is on its side. 

Figure 3: The transatlantic economy vs. 
the world, 2014
Share of world total (in %)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

34.1

29.8

25.3

59.4

70.0

50.2

29.0

GDP

Exports Imports

FDI 
Inward 
Stock

FDI 
Outward
 Stock

M&A 
Sales

M&A 
Purchases

Notes: FDI = Foreign Direct Investment; M&A = Mergers and Acquisitions
Source: United Nations, International Monetary Fund

8

EPSC Brief 
 
Notes and References

1.  The White House, The Inaugural Address, 20 January 2017.

2.  Phillips, Tom, Donald Trump and China on dangerous collision 

14. Chris Mooney, Trump: There is ‘some connectivity’ between humans 
and climate change, in The New York Time, 22 November 2016.

course, say experts, in The Guardian, 7 February 2017.

15. Ibid.

3.  AFP, South China Sea: US reports ‘unsafe encounter’ with Chinese 

16. Joseph Schatz, Trump’s EU jab ignores US role in Europe, in Politico, 

military aircraft, in The Guardian, 10 February 2017.

25 July 2016.

4.  BBC News, Full transcript of Trump press conference, 11 January 

2017.

17. Ian Schwartz, Full Replay: Donald Trump And Theresa May Hold A 
Joint Press Conference, in RealClear Politics, 27 January 2017.

5.  Sophie Tatum, Trump defends Putin: ‘You think our country’s so 

18. Henry Mance et al, Donald Trump takes swipe at EU as ‘vehicle for 

innocent?’, in CNN, 6 February 2017.

Germany’, 16 January 2017.

6.  The White House, Readout of the President’s Call with Russian 

President Vladimir Putin, 28 January 2017.

19. Sophia Rosenbaum, Trump defends immigration ban, calls the 
world ‘a horrible mess’, in New York Post, 29 January 2017.

7.  Julian Borger et al, Trump administration ‘officially putting Iran on 

20. Reuters, Trump says NATO is obsolete but still ‘very important to 

notice’, says Michael Flynn, 2 February 2017.

me’, 16 May 2017.

8.  Reuters, Trump tweets ‘Iran is playing with fire’, says won’t be as 

21. The White House, Remarks by President Trump to Coalition 

kind as Obama, 3 February 2017.

9.  Ben Wolfgang, Vice President Mike Pence: White House ‘evaluating’ 
President Obama’s Iran nuclear deal, in The Washington Times, 5 
February 2017.

Representatives and Senior U.S. Commanders, 6 February 2017.

22. The White House, Readout of the President’s Call with President 

Petro Poroshenko of Ukraine, 13 February 2017.

23. The New York Times, Trump on a ‘Very Major’ Border Tax, 23 

10. Reuters, Trump election puts Iran nuclear deal on shaky ground, 9 

January 2017.

November 2016.

11. Thomas Erdbrinkfeb, Iran’s Supreme Leader Thanks Trump for 

Showing America’s ‘True Face’, in The New York Times, 7 February 
2017.

12. Steve Holland and Emily Flitter, Exclusive: Trump would talk to 

North Korea’s Kim, wants to renegotiate climate accord, in Reuters, 
18 May 2016.

13. Demetri Sevastopulo and Bryan Harris, Mattis reassures allies on 
North Korea threat, in The Financial Times, 3 February 2017.

24. Igor Bobic, Donald Trump’s Cabinet Nominees Disagree With Him 
On A Lot Of Things. It May Not Matter, The Huffington Post, 12 
January 2017.

25. Ben Wolfgang, Vice President Mike Pence: White House ‘evaluating’ 
President Obama’s Iran nuclear deal, in The Washington Times, 5 
February 2017.

PDF: ISBN 978-92-79-70512-0  •  ISSN 2529-623X  •  doi:10.2872/255910  •  Catalogue number: ES-AD-17-001-EN-N
HTML: ISBN 978-92-79-70511-3  •  ISSN 2529-623X  •  doi:10.2872/654991  •  Catalogue number: ES-AD-17-001-EN-Q

9

EPSC BriefANNEX: President Trump’s 
Team (in alphabetical order)

