REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Report on the application in the Member States of Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances for the period 2012-2014
Date: 2017-11-16
Institutions: Directorate-General for Environment, European Commission
Subjects: accident prevention, accidental pollution, dangerous substance, environmental impact, industrial accident, industrial hazard, public health

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 16.11.2017  COM(2017) 665 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Report on the application in the Member States of Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances for the period 2012-2014  
 
 
Report from the Commission 

REPORT ON THE APPLICATION IN THE MEMBER STATES OF DIRECTIVE 96/82/EC ON 
THE CONTROL OF MAJOR-ACCIDENT HAZARDS INVOLVING DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES 
FOR THE PERIOD 2012-2014 

Contents 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 2 

2.  SUMMARY OF THE REPORTS BY MEMBER STATES ...................................... 4 

2.1.  Number of establishments ................................................................................. 4 

2.2.  Risk management measures .............................................................................. 5 

2.2.1.  Preparation of external emergency plans (EEP) .................................. 6 

2.2.2.  Testing and review of external emergency plans ................................ 7 

2.2.3. 

Information to the public ..................................................................... 8 

2.3. 

Inspections ......................................................................................................... 9 

3.  STATISTICS ON MAJOR ACCIDENTS DRAWN FROM EMARS ..................... 12 

4.  CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD .............................................................. 15 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Major accidents involving dangerous substances pose a significant threat to humans and 
the  environment.  Furthermore  such  accidents  cause  substantial  economic  losses  and 
disrupt  sustainable  growth.  At  the  same  time  the  use  of  large  amounts  of  dangerous 
substances  is  unavoidable  in  some  industry  sectors  which  are  vital  for  a  modern 
industrialised  society.  To  minimise  the  associated  risks,  measures  are  necessary  to 
prevent major accidents and to ensure appropriate preparedness and response should such 
accidents nevertheless happen. 

Council  Directive  96/82/EC1  on  the  control  of  major-accident  hazards  involving 
dangerous  substances  ("Seveso-II-Directive")  provides  for  the  relevant  framework  on 

1  Directive  96/82/EC,  OJ  L  10,  14.1.1997,  p.13;  amended  by  Directive  2003/105/EC,  OJ  L  345, 

31.12.2003, p.97 

2 

 
 
 
                                                 
risk  management  measures  to  prevent  major-accidents  and  to  limit  their  consequences. 
The  Seveso-II-Directive  was  meanwhile  replaced  by  Directive  2012/18/EU2  ("Seveso-
III-Directive") that had to be transposed by Member States by 31 May 2015.  

Under  Article  19(4)  of  the  Seveso-II-Directive,  Member  States  shall  provide  the 
Commission with a three-yearly report on the implementation of the Seveso-II-Directive. 
The  Commission  shall  publish  a  summary  of  this  information  every  three  years.  The 
present report primarily provides this summary for the period 2012-2014. In addition, the 
replacement of the Seveso-II-Directive  by the Seveso-III-Directive also provides for an 
opportunity to assess not only the latest reporting period but also to consider the overall 
progress made during the lifetime of the Seveso-II-Directive. 

Chapter 2 of this report summarises the information provided by the Member States on 
the basis of a questionnaire3, which focussed on earlier identified problem areas. The aim 
of this summary is to assess the level of implementation and to identify any shortcomings 
that  need  to  be  addressed.  Chapter  3  supplements  this  with  data  on  accidents  resulting 
from  an  analysis  of  the  eMARS4  database,  operated  by  the  Major  Accident  Hazard 
Bureau  of  the  Joint  Research  Centre  of  the  European  Commission,  on  the  basis  of 
information supplied by the Member States. Conclusions and the way forward follow in 
Chapter 4. 

Like for previous assessments, the Commission contracted an external service provider to 
analyse the reports provided by Member States, as well as other relevant data. The study 
produced  by  the  contractor  is  available  in  the  EU  Bookshop5  and  provides  a  detailed 
analysis  of  the  information  reported,  including  an  analysis  for  each  Member  State,  and 
other available information. 

The  full  contributions  of  the  28  Member  States  and  the  voluntary  contribution  from 
Norway,  as  well  as  the  questionnaire,  the  previous  reports  for  the  periods  2000-20026, 
2003-20057, 2006-20088, and 2009-20119 can be found online in CIRCABC10. 

