REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL On Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism
Date: 2017-11-15
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Bulgaria, corruption, independence of the judiciary, judicial reform, organised crime, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 15.11.2017  COM(2017) 750 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL On Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism {SWD(2017) 700 final}  
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION  

The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) was set up at the accession of Bulgaria 
to  the  European  Union  in  20071  to  address  shortcomings  in  judicial  reform  and  the  fight 
against corruption and organised crime. Since then, CVM reports have sought to help focus 
the  efforts  of  the  Bulgarian  authorities  through  specific  recommendations  and  have  charted 
the progress made. As underlined by the Council2, the CVM will end when all six benchmarks 
applying to Bulgaria are satisfactorily met. 
In  the  January  2017  CVM  report,3  the  Commission  took  stock  with  an  overview  of  the 
achievements, and the challenges outstanding, and set out the key remaining steps needed to 
achieve  the  CVM's  objectives.  To  this  end,  the  Commission  made  seventeen  key 
recommendations  that  if  followed  up  will  lead  to  the  conclusion  of  the  CVM  process.  The 
recommendations  set  out  in  January  2017  can  therefore  be  considered  as  sufficient  to  close 
the CVM – except if developments were to clearly reverse the course of progress. The report 
highlighted that the speed of the process would depend on how quickly Bulgaria will be able 
to fulfil the recommendations in an irreversible way.  

Therefore,  at  this  stage  of  the  CVM  process,  this  report  presents  the  progress  made  in 
following up the recommendations set out in the January 2017 report. As in previous years, it 
is the result of a careful process of analysis by the Commission, drawing on close cooperation 
with  Bulgarian  institutions,  as  well  as  the  input  of  civil  society  and  other  stakeholders, 
including other Member States.  

In  his  September  2017  State  of  the  Union  address,  President  Juncker  emphasised  the 
importance of the rule of law and of the independence of the judiciary;4 an imperative valid 
for all EU Member States, not just those involved in the CVM.  

Based on its analysis of progress in Bulgaria over the entire span of the CVM process since 
2007  and  on  progress  made  since  the  January  2017  report,  the  Commission  remains  of  the 
opinion  that,  with  a  continued  political  steer  and  a  determination  to  advance  the  reform, 
Bulgaria should be able to fulfil the remaining outstanding CVM recommendations in the near 
future.  The  analysis  underlines  the  importance  of  addressing  the  remaining  challenges  in  a 
spirit of good cooperation between institutions. 

The  Commission  intends  to  assess  progress  towards  the  end  of  2018,  and  stands  ready  to 
provide further assistance to help reinforcing the irreversibility of progress and therefore bring 
the mechanism to a conclusion. 

2.   GENERAL SITUATION 

As  noted  in  the  January  2017  report,  political  instability  over  the  years  has  affected  the 
capacity for reform. A new government came into office in May.5 Once the new government 
was  in  place,  the  various  strands  of  work  which  had  been  underway  under  the  previous 

1   Conclusions  of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  17  October  2006  (13339/06);  Commission  Decision  of  13 
December 2006 establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Bulgaria to address 
specific  benchmarks  in  the  areas  of  judicial  reform  and  the  fight  against  corruption  and  organised  crime 
(notified under document number C(2006) 6570). 

2    Council conclusions on the CVM. 
3   COM(2017) 43 final, 25.1.2017. 
4   http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm 
5   The caretaker government, in place until the formation of the new government in May, was able to take some 
steps of a preparatory or administrative nature, but progress on major legislative reforms was slowed down.  

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government  in  2016  were  revived,  allowing  reforms  to  move  ahead  with  a  degree  of 
continuity  in  policy,  picking  up  work  from  the  previous  government.  The  new  Government 
showed  determination  to  make  up  for  lost  time  by  pushing  ahead  quickly  with  legislative 
initiatives, targeting the completion of a number of significant reforms before the end of the 
year.  In  some  cases,  individual  stakeholders  have  raised  concerns  about  the  quality  of 
legislation or their involvement in the process.6 Important legislative initiatives are still under 
preparation or consideration and it will be important for these to be brought forward in a spirit 
of broad public debate and consultation with affected stakeholders. The Commission believes 
that  inclusive  legislative  processes  relying  on  better  regulation  principles  are  central  to  the 
sustainability of reform. 

