COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EVALUATION of the application of Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 Accompanying the document Commission report to the European Parliament and the Council
Date: 2017-10-02
Institutions: European Anti-Fraud Office, European Commission
Subjects: EU office or agency, cross-border cooperation, exchange of information, fraud, fraud against the EU, general budget (EU), judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the EU, operation of the Institutions, public prosecutor's department

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 2.10.2017  SWD(2017) 332 final   COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EVALUATION of the application of Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999  Accompanying the document Commission report to the European Parliament and the Council {COM(2017) 589 final}  
 
 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

EVALUATION 
of the application of Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 883/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations 
conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation 
(Euratom) No 1074/1999  

Accompanying the document 

Commission report to the European Parliament and the Council 

 
 
Contents 

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................................... 4 

1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 1 

1.1. Purpose of the evaluation ......................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2. Scope of the evaluation ............................................................................................................................ 1 

2. BACKGROUND TO THE INITIATIVE ............................................................................................... 2 

2.1. Objectives of the Regulation in historical context ................................................................................... 2 
2.2. Intervention logic ..................................................................................................................................... 3 
2.3. Baseline ................................................................................................................................................... 5 
2.4. Current policy and legislative developments ........................................................................................... 6 

3. IMPLEMENTATION, STATE OF PLAY AND RESULTS ................................................................ 7 

4. METHOD/PROCESS FOLLOWED ...................................................................................................... 9 

4.1. Procedural aspects of the evaluation ........................................................................................................ 9 
4.2. Evaluation methodology .......................................................................................................................... 9 
4.3. Evaluation challenges and limitations ................................................................................................... 10 

5. ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS .......................................................................... 11 

5.1. Relevance ............................................................................................................................................... 11 
To what extent have the specific objectives of Regulation 883/2013 proven to be relevant for 

the overarching objective of protection of the EU financial interests? ...................................... 11 
5.2. Effectiveness .......................................................................................................................................... 13 
How  have  the  Regulation  and,  more  specifically,  its  different  elements  contributed  to  the 
specific  objectives  of  Regulation  883/2013  (in  particular,  reinforced  procedural 
guarantees  of  persons  concerned  and  better  information  and  cooperation  between 
OLAF and Institutions, bodies, agencies and other competent authorities) and to an 
improved protection of the EU financial interests (recovery, prosecution, indictment 
and deterrence)? ............................................................................................................................. 13 

Which  are  the  external  factors  (in  particular  the  follow-up  responsibilities  –  once  OLAF 
concludes  an  investigation  -  of  Member  States  and  other  Commission  services  and 
EU  institutions,  bodies,  offices  and  agencies)  that  have  contributed  to  or  influenced 
the achievement of the objectives of Regulation 883/2013, and how? ........................................ 13 

Can  shortcomings  be  identified  in  the  different  elements  of  Regulation  883/2013  which 

negatively affect the achievements of its objectives? .................................................................... 13 
5.2.1. Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of OLAF’s investigative activity .................................. 13 
5.2.2. Improving cooperation and information exchange with partners ................................................ 22 
5.2.3. Strengthening the procedural guarantees of individuals subject to investigation....................... 25 
5.2.4. Reinforcing the governance of OLAF ............................................................................................. 27 
5.3. Efficiency ............................................................................................................................................... 28 
To  what  extent  has  the  implementation  of  Regulation  883/2013  impacted  on  OLAF's 
resources  and  the  use  of  those  resources?  Did  OLAF  use  the  possibility  to  open  an 
investigation  taking  into  account  the  need  for  efficient  use  of  its  resources  or  the 
subsidiarity principle? .................................................................................................................... 28 
5.3.1. Resources ........................................................................................................................................... 29 
5.3.2. Application of the Regulation .......................................................................................................... 29 
5.4. Coherence .............................................................................................................................................. 33 
5.4.1. Internal coherence ............................................................................................................................ 33 
5.4.2. External coherence ........................................................................................................................... 34 
5.4.3.  Has  the  Regulation  achieved  a  proper  balance  between  investigative  powers  and 

procedural rights? ........................................................................................................................... 35 

5.4.4.  To  what  extent  has  Regulation  883/2013  achieved  a  proper  balance  between 
independence,  on  the  one  hand,  and  cooperation,  supervision  and  control,  on  the 
other? ............................................................................................................................................... 36 

 
 
5.4.5.  To  what  extent  does  Regulation  883/2013  fit  into  the  wider  EU  policies  (and  the 

various elements of these policies) for the protection of the EU financial interests? ................ 37 

6. CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................................................... 39 

Annex 1 
Annex 2 
Annex 3 
Annex 4 
Annex 5 

: Procedural information ......................................................................................................... 44 
: Synopsis report of stakeholder consultation in the context of the Study .............................. 47 
: Methods and analytical approach.......................................................................................... 63 
: Evaluation questions ............................................................................................................. 67 
: Key elements of Regulation 883/2013 and related implementing rules ............................... 69 

 
 
 
 
 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 

ACA 
AFCOS   
CAFS 
CJEU 
COCOLAF 
CONT   
DG 
EDES 
EDPS 
EPPO 
FPDNet 
GIPs 
IBOAs   
IDOC 
IPP 
ISRU 
ISSG 
OLAF    
PIF 
SC 
SPE 
TFEU 
VAT 

Administrative Cooperation Arrangement  
Anti-Fraud Coordination Service 
Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy 
Court of Justice of the European Union  
Advisory Committee for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention 
European Parliament, Budgetary Control Committee  
Directorate General (of the Commission) 
Early Detection and Exclusion System  
European Data Protection Supervisor 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office  
Fraud Protection and Detection Network 
Guidelines on Investigation Procedures  
Institutions, Bodies, Offices and Agencies of the European Union 
Investigation and Disciplinary Office, DG for Human Resources 
Investigation Policy Priority 
Investigation Selection and Review Unit  
Inter-Service Steering Group 
European Anti-Fraud Office 
Protection of the EU Financial Interests 
Supervisory Committee  
Single Point of Entry 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
Value Added Tax 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  

1.1. Purpose of the evaluation 

This  Commission  Staff  Working  document  (SWD)  accompanies  the  Commission  report 
on  the  Evaluation  of  the  application  of  Regulation  (EU,  EURATOM)  No  883/2013  (the 
‘report'). The SWD was supported by an external study1. 
The  evaluation  is  required  by  Article  19  of  Regulation  883/20132  ('the  Regulation'), 
which provides that "by 2 October 2017, the Commission shall submit to the European 
Parliament and the Council an evaluation report on the application of this Regulation. 
That report shall be accompanied by an opinion of the Supervisory Committee and shall 
state whether there is a need to amend this Regulation".  

1.2. Scope of the evaluation 
The scope of the evaluation, as set out in the evaluation roadmap3, is the assessment of 
the  operation  of  the  key  elements  of  the  Regulation,  their  impact  on  the  general  and 
specific objectives pursued by the Regulation, and the extent to which these objectives 
have been met and remain relevant. Although the evaluation covers the Regulation as a 
whole, it focuses in particular on the changes introduced in 2013 compared to the 1999 
legal framework.  

The  evaluation  addresses  four  key  areas  –  effectiveness  and  efficiency  in  the 
application  of  key  elements  of  the  Regulation,  as  well  as  coherence  and  relevance  of 
the  Regulation  to  accomplish  its  objectives  and  in  the  context  of  evolving  anti-fraud 
policies and fraud trends. The future outlook regarding in particular the establishment 
of  the  European  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  (EPPO),  requested  by  the  evaluation 
roadmap,  is  addressed  in  the  report  as  it  is  not  a  subject  to  retrospective  evaluation. 
The further criterion required by the Better Regulation Guidelines4, the EU added value, 
is considered as addressed and is not covered by the evaluation as the European Anti-
Fraud  Office  (OLAF)  ensures  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial  interests,  in  the 
framework of Articles 317 and 325 TFEU, by performing specific tasks at EU level which 
cannot be performed at national level.  

The  time  period  covered  by  the  evaluation  is  1  October  2013  (when  the  Regulation 
entered into force) to December 2016. 

The Regulation requires that the results of the evaluation are used to assess the need to 
amend it. The evaluation findings, in section 5 below, identify certain shortcomings in 
the  application  of  the  Regulation  that  could  result  in  a  legislative  change  to  address 
them.  In  addition,  the  evaluation  has  considered  the  possible  need  to  amend  the 
Regulation  in  the  context  of  a  changing  anti-fraud  landscape  at  EU  level.  Without 
pre-empting  the  Better  Regulation  principles,  the  possible  need  to  amend  the 

1 Evaluation of the application of Regulation No 883/2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office 
(OLAF), Final Report, ICF Consulting Services Limited, 2017 (hereafter ''ICF report''). 
https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/sites/antifraud/files/evaluation_of_the_application_regulation_883_en.pdf 
2  Regulation  (EU,  EURATOM)  No  883/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  September  2013  concerning 
investigations conducted by the  European Anti-Fraud  Office (OLAF) and  repealing Regulation (EC) No  1073/1999  of the European 
Parliament  and  of  the  Council  and  Council  Regulation  (Euratom)  No  1074/1999,  OJ  L  248,  18.9.2013,  pp.  1–22,  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013R0883 .  
3 The roadmap for the evaluation of the Regulation was open to stakeholders' feedback during the life time of the evaluation on the 
following website: http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/roadmaps/docs/2017_olaf_001_evaluation_of_regulation_883_2013_en.pdf .  
4 Better Regulation Guidelines http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/toc_guide_en.htm.  

1 

 
 
                                                            
Regulation and the intended follow-up by the Commission to the evaluation results is 
outlined in the report. 

2. BACKGROUND TO THE INITIATIVE  

2.1. Objectives of the Regulation in historical context  

In  1999,  the  Commission  set  up  OLAF  to  carry  out  administrative  investigations 
concerning  fraud,  corruption  and  any  other  illegal  activity  affecting  the  EU  financial 
interests, and to help Member States fight fraud. OLAF investigates matters concerning 
all  areas  of  EU  expenditure  (the  main  spending  categories  are  structural  funds, 
agricultural  policy  and  rural  development  funds,  direct  expenditure  and  external  aid); 
some  areas  of  EU  revenue  (mainly  customs  duties);  and  suspicions  of  serious 
misconduct  by  EU  staff  and  members  of  the  EU  institutions.  Section  5  provides 
illustrative  examples  of  the  scope  of  the  work  carried  out  by  OLAF  and  amount  of  EU 
funding (recommended to be) recovered. 

OLAF’s investigative mandate for the protection of the EU financial interests was initially 
regulated  by  Regulations  1073/19995  and  1074/19996.  The  2013  Regulation  replaces 
them, and is the result of lengthy inter-institutional negotiations based on proposals by 
the Commission in 20047, 20068 and 20119.  

To achieve the ultimate objective of stepping up the fight against fraud, corruption and 
any  other  illegal  activity  affecting  the  EU  financial  interests,  Regulation  883/2013  was 
adopted with the objectives to (see also Figure 1):  

 

 

 

 

improve  the  effectiveness,  efficiency  and  accountability10  of  OLAF  while 
safeguarding its independence;  

strengthen the procedural guarantees and fundamental rights of persons subject to 
investigation11;  

strengthen  cooperation  with  Member  States,  EU  institutions,  bodies,  offices  and 
agencies (IBOAs), third countries and international organisations; and to  

reinforce the governance of OLAF. 

the 

(OLAF),  OJ 

(OCAF),  OJ 

European  Anti-Fraud  Office 

the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office 

5 Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted 
by 
L  136,  31.5.1999,  pp.  1–7,  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1404400470487&uri=CELEX:31999R1073 .  
6 Regulation (EC) No 1074/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted 
by 
L  136,  31.5.1999,  pp.  8–14,  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1404400545577&uri=CELEX:31999R1074. 
7  COM(2004)  103  final,  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No 
1073/1999  concerning  investigations  conducted  by  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office  (OLAF),  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1499163149081&uri=CELEX:52004PC0103. 
COM(2004)  104  final,  Proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  amending  Regulation  (Euratom)  No  1074/1999  concerning  investigations 
conducted 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
Anti-Fraud 
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1499163236604&uri=CELEX:52004PC0104 .  
8  COM(2006)  244  final,  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No 
1073/1999  concerning  investigations  conducted  by  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office  (OLAF),  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1499163871683&uri=CELEX:52006PC0244.  
9 COM(2011) 135 final, Amended Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the council amending Regulation (EC) 
No 1073/1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EURATOM) 
No 1074/1999, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52011PC0135.  
10 Throughout this report, the issues relating to accountability are addressed as part of the assessment of governance in sections 
dealing with effectiveness and efficiency of the application of the Regulation.   
11  Throughout  this  report,  the  issues  relating  to  procedural  guarantees  and  fundamental  rights  are  dealt  with  under  the  single 
heading of "procedural guarantees". 

(OLAF), 

European 

Office 

the 

by 

2 

 
 
                                                            
2.2. Intervention logic 

Regulation  883/2013  governs  the  conduct  of  OLAF's  investigations  for  the  purpose  of 
fighting  fraud,  corruption  and  any  other  illegal  activity  affecting  the  EU  financial 
interests12. The following types of investigations are regulated separately: 

 

 

External administrative investigations in Member States and in third countries and 
on the premises of international organisations13; 
Internal administrative investigations within the Union IBOAs14; 

In  addition,  OLAF  opens  coordination  cases  to  assist  the  Member  States  in  organising 
close and regular cooperation between their competent authorities aimed at protecting 
the EU financial interests against fraud15. 

The  intervention  logic  developed  in  the  context  of  the  evaluation  (Figure  1)  aims  to 
retrace  the  cause  and  effects  chains  through  which  the  provisions  of  the  Regulation 
generate intended outputs, results and impacts (which correspond to the objectives of 
the  Regulation  spelled  out  in  the  section  above).  Provisions  that  should  allow 
achievement of the objectives are: 

 

 

Investigative function (Articles 3, 4, 5, 7, 11); 

Safeguards (Articles 8, 9, 10 and 17); 

  Cooperation and coordination (Articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14); 

  Governance and control mechanisms (Articles 15, 16, 17). 

The  provisions  surrounding  the  investigative  function  allow  OLAF  to  fulfil  its  mandate 
and use its powers to obtain results in its investigations; they cover the selection phase 
for the opening of investigations, the investigative tools and powers, the procedure to 
be respected, as well as the follow-up to investigations. They are complemented by the 
provisions concerning safeguards, which are intended to protect the persons involved in 
the  investigations,  by  defining  the  rules  on  procedural  guarantees,  confidentiality  and 
data  protection.  Throughout  the  investigations,  OLAF  cooperates  with  its  sources  of 
incoming  information,  including  whistle-blowers,  IBOAs,  Member  States  or  third 
countries  authorities  and  international  organisations.  The  relevant  provisions  regulate 
this  cooperation  depending  on  the  specificities  of  each  of  those  categories.  The 
governance and control mechanisms ensure OLAF’s independence and the monitoring 
of its investigative function. 

The key elements of the Regulation and related implementing rules are further detailed 
in Annex 5.  

12 Article 1(1) of the Regulation. 
13 Article 3 of the Regulation. 
14 Article 4 of the Regulation. 
15 Article 1(2) of the Regulation. 

3 

 
 
                                                            
Figure 1 - Intervention logic for the Regulation 883/2013

Source: ICF report, section 2.2.1

4 

 
 
 
2.3. Baseline 

The legal baseline is provided by Regulations 1073/1999 and 1074/1999. Their evaluation in 
200316 pointed to a number of shortcomings which were in turn reflected in the objectives 
for  the  revision  of  the  legislative  framework.  Among  these  were:  the  need  for  OLAF  to 
establish  internal  rules  for  the  conduct  of  the  investigations;  the  necessity  to  conclude 
memoranda of understanding with the IBOAs and with third countries authorities; the need 
to  develop  standardised  practices  in  relation  to  national  authorities  and  institutions  and 
bodies, as well as in relation to the persons involved in the investigations; and the need to 
develop detailed rules to ensure respect of fundamental rights. The evaluation also pointed 
to  other  issues  impacting  on  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  OLAF,  which  were  not 
addressed in the revised Regulation, for example certain challenges posed by the references 
to national law in the provisions on OLAF powers in external investigations, or the possible 
need to include an obligation of the Member States to inform OLAF of the actions taken in 
the follow up to its investigations. 
The evaluation was accompanied by an opinion of the OLAF Supervisory Committee17 which 
emphasised the need for internal rules of procedure, in particular for the protection of the 
fundamental rights of persons under investigation.  

As  a  follow-up  to  the  evaluation,  the  European  Parliament  adopted  a  report  in  November 
200318. 

The  European  Court  of  Auditors  made  a  number  of  recommendations  for  improving  the 
organisation  and  working  methods  of  OLAF,  the  governance  framework,  the  rights  of  the 
persons  concerned  by  an  investigation,  relations  between  OLAF  and  the  Member  States’ 
competent authorities and cooperation with Eurojust and Europol19. 

An  impact  assessment  that  would  provide  for  a  comprehensive  picture  of  the  baseline 
situation at the time of the adoption of Regulation 883/2013 is not available. However, the 
yearly  OLAF  reports  give  a  good  idea  how  the  situation  evolved  since the  2003  evaluation 
both  in  terms  of  activities  carried  out  by  OLAF  and  operational  changes  introduced  to 
improve  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  OLAF  operations.  In  section  5,  a  number  of 
figures and tables provide a comparison for pre- and post-Regulation periods.  

The  organisational  structure  of  OLAF  changed  in  2012  with  the  arrival  of  the  new 
Director-General and in anticipation of the Regulation, to enable it to focus on core activities 
and  to  improve  the  management  and  supervision  of  its  operational  work.  In  order  to 
improved  operational 
enhance  efficiency,  OLAF  refined  performance 

indicators  and 

16  COM(2003)  154,  Commission  Report  -  Evaluation  of  the  activities  of  the  European  Anti-fraud  Office  (OLAF)  -  Parliament  and  Council 
Regulation  (EC)  No  1073/1999  and  Council  Regulation  (Euratom)  No  1074/1999  (Article  15),  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2003:0154:FIN. 
17 Opinion 2/03 on the Commission report, Evaluation of the activities of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), Luxembourg 18.6.2003, 
http://europa.eu/supervisory-committee-olaf/sites/default/files/documents/publications/reports/opinion_2003_en.pdf.   
18  Report  on  the  Commission  report  on  the  evaluation  of  the  activities  of  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office  (OLAF),  (COM(2003)  154  - 
(2002/2237(INI)), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A5-2003-
0393+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en.  
19  Special  Report  No  1/2005,  followed  by  Special  Report  No  2/2011.  Recommendations  included:  increasing  the  number  and  speed  of 
investigations by increasing the proportion of time spent on the investigative function; improving the efficiency (planning and monitoring) 
of investigations, in order to reduce their duration; developing the reporting on OLAF’s performance; revising the legal framework, notably 
to  consolidate  anti-fraud 
investigated.  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52005SA0001 (Special Report No 1/2005); http://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/NewsItem.aspx?nid=1049 
(Special Report No 2/2011). 

legislation  and  to  better  protect  the  rights  of  persons 

5 

 
 
                                                            
 
statistical data and final reporting. Actions were also taken to reduce the average duration of 
investigations.  

2.4. Current policy and legislative developments 
On  26 October  2016,  the  Regulation  was  amended20  as  regards  the  secretariat  of  the 
Supervisory Committee, previously provided by OLAF.  This  amendment responded to calls 
for  a  strengthened  independent  functioning  of  the  Committee's  secretariat,  and  aims  at 
avoiding  any  appearance  that  the  Committee's  independence  might  be  impaired.  From 
1 January  2017,  the  Committee's  secretariat  is  provided  by  the  Commission,  and  its 
budgetary appropriations have been moved from the budget line and the establishment plan 
of OLAF to that of the Commission. 

The  Commission  proposed  in  2014  to  amend  the  Regulation  to  establish  a  Controller  of 
procedural guarantees21. The Controller would review complaints lodged by persons subject 
to  OLAF  investigations  as  regards  the  respect  of  procedural  guarantees,  and  authorise 
certain  investigative  measures  related  to  members  of  the EU  institutions.  In  the  legislative 
discussions, the Council raised doubts about the need for such an initiative, as well as about 
its timing in view of the negotiations on the EPPO and the need to evaluate the Regulation22. 
The European Parliament has so far not adopted a report on the proposal. 

The  establishment  of  the  EPPO  is  one  of  the  Commission's  key  priorities  in  the  area  of 
criminal justice and part of the overall strategy to combat fraud against the EU budget23. The 
EPPO, once established as an enhanced cooperation, will be the first EU body equipped with 
the power to conduct criminal investigations and prosecute crimes affecting the EU budget, 
such  as  fraud,  corruption  or  serious  cross-border  VAT  fraud  in  the  participating  Member 
States. It is expected to bring a more consistent and effective prosecution policy for crimes 
affecting  the  EU  budget,  leading  to  a  greater  number  of  prosecutions,  convictions  and  a 
higher level of recovery of fraudulently lost Union funds.  

A number of additional changes to the legal framework and on-going policy developments 
have  been  considered  in  this  evaluation,  primarily  from  the  perspective  of  the  future 
coherence  and  relevance  of  OLAF’s  mandate  and  investigative  function.  These  cover,  in 
particular, the Directive on the fight against fraud to the EU financial interests by means of 
criminal  law  (the  'PIF  Directive')24,  which  provides  for  minimum  rules  on  the  definition  of 
criminal  offences,  sanctions  and  limitation  periods,  and  replaces  the  previous  legal 

as 

the 

establishment  of 

a  Controller  of  procedural 

20  Regulation  (EU,  Euratom)  2016/2030  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26  October  2016  amending  Regulation  (EU, 
Euratom)  No  883/2013,  as  regards  the  secretariat  of  the  Supervisory  Committee  of  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office  (OLAF),  OJ  L  317, 
23.11.2016, pp. 1–3, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R2030.  
21 COM(2014) 340 final, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 
guarantees,  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
regards 
883/2013 
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2014:0340:FIN. 
22 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 as regards the 
establishment  of  a  controller  of  procedural  guarantees  -  Outcome  of  proceedings,  http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-
14075-2014-INIT/en/pdf.  
23 Based on Article 86 TFEU, the Commission adopted the proposal on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office in July 
2013 (Interinstitutional File 2013/0255 (APP)). At the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 8 June 2017, 20 Member States reached a general 
approach  on  the  Regulation  establishing  the  EPPO  under  enhanced  cooperation.  All  references  in  this  document  to  the  draft  EPPO 
Regulation  are  to  the  document  9941/17  (text  of  the  general  approach,  after  revision  by  the  lawyer-linguists),  available  at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9941-2017-INIT/en/pdf).  
24  Directive  (EU)  2017/1371  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  5  July  2017  on  the  fight  against  fraud  to  the  EU  financial 
interests  by  means  of  criminal  law,  OJ  L  198,  28.7.2017,  pp.  29–41,  to  be  transposed  by  the  Member  States  by  6  July  2019,  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32017L1371.  

6 

 
 
                                                            
framework  based  on  the  1995  Convention  and  its  protocols25;  the  Early  Detection  and 
Exclusion  System  ('EDES')  introduced  by  the  Financial  Regulation;  and  the  Commission's 
Action Plan on VAT26.  

3. IMPLEMENTATION, STATE OF PLAY AND RESULTS  

Regulation  883/2013  entered  into  force  on  1  October  2013  and  was  directly  applicable. 
Certain  provisions  have  been  subject  to  concrete  implementation  measures,  as  described 
below.  The  effects  of  their  implementation  and  relevant  data  are  discussed  in  section  5. 
Further (monitoring)  information is available in the  annual OLAF Reports27, annual Reports 
on the protection of the EU's financial interest28, OLAF's Strategic and Management Plans29 
and Annual Activity Reports30. 

Opening and conduct of investigations 

• 

The  Director-General  adopted  Guidelines  on  Investigation  Procedures  (GIPs)  for  OLAF 
Staff31, as required by the Regulation. They entered into force on 1 October 2013. 

•  As  part  of  a  reorganisation  of  OLAF  in  2012  anticipating  the  Regulation,  a  new 
Investigation Selection and Review Unit (ISRU) was created. It reports directly to OLAF’s 
Director-General,  and  advises  on  whether  to  open  or  dismiss  an  investigation  or 
coordination case on the basis of the Regulation’s selection criteria. As part of this unit a 
single  point  of  entry  (SPE)  was  established  to  centralise  incoming  information  of 
investigative interest and filter input relating to other activities of the Office. 

• 

Investigation  policy  priorities  (IPPs),  required  by  the  Regulation,  are  determined  each 
year by the Director-General and included in the Annual Management Plan since 2014.  

Procedural guarantees  

• 

• 

The  ISRU  performs  the  legality  check  mandated  by  the  Regulation  prior  to  certain 
investigation activities, and the overall review of final reports, draft decisions and draft 
recommendations. Complementary internal controls are carried out by the Advisers to 
the investigative Directorates, by OLAF’s Legal Advice Unit and by the Director-General.  

The  GIPs  implement  the  procedural  guarantees  as  well  as  the  internal  control 
procedures. They are complemented by other instructions to staff. 

•  OLAF's Data Protection Officer32 is in charge of monitoring compliance of OLAF with data 
protection requirements. In April 2013, the OLAF Director-General adopted Instructions 
to staff on data protection for investigative activities33.  

• 

Beyond  the  explicit  requirements  of  the  Regulation,  OLAF  has  followed  the 
internal 
recommendation  of 

its  Supervisory  Committee  to  better  formalise 

its 

25 Council Act of 26 July 1995 drawing up the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests, OJ  C 316, 
27.11.1995,  pp.  48–57,  and  Protocols  of  27  September  1996,  29  November  1996  and  19  June  1997,  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.1995.316.01.0048.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:1995:316:TOC. 
26 COM(2016) 148, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee on an action plan on VAT Towards a single EU VAT area - Time to decide 
27 https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/about-us/reports/olaf-report_en.  
28 https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/reports/.  
29 https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/about-us/mission_en.  
30 https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/annual-activity-report-2016-european-anti-fraud-office_en.  
31 https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/investigation-guidelines-olaf-staff_en.  
32 http://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/olaf-and-you/data-protection/olaf-data-protection-officer_en.   
33 http://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/olaf-and-you/data-protection/olaf-instructions-staff-data-protection-investigative-activities_en.  

7 

 
 
                                                            
complaints procedure. In January 2014, OLAF made public on its internet site modalities 
for persons involved in OLAF investigations to complain to the Director-General of OLAF 
about the respect of the procedural guarantees applicable in OLAF investigations34. 

Cooperation and information exchange with Member States 

•  Anti-fraud  coordination  services  (AFCOS)  are  established  in  all  Member  States  as 
required by the Regulation. In addition to bilateral cooperation with OLAF, OLAF and the 
AFCOS  also  meet  in  the  context  of  the  Advisory  Committee  for  the  Coordination  of 
Fraud Prevention (COCOLAF). 

•  OLAF  has  signed  14  administrative  cooperation  arrangements  (ACAs)  with  national 

authorities in 8 Member States35 (situation on 1 September 2017).  

• 

In  the  area  of  fraud  prevention  policy,  OLAF  works  with  Member  States  in  the 
framework of the COCOLAF and its sub-groups36.  

Cooperation with EU IBOAs 

•  Administrative  arrangements  for  the  conduct  of  investigations  have  been  agreed  with 

several IBOAs37.  

•  Administrative  arrangements  for  operational  cooperation  have  been  agreed  with 
Europol and Eurojust38. Revised arrangements are under discussion with Europol, based 
on Regulation 883/2013 and the recently adopted Europol Regulation39.  

•  OLAF  cooperates  with  the  Commission  services  to  facilitate  the  exchange  of  best 
practices  and  to  provide  guidance  and  assistance,  in  the  framework  of  the  Fraud 
Prevention  and  Detection  Network  (FPDNet),  established  pursuant  to  the  Commission 
Anti-Fraud Strategy (CAFS)40. 

Cooperation with third countries and international organisations 

•  OLAF  has 

signed  ACAs  with  27 

third  country  authorities  and  with  12 

international/regional organisations. 

