COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT BULGARIA : Technical Report Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification mechanism
Date: 2017-11-15
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Bulgaria, corruption, independence of the judiciary, judicial reform, organised crime, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 15.11.2017  SWD(2017) 700 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT BULGARIA : Technical Report Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification mechanism {COM(2017) 750 final}  
 
 
Benchmarks  to  be  addressed  by  Bulgaria  pursuant  to  Commission  Decision  of  13/XII/2006 
establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Bulgaria to address specific 
benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organised crime1: 

Benchmark  1:  Adopt  Constitutional  amendments  removing  any  ambiguity  regarding  the 
independence and accountability of the judicial system 

Benchmark  2:  Ensure  a  more  transparent  and  efficient  judicial  process  by  adopting  and 
implementing  a  new  judicial  system  act  and  the  new  civil  procedure  code.  Report  on  the 
impact of these new laws and of the criminal and administrative procedure codes, notably on 
the pre-trial phase 

Benchmark  3:  Continue  the  reform  of  the  judiciary  in  order  to  enhance  professionalism, 
accountability  and  efficiency.  Evaluate  the  impact  of  this  reform  and  publish  the  results 
annually 

Benchmark 4: Conduct and report on professional, non-partisan investigations into allegations 
of  high-level  corruption.  Report  on  internal  inspections  of  public  institutions  and  on  the 
publication of assets of high-level officials 

Benchmark  5:  Take  further  measures  to  prevent  and  fight  corruption,  in  particular  at  the 
borders and within local government 

Benchmark  6:  Implement  a  strategy  to  fight  organised  crime,  focussing  on  serious  crime, 
money laundering as well as on the systematic confiscation of assets of criminals. Report on 
new and ongoing investigations, indictments and convictions in these areas 

List of acronyms:  

BORKOR: Centre for the Prevention and Counteraction of Corruption and Organised Crime 

CIAF: Commission on Illegal Asset Forfeiture 

CPACI: Commission for the Prevention and Ascertainment of Conflicts of Interest 

CVM: Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 

ECtHR: European Court on Human Rights 

ISJC: Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Council 

NAO: National Audit Office  

PACE: Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe  

SANS: State Agency for National Security 

SJC: Supreme Judicial Council 

SRSS: Structural Reform Support Service 

1 Previous CVM reports can be consulted at https://ec.europa.eu/info/effective-justice/rule-law/assistance-
bulgaria-and-romania-under-cvm/reports-progress-bulgaria-and-romania_en 

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INTRODUCTION 

This  technical  report  sets  out  the  information  which  the  Commission  has  used  as  the  basis  for  its 
assessment of Bulgaria's progress under the  Co-operation and Verification Mechanism (CVM)  since 
the  last  CVM  report  of  25  January  2017.  This  information  has  been  collected  from  a  variety  of 
sources. In the first place, the Commission has had the benefit of working closely with the Bulgarian 
government  and  key  judicial  and  State  bodies  on  CVM  issues,  which  have  provided  information  on 
progress in detailed and focused reports as well as in face-to-face meetings.2 The Commission services 
also follow developments on a continuous basis through a permanent presence in Sofia.3 Furthermore, 
Commission contacts with the Bulgarian administration across the full range of EU policies, including 
through the European Semester for economic governance, help to inform the CVM reports. Apart from 
official  contacts  with  Bulgarian  authorities,  the  Commission  meets  with  non-governmental 
organisations  active  in  the  area  of  judicial  reform  and  anti-corruption  work  as  well  as  with 
professional  associations  of  judges  and  prosecutors,  and  with  representatives  of  other  EU  Member 
States in Bulgaria. 

Over the years, Bulgaria has benefited from bilateral support from EU Member States among others. 
In  2016,  for  example,  several  Member  States  provided  experts  for  a  project  led  by  the  European 
Structural  Reform  Support  Service  (SRSS)  to  carry  out  an  independent  analysis  of  the  Public 
Prosecutor's Office of Bulgaria. Such assistance is in addition to the contribution from EU funds. In 
the current programming period, the Operational Programme "Good Governance" under the European 
Social Fund has dedicated approximately EUR 30 million to a separate priority axis for judicial reform 
in Bulgaria.4 Support from the SRSS also continues to be available for reforms in Bulgaria, including 
in the justice sector.5  

The Commission further draws on the various studies and reports that are available from international 
institutions  and  other  independent  observers  in  the  field  of  judicial  reform  and  the  fight  against 
corruption.  Since  the  time  when  the  CVM  benchmarks  were  drafted,  there  have  been  major 
developments  in  ECtHR6  case-law,  international  standards  and  best  practices,  and  comparative 
information  on  national  justice  systems  in  the  EU7,  which  also  help  to  give  an  objective  and 
comparable measure of the development of the Bulgarian judicial system and fight against corruption 
and  organised  crime.  While  informed  by  these  many  different  sources,  the  content  of  this  report 
remains the responsibility of the Commission services. 

The  Commission  Decision  of  2006  laying  out  the  basis  for  the  CVM  defined  six  benchmarks  for 
Bulgaria. These benchmarks have never been modified. While the six benchmarks were conceived in a 
particular context and their concrete wording reflects the specific situation at the time, the underlying 
issues that they refer to have remained relevant in subsequent years.  

The  first  three  benchmarks  relate  to  the  reform  of  the  judicial  system,  including  the  constitutional 
framework safeguarding judicial independence (benchmark 1), the relevant legislation (benchmark 2), 
and the need to improve the day-to-day functioning of the judiciary (benchmark 3). The following two 
benchmarks  concern  the  fight  against  corruption,  both  high-level  corruption  (benchmark  4)  and 
corruption more generally including at local level and the borders (benchmark 5). The final benchmark 
concerns measures to address organised crime (benchmark 6).  

2    The Commission services carried out fact-finding missions in Bulgaria in June and September 2017. 
3   The Commission has a CVM Resident Adviser at the Commission Representation in Sofia. 
4   28 projects financed by OP Good Governnace are in the process of implementation, covering one third of the 
available resources. Beneficiaries include Supreme Judicial Council, the Ministry of Justice, the Prosecutor's 
office, the National Instutite of Justice, the Inspectorate of the SJC, the National legal Aid Bureau, and non-
governmental organisations. Most of the projects are in an early stage of implementation.   

5   In addition, funding for the Ministry of Interior is available through the Internal Security Fund – Police.   
6   European Court on Human Rights.  
7   The EU Justice Scoreboard http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/scoreboard/ 

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The Commission's latest CVM report of 25 January 2017 presented a comprehensive assessment of ten 
years' progress in judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organised crime under the CVM. 
The January report used this longer-term perspective to identify the key remaining steps necessary to 
realise the objectives of the CVM. It also defined a clear pathway towards the conclusion of the CVM 
process.  Once  the  steps  set  out  under  each  of  the  benchmarks  have  been  addressed,  the  respective 
benchmark  will  be  considered  provisionally  completed.  When  this  applies  to  all  benchmarks,  the 
CVM  will  be  closed,  except  if  developments  were  to  clearly  reverse  the  course  of  progress.8 
Consequently,  this  technical  report  will  focus  on  the  progress  made  by  the  Bulgarian  authorities  in 
regard to each of the key remaining steps – 17 in total – which were identified in the January report. 
The 17 recommendations of the January report are set out below under their respective benchmarks, 
each followed by a summary of the progress made since January 2017. 

"The Commission's 2015 and 2016 CVM reports were able to acknowledge important steps taken by 
the Bulgarian authorities to put the reform process back on the agenda. During 2016 Bulgaria made 
additional  significant  progress  in  the  implementation  of  the  judicial  reform  strategy,  while 
implementation  of  the  national  anti-corruption  strategy  still  remains  in  an  early  stage.  More 
generally, over the past ten years, overall progress has not been as fast as hoped for and a number of 
significant challenges remain to be addressed. The new government will need to drive reform forward 
to secure irreversible results."  

Source:  Report  on  Progress  in  Bulgaria  under  the  Co-operation  and  Verification  Mechanism  adopted  on  25 
January 20179 

BENCHMARK 1: ADOPT CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS REMOVING ANY AMBIGUITY REGARDING 
THE INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM  

Recommendation  1:  Ensure  a  transparent  election  for  the  future  SJC,  with  a  public  hearing  in  the 
National  Assembly  before  the  election  of  the  members  of  the  parliamentary  quota,  and  giving  civil 
society the possibility to make observations on the candidates. 

The Supreme Judicial Council is the key institution governing the Bulgarian judiciary, including the 
allocation  of  resources  and  the  appointment  of  the  heads  of  courts  and  prosecutors'  offices.  The 
functioning  of  this  institution  is  therefore  of  key  importance  for  a  balanced  development  and 
professional  management  of  the  judiciary.  The  January  CVM  report  noted  that  controversies  and 
infighting  over  the  past  years  have  fuelled  suspicions  of  external  influence  and  affected  public 
confidence  in  the  judiciary.10  On  this  background  the  report  identified  as  a  significant  test  case  for 
2017  the  election  of  the  new  members  of  the  SJC,  which  was  due  this  year  for  both  groups  of 
members:  those  elected  within  the  magistracy  (judicial  quota)  and  those  elected  by  the  National 
Assembly (parliamentary quota).  

