REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Evaluation of the application of Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999
Date: 2017-10-02
Institutions: European Anti-Fraud Office, European Commission
Subjects: EU office or agency, cross-border cooperation, exchange of information, fraud, fraud against the EU, general budget (EU), judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the EU, operation of the Institutions, public prosecutor's department

EN 

   EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 2.10.2017  COM(2017) 589 final   REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Evaluation of the application of Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999  {SWD(2017) 332 final}  
 
 
1 

Introduction 

The Commission is pursuing an ambitious agenda to strengthen the protection of the Union's 
financial interests, and important milestones have been reached in 2017. In July, the Directive 
on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law (the "PIF 
Directive") has been adopted by the Parliament and the Council1. It is furthermore expected 
that  the  Council  will  soon  adopt,  in  enhanced  cooperation  among  20  Member  States,  the 
Regulation establishing the European Public Prosecutor's Office ("the EPPO")2.  

These  measures  complement  the  institutional  and  legal  landscape  for  the  protection  of  the 
Union's  budget,  which  relies  today,  at  EU  level,  on  the  work  of  the  European  Anti-Fraud 
Office  ("OLAF"),  the  European  Court  of  Auditors,  other  Union  institutions,  bodies,  offices 
and agencies ("IBOAs") and, at Member State level, on various national administrative and 
judicial authorities. They all carry out necessary actions to protect the Union budget in line 
with the obligation stemming from Article 325 TFEU. OLAF was established in 1999 by the 
Commission to conduct administrative investigations against fraud, corruption and any other 
illegal activity affecting the EU financial interests,  and to assist Member States in the fight 
against fraud3. 

All  these  components  are  important  as  the  Union  moves  towards  the  next  Multiannual 
Financial Framework. The Commission is currently conducting a reflection on what kind of 
budget is needed for the Europe of the future4. An efficient and proper spending of the Union 
budget  is  a  key  element  in  building  trust  of  the  EU  citizens  and  to  boost  the  strength  and 
added value of the European project.  Fraud and corruption diminish the resources available 
for the benefit of EU citizens, and may be at the source of other criminal activities (such as 
terrorism and organised crime); they must therefore be fought vigorously and effectively. The 
ultimate  goal  is  an  equivalent  and  high  level  of  protection  of  the  EU  budget  in  the  whole 
territory of the EU. 

In  this  context,  this  report  presents  the  results  of  the  evaluation  of  the  application  of 
Regulation No 883/2013 concerning investigations conducted by OLAF5 ("the Regulation"), 
required  by  its  Article  19.  Furthermore,  it  sets  out  possible  avenues  how  to  adapt  and 
strengthen, where necessary, the legal framework for OLAF investigations, in the light of the 
expected  adoption  of  the  Council  Regulation  on  the  establishment  of  the  EPPO,  and  in  the 
light of the main findings of the evaluation. 

This  report  is  accompanied  by  an  opinion  of  the  Supervisory  Committee  of  OLAF  on  the 
application  of  the  Regulation,  adopted  pursuant  to  Article  19  of  the  Regulation6.  The 

1 Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against 
fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law, OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29–41. 
2 Interinstitutional File 2013/0255 (APP). On 8-9 June 2017, the Justice and Home Affairs Council reached a 
general approach on a Regulation implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the EPPO. The 
draft Regulation was subsequently transmitted to the European Parliament for its consent. All references in this 
document to the draft EPPO Regulation are to the document 9941/17 (text of the general approach), available at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9941-2017-INIT/en/pdf   
3 Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 28 April 1999 establishing the  European  Anti-fraud  
Office (OLAF), OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 20–22. 
4 European Commission, Reflection Paper on the Future of EU Finances, COM(2017) 358 of 28 June 2017. 
5 Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 
2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 
1074/1999, OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1–22. 
6 Supervisory Committee of OLAF, Opinion No 2/2017 of 28 September 2017. 

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evaluation  report  of  the  Commission  and  the  opinion  of  the  Committee  are  independent 
documents and were drafted in parallel. 