Meanwhile, recent events in the National Assembly have again drawn attention to the impact 
of an unpredictable legislative decision-making process. In July a package of draft proposals 
for changes to the Judicial Systems Act were put on the agenda of the National Assembly by 
MPs, without public debate or consultation of stakeholders. The draft amendments gave rise 
to widespread criticism, as they were seen by many within the judiciary and civil society as a 
direct  attack  on  judicial  independence.  While  the  most  far-reaching  amendments  were 
withdrawn before the final vote7, some amendments which were adopted were criticised for 
potentially  undermining  the  independence  of  judges  and  are  seen  by  some  observers  as 
potentially unconstitutional.8 Additional draft amendments to the Judicial Systems Act were 
introduced in the same manner in early October, by individual MPs without public debate or 
consultation of stakeholders, and were again criticised by observers as reversing key elements 
of the 2016 reforms.9 Bulgaria should ensure the irreversibility and credibility of the judicial 
reform  process  by  establishing  an  environment  of  mutual  trust  and  cooperation  between 
institutions, crucial for the successful implementation of reforms. Whilst there is a clear need 
to  accelerate  the  pace  of  reform,  this  should  not  lead  to  the  by-passing  of  consultation 
procedures, which would risk creating a climate of uncertainty and a lack of ownership. 

In  the  judiciary,  the  newly  elected  Supreme  Judicial  Council  (SJC)  has  an  opportunity  to 
address the generally negative environment of debate which has reigned within the judiciary 
under the previous SJC, with evident divisions and mutual suspicions hampering an impartial 
decision-making process. Recent reforms have introduced undeniable improvements, notably 
the establishment of separate chambers within the SJC for judges and prosecutors. However, 
lingering  doubts over possible undue influence on judges through the SJC could undermine 

6   See below in 3.2. An important element in the implementation of the judicial reform strategy of 2014 was the 
establishment in early 2016 of a consultative council for judicial reform, which via the direct involvement of 
stakeholders in the preparation of the amendments, played a key role in ensuring wide public support for the 
major legislative changes adopted in 2016. In 2017, the determination to see quick results in some cases have 
resulted  in  a  less  inclusive  approach,  affecting  the  reception  of  reforms  by  affected  parties  within  the 
judiciary and civil society.  

7   Notably,  some  of  the  draft  amendments  would  have  restricted  the  access  of  professional  associations  of 

magistrates to foreign funding. These amendments were eventually withdrawn.  

8   This  referred  notably  to  amendments  for  the  obligatory  suspension  of  any  magistrate  being  put  under 
criminal  investigation,  without  right  of  appeal,  and  requiring  magistrates  to  declare  their  membership  of 
professional associations. Concerns were raised that in the Bulgarian context, such provisions could either be 
misused or inadvertently result in pressure on judges. The first element mentioned above was also criticised 
in  a  recent  Opinion  of  the  Venice  Commission  (see  reference  in  footnote  10  below).  Following  it,  on  27 
October, Bulgaria adopted further amendments addressing some of the concerns expressed.   

9   These amendments aimed at allowing the posting of magistrates to other courts for longer periods of time as 
well  as  the  introduction  of  performance-based  remuneration  for  magistrates  in  the  specialised  court  and 
prosecutor's office dealing with high-level corruption and organised crime. 

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the impression of an independent decision-making process within this key institution.10 Given 
this challenge, it will therefore be important for the new composition of the SJC to create an 
atmosphere  of  open  debate  and  transparency  on  key  decisions  so  as  to  recreate  the  trust 
among magistrates and the wider public which is fundamental to a well-functioning judiciary.  

3.  ASSESSMENT  OF  PROGRESS  ON  THE  FULFILMENT  OF  THE  CVM 
BENCHMARKS ON THE BASIS OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS SET OUT IN 
THE JANUARY 2017 CVM REPORT  

3.1   Benchmark One: Judicial Independence 

Recommendation  1:  Ensure  a  transparent  election  for  the  future  SJC,  with  a  public  hearing  in  the 
National  Assembly  before  the  election  of  the  members  of  the  parliamentary  quota,  and  giving  civil 
society the possibility to make observations on the candidates. 

Recommendation 2: Establish a track record of transparent and merit-based appointments to high–
level  judicial  posts,  including  the  upcoming  appointment  of  a  new  President  of  the  Supreme 
Administrative Court. 

