Long-term sustainability of digital service infrastructures : final report.
Date: 2017-11-13
Institutions: Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology
Subjects: digital technology, governance, information technology, product life, systems interconnection, telecommunications policy

Long-Term  
Sustainability of  
Digital Service  
Infrastructures 

FINAL REPORT  

A study prepared for the European Commission 

DG Communications Networks, Content & Technology by:  

Digital 
Single 
Market 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
   
This study was carried out for the European Commission by 

Authors' names:  

Martina Barbero 
Hans Graux 
Francesco Mureddu 
Sebastiaan van der Peijl 
Patrick Wauters 

Internal identification 

Contract number: 30-CE-0743850/00-27  
SMART number 2015/0040 

DISCLAIMER 

By the European Commission, Directorate-General of Communications Networks, Content & Technology.  

The information and views set out in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect 
the official opinion of the Commission. The Commission does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in 
this study. Neither the Commission nor any person acting on the Commission’s behalf may be held responsible 
for the use which may be made of the information contained therein. 

ISBN 978-92-79-70757-5 

doi:10.2759/210858 

© European Union, 2017. All rights reserved. Certain parts are licensed under conditions to the EU.  

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 

 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 

Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 4 

Résumé ....................................................................................................................................... 5 

Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... 6 

Résumé operationnel ................................................................................................................. 9 

Summary .................................................................................................................................. 12 

The extent to which financial sustainability is an issue ....................................................... 12 

Defining the potential solutions ........................................................................................... 13 

The front-runners ................................................................................................................. 15 

Weighing the pros and cons ................................................................................................. 16 

Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 18 

Recommendations ............................................................................................................... 19 

1 

2 

Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 24 

DSI sustainability: context ................................................................................................ 26 

2.1  DSIs and their characteristics .................................................................................... 26 

2.2 Why does sustainability matter? .................................................................................... 32 

3 

Current governance, operations, financing and architecture model of the DSIs ............ 36 

3.1 

The GOFA elements ................................................................................................... 37 

4 

The panorama of potential sustainability solutions ........................................................ 42 

4.1 

4.2 

The model for identifying sustainability solutions .................................................... 42 

Characteristics of the sustainability solution options ............................................... 45 

4.2.1 

Strong EC lead and dispersed management ...................................................... 46 

4.2.2 

Strong EC lead and concentrated management ................................................ 48 

4.2.3  No EC lead and decentralised management ...................................................... 51 

4.2.4  No EC lead and concentrated management ...................................................... 53 

4.2.5  Moderate EC lead and centralised management .............................................. 54 

5  Outcome of individual and cross-DSI analysis ................................................................. 57 

5.1  Outcome of the individual DSI analysis ..................................................................... 57 

5.2 

The sensitivity analysis .............................................................................................. 58 

5.3  Outcome of the cross-DSI analysis ............................................................................ 68 

5.3.1 

Assessment of solutions against cross-DSI assessment criteria ........................ 68 

5.3.2 

Potential blocking and risk factors ..................................................................... 70 

5.3.3 

Analysis of the solutions’ flexibility and extensibility ........................................ 73 

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5.4 

5.5 

Comparison of individual and cross-DSI analysis ...................................................... 74 

Pugh analysis across the sustainability solutions ...................................................... 76 

6 

Roadmaps for transition towards the sustainability solutions ........................................ 82 

6.1 

6.2 

6.3 

Transition to an EU Regulatory Agency ..................................................................... 83 

Transition to a new EC Programme ........................................................................... 86 

Transition to DIGIT or an Executive Agency .............................................................. 88 

7 

Conclusions and recommendations ................................................................................. 92 

7.1 

7.2 

7.3 

The analytical process................................................................................................ 92 

Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 93 

Recommendations ..................................................................................................... 97 

Table of Figures 

Figure 1- GOFA model .............................................................................................................. 36 

Figure 2 – Solutions typology ................................................................................................... 44 

Figure 3 – Handover to an EU Regulatory Agency: Timeline ................................................... 84 

Figure 4 – Transition to an EU Agency: Intensity of activities .................................................. 85 

Figure 5 - Establishment of an EC Programme timeline .......................................................... 87 

Figure 6 - Transition to an EC Programme: Intensity of activities............................................ 88 

Figure 7 - Handover to DIGIT timeline ..................................................................................... 89 

Figure 8 – Handover to an EU Executive Agency: Timeline ..................................................... 90 

Figure 9 – Handover to DIGIT or an Executive Agency: Intensity of activities ......................... 91 

Table of Tables 

Table 1 - Key findings on the sustainability solutions .............................................................. 16 

Table 2 - Key characteristics of DSIs ......................................................................................... 28 

Table 3 – Profiles of DSIs in their end-state ............................................................................. 31 

Table 4 – Current situation – key characteristics ..................................................................... 40 

Table 5 – Renewal of an EC Programme – key characteristics ................................................ 47 

Table 6 – Handover to DIGIT or Executive Agency – key characteristics ................................. 51 

Table  7  –  No  European  Commission 
lead  and  decentralised  management  –  key 
characteristics .......................................................................................................................... 52 

Table 8 – Handover to an institutionalised PPP – key characteristics ..................................... 54 

Table 9 – Handover to an EU Regulatory Agency – key characteristics ................................... 56 

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Table 10 – List of assessment criteria for the individual sustainability analysis ...................... 58 

Table 11 – Ranking of individual sustainability solutions per DSI ............................................ 60 

Table 12 –- DSI profile analysis ................................................................................................. 64 

Table 13 – Cross-DSI assessment criteria ................................................................................. 68 

Table 14 – Assessment of blocking and risk factors per GOFA ................................................ 71 

Table 15 – Scoring basis for the Pugh Analysis ........................................................................ 78 

Table 16 – Pugh Decision Matrix .............................................................................................. 79 

Table 17 - Key findings on the sustainability solutions ............................................................ 95 

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Abstract  

With  the  Connecting  Europe  Facility  (CEF)  programme  coming  to  an  end  in  2020,  the 
question  of  the  long-term  sustainability  of  the  CEF-funded  Digital  Service  Infrastructures 
(DSIs)  beyond  the  programme  needs  to  be  addressed.  The  objective  of  this  study  was  to 
assist  policy  makers  in  selecting  the  most  relevant  and  credible  solutions  to  ensure  the 
sustainability of all DSIs post-2020.  

The assignment therefore focused on identifying the long-term needs and requirements of 
each DSI and across DSIs. It established a list of possible solutions and assessed those from 
an  individual  and  cross-DSI  perspective  and  according  to  the  characteristics  of  groups  of 
DSIs,  by  means  of  a  sensitivity  analysis.  All  these  steps  were  also  summed  up  into  a  Pugh 
analysis comparing the benefits and weaknesses of the most promising solutions in order to 
provide  policy  makers  with  a  menu  of  options for  the  future.  It  emerged  that  handover of 
DSIs  to  an  EU  Regulatory  Agency  would  be  the  most  suitable  solution  taking  all  DSIs 
together, but that inclusion in a new programme to take over from the CEF from 2021 would 
also be a very viable option. The study also explains which solutions could suit individual DSIs 
or clusters of DSIs best. 

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Résumé  

Le Mécanisme pour l’interconnexion en Europe (CEF) prenant fin en 2020, la question de la 
durabilité à long terme des infrastructures de services numériques (ISN) financées par le CEF 
au-delà  de  ce  programme  doit  être  abordée.  L'objectif  de  cette  étude  était  d’aider  les 
décideurs politiques à choisir les solutions les plus pertinentes et crédibles afin d’assurer la 
durabilité de toutes les ISN après 2020.  

Le projet s’est donc attaché à identifier les exigences et besoins à long terme de chaque ISN 
ainsi que de l’ensemble des ISN. Une liste de solutions envisageables a été établie et évaluée 
du  point  de  vue  individuel  et  global  et  selon  les  caractéristiques  des  groupes  d’ISN,  au 
moyen d'une analyse de sensibilité. Toutes ces étapes ont également été résumées dans une 
analyse Pugh comparant les avantages et faiblesses des solutions les plus prometteuses afin 
de fournir aux décideurs une série d'options pour l'avenir. Il s'est révélé que le transfert des 
ISN à une Agence européenne de régulation serait la solution la plus appropriée pour réunir 
l’ensemble des ISN, mais également que l’inclusion dans un nouveau programme prenant le 
relais  du  CEF  à  partir  de  2021  serait  une  option  tout  à  fait  viable.  L'étude  explique  aussi 
quelles solutions pourraient  le mieux convenir aux ISN considérées individuellement et par 
groupes. 

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Executive Summary  

With  the  Connecting  Europe  Facility  (CEF)  coming  to  an  end  in  2020,  the  European 
Commission  commissioned  a  study  from  Deloitte  Consulting  to  assess  how  long-term 
business continuity can be assured for the 15 Digital Service Infrastructures (DSIs) covered by 
the  CEF.  The  objective  set  for  the  study  was  to  “provide  a  substantive  analysis  and 
assessment of a range of different solutions for ensuring the long-term sustainability of the 
DSIs.” The purpose was to assist policy makers by identifying the needs and requirements of 
individual DSIs, of clusters of DSIs, and across all DSIs. The solutions needed to be credible, 
responsive, extensible and flexible.  

Eight solutions were considered in all. Among these, three emerged clearly as front-runners. 
These could each accommodate all DSIs, but also groups of DSIs clustered by characteristics, 
any DSI individually, and the incorporation of other DSIs in future. 

  Regulatory Agency  
  EC Programme 
  DIGIT/an Executive Agency.  

A  fourth  solution,  handover  to  a  Public  Private  Partnership  (PPP),  was  also  considered 
carefully. It had merit for a small number of DSIs, but could not accommodate all DSIs, even 
if  uncertainties  about  whether  there  is  a  sufficient  legal  basis  for  this  solution  could  be 
resolved.  

The key advantages of the Regulatory Agency, which is the first choice, are that it: 

  has the best potential for including Member States and other stakeholders in decision-
making, and thus this is the most representative and flexible in terms of governance;  
  provides  open-ended  long-term  financial  security  because  there  is  an  ongoing 

obligation to provide funding, i.e. it is a once-and-for-all solution;  

  demonstrates the greatest potential for efficiency gains; 
  offers the possibility of charging third parties for services, where appropriate.  

An  EC  Programme  provides  more  limited financial  security (normally  in seven-year  cycles), 
less potential for efficiency gains, no possibility of charging for services and cannot involve 
Member States and other stakeholders in decision-making as closely.  

Handover  to  DIGIT/an  Executive  Agency  does  not  provide  financial  security.  It  would  be 
feasible only if financial security were assured from other sources, which would be complex. 
Moreover,  in  terms  of  governance  and  architecture,  handover  to  DIGIT  or  to  an  Executive 
Agency is not as good a solution as the handover to a Regulatory Agency. As Member States 
and  private  sector  stakeholders  cannot  be  involved  in  the  decision-making,  DIGIT  and  the 
Executive  Agency  solutions  are  less  inclusive  and  less  representative  than  the  other  two 
solutions.  Therefore,  even  for  DSIs  which  do  not  face  risks  in  terms  of  funding,  there  are 
strong governance arguments against these options.  

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Deciding  what  approach  to  take  involve  trade-offs  in  terms  of  the  degree  of  European 
Commission  intervention,  the  level  of  flexibility  sought  for  different  DSIs  (since  the  EC 
Programme  and  the  handover  to  DIGIT/Executive  Agency  may  suit  some  individual  DSIs 
better), whether synergies and efficiency gains outweigh the benefits of specialisation, and 
timing and effort. 

 The  Regulatory  Agency  requires  the  greatest  short-term  effort,  but  it  is  largely  a  one-off 
effort;  an  EC  Programme  requires  less  short-term  effort,  but  the  effort  must  be  repeated 
every seven years. In both cases, time is of the essence and work needs to start in 2017. 

Recommendations 

Handover  to  a  Regulatory  Agency  is  the  preferred  choice.  Whether  this  were  a  new  or  an 
existing  agency,  the  new  or  amended  mandate  would  have  to  be  flexible  enough  to  allow 
on-boarding  of  further  DSIs  subsequently.  The  advantages  of  this  solution  by  DSI  cluster 
would be: 

  DSIs  which  in  the  long  term  will  only  provide  or  maintain  standards  (eID  and 
eInvoicing) could provide and maintain these collaboratively, i.e. with the involvement 
of all relevant stakeholders, including the Member States and the private sector;  

  DSIs  which  in  the  long  term  will  also  only  provide  standards  and  specifications,  but 
which are providing services not specifically mentioned in their legal basis (eDelivery, 
eSignature  DSS  and  certain  components  of  eProcurement)  would  have  their 
temporary  operational  and  funding  needs  met,  gain  in  stability,  tap  into  a  source  of 
funding  for  the  additional  activities  they  are  currently  carrying  out,  and,  moreover, 
could charge the private sector for services.  

  DSIs  providing  centrally  managed  services  and  which  have  a  strong  legal  basis  (ODR, 
eSignature  TLM  and  eProcurement  eCertis  and  ESPD)  would  acquire  greater 
operational  and  financial  stability  from  a  once-and-for-all  solution  and  no  longer  be 
reliant on renewal of programmes for funding.  

  DSIs  which  have  no  legal  basis  and  provide  centrally  managed  services  only 
(Europeana,  Open  Data  Portal,  Safer  Internet)  would  acquire  a  legal  basis  and 
therefore long-term operational and financial stability.  

  DSIs providing both standards and specifications, and centrally run services, based on a 
legal  framework  (BRIS  and  eJustice  interconnection  of  insolvency  registers)  would 
obtain  long-term  operational  and  financial  stability  from  not  being  reliant  on  the 
renewal  of  funding  programmes  and  could,  moreover,  charge  the  private  sector  for 
services. 

  Other  DSIs  (eHealth,  Cyber  Security,  EESSI,  all  other  modules  of  eJustice)  could 
continue  to  provide  additional  services  beyond  the  scope  of  their  limited  legal  basis 
and would acquire financial and operational stability. It is important for these DSIs to 
be  able  to  involve  Member  States  and  other  stakeholders  in  their  governance  and 
architectural activities, and this solution would make this possible.  

If  the  Regulatory  Agency  solution    does  not  appear  feasible,  given  the  trade-offs  involved 
and the time required  to  implement  this  solution,  the  EC  Programme  is  recommended  as 
the  second  best  solution  common  to  all  DSIs.  This  solution  is  particularly  suited  to  DSIs 

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without  a  legal  basis  or  with  a  limited  legal  basis  (Europeana,  Open  Data  Portal,  Safer 
Internet and Cyber Security), but is a viable solution for all if it is felt that it is not feasible to 
implement  the  preferred  solution  between  now  and  the  end  of  the  CEF.  Any  such 
Programme  would  not  be  a  replica  of  the  CEF  but  should  foresee  new  or  enhanced 
mechanisms for: 

  cooperation and increased concentration of operations, governance and architectural 
coordination and assessing the potential to reduce duplication of services and costs; 
  additional  analysis,  if  felt  necessary,  of  the  sustainability  outlook  of  the  DSIs  and 
encouraging  them  to  find  alternatives  beyond  the  end  of  the  next  financial  cycle  in 
2027; 

  close  collaboration  and  cooperation  between  the  Member  States  and  the  European 
Commission so as to be a flexible tool for Member States wanting to engage more with 
cross-border IT services.  

If there is a preference for case-by-case sustainability solutions for each individual DSI rather 
than common solutions, it is recommended that the results of the individual DSI analysis be 
built on, using the multi-criteria assessment in the  study as a starting point for the individual 
discussions. 

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Résumé operationnel  

Alors que le Mécanisme pour l’interconnexion en Europe (Connecting Europe Facility – CEF) 
prendra  fin  en  2020,  la  Commission  européenne  a  mandaté  Deloitte  Conseil  pour  la 
réalisation d’une étude visant à évaluer les options pour assurer la continuité des opérations 
à long terme des quinze infrastructures de services numériques (ISN) couvertes par le CEF. 
L’objectif de cette étude était de « produire une analyse substantielle et l’évaluation d’une 
série de solutions visant à garantir la viabilité à long terme des ISN ». Le but était d’aider à 
l’élaboration  des  politiques  en  identifiant  les  besoins  et  prérequis  pour  chaque  ISN,  par 
groupes  d’ISN  et  pour  l’ensemble  des  ISN.  Les  solutions  devaient  être  crédibles,  réactives, 
extensibles et flexibles.  

Huit  solutions  ont  été  prises  en  considération.  Trois  d’entre  elles  se  sont  clairement 
imposées.  Chacune  d’entre  elles  s’adaptait  aux  besoins  de  toutes  les  ISN,  mais  également 
aux  groupes  d’ISN  agglomérées  selon 
ISN  prise 
individuellement et à l’inclusion d’autres ISN à l’avenir.  

leurs  caractéristiques,  à  chaque 

  Agence de régulation  
  Programme de la Commission européenne 
  Commission européenne (DG DIGIT)/Agence exécutive.  

Une  quatrième  solution,  la  remise  à  un  partenariat  public-privé  (PPP)  a  également  été 
considérée  avec  attention.  Elle  était  avantageuse  pour  un  petit  nombre  d’ISN  mais  ne 
pouvait  répondre  aux  besoins  de  toutes.  Par  ailleurs,  les  incertitudes  sur  l’existence  d’une 
base juridique suffisante pour cette solution n’ont pu être levées.  

Les principaux avantages d’une Agence de régulation, la solution favorisée, sont :  

  Son  potentiel  pour  l’association  des  Etats  membres  et  autres  parties  prenantes  à  la 
prise de décision, ce qui en fait la solution la plus représentative et flexible en matière 
de gouvernance ;  

  Sa  sécurité  financière  assurée  à  long  terme  résultant  de  l’obligation  continue  de 

financement, qui en fait une solution définitive ;  

  Son potentiel de gains en efficience ; 
  Sa possibilité, le cas échéant, de facturer des services à des tiers.  

Un  programme  de  la  Commission  européenne  offre  une  sécurité  financière  plus  limitée 
(généralement par cycles de sept ans), moins de potentiel pour des gains en efficience, pas 
de  possibilité  de  facturer  des  services  et  d'associer  les  Etats  membres  et  autres  parties 
prenantes aussi étroitement à la prise de décision.  

Confier les ISN à DIGIT ou une Agence exécutive n’offre pas de sécurité financière. Cela ne 
serait  possible  que  si  cette  sécurité  était  garantie  par  d’autres  sources,  ce  qui  s’avérerait 
complexe. De plus, confier les ISN à DIGIT ou à une Agence exécutive n’est pas une solution 

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aussi  satisfaisante  en  matière  de  gouvernance  et  d’architecture  que  de  les  confier  à  une 
Agence  de  régulation.  Les  Etats  membres  et  les  parties  prenantes  du  secteur  privé  ne 
pouvant être associés à la prise de décision, les solutions de DIGIT et de l’Agence exécutive 
sont  moins  ouvertes  et  représentatives  que  les  deux  autres.  Il  existe  donc  de  solides 
arguments en matière de gouvernance contre ces options, même pour les ISN non exposées 
à des risques en matière de financement. Le choix d’une approche implique des compromis 
sur le degré d’intervention de la Commission européenne, le niveau de flexibilité recherché 
pour  les  différentes  ISN  (le  programme  de  la  Commission  et  la  cession  à  DIGIT  ou  à  une 
Agence exécutive pouvant mieux convenir à certaines ISN), l’arbitrage entre les synergies et 
les  gains  en  efficience  et  les  bénéfices  de  la  spécialisation,  le  calendrier  et  les  efforts 
nécessaires. L’Agence de régulation est la solution requérant le plus d’efforts à court terme, 
mais il s'agit d'un effort unique ; le programme de la Commission requiert moins d’efforts à 
court terme, mais ceux-ci doivent être répétés tous les sept ans. Dans les deux cas, le temps 
est un facteur essentiel et les travaux doivent débuter dès 2017.   

Recommandations 

Confier  les  ISN  à  une  Agence  de  régulation  est  l’option  privilégiée.  Qu’il  s’agisse  d’une 
Agence  nouvelle  ou existante,  le  mandat établi ou  amendé  devrait  être assez flexible pour 
permettre  l’intégration  d’autres  ISN  par  la  suite.  Les  avantages  pour  chaque  groupe  d’ISN 
seraient les suivants : 

  Les ISN n’ayant pour vocation à terme qu’à fournir ou maintenir des standards (eID et 
eInvoicing)  pourraient  le  faire  de  manière  collaborative,  c’est-à-dire  en  impliquant 
toutes  les  parties  prenantes  concernées,  y  compris  les  Etats  membres  et  le  secteur 
privé.  

  Cette solution répondrait aux besoins opérationnels et financiers temporaires des ISN 
qui  à  terme  fourniront  également  des  standards  et  des  spécifications  mais  qui 
fournissent  aujourd'hui  des  services  ne  figurant  pas  spécifiquement  dans  leur  base 
légale (eDelivery, eSignature DSS et certains composants de eProcurement). Ces ISN 
bénéficieraient  de  gains  en  stabilité,  d’un  accès  à  des  sources  de  financement  pour 
leurs  activités  additionnelles  actuelles  et  pourraient  facturer  des  services  au  secteur 
privé. 

  Les  ISN  fournissant  des  services  gérés  de  manière  centralisée  et  à  la  base  juridique 
solide  (ODR,  eSignature  TLM,  eProcurement  eCertis  et  ESPD)  tireraient  une  plus 
grande  stabilité  opérationnelle  et  financière  d’une  solution  définitive  et  ne 
dépendraient plus du renouvellement des programmes de financement.  

  Les ISN sans base juridique et fournissant uniquement des services gérés centralement 
(Europeana,  Open  Data  Portal,  Safer  Internet)  se  doteraient  d’une  base  juridique, 
d’une stabilité opérationnelle et financière à long terme.  

  Les 

ISN  fournissant  des  standards,  des  spécifications  et  des  services  gérés 
centralement  sur  la  base  d’un  cadre  légal  (BRIS  et  l’interconnexion  des  registres 
d’insolvabilité d’eJustice) bénéficieraient  d'une stabilité opérationnelle et financière à 
long terme du fait qu’elles ne dépendraient plus du renouvellement des programmes 
de financement et pourraient facturer des services au secteur privé.  

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  Les  autres  ISN  (eHealth,  Cyber  Security,  EESSI,  tous  les  autres  modules  d’eJustice) 
pourraient continuer à fournir des services additionnels au-delà du cadre de leur base 
juridique  limitée  et  acquerraient  une  stabilité  financière  et  opérationnelle.  Il  est 
important  pour  ces  ISN  de  pouvoir  associer  les  Etats  membres  et  autres  parties 
prenantes  à  leur  activités  de  gouvernance  et  d’architecture,  ce  qui  serait  rendu 
possible par cette solution.    

Si la solution de l’Agence de régulation s’avère ne pas être possible en raison de compromis 
et  du  temps  nécessaire  à  sa  mise  en  place,  le  programme  de  la  Commission  est 
recommandé comme deuxième meilleure solution pour l’ensemble des ISN. Cette solution 
est  particulièrement  adaptée  aux  ISN  sans  base  juridique  ou  à  la  base  juridique  limitée 
(Europeana, Open Data Portal, Safer Internet et Cyber Security) mais est une solution viable 
pour toutes les ISN s’il n’est pas possible de mettre en place la solution privilégiée d’ici la fin 
du  CEF.  Un  tel  programme  ne  serait  pas  une  réplique  du  CEF  puisqu’il  inclurait  des 
mécanismes nouveaux ou renouvelés pour :   

  la coopération et une concentration accrue des opérations, de la gouvernance et de la 
coordination architecturale et l’évaluation du potentiel de réduction de la duplication 
des services et des coûts ;  

  l’analyse  additionnelle,  si  cela  est  jugé  nécessaire,  des  perspectives  de  durabilité  des 
ISN  et  l’incitation  à  trouver  des  alternatives  au-delà  de  la  fin  du  prochain  cycle 
financier en 2027 ;  

  la  collaboration  étroite  et  la  coopération  entre  les  Etats  membres  et  la  Commission 
européenne de manière à constituer un outil flexible pour les Etats membres désireux 
de s’impliquer dans les services informatiques transfrontaliers. 

Si l’utilisation de solutions de durabilité au cas par cas pour chaque ISN est jugé préférable à 
une solution commune, il est alors recommandé de s’appuyer sur les résultats de l’analyse 
individuelle de chaque ISN en utilisant l’évaluation multicritères de l’étude comme point de 
départ pour les discussions individuelles.    

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Summary 

With  the  Connecting  Europe  Facility  (CEF)  coming  to  an  end  in  2020,  the  European 
Commission  recognised  in  commissioning  this  study  from  Deloitte  Consulting  a  need  to 
assess  how  business  continuity  can  be  assured  for  the  15  Digital  Service  Infrastructures 
(DSIs) covered by the CEF in the long term. The objective set for the study was to “provide a 
substantive analysis and assessment of a range of different solutions for ensuring the long-
term sustainability of the DSIs.” 

The existing governance arrangements create a requirement for DSIs to plan for their own 
sustainability over time, but not all have yet taken concrete steps to do this. In any event, 
policy and strategic decisions will ultimately be needed at a higher level. The purpose of this 
study  was  to  assist  policy  makers  by  identifying  the  needs  and  requirements  of  individual 
DSIs,  of  clusters  of  DSIs,  and  across  all  DSIs  then  looking  at  which  potential  sustainability 
models  might  ensure  long-term  sustainability,  make  the  most  of  the  potential  for 
coordination  and  synergies,  and  be  flexible  enough  to  incorporate  additional  DSIs  in  the 
future.  

This  was  far  from  self-evident  given  the  disparate  nature  of  the  DSIs.  Some  are  building 
blocks  providing  components  for  other  users;  some  are  sector-specific.  Some  have  a  clear 
legal  basis  and  some  do  not.  Some  rely  entirely  on  the  CEF  Programme  for  their  funding, 
while  others  receive  funding  from  other  sources.  Some  handle  their  IT  in-house,  some 
outsource  it  to  DIGIT,  some  outsource  it  to  external  contractors.  There  are  DSIs  providing 
managed services, software, and standards and technical specifications or a combination of 
these.  Some  serve  only  the  public  sector,  others  work  with  both  private  and  public 
stakeholders.  The  extent  to  which  they  involve  Member  States  and  other  stakeholders  in 
their decision-making processes varies. 

The study included ten deliverables in two parts: 

  Part 1: Financial sustainability of individual DSIs up to 2020 
  Part 2: Identification of sustainability solutions beyond 2020; 

The purpose was to find an approach that was credible, responsive, extensible and flexible. 

The extent to which financial sustainability is an issue 
The  first  step  in  understanding  the  magnitude  or  otherwise  of  the  issue  of  long-term 
sustainability was understanding what the Terms of Reference defined as the “potential of a 
given DSI to generate revenue and/or benefit from sources of funding other than CEF, so as 
to become progressively self-standing or reliant on alternative sources of public funding or on 
a mix of private and public financing”. 

12 | P a g e  

 
 
The analysis in Part I covered the architecture and the nature of the core services of the DSIs, 
their  legal  frameworks  and  their  business  models.  It  included  estimates  up  to  2020  of  the 
total cost per DSI. This incorporated elements such as governance and auditing, as well as IT 
services as such. The analysis on the funding side looked at the amount of current funding 
and  where  it  comes  from.  It  also  looked  at  potential  sources  of  funding,  notably  the 
potential for raising revenue and any constraints on this because of the nature of the DSI’s 
users or its legal basis.  

The result was that the DSIs fall into three groups: 

  Financially sustainable DSIs (2) 
  Potentially financially sustainable DSIs (9) 
  DSIs with no clear path to financial sustainability (4). 

The  two  DSIs  that  are  already  financial  sustainable  are  ODR  and  eJustice.  They  mobilise 
sources  of  funding  other  than  the  CEF.  The  nine  DSIs  which  are  potentially  financial 
sustainable  fall  into  two  groups.  One  cluster  within  this  group  has  a  potential  for  revenue 
generation. These are eID, eSignature, eDelivery and eTranslation. Of these, eTranslation is 
furthest in estimating what revenue it could raise and how much of its costs it could cover in 
this way. A second cluster with this group has a strong potential for obtaining public funding 
on  the  grounds  of the  legal basis  creating them.  These are  BRIS,  EESSI, eHealth,  eInvoicing 
and eProcurement. The four DSIs with less certain prospects have no firm legal basis and no 
potential for revenue generation. They are Europeana, Public Open Data, Safer Internet and 
Cyber Security.  

Most  of  these  DSIs  have  yet  to  draw  up  strategies  for  ensuring  their  long-term  financial 
sustainability, yet this study has shown that they mainly face a real threat to their long-term 
sustainability if sources of funding are not found relatively quickly. 

Defining the potential solutions 
In  order  to  identify  the  solutions  which  might  best  offer  long-term  sustainability,  a  model 
known as GOFA was used to understand the needs and requirements of the DSIs in terms of 
their  Governance,  Operations,  Financing  and  Architectural  Coordination.  This  analysis  also 
showed that there are two key variables to be taken into account in assessing the solutions: 
the role of the European Commission, i.e. the extent to which it should take a lead across the 
GOFA elements, and the degree to which management is concentrated or spread.  

Combining  these  two  dimensions  across  concentration  and  dispersion  axes,  gave  rise  to 
eight possible sustainability solutions in five categories:  

i. 
a strong EC lead and dispersed management;  
ii. 
a strong EC lead and concentrated management;  
iii. 
no EC lead and dispersed management;  
iv. 
no EC lead and concentrated management and  
v.  moderate EC lead and concentrated management.  