L 

71, 

2005 

17.3.2005, 

94/140/EC,  OJ 

34 http://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/olaf-and-you/complaints-olaf-investigations_en  
35  ACAs  are  administrative  instruments  of  a  technical  and  operational  nature  which  establish  the  practical  modalities  for  operational 
cooperation within OLAF's mandate. They are not a prerequisite for OLAF cooperation with Member States. Most of the ACAs with national 
authorities in place predate the Regulation, which clarified obligation for cooperation for Member States.  
36 Commission Decision 94/140/EC of 23 February 1994 setting up an advisory committee for the coordination of fraud prevention, OJ L 61, 
4.3.1994, pp. 27-28, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:31994D0140,  and Commission Decision 2005/223/EC of 25 
February 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
amending  Decision 
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1505829846008&uri=CELEX:32005D0223.  
37  European  Commission,  European  Parliament,  Council,  European  External  Action  Service,  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee, 
Committee  of  the  Regions,  European  Central  Bank,  European  Investment  Bank,  European  Investment  Fund.  The  administrative 
arrangements with the European Parliament were signed in 2013 before the Regulation entered into force. 
38 Practical Agreement on arrangements of cooperation between Eurojust and OLAF signed on 24 September 2008 and published in OJ C 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
314, 
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2008.314.01.0003.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2008:314:FULL.  Administrative  arrangement  between 
the 
European  Police  Office  (Europol)  and  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office  (OLAF)  signed  on  18  April  2004,  https://ec.europa.eu/anti-
fraud/sites/antifraud/files/docs/body/administrative_arrangement_olaf_europol_en.pdf.  
39  Regulation  (EU)  2016/794  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  May  2016  on  the  European  Union  Agency  for  Law 
Enforcement  Cooperation  (Europol)  and  replacing  and  repealing  Council  Decisions  2009/371/JHA,  2009/934/JHA,  2009/935/JHA, 
2009/936/JHA 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0794.  
40 COM(2011) 376 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee, and the Committee of the Regions and the Courts of Auditors on the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy,  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2011:0376:FIN.  

2009/968/JHA, 

9.12.2008, 

24.5.2016, 

53–114, 

67-68, 

135, 

3-4, 

and 

pp. 

pp. 

pp. 

OJ 

L 

8 

 
 
                                                            
Governance of OLAF 

•  Working  arrangements  between  the  Supervisory  Committee  and  OLAF,  implementing 
the Regulation, were adopted on 14 January 201441, replacing earlier arrangements of 
September  2012.  At  the  end  of  March  2017,  these  working  arrangements  were 
discontinued  at  the  Supervisory  Committee's  request.  The  new  Committee  has 
expressed willingness to restart discussions to adopt new working arrangements. 

4. METHOD/PROCESS FOLLOWED  

4.1. Procedural aspects of the evaluation  

Work  on  the  evaluation  started  in  mid-2015.  An  Inter-Service  Steering  Group  (ISSG)  of 
Commission services was set up42 to follow the evaluation process at every step. It reviewed 
the roadmap, the terms of reference for the external contract, and all external deliverables. 
The ISSG was also closely involved in the preparation of the report and this SWD.  

An  OLAF  internal  working  group  was  set  up  to  support  the  evaluation  with  expertise  and 
experience on the conduct of investigations and knowledge of the investigative processes.  

An external contract for a study to support the Commission evaluation was signed with ICF 
International ltd (ICF)43. ICF's report is a crucial contribution to this staff working document, 
although  other  sources  have  been  also  used  (and  are  referenced  as  appropriate  in  the 
relevant sections). ICF also carried out consultation of stakeholders as discussed and agreed 
with  the  ISSG.  ICF's  final  evaluation  report  expresses  the  views  of  ICF  and,  unless  stated 
otherwise  in  this  SWD,  the  Commission  neither  endorses  these  findings  nor  can  it  be  held 
responsible for its content.  

On  1-2  March  2017  OLAF  organised  a  conference  on  the  evaluation  of  Regulation 
883/201344 involving close to 250 participants from various groups of stakeholders.  

Annex 1 provides more detail related to the procedural aspects of the evaluation. Annex 2 
provides a synopsis of the stakeholder consultation. 

4.2. Evaluation methodology 

This  staff  working  document  answers  questions  (Annex  4)  identified  in  the  evaluation 
roadmap. These questions were further detailed in the terms of reference for the external 
contract  and  operationalised  by  the  contractor  using  judgement  criteria,  indicators  and 
means of verification. The evaluation framework is presented in detail in Annex 3. 

The evaluation built on a number of research tools to generate the intended evidence.  

Desk research was used to collect, structure and analyse relevant documentation related to 
the implementation of the Regulation. A comprehensive legal analysis of the Regulation and 
other relevant legal instruments assessed the clarity of provisions, the internal and external 
coherence and their impact on the functioning of the Regulation. 

41 http://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/sites/antifraud/files/docs/body/working_arrangements_olaf_supervisory_committee_en.pdf.  
42The ISSG was composed of representatives of the Directorates General for Human Resources and Security, for Budget and for Justice and 
Consumers, and by the Secretariat General, the Legal Service and OLAF. 
43The open call for tender was launched on 23 March 2016 with a deadline for offers by 10 May 2016. The contract was signed on 26 July 
2016.  The  contract  was  entered 
in  ABAC  with  the  number:  SI2.735723,  http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:097025-
2016:TEXT:EN:HTML  
44All available presentations from the conference are available on the Commission website at   https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/policy/olaf-
regulation-evaluation/conference_en. 

9 

 
 
                                                            
The stakeholder consultation was organised by way of a survey to around 170 respondents 
and 160 interviews with key stakeholders45. Five case studies were used to develop the key 
findings using evidence from the stakeholder interviews and the online survey. In addition to 
the OLAF conference on the evaluation, the external contractor’s team attended two other 
conferences  and  expert  meetings,  and  organised  two  internal  validation  workshops  of 
evaluation findings46.  

4.3. Evaluation challenges and limitations 

The  evaluation  work  was  based  on  about  three  years  of  application  of  the  Regulation, 
which  means  that  very  limited  evidence  was  available  on  the  impacts  of  its  application. 
Certain  provisions  of  the  Regulation  may  not  have  yielded  their  full  results  yet.  While  this 
limitation could not be addressed, given the requirement of the Regulation to complete the 
evaluation  by  a  certain  date,  the  research  and  consultation  tools  were  designed  so  as  to 
capture comprehensive information on the application of the Regulation on the three years 
after entry into force.  

A number of challenges arose throughout the evaluation by the external contractor, which 
impacted the nature and extent of the analysis and the strength of the conclusions drawn.  

led  to  a  greater  emphasis  on  qualitative  data  and  analysis.  The 

First,  as  it  was  not  possible  for  reasons  of  confidentiality  of  investigations  to  give  the 
contractor access to the files of individual cases, they worked on aggregated data provided 
by OLAF on a set of agreed indicators. The lack of disaggregated case-level data prevented 
the benchmarking and advanced quantitative analysis originally planned by the contractor, 
and 
lack  of 
disaggregated/granular data meant, for example, that it was not possible to link outcomes to 
specific investigations or specific provision under the Regulation. However, the findings from 
the  contribution  analysis  provided  some  evidence  of  the  links  between  provisions  of  the 
Regulation  and  outcomes,  while  data  on  recoveries,  prosecution,  etc.  provide  some 
additional contextual evidence that allowed the contractor to build conclusions.  

Second, it proved challenging to limit the length/detail of the stakeholder consultation tools 
(interview  topic  guides  and  survey  questionnaire)  which  lengthened  the  duration  of  the 
stakeholder consultation activities. Despite this, all planned interviews were completed and 
the response rate to the online survey was positive. Third, the results of the survey analysis 
may suffer from a slight positive bias given that around one-third of respondents were OLAF 
staff  or  divergent  opinions  were  expressed  per  type  of  stakeholders.  To  take  this 
circumstance into account, the external contractor reported the results by stakeholder type 
throughout their final report, although this has not been done systematically.  

In summary, a combination of the mitigating actions taken, and the diversity of the evidence 
gathered  and  the  types  of  analysis  undertaken  (not  overly  reliant  on  one  approach  over 
another), helped to ensure overall sound evaluation conclusions. 

45 It is estimated that 61 stakeholders were consulted via both interviews and the online survey. A detailed breakdown is provided in the 
stakeholder consultation report, Annex 2. 
46 ICF report, section 2.2.3, and annex 4. 

10 

 
 
                                                            
5. ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS  

5.1. Relevance 

This  section  focuses  on  the  relevance  of  the  Regulation  for  the  overarching  objective  of 
protecting the EU financial interests.  

To what extent have the specific objectives of Regulation 883/2013 proven to be relevant 
for the overarching objective of protection of the EU financial interests?  

The  specific  objectives  of  the  Regulation  (section  2.1.)  aim  at  improving  the  effectiveness, 
efficiency  and  accountability  of  OLAF  and  at  strengthening  procedural  guarantees, 
governance and cooperation with partners. The evaluation has shown that these objectives 
have proven to be, and remain, relevant for the overarching objective of protection of the 
EU financial interests. 

Improving the effectiveness and efficiency of investigations  

The relevance of OLAF's investigative mandate and role in the protection of the EU financial 
interests  was  confirmed  already  by  the  evaluation  in  2003.  The  revision  of  the  previous 
legislative  framework  targeted  issues  linked  to  the  conduct  of  investigations,  but  its 
relevance  has  never  been  put  in  question.  This  is  also  closely  linked  to  the  fact  that  OLAF 
ensures the protection of the EU financial interests through specific tasks performed at EU 
level which could not be carried out at the national level alone.  

The specific role that OLAF plays was confirmed during the consultation process of national 
stakeholders  and  IBOAs.  Some  AFCOS  representatives  highlighted  the  scope  of  the 
Regulation as particularly relevant, given OLAF’s mandate covering all illegal activity affecting 
the  EU  financial  interests  compared  to  the  more  limited  competence  of  certain  national 
authorities.  AFCOS,  as  well  as  judicial  and  managing  authorities,  also  highlighted  the 
relevance and added value of the investigations governed by the Regulation in the detection 
of, and fight against, transnational fraud. National authorities referred to the relevance and 
positive impact of the Regulation on national awareness and activities for the protection of 
the EU financial interests. 

At the same time, the evaluation revealed that the  relevance of OLAF investigative actions 
varies across Member States. Interviews with national stakeholders47 and OLAF staff suggest 
that  the  main  limitation  to  the  relevance  of  OLAF’s  investigations  in  the  Member  States  is 
linked to the limited follow-up to judicial recommendations (see section 5.2, effectiveness). 
Finally, the evaluation showed that certain investigation tools should be further adapted to 
the changing landscape of cross-border crime and technical progress to remain relevant. 

Strengthening procedural guarantees and control mechanisms  

Procedural  rights  and  controls  are  central  to  any  robust  system  of  law  enforcement.  Their 
relevance has not been questioned by any stakeholder consulted. The inclusion of Article 9 
of  the  Regulation  on  procedural  guarantees  was  generally  recognised  as  a  positive 
development  (see  section  5.2  on  effectiveness).  The  specific  issue  of  the  balance  between 
the procedural guarantees and controls and the powers of OLAF to investigate is discussed in 
section 5.4 on coherence. 

47 Representatives of AFCOS, judicial and managing authorities. 

11 

 
 
                                                            
Strengthening cooperation and information exchange with partners 

The implementation of the EU budget by multiple actors at EU and national level, as well as 
the nature of OLAF investigations – conducted in the territory of the Member States or third 
countries  or  in  EU  IBOAs,  and  relying  on  the  subsequent  follow-up  to  recommendations  – 
makes  cooperation  with  partners  indispensable.  It  is  therefore  not  surprising  that  the 
Regulation’s  specific  objective  to  strengthen  cooperation  mechanisms  was  not  questioned 
during the evaluation.  

Several  provisions  in  the  Regulation  have  been  highlighted  by  consulted  stakeholders  as 
particularly relevant  to promote  cooperation  with  partners.  This  concerns  in  particular  the 
creation  of  the  "anti-fraud  coordination  services"  (AFCOS)  to  facilitate  the  cooperation 
between  OLAF  and  the  Member  States,  and  the  basis  provided  by  the Regulation  to  enter 
into ACAs with different partners to establish concrete modalities for cooperation.   

Strengthening the governance of OLAF 

The  hybrid  model  of  OLAF  -  independent  in  its  investigative  function  and  a  Commission 
service  responsible  for  anti-fraud  policy  -  motivated  the  creation  of  external  controls  to 
guarantee  its  independence  in  the  performance  of  the  investigative  function.  This  has  not 
been disputed by any consulted stakeholders, which agreed that the role performed by the 
Supervisory  Committee  to  ensure  OLAF’s  independence  is  relevant  and  necessary.  The 
Regulation  also  reinforced  aspects  of  accountability  by  introducing  the  annual  inter-
institutional exchange of views48. 

Relevance of the Regulation’s specific objectives in the context of the EPPO 

The  future  EPPO  will  be  competent  for  criminal  investigations  and  prosecutions  in  the 
participating  Member  States  as  regards  the  offences  harmonised  by  the  PIF  Directive.  The 
mandate  of  OLAF  under  Regulation  883/2013  encompasses  administrative  investigations 
into both fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities in all Member States. 

There is no need here to consider the impact of the establishment of the EPPO on areas of 
OLAF's investigative mandate outside the remit of the EPPO49. In the area of investigations 
into  suspected  fraudulent  irregularities,  where  OLAF  will  maintain  its  mandate  for  the 
conduct  of  administrative  investigations,  the  draft  EPPO  Regulation  governs  the  future 
relationship between the  EPPO and OLAF on the basis of the assumption that both bodies 
will act in a complementary way, and avoid undue duplication. 

The creation of the  EPPO therefore does not put into question the continued relevance of 
the objectives of Regulation 883/2013. The EPPO and OLAF will deal with distinct aspects of 
the  fight  against  fraud  affecting  the  EU  financial  interests  (criminal  and  administrative, 
respectively) and their activities will be largely complementary. 

48 Article 16 of Regulation 883/2013 provides for the organisation of an exchange of views at political level to discuss the Office’s policy 
relating to methods of preventing and combating fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union 
once  a  year  between  OLAF’s  Director  General  and  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  and  the  Commission  with  participation  of  the 
Supervisory  Committee.  Representatives  of  the  Court  of  Auditors,  Eurojust  and/or  Europol  may  be  invited  to  attend  on  an  ad  hoc  basis 
upon request of the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Director-General or the Supervisory Committee. 
49  Irregularities  which  do  not  involve  criminal  behaviour,  investigations  in  Member  States  which  will  not  participate  in  the  EPPO,  and 
serious misconduct by EU staff and members of the institutions where the EU financial interests are not at stake. 

12 

 
 
                                                            
5.2. Effectiveness 

This section presents the evaluation findings regarding the effectiveness of the Regulation: 
the  extent  to  which  it  has  achieved  its  objectives  and  any  significant  factors  that  have 
contributed to or inhibited progress towards those objectives. The objectives are reflected in 
the sub-headings of this section. 

The three questions below guided the research carried out by the external contractor. Given 
that their answers considerably overlap, to avoid repetitions the answer is provided jointly in 
the  sections  below.  In  particular  concerning  the  second  question,  the  external  factors  are 
identified as such in the different sub-sections of this section. 

How have the Regulation and, more specifically, its different elements contributed to the 
specific objectives of Regulation 883/2013 (in particular, reinforced procedural guarantees 
of  persons  concerned  and  better  information  and  cooperation  between  OLAF  and 
Institutions,  bodies,  agencies  and  other  competent  authorities)  and  to  an  improved 
protection of the EU financial interests (recovery, prosecution, indictment and deterrence)? 

Which  are  the  external  factors  (in  particular  the  follow-up  responsibilities  –  once  OLAF 
concludes  an  investigation  -  of  Member  States  and  other  Commission  services  and  EU 
institutions,  bodies,  offices  and  agencies)  that  have  contributed  to  or  influenced  the 
achievement of the objectives of Regulation 883/2013, and how?  

Can  shortcomings  be  identified  in  the  different  elements  of  Regulation  883/2013  which 
negatively affect the achievements of its objectives?  

5.2.1. Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of OLAF’s investigative activity 

The  effectiveness  of  OLAF  investigations  is  linked  to  various  provisions  in  the  Regulation, 
concerning the selection and opening of cases, the procedure and tools for the conduct of 
investigations,  and  the  duration,  output  of  and  follow-up  to  investigations,  as  discussed 
below. Efficiency aspects of this objective are dealt with in section 5.3. 

The Regulation should allow OLAF to conduct administrative investigations into corruption, 
fraud  and  any  other  illegal  activity  affecting  the  EU  financial  interests  that  lead  to  the 
successful  recovery  of  EU  funds,  or  to  disciplinary  or  judicial  action.  Over  time,  OLAF  has 
adapted to the changing nature and increasing complexity of fraud with EU funds50. In this 
context, the evaluation has also looked at the adequacy and sufficiency of OLAF’s tools and 
powers to deal with fraud in the context of current challenges and fraud trends. 

5.2.1.1. Opening of investigations 

The case selection criteria for the opening of investigations are one of the innovations of the 
Regulation51.  Once  a  sufficient  suspicion  of  fraud,  corruption  or  any  other  illegal  activity 
affecting  the  Union's  financial  interests  is  established,  the  following  criteria  are  taken  into 
account:  the  investigation  policy  priorities  (IPPs)  and  the  annual  management  plan  of  the 
Office,  the  efficient  use  of  the  Office's  resources  and  the  proportionality  of  the  means 
employed, and – for internal investigations - whether another IBOA is best placed to act. The 
Regulation does not establish a hierarchy of these other criteria. 

50 2016 OLAF report, pp. 15 and following. 
51 Article 5(1) of the Regulation. 

13 

 
 
                                                            
An analysis of the effectiveness of the application of each of the criteria individually was not 
possible since there is no available quantifiable data. The contractor looked in particular into 
the  application  of  the  IPPs,  which  were  introduced  by  the  Regulation  to  allow  OLAF  to 
concentrate on priority actions52. Evidence collected53 shows that they play a certain role in 
case selection, but have only partially served to concentrate OLAF's activity around a set of 
priority areas (e.g. in 2016, 30% of opened cases fell under the IPPs54). This can be explained 
by a number of factors. Habitually OLAF performs its case selection on incoming information 
from public and private sources, rather than opening cases on its own initiative on the basis 
of  a  pro-active  data  analysis.  Moreover,  the  rate  of  dismissal  based  on  the  absence  of  a 
sufficient  suspicion  of  fraud  is  on  average  50%  of  the  cases  dismissed  by  OLAF55,  which 
results  in  the  fact  that  OLAF  performs  its  case  selection  on  a  relatively  limited  number  of 
cases.  

As regards precisely the IPPs, this shows that OLAF manages to handle all cases where the 
application of all selection criteria points towards the opening of an investigation and does 
not  need  to  discard  cases  only  because  they  do  not  fall  under  the  IPPs.  Therefore,  even 
though the IPPs only partially lead to concentrating on selected priority areas, this does not 
appear as a shortcoming of the Regulation or its application. 

Various stakeholders shared a common view that the application of the criteria and impact 
on the selection of cases was unclear56. The contractor concluded that the perceived lack of 
clarity  of  the  case  selection  criteria  by  stakeholders  may  be  caused  by  the  fact  that  the 
Regulation  is  not  specific  about  how  they  should  apply  and/or  by  the  limited  level  of  the 
information provided by OLAF on the reasons for opening or dismissing a case57. However, it 
should also be noted that, while the selection criteria must be taken into account, they leave 
a margin of discretion for the Director-General to decide on the opening of cases. It is also 
often  the  case  that  the  criteria  (in  particular  efficiency,  proportionality  and  –  in  internal 
investigations – which IBOA is best placed to act) are considered in conjunction.  

5.2.1.2. Conduct of investigations  

The  range  of  powers  and  tools  available  to  OLAF  under  the  1999  Regulations,  and  further 
developed  in  Regulation  883/2013,  have  allowed  OLAF  to  deliver  concrete  results  in  the 
protection of the EU financial interests58 and to significantly increase the number of opened 
and  concluded  investigations  (Table  1).  At  the  same  time,  the  evaluation  has  shown  some 
limitations  in  the  available  powers  and  tools  or  in  their  application.  These  limitations  are 
outlined  below,  and  some  were  already  identified  in  the  2003  evaluation  of  the  previous 
legislative framework.  

on 

52  See  the  2006  proposal,  COM(2006)  244  final.  The  Supervisory  Committee  has  also  analysed  the  IPPs  in  several  instances:  Opinions 
1/2014, 2/2014 and 3/2015, available at http://europa.eu/supervisory-committee-olaf/opinions.  
53 OLAF annual reports and interviews for the evaluation. 
54 OLAF (2015), Note for the attention of Mr Tuomas Pöysti, Chairman of the OLAF Supervisory Committee, Subject: Supervisory Committee 
http://europa.eu/supervisory-committee-
Investigation 
comments 
olaf/sites/default/files/documents/publications/olaf-reply-sc-opinion/olaf_reply_sc_analysis_ipp_2015_en.pdf. 
55  According  to  an  internal  study  of  the  selection  process  conducted  in  OLAF,  from  a  sample  of  1902  cases  dismissed  during  the  period 
between January 2015 and October 2016, 929 were dismissed for insufficiency of suspicions alone. 
56 AFCOS representatives, Commission services, national judicial and managing authorities, other EU IBOAs and international organisations, 
ICF report, section 4.1.1.3. 
57 ICF report, section 4.1.2.4. 
58 The OLAF annual reports illustrate the role played by OLAF to combat fraud to EU funds. 

Priorities, 

Policy 

OLAF 

2015 

14 

 
 
                                                            
Table 1: OLAF's investigative activities 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

Investigations opened 

Investigations concluded 

Recommendations issued 

160 

140 

194 

152 

136 

172 

146 

154 

175 

43159 

266 

199 

253 

293 

353 

234 

250 

397 

219 

304 

364 

219 

272 

346 

Source: OLAF 2016 report 

On-the-spot checks and inspections 

Among  OLAF's  most  important  investigative  tools  and  powers  are  the  on-the-spot  checks 
and inspections, as set  out in Article 3 of Regulation 883/2013  and in  Regulation 2185/96. 
These  Regulations  provide  OLAF  with  its  own  autonomous  power  to  conduct  controls 
“subject to the Union law applicable” and “in compliance with […] the procedural guarantees 
of  Regulation  883/2013”60.  At  the  same  time,  both  Regulations  refer  to  compliance  with 
applicable national law ("and practices", in Regulation 883/2013).  

In  this  context,  the  evaluation  has  shown  that  different  interpretations  of  the  extent  to 
which national law applies, as well as differences in national law, result in fragmentation in 
the conduct of on-the-spot-checks in the Member States.  

The external contractor reports that the application of the reference to national laws in the 
Regulation has been identified by both OLAF staff and stakeholders61 as the major challenge 
influencing  the  effectiveness  of  the  conduct  of  on-the-spot  checks  and,  in  the  end, 
potentially delaying investigations and compromising their completeness and/or quality. The 
evaluation findings show that this can hinder OLAF’s ability to use on-the-spot checks as an 
investigative tool consistently across Member States. This can limit OLAF’s ability to ensure 
an equivalent protection of the EU financial interests across Member States, as required by 
Article 325 TFEU.  

This  issue  has  also  been  raised  by  other  independent  reports,  such  as  an  Ecorys  2013 
report62 and a recent Utrecht University  study comparing OLAF’s powers to those of three 
other  EU  authorities  exercising  competences  of  administrative  investigation  under  Union 
law63. The authorities compared to OLAF were DG Competition in the European Commission, 
the  European  Central  Bank  and  the  European  Securities  and  Markets  Authority.  This  study 
considers  the  application  of  Regulation  883/2013  suffers  from  a  "variable  geometry" 
concerning  the  exact  extent  of  OLAF’s  investigative  powers,  and  that  these  divergences  in 
the application of EU law powers is greater than for the other authorities considered.  

59 The figures for 2012 include 219 investigation cases, already under evaluation, opened as a result of the reorganisation of 1.2.2012. 
60 Article 3(3) of the Regulation reads: "During on-the-spot checks and inspections, the staff of the Office shall act, subject to the Union law 
applicable, in compliance with the rules and practices of the Member State concerned and with the procedural guarantees provided for in 
this Regulation."  
61 ICF report, section 4.2. 
62 "Study on impact of strengthening of administrative and criminal law procedural rules for the protection of the EU financial  interests", 
JUST/A4/2011/EVAL/01,  Project  coordinator  Ecorys  NL  Project  partner  ECLAN  (subcontractor),  Rotterdam,  11  February  2013;  see  in 
particular its point 4.2. 
63  "Investigatory  powers  and  procedural  safeguards:  Improving  OLAF’s  legislative  framework  through  a  comparison  with  other  EU  law 
enforcement 
2017, 
https://www.ris.uu.nl/ws/files/32039338/Report_Investigatory_powers_and_procedural_safeguards_Utrecht_University_1_.pdf.  While 
the authorities compared have different mandates, which may justify differences in their legal framework and the nature of their powers, 
the comparative analysis provides very useful insights into the way that the powers of EU administrative bodies may be defined in EU law. 

(ECN/ESMA/ECB)", 

authorities 

Luchtman 

Vervaele 

Michiel 

(eds), 

April 

John 

& 

15 

 
 
  
                                                            
Furthermore, the Regulation does not provide OLAF with tools to enforce its powers in the 
case of refusal or obstruction by persons concerned by investigations64. When an economic 
operator subject to investigation resists an on-the-spot-check or inspection, OLAF inspectors 
have to rely on the assistance of national authorities for coercive measures. In this regard, 
the  competent  authorities  of  the  Member  States  are  required  by  the  Regulation  to,  in 
conformity  with  national  rules,  give  the  necessary  assistance  to  enable  OLAF  staff  to  fulfil 
their  tasks  effectively65.  There  are  substantial  divergences  in  the  way  this  is  applied,  as  a 
result of different national rules. In comparison, other EU authorities that rely on assistance 
by  national  authorities  for  coercive  measures,  benefit  from  a  more  specific 
legal 
framework66.  In  this  regard,  the  Utrecht  University  study  noted  that  other  EU  bodies  with 
administrative  investigative  competencies  have  themselves  the  power  to  impose  penalties 
for lack of cooperation67.  

To  illustrate  the  above,  information  collected  by  OLAF  through  a  questionnaire  among 
Member  States  on  the  conduct  of  on-the-spots-checks,  in  2015,  reveals  the  variety  of 
scenarios  that  OLAF  is  confronted  with  when  applying  its  power  to  conduct  on-the-spot 
checks. The possibility to use coercive powers to assist OLAF in the conduct of a check was 
possible, at the time of the questionnaire, in around half of the Member States as regards 
both revenue and expenditure. In the remaining Member States, coercive powers to support 
OLAF were available only in revenue cases, or only in expenditure cases, or not at all. 

Digital forensic operations 

The issues arising from the references to national law in Regulations 883/2013 and 2185/96, 
are  specifically  relevant  to  the  use  of  digital  forensic  operations68  in  the  framework  of  on-
the-spot checks. While the Regulation specifically provides for access by OLAF to computer 
data, the impact of the general reference, for on-the-spot checks, to “the same conditions as 
national  administrative 
is 
particularly felt in this area70.  

in  compliance  with  national 

inspectors  and 

legislation”69 

A questionnaire among Member States on the conduct of on-the-spots-checks carried out by 
OLAF in 2015 collected information on the access to electronic communications by national 
administrative inspectors. In around one third of Member States, access was not possible in 
administrative  investigations;  in  another  third,  access  could  only  be  granted  by  a  court  or 
authority  different  from  the  administrative  inspector;  in  the  remaining  Member  States, 
access  was  possible  by  the  administrative  authority,  or  only  with  the  agreement  of  the 
economic  operator.  This  illustrates  not  only  the  divergences  that  OLAF  may  face,  but  also 
that,  in  some  instances,  OLAF’s  equivalent  access  to  that  of  national  inspectors  does  not 
ensure the effective application of the power to collect computer data granted by EU law.  

A number of consulted stakeholders have also raised questions surrounding aspects of the 
interpretation,  and  the  possible  need  to  clarify,  the  provisions  allowing  OLAF  to  carry  out 

64 Difficulties of implementation had already been noted, related to the refusal of economic operators to cooperate in terms of  access to 
buildings  or  documentation,  already  in  the  evaluation  of  Regulation  2185/96,  SEC(2000)844;  see  also  the  2003  evaluation  of  the  1999 
Regulations preceding the Regulation, COM(2003) 154, point 1.1.2. 
65 Article 7(3) of the Regulation.  
66 For instance, in Commission antitrust proceedings, Article 20 (4) to (8) of Regulation 1/2003. 
67 Utrecht University study, chapter "Comparison of the legal frameworks", pp. 247 and following. 
68 Digital forensic activities concern identification, acquisition, imaging, collection, analysis and preservation of digital evidence. 
69 Article 7 of Regulation 2185/96.  
70 ICF report, section 4.2.2.4. 

16 

 
 
                                                            
digital  forensic  operations  in  both  internal  and  external  investigations.  The  evaluation 
showed that the ambiguity surrounding digital forensic operations under different scenarios 
involving a mix of private devices can hinder OLAF’s ability to gather digital forensic evidence 
as part of its investigations.71 

Internal investigations 

In  internal  investigations,  OLAF  conducts  inspections  of  premises  and  digital  forensic 
operations within the IBOAs. The conduct of internal investigations is not based solely on the 
Regulation, but depends also on the terms of  individual internal decisions adopted by the 
IBOAs  pursuant  to  the  Interinstitutional  Agreement  concerning  internal  investigations  by 
OLAF72.  These  decisions  can  (and  do)  deviate  from  the  model  decision  attached  to  the 
Agreement,  based  on  the  institutional  autonomy  and  the  specificities  of  each  IBOA.  The 
resulting differences mainly concern the duty to cooperate with OLAF and the duty to supply 
information73.  Moreover,  OLAF  has  entered  administrative  arrangements  on  cooperation 
and  exchange  of  information  with  a  number  of  IBOAs,  further  specifying  the  modalities  of 
cooperation on investigations74. 