2  Directive  2012/18/EU of  the  European Parliament  and  of  the  Council of 4  July  2012  on  the  control  of 
major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and subsequently repealing Council 
Directive 96/82/EC Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 197, 24.7.2012, p. 1–37   

3 Document (C(2011) 4598 final, Commission Implementing Decision of 30.06.2011 

4 Major Accident Reporting System (https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu)  

5 http://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/26c9aa63-523e-11e7-a5ca-01aa75ed71a1  

6 Document C(2004)3335 

7 Document C(2007)3842 

8 Document C(2010)5422 final  

9 Document C(2013) 4035 final 

10 https://circabc.europa.eu/w/browse/4cc9ca17-0920-4d8a-8796-6ffa170612b7  

3 

 
 
                                                 
2.  SUMMARY OF THE REPORTS BY MEMBER STATES 

All 28 Member States submitted their triennial reports to the European Commission.  

2.1.  Number of establishments11 

Member  States  reported  a  total  of  11297  establishments  as  falling  under  the  Seveso-II-
Directive. This constitutes a net increase by 983 establishments compared to 2011 (10314 
establishments),  most  of  which  are  lower-tier  establishments  (LTE)  (756)  and  the 
remaining  upper-tier  establishment  (UTE)  (227).  While  almost  all  Member  States 
reported  an  increase,  a  significant  share  of  this  increase  occurred  in  Germany  (+859 
establishments).  The  data  available  does  not  allow  understanding  why  the  increase 
occurred  (possible  reasons  could  for  example  be  economic  expansion,  better 
implementation, or stricter classification of dangerous substances). 

Figure 1: Number of Seveso establishments in 2014 

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DE FR IT UK ES NL SE PL BE RO FI HU CZ BG EL PT AT DK IE SK EE LV SI HR LT CY LU MT

UTE

LTE

.

As  shown  in  Figure  2,  a  slow  but  steady  increase  can  be  observed  in  the  number  of 
establishments  covered  by  the  Directive.  This  needs  to  be  put  in  context  with  three 
enlargement  rounds  during  this  period  (2004,  2007  and  2013),  continuously  increasing 
knowledge  on  dangerous  substances,  economic  growth  and  improving  implementation. 
Data on lower-tier establishment was only reported as of the reporting period 2009-2011. 

11 Based on Member States' reports  

4 

 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of the number of establishments reported12 

12000

10000

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0

6279 

5523 

3742 

3684 

3278 

3949 

4528 

4791 

5018 

1996

1999

2002

2005

2008

2011

2014

UTE

LTE

Among 48 activities used to categorise Seveso establishments, four activities account for 
almost 40% of establishments: 

(1) 

(2) 

General chemicals (763 establishments = 12,3%) 

Fuel storage (650 establishments = 10,5%) 

(3)  Wholesale and retail (553 establishments = 8,9%); 

(4) 

LPG production, bottling and bulk distribution (465 establishments = 7,5%) 

2.2.  Risk management measures 

The  preparation  of  safety  reports  (which  includes  conducting  a  risk  assessment), 
emergency plans for upper-tier establishments, as well as measures to inform the public 
and inspections are key pillars of prevention of and preparedness for major-accidents. 

Earlier  assessments  of  the  application  of  the  Seveso-II-Directive  showed  no  systematic 
shortcomings  of  operators  in  the  preparation  of  safety  reports  and  internal  emergency 
plans. Therefore, this issue was no longer part of the questionnaire during the reporting 
period 2011-2014. 

The Seveso-II-Directive imposes several obligations on competent authorities, of which 
the  most  important  are:  to  examine  the  safety  reports  and  to  communicate  their 
conclusions to  the operator, to  draw up external emergency  plans (EEP), to  ensure that 

12  Data  on  1996  and  1999  is  not  fully  comparable  due  to  differing  definitions  on  establishments  and 
installations.  Several  installations  in  the  same  establishment  may  have  been  reported  individually 
which explains the apparent decrease in 2002. 

5 

 
 
 
                                                 
the public liable to be affected is informed on safety measures, to carry out inspections, 
to  identify  groups  of  establishments  with  possible  domino  effects,  and  to  take  into 
account land-use planning implications of major-accident hazards. 

2.2.1.  Preparation of external emergency plans (EEP) 

EEPs  are  to  be  prepared  by  authorities  for  upper-tier  establishments.  These  plans  are 
important to allow rapid and coordinated response to major accidents and play a vital role 
in minimising their effects.  