13 | P a g e  

 
 
The solutions were an EC Programme (category i), handover to DIGIT or an Executive Agency 
(category  ii),  handover  to  Member  States,  the  private  sector  or  a  non-profit  organisation 
(category  iii),  handover to  a  Public-Private  Partnership  (PPP)  (category  iv)  and handover  to 
an EU Regulatory Agency (category v). The potential solutions considered thus ran the gamut 
from  ‘hands-off’  solutions  where  the  Commission  is  merely  the  ultimate  guardian  of  the 
policy decision to create a DSI but all other activities are devolved to very close involvement 
of the Commission at every level. 

The eight solutions were assessed for their suitability for individual DSIs and across all DSIs 
looked at holistically using multi-criteria assessment along the GOFA model. This assessment 
was  subjected  to  a  sensitivity  analysis.  In  this,  the  DSI  owners  themselves  were  asked  to 
express preferences using weighting factors. Key DSI characteristics were used to assess the 
different weighting possibilities for the criteria. This work also provided a basis for looking at 
solutions by clusters of DSIs based on the following categories:: 

  DSIs providing solutions for others to implement,  
  DSIs providing centrally managed services, and  
  DSIs  providing  both  solutions  for  others  to  implement  and  centrally  managed 

services.  

A  further  step  was  analysis  from  a  cross-DSI  perspective.  This  included two  elements.  One 
was  assessment  of  each  solution  against  a  set  of  criteria  relevant  from  a  cross-DSI 
perspective. The other was consideration in relation to each GOFA criterion of where there 
were either blocking or risk factors. Blocking factors means that a given solution could not be 
implemented for a given DSI. Risk factors means that there were risks in implementing one 
or other solution for one or other DSI. 

The outcome of the analysis per DSI showed a clear consensus in favour of handover to an 
EU  Regulatory  Agency.  There  was  otherwise  a  spread  across  a  Public  Private  Partnership, 
DIGIT/Executive  Agency  or  an  EC  Programme  with  handover  to  the  Member  States  as  an 
outlier.  

But  any  solution  should  also  drive  synergies  and  efficiency  across  the  four  GOFA  criteria 
taking  the  DSIs  as  a  whole.  From  a  cross-DSI  perspective  the  Regulatory  Agency  ranked 
highest,  followed  by  an  EC  Programme  and  then  the  Public-Private  Partnership.  The 
DIGIT/Executive  Agency  solution  by  itself  was  problematic  because  it  would  not  provide  a 
basis for sustainable funding. 

However,  when  the  risk  and  blocking  factors  were  taken  into  account  for  the  cross-DSIs 
analysis,  only  the  Regulatory  Agency  and  the  EC  Programme  had  a  completely  clean  slate. 
The availability of assured financing was a risk factor for more than half the DSIs in the case 
of handover to DIGIT/an Executive Agency. There were blocking factors for ODR which would 
prevent  handover  to  Member  States  or  a  PPP,  and  there  would  be  risk  factors  for  several 
DSIs if they were brought under a PPP umbrella. 

From a cross-DSI perspective, handover to the Member States, the private sector or a non-
profit organisation were ruled out from further analysis at that point.  

14 | P a g e  

 
 
The Public-Private Partnership was not further explored after the cross-DSI analysis because 
this showed that there were  blocking factors that by definition ruled out certain solutions, 
making  it  impossible  to  apply  them  to  all  DSIs.  Moreover,  a  PPP  would  have  to  be 
established  by  law  to  be  certain  of  being  able  to  make  Member  States’  participation 
compulsory  and  thus  cater  for  the  stability  of  public  funding.  However,  no  regulatory  PPP 
has  ever  been  established  at  EU  level  outside  the  context  of  research  funding1,  so  that 
additional  assessment  of  the  potential  legal  basis  would  be  needed  to  properly  assess  the 
feasibility of such an option for the relevant DSIs. This would be a source of delay as well as 
of uncertainty. It would also mean accepting ex ante that there were some DSIs to which this 
solution could never apply, making duplication of effort a serious concern. 

The front-runners 
As  a  result  of  this  analysis,  three  solutions  emerged  as  credible,  responsive,  flexible  and 
extensible.  

  Regulatory Agency  
  EC Programme 
  DIGIT/an Executive Agency  

A Regulatory Agency could provide open-ended long-term financial security because there is 
an ongoing obligation to fund an Agency, it promises efficiency gains and offers the easiest 
route  in  what  was  seen  as  an  advantage  by  the  DSIs  themselves  of  a  larger  role  for  the 
Member States in decision-making and more openness to other stakeholders.  

An EC Programme can provide financial security, albeit time-bound (normally in seven-year 
cycles).  What  is  more  difficult  is  to  deliver  the  efficiency  gains  that  the  handover  to  a 
Regulatory Agency or DIGIT/an Executive Agency would bring.  

Handover to DIGIT/an Executive Agency could not provide a secure long-term financial base 
for DSIs without a legal basis, but promises efficiency gains that it is more difficult to deliver 
within an EC Programme.  

All  three  solutions  could  accommodate  the  incorporation  of  additional  DSIs  if  this  were 
borne in mind in the initial set up. 

The pros and cons of each are summed up in the following table. 

1 The  establishment  of  Joint  Undertaking  (which  are  a  form  of  PPPs)  within  the  domain  of  research  and 
innovation is specifically mentioned by the Treaties. There is no provision excluding the possibility to establish 
PPPs  in  other  domains  but  this  possibility  is  not  spelled  out  in  any  other  section  of  the  Treaty  on  the 
Functioning of the European Union. For the paragraph referring to the establishment of joint undertakings in 
the  research  and  innovation  domain  see  Article  187,  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union,  see: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN. The issue of whether a 
specific  Treaty provision would be needed for a  regulatory PPP in another context, or whether one could be 
established on the basis of the absence of any specific exclusion in the Treaty would require further study. 

15 | P a g e  

 
 
 
                                                      
 
 

 

 

 

Table 1 - Key findings on the sustainability solutions 

EU Regulatory Agency 
  High 

level 

EC Programme 
 

Currently  dispersed  but 
of 
possibility 
with 
concentration  and  good 
degree  of  flexibility  for  all 
GOFA activities 
Strong EC lead 
Ensures 
funding 

availability  of 

DIGIT/Executive Agency 
  High 

degree 

of 
level 
with 
concentration 
limited 
of 
flexibility  for  all  GOFA 
activities 
Strong EC lead 
Cannot 
ensure 
availability  of  funding 
in itself 

  Moderate 

of 
concentration, but with 
of 
high 
degree 
flexibility 
in 
implementation  of  all 
GOFA activities 
EC 

lead, 
shared  with  Member 
States  and  possibly 
other stakeholders 
Can  ensure  availability 
of  funding  (depending 
on  set-up)  and  does 
be 
not 
renegotiated every few 
years 

need 

to 

 

Key 
characteristics 

Credibility 
/receptivity 
/extensibility 
/flexibility 

 
 

 

 

  Best fit in the individual 

 

DSI analysis 

  Best 

for  all  DSI 

fit 
profiles/groups 
(including 
Block DSIs) 

Building 

  Best fit in the cross-DSI 

analysis 

23 

for 

Suitable  as  second  best 
DSI 
option 
scenarios 
Second  best  for  3  DSI 
profiles  
Second  best  in  the  cross-
(equal 
DSI 
second 
with 
DIGIT/Executive Agency) 

scenario 

Suitable 
second 
as 
best  option  for  14  DSI 
scenarios  
Second  best  for  2  DSI 
profiles  
in  the 
Second  best 
cross-DSI 
scenario 
(equal  second  with  EC 
programme) 

Roadmap 
establishment 

for 

Stable over time 

 
  High  short  term  effort, 
but  mainly 
one-off 
depending  on  the  set-
up 

  Not stable over time 
  Medium short term effort, 
but  repetitive  over  time 
leading  to  high  effort  in 
the long term 

  Organisationally  stable 
over  time  but  reliance 
on  EC  Programme  (no 
stable funding) 
Low 
(but 
effort 
repetitive  due  to  the 
need  to  rely  on  EC 
Programmes) 

 

The  final  stages  before  drawing  conclusions  and  making  recommendations  were  a  Pugh 
analysis and roadmaps for the three solutions in order to identify timelines and the intensity 
of effort required. 

Weighing the pros and cons 
Any choice between the sustainability solutions presented above (and indeed any others) is 
likely  to  involve  careful  consideration  of  trade-offs  on  the  part  of  policy  makers.  The  key 
trade-offs identified in this study are: 

  The  level  of  European  Commission  intervention  and  the  level  of  flexibility  for 
individual  DSIs  to  tailor  a  given  solution  to  their  individual  needs.  Some  DSIs  (e.g. 
building block DSIs, such as eDelivery, eInvoicing and eSignature) aim to enable market 
operators  to  provide  solutions  that  are  compliant  with  EU  policy  goals,  while  others 

16 | P a g e  

 
 
 
 
 
 
are  more  clearly  aimed  at  better  cooperation  among  public  administrations 
throughout  the  EU  (e.g.  Cybersecurity,  EESSI),  and  there  are  others  that  may  have 
varying  degrees  of  involvement  of  private  sector  organisations.  Over  time,  as  the 
deployment  matures  and  conditions  evolve  (e.g.  in  terms  of  take-up,  provision  of 
compliant  market  solutions,  involvement  of  different  stakeholders,  technological 
developments,  etc.)  this  may  impact  the  level  of  EC  intervention  that  is  required. 
Therefore,  any  solution  that  provides  the  most  flexibility  from  this  perspective  is 
desirable, taking into account the variety of DSIs. Among those assessed, this is clearly 
the EU Regulatory Agency. 

  The degree of concentration and the level of synergies that can be exploited across 
DSIs.  Under  the  EC  Programme  (as  currently  under  the  CEF),  DSI  owners  have  the 
freedom  either  to  implement  their  activities  in  a  decentralised  manner  within  the 
relevant policy DG or to involve a single organisation for specific activities, as happens 
with  DIGIT  under  the  CEF.  This  has  resulted  today  in  a  semi-concentrated  approach 
across the DSIs, which does not ensure the full exploitation of synergies and efficiency 
gains. However, the establishment of a new programme with different characteristics 
could  allow  for  more  synergies,  the  provision  of  shared  services  and  the  sharing  of 
shared  resources,  when  establishing  and  deploying  cross-border  IT  systems  used  by 
the Member States. This is equally true of the handover to an EU Regulatory Agency 
and for handover to DIGIT or to an Executive Agency. 

  The level of stability over time and the transition efforts in the long term. While the 
EU Regulatory Agency provides the highest degree of stability (as well as flexibility) it 
would require the most efforts in the short term to establish the effective handover of 
DSIs. The establishment of a new EC Programme requires a smaller effort in the short 
term  but  a  more  repetitive  effort  as  Programmes  must  be  re-established  every  few 
years.  The  handover  to  DIGIT  or  to  an  Executive  Agency  is  less  resource-intensive  in 
the short run but subject to the same constraints as the EC Programme in the long run 
because there have to be ultimate sources of funding.  

These trade-offs have to be considered bearing in mind that: 

  Based on the likely timeframes, the efforts to establish an EU Regulatory Agency or an 
EC Programme would need to commence in 2017 in order for the chosen solution to 
be operational in 2021 at the end of the current CEF Programme. 

  This study has assessed the ‘art of the possible’ for each of the solutions in assessing 
‘which’ solution would cater for the sustainability needs and requirements of the DSIs, 
but does  not  specifically  precisely  address  ‘how’  the  sustainability  solution  should  be 
constructed.  

  It will be up to policymakers and the legislators to decide whether to opt for a common 
solution for all or most of the DSIs or whether a case-by-case approach is preferred to 
ensuring sustainability over time.  

17 | P a g e  

 
 
Conclusions  
The  outcome  of  the  multi-layered  and  multi-dimensional  analysis  carried  out  per 
sustainability  solution  and  per  DSI  and  across  DSIs  identifies  one  solution  which  scores 
consistently better, across all layers, i.e. the handover to an EU Regulatory Agency. 

This  solution  offers  flexibility  across  all  GOFA  elements.  From  a  governance  perspective,  it 
can  accommodate  the  involvement  of  different  stakeholders  (e.g.  Member  States  and 
private sector non-/for profit organisations) and do so at a range of levels. At the same time, 
it allows for a concentrated approach to operations where there appears to be potential for 
synergies to be exploited across DSIs. It would also facilitate promotion of interoperability in 
delivering  services  cross-border  by  enhancing  architectural  coordination  and  it  would 
provide the possibility of charging third parties for services. It is a single, permanent solution 
and  would  be  flexible  to  add  other  DSIs  to  its  mandate  subsequently,  irrespective  of  their 
profile. It would be possible to raise revenue by charging for services. 

The disadvantage is the significant effort required in the short term. On the assumption that 
an  existing  agency  would  be  used,  this  would  start  with  identification  of  the  appropriate 
agency, consideration of how its mandate would have to be modified, and the level of detail 
of  the  mandate,  e.g.  the  extent  to  which  it  should  contain  stipulations  for  each  DSI 
individually and possibly the associated activities as well. Attention would have to be paid to 
ensuring the availability of funding and the stability of the operations over time, while at the 
same time leaving sufficient flexibility to on-board other DSIs in the future. 

The  EC  Programme  solution  does  provide  funding  certainty  for  the  duration  of  one  EU 
funding  cycle  of  seven  years  and  would  require  less  effort  initially  than  the  Regulatory 
Agency route. Moreover, this solution also has the advantage of allowing varying degrees of 
concentration depending on the decision-making by policy DGs as DSI owners. Additionally, 
an  EC  Programme  can  easily  be  mobilised  by  the  DG  in  charge  it  if  becomes  necessary  or 
desirable to take other DSIs on board. This has been proven by the CEF experience. The legal 
basis  of  a  programme  can  be  reworked  to  cater  for  new  needs  even  during  the  period  of 
implementation  of  the  programme.  This  mitigates  the  difficulty  of  foreseeing  precisely  in 
advance  how  many  and  which  DSIs  should  be  funded  and  for  how  long.  Because  of  this 
flexibility,  this  solution  also  comes  out  very  well  both  from  an  individual  and  cross-DSI 
perspective. However, it remains sub-optimal to the handover to an EU Regulatory Agency 
for three key reasons. First, the process of setting up an EC Programme has to be repeated 
at regular intervals. Second, it limits the breadth of funding sources available, since charging 
third parties,  for  instance,  would  be difficult.  Finally,  the  EC Programme solution  would be 
less  stakeholder-inclusive  as  only  Member  States  and  public  sector  could  formally  be 
stakeholders.  

Nonetheless,  the  EC  Programme  does  provide  a  potential  cross-DSI  solution;  other 
programmes,  which  might  be  a  source  of  funding  for  some  DSIs,  do  not  offer  this  benefit. 
Despite its time-bound nature, therefore, the establishment of an EC Programme (“renewal 
of the CEF”) is a credible solution. 

18 | P a g e  

 
 
The handover to DIGIT or an Executive Agency would in itself not require the same effort to 
put  in  place  because  it  could  be  achieved  through  Commission  Decisions  or  inter-DG 
Memoranda  of  Understanding.  However,  this  solution  cannot  in  itself ensure  sustainability 
due  to  the  lack  of  an  intrinsic  funding  mechanism.  For  some  individual  DSIs,  this  is  not 
expected to be a blocking factor. Sector-specific funding programmes can be used to cover 
these DSI activities and it has been assumed that these would continue in some form after 
2020 as they already roll over earlier equivalent programmes. This still leaves DSIs that have 
not  identified  a  source  of  funding  beyond  2020  (i.e.  Europeana,  Open  Data  Portal,  Safer 
Internet and Cyber Security) and would therefore be at risk once the current CEF Programme 
comes  to  an  end.  For  this  reason,  handover  to  DIGIT  or  to  an  Executive  Agency  is  only 
financially viable in combination with programme funding to be sustainable.  

For those DSIs where funding is not considered to be at risk beyond 2020, this solution alone 
could,  however,  bring  important  benefits  in  terms  of  the  ability  to  look  at  what  synergies 
could be exploited. Nonetheless, in terms of governance and architecture, handover to DIGIT 
or to an Executive Agency is not as optimal as the handover to a Regulatory Agency. Indeed, 
as  Member  States  and  private  sector  stakeholders  cannot  be  involved  in  the  decision-
making, DIGIT and the Executive Agency solutions are less inclusive and less representative 
than  the  two  other  solutions.  Therefore,  even for  DSIs  which  do  not  face  risks  in  terms  of 
funding, there are strong governance arguments against these options.  

Recommendations 
The recommendations flowing from the data collected and the result of the analysis are set 
out below.  

Should  it be  decided  to propose  a  common  sustainability solution to  all CEF  DSIs,  the  first 
choice should be the handover to an EU Regulatory Agency. The findings from all layers of 
the  analysis  (individual  DSIs,  cross-DSIs  and  clustered  profiles)  confirmed  that  this  is  the 
optimum solution. From the standpoint of individual DSIs, this solution scores highest for all 
the DSIs looked at. It also emerged as the top solution in the cross-DSI analysis, since in no 
case is there a blocking factor and the level of scoring across GOFA elements is consistent. 
Finally, the analysis per DSI profile shows that the EU Regulatory Agency can offer different 
advantages to different profiles: 

  For  DSIs  which  in  the  long  term  will  only  provide  or  maintain  standards  (eID  and 
eInvoicing),  the  EU  Regulatory  Agency  is  the  most  suitable  solution  as  it  makes  it 
possible to provide and maintain those collaboratively, i.e. with the involvement of all 
relevant  stakeholders,  including  the  Member  States  and  the  private  sector.  From  a 
governance and architectural point of view, this solution represents a synthesis of the 
needs of this profile. Similar considerations can be applied those DSIs which in the long 
term will also only provide standards and specifications but which actually go beyond 
this  mandate  and  provide  services  not  specifically  mentioned  in  their  legal  basis 
(eDelivery, eSignature DSS and certain components of eProcurement). For this profile, 
the handover to an EU Regulatory Agency has a dual advantage: it makes it possible to 
cater  for  their  governance  and  architectural  needs  in  a  participative  way,  and  it  also 

19 | P a g e  

 
 
caters for their temporary operational and funding needs (e.g. in terms of provision of 
software  and  other  time-bound  services).  Indeed,  inclusion  in  an  agency’s  mandate 
would allow these DSIs to gain in stability and also to tap into a source of funding for 
the additional activities they are currently carrying out. Being within an agency would 
also allow them to charge for the services provided to the private sector.  

  For  DSIs  providing  centrally  managed  services  and  with  a  strong  legal  basis  (ODR, 
eSignature  TLM  and  eProcurement  eCertis  and  ESPD)  the  handover  to  an  EU 
Regulatory  Agency  makes  it  possible  to  strengthen  the  operational  and  financial 
stability  because  it  is  a  once-and-for-all  solution  that  avoids  reliance  on  renewal  of 
programmes and dispersed management of the activities. More importantly, for  DSIs 
which  only  provide  centrally  managed  services  and  have  no  legal  basis  for  operation 
and  funding  (Europeana,  Safer  Internet,  Open  Data  Portal),  the  handover  to  an  EU 
Regulatory  Agency  solves  the  sustainability  puzzle  by  providing  a  legal  basis  and 
therefore  ensuring  the  availability  of  funding  and  stability  of  operations  in  the  long 
term. Therefore, although there might be other sustainability options available to DSIs 
providing  centrally  managed  services  and  having  a  strong  legal  basis  (e.g.  the  status 
quo due to their legal basis), for DSIs offering similar services but without a legal basis 
the  EU  Regulatory  Agency  would  offer  the  best  chance  of  ensuring  continuity  over 
time.  

  For DSIs providing both standards and specifications, and centrally run services based 
on  a  legal  framework  (BRIS  and  eJustice  interconnection  of  insolvency  registers),  the 
advantages are similar to those for DSIs offering managed services only on the basis of 
a  strong  legal  mandate:  the  handover  to  an  EU  Regulatory  Agency  would  provide  a 
once-and-for-all  sustainability  solution  and  would  de-link  it  from  the  renewal  of 
sectoral  programmes  such  as,  for  instance,  the  Justice  Programme.  In  addition  and 
given the revenue generation potential of BRIS and eJustice, the agency solution would 
also  facilitate  charging  the  private  sector  for  services,  if  and  when  the  European 
Commission decides to do so. Finally, for DSIs providing these services but which have 
a more limited or no legal basis for their activities (eHealth, Cyber Security, EESSI, all 
other  modules  of  eJustice),  the  handover  to  a  Regulatory  Agency  would  make  it 
possible  to  continue  going  beyond  the  strict  scope  of  the  related  legal  basis  or  to 
create  a  legal  obligation  and  to  continue  providing  additional  services  as  is  currently 
the  case.  The  agency  solution  would  not  only  provide  financial  and  operational 
stability,  but  also  guarantee  strong  involvement  of  the  Member  States  in  the 
governance  and  architectural  activities.  The  latter  are  both  crucially  important  for 
these DSIs.  

Therefore, all profiles should see advantages in the handover to an EU Regulatory Agency, 
although  for  different  reasons  and  relative  to  different  GOFA  elements.  This  also  suggests 
that  this  solution  is  flexible  and  extensible  enough  to  accommodate  other  DSIs  falling  into 
one  or  other  of  these  profiles.  The  EU  Regulatory  Agency 
is  therefore  strongly 
recommended  as  a  common  solution  for  all  DSIs.  It  must  nonetheless  be  noted  that  this 
solution has the disadvantage of being more complex to negotiate in the short term. 

20 | P a g e  

 
 
If  this  leads  to  a  need  to  modify  the  statute  of  an  existing  Regulatory  Agency,  it  is 
recommended that the following be taken into account: 

  Given the effort required to modify the statute of an existing Regulatory Agency, each 
reopening of negotiations on the statute should be seen as a window of opportunity 
and the possibility explored of handing over several DSIs at the same time during the 
same negotiation round; 

  Inclusion of a “flexibility clause” in the Agency’s statute. This should make it possible 

to: 

  test the handover of DSIs to the agency through Memoranda of Understanding 

before proceeding with a formal change of statute, and  

  leave  some  space  for  on-boarding  DSIs  in  cases  where  it  is  not  immediately 
feasible  to  establish  a  legal  basis  (through  the  intermediary  of  the  agency’s 
statute). 

The EC Programme is recommended as the second best solution common to all DSIs should 
it appear necessary or desirable to select a solution different from that of an EU Regulatory 
Agency. This would entail a continuation of the current situation (baseline scenario) with the 
renewal of an EC Programme similar to the current CEF. There are no blocking factors in the 
case  of  this  solution  (logically,  since  it  accommodates  them  all  now).  It  also  caters  for  the 
need  for  flexibility  and  extensibility  to  other  DSIs,  including  giving  the  Member  States  the 
possibility to suggest on-boarding other digital services during the programming period. This 
solution  is  particularly  suited  to  some  current  DSI  profiles,  notably  those  covering  DSIs 
without a legal basis (e.g. Europeana, Open Data Portal, Safer Internet and Cyber Security) 
and needing strong involvement on the part of Member States. Moreover, this solution has 
the advantage of being less complex to implement in the short term than an EU Regulatory 
Agency.  

Nonetheless,  the  solution  is  suboptimal  relative  to  the  handover  to  an  EU  Regulatory 
Agency  for  two  main  reasons.  First,  it  is  a  temporary  not  a  once-and-for-all  solution,  as  it 
must  be  renewed  every  seven  years.  Second,  the  stakeholder  involvement  remains  more 
limited  than  in  an  EU  Regulatory  Agency.  In  addition,  it  would  be  difficult  to  introduce 
charging  models  and  there  might  be  an  inherent  instability  of  operations  in  having  to 
renegotiate  funding  at  regular  intervals.  These  factors  make  the  EC  Programme  less 
desirable overall. Nevertheless, it is recommended that an EC Programme be considered as a 
second possible common solution. It could also act as a bridge to allow time for further work 
on the once-and-for-all sustainability options for the DSIs.  

In the light of the recommendation to consider the establishment of a new EC Programme at 
least  for  the  sustainability  of  some  of  the  DSI  groups,  the  following  should  also  be 
considered: 

  the  possibility  of  increasing  operational,  governance  and  architectural  synergies  by 
foreseeing  mechanisms  for  cooperation  and  concentration  in  these  domains  and 
assessing  the  potential  to  reduce  duplication  of  services  and  costs.  Areas  to  explore 
could  include  common  testing  and  support  services,  and  harmonised  governance 

21 | P a g e  

 
 
structures  and  procedures,  taking  into  account  the  new  European  Interoperability 
Framework and the latest developments in terms of organisational interoperability.2  
  a  certain  focus  on  sustainability  within  the  new  Programme.  This  solution  has  a 
lifespan  of  seven  years  and  does  not  constitute  a  long-term  option  for  the  DSIs. 
Therefore, the new programme  could  envisage mechanisms  for further analysing  the 
sustainability  outlook  of  the  DSIs  and  encouraging  them  to  find  alternatives  beyond 
the end of the next financial cycle in 2027. 

  the  EC  Programme  needs  to  be  a  flexible  tool  for  Member  States  wanting  to  look 
more  closely  at  cross-border  IT  services.  Therefore,  the future  programme  should  be 
considered  as  an  instrument  in  their  hands  and  provide  for  mechanisms  for  close 
collaboration  and  cooperation  between  the  Member  States  and  the  European 
Commission. This could entail setting up ad hoc mechanisms or dedicated governance 
structures under the programme’s umbrella.  

  Finally,  the  new  Programme  should  encourage  the  sharing  of  experiences  amongst 
existing  digital  infrastructures  as  well  as  the  reuse  of  building  block  DSIs.  This  will 
achieve  cost  efficiency  and  reduce  the  duplication  of  costs  and  efforts  linked  to  the 
development of similar services. The reuse of existing solutions should again be made 
binding  for  those  sector-specific  DSIs  receiving  funding  under  the  Programme  and 
incentives could be foreseen for voluntary compliance with informal rules on re-use. 

If  there  is  a  preference  for  case-by-case  sustainability  solutions  for  each  individual  DSI 
rather  than  common  solutions,  it  is  recommended  that  the  results  of  the  individual  DSI 
analysis be built on, using this analysis as a starting point for the individual discussions3. In 
addition,  it  is  recommended  that  the  following  points  be  considered  before  making  a 
decision: 

  Some  DSIs  are  less  fragile  in  terms  of  long-term  financial  sustainability  than  others 
because  they  can  rely  on  an  explicit  legal  basis  containing  an  obligation  for  the 
European  Commission  to  provide  and  fund  these  services.  These  are  notably  DSIs 
providing different types of services, but all doing so on the basis of a clear legislative 
mandate. Examples are eID and eInvoicing, which provide standards and specifications 
only,  ODR, eSignature TLM, eProcurement eCertis and ESPD, which provide managed 
services  only,    and  BRIS  and  eJustice  interconnection  of  insolvency  registers  which 
provide  both.  This  does  not  mean  that  they  do  not  need  sustainability  solutions,  as 
financing is only one of the GOFA elements to be considered to ensure their activities 
continue,  but  it  does  mean  that,  from  a  funding  perspective,  they  can  expect  some 
continuity. This also means that the status quo is an option for these DSIs. This applies 
in particular to ODR, eJustice, eProcurement and BRIS, which already largely tap into 

2 2 See:  Communication  (COM(2017)134)  from  the  European  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the 
Council,  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee,  the  Committee  of  Regions  on  the  European  Interoperability 
Framework, 
http://eur-
adopted 
lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2c2f2554-0faf-11e7-8a35-01aa75ed71a1.0017.02/DOC_1&format=PDF 
3 See in particular the outcome of the individual DSI analysis, page 40 of the present report. 

Implementation 

Strategy, 

March 

2017, 

on 

23 

22 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
funding  not  coming  from  the  CEF.  At  the  other  extreme  are  some DSIs  which do  not 
have  assured  funding  continuity  and  for  which  the  end  of  the  CEF  poses  a  serious 
threat. For these, it is relatively urgent to identify and establish sustainability solutions.   

For those DSIs without a strong legal basis, the level of funding needed by the individual DSIs 
can impact the ease with which a relevant sustainability solution can be found. Should there 
be  individual  DSIs  for  which  no  sustainability  solution  (including  a  solution  to  financing)  is 
found  before  the  end  of  the  CEF,  it  is  likely  that  it  will  be  easier  for  the  DSIs  with  smaller 
budgets  to  negotiate  coverage  under  sectoral  programmes.  This  could  be  the  case  for 
instance  of  DSIs  which,  in  their  end-state,  require  very  little  financial  support  to  maintain 
their services (e.g. eHealth).  

Finally, the analysis presented in this study has looked at the DSIs’ activities as they are now 
and as they will be in their end-state based on the current regulatory and policy framework. 
The  solutions  tested  offer  a  margin  for  flexibility  and  the  potential  of  a  given  solution  to 
incorporate  changes  was  also  one  of  the  criteria  considered.  If  there  were  to  be  major 
modifications to the policy and regulatory frameworks, such as conferring a formal status on 
a DSI by providing it with a legal basis or changes to an existing Regulation or Directive, the 
needs  and  requirements  of  the  DSI  or  DSIs  might  change  in  ways  that  made  further 
sustainability analysis necessary.  

23 | P a g e  

 
 
 
 
1  Introduction 

This report presents the key findings of the analysis conducted  during a study on the Long-
term  Sustainability  of  the  Connecting  Europe  Facility  (CEF)  Digital  Service  Infrastructures 
(DSIs)  which  are  supported  under  the  Connecting  Europe  Facility  (CEF).  They  deliver 
networked  cross-border  services  for  citizens,  businesses  and  public  administrations.  The 
report  draws  conclusions  and  makes  recommendations  on  which  post-2020  sustainability 
solutions  are  credible,  flexible  and  extensible,  i.e.  able  to  accommodate  the  inclusion  of 
additional DSIs. 2020 is a key threshold as it is the end-date of the EU’s Multiannual Financial 
Framework (its seven-year budget cycle) and with it the CEF.  