2  The evaluation of Regulation 883/2013 

The  evaluation  focused  on  four  key  areas:  effectiveness,  efficiency,  coherence,  relevance. 
The EU added value was not covered by the evaluation as OLAF ensures the protection of the 
EU  financial  interests,  in  the  framework  of  Articles  317  and  325  TFEU,  by  performing 
specific tasks at EU level which cannot be performed at national level. Aspects related to the 
future outlook of the Regulation to accomplish its objectives, and in the context of evolving 
anti-fraud policies and fraud trends, have also been addressed. 

The evaluation is based on a wide-ranging consultation of a high number of stakeholders. 
As part of the evaluation process, on 1-2 March 2017 OLAF organised a conference on the 
evaluation  of  the  Regulation7  involving  close  to  250  participants  from  the  anti-fraud 
coordination  services  of  Member  States,  Member  State  administrative  authorities  for  the 
management  of  EU  funds,  law  enforcement,  prosecutorial  and  judicial  authorities,  IBOAs, 
international  organisations,  academics,  and  non-governmental  organisations.  These 
stakeholder  groups,  as  well  as  OLAF  staff,  were  also  consulted  through  interviews  and 
surveys. 

The time period covered by the evaluation is 1 October 2013 (when the Regulation entered 
into force) to December 2016. 

The  evaluation's  detailed  findings  and  the  methodology  employed  are  described  in  the 
Commission staff working document accompanying this report. The preparation of the staff 
working document was supported by a study by an external contractor8. 

3  Main findings of the evaluation  

Regulation 883/2013 is the centrepiece of the legal framework governing OLAF’s mandate to 
conduct  administrative  investigations  concerning  fraud,  corruption  and  any  other  illegal 
activity affecting the EU financial interests. It was adopted after extensive inter-institutional 
discussions, replacing two regulations dating from 1999, in order to:  

- 

improve the effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of OLAF while safeguarding 
its independence;  

-  strengthen  the  procedural  guarantees  and  fundamental  rights  of  persons  subject  to 

investigation;  

-  strengthen  cooperation  with  Member  States,  EU  IBOAs,  third  countries  and 

international organisations; and to  
-  reinforce the governance of OLAF. 

The  evaluation  has  shown  that  these  specific  objectives  have  proven  to  be,  and  remain, 
relevant for the overarching objective of the protection of the Union’s financial interests. To 
this  end,  OLAF  performs  specific  tasks  at  EU  level  which  could  not  be  carried  out  at  the 
national  level  alone.  The  added  value  of  OLAF  investigations  was  confirmed  during  the 

7 All available presentations from the conference are available on the Commission website at  
https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/policy/olaf-regulation-evaluation/conference_en 
8 ICF Consulting Services Limited, 2017, Evaluation of the application of Regulation no 883/2013 concerning 
investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), Final report, https://ec.europa.eu/anti-
fraud/sites/antifraud/files/evaluation_of_the_application_regulation_883_en.pdf  

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consultation process of national and Union stakeholders. The evaluation has also confirmed 
the continued relevance of these objectives in the context of the establishment of the EPPO. 

The  Regulation  has  allowed  OLAF  to  deliver  on  its  mandate  with  concrete  results.  The 
evaluation showed a clear improvement in the effective conduct of investigations as a result 
of  several  specific  provisions  of  the  Regulation.  Cooperation  and  information  exchange 
between  OLAF  and  its  partners  has  been  reinforced  through  the  introduction  of  provisions 
enabling structured collaboration. The creation of the anti-fraud coordination services in the 
Member States, for example, was identified as a significant development to strengthen links 
between OLAF and the Member States.  

Evidence  has  shown  that  the  efficiency  of  OLAF’s  case  selection  and  investigations  has 
considerably increased with the Regulation, combined with internal organisational measures. 
This is illustrated by the increased numbers of investigations handled by investigative staff, 
and the increase in the number of recommendations and amounts recommended for recovery. 