The report highlighted in particular the importance of these elections being carried out, and being seen 
to be carried out, in an open and transparent manner following a serious debate on the merits of the 
respective  candidates.  Compared  to  the  election  of  the  previous  SJC  in  2012,  the  basic  procedural 
framework  has  evolved  significantly  due  to  constitutional  and  subsequent  legislative  amendments 
enacted in 2015 and 2016. A key improvement under the new procedures is that the 11 members of the 
judicial  quota  were  to  be  directly  elected  by  judges  and  prosecutors,  according  to  a  one-magistrate 
one-vote  principle.  11  Also  under  the  new  rules  introduced  in  2015,  the  election  of  the  11-member 

8   COM(2017) 43 final, p. 3. 
9   COM(2017) 43 final, p. 13. 
10   COM(2017)  43  final,  p.  8.  The  report  also  noted  that  tension  among  members  of  the  Council,  amidst 

allegations of a lack of objectivity in key decisions, had remained a concern (op cit., p. 4). 

11   In  the  January  2014  CVM  report,  the  Commission  regretted  that  the  2012  election  of  the  judicial  quota 

suffered from the decision not to allow for direct elections by judges – COM (2014) 36 final, p. 3. 

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parliamentary  quota  requires  the  support  of  a  2/3  majority  in  the  National  Assembly,  reflecting  a 
recommendation of the Venice Commission at the time.12   

The  elections  to  the  judicial  quota  were  completed  by  June  and  the  final  outcome  of  the  vote  was 
regarded by a large majority of interlocutors as representing a fair result reflecting the preferences of 
the entire body of magistrates.13  

The  election  of  the  parliamentary  quota  in  the  National  Assembly  was  in  turn  completed  on  20 
September  with  the  successful  candidates  being  elected  by  a  wide  majority  of  MPs,  including  MPs 
from  the  main  opposition  parties.  18  candidates  had  been  nominated  within  the  deadline  in  June, 
allowing  for a  significant  period  of  public  debate  on  the  relative  merit  of  the candidates.  In  spite  of 
this,  however,  the  election  was  criticised  by  civil  society  actors  and  some  judges  as  giving  the 
impression  that  the  outcome  had  been  predetermined  through  prior  agreements  between  the  main 
political  parties  and  did  not  reflect  an  open  consideration  of  the  relative  merit  of  the  candidates.  In 
particular, the prior public hearing in the legal affairs committee was criticised for giving insufficient 
time for discussion and for the fact that critical questions raised by civil society stakeholders were not 
raised.14  The  fact  that  the  final  distribution  of  posts  among  candidates  supported  by  the  main  party 
groups  was  widely  predicted  in  advance  of  the  vote,  has  been  raised  by  some  stakeholders  as  a 
concern, in particular as the proportion of members  elected  by the National Assembly in the Judges 
College remains high: the same number as for the judges elected by their peers. Concerns reflect the 
wide  variety  of  decisions  within  the  powers  of  the  SJC,  including  decisions  concerning  judges’ 
careers.15  

Interlocutors have pointed to the presence of a number of well-renowned senior magistrates among the 
new members of both the judicial and parliamentary quota as a positive development, the implication 
being that this may bode well for a professional atmosphere to develop within the council. The new 
members were sworn in on 3 October. A track record of impartial and professional decision-making in 
key  areas  over  the  coming  months  will  be  an  important  indicator  for  the  ability  of  the  Council  to 
establish its reputation.  

Recommendation 2: Establish a track record of transparent and merit-based appointments to high–
level  judicial  posts,  including  the  upcoming  appointment  of  a  new  President  of  the  Supreme 
Administrative Court. 

One of the main functions of the SJC is the appointment of heads of courts and prosecutors' offices. 
The SJC also elects nominees for the three highest offices in the Bulgarian judiciary, the Presidents of 

12   Six  members  for  the  judges'  chamber  and  five  members  for  the  prosecutors'  chamber  from  each  quota, 
together with the three ex officio members (the chairs of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme 
Administrative Court as well as the Prosecutor general), make up the 25 members of SJC. The 2/3 majority 
requirement for the parliamentary quota was introduced on the recommendation of the Venice commission in 
order  to  minimise  the  risk  of  politicisation  by  preventing  a  narrow  majority  in  the  National  Assembly  to 
appoint the entire parliamentary quota.   

13   The availability of an electronic voting system made possible a very high participation rate. 
14   Questions  from  civil  society  were  nevertheless  received  and  made  available  for  the  public on  the  National 

Assembly's website, as required by the law. 

15   These  concerns  are  also  reflected  over  years  in  analyses  of  Council  of  Europe  bodies  such  as  the  Venice 
Commission and GRECO, pointing to the significant quota of political appointees in the Bulgarian judicial 
council.  Recently,  the  risk  of  undue  political  influence  was  raised  by  GRECO  in  its  compliance  report  on 
Bulgaria  under  the  fourth  evaluation  round,  adopted  in  June  2017(https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/-
/bulgaria-publication-of-the-fourth-round-compliance-report ). In addition, in a recent Opinion on Bulgaria, 
the Venice Commission reiterates its concerns about risks to the independence of judges within the SJC and 
makes a number of recommendations in this regard. The Venice Commission Opinion focuses in particular 
on the role of the prosecutors within the SJC and the minority position of judges elected by their peers. See 
Venice Commission, "Bulgaria: Opinion on the Judicial System Act", adopted at 112th plenary 6-7 October 
2017. http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2017)018-e  

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the  two  Supreme  Courts  and  the  Prosecutor  General.16  As  pointed  out  in  the  January  report,  the 
conduct of such appointments in a merit-based and transparent manner is a key test of its capacity to 
function  as  a  professional  and  independent  institution  which  can  command  the  trust  of  the  judiciary 
and of broader society. This will therefore be an important area in which it will be possible to  assess 
the approach of the new Council. As highlighted in previous reports, decisions of the outgoing Council 
have often been associated with controversy in this area as well as others.17 During the last year of the 
outgoing SJC, a polarised atmosphere has continued to affect the work of the SJC.18  

The  recommendation  cited  above  makes  particular  reference  to  the  election  of  the  new  chair  of  the 
Supreme Administrative Court, which was one of the main appointments in the judiciary due to take 
place  in  the  course  of  2017.19  The  procedure  was  launched  in  July  and  the  vote  took  place  in  the 
plenary  of  the  outgoing  SJC  on  11  September,  presenting  a  choice  between  two  candidates  both  of 
whom  had  a  background  in  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court  itself.  The  vote  in  the  SJC  had  been 
preceded by a hearing of the general assembly of judges at the Supreme Administrative Court, under 
new  rules  introduced  in  the  Judicial  Systems  Act  in  2016  to  strengthen  the  involvement  of  general 
assemblies  of  courts  in  the  appointment  of  their  management.  The  hearing  resulted  in  a 
recommendation  in  favour  of  one  of  the  candidates,  who  was  also  supported  by  the  outgoing 
management20,  and  who  was  ultimately  also  the  candidate  selected  by  the  SJC  plenary.  However, 
following  the  vote  in  the  SJC  the  nomination  requires  the  endorsement  of  the  President  of  the 
Republic,  who  let  it  be  known  that  he  considered  it  more  appropriate  for  this  election  to  have  been 
carried  out  by  the  new  incoming  SJC,  rather  than  the  outgoing  one.  News  media  also  reported 
criticism of the SJC's decision from other sides, with calls for the President to reject it.21 On 4 October 
the President decided to request a confirmation of the nomination from the newly formed SJC. On 19 
October,  the  newly  formed  SJC  confirmed  the  candidate  with  a  large  majority  (20  votes  in  favour), 
and the new chair is expected to officially take up his responsibilities on 22 November. 22 

Recommendation  3:  To  improve  the  practical  functioning  of  the  ISJC  and  the  follow-up  by  the 
Supreme  Judicial  Council  to  the  inspectorate's  findings,  in  particular  on  integrity  issues,  consider 
soliciting external assistance, for example from the SRSS and/or Council of Europe. 

Previous CVM reports have acknowledged the positive contribution over the years of the Inspectorate 
to the Supreme Judicial  Council  (ISJC).  However, the area of integrity and disciplinary proceedings 
has  been  a  long-standing  issue  of  controversy,  with  unclear  practices  within  the  SJC.  With  the 
constitutional  amendments  of  2015  the  Inspectorate  was  given  additional  powers  in  the  area  of 
integrity, becoming  responsible  for  checking  declarations  of  interest  and  of  private  assets  as  well  as 
verifying cases where integrity of magistrates has been put into question.23 Under the new rules, the 
Inspectorate's  role  was  also  strengthened  in  regard  to  disciplinary  proceedings.  Previously,  five 
members  of  the  SJC  could  initiate  a  disciplinary  procedure,  whereas  under  the  new  rules  this 
competence  has  been  reserved  for  the  Inspectorate,  together  with  the  administrative  heads  of  the 
respective  judicial  bodies  and  the  Minister  of  Justice.  Although  it  is  still  ultimately  the  SJC  which 
decides  on  the  outcome  of  disciplinary  proceedings,  this  has  created  a  clearer  division  of  powers 
between  the  different  institutions  involved.  24  Detailed  rules  and  procedures  for  the  exercise  by  the 
Inspectorate of its new powers were included in the Judicial Systems Act in 2016 and came into effect 

16   In addition, these appointments are subject to endorsement by the President of the Republic.  
17   See e.g. COM (2017) 43 final, p. 4; COM(2016) 40 final, p. 4.  
18   As noted previously, tensions have been most visible in the judges' chamber, see SWD (2017) 24 final, p. 8.   
19   The term of the outgoing chair expires in the second half of November. 
20   However, the procedure reportedly did not allow for a secret vote.  
21   Among other issues, the criticism focussed on the fact that the outgoing SJC had deliberately chosen to bring 
forward the decision even though there would have been sufficient time for a new SJC to select a nominee 
before the end of the mandate of the currently serving chair.  
22   The President signed off on the appointment on 23 October. 
23   The Inspectorate can initiate such checks on the basis of alerts from the public as well as media reports. 
24   Decisions of the SJC are furthermore subject to appeal at the Supreme Administrative Court.  