The  findings  presented here  on  potential  solutions to  sustainability beyond  2020  based on 
an  analysis  of  the  needs  and  requirements  of  all  CEF  DSIs  is  underpinned  by  analysis  in  a 
series of preparatory reports on the: 

  commonalities and differences across DSIs,  
  sustainability of DSIs, and  
  consideration of sustainability from a cross-DSI perspective.   

This underlying analysis was based on: 

intensive discussions with key stakeholders, including the DSI ‘owners’,  

 
  application  of  a  range  of  methodologies,  including  multi-criteria  and  sensitivity 

analysis, and   

  development of multiple scenarios to validate and challenge the findings.  

The study looks not only at individual DSIs but also at: 

 

 

the  cross-DSI  sustainability  dimension,  i.e.  the  possibility  for  one  solution  to 
accommodate groups of DSIs or all DSIs,   
the 
accommodating additional DSIs in future.  

flexibility  and  extensibility  of  the  solutions, 

i.e.  their  suitability 

for 

The structure of this report is: 

  Chapter 2 provides background information on the characteristics of DSIs – what they 
have  in  common  and  where  their  differences  are,  and  explains  the  context  which 
makes it necessary to find sustainability solutions. 

24 | P a g e  

 
 
 
  Chapter  3  looks  at  how  DSIs  are  set  up  now  in  terms  of  governance,  operations, 
financing  and  architectural  coordination  (the  GOFA  model4)  as  a  baseline  for  using 
this model to define possible long-term sustainability solutions.  

  Chapter 4 provides a model for identifying potential sustainability solutions and the 
intrinsic characteristics of these in a DSI context, with a view to offering a complete 
panorama of the potential solutions.   

  Chapter 5 presents the main findings of the assessment of which of the sustainability 
solutions  are  most  credible  and  flexible  for  individual  DSIs  and  across  DSIs.  This 
assessment is the result of applying multiple scenarios combined first with sensitivity 
and then further refined with Pugh analysis5.  

  Chapter  6 provides  possible  roadmaps  for  the transition towards the  most  relevant 
sustainability solutions. The roadmaps include a theoretical timeline and describe the 
efforts  required  to  transition  to  the  sustainability  solution  chosen  in  order  to  see 
which  solutions  would  entail  the  most  effort  in  the  short  and  long  term  and  with 
which results. 

  Chapter 7 builds on all the insights collected all through the analysis to provide some 
overarching  conclusions  and  develops  a  number  of  recommendations  for  policy 
makers  in  terms  of  the  preferred  scenarios  for  ensuring  long-term  sustainability  of 
the DSIs. 

Overall, this study is designed to be of benefit to decision-making by narrowing the field of 
key sustainability solutions to those that offer valid prospects for the long-term sustainability 
of  the  DSIs  once  the  current  solution  provided  by  the  CEF  Programme  (and  associated 
mechanisms set up across DSIs) comes to an end in 2020. 

4 The  Governance,  Operation,  Financing  and  Architecture  (GOFA)  model  is  a  framework  for  categorising  the 
types of activities that sustain an IT infrastructure.  
5 The  Pugh  analysis  is  a  decision  making  model  used  for  evaluating  multiple  options  against  each  other  in 
relation to a baseline option.  

25 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
2  DSI sustainability: context 

This  chapter  provides  background  information  on  the  characteristics  of  DSIs  –  what  they 
have in common and where there  are differences and explains the context which makes it 
necessary to find sustainability solutions,  

2.1 DSIs and their characteristics  
There are currently fifteen DSIs. They are all funded, at least partially, under the Connecting 
Europe  Facility  Programme,  which  runs  from  2014-20206.  In  accordance  with  the  CEF 
Telecom Guidelines7, they fall into two categories: 

Building block DSIs: 

  Electronic delivery (eDelivery); 
  Electronic identification (eID); 
  Electronic invoicing (eInvoicing); 
  Electronic signatures (eSignatures); 
  Electronic translation (eTranslation);  
  Cybersecurity; 

Sector-specific DSIs: 

  Business Registers Interconnection System (BRIS) 
  Electronic exchange of social security information (EESSI); 
  Electronic health (eHealth); 
  Electronic justice (eJustice); 
  Electronic procurement (eProcurement); 
  Europeana; 
  Online dispute resolution (ODR); 
  Public Open Data; 
  Safer Internet. 

Building  block  DSIs  are  intended  to  establish  and  foster  the  adoption  of  technical 
specifications  which  can  be  used  by  and  be  common  to  all  EU  public  administrations  and 

6 Most  of  the  current  CEF  DSIs  were  already  funded  by  DG  CNECT  as  Large  Scale  Pilots  under  the  ICT  Policy 
Support Programme, see: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/cross-border-pilots  
7 See:  Regulation(EU)  No  283/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  March  2014  on 
guidelines  for  trans-European  networks  in  the  area  of  telecommunications  infrastructure  and  repealing 
Decision 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
1336/97/EC, 
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AJOL_2014_086_R_0014_01&from=EN  

No 

26 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
(when applicable) private stakeholders. They are “basic digital service infrastructures, which 
are key enablers to be reused in more complex digital services infrastructures”8 and are as 
such “intended to be re-used in other digital services”9. They offer reusable components and 
services which can be used in multiple contexts and domains.  

Sector-specific  DSIs  deliver  services  for  citizens,  businesses  and  public  administrations.  In 
some  cases,  they  are  adjuncts  to  the  implementation  of  EU  legislation.  The  sector-specific 
DSIs  “deliver  more  complex  trans-European  online  services  for  citizens,  businesses  and 
public  administrations  within  one  specific  policy  area,  such  as  health  or  justice”10.  Sector-
specific DSIs are expected to use the building block DSIs that are relevant to them. 

Some DSIs have a basis in EU law. That carries with it an obligation to implement or operate 
them, sometimes to fund them or at least to fund part of their activities, and sometimes to 
use the services or solutions they provide. Unless they are in a position to raise revenue or 
an alternative source of funding, even the DSIs which can count on a legal basis will need to 
position themselves so that they find an additional source of EU budget funding after 2020. 
However, some DSIs are intrinsically unsuited to raising revenue irrespective of the issue of 
their legal basis. This may be, for example,  because they deal with security issues or other 
areas  which  are  per  se  a  matter  for  government.  Cybersecurity,  EESSI,  eHealth,  ODR  and 
Safer Internet are examples. 

DSIs  can  have  very  different  audiences.  Some  support  market  operators  by  providing  IT 
solutions to support compliance with specific EU legislation (e.g. building block DSIs, such as 
eDelivery,  eInvoicing  and  eSignature).  Others  are  designed  to  improve  cooperation  among 
public administrations throughout the EU on issues of common concern (e.g. Cybersecurity, 
EESSI).  

Other  differentiators  are  the  nature  of  the  services  provided,  i.e.  whether  these  are 
standards  or  specifications,  software  for  reuse  and/or  centrally  managed  service,  and  the 
overall architectural nature of the DSIs, i.e. centralised, distributed or hybrid. 

The  table  below  illustrates  the  panorama  of  different  DSIs  characteristics.  Where  different 
components
cells  are 

the  different  nature  of 

reflects 

shown, 

their 

this 

8 Regulation EU No 283/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 March 2014 on Guidelines for 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
Networks, 
Trans-European 
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0283&from=EN   

Telecommunication 

see: 

9

Facility, 

 Connecting 

Europe 
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=4634  
10 See:  Regulation(EU)  No  283/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  March  2014  on 
guidelines  for  trans-European  networks  in  the  area  of  telecommunications  infrastructure  and  repealing 
Decision 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
1336/97/EC, 
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AJOL_2014_086_R_0014_01&from=EN  

Infrastructures, 

Service 

Digital 

No 

27 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
 
Table 2 - Key characteristics of DSIs 

Legal obligation 

Nature of services provided12 

DSI 
Owner11 

Building 
block 
(BB) or 
sector-
specific 
(SS) 

eID 

eInvoicing 

eDelivery 116 

eProcurement 117 

eSignature DSS 

eSignature TLM 

BB 

BB 

BB 

SS 

BB 

BB 

Provide 

Use 

Fund13 

MS 

MS 

EU 

DG CNECT 

EU, MS 

EU 

DG 
GROW 

DG CNECT 

DG 
GROW 

DG CNECT 

DG CNECT 

EU 

MS 

EU 

Stand-
ards/ 
tech-
nical 
specs 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

Centrally 
ma-
naged 
services 

Soft-
ware for 
reuse 

*14 

X 

* 

* 

X 

X 

Target audience 
Private 
sector 
organi-
sations, 
citizens, 
etc. 

Public 
sector 
(MS and 
EC) 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

**15 

X 

X 

X 

X 

** 

Nature of architecture 

Cen-
tralised 

Distri-
buted 

Hybrid 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

is 

of 

on 

on 

the 

 The 

based 

nature 

column 

services 

11 DIGIT always has some degree of involvement as a DSI service provider, ranging merely from providing cloud space to providing all the IT services the DSI needs. 
12

provided 
https://ec.europa.eu/cefdigital/wiki/display/CEFDIGITAL/Service+Offering  
13 This column is applicable only to those DSIs for which there is an EU level obligation to fund the core services laid down in a legislative act (Regulation, Directive etc.) 
14 *:  the  software  might  or  might  not  be  provided  beyond  2020  depending  on  development  of  the  DSIs.  It  is  important  to  note  however  that,  in  the  long  run,  the  Commission  will  not 
continue the provision of software as this will stop as soon as there is sufficient take-up from the market.  
15 **: the private sector is not directly targeted by the DSI but plays an indirect role (e.g. eSignature TLSO, eHealth private structures etc.) 
16 This profile of eDelivery relates only to the DSI’s service offering of standards and technical specifications which can be directly used by end-users or reused by solution providers to offer 
eDelivery-compliant solutions.  
17 This  profile  of  eProcurement  refers  only  to  the  (foreseen)  provision  of  technical  specifications  and/or  software  for  other  stakeholders  (public  and  private  sector)  to  use  for 
implementation.  This  includes  the  eTendering  solutions  foreseen  to  be  provided  in  the  near  future  and  may  possibly  include  the  European  Single  Procurement  Document  (ESPD)  in  the 
future  

offering  model. 

For  more 

service 

details 

Digital 

see: 

CEF 

the 

28 | P a g e  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Legal obligation 

Nature of services provided12 

Stand-
ards/ 
tech-
nical 
specs 

Soft-
ware for 
reuse 

Centrally 
ma-
naged 
services 

Nature of architecture 

Cen-
tralised 

Distri-
buted 

Hybrid 

Target audience 
Private 
sector 
organi-
sations, 
citizens, 
etc. 

Public 
sector 
(MS and 
EC) 

Building 
block 
(BB) or 
sector-
specific 
(SS) 

SS 

SS 

BB 

SS 

SS 

SS 

SS 

SS 

SS 

SS 

SS 

eProcurement 218 

ODR 

eTranslation 

Cyber 

EESSI 

eHealth 

BRIS 

e-Justice 

eDelivery 220 

Europeana 

Public Open Data 

DSI 
Owner11 

DG 
GROW 

DG JUST 

DG T 

Provide 

Use 

Fund13 

EU 

EU 

MS 

MS 

EU 

EU 

DG CNECT 

(EU) 

DG EMPL 

(EU) 

(MS) 

DG 
SANCO 

(EU) 

DG JUST 

EU 

MS 

EU 

DG JUST 

(EU) 

(MS) 

(EU) 

DG CNECT 

DG CNECT 

DG CNECT 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

** 

***19 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

18 This profile of eProcurement refers only to the provision of centrally managed services for other stakeholders (i.e. eCERTIS/ESPD) to use. 

19 ***: Depending on the countries, private sector stakeholders (e.g. private employment agencies) may be involved, although such involvement is limited. 

20 This profile of eDelivery refers only to the provision of centrally managed services for other stakeholders (e.g. OpenPEPPOL) to use. 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

29 | P a g e  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
DSI 
Owner11 

Building 
block 
(BB) or 
sector-
specific 
(SS) 

Legal obligation 

Nature of services provided12 

Provide 

Use 

Fund13 

Stand-
ards/ 
tech-
nical 
specs 

Soft-
ware for 
reuse 

Centrally 
ma-
naged 
services 

Target audience 
Private 
sector 
organi-
sations, 
citizens, 
etc. 

Public 
sector 
(MS and 
EC) 

Nature of architecture 

Cen-
tralised 

Distri-
buted 

Hybrid 

Safer Internet 

SS 

DG CNECT 

X 

X 

X 

30 | P a g e  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based  on  the  nature  of  the  services  provided,  DSIs  can  be  broken  down  into  three 
categories.  These can then be further broken down by the existence – or otherwise – of an 
explicit  legal  basis  for  operating  and  funding  the  activities  (above  and  beyond  the  CEF 
Regulation21) and by target audience. The target audience is only relevant where there is no 
legal basis to fund the DSI because those are cases where it is relevant to look at the scope 
to  turn  to  third  parties  for  funding.  Where  there  is  an  obligation  for  the  Commission  to 
operate/fund  the  DSI,  this  distinction  is  less  relevant  in  assessing  long-term  sustainability 
solutions.  

Table 3 – Profiles of DSIs in their end-state 

Nature of the services 
provided 

Explicit legal 
basis to operate 
and fund22 

Target audience 

DSIs 

Profile 1: DSIs providing use 
solutions for others to 
implement23  

Profile 2: DSIs providing 
centrally managed services 
for others to use26 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

No 

eID, eInvoicing24 

Public sector only  N.A.25 

Public sector and 
private sector 

eDelivery, eSignature (DSS), 
eProcurement  
eSignature (TLM), ODR, 
eProcurement 
(eCertis/ESPD) 

Public sector only 

eTranslation 

21 Regulation  (EU)  No 1316/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11 December  2013 
establishing the Connecting Europe Facility, amending Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulations 
relevance;  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
(EC)  No 680/2007  and 
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013R1316 

(EC)  No 67/2010  Text  with  EEA 

22 This column refers to the explicit legal obligation, for the European Commission, to fund and provide the DSIs 
services. In some cases, e.g Cybersecurity, there is a legal framework, but the activities of the DSI go beyond 
what  is  foreseen  in  the  legal  texts.  The  same  applies  for  eHealth  and  EESSI  as  well  as  for  some  activities  of 
eJustice (all modules except  the interconnection of insolvency registers), eSignature (DSS) and eProcurement 
(eTendering, eNotification, eSubmission).  
23 Solutions refers to standards and specifications and, for a limited amount of time, software to ensure take-up 
of the DSIs. 
24 The  eInvoicing  Directive  contemplates  an  obligation  to  implement  the  eInvoicing  standard  for  public 
authorities only. The private sector is free to continue using other standards or paper invoices. However, the 
scope of the DSI also includes promotion of the standard across the private sector as shown by the set-up of 
the  match-making  website  for  instance  and  by  the  involvement  of  the  private  stakeholders  in  the  eInvoicing 
multi-stakeholder forum.  
25 No example of this profile is found among the current set of DSIs. 
26 For instance translation machines, PKI/SML services, testing services etc.  

31 | P a g e  

 
 
 
                                                      
Nature of the services 
provided 

Explicit legal 
basis to operate 
and fund22 

Profile 3: DSIs providing 
centrally managed services 
and solutions for others to 
implement directly 27 

Yes 

No 

Target audience 

Public sector and 
private sector 

DSIs 
Europeana, Safer Internet, 
Public Open data, eDelivery 
(PKI, SML)  

BRIS, eJustice (insolvency 
registers module) 
eHealth, EESSI, 
Cybersecurity, eJustice (all 
other modules) 

Public sector only 

Public sector and 
private sector 

N.A.28 

2.2 Why does sustainability matter? 
The funding that is available for DSIs has had its legal basis in the Connecting Europe Facility 
(CEF)29 since  2014.  That  Facility  has  an  end-date  of  2020,  i.e.  the  end-date  of  the  current 
Multiannual  Financial  Framework,  which  runs  from  2014-2020.  The  funding  is  made 
available  through  annual  CEF  work  programmes  and  it  is  expected  that  this  funding  will 
continue to be available for the life of the CEF. What comes after that is the subject of this 
study.  

In  fact,  it  was  not  originally  expected  that  this  would  be  an  issue.  When  the  CEF30 was 
established,  the  European  Commission,  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Member  States 
not  only  agreed  on  guidelines  specifying  the  objectives  and  priorities  in  the  field  of 
telecommunications31, but expected them to be far enough in their development that it was 
realistic  to  believe  that  they  would  be  able  wean  themselves  off  reliance  on  the  CEF  for 
funding by the end of the CEF programme.  

The Guidelines stipulate that, to be funded under the CEF programme, these infrastructures 
must  already  be  “sufficiently  mature  for  deployment,  technically  and  operationally”31. 

27 Profile  3  therefore  includes  DSIs  which  provide  both  standards  and  specifications  (and  software)  and  the 
above mentioned centrally managed services.  
28 No example of this profile is found among the current set of DSIs. 
29

 http://eur-

Connecting 

lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ%3AL%3A2013%3A348%3A0129%3A0171%3AEN%3APDF 
30 Regulation EU No 1316/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing 
the 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
Facility, 
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1316&from=EN   
31 Regulation EU No 283/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 March 2014 on Guidelines for 
Trans-European 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
Networks, 
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0283&from=EN   

Telecommunication 

Europe 

see: 

see: 

32 | P a g e  

 
 
 
 
                                                      
Second, the DSIs are required to have a “sustainability plan to ensure the medium to long-
term  operation  of  core  service  platforms  beyond  the  CEF”31.  These  plans  are  required  to 
provide  for  a  means  of  phasing  out  of  the  CEF  financial  support  and  the  identification  or 
alternative sources of funding.  

Article  6  of  the  CEF  Telecommunications  Guidelines  states  specifically  that  the  DSIs  are 
expected to: “have a strategy and planning for long-term sustainability, where appropriate 
through  funding  sources  other  than  CEF,  the  quality  of  which  is  to  be  demonstrated  by  a 
feasibility  and  cost-benefits  assessment.  Such  strategy  should  be  updated  when 
appropriate”31.  

The  eGovernment  Action  Plan  2016-2020  also  made  reference  to  the  sustainability  of  the 
CEF DSIs in Action 3: “The European Commission will ensure the long term sustainability of 
cross-border digital service infrastructures”32. The target date is 2018. Therefore, this Action 
Plan  reiterates  the  need  for  the  European  Commission  to  have  a  vision  and  envisage 
solutions for the period beyond the CEF. 

Currently,  some  DSIs  have  already  started  addressing  these  requirements  through  specific 
sustainability studies and assessments33. Others still have to start. This study is expected to 
provide  input  for  that  work,  but  the  fundamental  problem  which  this  study  set  out  to 
address was the possibility that some DSIs might in fact not be not sustainable without the 
Connecting Europe Facility as a source of funding.  

A  separate  report  as  part  of  this  study,  which  looked  in  detail  at  the  extent  of  this  issue, 
found  that  in  fact  the  overwhelming  majority  were  not  sustainable  (according  to  the  CEF 
definition of sustainability34). Despite the idea at the outset of the CEF that they would be 
able  to  sustain  themselves,  the  analysis  has  clearly  shown  that  many  have  no  prospect  of 
covering their costs by charging for services or finding funding from some source other than 
the EU budget.  

In some cases, there may be a default option because there is a legal basis for the DSI. This 
creates an implicit or explicit obligation to continue funding them, but that still leaves open 
the issue of where that funding will come from in the absence of a CEF. For some, there are 
other programmes likely to be rolled over into the next Multiannual Financial Framework in 

(COM(2016)  179 

transformation  of  government 

32 See: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: EU eGovernment Action Plan 2016-2020 Accelerating 
the  digital 
final),  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016DC0179  
33 See  for  instance  the  study  carried  out  by  the  European  Commission  –  DG  Employment  on  the  long  term 
sustainability of the EESSI DSI.  
34 The CEF Telecom work programmes define sustainability as “the potential of a given DSI to generate revenue 
and/or benefit from sources of funding other than CEF, so as to become progressively self-standing or reliant on 
alternative sources of public funding or on a mix of private and public financing”. See Connecting Europe Facility 
Trans-European 
2017, 
Programme 
https://ec.europa.eu/inea/sites/inea/files/c_2017_696_f1_annex_en_v3_p1_875665.pdf   

Networks 

Work 

33 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
some  form  and  within  which  they  could  logically,  albeit  not  necessarily  automatically,  be 
incorporated. In some cases, they are already receiving funding from existing programmes, 
as discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Of these, some (notably the ODR) receive a 
far  more  significant  part  of  their  funding  from  another  programme  than  they  receive from 
the  CEF.  These  DSIs  are  likely  to  look  to  that  funding  continuing  after  2020  in  the  form  of 
new sectoral programmes.  

But that route is not open to all of them. The absence of an obligation to continue funding 
them  does  not  mean  there  is  no  possibility  of  them  continuing  to  be  funded  from  the  EU 
budget after 2020, but it does mean that the DSIs need to start reflecting now on how their 
financial needs can be met after 2020.  

Theoretically,  there  are  a  number  of  sources  of  funding  beyond  EU  programmes  that  DSIs 
could potentially tap into. They could, for example, be funded directly from the EU budget. 
The  budget  heading  used  would  depend  on  the  legal  basis  of  the  DSI  based  on  specific 
obligations  for the European  Commission  to  operate/fund DSIs.  They  could  also be  funded 
by contributions from Member States or other organisations, or from revenue generated by 
charging users of the DSI services/solutions35.  

These options are relatively rarely used at present, as there is currently only one DSI with a 
strong  basis  for  generating  revenue  from  its  activities  (eTranslation36)  while  none  are 
obtaining  contributions  from  third  parties.  This  is  due  in  some  cases  to  the  stage  of 
deployment of the DSI, the nature of its activities or to the political choice made by the DSI 
owner to incentivise take-up first and not to charge users. Some DSIs can never be funded 
through revenue generation activities under current rules. The ODR Regulation requires that 
it  be  free  for  all  its  users  and  EESSI  exists  only  to  provide  a  service  to  European  public 
administrations.  The  current  situation  is  therefore  mainly  characterised  by  a  centralised 
funding mechanism, i.e. the CEF programme, across the DSIs which can cater for the needs 
of all of them.  

Some  DSIs  aim  to  provide  services  to the Member  States  even  though  they  do  not  have a 
clear  legal  mandate to  do  so  beyond  what  is established by the  CEF.  This  point  matters  as 
the  European  Commission’s  budgetary  rules  only  allow  the  provision  of  services  to  the 
Member  States  where  there  is  a  basic  act37.  There  are  two  exceptions.  The  Financial 
Regulation  on  the  budget  of  the  Union  allows  for  some  flexibility  for  pilot  projects  of  an 

35 The following DSIs present some scope for revenue generation in the future, provided that this is considered 
as  politically  acceptable  and  that,  in  some  cases,  added  value  services  are  also  offered:  eTranslation,  BRIS, 
eDelivery, eJustice, eSignature, Europeana, Public Open Data, Safer Internet.  
36 MT@EC  (the  machine  translation  system  used  by  European  Institutions)  currently  generates  revenue  by 
charging  its  users.  This  will  be  merged  into  eTranslation  in  future,  giving  the  eTranslation  the  possibility  of 
continuing with this revenue generation option.  
37 A  “basic  act”  in  budgetary  terms  is  defined  as  an  “act  of  secondary  law  (regulation,  directive  or  decision) 
laying 
see: 
conditions 
objectives 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/explained/glossary/glossary_en.cfm  

implementation”, 

budget 

down 

and 

the 

for 

34 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
experimental nature or preparatory actions38. Nonetheless, none of the DSIs has made use 
of  these  provisions  so  far.  Therefore,  being  under  the  Regulation  creating  the  CEF 
programme currently suits all DSIs.  

However, the availability of funding is only one aspect of sustainability. It is part of a whole 
that includes governance arrangements, and the future of the existing architecture and the 
DSIs’ operations, issues which are covered in the next chapter.  

This  study  approaches  the  question  of  sustainability  from  three  perspectives:  on  the  one 
hand,  it  aims  not  only  to  answer  the  question  of  what  would  be  the  best  sustainability 
solution  for  each  individual  DSI,  but  also  considers  which  solutions  would  work  best  for 
certain  groups  of  DSIs  (profiles)  or  for  the  DSIs  as  a  whole  (cross-DSI  analysis).  This  triple 
dimension is important when looking synergies and scope for greater cost efficiency.  

38 See article 54 of the Regulation (EU, Euratom ) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council 
Regulation 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02012R0966-20160101&from=EN  

1605/2002, 

Euratom) 

(EC, 

No 

35 | P a g e  

 
 
 
 
                                                      
3  Current governance, operations, financing 

and architecture model of the DSIs 

This chapter describes the model used to assess the needs and requirements of the DSIs and 
their characteristics in terms of governance, architecture, finance and operation activities.  

In  order  to  have  a  framework  for  assessing  sustainability  solutions  for  the  DSIs,  the  GOFA 
model was used to list specific activities required to ensure continuity in the provision of DSI 
services and therefore vital for the sustainability of the DSIs.  

The GOFA model (governance, operations, financing and architecture coordination) provides 
a  useful  framework  for  classifying  activities,  and  assessing  needs  and  requirements.  The 
analysis  for  each DSI  and  across  DSIs  carried out  to  feed this  study looked  at  the different 
needs and requirements of each DSI from each of the GOFA perspectives. The GOFA model 
was used to structure discussion with the DSI owners.  

Figure 1- GOFA model 

Using  the  GOFA  model  makes  it  possible  to  identify  sustainability  solutions  (including 
procedures,  organisational  structures,  etc.)  that  can  ensure  adequate  governance, 
operations,  financing  and  architectural  coordination  (GOFA)  for  each  DSI  as  well  as  across 
DSIs.  This  analysis  clearly  showed  the  elements  that  need  to  be  considered  as  part  of  any 
future sustainability solution. 

The four elements that make up the GOFA model need to be implemented in a combination 
that provides a solution that is relevant to the specific services/software solutions that DSIs 
provide,  the  way  these  are  deployed  and  the  roles  of  different  stakeholders  (e.g.  decision 
makers and providers of the services, users of the services etc.) 

36 | P a g e  

 
 
 
 
The next section describes what is understood by the four elements in more detail. 

3.1 The GOFA elements    
Governance: for the purpose of this analysis, we distinguish two layers of governance39:  

  Policy governance: i.e. the responsibility  for taking decisions  affecting individual DSIs, 
which  implement  the  policy  which  led  to  the  establishment  of  the  DSI,  including 
strategic decisions on the main orientations for DSIs and on stakeholder management;  
  Operational  governance:  i.e.  day-to-day  decisions  on  the  functionalities  required  for 
the DSI to provide continuous service and where necessary improve it by adding new 
functionalities and services where appropriate.   

At the top layer, what can be described as the policy level, there are two models: 

  A regulatory framework is in place: in these cases, e.g. where there is a Regulation or 
a  Programme  providing  for  the  DSI,  there  is  a  policy  Directorate-General  of  the 
European  Commission  in  charge  of  these  governance  activities.  There  may  be 
committees  or  expert  groups  in  which  Member  States  and  (in  some  cases)  other 
stakeholders are represented which provide input into this level of decision-making. It 
is  assumed  that  these  legal  frameworks  and  the  associated  structures  will  remain  in 
place after 2020 (e.g. ODR, BRIS).    

  Another form of policy framework is in place: DG CONNECT or the other DGs derive 
their  authority  for  policy  governance,  including  setting  up  working  groups  with 
Member  States  and  other  stakeholders,  from  a  Communication  to  the  European 
Parliament  or  the  Council,  or  some  similar  policy  basis  put  in  place  to  discuss  and 
exchange best practices (e.g. Safer Internet, eTranslation). 

Irrespective of the sustainability solution chosen for a given DSI, there will always be one or 
other type of framework in place and a policy governance role for the European Commission 
in providing oversight of compliance with the relevant framework.  

Overall,  the  governance  picture  at  present  is  one  of  the  decision-making  powers  being 
largely  allocated  to  the  European  Commission.  Member  States  may  have  specific 
competences  in  decision-making  (e.g.  through  established  groups,  such  as  expert  groups). 
Member  States  have  a formal  role  only  where  there are  regulatory frameworks,  but  these 
vary  considerably.  Private  sector  stakeholders  play  no  role  in  decision-making  as  such,  but 
may have input in working or expert groups in some specific DSIs.  

Operations: Operational decision-making is generally already devolved to a dedicated entity. 
This may take the form of an operational management board (OMB)40 or similar body (such 

39 The CEF Non Paper on the IT Governance of the Building Block DSIs, for some DSIs and especially the building 
block DSIs, includes a middle policy layer of “strategic governance”. This covers the coordination and alignment 
See 
activities 
https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/28012015%20CEF%20Telecom%20EG%20Non-
Paper%20on%20IT%20Governance%20of%20CEF%20BB%20DSIs%20-%20REVISED%20-%20v5.01.pdf  

building 

needed 

block 

DSIs. 

the 

for 

37 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
as a steering committee) in charge of implementation of the DSI by the internal or external 
solution provider.  