Most Member States have made good progress over the last reporting periods in ensuring 
that EEP are drawn up, but on average, there was no further progress compared to the last 
reporting period. By the end of the reporting period, 40713 upper-tier establishments were 
not covered by an EEP, which represents 8% of the total upper-tier establishments at EU 
level (2010: 7%). 

Figure 3: Upper-tier establishments with external emergency plans 

120

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AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE EL ES FI FR HR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK

% of UTE with EEP

There  may  be  well-founded  reasons  why  an  EEP  is  not  available,  e.g.  in  cases  of  new 
establishments or when major changes took place shortly before the end of the reporting 
period.  However,  several  Member  States  reported  an  exceptionally  large  share  of 
establishments (i.e. above the average of 8%) without EEPs.  

In the cases of low number of EEPs, the reasons varied significantly. One Member State 
indicated  that  6  of  its  regional  authorities  had  not  adopted  external  emergency  plans. 
However, there was no indication on how many of its 25 establishments were affected by 
this thus no quantification could be made. Another Member State indicated that a single 
EEP  was  developed  for  the  whole  country  which  was  not  site  specific  and  from  the 
information provided it was not clear how that was tested. During the follow-up by the 

13  This  data  excludes  the  187  establishments  for  which  the  competent  authorities  decided  an  external 

emergency plan was not required in accordance with Article 11(6) of the Seveso-II-Directive. 

6 

 
 
                                                 
Commission, this Member State informed that the situation has meanwhile changed and 
individual EEPs were produced and tested after 2014. 

2.2.2.  Testing and review of external emergency plans 

EEPs  have  to  be  reviewed  and  tested  at  intervals  of  no  longer  than  three  years.  An 
outdated or untested EEP could be fatal in case of an emergency. 

In general, most Member States have made some progress over the last reporting periods 
in ensuring that EEPs are tested but although there are huge fluctuations on average no 
noteworthy progress was made compared to the previous reporting period. In the 2006-
2008 reporting period, 60% of the upper tier plans were reviewed and tested. In the 2009-
2011 period this share increased to 73% and reached 75% by the end of 2014. This seems 
to indicate that Member States are getting more efficient at testing EEPs, but have still a 
way to go in reaching the target of 100%.  

Figure 4: External emergency plans tested during 2012-2014 14 

120

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50 

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AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE EL ES FI FR HR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK

% EEP tested

Several Member States reported an exceptionally large share of EEPs as not tested, while 
some  Member  States  managed  to  test  the  majority  of  the  EEPs  or  at  least  significantly 
improved their rate, several Member States have made little progress.  

The  reported  reasons  for  not  testing  EEPs  may  be  well-founded,  however  they  varied 
significantly. One Member State reported that the EEPs could not be tested because most 
of the emergency services were composed of volunteers and this would make it difficult 
to  organise  tests.  Another  Member  State  indicated  that  it  would  have  a  single  non-site 
specific  EEP  for  the  whole  country  but  from  the  information  provided  it  was  not  clear 
how  that  was  tested.  Several  Member  States  did  not  provide  further  justification  while 
others informed that the situation was under investigation. Finally, some Member States 

14  This  data  excludes  the  187  establishments  for  which  the  competent  authorities  decided  an  external 

emergency plan was not required in accordance with Article 11(6) of the Seveso-II-Directive. 

7 

 
 
                                                 
informed that the establishments were new or changed status only recently or there had 
been updated thus the testing was not feasible within the reporting period. 

2.2.3.  Information to the public 

Information on safety measures and on requisite behaviour in the event of an accident has 
to be supplied regularly, without their having to request it, to persons liable to be affected 
by a major accident. The Directive leaves it open with regard to who is responsible for 
this  and  how  this  is  provided.  The  maximum  period  between  the  repetitions  of  this 
information  to  the  public  is  five  years,  i.e.  two  years  longer  than  the  reporting  period. 
Therefore,  not  providing  such  information  during  the  reporting  period  does  not 
automatically suggest that there was non-compliance with the requirements. 

