COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1073/2009 on common rules for access to the international market for coach and bus services
Date: 2017-11-08
Institutions: Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport, European Commission
Subjects: bus, carriage of passengers, freedom to provide services, international road transport, international transport, market access, road cabotage, services of general interest, transport licence

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 8.11.2017  SWD(2017) 358 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT  Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1073/2009 on common rules for access to the international market for coach and bus services {COM(2017) 647 final}  - {SWD(2017) 359 final}   
 
 
Table of Contents 

GLOSSARY OF DEFINITIONS, ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .................. III 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1 

2.  WHAT IS THE PROBLEM AND WHY IS IT A PROBLEM? ................................. 1 

2.1.  Policy Context ................................................................................................... 1 

2.2.  Market Context .................................................................................................. 4 

2.3.  Evaluation of the Regulation ............................................................................. 7 

2.4.  Problem definition ............................................................................................. 8 

2.5.  What are the problem drivers? ........................................................................ 16 

2.5.1.

  Problem  driver  1:  Restricted  access  to  national  inter-urban 

markets .............................................................................................. 16 

2.5.2.

  Problem driver 2: Excessive administrative costs of entry ............... 18 

2.5.3.

  Problem driver 3: Restricted access to key infrastructure ................. 20 

2.6.  Who is affected by the problem, in what ways, and to what extent? .............. 23 

2.7.  What is the EU dimension of the problem? ..................................................... 23 

2.8.  How would the problem evolve, all things being equal? ................................ 24 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? .............................................................................. 26 

3.1.  Legal Basis ...................................................................................................... 26 

3.2.  Subsidiarity ...................................................................................................... 27 

3.2.1.

  Necessity test ..................................................................................... 27 

3.2.2.

  EU added value test ........................................................................... 28 

4.  WHAT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED? ........................................................................ 28 

4.1.  General policy objective .................................................................................. 29 

4.2.  Specific objectives ........................................................................................... 29 

5.  WHAT  ARE  THE  VARIOUS  OPTIONS  TO  ACHIEVE  THE 

OBJECTIVES? .......................................................................................................... 30 

5.1.  Retained policy measures ................................................................................ 30 

5.2. 

Identification of possible policy packages ...................................................... 32 

5.3. 

Identification of a list of market access policy options ................................... 32 

5.4. 

Identification of a list of terminal access policy options ................................. 35 

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6.  WHAT  ARE  THE  IMPACTS  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  POLICY  OPTIONS 

AND WHO WILL BE AFFECTED? ........................................................................ 37 

6.1. 

Impacts of policy options to address excessive administration costs of 
entry and market access problems ................................................................... 39 

6.1.1.

  Economic impacts ............................................................................. 39 

6.1.2.

  Environmental impacts ...................................................................... 55 

6.1.3.

  Social impacts .................................................................................... 56 

6.2. 

Impacts of policy options to address terminal access problems ...................... 63 

6.2.1.

  Economic impacts ............................................................................. 63 

6.2.2.

  Environmental impacts ...................................................................... 66 

6.2.3.

  Social impacts .................................................................................... 66 

7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? .................................................................. 69 

7.1.  Effectiveness and efficiency ............................................................................ 69 

7.2.  Coherence ........................................................................................................ 71 

7.3.  Proportionality of the preferred option ............................................................ 73 

7.4.  Conclusion of the comparison of options and combined effects ..................... 76 

8.  HOW  WOULD  ACTUAL 

IMPACTS  BE  MONITORED  AND 

EVALUATED? ......................................................................................................... 78 

ANNEX  1:  PROCEDURAL  INFORMATION  CONCERNING  THE  PROCESS 
TO  PREPARE  THE  IMPACT  ASSESSMENT  REPORT  AND  THE 
RELATED INITIATIVE. ......................................................................................... 80 

ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION SYNOPSIS REPORT. ...................... 89 

ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED BY THE INITIATIVE AND HOW? ....................... 101 

ANNEX  4:  ANALYTICAL  MODEL  USED  IN  PREPARING  THE  IMPACT 

ASSESSMENT ....................................................................................................... 102 

 

 

Scenario design, consultation process and quality assurance ........ 105 

Main assumptions of the Baseline scenario .................................... 106 

ANNEX  5:  DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  ROAD  INITIATIVES  –  THE  ‘BIG 

PICTURE’. .............................................................................................................. 122 

ANNEX 6: DISCARDED POLICY MEASURES ......................................................... 128 

ANNEX 7: IMPACTS OF LIBERALISATION ON PSOS ........................................... 135 

ANNEX 8: CASE STUDIES .......................................................................................... 137 

ii 

 
 
 
GLOSSARY OF DEFINITIONS, ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 

ARAFER 
ART 
Cabotage operations 

EDF 
ETF 
EU 
GO 
KTEL 

IA 
IRU 
NPV 
OPC 
pkm 
PRMs 
PSC 

PSO 

PWD 

REFIT 
RIMMS 
SME 
SO 

Autorité de régulation des activités ferroviaires et routières 
Autorità di Regolazione dei trasporti 
Means either: 
- national road passenger services for hire and reward carried out on a 
temporary basis by a carrier in a host Member State, or 
- the picking up and setting down of passengers within the same 
Member State, in the course of a regular international service, in 
compliance with the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 1073/2009, 
provided that it is not the principal purpose of the service. 
European Disability Forum 
European Transport Federation 
European Union 
General objective 
Is the main intercity coach provider in Greece "Common Funds of Bus 
Proceeds" 
Impact Assessment 
Global Industry Association of Road Transport  
Net present value 
Open Public Consultation 
Passenger-kilometres 
Persons with reduced mobility 
Public Service Contract means one or more legally binding acts 
confirming the agreement between a competent authority and a public 
service operator to entrust to that public service operator the 
management and operation of public passenger transport services 
subject to public service obligations; depending on the law of the 
Member State, the contract may also consist of a decision adopted by 
the competent authority: 
- taking the form of an individual legislative or regulatory act, or 
- containing conditions under which the competent authority itself 
provides the services or entrusts the provision of such services to an 
internal operator; 
Public Service Obligation means a requirement defined or determined 
by a competent authority in order to ensure public passenger transport 
services in the general interest that an operator, if it were considering 
its own commercial interests, would not assume or would not assume 
to the same extent or under the same conditions without reward 
DIRECTIVE 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services 
Regulatory fitness and performance revision 
Railway Information Measuring and Monitoring System 
Small and medium-sized enterprises 
Specific Objective 

iii 

 
 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

This impact assessment (IA) accompanies a legislative proposal that revises Regulation 
(EC) No 1073/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for 
access to the international market for coach services, and amending Regulation (EC) No 
561/20061 (hereinafter “the Regulation”). 

The  Regulation  forms  part  of  a  common  EU  legal  framework  for  efficient,  fair  and 
sustainable road transport. Within the framework the Regulation is closely related to the 
legislation  on  access  to  the  occupation  of  road  transport  operator2  and  social  rules  for 
road transport operators (the Driving Time Regulation3, Road Transport Working Time 
Directive4, the Enforcement Directive5, and the Tachograph Regulation6) which together 
set the legal framework for road passenger transport operators to operate in the EU. 

This  initiative  is  part  of  a  broader  review  of  the  existing  legislation  applying  to  road 
transport. The objective of the review is to update and improve the existing legislation so 
that  it  continues  to  achieve  its  objectives  without  undue  burdens.  Together,  these 
initiatives  consider  a  range  of  different  options,  with  mutually  reinforcing  measures, 
which  ultimately  should  improve  the  efficiency,  fairness  and  sustainability  of  road 
transport.  For  road  passenger  transport  operations  the  interaction  of  this  initiative  and 
initiatives  on  access  to  the  occupation,  social  rules  and  the  Eurovignette7  are  closely 
linked. This package is further described in Annex 5. 

This  impact  assessment  concerns  a  new  REFIT  initiative  (regulatory  fitness  and 
performance revision) of current law8 that aims to simplify and reduce regulatory costs 
while maintaining benefits. 

2.  WHAT IS THE PROBLEM AND WHY IS IT A PROBLEM? 

2.1. 

Policy Context 

This  initiative  is  closely  linked  with  the  Communication  of  the  Commission  of  31  May, 
'Europe  on  the  Move'9,  which  aims  to  make  transport  cleaner,  more  connected  and 
competitive.  Bus  and  coach  services  have  the  possibility  of  contributing  to  all  these 
objectives by providing better services to citizens 

The  internal  market  is  not  yet  complete  and  barriers  remain,  notably  in  the  area  of 
services.  The  integration  of  the  European  Union  (EU)  transport  market  remains  low  in 
comparison to other parts of the economy and a genuine EU-wide internal market exists 
only  in  air  transport,  while  other  transport  modes,  including  road,  suffer  from  different 
degrees of fragmentation along national borders.  
The White Paper10 on transport policy adopted on 28 March 2011 (hereinafter “the 2011 
White  Paper”)  sets  out  the  Commission’s  vision  for  a  competitive  and  sustainable 
transport system and reiterates the continuing importance of our ultimate aim, to pursue a 

1 OJL 300, 14.11.2009, p. 88. 
2 Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009, OJ L 300, 14.11.2009, p. 51 
3 Regulation (EC) 561/2006, OJ L 102, 11.4.2006, p. 1 
4 Directive 2002/15/EC, OJ L 80, 23.3.2002, p. 35 
5 Directive 2006/22/EC, OJ L 102, 11.4.2006, p. 35 
6 Regulation (EU) No 165/2014, OJ L 60, 28.2.2014, p. 1 
7 Directive 1999/62/EC, OJ L 187, 20.7.1999, p. 42 
8 Initiative no. 9, annex 2, Commission Work Programme 2017 
9 SWD(2017) 177 final 
10 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0144  

1 

 
 
                                                 
single European transport area and remove competitive distortions. This will help the EU 
transport policy remains the creation of a single European transport area, to help the EU 
stay  competitive  by  optimising  the  performance  of  the  entire  transport  sector  for  the 
benefit of all  while  safeguarding  safety, security and the environment. It acknowledges 
that  curbing  mobility  is  not  an  option  and  that  new  transport  patterns  must  emerge, 
according to which greater numbers of travellers are carried jointly to their destination by 
the most efficient (combination of) modes. 

In the 1990s, the internal market for bus and coach services was created by two separate 
pieces of legislation, namely Council Regulation (EEC) No 684/92 on common rules for 
the international carriage of passengers by coach and bus11 and Council Regulation (EC) 
No  12/98  laying  down  the  conditions  under  which  non-resident  carriers  may  operate 
national  road  passenger  transport  services  within  a  Member  State12.  These  Regulations 
were consolidated by the Regulation which provides the conditions for the international 
carriage of passengers by coach and bus services within the EU by carriers for hire and 
reward. 

The Regulation was adopted as a part of a legislative package with Regulation (EC) No 
1071/2009 establishing common rules concerning the conditions to be complied with to 
pursue the occupation of road transport operator13 and Regulation (EC) No 1072/2009 on 
common rules for access to the international road haulage market14. Together, these three 
regulations  establish  the  conditions  for  accessing  the  profession  and  for  accessing  the 
markets for transport of goods and people by road and aim to support the completion of 
the internal market in road transport, its efficiency and competitiveness.  

The scope of the Regulation covers the international carriage of passengers by coach and 
bus within the EU by carriers for hire and reward in possession of a Community licence 
or by own-account carriers established in a Member State.  

The regulation provides for the opening of the markets for the following services: 
Table 2-1: International carriage of passengers 

Type of service 

Definition 

Regime 

Regular services 

Special Regular 
Services 

Regular services means services which provide for 
the carriage of passengers at specified intervals 
along specified routes, passengers being picked up 
and set down at predetermined stopping points. 
Typical example: Regular, scheduled service open 
to all passengers, such as Eurolines services 
between Member States. 
Special regular services mean regular services, by 
whosoever organised, which provide for the 
carriage of specified categories of passengers to the 
exclusion of other passengers. 
Typical examples: Regular, scheduled service not 
open to all passengers, such as: 

‐ 

School services serving only those 
attending a school; and 

Subject 
to 
granted  by 
authorities 
concerned 

authorisation 
the  competent 
the  MSs 
of 

Not  subject  to  authorisation 
where  they  are  covered  by  a 
contract  concluded  between 
the organiser and the carrier 

11 OJL 74, 20.3.1992, p. 1. 
12 OJL 4, 8.1.1998, p. 10. 
13 OJL 300, 14.11.2009, p. 51 
14 OJL 300, 14.11.2009, p. 72 

2 

 
 
                                                 
Occasional 
Services 

‐ 

Staff services serving only those working 
at a location. 

Occasional services means services which do not 
fall within the definition of regular services, 
including special regular services, and the main 
characteristic of which is the carriage of groups of 
passengers constituted on the initiative of the 
customer or the carrier himself. 
Typical examples: Multi-day visit or tour requested 
by a customer or offered by a carrier. Excursion or 
day trip requested by a customer or offered by a 
carrier. Local excursion or day trip offered to those 
already on a multi-day visit. 

Exempt from authorisations 

Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave 

The Regulation lays down the provisions to be complied with by undertakings that wish 
to operate on the international road passenger transport market and on national markets 
other than their own (known as cabotage operations).  

Table 2-2: Cabotage Operations 

Type of service 
Regular services 

Special Regular Services 

Permitted cabotage operations 
The  picking  up  and  setting  down  of  passengers  within  the  same  MS,  in 
the course of a regular international service provided that: 

 
 

 

It is not the principal purpose of the service; 
It is not a transport service meeting the needs of an urban centre 
or conurbation, or transport needs between it and the surrounding 
areas; and 
It is not performed independently of such international service 

Liberalised from any specific authorisation if carried out on a temporary 
basis and covered by a contract concluded between the organiser and the 
carrier. 
Liberalised from any specific authorisation 

Occasional Services 
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave 

It  includes  provisions  related  to  the  documents  to  be  issued  to  such  carriers  by  the 
Member  State  of  registration  (Community  licence)  and  by  the  authorising  authority 
(Authorisation for a regular service). It sets down provisions regarding the sanctioning of 
infringements and cooperation between Member States in that context. 

The Regulation has the following general objectives: 

  To promote coach transport as a sustainable alternative to individual car transport. 
  To open the market for international services and for cabotage operations without 

undermining public service obligations; 

  To  prevent  discrimination  on  grounds  of  nationality  or  place  of  establishment; 

and 

  To limit the administrative burden to the extent possible 

No rules have been adopted so far at EU level as regards access to the national markets 
for regular services by coach  and bus (except cabotage operations which are part of an 
international service) and therefore the operation of national services is otherwise subject 
to the laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States. 

This initiative should be seen as complementary to several parallel initiatives in the 
review  of  road  transport  legislation  as  part  of  the  mobility  package.  Market  and 

3 

 
 
social  issues  in  the  road  passenger  transport  sector  are  likely  to  become  more 
interdependent  because  market  opening  tends  to  increase  competitive  pressure  on 
operators and their mobile workers. Addressing these issues requires a holistic approach 
whereby the social, internal market and posting of workers' rules are considered together 
to ensure both fair working conditions for drivers and fair competition between operators. 
It  is  also  closely  linked  with  the  road  charging  initiatives  which  propose  to  include 
coaches in the Eurovignette Directive and contribute to a level playing field in particular 
with  rail.  Therefore,  this  initiative  on  access  to  the  coach  market  is  part  of  a  co-ordinated 
response to both the social and market challenges faced. 

This  initiative  is  in  particular  complementary  to  the  on-going  revision  of  the  Posting  of 
Workers  Directive  96/71/EC15  (PWD),  which  aims  to  clarify  and  update  the  provisions 
adopted  more  than  twenty  years  ago  and  to  ensure  that  the  Directive  still  strikes  the  right 
balance between the need to promote the freedom to provide services and the need to protect 
the rights of posted workers. The PWD revision deals with general issues, such as broader set 
of  remuneration  rules  or  maximum  periods  of  posting  to  be  applied  to  all  sectors.  This 
initiative is also complementary to the specific rules proposed by the Commission on 31 May 
201716  for  the  application  of  posting  rules  to  workers  in  road  transport.  This  proposal 
addresses  the  risks  of  inadequate  working  conditions  for  drivers,  including  terms  and 
conditions of employment, and at the same time mitigating the excessive regulatory burdens 
on operators and preventing distortions of competition. The overarching goal is to ensure a 
balance  between  adequate  working  conditions  for  drivers  and  freedom  to  provide  cross-
border services for operators. 

2.2. 

Market Context 

The  international  and  national  markets  for  inter-urban  regular  coach  services  play  an 
important role in passenger transport. Coach is an economical, efficient and sustainable17 
mode  of  transport  which  can  contribute  to  reducing  emissions  from  transport  and  to 
improving  accessibility  for  citizens  on  low  income  or  living  in  isolated  and  low 
population density regions with no rail services. 

In  2014,  the  bus  and  coach  transport  activity  (expressed  in  passenger-kilometre) 
represented 8.0% of passenger transport and 8.8% of land passenger transport within the 
EU18.  
Table 2-3: Modal split of passenger transport 201419 

Modal split of passenger transport in 2014 

Passenger car 

Powered 2 
wheel 

Bus and 
coach 

Railway 

Tram & 
Metro 

Air 

Sea 

72.3% 

1.9% 

8.0% 

6.5% 

1.5% 

9.2% 

0.6% 

15 OJ L 18, 21.1.1997, p. 1  
16 Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending 
Directive  2006/22/EC  as  regards  enforcement  requirements  and  laying  down  specific  rules  with 
respect  to  Directive  96/71/EC  and  Directive  2014/67/EU  for  posting  drivers  in  the  road  transport 
sector Brussels, 31.5.2017 COM(2017) 278 final 2017/0121 (COD) 

17 Coach has lowest CO2 emissions of all long distance modes (with E-trains) Bus and coach transport for 

greening mobility, Delft, October 2011 

18 Data from Statistical Pocketbook 2016 EU Transport in figures 
19 The modal split indicator is based on passenger transport activity expressed in passenger-kilometres. 

4 

 
 
 
                                                 
Modal split of passenger transport on land in 2014 

80.1% 

2.1% 

8.8% 

7.2% 

1.7% 

Source: Statistical Pocketbook 2016 EU Transport in figures 

Although  the  sector’s  share  of  the  land  passenger  transport  market  has  grown  by  0.4% 
since  2009,  these  high  level  statistics  do  not  accurately  describe  the  different  types  of 
coach  and  bus  services  within  the  scope  of  the  Regulation.  The  scope,  quality  and 
availability of data vary widely across Member States. There are inconsistencies across 
Member States in the definition of services (regular, international regular, special regular 
and  occasional)  and  the  distinction  between  bus  (usually  urban)  and  coach  services 
(usually inter-urban). Vehicle-kilometres and passenger-kilometres (pkm) are reported in 
different  and  mutually  inconsistent  ways  by  different  Member  States.  The  statistics 
available at the European and Member State levels frequently refer to all bus and coach 
services together. While some statistics are available at an aggregate level (and usually 
conflate both bus and coach operations) there are few statistics available for sub-sections 
of the market, e.g. medium or long distance coach services.  

As  shown  in  table  2-4,  14  Member  States  have  some  competition  on  the  market  for 
regular  services  accounting  for  an  estimated  278  billion  pkm.  However,  these  Member 
States  often  still  restrict  the  scope  of  inter-urban  coach  services  by  reference  to  a 
geographical market definition or a distance threshold; or by withholding permission to 
operate  following  an  analysis  of  the  impact  of  the  proposed  service  on  established 
operators;  or  by  requiring  operators  to  establish  locally;  or  in  some  cases  they  rely  on 
services  provided  under  public  service  contracts20  (PSC)  to  supplement  commerically 
operated  networks  and  protect  these  PSCs  from  competition.  These  will  be  described 
further in  section  2.5.1. Moreover,  as  desbribed in  section  2.3,  restrictions  in  a  broader 
sense  can  be  exacerbated  by  discrimination  in  access  to  bus  and  coach  terminals  (see 
section 2.3). 

There are a further 7 Member States with periodic tendering of concessions (competition 
for  the  market)  accounting  for  71  billion  pkm  and  7  Member  States  continue  to  limit 
competition considerably representing 30 billion pkm. 

Table 2-4: National market size and market liberalisation in the EU 

Member State 

Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 

20 See page iv for definition 

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Market size in 2015 
(billion pkm) 

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13.3 
7.6 
3.0 
1.1 
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Member State 

Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Slovak Republic 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 

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Market size in 2015 
(billion pkm) 

1.5 
4.4 
34.4 
45.1 
13.5 
14.7 
5.1 
77.0 
1.6 
2.4 
0.4 
0.4 
7.9 
32.2 
5.3 
10.6 
1.8 
4.8 
36.6 
4.9 
26.2 

Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave. 

The international market for regular services is small compared to the domestic market 
but it appears to be growing. It is estimated that international regular service passenger 
numbers  grew  by  40-60%  and  international  coach  pkm21  grew  by  between  0-40%, 
between 2009 and 201422. The domestic market in 2014 is broadly similar, and possibly 
slightly larger, than the market in 2009. The data suggests that the average international 
coach  trip  is  getting  shorter.  It  is  estimated  that  there  are  several  tens  of  millions  of 
passengers per year travelling, on average several hundred kilometres each. This stronger 
growth in international markets relative to the overall market suggests that operators have 
responded to opportunities provided by international liberalisation. 

In 2013 there were 43,352 enterprises operating bus and coach services in both national 
and  international  markets  (not  including  urban  or  suburban  services)  with  497,800 
employees23. 

21  A  passenger-kilometre  is  the  unit  of  measurement  representing  the  transport  of  one  passenger  by  a 

defined mode of transport over one kilometre 

22 Comprehensive Study on Passenger Transport in Europe, Steer Davies Gleave, April 2016 
23  Estimated  using  EUROSTAT  structural  business  statistics  "other  passenger  land  transport  n.e.c.  (not 
elsewhere categorised)". It is cautioned that this classification of economic activity is indicative as it 
includes more forms of land transport than coach. 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Many coach brands are a marketing alliance or partnership, managed by one operator and 
operated by several companies or by subcontractors. Many coach companies are domestic 
subsidiaries  of  foreign  owning  groups,  and  the  ultimate  ownership  of  individual  coach 
operators may depend on mergers and acquisitions activity among a more limited number 
of  parent  companies  including  rail  companies  (e.g.  Deutsche  Bahn  AG  and  SNCF)  and 
major transport groups (e.g. Arriva and National Express).  

Coach  operators  can  add  and  remove  routes  relatively  easily,  allowing  them  to  enter 
markets on a trial basis, or to modify services rapidly as markets change. The provision of 
the services, and their relative success, will generally depend on the characteristics of the 
competing  modes.  International  coach  services  and  networks  are  dynamic,  with 
competition sometimes leading to price wars and subsequent withdrawal of one or more 
operators. 

2.3. 

Evaluation of the Regulation 

The  ex-post  evaluation  of  the  Regulation  which  was  carried  out  from  2015  to  201724 
concluded  that  the  Regulation  has  contributed  to  the  establishment  of  a  more  coherent 
framework  for  international  services  by  coach  and  bus,  including  cabotage  operations. 
The opening of the international market for regular services has resulted in improvements 
in the level of service with growth in the number of operators, numbers of passengers and 
the  number  of  services  in  the  EU.  There  was  substantial  growth  in  certain  Member 
States, notably Czech Republic, Estonia and Poland, over the period 2009-2014 and the 
only  Member  State  with  data  available  that  reported  a  decrease  over  this  period  was 
Slovenia.  However, it has proved difficult to find evidence that directly links increase in 
activity  to  the  introduction  of  the  Regulation  and  some  of  the  evidence  is  largely 
anecdotal  and  insufficient  to  demonstrate  a  causal  relationship.  There  is  conclusive 
evidence  that  the  liberalisation  of  national  markets  by  MSs  in  combination  with  the 
liberalisation  of 
the  Regulation  created  a  favourable 
environment for the expansion of coach services at national and international level. The 
opening of national markets for regular services in countries such as Italy, Germany and 
France that followed the liberalisation of international services triggered the expansion of 
some  transport  operators  and  enhanced  the  provision  of  new  international  services.  It 
appears that  once  a  national  market  for  regular  service  is  established,  operators  tend  to 
exploit their national position through offering services to neighbouring countries. 

international  services  by 

The available evidence indicates that the Regulation has not had any discernible effect on 
the volume of employment. No conclusion could be drawn regarding the evolution of the 
working conditions of drivers. 

Despite its achievements, the inter-urban coach and bus sector has failed to grow at a rate 
comparable to that of other transport modes and its modal share has continued to decline 
over an extended period. There are different explanations to this but very importantly, as 
described  below;  it  appears  that  international  services,  without  competitive  inter-urban 
services, constitute less appealing service offerings to users. 

The evaluation has shown that the intended modal shift from passenger car to coach 
and bus services didn’t materialise to the anticipated extent. The anticipated impact 
was  a  more  sustainable  modal  mix  in  passenger  transport.  The  aim  was  to  promote 

24 The Commission published a Staff Working Document with the results of the evaluation: insert link to 

SWD 

7 

 
 
 
                                                 
passenger  transport  sustainability  by  shifting  traffic  volumes  away  from  car.  These 
expectations were largely based on an over-optimistic assumption that the promotion of 
bus alone would change passengers' modal choices. In fact, the coach sector has failed to 
grow  at  a  rate  comparable  to  that  of  passenger  cars  and  its  passenger  transport  share 
continued  to  decline  over  an  extended  period.  However,  the  problems  of  pollution, 
congestion and road safety that should have been addressed by the original objective of 
promoting coach and bus services as a sustainable alternative to individual car transport) 
still  exist  and  remain  valid.  Furthermore,  the  evaluation  identified  the  lack  of  an 
attractive  mix  of  affordable  alternative  transport  modes  for  citizens  as  a  new  and  –  at 
least - equally urgent challenge. 

The original Regulation did not aim at integrating national markets for regular services. 
However, the latter are recognised in the evaluation as a critical factor in the provision of 
international  services.  The  evolution  of  the  market,  in  terms  of  different  and  divergent 
rules  on  access  to  national  markets  in  Member  States,  is  a  problem  that  was  not 
previously apparent or  considered when the intervention was designed. This  patchwork 
of regulatory systems in the EU makes it difficult for carriers to exploit the full potential 
of operating in an Internal Market, impedes integration and undermines the efficiency of 
coach and bus services.  

The  scope  of  the  objectives  of  the  original  Regulation  did  not  cover  the  problem  of 
discrimination  in  access  to  terminals.  Yet,  without  non-discriminatory  access  to 
terminals, bus and coach operators are forced to stop at the road-side, which diminishes 
the quality of service provided to users. Moreover, terminals serve a vital role acting as a 
hub  in  a  network  enabling  passengers  to  change  coach  or  acting  as  a  multimodal  hub 
enabling  passengers  to  transfer  to  another  collective  mode  of  transport.  The  evaluation 
found evidence of discriminatory access to terminals in Austria, Czech Republic, France, 
Croatia and the UK which distorts service patterns and limits the possibility of operators 
to adapt services to passenger demand. The accessibility to terminals as well as the extent 
to which the terminals are linked to other modes of transport is particularly important for 
international regular services. 

2.4. 

Problem definition 

Following 
consultations, two main problems were identified. The main problems are: 

the  ex-post  evaluation,  further  Commission  work  and  stakeholder 

  operators  are  facing  obstacles  in  national  markets  to  develop  inter-urban 

coach services, and 
the low modal share of sustainable transport modes25.  

 

The effects of these problems for citizens are described in figure 2-1. In non-liberalised 
markets this contributes to the transport disadvantage of certain groups of citizens. 
Furthermore  citizens  in  general  are  faced  with  a  lack  of  connectivity  and  non–
integrated services. In particular, the ability of citizens in disadvantaged regions that are 
more  sensitive  to  the  price  of  transport,  and  to  purchase  end-to-end  tickets  from  a 
competitive  pan-European  operator  could  substantially 
to 
employment, education and leisure opportunities. 

their  access 

improve 

25 Of modes that are competing on inter-urban transport, coach and trains are the most energy efficient and 

produce the least CO2 emissions (Bus and coach transport greening mobility, CE Delft 2011).  

8 

 
 
                                                 
The  evaluation  concluded  that  operators  are  faced  with  a  wide  range  of  restrictions  on 
access  to  national  inter-urban  markets  even  in  Member  States  that  have  introduced 
different forms of market liberalisation. The date of most recent liberalisation relating to 
national  markets  for  regular  services  varies  widely,  from  1980  in  the  UK  to  2015  in 
France.  Partly  as  a  consequence,  both  the  type  of  services  which  have  been  liberalised 
and the extent of the liberalisation vary widely between Member States. For example: 

  Some  create  a  number  of  regional  concessions  competitively,  with  exclusive 

rights to operate services (e.g. Spain). 

  Some  permit  commercial  operations,  subject  to  rules  designed  to  protect  PSC’s 

(e.g. France) 

  Some  permit  commercial  operations  carrying  passengers  beyond  a  minimum 

distance (e.g. United Kingdom). 

  Some  delegate  responsibility  to  regional,  county  or  municipal  authorities  (e.g. 

Germany). 

9 

 
 
 
 Figure 2-1: Problem Tree 

10 

 
 
In  these  liberalised  national  markets,  restrictions  therefore  include  inter  alia  the 
prohibition  of  services  below  a  certain  distance  threshold  or  prohibition  of  cabotage 
services  or  withholding  permission  to  operate  due  to  negative  impacts  on  established 
operators.  Operators  encounter  additional  problems  due  to  the  excessive  time  taken  to 
grant  or  refuse  an  authorisation  following  a  procedure  with  little  or  no  transparency. 
Some Member States continue to require that operators establish locally forcing them to 
adopt different business models to overcome this restriction. 

In  the  14  Member  States  with  non-liberalised  markets  (see  table  2-4)  there  are  a  wide 
range  of  restrictions  on  access  to  markets  for  inter-urban  services.  These  restrictions 
originated  from  a  variety  of  different  sources  including  Member  States  protecting  rail, 
protecting  incumbent  operators,  protecting  PSC’s,  or  putting  in  place  market  access 
arrangements  that  are  considered  to  better  reflect  the  local  circumstances.  This  means 
that  barriers  to  market  entry  exist  at  a  number  of  levels,  ranging  from  tight  national 
control  of  services,  through  regional  awards  of  concessions  with  exclusive  rights 
(whether  directly  awarded  or  competitively  tendered),  to  local  requirements  for,  or 
prohibitions on, stopping in particular locations. 

The  number  and  diversity  of  regulatory  frameworks  and  authorising  procedures  across 
the  EU  imposes  excessive  administrative  costs  on  operators  seeking  to  provide  regular 
services  in  more  than  one  domestic  market.  Furthermore  the  range  of  authorising 
procedures  deters  coach  operators  from  providing  international  services  as  in  reality 
national  and  international  are  interlinked  and  in  turn  integrated  with  other  modes  of 
transport. 

Discrimination in access to terminals is a common problem across the EU. A review 
of a number of cases investigated by competition authorities in different Member States 
provided  information  on  whether  the  actions  of  particular  transport  and  terminal 
operators  were  anti-competitive26.  These  cases  demonstrate  the  variety  of  different 
problems  and  their  impacts  on  the  services  provided  by  competing  coach  operators 
including: 

  Refusal  to  grant  access  to  competitive  terms  can  prevent  a  competitor  from 

introducing a new service on a given route; 

  A decision by a terminal owner to also access to a single preferred supplier can 

have the effect of displacing even an established competitor; 

  A decision by incumbent coach operator to vacate a terminal in favour of a new 
facility  can  have  the  effect  of  undermining  the  services  of  competitors  who 
remain. 

They also demonstrate that reaching a decision in a case involving abuse of a dominant 
position and anti-competitive behaviour can take several years.  

The  UK  based  operator  association  Confederation  of  Passenger  Transport  (CPT)  stated  during  the 
consultation that terminal access was a major concern. They suggested that there should be an EU-wide 
regulation  requiring  Member  States  to  adopt  appropriate  measures  to  enhance  and  manage  terminal 
capacity. 

26 See table 3.3 Support Study for the IA for the Revision of Regulation 1073/2009 Steer Davies Gleave 

11 

 
 
                                                 
Coach services have the potential to provide transport opportunities that match the needs 
of these disadvantaged groups of citizens, typically without passenger cars, as it can offer 
low fares and a large network of services. 

In  2014  passenger  cars  accounted  for  83.4  %  of  inland  passenger  transport  whilst  the 
more  sustainable  collective  modes  of  transport  (train,  coach,  bus,  metro  and  tram) 
accounted for only 16.7%. Over the period 2004 to 2014 the relative importance of the 
use of passenger cars was quite stable, with its share always within the range of 83% to 
83.7%. This indicates that the more sustainable collective transport modes have not been 
able to reduce the relative importance of the use of passenger cars. 

The decline in the modal share of coach services has to be seen in the context of the 
very wide potential for such services. The potential for the development of the network 
of  coach  services  is  linked  to  the  density  of  the  road  network  in  the  EU.  The  greater 
density of the road network should enable coach operators to develop more extensive and 
complex  networks,  to  provide  services  to  more  cities,  and  to  provide  more  services  to 
rural areas that are not served by, or accessible to rail, air or maritime transport. Figure 2-
2 illustrates that the road density in each MS is much greater than that of the rail network. 
Figure  2-2:  Density  of  the  total  road  (km  road/km2  land  area)  and  rail  (km  rail/km2  land  area) 
networks27 

6%

5%

4%

3%

2%

1%

0%

BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT LV LT LU HU NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK

Density road network

Density rail network

Source: Adapted from Statistical Pocketbook 2016 EU Transport in figures 

Expansion  of  the  network  of  coach  services  could  improve  the  connectivity  of 
disadvantaged  regions  and  supplement  existing  bus  and  rail  networks.  Figure  2-3 
shows  the  GDP  (Gross  Domestic  Product)  per  capita  (measured  by  purchasing  power 
rates)  in  NUTS-228  regions  across  the  EU,  with  locations  served  by  Flixbus’s  network 
overlaid. Since commencing the expansion of its network beyond its home Member State 
(Germany)  in  2015  Flixbus  has  developed  one  of  Europe’s  largest  long-distance  coach 
and bus networks. The figure shows that the expansion has been heavily concentrated in 
recently  liberalised  markets  (France  and  Italy)  that  served  as  the  stepping  stone  for  the 
uptake of bus and coach services both at national and international level. It also clearly 
shows  that  network  expansion  has  been  constrained  significantly,  in  countries  such  as 
Greece  and  Spain  where  national  markets  are  still  closed  despite  the  presence  of  well-
established industries in tourism expected to generate significant levels of coach traffic. 

27 CY and MT are not included as they do not have rail networks 
28 Please see http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/overview for an overview of NUTS-2 (Nomenclature of 

territorial units for statistics)  

12 

 
 
                                                 
 
However it also shows that currently, there are relatively few locations in disadvantaged 
NUTS-2  regions  with  GDP  per  capita  of  less  than  €20,000  (e.g.  in  Poland,  the  Slovak 
Republic,  Hungary,  Romania  and  Bulgaria)  covered  by  the  network  of  coach  services. 
This suggests that an expansion of the network to the east could improve the connectivity 
of  several  more  disadvantages  NUTS-2  regions  and  supplement  existing  bus  and  rail 
networks  even  in  Member  States  with  liberalised  markets  (e.g.  in  Poland,  the  Slovak 
Republic, Romania and Bulgaria). As described above, better and more integrated service 
offerings to users from disadvantaged regions via the possibility to purchase end-to-end 
tickets  could  substantially  improve  their  access  to  employment,  education  and  leisure 
opportunities.  

Figure 2-3 GDP per capita by NUTS-2 region and the Flixbus network 

Source:  Comprehensive  study  on  passenger  transport  by  coach,  Steer  Davies  Gleave,  April 
2016. 
The Special Eurobarometer Report on Coach Services29 (hereinafter “the Eurobarometer 
Report”) survey indicates that the  pricing of coach services is an important factor in 
the  mode-choice  of  both  non-users  and  economically  disadvantaged  users.  More 
specifically,  the  socio-demographic  breakdown  shows  a  notable  difference  between  the 
average  non-user  and  non-users  from  disadvantaged  groups.  For  example,  on  average 
26% of respondents would be more likely to use coach services if fares were lower. This 
increases to 35% of people with difficulty paying bills most of the time, 31% who have 
difficulty paying bills from time to time, 36% of respondents still studying and 34% of 
respondents aged 15-24.  

Restrictions  to  the  provision  of  inter-urban  coach  services  in  national  markets  seem  to 
lead  to  low  service  quality  and  higher  fares.  Table  2-5  describes  the  impacts  on  inter-
urban  coach  services  in  Member  States  that  have  recently  liberalised  their  markets  to 
promote  travel  by  coach.  The  results  demonstrate  that  fares  can  be  as  much  as  20% 
more expensive on routes where the provision of coach services is restricted than on 

29  

http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/SP
ECIAL/surveyKy/2144 

13 

 
 
 
                                                 
routes where there is competition. It also demonstrates that service quality was lower, the 
number and frequency of services was lower, the size of the route network was smaller 
(with less accessibility), and less on-board services were provided e.g. less provision of 
Wi-Fi. 

Table 2-5: Impact of liberalisation on fares and service quality 

Study 

Member 
State 

Impact of liberalisation 

Identified  a  statistical 
level  of  market 
concentration and fare offered indicating that actual competition is an 
important  determinant  of  fare  levels.  Also,  the  threat  of  new  entry 
alone was sufficient to constrain the fares offered by incumbents. 

relationship  between 

From  the  customer’s  perspective,  coach  market  liberalisation  has 
already improved standards and choice. Increase in number of services 
and service frequencies. Coach services are now being promoted more 
actively,  with  services  marketed  on  the  size  of  the  route  network, 
better value for money and the environmental benefits of coach travel. 

Open  access  to  routes  can  have  a  significant 
impact  on  fare 
competition. It suggests that fares on routes served by three operators 
are 17% lower than on monopoly routes. 

Augustin 
(2013)30 

Germany 

France  

Deman31 

Germany 

Italy 

Germany 

Dürr 
and 
Hüschelrath 
(2015)32 

Gipp 
(2016)33 

Germany 

Gradual  decline  in  tariffs  and  greater  innovation  in  the  interests  of 
passengers (e.g. web-based ticketing & provision of Wi-Fi). 

Grimaldi  et 
al (2016)34 

Italy 

New entrants introducing pricing strategies based on airline-style yield 
management  with  substantial  discounts  available  for  early  booking,  in 
contrast to the more rigid, distance based fares strategies that are still 
pursued by established incumbents. 

Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave 

In  principle,  the  benefits  of  opening  access  described  above  serve  to  demonstrate  the 
benefits  foregone  in  Member  States  in  which  there  is  little  or  no  competition  between 
operators.  The  evidence  on  the  effects  of  competition  to  date,  coupled  with  the 

30  Contestability  of  the  long  distance  German  coach  market,  Katrin  Augustin,  KCW  GmbH,  European 

Transport Conference 2013. 

31 Liberalisation of passenger transport in Europe and its consequences for the fleet, Jan Deman, Director 

of Busworld Academy. 

32  Niklas  S  Dürr  and  Kai  Hüschelrath,  Competition  in  the  German  Interurban  Bus  Industry:  A  Snapshot 

Two Years After Liberalisation, Centre for European Economic Research, August 2015. 

33  Economic  Lessons  from  the  Liberalization  of  the  German  Bus  Market,  Christoph  Gipp,  IGES  Institut 

GmbH, March 2016. 

34 Intercity coach liberalisation - the cases of Germany and Italy, Raffaele Grimaldi, Katrin Augustin, Paolo 

Beria, World Conference on Transport Research, July 2016. 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
demonstrable  restrictions  on  market  access  in  many  Member  States,  suggest  there  is 
considerable scope for improving the competitiveness of the sector from the perspective 
of  passengers.  Greater  competition  within  national  markets  would  result  in  lower  and 
more innovative fares, more efficient promotion of coach and bus regular services. 

The  2011  White  Paper  calls  for  greater  integration  of  modal  networks  to  provide 
passengers with better modal choice. Passengers are less likely to use coach services if 
they do not connect with other coach services or sustainable modes of transport or if the 
connections  provided  are  not  convenient.  The  range  of  facilities  (such  as  well-signed 
information)  and  onward 
interchanges,  and  relevant  and  accessible  passenger 
connectivity  which  the  majority  of  coach  terminals  provide  makes  them  particularly 
attractive, and important, for passengers.  

Restrictions on access to terminals are widespread and that they have a material impact on the services 
provided  to  operators  and  passengers.  For  example,  during  the  targeted  consultation  exercise  the 
operators  National  Express  and  Megabus  confirmed  the  importance  of  serving  terminals  that  enable 
interchange with other modes. National Express also highlighted the importance of ensuring connectivity 
between international and national coach services.  

The  evidence  indicates that  the  provision,  standards,  ownership and  regulation  of  terminals  vary  widely 
between Member States, within Member States, and even within the same city. This variety of conditions 
makes access to terminals and integration with other modes complex and difficult. 

The  IRU  stated  that  there  is  a  general  lack  of  integrated  terminal  facilities  supporting  door-to-door 
transport and undermining the ability of operators to meet customer’s needs. Other operator stakeholders 
stated that roadside stops are not appropriate for encouraging multi-modal travel. Fewer than one in six 
respondents (13%) in the Eurobarometer Report gave good connections with other transport services as a 
reason for using coach services.  

The European Disability Forum (EDF) confirmed that multi-modal terminals are particularly important for 
persons  with  reduced  mobility  (PRMs)  who  rely  on  being  able  to  transfer  between  modes  easily.  The 
Eurobarometer  Report  indicates  that  of  the  respondents  that use  coach services one in ten respondents 
stated they use coach services to travel to or from airports and a further 7% use the services to travel to or 
from rail stations. Of the non-users of coach services 21% reported they would be more likely to use the 
services if there was a more extensive network of routes and stations and better connections with other 
transport modes. 

Consequences of problems 

Situations  of  transport  disadvantage,  or  low  levels  of  accessibility,  occur  when  there  is 
little  or  no access to  public transport or  other transport modes,  which restricts mobility 
and  access  to  employment,  education  and  leisure  opportunities.  This,  in  addition, 
disproportionately impacts on certain disadvantaged groups35 of citizens. 

Similarly to inter-urban services, there is evidence that the accessibility to long distance 
services is  associated  with  income  levels36.  In  other  words, citizens  with  high  levels  of 
income generally have access to much improved mobility services. 

35 Disadvantaged groups include those sensitive to the price of transport, low income, those in education 
and training, unemployed, young people, old people, people with restricted mobility (PRMs), disabled 
people, those living in disadvantage areas, living in isolated regions, and households with no access to 
a car and living outside urban areas. 

36 http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC96151/jrc96151_final version 2nd 

correction.pdf 

15 

 
 
                                                 
The  lack  of  inter-urban  mobility  for  economically  disadvantaged  groups  is  a  problem 
because these citizens may not be able to participate in key activities such as education, 
job, visiting family and friends, healthcare and in general suffer social exclusion. 

2.5.  What are the problem drivers? 

As indicated in the problem tree, figure 2.1, there are three underlying problem drivers 
affecting the two main problems of operators’ facing obstacles in national markets to 
develop inter-urban coach services, and a persistent low modal share of sustainable 
passenger transport modes.  

2.5.1.

  Problem driver 1: Restricted access to national inter-urban markets 

The regulatory frameworks for national coach services vary widely between the Member 
States.  In  some  cases  access  to  markets  is  directly  restricted  through  the  award  of 
contracts to monopoly service providers. This both eliminates the scope for competition 
on  individual  routes  and  substantially  hinders  the  development  of  international 
commercial  services  and  networks.  For  example,  in  Greece  contracts  are  awarded 
directly  to  operators  within  KTEL,  a  jointly  funded  group  of  companies  and  in  Spain 
contracts are competitively tendered, with operators only periodically being subjected to 
competitive  discipline.  Restrictions  may  also  stem  from  interactions  with  rail  services, 
which  Member  States  in  certain  cases  protect  as  these  are  considered  to  be  more 
environmental friendly. 