There  are  a  range  of  approaches  to  decisions  on  day-to-day  operations.  For  example,  the 
eID,  eSignature,  eInvoicing  and  eDelivery  building  block  DSIs  are  implemented  under  the 
auspices  of  DG  CONNECT  (consistent  with  the  eIDAS  Regulation)  or  DG  GROW  (for 
eInvoicing), but the operational activities are carried out by DIGIT in its role of DSI solution 
provider and Directorate-General specialising in IT.  

The DGs acting as owners of the sector-specific DSIs carry out operational activities in-house 
(e.g.  through  their  own  IT  departments)  and/or  task  DIGIT  with  only  some  activities  (e.g. 
when specific activities are required, such as hosting in the DIGIT Data Centre). Additionally, 
some  DSI  owners  or  solutions  providers  have  outsourced  specific  activities  through  public 
procurement.  These  DSIs  therefore  have  contractual  relationships  with  external  providers, 
either working out of house or in-house.  

Financing is more homogenous, but with some variations. The main funding mechanism at 
present is the CEF Programme, which provides a centralised source of funding, i.e. a source 
of funding  common  to  all  DSIs.  However,  some DSIs  can  also  call  on  other  programmes to 
fund  their  activities,  as  indicated  in  the  previous  Chapter.  Among  these  are  the  Consumer 
Programme 41,  the  Justice  Programme 42 ,  the  Programme  for  Employment  and  Social 
Innovation  (EaSI) 43,  and  the  Interoperability  Solutions  for  Public  Administration  (ISA) 
Programme. The importance of this funding to the DSI varies. 

Architectural coordination, i.e. all the activities aimed at ensuring IT architectural alignment 
and adoption of common target architecture, can be considered at two levels: at the level of 
an  individual  DSI  and  at  the  cross-DSI  level.  In  the  first  case,  these  activities  are  based  on 
clear agreements between DSI-specific stakeholders on the underlying architecture for that 
DSI;  in  the  second,  there  is  a  need  to  ensure  that  there  is  clear  and  consistent  alignment, 
that  is  to  say  coordination  of  needs  and  requirements,  across  the  DSIs  that  reuse  the 
solutions/services of other DSIs, in particular those of the building block DSIs. 

40 Currently, DSIs’ OMBs are made up of three elements: a DSI owner (see strategic governance), a DSI solution 
provider accountable for IT delivery and, for the Building Block DSIs, the sector-specific DSI owners if relevant.  
https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/28012015%20CEF%20Telecom%20EG%20Non-
See: 
Paper%20on%20IT%20Governance%20of%20CEF%20BB%20DSIs%20-%20REVISED%20-%20v5.01.pdf  
41 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2014:084:0042:0056:EN:PDF 
42 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1398443724131&uri=CELEX:32013R1382 
43 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:347:0238:0252:EN:PDF 

38 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
As part of the CEF Building Block Governance Model44, a common Architectural Management 
Board (AMB) was established under the CEF to oversee architectural coordination across the 
building block DSIs as well as with those sector-specific DSIs that use them. 

A further characteristic to look at when assessing possible future approaches to maintaining 
one or multiple digital service infrastructures is the degree of concentration or dispersion of 
the  GOFA  elements.  These  are  not  absolutes.  This  is  a  continuum,  not  an  either/or  choice 
between concentration and  dispersion. There are degrees of coordination and cooperation 
in-between.  Activities  may  be  concentrated  in  a  single  body  with  a  common  set  of 
procedures, but the operational governance may set rigid rules or merely provide guidance. 
In  fact, even  where  a  DSI  opts for  complete  autonomy,  this does  not  preclude  knowledge-
sharing with other DSIs.  

The  common  policy  and  operational  governance  procedures  for  the  building  block  DSIs 
under the CEF are an example of enhanced cooperation amongst different DSIs occupying a 
middle  ground.  Autonomous  management  of  the  sector-specific  DSIs  in  the  policy  DG  IT 
Units  deciding  independently  on  the  strategy  and  operations  of  a  DSI  is  an  example  of  a 
more spread approach. This continuum between a more concentrated and a more dispersed 
approach for carrying out IT activities flows through into the way Member States deal with 
their  IT  services  and infrastructures.  There  is  no position  in  this  continuum  that  is  good  or 
bad per se. The right equilibrium must be found on a case-by-case basis. 

Understanding  this  provides  a  framework  for  making  a  policy  choice  on  whether  to 
concentrate  multiple  DSIs  in  one  or  a  few  sustainability  solutions  or  to  leave  them 
completely  independent  of  each  other,  i.e.  spread  management  of  the  activities  across 
multiple players. 

Taking the GOFA elements and this additional characteristic of the degree of  concentration 
or dispersion into account, the current situation relative to the GOFA model can be summed 
up as:  

  Governance structures (policy and operational) may be concentrated, because they 
are linked to the CEF Programme and there are shared structures, especially for the 
building block DSIs, or dispersed because there are governance structures set up by 
legal  frameworks  governing  these.  There  is 
policy  DGs  and  there  may  be 
coordination  between  building  block  and  sector-specific  DSIs  through  mechanisms 
established  under  the  CEF,  but  there  are  no  compulsory  common  governance 
in  between  the  continuum  of 
procedures.  This  coordination  approach  falls 
concentration and spread of activities.  

  Operations are largely dispersed, depending on the choices of the lead policy DGs 
(in  their  role  as  DSI  owners)  as  to  how  operational  activities  are  carried  out,  i.e. 

44 See:  Non  Paper  on  the  IT  Governance  of  the  CEF  Building  Block  Digital  Services  Infrastructures  (DSIs), 
https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/28012015%20CEF%20Telecom%20EG%20Non-
Paper%20on%20IT%20Governance%20of%20CEF%20BB%20DSIs%20-%20REVISED%20-%20v5.01.pdf  

39 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
within the DG or through DIGIT. This results in some degree of concentration or, at 
least,  coordination  as  DIGIT  plays  a  key  role  (as  a  solution  provider)  in  the 
operations  of  several  building  block  DSIs.  In  addition,  several  policy  DGs  have 
chosen to entrust some operational activities to DIGIT, e.g. eInvoicing.  

  Financing is largely concentrated through the CEF Programme across all DSIs (with 
the  possibility  of  dispersed  funding  where  some  funding  comes  from  other 
programmes); 

Architectural  coordination  is  concentrated  for  the  building  block  DSIs  through  the 
coordination  activities  of  the  Architectural  Management  Board  and  largely  dispersed  for 
sector-specific  DSIs.  These  carry  out  architectural  coordination  activities  with  their  main 
stakeholders  independently  of  the  CEF  governance  structures.  The  table  below  correlates 
the  degree  of  concentration/dispersion  of  activities  with  what  this  means  in  terms  of  the 
degree of intervention by the European Commission.  

Table 4 – Current situation – key characteristics 

Current situation: CEF Programme, 15 DSIs 

GOFA 

Degree of concentration 

Degree of EC intervention 

Governance 

Concentrated  policy  governance  at  CEF 
programme level across all DSIs and a high 
level  of  coordination  for  strategic  and 
operational  governance  structures  across 
the building-block DSIs.  

European  Commission 
with 
approval 

Member 

led, 
States’ 

Dispersed operational governance for non-
building  block  DSIs,  with  policy  DGs 
deciding what is appropriate 

on 

Depends 
(European 
Member States) 

the 

DSI 
Commission, 

Dispersed operations, carried out by policy 
DGs and DIGIT with some concentration of 
activities  (e.g.  DIGIT  operations  for  most 
building  block  DSIs  as  well  as  specific  IT 
services for several sector-specific DSIs). 

European  Commission 
(Policy DGs and DIGIT) 

led 

Concentrated  financing  through  the  CEF 
Programme,  complemented  by  other 
sources of funding (e.g. other programmes 
such  as  Consumer  Programme,  Justice 
Programme, 
ISA 
Programme, etc.) 

Programme, 

EaSI 

approach 

across 
Cooperative 
building  blocks  and  DSIs  reusing  these 
building  blocks,  and  spread  architectural 
coordination per DSI 

(AMB) 

European  Commission 
led, 
with  Member  State  approval 
of Programme 

led, 
European  Commission 
with  possible  Member  State 
consultation 

Operations 

Financing 

Architectural 
coordination 

40 | P a g e  

 
 
 
The current situation is therefore  characterised by various organisational approaches, both 
in terms of bodies and procedures, as well as variety in the number and categories of actors 
involved. However, despite differences in the breadth and typology of stakeholders involved, 
at the moment the European Commission is generally the lead body via the different DGs. 
This  is  either  because  there  is  a  strict  legal  framework  which  mandates  this  or  because  of 
how the DSIs have evolved so far. This approach could be continued in the future, but it does 
not  necessarily  have  to  be  the  case  except  where  there  is  a  specific  legal  framework 
requiring this.  It would be conceivable in other cases to hand the lead over to other parties, 
while maintaining a degree of EC intervention. The minimum level of intervention would be 
policy governance. 

The  current  situation  serves  as  a  baseline  for  the  comparison  of  the possible  sustainability 
solutions in the next section. 

41 | P a g e  

 
 
4  The panorama of potential sustainability 

solutions 

This  chapter  takes  the  extent  of  concentration  and  the  degree  of  intervention  of  the 
European  Commission  as  a  starting  point for  identifying  possible  sustainability solutions.  It 
then  cross-references  these  against  the  needs  and  requirements  of  the  DSIs  in  order  to 
identify which are the most credible, extensible and flexible solutions. 

4.1 The model for identifying sustainability solutions 
In looking at the future of the DSIs and what the sustainable solutions could be, the previous 
chapter  showed  that  there  are  two  key  variables:  the  degree  of  EC  intervention  and  the 
degree  of  concentration  of  management  across  the  DSIs.  The  degree  of  EC  intervention  is 
the  degree  to  which  the  EC  wants  to  take  the  lead  running  the  DSIs  in  addition  to  always 
remaining  the  guardian  of  the  overall  policy  which  creates  the  justification  for  DSIs.  The 
concentration variable is the extent to which this lead passes to a third party.  

In  some  cases  the  degree  of  EC  intervention  is  mandated.  As  there  is  no  evidence  of  any 
intention to modify those mandates, they are taken as a given, while recognising that they, 
like the CEF, operate under the seven-year cycle of the Multiannual Financial Framework. 

In  these  cases,  both  policy  governance  (at  programme  level)  and  coordination  need  to 
remain  in  the  hands  of  the  EC,  though  it  may  share  some  of  the  responsibility  with  the 
Member States and obtain input from stakeholders. Even in those cases, it may be feasible, 
however,  for  the  Commission  to  hand  over  business  ownership,  i.e.  implementation  at 
operational level, to a third party. That could be the Member States (or a Member State or 
group  of  Member  States),  non-profit  organisations  (NPOs)  or  the  private  sector  (profit  or 
non-profit). 

Decisions on the extent to which concentration of management is desirable mean weighing 
the  advantages  of  a  complete  spread,  i.e.  DSIs  are  free  to  carry  out  their  activities 
independently in the way that seems best from the perspective of the single DSI against any 
benefits  from  concentration  of  activities.  These  benefits  could  be  economies  of  scale  and 
synergies, reuse of common resources or further interoperability45, since interoperability is 

45 TachoNET  is  a  good  example  of  how  concentration  of  activities  could  lead  to  synergies  and  use  of  shared 
resources.  Indeed,  DG  MOVE  developed,  through  its  IT  Unit,  three  different  systems  (TachoNET,  ERRU  and 
RESPER) along the same architectural lines and working in a similar way. This allows to optimise testing time 
and  identify  bugs  quickly.  The  three  systems  also  run  on  the  same  platform  and  are  managed  by  the  same 
team, although the policy owners are different DG MOVE’s units.  

42 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
the precondition for cross-border delivery of services in the Digital Single Market. These are 
not  either/or  solutions.  Reuse  of  Building  Blocks,  for  example,  is  a  middle  ground  which 
enables  synergies  and  reuse  of  common  resources.  There  are  also  economies  of 
specialisation  to  take  into  account,  but  concentration  might  still  be  positive  if  it  allows 
resources to be pooled, and existing knowledge and services to be built on when developing 
or  running  similar  IT  systems.  Moreover,  a  certain  degree  of  concentration  or  at  least 
coordination is needed in order to share knowledge and best practices amongst the DSIs and 
build  on  the  experiences  and  resources  of  the  existing  solutions  when  thinking  about  new 
DSIs.  

Based  on  the  different  possible  combinations  of  the  key  aspects  of  the  degree  of 
concentration  and  the  degree  of  European  Commission-led  intervention,  eight  long-term 
sustainability solutions were identified for assessment both for their suitability for individual 
DSIs and in a cross-DSI dimension. Most were identified in the terms of reference, but the 
list  was  expanded  during  the  course  of  the  study  to  include  the  public-private  partnership 
concept. 

The  eight  solutions  can  be  mapped  along  two  axes,  as  shown  in  the  figure  below.  They 
presuppose that the European Commission would, of course, always retain an oversight role 
in any scenario. It would be responsible for ensuring compliance with whatever framework 
governed the decision on a specific sustainability solution, however dispersed.  

43 | P a g e  

 
 
 
Figure 2 – Solutions typology46 

The first quadrant combines strong EU intervention with a lower degree of concentration of 
activities than other solutions. This solution replicates the current situation. It is the baseline 
scenario equivalent to “renewal of the present programme”, although changes to the rules 
and objectives of the programme might be possible. There is a single source of finance, but a 
significant  degree  of  dispersion  in  governance,  operations  and  architectural  coordination 
activities. Every DSI is independent, and DSIs are managed and owned by a range of policy 
DGs of the Commission, although collectively the DSIs are the responsibility of the European 
Commission as an institution. Policy DGs may also be the solution providers, but there is the 
flexibility to allow some level of concentration by calling on other EC entities to provide the 
solutions, as under the CEF, where it is often DIGIT.  

Solutions which involve a high degree of dispersion of activities at all levels are in the third 
quadrant. In these cases, responsibility for every aspect of a DSI could be handed over to the 
Member States, to the private sector (i.e. for profit) or the non-profit sector. Clearly, where 
an EC lead is mandated, these are not options, but a priori there is no reason not to consider 
them for other DSIs. In these solutions, there would be a number of lead entities, not one, 
each responsible for one or more DSIs. It could also be theoretically possible to envisage one 
such single entity being in charge of multiple DSIs.  

The  second  quadrant  contains  solutions,  i.e.  handover  to  DIGIT  or  an  Executive  Agency,  in 
which there is also a strong European Commission lead, but there is more concentration of 
everything  else.  The  extent  to  which  policy  governance  at  programme  level  can  be 
concentrated  may  be  constrained  in  some  cases  by  legal  frameworks  and  reluctance  to 
change  established  governance  mechanisms.  In  some  cases,  this  would  mean  this  had  to 
remain with policy DGs.  

The  handover  to  DIGIT  or  to  an  Executive  Agency  are  in  the  same  quadrant  because  both 
represent  the  same  degree  of  concentration  and  EC  intervention.  The  difference  is  in  the 
way the EC would “intervene”. In the case of handover to DIGIT there is clearly only one DG 
taking  the  lead  while.  In  the  case of  handover  to  an  Executive  Agency, several  DGs,  sitting 
together in the agency’s board, could take this role in combination.  

The fourth quadrant shows a solution in which there is a central entity in charge of all DSI 
activities (therefore entailing high level of concentration) but with no European Commission 
lead, i.e. a Public Private Partnership in which the European Commission would be one of a 
number of partners as part of an independent legal entity.  

46 The axes of the figure should be seen from a general GOFA perspective, and thus considering the degree of 
EU  intervention  and  concentration  from  the  point  of  view  of  governance,  operations,  financing  and 
architectural  coordination.  In  addition,  each  solution  has  implications  for  individual  DSIs  as  well  as  elements 
across  DSIs,  for  example  the  need  for  coordination  between  building  block  DSIs  and  DSIs  reusing  these,  and 
therefore takes into account both perspectives.  

44 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
Another  solution  straddles  quadrant  two  and  four.  This  is  to  place  the  DSIs  under  an  EU 
Regulatory  Agency.  The  European  Commission  still  plays  a  leading  role  but  shares 
responsibilities with other stakeholders who can be closely involved in relevant bodies and 
procedures. These stakeholders could be Member States as well as private sector parties (if 
deemed relevant).  

While  an  EU  Regulatory  Agency  is  a  European  entity  and  linked  to  a  parent  DG,  it  is  also 
independent of the European Commission and other stakeholders, such as Member States. It 
may have decision-making powers of its own at the strategic level through bodies such as a 
Management Board of which Member States can be members. This is relevant because close 
involvement of Member States in some form was identified as important in the needs and 
requirements analysis for this report. This is one way of addressing this. 

Most of the building block DSIs (e.g. eID, eInvoicing) and some of the sector-specific DSIs as 
well (e.g. eProcurement) in fact originated in the Large Scale Pilot experiences carried out by 
the  Member  States  themselves.  They  were  hence  established  originally  by  and  for  the 
Member States’ public administrations. Although the European Commission  now has policy 
and/or  strategic  ownership  of  these  DSIs,  Member  States  have  played  a  major  role  as 
beneficiaries of these services and as promoters of these initiatives.  

4.2  Characteristics of the sustainability solution options 
This  section  presents  the  characteristics  of  the  sustainability  solutions  in  each  of  the 
quadrants  mentioned  above.  Each  is  explained  relative  to  its  GOFA  characteristics  and 
relative to criteria for the degree of European Commission involvement and of concentration 
of the activities. 

  Strong EC lead and dispersed management 

  An EC Programme47 

  Strong EC lead and concentrated management 

  Handover to DIGIT 
  Handover to an Executive Agency 
  No EC lead and dispersed management 
  Handover to the Member States 
  Handover to the Private Sector 
  Handover to a Non-Profit Organisation 
  No EC lead and concentrated management 
  Handover to a Public Private Partnership 

  Moderate EC lead and concentrated management 

  Handover to an EU Regulatory Agency  

47 The  extent  of  the  EC  lead  in  a  programme  might  vary  according  to  its  characteristics.  Nonetheless,  as 
programmes are the funding instruments of the European Commission, a significant level of EC intervention is 
necessary to their functioning.  

45 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
4.2.1 Strong EC lead and dispersed management 

Renewal of an EC Programme  

A  clear  lead  role  for  the  European  Commission  and  a  priori  a  dispersed  approach  to 
management  is  the  status  quo  (or  “baseline”  scenario)  in  which  an  EC  Programme  is 
established along the lines of the CEF. In this hypothesis, it is deemed that there is a need to 
have a common, concentrated funding mechanism covering all DSIs. This does not preclude 
financing  under  other  EC  Programmes.  As  this  is  a  baseline  reference  scenario,  it  is  also 
assumed that the existing governance, operations and architecture arrangements are rolled 
over largely unchanged. This does not preclude some adaptations in the light of experience. 
Stakeholders  could  be  involved  in  policy  governance,  but  might  also  have  a  role  at  the 
operational level through expert groups, for example. 

In  this  scenario,  as  described  in  Chapter  3,  from  the  operational  perspective,  in  principle 
each  DG  can  carry  out  activities  independently.  In  practice,  however,  a  certain  degree  of 
concentration  via  coordination  is  likely.  This  is  what  happens  now  in  the  case  of  the  eID, 
eDelivery and eSignature building block DSIs. DG CONNECT (in its capacity as DSI owner) has 
agreed with DIGIT (i.e. through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)) that it will play a 
key role in the implementation of these DSIs. eInvoicing (owner: DG GROW) is another such 
example. 

Similarly, certain agreements have also been made with DIGIT under the current programme 
to delegate  some of the  operations  of  some  (though  not  all) DSIs.  These  agreements  have 
different  characteristics  that  place  them  at  different  point  of  the  continuum  in  between 
concentration and coordination.  

DIGIT  also  plays  an  important  role  as  a  central  organisation  providing  expertise  and 
supporting  thematic  DGs.  That  could  continue, but  it  would be  up to the  DGs  in  charge  of 
each individual DSI whether or not to involve a single organisation for operations (whether 
DIGIT, as at present, or any other structure with the expertise, such as an Executive Agency). 
Therefore, the solution is dispersed because there is no obligation to centralise. At the same 
time  it  provides  potential  for  a  degree  of  concentration,  depending  on  how  this  is 
encouraged by the EC Programme’s set up and rules. 

The financing mechanism is concentrated as described above. It is time-bound, at most for 
the seven years of the Multiannual Financial Framework. It is decided upon by the European 
Parliament and the Member States on the basis of a proposal from the Commission.  

Finally,  in  terms  of  architecture,  this  solution  allows  for  both  concentrated  and  dispersed 
architectural  coordination  activities.  It  could  follow  the  practice  under  the  current  CEF, 
which ensures a certain degree of architectural coordination across the DSIs, and especially 
the  building  blocks  and  those  DSIs  reusing  them.  It  would  also  be  possible  to  have  a 
completely  dispersed  approach.  However,  effectiveness  and  efficiency  considerations,  and 
the advantages in terms of achieving a properly functioning Digital Single Market, seem likely 
to drive a degree of concentration. 

46 | P a g e  

 
 
Table  5  provides  a  summary  of  these  characteristics  as  they  exist  in  the  baseline  scenario, 
which is one of renewal of an EC Programme post-2020.  

Table 5 – Renewal of an EC Programme – key characteristics 

Baseline scenario: ‘Renewal of an EC Programme’ - EC Programme, 15 DSIs 

GOFA 

Degree of concentration 

Degree of EC intervention 

Governance 

Operations 

Financing 

Architectural 
coordination 

programme 

policy 
Common 
governance, with shared structures across 
building block DSIs and sector-specific DSIs 
reusing building blocks 

and 

Dispersed  DSI-specific  governance,  policy 
DGs with their own governance structures 

Dispersed operations carried out by policy 
DGs  but  concentration  where  there  is 
outsourcing  to  DIGIT  (e.g.  similar  to  the 
current  setup  where  DIGIT  carries  out 
operations for most building block DSIs as 
well  as  specific  IT  services  for  several 
sector-specific  DSIs).  An  Executive  Agency 
could also play this role. 

through 

financing 

the  new 
Common 
Programme, complemented to a greater of 
lesser  extent  by  other  EU  sources  of 
funding  (e.g.  other  programmes  such  as 
Justice 
Consumer 
Programme, 
ISA 
Programme, etc.) 

Programme, 
EaSI 

Programme, 

High  level  of  coordination  (AMB)  across 
building  blocks  and  DSIs  reusing  these 
building 
decentralised 
architectural coordination per DSI 

blocks 

and 

led, 
European  Commission 
with  Member  State  approval 
of annual Work Programmes 

on 

Depends 
(European 
Member States) 

the 

DSI 
Commission, 

European  Commission 
led, 
with  involvement  of  policy 
an 
and  DIGIT  or 
DGs 
Executive Agency 

led, 
European  Commission 
based  on  approval 
from 
Council  of  Ministers  and 
European Parliament 

European Commission led,  

47 | P a g e  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Strong EC lead and concentrated management 

Handover to DIGIT or an Executive Agency 

Another possible  approach  for  ensuring  the  long-term  sustainability  of  the  CEF  DSIs  would 
be a more concentrated approach overall, with a strong EC lead and common management 
of the  DSIs  (Quadrant 2).  In  this  scenario, however,  it  is  assumed  that  funding  sources  are 
disparate,  i.e.  there  is  no  a  priori  reason  why  funding  should  come  from  a  CEF-type 
programme.  It  could  come  solely  from  other  EC  programmes.  However,  it  assumes  that 
those programmes and their respective DSI owners designate the same Agency to operate 
on  behalf  of  their  DSIs  as  this  is  the  only  way  to  reap  the  benefits  of  centralised 
management.  An  existing  Agency  could  be  used,  e.g.  EACEA,  which  already  has  executive 
responsibilities  on  behalf  of  DG  CONNECT,  or  INEA,  which  already  has  CEF  responsibilities. 
The key difference with the previous solution is in the  concentration of the activities under 
one entity. 

For  the  purposes  of  this  option,  therefore,  DIGIT  and  an  Executive  Agency  are  treated  as 
interchangeable, although there would be differences in practice. DIGIT is a service provider 
to all DGs and could be used as a service provider by all DSIs. An Agency has a parent DG (as 
discussed  subsequently)  and  handover  to  an  Agency  would  be  likely  to  imply  the  need  to 
work through a Programme or Programmes. Executive Agencies are explicitly established “to 
manage specific tasks related to an EU Programme”48.  

In this scenario, governance at policy level remains with the policy DG in cases where there 
is  a  regulatory  framework  for  the  DSI.  In  the  case  of  the  other  DSIs,  some  form  of 
concentrated policy governance mechanism would have to be created in order for the EC to 
provide a strong lead in ensuring compliance with the policy.49 DIGIT or the Executive Agency 
would be fully in charge of the operational governance, but a link with the policy governance 
layer would have to be maintained. 

There would be a similarity with an EC Programme in that a policy DG would take the lead in 
include  establishing  the  principles  of  stakeholder 
policy  governance.  This  would 
management,  both  the  involvement  of  Member  States  and  input  from  private  sector 
stakeholders.  Neither  an  Executive  Agency 50 nor  DIGIT  would  have  a  mechanism  for 
allocating decision-making powers to Member States or other stakeholders.  

As noted in section 4.1, the way in which external stakeholders could be associated with the 
solutions  involving  Executive  Agencies  and  DIGIT  would  be  much  the  same,  as  would  the 
roles  of  DIGIT  and  the  policy  DGs.  Executive  agencies  can  cater  for  the  involvement  of 

48 See: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies_en  
49 As  mentioned  previously,  the  governance  activities  at  policy  level  carried  out  in  line  with  existing  legal 
frameworks would be assumed to continue for the foreseeable future. 
50 As opposed to an EU Regulatory Agency that can explicitly include Member States and other stakeholders in 
its management board and allocate decision making powers to them as discussed further below. 

48 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
multiple DGs in their decision-making, all of whom can sit on the agency’s board. Moreover, 
each  Executive  Agency  has  a  policy  DG  (or  more  than  one,  e.g.  the  Education,  Audiovisual 
and  Culture  Executive  Agency  –  EACEA)  as  a  parent  DG.  In  the  case  of  DIGIT  on  the  other 
hand,  a  single  DG  (DIGIT)  would  be  primus  inter  pares  and  the  relationship  with  other 
relevant DGs would be more bilateral.  

The  handover  to  DIGIT  or  an  Executive  Agency  would  entail  strong  concentration  of  all 
operations. In this scenario,  a single organisation would be responsible for the operational 
activities.  This  would  make  it  possible,  if  considered  desirable,  to  exploit  synergies, 
economies of scale, shared services and other forms of resource pooling. It would facilitate 
time, 
interoperability,  and 
concentration  of  activities  could  have  some  drawbacks 
in  terms  of  economies  of 
specialisation and capacity to tap into in-depth content expertise.  

therefore  cross-border 

interoperability.  At 

the  same 

There would also be small differences in the way an Executive Agency and DIGIT would deal 
with the DSIs’ operations. First, an Executive Agency has more flexibility in recruiting semi-
permanent resources than DIGIT. In fact, although DIGIT can insource the necessary profiles 
rather easily, it cannot hire contract agents with the same facility as an Executive Agency. In 
the end-effect, the operational capacity is the same for both as they can gather the relevant 
resources when needed, but not in the same way. Second, they do not have the same back 
capital  of  expertise  in  managing  IT  systems.  DIGIT  undoubtedly  has  this,  but  Executive 
Agencies are not currently used for managing large scale IT systems as their primary role so 
far has been managing EU spending programmes. This means that DIGIT would already have 
inbuilt  capacity  to  manage  operations,  while  an  Executive  Agency  would  need  to  gain  it, 
starting  from  scratch  or  almost.  Nonetheless,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  an  Executive 
Agency building this expertise rather quickly through the rapid acquisition of relevant human 
resources.  Therefore, the  operational  strengths and  weaknesses  of DIGIT  and  an  Executive 
Agency  offset  each  other  and,  for  the  most  important  elements,  the  two  solutions  are 
essentially the same. 

Financing  would  be  dispersed  and  have  to  rely  on  multiple  sources.  The  nature  of  these 
would depend on the type of DSI (e.g. with or without a regulatory basis) and the presence 
or  absence  of  a  funding  instrument  (e.g.  the  next  generation  of  Programmes  such  as  the 
Consumer Programme, EaSI Programme, etc.) Funding sources would have to be identified, 
on  a  case-by-case  basis  for  each  DSI,  and  could  be  Heading  5  of  the  EU  budget  or  a 
Memorandum of Understanding.51  

The main difference between handover to DIGIT and to an Executive Agency with respect to 
the  financing  element  consists  in  the  different  level  of  dependence  on  a  programme  as 
opposed  to  some  other  form  of  basic  act,  such  as  the  Regulation  which  governs  ODR.  For 

51 Charging for third party services is theoretically possible,  but  involve taking a  pioneering role compared to 
existing  practice  that  is  discarded  here  because  of  its  unprecedented  nature  that  could  jeopardise  the  time 
frames.  The  The  Joint  Research  Centre  (JRC),  formally  a  European  Commission  DG,  does  charge  for  certain 
services it provides, but it is not clear that this would be an adequate precedent of itself; 

49 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
DIGIT,  the  existence  of  a  programme  as  such  is  not  a  pre-condition  for  carrying  out  its 
activities. Activities related to services provided only to the Commission (e.g. other DSIs) can 
be funded through  Heading 5 of  the  EU budget  (administrative expenditure)  or  by tapping 
into other headings if there is some other legal basis for its services. However, Heading 5 can 
be  mobilised  only  for  services  provided  to  Commission  bodies  (e.g.  MT@EC  services).  It 
cannot be used to provide them to the Member States. Therefore, the scope of DSI activities 
falling  within  the  definition  of  what  can  be  funded  by  DIGIT  under  Heading  5  is  rather 
limited.  