Figure  5:  Information  made  available  for  upper  tier  establishments  during  2012-
201415,  

120

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AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE EL ES FI FR HR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK

% of UTE with information made available

On average 81% of the upper-tier establishments had information made available and ten 
Member  States  reported  that  the  information  was  made  available  during  the  reporting 
period  for  all  upper-tier  establishments.  This  is  a  decrease  compared  to  87%  in  the 
previous  reporting  period,  but  as  outlined  above,  this  does  not  allow  concluding  that 
there was non-compliance.  

Most Member States reported that this information is provided in the form of leaflets and 
use  other  means  of  communication  in  addition  (e.g.  websites,  public  meetings).  Five 
Member States  reported that  the information  is  only  made  available online, which may 
not reach all persons liable to be affected. While some of those Member States make this 
information available also upon request to the competent authorities or in the operator's 
premises, this might not be in line with the spirit of "without having to ask for it". It is 

15  Some  values  are  over  100%  due  to  variations  in  the  number  of  establishments  during  the  reporting 

period.  

8 

 
 
                                                 
also noteworthy that in case of an accident, an increasing number of Member States uses 
mobile  solutions  such  as  warning  apps,  SMS  or  social  media  to  alert  everybody  in  the 
affected area and point to requisite safety behaviour. 

The  reported  reasons  for  not  providing  information  varied  significantly,  e.g.  lack  of 
information available; information was provided before the current reporting period and 
no update was required since; some establishments were new or became upper-tier only 
towards the end of the reporting period and the information was currently being prepared. 
Some  Member  States  informed  that  they  have  establishments  that  would  not  have  any 
off-site  risks.  Several Member  States  indicated  that  they became  aware  of  the  situation 
due to the reporting and the situation would be further investigated. 

2.3. 

Inspections 

The Seveso-II- Directive requires Member States to establish an inspection system and a 
programme  of  inspections  for  all  establishments.  Upper-tier  establishments  are  to  be 
inspected every twelve months, unless a system of systematic appraisal is deployed. 10 
Member States reported that such a system is applied. 

Figure 6 depicts the situation of those Member States without systematic appraisal16, i.e. 
where  upper-tier  establishments  consequently  need  to  be  inspected  annually.  While  12 
out of 18 Member States concerned reach or almost reach the target, there are significant 
deficits in some Member States. Those can be explained by: budgetary or organisational 
constraints,  lack  of  relevant  information  from  the  regional  competent  authorities, 
application of a mixed system under which establishments would in principle be subject 
to  annual  inspections  (hence  the  inclusion  in  Figure  6)  but  authorities  may  reduce  the 
frequency to once every 18 month. 

16 Some Member States reported mixed systems, e.g. depending on the regional approach. For the purpose 

of this report, these Member States were accounted as applying systematic appraisal. 

9 

 
                                                 
Figure  6:  Annual  inspection  of  upper-tier  establishments  during  2012-2014  in 
Member States without systematic appraisal15 

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% of UTE inspected

As  shown  in  Figure  7,  overall  86%  of  upper-tier  establishments  had  been  inspected  at 
least once during the reporting period. While Figure 6 indicates that some Member States 
appear to have difficulties to reach their annual target, Figure 7, which also includes the 
Member  States  applying  a  system  of  systematic  appraisal,  suggests  that  upper-tier 
establishments  are  at  least  inspected  at  regular  intervals  in  the  most  Member  States. 
Furthermore,  this  constitutes  an  improvement  compared  to  earlier  reporting  periods 
(2006-2008: 66%, 2009-2011: 65%). 

Figure 7: Inspection of upper-tier establishments at least once during 2012-201415,   

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% of UTE inspected

10 

 
 
 
For  inspections  in  lower-tier  establishments  the  Seveso-II-Directive  does  not  include  a 
frequency  requirement.  All  Member  States  reported  that  they  inspect  also  lower-tier 
establishments  during  the  reporting  period.  However,  with  77%  the  overall  the  rate  of 
inspections  is  lower  than  for  upper-tier  establishments.  Member  States  did  not  provide 
reasons  for  low  inspection  rates  in  LTE  but  it  can  be  assumed  that  they  are  similar  to 
those  for  UTE.  On  the  positive  side  this  is  a  significant  improvement  compared  to  the 
42% inspected during the previous reporting period 2009-2011. 