To ensure that the system established by the Interinstitutional Agreement, at a time where 
the number of individual decisions has gone from the three original signatories to above 60, 
allows the conduct of internal investigations in equivalent conditions in all IBOAs, it has been 
suggested during the evaluation (in particular by OLAF investigative staff consulted) that the 
main rules concerning internal investigations should be laid down and further clarified in the 
Regulation itself so as to apply uniformly in all IBOAs.  

There  are,  in  particular,  divergent  interpretations  between  institutions  with  regard  to  the 
possibility of OLAF to access the offices of Members of an institution. To address this, OLAF 
investigative staff have suggested that the right to inspect premises should be more clearly 
spelled out in the Regulation, which refers to the “right of immediate and announced access 
to  any  relevant  information”75  held  by  IBOAs,  together  with  clearer  conditions  for  the 
immediate and announced access76. 

71 Article 4(2)(a) of the Regulation provides that the Office "may take a copy of, and obtain extracts from, any document or the contents of 
any  data  medium  held  by  the  institutions,  bodies,  offices  and  agencies  and,  if  necessary,  assume  custody  of  such  documents  or  data  to 
ensure that there is no danger of their disappearance” (emphasis added). The increasing use of privately owned devices for work purposes 
in the IBOAs has brought up new questions regarding the extent of OLAF's powers to access/assume custody of such devices when their 
contents may be relevant to the investigation. Article 7 of Regulation 2185/96 enables OLAF (inter alia) to access “computer  data” in the 
framework  of  on-the-spot-checks.  Technological  development  and  the  emergence  of  new  forms  of  data  storage  and  new  forms  of 
hardware can lead to the contestation of OLAF's powers. See also ICF report, section 4.2.2.4. 
72 Interinstitutional Agreement of 25 May 1999 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the Commission 
of the European Communities concerning internal investigations by the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF), OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 15–19, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31999Q0531. See Model Decision in Annex; there are currently more than 
60 such decisions adopted by EU IBOAs. 
73  These  differences  have  already  been  pointed  out  in  the  past,  including  in  the  evaluation  of  the  1999  Regulations  conducted  in  2003, 
COM(2003)154, p. 7-8. See also in this respect J.F.H. Inghelram, "Legal and Institutional Aspects of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). 
An Analysis with a Look Forward to a European Public prosecutor's Office", Europa Law Publishing, 2011, p. 99, where the author mentions 
the decisions according to which officials are not permitted to convey information directly to OLAF, contrary to what is provided for by the 
model decision, but are obliged to pass it through an internal authority. 
74 ICF report, section 6.2.1.3. 
75 Article 4(2)(a) of the Regulation. 
76 For example, the current Practical Arrangements with the European Parliament, dating from 19.07.2013, provide in point 5.4 that OLAF 
must inform the European Parliament of its intention to access its premises at least 48 hours in advance, whereas  Article 4(2)(a) of the 
Regulation  provides  for  the  right  to  "immediate  and  unannounced  access"  to  information  detained  by  the  IBOAs.  See  also  ICF  report 
sections 4.2.1.3 and section 4.2.1.4. 

17 

 
 
                                                            
Access to bank account information 
In the framework of its investigations, OLAF can inspect the  accounts of the IBOAs77. Such 
power  does  not  exist  in  Regulation  883/2013  as  regards  the  private  bank  accounts  of  EU 
staff or economic operators and their staff who are under investigation. In the framework of 
on-the-spot  checks,  OLAF  can  have  access  to  the  bank  statements  held  by  economic 
operators78  (limited  to  what  is  in  their  possession).  In  order  to  have  full  access  to  bank 
information,  OLAF  is  dependent  on  its  national  counterparts  (administrative  or  judicial 
bodies)  and  their  own  powers  under  national  law  to  provide  bank  data  to  OLAF,  which 
naturally creates inconsistencies across Member States.  

Some  OLAF  staff  consulted  during  the  evaluation  have  stressed  that  access  to  bank  data, 
with  at  least  the  ability  to  identify  the  accounts  of  persons  investigated,  is  necessary  to 
identify  the  money  flow 
internal  and  external 
investigations79.  They  have  also  indicated  that  access  to  bank  data  appears  necessary  in 
order to enable OLAF to fulfil its mandate in the fight against VAT fraud as well (see section 
5.4.5)80. 

in  various  types  of  fraud 

in  both 

5.2.1.3. Final reports and follow-up to recommendations 

OLAF provides financial, disciplinary, judicial and administrative recommendations to IBOAs 
and Member States. The extent of the follow-up by their recipients determines the impact of 
OLAF’s investigations in the protection of the EU financial interests.  

indicates 

Table  1  above 
investigations  concluded  and 
recommendations  issued  every  year.  Table  2  below  provides  a  break-down  of  the  issued 
recommendations by type. 

increasing  numbers  of  OLAF 

Table 2: OLAF recommendations 

Type of recommendation 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

Financial 

Judicial 

Disciplinary 

Administrative81 

Total 

Source: 2016 OLAF report 

76 

61 

18 

39 

62 

67 

10 

33 

63 

73 

16 

23 

116 

233 

54 

25 

4 

85 

24 

11 

253 

101 

15 

28 

220 

209 

98 

16 

30 

87 

18 

32 

194 

172 

175 

199 

353 

397 

364 

346 

OLAF  monitors  the  follow-up  to  its  judicial,  financial  and  disciplinary  recommendations  on 
the basis of information submitted to it by Member States and IBOAs82. The  monitoring is 

77 Article 4(2)(a) of the Regulation. 
78 Article 7 of Regulation 2185/96. 
79  E.g.  when  the  fraud  is  suspected  of  being  committed  by  misappropriations  of  funds,  chain  of  shell  companies,  or  is  linked  with 
corruption, or when fraudsters try to divert payments from IBOAs due to contractors by providing the IBOA with a "new" bank account 
number, on the letter head  of the contractor; in such cases, OLAF has  no possibility to check this new bank account and  has to rely on 
Member States to find out the identity of the owner of the account. 
80 ICF report, sections 5.3.2 and 9.3.2. 
81  The  administrative  recommendations  issued  by  OLAF  are  of  two  types:  case-related  administrative  recommendations,  arising  in  a 
concrete  case  and  destined  to  address  a  specific  issue  related  to  that  case,  and  systemic  administrative  recommendations,  where  the 
investigation  identifies  weaknesses  in  management  or  control  systems  or  in  the  legal  framework  .They  are  not  monitored  currently, 
therefore their effectiveness cannot be assessed; they have thus not been included in the analysis of this section. 
82 The Regulation introduced the obligation for Member States to send to OLAF, at its request, information on the action taken following 
transmission of the final reports and recommendations (Article 11(6)). The 2003 evaluation of the 1999 Regulations (see Recommendation 

18 

 
 
                                                            
 
initiative  and  concerns  all  the 

judicial,  financial  and  disciplinary 
done  at  OLAF's 
recommendations issued. OLAF systematically requests information on the implementation 
of its recommendations from the competent authorities of the Member States (for judicial 
recommendations  and  financial  recommendations  in  the  area  of  revenue)  and  from  IBOAs 
(for  disciplinary  recommendations  and  financial  recommendations 
in  the  area  of 
expenditure).  

There are some limitations to the monitoring of recommendations, and consequently to the 
analysis below. There is not an obligation to provide reasons for a decision not to follow-up, 
and  the  information  transmitted  to  OLAF  greatly  varies  in  its  level  of  detail.  There  is  not 
always  information  available  to  assess  the  explanations  behind  the  different  rates  of 
follow-up.   

Moreover,  there  is  a  time  lag  between  the  issuing  of  OLAF  recommendations  and  their 
implementation by the recipients, which can take several years. Given the timeframe for the 
evaluation, which considers only the first three years after entry into force of the Regulation, 
the  data  currently  available  on  follow-up  by  recipients  of  recommendations  relate  to 
investigations for the most part concluded before the entry into force of the Regulation. The 
evaluation  timeframe  does  not,  therefore,  allow  to  assess  the  possible  impacts  of  new 
provisions  in  the  Regulation  on  the  follow-up  to  recommendations  in  terms  of  rate  of 
indictments, amounts recovered and for disciplinary measures taken. 

identified,  as  a  factor 

impacting  on  the  rate  of  follow-up  to 
The  evaluation  has 
recommendations,  the  quality  and  timeliness  of  OLAF  final  reports,  with  some  reported 
instances  of  lack  of  clarity,  inconsistency  between  conclusions  and  evidence,  and  factual 
mistakes83. On the other hand, the survey results were more optimistic with around 60% of 
the respondents (including OLAF respondents) agreeing or strongly agreeing that the OLAF 
reports  are  overall  clear  and  comprehensive  and  clearly  formulated84.  In  addition,  OLAF 
interviewees  suggested  that  the  Regulation  has  led  to  the  improvement  of  the  quality  of 
OLAF’s  reports  (due  to  higher  standards  linked,  for  instance,  to  the  internal  controls  and 
legality checks and reviews which contribute to the respect of procedures and to the quality 
and comprehensibility of the final reports85). Further improvement of the quality of OLAF's 
reports could be achieved by internal measures in OLAF and is not directly depending on the 
effectiveness of the relevant provisions in Regulation 883/2013. 

Furthermore,  the  differences  between  the  extent  of  the  discretion  enjoyed  by  the 
recipients on whether or not to take appropriate action following OLAF's recommendations 
leads  to  wide  differences 
lack  of  follow-up  to 
recommendations  (as 
illustrated  by  the  subsections  below).  While  maintaining  the 
non-binding  nature  of  OLAF  recommendations,  it  has  been  suggested  by  OLAF  staff 

in  the  responses  and  to  frequent 

No 6) and the Commission’s Reflection paper of 2010 on the future of OLAF (point 2.4) refer to the need for Member States to report on 
the follow-up to cases transmitted to them by OLAF. For internal investigations, the IBOAs recipients of the reports and recommendations 
are bound to take action as the result of the investigation warrants, and to report to OLAF (Article 11(4)). The Regulation is, however, silent 
on the follow-up by IBOAs in the framework of external investigations. 
83 ICF report, section 4.4.3.1; see also European Parliament Resolution of 11 March 2015 on the Annual Report 2013 on the protection of 
the EU financial interests – Fight against fraud (2014/2155(INI)), OJ C 316, 30.8.2016,  pp. 37-47, point 60, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.316.01.0037.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2016:316:TOC.  
84 ICF report, section 4.4.3.1. 
85 In addition, internal Guidelines and Instructions on several investigative aspects contribute to a greater consistency and quality of OLAF 
final  reports;  a  collection  of  Best  Practices  of  the  Office  stemming  from  the  legality  checks  and  reviews  performed  by  the  ISRU  aims  at 
ensuring coherence in the analysis of the various elements of the legal framework for the investigations, based on case experience. 

19 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
consulted  that  the  effectiveness  of  the  recommendations  could  be  strengthened  by 
extending the obligation to report on all cases (Member States and IBOAs in both external 
and  internal  investigations)  and  introducing  the  duty  to  state  reasons  should  there  be  no 
follow-up,  as  well  as  by  codifying  existing  case-law  by  clarifying  the  duty  to  take  the 
recommendations into account86 when deciding whether to take action in a certain matter 
or not. 

o  Follow-up to judicial recommendations 

On average, only around half of the cases submitted by OLAF to national judicial authorities 
lead to indictments, and the situation varies considerably across Member States87. The low 
rate of follow-up to OLAF's judicial recommendations has been repeatedly highlighted as a 
key problem by the European Parliament88. 
An  OLAF  internal analysis89  of  the  reasons  behind  this,  points  to  a  number  of  issues.  OLAF 
identified  as  the  main  factor  hindering  the  follow-up  to  judicial  recommendations  the  fact 
that the Regulation does not sufficiently ensure the use of OLAF reports as evidence in trial 
in  the  Member  States  (see  next  subsection).  Other  possible  factors  were  also  considered. 
Despite OLAF's investigative efforts, its investigation powers and tools are not sufficient in all 
cases to collect strong evidence of a criminal offence. For internal investigations, the OLAF 
analysis  considers  that,  whereas  for  OLAF  any  infringement  committed  by  EU  staff  is 
generally regarded as a serious matter, the priorities of the national judiciaries - in Member 
States where the principle of opportunity applies - may be different.  

The external contractor pointed out how early transmission of the information and evidence 
collected is also essential for the judicial follow-up90. 

o  Admissibility of OLAF reports as evidence in trial 

OLAF final reports constitute admissible evidence in administrative or judicial proceedings in 
the same way and under the same conditions as administrative reports drawn up by national 
administrative  inspectors91.  This  rule  ensures  the  equivalence  with  national  reports  of  a 
similar  nature,  but  not  the  effectiveness  of  OLAF  reports  accompanied  by  judicial 
recommendations.  In  Member  States  not  having  rules  providing  for  the  admissibility  of 
evidence,  in  judicial  proceedings,  of  similar  administrative  reports  drawn  up  by  national 
administrative  inspectors,  evidence  collected  by  OLAF  will  be  inadmissible.  In  various 
Member  States,  after  receiving  the  OLAF  final  report,  prosecutors  carry  out  all  the 
investigation  activities  once  again  in  order  to  acquire  admissible  evidence.  This  raises  also 
efficiency issues, and may also lead to offences becoming time barred.  

86 Case T-193/04, Hans-Martin Tillack v Commission, paragraph 72. The Court established an obligation of the national judicial authorities 
“to examine carefully” the information forwarded to them by OLAF and to draw the appropriate consequences from it in order to comply 
with Community law. 
87  According  to  the  OLAF  Report  2016,  the  indictment  rate  following  OLAF’s  recommendations  issued  between  1  January  2009  and 
December 2016 is on 50%; see figure 12, p. 33. 
88 See inter alia European Parliament Resolution of 16 May 2017 on the Annual Report 2015 on the protection of the EU financial interests 
–  Fight  against  fraud  (2016/2097(INI)),  points  95  to  97  and  102,  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2017-0206+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
89 Analysis on Member States follow-up to OLAF’s judicial recommendations issued between 1 January 2008 and 31 December 2015 - OLAF 
Report 2016, point 4.2, p. 32. 
90 ICF report, section 4.4.3.3. 
91 Article 11(2) of the Regulation. 

20 

 
 
                                                            
This assessment was confirmed by stakeholders consulted by the external contractor for this 
evaluation,  in  particular  by  AFCOS  and  judicial  authorities92.  A  study  commissioned  by  the 
Budgetary  Control  (CONT)  Committee  of  the  European  Parliament  underlined  how  the 
asymmetries  in  the  prerogatives  and  powers  of  OLAF  jeopardise  the  future  use  of  its 
findings.  In  addition,  the  rule  that  leaves  the  admissibility  of  OLAF  final  reports  to  the 
variable  geometry  of  the  national  criminal  procedural  law  creates  uncertainties  and  a 
duplication of efforts that is detrimental to both procedural economy and the rights of the 
persons under investigation93. 

o  Follow-up to financial recommendations 

Financial recommendations are addressed to the IBOAs or national authorities providing or 
managing  EU  funds.  They  seek  to  recover  the  defrauded  EU  funds  to  the  EU  budget.  The 
evolution of amounts recommended for recovery, and the amounts recovered according to 
monitoring  information  collected  by  OLAF,  are  captured  in  tables  3  and  4.  However  no 
correlation  can  be  established  between  the  amounts  recommended  and  the  amounts 
recovered in the same financial year, as the amounts recovered in one given year relate also 
to cases closed in previous years. 

Table 3: Amounts recommended by OLAF for financial recovery (million Euro) 

 Year of recommendation 

Amounts recommended 

Source: 2016 OLAF Report 

2012 

284.0 

2013 

402.8 

2014 

901.0 

2015 

888.1 

2016 

631.1 

The evidence collected for the evaluation identified as a key factor influencing the follow-up 
to  OLAF’s  financial  recommendations,  the  amounts  recommended  for  recovery,  which 
several stakeholders (IBOAs, Member States' judicial and managing authorities) considered 
to  be  often  unduly  overestimated94.  The  decision  on  the  final  amount  recovered  is  the 
responsibility  of  the  IBOAs,  which  have  underlined  that  the  calculations  done  follow  the 
applicable legal framework and internal rules.  

From the IBOAs experience, it results that other factors could also influence the recovery, as 
bankruptcy  of  the  economic  operators  concerned  which  often  arises  in  direct  expenditure 
cases.  In  addition,  the  use  of  OLAF's  reports  for  financial  follow-up  purposes  can  be 
problematic  in  practice,  for  confidentiality  reasons,  when  at  the  same  time  a  judicial 
follow-up  has  been  recommended.  Some  consulted  stakeholders  called  for  a  better 
the 
collaboration  between  OLAF  and 
recommendations95, and also in the follow-up phase. 

IBOA  prior 

responsible 

issuing 

the 

to 

Table 4: Amounts recovered (million Euro) 

Year of recovery  

Amounts recovered 

2012 

94.5 

2013 

117 

2014 

206.4 

2015 

186.3 

2016 

196.2 

Source: 2013-2016 OLAF Annual Activity Reports 

92 ICF report, annex 9. 
93 "The protection of the procedural rights of persons concerned by OLAF administrative investigations and the admissibility of OLAF Final 
Reports", author Prof. Dr. Katalin Ligeti, July 2017, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_IDA(2017)603790.  
94 ICF report, section 4.4.3.2. 
95 ICF report, section 4.4.3.2. 

21 

 
 
                                                            
in  October  2016,  OLAF 

The European Parliament has underlined in the past the uneven level of financial recovery 
object  of  OLAF  recommendations96.  OLAF’s  monitoring  data  does  not  allow  a  more 
comprehensive analysis of the factors behind this discrepancy, as OLAF is not provided with 
detailed  reasons  to  explain  the  follow-up  or  dismissal  of  recommendations.  OLAF  has 
undertaken an internal assessment in order to clarify terminology, improve the quality of its 
financial recommendations and to promote as far possible (taking into account the different 
areas of EU expenditures and revenues, and the fact that the typology of cases can widely 
vary within a specific area) a harmonised approach throughout OLAF. Following the internal 
assessment, 
financial 
recommendations97.  They  provide  guidance  to  staff  notably  on  the  determination  of 
relevant  estimated  amounts  and  on  the  content  of  OLAF  financial  recommendations  and 
relevant sections of the final report. The new instructions distinguish between the different 
fields  of  expenditure  and  revenues,  and  take  into  account  the  relevant  financial  principles 
and specific rules per each of these fields. They also address the usefulness for OLAF to hold 
bilateral  contacts  with  the  relevant  services  of  the  Commission  or  other  IBOAs  for  the 
determination  of  the  relevant  amounts,  without  jeopardising  OLAF's  independence.  These 
instructions  already  respond  to  some  extent  to  the  recommendations  formulated  by  the 
contractor in its report98. As the instructions have been adopted only in October 2016 it is 
too early to evaluate their practical impact. 

instructions  on 

internal 

issued 

o  Follow-up to disciplinary recommendations 

In  the 

last  three  years  2014-2016,  OLAF  has 

Disciplinary  recommendations  concern  misconduct  of  EU  staff  or  members  of  the  EU 
institutions  and  are  directed  at  the  authority  having  disciplinary  powers  in  the  IBOA 
concerned. 
issued  48  disciplinary 
recommendations.  IBOAs  have  taken  measures  in  22  cases,  in  11  cases  no  measures  were 
taken, and in 15 cases no decision has been taken yet99. 
Stakeholders  consulted100  indicated  that  for  a  better  follow-up,  discrepancies  in  the 
recommendations  could  be  avoided  by  a  better  interplay  between  OLAF  and  their  service 
during  the  investigations,  and  mentioned  also  a  particular  difficulty  in  the  cases  where  an 
OLAF  final  report  is  accompanied  by  recommendations  for  both  judicial  and  disciplinary 
actions; this resides in the obligation, provided for in the EU Staff Regulation, to suspend the 
disciplinary proceedings until the judicial proceedings are finalised101. 

5.2.2. Improving cooperation and information exchange with partners 

5.2.2.1. Improving cooperation and information exchange with IBOAs 

The  IBOAs  are  a  key  partner  of  OLAF  in  its  investigative  function.  They  share  the 
responsibility  for  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial  interests  and  their  role  is  essential  in 
both internal and external investigations. The extent of the cooperation between OLAF and 
IBOAs,  however,  differs  from  internal  to  external  investigations.  Some  provisions  in 

96  European  Parliament  Resolution  of  8  March  2016  on  the  Annual  Report  2014  on  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial  interests  –  Fight 
against fraud (2015/2128(INI)), point 80, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2F%2FEP%2F%2FTEXT%2BTA%2BP8-
TA-2016-0071%2B0%2BDOC%2BXML%2BV0%2F%2FEN&language=EN.  
97 Instructions on drafting Financial Recommendations and related sections of the Final Report, 7.10.2016. 
98 ICF report, annex 8. 
99 OLAF Report 2016, figure 13, p. 34. 
100 In particular IDOC staff, as indicated in the ICF report, annex 10; see also IDOC presentation at the OLAF conference. 
101 Annex IX to the EU Staff Regulation. In such situations, the IBOAs have however the possibility to open a case, conduct a complementary 
investigation or even suspend the person concerned. 

22 

 
 
                                                            
Regulation  883/2013  establish  more  explicit  duties  for  IBOAs  and  their  staff  in  internal 
investigations102. 

The majority of stakeholders consulted in the evaluation process expressed a positive view 
about  the  cooperation  between  OLAF  and  IBOAs103.  Cooperation  with  the  European 
Commission  is  particularly  relevant  given  the  important  role  played  by  the  so-called 
‘spending  DGs’  in  the  management  of  EU  funds.  Stakeholders  from  these  DGs  highlighted 
positive cooperation with OLAF. Overall, the consulted Commission stakeholders considered 
that ACAs contributed to an even better exchange of information104.  

An  important  aspect  of  cooperation  during  the  investigations  concerns  the  adoption  of 
administrative precautionary measures by the IBOAs105. There are no statistics available on 
the extent of use of precautionary measures, but results of the consultation of stakeholders 
suggest that their use is not very frequent. The external contractor points out to the lack of 
clarity  of  the  interplay  between  precautionary  measures  and  procedural  guarantees  that 
might  explain  in  part  the  reluctance  of  some  stakeholders  to  adopt  on  precautionary 
measures.  IBOAs  have  mentioned  in  particular  the  difficulty  to  assess  the  need  of 
precautionary  measures  given  the  inconclusive  nature  of  evidence  at  the  early  stage  of  an 
investigation,  and  resulting  risk  to  the  legality  of  the  precautionary  measures.  OLAF  staff 
raised  concerns  regarding  the  confidentiality  of  the  investigations  and  the  amount  of 
information  that  can  be  communicated  early.  There  were  suggestions  that  a  closer 
cooperation between OLAF and the Commission DGs concerned could help develop clearer 
procedures surrounding precautionary measures106. 

During the assessed period, and on the basis of the specific provision newly introduced by 
the  Regulation107,  OLAF  and  Europol  cooperated  effectively, 
in  particular  regarding 
counterfeit  goods.  The  future  working  arrangements  should  allow  enhancing  cooperation 
between the two bodies (as the current legal framework for OLAF and Europol allows for the 
exchange  of  operational,  strategic  and  technical  information,  including  personal  data, 
between the two bodies, not foreseen in the current administrative arrangements).  

Eurojust  and  OLAF  collaborate  effectively  through  the  exchange  of 
information  of 
investigative  interest  and  mutual  involvement  in  common  cases108.  Since  2005,  OLAF  and 
Eurojust exchanged information in relation to 66 cases. Also, since 2015 OLAF participates in 
joint investigation teams coordinated by Eurojust. 

5.2.2.2. Improving cooperation and information exchange with Member States 

The  effectiveness  of  OLAF  investigations  (in  particular  external)  relies  heavily  on  its 
partnership with the Member States at all stages of the investigative cycle, in particular as 
various provisions of the Regulation make OLAF's investigative work subject to national law, 

102  For  example,  OLAF’s  powers  to  access  relevant  information  in  IBOAs  are  stronger  in  internal  compared  to  external  investigations 
(Articles 4(2)(a) and 3(5), respectively). Equally, the duty of IBOAs’ staff to cooperate with OLAF (Article 4(7)) is only provided for in the 
Regulation  in  relation  to  internal  investigations;  the  Staff  Regulations  establish,  however,  the  obligation  of  the  staff  to  report 
(whistleblowing). 
103 ICF report, section 4.3.2.4. 
104 ICF report, section 4.3.2.4, and also section 7. 
105 Article 7(6) (b) and (c) of the Regulation. Precautionary measures can also be adopted by the Member States, according to Article 7(7) of 
the Regulation. 
106 ICF report, section 4.2.3.3. 
107 Article 13 of the Regulation. 
108  See  OLAF  report  2016,  p.  27  and  Eurojust  Annual  Report  2016,  p.  41,  http://eurojust.europa.eu/doclibrary/corporate/Pages/annual-
reports.aspx.  

23 

 
 
                                                            
and that OLAF has to request the assistance of national authorities for the conduct of certain 
investigative  measures.  Improving  cooperation  with  Member  States  was  thus  among  the 
main  objectives  of  Regulation  883/2013,  which  introduced  new  rules  on  the  AFCOS, 
administrative arrangements, information exchange, and follow-up after an investigation. 

The  data  collected  for  the  evaluation  shows  a  clear  improvement  in  the  cooperation  and 
exchange  of  information  between  OLAF  and  the  Member  States  after  the  creation  of  the 
AFCOS109.  However,  although  the  Regulation  requires  the  Member  States  to  designate 
AFCOS110,  it  leaves  at  their  discretion  what  competences  and  powers  to  grant  them.  This 
results in a considerable diversity in the role, profile and effectiveness of cooperation with 
the AFCOS.  
An OLAF survey of AFCOS111 showed that over 80% of the AFCOS are of limited size with only 
one  central  office,  with  the  remaining  operating  with  both  a  central  office  and  local  units. 
More than half of AFCOS cooperates with a wide range of national authorities (notably anti-
corruption,  anti-fraud,  customs,  EU  fund  managing  authorities  and  tax  administrations), 
offering  OLAF  an  indirect  access  to  these.  Almost  a  third  has  criminal  or  administrative 
investigative  powers.  More  than  half  are  either  already  cooperating  with  other  Member 
States' AFCOS or would be open to do so in future. 

This  diversity  was  the  main  factor  identified  by  the  external  contractor  as  inhibiting  the 
effectiveness  of  the  AFCOS.  However,  there  were  diverging  views  as  regards  further 
alignment  of  their  role  and  powers:  OLAF  staff  and  certain  AFCOS  tended  to  agree,  while 
other AFCOS supported the legal provisions as they currently stand.  

The  positive  role  of  the  AFCOS  has  also  been  underlined  by  the  European  Parliament, 
although  it  has  also  raised  concerns  regarding  discrepancies  between  the  functions,  tasks 
and powers that Member States have entrusted to AFCOS112. 

Several  AFCOS  referred  to  the  lack  of  ‘horizontal’  administrative  cooperation  possibilities 
between  AFCOS  as  a  limitation  to  the  current  framework113.  In  this  regard,  a  recent 
cooperation project in the area of structural funds, designed and coordinated by the Italian 
AFCOS and involving AFCOS from other Member States (hereinafter, the Italian cooperation 
project), concluded that improving the flow of information between Member States would 
be conducive to better prevention and combatting of transnational fraud in structural funds, 
and that the naturally identifiable channel for this could be the AFCOS114.  

OLAF respondents highlighted that the role of the AFCOS was relevant both in external and 
internal investigations, and that this should be further clarified in the Regulation. 

OLAF  can  also  cooperate  directly  with  administrative,  police  and  judicial  authorities.  The 
Regulation  contains  a  general  obligation  for  all  relevant  Member  States'  authorities  to 

109  According  to  the  ICF  report,  75  per  cent  of  the  respondents  agreed/strongly  agreed  that  the  establishment  of  AFCOS  strengthened 
cooperation between OLAF and the Member States' authorities, while no respondent disagreed; see section 4.3.1.3 and annex 11. 
110 Article 3(4) of the Regulation. 
111 OLAF survey on AFCOS, July 2016, unpublished; see ICF report, section 4.3.1.3. 
112 European Parliament Resolution of 11 March 2015 on the Annual Report 2013 on the protection of the EU financial interests  – Fight 
against  fraud  (2014/2155(INI)),  point  56.  See  also  European  Parliament  Resolution  of  8  March  2016  on  the  Annual  Report  2014  on  the 
protection of the EU financial interests – Fight against fraud (2015/2128(INI)), point 43. 
113 ICF report, section 7.2.3.1. 
114  The  project  was  conducted  during  2016,  by  way  of  two  conferences  and  several  round  tables,  and  its  results  were  published  under 
"Progetto  di  cooperazione  nel  settore  antifrode.  Cooperation  project  in  the  anti-fraud  sector",  Gangemi  Editore  International,  February 
2017. 