For an Executive Agency, on the other hand, the existence of a funding programme is almost 
essential  for  carrying  out  activities.  Executive  agencies  are  generally  precisely  tasked  with 
management  of  a  programme’s  funding  and  its  related  activities.  There  are  exceptions  to 
this rule: the EU Aid Volunteers initiative is managed by (EACEA) and directly funded through 
EU  budget,  based  on  Regulation  375/2014  establishing  the  European  Voluntary 
Humanitarian  Aid  Corps  (EU  Aid  Volunteer  Initiative)52.  Therefore,  although  the  level  of 
dependence of DIGIT and Executive Agencies on programmes is different, neither solution, if 
taken individually, would possess intrinsic financial options available to all  the current DSIs 
(e.g. a legal basis for mobilising EU budget).  

In terms of architectural coordination, concentrating all activities in one entity should make 
coordination across all DSIs easier. It would also facilitate the reuse of common architectural 
components. Concentration should not, however, be regarded as a panacea. In order not to 
lose  the  benefits,  for  example,  of  economies  of  specialisation,  a  case-by-case  approach 
would be needed and concentration could, for instance, be envisaged only where DSIs share 
similar features and needs, and as similar stakeholder constituencies (e.g. eJustice and BRIS). 
Dispersed approaches do not, moreover, mean that there cannot be coordination. However, 
as is currently the case under the CEF, the concentration of activities in one entity might be 
less resource-intensive.  

Taking  this  approach  to  architectural  coordination  does  not  exclude  consultation  of  other 
stakeholders (e.g. Member States), but it does limit their influence over the outcome since 
decision-making power would not be shared equally, given that a central body would have 
the final say.  

With respect to this last GOFA element, there is no evident difference between DIGIT and an 
Executive Agency. While DIGIT works more based on bilateral relations, it might be thought 
it  is  less  able  to  ensure  architectural  coordination  across  DGs  than  an  Agency.  However, 
there  is  no  particular  evidence  substantiating  this  assumption  and  the  experience  of  the 
building blocks DSIs proves that architectural coordination can very well be ensured within 
DIGIT  itself.  Therefore,  from  an  architectural  perspective,  the  handover  to  DIGIT  or  to  an 
Executive Agency can be considered equivalent. 

52 See Regulation 375/2014 of  the European Parliament  and the Council establishing the  European Voluntary 
Humanitarian 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
Volunteer 
Corps 
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0375&from=EN  

Initiative), 

(EU 

Aid 

Aid 

50 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
The key characteristics of this sustainability solution are summarised in the table below. 

Table 6 – Handover to DIGIT or Executive Agency – key characteristics 

Handover to DIGIT or Executive Agency 

GOFA 

Degree of concentration 

Degree of EC intervention 

Governance 

Concentrated  DSI  operational  governance 
(DSI-specific  policy  governance  remains  in 
the hand of the policy DGs in cases where 
there is a legal framework mandating that 
this should reside with a specific DG). 

led, 
European  Commission 
with  possible  consultation  of 
Member  States  and/or  other 
stakeholders 

Operations 

Concentrated  operations,  carried  out  by 
DIGIT or Executive Agency 

European Commission led 

Financing 

Dispersed financing from various financing 
instruments and sources 

European Commission led 

Architectural 
coordination 

Concentrated  architectural  coordination 
activities across all DSIs 

led, 
European  Commission 
with  possible  Member  State 
consultation 

Given  the  commonalities  of  handover  to  DIGIT  and  to  an  Executive  Agency,  the  two  are 
considered together in the subsequent assessments.  

4.2.3 No EC lead and decentralised management 

Another  solution  for  the  long-term  sustainability  of  the  DSIs  is  to  envisage  dispersed 
management  of  the  GOFA  elements  without  the  European  Commission  taking  the  lead 
(quadrant 3). This approach could be exemplified by  handing over  the management of the 
DSIs  completely  to  one  or  more  Member  States,  private  or  non-profit  organisations.  This 
should  not  be  understood  as  the  EC  abrogating  all  its  responsibilities.  As  indicated 
elsewhere, there would be a level of overarching policy governance where the EC would still 
need to have a role to oversee compliance with the mandate from the Member States and 
the  Parliament  on  DSI  policy  and  the  parameters  within  which  an  external  body  would 
operate.  Those  parameters  could  cover  stakeholder  management  in  whatever  degree  of 
detail  was  considered  necessary.  Policy  DGs  would  therefore  continue  to  have  a  legal 
responsibility and, in terms of operations. Complete handover to third parties of everything 
except  oversight/vision  is  possible  only  in  those  cases  where  the  Commission  has  no 
obligation  to  provide  certain  GOFA  elements,  i.e.  there  are  some  DSIs  for  which  this  is  by 
definition not possible.  

The handover of the DSIs to the Member States, private sector or non-profit organisations 
would minimise the extent of the EC lead and these organisations would be responsible  for 
operational governance.   

51 | P a g e  

 
 
Operational activities would, therefore, be handed over to Member States, private sector or 
non-profit organisations, either to run a single DSI or several DSIs. Synergies and economies 
of scale might be constrained by this, but it might make economies of specialisation easier53.  
The number of decision-making structures could be as numerous as the number of entities 
or groups of entities taking responsibility for the DSIs with no overarching coordination. 

Financing would also be dispersed across multiple sources. The entity running the DSI could 
fund  the  DSI  directly,  agree  with  a  variety  of  sources  (e.g.  Member  States,  private 
stakeholders,  third  countries)  that they  would  make  specified  contributions  to  the  budget, 
rely  on  funding  the  budget  by  charging  third  parties  for  services  on  a  pay-for-use  basis, 
and/or receive some funding at European level, e.g. through grants under an EC Programme 
(either  a  dedicated  Programme  or  a  Programme  of  the  type  from  which  some 
complementary funding comes now). The funding sources would need to be identified on a 
case-by-case basis. 

In terms of architecture, a highly dispersed approach such as this one¸ where there is policy 
governance,  but  no  other  form  of  oversight,  would  be  likely  to  be  inimical  (though  not  a 
complete barrier) to the establishment of a coordination mechanism across DSIs or common 
mechanisms to encourage the reuse of building blocks.  

The key characteristics of the sustainability solution are summarised in the table below. 

Table 7 – No European Commission lead and decentralised management – key characteristics 

Handover to Member States, private sector or non-profit organisations 

GOFA 

Degree of concentration 

Degree of EC intervention 

Governance  Dispersed  DSI  governance  carried  out  by 
multiple entities external to the EC (based 
on  an  overarching  policy  decision  and 
parameters  set  at  EC  or  EU  level,  and 
subject to a role for policy DGs where this 
is mandated by a regulatory instrument). 

Led  by  Member  States, 
private  sector  or  non-profit 
organisations  with  EC-led 
parameters,  with  possible 
other 
consultation 
stakeholders 

of 

Operations 

Dispersed  operations,  carried  out  by 
Member  States,  private  sector  or  non-
profit organisations 

Led  by  Member  States, 
private  sector  or  non-profit 
organisations 

Financing 

Dispersed financing from various financing 
instruments and sources 

Led  by  Member  States, 
private  sector  or  non-profit 
organisations 

Architectural  Dispersed 

architectural 

coordination  Led  by  Member  States, 

53 Economies  of  specialisation  are  defined  by  economic  sciences  as  the  productivity  gains  obtained  under 
greater specialisation. Within the context of the DSIs, this can be understood as leaving each policy DG dealing 
with its related DSIs in order to leverage on content and stakeholders expertise of the specific domain to gain in 
effectiveness and efficiency.  

52 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
Handover to Member States, private sector or non-profit organisations 

GOFA 
coordination  activities  and  potential  lack  of  common 

Degree of concentration 

architectural coordination across all DSIs 

Degree of EC intervention 
private  sector  or  non-profit 
organisations 

4.2.4 No EC lead and concentrated management 

Into the fourth quadrant fall those solutions in which there is no European Commission lead, 
but there is a concentration of all GOFA elements and multiple DSIs under one entity54, i.e. 
an institutionalised Public Private Partnership (PPP)55, in which the European Commission is 
one  of  the  partners  involved.  In  a  PPP  multiple  stakeholders  share  decision-making  power 
and  responsibility  over  a  determined  set  of  tasks.  They  pool  resources  from  different 
partners in order to reach a critical mass.  

The European Commission could set up an institutionalised PPP through the EU’s legislative 
procedure56,  but  would  be  breaking  new  ground.  Such  a  legal  basis  would  ensure  that 
participation  could  be  binding  both  for  the  European  Commission  and  for  the  Member 
States or only binding for the Commission. Other partners (e.g. private sector, NPOs) would 
come on board voluntarily.  

The handover of DSI activities to a PPP would entail a concentrated approach to governance 
(both  at  policy  implementation  and  operational  governance  level).  Decision-making  would 
be  shared, and  (depending  on  the exact  set-up),  there  would a priori be  no  single party in 
the  lead.  The  European  Commission,  the  Member  States,  private  stakeholders,  non-profit 
organisations,  standardisation  bodies,  etc.  could  all  have  a  role  in  decision-making 
appropriate to their role in the PPP. There could be a lead DG to represent the Commission 
on  the  PPP  Board,  or  individual  policy  DGs  could  be  represented,  particularly  those  with 
responsibilities  under  a  regulatory  instrument.  The  PPP,  therefore,  not  only  provides  a 
common  but  also  an  inclusive  solution.  The  PPP  would  be  responsible  for  operational 
decision  making.  It  could  involve  additional  stakeholders  through  working  groups,  which 

54 This option would not be applicable to any DSIs which were clearly mandated to the European Commission, 
as is the case now of ODR. 
55 PPPs can also be “contractual”. In this case, there is a contractual relationship and delegation of tasks to the 
private  partner  from  the  public  authority.  As  such,  this  form  of  PPP  can  be  considered  as  an  outsourcing 
strategy for the public authorities rather than a sustainability solution as it does not entail the establishment of 
a new structure/entity and could be applied within many of the sustainability solutions examined below (e.g. 
EU Regulatory Agency, DIGIT, Executive Agency,  NPO, and Member States etc.) Therefore, for the purpose of 
this assessment the only form of PPP considered is the institutionalised PPP described in this section.  
56 Outside article 187 TFUE, which is however specific to research policy, there is no mention in the Treaties of 
the possibility for the Commission of establishing a public private partnership. Nonetheless, there is nothing to 
exclude  the  possibility  of  establishing  such  an  organisation  by  adopting  a  legislative  act  based  on  any  other 
relevant article of the Treaty. Although this has never been further explored, this theoretical possibility exists.  

53 | P a g e  

 
 
 
                                                      
 
would  remain  nonetheless  integrated  in  one  overarching  and  concentrated  framework 
constituted by the PPP.  

From an operational perspective, the PPP would handle the activities of multiple DSIs or all 
activities  of  a  single  DSI.  This  should  make  it  possible  to  optimise  synergies,  economies  of 
scale,  shared  resources  and 
interoperability  where  this  can  be  established  to  be 
advantageous.  

The  PPP  solution  would  rely  on  multiple  sources  of  financing,  including  receiving  funding 
from  the  EU  based  on  the  PPPs’  legal  mandate,  contributions  from  the  partners,  charging 
third parties for services, etc. This range of possibilities presents some advantages in terms 
of  flexibility  and  mix  of  funding  sources,  but  has  the  disadvantage  that  it  would  not  be 
possible to point to a specific financing option which could be adopted for all DSIs.  

Finally,  from  an  architectural  perspective,  the  PPP  has  the  characteristics  of  the  other 
concentrated models of making coordination across DSIs and common mechanisms possible 
so as to encourage reuse of common components. 

The key characteristics of this sustainability solution are summarised in the table below. 

Table 8 – Handover to an institutionalised PPP – key characteristics 

Handover to an institutionalised PPP 

GOFA 

Degree of concentration 

Degree of EC intervention 

Governance 

Concentrated  DSI  governance  (except  for 
overarching policy setting by the EC and a 
role  for  the  policy  DGs  when  established 
by a regulatory framework). 

Led  by  the  partners  of  the 
PPP,  of  which  the  EC  is  one, 
with  possible  consultation  of 
other stakeholders 

Operations 

Financing 

Concentrated  operations,  carried  out  by 
Member  States,  private  sector  or  non-
profit organisations 

Concentrated  management  of  financing 
from  various  financing  instruments  and 
sources  

Led  by  the  partners  of  the 
PPP 

Led  by  the  partners  of  the 
PPP  

Architectural 
coordination 

Concentrated  architectural  coordination 
architectural 
common 
and 
activities 
coordination across all DSIs 

Led  by  the  partners  of  the 
PPP  

4.2.5 Moderate EC lead and centralised management 

Another approach to the long-term sustainability of the DSIs could be to hand them over an 
EU  Regulatory Agency.  This  approach  would  also  be  a  concentrated  management  solution, 
but  it  would reduce  the  level  of  intervention of  the  European  Commission  (from  strong to 
moderate).  

54 | P a g e  

 
 
 
 
This  would  leave  more  room  for  participation  of  a  range  of  stakeholders  in  the  decision-
making,  since  Regulatory  Agencies  are  more  inclusive  than  when  the  Commission  has  the 
lead. The management board of the Regulatory Agencies always includes both the European 
Commission and the Member States, and it can include other stakeholders from the private 
sector, standardisation bodies or non-profit organisations.  

Thus,  although  Regulatory  Agencies  are  formally  linked  to  a  ‘parent  DG’,  as  Executive 
Agencies  are,  the  former  are  far  more  independent  of  the  European  Commission  alone  in 
their decision making because of the make-up of the Management Board. At the same time, 
differently  from  a  PPP,  the  European  Commission  still  has  a  leadership  role  in  an  EU 
Regulatory Agency via the Agency’s parent DG, unlike the solutions in quadrant 4F. For some 
DSIs, the regulatory requirements applying to the policy DG’s involvement would need to be 
accommodated or reviewed if this solution were to be applied to them.   

From the operational perspective, the handover to an EU  Regulatory Agency entails strong 
concentration of all activities in one entity. This is highly similar to what would happen in the 
case of handover to DIGIT, an Executive Agency or a PPP, i.e. such an approach would create 
scope  for  synergies  and  use  of  common  services  and  infrastructures  while  also  enabling 
economies of scale.  

In terms of financing, EU Regulatory Agencies concentrate management of funding that may 
come  from  different  sources,  e.g.  charging  for  services,  contributions  from  the  Member 
States,  EU  budget  or  programmes.  While  this  is  similar  to  PPPs,  it  in  fact  guarantees  more 
financial stability over time because the legal basis of an EU Regulatory Agency is a basic act 
that  commits  the  European  Union  to  providing  funding  for  the  activities  mentioned  in  the 
mandate. The mandate does not provide any requirements as to where the funding should 
come  from.  However,  it  does  provide  the  guarantee  that  financial  resources  must  be 
available.  Hence  multiple  sources  can  be  used:  from  programmes,  contributions  from 
Member States or from the general budget of the EU where there is an explicit mandate, but 
also  from  charging  for  services.  Where  funding  came  from  the  EU  budget,  the  specific 
budget  heading  would  depend  on  the  legal  basis  or  on  the  legal  basis  of  the  services 
provided.  

The possibility of charging third parties for services is particularly relevant as it is a distinctive 
feature  that  is  generally  available  to  Regulatory  Agencies,  but  that  might  not  be  easily 
available for other solutions57. This is an important characteristic to consider. Even if only a 
minority  of  DSIs  have  revenue  generation  potential  at  present  that  could  evolve  in  future. 
Also for this reason, the EU Regulatory Agency is the solution offering the largest and most 
flexible choice of financial options.  

57 For an in-depth description of the criteria EU Regulatory Agency must meet in order to charge third parties 
for services,  see the European Parliament study on the partially self-financed EU agencies and the principle of 
fee 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/490689/IPOL-
setting: 
JOIN_ET(2014)490689_EN.pdf 

55 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
Finally,  with  respect  to  architecture,  the  EU  Regulatory  Agency  solution  is  identical  to  the 
other concentrated solutions, such as the handover to DIGIT, an Executive Agency or a PPP 
in  creating  scope  for  taking  advantage  of  synergies,  economies  of  scale,  optimisation  of 
interoperability of cross-border services and resource pooling.  

The key characteristics of this sustainability solution are summarised in the table below. 

Table 9 – Handover to an EU Regulatory Agency – key characteristics 

Handover to an EU Regulatory Agency 

GOFA 

Degree of concentration 

Degree of EC intervention 

Governance 

Concentrated  governance  within 
the 
context of an overarching EC policy on DSIs 
and  subject  to  accommodating  regulatory 
mandates applying to some policy DSIs. 

of 

the 

the  management 
Led  by 
Agency, 
board 
European 
the 
including 
Commission  and  Member 
States  and  possibly  other 
stakeholders 

Operations 

Concentrated  operations,  carried  out  by 
the Agency 

Led by the Agency 

Financing 

Dispersed financing from various financing 
instruments 
(but 
concentrated  management  of  funding 
received by the agency) 

sources 

and 

Architectural 
coordination 

Concentrated  architectural  coordination 
activities 
architectural 
common 
and 
coordination across all DSIs 

Possible  funding  based  on 
mandate,  as  well  as  EU  and 
Member  State  sources  and 
revenue generation 

by 

Led 
European 
Commission,  Member  States 
and 
other 
possibly 
stakeholders 

The  handover  to  an  EU  Regulatory  Agency  therefore  provides  a  flexible  solution  with  a 
variety  of  options  for  involving  different  parties  and  tapping  into  different  sources  of 
funding.  

56 | P a g e  

 
 
5  Outcome of individual and cross-DSI 

analysis 

This  chapter  describes  the  outcome  of  the  individual  and  cross-DSI  sustainability  analysis 
based  on  assessment  criteria  per  GOFA  element.  These  assessment  criteria  emerged  from 
the  analysis  of  needs  and  requirements  that  fed  this  report  when  applied  to  the 
sustainability  options discussed  in the previous  chapter.  This  chapter  also  includes  a  cross-
DSI Pugh analysis. 

5.1 Outcome of the individual DSI analysis 
As the analysis carried out for this assignment shows, the fifteen CEF DSIs considered here 
have many different GOFA features and characteristics.  As illustrated in Chapter 2, this is a 
function  of  the  nature  of  the  services  they  provide  (e.g.  managed  services,  software, 
standards and specifications, etc.), their target audience (e.g. public sector only, public and 
private stakeholders, etc.) and their legal basis (existence of a specific regulatory framework 
with direct or indirect obligations in relation to the provision and/or use of DSI services and 
related funding, or only a broader policy framework with no accompanying regulation).  

At the same time, there are also many similarities across all GOFA elements. This makes it 
possible  to  analyse  the  DSIs  not  only  individually  but  also  in  groups  and  on  the  basis  of 
similar profiles (see Chapter 2), i.e. broadly speaking: 

  Profile 1: DSIs providing solutions for others to implement,  
  Profile 2: DSIs providing centrally managed services,  
  Profile 3: DSIs providing centrally managed services and solutions for others to 

implement. 

To  account  both  for  DSIs’  differences  and  similarities,  the  team  not  only  carried  out  an 
extensive assessment of all individual DSIs and across DSIs, but also a multi-criteria analysis 
and  a  sensitivity  analysis  in  order  to  identify  the  most  relevant  solutions.  The  sensitivity 
analysis was carried out only for those solutions that could theoretically fit all the needs and 
requirements of a given DSI. This showed that handover to a non-profit organisation or the 
Member States had to be ruled out for certain DSIs.  

This was not carried out as an academic exercise. After an initial analysis in which the criteria 
were  not  weighted,  the  DSI  owners  themselves  were  then  asked  to  identify  specific 
“sustainability  attention  points”  in  order  to  adapt  the  weighting  accordingly.  In  a  further 
step, a standard weighting factor was applied to the GOFA elements based on the typical DSI 
profiles.  

57 | P a g e  

 
 
A separate analysis looked at the GOFA elements from a cross-DSI perspective. In this case, 
the  criteria  were  different  for  obvious  reasons:  synergies  assume  much  more  importance 
when looking at a cross-DSI perspective.  

5.2 The sensitivity analysis 
Clusters  were  developed  for  the  sensitivity  analysis.  The  first  sensitivity  analysis  cluster 
corresponded to a situation in which all GOFA elements counted the same. The ranking of 
the solutions was based simply on their scoring with respect to each of the criteria.  To this 
baseline sensitivity analysis cluster, the team added a second in which the GOFA elements 
had a different weighting, according to the importance that the DSI owner attributed to each 
of  them.  The  DSI  owner  had  10  weighting  points  to  distribute  across  the  four  GOFA 
elements. In a limited number of cases, e.g. eID, this produced a significantly different result 
from  the  unweighted  result,  but  in  most  cases  any  differences  were  slight.  Additional 
clusters were also identified based on the analysis of the common characteristics of groups 
of DSIs (and in some cases specific parts of DSIs). Therefore, for each DSI, the assessments 
were  subjected  to  multiple  weightings  to  verify  the  outcome  and  to  identify  the  possible 
ranking of sustainability solutions.  

Comparing  the  results  of  the  individual  and  cross-DSI  analysis  made  it  possible  to  identify 
those sustainability solutions that  seemed more flexible in accommodating all or individual 
cross-DSI situations. 

The assessment was based on a tailored indicator framework consisting of a predetermined 
list  of  criteria  to  score  each  of  the  sustainability  solutions.  The  criteria  covered  all  GOFA 
elements and are listed in the table below. 

Table 10 – List of assessment criteria for the individual sustainability analysis 

  Allocation  of  decision-making  power 

the  appropriate   
stakeholders (for example: European Commission, Member States, 
non-profit organisations, standardisation bodies) 

to 

 Governance 

  Ability to react to evolving needs in a sufficient timeframe (i.e. the 
degree  of  responsiveness  to  new  needs  and  to  the  incorporation 
of new technology, as well as ability to ensure sufficient flexibility 
of the decision making procedures over time) 

  Extent to which synergies across Member States can be achieved 
(that is to say, ability to enable Member States to coordinate their 
IT strategy, IT planning and IT alignment at European level) 

 Operations 

  Ability and capacity to ensure deployment, continuity and further 
develop  required  services  (including  scalability  potential  and 
capacity to attract the appropriate human resources) 

  Ability to ensure increased take-up over time (amongst other DSIs 

and target groups) 

58 | P a g e  

 
 
 Finance 

  Ability to cover the funding needs of the DSI and ensure financing 

continuity 

  Extent  to  which  the  costs  required  can  be  covered  by  a  mix  of 
funding  sources  (i.e.  the  ability  to  allow  for  various  sources  of 
finance simultaneously, including revenue generation) 

 Architecture 

  Ability to ensure architectural coordination with key stakeholders 

(e.g. implementers, other DSIs (re-using building blocks)) 

Overall, the result of the individual DSI analysis was largely consistent in terms of the ranking 
of sustainability solutions, as the following table shows. The EU Regulatory Agency (EU Reg 
Ag)  solution  came  out  on  top  for  all  clusters  and  all  DSIs.  There  was  more  variety  in  the 
solutions that occupy the second and third positions, depending on the characteristics of the 
DSIs  themselves.  However,  the  top  three  solutions  remained  largely  consistent.  The  PPP 
came second in 27 scenarios (and in shared first place in one case58), the EC programme was 
second in 23 cases, DIGIT or an Executive Agency in 14, and the Member States in one. In the 
third position, the EC Programme (EC prog.) appeared 22 times, the PPP 19 times, DIGIT/the 
Executive Agency (DIGIT-EA) 17 times, and the handover to the Member States twice. 

This  is  a  purely  arithmetic  result,  which  provides  a  useful  indication  per  DSI.  What  is  also 
interesting  to  observe  from  the  perspective  of  the  individual  DSIs,  but  particularly  for  the 
cross-DSI analysis, is how the second best solution varies according to the specific profile of 
the DSI.  

58 This is eInvoicing. In the second scenario the handover to a PPP moves to the top rank (together with the EU 
Regulatory Agency) due to the importance attached to governance and financing characteristics. However, for 
this DSI,  the financing element  is important  only in a mid-term perspective as in its end-state the operations 
will be limited to maintenance of the standard. Therefore, the third scenario is more forward-looking while the 
second is more based on immediate needs. From this perspective, they are not mutually exclusive, but the case 
for creating a PPP on a mid-term need basis does not seem proportionate. 

59 | P a g e  

 
 
  
 
 
                                                      
Table 11 – Ranking of individual sustainability solutions per DSI 

DSI 

eID 

eSignature 

eDelivery 

Cluster 
Unweighted 
DSI owner profile 
Profile 1.1 – Solutions for third parties to implement, with legal 
basis 
Unweighted 
DSI owner profile 
Profile 1.2 - Solutions for third parties to implement, without 
legal basis (DSS) 
Profile 1.2* - Solutions for third parties to implement, with legal 
basis (DSS) 
Profile 2.1 - Centrally managed services, with legal basis (TLM) 
Unweighted 
DSI owner profile (1) 
DSI owner profile (2) 
Profile 2.2 - Centrally managed services, without legal basis, 
public & private sector (managed services) 

1st  
EU Reg Ag59 
EU Reg Ag 

EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 

EU Reg Ag 

EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 

EU Reg Ag 

 - Solutions for third parties to implement, with legal basis 

EU Reg Ag 

Profile 1.2  

2nd  
EC prog60 
EC prog/PPP 

EC prog 
EC prog 
EC prog/PPP 

EC prog 

EC prog 
EC prog 
PPP 
PPP 
PPP 

PPP 

PPP 

3rd  
PPP61/DIGIT-EA62 
MS63 

PPP 
PPP/DIGIT-EA 
DIGIT-EA 

PPP 

PPP 
PPP 
DIGIT-EA 
DIGIT-EA 
DIGIT-EA/EC prog 

DIGIT/EA 

DIGIT-EA 

59 EU Regulatory Agency 
60 EC Programme 
61 Public Private Partnership 
62 DIGIT / Executive Agency 
63 Member States 

60 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
DSI 

eInvoicing 

eTranslation 

ODR 

eProcurement 

eHealth 

EESSI 

Cybersecurity 

Cluster 
Profile 1.2* - Solutions for third parties to implement, with legal 
basis 
Unweighted 
DSI owner profile 
Profile 1.1– Solutions for third parties to implement, with legal 
basis 
Unweighted 
DSI owner profile 
Profile 2.2 - Centrally managed services, without legal basis, 
public sector 
Unweighted 
DSI owner profile 
Profile 2.1 - Centrally managed services, with legal basis 
Unweighted 
DSI owner profile 
Profile 2.1 - Centrally managed services, with legal basis 
(eCertis/ESPD) 

Profile 1.2  

 - Solutions for third parties to implement, with legal basis 
Profile 1.2* - Solutions for third parties to implement, with legal 
basis 
Unweighted 
DSI owner profile 
Profile 3.2 - Centrally managed services and solutions for third 
parties to implement, without legal basis 
Unweighted 
DSI owner profile 
Profile 3.2 - Centrally managed services and solutions for third 
parties to implement, without legal basis 
Unweighted 

1st  

EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag/PPP 

2nd  

PPP 
EC prog 
EC prog 

3rd  

DIGIT-EA/EC prog 
PPP 
DIGIT-EA 

EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 

EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 

EU Reg Ag 

EU Reg Ag 

EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 

EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 

EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 

PPP 
EC Prog/DIGIT-EA 
DIGIT-EA 

EC Prog/DIGIT-EA 
DIGIT-EA  
DIGIT-EA  
DIGIT-EA  
PPP/DIGIT-EA 
PPP 

PPP 

PPP 

EC Prog 
PPP 
EC Prog 

PPP 
EC prog 
EC prog 
EC prog 
EC Prog 
EC Prog 

DIGIT-EA 

EC Prog 

EC prog 
PPP 
EC Prog/DIGIT-EA 
PPP 
EC Prog/DIGIT-EA/MS  PPP 

EC Prog/DIGIT-EA 
EC Prog/DIGIT-EA 
EC Prog 

EC Prog 
EC Prog 

MS/PPPs 
PPP 
PPP 

PPP 
DIGIT-EA 

61 | P a g e  

 
 
DSI 

Europeana 

Cluster 
DSI owner profile 
Profile 3.2 - Centrally managed services and solutions for third 
parties to implement, without legal basis 
Unweighted 
DSI owner profile 
Profile 2.2 - Centrally managed services, without legal basis, 
public & private sector 

Public Open Data  Unweighted 

Safer Internet 

BRIS 

e-Justice 

DSI owner profile 
Profile 2.2 - Centrally managed services, without legal basis, 
public & private sector 
Unweighted 
DSI owner profile 
Profile 2.2 - Centrally managed services, without legal basis, 
public & private sector 
Unweighted 
DSI owner profile 
Profile 3.1 - Centrally managed services and solutions for third 
parties to implement, with legal basis, public & private sector 
Unweighted 
DSI owner profile 
Profile 3.1 - Centrally managed services and solutions for third 
parties to implement, with legal basis, public & private sector 
(insolvency registers) 
Profile 3.2 - Centrally managed services and solutions for third 
parties to implement, without legal basis (all other modules) 

1st  
EU Reg Ag 

EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 

EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 

EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 

EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 

EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 
EU Reg Ag 

EU Reg Ag 

EU Reg Ag 

2nd  
DIGIT-EA 

EC Prog 
PPP 
PPP 

PPP 
PPP 
PPP 

PPP 
PPP 
PPP 

3rd  
EC Prog 

PPP/DIGIT-EA 
EC Prog 
EC Prog 

EC Prog 
EC Prog/DIGIT-EA 
EC Prog 

EC Prog 
EC Prog/DIGIT-EA 
EC Prog 

PPP 
EC Prog/DIGIT-EA 
EC Prog 

EC Prog 
PPP 
PPP 

EC Prog/PPP 
DIGIT-EA 
PPP 

DIGIT-EA 
EC Prog/PPP 
DIGIT-EA 

PPP 

PPP 

DIGIT-EA  

DIGIT/EA  

62 | P a g e  

 
 
The  next  table  uses  Pugh  analysis  to  apply the four  approaches  to  each of the  DSI  profiles 
analysed,  i.e.  the  profiles  with  shared  characteristics  identified  in  Chapter  264.  It  makes  it 
possible  to  see  which  are  the  second  and  third  choices  for  each  profile  relative  to  the 
Regulatory Agency.  