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in  January  2017.  As  a  result  of  these  changes,  the  Inspectorate  has  now  been  given  a  much  more 
central role in relation to all disciplinary matters with regard to magistrates than in the past.  

Considering the very sensitive issues concerned, the January report recommended that Bulgaria should 
consider external assistance in order to improve the practical functioning of the new institutional set-
up  on  integrity,  including  the  newly  strengthened  role  of  the  ISJC.  The  Bulgarian  government  has 
subsequently  expressed  interest  in  SRSS  assistance  for  the  Inspectorate.  Also,  a  mission  from  the 
Venice Commission has been extended to Bulgaria on the initiative of the Monitoring Committee of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in order to assess the recent reforms in 
the  Bulgarian  judiciary  following  the  constitutional  amendments  of  2015  and  subsequent  legislative 
amendments, including the new functions of the Inspectorate. The resulting Opinion, adopted in early 
October  2017,  sets  out  a  number  of  considerations  in  relation  to  the  composition  and  role  of  the 
Inspectorate.25  

In  the  meantime,  the  Inspectorate  has  taken  up  its  new  tasks,  receiving  and  publishing  interest  and 
asset  declarations  for  the  more  than  4,000  magistrates  covered  by  the  new  rules.  Proceedings  have 
been launched against magistrates who have not submitted their declarations. Agreements have been 
signed with institutional counterparts on exchange of relevant information. The Inspectorate has been 
provided with additional resources, including technical staff needed to perform analysis of conflicts of 
interest and personal assets of magistrates. Checks on the first declarations submitted have reportedly 
commenced, although the pace of implementation has been delayed for various technical reasons. In 
particular,  new  software  has  had  to  be  procured  as  the  existing  system  used  by  the  National  Audit 
Office for other public officials is unsuited for the declarations by magistrates under the new rules.26 In 
the  course  of  the  implementation  some  shortcomings  have  also  been  identified  in  the  new  rules, 
leading the Inspectorate to propose amendments to the Judicial Systems Act on a limited number of 
points, for example to facilitate access to bank account information as part of its checks.27  

The  Inspectorate  has  received  a  number  of  alerts  on  magistrates  but  most  of  these  have  not  led  to 
investigations. According to the Inspectorate this is mostly due to incomplete information provided. It 
appears therefore that the system for receiving alerts has not so far been fully effective. Based on its 
normal inspections of the various judicial bodies, the Inspectorate continues to refer cases to the SJC 
for disciplinary follow-up. The outgoing SJC has initiated a practice of holding regular meetings with 
the  Inspectorate  to  discuss  the  approach  taken  on  such  cases.  It  is  to  be  seen  how  the  interaction 
between the two institutions will evolve under the new SJC.  

BENCHMARK 2: ENSURE A MORE TRANSPARENT AND EFFICIENT JUDICIAL PROCESS BY ADOPTING 
AND  IMPLEMENTING  A  NEW  JUDICIAL  SYSTEM  ACT  AND  THE  NEW  CIVIL  PROCEDURE  CODE. 
REPORT  ON  THE  IMPACT  OF  THESE  NEW  LAWS  AND  OF  THE  CRIMINAL  AND  ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE CODES, NOTABLY ON THE PRE-TRIAL PHASE 

Recommendation  4:  Adopt  amendments  to  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  and  the  Criminal  Code  to 
improve the legal framework for the prosecution of high-level corruption and serious organised crime. 

The  January  report  notes  the  continued  challenges  facing  Bulgarian  judicial  authorities  in  ensuring 
effective investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption and organised crime under the existing 

25   The  Venice  Commission  Opinion  makes  concrete  recommendations  on  the  procedures  for  the  nomination 
and  dismissal  of  inspectors,  on  the  division  of  competences  vis-à-vis  the  SJC,  and  on  the  need  for  further 
clarifying the rules on inspections and disciplinary proceedings. See Venice Commission, op cit. 

26   Procurement  of  new  software  is  reportedly  now  in  progress  with  funds  being  provided  by  Operational 

Programme "Good Governance" of the European Social Fund.  

27   Also, the legislation appears not to have provided for any administrative liability for magistrates having left 
the service under the new rules. Although they are required to continue to submit declarations at the end of 
their  career,  there  could  therefore  be  an  issue  with  disciplinary  follow-up  on  failures  to  do  so.  (Source: 
Meeting with the ISJC, September 2017.) 

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criminal code and procedures. These are long-standing challenges, which persist in spite of repeated 
efforts  to  modernise  the  legal  framework  over  the  years.  In  early  autumn  2016,  a  package  of  draft 
amendments  to  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  which  aimed  to  address  some  of  these  issues,  was 
prepared by the Ministry of Justice, with the support of the Prosecutor's Office and other parts  of the 
judiciary. Due to the subsequent political developments these amendments were not taken forward in 
2016.  However,  in  June  2017  the  newly  established  government  submitted  draft  amendments  to  the 
National Assembly, which proceeded quickly with their adoption. The amendments were promulgated 
on 4 August and entered into force on 5 November. The aim of the package is to accelerate procedures 
and improve the efficiency of justice, notably by limiting the possibility for courts to send cases back 
to  the  prosecution  on  formal  grounds  at  the  more  advanced  stages  of  the  procedure.28  Another 
important  change  is  the  transfer  of  competence  in  cases  related  to  a  range  of  serious  crimes  with  a 
potential  or  direct  corruption  element  perpetrated  by  high-level  officials  –  including  MPs,  ministers 
and  magistrates  –  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Specialised  Court  and  Prosecutor's  Office  on  Organised 
Crime. A range of other changes were also included in the package, to ensure better enforcement of 
sentences, speed up deadlines, and allow for more flexibility on the length of pre-trial investigations in 
complex cases.29  

Civil society actors and parts of the judiciary have raised concerns about the very swift adoption of the 
package, citing concerns that it did not allow for a proper debate and consideration of possible impacts 
of  the  amendments.30  For  example,  the  acceleration  of  procedures  and  new  limitations  on  courts' 
ability to send cases back  to the prosecution has been criticised by some within the judiciary on the 
grounds  that  the  requirement  to  identify  all  procedural  errors  in  the  preliminary  hearing  could  be 
unrealistic  and  might  therefore  lead  to  unwarranted  acquittals.  At  the  same  time,  others  have  raised 
concerns that the rules could potentially infringe on the rights of defendants.31 In addition, the transfer 
of  jurisdiction  in  criminal  cases  concerning  high-level  officials  to  specialised  bodies  has  also  been 
questioned by some stakeholders, both in terms of the underlying reasoning, which would be to ensure 
stronger specialisation in such cases (currently handled mostly by the Sofia City Court), and on more 
formal grounds.32  

More generally, it appears to be widely acknowledged that the benefits of the amendments will depend 
to  a  significant  extent  on  the  manner  of  their  implementation  and  application  in  practice,  including 
accompanying measures of a more organisational nature. Hence, it appears that there will be a need for 
determined follow up in terms of training and other measures to ensure proper implementation of  the 
new system by all institutions involved. The January CVM report noted that the transfer of additional 
competences to the Specialised Court, and the Specialised Prosecutor's Office attached to it, needed to 
be carefully prepared and accompanied by appropriate analysis on resource needs and possible legal 

28   This  is  achieved  by  the  introduction  of  a  new  step  in  the  criminal  procedure  –  a  preliminary  hearing  –  at 
which a decision has to be taken whether there have been formal procedural errors committed during the pre-
trial  stage.  After  this  hearing,  it  will  no  longer  be  possible  for  the  court  to  send  the  case  back  on  such 
grounds.  The  new  rules  focus  on  general  procedural  errors,  such  as  for  example  a  failure  to  inform  the 
defendant of the crime with which (s)he is being charged, or of his or her right to non-self-incrimination. The 
preliminary  hearing  does  not  deal  with  errors  related  to  the  admissibility,  collection,  examination  or 
assessment of evidence. (See Criminal Procedural Code Article 248 and 249, as amended.)  

29   For example, a pre-existing rule which allowed defendants in serious criminal cases after two years of pre-
trial investigation to require their case to go to court, or charges to be dropped, has been softened, introducing 
an  independent  assessment  by  a  court.  At  the  same  time,  similar  rules  have  been  extended  to  cover  the 
relevant court proceedings. (Sere Criminal Procedure Code, Articles 368-369, as amended).   

30   In  2016  the  previous  government  established  a  special  consultative  council  on  judicial  reform  which  was 
used to ensure close involvement of relevant stakeholders in the preparation of a major reform of the Judicial 
Systems  Act.  This  approach,  which  was  highlighted  in  the  January  CVM  report,  appears  not  to  have  been 
applied in the same way in this case.   

31   Some have referred to possible constitutionality issues on these grounds.   
32   Some stakeholders have questioned the legal approach taken for the definition of jurisdiction in such cases as 
possibly raising constitutionality issues. This concern has however been rejected by the Prosecutor's Office 
and the Ministry of Justice.  

