COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Action Plan to enhance preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risks
Date: 2017-10-18
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: European security, action programme, biological weapon, chemical weapon, cross-border cooperation, extremism, fight against crime, nuclear weapon, organised crime, terrorism

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 18.10.2017  COM(2017) 610 final   COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Action Plan to enhance preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risks  
 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE EVOLVING THREAT  

The  EU  is  currently  facing  a  range  of  terrorist  threats  and  attacks  of  a  violent  nature,  from 
both networked groups and lone actors. Both terrorist groups and radicalised individuals have 
sought  to  carry  out  mass-casualty  attacks  in  the  EU  with  the  aim  of  maximising  both  the 
number of victims and the psychological and economic impact on society.  

Terrorist  organisations  have  not  used  chemical,  biological,  radiological  and  nuclear 
("CBRN")  agents  in  Europe.  Still,  there  are  credible  indications  suggesting  that  terrorist 
groups might have the intention of acquiring CBRN materials or weapons and are developing 
the knowledge and capacity to use them.1 Daesh has used chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq 
and  is  assessed  as  being  able2  to  produce  and  use  these  weapons.  Smaller  incidents  have 
shown Daesh's interest in innovating and in developing biological and radiological weapons.3 
It should be noted that whilst the term CBRN is used throughout the document, the likelihood 
of a nuclear weapon attack by any non-State actor is considered lower than that of chemical, 
biological or radiological attacks. 

This  should  be  seen  against  the  backdrop  of  technological  developments  which  might  be 
exploited  by  terrorists  for  malicious  purposes.  Daesh  has  made  use  of  unmanned  aerial 
systems  (UAS),  either  for  surveillance  and  command  or  for  carrying  out  attacks  with 
explosives.4  

The  potential  of  CBRN  attacks  features  prominently  in  terrorist  propaganda,  with  Jihadist 
media expressing intentions to commit CBRN attacks and sharing – on various social media 
platforms  –  possible  tactics  for  attacks  and  targets.5  The  CBRN  threats  have  been 
acknowledged  by  the  United  Nations  Security  Council6,  which  expressed  concern  over  the 
evolving risk of proliferation, including the use by non-State actors. 

This  underlines  the  need  for  the  European  Union  to  enhance  its  resilience  and  step  up  its 
preparedness to deal with the CBRN threat in the coming years.  

THE NEED FOR INCREASED EU COOPERATION 

This evolving threat requires taking a look at vulnerabilities and our defences against possible 
terrorist  attacks  involving  CBRN  material.  CBRN  threats  so  far  are  considered  as  low 
probability  but  with  high  impact  risks.  Even  at  a  small  scale,  a  CBRN  attack  may  have  a 
considerable impact on the societies and economies against which they are used, resulting in 
significant  and  lasting  disruption,  widespread  fear  and  uncertainty.  Both  the  human  and 

1  

2  
3  

4  

5  
6  

Europol,  Terrorism  Situation  and  Trend 
(TE-SAT)  2017,  p.  16,  available  at: 
report 
www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/tesat2017.pdf.  See  also  the  statements  by  the 
Director-General of the OPCW: www.globaltimes.cn/content/1044644.shtml.  
Interpol – Assessment of ISIL chemical weapons threats outside of Iraq and Syria, 7 February 2017. 
In  2016,  a  Daesh  cell  preparing  an  attack  with  a  rudimentary  biological  weapon  was  intercepted  in 
Morocco.  Interpol -  Biological  Threats  and  Incidents Pose  Increasing  Threat  to  Critical  Infrastructure 
and Public Health; 24 October 2016. Furthermore, a senior nuclear official in Europe was found to be 
under surveillance by terrorists linked to the Paris and Brussels attacks. Europol, TE-SAT 2016; page 
14.  Secrétariat  général  de  la  défense  et  de  la  sécurité  nationale  (France),  Chocs  futurs  -  Etude 
prospective à l'horizon 2030, May 2017, p.88: http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/ 
The  threat of  terrorist  attacks  with  the usage  of UAS  is addressed  by  the  Action Plan to  improve  the 
protection of public spaces – COM(2017)xxx. 
Europol, TE-SAT 2017; page 16. 
United Nations Security Council, Resolution S/RES/2325 (2016), 14 December 2016. 

2 

 
 
                                                 
financial  costs  associated  with  attacks,  involving  for  instance  a  radioactive  dispersal  device 
(also  known  as  dirty  bomb)7  or  an  anthrax  attack  using  unmanned  aerial  systems,  could  be 
extremely high. 

Reinforcing  resilience  against  CBRN  threats  in  terms  of  prevention,  preparedness  and 
response, requires significant investments on the part of Member States. It therefore calls for 
closer cooperation at EU level with a view to learning from each other, pooling expertise and 
assets  and  exploiting  synergies  across  borders.  The  Comprehensive  Assessment  of  EU 
Security Policy8 points to the need for increased cooperation at the EU level, based on better 
understanding  of  the  CBRN  threat  and  pooling  of  resources  with  a  view  to  achieve  better 
preparedness for possible CBRN attacks.  

The Directive on Combating Terrorism9 includes for the first time provisions on all strands of 
CBRN terrorism. It imposes obligations on Member States when it comes to the response to a 
terrorist  attack,  including  an  obligation  to  provide  medical  assistance  to  all  victims.  The 
initiatives proposed in this Communication will help Member States to meet their obligations 
to assist victims when it comes to an attack conducted with the CBRN materials.  