As shown in table 2-4 above, there are 14 Member States who limit competition on their 
markets accounting for in excess of 100 billion pkm. These Member States can exclude 
operators  entirely  from  potential  markets  or  award  PSCs  which  favour  incumbent 
operators  and  prevent  potential  new  entrants  from  competing  on  equal  terms  (e.g. 
Austria,  Belgium,  Greece  and  Spain).  By  definition,  the  award  of  monopoly  contracts 
effectively  eliminates  the  scope  for  competition  on  individual  routes.  It  can  also 
substantially constrain the development of international networks. Even where contracts 
are  subject  to  competitive  procurement,  the  cost  and  uncertainty  of  mounting  a  bid  to 
operate  an  entire  route  network  will  discourage  potential  market  entrants  who  would 
otherwise have tested commercial opportunities through more limited market entry. The 
length of concession contracts also limits the opportunities for new entry. 

As  mentioned above  restrictions  also occur on liberalised national markets  including:  a 
prohibition  of  services  below  a  certain  distance  threshold  (e.g.  France  and  Germany); 
withholding  permission  to  operate  following  an  analysis  of  the  impact  of  the  proposed 
service on an established operator (e.g. Ireland and Estonia); and prohibitions on certain 
types  of  services,  for  example  cabotage  operations,  in  Latvia.  The  application  of  these 
different approaches to protect PSCs makes it difficult for operators to plan new services. 

Operators  have  reported  during  the  stakeholder  consultation  that  even  in  liberalised  markets  they 
encounter problems due to the excessive time taken to grant or refuse an authorisation and that there is 
little or no transparency in authorisation procedures especially in the application of mechanisms to protect 
PSCs. 

Restrictions on market entry can be exacerbated through the process of awarding PSC’s, 
which  may  favour  incumbent  operators  and  prevent  potential  new  entrants  from 
competing on equal terms.  

For  example, BusUp,  a  provider  of occasional  and  discretionary  coach services,  noted  that  both  existing 
and new contracts are often tendered on terms that only established operators can meet. It stated that 

16 

 
 
the large size of concessions in Spain resulted in difficulties for SMEs bidding for them. Similarly, the Coach 
Tourism and Transport Council of Ireland has suggested that the pre-qualification criteria for bidding for 
recent PSC’s were such as to preclude the majority of private operators. 

Limiting the number of bidders in this way may mean that new operators are prevented 
from  extending  their  networks  even  where  they  are  prepared  to  operate  services  under 
PSC and meet contractual requirements defined by regional and local authorities. 

Member States that have liberalised national regular services always continue to require 
that  operators  establish  locally  and  have  not  taken  the  opportunity  to  decide  that  the 
Community licence shall be valid for national transport operations under the provisions 
of  Regulation  1073/2009.  This  forces  operators  to  adopt  different  business  models  to 
overcome  this  restriction.  The  business  models  include  contracting  services  to  local 
operators  and  establishing  subsidiaries.  Operators  have  confirmed  that  the  costs  of 
circumventing  local  establishment  requirements  can  be  significant,  even  for  large 
operators. The biggest perceived negative impact of the requirement to establish locally 
is  the  associated  administrative  costs  for  the  carrier.  81%  of  the  36  carriers  that 
responded  to  the  open  public  consultation  (OPC)  identified  these  costs  as  having  a 
negative impact. 

Stakeholders responding to the OPC generally agreed that restrictions on access to national markets for 
regular services are a problem. Of the 153 respondents, 33% agreed that it is a major problem and 27% 
stated  it  is  a  minor  problem.  67%  of  the  45  operators  responded  that  the  restrictions  have  a  negative 
impact on their ability to expand into new markets and none expressed the view that they had a positive 
impact. 

Public Service Contracts 

Some public passenger transport services that society needs as part of its general interest 
cannot be run commercially, so the competent national, regional or local EU authorities 
must be able to make certain they are provided. Competent authorities can do this: 

  by awarding exclusive rights to operators running public services, compensating them 
financially.  This  usually  takes  the  form  of  bundling  profitable  and  non-profitable 
routes together so that the profitable routes cross-subsidise the non-profitable routes, 
and also 

  by  defining  rules  (i.e.  public  service  obligations)  for  how public  transport  should  be 
operated.  For  instance,  public  subsidies  can  be  granted  for  the  provision  of 
transportation  services,  particularly  for  low-density  routes,  usually  connecting  rural 
areas.  Such  subsidies  can  be  granted  both  to  railway  and  coach  services.  As  a 
reference,  the  total  amount  of  subsidies  granted  for  the  compensation  of  railways 
PSOs in the European Union in 2015 amounted to EUR 20 billion. 

Article 14 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Protocol 
No 26 on services of general interest annexed to the TFEU sets out the general principles 
of how Member States define and provide services of general economic interest. The EU 
has developed legislation to avoid disparities between Member States in the procedures 
and conditions they apply to the execution of public service obligations. 

17 

 
 
Evidence from a previous study37 indicates that there is little consistency across Member 
States in terms of the size of the area of competence of the competent authorities which 
organise  public  transport  and  PSCs.  In  smaller  or  island  Member  States  the  authorities 
tend  to  be  national,  whilst  in  many  Member  State  there  can  be  a  large  number  of 
authorities.  Some  states  have  authorities  in  charge  of  transport  at  a  regional  level, 
including Belgium, Germany, Czech Republic, Denmark, Croatia, Italy, Spain, Slovakia 
and  Sweden.  There  is  nothing  to  prevent  authorities  of  national  competence  to  manage 
many  distinct  contracts.  However,  in  the  case  of  Ireland,  Cyprus  and  Malta,  there  are 
only a limited number of public service contracts in use.  

The opening of access to the national market for regular services would enable operators 
to provide new services which, if attractive, will both: 

  provide  welfare  benefits  to  new  passengers  who  would  not  otherwise    have 

travelled; and 

 

take  passengers  from  existing  services,  reducing  the  revenues  of  existing 
operators  and  incentivising  them,  where  possible,  to  improve  quality  and  lower 
fares, reduce costs, or cut services. 

Where new services effect existing services provided under a PSC, Member States and 
competent  authorities  are  likely  to  be  concerned  if  the  first  effect  “generation”  (of 
revenues through newly generated demand for bus and coach services) is small compared 
to the second effect “abstraction” (of revenues from existing operators). 

Currently  there  are  a  number  of  different  approaches  to  protecting  PSC’s  based  on 
restricting or limiting new entry. These are: 

  Regulation  1073/2009  requires  that  international  coach  services  be  authorised 
except on the basis of detailed analysis of their effect on one or more PSC’s. 

  Regulation 1370/2009 permits exclusive rights to protect any PSO provided by in 

particular any land transport mode. 

  Directive 2012/34 as amended Directive 2016/2370 requires that international and 
domestic  rail  services  may  be  limited  to  protect  the  economic  equilibrium  of  a 
PSC applicable to the same or an alternative route. 

Each  of  the  options  described  in  section  5  dealing  with  PSCs  will  continue  to  provide 
Member  States  with  the  capability  to  protect  PSCs  whilst  also  providing  carriers  with 
transparency together with clear, simple and rapid procedures to address demand.  

During  stakeholder  consultation  9  out  of  the  13  Member  States  that  replied  reported  that  they  were 
concerned about the potential adverse impact on services operated under PSCs. To address these concerns 
all measures dealing with market access include a measure to protect PSC’s. 

2.5.2.

  Problem driver 2: Excessive administrative costs of entry 

We have identified extensive evidence that administrative costs incurred by operators can 
be  material  and  that  administrative  processes  can  delay  entry.  It  is  also  clear  that  the 
requirements for the authorisation of national and international regular services can vary 
significantly by Member State.  

37 Study on economic and financial effects of the implementation of Regulation 1370/2007 on public passenger transport services by Steer 

Davies Gleave 2016 

18 

 
 
                                                 
Operators  face  excessive  costs  of  entry  in  national  and  international  markets  due  to 
national  and  local  authorisation  procedures  and  requirements  including  in  the  case  of 
applications to operate international services under the Regulation. 

In  Germany  the  application  process  can  take  up  to  four  months  with  different  procedures  in  different 
Länder.  The  authorisation  procedures  for  international  and  national  regular  services  involve  protracted 
paper-based  administrative  procedures  with  both  large  and  small  operators  acknowledging  that  this 
process  favours  larger  established  operators  who  are  well  placed  to  understand  national  requirements 
and  processes.  Operators  also  highlighted  the  importance  of  language  barriers  and  the  need  for 
translators to communicate requirements and complete application forms. 

Coach operators who carry out international occasional services, such as group tours to 
holiday destinations, require a journey form. The journey form holds information about 
the type of transport on the one hand and about destination, route and passengers on the 
other  hand.  The  journey  form  generates  an  unnecessary  administrative  burden  for 
operators.   

The  REFIT  Platform  has  considered  a  submission  from  the  Dutch  Ministry  of  Infrastructure  and 
Environment on the elimination of the journey form38 clearly shows mixed views. The Stakeholder group 
considers  that  the  journey  form  has  lost  its  relevance,  generates  unnecessary  administrative  burden  for 
many operators, in particular SME’s and recommends its removal. 

Within the Government group, views are divided. While a few Member States consider that the abolition of 
the  journey  form  would  reduce  regulatory  burden  for  both  carriers  and  Member  States,  the  majority  of 
Member States see the journey form as an effective control tool to complement tachographs which needs to 
be maintained. 

In the OPC 75% of the 65 companies and 78% of the 27 non-governmental organisations stated that the 
journey  forms  serve  no  useful  purpose.  Although  12  Member  States  indicated  that  they  do  not  support 
abolishing  the  form  the  reasons  provided  are  inconsistent  with  the  experience  in  Denmark,  Finland, 
Norway  and  Sweden  who  abolished  the  obligation  of  the  journey  form  for  operators  that  have  their 
business establishment in their countries in 2003 and there have been no negative consequences for road 
inspections. 

The estimated administrative burden of market entry for authorisation and journey form 
are provided in the table below: 

Table 2-6: Estimates of the administrative costs of market entry 
Process 
Authorisation  Resources used by 

Source of costs 

Time 
Three days  Based on stakeholder comments concerning need 

Comment 

operator to complete 
application 
The delay in the reply 
to the application for 
authorisation 
Resources used by 
national authority to 
process application 

Journey form  Time taken for 

operator/driver to 
complete journey 
form 
Resources used by 
national authority on 
inspection 

for translation and consultancy advice  

Two 
months 

Five days 

Stakeholders have indicated that elapsed time for 
approval can be four months but that two months 
would be more appropriate 
Elapsed time of four months suggests significant 
number of days’ effort 

Less than 
one hour 

No reason to modify this estimate based on 
evidence to date  

Five 
minutes – 
10% of 

Inspection time proportionate to time to complete 
the form. Inspection rate of 10% gives sufficiently 
high likelihood of inspection to encourage 

38 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/xv9apassengertransport.pdf  

19 

 
 
                                                 
forms 
inspected 

compliance 

Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave 

Some  Member  States  have  taken  action  to  reduce  the  administrative  burden.  For 
example, the abolition of the use of journey forms in Nordic Member States. Operators or 
national  authorities  do  not  record  the  administrative  cost  systematically  but  there  is 
extensive  evidence  that  the  costs  incurred  can  be  material  and  that  administrative 
processes can delay entry for operators.  

2.5.3.

  Problem driver 3: Restricted access to key infrastructure  

Terminals provide connectivity to the network of coach services and serve as a place of 
interchange between coach services. They also act as an interface between the network of 
coach services and urban, rail, air or maritime networks. The provision of terminals in the 
EU is variable. Some Member States appear to expect or require the competent national, 
regional  or  local  authorities  to  provide  terminals  whilst  others  have  no  systematic 
provision  of  terminals.  There  are  several  models  of  terminal  ownership  across  the  EU 
including  ownership  by  national,  regional  and  local  government,  by  operators,  by  the 
railway  infrastructure  manager,  by  airports,  privately  and  by  other  parties.  In  some 
Member States the terminal ownership is irrelevant, because the coach market is highly 
restricted or regulated and new coach services are not allowed to compete with existing 
services or operators are not permitted to operate domestic regular services. 

The success of inter-urban services depends largely on the extent to which they connect 
with other modes of transport and the convenience of the connections provided. Access 
to terminals is a factor that limits competition in the market. There is evidence (collected 
during two 2016 studies39,40) that carriers face restrictions in access to key infrastructure 
are common and widespread with instances identified in 14 Member States41. The issue 
of  equal  access  to  terminals  was  investigated  further  during  the  targeted  consultation 
exercise as there is a particular risk that access to terminals may be a barrier to entry if 
the  company  that  manages  the  terminal  is  vertically  integrated  with  one  of  the  coach 
operators. Where  the  terminal  operator  is  independent  of the  coach  operator,  it is  more 
likely that they will treat operators equally, although this is not guaranteed and they may 
still face incentives to protect the largest operator. The evidence indicates that restrictions 
on terminal access are widespread and that they can materially impact on services.  

Due to the decline in the coach market over an extended period the amount of terminal 
capacity has increased particularly in central and eastern European States, where rapidly 
increasing car ownership has reduced the demand for long distance coach travel.  

However,  there  are  still  issues  with  access  to  terminals  in  other  Member  States. 
Experience  in  Germany,  following  liberalisation  of  the  market  for  regular  services, 
suggests that terminal access may become a problem after market opening when a rapid 
expansion  of  services  puts  pressure  on  available  resources.  A  key  issue  is,  where  there 
are capacity restrictions, how is it decided to distribute slots between operators. This is 

39 Comprehensive Study on Passenger Transport by Coach in Europe, April 2016 
40  https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/modes/road/studies/doc/2016-04-passenger-transport-

by-coach-in-europe.pdf  

41 Belgium,  Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 

Slovakia, Sweden and UK 

20 

 
 
                                                 
not always transparent, and coach operators have been refused access to terminals on the 
basis  of  capacity  restrictions  which  were  very  unclear.  The  following  table  provides  a 
summary of some of the issues raised by stakeholders including operators, regulators and 
ministries:  

Table 2-7: Examples of restrictions on terminal access 

Stakeholder 

Remarks 

ARAFER 

ART 

Ministry of 
Transport 
Greece 

Ministry of 
Transport 
Slovak 
Republic 

Ministry for 
Transport for 
Baden-
Würtemberg 

Megabus 

Ouibus 

National 
Express 

Autorité de régulation des activités ferroviaires et routières cited a recent case in which 
it was required to resolve a dispute concerning access to Beauvais airport. Initially, the 
terminal operator failed to publish access rules, and while they were subsequently made 
available, ARAFER considered that they were poorly written and that the objective of 
the  rules  was  open  to  question.  At  the  time  of  writing  there  is  an  ongoing  procedure, 
whereby ARAFER is investigating whether the terminal operator has breached its legal 
obligations. 

Autorità di Regolazione dei trasporti highlighted a general lack of terminal capacity in 
cities such as Rome and Torino. The terminals that are available are heavily congested 
and it is difficult for new operators to gain access. ART also suggested that the lack of a 
clear  definition  of  terminals,  setting  out  minimum  standards  for  facilities,  made  it 
difficult to enforce access. 

It is bringing forward a Presidential Decree defining mandatory standards for different 
categories of terminal to clarify the facilities that should be made available to operators. 
It  also  referred  to  the  construction  of  a  new  terminal  at  Elleonas,  consolidating  the 
existing  facilities  at  Kifisos  and  Liosia.  This  will  provide  capacity  for  international 
services, which are currently not permitted to use the inter-city terminals. 

Cited a case recently referred to them in which an operator complained that a regional 
authority  had  refused  to  grant  a  licence  because  the  city  centre  at  one  end  of  the 
proposed  route  was  congested.  The  Ministry  subsequently  confirmed  that  the  licence 
should be issued, but the example demonstrates how local restrictions can frustrate or at 
least delay market entry. 

Observed  that  while  there  is  no  discrimination  in  terminal  access  in  Germany, 
infrastructure  designed  for  local  public  transport  is  not  necessarily  suited  to  longer 
distance  transport  services.  The  Supreme  Building  Authority  within  the  Bavarian 
Ministry of the Interior also noted that local authorities must be permitted to determine 
how the facilities that they owned were used to further their own transport objectives. 

Confirmed  that  it  preferred  to  use  terminals  rather  than  on-street  stops,  particularly 
when  passengers  require  inter-modal  transport  links.  It  noted  that  it  had  experienced 
difficulties  in  gaining  access  to  terminals  owned  and  managed  by  railway  operators, 
citing Trenitalia’s refusal to provide access to the terminal in Padua by way of example. 
They  also  observed  that  there  is  no  terminal  in  Brussels  and  that  the  city  centre  is 
reserved for tourist coaches. 

Noted difficulties in obtaining access to terminal facilities as well as on-street stops in 
some  French  cities,  and  indicated  that  in  some  cases  coaches  had  effectively  been 
prohibited from operating to city-centre locations. 

Observed that there are generally insufficient public terminals across Europe, and that 
several  major  cities  including  Amsterdam,  Paris  and  Brussels  do  not  have  any  public 
terminals. In Austria, terminals tend to be owned by the rail operator and requests for 
access can be refused, while in France they are increasingly being located outside of city 
centres.  Competitors  are  generally  unwilling  to  share  their  terminals  and  they  are 
anyway frequently capacity constrained. 

Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave 

21 

 
 
There is considerable evidence42 that discrimination is a common problem in the EU and 
occurs  where  terminal  facilities  are  both  privately  and  publicly  owned.  Discriminatory 
behaviour in relation to privately owned terminals is more difficult to challenge from a 
policy  perspective,  since  the  business  case  underpinning  private  sector  investment  may 
depend on a single operator having exclusive use of the available capacity. Regulations 
having  the  effect  of  providing  a  right  of  access  to  third  parties  whether  set  at  the 
European  Union  or  national  level  could  therefore  have  the  effect  of  discouraging  such 
investment.  For  this  reason,  concerns  about  discrimination  relating  to  privately  owned 
terminals are arguably better addressed through competition policy, whereby the relevant 
authorities  can  assess  the  merits  of  particular  actions  on  the  part  of  terminal  owners’ 
case-by-case. 

By  contrast,  discriminatory  behaviour  by  the  operators  of  publicly  owned  terminals  is 
more  difficult  to  justify,  since  the  underlying  investment  is  more  usually  driven  by 
recognition of the importance of providing appropriate facilities to support good quality 
public  transport  services  within  a  country,  region  or  city.  Moreover,  public  terminal 
facilities are often provided to ensure that passengers can interchange between transport 
modes, an important consideration in the planning of many coach services. 

The  cases  above,  amongst  others,  demonstrate  a  variety  of  impacts  that  discriminatory 
behaviour  can  have  on  carriers  including:  refusal  to  grant  access  on  competitive  terms 
can prevent a competitor from introducing a new service on a given route; a decision by a 
terminal  owner  to  allow  access  to  a  single  preferred  supplier  can  have  the  effect  of 
displacing even an established competitor; and a decision by an incumbent bus and coach 
operator  to  vacate  a  terminal  in  favour  of  a  new  facility  can  have  the  effect  of 
undermining the services of competitors who remain. They also demonstrate that in the 
absence of applicable rules the time taken to reach a decision on cases involving abuse of 
a  dominant  position  and  anti-competitive  behaviour  can  take  a  number  of  years, 
particularly if challenged in court. 

In the OPC, 81% of the 32 operators stated that discrimination against new entrants in providing access to 
terminals  is  a  problem  resulting  in  administrative  costs  for  operators  but  it  has  not  been  possible  to 
quantify the costs. 

In addition to the evidence gathered during the targeted consultation indicating that the 
restrictions are widespread and that they have a material impact on the services provided 
to operators and passengers, operators also reported that the various different structures 
of ownership and the regulation of terminals across Member States make it difficult for 
them  and  cause  an  unnecessary  administrative  burden.  They  find  it  difficult  determine 
who  to  contact,  how  capacity  will  be  allocated,  and  how  they  will  be  charged  by  the 
terminal operators across Member States. 

Finally, there are two other root causes to the driver of restricted access to key transport 
infrastructure:  constrained  terminal  capacity;  and  restrictions  on  access  to  city  centre 
locations. At this stage, the Commission is not proposing to address these issues as the 
question to what extent it is competent to do so first needs to be clarified. Transport is a 
shared  competence  between  the  Union  and  the  Member  States  and  subsidiarity 
considerations may come to play here. The Commission has launched a study on urban 

42 See IA Support Study Table 3.3 

22 

 
 
                                                 
vehicle access restrictions (which should be available in autumn 2017) and, based on its 
results, it will assess whether it is necessary to propose measures in this area or not.     

2.6.  Who is affected by the problem, in what ways, and to what extent?  

The excessive administrative costs, restricted access to national inter-urban markets and 
restricted  access  to  key  transport  infrastructure  have  a  direct  or  indirect  impact  on  the 
following stakeholders: 

Citizens  /  passengers:  face  an  inferior  offer  of  services  in  terms  of  availability,  cost, 
quality  and  reliability.  Regular  services  are  not  always  adapted  to  meet  passenger 
demand. They are not fully benefiting from the affordable mobility offered by inter-urban 
bus  and  coach  services;  in  particular  those  who  suffer  transport  disadvantage  suffer 
disproportionately and are more likely to experience reduced mobility. They are unable 
to  purchase  end-to-end  tickets  to  improve  their  access  to  employment,  education  and 
leisure  opportunities  across  the  EU.  Where  coach  and  bus  services  are  not  available 
citizens  are  also  affected  by  worse  air  quality  due  to  the  on  average  higher  emissions 
from  other  inter-city  passenger  transport  modes  (except  electric  rail)  and  in  particular 
from car. 

Road  passenger  transport  operators:  new  entrants  face  a  patchwork  of  regulatory 
requirements  including  restrictions  or  prohibitions  on  market  entry  and  lose  business 
opportunities. Incumbent operators remain protected and gain business opportunities with 
little or no incentive to innovate.  

Terminal  operators:  may  continue  to  provide  specific  carriers  with  discriminatory 
access  giving  them  a  competitive  advantage  on  certain  services,  preventing  effective 
competition  between  carriers  and  constraining  the  development  of  an  integrated  coach 
network. 

Road passenger transport workers: have a key interest in working conditions, pay and 
employment  conditions,  health  and  safety  in  the  workplace,  training  and  professional 
careers. 

Public  authorities  –  the  problems  affect  the  manner  in  which  national  competent 
authorities  interact  with  road  passenger  transport  undertakings  and  terminal  operators. 
The  problems  also  affect  how  public  authorities  provide  for  inter-urban  passenger 
transport e.g. commercially or in the general economic interest through PSCs. 

2.7.  What is the EU dimension of the problem?  

One  of  the  Europeans  Unions  main  transport  policy  objectives  is  to  improve  travel 
possibilities across Europe and ensuring high-quality transport services for its citizens. In 
that  context  one  of  the  primary  objectives  of  Regulation  1073/2009  is  to  increase  the 
level of performance of international coach and bus services. There is evidence43 that the 
opening of national markets for regular services by coach and bus has created a critical 
mass of operators who also introduce international services, resulting in a greater impact 
on  the  number  of  international  routes  and  service  frequencies  than  pan-European 
legislation alone. This suggests that further opening of national markets would strengthen 
the  development  of  the  international  market  for  regular  services,  quite  apart  from  any 
benefits for passengers making national journeys. 

43 Comprehensive Study on Passenger Transport by Coach in Europe, Steer Davies Gleave, April 2016,  

23 

 
 
 
                                                 
The problem drivers mentioned in the previous section are mainly due to the possibility 
of Member States to adopt their own rules and restrictions with regard to access to their 
national  market  for  regular  services.  The  different  national  approaches  and  the 
restrictions in access to terminals constitute a barrier to the free movement of services in 
the  field  of  transport  which  is  one  of  the  goals  of  the  Common  Transport  Policy.  This 
affects the effectiveness of the Internal Market in the field of passenger transport by road.  

Carriers have been unable to compete fully in national inter-urban transport markets. This 
has  limited  the  sectors  ability  to  grow  market  share  relative  to  other  modes.  It  has 
prevented the development of a fully integrated market for inter-urban travel by bus and 
coach, resulting in poor connectivity from some citizens, particularly those with limited 
access to a private car or rail services. EU citizens have access to a poorer (in terms of 
accessibility,  frequency,  price,  comfort)  than  optimal  mobility  offer  which  affects  the 
free  movement  of  persons  in  the  EU.  Indeed,  while  national  restrictions  on  paper  only 
affect domestic transport, in reality domestic and cross-border connections are interlinked 
and  in  turn  integrated  with  other  modes  of  transport  to  collectively  constitute  the 
available  passenger  mobility  offer  inside the  EU.  Hence  restrictions  on  domestic  coach 
services and access to terminals have far reaching consequences on the functioning of the 
passenger transport sector in the whole EU and across all transport modes. 

In  the  absence  of  harmonised  rules  at  EU  level,  carriers  operating  in  the  EU  regular 
services  are  faced  with  excessive  administrative  costs  of  entry,  a  patchwork  of  access 
rules and in discrimination in access to terminals. Simplifying administrative procedures, 
removing  restrictions  on  access  to  inter-urban  markets  through  a  harmonised  legal 
framework across the EU and preventing discriminatory access to public terminals would 
contribute  to  solving  the  issues  identified  and  facilitate  inter-urban  mobility  for  all 
citizens by promoting coach travel. 

2.8.  How would the problem evolve, all things being equal?  

This  section  analyses  how  the  problem  would  evolve,  assuming  the  continuation  of 
existing policies and the implementation of already planned policy reforms. There is no 
indication  that  Member  States  will  introduce  changes  to  existing  provisions.  However, 
Member  States  will  have  witnessed  the  increase  in  passengers  carried,  total  passenger 
km, employment levels and the density of the network of coach services along with lower 
fare  prices  in  recently  liberalised  markets  for  national  regular  services  (e.g.  France, 
Germany,  Italy and  Poland). In  the absence  of EU action  some Member States may be 
prompted  to  liberalise  their  markets  according  to  different  principles  to  improve 
efficiency.  

In the absence of further EU action, Member States may continue to maintain restrictions 
on  market  and  route  access  or  excessive  requirements  e.g.  the  requirement  of  local 
establishment.    All  things  being  equal  and  in  the  absence  of  any  further  liberalisation 
measures  at  the  EU  or  national  level,  it  is  estimated  that  by  2035,  around  26%  of  the 
market (equivalent to 108 billion pkm) will be subject to restricted access due to reliance 
on concessions or direct restrictions on market access. There will also be restrictions to 
market  access  for  new  entrants  in  the  remaining  74%  of  the  market  that  has  to  some 
extent  liberalised  but  continue  to  impose  various  restrictions,  for  example  in  order  to 
protect public services operated under PSCs. 

24 

 
 
The  network  of  coach  services  will  not  expand  and  develop  as  operators  will  continue 
failing to penetrate into restricted markets. There will continue to be a clear distinction 
between international regular services and national regular services for inter-urban travel. 

In restricted markets service frequencies are likely to continue to be low and passengers 
will continue to have a poor choice of combinations of fares and service quality. Citizens 
who are sensitive to the price of transport or who live in areas where restricted markets 
have  blocked 
the  network  of  coach  services  will  suffer 
disproportionately.  They  are  more  likely  to  experience  reduced  mobility;  this  is 
especially  the  case  for  those  with  little  or  no  access  to  other  modes.  The  reduction  in 
mobility hampers their access to employment, education and leisure opportunities. 

the  penetration  of 

There  are  other  potential  developments  described  in  table  2-8  which  could  have 
significant  implications  for  coach  travel.  It  is  difficult  to  quantify  the  impacts  of  these 
developments on the bus and coach sector with any confidence, since their effect depends 
on  a  wide  range  of  uncertain  factors  such  as  economic  conditions  across  Europe,  the 
extent of cost changes driven by new technology, changing attitudes to the application of 
technology  among  both  the  travelling  public  and  transport  employees,  and  policy 
responses  at  the  local,  regional,  national  and  European  level.  The  table  below  provides 
commentary on possible implications for bus and coach services should the technological 
development be implemented. 

Table 2-8 - Possible impacts of new technology on the bus and coach sector 

Technological 
development 

Autonomous 
vehicles 

Alternative fuels 

operating 

New 
models 

Possible impacts 

 

‘Platooning’ of vehicles on motorways and other major roads could improve 
efficiency, reducing coach service fuel costs and emissions 

  Could enable increase in operational hours of vehicles  
  May enhance the attractiveness of travel by private car, for example by 

relieving congestion and improving journey quality 

  Likely to reduce the carbon footprint of coach operations as well as other forms 

of road travel 

  Could change the relative costs of different types of operation, for example 

enabling the development of smaller fleets offering on-demand services (based 
on further development of the BusUp model) 

  May strengthen the attractiveness of travel by private car by reducing costs  
  May enable service users to pay a single subscription fee allowing them to 

access a wide range of transport services, reducing the benefits of a private car 
relative to public transport  

  Analysis of data about user choice and local conditions would allow coach 

operators to develop more user-focused services, operated to accommodate real 
time traffic constraints 

  Would support improved on-board service offer, including entertainment and 

services supporting more effective working on the move 

  Better real time coordination of coach and other transport services and more 

Integrated 
transport 
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave 

extensive availability of integrated tickets/electronic payment 

The  developments  under  current  trends  and  adopted  policies  (i.e.  baseline  scenario)  in 
inter-urban coach transport activity, energy use and CO2 emissions, as well as revenues 
and  employment  in  the  sector  by  2030  are  shown  in  the  table  below,  assuming  the 

25 

 
 
continuation of existing policies. The development of the baseline scenario44 is described 
in  detail  in  Annex  4  "Analytical  models  used  in  preparing  the  impact  assessment", 
together with the underlying assumptions.   

Table 2-9: Baseline projections for inter-urban coach transport to 2030 

Projections for 
2030 

Type of national market 

Total average 
annual change  

Liberalised  Transition   Concessions 

Non-
liberalised 

Total 

2015 – 2030 
(%) 

6 

5 

3 

68 

99 

14 

39 

45 

16 

383 

Passenger km 
(billions) 
Vehicle km 
(billions) 
Revenue (€ 
billions) 
Employment 
(000s) 
Energy use (000 
toe) 
CO2 emissions 
(000 t) 
Accident costs (€ 
millions) 
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave 

10,349 

3,640 

4,203 

3,204 

1,763 

1,121 

1,499 

517 

681 

622 

309 

110 

105 

181 

48 

51 

8 

5 

1018 

6,882 

19,519 

985 

589 

30 

73 

2.5% 

1.9% 

2.8% 

3.3% 

1.3% 

1.1% 

-1.6% 

It  is  estimated  that  continued  discriminatory  behaviour  in  relation  to  terminal  access 
could unduly constrain terminal capacity supporting some 1.5 billion vehicle kilometres 
and could result in the suppression of around 400 million vehicle kilometres.  

As  mention  in  Section  2.5.2,  the  administrative  costs  incurred  by  operators  can  be 
material  and  administrative  processes  can  delay  entry.  It  is  clear  that  even  the 
requirements  for  authorisation  of  international  services  vary  significantly  by  Member 
State and nothing indicates this will change. It is estimated that the total administrative 
costs on the coach sector is €884 million in 2015 (with 2/3 falling on operators and 1/3 
falling on government and/or regulatory bodies), rising to €1,288 million in 203045. 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? 

3.1.  Legal Basis 

44   The Baseline scenario builds on an update of the EU Reference scenario 2016 but additionally assumes 
the  implementation  of  the  reform  of  the  national  regulatory  frameworks  for  buses  and  coaches  in 
Germany, France, Italy and Poland. The updated EU Reference scenario 2016 includes some updates 
in the technology costs assumptions (i.e. for light duty vehicles) and few policy measures adopted after 
its  cut-off  date  (end  of  2014)  like  the  Directive  on  Weights  and  Dimensions,  the  4th  Railways 
Package, the NAIADES II Package, the Ports Package, the replacement of the New European Driving 
Cycle (NEDC) test cycle by the new Worldwide harmonized Light-vehicles Test Procedure (WLTP). 
It  has  been  developed  with  the  PRIMES-TREMOVE  model  (i.e.  the  same  model  used  for  the  EU 
Reference scenario 2016) by ICCS-E3MLab. A detailed description of this scenario is available in the 
Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 1999/62/EC on the 
charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures, SWD (2017) 180 

45  [Support  study  for  an  Impact  Assessment  for  the  revision  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  1073/2009,  Steer 

Davies Gleave] 

26 

 
 
  
                                                 
The right of the EU to act in the field of transport is set out in the TFEU (Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union). According to Article 4 TFEU, transport is one of the 
principal  areas  where  shared  competence  between  the  Union  and  the  Member  States 
applies. 

The  competence  for  this  initiative  derives  from  Title  VI  (Transport)  of  the  TFEU,  in 
particular  Article  91  which  states,  inter  alia,  that  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council shall lay down common rules applicable to international transport to or from the 
territory  of  a  Member  State,  or  passing  across  the  territory  of  one  or  more  Member 
States, as well as the conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate transport 
services  within  a  Member  State.  The  applicability  of  Title  VI  to  road  transport  is 
stipulated in Article 100 TFEU. 

As far as public service contracts are concerned, the measures considered under different 
PSC options in this IA are geared towards providing flexibility to Member States. Article 
14  and  Protocol  26  of  the  Treaty  confirm  the  place  occupied  by  services  of  general 
economic interest in the shared values of the Union. Under Article 106(2) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), companies that provide services that 
are of general economic interest are subject to the rules of the Treaties, in particular to 
the rules governing competition. But unlike other economic sectors, this Article does not 
apply when compensation is paid for public service obligations in land transport. Instead, 
this  type  of  compensation  is  covered  by  Article  93  TFEU  as  a  'lex  specialis'  and  is 
applied  according  to  the  rules  of  Regulation  1370/2007  on  public  passenger  transport 
services by rail and by road46. It is not proposed to make any amendment to Regulation 
1370/2007  and  Member  States  can  continue  to  act  to  ensure  that  services  of  general 
economic interest continue to be provided. In this respect, the initiative presented will not 
go further than allowed by the Treaty and will not impinge upon Member States' right to 
specify public service obligations underlying to PSCs. 

3.2. 

Subsidiarity 

In accordance with Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) any EU action 
should respect the principle of subsidiarity. This involves assessing two aspects. 

3.2.1.

  Necessity test 

The  necessity  test  assesses  if  the  objectives  of  the  proposed  action  can  be  sufficiently 
achieved  by  Member  States.  The  legitimate  rights  of  Member  States  to  take  actions 
which  reflect  their  local,  regional  or  national  specificities,  must  not  unduly  restrict  the 
proper functioning of the internal transport market. 

EU transport policy has always focused on overcoming obstacles between Member States 
and  creating  a  single  European  transport  area  with  fair  competition  conditions  for  and 
between the different forms of transport.  This means not only dismantling cross-border 
barriers but also integrating national markets in order to complete the internal market for 
transport. 

Across the EU there is a patchwork of rules for access to national markets for coach and 
bus services. Carriers are required to comply with different rules in each Member State in 
which  they  operate.  These  rules  include  restrictions  on  access  to  national  inter-urban 

46 OJ L 315, 03.12.2007, p. 1. 

27 

 
 
                                                 
markets  which  constrains  carriers’  ability  to  develop  services  into  pan-European  coach 
networks  and  denies  them  the  possibility  to  offer  integration  with  other  coach  services 
and transport modes.  

The past has shown that Member States action at the national or lower level (Article 25 
of the Regulation enables Member States to agree bilaterally or multilaterally to further 
liberalise services) has not been sufficient to tackle the identified problems. Furthermore, 
Member States acting alone cannot introduce or ensure the coherence and coordination of 
uniform market access rules needed for the emergence of a genuine internal market for 
road passenger transport. It is therefore necessary to provide rules at the EU level. 

3.2.2.

  EU added value test 

The EU added value test assesses if the objectives of the proposed action can be better 
achieved at Union level. 

Since  the  1980s,  the  EU  has  elaborated  a  framework  of  common  rules  and  procedures 
intended  to open  the European road transport  market to  competition.  The approach  has 
been consistent with the objective of developing Europe’s transport sector and the EU is 
best-placed  to  lay  down  common  rules  for  the  road  passenger  transport  market  that 
guarantees  carriers  access  to  operate  throughout  the  EU  without  discrimination.  The 
envisaged revision of the regulatory framework will streamline the national differences in 
market access rules and provide carriers with predictable business conditions throughout 
the  EU,  therefore  removing  distortions  of  competition  and  barriers  to  market  access  as 
well as providing the ground to strengthen the internal market. 

The envisaged revision should have an immediate and strong positive impact on the level 
of accessibility for EU citizens some of whom will have access to an affordable mobility 
offer  for  the  first  time.  Additionally,  but  over  the  longer  term,  it  will  have  a  positive 
impact on the external costs of transport due to the expected modal shift. The beneficial 
effects  of  the  modal  shift  from  car  and  air  together  are  greater  than  the  negative 
environmental impact associated with the generation of new traffic and the substitution 
of some rail use in favour of coach travel. The performance of coach and rail combined is 
improved leading to an increase in the modal share of sustainable transport modes. 

The envisaged revision should lead to an increase in inter-urban travel with the benefit of 
not  having  any  adverse  impact  on  the  environment.  It  will  facilitate  the  mobility  of 
citizens who otherwise could not afford to travel. It will reduce the negative externalities 
of  inter-urban  passenger  transport,  such  as  emissions,  accidents  and  fatalities,  road 
congestion as well as to improve the efficiency of use of transport resources. 

Furthermore, the introduction of measures to ensure a level playing field in the allocation 
of  terminal  capacity  should  lead  to  an  uplift  in  capacity  that  is  unduly  suppressed  by 
discriminatrory behaviour in access to terminals.  

The  EU  is  by  far  the  best  placed  to  act  to  achieve  an  accessible  and  competitive  inter-
urban coach passenger sector and a true internal market for road passenger transport as 
these  cannot  be  better  achieved  at  national  level.  The  proposal  does  not  aim  at  total 
liberalisation of domestic services and Member States may still limit the right of access 
to  national  markets  for  regular  services  if  a  commercial  service  would  compromise  the 
economic equilibrium of a public service contract. 

4.  WHAT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED? 

28 

 
 
4.1.  General policy objective 

The  proposed  revision  of  Regulation  1073/2009  aims  to  resolve  the  problems  of 
operators facing obstacles in national markets to develop inter-urban coach services and 
the  low  share  of  sustainable  transport  modes.  The  initiative  aims  at  a  proportionate 
response to national obstacles to market entry whilst avoiding excessive intrusion into the 
national markets. 

Therefore the 2 general objectives (GOs) of the proposed revision have been defined as 
follows: 

GO1:  Facilitate inter-urban mobility and connectivity for all citizens 

GO2: 

Increase the modal share of sustainable transport modes 

The  GOs  cover  both  national  and  international  regular  services,  reflecting  the  potential 
for  operators  to  provide  both  kinds  of  services  as  part  of  an  integrated  European  route 
network. 

It  is  in  line  with  the  political  priority  of  the  Commission  for  the  period  2014-2019  to 
create a fairer and deeper internal market and strengthened industrial base. 

It is also in line with the 2011 White Paper which foresees an efficient single transport 
area for multimodal intercity travel and transport, and recognises the need for the greater 
use of bus and coaches and the requirement to link the modal networks so they provide 
better modal choices for passengers. 

4.2. 

Specific objectives 

To  achieve  the  GO  the  following  3  specific  objectives  (SO)  have  been  developed.  The 
SOs align with the three problem drivers defined in section 2.5.  

SO1: Simplify administrative procedures  

This SO aims to address the problem of excessive administrative costs of entry, defined 
in  section  2.5.2,  by  clarifying  and  simplifying  administrative  procedures  including  the 
procedure for authorising regular services. 

SO2: Remove restrictions on access to inter-urban markets 

This SO aims to address the problem of restricted access to national inter-urban markets, 
defined  in  section  2.5.1,  by  removing  legal  barriers  to  market  access  and  stimulating 
competition in the national inter-urban markets. 

The majority of respondents to the OPC considered that establishing a common framework in the EU for 
access  to  national  markets  for  regular  services  would  contribute  to  improving  the  market  for  coach 
services (65%). 

SO3: Prevent discriminatory access to public terminal facilities 

The SO aims to address the problem of restricted access to key infrastructure, defined in 
section  2.5.3,  by  requiring  Member  States  to  grant  operators  access  rights  to  public 
terminal infrastructure on fair and non-discriminatory basis for the purpose of operating 
regular services.  

The  majority  of  respondents  to  the  OPC  considered  that  operators  should  have  a  level  playing  field  in 
access  to  terminals  (70%)  and  the  majority  of  Ministries/Regulators  that  responded  to  the  targeted 
stakeholder  questionnaire  supported  establishing  common  requirements  to  ensure  that  access  to  coach 

29 

 
 
terminals is fair and non-discriminatory. Seven of those responding (35%) supported the proposal. 

The SOs should be mutually reinforcing, such that interventions designed to ensure that 
they  are  met  can  be  expected  to  improve  the  competitiveness  of  the  sector  through  a 
series of interacting impacts. For example, removing restrictions on access to inter-urban 
markets  could  be  expected  to  reduce  the  administrative  costs  of  entry  by  simplifying 
procedures as well as removing direct restrictions on market access. 

5.  WHAT ARE THE VARIOUS OPTIONS TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES? 

The  stakeholder  consultation,  the  expert  meetings,  independent  research  and  the 
Commission's  own  analysis  have  allowed  the  Commission  to  identify  different  policy 
measures, which served as a basis for the identification of a wide set of policy options. 
These options have been considered in order to address the problem drivers and the three 
specific objectives. Although the three problem drivers contribute to the overall problem, 
one problem driver will be treated separately from the other two47.    

The  assessment  leading  to  the  choice  of  an  overall  policy  option  addressing  the  main 
problems has be broken down into two assessments leading to the choice of two sets of 
policy options: 

 
 

the first set of policy options on market access addressing SO1 and SO2; and  
the second set of policy options on terminal access addressing SO3. 

Then a separate assessment and comparison of the two different sets of policy options is 
performed and a preferred policy option from each set of options is selected. Finally, an 
assessment  of  cumulative  effects  for  the  combined  two  preferred  policy  options  is 
performed. 

The following process was applied for establishing the policy options: 

 

identify an extensive list of policy measures addressing the problems (considered 
policy measures); 

  as a result of this initial screening, a number of policy measures were discarded 
from the initial analysis (see Annex 6 for the list of measures and the underlying 
justification). 

  consider policy measures which are retained after a preliminary assessment; and  
 

identification of possible policy packages.  

5.1.  Retained policy measures  

Driver 1 – Excessive administrative costs of entry 

No.  Policy measure  Description 

1 

Standardise the 
authorisation 
procedure 

This  measure  aims  to  simplify  and  standardise  the  procedure  for  the 
authorisation of regular services.  There is a standardised authorisation procedure 
for  international  regular  services  but  the  authorisation  procedures  for  national 

47 The policy option to address "Restricted access to key transport infrastructure" or SO3 is not interlinked 
and  the  geographical  scope  of  the  effect  is  different  to  the  choice  of  a  policy  option  to  address 
“Excessive  administrative  costs  of  entry”  or  SO1  and  "Restricted  access  to  national  inter-urban 
markets" or SO2. Action in the former area need not imply action in the other and considering the two 
areas separately was considered optimal. 

30 

 
 
                                                 
No.  Policy measure  Description 

regular services vary widely across Member States.  

2 

Abolish the 
journey forms 
for occasional 
services 

This measure aims to simplify the operation of occasional services by removing 
the requirement to complete a journey form for occasional international services. 
This measure will reduce regulatory costs by eliminating the administrative costs 
for operators and national authorities. 

Driver 2 – Restricted access to national inter-urban markets 

No.  Policy measure  Description 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

Clarify the 
meaning of 
“Cabotage 
operations shall 
be 
authorised…”. 

Extend the 
scope of the 
Regulation to 
include national 
markets, subject 
to authorisation 

This measure aims at clarifying how cabotage operations are authorised. 

This  measure  aims  to  open  access  to  national  markets  for  regular  services  and 
simplify the authorisation procedure. Member States would be able to reject an 
application  for  an  authorisation  if  the  new  service  would  compromise  the 
economic equilibrium of an existing public service contract.  

During  the  targeted  consultation  6  Member  States  reported  that  they  did  not 
support  this  measure  and  the  reasons  given  were  concerns  about  unfavourable 
impacts  on  coach  sector  employees  (in  Bulgaria  and  Estonia),  the  potential 
adverse  impact  on  services  operated  as  PSOs  (Germany  and  Ireland),  safety 
(Italy) and inconvenience (Spain). The difference in views of these stakeholders 
does  not  appear  to  reflect  the  differences  in  the  market  liberalisation  as 
described  in  table  2.4  but  rather  reflect  each  Member  States  unique  national 
regulatory system. 