7 

 
 
                                                            
implications  of  the  changes.33  These  issues  appear  not  to  have  been  given  proper  consideration  and 
have now taken on additional urgency given the short period allowed for the new rules to enter into 
force.34  

The  amended  Criminal  Procedure  Code  was  accompanied  by  specific  amendments  to  the  Judicial 
Systems Act providing for a new possibility to remove judges from office. The amendments provided 
that this should be possible as soon as criminal investigations by the prosecution are launched against 
a judge, apparently without leaving any discretion for the SJC to take a decision based on an overall 
assessment  in  each  case  and  without  any  recourse  to  judicial  appeal  on  the  part  of  the  judge.  These 
amendments were very negatively perceived by judges and civil society representatives. They saw a 
risk  that  the  judge  could  be  arbitrarily  taken  away  from  a  case  (given  that  existing  rules  already 
include provisions on dismissal for abuse of office), and considered the new rules to present a threat to 
the  independence  of  the  judges  and  the  rule  of  law.35  The  new  rules  on  removal  of  judges  in  the 
context  of  a  criminal  investigation  were  also  raised  as  a  matter  of  concern  in  a  recent  Opinion  on 
Bulgaria by the Venice Commission36, prompting the government to take action to address the issue.37  

Work  carried  out  in  the  context  of  the  continued  judicial  reform  strategy38  has  suggested  additional 
avenues for possible improvements in the criminal procedures. This has led to the establishment of a 
working group under the Ministry of Justice to analyse different aspects and possibly identify the need 
for further amendment of the legislation. The areas covered include preliminary checks carried out by 
investigators  prior  to  formal  pre-trial  investigations,  authorisation  of  special  investigatory  measures, 
the  role  of  witnesses  in  pre-trial  investigations,  status  of  reports  of  the  Financial  Intelligence 
Directorate39  in  criminal  proceedings,  and  the  possible  need  to  give  investigatory  powers  under  the 
criminal  procedure  code  to  the  State  Agency  for  National  Security  (SANS).  Alongside  this working 
group  under  the  Ministry  of  Justice,  the  Prosecutor's  Office  has  also  engaged  in  the  preparation  of 
draft amendments concerning key provisions of the procedural code governing the criteria for bringing 
cases to court and the content and format of indictments.40 Many of these discussions go to the very 
heart  of  the  existing  procedural  system  and  can  be  expected  to  require  extensive  analysis  and 
consultation with stakeholders before any draft amendments are put forward to the National Assembly.  

As regards the Criminal Code, the January report acknowledges that a more comprehensive overhaul 
of the legal framework will be a long-term process and that the more short-term priority would be to 
concentrate  on  targeted  amendments  to  improve  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of  high-level 

33   COM(2017) 43 final, p. 13.   
34   Draft  amendments  to  the  Judicial  Systems  Act  were  tabled  in  the  National  Assembly  in  early  October 
apparently  to  facilitate  secondment  of  staff  to  the  Specialised  Court  and  Prosecutor's  Office.  Civil  society 
actors  expressed  concern  that  these  proposals  were  tabled  directly  by  MPs  without  prior  consultation  or 
debate  and  appeared  to  roll  back  key  elements  of  the  2016  reform.  The  draft  amendments  would  make  it 
possible  to  continue  secondments  over  longer  periods  and  would  provide  for  performance  based 
remuneration of staff at the Specialised Court and Prosecutor's Office. Although these were not government 
proposals, the Judicial Reform Council was later convened by the Minister of Justice to discuss them with 
stakeholders. However, at this stage the proceedings at the National Assembly were already well advanced. 
The changes were finally adopted on 27 October.  

35    Another change in the Judicial Systems Act adopted in July 2017 which triggered broad criticism on the part    
of  magistrates  was  the  newly  introduced  requirement  for  all  magistrates  to  declare  their  membership  in 
professional  organisations  or  associations  (which  has  apparently  prompted  a  significant  cancellation  of 
membership  in  the  Bulgarian  Judges  Association,  attributed  to  a  fear  on  the  part  of  some  judges  that  their 
membership could have a detrimental impact on their career). 

36   Venice Commission, op cit. p. 10-11.  
37   On the proposal of the Minister of Justice further amendments were subsequently adopted on 27 October to 
give the SJC some discretion to decide on the merits in cases not involving offences related to the official 
responsibilities of the magistrates concerned and providing for appeal at the Supreme Administrative Court. 

38   As referred to under Benchmark 3 and 4 below. 
39   The Bulgarian financial intelligence unit located within the State Agency for National Security (SANS) 
40   Articles 14, 246 and 249 (para 2) of the Criminal Procedure Code.  

8 

 
 
                                                            
corruption and organised crime. A number of issues have reportedly been identified and are the subject 
of further work in various fora under the Ministry of Justice and the Public Prosecutor's Office. These 
deliberations  concern  issues  such  as  the  possible  extension  of  abuse  of  office  offences  to  cover  the 
private sector and the need  to prove damages resulting  from abuse of office.41 It remains to be seen 
what  the  outcome  of  these  deliberations  will  be.42  As  is  the  case  for  the  issues  pertaining  to  the 
procedural code referred to above, amendments to the criminal code require careful consultation and 
debate  before  being  adopted  in  law,  even  if  these  amendments  would  concern  only  a  more  limited 
number of provisions.  

BENCHMARK  3:  CONTINUE  THE  REFORM  OF  THE  JUDICIARY  IN  ORDER  TO  ENHANCE 
PROFESSIONALISM, ACCOUNTABILITY AND EFFICIENCY. EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF THIS REFORM 
AND PUBLISH THE RESULTS ANNUALLY 

Recommendation  5:  Publish  a  report  for  public  consultation  detailing  the  progress  made 
implementing  the  national  judicial  reform  strategy  and  setting  out  the  remaining  steps  to  be  taken. 
Establish  a  mechanism for continued public reporting of progress for the  remaining  duration  of the 
strategy's implementation. 

The judicial reform strategy adopted by the government in office at the end of 2014 and endorsed by a 
broad majority in the National Assembly in January 2015 remains the overarching framework for the 
continuation  of  the  judicial  reform  process  in  Bulgaria.43  This  has  been  confirmed  by  the  new 
government which took office in May. However, the judicial reform strategy is not merely a check list 
of  planned  initiatives.  In  order  to  ensure  the  achievement  of  the  broad  objectives  set  out  in  the 
strategy,  there  is  a  need  for  continuous  debate  and  regular  consultation  of  stakeholders  to  identify 
elements  which  require  renewed  consideration  or  further  action  as  well  as  to  develop  broader 
ownership in society. The fifth recommendation of the January report sets out one element aimed at 
fostering such a public debate, namely to put in place a process of regular assessment and reporting on 
the implementation of the strategy, including the identification of steps still to be taken to achieve the 
objectives which were set out in the strategy.  

In response to this recommendation, the Ministry of Justice under the interim government published a 
first  implementation  report  in  early  2017,  covering  the  progress  made  in  2016.  A  discussion  of  the 
draft  was  organised  with  the  participation  of  representatives  of  the  institutions  involved  in  the 
implementation  of  the  strategy,  as  well  as  professional  and  non-governmental  organisations.  As  a 
follow-up, the new government has published a second implementation report covering the first half of 
2017,  which  was  discussed  in  the  consultative  forum  on  the  implementation  of  the  judicial  reform 
strategy on 24 July. It has been decided to continue publishing such reports every half year.  

Recommendation 6: Address the workload situation in the busiest courts based on the new workload 
standards, and agree a roadmap for the reform of the judicial map in parallel with the development of 
e-justice. 

The development of workload  standards and the preparation of a comprehensive reform of the court 
map have been important focus areas of the outgoing SJC. The January report noted that this work has 
now  reached  a  stage  where  concrete  steps  should  be  possible  towards  a  broader  reform  on  a  well-
informed basis. Nevertheless, it is clear that such a reform requires broader political backing, as well 
as  involvement  of  all  levels  of  the  judiciary,  to  ensure  a  good  outcome.  Meanwhile,  the  system  of 
workload  standards  which  is  now  in  place  could  provide  a  good  basis  for  a  consistent  policy  of 
reallocating workload and resources to alleviate the pressure on the busiest courts.  

41   Additional aspects having been under discussion, with possible links to the criminal code, include the ability 
to draw on cooperative witnesses and undercover agents (the latter in particular in the context of bribery).  

42   Some amendments have already been published for public consultation.  
43   An English version of the strategy can be found via this link: www.strategy.bg/FileHandler.ashx?fileId=5570  

9 

 
 
                                                            
Since January, the prosecutors' chamber of the SJC has endorsed in principle a model for a possible 
gradual  consolidation  of  the  113  local  prosecutors'  offices  within  the  28  larger  provincial  districts, 
which  could  be  implemented  independently  of  a  broader  reform  of  the  local  courts.44  However,  no 
final decision was taken to move ahead with this reorganisation, leaving the issue for the new SJC. On 
the  side  of  the  courts,  a  consolidation  of  the  113  local  courts  has  been  the  subject  of  analysis  and 
consultations  for  several  years,  but  these  efforts  have  not yet  proceeded  to  the  stage  of  presenting  a 
concrete roadmap for the reform45, possibly reflecting a preference to leave such a significant decision 
to a future SJC with a renewed mandate.46  

A  reform  of  the  broader  judicial  map  is  bound  to  represent  an  important  item  on  the  agenda  of  the 
newly established SJC, which will need to set out the next step in this process.47 As a broader reform 
will likely take time, however, measures are needed in the short term to address the workload situation 
in  the  busiest  –  and  typically  larger  -  courts.  One  approach  to  this  consists  in  the  allocation  of 
additional  staff  and  other  resources  to  the  busiest  courts,  an  approach  which  can  now  proceed  in  a 
more systematic manner based on the standards for the measurement of workload developed under the 
previous  SJC.  So  far,  this  process  appears  to  have  been  pursued  only  very  incrementally,  so  the 
problems remain. Moreover, the outgoing SJC appears to have recently taken the view, in spite of the 
workload  analysis  showing  continued  severe  imbalances,  that  the  allocation  of  additional  staff  posts 
was not the appropriate solution  for the problems at  certain larger courts.48 Another approach to the 
workload  issue  consists  in  changing  the  attribution  of  jurisdiction  for  certain  types  of  cases  among 
courts through legislative changes. This approach is reportedly being considered by the government, 
with analysis focussing on possible amendments to the civil procedure code. As these various strands 
of work are all related and interdependent, this will inevitably be an area for the new SJC to take up in 
a proactive manner, and in consultation with the government and other stakeholders.49  

Recommendation 7: Establish a roadmap for the implementation of the recommendations of the SRSS 
report  concerning  the  reform  of  the  Prosecutor's  Office  and  its  interactions  with  other  institutions, 
including a mechanism for the reporting of progress to the wider public. 