Recommendation  3:  To  improve  the  practical  functioning  of  the  ISJC  and  the  follow-up  by  the 
Supreme  Judicial  Council  to  the  inspectorate's  findings,  in  particular  on  integrity  issues,  consider 
soliciting external assistance, for example from the SRSS and/or Council of Europe. 

The most important development this year in regard to the judiciary has been the election of a 
new  Supreme  Judicial  Council  (SJC),  which  took  office  on  3  October.  The  elections  to  the 
judicial  quota  were  completed  in  June  in  accordance  with  the  "one  magistrate-one  vote" 
principle,  previously  highlighted  by  the  Commission,  and,  despite  some  concerns  voiced  at 
the  time,  the  process  was  generally  regarded  as  fair.  This  was  a  significant  improvement 
compared  to  the  election  of  the  previous  SJC  in  autumn  2012.11  The  election  of  the 
parliamentary  quota  was  completed  by  the  National  Assembly  on  20  September  with  the 
successful  candidates  being  elected  by  well  over  the  required  two-third  majority.  Criticism 
was  raised  in  the  media  and  civil  society  that  the  outcome  was  predetermined  through 
agreements  between the  main political  parties, and, with  a threadbare debate, that it did  not 
reflect an open consideration of the relative merit of the candidates.  12 A particular criticism 
voiced was that the prior public hearing in the legal affairs committee did not allow time to 
address  critical  questions  raised  by  civil  society,  though  these  were  received  and  made 
available for the public on the National Assembly's website. Overall, however, the elections to 
the new SJC showed the merits of the new legislative framework which was put in place in 
2016. It will now be up to the new composition of the SJC to illustrate their independence in 
practice through a track record of impartial and professional decision-making in key areas.  

10   The basis of such concerns in remaining structural weaknesses in the Bulgarian system have recently been 
highlighted  in  reports  of  the  Venice  Commission  and  the  Group  of  States  against  Corruption  (GRECO  - 
established in 1999 by the Council of Europe to monitor compliance with the organisation’s anti-corruption 
standards),  see  GRECO's  compliance  report  on  Bulgaria  of  June  2017  (https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/-
/bulgaria-publication-of-the-fourth-round-compliance-report)  and  the  Venice  Commission's  opinion  on 
Bulgaria  of  October  2017 
(http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-
AD(2017)018-e). 

11   In the January 2014 CVM report, the Commission regretted that the election of the judicial quota suffered 

from the decision not to allow for direct elections by judges - COM(2014) 36 final. 

12   In particular taking into consideration that the proportion of members elected by the National Assembly in 

the Judges' College remains high: the same number as for the judges elected by their peers. 

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An important responsibility of the SJC is the appointment to high level positions within the 
judiciary.  It  will  be  important  to  see  such  decisions  being  made  in  a  merit  based  and 
transparent manner. A particularly important decision in 2017 was the nomination of the new 
chair of the Supreme Administrative Court. Even though this decision could have been taken 
by  the  new  composition  of  the  SJC,  the  outgoing  SJC  decided  to  elect  its  nominee  on  11 
September  and  present  their  candidate  for  confirmation  by  the  President  of  the  Republic.13 
Meanwhile,  the  President  returned  the  candidature  on  the  grounds  that  it  would  have  been 
more legitimate if the nomination process had been completed by the new incoming SJC. This 
allowed  the  new  composition  of  the  SJC  to  reconsider  the  nomination  at  a  meeting  on  19 
October, where the chosen candidate was confirmed by a second vote with a wide majority.  

The  other  main  institution  set  up  under  the  Constitution  to  protect  the  independence  of  the 
judiciary  is  the  Inspectorate.  Constitutional  amendments  enacted  in  2015  gave  the 
Inspectorate stronger powers in key areas such as integrity, including checks on conflicts of 
interest  and  private  assets  of  magistrates,  and  a  more  central  role  in  the  preparation  of 
disciplinary proceedings. Although final decisions on such proceedings remain with the SJC, 
such  powers  are  inevitably  sensitive  –  disciplinary  decisions  of  the  SJC  have  given  rise  to 
controversies in the past – and therefore need to be implemented in a careful manner. Taking 
this  background  into  account,  the  January  2017  report  recommended  that  the  Bulgarian 
authorities  call  upon  external  expertise  to  improve  the  practical  functioning  of  the  new 
inspection and disciplinary system.14 In October, the Venice Commission adopted an opinion 
on  Bulgaria  which  contains  important  elements  which  could  form  the  basis  for  further 
assessment in the context of such a review.15  

On  the  basis  of  an  analysis  of  recommendations  1,  2  and  3,  overall,  Bulgaria  has  made 
further  significant  progress  on  benchmark  one.  However,  some  elements 
from 
recommendation 2 and 3 are still outstanding and will require further follow-up in the coming 
months.  