24 

 
 
                                                            
cooperate  with  OLAF  within  the  limits  permitted  by  national  law115.  Administrative 
arrangements  may  also  be  established116.  In  turn,  OLAF  investigators  cooperate  with 
national  authorities  during  the  follow-up  to  recommendations;  they  may,  for  instance,  be 
called to testify in national judicial proceedings as witnesses or experts117. According to OLAF 
staff  consulted  in  the  evaluation118,  the  cooperation  and  exchange  of  information  with 
national  authorities  is  overall  effective,  and  is  assessed  as  more  effective  with  Member 
States' authorities with whom ACAs are signed. However, the references to national law in 
the Regulation result in considerable differences across the Member States, in particular as 
regards cooperation with judicial authorities119, and it can lead to one way exchanges from 
OLAF to the judicial authorities which do not share information in return.  

5.2.2.3. Improving cooperation and information exchange with third countries and 
international organisations 

The  Regulation  bases  OLAF’s  powers  to  investigate  in  third  countries  and  international 
organisations on the cooperation and mutual assistance agreements concluded by the Union 
with these partners, such as association agreements120. The power of OLAF to investigate is 
also  frequently  laid  down  in  financing  programmes  and  conventions.  OLAF  may  also  enter 
into administrative arrangements with these partners.  

Based  on  information  provided  by  OLAF  investigators  and  by  representatives  of  national 
authorities in third countries121, the external contractor concluded that the cooperation with 
third  countries  is  more  effective  when  ACAs  are  signed.  ACAs  are  not,  however,  a 
prerequisite  for  cooperation.  OLAF  investigators  consulted  during  the  evaluation  have 
indicated that the Regulation122 should be clarified as it is sometimes interpreted by partners 
as not allowing the exchange of information with third countries authorities or international 
organisations in the absence of an administrative arrangement. 

5.2.3. Strengthening the procedural guarantees of individuals subject to investigation 

Article  9  of  the  Regulation  codified  and  clarified  procedural  safeguards  of  persons  under 
OLAF investigations123. It is generally recognised as an improvement for protecting the rights 
of individuals subject to an OLAF investigation124.  The evaluation has not  shown a need to 
substantially  revise  existing  provisions,  although  the  following  specific  elements  were 
highlighted  during  the  evaluation  as  potentially  affecting  effectiveness  of  OLAF 
investigations:  

- 

It  has  been  suggested  that  the  scope  of  Article  9,  which  focuses  particularly  on  the 
conduct  of  interviews,  could  be  clarified  to  apply  also  to  other  powers  of  OLAF  that 

115 Article 8(2) and (3) and Article 12(3) of the Regulation. 
116 Article 1(5) of the Regulation. 
117 Article 12(4) of the Regulation.  
118 See the results of the survey run during the evaluation, as quoted in the ICF report, section 4.3.1.3 and annex 11. 
119 ICF report, section 4.2.1.3. 
120 Article 1(1)(b) of the Regulation. 
121 ICF report, section 4.3.3.3. 
122 Articles 11 and 14 of the Regulation. 
123  Article  9  of  the  Regulation  provides  for  the  right  to  an  objective  and  impartial  investigation  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  the 
presumption of innocence; the right to avoid self-incrimination; the right to be informed of the intention of OLAF to interview the person 
concerned/witness; the right to be assisted by a person of the individual’s choice; and for the person concerned the right to comment on 
the facts of the case. 
124 ICF report, section 5.4. 

25 

 
 
                                                            
could  raise  procedural  rights  concerns,  such  as  collection  of  statements,  on-the-spot 
checks125 and digital forensic operations126. 

-  The  opportunity  to  comment127,  that  has  to  be  provided  once  the  investigation  has 
been  completed  and  before  conclusions  referring  by  name  to  a  person  concerned  are 
drawn  up,  was  questioned  by  OLAF  investigators  and  a  number  of  national  judicial 
authorities.  They  considered  it  may  represent  a  risk  to  the  confidentiality  of  the 
investigation  where  judicial  action  may  follow,  given  in  particular  that  the  Regulation 
allows for it to be deferred but not waived. Further legal uncertainty exists in relation to 
internal  investigations,  where  the  right  to  comment  is  provided  for  by  the  Regulation 
even in situations where the investigation has not yet been completed128. 

-  Some  of  the  consulted  stakeholders  pointed  out  that  the Regulation does  not  address 
the right of access to the file129. It must be noted that, based on existing legislation, the 
case law of the CJEU has systematically refused the right to access the OLAF case file as 
OLAF  final  reports  have  been  considered  preparatory  acts130.  In  accordance  with  the 
same  case-law,  access  to  documents  in  OLAF's  files  takes  place  in  the  context  of  the 
possible  follow-up  procedure.  OLAF’s  final  recommendations  are  submitted  to  the 
competent  Union  and/or  national  authorities.  If  those  authorities  intend  to  adopt 
measures or penalties against a person concerned by an OLAF investigation, they must 
give that person the opportunity to exercise his or her rights of defence in accordance 
with the applicable procedural rules131. 

The procedural guarantees are underpinned by OLAF internal and external controls.  
Internally,  OLAF  conducts  legality  checks  of  investigative  activities132  and  has  in  place  an 
internal  complaint  procedure.  The  review  function  introduced  by  the  Regulation  and  the 
internal controls were mentioned by OLAF staff as strengthening procedural guarantees of 
individuals  subject  to  investigation.  Despite  the  large  number  of  investigations  carried  out 
every  year,  their  sensitive  nature  and  the  fact  that  OLAF  deals  with  cases  involving  the 
integrity  and  reputation  of  natural  persons,  relatively  few  complaints  based  on  procedural 
guarantees  have  been  submitted  to  OLAF.  During  the  three  years  of  application  of  the 
Regulation, 15 complaints were filed against OLAF133; of these, 4 were declared inadmissible 
and 9 deemed unfounded. 

125 These were in particular mentioned during the workshop with the experts' panel organised by the contractor. 
126 See the study by Prof. Ligeti commissioned by the CONT Committee, for ex. p. 6; see also ICF report, sections 6.1.2.4 and 6.1.2.5. 
127  Article  9(4)  first  subparagraph  of  the  Regulation;  the  external  contractor  in  its  report  has  particularly  identified  the  opportunity  to 
comment as an area where further clarity would be needed in the Regulation – ICF report, section 4.5.4. 
128  Articles  4(8)  second  subparagraph  and  12(2)  third  subparagraph  of  the  Regulation  provide  for  the  right  to  comment  in  case  of 
transmission of information to national authorities even prior to the opening of a case or during an investigation. 
129 See the study by Prof. Ligeti commissioned by the CONT Committee, point 1.1.7, p. 17, and J. Inghelram, "Legal and Institutional Aspects 
of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) Analysis with a Look Forward to a European Public Prosecutor’s Office", Europa Law Publishing, 
2011. Furthermore, the study commissioned by the CONT Committee suggests to further develop Article 9 on procedural guarantees, in 
particular  as  regards:  the  threshold  for  invoking  the  privilege  against  self-incrimination,  the  minimum  information  provided  to  the 
interviewee prior to the interview by OLAF as well as external control over the restriction of the right to be heard, as well as the scope and 
conditions for OLAF to conduct digital forensics from the perspective of the right to privacy. 
130 Case T-215/02, Gomez Reino v. Commission, paragraph 65; case T-259/03, Nikolaou v. Commission; case T-48/05, Franchet and Byk v. 
Commission, and case T-447/11, Catinis v. Commission, paragraphs 63-64. 
131 Case T-447/11, Catinis v Commission, paragraph 64. 
132 Based on Article 17(7) of the Regulation. 
133 5 in 2014, 4 in 2015 and 6 in 2016. 

26 

 
 
                                                            
As  regards  the  external  controls,  the  Supervisory  Committee  monitors  developments 
concerning  the  application  of  procedural  guarantees  in  OLAF  investigations134.  It  has 
recommended  the  establishment  of  an  internal  complaint  mechanism  (implemented  by 
OLAF)135,  and  its  recent  evaluation  of  the  legality  check  and  review  in  OLAF  was  overall 
positive136.  

Other  external  controls  include  the  European  Data  Protection  Supervisor  (concerning  data 
processing by OLAF), the European Ombudsman (complaints about maladministration) and 
the  European  Court  of  Auditors  (external  audits).  Those  concerned  may  also  raise  issues 
related to OLAF investigations before the European Court of Justice, usually in the context of 
litigation against measures taken as a follow-up to OLAF recommendations, or in the context 
of an action for damages allegedly caused by OLAF137. 

The  Commission’s  proposal  concerning  the  Controller  of  procedural  guarantees,  currently 
pending,  aims  at  tasking  an  external  and  independent  structure  with  reviewing  OLAF’s 
compliance  with  the  procedural  guarantees  of  the  persons  concerned  by  OLAF 
investigations; it also takes into account the special status of members of EU institutions by 
submitting  certain  investigative  activities  concerning  them  to  prior  authorisation  by  the 
Controller.  During  the  consultation  of  stakeholders,  there  were  different  views  on  the 
Commission proposal138. A number of EU control bodies and several AFCOS were of the view 
that there is indeed a need to strengthen the current mechanisms by appointing a Controller 
of Procedural Guarantees, as proposed by the Commission139. In contrast, a number of other 
EU control bodies140 and certain OLAF staff suggested that the existing control mechanisms 
are sufficient to ensure compliance with procedural rights given the administrative nature of 
OLAF  investigations.  The  study  on  procedural  guarantees  commissioned  by  the  CONT 
independent  control  of  OLAF 
Committee  concluded  that,  whilst  an  effective  and 
investigations is undoubtedly needed, the added value of an additional layer of non-binding 
control appears questionable both in terms of coherence and effectiveness141.  

5.2.4. Reinforcing the governance of OLAF 

Ensuring the appropriate governance of OLAF as well as its accountability, guaranteeing its 
independence  while  providing  for  adequate  controls,  was  among  the  objectives  that  the 
legislative proposals to amend OLAF's former legal framework tried to address.  

Regulation 883/2013 introduced in particular new provisions aimed at clarifying the role and 
mandate of the Supervisory Committee, responsible for monitoring the implementation by 
OLAF  of  its  investigative  function,  in  order  to  reinforce  its  independence.  In  addition,  it 
monitors  developments  concerning  the  application  of  procedural  guarantees  and  the 
duration  of  investigations142.  The  relevant  provisions  were  amended  in  2016  to  ensure  a 
strengthened  independent  functioning  of  the  Committee's  secretariat  from  OLAF;  the 
Committee's secretariat is now provided by the Commission. 

134 Article 15(1) of the Regulation. 
135 Opinion No 2/2013, Establishing an internal OLAF procedure for complaints. 
136 Opinion No 2/2015, Legality check and review in OLAF. 
137  See,  as  a  recent  example,  case  T-483/13  Oikonomopoulos  v.  Commission,  where  the  General  Court  reviewed  a  broad  range  of 
procedural steps carried out by OLAF. 
138 ICF report, section 8. 
139 ICF report, section 7.2.2.2 – the report does not specify which EU control bodies expressed the view. 
140 ICF report, section 7.2.2.2 – the report does not specify which EU control bodies expressed the view. 
141 Point 1.3.4, p. 25, and also pp. 6 and 8. 
142 Article 15 of the Regulation. 

27 

 
 
                                                            
A contribution analysis performed by the external contractor on the available outputs of the 
Supervisory Committee concluded that the new provisions of the Regulation related to the 
Supervisory Committee did not reinforce the governance of OLAF by the regular monitoring 
of  the  implementation  by  OLAF  of  its  investigative  function143.  The  external  contractor 
considered  that  the  definition  of  the  Supervisory  Committee's  role  and  mandate  as 
contained  in  Article  15  of  the  Regulation  is  not  clear  enough  and  open  to  interpretation. 
Among  those  consulted  in  OLAF,  the  Supervisory  Committee  and  external  stakeholders, 
many  expressed  the  view  that  divergent  interpretations  on  the  Regulation’s  provisions  on 
the  Supervisory  Committee's  impacted  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  the  work  of  the 
Committee  and  its  cooperation  with  OLAF.  Two  issues  were  typically  identified  as 
problematic:  the  exact  nature  of  the  Supervisory  Committee’s  role,  and  the  Committee’s 
access to case-related information.  

However,  it  is  sufficiently  clear  from  the  terms  of  the  Regulation  that  the  Supervisory 
Committee carries out a role of general and systemic supervision of the investigative activity 
of OLAF with the purpose of reinforcing its independence. The Regulation does not empower 
the Supervisory Committee to review individual investigations or to interfere with on-going 
investigations.  In  this  context,  some  of  the  outstanding  issues  of  interpretation  between 
OLAF  and  its  Supervisory  Committee  as  regards  access  to  case-related  information  were 
addressed  by  a  common  interpretation  of  the  legal  services  of  the  Commission,  the 
Parliament and the Council in September 2016.  

The  Supervisory  Committee’s  role  as  regards  procedural  rights  and  the  duration  of 
investigations are also part of its general and systemic supervision role, and do not entail the 
control of individual investigations. However, these additional functions, introduced in 2013, 
seem to have contributed to the different interpretations on the nature of the Committee’s 
mandate. The consultation by the external contractor showed that OLAF staff regarded the 
Supervisory  Committee  primarily  as  a  control  body  rather  than  a  guardian  of  OLAF's 
independence. 

As  regards  the  inter-institutional  exchange  of  views,  the  external  contractor's  report 
considered  that  the  evidence  gathered  was  too  limited  to  derive  robust  findings  on  its 
effectiveness, but pointed to the fact that it contributes to the transparency of the work of 
OLAF144. 

5.3. Efficiency 

To  what  extent  has  the  implementation  of  Regulation  883/2013  impacted  on  OLAF's 
resources  and  the  use  of  those  resources?  Did  OLAF  use  the  possibility  to  open  an 
investigation  taking  into  account  the  need  for  efficient  use  of  its  resources  or  the 
subsidiarity principle?  

This  section  considers  the  extent  to  which  the  implementation  of  the  Regulation  had  an 
impact on OLAF resources and the use of those resources, as well as whether the provisions 
in the Regulation for the conduct of investigations are efficient for the achievement of the 
Regulation’s  overarching  objective.  To  provide  general  background  to  the  efficiency 
assessment, it starts by describing the general evolution of financial and human resources in 
OLAF before and during the evaluation period. 

143 ICF report, section 4.7.4. 
144 ICF report, section 4.8 

28 

 
 
                                                            
Due  to  the  limited  data  availability,  the  majority  of  the  assessment  is  of  a  qualitative 
character.  

5.3.1. Resources 

The  efficiency  considerations  discussed  below  should  be  read  in  the  context  of  decreasing 
human resources and a relatively stable budget over the analysed period. 
The number of posts in OLAF's establishment plan declined by 5.5 % between 2009 (384)145 
and 2016 (363)146 mainly in the context of general reductions in staff and budgets in the EU 
public service; the total workforce including service providers remained however stable over 
the  same  period.  This  decrease  concerned  mainly  staff  in  policy  functions.  The  challenges 
which OLAF faces in maintaining its current level of professional expertise are also linked to 
the ageing workforce, as investigative staff recruited from national services in the early days 
of OLAF retire147. 

Since 2009, the OLAF budget has been stable in absolute numbers ranging between EUR 57 
million to EUR 59 million a year. The proportion of the budget spent on staff has also been 
relatively stable, ranging from 65.8% in 2011 to 68.7% in 2016, with an additional 4.5% spent 
on external agents (contract staff, seconded national experts and interims).  

Table 5: OLAF administrative budget (in EUR million) 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

Staff costs 

External agents 

38.3 

38.5 

39 

40,5 

65,8 % 

67.1 % 

67 % 

67,3 % 

67,5 % 

68,7 % 

2.5 

2.6 

2.6 

2.6 

4,3 % 

4,5 % 

4,5 % 

4,5 % 

4,5 % 

4,4 % 

Total budget 

57.8 

57.1 

58.2 

57.4 

57.7 

57.2 

57.7 

58.9 

Source: The 2009-20016 OLAF reports 

5.3.2. Application of the Regulation 

Single point of entry, case selection and opening of investigations 

The  evaluation  has  shown  that  the  operational  efficiency  of  the  selection  phase  has 
increased under the Regulation, due to several factors. 

A  single  point  of  entry  (SPE)  filters  incoming  information  in  OLAF.  As  a  result,  only 
information of potential investigative interest reaches the selection stage, allowing a better 
use  of  staff  resources  in  the  ISRU  to  assess  information  of  true  potential  investigative 
interest and contributing to the expeditious case selection process. The external contractor 
concluded that the SPE made the selection process more efficient148. 

145Technical  annexes  to  the  Communication  on  the  Allocation  of  human  resources  and  decentralised  administrative  appropriations  for 
2009, SEC(2008) 3053/3. 
146  Technical  annexes  to  the  Communication  to  the  Commission  on  the  Allocation  of  human  resources  and  decentralised  administrative 
appropriations for 2016, SEC(2015) 501 final. 
147 The OLAF report 2016, p. 44.  
148 ICF report, section 9.2.2. 

29 

 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
The table below illustrates that the case selection criteria introduced by the Regulation149, 
alongside  the  reorganisation  after  the  arrival  of  the  new  Director-General  in  2012 
anticipating  the  Regulation150,  contributed  to  shaping  a  coherent  policy  on  openings  and 
dismissals  across  OLAF  and  allowed  to  effectively  track  all  information  coming  in  and  its 
treatment,  has  become  more  efficient  after  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Regulation  in 
processing  a  higher  number  of  incoming  information;  opening  a  higher  proportion  of 
incoming cases; and selecting or dismissing incoming cases much faster than in the previous 
period.  

Interviews  with  OLAF  investigators  carried  out  for  the  evaluation  confirmed  that  the  new 
case  selection  process  had  a  positive  impact  on  investigators'  work  as  they  were  now 
spending  more  time  on  investigations,  rather  than  on  the  evaluation  of  incoming 
information and case selection. 

Table 6: Number of incoming information and investigations opened 

Incoming information 

- from public sources 

- from private sources 

Investigations opened 

2009 

2010  2011  2012 

2013  2014  2015  2016 

959 

436 

523 

160 

975 

1041  1264 

1294  1417  1372 

1136 

381 

584 

152 

274 

767 

146 

375 

889 

431 

405 

889 

253 

458 

959 

234 

439 

933 

219 

380 

756 

219 

Selections completed 

1007 

886 

926 

1770 

1247  1353  1442 

1157 

Average duration (in months) of 
selection phase 

5.8 

6.3 

6.8 

1.4 

1.8 

2.0 

1.7 

1.7 

Source: The OLAF 2016 report 
Note: OLAF reorganisation took place in 2012 in anticipation of Regulation 883/2013 

However,  the  table  also  shows  a  high  and  stable  rate  of  dismissal  at  the  selection  stage 
since  2013,  of  around  80-85%  of  the  incoming  information151.  In  particular,  the  sufficient 
suspicion of fraud test led to the dismissal of an average of 50% of the cases152. OLAF staff 
have raised in this context the fact that the Regulation does not contain a duty of national 
competent  authorities  to  cooperate  with  OLAF  at  the  selection  stage.  Thus,  in  many  cases 
where the incoming information on its own may be insufficient to open a case, OLAF lacks 
tools to collect further information. 

Investigative process 

In terms of human resources, the average number of OLAF investigative staff declined from 
163  in  2009  to  148  in  2011  to  rise  again  to  168  in  2016  (see  figure  5).  The  number  of 

149 Article 5(1) of the Regulation. 
150  Previously,  the  assessment  of  incoming  information  was  carried  out  by  the  investigative  staff.  For  each  case,  the  responsible  unit 
submitted their proposal to an Investigations and Operations Executive Board who would then issue a recommendation to the Director-
General. Also, prior to the application of the Regulation, no selection criteria were defined for selection and opening of cases. De minimis 
thresholds were applied in practice to focus on more significant cases. The activity of the ISRU created after the reorganisation has also 
been assessed by the Supervisory Committee, regarding both its tasks of selection, on the one hand, and legality check and review, on the 
other hand; see in this respect Opinions 2/104 – Case selection in OLAF and 2/2015 – Legality check and review in OLAF. 
151  OLAF  Report  2016,  figure  17,  p.  60.  For  example,  in  2016,  219  cases  were  opened  following  assessment  of  1136  pieces  of  incoming 
information. 
152 According to an internal study of the selection process conducted in OLAF, from a sample of 1902  cases dismissed during the period 
between January 2015 and October 2016, 929 were dismissed for insufficiency of suspicions alone. 

30 

 
 
  
 
                                                            
investigative staff from 2013 to 2016 increased by 7% compared to the period 2009 to 2012. 
In comparison, the total number of cases opened increased by 32% between the two periods 
(see table 1 above). The figures below illustrate the evolution between 2009 and 2016. They 
all  show  a  substantial  increase  in  investigation  work  from  2013  to  2016  compared  to  the 
previous  three-year  period.  When  compared  to  the  period  before  2013,  the  number  of 
closed  investigation  cases  has  almost  doubled  in  the  period  from  2013  to  2016.  The  same 
can be said about the number of cases closed with recommendations. 

Figure 5: Allocation of OLAF investigative staff by role, 2009-2016 

Source: ICF report, section 5.2, based on calculations on OLAF unpublished data 

Figure 6: Number of closed investigations, 2008-2016 

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

266 

293 

250 

304 

272 

146 

95 

140 

136 

154 

81 

75 

86 

84 

148 

147 

165 

117 

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Number of closed investigations over 2008 to 2016 period

Number of closed investigations with recommendations over 2008 to 2016 period

Source: combined figures from ICF report, section 5.3.1, based on ICF calculations and OLAF Annual Reports 

31 

 
 
 
 
Table  7  presents  the  main  indicators  for  measuring  the  efficiency  of  the  investigative 
function  in  producing  its  outputs153.  All  indicators  confirmed  that  investigative  staff 
conducted  more  investigations  in  the  period  of  implementation  of  the  Regulation  than 
before.  The  overall  duration  of  investigations  has  tended  to  remain  stable  and  or  slightly 
decrease,  depending  on  whether only  cases  closed  or  cases  closed  and  on-going  cases  are 
considered, respectively. 

Table  7:  Indicators  for  assessing  the  efficiency  of  OLAF  investigative  function  before  and 
after the entry into force of Regulation 883/2013 

Period  

2008-2011 

2013-2016 

Average  number  of  selection  cases 
opened per investigative staff  

Average  number  of  ongoing  cases  per 
investigative staff  

Average  number  of  closed  cases  per 
investigative staff  

Average  number  of  closed  cases  with 
recommendations per investigative staff  

0.5 

1.3 

2.2 

0.9 

Average duration (months) of closed case 
vs. closed and ongoing cases  

Period from 2008 to 2011  

Closed cases only 

1.6 

3.4 

1.7 

0.9 

Period from 2013 to 2016  

Closed cases only 

Max = 27 

Max = 25.1  

Median =24.4  

Median = 23.3  

Min = 22.2 

Min = 22.3 

Closed & ongoing cases 

Closed & ongoing cases 

Max = 22.4 

Median = 20.5 

Min = 18.9 

Max = 18.7 

Median = 17.8 

Min = 17.2  

Source:  ICF  report,  section  5.3.1  -  Note:  ICF  calculations  based  on  OLAF  unpublished  data  and  OLAF  Annual  Reports.  The  number  of 
investigative staff for 2008 has been estimated on the basis of the year 2009 to enable comparisons between the two periods.  The number 
of cases per investigative staff reflects the number of cases per 'lead investigator', which provides a skewed picture as in a majority of cases 
there is a lead investigator and an associated investigator(s). 

Investigative tools and powers 

The  external  study  supporting  this  evaluation  concludes  that  efficiency  challenges  mainly 
stem – similarly as for effectiveness – from the divergences resulting from the reference to 
national  rules  in  the  case  of  external  investigations,  in  particular  as  regards  on-the-spot 
checks. OLAF limited access to forensic data and bank accounts were also cited as factors 
limiting the efficiency of the investigation process154.  

Cooperation and information exchange 

Overall,  the  external  contractor  considered  the  cooperation  and  information  exchange 
between  OLAF  and  its  partners  as  efficient,  in  particular  as  regards  IBOAs.  Enhanced 
cooperation with IBOAs, in particular Commission services through FPDNet meetings, led to 
a clarification of OLAF’s expectations and has contributed to an improvement in investigative 
practices and cooperation. The IBOAs' readiness and ability to provide OLAF with high quality 

153  The  year  2012  when  OLAF  was  reorganised  has  been  disregarded  so  as  to  compare  the  period  prior  to  the  implementation  of  the 
Regulation with the period after implementation.  
154 ICF report, section 5.3.2. 

32 

 
 
                                                            
information, and sectorial specific anti-fraud provisions, were identified by the contractor as 
additional factors positively affecting the efficiency of the cooperation155.  

The evaluator concluded that the level of efficiency related to cooperation and information 
exchange  with  AFCOS  depends  on  the  ability  to  establish  structured  cooperation  and 
communication  channels,  and  that  this  is  based  on  a  clear  role  and  tasks  of  AFCOS  at 
national level, an appropriate scale and nature of the powers of the AFCOS and, to a lesser 
extent,  the  presence  of  administrative  arrangements.  As  AFCOS’  competences  and  powers 
differ  from  one  country  to  another  so  does  their  efficiency  in  cooperating  and  exchanging 
information with OLAF156.  

The  external  evaluation  concludes,  based  on  interviews,  that  cooperation  and  level  of 
information exchange between OLAF and third countries and international organisations is 
more efficient when ACAs are in place157. 

Supervisory Committee 

The  differences  in  interpretation  of  the  provisions  of  the  Regulation  governing  the 
Committee (see section 5.2.4) hindered the efficiency of the Committee and its cooperation 
with OLAF.  

Doubts  have  been  expressed  by  OLAF  staff  consulted  as  regards  the  efficiency  of  the 
provision  in  the  Regulation  providing  that,  if  an  investigation  cannot  be  closed  within  12 
months after it has been opened, the OLAF Director-General must report to the Committee 
and indicate the reasons and any remedial measures envisaged158. The Regulation does not 
prescribe a maximum duration of 12 months for OLAF investigations, and remedial measures 
may  actually  not  be  necessary.  For  this  reason,  the  Supervisory  Committee  itself  has 
considered  that  this  provision  does  not  necessarily  correspond  to  the  reality  of  OLAF’s 
investigations159.  

5.4. Coherence  

This section focuses on  the extent to which the Regulation provides OLAF  with a coherent 
legal  framework  to  accomplish  its  tasks  and  achieves  an  appropriate  balance  between  its 
specific objectives (internal coherence). It also explores the extent to which the Regulation is 
coherent with other EU anti-fraud instruments (external coherence). It will further examine 
the  extent  to  which  the  Regulation  has  achieved  a  balance  between  investigative  powers 
and procedural rights, as well as between independence, on the one hand, and supervision 
and control, on the other. Lastly, it will examine the coherence of the Regulation in relation 
to wider EU policies for the protection of the EU financial interests. 

5.4.1. Internal coherence 

The  evaluation  has  identified  several  factors  affecting  the  internal  coherence  in  the 
application of the Regulation.  

155 ICF report, section 5.5.2. 
156 ICF report, section 5.5.1. 
157 ICF report, section 5.5.3. 
158 Article 7(8) of the Regulation. 
159  SC  opinion  No  4/2014  on  duration  of  investigations,  point  31:  "The  SC  adheres  to  OLAF's  position  that  the  first  12-month  period 
following the opening of an investigation, after which Regulation 883/2013 requires OLAF to indicate remedial measures to speed it up, 
does  not  necessarily  correspond  to  the  reality  of  OLAF's  investigations.  In  many  of  them,  their  complexity  and  the  need  to  carry  out  a 
number of investigative steps may indicate from the beginning that it is expected that certain investigations last more than 12 months and 
no particular remedial measures are needed when an investigation follows its normal course." 

33 

 
 
                                                            
The Regulation provides a legal basis for OLAF to provide the Member States with assistance 
in organising close and regular cooperation between their competent authorities in order to 
coordinate  their  action  aimed  at  protecting  the  EU  financial  interests  against  fraud 
(‘coordination cases’)160. However, the Regulation does not contain any concrete provisions 
on the modalities of coordination or the procedures applicable. The legal analysis conducted 
in  the  context  of  the  evaluation  identified  the  absence  of  specific  provisions  in  the 
Regulation  as  a  source  of  legal  uncertainly,  and  this  was  also  confirmed  in  interviews  with 
OLAF staff and in the survey161.  

Conversely, the evaluation has shown that the provisions of the Regulation concerning the 
adoption  of  the  GIPs  and  the  creation  of  an  internal  legality  check  have  positively 
contributed  to  the  internal  coherence  in  the  application  of  the  Regulation.  The  evaluation 
(interviews  with  OLAF 
identified  a  few 
inconsistencies  between  the  Regulation  and  the  GIPs  that  could  impact  on  the  coherent 
application  of  the  Regulation.  In  view  of  these  findings,  OLAF  is  already  taking  steps  to 
address any inconsistencies162.  

investigative  staff  and 

legal  analysis)  has 

5.4.2. External coherence 

Relationship between Regulations 883/2013, 2988/95 and 2185/96  

Regulation  883/2013  has  to  be  read  in  conjunction  with  Regulations  2988/95  on  the 
protection of the European Communities' financial interests163 and 2185/96 concerning on-
the-spot checks and inspections164, to which the Regulation makes a number of references.  