64 The Pugh analysis is based on the occurrence of the solutions as second best across the DSIs belonging to the 
profile.  

63 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
Nature of the 
services 
provided 

Explicit 
obligation 
to provide 
and fund65 

Yes 

Profile 1: DSIs 
providing use 
solutions for 
others to 
implement66  

Profile 2: DSIs 
providing 
centrally 
managed 

No 

Yes 

Target 
audience 

Public 
sector 
only 
Public 
sector and 
private 
sector 

Table 12 –- DSI profile analysis 

DSIs 

Eu Reg Ag 

DIGIT/EA 

EC Prog 

1.1: eID, 
eInvoicing67 

++++ 

+ 

N.A. 

1.2.a: N.A.68 
1.2.b: eDelivery, 
eSignature 
(DSS), 
eProcurement  
2.1 : eSignature 
(TLM), ODR, 
eProcurement 
(eCertis/ESPD) 

++++ 

+ 

++++ 

+++ 

+++ 

N.A. 

++ 

++ 

PPP 

++ 

N.A. 

+++ 

++70 

65 This column refers to the explicit legal obligation to fund and provide the DSIs services for the European Commission. In some cases, e.g, Cybersecurity, there is a legal 
framework of reference but the activities of the DSIs go beyond what foreseen in the legal texts. The same applies for eHealth and EESSI as well as for some activities of 
eJustice (all modules except the interconnection of insolvency registers), eSignature (DSS) and eProcurement (eTendering, eNotification, eSubmission). 
66 Solutions refer to standards and specifications and, for a limited amount of time, software to ensure take up of the DSIs 
67 The eInvoicing Directive contemplates an obligation to implement the eInvoicing standard for public authorities only; the private sector is free to continue using other 
standards or paper invoices. However, the scope of the DSI also includes promotion of the standard across the private sector as shown by the set-up of the match-making 
website for instance and by the involvement of the private stakeholders in the eInvoicing multi-stakeholder forum.  
68 No example of this profile is found among the current set of DSIs. 

64 | P a g e  

 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Explicit 
obligation 
to provide 
and fund65 

Nature of the 
services 
provided 

services for 
others to use69 

No 

Yes 

No 

Profile 3: DSIs 
providing 
centrally 
managed 
services and 
solutions for 
others to 
implement 
directly71 

Target 
audience 

Public 
sector 
only 

Public 
sector and 
private 
sector 

Public 
sector 
only 
Public 
sector and 
private 
sector 

2.2.a: 
eTranslation 
2.2.b: 
Europeana, 
Safer Internet, 
Public Open 
data, eDelivery  
3.1: BRIS, 
eJustice 
(insolvency 
registers 
module) 
3.2a: eHealth, 
EESSI, Cyber 
Security, 
eJustice (all 
other modules) 

N.A.72 

DSIs 

Eu Reg Ag 

DIGIT/EA 

EC Prog 

++++ 

+++ 

++++ 

++++ 

+ 

+ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

++++ 

++ 

+++ 

PPP 

+ 

+++ 

++ 

+ 

++++ 

N.A. 

N.A. 

N.A. 

70 This is not applicable for ODR  
69 For instance translation machines, PKI/SML services, testing services etc.  
71 Profile 3 therefore includes DSIs which provide both standards and specifications (and software) and the above mentioned centrally managed services.  
72 No example of this profile is found among the current set of DSIs. 

65 | P a g e  

 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
66 | P a g e  

 
 
 
The table above confirms the trends that emerged for the assessment for individual DSIs and 
the validity of the profiles. Indeed, the common characteristics of the different profiles lead 
to  the  development  of  different  weighting  of  the  GOFA  elements  per  profiles,  hence 
resulting in different recommended solutions: 

  For DSI sub-profile 1.1 (eInvoicing and eID): the Regulatory Agency receives the highest 
score,  while  the  EC  Programme  is  in  second  position.  These  DSIs  have  some  very 
specific  needs  and  requirements,  but  in  addition  both  need  a  strong  involvement  of 
Member States and possibly non-private stakeholders in their standards development 
activities.  An  EC  Programme  or  possibly  a  PPP  (as  the  third  option)  also  meets  these 
needs and requirements better than handover to DIGIT or an Executive Agency.  

  For  DSI  sub-profile  1.2.b  (eDelivery,  eSignature  DSS  and  those  activities  of 
eProcurement’s which are not legally binding), funding is an issue as these DSIs provide 
services which go beyond what  is specifically mentioned in their legal basis. It is also 
important,  while  not  compulsory,  to  encourage  the  participation  of  private 
stakeholders in the activities in order to ensure take-up. As such, these DSIs have no 
clear financing source to tap into at this stage, but they do have a significant number of 
users and some potential for charging them in the future, so these two sustainability 
options could offer a solution to that. This is why the PPP and the EC Programme show 
up  as  second  and  third  options.  They  also  have  the  advantage  of  offering  close 
involvement  in  the  activities  of  Member  States  (EC  Programme)  and  non-public 
partners (PPP).  

  For DSI sub-profile 2.1 (ODR, eSignature TLM and eProcurement eCertis/ESPD) funding 
is not a problem in principle as their activities are established by EU legislation, which 
foresees  an  obligation  to  maintain  and  fund  them.  This  explains  why  the  second 
highest scoring option for this sub-profile is the handover to DIGIT or to an Executive 
Agency.  These  do  not  alone  offer  funding  solutions,  but  could  both  ensure  the 
continuity of operations while tapping into the EU budget for funding.  

  For DSI sub-profile 2.2.a (eTranslation), it is relevant that its purpose  is the long-term 
provision  of  services  to  the  public  sector  only  (European  Commission  and  Member 
States).  This  makes  it  logical  that  the  handover  to  DIGIT  or  to  an  Executive  Agency 
seem  to  be  the  next  most  promising  solution  for  ensuring  continuity  and  public 
authority user-centricity, especially for EU level users, including the other DSIs.  

  For  DSI  sub-profile  2.2.b  (Europeana,  Open  Data  Portal,  Safer  Internet,  eDelivery 
centrally  managed  services),  there  is  no  regulatory  obligation  for  the  Commission  to 
provide  these  services.  Thus  the  availability  of  funding  in  future  is  an  important 
concern. For these reasons, the solution which scores second best is a PPP as it would 
allow these services to be provided by the public and private sector jointly and at the 
same time share the financial costs and benefits.  

  For  DSI  sub-profile  3.1  (BRIS,  eJustice  insolvency  register)  there  is,  as  for  sub-profile 
2.1,  a  legal  basis  conferring  a  mandate  on  the  Commission  to  manage  the  services. 
Nevertheless, because they target and need to include in their activities a broad range 
inclusive 
of  stakeholders  (e.g.  business  registries,  business  associations)  more 

67 | P a g e  

 
 
solutions, such as the EC Programme or the PPP, score better than handover to DIGIT 
or to an Executive Agency. However, second position in the ranking is well behind the 
first in terms of overall scoring relative to handover to an EU Regulatory Agency. 

  Finally, for DSI sub-profile 3.2.a (eHealth, EESSI, Cybersecurity and all non-compulsory 
modules of eJustice), the EC Programme solution is clearly the second best option. This 
is due to the role the Commission has to play in these DSIs combined with the need to 
identify a possible source of funding given that these DSIs also provide services that go 
beyond the mandate in the related legal basis.  

Scoring  an  option  in  a  “second”  position  masks  variability  in  how  credible  these  are  as 
alternatives. For some profiles the second scoring option is close to the first, for others the 
difference  is  more  important.  The  extremes  are  sub-profile  2.1)  (a  narrow  gap)  and  sub-
profile  3.1  (a  wide  gap).  In  assessing  trade-offs,  there  is  therefore  a  need  to  consider  this 
aspect.  

5.3 Outcome of the cross-DSI analysis 
The cross-DSI analysis aimed to examine:  

  the  extent  to  which  each  of  the  sustainability  solutions  presents  specific  benefits  or 
disadvantages in creating synergies or in realising efficiency gains across the DSIs (i.e. 
applying  a  set  of  assessment  criteria  additional  to  those  for  the  individual  DSI 
assessments);  

  the  existence  of  any  factors  which  might  potentially  pose  a  risk  or  block  a  cross-DSI 

solution; and 

  the  extent  to  which  each  of  the  sustainability  solutions  could  be  applicable  to  all  or 
some of the DSIs and offer benefits at this level which might outweigh the benefits of 
the solution which rates most highly per DSI.  

5.3.1 Assessment of solutions against cross-DSI assessment criteria 

The  criteria for  assessing  sustainability  solutions  for their  cross-DSI potential  are  set  out  in 
the table below. 

Table 13 – Cross-DSI assessment criteria 

 Governance 

  Extent to  which  governance  synergies  can  be  achieved  across DSIs 
and across Member States (i.e. the extent to which it is possible to 
have  individual  decision-making  processes  for  different  DSIs  while 
ensuring synergies and an enterprise architecture) 

  Extent  to  which  the  solutions  allow  the  allocation  of  decision- 

making power to a variety of relevant stakeholders 

 Operations 

  Extent  to  which  synergies  across  DSIs  can  be  achieved  for 

operations (shared services etc.) 

  Ability to ensure take up of common solutions (e.g. building blocks) 

68 | P a g e  

 
 
over time 

 Finance 

  Extent to which cost effectiveness and efficiency can be achieved by 
exploiting synergies in operations, governance and architecture and 
ability to cross finance across DSIs 

  The  ability  of  the  sustainability  solutions  to  cover  the  needs  and 

ensure continuity 

  The extent to which they can ensure a mix of funding sources 

  Ability  to  ensure  the  alignment  on  the  needs  across  sectors  and 

policy domains (coherence management across domains) 

 Architecture 

  Ability to be a member of global ICT fora and consortia 
  Ability  to  ensure  a  shared  enterprise  architecture  (portfolio  of 

reusable common components and infrastructures) 

The assessment of the sustainability solutions against the cross-DSI criteria presented in the 
table above produced the following results: 

  The handover to an EU Regulatory Agency ranked best due to very consistent scoring 
across all the GOFA elements. This solution scored significantly higher than the others 
due  to  many  strengths  across  all  GOFA  elements.  In  terms  of  governance,  the  EU 
Regulatory  agency  allows  the  representation  of  different  interests  and  inclusion  of 
non-public  stakeholders  in  the  coordination  activities,  resulting  in  possibilities  for 
fostering  synergies  and  collaboration  with  the  private  sector.  From  an  operational 
perspective, this solution ensures greater suitability and flexibility with respect to the 
mandate. This could enable synergies and shared services to be exploited to a greater 
extent and in the long term. Financially, handover to an EU Regulatory Agency would 
mean exploiting the possibility of funding all DSIs based on the Agency’s mandate and 
mobilising  funding  coming  from  different  funding  sources  (i.e.  contributions  from 
Member States, charging third parties etc.) A final strength of this advantage lies in the 
potential  for  architecture  coordination, 
i.e.  the  ability  to  foster  architectural 
cooperation, ensure synergies are optimised, and be a member of global ICT fora and 
organisations.  

  The  establishment  of  an  EC  Programme  ranked  equal  second  in  the  cross-DSI 
assessment.  This  is  due  to  its  positive  characteristics  in  terms  of  governance  and 
operations.  Indeed,  an  EC  Programme  is  perfectly  able  to  accommodate  Member 
States’ needs and aspirations (including new DSIs) while maintaining the possibility of 
exploiting  a  degree  of  operational  and  governance  synergies.  The  shared  services  of 
the building block DSIs under the CEF and the non-paper on CEF building block DSIs44 
have  demonstrated  this.  Moreover,  depending  on  how  any  future  programme  is 
conceived,  these  synergies  could  also  be  strengthened  in  the  future.  There  are 
disadvantages in the lack  of architectural representativeness in ICT bodies and  in the 
difficult of charging and of cross-financing, thus making this solution not as good as the 
EU Regulatory Agency in a cross-DSI dimension. 

69 | P a g e  

 
 
  
  The handover to DIGIT or to an  Executive Agency ranked equal second in the cross-
DSI ranking. These solutions are very well suited to ensuring synergies across all GOFA 
elements and these are important criteria in a cross-DSI dimension. To work, however, 
these solutions need to have an assured source of funding. In the case of DIGIT, the DSI 
owner  would  need  to  have  a  source  of  funding  within  the  EU  budget;  an  Executive 
Agency normally operates on the basis of a Programme. These solutions are clearly EC-
led.  Member  States  can  only  play  a  role  through  comitology,  while  stakeholders 
provide input through advisory or expert groups.    

  The  establishment  of  a  PPP  came  third  in  the  cross-DSI  assessment.  It  offers  the 
advantages  of  having  a  centralised  entity  dealing  with  the  operational  and 
architectural activities of the DSIs and flexibility in terms of governance and allocation 
of decision- making powers. However, there are some key weaknesses. First, a public 
sector  led  solution  could  be  expected  to  offer  more  operational  stability  than  one 
involving  private  stakeholders,  who  would  probably  be  freer  to  choose  to  withdraw. 
Second,  the  synergies  a  PPP  could  offer,  for  instance  in  terms  of  architectural 
coordination,  are  limited  to  those  DSIs  that  can  legitimately  be  handed  over  to  the 
solution, and some cannot. This a priori limits the scope for synergies.  

  The solution of a handover to the Member States offers the least advantages from a 
cross-DSI perspective,  as  there  would be  limits  on the  ability  to  cross-finance DSIs  or 
optimise  synergies.  Moreover,  there  are  some  DSIs  that  could  by  definition  not  be 
handed  over  to  the  Member  States.  This  would  make  it  necessary  to  adopt  a  hybrid 
solution and decide which of the other solutions were best suited to the stranded DSIs 
(or certain activities of those DSIs).  

5.3.2 Potential blocking and risk factors 

The assessments above on the limits to certain solutions for certain DSIs take a second step 
in  the process  into  account,  which  was to  screen  for  potential  blocking or  risk  factors that 
one or other solution might pose to individual DSIs. The table below presents the result of 
this assessment and identifies relevant GOFA risk or blocking factors which could prevent  a 
given solution from being applicable to all DSIs73.  

The  colour  coded  cells  show  where  the  blocking  (orange)  and  risk  (yellow)  factors  can  be 
found and indicate the GOFA element they refer to. The blocking factor might be due to the 
regulatory framework (as for instance in the case of ODR, where the legal basis would have 
to  be  changed  for  it  to  be  handed  over  to  a  PPP)  or  to  the  characteristics  of  the  DSIs 
themselves. In the case of Europeana or Public Open Data, for example, the risk factor is the 
absence of an obvious source of financing in the event of handover to DIGIT or an Executive 
Agency.  The  risk  and blocking  factors  show  the  viability  of the  solutions across  all  the  DSIs 
examined. 

73 The handover to a non-profit organisation was not assessed in this screening. This solution potentially only 
fits 5 of the 15 DSIs analysed and therefore does not qualify for the cross-DSI assessment. 

70 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
Table 14 – Assessment of blocking and risk factors per GOFA 

EC 
Programme 

EU 
Regulatory 
Agency 

DIGIT/ 
Executive 
Agency 

Handover to 
Member States 

PPP74 

G 

G,O 

O (eCertis/ 
ESPD) 

O (TLM75) 

G,O 

G,O 

F 

F*  

F*  

F 

F* 

F*  

F 

F 

F 

F 

BRIS 

Cybersecurity 

eDelivery 

EESSI 

eHealth  

eID 

eInvoicing 

e-Justice 

eProcurement 

eSignature 

eTranslation 

Europeana 

ODR 

Public Open 
Data 

Safer Internet 

(*) Some activities only. 

74 Note that for the establishment of a PPP, a mandate is defined in which (similar to an EU Regulatory Agency) 
responsibility for specific DSIs are naturally included (thereby establishing a basic act in budgetary terms). 
75 eSignature Trusted List Manager 

71 | P a g e  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
Thus, there only two sustainability solutions where no blocking factor or risk has to be taken 
into account based on the research for this study, including collecting the views of the DSI 
owners.  They  are  the  establishment  of  a  new  EC  Programme  and  handover  to  an  EU 
Regulatory Agency.  

A new EC Programme would by definition have a specific mandate to deal with DSIs and the 
way it would function is a known quantity as it is assumed to be essentially a renewal of the 
current  CEF  though  probably  with  some  adaptations  to  take  experience  with  the  current 
Programme into account.  

There  is  also  a  model  for  using  an  EU  Regulatory  Agency  in  the  European  Agency  for  the 
operational management of large-scale IT systems (EU-LISA)76. The Regulation77 establishing 
EU-LISA  specifically  refers  to  the  systems  it  manages  (e.g.  SIS  II,  VIS,  Eurodac),  and  the 
method by which it is to be financed, i.e. a subsidy from the general budget of the Union, a 
contribution from the countries associated with its tasks, and any financial contribution from 
the Member States, all without prejudice to any other sources of funding. There is thus an 
implicit  obligation  to  fund  the  Agency.  Operational  management  is  understood  as  “all  the 
tasks  necessary  to  keep  large-scale  IT  systems  functioning  in  accordance  with  the  specific 
provisions  applicable  to  each  of  them,  including  responsibility  for  the  communication 
infrastructure  used  by  them.”  The  legal  basis  also  leaves  open  the  possibility  of  extending 
the mandate of EU-LISA to other unspecified large-scale systems. Inclusion of Smart Borders 
in the EU-LISA mandate is under discussion78.  

All other solutions imply one or more risks and blocking factors to a single solution for all 
DSIs  because  of  DSI-specific  context.  The  handover  to  a  PPP  is  hard  to  reconcile  with  the 
regulatory  frameworks  governing  some  DSIs.  For  instance,  a  PPP  could  not  accommodate 
the  needs  of  the  ODR  DSI  as  currently  constituted,  as  it  would  not  be  consistent  with  the 
ODR  Regulation79 mandating  the  European  Commission  alone  to  be  in  charge  of  this  DSI’s 
specific activities. The PPP solution also presents some risks for other DSIs in cases where it 
is  unclear  whether  the  involvement  of  private  sector  would  be  possible  or  desirable  (e.g. 
Cybersecurity and EESSI). Hence, this solution does not fit all DSIs’ needs equally well.  

The handover to DIGIT or to an Executive Agency would accommodate the needs of those 
DSIs  for  which  the  European  Commission  bears  full  responsibility  as  these  are  centralised 

in 

freedom, 

the  area  of 

76 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32011R1077 
77 Regulation  1077/2011,  establishing  a  European  Agency  for  the  operational  management  of  large-scale  IT 
systems 
see:  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32011R1077&from=EN  
78 http://www.eulisa.europa.eu/AboutUs/SmartBorders/Pages/default.aspx 
79 See ODR Regulation 524/2013: “The Commission shall develop the ODR platform (and be responsible for its 
operation, including all the translation functions necessary for the purpose of this Regulation, its maintenance, 
funding 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:165:0001:0012:EN:PDF  

security  and 

security)…”, 

justice, 

data 

and 

72 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
 
solutions  led  by  the  European  Commission.  However,  what  these  solutions  cannot  do  for 
many  of  the  DSIs  is  to  ensure  the  availability  of  funding  for  their  activities.  EU  Regulatory 
Agencies, PPPs and EC Programmes possess intrinsic financial possibilities – the possibility of 
receiving  funding  through  their  mandates  and  by  charging  third  parties  in  the  case  of  EU 
Regulatory Agencies and PPPs, and the availability of resources for up to seven years for EC 
Programmes.  A  handover  to  DIGIT  or  an  Executive  Agency  does  not  offer  this  possibility 
directly.  Both  offer  a  range  of  financial  possibilities  for  each  of  the  DSIs,  but  this  solution 
would  not  be  able  –  in  isolation  –  to  provide  one  single  financial  solution  for  all,  such  as 
funding from a single programme or single mandate. For this reason, financing is a risk factor 
of these solutions for some of the DSIs analysed.  

For DSIs such as Europeana, Safer Internet and Public Open Data for instance, financing was 
identified during this study  as a key concern in ensuring sustainability. A cross-DSI solution 
which did not ensure availability of resources for their activities would pose a potential risk 
to  their  sustainability.  For  other  DSIs  where  the  financial  sustainability  issues  are  less 
complex,  either  because  there  are  activities  that  can  be  funded  through  the  EU  budget 
(eSignature, TLM  or  ODR)  or  because  the level of  activity  is  relatively  low  in the  long term 
(e.g.  eInvoicing,  eHealth),  the  handover  to  DIGIT  or  to  an  Executive  Agency  does  not  pose 
any potential risk.   

The handover to Member States cannot qualify as a cross-DSI solution either, as it is a purely 
decentralised  solution  in  which  there  would  be  no  direct  involvement  of  the  European 
Commission  in  governance  beyond  the  original  setting  of  the  policy  framework  which 
permitted  this  devolution.  In  this  case,  it  is  assumed  that  there  would  be  many  different 
Member  State  configurations  dealing  with  these  activities,  i.e.  it  would  not  be  possible  to 
have one entity in charge of all or most of DSIs. Moreover, this solution could not be applied 
to any DSI (such as ODR at present) where the European Commission has a clear mandate. 

Thus, not all sustainability solutions would be equally able to accommodate the needs of all 
DSIs. The next section deals with the assessment against cross-DSI criteria. In this case, the 
focus  in  not  primarily  on  the  risks/blocking  factors  but  rather  on  the  performance  of  the 
solutions vis-a-vis some specific criteria linked to cross-DSI needs.  

5.3.3  Analysis of the solutions’ flexibility and extensibility 

The cross-DSI analysis in the previous sections also helps by extension in the definition of the 
flexibility and extensibility of the solutions to other DSIs (e.g. TachoNET80, TestaNG81). These 
two  additional  elements  can  be  defined  as  the  capacity  of  the  solutions  to  accommodate 
other DSIs and fulfil their possible needs in both an individual and cross-DSI perspective.  

80 Exchange of tachometer information across Member States. 
81 Trans European Services for Telematics between Administrations) New Generation. Testa as it exists now is a 
communication platform to exchange electronic data between European and Member States administrations in 
a secure, reliable and efficient way. 

73 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
Even  from  this  point  of  view,  taking  into  account  all  the  possible  characteristics  defined 
above, the handover to a Regulatory Agency remains the best possible solution. It could also 
be applied to all other DSIs and could accommodate their specific needs because it is very 
flexible  in  terms  of  governance,  operations,  financing  and  architecture,  as  proven  by  the 
individual DSI assessment.  

Similarly, the establishment of a new EC Programme could also work for any other DSIs while 
also catering for certain operational and governance synergies, much as has proved possible 
under  the  current  CEF.  Learning  from  the  current  CEF  experience,  the  future  new 
Programme  could  put  even  more  emphasis  on  this  cross-DSI  aspect  and  on  achieving 
synergies  across  DSIs  as  this  solution  is  flexible  enough  to  allow  for  this.  Furthermore,  a 
future EC Programme could cater for the needs of other DSIs by reinforcing certain flexibility 
characteristics, for instance.  

The  handover  to  DIGIT  or  to  an  Executive  Agency  on  the  other  hand,  although  scoring 
reasonably well in the cross-DSI assessment, does not provide the same degree of flexibility 
and extensibility that an EU Regulatory Agency or an EC Programme has because of the risk 
and blocking factors. The same is true of the establishment of a Public Private Partnership. 
These solutions may be appropriate, therefore, for DSIs on a case-by-case basis but they do 
not  constitute  optimal  solutions  in a  cross-DSI perspective  when  considering  flexibility and 
extensibility. 

5.4 Comparison of individual and cross-DSI analysis 
Looking overall at the key findings from the individual DSI assessment and sensitivity analysis 
and the cross-DSI analysis discussed in the previous sections provides insights for evaluating 
the overall suitability of each of the solutions.  

The  first  conclusion  that  can  be  drawn  from  a  combined  assessment  of  these  two  aspects 
(individual and cross-DSI) is that the handover to the Member States and the handover to 
Non-Profit Organisations are not as credible as the other solutions. 

Handover  to  an  EU  Regulatory  Agency  is  the  most  promising  option  overall.  It  was 
consistently in first place in the individual DSI analysis and also scored best in the cross-DSI 
assessment and in the assessment per group of DSIs. Indeed, this solution comes first for all 
grouping of DSIs. Moreover, there are no blocking factors. There is also no end-date for the 
funding obligation. 

The  establishment  of  a  new  EC  programme  scored  very  well  both  in  the  individual  DSI 
analysis and in the cross-DSI analysis. This is logical and linked to the intrinsic nature of this 
solution, i.e. it is possible to adapt the balance between concentration and dispersion of the 
GOFA  elements.  This  is  akin  to  the  situation  under  the  CEF,  where  the  governance  and 
operations  of  the  building  block  DSIs  are  currently  quite  concentrated,  but  this  is  not  the 
case for sector-specific DSIs.  

Therefore,  from  an  individual  DSI  perspective,  the  EC  Programme  solution  is  very  suitable 
and  flexible.  It  can  accommodate  all  needs  very  well  as  it  provides  scope  for  varying  the 
point  of  equilibrium  between  concentration  and  dispersion.  From  an  overarching 

74 | P a g e  

 
 
perspective, the examples of synergies and coordination achieved under the CEF programme 
prove that the EC Programme is a solution which is also flexible enough to accommodate a 
certain  need  for  concentration  across  DSIs.  The  new  funding  programme  could  also  be 
established  in  such  a  way  as  to  further  foster  this  cross-DSI  dimension  through  the 
promotion  of  more  shared  services  and  occasions  for  synergies.  Moreover,  since  this 
solution  presents  no  blocking  factors  across  DSIs  and  performs  well  per  DSI,  it  has  been 
retained as a credible option.  

The  handover  to  DIGIT  or  to  an  Executive  Agency  scores  well  against  the  cross-DSI 
assessment  criteria  but  ranks  lower  in  the  individual  DSI  analysis  because  governance  and 
financing  are  suboptimal  in  this  solution.  These  solutions  do  not  allow  the  same  level  of 
involvement of Member States in decision-making and do not provide stable funding options 
for all DSIs. The positive trade-offs are in greater efficiency and coordination in a cross-DSI 
dimension. This makes this solution worth considering while recognising that there are risks 
linked to financing which it would be necessary to resolve.    

Both  the  cross-DSI  and  individual  DSI  analysis  show  the  potential  flexibility  of  the  PPP 
solution to cater for the needs of some of the DSIs (largely due to the fact that the PPP has 
some  of  the  same  strengths  in  relation  to  governance  and  financing  as  the  EU  Regulatory 
Agency).  Nonetheless,  the  cross-DSI  analysis  showed  that  a  PPP  would  not  be  a  suitable 
solution for all DSIs. Moreover, despite obvious merits, it represents uncharted territory as 
there is no clear provision in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU)82. Thus, further 
analysis would be needed as to whether it would nevertheless be possible to establish a PPP 
in  the  context  of  the  Digital  Single  Market.  The  PPP  could  also  mean  duplication  of  effort 
that would need to be justified by further assessment given that this solution is not viable 
across  all  DSIs.  Given  these  hurdles,  this  solution  was  discarded  from  the  possible 
implementation scenarios discussed in the next Chapter.  

Non-Profit  Organisations  are  not  as  credible  as  the  other  remaining  solutions.  These 
solutions  are  completely  decentralised  and  do  not  fit  the  need  of  the  DSIs  for  cross-
coordination.  Moreover,  even  in  the  individual  DSI  assessment  these  solutions  are  either 
rarely to be found in the top three (handover to the Member States) or never (handover to 
an NPO). The NPO solution was dropped before the cross-DSI analysis for this reason, and in 
the light of the results of the cross-DSI analysis, there is no case for any further consideration 
of handover to Member States because the disadvantages are too great.  

The comparison of the cross-DSI and individual DSI analysis results hence clarifies the range 
of choices policy makers have and the trade-offs they are faced with: 

  The  EU  Regulatory  Agency  presents  fewer  trade-offs  than  all  other  solutions,  but 
careful  consideration  would  need  to  be  given  when  establishing  this  agency  or 
changing the mandate of an existing Regulatory Agency (and especially the content of 
its  mandate)  to  the  financial  and  operational  concerns  of  all  DSIs  taken  together.  In 

82 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2007) 

75 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
addition, it needs to be recognised that establishing a new Agency may well be more 
complex than the other options; 

  The establishment of a new EC Programme has the advantage of being flexible enough 
to allow for different configurations of  concentration versus dispersion elements, but 
has  a  disadvantage  that  it  is  only  for  a  set  period  of  time,  unlike  an  EU  Regulatory 
Agency;  

  The handover to DIGIT or an Executive Agency  could facilitate synergies, but it would 
need to be combined with solutions to the funding of all DSIs.  Moreover, flexibility in 
governance  in  accommodating  stakeholders  external  to  the  European  Commission 
would  be  more  limited  due  to  the  specific  decision-making  characteristics  of  this 
solution. In fact, even if important modifications were made to the DIGIT and executive 
agency’s mandates, these solutions will not be able to include non-public stakeholders 
to  the  same  extent  a  Regulatory  agency  can  do.  This  is  discussed  further  in  the  next 
chapter; 

  Going the PPP route would mean accepting that this entity would not be able to host 
all DSIs and it would have to work based on groupings of DSIs. Given the uncertainties 
related  to  the  fact  that  a  PPP  of  this  kind  is  unprecedented  and  the  duplication  of 
effort  that  working  in  groupings  would  be  likely  entail,  this  does  not  appear  to  be  a 
feasible  sustainability  solution  at  present.  It  is  therefore  not  considered  in  the 
roadmaps for sustainability analysed in the following chapter. It is included in the Pugh 
analysis in the next section as a matter of record. 