Require access 
to national 
regular services 
markets without 
discrimination 

This measure aims to ensure that carriers from all Member States be guaranteed 
access to national markets for regular services without discrimination on grounds 
of nationality or place of establishment. The fact that a carrier is established in 
another  Member  State  shall  no  longer  constitute  justification  for  rejecting  an 
application for authorisation. 

Set  common 
requirements for 
the protection of 
PSCs 

This measure aims to ensure that Member States are permitted to take action to 
protect  all  public  passenger 
transport  services  covered  by  PSCs  from 
competition.  Member  States  may  limit  the  right  of  access  on  services  that  are 
covered by one or more public service contracts if the service would compromise 
the economic equilibrium of a public service contract.  

 Set common 
requirements for 
the protection of 
PSCs meeting 
the needs of an 
urban area 

This measure aims to ensure that Member States are permitted to take action to 
protect  all  public  passenger  transport  services  covered  by  PSCs  meeting  the 
needs  of  an  urban  centre  or  conurbation,  or  transport  needs  between  it  and  the 
surrounding  area.  An  automatic  authorisation  procedure  shall  apply  to  services 
carrying passengers 100km or more. Member States may limit the right of access 
on services that carry passengers less than 100km if the proposed service would 
compromise the economic equilibrium of a public service contract.  

Of the 20 Ministries or regulators that replied, five (Bulgaria, Finland, France, 
Ireland  and  Portugal)  supported  a  set  of  common  requirements,  as  this  would 
help to create a more level playing field. All the Member States that supported 
this measure have already opened national markets.  Six (Estonia, Italy, Latvia, 
Slovakia, Spain and the UK) maintain that the protection of PSOs is outside the 
scope  of  Regulation  1073/2009  and  should  be  addressed  through  Regulation 
1370/2007.  Although  these  six  Member  States  share  the  same  view  on  the 

31 

 
 
No.  Policy measure  Description 

8 

Abolish the 
authorisation 
procedure 

protection  of  PSO’s  the  regulatory  status  in  each  of  their  national  markets  is 
different. 

This  measure  aims  to  abolish  the  need  for  an  authorisation  for  regular  services 
carrying passengers over distances of 100km or more. Regular services would be 
fully liberalised along the same lines as occasional services. This measure would 
also  address  driver  1  as  the  time  consuming  authorisation  procedure  would  no 
longer be required and administrative and compliance costs would be reduced.  

Driver 3 – Restricted access to key transport infrastructure 

No. 

Policy measure  Description 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

 Define a coach 
terminal 

This  measure  aims  to  provide  the  meaning  of  the  term  terminal.  Terminals 
are  not  yet  defined  in  EU  legislation  and  a  definition  would  be  a  necessary 
precursor to any action related to access to them.  

Encourage coach 
terminal operators 
to provide access 

This measure aims to encourage coach terminal operators to provide access to 
carriers operating regular services on fair and non-discriminatory terms. This 
should be done by guidelines/recommendations.  

Encourage the 
publication of 
conditions of use 

This  measure  aims  to  encourage  the  publication  of  conditions  of  use  to 
provide operators with transparency on how they will be treated by terminal 
operators.  

Require the 
European 
Commission to 
report on market 
opening 

Require Member 
States to grant 
non-
discriminatory 
access 

This measure aims to provide the European Commission with evidence of the 
scale,  incidence  and  duration  of  terminal  access  disputes.  It  may  be 
advantageous  to  expand  the  evidence  base  before  further  intervention  to 
specify proposals for the addition of capacity or the resolution of disputes. 

This measure aims to require Member States to grant carriers access rights to 
terminal  infrastructure  on  fair  and  non-discriminatory  terms  for  the  purpose 
of operating regular services.  

Require the 
publication of 
conditions of use 

This measure aims to require the publication of conditions of use to provide 
operators  with  transparency  on  how  they  will  be  treated  by  terminal 
operators.  

5.2. 

Identification of possible policy packages 

The policy packages have been defined so as to reflect an increasing level of regulatory 
intervention and entailing an increasing level of expected impacts. They are cumulative, 
in the sense that all measures in PO1 are also part of PO2, which itself includes  further 
measures,  and  so  on.  This  is  intended  to  facilitate  and  structure  the  analysis  of  the 
impacts,  given  the  large  number  of  measures  which  must  be  assessed.  They  have  been 
defined  in  a  way  to  show  the  expected  outcomes  of  increasing  levels  of  regulatory 
intervention.  

5.3. 

Identification of a list of market access policy options 

The retained market access policy options to address SO1 and SO2 are: 

PO0 - Baseline 

The Regulation would continue to apply in its present form. No new measures applied. 

PO1  –  Open  access  to  the  market  for  regular  services  with  the  possibility  to  refuse 
authorisation if the  economic equilibrium of a PSC is compromised 

32 

 
 
Policy Measure Numbers:  1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. 

This option would provide common market access rules for inter-urban regular services. It would 
simplify  and  standardise  the  authorisation  procedure.  The  option  would  reduce  costs  by 
standardising  the  authorisation  procedure  throughout  the  EU;  make  the  procedure  more 
transparent; as well as reducing the number of grounds for refusal. Member States will be able to 
protect  all  public  service  contracts  by  limiting  the  right  of  access  if  the  proposed  service  would 
compromise the economic equilibrium of an existing public service contract. As this option does 
not aim at total liberalisation of the domestic market it will still be possible for Member States to 
intervene in areas where regular services cannot be operated on a commercial basis. 

It would abolish legal monopolies, national establishment requirements and eliminate any special 
protection of other transport modes granted by Member States on inter-urban routes.  

It  would  reduce  the  administrative  burden  by  standardising  and  simplifying  the  authorisation 
procedure for national regular services and abolishing the journey form for occasional services. 

In  practice  this  would  provide  a  common  procedure  for  authorising  national  and  international 
regular  coach  and  bus  services.  Under  this  option  Member  States  would  have  the  option  of 
limiting the right of access to the market where the new service would compromise the economic 
equilibrium  of  an  existing  public  service  contracts  providing  any  public  passenger  transport 
service.  To  determine  if  a  PSC  may  be  compromised  an  independent  body  should  make  the 
decision  to  grant,  refuse  or  limit  the  service  on  the  basis  of  an  objective  economic  analysis, 
following a request from the competent authorities that awarded the public service contract or the 
public  service  contract  operator.  The  new  independent  body  is  proposed  to  ensure  the 
impartiality  and  objectivity  of  the  economic  analysis  and  should  function  in  a  way  which  avoids 
any conflict of interests and any possible involvement in the award of the public service contract 
under  consideration.  The  procedure  and  criteria  to  be  followed  when  determining  whether  the 
economic  equilibrium  of  the  PSC  is  compromised  by  a  new  service  should  be  in  line  with  test 
carried out by regulatory bodies in other transport modes, EU Law and the principles of equality 
and non-discrimination. . If no request for a test is submitted within the deadline, the authorisation 
would  be  granted.  If  there  is  a  request  for  the  test  the  entity  making  the  request  would  be 
required to provide the independent body with the information required to conduct the test.  The 
independent  body  would  assess  whether  the  economic  equilibrium  of  a  public  service  contract 
would  be  compromised  by  the  proposed  new  service.  Member  States  will  not  be  obliged  to 
introduce a new independent body but will be free to use an already established body. The body 
will only incur costs if it is requested to conduct a test but as the required information is provided 
by other entities the cost of the test for the independent body will be minimal. The independent 
bodies would be required to develop a consistent methodology that would be clear, transparent 
and non-discriminatory. The analysis would focus on the economic impact of the proposed new 
service  on  the  public  service  contract  as  a  whole,  not  on  individual  services  operated  under  it, 
over its entire duration. The economic equilibrium of a public service contract would generally be 
considered as compromised if the proposed new service has a substantial negative impact on the 
profitability  of  services  operated  under  the  public  service  contract,  and/or  the  net  cost  for  the 
competent authority awarding the public  service contract. The independent body may grant the 
authorisation, refuse the authorisation or indicate possible changes to the proposed service that 
would ensure that the conditions for granting the authorisation are met, and give the opportunity 
to the applicant to adjust its application for authorisation accordingly. 

This method of regulating the interaction between commercial services and PSCs is similar to the 
method  employed  currently  in  Regulation  1073/2009  for  international  regular  services.  It  is  not 
possible  to  determine  how  new  services  would  affect  PSC’s  in  all  the  non-liberalised  Member 
States  but  under  this  option  the  relationship  between  inter-urban  (commercial)  services  and 
urban  (usually  operated  under  PSC  and  subsidised)  services  is  clearly  defined  and  the 
commercial service will only be permitted if it will not compromise the economic equilibrium of a 
PSC. There is no evidence to indicate that this method of regulating the relationship with PSCs 
has  been  problematic. However,  there is  the  risk  that  operators are not  provided  with sufficient 
flexibility to address demand and provide services where they are needed. 

The extension of the scope of the legislation to include national regular services under this option 

33 

 
 
is not supported by 6 Member States for 

PO2 – Open access to the inter-urban market for regular services over distances of 100km 
or  more.    Authorisation  can  be  refused  if  the  economic  equilibrium  of  an  urban  PSC  is 
compromised 

Policy Measure Numbers:  1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7. 

This  option  differs  from  PO1  in  the  approach  taken  to  protect  public  service  contracts  and  the 
extent of the REFIT intervention. It would simplify and standardise the authorisation procedure for 
national  and  international  regular  services  and  change  the  grounds  for  refusal.  Similar  to  PO1, 
this option does not aim at total liberalisation of the domestic market. In this case Member States 
will  be  able  to  intervene  in  areas  where  commercial  services  may  compromise  the  economic 
equilibrium of certain PSC’s. The opening of a new coach line could no longer be refused if the 
service carries  passengers more than 100km. The 100km threshold enables Member  States to 
take action to protect urban transport services covered by PSCs from competition. The extent of 
the  REFIT  intervention  is  increased  as  the  authorisation  regime  becomes  faster,  more 
transparent and effectively lowers the barrier for new market entrants. It provides operators with 
more  certainty  when  assessing  whether  a  new  coach  line  is  acceptable  or  not.  It  reduces  the 
administrative burden on operators through simplification and standardisation of the authorisation 
procedure.  There  is  no  longer  a  requirement  to  get  agreement  from  authorities  in  all  Member 
States in whose territories passengers are picked up and set down. 

In  practice  this  would  provide  a  common  procedure  for  authorising  national  and  international 
regular coach and bus services. New entrants would apply for authorisation to commence a new 
service.  If  the  new  service  is  carrying  passengers  over  distances  of  100km  or  more  the 
authorisation is automatically granted. If the new service is carrying passengers over a distance 
of less than 100km competent authorities or the operators of a PSC would have a defined time to 
request an economic equilibrium test which would be conducted by an independent body in the 
same way as PO1.  

This method of regulating the interaction between commercial services and PSCs is employed in 
a  number  of  Member  States  including  Germany,  France,  Italy  and  in  the  past  in  the  UK  and 
Sweden.  It  is  not  possible  to  determine  the  future  relationship  between  commercial  and  PSC 
services in all non-liberalised Member States. However, the distance threshold will clearly define 
the  relationship  between  inter-urban  (commercial)  services  and  urban  (usually  operated  under 
PSC and subsidised) services. There has been no evidence to indicate a problematic relationship 
between commercial services and PSC services in any of the Member States that have opened 
market  access  using  a  similar  framework  but  there  is  some  anecdotal  evidence  from  Germany 
that rail has lost many customers to coach with twice as many coach passengers (30%) coming 
from long-distance trains as from local or regional trains (14%) but the German Ministry suggests 
that the loss of rail passengers is likely to be effected by other factors such as rail strikes, floods 
on lines and decreasing supply.  

The model to compensate public service operators for the operating a public passenger transport 
service  under  PSC  that  involves  compensation  from  public  authorities  in  the  form  of  granting 
exclusive  rights  to  provide  services  on  a  profitable  route,  in  such  a  way  that  profits  for  the 
provision  of  the  service  cross-subsidise  other  non-profitable  services  imposed  on  the  service 
provider  appears  to  be  more  challenged  under  this  option.  This  model  is  used  both  in  railways 
(for instance in the United Kingdom) and in coaches (for instance in Spain). Such a model relies 
on  the  existence  of  a  monopoly  in  the  profitable  service,  and  weak  competition  from  other 
transport  modes,  as  otherwise  it  would  not  be  possible  to  extract  the  necessary  rent  from  the 
profitable  services  to  cross-subsidise  the  other  services48.  The  new  services  would  introduce 
competition in the long distance market and a threat to this model of PSO funding. It is likely that 
new services would “cherry-pick” the profitable lines and as the PSO operator loses revenue from 
the  profitable  services  this  model  of  public  intervention  becomes challenged  and  new  financing 

48 See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/601970/IPOL_STU(2017)60197 

0_EN.pdf  

34 

 
 
                                                 
models may be required. 

PO3 – Open access to the inter-urban market for regular services without an authorisation 
process for regular services carrying passengers over distances of 100km or more 

Policy Measure Numbers:  2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8. 

for 

time-consuming  national  and 

these  services.  The  existing 

This  option  differs  from  PO1  &  PO2  in  that  all  regular  services  that  carry  passengers  over 
distances  of  100km  or  more  would  be  fully  liberalised  and  there  would  be  no  authorisation 
procedure 
international 
authorisation  procedures  would  no  longer  be  necessary  and  the  principle  of  free  competition 
would  apply.  This  removes  the  complexity,  delay  and  cost  associated  with  an  authorisation 
regime  resulting  in  a  reduction  of  administrative  and  compliance  costs.  As  the  authorisation 
procedure is abolished enforcement would have to focus on rules on access to the profession or 
on road safety. In the absence of an authorisation procedure the Member State of establishment 
would  have  a  vital  supervisory  role  in  this  new  regime  and  the  investigations  during  the 
application  procedure  for  a  Community  licence  (or  the  certified  true  copies)  would  replace  the 
investigations carried out in the current authorisation procedures. As such, host Member States 
would  rely  on  Member  States  of  establishment  to  carry  out  controls  and  would  be  deprived  of 
direct  enforcement  possibilities.  As  a  result  of  the  inclusion  of  the  measure  to  abolish  the 
authorisation  procedure  for  this  option  would  have  substantial  benefits  in  terms  of  reduction  of 
administrative burden. 

In  practice  new entrants would  not have  to  apply  for  authorisation  to commence  a  new  service 
carrying  passengers  over  distances  of  100km  or  more  but  they  would  have  to  notify  the 
competent authority before commencing, ceasing or altering operation on a route. Similar to PO1 
and  PO2,  this  option  does  not  aim  at  total  liberalisation  of  the  domestic  market.  In  this  case 
Member  States  will  also  be  able  to  intervene  in  areas  where  commercial  services  may 
compromise the economic equilibrium of certain PSC’s. If the new service is over a distance of 
less than 100km authorisation would be required and competent authorities or the operators of a 
PSC  would  have  a  defined  time  to  request  an  economic  equilibrium  test  which  would  be 
conducted by an independent body in the same way as PO1.  

The method of regulating the relationship with PSC’s under this option is the same as under PO2. 

The three ways in which the needs for authorisations are proposed to be reduced further 
along with the protection of PSC are set out in the following figure. 

Figure 5-1: Approaches to reducing the requirement for authorisations and the protection of PSC's 

PO1 

PO2 

PO3 

  Authorisation applies 

  Authorisation applies 

  Authorisation cannot 

be required 

100km or 
more 

  Authorisation can be 

rejected  if it 
compromises a PSC 

  No protection of PSC 

  No protection of PSC 

Less than 
100km 

  Authorisation applies 
  Authorisation can be 

  Authorisation applies 
  Authorisation can be 

  Authorisation applies 
  Authorisation can be 

rejected  if it 
compromises a PSC 
Identification of a list of terminal access policy options 

rejected  if it 
compromises a PSC 

rejected  if it 
compromises a PSC 

5.4. 

The retained terminal access policy options to address SO3 are:  

PO4 – Soft Regulation and report  

Policy Measure Numbers:  9, 10, 11 and 12. 

This  would  establish  guidelines  or  recommendations  on  access  to  terminals.  The  guidelines  or 
recommendations  would  include  a  definition  of  a  coach  terminal  as  it  is  not  yet  defined  in  EU 
legislation.    The  definition  would  address  barriers  to  entry  in  the  form  of  access  to  terminals.  

35 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
They  would  encourage  operators  and  managers  of  terminal  infrastructure  to  provide  access  to 
carriers  operating  regular  services  on  fair  and  reasonable  grounds  and  without  discriminatory 
between  operators.  In  practice  it  is  expected  that  the  operator  or  manager  of  a  terminal  would 
grant  access  to  and  use  of  a  coach  terminal  to  all  carriers  on  the  same  terms.  It  would  be 
considered  fair  and  reasonable  for  an  operator  or  manager  of  a  terminal  to  refuse  access  to  a 
terminal if there is no available capacity.  

They would encourage the operators and managers of terminals to make available the conditions 
of use  of the terminal which shall include at least: 

list of the services provided with prices 
rules for scheduling the allocation of capacity 
current capacity allocation, and  
current timetable.  

• 
• 
• 
• 
The conditions of use would be published in two official languages of the EU and made available 
free  of  charge  from  the  operator  or  manager  of  the  terminal  and  the  competent  authority.  The 
conditions  of  use  would  also  be  displayed  in  the  terminal,  where  they  have  websites,  on  the 
websites of the operator or manager of the terminal and the competent authority.  

The  guidelines  or  recommendations  would  also  encourage  that  decisions  on  applications  for 
access are taken within a specified time after the date of application. 

The European Commission would report on the effects of market opening after a period of time 
during which it is expected that overall demand for access to terminal infrastructure would either 
have reached a plateau or peaked and begun to decline. 
PO5 – Equal access rules 

Policy Measure Numbers:  9, 12, 13 and 14. 

This  would  define  a  terminal  in  legislation.  It  would  require  that  operators  and  managers  of 
terminal  infrastructure  to  grant  access  to  carriers  operating  regular  services  on  fair  and 
reasonable  grounds  and  without  discriminatory  between  carriers.  In  practice  operators  or 
managers of a terminal would be required to grant access to and use of a coach terminal to all 
carriers  on  the  same  terms.  It  would  be  considered  fair  and  reasonable  for  an  operator  or 
manager of a terminal to refuse access to a terminal if there is no available capacity.  

Operators and managers of terminals would be required to make available the conditions of use  
of the terminal which shall include at least: 

• 
• 
• 
• 

list of the services provided with prices 
rules for scheduling the allocation of capacity 
current capacity allocation, and  
current timetable.  

The conditions of use would be required to be published in two official languages of the EU in line 
with  existing  international  practices49    and  made  available  free  of  charge  from  the  operator  or 
manager  of  the  terminal  and  the  competent  authority.  The  conditions  of  use  would  also  be 
displayed in the terminal, where they have websites, on the websites of the operator or manager 
of the terminal and the competent authority.  

Decisions on applications for access would be required to be taken within a specified time after 
the  date  of  application.  Member  States  would  be  required  to  ensure  that  carriers  have  the 
capability to appeal negative decisions. 

The European Commission would be required to report on the effects of market opening after a 
period of time during which it is expected that overall demand for access to terminal infrastructure 
would  either  have  reached  a  plateau  or  peaked  and  begun  to  decline.  It  would  ensure 
undertakings can appeal negative decisions by requiring Member States to ensure that they have 

49 For example see Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 

2012 establishing a single European railway area Text with EEA relevance, recital 34. 

36 

 
 
                                                 
the possibility to appeal decisions refusing access to at least on independent and impartial body. 

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE DIFFERENT POLICY OPTIONS AND WHO WILL BE 

AFFECTED? 

The  analysis  of  impacts  covers  all  policy  options.  The  key  impacts  are  captured 
quantitatively  at  a  level  of  detail  consistent  with  the  available  data,  otherwise  they  are 
treated  qualitatively.  Based  on  a  set  of  assumptions,  an  IA  tool  was  developed  by  the 
external consultant  to assess the development of  the baseline and the effects  of various 
policy  measures  within  a  20  year  timespan  (from  2015  to  2035)  to  align  with  related 
impact assessments in the mobility package. The development of the baseline scenario is 
based  primarily  on  input  assumptions  from  an  update  of  the  EU  Reference  Scenario 
201650  but  additionally  covers  the  implementation  of  the  reform  of  the  national 
regulatory frameworks for buses and coaches in Germany, France, Italy and Poland. The 
key output variables which result from the overarching modelling framework include: 1) 
changes to the level of transport activity; 2) fares for users; 3) connectivity of different 
social groups; 4) environmental costs and 5) regulatory costs for different groups. Some 
of the other important impacts (e.g. working conditions) are estimated based on the desk 
and field research. All costs and benefits are summarised over the 20-year period 2015-
2035 and presented as a 2017 Net Present Values using a discount rate of 4%. Impacts on 
transport activity and employment are presented for 2030, relative to  the Baseline. The 
sensitivity and robustness of the results were tested; the relative impacts of each policy 
option were not  significantly  affected by the low and high  cases  used  in the sensitivity 
analysis,  as  described  in  Annex  4.  Each  policy  option  presented  below  is  compared 
against the results of the baseline scenario, unless stated otherwise. 

Each policy option has been analysed in terms of its economic, environmental and social 
impacts.  Where  possible,  quantitative  estimates  are  given,  in  other  cases  however, 
because  of  the  non-availability  of  statistics,  this  was  not  possible.  In  these  cases,  a 
qualitative  assessment  is  provided  and  where  relevant  strengthened  by  the  opinion  of 
stakeholders. 

The impacts are likely to vary between Member States depending on the existing market 
access rules and the economics of individual routes. However, as noted in table 2-4, 14 
Member States have already liberalised including 6 of the largest 7 national markets.  In 
this IA the quantification of the problem of obstacles in national markets that hinder the 
development of inter-urban bus services focuses on the 14 Member States that have not 
liberalised  their  inter-urban  regular  coach  and  bus  services.  The  estimated  impact  of 
market  opening  in  these  Member  States  is  based  on  evidence  from  previous  domestic 
coach market opening initiatives. The levels of secondary impacts are driven by changes 
to the level of transport activity. It is assumed that the non-liberalised Member States will 

50  The  updated  EU  Reference  scenario  2016  includes  some  updates  in  the  technology  costs  assumptions 
(i.e. for light duty vehicles) and few policy measures adopted after its cut-off date (end of 2014) like 
the Directive on Weights and Dimensions, the 4th Railways Package, the NAIADES II Package, the 
Ports  Package,  the  replacement  of  the  New  European  Driving  Cycle  (NEDC)  test  cycle  by  the  new 
Worldwide  harmonized  Light-vehicles  Test  Procedure  (WLTP).  It  has  been  developed  with  the 
PRIMES-TREMOVE model (i.e. the same model used for the EU Reference scenario 2016) by ICCS-
E3MLab. A detailed description of this scenario is available in the Impact Assessment accompanying 
the Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 1999/62/EC on the charging of heavy goods vehicles 
for the use of certain infrastructures, SWD (2017) 180 

37 

 
 
                                                 
experience a rate of transport activity growth between that of Germany and the UK in the 
first five years following market opening. The assumption is adjusted depending on the 
ability of each Member State to restrict market access under each option. 

A schematic diagram of the segments of coach and bus markets is shown in figure 6-1 
below.  

Figure 6-1: Segments of the market for regular coach and bus services 

Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave  

The red dotted line divides the services that require subsidy (below the line) or services 
that can be operated commercially (above the line).  

The horizontal axis of the figure indicates the distance over which a passenger is carried, 
ranging from short services on the left to long services on the right, and then international 
services  which  are  the  focus  of  Regulation  1073/2009.  The  vertical  axis  of  the  figure 
indicates the number of services. 

The ellipses on the figure illustrate a number of market segments. First, and bottom left, 
are  short-distance  regular  services,  a  large  proportion  of  which,  particularly  on  urban 
and  suburban  routes,  are  not  commercially  viable  and  hence  require  a  public  service 
contract as provided for under Regulation 1370/2007. 

Second, and top left, are  short-distance  regular services in Member States in  which all 
services  are  liberalised,  and  fares  are  either  unregulated  or  set  at  levels  which  can  be 
commercially viable. 

Third, and bottom right, are longer-distance regular services in Member States where a 
mix of profitable and unprofitable services are operated as a package, as in the regional 
concessions in Spain and under the contracts awarded to KTEL companies in Greece. 

Fourth,  and  top  right,  are  longer-distance  services  in  Member  States  which  have 
liberalised regular domestic services, such as Germany (2013), Italy (2014) and France 
(2015)  where,  subject  to  the  restrictions  described  above,  new  entrants  have  typically 
first  entered  the  market  on  the  most  profitable  routes.  However,  as  indicated  with  the 
ellipse with the question mark (“?”), these services will in principle continue to expand 

38 

 
 
 
until  all  profitable  opportunities  have  been  exploited,  in  theory  including  all  services 
above the dotted red line. 

This shows that opening access to commercial services and protecting public service 
contracts are  not mutually exclusive. Opening access with the adequate protection of 
PSCs provides opportunities for carriers to respond to demand and provide new services. 
However,  it  also  introduces  the  risk  of  carriers  cherry-picking  the  most  profitable 
services.  It  is  therefore  necessary  for  the  authorisation  procedure  and  the  economic 
equilibrium test to strike a balance  between the benefits of opening market access with 
the potential impact on the economic equilibrium of PSC’s. The retained policy options 
provide different combinations of protection for PSCs and market opening to assess the 
impact  of  each  combination.  The  experience  from  liberalised  and  transition  Member 
States (see table 2-4) has shown that PSC’s can be protected and co-exist with a thriving 
open  inter-urban  domestic  transport  market.  The  approach  taken  to  opening  market 
access in each of the liberalised Member States was different but in all cases it has been 
perceived to have been a success. 

6.1. 

Impacts of policy options to address excessive administration costs of 
entry and market access problems 

6.1.1.

  Economic impacts 

Transport Activity: The impact of the policy options on transport activity is focused on 
the  14  non-liberalised  Member  States  (including  those  awarding  concessions  through 
competitive tendering).  Impacts  on  other  Member  States,  which  are  already  liberalised, 
are  expected  to  be  positive  due  to  an  increasing  alignment  of  national  market  access 
rules,  which  will  reduce  the  administrative  burden  on  operators  seeking  to  provide 
regular services in more than one domestic market. Furthermore the alignment of rules is 
expected to encourage some coach operators to provide international services.  

Figure  6-2  shows  the  increase  in  inter-urban  coach  traffic  under  the  market  opening 
options  by  Member  State  in  2030  relative  to  the  Baseline.  While  all  options  lead  to 
substantial increases of coach traffic in Member States, Option 2 and Option 3 deliver the 
same increase (displayed as one column in figure 6-2) which is considerably larger than 
the increase under Option 1. Under Option 1 the economic test can be used to assess if 
the new service would compromise the economic equilibrium of the PSC. The test would 
examine the balance of the effects of a proposed new service between generation of new 
revenue (by creating new demand) and abstraction of revenue from existing rail or coach 
services operated under a PSC.  The test allows the positive effect of authorising  a new 
service  (e.g.  lower  fares  with  more  services,  better  connectivity  and  rail  operators  can 
enter  into  coach  market  or  benefit  from  integrating  with  coach  and  picking  up  its 
passengers) to be considered and balanced against the negative effect of abstraction.  

This  inclusion  of  the  measure setting  common  requirements  for  the  protection  of  PSCs 
meeting the needs of an urban area, which will simplify the authorisation procedure and 
remove  discretion  to  restrict  market  access  unduly.  The  effect  varies  considerably 
between  Member  States  and  the  increases  in  Belgium,  Hungary  and  Greece  are 
particularly large when compared to Spain, which has a well-developed coach market.  

Figure  6-2:  Impact  of  options  by  MS  (increase  in  inter-urban  coach  traffic  in  2030  relative  to  the 
Baseline, in billion passenger-kilometres) 

39 

 
 
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave 

The average growth rate by Member State by 2030 are shown in figure 6.3 below. The 
growth rates in Spain & the Netherlands, which have well-developed coach markets, are 
low  even  after  the  adjustment  for  the  effect  of  liberalisation,  and  the  additional  traffic 
generated is therefore correspondingly low despite the volume of traffic in the baseline. 
By  contrast,  Hungary  experiences  a  higher  rate  of  growth  in  the  baseline  than  Spain, 
reflecting  the  economic  conditions  taken  into  account  in  the  baseline  and  the  adjusted 
growth rate and increment in traffic is correspondingly large. 

Figure 6-3: Average annual growth rate by 2030 by MS under each option 

Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave 

Under options 2 and 3 new services carrying passengers over distances of 100km or more 
cannot be prevented solely to  protect an existing PSC. This  introduces the risk that the 
new service may erode some form of PSCs such as a service to a remote area via inter-
urban  bus  services  or  alternatively  it  may  result  in  the  requirement  for  an  increase  in 
subsidies. However, no evidence is available to indicate that the opening of the national 

40 

0.05.010.015.020.025.0HUBEELATHRESLTSINLEELVCYMTLUBillion pkmPO1PO2 & PO3-2%-1%0%1%2%3%4%5%6%7%HUHRATBESIELMTLTEELUCYLVNLESAverage annual growth rates (2015-2030)BaselinePO1PO2 & PO3 
 
 
market for regular coach and bus services has had either of these effects. In cases where 
profitable and non-profitable services are bundled together, passengers on the profitable 
routes are “subsidising” through increased fares the passengers on non-profitable routes. 
This  inflates  the  fares  on  profitable  routes,  makes  these  services  less  attractive  for 
citizens and promotes private use of cars. As described in table 2-4, 14 Member States 
have already opened their markets accounting for 73% of the total passenger kilometres 
for the EU. The impact of market opening in these Member States has been widely 
studied  and  we  have  not  found  any  evidence  that  the  market  opening  has  eroded 
PSCs serving rural areas or that the negative impact of abstraction has been larger 
than  the  positive  impact  of  generation.  There  are  very  few  PSCs  in  place  that  cover 
services  beyond  100km  so  the  overall  impact  on  PSCs  of  opening  the  market  in  this 
segment is likely to be very small. The national policies and frameworks towards the 
provision  of  regular  services  varies  across  the  non-liberalised  Member  States 
however  this  was  also  the  case  for  the  14  Member  States  that  have  already 
liberalised.  Furthermore,  stakeholders  have  been  widely  consulted  and  no 
stakeholder has indicated that market opening has resulted in these issues. 

The  evidence  in  the  Impact  Assessment  support study  suggests  that  Member  States  are 
more  concerned  with  their  urban  PSCs  and  have  chosen  regulatory  distances  broadly 
consistent  with  permitting  no  journey  wholly  within  their  largest  suburban  system,  and 
by  implication  any  other  suburban  system.  The  current  precedents  include  100  km  in 
France and 50km in Germany, and past precedents include 100 km in Sweden and 48km 
in the UK.   

Table  6-1  below  provides  further  information  of  incremental  traffic  under  each  policy 
option  in  2030  relative  to  the  Baseline.  The  Baseline  projection  of  coach  traffic  is  589 
billion pkm in 2030. The change relative to the Baseline under Option 2 and Option 3 is 
around 66.5 billion pkm in 2030, representing an increase of 11.3% in coach traffic. The 
change  relative  to  the  baseline  for  journeys  is  roughly  430  million  and  the  number  of 
services increases by about 510 in 2030.  

Table 6-1: Estimated impact of options on coach traffic levels 

Metric 

Billion passenger-km 

National 

International 

Total 

% increase 

Million journeys 

Number of Services 

Average load factor (p.p. change)  

Change relative to the baseline in 2030 

PO1 

PO2 

PO3 

25.0 

3.4 

28.4 

4.8% 

190 

220 

-0.7 

58.3 

8.2 

66.5 

58.3 

8.2 

66.5 

11.3% 

11.3% 

430 

510 

-1.1 

430 

510 

-1.1 

Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave 

When  estimating  the  impacts  it  was  not  possible  to  differentiate  between  national  and 
international  regular  services  from  the  available  data.  The  estimated  volume  of 
international traffic rises in line with the total traffic which is broadly consistent with the 
recent  experiences  when  domestic  liberalisation  has  been  seen  to  stimulate  the 
introduction  of  new  international  services  as  well  as  the  development  of  national 
networks.  It  is  also  assumed  that  vehicle  kilometres  operated  increase  in  line  with 
demand and the average load factor will not change materially between options. 

41 

 
 
Just fewer 60% of the respondents to the OPC consider that establishing a common framework in the EU 
for  access  to  national  markets  for  regular  services  would  have  a  positive  impact  on  growth  in  the 
passenger transport sector. However, the national authorities had mixed views with 2 of the 3 considering 
it would have a negative effect. The same percentage of respondents consider that it will have a positive 
impact  on  the  administrative  burden  for  public  administrations  with  just  more  than  60%  considering  it 
would also have a positive impact on the reduction of cost of compliance with legislation. 

Revenue: The projected impacts on coach revenue reflect the underlying traffic activity 
impacts  described  above.  Option  1  generates  in  the  region  of  €27  billion  in  additional 
coach sector revenue in net present value (NPV) terms over the timescale of the impact 
assessment  (2015-2035).  Again,  Options  2  and  3  perform  particularly  well,  generating 
roughly  €62  billion  in  additional  coach  sector  revenue  reflecting  the  inclusion  of  the 
measure setting common requirements for the protection of PSCs meeting the needs of an 
urban area, which  would simplify the authorisation procedure and remove discretion to 
restrict market access unduly. 

Just fewer than 60% of respondents to the OPC consider that abolishing restrictions on access to national 
markets  for  regular  services  would  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  economic  situation  of  small  road 
passenger transport operators. The results are mixed across stakeholder groups with national authorities 
and  NGOs  consider  that  the  impact  would  be  negative.  More  than  60%  of  the  respondents  (and  the 
majority  of  all  stakeholder  groups)  consider  that  it  will  have  a  negative  effect  on  incumbent  coach 
operators. 

Fares  for  users  and  service  quality:  Given  the  lack  of  data  from  liberalised  Member 
States  on  the  effects  of  coach  market  liberalisation  the  impact  on  fares  for  users  and 
service quality has been assessed in qualitative terms. Fares for users and service quality 
have been assessed together rather than in isolation to demonstrate the overall impact on 
customer service.  

The  evidence  indicates  that  most  coach  services  are  cheaper,  on  a  fare  per  kilometre 
basis,  than  the  equivalent  rail  service.  This  may  be  because  rail  often  offers  faster 
journeys and can therefore act as a market ‘price-maker’. However, this is not always the 
case  and  coach  fares  have  been  found  between  two  and  three  times  greater  than  the 
equivalent rail fare, despite average speeds being similar between modes. In this case it is 
likely that there are additional factors such as service frequency and quality which permit 
coach operators to charge a much higher fare. Where one mode offers more frequent and 
faster services, the other may have the characteristics of an “inferior good51” and have to 
accept lower fares. At long distances, where air services are available, coach services can 
attract  passengers  by  not  charging  for  heavy  baggage,  and  may  be  viable  when  rail 
services are not. 

In cases where rail services are slower and less frequent than coach services, rail may be 
an  “inferior  good”  and  coach  may  charge  a  fare  many  times  the  rail  fare.  This  is 
particularly  the  case  on  the  routes  in  the  EU13  and  is  not  dependent  on  the  state  of 
market opening. 

The Eurobarometer Report provides an indication of passengers’ perception of fares as well as different 
aspects  of  service  quality.  The  results  do  not  suggest  any  systematic  differences  in  the  satisfaction  of 
passengers  in  liberalised  and  non-liberalised  Member  States.  Nevertheless,  there  is  evidence  from 
individual Member States that have   liberalised indicating that market opening can lead to a substantial 

51 The term “inferior good” here as defined strictly within economic terminology. In economics, an inferior 

good is one for which demand falls when consumer income rises, and vice versa.   

42 

 
 
                                                 
reduction in fares as well as improvements in service quality, at least in the short term. 

Over  the  longer  term  the  evidence  suggests  that  after  market  opening,  strong 
consolidation takes place. The competent authorities have the role of ensuring that there 
is  no  decline  in  competition  in  the  supply  of  bus  services  after  the  removal  of  market 
restrictions due to the abuse of a dominant position by one player. 

The following figure shows changes in National Express average real fares and service 
departures  from  Victoria  Coach  Station  in  London  (the  latter  is  an  indication  of  two 
different dimensions of service quality, namely the range of routes served and the service 
frequency offered). It indicates that in the five years following full market liberalisation 
in 1980, average fares fell by more than 20%, while the number of departures increased 
by  more  than  100%,  representing  a  substantial  improvement  in  the  service  offer.  Note, 
however,  that  by  1991  average  fares  were  more  than  10%  higher  than  in  1980  while 
departures  had  fallen  back  to  120%  of  their  pre-liberalisation  level,  reflecting  the 
consolidation  of  the  market  and  the  strengthening  of  National  Express’s  dominant 
position from 1984. 

Figure 6-4: Trends following domestic liberalisation in the UK 

Source:  Peter  White,  reported  by  ECMT,  Steer  Davies  Gleave  analysis  in  Annex  F  of  support 
study 

Whether  the  resulting  price-service  quality  offer  represented  an  improvement  on  the 
position in 1980 is difficult to determine on this evidence alone, although the increase in 
departures was clearly a benefit to passengers. In any event, the figure demonstrates the 
difficulties of sustaining any initial, substantial improvement in the value of the service 
offer, particularly if competition in the market is not preserved. 

More recent evidence from Germany supports the view that that the immediate effect of 
liberalisation  is  to  improve  the  price-service  quality  ratio  and  that  competition  is 
recognised  an  important  determinant  of  fare  levels52.  A  previously  cited  study  by  Dürr 
and  Hüschelrath  (2015)  reported  that  there  are  significant  reductions  in  fares  on  routes 
where there is competition between two or more operators. It also suggests, as illustrated 
in  the  figure  6-4  below,  that  liberalisation  resulted  in  a  wide  range  of  price-service 
quality combinations within the first year of the new market access arrangements taking 
effect. 

52  Contestability  of  long  distance  German  coach  market,  Katrin  Augustin,  KCW  GmbH,  European 

Transport Council 2013. 

43 

 
 
    
                                                 
Figure 6-5: price-service quality offer of German coach operators in 2014 

Source: Dürr and Hüschelrath (2015) 

This  can  be  interpreted  as  a  measure  of  customer  perceptions  of  the  overall  value  for 
money offered by the different operators. As shown, operators offering higher value for 
money  include  both  FlixBus  (with  lower  fare  and  lower  service  quality  rating)  and 
DeinBus.de  (with  a  higher  fare  and  higher  service  quality  rating).  Those  apparently 
offering lower value for money, based on customer perceptions, include operators such 
as Berlin Linen Bus and Eurolines Germany, both of which charged relatively high fares 
but  whose  service  quality  offering  was  broadly  comparable  with  that  of  FlixBus.  Note 
that  both  these  operators  were  established  before  liberalisation,  and  could  therefore  be 
considered to represent the price-service quality offering in the absence of competition. 

As part of the 2016 study on passenger transport by coach in Europe a number of fares 
for interurban services were sampled across 19 Member States as illustrated in the figure 
below.  The  fares  include  both  peak  and  off-peak  return  fares  and  recorded  data  for 
booking  one  day,  one  week  and  one  month  ahead  for  a  single  point-to-point  journey. 
From  the  available  data,  it  appears  that  the  fare  per  kilometre  averages  at  €0.06  in 
liberalised markets, compared to €0.11 in restricted markets. This significant difference 
indicates that liberalisation usually leads to a reduction in prices with positive impacts for 
the passengers. 

Figure 6-6: Sample of fares for national inter-urban services 

Cheapest single, return or advance

Most expensive single, return or advance

0,16
0,14
0,12
0,10
0,08
0,06
0,04
0,02
0,00

AT EL HU HR ES

LT LV BG PT SE RO CZ FR DE

IE UK IT

PL

FI

Restricted Market

Liberalised

e
r
t
e
m
o

l
i
k
r
e
p
e
r
a
f
d
e
t
s
u
d
a
_
P
P
P

j

Source: Adapted from Support Study for the IA for the Revision of Regulation 1073/2009 

44 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Over the long term it is more difficult to predict because the fares depend on the extent to 
which competition on the individual route is  sustained. If competition is not  preserved, 
the efficiency gains resulting from the removal of market restrictions can be outweighed 
by  the  negative  consequences  through  the  abuse  of  a  dominant  position  by  one  player, 
leading  to  higher  fares.  However,  any  abuse  of  market  power  is  susceptible  to 
intervention  by  supervisory  authorities;  also  the  specific  dynamics  of  this  market  will 
counter  this:  as  fixed  investment  required  for  market  entry  is  typically  very  low  (no 
infrastructure  investment,  availability  of  leased  bus  capacity),  any  excessive  price  rises 
by  mono-  or  oligopolists  will  immediately  provoke  new  entry.  These  markets  will 
therefore clearly remain contestable after the elimination of national regulatory barriers. 

Based  on  this  analysis,  it  can  be  expected  that  under  Option  1,  market  opening  will 
initially  lead  to  a  reduction  in  fares  and  more  innovative  pricing  strategies  in  the  short 
term.  The  studies  mentioned  above  have  identified  significant  reductions  in  fares  on 
routes where there is competition between two or more operators. 

However, the impact on fares over the long term is more difficult to predict, because it 
depends  on  the  extent  to  which  competition  on  individual  routes  is  sustained.  There  is 
clear  evidence  that  the  market  in  Germany  has  become  concentrated  and  emerging 
evidence that consolidation among operators is taking place in France and Italy. The UK 
market  continues  to  be  dominated  by  National  Express  despite  more  than  35  years  of 
liberalisation. 

Against this background, it seems that  the impact  on fares  over the long term will to  a 
great extent depend on the willingness of competent authorities to take action to preserve 
competition. 

We  have  not  identified  any  evidence  from  the  Eurobarometer  survey  suggesting  that 
passengers using services in liberalised markets perceive service quality to be materially 
higher  than  in  other  markets.  However,  some  studies  suggest  that  market  liberalisation 
leads to a more innovative use of sales channels, the adoption of yield management and 
faster introduction of on-board services such as Wi-Fi. In addition, there is clear evidence 
from  independent  studies  that  the  number  of  services  offered  increases  substantially  in 
liberalised markets.  

Option 2 and Option 3 will have the same impact on fares as Option 1 but as they will 
stimulate more rapid market growth more aggressive price competition in the short term 
under both these options is expected. 

Just  fewer  than  60%  of  the  respondents  to  the  OPC  consider  that  market  opening  will  have  a  positive 
effect on fares. The stakeholder groups that were the most divided in their assessment of the effect were 
governmental authorities (2 of 3 view the effect as negative) and NGOs (14 of 28 view it as negative). 

Options 1, 2 and 3 all include measures that will simplify the market access procedures 
and open the inter-urban market to competition. As described in the impacts on transport 
activity section above, each option has a positive impact on the number of services as a 
result of newcomers entering the markets with extensive networks including coach lines 
in areas where coach services were previously barely present. There is also evidence (see 
table 2-5 above), from recently liberalised markets, that service frequency increases with 
the  number  of  competitors  on  the  route  and  that  liberalisation  has  provided  passengers 
with a greater choice of combinations of price and service quality.  

45 

 
 
Each  of  the  three  options  has  a  positive  impact  on  safety  which  is  driven  by  the 
significant  reduction  in  car  traffic.  External  costs  of  accidents  fall  under  Option  1  by 
about  €1.2  billion,  expressed  as  present  value  over  2015-2035.  They  fall  more 
substantially under option 2 and 3 generating in the order of €2.8 billion in savings over 
the same period. This is discussed in more detail in the section 6.1.3. on social impacts.  

Market  opening  has  led  to  the  use  of  more  innovative  use  of  sales  channels  and 
platforms, the adoption of yield management and faster introduction of on-board services 
such  as  Wi-Fi.  This  is  particularly  important  to  younger  passengers  who  are  the  most 
interested in coach services. There is no evidence of any difference across the 3 options. 

The  majority  (just  under  60%)  of  respondents  to  the  public  consultation  reported  that  in  their  view 
opening the market for national regular services would have a positive effect on service quality provided 
to  passengers.  The  views  of  the  stakeholder  groups  were  mixed  with  the  majority  of  governmental 
authorities (3 of 3) and NGO’s (16 of 28) considering that the effect on service quality will be negative. The 
Eurobarometer Report results indicate that passengers using coach services in liberalised markets do not 
perceive the quality of service to be materially higher than in other markets. 