However,  the  assessment  also  unveiled  several  shortcomings  related  to  the  conduct  of 
investigations that impact the effective and efficient application of the Regulation.  

(1) OLAF  exercises  investigative  powers  stemming  from  various  acts  of  Union  law, 
including  the  Regulation.  However,  in  various  instances  these  acts  make  the 
application  of  these  powers  subject  to  conditions  of  national  law,  notably  as 
regards on-the-spot checks and inspections of economic operators and digital forensic 
operations  conducted  in  the  territory  of  the  Member  States.  It  follows  from  the 
evaluation  that  the  extent  to  which  Regulation  883/2013  makes  national  law 
applicable  is  not  completely  clear.  Today,  different  interpretations  of  the  relevant 
provisions, and differences in national law, lead to a fragmentation in the exercise of 
OLAF's  powers  in  the  Member  States,  in  some  cases  hindering  OLAF’s  ability  to 
successfully  conduct  investigations  and  ultimately  to  contribute  to  the  Treaty 
objective of an effective protection of the financial interests across the Union.  

(2) The Regulation does not provide OLAF with tools to enforce its powers in the case of 
refusal or obstruction by persons concerned by investigations and witnesses. This in 
turn  can  limit  the  effectiveness  of  OLAF  investigations,  with  divergences  across 
Member States depending on the ability of national competent authorities to support 
OLAF with their own enforcement tools; a matter where there are also divergences in 
the applicable national law. 

(3) The  evaluation  pointed  to  the  need  to  consider  certain  changes  to  the  investigative 
powers available to OLAF based on the input from some stakeholders. The need for 
and  possibility  of  better  access  to  bank  account  information  under  appropriate 
conditions, which could be central to uncovering many cases of fraud or irregularity, 
should be assessed. This power is linked also to the possibility to investigate VAT, an 
area  where  the  evaluation  has  shown  that  OLAF’s  mandate  should  be  clarified  and 
strengthened.  

(4) In the area of internal investigations, the Regulation applies in conjunction with the 
internal  decisions  adopted  by  each  IBOA,  which  sometimes  leads  to  divergent 
possibilities  for  OLAF  to  act.  The  evaluation  found  that  further  clarity  in  the 
Regulation about the conditions  for the conduct of internal investigations applicable 
in  all  IBOAs  could  help  better  ensuring  a  uniform  protection,  and  provide  a 
framework  in  which  to  assess  specific  arrangements  contained  in  the  internal 
decisions. Moreover, the rules applicable to internal and external investigations could 

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be further aligned (where divergent rules are not justified) to ensure a more coherent 
framework for investigations. 

(5) The evaluation identified scope to make further use of the possibilities for the  early 
transmission of information by OLAF to other IBOAs, in cases where parts of the 
facts  of  an  investigation  in  progress  might  have  already  been  established  and  could 
necessitate immediate precautionary measures without waiting for the completion of 
the investigation. 

As  regards  the  follow-up  to  investigations,  there  are  large  differences  in  the  follow-up  to 
OLAF  recommendations  across  recipients,  and  sometimes 
important  gaps  between 
recommendations  and  follow-up.  The  evaluation  pointed  to  the  quality  and  timeliness  of 
OLAF final reports as a factor impacting on the rate of follow-up to recommendations, and - 
as  regards  the  follow-up  to  financial  recommendations  -  also  identified  discrepancies  in 
assessing the prejudice to the EU budget by OLAF and by the IBOAs.  

the  most 

identified  as  regards 

important  shortcoming 

to 
However, 
recommendations  relates  to  the  rules  on  the  admissibility  of  OLAF-collected  evidence  in 
national  judicial  proceedings.  The  Regulation  provides  that  OLAF  reports  constitute 
admissible evidence in such proceedings in the same way and under the same conditions as 
administrative  reports  drawn  up  by  national  administrative  inspectors.  The  evaluation 
suggests that in some Member States this rule does not sufficiently ensure the effectiveness of 
OLAF’s activities.  