This  Action  Plan  aims  to  increase  the  European  cooperation  to  strengthen  CBRN  security 
with  a  focus  on  preventing,  preparing  for,  and  responding  to  CBRN  threat  and  terrorism 
attacks. Actions set out in this Communication will support Member States to protect citizens 
and  infrastructures.  Many  of  the  proposed  actions  pursue  an  all-hazards  approach  and  will 
also contribute to improving preparedness for any large scale CBRN incidents unconnected to 
terrorism.  

BUILDING UPON THE 2010-2015 CBRN ACTION PLAN 

This Action Plan builds upon the work launched in the EU with the 2010-2015 CBRN Action 
Plan.10 It addresses the gaps identified in its implementation and takes into account emerging 
threats. At EU level, the 2010-2015 Action Plan has led to a better understanding of the threat, 
more  information  sharing  (development  of  a  CBRN-E  Glossary  and  inclusion  of  CBRN 
incidents in the European Bomb Data System), and achievements such as the development of 
an  EU  training  infrastructure  (European  Nuclear  Security  Training  Centre  –  EUSECTRA). 
The biological area has also seen an important legislative development with the adoption of 
Decision 1082/2013/EU on serious cross-border threats to health, which sets up provisions to 
strengthen preparedness and response planning in the EU. 

Member  States  consulted  on  the  implementation  of  the  2010-2015  Action  Plan  reported  a 
large  number  of  activities  taking  place  at  national  level,  including  trainings  and  exercises. 
They reported also some difficulties in ensuring coordination of different actors. Stakeholders 
emphasised for instance the need to further deepen knowledge on CBRN risks, promote cross-

7  

8   
9   
10  

See for instance von Winterfeldt, Detlof and Rosoff, Heather, "A Risk and Economic Analysis of Dirty 
Bomb  Attacks  on  the  Ports  of  Los  Angeles  and  Long  Beach"  (2007).  Published  Articles  &  Papers. 
Paper 39. http://research.create.usc.edu/published_papers/39. The authors assessed the consequences of 
a  dirty  bomb  attack  at  the  port  of  Los  Angeles.  Apart  from  decontamination  costs,  for  instance  the 
impact  of  shutdown  of  the  port  and  related  businesses  would  cost  up  to  100  billion  EUR. 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5cc0/3b4436d06165aac72041315c824fbef44d5b.pdf. 
COM(2017) 407, SWD(2017) 278 final. 26.7.2017. 
OJ L88 of 31/3/2017, p. 6.   
Council  of  the  European  Union,  document  15505/1/09  REV  1,  adopted  in  December  2009  by  the 
Council with the aim of strengthening CBRN security throughout the EU. 

3 

 
                                                 
sector  cooperation  and  investing  further  in  trainings  and  exercises.11  Providing  cross-
border/cross-sectoral  trainings  and  exercises  –  ideally  organised  in  a  structured  way  and 
following  pre-agreed  curricula  –  was  identified  as  one  of  the  areas  where  the  EU  can  add 
value. Member States also pointed at insufficient information exchange on CBRN incidents, 
threats,  equipment  and  technologies  developed  to  tackle  these  threats.  They  underlined  also 
the  need  to  develop  cooperation  with  other  partners  not  covered  by  the  previous  CBRN 
Action Plan, such as military and key third countries. 

SETTING OUT A MORE FOCUSED AND COORDINATED APPROACH 

Building on these achievements, this new Action Plan takes a targeted approach, in line with 
the  2012  EU  CBRN-E  Agenda,  in  which  the  Council  asked  the  Commission  to  develop  a 
more  focused  policy,  addressing  a  selected  number  of  key  priorities  with  clear  EU  added 
value and tangible outcomes.  

The Action Plan provides an opportunity for Member States to strengthen their preparedness 
capacity against the evolving threats through voluntary participation in a series of initiatives 
proposed under the Action Plan. 

This  Action Plan  is  rooted in  the firm belief that tackling CBRN risks  requires a horizontal 
approach,  cutting  across  diverse  areas  and  actors  such  as  law  enforcement,  emergency 
management,  protection  of  critical  infrastructure  and  public  spaces,  public  health,  and  the 
private sector. Some of the actions proposed will also contribute to an increased resilience of 
critical infrastructures in the EU, especially as regards nuclear plants and chemical facilities. 

There  is  also  a  clear  need  to  increase  internal-external  security  actions,  focusing  efforts  in 
particular through the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence initiative. One key priority will be to 
ensure border security and detection capacity against illicit entry of CBRN materials. Customs 
officials play a key role in ensuring external border and supply chain security. Adapting cargo 
information  systems  is  essential  to  strengthening  monitoring  and  risk  based  controls  of 
international supply chains in order to ensure that CBRN material are not illicitly entering into 
the  EU.  Measures  to  strengthen  dual-use  trade  controls  at  export  are  also  required. 
Cooperation  and  coordination  with  EU  strategic  and  regional  partners  is  essential,  and 
synergies will be sought with all relevant stakeholders, including military actors, the EDA and 
NATO, as well as the private sector. 

The Action Plan therefore pursues the following four objectives: 

(1) Reducing the accessibility of CBRN materials, 

(2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents, 

(3)  Building  stronger  internal-external  links  in  CBRN  security  with  key  regional  and 
international EU partners, and 

(4) Enhancing our knowledge of CBRN risks. 

11  

As part of the review, Member States were also asked specific questions regarding future priority areas 
for cooperation.  