Stephen Bannon, 63, Chief 
Strategist and Senior Advisor 
to the President, was formerly 
the executive chairman of 
Breitbart News – a conservative 
news website which has been 
blamed by some in the US 
of promoting xenophobic and racist views. He is a 
Washington outsider like his boss and, in what many 
see as a departure from tradition, President Trump 
has given him a seat at the National Security Council. 
There is a general perception in Washington that he is 
the mastermind behind the flurry of activity in the first 
days of the administration, including the ‘travel ban’ 
on citizens and refugees from seven Muslim majority 
countries which is now temporarily suspended at the 
order of a federal judge from Washington State, a 
decision subsequently upheld by a federal appeals court. 
He seems to be the ideologue in the president’s inner 
circle. He has spoken about the crisis of capitalism and 
of the traditions that underpin the Judeo-Christian West, 
and has praised political parties like the United Kingdom 
Independence Party and France’s National Front as 
members of a larger global political movement.

Elaine Chao, 63, Secretary of 
Transportation, has vast executive 
experience, having served in 
both Bush administrations: first 
as director of the Peace Corps 
and then as Labour Secretary for 
8 years under George W. Bush. 
She will be key in delivering one of President Trump’s 
key election campaign promises: the infrastructures 
programme. She is married with Mitch McConnell, 
the Senate majority leader (Republican senator from 
Kentucky).

Kellyanne Conway, 50, 
Counsellor to the President, was 
formerly a Republican strategist 
and pollster and one of the 
main architects of President 
Trump’s road to victory serving 
as his campaign manager in the 
final months of the race. She is a combative (and often 
divisive) operative figure, serving as a ‘front woman’ for 
the president, defending his decisions and actions. She has 
become ubiquitous in the many US political commentary 
and news shows. Her ‘alternative facts’ expression will 
certainly haunt this presidency.

10

Betsy DeVos, 58, Secretary of 
Education, is a billionaire owner 
of a company that invests in 
manufacturing, technology and 
clean energy. She has been a 
fundraiser for the Republican 
Party. Her nomination to the 

Department of Education has raised opposition from 
groups in the US that support public schools and believe 
she will seek to privilege private schools. 

Rudy Giuliani, 72, Chairman of 
the Cyber-Security Committee, 
was formerly the Mayor of New 
York. This is a new role created by 
Trump to increase US defences 
on cyber, an area that the new 
president believes was overlooked 

by the Obama Administration. Giuliani is likely to have 
informal influence within the US national security 
apparatus.

Nikki Haley, 44, Ambassador 
to the United Nations, was 
previously Governor of South 
Carolina. She is the daughter 
of Indian immigrants. She was 
critical of Donald Trump during 
the campaign. A rising star in the 
Republican Party, she has no foreign policy experience. 

Keith Kellogg, 72, Acting 
National Security Advisor, was 
a lieutenant general in the US 
Army. He is presently replacing 
General Michael Flynn, who was 
forced to resign amid allegations 
that he had illegally discussed US 

policy with a Russian diplomat in Washington. Kellogg 
had a 36-year long career in the military. During the 
campaign, he was appointed as one of Donald Trump’s 
Foreign Policy Advisors. In the Washington beltway, 
Vice Admiral Robert Harward, a onetime Navy SEAL and 
former deputy commander of US Central Command, 
is being tipped as the frontrunner to replace General 
Flynn as National Security Advisor. He is described as 
the antithesis of General Flynn. He has partly grown up 
in Iran while his father, also a navy officer, was serving 
during the Shah years. The current Secretary of Defence 
has praised his brilliance and he would be seen as a 
steady hand if he takes the job. He is presently the 
Chief Executive Officer of Lockheed Martin UAE, United 
Arab Emirates.

EPSC Brief 
John Kelly, 66, Secretary for 
Homeland Security, is a retired US 
Marine Corps general and the former 
commander of the US Southern 
Command, overseeing military 
operations and liaison relationships 
across Central and South America, 

Mike Pence, 57, Vice-President 
of the United States, was a 
former congressman for 12 
years and former Governor of the 
State of Indiana. He has valuable 
political and executive experience, 
something that is lacking in many 

and working with several Department of Homeland Security 
agencies at the time. He is a border security hawk and, like 
the president, has warned about drugs, terrorism and other 
cross-border threats that he believes are coming from 
Mexico and Central and South America.

of President Trump’s appointees. He was chairman of 
the president’s transition team. For the moment, he is 
set to become the president’s eyes and ears on Capitol 
Hill and a bridge to the Republican Party.