Notwithstanding the trade-offs presented above, these four solutions are further compared 
in  the  next  section,  which  assesses  them  against  the  baseline  situation  under  the  CEF 
Programme (as described in chapter 2).  

5.5 Pugh analysis across the sustainability solutions 
A Pugh analysis was also carried out based on the assessment of a range of options vis-à-vis 
the baseline situation. The current situation, corresponding to the EC Programme solution, is 
characterised by: 

  Governance:  each  DG  is  individually  responsible  for  policy  and  operational  decision-
making.  Where  applicable  the  DGs  manage  the  policy  decisions  and  the  activities 
linked  to  sector-specific  issues.  The  DSIs  have  established  operational  management 
procedures  (e.g.  through  OMBs  or  steering  committees)  for  the  operational  decision 
making  within  policy  DGs  or  DIGIT.  This  may  also  involve  participation  of  expert 
groups. 

  Operations: these are carried out both by DIGIT and by the sectoral DGs at the same 
time.  The  split  of  operations  across  the  two  is  different  on  a  case-by-case  basis 
depending on the capacity and resources available to the IT Unit of the sectoral DGs.  
  Financing: the CEF is the main source of funding for the building block DSIs while the 
sector-specific solutions couple this with funding coming from other programmes. 
  Architecture: each DSI ensures coordination with its implementers autonomously. For 
the  coordination  across  building  block  DSIs  and  DSIs  re-using  these,  specific 

76 | P a g e  

 
 
governance  structures  have  been  set  up  under  a  MoU  with  DIGIT.  These  are  the 
architectural management board supported by the project architecture office83.  

This  situation  is  the  starting  point  for  comparison  of  future  sustainability  solutions. 
Conducting  a  Pugh  analysis  is  particularly  suited  to  this  in  order  to  build  the  final  decision 
matrix based on the different levels of analysis. The table below provides an overview of: 

  Individual DSIs: the average of the scores for each GOFA element from the individual 

DSI assessment across all DSIs (expressed as a percentage of the top score); 

  Cross-DSI:  the  average  of  the  scores  for  each  GOFA  element  from  the  cross-DSI 

assessment across all DSIs (expressed as a percentage of the top score); 

  Risk:  the  risks  identified  for  each  GOFA  element  (expressed  as  a  percentage;  100% 

indicates that no risks were identified); 

  Block:  the  blocking  factors  identified  for  each  GOFA  element  (expressed  as  a 

percentage; 100% indicates that no blocking factors were identified); 

  Total average: the averages of the score across all four dimensions. 
  Total: the average of the total average. 

83 The  reuse  of  the  building  block  DSIs  is  required  for  sector  specific  DSIs  whenever  they  need  one  of  the 
functions covered by the former.  

77 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
Table 15 – Scoring basis for the Pugh Analysis 

Baseline (EC Programme) 

EU Regulatory Agency 

DIGIT/Executive Agency 

PPP 

Total 
aver-
age 

Indi-
vidual 
DSI 

Cross-
DSI 

Risk 

Block 

Total 
aver-
age 

Indi-
vidual 
DSI 

Cross- 
DSI 

Risk 

Block 

Total 
aver-
age 

Indi-
vidual 
DSI 

Cross- 
DSI 

Risk 

Block 

Total 
aver-
age 

Indi-
vidual 
DSI 

Cross- 
DSI 

Risk 

Block 

G 

O 

F 

A 

89% 

76% 

80% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

99% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

82% 

69% 

60% 

100% 

100% 

84% 

76% 

70% 

87% 

93% 

91% 

75% 

90% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

99% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

92% 

78% 

90% 

100% 

100% 

81% 

79% 

70% 

80% 

93% 

85% 

75% 

67% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

72% 

76% 

73% 

40% 

100% 

84% 

55% 

80% 

100% 

100% 

90% 

87% 

73% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

93% 

87% 

87% 

100% 

100% 

89% 

77% 

80% 

100% 

100% 

Total   89% 

100% 

85% 

84% 

78 | P a g e  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This  overview  of  the  different  levels  of  analysis  can  be  further  simplified  as  shown  in  the 
table below, where the different solutions are compared in terms of better (+/++) or worse (-
/--) as compared to the baseline (=). 

Table 16 – Pugh Decision Matrix 

Baseline 

EU Regulatory 
Agency 

DIGIT/Executive 
Agency 

PPP84 

Governance 

Operations 

Finance 

Architecture 

= 

= 

= 

= 

++ 

++ 

++ 

+ 

- 

+ 

-- 

+ 

- 

- 

- 

- 

The handover to an EU Regulatory Agency is the most advantageous solution relative to the 
current situation both from the individual and  cross-DSI perspective. The baseline scenario 
on the other hand remains the second most suitable option of those examined.   

From  a  governance  point  of  view,  an  EU  Regulatory  Agency  could  offer  the  possibility  of 
involving  Member  States  in  the  strategic  decision-making  through  their  participation  in 
governing  boards  or  other  high  level  decision-making  bodies  and  of  involving  non-public-
stakeholders  in  these  same  bodies.  This  involvement  was  highlighted  as  a  need  and 
requirement by all DSIs in the individual analysis and also emerged as crucial in a cross-DSI 
dimension.  It  would  allow  for  synergies  across  DSIs  to  be  exploited  and  facilitate 
coordination. 

The PPP solution also offers these possibilities but scores less well than the baseline from a 
governance  perspective  because  of  the  risks  and  blocking  factors  for  certain  DSIs.  Thus,  it 
has limitations as a cross-DSI solution and potentially in terms of extensibility and flexibility 
i.e. the capacity to take on the hosting of others in future85.  

The handover to DIGIT or an  Executive Agency produces rather less positive results overall 
because  of  the  limits  to  what  is  regarded  as  the  important  aspect  of  involvement  of  the 
Member States and other stakeholders.  

In terms of operations, the handover to an EU Regulatory Agency has two main advantages. 
First, it would make it possible to tap into synergies and promote the use of shared services 
across  DSIs.  Second,  it  would  be  able  to  pull  human  resources  and  skills  together  in  one 
place. This second advantage is also one that DIGIT or an Executive Agency have, while this is 
less  the  case  of  an  EC  Programme  (on  the  assumption  that  it  is  broadly  modelled  on  the 
current CEF). Handing over all operations to a PPP is also a way to tap into synergies, but this 

84 The rating for the PPP may be considered in cases where a PPP is applicable, but recognising upfront that this 
is not applicable to all DSIs due to specific blocking factors/risks. 
85 E.g. TestaNG and Tachonet, as discussed in the previous section. 

79 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
solution  does  not  present  the  same  operational  stability  as  an  EU  Regulatory  Agency, 
DIGIT/Executive  Agency  or  EC  Programme  and  presents  a  number  of  risks  and  blocking 
factors in a cross-DSI dimension. It therefore scores the least well in this assessment.  

The  handover  to  DIGIT  or  to  an  Executive  Agency  scores  slightly  better  than  the  EC 
Programme  but  significantly  less  well  than  the  EU  Regulatory  Agency.  This  is  primarily 
because DIGIT and Executive Agencies do not have the same operational stability  as an EU 
Regulatory Agency (which is mandated by law and set up by the Council and the European 
Parliament) and would operate on the basis of Memoranda of Understanding or Commission 
Decisions.  

From  a  financing  perspective,  the  EU  Regulatory  Agency  solution  again  offers  the  most 
advantages.86 First, the mandate of the EU Regulatory Agency can constitute a basic act on 
the  basis  of  which  funding  can  be  committed  without  necessarily  relying  on  a  programme 
but through direct transfer from the EU budget87. This funding could  be complemented by 
revenue  generated  by  charging  fees  to users  and/or  re-users  as  well  as contributions  from 
third  parties  (Member  States,  non-public  stakeholders,  etc.)  Additionally,  it  would  make 
cross-financing of the DSIs possible, i.e. using revenue raised from charging for the services 
of one to fund other DSI activities.  

The  PPP  would  in  principle  offer  the  same  advantages  as  the  EU  Regulatory  Agency, 
depending on how it was set up, but  it comes out less well than the EU Regulatory Agency 
and the EC programme in both the individual and cross-DSI assessment. This is mainly due to 
the financial instability which could come from being reliant on private stakeholders for part 
of the funding.  

The handover to DIGIT or to an Executive Agency would be the least well suited in terms of 
financing as it would close off the option of charging for services. There are some DSIs for 
which handover to DIGIT or an Executive Agency might still require the use of EC Programme 
funding if provision of services to Member States were envisaged and if there were no clear 
obligation  for  the  Commission  to  fund  the  services.  A  programme  would  need  to  be 
established for these DSIs. This is the main reason why multiple risk factors were identified 
for a number of DSIs in relation to financing. 

Finally, with respect to architecture, the EU Regulatory Agency and DIGIT/Executive Agency 
solutions  are  all  better  than  the  current  baseline  scenario.  Both  could  deliver  enhanced 
cooperation  across  all DSIs  (and not  just the building  blocks).  As  illustrated  in  the  previous 

86 The EU contribution appears in the general budget, under the policy area concerned, on a dedicated budget 
line from operational appropriations. Accordingly, the amount of the EU contribution entered into the budget 
and  the  establishment  plan  are  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Budgetary  Authority.  Page  10,  Draft  General 
Budget 
III; 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/documents/2017/DB2017_WD03_en.pdf 
87 To  be  a  “basic  act”  in  budgetary  terms,  the  mandate  of  the  Regulatory  Agency  would  need  to  be  specific 
enough in mentioning the DSIs and the specific activities that need to be maintained. Otherwise, a Regulatory 
Agency would find itself in the same situation of dependency on programmes as DIGIT or an Executive Agency.  

Document 

Working 

2017, 

Part 

the 

EU 

of 

80 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
section, an EC Programme could also guarantee (and already guarantees) a certain level of 
architectural  coordination,  e.g.  the  coordination  established  amongst  the  building  block 
DSIs. A PPP would not automatically guarantee more architectural coordination as it would 
not be applicable to all DSIs. This is why it scores less than the baseline scenario.  

Therefore, the overall analysis suggests that the handover to an EU Regulatory Agency is the 
most  flexible  and  extensible  solution.  It  is  therefore  considered  the  best  option  in 
comparison  with  the  baseline  scenario.  The  baseline  scenario  remains  the  second  best, 
slightly  ahead  of  the  handover  to  DIGIT  or  to  an  Executive  Agency.  These  have  clear 
advantages  in  terms  of  operations  and  architecture  and  clear  disadvantages  in  terms  of 
governance  and  financing.  Finally,  the  PPP  comes  last.  It  can  offer  enhanced  architectural 
coordination, but it has a number of disadvantages in terms of governance, operations and 
financing  arrangements  and  for  this  reason  is  not  retained  for  the  assessment  of  the 
transition roadmaps in the next chapter. 

81 | P a g e  

 
 
6  Roadmaps for transition towards the 

sustainability solutions 

This  chapter  illustrates  the  possible  roadmaps  for  the  transition  towards  the  three 
sustainability  solutions  identified  as  the  most  relevant  in  the  previous  assessment.  The 
transition  scenarios  are  based  on  insights  available  from  the  experience  of  the  European 
institutions  in  establishing  similar  solutions  and  based  on  the  procedure  to  follow  for 
establishing the solutions themselves.  

The transition period can be divided into three phases: 

  Inception  phase:  the  European  Commission  adopts  its  internal  position  on  how  to 
proceed with the transition. The inception phase partially overlaps with the following 
phase  (the negotiation phase)  as  it  also  involves  preliminary  discussion with  external 
stakeholders (e.g. Member States). This phase may end with a: 

  Proposal  for  a 

legislative  framework  (enabling  handover  to  an  EU 
Regulatory  Agency  or  establishment  of  a  new  EC  Programme,  with  or 
without handover of some functions to an Executive Agency); or  

  Proposal for an alternative form of legal basis (e.g. handover of operations 
to  DIGIT  based  on  MoUs,  handover  of  operations  to  an  Executive  Agency 
outside the framework of a programme88); 

  Negotiation phase:  
 

Legislative proposal: discussion in and approval (possibly in amended form) 
by the European Parliament, the Council of the EU; 

  Alternative form of legal basis: discussion with policy DGs on terms of 

handover to DIGIT or to an Executive Agency.  

This  phase  concludes  with  the  formal  adoption  of  a  legally  binding  act  (e.g. 
Regulation)  establishing  the  basis  for  the  sustainability  solution  chosen  or  with  the 
adoption  of  an  internal  agreement  (e.g.  Commission  Decision,  Memorandum  of 
Understanding) defining the relationships and tasks of different bodies and DGs; 
  Operational phase: this consists of set-up of the activities under the new solution and 
achieving  cruising  speed.  Set-up  is  an  adjustment  phase  which  is  needed  before  the 
DSIs  are  fully  handed  over  and  accommodated  in  the  new  structure.  It  involves 
collecting the resources needed to carry out the activities and establishing the related 
procedures.  Once  the  set-up  activities  are  finished,  the  new  solution  (and  the  DSIs) 
enter full ‘business as usual’ operational mode.  

88 See the example of the EU Aid Volunteer Initiative mentioned in section 4.2.2. 

82 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
The next sections describe per solution how these phases differ in duration and milestones 
per  solution,  and  in  administrative  effort  and  intensity  of  resources  during  the  different 
phases.  

6.1 Transition to an EU Regulatory Agency 
Handing  over  the  DSIs  and  the  cross-DSI  coordination  to  an  EU  Regulatory  Agency  would 
require  a  new  EU  Regulatory  Agency  to be  established  by  means  of  a new legal  act  or  the 
modification  of  the  mandate  of  an  existing  agency  in  order  to  specify  the  Agency’s 
responsibilities vis-à-vis the DSIs89. Extending the mandate of an existing Agency appears to 
stand  a  better  chance  of  obtaining  political  agreement  than  establishing  a  complete  new 
structure.  EU-LISA  or  the  European  Agency  for  Network  and  Information  Security  (ENISA) 
appear a priori to be the most logical choices, although the identification of a particular body 
was not in the scope of this study.  

The extension or modification of an EU Regulatory Agency’s mandate is not unprecedented. 
Examples  of  changes  in  the  role  and  responsibilities  of  different  Agencies,  and  thus  their 
mandates, over time, include: 

  ENISA:  established  in  2004,  its  mandate  was  modified  first  in  200890 and  then  in 
201391, in order to include new challenges in the scope and activities of the Agency; 
  EEA (European Environmental Agency): established in 1993, its mandate was partially 
changed in 2009 through Regulation (EC) No 401/2009 on the European Environment 
Agency and the European Environment Information and Observation Network92. 

While there have not been any changes to the mandate of EU-LISA since its establishment in 
2011, there are plans to make changes in 2017.  

Building especially on the experience of the modification of ENISA’s statute as well as on the 
general insights available on the legislative procedures of the EU, it is possible to lay down a 
standard  timeline  on  the  three  phases  of  the  roadmap  and  related  activities  described 
above.  

89 Given  the  known  political  reluctance  to  create  new  Agencies,  that  possibility  is  not  considered.  Nor  is  it 
considered necessary 
90 Regulation  (EU)  No  1008/2008  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  24  September  2008 
amending  Regulation  No  460/2004  establishing  the  European  Union  Agency  for  Network  and  Information 
Security (ENISA) and its duration  
91 Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 concerning the 
European  Union  Agency  for  Network  and  Information  Security  (ENISA)  and  repealing  Regulation  (EC)  No 
460/2004 
92 Regulation  (EC)  No  401/2009  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  23 April  2009  on  the 
European  Environment  Agency  and  the  European  Environment  Information  and  Observation  Network 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32009R0401 

83 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
The  following  graphic  illustrates  a potential timeline  for the  handover  to  an  EU  Regulatory 
Agency, starting from the inception phase through to full deployment of the DSI activities in 
the new structure.  

Figure 3 – Handover to an EU Regulatory Agency: Timeline 

As the figure shows, the European Commission may need up to one full year to prepare the 
amendments to the statute and to launch the legislative procedure as it will need to comply 
with  the  Better  Regulation  Guidelines93 and  carry  out  all  the  necessary  public  consultation 
and impact assessment activities. This means that, if the process were to start in 2017, the 
negotiations  with  the  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the  text  proposed  by  the  European 
Commission  could  start  in  the  beginning  of  2018.  For  ENISA,  the  renegotiation  of  the 
mandate took more than two years. Even though the ordinary legislative procedure lasts an 
average  of  19  months,94 two  full  years  (24  months)  have  been  allocated  to  this  phase  in 
order to provide a realistic estimate. This number of months should be sufficient to carry out 
the  negotiations  and  reach  an  agreement.  Renegotiation  of  ENISA’s  mandate  was  held  up 
because it straddled a period when there were European Parliament elections. This is also a 
risk in this case. The result of the negotiation phase is the formal approval of the agency’s 
modified mandate.  

Following  formal  approval  of  the  modified  mandate,  the  operational  phase  can  start.  But 
before  reaching  full  operational  maturity,  the  Regulatory  Agency  would  go  through  a 
transition  phase  during  which  the  DSIs  would  be  handed  over  gradually  and  the  resources 

93  Commission  Staff  Working  Document,  Better  Regulation  Guidelines,  COM(2015)215  Final,  see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/swd_br_guidelines_en.pdf 
94  See  the  Activity  Report  on  Codecision  and  Conciliation  (2009-2014)  of  the  European  Parliament: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/code/information/activity_reports/activity_report_2009_2014_en.pdf  

84 | P a g e  

 
 
 
                                                      
needed to manage/operate them would be built up. The assumption here is that this could 
take up to a year, so that the Regulatory Agency would enter full operational mode towards 
the end of 2021.  

This roadmap hence establishes the need to plan for the actual handover of all DSIs to an EU 
Regulatory Agency to coincide with the formal end of the CEF Programme, 2020 being the 
last  year  of  the  CEF  Programme.  As  DSIs  could  still  request  CEF  funding  in  2020  and  this 
could  last  for  some  years  after  the  formal  end  of  the  Programme,  this  could  provide 
sufficient  flexibility  for  the  handover  period.  This  implies  that  the  EU  Regulatory  Agency 
solution requires relatively intense efforts in negotiation and preparatory activities over the 
next few years and until stability is reached in 2021. The figure below provides a graphical 
representation of the curve representing the order of magnitude in intensity of efforts and 
resources in the event of handover to an EU Agency. 

Figure 4 – Transition to an EU Agency: Intensity of activities 

Clearly,  as  the  graphic  suggests,  the  period  from  the  second  half  of  2017  until  the  end  of 
2020 would be particularly resource-intensive first for the European Commission, and then 
for  the  policy  makers  in  terms  of  negotiations.  However,  once  the  new  mandate  of  the 
Regulatory Agency is adopted, the slope representing the amount of resources needed starts 
to  go  down.  Indeed,  once  the  Regulatory  Agency  had  put  together  the  human  and 
technological  resources  needed,  it  could  start  running  the  activities  and  switch  to 
operational mode with a significantly reduced effort on the part of all stakeholders  leading 
to  stabilisation  of  these  efforts  in  the  long  term.  This  means  that,  once  the  intensive 
negotiation and set-up phase had passed, the handover to an EU Regulatory Agency would 
enter  the  operations  phase  in  which  it  had  resources  to  ensure  the  activities  to  fulfil  the 
needs and requirements for the sustainability of the DSIs over the long term. The stability of 
the DSIs would therefore be ensured on a permanent basis (ceteris paribus).  

85 | P a g e  

 
 
 
In  a  scenario  in  which  the  Agency did  not have a  detailed  and  specific mandate for all the 
DSIs,  the  set-up  phase  would  also  need  to  include  negotiation  of  Memoranda  of 
Understanding  and  agreements  between  the  Commission  and  the  Agency  to  clarify  the 
responsibility for certain tasks not be directly mentioned in the mandate. This would entail 
additional  effort  in  the  set-up  phase,  although  these  negotiations  are  only  internal  to  the 
European Commission. It is assumed that this should not take more than a year. Hence, they 
do  not  affect  the  timeline  presented  above.  However,  these  internal  MoU  negotiations 
would  need  to  be  repeated  for  any  new  DSI  handed  over  to  the  agency,  resulting  in  the 
possible need for multiple set-up phases in this scenario.   

There is a case, therefore, for the amendment to the mandate of the Regulatory Agency to 
be sufficiently wide/open to include future DSIs stemming from different policy domains or 
as  new  building  blocks.  This  would  mean  that  any  future  handover  to  the  EU  Regulatory 
Agency  would  be  a  much  smoother  process  without  the  need  for  additional  amendments. 
This is an important consideration, given that the mandate of some existing EU Regulatory 
Agencies  is  rather  restrictive  both  in  terms  of  policy  domains  and  the  possibility  of  the 
systems they operate. As a result, they require amendments for the handover of additional 
activities.  

If the outcome of the political negotiations were to result in a more restrictive mandate for 
the EU Regulatory Agency (e.g. based on the current DSIs in terms of domains, activities of 
specific  DSIs),  any  future  extension  of  the  agency’s  activities  to  a  new  DSI  would  require 
additional  amendments  and  a  repetition  of  this  process.  This  could  be  equally  or  less 
intensive  depending  on  the  specific  context.  A  halfway  house  could  be  temporary  'on-
boarding’ of the DSI by the agency through Memoranda of Understanding along the lines of 
current practice in relationships with DIGIT. The DSI could then be included in the Agency’s 
mandate  at  a  later  stage  once  there  was  enough  “critical  mass”  to  justify  amending  the 
agency’s legal basis. 

The  roadmap  representing  the  handover  to  an  EU  Regulatory  Agency,  therefore,  assumes 
commitment from the main institutional stakeholders in the medium term, first to establish 
the modifications to the statute and then to agree on them. This one-off effort would enable 
successful introduction of the solution and ‘business as usual’ operations would be the main 
focus  to  ensure  the  sustainability  of  the  DSI  based  on  their  individual  needs  and 
requirements.  This  means  that,  despite  being  resource-intensive  in  the  short  to  medium 
term, the EU Regulatory Agency option is resource-effective in the long term as it makes it 
possible to establish a sustainability solution once and for all.  

6.2 Transition to a new EC Programme 
The  European  Commission  has  considerable  experience  in  the  establishment  of  EC 
Programmes as they are the main spending tool of the institutions and several programmes 
are  created  for  each  Multiannual  Financial  Framework.  However,  adoption  of  an  EC 
Programme is subject to the legislative procedure involving the Member States (the Council) 
and the European Parliament. The figure below illustrates what such a negotiation process 
could look like for the adoption of a programme post-CEF.  

86 | P a g e  

 
 
Figure 5 - Establishment of an EC Programme timeline 

The figure illustrates the potential timeline for the establishment of an EC Programme. This 
applies  to  any  potential  thematic  Programme.  As  is  the  case  of  the  other  solutions,  the 
roadmap starts with an inception phase in which the Commission works internally to adopt a 
legislative  proposal,  which  is  the  text  negotiated  in  the  following  phase  by  the  Parliament 
and the Council. Normally, the European Commission adopts the proposal for a new funding 
programme 2-3 years before the end of the current programming period.  As the legislative 
procedure is governed by the Better Regulation Guidelines95, any proposal would have to be 
preceded by impact assessment and  stakeholder consultation. Therefore, one could expect 
the process to need to start at some point in 2017.  

The EP and the Council would again be likely to have up to two full years to decide on the 
funding  programme  and  formally  adopt  it.  However,  negotiations  have  to  be  completed 
before the new programming period officially starts, which leaves around two full years for 
the  negotiations.  The  operational  phase  would  then  start  with  the  first  day  of  the  new 
programming period in 2021 and from then onward the solution would be in full operational 
mode.  However,  an EC  Programme  is not  forever,  so  that, based on the  timeline  assumed 
here,  the  European  Commission  would  need  to  start  this  process  again  around  2024  to 
ensure continuity of funding based on the funding needs at that time. This means that the 
EC Programme is not a ‘once and for all’ solution for the long-term sustainability of the DSIs, 
as the figure below on the resource intensity of the Programme solution shows. 

95  Commission  Staff  Working  Document,  Better  Regulation  Guidelines,  COM(2015)215  Final,  see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/swd_br_guidelines_en.pdf  

87 | P a g e  

 
 
 
                                                      
Figure 6 - Transition to an EC Programme: Intensity of activities 

As  indicated  by  the  dotted  line  in  the  graph,  there  is  a  certain  pattern  in  the  intensity  of 
resources needed for the EC Programme solution, notably the repetition of the negotiating 
effort every 5-7 years, with peaks and troughs in the resources needed depending on where 
the Programme is in its implementation cycle: the initial years after a programme starts are 
not resource-intensive, but as soon as the negotiation for the new programme begins, there 
is a peak. This situation means that this solution would need resources to be dedicated to it 
to make it work in the long term and to negotiate programmes repeatedly in order to ensure 
continuity.  Therefore,  this  solution  requires  more  effort  in  the  long  term,  taking  the 
cumulative effect over time.  

6.3 Transition to DIGIT or an Executive Agency 
The  handover  to  DG  DIGIT  or  to  an  Executive  Agency  cannot  constitute  a  sustainability 
solution in itself because it cannot provide a permanent solution to the issue of DSI financing 
- as explained in other sections. For the sake of comparability and soundness of the analysis, 
these solutions have been assessed in their “pure” form up until this point, as was done for 
the other sustainability solutions. In reality, DIGIT and an  Executive Agency can realistically 
only  be  tackled  in  conjunction  with  the  EC  Programme  solution  and  that  is  assumed  from 
here on. This is particularly true for the solution of handover to an  Executive Agency since 
this  could  not  even  exist  other  than  within  the  framework  of  an  existing  or  new  funding 
programme.  

The DIGIT and Executive Agency solutions differ in this case in that for an Executive Agency, 
the programme defines the types of activities that the body can or cannot perform. This also 
includes  operational  and  architectural  activities.  Therefore,  for  an  Executive  Agency,  the 
funding  programme  is  more  than  a  simple  funding  instrument  but  rather  an  intrinsic 
element of the solution. On the other hand, for DIGIT the programme would only be crucial 
for solving the absence of any other automatic funding possibility.  

Nonetheless, it can be argued for both that they would need an EC Programme to provide 
funding to ensure the long-term sustainability of the DSIs  (at least for an initial seven-year 
period) and to provide the governance needed.  

That requires parallel transition roadmaps, one to hand over operations to DIGIT (for those 
DSIs which are not currently operated in this framework) and one to identify and implement 

88 | P a g e  

 
 
 
handover  to  an  Executive  Agency,  and  one  for  the  negotiation  of  a  new  or  several  new 
funding programmes.  

The  figure  below  shows  what  the  roadmap  to  handover  to  DIGIT  could  look  like  over  the 
next few years.  

Figure 7 - Handover to DIGIT timeline 

Compared to the roadmap for handover to an EU Regulatory Agency,  handover to DIGIT  is 
less complex and shorter because it does not require the adoption of any legal act, but relies 
on formal (e.g. Memoranda of Understanding) and informal agreements between the policy 
DGs  and  DIGIT  itself.  The  inception  and  negotiation  phases  of  such  agreements  could  be 
completed in eighteen months, taking a worst-case scenario. This is far less than in case of 
solutions  involving  discussion  in  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council.  Handover  to 
DIGIT takes two years less  than handover to an EU Regulatory Agency. As a result, all DSIs 
could even be directly managed by DIGIT as of 2019 if that seemed worth considering. 

As in the case of handover to DIGIT, the roadmap for handover to an Executive Agency is less 
complex  and  shorter  than  in  the  case  of  an  EU  Regulatory  Agency.  As  shown  in  the  figure 
below,  the  modification  of  an  Executive  Agency  statute  by  means  of  a  Commission 
implementing  decision  can  be  reasonably  fast  as  it  mainly  involves  internal  European 
Commission negotiations. For instance, the change in the agency mandate transforming the 
previous  Trans-European  Transport  Network  Executive  Agency  into  the  current  Innovation 
and Networks Executive Agency (INEA) only took one year.  

89 | P a g e  

 
 
 
Figure 8 – Handover to an EU Executive Agency: Timeline 

Therefore, for the handover to DIGIT or to an Executive Agency, the transition period would 
be relatively more limited in time and effort because the activities needed to carry out these 
solutions  are  internal  to  the  European  Commission.  However,  as  mentioned  above,  the 
handover to DIGIT or to an Executive Agency alone is not self-sustaining. Both options must 
be  accompanied by  a  financing  mechanism  in  order to  provide  a  sustainability  solution for 
the  DSIs.  For  this  reason,  the  roadmap  in  the  previous  section  on  the  establishment  of  (a) 
new EC Programme(s) should also be taken into account, resulting in a need to superimpose 
the timelines and roadmaps for the handover to DIGIT or to an Executive Agency and for the 
establishment  of  a  new  EC  Programme(s).  This  then  provides  an  understanding  of  how 
resource-intensive  the  combination  of  these  two  solutions  would  be  in  the  short,  medium 
and long term.  