4 

 
 
 
                                                 
By  pursuing  work  across  these  pillars,  the  EU  can  provide  a  more  robust  framework  for 
reducing  the  threat  of  CBRN  attacks,  strengthening  security  measures,  increasing  resilience 
and preparing for an effective response in case of attack. 

The  proposed  actions  will  be  supported  by  mobilising  funding  under  the  different  existing 
instruments  of  the  Commission,  including  Horizon  2020,  ISF-Police  and  the  Union  Civil 
Protection  Mechanism  (UCPM)  or  the  wide  range  of  external  financing  instruments  (e.g. 
Development  Cooperation  Instrument,  European  Neighbourhood  Instrument,  Instrument 
contributing to Stability and Peace). 

OBJECTIVE 1: REDUCING THE ACCESSIBILITY OF CBRN MATERIALS 

The capability of terrorists to carry out CBRN attacks depends on the accessibility of agents, 
substances  and  materials  needed  for  CBRN  weapons.  Similar  to  the  work  already  done  for 
explosives and firearms, the EU needs to better control access to high risk CBRN materials 
and to optimise our ability to detect such materials at the earliest stage possible, restricting or 
controlling  access.  The  significant  issue  of  insider  threats  to  critical  infrastructure  and 
facilities  possessing  CBRN  materials  also  needs  to  be  addressed.  Moreover,  there  is  a  clear 
need, acknowledged by EU Member States, to further improve the exchange of information 
on  CBRN  materials,  including  threats  and  security  incidents  such  as  thefts  or  trafficking 
thereof. This can be achieved by maximising the use of existing tools and information sharing 
systems. 

The Commission therefore sets out the following priority actions that need to be taken in close 
cooperation with Member States and other stakeholders. 

Commitment 

Action 

1.1   Optimise 
the 
exchange of 
information 
on CBRN 

Member  States  to  more  systematically  include 
technical  information  on  CBRN  weapons  and 
incidents  in  the  European  Bomb  Data  System 
(EBDS)12  managed  by  Europol.  Consideration 
should  be  given  to  the  feasibility  to  establish  a 
reporting  system  mirroring  what  is  in  place  in 
the field of explosives precursors. 

Deliverable and 
Timeframe 

Europol to regularly 
report to the EU 
CBRN Security 
Advisory Group on 
the use of the EBDS 
(starting as of 2018). 
Commission to work 
with EU Member 
States to improve 
information sharing 
through EBDS. 

12  

European Bomb Data System (EBDS) is an IT platform which allows Member States to share timely 
and  relevant  information  and  intelligence  on  explosives  and  CBRN  materials  and  related  incidents. 
Since  it  requires  a  higher  level of secure  connection,  Europol created  a  complementary on-line-based 
Europol  Platform  for  Experts,  where  users  can  interact  and  collaborate  with  each  other  via  virtual 
communities. 

5 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Better  use  of  other  information  sharing  tools 
such  as  the  Incident  and  Trafficking  Database13 
at IAEA14. 

Explore  links  with  other  information  systems  – 
such  as  DUeS, 
the  Dual-Use  Electronic 
System15, with information on items and persons 
are suspected of "harmful" trade. 

Europol to conduct a 
mapping of 
information systems, 
needs and possible 
shortcomings in 
terms of information 
exchange by mid- 
2018). 

information  from 

Improve  cargo 
trade  and 
enhance  detection  capacities  for  customs  in 
cooperation  with  other  agencies  to  monitor 
international supply chains in order to detect and 
control illicit entry of CBRN materials. 

Agreement with 
Member States (mid-
2018) to establish 
common repository 
of cargo information. 

law  enforcement, 

Raise awareness of CBRN threat among customs 
and 
inter-agency 
cooperation  and  information-sharing  between 
customs  and  other  authorities,  in  line  with  the 
EU  Strategy  and  Action  Plan  for  customs  risk 
management (COM (2014) 527) 

improve 

1.2   Strengthen 
risk-based 
customs 
controls to 
intercept 
dangerous 
CBRN 
materials at 
the border 

Customs Detection 
Technology Project 
Group to explore 
detection capability 
for Biological and 
Chemical materials 
in international 
supply chains. 
Report by Mid 2018 

Extend the 
Radiological/Nuclea
r training for law 
enforcement, 
customs officers and 
other front line 
agents at 
EUSECTRA16 
training facility 

Update the EU lists 
of CBRN high risk 
materials in 2018 
and assess the scope 
and nature of 

1.3   Strengthen 
EU export 
controls 

Preventing  external  actors  (state  and  non-state) 
to access dual-use / CBRN items through trade 

13  

14  
15  

16  

Incident  and  Trafficking  Database  (ITDB)  is  the  IAEA’s  information  system  on  incidents  of  illicit 
trafficking and other unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear and other radioactive material 
outside of regulatory control. 
International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Dual-use  e-System  (DUeS)  is  a  secure  electronic  system  hosted  by  the  Commission  for  exchanging 
information among Member States. It has been fully operational since 2012 and it aims to improve the 
exchanges  of  denials of  dual-use  items  between  EU  Member  States.  The  main  information  processed 
covers  the  description  of  the  goods  under  denial  and  the  parties  involved  in  the  denials  such  as  the 
Member States, the exporter, broker, consignee and end-user.  
The  European  Nuclear  Security  Training  Centre  has  been  established  to  address  concerns  of  theft  of 
radioactive  materials  that  could  be  associated  with  crime  and  acts  of  terrorism.  It  provides  hands-on-
training  using  real  nuclear  material  to  front  line  officers,  trainers  and  other  experts  in  the  field.  The 
centre is located at the European Commission Joint Research Centre in Karlsruhe and Ispra.  