3.2   Benchmark Two: Legal Framework 

Recommendation  4:  Adopt  amendments  to  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  and  the  Criminal  Code  to 
improve the legal framework for the prosecution of high-level corruption and serious organised crime. 

On  criminal  procedures,  a  package  of  amendments  to  the  criminal  procedure  code  was 
adopted  by  the  National  Assembly  in  July.  These  proposals  aim  at  addressing  delays  in 
criminal  proceedings,  notably  by  limiting  the  ability  of  courts  to  refer  cases  back  to  the 
Prosecutor's Office on formal grounds. While many of the changes are in line with proposals 
that  were  presented  already  in  the  autumn  2016,  there  were  concerns  voiced  that  the  final 
package was pushed through in the National Assembly without much time for wider debate 
within the judiciary, leaving some possible concerns unaddressed. One consequence of these 
newly  enacted  amendments  was  the  transfer  of  jurisdiction  over  corruption  cases  involving 
high-level officials – including ministers, MPs and magistrates – to the Specialised Court for 
Organised  Crime.  The  very  short  deadline  made  available  for  the  implementation  of  this 

13   According to the Bulgarian Constitution it is the President who appoints the chairs of the two supreme courts 
as well as the Prosecutor General, on a motion of the SJC. The President can refuse a candidate once, but 
cannot block a second time.    

14   The Bulgarian government has expressed interest in SRSS assistance for the Inspectorate.  
15   See reference in footnote 10 above.  

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change has created organisational challenges.16 As noted in the January report, such changes 
need to be carefully prepared and accompanied by appropriate analysis on resource needs and 
possible legal implications of the changes. In addition, the amended Criminal Procedure Code 
was  accompanied  by  specific  amendments  to  the  Judicial  Systems  Act  providing  for  a  new 
possibility to remove judges from office, which has been raised as a concern by the Venice 
Commission.17 More generally, the impact of the still recent changes is expected to become 
visible in the track record on cases as the various provisions are implemented in practice.  

A range of additional areas for possible legislative changes to the criminal procedures and the 
criminal  code  are  under  consideration  in  working  groups  under  the  Ministry  of  Justice, 
benefiting  from  technical  input  from  the  Public  Prosecutor's  Office  and  others,  to  address 
issues identified in the context of benchmarks three and four.18 The issues under consideration 
have  been  identified  by  experts  and  Bulgarian  authorities  as  being  relevant  for  a  more 
effective investigation and prosecution of serious offences linked to corruption and organised 
crime. However, in order to foster the necessary trust in this process among the wider public, 
as well as acceptance within the judiciary of the changes proposed, it is of key importance that 
fundamental  changes  to  the  criminal  laws  are  carried  out  in  a  transparent  way,  following 
public  debate  within  the  judicial  professions  and  consultation  of  civil  society.  Not  only  the 
content  of  the  legislative  changes,  but  also  the  procedure  used  for  their  preparation  and 
adoption, have an impact on the sustainability of progress.  

Overall,  Bulgaria  has  taken  concrete  steps  to  address  recommendation  4  to  meet  the 
objectives  of  benchmark  two.  A  number  of  changes  to  the  criminal  procedure  code  have 
already  been  adopted,  and  further  legislative  proposals  are  in  preparation  in  relation  to 
benchmarks three and four, including in the criminal code. The successful implementation of 
these reforms will require careful preparation and follow-up, in addition to public debate and 
consultation of relevant stakeholders in the judiciary and civil society.  

3.3   Benchmark Three: Continued Judicial Reform 

Recommendation  5:  Publish  a  report  for  public  consultation  detailing  the  progress  made 
implementing  the  national  judicial  reform  strategy  and  setting  out  the  remaining  steps  to  be  taken. 
Establish  a  mechanism for continued public  reporting  of progress for the  remaining  duration  of the 
strategy's implementation. 