As noted in the January CVM report, the role and place of the Public Prosecutor's Office within the 
overall institutional architecture has been a divisive issue in Bulgaria and is at the same time of high 
importance in relation to the fight against corruption and organised crime.50 In response to this issue, 
one of the actions envisaged under the judicial reform strategy was the completion of an independent 
analysis of the structural and functional model of the Bulgarian Prosecutor's Office. Such an analysis 
was  carried  out  in  2016  with  the  assistance  of  the  Commission's  Structural  Reform  Support  Service 
(SRSS)  and  experts  (senior  prosecutors)  from  Germany,  Spain,  The  Netherlands  and  the  United 

44   Previously there has been some uncertainty about the possibility of decoupling a reform of the prosecutors' 
offices  from  that  of  the  courts  under  the  Bulgarian  Constitution,  but  in  early  2017  the  Prosecutor  General 
referred this question to the Constitutional Court, which confirmed that such a decoupling was possible.  
45   A  project  financed  under  Operational  Programme  "Good  Governance"  of  the  European  Social  Fund  is 
expected  to  provide  support  in  bringing  the  process  to  the  next  stage,  also  involving  the  introduction  of  a 
common  IT  system  for  the  judiciary.  However,  the  project  has  reportedly  been  delayed  and  remains  in  an 
early phase of implementation.  

46   Similar discussions have taken place on consolidation of the five appeal courts or the three military courts as 
well as the need to further analyse the system of 28 administrative courts, also with no final decisions made.  
47   It  should  also be  noted  that  the  next  steps are  likely  to  be  more  about drawing  conclusions  and building a 

consensus than about further analysis.  

48   This  lack of  follow-up  has  led  to  frustration  at  the  affected  courts  and criticism  of  the  lack of  an  effective 

mechanism to address the problems identified.  

49   Under  Bulgarian  law  the  SJC has  wide  competences  in  regard  to  the  overall  management  of  the  judiciary, 
including decisions on the number of judicial districts which are to be taken in consultation with the Minister 
of Justice (Judicial Systems Act, Article 30, para 2.). 

50   COM(2017) 43 final, p. 5. 

10 

 
 
                                                            
Kingdom.  The  resulting  report  from  December  201651  contained  recommendations  for  the 
improvement of the prosecution service and its interactions with other institutions, focusing on issues 
such as independence and accountability as well as transparency, effectiveness and efficiency.  

The outcome of the independent analysis has been generally welcomed by the Bulgarian authorities. 
While  some  of  the  recommendations  were  considered  by  the  authorities  as  difficult  to  implement 
within  the  specific  Bulgarian  context  and  were  therefore  expressly  not  followed  up52,  most  of  the 
recommendations  were  considered  relevant  and  taken  up  for  further  consideration.  In  July  2017  the 
Ministry  of  Justice  and  the  Prosecutor's  Office  set  out  a  joint  roadmap  covering  both  organisational 
and potential legislative measures in response to the recommendations contained in the report.  

On  the  legislative  side,  a  number  of  working  groups  have  been  established  under  the  Ministry  of 
Justice to consider the possibility of amending various laws. These include two working groups set up 
to reflect on amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code and the Criminal Code. These were already 
mentioned above under benchmark 2. A third working group is looking into possible amendments of 
the  Judicial  Systems  Act,  notably  on  issues  such  as  remuneration  and  external  appointments  to  the 
Prosecutor's  Office.  A  fourth  group  has  been  tasked  with  the  elaboration  of  proposals  to  clarify 
procedural  aspects  of  criminal  investigations  in  regard  to  a  serving  Prosecutor  General  or  Supreme 
Court  chair.  The  independent  analysis  specifically  recommended  the  introduction  of  a  procedure  for 
the investigation of a serving Prosecutor General, as this is where a potential gap in the rules has been 
identified.53  However,  the  Bulgarian  government  appears  to  have  decided  that  also  the  chairs  of  the 
two Supreme Courts should be considered in this context. Finally, a fifth working group is considering 
ways to improve the use of expert witnesses in the Judiciary.  

In addition to the work on possible legislative changes, a number of organisational measures have also 
been  considered  in response to the analysis. Among  those already implemented is a new practice of 
appearance of the Prosecutor General every three months before the Legal Affairs Committee of the 
National Assembly to discuss progress in the prosecution of corruption and organised crime,54 as well 
as wider organisational and legal matters related to the work of the prosecution. In addition, measures 
described  to  the  Commission  include  better  transparency  around  general  methodological  guidance 
issued by the Prosecutor General, improving public communication, expanding access to training on 
anti-corruption and organised crime related topics, assigning additional prosecutors and investigators 
to  work  on  corruption  and  organised  crime,  requesting  interpretative  rulings  to  clarify  divergent 
practices on grounds for returning cases from courts to the prosecution. There would also be further 
analysis of the handling of European arrest warrants and controlled delivery, suspended cases, follow-
up  on  suspicious  transaction  reports,  and  the  interaction  between  the  Prosecutor's  Office  and  the 
Bulgarian  asset  recovery  office.55  In  relation  to  IT,  it  is  furthermore  envisaged  to  explore  the 
possibility  of  the  Ministry  of  Interior  joining  the  integrated  information  system  of  the  Prosecutor's 
Office, in order to improve the handling of case files between the institutions.  

51   An executive summary can be found at the website of the Bulgarian Ministry of Justice: 

http://www.mjs.bg/Files/Executive%20Summary%20Final%20Report%20BG%2015122016.pdf  

52   Notably, some of the recommendations aiming at strengthening the responsibility and accountability of the 
senior management within the Prosecutor's Office regarding important cases, as well as recommendations to 
extend  the  mechanisms  for  judicial  review  over  certain  prosecutorial decisions, were not taken  up, as  they 
were seen by the authorities as difficult to reconcile with the Bulgarian system or a step backwards towards 
practices which had not worked well in the past.  

in 

53   One  of  the  often  raised  criticisms  of  the  Bulgarian  system  is  that  it  is  allegedly  difficult  to  envisage  an 
independent investigation into possible criminal actions of a serving Prosecutor General. Reference is often 
(Kolevi  vs  Bulgaria),  see 
the  ECtHR 
made 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["001-95607"]} This issue was also raised in a recent opinion of the 
Venice Commission, which recommends to increase the accountability of the Prosecutor General by setting 
out  in  law  a  procedure  allowing  for  effective  and  independent  investigation  into  alleged  misconduct  of  a 
serving Prosecutor General. Venice Commission, op cit.   

this  context 

from  2009 

ruling  of 

to  a 

54   Although without reference to specific cases.  
55   The Commission on Illegal Asset Forfeiture (CIAF).  

11 

 
 
                                                            
 
While  interim  deadlines  have  reportedly  already  been  observed  on  several  of  the  above  measures, 
many of these refer to first steps towards general objectives with concrete steps still to be taken and 
outcomes  reported.  It  is  to  be  expected  that  many  of  the  measures  may  need  a  certain  time  to  be 
translated into concrete action. As regards the reporting on progress to the general public, one option 
would  be  to  build  on  the  quarterly  appearances  of  the  Prosecutor  General  before  the  National 
Assembly's Legal Affairs Committee.56  

Recommendation 8: Establish a roadmap for the implementation of the recommendations of the study 
[on ECtHR rulings], including a mechanism for the reporting of progress to the wider public. 

In response to a 2015 ruling of the ECtHR, mentioned in the January 2017 CVM report, in which the 
court  expressed  concern  about  the  existence  of  a  systemic  problem  of  ineffective  investigation  of 
crime in Bulgaria57, the Prosecutor's Office carried out an analysis in 2016 of the existing case law of 
the ECtHR on Bulgaria, identifying a number of concrete recommendations for legislative as well as 
organisational follow-up measures.  

In  July  2017  a  roadmap  was  adopted  and  published  by  the  Prosecutor's  Office,  including  both 
organisational and possible legislative measures.58 Among the organisational measures envisaged are: 
an  analysis  of  case  law  on  judicial  review  of  prosecutorial  decisions  to  terminate  criminal 
investigations, the designation of specialised prosecutors and investigators to deal with complaints of 
excessive  use  of  force  by  law  enforcement,  and  updating  the  content  of  internal  control  within  the 
Prosecutor's  Office  in  light  of  the  findings  of  the  ECtHR.  Training  for  prosecutors  on  effective 
investigations in light of the case law of the ECtHR and the 2016 analysis has been launched in the 
various  appellate  regions,  and  a  proposal  has  been  prepared  for  the  integration  of  the  subject  in  the 
mandatory training for junior prosecutors as well as making it a permanent feature of the programme 
of continued training. Finally, a working group has been set up to explore ways to step up cooperation 
between  the  Ministry  of  Justice  and  the  Prosecutor's  Office  with  respect  to  cases  at  the  ECtHR  and 
their follow-up. 