6 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1.4  Address 

insider 
threats 

Exchange  best  practices  on  vetting  and 
background  checks  in  facilities  holding  CBRN 
materials  such  as  biological  laboratories  or 
nuclear facilities. 

technical interactions 
between "CBRN" 
and "dual-use" items 

A mapping of 
existing vetting 
practices to be 
finalised by end 
2017.  

OBJECTIVE  2:  ENSURING  A  MORE  ROBUST  PREPAREDNESS  FOR  AND 
RESPONSE TO CBRN SECURITY INCIDENTS 

Operational  preparedness  is  crucial  in  order  to  effectively  mitigate  the  impact  of  a  CBRN 
attack  or  incident.  Given  the  inherently  cross-border  and  transnational  nature  of  the  CBRN 
threat, EU cooperation can add value by encouraging capacity building activities in the EU, 
such  as  cross-border  cooperation  in  training,  exercises  and  response,  facilitating  mutual 
assistance,  providing  guidance,  promoting  minimum  standards  across  the  Union,  and  where 
needed, funding for trans-national projects in this area. 

The  Commission  has  already  organised  numerous  training  sessions  and  exercises  at  the  EU 
level focusing on cross-sectoral cooperation in case of CBRN attacks. For instance, the 2014 
ARETE  exercise  focused  on  cooperation  between  law  enforcement  and  civil  protection  in 
case  of  a  complex  chemical  and  terrorism  situation  including  hostage-taking.  Moreover  the 
Commission  funded  a  series  of  training  courses  organised  in  cooperation  with  the  Member 
States'  authorities  on  cross-sectoral  response  to  a  radiological  dirty  bomb  attack.  These 
initiatives were complemented by exercises organised in the civil protection area and trainings 
organised by Europol and CEPOL. 

Further  actions  will  build  on  these  experiences  and  bring  the  various  preparedness  and 
response initiatives together in a coherent programme,  maximising the training and exercise 
opportunities for Member States and enhancing consistency in Member States' approaches. 

Additional  actions  facilitating  multi-agency  cooperation  will  be  identified  following  the  EU 
workshop on cooperation of first responders at the disaster scene following terrorist attacks, 
held  in  October  2017.  In  case  of  a  major  CBRN  incident,  the  response  will  require  the 
involvement of various stakeholders, including private actors, e.g. when it comes to ensuring 
that medical countermeasures are available. 

The Commission therefore sets out the following priority actions that need to be taken in close 
cooperation with Member States and other stakeholders. 
Commitment 

Action 

Deliverable and 
Timeframe 

2.1 

Strengthen EU 
CBRN 
preparedness 
and response 
through cross-

in  cooperation  with 
The  Commission 
Member  States  will  strengthen  training  and 
exercises  for  first  responders  from  the  law 
enforcement, 
health 
structures  and,  where  relevant,  borders  and 

protection, 

civil 

A mapping of 
existing EU training 
activities by January 
2018 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
sectorial 
training and 
exercises 

customs  authorities  and  military  partners. 
Training  and  exercises  will  be  carried  out 
through  existing  financial  instruments  and 
operational  tools,  in  particular  the  Union's 
(UCPM), 
Civil  Protection  Mechanism 
CEPOL and the ISF-Police.  

The  development  of  a  common  EU  CBRN 
training  curriculum  will  be  promoted  in 
close  cooperation  with  EU  Member  States' 
experts.  

2.2 

Strengthen the 
EU's response 
capacity for 
CBRN 
incidents under 
the EU civil 
protection 
mechanism 

2.3 

2.4 

Conduct a gap 
analysis on the 
detection of 
CBRN 
materials 

Improve early 
warning and 
response as 
well as 
information 
exchange 
regarding 

States 

In order to provide better support to Member 
States  in  the  event  of  a  major  CBRN 
incident,  Member 
the 
Commission will continue strengthening the 
existing  European  Emergency  Response 
Capacity  (EERC)  of  the  UCPM,  including 
the  EU  Medical  Corps.  Encourage  Member 
States  to  continue  committing  new  CBRN 
capacities to the EERC. 

and 

Support  Member  States  in  the  process  of 
registering  and  certifying  CBRN  modules 
and other capacities into the EERC. 

Review the initial capacity goals in the field 
of CBRN disasters. 

cross-sectorial 

Test 
response to pandemics. 

preparedness 

and 

the  extent 

the  CBRN 
In  close  cooperation  with 
the  Commission  will 
Advisory  Group, 
examine 
to  which  existing 
detection  equipment  can  detect  CBRN 
materials.  Results  will  feed  into  detection 
pool activities and work on standardisation. 
Re-engineer 
and 
Response  System  (EWRS)  with  a  view  to 
improving 
and 
incident  management  for  serious  cross 
border  threats  to  health  as  well  as  to  link 
EWRS 
rapid  alert  and 
information systems. 

the  Early  Warning 

to  other  EU 

situational 

awareness 

8 

EU Advisory Group 
to consider 
additional needs by 
Q2 2018 

Roll-out of new 
training and 
exercises starting in 
Q4 2018 

Conduct further 
exercises at EU level 
(similar to the 
ARETE exercise in 
2014) in 2019 

Assess gaps in the 
field of CBRN 
disasters response in 
2018. 

Adaptation grants for 
registration/ 
certification of 
modules 

Cross-sectorial table 
top exercises on 
business continuity 
planning during a 
pandemic (2018) 

Workshops on 
preparedness and 
International Health 
Regulations  
implementation and 
on best practices 
regarding entry and 
exit screening. 
Planned for 2017-
2018. 