Recommendation 6: Address the workload situation in the busiest courts based on the new workload 
standards, and agree a roadmap for the reform of the judicial map in parallel with the development of 
e-justice. 

Recommendation 7: Establish a roadmap for the implementation of the recommendations of the SRSS 
report  concerning  the  reform  of  the  Prosecutor's  Office  and  its  interactions  with  other  institutions, 
including a mechanism for the reporting of progress to the wider public. 

Recommendation 8: Establish a roadmap for the implementation of the recommendations of the study 
[on ECtHR rulings], including a mechanism for the reporting of progress to the wider public. 

16   In apparent connection with the enacted amendments, additional draft amendments to the  Judicial Systems 
Act  were  proposed  in  the  National  Assembly  in  early  October  without  prior  debate  or  consultation,  which 
were  criticised  for  calling  into  question  elements  of  previously  enacted  reforms  and  possibly  raising 
additional concerns. The amendments were nevertheless adopted by the National Assembly on 27 October. 

17   See footnote 8 above. 
18   See below in 3.3 and 3.4. 

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in 

the  January  2017  report  aimed  at  strengthening  public 
Four  recommendations 
accountability and cooperation between institutions. The goal was to foster wider ownership 
in society to the reform process and thereby provide a stronger element of irreversibility. This 
is  particularly  relevant  in  the  context  of  the  continued  reform  of  the  judiciary.  While  a 
successful  implementation  of  the  judicial  reform  strategy  ultimately  needs  to  rest  on  the 
involvement  of  many  separate  institutions,  both  within  the  judiciary  and  beyond,  the 
government and the SJC have a key role in this process, including in providing an overarching 
framework for public debate and inter-institutional consultations. Some steps have been taken 
by the Bulgarian government, with a commitment to publish regular reports on progress under 
the strategy. This could form the basis of public debate as well as a dialogue with the SJC and 
the  judiciary  at  large  on  the  concrete  measures  and  specific  objectives  which  need  to  be 
pursued  in  order  to  achieve  the  overall  strategic  goals  set  out  in  the  2014  strategy  over  the 
remaining  period  until  2020.19  It  is  expected  that  this  process  is  brought  forward  in 
cooperation with the newly elected SJC in the coming months.  

A reform of the judicial map and the introduction of a comprehensive e-justice system have 
been  on  the  agenda  for  some  years,  with  the  previous  SJC  having  carried  out  a  significant 
amount of preparatory work, and further analysis being underway under a project supported 
with EU funds. This still appears to be a longer term project, to be developed by the new SJC 
and  also  requiring  wider  political  support.  However,  some  elements  can  move  ahead  more 
quickly.  Notably,  the  Prosecutor  General  has  already  presented  a  concrete  model  for  a 
consolidation of local prosecutors' offices within the 28 regions, which would not necessarily 
require a parallel consolidation of the local courts. More specifically, there is an urgent need 
to  address  the  workload  imbalances  between  courts,  with  especially  the  larger  courts  in  the 
capital being subject to higher workload than the average.20 This issue is inevitably one of the 
important agenda items for the new SJC as it takes up its functions. Besides the allocation of 
extra  staff  to  overburdened  courts,  another  possible  approach  consists  in  reconsidering  the 
jurisdiction for certain types of cases. The government is exploring certain possibilities in this 
direction. Such  changes naturally  require appropriate consultations and debate with relevant 
stakeholders, notably given the impact on access to justice.  

Important avenues for further possible reforms have been highlighted last year in an analysis 
of  the  Bulgarian  Prosecutor's  Office,  which  was  carried  out  with  assistance  from  the 
Commission's  Structural  Reform  Support  Service  (SRSS)  with  a  team  of  senior  prosecutors 
from Germany, The Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. The Bulgarian authorities – 
with the Prosecutor's Office in the lead and with the support of the Ministry of Justice – have 
prepared a roadmap containing a number of actions as a follow-up to this analysis. Given the 
complexities involved, many of the actions envisaged in the roadmap are still to be translated 
into  concrete  outcomes  and  decisions  on  how  to  proceed.21  It  remains  to  be  seen  if  a 
consensus can be developed among the various institutions involved on the changes which are 
necessary in order to implement a thorough follow-up to the recommendations set out in the 
expert report.22  

19   An English version of the strategy can be found via this link: www.strategy.bg/FileHandler.ashx?fileId=5570 
20   The  previous  SJC  developed  an  analytical  framework  for  the  analysis  of  workload,  which  is  now  bearing 

fruit in terms of providing comprehensive data on workload in all courts and prosecutors' offices.   