Figure 8: Inspection of lower tier establishments at least once during 2012-201415 

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% of LTE inspected

While noteworthy progress has been made compared to earlier reporting periods and the 
number  of  inspections  is  increasing  (Figure  9),  the  situation  on  inspections  is  still  not 
fully  satisfactory  in  several  Member  States.  It  can  nevertheless  be  assumed  that  the 
observed  rate  of  compliance  by  establishments  with  the  requirements  of  the  Seveso-II-
Directive is in part a result of the rigorous inspection regime mandated by the Directive. 

11 

 
 
Figure 9: Evolution of the number of inspections reported 

4838 

4323 

2741 

2999 

3174 

2395 

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2005

2008

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UTE

LTE

In  order  to  improve  the  situation  further,  clearer  inspection  requirements  have  been 
introduced with the Seveso-III-Directive establishing amongst other a timeframe also for 
lower-tier  establishments  (at  least  every  three  years),  clarifying  the  provisions  on 
inspection plans and systematic appraisals and an obligation for non-routine inspections 
e.g. after serious complaints or near misses17. 

3.  STATISTICS ON MAJOR ACCIDENTS DRAWN FROM EMARS 

The number of major accidents is one of the key indicators to measure the performance 
of the Seveso-II-Directive and its aim to prevent major accidents. On itself this figure is 
however  not  significant,  as  it  needs  to  be  considered  that  other  factors  influence  the 
assessment,  such  as  the  increasing  number  of  establishments  or  the  impact  (health, 
environmental, economic ) of accidents. In particular for the latter little data is available 
hence limiting the possibility to assess the situation. Finally, the relatively low number of 
comparable  accidents  with  similar  causes  and  impacts  does  not  allow  drawing  sound 
conclusions. 

17  Near  misses  are,  for  instance,  serious  safety  relevant  incidents  which  eventually  did  not  lead  to  an 

accident as the situation was eventually brought under control. 

12 

 
 
 
                                                 
Figure  10:  Number  of  major  accidents  meeting  at  least  one  criterion  of  Annex  VI 
over the period 2000- 201418 

s
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major accidents

UTE

Between 2000 and 2014 a total of 490 accidents were reported to the eMARS database. 
Out of those, 421 were major accidents fulfilling at least one criterion of Annex VI19 to 
the  Seveso-II-Directive.  This  means  that  there  are  on  average  30  major  accidents  per 
year. Around 70% of the major accidents occurred in upper-tier establishments. As can 
be  seen  in  Figure  10,  overall  the  number  of  major  accidents  remains  relatively  stable 
despite  the  increase  in  the  number  of  sites  covered  by  the  Seveso-II-Directive.  In 
addition, Figure 11 suggests that the number of fatalities has reduced since 2000 which 
could  indicate  that  the  impact  of  accidents  might  be  reducing.  It  is  in  particular 
encouraging that no offsite fatality was reported after 2004.  

18 This graph only shows UTE because the number of LTE is only available as of the 2009-2011 reporting 
period,  as  explained  earlier  in  this  report.  However,  it  can  be  assumed  that  including  LTE  would 
actually  not  change  the  overall  picture  as  the  increase  of  LTE  and  UTE  is  largely  similar  over  the 
years. Statistically reliable data on accidents is not available prior to 1991. 

19  For  editorial simplification,  for  the  purpose  of  this chapter,  the  term  'major  accident'  refers  to  the 421 
accidents  that  were  reported  as  fulfilling  at  least  one  criterion  of  Annex  VI.  For  the  other  reported 
accidents it is not easily possible to establish whether they constitute major accidents or other kinds of 
accidents that were reported on a voluntary basis e.g. for the purpose of lesson learning. 

13 

 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Number of onsite and offsite fatalities in 2000- 2014 

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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Onsite

Offsite

Number of fatalities

The reasons for reporting major accidents have not changed much over the years. Among 
the hazardous phenomena involved in the reported accidents, toxic release appears to be 
the  most  frequent.  This  correlates  with  the  fact  that  the  majority  of  accidents  involve 
toxic  and/or  flammable  substance.  Considering  also  the  number  of  establishments,  the 
collected  data  shows  that  the  petrochemical  &  oil  refineries  sector  are  most  prone  to 
major accidents.  