Initial gap analysis 
report with 
recommendations by 
Q3-2018 

New platform to be 
ready by mid-2018 

 
 
 
2.5 

2.6 

serious cross-
border threats 
to health17  

Strengthen 
preparedness 
of laboratories 
in the EU 
against serious 
cross-border 
threats to 
health 

Increase 
preparedness 
of Member 
States for 
cross-border 
threats to 
health 

2.7 

Improving 
awareness, 
preparedness  
and response 
to bio-risks, 
including 
emerging 

rapid 

identification 

Ensure 
and 
characterization  and  rapid  sample  sharing 
mechanisms;  provide 
less 
equipped Member States. 

support 

to 

threats 

to  health  via 

Increase preparedness of Member States for 
cross-border 
joint 
procurement  of  medical  countermeasures 
of  Decision 
(based 
serious  cross-border 
1082/2013/EU  on 
threats to health). 

on  Article 

5 

2015-2018 

Implementation 
by 
Member  States  with 
Commission  support 
in  the  framework  of 
the  EMERGE  Joint 
Action18  on  Efficient 
response 
to  highly 
and 
dangerous 
emerging  pathogens 
at EU level. 
Joint procurement of 
vaccines together 
with the Member 
States concerned; 
2018 (preparations 
ongoing) 

(Joint 
in 

(Joint 
in 

Strengthen preparedness as well as actions at 
points  of  entry  (air,  maritime  and  ground 
crossing. 

2017-2020 
Action 
preparation) 

2017-2020 
Action 
preparation) 

Member  States  and  the  Commission  to 
develop a shared vision at EU level on how 
to  improving  vaccine  coverage  in  the  EU, 
to  strengthen  vaccine 
and  start  actions 
supply  and  stock  management,  enhance  the 
interoperability 
of 
and 
immunisation  information  systems,  improve 
vaccine confidence and tackle hesitancy, and 
increase 
the  effectiveness  of  vaccine 
research and development at EU level. 

interaction 

from 

arising 

Strengthen EU's cross-sectoral awareness on 
bio-risks 
accidental  or 
voluntary  releases  through  training,  such  as 
the 
joint  European  Centre  for  Disease 
Prevention  and  Control  (ECDC)/Europol 
course on “Cross-sectoral biorisk awareness 
health 
and  mitigation 

training” 

for 

Next edition of the 
course  in Q2-2018 
(further sessions to 
be arranged as 
needed)  

17  

18  

As defined in the Article 2 of the Decision 1082/2013/EU on serious cross-border threats to health: 1. 
threats of biological origin (communicable diseases; antimicrobial resistance and healthcare-associated 
infections  related  to  communicable  diseases  (hereinafter  ‘related  special  health  issues’);  biotoxins  or 
other harmful biological agents not related to communicable diseases; 2. threats of chemical origin; 3. 
threats  of  environmental  origin;  4.  threats  of  unknown  origin;  5.  events  which  may  constitute  public 
health  emergencies  of  international  concern  under  the  IHR,  provided  that  they  fall  under  one  of  the 
categories of threats set out in points (a) to (d). 
http://www.emerge.rki.eu/Emerge/EN/Home/Homepage_node.html. 

9 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
threats 

2.8 

2.9 

CBRN 
detection pool 
of Member 
States' experts  

Reinforce 
nuclear 
security 
capacities and 
networks 

2.10  Enhance 

cooperation in 
the area of 
nuclear 
forensics  

emergency  services,  law  enforcement  and 
civil protection. 

including 
preparedness 

Support Member States in their fight against 
elaboration  of 
bioterrorism, 
for 
strategies 
national 
bioterrorism  issues  via  development  –  in 
collaboration  with  network  of  experts  from 
Member  States  –  of  an  EU  focussed 
handbook on bioterrorism threats. 

ECDC  will  help  Member  States  raise 
awareness  and  exchange  best  practices  as 
regards  "Do  it  yourself"  (DIY)  biology, 
including  amateur  experimentation,  use  of 
biological  agents  and  genetic  engineering 
techniques  outside  laboratory  environments 
and by non-trained individuals and risks for 
biosafety and biosecurity19. 
Extend  the  explosives  detection  pool20  to 
CBRN experts with a view to assist Member 
States  with  e.g.  securing  large  scale  events. 
Activities of the detection pool will be based 
–  among  others  -  on  the  guidance  material 
developed  for 
the  protection  of  public 
spaces. 

Promote  full  use  of  European  Nuclear 
Security  Training  Centre  (EUSECTRA)  for 
joint  trainings  in  radiological  and  nuclear 
detection. 

forensic 

capabilities 

scope  and  comprehensiveness  of 
The 
nuclear 
vary 
significantly with only a few Member States 
being  able  to  perform  in-depth  examination 
of  nuclear  and  radioactive  material.  Most 
Member  States 
core 
capabilities, which are complemented by the 
more  advanced  ones  offered  i.a.  by  the 
Commission's Joint Research Centre.  

rely  only  on 

Development of the 
handbook by Q3 
2018 

Awareness raising 
material on risks 
related to emerging 
biotechnologies 

The activity will start 
in Q3 2017 and will 
continue in Q4 2017 
– Q1 2018 

Training for 
detection pool 
experts – Q3-2018 
with a view to be 
operational in 2019. 