Mike Pompeo, 52, Central 
Intelligence Agency Director, 
member of the House of 
Representatives and in the ranks 
of the Tea Party Movement within 
the Republican Party. He is also 
a former military officer. He took 

is new job at the moment when the row between the 
incoming administration and the intelligence community 
was swelling over Russian hacking and interference in 
the US presidential election and this will be a hot file on 
his desk.

Tom Price, 62, Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, 
was a congressman hailing from 
Georgia for 12 years. He has 
been one of the leading voices in 
Congress to repeal and replace 
the Affordable Care Act – or so-
called ‘Obamacare’. He is close to Vice-President Mike 
Pence and House Speaker Paul Ryan. He will need to 
work closely with Republicans in Congress to eventually 
replace Obamacare.

Reince Priebus, 44, White House 
Chief of Staff, is an attorney 
and politician and previously 
served as the Republican 
National Committee’s chairman. 
He was critical of some of the 
positions that Mr Trump voiced 

as a candidate (e.g. Muslim ban), but maintained 
the Republican National Committee’s support to the 
businessman nevertheless. Priebus’ close relations with 
Republicans in Congress can also prove to be an asset in 
the long term for President Trump.

Jared Kushner, 35, Senior White 
House Advisor to the President, 
is Donald Trump’s son-in-law. A 
millionaire Orthodox Jew married 
to Ivanka Trump, he became a 
steady and trusted advisor during 
the campaign. While his role will 

be broad, he is expected to work on issues related to the 
Middle East and Israel. He is thought to also be one of 
the most influential advisors in the new White House. 

James ‘Mad Dog’ Mattis, 66, 
Secretary of Defence, is a retired 
US Marine Corps general who last 
served as the 11th Commander 
of the US Central Command. He 
is considered an intellectual in 
the military with great strategic 

acumen. In his confirmation hearing in the Senate, Mattis 
considered President Putin a threat to global order whose 
goal was to break the NATO alliance. While he considered 
it important to engage with Moscow, he admitted that the 
issues where cooperation was possible were decreasing 
and the ones where confrontation was necessary were 
increasing. He has publicly supported the Iran deal. He 
defended the strengthening of US alliances, the need to 
respect treaty obligations and the importance of burden 
sharing, whereby those who benefit from shared defence 
should carry part of the cost. In his first trip abroad, 
Secretary Mattis flew to Tokyo and Seoul to reassure 
American allies in the region of Washington’s enduring 
commitment to the security and stability of the Asia-
Pacific region.

Steve Mnuchin, 54, Secretary 
of the Treasury, was a former 
Senior Executive at Goldman 
Sachs and a successful hedge 
fund manager. As an early Trump 
supporter, he served as National 
Finance Chairman during the 
campaign. He has no government experience, but is 
considered by President Trump’s close associates as a 
financial expert.

11

EPSC Brief 
Jeff Sessions, 70, Attorney 
General, was for the past 20 
years a senator from Alabama. 
He was the first senator to 
endorse Trump’s run for the 
presidency. A conservative, he has 
consistently opposed immigration 

reform in the Senate. He is a controversial figure in 
American politics and many allege that he has made 
racist comments and shown sympathy for the Ku Klux 
Klan, a white supremacist movement in the US.

Rex Tillerson, 64, Secretary 
of State, was formerly the 
Chief Executive Officer of Exxon 
Mobile. As a businessman, he 
received the Order of Friendship 
from Vladimir Putin. During his 
confirmation hearing in Congress, 

Tillerson said the US should be ‘clear-eyed’ about its 
relationship with Russia. He criticised the annexation 
of Crimea; admitted that Russian hacking reports were 
‘troubling’; and acknowledged that NATO allies were 
right to feel alarmed by its resurgence. However, he 
favoured an open and frank dialogue with the Kremlin; 
was ambiguous on the issue of sanctions; and favoured 
joining forces with the Russians in fighting radical 
Islam. In the hearing, Tillerson also deviated from the 
president-elect, saying that he was not opposed to the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership; supported NATO’s Article 5 
commitment; and rejected the idea of Japan, South 
Korea and Saudi Arabia acquiring nuclear weapons. 
He set as a first priority combating radical Islam and 
defeating ISIS and called for a tougher approach to 
China. The words ‘Europe’ or ‘European Union’ did not 
feature on the nine pages of his prepared remarks for 
the Senate confirmation.

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EPSC Brief