Level  of  performance  of  other  modes  of  transport:  Increases  in  the  level  of  coach 
transport  activity  are  likely  to  lead  to  decreases  in  the  level  of  transport  activity  on 
competing  transport  modes.  Competition  from  long  distance  coaches  encourages  rail 
transport to lower its prices and set up low cost services to retain its customers. Also, rail 
operators have the capability to enter the coach market to regain some of the passengers 
lost to rail such as in France where Ouibus (a 95% subsidiary of SNCF) holds 30% of the 
intercity coach market. To calculate the decrease in traffic for each competing transport 
mode,  the  traffic  diversion  factors  derived  from  experience  in  Germany  have  been 
applied. These factors are: 4% for air transport, 40% for passenger car transport, 46% for 
rail transport and 10% for generated coach transport. The formula used to calculate the 
change  in  share  is  described  in  Annex  4,  in  the  section  “Assessment  of  secondary 
impacts”.  

One factor that provides coach an advantage compared to rail is that operators make no 
payment  for  the  use  of  infrastructure  beyond  an  annual  licence,  while  rail  operators 
maybe required to pay not only the cost that is directly incurred as a result of operating 
the  train  service  but  also  mark-ups  on  the  basis  of  efficient,  transparent  and  non-
discriminatory principles which are permitted to obtain full recovery of the costs incurred 
by  the  infrastructure  manager.  Thus,  while  the  directly  variable  costs  of  coach  may  be 
lower  than  those  of  rail,  the  effect  of  mark-ups,  the  effect  of  mark-ups  may  be  the 
average costs of rail are higher than those of coach. In practice many of the costs of both 
rail and coach operations, including the provision of vehicle and crew, are time-based, so 
an  important  factor  may  often  be  the  relative  average  speeds  achievable  by  rail  and 
coach, determined both by the rail and road infrastructure and the number of stops made 
on  route.  This  initiative  on  access  to  the  coach  market  should  be  seen  as  part  of  a  co-
ordinated  response  to,  amongst  other  things,  market  challenges  faced.  As  part  of  this 
package  buses  and  coaches  will  be  included  within  the  scope  of  the  Eurovignette 
Directive.  The  inclusion  of  buses  and  coaches  will  help  to  diminish  distortions  of 
competition  in  the  internal  market  for  passenger  transport  caused  by  according 
preferential treatment (i.e. exemption from paying for the use of infrastructure) to these 
vehicles, vis-à-vis rail transport, which is already subject to such charging.  

A second factor providing coach with  an advantage compared  to  rail is that  the unit  of 
capacity, a coach, is much smaller than a typical train. In practice, an interurban-service 

46 

 
 
with  a  number  of  intermediate  stops  may  generate  only  sufficient  demand  to  justify  a 
train every hour or every two hours. The demand between the two cities alone, however, 
may be sufficient to support a half hourly coach service operating non-stop between them 
on a direct motorway, in some cases with a comparable or shorter overall journey time. 

The  impact  of  each  policy  option  on  traffic  carried  by  mode  in  2030  relative  to  the 
Baseline is shown in figure 6-3 below. Under Option 1 there is a limited impact on rail of 
about  2%  (about  13  billion  pkm)  and  a  4.8%  (about  28  billion  pkm)  increase  in  coach 
total pkm. Under Options 2 and 3 there is a larger but still limited impact on rail of 4.8% 
(about  30  billion  pkm)  with  a  significant  increase  in  coach  transport  activity  of  11.3% 
(about 66 billion pkm). The modal share of rail in under Options 2 and 3 is decreasing by 
0.4 percentage points in 2030 relative to the Baseline (from 8.4% to 8%) 

Figure 6-7: Estimated impact of market opening options on other modes (% change to the Baseline 
in 2030) 

Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave 

Our analysis, based on the experience of Member States that have liberalised their coach 
markets, indicates that the liberalisation of national markets can only be expected to 
have a limited impact in terms of passenger shift from rail. This could be explained 
somewhat  by  the  targeting  of  coach  operators  of  services  at  different  groups  of 
passengers. In the targeted consultation, coach operators confirm that they target specific 
groups  such  as  those  without  access  to  a  car,  younger  and  older  passengers  and 
passengers who could be considered more finically disadvantaged.  

The decrease in passenger car transport activity for the 3 options appears small at under 
0.5%  (27  billion  passenger-kilometres)  relative  to  the  Baseline  in  2030  but  given  the 
dominance  of  car  travel  in  the  EU  passenger  transport,  even  the  small  percentage 
reduction in car traffic achieved under each option has important implications for traffic 
congestion and emissions as discussed below. 

As a result of the changes in the allocation of traffic across modes under Options 1, 2 and 
3, the modal share of coach services increases. Under Option 1 the sector’s modal share 
increases by 0.4 percentage points in 2030 relative to the Baseline. Under Options 2 and 

47 

-5%-3%-1%1%3%5%7%9%11%CoachRailCarAir% change to the Baseline in 2030PO1PO2 & PO3 
 
3,  which  generate  more  substantial  additional  coach  traffic,  the  sector’s  modal  share 
increases  by  0.9  percentage  points.  Against the background of  the  long term  decline  in 
modal  share  described  in  Section  2.2  this  would  represent  an  improvement  in  the 
competitiveness  of  the  sector  and  facilitate  inter-urban  mobility  for  all  citizens  and  in 
particular for groups with limited access to other modes. 

The increase in coach traffic generated by each of the options results in a diversion away 
from other modes. The beneficial effects of the modal shift from car and air together with 
the generation of new traffic are greater than the abstraction from rail. The performance 
of coach and rail combined is improved by all three options so increase the modal 
share of sustainable transport modes. 

The  modal  shift  also  reduces  the  revenues  earned  by  other  forms  of  public  transport, 
particularly rail transport. However, similar to the net beneficial effect of the modal shift 
under each option there is a net increase in revenues due to the expansion of the market 
towards new passengers as described in figure 6-8 below. 

Figure 6-8: Revenue of coach and other modes relative to the Baseline over 2015-2035 (expressed as 
present value) 

Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave 

To assess the impact of the policy options on the performance of other transport modes, 
the lost revenue arising from the decrease in the level of transport activity was estimated 
based  on  the  demand  reduction  rates  provided  in  in  the  first  paragraph  of  this  section. 
Under  Option  1  rail  revenues  decrease  by  about  0.6%  (€20  billion)  relative  to  the 
Baseline and there is a net increase in revenues of around €5 billion (expressed as present 
value).  Under  Options  2  &  3  the  estimated  reduction  in  revenues  is  about  1.4%  (€46 
billion)  and  there  is  a  net  increase  in  revenues  of  around  €10.7  billion  relative  to  the 
Baseline (expressed as present value). However, the estimates of revenue loss are based 
on  diversion  factors  derived  from  experience  in  Germany,  which  in  some  respects  has 
introduced a greater degree of liberalisation than is implied in the policy options which 
provided  more  protection  to  existing  services  than  is  the  case  in  Germany  so  the 
estimates of rail revenue loss shown in the figure below may overstate the impact. 

48 

5.010.710.7-60.0-40.0-20.00.020.040.060.080.0PO1PO2PO3Revenues (present value in billion €)CoachRailAirNet 
 
 
Administrative Burden: The reductions in administrative burdens are estimated using the 
costs associated with authorisations and journey forms as previously described in table 2-
653.  

The  saving  from  the  measure  abolishing  the  journey  form  for  occasional  services  is 
estimated at €4 million over the period 2015-2035 (expressed as present value) relative to 
the  Baseline  under  all  three  options  and  is  the  only  reduction  in  administrative  burden 
under option 1. 

Under Option 2 the same savings are generated from abolishing the journey form. It is 
assumed  that  revenue  is  foregone  due  to  delays  in  the  authorisation  procedures  and 
therefore  savings  are  generated  by  the  reduction  in  time  to  complete  authorisation 
process from four months to two months. This saving is estimated at €1,450 million over 
the period 2015-2035 (expressed as present value) relative to the Baseline. 

Under Option 3 the same reductions from getting rid of the journey form are generated as 
Option 2 with a reduction of around €240 million over the period 2015-2035 relative to 
the Baseline due to the elimination of the authorisation procedure and €3,230 million cost 
savings generated by the reduction in time to complete the authorisation process. 

Impact on market structure in the coach  and bus sector: Under Option 1, it is expected 
that the liberalisation of the market would lead to a more competitive market structure, at 
least in Member States where the market is currently dominated by a limited number of 
incumbents.  Competitors  are  likely  to  focus  on  specific  routes  rather  than  trying  to 
replicate or establish national route networks. Over the longer term the evidence suggests 
that  after  market  opening,  strong  consolidation  takes  place. The  competent  competition 
authorities have the role of ensuring that the efficiency gains resulting from the removal 
of  market  restrictions  are  not  unduly  appropriated  through  the  abuse  of  a  dominant 
position by one player, leading to higher fares. The inclusion of the measure abolishing 
journey forms will also reduce costs of entry for the providers of occasional services.  

Option 2 will have the same impact on the market structure as under Option 1 but it is 
likely that there will be more rapid growth which  may lead to greater fragmentation of 
the market in  the early years of liberalisation  followed by consolidation. As  mentioned 
above, the competent competition authorities have the role of ensuring that the efficiency 
gains  resulting  from  the  removal  of  market  restrictions  are  not  unduly  appropriated 
through the abuse of a dominant position by one player. 

Option 3 will have the same impact on the market structure as under Option 2, but the 
inclusion  of  the  measure  abolishing  of  the  authorisation  procedure  is  likely  to  make  it 
more difficult to track market developments. If the European Commission does not have 
at its disposal comparable, reliable, synchronised, regular  and comprehensive statistical 
data  on  the  market  it  makes  it  difficult  for  the  European  Commission  to  carry  out  the 
tasks entrusted to it in the context of the common transport policy. 

Potential relocation of businesses: The inclusion of a measure requiring Member States 
to grant access to national markets for regular services without discrimination in Options 
1, 2 and 3 will enable operators to operate in markets that were otherwise closed to them 
without having to establish subsidiaries. However, in practice, operators may continue to 

53  Calculated  using  the  EU  average  wage  (https://www.reinsfischer.com/average-salary-european-union-

2016) and assumptions on time taken as described in table 2-6 

49 

 
 
                                                 
establish subsidiaries in different Member States for a variety of strategic and operational 
reasons regardless of the regulatory environment. 

We would not  expect any of the options  to  have a material effect in  the distribution of 
coach  companies  across  the  EU,  although  there  may  be  some  migration  over  the  long 
term  away  from  Member  States  whose  markets  are  currently  closed  to  operators 
established elsewhere.  

Integration  of  ticketing  and  price  competition:  Under  Option  1  the  more  fragmented 
market  over  the  short  term  may  result  in  less  integrated  ticketing  since,  for  example, 
inter-modal ticketing arrangements will be more difficult to coordinate. Consolidation of 
the  market  could  be  expected  to  make  such  coordination  easier.  Over  the  longer  term, 
competition  could  lead  to  the  creation  of  a  wide  range  of  multi-modal  products 
introduced  through  partnerships  between  coach  companies  and  airlines  as  well  as  rail 
operators. 

The more effective protection of public service contracts under Options 2 and 3 due to 
the  inclusion  of  the  measure  to  set  common  requirements  for  the  protection  of  PSCs 
meeting the needs of an urban area will help preserve integrated ticketing arrangements 
in conurbations. 

Level  of  infringements  of  rules  on  access  to  the  market:  Under  Option  1  the  rules 
governing access to national markets will be streamlined and it is expected that there will 
be  fewer  opportunities  for  operators  to  infringe  them  and  hence  fewer  recorded 
infringements. However, it is possible that a greater level of market activity could result 
in  some  remaining  rules,  for  example  those  protecting  PSCs,  to  be  infringed  more 
frequently. 

Option  2  should  also  result  in  fewer  infringements  due  to  the  streamlining  of  market 
access rules, including those protecting PSCs. 

The  inclusion  of  the  measure  abolishing  the  authorising  procedure  in  Option  3  would 
appear to increase the risk of infringements. The operator opening a new route would no 
longer be checked immediately before commencing the route. Enforcement would have 
to  focus  on access  to  the  profession  and  the  Community  licence.  The Member  State  of 
establishment  would  have  a  vital  role  in  encouraging  carriers  to  comply  with  the 
regulations. 

Level  of  congestion:  the  changes  to  the  level  of  transport  activity,  for  both  coach 
transport and competing modes, imply changes to the level of externalities produced by 
each  transport  mode.  The  net  change  in  the  level  of  congestion  is  based  on  changes  to 
transport activity and the demand extraction rates and is further explained in Annex 4. 

The absolute reduction in car traffic as a result of the options is significant, and since car 
traffic makes a major contribution to congestion the impact of the options on congestion 
costs are correspondingly large. Option  1 delivers a reduction in  congestion costs of in 
the region of €6 billion over the timescale of the impact assessment (expressed as present 
value). Options 2 and 3 deliver a significantly greater reduction of about €15 billion in 
such costs over the same period. 

There  is  no  evidence  that  any  of  the  three  options  would  lead  to  greater  congestion  in 
urban areas. Urban congestion is more likely to be a result of terminals not being able to 

50 

 
 
adequately accommodate all coaches in stands or if terminals no longer have the scope to 
expand to cater for further frequency increases in coach traffic. 

Economic  effects  for  SME’s:  Under  Option  1  liberalisation  would  provide  new 
opportunities for SMEs, notwithstanding the risk of consolidation over the long term. If 
some  new  business  models  were  to  become  widespread,  national  operators  seeking  to 
expand their networks would provide opportunities for sub-contracting and offer benefits 
that could be of considerable value to the SMEs. However these effects could be offset 
by a general trend towards greater market consolidation, especially if dominant operators 
emerge that prefer to manage operations in-house rather than out sourcing.  

Under  Option  2  the  greater  market  stimulation  would  be  expected  to  generate  more 
opportunities  for  SMEs.  As  the  measure  abolishing  authorisations  in  Option  3  would 
significantly reduce the regulatory costs faced by SMEs it would be expected to generate 
even  more  opportunities  and  encourage  new  businesses  to  enter  the  market,  either  as  a 
sub-contractor or primary operators. 

Just  fewer  than  60%  of  respondents  to  the  public  consultation  have  the  view  that 
abolishing  restrictions  on  access  to  national  markets  for  regular  services  will  have  a 
positive effect on the economic situation of SMEs. 

Impact on public service contracts: In rail passenger transport competition takes the form 
of 

  competition  for  the  market  –  via  PSC  or  service  concessions,  giving  an 
undertaking exclusive right to operate on a specific route or bundle of routes; or 
  competition  in  the  market  –  where  two  or  more  operators  compete  on  the  same 

route. 

Ensuring the provision of public rail services usually implies the need for compensating 
undertakings.  Suburban  and  regional  trains  are  usually  run  through  PSC,  whereas  long 
distance and high speed trains may be more frequently operated under competition in the 
market.  In  most  countries  providing  data  via  Railway  Information  Measuring  and 
Monitoring System (RIMMS), the PSC compensation per train-km is higher than EUR 5 
(with  the  notable  exception  of  the  UK).  There  does  not  appear  to  be  any  difference 
between  the  levels  of  PSC  compensation  per  train-km  between  the  group  of  Member 
States that have liberalised their coach market and the group of Member States that limit 
competition. 

The  portion  of  PSC  services  in  total  rail  passenger  traffic  varies  widely  between  the 
Member States. As shown in the figure below the portion of PSC services as % of total 
rail passenger services indicates that liberalisation of coach market appears to have little, 
if any impact on the portion of rail services operated under PSC in Member States. 

Figure 6-9: PSC Services as % of total rail passenger services 

Non-
liberalised 
coach 
markets 

51 

 
 
 
Liberalised 
coach 
markets 

Source: RIMMS, 2014 data except for IE and NL (2013) and EL and ES (2012). Domestic PSO 
for  FR  includes  also  train  services  TET,  TER  and  Transilien  (operated  only  by  SNCF,  and  not 
RATP) 

This indicates that the introduction of commercial coach services does not appear to have 
any significant impact on rail PSCs. However, in principle, it may result in a number of 
responses either by PSC operators, within any flexibility to do so provided in their 
contracts, or by the competent authorities. Responses might include changes to fares, 
vehicle  quality,  service  frequency,  length  of  service  day  (from  first  service  to  last 
service), off-peak and weekend provision, stopping pattern and, potentially, withdrawal. 
The  mechanisms  by  which  liberalisation  may  result  in  changes  to  PSC  services  are  set 
out in table 6-2 below. 

Table 6-2: Mechanisms by which liberalisation may result in changes to PSO services 

Issue 

Details 

Has  the  liberalisation  of  the  coach  market 
resulted in loss of revenue to services? 

If  there  has  been  a  loss  of  revenue,  has  the 
operator of those services detected this effect? 

If  the  operator  has  detected  the  effect,  can  it 
identify  on  which  services  the  revenue  is  being 
lost? 

If the operator can identify on which services the 
revenue  is  being  lost,  can  it  identify  a  service 
reduction  plan  (including  complete  closure) 
which would mitigate the losses? 

If  the  operator  can  identify  a  service  reduction, 
can it implement it? 

This  appears  likely  to  be  the case except  where  the 
coach  service  is  in  a  wholly  new  market  and  does 
not abstract any passengers from existing routes. 

If revenues are monitored by route, or boarding’s are 
monitored  by  stop  or  service,  the  operator  may 
detect the effect. 

However, in a large PSO operation, with no detailed 
revenue  reporting,  the  effect  of  minor  competition 
may not have been noticed. 

As  above,  this  may  depend  on  the  level  of 
monitoring and revenue reporting of the operator. 

This may depend on many operational practicalities. 
For  example,  if  a  liberalised  service  takes  demand 
from the centre of a route which remains busy at the 
ends, there may be no saving from cutting the route 
into two. 

To implement a service reduction it may still need to 
be consistent with the public service contract and/or 
overall  transport  policies  or  labour  agreements.  For 
example,  a  requirement  that  all  services  remain  at 
least  hourly,  or  of  no  compulsory  redundancies,  or 
vehicle leases which do not expire for a long period, 
may mean no change in response to loss of revenue. 

If 
the  operator  can 
reduction, will it be material? 

implement  a  service 

Cost-recovery may be so low that any further loss of 
revenue is immaterial. 

52 

 
 
 
If all the above are true: 

If any of the above are true: 

  The  PSO  operator  may  cut  back  services  to 
the extent that is permitted by its contract. 

  The  competent  authority  may  change  the 
specification of services in the next contract. 

 

 

In  a  net  cost  contract,  the  PSO  operator  may 
accept revenue losses. 

In  a  gross  cost  contract,  or  where  there  is  an 
internal  operator,  the  competent  authority  may 
accept revenue losses. 

Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave 

In summary, competent authorities specifying PSC services, prima facie: 

  may not bear revenue risks, in the case of net cost contracts; However, operators 
may  stop  operating  under  PSC  if  operations  turn  out  to  be  financially 
unsustainable. 

  may  continue  to  provide  services  on  social  grounds  irrespective  of  losses  if 

politically acceptable; and/or 

  may set fares much lower than costs, so that large revenue losses have relatively 

little effect on subsidy; and/or 

  may make no change until the next contract is awarded, which may be up to 15 

years away. 

Under option 1 all PSCs remain protected so there is no impact. Under options 2 and 3 
PSCs would be affected as follows: 

 

liberalised services required to carry passengers 100 kilometres more would only 
affect  a  small  proportion  of  public  service  contracts,  because  many  routes 
operated in accordance with public service obligations are under 100 kilometres 
long and passenger journeys on them are implicitly shorter; 

  where  cost-recovery  is  low,  revenue  loss  has  limited  impact  on  overall subsidy; 

and 

  publicly  contracted  services  affected  by  liberalisation  may  not  change  until 

contracts are renewed. 

Where  coach  markets  have  been  liberalised,  we  have  found  no  evidence  of 
competent authorities awarding public service contracts or public service operators 
citing it as a major cause of reductions in the services provided or closing of lines. 
Member States  such as FR, DE, IT, and SE who have  already liberalised their markets 
have  not  reported  during  the  consultation  that  there  has  been  a  requirement  to  increase 
subsidies or that there has been any loss of public service contract revenues. The opening 
of  market  access  also  provides  the  opportunity  for  competent  authorities  to  reorganise 
existing PSC after their which may result in significant cost savings and/or also reduce 
travel times by taking advantage of the best of coach and rail. 

There  is  specific  evidence  from  France,  Spain  and  Sweden  an  EU-wide  study  on  PSO 
night trains that provides detailed information on the financing of PSCs. A summary of 
the findings are in the table below, and more detailed information are in Annex 7. 

Table 6-3: Summary of evidence of impacts of liberalisation on PSOs 

Source 
Public  Service 
Contract 
duration 

Evidence 
Whatever  impacts  on  demand  and  revenue,  PSO  services  may  not  change  until 
contract renewal, which may be as long as 10-15 years. 

53 

 
 
France 

Spain 

Sweden 

EU-wide 

SNCF expects to lose 15-25% of revenue, or €1-2 billion per year, but it is not 
clear what is due to coach and what is due to car-sharing. 
Two of the five busiest coach routes are little more than 100 kilometres long. 
ARAFER  has  received  multiple  applications  to  carry  passengers  less  than  100 
kilometres, although these may be between intermediate stops on longer routes. 
Average  passenger  length  on  interregional  services  has  risen  to  180  kilometres, 
but no equivalent information was found on regional services. 
Lack  of  information  on  regional  concessions,  and  of  the  mix  of  services  in  any 
concessions, makes it difficult to identify where new entry might occur. 
One  County  has  no  PSO  services  longer  than  100  kilometres,  and  over  60%  of 
revenue is from routes shorter than 20 kilometres, implicitly for journeys which 
are even shorter. 
Cost  recovery  varies  from  80%  to  almost  zero,  averaging  30%  for  all  route 
lengths:  a  given  percentage  loss  of  revenue  would  require  a  much  smaller 
percentage increase in subsidy. 
Liberalisation  in  Germany,  France  and  Italy  was  not  cited  by  stakeholders  as  a 
direct  or  even  major  cause  of  closures  of  night  train  services,  but  it  had  driven 
their fares down. 

Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave 

The  intervention  of  the  Member  States  would  only  be  required  under  circumstances 
where  commercial  services  serving  remote  areas  fall  below  the  limits  acceptable  to  the 
competent authorities. Member States will continue to be free to organise PSO’s that are 
required  in such  a  way as  to  ensure  bus  connectivity  of  remote  urban centres  under  all 
options. The usual model of PSO to ensure coach connectivity with remote urban areas is 
the  granting  of  public  subsidies  for  the  provision  of  these  transportation  services. 
Member  States  have  flexibility  to  better  organise  the  balance  between  commercial  and 
non-commercial services and target the mobility needs of citizens. The distance threshold 
should not create many distortions for PSO operators serving rural areas as in some of the 
Member States that have not yet liberalised. It is estimated that less than 5% of bus and 
coach  revenue  from  PSCs  relates  to  routes  over  100km.  Given  that  such  services  seem 
likely  to  include  intermediate  stops  rather  than  serving  only  end-to-end  flows,  it  is 
estimated  that  less  than  2.5%  of  revenue  relates  to  passenger  journeys  over  100 
kilometres.  As  not  all  such  journeys  would  be  replaced  by  a  commercial  service,  less 
than  1.25%  of  bus  and  coach  PSC  revenue  would  be  lost  to  commercial  services.  The 
introduction of competition on these routes is likely to result in decreased revenues from 
PSO passenger fares which may require an increase in  public subsidies to  maintain the 
same  level  of  service  under  all  options  but  the  increase  is  relatively  small.  This  would 
indicate  that  under  all  options  the  sustainability  of  public  service  contracts  serving 
remote urban areas would not be undermined. 

Under  PO1,  a  significant  part  of  the  long  distance  coach  and  bus  market  would  not  be 
opened  for  commercial  operators  to  address  demand.  The  impact  on  PSOs  is  less  than 
under  other  options  as  all  PSOs  can  be  protected  but  this  option  also  limits  the 
effectiveness of the market opening considerably as operators do not have the flexibility 
to address demand where it is needed. 

Under PO2 and PO3 the impact on PSO’s is increased as more of  the national markets 
for regular services are liberalised and new services carrying passengers over distances of 

54 

 
 
greater than 100km cannot be refused on the grounds that the service could compromise 
a  PSO.  The  distance  threshold  is  set  at  a  level  to  minimise  distortions  to  PSO’s  whilst 
maximising  the  impact  of  opening  market  access.  Increasing  the  level  of  the  distance 
threshold  will  reduce  the  impact  on  PSOs  but  will  also  reduce  the  effectiveness  of  the 
market opening.  

Notwithstanding  the  overall  abstraction  of  passengers  from  the  rail  sector,  we  estimate 
the  associated  loss  in  rail  revenues  to  be  around  1.4%  relative  to  the  baseline  over  the 
horizon  of  the  impact  assessment  (expressed  as  present  value).  We  therefore  conclude 
that the primary effect of new coach services on the railways is likely to be a requirement 
for a relatively small increase in subsidy by the competent authority. 

6.1.2.

  Environmental impacts 

The  changes  to  the  level  of  transport  activity,  for  both  coach  transport  and  competing 
modes,  imply  changes  to  the  level  of  externalities  produced  by  transport  modes.  The 
formula  used  to  calculate  the  net  changes  is  defined  in  Annex  4.    In  this  section  the 
impacts of the options on carbon emissions, air pollution and energy use are described. In 
all  cases the  environmental  impacts  of  Option  2  and  Option  3  are equal  as  the level  of 
transport activity was the same in each case. 

Level  of  carbon  dioxide  emissions:  The  savings  in  CO2  emission  costs  are  substantial. 
They  reflect  the  absolute  reduction  in  car  traffic  achieved  under  each  of  the  options. 
Under  Option  1  CO2  emission  costs  are  reduced  by  around  €80  million  relative  to  the 
Baseline  over  the  timescale  of  the  impact  assessment.  Options  2  and  3  deliver 
significantly greater savings with CO2 emission costs reduced by around €183 million in 
NPV terms.  

As  an  illustration,  2  case  studies  were  carried  out  looking  at  the  connections  between 
Paris and Lille and between London and Birmingham to assess the CO2 emissions in two 
different  markets,  respectively  a  recently  opened  market  and  a  more  mature  market.  In 
both cases, as explained in Annex 8, the CO2 emission impacts were important. 

Passenger  cars  are  by  far  the  largest  emitters  of  CO2  serving  the  connection  between 
Paris  -  Lille  and  are  responsible  for  in  excess  of  65%  of  all  CO2  emissions.  Coaches, 
together with electric trains, transporting passengers collectively are the lowest emitters 
of CO2. 

A  typical  rail  fare  would  be  roughly  €40  with  a  transit  time  of  1  hour  compared  to  a 
typical  coach  fare  of  roughly  €15  with  a  transit  time  of  3  hours.  These  differences 
illustrate the fact that users of rail and coach have very different preferences and that the 
coach customer group are more price conscious and place less value of time. 

Based on available travel statistics and CO2 emissions per person by mode of transport, it 
can be calculated that the introduction of the coach connection between Paris and Lille 
has  reduced  transport  CO2  emissions  by  about  10,000  tonnes  of  CO2  per  annum. 
Moreover, it has resulted in around 250,000 less car journeys between the cities, thereby 
reducing also congestion as well as air and noise pollution. 

It  should  be  noted  that  this  CO2  reduction  was  calculated  based  on  one  of  the  busiest 
interregional  connections  in  Europe with  the  presence  of  a  high  number  of  parallel  rail 
services.  Considering  that  rail  lines  are  relatively  limited  in  the  EU  (200,000  km) 
compared to roads (5 million km), the scope for coach services – without any parallel rail 

55 

 
 
services – is very important, and such new services would have an even more positive net 
CO2 effect, as travellers in these cases only have cars as an alternative option.  

Energy  use:  The  reduction  in  net  energy  use  is  also  substantial.  Again,  it  reflects  the 
absolute reduction in car traffic achieved under each of the options. Under Option 1 net 
energy use is reduced by about 3.6 million tonnes of oil equivalent over the timescale of 
the impact assessment relative to the baseline. Reflecting the increased transport activity, 
Options 2 and 3 deliver significantly greater savings with a reduction of about 8.4 million 
tonnes of oil equivalent relative to the baseline. 

Level  of  air  pollution:  Again,  the  savings  in  net  air  pollution  costs  are  substantial  and 
reflect  the  absolute  reduction  in  car  traffic  achieved  under  each  of  the  options.  Under 
Option 1 air pollution costs are reduced by around €250 million relative to the Baseline 
over the timescale of the impact assessment (expressed as present value). Options 2 and 3 
deliver  significantly  greater  savings  with  air  pollution  costs  reduced  by  about  €590 
million. 

6.1.3.

  Social impacts 

Working conditions and job quality: This initiative on rules on access to the coach market 
should be seen as part of a co-ordinated response to the social and market challenges faced. 
As  part  of  this  package  market  and  social  issues  in  the  road  passenger  transport  sector 
will become more interdependent. A holistic approach has been adopted with the social, 
internal market and posting of workers' rules working better together to ensure both fair 
working conditions for drivers and fair competition between operators.   

The results of then open public consultation show that stakeholders have divided views about the effect of 
a  common  framework  in  the  EU  for  access  to  national  markets  for  regular  coach  and  bus  services,  the 
effect of abolishing restrictions on access to national markets and the effect of removing the protection of 
PSCs from competition. The operators and others consider that these measures will have a positive effect; 
regulators  are  equally  divided  whereas  National  authorities  and  NGOs  consider  they  will  have  negative 
effects. 

The  concerns  of  the  stakeholders  have  been  addressed  by  the  different  interlinked 
initiatives  in  this  package:  (i)  internal  market  rules  governing  access  to  occupation  of 
road  transport  operator  and  access  to  passenger  and  freight  markets,  (ii)  social  rules 
applicable  to  road  transport  sector,  (iii)  rules  implementing  the  user  and  polluter  pays 
principle  in  the  context  of  road  charging  and  (iv)  the  rules  on  interoperable  tolling 
services  through  digital  technologies.  All  together  these  initiatives  jointly  contribute  to 
fair,  efficient,  environmentally  and  socially  sustainable  road  transport  sector.  In 
particular,  the  links  between  the  social  and  the  internal  market  provisions  are  most 
prominent. The abuse of internal market rules by applying illegal business practices, such 
as:  illegal  cabotage,  fake  establishment  in  low-cost  countries,  have  adverse  effects  on 
drivers' working conditions and often deprive them from their social protection rights. In 
the same vein, the misapplication of the social rules in road transport by non-respecting 
the driving, working or resting time requirements or applying the terms and conditions of 
employment of the low-wage country to drivers working  most of the time in high-wage 
countries  disrupts  fair  competition  between  operators  by  unfair  cost  gains.  Therefore, 
solving  the  social  challenges  in  the  sector  must  go  hand  in  hand  with  addressing  the 
internal market problematic issues. Enforcement is a cross-cutting element affecting the 
effectiveness  of  both:  the  social  and  the  internal  market  legislation.  By  strengthening 
enforcement  and  administrative  cooperation  between  Member  States  in  the  social  rules 

56 

 
 
and  access  to  the  occupation  initiatives  should  contribute  to  ensuring  fair  working  and 
business  conditions,  which  will  enable  a  balance  between  the  freedom  to  provide  road 
transport  services  and  adequate  working  conditions  and  social  protection  of  road 
transport workers. 

The  on-going  revision  of  the  Posting  of  Workers  Directive  will  ensure  the  right  balance 
between  the  need  to  promote  the  freedom  to  provide  services  and  the  need  to  protect  the 
rights of posted workers. 

Although  there  is  likely  to  be  increased  competitive  pressure  the  holistic  and  co-
ordinated  response  means  that  other  initiatives  will  seek  to  alleviate  the  pressure  on 
working  conditions  from  the  policy  options  on  market  access.  These  initiatives  will 
address any potential erosion of labour market standards that is likely to occur over time 
and there does not appear to be a requirement for any further labour market policies to 
address these problems.  

Employment:  In  the  calculation  of  the  estimate  of  employment  it  is  assumed  that 
employment  grows  in  line  with  transport  activity  throughout  the  assessment  period  but 
the  estimates  assume  no  increases  in  productivity.  There  is  also  strong  evidence  from 
recently liberalised MSs such as France, Italy and Germany of the positive impact market 
opening has had on employment. Market opening at the EU level is estimated to result in 
an  increase  in  employment  in  the  coach  sector.  Under  Option  1,  it  will  result  in  about 
34,000 additional employees by 2025, rising to about 37,000 by 2030. 

Options  2  and  3  deliver  significantly  more  employment  with  about  82,000  additional 
employees by 2025, rising to about 85,000 by 2030. 

We would expect that emerging technological developments in section 2.8, including the 
introduction of driverless vehicles, will have an impact on the employment sector but it is 
not possible to forecast these with confidence at present. 

Road Safety: The impact on road safety is positive for all options. The absolute reduction 
in  car  traffic  drives  savings  in  accident  costs  relative  to  the  Baseline.  Under  Option  1, 
savings  of  around  €1.2  billion  will  be  generated  by  2035  relative  to  the  Baseline 
(expressed  as  present  value).  With  Options  2  and  3  the  savings  generated  increase  to 
around €2.8 billion relative to the Baseline over the time scale of the impact assessment 
(expressed as present value). 

Accessibility  for  people  with  reduced  mobility,  rights  of  the  elderly  and  integration  of 
persons  with  disabilities:  The  EDF  has  received  complaints  from  members  who  are 
concerned  that  market  opening  will  disadvantage  people  with  restricted  mobility.  In  its 
view,  the  needs  of  people  with  reduced  mobility  are  generally  not  taken  into 
consideration when operators are purchasing new coaches, and terminals are also poorly 
equipped. However, no evidence was found indicating that market opening has resulted 
in  the  provision  of  a  poorer  service  to  PRMs,  affected  the  rights  of  the  elderly,  or  the 
integration of persons with disabilities more than regulated ones. 

Connectivity of different social groups: To determine whether the impact of liberalisation 
can be expected to be adverse or favourable overall, the following was considered: 

 

the  extent  to  which  publicly  contracted  services,  and  existing  commercial 
services, are cut back in a way which disadvantages citizens with limited access 
to other modes; and 

57 

 
 
 

the extent to which liberalised services create new opportunities for citizens with 
limited access to other modes. 

On  the  first  point,  the  impact  is  unpredictable,  as  it  depends  on  many  decision-makers 
dealing  with  routes  with  different  levels  of  exposure  to  liberalised  services,  different 
levels of materiality to subsidy levels, different policies and different constraints. 

On the second point, those introducing new services in liberalised markets are unlikely to 
have  data  on,  and  hence  be  able  to  target,  citizens  with  limited  access  to  other  modes. 
They may enter the market using at least two business models: 

 

 

identifying  a  new  connection,  in  a  new  market,  which  can  be  operated 
commercially: this may benefit citizens who did not have private transport; and 
identifying  an  existing  connection,  in  a  proven  market,  from  which  they  can 
abstract passengers (given that the typical market positioning of coach relative to 
rail  and  air  is  that  it  is  slower  but  cheaper,  this  may  benefit  citizens  (or  non-
citizens) who could not afford access to other modes). 

Evidence from the German market provides some insight into this issue, since it enables 
analysis of the origins of passengers on liberalised coach services54. It suggests that only 
around 10% of passengers had no access to other modes, but many of the others might 
have had “limited” access, such as a car which was not always available to them. We also 
note that more than twice as many coach passengers (30%) had come from long-distance 
trains as from local or regional trains (14%). 

Data  from  a  FlixBus  coach  users  indicates  that  around  70%  of  coach  stops  could  have 
been reached via the public transport or rail network, even if the coach journey itself was 
not well-served by public transport55. 

Liberalised  services  may  serve  points  which  did  not  previously  have  public  transport, 
particularly if they impose only a small time penalty or would be necessary in any case 
for  rest  or  a  crew  change.  One  example  of  the  former  is  on  the  frequent  Oxford  Tube 
coach service between Oxford and London in Great Britain, which includes a stop at the 
small  village  of  Lewknor  (population  around  600),  20  kilometres  from  Oxford  and  60 
kilometres from London. However, we note that Member States would not be obliged to 
authorise such a stop in Options 2 and 3, as no passengers from Lewknor could be carried 
more than 100 kilometres. 

54 Bundesamt für Güterverkehr “Marktanalyse des Fernbuslinienverkehrs 2014”. 
55 Bundesamt für Güterverkehr “Marktanalyse des Fernbuslinienverkehrs 2015”. 

58 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Figure 6-10Error! Reference source not found. compares coach and rail fares on 
journeys over 300 kilometres and plots rail fare on the horizontal axis and coach fare on 
the vertical axis. 

Figure 6-10: comparison of coach and rail fares 

Source:  Comprehensive  study  on  passenger  transport  by  coach,  Steer  Davies  Gleave, 
February 2016. 

Coach fares are lower than rail fares (points low right on the chart) in many liberalised 
markets, and most notably in the UK, suggesting that in these markets, coach may be an 
inferior mode that tends to charge lower prices. This is also the case with all four of the 
transition Member States although coach fares may fall by around 20% in the first four 
years after liberalisation before rising to previous levels (see UK case study in Annex F 
of IA Support Study). 

In practice, the outcome of liberalisation on coach fares depends on at least two factors: 

 

 

In the first few years after liberalisation, coach fares may fall, as new entrants try 
to attract passengers and build market share. 
In the longer term after liberalisation, coach fares determined in the market place 
may either be lower or higher than rail fares, depending on the relative quality, 
and particularly average speeds, of coach and rail services. 

Of the Member States shown in figure 6-9, only Spain has a significantly lower average 
coach  speed  than  rail  speed56.  This  suggests  that,  all  other  things  being  equal,  average 
coach  fares  in  Spain  may  fall  after  liberalisation,  but  provides  little  indication  of  what 
may happen in other Member States. 

56  See  figure  5.10  Study  on  the  prices  and  quality  of  rail  passenger  services,  Steer  Davies  Gleave,  April 

2016 

59 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The estimate of the proportion of additional traffic accounted for by passengers living in 
remote regions, passengers facing difficulty paying bills and elderly passengers (65 and 
over) under each option is derived using the data from the Eurobarometer Report.  

The results of the assessment show that these disadvantaged or vulnerable social groups 
would  benefit  significantly  from  all  three  market  opening  options.  Passengers  living  in 
remote  regions  would  account  for  around  162  billion  pkm  by  coach  in  the  Baseline by 
2030.  Relative  to  the  Baseline,  under  Option  1  the  pkm  by  this  group  will  increase  by 
about 10 billion pkm in 2030. Under Option 2 and 3 the increase will be slightly over 2 
billion pkm in 2030 relative to the Baseline.  

Passengers  facing  difficulties  paying  bills  would  account  for  around  50  billion  pkm  by 
coach in 2030 in the Baseline. Relative to the baseline, under Option 1 the pkm by this 
group will increase by about 4 billion pkm in 2030. Under Option 2 and 3 the increase 
will be about 10 billion pkm relative to the Baseline in 2030. 

Elderly passengers (65 and over) would account for about 145 billion pkm by coach in 
the Baseline in 2030. Relative to the Baseline, under Option 1 the pkm by this group will 
increase  by  around  7  billion  pkm  in  2030.  Under  Option  2  and  3  the  increase  will  be 
around 15 billion pkm. 

In  practice,  it  is  expected  that  passengers  facing  difficulties  paying  bills  to  benefit 
disproportionately, since their travel decisions are typically constrained by fares on offer 
and lack of access to a car. 

Six of the eight Consumers (75%) and six of the seven Companies (86%) participating in the OPC gave a 
positive response when asked if coach services were viewed as important for the economic development 
of  the  respondent’s  region  and  jobs.  A  frequent  comment  in  the  free  text  section  was  that  better 
connections  and  coordination  between  different  modes  of  transport  would  encourage  greater  use  of 
coach services. 

Table 6-4: Synthesis of Economic, environmental and social impacts 

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Transport activity 
in 2030 
(difference to the 
Baseline) 

Change in 
revenues relative 
to the Baseline 
(present value for 
2015-2035) 

Performance of 
other modes 
relative to the 
Baseline in 2030 
(in billion pkm 
and % change) 

Modal Share in 

Billion pkm 

% increase 

Million 
journeys 

Services 

Load factor 
(p.p. change) 

PO1 

28 

4.8 

190 

220 

-0.7 

PO2 

66 

11.3 

430 

510 

-1.1 

PO3 

66 

11.3 

430 

510 

-1.1 

€ Billion 

27 

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62 

Coach 

Rail 

Car  

Air 

28 (4.8%) 

-13 (-2%) 

66 (11.3%) 

66 (11.3%) 

-30 (-4.8%) 

-30 (-4.8%) 

-11 (-0.2%) 

-27 (-0.5%) 

-27 (-0.5%) 

-1 (-0.1%) 

-3 (-0.3%) 

-3 (-0.3%) 

Impact on coach 
share (p.p. 

+0.4 

+0.9 

+0.9 

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2030 

change to the 
Baseline) 

Impact on coach 
and rail 
combined 
(difference to 
the Baseline in 
billion pkm) 

PO1 

PO2 

PO3 

15.5 

36.3 

36.3 

Frequency 

Increases 

Larger Increase due to 
more competition 

Same as PO2 

Availability 

Improves 

Greater improvement  

Same as PO2 

Safety (savings 
relative to the 
Baseline) 

Ease of 
purchasing 
tickets 

Abolish journey 
form 

Simplify 
authorisation 
procedure 

Quality of 
services 

Market structure 

Relocation of 
business 

Fares 

Integration of 
tickets 

Administrative 
burden (cost 
savings relative to 
the Baseline) 

Level of 
infringements 

Congestion costs 
(change relative to 
the Baseline, 
present value 
2015-2035) 

SMEs 

€1.2 billion 

€2.8 billion 

€2.8 billion 

Improves due to 
more innovation 

Same as PO1 

Same as PO1 

More competitive 
market structure 

As per PO1 but likely 
to result in more rapid 
growth 

As per PO2 but 
more difficult to 
track market 
developments 

No material effect  

No material effect 

No material effect 

Reduction in fares 
and more 
innovative price 
strategies. Long 
term action may 
be required to 
preserve 
competition 

As per PO1 but 
greater reduction in 
short term due to 
more aggressive price 
competition 

Difficult in short 
term but positive 
over longer term 

More effective 
protection of PSCs 
will help preserve 
integrated ticketing in 
urban areas 

As per PO1 but 
greater reduction 
in short term due 
to more 
aggressive price 
competition 

More effective 
protection of 
PSCs will help 
preserve 
integrated 
ticketing in urban 
areas 

€4 million 

€4 million 

€4 million 

0 

€1.4 billion 

€3.5 billion 

Fewer recorded 
infringements 

As per PO1 

Increase potential 
of infringements 

€6.4 billion 

€14.5 billion 

€14.5 billion 

New opportunities 

Greater market 

Reduced 

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Public Service 
Contracts (change 
relative to the 
Baseline, present 
value 2015-2035) 

CO2 emissions 

Energy Use 

Air pollution 

PO1 

PO2 

PO3 

but risk of 
consolidation in 
long term 

stimulation so more 
opportunities 

regulatory costs 
so even more 
opportunities  

Coach 

No impact 

Rail 

No impact 

Overall increase in 
subsidy of less than 
1% 

Overall increase 
in subsidy of less 
than 1% 

Loss of revenue of 
1.4% 

Loss of revenue 
of 1.4% 

€80 m 

€183 m  

€183 m 

3,600 

8,400 

8,400 

€250 million 

€590 million 

€590 million 

Net cumulative 
savings in CO2 
emissions costs 
relative to the 
Baseline 

Net cumulative 
energy savings 
relative to the 
Baseline (000 
tonnes of oil 
equivalent) 

Net cumulative 
savings in air 
pollution costs 
relative to the 
Baseline 

Accessibility 

No impact 

No impact 

Negative as 
effective 
enforcement more 
difficult 

27 

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As per PO1 

As per PO1 

Increased 
competitive 
pressure but no 
direct effect 

37,000 

85,000 

85,000 

€1.2 billion 

€2.8 billion 

2.8 billion 

Connectivity 

Working 
conditions 

Employment 
(additional 
employment in 
2030 relative to 
the Baseline) 

Road Safety 

Increase in 
billion pkm of 
disadvantaged 
social groups (in 
2030 relative to 
the Baseline) 

Savings in 
external costs of 
accidents 
relative to the 
Baseline 
(present value, 
2015-2035) 

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6.2. 

Impacts of policy options to address terminal access problems 

6.2.1.