OLAF investigative staff and AFCOS, as well as the legal analysis conducted in the context of 
the  evaluation,  revealed  certain  inconsistencies  between  Regulation  883/2013  and  the 
other  two  regulations165.  For  instance,  Regulation  883/2013  governs  OLAF’s  investigations 
concerning  any  illegal  activity  affecting  the  EU  financial  interests,  whereas  Regulations 
2185/96  and  2988/95  do  not  apply  to  all  sources  of  Union  revenue  (but  only  to  revenue 
collected directly on behalf of the European Union, which is interpreted to exclude revenue 
based on VAT). These differences can lead to legal uncertainty and divergent interpretations. 
The  Utrecht  University  study  has  shown  that  this  situation  differs  from  that  of  the  other 
European  authorities  analysed  by  that  study,  which  benefit  from  a  more  coherent 
framework for their investigations166.  

Coordination cases and mutual administrative assistance 

As  explained  above,  Regulation  883/2013  tasks  OLAF  with  providing  Member  States  with 
assistance  in  organising  close  and  regular  cooperation,  without  further  regulating  these 
tasks. In addition, in the areas of customs and intellectual property rights, OLAF has specific 
competence  to  engage 
including  by 
coordinating Member States' competent authorities, on the basis of Regulations 515/97 on 

in  mutual  administrative  assistance  activities, 

160 Article 1(2) of the Regulation. 
161 ICF report, section 4.3.1.3. 
162 ICF report, section 6.1.1. 
163 Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests, 
OJ L 312, 23.12.1995, pp. 1–4, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31995R2988.  
164 Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the 
Commission in order to protect the European Communities' financial interests against fraud and other irregularities, OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, 
p. 2–5, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A31996R2185.  
165 ICF report, section 6.2.1.1, table 9. 
166 Utrecht University study, p. 311. 

34 

 
 
                                                            
mutual administrative assistance in customs and agricultural matters167 and 608/2013 on the 
customs  enforcement  of  intellectual  property  rights168.  Contrary  to  Regulation  883/2013, 
this framework governs in detail the tasks performed to support administrative cooperation.  

There are no references in Regulation 883/2013 to Regulations 515/97 and 608/2013 or vice 
versa. The unclear relationship between the different legal acts on the basis of which OLAF 
coordinates  the  activities  of  national  authorities  in  the  areas  of  customs  and  intellectual 
property creates uncertainty and can lead to practical difficulties169, also highlighted by the 
Utrecht study170.  

From a broader perspective, the detailed provisions on mutual administrative assistance in 
specific  areas  (customs,  intellectual  property),  coupled  with  the  absence  of  specific 
provisions on coordination cases in Regulation 883/2013, lead to varying levels of available 
tools  for  transnational  cooperation  in  the  fight  against  fraud.  The  Italian  cooperation 
project referred to in section 5.2.2.2 concludes that a common denominator of many of the 
problems  relating  to  the  prevention  and  combatting  of  transnational  fraud  in  the  area  of 
structural funds - the largest item of expenditure within European funding, and particularly 
exposed to certain risks of fraud - is the absence of legal provisions on mutual administrative 
assistance. This position has also been expressed by the European Parliament, which has on 
several  occasions  invited  the  Commission  to  create  mechanisms  for  the  exchange  of 
information  between  national  competent  authorities  with  regard  to  structural  and 
investments funds171.  

5.4.3. Has  the  Regulation  achieved  a  proper  balance  between  investigative  powers  and 
procedural rights?  

Conflicting  views  have  been  collected  during  the  evaluation  concerning  the  relationship 
between OLAF’s investigative powers and the procedural safeguards in the Regulation.  

-  OLAF 

investigative  staff 

in  general  considered  that  the  guarantees  were 
disproportionate,  in  the  light  of  OLAF's  current  powers,  the  absence  of  a  means  to 
enforce them, the fact that OLAF investigations end in recommendations and do not 
as  such  affect  the  position  of  persons  concerned,  and  that  the  cooperation  of  the 
person  concerned  with  OLAF 
in  external 
investigations.  A  common  perception  shared  among  OLAF  staff  and  a  number  of 
consulted stakeholders in IBOAs was that, while OLAF’s powers are designed for the 
conduct  of  administrative  investigations,  the  procedural  guarantees  and  safeguards 
introduced  by  the  Regulation  are  commensurate  with  those  guaranteed  in  national 

investigators  remains  voluntary 

167 Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of the Member States 
and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters, 
OJ L 82, 22.3.1997, pp. 1–16, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:31997R0515.  
168  Regulation  (EU)  No  608/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12  June  2013  concerning  customs  enforcement  of 
intellectual  property  rights  and  repealing  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1383/2003,  OJ  L  181,  29.6.2013,  pp.  15–34,  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:32013R0608.  
169 ICF report, section 6.2.1.2. 
170 Utrecht University study, p. 250. 
171 European Parliament Resolution of 11 March 2015 on the Annual Report 2013 on the protection of the EU financial interests  – Fight 
against fraud (2014/2155(INI)), point 47; European Parliament Resolution of 8 March 2016 on the Annual Report 2014 on the protection of 
the EU financial interests – Fight against fraud (2015/2128(INI)), point 42; European Parliament Resolution of 16 May 2017 on the Annual 
Report 2015 on the protection of the EU financial interests – Fight against fraud (2016/2097(INI)), point 50.  

35 

 
 
                                                            
criminal  procedures  or  set  a  higher  standard  than  those  prescribed  in  similar 
administrative investigations in Member States172.  

-  A  number  of  consulted  stakeholders  in  EU  IBOAs,  EU  control  bodies  and  national 
judicial  authorities  suggested  that  the  Regulation  achieves  an  appropriate  and 
coherent  balance  between  the 
level  of  procedural  guarantees  and  OLAF’s 
investigative powers173.  

-  A  number  of  stakeholders  in  EU  control  bodies,  Commission  services,  and  former 
Supervisory Committee members expressed the view that the procedural guarantees 
as provided for in the Regulation are not sufficient in the light of the alleged intrusive 
investigation powers of OLAF174.  

The  question  of  balance  between  investigative  powers  and  procedural  rights  was  also 
addressed  by  the  Utrecht  University  study  and  by  the  study  on  procedural  guarantees 
commissioned by the CONT Committee in the European Parliament, mentioned above. The 
Utrecht study considered that, in order to assess the full scope and competences of OLAF’s 
investigatory powers and procedural safeguards, an analysis of the interaction between EU 
and national law is essential175. The study commissioned by the CONT Committee underlined 
the  close  connection  of  OLAF  investigations  with  criminal  law  and  criminal  law  follow-up, 
which requires the existence of adequate safeguards in the context of OLAF investigations; it 
concluded that the safeguards in the Regulation do not seem excessive or disproportionate 
and  that  clarifying  and  strengthening  procedural  safeguards  in  OLAF  investigations  fosters 
the further use of OLAF final reports in national judicial proceedings176. 

The  view  was  also  expressed  that,  since  the  procedural  guarantees  applicable  to  OLAF 
investigations  stem  from  the  general  principles  of  EU  law  and  the  Charter  of  Fundamental 
Rights,  their  codification  in  Article  9  of  the  Regulation  actually  clarifies  their  application  in 
the context of OLAF investigations177. 

On  the  basis  of  the  above,  the  evaluation  does  not  provide  conclusive  evidence  that  the 
procedural guarantees in the Regulation are disproportionate to the available investigative 
powers, nor does it suggest that the guarantees are insufficient in the light of those powers. 
Certain concrete suggestions to further clarify or complement the relevant provision in the 
Regulation have been discussed in section 5.2.3. on effectiveness. 

5.4.4. To  what  extent  has  Regulation  883/2013  achieved  a  proper  balance  between 
independence, on the one hand, and cooperation, supervision and control, on the other?  

As  discussed  in  section  5.1  on  relevance,  the  existence  of  external  controls  to  guarantee 
OLAF's independence in the performance of its investigative function has not been disputed 
by  the  consulted  stakeholders.  The  evaluation  has  not  identified  conclusive  evidence 
suggesting  a  lack  of  balance  between  the  Regulation’s  provisions  on  independence  and 
control.  

172 ICF report, section 6.1.2.1. 
173 ICF report, section 6.1.2.3. 
174 ICF report, section 6 Findings and point 6.1.2. 
175 Utrecht University study, p. 2. 
176 Prof. Ligeti study for the CONT committee, "Main findings" and "Recommendations and Conclusions", pp. 6-7. 
177 Presentations at the evaluation conference on 1-2 March 2017 and at the workshop organised by CONT Committee of the European 
Parliament on "The future of OLAF", 29 May 2017. 

36 

 
 
                                                            
OLAF  is  also  subject  to  other  mechanisms  of  external  controls  as  regards  the  rights  of 
individuals,  in  particular  by  the  European  Data  Protection  Supervisor  and  the  European 
Ombudsman (within their respective fields of competence). Several OLAF staff as well as EU 
control  bodies  mentioned178  that  the  various  external  controls,  provided  for  in  the 
Regulation and in other acts of EU law, may lead to overlaps as an individual can bring cases 
through  these  different  channels  simultaneously179.  This  would  not  only  impact  on 
coherence, but also on efficiency and effectiveness of these controls.  

5.4.5. To  what  extent  does  Regulation  883/2013  fit  into  the  wider  EU  policies  (and  the 
various elements of these policies) for the protection of the EU financial interests?   

5.4.5.1. Early Detection and Exclusion System 

The  Early  Detection  and  Exclusion  System  (EDES)  aims  at  reinforcing  the  protection  of  the 
EU's financial interests. It was introduced by the 2015 revision of the Financial Regulation180 
and entered into force on 1 January 2016181. EDES ensures the early detection of economic 
operators  representing  risks  to  the  EU’s  financial  interests;  the  exclusion  of  unreliable 
economic  operators  from  obtaining  EU  funds  and/or  the  imposition  of  a  financial  penalty; 
and the publication, in the most severe cases, on the Commission’s website of information 
related  to  the  exclusion  and/or  the  financial  penalty,  in  order  to  reinforce  the  deterrent 
effect. 

This  new  system  represents  a  significant  improvement  in  the  application  of  rules  on 
independence  and 
to 
administrative  sanctions  with  respect 
transparency.  

fundamental  rights, 

EU IBOAs can now only decide to impose sanctions on unreliable economic operators after 
obtaining  a  recommendation182  from  a  new  centralised  Panel183.  The  Panel  assesses  cases 
where  there  is  no  final  judgment  or  final  administrative  decision.  It  has  no  investigative 
powers.  In  principle,  the  panel  bases  its  assessment  on  facts  and  findings  resulting  from 
audits  performed  under  the  responsibility  of  the  competent  Commission  service  and/or 
investigations conducted by OLAF. 

According  to  the  external  contractor,  OLAF  staff  reported  successful  cooperation  with  the 
EDES  panel  since  it  was  set  up.  Commission  services  involved  in  early  detection  and 
exclusion  procedures  have  indicated  that  most  of  the  elements  for  use  in  EDES  are 
communicated  by  OLAF  only  once  the  investigation  is  closed.  They  consider  that  this  may 
lead  to  delays  in  identifying  and  taking  appropriate  measures  against  economic  operators 

178 These issues were raised at a panel on Governance at the OLAF conference on evaluation of the Regulation. 
179 ICF report, section 6.1.3. 
180 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2015/1929 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 October 2015 amending Regulation (EU, 
Euratom)  No  966/2012  on  the  financial  rules  applicable  to  the  general  budget  of  the  Union,  OJ  L  286,  30.10.2015,  pp.  1-29,  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2015.286.01.0001.01.ENG. 
181 Also see COM(2017) 351 final, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the Court of Auditors 2016 
Annual  Management  and  Performance  Report 
the  EU  Budget,  Part  2/2,  p.  79-80,  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1505833296394&uri=CELEX:52017DC0351. EDES does not apply to shared management. 
182  For  the  situations  referred  to  in  Article  106(1)(c)  to  (f)  of  the  Financial  Regulation  (i.e.  grave  professional  misconduct,  fraud,  serious 
breaches of contractual obligations, or irregularities). 
183 Panel referred to in Article 108(5) to (10) of the Financial Regulation: Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
(EC, 
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1505833505493&uri=CELEX:32012R0966; last amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2015/1929 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 28 October 2015. 

26.10.2012, 

1605/2002, 

Euratom) 

1-96, 

298, 

pp. 

for 

No 

OJ 

L 

37 

 
 
                                                            
concerned  and  called  for  more  sharing  of  information  during  investigations184.  This  would, 
however,  need  to  be  balanced  with  the  need  to  preserve  the  confidentiality  of  the 
investigation.  The  latter  may  come  into  conflict  with  the  requirement  that  the  economic 
operator  concerned  is  heard  before  certain  of  the  measures  available  under  the  EDES 
procedures  are  taken,  where  it  can  prejudice  on-going  investigations.  While  the  Financial 
Regulation provides for the possibility to defer notification to the person or entity concerned 
in  exceptional  cases185,  the  short  period  of  experience  with  the  EDES  procedures  does  not 
yet permit a robust assessment of the effectiveness of the possibility to defer. 

Experience  drawn  in  the  first  year  of  the  functioning  of  this  new  procedure  shows  the 
importance of OLAF  

- 

informing the Panel and authorising officers, as far as possible, of the state of play of 
national  judicial  proceedings,  the  reasons  of  the  closure  of  national  proceedings 
without further actions, or all other ongoing investigations concerning the economic 
operator subject to an administrative sanction procedure; 

-  helping identify which parts of a final report may not be suitable for disclosure to the 
economic  operator  concerned  so  as  to  preserve  the  confidentiality  of  on-going 
investigations or judicial proceedings. 

Finally,  where  there  is  a  financial  impact,  OLAF  plays  an  important  role  in  assisting  the 
responsible authorising officer in the accurate calculation of the financial damage, since the 
financial  impact  on  the  EU  financial  interests  is  key  for  the  application  of  the  principle  of 
proportionality in deciding on the extent of administrative sanctions. 

5.4.5.2. OLAF role and powers in relation to VAT 

According  to  the  Regulation,  OLAF's  mandate  extends  to  fraud,  corruption  and  any  other 
illegal  activity  affecting  the  EU's  financial  interests.  The  Court  of  Justice  has  confirmed  on 
several occasions that VAT is a financial interest of the Union186. However, OLAF very rarely 
carries  out  investigations  into  irregularities  concerning  VAT.  This  is  the  result  of  several 
factors.  OLAF  lacks  the  instruments  available  to  national  administrations  which  operate  in 
this  field,  such  as  access  to  Eurofisc,  VIES  or  bank  account  information.  The  on-the-spot 
checks of Regulations 2185/96 and 2988/95 do not apply only to revenue collected directly 
on behalf of the European Union, interpreted to exclude VAT187. This lack of tools has been 
noted  by  the  European  Court  of  Auditors,  that  has  called  for  granting  to  OLAF  clear 
competences and tools to investigate intra-Community VAT fraud188. 

The policy and legal framework as regards VAT has evolved since the adoption of Regulation 
883/2013,  with  an  increased  emphasis  on  the  fight  against  VAT  fraud.  The  Commission 
adopted  an  Action  Plan  on  VAT  "Towards  a  single  EU  VAT  area"  on  7  April  2016189.  The 

184 ICF report, section 8.2.  
185  See  Article  108  of  Regulation  (EU,  Euratom)  No  966/2012,  in  particular  the  second  subparagraph  of  paragraph  1  and  point  (d)  of 
paragraph 8 thereof. 
186 Most recently, see case C-105/14, Taricco. 
187 Art. 1(2) of Regulation 2988/95 links the definition of ‘irregularity’ to infringements “prejudicing the general budget of the Communities 
or  budgets  managed  by  them,  either  by  reducing  or  losing  revenue  accruing  from  own  resources  collected  directly  on  behalf  of  the 
Communities, or by an unjustified item of expenditure” (emphasis added).  
188 European Court of Auditors, Special Report No 24/2015, "Tackling intra-Community VAT fraud: More action needed", Recommendation 
14 (b), http://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=35308.  
189  COM(2016)  148  final,  Opinion  of  the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  on  the  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the 
European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on an action plan on VAT: Towards a single EU VAT 

38 

 
 
                                                            
 
Action  Plan  sets  out,  inter  alia,  immediate  and  urgent  actions  to  tackle  the  VAT  gap, 
including  actions  to  enhance  cooperation  between  different  authorities,  and  invites  to 
explore possible cooperation and a partnership between Member States, Europol and OLAF 
on exchange of information. The European Parliament has also recently stressed the need to 
tackle the VAT gap, taking note of the Commission's Action Plan and inviting Member States, 
in this respect, to improve information exchange also with OLAF190.  
The  PIF  Directive  has  clarified  that  VAT  is  part  of  the  EU  financial  interests191.  Until  its 
adoption  some  Member  States  have  questioned  this  and,  as  a  result,  shown  reluctance  to 
cooperate  with  OLAF  on  the  matter.  The  future  EPPO  will  be  competent  for  VAT  fraud 
connected with the territory of two or more Member States that involves a total damage of 
at least EUR 10 000 000.  

Against this background, the current legal framework appears insufficient to enable OLAF to 
fulfil its mandate in the area of VAT, and its duty to cooperate with and support the future 
EPPO.  Customs  duty  fraud  is  in  fact  intrinsically  linked  with  VAT  and  excise  duty  fraud  at 
importation into the EU. In the experience of OLAF investigations, investigating one type of 
fraud involves investigating also the other. OLAF staff consulted have highlighted the need to 
give OLAF the necessary capabilities to investigate in the field of VAT, to coordinate activities 
in complex investigations of a transnational nature, and to perform intelligence and strategic 
analysis  activities.  This  would  allow  it  to  provide  elaborated  information  to  other  actors 
involved in countering VAT fraud including national authorities and, within its competence, 
the EPPO. 

To  achieve  this,  Regulation  883/2013  would  need  to  be  clarified  and  supported  by  new 
provisions  awarding  OLAF  the  means  to  act  in  the  area  of  VAT  fraud.  The  Commission  is 
currently considering providing access to VAT data to EU bodies, such as OLAF and Europol, 
in  its  on-going  revision  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  904/2010  on  administrative  cooperation 
between Member States in the field of VAT192. The effective use of these VAT data by OLAF 
in  the  fight  against  VAT  fraud  would  call  for  the  introduction  of  powers  of  investigation  in 
this  field  (e.g.  to  conduct  on-the-spot  checks  as  it  currently  does  in  its  investigations 
concerning expenditure and other sources of revenue).  

6. CONCLUSIONS 

Relevance 

  The  evaluation  has  shown  that  the  specific  objectives  of  Regulation  883/2013  have 
proven to be, and remain, relevant for the overarching objective of protection of the 
EU financial interests.  

  The creation of the EPPO does not put into question the continued relevance of the 
objectives of Regulation 883/2013. The EPPO and OLAF will deal with distinct aspects 
of  the  fight  against  fraud  affecting  the  EU  financial  interests  (criminal  and 
administrative, respectively) and their activities will be largely complementary. 

C 

to 

OJ 

Time 

decide, 

area — 
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1505833617776&uri=CELEX:52016AE2343.  
190  European  Parliament  Resolution  of  16  May  2017  on  the  Annual  report  2015  on  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial  interests  –  Fight 
against fraud (2016/2097(INI)), points 14. – 17. 
191 Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the EU financial 
interests by means of criminal law. Definition of “EU financial interests” in Article 1(1)(a). 
192 Inception impact assessment available at http://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2017-1072511_en.  

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

21.10.2016, 

43-49, 

389, 

pp. 

39 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Effectiveness 

  The  range  of  powers  and  tools  available  to  OLAF  under  the  1999  Regulations,  and 
further  developed  in  Regulation  883/2013,  have  allowed  OLAF  to  deliver  concrete 
results in the protection of the  EU financial interests. The evaluation has, however, 
also  confirmed  or  unveiled  a  number  of  shortcomings  in  the  available  powers  and 
tools for investigations that hinder the effectiveness of the Regulation. 

o  OLAF exercises investigative powers stemming from various acts of Union law, 
including the  Regulation. However, in various instances these acts make the 
application of these powers subject to conditions of national law, notably as 
regards  on-the-spot  checks  and  inspections  of  economic  operators  and 
digital forensic operations conducted in the territory of the Member States. 
The  Regulation  does  not  specify  the  extent  to  which  national  law  should 
apply.  As  a  result,  different  interpretations  of  the  relevant  Union  law 
provisions,  and  differences  in  national  law,  lead  to  a  fragmentation  in  the 
exercise  of  OLAF's  powers  in  the  Member  States,  in  some  cases  hindering 
OLAF’s  ability  to  successfully  conduct 
investigations  and  ultimately  to 
contribute  to  the  Treaty  objective  of  an  effective  protection  of  the  financial 
interests across the Union. 

o  The Regulation does not provide OLAF with tools to enforce its powers in the 
case  of  refusal  or  obstruction  by  persons  concerned  by  investigations  and 
witnesses.  OLAF  relies  on  the  assistance  of  national  authorities,  required  by 
the Regulation to assist OLAF, in conformity with their national law. This can 
limit  the  effectiveness  of  OLAF  investigations,  with  divergences  across 
Member States depending on the ability of national competent authorities to 
support OLAF with their own enforcement tools. 

o  The  absence  of  access  or  the  limited  access  to  bank  account  information, 
which could be central to uncovering many cases of fraud or irregularity, can 
limit  OLAF’s  ability  to  fulfil  its  mandate.  This  power  is  also  linked  to  the 
possibility  to  investigate  VAT,  where  the  evaluation  has  shown  that  OLAF’s 
mandate should be clarified and strengthened. 

o  As  regards  internal  investigations,  the  evaluation  found  that  the  current 
framework  based  not  only  on  the  Regulation  itself,  but  also  on  the  internal 
decisions  adopted  by  each  IBOA,  leads  sometimes  to  divergent  possibilities 
for OLAF to act in different IBOAs. The evaluation found that further clarity in 
the Regulation about the conditions for the conduct of internal investigations 
(in particular inspection of premises) applicable in all IBOAs could help better 
ensuring  a  uniform  protection,  and  provide  a  framework  in  which  to  assess 
specific arrangements contained in the internal decisions. Moreover, the rules 
applicable  to  internal  and  external  investigations  could  be  further  aligned 
(where  divergent  rules  are  not  justified)  to  ensure  a  more  coherent 
framework for investigations. 

  The actual impact of OLAF's investigations is de facto defined by the actual follow-up 
to its recommendations. The main internal factors identified as critical for the uptake 
of the recommendations are the quality and timeliness of the OLAF's reports and – as 
regards financial recommendations – the discrepancies in assessing the prejudice to 

40 

 
 
the  EU  budget  by  OLAF  and  the  IBOAs.  As  an  external  factor,  the  follow-up  to  all 
types of recommendations is affected by the discretion of the recipients to follow-up 
or not, and (in the case of Member States) the absence of a duty in the Regulation to 
take recommendations into account. This leads to differences in the response across 
recipients and to at times significant gaps between recommendations and follow-up.  

  The  most 

the 

follow-up 

factor  hindering 

important  external 

judicial 
recommendations relates to the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in national 
judicial  proceedings.  The  Regulation  provides  that  OLAF  reports  constitute 
admissible  evidence 
in  the  same  way  and  under  the  same  conditions  as 
administrative reports drawn up by national administrative inspectors. However, this 
does  not  sufficiently  ensure  the  effectiveness  of  OLAF's  activities,  in  particular  in 
those  Member  States  that  do  not  have  rules  providing  for  the  admissibility  of 
evidence,  in  judicial  proceedings,  of  similar  administrative  reports  drawn  up  by 
national administrative inspectors. 

to 

  Cooperation  and  exchange  of  information  with  EU,  national  and  international 
partners is overall effective, and is assessed as more effective with authorities with 
whom ACAs are signed. 

  The  evaluation  pointed  to  a  positive  cooperation  between  OLAF  and  IBOAs. 
Cooperation  with  the  European  Commission  is  particularly  relevant  given  the 
important role played by the so-called spending DGs in the management of EU funds. 
The  extent  of  the  cooperation  between  OLAF  and  IBOAs,  however,  differs  from 
internal to external investigations. Some provisions in Regulation 883/2013 establish 
more explicit duties for IBOAs and their staff in internal investigations. 

  Eurojust  and  OLAF  collaborate  effectively  through  the  exchange  of  information  of 
investigative  interest and mutual  involvement in common cases. Collaboration with 
Europol currently takes places primarily regarding counterfeit goods. Future working 
arrangements - established on the basis of the new Europol regulation - should allow 
enhancing information exchange between the two bodies. 

  Cooperation and exchange of information between OLAF and the Member States has 
been  strengthened,  in  particular  after  the  creation  of  the  AFCOS.  However,  the 
discretion that the Regulation leaves Member States to decide the competences and 
powers of the AFCOS does not ensure for a uniform impact of this new provision in 
the Regulation.  

  Cooperation  with  national  administrative,  police  and  judicial  authorities  is  overall 
effective,  and  is  assessed  as  more  effective  with  Member  States'  authorities  with 
whom  ACAs  are  signed.  However,  the  fact  that  the  possibilities  to  cooperate  are 
made subject to conditions of national law in the Regulation results in considerable 
differences  across  the  Member  States,  in  particular  as  regards  cooperation  with 
judicial authorities. 

  The  inclusion  of  Article  9  on  procedural  guarantees  is  generally  recognised  as  a 
positive  improvement  for  protecting  the  rights  of  individuals  subject  to  an  OLAF 
investigation.  The  legality  review  function  introduced  by  the  Regulation  and  the 
internal  complaint  procedure  are  considered  to  have  strengthened  procedural 
guarantees  of  individuals  subject  to  investigation.  The  evaluation  has  not  shown  a 

41 

 
 
conclusive  need  to  substantially  revise  existing  provisions,  although  concrete 
suggestions  to further clarify or strengthen the relevant provision in the Regulation 
have been made by various stakeholders.  

  The  evaluation  suggests  that  divergent  views  and  practices  with  regard  to  the 
provisions on the Supervisory Committee's role and mandate, and as a result on its 
access  to  case-related  information  held  by  OLAF,  impacted  the  work  of  the 
Committee and its cooperation with OLAF in the past. 

Efficiency 

  Given  the  available  data  and  the  time  lag  between  the  entry  into  force  of  the 
Regulation  and  the  evaluation  of  its  application,  the  extent  to  which  Regulation 
883/2013  was  efficient  in  generating  its  intended  results  could  not  be  ascertained 
exactly.  However,  the  increased  numbers  of  investigations  handled  with  more 
restricted  resources,  and  the  increase  in  the  number  of  recommendations  and 
amounts  recommended  for  recovery  suggest  that  the  changes  introduced  by  the 
Regulation,  alongside  various  organisational  changes  since  2012,  allowed  OLAF  to 
deliver on its mandate efficiently.  

  The  evaluation  has  shown  that  the  efficiency  of  the  selection  phase  has  increased 
with the Regulation and related organisational changes (creation of the single point 
of entry, case selection criteria of the Regulation and creation of the ISRU). However, 
as a result of the absence of a duty of national competent authorities to cooperate 
with OLAF at the selection stage, in many cases where the incoming information on 
its  own  may  be  insufficient  to  open  a  case,  OLAF  lacks  tools  to  collect  further 
information. This leads to a high rate of dismissal at the selection phase. 

  Overall,  the  evaluation  suggests  that  the  cooperation  and  information  exchange 
between  OLAF  and  its  partners  is  efficient,  in  particular  where  there  are  specific 
arrangements for structured collaboration in place (AFCOS, FPDNet, ACAs). 

Coherence 

  The  Regulation  provides  a  legal  basis  for  OLAF  to  provide  the  Member  States  with 
assistance  in  organising  close  and  regular  cooperation  between  their  competent 
authorities to coordinate their action for the protection of the EU financial interests. 
This is a key element of OLAF’s mandate to support cross-border cooperation among 
the Member States. However, the Regulation does not contain detailed provisions on 
the  modalities  of  coordination  or  the  procedures  applicable  in  these  so-called 
‘coordination  cases’.  This  results  in  a  lack  of  legal  certainty  for  OLAF  and  for  the 
Member States that could rely on OLAF’s assistance. 

  The GIPs and the creation of an internal legality check, both based on provisions of 
the  Regulation,  have  positively  contributed  to  the  internal  coherence  in  the 
application of the Regulation. 