21   Many of the measures concern legislative changes in the criminal code or criminal procedure code and there 

is therefore a significant overlap with the measures envisaged under benchmark two above.  

22   An executive summary can be found at the website of the Bulgarian Ministry of Justice: 

http://www.mjs.bg/Files/Executive%20Summary%20Final%20Report%20BG%2015122016.pdf 

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In  a  separate  initiative  in  2016,  the  Prosecutor's  Office  itself  carried  out  an  analysis  of 
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (ECtHR)  rulings  concerning  ineffective  criminal 
investigations in Bulgaria. The follow-up to this analysis is also progressing in the context of 
a roadmap prepared by the Prosecutor's Office, which is in the process of implementation.  

Overall,  Bulgaria  has  taken  further  steps  to  address  the  four  recommendations  under 
benchmark three. However, these initiatives are still to be finalised and need to be translated 
into a clear plan of action to be taken in key areas.  

3.4   Benchmark Four: High-level Corruption 

Recommendation  9:  Adopt  a  new  legal  framework  on  the  fight  against  corruption  in  line  with  the 
intentions  set  out  in  the  anti-corruption  strategy,  and  ensure  its  implementation.  Set  up  an  effective 
anti-corruption authority. 

Recommendation 10: Adopt and implement a reform of the law on public administration to strengthen 
the internal inspectorates in the public administration. 

Recommendation 11: Building on the analysis of past cases, establish a roadmap between all relevant 
institutions  to  address  shortcomings  in  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of  high-level  corruption 
cases, including a mechanism for the reporting of progress to the wider public. 

Recommendation  12:  Establish  a  mechanism  for  public  reporting  on  progress  in  high-level 
[corruption] cases which are in the public domain. General Prosecution to report – whilst respecting 
the  presumption  of  innocence  –  on  investigations  and  indictments.  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  and 
Ministry of Justice to report on convictions as well as the enforcement of sentences. 

The  fight  against  corruption  was  highlighted  in  the  January  CVM  report  as  the  area  where 
least  progress  had  been  made  in  Bulgaria  over  the  ten  years  of  the  CVM,  including  in  the 
implementation  of  the  anti-corruption  strategy  that  was  adopted  in  201523  and  the  related 
efforts to pass a comprehensive reform of the legislative framework and set up a unified anti-
corruption agency. The new government presented a revised draft to the National Assembly 
on 4 October with the expressed aim of having this major legislative reform adopted by the 
end  of  the  year.  When  the  law  has  been  adopted,  the  new  institution  will  need  to  be 
established and start working.24 A key aspect will be the appointment of the leadership of the 
new  institution  in  an  open  and  transparent  procedure,  to  provide  the  basis  for  the  new 
institution  to  command  broad-based  trust  in  the  wider  society,  as  well  as  among  public 
officials.  

Another  important  element  coming  out  of  the  anti-corruption  strategy  in  2015  concerns  the 
operation of internal inspectorates in the State administration. These important structures are 
responsible for internal control of good administrative practices but have so far been working 
without a clear legal framework and common operating standards. In order to strengthen the 
role  of  the  inspectorates,  draft  amendments  to  the  Law  on  Public  Administration  were 
presented in September 2017 and adopted by the National Assembly on 12 October. The new 
law now needs to be implemented in concrete organisational terms.  

23   An English version can be found via this link: http://rai-see.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Bulgaria_Anti-

corruption_strategy_-2015.pdf 

24   In this context, the January 2017 report noted some concern as regards the continued effective functioning of 
the Commission for Illegal Asset Forfeiture in the new framework, an area where Bulgaria has developed a 
solid track record in recent years.  