the  follow-up 

The  inclusion  of  a  new  provision  on  procedural  guarantees  introduced  in  2013  was 
generally  recognised  during  the  evaluation  as  an  improvement  for  protecting  the  rights  of 
individuals subject to an OLAF investigation. The legality review function introduced by the 
Regulation and the new internal complaint procedure have further strengthened procedural 
guarantees of individuals subject to investigation. Whilst a number of consulted stakeholders 
raised concerns about the added value of the new provisions, others argued that the balance 
between OLAF powers and procedural rights is appropriate, and yet again others called for a 
reinforcement of the procedural rights. Overall, the evaluation does not provide evidence that 
the procedural guarantees in the Regulation are insufficient in the context of OLAF's current 
investigative  powers  and  tools.  As  regards  the  Regulation’s  provisions on  supervision  and 
control,  the  evaluation  suggests  that  divergent  views  and  practices  with  regard  to  these 
provisions, in particular of the Supervisory Committee's role and mandate, and of its access 
to  case-related  information  held  by  OLAF,  impacted  the  work  of  the  Committee  and  its 
cooperation with OLAF.   

The  evaluation  has  also  identified  several  issues  from  the  perspective  of  the  internal  and 
external coherence of the Regulation.  

(1) The Regulation provides a legal basis for OLAF to provide the Member States with 
assistance  in  organising  close  and  regular  cooperation  between  their  competent 
authorities to coordinate their action  for the protection  of the EU financial interests. 
This is a key element of OLAF’s mandate to support cross-border cooperation among 
the Member States. However, the Regulation does not contain detailed provisions on 
the  modalities  of  coordination  or  the  procedures  applicable  in  these  so-called 
‘coordination cases’. This  results in  a lack of legal certainty  for OLAF and  for  the 
Member States that rely on OLAF’s assistance. This is particularly limiting in areas 
(such as, for example, structural funds) where no other acts of EU law provide for a 
supporting and coordinating role for OLAF. In those areas where such provisions do 

4 

 
 
exist (for instance, in the area of customs and intellectual property9), the relationship 
between  Regulation  883/2013  and  these  other  legal  acts  can  lead  to  practical 
difficulties of application. 

(2) Regulation 883/2013 applies in conjunction with other acts of EU law, on which the 
effective  exercise  of  OLAF’s  mandate  depends.  Regulations  2185/96  and  2988/95, 
on  which  one  of  OLAF’s  main  investigative  tools  –  the  on-the-spot  checks  and 
inspections  –  is  based,  predate  the  adoption  of  Regulation  883/2013  and  its 
predecessors  in  1999.  The  evaluation  has  identified  certain  inconsistencies  between 
these  closely  linked  legal  acts,  which  in  some  cases  may  lead  to  uncertainty  and 
divergent interpretations. 

Finally,  the  staff  working  document  attached  to  this  report  and  the  report  of  the  external 
contractor  identify  a  number  of  provisions  in  the  Regulation  which  could  benefit  from 
clarification  or  simplification  in  the  Regulation  or  from  improved  application  through 
implementation  measures.  Some  of  these  are  referred  in  section  5.3  below  as  particularly 
deserving attention. 

Possible ways forward as regards the follow-up to the evaluation are spelled out in section 5. 
They should rely, on the one hand, on the experience with the application of the Regulation, 
assessed  by  the  evaluation.  On  the  other  hand,  they  should  also  consider  the  future 
establishment of the EPPO which will substantially reinforce and change the mechanisms for 
the protection of the EU’s financial interests at EU level.  