On the legislative side, many of the actions already referred to above are also relevant in this context.59 
In  addition,  the  roadmap  refers  to  some  further  specific  topics  to  be  analysed,  such  as  better 
enforcement  of  judicial  review  of  prosecutorial  decisions60,  the  possible  introduction  of  additional 
judicial review clauses61, analysis of the statute of limitations in a comparative context, clarifying the 
Prosecutor  General's  powers  to  reopen  investigations  in  exceptional  cases,  clarifying  rules  on  the 
temporary  suspension  of magistrates  under  criminal  investigation,  making  mandatory  the  training  of 
newly  appointed  police  investigators  in  ECtHR  case  law,  introducing  ID  marking  of  masked  police 
officers, and the insertion of a new criminal offence on torture in the Bulgarian criminal code.  

Similarly to the roadmap for the SRSS analysis, the measures under this roadmap are still at an early 
stage of implementation. Several of the measures are only defined in terms of broad objectives and are 
yet to be spelled out in concrete actions and results.  

56   Discussion of the SRSS report has proven difficult in the previous SJC. It is to be seen how such discussions 

will be handled by the new SJC.  

57   See Systemic problem of ineffectiveness of investigations in Bulgaria, ECHR 070 (2015). 

https://www.slideshare.net/NatashaDobreva/sz-v-bulgaria-systemic-problem-of-ineffectiveness-of-
investigations-in-bulgaria  

58   Endorsed by order of the Prosecutor General of 28 July 2017.  
59   See discussion above of criminal procedures as well as on the follow up to the SRSS analysis with regard to 

criminal investigation of a serving Prosecutor General.  

60   This  refers  in  particular  to  judicial  review  over  the  termination  of  criminal  investigations  by  prosecutors, 
where  it  is  considered,  depending  on  an  analysis  of  current  practice,  to  clarify  the  disciplinary  liability  of 
prosecutors who disregard such court rulings.  

61   This refers to judicial review of decisions by prosecutors not to open investigations, which currently are only 
subject to review by a superior prosecutor. As referred to above, such issues were not taken up in the context 
of the follow-up to the SRSS analysis, but apparently it is nevertheless given consideration in this context.   

12 

 
 
                                                            
 
BENCHMARK 4: CONDUCT AND REPORT ON PROFESSIONAL, NON-PARTISAN INVESTIGATIONS INTO 
ALLEGATIONS  OF  HIGH-LEVEL  CORRUPTION.  REPORT  ON  INTERNAL  INSPECTIONS  OF  PUBLIC 
INSTITUTIONS AND ON THE PUBLICATION OF ASSETS OF HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS 

Recommendation  9:  Adopt  a  new  legal  framework  on  the  fight  against  corruption  in  line  with  the 
intentions  set  out  in  the  anti-corruption  strategy,  and  ensure  its  implementation.  Set  up  an  effective 
anti-corruption authority. 

The fight against corruption was highlighted in the January CVM report as an area where only limited 
progress  had  been  achieved  in  Bulgaria  so  far.  The  challenges  have  been  noted  in  successive  CVM 
reports over the years and include a fragmented landscape of institutional structures dealing with the 
prevention  of  corruption,  as  well  as  procedural  and  legal  obstacles  hampering  the  effective 
investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption, as already referred to above. In 2015, following 
a  comprehensive  evaluation  of  the  existing  anti-corruption  policy  and  the  presentation  of  a  new 
national  anti-corruption  strategy,  the  government  presented  a  draft  law  which  would  have  seen  the 
introduction of a new unified agency to ensure a more coordinated approach to addressing corruption 
risks  among  high-level  officials,  including  issues  such  as  conflicts  of  interest  and  declaration  of 
personal  assets.62  The  new  agency  would  also  have  had  powers  to  conduct  administrative 
investigations  based  on  anonymous  alerts.  However,  the  draft  law  failed  to  receive  backing  in  the 
National Assembly, forcing the government back to the drawing board.63  

Since  2015  discussions  have  continued  on  the  draft  law  at  various  levels.  Following  further 
consultations, the government presented a revised version of the draft law in spring 2016.64 This time 
the  proposal  passed  the  first  reading  stage  in  the  National  Assembly,  allowing  for  deliberations  to 
commence in relevant committees. However, the parliamentary process did not reach a decisive stage 
by  the  time  the  government  stepped  down  and  the  National  Assembly  was  dissolved  in  early  2017, 
resulting  in  a  failure  to  bring  the  reform  to  a  final  vote.65  Nevertheless,  the  issue  remained  on  the 
public agenda through the election period, and the new government which took office in May affirmed 
its  commitment  to  the  anti-corruption  strategy,  including  the  proposal  to  put  in  place  a  new  more 
effective institutional framework in the form of a unified agency.  

The approach of the new government included some additional compromises in light of some of the 
sensitivities which had been revealed by the political discussions on the draft. Notably, this involved a 
rejection of the possibility of the new agency to act on anonymous alerts, although the agency would 
still carry out investigations based on alerts received  from  citizens and  media and would inform the 
relevant judicial authorities of any evidence of criminal wrongdoing found. Also, the current proposal 
reportedly aims to ensure the continued functioning of the existing asset recovery office (CIAF) within 
the  new  structure,  by  in  effect  building  the  new  structure  up  around  that  institution.  66  Finally, 
according to the government proposal, the head of the new agency would be elected by the National 
Assembly. 

As  the  new  draft  contained  a  number  of  modifications  compared  to  the  original  proposal,  the 
government decided to go through an additional round of stakeholder consultations, before introducing 

62   A number of existing institutions would be incorporated into the new agency, including the Commission for 
the Prevention and Ascertainment of Conflicts of Interest (CPACI), parts of the National Audit Office (NAO) 
dealing  with  asset  declarations  of  public  officials,  and  the  Centre  for  the  Prevention  and  Counteraction  of 
Corruption and Organised Crime (BORKOR). 

63   COM (2016) 40 final, p. 8.  
64   An important new feature of the second draft law was the proposal to include the confiscation of illicit assets 
within its remit and incorporate the existing Commission on Illicit Asset Forfeiture (CIAF) in the new unified 
anti-corruption agency. 
65   COM (2017) 43 final, p. 6.  
66   The need for continued independent and effective functioning of the CIAF was raised in the January CVM 

report (COM (2017) 43 final, p. 11). 

13 

 
 
                                                            
the proposal in the National Assembly on 4 October.67 The government has indicated that it aims to 
have  the  proposal  adopted  before  the  end  of  the  year,  following  which  the  new  unified  agency  will 
have to be established and start working.68  

Recommendation 10: Adopt and implement a reform of the law on public administration to strengthen 
the internal inspectorates in the public administration. 

A well-functioning system of internal control is a key element in the prevention of corruption in public 
institutions.  The  inspectorates  in  the  State  administration  play  an  important  role  in  this  regard,  but 
their impact could be improved through a clearer institutional framework and enhanced capacity. The 
2015  CVM  report  noted  that  the  effectiveness  of  these  institutions  was  hampered  due  to  lack  of  a 
coordinated  approach,  partly  due  to  shortcomings  in  the  legal  framework.69  Accordingly,  one  of  the 
measures  envisaged  in  the  Bulgarian  anti-corruption  strategy  in  2015  was  a  strengthening  of  the 
system of internal control through  amendments to the Law on Public Administration  to increase the 
independence, competencies and capacity of the inspectorates.  

A draft amending law to the Law on Public Administration was prepared in spring 2015 but, due to a 
protracted  process  of  administrative  vetting,  was  brought  forward  to  political  endorsement  only  in 
September 2017, when it was adopted by the government and submitted to the National Assembly. It 
was adopted by the National Assembly on 12 October. 

The amendments provide a clearer legal framework for administrative control70, distinguishing the role 
of the inspectorates from that of other control agencies, such as those responsible for financial control 
or public procurement. It provides that an implementing regulation of the government should define 
the overall structure of inspectorates and define their number, as well as setting out working methods 
and  procedures  for  their  work,  including  for  their  interaction  with  specialised  control  agencies,  and 
defining  minimum  qualifications  for  the  managing  heads  of  the  inspectorates.  The  functions  of  the 
inspectorates are also more clearly defined in the draft law, including the central coordinating role of 
the chief inspectorate71, which will evaluate the work of sectorial inspectorates and will play a role in 
the coordination of general anti-corruption policy.  

Adoption of the amendments to the Law on Public Administration is an important first step. Now the 
government will need to set out the implementing acts and ensure the implementation and application 
of the reform in concrete organisational terms.  

Recommendation 11: Building on the analysis of past cases, establish a roadmap between all relevant 
institutions  to  address  shortcomings  in  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of  high-level  corruption 
cases, including a mechanism for the reporting of progress to the wider public. 

The establishment of an effective system of investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption has 
been highlighted as a key challenge in Bulgaria, with successive CVM reports underlining the need for 
careful  analysis  of  the  hurdles  and  challenges  met  through  the  pre-trial  and  trial  stages  to  identify 
practical and legal measures which could make the system more effective.72 In 2016 the Prosecutor's 

67   This did not prevent criticism from some stakeholders who considered the consultations to be managed in a 

restrictive manner which did not allow for a proper discussion of the proposal as a whole. 