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Apart  from  these  reforms  of  key  institutional  structures,  Bulgaria  also  needs  to  establish  a 
track record of effective investigation, detection and prosecution of corruption. Many of the 
challenges noted under benchmarks two and three above are particularly relevant also in this 
context. However, in order to ensure a specific focus on the challenges related to high-level 
corruption  cases,  the  Prosecutor's  Office  carried  out  an  analysis  of  a  sample  of  cases 
processed  since  2013,  in  order  to  identify  possible  lessons  to  be  learnt  and  measures  to  be 
taken to make such investigations and proceedings more effective in the future. On the basis 
of this analysis, a  roadmap was drawn up and is  now being carried forward by the  relevant 
institutions.  Regular  reporting  will  take  place  in  the  National  Council  for  Anti-Corruption 
Policies, established under the previous government to bring together the various institutions 
dealing with anti-corruption policy and chaired by a National Anti-Corruption Coordinator.25 
As  for  the  other  roadmaps  referred  to  under  benchmark  three  above,  many  of  the  measures 
envisaged  are  only  formulated  in  general  terms  and  have  not  yet  been  spelt  out  in  concrete 
actions.  

Finally,  an  important  element  underpinning  a  credible  strategy  for  the  investigation  and 
prosecution  of  high-level  corruption  is  the  existence  of  a  coherent  framework  for 
communication  to  the  public  about  progress.  In  response  to  the  recommendation  in  the 
January 2017 report, the Bulgarian Supreme Court of Cassation has established a mechanism 
for keeping track and reporting on corruption cases as they proceed through the court system. 
This  comes  in  addition  to  the  communication  by  the  Prosecutor's  Office  on  prosecutorial 
actions in concrete cases.26  

Overall, Bulgaria has taken further steps to address the four recommendations of the January 
report  under  benchmark  four.  However,  several  key  initiatives  are  still  to  be  adopted  and 
implemented. Others are in an initial stage of implementation with concrete actions still to be 
clearly defined.  

3.5   Benchmark Five: Corruption in General including Local Level and Borders 

Recommendation  13:  Carry  out  an  external  review  of  the  ex  ante  checks  of  public  procurement 
procedures and their follow-up, including ex post checks, as well as on cases of conflicts of interest or 
corruption discovered and remedial measures taken to address identified shortcomings. 

Recommendation 14: Put in place risk-based measures to address low-level corruption  in high risk 
sectors within the public administration, taking inspiration from what has been done in the Ministry of 
Interior. Continue the efforts in the Ministry of Interior. 

Recommendation  15:  Establish  a  mechanism  for  public  reporting  on  the  implementation  of  the 
national anti-corruption strategy covering the remaining duration of the Strategy's implementation. 

The  January  2017  report  acknowledged  progress  in  the  public  procurement  area  and 
recommended  Bulgaria  to  undertake  an  external  evaluation  of  the  functioning  of  the  new 
system  of  ex  ante  checks  and  their  follow-up.  In  response  to  this  recommendation,  the 

25   The  current  Deputy  Prime  Minister  for  Judicial  Reform  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  has  also  been 

appointed National Anti-Corruption Coordinator.  

26   On the latter, no systematic  mechanism of reporting has been put in place. The Prosecutor's Office reports 

such data to the SJC and the Ministry of Justice and also informs the public in regular press briefings.  

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Bulgarian authorities are reportedly envisaging having an external contractor to carry out such 
a review in 2018.27  

Another  strand  of  work  under  the  strategy  focuses  on  the  introduction  of  anti-corruption 
plans, with targeted and practical measures to prevent corruption in various high-risk sectors. 
The  National  Council  on  Anti-Corruption  Policies  decided  in  July  to  launch  a  review  of 
existing  sectorial  anti-corruption  plans  in  the  State  administration  in  order  to  identify 
possibilities for further coordinated action in this area. The review is expected to be finalised 
before the end of the year, following which it will need to be followed up in the various sector 
administrations. This is an area where continued and determined action is needed on the part 
of the management, inspectorates and other actors across the State administration.  

The final recommendation under this benchmark aims to ensure continued public debate and 
political  attention  to  the  implementation  and  further  development  of  the  Anti-corruption 
strategy, through a mechanism for public reporting. The Bulgarian authorities have decided to 
continue  the  National  Council  on  Anti-corruption  Policy  and  charge  it  with  regularly 
evaluating and informing the public on progress.  

Overall, Bulgaria has taken steps to address the three recommendations of the January report 
under benchmark five. On the basis of the steps taken, necessary actions should be taken in 
2018.  

3.6   Benchmark Six: Organised Crime 

Recommendation  16:  Establish  a  mechanism  for  public  reporting  on  progress  in  high-level 
[organised  crime]  cases  which  are  in  the  public  domain.  General  Prosecution  to  report  –  whilst 
respecting  the  presumption  of  innocence  –  on  investigations  and  indictments.  Supreme  Court  of 
Cassation and Ministry of Justice to report on convictions as well as the enforcement of sentences. 