4  The creation of the European Public Prosecutor's Office and its impact on OLAF’s 

mandate and investigations 

The  establishment  of  the  EPPO  is  one  of  the  Commission's  key  priorities  in  the  area  of 
criminal justice and part of the overall strategy to combat fraud against the EU budget. At the 
Justice  and  Home  Affairs  Council  of  8  June  2017,  20  Member  States  reached  a  general 
approach  on the Regulation establishing  the EPPO under enhanced cooperation. The EPPO 
will  be  the  first  EU  body  equipped  with  the  power  to  prosecute  crimes  affecting  the  EU 
budget,  as  defined  in  the  PIF  Directive,  such  as  fraud,  corruption  or  serious  cross-border 
VAT  fraud.  It  is  expected  to  bring  a  more  consistent  and  effective  prosecution  policy  for 
crimes affecting the EU budget, leading to a greater number of prosecutions, convictions and 
a  higher  level  of  recovery  of  fraudulently  lost  Union  funds.  It  will  also  have  a  potential  to 
address  some  of  the  shortcomings  identified  in  the  evaluation  as  far  as  the  participating 
Member States are concerned.  

The  Commission  has  already  highlighted  in  the  past  the  need  to  reinforce  the  fight  against 
fraud  affecting  the  Union  budget  through  an  integrated  policy  of  criminal  and  of 
administrative  investigations10. This  approach remains valid today. With the creation of the 

9 Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative 
authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct 
application of the law on customs and agricultural matters, OJ L 82, 22.3.1997, pp. 1–16, as last amended by 
Regulation (EU) 2015/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015, and 
Regulation (EU) No 608/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 concerning 
customs enforcement of intellectual property rights and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003, OJ L 
181, 29.6.2013, pp. 15–34. 
10 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 'On the protection of the financial interests of the 
European Union by criminal law and by administrative investigations - An integrated policy to safeguard 
taxpayers' money', COM(2011) 293 final of 26.5.2011. 

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EPPO,  the  Union  will  dispose  of  bodies  able  to  conduct  both  types  of  investigations 
strengthening the overall possibilities for action at EU level, to complement and reinforce the 
action taken by the Member States within their own responsibility to protect the EU budget. 

Once the EPPO is established, OLAF’s overall mandate will not change, but its operation will 
need to adapt in several ways to the existence of the EPPO.  

OLAF will remain competent for the administrative investigation of suspected fraudulent and 
non-fraudulent irregularities within the Union IBOAs and in all Member States, with a view 
to  issuing  recommendations  to  launch  judicial,  disciplinary,  financial  or  administrative 
procedures.  

In  the  area  of  suspected  fraud,  the  EPPO  and  OLAF  will  be  called  to  cooperate  closely. 
Today,  when  an  OLAF  investigation  points  to  the  possible existence  of  a  criminal  offence, 
OLAF cooperates with the national prosecution and judicial authorities. With the creation for 
the  first  time  of  an  EU-level  body  for  criminal  investigations  and  prosecutions,  strong 
synergies need to be created between the EPPO and OLAF in order to allow both to perform 
their tasks in the most efficient and productive manner, and to give cases of suspected fraud 
in the whole EU a swift and effective response. 

In  this  context,  adaptations  to  the  framework  for  OLAF  investigations  will  have  to  be 
considered  to  avoid  any  risk  of  duplication  of  investigations  into  the  same  facts,  and  to 
provide for the necessary mechanisms for OLAF to perform its role of operational support.  

In various cases, the activities of OLAF and the EPPO will not need to be coordinated due to 
their  distinct  mandates,  with  the  EPPO  conducting  criminal  investigations  and  OLAF 
administrative investigations focusing on financial, disciplinary and administrative follow-up. 
OLAF  will  also  continue  its  investigations  in  the  Member  States  not  participating  in  the 
EPPO at this stage. In these Member States, the national authorities as well as OLAF should 
contribute to creating the conditions to ensure an effective and equivalent level of protection 
of the Union’s financial interests in the whole EU. The establishment of the EPPO should in 
no  way  lead  to  an  ineffective  protection  of  the  budget  in  Member  States  which  do  not 
participate in the EPPO. 