68   On 25 October the draft law was endorsed by the plenary of the National Assembly in first reading, allowing 

for more detailed deliberations to commence in the relevant committees.  

69   COM (2015) 36 final, p. 7. The analysis identified issues such as limited staff resources and high turnover 
and a lack of a clearly recognised status of internal administrative control in the law, making it difficult to 
enforce common binding guidelines and potentially creating a risk of political influence on inspections. See 
SWD (2015) 9 final, p. 21. 

70   Broadly, administrative control aims at verifying and evaluating actions of the administration for compliance 

with legal acts and for effectiveness and transparency as well as prevention of corruption.  

71   The chief directorate is responsible for overall coordination and refers directly to the Prime Minister.  
72   See for exemple: COM (2017) 43 final, p. 12; COM (2016) 40 final, p. 12.  

14 

 
 
                                                            
Office  analysed  a  broad  sample  of  corruption  cases  processed  since  2013,  which  resulted  in  the 
identification  of  a  number  of  issues  and  recommendations  for  further  work.  The  challenges  include 
organisational,  legal  and  procedural  issues  and  would  seem  to  require  a  comprehensive  response  at 
many levels.73  

The analysis carried out by the Prosecutor's Office was an important first step towards addressing the 
issues, but to provide effective solutions this needs to involve the relevant actors along the entire chain 
from investigation over prosecution to adjudication – as well as the government in as far as possible 
legislative amendments are considered. This was the background for the recommendation to bring all 
the  relevant  institutions  together  in  a  common  process  to  identify  joint  solutions  and  plan  concrete 
steps for the way ahead. The recommendation also highlights the need for public transparency around 
this  effort.  Such  transparency  can  allow  for  the  involvement  of  stakeholders  in  the  debate  and  help 
create trust in the process on the part of the wider public.  

In response to this recommendation, the Bulgarian authorities report that a roadmap was prepared and 
discussed  at  a  meeting  of  the  National  Council  on  Anti-Corruption  Policies  on  20  July  2017.74  The 
roadmap  focusses  to  a  large  extent  on  elements  which  have  already  been  mentioned  under 
Benchmarks 2 and 3 above and include issues such as possible amendments to the definition of key 
corruption offences, simplification of criminal procedures, providing better tools for the prosecution of 
high-level corruption through the use of collaborating witnesses, analysis of current practice regarding 
judicial review of prosecutorial decisions to terminate investigations, improving the use of expertise in 
criminal proceedings, and further specialisation and training.75  

In order to ensure follow-up and publicity around the measures set out in the roadmap, the responsible 
institutions have agreed to provide six-monthly progress reports to the anti-corruption policy council, 
which will publish a summary on its website. Beyond the specific roadmap, the Bulgarian authorities 
also refer to the envisaged  strengthening  of the capacity of specialised units dealing with corruption 
cases.76  

Recommendation  12:  Establish  a  mechanism  for  public  reporting  on  progress  in  high-level 
[corruption] cases which are in the public domain. General Prosecution to report – whilst respecting 
the  presumption  of  innocence  –  on  investigations  and  indictments.  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation  and 
Ministry of Justice to report on convictions as well as the enforcement of sentences. 

Successive CVM reports have noted that Bulgaria still needs to show a track record of final results in 
high-level  corruption  cases.77  The  Prosecutor's  Office  reports  that  a  number  of  investigations  are 
ongoing  and  new  cases  continue  to  be  brought  to  court.  However,  the  credibility  of  the  system 
ultimately rests on whether cases brought to court lead to final convictions.78  

73   SWD(2017) 24 final, p. 31-33.  
74   This council was set up under the previous government as a forum for monitoring and evaluation of progress 
on  the  anti-corruption  strategy  and  is  headed  by  the  National  Anti-corruption  Coordinator  (currently  the 
Deputy Prime Minister for Judicial Reform and Minister of Foreign Affairs).  

75   Naturally there is a significant overlap between the issues identified in this process and those highlighted by 
the analysis of the structure and functional model of the Prosecutor's Office and in the wider discussion of 
criminal procedures.  

76   Reference  is  made  in  this  context  to  the  specialised  anti-corruption  unit  currently  under  the  Sofia  City 
Prosecutor's  Office.  The  subsequent  decision  to  move  key  high-level  corruption  cases  to  the  Specialised 
Prosecutor's  Office  for  Organised  Crime  would  however  likely  require  some  reassessment  of  these  plans, 
depending on the exact working arrangements between the various institutions.  

77   See e.g. COM (2017) 43 final, p. 11; COM (2016) 40 final, p. 9.  
78   This is not to suggest that acquittals are problematic in the context of lacking evidence. Rather, the issue is 
overall lack of successful high-level cases, a situation which does not correspond to the perceived extent of 
the  problem  with  high-level  corruption  in  Bulgaria,  further  underlined  by  the  high  number  of  cases  being 
brought  to  court  by  the  prosecution  each  year.    While  a  significant  number  of  cases  have  been  launched 

15 

 
 
                                                            
 
Many of the efforts undertaken by Bulgaria in the context of the recommendations referred to above 
aim directly or indirectly at addressing this issue.  However, in addition to measures to address legal 
and  procedural  issues,  it  is  also  important  for  the  Bulgarian  authorities  to  ensure  transparency  and 
public  scrutiny  of  activities  in  the  fight  against  high-level  corruption,  in  full  respect  of  procedural 
rights.  This  is  the  background  for  this  recommendation,  which  calls  for  Bulgaria  to  establish 
mechanisms for regular public reporting on ongoing high-level corruption cases, so that it is possible 
for  the  public  –  including  media  and  civil  society  –  to  be  generally  informed  about  such  cases  and 
follow  the  progress  made  in  establishing  a  track  record  in  this  area.  In  addition,  such  reporting  will 
also help the judicial and other authorities in identifying possible challenges of a procedural or legal 
nature which need a more systematic follow-up.  

In  response  to  this  recommendation,  a  new  system  has  been  set  up  with  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Cassation  for  the  collection  and  publication  of  information  about  ongoing  corruption  and  organised 
crime  cases  on  a  dedicated  website.  The  new  system  entered  into  force  in  April  2017.  A  unified 
catalogue  of  corruption  crimes  was  approved  as  a  basis  for  selection  of  cases  to  include  in  the  new 
public register. Every month, summaries of new cases are to be sent by all courts, followed by regular 
updates,  to  be  published  on  the  website,  organised  per  appellate  region.79  The  information  is  also 
forwarded to the SJC and the Ministry of Justice on a monthly basis.  

As for the Prosecutor's Office, the Bulgarian authorities refer to the existing provisions in the Judicial 
Systems  Act,  which  require  the  Prosecutor  General  every  six  months  to  provide  summarised 
information about the initiation and completion of case files to the prosecutors' chamber of the SJC, 
the  Inspectorate  of  the  SJC  and  the  Minister  of  Justice.80  In  addition,  the  Annual  report  of  the 
Prosecutor's Office contains general statistics on different types of criminal cases. The annual report is 
made public. It is submitted for a debate in the SJC following which it is submitted to the National 
Assembly  for  adoption.81  The  statistics  do  not  provide  information  on  individual  cases.  For 
information  on  particularly  emblematic  cases,  the  Prosecutor's  Office  refers  to  its  general 
communication to the public through press releases.  

According to the Bulgarian Prosecutor's Office, overall numbers for cases brought to court appear to 
be  stable  compared  to  previous  years.  Recent  cases  under  investigation  or  brought  to  court  include 
several  cases  involving  senior  officials,  including  magistrates.  A  number  of  final  convictions  in 
corruption  cases  have  been  reported  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation,  although  the  list  remains 
limited in regard to high-level cases.82   

BENCHMARK  5:  TAKE  FURTHER  MEASURES  TO  PREVENT  AND  FIGHT  CORRUPTION,  IN 
PARTICULAR AT THE BORDERS AND WITHIN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 

Recommendation  13:  Carry  out  an  external  review  of  the  ex  ante  checks  of  public  procurement 
procedures and their follow-up, including ex post checks, as well as on cases of conflicts of interest or 
corruption discovered and remedial measures taken to address identified shortcomings. 

against  senior  officials  as  well  as  ministers  and  magistrates  over  the  years,  they  only  rarely  result  in  final 
convictions, see SWD (2017) 24 final, p. 30-33. This pattern points to a generalised  problem. 

79   The Specialised Court for Organised Crime has its own section as do the military courts.  
80   This provision was introduced in 2016. Judicial Systems Act, Article 138, item 11.  
81   Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Article 84, item 16.  
82   Notably the list includes a recent confirmation at final instance of a one-year suspended prison sentence in a 
case on illegal surveillance permits involving the former Head of the Sofia City Court (the so-called 'Worms' 
case). Other final convictions confirmed since March this year include four cases of active bribery (bribing of 
police officers) with prison sentences of up to two years and eight months enforced, three cases of passive 
bribery  (including  a  case  of  extortion  by  a  senior  official)  with  prison  sentences  of  up  to  three  years 
suspended, a case of smuggling by officials connected to the customs service with prison sentences of up to 
three years suspended, a case of intentional unfavourable transaction to the detriment of the state with a six 
months suspended prison sentence, and a case of embezzlement with a two years suspended prison sentence. 