Recommendation 17: Adopt the necessary amendments to the law on confiscation of criminal assets 
and ensure the Illegal Asset Forfeiture Commission continues to operate independently and efficiently. 

The  January  2017  report  recognised  that  a  broad  change  in  the  criminal  environment  has 
taken  place  over  the  past  ten  years, with  organised  crime  becoming  less  visibly  violent  and 
constituting less of a threat to the stability of society than in the past, and the overall picture in 
Bulgaria  therefore  becoming  more  similar  to  the  situation  in  some  other  Member  States.  In 
addition,  it  was  noted  that  the  specialised  institutions  which  had  been  created  in  2012  were 
beginning to establish a coherent track record in terms of final convictions in organised crime 
cases and the confiscation of illicit assets.  

The  report  nevertheless  included  some  key  final  recommendations  aimed  at  further 
consolidating  this  positive  trend.  Firstly,  it  was  recommended  to  establish  a  system  of 
reporting on serious organised crime cases allowing the public and media to follow progress 
on  such  cases.  This  recommendation  is  analogous  to  the  similar  recommendation  on  high-
level corruption cases and the measures taken cover both recommendations. As noted above, 
the  January  2017  report  acknowledged  the  track  record  of  the  Specialised  Court  and 
Prosecutor's Office on Organised Crime. However, the Commission notes that recent changes 
to  the  law  on  criminal  procedures  provides  for  important  organisational  changes,  with 

27   With funding provided from Operational Programme "Good Governance", under the European Social Fund. 

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jurisdiction in high-level cases being moved to the Specialised Court. Bulgaria should ensure 
that these changes will strengthen the progress already achieved in this area.  

Secondly, it was recommended to adopt amendments to the asset forfeiture law to address a 
number  of  challenges  which  had  been  identified  by  the  Commission  on  Illegal  Asset 
Forfeiture  (CIAF).  In  response  to  this  recommendation,  the  Bulgarian  authorities  have 
informed  the  Commission  that  the  legal  amendments  have  been  adopted.  The  Commission 
nevertheless  notes  that  the  new  anti-corruption  law  currently  under  consideration  in  the 
National  Assembly  includes  provisions  on  illicit  asset  forfeiture  and  provides  for  a  new 
institutional  set  up.  As  noted  in  the  January  2017  report,  it  will  be  important  to  ensure  that 
these  changes  do  not  put  into  question  the  progress  already  made  in  this  area  and  the 
institutions' ability to maintain the positive trend observed so far.  

Overall, Bulgaria has taken steps to implement recommendations 16 and 17 under benchmark 
six.  However,  the  Bulgarian  authorities  should  ensure  that  the  recent  decisions  on 
organisational  and  legal  changes  are  carried  out  in  such  a  manner  as  to  consolidate  the 
progress achieved.  

4. CONCLUSION  

During  the  nine-month  period  since  the  January  2017  report,  setting  out  the  key 
recommendations  to  fulfil  all  CVM  benchmarks,  further  positive  developments  have  taken 
place. While political uncertainty led to some delays in the implementation of reforms early in 
the year, since May the reform process has again taken on momentum, even if final outcomes 
are still to be seen, notably in areas requiring legislative reform and government action, such 
as  in  the  fight  against  corruption.  In  the  judiciary,  important  developments  have  also  taken 
place this year, notably with the election of a new SJC, the impact of which should begin to 
show in the coming year.  

This report notes that significant progress has been achieved on the recommendations set out 
in the January 2017 report, in particular recommendations 1, where it will now be up to the 
new  composition  of  the  SJC  to  demonstrate  results,  and  16  and  17,  where  the  progressive 
trend  should  be  maintained.  Important  progress  has  also  been  made  on  recommendation  4, 
although more remains to be done. While the Commission cannot yet conclude that any of the 
benchmarks  are  at  this  stage  satisfactorily  fulfilled,  it  remains  of  the  opinion  that,  with  a 
continued political steer and a determination to advance the reform, Bulgaria should be able to 
fulfil the remaining outstanding CVM recommendations in the near future.  

The  Commission  invites  Bulgaria  to  implement  the  necessary  actions  and  fulfil  all 
recommendations, and will assess progress again towards the end of 2018. 

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