5. The way forward 

Regulation  883/2013  has  allowed  OLAF  to  continue  delivering  concrete  results  in  the 
protection of the EU budget. The 2013 changes have brought clear improvements, as regards 
the conduct of investigations, cooperation with partners and the rights of persons concerned. 
At  the  same  time,  the  evaluation  has  highlighted  some  shortcomings  which  impact  on  the 
effectiveness and efficiency of investigations. Moreover, the creation of the EPPO will be a 
game-changer  and  call  for  swift  adaptations  in  the  operation  of  OLAF,  to  ensure  synergies 
and the efficient use of resources at EU level.  

In response to this, the Commission will prepare an assessment in line with Better Regulation 
principles  which  may  lead  to  a  proposal  for  the  amendment  of  Regulation  883/2013  in  the 
first  half  of  2018,  which  should  be  in  force  by  the  time  the  EPPO  becomes  operational11, 
ensuring a seamless transition into the new institutional framework. This assessment will also 
take  into  account  the  opinion  of  the  Supervisory  Committee  of  OLAF  accompanying  this 
report. 

11 Article 120(2) of the draft EPPO Regulation. The EPPO will assume its investigative and prosecutorial 
competences at a date determined by a Commission decision, and not earlier than three years after the entry into 
force of the EPPO Regulation. 

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The assessment will primarily consider changes which would respond to the establishment of 
the  EPPO  on  the  role  and  operation  of  OLAF.  It  could  also  include  possible  additional 
targeted  changes,  where  necessary,  based  on  the  most  unambiguous  findings  of  the 
evaluation.  These  would  strengthen  the  framework  for  OLAF  investigations  to  maintain  a 
strong and fully-functioning OLAF that complements the EPPO's criminal law approach with 
administrative investigations.  

The assessment, conducted in line with Better Regulation principles, to prepare the potential 
2018 proposal, and other measures to follow-up to the evaluation, will particularly cover the 
following areas. 

5.1 Adaptation to the establishment of the EPPO 

The draft EPPO Regulation already lays down the main principles for the future relationship 
between  the  EPPO  and  OLAF,  requiring  that  both  bodies  act  in  a  complementary  way  to 
ensure  that  all  available  means  are  used  to  protect  the  Union's  financial  interests12.  The 
assessment  will  consider  how  these  could  be  mirrored  in  Regulation  883/2013  with  the 
introduction  of  concrete  procedures  for  cooperation,  and  complemented  by  working 
arrangements. 

One  aspect  which  could  be  addressed  regards  the  handling  by  OLAF  of  incoming 
information  and  the  swift  transmission  of  information  to  the  EPPO  of  any  criminal 
conduct in respect to which the latter may exercise competence13. Given its mandate, OLAF 
will be an important source of incoming information for the EPPO. Moreover regarding the 
case selection in OLAF, the relevant provisions should avoid simultaneous investigations by 
OLAF and the EPPO, with OLAF refraining from conducting an administrative investigation 
as soon as the EPPO is carrying out a criminal investigation into the same facts14. 

Furthermore, the handling by OLAF of cases referred to it by the EPPO for administrative 
follow-up15 should also be analysed. 

Lastly,  the  assessment  will  look  at  ways  to  give  effect  to  the  provision  in  the  draft  EPPO 
Regulation enabling the EPPO to request operational support from OLAF16. This might 
include  examination  of  options  for  procedures  for  the  handling  of  the  requests,  as  well  as 
procedures which OLAF should follow in  carrying out  the tasks in  order to  ensure that the 
results of the activity may be used by EPPO in its investigations and for the subsequent use of 
any evidence.  

5.2 Enhancing the effectiveness of OLAF’s investigative function 

The Commission will also examine possible solutions to  certain  shortcomings  identified by 
the evaluation. The focus should be on targeted changes aimed at improving the effectiveness 
of investigations. The following issues will be considered in particular in the assessment. 

Possible solutions to increase the coherent application of the investigative tools available to 
OLAF across the Member States and IBOAs will be examined, in order to ensure a consistent 
level  of  protection  across  the  Union.  The  current  references  to  national  law  should  be 
considered in this light, as well as the provisions on internal investigations.  