14 

 
 
 
Figure  12:  Reasons  for  reporting  major  accidents  in  eMARS  for  the  period  2000-
201420, 21 

Reason 1 (quantity)

Reason 2 (health)

183 

159 

Reason 3 (environm. damage)

29 

Reason 4 (property damage)

111 

Reason 5 (transboundary impact)

5 

Reason 6 (lessons learned)

39 

No reason provided

28 

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Number of accidents reported

The eMARS database includes limited information about socio-economic consequences 
(e.g. lost property, environmental damage, job-loss, image loss, long-term impact on the 
neighbourhood).  Only  124  out  of  490  accidents  reported  include  such  data  to  some 
extent. Typically, this is limited to  the  immediate impact (e.g. insured losses) and does 
not  consider  wider  or  long-term  impacts  (e.g.  job-loss,  environmental  damage).  More 
substantial  information  about socio-economic consequences is  publically available only 
for  a  small  number  of  exceptional  major  accidents.  The  United  Kingdom's  Health  and 
the  economic 
Safety  Executive  has  developed  a  methodology  for  modelling 
consequences  for  some  impacts  of  a  major  accident22.  Although  this  excludes  certain 
important  impacts  (including  environmental  damage),  applying  this  approach  to  the 
European  Union  suggests  an  annual  impact  in  the  order  of  several  billion  Euro.  While 
improved  knowledge  of  socio-economic  consequences  would  be  useful  to  better 
understand  the  impact  and  benefits  of  the  legislative  framework,  it  would  constitute  a 
significant effort to collect such information more systematically. 

20  Sum  of  reasons  is  higher  than  the  total  number  of  accidents  reported  because  an  accident  may  fulfil 

several reasons. 

21 The criteria behind the reasons can be summarised as follows: 

•  Reason 1: Substances involved: greater than 5% of quantity in column 3 of Annex I; 
•  Reason 2: Injury to persons: >= 1 fatalities, >= 6 hospitalising injuries etc.; 
•  Reason 3: Immediate damage to the environment (according to Annex VI); 
•  Reason 4: Damage to property: onsite >2M Euro, off-site > 0.5M Euro; 
•  Reason 5: Cross-border damage: transboundary accidents;  
•  Reason 6: Interesting for lessons learned 

22 http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrhtm/rr1055.htm  

15 

 
 
 
                                                 
4.  CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD 

Considering the very high rate of industrialisation in the European Union, the Seveso-II-
Directive has contributed to  achieving a low frequency  of major  accidents. It is  widely 
considered as a benchmark for industrial accident policy and has been a role model for 
legislation in many countries world-wide. 

The  above  analysis  confirms  that  the  Seveso-II-Directive  is  working  properly.  The 
practical  implementation  and  enforcement  of  the  Seveso-II-Directive  has  further 
improved  in  most  areas,  and  in  particular  industry  operators  are  complying  to  a  large 
extent  with  the  requirements  regarding  safety  reports  and  internal  emergency  plans. 
However,  as  was  observed  already  for  the  previous  reporting  periods,  efforts  are  still 
needed in some fields in a small number of Member States. This concerns in particular 
the  development  and  testing  of  external  emergency  plans,  providing  information  to  the 
public and inspections. However, while these shortcomings may have increased the risk, 
there is no evidence that this has already resulted into a higher rate of major accidents in 
those Member States. 

Despite the increase in the number of establishments covered by the Seveso-II-Directive, 
overall  the  annual  number  of  major  accidents  remained  stable  around  30  per  year  and 
there are indications that their impact is decreasing. 

The findings covering the previous reporting period have been taken into account by the 
Commission  in  the review  of  the  Seveso-II-Directive,  which  has  led to  the  adoption  of 
the  Seveso-III-Directive.  The  new  Directive  improves  the  right  of  the  public  to  be 
appropriately  informed,  making  certain  provisions  also  applicable  to  lower-tier 
establishments. It includes detailed rules to guarantee adequate consultation of the public 
on individual projects and introduces stricter provisions on inspections. Compliance with 
the  Seveso-III-Directive 
the  necessary 
improvements highlighted in this report.  

therefore,  expected 

to  contribute 

is, 

to 

The  Commission  will  closely  monitor  progress  on  these  issues  and  continue  to  assist 
Member States to further improve their level of performance, through various supporting 
activities and enforcement action as appropriate. 

The Commission will also continue working on simplification of reporting process thus 
reducing  administrative  burden  whilst  improving  the  relevance  and  quality  of  the  data 
deducted from the reports. To achieve this, the monitoring systems will be reviewed also 
with  a  view  to  develop  indicators  to  better  monitor  the  implementation  and  assess  the 
performance of the Seveso-III-Directive. 

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