16 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Public procurement is a key area of concern with regard to corruption. An important focus in previous 
reports  has  been  on  the  introduction  of  more  thorough  ex  ante  checks  on  public  procurement 
procedures  in  order  to  identify  areas  of  risk  and  improve  prevention.83  In  2016,  as  part  of  a  wider 
reform  of  its  public  procurement  legislation84,  Bulgaria  introduced  a  new  approach  to  these  ex  ante 
checks performed by the Public Procurement Agency, replacing the previous system of automatic but 
rather  formalistic  checks  with  a  system  for  randomised  but  more  in-depth  control.  This  was  also 
accompanied  by  stronger  powers  for  the  Agency  to  monitor  procedures  and  alert  ex  post  control 
bodies85 of potential risks.  

The new system came into force in September 2016 alongside measures to enhance the capacity of the 
Public  Procurement  Agency  and  efforts  to  generally  strengthen  coordination  with  ex  post  control 
bodies. These efforts have also included a stronger focus on the prevention and detection of conflicts 
of  interest  in  public  procurement.  This  has  involved  training  for  local  authorities  organised  by  the 
Commission for the Prevention and Ascertainment of Conflicts of Interest (CPACI) as well as closer 
cooperation between this institution and the various control bodies.86  

The January CVM report recommended the Bulgarian authorities to carry out a general evaluation of 
the functioning of the new system, with the involvement of outside expertise, to identify avenues for 
further  improvement  and  better  implementation  of  the  new  rules.  The  review  should  also  cover  the 
application of rules on conflicts of interest and follow-up to any issues identified.  

In response to this recommendation, the Bulgarian authorities are reportedly envisaging a review to be 
carried  out  in  2018  with  an  external  contractor  and  funding  from  Operational  Programme  "Good 
Governance" under the European Social Fund.  

Recommendation 14: Put in place risk-based measures to address low-level corruption  in high risk 
sectors within the public administration, taking inspiration from what has been done in the Ministry of 
Interior. Continue the efforts in the Ministry of Interior. 

The  2015  Anti-corruption  Strategy  included  a  focus  on  rolling  out  practical  measures  to  address 
corruption in specific high risk sectors. The January report noted that progress on these plans was still 
at an early stage, with the exception of the Ministry of Interior, which had been implementing a broad 
range  of  targeted  anti-corruption  measures  in  the  context  of  a  more  comprehensive  administrative 
reform of the Ministry.87 Other ministries have adopted action plans, although in a number of cases it 
has been unclear to what extent they went beyond existing practices88 and how far they were advanced 
in  terms  of  implementation:  strong  public  statements  by  Ministers  responsible  for  high-risk  policy 
areas  can  act  as  a  sign  that  such  policies  are  being  given  high  priority,  but  the  Commission  has  not 
been  made  aware  of  examples  of  how  this  has  translated  into  concrete  results.  Some  measures  in 
specific sectors have been focussed on  further improving existing integrity policies and controls, for 
example  improving  the  rules  for  confidential  treatment  of  alerts,  improving  public  procurement 
procedures to prevent corruption risks, or clarifying rules for private economic activity with possible 
relation to official responsibilities of employees. However, this is an area which requires focused and 

83   See COM(2016) 40 final, p. 12. 
84   The  package  adopted  in  January  2016  reportedly  aimed  at  transposing  recent  changes  to  EU  public 
procurement  rules  into  national  law.  However,  it  should  be  mentioned  that  Bulgaria  failed  to  meet  the 
deadline  of  18  April  2016  for  the  transposition  of  Directive  2014/23/EU  on  the  award  of  concessions 
contracts into its national legal order by the deadline of 18 April 2016. Given the importance of this Directive 
for  the  public  procurement  sector,  the  absence  of  timely  transposition  may  result  in  reduction  of  legal 
certainty and suboptimal use of public funds. 

85   The State Financial Inspection Agency and the National Audit Office.  
86   A cooperation agreement was recently signed in order to step up synergies between these institutions.  
87   COM (2017) 43 final, p. 6-7. This also includes a specific focus on prevention of corruption at the borders, 

including customs, with targeted checks, rotation of personnel, video surveillance etc.  

88   General  integrity-related  policies  exist  in  different  sectors  of  government,  including  training  of  new 

employees, rules on gifts, etc.  

17 

 
 
                                                            
determined attention over time, sometimes necessitating a broader effort to change culture in sectors 
where practices may be entrenched. Structured and coordinated follow-up is a way of embedding such 
policies and efforts in a common policy across sectors.  

The  previous  government  in  2015  established  a  National  Anti-corruption  Policy  Council,  bringing 
together  the  various  institutions  and  stakeholders  to  monitor  progress  in  the  implementation  of  the 
anti-corruption  strategy.  This  institution  has  continued  under  the  new  government.89  At  the  first 
meeting  under  the  new  government  in  July,  a  decision  was  taken  to  set  in  motion  a  cross-cutting 
analysis of the sector plans which had been prepared across the various government departments. The 
analysis  should  be  finalised  before  the  end  of  the  year  and  result  in  recommendations  for  further 
improvement and streamlining of the efforts.90  

Recommendation  15:  Establish  a  mechanism  for  public  reporting  on  the  implementation  of  the 
national anti-corruption strategy covering the remaining duration of the Strategy's implementation. 

The comprehensive anti-corruption strategy adopted by the previous government in 2015 remains the 
framework within which Bulgaria implements its anti-corruption policy.91 As in the case of the judicial 
reform strategy, an important part of such a framework is to ensure regular evaluation of progress and 
encourage  a  continuous  debate  on  objectives  among  stakeholders.  This  was  the  background  for  this 
recommendation  to  ensure  regular  public  reporting  on  the  implementation  of  the  strategy,  which  is 
valid until 2020.  

In  response  to  this  recommendation,  the  Bulgarian  authorities  report  that  they  have  revived  the 
National  Council  for  Anti-corruption  Policy.  As  mentioned  above,  this  institution  was  established 
under  the  previous  government  with  the  purpose  of  ensuring  continued  political  attention  to  the 
implementation and further development of the strategy. The Council is responsible for following up 
and ensuring continuous evaluation of progress and initiation of the measures as set out in the strategy.  

BENCHMARK 6: IMPLEMENT A STRATEGY TO FIGHT ORGANISED CRIME, FOCUSSING ON SERIOUS 
CRIME,  MONEY  LAUNDERING  AS  WELL  AS  ON  THE  SYSTEMATIC  CONFISCATION  OF  ASSETS  OF 
CRIMINALS. REPORT ON NEW AND ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS IN THESE AREAS 

Recommendation  16:  Establish  a  mechanism  for  public  reporting  on  progress  in  high-level 
[organised  crime]  cases  which  are  in  the  public  domain.  General  Prosecution  to  report  –  whilst 
respecting  the  presumption  of  innocence  –  on  investigations  and  indictments.  Supreme  Court  of 
Cassation and Ministry of Justice to report on convictions as well as the enforcement of sentences. 

This recommendation is analogous to the recommendation under Benchmark 4 above concerning high 
level corruption cases. The follow-up by the Bulgarian authorities is also broadly similar. In fact it is 
the same general system applying to both types of cases.  

In  general,  the  January  report  acknowledged  the  progress  made  over  recent  years  in  establishing  a 
track  record  in  organised  crime  cases.  The  report  also  recognised  a  broader  change  in  the  nature  of 
organised crime in Bulgaria over the past ten years, with an overall picture closer to the situation as it 
exists in various other Member States.  

Based  on  information  provided  by  the  Bulgarian  authorities,  the  Specialised  Prosecutor's  Office  and 
Court  for  Organised  Crime  continue  to  consolidate  the  positive  trend  which  has  been  observed  in 

89   As mentioned above, it is headed by the Deputy Prime Minister for Judicial Reform and Minister for Foreign 

Affairs, who has also been given the title of national anti-corruption coordinator.  

90   The  analysis  is  being  carried  out  by  the  Centre  for  the  Prevention  and  Counteraction  of  Corruption  and 

Organised Crime (BORKOR).  

91   An English version can be found via this link: http://rai-see.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Bulgaria_Anti-

corruption_strategy_-2015.pdf  

18 

 
 
                                                            
previous  years  in  terms  of  track  record,  with  a  steady  stream  of  cases  concerning  serious  organised 
crime leading to prison sentences at final instance.92  

Recommendation 17: Adopt the necessary amendments to the law on confiscation of criminal assets 
and ensure the Illegal Asset Forfeiture Commission continues to operate independently and efficiently. 

The legislative amendments referred to in the previous report have been adopted. Generally, the asset 
forfeiture  commission  appears  to  continue  developing  its  track  record,  now  further  facilitated  by  a 
more  effective  legal  framework.93  The  new  legislative  proposal  envisaging  incorporating  the  asset 
forfeiture  commission  (CIAF)  in  a  new  unified  anti-corruption  institution  could  possibly  reopen 
negotiations on the existing legal framework as well as affect the organisational set up. The Bulgarian 
authorities have however underlined their intention to ensure the continued effective functioning of the 
asset recovery office within the new set-up.94  

92   The number of effective prison sentences has ranged between 20 and 72 per year since 2012, with 33 in the 
first  half  of  2017.  Examples  of  final  convictions  confirmed  since  March  this  year  include  a  case  against  a 
group involved in counterfeiting of payment instruments and a case against a group (including a member of 
the border police force) involved in excise fraud, both cases resulting in prison sentences of up to six years.  
93   Total confiscated assets were at approximately EUR 9.4 million in 2016, which is significantly more than in 
previous years. The increase continues in 2017 with more than EUR 11 million confiscated by September.  

94   See also above.  

19