Customs Training 
campaign phase-2 at 
EUSECTRA to be 
launched in Q4 -
2017 

Develop legal 
framework for using 
the Commission 
services capability in 
the nuclear forensics 
domain – by the end 
of 2018 

19  

20  

Commercially  available  "do-it-yourself"  bio-kits  make  it  possible  for  a  user  to  produce  genetically 
modified  microorganisms.  Progress  in  this  area  may  lead  to  intentional  attack  or  accidental 
contamination with modified viruses or bacteria. See also: European Centre for Disease Control, Rapid 
Risk  Assessment:  Risk  related  to  the  use  of  ‘do-it-yourself’  CRISPR-associated  gene  engineering  kit 
contaminated  with 
https://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/rapid-risk-
assessment-risk-related-use-do-it-yourself-crispr-associated-gene.  
The pool was introduced in the 2015 EU action plan against illicit trafficking in and use of firearms and 
explosives  (COM(2015)  624  final)  with  an  aim  to  provide  Member  States  operational  support  in  the 
area of detection of explosives.  

pathogenic 

bacteria, 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
The  Commission  will  further  develop  the 
legal  framework  (agreements  with  Member 
States) for using these Commission services 
and to provide - both general and advanced - 
training to Member States in this area.  

OBJECTIVE  3:  BUILDING  STRONGER  INTERNAL-EXTERNAL  LINKS  AND 
IN  CBRN  SECURITY  WITH  KEY  REGIONAL  AND 
ENGAGEMENT 
INTERNATIONAL EU PARTNERS 

CBRN threats can arise from both inside and outside the Union. Working beyond the Union 
as  well  as  building  stronger  partnerships  and  closer  internal-external  security  links  are  an 
inherent part of the EU's strategy to counter-terrorism and CBRN risks. The call for a more 
“joined-up Union” between the internal and external dimensions of security policies is a key 
priority  in  the  EU  Global  Strategy21and  in  the  context  of  the  2016  EU-NATO  Joint 
Declaration .  

CBRN  security  needs  to  be  mainstreamed  in  the  EU's  external  action,  through  the 
development  of  capacities  in  third  countries  (notably  in  neighbouring  countries),  enhancing 
cooperation with strategic partners as well as specialised international organisations, such as 
Interpol, IAEA, OPCW building on the renewed commitment of the UN Security Council to 
prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. There is also a need to develop 
closer  links  between  activities  undertaken  within  the  framework  of  EU  CBRN  Centres  of 
Excellence. In this regard, priority should be given to the EU Neighbourhood countries.  

The Commission therefore sets out the following priority actions that need to be taken in close 
cooperation with Member States and other stakeholders. 

Commitment 

Action 

3.1 

Develop 
CBRN 
security 
cooperation 
with key 
international 
partners, 
including in 
the context of 
the 
CT/Security 
dialogues  

Deepen  cooperation  with  strategic  partners 
experienced with CBRN: 

(1)  sharing  of  information  on  CBRN  threat 
and risks; 

(2) exchange of best practices; 

(3) joint trainings or exercises. 

Discuss  on a  regular  basis  CBRN  security  in 
the CT/Security dialogues with relevant third 
countries,  with  a  view  to  identify  possible 
cooperation and capacity-building actions.  

Deliverable and 
Timeframe 

In the context of the 
existing CBRN 
dialogue, hold a 
workshop on 
security of 
radioactive sources 
with the United 
States – Q2-2018 

EU-US workshop on 
criminal-
joint 
epidemiological 
investigations  –  Q4-

22  

Shared  Vision,  Common  Action:  A  Stronger  Europe.  A  Global  Strategy  for  the  European  Union’s  Foreign  And 
Security Policy. http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2018  

Invite 
strategic 
partners  to  dedicated 
of 
sessions 
the 
Security 
CBRN 
Advisory 
Group, 
where appropriate. 

Work towards closer cooperation with NATO 
in  relation  to  third  countries,  notably  in  the 
fields of: 

EU-NATO 
workshop – Q1/2-
2018. 

(1) information exchange; 

(2) capacity building;  

(3) training; 

(4) exercises. 

Develop  synergies  with  NATO  on  how 
counter-terrorism  may  benefit  from  defence 
capability  development inter  alia in the  areas 
of Unmanned Airborne Vehicles (UAVs), and 
Chemical  Biological,  Radiological 
and 
Nuclear (CBRN) weapons.  

In  cooperation  with  the  NATO-accredited 
CBRN  Centre  of  Excellence  design  tailor 
made training modules for EU CBRN Centre 
of Excellence partners. 

The EEAS and Commission will engage with 
specialised 
organisations 
multilateral 
(Interpol,  IAEA,  OPCW22,  BWC  ISU23, 
UNODA24)  to  share  best  practices  and  look 
field  of 
for  synergies  notably 
information  sharing  and  capacity-building  in 
third countries. 

the 

in 

Common trainings, 
e.g. in NATO-
accredited CBRN 
CoE (Q4 2017) and 
envisaged for 2018/ 
2019/2020 

based 

2018, 
on 
lessons  learned  from 
of 
rounds 
first 
common trainings. 

Regularly invite 
these organisations 
to the CBRN 
Security Advisory 
group as well as 
trainings and 
exercises 

3.2 

Develop 
cooperation 
with NATO  
on CBRN 
related issues  

3. 