  Economic impacts 

Transport  Activity:  Section  2.8  described  the  calculation  of  the  terminal  capacity  that 
might  be  unduly  suppressed  because  of  discriminatory  behaviour.  It  suggested  that  an 
additional  400  million  vehicle  kilometres  might  be  accommodated  if  publicly  owned 
capacity were available on a non-discriminatory basis and managed effectively. This has 
been used as a basis for estimating the effects of a one-off and sustained uplift in capacity 
as  a  result  of  introducing  measures  to  ensure  a  level  playing  field  in  the  allocation  of 
terminal capacity. 

The effects of the options for improving terminal access are small in comparison to the 
effects  from  the  market  access  policy  options.  The  effect  under  Option  4  is  due  to  the 
measure  encouraging  terminal  operators  to  provide  non-discriminatory  access  that 
delivers an estimated increase of 0.9% in coach transport activity in 2030 relative to the 
Baseline. Under Option 5 the effect is due to the requirement for Member States to grant 
non-discriminatory  access,  leading  to  1.7%  increase  in  coach  transport  activity  (around 
10 billion pkm) relative to the Baseline in 2030. It is important to note that this increase 
is instead of, as opposed to in addition to, the uplift under market access policy options. 

Table 6-5: Estimated impact of options on coach traffic levels 

Metric 

Billion passenger-km 

National 
International 
Total 
% increase 

Change relative to the 
baseline in 2030 

PO4 

PO5 

4.4 
0.7 
5.1 
0.9% 
24 
38 
0.0 

8.8 
1.4 
10.2 
1.7% 
47 
76 
0.0 

Million journeys 
Number of Services 
Average load factor (p.p. change)  
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave 

Revenue: The revenue impacts reflect the underlying traffic impacts. Option 4 generates 
roughly  €6  billion  in  additional  coach  sector  revenue  over  the  timescale  of  the  impact 
assessment  relative  to  the  Baseline  (expressed  as  present  value)  but  the  additional 
revenue generated by Option 5 is more significant at an estimated €12.5 billion. 

Level of performance of other modes of transport: The impact of each policy option on 
traffic carried by mode is shown in the figure below. The effects of Options 4 and 5 on 
modal  share  of  coaches  are  limited.  The  small  reduction  in  car  transport  represents  an 
absolute reduction which is more substantial under Option 5. Option 5 also delivers twice 
as much of an increase in coach pkm as Option 4.  Under Option 4 about 0.4% (2 billion 

63 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
pkm) is diverted from rail in 2030 relative to the Baseline and under Option 5 it is about 
0.7%  (5  billion  pkm).  In  both  cases  this  is  a  very  small  portion  of  the  traffic  diverted 
from rail. 

Figure  6-11:  Impact  of  terminal  options  on  other  modes  (%  change  in  transport  activity  in  2030 
relative to the Baseline) 

Source: Adapted from Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave 

As  the  change  in  allocation  of  traffic  across  modes  under  terminal  access  options  is 
small, the increase in the modal share of coach services is also small at an estimated 0.1 
percentage points for both options relative to the Baseline in 2030.  

The increase in coach traffic generated by the two options reduces the revenues earned 
by  other  forms  of  public  transport.  Under  Option  4  rail  revenues  decrease  by  around 
0.1% (€5 billion) during the timescale of the impact assessment relative to the Baseline. 
Under Options 5 the estimated reduction in revenues is about 0.3% (€9 billion) relative to 
the Baseline.  

Quality of service: There is no evidence that Options 4 or 5 providing greater access to 
public terminals will have any effect on the quality of service. However improved access 
to terminals could encourage investment in new facilities. 

Impact  on  market  structure  in  the  coach  and  bus  sector:  It  is  expected  that  Option  4 
would  support  new  entry  and  a  more  competitive  market  structure  but  under  soft 
regulation  the  effect  is  likely  to  be  marginal.  The  inclusion  of  the  report  provides  the 
Commission  with  the  opportunity  to  identify  any  remaining  barriers  but  this  would not 
encourage new entry unless followed up by further action. 

The  expected  effect  of  Option  5  on  market  structure  is  greater  than  under  Option  4  as 
where  competition  authorities  have  taken  action  to  address  discriminatory  behaviour 
competing operators have been able to establish new services. 

Potential  relocation  of  businesses:  Providing  greater  access  to  public  terminals  is  not 
expected  to  have  any  material  effect  in  the  distribution  of  coach  companies  across  the 
EU.  

64 

-1.0%-0.5%0.0%0.5%1.0%1.5%2.0%CoachRailCarAir% change to the Baseline in 2030PO4PO5 
 
 
Fares for users: Given the  estimated  impact on traffic levels, it is not expected that the 
release of terminal capacity under Options 4 or 5 would have a material impact on fares 
other  than  on  specific  routes  affected  by  discriminatory  behaviour.  Improved  access  to 
terminals could encourage investment in new facilities by new entrants and there is a risk 
that  terminal  facilities  might  be  removed  to  exclude  facilities  from  the  scope  of  the 
Regulation if a prescriptive definition of a terminal is introduced. 

Integration  of  ticketing  and  price  competition:  Option  4  could  lead  to  more  ticketing 
facilities at terminals under the measure encouraging non-discriminatory access, although 
the  effect  is  likely  to  be  marginal.  A  report  by  the  Finnish  Competition  and  Consumer 
Authority  in  2016  reveals  how  discriminatory  behaviour  can  impact  on  integration  of 
ticketing  and  price  competition.  In  summary  it  finds  that  the  major  bus  companies 
formed a cartel with the aim of preventing market entry. In particular, by refusing access 
to  certain  services  so  competitors  were  unable  to  include  their  routes  within  published 
timetables, or sell their tickets through established service points.  

The provision of ticketing facilities under Option 5 could be greater than under Option 4 
as  the  terminal  capacity  released  under  a  non-discrimination  requirement  could  be 
expected to increase further. However, the effect is still likely to be limited. 

Administrative Burden: The total level of administrative activity performed by operators 
and authorities decreases under both options relative to the baseline. Under Option 4 the 
administrative costs have limited or no impact. Under Option 5 there is a saving of about 
€110 million as improved terminal access results in reduced delay to the introduction of 
new services, enabling operators to secure incremental revenue more quickly (one year’s 
delay under the baseline is eliminated). 

Level  of  infringements  of  rules  on  access  to  the  market:  The  assessment  indicates  that 
Options 4 and 5 would not have any material effect on level of infringements of rules on 
access to the market. 

Level  of  congestion:  There  is  an  absolute  reduction  in  car  traffic  as  a  result  of  the 
options, and since car traffic makes a major contribution to congestion the impact of the 
options on congestion costs is of a corresponding magnitude. The estimates indicate that 
Options  4  delivers  a  reduction  of  about  €1.7  billion  in  congestion  costs  relative  to  the 
Baseline  and  Option  5  delivers  an  estimated  reduction  of  nearly  €3.4  billion  over  the 
timescale of the impact assessment, expressed as present value. 

The removal of restriction in access to terminals located in urban areas may reduce urban 
congestion  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  terminal  as  coaches  would  have  access  to 
stands within the terminal and would not require to park at on street stopping points. 

Economic  effects  for  SME’s:  Under  Option  4  new  entry  of  SMEs  could  be  supported. 
However, under soft regulation the effect is likely to be marginal.  

Under Option 5 increased entry of SMEs is expected as the evidence indicates that where 
competition authorities have taken action to address discriminatory behaviour, competing 
operators  have  been  able  to  establish  new  services.  However,  the  overall  effect  is  still 
expected to be limited. 

Impact  on  public  service  contracts:  Providing  greater  access  to  public  terminals  is  not 
expected to have any material effect on public service contracts. 

65 

 
 
6.2.2.

  Environmental impacts 

The  changes  to  the  level  of  transport  activity,  for  both  coach  transport  and  competing 
modes,  imply  changes  to  the  level  of  externalities  produced  by  transport  modes.  The 
changes  are  smaller  in  the  terminal  access  options  compared  to  the  market  access 
options. In this section the impacts of the terminal access options on carbon emissions, 
air pollution and energy use are described.  

Level of carbon dioxide emissions: The net cumulative savings in  CO2 emissions costs 
relative to the Baseline are relatively small and reflect the absolute reduction in car traffic 
achieved under each of the options. Under Option 4 CO2 emission costs are reduced by 
about  €20  million  over  the  timescale  of  the  impact  assessment,  expressed  as  present 
value.  Options  5  delivers  double  the  savings  with  net  cumulative  CO2  costs  being 
reduced by about €40 million (expressed as present value).  

Energy use: The net reduction in cumulative energy use relative to the Baseline is also 
relatively  small.  Under  Option  4  energy  use  is  reduced  by  850  thousand  tonnes  of  oil 
equivalent relative to the Baseline over the timescale of the impact assessment. Option 5 
delivers twice  as  much savings with a reduction of 1.7  million tonnes of oil equivalent 
relative to the Baseline. 

Level of air pollution: Finally, the net cumulative savings in air pollution costs are also 
relatively  small.  Under  Option  4  air  pollution  costs  are  reduced  by  about  €70  million 
relative to the Baseline over the timescale of the impact assessment, expressed as present 
value. Under Options 5 savings in air pollution costs of about €135 million are achieved. 

6.2.3.

  Social impacts 

Working  conditions  and  job  quality:  The  assessment  indicates  that  Options  4  and  5 
would not have any material effect on working conditions and job quality. 

Employment:  In  the  calculation  of  the  estimate  of  employment  it  is  assumed  that 
employment grows in line with transport activity throughout the assessment period. The 
two  options  result  in  an  increase  in  employment  in  the  coach  sector.  Under  Option  4, 
there  are  just  about  9,000  additional  employees  by  2030.  Option  5  delivers  more 
employment, with almost 18,000 additional employees by 2030. 

We would expect that emerging technological developments in section 2.8, including the 
introduction  of  driverless  vehicles,  will  have  an  impact  on  employment  but  it  is  not 
possible to project this with confidence at present. 

Road  Safety:  The  impact  on  road  safety  is  positive  for  both  options.  The  absolute 
reduction  in  car  traffic  drives  savings  in  external  costs  of  accidents  relative  to  the 
Baseline over the timescale of the impact assessment. Under Option 4, savings of around 
€260 million would be generated relative to the Baseline, expressed as present value over 
the timescale of the impact assessment. With Option 5 the savings generated increase to 
around €520 million. 

Accessibility  for  people  with  reduced  mobility,  rights  of  the  elderly  and  integration  of 
persons with disabilities: The assessment indicates that Options 4 and 5 would not have 
any  material  effect  on  accessibility  for  people  with  reduced  mobility,  the  rights  of  the 
elderly or integration of persons with disabilities. 

Connectivity  of  different  social  groups:  The  estimate  of  the  proportion  of  additional 
traffic accounted for by passengers living in remote regions, passengers facing difficulty 

66 

 
 
paying bills and elderly passengers (65 and over) under each option is derived using the 
data from the Eurobarometer Report.  

The results of the assessment show that these disadvantaged or vulnerable social groups 
would  benefit  significantly  from  all  both  options.  Passengers  living  in  remote  regions 
account for around 28% of coach pkm. Relative to the Baseline, under Option 4 the pkm 
by  this  group  will  increase  by  about  one  billion  pkm  in  2030.  Under  Option  5  the 
increase will be about 3 billion pkm in 2030.  

Passengers facing difficulties paying bills account for 8.5% of coach pkm. Relative to the 
Baseline,  under  Option  4  the  pkm  by  this  group  will  increase  by  almost  500  thousand 
pkm in 2030. Under Option 5 the increase will be almost one billion pkm in 2030 relative 
to the Baseline. 

Elderly passengers account for 25% of coach pkm. Relative to the Baseline, under Option 
4 the pkm by this group will increase by around one billion pkm in 2030. Under Option 5 
the increase will be about 2 billion pkm in 2030 relative to the Baseline. In practice, it is 
expected  that  passengers  facing  difficulties  paying  bills  will  benefit  disproportionately, 
since their travel decisions are typically constrained by fares on offer and lack of access 
to a car. 

Table 6-6: Synthesis of Economic, Environmental and Social Impacts 

Transport activity 
in 2030 
(difference to the 
Baseline) 

Change in 
revenues relative 
to the Baseline 
(present value for 
2015-2035) 

Performance of 
other modes 
relative to the 
Baseline in 2030 
(in billion pkm 
and % change) 

Modal Share in 
2030 

Quality of services 

Billion pkm 

% increase 

Million journeys 

Services 

Load factor 

€ Billion 

Coach 

Rail 

Car  

Air 

Impact on coach share 
(p.p. change to the 
Baseline) 

Frequency 

Availability 

Safety (savings 
relative to the 
Baseline) 

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PO4 

5 

0.9% 

24 

38 

0.0 

6.2 

5 (0.9%) 

-2 (-0.4%) 

 -2 (-0.04%) 

  0 (0%) 

0.1 

0 

0 

PO5 

10 

1.7% 

27 

76 

0.0 

12.5 

10 (1.7%) 

-5 (-0.7%) 

-4 (-0.1%) 

0 (0%) 

0.1 

0 

0 

€260 million 

€520 million 

Ease of purchasing 
tickets 

0 

Purchasing of tickets easier in 
terminals 

Market structure 

Support new entry but 

Greater effect as operators 
enabled to establish new 

67 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relocation of 
business 

Fares 

Integration of 
tickets 

Administrative 
burden (cost 
savings relative to 
the Baseline) 

Level of 
infringements 

Congestion costs 
(change relative to 
the Baseline, 
present value 
2015-2035) 

SMEs 

Public Service 
Contracts 

CO2 emissions 

Energy Use 

Air pollution 

Accessibility 

Connectivity 

Working 
conditions 

Employment  
(additional 
employment in 
2030 relative to 
the Baseline) 

Road Safety 

PO4 

effect is marginal 

0 

0 

PO5 

services 

0 

0 

More ticketing 
facilities at terminals 

More ticketing facilities as 
more terminal capacity 
released but effect still limited 

Improved access to 
terminals 

0 

0 

€110 million 

0 

Coach 

Rail 

Net cumulative 
savings in CO2 
emissions costs 
relative to the 
Baseline 

Net cumulative energy 
savings relative to the 
Baseline (000 tonnes 
of oil equivalent) 

Net cumulative 
savings in air 
pollution costs relative 
to the Baseline s 

Increase in billion 
pkm of disadvantaged 
social groups (in 2030 
relative to the 
Baseline) 

€1.7 billion 

€3.4 billion 

New entry supported 
but impact is marginal 

Operators able to establish 
new services but overall 
effect is limited 

0 

0 

0 

0 

€20 million 

€40 million 

850 

1,700 

€70 million 

€135 million 

0 

4 

0 

0 

8 

0 

9,000 

18,000 

Savings in external 
costs of accidents 

€260 million 

€520 million 

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PO5 

relative to the 
Baseline (present 
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7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? 

7.1.  Effectiveness and efficiency 

The  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  the  policy  options  for  market  access  and  terminal 
access  are  assessed  separately  against  the  policy  objectives  described  in  section  4. 
Considering that the regulatory costs are part of the policy objectives, the efficiency of 
the policy options is considered at the same time. 

The effectiveness of the options depends on their ability to deliver the specific objectives 
set for this initiative.  The effectiveness of PO1 is positive but limited. It will introduce 
more  uniform  market  access  rules  and  remove  some  restrictions  on  market  access  but 
Member  States  will  still  be  able  to  restrict  access  to  national  inter-urban  markets.  In 
terms of cost effectiveness it rates the lowest with only a limited reduction in costs for 
operators and national authorities. 

PO2  rates  very  effective  in  terms  of  delivering  reduced  fares  and  improved  quality  of 
services.  It  simplifies  the  authorisation  procedure  for  operators  providing  them  with 
greater  transparency.  It  generates  significant  savings  in  environmental  costs  and  an 
increase in modal share. It rates highly in terms of efficiency with significant reduction in 
costs  for  operators  and  authorities  as  a  result  of  the  simplification  of  the  authorisation 
procedure and the introduction of a 100km threshold. There is a limited effect on PSC’s 
and other transport modes. 

PO3  brings  additional  gains  in  terms  of  effectiveness  due  to  the  abolition  of  the 
authorisation  procedure  for  services  carrying  passengers  over  100  km.  There  remains  a 
limited effect on PSC’s and other transport modes. 

Strongly 
negative 

Weakly 
negative 

No or limited 
impact 

Weakly 
positive 

Strongly 
positive 

Table 7-1: Effectiveness of market access policy options 

GO1: Facilitate inter-
urban mobility and 
connectivity for all 
citizens by facilitating 
the provision of inter-
urban coach services 

GO2: Increase the 
modal share of 
sustainable transport 
modes 

PO1 

PO2 

Improves quality of service 
and reduces fares, simplifies 
authorisation process, and 
generates savings in 
environmental costs.  

More aggressive fare and 
quality of service competition, 
further simplification of 
authorisation process, 
increased level of savings in 
environmental costs.  

PO3 

Same as 
PO2 

Moderate increase in modal 
share. No impact on PSCs 
and limited on performance 
of other modes. 

More significant increase in 
modal share. Limited impact on 
PSCs and performance of other 
modes 

Same as 
PO2 

Efficiency shows the relation of achieved results and the necessary costs to do so. There 
are no major compliance or enforcement costs associated with any of the 3 market access 
policy  options  for  either  businesses  or  national  authorities, and  the  administrative  costs 
are  reduced  in  comparison  to  the  baseline.  PO1  is  positive  in  that  it  delivers  the 
objectives  at  very  limited  cost  and  a  small  reduction  in  administrative  burden  of  €4 

69 

 
 
 
 
 
 
million over 2015-2035 expressed as present value. However PO2 and PO3 have greater 
efficiency  gains  in  that  the  deliver  stronger  results  with  limited  costs  and  a  substantial 
reduction  in  administrative  burden  of  €1.4  billion  and  €3.5  billion  2015-2035 
respectively. PO3 will require changes to enforcement and control. The abolishing of the 
authorisation procedure means that enforcement and control will now have to focus and 
access  to  the  profession  rules,  the  Community  licence  and  road  safety  rules.  Member 
States of establishment would have a much increased supervisory role. There would have 
to be increased cooperation between Member States to ensure the correct application of 
the Regulation. The only  investigations that  would  take place would be in  the Member 
State  of  establishment.  Host  Member  States  would  rely  on  Member  States  of 
establishment would rely on Member States of establishment to carry out controls. 

Table 7-2: Efficiency of market access policy options 

Compliance and administrative costs for businesses  

Compliance, enforcements and administrative costs for authorities  

PO1 

PO2 

PO3 

+ 

+ 

++ 

++ 

++ 

+ 

For the terminal access policy options, the effectiveness of PO4 is very limited. There are 
some small positive impacts in terms of environmental costs, modal share and increases 
in transport activity and connectivity for disadvantaged social groups. The efficiency is 
weakly  positive  with  small  savings  in  compliance  and  administrative  costs  from  the 
abolition of the journey form. 

The effectiveness of PO5 is positive but limited with a greater increase in coach transport 
activity.  There is also a positive impact on connectivity for disadvantaged social groups. 

Table 7-3: Effectiveness of terminal access policy options 

PO4 

PO5 

Effectiveness 

GO1: Facilitate inter-
urban mobility and 
connectivity for all 
citizens by facilitating 
the provision of inter-
urban coach services 

GO2: Increase the 
modal share of 
sustainable transport 
modes 

Increases transport activity and 
connectivity for disadvantaged 
social groups somewhat. Generates 
small savings in environmental 
costs. Small increase in modal 
share. No change to quality of 
service or fares. No impact on PSCs 
and negligible impact on 
performance of other modes 

Increases transport activity and 
connectivity for disadvantaged social 
groups somewhat. Greater increase in 
transport activity and connectivity for 
disadvantaged social groups increases 
substantially. Limited impact on PSCs 
and other transport modes. 

Small increase in modal share. 

Small increase in modal share. 

PO4  whilst  addressing  the  problem  of  restricted  access  to  key  infrastructure  includes 
voluntary  measures  to  encourage  coach  terminal  operators  to  provide  access.  This  may 
not be adopted by all Member States and accordingly may only partly address some of 
the  problems  identified  in  practice.  The  efficiency  gain  of  PO4  is  therefore  limited  as 
although  there  is  no  major  costs  for  businesses  or  national  authorities  there  are  also 

70 

 
 
 
 
 
limited benefits associated with this option. PO5 is expected to deliver positive benefits 
in terms of facilitating inter-urban mobility at minor, if any, regulatory costs. 

Table 7-4: Efficiency of terminal access policy options 

Compliance and administrative costs for businesses  

Compliance, enforcements and administrative costs for authorities  

7.2.  Coherence 

PO4 

0 

0 

PO5 

+ 

+ 

In terms of the coherence with EU policy, the following aspects have to be examined:  

• 

• 

• 

Internal coherence among the policy measures under consideration;  

Coherence with key EU policy objectives; and  

Coherence with other relevant EU legislation, including access to the profession, 
social legislation and the Posting of Workers Directive. 

The policy options are coherent with two key overarching EU strategies, the Agenda for 
Jobs,  Growth,  Fairness  and  Democratic  Change  of  President  Juncker57  and  the  2011 
White Paper on transport policy58.  

All options contribute positively to employment but the impacts of Option 2 and Option 
3 are much greater than the other options.  The opening of national markets by Options 1, 
2 and 3 and the requirement to grant non-discriminatory access to terminals in Option 5 
contribute positively to a fairer and deeper internal market. Option 4, which encourages 
terminal operators to provide access, is neutral. 

The general aim of EU transport policy is to reduce the adverse effects connected with 
mobility which above all means the promotion of co-modality i.e. optimally combining 
various  modes  of  transport  within  the  same  transport  chain.  The  objectives  of  this 
initiative are coherent with the 2011 White Paper as described in section 2.1 in that they 
both aim to make greater use of bus and coach as part of the core network for multimodal 
intercity travel. Under all 5 options the amount of traffic generated by the combination of 
rail and coach increases. The aim of and this initiative is complimentary to the aims of 
rail as they both have the objective of increasing the modal share of the more sustainable 
transport modes and improving performance vis-à-vis car.  

The Commission's Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050 
and the White Paper, transport  as  a whole has  to reduce  its CO2 emissions  by 2050 of 
about  60%  vs  their  1990  level.  The  average  CO2  emissions  of  bus  and  coach  per 
passenger  transported  are  best  in  class  (with  e-train)  for  long  distance  transport  and  as 
such  these  services  can  play  a  significant  role  in  decarbonisation  of  transport.  The 
revision is coherent with this strategy as the aim of sustainability is shared and the aim of 
increasing the modal share of sustainable transport modes is complementary to the aims 
of emission reduction, low-carbon, and a climate-friendly economy. All 5 options deliver 
savings  in  environmental  costs  of  energy  use,  carbon  and  air  pollution  and  contribute 

57   Juncker, J.-C. (2014): A new start for Europe. My agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic 

Change. Political Guidelines for the next European Commission. 

https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/juncker-political-guidelines-speech_en_0.pdf. 
58   COM(2011) 144 final of 28.3.2011. 

71 

 
 
 
                                                 
positively  to  the  objective  of  cutting  transport  emissions  in  the  Energy  Union  and  the 
2011 Transport White Paper. 

The absolute reduction in car traffic results in a fall in accident costs under all options is 
positive  for  road  safety.  The  market  opening  options  will  deliver  a  higher  share  of 
collective  transport  (coach  and  rail  combined)  increasing  the  density  and  frequency  of 
service, thereby generating a virtuous circle for public transport modes. The aim of  the 
Eurovignette  directive59  is  to  improve  the  functioning  of  the  road  transport  internal 
market  by  reducing  the  differences  in  the  levels  and  systems  of  tolls  and  vignettes 
applicable  in  Member  States  and  to  take  better  account  of  the  principles  of  fair  and 
efficient pricing by providing for greater differentiation of tolls and vignettes in line with 
costs  associated  with  the  road  use.  The  inclusion  of  buses  and  coaches  will  help  to 
diminish  distortions  of  competition  in  the  internal  market  for  passenger  transport  by 
according preferential treatment (i.e. exemption from paying for the use of infrastructure) 
to  these  vehicles  vis-à-vis  rail  transport,  which  is  subject  to  such  charging.  Requiring 
non-discriminatory  access  to  terminals  promotes  the  greater  integration  of  the  modal 
networks providing citizens with a better modal choice.  

Strongly 
negative 

Weakly 
negative 

No or limited 
impact 

Weakly 
positive 

Strongly 
positive 

Table 7-5: Coherence of market access policy options with overarching EU Strategies 

PO1 

PO2 

PO3 

Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change of President Juncker 

Boost for Jobs, Growth 
and Investment 

Slight positive impact on 
employment levels. 

Positive impact on 
employment levels 

Positive impact on 
employment levels 

Resilient Energy Union 
with a Forward looking 
Climate Change Policy 

Deeper and fairer 
internal market 

Limited but positive 
impact on net energy 
usage, net CO2 costs 
and net air pollution 
costs 

Introduction of more 
uniform market access 
rules but some 
restrictions remain on 
access to inter-urban 
services 

Same as PO2 

Substantial positive 
impact on net energy 
usage, net CO2 costs 
and net air pollution 
costs 

Introduction of more 
uniform market access 
rules with authorisation 
procedure for inter-
urban services. 

Introduction of more 
uniform market access 
rules and abolish 
authorisation 
procedure. 

2011 Transport White Paper 

Access to market and 
fair competition 

Non-discriminatory 
access to national 
markets but some 
markets and routes will 
remain restricted 

Non-discriminatory 
access to national inter-
urban markets  

Same as PO2 

Transport emission 
reduction 

Reduction in transport 
emissions 

Significant reduction in 
transport emissions 

Same as PO2 

Road Safety 

Reduction in net 

Significant reduction in 

Same as PO2 

59 COM/2017/0275 final - 2017/0114 (COD) 

72 

 
 
 
                                                 
An efficient core 
network for multimodal 
intercity travel and 
transport 

accident costs 

net accident costs 

Positive impact on 
number of services and 
size of network 

Strongly positive impact 
on number of services 
and size of network 

Same as PO2 

Table 7-6: Coherence or terminal access policy options with overarching EU Strategies 

PO4 

PO5 

Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change of President Juncker 

Boost for Jobs, Growth 
and Investment 

Slight positive impact on 
employment levels. 

Resilient Energy Union 
with a Forward looking 
Climate Change Policy 

Limited but positive impact on net 
energy usage, net CO2 costs and 
net air pollution costs 

Same as PO4 

Same as PO4 

Deeper and fairer 
internal market 

Very limited/insignificant due to 
voluntary nature of measures 

Positive impact as discriminatory 
access to terminals is prevented. 

2011 Transport White Paper 

Access to market and 
fair competition 

Limited as non-discriminatory 
access to terminals is not 
guaranteed 

Positive impact as discriminatory 
access to terminals is prevented 

Transport emission 
reduction 

Reduction in transport emissions 

Same as PO4 

Road Safety 

Reduction in net accident costs 

Same as PO4 

An efficient core 
network for multimodal 
intercity travel and 
transport 

Limited as carriers may still be 
discriminated in access to inter- 
and intra-modal terminals 

Positive impact as discriminatory 
access to intra- and inter-modal 
terminals is prevented 

Market opening may increase the competitive pressure on operators and their workers in 
non-liberalised  markets.  In  this  context  there  is  an  interaction  with  the  legislation  on 
access  to  the  profession,  social  legislation  and  the  Posting  of  Workers  Directive.  The 
strengthening of criteria of establishment and better cooperation between Member States 
in the legislation on access to the profession together with the clarifications of the posting 
rules applicable to road transport provided in the recent legislative proposals have been 
considered. While there are interactions due to the impact of these changes, overall the 
revisions  make  little  difference  to  the  assessment  of  impacts  of  the  options  and  do  not 
change the preference ordering of the policy options.  

No significant coherence issues have been established regarding the interaction between 
the different policy packages and the Tachograph Regulation.    

7.3. 

Proportionality of the preferred option 

The preferred option does not exceed what is necessary to solve the problems and meet 
the objectives of the initiative. The problems identified can be best addressed at EU-level 
in the context of an amendment to the Regulation. The scope of the Regulation includes 
the international carriage of passengers by coach and bus within the territory of the EU as 
well as the conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate national transport 
services  within  a  Member  State.  For  a  policy  intervention  in  the  internal  market,  and 

73 

 
 
 
international 

importantly  for 

more 
to  have  uniform 
transport, 
implementation across all Member States and to ensure the homogeneous application of 
the  rules  and  provide  for  fair  competition.  Under  these  conditions  regulations  are  the 
most appropriate instrument as they provide clarity and they do not need to be mediated 
into national law by means of implementing measures.  

is  necessary 

it 

74 

 
 
Figure 7-1: Preferred Option Intervention Logic 

75 

 
 
 
7.4.  Conclusion of the comparison of options and combined effects 

Based on the analysis above, the preferred policy option to simplifying administrative 
procedures and remove restrictions on access  to  inter-urban markets rules is PO2 
‘Open access to  the inter-urban market for regular services  with the  possibility  to 
refuse authorisation if the economic equilibrium of an urban PSC is compromised’. 
It  provides  the  same  positive  impacts  as  PO3  in  terms  of  increasing  the  mobility  of 
citizens with little or no access to other modes of transport and increasing the provision 
of inter-urban regular services. The competent competition authorities would have a role 
of ensuring that the efficiency gains resulting from the removal of market restrictions are 
not unduly appropriated through the abuse of a dominant position by one player, leading 
to higher fares. The inclusion of the measure abolishing journey forms will also reduce 
costs of entry for the providers of occasional services. PO3 has the largest reduction in 
administrative burden which is as a result of the abolition of the authorisation procedure 
for  regular  services.  PO3  significantly  alters  the  enforcement  and  control  possibilities. 
Host Member States would rely on Member States of establishment to carry out controls 
and would be deprived of direct enforcement possibilities.  

15  of  the  20  Ministries/Regulators  (75%)  that  responded  to  the  targeted  stakeholder  questionnaire 
supported keeping the authorisation procedure. In their opinion it was a useful tool to monitor the market 
and ensure safety standards were met. 

On  the  other  hand,  PO2  benefits  from  a  new  simplified  authorisation  procedure  that 
provides for effective monitoring of market developments and ensuring that services are 
operated safely. 

The preferred policy option to simplifying administrative procedures and providing 
for greater terminal access is PO5 ‘Equal access rules’. It provides the most positive 
impacts  in  terms  of  increasing  the  availability  of  existing  public  terminal  capacity, 
increasing the modal share of interurban coach services and increasing the number of low 
income citizens and regions connected by coach services. 

As  previously  described  in  section  5.2  the  sets  of  market  access  policy  options  and 
terminal access policy options have been considered separately as they are not interlinked 
and  the  geographical  scope  of  the  effect  is  different  in  each  case.  The  outstanding 
question is in how far the envisaged options would have impacts that are not captured by 
simple aggregation of those already reported. It is considered that PO5 would reinforce 
the impact of PO2 and have important synergy effects as follows: 

1.  Terminal capacity must be used as efficiently as possible to maximise the benefits of 
liberalisation.  The  growth  in  the  number  of  services  following  market  opening  can 
quickly absorb available terminal capacity and the ability to investigate the allocation 
of  capacity  within  individual  terminals  independently  can  results  in  a  significant 
uplift and allow new services to be accommodated. 

2.  The  presumption  in  favour  of  non-discrimination  would  help  to  ensure  a  more 
favourable  business  environment  for  new  and  smaller  operators,  allowing  them  to 
plan services with greater confidence. 

3.  The  presumption  in  favour  of  fair  and  non-discriminatory  access  could  reduce  the 
number of allegations of discriminatory behaviour (through a deterrence effect) and 
the  costs  of  investigating  them  (by  providing  legal  clarity).  If  so,  there  would  be  a 
reduction in the administrative burden for all affected stakeholders. 

76 

 
 
4.  New  public  terminal  facilities  would  be  subject  to  new  legislative  provisions 
governing access, preventing dominant operators establishing rights to capacity that 
might become entrenched. 

5.  New rules to ensure fair and non-discriminatory access to public terminals would be 
in line with broader EU competition law and policy, as well as legislation governing 
other  sectors.  It  would  help  to  reinforce  the  expectations  of  operators  and  policy 
makers about the direction of travel of the coach industry. 

It  would  limit  the  ability  of  stakeholders  to  frustrate  liberalisation  through  control  of 
access to terminals. 

One of the key objectives of this REFIT initiative is to reduce the administrative burden 
for  private  operators.  The  following  table  summarises  the  expected  impacts  of  the 
preferred option on business costs. 

Table 7-7: “REFIT” balance of the preferred option (Figures provided represent Net Present Values 
for the period 2015-2035 in million Euros) 

Policy measure 

Total impact 
expected 

Qualitative assessment/comment 

C4: Abolition of journey forms 

4 

C1 & U4: Standardise 
authorisation procedure and set 
common requirements for the 
protection of PSCs meeting the 
needs of urban areas 

T5: Require Member States to 
grant non-discriminatory access 
to terminals 

1,450 

110 

A small saving due to the abolition of journey 
forms for occasional services  

A standardised authorisation procedure and the 
introduction of 100km threshold simplifies the 
authorisation process and reduces delay to 
securing incremental revenue for operators 
(reduction from current 4 months to 2 months 
expected by stakeholders) 

Improved terminal access results in reduced 
delay to the introduction of new services, 
enabling operators to secure incremental 
revenue more quickly (one year’s delay under 
the baseline is eliminated) 

The main impact of the preferred option is the standardisation and simplification of 
the authorisation procedure which is expected to save €1,450 million for the period 
2015-2035  relative  to  the  Baseline,  expressed  as  present  value.  This  saving  results 
primarily from speeding up the authorisation procedure. The opening of a new coach line 
can only be refused for a number of defined grounds. The opening of a new coach line 
that  carries passengers more  than  100km  cannot  be  refused  to  protect PSCs  or  because 
the principal purpose of the service is  not  to  carry  passengers between stops located in 
different Member States. This makes the authorisation regime simpler, more transparent 
and  effectively  lowers  the  barrier  for  new  entrants.  Operators  benefit  because  fewer 
refusal grounds provides them with more certainty when they are assessing the viability 
of a new line.  

Competent  authorities  also  benefit  from  a  reduction  in  administrative  costs  associated 
with  national  authorisation  procedures  and  possibly  because  fewer  disputes  about 
negative decisions. There will no longer be a  requirement for authorising authorities to 
seek the agreement of the competent authority of all  Member States in whose territories 

77 

 
 
passengers are picked up or set down for services carrying passengers over 100km. The 
time  taken  for  an  authorising  authority  to  take  a  decision  on  the  applications  for  these 
services can be reduced from 4 months to 2 months. 

Savings of €110 million NPV over the period 2015-2035 relative to the Baseline are 
expected  as  a  result  of  improved  terminal  access.  This  will  reduce  the  delay  for 
undertakings  gaining  access  to  terminals  and  enable  them  to  commence  the  new  coach 
line earlier securing incremental revenue more quickly. 

The  final  saving  on  administrative  burden  is  expected  from  the  abolition  of  the 
journey  form  for  occasional  services.  This  is  expected  to  save  €4  million  over  the 
period 2015-2035 relative to the Baseline, expressed as present value. These savings 
result  from  undertakings  having  less  administrative  work  to  complete  the  forms  and 
national  authorities  having  less  administrative  costs  from  producing,  distributing, 
collecting and monitoring the books of journey forms. 

8.  HOW WOULD ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? 

The Regulation does not contain satisfactory monitoring and reporting arrangements so 
the quality and availability of data and statistics pertaining to aspects of the Regulation is 
often limited. Although the information required to be reported under Article 28(1) & (2) 
of  the  Regulation  is  clear,  the  start  and  finish  dates  of  the  reporting  period  are  not 
provided and no deadline for the submission of the report is mentioned. This has resulted 
in  inconsistent  reporting  periods  being  used  and  reported  by  Member  States.  Even  if 
good  and  reliable  data  were  available  on  the  number  of  passengers  and  the  amount  of 
pkms concerning cabotage operations, there are few statistics available for sub-sections 
of the market (e.g. medium or long distance coach services) to put the cabotage data into 
context. 

The  European  Commission  will  monitor  and  evaluate  the  implementation  and 
effectiveness of the legislation. The functioning of the Regulation should be observed to 
determine  to  what  extent  its  provisions  have  contributed  to  a  better  functioning  road 
passenger transport market. Thus the reporting obligation in the Regulation needs to be 
strengthened in order to allow a systematic analysis of the market. The Regulation needs 
to  make  clear  what  data  (definition)  needs  to  be  gathered  and  reported  as  well  as  what 
kind  of  analysis/report  is  produced  by  the  European  Commission.  The  relevant  data 
should be available from Member States. 

The  Regulation  should  have  a  provision  which  foresees  a  review  and  the  evaluation  of 
the  new  rules  some  five  years  after  they  apply.  The  evaluation  could  amongst  others 
assess  to  what  extent  the  revision  of  the  Regulation  has  contributed  to  reaching  its 
objective of simplifying administrative procedures, remove restrictions on access to inter-
urban markets and preventing discriminatory access to public terminal facilities. 

Operational Objectives 
Reduce the elapsed time for the 
authorisation process 
Open inter-urban market for 
regular services for competition 

Indicator 
Average reported elapsed time by 
Member State 
The following metrics on regular 
services disaggregated by national and 
international traffic 

Sources 
MS Reports 

MS Reports 
EU Transport in figures 

  Passenger km 
  Number of journeys 
  Number of services 

78 

Note: Total passenger km 

 
 
 
 
Operational Objectives 

Indicator 

  Number of operators 
Modal share of inter-urban coach 
services 
Number of complaints relating to 
regular services 

Number of authorisations for regular 
services refused on the grounds they 
would affect PSC 
Number of complaints relating to PSCs 
Number of carriers operating domestic 
regular services in a host Member 
State 
Number of carriers refused 
authorisation to operate regular 
services in a host Member State 
Number of complaints relating to 
terminal access 
Number of operators using terminals 

Establish a common approach 
to protection of PSC’s 

Facilitate cross border entry 

Facilitate the level playing field 
in access to terminals 

Sources 
already available for all 
Member States but reliability 
needs to be improved. The 
aim is to ensure consistent 
treatment of international 
traffic. 
MS Reports 

MS Reports 

MS Reports 

79 

 
 
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PROCESS TO PREPARE THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

REPORT AND THE RELATED INITIATIVE. 

Lead DG 

The lead DG for this initiative is DG MOVE. This impact assessment report concerns the 
initiative with Agenda planning reference 2016/MOVE/002  - "Better functioning of the 
market for bus and coach transport - Reg 1073/2009".   

Foreseen adoption date: 4th Quarter 2017. 

Organisation and timing 

The initiative was validated in December 2016 and the impact assessment work started 
immediately afterwards. It lasted until August 2017.  

The Inter-service  Steering Group was  chaired by the Secretariat-General with  the close 
involvement  of  DG  MOVE.  All  consultations  of  the  associated  DGs  were  closely 
coordinated between the two services.      

The  following  DGs  participated  in  the  Inter-service  Steering  Group:  DG  COMP,  DG 
RTD, and DG EMPL. 

Inter-service Steering Group meetings were held on 25 October 2016 and 13 June 2017.      

Consultation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board 

The  Regulatory  Scrutiny  Board  received  the  draft  version  of  the  present  impact 
assessment  report  on  28  June  2017  and  following  the  Board  meeting  on  19  July  2017 
issued  a  negative  opinion  on  24  July  2017.  The  Board  made  several recommendations.  
Those were addressed in the revised IA report as follows:  

RSB recommendations 

Modification of the IA report 

Main considerations 

1. The report does not make a convincing, evidence-
based argument why national markets for buses and 
coaches  and  access  to  public  terminal  facilities 
should be regulated at the EU level.   

the 

The  argumentation  of 
report  has  been 
strengthened  to  clarify  the  need  for  action  at  the 
EU  level.  This  includes  the  insertion  of  further 
evidence  from  the  Evaluation  Report  and  the 
support study. An additional problem with the lack 
of  an  attractive  mix  of  alternative  sustainable 
transport  modes  has  been  inserted.  Also  problems 
with  objectives  not  aiming  at  integrating  national 
markets  and  the  problem  of  discrimination  in 
access to terminals are added (see section 2.3). 

The  problem  definition  is  restructured  and  revised 
to  take  into  account  the  problems  identified  in  the 
Evaluation  section  including  in  particular  the  low 
modal  share  of  sustainable  transport  modes  (see 

80 

 
 
 
section 2.4). 

The  description  of  problem  drivers  is  revised  and 
provides  further  information  about  how  national 
restrictions  prevent  carriers  from  extending  their 
networks (see in section 2.5.1).  

The  EU  dimension  of  the  problem  has  been 
developed 
integration 
between  national  and  international  markets  (see 
section 2.7). 

to  explain 

further 

the 

The reasoning concerning the legal basis is revised 
to  account 
the 
commercial services and PSCs (see section 3.1 and 
3.2.1). 

interaction  between 

the 

for 

2.  The  objectives  of  the  initiative  are  not  presented 
in a consistent way throughout the text. It is not clear 
to  what  extent  the  initiative  aims  to  increase 
accessibility  and  connectivity  for  disadvantaged 
consumers  compared  to  lowering  environmental 
impacts.  The  report  does  not  explore  potential 
conflicts  with  obligations  to  serve  remote  areas  via 
inter-urban  bus  services.  If  liberalisation  erodes 
Public Service Contracts, bus service providers may 
drop unprofitable connections to low-density regions 
and  urban  centres,  going  against  the  objective  of 
greater  connectivity  for  all  citizens.  If,  on  the 
contrary, Member States maintain these routes using 
Public  Service  Contracts,  subsidy  requirements  will 
increase or the effectiveness of the initiative is likely 
to be small. 

The  general  objectives  are  revised.  There  are  two 
general objectives; Facilitating inter-urban mobility 
and connectivity for all citizens and increasing the 
modal  share  of  sustainable  transport  modes.  The 
objectives  are  complementary  and  not  mutually 
exclusive  and  the  proposed  measures  serve  both 
objectives (see section 4.1) 

An overview of public service contracts is provided 
(see section 5.1). 

The  expected  impacts  on  public  service  contracts 
are  described  (see  section  6.1.1).  The  section 
describes the likely responses to the introduction of 
commercial  services.  The 
further 
explored  whilst  discussing  the  impact  of  the 
options  on  the  connectivity  of  different  social 
groups (see section 6.1.3). 

impact 

is 

3.  The  report  ignores  national  differences  in  road 
and rail transport sectors. It does not differentiate the 
impacts  across  Member  States  according  to  the 
availability  of  public 
inter-urban  services  and 
national differences in bus and coach regulations. 

A description of the impact of national differences 
between  road  and  rail  have  been  included  (see 
level  of 
section  6.1.1  subsections  on  fares, 
performance  of  transport  modes  and  impact  on 
public 
section  6.1.3. 
subsection  on  the  connectivity  of  different  social 
groups). 

service  contracts  and 

4.  The  report  does  not  address  stakeholders’ 
reservations on the proposed policy option. 

Stakeholders’ reservations have been included (see 
section  5.2)  and  addressed  (see  section  5.4  and 
5.6). 

Further considerations and adjustment requirements 

1.  

Need to act at EU level and stakeholders’ views 

•  The  report  should  clarify  the  added  value  of  EU 
level  intervention;  given  that  the  impacts  concern 
mainly national markets and that the effect on global 
social costs of transport (CO2 emissions) is small. 

including 

The  problem  definition 
the  EU 
dimension  of  the  problem,  objectives  and  impact 
sections has been restructured and revised to clarify 
the  added  value  of  EU  level  intervention.  More 
detail has been provided on the impacts on users in 
the  subsection  on  fares  and  service  quality  (see 

81 

 
 
• The conclusions of the evaluation regarding shifts 
between  modes  of  transport  should  be  discussed  in 
the  problem  definition  and  be  taken  into  account 
the 
when  assessing 
objectives of the initiative. 

the  need  for  action  and 

• Critical views of stakeholders should be mentioned 
and put into context. 

section  6.1.1)  and  the  connectivity  of  different 
social groups (see  section 6.1.3) 

The presentation of the evaluation results has been 
revised  (see  section  2.3).  The  finding  in  the 
evaluation report that reveals a lack of accessibility 
of affordable transport as a problem (which was not 
a problem addressed by the original Regulation and 
was  therefore  not  explicitly  evaluated)  has  been 
added.  The  evaluation  results  are  more  explicitly 
taken  into  consideration  in  the  revised  problem 
definition  (see  section  2.4)  and  objectives  (see 
section  4)  including  the  separate  introduction  of  a 
new  general  objective  to  increase  the  modal  share 
of sustainable transport modes. 