12 Article 101(1) of the draft EPPO Regulation. 
13 Article 24(1) of the draft EPPO Regulation. 
14 Article 101(2) of the draft EPPO Regulation. 
15 Articles 39(4) and 101(4) of draft EPPO Regulation.  
16 Article 101(3) of draft EPPO Regulation. 

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Possible changes to the rules on the admissibility of OLAF reports as evidence in judicial 
proceedings in the Member States should be considered, in order to ensure their effectiveness 
and avoid inefficiencies resulting from the duplication of investigations. 

The  Commission  will  also  assess  ways  in  which  to  reinforce  the  enforcement  of  OLAF’s 
existing  powers.  Linked  to  this,  a  revision  of  the  duties  to  cooperate  enshrined  in  the 
Regulation  could  be  analysed  in  order  to  ensure  a  coherent  and  effective  framework  at  the 
various stages in an investigation. 

Furthermore, the assessment will consider clarification of OLAF’s mandate and investigative 
tools  in  the  area  of  VAT,  as  well  as  the  need  for  and  possibility  of  better  access  to  bank 
account information.  

Finally, new provisions regulating the conduct of coordination cases could be assessed to fill 
the current gap in the Regulation. 

5.3 Other evaluation findings 

In addition to those mentioned above, the evaluation identified a number of issues that could 
benefit  from  further  clarification  or  simplification  in  the  Regulation,  or  which  could  be 
addressed either by legislative measures or by improved application of the Regulation.  

In  particular,  the  Commission  will  consider  how  to  better  address  practical  difficulties 
resulting from diverging views on the provisions on the role and mandate of the Supervisory 
Committee. In this regard, the Commission recommends that working arrangements between 
OLAF and its Supervisory Committee are concluded swiftly.  

Possible  areas  of  further  clarification  of  the  Regulation  identified  in  the  evaluation  include 
the  provisions  on  internal  investigations  (in  particular  the  inspection  of  premises),  digital 
forensic  operations  and  the  transmission  of  information  to  third  countries  and 
international organisations. Targeted changes could also address perceived inconsistencies 
and further align the rules applicable to internal and external investigations (where divergent 
rules are not justified). 

The  Commission  may  also  examine  measures  to  ensure  closer  cooperation  between  OLAF 
and IBOAs concerning the possible early transmission of information by OLAF where the 
adoption  of  precautionary  measures  might  be  necessary,  as  well  as  to  reduce  discrepancies 
with regard to the follow-up to financial recommendations. 

The  Commission  recommends  that  OLAF  take  internal  measures  to  ensure  the  consistent 
quality  of  final  reports  and  recommendations,  and  consider  whether  there  is  a  need  to 
revise the Guidelines on Investigation Procedures, to address any possible inconsistencies 
with the Regulation. 

5.4 Outlook 

At  a  later  stage,  a  proposal  potentially  presented  in  2018 could  be  followed  by  a more  far-
reaching  process  to  modernise  the  framework  for  OLAF  investigations,  which  in  its  core 
aspects  dates  from  the  creation  of  OLAF  in  1999  (and  even  before).  This  would  be  the 
opportunity to consider more fundamental changes in the context of 21st century fraud trends 
and  should  take  account  of  the  experience  gained  in  the  cooperation  between  EPPO  and 
OLAF. It would also  allow focusing on other aspects of the legal  framework where further 
reflection and discussion may be needed. This might include the institutional governance of 
OLAF  and  the  controls  on  its  activity.  The  evaluation  has  not  shown  a  clear  need  to 
substantially revise the relevant provisions of the Regulation at this stage. It should also be 

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noted  that  the  Commission  proposal  for  the  establishment  of  a  controller  of  procedural 
guarantees17  is  still  pending,  and  has  not  been  taken  forward  by  the  co-legislator.  Larger 
issues  relating  to  the  overall  coherence  of  the  EU  anti-fraud  legal  framework  beyond 
Regulation 883/2013, as revealed by the evaluation, could also be part of this second step in 
the possible revision of the legal framework. 

17 COM(2014) 340 final. 

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