Develop 
cooperation 
with 
specialised 
international 
organisations  

OBJECTIVE 4: ENHANCING OUR KNOWLEDGE OF CBRN RISKS 

CBRN is a technically complex and rapidly developing area which needs close monitoring. At 
present, CBRN expertise is distributed unevenly within the European Union and spread across 
many different governmental, academic and private actors. An EU-wide framework is needed 
to  bring  relevant  actors  together,  to  build  partnerships  across  these  sectors,  collectively 
Research.  
identify 

benefits 

harness 

further 

needs 

and 

EU 

the 

of 

4.1 Creation of an EU CBRN security network  

22  
23  
24  

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon. 
Biological Weapons Convention – Implementation Support Unit. 
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
To  improve  coordination  at  EU  level,  an  EU  CBRN  security  network  will  pool  together  all 
CBRN  actors  at  both  strategic  (policy-making)  and  operational  levels  to  overcome  the 
fragmentation  of  efforts.  It  will  bring  together  Member  States,  EU  institutions  and  relevant 
agencies, and where appropriate key international partners and the private sector. The network 
will  rely  on  three  pillars:  1)  an  advisory  group  bringing  together  all  CBRN  security 
coordinators of the MS, 2) a support network composed of existing CBRN centres across the 
EU and 3) a CBRN knowledge hub set up in the European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC) 
in Europol.  

Its objectives will be to (1) maintain a comprehensive and updated understanding of CBRN 
risks  coming  from  inside  and  outside  EU  and  to  support  the  formulation  of  policies  and 
initiatives to address identified gaps; (2) develop cooperation and coordination at operational 
level (e.g. information exchange, exchange of best practices); and (3) facilitate civil-military 
cooperation in areas which are mutually beneficial. 

Commitment 

Action 

4.1.1  Set up a 

dedicated  
Advisory 
Group on EU 
CBRN 
Security 

Member  States  to  appoint  national  CBRN 
Security  Coordinators,  as  primary  points  of 
the 
in  Member  States 
contact 
implementation  of  the  EU  CBRN  Security 
Action Plan.  

for 

its 

implementation, 

Building  upon  the  previous  CBRN  advisory 
group,  which  was  created  under  the  2010-
2015  Action  Plan  with  the  mandate  of 
overseeing 
the 
Commission  will  set  up  a  new  dedicated 
Advisory  Group  on  EU  CBRN  Security  for 
the  purposes  of  the  present  Action  Plan, 
together  Member  States  CBRN 
bringing 
Security  Coordinators,  the  Commission  and 
relevant  EU  agencies,  the  European  External 
Action  Service  and  other  relevant  public  and 
private CBRN stakeholders, which will: 

(1) regularly review and analyse the evolving 
CBRN  threats  and  risks  (in  cooperation  with 
INTCEN and Europol); 

identify  gaps 

in  CBRN  prevention, 
(2) 
detection, 
response 
measures,  and  advise  on  new  policy 
initiatives to address those gaps; 

preparedness 

and 

Deliverable and 
Timeframe 

A list of coordinators 
in all Member States 
by December 2017. 

A first meeting of 
the Advisory Group 
by January 2018 and 
periodically (2-3 
meetings /year) 
afterwards 

A first gap analysis 
by April 2018 and to 
be reviewed 
periodically  

A regular and 
systematic exchange 
of good practices on 
identified risks and 
gaps 

A first mapping of 
existing centres of 
expertise by May 
2018. 

(3)  map  existing  centres  of  expertise  and 
identify 
to 
encourage synergies and complementarity. 

arrangements 

collaborative 

4.1.2  Creation of 

an EU CBRN 

At  operational  level,  an  EU  CBRN  Support 
Network composed of existing CBRN centres 

Commission to 
publish a call for 

13 

 
 
 
Support 
Network  

of  expertise  and  networks  will  feed  into  the 
CBRN Security Advisory Group in:  

(1)  developing  a  EU  expert  support  structure 
(in  close  cooperation  with  Europol)  which 
can  provide  guidance  and  advice  also  on 
technical  and  scientific  issues  to  Member 
States and EU institutions on CBRN security, 
including during incidents;   

CBRN project 
proposals under ISF-
Police by October 
201725 

A fully operational 
Network by summer 
2018 

facilitating 

(2) 
and 
dissemination  of  good  practices  and  lessons 
learned; 

identification 

the 

4.1.3  Europol 

(ECTC) to 
develop a 
knowledge 
hub on 
CBRN 

(3)  sharing  expertise  and 
liaising  with 
existing  CBRN  centres  of  excellence  in 
Europe and outside. 

Interested  Member  States  will  be  asked  to 
identify  by  December  2017  structures  which 
could  feed 
into  an  EU  CBRN  Support 
Network. 

Europol  (ECTC) 
to  develop  its  existing 
CBRN team into a knowledge hub to support 
law  enforcement  authorities  on  CBRN 
security, including weapons and threats: 

(1)  supplying  analytical  products  on  CBRN 
threats and incidents; 

(2)  facilitating  cooperation  and  exchange  of 
information (notably via EBDS, and networks 
such as EEODN26) between law enforcement 
and  other  actors  (including  military),  as  well 
as with its network of international partners; 

(3)  organising  training  (in  cooperation  with 
CEPOL); 

(4)  providing  operational 
deploying  CBRN  expertise 
investigation of CBRN incidents 

support  and 
support 

to 

Optimise  the  use  of 
Europol 
existing 
to 
capabilities 
collective 
enhance 
knowledge 
on 
CBRN threats 

Systematic 
sharing 
of  CBRN-relevant 
information 
via 
EBDS 

Deploy 
expertise 
investigations 

CBRN 
to  assist 

4.2 Harnessing the benefits of EU security research 

Exploiting better EU security research via dissemination activities for research results, as well 
as via ensuring that research activities respond to the operational needs in the area of CBRN. 