  When considering Regulation 883/2013 in the larger context of existing legislation on 
the  protection  of  the  EU  financial  interests,  the  evaluation  has  identified  several 
factors affecting the overall coherence of the current legal framework.  

o  Regulation  883/2013  applies  in  conjunction  with  Regulations  2185/96  and 
2988/95,  on  which  OLAF’s  main  investigative  tool  –  the  on-the-spot  checks 

42 

 
 
and  inspections  –  is  based.  These  predate  the  adoption  of  Regulation 
883/2013 and its predecessors in 1999. The evaluation has identified certain 
inconsistencies  between  these  closely  linked  legal  acts,  which  can  lead  to 
uncertainty and divergent interpretations. 

o  As regards OLAF's mandate to engage in mutual administrative assistance and 
assist  Member  States  coordinate  its  activities,  the  unclear  relationship 
between  the  different  legal  acts  in  the  areas  of  customs  and  intellectual 
property  (Regulations  515/97,  608/2013  and  883/2013)  creates  uncertainty 
and  can  lead  to  practical  difficulties.  Moreover,  the  detailed  provisions  on 
mutual administrative assistance in specific areas (customs), coupled with the 
absence of specific provisions on coordination cases in Regulation 883/2013, 
lead  to  varying  levels  of  available  tools  for  transnational  cooperation  in  the 
fight against fraud. 

  Overall,  the  evaluation  does  not  provide  conclusive  evidence  that  the  procedural 
guarantees  in  the  Regulation  are  disproportionate  to  the  available  investigative 
powers, nor does it suggest that the guarantees are insufficient in the light of those 
powers. 

  The  evaluation  has  not  identified  evidence  of  a  lack  of  balance  between  the 

Regulation’s provisions on independence and control. 

  The  first  experience  with  the  Early  Detection  and  Exclusion  System  (EDES), 
introduced on 1 January 2016, points to the relevant role of OLAF informing the EDES 
Panel  and  authorising  officers  on  the  state  of  proceedings,  helping  identify  which 
parts  of  a  final  report  may  not  be  suitable  for  disclosure  to  the  economic  operator 
concerned,  and  assisting  in  the  accurate  estimation  of  financial  damage.  This 
collaboration needs to be balanced with the need to preserve the confidentiality of 
on-going investigations or judicial proceedings. 

The external contractor provided a number of recommendations that will be duly taken into 
account in preparation of the follow-up to the evaluation.  

43 

 
 
 
 
Annex 1 : Procedural information  

This  annex  provides  procedural  information.  It  explains  how  the  evaluation  managed  was 
both  in  terms  of  organisation  and  time.  It  provides  information  about  external  expertise 
used.  

A1.1 

Lead DG:  

European Commission, European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). 

A1.2 

Organisation: 

The  evaluation  roadmap  was  published  in  December  2015  and  set  out  the  context,  scope 
and aim of the exercise. The roadmap presented the questions to be addressed under the 
five  categories  of  effectiveness,  efficiency,  relevance,  coherence  and  future  outlook.  The 
future  outlook  is  discussed  in  the  report  which  this  Commission  Staff  Working  Document 
(SWD) accompanies.  

An Inter-Service Steering Group (ISSG) was set up to support the evaluation. The tasks of the 
ISSG  were  to  check  the  key  elements  of  the  external  study,  to  support  and  monitor  the 
evidence gathering and stakeholder consultation process, to review all external deliverables 
for  the  evaluation  as  well  as  the  SWD  and  to  assists  with  the  quality  assessment  of  the 
consultant's evaluation report. 

The  ISSG  was  composed  of  the  Secretariat-General  of  the  Commission,  Legal  Service  and 
DGs  HR,  JUST  and  BUDG.  Given  the  scope  of  the  evaluated  Regulation  and  the  tight 
timetable, the standing ISSG decided to involve other DGs affected by the application of the 
Regulation in the next steps prior to the launch of an inter-service consultation (ISC) during 
the last ISSG meeting. The DGs invited to join the standing ISSG were (8) DGs AGRI, CNECT, 
DEVCO, EMPL, NEAR, REGIO, RTD and TAXUD. (6) DGs AGRI, CNECT, EMPL, REGIO, RTD and 
TAXUD took part at the meeting. 

In  parallel,  an  OLAF  internal  working  group  was  set  up  and  consulted  to  support  the 
evaluation with expertise and experience on the conduct of investigations and knowledge of 
the investigative processes.  

The Commission contracted out an external study in support to the evaluation (see below), 
which provided the basis for this SWD. 

44 

 
 
 
 
A1.3 

Timetable: 

Date 
September 2015 
30 September 2015 
19 February 2016 
23 March 2016 

01 July 2016 
26 July 2016 
29 July 2016 

28 September 2016 
November    –  April 
2017 
21 February 2017 
1-2 March 2017 
07 April 2017 
18 April 2017 
12 June 2017 
25 July 2017 
5 September 2017 
October 2017  
Source: OLAF  

Description 
Establishment of the Steering Group  
1st Steering Group Meeting: Evaluation roadmap  
2nd Steering Group Meeting: ToR 
Launch  of  call  for  tender  for  study  contract  to  support  the 
evaluation 
Award of a study contract to ICF 
Signature of the contract with ICF  
3rd  Steering  Group  Meeting:  Kick  off  meeting  with  the  external 
contractor 
4th Steering Group Meeting: Inception report meeting 
Targeted  stakeholder  consultation  –  targeted  surveys,  interviews, 
expert panels  
5th Steering Group Meeting: Progress report meeting 
Conference on the evaluation of Regulation 883/2013 
6th Steering Group Meeting: Interim report meeting 
ICF’s expert panel workshop 
7th Steering Group Meeting: External Draft final report meeting 
8th Steering Group Meeting: 1st draft Staff Working Document  
9th Steering Group Meeting: 2nd draft Staff Working Document  
Adoption of the report accompanied by the SWD 

A1.4 

Exceptions to the Better Regulation Guidelines: 

The evaluation criterion 'EU added value' was excluded from the scope of the evaluation as 
OLAF carries out a specifically European task for the protection of the EU's financial interests 
in the framework of Articles 317 and 325 TFEU which cannot, in the same way, be carried 
out at national level, the EU added value was considered as addressed. 

Targeted  consultations,  given  the  scope  of  the  Regulation  and  the  well-defined  group  of 
stakeholders,  were  considered  as  an  appropriate  and  proportional  means  of  consultation 
rather  than  an  open  public  consultation.  Considering  that  the  public  at  large  could  not  be 
considered as directly impacted by the provisions of the Regulation, or responsible for their 
application,  or  possessing  specific  evidence  needed  for  the  evaluation,  an  open  public 
consultation was not carried out. 

A1.5 

Consultation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board: 

The evaluation has not been selected for scrutiny by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board. 

45 

 
 
 
 
A1.6 

External Expertise: 

External evaluation study 

An external independent study is the basis for the conclusions presented in this document. A 
contract was signed on 26 July 2016 with ICF International Ltd.  

The external contractor carried out targeted consultations for the evaluation as explained in 
Annex 2.  

The  contractor  was  supported  by  an  external  expert  panel  composed  of  academics  and 
enforcement law practitioners that provided a critical input to the evaluation. 

Conference on the evaluation of Regulation 883/2013 

On  1-2  March  2017,  OLAF  organised  a  conference  to  discuss  the  preliminary  evaluation 
findings of the external study as regards the key evaluation topics. The conference brought 
together stakeholders from a wide range of anti-fraud backgrounds, such as the Anti-Fraud 
Coordination Services of Member States (AFCOS), Member State administrative authorities 
for  the  management  of  EU  funds,  law  enforcement,  prosecutorial  and  judicial  authorities, 
EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies (IBOAs), international organisations, academics, 
non-governmental organisations etc. Conference participants brought (new) insights on the 
application of the Regulation, discussed the preliminary evaluation findings and/or provided 
further evidence. The conference was also an opportunity to discuss how the EPPO  would 
impact on the current framework of OLAF and the anti-fraud landscape in general and what 
changes  to  the  Regulation  might  need  to  be  considered.  Results  of  the  conference  were 
taken on board for the external evaluation report as part of the consultation process. 

The external contractor took part at a number of other conferences and meetings that fed 
into their report (see Annex 2). 

46 

 
 
 
 
Annex 2 : Synopsis report of stakeholder consultation in the context of the Study 

This annex provides a synopsis of the stakeholder consultation that was carried out for this 
evaluation  by  an  external  contractor  as  part  of  the  external  support  study.  It  presents  the 
main steps and findings of the consultation of interested parties and stakeholders. It shows 
that  the  stakeholder  consultation  process  complied  with  the  Commission's  stakeholder 
consultation  principles  and  minimum  standards  taking  into  account  proportionality  as 
required by the Better Regulation Guidelines193. 

A2.1 

Feedback on evaluation roadmap 

The evaluation roadmap was opened for feedback to stakeholders during the course of the 
evaluation. One piece of feedback was received with a generally positive assessment of the 
evaluated Regulation highlighting the importance of OLAF.  

A2.2 

Open public consultation 

Regulation  883/2013  regulates  the  conduct  of  OLAF's 
investigations  against  fraud, 
corruption and other illegal activity affecting the EU's financial interest. Its scope does not 
cover the anti-fraud policy in general, it rather introduces specific instruments/powers and 
cooperation  mechanisms  with  institutional  partners.  The  groups  of  stakeholders  it  targets 
and impacts are well-defined,  for the most part within the EU institutional framework and 
relevant  Member  States'  authorities.  The  public  at  large  cannot  be  considered  as  directly 
impacted  by  the  provisions  of  the  Regulation  or  responsible  for  their  application  or 
possessing  specific  evidence  that  would  usefully  contribute  to  the  evaluation  of  the 
application of the Regulation. Moreover, the different stakeholders are affected by different 
distinct elements of the Regulation in different ways. Therefore, an open public consultation 
was  not  carried  out  and  stakeholders  were  consulted  in  targeted  consultations  as 
explained below. 

A2.3 

Targeted consultations – overview of stakeholders consulted  

This  section  presents  an  overview  of  different  stakeholder  groups  consulted  via  in-depth 
interviews and a survey. Other consultation activities are covered in the following sections.  

A  total  of  267  stakeholders  were  consulted  through  interviews  and  survey:  160  were 
consulted  through  interviews  and  168  through  the  online  survey.  It  is  estimated  that  61 
stakeholders were consulted via both interviews and the online survey. At least 29 of the 
interviews informed the development of five case studies. 

193 Better Regulation Guidelines, p. 70. 

47 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
Table A2.1: Overview of stakeholders consulted 

Category 

Total 
stakeholders 
consulted194 

Stakeholders consulted via interviews 

Consulted  Targeted 

Difference 
(actual & 
target) 

Conducted 
or used for 
the case 
studies 

Stakeholders 
consulted via 
survey 

OLAF staff in Investigative 
or investigative-support or 
management functions195 
OLAF staff in policy related 
and other functions (non-
investigative or 
management-related) 196 
Supervisory Committee 

EU control bodies  

Commission services and EU 
executive agencies 

Other EU institutions, 
bodies, offices  

Member State stakeholders 

Third countries 

International organisations 

Membership organisations, 
EU & national associations 
of lawyers and prosecutors 

100 

3 

6 

49 

12 

69 

12 

11 

5 

53 

13 

3 
5197 
28199 

9201 

35203 
3205 
10207 
1209 

30 

23 

12 

30 

-17 

4 

5 

20 

10 

42 

9 

6 

5 

-1 

0 

8 

-1 

-7 

-6 

4 

-4 

10 

1 

6 

37 

23 

0 
2198 
32200 

5202 

54204 
9206 
2208 
4210 

Total 
Source: ICF report, Annex 4 (ICF listed the EP as a control body, while this table places it under the EU IBOAS. The numbers of targeted EU 
control Bodies and EU IBOAS however reflect the ICF's planning with understanding the EP might be counted in as a control body.) 

267 

160 

160 

168 

29 

-1 

194 Stakeholders consulted several times, ie. via the survey and the interviews have been removed from the total figure.  
195 Including staff from Directorate C - Investigation support services, the DPO, Advisors to the DG, and from Unit 0.1 – ISRU. 
196 Including staff from Unit 0.2 - Human Resources and Budget. 
197 EU Ombudsman (1); EDPS (2); European Court of Auditors (1); CJEU (1). 
198 Ombudsman (1); Court of Auditors (1). 
199 DG DEVCO (4) (incl. 1 EU DEL); BUDG (2); DG CONNECT (2); DG HR. IDOC.1 (2); DG JUST (1); EASME (2); REA (2); SG (2); EACEA (1); AGRI 
(1); DG EAC (1); DG EMPL (1); DG GROW (1); DG NEAR (1); DG REGIO (1); DG RTD (1); ECHO (1); IAS (1); SJ (1);  
200 DG HR (3); DG SG (3); DG ECHO (2); DG DEVCO (2); DG TAXUD (2); DG AGRI (1); DG BUDG (1); DG EAC (1); DG EMPL (1); DG ENV (1); DG 
SCIC  (1);  DG  JRC  (1);  DG  JUST  (1);  DG  NEAR  (1);  DG  RTD  (1);  DG  FPI  (1);  European  Policy  Strategy  Centre  (EPSC)  (1);  Infrastructures  and 
Logistics - Brussels (OIB) (1); Internal Audit Service (IAS) (1). EU executive agencies: Non-specified Executive Agency (2), EACEA (1), EASME 
(1). INEA (1), REA (1).  
201 European Parliament (3); European Investment Bank (2); EEAS (1); Council of the EU (1); Eurojust (1); EUROPOL (1). 
202 European Parliament (1); European Investment Bank (2); EEAS (1), European Research Council (1). 
203 21 AFCOS (AT; BE; BG; CY; DE; EE; EL (2); ES, FR, HR, IT, LT (2), PL, RO, SE (2), SI, SK); 9 national managing authorities (BG; DE; EL; FR; HU; 
LT; NL (2), RO); 6 national judicial authorities (BG, CZ, HU, NL, RO, SK). 
204 BG (7); SK (6); CZ (5); EE (5); ES (4); HU (3); UK (3); CY (2); IT (2); LT (2); NL (2); RO (2); SE (2); AT (1); BE (1); DK (1); DE (1); EL (1); LV (1); LU 
(1); MT (1). 
205 Serbia (2) and Senegal (1). 
206 Bosnia and Herzegovina (2); the Occupied Palestinian Territories (1); and 6 unspecified.  
207 African Union; Council of Europe (2); EBRD (2); Global fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis & Malaria; United Nations  Headquarters; United 
Nations Development Programme; World Bank (2). 
208 The African Union Commission and one other, unspecified International Organisation. 
209 European Partners Against Corruption (EPAC). 
210 Bulgarian Supreme Cassation Prosecutor Office; Legal Interaction Alliance; one unspecified organisation from Lithuania and the Centre 
for Criminal Tax Law (CDPT). 

48 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
OLAF staff were the most represented within the stakeholder consultation (100 in total). 
The  table  A2.2  below  provides  a  breakdown  of  categories  of  OLAF  staff  consulted  by 
consultation activity. 26 OLAF staff were consulted twice, via an interview and participation 
to the survey. 

Table A2.2: Categories of OLAF staff consulted by consultation activity 

# interviewed 

#  consulted via the survey 

Dir A 

Dir B 

Dir C 

Dir D 

ISRU 

Other 

Total 

Source: ICF report, Annex 4 

19 

10 

13 

13 

7 
4211 

66 

21 

5 

22 

8 
4212 

60 

OLAF staff in investigative functions were consulted on all aspects of Regulation 883/2013, 
as well as internal and external factors which have influenced how the Regulation is being 
applied.  Investigative  support  staff  were  consulted  to  understand  the  tools  and  support 
(legal support; ICT support) at OLAF’s disposal to conduct its investigative functions and their 
appropriateness.  Legal  issues  raised  over  the  interpretation  of  some  of  the  Regulation’s 
provisions, complaints to control bodies and issues dealt with by the Data Protection Officer 
were also discussed.  

OLAF  staff  in  policy-related  functions  were  consulted  to  understand  how  the  Directorate’s 
policy  work  supports  fraud  prevention  and  detection,  as  well  as  OLAF’s  investigative 
function,  including  the  future  outlook  in  a  changed  policy  and  institutional  landscape,  e.g. 
with the establishment of the EPPO. Relations with the Supervisory Committee and its role in 
supervising OLAF’s investigative function were also discussed.  

Staff in ISRU were consulted on the review of incoming information and on the process of 
supporting  OLAF’s  Director-General  in  selecting  cases  for  opening  of  an  investigation  or  a 
coordination case. HR & budget staff were consulted on OLAF’s capacity – in terms of human 
and financial resources – to conduct its investigative function.  

The Director-General, his Adviser, one of his assistants, OLAF’s Internal Auditor and the Data 
Protection Officer were also consulted on high-level issues related to Regulation 883/2013, 
its application, and related management and organisational issues. 

National  stakeholders  from  EU  Member  States  were  the  second  most  consulted  group. 
Overall,  69  national  stakeholders  from  25  EU  Member  States  were  consulted  (see  Table 
A2.3).  20  stakeholders  took  part  in  interviews  and  22  took  part  in  the  online  survey.  20 
national  stakeholders  took  part  in  both  the  survey  and  interviews.  The  rest  participated 
through  a  separate  workshop  with  AFCOS  on  26  April.  Three  Member  States  did  not  take 

211 Internal Auditor; DG Assist; DG DPO; DG PA.  
212 Unit 0.2 - Human Resources and Budget; Advisor; DG Team; DPO.  

49 

 
 
 
 
                                                            
part neither in the interviews nor survey (FI, IE, PT)213. The most participation came from BG, 
SK,  CZ,  ES  and  EE,  and  HU.  This  corresponds  to  Member  States  with  a  large  number  of 
concluded investigations in 2014 and 2015214 - 30 in BG, 30 in HU, 15 in SK, ten in CZ. It also 
covers a diversity of AFCOS. 

Table A2.3: National stakeholders consulted by consultation activity 

# stakeholders interviewed 

# stakeholders consulted via the survey 

Target 

Difference 

BG 

SK 

CZ 

EE 

ES 

HU 

UK 

CY 

IT 

LT 

NL 

RO 

SE 

AT 

BE 

DE 

DK 

EL 

LU 

LV 

MT 

PL 

FR 

HR 

SI 

3 

2 

1 

1 

2 

2 

0 

1 

1 

3 

3 

3 

2 

1 

1 

2 

0 

2 

0 

0 

0 

1 

2 

1 

1 

2 

2 

2 

2 

3 

2 

0 

1 

3 

2 

2 

3 

1 

1 

0 

2 

0 

3 

1 

0 

0 

3 

3 

1 

1 

Total 

35 
Source: ICF report, Annex 4 

42 

1 

0 

-1 

-1 

-1 

0 

0 

0 

-2 

1 

1 

0 

1 

0 

1 

0 

0 

-1 

-1 

0 

0 

-2 

-1 

0 

0 

-7 

7 

6 

5 

5 

4 

3 

3 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

0 

0 

0 

54 

Consulting  the  AFCOS  allowed  to  gather  information  on  how  well  cooperation  between 
OLAF, the AFCOS and other national stakeholders has been structured. Consulting  national 
authorities managing EU funds allowed to gather information on (1) the detection of fraud 

213 They declined participation in a group interview for AFCOS and did not take part in the online survey. 
214 Figure  18  of OLAF’s 2014 and 2015 Annual Report. Note: Only external investigations in the following reporting sectors are  counted: 
agricultural funds, external aid, new financial instruments, structural funds. 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
and irregularities and the provision of incoming information, and the role of supporting tools 
such  as  the  Irregularities  Management  System,  (2)  cooperation  in  the  case  of  an  OLAF 
investigation and the role of the AFCOS, (3) policy work supporting OLAF investigations, (4) 
level of engagement and consultation in the course of an investigation and in its aftermath. 
Consulting national judicial authorities allowed to gather information on cooperation with 
OLAF  investigators  in  the  course  of  investigations,  and  also  when  following-up  on  judicial 
recommendations.  Issues  covered  were  level  of  communication  and  sequencing  or  lack 
thereof of OLAF and national investigations. The EU & national associations of lawyers and 
prosecutors215  consulted  shared  information  on  how  they  perceived  OLAF  and  national 
efforts  to  protect  and  investigate  harm  against  the  EU’s  financial  interests  and  how 
cooperation  at  both  levels  worked.  They  were  rather  distant  from  Regulation  883/2013, 
however, and views were general overall. 

Overall, 49 stakeholders from services of Commission DGs and EU executive agencies were 
consulted.  11  took  part  both  in  the  survey  and  interviews.  They  have  been  distinguished 
between  those  managing  and  controlling  (including  auditing)  EU  funds  and  developing 
policies  and  anti-fraud  strategies,  and  those  involved  in  governance,  legal  and  disciplinary 
issues.  

Within  the  first  group,  Commission  DGs  and  EU  executive  agencies  were  consulted  to 
understand  their  role  vis-a-vis  OLAF  on  channelling  incoming  information  to  OLAF, 
supporting  OLAF  investigators  in  their  investigative  process,  the  level  of  communication 
which occurred in the process and their role in following-up OLAF recommendations at the 
end of the process. Stakeholder coverage of the Commission DGs and executive agencies is 
presented in the table A2.4 below.  

investigative  work216 

In  terms  of  data  coverage,  the  mix  of  stakeholders  consulted  reflects  the  core  sectors  of 
i.e.  structural  funds217  (153  ongoing 
OLAF’s  ongoing 
in  2014, 
investigations  in  2014218),  external  aid  (79),  agricultural  funds219  (60),  customs  and  trade 
(56),  centralised  expenditure  (49),  EU  staff  (43),  tobacco  and  counterfeit  goods  (23),  new 
financial instruments (13). The mix also covers well the three modes of management of EU 
funds  (direct,  shared  and  indirect).  This  was  important  to  understand  the  division  of 
responsibility  between  the  Commission,  relevant  EU  Member  States  and  OLAF  to  detect, 
prevent and investigate fraud cases. Sectoral legislation (governing different EU funds) was 
discussed in those consultations.  

Within  the  second  group,  Commission  staff  were  consulted  on  certain  provisions  of  the 
Regulation  and  accompanying  measures,  e.g.  internal  investigations,  EDES,  the  clearing 
house,  the  use  of  precautionary  measures,  and  disciplinary  measures  following  an  OLAF 
investigation. The following were consulted: SG; DG HR; BUDG; IAS; SJ;  DG SCIC; European 

215  European  Partners  Against  Corruption  (EPAC);  Bulgarian  Supreme  Cassation  Prosecutor  Office;  Legal  Interaction  Alliance;  one 
unspecified organisation from Lithuania and the Centre for Criminal Tax Law (CDPT). 
216 Data on number of ongoing investigations by sector at the end of 2014, source: OLAF Annual Report 2014. 
217  As  per  the  terminology  used  in  OLAF  Annual  Report  2014,  the  term  ‘Structural  Funds’  covers  the  following:  European  Regional 
Development  Fund  (ERDF),  European  Social  Fund  (ESF),  Cohesion  Fund  (CF)  and  European  Maritime  and  Fisheries  Fund  (EMFF,  and  its 
predecessors EFF and FIFG), as well as the EAGGF Guidance Section.   
218 Of which 42 concerned the European Social Fund. Source: OLAF Annual Report 2014. 
219 As per the terminology used in OLAF Annual Report 2014, the term ‘Agricultural Funds’ covers the following: European Agricultural Fund 
for  Rural  Development  (EAFRD),  European  Agricultural  Guarantee  Fund  (EAGF),  European  Agricultural  Guidance  and  Guarantee  Fund 
(EAGGF — except the EAGGF Guidance Section) and pre-accession funding, including through the IPA, Phare and Sapard programmes. 

51 

 
 
                                                            
Policy  Strategy  Centre  (EPSC);  Infrastructures  and  Logistics  -  Brussels  (OIB);  Internal  Audit 
Service (IAS). 

Table A2.4: Table 21. Overview of the Commission DGs and executive agencies consulted by 
consultation activity 

DG DEVCO 
DG ECHO  
DG JUST 220 
DG AGRI   
DG EAC  
EASME   
REA   
DG EMPL  
DG NEAR  
DG RTD  
DG CONNECT  
DG TAXUD  
EACEA  
INEA  
Non-specified 
Executive Agencies  
DG GROW  
DG REGIO  
DG ENV  
DG JRC  
DG FPI  
Total 
Source: ICF report, Annex 4 

# stakeholders consulted through 
interviews 
4, incl. 1 EU delegation 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 

# stakeholders consulted through 
survey 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 

1 

1 
1 

21 

2 
1 
1 

2 

1 
1 
1 
21 

Stakeholders  from  third  countries  (12)  and  international  organisations  (11)  were  also 
consulted. They were from accession countries Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and from 
Senegal  and  the  occupied  Palestinian  Territories.  Six  survey  participants  were  from 
unspecified countries. Stakeholders representing international organisations were from the 
African  Union  (one  stakeholder  consulted  via  the  survey  and  an  interview);  Council  of 
Europe;  EBRD;  the  World  Bank;  Global  fund  to  Fight  Aids,  Tuberculosis  &  Malaria;  United 
Nations  Headquarters;  United  Nations  Development  Programme;  and  one  other, 
unspecified, international organisation. 

Consulting third countries and international organisations allowed to understand the level of 
cooperation  of  these  organisations  with  OLAF.  Although 
less  familiar  with  OLAF’s 
investigative powers and tools, these interviews shed light on the exchange of information 
between  these  institutions  and  OLAF,  as  well  as  the  possible  follow-up  actions  based  on 
OLAF investigations.  

Three  former  members  of  the  Supervisory  Committee  were  interviewed  to  understand 
their views on their mandate, according to Regulation 883/2013, and their effective ability to 

220 DG JUST was also consulted on the future outlook of the EU anti-fraud landscape.  

52 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
exercise  their  mandate.  They  discussed  difficulties  in  interpreting  provisions  in  the 
Regulation on their role, and their access to information on cases. Capacity issues faced were 
also discussed. They were not consulted via the survey on account of the limited number of 
members.  

Eight  members  of  staff  of  several  EU  control  bodies  (EU  Ombudsman;  EDPS;  European 
Court of Auditors; CJEU) were consulted to collect their views on problems that Regulation 
883/2013 sought to address; improvements introduced by Regulation 883/2013 and issues 
with  practical  implementation,  e.g.  interpretation  of  certain  legal  provisions.  They  were 
mainly  consulted  on  their  ability  to  control  and  supervise  OLAF’s  investigations.  Two  took 
part in both the survey and interviews.  

Ten  stakeholders  from  other  EU  institutions,  bodies,  offices  and  agencies  (IBOAs)  were 
consulted. They were from the European Parliament; European Investment Bank; Council of 
the EU; Eurojust; EUROPOL; the EEAS; and the European Research Council. One took part in 
both  the  survey  and  an  interview.  They  were  consulted  mainly  on  law  enforcement 
cooperation  with  OLAF;  governance  issues;  and  on  OLAF’s  future  outlook  and  current  and 
future  legislative  proposals.  The  EIB,  as  an  institution  administering  EU  funds,  was 
interviewed on the same issues as Commission spending DGs and executive agencies. 

A2.4 

Evolution of the stakeholder engagement plan 

Initially,  the  external  contractor  planned  161  interviews,  160  were  carried  out  with  some 
changes  in  the  mix  of  stakeholders  interviewed221.  Those  changes  did  not  modify  data 
coverage in any substantial manner, nor introduce bias.  

in 

involved 

investigative  functions, 

Considering the focus of Regulation 883/2013 on OLAF’s investigative function, it was agreed 
between  the  external  consultant  and  the  Inter-Services  Steering  Group  (ISSG)  to  focus 
interviews  with  OLAF  staff 
investigative-support 
functions,  or  management  functions  rather  than  interviewing  staff  (+23  against  the  initial 
planning)  in  policy  related  functions  (-17).  Similarly,  having  in  mind  the  importance  of 
Commission services and EU executive agencies in managing EU funds, and also preventing, 
detecting,  and  supporting  OLAF  staff  during  investigations,  it  was  agreed  that  additional 
interviews were conducted with them (+8). The number of interviews with other IBOAS (-1),  
Member  State  stakeholders  (-7),  third  countries  (-6)  and  membership  organisations/EU  & 
national  associations  of  lawyers  and  prosecutors  (-4)  was  modified  as  (i)  some  of  them 
declined to be interviewed for their limited availability and (ii) the difficulty to identify the 
right  stakeholders  in  third  countries.  This  was  partially  compensated  by  increase  in  the 
number of interviews with the international organisations (+4).  

A2.5 

Targeted consultations – overview of consultation activities  

The targeted consultation of stakeholders was carried out through in-depth interviews; an 
online  survey;  workshops;  and  conferences  and  meetings.  These  tools  allowed  for 
collecting information from various stakeholder groups and were complementary, allowing 
data triangulation. 

221 Detailed description can be found in ICF report, Annex 4. 

53 

 
 
                                                            
A2.5.1 

Interviews 

Fifteen scoping interviews were conducted and 145 in-depth interviews, of which at least 
29  were  used  or  conducted  for  informing  the  case  studies.  15  scoping  interviews  were 
conducted  with  a  diverse  range  of  stakeholders  to  better  understand  the  needs  and 
expectations of the users of this evaluation and to enhance the study team’s understanding 
of OLAF’s functioning and performance to date. The findings from these scoping interviews 
informed  the  contextual  analysis  and  the  evaluation  approach  in  particular,  as  well  as  the 
research  tools.  Detail  on  the  focus  of  the  interviews  with  individual  stakeholder  groups  is 
explained above. 