The critical views of stakeholders are included and 
better  put  into  context  (see  sections  5.2  and  5.4). 
The  report  has  been  reviewed  to  respond  to  the 
regarding  possible 
concerns  of 
negative  effects  of  further 
liberalisation  (see 
section 6.1.3). 

stakeholders 

further 
•  Explain  Member  States’  views  on 
liberalisation  and  why  some  of  them  have  decided 
not to open their national markets. 

further 
The  views  of  Member  States  on 
liberalisation,  where  known,  are  included  together 
with 
information  on  non-liberalised 
Member States (see section 2.4). 

further 

•  Explain  to  what  extent  the  initiatives  under  the 
package respond to stakeholders concerns regarding 
social aspects and safety. 

The  interlinkages  between  the  initiatives  and  the 
way  in  which  they  jointly  contribute  to  a  fair, 
efficient,  environmentally  and  socially  sustainable 
road  transport  sector  are  explained  (see  section 
6.1.3). 

2.  

Objectives and Intervention logic 

Clarify  which  relative  weight  accessibility 
• 
and  the  reduction  of  external  costs  have  and  what 
dominates in case of conflict. 

Section  4.1  is  revised  and  restructured  with  the 
inclusion  of  a  second  general  objective  aimed  at 
increasing the modal share of sustainable transport 
modes.  The  report 
is  now  focused  on  both 
facilitating  inter-urban  mobility  and  connectivity 
the  modal  share  of 
for  all  and 
sustainable 
is 
transport  modes.  The 
expected  to have  an  immediate  positive  impact on 
the  level  of  accessibility  and  a  more  long  term 
positive  impact  on  external  costs  due  to  modal 
shift. 

increasing 

initiative 

• 
regard to the social objectives. 

Explain the need to act at EU level with 

The  problem  definition  and  objectives  are 
restructured and reviewed. The social objective has 
been  removed,  as  the  transport  disadvantage  of 
certain  groups  of  citizens  is  now  considered  as  a 
consequence  to  the  problems  identified.  However, 
the  mobility  of  EU  citizens,  especially  access  to 
low-price international travel options is considered 
a valid higher level objective that is served by the 
general  objective  of  the  initiative  (see  sections  2 

82 

 
 
Clearly  link  the  identified  problem  (i.e. 
• 
"operators are facing obstacles in national markets to 
develop 
the 
objectives  and  the  options  proposed  and  how  it 
affects international coach services. 

inter-urban  coach 

services") 

to 

and 4 and Figures 2-1 and 7-1). 

The restructuring of the problem definition and the 
objectives  provide  further  clarity  on  the  link 
between  the  problems  and  objectives.  The  link  is 
also described in the intervention logic in figure 7-
1. 

• 
Explain  the  role  and  the  prevalence  of  the 
Public Service Obligations for national and local bus 
services. 

An  introduction  to  PSC’s  and  a  discussion  of  the 
role of PSC’s is included in the report (see section 
2.5.1).  The  impact  on  PSCs  is  restructured  and 
reviewed in section 6.1.1. 

• 
Reconsider  the  need  to  act  and  strengthen 
the subsidiarity element in light of the importance of 
Public Service Contracts (PSC). 

The reasoning  concerning the  legal basis has  been 
revised  to  include  the  issue  of  PSCs  (see  section 
3.1).  The  authorisation  procedure  now  an 
independent  body  in  each  MS.    A  competent 
authority or operator of a PSC can request that the 
independent  body  assess  whether  the  economic 
equilibrium  of  a  PSC  would  be  compromised  by 
the 
certain 
proposed 
circumstances. 

service 

under 

new 

• 
packages. 

Better  explain  the  choice  of  options  and 

The  reasoning  behind  the  formulation  of  the 
options is better explained in section 5.6.  

• 
implemented in practice. 

Further  clarify  how  the  options  would  be 

Each individual option is further clarified in section 
5.6. 

Define  what  exactly 

• 
‘terminal 
statement’ and what ‘essential information’ it would 
provide. 

is  a 

3.  

Assessment of impacts 

The  baseline 

likely 
• 
technological  changes  in  the  road  sector  and  other 
transport  modes,  and  how  these  impact  on  social 
costs. 

should 

refer 

to 

The  terminology  is  changed  to  ‘conditions  of  use’ 
and  defined  in  Section  5.1  under  objective  SO3 
policy measure T3. 

Likely  technological  changes  are  described  in 
section 2.8 

The  report  should  provide  more  detail  on 
• 
likely  impacts  on  users  and  better  explain  to  what 
extent the proposed options would make a difference 
for disadvantaged groups of persons. 

More details on impacts are provided in section 6. 
See 
subsection 
section  6.1.3 
Connectivity of different social groups 

in  particular 

It  should 

indicate  whether 

• 
the  price 
reductions observed for early liberalisation episodes 
can  be  expected 
last  or  whether  market 
concentration (like in the case of urban deregulation) 
will increase prices at a later stage. 

to 

Additional  information  has  been  added  on  fares 
(see  section  6.1.1).    The  price  reductions  that  are 
the  likely  result  of  early  liberalisation  can  be 
expected  to  persist to  a  considerable  extent due  to 
the  combined  effect  of  market  supervision  by 
regulatory  authorities  (in  case  of  abuse  of  market 
power by oligopolists) and by the dynamics typical 
for  this  type  of  market.  As  fixed  investment 
required for market entry is typically very low (no 
infrastructure investment, availability of leased bus 
capacity) new entry will be provoked by excessive 
price  rises.  These  markets  will  therefore  remain 

83 

 
 
contestable  after 
regulatory barriers. 

the  elimination  of  national 

The 

• 
transparently 
report  should  more 
present  the  methods  used,  the  limitations  and 
uncertainties faced, as well as the assumptions made. 

Further  information  on  the  methods  used,  the 
limitations  and  uncertainties  faced,  as  well  as  on 
the  assumptions  made  have  been 
inserted 
throughout Section 6. 

The 

analysis 

• 
provide  more 
information  on  the  expected  effects  in  individual 
countries. 

should 

The  report  should 

• 
incorporate  existing 
differences  in the  organisation  of  inter-urban  public 
transport when assessing the effects of liberalisation. 

The  report  should  assess  modal  shift 
• 
potential  and  social  impacts  taking  into  account 
different national patterns of potential substitution or 
complementarity between rail and road transport. 

Section 6 explains that the expected effect is more 
likely to be determined by the response of the PSO 
operator or by the competent authority.  

Differences between MS’s are incorporated into the 
subsection on fares for users (see section 6.1.1) and 
the  subsection  on  connectivity  of  different  social 
groups  (see  section  6.1.3).  However,  country 
specific projections could not be obtained from the 
modelling. 

Modal  shift  potential  is discussed  in  section 6.1.1. 
and further evidence is presented in subsections on 
Fares  for  users  and  service  quality  and  Level  of 
performance  of  other  modes.  The  connectivity  of 
different social groups is discussed in section 6.1.3. 
and  further  evidence  is  presented  on  the  expected 
positive impact of liberalisation. 

the 
• 
developments of PSC in a liberalised context. 

The  report  should 

indicate 

likely 

Section 6 explains that the expected effect is more 
likely  to  be  determined  by  the  response  of  PSO 
operator or by the competent authority. It provides 
the mechanisms by which liberalisation may result 
in  change,  as  well  as  further  available  evidence 
from different markets. 

The  expected  modal  shift  should  be 
• 
indicated 
them 
comparable  and  their  overall  importance  should  be 
assessed. 

in  absolute  numbers 

to  make 

Absolute  figures  have  been  inserted  into  the 
subsection  on  the  level  of  performance  of  other 
modes (see section 6.1.1 and 6.2.1). 

• 
The  report  should  make  clear  whether  or 
not  liberalisation  is  expected  to  lead  to  greater 
congestion in urban areas. 

It  is  clarified  that  there  is  no  evidence  that 
liberalisation  would  lead  to  greater  congestion  in 
urban areas (see section 6.1.1 – level of congestion) 

The  discussion  of  access 

• 
terminals 
should further assess the need for and the ways how 
to regulate fair access. 

to 

The  problem  driver  of  restricted  access  to  key 
to  better 
infrastructure 
demonstrate the need for regulated fair access (see 
section 2.5.3). 

is  developed 

further 

Measures T1 to T6 on access terminals (see section 
5.2)  and  policy  options  PO4  and  PO5  have  been 
further  developed  to  demonstrate  how  to  regulate 
fair access (see section 5.6) 

It  should  take  into  account  that  a  lack  of 
• 
restrictions  in  terminal  access  can  substantially 
increase urban congestion. 

It  is  clarified  that  there  is  no  evidence  that 
eliminating  restrictions  to  terminal  access  would 
lead  to  greater  congestion  in  urban  areas  (see 

84 

 
 
section 6.1.1 – level of congestion)  

4. Coherence with other transport policies 

• 
The evaluation of coherence should further 
analyse  relevant  links  and  synergies  (or  risks  of 
redundancies) with other transport policies. 

The links with other road initiatives in the package 
has  been  further  analysed  (see  section  6.1.3);  the 
same has been done for other transport policies (see 
section 7.2). 

• 
The  options  should  be  evaluated  in  the 
context  of  synergies  with  other  interventions  to  de-
incentivise  road  transport  (e.g.  Eurovignette)  and 
support for the rail sector. 

The  synergies  with  other  interventions  of  the 
options are discussed (see section 7.2). 

The  Regulatory  Scrutiny  Board  received  the  revised  version  of  the  impact  assessment 
report  on  29  August  2017  and  issued  in  written  procedure  a  positive  opinion  with 
recommendations  on  13  September  2017.  The  Board  made  further  recommendations 
which were addressed in the revised IA report as follows: 

RSB recommendations 

Modification of the IA report 

Principal recommendations 

(1) The revised report does not provide 
clear evidence that EU regulation improves 
national inter-urban bus services.  

(2) It does not sufficiently substantiate that 
public service arrangements to ensure bus 
connectivity of remote urban centres are 
not undermined by the regulation.  

(3) The report does not provide detailed 
information on local bus terminal 
capacities. It does not show that there are 
no risks to the economic viability of current 
terminal operations or of increasing urban 
congestion levels.  

The  EU  dimension  of  the  problem  is  further 
developed  to  explain  the  need  to  liberalise 
national  coach  services.  This  includes  further 
clarification  on  the  link  between  national  and 
international 
the 
liberalisation  of  national  markets  can  be  a 
the  provision  of  new 
in 
critical 
international services (Section 2.7). 

services 

factor 

that 

and 

impact  on  rural  bus  services 

The  models  of  PSC  typically  used  to  connect 
rural  areas  are  presented  (Section  2.5.1).  The 
expected 
is 
presented  and  it  is  clarified  that  MS’s  will 
continue to be free to organise PSO’s in such a 
way  as  to  ensure  bus  connectivity  of  remote 
urban  centres  under  all  options  (Section  6.1. 
subsection 
service 
contracts’). 

‘Impact 

public 

on 

terminals 

information  on 

Additional 
is 
presented. It is clarified that this IA focuses on 
equal  access 
terminals  and  not  on 
constrained terminal capacity which is an issue 
for  local,  regional  and  national  authorities 
(Section 2.5.3). 

to 

Further considerations and adjustment requirements 

1a. The report should further substantiate the 
need  to  liberalise  domestic  bus  transport  at 

It  is  clarified  that  an  increase  in  performance 
of  international  market  is  one  of  the  primary 

85 

 
 
 
EU  level.  It  should  demonstrate  that  cross-
border  supply  will  increase  national  service 
in 
levels  without 
terminal capacity. 

creating  bottlenecks 

increase 

objectives of the Regulation. There is evidence 
that  this 
is  driven  by  domestic 
demand  (Section  2.7.).  Our  aim  is  to  ensure 
that the existing excess in terminal capacity is 
used. 
is  clarified  that  the  supply  of 
additional  terminal  capacity  is  outside  the 
scope  of  this  revision  and  that  this  proposal 
will  help  to  allocate  and  use  existing  terminal 
capacity efficiently (Section 2.5.3). 

It 

1b.  The  report  should  take  into  account  the 
current regulatory status of national markets. 
It  should  be  made  clear  to  what  extent 
in  stakeholders'  views  reflect 
differences 
these differences in national markets. 

The  current  regulatory  status  is  presented  in 
Table  2.4.  The  differences  in  stakeholders’ 
views  of  the  market  access  options  are 
presented in section 5.1. 

the 

2a.  The  report  is  now  more  transparent 
concerning the new limitations introduced by 
the  preferred  option  to  the  protection  by 
Member  States  of  PSCs,  both  in  terms  of 
geographic  scope  and  modalities  for  the 
required  authorization. 
rejection  of 
However, at places (e.g. on p. 18, 25 and 32) 
the  report  continues  to  suggest  that,  in  all 
cases,  commercial  services  will  only  be 
permitted  if  they  do  not  compromise  PSCs. 
The  report  makes  clear  that  the  preferred 
option limits the PSC protection to urban (less 
than  100  km)  services.  But  it  should  justify 
the  need  for  a  new  "economic  equilibrium 
test",  carried  out  by  an  independent  body 
rather than competent authorities, to protect 
PSCs in urban services. The report should also 
clarify 
these  new 
consistency  of 
envisaged  measures  with  the  provisions  of 
Art. 14 (TFEU) and Protocol 26. 

the 

The  current  authorisation  procedure  includes 
an economic equilibrium test for international 
regular  services.  This  test  has  been  changed 
and  will  now  also  be  used  for  national  and 
international  regular  services.  The  test  has 
been  developed  to  be  coherent  with  test 
carried  out  by  other  transport  regulatory 
bodies  assessing  the  economic  equilibrium  of 
a  PSC.  The 
independent  body  has  been 
impartiality  and 
proposed  to  ensure  the 
objectivity  of  the  economic  analysis  and  is 
further explained (Section 5.3).  

It  is  clarified  that  all  measures  are  consistent 
with  the  provisions  of  Art.  14  (TFEU)  and 
Protocol 26 (Section 3.1). 

low-density 

2b. The report presents service arrangements 
for 
regions  as  of  minor 
importance. It should be more transparent on 
the  subsidy  requirements  to  maintain  such 
inter-urban  public  service  arrangements  as  a 
consequence  of  the  liberalisation.  It  should 
explore  to  what  extent  the  ability  to  protect 
limit  the 
public  service  contracts  could 
effectiveness of the liberalisation. 

The impact on PSC serving low density regions 
is  presented  with  the  impacts  on  urban  PSCs 
including a description of the balance between 
protection  of  rural  PSCs  and  market  opening 
(Section  6.1.  subsection  ‘impact  on  public 
service contracts’).  

2c.  The  report  should  discuss  whether 
competition-  or  labor  market  policies  are 
needed  to  avoid  a  decline  in  competition  in 
the  supply  of  bus  services  or  the  erosion  of 
labour market standards over time. It should 

It  is  clarified  that  the  competent  authorities 
have  the  role  of  ensuring  that  there  is  no 
decline  in  competition  in  the  supply  of  bus 
services  after 
removal  of  market 
restrictions  due  to  the  abuse  of  a  dominant 

the 

86 

 
 
provide  information  on  the  costs  of  such 
measures. 

3a.  Additional  information  on  differences  in 
terminal  capacity  across  regions  and  cities 
would  avoid  the  risk  to  have  overlooked 
capacity  constraints  in  some  places.  This 
would qualify the expectation that additional 
traffic  can  be  accommodated  everywhere. 
is 
This  could  also  explain  why 
stakeholder demand for additional terminals. 

there 

position by one player (Section 6.1).  As for the 
labour market policies the posting of workers' 
rules  will  ensure  both  fair  working  conditions 
for  drivers  and  fair  competition  between 
operators. This has been developed in Section 
6.1.3. 

Information  on  capacity  constraints  at  the 
level  of  regions  and  cities  is  limited  but  we 
know that the provision of terminals varies in 
the  EU  and  at  the  level  of  MS.  We  have  no 
evidence to indicate that additional traffic can 
be accommodated everywhere. We are aware 
that many terminals appear to have adequate 
capacity  for  current  services,  particularly  in 
Central  and  Eastern  European  States,  if  they 
were  built  at  times  when  car  ownership  was 
lower.  However,  this  is  not  always  the  case 
(Section 2.5.3). 

3b.  The  report  should  give  more  information 
on why and how bus terminals are managed. 
It should explore to what extent the reported 
excess  capacity 
is  due  to  management 
regimes  to  avoid  urban  congestion  and/or 
access  pricing  regimes  to  cover  their  full 
costs. 

Further information about the management of 
terminals  is  presented  in  section  2.5.3.  It  is 
clarified  that  there  is  excess  capacity  in  some 
Member States but this is due to the decline in 
the coach market as a result of increasing car 
long 
ownership  reducing  the  demand  for 
distance coach travel. 

Duplications  have  been 
and 
inconsistencies  are  addressed.  Figures  quoted 
now  better  reflect  the  assumptions  and 
limitations. 

removed 

length 

4.  Removing  some  of 
the  duplications 
contained in the report would help reduce its 
excessive 
(e.g.  similar  evaluation 
findings  are  mentioned  on  p.8  and  again  on 
p.11,  p.42). 
Inconsistencies  need  to  be 
addressed  (e.g.  Sweden  is  indicated  a  fully 
liberalised Member State according to fig 6.1 
p.35  but  only  for  distances  above  100km 
according  to  p.38;  a  new  objective  has  been 
added  but  is  not  taken  into  account  when 
assessing  the  effectiveness  of  the  different 
options).  Overall,  the  level  of  precision  of 
estimated  impacts  (e.g.  number  of  services 
estimated  under  each  option)  should  not 
exceed the level of confidence allowed by the 
model.  Excessive  precision  in  the  figures 
quoted  may  give  a  false  sense  of  scientific 
rigour 
to 
rough  estimates 
numerous assumptions and limitations. 

subject 

to 

Data used in impact assessment and external expertise  

87 

 
 
 
The Commission sought external expertise in the economic field through a contract for a 
support study with Steer Davies Gleave. In the course of the support study, a wide range 
of stakeholders were consulted to confirm the scope and the magnitude of the problems 
and to provide their views on the potential solutions to these problems60. This IA support 
study itself followed on from the ex-post evaluation of Regulation (EC) No 1073/200961 
and  a  fact-finding  study62.  In  parallel  to  these  studies,  the  Commission  services  sought 
further expertise and input from stakeholders by means of dedicated meetings throughout 
the impact assessment, an open public consultation63. 

Other sources of data used included: 

–  Study on Passenger Transport by Coach in Europe Final Report, July 2009; 

–  Impact  Assessment  accompanying  the  proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council on common rules for access to the market in coach and 
bus services (recast), SEC(2007) 635 of May 2007;  

–  Member  State  reports  on  the  activities  of  the  competent  authorities  delivered  to  the 

Commission under Article 26 of Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009; 

–  Member  State  reports  on  the  activities  of  the  competent  authorities  delivered  to  the 

Commission under Article 28 of Regulation (EC) No 1073/2009 (unpublished). 

60 See Annex 2 Stakeholder consultation synopsis report for further details. 

61 Insert link 

62  This  study  was  the  main  basis  for  the  Commission's  ex  post  evaluation  of  the  Regulations: 

https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/modes/road/studies/doc/2016-04-passenger-
transport-by-coach-in-europe.pdf  

63 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/node/4841  

88 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION SYNOPSIS REPORT. 

Introduction 

This stakeholder consultation synopsis report provides a summary of the outcomes of the 
stakeholder  consultation  activities  which  were  carried  out  as  part  of  the  review  of  the 
legislation on access to the international market for coach and bus services. It provides a 
basic analysis of the responses of stakeholder groups involved in the consultation process 
and a summary of the main issues which they raised. Five separate consultation activities 
were undertaken, namely: 

  an  open  public  consultation  organised  by  the  Commission  services  which  was 

launched on 14/12/2016 and lasted until 15/03/2017 (13 weeks);  

  a targeted stakeholder consultation organised by Steer Davies Gleave which was 
launched on 27 January 2017 and remained open until 24 March 2017 (9 weeks); 

  18 interviews with a number of stakeholders, including industry representatives, 
trade  unions,  national  authorities  and  operators,  which  took  place  during  the 
period 9 March 2017 to 19 April 2017;  

  a Special Eurobarometer organised by the Commission, based on interviews with 
27,901  respondents  at  their  homes  across  28  Member  States  between  18  March 
2017 and 27 March 2017; and  

  stakeholder seminars and discussions at several different events. 

The objectives of the consultation activities were to:  

  provide the public and stakeholders with an opportunity to express their views on 
all elements relevant for the functioning of the internal market in road passenger 
transport, as well as to express their positions on the possible/desirable changes to 
the regulatory framework; and 

  gather  specialised  input (data  and  factual information,  expert  views)  on  specific 
aspects  of  the  legislation  (e.g.  national  markets  for  regular  services,  terminals, 
etc.) from the enforcement community and from the industry, in order to prepare 
the impact assessment and the legislative proposal. 

Consultation activities 

Open public consultation (OPC) 

The  objectives  of  the  OPC  were  to  help  verify  the  problems  faced  by  the  sector,  as 
identified  in  the  ex-post  evaluation,  validate  the  objectives  of  the  possible  policy 
interventions and obtain the opinion of stakeholders on the appropriateness and expected 
impacts of the interventions. It was comprised of two questionnaires, one for the general 

89 

 
 
 
 
public  and  a  more  specialised  one  for  key  stakeholders,  which  were  made  available 
online  through  the  Commission’s  EU  Survey  facility,  ‘Your  Voice  in  Europe’.  The 
survey was open to all categories of respondents (individual citizens, representatives of 
business  including  individual  firms  or  associations,  public  authorities  and  civil  society 
organisations). 

The  general  questionnaire  was  concerned  with  establishing  how  frequently  respondents 
used coach services, their view on the importance of such services and their motivation 
for  using  them.  A  total  of  18  responses  were  received:  eight  from  consumers/citizens, 
seven from companies, two from non-governmental authorities and one other as shown in 
the table below.  

Table A.2-1: Classification of stakeholders responding to the general questionnaire 

Stakeholder category 

Number of 
responses 

% of responses 

A citizen/consumer 

A  non-governmental  authority  (e.g. 
NGO) 

A company 

Other 

Total 

8 

2 

7 

1 

18 

44% 

11% 

39% 

6% 

100% 

Notes: “Other” is based on the respondents’ choice. 

Respondents resided, or were based, in nine different Member States (Austria, Finland, 
Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). The 
most  responses  were  from  Austria,  Germany  and  Hungary,  each  accounting  for  three 
responses (17% of the total). 

Six  (33%)  of  the  responses  were  from  EU-13  Member  States  and  12  (67%)  were  from 
EU-15 Member States. 

The  specialised  questionnaire  was  concerned  with  determining  stakeholders’  views  on 
the  performance  of  the  market  and  the  possible  impacts  of  potential  changes  to 
Regulation 1073/2009. There was a total of 153 complete or partial responses, including 
68  companies  involved  in  the  transport  chain,  28  non-governmental  authorities  and  17 
road passenger transport workers, as shown in the table below. 

Table A.2-2: Classification of stakeholders responding to the specialised questionnaire 

Stakeholder category 

Number of 
responses 

% of responses 

A citizen/consumer 

A  road  passenger  transport  worker 
(e.g. driver) 

Company engaged in transport chain 

EU Governmental authority 

1 

17 

68 

3 

1% 

11% 

44% 

2% 

90 

 
 
Stakeholder category 

Number of 
responses 

% of responses 

Enforcement authority 

Regulatory  authority  (e.g.  national 
transport 
national 
regulator, 
competition authority) 

A  non-governmental  authority  (e.g. 
NGO) 

An academic 

Other 

Total 

Notes: “Other” is based on the respondents’ choice. 

3 

7 

28 

1 

25 

153 

2% 

5% 

18% 

1% 

16% 

100% 

Respondents resided in, or were based in, 16 different Member States (Austria, Belgium, 
Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  France,  Finland,  Germany,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  the 
Netherlands,  Portugal,  Romania,  Spain,  Sweden  and  the  United  Kingdom).  Four 
respondents were from other European non-EU countries. 90 responses (59%) were from 
Germany. 

Five (3%) of the responses were from EU-13 Member States and 144 (94%) were from 
EU-15 Member States. 

Targeted stakeholder consultation 

The  targeted  stakeholder  consultation  involved  sending  a  detailed  questionnaire  to  key 
stakeholders  identified  during  the  inception  stage  of  the  study.  Four  different 
questionnaires were produced, each tailored to the type of stakeholder.  

A total of 31 responses were received, and a breakdown by stakeholder group is shown in 
the table below. 

Table A.2-3: Targeted questionnaire responses 

Type 

Questionnaires 
sent 

Responses 
received 

Ministry / Regulator 
Pan-European 
organisation 
Operator 
Operator association 

53 
14 

91 
27 

Table A.2-4: Responses to questionnaire 

20 
2 

3 
6 

of 

Percentage 
questionnaires 
sent 
38% 
14% 

3% 
22% 

Member State 

Number of responses 

Percentage 

EU13 

EU15 

10 

19 

32% 

61% 

91 

 
 
Pan-European 

2 

6% 

Interviews  were  conducted  with  the  aim  of  gathering  more  detailed  insights  into 
stakeholder’s  experiences  as  well  as  their  views  on  the  different  measures  under 
consideration. They also provided an opportunity to request quantitative data required for 
the impact assessment. In each case, we submitted specific questions in advance and/or 
sought clarification on information provided through the questionnaires. Interviews were 
held either face-to-face or by phone. 

Table A.2-5: Summary of interview programme 

Type of stakeholder 

Ministry / Regulator 
Pan-European 
organisation 
Operator 
Operator association 

Eurobarometer 

Number  of 
completed 
6 

interviews 

Member States covered 

UK, EL, IT, IE, NL, FR 

4 

4 
4 

UK, FR, ES 
DE, UK, IE, SE 

A Eurobarometer public opinion survey is to be conducted amongst European citizens in 
the 28 Member States of the EU. The objective of this survey was to gather the opinion 
of  the  European  citizens  on  a  series  of  issues  related  to  satisfaction  with  current  coach 
services in their country and reasons for using/ not using such services. 

Targeted stakeholder consultation 

The  consultant  responsible  for  the  support  study  consulted  stakeholders  through 
questionnaires. The questionnaires were targeted at each relevant stakeholder group and 
were adjusted to the needs of each particular group. 

The survey investigated:  

the extent of both domestic and international coach travel;  
the purposes for which coach services are used;  

  how many Europeans use coach services and how regularly they do so;  
 
 
  how users rate coach services in general, and how they rate specific aspects of the 
service including feelings of safety, punctuality and reliability, fares, comfort and 
integrated ticketing;  

  perceptions of service quality among non-users;  
 
  what improvements in existing services, if any, would make them more likely to 

the reasons why citizens choose to travel by coach; and  

use coach services. 

Conclusions and limitations 

The  objectives  of  the  consultation  activities  have  been  largely  achieved.  All  relevant 
stakeholder groups within all EU Member States have been consulted, and most provided 
their views to the policy measures under consideration. 

92 

 
 
 
It was difficult to engage stakeholders due to the level of consultation activity in 2017 in 
support of the study and that undertaken in 2016 as part of the evaluation. The feedback 
from  most  stakeholders  we  contacted  was  that  they  had  already  responded  to  the  OPC 
and/or  targeted  stakeholder  questionnaire  and  were  too  busy  to  engage  further. 
Consulting  via  various  methods  on  the  same  subject  in  a  short  period  meant  that  there 
was only a limited response in some areas. 

Although we requested that stakeholders send us any available data on the coach market, 
relatively little was received. This reflected the following: 

  many  Member  States  do  not  collect  statistics  for  the  coach  market  and  are  only 

 

concerned with the authorisations granted; and 
the  operators  we  spoke  to  would  not  share  data  for  reasons  of  confidentiality  or 
because of their company policy. 

Results of consultation activities 

Stakeholder input on problems with current legislation 

Stakeholders  provided  significant  input  that  helped  to  validate  and  elaborate  the 
definition of the problem and identify potential changes to the  current legislation. Input 
relating  to  the  problem  definition  came  primarily  from  the  OPC  and  the  targeted 
stakeholder questionnaires, and to a lesser extent from the interviews and Eurobarometer. 

The  sections  below  summarise  the  inputs  provided  and  their  implications  for  the 
following aspects of the problem:  

i. 
ii. 
iii. 

iv. 

restricted access to the market for domestic regular services;  
the requirement for establishment in Member State;  
different national approaches to liberalisation; discrimination in access to bus and 
coach terminals;  
and  the  role  of  coach  services  in  improving  connectivity  and  economic 
development. 

Access to the market for domestic regular services is restricted 

The  Open  Public  Consultation  Specialised  (OPCS)  stakeholders agreed  that  restrictions 
on access to the national market for regular coach and bus services constitutes a problem. 
50 of the 153 (33%) respondents agreed that it is a major problem and 42 (27%) agreed 
that  it  is  a  minor  problem.  30  of  the  45  (67%)  of  companies  engaged  in  the  transport 
chain (“Companies”) indicated that the restrictions have a negative impact on the ability 
of undertakings to expand into new markets, and none expressed the view that they had a 
positive  impact.  A  majority  of  stakeholders  stated  that  establishing  a  common  EU 
framework  for  access to  national  markets  for  regular  services  would reduce  the  cost  of 
compliance with legislation relative to the costs under the present rules. However, such a 
framework  was  also  considered  to  have  a  possible  negative  effect  on  incumbent  coach 

93 

 
 
 
operators by 22 of the 68 (32%) Companies, two of the three (67%) EU Governmental 
Authorities, 19 of the 28 (68%) NGOs and seven of the 17 (41%) Workers.  

In an interview, National Express stated there was no discrimination in providing access 
to the UK market. They cited an example of a new entrant from the US gaining access 
and  operating  a  service  within  six  months  of  announcing  its  intention.  However,  two 
operators responding to the targeted stakeholder questionnaire noted that they had been 
refused  access  to  the  domestic  market,  given  partial  permission  to  operate  or  asked  to 
modify their schedule because it was in competition with an existing public service. 

The requirement for establishment in Member State 

A majority of stakeholders responding to the OPCS stated that the specific requirement 
for local establishment is a concern, with 83 of 153 (54%) identifying it as either a minor 
or  major  problem.  39  of  the  68  (57%)  Companies  who  responded  stated  that  it  was  a 
major  or  minor  problem.  However,  two  of  three  responses  from  EU  Governmental 
Authorities,  14  of  28  (50%)  from  NGOs  and  four  of  seven  (57%)  from  Regulatory 
Authorities  indicated  that  the  requirement  was  not  a  problem.  The  biggest  perceived 
negative impact of this requirement among Companies was the associated administrative 
costs for carriers – 29 of the 36 (81%) identified these costs as a negative impact.  

Moreover, a majority of stakeholders considered that assisting entry into national markets 
by  carriers  resident  in  other  Member  States  would  be  beneficial.  38  of  the  68  (56%) 
Companies and 11 of the 17 (65%) road passenger transport workers (“Workers”) stated 
that this would make a positive contribution to the market. At the same time, a majority 
of  NGOs,  15  of  the  28  (54%),  and  Regulatory  Authorities,  three  of  the  seven  (43%), 
stated that there would be no impact on the market. 

Different national approaches to liberalisation 

43  of  the  68  Companies  (63%)  and  14  of  the  17  Workers  (59%)  responded  that  the 
‘patchwork’ approach to liberalisation across the EU was a problem. However, two of the 
three EU Governmental Authorities (67%), 16 of the 28 NGOs (57%), four of the seven 
Regulatory  Authorities  (57%)  and  two  of  the  three  Enforcement  Authorities  (67%)  did 
not  consider  the  differences  between  the  levels  of  liberalisation  in  different  Member 
States  to  be  a  concern.  Again,  the  effect  on  the  administrative  costs  for  carriers  was 
considered to be the greatest negative impact, with 32 of the 38 (84%) Companies, seven 
of the nine (78%) NGOs, two of the three (67%) Regulatory Authorities, six of the eight 
(75%) Workers and an Enforcement Authority respondent indicating that there would be 
a significant negative impact or negative impact.   

This  view  was  reinforced  during  interviews  with  operators.  For  example,  National 
Express highlighted that consistency on market access rule is needed as some countries’ 
national  rules  have  precedent  over  European  rules,  making  it  difficult  to  enter  new 
markets.  However,  the  European  Trade  Worker’s  Federation  (ETF)  said  that  they 
disagreed  with  liberalisation  as  there  are  no  consistent  rules  governing  driver  working 
conditions across the EU. They cited the freight industry as an example of how problems 
can  arise  in  a  mature  liberalised  market.  This  opinion  was  supported  by  other  Pan-

94 

 
 
European organisations, including the EDF, which stated in interview that it would prefer 
a more regulated market, as in the rail sector.  

Discrimination in access to bus and coach terminals 

A  majority  of  stakeholder  groups  responding  to  the  OPCS  stated  that  discrimination 
against  new  entrants  in  providing  access  to  terminals  was  a  problem.  39  of  the  68 
Companies  (57%),  two  of  the  three  EU  Governmental  Authorities  (67%),  15  of  the  28 
NGOs (54%), four of the seven Regulatory Authorities (57%) and 10 of the 17 Workers 
(59%) indicated that discrimination was either a major or a minor problem. 26 of the 32 
(81%) Companies stated that the resulting administrative costs for carriers constituted a 
negative impact. No stakeholder group considered that discriminatory access to terminals 
had a positive impact.  Two of the  three  (67%) Enforcement  Authorities  that  responded 
did not consider discrimination to be a problem however. 

When  asked  about  complaints  from  operators  in  regards  to  terminal  access,  the  French 
Regulator  gave  an  example  of  an  ongoing  dispute  by  a  coach  operator.  The  operator 
could not gain access to the coach terminal at Beauvais airport due to the non-publication 
of  the  terminal  access  rules.  The  case  was  dismissed  after  the  rules  were  subsequently 
published,  but  it  was  decided  at  the  end  of  December  2016  to  open  an  infringement 
procedure to investigate possible breaches by the operator of its legal obligations. In the 
Regulator’s opinion, the rules were not objective, transparent and non-discriminatory in 
nature. The investigation is on-going.  

The view that terminal access is discriminatory was supported by Megabus who told us 
that they had been denied access to the terminal in Birmingham which is privately owned 
by National Express, a rival operator, and have had difficulty obtaining departure slots at 
the public terminal in Leeds which is managed by National Express.  

The role of coach services in improving connectivity and economic development 

Six of the eight Consumers (75%) and six of the seven Companies (86%) participating in 
the  Open  Public  Consultation  General  (OPCG)  gave  a  positive  response  when  asked  if 
coach  services  were  viewed  as  important  for  the  economic  development  of  the 
respondent’s region and jobs. A frequent comment in the free text section was that better 
connections  and  coordination  between  different  modes  of  transport  would  encourage 
greater  use  of  coach  services.  In  general,  respondents  did  not  consider  that  the  use  of 
coach  services  was  discouraged  by  excessive  fares,  with  four  of  the  seven  (57%) 
Companies,  100%  of  NGOs  and  five  of  the  eight  (63%)  consumers  viewing  fares 
positively. 

However,  these  results  must  be  qualified  to  some  degree  by  the  results  of  the 
Eurobarometer survey. Across the EU, some 35% of those surveyed made some use of 
coach  services  to  travel  within  their  own  country,  with  25%  using  them  to  travel  to 
destinations in other countries. The majority of journeys are made for leisure purposes, 
although some passengers use coach services to connect with airports and rail stations as 
well as to make work-related trips. The primary reasons for travelling by coach are the 
availability  of  low  fares,  even  among  countries  with  more  liberal  market  access  rules, 

95 

 
 
although  lack  of  access  to  a  car  was  also  frequently  cited  a  reason  for  choosing  coach 
services. 

responses  among  economically  disadvantaged  non-users 

Nevertheless, the Eurobarometer results also provide some evidence that fares continue 
to  be  a  barrier  to  coach  travel.  Among  non-users,  the  most  frequent  responses  to  the 
question ‘what would make you more likely to travel by coach?’ were lack of access to a 
car  (37%  of  non-user  responses)  and  lower  prices  (26%  of  non-user  responses).  The 
corresponding 
(facing 
difficulties  paying  bills  most  of  the  time)  were  similar  (35%  and  32%  respectively). 
Moreover,  among  users  of  coach  services  in  the  same  disadvantaged  group,  low  prices 
accounted for 32% of responses to the question ‘why did you decide to travel by coach 
on the most recent trips?’ This suggests that lower income passengers are aware of the 
price  competitiveness  of  coach  travel  but  would  make  more  trips  if  fares  were  even 
lower.  

Stakeholder input on policy measures considered 

Stakeholders provided input on the level of support and expected impacts of the policy 
measures under consideration. An analysis of the views expressed is presented below. 

Extend the scope of the legislation to include all regular services (both international and 
national services)  

The majority of respondents to the OPCS supported establishing a common framework in 
the  EU  for  access  to  the  national  for  markets  for  regular  services.  44  of  the  68  (65%) 
Companies,  four  of  the  seven  (57%)  Regulatory  Authorities,  all  three  (100%) 
Enforcement  Authorities  and  11  of  the  17  (65%)  Workers  gave  the  opinion  that  the 
measure  would  improve  the  performance  of  the  coach  market.  Two  of  the  three  (67%) 
EU Governmental Authorities and 15 of the 28 (54%) NGOs responding stated that this 
proposed measure would not contribute to the performance of the coach market. 

The respondents to the targeted questionnaire expressed mixed opinions on the proposed 
extension of scope. Most Ministries/Regulators that offered an opinion (six out of eight) 
did not support the extension or considered that it should be limited and only applicable 
in  certain  circumstances.  The  reasons  given  ranged  from  concerns  about  unfavourable 
impacts on coach sector employees to the potential adverse impact on services operated 
as  public  service  obligations.  However,  two  of  three  operators,  the  two  Pan-European 
organisations, and two of three operator associations offering an opinion were supportive. 
A number of these respondents cited the success of liberalisation in Germany and France, 
a  reduction  in  bureaucracy  caused  by  national  regulations  and  prevention  of  unfair 
competition as reasons to extend the scope. 

Abolish  the  authorisation  procedure  so  that  any  undertaking  established  in  a  Member 
State  would  be  free  to  operate  new  regular  international  and  national  services  on  any 
route whether it is already operated by one or more transport undertaking 

15  of  the  20  Ministries/Regulators  (75%)  that  responded  to  the  targeted  stakeholder 
questionnaire  supported  keeping  the  authorisation  procedure.  In  their  opinion  it  was  a 
useful  tool  to  monitor  the  market  and  ensure  safety  standards  were  met.  Only  one 

96 

 
 
 
 
Ministry/Regulator  supported  abolition  of  the  authorisation  procedure,  stating  that  the 
current process was an unnecessary administrative burden. Four of the six operators who 
responded (67%) also supported keeping the authorisation procedure but highlighted that 
they would like to see the timescale reduced. There was mixed support among operator 
associations, with two arguing for abolition to increase transparency and two stating that 
it should be kept but standardised. 

When  interviewed,  the  Italian  Regulator  was  in  favour  of  keeping  the  authorisation 
procedure and establishing a framework that could be used to evaluate the economic and 
financial capabilities of applicants. The main reason authorisations are refused in Italy is 
because the applicant does not meet the minimal financial requirements to guarantee the 
service. This view was supported by National Express, who noted that the authorisation 
procedure  was  robust  albeit  time  consuming.  They  suggested  that  the  length  of  the 
process could be reduced from three to two months.  

Set common requirements for the protection of PSCs so as to ensure that Member States 
are permitted to take action to protect public services contracts from competition 

36  of  the  68  Companies  (53%)  and  eight  of  the  17  Workers  (47%)  responding  to  the 
OPCS stated that removing the protection of PSCs from competition would contribute to 
improving the performance of the market. The biggest negative impact was perceived to 
be the effect on incumbent coach operators.  

The Italian Regulator suggested in an interview that removing the national limitation for 
PSOs would be beneficial. If a service in Italy crosses two regions it is regulated at the 
national  level,  and  otherwise  subject  to  regional  regulation.  Introducing  a  kilometre-
based definition for the purposes  of determining regional jurisdiction would  simply  the 
process. 

The response to the targeted stakeholder questionnaire was more divided. Six out of 20 
Ministries/Regulators  (30%)  supported  a  set  of  common  requirements  on  the  grounds 
that this would help to create a more level playing field, while five (25%) did not support 
the proposed measure.  

Require  that  carriers  from  all  Member  States  be  guaranteed  access  to  national  regular 
services  markets  without  discrimination  on  grounds  of  nationality  or  place  of 
establishment 

The  responses  to  an  OPCS  question  concerning  abolition  of  restrictions  on  access  to 
national markets for regular services were mixed. 42 of the 68 Companies (62%), four of 
the  seven  Regulatory  Authorities  (57%)  and  10  of  the  17  Workers  (59%)  stated  that 
abolition would contribute to improving performance of the market. However, two of the 
three  EU  Governmental  Authorities  (67%),  17  of  the  28  NGOs  (61%)  and  two  of  the 
three  Enforcement  Authorities  (67%)  did  not  consider  that  the  proposal  would  be 
beneficial.  

9  of  the  20  Ministries/Regulators  (45%)  that  responded  to  the  targeted  stakeholder 
questionnaire did not support this proposal. They considered that the measure could lead 
to  discriminatory  conditions  or  have  a  negative  impact  on  employment.  The  other 

97 

 
 
respondents  within  this  category  either  did  not  express  an opinion  or  did  not  recognise 
the  underlying  concern.  The  only  support  for  the  measure  came  from  the  operator 
associations  -  3  of  the  6  respondents  in  this  category  (50%)  considered  that  it  would 
benefit customers and lead to a better quality of service.  

Devise  a  definition  of  a  coach  terminal  so  that  it  can  be  differentiated  from  stopping 
points and on-street bus stops 

The  respondents  to  the  targeted  stakeholder  questionnaire  broadly  supported  this 
proposal.  Two  of  the  three  operator  associations  (67%)  that  responded  to  the  question 
believed 
the 
to  have  one 
Ministries/Regulators  that  responded,  8  (40%)  supported  having  a  common  definition 
while 5 (25%) did not see any merit in a definition and considered that it should be left to 
Member States. 

transparent  definition.  Of 

it  would  be  useful 

When  interviewed,  the  EDF  highlighted  their  preference  for  terminals  in  defined 
locations  to  guarantee  better  access  for  disabled  people.  EDF  added  that  this  was 
particularly  important  for  people  with  autism  as  it  allowed  them  to  plan  their  trips  in 
advance. 

Establishing  minimum  common  requirements  to  ensure  that  coach  terminals  provide 
access to operators of regular services on fair and non-discriminatory terms 

A majority of respondents to the OPCS considered that facilitating a level playing field in 
access to terminals would help to improve the performance of the market. 46 of the 68 
Companies (68%), 15 of the 28 NGOs (54%), five of the seven Regulatory Authorities 
(71%) and 11 of the 17 Workers (65%) responded positively to this proposal, although 
two of the three (67%) Enforcement Authorities that responded considered that it would 
have a negative impact. 41 of the 68 Companies (60%) and 10 of the 17 Workers (59%) 
stated that the effect on service quality would be beneficial.  

Moreover,  the  majority  of  Ministries/Regulators  that  responded  to  the  targeted 
stakeholder  questionnaire  supported  establishing  common  requirements  to  ensure  that 
access  to  coach  terminals  is  fair  and  non-discriminatory.  Seven  of  those  responding 
(35%)  supported  the  proposal,  although  two  considered  that  it  should  be  left  to  best 
practice  and  four  stated  that  there  are  sufficient  measures  already.  All  three  Pan-
European organisations and all three operator organisations that responded supported the 
proposed  measure.  Two  operators  indicated  that  establishing  requirements  was  an 
essential measure. 

In  an  interview,  the  operator  association  Confederation  of  Passenger  Transport  (CPT) 
stated that terminal access was a major concern. They suggested that there should be an 
EU-wide regulation requiring Member States to adopt appropriate measures to enhance 
and manage terminal capacity. CPT also indicated that the coach terminal at Heathrow in 
the UK was an example of good practice in the definition and transparency of schedules 
and tariffs.  