25  

26  

The call for proposals will support implementation of this Action Plan as well as the EU Action Plan on 
the protection of public spaces as well as the Commission Recommendation on the implementation of 
Regulation 98/2013. The call can support – among others - developing an EU expert support structure 
or regional networks, which will later be part of the Support Network.   
European  Explosive  Ordnance  Disposal  Network  (EEODN)  is  a  network  of  bomb  technicians  and 
CBRN  experts  managed  by  Europol.  The  network  allows  its  members  sharing  of  best  practices  and 
lessons  learned  as  well  as  common  trainings.  EEODN  organises  yearly  conferences  combined  with 
trainings.  

14 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
The Commission will extend the testing of equipment, encourage harmonisation of standards 
and support the development of shared capacities via its extended detection pool of experts. 

Commitment 

Action 

4.2.1  Support the 
disseminati
on and take-
up of 
research 
results  

Further develop the Platform of the Community 
of Users on Secure, Safe and Resilient Societies 
researchers,  policy 
(CoU),  which  gathers 
representatives  and 
industry/SME 
makers, 
responders, 
practitioners 
to 
first 
including 
translate 
into  practical 
research  outcomes 
action. 

Increase  the  dissemination  of  research  results 
and promote information exchanges to enhance 
the  dialogue  among  different  actors,  in  the 
CBRN  area,  and  provide  regular  update  about 
research  outputs  also  in  the  context  of  the  EU 
CBRN Security Advisory group and its support 
network 

4.2.2 

Identify 
further 
research 
needs and 
address 
emerging 
CBRN 
threats 

Ensure that research projects focus on the needs 
of end-users in the CBRN area 

Prioritise research efforts to: 

(1)  provide  solutions  on  how  to  mitigate 
emerging  CBRN  threats,  such  as  UAS  or  bio-
hacking; 

(2)  enhance  Member  States'  disaster  risk 
from 
reduction 
preparation/preparedness, 
to 
response and recovery. 

monitoring 

capacities, 

Deliverable and 
Timeframe 

2018 CoU planning 
to be presented in 
November 2017, 
covering 18 thematic 
workshops, 
including 6 CBRN-
related topics like 
chemical hazards or 
water safety and 
security. The 
workshops will 
provide an annual 
update on ongoing 
research and 
capacity building 
activities and 
identify future 
priorities 

Mapping report of 
H2020 projects 
covering the 2014-
2016 calls to be 
finalised by 
December 2017  

Regularly publish 
results from CBRN 
research projects via 
the EU CBRN 
security network  

Continuous dialogue 
in the various EU 
fora, such as the 
CBRN advisory 
group, New actions 
under the Horizon 
2020 2017 call  

New CBRN projects 
selected from the 
call 2017 starting in 
Q1-2018 

A CBRN security 
call for proposals in 
Q2-2018 

4.2.3  Encourage 

Extend  the  current  testing  of  CBRN  detection  Enhance the capacity 

15 

 
 
harmonisati
on through 
standardisat
ion and 
certification 
for CBRN 
security 
products 
and systems 

equipment  with  a  view  to  propose  areas  for 
standardisation. This work will also help inform 
practitioners  on  equipment  performance  and 
provide training to the detection pool experts.   

Continue  pre-normative 
research  activities 
within  the  framework  of  the  Commission's 
European  Reference  Network 
for  Critical 
Infrastructure  Protection27  with  an  aim 
to 
develop CEN28 Workshop Agreements; identify 
CBRN areas in which mandates to CEN can be 
launched  and  launch  new  calls  in  support  of 
CBRN standardisation under Horizon 2020. 

of performance 
testing of CBRN 
detection equipment 
in MS and identify 
standardisation 
needs prone to 
mandates to CEN by 
the end of 2018. 

Calls for 
standardisation-
related research in 
Q2-2018 and Q2-
2019 

CONCLUSIONS 

In  light  of  the  evolving  threats,  Europe  needs  to  pool  resources  and  expertise  to  develop 
innovative,  sustainable  and  effective  solutions.  Cooperation  efforts  across  the  EU  along  the 
lines  set  out  in  this  Action  Plan  can  result  in  significant  security  gains  and  lead  to  tangible 
results. 

The  proposals  set  out  in  this  Communication  will  pave  the  way  for  a  more  effective  and 
focused  EU  cooperation  in  the  protection,  preparedness  and  response  against  chemical, 
biological,  radiological  and  nuclear  threats.  The  Commission  encourages  Member  States  to 
take  advantage  of  the  various  opportunities  set  out  in  this  Communication,  and  invites  the 
European Parliament and the Council to endorse this action plan and to actively engage in its 
implementation,  in  close  cooperation  with  all  relevant  stakeholders.  The  Commission  will 
review progress at the latest after two years. 

27  

28  

The  European  Reference  Network  for  Critical  Infrastructure  Protection  (ERNCIP)  is  the  Commission 
co-financed  project  coordinated  by  Joint  Research  Centre  aiming  at  providing  a  framework  within 
which experimental facilities and laboratories will share knowledge and expertise in order to harmonise 
test protocols throughout Europe, leading to better protection of critical infrastructures against all types 
of threats and hazards and to the creation of a single market for security solutions. Three of the working 
groups  deal  with  CBRN  threats:  chemical  and  biological  risks  to  drinking  water;  detection  of  indoor 
airborne chemical-biological agents and radiological and nuclear threats to critical infrastructure.  
European Committee for Standardisation. 

16