A2.5.2  Online survey 

The survey was launched on 30 January to all respondents other than OLAF staff and third 
countries.  The  survey  was  sent  to  186  contacts  within  this  group.  Following  this  initial 
launch,  the  survey  was  also  sent  to  95  OLAF  staff  contacts  on  3  February,  9  third  country 
stakeholders  on  31  March  (1  bounced)  and  6  EU  delegation  contacts  on  21  April  (none 
responded),  thus  bringing  the  total  number  of  contacts  directly  invited  to  complete  the 
survey  to  295.  As  the  invited  respondents  were  asked  to  forward  the  survey  to  other 
relevant/interested stakeholders who also filled the questionnaire out, it is not possible to 
indicate the response rate based on the number of direct recipients and responses received 
(as illustrated in Table A2.1). 

The  survey  was  relatively  long  for  some  stakeholders.  However,  prima  facie,  this  did  not 
appear to have a material impact (if any) on the response rate. Another challenge related to 
specific  aspects  of  the  design/routing  of  the  survey.  For  instance,  some  respondents 
highlighted  that  the  survey  left  insufficient  space  and  opportunities  to  comment  on  their 
answers  or  add  other  options  than  those  specified  in  the  questions.  Furthermore,  some 
concerns  were  raised  as  to  whether  certain  questions  were  sufficiently  tailored  and  that 
some respondents were asked to answer certain questions outside their functions or their 
knowledge of the application of the Regulation. 

Certain  questions  were  asked  to  specific  stakeholder  groups  only,  which  resulted  in  some 
questions  with  low  numbers  of  responses.  For  example,  two  questions  which  were  only 
asked of OLAF’s ISRU unit received a total of 8 responses each. Another example relates to a 
small number of questions which were only asked of specific OLAF staff (as it was felt they 
would be best placed to respond), resulting in around 30 responses only to these questions. 

As a result of the survey design where many questions were targeted at certain sub-groups 
of  stakeholders  only,  small  bases  do  occur  among  a  number  of  survey  questions222. 
Nevertheless,  there  are  no  specific  themes  or  types  of  questions  where  this  issue  is 
specifically concentrated. 

Finally,  some  of  the  open  text  comments  provided  by  respondents  were  insufficiently 
detailed or clear, making interpretation challenging.  

222 Overall, 50 questions have at least one sub-question with 40 or fewer responses. Of these, 22 questions have 30 or fewer responses and 
17 questions have 20 or fewer responses. 

54 

 
 
                                                            
A2.5.3  Validation workshops  

The  external  contractor  consulted  (1)  its  internal  high  level  experts,  (2)  OLAF  and  (3)  the 
AFCOS via four separate validation workshops. The purpose of those workshops was to test 
emerging  findings.  They  were  useful  to  critically  reflect  on  emerging  findings  and  provide 
strategic steer to the external evaluation team. 

Two  workshops  were  organised  with  external  contractor's  high  level  experts  panel  during 
the evaluation. A first workshop was held on 14 September to gather the experts’ views on 
the  overall  scope  of  the  assignment;  discuss  the  key  points  for  the  contextual  analysis; 
identify  key  issues  to  be  explored  as  part  of  the  evaluation;  and  invite  comments  on  the 
evaluation framework. The second workshop was held on 18 April and focused on, amongst 
other things, the analysis of possible future scenarios for OLAF.  

Two  separate  workshops  were  hold  by  the  external  contractor  with  OLAF  staff  and  the 
AFCOS,  both  on  26  April.  Findings  on  various  key  evaluation  issues223  and  OLAF’s  future 
outlook  were  discussed.  At  the  OLAF  workshop,  members  of  all  Directorates  and  the 
Principal Advisor participated. Countries represented at the AFCOS workshop were BG, EE, 
FI, EL, IE, IT, MT, PT, SK. Two staff of OLAF were also present.  

A2.5.4  Conferences and meetings 

The external contractor attended the following events during which further information of 
use to the evaluation was collected: 

OLAF  organised  a  high  level  “Conference  on  the  Evaluation  of  Regulation  883/2013”  in 
Brussels  on  1-2  March  2017.  The  conference  brought  together  stakeholders  from  a  wide 
range  of  anti-fraud  backgrounds,  such  as  the  Anti-Fraud  Coordination  Services  of  Member 
States (AFCOS), Member State administrative authorities for the management of EU funds, 
law enforcement, prosecutorial and judicial authorities, EU institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies  (IBOAs),  international  organisations,  academics,  non-governmental  organisations 
etc.  The  conference  was  divided  into  two  parts  different  in  concept  and  format.  The  first 
morning  was  of  a  general  character  and  set  the  scene  in  broad  policy  lines.  The  speakers 
provided strategic and political input to the evaluation of Regulation 883/2013. The second 
part  of  the  conference was  built  around  four  discussion  panels  covering  key  topics  for  the 
evaluation of Regulation No 883/2013, at a more technical level. This part of the conference 
was interactive, addressing the core elements of the Regulation in more detail. The panels 
covered  the  following  topics:  OLAF  external 
internal 
investigative activities, governance and the future relationship between OLAF and the EPPO. 
Results of the discussion were fed into the (external) evaluation report224.  

investigative  activities,  OLAF 

The  external  contractor  also  took  part  at  the  Conference  on  “Cooperation  project  in  the 
Anti-fraud  sector”  held  in  Brussels  on  9  November  2016  by  the  Italian  AFCOS  (Guardia  di 
Finanza).  The  conference  notably  provided  information  on  existing  best  practices  in 

223 Opening investigations; investigative powers & tools; cooperation & information exchange; investigative recommendations & follow-up; 
procedural rights & safeguards; Supervisory Committee. 
224  For  more 
evaluation/conference_en.  

link  https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/policy/olaf-regulation-

information  about 

the  Conference 

follow 

the 

55 

 
 
                                                            
administrative  cooperation  in  the  sector  of  structural  and  investment  funds,  and  on  the 
evolving legislative EU anti-fraud landscape. 

A “lunch debate on the revised Regulation 45/2001” organised by OLAF’s DPO and DG JUST 
on 24 January 2016 to present the recent Commission proposal to revise this Regulation and 
align it with the EU Data Protection reform and the adoption of the General Data Protection 
Regulation  explained  the  new  features  of  the  Commission  proposal  and  to  what  extent  it 
could impact OLAF’s work if adopted.  

A2.6 

Results across consultation activities 

Table A2.5 presents key results per consultation activity, organised by evaluation theme, as 
well  as  the  level  of  (1)  consistency  of  results  across  consultation  activities  and  (2) 
complementarity of results across consultation activities.  

Overall, there was a large degree of convergence in results from the different consultation 
activities. 

56 

 
 
Table A2.5: Overview of consultation results across the consultation activities 

Headline results 

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Interviews 

Survey 

Workshops 

Conferences 

Opening 
investigations 

  Selection criteria considered overall 

helpful for OLAF investigative staff, yet 
lack of clarity on the impact of case 
selection criteria on selection decisions 
amongst non-OLAF stakeholders225.  

  The introduction of selection criteria 

  Most respondents - aside from 
those from the EC and other EU 
IBOAs - agreed that the case 
selection criteria and their 
application are transparent 
overall, while almost 30 per cent 
(n=16) disagreed.  

  Some stakeholders (e.g. 

 
AFCOS and IBOAs) reported 
lack of information on 
opening of cases and lack of 
clarity on how the selection 
criteria were effectively 
applied.  

Lack of clarity of case 
selection criteria was 
raised indicating that 
this creates some 
challenges and potential 
inconsistencies in 
application. 

overall improved consistency in the cases 
selected for investigation, yet some OLAF 
staff reported potential inconsistencies in 
application of the selection criteria. 

IPPs play a marginal role in case selection, 
being used only when one or more of the 
selection criteria set out in the Regulation 
would suggest a dismissal of the case. 

  Most survey respondents – aside 
from those from the EC and other 
EU IBOAs - agreed or strongly 
agreed that the information 
 
provided by OLAF on the reasons 
for opening an investigation was 
comprehensive and most also 
agreed it was transparent.  

  Discussion on 

whistleblowing status of 
informants.  

 

 

Lack of information communicated to 
relevant stakeholders on case selection 
decisions. 

  Some scope for improving the 

knowledge/experience of ISRU staff.  

  Agreement that OLAF’s investigative 

powers and tools were largely unchanged 
with the introduction of the Regulation 
and that it mainly clarified its role in 

  OLAF respondents were generally 
more likely to agree that specific 
powers and tools (surrounding 
inspections, interviews and on-

  The issue of the legal basis 
for conducting on-the-spot 
checks in the framework of 
internal investigations was 

  Challenges in 

interpreting/applying 
the external 
investigatory tools and 

Investigative 
tools and 
powers 

225 AFCOS representatives, Commission services, national judicial and managing authorities, other EU IBOAs and international organisations. 

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High 

High 

High 

High 

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 

Headline results 

Interviews 

Survey 

Workshops 

Conferences 

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internal investigations.  

Lack of agreement amongst stakeholders 
(even those within the same group / 
organisation) on whether the Regulation 
provides OLAF with sufficient tools and 
powers to conduct administrative 
investigations. 

  Challenges for OLAF investigators in 

navigating national law and practices, e.g. 
to conduct digital forensic operations, or 
access bank accounts/statements of 
beneficiaries. 

  OLAF investigative staff and AFCOS 
referred to certain inconsistencies 
between Regulation 883/2013 and 
Regulations 2185/96 and 2988/95 also 
impacting the consistency and the legal 
basis OLAF’s investigative tools.  

 

Issues around some specific provisions 
were reported: the authorisation 
necessary to conduct interviews (e.g. of 
witnesses) and the burden this can create 
for investigators; need to improve clarity 
surrounding the timing and legality of 
precautionary measures; length of “on-
the-spot” checks due to the notification of 
national authorities and OLAF’s internal 
approval procedures. 

the-spot checks) were 
clear/sufficient in the context of 
internal rather than external 
investigations. 

raised at a workshop with 
OLAF heads of units and 
other staff.  

  OLAF investigators, ie. ‘closer’ to 
these powers and tools  were less 
likely to agree that these powers 
and tools are clear compared to 
survey respondents who are not 
directly involved in interpreting 
and applying these powers and 
tools (e.g. ISRU staff).   

  Most respondents agreed that 
OLAF’s powers to inspect 
premises are clear in relation to 
inspections of the premises of EU 
IBOAs. A far lesser proportion 
agreed in relation to inspections 
within Member States, third 
countries and/or international 
organisations, e.g. to undertake 
digital forensic operations. 

  Only 45 % of survey respondents 
from OLAF investigative units 
agreed that OLAF provides 
information to IBOAs and Member 
States with regard to 
precautionary measures that is 
exhaustive and in line with the 
requirements set by Art. 7. Only 

  Challenges associated with 
the dependency on national 
rules and practices was also 
discussed at length at a 
workshop with OLAF heads 
of units and other staff.  

  At the OLAF evaluation 

 

conference, the legal basis 
for on-the-spot checks and 
inspections (Regulation 
883/2013) was reported as 
unclear due to  references 
made to other 
tools/regulations as well as 
‘rules and practices’ of 
Member States. 

  An ssue related to the 

authorisation necessary to 
conduct interviews was 
raised at workshop involving 
external expert panel, as 
well as need to clarify the 
legal basis for statements 
vis-à-vis interviews.  

powers set out in 
Regulation 883/2013 
given the reference 
within the Regulation to 
national rules and 
practices and in 
identifying what the 
‘competent authority’ in 
each Member State is.  

Issues related to the 
authorisation necessary 
to conduct interviews 
and the burden this can 
create for investigators 
and lack of clarity 
surrounding digital 
forensic operations 
under certain scenarios 
and difficulties accessing 
bank 
accounts/statements  – 
were raised at the OLAF  
conference.  

58 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Cooperation 
and 
information 
exchange 

Headline results 

Interviews 

Survey 

Workshops 

Conferences 

  Key added value - OLAF investigators can 
collect evidence and information in 
several Member States.  

  Regulation 883/2013 does not provide 
sufficient detail on OLAF’s role in 
coordination cases.  

1/3 of respondents from EC, other 
EU IBOAs, Member State 
stakeholders and third countries 
agreed with this statement. 

  Regulation 883/2013 does not 

provide sufficient detail to know 
with certainty what OLAF’s role is 
in coordination cases. 

  Stakeholders had mixed views on the level 
of cooperation and information exchange 
between OLAF and national authorities.  

  AFCOS strengthened cooperation and the 
exchange of information between OLAF 
and Member States’ authorities, yet 
agreement that some AFCOS had 
insufficient staff, powers or knowledge to 
fulfil this support role.   

  While OLAF has strong cooperation with 
administrative authorities – or at least 
these authorities have an obligation to 
cooperate with OLAF (Art. 3), the level of 
cooperation with judicial authorities is 
lower, notably regarding the follow-up to 
OLAF judicial recommendations and the 
level of indictment. 

 

Improved cooperation and  exchange of 
information between OLAF and Member 
States’ authorities, leads to reduced 

  Most OLAF investigative survey 
respondents considered that 
cooperation and exchange of 
information with Member States’ 
authorities and IBOAs during 
investigation had been overall 
effective. 

  This was not the case in the case 
of cooperation and exchange of 
information with between OLAF 
and third countries’ authorities in 
the context of investigations (10 
per cent (n=2) agreed it had been 
overall effective). 

  Shortcomings in practice 
regarding the role of the 
AFCOS were highlighted.  

  At a workshop involving 
AFCOS representatives, it 
was apparent that the 
suggestion to introduce 
greater specificity in 
Regulation 883/2013 
regarding the AFCOS 
(profile, size, powers, etc.) is 
contentious and relatively 
polarising. 

  A majority of survey respondents 
agreed that the creation of the 
AFCOS strengthened cooperation 
and the exchange of information 
between OLAF and Member 
States’ authorities, although 

  At a workshop of OLAF 
heads of unit and other 
staff, there was a clear 
consensus that Regulation 
883/2013 should be 
amended to specify the role 
and obligations of the 

  At the OLAF evaluation 
conference, the OLAF 
Director-General noted 
that OLAF requires the 
cooperation of EU IBOAs 
and this varies in 
practice. 

  Shortcomings in practice 
regarding the role of the 
AFCOS were highlighted.  

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Conferences 

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investigation duration, increased criminal 
investigations and prosecutions, increased 
recovery of misused public funds and 
increased deterrence. 

improvements to AFCOS powers 
and capacity would be helpful.  

AFCOS.  

  The provisions of the 

  The vast majority of Member 

State respondents agreed that the 
activities organised in the context 
of COCOLAF led to a more 
effective cooperation. 

Regulation are not sufficient 
to guarantee the 
effectiveness of cooperation 
in third countries and ACAs 
are considered by OLAF as 
particularly important to 
facilitate international 
cooperation. 

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Medium 

High 

Investigative 
recommendati
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up  

  Agreement that the quality and 

comprehensiveness of OLAF’s final reports 
is mixed. 

  Concerns relate more to shortcomings in 
OLAF’s application/execution of the 
Regulation rather than Regulation itself. 

  The lower level of cooperation between 
OLAF and judicial authorities, notably 
regarding the follow-up to OLAF judicial 
recommendations, was detrimental to the 
level of indictment. 

  Positive impact of the Regulation 

883/2013 and its application on the 
design of national anti-fraud legislation 
and practices. 

  Almost 2/3 of respondents agreed 
that OLAF’s investigation reports 
are overall clear and 
comprehensive, with 40-70 per 
cent of non-OLAF stakeholders 
agreeing, while around 80 per 
cent of OLAF respondents agreed.  

  More than half agreed that OLAF’s 
recommendations are clearly 
formulated with a well-defined 
description of the actions to be 
taken, with 40-56 per cent of non-
OLAF stakeholders agreeing, and 
around 80 per cent of OLAF 
respondents agreed. 

  The vast majority of survey 

respondents (EC, other EU IBOAs 
and Member States) suggested 

  The follow-up to judicial 

recommendations varies in 
practice depending on 
factors such as Member 
States’ rules on the 
admissibility of evidence and 
national authorities. 

  Differences across MSs 
as to how they value 
OLAF reports were 
discussed. 

  Drivers for follow-up 

  AFCOS representatives 
expressed a desire to 
receive OLAF’s final reports. 

  Representatives at the OLAF 
workshop were uniformly 
against as this would extend 
AFCOS’ role/remit beyond 
that which is specified in 
Regulation 883/2013 when 
the reports and 
recommendations are 

reported were: quality 
of OLAF reports; right to 
be heard not deferred; 
timely reports; 
information provided by 
OLAF to facilitate 
precautionary measures. 

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intended for judicial 
authorities. 

that OLAF’s financial 
recommendations were followed-
up upon within the reporting 
period (12 months), while 90 per 
cent (n=35) agreed that OLAF’s 
financial recommendations led to 
recovery proceedings. 

  A minority of survey respondents 
agreed that national judicial 
authorities followed up on OLAF 
judicial recommendations and 
IBOAs followed up on 
administrative and disciplinary 
recommendations. 

  The Regulation 

  OLAF’s Director-General 

High 

High 

Procedural 
rights and 
safeguards  

  Art. 9 introduced rights and safeguards 
that were disproportionate to the 
administrative nature of OLAF’s 
investigations. 

  Whilst the clarification of procedural 
guarantees was welcome, it had a 
negative effect on the efficiency of the 
investigative function, according to OLAF 
investigative staff.  

  The Regulation has made OLAF more 
compliant with data protection and 
fundamental rights although some issues 
remain.  

  The majority of respondents 
agreed that procedural 
guarantees under Art. 9 are clear 
and contributed to strengthening 
the procedural guarantees of 
individuals subject to 
investigations. 

  The majority of survey 

respondents agreed that the 
confidentiality and data 
protection provisions in the 
Regulation had contributed to 
strengthening the protection of 
personal data of individuals 
subject to investigations. 

strengthened and in some 
cases introduced procedural 
rights.  

  Rights and safeguards, are 

somewhat commensurate to 
those of persons subject to 
criminal investigations, and 
as such  can be considered 
as disproportionate to the 
administrative nature of 
OLAF’s investigations. 

  A number of external 

controls exist which OLAF 

indicated that 
procedural guarantees, 
whilst having 
strengthened the 
transparency and 
accountability of OLAF, 
were disproportionate – 
(OLAF has no powers to 
conduct criminal 
investigations but must 
respect the rights of 
persons as if they were 
subjected to one). 

61 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e
u
s
s
i

n
o
i
t
a
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a
v
E

l

Headline results 

Interviews 

Survey 

Workshops 

Conferences 

has to comply with.  

  A larger portion of survey 

  At a workshop involving 

s
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Medium 

High 

Supervisory 
Committee and 
other control 
mechanisms 

  Difference in opinion between the SC on 
whether the SC should be entitled to 
information on individual, ongoing cases 
to allow it to fulfil its mandate, solved by 
the Joint Opinion of the Legal Services of 
the EP, the Council and the EC, of 12 
September 2016. 

  While stakeholders interviewed 

highlighted the necessity of external 
controls and complaints mechanisms, 
they agreed that they had proliferated 
and were somewhat overlapping and had 
created  administrative burden on OLAF to 
respond.  

respondents (OLAF226 and the EC) 
disagreed that: 

  the role and tasks of the SC 

(Art. 15), 

  clarifications regarding 

modalities for OLAF to report 
to the SC on investigations, and  

  the definition of working 

arrangements between the SC 
and OLAF,  

  had led to a more effective and 

ICF’s expert panel, the main 
points were that the 
Regulation is unclear as to 
the SC’s mandate and 
powers, especially in 
relation to OLAF’s conduct in 
undertaking investigations 
and what the SC should have 
access to. 

  The clarity of the SC’s 
role and mandate was 
discussed at the OLAF 
evaluation conference – 
the legislator left some 
issues unresolved and 
never decided whether 
the SC should be an 
advising or a supervising 
body. 

efficient cooperation between the 
SC and OLAF. 

Stakeholders consulted had mixed views as regard to the effectiveness of the inter-institutional exchange of views. The evidence 
gathered was limited. 

Medium 

Low 

Inter-
institutional 
exchange of 
views 

Source: ICF report, Annex 4 (shortened) 

226 OLAF respondents constituted the bulk of the sample for this question (27 of 30 respondents) and so the data for these questions will disproportionately reflect the views of OLAF staff. 

62 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Annex 3 : Methods and analytical approach 

This annex provides a description of the methodological approach to the evaluation taken by 
the  external  contractor  that  supported  this  SWD.  It  summarises  the  main  methodological 
elements  and  cross-references  to  the  more  detailed  methodological  annex  of  the  external 
report supporting this SWD. 

A3.1 

Logic of intervention  

The  intervention  logic  developed  in  the  context  of  the  evaluation  (Figure  A3.1)  aimed  to 
retrace the cause and effects chains through which the provisions of the Regulation generate 
intended outputs, results and impacts (which correspond to the objectives of the Regulation 
spelled out in Section 2.1). Provisions that should allow achievement of the objectives are: 

 

 

Investigative function (Articles 3, 4, 5, 7, 11); 

Safeguards (Articles 8, 9, 10 and 17); 

  Cooperation and coordination (Articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14); 

  Governance and control mechanisms (Articles 15, 16, 17). 

The  provisions  surrounding  the  investigative  function  allow  OLAF  to  fulfil  its  mandate  and 
use its powers to obtain results in its investigations; they cover the selection phase for the 
opening of investigations, the investigative tools and powers, the procedure to be respected, 
as  well  as  the  follow-up  to  investigations.  They  are  complemented  by  the  provisions 
concerning  safeguards,  which  are  intended  to  protect  the  persons  involved  in  the 
investigations,  by  defining  the  rules  on  procedural  guarantees,  confidentiality  and  data 
protection.  Throughout  the 
including 
whistleblowers,  IBOAs,  Member  States  or  third  countries  authorities  and  international 
organisations,  and  the  relevant  provisions  regulate  this  cooperation  depending  on  the 
specificities  of  each  of  those  categories.  The  governance  and  control  mechanisms  ensure 
OLAF’s independence and the monitoring of its investigative function. The key elements of 
the Regulation and related implementing rules are further detailed in Annex 5. 

investigations,  OLAF  cooperates  with  sources, 

Ultimately,  the  Regulation  is  expected  to  directly  or  indirectly  contribute  to  the  effective 
protection  and  enforcement  of  the  EU’s  financial  interests  across  EU  Member  States  and 
beyond, and enhance the credibility of the Union’s budgetary responsibility. Expected results 
are  to  recover  a  greater  proportion  of  misused  EU  public  money,  to  better  enforce  laws 
designed  to  combat  fraud  or  other  illegal  activities  affecting  the  Union's  financial  interest, 
and to increase deterrence through improved cooperation. These results should be achieved 
while  affording  the  necessary  procedural  guarantees  to  persons  concerned  as  well  as  by 
respecting the independence of OLAF.  

63 

 
 
Figure A3.1: Intervention logic of the Regulation 

Source: ICF report, section 2.2.1 

A3.2 

Evaluation Framework  

The  evaluation  framework  operationalised  the  evaluation  criteria  and  questions  by  using 
judgement criteria, indicators and means of verification. Judgment criteria, expressed in the 
form of statements are used to answer the various evaluation questions. They can be then 
confirmed  and/or  rejected  by  the  research.  A  comprehensive  set  of  indicators  were 
developed  against  these  judgment  criteria  and were  populated  by  the  evidence  generated 
by the evaluation. The evaluation framework also included means of verification, that is the 
research methods and tools that were used to collect data and to run the analytical exercises 
to inform the indicators put forward.  

A3.3 

Data collection and analytical exercises 

The evaluation built on the following research to generate the intended array of evidence: 

  Desk  research  was  used  to  collect,  structure  and  analyse  all  relevant  documentation 

 

related to Regulation 883/2013 and its implementation. 
Stakeholder  consultations  were  organised  by  way  of  a  survey  reaching  out  to  around 
170  respondents  and  more  than  by  way  of  160  interviews  with  key  respondents.  It  is 

64 

 
 
 
 
 
 
estimated that 61 stakeholders were consulted via both interviews and online survey. In 
addition,  the  evaluation  team  attended  three  high  level  conferences  and  expert 
meetings, as well as organised two internal validation workshops of evaluation findings 
(see Annex 2 for detail). 
Five  case  studies  were  used  to  further  deepen  the  insights  into  key  findings  using 
evidence from the stakeholder interviews and the online survey.  

 

The evidence collected was used to run the following analytical exercises: 
  Descriptive qualitative analysis, which consisted of extracting from and structuring the 
evidence  contained  in  key  documents  in  order  to  validate  or  reject  specific  judgment 
criteria.  

  Descriptive  quantitative  analysis  of  monitoring  and  administrative  data  informed  the 
quantitative  indicators  related  to  effectiveness  and  efficiency  in  the  evaluation 
framework.  

 

  A comprehensive legal analysis of key provisions of the Regulation and key relevant legal 
instruments in the area of anti-fraud assessed the clarity of key provisions, internal and 
external coherence and potential impact on the functioning of the Regulation. 
Four  contribution  case  studies  formed  the  basis  for  the  contribution  analysis.  The 
method  involved  defining  the  link  between  variables  as  well  as  the  influence  of 
explanatory variables on impact variables relating to specific cause and effect chains of 
the Regulation.  
The  stakeholder  consultation  analyses  involved  analysing  inputs  from  stakeholders 
interviewed and stakeholders surveyed via the online survey. 

 

A3.4 

Evaluation challenges and limitations 

This section describes the main challenges encountered and the associated limitations of the 
evaluation  results  and  mitigation  measures  put  in  place.  In  doing  so  it  provides  an  overall 
assessment of the robustness of the methodology applied and the reliability of the available 
data. 

 

The evaluation work was based on about three years of application of the Regulation, 
which means that very limited evidence was available on the impacts of its application. 
Certain  provisions  of  the  Regulation  may  not  have  yielded  their  full  results  yet.  While 
this  limitation  could  not  be  addressed,  given  the  requirement  of  the  Regulation  to 
complete  the  evaluation  by  a  certain  date,  the  research  and  consultation  tools  were 
designed  so  as  to  capture  comprehensive  information  on  the  application  of  the 
Regulation on the three years after entry into force.  

  Desk  research  (qualitative  information)  –  the  evidence  base  gathered  through  desk 
research  informed  the  qualitative  indicators  of  all  evaluation  questions.  Desk  research 
generated  evidence  supporting  findings  for  all  evaluation  criteria  although  evidence 
from desk research was quite limited on the relevance criteria. This limitation had little 
bearing  on  the  findings  on  relevance  as  other  research  tools  were  used  to  generate 
evidence on the needs and issues faced by stakeholders.   

  Desk  research  (quantitative  information)  –  the  quantitative  research  designed  initially 
intended  to  rely  on  case  level  data.  However,  it  was  not  possible  for  reasons  of 
confidentiality  of  investigations  to  give  the  contractor  access  to  the  files  of  individual 

65 

 
 
 
 
cases, they worked on aggregated data provided by OLAF on a set of agreed indicators. 
The  lack  of  disaggregated  case-level  data  prevented  the  benchmarking  and  advanced 
quantitative analysis originally planned by the contractor, and led to a greater emphasis 
on  qualitative  data  and  analysis.  The  lack  of  disaggregated/granular  data  meant,  for 
example, that it was not possible to link outcomes to specific investigations or specific 
provision  under  the  Regulation.  However,  the  findings  from  the  contribution  analysis 
provided  some  evidence  of  the  links  between  provisions  of  the  Regulation  and 
outcomes,  while  data  on  recoveries,  prosecution,  etc.  provide  some  additional 
contextual evidence that allowed the contractor to build conclusions.    

  Consultations  with  stakeholders  were  delayed  for  a  number  of  reasons  (e.g. 
identification  of  key  stakeholders,  approval  to  interview  them,  linguistic  issues)  all  of 
which  were  successfully  mitigated  against.  Due  to  the  length  of  the  evaluation 
questions, the questionnaires proved to be too long and this led to partial coverage of 
the  interview  questions  in  some  cases.  The  consequence  was  that  at  times  the 
triangulation  of  evidence  was  limited  to  a  couple  of  sources  (e.g.  desk  research  and 
survey)  because  some  of  the  questions  were  left  unanswered  by  the  majority  of 
interviewed  stakeholders.  Whenever  this  took  place,  contradictory  evidence  on  the 
basis  of  a  few  sources  was  not  always  reported  and  evidence  pointing  in  the  same 
direction was reported with the necessary caveats.  
The online surveys covered all stakeholder groups as intended. The results of the survey 
analysis  may  suffer  from  a  slight  bias  in  the  responses  provided  due  to  the  fact  that 
more  than  one  third  of  the  respondents  were  OLAF  staff.  The  sensitivity  analysis 
performed on a number of key questions demonstrated that weighting the responses of 
this stakeholder group would not have changed the overall direction of the results. 
  Case  studies  were  mainly  focused  on  gathering  evidence  of  good  practices.  At  times, 
interviewers found it difficult to obtain illustrative examples of “bad” practices because 
stakeholders  were  reluctant  to  name  other  stakeholders  that  have  not  adopted  best 
inform 
practices.  This 
recommendations on effective and efficient working practices.  

limited  the  extent  to  which  the  case  studies  could 

 

  Analysis and triangulation of evidence throughout the revised ICF's Final Report sought 
to  provide  greater  explanation  and  analysis  of  stakeholders’  views  collected  through 
interviews  and  the  survey,  and  to  ensure  evidence-based  links  to  all  conclusions  and 
recommendations drawn in the report. However, this has not been done systematically 
and  therefore  also  this  SWD  could  not  reflect  the  typology  of  stakeholder  presenting 
certain positions. 
The  length  of  the  draft  final  report  has  been  shortened  to  reduce  the  length  of  the 
overall report without being able to fully conform to the page limitation of 100 pages set 
in the ToR. 