90 | P a g e  

 
 
 
Figure 9 – Handover to DIGIT or an Executive Agency: Intensity of activities 

As the figure suggests, the combination of the handover to DIGIT or to an Executive Agency 
and  the  EC  Programme  solution  is  relatively  more  resource-intensive,  both  in  the  medium 
and  in  the  long  term.  The  reason  is  simple  and  shows  clearly  in  the  pattern  of  peaks  and 
troughs: the handover to DIGIT or to an Executive Agency is per se less burdensome, but the 
negotiation of a new or several new EC Programmes is repeated over time in the long term 
in order to ensure funding for the DSIs. Over the next few years the peak would occur when 
simultaneously negotiating handover to DIGIT or to an Executive Agency (which both require 
a rather limited amount of resources) and the establishment of a new EC Programme.  

Once  the  operational  phase  is  reached,  the  only  resources  needed  are  those  for  the 
‘business as usual’ needs and requirements of the DSI up to the moment when, possibly 2-3 
years  afterwards,  there  would  be  another  peak  linked  to  the  negotiation  of  a  new 
into 
programme,  and  each  seven  years  after  that.  The  need  to  put  resources 
establishment/maintenance  of  the  solution  is  therefore  cyclical  in  this  scenario  due  to  the 
nature of the EC Programmes. If new DSIs needed to be taken on over time, new MoUs and 
agreements would be needed, therefore implying a repetition of effort involved in handover 
to DIGIT or Executive Agency.  

This  means  that,  although  less  resource-intensive  than  the  handover  to  an  EU  Regulatory 
Agency in the midterm, the combination of an EC Programme and handover to DIGIT or to 
an Executive Agency requires repeated efforts over time to ensure sustainability in the long 
term. Indeed, as it does not solve once and for all the question of the DSI sustainability, this 
combination  of  solutions  may  not  constitute  the  best  return  on  investment  from  an 
economic perspective.  

91 | P a g e  

 
 
 
 
7  Conclusions and recommendations 

This  chapter  presents  a  summary  of  the  analytical  process  and  the  key  findings  from  the 
insights of the analysis presented in the previous sections before reaching conclusions and 
making recommendations.  

7.1 The analytical process  
The 15 CEF DSIs considered do not all have the same needs and requirements when it comes 
to  their  sustainability.  The  GOFA  model  was  used  for  this  analysis,  i.e.  their  key 
characteristics were defined in terms of governance, operations, financing and architectural 
coordination.  Key  characteristics  include  the  nature  of  the  services  they  provide  (e.g. 
managed  services,  software,  standards  and  specifications  etc.),  their  target  audience  (e.g. 
public sector only, public and private stakeholders etc.) and the nature of the legal or policy 
framework  that  governs  them.  This  makes  it  challenging  to  select  the  most  suitable  and 
credible  sustainability  solution  both  for  individual  DSIs  and  across  all  DSIs.  Nevertheless 
there are more than enough similarities for it to make sense to exploit the synergies more in 
future.  

There are nevertheless two key differentiating factors when analysing how the DSIs could be 
set  up  and  operated  based  on  an  analysis  of  the  current  structures:  the  degree  of 
concentration  of  activities  (ranging  from  having  different  entities  in  charge  of  them  to 
handover  to  a  single  entity)  and  the  degree  of  EC  intervention  or  non-intervention. 
Combining  these  two  dimensions  resulted  in  eight  possible  sustainability  solutions.  This 
study assessed this menu of options for their credibility and adequacy for the sustainability 
of all individual DSIs and across all DSIs. The extent to which the solution was flexible enough 
to extend it to taking other DSIs on board over time was also taken into account.  

At the same time, the range of sustainability options available to policy makers for ensuring 
the  long  term  sustainability  of  these  CEF  DSIs  also  includes  solutions  with  many  different 
characteristics.  The  assessment  of  possible  sustainability  solutions  was  carried  out  from 
multiple perspectives and at multiple levels, and in particular at three layers of analysis: an 
individual  DSI  perspective,  a  profile  perspective  (i.e.  for  groups  of  DSIs  with  similar 
characteristics) and a cross-DSI perspective. The relevant sustainability solutions were then 
plotted  to  axes  representing  the  degree  of  EC  intervention  and  degree  of  concentration 
inherent in each solution. This made it possible to eliminate two solutions which were not 
sufficiently credible.  

The  shortlisted  sustainability  solutions  were  then  subjected  to  a  multi-criteria  analysis  for 
each DSI individually and across all DSIs. This resulted in a ranking that was subjected to a 
sensitivity  analysis  and  further  refined  via  a  Pugh  analysis  that  compared  the  remaining 
solutions with the baseline, i.e. the current CEF Programme.  

92 | P a g e  

 
 
This  further  narrowed  the  number  of  solutions  to  three  that  appeared  to  be  sustainable, 
bearing in mind as well information on precedents and the political environment:  

  use of a Regulatory Agency,  
  an EC Programme, or  
  handover to DIGIT or an Executive Agency.  

Finally,  roadmaps  on  the  timeline,  milestones  and  intensity  of  effort  involved  in  each 
scenario  were  assessed.  All  these  factors  combined  give  rise  to  a  number  of  key  findings 
summarised in the next section.  

7.2 Conclusions 
The  outcome  of  the  multi-layered  and  multi-dimensional  analysis  carried  out  per 
sustainability  solution  and  per  DSI  and  across  DSIs  identified  one  solution  which  scores 
consistently better, across all layers, i.e. the handover to an EU Regulatory Agency. One of 
the  key  reasons  for  this  is  the  flexibility  the  EU  Regulatory  Agency  offers  across  all  GOFA 
elements. From a governance perspective, it can accommodate the involvement of different 
stakeholders (e.g. Member States and private sector non-/for profit organisations) and do so 
at a range of levels, while allowing for a concentrated approach to operations where there 
appears  to  be  potential  for  synergies  to  be  exploited  across  DSIs.  It  would  also  facilitate 
promotion of interoperability in delivering services cross-border by enhancing architectural 
coordination and it would provide the possibility of charging third parties for services96.  

Moreover, this  option  has  the  advantage  of  putting  in  place  a  single  sustainability  solution 
which  is  permanent  and  would  be  flexible  should  there  be  a  wish  to  add  other  DSIs  to  its 
mandate  subsequently,  irrespective  of  their  profile.  The  advantages  would  have  to  be 
weighed  against  the  significant  effort  required  in  the  short  term.  This  would  start  with 
identification  of  the  Agency,  the  extent  to  which  its  mandate  would  have  to  be  modified, 
and the level of detail of the mandate, e.g. the extent to which it should contain stipulations 
for each DSI individually and possibly the associated activities as well. Attention would have 
to  be  paid  to  ensuring  the  availability  of  funding  and  the  stability  of  the  operations  over 
time, while at the same time leaving sufficient flexibility to on-board other DSIs in the future. 

The  EC  Programme  solution  does  provide  funding  certainty  for  the  duration  of  one  EU 
funding  cycle  of  seven  years  and  would  require  less  effort  initially  than  the  Regulatory 
Agency route. Moreover, this solution also has the advantage of allowing varying degrees of 
concentration depending on the decision-making by policy DGs as DSI owners. Additionally, 
an  EC  Programme  can  easily  be  mobilised  by  the  DG  in  charge  it  if  becomes  necessary  or 
desirable to take other DSIs on board. This has been proven by the CEF experience. The legal 
basis  of  a  programme  can  be  reworked  to  cater  for  new  needs  even  during  the  period  of 
implementation  of  the  programme.  This  mitigates  the  difficulty  of  foreseeing  precisely  in 

96 As some EU Regulatory Agencies already do, see for instance: European Banking Authority, Single Resolution 
Board, and Office for the Harmonisation of the Internal Market etc.  

93 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
advance  how  many  and  which  DSIs  should  be  funded  and  for  how  long.  Because  of  this 
flexibility,  this  solution  also  comes  out  very  well  both  from  an  individual  and  cross-DSI 
perspective. However, it remains sub-optimal to the handover to an EU Regulatory Agency 
for three key reasons. First, the process of setting up an EC Programme has to be repeated 
at regular intervals. Second, it limits the breadth of funding sources available, since charging 
third parties,  for  instance,  would  be difficult.  Finally,  the  EC Programme solution  would be 
less  stakeholder-inclusive  as  only  Member  States  and  public  sector  could  formally  be 
stakeholders.  

Nonetheless,  the  EC  Programme  does  provide  a  potential  cross-DSI  solution;  other 
programmes,  which  might  be  a  source  of  funding  for  some  DSIs,  do  not  offer  this  benefit. 
Despite its time-bound nature, therefore, the establishment of an EC Programme (“renewal 
of the CEF”) seems to be a very appropriate solution. 

The handover to DIGIT or an Executive Agency would in itself not require the same effort to 
put  in  place  because  it  could  be  achieved  through  Commission  Decisions  or  inter-DG 
Memoranda  of  Understanding.  However,  this  solution  cannot  in  itself ensure  sustainability 
due to the lack of an intrinsic funding mechanism, whereas there is an obligation to fund an 
EU Regulatory Agency. For some individual DSIs, this is not expected to be a blocking factor. 
Sector-specific  funding  programmes  could  be  used  to  cover  these  DSI  activities  and  it  has 
been assumed that these would continue in some form after 2020 as they already roll over 
earlier  equivalent  programmes.  This  still  leaves  DSIs  that  have  not  identified  a  source  of 
funding beyond 2020 and would therefore be at risk once the current CEF Programme comes 
to an end.  

Therefore, this sustainability solution in itself cannot ensure the availability of funding for all 
DSIs and in itself does not provide for sustainability of all DSIs from the perspective of any of 
the dimensions analysed (individual DSI, profile and cross-DSI dimensions). For this reason, 
handover  to  DIGIT  or  to  an  Executive  Agency  is  only  financially  viable  in  combination  with 
programme funding to be sustainable. 

For those DSIs where funding is not considered to be at risk beyond 2020, this solution alone 
could,  however,  bring  important  benefits  in  terms  of  the  ability  to  look  at  what  synergies 
could be exploited. Nonetheless, in terms of governance and architecture, handover to DIGIT 
or  to  an  executive  solution  is  not  as  good  a  solution  as  handover  to  an  EU  Regulatory 
Agency.  As  Member  States  and  private  sector  stakeholders  cannot  be  involved  in  the 
decision-making,  the  DIGIT  and  Executive  Agency  solutions  are  less  inclusive  and  less 
representative than the two other solutions. Therefore, even for DSIs which do not face risks 
in terms of funding, there are strong governance arguments against these options.   

The next table provides an overview of the key findings on the solutions ultimately retained 
from  the  analysis  which  can  inform  the  decision  making  of  policy  makers  as  to  which 
solutions might be preferred. These key findings address: 

  The key characteristics of the solutions in terms of: 

 

flexibility  of  concentration/dispersion  (i.e.  the  capacity  to  accommodate  GOFA 
activities in a flexible way on the concentration/dispersion continuum): 

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 
 

 

 

 

  stakeholders in the lead;  

  possibility of ensuring availability of funding; 

  The credibility/extensibility of the solutions, that is to say their relevance for individual 

DSIs, groups of DSIs and in a cross-DSI dimension; 

  The amount of effort needed to establish the solutions and the nature of these efforts 

(one off/repetitive). 

Table 17 - Key findings on the sustainability solutions 

EU Regulatory Agency 
  High 

level 

EC Programme 
 

Currently  dispersed  but 
of 
possibility 
with 
concentration  and  good 
degree  of  flexibility  for  all 
GOFA activities 
Strong EC lead 
Ensures 
funding 

availability  of 

DIGIT/Executive Agency 
  High 

degree 

of 
level 
with 
concentration 
limited 
of 
flexibility  for  all  GOFA 
activities 
Strong EC lead 
Cannot 
ensure 
availability  of  funding 
in itself 

  Moderate 

of 
concentration, but with 
of 
high 
degree 
flexibility 
in 
implementation  of  all 
GOFA activities 
EC 

lead, 
shared  with  Member 
States  and  possibly 
other stakeholders 
Can  ensure  availability 
of  funding  (depending 
on  set-up)  and  does 
be 
not 
renegotiated every few 
years 

need 

to 

 

Key 
characteristics 

Credibility 
/receptivity 
/extensibility 
/flexibility 

 
 

 

 

  Best fit in the individual 

 

DSI analysis 

  Best 

for  all  DSI 

fit 
profiles/groups 
(including 
Block DSIs) 

Building 

  Best fit in the cross-DSI 

analysis 

23 

for 

Suitable  as  second  best 
DSI 
option 
scenarios 
Second  best  for  3  DSI 
profiles  
Second  best  in  the  cross-
(equal 
DSI 
second 
with 
DIGIT/Executive Agency) 

scenario 

Suitable 
second 
as 
best  option  for  14  DSI 
scenarios  
Second  best  for  2  DSI 
profiles  
in  the 
Second  best 
cross-DSI 
scenario 
(equal  second  with  EC 
programme) 

Roadmap 
establishment 

for 

Stable over time 

 
  High  short  term  effort, 
but  mainly 
one-off 
depending  on  the  set-
up 

  Not stable over time 
  Medium short term effort, 
but  repetitive  over  time 
leading  to  high  effort  in 
the long term 

  Organisationally  stable 
over  time  but  reliance 
on  EC  Programme  (no 
stable funding) 
(but 
effort 
Low 
repetitive  due  to  the 
need  to  rely  on  EC 
Programmes) 

 

Any choice between the sustainability solutions presented above (and indeed any others) is 
likely  to  involve  careful  consideration  of  trade-offs  on  the  part  of  policy  makers.  The  key 
trade-offs are between: 

  The  level  of  EC  intervention  envisaged  in  the  future  and  the  level  of  flexibility  for 
individual  DSIs  to  tailor  a  given  solution  to  their  individual  needs.  Some  DSIs  (e.g. 
building block DSIs, such as eDelivery, eInvoicing and eSignature) aim to enable market 
operators  to  provide  solutions  that  are  compliant  with  EU  policy  goals,  while  others 

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are  more  clearly  aimed  at  better  cooperation  among  public  administrations 
throughout  the  EU  (e.g.  Cybersecurity,  EESSI),  and  there  are  others  that  may  have 
varying  degrees  of  involvement  of  private  sector  organisations.  Over  time,  as  the 
deployment  matures  and  conditions  evolve  (e.g.  in  terms  of  take-up,  provision  of 
compliant  market  solutions,  involvement  of  different  stakeholders,  technological 
developments,  etc.)  this  may  impact  the  level  of  EC  intervention  that  is  required. 
Therefore,  any  solution  that  provides  the  most  flexibility  from  this  perspective  is 
desirable, taking into account the variety of DSIs. Among those assessed, this is clearly 
the EU Regulatory Agency. 

  The degree of concentration and the level of synergies that can be exploited across 
DSIs.  Under  the  EC  Programme  solution  (as  is  currently  the  case  under  the  CEF),  DSI 
owners would have the freedom either to implement their activities in a decentralised 
manner  within  the  relevant  policy  DG  or  to  involve  a  single  organisation  in  specific 
activities, just as happens with DIGIT under the CEF. This has resulted today in a semi-
concentrated approach across the DSIs, which does not ensure the full exploitation of 
synergies and efficiency gains. However, the establishment of a new programme with 
different  characteristics  could  allow  for  more  synergies,  the  provision  of  shared 
services  and the  sharing  of  shared  resources,  when  establishing  and deploying  cross-
border IT systems used by the Member States. This is equally true of the handover to 
an EU Regulatory Agency and of handover to DIGIT or to an Executive Agency. 

  The level of stability over time and the transition efforts in the long term. While the 
EU Regulatory Agency provides the highest degree of stability (as well as flexibility) it 
would require the most efforts in the short term to establish the effective handover of 
DSIs. The establishment of a new EC Programme requires a smaller effort in the short 
term  but  a  more  repetitive  effort  as  Programmes  must  be  re-established  every  few 
years.  The  handover  to  DIGIT  or  to  an  Executive  Agency  is  less  resource-intensive  in 
the short run but subject to the same constraints as the EC Programme in the long run 
because there has to be an ultimate source of funding.  

Other points to bear in mind are that: 

  Based on the assessment of the timeframes for the establishment of the solutions, the 
efforts  to  establish  an  EU  Regulatory  Agency  or  an  EC  Programme  would  need  to 
commence  in  2017  in order for the  chosen  solution to be  operational  in  2021  at  the 
end of the current CEF Programme. 

  Handover to an EU Regulatory Agency is expected to entail handing over to an existing 
EU Regulatory Agency (such as EU-LISA) and probably modifying its mandate, although 
it  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study  to  evaluate  which  agency  would  be  the  best 
candidate or the mandates of the different potential candidates.    

  This study has assessed the ‘art of the possible’ for each of the solutions in assessing 
‘which’ solution would cater for the sustainability needs and requirements of the DSIs, 
but does  not  specifically  precisely  address  ‘how’  the  sustainability  solution  should  be 
constructed.  

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  It will be up to policymakers and the legislators to decide whether to opt for a common 
solution for all or most of the DSIs or whether a case-by-case approach is preferred to 
ensuring sustainability over time.  

7.3 Recommendations 
The recommendations flowing from the data collected and the result of the analysis are set 
out below.  

Should  it be  decided  to propose  a  common  sustainability solution to  all CEF  DSIs,  the  first 
choice should be the handover to an EU Regulatory Agency. The findings from all layers of 
the  analysis  (individual  DSIs,  cross-DSIs  and  clustered  profiles)  confirmed  that  this  is  the 
optimum solution. From the standpoint of individual DSIs, this solution scores highest for all 
the DSIs looked at. It also emerged as the top solution in the cross-DSI analysis, since in no 
case is there a blocking factor and the level of scoring across GOFA elements is consistent. 
Finally, the analysis per DSI profile shows that the EU Regulatory Agency can offer different 
advantages to different profiles: 

  For DSIs which in the long term will only provide or maintain standards (profile 1.1, eID 
and eInvoicing), the EU Regulatory Agency is the most  suitable solution as it makes it 
possible to provide and maintain those collaboratively, i.e. with the involvement of all 
relevant  stakeholders,  including  the  Member  States  and  the  private  sector.  From  a 
governance and architectural point of view, this solution represents a synthesis of the 
needs of this profile. Similar considerations can be applied to profile 1.2, which groups 
those  DSIs  which  in  the long  term  will  also  only provide  standards  and  specifications 
but  which  actually  go  beyond  this  mandate  and  provide  services  not  specifically 
mentioned  in  their  legal  basis  (eDelivery,  eSignature  DSS  and  certain  components  of 
eProcurement). For this profile, the handover to an EU Regulatory Agency has a  dual 
advantage: it makes it possible to cater for their governance and architectural needs in 
a  participative  way,  and  it  also  caters  for  their  temporary  operational  and  funding 
needs (e.g. in terms of provision of software and other time-bound services). Indeed, 
inclusion in an agency’s mandate would allow these DSIs to gain in stability and also to 
tap into a source of funding for the additional activities they are currently carrying out. 
Being within an agency would also allow  them to charge for the services provided to 
the private sector.  

  For DSIs providing centrally managed services and with a strong legal basis (Profile 2.1, 
ODR,  eSignature  TLM  and  eProcurement  eCertis  and  ESPD)  the  handover  to  an  EU 
Regulatory  Agency  makes  it  possible  to  strengthen  the  operational  and  financial 
stability  because  it  is  a  once-and-for-all  solution  that  avoids  reliance  on  renewal  of 
programmes  and  dispersed  management  of  the  activities.  More  importantly,  for 
profile 2.2 DSIs which have no legal basis for operation and funding (Europeana, Safer 
Internet,  Open  Data  Portal),  the  handover  to  an  EU  Regulatory  Agency  solves  the 
sustainability puzzle by providing a legal basis and therefore ensuring the availability of 
funding and stability of operations  in the long term. Therefore, although  there might 

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be other sustainability options available to profile 2.1 DSIs (e.g. the status quo due to 
their  legal  basis),  for  profile  2.2  DSIs  the  EU  Regulatory  Agency  would  offer  the  best 
chance of ensuring continuity over time.  

  For DSIs providing both standards and specifications, and centrally run services based 
on  a  legal  framework  (profile  3.1,  BRIS  and  eJustice  interconnection  of  insolvency 
registers), the advantages are similar to profile 2.1: the handover to an EU Regulatory 
Agency  would  provide  a  once-and-for-all  sustainability  solution  and  would  de-link  it 
from  the  renewal  of,  for  instance,  the  Justice  Programme.  In  addition  and  given  the 
revenue  generation  potential  of  BRIS  and  eJustice,  the  agency  solution  would  also 
facilitate  charging  the  private  sector  for  services,  if  and  when  the  European 
Commission decides to do so. Finally, for profile 3.2 DSIs, which includes DSIs providing 
these  services  but  which  have  a  more  limited  or  no  legal  basis  for  their  activities 
(eHealth,  Cyber  Security,  EESSI,  all  other  modules  of  eJustice),  the  handover  to  a 
Regulatory Agency would make it possible to continue going beyond the strict scope of 
the  related  legal  basis  or  to  create  a  legal  obligation  and  to  continue  providing 
additional services as is currently the case. The agency solution would not only provide 
financial  and  operational  stability,  but  also  guarantee  strong  involvement  of  the 
Member  States  in  the  governance  and  architectural  activities.  The  latter  are  both 
crucially important for these DSIs.  

Therefore, all profiles should see advantages in the handover to an EU Regulatory Agency, 
although  for  different  reasons  and  relative  to  different  GOFA  elements.  This  also  suggests 
that  this  solution  is  flexible  and  extensible  enough  to  accommodate  other  DSIs  falling  into 
is  therefore  strongly 
one  or  other  of  these  profiles.  The  EU  Regulatory  Agency 
recommended  as  a  common  solution  for  all  DSIs.  It  must  nonetheless  be  noted  that  this 
solution has the disadvantage of being more complex to negotiate in the short term. 

If  this  leads  to  a  need  to  modify  the  statute  of  an  existing  Regulatory  Agency,  it  is 
recommended that the following be taken into account: 

  Given the effort required to modify the statute of an existing Regulatory Agency, each 
reopening of negotiations on the statute should be seen as a window of opportunity 
and the possibility explored of handing over several DSIs at the same time during the 
same negotiation round; 

  Inclusion of a “flexibility clause” in the Agency’s statute. This should make it possible 

to: 

 

 

test the handover of DSIs to the agency through Memoranda of Understanding 
before proceeding with a formal change of statute, and  
leave  some  space  for  on-boarding  DSIs  in  cases  where  it  is  not  immediately 
feasible  to  establish  a  legal  basis  (through  the  intermediary  of  the  agency’s 
statute). 

The EC Programme is recommended as the second best solution common to all DSIs should 
it appear necessary or desirable to select a solution different from that of an EU Regulatory 
Agency. This would entail a continuation of the current situation (baseline scenario) with the 
renewal of an EC Programme similar to the current CEF. There are no blocking factors in the 

98 | P a g e  

 
 
case  of  this  solution  (logically,  since  it  accommodates  them  all  now).  It  also  caters  for  the 
need  for  flexibility  and  extensibility  to  other  DSIs,  including  giving  the  Member  States  the 
possibility to suggest on-boarding other digital services during the programming period. This 
solution  is  particularly  suited  to  some  current  DSI  profiles,  notably  those  covering  DSIs 
without  a  legal  basis  and  needing  strong  involvement  on  the  part  of  Member  States  (e.g. 
Europeana, Open Data Portal and Safer Internet). Moreover, this solution has the advantage 
of being less complex to implement in the short term than an EU Regulatory Agency. 

Nonetheless,  the  solution  is  suboptimal  relative  to  the  handover  to  an  EU  Regulatory 
Agency  for  two  main  reasons.  First,  it  is  a  temporary  not  a  once-and-for-all  solution,  as  it 
must  be  renewed  every  seven  years.  Second,  the  stakeholder  involvement  remains  more 
limited  than  in  an  EU  Regulatory  Agency.  In  addition,  it  would  be  difficult  to  introduce 
charging  models  and  there  might  be  an  inherent  instability  of  operations  in  having  to 
renegotiate  funding  at  regular  intervals.  These  factors  make  the  EC  Programme  less 
desirable overall. Nevertheless, it is recommended that an EC Programme be considered as a 
second possible common solution. It could also act as a bridge to allow time for further work 
on the once-and-for-all sustainability options for the DSIs.  

In the light of the recommendation to consider the establishment of a new EC Programme at 
least  for  the  sustainability  of  some  of  the  DSI  groups,  the  following  should  also  be 
considered: 

  the  possibility  of  increasing  operational,  governance  and  architectural  synergies  by 
foreseeing  mechanisms  for  cooperation  and  concentration  in  these  domains  and 
assessing  the  potential  to  reduce  duplication  of  services  and  costs.  Areas  to  explore 
could  include  common  testing  and  support  services,  and  harmonised  governance 
structures  and  procedures,  taking  into  account  the  new  European  Interoperability 
Framework and the latest developments in terms of organisational interoperability.97  
  a  certain  focus  on  sustainability  within  the  new  Programme.  This  solution  has  a 
lifespan  of  seven  years  and  does  not  constitute  a  long-term  option  for  the  DSIs. 
Therefore, the new programme  could  envisage mechanisms  for further analysing  the 
sustainability  outlook  of  the  DSIs  and  encouraging  them  to  find  alternatives  beyond 
the end of the next financial cycle in 2027. 

  the  EC  Programme  needs  to  be  a  flexible  tool  for  Member  States  wanting  to  look 
more  closely  at  cross-border  IT  services.  Therefore,  the future  programme  should  be 
considered  as  an  instrument  in  their  hands  and  provide  for  mechanisms  for  close 
collaboration  and  cooperation  between  the  Member  States  and  the  European 
Commission. This could entail setting up ad hoc mechanisms or dedicated governance 
structures under the programme’s umbrella.  

97 97 See:  Communication  (COM(2017)134)  from  the  European  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the 
Council,  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee,  the  Committee  of  Regions  on  the  European  Interoperability 
Framework, 
http://eur-
adopted 
lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2c2f2554-0faf-11e7-8a35-01aa75ed71a1.0017.02/DOC_1&format=PDF 

Implementation 

Strategy, 

March 

2017, 

on 

23 

99 | P a g e  

 
 
                                                      
  Finally,  the  new  Programme  should  encourage  the  sharing  of  experiences  amongst 
existing  digital  infrastructures  as  well  as  the  reuse  of  building  block  DSIs.  This  will 
achieve  cost  efficiency  and  reduce  the  duplication  of  costs  and  efforts  linked  to  the 
development of similar services. The reuse of existing solutions should again be made 
binding  for  those  sector-specific  DSIs  receiving  funding  under  the  Programme  and 
incentives could be foreseen for voluntary compliance with informal rules on re-use. 

If  there  is  a  preference  for  case-by-case  sustainability  solutions  for  each  individual  DSI 
rather  than  common  solutions,  it  is  recommended  that  the  results  of  the  individual  DSI 
analysis be built on, using this analysis as a starting point for the individual discussions98. In 
addition,  it  is  recommended  that  the  following  points  be  considered  before  making  a 
decision: 

  Some  DSIs,  and  notably  profile  1.1  (eID  and  eInvoicing),  2.1  (ODR,  eSignature  TLM, 
eProcurement  eCertis  and  ESPD)  and  3.1  (BRIS  and  eJustice  interconnection  of 
insolvency registers), are less fragile in terms of long-term financial sustainability than 
others because they can rely on an explicit legal basis containing the obligation of the 
European  Commission  to  provide  and  fund  these  services.  This  does  not  mean  that 
they  do  not  need  sustainability  solutions,  as  financing  is  only  one  of  the  GOFA 
elements to be considered to ensure their  activities continue, but it does mean  that, 
from a funding perspective, they can expect some continuity. This also means that the 
status  quo  is  an  option  for  these  DSIs.  This  applies  in  particular  to  ODR,  eJustice, 
eProcurement  and  BRIS,  which  already  largely  tap  into  funding  not  coming  from  the 
CEF. At the other extreme are some DSIs which do not have assured funding continuity 
and  for  which  the  end  of  the  CEF  poses  a  serious  threat.  For  these,  it  is  relatively 
urgent to identify and establish sustainability solutions.   

  For  those  DSIs  without  a  strong  legal  basis,  the  level  of  funding  needed  by  the 
individual DSIs can impact the ease with which a relevant sustainability solution can be 
found. Should there be individual DSIs for which no sustainability solution (including a 
solution to financing) is found before the end of the CEF, it is likely that it will be easier 
for the  DSIs  with  smaller  budgets  to  negotiate  coverage under  sectoral programmes. 
This could be the case for instance of DSIs which, in their end-state, require very little 
financial support to maintain their services (e.g. eHealth).  

Finally, the analysis presented in this study has looked at the DSIs’ activities as they are now 
and as they will be in their end-state based on the current regulatory and policy framework. 
The  solutions  tested  offer  a  margin  for  flexibility  and  the  potential  of  a  given  solution  to 
incorporate  changes  was  also  one  of  the  criteria  considered.  If  there  were  to  be  major 
modifications to the policy and regulatory frameworks, such as conferring a formal status on 
a DSI by providing it with a legal basis or changes to an existing Regulation or Directive, the 
needs  and  requirements  of  the  DSI  or  DSIs  might  change  in  ways  that  made  further 
sustainability analysis necessary.  

98 See in particular the outcome of the individual DSI analysis, page 40 of the present report. 

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European Commission 

Long Term Sustainability of Digital Service Infrastructures  

Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union 

2017 – 98 pages  

ISBN 978-92-79-70757-5 

doi:10.2759/210858 

 
 
 
 
 
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doi:10.2759/210858            ISBN 978-92-79-70757-5