Abolish the requirement for occasional services to require a journey form 

98 

 
 
There was a positive response to the OPCS on whether journey forms are useful. Three 
EU  Governmental  Authorities  (100%),  six  of  the  seven  Regulatory  Authorities  (86%) 
and  two  Enforcement  Authorities  (67%)  supported  this  view.  However,  49  of  the  65 
Companies (75%), 21 of the 27 NGOs (78%) and 15 of the 17 Workers (88%) considered 
that journey forms served no useful purpose. 

the  requirement  for  a 

Only  one  Ministry/Regulator  responding  to  the  targeted  stakeholder  questionnaire 
supported  abolition  of 
the  14 
Ministries/Regulators  (93%)  that  responded  to  the  question  wanted  to  keep  the 
requirement  as  they  regard  it  is  a  useful  means  of  monitoring  and  regulating  coach 
services.  one  operator,  one  Pan-European  organisation  and  one  operator  association 
stated that journey forms should be retained. However, three of the operator associations 
that  responded  (75%)  and  one  Pan-European  organisation  stated  that  journey  forms 
should be abolished in the interests of reducing bureaucracy. 

journey  form.  13  of 

Clarify the definition of ‘international carriage’ to ensure that closed-door tours that visit 
other Member States are not excluded from the scope of the Regulations 

The respondents to the targeted stakeholder questionnaire did not offer specific support 
on  the  clarification  of  the  definition  of  ‘international  carriage’,  although  only  one 
Ministry and one operator explicitly stated that the meaning is currently clear and well-
understood. 

Similarly  a  majority  of  stakeholders  responding  to  the  OPCS  considered  that  the 
definition  was  sufficiently  clear.  40  of  the  66  Companies  (61%),  two  of  the  three  EU 
Governmental Authorities (67%), 20 of the 26 NGOs (77%), six of the seven Regulatory 
Authorities  (88%),  13  of  the  16  Workers  (81%)  and  all  three  Enforcement  Authorities 
participating stated that further clarity was not needed. 

Clarify the definition of “regular services” to ensure that there is no requirement to have 
stopping  points  along  the  route  but  if  there  is  stopping  points  they  must  be  known  in 
advance 

The  respondents  to  the  targeted  stakeholder  questionnaire  did  not  offer  any  specific 
support for clarifying the definition of ‘regular services’, although only one Ministry and 
one  operator  explicitly  stated  that  the  meaning  is  currently  clear  and  well-understood. 
One  Ministry  mentioned  that  it  would  support  a  clear  definition  of  ‘special  regular 
services’. 

A  majority  of  all  stakeholder  groups  responding  to  the  OPCS  also  stated  the  definition 
was sufficiently clear. 35 of the 65 Companies (54%), two of the three EU Governmental 
Authorities (67%), 20 of the 27 NGOs (74%), four of the seven Regulatory Authorities 
(57%), nine of the 16 Workers (56%) and all three Enforcement Authorities participating 
stated that clarity was not required. 

Clarify that there is no requirement for an own-account operator to possess a community 
licence to be issued a certificate for own-account operations 

99 

 
 
Similarly,  respondents  to  the  targeted  stakeholder  questionnaire  did  not  offer  specific 
support for clarifying that there is no requirement for an own-account operator to possess 
a community licence if it is to be issued a certificate for own-account operations. Among 
the stakeholder groups responding to the OPCS, only two of the three EU Governmental 
Authorities (67%) indicated that the current provision is not sufficiently clear. 

Clarify the meaning of “Cabotage operations shall be authorised…” in Article 15 to mean 
that cabotage operations are authorised rather than need to be authorised 

10  of  the  20  Ministries/Regulators  (50%)  that  responded  to  the  targeted  stakeholder 
questionnaire specifically mentioned that they would support clarification of the meaning 
of this provision. This view was supported by the two Pan-European organisations that 
responded, and an operator noted that it was particularly important as interpretations vary 
by country. Moreover, only four Ministries/Regulators (20%) considered the meaning to 
be sufficient already. 

The need for greater clarity was generally supported by the results of the OPCS. Two of 
the three EU Governmental Authorities (67%), four of the seven Regulatory Authorities 
(57%)  and  two  of  the  three  Enforcement  Authorities  (67%)  indicated  that  the  current 
cabotage rules are sufficiently clear. However, 26 of the 67 Companies (39%), 20 of the 
27 NGOs (74%) and seven of the 15 Workers (47%) saw no value in further clarification. 
The  biggest  negative  impact  of  not  having  clarification  was  perceived  to  be  the 
enforcement costs for Member States. 

Use of consultation results 

The  open  public  consultation  was  mostly  used  as  a  test  of  the  validity  of  the 
Commission's  understanding  of  the  problems  at  stake  and  of  the  most  adequate  policy 
measures considered. The results confirmed the Commission's initial views and approach 
to the ex-post analysis and to the Impact Assessment.  

The  OPC  and  the  targeted  stakeholder  questionnaires,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  from  the 
interviews and Eurobarometer provided the information for the problem definition. It was 
not  possible  to  get  much  more  quantitative  (data,  statistics)  information  from  the 
stakeholders during the consultation process. However, it was a rich source of qualitative 
(opinions,  views  and  suggestions)  information  which  helped  close  the  Commission’s 
knowledge gap. 

100 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED BY THE INITIATIVE AND HOW? 

Citizens  &  passengers  –  are  provided  with  an  improved  offer  of  passenger  transport 
services  in  terms  of  availability,  cost,  quality  and  reliability  across  the  EU.  The 
promotion  of  coach  travel  facilitates  mobility  for  all  and  in particular  those  who  suffer 
from  transport  disadvantage.  Where  new  coach  and  bus  services  operate  citizens  will 
benefit from less congestion, better air quality due to the on average lower emissions that 
all other inter-city passenger transport modes and in particular from car. 

Road  Passenger  Transport  Operators  –  benefit  from  the  removal  of  legal  barriers  to 
market access and the introduction of uniform market rules. There is a reduction in the 
administrative  burden and new entrants  will have fair  and non-discriminatory access to 
terminal  infrastructure  gain  business  opportunities.  Incumbent  operators  lose  protection 
but also benefit from new business opportunities and the incentive to innovate.  

Terminal  Operators  –  must  provide  all  carriers  with  non-discriminatory  access  to 
terminals, promoting competition between carriers and the development of an integrated 
coach network. They will benefit from new business opportunities. 

Road  Passenger  Transport  workers  –  there  will  be  an  improvement  in  employment 
opportunities  without  any  apparent  adverse  impact  on  working  conditions,  pay  and 
employment conditions or health and safety in the workplace.  

Public  Authorities  –  Will  benefit  from  a  reduction  in  administrative  burden  from  the 
introduction of a simplified authorisation procedure for regular services and the abolition 
of  the  journey  form  for  occasional  services.  May  affect  how  public  authorities  provide 
for inter-urban passenger transport e.g commercially or in the general economic interest 
through PSCs. 

101 

 
 
 
   
 
 
ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL MODEL USED IN PREPARING THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

STRUCTURE OF THE IA TOOL 

An Excel-based IA tool was developed to evaluate impacts in each Member State across 
a 20-year assessment period from 2015 to 2035. An illustration of the structure of the IA 
tool is set out in the figure below. 

Figure A.4-1: IA tool structure 

The main elements within the tool are as follows: 

  Estimating  the  baseline  scenario:  it  provides  projections  under  current  trends 
and adopted policies, drawing on input and growth assumptions an updated EU 
Reference scenario 201664. 

  Estimating the impact of liberalisation: changes to the baseline scenario level 
of transport activity arising from the implementation of defined policy measures 
are  estimated  based  on  evidence  from  previous  domestic  coach  market 
liberalisation initiatives. Impacts on regulatory costs are calculated separately. 

64   This scenario has been developed with the PRIMES-TREMOVE model (i.e. the same model used for 
the EU Reference scenario 2016) by ICCS-E3MLab. A detailed description of this scenario is available 
in the Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 1999/62/EC 
on the charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures, SWD (2017) 180 

102 

 
 
 
                                                 
  Assessing  secondary  impacts:  deviations  from  the  baseline  scenario  level  of 

secondary impacts are driven by changes to the level of transport activity. 

Each of these elements is explained in more detail in the following paragraphs. 

BASELINE SCENARIO 

The  Baseline  scenario  builds  on  the  EU  Reference  scenario  2016  but  additionally 
includes some updates in the technology costs assumptions (i.e. for light duty vehicles) 
and few policy measures adopted after its cut-off date (end of 2014) like the Directive on 
Weights and Dimensions, the 4th Railways Package, the NAIADES II Package, the Ports 
Package, the replacement of the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC) test cycle by the 
new  Worldwide  harmonized  Light-vehicles  Test  Procedure  (WLTP)65,  and  the  market 
liberalisation of buses and coaches market in France, Germany, Italy and Poland.  

The Baseline scenario has been developed with the PRIMES-TREMOVE model (i.e. the 
same model used for the EU Reference scenario 2016) by ICCS-E3MLab. The impact of 
the  market  liberalisation  of  buses  and  coaches  market  in  France,  Germany,  Italy  and 
Poland has been evaluated directly with the Excel-based IA tool. 

The Baseline scenario of the Excel-based IA tool, used as benchmark for comparing the 
Policy  Options,  is  defined  in  terms  of  few  metrics  estimated  for  the  whole  of  the 
assessment period (2015-2035): 

  the  level  of  coach  transport  activity  (in  terms  of  passenger  kilometres,  vehicle 

kilometres and journeys); 

  the level of transport activity on competing modes (rail, car and air); 
  the modal share for coach; 
  fare levels; 
  revenue (for coach and competing transport modes); 
  levels of employment; 
  congestion costs; 
  accident costs; 
  energy use (in tonnes of oil equivalent); 
  CO2 emissions (in tonnes and monetised using the value of CO2); 
  air pollution (in terms of the external costs of pollution); and 
  regulatory costs. 

The sources and assumptions used to estimate each of these metrics in the Excel-based 
IA tool, in each Member State, are shown in the table below.  

65   A detailed description of the Baseline scenario is available in the Impact Assessment accompanying the 
Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 1999/62/EC on the charging of heavy  goods vehicles for 
the use of certain infrastructures, SWD (2017) 180. 

103 

 
 
                                                 
Table A4-1: Baseline Scenario sources and assumptions 

Metric 

Source for 2015 value 

Growth assumption 

The level of coach activity 

The level of transport activity 
on competing modes  

Coach mode share 

PRIMES-TREMOVE model*,**  

PRIMES-TREMOVE model 

PRIMES-TREMOVE model 

PRIMES-TREMOVE model 

PRIMES-TREMOVE model 

PRIMES-TREMOVE model 

Fare levels 

Revenue 

Employment 

Congestion costs 

Accident costs 

Energy use 

CO2 emissions  

Air pollution 

Regulatory costs 

PRIMES-TREMOVE model 
(provided as unit costs) 

PRIMES-TREMOVE model 
(using unit costs and transport 
activity) 

EU Statistical Pocketbook  

PRIMES-TREMOVE model 

PRIMES-TREMOVE model 

Grows in line with the level of 
transport activity 

PRIMES-TREMOVE model 

PRIMES-TREMOVE model 

PRIMES-TREMOVE model 

PRIMES-TREMOVE model 

PRIMES-TREMOVE model 

PRIMES-TREMOVE model 

PRIMES-TREMOVE model 

PRIMES-TREMOVE model 

PRIMES-TREMOVE model 

PRIMES-TREMOVE model 

Estimated based on bottom up 
calculations 

Grows in line with the level of 
transport activity 

* Does not include number of services, international coach activity or cabotage. Source: Steer Davies Gleave 

** The PRIMES-TREMOVE is a private model that has been developed and is maintained by E3MLab/ICCS of National 
Technical University of Athens, based on, but extending features of the open source TREMOVE model developed by 
the TREMOVE modelling community.  

As  shown  in  the  table  above,  in  most  cases,  the  metrics  have  been  sourced  from  the 
Baseline scenario developed with the PRIMES-TREMOVE model in the context of the 
Impact  Assessment  accompanying  the  Proposal  for  a  Directive  amending  Directive 
1999/62/EC  on  the  charging  of  heavy  goods  vehicles  for  the  use  of  certain 
infrastructures.  

The  PRIMES-TREMOVE  transport model  does  not  contain  projections  of  employment 
levels and some measures of transport activity (the number of services and international 
coach  activity)  for  the  coach  market.  Therefore,  the  baseline  level  of  these  metrics  has 
been estimated using alternative sources and assumptions. 

PRIMES-TREMOVE model 

The  PRIMES-TREMOVE  transport  model  projects  the  evolution  of  demand  for  passengers  and  freight 
transport by transport mode and transport mean. It is essentially a dynamic system of multi-agent choices 
under  several constraints,  which  are not necessarily  binding  simultaneously.  The  model  consists  of  two 
main  modules,  the  transport  demand  allocation  module  and  the  technology  choice  and  equipment 
operation module. The two modules interact with each other and are solved simultaneously.   

The projections include details for a large number of transport means, technologies and fuels, including 
conventional and alternative types, and their penetration in various transport market segments for each 
EU Member State. They also include details about greenhouse gas and air pollution emissions (e.g. NOx, 

104 

 
 
PM, SOx, CO), as well as impacts on external costs of congestion, noise and accidents. 

In  the  transport  field,  PRIMES-TREMOVE  is  suitable  for  modelling  soft  measures  (e.g.  eco-driving, 
deployment of Intelligent Transport Systems, labelling), economic measures (e.g. subsidies and taxes on 
fuels,  vehicles,  emissions;  ETS  for  transport  when  linked  with  PRIMES;  pricing  of  congestion  and  other 
externalities such as air pollution, accidents and noise; measures supporting R&D), regulatory measures 
(e.g.  CO2  emission  performance  standards  for  new  passenger  cars  and  new  light  commercial  vehicles; 
EURO standards on road transport vehicles; technology standards for non-road transport technologies), 
infrastructure  policies  for  alternative  fuels  (e.g.  deployment  of  refuelling/recharging  infrastructure  for 
electricity, hydrogen, LNG, CNG). Used as a module which contributes to a broader PRIMES scenario, it 
can show how policies and trends in the field of transport contribute to economy wide trends in energy 
use and emissions. Using data disaggregated per Member State, it can show differentiated trends across 
Member States.  

PRIMES-TREMOVE  has  been  used  for  the  2011  White  Paper  on  Transport,  Low  Carbon  Economy  and 
Energy  2050  Roadmaps,  the  2030  policy  framework  for  climate  and  energy  and  more  recently  for  the 
Effort  Sharing  Regulation,  the  review  of  the  Energy  Efficiency  Directive,  the  recast  of  the  Renewables 
Energy  Directive,  the  European  strategy  on  low-emission  mobility  and  the  revision  of  the  Eurovignette 
Directive. 

The PRIMES-TREMOVE is a private model that has been developed and is maintained by E3MLab/ICCS of 
National Technical University of Athens, based on, but extending features of the open source TREMOVE 
model developed by the TREMOVE modelling community. Part of the model (e.g. the utility nested tree) 
was  built  following  the  TREMOVE  model.  Other  parts,  like  the  component  on  fuel  consumption  and 
emissions, follow the COPERT model.  
As  module  of  the  PRIMES  energy  system  model66,  PRIMES-TREMOVE  has  been  successfully  peer 
reviewed67, most recently in 201168. 

The EU Reference scenario 2016 

  Scenario design, consultation process and quality assurance 

The  Baseline  scenario  used  in  this  impact  assessment  builds  on  the  EU  Reference  scenario  2016  but 
additionally includes few policy measures adopted after its cut-off date (end of 2014) and some updates 
in the technology costs assumptions. 

Building an EU Reference scenario is a regular exercise by the Commission. It is coordinated by DGs ENER, 
CLIMA and MOVE in association with the JRC, and the involvement of other services via a specific inter-
service group.  

For  the  EU  Reference  scenario  2016,  Member  States  were  consulted  throughout  the  development 
process  through  a  specific  Reference  scenario  expert  group  which  met  three  times  during  its 
development.  Member  States  provided  information  about  adopted  national  policies  via  a  specific 
questionnaire,  key  assumptions  have  been  discussed  and  in  each  modelling  step,  draft  Member  State 
specific  results  were  sent  for  consultation.  Comments  of  Member  States  were  addressed  to  the  extent 
possible, keeping in mind the need for overall comparability and consistency of the results. 

Quality  of  modelling  results  was  assured  by  using  state  of  the  art  modelling  tools,  detailed  checks  of 
assumptions  and  results  by  the  coordinating  Commission  services  as  well  as  by  the  country  specific 

66   http://www.e3mlab.National Technical University of Athens.gr/e3mlab/ 
67   http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/analysis/models/docs/primes_model_2013-2014_en.pdf.   
68   https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/sec_2011_1569_2.pdf   

105 

 
 
 
                                                 
comments by Member States. 

The  EU  Reference  scenario  2016  projects  EU  and  Member  States  energy,  transport  and  GHG  emission-
related  developments  up  to  2050,  given  current  global  and  EU  market  trends  and  adopted  EU  and 
Member States' energy, transport, climate and related relevant policies. "Adopted policies" refer to those 
that have been cast in legislation in the EU or in MS (with a  cut-off date end of 201469). Therefore, the 
binding 2020 targets are assumed to be reached in the projection. This concerns greenhouse gas emission 
reduction  targets  as  well  as  renewables  targets,  including  renewables  energy  in  transport.  The  EU 
Reference  scenario  2016  provides  projections,  not  forecasts.  Unlike  forecasts,  projections  do  not  make 
predictions  about  what  the  future  will  be.  They  rather  indicate  what  would  happen  if  the  assumptions 
which underpin  the  projection  actually  occur. Still,  the  scenario allows  for  a  consistent  approach in  the 
assessment of energy and climate trends across the EU and its Member States.   

The  report  "  EU  Reference  Scenario  2016:  Energy,  transport  and  GHG  emissions  -  Trends  to  2050"70 
describes  the  inputs  and  results in  detail.  In  addition,  its  main  messages  are summarised  in  the  impact 
assessments  accompanying  the  Effort  Sharing  Regulation71  and  the  revision  of  the  Energy  Efficiency 
Directive72, and the analytical work accompanying the European strategy on low-emission mobility73.   

PRIMES-TREMOVE  is  one  of  the  core  models  of  the  modelling  framework  used  for  developing  the  EU 
Reference  scenario  2016  and  has  also  been  used  for  developing  the  Baseline  scenario  of  this  impact 
assessment. The model was calibrated on transport and energy data up to year 2013 from Eurostat and 
other sources. 

  Main assumptions of the Baseline scenario 

The projections are based on a set of assumptions, including on population growth, macroeconomic and 
oil price developments, technology improvements, and policies.  

Macroeconomic assumptions 

The  Baseline  scenario  uses  the  same  macroeconomic  assumptions  as  the  EU  Reference  scenario  2016. 
The population projections draw on the European Population Projections (EUROPOP 2013) by Eurostat. 
The  key  drivers  for  demographic  change  are:  higher  life  expectancy,  convergence  in  the  fertility  rates 
across Member States in the long term, and inward migration. The EU28 population is expected to grow 
by 0.2% per year during 2010-2030 (0.1% for 2010-2050), to 516 million in  2030 (522 million by 2050). 
Elderly people, aged 65 or more, would account for 24% of the total population by 2030 (28% by 2050) as 
opposed to 18% today.  

GDP projections mirror the joint work of DG ECFIN and the Economic Policy Committee, presented in the 
2015 Ageing Report74. The average EU GDP growth rate is projected to remain relatively low at 1.2% per 
year  for  2010-2020,  down  from  1.9%  per  year  during  1995-2010.  In  the  medium  to  long  term,  higher 
expected growth rates (1.4% per year for 2020-2030 and 1.5% per year for 2030-2050) are taking account 
of the catching up potential of countries with relatively low GDP per capita, assuming convergence to a 

69  In addition, amendments to two Directives only adopted in the beginning of 2015 were also considered. 
This  concerns  notably  the  ILUC  amendment  to  the  Renewables  Directive  and  the  Market  Stability 
Reserve Decision amending the ETS Directive. 

70   ICCS-E3MLab  et  al.  (2016),  EU  Reference  Scenario  2016:  Energy,  transport  and  GHG  emissions  - 

Trends to 2050 
71   SWD(2016) 247 
72 SWD(2016) 405 
73   SWD(2016) 244 
74   European  Commission/DG  ECFIN  (2014),  The  2015  Ageing  Report:  Underlying  Assumptions  and 

Projection Methodologies, European Economy 8/2014. 

106 

 
 
                                                 
total factor productivity growth rate of 1% in the long run.  

Fossil fuel price assumptions 

Oil  prices  used  in  the  Baseline  scenario  are  the  same  with  those  of  the  EU  Reference  scenario  2016. 
Following a gradual adjustment process with reduced investments in upstream productive capacities by 
non-OPEC75 countries, the quota discipline is assumed to gradually improve among OPEC members and 
thus the oil price is projected to reach 87 $/barrel in 2020 (in year 2013-prices). Beyond 2020, as a result 
of  persistent  demand  growth  in  non-OECD  countries  driven  by  economic  growth  and  the  increasing 
number of passenger cars, oil price would rise to 113 $/barrel by 2030 and 130 $/barrel by 2050.  

No specific sensitivities were prepared with respect to oil price developments. Still, it can be recalled that 
lower oil price assumptions tend to increase energy consumption and CO2 emissions not covered by the 
ETS. The magnitude of the change would depend on the price elasticities and on the share of taxation, 
like excise duties, in consumer prices. For transport, the high share of excise duties in the consumer prices 
act as a limiting factor for the increase in energy consumption and CO2 emissions.  

Techno-economic assumptions 

For all transport means, except for light duty vehicles (i.e. passenger cars and light commercial vehicles), 
the Baseline scenario uses the same technology costs assumptions as the EU Reference scenario 2016.  

For light duty vehicles, the data for technology costs and emissions savings has been updated based on a 
recent study commissioned by DG CLIMA76. Battery costs for electric vehicles are assumed to go down to 
205 euro/kWh by 2030 and 160 euro/kWh by 2050; further reductions in the cost of both spark ignition 
gasoline  and  compression  ignition  diesel  are  assumed  to  take  place.  Technology  cost  assumptions  are 
based on extensive literature review, modelling and simulation, consultation with relevant stakeholders, 
and further assessment by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission. 

Specific policy assumptions 
The key policies included in the Baseline scenario, similarly to the EU Reference scenario 2016, are77:   

  CO2  standards  for  cars  and  vans  regulations  (Regulation  (EC)  No  443/2009,  amended  by  Regulation 
(EU) No 333/2014 and Regulation (EU) No 510/2011, amended by Regulation (EU) No 253/2014); CO2 
standards  for cars  are assumed  to  be 95gCO2/km as  of  2021 and for  vans 147gCO2/km as  of  2020, 
based  on  the  NEDC  test  cycle,  in  line  with  current  legislation.  No  policy  action  to  strengthen  the 
stringency of the target is assumed after 2020/2021. 

  The  Renewable  Energy  Directive  (Directive  2009/28/EC)  and  Fuel  Quality  Directive  (Directive 
2009/30/EC) including ILUC amendment (Directive 2015/1513/EU): achievement of the legally binding 
RES target for 2020 (10% RES in transport target) for each Member State, taking into account the use 
of  flexibility  mechanisms  when  relevant  as  well  as  of  the  cap  on  the  amount  of  food  or  feed  based 
biofuels  (7%).  Member  States'  specific  renewable  energy  policies  for  the  heating  and cooling  sector 
are also reflected where relevant. 

  Directive on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure (Directive 2014/94/EU). 

  Directive  on  the  charging  of  heavy  goods  vehicles  for  the  use  of  certain  infrastructures  (Directive 

75   OPEC stands for Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. 
76   Source: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/transport/vehicles/docs/technology_results_web.xlsx  
77   For  a  comprehensive  discussion  see  the  Reference  scenario  report:  “EU  Reference  Scenario  2016: 

Energy, transport and GHG emissions - Trends to 2050”  

107 

 
 
                                                 
2011/76/EU amending Directive 1999/62/EC).  

  Relevant  national  policies,  for  instance  on  the  promotion  of  renewable  energy,  on  fuel  and  vehicle 

taxation, are taken into account.  

In addition, a few policy measures adopted after the cut-off date of the EU Reference scenario 2016 at 
both EU and Member State level, have been included in the Baseline scenario: 

  Directive on weights & dimensions (Directive 2015/719/EU); 

  Directive as regards the opening of the market for domestic passenger transport services by rail and 

the governance of the railway infrastructure (Directive 2016/2370/EU); 

  Directive on technical requirements for inland waterway vessels (Directive 2016/1629/EU), part of the 

Naiades II package; 

  Regulation establishing a framework on market access to port services and financial transparency of 

ports78; 

  The  replacement  of  the  New  European  Driving  Cycle  (NEDC)  test  cycle  by  the  new  Worldwide 
harmonized  Light-vehicles  Test  Procedure  (WLTP)  has  been  implemented  in  the  Baseline  scenario, 
drawing on work by JRC. Estimates by JRC show a WLTP to NEDC CO2 emissions ratio of approximately 
1.21 when comparing the sales-weighted fleet-wide average CO2 emissions. WLTP to NEDC conversion 
factors are considered by individual vehicle segments, representing different vehicle and technology 
categories79.  

  For  Germany,  an  extension  of  the  toll  network  by  roughly  40,000  kilometres  of  federal  trunk  road 

from 2018 onwards for all heavy goods vehicles over 7.5t.80  

  For Austria, the incorporation of exhaust emissions and noise pollution in the distance based charges. 
All federal highways and motorways, totalling around 2,200 km, are subject to distance based charges.  

  For Belgium, a distance based system replaced the former Eurovignette for heavy goods vehicles over 
3.5t from April 2016. The system applies to all inter-urban motorways, main (national) roads81 and all 
urban roads in Brussels.  

  For  Latvia,  the  introduction  of  a  vignette  system  applied  for  goods  vehicles  below  3.5t  on  the 
motorways,  starting  with  1  January  2017.  In  addition,  for  all  heavy  goods  vehicles  over  3.5t  the 
vignette rates applied on motorways for the EURO 0, EURO I, EURO II are increased by 10% starting 
with 1 January 2017. 

  The reform of the national regulatory frameworks of the buses and coaches market in Germany, France, 

Italy and Poland has been additionally reflected through the IA excel-based tool. 

Transport activity 

78   Awaiting signature of act (Source : 

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2013/0157(COD)&l=en)  
79   Simulation  at  individual  vehicle  level  is  combined  with  fleet  composition  data,  retrieved  from  the 
official European CO2 emissions monitoring database, and publicly available data regarding individual 
vehicle characteristics, in order to calculate vehicle CO2 emissions and fuel consumption over different 
conditions. Vehicle CO2 emissions are initially simulated over the present test protocol (NEDC) for the 
2015  passenger  car  fleet;  the  accuracy  of  the  method  is  validated  against  officially  monitored  CO2 
values and experimental data. 

80   Currently, 15,000 kilometres of federal trunk road and motorways are subject to tolls. 
81   E.g. http://www.viapass.be/fileadmin/viapass/documents/download/VlaanderenE.JPG  

108 

 
 
 
                                                 
In estimating the baseline number of coach services and the level of international coach 
activity, national statistics and stakeholder consultation responses have been drawn upon 
to fill some data gaps. However, not every Member State records or publishes this data 
and it was not possible to prepare a comprehensive data set. Therefore the remaining data 
gaps have been filled as follows: 

  To  estimate  the  level  of  international  coach  activity,  the  data  –  from  Member 
States where it was available – has been used to generate a ratio of international 
coach activity (as a proportion of total coach activity) relative to the number of 
international borders. We then applied this ratio to the remaining Member States. 
  Similarly, to estimate the number of coach services, the available data has been 
used  to  generate  a  ratio  of  coach  services  to  coach  transport  activity.  We  then 
applied this ratio to the remaining Member States. 

No data on the level of cabotage activity has been found and no useful information on the 
level of cabotage has been received from stakeholders. Accordingly, it was not possible 
to provide estimates of cabotage within the IA tool. 

Employment 

The  EU  Statistical  Pocketbook  contains combined  total  employment  levels  across  local 
bus and interurban coach industries in each Member State, and the PRIMES-TREMOVE 
model provide projections of the total number of bus and coach vehicles in each Member 
State. To estimate total coach industry employment, the proportion of coaches in the total 
bus  and  coach  fleet  has  been  applied  to  the  total  employment  level  provided  in  the 
Statistical pocketbook. It has been assumed that employment grows in line with transport 
activity throughout the assessment period. 

Administrative costs 

To  estimate  regulatory  costs  in  the  baseline  scenario,  the  costs  associated  with 
authorisations,  licences  and  journey  forms  separately  for  both  coach  operators  and 
national authorities have been estimated. To estimate each of these costs, we have used 
the following formula: 

𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠

=  𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)
× 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑 (𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦) 

Where: 

And: 

𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡  ×  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦  

𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 

109 

 
 
The  price  of  each  regulatory  activity  has  been  calculated  using  the  EU  average  wage 
(calculated by Reinies Fischer82) and the assumptions on the time taken to carry out each 
activity are shown in the table below. 

Table A4-2: Baseline Scenario sources and assumptions for administrative costs 

Process 

Type of effect 

Licence 

Operator  –  resources  used 
in application 

Estimate 
previous 
study 
Not made 

in 

Revised 
estimate 

Comment 

20 days 

Government/regulator 
resources used in approval 

– 

Not made 

Ten days 

Authorisation  Operator  –  resources  used 
in application 

One  day  for 
administrative 
staff 

Three 
days 

Journey form  Operator  –  time  taken  to 

complete 

Less  than  one 
hour 

Less  than 
one hour 

Government/regulator 
– 
resources used in inspection 

Not made 

Five 
minutes  – 
10% 
of 
forms 
inspected 

of 

approving 

experience 
operators 
the 

Based  on  Steer  Davies 
of 
Gleave 
supporting 
in 
completing 
licence 
process 
Assumed to require twice the 
effort 
an 
authorisation  
Based 
stakeholder 
on 
comments  concerning  need 
and 
translation 
for 
consultancy advice  
No  reason  to  modify  this 
estimate based on evidence to 
date  
Inspection time proportionate 
to time to complete the form. 
Inspection  rate  of  10%  gives 
sufficiently  high  likelihood 
of  inspection  to  encourage 
compliance 

To  estimate  the  total  number  of  authorisations  and  licences  (for  both  national  and 
international  services),  the  number  of  international  authorisations  and  international 
Community licences have been scaled up based on the ratio of international to national 
coach  transport  activity.  To  estimate  the  number  of  journey  forms,  a  ratio  of  forms  to 
transport  activity  has  been  generated,  in  Member  States  where  data  is  available,  and 
applied this across all Member States. 

It has been assumed that all administrative costs grow throughout the assessment period 
in line with the level of transport activity. 

IMPACT OF POLICY OPTIONS 

Approach to assessment of impacts 

Table  A.4-3  summarises  how  the  impacts  of  the  Policy  Options  have  been  assessed. 
Monetised  impacts  have  been  calculated  as  2015  Net  Present  Values  (NPVs)  using  a 
discount rate of 4%. For all policy options, the measures are assumed to be implemented 
starting with 2019. 

82 https://www.reinisfischer.com/average-salary-european-union-2016 

110 

 
 
 
                                                 
Table A4-3: Assessment methodology by impact 

Impact 

Economic impacts 

Increases (or decreases) in the volume of transport 
activity (in terms of passenger-kilometres and 
passenger journeys), segmented by type of 
transport: national, cabotage, and international. 
Changes in the transport activity should to the 
extent possible, be explained by changes in inter alia 
(i) the average load factor (passengers per coach), 
(ii) number of services, (iii) average journey length. 

Increases (or decreases) in the quality of service. 

Impact on the market structure in the coach and bus 
sector. 

Potential relocation of businesses from some 
Member States to others and economic effects on 
particular Member States and/or regions. 

Fares for users and effect on consumer prices. 

Integration of ticketing and price competition. 

Regulatory costs for road passenger transport 
operators and terminal operators. These are the 
costs incurred by the relevant parties to comply with 
possible new legislative requirements, including 
their sub-components (administrative costs, direct 
compliance costs, hassle costs, etc.). 

Economic effects for SMEs, notably in terms of 
regulatory costs and their competitive position. 

Regulatory costs (administrative, compliance and 
enforcement costs) incurred by the responsible 
national authorities. 

1 

2 

3 

4  

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

Level of infringements of rules on access to the 
market. 

11 

Level of congestion. 

12 

Performance of other modes of transport and 
integration between modes. 

13  Working conditions and job quality 

14 

Overall level of employment and distribution across 
Member States. 

15 

Level of infringements of social rules, including 

111 

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 

 

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impact 

labour law applicable to the employment contracts, 
maximum working time, minimum rest periods, etc. 

16 

Impact on remote regions. 

17  Access to mobility for low-income consumers. 

18 

19 

20 

Accessibility of the bus and coach services for people 
with reduced mobility. 

The rights of the elderly (EC Charter of Fundamental 
Rights – Article 25). 

Integration of persons with disabilities (EC Charter of 
Fundamental Rights – Article 26). 

21  Accident costs 

Environmental impacts 

22 

Level of carbon dioxide emissions. 

23  Air pollution 

24  Energy use and efficiency. 

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25  Share of road passenger transport in modal split. 

 

Source: Steer Davies Gleave 

Analysis of options 

The  policy options  selected  for  further  analysis  cover  three  broad  kinds  of  measure  for 
supporting the further development of interurban bus and coach markets, namely: 

  measures  for  clarifying  existing  legislation  and  simplifying  current  regulatory 

procedures (included in Options PO1, PO2 and PO3);   

  measures for removing restrictions on access to inter-urban markets (included in 

Options PO1, PO2 and PO3); and 

  measures to facilitate the level playing field for access to terminals (included in 

Options PO4 and PO5). 

A  high-level  description  of  the  methodology  for  assessing  each  group  of  measures  is 
provided  below,  followed  by  the  assumptions  used  to  estimate  the  impacts  of  each 
option. 

Clarification measures 
In principle, measures to clarify existing provisions in Regulation 1073/2009 could result 
in a change in operator behaviour, for example by encouraging them to introduce more 
scheduled  services  without  intermediate  stops  (following  a  clarification  of  the  term 
‘regular  services’).  However,  for  the  most  part  stakeholders  considered  that  most 

112 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
provisions  identified  as  potentially  requiring  clarification  for  the  purposes  of  the 
consultation  were  already  clear.  This  suggests  that  current  market  activity  is  not 
influenced to any material extent by a lack of clarity, and it has been therefore assumed 
that these measures would not have any impact on the number of services provided or the 
level of traffic carried. 

However,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  streamlining  of  regulatory  processes,  for  example 
the abolition of journey forms or authorisations, could have a significant impact on the 
regulatory  burden.  Therefore  estimates  of  these  have  been  made,  based  on  the 
quantification of the regulatory  burden in  table A.4-2 and based on these values,  it has 
been  estimated  that  the  total  regulatory  burden  on  the  coach  sector  is  €884  million  in 
2015  (with  66.4%  falling  on  operators  and  33.6%  falling  on  government  and/or 
regulatory bodies), rising to €1,228 in 2030.     

Measures for removing restrictions on access to inter-urban markets 
The  assumptions  used  in  estimating  the  impact  of  each  of  the  options  covering 
clarification and uniform business conditions are set out in the table below. 

Table A.4-4: Assumptions used in estimating impacts of PO1, PO2 and PO3 

Option  Measure 

C1: clarify definition of ‘international 
carriage’ 

Key assumptions 

No quantifiable impact 

C2: clarify definition of ‘regular services’ 

No quantifiable impact 

C3: clarify provisions relating to own-
account operations 

No quantifiable impact 

C4: abolish journey forms 

PO1 

C5: clarify provisions relating to cabotage 

U1: extend scope of Regulation 1073/2009 
to include national services 

U2: require that carriers from all Member 
States have access to national markets 

U3: set common requirements for 
protection of public service contracts 

As for PO2 (except U3) 

PO2 

U4: action to protect public service 
contracts limited to contracts for services in 
urban centres, conurbations and the 
surrounding areas 

PO3 

As for PO2 

A reduction in the administrative costs 
associated with journey forms 

Not modelled due to lack of data on 
cabotage services 

An increase in the level transport activity 
based on the average growth rate of 
Germany and the UK in the years following 
liberalisation, adjusted downwards by a 
factor of a half. 

An increase in the level transport activity 
based on the average growth rate of 
Germany and the UK in the years following 
liberalisation. Note this uplift is instead, as 
opposed to in addition to, the increase 
described in PO1. 

113 

 
 
 
 
Option  Measure 

Key assumptions 

U5: abolish authorisation procedure 

A reduction in all regulatory costs 
associated with authorisations, based on 
the regulatory cost calculation. 

Source: Steer Davies Gleave 

Measures to facilitate the level playing field for access to terminals 
An  illustrative  calculation  of  the  terminal  capacity  that  might  be  unduly  suppressed 
because of discriminatory behaviour is provided in Chapter 3 of the support study. This 
suggested  that  an  additional  400  million  vehicle  kilometres  might  be  accommodated  if 
publicly  owned  capacity  were  available  on  a  non-discriminatory  basis  and  managed 
efficiently.  This  is  used  as  a  basis  for  estimating  the  effects  of  a  one-off  and  sustained 
uplift in capacity as a result of introducing measures to ensure a level playing field in the 
allocation of terminal capacity. 

It  should  be  noted  that  the  impact  of  this  group  of  measures  might  be  expected  to 
increase over the long term, enabling more effective use of a growing volume of terminal 
capacity  across  Europe  (i.e.  resulting  in  a  proportionate  increase  in  available  capacity 
rather  than  an  absolute  uplift).  However,  it  is  also  possible  that  investment  in  terminal 
capacity over the time horizon up to 2035 relieves the problem of discrimination as well 
as more general capacity constraints, and that the impact of measures designed to address 
discrimination  becomes  less  over  time.  The  assumption  of  a  one-off,  absolute  and 
sustained uplift in available capacity can be regarded as conservative. Sensitivity analysis 
has been undertaken to estimate the effects of alternative assumptions. 

In the table below, a description of all the assumptions used in calculating the impact of 
measures related to terminal access are provided.     

Table A.4-5: Assumptions used in estimating impacts of PO4 and PO5 

Option  Measure 
PO4 

T1: define a ‘coach terminal’ so that it can 
be differentiated from stopping points/on-
street stops 
T2: establish guidelines/recommendations to 
encourage terminal operators to provide 
access on fair and non-discriminatory terms 
T3: Recommend publication of rules for 
allocating capacity and current 
timetable/capacity allocation 

PO5 

T4: require the European Commission to 
submit a report on market opening 
T1: define a ‘coach terminal’ so that it can 
be differentiated from stopping points/on-
street stops 

Key assumptions 
No quantifiable impact in itself but essential 
to enable other measures 

An increase in transport activity adjusted 
downwards by a factor of a half. 

An increase in the administrative costs 
associated with undertaking five terminal 
capacity studies (Based on the EU average 
wage and the assumption that one study 
takes 100 hours). 
No quantifiable impact  

No quantifiable impact in itself but essential 
to enable other measures 

114 

 
 
T5: Require Member states to grant access 
to terminals on fair and non-discriminatory 
terms 

An increase in transport activity. Note this 
increase is instead of, as opposed to in 
addition to, the uplift described in PO1. 
In addition, an increase in the administrative 
costs associated with undertaking one 
additional terminal capacity study. (Based 
on the EU average wage and the assumption 
that one study takes 100 hours). 

Source: Steer Davies Gleave 

115 

 
 
Assessment of primary impacts 

Changes to the level of transport activity 
A  summary  of  the  impact  of  each  policy  option  on  transport  activity  is  shown  in  table 
A.4-6.  For  policy  options  relating  to  market  liberalisation,  the  annual  growth  rates  of 
passenger  kilometres  and  vehicle  kilometres  have  been  multiplied  by  a  value  derived 
using the methodology described in the section 3 of the support study. For policy options 
relating to terminal access, the level of transport activity has been uplifted based on the 
methodology described below: 

The  illustrative  calculation  of  the  potential  size  of  the  discrimination  problem  is  based  on  the  National 
Express data. The calculation is based on the following assumptions: 
•  60% of terminals used by coach operators across Europe are publicly owned (equivalent to 18 out of 

30 in the National Express example); 

•  of these, some 11% (approximately equivalent to 2 of 18) are managed by incumbent operators; 
•  publicly owned terminals that are managed by incumbent operators are more likely to be subject to 
discrimination than those managed by the local authority itself (although no suggestion is made that 
the  two  privately  managed  terminals  included  in  the  National  Express  data  are  subject  to  such 
discrimination); and 
the proportion of vehicle kilometres operated into such terminals  is equivalent to the proportion of 
such terminals in the total (at both the Member State and European level). 

• 

Table A.4-6: Impact of policy options on transport activity 

Option  Applies to 

Impact of policy option 

Growth 
multiplier/ 
Activity uplift 

Growth uplift 
assumption 

PO1 

PO2 

PO3 

Non-
liberalised 
Member States 

Growth rate multiplied by 
ratio in the 6 years following 
implementation. * 

Non-
liberalised 
Member States 

Non-
liberalised 
Member States 

PO4 

All Member 
States 

Level of activity uplifted in 
all years following 
implementation. 

PO5 

All Member 
States 

116 

10.1 

20.1 

20.1 

0.9% 

1.7% 

Based on method 
described in section 3 of 
the support study, dived by 
two. 

Average of DE-UK growth 
ratio described section 3 of 
the support study 

Based on method 
described from section 3 
of the support study dived 
by two. 

Based on method 
described from section 3 
of the support study. 

 
 
 * In Member States where the baseline growth rate in the six years following liberalisation is negative, we have 
applied the growth multiplier to the EU average growth rate in those years. Source: Steer Davies Gleave 

The method used to estimate the baseline level of each remaining measure of transport 
activity, and the assumed impact of the policy options on each remaining measure, are 
shown in table A.4-4. 

Table A.4-7: Transport activity impact methodology 

1.1 

Measure of transport activity 

Estimation method 

Baseline level 

Impact of policy options 

Passenger kilometres 

PRIMES-TREMOVE Model 

See table A.4-4 

Vehicle kilometres 

PRIMES-TREMOVE Model 

See table A.4-4 

Passenger journeys 

International activity 

𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑗𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ

Discussed above in the section 
titled Transport Activity  

Grows with passenger 
kilometres 

Cabotage 

Unable to estimate due to lack of evidence 

Average load factor 

Number of services 

𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠 ∗

Discussed above in the section 
titled Transport Activity 

Grows with passenger 
kilometres 

Average journey length 

Based on sample of routes 

Assumed to remain constant 

*Assuming 50 seats to coach, based on evidence from Germany. Source: Steer Davies Gleave assumptions 

Regulatory costs for operators and national authorities 
The  regulatory  activates  assumed  to  be  undertaken  by  both  operators  and  authorities 
under each policy option are shown in table A.4-8. The method used to calculate the total 
cost  of  each  of  these  activates  is  consistent  with  the  method  used  in  the  baseline 
described above. The cost of a terminal capacity study is estimated using the EU average 
wage and the assumption that one study takes 100 hours based on Steer Davies Gleave’s 
experience of undertaking such studies. 

Table A.4-8: Impact of policy options on regulatory activity 

Type of Regulatory cost 
Journey Forms 
Authorisations 
Licences 
Number of Terminal Capacity Studies 

Baseline 
√ 
√ 
√ 
- 

Source: Steer Davies Gleave assumptions 

PO1 

PO2 

PO3 

PO4 

√ 
√ 
- 

√ 
√ 
- 

√ 
- 

√ 
√ 
√ 
5 

PO5 
√ 
√ 
√ 
6 

117 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As with the baseline, regulatory costs grow throughout the assessment period in line with 
the level of transport activity. 

Assessment of secondary impacts 

Overall level of employment 
Increases  to  the  level  of  employment  in  the  coach  industry,  arising  from  the 
implementation  of  the  policy  options,  are  in  proportion  to  increases  in  the  level  of 
transport  activity.  The  employment  in  the  coach  industry  in  year  n  will  be  calculated 
using the following formula: 

𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑌𝑛   =
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑌𝑛 × (1 + ∆%𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑌𝑛)  

Share of road passenger transport in modal split 
Increases  in  the  level  of  coach  transport  activity  will  lead  to  decreases  in  the  level  of 
transport  activity  on  competing  transport  modes.  The  proportion  of  new  passenger 
demand extracted from each competing transport mode is based on the experience of the 
German market, and is shown in table A.4-9. 