 

Overall,  the  contractor  declared  that  the  planned  data  collection  and  analytical  exercises 
could be implemented as planned. Most of the challenges were overcome and/or mitigated 
against.  The  robustness  of  the  evidence  base  gathered  was  judged  satisfactory  by  the 
evaluators.  The  ISSG  carried  out  a  Quality  Assessment  of  the  external  report  before 
accepting the final product. 

66 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 4 : Evaluation questions 

This  annex  provides  an  overview  of  evaluation  questions  as  presented  in  the  evaluation 
roadmap. Questions in section E are addressed in the report which this SWD accompanies. 

A.  Relevance: 
• 

To  what  extent  have  the  specific  objectives  of  Regulation  883/2013  proved  to  be 
relevant for the overarching objective of protecting the financial interests of the EU?  

• 

• 

To  what  extent  have 
Regulation 883/2013 proved to be relevant to achieve the specific objectives? 

tools  and  control  mechanisms 

the 

introduced  by 

To  what  extent  are  the  specific  objectives  of  Regulation  883/2013  relevant  in  the 
context of wider EU policies and current policy developments (in particular as referred 
to in sections 1.4 and 1.6) for the protection of the EU's financial interests? 

B.  Effectiveness: 
• 

To what extent have the specific objectives of Regulation 883/2013 been met so far? To 
what extent have the different components of the Regulation contributed to achieving 
the  specific  objectives  of  Regulation  883/2013  and  to  an  improved  protection  of  EU 
financial 
indictment  and 
deterrence)? 

(recovery/financial  corrections,  prosecution, 

interests 

•  Which  are  the  external  factors  beyond  the  influence  of  OLAF  (including  the  follow-up 
responsibilities  –  once  OLAF  concludes  an  investigation  -  of  Member  States  and  other 
Commission  services  and  EU  institutions,  bodies,  offices  and  agencies)  that  have 
contributed to or influenced the achievement of the objectives of Regulation 883/2013, 
and how? 

• 

To what extent do the legal instruments contained in Regulation 883/2013 provide OLAF 
with sufficient tools to accomplish its mandate?  

•  What  are  the  shortcomings  that  can  be  identified  in  the  different  components  of 
implementation,  which  negatively  affect  the 

Regulation 883/2013  or 
achievement of the Regulation's objectives? 

in  their 

C.  Efficiency: 
• 

To  what  extent  has  the  implementation  of  Regulation  883/2013  impacted  on  OLAF's 
resources and the use of those resources? And on the resources of other actors in the 
application of Regulation 883/2013? 

• 

To what extent are the tools available in Regulation 883/2013 for the conduct of OLAF 
administrative investigations, their follow-up and the successful cooperation with other 
entities  efficient  for  the  achievement  of  the  overarching  objective  of  protecting  the 
financial interests of the EU? 

D.  Coherence: 
• 

To what extent does the current set of rules in Regulation 883/2013 provide OLAF with a 
coherent legal framework to accomplish its tasks? In particular, to what extent has the 
Regulation  achieved  a  proper  balance  between  investigative  powers  and  procedural 
rights? And to what extent has Regulation 883/2013 achieved a proper balance between 
independence, cooperation, supervision and control? 

67 

 
 
• 

To  what  extent  does  Regulation  883/2013  fit  into  the  wider  EU  policies  and  current 
policy  developments  (in  particular  as  referred  to  in  sections  1.4  and  1.6)  for  the 
protection of the EU's financial interests? 

E.  Outlook: 
• 

In  the  current  institutional  and  legal  framework,  and  in  the  light  of  current  policy 
developments described in particular in sections 1.4 and 1.6, if shortcomings regarding 
the  protection  of  the  financial  interests  of  the  Union  are  identified  in  Regulation 
883/2013 or its application, how could they be addressed? 

• 

To  what  extent  should  Regulation  883/2013  be  reviewed  in  the  new  institutional 
context emerging from the negotiations on the EPPO Regulation? 

68 

 
 
 
 
Annex 5 : Key elements of Regulation 883/2013 and related implementing rules 

This section introduces the key elements of Regulation 883/2013 and related implementing 
rules that were subject to the evaluation.  

A5.1 

Investigative functions (Art. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11)  

A5.1.1 

Investigative powers  

OLAF’s  investigative  powers  were  initially  defined  in  Regulations  1073/99  and  1074/99, 
which were replaced by Regulation 883/2013. Investigations are defined as "any inspection, 
check  or  other  measures  undertaken  by  the  Office  […]  with  the  view  to  achieving  [its] 
objectives  and  establishing,  where  necessary,  the  irregular  nature  of  the  activities  under 
investigation"227.  Regulation  883/2013  further  defines  OLAF’s  powers  during  external  and 
internal investigations in its Articles 3 and 4, respectively.  
As part of external investigations OLAF can carry out on-the-spots checks and inspections228 
in Member States and third countries, and on the premises of international organisations229, 
the  Regulation  refers  to  national  rules  and  practices  for  application  of  these  investigative 
powers.  In  turn,  national  authorities  must  assist  the  Office  with  its  investigative  tasks  and 
ensure that OLAF investigators are allowed access to information and documents relating to 
the  subject  of  the  investigation  under  the  same  conditions  as  equivalent  national 
authorities230. In addition, OLAF may interview a person concerned or a witness at any time 
during an investigation. At all stages of the investigations, procedural guarantees as defined 
in the Regulation must be respected. 

internal 

investigations  within 

IBOAs,  OLAF  carries  out  administrative 
As  part  of 
investigations  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Regulation  883/2013,  with  the  Inter-
institutional  agreement  and  with  decisions  adopted  by  the  relevant  IBOA,  which  lay  down 
the terms and conditions for internal investigations concerning them231. OLAF has the right 
to: 

 

 
 

immediate  and  unannounced  access  to  relevant  information  (including  in  databases) 
and to the IBOA’s premises and accounts232; 
request oral information, including through interviews, and written information233; and 
carry out on-the-spot checks and inspections at the premises of economic operators in 
order to obtain access to relevant information234. 

In  addition  to  investigations,  OLAF  can  open  coordination  cases  to  provide  assistance  and 
contribute  to  investigations  carried  out  by  competent  national  authorities.  In  these  cases, 
OLAF  cannot  conduct  investigative  activities  and  its  role  is  limited  to  supporting  Member 

227 Article 2(4) of the Regulation. 
228 Such on-the-spot checks and inspections are carried out in accordance with the provisions of Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 
November  1996  concerning  on-the-spot  checks  and  inspections  carried  out  by  the  Commission  in  order  to  protect  the  European 
Communities' financial interests against fraud and other irregularities, on economic operators to whom Community, and with the relevant 
provisions  of  Regulation  (Euratom,  EC)  No  2988/95  of  18  December  1995  on  the  protection  of  the  European  Communities  financial 
interests. 
229 In accordance with relevant cooperation and mutual assistance agreements and any other legal instruments in force.  
230 Article 3(3) of the Regulation. 
231 Article 4(1) of the Regulation. 
232 Article 4(4) of the Regulation. 
233 Article 4(2)(b) of the Regulation. 
234 Article 4(3) of the Regulation. 

69 

 
 
 
                                                            
States’ competent authorities. Coordination cases can be reclassified as investigation cases 
upon  request  by  OLAF’s  Director-General  (upon  request  of  the  investigation  unit  and  a 
positive opinion from the ISRU). 

A5.1.2  Selection of investigations 

The  decision  to  open  an  investigation  is  taken  by  OLAF’s  Director-General  on  the  grounds 
that  there  is  a  sufficient  suspicion  that  there  has  been  fraud,  corruption  or  other  illegal 
activities  affecting  the  EU’s  financial  interests  based  on  information  provided  by  public  or 
private sources. As part of the internal reorganisation of OLAF in 2012, a new Investigation 
Selection and Review Unit (ISRU) was created. It is an independent unit reporting directly by 
OLAF’s  Director-General,  which  advises  him  on  whether  an  investigation  or  coordination 
case should be opened, or whether the case should be dismissed. 

The criteria as well as the general principles of the procedure to open an investigation are 
defined in Article 5 of Regulation 883/2013. The introduction of selection criteria is one of 
the  innovations  of  Regulation  883/2013.  OLAF’s  Director-General  can  open  an  external  or 
internal investigation on his own initiative, or upon request of a Member State concerned 
or any IBOA. Such a decision is taken within two months from receiving such request. 

A5.1.3 

Investigation procedure 

The  main  rules  applicable  to  the  investigation  procedure  are  defined  in  Article  7  of  the 
Regulation.  Investigations  are  conducted  by  staff  designated  by  OLAF’s  Director-General, 
instructions  and  written  authorisations235.  For  each 
acting  under  his  direction  via 
investigative  activity,  investigators  receive  a  written  authorisation  featuring  their  identity 
and  capacity,  the  subject  and  purpose  of  the  investigation,  its  legal  bases,  and  its  related 
powers236. 

The  context  of  an  investigation  can  justify  the  adoption  of  administrative  precautionary 
measures  to  protect  the  financial  interests  of  the  Union.  On  the  basis  of  information 
provided  by  the  Office,  IBOAs  and/or  EU  Member  States  decide  whether  to  take  such 
measures237 in accordance with national/EU law238.  

OLAF’s powers to investigate in third countries and international organisations are based on 
the  cooperation  and  mutual  assistance  agreements  concluded  by  the  Union  with  these 
partners,  such  as  association  agreements239.  The  power  of  OLAF  to  investigate  is  also 
frequently  laid  down  in  financing  programmes  and  conventions.  OLAF  may  also  enter  into 
administrative arrangements with these partners.  

A5.1.4  Reporting and monitoring 

Once an investigation is completed, a Final Report on the investigation is drafted under the 
authority of the Director-General240. The report is sent to the competent authorities of the 
Member  State(s)  and/or  the  IBOA  concerned241.  This  report  may  be  accompanied  by 

235 Article 7(1) of the Regulation. 
236 Article 7(2) of the Regulation. 
237 Article 7(6) of the Regulation. 
238 Article 7(7) of the Regulation. 
239 Article 1(1)(b) of the Regulation.  
240 Article 11(1) of the Regulation. 
241 Article 11 (3)-(5) of the Regulation.  

70 

 
 
                                                            
Recommendations  for  actions  to  be  taken  following  the  investigation,  which  must  specify 
the  preliminary  legal  classification  of  the  facts  established.  Recommendations  may  be 
financial, judicial, administrative or disciplinary242. 

OLAF  reports  must  constitute  admissible  evidence  before  national  courts  under  the  same 
conditions as equivalent national reports243.  

According  to  the  GIPs,  the 
ISRU  (Review)  reviews  the  Final  Report  and  the 
Recommendations including the accompanying draft notes and letters in order to provide 
an  opinion  to  the  Director-General244.  It  analyses  whether  the  investigation  unit  complied 
with  rights  and  procedural  guarantees,  data  protection  requirements,  and  the  legality, 
necessity  and  proportionality  of  the  investigation,  as  well  as  whether  the  preliminary 
qualification of the facts under national criminal law is correct. In addition, the ISRU much 
check whether the Recommendations and the case closure decision are justified in line with 
the findings of the case245. 

In the event no evidence has been found against the person concerned, the investigation is 
closed regarding that person, who is informed of this decision within 10 working days246. 

A5.2 

Safeguards (Art. 4, 9, 10, 12) 

A5.2.1  Procedural guarantees 

External  and  internal  investigations  must  be  conducted  in  compliance  with  the  procedural 
guarantees  defined  in  Article  9  of  the  Regulation.  The  introduction  of  Article  9  constitutes 
one  of  the  main  innovations  of  Regulation  883/2013.  The  guarantees  offered  include  the 
right  to  an  objective  and  impartial  investigation,  the  right  to  avoid  self-incrimination,  the 
right to be interviewed/heard (once prior notice has been provided), including the right to 
be assisted by a person of the individual’s choice, and the right for the person concerned to 
comment on the facts of the case. 

In  relation  to  procedural  guarantees,  the  ISRU  (Review)  reviews  and  verifies  the  legality, 
proportionality and necessity of the proposed investigative measures. All ISRU opinions are 
submitted  to  OLAF’s  Director-General  for  him  to  make  a  decision  or  to  authorise  an 
investigative act. 

In  addition,  any  person  affected  by  an  investigation  may  address  a  complaint  directly  to 
OLAF247  or  to  external  and  independent  institutions  or  bodies  (European  Ombudsman, 
European Data Protection Supervisor). 

A5.2.2  Confidentiality and data protection  

Article 10 of the Regulation defines general rules on confidentiality of information and data 
protection  applicable  to  the  Office,  while  IBOAs  have  an  obligation  to  establish  internal 

242 Article 11(2) of the Regulation and Article 19 of the GIPs. 
243 Article 11(2) of the Regulation. 
244 Article 20 of the GIP. 
245 Article 21 of the GIP. 
246 Article 11(7) of the Regulation. 
247  The  Legal  Advice  Unit  deals  with  all  complaints  according  to  the  procedure  available  on  OLAF's  website:  https://ec.europa.eu/anti-
fraud/olaf-and-you/complaints-olaf-investigations_en (Part A). 

71 

 
 
 
                                                            
procedures  to  ensure  the  confidentiality  of  internal  investigations  at  all  stages248.  OLAF  is 
also  subject  to  Regulation  45/2001  on  the  protection  of  individuals  with  regard  to  the 
processing  of  personal  data  by  Community  institutions  and  bodies249  and  is  under  the 
supervision of the EDPS. Data protection rules also apply to exchanges with third countries. 

In 2008, a Data Protection Officer was appointed by a Decision of OLAF’s Director-General. 

A5.3 

Cooperation and coordination (Art. 1, 8, 12, 13, 14) 

A5.3.1  Cooperation and coordination with Member States  

Investigation-related cooperation 

Member  States  have  an  obligation  to  assist  OLAF  in  the  context  of  internal  and  external 
investigations.  Member  States  must  assist  OLAF’s  staff  as  necessary  for  them  to  carry  out 
their  tasks  effectively,  and  to  ensure  they  have  access  to  all  relevant  information  and 
documents  relating  to  the  investigated  matter  under  the  same  conditions  as  national 
authorities250.  In  addition,  they  are  required  by  Article  3(4)  of  the  Regulation  to  set  up  an 
Anti-Fraud  Coordination  Service  (AFCOS)  to  facilitate  cooperation  and  the  exchange  of 
information.  

There are 14 Administrative Cooperation Arrangements (ACAs) in force between OLAF and 
Member States’ authorities establishing some practicalities for the exchange of information 
with the partner authorities of 8 Member States and the conduct of (internal and external) 
investigations.  ACAs  do  not  constitute  a  prerequisite  for  conducting  investigations  in 
Member  States,  but  provide  some  practical  modalities  for  cooperation  where  there  is  an 
identified need. 

Selection and safeguard of evidence 

Before  a  decision  is  taken  on  whether  to  open  an  investigation,  OLAF  informs  the 
authorities  of  the  Member  States  concerned  in  case  information  suggests  that  there  has 
been  illegal  activity  affecting  the  financial  interests  of  the  Union,  who  shall  ensure  that 
appropriate  action  is  taken;  in  turn,  the  authority  will  inform  OLAF,  upon  request,  of  any 
action  taken  pursuant  to  the  receipt  of  the  information251.  Where  investigations  show  it 
might  be  appropriate  and  if  so  requested  by  OLAF,  it  is  the  responsibility  of  national 
competent  authorities  to  decide  on  appropriate  precautionary  measures  to  protect  the 
financial interests of the Union, including measures for the safeguarding of evidence252. 

In cases where OLAF’s DG decides not to open an external investigation, he may send any 
relevant information to the Member State concerned for the competent authorities to take 
appropriate action253. 

248 Article 4(5) and 10(3) of the Regulation. 
249 Regulation (EC) 45/2001 of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the 
Community  institutions  and  bodies  and  on  the  free  movement  of  such  data,  OJ  L  8,  12.1.2001,  pp.  1-22,  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32001R0045. 
250 Articles 3(3) and 7(3) of the Regulation. 
251 Article 3(6) of the Regulation. 
252 Article 7(7) of the Regulation. 
253 Article 5(6) of the Regulation. 

72 

 
 
 
                                                            
Follow-up and monitoring 

OLAF may provide the competent authorities with the information obtained in the course of 
external investigations in due time, so that they can take appropriate action in application 
of their national law, following the investigation. Such information must also be transmitted 
by OLAF’s Director-General to any IBOA concerned. In addition, OLAF’s Director-General has 
an obligation to transmit information obtained in the course of an internal investigation on 
facts  falling  under  the  jurisdiction  of  a  Member  State  to  its  judicial  authorities.  OLAF  can 
provide evidence in national proceedings, in accordance with national law and the EU Staff 
Regulations254. 

In addition, Regulation 883/2013 requires OLAF’s partners to provide information on follow-
up  actions  at  the  Office’s  request  in  accordance  with  national  law  and  Regulation 
883/2013255. 

Policy-related cooperation 

In addition to bilateral cooperation between OLAF and the AFCOS in Member States, OLAF 
and the AFCOS cooperate as a network in the AFCOS group of the Advisory Committee for 
the Coordination of Fraud Prevention (COCOLAF). 

A5.3.2  Cooperation and coordination with EU IBOAs 

Investigation-related cooperation 

Article 4 of the Regulation regulates the exchanges of information between OLAF and IBOAs 
targeted  by  an  (envisaged  or  ongoing)  investigation,  as  well  as  the  modalities  of  their 
cooperation, OLAF’s powers and obligations and the IBOAs’ duty to cooperate.  

In addition, Article 1(5) of the Regulation provides that IBOAs may conclude administrative 
arrangements  with  OLAF.  A  number  of  administrative  arrangements  are  in  force  between 
OLAF and IBOAs. These are:  

 

Practical Arrangements between the European Parliament and the European Anti-Fraud 
Office (2013, before Regulation 883/2013 entered into force);  

  Administrative arrangements between OLAF and the European Commission (2015); 
  Administrative arrangements with the European External Action Service (2015); 
  Administrative  arrangements  with  the  European  Investment  Bank  and  the  European 

Investment Fund (2016);  

  Administrative arrangements with the Economic and Social Committee (2016);  
 
 
 
 
Another arrangement is currently being negotiated with the Court of Auditors.  

the European investment Bank (2016);  
the European Central Bank (2016);  
the Council of the European Union (February 2017) and  
the Committee of the Regions (May 2017).  

254 Article 12(4) of the Regulation. 
255 Article 11 of the Regulation. 

73 

 
 
                                                            
Selection 

Before  a  decision  to  open  an  investigation  is  taken,  and  when  OLAF  handles  information 
suggesting  that  fraud  has  taken  place  within  an  IBOA,  OLAF  has  the  option  to  inform  the 
IBOA. If OLAF chooses to do so, the IBOA must inform it of any action taken internally on the 
basis of the information communicated256. 

While  OLAF’s  Director-General  considers  whether  to  open  an  investigation  following  a 
request by an IBOA concerned or a Member State, and while the investigation is conducted, 
the  IBOA  shall  not  open  parallel  inquiries  on  the  same  facts  without  OLAF’s  consent257.  In 
cases where OLAF’s Director-General decides not to open an internal investigation, he may 
send any relevant information to the IBOA concerned for it to take appropriate action258. 

Investigation 

OLAF has an obligation to inform the IBOA concerned when an investigation is conducted on 
it  premises  and  when  OLAF  consults  documents  or  information  held  by  it259.  In  addition, 
OLAF  must  inform  IBOAs  when  an  investigation  reveals  that  one  of  their  officials,  other 
servants of offices or agencies, members, heads, or staff members may be concerned. IBOA 
staff have a duty to cooperate with and supply information to OLAF in the context of internal 
investigations260. During external investigations, OLAF also may have access to any relevant 
information  held  by  IBOAs,  including  information  on  databases.  In  cooperation  with  OLAF, 
the IBOA concerned may decide to take appropriate precautionary measures to protect the 
financial interests of the Union, including measures for the safeguarding of evidence261. 

Cooperation with Eurojust and Europol 

A specific provision of the Regulation governs the cooperation with Eurojust and Europol. It 
provides basis to conclude administrative arrangements with them to regulate exchanges of 
operational,  technical  and  strategic  information,  including  personal  data  and  classified 
information, and progress reports262. 

Administrative arrangements with Europol date from 2004, and were based on Art. 9(2) of 
the  Administrative  Agreement  on  Co-operation  between  the  European  Commission  and 
Europol.  Revised  arrangements  are  currently  under  discussion.  The  revision  results 
Regulation  883/2013,  which  allows  the  exchange  of  information  between  the  two  bodies, 
currently  not  foreseen  in  the  administrative  arrangements,  and  the  recently  adopted  new 
Europol Regulation263. 

256 Article 4(8) of the Regulation. 
257 Article 5(3) of the Regulation. 
258 Article 5(5) of the Regulation. 
259 Article 4(4) of the Regulation. 
260 Article 4(7) of the Regulation. 
261 Article 7(6) of the Regulation. 
262 Article 13(1) of the Regulation. 
263  Regulation  (EU)  2016/794  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  May  2016  on  the  European  Union  Agency  for  Law 
Enforcement  Cooperation  (Europol)  and  replacing  and  repealing  Council  Decisions  2009/371/JHA,  2009/934/JHA,  2009/935/JHA, 
2009/936/JHA 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0794.  

2009/968/JHA, 

24.5.2016, 

53–114, 

135, 

and 

OJ 

p. 

L 

74 

 
 
                                                            
A  Practical  Agreement  on  arrangements  of  cooperation  between  Eurojust  and  OLAF  was 
adopted  in  2008264.  It  was  not  considered  necessary  to  update  it  after  the  adoption  of 
Regulation  883/2013,  as  it  already  covers  the  exchange  of  information  between  the  two 
bodies. The on-going revision of the new Eurojust legal framework may, however, have an 
impact on the further cooperation. 

A5.3.3  Cooperation and coordination with third countries and international organisations 

Article  1(1)(b)  of  the  Regulation  states  that  in  order  to  achieve  its  objectives,  OLAF  must 
exercise its power of investigation conferred on the Commission by relevant EU acts as well 
as  cooperation  and  mutual  assistance  agreements  with  third  countries  and  international 
organisations.  In  addition,  Article  14  provides  that  administrative  arrangements  may  be 
concluded with relevant third country authorities and international organisations concerning 
operational, strategic, or technical information.  

In addition, Article 17 of the GIPs specifies that investigative missions can be conducted by 
investigation units in cases where the evidence needed to establish the existence of fraud, 
corruption or other illegal activities is not available in the Member States. Such missions can 
relate to illegal activities in the fields of customs, traditional own resources, expenditure of 
EU  funds,  including  through  international  organisations  or  financial  institutions,  or  other 
bodies funded by the EU.  

OLAF has ACAs in force with 27 third country authorities and with 12 international/regional 
organisations.  ACAs  are  considered  by  OLAF  as  particularly 
important  to  facilitate 
international cooperation. 

A5.4 

Governance and control mechanisms (Art. 15, 16, 17) 

A5.4.1  Director-General  

The mandate and powers of OLAF’s Director-General are defined in Article 17 of Regulation 
883/2013. He acts independently in the performance of his duties265, which include: 

carrying-out external and internal investigations; 

  opening external and internal investigations;  
 
  drafting reports following investigations; 
 

reporting  findings  of  investigations  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the 
Commission and the Court of Auditors; 

  determining the IPPs each year and communicating them to the Supervisory Committee; 
 
informing  the  Supervisory  Committee  about  cases  where  his  recommendations  were 
not  followed,  cases  where  information  was  transmitted  to  Member  States  authorities, 
and about the duration of cases; 
adopting guidelines on investigation procedures.  

 
OLAF’s  Director-General  is  appointed  by  the  European  Commission  for  seven  years,  non-
renewable.  

264 Available at http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/doclibrary/Eurojust-
framework/agreements/Practical%20Agreement%20on%20arrangements%20of%20cooperation%20between%20Eurojust%20and%20OLA
F%20(2008)/Eurojust-OLAF-2008-09-24-EN.pdf.  
265 Articles 17(3), 17(4), 17(5), 17(8) of the Regulation. 

75 

 
 
 
                                                            
A5.4.2  Supervisory Committee  

The  Supervisory  Committee  (SC)  is  a  body  composed  of  external  experts,  created  to 
reinforce  and  guarantee  OLAF’s  independence266.  Working  Arrangements  between  the  SC 
and  OLAF  were  adopted  on  14  January  2014,  replacing  earlier  arrangements  adopted  in 
September  2012.  In  March  2017,  the  working  arrangements  were  discontinued  at  the 
request  of  the  SC.  The  new  Committee  has  expressed  willingness  to  restart  discussions  to 
adopt new working arrangements. 

Mandate 

Article  15(1)  of  Regulation  883/2013  provides  that  the  SC  should  “monitor  the 
implementation  by  OLAF  of  its  investigative  function,  in  order  to  reinforce  the  Office’s 
independence  in  the  proper  exercise  of  the  competences  conferred  upon  it  by  this 
Regulation”,  and  in  particular  “developments  concerning  the  application  of  procedural 
guarantees and the duration of investigations”.  

In practice, SC’s mandate is three-fold: 

1.  Advisory role: The SC addresses opinions to OLAF’s Director-General on its own initiative 
or at the request of the DG or of any IBOA267. In its opinions, the SC issues a number of 
recommendations,  which  are  then  discussed  between  the  Office  and  the  SC.  It  also 
delivers a yearly opinion on the draft budget submitted by OLAF.  

2.  Supervisory role: The SC is regularly informed by OLAF’s Director-General of the Office’s 
activities268,  especially  concerning  its  investigative  function  and  follow-up  actions.  It 
protects the independence of OLAF’s Director-General and is informed in cases where the 
latter decides to bring an action before the CJEU after identifying a suspected breach of 
his independence by the Commission269. 

3.  Reporting  role:  Finally,  the  SC  reports  on  its  activities  once  a  year  to  the  European 
Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, where it assesses the 
Office’s  independence,  the  application  of  procedural  guarantees  and  the  duration  of 
investigations.  

Secretariat 

The  SC  is  supported  by  a  secretariat  in  its  work.  The  secretariat  was  provided  by  OLAF  in 
application of Article 15(8) of the Regulation, and its budget featured within the budget line 
of OLAF according to Article 18 of the Regulation.  
However,  after  the  SC  raised  concerns  on  potential  conflicts  of  interest270,  the  Regulation 
was  amended271.  From  1  January  2017  the  secretariat  of  the  SC  is  provided  by  the 

266 OLAF Annual Report 2015, p. 40. 
267 Article 15(1) of the Regulation. 
268 The OLAF DG has to report to the Supervisory Committee information about cases lasting more than 12 months. 
269 Article 17(3) of the Regulation. 
270  Annual  Activity  Report  2013  http://europa.eu/supervisory-committee-olaf/sites/default/files/documents/publications/annual-
reports/scan_2013_FINAL_en.pdf;  
Annual 
2014 
reports/scar_2014_supcom_en.pdf.  
271  Regulation  (EU,  Euratom)  2016/2030  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26  October  2016  amending  Regulation  (EU, 
Euratom) No 883/2013, as regards the secretariat of the Supervisory Committee of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). 

http://europa.eu/supervisory-committee-olaf/sites/default/files/documents/publications/annual-

Activity 

Report 

76 

 
 
                                                            
Commission, independently from OLAF, and its budgetary appropriations have been moved 
from the budget line and the establishment plan of OLAF to that of the Commission. 

A5.4.3 

Institutional exchange of views  

Article 16 of Regulation 883/2013 provides for the organisation of an exchange of views at 
political level to discuss the Office’s policy relating to methods of preventing and combating 
fraud,  corruption  or  any  other  illegal  activity  affecting  the  financial  interests  of  the  Union 
once a year between OLAF’s Director-General and the European Parliament, the Council and 
the  Commission  with  participation  of  the  SC,  representatives  of  the  Court  of  Auditors, 
Eurojust  and/or  Europol  may  be  invited  to  attend  on  an  ad  hoc  basis  upon  request  of  the 
European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Director-General or the Supervisory 
Committee. 

77