Table A.4-9: Demand extraction rates used in impact assessment 

Source of new coach demand 
Generated 
Car 
Rail 
Air 

Demand extraction rate 

10.0% 
40.0% 
46.0% 
4.0% 

Source: BAG (Marktanalyse des Fernbuslinienverkehrs, 2014) 

On  each  competing  transport  mode,  the  decrease  in  transport  activity,  arising  from  an 
increase in coach transport activity, has been calculated using the following formula:  

𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑌𝑛  =
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑌𝑛 − (∆𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑌𝑛 ×
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)  

Therefore,  the  share  of each  transport  mode  in  year  n  is  calculated  using  the  following 
formula: 

𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑌𝑛   =

𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑌𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑌𝑛   

Externalities 
Changes to the level of transport activity, for both coach transport and competing modes, 
imply  changes  to  the  level  of  externalities  produced  by  each  transport  mode.  The 
externalities considered include: 

118 

 
 
 
 
  Congestion; 
  Accidents; 
  Carbon emissions; 
  Air pollution; and 
  Energy use. 

The  formula  used  to  calculate  the  net  change  to  the  level  of  each  externality,  based on 
changes to transport activity and the demand extraction rates in table A.4-9, is as follows: 

𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑌𝑛   = (∆ 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑌𝑛
× 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑌𝑛)
− (∆ 𝐶𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑌𝑛
× 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑌𝑛)
− (∆ 𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑌𝑛
× 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑌𝑛)
− (∆ 𝐴𝑖𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑌𝑛 × 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑖𝑟 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒

𝑌𝑛

) 

The sources and assumptions used to calculate the net change in each externality are 
shown in table A.4-10. 

Table A.4-10: Externality assumptions used in impact assessment  

Externality 
Congestion 

Accidents 

Source 
PRIMES-TREMOVE 
model 
PRIMES-TREMOVE 
model 

€ Million 

Unit of measurement 
€ Million 

Other assumptions 

CO2 emissions 

PRIMES-TREMOVE 
model 

€ Million 

Air pollution 

Energy consumption 

PRIMES-TREMOVE 
model 
PRIMES-TREMOVE 
model 

€ Million 

Tonnes of oil equivalent 
(‘000s) 

Source: Steer Davies Gleave assumptions 

Performance of other modes of transport 
To assess the impact of the policy options on the performance of other transport modes, 
the  lost  revenue  (separately  for  rail  and  air)  arising  from  the  decrease  in  the  level  of 
transport activity have been estimated based on the demand extraction rates in table A.4-

119 

Cost of air and rail 
accidents are not 
considered. 
Carbon emissions have 
been monetised using 
the projected ETS 
carbon price 

 
 
 
 
 
9  to  calculate  the  fall  in  revenue,  for  both  air  and  rail,  the  following  formula  has  been 
used: 

𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑌𝑛   = ∆ 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑌𝑛

× 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠 

The unit cost per passenger kilometre for passengers, for each transport mode, has been 
taken from the PRIMES-TREMOVE model. 

Access for low-income, rural and the elderly consumers 
To  assess  the  impact  of  the  policy  options  on  the  low-income,  rural  and  the  elderly 
consumers, the results from the Eurobarometer survey have been used that estimate the 
proportion of passenger demand that falls into each of these social groups.  

The  level  of  transport  activity,  for  each  of  these  social  groups  in  year  n,  has  been 
calculated using the following formula: 

𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠  𝑌𝑛   = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑌𝑛

× % 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 

SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 

As explained above, a number of assumptions have been used for evaluating the impacts 
of the policy options. To test the sensitivity and robustness of the results, the growth rate 
multipliers and transport activity uplifts described in table A.4-6 for each policy option 
have been adjusted. The sensitivity adjustments applied to each set of options is shown in 
table A.4-11; for each set of options both a low and high scenario has been tested.  

Table A.4-11: Sensitivity analysis adjustments 

Low case 

Assumption 

Options 

Growth 
multiplier/ 
Activity 
uplift 

High case 

Assumption 

Growth 
multiplier/ 
Activity 
uplift 

PO1 

PO2 

PO3 

PO4 

PO5 

6.7 

5% 

UK growth multiplier 
described in section 3 
of support study 

Estimate of lower 
bound of terminal 
capacity increase 

33.6 

48% 

DE growth multiplier 
described in section 3 of 
support study 

Upper bound of terminal 
capacity increase described 
in section 3 of support study 

Source: Steer Davies Gleave assumptions 

120 

 
 
The results and relative impact of each policy option were not materially affected by the 
low and high cases used in the sensitivity analysis. 

121 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 5: DESCRIPTION OF THE ROAD INITIATIVES – THE ‘BIG PICTURE’. 

INTRODUCTION 

The  Road  Initiatives,  which  are  all  REFIT  Initiatives,  are  fully  inscribed  in  the  overall 
priorities  of  the  Juncker  Commission  notably  under  the  'A  deeper  and  fairer  Internal 
Market' and the 'Climate and Energy Union'. 

The  Communications  from  the  Commission  on  'Upgrading  the  Single  Market:  more 
opportunities  for  people  and  business'  (COM(2015)  550  final)  and  on  'A  Framework 
Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy' 
(COM(2015) 80 final) explicitly refer to the Road Initiatives. 

The table below presents the link between the Juncker priorities, the Impact Assessments 
prepared for the Road Initiatives and the related legislative acts. 

Priorities 
A  deeper  and 
fairer 
Internal 
Market 

Climate 
Energy Union 

and 

IAs 

Legislation 

Hired vehicles 
Access  to  the  haulage  market 
and to the Profession  
aspects:  Driving/rest 
Social 
and 
time,  working 
enforcement 
measures 
(tachograph), Posting of workers 
and enforcement measures 
Access  to  the  market  of  buses 
and coaches 

time 

Directive 2006/1 
Regulation 1071/2009 & 1072/2009  

Regulation  561/2006  and  Regulation 
165/2014  
Directive  96/71,  Directive  2014/67, 
Directive  2002/15  and  Directive 
2006/22  
Regulation 1073/2009 

Eurovignette 
European  Electronic  Toll  Service 
(EETS) 

Directive 1999/62 
Directive 2004/52 
Commission decision 2009/750 

Moreover,  the  transport  strategy  of  the  Commission  as  laid  down  in  the  White  Paper 
"Roadmap  to  a  Single  European  Transport  Area  -  Towards  a  competitive  and  resource 
efficient  transport  system"  adopted  on  28  March  2011,  included  references  to  the  road 
initiatives83.   

THE EU ROAD TRANSPORT MARKET 

Road transport is the most prominent mode of transport. In 2014, almost three quarters 
(72%) of all inland freight transport activities in the EU were by road. On the passenger 

83   More specifically in the Annex under points 6, 11 and 39 

122 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
side, the relative importance of road as mode of transport is even greater: on land, road 
accounts  for  more  than  90%  of  all  passenger-kilometres:  83%  for  passenger  cars  and 
almost 9% for buses and coaches. 

Almost half of the 10.6 million people employed in the transport and storage sector in the 
EU are active in carrying goods or passengers by road. Road freight transport services for 
hire  and  reward  employs  around  3  million  people,  while  the  road  passenger  transport 
sector  (buses,  coaches  and  taxis)  adds  another  2  million  employed  persons  (a  third  of 
which are taxi drivers). This corresponds to more than 2.2% of total employment in the 
economy  and  does  not  include  own  account  transport  which  in  road  freight  transport 
alone provides employment for 500,000 to 1 million additional people. 

There are about 600,000 companies in the EU whose main business is the provision of 
road  freight  transport  services  for  hire  and  reward.  Every  year,  they  generate  a  total 
turnover  of  roughly  €300  billion,  around  a  third  of  which  is  value  added  by  the  sector 
(the  rest  being  spent  on  goods  and  services  from  other  sectors  of  the  economy).  The 
provision  of  road  freight  transport  services  for  hire  and  reward  is  hence  an  important 
economic sector in its own right, generating almost 1% of GDP. 

In road passenger transport, there are about 50,000 (mostly) bus and coach operators (of 
which  12,000  provide  urban  and  suburban  services,  (some  including  tram  and 
underground)) and around 290,000 taxi companies in the EU. Together, they generate a 
turnover of €110 billion. Without taxis, total turnover of the sector is around €90 billion 
per year, of which some €50 billion is value added. 

WHY IS THERE A NEED FOR ACTION? 

Road  transport  is  for  a  large  part  international  (around  34%84)  and  this  share  is 
increasing,  which  explains  the  need  for  a  common  EU  legal  framework  to  ensure 
efficient,  fair  and  sustainable  road  transport.  The  framework  covers  the  following 
aspects:   

 

Internal market rules governing access for operators to the markets of freight and 
passengers 

  Social  rules  on  driving/rest  time  and  working  time  to  ensure  road  safety  and 

respect of working conditions and fair competition 

  Rules implementing the user and polluter pays principles in the context of road 

charging  

  Digital  technologies  to  enable  interoperable  tolling  services  in  the  EU  and  to 

enforcement EU rules (e.g. the tachograph) 

It is clear that current rules are no longer fit for purpose. Member States are increasingly 
adopting  own  national  rules  to  fight  "social  dumping"  while  acknowledging  that  their 
actions have adverse effects on the internal market. Moreover, public consultations have 
shown  a  strong  support  for  EU  action  to  solve  current  issues  in  road  transport.  For 
example: 

84   Statistical Pocketbook 2016, EU Transport in figures 

123 

 
 
                                                 
•  Severe competition in the road transport sector has led many operators to establish in 
low-wage countries without necessarily having any business activity in these countries. 
There is a lack a clear criteria and enforcement mechanisms to ensure that such 
establishment practises are genuine, and that there is a level playing for operators. 
•  Measures on Posting of Workers implemented in 4 Member States (DE, FR, AT and 
IT) are all different and obviously from other Member States which have not 
implemented any measure to implement the minimum wage to road transport on their 
territory. Stakeholders ask for a common set of (simplified) enforcement rules.  
•  CO2 emissions from road transport represent a large share of total emission and the 
share is set to rise in the absence of common action (at EU 28 level), which is needed to 
contribute substantially to the commitment under the Paris Agreement and to the 2030 
goals.  
•  Due to the increasingly more and more hyper-mobile nature of the sector, there is a 
need for common and enforceable rules for workers.  All workers should benefit from the 
same level of protection in all Member States to avoid social dumping and unfair 
competition between hauliers. This is currently not the case. 

WHAT ARE THE MAIN PROBLEMS? 

The  Internal  market  for  road  transport  is  not  complete.  It  is  our  assessment  that  the 
current situation does not allow to exploit the full potential of transport services 

  e.g. current rules on bus/coach services or the rules on hired vehicles are still very 
restrictive. Some Member States have decided to unilaterally open their market, 
which has led to a fragmentation of the EU internal market.  

Many  rules  are  unclear,  therefore  leading  to  different  levels  of  implementation  by 
Member States and problems of enforcement: 

  e.g. on cabotage where all stakeholders agree that current rules are unenforceable. 

There  are  allegations  of  'social  dumping'  and  unfair  competition  in  the  road  transport 
sector.  This has led to a division between East and West in Europe.  As a consequence, 
several Member States have decided to take national measures, which might jeopardize 
the unity of the EU market for road transport:  

  e.g. minimum wage rules in DE, FR, IT and AT coupled with disproportionate 

administrative requirements ;  prohibition of drivers taking the weekly rest in the 
cabin of vehicles in FR and BE.  

Environmentally, we have made good progress in reducing pollutants from heavy goods 
vehicles but our legal framework currently does not address the issue of climate change 
(CO2). At the same time, the infrastructure quality is degrading in the EU although user 
charges and tolls are levied on most motorways and other TEN-T roads. 

Electronic  tolling  systems  in  the  EU  are  still  far  from  being  interoperable,  despite  the 
primary objective of EU legislation of establishing "one contract/one on-board unit/one 
invoice"  for  the  users.  More  generally,  the  benefits  of  digitalisation  are  still  under-

124 

 
 
exploited in road transport, in particular to improve control of EU legislation (e.g. many 
Member States do not currently allow the use of electronic waybills).  

OPTIONS AND MAIN IMPACTS 

To  achieve  these  objectives,  all  IAs  will  consider  a  range  of  different  options,  which 
ultimately should improve the efficiency, fairness and sustainability of road transport. 

The IA on Hired Vehicles will assess options aiming at removing outdated restrictions on 
the use of hired goods vehicles and thus at opening up new possibilities for operators and 
leasing/hiring companies alike. More flexibility for the hiring of vehicles should lead to 
more efficient operations, higher productivity and less negative environmental impacts as 
fleet renewal will be promoted. 

The IA on Access to the haulage market and to the Profession will study various options 
to  ensure  effective  and  consistent  monitoring  and  enforcement  of  the  existing  rules  in 
Member States and to ensure coherent interpretation and application of the rules. Three 
broad groups of potential measures will be assessed, namely measures liable to improve 
enforcement,  measures  ensuring  simplification  and  clarification  of  current  rules  and 
measures reinforcing the cooperation between Member States. 

The  IA  on  Access  to  the  market  of  buses  and  coaches  will  assess  options  aiming  at 
improving  the  performance  of  coach  and  bus  services  vis-a-vis  other  transport  modes, 
especially  private  car  and  further  developing  the  internal  market  for  coach  and  bus 
services. This should lead to a reduction of the adverse environmental and climate effects 
connected  with  mobility.  Various  policy  options  will  be  considered  for  creating  more 
uniform business conditions and also a level playing field for access to terminals.  

The  IA  on  Social  aspects  of  road  transport  will  study  options  aiming  at  ensuring  the 
effectiveness of the original system put in place and therefore contributing to the original 
policy objectives, i.e.: (1) to ensure a level playing field for drivers and operators, (2) to 
improve and harmonise working conditions and (3) to improve road safety. An additional 
objective,  in  the  context  of  the  implementation  and  enforcement  of  the  provisions  on 
posting of workers, is to ensure the right balance between the freedom to provide cross-
border transport services and the protection of the rights of highly mobile road transport 
workers.    In  this  perspective,  three  broad  groups  of  measures  will  be  analysed:  1. 
Simplification,  update  and  clarification  of  existing  rules,  2. More  efficient  enforcement 
and cooperation between Member States and 3. Improved working conditions of drivers 
and fair competition between operators. 

The  IA  on  the  Eurovignette  Directive  will  assess  options  to  promote  financially  and 
environmentally  sustainable  and  socially  equitable  (road)  transport  through  a  wider 
application  of  the  'user  pays'  and  'polluter  pays'  principles.  A  number  of  different 
measures  and  their  variants  aiming  at  correcting  price  signals  in  freight  and  passenger 
transport will be considered in order to address the issues identified. The policy options 
range from minimum adjustments to the Directive required for improving its coherence 
and addressing all policy objectives, through the promotion of low carbon (fuel efficient) 
vehicles and the phasing out of time-based charging schemes (vignettes) for trucks to the 
optimisation of tolls for all vehicles. 

125 

 
 
The  IA  on  EETS  (European  Electronic  Tolling  Service)  will  study  options  aiming  at 
reducing the cost and the burden linked to the collection of electronic tolls in the EU  – 
for  users  and  for  society  at  large.  It  will  equally  seek  to  improve  the  framework 
conditions  for  the  faster  and  more  widely  provision  of  an  interoperable  European 
Electronic  Toll  Service.  Different  policy  options  will  be  considered,  including  a  non-
legislative  approach  (facilitating  exchange  of  best  practice,  co-financing  EETS-related 
projects) and a legislative review. 

These  policy  options  and  their  impacts  will  be  presented  and  assessed  in  detail  in  the 
respective IAs. 

EXPECTED SYNERGIES OF THE PACKAGE 

The  different  initiatives  constitute  a  coherent  set  of  measures  which  will  jointly 
contribute to an efficient, environmentally and socially sustainable road transport sector.  
It is expected that the combined impacts will be more than the addition of the impacts of 
each initiative, meaning that the initiatives are complementary. Some examples of such 
synergies are provided below. 

  Current restrictions on cabotage are unclear and therefore lead to illegal cabotage.  
These  illegal  activities  are  closely  linked  with  the  fact  that  transport  operators 
established  in  low-wage  countries  exert  unfair  competition  via  'social  dumping' 
and  not  respecting  the  rights  of  workers,  who  often  are  staying  in  their  trucks 
abroad  for  longer  periods.  This  illustrates  the  clear  link  between  compliance  of 
internal market rules and social/fair competition aspects of road transport, which 
are all addressed by the road initiatives and which cannot be dealt with separately. 

  When  assessing  the  laws  applying  a  national  minimum  wage  to  road  transport, 
Member  States  explained  the  Commission  that  one  of  the  reasons  for  adopting 
these  national  measures  is  to  fight  the  phenomenon  of  fake  establishments  and 
“letterbox”  companies  in  low-wage  countries.    Tackling  the  issue  of  posting  of 
workers  in  road  transport  goes  therefore  hand  in  hand  with  the  issue  of 
establishment of road transport operators, which again illustrates the link between 
internal market and social aspects of road transport. 

  Promoting  interoperability  of  electronic  tolls  systems  will  lead  to  lower 
implementation costs of such systems by Member States.  We can expect that this 
will incentivise Member States to put in place distance-based tolls, which better 
reflect  the  user  and  polluter  pays  principles.  This  shows  the  close  link  between 
the Eurovignette and EETS initiatives. 

  Seeking  to  improve  the  performance  of  coach  and  bus  services  vis-a-vis  other 
transport modes will inevitably  lead discussion on a level playing  between  road 
and rail services. Current EU legislation provides that rail users shall pay for the 

126 

 
 
 
use  of  infrastructure,  while  it  is  not  currently  the  case  for  buses  and  coaches 
which are outside the scope of the Eurovignette directive. The inclusion of buses 
and coaches in the Eurovignette initiative to ensure that they pay a fair price for 
using  the  road  infrastructure  is  therefore  essential  and  will  ensure  overall 
coherence. 

  The  initiative  on  hired  vehicles  is  in  particular  related  to  the  initiatives  on  the 
access to the market and to the profession, all having the aim of establishing clear 
and  common  rules  for  a  well-functioning  and  efficient  Internal  Market  for  road 
haulage: some of them by ensuring a good functioning of the market of transport 
services, others by ensuring the best use of the fleet of vehicles. 

127 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 6: DISCARDED POLICY MEASURES 

The  policy  measures  were  screened  to  identify  the  most  viable  options  prior  to 
conducting an in-depth analysis of the impacts of the retained policies. The criteria used 
for  screening  the  viability  of  the  measures  were  legal  feasibility,  technical  feasibility, 
previous  policy  choices,  coherence  with  other  EU  policy  objectives,  effectiveness  and 
efficiency, proportionality, political feasibility and relevance.  

The following policy measure was discarded.  

Objective 

SO3 

Policy 
measure 
T7 

Description 

Require  separation  of  operation  of  transport  operators  and 
control  of  terminals.  This  measure  would  require  that,  if  a  road 
passenger  transport  operator  is  a  public  entity,  a  distinct  public 
authority must exercise control over terminal infrastructure. 

Policy  measure  T7  provided  for  the  separation  of  terminal  infrastructure  managers  and 
road passenger transport operators to ensure their mutual independence. It required that if 
a  road  passenger  transport  operator  is  a  public  entity,  a  distinct  public  authority  must 
exercise  control  over  terminal  infrastructure.    This  measure  was  discarded  for  the 
following reasons: 

it  appears  relatively  inefficient  and  ineffective,  in  that  it  would  require  significant 
changes to ownership and management arrangements at terminal locations across the 
EU.  The  likely  results  are  at  best  unclear  and  there  would  be  substantial  effort 
required to ensure compliance; 
imposing  such  a  separation,  in  advance  of  identifying  the  scale  or  materiality  of 
discrimination  by  public  entities  controlled  both  transport  operations  and  terminals, 
would not be proportionate; and 
it may not be politically feasible, because the requirement for enforced separation or 
road  passenger  transport  operations  and  terminal  control  would  apply  even  at 
terminals which may never be served by regular coach services, particularly on small 
islands. 

 

 

 

 

Policy measures U3 to U5 on market access also had to be screened as there were many 
different  types  of  approaches  that  could  be  taken  under  each  measure.  These  three 
measures  were  divided  into  three  approaches  to  investigate  simpler,  faster  and  cheaper 
approaches  which  could  be  used  as  common  requirements  for  the  protection  of  public 
service contracts as detailed in table A6-1 below. 

128 

 
 
 
 
 
Table A6-0-1: Measures U3 to U5 and protecting PSCs 

:
1
h
c
a
o
r
p
p
A

s
e
c
i
v
r
e
s
g
n
i
t
s
i
x
e
d
n
a
d
e
s
o
p
o
r
p
n
o
d
e
s
a
B

:
2
h
c
a
o
r
p
p
A

e
c
i
v
r
e
s
d
e
s
o
p
o
r
p
n
o
d
e
s
a
B

:
3
h
c
a
o
r
p
p
A

s
r
o
t
c
a
f

r
e
h
t
o
n
o
d
e
s
a
B

Method 

Detailed analysis of 
impact, as required 
to refuse 
authorisations 

Services may not 
compete with a rail 
public service 
contracts 

Services may not 
compete with any 
public service 
contract 

Service may not 
carry passengers 
between two points 
in the same 
administrative area 

Service may not 
carry passengers less 
than a certain 
distance 

Services must have 
a minimum distance 
between stops 
Service must not 
compete with a 
public service 
contract on price 
Service must not 
compete with a 
public service 
contract on 
frequency 
Service must not 
compete with a 
public service 
contract on booking 
conditions 

Example 
Article  8(4)(d) 
of  Regulation 
1073/2009 

Issues 
Might  be  complex, 
slow and expensive 

Germany 2013  Sensitive 

to 

rail 

timetable change 

Sensitive  to  public 
service 
contract 
timetable change 

Different  Member 
States have different 
internal subdivisions 

to 

Sweden 
2012 
France  2011-
2015 
France 2016 

to 
UK 

Sweden 
2012, 
1980, 
Germany 
2013,  France 
2015 

Areas  might  often 
be  new  and  wholly 
artificial 

Might be difficult to 
enforce 

Might  prevent  outer 
urban  pick-up  and 
set-down 
Comprehensive 
study  found  coach 
costs  of  €2.20  per 
coach-kilometre 
Limits  benefits,  can 
be 
by 
evaded 
operator collusion 

Taxis 
segmented 
into  “on  demand” 
and “pre-booked” 

Details 

the 

that 

service 

the  basis  of  a  detailed 
“on 
analysis 
service 
concerned would seriously affect 
the  viability  of  a  comparable 
service  covering  one  or  more 
public 
contracts 
conforming  to  a  Community law 
on the direct sections concerned” 
journey  must  exceed  a 
Rail 
certain time. 
Rail  journey  must  be  circuitous, 
exceeding  distance  by  straight 
line by a certain factor. 
Public  service  contract  journey 
must exceed a certain time. 

Public  service  contract  journey 
must  be  circuitous,  exceeding 
distance  by  straight  line  by  a 
certain factor. 
Area is a County 

Area is a Region 

is  a  metropolitan  or 

Area 
municipal area 
Area is chosen by Member State, 
but  may  not  exceed  a  certain 
size, such as no two points in the 
area  more  than  50  kilometres 
apart. 
Tickets  must  be 
travel 
between locations separated by a 
certain  distance  by  road  or  in  a 
straight line. 

for 

stops  must 

be 
Successive 
separated by a certain distance by 
road or in a straight line. 
Minimum coach fare. 

Maximum frequency. 

Minimum pre-booking time. 

Taxis 

129 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on proposed and existing services 

Under  the  approach  to  protecting  PSCs  based  on  proposed  and  existing  services  three 
different methods to protect PSCs were considered.  

  Detailed  analysis  of  impact.  This  method  is  similar  to  the  method  used  in  the 
Regulation to protect PSCs. It is considered slow and expensive by stakeholders 
and there is no transparency on comparable PSCs. 

  Services may not compete with a rail PSC. Examples include rail journeys must 
exceed a certain time or must be circuitous, exceeding a straight line by a certain 
distance.  This  method  of  protecting  is  particularly  sensitive  to  rail  timetable 
changes. 

  Services  may  not  compete  with  any  public  service  contract.  Similar  to  the  rail 
method above but includes any PSC. This method is particularly sensitive to PSC 
timetable change 

These  three  methods  create  the  problem  that  an  applicant  proposing  a  new  service 
must wait to find out with what existing or future PSC a competent authority says it is 
“comparable”. Also it does not make the authorisation procedure faster or simpler for 
operators and competent authorities still have to conduct a detailed analysis for each 
new  application  if  they  think  that  it  may  compromise  the  economic  viability  of  a 
PSC. 

Based on proposed service 

Under  the  approach  to  protecting  PSCs  based  on  proposed  service  three  different 
methods to protect PSCs were considered. 

  Services may not carry passengers between two points in the same administrative 
area. This method has been employed in Sweden, France and the UK. However, 
the internal subdivisions of the Member States may be of different types (Länder, 
Provinces,  Regions,  Counties,  Departments,  Cities,  Communes)  or  sizes.  This 
could  mean,  for  example,  market  entry  in  Member  States  with  large  internal 
subdivisions  was  much  more  restricted  that  entry  in  Member  States  with  small 
internal subdivisions85. 

  Service may not carry passengers less than a certain distance. Using this method 
tickets  must  be  for  travel  between  locations  separated  by  a  certain  distance  by 
road  or  in  a  straight  line.  It  has  been  employed  in  the  UK  and  Sweden  and  is 
employed  in  Germany  and  France  but  may  be  difficult  to  enforce.  If  fares  are 

85  In  principle,  a  solution  to  this  problem  would  be  to  specify  the  maximum  size  of  areas  within  which 
passengers  could  not  be  carried,  for  example  with  a  requirement  that  no  two  points  in  such  an  area 
could be more than 100, 50 or 25 kilometres apart in a straight line. A potential disadvantage of this 
approach is that, to comply with the regulation, some Member States would need to introduce new and 
artificial subdivisions, which might bear no relation to existing administrative boundaries or transport 
demand. 

130 

 
 
 
                                                 
sufficiently  low,  passengers  may  “underride”  on  tickets  which  are  printed  as 
being valid for longer journeys86,87. 

  Services  must  have  a  minimum  distance  between  stops.  Under  this  method 
successive stops would have to be separated by a certain distance by road or in a 
straight line. This could be easier to monitor than the method on carriage over a 
certain  distance,  as  it  would  only  require  checks  on  where  the  bus  or  coach 
stopped, rather than where individual passengers boarded and alighted. However, 
we are not aware of any examples of this approach being adopted. It might also 
make  it  difficult  to  serve  two  locations  in  the  same  urban  area  to  provide 
passengers with a choice of pick-up and set-down points. 

Based on other factors 

Three other methods to protecting PSCs which do not rely on the locations of the points 
served were considered. 

  Service  must  not  compete  with  a  public  service  contract  on  price.  Under  this 
method a minimum fare would be introduced to ensure that coach services did not 
undercut local PSCs. However, we have identified fares for long-distance coach 
travel  as  low  as  €0.60  (actually  £0.50,  in  the  UK)  if  booked  far  enough  in 
advance:  this  appears  to  be  a  commercially  legitimate  means  of  filling  capacity 
which would not otherwise be used. A minimum fare, unless set very low, might 
deprive  operators  of  a  significant  part  of  their  revenue.  More  widely,  it  would 
limit their ability to offer very low prices to passengers if they wished to do so. 
  Service must not compete with a public service contract on frequency. Under this 
method a maximum frequency would be introduced, such as limiting services to a 
certain  number  per  day,  or  specifying  a  minimum  interval  between  successive 
services. However, there is a concern that it could merely result in two or more 
operators,  whether  in  collusion  or  not,  operating  on  the  same  route  in  a  way 
which offered a frequent overall service. 

  Service  must  not  compete  with  a  public  service  contract  on  booking  conditions. 
Under  this  method  a  minimum  pre-booking  time  would  build  on  the  common 
practice of allowing discounts for advance tickets for travel by air or rail88. With 

86  “Under-riding”  is  controversial  in  Great  Britain  where,  to  protect  rail  revenue  from  short  journeys, 
promotional  tickets  for  long  journeys  may  not  be  used  for  shorter  journeys.  There  are  frequent 
complaints  that  rail  passengers  who  do  not  understand  these  restrictions  have  been  made  to  pay  a 
penalty for travelling a shorter distance than that specified on their ticket. 

87 Assume a distance threshold of 100 kilometres, and an operator wishing to link two cities A and B, 95 
kilometres apart. It could introduce second stops A’ and B’ in each city, so that the overall route was 
A’ (5 kilometres) A (95 kilometres) B (5 kilometres) B’, and then sell only tickets from “anywhere in 
A  to  anywhere  in  B’”  and  “anywhere  in  B  to  anywhere  in  A’”.  All  the  tickets  would  be  valid  for 
journeys of at least 100 kilometres, but it would be difficult to ensure that they were not used for the 
95-kilometre journey from A to B. 

88  Early  booking  discounts  are  also  often  available  for  events  such  as  conferences.  In  additional, 
promotional  air  and  rail  fares  may  be  offered  in  advance,  such  as  travel  for  Christmas  booked  by 
September. 

131 

 
 
                                                 
many of the new entrant coach operators selling tickets primarily or exclusively 
over the internet, a requirement that tickets were booked at least (say) 24 hours in 
advance might prevent their service being used as an alternative to “turn up and 
go” PSC services, while not unduly affect their business model. 

All the approaches and methods impose the risk that changes to services operated under 
public  service  contracts,  which  might  be  have  the  deliberate  intention  of  preventing 
entry, may mean that a proposed new service is no longer permitted.  

The  approaches  and  methods  to  protect  existing  public  service  contracts,  whether  from 
international,  cabotage  or  national  regular  services,  should  therefore  be based  either  on 
the  characteristics  of  the  proposed  service  or  on  some  other  feature.  Analysis  of 
approaches  and  methods  adopted  to  date  by  Member  States  indicates  that  the  most 
workable  approaches  and  methods  appear  to  require  that  each  passenger  is  carried  a 
minimum distance in a straight line, for which there are past and current precedents of: 

  100 kilometres in France and Sweden; 
  50 kilometres in Germany, and 
  48 and 24 kilometres (30 and 15 miles) in the UK. 

An added benefit of this approach is that the minimum distance carried can be reduced in 
stages,  and  either  competent  authorities  or  individual  Member  States  or  the  EU  can 
liberalise further by setting a lower minimum distance carried. 

A number of stakeholders were concerned that application of a common distance might 
not reflect the different requirements of the Member States and the urban and suburban 
networks  within  them,  which  vary  widely  in  size.  Figure  A6-1  below,  for  example, 
compares the radii of the systems of fare zones in a number of European cities. 

Figure A6-0-1: Measures U3 to U5 - comparison of zonal systems in urban areas 

132 

 
 
Source:  Figure  3.6  of  “Study  on  the  prices  and  quality  of  rail  passenger  services”,  Final 
Report, April 2016 

Some European cities have fares zones extending between an urban centre or conurbation 
into the surrounding area. In the case of Tallinn, for example, the built-up area extends 
only around 15 kilometres from the city centre, but the zonal fares system, at least for rail 
travel, extends over 70 kilometres. 

Figure A6-0-2 compares the regulatory limits on the shortest distance a passenger may be 
carried with an estimate, from Figure A6-0-1, of the effective radius and hence diameter 
of the largest urban area identified in each Member State. 

Figure A6-0-2: Measures U3 to U5 - regulatory limits and diameters of urban areas 

133 

 
 
 
Source: Support Study for the IA for the Revision of Regulation 1073/2009 

The evidence suggests that each Member State has chosen a regulatory distance broadly 
consistent  with  permitting  no  journey  wholly  within  their  largest  suburban  system,  and 
by implication any other suburban system.  

On the basis of the evidence the approach retained for protecting PSCs is based on the 
proposed  service  with  the  method  that  the  service  may  not  carry  passengers  less  than 
100km  by  road.  This  enables  Member  States  to  liberalise  further,  or  to  set  smaller 
distance thresholds if they wish. All other approaches and methods are discarded. 

134 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 7: IMPACTS OF LIBERALISATION ON PSOS 

The IA support study provides evidence from France suggesting that there is demand to 
operate  liberalised  services  carrying  passengers  both  over  and  under  100km  although 
permission  to  operate  the  latter  requires  a  demonstration  that  the  new  service  will  not 
negatively impact the economic balance of the PSC for regional rail services. ARAFER 
have indicated that for services below 100km the link that faces competition is often only 
a small part of a public service. Also, if the link is a very important part of the service, 
then there is often a high level of frequency and the impact of the declared service would 
not be substantial.  

The case study on Spain (see Annex F of IA Support Study) noted that: 

  some regions are islands with no scope for long-distance or international services; 
  all regular services are operated as regional or interregional concessions (F.80); 
  ALSA, owned by National Express, has large shares in the concession market on 

any measure (Figure F.45); and 

  average passenger journey length on interregional concessions has risen from 117 
kilometres in 2000 to 180 kilometres in 2014 (Table F.2). However, we found no 
equivalent information on regional concessions or on individual routes and their 
lengths. 

In the event of market opening, a plausible outcome is that there would be new entry on 
many  interregional  routes  and  on  some  intraregional  routes.  However,  with  the  market 
currently  controlled  through  the  concession  system,  there  is  no  basis  on  which  to 
estimate: 

  what  routes  new  entrants  would  choose  to  operate  commercially,  how  many  of 
them  would  be  identical,  or  similar,  to  existing  concessions,  and  hence  whether 
existing concessions would need to be renewed, and at what subsidy levels; 

  what  fares  new  entrants  would  charge,  and  whether  these  would  be  higher  or 
lower  than  those  currently  set,  or  would  be  extensively  yield-managed  with  a 
range of fares for each journey; or 

  what  levels  of  service,  including  frequency  and  on-board  services,  they  would 

include. 

One  county  in  Sweden  produces  detailed  annual  analysis  of  publically  contracted 
passenger transport  services  indicates  that  only  12.5%  of  revenue  from  PSCs  relates  to 
routes  over  50  kilometres,  and  none  relates  to  routes  more  than  100  kilometres  (the 
longest route within the county is less than 90 kilometres). It is possible to make journeys 
of over 130 kilometres in the county, but there is no publicly contracted service of this 
length. The limited sample of Sweden and France suggests that the actual proportion of 
contracted services over 100 kilometres in some Member States, may be small, because 
such services are dominated by local bus services. Over 60% of all revenue from publicly 
contracted services in the county relates to routes shorter than 20 kilometres.  

135 

 
 
A further study89 drew attention to the recent liberalisation of coach markets in Germany, 
Italy and France and to subsequent reductions in night train services in all three Member 
States, including publicly contracted services in France and Italy. However, rail industry 
stakeholders interviewed for that study did not suggest that coach liberalisation had been 
a direct cause of reductions in night train services. In total, coach liberalisation was cited 
as: 

  a factor in rail closures, but not a dominant or sole cause, by the Bundesamt für 

Güterverkehr in Germany; 

  a  factor  in  falling  rail  demand,  but  not  a  dominant  or  sole  cause,  by  DB  and 

Trenitalia; and 

  a cause of rail fare reductions, by DB alone. 

While  the  study  related  to  night  trains,  which  mainly  carry  passengers  long  distances, 
rather  than  to  bus  and  coach  services  operated  under  public  service  contracts,  we  note 
that  there  were  only  limited  suggestions  by  stakeholders  that  coach  liberalisation  had 
caused contractions in public services. 

89 “Passenger night trains in Europe: the end of the line?”, European Parliament 

136 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
ANNEX 8: CASE STUDIES 

Revision of Regulation 1073/2009 

DG MOVE analysis of possible CO2 impacts  

To illustrate CO2 impacts of a revision of Regulation 1073/2009, DG MOVE has carried 
out  a case study  looking at the connection between  Paris  – Lille, which  was opened  to 
competition as part of the general market opening for coaches in France.  

Facts: 

Passenger  cars  are  by  far  the  largest  emitters  of  CO2  serving  the  connection  between 
Paris  -  Lille  and  are  responsible  for  in  excess  of  65%  of  all  CO2  emissions.  Coaches, 
together with electric trains, transporting passengers collectively are the  lowest emitters 
of  CO2.  As  illustrated  in  the  diagram  below,  coach  transport  has  the  lowest  CO2 
(gram/pass-km) compared to all other modes: 

Source: Bus and coach transport for greening mobility, CE Delft 2011 

Until August 2015, the intercity market in France was strictly regulated and long distance 
coach  services  were  restricted  to  cabotage  as  part  of  an  international  service.  Since 
liberalisation of domestic coach services the coach market has experienced rapid growth. 

The Paris - Lille connection is 225km and is serviced by 4 coach operators (FLEXBUS, 
IDIBUS, MEGABUS, and OUIBUS) with 97 departures and arrivals daily. In addition, 
SNCF  operates  44  train  daily  departures  and  arrivals.    SNCF,  through  its  subsidiary 
OUIBUS, operates 38 of the 97 bus services serving this connection.  

137 

 
 
 
 
 
A typical rail fare would be €40 with a transit time of 1 hour compared to a typical coach 
fare of €15 with a transit time of 3 hours. These differences illustrate the fact that users of 
rail  and  coach  have  very  different  preferences  and  that  the  coach  customer  group  are 
more price conscious and place less value of time. This also explains why SNCF is not 
cannibalising its own rail services when offering parallel coach services.  

The figure below shows that coach has a very low modal share (1.39%) of long distance 
passenger  transport.  Looking  at  the  sources  of  coach  passengers,  i.e.  which  mode 
passengers previously used prior to the market opening in France, the main share came 
from cars (50%), followed by rail (20%) and existing coach services (18%). 

Source: Own calculations 

Analysis of impacts: 

Based on the CO2 emissions per person by mode of transport it can be calculated that the 
introduction of the coach connection between Paris and Lille has reduced transport CO2 
emissions  by  just  over  10,000  tonnes  of  CO2  per  annum.  Moreover,  it  has  resulted  in 
250,000 less car journeys between the cities, thereby reducing also congestion as well as 
air and noise pollution.  

Extrapolating this CO2 saving to the EU would require a more comprehensive study. An 
estimation, however, assuming a similar shift of passengers from long distance car travel 
to coaches for the whole of EU would result in a CO2 saving of 1,618,126 tonnes/year.  

The CO2 saving for the Paris – Lille connection has had little impact on modal shares. 
Looking at rail in particular, the shift of passengers to coach represents 20% of the coach 
modal  share  of  1.39%,  i.e.  0.28%  of  the  total  long-distance  rail  market  share.  SNCF, 
operating around 40% of the coach service between Paris – Lille, can be assumed to have 
regained the same amount of passengers. 

Conclusions:  

138 

 
 
 
The net CO2 effect of the opening of the coach market in France, illustrated by the case 
study Paris – Lille, has been very positive in the sense that this particular connection has 
lowered  total  CO2  emissions  from  transport  by  10,000  tonnes/year  and  reduced  noise 
pollution  and  congestion.  The  potential  CO2  saving  for  the  EU  has  been  tentatively 
estimated to 1,618,216 tonnes. 

Very  importantly,  this  overall  CO2  reduction  has  been  achieved  on  one  of  the  busiest 
interregional  connections  with  the  presence  of  a  high  number  of  parallel  rail  services. 
Considering  that  rail  lines  are  relatively  limited  in  the  EU  (200.000  km)  compared  to 
roads (5 million km), the scope for coach services – without any  parallel rail services – 
is  very  important,  and  such  new  services  would  have  an  even  more  positive  net  CO2 
effect, as travellers currently only have cars as an option. 

The  introduction  of  new  coach  services  have  had  little  impact  on  the  rail  services  in 
France (0.28%), which is supporting learnings from other countries where inter-city rail 
services  and  a  liberalised  long-distance  bus  sector  are  complementary,  and  one  should 
not be considered an alternative to the other. The major share is coming from passenger 
cars, which explains the CO2 savings documented via this case study.  

More  generally,  in  a  recent  fact-finding  study  prepared  for  the  EU  Commission  it  is 
reported that the liberalisation of the international coach market has reduced interurban 
congestion, air and noise pollution and CO2 emissions as a consequence of modal shift 
from cars. Experience across Europe has shown that liberalisation of the domestic coach 
market  results  in  significant  growth  in  passengers  and  rapid  changes  in  service  quality 
and cost. 

A revision of 1073/2009 would – in addition to reducing CO2 emissions - contribute to a 
broader and more uniform provision of coach services, which today mainly are present at 
certain high-volumes links, such as Paris – Lille. By ensuring more harmonised rules, as 
well  as  non-discriminatory  access  to  terminals,  it  would  enable  also  SMEs  to  enter  the 
markets in different countries, which today largely is restricted to main operators and rail 
incumbents  having  the  necessary  capacity  and  resources  to  deal  with  the  high 
administrative burdens. 

Revision of Regulation 1073/2009 

DG MOVE analysis of possible CO2 impacts  

To illustrate CO2 impacts of a revision of Regulation 1073/2009, DG MOVE has carried 
out a case study looking at the connection between London – Birmingham. The route was 
selected as it is part of a network in a more mature market. 

Facts: 

Coach  services  in  the  UK  were  liberalised  in  1980  since  when  coach  companies  have 
been able to operate regular services simply by applying for an operating licence.  

139 

 
 
 
 
The London - Birmingham connection is 200km. On this route passenger cars are by far 
the  largest  emitters  of  CO2  and  are  responsible  for  in  excess  of  80%  of  all  CO2 
emissions. 

The route is serviced by 2 coach operators (National Express and MEGABUS) and on an 
average weekday there are 54 coaches travelling from London to Birmingham. A typical 
coach fare would be €17 with a transit time of 2 hours and 30 mins. The coach operators 
serving this route are part of larger groups that also run rail services in the UK. 

The route is serviced by 3 rail operators (Virgin, Chiltern and Londonmidland) and on an 
average weekday there are 168 trains travelling from London to Birmingham. A typical 
train fare would be €30 with a transit time of 1 hour 43 minutes.  

These  differences  illustrate  that  users  or  rail  and  coach  have  very  different  preferences 
and that the coach customer group are more price conscious and place less value of time.  

The  figure  below  shows  that  coach  serves  a  relatively  low  share  (6%)  of  the  journeys 
between the two cities. However, together with rail, collective transport accounts for 25% 
of the journeys. 

Mode Share 2016  
London to Birmingham   

Car

Rail

Coach

Other

Source: Own calculations 

Analysis of impacts: 

The total volume of passenger traffic on the route has increased by 6.3% between 2008 
and  2016.  Based  on  the  CO2  emissions  per  person  by  mode  of  transport  it  can  be 
calculated that transport CO2 emissions have increased on this route by 5.75% during the 
same period. Car is responsible for 75% of the increase in emissions with rail and coach 
being responsible for 20% and 5% respectively.  

The case study suggests that the opportunity to use collective transport instead of private 
car is helping to avoid CO2 emissions. For coach, in 2016, there were 1.15 million coach 
journeys between the cities. Assuming that 45% of the coach users have access to a car 
then 517,500 more car journeys would have been made which would have contributed to 

140 

 
 
 
103.5  million  passenger  km  and  10.6  thousand  tonnes  of  CO2  compared  with  3.8 
thousand tonnes of CO2 for the same journeys made on bus. 

Actual -v- Potential CO2 emissions by 
coach London - Birmingham  

2

O
C
f
o
)
s
d
n
a
s
u
o
h
t
(

s
e
n
n
o
T

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

10,6 

3,8 

Coach 

Potential emissions: had a car been used for the same journey

Actual emissions: by choosing coach

Conclusions:  

In  this  more  mature  coach  market  CO2  impacts  are  less  significant  as  in  emerging 
markets  as  most  customers  have  already  shifted  to  long  established  services.  However, 
coach  continues  to  make  a  positive  contribution  to  the  decarbonisation  of  transport  by 
providing  an  alternative  to  travelling  by  private  car  which  emits  the  greatest  level  of 
CO2.  The  case  study  shows  that  every  coach  user  with  access  to  a  car who  chooses  to 
travel by coach is helping to avoid CO2 emissions.  

The  avoidance  of  higher  CO2  emissions  on  the  London  –  Birmingham  route  has  been 
achieved on one of the busiest inter-city connections with the presence of a huge number 
of parallel rail services. The growth in the coach services on this route has not resulted in 
any negative impact on the rail services which have grown (>10%) over the past decade. 
Rail  and  coach  continue  to  grow  faster  than  car  and  this  case  study  supports  learnings 
from other countries indicating that inter-city rail services and a liberalised long-distance 
coach sector operate complementary, and one should not be considered an alternative to 
the other.  

141 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
142